The War of the Spanish Succession 1701-1714 9781781590317

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the war of the spanish succession 1701–1714

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the war of the spanish succession 1701–1714 James falkner

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First published in Great Britain in 2015 by PEN & SWORD MILITARY an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd 47 Church Street Barnsley South Yorkshire S70 2AS Copyright © James Falkner, 2015 ISBN 978 1 78159 031 7 The right of James Falkner to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Typeset in Ehrhardt by Chic Graphics Printed and bound in England by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Pen & Sword Books Ltd incorporates the imprints of Pen & Sword Archaeology, Atlas, Aviation, Battleground, Discovery, Family History, History, Maritime, Military, Naval, Politics, Railways, Select, Social History, Transport, True Crime, Claymore Press, Frontline Books, Leo Cooper, Praetorian Press, Remember When, Seaforth Publishing and Wharncliffe. For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles please contact PEN & SWORD BOOKS LIMITED 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.pen-and-sword.co.uk

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Contents List of Maps......................................................................................vi List of Illustrations ..........................................................................vii Introduction ....................................................................................viii The Line of Succession to the Throne of Spain ....................................xii Chronology: The Principal Events of the War of the Spanish Succession ....................................................................................xiii Chapter 1. This is the King of Spain ................................................1 Chapter 2. The Grand Alliance........................................................21 Chapter 3. The French Offensive ....................................................31 Chapter 4. Campaigning in the Low Countries ................................44 Chapter 5. Adventures in Southern Germany ..................................60 Chapter 6. Enter the Duke of Berwick ............................................76 Chapter 7. Year of Miracles ..........................................................104 Chapter 8. Over the Seas to Spain..................................................129 Chapter 9. Vexatious Distractions ..................................................143 Chapter 10. France at Bay ..............................................................159 Chapter 11. Unattainable Peace ......................................................172 Chapter 12. An End to a Weary Journey ........................................194 Chapter 13. A Balance of Power ....................................................212 Appendix 1: The Main Terms of the 1702 Treaty of Grand Alliance ......................................................................218 Appendix 2: The Main Terms of the Treaties of Utrecht, Baden and Rastadt, and Madrid (1713–15) ............................219 Appendix 3: Key Military Figures in the War of the Spanish Succession ....................................................................221 Notes..............................................................................................233 Bibliography ..................................................................................249 Index ............................................................................................253

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List of Maps Map 1: Spain in the early eighteenth century...................................xx Map 2: The Netherlands in the late seventeenth century..................20 Map 3: The Duke of Marlborough’s famous march to the Danube in 1704. ..................................................................62 Map 4: France in the early eighteenth century................................105 Map 5: Prince Eugene’s march to relieve Turin, May–September 1706...................................................................................122 Map 6: The march by Prince Eugene and Victor-Amadeus of Savoy to attack Toulon, July 1707. ....................................151

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List of Illustrations Louis XIV, King of France. The Sun King. William of Orange, King William III of England. Emperor Leopold of Austria. King Carlos II of Spain. His death brought on the war. Phillipe, Duc D’Anjou, the Bourbon claimant to the throne of Spain. Archduke Charles of Austria, the Habsburg claimant. Victor-Amadeus II of Savoy. Queen Anne of Great Britain. Louis-Guillaume, Margrave of Baden. Maximillien-Emmanuel von Wittelsbach, Elector of Bavaria. George, Elector of Hanover and later King George I of Great Britain. The famous comrades-in-arms: Prince Eugene of Savoy and the Duke of Marlborough. Henry of Nassau, Count Overkirk. James, Earl Stanhope. Nicolas de Catinat, Marshal of France. Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy. Claude-Louis-Hector, Duc de Villars, Marshal of France. James Fitzjames, Duke of Berwick, Marshal of France. A contemporary depiction of the allied siege of Barcelona in September 1705. The layout of a siege battery, c.1710. Austrian soldiers, c.1700. The siege of Tournai, 1709, just before the battle of Malplaquet. The bitterly contested fighting in the woods at Malplaquet, 11 September 1709.

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Introduction ‘Isolated and remote. A country divided within itself . . . Fragmented, disparate, a complex of different races, languages and civilizations.’1

Whatever natural disadvantages Spain may have had to endure at the close of the seventeenth century, it was the object of much envy in European capitals and, while weakened by a lack of strong central government, was still potentially a force to be reckoned with. In particular the world-wide Spanish Empire, and the rich trading opportunities that went with it, was a prize of huge value that attracted the ill-concealed ambitions of other states, none of whom would view the advancement of the others with complacency. As a consequence, for thirty years or more one of the most burning issues that was discussed in council chambers across western Europe had been the matter of – ‘What was to be done about Spain’ – more particularly ‘what was to be done if the king in Madrid died having no legitimate heir’. The awkward question would have to be answered once the ailing King Carlos II went to his grave; there was no obvious immediate successor, for that invalid and enfeebled monarch had no children or younger brother or sister, and yet the vast and immensely wealthy Spanish Empire, stretching from the Iberian peninsula across wide swathes of the Mediterranean and Italy, the Low Countries, enclaves in North Africa, across the high seas to the Americas, and even the far-off Philippines, plainly had to have a firm ruler. Yet, with so much at stake, who was that ruler to be? In the second half of the 17th Century and the early decades of the 18th Century the most important single theme in European politics was the rivalry between the two hegemonal powers of Austria and France. Among the smaller states the neighbours of France inclined to Austria, and those of the Austrians to France.2 France and Austria had arguably good hereditary claims for their

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Introduction ix princes – that was evident – but there were others, most notably the Duke of Savoy on the one hand, and that of the house of Wittelsbach, the Electors of Bavaria, on the other. The prolific descendants of King Philip II of Spain had sown a devil’s harvest for a later generation, but these lesser claimants could hardly expect to make progress unless it was with the connivance and blessing of one or other, or perhaps a little optimistically of both, of the main contenders. Such an approach was not out of the question, for it would suit everyone to avoid outright war over the issue, as the closing decade of the seventeenth century had already been one of ruinously expensive conflict for western Europe. The question over the succession was complex, and made more so because the aims and ambitions of the contenders, whether large or small, were hedged about by the needs and aspirations of their near neighbours, states that had also every reason to avoid war as long as their interests could be assured. Such assurances would be sought, over such diverse matters as the Protestant succession to the throne in London, the security of the southern border of Holland against any fresh French attack, and opportunities for English and Dutch merchants of the ‘Maritime Powers’ to trade in the wide Spanish empire, markets hitherto closed to them; guarantees needed to be given, or else they might have to be enforced.3 When matters came to a head in the late autumn of 1700, at first it seemed that King Louis XIV of France had got what he wanted without fighting, and hoped to retain the same without provoking a war. However, largely due to the king’s untypical clumsy mistakes, it proved impossible to avoid war – a conflict that no-one sought but perhaps, given the complexity of the principal question of the succession to the throne in Madrid, it was not to be avoided. Once embarked upon, the conflict itself was on an almost unprecedented scale, covering wide regions of western and northwestern Europe, southern Germany, the Balearic islands of the Mediterranean, much of Italy, briefly an incursion into Scotland, the West Indies, battle-fleet naval actions and wide-scale privateering on the high seas, and even an attack on French-held parts of Canada. In Scandinavia, the Great Northern War would have its effect, at one distant but briefly dangerous remove, and rebellion against imperial rule in Hungary would sap the efforts of the Austrians to press home their claim. A war no one sought but which had to be – sometimes these

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x The War of the Spanish Succession matters had to be put to the crucial test, and so it proved, but it is far easier to start a war than to stop one. Great issues, both dynastic and national, were at stake but there was little apparent animosity between the belligerents, and despite the cruelties inevitably involved in warfare, barbarism was almost entirely absent from the conflict; prisoners of war were generally well treated (the exceptions at places like Calcinato in early 1706, and Brihuega four years later, were so uncommon as to attract wide comment and criticism). Commanding generals were in many cases well acquainted with their opponents, often listing them as friends and even, as with the Duke of Marlborough and the Duke of Berwick, close relations. The misfortunes of the common people who endured campaigning armies crossing their lands hardly need stating for such things, sadly, must be in warfare. Still, there was little of a fervent or religious nature about the conduct of the war, with all the attendant horrors common in such conflicts, even though the presence of large numbers of Protestant soldiers in staunchly Catholic Spain did the allied cause no good, and the assurance of a Protestant succession to the throne in London was one of the main planks of the Grand Alliance. The allies ranged against Louis XIV and his grandson did attempt to foment rebellion amongst the Protestants in southern France, but this unhelpful distraction for the king was limited, while his own support for the largely Protestant rebels in Hungary hampered the efforts of Catholic Vienna in the war. The rebellion in the Cevennes region was suppressed with some rigour, as were those Catalans who declared for the Habsburg claimant, but that was the way that rebels were dealt with, then and since. In fact, what each participant sought could have been achieved with judicious negotiation and an element of compromise, and this was proved to be so with the terms belatedly agreed in 1713. In particular, after the lavish expenditure in treasure, effort and blood, the end result would see the Spanish people, whose opinion in the matter had never been sought, on the whole quite content with a king who, contrary to expectation, had proved himself to be worthy of his calling and earned their trust and respect, and perhaps also their love. By a strange irony, when peace came at last, and given a dispassionate judgement, it appeared that everyone had achieved what they originally sought, but no-one was able to say so.

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Introduction xi Dating, Grammar and Nomenclature In the early eighteenth century the Julian Calendar was in use in the British Isles, while on the Continent the newer Gregorian Calendar was in use. From 1700 onwards the new system (N.S.) was eleven days ahead of the old system (O.S.). So, the declaration of war by the Grand Alliance on France is sometimes given as being made on 4 May 1702 in London, but this was regarded as being on 15 May in The Hague and Vienna. As most of the events described in this book take place in mainland Europe, (N.S.) has been used throughout for dating, unless otherwise stated. The often idiosyncratic and inconsistent grammar and spelling in many of the contemporary accounts quoted in this book have been corrected for greater clarity, sensitively it is hoped, with additional explanatory comments, where these seem to be appropriate, inserted in square brackets. Of the two active claimants for the throne of Spain, Philippe Duc d’Anjou and Archduke Charles, both were proclaimed as king, but only the young French prince made good his claim, after many years of war. Therefore I have referred to the Austrian Charles as Archduke as throughout, until he eventually ascended the imperial throne in Vienna, while according to Philippe the regal title eventually secured as King of Spain.

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The Line of Succession to the Throne of Spain. (The two main contenders only)*1

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Chronology The Principal Events of the War of the Spanish Succession

1700 7 October 1 November 8 November 16 November

4 December 1701 6 February 18 February April 20 May 18 June 9 July 1 September 7 September

King Carlos II of Spain signs a new will, naming Philippe, Duc d’Anjou, as his successor Death of Carlos II in Madrid News of the late king’s will reaches the French court Louis XIV recognises his second grandson as Philip V of Spain Emperor Leopold I recognises the Elector of Brandenburg as King in Prussia Philip V leaves Versailles for Madrid

French troops begin to occupy the Barrier Towns in the Spanish Netherlands Philip V enters Madrid King William III, and the Dutch States-General, recognise Philip V as king of Spain Prince Eugene of Savoy takes command of imperial troops in northern Italy King Pedro II of Portugal concludes treaty with France and Spain Prince Eugene forces Marshal Catinat’s position at Carpi Eugene defeats the French and Savoyards at the battle of Chiari Treaty of Grand Alliance agreed between Austria, Holland and England

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xiv The War of the Spanish Succession 11 September 16 September

1702 31 January 18 March 12 May 15 May 1 July 18 August 26 August 1 September September 26 September 22 October 26 October December 1703 4 March 9 May 15 May 16 May 30 June 26 August 13 September 19 September 25 October 15 November 27 December

Philip V marries Marie-Louise of Savoy Death of exiled James II: Louis XIV acknowledges James Stuart as King of England

French defeat at Cremona, Marshal Villeroi captured Death of King William III. Queen Anne succeeds to the throne in London Negotiations open to bring Portugal into the Grand Alliance Grand Alliance declares war on France and her allies Marlborough assumes command of the AngloDutch army Benbow’s naval action against Ducasse off Santa Maria Allied landings near to Cadiz French defeated at battle of Chiari Electors of Bavaria and Liège ally themselves to France Allied expedition to take Cadiz abandoned Spanish treasure fleet captured or sunk in Vigo Bay Allies capture Liège Anglo-Dutch treaty with Portugal agreed.

Imperial army defeated at battle of Heyzempirne French capture Kehl Allies capture Bonn Anglo-Dutch-Portuguese treaty signed Dutch defeated at Eckeren near Antwerp Allies take Huy Archduke Charles of Austria proclaimed as King Carlos III of Spain Austrian army under Count Styrum defeated at Höchstädt Duke of Savoy declares for the Grand Alliance French victory at battle of Speyerbach French re-take Landau Portugal joins the Grand Alliance

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Chronology xv

1704 7 March May 19 May 30 May 2 July 4 August 11 August 13 August 24 August 7 October 29 October 11 November 15 November 28 November 20 December 1705 20 March 5 May

Archduke Charles arrives in Lisbon Allied advance from Portugal into Spain Marlborough begins march up the Rhine from Holland Allied attempt to take Barcelona fails The battle of the Schellenberg on the Danube Gibraltar captured by Anglo-Dutch forces Margrave of Baden begins siege of Ingolstadt Franco-Bavarian army defeated at Blenheim Naval battle off Málaga Inconclusive battle on the Agueda river in Spain Marlborough occupies Trier on the Moselle river Franco-Spanish attempt to recapture Gibraltar begins Admiral Leake relieves Gibraltar Allies capture Landau Allies take Trarbach

December

Second relief of Gibraltar by Leake Death of Emperor Leopold I of Austria. Emperor Joseph I succeeds his father French capture Huy Allies re-take Huy French defeated in battle at Elixheim Abortive allied attempt to attack the French at the Yssche stream Allied forces land in eastern Spain Allies capture Leau Barcelona captured by allies. Carlos III proclaimed. Allies occupy Valencia

1706 6 January 3 April

French capture Nice French besiege Barcelona

10 June 11 July 18 July 18 August 22 August 6 September 14 October

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xvi The War of the Spanish Succession 22 May 23 May 28 May 17 June 23 June 27 June 9 July 4 August 22 August 7 September 8 September 13 September 24 September 11 November 1707 1 January 13 February 25 April 22 May

July 22 August 4 October 14 November 1708 16 April 30 April May 5 July 7 July 11 July

Barcelona relieved of French siege by a naval squadron French defeated at battle of Ramillies French abandon Brussels Antwerp taken by allies Allies occupy Cartagena Anglo-Portuguese army enters Madrid Ostend captured by allies. Peace proposal tentatively made by Louis XIV Allies evacuate Madrid Menin captured by allies French defeated at the battle of Turin Alicante captured by allies Majorca and Ibiza occupied by Anglo-Dutch forces Charles XII of Sweden invades Saxony Franco-Spanish forces re-take Cartagena

King Pedro II of Portugal dies, succeeded by John V France and Austria agree to de-militarise northern Italy Allies defeated at Almanza in Spain Lines of Stollhofen on the Rhine stormed by the French. Marshal Villars raids southern Germany Imperial troops occupy Naples Allied attempt to take Toulon fails Ciudad Rodrigo captured from Portuguese Lerida captured by French and Spanish forces

Allies surrender Alicante Imperial troops under von Starhemberg arrive in Catalonia Jacobite invasion of Scotland fails French capture Bruges French seize Ghent French defeated at the battle of Oudenarde

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Chronology xvii August 11 August 29 August August– December 28 September 18 November 9 December 1709 2 January February 9 April 7 May May July 3 September 11 September 20 October 29 October 1710 25 June 27 July 20 August 28 August September 29 September 8 November 9 December

Confidential peace negotiations opened Sardinia occupied by the allies Minorca captured by the allies Allied siege of Lille French defeat at battle of Wynendael Denia capitulates to French forces Citadel of Lille captured by allies

Allies recapture Ghent and Bruges Charles XII attacks Russia Louis XIV declares intention to remove troops from Spain Allies defeated at battle of Caya/Val Gudina in Portugal Louis XIV agrees allied terms for peace, apart from one clause Charles XII defeated at Poltava in Russia Tournai captured by allies Battle of Malplaquet Mons taken by the allies First Anglo-Dutch Barrier Treaty agreed

10 December

Allies capture Douai Allied victory at battle of Almenara Allied victory at battle of Saragossa Bethune captured by the allies Carlos III enters Madrid Allies capture St Venant Aire taken by the allies British army defeated at Brihuega. Philip V re-enters Madrid Franco-Spanish success at battle of Villaviciosa

1711 25 January

Gerona captured by Franco-Spanish forces

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xviii The War of the Spanish Succession 14 April 17 April 7 August 14 September 22 September 8 October

Death of the Dauphin of France Death of Emperor Joseph, succeeded by his brother Archduke Charles (Carlos III/Charles VI) Lines of Non Plus Ultra breached by Marlborough Capture of Bouchain by the allies Archduke Charles leaves Barcelona – elected as Emperor Charles VI Preliminary Articles for Peace agreed between France and Great Britain

31 December (O.S.)

Marlborough dismissed by Queen Anne

1712 12 January 8 February 21 May 4 July 16 July 24 July 30 July 2 August 8 September 2 October 3 October 19 October 2 November 3 November

Congress for a peace opened at Utrecht Death of the Duc de Bourgogne Restraining Orders issued to the Duke of Ormonde Le Quesnoy captured by the allies British troops removed from active operations Allied troops defeated at Denain by the French French capture Marchiennes Allies fail to capture Landrecies French re-capture Douai Hostilities suspended in Spain Le Quesnoy re-taken by the French French re-capture Bouchain Philip V renounces any claim to the French throne Hostilities suspended in Portugal

1713 30 January 11 April May 26 June 9 July 13 July

Second Anglo-Dutch Barrier Treaty agreed Treaty of Utrecht agreed between France, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia and Savoy French re-capture Landau Holland concludes Treaty of Utrecht Barcelona declares support for King Carlos III Anglo-Spanish Treaty agreed

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Chronology xix 1714 6 March 26 June 1 August 18 September

1715 6 February 1 September 15 November

Treaty of Rastadt agreed between France and Austria Treaty agreed between Holland and Spain Death of Queen Anne, accession of King George I Treaty of Baden agreed between France and the Austrian Empire. Barcelona taken by Franco-Spanish forces under Berwick

Treaty agreed between Spain and Portugal Death of Louis XIV, succeeded by his greatgrandson Louis XV (as a minor) Barrier Treaty agreed between Holland, France and Austria

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Map 1: Spain in the early eighteenth century.

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Chapter 1

This is the King of Spain ‘He lingered till November 1700.’1

In November 1659, long before the ill-health of an invalid king in Madrid became the matter for international concern, peace had come to the warring nations of France and Spain with the conclusion of the Treaty of the Pyrenees; this welcome event coincided with an agreement for the marriage of the young French King, Louis XIV, and the Spanish Infanta Maria-Theresa, the eldest daughter of King Philip IV. The details of both the treaty and the marriage were confirmed and ratified at Toulouse and Madrid at the end of the same month. As a part of the marriage settlement. Maria-Theresa renounced any claim she or any children she bore might have to succeed to the Spanish throne, receiving in recognition of this renunciation a dowry set at the fabulous sum of 500,000 gold crowns, all to be paid within eighteen months of the date of the marriage. The royal couple were married on 9 June 1660, at Bayonne close to the Franco-Spanish border. Within twelve months, Louis XIV was sounding opinion in Madrid whether the renunciation of the succession to the throne was valid, and in particular that any child or grandchild of Maria-Theresa might, despite the explicit terms of the marriage settlement, be eligible. Philip IV proved incapable of paying the huge dowry for his daughter, which might well have been expected, and this gave Louis XIV the excuse he needed to embark on a course of territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Spain. It also could be argued, just, that the failure to pay the money made the renunciations in the marriage settlement ineligible, but this was a weak and highly debateable point, as the renunciations had not been dependent upon actual payment of the huge dowry. The seeds of future trouble had, however, been sown. An heir to the Spanish throne was born to Philip IV and his

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2 The War of the Spanish Succession Austrian-born second wife Marie-Ann, on 6 November 1661, and was named Carlos, a sickly and weak child from the start who was not expected to live all that long. Louis XIV, meanwhile, embarked on a war to seize Spanish territory in the Low Countries, claiming his wife’s ‘rights’ and unpaid dowry in the matter as rather spurious justification for his aggression. The king also concluded a confidential treaty with Emperor Leopold I of Austria who, like Louis XIV, was a grandson of Philip III of Spain. They would divide the Spanish inheritance and empire should, as widely anticipated, the young Spanish king, who had succeeded his father in 1665 at the tender age of four, not live long or be survived by an heir of his own. In effect, the treaty terms allowed for the emperor to succeed to the Spanish throne, together with the Spanish-held territories in Italy and the Indies, while Louis XIV would gain the southern Netherlands for France. In this way, the French king had no fear of renewed Habsburg encirclement such as had been achieved by Emperor Charles V many years before; he would, however, have gained extensive new territories in Flanders, Brabant, Guelders and Luxembourg. Understandably, Spanish opinion in the matter was not taken into account, and the whole arrangement was spoiled when Carlos II lived on much longer than had been thought likely. Diplomatic tensions, and intermittent wars waged by Louis XIV in order to expand his territories on the north-eastern borders of France, complicated the scene, and in growing concern the emperor sought the aid of England and Holland, the Maritime Powers as they were known, to counterbalance growing French power and influence. William of Orange, the Dutch Stadtholder, replaced James II as King of England in 1688, becoming by Act of Parliament William III and ruling with his wife Mary, the elder daughter of the exiled king. The following year, England and Holland agreed to guarantee that Emperor Leopold should succeed Carlos II if he had no heir. The emperor’s position was strengthened by the marriage in that same year of his sister-in-law, Maria Ana of Neuburg, to the feeble Spanish king, but ruinously expensive war came to western Europe in 1689, which trundled aimlessly on and was only brought to a tired end with the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. In the process, an apparently neat solution to the tricky problem of the succession had been devised by Louis XIV and his old opponent, William III, without, it should be said once again, consulting the Spanish nobility or their people on a matter of

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This is the King of Spain 3 such importance to them. A Partition Treaty, one element of the negotiations to bring an end to the Nine Years War, was agreed between France, Holland and England in September 1698, and provided that the young son of the Elector of Bavaria, JosephFerdinand Wittelsbach, should succeed to the throne in Madrid once Carlos was in his grave. The electoral prince was the grandson of Emperor Leopold I, who would be expected to set aside his own claim and that of his immediate family, as would Louis XIV and his own son and three grandsons. Joseph-Ferdinand was, in effect, a neutral choice, being the grandson of Carlos II’s younger sister, Margareta-Theresa, who had been the first wife of Emperor Leopold. In this way, by putting Joseph-Ferdinand on the throne once it became vacant it was intended that neither Imperial Austria or France would gain too great an accretion of power. The French king’s eldest son, the Dauphin, born of Carlos II’s older half-sister Maria-Theresa, would receive Sicily, Naples and certain Italian territories, and Archduke Charles of Austria, the emperor’s younger son by his second wife, would get Luxembourg and the Milanese region in northern Italy, as compensation for any disappointed hopes they may have. England and Holland would have better trading rights in the wide Spanish Empire of the Indies; the French king wrote to the Comte de Tallard, his ambassador in London: I have examined with great attention all the problems that one could foresee either by suspending the negotiations with the King of England or concluding them. The first seems to me to be the greater [danger]. In breaking with that Prince we should indirectly decide to force him to enter relations with Bavaria, and the other princes of the Empire . . . it would be easy for him to draw out their ideas and treaties could be signed during his stay in Holland.2 Louis XIV wanted no more wars with powerful coalitions, the experience of the hard years between 1688 to 1697 had made him wary, and in any case his treasury would probably not bear renewed conflict. ‘When one begins a war’ he added ‘one does not know the finish.’ By this treaty of partition, judiciously arrived at but without reference to the Spanish king and nobility, England and Holland also hoped to avert

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4 The War of the Spanish Succession complications which could arise from whatever Carlos II might do about the inheritance. In this way, a new king acceptable to both Versailles and Vienna, and to the Maritime Powers, would be on the throne, and the Spanish Empire would be divided on terms which might in a favourable light be seen as being equitable between the rival parties. Emperor Leopold was ill at ease when he learned of what was intended, recalling his earlier agreement with William III, and believing that far too much was being given away without reference to him. Equally unhappy were the Spanish nobility, whose firm intent was that the empire should not be divided at all, certainly not at the wish of foreign rulers more concerned with their own interests than those of Spain. Accordingly, on 14 November 1698, Carlos II signed and declared a new will, leaving the throne to young Joseph-Ferdinand of Bavaria on his death, together with the Spanish Empire in its entirety. This declaration had a logic that defied argument and plainly had legitimacy, certainly more so than what had been proposed under the recently concluded Partition Treaty. A sensible and workable solution, it seemed, had been reached by the Spanish monarch without reference to the opinions of the other powers in western Europe. All might yet have been well, for despite the emperor’s ill-feeling over the issue it seemed unlikely that he could over-turn the will, either by negotiation of by force, and Austria, with many distractions in eastern Europe, would not go to war over the issue without the active participation of firm allies. Then fate intervened dramatically, and the young Bavarian prince, heir now to the vast Spanish Empire, suddenly caught smallpox while visiting the Spanish Netherlands where his father was governor-general, and died on 6 February 1699. Dark suspicions were raised at this unexpected and curious turn of events, perhaps so fortunate for Austrian hopes of gaining the throne in Madrid, but nothing could be proved, and there it was. A convenient solution to a thorny problem had now passed by, and the whole matter was again alive and would soon trouble Europe for another fifteen years. Once more Louis XIV and William III were active over the question, and a second Partition Treaty, agreed on 11 June 1699, named the young Archduke Charles of Austria, second son of the emperor, as heir to the throne, as long as Spain was never to be united with the

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This is the King of Spain 5 Empire. The Dauphin of France would receive Sicily, Naples and the Milanese as recompense for setting aside his own claim. Typically, Emperor Leopold, despite the glittering offer for his young son, was still reluctant to agree, concerned at such a growth in French power and influence in Italy, and he perversely refused to ratify the new treaty, England, France and Holland doing so alone on 25 March 1700, No amount of persuasion by England and Holland would move him, as his mind was set on gaining territories in Italy. ‘Our condition would be very wretched if we were to give France what she asks.’3 In this respect Leopold might be thought that he had played his hand high and that he lost equally high, for the terms were patently generous to Austria, which for the moment was not in conflict with the Ottoman Turks, and the prospect of war with France loomed as a result of his stubborn stand, but all that was yet to be seen with any clarity. The French king was alert to the danger, and he noted that an offer that had been made to his distant cousin Duke Victor-Amadeus II of Savoy, to transfer certain territories around Nice on the border with France and receive in their place the Duchy of Milan, had not been accepted. The duke could also advance a claim to the throne in Madrid based on his grandmother, the Spanish Infanta Catherina Michelle having been the daughter of King Philip II of Spain, and whose dowry was, just like that of Marie-Theresa, never paid. Victor-Amadeus appeared to be playing for time, that was his nature, and although the French offer had advantages for Savoy he was, like the emperor, perhaps aiming for higher stakes, ‘There is reason to believe,’ Louis XIV wrote, ‘that the Duke of Savoy, seeing himself the immediate successor to the Archduke [Charles] will lie up with the Emperor to obtain execution of the testament and the favour of the Emperor as soon as my grandchildren will have abandoned the new right that they could obtain from the testament.’4 A confidential clause in the treaty of partition allowed for the emperor to accept the provisions it contained no more than two months after the terms were agreed. Leopold did not take the opportunity to do so, and this clumsiness gave Louis XIV the chance, in the meantime, to accept the provisions of any new will in favour of his own son or grandson, without seeming to break his word over the treaty. Despite this legal nicety, Louis XIV in the meanwhile was certainly engaged in something of a double game, and his ambassador in Madrid, the

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6 The War of the Spanish Succession Marquis de Blécourt, was exerting what influence he could, including the payment of large sums of money, to promote French interests, and in particular that of the king’s second grandson, the seventeen-year-old Philippe, Duc d’Anjou, as an eligible successor to Carlos II. In this endeavour he was assisted by the not-unrealistic belief that the best, perhaps the only, way to maintain the Spanish Empire undivided was by means of harnessing French interest in doing so. The pro-Austrian faction in the court, encouraged by the king’s wife who was the sisterin-law of Emperor Leopold, failed to prosper in part because of the overbearing manner of the imperial emissaries in their dealings with the proud Spanish nobles. The French king, however, was doubtful of the likelihood of success for his endeavours: The King of Spain has always opposed the legitimate rights of my son. The mastery of the Queen over his mind and the attachment that she has for the Emperor’s interests have been such that it is not surprising that I demand assurances before listening to any proposition [that d’Anjou would be named heir to the throne] so contrary to the conduct of the King of Spain throughout his life.5 In fact, the Council of State in Madrid had met in June 1700 and voted in favour of the French aspirant to the throne; Carlos II did not attend the council, so that the vote should be seen as impartial. The following month the Pope declared himself to be in favour of Anjou, as being the choice most likely to ensure the continuance of peace in western Europe, but stressed that the opinion of the Council of State had already indicated the best way forward. As the ailing Carlos II sank towards his deathbed, the Archbishop of Toledo, prominent in the pro-French faction at the Spanish court, took charge of the king’s sick chamber and had the German-born queen barred from entering. A new will, naming the Duc d’Anjou as successor with an undivided empire was drawn up, and completed on 7 October 1700, and the detailed provisions in the fifty-nine articles contained in the document were promptly conveyed in confidence to Louis XIV. The renunciations made by his mother, Anne of Austria, and his own Spanish wife, Maria-Theresa, were annulled and the succession was fixed on d’Anjou, or his younger brother.

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This is the King of Spain 7 Recognising as a result of several consultations with Minsters of State and of Justice that the reason why Doña Ana and Doña Maria Teresa, Queens of Spain, my aunt and sister, renounced succession to those kingdoms was to avoid the prejudice of uniting them to the Crown of France, and recognising that, this fundamental motive no longer existing, the right of succession in accordance with the laws if those kingdoms, and that today this condition is fulfilled by the second son of the French Dauphin, therefore, in obedience to these laws, I declare my successor to be (should God take me without leaving heirs) the Duke of Anjou, second son of that Dauphin; and as such, I call him to the succession in all my Kingdoms and dominions, without exception of any part of them.6 The Duc de Berry, Louis XIV’s younger grandson, was named next in line of succession, and only then was Archduke Charles of Austria, second son of the emperor, mentioned as, in effect, the third and least favoured choice. In the unlikely event that all three of the young princes should refuse, then the throne was to be offered to the Duke of Savoy. In the meantime, a regency was to be established to govern Spain until the new king, whoever that might be, should arrive in Madrid. The difference between the non-partitioning provisions contained in the new will, and the terms of the newly-agreed treaty between France and the Maritime Powers, although not ratified in Vienna, were obvious with the potential for renewed conflict on a wide scale if great care was not taken by all concerned. Aware of the offer contained in the will, Louis XIV awaited the arrival of the expected and fateful news with feelings of some unease. ‘I see that from all sides one confirms that which you wrote to me about the disposition that he [Carlos II] made by his testament in favour of one of my grandsons.’ The king wrote to his ambassador in Madrid: Nothing makes it more evident than the secrecy that they keep on this subject with the Emperor’s ministers’ and at the same time by the fact that some of those who witnessed the signature of the testament have assured you of this disposition. But since I cannot change the resolutions that I have taken on the simple news that you give me, it will be necessary to await the declaration. There is

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8 The War of the Spanish Succession even much chance that if the health of the King should improve, one would make him change the dispositions that he has made.7 Three weeks later, after rallying and seeming to recover his health a little, so much so that the Austrian ambassador, Von Harrach, felt rather fancifully that there might yet be hopes of an heir, Carlos II died in the early afternoon of All Saints Day, 1 November 1700. He had been ineffective and a semi-invalid for many years but was lamented by his people to whom he was, despite the manifest mental and physical difficulties of his short life and the economic distress of the times, a benevolent and well-liked monarch. The death of the king, and choice of successor on the throne, was duly declared to the assembled notables with a knife metaphorically being twisted in the side of the Austrian ambassador: At length the folding doors being thrown open the duke of Abrantes appeared, and a general silence ensued to hear the nomination. Near the door stood the two ministers of France and Austria, Blécourt and Harrach. Blécourt advanced with the confidence of a man who expected a declaration in his favour; but the Spaniard, casting on him a look of indifference, advanced to Harrach and embraced him with a fervour which announced the most joyful tidings. Maliciously prolonging his compliment, and repeating his embrace, he said ‘Sir, it is with the greatest pleasure – Sir it is with the greatest satisfaction for my whole life – I take my leave of the most illustrious House of Austria!’8 The news of Carlos’ death, in a coded message, reached the French court at Fontainebleau on the morning of 8 November, and two further letters were shortly afterwards received by Louis XIV from the Junto, the council of ministers, in Madrid with additional details of the offer of the throne to his grandson: We do by this express send your Majesty a copy of the will and Codicil, which the deceased King our Master, whom God absolve, has left behind him, that you may perfectly know all the Circumstances that are therein contained. We make use of this occasion (as we have done on all others) to acquaint your Majesty,

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This is the King of Spain 9 that the Nobility and Commonality desire their new King with inconceivable uneasiness and impatience . . . We congratulate your Majesty upon this Occasion of having your second Grandson named and proclaimed King of Spain.9 The pressure to accept the will was acute but the king was faced with a particular difficulty that could no longer be avoided, with potential risks that were clear to all. After receiving assurance that the will was acceptable in Spain, Louis XIV consulted his council, in particular, his son the Grand Dauphin, Minister for Foreign Affairs Torcy, Chancellor Pontchartrain, and the Duc d’Beauvilliers, the governor to the royal children. Opinion on the best course of action was divided, with Beauvilliers recommending rejection of the offer, while Torcy pointed to the danger to French interests if the throne was instead taken by Archduke Charles, with a re-emergence of Habsburg encirclement of France, and a loss of influence in Italy. The Dauphin, usually indolent and indecisive, was untypically robust in asserting his right to the throne by virtue of his mother, Maria-Theresa, having been Carlos II’s half-sister, but he willingly assigned that right to his young son. The waspishly observant courtier and memoirist at court, Louis de Rouvoir, Duc de St Simon, wrote that: To the great surprise of the King and his ministers, when it was his turn to speak he expressed himself with force in favour of accepting the will. He took the liberty of asking for his inheritance, that the monarchy of Spain belonged to the Queen his mother, and consequently to him; that he surrendered it willingly to his second son for the tranquillity of Europe, but that to no other would he yield an inch.10 Louis XIV, aware of the dilemma they all faced but with an offer that could hardly be turned away, kept his own counsel for the moment and said little, but a few days later he almost teasingly asked the Princess of Conti what she thought of the offer, and she replied straightaway that d’Anjou should go to Spain. ‘Whatever I do’ the king replied gravely ‘I will be blamed by many people.’11 That the French king would agree to the acceptance by his grandson of the proffered throne was almost a foregone conclusion, although he was clearly in an acute dilemma. ‘If

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10 The War of the Spanish Succession the King refused to accept the will, the same Deed transferred the entire succession to the Archduke Charles. The same courier that had been despatched into France would proceed to Vienna.’12 Louis XIV wrote to Madrid on 12 November indicating acceptance of the will, before any public announcement was made, and concerned at the Europe-wide reaction that would certainly greet his grandson having the throne in Madrid, and the dangers of what the alternative would be, he wrote from Fontainebleau to his ambassador to the United Provinces, the Comte de Briord, on 14 November: The Spanish ambassador has asked for an audience, which I gave him on the morning of the 11th. He handed me a letter signed by the Queen of Spain and by the members of the Council appointed by the late King, his master, with the details of the prince’s will in favour of my grandsons; in the event of them not accepting it the heir is the Archduke [Charles], and after him the Duke of Savoy [Victor-Amadeus II].13 After assuring the comte that he had given the whole matter the most grave consideration, and rehearsing the difficulties of whatever course he adopted, Louis XIV went on regarding ways to assuage the concern of other states: I have decided to accept the will, after I had received the Spanish ambassador in audience. I told him that I would send the Duc d’Anjou to Spain without delay. On the next day I had given him a letter which I wrote to the Council of Regency, and I only pointed out to him that it was necessary to keep the matter secret for some days in order to give me time to advise the King of England [William III] and the Pensionary [of Holland]. Now the king got to the point, that to refuse the will would be to hand the crown and undivided empire to the Austrian archduke, and his tone sharpened as if in exasperation: The English ambassador has been told on my behalf practically the same as I am writing to you . . . He has been told that it would have been dangerous to deliberate at any length on the reply to be

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This is the King of Spain 11 made to the Spanish ambassador, and that it might easily have happened that the latter would have received instructions to send an express to Vienna, as soon as I refused the will, to offer the whole inheritance to the Archduke. You will say the same to the Pensionary. You are to make him see too that as the Emperor was not committed there was no security of the Treaty [of Partition]; indeed we should not find ourselves in this predicament if the King of England and the States-General had put pressure on the Emperor to ratify instead of raising secretly in him hopes that he would not be forced to do so. A similar note was sent to the Comte de Tallard in London. Conciliation was to be sought if at all possible, and assurances given, but the French ambassadors were to be on the watch for trouble: It is not advisable to reproach them in any way. It is sufficient to speak to the Pensionary as I indicate in this letter . . . Be more on the alert than ever in order to be promptly informed of the decisions taken by the States-General, and of the orders given by them for the raising of troops and the fitting-out of ships. Everything was then set for a scene of high historical drama at Versailles. After Louis XIV’s customary levee on 16 November, the Spanish ambassador, Castel del Rey, was brought into the king’s cabinet or private chambers, and invited to kneel and kiss the hand of his new young king, Philip V. This he did, and made a lengthy and tearfully emotional speech in Spanish, which d’Anjou could not understand as he did not yet speak the language, and so his grandfather on this occasion answered for him. St Simon wrote of the dramatic scene: At last, on Tuesday the sixteenth on November, the King publicly declared himself . . . The King, contrary to all custom, opened the two folding doors of his cabinet and commanded everybody to enter, it was a very full Court that day. The King, majestically turning his eyes towards the numerous company, and showing them M. Le Duc d’Anjou said ‘Gentlemen, behold the King of Spain. His birth called him to that crown; the late King also called him to it by his will; the whole nation wished for him,

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12 The War of the Spanish Succession and has asked me for him; it is the will of heaven; I have obeyed with pleasure.’ Then, turning towards his grandson, he said ‘Be a good Spaniard, that is your first duty, but remember that you are a Frenchman born and preserve the union between the two nations. That is the way to make them happy and to preserve the peace of Europe.’ The King afterwards went to Mass, during which at his right hand was the new King of Spain, who, during the rest of his stay in France was publicly treated in every respect as a sovereign.14 On entering the royal chapel Louis XIV offered his hassock, the kneeling cushion usually only made available to him, to his grandson, but the young man blushingly refused to take it. In consequence both men, king and king to be, heard Mass kneeling on the carpet. A sign of the trouble that this was bound to cause came when the Austrian imperial ambassador entered not knowing what had taken place, and as St Simon added ‘was confounded when he heard the news’. The recent discomforting of von Harrach in Madrid was clearly mirrored at Versailles. The King’s courteous formal reply to the Junto was to the point, and significantly altered the course of European history. After the considerable flowery preamble expected in diplomatic letters at the time, the note ran ‘We accept in favour of our Grandson, the Duc d’Anjou, the will of the deceased Catholic King; our only Son, the Dauphin accepts it also, quitting, without any reluctancy, the just rights of the deceased Queen his Mother, and our dear Spouse.’15 Resentment and annoyance was certain to be felt in Vienna, but concern was inevitable also in London and The Hague, although it was far from clear what, if anything, could effectively be done. The will was valid, as was the right of the young French prince to the throne by virtue of his grandmother’s relationship to the recently deceased king. As far as could be told, the Spanish were content with the arrangement, while the provisions of the Partition Treaty had not been ratified by Vienna or guaranteed by the Maritime Powers, and so this could not be held up as a true reason for dispute. Suspicions of Louis XIV’s motives were lively, but Parliament in London would almost certainly not vote funds for a new war, even if there had been a sound argument to embark on such a dramatic course, and that, it seemed, was that. On 22 December 1700, the French ambassador in London, Tallard, could

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This is the King of Spain 13 write to Versailles that both William III and the States-General in The Hague would acknowledge Philip V as King of Spain. and it seemed that the storm could be weathered, and if the Austrian emperor was inclined to argue the point on behalf of his younger son, he would in all likelihood have to do so alone. The new king, meanwhile, had begun to make his way to Madrid, accompanied by an enormous retinue and fortified by a gift from his grandfather of twenty-one bags each containing 1,000 Louis d’Or. The French king, however, took care that his grandson did not cross the border into Spain until the two months’ grace allowed by the confidential clause in the Treaty of Partition for the emperor to sign, had expired. Leopold would do no such thing, and was openly preparing for war, so Louis XIV could comfort himself that he had kept on the right side of legality, as he saw it. ‘The Emperor had confirmed the King in the opinion that had has done the right thing, for he [Leopold] refused to sign the Treaty.’16 Louis XIV always liked to have legal cover for whatever he attempted, and it seemed that this could be accomplished. Philip V had been recognised as King of Spain by the Elector of Bavaria before he even set off from Versailles, and Savoy, Poland, Brunswick, Malta, Danzig and Hesse-Darmstadt hurried to do the same; the Maritime Powers accepted things as a fait accompli. Richly dressed in the Spanish style and sporting the starched godilla neck-cloth worn at the court, with the fair hair of his grandmother, and appearing to be calm and reflective yet eager to please and be pleased, Philip arrived at the Buen-Retiro palace just outside Madrid on 18 February 1701, where he was received with a tumultuous and joyous welcome from the assembled people. The Duc de St Simon recalled that: The King of Spain arrived in Madrid on the 18th February. From his first entrance into the country he had everywhere been most warmly welcomed. Acclamations were uttered when he appeared; fêtes and bull-fights were given in his honour; the nobles and ladies pressed around him. He had been proclaimed in Madrid some time before, in the midst of demonstrations of joy. Now that he had arrived amongst his subjects there, that joy burst out anew . . . It was impossible to conceive a greater or more general demonstration of joy. The Buen-Retiro, where the new King took up his quarters, was filled by the Court and the

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14 The War of the Spanish Succession nobility. The Junto and a number of great men, received him at the door and the Cardinal Portocarrero, who was there, threw himself on his knees, and wished to kiss the King’s hand, but the King would not permit this; raised the Cardinal, embraced him, and treated him as his father.17 The late Carlos II’s German-born widow, Mariana von Neuburg, was packed off into obscure and not very comfortable retirement, where she would be unable to make mischief. ‘The Queen of Spain was sent away from Madrid, and banished to Toledo, where she remained with but a small suite and still less consideration.’18 The very capable proAustrian viceroy to Catalonia, George, Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt, was replaced by a nephew of Cardinal Portocarrero. French influence was strengthened by having the Duc d’Harcourt, Louis XIV’s ambassador to Madrid, appointed to be a member of the king’s council, while the national finances, such as they were, were put in the hands of French advisers. On 14 April Philip V made his formal state entry into Madrid; the pouring rain did nothing to dampen the enthusiasm of the welcoming crowds as the royal procession made its way from the Prado to the Puerta del Sol and onwards to the Alcázar. All things told, the new king was thought to have made a very good start to his reign, and encouraging news was received shortly afterwards that William III of England, bowing to parliamentary pressure to avoid renewed war, had on behalf of England and Holland sent his congratulation to the young Frenchman on his accession to the throne. A king had, of course, to have a wife and it was not to be expected that he would make his own choice, certainly not in a matter of such state importance and at the tender age of hardly eighteen years. In this affair Louis XIV was active on his grandson’s behalf, and chose as a suitable spouse Marie-Louise, the thirteen-year-old younger daughter of Duke Victor-Amadeus II of Savoy. The duke’s older daughter was already married to the Duc de Bourgogne, the Dauphin’s eldest son and eventually heir to the French throne, so this new alliance would keep things nicely in the family and, it was confidently hoped, bind Savoy more closely to France. This proved to be a false hope, however, and Victor-Amadeus, having his own dynastic ambitions, would in time join the military effort against France and the French contender for the Spanish throne. This could not be foreseen or imagined, and the

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This is the King of Spain 15 marriage was duly celebrated, by proxy, in Madrid and Turin on 11 September 1701, and the bride set out for Nice two days later. where Spanish galleys waited to take her to her new home and husband. Philip V, just having learned of the joyful celebrations in the overseas empire at his accession to the throne, began a journey through Aragon and Catalonia to greet his wife. He travelled first to Saragossa, where he confirmed the fueros, their traditional rights and liberties, and then on to Barcelona, where the Catalan Cortez met the king in formal session, and their fueros were also confirmed. The marriage ceremony between the young royal couple was completed at Figueras; Marie-Louise had been accompanied by AnneMarie de la Trémoille, the widowed Princesse des Ursins as her camarera mayor (head of household), chaperone and companion, and she would prove to be the éminence gris behind the throne, and misjudging her own role and position, in some respects make herself a thorough nuisance.19 The marriage got off to an inauspicious start, as the young bride was strong-willed and on learning that her Savoyard attendants were not to accompany her to Madrid, refused to enter her husband’s bed for several nights. On hearing of this difficulty, Louis XIV felt it appropriate to offer a few helpful words to his grandson concerning what made for a happy marriage: She has intelligence, and she will see that she ought to care uniquely to please you. I am sure that she will apply herself to this as soon as she controls her own behaviour, but it is necessary for your happiness, and for hers, that she disabuse herself of the ideas that someone has given her of governing you . . . Kings, exposed to public view, are even more scorned when they allow their wives to dominate them. You have before your eyes the example of your predecessor. The Queen is your first subject. In this role and in that of your wife, she ought to obey you. You ought to love her. You will not love her if tears have enough power over you to make you agree things contrary to your duty. Be firm from the beginning. I know that the first refusals will cause pain; that they are contrary to the sweetness of your nature, but do not fear to cause the Queen these slight chagrins for they will save her the real ones in the course of her life . . . Keep the Queen happy in spite of herself.20

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16 The War of the Spanish Succession What attention the young king paid to this well-meant advice is not too clear, but the couple quickly became affectionate and close, as far as court etiquette would permit, even though Marie-Louise had all her father’s stubbornness of character. She remained a force to be reckoned with both at court and in her own household, and at times, particularly those of crisis in the coming war, she would prove her value as consort for Philip V. At his grandfather’s urging, in September 1701 Philip set out to travel to Naples to greet his Italian subjects. but the reception he received was not particularly warm and it was reported that ‘they seemed indifferent to whether a Bourbon or Habsburg prince should rule them. The Emperor has a considerable party there and the desire to have a king of their own is always apparent in their minds.’21 Cardinal Portocarrero had been appointed to be governor of Spain in his absence, and the queen remained behind, but the grandees in Madrid were not amused that their new king should prefer to spend time in Italy when affairs demanded his attention in Spain. The young man was understandably also homesick for the company of his new wife, and soon returned. All the same, despite such relatively minor difficulties, it seemed outwardly that the question of the succession to the throne was settled; there was no realistic possibility of a union of the crowns of France and Spain taking place, although French influence had obviously been extended, and so long as Louis XIV behaved judiciously in his dealings with his neighbours. The Maritime Powers, England and Holland, would certainly not go to war for the sake of an Austrian archduke, particularly if their trading interests in the Spanish Empire could be assured and even enhanced, while the actual ability of France to overawe and influence Spain in the long term appeared to be limited. Certainly no-one really wanted the expense and aggravation of a renewal of outright war over the issue – all might yet be well, even though the English and Dutch hopes of improved trading rights were dashed when the Spanish signed over the contract for the slave trade – the Asiento, previously held by the Portuguese – to a French company.22 Parliament in London had no taste for the cost and risks of renewed war – if only some ground could be gained over trade with the Spanish Empire perhaps the brewing storm would pass by. Attempts to reach an amicable and lasting agreement to settle the problem proved elusive, and Louis XIV would miscalculate the

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This is the King of Spain 17 implacable opposition which he faced. However, for the moment Philip V was widely recognised as the legitimate King of Spain, only in Vienna was this denied. Louis XIV was strategically in a strong position, being able to count as potential allies in the event of trouble, declared or intending to do so before long, Spain, Portugal, Savoy, Bavaria and the Elector-Bishops of Cologne and Liège. This being so, it was difficult to see how France itself could be attacked other than at enormous and laborious effort, while the Iberian peninsula was in the same way difficult for any force hostile to the new king to approach. Conversely, two of the main parties which might range themselves against France, Holland and Austria, were exposed to potential attack, and this perceived vulnerability would dominate the councils of the allies, and fix their strategy, for several long years. In the meantime, active hostilities had begun in earnest in northern Italy where the emperor had gathered an army and manned the passes through the southern Tyrol to counter the movement of large numbers of French troops into the plain of Lombardy. After some time the war, waited for and expected by all Europe at last broke out, by some Imperialist troops firing upon a handful of men near Albaredo. One Spaniard was killed, and all the rest of the party taken prisoner. The Imperialists would not give them up until a cartel was arranged. The King, upon hearing this, at once despatched the general officers to Italy. Our troops were to be commanded by Catinat, under M. De Savoie [VictorAmadeus II]; and the Spanish troops by [the Prince of] Vaudemont, who was Governor-General of the Milanese.23 The Milanese was one key part of French strategy, for to hold this region would effectively keep Habsburg Austria well away from Spain and much of the rest of Italy. At Louis XIV’s instructions, Marshal Nicolas de Catinat secured Mantua and the valley of the river Po, taking up a good defensive posture with his left flank secured on Lake Garda; Catinat and Vaudemont were, however, not on good terms and this hampered their operations. The imperial forces, commanded since May 1701 by the redoubtable Prince Eugene of Savoy, were concentrated at Roverodo to the north of Rivoli. After seeming to threaten an advance on Milan, and drawing French attention in that direction, Eugene then moved over

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18 The War of the Spanish Succession steep mountain passes to Vicenza, blithely ignoring Venetian neutrality, and then pressed on across the rivers Adige and the Po to Carpi on 9 July 1701, completely turning the right flank of the French position. This was a significant accomplishment, passing large numbers of troops and materiel over poor roads and harsh terrain. ‘Retreat became necessary, but it was accomplished in excellent order and without disturbance from the enemy.’24 Catinat hastily withdrew to hold the line of the river Mincio, but Eugene adroitly switched his line of approach and turned the left of the new French position at Peschiera close to Lake Garda. ‘I trust,’ Louis XIV wrote peevishly on receiving the news of the reverse suffered by Catinat, ‘that my soldiers did their duty.’25 The French lines of communication to Milan were now threatened, and Catinat fell back again, but having lost the confidence of the king, he was replaced on 23 August 1701 by François de Neufville, Duc de Villeroi. ‘The surprise of everybody at this was very great,’ St Simon recalled, ‘for no one expected that the Marechal de Villeroi would repair the fault of Catinat.’26 Louis XIV was, however, confident of new successes and wrote to Villeroi: ‘I cannot tell you how pleased I am to have you in command. I have reason to believe that you will finish the campaign gloriously, but take care of yourself, you know how necessary you are to me.’27 By then the imperial army had reached Chiari, and Eugene went into an entrenched camp in front of the French positions on the river Oglio. There, on 1 September the Franco-Spanish and Savoyard troops attacked Eugene in position, not understanding the strength of his defences, and in fierce fighting they were repulsed with severe losses. ‘My post at Chiari,’ the Prince wrote, notwithstanding its excellence, was nearly forced by the unparalleled impetuosity of the French; the houses, mills and all were already carried. Never did I witness such valour. Daun drove them back. My right, concealed on the ground behind an entrenchment, suddenly started up and fired when the enemy had advanced quite close. Villeroi ordered an attempt to be made with the centre; but this scarcely ever succeeds when the wings are beaten. The worthy, the admirable, Catinat rallied the troops, led them back to the attack, and received severe contusion on the breast, and a shot in the hand.28

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This is the King of Spain 19 Villeroi had been accompanied by Duke Victor-Amadeus, as well as Catinat and Vaudemont, which cannot have simplified the chain of command on the day. ‘M. De Savoie,’ St Simon wrote, ‘led the attack; but was so firmly met by Prince Eugene, who was in an excellent position for defence, that he could do nothing and in the end was compelled to retire.’29 The news of this costly defeat stunned Louis XIV, but his reproof for his army commander was measured ‘I ordered you to seek out the enemy, to keep as near to them as possible, but that ought to have been carried out with prudence.’ The king and Villeroi were old friends, and the note then softened in tone, alluding to the clearly demonstrated skill of his opponents. ‘I have great confidence in you . . . Be cautious and risk nothing with people who know how to profit by everything, and who entrench themselves before you.’30 There was not much more to be done than to prepare to go into winter quarters, and Villeroi settled his army into camp at Cremona. ‘The campaign passed away, our troops always retreating, the Imperialists always gaining ground, they continually increasing in numbers; we diminishing little by little every day.’31 With this skilful campaign, and Mantua firmly in imperial hands, Prince Eugene had thrown back the French occupation of much of the north of Italy, savaged Villeroi’s army in the process, and encouraged the Italian states either to support the alliance being formed against Louis XIV, or at least to cling to neutrality and not get too closely involved. In this preliminary phase, before the outbreak of the war proper, a significant advantage had thus been gained in the struggle for the throne of Spain. If imperial troops could seize and hold enough Spanish territory in northern Italy, then the division of the empire could be said to be actively underway. This was widely recognised, and would help to persuade the Elector of Brandenburg of the wisdom of allying himself to the effort against France. More might still be obtained and the Earl of Marlborough, soon sent to command the Anglo-Dutch army in the north, had a careful eye on events in Italy, and the strategic importance of what was achieved there, writing that ‘the King [William III] is greatly perturbed as to the possibility of a French attack on Holland [but] the strengthening of Prince Eugene must not be neglected.’32

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Map 2: The Netherlands in the late seventeenth century, before Louis XIV’s campaign of expansion.

