The Vision of Didymus the Blind: A Fourth-Century Virtue-Origenism (Oxford Theology and Religion Monographs) 9780198747895, 0198747896

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OXFORD THEOLOGY AND RELIGION MONOGRAPHS Editorial Committee J. BARTON M. J. EDWARDS G. D. FLOOD M. N. A. BOCKMUEHL S. R. I. FOOT P. S. FIDDES G. WARD D. N. J. MACCULLOCH

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OXFORD THEOLOGY AND RELIGION MONOGRAPHS Visionary Religion and Radicalism in Early Industrial England From Southcott to Socialism Philip Lockley (2012) Repentance in Late Antiquity Eastern Asceticism and the Framing of the Christian Life c.400–650 CE Alexis C. Torrance (2012) Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language Forming the System of Identity Daniel Whistler (2013) Patmos in the Reception History of the Apocalypse Ian Boxall (2013) The Theological Vision of Reinhold Niebuhr’s The Irony of American History “In the Battle and Above It” Scott R. Erwin (2013) Heidegger’s Eschatology Theological Horizons in Martin Heidegger’s Early Work Judith Wolfe (2013) Ethics and Biblical Narrative A Literary and Discourse-Analytical Approach to the Story of Josiah S. Min Chun (2014) Hindu Theology in Early Modern South Asia The Rise of Devotionalism and the Politics of Genealogy Kiyokazu Okita (2014) Ricoeur on Moral Religion A Hermeneutics of Ethical Life James Carter (2014) Canon Law and Episcopal Authority The Canons of Antioch and Serdica Christopher W. B. Stephens (2015) Time in the Book of Ecclesiastes Mette Bundvad (2015) Bede’s Temple An Image and its Interpretation Conor O’Brien (2015)

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The Vision of Didymus the Blind A Fourth-Century Virtue-Origenism

G R A N T D . BA YL IS S

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries # Grant D. Bayliss 2015 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First Edition published in 2015 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2015932777 ISBN 978–0–19–874789–5 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

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Acknowledgements uxori liberisque meis › Iłıc Ł, Ūc ŒÆd Æcæ B IºÅŁÆ  æåø, P ØƺØ  b ÆØ ø ŒÆd Ø Œø  f  ø ÆæÆÆÆ Æı f æe e åøæE a  F ±ª ı  Æ  åÆæÆÆ. Didymus, Commentary on Zechariah 2.182.8–11 (3.1)

This book has been rather too many years in the making since my initial forays into the fate of Alexandrian exegesis after Origen first led me to the then largely unexamined Toura works of Didymus. So I am profoundly grateful to all those who supported me and encouraged me along the way, even as I struggled to balance first parochial ministry, then chaplaincy and seminary teaching, alongside research. I would not be where I am without the love and kindness of the parishes and people of the Bridge Group, Dorchester and Prestbury and All Saints, Cheltenham, of the students and fellows of St John’s College, Cambridge, and of the ordinands and faculty of Ripon College Cuddesdon, Oxford. Fr Stephen Gregory and Fr Michael Cozens deserve especial mention both for their grace and support of my academic projects, as does Fr David Hoyle for his wisdom at a key time. All errors of fact or interpretation are of course my own but I owe an enormous debt to my doctoral supervisor, Mark Edwards, for all his insights and advice over fifteen years, as well as to Frances Young, Morwenna Ludlow, and Rowan Greer for their perceptive comments at various stages. I remain grateful to the Theology Faculty of Oxford University and Wolfson College, as well as the Ministry Division of the Church of England, for funding my DPhil studentship and to Diarmaid MacCulloch and the Oxford Theology and Religion Monographs Committee for their enduring patience, even as repeated deadlines have slipped by. Finally I would like to express my profoundest thanks to my wife, Christine, for all her love and practical support—without her truly nothing would be possible. AMDG Oxford Epiphany 2014

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Table of Contents viii

List of Abbreviations

Introduction: A Fourth-Century ‘Virtue-Origenism’

1

Part I: Background 1. Didymus through the Eyes of Others

8

2. Teaching Virtue

30

3. Footprints in the Sand: Assessing the Didymean Corpus

46

4. Reading Virtue: Didymus and ‘Elevated’ Exegesis

56

Part II: Didymus and the Doctrine of Virtue 5. Virtue, Reality, and the Pre-existence of the Soul

90

6. The Call to Virtue

120

7. Numbering the Virtues

145

Part III: Didymus and the Doctrine of Sin 8. Psychology and the Pathology of Sin

175

9. The Doctrine of Pre-Passion

201

10. Interpreting ‘Original’ Sin

221

Afterword

239

Bibliography Index

245 269

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List of Abbreviations Works of Didymus are cited without reference to the author and in the case of the Toura works according to published volume, papyrus page, and line number. (For the Commentary on Zechariah, the internal book division and Doutreleau’s paragraphing are given in brackets.) C.Man. D.S.S. EcclT GenT HiobT Incorp. IoT Philos. PrT PsT Theoph. Trin.

Contra Manichaeos De Spiritu Sancto Lecture-Notes on Ecclesiastes Commentary on Genesis Commentary on Job De Incorporeo Lecture-Notes on John Ad Philosophum Minutes (Protokoll) of a Dialogue with a Heretic Lecture-Notes on Psalms Sermo de Theophania De Trinitate

The following abbreviations are common to all authors: Comm. Ep. H.E. Hom.

Commentarii Epistulae Historia Ecclesiae Homiliae

References to more or less complete exegetical works are given in the form Hom.Gen. or Comm.Gen. (employing Latin titles) followed by internal numbering, to fragments as In Gen. followed by the biblical verse. Alcin. Didasc. Ambr. Apol.David Bon.Mort. Excess.Sat. Exp.Luc. Noe Parad. Ant.Aeg. Ant.Mel. Sent. Aphr. Dem. Apoll.

Alcinous Platonis Dogmatum Didascalicus Liber Ambrose of Milan De Apologia Prophetae David De Bono Mortis De Excessu Fratris Satyris Expositio Evangelii secundam Lucam De Noe et arca De Paradiso Antony of Egypt Antony Melissa Sententiae (Loci Communes) Aphrahat of Persia Demonstrationes (Expositiones) Apollinarius of Laodicea

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List of Abbreviations Ad Iul. Dem. Fid.Sec.Part. Apul. Plat. Arist. Anal.Post. Anal.Pr. Anim. Cat. E.E. E.N. Gen.Animal. Hist.Animal. Int. Met. M.M. Mot.Animal. Phys. Poet. Rhet. Top. Ps.-Arist. Mund. Athan. C.Ar. C.Gen. Decr. Ep. ad Serap. Ep.Encycl Ep.Fest. Hist.Aceph. Hist.Arian Incarn. Syn. Vit.Ant. Ps.-Athan. C.Apoll. Dial.Mont. Dial.Trin. Serm.Fid. Athenag. Leg. Ps.-Athenag. Res.

ix

Ad Iulianum Demonstratio de Divina Incarnatione ad Similitudinem Hominis (Apodeixis) Fides Secundum Partem (Kata Meros Pistis) L. Apuleius of Madaura De Platone et eius Dogmate Aristotle of Stagira Analytica Posteriora Analytica Priora De Anima Categoriae Ethica Eudemia Ethica Nicomachea De Generatione Animalium De Historia Animalium De Interpretatione Metaphysica Magna Moralia De Motu Animalium Physica Poetica Rhetorica Topica De Mundo Athanasius of Alexandria Contra Arianos Contra Gentes De Decretis Nicaenae Synodi Epistulae ad Serapionem Epistula Encyclica Epistulae Festivales Historia Acephala Historia Arianorum ad Monachos De Incarnatione Epistula de Synodis Arimini et Seleuciae Vita Antonii De Incarnatione Contra Apollinarium Dialexis Montanistae et Orthodoxi De Sancta Trinitate Dialogi Sermo Maior de Fide (Epistula ad Antiochenos) Athenagoras of Athens Legatio pro Christianis (Supplicatio) De Resurrectione Mortuorum

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x Aug. Ad Oros. C.Acad. Civ.Dei Conf. Doct.Christ. Gest.Pelag. Lib.Arb. Quaest.Hept. Retract. Serm. Serm.Dom. Trin. Aul.Gell. N.A. Bas.Caes. Bapt. Hex. Mor. Ps.-Bas.Caes. C.Eun. Calcid. In Pl. Tim. Cassiod. Hist.Trip. Inst. Chrysipp. Iure Sap. Cic. Acad.Post. Fin. Nat.Deorum Tusc. Clem.Alex. Ecl. Exc.Theod. Paed. Protr. Strom. Cypr. Cyr.Alex. Adv.Anthrop. C.Iulianum Glaph.Gen. Cyr.Scyth.

List of Abbreviations Augustine of Hippo Ad Orosium contra Priscillianistas et Origenistas Contra Academicos De Civitate Dei Confessiones De Doctrina Christiana De Gestis Pelagii De Libero Arbitrio Quaestiones in Heptateucham Retractationes Sermones De Sermone Domini in Monte De Trinitate Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae Basil of Caesarea De Baptismo Homiliae in Hexaemeron Moralia Contra Eunomium (Adversus Eunomium) Calcidius Commentarii in Platonis Timaeum Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus Historia Tripartita Institutiones Chrysippus of Soli De Iure et Lege De Sapiente et Insipiente M. Tullius Cicero Academica Posteriora De Finibus De Natura Deorum Disputationes Tusculanae Clement of Alexandria Eclogae ex Scripturis Propheticis Excerpta e Theodoto Paedagogus Protrepticus (Cohortatio ad Gentes) Stromata Cyprian of Carthage Cyril of Alexandria Adversus Anthropomorphitas (Epistula ad Calosyrium) Contra Iulianum Imperatorem Glaphyra in Genesim Cyril of Scythopolis

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List of Abbreviations Vit.Sabae Dam. In Pl. Phaed. Diod. Diog.Laert. Vit. Dion.Alex. Ephrem Hymn.Nativ. Hymn.Parad. Epiph. Ancor. Ep. ad Jn.Jer. Pan. Eus.Caes. Dem.Evang. Praep.Evang. Eustrat. Laud. Evag. Ad Monach. Antirr. Ceph. Ep. ad Mel. Eulog. Gnost. Pract. Evag.Schol. Galen Comp.Tim. Plac. Genn. Eccl.Dogm. GeorgeSync. Chronogr. G.Naz. Carm. Or. G.Nyss. Anim.Res. Beat. Enc.Steph. Hom.Opif. Inscr.Ps. Virg. Vit.Mos.

Vita Sabae Damascius In Platonis Phaedonem Commentarii Diodore of Tarsus Diogenes Laertius Vitae Philosophorum Dionysius of Alexandria Ephrem of Nisibis Hymni de Christi Nativitate Hymnus Paradisi Epiphanius of Salamis Ancoratus Epistula ad Joannem III Hierosolymitanum Panarion (Adversus Haereses) Eusebius of Caesarea Demonstratio Evangelica Praeparatio Evangelica Eustratius of Constantinople Laudatio in Eutychium Evagrius of Pontus Sententiae ad Monachos Antirrheticus Cephalaea Gnostica Epistula ad Melaniam Tractatus ad Eulogium [Ps.-Nilus] Gnosticus Practicus Evagrius Scholasticus Galen Compendium Platonis Timaei De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis Gennadius De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus George of Syncella Chronographia Gregory of Nazianzus Carmina Orationes Gregory of Nyssa Dialogus de Anima et Resurrectione Orationes de Beatitudinibus Encomia in Santum Stephanum Protomartyrem De Hominis Opificio In Inscriptiones Psalmorum (In Psalmorum Titulos) De Virginitate De Vita Mosis

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xii Ps.-G.Nyss. Adv.Ar.&Sab. Heracl. Quaest.Hom. Herm. Vis. Herm.Alex. In Pl. Phdr. Hipp. Ref. Iamb. Anim. Myst. Ign. Rom. Iren. Adv.Haer. Isid.Hisp. Diff.Verb. J.Chrys. Ad Theod.Laps. Laz. Prov.Dei J.Clim. Scal. J.Dam. Sacr.Par. Jer. Adv.Ruf. Chron. C.Jn.Jer. C.Pelag. D.S.S.Did. Hom.Orig. Jer.&Ezek Vir.Ill. Ps.-Jer. Vis.Is. Just. Apol. Lact. Inst. Ps.-Mac.Aeg. Hom. Man. Ceph.

List of Abbreviations Adversus Arium et Sabellium de Patre et Filio Heraclitus the Stoic Quaestiones Homericae (Allegoriae) Hermas Visiones Pastoris Hermias of Alexandria In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia Hippolytus of Rome Refutatio Omnium Haeresium Iamblichus of Chalcis De Anima De Mysteriis Ignatius of Antioch Epistula ad Romanos Irenaeus of Lyons Adversus Haereses Isidore of Spain De Differentiis Verborum (Etymologiarum Libri) John Chrysostom Adhortationes ad Theodorum Lapsum. De Lazaro Conciones De Providentia Dei John Climacus Scala Paradisi John of Damascus Sacra Parallela Jerome Apologia Adversus Libros Rufini Chronicon Contra Joannem III Hierosolymitanum Dialogi contra Pelagianos Translatio Didymi Alexandrini De Spiritu Sancto Translatio Origenis Homiliarum in Hieremiam et Ezechielem De Viris Illustribus In Visionem Isaiae de Cherubim Justin Martyr Apologiae Lactantius Institutiones Divinae [Macarius of Egypt] Homiliae Mani Cephalaea (Capita)

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List of Abbreviations M.Anton. Medit. Marc.Anc. Max.Conf. Thal. Method. Res. Symp. Nem. Nat.Hom. Numen. Olymp. In Pl. Phd. Orig. C.Cels. Comm.Ser.Mt. Dial. Ep. ad Alex. Orat. Philoc. Princ. Pall. Hist.Laus. Phld. Diis Phot. Bibl. Philo Abr. Agr. Cher. Conf. Det. Deus Ebr. Gig. Heres Leg.All. Opif. Praem. Post.Cain. Quaest.Gen. Sacr. Spec.Leg. Virt. Vit.Contemp.