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Chapter 2

The Grand Alliance ‘No great war was ever entered upon with so much reluctance.’1

Early in February 1701, in a dramatic and highly inflammatory move, French troops had been sent to occupy the principal towns in the Spanish Netherlands. This could only have been done with the connivance of the governor-general of the region, MaximilienEmmanuel Wittelsbach, the Elector of Bavaria. Ostensibly owing allegiance to the emperor in Vienna, the elector was, however, in league with Louis XIV, having arranged a secret treaty with the king, the key clause being that ‘He shall permit the troops of France upon a certain day to enter into all the strong places of the Low Countries.’2 Furthermore, if conflict with Austria or the Maritime Powers ensued, the elector was to quit the Spanish Netherlands, handing the governance over to the Marquis de Bedmar, and go to Bavaria where ‘he would receive into his dominions a body of French troops with such a general as the Most Christian King shall think fit to command them’. The motives of the elector and the inducements offered him were clear and on a vast and dazzling scale, for a further clause in the agreement had it that ‘if it should please God to bless his Electoral Highness’s arms so far as to dethrone the Emperor, the two Kings [Louis XIV and Philip V] will employ all their power to place his Electoral Highness upon the Imperial throne’. Wittelsbach was a gifted soldier with a fine reputation in the field, but his ambitions got the better of him and he would prove to be a poor statesman. The ostensible reason for this French campaign of seizure was to afford some protection for the possessions of His Most Catholic Majesty, King Philip V (until recently the Duc d’Anjou), but the practical result was to give enormous offence to the Dutch. Towns which provided the States-General with their Barrier, a safeguard

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22 The War of the Spanish Succession against future French aggression, and guaranteed to them under solemn treaty terms, now passed into the hands of Louis XIVs soldiers withoutt a shot being fired. There was almost no resistance; the local Spanish officials welcomed the arrival of the French troops, and the Dutch garrisons in Luxembourg, Namur, Mons, Charleroi, Oudenarde, Ath and Nieupoort, 15,000 strong, were rounded up and interned. At the same time, the towns of Liège, Huy and Ruremonde came under French influence when the Prince-Bishop of Liège allied himself to France. Only at Maastricht, packed with huge stocks of warlike materiel, did the Dutch governor, Johan Wigand van Goor, robustly refuse the French summons, but at a stroke, the southern border of Holland had, it seemed, been laid open to whatever malevolent intentions Louis XIV might have for the future. The French king had gained important and strong positions for use in any future military campaign, and certainly had no intention of quickly handing them over to the care of Spanish garrisons: ‘They never had any apprehensions of the Dutch remaining in their towns in Flanders and it is not they but France who has driven them out and will never give the fortresses back to Spain.’3 Louis XIV had gained much but was to pay more for this unwise course of action, and the price demanded would be disproportionately high. Why Louis XIV was so apparently clumsy and unwise in seizing the Barrier Towns, and inevitably giving offence and alarming his neighbours, most obviously the Dutch, is something of a puzzle – the king was not usually so lacking in awareness. Perhaps it was simple folie de grandeur: he was used to getting his own way and doing as he saw fit in the interests of himself, his family and France, and was blind to the offence he was giving to others. In his kingly way, over simply, he could not see this, for his grandson was now King of Spain, and acknowledged as such by William III and others but not by Vienna, and how then could important towns in his grandson’s domains possibly be left in the hands of others, with whom he might soon be at odds if not actual war? The towns were indefensible anyway, if it came to open hostilities: they were a tripwire to alert the Dutch to French aggression, and William was aware of this. He was also aware that Louis XIV was moving to take them into French hands, but kept the information to himself, perhaps not being averse to seeing trouble stirred up in the process. Predictable outrage was felt both in The Hague and in London; the

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The Grand Alliance 23 interests of England and Holland were, of course to a large degree synonymous at this point, The Dutch were far more in danger of French aggression, but both of the Maritime Powers were shut out of trade with the Spanish Empire, trade that now would go more readily to French merchants and French shipping. Gradually it became plain that the alliance which had held firm against France through the long years of war at the close of the previous century would have to be re-forged. The members of both Houses of Parliament were moved to action and in June authorised William III to seek allies in the worsening atmosphere and the king went to The Hague the following month, using the urbane services of the Earl of Marlborough as England’s ambassador-extraordinary with far-reaching powers in discussions with the States-General to find a united way forward. Matters progressed well enough for the agreement of a Grand Alliance formed between England, Holland and Austria to be signed on 7 September 1701 (see Appendix I for the principal terms of the treaty).4 The support and assistance of Denmark and the German states was sought and gained by subsidiary treaties over the next few months – the reasons for this support varying from stark self-interest, the offer of ready money, adherence to the interests of the emperor, and not least to a lingering and not irrational fear of an overly powerful France. The aid of Denmark was secured, in part because of the influence of the Princess Anne’s Danish husband, Prince George, but also because Charles XII of Sweden had been persuaded both to disassociate himself from Louis XIV and his plans, and to cease hostilities with his Scandinavian neighbour.5 In all cases of providing diplomatic, moral and military support, the ability of the main parties in the Grand Alliance, most particularly England and Holland, to pay hard cash for the services of the troops provide by these states was a telling factor. The key issue for George, Elector of Hanover, was, however, the clause in the treaty of the alliance that guaranteed the eventual Protestant succession to the throne in London, while the treaty also acknowledged the Elector of Brandenburg as King in Prussia. The specific details of the Treaty were confidential, but were disclosed to the French king by the Swedish ambassador to Versailles on 10 November. There was still a prospect that the problem of Spain could be settled without recourse to renewed conflict, for above all other considerations, Philip V had been generally acknowledged as the new and perfectly

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24 The War of the Spanish Succession legitimate king in Madrid. The vexed question of the partition of the empire remained, however. Matters were greatly aggravated within a week of the treaty signing, when Louis XIV went to St Germaine and stood at the sickbed of his old friend the exiled King James II of England. He emotionally declared that the dying king’s young son, James Edward Stuart (known to history as the Old Pretender), was regarded by France as the rightful heir to the throne in London: The King’s servants, imagining he would be private (the room being full of people), began to retire, which his Most Christian Majesty perceiving, said out aloud, ‘Let nobody withdraw,’ and then went on: ‘I am come, sir, to acquaint you, that whenever it shall please God to call Your Majesty out of this world, I will take your family under my protection, and will treat your son the Prince of Wales, in the same manner I have treated you, and will acknowledge him as he then will be King of England.’ Upon which all that were present, as well French as English, burst into tears, not being able in any other way to express that mixture of joy and grief with which they were so surprisingly seized . . . his Most Christian Majesty was so moved, that he could not refrain from weeping himself.6 This unwise declaration, contrary to the advice of Louis XIV’s own council, was a gross breach of the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick and an obvious attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of England, Ireland and Scotland. The possibility of invasion and religiously-inspired civil war, of usurpation of the throne in London, was raised and understandably this gaffe caused considerable anger in Parliament and amongst the British people generally when it became known. Louis XIV was true to his word, however, and on the death of James II a few days later, his son was duly proclaimed as King of England, Scotland and Ireland at Versailles and in Madrid. It was argued rather speciously that the declaration had no real meaning or import, and was simply a matter of polite form, rather as kings of England still liked to style themselves as kings of France in an antiquated throwback to the strategic position in mediaeval times and the Hundred Years War. This suggestion placated no-one, as it was known that Louis XIV, always alert to what was best for France, had been working to bring about a

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The Grand Alliance 25 Jacobite restoration once William III passed away, should this prove likely to weaken England’s stance over the Spanish Succession. Such repeated and quite uncharacteristic diplomatic errors made by Louis XIV served to stir up his opponents to a hitherto unknown degree. All this post-dated the actual creation and signing of the Treaty of Grand Alliance of course, but it served very well to inflame opinion in London against France and in favour of renewed war. Matters were made even worse when it was announced that English manufactured goods would no longer be permitted to be exported to France – economic injury was thus added to the insult of a breach of treaty obligations. ‘It was to wound the Prince of Orange [William III] in the tenderest point, and to invite England and Holland to become allies of the Emperor against France.’7 Diplomatic relations between England and France were for the time being ruptured with the respective ambassadors, Tallard in London and the Earl of Portland in Versailles, being withdrawn. This was unfortunate as Tallard, the shrewd French representative to the Court of St James, had been using his calm diplomatic skills to good effect, and when he left so too did his influence on events. Louis XIV could be seen to have played for high stakes and, despite the errors made and antagonism consequently stirred up, had played rather well. His old adversary William III was known to be ailing, and when he died his implacable opposition to France would surely die with him. Holland would perhaps come to terms, now that the StatesGeneral had no Barrier to shelter behind if French troops and their Spanish allies swarmed northwards towards the exposed Dutch border, while the Elector of Bavaria would in all likelihood declare for France, in defiance of the emperor in Vienna. Leopold’s attention was on making gains in northern Italy, while simultaneously being distracted by rebellion in Hungary and the ever present, but currently dormant, threat from the Ottoman Turks to the east. This was all a significant misjudgement by the French king, who plainly took no account of the anger caused in London over the matter of the succession, whether it be Protestant or Catholic Jacobite. An additional clause was even added to the Treaty of Grand Alliance, such that hostilities once commenced, should not cease until Louis XIV had acknowledged the validity of the Protestant succession, a key factor now, having previously had no relevance, in the war on which the allies would embark. In addition, an

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26 The War of the Spanish Succession act of attainder was passed by Parliament against the young James Stuart, so that he was in effect to be treated as an outlaw. The peace party in England, the Tories who had held sway since the close of the Nine Years War in 1697 and had overseen the virtual disbandment of the army, were losing ground in parliament. Despite having acknowledged Philip V as king in Madrid, William III was able to mobilise support for a great effort to curb the burgeoning influence of France. In a stirring address to the Houses of Parliament in the autumn of 1701 he declared: The owning and setting up of the pretended Prince of Wales for King of England, is not only the highest indignity offered to me and the whole nation, but does so nearly concern every man, who has a regard for the Protestant religion, or the present and future happiness of your country . . . By the French King placing his grandson on the throne of Spain, he is in a condition to oppress the rest of Europe, unless speedy and effectual measures are taken. Under this pretence he is to become the real master of the whole Spanish Monarchy; he has made it to be entirely depending on France, and disposes of it as of his own dominions; and by that means he has surrounded his neighbours in such a manner, that though the name of peace may be said to continue, yet they are put to the expense and inconveniences of war . . . It is fit that I should tell you, the eyes of all Europe are upon this Parliament.8 The appeal was so framed that both the peaceful Protestant succession to the throne, with the avoidance of civil war and religious strife, and the trading interests of England were neatly bound together. Supplies for the rebuilding of the army and navy were promptly voted, and preparations for renewed war were made: the regiments so casually allbut-disbanded four years earlier were re-formed and funds rasied for military operations and the mustering of foreign levies in Germany and Denmark. Of particular concern was the likelihood that, once war began, the French would attack Holland before the allies had properly mustered their strength, and by so doing drive the republic out of the conflict while the Austrians were busily engaged in Italy. There, Prince Eugene

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The Grand Alliance 27 of Savoy was already campaigning with some success but he could be isolated and defeated if France was also left free to concentrate forces against him. Count Wratislaw, the Austrian ambassador to London, wrote to the emperor on 19 February 1702 that in conversation with John Churchill, Earl of Marlborough: He said that the King is greatly perturbed as to the possibility of a French attack in full force on Holland. Further, he wants a vigorous campaign on all sides, the sight of which may maintain the readiness of the republic to continue to bear its heavy burden. The strengthening of Prince Eugene must not be neglected. For from the general point of view it would be less harmful for the king [William III] to lose some battle than for Prince Eugene to be overthrown.9 Such advice, while sound, was of little use and a decided diffusion of allied effort continued, endangering the allied cause in the Low Countries and in Spain where Philip V was consolidating his position in Madrid. Louis XIV had already made an early start in strengthening his position in the north, by sending troops to occupy the Bishopric of Liège in November 1701, and occupying Bonn in the Bishopric of Cologne; Dutch-held Maastricht was isolated and vulnerable as a result. Joseph-Clement Wittlesbach, the Elector-Bishop of Cologne, had declared his support for France, but his council thought otherwise and called in allied troops to resist French encroachment. The king all the while was rapidly increasing the size and strength of his army, although the practice of raising new regiments to satisfy the hectoring demands of courtiers for places and commands, for themselves and their relatives, meant that established units withered from a lack of recruits and funds with which to find them, while those newly raised were often ill-equipped and poorly trained. St Simon remembered that: ‘The excellence of the [veteran] regiments, the merits of the officer, those who commanded, all were forgotten by Barbezieux [the Minister for War], young and impetuous, whom the King allowed to act as he liked.’10 William III, staunch opponent of the French king, would not live to fight another war against Louis XIV. He died on 19 March 1702 (N.S.) from the effects of falling from his horse and breaking his collar-bone a

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28 The War of the Spanish Succession little over two weeks earlier. His sister-in-law, Princess Anne, the youngest daughter of the recently-deceased King James II, ascended the throne in London. ‘We have lost a great king,’ it was declared in Parliament in London, but ‘we have got a most gracious Queen.’11 Hopes and expectations in Versailles were high that England’s warlike preparations would falter under the new monarch, but such hopes were soon dashed. The new queen’s principal concerns, stated emphatically at her first meeting of the Privy Council, were to ensure the Protestant succession to the throne, and to limit the power of France – with clear and overt French support for the Jacobite cause the two issues were closely linked. She was to prove to be just as resolute as her late brotherin-law in her opposition to Louis XIV and his ambitions, and the States-General were re-assured that she was just as firm of purpose: The Grand Alliance was very sensibly touched by the loss, but found itself so well cemented, that the spirit of William continued to animate it, and [Grand Pensionary] Heinsius, his confidant, perpetuated it, and inspired all the chiefs of the republic, their allies and their generals.12 The Earl of Marlborough was sent as the Queen’s ambassadorextraordinary back to The Hague, where the French ambassador was making as much mischief as he could and trying to undermine the spirits of the Dutch ministers now that their prince and stadtholder was dead. An offer was made of a separate peace for Holland if the Dutch would abandon the Grand Alliance, but with no hint of a return of their Barrier Towns in the Spanish Netherlands such a suggestion had few attractions. Marlborough’s arrival with the assurances of Queen Anne’s steadfast intent soon settled the frayed nerves of the States-General, and the close and friendly relationship that the earl enjoyed with Antonius Heinsius was a significant help. A state of war with France and the French prince in Spain was declared by the parties to the Grand Alliance at 1.00pm on 15 May 1702, the Garter King of Arms making the declaration at the gates of St James’s Palace in London, and simultaneous announcements being made in The Hague and Vienna. The declaration by Queen Anne was based firmly on the terms of the newly agreed Treaty of Grand Alliance, while that of the States-General relied upon the provisions of

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The Grand Alliance 29 the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick which allowed for no French aggression or overt threat of such a course against Dutch territory. Most importantly for Holland, the seizure of the Barrier Towns was a stark offence committed by Louis XIV which had to be undone in entirety. ‘That the King of France having cast his eyes upon their provinces, either to make himself master of, or ruin, them, had attacked them, in two bloody wars.’13 Emperor Leopold hardly needed to declare war, of course, as his forces had been busily fighting the French in northern Italy for some time. Leopold did so, however, for the sake of form, referring to the unfulfilled terms of the Treaty of Ryswick, in the name of both himself and also the electors, princes and states of the empire. The news of war was soon conveyed to Louis XIV who ‘took the declaration and in a transport of anger, cast it upon the table’.14 He calmed sufficiently to comment, rather wittily, that as a lady (Queen Anne) had declared war on him, he must be getting old. The objectives of the Grand Alliance were on the face of things quite simple, well focussed and rested on one principal and over-riding aim, as outlined by a British minister some time after the war concluded: The object of the war, which King William meditated and Queen Anne waged, was a Partition, by which a Prince of the House of Bourbon, already acknowledged by us and the Dutch as King of Spain, was to be left on the throne of that dismembered monarchy. The wisdom of those counsels saw that the peace of Europe might be restored and secured on this footing and the liberties of Europe would be in no danger.15 How far the allies allowed themselves to stray from this apparently laudable, rational and achievable course will soon be seen. A thorny problem for the Maritime Powers, however, was who should command the Anglo-Dutch army when on campaign. Marlborough was appointed to be the captain-general of the troops paid for by Queen Anne’s treasury, but Holland would put many more troops into the field and could claim, with some justification, the right to appoint a supreme commander. The queen hoped that her husband, Prince George of Denmark, might take up the command, but the Dutch would have none of that unwise suggestion as he was well-meaning but

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30 The War of the Spanish Succession an ineffective soldier, and the idea was quietly dropped. George, Elector of Hanover, a man of considerable influence within the empire and probably a safe pair of hands, was also briefly considered, while several Dutch generals, men of experience and reputation, aspired to the role, amongst them Henry of Nassau, Count Overkirk and Godert Rede van Ginkel, Earl of Athlone. The financial strength of England, and the major contribution being made to the war effort counted most, and so it was decided that the Earl of Marlborough should take up the appointment and time would show that for the Grand Alliance this was a inspired choice, for it was said, with perfect truth that ‘Between the ages of fifty and sixty he went through his great campaigns at the head of half the armies of Europe.’16 The forces that were now combining against Louis XIV and his grandson were impressive, as long as they could be induced to work harmoniously together, which remained to be proved. England, Holland and Austria could count on the support, both overt and tacit, of Hanover, Brandenburg (soon to be known as Prussia), Denmark, the Bishoprics of Munster and Wurzburg, and the Electors of the Palatinate, Trier, Mainz and Mecklenburg Schwerin. In addition, most of the other German princes and electors, such as those of HolsteinGottorp, Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Cassel, while not prepared to go to the length of declaring war on Louis XIV, were very ready to hire out their excellent soldiers to the alliance in return for generous cash subsidies. Amongst the first moves in the war was the forthright ousting by the Elector of Hanover of the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, who at the urging of his younger brother had rashly allied himself to Louis XIV. The cause of the Grand Alliance in northern Germany was strengthened in the process, and the dynastic fortunes of the house of Guelph also. By contrast, Louis XIV could only count as allies Savoy, Bavaria, the Bishopric of Liège, and a rather reluctant Portugal, while Philip V’s Spanish troops were in general ill-equipped and poorly trained. Savoy and Portugal would before long abandon the French cause and join the Grand Alliance, and the active involvement with the Elector of Bavaria would prove to be a very mixed blessing for France.

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Chapter 3

The French Offensive ‘Executed with bravery and resolution.’1

Louis XIV had the marked advantage in the early stages of the war of holding a central position with a large and well-equipped army ready to deploy as he saw fit. His allies in Bavaria and Savoy would welcome French troops, and threaten the security of Vienna and the more minor princes of the empire, thus unsettling the foundations of the Grand Alliance, while the French alliance with Portugal secured the otherwise exposed Atlantic seaboard of Spain. With elaborate formal lines of defence in the north-east, recently constructed with much labour and expense under the supervision of Vauban, and forbidding mountain ranges and difficult country along the east and south-eastern borders, French territory was under little threat for the time being. Equally, with the king’s grandson on the throne in Madrid there was little likelihood of an attack from the south, even though Spanish military strength was comparatively feeble, and Philip V would need the deployment of large numbers of French troops before long if he was to secure his throne.2 The king, by comparison with his opponents, could choose to strike in any one of several directions, depending upon which course seemed most promising. The river Rhine provided a convenient barrier both for France, and also co-incidentally for the German princes and electors who supported the Grand Alliance. This line was held for much of its uppers stretches by imperial troops commanded by Louis Guillaume, the Margrave of Baden, an astute commander somewhat of the old school, who had gained a fine reputation while fighting the Ottoman armies in eastern Europe. Extensive formal lines of defence were constructed at Stollhofen ten miles or so downstream from Strasbourg, neatly barring any attempt French commanders might make to force a passage

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32 The War of the Spanish Succession between the river and the tangled tracks of the Black Forest. Baden had insufficient strength, however, to do more than adopt a defensive posture and this enabled large numbers of French troops to be deployed elsewhere, a relatively small force under the command of Marshal Catinat being left in place to keep an eye on the margrave. After having been replaced in command in northern Italy by Villeroi, and having to watch without the power to alter things the defeat at Chiari, Catinat had returned to Versailles and to his house in St Denis, and had been without employment or command for some time. Offered command of the French army on the Rhine he was reluctant at first to accept, feeling that there had been a loss of faith in his abilities which led to his replacement in Italy. On 11 March he was taken into private conversation by Louis XIV; they discussed the events of the recent campaign, and the scheming that had taken place between the Prince of Vaudemont and Michel de Chamillart (the French Minister for War who succeeded Barbezieux when he died), to remove him from the command and install Villeroi in his place. At length, Catinat was assured of the trust that was placed in him by the king, and he went to the Rhine, but his heart was plainly not in the appointment, and St Simon wrote that: ‘He took the command he had been called to, but did not remain long in it . . . he soon resigned his command, finding himself too much obstructed to do anything, and retired.’3 Even with the fighting already taking place in northern Italy, and the keen importance attached to affairs there by both Versailles and Madrid, there was little likelihood of an early and decisive decision. The most promising target for a major French attack was Holland, whose border was exposed now that the Spanish Netherlands were firmly in the hands of Louis XIV’s troops. The States-General had naturally been disconcerted at the recent death of William III, Queen Anne being as yet an largely unknown quantity to them, despite her declarations of firm intent to proceed against France. Memories were long, and many in Holland remembered very well the French invasion of the 1670s when only a desperate flooding of their land had saved them from domination by Louis XIV. A damaging attack on southern Holland would, as a result, readily dislocate the Grand Alliance and leave the king and his grandson the victors in the war for Spain. The veteran Marshal Boufflers, a steady pair of hands, was sent north with a 60,000-strong army to accomplish this task.

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The French Offensive 33 In northern Italy Marshal Villeroi still faced the army commanded by Prince Eugene, whose successes so far meant that for the time being the initiative lay with him. However, the imperial commander was short of supplies, munitions and money, and Pope Clement XI having declared support for the Bourbon cause in the war, local merchants and dealers had a firm reason to refuse to provide provisions under anything less than duress. Eugene could not afford to delay while his army withered away, and formed a plan to seize the fortified city of Cremona on the river Po, in the centre of the French position; having done so he would try to go on and take Milan. On 1 February 1702, the prince managed to infiltrate a body of troops into Cremona using a disused and presumably overlooked aqueduct that led through the walls, and simultaneously a storming party attacked the main gate. The guards, suddenly beset on two sides, were overwhelmed, and when the halfdressed Marshal Villeroi galloped to the scene with just a single aide at his side, he was accosted and taken prisoner by Captain MacDonnel, an Irish officer in the imperial service, The initial success for Eugene’s troops could not be sustained, however, and the French quickly counter-attacked with great spirit, breaking down a bridge by which imperial reinforcements might have reached the walls: Prince Eugene . . . finding that his troops were giving way, ascended the cathedral steeple to see what was passing in different parts of the town . . . he saw his detachments on the banks of the Po, and the bridge broken, thus rendering their assistance useless.4 After ten hours of fierce close-quarters fighting in the streets of Cremona, and with ammunition almost exhausted, the prince had no alternative but to order his men to withdraw. They took with them some hundreds of prisoners amongst whom, of course, was the unfortunate Marshal of France.5 As a result, Louis-Joseph de Bourbon, the astute Duc de Vendôme, was sent to replace Villeroi as commander in the Po valley, and he soon proved to be a much tougher opponent for Eugene to deal with. At sea, the French appeared to have a marked advantage over their British and Dutch opponents. In the Mediterranean, the route through which the Smyrna convoys brought their exotic and highly desirable

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34 The War of the Spanish Succession cargoes from the Levant, the ports of Spain and Italy were open to Louis XIV’s ships but now closed to those of the Maritime Powers. Meanwhile, the Indies were also open only to French and Spanish traders, with an embargo enforced by a powerful French cruising squadron. British outposts in the Caribbean, the valuable sugar and spice islands of Jamaica, Antigua, Barbados and the Bahamas, were at risk of attack, unless something was attempted to support them. That something proved to be Admiral John Benbow, who had been sent to the Indies in 1701 by William III with a small but well-equipped force to maintain a presence in Jamaica, and keep an eye on French activities. In June 1702 news came of the outbreak of war two months and more earlier, and Benbow also learned that the French naval commander, the Marquis de Châteaurenault, had made for Vera Cruz on the coast of Mexico to cover the departure of the immensely valuable Spanish annual treasure fleet. In mid-July the treasure fleet sailed for Europe covered by Châteaurenault’s thirty warships, a force that Benbow could not hope to challenge. He could, however, move to attack the small French squadron left behind to cover Cartagena and the result was an inconclusive running battle between the local French commander, Admiral Jean Ducasse, and Benbow’s English squadron. On 4 September 1702, Benbow at last brought Ducasse to a general action off Cape Santa Marta, but in a scrambled but fierce engagement the admiral was gravely wounded by a French chain-shot on his own quarterdeck of HMS Breda, and had to be strapped to a chair to continue to command. As it was, some of his captains were reluctant to continue with the fighting and in consequence, the French escaped a serious mauling; Benbow returned with his squadron to Jamaica, where he subsequently died from his injuries. ‘His leg never having set to perfection, which malady being aggravated by the discontent of his mind, threw him into a sort of melancholy which ended his life.’6 Two of Benbow’s captains, Kirby and Wade, who had been so reluctant to engage the French ships were properly court-martialled and faced a firing squad for their craven behaviour, Queen Anne refusing them a pardon. Ducasse had already written to Benbow, lamenting that he had not succeeded in taking the Breda, and adding in disgust at the miserable conduct of his opponent’s subordinates, ‘As for your cowardly Captains, hang them, for, by Heaven, they deserve it’.7

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The French Offensive 35 If the Maritime Powers were to re-establish a meaningful presence in the Mediterranean, then Cadiz in south-western Spain had first to be neutralised as a base from which the French and Spanish squadrons could sally forth to intercept any passage of the Straits of Gibraltar. The port might also prove to be a useful forward base for the allied navies. The very capable Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt, who had been replaced as viceroy of Catalonia when Philip V took the throne, and Austrian influence in Madrid faded accordingly, had put this proposal to King William III before his fatal riding accident. Port Mahon in Minorca, or Cartagena and Barcelona on the Valencian and Catalan coast, would serve equally well as a base from which the allied warships could operate, but no movement towards Naples and promising opportunities to operate against Spanish territories in southern Italy was possible until the unhampered passage of the straits could be assured. Cadiz, moreover, was the principal base for the Spanish navy, and the most convenient port from which the valuable trade with the Americas could be conducted and protected. To seize the port, therefore, would pay handsome dividends for the Grand Alliance on several scores, damaging Spanish commerce and finances, exerting pressure on Portugal and Savoy, and paving the way to securing regular passage to and from the Mediterranean. There was also the added attraction that French effort to prevent the seizure of the port would be harder than any operations against Barcelona or Port Mahon, both of which lay much closer to the great naval base at Toulon in southern France. In trying to protect Cadiz, the French fleet might be tempted to venture out a very long way, and be vulnerable to interception and attack. Philip V had briefly visited his domains in Naples, and succeeded in persuading the Pope to support his claim to the Spanish throne; the emperor was anxious that an increased allied effort be made there before things went too far. Possession of Naples and the ability to campaign in southern Italy were not the only considerations, for advances had been made to King Pedro II of Portugal to forsake his alliance with France and Spain, and to join the Grand Alliance. With Cadiz firmly in allied hands, the choice for Portugal to change sides might be made so much easier, and Prince George went to Lisbon early in July 1702 to open negotiations to achieve that end. The newly-arrived English ambassador, John Methuen, who was familiar with Lisbon and the

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36 The War of the Spanish Succession Portuguese court, received a warm welcome and was soon active in persuasion also, but the king was cautious, as to break with France plainly carried risks, and he needed re-assurance that the Grand Alliance had the power and the will to win the war. The decision to attack Cadiz was taken shortly before William III’s death, and much of the planning had been carried out by Prince George. The Earl of Marlborough wrote from The Hague to his friend Sidney Godolphin in early April, and he plainly saw the advantages in pursuing an aggressive and wide-ranging naval strategy: I do not doubt that the Dutch will come to the project of Calais and when we are masters of it, I believe they will be of the opinion that part of the fleet may go with six or seven thousand men as high as Naples. The time this squadron is in the Straits [of Gibraltar], the rest of the men must be employed in fortifying Cadiz. A further thought here is that before the fleet shall return home they should seize upon Corunna, and leave a garrison there.8 Using their naval superiority, which time and circumstances would improve, the Maritime Powers were to open a promising new front against France and Philip V. Not only would valuable ports be obtained for use as bases in future operations, but Spanish and French trade would be hindered and their prestige impaired. Also, by moving in force into the Mediterranean, Victor-Amadeus of Savoy would be encouraged to take the allied side, and the Catalan, Valencian and Andalusian coastline threatened and laid open to attack. The French fleet based in Toulon would almost certainly have to intervene, and a major naval action perhaps brought on in the open seas. That Cadiz was an inviting target for an allied amphibious landing was little more than an open secret, and the emperor in Vienna acknowledged that the place should be seized before a further move was made towards Naples. So it was that the very same month after the immensely valuable treasure fleet had set sail from the Indies, an AngloDutch naval expedition, fifty warships strong with many transports, under the command of 52-year-old Admiral Sir George Rooke and the Dutch Lieutenant-Admiral van Allemond, sailed from the English Channel and on down the coast of Portugal. The fleet made an

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The French Offensive 37 ostentatious and impressive display but did not linger in harbour at the mouth of the Tagus; King Pedro was suitably impressed though. The transports carried almost 14,000 troops to form a landing force commanded by James, 2nd Duke of Ormonde, when the opportune moment came.9 Rooke was joined on his flagship by Prince George and Paul Methuen, son of the ambassador to Lisbon, brought out to the passing fleet on a frigate on 21 July. The wide-ranging instructions to the admirals were to ‘reduce and take the town and island of Cadiz, or any other place belonging to Spain or France’, although if a French naval squadron rumoured to be at Corunna was encountered, that was to be the main target of the expedition.10 Rooke knew the approaches and environs of Cadiz well, and the defences of the town and port were thought to be poorly equipped. Not finding the French squadron en route, the allied fleet anchored off the town on 23 August 1702. Several days were then wasted in discussion between the senior officers as to how best to proceed – some favoured an amphibious landing on the isthmus to the south of Cadiz, while others felt that a blockade and bombardment of the port was the better course. At last a landing was agreed upon the Bay of Bulls to the north of the harbour between the town of Rota and Santa Caterina – further from Cadiz than was ideal but offering a better anchorage for the fleet. In a freshening wind which upset some of the boats, tipping the soldiers into the surf, with some men being drowned and others being saved by the oarsmen, the allied landing in the bay to the north of Cadiz was made on 26 August. There was little real opposition other than from some scattered and ineffective fire from a nearby battery, and a demonstration by a small detachment of Spanish cavalry, commanded by Don Felix Vallero. He did not, however, close in to come to grips, merely exchanging some shots with the first allied soldiers on the beach. The small town of Rota was occupied the next day without trouble, providing a useful wharf for the landing of men and materiel. A proclamation was read out asserting the rights of Archduke Charles over the question of the Spanish throne, and the imperial standard was raised by Prince George; disappointingly, the reaction of the locals was rather subdued if not actually hostile. The landing of the bulk of the men, guns, horses and equipment took just two days, a creditable achievement, but a further week went by before the force felt able to advance on Cadiz. Discipline amongst the

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38 The War of the Spanish Succession troops was good, and as it was necessary to persuade locals to come over to the Habsburg cause, looting was forbidden; after the first soldier was hanged for this offence, four more would have paid the penalty had not the local people petitioned for them to be pardoned as little harm had actually been done. The fort at Santa Caterina was soon occupied, after brief fighting, and Port St Mary was taken along with 200 Spanish prisoners. Unfortunately, some thirsty allied soldiers then found stocks of wine in the all-but-deserted town and disorder set in. Looting of warehouses and homes quickly became widespread, and those inhabitants who had not already fled were threatened with violence. The officers appeared to have little appetite for imposing order on their belligerently drunken men, while a Captain Norris was subsequently court-martialled for striking a fellow officer in a heated argument in the street over some purloined claret. The immediate effect of this disorder was to fatally shock and outrage local Spanish opinion against the allies and the Habsburg cause, and henceforth the region would be firmly inclined in favour of King Philip V. Admiral Rooke was well aware of the damage done, both physical and moral, and ruefully reported that ‘the inhumane plundering of Port St Mary made a great noise here’.11 The Cadiz operation never recovered its former vigour, and orders were received from London to carry out a strict enquiry into the outrages inflicted on the small town. Rooke was also concerned at the prolonged anchoring of his ships off a lee shore, while the soldiers on land suffered in the hot weather with a lack of drinking water – the local wine-shops and cellars now being kept under strict guard. The terrain to be crossed by the troops was marshy with many creeks to be forded or bridged, and the advance on Cadiz slowed to a crawl in consequence. The Spanish fort at Santa Cruz was attacked, but with no success, as the governor of Cadiz, the Duc de Brancacio, had disposed his troops well to cover all likely approaches. The fort at Santa Catalina was occupied on 2 September, and two days later Rooke agreed to force a passage into Cadiz harbour and attack the eight French galleys at anchor there. Brancacio had, however, already sunk three merchant ships across the entrance between Fort Matagorda and Fort Santa Lawrencio, and the attempt had to be abandoned. The Matagorda was bombarded, but the allied guns sank into the marshy surface on which they had been emplaced, and that

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The French Offensive 39 effort also had to be called off after three days of ineffective firing. Parties of sailors and marines were working on shore, preparing roadways and platforms for the guns, but the ships were under-manned as a result, and Rooke recalled that ‘such slavish labour was not for seamen’.12 The disorder and plundering that had occurred had soured the whole enterprise, and there was no sign that the Spanish populace, nobility or commoners, would rise to support the Habsburg cause. Prince George wrote in exasperation at the fumbling of the operations, and a seeming lack of purpose amongst the commanders on land and sea, and a growing inclination to call off the whole enterprise. ‘The methods which have been taken hitherto, seem not directed to do anything but to find some pretence, after some unanswerable delays, to go with the first fair wind for England.’13 Sure enough, on 26 September it was decided to abandon the expedition and re-embark the troops. A final parting bombardment of Cadiz was considered, but this would have been no more than an act of vindictive frustration, and mercifully it was not carried out. Enough damage had been done, however, amongst the unfortunate local villagers to seriously damage the prospects for a successful allied campaign in much of southern Spain: The cause of Charles III became associated in the Spaniards’ minds with the scandalous conduct of Ormonde’s troops, who plundered Santa Maria to the bare walls, sacked the churches with heretical glee, raped women, and even nuns.14 The officers, it was said ‘even went so far, in their deplorable mean-ness of soul, as to place guards in the street to take the spoil from the privates and store it all away for their superiors’. By 28 September the main body of the allied troops had re-embarked, with some sharp rearguard fighting by the English Foot Guards to hold off an advance by Spanish troops to try and disrupt the evacuation. The next day the fleet weighed anchor and sailed away, Prince George and Paul Methuen returned to Lisbon, while the crowded ships made their way northwards. This dismal failure at Cadiz and its environs, and resulting disappointment, was tempered by the news that the Spanish treasure fleet had arrived off the coast of Galicia, evading the attentions of an intercepting naval squadron under Admiral Sir Cloudesley Shovell,

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40 The War of the Spanish Succession and had put in to take shelter in Vigo Bay. News of their arrival was given incautiously in idle conversation in Lagos on the Algarve coast to the chaplain of HMS Pembroke, whose captain hurried on to meet Rooke and his squadron with the exciting tidings. The chance to snap up such a vast prize could not be denied, and on 22 October Rooke, having as instructed detached a small squadron for service in the west Indies, successfully entered Vigo Bay on a northerly wind. The treasure fleet consisted of seventeen laden merchantmen, with their escort of fifteen French and three Spanish warships under the command of the Marquis de Châteaurenault, all neatly protected by a stout boom laid across the estuary at its narrowest point at Redondella. Rooke was unwell with gout, and kept to his cabin, but his squadron broke through the boom with HMS Torbay, commanded by ViceAdmiral Hobson, in the van. Ormonde subsequently landed with a party of marines to rush and capture the Spanish Fort Randa that covered the narrows and could have taken the allied warships under a damaging fire: He ordered Lord Shannon to put himself at the head of the grenadiers, and march directly to the fort which covered the entrance into the port where the boom was, which was executed with bravery and resolution . . . Lieutenant-General Churchill’s Regiment, seeing this happy success, marched up to support the grenadiers.15 Six transports partly laden with treasure and goods were captured, while three Spanish ships of the line and eleven other transports were burnt or sunk. The covering French squadron was also destroyed in the engagement, with ten warships sunk and six more captured and taken into allied service.16 This was a major blow to France and her hopes of ever mounting an effective naval campaign, for time and money to restore such losses were both lacking. The success was not quite as resounding as it appeared, as much of the silver cargo had been landed before Rooke attacked, and being private property and not that of the Crown, seven million silver pesos were subsequently appropriated by Philip V to finance his campaign to hold onto the throne in Madrid. The sequestration of funds was cloaked in the legal fiction that it represented an advance

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The French Offensive 41 payment of taxes. For Rooke and his crews, of course, there was still a considerable haul to be taken as booty, valued at the fabulous sum of £1 million sterling, together with payment of prize money for their captures in the bay.17 The success at Vigo enabled a gloss of a kind to be thrown over the earlier failure at Cadiz and the disgraceful sacking by allied soldiers of Port St Mary. Those charges that were brought against certain offenders were either dropped on the spurious grounds that they could not be pressed in England when the offences occurred abroad, or diluted to trivial charges of officers being ashore without proper permission. Two senior officers were court-martialled – Lieutenant General Sir Henry Belasys and Major-General Sir Charles O’Hara (a ‘one-time highwayman’ according to one detractor).18 Belasys was dismissed and then promptly re-instated, while O’Hara was acquitted of the charges and with his reputation apparently unsullied was promoted two years later to become lieutenant-general. Efforts were still in hand to persuade the Portuguese to join the Grand Alliance, but the evident lack of success at Cadiz did nothing to encourage King Pedro to do so, even though the results of the attack at Vigo were reported in Lisbon first. Rooke had decided not to leave ships in Portuguese ports over the winter, although he could have done so by long-standing treaty terms; again, this did not encourage Pedro to take the risk and switch sides. Methuen’s mission to Portugal had born little fruit so far, although Count Waldstein, the imperial ambassador, and the Dutch minister Meinheer Francis Schonenberg were also active there.19 Both Methuen and Schonenberg felt at home in Lisbon, but Waldstein was less comfortable, and the competing interest and inherent rivalries, particularly over matters of trade, between England, Holland and Austria made an effective concerted campaign to bring Portugal over to the allied cause more difficult. In October 1702 Juan Luis Enrique de Cabrera, hereditary Almirante of Castile, having deserted Philip V’s cause, arrived in Lisbon with an impressive retinue, including the Count of Corzona, to add his weight to the arguments. Cabrera had considerable influence not only in Castile, but in Andalusia and Catalonia, and with large estates in Sicily, so his declared support for the Habsburg clamant was very encouraging – a fact not lost on the Portuguese during the protracted negotiations that went fitfully onwards. Cabrera was representative of

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42 The War of the Spanish Succession those grandees of Castile who were still suspicious of the new Frenchborn king in Madrid and what he might do to their treasured privileges; he had been intended to be Philip V’s ambassador to Versailles, largely to keep him out of the way where he could not make mischief. On the road to Paris, however, he took a different turning and went to Lisbon, effectively declaring for Archduke Charles in the process, so his reputation as a rather tricky customer with an inclination to sit on the fence while events unfolded was apparently well merited.20 A powerful argument in favour of Portugal joining the Grand Alliance, however, was that the French and Spanish naval commanders were losing their war with the allies. This was evident and would become more marked as time went on; the portents for Louis XIV and Philip V, after such setbacks as those in the West Indies and at Vigo bay, were already not good. King Pedro had a number of senior advisers who advocated neutrality, but he was rightly concerned for the security of Portugal’s overseas merchantile interests, and England and Holland could devastate these if they chose – Rooke had been able to bring his fleet to the southern shores of Spain, land an army and then re-embark them without interference, while the approaches to the English Channel had been held firm against any French incursion: Louis XIV could never have done so much. Whether Portugal stayed with its alliance with the French king or tried to become a neutral in the war, her merchantmen would be fair game on the high seas. In effect Portugal had few realistic alternatives but to join the cause against Philip V and make the best of it, unless Pedro could negotiate a position of benevolent neutrality. This seemed increasingly unlikely to happen, and a letter sent from Lisbon to London that October set things out with stark clarity The French have no fleets at sea, and we are in possession of these seas, and these people [the Portuguese] can have no trade but under our protection. Though their trade is certainly beneficial to us, yet ’tis so more to Portugal. All their gold, sugars and tobaccos are the returns of our own manufacturers, which our people give them on credit, to be paid for upon the return of the Brazil trade. Three parts of the corn expended here and all the dried fish is imported by the English, so it is plain these people live by us.21

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The French Offensive 43 On 4 October 1702, Methuen tried to force the issue, offering territorial concessions to Portugal in Estremadura and Galicia, together with generous cash subsidies and provision of supplies for troops on campaign, in return for active support of the Grand Alliance. The offer was repeated formally on 13 December, although the notion of territorial gains was quietly dropped as being plainly undeliverable, with such exotic alternatives as the Philippines, the Canary Islands and even Buenos Aires mentioned in passing. French efforts to retain the Portuguese alliance fell flat, although King Pedro had astutely used this and the rivalries between the allied ambassadors, who each with good reason suspected the others at various times of double-dealing, to secure the best terms he could. The treaty between Portugal and the Grand Alliance was signed in Lisbon on 16 May 1703, and ratified in London on 14 July. The terms as concluded between Portugal, England. Austria and Holland allowed for Archduke Charles to be declared as King Carlos III and to come to Lisbon to press his claim to the throne in Madrid by force of arms. When he arrived King Pedro was to declare war on Philip V, and provide an army 15,000 strong, with another 13,000 auxiliaries, maintained with allied subsidies and supplies. The allies would provide 12,000 troops to campaign with the Portuguese, together with a cruising squadron of twelve ships sufficient to fend off any threat from French and Spanish warships. The territorial integrity of Portugal was guaranteed by the Maritime Powers, and amendments favourable to Portugal made to the frontiers on the Amazon and La Plata in the Americas. Such concessions, of course, depended upon the Archduke succeeding in his claim and being in position to honour them; typically Emperor Leopold was slow to ratify the treaty, but eventually did so.22

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Chapter 4

Campaigning in the Low Countries ‘You can guess my impatience I hope for the fame of my armies.’1

The French commander in the Low Countries, Louis-François de Boufflers, Marshal of France, advanced early in the spring of 1702 to defeat the Dutch army, hoping to strike effectively before Queen Anne’s troops could properly assemble to its support. Had this potentially warwinning stroke been speedily achieved, then the Grand Alliance would have been in utter disarray, with the southern border of Holland laid bare and Louis XIV and his grandson in Madrid soon victorious. Boufflers quickly established his main force at Xanten, from where he could observe the Dutch army, commanded at the time by Godert Rede van Ginkel, the Earl of Athlone. The Dutch had already begun a siege of Kaiserswerth on the Rhine, and on the king’s instructions the Comte de Tallard was sent with 13,000 French troops to hamper that operation. Early in June Boufflers, encouraged perhaps by the arrival on campaign of the King’s eldest grandson, the Duc de Bourgogne, and by the young Duc de Maine, the King’s illegitimate son, advanced to Cleves to confront Ginkel. ‘I should not doubt his courage,’ Louis XIV wrote to the veteran Marshal about Bourgogne, enquiring after his conduct on campaign: Those of his blood have never lacked it [courage], but the manner in which it is shown, and the satisfaction of the troops [at his being with the army]. You can guess my impatience I hope for the fame of my armies and that of the Duc de Bourgogne that it will be possible to attack the enemy. It would be glorious for him to win a considerable advantage.2

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Campaigning in the Low Countries 45 The Dutch, and those few of Queen Anne’s troops who had so far joined them, had indeed fallen back in some confusion, to take up a position near to Nijmegen, where Athlone could draw support from the defences of the town. An unexpected raid into western Flanders by the noted Dutch military engineer Meinheer van Coehorn, intended to do little more than to ‘levy contributions’ amongst the populace, proved a worrying distraction, as French troops had to be diverted there to counter the thrust. Boufflers’ hitherto very astute campaign lost some of its sparkle, and, intent on closing with the Dutch army as quickly as possible, he had neglected to try and seize the Dutch fortress of Maastricht on the river Meuse, which lay uncomfortably close his own lines of supply and communication. The strength behind the initial French thrust had also been diluted by the diversion of troops to Kaiserswerth and Flanders, and imperceptibly but definitely the initiative had passed to their opponents. On 30 June 1702, the Earl of Marlborough arrived to take command of the 60,000-strong Anglo-Dutch army, despite some lingering resentment amongst other commanders, notably Ginkel, who felt that they had a better claim to the role. Despite his relative lack of experience, the earl was well known to the Dutch and his confident handling of the army soon allayed any misgivings about his appointment. Marlborough was sure that an early and forthright move to drive the French back was necessary, but some of the Dutch generals were inclined to be more cautious. The earl was aware that he now had a superiority in numbers over Boufflers once Tallard had gone to Kaiserswerth, and wrote from his camp on 13 July: We ought to have marched from hence three or four days ago; but the fears the Dutch have for Nijmegen and the Rhine created such difficulties when we were to take the resolution that we were forced to send to The Hague, and the States [General] would not come to any resolution, but have made it more difficult, by leaving it to the general officers, at the same time recommending, in the first place, the safety of the Rhine and Nijmegen.3 However, two days later the Anglo-Dutch army moved forward to Grave on the Meuse, and went into camp only seven miles from the main French force. Boufflers meanwhile was in communication with

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46 The War of the Spanish Succession Frederick-Wilhelm, the King in Prussia (previously the Elector of Brandenburg) in an attempt to wean him away from the Grand Alliance. Wilhelm was offered the whole of the province of Liège and that of Cologne, in exchange for turning his coat and laying Holland open to attack, but he wisely treated the approach with caution, kept the French marshal in uncertainty as to his intentions, and the Dutch in some alarm, while trying to get better terms for the support he gave the allies. Before long it had become clear to Boufflers that nothing would come of this attempt, by which time he had more pressing concerns to engage his attention. Although the Hanoverian and Prussian troops in the army had orders not to cross to the west of the Meuse, Marlborough managed to persuade his commanders that a move to threaten the French communications would not be too hazardous, and on 26 July he moved southwards towards Lille St Hubert. Boufflers was caught off-guard by this march, and hurriedly fell back towards Venlo and Ruremonde on the Meuse to try and recover his tactical poise. A promising opportunity to maul the withdrawing French troops was missed at the Heaths of Peer on 2 August, much to Marlborough’s dismay. ‘This was very fortunate for us,’ James FitzJames, the Duke of Berwick, wrote, ‘for we were posted in such a manner, that we should have been beaten.’4 Still, despite the missed opportunity to do more damage, the French had been forced away from the lower Rhine, Tallard having been recalled from the attempt to disrupt the siege of Kaiserswerth, and Boufflers no longer posed an immediate threat to the security of the Dutch border. The allies had in the process demonstrably wrong-footed their French opponents, and gained valuable room in which to manoeuvre for the coming campaign. Louis XIV sent firm instructions that the fortresses along the Meuse were to be held, as in that way the supply and maintenance of the Anglo-Dutch army in Brabant would be hampered. An attempt was made on 16 August to intercept an allied supply convoy of 700 wagons making its laborious way forward, but Marlborough manoeuvred to catch the French as they advanced, and a week later only a perfectlyavoidable delay by the Dutch general Opdham in getting his troops into position saved Boufflers from a serious and damaging defeat. Marlborough wrote: ‘The ten thousand men upon our right did not march as soon as I sent the orders, which if they had, I believe we

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Campaigning in the Low Countries 47 should have had an easy victory, for their whole left was in disorder . . . Venlo will be invested tomorrow.’5 The French king wrote to Boufflers, ‘If they take Venlo, then Guelders will be lost, and in the end you will be driven from the whole territory of Cologne.’6 The allied army proceeded to lay formal siege to Venlo, Stevensweert and Ruremond. Liège was under threat and Louis XIV again wrote to his army commander in some alarm. ‘If they take Liège the Elector of Cologne will have to come to terms with them . . . This would put them to begin next year’s campaign with the siege of Namur, perhaps Luxembourg, and then frontiers of my country.’7 Despite such exhortations, Liège fell to the allies at the end of October, the earnest efforts of Marshal Boufflers to save the place proving ineffective; one of the main magazines in the citadel blew up, which hardly helped the French defence. Marlborough, having taken the 1,700-strong garrison as prisoners of war, wrote to London with the news: The post not being gone, I could not but open this letter to let you know that, by the extraordinary bravery of the officers and soldiers, the citadel has been carried by storm, and, for the honour of Her Majesty’s subjects, the English were the first that got upon the breach, and the Governor [the Marquis de Violane] was taken by a lieutenant in Stewart’s Regiment.8 The Elector-Bishop of Cologne declared his neutrality, but with his domains being in allied hands, he really could little else. As this sorry tale of reverses unfolded, the Duc de Bourgogne left the army to return to Versailles as did his half-brother, the Duc de Maine, perhaps to avoid the taint of defeat attaching itself to a Prince, or even two Princes, of the Blood. Louis XIV was not impressed: ‘I fear his departure will have a bad effect on my troops and give confidence to the enemies who will be sure that my army is in no condition to attempt anything against them.’9 However, the Duke of Berwick recalled that in fact ‘the King, seeing the ill-turn affairs took in this campaign, recalled the Duke of Burgundy from the army’.10 Boufflers’ efforts were further hampered by Louis XIV’s insistence that he send troops to bolster the French forces on the Rhine and in Alsace. The fortress of Landau had been lost to imperial troops commanded by the Emperor’s eldest son, Joseph, the King of the Romans, in mid-September but this further

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48 The War of the Spanish Succession dividing of French forces was a distinct handicap. ‘The detachment we had sent into Germany,’ Berwick wrote, ‘had so weakened us, that we could not venture to risk an action.’11 The allies were presented with a seemingly valuable chance to corner and defeat the French forces in the Low Countries while they still enjoyed a superiority in numbers. However, Dutch caution, understandable but frustrating, prevented Marlborough from forcing a general engagement in the open on Boufflers, even though he had this advantage. With the loss of Liège on 26 October, the French army had fallen back behind its lines of defence, and Marlborough sent his own troops to their winter quarters, as there was clearly nothing to be gained from keeping them in the field in deteriorating weather. Although Marlborough was made a duke by Queen Anne in recognition of his successes against the French that summer, the year overall had been one of general disappointment in the Low Countries, with no decisive blow being struck. Philip V, in the meantime, was gradually establishing his position in Madrid and was generally proving to be popular with the Spanish people and agreeable to the grandees at court. His grip on affairs was, understandably, a little loose as he had still to learn to speak Spanish properly, and the machinery of government in Madrid did not come close to matching that which prevailed in France. An astute observer at the French court remarked that he was ‘Old enough to be a king, but not yet old enough to have a will of his own’.12 Still, if the allies were to achieve their declared aims, they would have to do better than they had managed so far. The campaign of 1703 in the Low Countries opened with an attack by Marlborough on the French garrison in Bonn, which held out for twelve days before being forced to capitulate on 15 May. The newlycreated duke then moved to combine with the Dutch troops under command of Veldt-Marshal Overkirk, and this was achieved, near to Maastricht, two days later. The principal aim now was to seize the important ports of Antwerp and Ostend, and a strong detachment of Dutch troops had already been sent forward to Bergen-op-Zoom, but their commander, General Opdam, advanced prematurely to levy ‘contributions’ in the countryside, a form of licensed looting, and as a consequence found himself to be in an exposed position and without close support. Alarmed at this rashness, Marlborough wrote with some asperity on the last day of the month, concerning the true reason for

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Campaigning in the Low Countries 49 Opdham’s impetuosity: ‘As he is governor of West Flanders, he has the tenth of all the contributions.’13 Marlborough marched from the Meuse to combine forces with the Dutch advanced detachment, and Coehorn and Baron Spaar advanced across the Scheldt on 26 June. Three days later Opdam moved forward to the village of Eckeren just to the north of Antwerp. The French were well aware that their opponents had failed to concentrate their advanced forces in good time, and Marshal Boufflers rapidly marched with 20,000 troops to combine with those local forces commanded by the Marquis de Bedmar. However hard he pushed his marching men, Marlborough could not overtake the French marshal, and on 2 July he wrote: ‘If M. De Opdam be not upon his guard, he may be beat before we can help him, which will always be the consequence when troops are divided, so as that the enemy can post themselves between them.’ He had to add a postscript to the letter already written but not yet sent, ‘Since I sealed my letter, we have a report come from Breda that Opdam is beaten.’14 As had been feared, Boufflers reached Antwerp on 30 June, and he and Bedmar promptly advanced and struck Opdam’s small army in its encampment at Eckeren. A French officer, the Marquis de Langallerie, wrote afterwards that: The troops marched by diverse roads to the enemy, who did not think of such an unexpected visit. We began to attack them about 4 o’clock in the afternoon between Eckeren and Capelle; we charged them on all sides with the greatest fury, the Marquis de Bedmar with his army in front, and Marshal Boufflers in flank. Never was a sharper combat seen.15 Apart from sending away his baggage, the Dutch commander had done little to prepare the place for defence, and while scouting the approaching French army he managed to get lost and took himself off to Breda to announce that his whole force had been overwhelmed. This was the news that carried to Marlborough, but it was not quite so. Baron Slangenberg had assumed the command in Eckeren as Opdam was nowhere to be found, and after a desperately-fought defence in and around a churchyard in the village he managed to get the staunch Dutch infantry off the field and on the road to Lillo, severely mauled but more or less intact. The Comte de Merode-Westerloo, a Walloon cavalry

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50 The War of the Spanish Succession officer in the service of Philip V, wrote rather dismissively that, ‘All we gained was what the enemy cared to leave on the field of battle.’16 In fact, the Dutch suffered about 4,000 casualties, having to abandon their wounded, who were, however, well cared for by the French on the orders of Boufflers. In addition all their tentage, six field guns, fortyfour Coehorn mortars, and 150 wagons laden with the army’s baggage were lost. A severe blow had been struck, and the Dutch would take some time to recover their poise. ‘The success of an action so glorious,’ Louis XIV wrote, ‘which has broken the enemy’s projects, is equally due to the conduct of the generals and bravery of the troops.’17 Despite this setback to his plans, on 5 July Marlborough moved his main army towards the French lines of defence protecting Antwerp. Little could be achieved while operations were delayed and the Dutch commanders quarrelled amongst themselves over who was most to blame, and who could claim most credit, for the defeat and narrow recovery from what so nearly had been a disaster at the battle of Eckeren. By 23 July 1703 Marlborough had to accept that there was now little prospect of success against Antwerp, and in the second week of August took his army back to the Meuse where he laid siege to Huy; from there he could move on and threaten the key French-held fortress of Namur. If that place could be taken then the whole length of the river would be open to convey supplies for the allied armies, a potentially huge asset for the allied campaign. Louis XIV was concerned for the safety of Huy, understanding clearly that the loss would inevitably expose Namur to attack, and he wrote to Boufflers: ‘You know its importance and the unfortunate effects its loss would entail; but I cannot believe that the enemy will attempt it as long as the army you command is so close to them.’18 Despite this, on 15 August the fortress was invested while Marlborough covered the siege operations from a nearby position on the Mehaigne river. The allied siege train came up the Meuse from Maastricht, and the bombardment of the defences of the citadel of Huy began on 21 August. One of the French magazines blew up during this bombardment, causing inevitable confusion and losses amongst the garrison, and the French commander, the Marquis de Millon, capitulated on 26 August rather than face an assault by the allies. The 900 French troops taken prisoner were eventually exchanged for two allied battalions lost earlier in the campaign when Tongres had been captured. Meanwhile, Marlborough had manoeuvred towards the

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Campaigning in the Low Countries 51 French field army, now placed under the command of Marshal Villeroi, but had not found a chance to engage them in open battle and turned instead to lay siege to the minor fortress of Limburg, which fell on 27 September. Bad weather forced the armies to move into winter quarters once more, but not before the allies had captured the small town of Guelders lying between Venlo and Rheinberg, where a siege had been proceeding, sometimes with energy and enterprise and sometimes not, since the spring. Although the duke had not once been able to corner the French field army and force it to stand and fight, his achievement in clearing out French and Spanish garrisons in Brabant and along the lower Rhine was significant. Holland was made secure, and Dutch commanders would in consequence chance more to achieve success, while the Spanish Netherlands, a most important part of the empire of Louis XIV’s grandson in Madrid, was being laid open to attack. In the meantime, however, while Marlborough was enjoying repeated success on the Meuse, French commanders had been gaining a great deal of ground elsewhere. The imperial field commander on the upper Rhine, Louis Guillaume, Margrave of Baden, had captured the fortress of Landau on the river Queich in September 1702, with the King of the Romans as titular head of the army, but had to leave a garrison in place and withdraw to the east bank of the Rhine when the Elector of Bavaria openly allied himself to Louis XIV. This caused a strategic shift in the war, potentially very promising opportunities for France presented themselves, with Vienna isolated and exposed to attack. Still, the king was obliged to support his new ally in southern Germany with substantial numbers of troops who might have been more usefully deployed to campaign in the Low Countries or northern Italy. A sharp engagement between Bavarian and Imperial forces took place on 4 March 1703 at the village of Heyzempirne, not far from Passau on the Danube. The snow still lay thick on the ground, and the Austrian commander, General von Schlick, advanced to surprise the elector’s army while still in camp. Failing in this, the imperial troops themselves encamped, and were then attacked in a blinding snowstorm by the Bavarians. Colonel Jean-Martin de la Colonie, who fought with the elector’s army that bitterly cold day, recalled that: Victory hung for a long time in the balance between the opposing

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52 The War of the Spanish Succession cavalry, so stubborn was the fight, for the Elector’s cuirassiers are really among his very best troops. Our infantry did not experience the same resistance; they stood the first effect of the enemy’s fire, charged with bayonets fixed, and crushed all resistance. Soon afterwards the enemy’s cavalry gave way, and their rout became universal.19 The colonel went on to add that ‘Schlick escaped with the debris of his army’. The fighting had been vicious and at close quarters, and de la Colonie certainly felt the benefit of his ‘secret,’ the uncomfortable iron skull cap that cavalrymen often wore under their hats: I put to the test at this battle a small frame of well-tempered iron, which the cavalry officers, not in the cuirassiers, were in the habit of placing in the crown of their hats. It certainly saved me from the effects of two heavy sabre cuts which I received in the melee. Having thrown the Austrians back in considerable disorder, the elector went on to take possession of the town of Ratisbon, which submitted without resistance to admitting a Bavarian garrison, and then secured his hold on the line of the Danube by moving on to Neuburg. ‘The enemy, who had no doubt that the town would be attacked after the battle of Heyzempirne, added new works to the old walled enceinte; but they were not of much use, for we took possession of it in five days.’20 The Duc de Vendôme was still active in northern Italy, campaigning against the Imperial commander, Guido von Starhemberg, On the Rhine Marshal Claude-Louis-Hector de Villars, vigorous and dangerously capable, seized Kehl just across the river from Strasburg on 9 May 1703, after a ten-day siege. He then took his army through the tracks of the Black Forest to support the Elector of Bavaria’s operations on the Danube. Louis XIV wrote to Villars, ‘I need not tell you that upon this junction depends the success of the war, which would be more difficult to sustain if I should lose an ally who might secure for me a peace as glorious as it would be advantageous.’21 There was, at the same time, outright rebellion against imperial rule in parts of Hungary, the rebels being subsidised by France to encourage their troublemaking, In simple fact, if the French and their allies could defeat the imperial armies and seize Vienna, even for just a short time, then the

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Campaigning in the Low Countries 53 shock and moral effect of this would wreck the Grand Alliance just a surely as if the Dutch had been defeated on their borders, and on this account if no other Louis XIV and his grandson in Madrid would have succeeded – opposition to French efforts in northern Italy would fade away, and Louis XIV could concentrate his forces to regain the security of the southern Netherlands. The whole Spanish Empire, undivided, would be in Philip V’s hands, courtesy of his grandfather. For the ambitious Elector of Bavaria, there was always the enticing thought that, once installed in Vienna, he might even replace Leopold as emperor; the thought might have been far-fetched, but the elector was a better soldier than statesman, and he was certainly ambitious. In a certain light, and with such a formidable ally as Louis XIV at his back, it might just be possible. In June 1703 Villars had wanted to advance boldly on Vienna with the combined Franco-Bavarian army, by then some 70,000 strong. He wrote of the dilapidated defences of the city that ‘We can easily lodge ourselves on the counter-scarp on the first day’.22 However, the elector had decided to advance into the Tyrol instead, hoping to combine with Vendôme as he advanced northwards from Italy. Louis XIV was enthusiastic about the prospects, but the ambitious combined operation soon foundered in the face of fierce local Tyrolese resistance in the north, while Vendôme failed to move to make a passage through the Trentino region in the south. The increasing activities of allied cruising squadrons in the Mediterranean, hardly challenged as they were so far by the French fleet, had been noticed, and the French lack of success in northern Italy had not been lost on Duke Victor-Amadeus II of Savoy. He was already wavering in his support for Louis XIV in the war – in fact the untypical inaction of Vendôme was at least in part because he suspected Victor-Amadeus of being about to turn his coat and imperil his own lines of supply and communication, which he duly did. Vendôme refused to advance with such a threat to his back, and Louis XIV had to write to him in some exasperation: Do you think that when I give an order as precise as the one that you received, that I do not have reasons stronger than yours for sending it? You allow yourself to be engaged by what is before you, and I see those things that are in the distance which can have effects and which cause me to make resolutions suitable to one

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54 The War of the Spanish Succession who is charged with the weight of government . . . The conquest of the Tyrol would have been easy.23 Innsbruck had indeed been taken by the elector’s troops, but the French king had clearly disregarded the local resistance they met in what was a rather hesitant advance. His discontent with Vendôme’s conduct was soon tempered when Victor-Amadeus, as feared and expected, chose to throw caution to the winds and abandon his alliance with France. North of the Alpine barrier, the French and Bavarian effort in the campaign had become riskily divided, and Villars was faced by the Margrave of Baden and an imperial army on the Danube in mid-July. The free city of Augsburg in Bavaria was invested by imperial troops in August, but the elector withdrew his army from the Tyrol and moved to combine forces once more with Villars. ‘We now found ourselves forced to make a precipitous retreat, for a delay of twenty-four hours would have exposed us to the risk a massacre by the Tyrolese who rose in revolt.’24 The imperial forces opposing them had not been fully concentrated, with the Margrave of Baden south of the Danube and Count von Styrum’s 18,000-strong detachment still north of the river. The count moved to combine with Baden, but waited a day at Schwenningen just to the east of the plain of Höchstädt, to allow his artillery train to close up. There, on 20 September 1703, he was caught by Villars and the elector and, after an initial success for the imperial cavalry, was severely defeated. ‘The armies were very unequal, and Count von Styrum saw himself surrounded by the enemy he was obliged to retire.’25 Styrum withdrew in some disarray northwards to Nordlingen in Franconia, losing his guns and much baggage, while the Margrave of Baden, now threatened from the rear, made good his escape from Bavaria and took his own army back towards the Rhine. The imperial effort to counter the French and Bavarian threat as in clear disarray, and Louis XIV wrote in delight to the elector. ‘I am never surprised about the advantages that my troops win when you are at their head.’26 While all this was taking place, Camille d’Hostun, duc de Tallard, had moved to seize the newly-built fortress of Brisach in Alsace; once more, the Duc de Bourgogne was sent to nominally lead the army in the operations, but Tallard exercised the command employing his customary tact. The potential difficulty of divided influence and

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Campaigning in the Low Countries 55 command was there once more, with a royal prince, well-meaning but still quite unversed in the ways of war, present at headquarters alongside the army commander. Louis XIV was concerned at the choice of Brisach, as Marshal Vauban had warned against the attempt, and he wrote to Tallard that the gifted military engineer: Insists that it is not possible to take it until the floods of the Rhine have receded, and that if the Duke of Burgundy attacks it before the end of August or the beginning of September, he will receive an affront . . . it would be better to attack Freiburg or Landau.27 The king was clearly concerned that his grandson should not participate in a failed operation or even one that stalled, but he would not explicitly order Tallard on the point, adding, ‘You know the confidence with which I give myself to anything that you think proper for the good of my service . . . I cannot, however, put aside the experience of a man who has served me so long, and so well as the Marshal Vauban.’ To make sure of no mishaps, the King sent the engineer to join the siege operations, writing to Michel de Chamillart, that ‘The Duke of Burgundy can depend in everything upon Marshal Vauban as upon Marshal de Tallard, but of operations beyond the trenches, Marshal de Tallard will be in charge.’28 The siege began on 23 August and was successfully concluded in little more than two weeks, at least in part because the defences were flooded by the rising waters of the river. The road linking the French magazines and depots in Alsace with their troops operating deep in Bavaria, was thus secured, and to make doubly sure Tallard went on to lay siege to Landau on the river Queich. The fortunes of the French and Bavarian operations on the Rhine and in southern Germany appeared to be prospering, but this was something of an illusion. Villars and the elector had found that they could not work harmoniously together, and Louis XIV had to write to the marshal that he should ‘not be haughty with a man of his birth and rank. You should be firm in important things, but present them frankly and you will gain more influence over his conduct than you can by other means.’29 The two strong-willed men continued to quarrel however, and at last Villars had to be sent to quell an insurrection in the Cevennes region of southern France, and Louis XIV replaced him in command of

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56 The War of the Spanish Succession the French troops in Bavaria with the newly promoted Marshal Ferdinand Marsin. An allied attempt to raise the siege of Landau failed with the heavy defeat of the Prince of Hesse-Cassel by Tallard at Speyerbach in November 1703, and the garrison in the fortress capitulated to the French a few days later. The prospects for the campaign in the coming year seemed very bright in Versailles, with the ability to deploy no fewer than eight field armies – those commanded by Villeroi in the Low Countries, La Feuillaide in Savoy, Villars in the Cevennes, Berwick in Spain, Marsin in Bavaria, Tallard on the upper Rhine, the Grand Prior in Lombardy, and the Duc de Vendôme in northern Italy.30 This was all very comforting, and it remained to be seen what the allies could do to counter such an imposing array. On the other side of the tactical hill, the fortunes of the Grand Alliance were seen to be flagging – Philip V had established himself firmly in Madrid, the Dutch, having secured their borders, were reluctant to engage the French in open battle, parliament in London was wearying of the expense and risks of war, French troops occupied much of northern Italy, fortresses along the upper Rhine had been lost and Vienna was far away and under threat. The allies had the advantage on the high seas, but the war would not be won there. So, the initiative in the war appeared to be firmly in the hands of Louis XIV. In fact this was an illusion, for French forces were over-extended, and Marshal Marsin, in particular, was exposed and at the end of long and tenuous lines of supply and communication back through the difficult country of the Black Forest to Alsace. Maintaining the French army in Bavaria, and ensuring its security, would absorb enormous attention and effort, which might well have been better employed elsewhere. The Elector of Bavaria had high hopes and ambitions, and promised much, but his attempts to properly supply his own army, and that of his French allies, proved only partly successful. Efforts on the political level to alter the balance of the war continued elsewhere. A key requirement for Portugal to join the Grand Alliance had been that Archduke Charles, and an army 12,000 strong to support his cause, should go to Lisbon. In addition, an Anglo-Dutch cruising squadron should be established in Portuguese waters to guard against any naval attack. Portuguese troops would be paid for and supplied by the Grand Alliance, as originally intended, and it was expected that some 28,000 horse and foot would be able to take the field. The

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Campaigning in the Low Countries 57 archduke had been proclaimed in Vienna as King Carlos III on 12 September 1703, even though England and Holland had prior to the commencement of the war, each freely acknowledged Philip V. Six weeks later Victor-Amadeus II of Savoy broke with France, despite treaty obligations and his close family ties with the House of Bourbon, and declared for the Grand Alliance. St Simon wrote that: The Duke of Savoy had been treacherous to us, and had shown that he was in league with the Emperor. The King had accordingly broken off all relations with him, and sent an army to invade his territory. It need be no cause of surprise, therefore, that the Archduke was recognised by Savoy.31 This dramatic course of action was taken despite the duke’s daughter, Marie-Adelaide, being married to the Duc de Bourgogne, one day to be heir to the throne of France, and another daughter, Marie-Louisa, being married to Philip V of Spain, both grandsons of the French king. This change of course carried with it high risks, for French fortunes still prospered with substantial numbers of troops in much of Piedmont and Savoy itself under command of La Feuillarde. It could help, however, to divert at least some French attention from the campaign against Vienna. The interests of Savoy as an independent state could also be best served, perhaps, by making sure that French influence in northern Italy was not that firmly established. Victor-Amadeus was happy to accept a subsidy of 800,000 crowns each month from England, but also hoped to profit from the inherent weakness of both France and Austria, in both failing to establish and maintain large numbers of troops in the region as each had other pressing problems elsewhere – for France this was the exposed border with the Low Countries, while for Austria there was the lingering rebellion in Hungary and the ever-present, but for the time being dormant, threat from the Ottomans to the east. There was also a more immediate threat to Vienna, from Marshal Marsin and the elector of course, but that would soon receive attention. Victor-Amadeus undoubtedly had a certain cunning, he judged his chances with care, and the risks he took were measured. After some procrastination by the emperor, who understandably was reluctant to expose his youngest son to risk, Charles made his way to England where he arrived at the end of December 1703, before

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58 The War of the Spanish Succession travelling to Windsor to be received by Queen Anne, whose treasury would soon become his de facto paymaster. During the round of agreeable festivities that greeted Charles’ arrival, there was opportunity to discuss joint operations against France by the Duke of Marlborough in the Low Countries, or perhaps through the Moselle valley, and equally importantly the best ways to prosecute an allied advance from Portugal on Madrid. Charles was an agreeable young man and made a very good impression. HMS Royal Katherine was suitably re-equipped to carry the newly-proclaimed king and his entourage to Lisbon, and after some delays with contrary winds she sailed towards the end of February, arriving without mishap at the mouth of the river Tagus on 6 March 1704. Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt, appointed as commander-in-chief of the expedition and regarded as a sound choice with a good knowledge of Spain and the often difficult ways of campaigning in the peninsula, had arrived a few weeks earlier aboard HMS Panther. The Grand Alliance had gained Portugal for the Habsburg cause, with a safe haven in the mouth of the river Tagus for warships to prowl onwards into the Mediterranean. Still, accounts of the outrages committed at Cadiz had altered the general mood, and the threat of Portuguese troops soon invading Spanish soil set all of Castile and much of Aragon, Estramadura and Murcia against the Habsburg cause. It was therefore, a welcome entry in the credit column for the allies that Victor-Amadeus had at last joined the Grand Alliance. Count Johann Wentzel Wratislaw, the emperor’s envoy to England, had urged throughout 1703 that the imperial forces deployed on the Danube should be augmented by Vienna’s allies, but his appeals had so far been fruitless. George, the astute Elector of Hanover, had also urged that additional support be provided to secure Vienna from attack; priorities, in particular Marlborough’s plans to seize Antwerp, had, however, been firmly elsewhere for the time being. A corps of twelve Dutch battalions under the very capable command of LieutenantGeneral Johan Wigand van Goor had been sent to the upper Rhine, but little else. Goor quarrelled with the obstinate imperial commander in that region, the Margrave of Baden, and this problem came to a head in November 1703 when Goor refused an instruction to supply a garrison for a small fortress as that would entail breaking up his command, contrary to the express orders he had from the States-General. Baden attempted to relieve Goor of his command, a course of action for which

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Campaigning in the Low Countries 59 he had no authority, and the Dutch in frustration suggested that their general be sent back home to Holland, accompanied by his troops of course. ‘The carrying out of this order would set Marshal Tallard absolutely free to throw a new and large reinforcement into Bavaria.’32 Baden swallowed his pride, and prudently backed down, for such a diminution of bayonet strength would have had dire consequences for the campaign to combat the Elector of Bavaria and his French allies. Coming after the defeat at Speyerbach, it was apparent that the allied effort on the upper Rhine was in real disarray and unless something drastic was attempted, the whole imperial strategic posture in the war was in danger of collapse.