M. Aurelius Antoninus Meditationes in Semet Ipsum Marcellus of Ancyra Maximus the Confessor Quaestiones ad Thalassium de Scriptura Methodius of Olympus De Resurrectione Mortuorum (Aglaophon) Symposium Decem Virginum (Convivium) Nemesius of Emesa De Natura Hominis Numenius of Apamea Olympiodorus the Younger In Platonis Phaedonem Scholia Origen of Alexandria Contra Celsum Commentariorum Series in Matthaeum Dialogus cum Heraclide Epistula ad Amicos Alexandrinos De Oratione Philocalia De Principiis Palladius the Monk Historia Lausiaca Philodemus De Diis Photius of Constantinople Bibliothecae Codices Philo of Alexandria De Abrahamo De Agricultura De Cherubim De Confusione Linguarum Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Soleat Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis De Ebrietate De Gigantibus Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit Legum Allegoriae De Opificio Mundi De Praemiis et Poenis, de Exsecrationibus De Posteritate Caini Quaestiones in Genesim De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini De Specialibus Legibus De Virtutibus De Vita Contemplativa

xiii

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xiv Vit.Mos. Pl. Euthphr. Gorg. Lach. Leg. Phaed. Phdr. Prot. Resp. Soph. Symp. Theaet. Tim. Ps.-Pl. Alc. Def. Plot. Enn. Plut. Aud.Poet. Libid. Sanit. Symp. Virt.Mor. Porph. Ant.Nymph. Ep. ad Marc. Quaest.Hom. Sent. Vit.Plot. Proc. In Pl. Tim. Procop. Ruf. Apol. Ps.-Ruf. Apopth.Patr.R. Hist.Monach. Sen. Ira Soc. Sophron. Chron.Pasch. Ep.Syn Soz.

List of Abbreviations De Vita Mosis Plato Euthyphro Gorgias Laches Leges Phaedo Phaedrus Protagoras Respublica Sophista Symposium Theatetus Timaeus Alcibiades Definitiones Plotinus Enneades Plutarch of Athens De Audiendis Poetis (Moralia) De Libidine et Aegritudine De Tuenda Sanitate Praecepta (Moralia) Symposium vel Septem Sapientium Convivium (Moralia) De Virtute Morali (Moralia) Porphyry of Tyre De Antro Nympharum Epistula ad Marcellam Quaestiones Homericae Sententiae ad Intelligibilia Ducentes (Aphormai) Vita Plotini Proclus Diadochus In Platonis Timaeum Commentarii Procopius of Gaza Tyrannius Rufinus of Aquileia Apologiae contra Hieronymum Apopthegmata Patrum (Recensio ps-Rufinii) Historia Monachorum L. Annaeus Seneca (the Younger) De Ira Socrates Scholasticus Sophronius of Jerusalem Chronicon Paschale Epistula Synodica ad Sergium Sozomen of Salamis

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List of Abbreviations Stob. Ecl. Syn. Prov. Tert. Adv.Herm. Anim. Carn.Res. Monog. Thdt. Quaest.Gen. Theod.Anag. Theod.Mops. C.Alleg. Theoph.Alex. Ep.Pasch. Theoph.Ant. Ad Autol. Vict.Tunn. Chron. Vital. Fid. Xen. Mem.

John Stobaeus Eclogae Synesius of Cyrene De Providentia Q. Septimius Florens Tertullianus (Tertullian) Adversus Hermogenem De Anima De Carnis Resurrectione De Monogamia Theodoret of Cyrrhus Quaestiones in Genesim Theodore Anagnostes Theodore of Mopsuestia Contra Allegoristas Theophilus of Alexandria Epistulae Paschales Theophilus of Antioch Ad Autolycum Victor Tunnensis Chronicon Vitalis the Apollinarian De Fide Xenophon Memorabilia

Editions of works are cited by editor where necessary, except for: CCSG CCSL PG PL SVF

Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca (Turnhout: Brepols) Corpus Christianorum Series Latina (Turnhout: Brepols) Patrologia Graeca J. P. Migne (ed.) Patrologia Latina J. P. Migne (ed.) Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta von Arnim (ed.)

xv

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Introduction A Fourth-Century ‘Virtue-Origenism’

I have styled my presentation of Didymus’ vision as a ‘virtue-Origenism’, not because this is the entirety of his thought but because virtue is the weightiest of the centres of gravity shaping the contours of his exegesis.1 Like many fourthcentury Christians and late antique philosophers in general, Didymus is happy to define human nature in terms of the ‘acquisition of virtue’ and ‘living according to virtue’.2 But he exploits such language in a far more sustained way than his predecessors, for whom virtue is often purely propaedeutic, and focuses primarily on the moral dimensions of human existence and the journey of the soul as a soteriologically directed participation in divine virtue. This turn to virtue has been noted in passing by Torjesen3 and is given some place by Layton in his focus on a mimetic pedagogy,4 but its full impact on his theology has not yet been brought out. Admittedly scholarship on Didymus can still be said to be in its infancy. The chance discovery of the Toura Commentaries in 1941 was quick to disengage Didymus the exegete from the Trinitarian dogmatist portrayed by Leipoldt and Bardy on the basis of the anonymous, untitled work usually referred to as ‘Didymus’ On the Trinity’; but a rival portrait has been slower to emerge. This is probably partly due to the intimidating size of the corpus (particularly once one includes the fragmentary 1

This monograph represents a slightly revised version of my 2005 DPhil thesis, In Search of an Alexandrian Theology: The Moral Vision of Didymus the Blind. My thanks to Rowan Greer for the suggestion to bring out more clearly the language of ‘virtue-Origenism’. The broader claim that Didymus is an ‘Origenist’ at all has recently been disputed by Stefaniw (2010). However, this is to ignore Didymus’ deliberate defence of Origen’s reputation and commitment to his person, as well as the broadly ‘scholastic’ style of his interpretation of a Philonic/Origenist hermeneutic; cf. Layton (2004), esp. 135–58, which, though I would dispute some of the details, offers a far more accurate reading of Didymus’ wider corpus. 2 EcclT 4.238.9; HiobT 2.152.32–3. 3 Torjesen (1982a), 951–4. 4 Layton (2004), working independently parallel to my original thesis, recognizes a similar prioritization of virtue but would ascribe this more generally to the predisposition of philosophical schools such as Didymus’ ‘circle’ as ‘schools for virtue’.

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and disputed works) and also the result of a widespread tendency to read Didymus not as an important thinker in his own right but purely as a source: firstly, for ancient philosophy, then Christology and pedagogy, but above all for ‘Alexandrian’ hermeneutics. The stance of Simonetti is not untypical: The Commentary on Genesis merits a separate if brief mention. This is the oldest commentary by a Greek Christian author on this text which has come down to us in its entirety, and it allows us to reconstruct certain interpretations from the lost commentary of the same name by Origen.5

Surely the oldest complete commentary on Genesis might warrant a little consideration of its own! Layton’s work6 represents a welcome change of approach, offering significant insight into particular passages; but to my mind is too committed to a reading of Didymus as constrained by tradition and public office to articulate the philosophically inspired ideas of Origen which he did not understand and so transformed through the interpretational lens of biblical narratives. My primary interest is in Didymus as theologian—though not as distinct from Didymus the exegete, since for him, as for most patristic writers, theology and exegesis were one and the same. And it as a theologian that he seems to place a new importance on virtue. Typically references to virtue are not developed greatly either within ancient or modern patristic writings. Origen and Athanasius can both speak of the Son as essential virtue without giving the concept much significance7 and only in Gregory of Nyssa’s Life of Moses and On Virginity does it move to the theological and anthropological foreground. Consequently it is unsurprising that Didymus has not been read within this context.8 The Toura Commentaries are essentially moral and protreptic, which is not what the standard ‘Alexandrian’/‘Antiochene’ paradigm I had originally set out to investigate predicts. This is not because Didymus displays any apologetic rejection of Greek philosophy, allegorical exegesis, or indeed the ‘esoteric’ doctrines for which Origen is now considered to have been justly condemned (though none of these plays the role that a modern anti-Origenist like Hanson assumes). Rather it is within the Origenist framework condemned

5 Simonetti (1994), 78. Only three of the works have been treated in isolation and then quite briefly: HiobT by Marchal (1977), PsT by Prinzivalli (1988) and (2005), and EcclT by Sánchez (1991) . 6 Layton (2004). 7 Orig. Comm.Cant. 1 explains that the virtues love Christ because he is the substance of those very virtues; while Athan. C.Gen. 46.8 includes in a long list the fact that the Son is the very virtue (ÆPÆæ) of the Father. 8 Good work has been done by Orphanos (1974) on anthropology and Bennett (1997) on C.Man., though one struggles for an overall sense of Didymus’ thought. On Christology, Gesché (1962) is now rather outdated, while Ghattas (1996) and (2001) is thorough but tied to a titular analysis. Sadly I was unable to locate Solari’s thesis but Solari (1999) suggests its likely value.

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Introduction: A Fourth-Century ‘Virtue-Origenism’

3

by Antiochenes and dogmatic historians that Didymus advances a new role for virtue as a controlling concept. I am less interested in trying to isolate the origins and motivation of this move than in its consequences. Whatever the polemical or apologetic background to Philo and Clement’s ‘Alexandrian’ exegesis, in Origen the approach was given philological rigour, biblical breadth, and a clearer series of metaphysical and doctrinal correlations. It would be wrong to see this as a ‘systematization’ but the perception emerges of deliberate rigour and coherence. Origen’s speculations comprise a carefully maintained series of tensions, paradoxes, and parallels, and crystallization of any aspect of his thought has implicit consequences for the whole—indeed it is precisely such a doctrinal domino effect that his successors, conscious and unconscious, had to deal with. His heritage is more a world view and perception of reality than a hermeneutic and, for all the determinative significance of his scriptural debates with ‘heretics’ and Jews, it is his theology of exegesis rather than his rhetoric of exegesis which is fundamental. Didymus, fairly consistently across his known writings, advocates a ‘virtueOrigenism’ which, for all his fidelity to Origen’s name and thought, constitutes a first-order deviation from his master; whereas Eusebius’ ‘historicalOrigenism’ and Evagrius’ ‘incorporeality-Origenism’ should probably only be regarded as second-order deviations (though the latter case is complicated by direct or indirect connections to Didymus’ metaphysic). This synchronic consideration of his extant corpus as a whole represents an attempt to engage with the consequences of that primary moral vision. Virtue (aretē) is a central term in much ancient thought and connotes a wide range of meaning. From its basic root in ‘excellence’, it could be used of Homeric bravery, Herodotan fertility, or Euripidean kindness but became in Plato and Aristotle a key designation of desirable moral and intellectual qualities. Typically in much Greek philosophical thought it combined both the ethical and the rational, since correct moral behaviour was largely predicated on correct understanding. Indeed by the third century, Plotinus could speak of humanity’s goal as ‘assimilation to God through virtue’ and intend something purely intellectual (on the basis of Eudorus’ reading of the Theatetus’ ‘become like God as far as possible’ as referring not to a particular extent but to the human faculty capable of such likeness, namely the mind).9 In Origen, virtue is primarily moral action and keeping the commandments; hence its role is significant but limited. His participative ontology and educational soteriology seem to distinguish two primary movements: one from image to likeness, from an implanted minimal participation to an attained maximal one;10 the other through a series of correlated triads: Holy

9

Plot. Enn. 1.2; cf. Dillon (1977), 122–3.

10

Alviar (1993).

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Spirit, Son, Father; body, soul, spirit; ethics, physics, epoptics; purgation, illumination, union; Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs; the letter, soul, and spirit of Scripture.11 Spiritual progress is thereby not arbitrary but precisely contingent upon the deep structure of the Bible and of the universe— God’s dual revelation of his own being; and within this, virtue, ethics, and ascesis are limited to a propaedeutic role that is transcended as the soul advances.12 In Didymus, both the content and purpose of virtue are further extended. Virtue is a state of being, not a list of right actions which may be weighed up and balanced against wrong ones. It is grounded in intent and motive as much as result and is a disposition that labours towards peace and tranquillity through participation in the divine simplicity, which must be active and positive rather than a mere avoidance of evil. It is a constant struggle against demons, passions, and sophistry which can only be achieved by grace and a journey which is marked out by little steps, by movement from virtuous action to virtuous action, by deepening insight into the truth which lies inside the truth and an occasional hint at endless progress into the mystery of God. It is thus virtue as value which comprises Didymus’ ethics, making them teleological and participatory rather than deontological, and equally giving them an importance within his thought which goes far beyond an initiatory phase in a schema of purgation, illumination, and union. As we shall see in Chapter 4, Didymus’ hermeneutical strategy is not identical either with modern construals of Origen’s threefold reading of Scripture as laid down in the abstract discussion of On First Principles, nor later fourfold models. Rather his primary assumption is that there is a depth or range to the biblical text, as the shadow cast by a higher reality, and that the soul’s journey is one of elevation through these levels. In this he is faithful to Origen’s initial portrayal of a threefold Scripture according to the reading purposes of initiates, those progressing, and the perfect, but not to its subsequent description as logical, moral, and spiritual.13 This exegetical ascent is interlaced with the concerns of virtue throughout as they are equally valid to the initiates, the progressing, and the perfect. Consequently, there is no regular ‘moral’ lens of interpretation equating to a consistent ‘soulish’ sense of Scripture and this has led, I suspect, to paradigmatic conceptions of Didymus as dogmatic allegorist, rather than the proponent of the moral vision that is ‘virtue-Origenism’.14 To be sure, Didymus offers nothing of a Chrysostom’s detailed discussion of the temptations of daily life, nor the systematic ordering 11

Edwards (2002), 135–44; cf. Hadot (1979) on philosophical curricula as stages of ascent. 13 On Origen’s ethics, see Konstantinou (1966), 75 ff. Orig. Princ. 4.2. 14 Doutreleau ZachT I, 100, states ‘L’aspect moral du commentaire frappe moins que son aspect doctrinal. Didyme est plus exégète et catéchète que moraliste,’ seemingly on the grounds that Didymus does not employ æºªÆ to delineate a consistent moral sense in accordance with de Lubac’s model (59). 12

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Introduction: A Fourth-Century ‘Virtue-Origenism’

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of an Evagrius, but he constantly turns to the description of the metaphysical landscape of the soul’s return to God, in terms not of a progressive illumination but a reshaping according to virtue. For Didymus, the moral life is found more fully in its dynamics than its particular details, and it is these dynamics, and the struggles which they provoke in the human soul, that he reads out of his Scriptures. He is by no means unique in this and I would suggest that the language of ‘virtue-Origenism’ works equally well in relation to Gregory of Nyssa, for example (albeit with quite different corollaries for their metaphysical conclusions).15 Hopefully, offering such a reading may assist in locating Didymus more clearly within the narratives and theological trajectories of fourth-century scholarship. I begin by offering a consideration of Didymus’ background. Exploring the conceptualizations of him in antiquity and modernity, I find his identity as a commentator, Origenist, and intellectual ascetic far more significant than that as supposed head of the Alexandrian Catechetical School. I then turn to his understanding of the role of the teacher both practically (in his classroom and relationship to episcopal authority) and theoretically (as the primary preeschatological Christian calling and as a controlling metaphor for his Christology), before briefly describing his extant writings. Chapter 4 sets out the basic hermeneutical principles which underpin his theology and suggests that there is no real break with Origen in terms of exegetical principles, only an individualizing turn in his basic world view which leads to a preference for psychological interpretations (often but not exclusively derived from Philo). Part II represents the main argument of the book and investigates the role of virtue. Virtue is the human potential for unity with the Trinity which is the source of that virtue. Despite the fall of the pre-existent souls, their incorporation into corruptible bodies does not impede their capacity for exercising a mutable freedom in the context of providence. Thus Chapter 5 seeks to establish that the instrumental pre lapsarian bodies function not as a bridge uniting soul and body or indeed the rational creation with God but rather as a barrier. In this way the instrumental body clarifies the distinction between the essential existence of the Creator and the accidental and participatory existence of creation, and the pre-existence of the soul is found to be for Didymus both a corollary and a defence of the ontological reality of virtue. Chapter 6 turns from protology to the call to virtue in this life, that is the actualization of the potentialities left to rational beings after the Fall. These comprise not only common ideas, the conscience, and the image of God, but also a positive role for the passions directing the ever-moving soul towards virtue. Chapter 7 examines different schematic relationships between the specific virtues and the contemplative and practical aspects, before assessing how they are

15

Cf. Konstantinou (1966) on the central role of virtue in Gregory of Nyssa.