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Chapter 5

Adventures in Southern Germany ‘The enemy have marched.’1

The famous march up the Rhine, undertaken by the army commanded by the Duke of Marlborough, is rightly remembered as a notable feat of daring, cool judgement and sound logistics. Early in 1704, a decision could not be forced in the Low Countries, but Vienna was threatened and the imperial armies on the Danube had to be supported, while Marlborough was keen to shake off the restraining hands of his Dutch allies. ‘He saw that the Marshals Villeroi and Boufflers kept themselves close within their Lines in Brabant, and that it was impossible to bring them to a battle.’2 The States-General were, however, highly unlikely to agree to their army being marched off so far southwards, but they could hardly forbid Marlborough from taking Queen Anne’s troops on such a venture; persuasion and some subtle deception was necessary, as is often the case in coalition warfare. Making a virtue of necessity, the plan was hatched between Marlborough and Count Wratislaw and almost kept a secret; in March 1704 Queen Anne gave her consent for the duke to take his troops to southern Germany, ‘a speedy succour’ to confront the French and Bavarian armies threatening Emperor Leopold and Vienna. The potential danger to southern Holland once Marlborough went away was real, and this risk had to be finely judged and balanced against the danger to Vienna. Dutch fears and concerns were not imagined or irrelevant, but Marlborough was able to assure the States-General that the French would not be able to ignore his march southwards, and would have to quickly redeploy their own forces to meet the new threat, as yet undefined, that he posed. In this way, the danger to Holland would be diminished and in any case, the Dutch troops commanded by

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Adventures in Southern Germany 61 Overkirk would remain in place to assure the safety of their borders. Another consideration was that powerful French armies lay at intervals along the route that Marlborough must take, Bedmar in the Moselle valley and Tallard in Alsace. The preparations for such a shift in emphasis in the war could not be kept entirely hidden, but the actual intention had to remain in some question for as long as possible. Surprise and fast marching were required to keep the initiative in allied hands, and to not allow the French commanders either to recognise what was intended, or move to intervene, perhaps forcing a damaging engagement on the duke’s army while strung out on the march, well away from its supports and depots. On 19–21 April 1704, Marlborough crossed from England to The Hague, and announced his intention to go and campaign against the Marquis de Bedmar in the Moselle valley that summer. Still, ‘I would not conceal from you,’ the Duke wrote to a friend in London: my resolution of marching with the English, some of our auxiliaries, and what other troops can with safety be spared, up to the Danube, as what may tend most to the advantage of the common cause, the support of the Empire, and the protection of the House of Austria, for which, by particular directions from her Majesty, I am to have all possible regard.3 The representatives of the province of Zealand, in particular, strongly objected to what was suggested for a summer campaign on the Moselle, let alone anything further away, but the duke’s persuasive arguments at last won the day. Overkirk and Marlborough got along well together, and the fact that the Dutchman at first raised no great objections to what was proposed counted for a lot. With the queen’s permission safely in his pocket, the duke could go whether or not the Dutch approved, and in their hearts they knew it. The States-General, with some reluctance, gave their consent to the enterprise on 4 May, and fifteen days later the 19,000 troops in Queen Anne’s pay began their march southwards from Bedburg.4 The Dutch were not quite as ignorant of what was really intended as is often thought, for Marlborough wrote to the Grand Pensionary, Anthonius Heinsius, on 21 May: ‘You might send us so many troops as might make me succeed against the Elector [of Bavaria] and M. Overkirk be able to undertake whatever you should

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Map 3: The Duke of Marlborough’s famous march to the Danube in 1704.

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Adventures in Southern Germany 63 think best in Flanders.’5 A few days later Coblenz at the confluence of the river Moselle and the Rhine was reached without hindrance, and Marlborough was as arranged joined here by a contingent of Hanoverian and Prussian troops. Captain Robert Parker wrote of the good manner in which the operation was conducted. ‘Surely never was such a march carried on with more order and regularity and with less fatigue both to man and horse.’6 Marshal Villeroi, the French commander in the Low Countries, although aware that plans had been made for a possible allied campaign in the Moselle valley, was puzzled at the speed of Marlborough’s moves. He appealed to Louis XIV for advice on what best to do, as the borders of Holland appeared to have been rashly laid bare in the process. The clear strategic shift in allied operations could not, however, be ignored or discounted and the prompt reply from Versailles was that if the duke marched then the marshal must march also, while leaving a modest force to observe Overkirk and his Dutch troops. ‘The King immediately sent orders to Marshal Villeroi to follow the Duke of Marlborough, with a body of 20,000 troops.’7 As the duke had predicted, Holland remained safe, while Marlborough blithely crossed over to the east bank of the Rhine on 27 May, and the pretence of a Moselle campaign faded away. He could still go and attack Marshal Tallard in Alsace, a perfectly valid option as a French defeat there would further isolate Marsin and his army in Bavaria. Instead, the river Main was crossed on 3 June, and the intention to campaign in Bavaria became plain with new and more secure lines of supply and communication opened into central Germany, well away from the threat of any French interference. On 7 June the river Neckar was crossed by Marlborough’s marching soldiers, and the duke now admitted to the States-General that his intention really was to go to the Danube. This was not, as we have seen, news to Heinsius but he seems to have kept it to himself up to that point. The Dutch received the by now not wholly unexpected news with commendable calm and gave permission for the use of van Goor’s Dutch detachment which had campaigned on the upper Rhine since the previous year. With this increment, and Hessian and Danish troops coming to join the campaign, Marlborough could deploy some 40,000 troops, and could outmatch any one of the French columns likely to manoeuvre against him either on the march or on arrival on the banks

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64 The War of the Spanish Succession of the Danube. All this while, Louis XIV’s field commanders had not been idle, and Tallard had already managed to take a re-supply convoy across the passes of the Black Forest to replenish Marsin’s depots and magazines, and had then evaded an attempt by Baron Thungen, the imperial commander in the Lines of Stollhofen, to intercept his safe return to Alsace. Marshal Villeroi, at the urging of his king, had hurried after Marlborough on his march up the Rhine, leaving Bedmar in place on the Moselle, and combined forces with Tallard in Alsace early in June. As their opponent’s intention to cross the Swabian Jura hills to campaign in Bavaria became evident, the two marshals faced a dilemma. Marsin could hardly be left without reinforcement, but if they both advanced to try and combine and confront Marlborough they had little confidence in the ability of the Elector of Bavaria to provision a fresh French army. Louis XIV’s perplexity at the unfolding campaign, with his commanders clearly having lost the initiative from the outset and being somewhat at a loss, can be seen when writing to Tallard: ‘You and Marshal Villeroi should come together with a plan to prevent all the forces of the Empire from uniting with the Dutch and the English and falling upon the Elector, who would be unable to resist them.’8 Their perplexity continued, and a fresh appeal was sent to Versailles for advice. Instructions eventually came from the king that Tallard should proceed with his army to join Marsin and the elector on the Danube, while Villeroi remained with his troops to hold Alsace secure and prevent any further allied reinforcements being sent from the Rhine to add to Marlborough’s strength. The king was obliged by bitter experience to look over his shoulder at this point, and instructed Tallard to keep his troops independent of the combined FrancoBavarian army under Marsin and the elector, unless the allies should successfully combine their own forces. In that way, it seemed, should Wittelsbach play Louis XIV false, as the King of Portugal and the Duke of Savoy had both recently done, Tallard could manoeuvre to extricate Marsin and his troops from Bavaria with comparative freedom. On 10 June 1704, Marlborough for the first time met the President of the Imperial War Council, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and four days later they were joined at Gross Heppach by the Margrave of Baden. Their plan for a joint campaign saw Eugene going to hold the Lines of

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Adventures in Southern Germany 65 Stollhofen on the Rhine, to try and prevent any further French reinforcements being sent to Bavaria. Meanwhile, Marlborough and Baden were to combine and force the line of the Danube, to interpose their armies between Vienna and the French and Bavarians. Although the three allied detachments would quite separated, there was little apparent danger that the French would suddenly spring into action and attempt to defeat any one of them while they remained apart. However, poor weather had slowed the marching pace of the allied soldiers, and Marlborough wrote on 19 June that: We expect to hear hourly from Prince Louis [Baden], that we may march and join him, but the continued rains we have had for several days will retard our designs. The Elector of Bavaria has repassed the Danube with all his troops, and put his gross baggage into Ulm. The Prussian troops are to join Prince Eugene tomorrow, and then he will have an army of 30,000 men to observe the enemy’s motions on the Rhine. We do not hear that they have yet undertaken anything.9 On 22 June Marlborough and Baden combined forces and could between them now deploy some 60,000 troops in addition to those commanded by Eugene on the Rhine. Marshal Marsin and the elector with a combined strength of just 40,000, could not risk an engagement in the open, and went into an entrenched camp at Dillingen on the north bank of the Danube, just downstream from the free city of Ulm which had been occupied by the Bavarians the previous year. Marlborough could not conduct an effective campaign in Bavaria unless he had a good forward base and could force the passage of the Danube to operate south of the river. Nordlingen was fairly free of the danger of French attack and sat astride a good old Roman road leading northwards to Nuremburg which was the duke’s main supply base. However, Nordlingen was too far away from the Danube to be suitable once the river was crossed. In addition, the Elector of Bavaria was a sound tactician, whatever shortcomings he may have had as a statesman, and could be counted on to manoeuvre to defend the line of the Danube as firmly as possible. If he should succeed in this, then Marlborough and Baden would be left stranded, almost, north of the river, while the French and Bavarian threat to Vienna developed with the additional

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66 The War of the Spanish Succession reinforcement that Louis XIV was likely to send to bolster the campaign in southern Germany. The small town of Donauwörth, sitting at the confluence of the Danube and the river Wornitz, some twenty miles south of Nordlingen, appeared to offer everything that the Allied commanders needed as a forward base. It was easily defensible to any threat from the south, and had a good bridge over the Danube. The town also had capacious storehouses and magazines to receive the supplies that the allied campaign would require. The difficulty was that these advantages were also very evident to the elector, and he had established a good garrison in the town, commanded by a French Colonel DuBordet, and the nearby Schellenberg hill, which dominated the place, was being put into a state of defence by a 12,000-strong French and Bavarian corps backed by artillery, under the command of a very capable Piedmontese officer, Comte Jean d’Arco. The options open to Marlborough and Baden were limited. Any attack on the Schellenberg was likely to be an expensive business, as d’Arco had a good reputation as a fighter, and would exact a high price for any ground given up. However, the narrow frontage leading to the hill made manoeuvring the defenders out of position a difficult and time-consuming prospect, with no guarantee at all of easy or early success, while the elector would be certain to reinforce d’Arco once the intention to seize Donauwörth was recognised. The allied commanders could move down the Danube towards Ingolstadt and attempt to force a crossing there, but the town also had a stout Bavarian garrison and any such movement would lay open Marlborough’s line of supply and communication northwards to Nordlingen and Nuremburg open to attack. The Margrave of Baden, used to campaigning in a rather measured way, was reluctant to attack the Schellenberg directly, but Marlborough pressed the merits of early action and got his way. Deserters confirmed that the defences on the hill were incomplete, and the duke’s decision in this was strengthened when it was learned that Tallard had evaded Prince Eugene at the Lines of Stollhofen and was making his way through the Black Forest with a fresh French army to reinforce Marsin and the elector in pushing forward their campaign against Vienna.10 With time pressing hard on the allied commanders, on 2 July 1704 they struck at d’Arco on the Schellenberg, and in the course of a bitterly-fought action, during which the defenders put in

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Adventures in Southern Germany 67 one very smart counter-attack, the French and Bavarians were driven off the hill and to destruction in the wide waters of the Danube behind them. Colonel Jean-Martin de la Colonie recalled the ferocity of the fighting: The enemy’s battery opened fire upon us and raked us through and through . . . so accurate was the fire that each discharge of the cannon stretched some of my men on the ground. I suffered agonies at seeing those brave fellows perish.11 The cost in obtaining success was heavy: some 5,000 Allied troops were killed and wounded (amongst them the Margrave of Baden, who was shot in the foot, and General van Goor who was killed) but the Duke now had his forward base and a good crossing over the Danube; Bavaria lay open to the attentions of the allied army. Of d’Arco’s excellent corps, only about 3,000 men escaped to rally to the elector for the coming campaign. The sorry list of those allied troops who had fallen were recounted in the duke’s letter to the States-General written the day after the battle: We have lost many brave officers, and we cannot enough bewail the loss of Sieurs Goor and Beinheim who were killed in this action. The Prince of Baden and General Thungen are slightly wounded. Count Styrum has received a wound across his body, but it is hoped he will recover. The Hereditary Prince of HesseCassel, and the Count de Horne, Lieutenant-General, Major General Wood and [Brigadier-General] Van Pallandt have also been wounded.12 Marlborough was heavily criticised for the losses sustained – ‘What was the sense of capturing a hill in the heart of Germany at such heavy loss,’ one of his critics in London asked, adding not surprisingly ‘were there not many such hills?’13 Despite such comments and reservations, the duke could now move across the Danube and interpose the allied army between the French and Bavarians and the emperor in Vienna. In so doing, he had achieved the principal aim of his whole campaign. Unless the Elector of Bavaria and Marshal Marsin came out into the open to fight, and this was unlikely as they were even more outnumbered now,

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68 The War of the Spanish Succession for the time being they no longer posed a threat to the security of Vienna. Emperor Leopold was sure of the value of what had been achieved, and he wrote in warm tones and in his own handwriting (a most unusual honour) to Marlborough with congratulations at the success on the Schellenberg: My generals themselves, and my ministers declare that this success (which is most gratifying and at the present time more opportune than almost anything else that could befall me) is principally due to your judgement, foresight, execution and also to the wonderful ardour and constancy of the forces under your command.14 Others were not so sanguine at what had been achieved and at such heavy cost, and Sophia, the elderly Electress of Hanover, whose regiments had suffered heavily in the fighting wrote in waspish tones that ‘The Elector [her son, George] is saddened at the loss of so many brave subjects in consequence of the mistakes made by the great general Marlborough. He says that the Margrave of Baden did very much better.’15 The electress was also affronted that the reports of the battle gave insufficient credit to the Hanoverian troops involved. Baden, it is true, had made a very neat flanking attack to complete the success of the day, and the States-General in The Hague had a medal minted to commemorate the victory, but it featured the margrave, not the duke. That Marlborough had been the driving force behind the operation, and the principal guiding hand in the attack on the Schellenberg itself, seemed to have been overlooked. The heavy casualties had, however, been an undoubted shock and this coloured attitudes. Louis XIV, however, was in no doubt about what had been achieved for the allied cause: Nothing can now prevent the Emperor from making himself master of Munich, taking the Electress and her children prisoners and all that the Elector regards as most precious. I would like to believe that we could have prevented this passage.16 Marlborough and Baden crossed over the Danube, partly using the captured Bavarian pontoon train, and entered Bavaria. The duke wrote

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Adventures in Southern Germany 69 to London on 6 July, ‘We are now preparing to pass the Lech, which I hope to do tomorrow or Tuesday, and then we shall be in the heart of Bavaria.’17 The duke successfully laid siege to the small fortress of Rain, despite a lack of heavy guns that Baden had promised but failed to provide; had matters been left to the margrave, it seems likely that the allies would not have established themselves south of the river until Eugene arrived some weeks later. Negotiations with the elector to persuade him to abandon his alliance with Louis XIV failed, despite the electress urging her husband to come to terms with the allies. ‘You see to what extremities the Elector my spouse has reduced his dominions. I have done all that I am able to keep the war from so fine a country.’18 Unable to negotiate satisfactorily with the elector, Marlborough let loose his cavalry on a campaign of destruction across the rich countryside, burning and looting at will, although the elector’s own estates were ordered not to be touched. Many Bavarian troops were deployed to protect the elector’s property all the same, diminishing the strength of the Franco-Bavarian field army in consequence, to the indignation of Marshal Marsin at such a wasteful dispersal of effort. The Margrave of Baden protested at the campaign as being too savage but Marlborough ignored him, having however to write to London to assure his wife that British troops were not engaged in the burnings – this was not true. On 29 July the duke wrote of: The Comte de la Tour being gone out this morning with a strong detachment of horse and dragoons to destroy and burn the country about Munich, as I fear we shall be forced to do in other parts, to deprive the enemy as well of present subsistence as future support on this side [of the Danube].19 Reports of the extent of this notorious campaign to harry the Bavarian countryside seem to have been exaggerated, and Colonel de la Colonie wrote that: ‘I followed a route through several villages said to have been reduced to cinders, and although I certainly found a few burnt houses, still the damage was as nothing compared with the reports current throughout the country.’20 Ruthless harrying of the countryside had a dual purpose – it was hoped that the pressure exerted would induce the elector to come to terms, but if not, then Bavaria was to be ruined as a

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70 The War of the Spanish Succession base from which an army could operate throughout the coming months of winter. The common people would starve also, of course, but that was what happened in war and was just unfortunate. Despite the destruction, to whatever extent, the elector held firmly to his alliance with the French, and General Legall was sent to his camp by the French king with assurances that a major reinforcement of troops under Tallard was on the road to the Danube. The successful arrival in Bavaria on 6 August of the marshal with a fresh French army to support the campaign against Vienna appeared to have checked Marlborough’s campaign. No longer did the allies have a significant superiority in numbers and as the cool months of autumn approached, it seemed that the duke would soon have to withdraw into central Germany, to sustain his troops by drawing on his own depots and magazines established around Nuremburg. Once he had done so, and with the summer campaign on the Danube only partially successful and achieved with a heavy cost in effort, treasure and blood, it was likely that the States-General would demand his return to the Low Countries in the spring. In all likelihood, therefore, Vienna would be laid open to attack once more in 1705, and Marlborough would have to explain to Parliament in London why he had taken their army so far away and to so little benefit. Prince Eugene had not been able to prevent Tallard’s march through the Black Forest, despite the marshal wasting several days trying to take the minor fortress of Villingen. Shadowing the French march through the difficult wooded country, the prince kept Tallard under observation, but had prudently not ventured so close as to bring on a general engagement., By 6 August Eugene had encamped with his force of 18,000 troops on the north bank of the Danube, near to the village of Höchstädt. Marlborough and Baden with their larger army were some twenty-four miles away to the south-east at Rain. The three commanders met to agree their next moves, and it was agreed that Baden would take his own 15,000 troops to lay siege to the Bavarianheld fortress of Ingolstadt, which would provide the allies with another convenient crossing-point over the Danube in case Donauwörth should at some point become untenable. However, for Marlborough to move immediately to combine forces with Eugene would be premature at this time. If this took place south of the river then the Franco-Bavarian army might then be able to move northwards to intercept

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Adventures in Southern Germany 71 Marlborough’s lines of supply to Nordlingen and Nuremburg. If, on the other hand, the allied concentration was north of the Danube, then the line of approach towards Vienna might be laid open once more and Baden exposed to attack while engaged at Ingolstadt. The danger in the meantime was that Tallard, Marsin and the elector might move out from their entrenched camp at Dillingen and attack Eugene while he was still separated from Marlborough. That is just what they tried to do, crossing over pontoon bridges to the north bank of the Danube on 10 August to confront Eugene. The prince drew his troops back towards the small village of Münster, close to Donauwörth, thereby distancing himself from imminent attack while making a combination with Marlborough easier to achieve. He wrote to the duke, who was still at Rain, with an urgent summons, heavy with significance and committing the allies to fighting a battle north of the Danube: Monsieur, The enemy have marched. It is almost certain that the whole army is passing the Danube at Lauingen. They have pushed a Lieutenant-Colonel whom I sent to reconnoitre back to Höchstädt. The plain of Dillingen is crowded with troops. I have held on all day here; but with eighteen battalions I dare not risk staying the night. I quit however with much regret [the position] being good and if he takes it, it will cost us much to get it back. I am therefore marching the infantry and part of the cavalry to a camp I have had marked out before Donauwörth. I shall stay here as long as I can with the cavalry . . . Everything, milord, consists in speed and that you put yourself forthwith in motion to join me tomorrow, without which I fear it will be too late . . . While I was writing sure news has reached me that the whole army has crossed. Thus there is not a moment to lose and I think you might risk making a march by the [river] Lech and the Danube. That will shorten it a good deal, and the road is better. I await your answer, milord, to make my dispositions.21 Marlborough needed little urging now that Tallard and his fellow commanders had committed themselves by crossing to the north bank of the river. Twenty-seven squadrons of cavalry were straight away sent to support Eugene and the main army was put on the road, marching at

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72 The War of the Spanish Succession a good pace and covering the intervening miles in less than 24 hours. By the evening of 11 August the allied armies had successfully combined at Münster, and the immediate danger of either being isolated and defeated in detail had passed. The opposing commanders had now at last each effected their combination of forces, but having detached Baden to Ingolstadt, the allies had give up a precious superiority in numbers by so doing. The Franco-Bavarian army occupied a sound defensive position on the wide plain of Höchstädt; time might be said to be on their side, as the likelihood was that the allies could not push their campaign on the Danube to a decisive point before autumn came. Secure in their encampment, with flanks anchored on the Danube and the wooded hills of the Swabia Jura, the marshals and the elector could wait for events to unfold, and perhaps look to fall on Marlborough’s marching columns if, as they expected, he had to withdraw towards central Germany to find winter quarters for his troops. Everything changed on 13 August 1704, when Marlborough and Eugene surprised and attacked the French and Bavarians in their camp. The narrow defile at Schwenningen which might have been easily held was left unguarded and gave the allied army uncontested access to the plain of Höchstädt; the surprise that the allied commanders sprang upon their opponents was complete. Prince Eugene on the allied right was tasked to attack and tie down the troops commanded by Marshal Marsin and the Elector of Bavaria, while Marlborough used his powerful cavalry on the left against Marshal Tallard and his forces next to Blindheim (Blenheim) village. In the course of a very hard-fought day, the allies were eventually triumphant, destroying Tallard’s cavalry, inflicting 20,000 casualties and taking 13,000 unwounded prisoners, mostly French infantry packed uselessly into Blindheim where they were unable to use their muskets to any real effect. The Elector of Bavaria and Marshal Marsin managed to hold their positions fairly well until the evening, but at heavy cost, and then got their own battered troops off the field of battle as night fell. Tallard and many of his senior officers were among the prisoners taken. The Franco-Bavarian campaign was in ruins, and so too was Louis XIV’s main strategic effort to win the war. ‘We are in terrible consternation’ a French officer wrote ‘We have only 250 officers in all our armies who are not wounded or killed.’22 The news of the allied

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Adventures in Southern Germany 73 victory was greeted with astonishment and jubilation in Holland and England. So much had been feared, and so little expected, that the magnitude of France’s losses was seen as the wonder of the age, and men remembered that the excitement was such that sleep was impossible. Surely, it was felt, the war would now spin quickly to an advantageous conclusion for the Grand Alliance. Emperor Leopold in Vienna, often so swift to cavil and carp, was fulsome in the praise that he sent to Marlborough: These victories are so great, especially that near Höchstädt, over the French, which no ages can parallel, that we not only congratulate you on having broken the pride of France, defeated their pernicious attempts, and settled again the affairs of Germany, or rather of all of Europe, after so great shock; but have hopes of seeing the full and entire liberty of Europe in a short time happily restored from the power of France.23 The court in Versailles had been celebrating the birth on 25 June of a son to the Duc and Duchesse de Bourgogne. ‘This event caused great joy to the King and the Court. The town shared their delight, and carried their enthusiasm almost to madness by the excess of their demonstration and their fêtes.’24 But, the rejoicing was cut short in the most stark way when ‘News reached us which spread consternation in every family’. The Duc de St Simon recalled the distress and utter bewilderment at Versailles as the news of the catastrophe on the banks of the Danube emerged, piece by bitter piece: For six days the King remained in uncertainty as to the real losses that had been sustained. Everybody was afraid to write bad news; all the letters which from time to time arrived, gave, therefore, but an unsatisfactory account of what had taken place. The King used every means in his power to obtain some news. Every post that came in was examined by him, but there was little found to satisfy him. Neither the King nor anybody else could understand, from what had reached them, how it was that an entire army had been placed inside a village, and had surrendered itself by a signed capitulation. It puzzled every brain.25

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74 The War of the Spanish Succession When the details were confirmed, St Simon went on, ‘There was scarcely an illustrious family that had not had one of its members killed, wounded, or taken prisoner . . . the public sorrow and indignation burst out without restraint.’ The casualties suffered by Marlborough and Eugene in the battle were also severe, at some 12,000 killed and wounded, and their weary army could only follow up this success at a measured pace as a result. The small Bavarian garrison in Ulm submitted without resistance, and the two victorious commanders, having been joined again by the Margrave of Baden who had taken Ingolstadt in the meantime, pursued their defeated opponents on their sorry way to the Rhine. Marshal Villeroi in Alsace came forward to shepherd the defeated and dejected troops, who had been attacked repeatedly on the road by bands of outraged peasants, across the river to safety. He then conducted a cautiously effective defensive campaign to slow the allied advance. Eugene and Baden laid siege to Landau, while Marlborough marched his own troops across the difficult country of the Hunsruck to the Moselle valley where he laid siege to Trier and Trarbach. He was joined there by Overkirk, who had been summoned south with his Dutch corps to take part in the campaign. The likelihood of any attack on the southern borders of Holland was now very remote, and Overkirk had no hesitation in responding to the duke’s summons. The French garrison in Landau submitted at last on 29 November, after a very creditable defence led by the blind Marquis de Laubanie that had lasted for seventy days, slowing the progress of the allies to a crawl as the cold weather of winter set in. Although the campaign through the autumn had been, by comparison with the glories of the summer, a rather plodding affair, Marlborough had managed to secure the fortress of Landau in Alsace, and Trier and Trarbach in the Moselle valley, and in so doing breached the French strategic line of defence on the Rhine, ready for fresh efforts in the coming year. At the close of an exhausting but exhilarating campaign, Marlborough visited Berlin, Hanover, and The Hague to consult with his allies, and to receive their jubilant congratulations. He then travelled, to London accompanied by his distinguished prisoners, where his arrival was reminiscent of a Roman triumph, and the captured standards and colours from the Schellenberg and Blenheim were paraded through the streets and taken to be hung in Westminster

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Adventures in Southern Germany 75 Hall. Parliament did not stint in its praise when it presented the duke with an adulatory address on the successes that he had achieved that summer, in terms that reflected the general air of wonder at what had taken place: The happy success that has attended her Majesty’s arms under your Grace’s command in Germany the last campaign, is so truly great, so truly glorious, in all its circumstances, that few instances in the history of former ages can equal, much less excel the lustre of it. Your Grace has not overthrown young unskilful generals, raw and undisciplined troops; but your Grace has conquered the French and Bavarian armies; armies that were fully instructed in the arts of war, select veteran troops, flushed with former victories, and commanded by generals of great experience and bravery. The glorious victories your Grace has obtained at Schellenberg and Hochstadt, are very great, very illustrious in themselves; but they are greater still in their consequences to her Majesty and her allies.26 Given the scale of what had been achieved by Marlborough and Eugene that summer, the laudatory language may be felt not to have been overdone, and funds were voted for the building of a great palace for the duke, which would be named, appropriately enough, Blenheim.27

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Chapter 6

Enter the Duke of Berwick ‘For that purpose, an army was necessary’1

Late in 1703 it had become apparent to Louis XIV that a substantial troop reinforcement was necessary to secure his grandson’s position in Madrid, and on 29 November James Fitzjames, the English-born Duke of Berwick, was appointed to command the eight regiments of French cavalry and dragoons and twenty battalions of infantry to be sent to Spain in the following February.2 Berwick was a highly capable soldier, although he had not previously acted as commander-in-chief of an army, so that he had the assistance of the equally gifted Jean-François de Chasteney, Marquis de Puységur (both men later to be made Marshals of France). However, the marquis soon quarrelled with Philip V’s financial adviser, Jean Orry, whom he suspected, and came close to accusing, of theft and embezzlement. ‘What was his surprise’ the Duc de St Simon wrote ‘when he found that from Madrid to the frontier not a single preparation had been made for the troops, and that in consequence all that Orry had shown him, drawn out upon paper, was utterly fictitious.’ The dispute between Puységur and Orry was able to be resolved, fortunately, as it had arisen from an obvious misunderstanding in the drafting of a message rather than anything more serious.3 Berwick entered Madrid in lavish state on 15 February, and was appointed the next day by Philip V to the command as CaptainGeneral of the French and Spanish armies in the peninsula. Coalitions always have their strains, and never more so than when engaged in outright warfare. The difficulties that faced the allied commanders were no less severe for Berwick in attempting to pursue an effective campaign in Spain and Portugal. The Spanish soldiers were brave enough, as experience would show, but they were ill-equipped, poorly paid and their training was outdated. This could be corrected

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 77 under the flinty eyes of a few good French drill sergeants, but the Spanish officers were resentful of French interference and influence, even though they had to have both in order to learn to campaign effectively. Rivalries between ambitious people at the court in Madrid added to Berwick’s difficulties, some wanting just to please Philip V with flattery and soft words, some hoping to please him and his grandfather, while others were only interested in what was thought in Versailles, and yet more thought the French in Madrid were just too numerous and insufferably presumptuous anyway. A good deal of diplomacy and patience was called for, as Berwick made preparations for the coming campaign. The duke remembered that: I would have nothing to do with their quarrels, and indeed I had business of too much consequence upon my hands to admit of my entering into discussions, so disagreeable, as they were useless to the affairs I was principally entrusted to conduct.4 With typical energy and the application of a healthy amount of tact, Berwick and Puységur set about reforming, improving and training the Spanish troops under their command, and within a remarkably short space of time, could put a force of 40,000 reasonably well-equipped and trained men in the field, of whom some 10,000 were cavalry. The solid core of this army were still the 12,000 experienced soldiers that Berwick had brought south from the Spanish Netherlands, but the financial reforms that Orry had pushed through in Madrid enabled the soldiers to be regularly paid, which was something of an innovation in Spain at that time. King Pedro of Portugal had bowed to pressure and joined the Grand Alliance, and as agreed under the terms of the treaty Archduke Charles, accompanied by 4,000 British and Dutch troops, arrived in Lisbon on 6 March 1704, together with a powerful cruising squadron under Admiral George Rooke. The French ambassador, who had valiantly not ceased to try and persuade the king to return to his alliance with Louis XIV, hastily left Lisbon for Madrid (having bought up as many horses in the neighbourhood as he could, and sending them ahead to Spain). Charles entered the city and was greeted with great celebrations and acclamations, while Rooke took the bulk of his squadron to cruise in the Straits of Gibraltar. Pedro was ailing and unwell at this time, and

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78 The War of the Spanish Succession preparations for the coming campaign slowed, men and supplies were not being forthcoming in the numbers and quantities agreed. The Dutch subsidies in cash agreed under treaty terms were, under an accounting sleight of hand, diverted to repay old debts owed by Portugal to Dutch traders rather than in funding the army, although Queen Anne’s treasury paid England’s share of the monies promptly.5 The commander of the troops provided by England, Meinhardt, Duke of Schomberg, failed to take a grip of the situation and much valuable time was lost and the patience of many of his officers tested. The equipping of the cavalry and dragoons proved particularly difficult, as many horses had been lost on the voyage from southern England and Holland, and the Portuguese had been used to getting many of their remounts from Spain, an option that was no longer open to them. The recent activities of the now departed French ambassador did not help at all. The difficulty was made worse because the allied commanders thought the tough local ponies, the Rosianates, to be unsuitable for the weight of their troopers, so drafts of horses had laboriously and expensively to be shipped to the Tagus, with many continuing to be lost on the way. Rooke managed to secure a number of French prizes on his cruise, and returned to Lisbon in mid-April. Just how flexible and far-reaching English policy could be, both on land and at sea, was seen in the further instructions that he had received and set out in detail when Queen Anne wrote to the Archduke on 16 May: My Admiral has my orders to co-operate with Your Majesty’s Forces [the queen now always referred to Charles as if he were already the king of Spain] in reducing your kingdom; and since he has sailed for the Mediterranean with the aim of aiding Nice and Ville Franche [Savoyard territories], he will go no further than the Catalonian coast unless he is assured that these two places are in danger, and he will be removed scarcely beyond the coats of Spain, having given a rendezvous to his ships in the Bay of Altea. The operations in Napes, Sicily and the Adriatic will be regulated by the circumstances.6 Any project for operations in the distant Adriatic never came about, but there was clear concern that the French Mediterranean fleet might be reinforced, and attempt to combine with any residual Spanish squadron

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 79 loyal to Philip V to bar the allied passage through the Straits of Gibraltar. In that case Savoy would be exposed and left without support, as would Charles’s hopes of establishing a presence in Naples: For some time he has been waiting to carry troops to Catalonia, but since they could not be expected within a certain time, and having received news of a French squadron coming from Brest to join another at Cadiz which was expected at Toulon, it seems that his resolve of putting to sea without delay and without weakening his fleet, should be approved; since he was in a condition and had sufficient time, to prevent the Count de Toulouse from passing the straits . . . I am not forgetting the safety of the port of Lisbon.7 The admiral clearly had wide-ranging instructions, and he could offer assistance to the rebels in the Cevennes region of southern France if that was practical, and even try and influence the Moors in North Africa to openly declare support for the alliance. The lack of available troops to use as a landing force was regrettable, but ships swinging comfortably at anchor in harbour could not compare with an active fighting squadron at sea. King Pedro had promised two battalions of his own troops for this purpose, but time was pressing on Rooke and he would not delay while they marched from their inland camps. He set off to intercept the French ships coming from Brest, but proved unable to find them. He did, however, make the passage of the straits without difficulty. The admiral found, however, that a landing on the coast of Valencia was not practical at that time, particularly as he could not spare his marines ashore for very long, and so moved northwards to see what might be attempted in Catalonia. The Portuguese had watched the squadron sail away with some misgivings, for their own security had been assured under the terms of the treaty agreed with the alliance, and a major part of that security rested with the presence of allied warships off the Tagus. Those vessels had now gone on their way to the Mediterranean with Rooke, but John Methuen, adept diplomat that he was, assured King Pedro that the best way to guarantee safety was to seek out and engage the French fleet wherever it might be found. With some reluctance, and in order to ensure that a degree of harmony was maintained with an active

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80 The War of the Spanish Succession campaign in preparation, the point was accepted by the king. This reassurance proved to be correct when the French squadron from Brest made no attempt to attack Portuguese ports or shipping on its way southwards. Lingering resentment was felt though, particularly when a squadron under the command of Sir Cloudesley Shovell put in to the Tagus, but then left again at the end of June refusing to leave a single guard-ship on post there. As a result of the growing threat from Portugal having joined the allies, the Duke of Berwick almost inevitably had to begin his campaign in an effort to drive Lisbon out of the war, and in May he sent five columns of French and Spanish troops across the border. He took command of the main force, 14,000 strong, as it moved down the right bank of the river Tagus to Villa Velha, intending to combine there with a detachment of 5,000 troops under command of the Prince de Tzerclaes Tilly who was to clear Portalegre on the left bank. Subsidiary columns were commanded by Don Franciso de Ronquillo who was to advance by Almeida in Beira, and also under the Duke of Hijar and the Marquis de Villadarias. In all Berwick, who was for the time being accompanied by Philip V, had some 28,000 troops in the field, the majority being French, in the various detachments deployed. Galway and the Portuguese general Antonio Luis de Souza, Marqués Das Minas, could only field some 21,000 men to oppose Berwick, but the commanders on both sides had problems with forage for their horses, scarcity of supplies and a steady trickle of deserters from the ranks. It was no simple thing therefore, for Berwick to deploy his numerical advantage to best effect. Baron Nicholas Fagel stood in the path of Berwick’s main advance, but with only some 2,500 Dutch troops under command he could do little to hinder the French and Spanish progress. The minor Portuguese fortresses of Salvatierra, Segura, Rosmarinos, Cabresos and Pena Garcia capitulated without too great a struggle, and Monsanto and Idanha-la-Vieilha were both stormed by the French. The terrain made close cooperation between the various French and Spanish columns difficult, though, and supplies came forward only slowly. Berwick’s advance was so successful however, that James, Earl Stanhope, serving with the British and Dutch troops in Portugal, wrote that ‘I see no human possibility of saving Lisbon, but by a treaty, if the enemies push their advantages’.8

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 81 Despite the promising initial success of Berwick’s campaign, Das Minas advanced from Almeira in Beira with his Portuguese army, to which a few hundred Dutch troops had been added by a detachment sent by Fagel to ease his own lack of supplies. Orders came from Lisbon to turn away from Ciudad Rodrigo, the intended objective, and move to the Tagus to halt the French and Spanish advance there. Neither Schomberg. Das Minas or Fagel had pontoon bridging equipment, which meant that the Tagus kept them apart, unlike their opponents who could bridge the river at will. Tilly reached Portuguese-held PortoAlegre, and the garrison was forced to submit, and on 27 May, the French general Thouy, commanding a detachment of 4,000 troops, forced two battalions of Dutch infantry to surrender at Zarceda. Berwick combined forces with Tilly at Porto-Alegre, although supplies were still hard to come by, and forage was scarce for the horses, with large numbers of the animals sick or dying. The initially promising campaign to dominate the border region was slowing noticeably. Das Minas meanwhile had approached Monsanto, and on 11 June was confronted by the French and Spanish force commanded by Don Ronquillo. The Portuguese cavalry were charged and forced to give way, but their infantry proved to be more robust and Ronquillo withdrew in some haste once artillery fire was opened on his troops. Das Minas went on the next day to capture the fort at Monsanto with the garrison of 120 French soldiers being taken as prisoners of war and the place thoroughly plundered. The marquès then advanced to the Ponsul river, but learning that Berwick was close by at Castel Branco, he fell back to Penamacor. The duke did not pursue Das Minas, and instead combined with Villadarias who had come north from Andalusia with a force of 4,000 troops. Berwick managed to secure the fortress of Castello de Vide, partly because the timid governor insisted on giving up as soon as he could. ‘Our cannon,’ Berwick remembered derisively, ‘having begun to scratch their walls, the Portuguese governor desired to capitulate.’9 The comments were a little unwarranted, as he had threatened to sack the town and put the inhabitants to the sword if the garrison did not submit without delay. A number of secondary Portuguese-held fortresses had been secured, and overall the scanty laurels in the campaign so far lay with Berwick, but not a great deal had been achieved. The operations came almost to a halt in the heat of summer, with a worsening lack of regular

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82 The War of the Spanish Succession supplies, and an increased rash of guerrilla attacks on Berwick’s convoys and any lone stragglers; a defensive posture had to be adopted along the frontier with Portugal, where the allied commanders could still deploy over 20,000 troops. The condition of the French and Spanish cavalry mounts continued to deteriorate, and the duke wrote ruefully that he had ‘credited the people of the country, who assured us that it was absolutely necessary to give barley to the Spanish horses, without which they would perish . . . we were accustomed to feed the cavalry with such forage as we found.’10 On 1 July 1704, Berwick drew his troops back from the frontier, demolishing the defences of the places he had taken, with the exception of the forts at Segura, Marvão and Salvatierra, where garrisons were left. Philip V was unwell and not able to contribute very much to what remained of the campaign, so he went back to Madrid – Berwick took up a position at Salamanca and Villadarias returned to the south. ‘Thus ended this first campaign, the success of which ought to have been more considerable.’11 For the allies, the campaign had certainly seen very mixed fortunes, although to turn back the Franco-Spanish advance was recognised as an achievement, and the soldiers had on several occasions, as at Monsanto, fought well in unpromising circumstances. One benefit of the campaign for Berwick, however, was that he and his troops had eaten up the scanty supplies in the country along the Tagus, and the allied commanders, should they venture to advance into Spain, would find little to scavenge and have to bring their own provisions with them along the bad roads of the region. The soldiers on both sides were now in camp and quarters while the intense heat of the summer lasted, and preparations were made, with uneven success, to improve the supply arrangements for the renewal of activity in the autumn. The skills of the Duke of Schomberg had, however, been cast into doubt, as had his ability to cooperate effectively with his allies, and so he was soon to be replaced. The British and Dutch squadron commanded by Admiral Rooke, having safely convoyed the Levant fleet through the Straits of Gibraltar, failed to achieve a successful landing of troops in Valencia, or to bring to battle the French Mediterranean fleet, which had been expecting by the impending arrival of the squadron from Brest commanded by the Admiral of France, the Comte de Toulouse. A plan to attack Toulon was set aside, as the Duke of Savoy could not participate in such a venture at this time. Instead, on 30 May 1704 Rooke landed 1,600

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 83 English and Dutch marines, under the command of Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt, near to Barcelona in Catalonia. This project had been discussed in Lisbon prior to the fleet’s departure, and much was hoped from a Catalan uprising on behalf of the archduke. However, although there was little animosity shown to the allied troops, it was soon found that there was for the time being no particular sentiment in favour of Charles, while the Governor of Barcelona, Don Velasco, refused to accept a letter from the archduke. A threat to bombard the city only produced a derisive response and resentment from the populace when it became know, and was generally an ill-judged move that failed to impress Don Velasco. Lacking real numbers to make Prince George’s presence ashore count, Rooke then re-embarked the troops on 1 June and sailed for the coast of southern France once more to see if he could force an engagement on the French fleet. Adverse winds drove him back which ‘did as much damage to yards, masts and sails, as a battle’.12 Another attempt to intercept the Brest squadron failed, and Rooke turned for the straits once more. On 26 June he combined forces with the fresh squadron just arrived from the Tagus under the command of Shovell, and a fresh attempt to take Cadiz, or to seize Port Mahon in Minorca, were discussed but discounted. However, it was known that Gibraltar with its comparatively safe harbour for shipping, was weakly garrisoned by Spanish soldiers, and that would be a prize well worth having. The allied fleet took on board fresh water at Tetuan on the North African coast, and crossed the straits on 30 July 1704. That afternoon a 1,800-strong party of English troops and marines were landed on the narrow sandy isthmus that connects the Rock with the Spanish mainland, Some allied warships entered the harbour and warning shots were fired by the garrison gunners, one of which took away the topmast of HMS Ranelagh. The Governor of Gibraltar, Don Diego de Salinas, was immediately summoned to surrender, but he gallantly refused to do so, even though the defences were dilapidated and his inadequate garrison consisted of no more than ‘fifty-six men of whom there were not thirty in service’ in addition to a militia formed from the inhabitants of the town.13 A heavy bombardment began two days later, while armed boats were sent in with a boarding party to take hold of a French privateer which was sheltering beside the Old Mole; the vessel was secured and brought off without any casualties being suffered. A

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84 The War of the Spanish Succession Spanish battery on the New Mole was dismounted by the cannonade, and an unopposed landing was made there, although a powder magazine blew up causing a number of casualties amongst the attackers, and wrecking some of the boats beached nearby. A party of armed seamen landed at Europa Point at the southern extremity of the Rock, and at that de Salinas could see that continued resistance was futile. His small garrison, and the civilian inhabitants, had been subjected to the truly extraordinary total of 40,000 roundshot and shells in the naval bombardment, which did a lot of damage but caused very few casualties. The governor submitted on being granted good terms, and he and the garrison, and most of the inhabitants who feared what their fate might be amongst the Protestant heretic soldiers (the fresh and well-remembered outrages at Cadiz cast a long shadow), left the Rock. They established a camp on the Spanish mainland in sight of their old homes, with what few possessions they had been able to carry with them. Those few French subjects present in Gibraltar had to surrender themselves as prisoners of war. The allies had taken possession of Gibraltar in the the name of Archduke Charles at a fairly modest cost of some 300 killed and wounded, mostly caused by the explosion of the magazine, but before long the British would come to regard the place as being just for their own use. Even so, the value of using Gibraltar to ensure safe passage for allied warships through the straits was plain, and was described in London, with a degree of exaggeration, as being ‘a footing for the King of Spain [Carlos III of course] in the strongest fort belonging to that country, and of great use to us for securing our trade and interrupting of the enemy’s’.14 The news of the loss of Gibraltar was greeted with understandable dismay in Madrid, and the Comte de Toulouse, now commanding the French fleet in Toulon, set out to challenge Rooke’s hold on the straits. Four of the Dutch ships with Rooke had already sailed for Holland, to embark troops for service in Spain, and three frigates had been despatched to the Azores to shepherd in Portuguese merchantmen coming from Brazil. Rooke’s fleet was reduced in strength, but he was rejoined by Sir Cloudesley Shovell, whose ships had also re-supplied with fresh water at Ceuta. The French turned back rather than enter the straits, but, the opposing fleets met and clashed off Málaga on the morning of 24 August 1704. Rooke had fifty-nine warships plus seven fireships, while Toulouse could put in the line of battle fifty-seven

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 85 warships, six fireships and twenty-eight swift galleys. These oar-driven vessels proved their worth in towing the larger French ships into position when the wind dropped, and their heavy bow-mounted guns did a lot of damage to their opponents. With a brisk easterly coming up Rooke had the wind advantage, but the battle, while fiercely fought, was inconclusive, and despite a prodigious expenditure of powder and shot no ship on either side was sunk or taken, although most were badly battered, and Captain Sir Andrew Leake had been mortally wounded aboard HMS Grafton (70 guns). ‘The Comte de Toulouse,’ the Duc de St Simon wrote, ‘met the fleet under Rooke off Málaga and fought with it from ten in the morning till eight at night. It was long since such a tenacious and furious contact had been seen at sea.’15 British and Dutch casualties came to 2,718, while Toulouse lost 3,048 killed and wounded, amongst whom were Admirals de Bellisle and Lorraine. The next day Toulouse had the wind advantage, but after the rough handling received the previous day he did not engage the allied fleet. He was not to know that Rooke’s ships were perilously low on powder and shot, after their wasteful bombardment of Gibraltar a few weeks earlier, after which there had been no chance for replenishment. That the French had held their own could not be doubted though, with every chance of greater success to come. At a council of war on his flagship, Toulouse pressed the case for engaging Rooke again the next morning, but his senior officers, appalled at the high casualties already suffered, would not agree. As a result, the French Mediterranean fleet hauled off that night and made for Toulon, enabling a very relieved Rooke to get his battered ships into the shelter of Gibraltar bay, where the Dutch flagship Albemarle blew up, apparently by accident, taking with her almost the entire crew. Louis XIV received a highly-slanted report of the engagement, in which the advantages gained were exaggerated, so he wrote with considerable satisfaction to the Cardinal de Noailles: The fleet which I have drawn together in the Mediterranean under the command of my son, the Comte de Toulouse, Admiral of France, has not only disappointed the designs of the English and Dutch fleet joined together upon the coast of Catalonia, but has likewise ended the campaign gloriously by a general engagement altogether to our advantage; although the enemy was

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86 The War of the Spanish Succession considerably more numerous and had a favourable wind, yet their first efforts were sustained, and they have been repulsed with so much bravery by our officers and seamen, animated by the example of a general, that they had no other thought during the fight, which lasted ten hours, than to avoid being boarded by our ships, which was several times attempted.16 Despite this evident satisfaction, the engagement of the two fleets had been a scrambled affair without real advantage being gained one way or the other, and Toulouse was reluctant to venture out again. Rooke’s ships were in no fit state to serve on without major repairs, in fact some were hardly seaworthy, and in mid-September they limped away to refit in the Tagus, and even England and Holland, before winter set in. Still, for all the French claims of having achieved victory, the simple fact was that from this point onwards, they and their Spanish allies never again seriously challenged the British and Dutch to a general engagement of battle-fleets at sea. This moral defeat was clear, even though the French ships’ firepower, rigging and sailing characteristics had on the whole been noticeably better than that of their opponents, even if the crews were evenly matched. In the meantime, the battered defences of Gibraltar were repaired and strengthened, with a garrison of 2,300 Dutch and English marines, some seventy volunteer seamen serving as gunners, and a small detachment of Catalan irregulars. Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt commanded the garrison, with the Irish-born Colonel Henry Nugent as the governor, having the local rank of major-general and already holding the honorary Spanish title of the Count de Val de Soto. Rooke had asked Archduke Charles that the marines be released for sea service, but nothing came of this, the admiral had, however, arranged a considerable re-supply from North African ports, helped by an enterprising English trader named Mr Warren, before his ships left the straits. The Alcayde Ali Benabdulla, the Moorish governor in Tangier, was particularly helpful, as he hoped to see the Spanish troops in the besieged enclave of Ceuta leave to pursue their quarrels elsewhere over the throne in Madrid. He had been impressed by the display of allied naval might over recent weeks, and clearly felt it opportune to adopt such a cooperative course. Prince George sent an envoy to negotiate with the Alcayde, hoping to secure horses, corn and barley, and perhaps

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 87 even the use of Moorish mercenary troops, although this would surely have meant more trouble than it was worth. Having Protestant soldiers serving in the peninsula was bad enough for the locals to endure without any such complications and, perhaps fortunately, the dangerous notion was dropped. Before long efforts to retake the Rock were seen to be in preparation, with the approach of a 600-strong advanced guard of Spanish troops, followed by a more substantial force commanded by the Marquis de Villadarias in early September. A land blockade was established in the process, but few real hostilities took place for the time being. Rooke and his ships had gone, and on 4 October, a French squadron of twenty warships commanded by Admiral Jean Pointis entered Gibraltar bay, escorting transports which landed troops, guns and stores before sailing away to Cadiz. Once established there, Pointis and his squadron should be well placed to intercept any attempts to replenish and reinforce the garrison on the Rock. Three days later Queen Anne penned a note to the archduke, setting out how clearly what an advantage to the allied cause holding firmly on to Gibraltar was: The capture of the town of Gibraltar upon which you congratulate me is the more pleasing since it will open a passage into Your Kingdom of Spain and its conservation will no doubt ensure great advantages. With that view I am working, on my side, with all application, and I hope that Your Majesty and the King of Portugal both will unite with me in taking the necessary measures to defend the place.17 Villadarias had command of 8,000 Spanish troops in sight of Gibraltar, in addition to the 4,000 French reinforcements landed by Pointis, while a siege train of forty heavy guns and twelve mortars had been brought forward into position, at great effort, with which to batter the defences. Trenches were opened on 21 October opposite the Landport gate, and a bombardment began six days later. On 9 November, a squadron sailing out of Lisbon commanded by Admiral Sir John Leake appeared off the Rock, after evading the attentions of the French squadron in Cadiz, and drove ashore to be set on fire several French ships found in the Bay, although one frigate, the Etoile (24 guns) was boarded and captured by an armed party from HMS Swallow. That

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88 The War of the Spanish Succession same day Major-General Nugent was mortally wounded by an exploding shell; but despite sickness amongst the garrison, an attempt to surprise the defences on 11 November was driven off with heavy Spanish losses. ‘The enemy attacked us this day, at break of day, at the Round tower and the breach above it.’18 Leake had landed stores and reinforcements, including workmen to improve and repair the defences, but at the end of the month, learning that Pointis was approaching with his squadron from Cadiz (lookouts on the Rock had the ability to see over the adjacent Spanish headland into the approaches from the open waters of the Atlantic), the admiral moved his ships to a better position from which to fight a general engagement, and to cover an expected convoy bringing more reinforcements for the garrison. The bombardment of the defences of Gibraltar continued all the while, with breaches appearing at intervals and the besiegers’ entrenchments creeping ever closer. By the first week of December only about 1,000 troops in the garrison were fit to man their posts, but the bad weather that battered Leake’s squadron also slowed the siege work and flooded the entrenchments, so that there was in consequence a lowering of morale and lessening in enthusiasm amongst Villadarias’s troops. However, a new battery mounting 36-pounder siege guns was set up and soon did a lot of damage to the defences along the Old Mole. On 14 December, a ship arrived with news that a relief convoy was sailing from Lisbon, and although several ships were lost in an encounter with a French squadron off Cape Spartel, thirteen warships and four transports arrived safely in Gibraltar bay by 19 December. A welcome reinforcement of over 1,700 troops, including English Foot Guards, were landed with a substantial quantity of stores and ammunition. On 23 December a sally by allied soldiers destroyed lengths of the siege works for little loss, evidence of a new offensive spirit amongst the Gibraltar garrison, and this exploit was repeated a week later with similar success. The spark seemed to have gone out of the siege operations, and the bombardment by the Spanish and French gunners now dwindled away, with casualties and sickness reducing the force commanded by Villadarias to fewer than 6,400 men. On Christmas Day the squadron under Leake re-appeared from the east where it had been wind-bound for several days, and early in January 1705 he took the various ships gathered in Gibraltar bay off to Lisbon, where they arrived safely on 20 January. The Marquis de Villadarias was

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 89 replaced by Marshal Tessé, and Admiral Pointis still cruised hopefully off the Rock with his squadron, but fresh attempts to storm the defences proved fruitless, with a sharp bombardment and infantry attack on 5 February by French troops being beaten off, and a brisk counter-attack by Dutch troops having some success. Leake re-supplied the allied garrison once more in late March with a joint Anglo-Dutch and Portuguese squadron and inflicted a damaging local defeat on the French squadron with three ships captured and two others driven ashore and burned; Pointis was wounded in the engagement, never to fully recover his health.19 By April, Tessé recognised that the attempt to recover Gibraltar was fruitless without the employment of far greater resources than were available, and turned his siege operations once more into a simple blockade. In any case, concern was felt that allied attention would once more be given to a fresh attack upon Cadiz, and the garrison there urgently needed strengthening. Philip V reluctantly consented to the attempt on the Rock being abandoned, and by the third week of the month Tessé began to withdraw his troops, unmolested by the allied garrison, a difficult operation that he accomplished with great skill. The cost of this failed enterprise was heavy, for of the 18,000 troops eventually devoted to retaking the Rock, some 12,000 had become sick or casualties. The loss amongst the garrison was far less, and the cause of Archduke Charles in the contest for the throne in Madrid was boosted, to a limited degree, by this manifest failure on behalf of Philip V and his generals. The allied presence in southern Spain, by contrast, had been emphatically maintained, and this achievement at Gibraltar was not simply the seizure of the Rock and the gaining of a safe, if rather cramped, anchorage in the sheltered waters of the bay. The ability to dominate passage of the straits was a major benefit, but could only be had if a naval squadron was permanently stationed at the Rock, and for the time being this could not be provided. The French and Spanish had been drawn into what was in effect a futile sideshow, with the diversion of resources away from more promising campaigns, imposing a wearying and persistent drag upon the preparations to counter the expected advance of allied troops from Portugal. In that wider campaign, the Duke of Berwick had faced a clear dilemma, for Philip V, urged on by his grandfather in Versailles, had wanted Gibraltar to be recovered without delay. By now Schomberg had

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90 The War of the Spanish Succession returned to London and been replaced by the veteran campaigner Henri de Ravigny, the Earl of Galway. ‘Finding that the King of Portugal complains that the Duke of Schomberg,’ Queen Anne had written to the archduke, ‘I have resolved to recall him and send out the Earl of Galway to take the command of my troops, which – I am anxious to Inform you – I shall soon bring to full strength.’20 Das Minas was preparing a fresh advance into Spain from Beira, while Berwick’s own forces were reduced by casualties, sickness and a lack of forage. Campaigning in the peninsula was proving to be a testing business, and he wrote that: The army of the enemy would be composed of thirty-seven battalions, ten of which were English or Dutch, and of fifty squadrons. The only forces I had to oppose to them were eighteen French battalions reduced to nothing, and thirty-seven squadrons in the weakest condition, exclusive of five Spanish battalions in garrison in Ciudad Rodrigo.21 There was also lingering concern that the small garrison at Badajoz on the river Guadiana would be attacked by the allies, so Berwick firmly refused requests to detach any troops to aid the attempt to recover Gibraltar. There was understandably a degree of strain between the commanding general and the court in Madrid, where the newly-arrived French ambassador, the Duc de Gramont, sought to establish his own position by meddling and criticising the conduct of the war. Even Puységur, normally so helpful and calm, felt that fears for the security of the south of the country were exaggerated, whether it be from a sortie from Gibraltar into Andalusia, or a fresh advance into Estramadura from Portugal by way of Badajoz. Berwick remained sure that the main threat lay in a direct approach through Alcantara and Toledo: A certainty that the King of Portugal and the Archduke would come and attack me. All my representations, however, were still disregarded, to which Puységur, who was then at Madrid, contributed much; for he insisted that the enemy could not collect a sufficient force to make head upon me.22

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 91 True enough, the allied army, commanded by Das Minas and the newly-arrived Galway, with the Dutch troops still under Baron Fagel, was on the move. By 23 September they had reached Almeida with a force nearly 20,000 strong, and King Pedro and Archduke Charles joined the army two days later to review the troops, expressing themselves very satisfied with their spirits, condition and state of equipment. Das Minas was eager that Ciudad Rodrigo should be threatened, and once that fortress fell an advance on Madrid in the cooler months of autumn was a promising prospect. This course was also urged by the Almirante of Castile, as the best way to raise the countryside for the Habsburg cause. Both Galway and Fagel were unconvinced however, and Archduke Charles, who was unwell with dysentery, refused to put forward a decided opinion. The danger was belatedly recognised, however, in Madrid, and a reinforcement of Spanish household cavalry was hastily sent to Berwick, together with a not altogether helpful instruction that he was to avoid a general action, and to retire if Galway advanced. The duke decided to ignore this, called Tilly from Badajoz with reinforcements, and decided to hold the line of the river Agueda. ‘Being convinced that if I did not, Spain was lost; so that it was much better to hazard a battle with some hope of success, than to abandon and forfeit all.’23 Berwick’s judgement was sound and the decision proved to be correct, and the allies, who had to delay operations while supplies were brought forward, only advanced to the line of the river on 7 October. After a sharp artillery exchange, Das Minas decided that the position adopted by Berwick was too strong to be carried, and the planned assault was called off. Poor weather set in, forage was harder to find and the allied army, unable to force the line of the Agueda, fell back along its lines of communication and supply into Portugal once more.24 The missed chance for the allied army to strike effectively that autumn inevitably led to recriminations and a general laying of blame for inaction, while King Pedro’s declining health forced him out of the future planning of operations. For all his initial understandable reluctance to abandon his treaty with France he had proved to be a good ally, and was certainly no fool where it came to the realities of having to campaign in adverse circumstances. On the other side of the hill, the Duke of Berwick was soon recalled to France, and his place as commander of the French and Spanish armies was taken by Marshal

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92 The War of the Spanish Succession Tessé who, it was thought, would be more likely to pay attention to instructions from Madrid unlike the ‘great dry devil of an Englishman’.25 This was no adverse reflection upon Berwick’s considerable achievement in turning Das Minas and Galway and their army back in the closing months of the years’ campaign, and the duke was awarded the prestigious Order of the Golden Fleece by Philip V before he left Madrid. As it was, Tessé proved to be just as robust in maintaining his position as field commander free to operate as he saw fit, and even managed to get the interfering Duc de Gramont recalled to Versailles. Although the failure to recover Gibraltar was regretted in Madrid, this could be seen as a temporary setback to be put right in due course, and if anything the allied success there had aggravated the already rather unsympathetic people of Andalusia. An advance through the region had been suggested by John Methuen, but not taken forward despite the potential advantages of using the navigation of the river Guadalquiver as far as Cordoba for the shipment of men and supplies. Personal rivalries between the allied commanders hampered preparations for the coming fine weather of spring, and Fagel, veteran and hard-bitten from many long campaigns, complained that Galway was not up to the task, although the earl had been accorded the rank of Mestre de Campo, just as was held by Das Minas, by King Pedro. Fagel was never actually disloyal but the disparity in rank irked him and did not make for easy cooperation between the two men. The baron prepared a carefully thought-through appreciation and plan for the coming campaign, and this had been presented to the king late in 1704, but Pedro suffered a stroke early in the new year, and Queen Catherine of Braganza (Charles II of England’s elderly widow) became regent. Unavoidable delay resulted, for the king, although in declining health, had been active in reforming and re-supplying his own army in anticipation of the fresh campaign. He recovered slightly, and attempted to regain control of events, but a degree of confusion resulted as to who was to be obeyed over the conflicting instructions that were given. The plan agreed on was, unsurprisingly, to march on Madrid, as it was argued that this would give Archduke Charles the victory in Spain, whereas to go to Andalusia might just be a distraction far off to the south. Galway reviewed the army in early April 1705 but was disappointed to find that preparations for the campaign were still

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 93 lagging. The cavalry were poorly mounted and equipped and were a particular concern, but if a move was made soon the French and Spanish might well be caught ill-prepared and with inferior numbers. Morale was not that good, however, and an English officer of dragoons wrote to his regimental colonel that ‘Pray God you never see this hellish country. Everybody is weary of it.’26 The king’s continued ill-health depressed the spirits of the Portuguese officers, and promised supplies from England were slow in coming, leading to suspicions of bad faith and a lack of interest in London, with reinforcements, when the did arrive, often being diverted to support the garrison on the Rock. The siege train had been sent to Elvas in preparation for an assault on Badajoz, but that operation was called off, and the heavy guns had to be dragged to the army on the Tagus at enormous time-consuming labour; in any case many of the fuzes for the explosive shells were defective, and baulks of timber to support the heavy guns in their battery positions were in short supply. Despite all these difficulties, the 17,000-strong allied army advanced on a fresh campaign in late April 1705. By 3 May they had reached the minor fortress of Valencia d’Alcantara, to the south of the Tagus. A bombardment of the defences was begun, and the breach was stormed by Dutch and British troops, at which the garrison quickly and prudently capitulated. Unfortunately the town was then pillaged by the Portuguese troops and camp followers who were in a mood to pay off some old scores, although the citizenry fortunately suffered few casualties in the process. The hope of bringing the locals over to the Habsburg cause suffered another setback as a consequence, and when next the magistrates of Albuquerque, a small fortified hilltop town, were summoned to declare for Charles, the prompt and very emphatic response was that they would rather die for King Philip if need be. In the event, despite such bravado, once attacked the garrison submitted after a brief defence on 21 May. After such a promising start, divided counsels took over, with Galway urging that an advance on Badajoz be made, while Fagel wanted to go on to take Alcantara on the southern bank of the Tagus. Advice was sought from Lisbon, and on receiving this the advance on Badajoz went ahead, but Tessé in the meantime had managed to reinforce the garrison, and the operation was called off on 5 July. The searing heat of summer had brought everything to a halt once again, with the attempt to take Badajoz only being restarted in

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94 The War of the Spanish Succession September, the allies marching around the fortress and making their approach from the eastwards to invest the place. Tessé manoeuvred to hamper the allies but without much success, and the siege batteries soon began to open a breach in the walls. Galway was wounded in the arm by a French roundshot fired from the town, and the limb had to amputated by a French surgeon sent by Tessé to attend the stricken earl. On 14 October the marshal approached from Talavera la Real in a determined attempt to lift the siege, and after some skirmishing and long range bombarding the allied commanders agreed that they had to withdraw, each blaming the other for their lack of success, although Galway in his stricken state could hardly have been be said to be to responsible for it. While the allied campaign on the border with Spain languished, fresh troops had come from England, accompanied by Charles Mordaunt, the brilliant and devious Earl of Peterborough, once described rather maliciously as ‘the ramblingest lying rogue on earth’.27 The intention was that this force would proceed to the Mediterranean to assist the Duke of Savoy, or if that were not possible or necessary, to take some important place on the Spanish coastline – Catalonia was seen as a promising option. Admiral Sir Cloudesley Shovell commanded the fleet, and the instructions which they both carried from Queen Anne were comprehensive and also to the point: Nothing could be of more importance to the Common Cause or prove more conducing to the establishment of King Charles III on the Throne of Spain, than the possession of Barcelona and Cadiz, we therefore command you to concur to the utmost of your power with all such measures as may be proposed to you for the reduction of these important places . . . Being arrived on the coast of Catalonia we require and command you to do the best that you can to induce the Catalans to co-operate with you for the reduction of Spain to the obedience of King Charles III, and you are to encourage those people whom we think well affected to the House of Austria to shake off the yoke of France; and to animate them to prosecute their Liberty with more vigour, you are hereby empowered to assure them that they shall not want Our support, and you may promise in Our name that We will secure them a Confirmation of their Rights and Liberties.28

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 95 Fine and encouraging words and promises that would have a hollow ring when England tired of the war. There was also more than just a hint of menace in tone as the Queen went on with her instructions: In case you find no suitable Returns from the Catalans and Spaniards to Our kind offers, and that they are not to be prevailed on by fair means to espouse the interests of the House of Austria, then you are to take the proper measures for annoying the towns on the Coast of Spain and reduce them by force.29 Archduke Charles, with his largely Austrian retinue, boarded Shovell’s squadron with Peterborough in attendance as the nominated commander-in-chief, and the whole expedition sailed from the Tagus on 26 July 1705. Charles had managed to discharge some of his debts in Lisbon by means of a loan arranged for him by John Methuen, partly secured on two Spanish ships laden with silver that had been seized in Rio de Janeiro. A stop was made at Gibraltar to take on board Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt, together with some of the veteran troops in the garrison there, before proceeding northwards. Prince George urged that a landing in Valencia be attempted, with the chance of an early advance on Madrid from the relatively exposed south, but after some heated discussion it was agreed instead to try and seize Barcelona and raise Catalonia for Charles’s cause. The difficulty was that the Spanish viceroy in the town, Count Francisco Don Velasco, was a highly competent soldier and had a decent-sized garrison of nonCatalan troops under his command; he had also put some local notables under house arrest on suspicion of supporting the Habsburg claimant’s cause – a number of Prince George’s old friends were imprisoned just in case they gave trouble. In consequence, taking control of Barcelona would be no simple matter, especially as the expedition had no formal siege train, although this lack might be made good by landing some of the guns from Shovell’s warships. However, there was room for optimism, as it was known that the Catalans would support anyone who offered to restore and uphold their ancient rights and privileges, and they had little regard for the French prince who had taken the throne in Madrid and would almost certainly do no such thing. The allied squadron stopped off Altea in the second week of August, and met a warm welcome, and the port of Denia was occupied without

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96 The War of the Spanish Succession resistance; the earlier suggestions that a landing in Valencia might be the best course to take appeared to have been born out. Encouraged by this, Peterborough suggested a landing at Alicante, but Archduke Charles urged the merits of encouraging a Catalan uprising. Once the archduke had established himself, and installed a viceroy in Barcelona, he could always go on to the domains he claimed in Italy if it were necessary. Of course, Catalonia would not declare for him if he did not take the trouble to go there, and that was the conclusive argument in favour of an attempt on Barcelona. Given the known factors as they stood at the time, and even acknowledging the pro-Habsburg sentiment evident in Valencia, of which advantage might have been taken, the decision to go on to Catalonia was not necessarily a bad one. An easterly wind delayed progress, but after a preliminary visit to Mataró to meet a local deputation which had already declared their support, some 7,000 allied marines and infantrymen began to land on the beaches to the north of Barcelona on 22 August 1705; the archduke went ashore from an English warship and once more received a warm reception from those local people who gathered on the beach. A headquarters for the expedition was established at San Martin on the river Besos, but there were no Catalan forces formed and ready to go on campaign, despite rumours that they would be able to do so. Some local irregular troops – a raffish band known as Miquelets – were available and these men were hardy and adventurous with a zest for fighting. They offered to serve Charles but were reluctant to take orders or submit to discipline, and as a result were often more of a hindrance than a help. After the successful and unopposed landing, there was a pause of three weeks while the leaders of the expedition discussed what best to do next; valuable time for good campaigning was frittered away with endless and apparently aimless talking. There was even a suggestion that the operation against Barcelona be abandoned and the whole squadron take itself off to Italy. The season was now too far advanced for that to be practical, and on 7 September the naval commanders flatly said so. Peterborough mentioned the advantages of Valencia once more, while an alternative, to march on the relatively less formidable towns of Tarragona and Tortosa was also considered. At length, it was agreed that Barcelona should be attacked as intended before the landing commenced, and once taken, the belated decision was at last pushed forward with some resolution.

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 97 The defences of Barcelona were secured on the strength of the fortress of Montjuich, sitting some 1,000 yards to the south-west of the St Paul’s demi-lune on the main walls of the New Town, Information received from locals, and the occasional deserter from the garrison, indicated that Montjuich was weakly held and in a poor state of repair. Prince George was sceptical, as his own information was that the fort had been strengthened, but as the allies had shown no interest so far in the south side of Barcelona, all de Velasco’s attention had been devoted to the defences of the northern and western walls. Peterborough, full of enthusiasm and energy once more, saw the potential opportunity and seized the chance offered. Plans for the projected advance on Tarragona having been shelved, on 13 September the earl put the plan to attack Fort Montjuich to his commander of artillery, Colonel John Richards, a Catholic soldier holding a Portuguese commission. Prince George of course was included in the discussions, which proceeded with such discretion that regimental commanders were only told their objective when they were about to step off with their troops that evening. As a matter of form, Archduke Charles had also to be told, but instead of taking offence at not being really included in the planning, he sent a message of good luck and God speed to the marching commanders.30 A close reconnaissance of the route to be taken on Monday 14 September had not been possible, as secrecy had to be preserved as much as possible. The track ran in pitch darkness through the village of Sarria and across over ten miles of difficult country marched, with only local guides for assistance and these managed to get lost more than once. A soldier who took part remembered: ‘That night we marched as if we were going to our shipping, but we marched all night and took a compass round the back-side of the city.’31 Dawn was almost upon the allied column of 1,000 weary soldiers as they at last reached the foot of the hill on which Fort Montjuich stood. English grenadiers quickly took possession of the covered way which linked the fort with the St Paul’s demi-lune, and cut off any hope of assistance being sent from the main garrison. A party of Spanish soldiers in the covered way took refuge in a small redoubt nearby, while the Neapolitan troops in Fort Montjuich opened fire as the growing light of early morning showed the allied soldiers climbing the hill towards them. Peterborough and Prince George were with the leading echelon of attackers, but the earl

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98 The War of the Spanish Succession went back along the line of march to hurry along the main body of allied troops, who seemed to yet again have missed the right turning. The prince, eager to ensure that the troops in Fort Montjuich should not be supported from the town, rode forward towards the redoubt, and was struck in the thigh by a musket ball, receiving a fatal wound. A degree of confusion amongst the attackers resulted, and a smart sortie by the defenders in the redoubt drove the allied soldiers back down the hill, where they were met by Peterborough who had brought up the main body of men. Furious at this repulse, he calmed the shaken soldiers and led them back up the slope once more, and this time they seized and held the outer works of Fort Montjuich. Colonel Richards wrote that ‘My Lord Peterborough had all the success imaginable, and without any flattery entitles us to all that followed.’32 The earl afterwards wrote to his wife that ‘We marched a thousand men thirteen hours, and with scaling ladders took the place upon a rock . . . I was forced to lead them on with the Prince of Hesse, who was killed.’33 With the attacking force thus firmly established, too well entrenched to be pushed out by a sortie from the garrison in Barcelona (even if Don Velasco had attempted to do so, which he did not), and with Miquelet sharpshooters holding parts of the covered way leading to the hill, it was possible to land guns from the warships waiting offshore. A bombardment of Fort Montjuich was begun, and two days later a lucky shot, from 7in mortars commanded and directed by the Dutch Colonel and Fire-master Schellundt, detonated the magazine, killing the Neapolitan commander, Colonel Carraccioli, and several of his officers while they sat at dinner. This sealed the fate of the fort, and facing an imminent storm the survivors of the small garrison submitted without further delay. The heavy guns on the lower slopes of the hill, dragged into position by relays of seamen heaving on the ropes, could now be turned against the demi-lune and the main defences of Barcelona. Despite a day of heavy rain with the tracks churned to mud, fifty-eight of the large guns were emplaced, and begun the work under the supervision of Colonel Richards of demolishing the defensive wall between the St Paul’s demilune and the nearby St Anthony’s bastion. Siege entrenchments were begun on 20 September, and despite a lack of experience in such operations amongst the naval gunners, a practicable breach was made in the bastion of St Anthony. Don Velasco prudently agreed to surrender

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 99 Barcelona on 8 October, and marched out six days’ later, rather than face an assault and subsequent sack of the town. ‘All things were got ready for a storm’ Captain George Carleton wrote: which don Velasco the governor, being sensible of, immediately beat a parley; upon which it was, amongst other articles concluded that the town should be surrendered in three days; and the better to ensure it the bastion, which commanded the Port St Angelo, was directly put into our possession.34 This was just as well, for the weather had truly broken and rain poured down on besieger and defender alike. Had the count held on for a few more days, the allies may well have found that success had eluded them. The likelihood of Barcelona having to endure a sack was, of course, rather slim, as the city was believed to be friendly to the Habsburg claimant, and the allied officers would have done their utmost to restrain their men, although their ability in such circumstances might be limited once an assault had taken place. Moreover, as events would show, the citizens of the place were robust and unlikely to meekly submit to any outrages. It was generally understood that Velasco had behaved well, with limited resources and in trying to conduct a defence with barely adequate numbers of troops amidst a sullenly hostile populace. Good terms for the submission having been agreed, the remnants of the garrison were to be conveyed to Rosas on Shovell’s ships without having to give their parole. In the confusion of the handover of the defences to the allied troops, a number of the locals rioted and attempted to attack the soldiers of the defeated garrison and any Spanish sympathisers they could lay hands on. The count had to be hurried on board a warship for his own safety, while Peterborough promptly put a stop to the disturbances, with soldiers patrolling the streets with fixed bayonets. He personally intervened to save one Spanish noblewoman, the Duchess of Populi, who was on the point of being lynched by the mob. George Carleton remembered that ‘We saw a lady of apparent quality and indisputable beauty, in a strange but most affecting agony, flying from the apprehended fury of the Miquelets.’35 With Barcelona safely in allied hands, and Archduke Charles proclaimed as King Carlos III in the town square, all Catalonia hastened

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100 The War of the Spanish Succession to follow suit, fired as much perhaps by resentment of Castile as any particular enthusiasm for the Habsburg cause. Still, it was all very encouraging for the Austrian claimant, and soon Gerona, Tarragona, Tortosa and Lerida had all declared their allegiance. Charles was also proclaimed throughout Murcia and Valencia as King of Spain and the war for the throne formally became, no longer an attempt to divide the Spanish empire and curb the growing power of France, but a dynastic matter between the Houses of Habsburg and Bourbon. The archduke wrote to Queen Anne on 23 September, ‘The city of Barcelona is surrendered to me by capitulation. I doubt not that you will receive this great news with entire satisfaction; as well because this happy success is the effect of your Arms always glorious.’36 The allies, for good or ill, had committed to a major campaign in eastern Spain, which promised and proved to be enormously expensive in men, money and effort. Any attempt to succeed in the now declared intention to secure the throne for Charles must fail if it could not be accomplished in Spain, and the inevitability of this fact overcame all other considerations. For the time being things seemed to be going very well. Count Cifuentes, an influential nobleman, declared for Charles, and brought over many of the inland towns of Catalonia to his cause without too much trouble, eventually being appointed Viceroy of Sardinia. He also had a lot of influence with the local Miquelet leaders which was helpful in promoting a degree of discipline into their activities. The allied fleet could not winter in the Mediterranean, although an attempt to seize Port Mahon in Minorca was briefly considered, and after some difficulties with contrary winds, Shovell and Leake took their squadrons back through the Straits of Gibraltar to Lisbon and England. No immediate re-supply could be expected from the sea for the allied troops in Barcelona, but on the credit side both Catalonia and Valencia could be expected to supply much of what was needed for the time being. The ability to purchase and requisition large numbers of horses in the region was a particular boost for the allied cause. Peterborough was active in Valencia in particular, buying 521 mounts at £9 each, far cheaper and more likely to be available on parade than shipping them out from England and Holland, thereby enabling a fresh regiment of dragoons to be raised for service.37 The allied campaign, however, was always hampered by a lack of money: Archduke Charles looked to England for continued subsidies

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 101 which were sometimes slow in coming. Queen Anne’s treasury was able to dispense large sums for the allied cause, but her own patience wore a little thin at times, and she wrote to the archduke with barely-concealed exasperation: ‘You ask me for another advance of money, beyond the 40,000 [pounds] sterling which I gave order to be given to you.’38 This was not a case of simple improvidence, as Charles was conscientious in pursuit of his own claim, and appreciative of the very considerable amount of aid, whether in cash and/or warlike materiel, and subsistence provided by England and Holland. However, he had little access to funds of his own, the financial affairs in Vienna being always in a parlous condition, and the numerous adherents, place-seekers, advisers and hangers-on that accompanied him on campaign all expected to be fed and maintained while waiting in eager anticipation of more lavish rewards once Charles was comfortably settled in Madrid.39 It was, as a result, hard to pay the troops regularly and this made for discontent, lowering morale and ill-discipline. Despite this difficulty, Peterborough brought almost all of Valencia over to the Habsburg cause by the end of the winter, with Philip V in Madrid now neatly caught between two simultaneous threats – the Anglo-Dutch and Portuguese army in the west under Galway, Fagel and Das Minas, all sustained through Lisbon, and the Allied and Catalan forces now based on Barcelona and Valencia to the east. At the same time, the continuation of Spanish maritime trade was entirely at the mercy and discretion of the allied cruising squadrons, as the French fleet showed no sign of venturing very far out of the port of Toulon. An attempt by Philip V to recover Barcelona was to be expected, of course, but an advance by Marshal Tessé was brought to a halt at the end of January 1706 in a sharp little battle at San Estevan de Litera on the border with Aragon where General d’Asfeld was forced to retire with the loss of over 400 men. In the meantime the garrison in the Valencian town of San Mateo robustly held out against a French siege until relieved by an allied force advancing from Tortosa. Whatever the ebb and flow of the campaign in the peninsula, a significant distraction for Louis XIV had been the outbreak of open insurrection in the Cevennes region in southern France which had almost coincided with the commencement of the war for Spain. Religious intolerance was at the root of the trouble, and the Huguenot rebels, known as Camisards, fought well, but could not match the

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102 The War of the Spanish Succession considerable French forces that were sent against them. Certainly those same forces could have been profitably deployed elsewhere had not the necessity arisen to deal with the insurrection, a rising that had the active encouragement, and occasional practical support, from the parties of the Grand Alliance. First Marshal de Montrevel fought the Camisards in 1703, then Marshal Villars, who had been unable to work harmoniously with the Elector of Bavaria, and eventually in 1705 the Duke of Berwick, fresh from his successful campaigns in Spain, was sent to the Cevennes to settle matters once and for all. Under his firm hand the rebels were unable to take advantage of help from the AngloDutch cruising squadrons lying off-shore, and the disturbances were at last put down, Some of the Huguenot leaders were executed with considerable barbarity, attracting a good deal of criticism to Berwick, but that was the way of the times when dealing with rebels. The duke had no doubts about the actions taken, and wrote that: ‘To rebellion, sacrilege, murder, theft and licentiousness they joined the most unheard-of cruelties.’40 Atrocities had, it was true, been committed by both sides in the bitter struggle – civil wars with a religious backdrop tending to be savage affairs. All the while, the position of Duke Victor-Amadeus II of Savoy was precarious – he had declared himself against France and his forces were badly over-stretched. The Duc de Vendôme was enjoying renewed success in northern Italy, despite a setback when he was attacked at Cassano by the Margrave of Baden. Berwick, having dealt with the rebellious Camisards, was instructed to move against the Savoyard town of Nice. This was no simple task as the defences of the place had been greatly improved, and the duke had a relatively small force with which to operate. He could, however, draw upon the considerable naval arsenal at Toulon for siege guns with which to bombard the fortifications. The heavy and cumbersome pieces were brought along the coast on naval galleys by the Chevalier de Roanez, avoiding the excessive labour of dragging them over indifferent inland roads. With some 8,000 troops Berwick crossed the river Var on 31 October 1705, and despite rapidly deteriorating weather was able to mount his siege guns and summon the governor of Nice, the Marquis de Carail, to submit on 14 November. The small Neapolitan garrison, which included some Camisard refugees, promptly withdrew into the citadel and gave up the main town.

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Enter the Duke of Berwick 103 The citadel of Nice was a formidable place, well sited and difficult to approach over rocky ground. After a careful reconnaissance of the place, Berwick mounted his heavy guns on the Montalban side. ‘The bad weather, the nature of the soil, and the few workmen that could be spared from our little army,’ Berwick wrote, ‘were the reason that our batteries could not begin to play till the 8th of December.’41 The garrison made several sorties to slow the work of emplacing the guns, and the French chief engineer was killed by a roundshot, which hampered progress. Once a breach had been made, however, de Carail prudently submitted on 6 January 1706, rather than face a storm of the citadel. Full honours of war were granted by Berwick, and the Régiment de Dauphin took possession of the fortifications straight away. Duke Victor-Amadeus was in fact only nine miles away with a relieving force, and with his limited numbers Berwick would have had to abandon his siege operations, and his formidable array of fifty heavy guns, had the governor not submitted when he did. Still, these are matters of fine judgement, and Berwick had pushed forward boldly in a difficult campaign with inadequate resources, and having out marched, out-gunned and over-awed his opponent, came through with a complete success. His was a notable achievement, and Louis XIV, delighted at the news, ordered that the defences of Nice be immediately demolished, and a month later the English-born Berwick was made a Marshal of France in recognition of his achievement. This unique honour could only be accepted because Berwick, nephew of the Duke of Marlborough, was a staunch Catholic in his religious observances.42

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Louis XIV, King of France. The Sun King.

William of Orange, King William III of England.

Emperor Leopold of Austria. King Carlos II of Spain. His death brought on the war.

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Phillipe, Duc D’Anjou, the Bourbon claimant to the throne of Spain.

Archduke Charles of Austria, the Habsburg claimant.

Queen Anne of Great Britain.

Dukw Victor-Amadeus II of Savoy.

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Louis-Guillaume, Margrave of Baden.

Maximillien-Emmanuel von Wittelsbach, Elector of Bavaria.

George, Elector of Hanover and later King George I of Great Britain.

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The famous comrades-in-arms: Prince Eugene of Savoy, and John Churchill, 1st Duke of Malrborough.

Henry of Nassau, Count Overkirk.

James, Earl Stanhope.

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Nicolas de Catinat, Marshal of France.

Claude-Louis-Hector, Duc de Villars, Marshal of France.

Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy.

James Fitzjames, Duke of Berwick, Marshal of France.

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A contemporary depiction of the allied siege of Barcelona in September 1705. The Earl of Peterborough can be seen directing the operations with his Chief of Engineers Colonel John Richards.

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The layout of a siege battery, c.1710.

Austrian grenadier (left) and ‘hatman’, with an officer in the background, c.1700.

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The siege of Tournai, 1709, just before the battle of Malplaquet. The bitterly contested fighting in the woods at Malplaquet, 11 September 1709. Marshal Villars’ attempt to lift the siege of Mons was unsuccessful.

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Chapter 7

Year of Miracles ‘I thought it was time to finish the war.’1

After the startling success for the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene at Blenheim in the summer of 1704, French armies could be rebuilt, given enough time, but this was a laborious and expensive process, while bruised morale was not so quickly rebuilt, and the whole process was overshadowed by the spectre of the immense and unexpected defeat at the hands of two commanders. Still, the following year proved to be something of a disappointment for the Grand Alliance. With the death of Emperor Leopold on 5 May 1705, there was a measure of uncertainty in Vienna, and Eugene was distracted from campaigning while providing reassurance to the princes and electors of the empire at a time of change. The late emperor’s eldest son, Joseph, ascended to the imperial throne as expected, for he was the King of the Romans and, as a result, did not have to submit to an election, but there was unavoidable delay in the process. On hearing the news of Leopold’s death from the Papal Nuncio, Louis XIV, the emperor’s old adversary, true to form, immediately put the French court into mourning as did his grandson in Madrid. Emperor Joseph was an admirer and supporter of Eugene, and the allied war effort benefitted from this confidence. The new emperor also trusted the Duke of Marlborough, and he wrote on 9 May 1705: ‘If my affairs permitted me, I would so myself the pleasure of joining you at the army, to testify in person the sentiments of my esteem and friendship. I have, nonetheless, ordered the Prince of Baden to act in concert with you on the Moselle.’2 After the reverses of the previous summer, Louis XIV and his grandson in Madrid had little option but to stand on the defensive for the time being, and surrender the initiative to their opponents. The

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Map 4: France in the early eighteenth century.

observant Duc de St Simon grimly reflected with a striking element of prophesy on France’s position at this juncture: I saw quite plainly towards what rock we were drifting. We had met losses at Höchstädt, Gibraltar, and Barcelona; Catalonia and the neighbouring countries were in revolt; Italy yielded us nothing hut miserable successes; Spain exhausted; France failing

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106 The War of the Spanish Succession in men and money, and with incapable generals, protected by the Court against their faults. I saw all these things so plainly. I thought that it was time to finish the war before we sank still lower, and that it might be finished by giving the Archduke what we could not defend and making a division of the rest.3 This notion actually met the original aims of the Grand Alliance, as the intention had been to leave Philip V on the throne in Madrid, but to simultaneously divide the Spanish empire. In any case such ideas found no favour as too much would be given away, and the Minister for War, Michel de Chamillart, told St Simon that ‘the King would not give up a single mill of all the Spanish Succession’.4 Strenuous efforts were made to re-build France’s fighting capability, by means of drafts of recruits from the militia (a highly unpopular measure, much resented and technically not even legal), large-scale purchases of horses in Switzerland and increased taxation of all kinds. In consequence, Louis XIV could field three main armies in northern Europe. Marshal Villeroi commanded 60,000 men in the Spanish Netherlands, Marshal Villars had 50,000 in the Moselle valley, while Marshal Marsin was in Alsace with just over 30,000. In Brabant in particular the French had constructed lengthy lines of defence behind which they could manoeuvre to foil any Allied advance, while Villars was able to take up a strong defensive position astride the Moselle. A further 65,000 troops were under the command of the Duc de Vendôme in Italy, while Marshal Tessé held the ring for French interests in Spain and the Duke of Berwick was active with a small army in south-eastern France. The French commanders in the north and north-east were instructed to consider themselves to be operating as a single strategic unit, able and ready to reinforce each other as the threat from the allies developed. This admirable intention, however, was overly optimistic and hampered by the relatively slow means of communication available, and depended also on the allies not being innovative enough to strike at the French in several sensitive points at the same time. Marshal Villars had arrived in Metz on 2 February 1705, to prepare a defence of the Moselle valley against any allied advance. He quickly established a line of fortified posts from the fortifications of Thionville to those of Saarlouis, and on inspecting the troops available to him found them to be well equipped and in good heart. Bad weather had set

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Year of Miracles 107 in, which prevented the marshal from making an attempt to attack the allied camp at Trier, and a projected advance across the Saar had to be abandoned in the third week of April because of heavy rain. Frustrated in his efforts to take the early initiative, the temperamentally aggressive Villars settled his troops into good defensive positions and waited to see what the allies would do. The Duke of Marlborough, having gained ground in Alsace in the closing weeks of the previous year, had formed a scheme to thrust into France by way of the Moselle, in conjunction with an advance from Landau by imperial troops commanded by the Margrave of Baden; the new emperor’s assurance that he would co-operate was heartening. Such a combined operation should pin the French in the Moselle valley while simultaneously outflanking their position. The intention to use the Moselle valley as a route by which to enter France could not be concealed, as preparations had to be made well in advance. While Marlborough and Baden did so, Overkirk would hold the borders of Holland secure with his corps of Dutch troops. Nothing went to plan; by the time the duke had assembled his 60,000-strong army at Coblenz, sitting at the confluence of the Rhine and the Moselle, it was clear that the margrave would not be ready to march to combine forces for some time. The duke was obliged to go to Rastadt in the third week in May, to confer with Baden on the future of the campaign. The margrave was not well, suffering still from the wound to his foot sustained at the Schellenberg in July the previous year, but he still had the firm instructions from Emperor Joseph to join Marlborough. The difficulty was that the imperial troops were ill-equipped and fewer in numbers than promised when the plan for the campaign was formed, numbering only some 15,000 rather than twice that number as Marlborough had expected. Vienna had diverted forces to campaign in Italy and to combat the lingering rebellion in Hungary, and the effort of the empire was diffused as a result. Despite this it was agreed that the rendezvous for the two commanders at Trier should take place on 12 June, with an advance up the line of the Moselle to take place as soon afterwards as could be done. Marlborough could not maintain his army in camp at Trier while waiting for Baden to come, especially as the commissary officer appointed to gather the stores for the campaign embezzled the funds supplied and defected to the French to avoid punishment. So, on 3 June

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108 The War of the Spanish Succession the duke advanced past Consarbrück to confront Marshal Villars at Sierck, but the French commander prudently refused to give battle. and Marlborough could not assault his strong defences with much hope of success. Forage was hard to come by, and the allied lines of communication and supply back to Trier and Coblenz were lengthy and lay along poor roads. ‘Send forward all possible grain and forage,’ Marlborough wrote, ‘also with the utmost diligence the biscuit to Treves [Trier], for I shall soon have need of it . . . for we are in a country where we find nothing.’5 It was also apparent that Villars was being reinforced by troops sent by Marsin on the upper Rhine, having now some 70,000 men under command, and the odds for success for Marlborough were lengthening by the day. Meanwhile, Marshal Villeroi had unexpectedly taken the offensive in the Low Countries, and seized the allied-held fortress of Huy on the river Meuse on 13 June 1705. Overkirk, finding that he was outnumbered, fell back to the protection of an entrenched camp at Maastricht, and Villeroi was able to enter Lie`ge and threaten the allied garrison in the citadel. The French commander had touched a very raw nerve indeed, as the Dutch could not summon sufficient strength to counter this new and very well-judged offensive. This was a critical moment for the alliance, and their commanders in the north were, in military terms, fixed and forced to react to what their opponents were doing. Whatever Marlborough might achieve in the Moselle valley, and the prospects for success had already dimmed, would be nothing if the Dutch lost the hard-won river lines in the Spanish Netherlands and their own border was threatened yet again; it was even possible that if the threat were not speedily countered, they might have to make a separate peace with France. Such an outcome would be extreme, but was by no means out of the question, and the clear likelihood is that Villeroi was directed to take action to cripple Marlborough’s own operations on the Moselle by adroitly applying pressure at a most sensitive point elsewhere. Messengers hurried from Maastricht to the duke’s headquarters on the Moselle, urging him to return with his army without delay, a plaintive summons that could hardly be ignored. Marlborough was already at a standstill in front of Villars’ strong positions astride the Moselle, in the midst of a campaign that was languishing and likely to be abandoned before long. The duke was,

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Year of Miracles 109 accordingly, quite prepared to march northwards in response to the urgent summons from Overkirk; he now had a sound reason which brooked no argument for changing the course of his campaign for the year – virtue could be neatly made out of necessity with a healthy dash of prompt action. On 16 June 1705 he wrote: This moment is come lieutenant-general van Hompesch, from Monsieur d’Overkirk, to let me know, that if I do not immediately help them they are undone, which only serves to shew the great apprehensions they are in; for it is impossible for me to send troops to them sooner than I have already resolved; but since they have so much fear at the army [at Maastricht], I dread the consequences at The Hague.6 In pouring rain, Marlborough’s army began to withdraw the next day down the Moselle, on the long road back to the Low Countries. The duke abandoned the campaign with some regret. ‘It is most certain,’ he wrote, ‘that the Moselle is the place where we might have done the French the most harm.’7 Given the strength of Villars’ position, however, and the skill with which the French commander could be relied upon to act, there was an element of wishful thinking in Marlborough’s judgement of what might have been achieved on the Moselle that year. Leaving a stout garrison in Trier to guard the line of the river, Marlborough took his army over the rough country of the Eiffel at a good pace despite the unseasonably poor weather, so that by 27 June he reached Maastricht and combined forces with Overkirk five days later. The allied army was now some 60,000 strong, and Villeroi prudently lifted his siege of the Liège citadel and fell back behind his own defensive lines. Marlborough was, however, disappointed to learn that Triers had been abandoned with all its stores, even though the place had been under no French threat, and the allied garrison had withdrawn to Trarbach. So surprised was Marshal Villars at this, that he only occupied Trier four days after the allied rearguard he had left the place. His expectations of the distraction that Villeroi’s moves in the Low Countries would impose on allied intentions in the valley, had clearly been exceeded by their actual effect when put into practice. With his Moselle campaign abandoned, and the French offensive in

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110 The War of the Spanish Succession the Low Countries checked, Marlborough faced a difficult choice in achieving very much in the remainder of the summer. Huy was soon recovered, but the French field army could only be brought to battle if the 60-mile long Lines of Brabant, constructed with such cost and effort over the previous few years, were first crossed. Despite Dutch doubts at the wisdom of the project, this was achieved on 18 July with the lines breached and a strong French and Bavarian covering detachment severely mauled in battle at Elixheim, not far from Louvain. Marshal Villeroi had been badly wrong-footed, and might have suffered even more severely had the Dutch troops, tired after a long night march and then through the heat of the summer morning, got to the field of battle an hour or two sooner. The Elector of Bavaria, whose troops had taken part, and performed very well in the fighting at Elixheim, wrote with an explanation to Versailles that can have done little to cheer the king: The enemy surprised the barrier between Wanghen [Wanghe] and Espen [Elixheim], and at four o’clock in the morning broke through. It was not discovered until five o’clock. When I was alerted, I went with Marshal de Villeroi with all diligence, but too late to remedy the situation, for we found a great number of the enemy army had passed through in spite of the charges that were made without success because the enemy forces were superior to those that we could oppose against the, The army was too spread out to attempt a general engagement.8 The whole French strategic posture in Brabant was now turned, and Villeroi fell back behind the river Dyle. Louis XIV wrote to him to express his concern at what had happened. ‘However much I am convinced of your vigilance and the care that you have taken to be alert to the movements of the enemy, it is nonetheless quite disagreeable to see them past the lines in the centre of the Netherlands, and at several important places.’9 With the marshal intent on covering the approaches to Louvain and Brussels, Marlborough managed to slip past and interpose himself between Villeroi and the border with France. Towns such as Mons and Oudenarde were exposed as a result, but Marlborough’s attempts over the next few weeks to engage Villeroi on the Dyle and then to the south of Brussels came to nothing, Dutch

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Year of Miracles 111 caution once more proved a hindrance, although one of the duke’s projects for an attack at the Yssche stream would have probably incurred heavy losses had it gone ahead; the unproductive campaign for the year stuttered to a close with the onset of the cold weather. Some satisfaction was felt in Versailles, for it seemed that Marlborough had certainly been foiled by his opponents. While these events were taking place across the southern Netherlands, matters were not prospering for the Grand Alliance in Savoy and northern Italy. Vendôme had carried on a generally very successful campaign throughout 1705, and Turin was under constant threat. The reliable imperial field commander, Count Vaudemont, caught a fever and died, and his replacement, Graf Leopold Herberstein, proved less capable of dealing with the bruising tactics of Vendôme. Prince Eugene of Savoy, as President of the Imperial War Council, had Herberstein posted to a less demanding role elsewhere and took over the field command himself in April 1705. Neglect at army headquarters was evident, and his initial report to the emperor Leopold made sober reading: I should be pressing forward with all speed, but with starving and half-naked soldiers, and without money, tents, bread, transport, or artillery, this is quite impossible . . . The troops are so starved that they are more like shadows than men, Up till now they have been patient, in the hope that I would bring substantial relief. But as I have been provided with very little I fear that my arrival will merely lead to despair. Desertions are daily increased to a rate of nearly fifty a day.10 Eugene’s arrival had a beneficial effect on the morale of the soldiers: officers and men alike had more reason to be hopeful, while the French immediately began to move with rather more caution and their campaign inevitably lost some of its sparkle. Vendôme intended to keep between the imperial army and Turin, and moved to confront the prince on the river Adda. A bitterly-fought battle at Cassano in mid-August was indecisive, but Eugene was prevented from getting his army across the river, and so Vendôme achieved his immediate objective. Dogged still by shortages of money, munitions and equipment, Eugene wrote that ‘The army still hangs together’.11 Still, there was little choice but to

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112 The War of the Spanish Succession pull back while the cold months of autumn came on, and the spirits of the troops sagged once more. The disappointing battle at Cassano, however, had halted Vendôme for a time, while giving some relief to imperial Field-Marshal Guido von Starhemberg in Turin, and so was not entirely without benefit. Eugene described his strategic effort as ‘A war of diversion. This diversion already involves a heavy expenditure for the French in men and money. They have to keep 80,000 men in Italy, whereas the Allies only have 40,000 there.’12 Unable for the moment to maintain his army in the field, Eugene withdrew into Venetian territory, ignoring the perfectly natural complaints of that neutral state at the unwanted incursion. The imperial army could rest and recuperate to a certain degree, but the risk however was that if the allied campaign failed to make more progress than it had up to now, Venice, and possibly other Italian states, might make common cause with France if they were pushed too far. Marlborough went to Vienna late in 1705 to confer with Emperor Joseph, and Eugene wrote to him with a frank account of his concerns at this precarious stage for the fortunes of the Grand Alliance: My army is ruined, the horses worn out with past fatigues, no sure footing in this country, and the enemy re-assembling their forces in my front. Besides, the Venetians threaten to declare against us, if we do not quit their territory; the princes of Italy join in this declaration, and are inclined to form a league for their common defence . . . Succours of men and money should be prepared for this army, so that it be enabled to take the field, at the latest, towards the end of March, for which purpose the magazines should be established, the recruits and horses for remounting the cavalry at hand and the fleet ready to co-operate in the spring, either on the coast of Spain, or to invade Naples, which is without troops. I am much concerned that I cannot have the honour of joining your Highness at Vienna.13 Amongst the fruits of the duke’s timely visit to Vienna, where he was incapacitated with gout for a while, was the immediate provision on his own authority of 100,000 crowns for outstanding wages to be paid to the troops, and a further loan of £250,000 to buy supplies for

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Year of Miracles 113 Eugene’s army. The degree to which both men were quite convinced that the war for Spain could be lost or won in Italy, regardless of what happened in the Low Countries, was remarkable and shown in a comment made in a letter Eugene sent from Vienna to Marlborough a few weeks later: No breach can be made in the Spanish Monarchy except through Italy. This fact is evident from the efforts of the King of France to support this war, and his comparative indifference in other quarters; for this [French] army has never diminished; but on the contrary, this moment is increasing with considerable reinforcements.14 The point was a good one in achieving a division of the empire, the aim as originally envisaged in 1701, but would do little to secure the throne in Madrid. That additional aspiration was still in the growing stage and had not yet transfixed the attention of the allies to the exclusion of almost anything else. The strong desire in Vienna to secure their gains in as much of Italy as possible was clear, but it was hard to dispassionately argue that gains in Italy were of more benefit to the Grand Alliance than those that might be achieved in Spain or in the wealthy Spanish Netherlands. At any rate, the loan arranged by Marlborough was paid directly to Eugene, through bankers in Venice, to avoid the almost inevitable siphoning off of funds that would happened if Vienna had been involved. Although Catalonia had been taken and held for Archduke Charles, the general lack of progress for the Grand Alliance in 1705 inclined Louis XIV to look forward to the coming campaigns with renewed confidence. In particular, a feeling took hold that the earlier successes of the Duke of Marlborough in the Low Countries and southern Germany had been due to good fortune rather than to skill, and that Marshal Villeroi, having handled operations in the southern Netherlands rather well, should be able to continue to do so. The king’s grandson was in Madrid and securing his position satisfactorily, the treasury was under acute strain, however: tax revenue was insufficient to fund the war, and an end to that vast expense would be very welcome. It seemed in Versailles that the most propitious way to bring the allies to the negotiating table in the meekest frame of mind would be to attack them

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114 The War of the Spanish Succession everywhere, and so demonstrate the continued vitality and strength of the French war effort. Instructions were sent out to French field commanders that they were to take the offensive on all fronts; reinforcements went to Marshal Tessé in Spain, Marshal Villars commanded energetically on the upper Rhine and achieved a success against imperial troops at Hagenau, while Marsin was active in the Moselle valley. Berwick had struck in the south, seizing Nice, while in northern Italy Vendôme achieved a victory over an imperial army on 19 April 1706. ‘He attacked the troops of Prince Eugene upon the heights of Calcinato, drove them before him, killed three thousand men, took twenty standards, ten pieces of cannon, and eight thousand prisoners.’15 Savoy, newest and most junior member of the Grand Alliance, was imperilled and isolated, ready to be picked off, so that the Duke of Marlborough, frustrated at the lack of progress in the Low Countries, even considered marching south to once more combine forces with Prince Eugene. ‘It seems to me,’ he wrote to Count Wratislaw, ‘high time to think seriously about this war in Italy. A war which employs so great a number of enemy troops, who would fall upon our backs everywhere.’16 It did not seem likely that the States-General would be at all enthusiastic over a proposal for Marlborough to go and campaign so far away as northern Italy. However, the defeat at Calcinato underlined the gravity of the imperial position in the region, and if the campaign in the Low Countries was to be just a repeat of the sterile events of 1705, and assuming that the Margrave of Baden would not throw off his inertia and move to threaten the French in the Moselle valley, then the far-off project was not so unrealistic as it might have appeared at first glance. The duke put the details to a few trusted confidantes at The Hague, but he wrote to Sidney Godolphin in London, ‘They are very positive, that they dare not consent to letting their own countrymen go.’17 There was no intention that Dutch troops would be expected to go so far away, so Marlborough was actually encouraged that the suggestion made was not immediately condemned out of hand. As it turned out, affairs would quicken dramatically in Brabant before very long and there would be no more talk of going to Italy with or without Eugene. Marlborough was not at all optimistic of success in the Low Countries in the coming year, even though the States-General had given assurances that their generals would be more amenable to offensive

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Year of Miracles 115 action if the prospects for success were good. The allied army was still gathering for the coming campaign, and contingents of foreign troops – Hanoverian, Prussian and Danish – had yet to reach the appointed rendezvous, as their terms of service were still being discussed and alleged arrears of pay argued over. Queen Anne appealed to her brother-in-law the King of Denmark on 23 April 1706 that: The Duke of Marlborough is projecting an important undertaking against the enemy, and the friendship which I have for you making me rely on your own, I hope that you will consent to allow Your Majesty’s troops now under the said General’s command, to march wherever he thinks best for the good of the service.18 The king was not immediately convinced, and the dispute over payment for the Danish troops rumbled on, even as the campaign opened. In the meantime, Villeroi had received a number of letters from Louis XIV and the French Minister for War, urging him to get on with things and take the offensive against the allies. The Duc de St Simon wrote that: The Marshal, piqued with these reiterated orders, which he considered as reflections upon his courage, determined to risk anything in order to satisfy the desire of the King. But the King did not wish this. At the same time that he wished for a battle in Flanders, he wished to place Villeroi in a state to fight it. He sent orders, therefore, to Marsin to take eighteen battalions and twenty squadrons of his army, to proceed to the Moselle, where he would find twenty others, and then to march with the whole into Flanders and join Marshal Villeroi.19 Louis XIV clearly understood that Villeroi needed this augmentation in bayonet strength before bringing on a general engagement; however, he also understood the rash bravery of a man of limited abilities anxious to prove his worth once more, and, St Simon went on: ‘He prohibited the latter from doing anything until this reinforcement reached him. Four couriers, one after the other, carried this prohibition to the Marshal; but he had determined to give battle without assistance, and he did so.’

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116 The War of the Spanish Succession Villeroi was concerned that Marlborough would move to attack the French-held fortress of Namur, and on 19 May 1706 he left his concentration area around Louvain and moved his 60,000-strong French, Walloon and Bavarian army to the southwards to take up a position on the low ridge-line near to the village of Ramillies. His march was reported to Marlborough almost immediately, and in response the allied commander brought his as yet still incomplete army south through Merdorp to take up a position on the same ridgeline. By doing so the duke expected to confront Vilereoi as he advanced, but the French commander got into position first. The march had been pressed at a good speed, although Villeroi made better time overall, but the duke delayed for a day to allow the Danish troops, both horse and foot, to come up from their cantonments, where they had orders not to join the campaign until their arrears of pay were settled. The valuable Prussian and Hanoverian contingents were still absent also, for disputes over the precise terms of their service remained unresolved. On the morning of Sunday 23 May Marlborough with 62,000 troops found that Villeroi had established himself in a three-mile wide defensive position running from Taviers on the Mehaigne stream in the south to Autre-Église on the Petite Gheete stream in the north. ‘The position which he had taken up was one which was well known to be bad,’ St Simon remarked. ‘The late Marshal Luxembourg had declared it so, and had avoided it.’20 In fact, the ground chosen was both favourable and unfavourable whether for attack or defence, depending upon the way the battle was handled. The necessity to hold the outlying villages of Taviers and Autre-Église at either end of the ridge-line, extended the frontage Villeroi had to cover. However, the northern part of his position was marshy and difficult to cross which aided his defensive arrangements, while the wide open plain to the south of Ramillies village was ideal for the deployment of his numerous and well-equipped cavalry. On the other hand, as Marlborough approached from the east his flanks were at some risk of French envelopment from the troops in Taviers and Autre-Église, had Villeroi taken this bold course. Still, as he advanced on a narrower front the duke had the valuable ability of easily passing troops from one flank to another, ‘cutting across the chord of the arc’ as it were, while his opponent in responding would have to move troops the longer route around the outside of the curve. Marlborough was not discouraged by the marshy

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Year of Miracles 117 obstacles in the north of the field as he quite rightly saw that he would be able to pass infantry across them without too much difficulty. That confidence was in contradiction of earnest advice he had been given by his staff officers, but the duke had taken the chance to scout the ground the previous autumn, and as a result felt that the terrain was passable. By early afternoon the armies were in place, and after a furious opening cannonade, Overkirk attacked with Dutch troops and secured Taviers in the south, while Marlborough pushed British and Danish infantry across the marshes of the Petite Gheete to the north. The fighting was heavy, but the Earl of Orkney managed to get his troops into the hamlet of Offuz to the north, before being recalled by Marlborough to support the attacks on Ramillies and the French cavalry to the south. Marshal Villeroi, however, was concerned at the risk posed by Orkney’s persistent attacks, and concentrated his attention and reserves in the northern part of the field, while his own cavalry to the south were being worn down by the repeated attacks of Dutch and Danish squadrons under the command of Overkirk. Too late Villeroi realised the danger, and as he attempted to re-deploy his reserves in the early evening to meet the escalating crisis on his right, the Danish cavalry put in a slashing flank attack that rolled up the opposing army from end to end. ‘The word sauve qui peut went through the great part [of the army],’ Irish soldier of fortune Peter Drake wrote, ‘and put all in confusion. Then might be seen whole brigades running in disorder.’21 Marshal Villeroi’s fine and well-equipped army was broken and trying only to find safety behind the shelter of the river Dyle. The beaten French and Bavarian commanders met by the light of flaming torches in the main square of Louvain that night, and all were agreed that after such a crushing defeat flight was the only course open to them. ‘We had the finest army in the world,’ the Elector of Bavaria wrote soon afterwards, ‘but the defeat is so great, and the terror that is in our troops so horrible, that I know not what the morrow will bring forth.’22 Huge quantities of stores and munitions were burned or dumped into the river Dyle, or abandoned to the pursing allied cavalry, and the defeated army, in little form or order, withdrew to the westwards as hastily as possible. Villeroi announced the defeat to Versailles in courtly terms: ‘I have the honour to inform your Majesty of the unlucky day of the 23rd . . . Our right wing had been absolutely defeated.’23 The scale of the losses suffered, it was soon found, was

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118 The War of the Spanish Succession simply staggering, both in terms of men, guns, stores, territory and, irretrievably, French prestige and morale. Marlborough wrote to his wife the next day to let her know of the victory, and in passing, of his remarkable escape when a French roundshot just missed him: On Sunday last we fought, and that God Almighty has been pleased to give us a victory. I must leave the particulars to this bearer Colonel Richards, for having been on horseback all Sunday, and after the battle marching all night, my head aches to that degree, that it is very uneasy to me to write. Poor Bringfield, holding my stirrup for me, and helping me on horseback, was killed. I am told he leaves his wife and mother in a poor condition.24 Marlborough’s victorious troops were in close pursuit, and there was no chance for the French to recover their poise short of abandoning large areas of valuable territory, and important towns such as Louvain, Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges and (after a stiff fight and bombardment) the valuable port of Ostend. Overkirk’s notification of the success to the States-General ran, ‘It has pleased Almighty God to grant your Arms and those of your allies a complete and perfect victory over our enemies.’25 It was commented that it seemed that the allied army had just thrown itself upon an unlatched door and simply fallen through. Marlborough was able to go on and lay siege to Menin, Ath and Dendermonde and soon his army stood on the very borders of northern France, having captured almost the whole of the immensely valuable Spanish Netherlands in a few short weeks. Major John Blackader, campaigning with his regiment in Flanders, wrote that ‘towns that we thought would have endured a long siege are giving up and yielding without a stroke . . . What the French got in a night by stealth at the King of Spain’s death they have lost again in a day.’26 The speed and scale of Marlborough’s advance after the victory was breathtaking, and even the duke seemed to be astonished by its extent, writing on 31 May to the Duchess: ‘So many towns have submitted since the battle, that it really looks more like a dream than the truth.’27 Understandably, Villeroi was held to blame for this disaster to both French interests in north-western Europe and to the French claimant in Madrid, who had now lost one of the most valuable parts of the Spanish

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Year of Miracles 119 empire with its vast tax revenues and recruiting potential. ‘In this way, with the exception of Namur, Mons and a very few other places, all the Spanish Low Countries were lost.’ St Simon recalled.28 In the face of such astonishing events, the civic authorities in the region promptly and prudently declared their allegiance to the Habsburg claimant, Archduke Charles. Despite such utter defeat, Villeroi proved reluctant to relinquish his command, and at last Louis XIV had to announce that his old friend had resigned. The marshal was kindly received on his return to Versailles, but was never entrusted with a field command again. ‘We have not been fortunate in Flanders’, the King wrote with masterly understatement to his grandson in Madrid.29 Villeroi was replaced by the Duc de Vendôme, fresh from his successes in Italy. French troops were brought in from distant garrisons and far-off campaigns to make good the losses suffered at Ramillies, and Marshal Villars’ gains on the Rhine at Hagenau, attempts to recover Landau and operations in Italy were all abandoned or put at risk by this necessary diversion of effort. The psychological shock of such a defeat could not readily be made good, however, and the lasting effect of such complete and astonishing success as Marlborough had achieved was profound. For the Dutch the victory at Ramillies gave them perhaps their most cherished aim, the restoration of the Barrier against the French – those towns so carelessly stripped away from them by Louis XIV five years earlier. For Archduke Charles, his prospects brightened immeasurably, and he could now look to establish his own administration in the southern Netherlands. This inevitably caused a degree of friction with the Dutch who, in addition to expecting to garrison their Barrier Towns once more, hoped to recoup some of the enormous cost of the war that they had incurred so far by taxing the populace. The archduke, understandably, saw those same tax revenues as belonging to him, and hoped to use those same monies raised to defray some of his own considerable expenses. Marlborough was also reluctant to see Ostend designated as a part of the Barrier, as this valuable port gave him direct access to southern England for both communication and supply, and he preferred to see the place firmly in the hands of British soldiers. In actual fact, had sober and well-measured counsels prevailed, it might now have been realised, that the parties to the Grand Alliance had attained what they set out to achieve. ‘The Treaty of Grand Alliance of September 1701 does not bind the allies to recover Spain and the

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120 The War of the Spanish Succession Spanish Americas from Philip, but only to obtain security and compensation for his kingship.’30 How far four years of bitter war had carried the main parties forward in their intentions, with only one additional clause entered in 1703, that to ensure a Protestant succession to the throne in London. The treaty with Portugal, of course, had largely been based on the attempt to install Archduke Charles as the king in Madrid, but that arrangement was subsidiary to the aims of the main treaty of alliance. The aims had changed, to fit circumstances for the involvement of Portugal and the Protestant succession, and could presumably change again to mutual benefit. The key point seemed to go unnoticed, that the main aim of the alliance, to divide the Spanish empire, had now been achieved. The destruction of one of Louis XIV’s main field armies at Blenheim in 1704 had stripped him of the ability to manoeuvre strategically, impose his will on others by force and win the war outright – such losses could not easily be made good. The subsequent destruction of another army, at Ramillies two years later, was nothing short of a catastrophe for the French cause, and in effect the king had lost the war – he could only now fight on the defensive, and hope for as good a peace as could be obtained by negotiation. To that end, he could still mount local offensive campaigns, but the empire that his grandson had inherited from Carlos II was now de facto divided and, barring some inexplicable and very unlikely error by the allies, likely to remain so. The archduke had possession of the southern Netherlands and much of Italy, the Dutch regained their Barrier, while British trade would benefit from the crippled state of the French and Spanish navies and the grip Queen Anne’s troops had on Gibraltar. Philip V would remain in Madrid, certainly, but his removal was not an aim of the alliance as originally agreed, and there was no realistic prospect of a union of the crowns of France and Spain, so that any lingering concern on that score was largely manufactured. Louis XIV had plenty of legitimate heirs without having to involve his second grandson. Any such a union would have been absurdly impracticable anyway. Madrid had no intention of being ruled from Versailles, even allowing for present French influence at the Spanish court, while there was no prospect that France would ever be subordinate to a king in Madrid. A good peace, carefully negotiated and to mutual benefit, was surely at hand, but a measure of how far opinion had changed was seen in a

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Year of Miracles 121 letter sent by the Duke of Marlborough to Antonius Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland, on 10 September 1706: I must be of the opinion of my country, that both by treaty and interest we are obliged to preserve the monarchy of Spain entire. At the same time, as a friend, I must acknowledge that I believe France can hardly be brought to a peace, unless something is given to the Duke of Anjou. (Author’s own italics)31 The duke was far from being alone in taking this line, but the whole approach, of imposing a settlement and perhaps scattering a few favours, was a significant error on the part of the Grand Alliance. This misjudgement of the nature of the French king, his robust people, and also his increasingly strong-willed grandson in Madrid would cost dearly. With the opening of the campaign in Italy in April 1706, Prince Eugene had made his way from Vienna to join the army, only to learn that the Duc de Vendôme had inflicted a severe defeat on the troops commanded in his absence by Graf Reventlau, in a costly battle at Calcinato. With typical energy, Eugene drew his battered army together again and re-established order and discipline, managing to maintain his troops as effective in the field in a remarkably short time after the defeat. Of Reventlau’s failure on the day, the prince mildly commented that is showed that ‘not everyone can command an army’.32 Eugene was now to face two armies rather than just one, for Louis XIV had decided that Vendôme should keep Eugene at bay, while Marshal de la Feuillade (‘very young and inexperienced’ according to St Simon)33 attacked Turin, defended by only the remnant of Victor-Amadeus’s army and some 7,000 Imperial troops commanded by Graf von Daun. By the second week in May 1706 the French investment of Turin was complete with formal lines of contravallation and circumvallation being constructed.34 Victor-Amadeus had left the city with 6,000 Savoyard cavalry just before the investment was complete, and conducted a welldirected and skilful campaign with this small army to delay and frustrate the French operations. La Feuillade pursued the duke into the Luserna valley, neglecting to press forward the siege instead, but for all the marching and counter-marching that was involved could not bring him to battle.

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122 The War of the Spanish Succession Vendôme took up a defensive posture on the river Adige, constructing stout earthworks to improve his positions stretching south and eastwards from Verona, and there seemed little likelihood that Eugene would have the strength to break through to relieve Turin. At the end of May, however, news came in of the catastrophe for French arms at Ramillies in the southern Netherlands, and the wholesale destruction of Marshal Villeroi’s army at the hands of the Duke of Marlborough. An urgent command soon came from Versailles summoning Vendôme north, to take up the command in Flanders and to try and save something from the wreck in that region. The shocking defeat for France at Ramillies also steadied the nerves of Venice and other Italian states, who no longer saw any advantage in allying themselves to Louis XIV and his fading fortunes, or forming an armed league against the allies.

Map 5: Prince Eugene’s march to relieve Turin, May–September 1706.

With such distractions, and Vendôme’s mind perhaps elsewhere, the conduct of the French campaign in northern Italy sagged noticeably. Early in July Eugene got his 30,000-strong army across the Adige at Rovigo, a good forty miles downstream from Verona, and by crossing

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Year of Miracles 123 the river Po near to Ferrara neatly outflanked the waiting French army holding the line of the river. ‘Prince Eugene will not be able to disturb the siege of Turin,’ Vendôme wrote to Versailles with remarkably misplaced confidence, ‘we have too many positions in which to stop him, for his ever dreaming of bringing relief.’35 He now had to leave his army headquarters and hurry north to new responsibilities, and Marshal Ferdinand Marsin, who had fought so hard and so well at Blenheim two years earlier, came from the Moselle to assume the command of the French army covering the operations against Turin. He had to withdraw towards Cremona to avoid being outflanked by Eugene’s march. The progress of the imperial army was both rapid and impressive, given the general lack of supplies and money, and much of the marching was done at night to shield the toiling soldiers from exertions in the withering heat of an Italian summer. The prince kept to the south of the river Po, with that obstacle between his army and any attempt by the French to come and interrupt his progress. A chance to strike at the advance of Eugene’s army was missed, and the Duc de St Simon recalled that: An intercepted letter, in cipher, from Prince Eugene to the Emperor, which fell into our hands proved, subsequently, that this course would have been the right one to adopt; but the proof came too late; the deciphering table having been forgotten at Versailles.36 Frustrating as this may have been, whether the superficially useful information could have been gleaned and then passed on to Marshal Marsin to put into action before the Imperial army had moved on must be in some doubt. In any case, Reggio was passed by Eugene’s marching troops on 14 August, and Piacenza five days later, all without hindrance from Marsin, whose attention was distracted by the arrival at Verona of a 4,000-strong contingent of Hessian reinforcements for Eugene’s army. The river Tonora was crossed above Allessandia, and on 1 September 1706 Prince Eugene and Victor-Amadeus joined forces at Villa Stelloni about twenty miles to the south of the besieged city of Turin. This was a remarkable military achievement, likened to and ranking with Marlborough’s march to the Danube in 1704. It was accomplished by Prince Eugene with daring and skilful flair, in marching around the

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124 The War of the Spanish Succession flank of a larger enemy army, keeping them at arm’s length along the route of a forced march some 150 miles long, with precarious supplies and no hope of assistance if the army was opposed by any substantial formed body of troops at any one point on the route. The initiative in the whole campaign in northern Italy now lay with the allies – a remarkable turn-around in fortune over the previous six months. The young Duc d’Orleans, nephew of Louis XIV and therefore a Prince of the Blood, had arrived at Turin on 28 August to lend a hand in the siege. His presence, as on other notable occasions, was in fact a distraction, as there was nothing really for him to do but he was bound to be attended to on account of his rank and standing at Versailles. Orleans was nominally in command of the operations but the actual command lay with La Feuillade and Marsin, neither of whom seemed inclined to harken to his advice and comments nor really to each other. Given Orleans’ lack of military experience, despite his well-intentioned suggestions, this neglect to grip the command problem presented to the two marshals is not all that surprising. Despite their superior numbers, French operations were now dragging as the initiative was so clearly lost to them, and on the 4 September Eugene began to cross the river Po to take up a position near Pianezza; his forward troops were now less than three miles from the beleaguered defences of the city. Two days later the prince moved to threaten the portion of the French siege works, the outward-facing lines of circumvallation, that had still not been completed on the western side of Turin. The Duc d’Orleans urged that the siege be suspended so that the army could concentrate to meet Eugene’s advance, but Marsin brushed the comment aside, and pointedly reminded him that he had no authority over the conduct of the siege operations. The most critical stage in a formal siege was now reached, a stage that should by any measure, and with a degree of careful planning, have been avoided. The army investing the fortress, and quite rightly directing its attentions to that onerous task, relied implicitly upon the covering army to keep any opposing force, whose intention must be to relieve the garrison in the fortress, firmly at a safe distance. The French commanders had failed to accomplish this essential task, Eugene was close at hand and the success of the siege, as a result, hung in the balance. A general attack was ordered by the prince on 7 September 1706,

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Year of Miracles 125 and at a third attempt Prussian troops broke through the French position on the right. Eugene recalled that: The right wing was at first repulsed, because it could not attack as soon as the left. Anhalt [Leopold, Prince of Anhalt-Dessau] set all to rights again with his brave Prussian infantry, and I at the head of some squadrons. For an hour and a half some advantages were gained on either side; it was a carnage but not a battle. Our troops at length leaped into the entrenchments of the French, but threw themselves into disorder in the pursuit . .. In rallying the latter, one of my pages and a valet de chamber were killed behind me, and my horse, wounded with a carbine shot, threw me into a ditch.37 Marsin was, as he had predicted, mortally wounded in the fighting, and Orleans was wounded in two places.38 Eugene wrote that if the Marshal ‘had come out to the attack me first, and to turn [outflank] me, I should have been a good deal embarrassed’.39 Count von Daun successfully sallied out from the defences to meet the relieving army, and in the process the siege was utterly broken. The Marquis de Langallerie, who fought under Eugene that day, recalled that: By Noon the victory was entirely ours, and the city entirely delivered, for the Enemy abandoned the Attack, and all their Camp retired with the remains of their Army to the other side of the Po. The rest of the day was spent in taking several Cassines and Redoubts possessed by the Enemy, who all yielded themselves Prisoners of War, and his Royal Highness [VictorAmadeus] entered triumphantly his Capital that evening.40 Prince Eugene remembered the marquis well, describing him rather cuttingly as ‘imprudent, who turned out ill, but to whom I was then much attached for bravery and intelligence’.41 The day of battle had been costly, with some 9,000 French casualties, including many unwounded prisoners, and 5,000 allied killed and wounded. Marshal Marsin lay dying, and the Duc d’Orleans would have withdrawn towards Lombardy to draw support from the many French held fortresses in the region, but the road was barred. Instead the battered French army, its commanders despairing of continuing the

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126 The War of the Spanish Succession struggle and leaving behind their valuable siege train, fell back towards the French frontier and effectively abandoned the campaign in Italy. An officer who took part in the flight of the French troops wrote to a friend of ‘the disorder in which they fought the battle of Turin, and the confusion that prevailed among us when we turned our backs on an army, which, even after the engagement, was greatly inferior to ours. I shall draw a veil over this disagreeable scene’.42 Prince Eugene elatedly remarked to Victor-Amadeus, on hearing the inexplicable direction that the French retreat took, that ‘Italy is ours, Cousin’.43 The result of this remarkable campaign, the weight of which had mostly lain on the shoulders of the prince, was that Vienna was from that point onwards able to virtually ignore French and Spanish interests, and dictate affairs in Italy pretty well as it saw fit. Eugene, despite nursing a head wound and numerous grazes and bruises from his fall sustained during the battle, wrote to the Duke of Marlborough on the evening of the day of victory, giving due thanks for the financial support that he had obtained, and the influence used to ensure that reinforcements of German troops had been sent south to join the campaign in good time: You have had so great a share of it by the succours you have procured, that you must permit me to thank you again. Marshal Marsin is taken prisoner and mortally wounded. The troops have greatly signalized themselves. In a few days I will send you a correct account; and in the meantime refer you to that which you will hear from the bearer of this letter [the Baron de Hohendorff], who is well informed, has seen everything, and is competent to give you an accurate relation.44 The political impact for the allied cause of the twin victories in 1706 was profound. The loss of the southern Netherlands, with its large taxgathering potential, and defeat in strategically important northern Italy, were a severe shock for Louis XIV and his grandson. The costs incurred by the king’s treasury in sustaining the war, both for France and in large measure for Spain were staggering, while the prospects for recovery in both theatres of war appeared very slim. There had, however, been a corresponding lack of success for the alliance elsewhere, most particularly in Spain despite the successful

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Year of Miracles 127 holding of Valencia and Catalonia, but also on the Rhine where Villars had held firm, and in Hungary where rebellion against imperial authority smouldered on under the direction of Prince Rakoczy. This running sore in the side of the imperial war effort might have been settled, but the success at Ramillies in May 1706 had seemed to stiffen the resolve on the emperor’s advisers in Vienna, and Rakoczy wrote to the Duke of Marlborough that ‘we are affected here through the insupportable arrogance which your rapid conquests breed in the hearts of the imperial Ministers’.45 Emperor Joseph, however, would have none of this and declared that he would give up both Spain and Italy sooner than part with any part of Hungary or Transylvania. With so much achieved in the campaigns that year, and the southern Netherlands comfortably in allied hands, thoughts and concerns in Vienna turned to the east, and the attention of Austria from then onwards was never so devoted to the wider common cause of the Grand Alliance as before. Holland had regained its Barrier against future French aggression, Austria had substantial gains in Italy and the Low Countries, and Savoy was secure, while Britain firmly held Gibraltar, and the allies were in possession of a large part of eastern Spain, with their cruising squadrons dominating much of the Mediterranean, so that the Maritime Powers could count expanded trade in the region amongst their rewards. The division of the old Spanish empire was in practice achieved, France was smitten, and French power and prestige demonstrably weakened by repeated failure on the field of battle – Louis XIV would not again be able to dominate affairs as he had been used to do. On the face of things, the Grand Alliance had won the war militarily, and now it just had to win the peace. In this task the allies proved incompetent; with so much gained, the argument ran, and France so apparently prostrated, nothing that was demanded would not be meekly delivered up by Louis XIV and his grandson. These were the fatal judgements of politicians and diplomats settled in comfortable chambers far removed from anything that reeked remotely of a field of battle. A gross miscalculation was made, that ensured that the war had to go on, when with judicious negotiation, it might have now been brought to a conclusion. This was a significant error, and what might have been had cheaply by judicious negotiation was instead arrogantly demanded and consequently thrown away.