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subsumed within the wider framework of virtue as ultimately both unitary and unifying in the Trinity as both the goal and source of virtue. Part III focuses on sin, and seeks to depict the battleground upon which the dynamics of virtue and sin are played out; whereby Didymus takes sin seriously as an obstacle in the ascent towards unity in and through virtue, whilst remaining fundamentally optimistic that evil is in no way insuperable. Chapter 8 reveals Didymus’ psychology to be philosophically eclectic, drawing widely on various contemporary models and themes but ultimately driven towards unity and order, with sin as fundamentally stages of disorder within the potential hierarchies of his anthropology. Chapter 9 returns to the wellworn topic of Didymus’ distinctive doctrine of pre-passion. However, by taking seriously the Philonic background to his comments we discover not a misunderstanding of his Origenist sources but an innovative and important attempt to confront contemporary issues in Christology and ethics. Then finally in Chapter 10 we turn to a doctrine for which Didymus was once famous, that of original sin, and explore how solidarity with Adam and universal human ‘sinfulness’ is not connected to any suggestion of a premundane Fall but rather the Adamic Fall and its resultant succession. By exploiting Origen’s distinction of dirt from sin, he offers a variety of ways of understanding how humanity is somehow tainted by worldly existence without compromising a fundamental belief in the freedom of human free will. This reshaping of Origen’s thought according to a new prioritization of virtue and its role in Christian living is not the whole of Didymus’ teaching but somehow underpins almost all else he has to say, and so it is to this we must now turn in roundabout ways in order to understand the man better.

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Part I Background

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1 Didymus through the Eyes of Others Little is known with any certainty about the life of Didymus. Despite their emphasis on imitation of the teacher’s character, his own works subscribe to the ancient concept of the anonymity of the author, which only really begins to change with Gregory of Nazianzus’ autobiographical poems and Augustine’s Confessions. Jerome, Palladius, Rufinus all offer short summaries based on personal knowledge,1 while the fifth-century historians Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret each accord Didymus a brief biographical notice;2 yet Didymus remains an elusive figure. His dates are usually given as 313–983 but the only real certainty is that Didymus was in his eighties during the 390s,4 and so spanned a remarkably turbulent era not just within Christian thought and doctrine but also imperial and civic life. He lost his sight in early childhood5 and yet gained the traditional liberal education in geometry, astronomy, mathematics, dialectic, and philosophy.6 Universally and exclusively associated with Alexandria,7 he went on to teach8 and write prodigiously,9 and was seen as instrumental in opposing ‘Arianism’: The providence of God raised up Didymus on the one hand against those Arianizing in Alexandria, and on the other Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus against those in the other cities.10

1 Jer. Vir.Ill. 109; Pall. Hist.Laus. 4; Ruf. H.E. 11.7. The apparent testimony of Libanius and Isidore is usually considered dubious: Bardy (1910), 2, 9; pace Ghattas (1996), 19. 2 Soc. H.E. 4.25; Soz. H.E. 3.15.1–5; Thdt. H.E. 4.(26)29 (Cassiod. Hist.Trip. 8.1, 7–8 is entirely dependent). On the Tendenz and context of these historians, see Chesnut (1977), 167–206. 3 Pall. Hist.Laus. 4 gives Didymus’ age of death as 85 and refers to four visits over ten years. The dates 313–98 are reached by assuming these suspiciously round numbers are meant precisely and taking Butler’s chronology for Palladius’ own life (Butler (1898), 180–1). 4 Jer. Vir.Ill. 109 (written in 392): ‘He is still alive today and has passed 83 years old’ (other MSS read 80, 84, and 87—Bardy (1910), 4). 5 Pall. Hist.Laus. 4: ‘He was blind, losing his sight—as he told me himself—when he was four years old’; Ruf. H.E. 11.7; Jer. Chron. AD 372 [Helm 246.13–17]. 6 Ruf. H.E. 11.7; Jer. Vir.Ill. 109; Soc. H.E. 4.25.2–5; Soz. H.E. 3.15.1–2; Thdt. H.E. 4.(26)29.3. 7 Jer. Ep. 84.3; Ruf. Apol. 2.12; Soc. H.E. 4.24.1–26.1; Soz. H.E. 6.2.6. 8 9 Ruf. H.E. 11.7. Jer. Vir.Ill. 109. 10 Soc. H.E. 4.26.1; cf. Soz. H.E. 3.15.1; 6.2.6; Thdt. H.E. 4.(26)29.1.

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Nonetheless, there is little agreement on his educational context, the extent of his corpus, or historical significance, and so he has been susceptible to quite varied portrayals and understandings.

‘ DIDYMUS THE COMMENTATOR ’

Reputation in Antiquity Despite the ubiquity of the appellation today, Didymus is rarely styled ‘the Blind’ in antiquity. Jerome calls him ‘the Alexandrian’11 or else ‘Didymus the Seeing’;12 Palladius and Sozomen, ‘the Commentator’.13 In a brief aside to Domnio, Jerome can present his name as synonymous with ‘knowledge of the Scriptures’, just as Cicero is the standard of eloquence and Plato of wisdom;14 and even from the short notice in On the Lives of Illustrious Men both his prodigious writing and the preponderance of biblical commentary are apparent.15 Thus it is entirely right that recent scholarship has recovered him as first and foremost a biblical exegete.16 Jerome describes Didymus’ exegetical approach in the Commentary on Zechariah as ‘entirely allegorical (allegorica) and scarcely touching on the history (historia)’17 and often finds him ‘following in the footsteps of his master Origen’,18 whom Didymus defends fiercely as second only to the apostles.19 Even if he was relatively secure within his lifetime, one might expect an ‘Antiochene’ backlash against this commentator on Origen whom Sozomen could describe as an ‘ecclesiastical philosopher’,20 especially if the late fourth-century Origenist controversy was as widespread and fierce as older portrayals tended to suggest. Yet Theodoret does not condemn his 11

Jer. Chron. AD 372; Vir.Ill. 109; Ep. 112.20. Jer. Comm.Gal. prol. [PL 26.309a]—a notion he often connects to having the ‘eye of the Bride’ in the Song of Songs, D.S.S.Did. prol. 13 Soz. H.E. 3.15.1: ‘Didymus the ecclesiastical commentator (› KŒŒºÅØÆØŒe ıªªæÆç)’; Pall. Hist.Laus. 4 gives ‘Blessed Didymus the commentator who became blind’ but 5 shows that ‘commentator’ is the primary title. 14 Jer. Ep. 50.1–2. 15 Jer. Vir.Ill. 109: ‘He composed many noble works—Commentaries on all the Psalms, Commentaries on the Gospel of Matthew and of John; On Doctrines and two books Against the Arians and a book On the Holy Spirit, which I translated into Latin; eighteen volumes On Isaiah; three books of Commentaries on Hosea, which he wrote to me; and five books On Zechariah, written at my request; and Commentaries on Job, and countless other things, to detail which would require a catalogue of its own.’ 16 17 Doutreleau (1959), 75; pace Heron (1972), 228. Jer. Comm.Zach. prol. 18 Jer. Ep. 73 (on Melchizedek as an angel); cf. Ep. 119.5. 19 Jer. Hom.Orig.Jer.&Ezek. prol. [PL 25.583d]; Ep. 84.10; Adv.Ruf. 1.6; 2.11, 16. 20 Soz. H.E. 6.2.6. 12

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style of exegesis but rather praises his ability to move beyond the letter to the meaning (noēmata) of Scripture and—contrary to the usual lambasting of Origen’s philosophically adulterated Christianity we find in Theodore of Mopsuestia21—offers Didymus the excuse that he did not use philosophy to teach the truth but as a weapon of the truth against heresy.22 Didymus is for him not the bête noire we might expect but a praiseworthy ascetic. However, we cannot be certain whether Theodoret is speaking from direct knowledge here. Evidence for reading Didymus is confined to broadly Origenist circles and, if he had no official connection either to Athanasius or to an institutional school, he may have been little known outside them.23 Certainly, given Epiphanius’ hostility to all things ‘Origenist’, it is astonishing that so long-lived a contemporary expositor of Origenist exegesis escaped his ire. We can prove readership by Ammonius the Tall Brother,24 Ambrose,25 and Augustine,26 and contact with Antony27 and Evagrius,28 while no lesser personages than Jerome, Rufinus, and Palladius all sought him out personally. Socrates knows of works not cited elsewhere and the very survival of the often annotated Toura manuscripts shows an enduring, if not always approving, readership in monastic circles until at least the sixth century.29

Influence of his Thought For most of the last seventy years Didymus has held little place in histories of doctrine. Doubts concerning his authorship of On the Trinity quickly deprived him of the role of systematizing Trinitarian thought accorded to him in early twentieth-century scholarship,30 though more recently Ayres has begun to recognize the originality of aspects of his pneumatology.31 Instead he has been seen as representing an unsuccessful anti-Apollinarian development of the

21

22 e.g. Theod.Mops. C.Alleg. 4. Thdt. H.E. 4.(26)29.3–4. Contrast usual claims for the universality of his reputation: Bardy (1910), 243; Doutreleau (1959), 35. 24 Pall. Hist.Laus. 12. 25 For Jerome’s savage reaction to his ‘plagiarism’ of D.S.S., see Doutreleau (1987); Kelly (1975), 143–4. 26 Aug. Quaest.Hept. 2.25. 27 Jer. Ep. 68.2; Pall. Hist.Laus. 4; Ruf. H.E. 11.7; Soc. H.E. 4.25.9–11; Soz. H.E. 3.15.4–5. 28 Evag. Gnost. 48 [=Soc. H.E. 4.23.70–1]. 29 Cf. Doutreleau ZachT I, 178–80 on the largely critical marginal comments, the most common being P . Later readers include Procopius of Gaza (Nautin GenT I-II notes parallels), John of Damascus (e.g. Sacr.Par. [PG 95.1522a]), Olympiodorus (Hagedorn and Hagedorn (1994)), and Cassiodorus (Inst. 5, 8). The Enarratio was seemingly still read in the eighth century in the West with the caution, ‘Read and understand with care, since they have been expelled from Rome’, MS Laon 96 cited by Bogaert (1963), 12n.3. 30 31 Leipoldt (1905), 95 ff.; Bardy (1910), 59. Ayres (2010). 23

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doctrine of Christ’s rational soul32 and an archaic Origenist coda in eschatology,33 and even Layton’s admirable work on his significance for a circle of urban intellectual ascetics has largely left him as a footnote to studies of Origen and Athanasius. The extent of his influence on later theology must remain largely unknown until further work on the Toura commentaries provides sufficient basis for comparison. Even so, Cyril of Alexandria, who was long known to have made use of On the Trinity, probably also drew on the commentaries;34 Arsenius’ Letter shows ‘striking’ parallels which add to the physical association of the Toura works with his monastery;35 Gregory of Nazianzus, once habitually designated a student on the assumption that he could not have studied at Alexandria under anyone else, is tentatively linked to Didymus once more by McGuckin;36 while more recently DelCogliano has suggested that Basil’s On the Holy Spirit is dependent on Didymus’ own;37 but it is Gregory of Nyssa and Evagrius who immediately strike the reader of the Toura corpus as closer to his thought. In the West, work needs to be done on Ambrosian parallels38 but it is chiefly thanks to Jerome’s translation of his On the Holy Spirit that Didymus had a considerable impact into the Middle Ages.39 The lack of translations40 probably tells against a widespread readership; and it is perhaps surprising that there is no evidence that Rufinus translated any of Didymus’ works into Latin as he did those of Origen and Evagrius,41 which should caution us against too simplistic a reading of the significance ascribed to Didymus in Jerome and Rufinus’ correspondence of the 390s and the assumption that Didymus really was ‘the most learned man of his time’.42

32

Grillmeier (1975), 361 ff.; le Boulluec (1987b); Bouteneff (2001). Daley (2003), 90. Kerrigan (1952), 249–50; cf. Leipoldt (1905), 147. 35 van Parys (1981), 83–5. 36 McGuckin (2001), 44–5. Beeley (2008), 283–4, denies any influence as part of his wider separation of Nazianzen from Athanasian thought. 37 DelCogliano (2010); primarily because of the anti-Eunomian treatment of Amos 4:13 and Jn. 1:3. 38 Beyond the dependence of his own D.S.S., Hadot (1976) claims dependence for his Apol. David but this could simply be common usage of Origen; cf. Prinzivalli (1988), 62–70. Meanwhile his De Mysteriis makes clearer use of the Alexandrian, if not Didymean, De Trinitate; cf. Bardy (1910), 31. 39 Doutreleau D.S.S., 122–32. 40 On those of Epiphanius Scholasticus, see Cassiod. Inst. 5, 8. 41 Ruf. H.E. 11.7 actually claims not to have read any of Didymus’ works but this is almost certainly a rhetorical ploy, exploiting ancient ideas of intimacy and orality to denigrate Jerome’s relationship with their shared teacher and in particular his pride in receiving Commentaries on Zechariah and Hosea on request. 42 Jer. Comm.Os. prol. [CCSL 76.5]; Ep. 68.2. He does not even appear on the reading list of the ‘Origenist’ Melania the Elder: ‘Origen, Gregory, Stephen, Pierius and Basil’ (Pall. Hist.Laus. 55). 33 34

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Reclusive Bookworm? Until the last decade or so the tendency was to view Didymus’ influence as purely literary, on the basis of Bardy’s carefully penned portrait of a monastic recluse far removed from the vicious doctrinal disputes of his lifetime.43 Basing his argument partly on Didymus’ general equanimity and lack of vitriol towards heretics, partly on a presumed social incapacity resultant from his blindness but also on the lack of any reference to him being driven out during Lucius’ episcopacy, Bardy reduced the anti-heretical role accorded him by his biographers from that of ‘brightly shining light’ raised up by God to dispel the gloom of ‘Arianism’44 to a detached and passive literary support for orthodoxy. The Toura commentaries evoke much the same stance towards heresies as did On the Trinity, and clearly Didymus viewed a calm but persistent antiheretical exposition as key to his role as teacher.45 Though too late to bear witness to the height of the ‘Arian’ conflict,46 they do attest not just to classroom opposition but active personal engagement with a non-Christian philosopher47 and a Manichee.48 Meanwhile, discovered alongside the commentaries was a fragment comprising minutes of a dialogue between Didymus and a heretic who held broadly Apollinarian views on the soul—a formal dispute much in the manner of Origen’s interrogation of Heraclides (itself discovered in the Toura cave).49 The On the Holy Spirit was written in response to the requests of the ‘brothers’ disquieted by contemporary pneumatological debate50 and more recent evidence also points to active criticism of episcopal simony.51 So we must assign to Didymus a far more active role in public life than has long been presumed.