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128 The War of the Spanish Succession Negotiations were opened confidentially to find a means to conclude a peace satisfactory to all parties, but these made little progress with the ambitions of the allies now so greatly inflated by their successes, even though the original aims of the Treaty of Grand Alliance were pretty well obtained. However, great success breeds exorbitant ambition, and the talk in Parliament in London was increasingly that there could be ‘No Peace without Spain’ and that Archduke Charles must be placed on the throne in Madrid, and Philip V deposed. Plainly this was only likely to be done if there was military success on the field in Spain, and so far the allies had found this to be elusive. This had not even been an objective of the Grand Alliance when it was formed, and proved to be a fatal and ultimately unattainable extension of war aims.

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Chapter 8

Over the Seas to Spain ‘I thought fit to impart to you a new joy.’1

Whatever heartening successes were being gained by Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough in Italy and the Low Countries, these mattered little for the expanded ambitions of the Grand Alliance if progress could not be made for the Austrian archduke’s cause in Spain. In the spring of 1706 Philip V attempted to recapture Barcelona, contrary to the advice of his grandfather in Versailles who urged a degree of caution: ‘I should have hesitated to recommend such a plan, but since you have made up your mind, it only remains for you to carefully consider the mode of carrying out your resolution.’2 Meanwhile, the newly-created Marshal Berwick was sent back to Spain, at Philip’s request, and he arrived in Madrid on 12 March. Concerned that the concentration of French and Spanish troops against Barcelona would leave Madrid exposed to an advance from Portugal, he ordered whatever troops could be gathered together to concentrate on holding the line in Estramadura. The Marquis de Villadarias in Andalusia refused a request to send troops to support Berwick, as he feared a fresh Anglo-Dutch attack on Cadiz, but the marshal was unconvinced, as any such attempt was unlikely while Barcelona was threatened by Philip V and Tessé’s army. Berwick went to Badajoz and found to his dismay that the best troops had already been taken from the garrison for the Barcelona operations, while the forces commanded by the Earl of Galway and the Marqués Das Minas, presently at Campo Mayor, were reported to number no fewer than 25,000. With no reinforcements coming from either Villadarias or from troops stationed in Galicia, Berwick made what hasty preparations he could to foil any advance by the allies but, as before, he found that adequate supplies were hard to obtain, and the force he could deploy was barely adequate for the task.

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130 The War of the Spanish Succession Operations to recover Barcelona continued in the meantime, and the French Mediterranean fleet under the command of the Comte de Toulouse anchored off the port on 1 April 1706, while General Legal arrived before the defences the next day with a force of some 9,000 troops. Philip V and Marshal Tessé joined him on 3 April, having bypassed the allied garrisons in Saragossa and Lerida, leaving their lines of supply and communications exposed as result. Meanwhile Marshal Noailles had advanced through Roussillion to take part in the operations, and the small allied garrison in Gerona was withdrawn as he approached. A skilful concentration of French and Spanish forces on land and sea had thus been achieved, with a besieging force 21,000 strong, the majority of whom were well-trained and equipped French soldiers. The Barcelona garrison under command of Count Uhlfeld comprised only about 3,000 troops, half of whom were irregulars with a tendency to please themselves where obeying orders were concerned. In addition the 5,000-strong city militia, enthusiastic and brave but illtrained and poorly equipped, helped to man the defences where these were least exposed to attack. Reinforcements had been called for from the allied garrison in Tortosa and that withdrawn from Gerona, and Hamilton’s English Regiment of Foot arrived to augment the garrison just in time to avoid Tessé’s investment of the city. Meanwhile, the Count de Cifuentes was active with his Miquelets against the supply lines of Tessé’s army, harrying patrols and pickets, and raiding encampments under cover of dark. The fortifications of Barcelona were in generally good condition, with the commanding outpost at the Montjuich having been strengthened by the chief engineer, Colonel Petit, to provide a useful bulwark against attack. A palisaded line of communication had been constructed and led from Montjuich to the main defences, allowing easy access to and from the town, and so a weakness in the defences that had been exploited by the allies when they took the place had been put right. On 4 April, Tessé attempted a coup de main, hoping to surprise the outwork with a sudden attack, but the effort was smartly repulsed by Hamilton’s Regiment, although French troops managed to drive some Catalan irregulars out of the Capuchin convent nearby. Recognising the need for a formal siege, Tessé now completed his investment of the city and began to construct lines of circumvallation to secure his own encampment.

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Over the Seas to Spain 131 Philip V took a keen interest in the proceedings, but whatever credit he thereby gained with the Spanish troops, who were undoubtedly glad to see their acknowledged king so active, his presence with the army was something of an irritation for Tessé, who found that his own authority was thereby undermined. ‘The king’s presence does more harm to his service than if he had stayed in Madrid,’ the marshal wrote rather peevishly to Versailles.3 The old problem of divided command was present once again. Philip’s personal safety was also a constant and lingering concern, and a raid by Cifuentes’s irregulars on the French and Spanish encampment on 5 April narrowly missed seizing him, although some of his camp equipment was carried off in triumph. The king thereafter slept on board one of Toulouse’s ships each night for security. French engineers gradually reduced Fort Montjuich by skilful sapping, but the arrival of a powerful Anglo-Dutch squadron under command of Admiral Leake on 7 May forced Toulouse to sail away as he had firm instructions to avoid a general action at sea. The French naval commander had been warned of the allied warships’ approach by a Genoese merchantman, and Leake was just in time to see the topsails of the French fleet disappear over the distant horizon. The Earl of Peterborough, as active as ever, was with Leake having had himself rowed out to the flagship as the admiral passed the Valencian coastline. With allied reinforcements for the defenders being landed without real hindrance, the siege of Barcelona quickly became a broken-backed enterprise, with the rear areas of the Franco-Spanish army under constant harrying from Catalan irregulars. Recognising the failure of the endeavour, on 11 May Philip V and his commanders abandoned their guns, stores and the hundreds of wounded, sick and convalescent soldiers, and withdrew, travelling on a circuitous passage through southern France, the fear being, apparently, that they might be exposed to attack on the road if they took a more direct route. A two-hour long total eclipse of the sun, the symbol of his grandfather, seemed to presage further misfortunes for the Bourbon claimant to the throne. The young king wrote to his grandfather in a mood of understandable dejection: ‘I cannot express to you my grief at having to leave the Archduke in Barcelona, and I shall have no rest until I fight him wherever he is.’4 The Austrian claimant, however, was at the same time writing with quiet satisfaction to the Duke of Marlborough, that:

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132 The War of the Spanish Succession I thought fit to impart to you a new joy – I have to see my city of Barcelona entirely delivered from the siege. Never any retreat was made with greater precipitation than that which the enemy have made, having left behind them 140 pieces of brass cannon, and such a prodigious quantity of ammunition and provisions that the same is incredible.5 Taking advantage of the diversion of French troops to attack Barcelona, Galway and Das Minas with their Anglo-Portuguese and Dutch army had advanced from Campo Mayor in April 1706 to threaten Madrid. As they moved forward they were faced by Marshal Berwick, heavily outnumbered as he was with just 15,000 poorly-equipped Spanish soldiers. After some initial skirmishing, Alcantara was taken by Portuguese troops, having fought off a very hard-driven counter-attack, and after a siege of only four days. In the course of the hand-to-hand fighting both Das Minas and Berwick came close to being captured, both men forced to ride for their lives in opposite directions. Having taken Alcantara, the allies advanced with confidence to Almarez but then hesitated, unsure of Berwick’s movements; Das Minas, so valiant at the fighting for Alcantara, was reluctant to venture forward, and John Methuen wrote in frustration to King Pedro in Lisbon with a protest at the likely consequences of inaction: I find myself obliged to represent to your Majesty in the name of the Queen my mistress, that, since it appears now to be in your Majesty’s power by marching immediately towards Madrid, if any other resolution than that be taken the Queen my mistress will look upon it as the loss of the greatest occasion that could be wished. Methuen then went on to add a barely-concealed threat to the king, should the Marqués not show a little more spirit: If the army shall be otherwise employed this spring, than in marching into Spain towards Madrid, I am commanded to retire the English forces in Portugal to be embarked on the fleet which I expect in the next month, and in that case I am likewise commanded not to continue the payment of the subsidies for the pay of the troops of your Majesty.6

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Over the Seas to Spain 133 It was enough, and the army duly moved forward; Placentia was given up, and Ciudad Rodrigo submitted to the allies on 26 May. Encouraged by the news of the raising of the siege of Barcelona, the advance continued to Salamanca on 7 June, where a substantial supply depot was seized. The civic dignitaries arranged a warm welcome, although the locals once again showed little enthusiasm at the presence in their midst of foreign troops. Berwick fell back to cover the pass over the Sierras at Guadarama and in this way hoped to shield the approaches to the capital, but on 18 June Galway received the even better news of the crowning triumph for Marlborough at Ramillies, and the allies pressed forward with appropriate determination. A week later Berwick withdrew his army to Madrid; in the meantime, Philip V had returned to the capital to find that after the failure at Barcelona, there was a noticeable lessening of confidence that he could maintain and make good his claim to the throne. On 20 June, the queen took Berwick’s advice to retire to Burgos in Old Castile for her security, with the members of the Privy Council, and Philip joined her there with the worn-out remnants of the army he had taken to try and capture Barcelona. This distinct and humiliating setback for the young king’s cause added to the lustre of the allied victories at Ramillies and Turin, and the prospects for a Habsburg success seemed to be bright, but things were never quite so simple in the peninsula. Berwick had, with inadequate resources, conducted a cautious and skilful campaign, in effect a prolonged holding action. He had eluded his opponents as they advanced on Madrid, without giving them the opportunity to force a battle in the open. The marshal wrote afterwards that: It took two to make a battle, and that a general should only resort to it when he could do nothing else, because the outcome was always uncertain, and that one should not risk the success of a campaign, of a war, or even less the destiny of a State when one could equally well, by good emplacements and clever manoeuvres, achieve one’s object.7 For all the appearance of an allied success, he was still in the field, but even after receiving reinforcements from Valencia, Berwick could now

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134 The War of the Spanish Succession field only some 14,000 men after detachments to hold key fortresses. Galway and Das Minas, after the inevitable losses from desertion and sickness during the long and trying march now had command of about the same number of troops. On 24 June Galway reached Nuestra Senora de Ratamal and learning that Berwick had withdrawn northeastwards to Alcala on the river Henares, he sent an advance guard commanded by the Marquis de Villaverde to take possession of Madrid. The allied commanders were delighted to enter the city three days later; their cause appeared to have triumphed, and there was jubilation in Lisbon when the news arrived. ‘The contentment of the land was beyond description and understandably so, for the Portuguese were not made for such things and could not hope for so much.’8 Archduke Charles was proclaimed as King Carlos III of Spain on 2 July, but the people of Madrid were decidedly cool in their response, and were certainly not pleased by the presence of large numbers of Portuguese troops on their streets. However, the dowager Queen, Mariana von Neuberg, widow of Carlos II, sent her acknowledgement from her place of exile in Toledo, and some grandees prudently did the same, although many others left Madrid to stay quietly on their estates until things had settled down.9 The allied achievement was significant; in three months Galway and Das Minas had manoeuvred Berwick away from Madrid, and inflicted heavy losses in guns (nearly 100 having been abandoned to the advancing allies), stores and equipment on his army. The fortresses of Alcantara and Ciudad Rodrigo had been taken, as had Salamanca and Toledo, with 8,000 Spanish prisoners taken or picked up as deserters. Most significantly, Philip V’s forces had evacuated large areas of Leon, Old Castile and Estremadura, with Madrid now in allied hands. Despite this, there was still little evidence popular enthusiasm for the Austrian claimant and his foreign troops, many of who were Protestant and therefore heretics; detachments were increasingly harried and ambushed wherever they went. Still, many principal towns in Spain could now be counted to be in allied hands, however thin that grasp might have been in the countryside round about. It remained to be seen though, whether the allied commanders having got to Madrid could maintain themselves there. Messages were sent to Archduke Charles in Barcelona, urging that he make his way to Madrid without delay, to make the most of what had

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Over the Seas to Spain 135 been achieved before Philip V and his commanders could recover their poise, but there was no immediate response. Berwick meanwhile had fallen back to Guadalajara about thirty-five miles from Madrid, and taken up a good defensive position on the Henares. On 11 July Galway advanced to Alcala, establishing a supply base there, and having learned that Berwick had retired once again, the allied army moved forward. The marshal in the meantime had received reinforcements from among the troops who had returned from the failed Barcelona operation, and could now field over 20,000 troops, half of whom were French, and significantly outmatching those that Galway and Das Minas had under command. Two weeks later the allies advanced to Sopetran but an attempt to seize the French-held bridge over the Henares there failed, with an inconclusive artillery duel the only result. By 30 July, their army had been reduced by sickness, casualties and desertion to no more than about 12,000 troops, and had to fall back, allowing Berwick to regain his position at Guadalajara. Berwick apparently did not fully appreciate the numerical advantage he had, and neither opposing commanders found a promising opportunity to manoeuvre the other out of position, and so were reduced to keeping watch and awaiting developments. The strategic initiative however, which had briefly lain with the allies, was fast slipping away. The archduke, meanwhile, was making his way towards Madrid in a rather sedate manner, after a fractious series of meetings with the Earl of Peterborough, whose brusque and rather high-handed manner had already alienated him from Charles’ Austrian advisers. The respective merits of going to Madrid through Valencia or through Aragon were debated at length and valuable time wasted. The earl, for his part, was exasperated at the indecisiveness of the discussion, with the archduke ‘obstinate in some circumstances beyond expression, where there is nothing but matters of form and pride, but irresolute and changing where there is a matter of difficulty and hazard’.10 It was at last resolved to take the route through Valencia, and at the end of May Peterborough sailed there with a force of 4,500 infantry, followed by 2,000 cavalry taking the overland route through Tortosa. Preparations to sustain and re-supply the troops on the march were found to be faulty, and although it had been learned on 4 July that Madrid was in allied hands, it was not until three weeks later that Charles gave firm instructions for an advance. The route actually

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136 The War of the Spanish Succession taken ran through Saragossa and Aragon rather than through Valencia, and so Peterborough’s journey there was a largely wasted effort. The hitherto dispersed allied armies of the archduke and that of Galway and Das Minas met at last on 6 August, well over a month having been wasted since Madrid was taken. Peterbrough had caught up with Charles on the road, but they brought with them a force of just 4,000 troops, in doing so bringing the combined allied army back to its previous force level. Meanwhile news came in that the allies had managed on 8 August to secure Alicante on the Valencian coast, the Bourbon garrison commanded by Colonel Mahony being generously permitted to march out with the honours of war. Allied warships had also secured the Balearic islands of Majorca and Ibiza for the Archduke’s cause, and a successful landing was made at the port of Cartagena on the Murcian coast, which was occupied in collusion with the commander of the Spanish galley fleet, the Count of Santa Cruz, who clearly felt it the right time to change his coat. It was obvious, however, that the fumbling by allied commanders had let slip a wonderful opportunity, for the people of Madrid had risen in support of Philip V once the allied army left to confront Berwick, and in the meantime both Toledo and Salamanca, commanding the roads leading from the Portuguese frontier, had been re-occupied by French and Spanish troops. Salamanca was eventually recovered by the Portuguese general Fonte Arcada who imposed a fine of 50,000 pistoles on the unfortunate citizenry for having welcomed the French troops. The allies could not hope to recover Madrid, where the populace had always been unwelcoming, and withdrew to Chinchon on the Tajuna river some twenty miles to the south. Of necessity, the allied lines of supply now had to run south-eastwards to Valencia rather than all the troubled way to Portugal and such fortresses as Ciudad Rodrigo. The recent capture of both Alicante and Cartagena had certainly been fortuitous in enabling this switch in communications. On 14 August Galway, who now uncomfortably had to share the command with both Das Minas and Charles’s favourite general, the Count of Noyelles, encamped near the junction of the Tajuna with the river Xarama, with an army just 4,000 strong. The clear hostility of the local populace had at least, for the time being at least, served to discourage desertion amongst his dispirited troops. By comparison, Berwick could command

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Over the Seas to Spain 137 26,000 men, and was particularly strong in cavalry; however, he saw no need to fight an outright battle for what might be obtained more cheaply by stealth. The marshal detached General Légal with 3,000 cavalry to attack the allied outposts at Alcala, and the posture of the allied army was disrupted; Berwick had seized the initiative without having to fight very much, and the allies could not without venturing to fight a battle at long odds, bar the road to Madrid. On 4 September 1706 LieutenantGeneral de Vallée entered the capital with a strong force of French cavalry, which was warmly welcomed by the residents. A small AustroSpanish garrison commanded by the Count de las Amajuelas held out gamely for several days in the citadel, before despairing of any hope of relief and submitting. The captured soldiers were ill-treated, and many were sent to serve in the French galleys for their support for Charles, while a huge quantity of abandoned stores fell into de Vallée’s hands. Despite internal divisions in the army command, Galway maintained his position at Chinchon, but with any hope of recovering Madrid gone, on 9 September in deteriorating weather the allied army began to withdraw to Valencia. They crossed the Tagus river at Duennas on the few pontoon bridges not abandoned in Madrid, and moving on to Valverde. At Veles a week later, Galway received 1,400 British reinforcements and a substantial and much-needed re-supply of stores and provisions, Berwick shadowed the allied march, not seeking to give battle, but always keeping carefully between his opponents and the road to Madrid. On 25 September, things changed, when Berwick suddenly attempted to intercept the allied line of withdrawal at the Gabriel river, but failed to do so when the allied rearguard showed a brave front backed by artillery. The marshal, apparently abandoning any hope of inflicting serious damage on the retreating army, turned back. The allies made their way into Valencia, just some 12,000 strong, without further interference on 1 October. The troops were sent away to winter quarters after a generally well conducted retreat at the close of what was a very disappointing campaign for the Habsburg claimant to the throne. Still, the archduke summoned the Valencian Cortez, something Philip V had never done, and the assembly promptly voted a large sum of money for his cause. The Earl of Peterborough, tiring of the divided and fractious command in the allied army, had taken himself off to Italy before the withdrawal began and managed to raise, at a high rate of interest, a substantial loan for Charles, without proper authority

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138 The War of the Spanish Succession to do so, but which was very welcome all the same. Philip V re-entered Madrid on 4 October, where his welcome reception was warm and genuine, and amply demonstrated by the populace. To no great surprise enquiries were made concerning those grandees who had felt it appropriate to acknowledge the archduke, and a number of those concerned were banished from the capital, but punishment was, on the whole, moderate and intended to both heal divisions and demonstrate the generous and easy self-confident nature of King Philip V. Few actual reprisal were enacted, although ex-Queen Mariana of Neuburg was sent to live quietly in Bayonne where she could make less trouble. The failure of the allied commanders to consolidate their early gains, and the delays and indecision demonstrated, had left Berwick free to regain the initiative. During the autumn months he was able to recover a lot of the ground lost earlier in the campaign, with Cuenca submitting on 10 October after a halfhearted resistance by the isolated Habsburg garrison, and the next day Orihuela being taken by Spanish troops under the command of Luis Belluga, Bishop of Murcia. Berwick entered Elche on 21 October and recaptured Cartagena in November, while the Marques de Bay re-took Alcantara on the Tagus in December. In this methodical way almost all of Castile, Estramadura and Murcia, was once more secured for Philip V by the end of the year. The king had, however, not been successful in securing his position in Italy, and Vienna’s hopes in that direction were still very much alive. On 13 March 1707 Emperor Joseph concluded a confidential agreement with France that, in effect, brought active hostilities in Italy to a close. French garrisons were withdrawn from the Milanese region and Mantua, and were as a result able to be deployed elsewhere against Austria’s own allies. The move was self-serving in the extreme for Vienna, and many of these troops were soon making their way accompanied by the Louis XIV’s nephew, the Duc d’Orleans, to bolster the French effort in Spain. Galway and Das Minas, having wintered their troops in Valencia and Catalonia, resolved to take the offensive before their opponents could be so substantially reinforced. Their army, now numbering 15,000 troops and comprising Portuguese, English, Dutch, Huguenot and a few hundred German troops, advanced on 10 April on the road towards Yecla where the well-filled storehouses and magazines prepared by

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Over the Seas to Spain 139 Berwick fell into their hands. Thus providentially re-provisioned, Galway then laid siege to the fortress at Villena, from where he learned that Berwick had advanced to take up a position at the small town of Almanza. The likelihood was that he would be joined there by the Duc d’Orleans with more troops, and so Galway resolved to attack the French commander without delay and before such a concentration of forces could be accomplished. The allied army moved on the twenty-five miles to Almanza, to confront the 25,000 French and Spanish troops commanded by Berwick. Galway was outnumbered, but probably not aware of the extent of this, and was naturally concerned that the French commander would be further reinforced if he delayed an engagement. The earl advanced resolutely on 25 April, but had no time to carry out a close reconnaissance, and the forward movement was over-hasty, as the troops had to cross broken ground which upset their dressing, and made proper control hard to maintain. Despite the difficulties, in midafternoon the allied infantry attacked with vigour, but after an initial success were driven back, and a soldier who took part in the advance remembered that: Our advanced guard marched up to them very boldly and beat them in a gallant manner, all their out guards. So our army marched up in line of battle, though our men were much spent for they could get no water all the day’s march. So then the armies engaged very brisk and sharp so that at one time it was thought we should have gained the day, for our Foot beat theirs and drove them, but our Horse was much overpowered.11 Although Galway had astutely interlined his horse and foot to give mutual support, the Portuguese cavalry took alarm at Berwick’s confident counter-moves, and fearing to be outflanked they fled the field leaving the Allied infantry, which had been outnumbered from the start, in a desperate plight. ‘Our cavalry, and particularly the Portuguese gave way without waiting for any charge, abandoning all alone on the plain our infantry.’ Galway was wounded, as was Das Minas, but the Earl managed to remount his horse to resume direction of the fighting. After a sharp struggle against heavy odds, some 2,000 Dutch and British infantry

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140 The War of the Spanish Succession under command of Major-General Dohna and Brigadier-General Shrimpton were surrounded in a wood, and obliged to surrender to Berwick the next day. Much of the allied baggage and artillery was lost, and the French commander could count no fewer than twenty field guns, 3,000 prisoners and 120 colours and standards, amongst the spoils of his well-deserved victory. The badly-beaten allied army, now reduced to about 6,000 men, fell back in disorder towards Valencia, with insufficient strength to make a stand to defend the region. Galway wrote to James, Earl Stanhope with details of the defeat that had been suffered that day: We marched on the 25thy [April] into the plain of Almanza. The enemy waited for us near the town where we gave them battle and were defeated; both our wings being broke and routed. Our foot was hounded by the enemy’s horse, so that none could get off . . . All the generals that are here assembled yesterday to consult what was now to be done. All agreed that we were not in a position to think of defending this kingdom [Valencia] and resolved to retire on Tortosa with what horse is left to us.12 A lack of harmony amongst the allied commanders, in addition to the poor quality of training and equipment of some of the troops, had contributed to this reverse. As the Earl predicted, Valencia could not be held after such losses, and Archduke Charles and his adherents would soon fall back into Catalonia with a dejected army in total less than 10,000 strong, together with a hold on scattered outposts at Tortosa, Lerida, Denia and Alicante, and not much more. The court in Lisbon was alarmed at the scale of the defeat, feeling with some justification that they might be now more exposed to attack by French and Spanish armies, and with very little to defend them. In fact, Berwick had now been joined by the Duc d’Orleans and had other plans; his own casualties in the fighting at Almanza had not been insignificant and he did not pursue Galway and Das Minas all that vigorously, but turned his attention instead to Requena and Valencia, while a detachment operated against the allied garrison in the port of Denia. The Austrian governor in Requena surrendered almost as soon as the place was invested, and on 8 May Valencia also submitted. Berwick promptly had the defences demolished, and fined the

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Over the Seas to Spain 141 inhabitants 40,000 pistoles for having supported the Austrian claimant to the throne. The pursuit of the beaten allied army was undoubtedly cautious, and the town of Xativa was only secured by the Chevalier d’Asfeld after heavy house-to-house fighting on 19 May, and the citadel still held out. An attempt by Berwick to cross the river Ebro on 25 May was repulsed, so that the French had to march sixty miles upstream to Caspe in Aragon, in order to get over the obstacle. Saragossa submitted to a force commanded by the Duc d’Orleans on 26 May, while Alcira held out until 1 June, when the allied garrison were permitted to march out on good terms. The troops in the citadel in Xativa capitulated on 12 June, after a valiant defence of thirty-nine days which did much to slow the preparations Berwick was making to advance towards Catalonia. The reprisals ordered by the French commander at the siege, d’Asfeld, were, however, unduly harsh, and much of the town of Xativa was burned by his troops before they moved on. The allied garrison were permitted to march out with the honours of war, but suffered badly from privation and harassment on the road back to Catalonia.13 Energetic efforts by Galway and the steady arrival of troops posted as missing at Almanza, and who had either evaded capture or escaped from the French, brought his army back to a strength of over 14,000 horse and foot. Lerida gallantly held out until the beginning of October, and the citadel garrison only surrendered six weeks later. This was still a blow for the allied cause, as the country around the town had provided much of the produce and provisions needed by the army to operate effectively. News came that Ciudad Rodrigo had been recaptured from the Portuguese, but the defence of Denia became a minor epic; the garrison was commanded by General Juan Ramos, and the governor of the citadel was Don Diega Rejon de Silba, two very capable soldiers. Earthworks had been thrown up to reinforce the formal defences, and it was only at the end of June that the French had properly established their trenches and brought up the siege train. These batteries opened fire four days later, and despite vigorous counter-battery fire from the garrison, on 6 July a breach had been made in the defences. An assault was mounted the next day, which was repulsed with the loss of over 300 of the stormers, and a second attempt under cover of night was no more successful. New batteries having been established, a second breach was made, and on 10 July the French commander, d’Alsfeld, beat a parley, sending a message to Ramos and de Silba that having had to make two

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142 The War of the Spanish Succession assaults, he would certainly make a third and more powerful attack, and would offer no quarter unless the garrison submitted before that took place. The robust response was that they would certainly not submit, and would in turn offer no quarter to his attacking troops. The spirits of the garrison had been lifted by the landing of 400 marines and armed seamen from HMS Lancaster, which lay off-shore. The third French attack went in late that afternoon, directed at both breaches to divide the attention and fire of the defenders, and in ninety minutes of heavy and hand-to-hand fighting the attackers were once again repulsed. A fourth attempt was made at similar heavy loss. ‘A bloody engagement took place, and at the close of two hours’ hand-to-hand fighting, Ramos was again victorious, the Bourbon troops being hurled back to their trenches, leaving the breaches covered with their dead and wounded.’14 D’Asfeld in frustration gave up these expensive attacks, and instead established a tight blockade of the place. The French went on to attack Alicante. The defence was a good one, and the besiegers could only make slow progress. Although the town had to be given up, the citadel doggedly held out with an English and Huguenot garrison commanded by Major-General John Richards. Such valiant resistance was admirable, but it was plain that the allies had lost the initiative, an however valiant the defences might be, Denia and Alicante must, unless a major land operation was mounted to relieve them, fall in time.

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Chapter 9

Vexatious Distractions ‘The number of enemy forces has risen daily.’1

Tired of war, Louis XIV would have welcomed a good peace, for repeated military reverses had taught a stark lesson, and confidential negotiations with the parties to the Grand Alliance to achieve this end were in hand. Still, while inclined to settle matters, he remained obstinate, aware of the central position which France held, with a unity of purpose between himself and his grandson. Formidable armies were still able to be deployed and in the capable hands of commanders like Villars, Vendôme and Berwick they might yet turn the scales; if the Allies would not agree acceptable terms they might yet be imposed. France was as yet untouched, and a powerful stab at one or more of the more minor allies ranged against him – Portugal, Savoy or the German states perhaps – might pay handsome dividends. The Ottomans might even be persuaded to renew their threat to Vienna – Louis XIV had courted them in the past in attempts to distract and weaken Austria, and could do so again. Then there was always the north, where the volatile Swedish king might make mischief to France’s benefit. King Charles XII of Sweden, twenty-five years old, warlike, capricious and unpredictable, had challenged his neighbours for control of the Baltic, went on to wage against Augustus, King of Poland and Elector of Saxony, and had soundly beaten his army at Fraustadt in February 1706. The prowess of the well-drilled Swedish troops, 40,000 strong and renowned for their discipline and valour, was at its height, The Swedish king established his headquarters at Altenstadt near Leipzig for the winter months, and set out his demands to Augustus, most particularly that he should renounce his title as King of Poland, acknowledge Charles’s own nominee, and abandon his alliance with

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144 The War of the Spanish Succession Tsar Peter of Russia. The strategic aim was apparent, to deny allies to the Tsar and so prepare for a military operation in the east. The king, however, was sufficiently unpredictable to cause general concern amongst the parties to the Grand Alliance that, instead, he might march south and meddle in the war for Spain. On 23 November 1706 a letter was sent by Mr George Stepney, British ambassador at The Hague to a friend in London, explaining that: M. Palonquist, Envoy Extraordinaire from the King of Sweden, notified to the States-General and to my Lord Duke of Marlborough, that a treaty had been concluded the 24th past, at Alt Rastadt, between his master and King Augustus; whereby the latter renounces the crown of Poland, and consents to acknowledge Stanislaus, reserving to himself the title of King; [and] promises to send no assistance to the Tsar.2 Charles remained with his victorious troops in Saxony through the winter, and the possibility of war with Imperial Austria grew more likely over allegations of Vienna’s ill-treatment of Protestants in Silesia. That any such an attack would assist at one remove staunchly Catholic France in its war for the throne of Spain was apparently disregarded by the rigorously Protestant Swedish monarch. The danger of a third front opening against the Grand Alliance, with Charles entering the fray and engaging with Vienna was real and any additional diversion of Austria’s attention in this way would be immensely damaging. In February 1707, the Duke of Marlborough, expressing the widelyheld concern at what Charles XII might do in the coming campaigning season, wrote to Antonius Heinsius: ‘I should not scruple the trouble of a journey as far as Saxony, to wait on the King, and endeavour, if need be, to set him right, or at least to penetrate his design, that we may take the justest measures we can not to be surprised.’3 In the third week of April Marlborough took to his coach and went through Hanover to meet Charles at Altenstadt, to press him to stay out of the war, and particularly not to engage in fighting with Vienna. On 27 April 1707 the duke wrote to his friend Sidney Godolphin in London:

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Vexatious Distractions 145 This morning at a little after ten I waited on his Majesty. He kept me with him till the hour of dining which was at twelve, and as I am told sat longer at dinner by half an hour, than he used to do. He also took me again into his chamber where we continued for above an hour.4 The suave English courtier and the rough-hewn Swedish king – both being victorious generals of great renown – each quite naturally had a certain fascination with the methods of the other. The king seemed to feel that the duke’s mode of dress complete with his garter sash was too showy for a soldier, but they managed to agree on the main points under discussion. ‘The King expressing great tenderness and respect for Her Majesty as well as friendship for his Royal Highness Prince George of Denmark [the king’s uncle] and seeming very well inclined to the interest of the allies.’5 The concern that the Maritime Powers felt at the Swedish incursion into Saxony was put as forcefully as the duke could manage, within the bounds of civility, but here his courtier’s charms paid no dividend. The king’s cool response was: ‘You may assure the Queen, my sister, that my design is to depart from hence as soon as I have gained the satisfaction I demand, but not sooner.’6 The allied aim, of course, was to see that Charles did not interfere in the war for the throne in Madrid, but turn his attention elsewhere. Marlborough’s ability to offer inducements to Charles XII’s ministers certainly helped, and the English envoy to Sweden wrote three days after the duke met the king for the first time: By his Grace’s orders I have acquainted Count Piper, M. Hermeline and M. Cederheilm that her Majesty will give yearly pensions; to the first £1500 and to each of the other £300; but the second for the first time £1000, and that the first payment should be made without delay.7 Marlborough took care to enquire about the organisation and methods of the Swedish army, hitherto so victorious under the iron command of their young king. He was surprised to find that their army travelled very light, with little support from an administrative tail and with ‘no artillery train, no hospitals, no magazines’. For an army to be light on its feet was demonstrably a good thing, but this could be

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146 The War of the Spanish Succession overdone to the point of rashness, and the duke added, quite prophetically as it turned out, that: ‘It is an army that lives on what it finds and which in a well contested war will very soon be destroyed [author’s italics and translation].’8 The generally amiable discussions between king and duke ended, and the two men set out for Leipzig to meet the Elector of Saxony, and Stanislaus, now named as King of Poland at the behest of the Swedes, but not recognised as such by Queen Anne. Marlborough paid Stanislaus due compliments, in order to be civil, but indicated no formal recognition. The next day the duke left Charles XII, paid a courtesy call on Frederick-Wilhelm, King in Prussia, and returned to Brussels, having achieved something of a diplomatic coup. Charles XII stayed out of the war for Spain, and instead took his formidable troops to attack Russia on the grim road that led to defeat at Poltava two years later. Having established his forces in the Milanese, the attention of Emperor Joseph meanwhile was turned to making gains in southern Italy. From Vienna’s point of view this might have been the most promising theatre on which to concentrate even allowing for the continuing problems in Hungary, but it did few favours to the cause of the emperor’s younger brother in Spain. Marlborough, campaigning once more in Flanders, wrote in frustration to Secretary of State Robert Harley in London that ‘the court of Vienna should immediately be written to, to dissuade them from the expedition to Naples, and to press them in the most earnest manner to proceed with the greatest vigour in Spain’.9 Such appeals were fruitless, for the emperor was intent on making sure of acquiring Naples, and diverted significant numbers of his troops to achieve that end. Count Philip Ludwig Sinzendorf, the imperial plenipotentiary to The Hague, wrote to the Duke on 21 May 1707, soon after the news of the calamity at Almanza was known: Notwithstanding the defeat, the remains of the army must have retired to Barcelona; and as we are masters of the sea, that city can always be provisioned by the fleet, and the enemy will not be able to besiege it, for want of heavy artillery, and other necessaries. The King [Archduke Charles], therefore may remain there in safety, until means can be taken to succour him with fresh troops towards the autumn.10

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Vexatious Distractions 147 In effect, the count was saying that despite the defeat, affairs in Spain would have to wait while the emperor attended to more pressing affairs elsewhere, not just in southern Italy but in dealing with continuing rebellion in Hungary. Sinzendorf went on to point out that when fresh troops became available they would have to be paid for by Holland and England as they would be provided ‘under the condition that the two powers shall furnish their subsistence which we cannot provide . . . Be convinced that the emperor is not in a position to maintain the troops in Spain.’11 The agreement reached between France and Austria had effectively de-militarised northern Italy with the evacuation of all remaining French troops; the memorandum of the terms had been signed in Milan on 13 March 1707. Although 20,000 well-trained French troops were in this way enabled to rejoin the field armies of Louis XIV elsewhere, imperial forces could clearly be found to occupy Naples, and Queen Anne referred to this in a gently barbed tone in a letter of encouragement sent to the emperor on 6 May: The gains which the enemy has lately made in Spain may have such unfortunate consequences that I cannot but tell you that it is of the greatest importance that all your troops now in Italy should be used for an invasion of France . . . Your Majesty is too enlightened to be distracted by a trifling expedition [Votre Majeste est trop éclairé pour s’amuser á une petite expedition]. I am assuring myself therefore that is your wisdom you will think solely of the recovery of the Prince’s affairs; obliging his enemies’ to recall their troops for the defence of their own countries.12 It was no use: substantial imperial forces were committed away from the main theatres of war, and effort which should have been concentrated was diffused. A grand project against the great French naval base at Toulon had been planned for some time, however, and a major threat to the port and naval base would serve very well to draw French attention and troops away from the campaign in Spain. The Margrave of Baden had died from the festering effects of his wound received in 1704, and the Margrave of Bayreuth, who now commanded for the emperor on the Rhine frontier, was short of men. Too many imperial troops were committed elsewhere. The margrave

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148 The War of the Spanish Succession had the protection of the Lines of Stollhofen, stretching from Fort Louis on the river to Windeck on the margins of the tangled country of the Black Forest, to mask his lack of numbers, and additional defensive works had been constructed northwards along the Rhine to the fortresses of Landau and Philippsburg. His small army was faced by Marshal Villars, one of Louis XIV’s best and most aggressive commanders, and on 22 May the French broke through the defensive lines with complete surprise and little fighting and loss, and the imperial troops fell back in confusion towards Rastadt and Durlach. A delighted Louis XIV wrote to Villars: I do not know how to praise too much the disposition you made to become master of the Lines of Stollhofen, and the way it was done and the lucky success of the movement . . . You remember that the greatest advantage that you can draw from this expedition is that of allowing my army to supply itself at the expense of the enemy and to oblige them to fortify considerably their fortresses to oppose you.13 The king could clearly see that Villars’ army could not be maintained in any extended campaign in Germany, but for the time being the Imperial Circles of Swabia and Franconia were laid open to attack. The strategy by which Austria had for years defended its frontier on the Rhine had been broken, while the attention of Vienna was elsewhere. Detachments of French troops were left to labour at demolishing the now redundant Lines of Stolhoffen, while Villars and his army pressed onwards. The Margrave of Bayreuth had not the strength to check the French advance, and by 8 June the marshal had entered Stuttgart, levying contributions of money and supplies and spoiling the countryside as he went. Villars had cut himself loose from his own lines of supply and his army was in effect a huge flying column, supplying its needs from the regions through which it passed and from the depots and stores abandoned by the margrave as he fled. Out-generalled by Villars, Bayreuth had little option but to retreat further, taking up a defensive position not far from Nordlingen. Soon, French officers had the opportunity to ride over and view the old battlefield on the plain of Höchstädt, and to walk the slopes of the Schellenberg hill, still strewn as both sites were with the debris of the bitter fighting in 1704. Had the

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Vexatious Distractions 149 available Imperial forces been gathered together under a single firm commander – ‘A general of authority, capable of commanding troops’14 – then Villars’ progress might have been stemmed, for he was very much out on a limb, unable to receive immediate support if challenged, and potentially vulnerable to being cut off from his own line of withdrawal. Bayreuth, however, was irresolute and daunted by the threat he faced, and the Duke of Marlborough, exasperated at the deteriorating situation in southern Germany, wrote to him from Meldert on 7 June: ‘If all the troops Your Highness has in hand were concentrated the army of the Empire would be at least equal and perhaps superior to the enemy’s forces, of which it is certain that at least half are but militia.’ The Duke went on with just a hint of acidity in his tone: ‘If the advantage had been on our side, and we had made an irruption into their country, the French would not leave six thousand men at Strasbourg with their arms folded.’15 However, the margrave, an honest man of rather limited abilities, did little more than wring his hands in despair and hope for better times. Villars sent a message to Charles XII that he should bring his army, at that point still in Saxony, to jointly campaign in central Germany, but the Swedish king had other plans. Even so, the marshal still held the initiative, and could raid almost where he pleased, and so French cavalry crossed to the south bank of the Danube. The magistrates of Ulm were so alarmed that they implored Marlborough to come south once more, and take up the command of the allied campaign himself. This was not a realistic suggestion, with the summer campaign in Flanders still underway and not making very much progress. Instead, George, Elector of Hanover, was appointed; he was a good general, with enough authority to compel co-operation from fellow electors and princes. Saxon troops were diverted to the campaign against Villars, who found that his opponents were at last combining against him at Philippsburg, Saxons, Hanoverians, Prussians and Palatines, uncomfortably close to his own line of withdrawal to the Rhine and Alsace. The marshal, having done enough damage to the empire and achieved his own limited strategic aim, drew his troops back to a position at Durlach to the north of Rastadt; instructed by Louis XIV to re-cross the Rhine to winter his troops, he did so without interference at the end of October.16 Duke Victor-Amadeus II of Savoy was concerned at imperial ambitions for southern Italy, for he had his own plans for the region, but

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150 The War of the Spanish Succession it was at length agreed that, although Austrian troops would still move into Naples, Prince Eugene would combine forces with the duke to undertake the projected attack on Toulon. Command of the Mediterranean had long been an unspoken but widely understood goal for the Maritime Powers, and to seize Toulon and destroy the French fleet and its base would go a long way to achieve that purpose. Both Vienna and Turin were dependent upon the cash subsidies from London and The Hague, and the Maritime Powers wanted to attack the port and so it was to be done. The preparations for the campaign were delayed, and the open buying-up of stores in Genoa alerted the French ambassador there to what was being planned. Only at the end of June 1707 did Eugene and Victor-Amadeus move forward from their camps around Turin with 35,000 troops, on the road south towards Borgo on the river Sturo, and on across the Maritime Alps to Mentone on the coast, which was reached on 7 July. Marshal Tessé had covered the Dauphine against any possible direct threat, and now moved his own army through the heat of high summer to shadow the allied march. Eugene’s army met Admiral Shovell’s cruising squadron lying off Nice on 11 July, and in a well-handled combined operation the line of the river Var was crossed the next day. ‘You will be able to judge by our having set aside all difficulties,’ Eugene wrote to the Duke of Marlborough, ‘the eagerness of my zeal for the august desires of the Queen and for the good of the common cause.’17 With the availability of close naval support any concerns for lengthy lines of supply and communication for the allied army were allayed for the time being. The weary troops were allowed to rest, and after the commanders had conferred on board Shovell’s flagship, HMS Association, the march commenced again on 15 July and the river Argens was reached four days later. Desertions from the allied army, particularly amongst those French and Bavarians taken prisoner at Blenheim in 1704 and then pressed in to imperial service, increased at a marked rate as the march went on and Toulon came nearer. Marshal Tessé won the race to Toulon by a narrow head, and when Prince Eugene, Victor-Amadeus and Shovell arrived before the naval base on 26 July, they found French troops in large numbers securely in place in the fortifications and ready to receive them. Shovell pressed his colleagues to immediately storm the port, but Eugene sensibly would not do so, foreseeing heavy casualties and an uncertain outcome. The

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Map 6: The march by Prince Eugene and Victor-Amadeus of Savoy to attack Toulon, July 1707.

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152 The War of the Spanish Succession decision was a hard one, as French reinforcements were bound to be summoned from Spain and the Rhine frontier, and Tessé would probably soon be able to deploy superior numbers. Those imperial troops that might have bolstered the operations against Toulon had, of course, been sent with Graf von Daun to take possession of Naples instead. Despite the daunting prospect ahead, the allied commanders pressed on and an outwork called Fort St Catherine was stormed on 30 July, and Eugene wrote that, ‘The Duke of Savoy directed me to carry the heights of St Catherine where I posted the young Prince of SaxeGotha. The Duke promised him a reinforcement of four battalions, if he should he be attacked.’18 However, Tessé’s rapidly-growing army lay in an entrenched camp on St Anne’s hill just to the north of Toulon and the prince had doubts about the prospects for success; he wrote to the emperor in Vienna on 5 August that ‘in spite of the representations I have made to the Admiral, he absolutely insists upon carrying on with the attack’.19 The probing and skirmishing that had taken place so far only confirmed the robustness of the French dispositions, and the good morale of their soldiers. Shovell was forced to acknowledge that the opportunity to get Toulon quickly had passed by and he doubted that, even with the effort and expense of a formal siege, there was time enough to now succeed: Owing to the large number of cannons all round the city, to the powerful garrison within, and to the numerous earthworks encircling the place, Toulon has been turned into a very strong fortress under the enterprising command of Marshal Tessé. Moreover, the number of enemy forces has risen daily until they are by now nearly equal to our own. The success of our undertaking is therefore very doubtful.20 Eugene was of exactly the same opinion, but understood that the admiral had strict instructions to see that Toulon was taken, and such instructions were not lightly to be put to one side.21 Matters were resolved, after a fashion, on the night of 14/15 August when French troops recaptured St Catherine in a very well-handled attack. There was a stiff fight with the allied troops there under command of the Prince of Saxe-Gotha, who was mortally wounded by two musket balls. Desertions, sickness and a lack of ready provisions

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Vexatious Distractions 153 sapped the strength of the allied army, while Tessé grew stronger still as more French troops arrived in his camp. Probing attacks were made, and it would surely not be that long before the marshal mounted a major effort to throw the allied army back from Toulon. It had to be acknowledged that the operation had failed, and that Eugene and Victor-Amadeus should withdraw while their army was still in one piece, and in sufficient numbers to hold off any determined pursuit. A week after the loss of Fort St Catherine the decision was taken to withdraw, and having embarked the sick and wounded and many of their guns on Shovell’s ships, the allied army began the long march back out of French territory. Tessé let them go without serious interference, and despite the general disappointment for the allies in the enterprise, on the credit side it should be said that the French had burned or beached their own Mediterranean fleet to avoid it falling into their opponent’s hands, so the effort was not without some good results. Prince Eugene gave the French commander full credit for his successful defence of the port. ‘But for the bravery and talents of Tessé, and the unfortunate affair in which the prince of [Saxe] Gotha fell, we should have been successful.’22 Louis XIV had neither the time or money to refloat and refit his fleet, even if had chosen to try and challenge the Maritime Powers once more on the high seas. In addition, the overall benefit, at one remove, for the allied cause from the outward failure at Toulon, was that Marshal Berwick had been required to divert many of his own troops from Spain to reinforce Tessé in southern France. Accordingly, Berwick was unable to make quite as much from his recent victory at Almanza as might have been expected, and when they were eventually returned to Spain, the men were in a weak and ill-equipped condition. Eugene had also been able to add to the credit side at the end of September, the recapture the small town of Susa on the border between Savoy and France. Maritime strategy in the Mediterranean had evolved during the year, and a highly favourable treaty for future trade had been concluded between Great Britain and Archduke Charles, so that an Anglo-Spanish trading company would be established, once the war was over, with French traders excluded from the Indies. The war had to be won first, of course, but with his fortunes at a low ebb after the defeat at Almanza, Charles was too dependent upon British gold and troops to say no to what was proposed; Holland was less pleased, as

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154 The War of the Spanish Succession there was no provision for Dutch trade to benefit from the same agreement, which clearly cut across a clause in the Treaty of Grand Alliance that no ally should attempt to gain preferential terms to the exclusion of all or any of the others. All the same, sea power in the Mediterranean was largely exercised by the Royal Navy, and London had no compunction about taking advantage of that fact. In any case, Holland also tended to pick and choose which commitments it adhered to closely, as its lack of observance of the treaty agreement with Portugal had demonstrated. In Flanders, meanwhile, the immediate difficulty faced by the Duke of Marlborough was that the French army commander, the everdangerous Duc de Vendôme, had no intention of being caught and forced to fight in open battle. With imperial military activity concentrated in southern Europe for the time being, the French had a superiority in numbers in the north, but Louis XIV had given instructions that risks were not to be taken with the army, so that Vendôme set up a fortified camp at Gembloux, and sat down to watch what moves Marlborough would attempt to draw him out. The duke was also constrained: his lack of numbers made the chances of successfully laying siege to a French fortress unlikely, as he could not conduct such an operation and simultaneously prevent the larger French field army from interfering. Meanwhile the Dutch were reluctant to risk all that had been achieved in the previous year, and were busily counting their gains and laying out in their minds the extent and depth of an enlarged barrier for their future security. ‘Our friends will not venture,’ Marlborough wrote to Robert Harley, ‘unless we have an advantage which our enemies will be careful not to give.’23 Field Deputy Sicco van Goslinga recalled afterwards that, while the allied army lay inactive at Meldert in early June: We received in this camp positive orders from our masters [the Dutch States-General] to risk nothing. The reasons for these fine orders were the uncertain outcomes of the Toulon expedition and the superior strength of the enemy . . . We were ordered anew to avoid all occasions where there would be any risk of coming to an action, until the outcome of the Toulon enterprise was known or until the Duke of Vendôme had made a substantial detachment.24

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Vexatious Distractions 155 Marlborough was perceptive enough to see the wider picture, and to recognise the difficulties his opponents must also face, and he wrote to his wife on 13 June that ‘our affairs go very ill in Germany as well as Spain, and for my part, notwithstanding the noise the French have made, I think they would less care to venture a battle than our friends’.25 In effect, the French could play for time while the Grand Alliance fumbled. A situation close to stalemate had been reached in the Low Countries, neither side caring to risk open battle, while hoping both that affairs would prosper in other theatres of the war, and perhaps that their opponent would commit some serious error of which they might take advantage. As it happened, by the first week of August Louis XIV was sufficiently concerned by events in southern France to order a detachment of 10,000 troops from Vendôme’s army to be sent there. The French numerical superiority in Flanders was gone as a result, and taking advantage of this Marlborough moved against Vendôme’s lines of communications and supply, stretching back into the French fortress belt. Genappe was passed without difficulty, and the allied army reached Soignies three days later. The whole posture of Vendôme’s army at Gembloux was now untenable, and he fell back to reach Cambron the same day that Marlborough rode into Soignies; the opposing armies were marching on converging courses and at one point near Seneffe they had been only about three miles apart. The weather turned unseasonably foul, the pace of marching slowed and an attempt by Marlborough to overtake the French rearguard, and perhaps at last force a general action, miscarried when a wrong turning was taken and orders went astray in the gloomy darkness of a wet night. ‘It rained heavily, was pitch dark, and no house near, so that it was an hour before a light could be got.’26 Count Tilly eventually pushed his Danish cavalry squadrons forward, but Vendôme’s rearguard troops skilfully obstructed the road and managed to get away without serious harm, although the allies were able to take some hundreds of French stragglers as they overtook them on the line of march. Vendôme was not to be caught, and he took up a good new defensive position with his flanks anchored on the fortresses of Mons and Ath. Sombre news soon came to the allied camp of the failure of the campaign in southern France, and Marlborough wrote on 7 September: ‘We have learned from France that the Duke of Savoy has quitted the siege of Toulon and retreated.’27

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156 The War of the Spanish Succession Despite the disappointment, Marlborough persisted in trying to pin Vendôme down and he crossed the Scheldt under the protection of the guns of the allied-held fortress of Oudenarde and took up a strong position between that river and the Lys. The French commander had no intention of attacking his opponent, and withdrew to the shelter of the river Marque near to Lille, inside the border of France itself. The weather was still bad, and Vendôme had eaten up the campaigning weeks of summer and autumn very well, so that after some ineffectual manoeuvring there was not much more to do but for the opposing army commanders to send their troops off to winter quarters to prepare for what might be achieved in the coming year. In all theatres of the war, the affairs of the Grand Alliance had certainly not prospered in 1707, while those of Philip V, now back in Madrid, had by comparison blossomed. With the opening of the new year, Louis XIV attempted to divert the attentions of his opponents, by means of a speculative raid into Great Britain, with the twenty-year-old James Stuart, the Jacobite Pretender to the throne in London, at its head. Men, guns and ships were assembled in Dunkirk, and the blessing of the Pope for the venture was secured, even though the young prince was recovering from a bout of the measles, an ailment that at the time often proved fatal. All the elaborate preparations could not be achieved in secret, and the port was blockaded at the end of February 1708 by a squadron of eighteen warships under the command of Admiral Byng. Queen Anne wrote to her Privy Council in Scotland on 8 March 1708: The pretended Prince of Wales is at Dunkirk with some battalions of French and Irish Papists, ready to embark for Scotland, and our Enemies give out that they have invitations from some of our Subjects there. We are very hopeful that this attempt will, by the blessing of God on our Arms and Councils, be disappointed and turned to the confusion of all concerned in it . . . We take this occasion to let you know that Our Fleet is now at sea and much increased since our last. The Dutch Fleet is in great forwardness, and both are so disposed that Our Enemies cannot reasonably hope to escape an Engagement . . . The Troops from England are also posted in the best way for the relief of Our people in Scotland if our enemies shall have the boldness to pursue their designs.28

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Vexatious Distractions 157 As a distraction to prevent the Grand Alliance from pursuing its aims, the highly speculative adventure to Scotland had obvious attractions, but in the event proved to be a complete disappointment, and overall probably more troublesome for the French than the British and their Dutch allies. Parliament in London declared to the Queen that: No attempts of this kind shall deter us from supporting Your Majesty in the vigorous prosecution of the present war against France until the monarchy of Spain be restored to the house of Austria, and Your Majesty shall have the glory to complete the restoration of the liberties of Europe.29 Despite such stirring sentiments, the French Admiral Forbin was able to slip past the blockading squadron and with Byng in hot pursuit, made for the shores of the north of Scotland. It was all in vain, for when Forbin entered the Firth of Forth on 23 March, there was no one ready to welcome the Pretender and his landing party, while Byng was close behind, ready to blockade the close waters of the Firth. The French squadron managed to escape, with the loss in a running fight of only the Salisbury (50), which had been captured by the French in 1703. Forbin sailed on northwards, looking to land troops and capture Inverness, but ‘there arose a strong contrary wind which continued the next day with violence’.30 The French admiral decide that the risks of pressing on were too great and turned for Dunkirk, much to James Stuart’s dismay. The troubles encountered during the three-week sea voyage so weakened the crews of the ships, and the soldiers that the transports carried, that when they put into harbour in France it was noted that they were in a miserable condition and looked more like drowned rats than men. The whole enterprise was a humiliating failure for the Jacobite cause. The Duke of Marlborough had been obliged to divert some troops from his campaign to bolster the strength of the army in England, but as soon as the threat passed they returned to Flanders. It had been a desperate venture, one in which Louis XIV perhaps did not place too much faith and much had depended upon the good fortune which enabled Forbin to get ahead of Byng on the passage north, thanks mainly to the cleaner condition of the hulls of the French ships which allowed them to make better speed through the water. Had a successful

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158 The War of the Spanish Succession landing been achieved, and always assuming there was a popular rising of some magnitude in favour of the Jacobite Pretender, then the consequence for British involvement in the war for Spain could have been serious. The Duke of Marlborough might well have had to bring a large part of his army back to England to secure London, and even go and campaign himself in Scotland. As it was, the firm handling of the situation by Queen Anne’s ministers re-assured their partners in the Grand Alliance, and the campaign in Flanders could be pressed on as originally intended without too much distraction. Louis XIV learned from this sorry tale, and would not again try to impose a Jacobite on to the throne of Great Britain.