‘DIDYMUS THE H E AD OF THE CATECHETICAL SCHOOL ’ ? That more active role is not however likely to be linked to Didymus’ chief claim to fame in modernity—his supposed headship of the Catechetical School 43 Bardy (1910) continually portrays the Alexandrian as ‘an admirable model of serenity and calm’ (1), arguing that his infirmity would protect him from Arian attacks (6) and suggesting that he was never personally involved with heretics (12–13); cf. Ghattas (1996), 65–70. 44 45 Ruf. H.E. 11.7; Soc. H.E. 4.26.1. Cf. Ghattas (1996), 65–147. 46 Dating is all but impossible. On the basis of Jerome, Doutreleau ZachT I, 23–5 suggests c.387 for ZachT. References to heresies place the anti-Apollinarian PsT and EcclT after 365, antiManichaean sentiment is strong throughout the corpus, while anti-Arian references are few and far between. Layton (2004), 6, suggests HiobT and GenT in the 360s, PsT and EcclT in the 370s, and ZachT in the 380s. 47 48 PsT 4.239.14–19; 1.34.10–14. EcclT 5.274.17–275.2. 49 50 51 Kramer Kleine, 107–11; cf. Orig. Dial. 1–2. D.S.S. 2(1). Bennett (2001).

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of Alexandria. Few recent scholars still hold to the original understanding, which saw this as ‘the noblest scheme of Christian education ever’52 or, as Gauche claimed, an independent institution, capable of offering courses in the various branches of sacred and profane learning and of supplying the needs of students who wished to pursue higher studies.53

Nonetheless, assumptions about the implications of episcopal appointment to an official institution continue unabated, particularly as regards Didymus’ relationship with Athanasius. All the evidence both for Didymus’ headship and indeed for the continuing existence of a school tracing its origins back to Origen and Clement is found in three sources: Rufinus describes him as ‘a teacher of an ecclesiastical school’ and says he was ‘approved by Bishop Athanasius and the rest of the wise men of the Church of God’;54 Sozomen claims he was head of the ‘School of Sacred Disciplines in Alexandria’;55 and an eleventh-century manuscript containing a summary of a succession list from the fifth-century ecclesiastical historian, Philip Sidetes, conflated with Eusebius, styles him twelfth head of a school in Alexandria which originated with Athenagoras.56 However, unlike Socrates, Sozomen shows no independent knowledge of Didymus and seems to be dependent on Rufinus, so we are really left with just two witnesses. Against this must be set the silence not only of regular visitor Palladius, the pro-Origenist Socrates, and anti-Origenist Theodoret but also of both Rufinus and Jerome in their key appeals to Didymus throughout their quarrel.57 If indeed Didymus was head of an institutional school, it can hardly have been significant either in associating him more closely with Origen or in contributing to his authority. More probably, Rufinus’ language should be understood as affirming Didymus’ teaching as belonging to the orthodox party and his informal approval not just by Athanasius but by all the Alexandrian leadership—though clearly with enough ambiguity to deceive Sozomen.58 Meanwhile, the account dependent on Philip has, it seems to me, a rather different purpose. Athenagoras first led the school in Alexandria (F Øƌƺı F K

º Æ æÆ fi ) . . . Philip says that Clement (the author of the Stromateis) was this

52

53 54 Bigg (1886), 43. Gauche (1934), 36. Ruf. H.E. 11.7. Soz. H.E. 3.15.1. 56 Cod.Baroccianus 142 (ap. Theod.Anag. H.E. [Hansen 160]); cf. Pouderon (1994). 57 For Jerome’s polemical use of succession lists against Evagrius and Pelagius, cf. Comm.Jer. 4.1.2; Ep. 133.2; C.Pelag. prol.; Elm (1997), 314. 58 Cf. Nautin (1992), 235. Rufinus does however use the phrase ‘schola ecclesiastica’ to translate Eus.Caes. H.E. 5.10.1: ‘ H ØH ØÆæØ’ and 7.32.30: ‘B ƒæA ø e ØƌƺE ’. 55

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man’s pupil and Pantaenus that of Clement . . . But Eusebius says that Pantaenus had been Clement’s teacher; and that he remembers him as his teacher in the Hypotyposes. And this Pantaenus had a pupil put in charge as successor of the school after him—according to Philip, Origen but, according to Eusebius, Clement and then after Clement, Origen—but whether this way or that way Origen was fourth in charge of the Christian school. After Origen came Heraclas, after him, Dionysius and, after him, Pierius; after Pierius came Theognostus and, after him, Serapion and, after him, Peter the Great, the bishop who became a martyr; after Peter came Macarius whom his country-men used to call the Citizen; after him, Didymus and after Didymus, Rhodon; who also according to Philip moved the school (ØÆæØc ) to the city of Side itself during the times of Theodosius the Great. Philip says that he was the pupil of this Rhodon; to whom he also bears great witness about his knowledge of ideas, both ours and those of men outside the faith.59

Crucially, the last-named head was Philip’s own teacher, Rhodon, who supposedly moved the school to Side. Given the importance of delineating one’s theological position to attract pupils and patronage,60 we are more likely dealing with an advert for Rhodon’s credentials than a serious claim that he moved an institutional school. Moreover, instead of reading the list as a linear chronology, as the summarizer has portrayed it, the appeal to Serapion, Macarius the Alexandrian, and Didymus, (all contemporaries despite the confused chronology) should probably be read in parallel, just like Rufinus’ list of his own many teachers in the Apology: Didymus, Serapion, Menites, Paul disciple of Peter the Martyr, both Macarii, Isidore, and Pambas.61 In this way Rhodon would have actually been claiming not an institutional appointment but rather magisterial succession from three significant ascetic intellectuals and within a larger ‘Alexandrian’ or ‘Origenist’ mode of thinking and hermeneutics; and such a presentation of succession, whether real or imagined, would have been vital in drawing the sort of ideological distinctions necessary to secure patronage, particularly when moving to a new area. Didymean scholars remain split on the issue62 but unlikely parallels continue to be drawn between his teaching context and that of a modern university,63 which may seem to imply such institutional paraphernalia as colleagues, a 59

Cod.Baroccianus 142 (ap. Theod.Anag. H.E. [Hansen 160]). Cf. Elm (1997), 312–13. 61 Ruf. Apol. 2.12. Contrast van den Broek (1996), 199, insisting that this proves that the idea of an Alexandrian ØÆå was well established by 400. 62 Against: Doutreleau (1959), 69; Young (1983a), 85; Nautin (1992), 235; Bennett (1997), 17. For: Heron (1971), 14–15; Bienert (1972), 5; Orphanos (1974), 16–17; Marchal (1977), 45; Prinzivalli (1988), 9–10. Most recently Layton has suggested that Didymus held a position on the staff parallel to that of Pierius, who is styled head of the school by Phot. Bibl. 119 but not Eus. Caes. H.E. 7.32.26–7. 63 e.g. Nelson (1995), 8. 60