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Chapter 10

France at Bay ‘I think everything goes very wrong.’1

The Duc de Vendôme was a tough and capable opponent, descended from an illegitimate son of Henry IV of France. With such a lineage his rather boorish manners were, in consequence, tolerated at the fastidious court of Versailles. He was, however, a difficult man to be with on campaign, disinclined to listen to the opinions and advice of others, and obstinate to the point of being perverse once his mind was made up. This was unfortunate, as most of the Marshals of France found him impossible to work with, and only Marshal Matignon was prepared to try and do so. Things were complicated further by the presence with the army in the Low Countries of the Duc de Bourgogne, Louis XIV’s eldest grandson and eventual heir to the throne. As in the early years of the war, the king was anxious that the young man should gain experience in the field, and to become better known to his soldiers. All very admirable, but Bourgogne had little taste for military life and no more skill as a field commander, but he did have strong opinions. Not only that, the presence of a royal prince with the army naturally attracted to him the deference and attention that his rank deserved, while he and Vendôme heartily disliked each other and often had very differing ideas on how to proceed. This fracture in the command structure of the army was perilous, and the French king was aware of this and wrote rather prophetically to his grandson with a word of advice: ‘It is not possible to succeed if you do not in the future act in concert with the Duke of Vendôme.’2 The catastrophe that would overtake Vendôme and his soldiers, and put large areas of northern France into the hands of the allies, had yet to happen. The outlook for the Grand Alliance, in the meantime, was not that promising. The failure at Toulon in 1707 had denied the allies

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160 The War of the Spanish Succession of the chance to secure the fine port for their own use, or to deny its use permanently to their opponents. A proposal was made that Prince Eugene should go to Catalonia to take charge of the operations there, and even talk of a grand strategic plan with the Duke of Marlborough advancing with an army from Portugal to meet that led by Eugene marching westwards from Catalonia. None of this was realistic: the Dutch would not countenance the captain-general being so far away, and Eugene was reluctant to go to the peninsula anyway, and the emperor declared that he could not be spared at that time as President of the Imperial War Council, so the whole fantastic idea was not taken forward. Instead, Field-Marshal Count Guido von Starhemberg, an energetic Austrian officer, capable and dangerous in the field, was sent as commander-in-chief, arriving in Barcelona at the end of April 1708. The archduke’s favourite general, Count Noyelles, had recently died, so there was no unhelpful rivalry or resentment at this appointment. In May the Earl of Galway, a victim now of ill-health and numerous wounds, stood down and returned to Portugal, where his influence, although less than it had been, was generally beneficial. The new king, John V, married the eldest sister of Archduke Charles, Maria Anna, who was brought to Lisbon on board a British warship sailing from southern England. It was expected that this happy event would help cement the two widely separated parts of the alliance in the peninsula more firmly together, but despite such hopes, there was little appetite in Portugal for active campaigning throughout much of 1708, the bitter lessons of the previous year with the humiliation of defeat at Almanza, having their inevitable effect. In May, Earl Stanhope, after visiting London and consulting Marlborough in Flanders, was appointed in Galway’s place to command the British troops in Catalonia. Von Starhemberg had been accompanied by 3,300 imperial, Palatine and Italian troops to boost the allied effort, fewer than hoped for, but in July Sir John Leake carried another very welcome 3,000 cavalry and infantry across from Italy. Paying these troops regularly was more difficult than bringing them to Catalonia, however, and their discipline was not always the best as a result. When the allied garrison in Tortosa was attacked, the Palatines did not distinguish themselves in its defence, and the garrison had to submit without putting up a prolonged or determined resistance. With Valencia lost the previous year, supplies were still hard to come by, but

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France at Bay 161 the British and Dutch naval squadrons dominated the seas, raiding the coastline at will, and there was flexibility in how the allies operated between the eastern seaboard of Spain, Gibraltar, the Balearic islands and Italy. While the ships came to and fro without much opposition, Archduke Charles and his army would not starve, but whether a fresh offensive beyond the bounds of Catalonia could be mounted, with any real prospect of success, was far from clear. It was not yet known that Louis XIV would not reinstate his Mediterranean fleet as a viable fighting force – time and money would not be available to permit this, but that was in the future and not to be foreseen. The ability to be able to winter their fleet in the Mediterranean had long been an aspiration of the Maritime Powers, and the Duke of Marlborough had written to Stanhope: ‘I am so entirely convinced that nothing can be done effectually without the Fleet, that I conjure you if possible to take Port Mahon.’3 This entailed gaining the possession of the island of Minorca, and Archduke Charles added his weight to the instructions given to Leake and Stanhope to seize the place ‘that the fleet may be more secure in those seas and better security of my person; and likewise to guard the transports for the subsistence of my army.’4 As a preliminary move, Leake’s squadron arrived off Cagliari, the capital of Sardinia, on 11 August and summoned the governor of the island, the Marquis de Jamaica, to submit, but he declined to do so until forced. Allied troops and armed seamen were landed the next day, after a short bombardment, and the governor duly submitted, his garrison troops being granted, rather spuriously given that they had made virtually no effort to defend the place, the honours of war. In the meantime Stanhope, who was always full of energy and ambition, had assembled a force of 1,700 British, Catalan and Portuguese troops, together with a siege train of ten large guns in addition to mortars, to go and take the island of Minorca. The expedition embarked at Barcelona in commendable secrecy, and despite a reluctance amongst some naval officers to participate in the enterprise at all, set sail on 3 September escorted by HMS Milford and HMS York, arriving off the coast of Majorca three days’ later. Having conferred with the governor of the island, and gathering 300 more men from the garrison there, Stanhope persuaded Leake to detach 600 marines from service aboard ship to join in the operations against Minorca. The

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162 The War of the Spanish Succession admiral, however, having gained Sardinia, felt that he had done all that was required of him, and was anxious to return to England with part of his fleet, and took no further part in the expedition. The French and Spanish troops on Minorca were concentrated at Port Mahon, the valuable deep-water anchorage on the eastern side of the island. Well sited and with ample provisions, the 1,000-strong garrison were commanded by the Marquis de la Jonquière, a very able veteran soldier who could be relied on to do his best to hold on to the port.5 On the evening of 14 September 1708, Stanhope began landing his troops, and over the next three days brought ashore his whole force, and their heavy guns, without interference. Attempts to subvert the loyalty of the Spanish troops in the defences failed, but despite being under fire from the outer wall of the defences, by 28 September Stanhope had his siege batteries in place opposite Fort St Phillipe covering the entrance to the deep harbour. After only a few hours’ bombardment, the wall of the fort was seen to be collapsing, with breaches beginning to appear. A call to the defenders to submit was refused, so Stanhope ordered a general assault, with himself gallantly leading the troops from the front. ‘The General led the men on to a tower under the castle, being all this time on horseback, exposed to the enemies’ cannon, small shots and bombs, which they gave us as fast as they possibly could.’6 The attack was brought to a halt, and Stanhope renewed his offer of good terms to the defenders if they would surrender without further bloodshed. The Spanish troops had their families with them suffering under the bombardment – distracted by the ‘loud lamentations and cries of near 1,000 women and children’7 – so the soldiers wanted to capitulate immediately, and on 30 September, the governor submitted. Stanhope had gained control of the harbour of Port Mahon, and immediately sent troops to occupy the fort covering the anchorage at Fornells in the north of the island. Those Spanish troops who did not wish to switch their support to Archduke Charles were sent to Murcia under parole, and the French soldiers shipped back to Toulon. Success was tinged with sadness for Stanhope, as his younger brother Philip, a Royal Navy officer, had been killed in the assault. Just as with Gibraltar, four years earlier, Minorca had been secured by an allied force acting in the name of Archduke Charles – Great Britain, however, with eyes on the advancement of trade from the Levant, had no intention of lightly

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France at Bay 163 relinquishing control of the island. ‘England ought never to part with this island,’ Stanhope wrote, ‘which will give the law to the Mediterranean both in time of war and peace.’8 At the end of the year, formal instructions arrived from London confirming Stanhope’s chief engineer, Colonel Petit, as the governor of Port Mahon with the firm understanding that only British troops were to garrison the fortress of St Philippe and adjacent defences. Stanhope was under instructions to persuade the archduke to formally confirm British possession of Minorca ‘as some sort of security for all our expenses in the peninsula’.9 Charles, despite having taken an oath on being proclaimed as king not to divide the empire, had little choice but to do so. Once again the Dutch were resentful of British encroachment and gains in which they had no part, but their own demands for a much enlarged Barrier had earned them no friends, and Stanhope was dismissive of their complaints at British possession of Minorca. He wrote: ‘I hope the Dutch will always be our friends but if they should ever be otherwise, they will never be able to carry on their trade with the Levant without our leave.’10 Possession was nine points of the law, and as far as Minorca was concerned that, so it seemed, was that. The French army under Vendôme still had to be engaged and defeated in the Low Countries. The Duke of Marlborough had prepared a plan with Prince Eugene for their armies to combine in Flanders, and to engage and defeat Vendôme before he in turn could be reinforced from elsewhere. George, Elector of Hanover, would remain in command on the Rhine to try and fix those French troops there and prevent their being sent north. Marlborough wrote: ‘The Elector has consented to the project for three armies.’11 Internal tensions were evident, for Marlborough and Eugene did not feel able to share the whole plan with George, the Duke adding in his letter ‘as for the joining of the two armies [his and those of Eugene] we thought it best not to acquaint the Elector with it’. Hanoverian support for the Grand Alliance was firm, and so too were the large numbers of excellent troops hired out to the allied cause, and this was a clear snub, implying that the elector could not be entrusted with the details, and something that would neither be forgotten or forgiven. The allied plan was sound, but had little subtlety, and Vendôme and Marshal Berwick, who now commanded the French troops in the

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164 The War of the Spanish Succession Moselle valley, were alert to any move by Eugene to take his army northwards to combine with Marlborough. In any case, the preparations that Eugene made for the campaign were impeded by internal tensions in the empire, and his march northwards was delayed as a result. The opposing armies in Flanders could do little more in the meantime but to manoeuvre and try and catch each other off guard. In this endeavour Vendôme proved to be the more successful, and after threatening Brussels and Louvain, in July he seized the strategically important towns of Ghent and Bruges with the enthusiastic assistance of many of the citizenry. In this way he neatly cut Marlborough’s lines of supply and communication with England and Holland, and interrupted his use of the valuable waterways of the region. It seemed that all the remarkable gains for the Grand Alliance of the glorious but distant summer of 1706, were now in jeopardy. An attempt was also intended to be made to seize Oudenarde, but the allied governor, DenisFrançois de Chanclos, firmly put the magistrates in no doubt that he would burn the place to the ground before allowing that to happen. Although clearly caught off guard, Marlborough recovered his composure with the assistance of Prince Eugene who had ridden ahead of his own troops on the long march from the Moselle. He had paid a fleeting visit to his aged mother, a resident of Brussels – a meeting remembered as ‘after a separation of twenty-five years, very tender, but very short’.12 With the encouragement of Eugene, Marlborough manoeuvrd the French away from the line of the river Dender at Lessines, and went on overtake them as they crossed the Scheldt just below Oudenarde on 11 July. In a rapidly escalating infantry battle they inflicted a serious defeat on Vendôme and the Duc de Bourgogne there. ‘The spectacle was magnificent, it was one sheet of fire.’13 The divided nature of the command of the French forces was fatal to any chance of success that day, as was Vendôme losing his composure as army commander and becoming involved in the hand-to-hand fighting. Eugene saw him in the smoke-filled water-meadows with his embattled and weary soldiers: ‘I found Vendôme on foot, with a pike in his hand, encouraging the troops.’14 Overkirk accomplished a great turning movement with his Dutch and Danish corps around the right flank of the French army, and only the onset of night prevented it becoming a complete victory for the allies. ‘If we had been so happy as to have but two more hours of daylight,’ Marlborough wrote, ‘I believe we should

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France at Bay 165 have made an end of this war.’15 After such a humiliating defeat, Vendôme could do little more than draw his battered army back behind the shelter of the Ghent-Bruges canal, where he could cover earlier conquests while his dispirited troops regained their poise. From there he could also continue to interdict the supply lines for the allied army leading from Ostend and southern Holland. ‘Do not lose courage,’ Louis XIV wrote to the Duc de Bourgogne, ‘we must re-assure our officers and troops . . . without the junction of Prince Eugene [with Marlborough] we would have had nothing to fear.’16 Marlborough was now faced with a clear dilemma. Eugene’s troops had arrived in Flanders after their march from the Moselle, but Marshal Berwick had also now come up, and the reinforcements he brought largely made good the French losses suffered at Oudenarde. What could not be as easily put right was the battered morale of the French soldiers after the humiliation of defeat. All the same, there was no simple way to manoeuvre Vendôme out from behind the line of the Ghent-Bruges canal, and any attempt to force a way across the defences would be very expensive in casualties. The plan that the duke put to his generals instead was ambitious in scope and daring, and involved an advance deep into northern France, to oblige Vendôme to follow and give battle in the open in order to save Paris and Versailles. Marlborough’s generals were unconvinced that so ambitious a project would succeed, dependent as the army would be on being re-supplied by ships lying off the coast of Normandy. Marlborough could not insist in the face of their lack of enthusiasm, and accordingly the allied campaign was directed instead at the great French fortress of Lille, the most cherished conquest of Louis XIV’s earlier years. Lille had been massively fortified under the supervision of Vauban, and the siege in consequence was to be an enormous undertaking. The preparations for such a complex and demanding operation went ahead at a good pace, and a great convoy laden with all the stores and munitions necessary for a major siege left Brussels on 22 July 1708 and safely negotiated the seventy miles of road to reach the allied camp at Menin in just three days, remaining free from French interference. Louis XIV was full of concern for the security of his frontier fortresses and had sent instructions to Marshal Berwick, now operating out of Mons, that he was not to venture too far northwards, while Vendôme was to move out from behind the canal and co-operate with him. The

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166 The War of the Spanish Succession veteran Marshal Boufflers, solid and dependable, was sent by the King to take command of the garrison in Lille, and he arrived in the city in late July. The allied siege train was ready to come from Brussels, and 3,000 wagons and 154 heavy guns and mortars were brought forward on 6 August, a 15-mile long target for the French commanders to intercept and savage. They failed to do so, their inertia a plain indicator of their lowered morale after their recent defeat, and six days later the valuable convoy of guns and munitions came safely through to Menin. The French had twice missed the chance of attacking an inviting target of almost unimaginable value to the allied operations against Lille, and on this a French officer wrote ruefully of the lost opportunity: ‘Posterity will hardly believe this fact, though it is an indisputable truth. Never was a daring enterprise so conducted with more skill or greater circumspection.’17 While this huge endeavour was gradually taking firm shape, Archduke Charles was elated at the news of the success at Oudenarde, and he wrote from Barcelona to Marlborough and repeated the offer that had been made in the heady days after Ramillies, that the duke should be appointed to be the governor-general of the Spanish Netherlands. ‘You will find me always willing to renew the patent for the government of my Low Countries, which I sent you two years ago, and to extend it for your life.’ As before, Marlborough was tempted, the stipend was generous, but aware that the Dutch would take offence at his acceptance of such an appointment in what they regarded as their own sphere of influence, he politely declined, writing to Sidney Godolphin: ‘This must be known to nobody but the Queen, for should it be known before the peace, it would cause great inconveniences in Holland.’18 Allied cavalry were now raiding the border region of northern France, and even the suburbs of Arras were harried, causing Louis XIV to protest at ‘the harshness with which the enemy execute their demands for contributions’.19 Marlborough and Eugene also seized as many horses and draft animals as they could, to assist in the dragging forward of the huge quantities of warlike materiel necessary to further the siege of Lille. In any case, such comments by the king sat badly coming as they did from a monarch whose generals had for decades happily lived off the land of his neighbours whenever it suited them, and who had adopted without hesitation a policy of ‘eating up a

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France at Bay 167 country’ to prevent anyone, civil or military, from subsisting there, but it now was France that suffered and that was the real difference. An outer-work at the Marquette Abbey, on the northern side of the French defences of Lille, was stormed by British and Dutch troops on 11 August, but the scale of the task in hand had plainly been underestimated by both Marlborough and Eugene. The siege operations proceeded more slowly than anticipated, while the French field army, reinforced by troops drawn from garrisons elsewhere, attempted without much success to hamper the allied progress. Marlborough commanded the covering army, while the prince oversaw the actual siege operations in the trenches and gun batteries. As the French manoeuvred against him from the southwards in early September, the duke took up a strong defensive position between the river Marque at Peronne and the Deule (Dyle) at Noyelles. Once established there Marlborough defied the French commanders to attack him in position, and drew some of Eugene’s troops out from the entrenchments before Lille to bolster his covering army. Daunted by the strength of the allied defences, the French hesitated and even referred the question of whether to make an attack back to Versailles. At length the decision was that Marlborough was too well entrenched to risk an assault, with Berwick writing to the Minister for War that ‘it would not be possible to attack an enemy at least as strong as we, well posted, entrenched, whose flanks are covered and who cannot be dislodged’.20 The truth of this simple fact was not lost on the king, although he still urged his grandson that Lille be saved, so long as no unnecessary risks were run. ‘Nothing could be more advantageous to the good of the state. I pray to God that He will assist you and conserve you in what you are doing.’21 A rather premature allied attack on Lille was made on the night of 7 September to try and storm the gates of St Andrew and St Magdalene, but this was bloodily repulsed by the French defenders. A sharp counter-attack was made the following morning which caused some confusion in the besiegers’ trenches, but a French attempt to intercept the latest supply convoy coming forward from Brussels was foiled by cavalry under command of the Earl of Albemarle, and the convoy came safely into the allied camp on 11 September. This was fortunate, for the Duc de Vendôme, having failed to engage Marlborough’s covering army, or delay the admittedly rather slow progress of the siege of Lille,

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168 The War of the Spanish Succession now turned his full attention to cutting off the allied army from its bases around Brussels, Ostend and in southern Holland. In the meantime a second assault on the Lille defences was thrown back with heavy loss, including Prince Eugene who was wounded in the attempt. Marlborough had to take a closer hand in the siege operations while he recovered, and managed in so doing to inject a greater sense of urgency into the whole project. The duke wrote to Sidney Godolphin in London on 20 September: It is impossible for me to express the uneasiness I suffer for the ill-conduct of our engineers, at the siege, where I think everything goes very wrong. It would be a cruel thing, if after all we have obliged the enemy to quit all thoughts of relieving the place, by force, which they have done, by re-passing the Scheldt, we should fail to take it, by the ignorance of our engineers, and the want of stores.22 The lines of supply and communication for the allied army, both to Brussels and to Ostend, were always vulnerable while the French held on to Ghent and Bruges, and a particularly vicious battle was fought at Wynendael late in September 1708 when Comte de la Motte, the French commander in Bruges, tried to intercept a convoy of wagons taking much-needed supplies to the besieging army before Lille. Marshal Boufflers had given up the town once a breach had been made in the defences by the allied batteries, and withdrew his surviving troops into the massive citadel on 25 October. Meanwhile, Vendôme seized the crossing places on the river Scheldt (except at allied-held Oudenarde), to cut Marlborough’s army off from Antwerp and southern Holland. An attempt by the Elector of Bavaria to seize Brussels failed, and Marlborough was able to force Vendôme’s troops away from the Scheldt crossings, re-opening his lines of supply and communication, and maintained the tempo of the siege operations in the meantime. All efforts to interrupt the siege having failed, and plainly not likely to be renewed before spring, if at all, Boufflers sought permission from Louis XIV to give up the citadel, once a breach began to be opened in the walls. This was granted, and on 9 December the marshal capitulated on good terms. The loss of so important a fortress was greatly regretted,

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France at Bay 169 but the valiant defence that Boufflers and his garrison had made had pulled the allied campaign to a standstill for over four months, and Marlborough and Eugene had been unable to make the most of their initial success so daringly grasped at Oudenarde in July. Louis XIV was in no doubt about what had been achieved by the long defence of Lille, and he wrote to Boufflers: I cannot sufficiently praise your vigour, and the pertinacity of the troops under your command. To the very end they have backed up your courage and zeal. I have given the senior officers special proof of my satisfaction with the manner in which they defended the town. You are to assure them, and the whole of the garrison, that I have every reason to be satisfied with them. You are to report to me as soon as you have made the necessary arrangements for the troops. I hope these will not detain you, and that I shall have the satisfaction of telling you myself that the latest proof you have given of your devotion to my service strengthens the sentiments of respect and friendship which I have for you.23 Meanwhile, Louis XIV had written to Philip V in Madrid with a sombre assessment of the results of the year’s arduous and arid campaigning together with an even more gloomy prediction, alluded to almost in passing: I have always laboured to maintain you in the rank that it pleased God to place you. You see that up to now I have made the utmost efforts to keep you there and I have not asked whether the good of my kingdom demanded it. I have followed the suggestions of the tender love that I have always had for you, and you can be assured that it will lead me as long as the state of my affairs permits.24 At the close of the year, the weather had turned bitterly cold, and there was excessive taxation and economic chaos in France, with a failed harvest, food shortages in many districts, bread riots and discontent at burdensome taxation. For all the devotion and gallantry of commanders like Marshal Boufflers, justly commended as he was by the king, the

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170 The War of the Spanish Succession continuing cost of the war was stupendous, and the Duc de St Simon wrote of the distress amongst the French at this time: People never ceased to wonder what had become of all the money of the realm. Nobody could any longer pay, because nobody was paid; the country-people, overwhelmed with exactions and with valueless property, had become insolvent; trade no longer yielded anything – good faith and confidence were at an end . . . The realm was entirely exhausted; the troops even, were not paid, although no one could imagine what was done with the millions that came into the King’s coffers.25 There was an understandable desire in Versailles to deflect blame from the Duc de Bourgogne, the King’s grandson, for the calamities of the 1708 campaign in the Low Countries, and instead to lay this at the door of the Duc de Vendôme. In this the veteran soldier did not help himself, writing a partial and very misleading account of the activities of the French army that summer and autumn, and in so doing handed Louis XIV a firm reason to dismiss him from the royal service: He learned that he was not to serve, and that he was to no longer receive a general’s pay. When M. de Vendôme returned from Flanders, he had a short interview with the King in which he made many bitter complaints against Puységur, one of his lieutenant-generals, whose sole offence was that he was much attached to M. De Bourgogne. Puységur was a great favourite of the King . . . He had, in his turn, come back from Flanders, and had a private audience with the King. At the name of Vendôme, Puységur lost all patience. He described to the King all his faults, the impertinences, the obstinacy, the insolence of M. De Vendôme, with precision and clearness.26 However, Vendôme, for all his boorishness and faults, was too good a general to be left out of things for long, and he was sent the following year to take a firm grip on the faltering campaign in Spain. He arrived in the aftermath of a series of reverses for the French claimant and his supporters, and, as it proved, just in time. France, and the French cause in the war, was in distress, and

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France at Bay 171 Madame de Maintenon, the morganatic wife of the French king, wrote from Versailles to the Princesse des Ursins in Madrid with a very caustic assessment of the events in Flanders: You know that the end of our campaign has been pitiful, and that the enemies have the audacity to besiege Ghent because they hope that they will have as much success there as they had in the assault upon Lille. Marshal Boufflers’ defence has made us understand how bold this enterprise was, since he gave our armies four months to raise the siege and during those four months we were able to succeed only in small enterprises; a greater effort would have had the same success.27 The lady missed the key point completely, for Boufflers’ prolonged defence of Lille had, after the astonishing success gained at Oudenarde, dragged the allied campaign to a halt. The siege had only succeeded after immense effort and toil, and Lille had fulfilled the role for which it had been so stoutly fortified by Vauban. The fortress belt, constructed along the north and eastern frontiers of France over the previous thirty years, at enormous expense, was soon to prove its worth. The siege was just the opening act in a prolonged passage of arms that would over the next four years save France from invasion and disaster. In the meantime, Ghent and Bruges were indeed retaken by the allies in the early part of January 1709, and while severe winter weather gripped western Europe, moves to achieve a longed-for peace moved steadily forward.

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Chapter 11

Unattainable Peace ‘We wait with impatience for that happy hour.’1

The night of 5 January 1709 saw the onset of bitterly cold weather across most of north-western Europe. The hard frost that set in continued for seventeen days, followed by a twelve-day thaw and then a fall of heavy snow and a biting cold wind which lasted until mid-March. The effect on the French was devastating with even vines as far south as Provence dying of the frost. The river Seine froze, as did the sea surf in Brittany, hard enough for fully-laden wagons to safely pass over the mouths of wide estuaries, while in Versailles wine froze in the decanters before reaching the glass. The impact on livestock was devastating, with thousands of animals freezing to death in their stalls and barns, while marching soldiers, who could at least swing their arms in an effort to keep warm, were seen to suddenly drop dead in their tracks. France was in desperate straits; her soldiers were threadbare and often unpaid, the northern regions invaded, farmland and crops devastated by war and the bitterly cold winter weather, and her people beaten down with taxation and lack of food. Heavy spring rain in the peninsula, after a poor harvest the previous autumn, made it almost certain that the Spanish people would face food shortages before long, leading Philip V to open all Spanish ports to traders of whatever nationality, so that desperately-needed corn could be imported even if it was carried in British and Dutch ships. French troops in Catalonia were subsisting by seizing what food they could from the local people, with Marshal Noailles expressing the hope that the peasants would revolt, and by thus becoming rebels justify the confiscation already being widely practised by his soldiers. Louis XIV was obliged to seek terms from the Grand Alliance to bring to an end the war for the throne of Spain. ‘This was the frightful state to which we were reduced,’ the

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Unattainable Peace 173 Duc de St Simon remembered, ‘when envoys were sent into Holland to try and bring about a peace.’2 Negotiations had of course been going on for some time, making little progress, as the fortunes of war waxed and waned, and hopes and ambitions, and the desire to conclude a peace, shifted accordingly. Now, Louis XIV’s treasury was empty and he needed peace. The French Minister for War, Michel de Chamillart, wrote on 29 March 1709 to Marshal Villars, now commanding the army in Flanders, that ‘the long duration of a war, out of all proportion to the King’s finances, has placed us under the hard necessity of receiving law [demands] from our enemies’.3 The Grand Alliance had achieved all that it had originally sought and more, but the heady successes of the summer of Ramillies and Turin, in particular, had inclined the allies to increase their demands. ‘No Peace without Spain’ was the cry, coined in London at first, but taken up with enthusiasm by the rest of the alliance soon enough. Philip V was to be deposed and Archduke Charles should after all have the throne in Madrid with an undivided empire. The appointed allied negotiators were under instructions to conclude terms to bring the war to an end, but only to the greatest possible advantage of the Grand Alliance.4 While the talking went on in comfortable council chambers and salons, the fighting also continued so that each side could try and ring the last drop of advantage from the weary war. After the capture of the Valencian port of Denia by the Chevalier d’Asfeld in November 1708, the French moved quickly on to attack Alicante. The commander of the allied garrison, Major-General John Richards, had only 700 men from Sybourg’s Regiment and Hotham’s Regiment to face a besieging force of about 14,000 French and Spanish horse and foot together with a powerful siege battery. Finding the citadel too powerful and well-sited to overcome by breaching with artillery, d’Asfeld had a large mine dug and primed with 1,200 barrels of gun-powder; after inviting the allied officers to view the thoroughness of the preparations, he called on Richards to submit. The invitation to do so was rejected several times, and on 3 March 1709 the mine was detonated. Richards and fifty of his men were killed in the explosion, but the survivors, commanded by the Huguenot officer Lieutenant-Colonel d’Albon, continued to resist, and a naval squadron under Admiral Byng put into the bay on 16 April to bombard the besiegers in their trenches. This attempt had to be called

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174 The War of the Spanish Succession off due to bad weather. With no hope of relief, the remnants of the allied garrison submitted after a valiant defence over five months, eating up precious time that d’Asfeld could have more profitably used elsewhere. The loss of Alicante was just the latest in a list of allied reverses in Spain; the fortunes of the Archduke Charles and his adherents continued to flag, with Philip V firmly established in Madrid and proving increasingly popular with the bulk of the Spanish people. The young king was however, well aware that his grandfather had to shift troops away from the peninsula in order to bolster the northern border of France, Louis XIV writing to his grandson early in June that ‘I am obliged to recall immediately all the troops I now have in Spain’.5 This was no great surprise, for the desperate military situation in the north was well known, but Philip V had little option but to declare a firm intention to fight on no matter what happened. On 17 April he wrote to his grandfather: My own resolution has long been taken, and nothing in the world can make me change it. God has set the crown of Spain upon my head; I shall keep it there as long as I have a drop of blood in my veins. This much I owe to my conscience, my honour, and my subjects’ love. I am sure that they will not abandon me, whatever happens, and that if I expend my life at their head, as I am determined to do, even to the very last extremity, to remain with them, they will shed their blood with equal cheerfulness, to keep me. Were I capable of such cowardice as to resign my kingdom, you, I am certain, would disown me as your grandson.6 Louis XIV was moved, and admired his grandson’s determination, but not his grasp of political and economic reality, replying: ‘Knowing that my kingdom cannot hope to sustain much longer the weight of this war it is necessary to end it at whatever price.’7 All the same, as Philip was in such a frame of mind, it was not at all sure that he would now be prepared to be dictated to by his grandfather in Versailles just in order that France could have peace. The letters contained plain implied criticism on each side, but Philip refused to dilute the message. ‘Those are my true feelings.’8 Ignoring protests from his bishops, he expelled

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Unattainable Peace 175 the Papal Nuncio, as Clement XI, under Habsburg pressure in Italy, had recognised Archduke Charles as ‘the most Catholic King’. Meanwhile, the Earl of Galway and the Marquis de Frontiera had advanced from Campo Mayor in Portugal once more, but on 7 May 1709 at the river Caya their 15,000-strong army was badly beaten in battle by a similar number of Spanish troops commanded by the Marquis de Bay. The intention had been to prevent Bay’s troops from devastating the growing spring crops in the region, but Frontiera’s cavalry advanced over the Caya, without adequate infantry support, and been driven off in confusion, and a brigade of British and Catalan infantry under the command of Major-General Sankey in the centre were isolated and forced to surrender. With some 500 men killed or wounded on either side in the action, the allies could also count the loss of 900 prisoners and five guns. They withdrew to Elvas, where on Galway’s advice a good defensive position was adopted that foiled an attempted advance by Bay, who had not unreasonably hoped to make more of his recent success. A sharp rebuff had been suffered by the largely Portuguese-manned army, and although a disaster had been avoided they were in no state to do any more active campaigning, especially as the season of hot weather was settling in. The attention of King John turned to the diplomatic field, where rumours of protracted peace negotiations apparently proceeding well spurred Lisbon to despatch an envoy to The Hague to keep an eye on things, and to ensure that the interests of Portugal were not neglected. In the meantime a kind of informal truce was established along the Spanish/Portuguese border so that, although hostilities had not ceased, trade and agriculture could commence once more to mutual benefit. The news of the battle on the Caya inevitably buoyed up the spirits of Philip V and his supporters, and the wider repercussions were soon felt. The Duke of Marlborough in northern France sensed a harder tone in the French emissaries undertaking negotiations for peace at The Hague. It was an open secret that France was in difficulties on many counts, but the Marquis de Rouille arrived from Versailles to take the negotiations for an agreed peace forward with a fifty-page brief from his king metaphorically tucked under his arm – he could give ground but only step by measured step. In the extremity into which France had fallen, Louis XIV felt that he must accede to the demands of the allies set out in preliminaries for

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176 The War of the Spanish Succession an agreed armistice. However, he could not give way on two clauses, stipulating that he should give up certain key fortresses as surety that his grandson would vacate the throne of Spain within two months. Furthermore, Louis XIV was required to act in co-operation with the allies to remove Philip V from Madrid by force of arms if it proved necessary. In the event that the preliminaries were not successfully fulfilled, hostilities would resume and France would have to fight on having been significantly weakened by the loss of those same fortresses. The Duke of Marlborough wrote to Heinsius on the point. ‘It will be impossible for the French to comply with the article for the giving up of the monarch of Spain.’9 The allied demand was absurd, and incapable of being put into actual effect, but it caused great offence when it became known. The paradoxical weakness of the allied position, for all their vaunted military successes, was made clear. Their generals had failed in Spain, and they could not with their own efforts displace Philip V from the throne, other than with the connivance and complicity of his grandfather. The suggestion combined arrogance with ignorance, and it was too much to be borne. ‘The French Ministers absolutely refused an amendment which might, they said, possibly engage their master to a condition so unnatural as to make war on his grandson.’10 The preliminaries, which had every appearance of being an ultimatum, were sent to Versailles, and the Marquis de Torcy, the French foreign minister, wrote to his king: ‘Your Majesty is thus entirely free to reject absolutely these conditions, as I trust the state of your affairs will permit; or to accept them if unhappily you conceive it your duty to end the war at any price.’11 Marshal Villars, learnt of the terms when he met Torcy at Douai and sent a message to Versailles that whatever happened, the king could rely on the army. Chamillart, the wearied Minister for War, had been replaced by the more energetic and able Comte de Voysin, and he would ensure that the army had munitions with which to fight on if necessary. The terms presented by the allies were received in Versailles, and in a tense debate in the king’s council the Dauphin stoutly insisted that his son should not be forced from the throne in Madrid. ‘The Council dealt with the peace proposals of the Allies which were found very hard,’ an observer at the court wrote. ‘The Dauphin opposed them with heat, and so did the Duc de Bourgogne, and a general assured me on good

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Unattainable Peace 177 grounds that the council did not think fit to accept them.’12 Louis XIV duly rejected the terms, and everything fell to pieces; the allies, who had been so sure of themselves and their success, were astounded at the outcome. ‘It would be impossible for me,’ the king wrote to Marshal Villars, ‘to accept the conditions which would only give suspension of arms for two months, and which would oblige me to join my armies to those of my enemies to dethrone the King of Spain or to recommence the war against them.’13 What no-one expected or wished for had happened, and the war had to go on. The expectation of a peace soon to be agreed was so widespread that arrangements had been put in hand to disband the allied armies. ‘There is no doubt,’ Marlborough had written to his wife with significantly misplaced confidence, ‘of its ending in a good peace.’14 Meanwhile, Louis XIV felt that he must explain how things stood to his provincial governors: As the hope of an early peace was so widely entertained in my kingdom, I feel that I owe it to the loyalty which my people have displayed towards me throughout my reign to tell them what still prevents them from enjoying the repose which I was trying to secure for them. To bring this about I would have accepted conditions very much opposed to the safety of my frontier provinces, but the more I gave evidence of a readiness and a desire to dispel the distrust that my enemies pretended to have of my power and my intentions, the more they increased their pretensions; in this way, by adding new demands to the original ones, or by working under cover of the Duke of Savoy or of the Princes of the Empire, they left me under no illusion that their sole object was, at the expense of my crown, to enlarge the states on the borders of France, and to open up ways of penetrating to the heart of my kingdom whenever it should suit their interest to begin a new war . . . I pass in silence over the suggestion made to me that I should join my forces to those of the league [the Grand Alliance] and oblige the King, my grandson, to abdicate if he would not voluntarily consent to live in future without a kingdom . . . Let us show our enemies that we are still not sunk so low, but that we can force upon them such a peace as shall be consistent with our honour and with the good of Europe.15

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178 The War of the Spanish Succession It does not do to grind your enemies too small, particularly when they are as robust as the King of France and his resourceful people. There was a certain absurdity in what had been proposed by the Allies, and Marlborough wrote on 22 August: ‘I think it is plain that the French Ministers have it not in their power to recall the Duke of Anjou.’16 In effect, if Philip V refused to leave the Spanish throne, there was very little that the allies could do about it, as they had repeatedly proved to themselves and to their opponents over the preceding six years of war. Taken up with their own cleverness and the fatal illusion of success, the parties to the Grand Alliance had wildly overplayed their hand, and lost what chance there was of a good peace in 1709. When, later in the year, the allies indicated to Louis XIV that the strict terms of the two fatal clauses might not in practice have to be applied, the approach met a cool and dismissive response. Once it became apparent to everyone that peace was not to be had, hurried preparations were made for the renewed summer campaign. Marlborough and Eugene turned their attention to the fortress of Tournai, which they laid siege to on 27 June, having first decoyed Marshal Villars with his army away to the west. Tournai was a formidable fortress, of modern Vauban style, and held by a garrison commanded by the very capable Marquis de Surville-Hautfois. Marlborough wrote to Sidney Godolphin in London on that same day, with misplaced optimism that ‘we cannot have our cannon brought to us by the Scheldt in less than ten days, but when we have them once on our batteries, I believe it will go very quick’.17 In fact, things went along slowly as the defenders proved particularly aggressive, and fodder and forage was hard to come by in the region after the appalling winter just passed. Godolphin replied with sombre words for the duke: ‘I am glad to find you continue to have so hopeful an opinion of the siege of Tournai; the people are a good deal prejudiced against it here.’18 He took care to add a note of caution, that a success was really necessary otherwise Parliament in London might not vote sufficient funds for the campaign to the end of the year. It seemed clear that weariness with never-ending war had taken hold, not just in France, although the spirits of Louis XIV’s soldiers were lifted by a neat victory over an imperial German army at Rummersheim in late August.19 This defeat, relatively small in the overall scale of the war, nonetheless firmly put paid to any hopes of a

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Unattainable Peace 179 simultaneous allied advance into eastern France, as had been intended, while Eugene and Marlborough attacked the fortress belt in the north. The French king was hopeful that the allied campaign would yield no positive results, but all the same urged caution on Villars so that he was ‘always to be situated so that you will not be forced to fight unless you enjoy a great advantage’.20 Any such engagement was fraught with risk for France – if a victory was had it could not be followed up with much vigour, the parlous state of the supplies available to Villars preventing it, while a major defeat on the other hand would be disastrous, with northern France laid open to invasion on a grand scale. The marshal had declared that Tournai could hold out for four or five months, and the French defence of the fortress and citadel was certainly well handled, and involved hand-to-hand fighting in the entrenchments. The town was given up at the end of July, with the garrison withdrawing into the citadel to continue the defence; there was extensive mining, an activity at which the allied besiegers were proved to be less adept than their opponents. Marlborough wrote to London on 12 August: We are obliged to carry on our attack on the citadel with great caution, to preserve our men from the enemy’s mines of which they have already sprung several with little effect. Our miners have discovered one of their galleries at each attack [approach] but dare not advance to make the proper use of the discovery because of the enemy’s continual fire of small shot under ground. We are preparing to roll bombs into these galleries in order to dislodge them.21 Ten days later the Duke added a note: ‘Our miners had the good fortune the day before to discover a mine under this battery, out of which they took eighteen barrels of powder.’22 To the general relief of everyone involved, the Marquis de Surville-Hautfois, after a most gallant defence, submitted on 5 September rather than face a storm of the widening breaches in his citadel walls. As soon as this was clear, Marlborough set his advanced guard marching south and eastwards past St Ghislain to invest the fortress of Mons, from where, once secured, the allied army would be well placed to launch itself still further against the French fortress belt in the coming year. Mons was invested by allied

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180 The War of the Spanish Succession cavalry commanded by the Prince of Hesse-Cassel, on the same day that the Tournai citadel was given up. Despite his earlier urging of the need for caution, Louis XIV now wrote to Villars, calling on him to save Mons no matter what the cost. ‘Should Mons follow Tournai, our case is undone, you are by every means in your power to relieve the garrison; the cost is not to be considered.’23 Urged on in this way, Villars responded by advancing from his lines of defence to challenge Marlborough and Eugene in the woods near to the village of Malplaquet. There he was able to establish a formidably strong defensive position, and on 11 September 1709 a bloody battle was fought, which obliged Villars to withdraw with his army battered but intact, although thirty-five guns had to be left behind. The scale of the losses suffered by the allied army, at some 20,000 killed and wounded (amongst them Prince Eugene who was once again struck by a spent musket ball), compared with French casualties estimated at 13,000, caused consternation, and attracted a great deal of criticism to Marlborough. Villars was gravely wounded in the knee during the engagement, but his successor in command of the army, Marshal Boufflers, was unable to interrupt the siege of Mons which fell six weeks later, the commander of the garrison capitulating on 20 October. The marshal tried to make the besiegers give up the undertaking by threatening their lines of supply, but his men were lacking bread and without pay: still, St Simon wrote: ‘The Court had become so accustomed to defeats that a battle lost as was Malplaquet seemed half a victory.’24 While the siege of Mons pressed forward, Philip V left Madrid to assume the personal command of his field army which, apart from a small bodyguard of French troops, was now comprised entirely of Spanish units. Some other French soldiers remained in garrisons, their cost met by Spain, but their role was strictly to act on the defensive. ‘The king is preparing to leave tomorrow,’ a courtier wrote, ‘to put himself at the head of the army, for he is determined to die rather than be covered in infamy.’25 Such was the king’s energy at this critical time, that he soon gained the nickname ‘El Animoso’ amongst his soldiers – a valiant king and hero in the old Spanish mould. The more independent tone that Philip V adopted, a consequence of his grandfather having to withdraw from active participation in the campaign in Spain, resulted in him making a direct approach to the

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Unattainable Peace 181 allies still in conference at The Hague, to test what terms might be secured in a peace settlement. Count Bergeryck, the Spanish finance minister in the Low Countries, was instructed by Philip to advise the Dutch that ‘My interests now are different from those of France . . . The Spaniards do not wish France to collaborate in the government of Spain, and I am wholly in agreement with them.’26 To what degree Louis XIV was privy to these sentiments is unclear, but he cannot have been entirely unaware. The Spanish campaign in 1710 was confined initially to operations in Aragon. The allied commanders led troops who were now reinforced and re-supplied and, after much delay, regularly paid. The enormous sum of over £1,100,000 had been authorised by Parliament in London to push forward affairs in the peninsula. The allies advanced to take advantage of their new-found strength, with the comforting knowledge that active French support for Philip V was waning. Even the Portuguese cavalry, who had attracted some criticism in the past, especially after the débâcle at Almanza, now found praise. ‘I believe that if their troops were paid and they had [good] officers at the head of them, they would soon be brought into discipline and do good service.’27 Earl Stanhope suggested that an advance into Valencia might be most promising, but with the Archduke’s backing von Starhemberg opted for Aragon instead. It was unfortunate that Prince Henry of HesseDarmstadt, younger brother of the deceased Prince George and valiant commander at the siege of Lérida, picked an argument with von Starhemberg and had to be packed off to Italy, robbing the allies of one of their best field commanders and a man who was very popular with the Catalans. Philip V joined the Marquis de Villadarias and the army early in May, leading a force strong in cavalry but weaker in infantry. ‘He crossed the Sègre river on the 14th May,’ Saint Simon wrote, ‘and advanced towards Balaguier, designing to lay siege to it, but heavy rains falling and causing the waters to rise he was obliged to abandon the project and fall back.’28 Von Starhemberg and Stanhope joined forces at the end of that month, and they manoeuvred to foil a Spanish advance from Lérida. After several weeks of rather inconclusive marching, the two armies met and a very sharp engagement was fought at Almenara on the river Noguera late in the afternoon on 27 July. The allies carried the day in fine style with a dashing cavalry charge, and quickly inflicted

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182 The War of the Spanish Succession heavy losses in casualties, prisoners and baggage on Philip V’s army; the king himself narrowly escaped capture by Stanhope’s cavalry. Archduke Charles was also present at the engagement, and so the two contenders for the throne in Madrid, both proclaimed king and each with all to play for, had the chance at last to face each other across a field of battle. Philip V withdrew with his battered force to Lérida, and summoned the Marquis de Bay to come and replace Villadarias. With the allies advancing on a broad front once more, Philip V was almost overtaken at Candasnos, but got away after losing some baggage; von Starhemberg reputedly sat down to eat the king’s rapidly cooling dinner in his abandoned tent. Philip and Villadrias fell back to Saragossa, where Bay joined them from Estramadura. There on 20 August another battle was fought, after some preliminary skirmishing across a ravine the action became general at about noon. Stanhope and von Starhemberg had only a slight advantage in numbers, but they drove back repeated charges by the Spanish cavalry, who on at least one occasion pursued their opponents too far, allowing Stanhope to slip troops into the gap in their own line that had been created by their impetuosity. Philip V’s troops fought hard but were beaten in decided fashion on the old Moorish battlefield known locally as the Barranca de los Muertos (‘Field of the Dead’). As had been seen before, the outdated custom of French and Spanish squadrons halting to fire off their pistols and carbines put them at an acute disadvantage, when their opponents charged with sword in hand. ‘They gave us the fire,’ an allied dragoon remembered, ‘but by the blessing of God we gave them no liberty to let them fire again but were upon them in a moment of time, cutting and hewing them down in hand.’29 A large haul of prisoners, guns, colours, standards and munitions were taken in what was a decided allied victory in open battle, although the success might have been greater if Stanhope had known sooner and for sure of the success gained elsewhere on the field and that he could have pressed the pursuit with more vigour. Still, Philip V had lost 4,000 killed or wounded that day, with another 6,000 unharmed prisoners taken, and it had been an undeniable calamity for the young king. The victorious allied commanders entered Saragossa the following day, where some prudent but modest enthusiasm was shown at the arrival of the Archduke. Philip V had suffered a much more serious defeat than at Almenara in July, and the immediate result was that much

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Unattainable Peace 183 of Aragon now came under the control of Charles’ army, while the road leading to Madrid was invitingly laid open to them. The Duc de Vendôme was making his way from France to take up the command, but had only reached Bayonne by the time the battle; had he been present on the day, the chances of such an allied success would have been much diminished. ‘The King of Spain, who eagerly wished for M. De Vendôme, despatched a courier, begging the King to allow him to come and take command.’30 Stanhope was eager to make the most of the success gained at Saragossa and press on to Madrid, but Archduke Charles had his doubts, writing to his wife rather crisply that ‘If this plan of the English should succeed all the glory will be theirs; if it fail, all the loss will be mine.’31 Von Starhemberg was also reluctant to advance too far and too quickly to the south, and his inclination was instead pursue Philip V and his beaten army. A more promising course would certainly have been to attempt to bring Philip to battle once more, and inflict a final and decisive defeat before Vendôme and his reinforcements could take the field; however, the lure of the undefended capital of Spain was too strong.32 An opportunity would be missed, and a measure of Philip V’s enduring success in the wider context was clearly seen on 28 September when the archduke entered Madrid. The king had gone with his family and a large retinue of Spanish notables to Valladolid a couple of weeks previously. The welcome that the Austrian claimant received was very cool, with houses shut up and no formalities offered, contrasting markedly with the enthusiastic reception of Philip on his arrival at Valladolid. ‘I am very pleased,’ the king wrote mendaciously, ‘that the English have brought the Archduke to Madrid; he will have occasion to see the disposition of the people in my capital.’33 The arrival of the allied army in Madrid enabled the colours lost at the awful defeat at Almanza three years’ earlier to be recovered by their rightful owners: General Stanhope sent a Captain with fifty troopers to the convent of Our Lady of Arocha to take away all the colours and standards that had been laid there by Philip V since the start of the war. They were distributed to soldiers from each nation that they had been captured from, especially at the battle of Almanza. They carried them in triumph through the streets of this city

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184 The War of the Spanish Succession with as much pride as if they had been taken in battle, rather than down from the walls of a church.34 It was hoped that concerns about the provisioning of the allied army would be addressed by opening up lines of communication and supply both southwards to Valencia and westwards to Portugal. Stanhope went on with a strong detachment to occupy Toledo, where it was hoped he would be joined by the Anglo-Portuguese forces advancing from the frontier. ‘We will have a garrison in Toledo,’ Stanhope wrote to the Earl of Galway, ‘and upon notice from you, will, if you judge necessary, make one or two marches even beyond that place.’35 However, the Portuguese troops commanded by the Count de Vila Verde, having taken Barca Rota and Xeres de los Caballeros, then received instructions to retire westwards and promptly did so. Stanhope, it was said with prophetic gloominess, ‘had carried his men on but won’t know how to get them back again’.36 The extended allied position was dangerous, and their army in Castile was out on the end of a very long, unsupported and bending branch. While these stirring events unfolded in Spain, Great Britain and France had re-opened the confidential discussions to see what terms for a general peace might be arranged. The government in London had changed with the anti-war Tory party coming to power in Parliament in 1710. Such negotiations, while informal, cut across the terms of the treaty signed by the British and the Dutch, and across the more overt negotiations that had been in progress for some time, only to fall flat over the controversial clauses. The Tories, committed to a ‘good’ peace and tired of endless war, had gained the ascendancy in London, and could not be ignored. What could be achieved remained to be seen, but the unexpected success for the allies at Saragossa and the occupation of Madrid, had repercussions in those protracted discussions, with a British minister telling his French counterpart, the Marquis de Torcy: ‘We must wait for the face of things in Spain to change a little before negotiation, and see if the King of Spain will be absolutely driven out by his rival King Charles.’37 The British were not alone in the alliance in feeling that they had every reason to play for time, while the war in Spain tottered onwards. Holland was exhausted by the conflict, its effort in terms of manpower and money over the preceding eight years had been

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Unattainable Peace 185 immense and ‘her strength was ebbing away with the drain of war’.38 Unlike the late 1690s, when William III could negotiate with the French on behalf of both the Maritime Powers to their mutual benefit, the two sets of politicians in London and at The Hague pursued the same general course but with differing ambitions and aspirations. The need for a peace that the Dutch sought was obscured by the lure of a new treaty offered by astute British politicians, mindful of the concurrent need to keep them in the war for the time being. Everything that Holland sought was offered – even the British monopoly on trade agreed between Archduke Charles and Earl Stanhope in 1707 was set to one side so that Dutch merchants could equally benefit from the commercial opportunities that would come with eventual peace. Minorca would be given up to Charles, freeing trade routes in the western Mediterranean from any British stranglehold, although there was no mention of leaving Gibraltar. Equally alluring was the offer of a greatly enlarged battier in the southern Netherlands; the towns of Nieupoort, Ypres, Menin, Tournai, Condé, Valenciennes, Mauberge, Charleroi, Namur, Hal, Dendermode and even Lille, in addition to the forts at Knokke and Damme, would pass into the hands of Dutch garrisons, with all the tax-raising potential and commercial opportunities that went with them, denuding the Habsburg claimant of those same sums and prospects in the process. Only the port of Ostend, vital for British interests, was excluded from what the Dutch had sought. Upper Guelderland, promised to the King in Prussia in return for his valiant support for the Grand Alliance was to go to Holland instead (the king, naturally enough, was not consulted). The new Barrier Treaty was signed in October 1709, and ratified before the end of the year. In this way the Dutch aimed too high and in effect signed away their future, binding themselves to more years of ruinously expensive war, but the fact that the terms of the treaty would not be deliverable when peace at last came could not be foreseen or perhaps even imagined. When the negotiations with the French resumed at Gertruydenberg early in 1710, the Dutch were resolute in their support for the British demand of the throne in Madrid for the Archduke and nothing less. Again Louis XIV had to undertake to remove his grandson by force if need be, but the absurdity of this repeated demand was apparent to those astute enough, or willing

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186 The War of the Spanish Succession enough, to see it: ‘Nothing but seeing so great men believe it, could ever incline me to think France reduced so low to accept such conditions.’39 The allied campaign in Flanders in 1710 proceeded at a stately and outwardly victorious pace. Unwilling to risk another outright battle such as that fought at Malplaquet the previous autumn, Villars stuck to his lines of defence, and trusted to his fortress belt to fight his battles. This was a wise policy, and although Marlborough and Eugene were successful and seized a string of French-held fortresses, they were each valiantly defended and the cost in casualties and effort was high. There was little glamour in such a campaign, and the duke’s critics in London were more strident in their complaints concerning his conduct of the war. Louis XIV regretted the loss of these places, of course, but he was buying time while the allied resolve, energy and unity of purpose gradually weakened. During the siege of Douai, Villars wrote to Versailles for advice, and the king’s reply was illuminating: It is not possible for me to give precise orders from this distance. I have explained to you my idea, and you know well the reasons that make me hope to be able to oblige my enemies to raise the siege of Douai. Their army would have small chances to retreat if you should succeed in defeating them. While they still await some troops that have not yet come up . . . However, if you find the enemy too well posted to be able to attack them without reasonable hopes for success, it would be rash to engage them.40 The French garrison in Douai submitted at the end of June, and were granted the honours of war and permitted to march out. Marlborough wrote to London: ‘Douai and Fort Scarpe being surrendered, the giving up of the latter will save us a good deal of time and a great many men’s lives.’41 Two weeks later the Duke had invested Bethune, and went on to lay siege to and capture both Aire-sur-la-Lys and St Venant, but when the campaign season in the Low Countries came to a weary close that autumn, the allied losses in this gruelling warfare were startling. In the four sieges undertaken, the army’s losses totalled over 19,000 killed and wounded, with thousands more soldiers languishing in hospitals due to the rigours of operating in the foul weather that had set in. The French casualties, by comparison, were relatively modest, at just some 6,000 killed and wounded, in addition to prisoners taken and paroled. Villars

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Unattainable Peace 187 was suffering still from the musket-ball lodged in his knee, and in midSeptember had sought the king’s permission to retire and take the curative waters at Aix-la-Chapelle, which was given with some evident reluctance: ‘I desire the complete recovery of your wound too much not to consent to anything that will contribute to it. You may leave on the 20th of this month.’42 Marshal d’Harcourt took over the command of the army for the time being. The fortunes of Philip V had appeared to be bleak after a summer of repeated defeat at Almenara, Saragossa and the loss of Madrid, and increasing numbers of Spanish grandees began to hesitantly indicate their belated and rather opportunistic support for the Habsburg cause. In such deteriorating circumstances Louis XIV had to intervene once more or perhaps see his grandson, and French interests in Spain, ruined. Negotiations with the representatives of the Grand Alliance to try and arrange a peace stuttered on, but were suspended in July. The Duc de Vendôme, brashly confident as ever, had been sent to take lead the campaign in the peninsula with 8,000 fresh French troops, and much urgently needed supplies and munitions. On 20 September Vendôme arrived in Valladolid to confer with Philip V and to formulate a new strategy to remedy the losses of the summer. The French commander was impressed by the quality of the Spanish troops he saw, and reported favourably to Versailles on the subject. Louis XIV understood, and found the means to reinforce the effort in Spain still more. It was decided that the Marquis de Bay should take command once more in Estramadura to hold off the Portuguese, while simultaneously the Duc de Noailles would attack Catalonia from the north. Vendôme would manoeuvre against the main allied army in Castile and try to catch Stanhope’s exposed detachment on the river Tagus in the process. By 6 October 1710 Vendôme, whose reputation for indolence was often belied by driving energy on campaign, was at Salamanca with 14,000 troops, and he quickly pushed forward to Placentia and then Almaraz on the Tagus, where he destroyed the important bridge across the river. Stanhope was some thirty miles to the east, and he withdrew to Toledo while the French commander followed him to establish his own camp at Talavera de la Reina. By now Vendôme’s army had increased to 25,000 horse and foot, and any lingering hopes that Stanhope might combine forces, or even establish a line of supply, with the Portuguese under the Count de Villa Verde were well and truly dead.

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188 The War of the Spanish Succession In the meantime, von Starhemberg was reluctant to winter his soldiers in Castile, with existing lines of supply and communication to Catalonia exposed and susceptible to interference. Madrid remained unwelcoming, and the archduke, bitterly disappointed at the reception he had received, left for Saragossa and then Barcelona in early November. The allied campaign had been a failure, early successes had not been followed up, and what could be saved was to be saved, but little more. Von Starhemberg and his army marched out on 11 November, and Philip V escorted by 4,000 cavalry re-entered the capital on 3 December, receiving a rapturous welcome from the populace: ‘It took many hours for his triumphal carriage to pass through the main streets, since the crowds were immense.’43 This was the true measure of Philip’s success and strength, and conversely also of the fatal weakness of that of Archduke Charles, in the matter of the throne of Spain. True to form, Philip refused to take part in any premature victory celebrations or vindictive reprisals, and left Madrid on 6 December to join Vendôme on campaign in his pursuit of the allied army. Von Starhemberg combined forces with Stanhope once more at Chinchon between the Tagus and Jarama rivers. The allied army then withdrew towards Catalonia in three separate columns, the main force under von Starhemberg with Stanhope and the Marquis de Atalaya marching on either side; to try and use a single road would make progress and gathering supplies difficult, and Vendôme was bound to be in pursuit. This much was practical and made sense, but command and control of the movement was all the more complicated in the process, and the ability of any one column to support either of the others was in doubt. Stanhope was harassed by French cavalry and local irregulars on the route, and had to turn repeatedly and beat them off. ‘We kept on marching very slowly, and every little while facing about towards the enemy.’44 On 8 December the 4,000-strong British detachment, four regiments of horse and eight of foot – all not at anything like full strength – was overtaken at Brihuega on the right bank of the river Tajuna. Stanhope had halted there to gather and grind grain so that his troops could have bread, and was unaware that his opponents had made such good time in their pursuit and were closing in on him. As the danger became apparent an urgent request was belatedly sent to the field-marshal, who was twelve miles away at Cifuentes, to march to Stanhope’s aid. It was to no avail, and after a

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Unattainable Peace 189 sharp bombardment by Vendôme’s gunners on Tuesday 9 December, the walls of Brihguega were stormed and fierce fighting raged through the streets of the small town. A British dragoon recalled that: We were posted at a gate of the town, where our officers thought it to be the weakest of the all the town’s, and as the enemy knew, for they set the gate on fire three times, but we did put it out as fast and kept them out to that degree that could not be well expected, for we had no cannon . . . we should have kept them out longer but now our ammunition began to be wanting that our men was [were] forced to be careful with it.45 After a gallant defence of the dilapidated defences, with 150 soldiers falling in the fighting for the gateway alone, and with their ammunition almost exhausted, the British troops had no choice but to submit to Vendôme’s stormers. ‘When the parley was heard,’ the anonymous dragoon wrote, ‘they came to our breastwork and talked with us . . . the reason we got good quarters [terms], was that the enemy knew that our General Starhemberg was coming to our relief.’46 Signal guns had been fired by von Starhemberg to indicate to his ally that he was closing in as quickly as he could, but in the confusion of the street fighting these guns were not heard or not understood. Stanhope’s explanation of the reason behind the capitulation, given in his report on his eventual release from captivity, was that ‘I thought myself in confidence obliged to try and save so many brave men who had done good service to the Queen, and will, I hope, live to do so again’.47 Good terms were certainly granted by the French commander for the capitulation of Stanhope’s small force, some 3,000 of whom were marched away as unwounded prisoners. Unfortunately those good terms were not always observed and some of the prisoners, particularly the junior ranks, were brutally treated before they were eventually exchanged. The clear victory for Vendôme was welcome, but had still not been bought cheaply, as his casualties were nearly 1,300 killed and wounded that cold and clear day in December. The very next day Vendôme clashed with von Starhemberg and the main allied army at the village of Villaviciosa, about two miles upstream from Brihuega. Philip V had the command of the Franco-Spanish right wing in the battle, and his cavalry charged and swept through the allied

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190 The War of the Spanish Succession camp with the Dutch generals Belcastel and St-Amand amongst those killed in the melee. The field-marshal kept his composure and reinforced his line where it was most threatened and his troops stood their ground admirably. After an afternoon and evening of heavy combat, von Starhemberg had fought Vendôme to a standstill, and camped on the field that night. Technically the victor, the Austrian was heavily outnumbered and to stay risked catastrophe. He withdrew his army the following morning, intact but badly mauled, having suffered almost 4,000 casualties and the loss of many heavy guns which could not be got away. Also abandoned were the French and Spanish guns seized in the battle, after they had been spiked and the carriages smashed. Vendôme, who had lost a similar number of men in the battle, let his opponents go: his army was equally battered and enough had been achieved. The French commander was criticised for not following von Starhemberg and trying to bring him to battle once more, but his troops had been too hard hit at both Brihuega and Villaviciosa to do anything more for the time being. Vendôme still claimed the action to be a victory, of course, but it could only count as a heavily qualified one. Philip V’s rather specious report to his grandfather on the events of the day read, ‘the debris of the enemy retired in much haste, licking their wounds’.48 The allied army reached Saragossa in fairly good order on 23 December, where much of the stores and materiel collected for the campaign had to be burned. With insufficient strength to hold on to Aragon, the allies began to withdraw to Tarragona and Barcelona on 6 January 1711 with little more than 7,000 troops still under command, including those few British units that had not been at the defeat at Brihuega. Desertions and sickness had taken a heavy toll in the aftermath of the recent reverses. Archduke Charles certainly maintained a foothold of sorts between the Catalan triangle of Barcelona, Igualada and Tarragona, but Vendôme had achieved a notable success in those autumn and winter months and re-occupied all of Castile and Aragon without further real opposition. The Habsburg cause in Spain was now irretrievably damaged, and this was increasingly acknowledged to be so – King Philip V was back in Madrid and likely to remain there. Although wintry weather had set in, the Duc de Noailles pursued his campaign from Roussillon with a 19,000-strong army, and began a siege of Gerona on 15 December. The fortress was well provisioned, and

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Unattainable Peace 191 sitting close to the junction of the river Donia with the Ter, was difficult to approach with battering artillery. The garrison, commanded by Count Tattenbach, resisted well and an outwork known as Fort Rouge was only abandoned after it had been undermined and seriously damaged. The French battery positions were then flooded due to heavy rain and the rivers rising, and it was not unitl 14 January 1711 that Noailles could re-establish his siege operations properly. A breach in the main walls began to be made, and on 23 January a storming party took possession of the covered way preparatory to entering the breach itself. Count Tattenbach had long understood that he could not expect to be relieved by von Starhemberg, and having done his best in adverse circumstances he submitted the next day. He and his troops were granted the honours of war for their well-handled defence of the fortress, and permitted to march out with colours flying and drums bravely beating. The dynamics of the Grand Alliance had altered considerably with the change of government in London, and, dramatic events in Vienna would change things even more. Defeat for allied forces in Spain, strategically deadly for the Habsburg cause, pointed clearly the way ahead, and the Marquis de Torcy wrote of the news from Brihuega and Villaviciosa. ‘No matter what, never had victory been more complete and this day will change the face of affairs in Spain and at the same time those of Europe.’49 The British minister who, after the successful battle of Saragossa, had delayed negotiations with the French while events took their course in Madrid, wrote that: We will no longer insist on the entire restoration of the Monarchy of Spain to the House of Austria, or if we do it will be weakly and pro formâ, and we shall be content provided France and Spain will give us good securities for our commerce; and as soon as we have got what we need and have made our bargain with the two crowns, we will tell our Allies.50 ‘No peace without Spain’ was plainly no longer the watchword for the allies, and what had been available and on offer in the spring of 1709, but had been rashly turned away, would now serve very well. Once more a lack of money dogged the allied efforts to re-establish the position in Catalonia, with supplies failing and growing air of

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192 The War of the Spanish Succession indiscipline amongst the unpaid troops. ‘Soldiers are great thieves,’ an observer wrote, ‘and as they don’t have money to pay, they take what they want saying they have a right to do so.’51 Efforts were in hand to restore the situation, however, and on 21 February 1711 John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll, was appointed by Queen Anne to be her commander-in-chief in Spain. The duke was energetic, hard-headed and an astute commander, with considerable influence in London, and although lacking subtlety much was expected from him. In mid-May 8,000 imperial reinforcements were landed from ships under command of Admiral Sir John Norris, but Argyll was still in Italy and found to his dismay that promised funds were not available to supply the needs of the troops. He wrote in exasperation to the Queen: ‘I find neither money nor credit to subsist your army, which is starving for want of pay.’52 Arriving in Catalonia Argyll found that Vendôme was making preparations to advance across the Segre river on Lérida, and then to Tarragona, which was reinforced by British troops early in June. The welcome arrival of drafts of money lifted the immediate difficulties of the allied commanders in subsisting their men, and by the end of the following month, some 18,000 allied troops could be put in the field. The prospects for success in the war in eastern Spain appeared, on the surface at least, to have been unexpectedly turned around, but whether much of lasting value could be achieved remained in doubt. With the intense heart of summer little serious campaigning had taken place other than skirmishing and patrolling, enabling the opposing commanders to build up the strength of their forces. On 27 September, however, a serious clash took place at El Prats del Rei, where a British detachment drove back the French some way before being recalled for lack of support. The campaign languished, however, for British attention was turning more and more towards retaining their hold on Minorca, and with confidential negotiations in progress for a peace, neither side seemed keen, or were permitted, to push matters too seriously. A Franco-Spanish attempt to take Cardona late in November was turned back by von Starhemberg in some sharp fighting, but Argyll was unwell, and he sailed for Minorca early in 1712 on his way to return to London to recuperate. Major-General Whetham now had command of the remaining British troops in Catalonia, but he had few firm instructions. The war had spread with a will to the New World early in 1711

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Unattainable Peace 193 when, following a visit to London the previous year by Mohawk chiefs representing the Five Nations kindly disposed to British rule and a subsequent expedition to seize Port Royal in Acadia (Nova Scotia) from the French, a fresh force was prepared to try and attack their settlements in Quebec. Queen Anne wrote to her Governor-General in New York that February that ‘by driving out the French from thence, the several Indian nations will be under Our Subjection, and Our Subjects will enjoy the whole trade of fur and peltry’.53 Strict secrecy about the expedition was for once achieved, with even the British Admiralty not being aware of what was intended for their fleet: A design of this nature was kept a secret from the Admiralty, who, had they been consulted, would not, I am apt to think, have advised the sending of ships of 80 and 70 guns to Quebec, since the navigation up the river St Lawrence was generally esteemed to be very dangerous.54 Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker was in command of the naval squadron, and Major-General Sir Richard Hill, whose wife Abigail had become a favourite and close confidante of Queen Anne, commanded the troops to be landed. Walker’s ships reached Boston in New England late in June, and had some delay in co-ordinating operations with the colonial militias who had a tendency to please themselves concerning what instructions they would or would not follow. The expedition eventually set off, but the admiral had not taken the precaution of obtaining pilots with a close knowledge of the navigation of the St Lawrence river, and when a storm blew up eight of the troopcarrying transports were driven onto the rocks and wrecked with heavy loss of life. The morale and resolve of Walker and Hill appeared to sink with the lost ships, and they withdrew from the mouth of the river, and abandoned any attempt to seize Quebec, which was, in fact, held by a very inadequate French garrison. The colonial militia, which were making their way overland from Albany in northern New York, withdrew on learning of the fleet’s failure to land their troops anywhere useful. Any fresh British attempt to gain territory in North America would have to wait for negotiations for peace, and what might be quietly and more comfortably achieved then.

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Chapter 12

An End to a Weary Journey ‘I ask forgiveness for the bad example I have set you.’1

The secret negotiations between France and Great Britain to bring an end to the war, facilitated by the efforts of a French priest, Father Gaultier, who was resident in London and took on the role of gobetween, progressed to the degree that tentative terms for a treaty for a cessation of hostilities – a sketched-out structure that would lead to a formal treaty – were agreed in April 1711. Louis XIV undertook that his representatives should negotiate on his grandson’s behalf as well as his own. ‘I hope,’ he wrote from Versailles, ‘that you will not regret this confidence in me, and that you will find that I will make good use of the power that you have given me.’2 In brief, the intention was that Philip V would remain on the throne in Madrid, Austria retain its gains in Italy and the Low Countries, Great Britain receive preferential trading rights in the Americas, and the Dutch regain their Barrier Towns. This outline for a peace agreement was then made public, and was met with predictable protests from Vienna and The Hague, with accusations of bad faith and double-dealing on the part of London. Despite this furore, the whole question of the succession in Spain was settled firmly on 17 April 1711 with the death from smallpox of 34-year-old Emperor Joseph; the bereaved empress was made regent at the head of an interim council of state. Prince Eugene, appointed as a member of the council, wrote to the Duke of Marlborough on 25 April that, nine days earlier: ‘He was believed to be out of danger. That same day, towards evening, the malady increased and he died the next morning at eleven.’3 With an inevitable period of uncertainty that ensued in the empire, preparations for the coming allied campaigns

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An End to a Weary Journey 195 were delayed and imperial troops withdrawn from the Low Countries into Germany to ensure stability. Of much greater significance was the simple fact that Archduke Charles, who might once have been Carlos III of Spain, was likely to be elected as the new emperor in Vienna. This was not a foregone conclusion, as the archduke had never been King of the Romans and therefore the nominated successor should his older brother die. Still, the only other likely candidate with any demonstrably valid claim, the Elector of Bavaria, was a fugitive dependent for the time being upon the charity of Louis XIV, and accordingly could hardly be considered very eligible. In a curious exchange of diplomatic niceties, Philip V wrote to Archduke Charles in Barcelona with condolences at the death of his brother, but the letter was returned unopened, as the archduke would have been obliged to address any reply to the Duc d’Anjou, rather than to the King of Spain, and needless offence thereby given. The whole political climate changed completely with this death; the archduke was set to succeed his brother, and to have the new Emperor Charles also crowned as Carlos III would be unsupportable, even assuming that he could be forced upon the Spanish people. The logic behind any continuation of the war was therefore gone. By dint of the military success of commanders such as Eugene and Marlborough, the Spanish Empire was divided with large areas of the Low Countries and Italy now in allied and Austrian hands, while the corresponding lack of success in the peninsula left Philip V secure in Madrid, as the Catalans could not and would not be supported indefinitely in their admirable but hopeless allegiance to the Habsburg claimant. On 27 September 1711 the archduke sailed from Barcelona bound for Vienna, and on 2 October he was duly elected as Emperor Charles VI; although his wife stayed in Catalonia for the time being as a token of good faith; he never returned to Spain. In the meantime, the Duke of Marlborough had been obliged to open his campaign in northern France, in Eugene’s absence, with a distinct lack of numbers compared to his opponent, Marshal Villars. The French commander had no need to seek a battle in the open, and his army lay secure behind formidable lines of defence stretching from the Channel coast to Mauberge on the river Sambre, the ‘Lines of Non Plus Ultra’. It seemed that only a bloody frontal assault could shift the French from their position, but instead Marlborough fooled Villars into

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196 The War of the Spanish Succession reinforcing his posts around Arras to the westwards, and then struck across the lines at Arleux, ‘having got over their prodigious lines which nobody thought we should have done without a battle’, and going on to lay siege to the French fortress of Bouchain at the junction of the Scheldt and Sensee rivers.4 The garrison put up a spirited defence, and Villars brought his army in close to Bourlon Wood to try and impede the progress of the siege. Despite his greater numbers, the marshal proved unable to lift the allied siege and the commander of the garrison, the Marquis de Ravignan, capitulated on 12 September. ‘The garrison was numerous,’ a Dutch officer wrote, ‘and wanted nothing, it was supported by the French army; and yet in the sight of a hundred thousand fighting men, they were made prisoners of war.’5 An unseemly argument ensued over the terms of the capitulation, but Marlborough was adamant that the marquis and his men were his prisoners of war and not immediately eligible for parole. Affairs in Spain went forward rather haltingly for much of the year. The exertions of both armies in the closing months of the previous campaign, for all the success that Vendôme had achieved at Brihuega and Villaviciosa, had worn down the capabilities of both sides, and it was only in September 1711 that he advanced in earnest once more. Now reinforced with fresh Austrian troops from Italy and British units from the garrison in Gibraltar, von Starhemberg and Argyll took up a strong defensive position at Pratz del Roy with an army 15,000 strong, in order to cover the approaches to both Tarragona and Barcelona. On 16 September Vendôme with a slightly larger force attempted to manoeuvre them out of the defences, but failing in this he withdrew to Cervera, sending a detachment of 3,000 troops to lay siege to the allied fortress at Cardona. This operation went on rather slowly in the face of a valiant defence by the governor, Count Eck, who prudently withdrew into the citadel once the main walls were breached. On 20 December von Starhemberg sent a relief force which in a two-day battle drove the besieging army away with the loss of all their guns and baggage. The news of the reverse was not well received and Louis XIV urged that no risks be taken. ‘I do not believe it to be apropos for you to seek to fight,’ he wrote to Vendôme, who accordingly withdrew his troops into winter quarters behind the river Segre.6 That same autumn negotiations had reached a kind of resolution between France and Great Britain for a general cessation of hostilities.

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An End to a Weary Journey 197 The ‘Preliminary Articles’ that were agreed in late September for a permanent treaty guaranteed to Great Britain ‘most favoured nation’ status in trading with Spain and the Spanish empire, while both Gibraltar and Minorca were to remain in British hands. Britain also made considerable gains in North America with the fisheries around Newfoundland and the fur trade out of Hudson’s Bay being confirmed as solely British interests. An additional benefit for British trade was that the fortifications and harbour mole at the notorious privateering port at Dunkirk were to be demolished. A subsidiary paper guaranteed the Protestant succession to the throne in London, the separation for all time of the thrones of France and Spain, the restoration of the Dutch Barrier in the southern Netherlands, and the territorial gains made for Austria in Italy and the Low Countries. It was, however, clear that France and Great Britain had arranged terms to best suit themselves, while the Dutch had ‘to jostle with the Austrians for such broken meats as they would find under the conference table’.7 Too much was left vague and subject to further manoeuvring for those in The Hague, Vienna and Turin to be satisfied, but those in London and Versailles, and to a degree in Madrid, had got what was sought. While these discussions, whether conducted in good faith or bad, proceeded at a stately pace, with the Duke of Marlborough was out of favour in London and excluded from the negotiations. He was suddenly relieved of all his posts by Queen Anne on 31 December 1711. ‘I am very sensible of the honour your Majesty does me,’ the Duke wrote bitterly, ‘in dismissing me from your service by a letter of your own hand.’8 With matters all but settled between France and Great Britain, Marlborough with his brilliant talents was now an inconvenience, and was put out of the way. Louis XIV learned the news of the dismissal with satisfaction: ‘The affair of displacing the Duke of Marlborough will do all for us we desire.’9 A congress was convened at Utrecht to formalise the discussions that had taken place to achieve peace. The affair was largely managed by the Marquis de Torcy for France and Robert Harley, the Earl of Oxford, for Great Britain, and the most pressing issue remained that of guaranteeing the separation of the two crowns of France and Spain. This had become urgent due to the ravages of an epidemic of measles in the French court, which had carried off the heir to the throne the Duc de Bourgogne (his father, the Dauphin, having died of smallpox

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198 The War of the Spanish Succession the previous year), and also his elder son. The younger son, Louis, still an infant in arms, thanks to the tender ministrations of his formidable nurse who barred the nursery door to keep the well-intentioned but incompetent royal doctors away, survived to succeed his greatgrandfather a couple of years later. Had the infant not lived, the spectre of Philip V of Spain being the only legitimate heir of Louis XIV would have arisen, with incalculable consequences. The Earl of Oxford suggested an exchange of Spanish titles and territories between Philip V and Victor-Amadeus of Savoy, should the Frenchman accept the throne, but nothing came of this notion and assurances given by Louis XIV over the separation of the crowns being irrevocable had to be accepted for what they were. Marlborough’s successor in command of the British troops, James Butler, 2nd Duke of Ormonde, received instructions from London, which were notoriously to become known as the restraining orders, and he was to effectively mark time while the protracted negotiations for peace went on. Ormonde was at first advised to ‘be cautious for sometime of engaging in an action’ but then Secretary of State Henry St John wrote to him on 21 May 1712: It is therefore the Queen’s positive command to your Grace that you avoid engaging in any siege, or hazarding a battle, till you have further orders from Her Majesty. I am, at the same time, directed to let your Grace know that the Queen would have you disguise the receipt of this order, and her Majesty thinks that you cannot want pretences for conducting yourself so as to answer her ends without owning that which might, at present, have an ill effect if it was publicly known. P.S. I had almost forgot to tell your Grace that communication is given of this order to the Court of France.10 Britain’s allies were, in effect to be kept in the dark concerning the determination to conclude an agreement for a peace with France, while being misled as to the day-to-day intentions of the army while on campaign. Versailles, however, was clearly informed of the detail, and diplomatic duplicity was plainly in full play. The Dutch and Prince Eugene were, however, not to be gulled in this, and were well aware of what was going on in London, even if the

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An End to a Weary Journey 199 precise nature of the restraining orders were, for the moment, not entirely clear to them. When Eugene proposed a march to surprise the French in their encampment, Ormonde cried off, pleading that he needed instructions from London before acting. ‘There are several among them,’ he wrote to London, ‘who do not hesitate to say that they have been betrayed.’11 It was clear also that other supporters of the alliance, with a keen interest in the outcome of the war, were likely to take a robust stance. ‘The Elector of Hanover is strongly opposed to the peace, and will let his troops serve with the Dutch. I am also doubtful whether we can win over the Danes.’12 Ormonde became concerned that the British troops might even be disarmed and interned by their late comrades in arms. Parliament in London, meanwhile were being assured that no such deceit was being attempted on Britain’s allies. ‘Nothing of that nature was ever intended,’ Robert Harley declared with astonishing aplomb. ‘The Allies are acquainted with our proceedings, and satisfied with our terms.’13 Rarely, it appears, have the Members of Parliament in London been lied to quite such a bare-faced fashion. Von Starhemberg and Vendôme continued to manoeuvre against each other in Catalonia, but neither achieved a great deal. The French commander died of food poisoning at Vinaroz in June 1712, taking away one of Louis XIV’s best field commanders, but the allies had insufficient strength or the will to push their campaign forward and take advantage of his removal from the scene, other than to attempt a rather ineffective blockade of Gerona. The last British troops left Barcelona in late November. ‘The poor Spaniards, seeing they were left in the lurch, they called us traitors, and all the vile names they could invent, and the common people threw stones at us.’14 Most British and Dutch troops had already been removed from Portugal at the end of 1711, and used to augment the garrisons in Gibraltar and Port Mahon in Minorca, but hostilities along the border stuttered on in a rather aimless way. The following autumn, a late Spanish attempt was made to seize Campo Mayor, near to Elvas on the river Guadiana, before peace brought everything to a halt. The Portuguese garrison resisted valiantly, and reinforcements broke through the Spanish lines twice to reach the fortress, and the besiegers’ main magazine was blown up by a lucky mortar bomb. An attempt to storm the main bastion was made by the Marquis de Bay’s troops on 17 October, but was beaten off with heavy

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200 The War of the Spanish Succession losses, and when news came of a suspension of hostilities the siege had to be lifted, and the Spanish army rather reluctantly withdrew across the border once more. When the remaining British troops made their way to Gibraltar by marching across Andalusia, with Spanish permission of course, it was remembered that the locals showed great hospitality and generosity to the soldiers, who reciprocated by behaving very well on the march. The Portuguese regiments that made their way home from Catalonia received a cooler reception on the way, but were not actively hindered in their progress. The armistice between Spain and Portugal, for that was all it was, had to be renewed every four months until the treaty for peace was ratified by the two countries in February 1715. Meanwhile, in northern France Eugene was keen to maintain pressure on the French, and the allied army crossed the Selle river on 8 June 1712, accompanied still by a British detachment; Ormonde had agreed to take part in the operation to attack Le Quesnoy, because to refuse would be to publicly declare the duplicitous hand he was having to play. Marshal Villars had been assured that active British operations were at an end while negotiations for peace were ongoing, and he protested at what seemed to be such a breach of good faith. That a far greater breach of good faith was in active play against Ormonde’s own allies in the campaign was of no concern to Villars. Relations between Eugene and Ormonde were understandably under some strain, and when the British general advised the prince to abandon the siege of Le Quesnoy, the tart response was that the operations would instead be pressed with all vigour. ‘The English, for their part,’ Colonel JeanMartin de la Colonie wrote, ‘did not separate themselves from the allied army, but allowed the siege to progress without participating in the work.’15 The Elector of Hanover remained suspicious of what was taking place behind closed doors, and Queen Anne wrote to her heir and eventual successor on the throne in London on 17 June 1712, in order to reassure him: You will see with satisfaction how much at heart I have had the true interests of your Family; and that you will be agreeably surprised to see how France’s offers approach towards a just and reasonable satisfaction for all the Allies, while containing great advantages for my subjects, by which they may hope to repay

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An End to a Weary Journey 201 themselves somewhat for the heavy expense of a long and arduous war, of which the principal burden has fallen on them. The opposition which I have met during the course of this negotiation, and the disunion which has so inopportunely arisen among the confederates might have produced the worst consequences; but I hope with God’s blessing, to bring this great Work, already far advanced, to a happy end.16 The queen spoke with perfect truth over who had for much of the war carried the greatest share of the burden, and she would have no more of it. In effect, Great Britain had got what it needed from the war, as had her allies if only they could bring themselves to see it. Out on campaign, meanwhile, there was a growing conviction that the British troops were no longer to be relied on, additional measures were been taken by Eugene to ensure the security of the allied camp. On 28 June Ormonde sent instructions to the commanders of the foreign troops in British pay to be ready to march and quit the campaign, but the response was immediate and quelling – in effect that they would not march off without express instructions from their own princes. Three days later the 3,000-strong French garrison of Le Quesnoy submitted as prisoners of war, and the British troops left the allied army soon afterwards, marching north to encampments around Ghent and Bruges. Most other towns in the southern Netherlands firmly and with manifest disdain closed their gates to the British regiments, but control of the valuable fortified port of Dunkirk was handed over to the British, pending demolition of the defences, for that was a part of the secret deal that had been struck. Eugene and his Dutch allies, together with the German and Danish contingents, were still in the field, still flushed with success and confidence. Their French opponents could only look ruefully back at a long list of defeats and setbacks, Le Quesnoy being only the latest over several years of disappointment. The French commander occupied a good defensive position between Arras and Cambrai, however, and would not easily be manoeuvred into the open. To try and achieve this, Eugene struck at Landrecies just to the south of the Forest of Mormal, but his lines of supply and communication back to Douai were lengthy and exposed, while the French still held fortified places such as Mauberge and Valenciennes within striking distance. As Colonel de la

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202 The War of the Spanish Succession Colonie remembered: ‘The siege of Landrecies took him so much further afield that he found his convoys were no longer safe from attack.’17 On 22 July Villars advanced across the Selle river, and by turning quickly northwards within two days had invested the alliedheld fortified encampment at Denain. Villars now threatened Eugene’s lines of supply, and the hunted had turned hunter in consequence. Denain was held by a garrison 8,000 strong, under the very capable command of Arnold Joost van Keppel, the Earl of Albemarle. Although Eugene counter-marched from Landrecies with his army to relieve Denain, the French attacked and routed an outpost at Neuville on 24 July, and as they advanced, Albemarle had to draw his garrison in to a close defence of the encampment: Arrangements were made to invest these entrenchments to a certain degree, and as the enemy’s cannon were firing pointblank at us, the leading brigades were ordered to lie down to avoid the shot as much as possible . . . In the orders for the assault the front ranks of our troops were directed to sling their muskets and use their sword, so as to have greater freedom in scaling the parapets. Those in rear followed with bayonets fixed.18 Villars attacked with great skill and determination, and Albemarle was forced back upon a single pontoon bridge to try and get his troops across the river Escaut. This structure collapsed under the strain and 5,000 allied soldiers were killed, drowned or taken prisoner by the victorious French. ‘In a moment they were engulfed in the stream, and all that were left of the eighteen battalions were two or three thousand who were cut off and taken prisoner.’19 Amongst the allied prisoners taken were Albemarle, the Prince of Nassau-Siegen, Count Lippe and Count Hohenzollern, while Eugene had been obliged to watch the unfolding catastrophe from the far side of the river, with those few cavalry squadrons he had managed to bring up to try and save the day. The loss in killed and wounded suffered by Villars in achieving this brilliant success was modest by comparison, although several officers of high rank were counted amongst the casualties, such had been the vigour with which they had pressed their attack. Louis XIV was understandably elated at the news of the victory and he wrote to the marshal: ‘Nothing could more favourably advance and assist the

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An End to a Weary Journey 203 negotiations for peace, than to recover this superiority that my troops have had for so long but which they unhappily had lost for the last several years.’20 In the wake of such a defeat Prince Eugene had to abandon the operations against Landrecies and fall back to recover his lines of supply and communication. ‘I was obliged to raise the siege of Landrecy, and to approach Mons, for the purpose of subsisting my army.’21 A huge depot he had established at Marchiennes on the river Scarpe fell into French hands, as did the minor fortresses of Mortagne and Saint Amand. Douai was invested by Villars on 12 August, and with only a weak garrison with which to defend the place, the governor had to submit in the second week of September. Eugene would have made an attack to relieve the place, but the Dutch, shocked at the débâcle at Denain and aware that an agreement for peace was in the offing were reluctant to do so. Le Quesnoy was regained by Villars on 6 October, and Bouchain fell fifteen days later. In the space of a few short weeks, the French commander had regained at remarkably little cost almost all that had been lost to the allies in the previous two years, and Louis XIV, both relieved and exultant at this remarkable turnaround in French fortunes, had solemn services of thanksgiving held by the Archbishop of Paris. The grim lesson for the Grand Alliance was that it could not fight on without the British contingents, who had now left the field, or operate without the cash subsidies that had flowed at one time from Queen Anne’s treasury. Great Britain was no longer an active participant in the war, having arranged matters to satisfaction with the French, and it remained for her erstwhile allies to do the same. The articles for peace having been agreed between British and France, Holland had little option but to follow suit, and this was duly done with the conclusion of what collectively became known as the Treaty of Utrecht. (See Appendix 2 for the treaty terms.) The Dutch got their Barrier once more, partly carved out of French territory gained by Marlborough and Eugene in long years of arduous campaigning. This was an improvement on the old Barrier that had been rashly swept away in 1701, but not as extensive as they had hoped for in 1709.22 Louis XIV regained Lille, Aire Sur la Lys and St Venant, but failed in an attempt to have Tournai restored to France. The King’s ally, the Elector of Bavaria, was restored to his estates, but gained little else from his devious engagement in the war. The King in Prussia was

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204 The War of the Spanish Succession rewarded for his support for the Grand Alliance with the territory of Upper Guelderland, while Nice and Savoy were returned to VictorAmadeus of Savoy, who also gained Sicily. The thrones of France and Spain were to be kept apart, and the renunciation by Philip V on this key provision ran: We have determined both to establish this treaty on a firm footing and to spread the boon of peace, thus ensuring the good of all people and the peaceful balance of power in Europe . . . to accede to the representations made by England and approved by His Majesty, Our Grandfather [Louis XIV] and, so that it shall henceforth never come within the realms of possibility for the Crown to be wed with that of France, to agree to renounce, in Our own Name and in that of all Our descendants, all rights to the French Throne, which renunciation shall be matched by an equal and opposite renunciation [by his younger brother the Duc de Berry] adhering to this fundamental maxim that the balance of power within Europe shall be maintained, all steps shall be taken to guarantee that at no time shall this inheritance fall to the House of Austria, for, should this happen, this House, even without the domains and territories attaching to the Empire, would be made formidably powerful, a factor which in the past made the separation of the hereditary estates enjoyed by the House of Austria from the body of the Spanish Realms a laudable enterprise . . . In the event of our dying without issue, or of Our line being for any reason interrupted and not enjoying true continuance, the heir to this Our throne shall be the Duke of Savoy and His sons.23 Clearly, the hand of Louis XIV was in this: the old concern at the prospect of Habsburg encirclement of France had not lessened with the passage of the years. As set out in the treaty, if the line of Philip V failed, France agreed that Victor-Amadeus or his own descendants, would inherit the throne in Madrid. It might be thought then, that the wily duke, who had backed first one side and then the other, was the real victor in the war. Portugal gained no Spanish territory as hoped, but her frontiers in South America were made more secure against encroachment. After some late arguing over such details as fishing

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An End to a Weary Journey 205 rights off Nova Scotia and the precise extent of the renewed Dutch Barrier the treaty was signed on 11 April 1713 at Utrecht, firstly between Great Britain and France, then between France, Savoy and Prussia, and lastly between France and Holland. The Treaty was brought to London on 14 April where it was received with enormous acclamation. Peace, however dubiously achieved, and glorious or otherwise, was very welcome: ‘Last night,’ an English lady wrote, ‘we had a vast number of bonfires in every village.’24 Austria tried to fight on alone to gain better terms, but the cause was irretrievably lost once Great Britain and Holland had agreed things with Louis XIV: The Emperor had made up his mind to continue the war, in order to exact better conditions touching certain points that concerned him in particular so that if, after all, he was obliged to accept peace, it should not be said afterwards that lesser Powers had restricted his demands.25 As it turned out, Vienna was in no fit shape to fight on alone, and little of significant value was achieved. The southern Netherlands were no longer to be the key battleground, and attention switched to the length of the middle and upper Rhine. Kaiserlauten was captured on 24 June 1713, and Marshal Bezon moved from Alsace to invest the fortress of Landau. Prince Eugene had been hopeful of holding the line of the Rhine, but: The tardiness of the princes and circles [of the Empire] prevented me from anticipating the French on the upper Rhine . . . as I clearly perceived that Villars meant to make an attempt on Landau, I ordered lines to be formed at Etlingen, within which I sent one half of my army, and posted the other at Mühlberg, where I hoped my reinforcements would arrive before the fall of Landau; but the Prince of Württemberg was obliged to capitulate.26 Württemberg had put up a creditable defence: ‘A thoroughly wellinformed and brave man, who took every possible opportunity of delaying our approaches,’ Colonel de la Colonie recalled.27 The Marquis

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206 The War of the Spanish Succession de Biron was amongst those wounded in the French trenches, losing an arm; good terms were not offered to the garrison by Villars, and they had to surrender ‘at discretion’ as prisoners of war on 20 August. Having taken this key fortress, Villars once more raided imperial lands in Germany, and began a siege of Freiburg on 1 October. The garrison under the command of Baron d’Arsch fought bravely from well-prepared works, but after a bloodily expensive French assault on the main walls on 2 November had to withdraw into the citadel. ‘What added to the furious and murderous character of this action was the fact that we had pitched upon the same night for our attack that the besieged had themselves elected to make a sortie upon us.’28 Villars made no attempt to storm the citadel, but threatened to burn the town if the garrison did not submit. The baron was permitted to ask instructions from the emperor in Vienna, who directed that he should yield rather than incur such destruction, and accordingly d‘Arsch capitulated on 21 November. With the coming of bad weather and biting cold, the opposing armies tramped wearily off to their quarters Negotiations to achieve a peace progressed through the winter months, with Eugene and Villars taking a prominent part – they had been old friends and comrades when fighting the Ottoman Turks in Hungary when young and this helped in the discussions. ‘Never did men embrace with more military sincerity,’ the prince remembered, ‘and I may venture to add, with more esteem and attachment.’29 In March 1714 peace was agreed between Vienna and Versailles with the Treaty of Rastadt, and the subsequent treaties of Baden and Madrid. So, at last, quiet came to a weary western Europe. Long critical years of outright war, devastation of land and property, and burdensome taxation were past, and there was understandably general relief that it should be so. Much had been achieved by both sides in the conflict, although ambitions, both spoken and unspoken, reasonable and exorbitant as they might have been, had been so high that much was also lost and regretted. In particular, Louis XIV, whose fortunes had been so low in the terrible years 1706 to 1709, could have felt with justification that the subsequent recovery of the French position was remarkable. The Marquis de Torcy wrote: Who would have said at this time, that the property of the formidable Alliance of the enemies of France and Spain had

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An End to a Weary Journey 207 reached its final limit . . . these proud warriors, so drunk with their successes, would, confounded in their designs, restore to the King the most important fortresses they had captured, that there would no longer be any question of their demanding hostages to guarantee the inviolable word of a great King, nor of proposing as the foundation of a Treaty odious preliminaries.30 The final sad act of the long war for Spain took place in Catalonia, where the people had taken up the cause of Archduke Charles and alone held firm to their allegiance. They had, of course, at first been reluctant to support the Habsburg claimant to the throne, but with the likelihood of British naval blockade of their ports, and with comforting assurances ‘of the Queen’s support’,31 they had risen in favour of the archduke and remained steadfast to the cause they had espoused when others fell away. A provision of the Treaty of Utrecht stipulated that, once allied troops had left Catalonia, a general amnesty would be offered, but this important provision was not included in the agreement between Great Britain and Spain. When von Starhemberg evacuated Barcelona with the bulk of his Austrian, Dutch and Palatine troops, as required under treaty terms, he contrived to hand the city over to the Catalans and not to the Duca de Populi who had confidently expected to take possession in the name of Philip V. Resentment in Madrid at what appeared to be double-dealing was immediate. So, the fighting went on. The Catalan cause was apparently without hope of success but they remained resolute nonetheless, and de Populi had not enough strength to force the stout defences of the city and nearby Fort Montjuich. Philip V had yet to formally conclude an agreement to cease hostilities with Holland, and Louis XIV was reluctant to commit French troops to assist in the operations against Barcelona until this had been achieved. He wrote to his apparently wilful grandson in exasperation in April 1714: I tell you that I will not give you any fresh help towards the reduction of Barcelona until you have signed this peace. I am very distressed to be compelled to take this decision, but you can change it whenever you wish; for as soon as you have concluded the treaty with Holland my troops, which I am still concentrating in Roussillon, will be at your disposal; I will also at once send the

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208 The War of the Spanish Succession engineers that I have earmarked for you, and that I am still keeping ready.32 No immediate answer was forthcoming from Madrid and the Catalans took advantage of this pause to strengthen their position. The Duca de Populi made a careful study of the defences of Barcelona, and reported to Madrid that, without French assistance, there was little chance of making a successful assault. After a three-month delay that could well have been avoided, Philip V acquiesced in his grandfather’s wishes and terms were agreed with the Dutch. The Duke of Berwick accordingly left Versailles on 22 June to take charge of the French troops in the campaign against those Catalans who still refused to acknowledge the king’s authority. Berwick had command of 35,000 French and Spanish infantry and 6,000 cavalry, concentrated around Gerona, with another 12,000 troops near to Tarragona. He was opposed by 16,000 Catalan defenders in Barcelona, who had the support of some 4,000 foreign volunteers, notably those Austrians and Italians who had stayed to fight when von Starhemberg left. Sentiment was hardening on both sides, with instructions to Berwick coming from Madrid that no mercy should be shown unless the Catalans submitted without delay with the promise of only the barest of good terms, while on the other hand the authorities in Barcelona suppressed any show of sympathy or support for Philip V, however tepid, with considerable severity. On 10 July 1713 the three Estates of Catalonia voted to ignore the offered amnesty and instead opt for war in pursuit of the preservation of their ancient rights and privileges. Barcelona was already blockaded, although a partial replenishment of the city by ships sailing from Majorca and Ibiza had been accomplished earlier in the month. The islands remained loyal to Charles, and the small flotilla of Catalan ships were able to slip in and out of the port with supplies. Philip V asked the newly-appointed British ambassador in Madrid, Lord Lexington, to provide a naval squadron to complete the blockade of the Catalan coastline, but this was refused – Great Britain could be accused of leaving the Catalans to face the consequences, but plainly some things would have been just too dark and disgraceful to contemplate. The ambassador did, though, urge the king to adopt a conciliatory approach in reaching an agreement with the Catalans, but this advice was ignored.

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An End to a Weary Journey 209 Lexington wrote to the Estates in Barcelona: ‘I always desired to help bring about the solution most favourable in the present situation, and accordingly I repeat to you that I cannot give you better advice than to accept the amnesty offered to you.’33 Marshal Berwick had to contend with irregular Catalan forces under the command of the Marquis de Peral manoeuvring against his lines of supply, but he pushed his preparations for a siege along at a good pace. The trenches were opened on 12 July, with a vigorous sally by the garrison having to be beaten off with some difficulty the next day. The bombardment of the bastions of Puerta Nueva, Santa Clara and El Levante began two weeks later, and there was a period of fierce fighting for possession of the Santa Clara feature in particular, with heavy casualties on both sides, but the bastion remained in the hands of the defenders. The work of the big guns went on regardless, and Berwick had to restrain those of his officers who, anxious to demonstrate their valour, wished to make a premature attack on the gradually widening breach; The vigorous resistance of the enemy determined me to hazard no more attacks of this kind; but at the same time it was very difficult to find out how one could make oneself master of the town by any other method. Our engineers, whose knowledge did not extend beyond the ordinary rules of the art, seeing that the environs were all laid under water, proposed to me as the only resource to give the general assault at a breach which had been made between Puerta Nueva and Santa Clara. It appeared that those who were capable of making such a proposal, must have lost their senses, for the flanks were still entire, the breach undermined, and besides there was behind a very strong entrenchment.34 Berwick was determined to have the defences battered down still further before attempting an assault. ‘I therefore advanced some batteries, and armed myself with patience against all the discourses of the officers of the army, who grew very much tired with the length of the siege.’35 Attempts to negotiate a capitulation of the city on reasonable terms proved unsuccessful, and Berwick became increasingly exasperated at what he saw as a pointless and doomed

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210 The War of the Spanish Succession defence with no realistic hope of relief. ‘The obstinacy of these people was the more surprising as there were seven breaches in the body of the place; no possibility of receiving any succours, and no provisions in the town.’36 At daybreak on 11 September 1714, a grand assault was made, and after heavy hand-to-hand fighting the three main bastions were firmly in Berwick’s hands. Another defensive work, the San Pedro bastion, was also taken, but was enfiladed by heavy fire from Catalan troops in a nearby convent and a sharp counter-attack almost drove the marshal’s troops back into their own entrenchments. He was well forward with his generals, and with his encouragement, the gains of the early morning were held against fierce resistance and made secure by mid-afternoon. The garrison commander, Don Antonio Villaroel, now asked for terms for a capitulation, but Berwick refused the request, not unreasonably as he had been forced to make such a bloody assault which might well have been avoided by an earlier submission. He wrote: It was now too late; that we were already masters of the city, and had it in our power to put everything to the sword; and I should not therefore listen to any proposals on their part, except of submitting at discretion to His Catholic Majesty, and of imploring his mercy.37 The discussions ended abruptly and the firing of the breaching batteries, and the counter-battery work, went on. Berwick sent a further message to Villaroel that evening, that he expected a capitulation without further delay or he would allow Barcelona to be sacked by his troops. The garrison commander and the authorities in the city, driven to the last extremity in their defence, had no choice but to agree, and Berwick dictated quite reasonable terms, in the circumstances: I then promised them their lives would be safe, and even that there should be no plunder, which I did in order to preserve, to the King of Spain, a rich and flourishing city . . . On the morning of the 13th [September] the rebels retired from all their posts; and our troops marched through the streets in such order to the quarters that were assigned to them, that not a single soldier got out of the ranks.38

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An End to a Weary Journey 211 That there was no attempt to sack or plunder Barcelona says much for the good state of discipline of the troops that Berwick led. This restraint was remarkable for the success was certainly hard won, with some 6,000 French and 3,000 Spanish troops killed and wounded during the siege. The scale of casualties amongst the garrison, which include many armed citizens and irregulars, was uncertain, but must have been equally heavy. With the conclusion of the peace treaties, the great and outstanding matter to be settled had been that of the Catalans who, having been encouraged to fight against their declared sovereign, Philip V, had then been left to face the consequences once the parties to the Grand Alliance lost interest. These consequences became manifest with the fall of Barcelona; the Catalans were not, in a strict sense, rebels as they had taken up arms to support the allied cause at a moment when the young French prince, although proclaimed as King of Spain, had not yet made good that claim, while the Austrian archduke, arguably, had just as good a claim to the throne. Not all Catalans by any means had supported the Habsburg claimant, and numbers of those disaffected by the turn of events had left Barcelona when Charles was welcomed there. ‘At no stage was there unanimous or even majority support for the Archduke.’39 The citizens of the town of Tarragona, for example, had only declared their support under considerable duress, when subjected to a bombardment by an allied naval squadron, and the depredations of marauding armies was resented and widely resisted. ‘They marched continually, across the principality, eating and drinking, sacking and burning.’40 With the surrender of Barcelona, all Catalonian rights were in effect suspended and the region remained under martial law for many years. Majorca, last bastion of resistance to Philip V, only submitted to French troops commanded by the Chevalier d’Asfeld in June 1715, but no attempt was made to recover Minorca from the British, this having been agreed of course under the treaty terms.

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Chapter 13

A Balance of Power ‘The most destructive and bloody war as ever had been.’1

The seventeenth century in western Europe might well have been regarded, in retrospect, as France’s century, with the achieving of a position of dominance over neighbouring states, under the rule of that most sagacious, and at the same time most ambitious, monarch Louis XIV secure in his wonderful new palace at Versailles. Active opposition to the Sun King and his ministers was fragmentary and weakened. After a period of military success, with Spanish armies within striking distance of the walls of Paris at one early point, Spain had lapsed from being a world power, despite its vast empire, and her ruling classes had sunk into commercial and intellectual indolence induced by the steady flow of treasure, unearned and therefore taken for granted, from the New World. Austria was concerned with the Ottoman threat from the east, added to which unrest in Hungary increasingly caught and held the attention of Vienna. The Holy Roman Empire (neither Holy, Roman or an Empire, as it was waggishly described) was a fragmented and increasingly irrelevant entity, especially as the more dynamic component parts – Bavaria, Hanover, Brandenburg, Saxony – pursued their own very self-centred courses of action, sometimes at the expense of the interests of the emperor in Vienna. Smaller states, weakened by the long and gruelling torment of the Thirty Years War, were prone to be prey to the power and aspirations of others, as with the Duchy of Lorraine which fell into the French sphere of influence many years before it was formally incorporated as a part of France. Protestant Holland had gained its independence from Spain after a long and bitterly fought war – a war that was won in part thanks to French support and assistance – France always being eager to weaken Spanish influence on its borders when this could be done without too

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A Balance of Power 213 much effort or cost. Aspirations and ambitions then shifted and Louis XIV attacked the small new republic and all but brought about its ruin, but the stout Dutchmen were saved by the intervention of a far older enemy, the salt sea, and the French armies had to withdraw from what had become a watery wasteland. The fortunes of Holland were then closely linked to those of England, which had been alternately an ally or enemy of France depending upon shifting political attitudes at any given moment. This new combination of Protestant powers in northern Europe, under the hand of King William III, to which the weight and effort of Brandenburg and Denmark could be added, brought about a theoretical power bloc capable of challenging previously unchallengeable Catholic France. After nine long years of cruelly unproductive war, a truce borne of exhaustion was agreed in 1697 with the conclusion of the Treaty of Ryswick, and the weary parties looked forward to, and hoped for, a period of peace. That this period of peace might merely be a breathing-space for the contending powers to recruit and recover their energies for fresh efforts triggered by as yet unforeseen circumstances, became evident, but the brief period of relative tranquillity was welcome nonetheless. In the event, when King Carlos II died in Madrid in 1700, and the newly-vacated throne was offered to d’Anjou, Louis XIV proved unable to refuse the chance. Had he done so, of course, then the throne would immediately have gone to Archduke Charles in Vienna, with the likelihood that this increment to the power and influence of Austria would have been just as troublesome and unwelcome as any perceived strengthening of the Sun King and his circle. The throne vacated by Carlos II was in fact a poisoned chalice for all concerned, and almost inevitably it brought about an unwelcome renewal of outright war. Although all the contending parties – France, Spain, Holland, Austria, England, Portugal, Bavaria and Savoy – wanted to avoid war as long as they could have their own way in the process: this could not be achieved and almost thirteen years of conflict was the result. So what came of it all in the end? Well, the division of the old Spanish empire between the rival claimants to the throne, as sought at the creation of the Grand Alliance in 1702 was achieved. Great Britain gained significantly in terms of trade opportunities and the valuable ports from which her cruising squadrons could operate. A rapidly expanding empire based on pursuit of that trade was the result. The

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214 The War of the Spanish Succession British also got their Protestant succession with George, the Elector of Hanover, peacefully succeeding to the throne on the death of Queen Anne, and avoiding internal strife over any Jacobite claim, the support for which was virtually abandoned by France and thereafter became a hopeless if superficially romantic lost cause. Despite the attention that the new king on the throne in London gave to his Hanoverian interests, the British in effect turned their backs on Europe as far as they could and pursued a world-wide future based on a trading empire underpinned by almost unchallenged maritime power: The English government more and more steadily, and with conscious purpose, pushed an extension of her sea power. While as an open enemy she struck at France upon the sea, so as an artful friend, many at least believed, she sapped the power of Holland afloat . . . At the peace Holland received compensation by land, but England obtained, besides commercial privileges in France, Spain and the Spanish West Indies, the important maritime concessions of Gibraltar and Port Mahon [Minorca] in the Mediterranean, of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Hudson’s Bay in North America. The naval power of France and Spain had disappeared; that of Holland thenceforth steadily declined. The eye of England was steadily fixed on the maintenance of her sea power.2 Holland, so sturdy and resolute, was broken by the phenomenal effort that the States-General had put into the war for Spain. ‘The financial position of the Republic was precarious. No receipts at all had come from two of the seven provinces . . . The bulk of the expenditure could only be met by borrowing under adverse conditions.’3 The armies of Louis XIV had almost overwhelmed the republic on two occasions, in the 1680s when only the drowning of their land saved the Dutch, and then in 1702 when Marshal Boufflers seemed certain to defeat their army before the strength of the Grand Alliance could be fully put forth. No other state had done so much to curb Louis XIV’s ambitions and French aggrandisement in western Europe over a thirty-year period of almost constant conflict, but the effort was too great in financial terms and in the demands on available manpower, the cherished Barrier on which such faith was placed was militarily indefensible in practice, and

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A Balance of Power 215 unable to hold on to any hopes of a wider influence, Holland slipped into gradual but inevitable decline as a world power. German princes, so active in the cause of the Grand Alliance during the war for Spain, were increasingly prone to assert their right to be taken into account in the affairs of western Europe rather than as just subjects and electors of the Holy Roman Empire. The power and influence of those states, most particularly Prussia, would eventually coalesce to form a dominating power in Europe. A possible counter to this might have been Austria, but Vienna happily took its gains in the southern Netherlands and Italy and otherwise turned away to deal with the latent Ottoman threat, and to intrigue in the affairs of eastern Europe, once more. The greatly increased tax revenues for Vienna from the newly acquired possessions in the Low Countries especially, also helped to fund a significant expansion and re-organisation of the Austrian army to the degree that by the closing decade of the eighteenth century Vienna could field no fewer than 300,000 troops. Good generalship and sound command and control was not always in place, however, and sustained Austrian military success was, at a most generous assessment, uneven. King Charles XII of Sweden, who might have made so much trouble for Vienna and the Grand Alliance, took his fine army off to destruction in Russia, and was never again a serious factor in European history. Spain, which might have been devastated by long years of any war that had been pushed to the hardest extreme, instead entered a period of relative peace and prosperity. An outwardly united country with a popular young king had been the outcome, for whatever the separatist ambitions of the people of Aragon, Valencia and Catalonia had been, these had withered away, and if, contrary to what had been unwisely claimed in 1701, the Pyrenees still existed then the river Ebro as a frontier of any effect did not. It could with perfect truth be said that ‘Philip V was not merely King of Castile and Count of Barcelona; he was also King of Spain’.4 On the wider scene, much of the vast Spanish Empire was intact, particularly in the Americas. Still, Spain as a major power was eclipsed, yearning in vain for the return of Gibraltar and Minorca, and despite the opening of a promising age of naval exploration, still to a degree at the beck and call of her powerful neighbour to the north. The impact on the Spanish people of the long war to decide who should have the throne in Madrid would take time to lessen:

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216 The War of the Spanish Succession The most fatal blow, which profoundly injured our industry and population, came from the impact of the War of the Spanish Succession. It is impossible to describe the degree of misery caused by the hostilities and by the licence of the troops, and by the demands made on the country by the commissaries and contractors supplying food to the army.5 However, there was no significant de-population over the decade of the war – both sides as a matter of pragmatic policy tried to avoid civilian casualties and those losses sustained in battle were, more often than not, non-Spaniards. The passage of campaigning armies, whether they be Spanish, French, Dutch, Portuguese, British or Austrian, had in fact, relatively little impact upon the ordinary people, apart from the usual trials and inconveniences of having hungry, ragged and sometimes illdisciplined or mutinous soldiers roaming the neighbourhood. Any army in the early eighteenth century depended upon being able to support itself on the produce of the region through which it moved. Much of Spain was so agriculturally unproductive that armies simply could not fully operate there, both Berwick and Das Minas finding this out to their cost, and the freedom of action of such army commanders as a result was constrained to a fair degree. Poor harvests over the period of the war were a greater burden to the people than the vagaries of having campaigning armies operating in the locality, and between 1708 and 1711 the crops failed repeatedly, with much taxation being of necessity remitted by Philip V to alleviate the resulting distress of the people. That tax revenue would have been used to pay the troops and further the course of the war, but instead the king’s grandfather in Versailles made up the loss. Even so, late in October 1710, Philip V had to agree that Spanish ports should be opened to all shipping bringing in grain, even though those vessels might be Dutch or British. Bad harvests, not war, brought most distress to Spain over these years. The lingering fear, at least partly manufactured to encourage a cautious and sceptical parliament in London on the march to war, that there might be a union of the crowns of Spain and France, proved in the end to be nonsense. The France of Louis XIV, arguably the main player in the whole drama of the disputed succession, was left exhausted financially and militarily by the enormous efforts expended to secure the throne for d’Anjou. ‘I have loved war too much,’ the old king murmured on his

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A Balance of Power 217 deathbed in 1715, and this was evident from the state of affairs of the country that he bequeathed to his great grandson, the infant Louis XV. Periods of regency, such as that which ensued in France after the king’s death, are often not stable, and before long national bankruptcy came with harebrained notions on national finances and the abolition of money running amuck through the economy under the malevolent influence of a Scottish banker, Samuel Barnard. France and the French were robust enough, of course, to recover, but this inevitably took time, and when combined with the cost of the war, both in terms of treasure and lost prestige, the ability of the French to influence and dominate their neighbours in western Europe was diminished for many years as a result. The eighteenth century would certainly see many years of renewed war, but the formidable power and influence of the France of Louis XIV had been wasted away by the gruelling years of conflict. That noone could be said to have either won the war on the one hand, or lost the war on the other, was beside the point. It had been found in 1702 that the question of who should succeed Carlos II could only be settled by force of arms – a conflict that no-one wanted was still a war that no-one was able to avoid. The reduction in French power, influence and prestige was a notable and in a broad sense beneficial turning point in European history, establishing once more a kind of balance of power that had been lost with the breaking up of the empire of Charles V many years before. No one state predominated, and was able to over-awe and over-power its neighbours, at least until the arrival of revolution in Paris and the rise of Emperor Napoleon I and his brilliant and baleful military capabilities. To that end, then, the treaties to end the war for Spain, arranged between 1713 and 1715, at Utrecht, Baden, Rastadt and Madrid, may be viewed, dispassionately and in their entirety, to have been a good thing.

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Appendix 1

The Main Terms of the 1702 Treaty of Grand Alliance That the Allies [England, Holland and Austria, although Portugal and Savoy would join in time] would seek to obtain, by negotiation or war, that: 1. Binding guaranties be given that the thrones of France and Spain would remain separate. [Note: Not that the Duc d’Anjou would necessarily have to vacate the throne in Madrid.] 2. Austria should receive the Milanese, Naples, Sicily, the Balearic Islands, the Spanish [southern] Netherlands and Luxembourg. 3. Holland would regain her Barrier Fortresses, recently seized by the French. 4. The Elector of Brandenburg to be recognised as King in Prussia [not of Prussia] in return for his active support for the Grand Alliance. 5. Financial subsidies to be paid to German princes in return for their military support for the Alliance. 6. England and Holland to be free to conduct trade in the West Indies. Clauses(2) and (3) were partly contradictory over the issue of who had sovereignty over the southern Netherlands, but the treaty was drafted in sufficiently general terms that it was acceptable to all parties. The region was intended to ‘serve as a dyke, rampart and barrier to separate and keep off France from the United Provinces’: see Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 146. Clause (6) was of particular interest to England, where there were strong ambitions to expand overseas trade, including that of slaves, in the Indies. A later clause was added in April 1702 that the allies would jointly insists on a peaceful Protestant succession for the Crowns of England and Scotland – a direct result of Louis XIV’s injudicious acknowledgment of the Jacobite Pretender as King James III.

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Appendix 2

The Main Terms of the Treaties of Utrecht, Baden and Rastadt, and Madrid (1713–1715) (a) King Philip V to be recognised as King of Spain and the Indies. The crowns of France and Spain to always remain separate.* (b) Naples, the Milanese region, Sardinia and the southern Netherlands to be under Austrian rule. The Dutch Barrier in the southern Netherlands, in revised form, to be re-established. (c) France to surrender the fortresses of Kehl, Freiburg and Breisach on the right bank of the river Rhine, but to retain Strasburg and Alsace. The fortifications and harbour mole at the port of Dunkirk to be demolished. (d) The Elector of Bavaria, and the Elector-Bishops of Liège and Cologne to be restored to their domains and properties.** (e) The Protestant succession to the throne in London, on the death of Queen Anne, to be assured. James Stuart, the Pretender James III, to be expelled from France. (f) Great Britain to retain Minorca, Gibraltar, Newfoundland, Hudson’s Bay, Arcadia (Nova Scotia) and St Kitts. (g) Holland and Great Britain to receive exclusive access to trade with certain Spanish ports and territories, to the exclusion of the French. (h) The Kingdom of Prussia (previously Brandenburg) to be recognised, and to receive Upper Guelderland. The Duke of Savoy to be recognised as King of Sicily and to receive a portion of the Milanese. Notes * How such a renunciation of rights to the throne of France could be assured and if necessary enforced is hard to see. There was no legal mechanism for a French Prince of the Blood, whatever other office he

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220 The War of the Spanish Succession may hold, to renounce his claim even if he wished to do so. The Grand Alliance was, in effect, trusting that Louis XIV, Philip V and any heirs to either throne to keep to the bargain they had struck. Events were to prove that they would do so, as Louis XV, when he matured, did not lack heirs of his own. ** In restoring the Elector of Bavaria, the Duke of Marlborough lost the possession of the Principality of Mindleheim that had been given to him after the victory at Blenheim by Emperor Leopold I. Marlborough retained the title of Prince of Mindleheim, however.

The Range of Treaties in Total The whole series of treaties which brought to an end the War for Spain, generally but over-simply known as ‘the Treaty of Utrecht,’ comprised: Utrecht 11 April 1713 13 July 1713 13 August 1713 26 June 1714

Treaty between France, Great Britain, Holland, Prussia, Portugal and Savoy. Treaty between Spain and Great Britain. Treaty between Spain and Savoy. Treaty between Spain and Holland.

Rastadt and Baden 6 March/7 September 1714 Treaty between France and Austria. Madrid 6 February 1715 15 November 1715

Treaty between Spain and Portugal. Barrier Treaty between Holland, France and Austria.

(N.B. Spain and Austria finally concluded a treaty at The Hague in February 1720).

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Appendix 3

Key Military Figures in the War of Spanish Succession James FitzJames, Duke of Berwick (1670–1734) and Marshal of France was born on 21 August 1670, the natural son of James, Duke of York (James II of England) and his mistress, Arabella Churchill, the elder sister of John Churchill, the future Duke of Marlborough. In 1686 FitzJames was sent to take part in the campaign against the Ottoman Turks, serving with the imperial army at the capture of Budapest, which had been in Ottoman hands for 145 years, and the expulsion of the Turkish forces from much of Hungary. The young FitzJames was noted for behaving ‘with remarkable gallantry’ in the action. See Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, pp. 27–8 for more details on this campaign in Hungary. In March 1687 FitzJames was created Duke of Berwick, Earl of Tynemouth and Baron Bosworth by his father, now on the throne, rather precariously as it turned out, in London. Campaigning once more in Hungary, Berwick made the acquaintance of Claude-Louis-Hector de Villars, who would become a Marshal of France of equal renown in the arduous campaigns against Marlborough and Eugene. Made a major-general in the imperial army, although he never actively exercised that role, Berwick on his return to England was appointed to be governor of Portsmouth and Colonel of the Royal Horse Guards. On his father going into exile in France, Berwick campaigned in Ireland in the futile cause of a Jacobite restoration, landing in Kinsale on 27 March 1689, and going on to enter Dublin a week later. He served at the unsuccessful siege of Londonderry, and was present at the defeat suffered by his father at the Boyne in July 1690. After successfully defending the line of the Shannon for some months, Berwick returned to France in the spring of 1691. Serving with the French army in the Low Countries, the duke fought at the cavalry battle at Leuze in September of the same year, and

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222 The War of the Spanish Succession would have had command a fresh expeditionary force to attempt a restoration of James II had the French ships involved not been destroyed at Barfleur and La Hogue in 1692. Having fought at the battle of Steinkirk, Berwick was taken prisoner during the bitter fighting at Landen in July 1693, having been recognised in the melee by Charles Churchill, Marlborough’s younger brother, and was introduced to William III. ‘The prince,’ he recalled (not caring to recognise William as a king), ‘made me a very polite compliment, to which I only replied with a low bow.’ Concerns that he would be regarded as a rebel and traitor were soon set to one side as ‘We were in the country of the King of Spain, and I had the honour to serve as Lieutenant-General in the army of the Most Christian King [Louis XIV]’: see Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, pp. 100–1. Soon set at liberty, Berwick married Honora de Burgh, the widow of Patrick Sarsfield, Earl of Lucan, in 1695, and crossed to England clandestinely the next year to sound out what support for the Jacobite cause might exist. His wife having died, Berwick married again in 1700, to Anne Bulkely, a fruitful union that produced thirteen children, not all surviving infancy. Serving actively through the war for the throne of Spain, and receiving his marshal’s baton as reward for many successes, the duke was engaged in campaigning in Spain once again in 1719 as Philip V’s forces tried to overturn the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht. He was made military governor of Guyenne, and took part of moves to reform the structure and training of the French army. Having lived in semi-retirement for some time, Berwick was recalled to service by King Louis XV to campaign in the War of the Polish Succession. At the siege of Phillipsburg, on 12 June 1734, he was decapitated by a roundshot thought to have been fired in error by his own gunners. Nicolas de Catinat, Marshal of France (1637–1712), born in Paris, and studied as a lawyer, but he entered military service and distinguished himself at the capture of Lille in 1667. Serving under the Prince of Condé, he fought at Seneffe in 1674, and subsequently against the Duke of Savoy and his Austrian allies in northern Italy. Catinat commanded at the victories of Staffardo and Marsaglia in 1693 and was made a Marshal of France, having the charge of the the successful siege of Ath in 1697, with Vauban’s assistance. At the outbreak of the war for Spain Catinat, ‘a careful general’, held the appointment of commander

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Appendix 3 223 of the French forces in northern Italy, where he was outmatched by Prince Eugene’s daring strokes such as at Carpi, although contradictory instructions from Versailles and a lack of supplies hampered his efforts. After being replaced in command by Marshal Villeroi, he continued to serve loyally for a time with the army before being recalled to Versailles by Louis XIV. It is only fair to say that Villeroi had no more success fighting against Eugene than Catinat had enjoyed, and his replacement was something of an error. He held no further appointments, and in retirement was an ardent gardener. Prince (François) Eugene de Savoy-Carignan (1663–1736) was born in Paris the son of Eugene-Maurice, Comte de Soissons, and Olympia Mancini, the niece of Louis XIV’s close adviser in his early years, the Italian-born Cardinal Mazarin. Eugene was refused a commission in the French army by the king, who felt that he would make a better priest instead. Having no taste for a career in the church, Eugene took off for the Spanish Netherlands at the age of twenty-one, and went on to Vienna where he entered the service of Emperor Leopold I. He was engaged in the campaigns against the Ottoman Turks, and fought at the relief of the siege of Vienna, in Hungary where he was the imperial commander for a time, and at the battle of Zenta in September 1697, where the main Ottoman army was defeated. Appointed to the Imperial War Council in 1703, Eugene’s close collaboration with Marlborough in the 1704 campaign on the Danube was a key factor in the triumphant victory at Blenheim on 4 August that year. The skilful victory at the siege of Turin in 1706 later re-stated Eugene’s reputation as a great commander, and although unsuccessful at the abortive siege of Toulon in 1707, he fought in the victories at Oudenarde in 1708 and Malplaquet in 1709. Commanding the allied army in Flanders in 1712, his troops were out-manoeuvred and soundly defeated at Denain by Marshal Villars. After the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession, Eugene was appointed in 1714 to be the governor of the Austrian (previously Spanish) Netherlands, but campaigning against the Ottomans once more he was present at the victory at Peterwardin in 1716 and the capture of Belgrade the following year. Although he retired from active service, the prince became the principal adviser to Emperor Charles VI, and despite his age and increasing ill-health was appointed to be the imperial commander

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224 The War of the Spanish Succession in the War of the Polish Succession in 1734–5. Although fond of female company, Eugene remained a lifelong bachelor and became a noted patron of the arts, and he died at his home in Vienna at the age of seventy-three. Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt (1662–1705), was the second son of Landgrave Ludwig I and his wife Elizabeth. He fought in the imperial service against the Ottomans in Hungary in 1687, and took part in the battle of Mohacs. After serving with the Venetians in the abortive fighting against the Ottomans in the Aegean, Prince George fought at the siege of Mainz, and was wounded in an attack on the French-held citadel in Bonn. He entered the service of William III of England in 1690 and was present at the Boyne and Aughrim, being wounded on both occasions. The prince became a Roman Catholic and served against the Ottomans again before being appointed Emperor Leopold’s commander in Catalonia, where he was made Captain of Horse by King Carlos II. A highly competent commander, Prince George became well acquainted with Spain and the Catalonian people, which proved of great value in the opening years of the war of succession. His early death at the siege of Barcelona in 1705 was a distinct blow to the allied cause in the peninsula. Admiral Sir John Leake (1656–1720), the son of Captain Richard Leake, Master-Gunner of England, born in London and a highly accomplished seaman, described as ‘his countenance open, his eye sharp and piercing, and his address both graceful and manly, denoting both a military man and a gentleman’.1 He served at the battle of the Texel in 1673, during the Third Anglo-Dutch war, and was master-gunner of HMS Neptune (90 guns). He commanded the bomb-vessel HMS Firedrake, designed by his father, at the battle of Bantry Bay in 1689, where the French warship La Diamante was set on fire. Leake was present at the relief of the siege of Londonderry and three years later served at the destruction of the French fleet at the battles of Barfleur and La Hogue. As a vice-admiral he conducted highly damaging operations against French shipping and outposts in the early years of the war for Spain. His operations during the capture and subsequent siege of Gibraltar were very well handled, but his conduct of the seabattle with the French main fleet off Málaga was criticised. He

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Appendix 3 225 successfully relieved besieged Barcelona in 1706 having command of a fleet of ninety warships and transports, relieved Cartagena and Alicante, and participated in the occupation of Majorca and Ibiza. After the capture of Sardinia, Leake took part of his fleet out of the Mediterranean for the winter, and so did not join in the capture of Minorca. Promoted to Rear-Admiral in 1710, and a Lord of the Admiralty, he was also a Member of Parliament, but was pensioned off by King George I when he came to the throne in London in 1714, after which he lived quietly in retirement. John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough (1650–1722), was born into a family impoverished by the English Civil War, and taken into royal service in 1668 after the restoration of King Charles II. Granted a commission in the King’s Own Company of the 1st English Foot Guards, he saw service at Tangiers, and at the naval battle of Solebay against the Dutch in 1672. Churchill then served in France with the English troops loaned to Louis XIV, and in 1674 was present at the battles of Sinsheim and Entzheim under the great Marshal Turenne. The next year Churchill was granted a commission in the Duke of York’s Regiment, and in 1678 took part in the negotiations with the Dutch States-General for an alliance against France. Four years later he was made Baron Churchill of Aymouth in the Scottish peerage, and had command in 1685 of the royalist infantry at the battle of Sedgemoor which ended Monmouth’s rebellion against King James II. He changed his allegiance to William of Orange at the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and was subsequently made Earl of Marlborough, fighting at the battle of Walcourt in the Low Countries in the following year. Marlborough was sent by Queen Mary to southern Ireland to retake Cork and Kinsale from James II’s troops, later that year, but he fell into royal disfavour for some time, only being reinstated as conflict over the question of the Spanish Succession grew more pressing. Marlborough became General of Infantry in 1701, and on the accession of Queen Anne early in 1702 was made England’s CaptainGeneral, and appointed to command the Anglo-Dutch armies when in the field. Success in the Low Countries in 1702–03 brought a dukedom as reward, but the campaign in Bavaria in 1704, which led to the victory at Blenheim, sealed Marlborough’s reputation as one of the great commanders in history. The duke triumphed again at Elixheim in 1705, Ramillies in 1706, Oudenarde in 1708 and, less emphatically, at the costly

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226 The War of the Spanish Succession battle of Malplaquet in September 1709, and he laid siege to and captured a number of major French fortresses including Menin, Lille, Tournai, Mons, Bethune and Bouchain. His political influence having failed, and being removed from all his posts at the end of 1711, the Duke went to live abroad and only returned to London in 1714 on the accession to the throne of Great Britain of George I (the Elector of Hanover). Re-instated as Captain-General and Master-General of the Ordnance, Marlborough’s age and declining health soon obliged him to retire more and more from public life, and he died at Windsor Lodge in June 1722. Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough (1658–1735) began a naval career and served at the Moorish siege of Tangiers in 1680, where he obtained a reputation for high and raffish living. He then entered the Dutch service, and it was said that he first suggested to William of Orange that he might supplant his brother-in-law, staunchly Catholic and increasingly unpopular James II, on the throne on London. Created the 1st Earl of Monmouth in 1688, and a declared supporter and attendant of William III, the king seemed did not trust him or his nature too much, and Queen Mary wrote that ‘Lord Monmouth is mad, and his wife who is madder, governs him’.2 The earl was imprisoned in the Tower of London for three months in 1697, over political differences with the king, and in the same year he became 3rd Earl of Peterborough on the death of his uncle. On the accession of Queen Anne in 1702 he was appointed Governor of Jamaica. His brilliant but capricious talents, most noticeably for blatant self-promotion, earned him the joint command, with Admiral Rooke, of the Anglo-Dutch troops sent to Portugal in 1705, to support the Habsburg cause there. He participated in the daring capture of Barcelona, gallantly taking the command when Prince George was mortally wounded, and successfully extended the campaign into Valencia. Peterborough found it difficult to co-operate successfully with Archduke Charles and his Austrian generals and advisers and his impatient and often high-handed manner caused great resentment; the failure of Charles to move quickly to go to Madrid when it had been vacated by Philip V in 1706, must partly be laid to his contradictory and ill-judged advice. Peterborough left Spain in March 1707, on being recalled, and the archduke was glad to see him go. He travelled to many of the capitals of the parties to the Grand Alliance and attempted, without any formal authority to do so, to influence events.

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Appendix 3 227 Although criticised for not keeping proper accounts for the huge sums of money he received to fund the military effort in eastern Spain, he received the thanks of Parliament for his service. Becoming a political opponent of the Duke of Marlborough, and loving to intrigue and make mischief, Peterborough was appointed to be the Queen’s Ambassador to the court in Vienna in 1710, and at the Savoyard Court three years later. George I had no use for the Earl and his ways, and he was dismissed in 1714. With a wide circle of friends and admirers, but no political powerbase, he travelled widely and died in Lisbon on 21 October 1735 after eating, it was rumoured, too many grapes. James, 1st Earl of Stanhope (1673–1721), as a young man accompanied his father to the court in Madrid, on diplomatic missions for King William III, and gained a great deal of experience both of Spain and the Spanish people. Serving with the king in the Nine Years War he showed considerable flair, and gained a colonelcy at the age of twenty-three. At the capture of Barcelona in 1705 Stanhope fought as a brigadier-general, and on Peterborough being recalled to London in 1707 became major-general and commander-in-chief of the British forces in Spain. His capture of the island of Minorca in 1708 was deftly carried out, but two years later after the occupation of Madrid he advanced too far forward, the allied effort was diffused as a result, and on the subsequent retreat from the capital that December his small, mostly British army was overwhelmed at Brihuega by the Duc de Vendôme. Taken prisoner, he was exchanged in 1712, and although his reputation and popularity remained high, he never held a military command again. Appointed as a Secretary of State by the newly enthroned King George I, Stanhope was very active diplomatically and politically, helping to draft a new treaty between Great Britain and Holland, and became First Lord of the Treasury (and Chancellor of the Exchequer) in 1718, and was created 1st Earl Stanhope that same year. He died of a stroke shortly after debating the causes, and blame, for the South Sea Bubble scandal in Parliament. Guidobald von Starhemberg, Field Marshal of Austria (1657–1737), the son of Ernst Rodiger von Starhemberg, accompanied his father as an aide de camp at the defence of Vienna against the Ottoman Turks in 1683, He fought at the victory at Mohacs three years

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228 The War of the Spanish Succession later, at the capture of Belgrade and at Zenta in 1697. A soldier of considerable ability, whose reputation was rather eclipsed by that of Prince Eugene of Savoy, von Starhemberg commanded the imperial troops in northern Italy while the prince was involved in affairs of state in Vienna, and was present at Luzzara in 1702. Made field-marshal in 1704, he was appointed to be the imperial commander in Catalonia in 1708, and campaigned with considerable success sharing the victories at Almenara and Saragossa with Stanhope in 1710, which lead to the occupation of Madrid. Unjustly criticised for not supporting Stanhope in time at the defeat at Brihuega, the Field-Marshal fought the Duc de Vendôme to a standstill at Villaviciosa the following day. Appointed to be the head of the Imperial War Council in 1716, von Starhemberg was also Governor of Slavonia until his death. Camille d’Hostun, Duc de Tallard, Marshal of France (1652–1728), served as a young man under Marshal Turenne and the Prince de Condé, and was made lieutenant-general in 1693. Appointed as ambassador to England in 1697, Tallard proved to be an adept diplomat, and his calm influence was of great assistance to both Louis XIV and William III at a time of rising tension over the question of the succession to the Spanish throne. He was dismissed from the English court after the French king acknowledged the Jacobite pretender in 1701, and was given the command the next year of the French army on the Rhine. His very capable handling of the campaign there with the captured the key fortress of Landau, earned him his place as a Marshal of France, Early in 1704, Tallard took a large convoy through the difficult country of the Black Forest to support Marshal Marsin and the Elector of Bavaria in their campaign against Vienna, a very well conducted operation that tends to be overlooked. On the instructions of Louis XIV he then repeated the exploit in July, and having combined forces with Marsin and the elector was heavily defeated at Blenheim and taken prisoner in August 1704. His young son, serving as his aide de camp, was killed at his side that day. Taken as an honourable captive of state to England, Tallard was comfortably lodged in Nottingham where he became very popular with the local gentry and introduced celery as a hitherto unknown delicacy to the English. In September 1711 Tallard was released and returned to Versailles, where he was warmly welcomed by the king. Living quietly

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Appendix 3 229 in retirement, Tallard was a highly cultured man, and a noted patron of the arts. René de Froulai, Comte de Tessé, Marshal of France (1650–1725) was born into a noble family in ‘reduced circumstances,’ but he had the Marquis de Louvois, Louis XIV’s formidable Minister for War, as a patron. This enabled the young man to gain a commission in the army and with his undoubted talents he advanced rapidly so that by 1691 he was governor of the fortress of Ypres. Serving through the major campaigns of the Nine Years War, Tessé was made lieutenant-general in 1692, and Colonel-General of Dragoons, an appointment only once made before. Serving in northern Italy prior to the commencement of the war for Spain, Tessé was successful at the battle of Castiglione in 1701, and two years later was made a Marshal of France and sent to Madrid. Despite his acute organisational and tactical skills, he could not recover Gibraltar for the Bourbon cause, at least in part because of a diffusion of effort while the Duke of Berwick was countering an AngloPortuguese advance elsewhere. Lifting the futile siege, he recovered the fortress of Badajoz from Portuguese hands, but was unsuccessful at the siege of Barcelona the next year, having to abandon much of his artillery and equipment, and many of his wounded, when he withdrew into southern France. In 1707 he was active in very skilfully frustrating the allied attempt to seize the port of Toulon, an operation that did him great credit. Being then employed as ambassador to the Holy See in Rome, Tessé was able to deflect much of the efforts of the Grand Alliance to enlist the support of the Pope for the Habsburg cause; his forthright correspondence with the Pope on the subject ultimately did little to further his cause however. After the Treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt and Baden he was sent to Madrid as ambassador to Spain, and was instrumental in persuading Philip V, with whom he had established a close rapport (and who had abdicated in favour of his son, King Louis I), to re-ascend the throne on the death of the younger man. In retirement, Tessé took holy orders, and died having remained something of an enigma, at the age of seventy-five. Louis-Joseph de Bourbon, Duc de Vendôme (1654–1712), the grandson of King Henry IV of France, by an illegitimate line, served under Marshal Turenne and Marshal de Crequi, and established a

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230 The War of the Spanish Succession reputation as an aggressive but impetuous soldier, disinclined to listen to advice and the opinion of others. During the Nine Years War his many tactical successes brought him promotion to lieutenant-general, and the appointment of commander-in-chief of the French forces in Catalonia, where he besieged and took Barcelona. Sent to command the French forces in northern Italy in 1702, Vendôme fought two inconclusive battles against Prince Eugene, and was then surprised and his army badly battered at Cassano. He failed to advance northwards through the Alpine passes to join the Elector of Bavaria and Marshal Villars in 1703 despite the urging of King Louis XIV. He was sent to replace Marshal Villeroi in the summer of 1706, in command of French and Spanish forces in the Low Countries, and conducted a generally very astute and skilful campaign, with few resources, to restore French fortunes in the region after the calamity of the battle of Ramillies. His manoeuvres in the following year frustrated the Duke of Marlborough’s attempts to bring him to battle, but Vendôme badly mishandled the 1708 campaign, suffering a heavy defeat at Oudenarde, and then proving incapable of preventing the protracted allied siege of Lille. Temporarily dismissed from the royal service after attempting to blame Louis XIV’s eldest grandson, the Duc de Bourgogne, for these failures, Vendôme was sent to Spain in 1710, and recovered Madrid for Philip V, and went on to defeat one allied army at Brihuega and batter another the next day at Villaviciosa. Two years later, while campaigning in Catalonia, Vendôme died of food poisoning. An undeniably gifted soldier, and a formidable opponent, Vendôme’s reputation was unfairly traduced, in particular, by the Duc de St Simon, who heartily disliked him and his rough soldierly manners. Victor-Amadeus II, Duke of Savoy (1666–1732) was born in Turin, and came to the ducal title at the age of nine, on the death of his father. A projected marriage to the Infanta of Portugal came to nothing, and in 1684 he married the French princess Anne-Marie d’Orleans, at the urging of her uncle King Louis XIV. Despite French influence and pressure, Victor-Amadeus pursued a subtle and devious foreign policy, playing of opposing sides to best effect, but two of his daughters, Marie-Adelaide and Marie-Louisa, married French Princes of the Blood. Despite these close family ties to Louis XIV, and having fought well alongside the French at the unfortunate battle of Chiari in 1701,

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Appendix 3 231 the duke joined the allied effort to divide the Spanish empire, hoping in the process to both further his own rather spurious claim to the throne in Madrid (a claim to which no-one paid very much attention), and to expand his territories at the expense of his near neighbours. The duke was a skilful soldier, and fought well in the campaign to save Turin from the French in 1706, but was less successful in attacking the port of Toulon with Prince Eugene the following year. With the Treaty of Utrecht Savoy gained Sicily, and Victor-Amadeus was proclaimed king, but was forced to exchange this territory for Sardinia in 1720. Having carried out considerable reforms to the Savoyard state bureacracy and military, he abdicated in favour of his son in September 1730, and died two years later. Claude-Louise-Hector de Villars, Marshal of France (1653–1734), a Gascon by birth, served as a young man under the volatile Prince de Condé and Marshal Turenne, and soon established a reputation as a dashing and courageous soldier. After undertaking diplomatic missions amongst the German states, Villars fought against the Ottoman Turks in Hungary in the service of the Elector of Bavaria, before being sent to Vienna as the French ambassador in 1699. After serving with Marshal Catinat in northern Italy in the opening phases of the war for Spain, Villars was given command of a substantial French force sent to support the Elector of Bavaria in 1702, but although he was made a Marshal of France for his successes, the two strong-willed men could not cooperate well enough together and Villars was sent to combat an insurrection in the Cevennes region in southern France. In 1707 he raided central and southern Germany, causing great alarm in the Grand Alliance, and in early 1709 was appointed to command the French forces in Flanders. Villars fought a very astute defensive battle at Malplaquet that September, in the course of which he was gravely wounded in the knee. Although unable to prevent Marlborough from capturing a number of major French fortresses during 1710–11, the marshal was very successful at the battle of Denain in 1712 when he inflicted a heavy defeat on the Dutch. He then went to campaign on the Rhine against imperial forces under the command of Prince Eugene, until peace with Vienna came with the Treaty of Baden in 1714. His mangled leg never fully healed, but Villars was active in court politics and diplomacy, and was appointed to be Marshal-General of France

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232 The War of the Spanish Succession with command of the French forces in Italy in 1733. The veteran old soldier, who had been one of Louis XIV’s best generals, died in Turin on 17 June the following year. François de Neufville, Duc de Villeroi, Marshal of France (1643–1730), had been a boyhood friend of King Louis XIV, and an accomplished and witty courtier, with a great reputation amongst the ladies at Court. Present at the battle of Neerwinden in 1693, Villeroi was well known for his personal; bravery, but his skills as an army commander were less evident. Two years later he failed to raise the siege of Namur, going to bombard Brussels instead, a futile act that was much criticised – his long friendship with the king, however, stood him in good stead and he had the command of French forces in northern Italy in 1701, where he replaced Marshal Catinat. Surprised and heavily defeated at the battle of Chiari, Villeroi then suffered the indignity of being taken prisoner at Cremona early in 1702, although his own brave impetuosity in riding ahead of his escort seemed to be the main reason for this mishap. The support and friendship of Louis XIV remained firm, however: ‘They fall upon Villeroi,’ the king remarked acidly, ‘because he is my favourite.’3 After his release, Villeroi was given the command of the French army in the Low Countries, and was outmanoeuvred and beaten at the hands of the Duke of Marlborough at Elixheim in 1705, and then suffered a catastrophic defeat at Ramillies in May the following year. Although kindly received by the king when he returned to Versailles, the marshal was never entrusted with a military command again, but resumed his elegant career as a, now rather elderly courtier. On the accession of the infant Louis XV in 1714, Villeroi was active in ensuring that the illegitimate sons of the deceased king remained excluded from the succession, but engaging in intrigues and an inveterate gossip, was eventually sent in 1722 by the Regent, the Duc d’Orleans, to be governor of Lyons where he could make less mischief. Eventually recalled to the court when Louis XV gained his majority, Villeroi died in July 1730, in Paris.

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Notes Introduction 1. Elliott, Prologue. 2. Duffy, p. 320. 3. The exclusion of English and Dutch merchants from trading legitimately with the Spanish empire, and particularly being barred from the slave trade in favour of French shipping, was a particular cause for resentment in both London and at The Hague. Chapter 1 1. Nada, p. 251. 2. Wolf, pp. 497–8. 3. Churchill, Book One, p. 456. 4. Wolf, p. 506. 5. Ibid, p. 500. 6. Nada, pp. 255–6. 7. Wolf, pp. 504–5. 8. Coxe, Memoirs of the Kings of Spain, Volume III, pp. 85–6. 9. Langallerie, p. 104. 10. St John, Volume I, p. 182. 11. Cronin, p. 311. 12. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 133. 13. Petrie, pp. 279–81. 14. St John, p. 183. 15. Langallerie, p. 106. 16. Wolf, p. 509. 17. St John, Volume I, pp. 185–6. 18. Ibid. 19. St John, Volume I, pp. 262–3. The Princesse des Ursins was described by the Duc de St Simon as being ‘Tall, a brunette, with blue eyes of the most varied expression, in figure perfect, with a most exquisite bosom; her face, without being beautiful, was charming; she was extremely noble in air, very majestic in demeanour . . . She was eminently fitted for intrigue.’ 20. Wolf, p. 524. 21. Kamen, The War of Succession in Spain, p. 248. 22. See Francis, p. 19 for interesting comments on this. 23. St John, Volume I, pp. 190–1. 24. Ibid, p. 192. 25. Wolf, p. 516.

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234 The War of the Spanish Succession 26. St John, Volume I, p. 192. 27. Wolf., p. 526. 28. Shoberl, p. 65. 29. St John, Volume I, p. 193. 30. Wolf, p. 518. 31. St John, Volume I, p. 193. 32. Churchill, Book One, p. 481. Chapter 2 1. Churchill, Book One, p. 450. 2. Langallerie, pp. 121–3. A rather more charitable explanation of the reasons for the Elector of Bavaria to ally himself to Louis XIV, contrary to his already declared allegiance to the emperor, is given by Colonel Jean-Martin De La Colonie, a French officer in the Bavarian service. ‘He was surrounded by powerful enemies, and his timorous friends abandoned him day by day . . . The choice only remained to him, either to be an ally of the Emperor, and make war against the Duke of Anjou, son of his dearly loved sister, or to join the King of France, and support his nephew on the Spanish throne, which had fallen legitimately to him.’ See Horsley, p. 77. 3. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 138. 4. William III’s instructions to Marlborough in negotiations with the Dutch States-General over the formation of the Grand Alliance were precise. The brief the earl held was so far-reaching that he was: At liberty to enter into negotiations for the ends aforesaid in any other place that shall be thought proper for that purpose . . . You are to enter forthwith into such negotiations with the ministers of France and Spain and other potentates at The Hague, in concert with the ministers of the States-General to obtain the conditions following: That the Most Christian Majesty [Louis XIV] shall order all his troops, that now are, or shall be in garrison in any of the Spanish Towns in the Netherlands, actually to retire from thence, so as the same shall be entirely evacuated of French troops. (See Churchill, Book One, pp. 1000–2 for further details on this correspondence.) 5. England was bound by treaty to go to the aid of Sweden if called on, but this did not occur, as Charles XII pursued his own wayward path. 6. Cronin, p. 315. 7. St John, Volume I, p. 231. 8. Chandler, Military Memoirs: Robert Parker and Comte de Merode-Westerloo, pp. 12–13. 9. Churchill, Book One, p. 481. 10. St John, Volume I, p. 237. Barbezieux was the son of François-Michel de Tellier, Marquis de Louvois, the formidable and talented French Minister for War who served Louis XIV so long and so well.

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Notes 235 11. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 162. 12. St John, Volume I, p. 242. 13. Langallerie, p. 171. 14. St John, Volume I, p. 176. 15. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 146. 16. Ibid, p. 180. See also Hatton, George I, p. 103. Chapter 3 1. Langallerie, pp. 198–9. 2. Spanish forces available to Philip V in 1702–3 comprised just 5,097 horse and 13,268 foot. Training and standards of equipment were quite feeble. See Kamen, The War of Succession in Spain, p. 60. 3. St John, Volume I, p. 245. 4. Ibid, pp. 196–7. 5. Marshal Villeroi was kept in comfortable detention in Austria after his capture at Cremona, as an honoured prisoner first at Innsbruck and then at Graz. He was released to return to France nine months later and punctiliously sent Prince Eugene 50,000 livres to cover the cost of his board and lodging, but this sum was promptly returned. The Duc de St Simon’s opinion of the episode, unusual in being the only time someone of Villeroi’s rank was taken prisoner, was that ‘in truth it was no fault of the Marshal, who had arrived at Cremona the day before the surprise, that he was taken prisoner directly he set foot in the street. How could he know of the aqueduct?’ See St John, Volume I, p. 198, for further details on this. 6. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 253. 7. Jenkins, p. 96. 8. Churchill, Book One, p. 572. 9. Ibid, p. 573. 10. Parnell, p. 23. 11. Francis, p. 49. 12. Ibid, p. 51. 13. Parnell, p. 29. 14. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 265. 15. Langallerie, pp. 198–9. 16. The French ships captured in Vigo Bay were the Prompte (76 guns), Ferme (74), Bourbon (68), Modére (54), Assuré (66) and Triton (42). The ships sunk or beached were the Jesus-Marie-Josephe (76), Esperance (70), Superbe (70), Sirene (62) and Voluntaire (46). The ships burned were the Forte (76), Oriflame (64) (whose commander Captain Fricambault blew the ship up, killing himself), Prudent (64), Solide (56), Dauphine (44), Entrepenant (24), Choquante (8) and Terror (fireship). See also Parnell, p. 37 for additional details on this epic action. 17. Philip V received nearly 600,000 silver pesos, as the royal share, from the

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236 The War of the Spanish Succession cargo already landed at Vigo, while retaining a further 6.5 million (much of it from Dutch and English-owned cargoes) to help fund his military campaigns and partly to repay his grandfather for the expense of the French war effort. See Francis, p. 54. 18. Ibid, p. 45. 19. Schonenberg could be said to be a Spaniard, having been born in Antwerp in the Spanish Netherlands, although it is possible that he was also granted English nationality by King William III. 20. Cabrera publicly declared for the Habsburg cause in January 1703 after his property in Madrid was seized. See Francis, p. 65. 21. That Great Britain benefitted hugely from the treaty with Portugal and the enhanced opportunities for trade can be seen in the pamphleteer comment made in 1713 that ‘Tis the Portugal trade that has supported us in the war, and without it we should soon find the peace more burdensome than the war.’ See Trevelyan, Blenheim, pp. 299–300. 22. Either by accident or design the Dutch never did formally ratify the treaty with Portugal, and refused on that basis to press ahead with the terms in 1713. Chapter 4 1. Wolf, p. 521. 2. Ibid. 3. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume I, p. 89. 4. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 153. 5. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume I, p. 94. 6. Wolf, p. 521. 7. Ibid, p. 522. 8. Murray, Volume I, pp. 48–9. 9. Wolf, p. 521. 10. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 154. 11. Ibid. 12. Wolf, p. 523. 13. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume I, p. 119. 14. Ibid, p. 123. 15. Langallerie, p. 219. 16. Chandler, Military Memoirs; Captain Robert Parker and Comte de MerodeWesterloo, pp. 151–2. 17. Langallerie, p. 221. 18. Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, p. 118. 19. Horsley, pp. 131–2. 20. Ibid, p. 134. 21. Wolf, p. 527. 22. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 319.

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Notes 237 23. Wolf, p. 529. 24. Horsley, pp. 144–5. 25. Langallerie, p. 212. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid, p. 531. 28. Halevy, p. 629. 29. Wolf, p. 629. 30. Vendôme was never made a Marshal of France, although he is often referred to as such. 31. St John, Volume I, p. 268. Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy wrote to the States-General in The Hague on 8 October 1703: The jealousies of France against us, upon our espousing the common cause, has induced her to treat us with an unheard of violence, contrary to all sorts of good faith, having disarmed and made prisoners of war all our officers and soldiers which were in the army of the Two Crowns in Italy. We inform your High Mightinesses therewith, being well pleased that a treatment of this nature, gives us an opportunity of showing you the desire that we have to join ourselves to the Allies; depending upon your friendship in assisting us with all necessary succours, vigorously to maintain so just a cause, for which we are ready to sacrifice all that belongs to us, and wishing you all sort of prosperity, we pray you to believe that we are in all sincerity. See Langallerie, p. 231. 32. Churchill, Book One, p. 719. Chapter 5 1. Churchill, Book I, p. 807. 2. Langallerie, p. 225. 3. Murray, Volume I, p. 258. 4. A witty doggerel rhyme sung by the troops who marched up the Rhine with Marlborough on the road that led them to Blenheim, is quoted in Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 220: Here’s forty shillings on the drum For them that volunteers to come With shirts and clothes and present pay When over the hills and far away Come on the boys, and you shall see We every one shall Captains be To whore and rant as well as they When over the hills and far away 5. T’Hopf, p. 105. 6. Chandler, Military Memoirs, Captain Robert Parker and Comte de MerodeWesterloo, p. 31.

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238 The War of the Spanish Succession 7. Langallerie, p. 237. 8. Wolf, p. 534. 9. Murray, Volume I, p. 319. 10. Horsley, pp. 32–3. 11. Ibid, p. 162. 12. Langallerie, p. 239. 13. Churchill, Book One, p. 807. 14. Lediard, Volume I, p. 344. 15. Churchill, Book One, p. 807. 16. Wolf, p. 536. 17. Murray, Volume I, p. 345. 18. Langallerie, p. 244. 19. Murray, Volume I, pp. 378–9. 20. Trevelyan, Blenheim, pp. 368–9. 21. Churchill, Book One, p. 837. 22. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 401. 23. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume I, p. 223. 24. St John, Volume I, pp. 284–5. 25. Ibid, p. 290. 26. Tindal, p. 77. 27. The construction of Blenheim Palace would take far longer than anticipated and cost much more than originally thought. When the duke’s influence failed, and memories of his great military triumph faded, this ongoing project became the cause of much dispute. Chapter 6 1. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 190. 2. Ibid, p. 164. 3. St John, Volume I, p. 271. Orry had sent a message to Puységur that the stores of munitions and materiel for the coming campaign would be replenished, but this was read to mean that they had been replenished. When the empty storehouses were inspected, therefore, fraud and theft was suspected, and accusations began to fly, until the misunderstanding was corrected once Berwick had made enquiries. 4. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 168. 5. Francis, pp. 86–7. 6. Brown, pp. 143–4. 7. Ibid. 8. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 171. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid, p. 173. 11. Ibid, pp. 171–2. The capitulation of the garrison of Castello de Vide was undoubtedly premature, and demonstrated very well the strains of having

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Notes 239 to work with allies who might not share values and opinions. The Duke of Berwick recalled the negotiations that preceded the giving up of the place: ‘At the end of four days siege, our cannon having begun to scratch the wall, the Portuguese governor desired to capitulate, and sent, as hostages an English and a Portuguese colonel. It was proposed to them to yield themselves as prisoners of war; upon which the Englishman began to swear and storm, saying he would never consent to it; but we found means to intimidate the governor, by assuring him, that if he defended himself, we would put all the men to the sword, while the women would necessarily be exposed to the brutality of the soldiers; but that if he surrendered at present, we would leave him and the officers all their equipages, and engage to prevent all plunder and disorder in the town. He then consented to surrender himself prisoner of war, in which the English not acquiescing the Portuguese introduced us into the town. The English troops were compelled to submit to the same fate as the rest of the garrison, which consisted of two battalions of Portuguese.’ 12. Francis, p. 107. 13. Trevelyan, Blenheim, p. 410. 14. Ibid, p. 415. 15. Bradford, p. 43. 16. Langallerie, p. 267. 17. Brown, p. 152. 18. Pla, p. 30. 19. The French ships lost by Admiral Jean Pointis off Gibraltar were the Lys (88 guns), Magnanime (74), Marquis (56), Ardente (66) and Arrogante (56). See Francis, p. 145. 20. Brown, p. 147. 21. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 174. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid, p. 175. 24. While the fighting across the river Agueda was at its height, Berwick received a helpful letter from King Philip V giving him permission to engage his opponents there after all! 25. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 176. 26. Francis, p. 158. 27. Trevelyan, Ramillies and the Union with Scotland, p. 65. 28. Brown, pp. 157–8. 29. Ibid. 30. Peterborough claimed and was accorded the credit for the capture of Barcelona, but the decision to attack Fort Montjuich could only be taken in consultation with Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt. The naval commanders also had to be included, and Archduke Charles had, nominally at least, to give his consent. However, had the operation failed, all the blame

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240 The War of the Spanish Succession and odium would have fallen on Peterborough, so the claim and apportioning of credit was not without some merit. To many common soldiers, however, the Prince was the hero of the hour. ‘In this action we lost the brave Prince of Hess, whom the Catalonians loved better than they did him whom we had brought to be their king.’ See Atkinson, ‘A Royal Dragoon in the Spanish Succession War,’ p. 14. 31. Ibid. 32. Trevelyan, Select Documents for Queen Anne’s Reign, p. 176. 33. Francis, p. 189. 34. Carleton, pp. 103–4. 35. Ibid, p. 105. 36. Langallerie, p. 287. 37. Francis, pp. 204 and 218. Colonel St Pierre of the Royal Dragoons wrote of the Earl of Peterborough that ‘He is the first general that I know that can make war without men or money.’ 38. Brown, p. 145. 39. Even when Archduke Charles received a large annuity from the estate of the deceased Emperor Leopold I in 1705, the sum received was hardly sufficient to cover his normal household expenses. 40. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 182. 41. Ibid, p. 187. 42. The Duke of Berwick’s uncle, John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, had been offered a commission in the French army when a young man. He had refused this, feeling (quite rightly as it turned out with the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in October 1685), that as a Protestant he could not hope to rise far in the service of Louis XIV. Chapter 7 1. St John, Volume I, pp. 329–30. 2. Taylor, Volume I, p. 274. 3. St John, Volume I, pp. 329–30. 4. Ibid. 5. Murray, Volume II, p. 74. 6. Churchill, Book One, p. 937. 7. Taylor, Volume 1, p. 281. 8. Wolf, pp. 541–2. 9. Ibid. 10. Henderson, pp. 117–18. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid, p. 119 13. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume I, pp. 356–7. 14. Ibid, pp. 363–4. 15. St John, Volume I, p. 336.

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Notes 241 16. Henderson, p. 121. 17. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume I, p. 402. 18. Brown, p. 184. 19. St John, Volume I, p. 338. 20. Ibid. 21. Burrell, p. 79. 22. Taylor, Volume I, p. 387. 23. Wolf, pp. 543–4. 24. Trevelyan, Select Documents for Queen Anne’s Reign, pp. 177–8. 25. Langallerie, p. 308. 26. Churchill, Book Two, p. 135. 27. Trevelyan, Select Documents for Queen Anne’s Reign, p. 18. 28. St John, Volume I, p. 340. 29. Taylor, Volume I, p. 338. 30. Trevelyan, Select Documents for Queen Anne’s Reign, p. 2. 31. Ibid, p. 190. 32. Henderson, p. 125. 33. St John, Volume I, p. 344. 34. In a formal siege, the attacking army would protect itself by building lines of contravallation facing towards the fortress, and lines of circumvallation facing out, towards any enemy army that might approach to lift the siege operations. 35. Henderson, p. 131. 36. St John, Volume I, p. 344. 37. Shoberl, p. 99. 38. Marshal Marsin had a premonition of his own death, leaving a letter with his priest before the onset of the battle at Turin which read, in part: ‘Ever since I received the orders of the King to go to Italy I have not been able to clear from my mind the conviction that I shall be killed in the campaign; and Death, in the workings of God’s pity, thrust itself upon me at every moment and possesses me day and night.’ See Churchill, Book Two, p. 174 for more details on this intriguing prediction. 39. Shoberl, p. 101. 40. Langallerie, p. 315. 41. Shoberl, p. 101. 42. Ibid, p. 277. 43. Ibid, p. 102. Of almost as much importance to the Grand Alliance, the well -populated Italian states were opened to trade by the Maritime Powers, whose fleets already cruised at will and dominated the trading routes through the Mediterranean. 44. Henderson, pp. 133–4. 45. Churchill, Book Two, p. 189.

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242 The War of the Spanish Succession Chapter 8 1. Langallerie, p. 299. 2. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 189. 3. Kamen, Philip V, p. 48. 4. Ibid, p. 49. 5. Langallerie, p. 299. 6. Dickinson, ‘The Recall of Lord Peterborough,’ p. 176. 7. Miller, p. 85. 8. Francis, p. 225. 9. The grandees who declared for Archduke Charles were the Duke of Nejara, the Count of Oropesa, the Marquis de Mondejor, the Count of Santa Cruz, and the Count of Cordova. See Kamen, Philip V, p. 54. The Count of Lenos attempted to ride to join the archduke, but was detained on the road by troops loyal to Philip V. 10. Dickinson, ‘The Recall of Lord Peterborough’, p. 175. 11. Atkinson, p. 21: ‘Full twenty miles we marched that day, without one drop of water, Till we poor souls were almost spent, before the bloody slaughter.’ See also Williams, p. 58. 12. Churchill, Book Two, pp. 233–4. 13. The Duke of Marlborough was moved to protest to Berwick at the hard treatment of the garrison of Xativa, and the roundabout way in which they were forced to return to Catalonia, with many casualties suffered from sickness and starvation on the road. His nephew’s robust response was that he had offered good terms, but not that the soldiers would be permitted to return to their army quickly or by the most direct path. In any case, he added, many of them had made off to join the irregulars who constantly harassed the French army in the area, so that he regretted offering the terms at all. 14. Parnell, pp. 230–1. Chapter 9 1. Henderson, p. 145. 2. Murray, Volume III, p. 231. 3. Churchill, Book Two, p. 222. 4. Ibid, p. 226. 5. Murray, Volume III, p. 347. 6. Godley, p. 126. 7. Churchill, Book Two, p. 227. 8. Ibid, p. 224. 9. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume II, p. 63. 10. Ibid, p. 66. 11. Ibid. 12. Brown, p. 221.

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Notes 243 13. Wolf, p. 548. 14. Murray, Volume III, p. 391. See also Taylor, Volume II, p. 17. 15. Murray, Volume III, p. 391. 16. The huge sums of money raised by Marshal Villars during his audacious raid into southern Germany were divided into three parts. The first was used to pay for the expenses of the army during the summer, so that the cost to Louis XIV’s already strained treasury was negligible. The second part was used to redeem those promissory notes issued to French officers in lieu of proper pay, so raising their morale considerably and again at no cost to the treasury. The third part Villars comfortably pocketed for himself, and when complaints were made to the king about his making a fortune in this way, the regal reply was that ‘He is making mine too’. See Taylor, Volume II, p. 20. 17. Churchill, Book Two, p. 251. 18. Shoberl, p. 104. 19. Henderson, p. 145. 20. Ibid. 21. The defences of Toulon comprised 236 heavy guns, mostly 24-pounders but including thirty-six massive 36-pounders. See Francis, p. 253. 22. Shoberl, pp. 105–6. The French ships beached, sunk or burned in Toulon harbour in the autumn of 1707 were Le Triumphant (82 guns), Le Sceptre (90), La Vainquer (86), Le Neptune (76), Le Invincible (70), Le Serieux (60), Le Laurier (60) and Le Sage (54). See Langallerie, pp. 241–2 for further details. 23. Churchill, Book Two, p. 265. 24. Goslinga, p. 34. 25. Churchill, Book Two, p. 264. 26. Ibid, p. 269. 27. Murray, Volume III, p. 548. 28. Brown, pp. 242–3. 29. Churchill, Book Two, p. 319. 30. Taylor, Volume II, p. 100. Chapter 10 1. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume II, p. 311. 2. Wolf, p. 550. 3. Williams, p. 72. 4. Ibid. 5. The Marquis de la Jonquière had reputedly been sent to command the garrison in Minorca as a punishment for some unspecified misdeed. See Thorburn, p. 70. 6. Ibid, p. 76. 7. Ibid, p. 79.

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244 The War of the Spanish Succession 8. Ibid, p. 71. 9. Ibid. 10. Williams, p. 80. 11. Churchill, Book Two, p. 334. 12. Shoberl, p. 111. 13. Ibid, p. 114. 14. Ibid, p. 15. 15. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume II, p. 267. 16. Wolf, p. 551. 17. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume II, p. 301. 18. Ibid, pp. 315–16. 19. Wolf, p. 552. 20. Churchill, Book Two, p. 435. 21. Wolf, p. 553. 22. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume II, pp. 311–12. 23. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 232. 24. Wolf, p. 554. 25. St John, Volume II, pp. 59–60. 26. Ibid, pp. 68–70. 27. Wolf, pp. 556–7. Chapter 11 1. Hamilton, p. 232. 2. St John, Volume II, p. 60. 3. Taylor, Volume II, p. 323. 4. The instructions sent by Queen Anne on 2 May 1709 to the Duke of Marlborough and Viscount Charles Townsend, acting as her plenipotentiaries at the negotiations in Holland to bring the war to a successful conclusion, were explicit in pursuit of a negotiated peace, but on the best possible terms, both concerning an enlarged barrier for the Dutch (at the expense of Austria’s interests in the southern Netherlands), and beneficial trading terms for Great Britain, but not extending the same advantage to the Dutch: In Our name represent to the Pensionary [Heinsius] and other Members of the States as might be proper how desirous We were that such further preliminaries should be adjusted, as far as possible of the rest of the Allies; and particularly you were to propose that without loss of time a sufficient Barrier for Holland should be settled, for the maintaining of which We were willing to become guarantee, not doubting in like manner but that the States would be guarantees to the succession to the Crown of Great Britain in the Protestant line . . . You are further to endeavour by all possible means that an advantageous Treaty of Commerce between Us and France

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Notes 245 be set on foot and concluded, as soon as the nature of such an affair will admit, and pursuant to such particular Instructions as you shall receive from Us from time to time for that purpose . . . You are to give the Pensionary, and such others of the States as shall be thought proper, to understand that We think Our right to Newfoundland and Hudson’s Bay to be of so great and necessary importance to Us and Our Realms that We cannot give Our consent to a Peace unless the aforesaid countries and places be agreed to be restored to Us. See Brown, pp. 273–6 for a fuller text of these instructions. 5. Kamen, Philip V, p. 70. 6. Taylor, Volume II, pp. 328–9. 7. Wolf, p. 559. 8. Kamen, Philip V, p. 72. 9. T’Hopf, p. 435. 10. Churchill, Book Two, pp. 542–4. Article IV read in part: ‘If it should happen that the said Duke of Anjou does not consent and agree to the execution of the present convention, before the expiration of the said term aforesaid, the Most Christian King, and the Princes and States concerned in the present treaty shall in concert take convenient measures to secure the full execution thereof.’ Article XXXVI in part read: ‘In case the King of France executes all that is above mentioned, and that the whole monarchy of Spain is delivered up and yielded to King Charles III as is stipulated by these articles, within the limited time, it is agreed that the cessation of arms between the parties in war shall continue.’ 11. Ibid, p. 547. 12. Ibid, p. 550. 13. Wolf, p. 563. 14. Churchill, Book Two, p. 547. 15. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, pp. 236–7. 16. Churchill, Book Two, p. 553. 17. Ibid, pp. 575–6. 18. Ibid, p. 577. 19. The battle at Rummersheim was fought on 27 August 1709, and resulted in a smart defeat for the imperial army commanded by General Mercy. George, Elector of Hanover, was not in command of the imperial troops that day, although he is often reported as such. See Hatton, George I, p. 334, and also Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, p. 250, for interesting comments on this. 20. Wolf, p. 566. 21. Murray, Volume IV, p. 572. 22. Ibid, p. 577. 23. Churchill, Book Two, p. 581. 24. St John, Volume II, p. 111.

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246 The War of the Spanish Succession 25. Kamen, Philip V, p. 71. 26. Ibid, p. 73. 27. Francis, p. 280. 28. St John, Volume II, p. 149. 29. Atkinson, ‘A Royal Dragoon in the Spanish Succession War’, pp. 5 and 37. 30. St John, Volume II, p. 149. 31. Trevelyan, The Peace and the Protestant Succession, p. 83. 32. An indication of ruthless realpolitik, or perhaps simple realism, can be seen in Stanhope’s comment that Charles would not survive twelve months in Madrid without allied bayonets to support his throne, but that did not matter as treaty obligations would have been discharged and a peace concluded in the meantime. See Francis, p. 311. 33. Kamen, Philip V, p. 74. 34. Chartrand, p. 262. 35. Francis, p. 313. 36. Trevelyan, The Peace and the Protestant Succession, p. 84. 37. Ibid, pp. 87–8. 38. Trevelyan, The Peace and the Protestant Succession, p. 39. 39. Ibid, p. 32. 40. Wolf, p. 572. 41. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume III, p. 51. 42. Wolf, p. 574. 43. Kamen, Philip V, p. 76. 44. Atkinson, ‘A Royal Dragoon in the Spanish Succession War’, p. 47. 45. Ibid, p. 49. 46. Ibid, p. 50. 47. Williams, p. 112. 48. Wolf, p. 576. 49. Ibid, p. 577. 50. Trevelyan, The Peace and the Protestant Succession, p. 88. See also Wolf, p. 576. 51. Tumath, p. 187. 52. Churchill, Book Two, p. 804. 53. Brown, p. 321. 54. Trevelyan, The Peace and the Protestant Succession, pp. 143–4. Chapter 12 1. Norton, St Simon at Versailles, p. 209. 2. Wolf, p. 580. 3. Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, Volume III, p. 199. 4. Churchill, Book Two, p. 871. It has been well argued that the operation to deceive the French commander and break across the French lines of defence at Arleux was not a deliberate ploy by the Duke of Marlborough, but that he

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Notes 247 was reacting to French aggressive moves to demolish the allied post there and prevent its future use. In this way, it could be said, he made a virtue of necessity rather than anything more cunning. See Hussey for interesting comments on this point. 5. Lediard, Volume III, p. 147. 6. Wolf, p. 581. 7. Kenyon, p. 329. 8. Churchill, Book Two, p. 912. Foreseeing his impending dismissal, Marlborough had written on 31 October 1711: ‘What hopes can I have of any countenance at home if I am not thought fit to be trusted abroad.’ See Alison, p. 343. 9. Churchill, Book Two, p. 913. 10. Ibid, p. 947. See also Trevelyan, The Peace and the Protestant Succession, p. 216, and Brown, p. 366. 11. Churchill, Book Two, p. 948. 12. Ibid, p. 950. 13. Ibid. 14. Tumath, p. 205. 15. Horsley, p. 357. 16. Brown, pp. 372–3. 17. Horsley, p. 358. 18. Ibid, p. 362. 19. Ibid, p. 371. 20. Wolf, p. 590. 21. Shoberl, p. 153. 22. The new Barrier Towns that the Dutch secured in 1713 were Furnes, Fort Knocke, Ypres, Mons, Tournai, Ghent, Namur and Charleroi. In addition they had possession of a number of minor forts. See also Appendix 2 for the details on the treaties. 23. Chivalric Orders website, The French Succession, the renunciations of 1712, the Treaties of Utrecht and their aftermath, 2000, p. 7. 24. Trevelyan, The Peace and the Protestant Succession, p. 221. 25. Horsley, p. 378. 26. Shoberl, p. 156. 27. Horsley, p. 379. 28. Ibid, pp. 381–2. 29. Shoberl, p. 160 30. Churchill, Book Two, pp. 874–5. 31. Petrie, The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, p. 249. 32. Ibid, pp. 250–1. 33. Francis, p. 373. 34. Petrie, p. 249. 35. Ibid.

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248 The War of the Spanish Succession 36. Ibid, p. 171. 37. Ibid, pp. 174–5. 38. Ibid, pp. 175–7. 39. Kamen, Philip V, p. 88. 40. Ibid, p. 85. Chapter 13 1. Chandler, The Journal of Sergeant John Wilson, p. 90. 2. Mahan, pp. 61–2. 3. Churchill, Book One, p. 715. 4. Elliott, pp. 377–8. 5. Kamen, The War of Succession in Spain, p. 162. Appendix 3 1. Hattendorf, ‘Sir John Leake’, p. 978. 2. Hattendorf,, ‘Charles Mordaunt, 3rd Earl of Peterborough’, p. 14. 3. Murray, Volume V, p. 651.

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Bibliography Abbreviations: JSAHR – Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research. DNB – Dictionary of National Biography. Adamson, J. (ed.), The Princely Courts of Europe, 1500-1750, 1999. Alison, A., Military Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, 1848. Allonville, C-A., Memoires secrets sur l’étabissement de la maison du Bourbon en Espagne, 2 volumes, 1818. Anon., The French Succession; the Renunciations of 1712, the Treaties of Utrecht and their aftermath, Chivalric Orders website, 2000. Arneth, A., Prinz Eugen von Savoyen, 1858. Atkinson, C. T. (ed.), ‘A Royal Dragoon in the Spanish Succession War’, JSAHR, 1938. –– ‘The British at Brihuega’, JSAHR, 1956. Bain, R., Charles XII and the Collapse of the Swedish Empire, 1682- 1719, 1895. Ballard, C., The Great Earl of Peterborough, 1929. Baudrillart, A., Philippe V et la Cour de France, 5 volumes, 1899–1900. Bottineau, Y., Les Bourbons d’Espagne, 1700-1808, 1993. Bradford, E., Gibraltar, the History of a Fortress, 1971. Bray, W. (ed.), The Diary of John Evelyn, 1879. Brodrick, T., A Compleat History of the Late War in the Netherlands, 1713. Brown, B. (ed.), The Letters and Diplomatic Instructions of Queen Anne, 1935. Burrell, S. (ed.), Amiable Renegade, the Memoirs of Captain Peter Drake, 16711753, 1961. Carmichael-Smyth, J, A Chronological Epitome of the Wars in the Low Countries, from the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659 to that of Paris in 1815, 1825. Chandler, D.(ed.), Military Memoirs: Robert Parker and Comte de MerodeWesterloo, 1968. –– ‘The Siege of Alicante’, History Today, 1972. –– Marlborough as Military Commander, 1973. –– (ed.), ‘A Journal of the Spanish Succession War’, JSAHR, 1984. –– (ed.), ‘The Journal of John Wilson’, Army Records Society, 2005. Chartrand, R., ‘The Recovery of British Colours lost in Spain, 1710’, JSAHR, 1991. Chevalier, R., Histoire de la Marine Française, 1902. Churchill, W., Marlborough, His Life and Times, 1947 (4 volumes in two-book reprint edition). Coombs, D., The Conduct of the Dutch. British opinion and the Dutch alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession, 1958. Corbett, J., England in the Mediterranean, 1603-1713, 1904.

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250 The War of the Spanish Succession Corvisier, A., L’armée Française de la fin du XVIIe siècle, 1964. Coxe, W., Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon, 1815 (5 volumes). –– Memoirs of the Duke of Marlborough, 1847 (3 volumes). Cra’ster, H, (ed.), Letters of the 1st Earl Orkney (Historical Manuscripts Commission), 1904. Cronin, V., Louis XIV, 1964. Dickinson, H., ‘The Recall of Lord Peterborough’, JSAHR, 1969. –– Bolingbroke, 1970. Dickson, P., Red John of the Battles, John 2nd Duke of Argyll and 1st Duke of Greenwich, 1680-1743, 1973. Duffy, C., The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 1987. Elliott, J., Imperial Spain, 1469-1716, 1963. Falkner, J., Great and Glorious Days, Marlborough’s Battles, 2002. –– Marlborough’s Wars, Eye-Witness Accounts, 2005. –– Fire over the Rock, the Great Siege of Gibraltar, 1779-1783, 2009. –– Marshal Vauban and the Defence of Louis XIV’s France, 2011. Fortescue, J. (ed.), Life and Adventures of Mrs Christian Davies (also known as Mother Ross, 1929. Francis, D., The First Peninsula War, 1974. Geike, R., The Dutch Barrier, 1704-1709, 1930. Godley, E., Charles XII of Sweden, 1928. Goffman, D., The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, 2002. Goslinga, S., Memoires de Sicco van Goslinga, 1857. Halevy, D., Vauban, Builder of Fortresses, 1924. Hamilton, E., The Backstairs Dragon, A Life of Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford, 1969. Harbron, J., Trafalgar and the Spanish Navy; the Spanish Experience of Sea Power, 1988. Hargreaves-Mawdsley, W. (tr & ed.), Spain under the Bourbons, 1973. Harris, S., Sir Cloudesley Shovell: Stuart Admiral, 2001. Hartmann, C. (ed.), Memoirs of Captain Carleton, 1929. Hattendorf, J., ‘Sir John Leake’, DNB, 2004, Volume 32. –– ‘Charles Mordaunt, 3rd Earl of Peterborough’, DNB, 2004, Volume 39. –– ‘Sir George Rooke’, DNB, 2004, Volume 42. Hatton, R., Europe in the Age of Louis XIV, 1959. –– Louis XIV and His World, 1972. –– George I, Elector and King, 1978. Henderson, N., Prince Eugen of Savoy, 1964. Horsley, W. (tr & ed.), The Chronicles of an Old Campaigner, 1692-1717, 1904. Hugill, J., No Peace without Spain, 1991. Hume, M., Spain, its Greatness and Decay, 1479-1788, 1935. Hussey, J., ‘Marlborough and the Loss of Arleux’, JSAHR, 1996.

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Bibliography 251 Jenkins, E., A History of the French Navy, 1973. Jones, D., War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough, 1988. Kamen, H., The War of the Succession in Spain, 1969. –– Spain in the late Seventeenth Century, 1980. –– Philip V of Spain, the King who Reigned Twice, 2001. Kekewich, M. (ed.), Princes and Peoples, 1620-1714, 1994. Kenyon, J., Stuart England, 1978. Kroll, M., Sophie, Electress of Hanover, 1973. Langallerie, M, Memoirs of the Marquis de Langallerie, 1710. Lagrange, E., Guerre de la Succession d’Espagne, 1892. Lediard, T., Life of Marlborough, 1736 (3 volumes). Legrelle, A., La diplomatic Française et la succession d’Espagne, 1892. Lisk, J., The Struggle for Supremacy in the Baltic, 1600-1725, 1967. Louda, J., and MacLagan, M., Lines of Succession, 1981. Lynch, J., Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808, 1989. Lynn, J., The French Wars, 1667-1714, 2002. Mahan, A., The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1890. McKay, D., Prince Eugene, 1977. Mignet, F., Négotiations relatives à la Succession d’Espagne, 1842. Miller, P., James, 1971. Money, D. (ed.), 1708, Oudenarde and Lille, 2008. Murray, G. (ed.), Letters and Dispatches of the Duke of Marlborough, 1845 (5 volumes). Nada, J., Carlos the Bewitched, 1962. Nicolini, F., L’Europa durante la Guerra de Succession de Spagna, 1938. Norton, L., St Simon at Versailles, 1958. –– First Lady at Versailles, Marie-Adelaide of Savoy, 1992. Owen, J., The War at Sea under Queen Anne, 1938. Pagès, G. (ed.), Louis XIV et l’Allemande 1661-1715, 1937. Parnell, A., The War of the Succession in Spain, 1888 (2012 reprint). Petrie, C., Bolingbrook, 1937. –– Louis XIV, 1938. –– The Marshal, Duke of Berwick, 1953. Pla, J., Gibraltar, 1955. Rennoldson, N., Renaissance Military Texts, Warfare in the Age of Louis XIV, 2005. Richmond, H., The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 1953. Russell, F., The Earl of Peterborough, 1887. Sautai, M., La Bataille de Malplaquet, 1904. Shaw, L., The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 1998. Shoberl, F. (tr), Memoirs of Prince Eugene of Savoy, 1811. St John, B. (tr & ed.), Memoirs of the Duke of Saint Simon, 1876 (3 volumes). Swift, J., The Conduct of the Allies, 1712.

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252 The War of the Spanish Succession Symcox, G. (tr & ed.), War, Diplomacy and Imperialism, 1618-1763, 1974. Taylor, F., The Wars of Marlborough, 1702-1709, 1921 (2 volumes). T’Hopf, B. (ed.), The Correspondence, 1702-1711, of John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough and Anthonie Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1951. Thorburn, R., ‘The Capture of Minorca, 1708’, JSAHR, 1977. Tournoux, P., Defense des Frontiers, 1960. Tindal, N., The Continuation of Mr Rapin’s History of England, 1743, Volume XVI. Trevelyan, G. M., Select Documents for Queen Anne’s Reign, 1929. –– England Under Queen Anne, 1948 edition (3 volumes): Blenheim, Ramillies, The Peace and the Protestant Succession. Trevelyan, M., William III and the Defence of the Dutch Republic, 1930. Tuetey, L., Les Officiers sous l’ancien regime, 1908. Tumath, A., ‘The British Army in Catalonia after the battle of Brihuega, 17101712’, JSAHR, 2013. Turner, M., Anglo-Portuguese Relations in the War of the Spanish Succession, 1932. Vogue, C. (ed.), Mémoires du Maréchal de Villars, 1887. Walker, G., Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700-1789, 1979. Warburton, E., A Memoir of Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough, 1853 (2 volumes). Wauters, E., Like Salt in a Fire (essay) 2008, see also Money (above). Weygand, H., Histoire de l’Armée Français, 1938. Williams, B., Stanhope, 1932 . Wolf, J., Louis XIV, 1968. Fiction Woodruff, P, Colonel of Dragoons, 1951. Although a novel, very well researched and with useful details of the capture of Barcelona in 1705, with many genuine contemporary quotes, and judiciously drafted appendices.

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Index Aire sur la Lys, siege of, 186 Albemarle, see Keppel Alcala, 135, 137 Alicante, 136, 142, 173–4 Allemond, Hendrik von, Admiral, 36 Almanza, battle of, 139–41, 153, 160, 181 Almenara, battle of, 181–2, 187 Anhalt-Dessau, Prince Leopold of, 125 Anjou, Philippe, Duc d’, see Philip V of Spain Anne, Queen of England/Great Britain: succeeds William III, 28, 32, 34, 44–5, 48 instructions to commanders, 78, 87, 90, 95, 100–1 appeal to King of Denmark, 115,145, 147, 157 appoints Argyll to command in Spain, 192, 193 dismisses Marlborough, 197, 200, 203, 214 Antwerp, 49–50 Argyll, John Campbell, 2nd Duke of, 192, 196 Asfeld, Claude-François Bidal, Chevalier d, 101 captures Xativa, 141 attacks Ciudad Rodrigo, 142, 173 takes Majorca, 211 Athlone. see Ginkel Augustus, King of Poland, 143–4

Badajoz, 90, 93, 129 Baden, Louis-Guillaume, Margrave of, 31–2, 51, 54, 58–9, 65 wounded, 67, 69 lays siege to Ingolstadt, 70–2, 74 at battle of Cassano, 102, 104 unwell, 107, 114 death, 147 Barcelona, 83 capture of, 95–9, 129–30 siege of, 130–3, 134, 135, 166, 195 evacuated by allied troops, 207 renewed siege of, 207–10 submits to Philip V, 210–11 Barrier Towns: seized by the French, 22, 60, 68, 70, 114, 119–20 restored, 197, 206–7, 219–20 Barrier Treaty, 119, 185 Bavaria, devastation of, 69–70 Bavaria, Elector of, see Wittelsbach Bedmar, Isidore, Marquis de, 21, 61 Belluga, Luis, Bishop of Murcia, 138 Benabdulla, Ali, Alcayde, 86–7 Benbow, John, Admiral, 34 Berry, Charles, Duc de, 7 Berwick, James FitzJames, Duke of, Marshal of France, x, 46, 48 appointed to command in Spain, 76–7, 80–2, 89–91 replaced in command, 91–2, 102 captures Nice, 103, 106, 114 returns to Spain, 129, 132–3, 135–7 regains lost territory, 138–9 battle of Almanza, 139–40, 143, 153

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254 The War of the Spanish Succession reinforces Vendôme after Oudenarde, 165 conducts siege of Barcelona, 208–11, 216, 221–2 Bethune, siege of, 186 Blenheim, battle of, 72–3 Bouchain, siege of, 196, 203 Boufflers, Louis-François, Duc de, Marshal of France: commands army in the north, 32, 44–5 caught off-guard, 46, 47, 60 takes command of Lille garrison, 165–6 capitulates Lille citadel, 168–9, 171 at Malplaquet, 180, 214 Bourgogne, Louis, Duc de (Le Petit Dauphin), 14, 44, 47 at siege of Brisach, 54–5 birth of a son, 73 nominally commands army in Low Countries, 159 opposes peace terms, 176, 197 Brihuega, battle of, x, 188–9, 191, 196 Bruges, taken by French, 164, 168, 171, 201 Brussels, 110 captured by allies, 118, 164 attacked, 168 Byng, George, Admiral, 156–7, 173 Cabrera, Juan Luis Enrique, de, Almirante, 41–2 Cadiz, allied attack on, 35–40, 58, 83, 87–8, 129 Calcinato, battle of, x, 114, 121 Cape Santa Marta, naval battle of, 34 Carlos II, King of Spain, viii ill–health, 2–3 declares a new will, 4

death, 8, 120, 134, 213, 217 Carpi, battle of, 18 Catinat, Nicholas, Marshal of France, 17–18, 31, 222–3 Cartagena, 35, 136, 138 Cassano, battle of, 102, 111–12 Castello de Vide, 81 Caya river, battle at, 175 Cevennes insurrection, 79, 101–2 Chamillart, Michel de, 32, 106, 173, 176 Chanclos, Denis-François de, Brigadier-General, governor of Oudenarde, 164 Charles, Archduke of Austria (Carlos III of Spain/Charles VI of Austria), 3–4, 7, 9, 42 proclaimed as Carlos III, 56–7 goes to Portugal, 58, 77, 84, 86, 89, 91–2, 95 lands in Catalonia, 96 proclaimed in Barcelona, 99–100 finances, 101, 113, 119, 128, 134 defeat at Almanza, 139–40 trade treaty with Great Britain 153, 185, 161–2, 166, 173–4 recognised by Pope as King, 175 at Almenara success, 181 at Saragossa victory, 182 enters Madrid, 183 leaves Madrid, 188, 190 becomes emperor, 195, 207, 213 Charles XII, King of Sweden, 23, 143–6, 149, 215 Charles V, Emperor, 2, 217 Chateaurenauilt, Louis, Marquis de, 34 Chiari, battle of, 18–19, 31 Ciudad Rodrigo, 81, 90–1, 133, 136, 141–2 Cremona, battle of, 19–20, 33, 123

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Index 255 D’Arco, Jean, Comte, 66–7 Das Minas, Antonio Luis de Souza, Marqués, 80–1, 90–1, 101, 129, 132, 134–8 at Almanza, 139, 140, 216 De La Colonie, Jean-Martin, Colonel, 51–2, 67, 200–1, 205 Denain, battle of, 202–3 Donauwörth, 66–7, 70–1 Douai, 176 siege of, 186 recaptured by Villars, 203 DuCasse, Jean, Admiral, 34 Dunkirk, 197, 201 Eckeren, battle of, 48–50 Eugene (Eugen), Prince of Savoy: opens campaign in Italy, 17–19, 32, 64, 66 fails to intercept Tallard’s march, 70 combines with Marlborough, 71–2 at battle of Blenheim, 72–3, 75, 111–12, army beaten at Calcinato, 114 marches to save Turin, 122–3 at siege of Turin 123–6, 129 Toulon campaign, 150–3, 160 marches to join Marlborough, 163–4 at Oudenarde, 164–5 wounded at Lille, 168, 169, 178 wounded at Malplaquet, 180,194, 198, 200–1, 223–4 Elixheim, battle of, 110 Fagel, Nicholas, Baron, 80–1, 91–2, 101 Feuillade, Louis d’Aubasson, Marshal of France: attacks Turin, 121, 124

Forbin, Claude, Admiral, 157 Frederick-Wilhelm, King in Prussia, 6, 23, 146, 185, 203–4 Galway, Henri de Ruvigny, Earl, 90–3 wounded, 94, 101, 129, 132, 134–8 wounded at battle of Almanza, 139–40 ill-health, 160, 175 George, Elector of Hanover (George I of Great Britain), 23, 30, 58, 68, 149, 199–200, 214 George, Prince of Denmark, 23, 29, 145 Ghent, taken by French, 164, 168, 171, 201 Gibraltar: strategic importance of, 35, 77, 79, 82 seized by allies, 83–4 attempts to recapture, 87–8, 92, 95, 105, 127, 161, 197, 199–200, 214–15 Ginkel, Godert Rede van, Earl of Athlone, 30, 44–5 Godolphin, Sidney, 36, 114, 166, 168, 178 Goor, John Wigand van, MajorGeneral, 58–9, 62 killed, 67 Goslinga, Sicco van, Deputy, 154 Grand Alliance, the, 23 declares war on France and Philip V of Spain, 28 objectives, 29, 31–2, 42 joined by Portugal, 43, 56–7 joined by Savoy, 56–8, 73, 106, 111, 113–14, 119, 127 opens negotiations, 128, 144, 154–7, 159, 172–3

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256 The War of the Spanish Succession over-confidence, 177–8, 187, 191, 203, 213–15 Guadalajara, 135 Harley, see Oxford Heberstein, Graf Leopold, 111 Hesse-Cassell, Prince Frederick of, 180 Hesse-Darmstadt, Prince George of, 14, 35, 58, 83, 86, 95 leads attack on Barcelona, 97 killed, 98, 224 Hesse-Darmstadt, Prince Henry of, leaves Spain, 181 Heinsius, Antonius, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 28, 61, 121, 176 Hill, Sir Richard, Major-General, 193 Höchstädt, battle of (1703), 54 Hompesch, Graf Reynard, Vincent van, 109 Hungary, rebellion, 25, 57, 107, 127 Huy, 50 captured by Villeroi, 108 Hyzempirne, battle at, 51–2 Ibiza, 136 Ingolstadt, siege of, 66, 70–2, 74 James II, King of England, son acknowledged by Louis XIV, 24, 28 John, V, King of Portugal, succeeds his father, 160, 175 Joseph, King of the Romans, 47, 51 becomes emperor, 104, 107, 127, 138 death, 194 Kaiserswerth, siege of, 44–6 Keppel, Arnold Joost van, Earl of Albemarle, 167 beaten at Denain, 202

Landau, 47, 51, 56 captured by allies, 74, 107, 119, 148, 205–6 Leake, Sir John, Admiral, 87–8, 100 relieves siege of Barcelona, 131, 161, 224–5 Leopold I, Emperor of Austria, 2–5, 13, 29, 43, 68, 73 death, 104 Le Quesnoy, 200–1, 203 Liège, 47–8, 108–9 Lille, 156 siege of, 165–9, 203 Lines of Brabant, 60, 110 Lines of Non Plus Ultra, 195–6 Lines of Stollhofen, 31, 64–6, 148 Louis, the Grand Dauphin, 5, 7, 9, 12 opposes peace terms, 176 Louis XIV, King of France, ix, 1, 3–4 learns terms of new will, 6, 7 learns of death of Carlos II, 8–9 accepts the will, 10 marital advice to his grandson, 15 hears terms of the Grand Alliance, 23 diplomatic errors, 24–5, 28 learns of declaration of war, 29 strategic advantages, 31, 52–3 exasperation with Vendôme, 53–4, 62 advice to his commanders, 64, 68 gets news of Blenheim, 73 reinforces army in Spain, 76 satisfaction at battle of Malaga, 85–6, 104, 106, 110 confidence, 113, 115 reaction to Ramillies, 118–19 recalls Villeroi, 119 strategic problems, 121, 126

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Index 257 growing weakness, 127 ready for peace, 143 congratulates Villars, 148, 155 advice to Bourgogne after Oudenarde, 165, 169–70 financial straits, 173 recalls troops from Spain, 174 enters peace negotiations, 175–6 rejects terms offered, 177 instructs Villars to save Mons, 180 rejects terms again, 185–6 advice to Villars, 186, 194 cautions Vendôme, 196, 197–9 delight at Denain victory, 202, 204, 207–8, 213, 216 Maastricht, 27, 45, 48, 50, 109 Madrid: entered by Philip V, 13–14 taken by allies, 134 popular rising for Philip V, 134, 136 re–taken by French troops 137 entered by Philip V, 138 entered by Archduke Charles, 183–4 Majorca, 136, 161, 211 Malaga, battle of, 85–6 Malplaquet, battle of, 180 Maria-Theresa, Infanta of Spain, Queen of France, 1, 3, 6, 9 Marie-Louise, Princess of Savoy, marriage to Philip V, 14–16 Marlborough, John Churchill, 1st Duke of, x, 19, 27 reassures the Dutch, 28 appointed to command, 30, 36, 46, 48 made a duke, 48, 50 march up the Rhine, 60–5 success at the Schellenberg, 66–8 devastates Bavaria, 69–70

victory at Blenheim, 72–4, 75, 103, 104 success at Elixheim, 110 goes to Vienna, 112–13, 114 victory at Ramillies, 116–20, 121–2, 129 news of relief of Barcelona, 131 meets Charles XII, 144–6, 149, 154–5, 157–8 campaign plans, 163 victory at Oudenarde, 164–6 directs Lille siege operations, 167, 169, 175, 177–8 Douai siege, 186, 194, 196 excluded from negotiations and dismissed, 197, 225–6 Marsin, Ferdinand, Comte de, Marshal of France, 56, 62, 64–65, 67, 69 at Blenheim, 72–3, 106, 114, 123 killed at Turin, 125–6 Methuen, Sir John, ambassador to Lisbon, 35–6, 41, 43, 79, 92, 132 Methuen, Paul, 37 Minorca, 83, 100, 161, 192, 197, 199, 214–15 Mons, 110, 119, 179–80, 203 Montjuich, Fort, 97–8, 130–1, 207 Moselle valley, 74, 106–9, 114–15 Namur, 50, 119 Neuburg, Mariana von, Queen of Spain, 6, 14, 134 sent into exile, 138 Nice, siege, 102–3, 106, 114 Nine Years War, 3, 26 Noailles, Adrien-Maurice, Marshal of France, 172 ‘No Peace without Spain’, 128, 173, 191 Nugent, Henry, Colonel (Major-

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258 The War of the Spanish Succession General and Count de Val de Soto), 86 Orleans, Philippe II, Duc d’, 124–5, 138 Ormonde, James Butler, 2nd Duke of, 37 at Vigo Bay, 40, 198–201 Ostend, 118–19 Oudenarde, 110, 156 battle of, 164–6, 168 Overkirk, Hendrik van Nassau, Veldt-Marshal, 30, 48, 61–2 joins Marlborough, 74, 107–9 at Ramillies, 117–18 at battle of Oudenarde, 164, 171 Oxford, Robert Harley, Earl of, 154, 197–9 Partition Treaties, 4, 12 Pedro, King of Portugal, 35–7, 41–3, 77–9, 90 declining health, 91, 92, 132 Peterborough, Charles Mordaunt, Earl of, 94, 96 at Barcelona, 98, 99–100, 131, 135–6 goes to Italy, 137–8, 226–7 Philip II, King of Spain, ix, 5 Philip III, King of Spain, 2 Philip IV, King of Spain, 1 Philip (Felipe) V of Spain, 6 accepts terms of the will, 11–12 goes to Spain, 13–14 marries 14–16, 21, 23 troops ill-equipped, 30 depends on French support, 31 visits Italy, 35, 38 finances, 40–1, 48, 80 unwell, 82, 89–90, 92, 101, 120, 128–9

at Barcelona siege, 130–1 personal safety, 131, 156, 169 opens ports to trade, 172, 173–4 expels Papal Nuncio, 175 joins field army on campaign, 180–1 different views to Louis XIV, at Almenara defeat, 181 at defeat of Saragossa, 182–3 re-enters Madrid, 188 at Villaviciosa, 189, 190, 195, 198 renunciations, 204, 207–8, 211, 215–16 Pointis, Jean, Admiral, 87, 89 Populi, Duca de, 207–8 Port Mahon, 83, 100 allied capture of, 161–3 Portocarero, Cardinal, 14, 16 Portugal: approaches to join allies, 35–41 vulnerability, 42 joins Grand Alliance, 43, 56 ceases hostilities with Spain, 187 Puységur, Marquis de, 76–7 Rakoczy, see Hungary Rain, siege of, 69, 70–1 Ramillies, battle of, 116–22, 127, 133, 166, 173 Rey, Marquis Castel del, 11 Richards, John, Colonel (MajorGeneral), 97–8, 173 Rooke, George, Admiral, 36–7, 39–41, 77, 82 at battle of Malaga, 84–6 Rummersheim, battle of, 178–9 Salamanca, 133–6, 187 Salinas, Don Diego, surrenders Gibraltar, 83–4 Saragossa, 15, 130, 135 battle of, 182, 187, 190–1

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Index 259 Savoy, 79, 111 security, 127, 143, 153, 213 Schellenberg, battle of the, 66–8 Schomberg, Meinhardt, Duke of: commands in Portugal 78, 82 replaced, 90 Schonenberg, Francis, Meinheer, 41–2 Shovell, Sir Cloudesley, Admiral, 40, 70, 83–4, 94–5, 99–100 Toulon campaign, 150–3 Sophia, Electress of Hanover, 68 Spanish Netherlands, 4, 113 occupied by allies, 118–19 Speyerbach, battle of, 56, 58 Stanhope, James, Earl, 80, 140, 160 leads attack on Minorca, 161–3, 181 at Almenara and Saragossa successes, 182–3, 183–4, 185 beaten at Brihuega, 188–9, 227 Starhemberg, Guido von, Field Marshal, 52, 112 commands in Catalonia, 160, 181 at battles of Almenara and Saragossa, 182–3, 188 fights drawn battle at Villaviciosa, 189–90, 192, 199 leaves Barcelona, 207–8, 227–8 States-General of Holland, concern at their Barrier Towns, 21–2, 60, 68, 70, 114, 118–19 Stepney, George, ambassador, 144 Stuart, James (‘the Old Pretender’), 24, 28 sails to Scotland, 156–7 Surville-Hautfois, Louis-Hector, Marquis de, 178–9 Tallard, Camille d’Hostun, Marshal of France, 3, 11–12

expelled from London, 25, 44, 46, 54–6, 59, 61–2, 64 marches to reinforce Marsin, 70–2 defeat at Blenheim, 72–3, 228–9 Tessé, René de Froulai, Comte and Marshal of France: commands attempt to recover Gibraltar, 89 replaces Berwick in command, 91–2, 93–4, 106, 114 at Barcelona siege, 130 defence of Toulon, 150–3, 229 Torcy, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de, 191, 197, 206–7 Toulon, 35–6, 102 allied attack on, 150–2, 159 Toulouse, Louis-Alexandre, Comte de, Admiral of France, 82–3 at battle of Malaga, 84–6 at Barcelona siege, 130–1 Tournai, 178 siege 178–9, 203 Treaty of Grand Alliance, 23, 25, 28, 119, 128, 218 Treaty of the Pyrenees, 1 Treaty of Ryswick, 2, 24, 29, 213 Treaty of Utrecht 197 (and Rastadt, Baden and Madrid), 203, 206–7, 217, 219–20 Trier, 106–9 Turin, 111 siege, 121–3 relief of, 123–6, 133, 173 Ursins, Marie de Trémoille, Princesse des, 15, 171 Valencia, 96, 101, 135–8, 140, 184 Vallero, Felix, Don, 37 Vauban, Sebastien le Prestre, Marshal of France, 31, 55

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260 The War of the Spanish Succession Velasco, Francisco Don, Count, 83, 95 surrenders Barcelona, 98–9 Vendôme, Louis de Bourbon, Duc de, 33, 52–3, 102, 106 at battle of Cassano, 111–12, 121 commands in Low Countries, 119, 122–3, 143, 154–6, 159, 163 beaten at Oudenarde, 164–5 dismissed by Louis XIV, 170 sent to command in Spain, 183 takes the offensive, 187–8 defeats Stanhope at Brihuega, 188–90 fights Starhemberg at Villaviciosa, 189–90, 196, 199 death, 199, 229–30 Venlo, 47, 51 Victor-Amadeus II, Duke of Savoy, ix, 5 daughter marries Philip V, 14, 19, 36, 52–3 joins Grand Alliance, 57, 94, 102 fails to relieve Nice, 103 at siege of Turin, 121–6, 149 attack on Toulon, 150–3, 155, 198, 204, 230–1 Vigo Bay, 40–2 Villadarias, Marquis Luis de, 87–8 replaced by Tessé, 88, 129 Villars, Claude-Louis-Hector de, Marshal of France, 52–3 combats Cevennes revolt, 102, defence of Moselle valley, 106–9, 114, 119 raids German states, 148–9 commands in Flanders, 173, 176–7 wounded at Malplaquet, 180, 186–7, 195, 200 victory at Denain, 202, 203 recaptures Landau, 206, 231–2

Villeroi, François de Neufville, Marshal of France: replaces Catinat in command in Italy, 18–19, 31 taken prisoner, 33 takes command in Flanders, 50, 60, 62, 64, 106 takes offensive, 108 beaten at Elixheim, 110, 113, 115 defeated at Ramillies, 116–19, 123, 232 Villaviciosa, battle of, 189–90, 191, 196 Walker, Hovenden, Admiral, 193 William III of England (Orange), 2, 4, 13 acknowledges Philip V as king, 14 seeks an alliance against France, 23, 25–6 death, 27–8, 32, 185 William I, King in Prussia (Brandenburg), 23 Wittelsbach, Joseph-Clement, Elector-Bishop of Cologne, 27 Wittelsbach, Joseph-Ferdinand, 3–4 Wittelsbach, MaximilienEmmanuel, Elector of Bavaria, 3 ambitions, 21, 25, 30, 51, 53, 59, 61, 64–6 refuses allied terms, 69–70 at Blenheim 72–3, 102 at Elixheim, 110 after Ramillies, 117 attacks Brussels, 168 restored to estates, 203 Wratislaw, Johann Wentzel, Count, 27, 58, 60, 114 Wynendael, battle at, 168