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syllabus, and buildings. In fact the whole modern doctrine of the ‘Catechetical School’ requires some serious re-examination, not just for the period prior to Origen64 but the continued existence alluded to by Eusebius.65 Perhaps the most interesting feature of the modern account is the lack of clarity on what is meant by either school (didaskaleion) or succession (diadochē) in these contexts.66 The suggestion that Didymus could have held a public role throughout the turbulent times which saw his supposed patron repeatedly exiled and even Rufinus forced to flee has long been recognized as problematic,67 particularly if one concedes that he appears already to be a famous Christian teacher by Antony’s visit in 338.68 At the least, the Toura writings themselves must span the 370s and 380s and the crucial era of Valens (364–78), against the background of whose ‘Arianizing’ agenda Rufinus paints Didymus as so bright a light of orthodoxy.69 The troubles in Alexandria itself in 373 after Athanasius’ death and during Lucius’ episcopacy after 378 were particularly explosive, and Haas is almost certainly correct to link many of the inter-communal tensions of the period to the interactions of the nexus of religious and scholastic communities in the city.70 However, rather than simply postulate a break in ‘official’ lectures71 or arguments from silence about rival ‘Arian’ candidates, it is the whole paradigm of such an institutional school which should be reconsidered. Indeed, more cautious historiography and close attention to the sources have eroded the very idea of the non-Christian philosophical institutions which the Alexandrian Catechetical School was once thought to parallel.72 Most ‘schools’ now appear to comprise not institutions but rather the claims of individual teachers keen to present themselves as authentic interpreters of a particular tradition.73 As Dillon notes, ‘We must never underestimate the simplicity and informality of the arrangements in any ancient philosophical school’.74

64 Nautin (1977), 51–3, 180–97; Scholten (1995); van den Broek (1996); van den Hoek (1997); cf. Bardy (1937); Bardy (1942); Hornschuh (1960); Wilken (1987); le Boulluec (1987a). 65 Eus.Caes. H.E. 5.10.1; 7.32.30. Thus, van den Broek’s (1996), 205, piercing scepticism about the third-century school is replaced with unquestioning assumptions about a conservative fourth-century ecclesiastical institution. 66 Cf. Wilken (1987). 67 Ruf. H.E. 11.4; cf. Bardy (1910), 6. The tendency is to presume a break from official lectures, e.g. Young (1983a), 85, but this does not explain why an ‘Arian’ teacher was not appointed to the ‘vacancy’. 68 On the dating of this visit, see Athan. Vit.Ant. 69; Layton (2004), 20–1. 69 70 71 Ruf. H.E. 11.7. Haas (1997). e.g. Young (1983a). 72 Gauche (1934), 8, 30–1, 44. 73 Glucker (1978); Lynch (1972). Watts (2006) now offers an excellent overview of the circles of philosophical teachers in both Athens and Alexandria through this period. 74 Dillon (1979), 76; cf. Glucker (1978), 143.

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The reality is that Didymus offers us some of the clearest insight into the ancient educational setting75 and there is a much stronger argument for reading other accounts according to his paradigm than vice versa. Yet nothing in his writings presumes either an institutional setting or authority. His selfidentity is rather constructed around an ascetico-intellectual appeal to Scripture as a teacher in the line of Origen. Hence, we should be somewhat cautious of assuming a priori a close relationship between Athanasius and Didymus as contemporary public figures and drawing significant conclusions from it.76 I find it hard to justify either Elliott’s views that Athanasius sponsored Didymus as a teacher of the Catechetical School in the 360s, proving that Origenist association was only disadvantageous at the end of the century,77 or Prinzivalli’s gradual drift of the strict Origenism of the School away from Athanasius’ own position and thus a diminution of its ecclesiastical significance.78 Nor is there much from the situation alone to justify Doutreleau’s depiction of Didymus as effectively an Athanasian stooge who ‘made the battle of Athanasius his own’ and felt that ‘the blows which struck the bishop affected him too’;79 indeed recent work on the pneumatology of both has gone further, critiquing Doutreleau’s arguments for dependency of the On the Holy Spirit on Athanasius’ Letters to Serapion and concluding that they are responding to different currents in contemporary angel pneumatology.80 Indeed, when one looks to the absolute antipathy of Athanasius towards not just academic groups but the language of teaching (didaskalia), as catalogued by Brakke,81 even Layton may be pressing the case in suggesting that ‘Athanasius bestowed his “approval” on an independent circle of scholars that promoted a theological outlook congenial to his own’;82 what Watts styles an independent but ‘officially sanctioned position as a Christian teacher’, perhaps equivalent to ideas of a poet laureate.83

75 On Aulus Gellius’ depiction of Calvisius Taurus and Porphyry’s of Plotinus, see Snyder (2000), 111–18; Dillon (1979), 71–6. Marrou (1956) still offers the most substantial engagement with ancient education in general. 76 The only biographical evidence linking the two besides Rufinus is the brief anecdote of his prophetic vision of the death of the Emperor Julian, which he is told he should report to Bishop Athanasius, Pall. Hist.Laus. 4; Soz. H.E. 6.3. There is particular need for caution, as the same tale is also ascribed to Theodore (Pall. Hist.Laus. 23) and Julianus Sabas (Thdt. H.E. 3.24). 77 78 79 Elliott (2000), 7. Prinzivalli (1988), 9–10. Doutreleau (1962), 15. 80 DelCogliano D.S.S., 37–40; contrast Doutreleau D.S.S., 25–40. 81 Brakke (1995), 66–70. 82 Layton (2004), 15–18. More significance should probably be placed on Rufinus’ (H.E. 11.7) claim that it was with God as his teacher that Didymus could advance so rapidly, becoming an orthodox teacher approved by Bishop Athanasius and the rest of the wise men in the Church of God. 83 Watts (2006), 182–3.

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‘ DIDYMUS THE ORIGENIST ’

Condemnation in Antiquity Earlier scholarship tended to see Didymus as escaping controversy in his own lifetime, as it was only after his death that Origen’s teachings were seriously attacked, particularly in Alexandria. It was Rhodon who would need to move the ‘Alexandrian School’ in response to the changing theological winds. However, the conception of anti-‘Origenism’ as a late fourthcentury phenomenon has begun to unravel84 and the role played by Didymus in the bitter personal disputes between Jerome and Rufinus has also received more critical thought. Consequently, we should no longer be looking to a controversy which did not explode until after Didymus’ demise but rather one that continued throughout his lifetime unabated and yet which did not particularly inconvenience him, nor cause him to change his views on any of the issues that would be so roundly condemned in the sixth century. I would suggest that Cappadocian caution, particularly regarding the preexistence of the soul, has concealed how readily this and other key Didymean positions could be maintained within the bounds of emerging orthodoxies, despite the writings of Methodius and Epiphanius and the different line taken by the Alexandrians Dionysius and Peter.85 Didymus clearly knew Methodius’ critique86 and yet his position does not become more moderated but apparently more ‘hard-line’, such as on the salvation of the Devil.87 Didymus’ own writing and probably his reading of Origen fit far more closely to the Justinian anathemas than do Origen’s. To construe the complexities of controversies in the late 390s properly, there probably needs to be greater separation of Theophilus’ novel dispute over the image of God within Evagrian-style Origenism and Epiphanius’ tirades against broader ‘Origenist’ conceptions of the Resurrection, which had gone on for over a century but flared up so dramatically in the 390s precisely because of the density of Jerome and Rufinus’ networks of relationships.88 Prior to Jerome’s stay on Salamis, Epiphanius’ influence may not have 84 Junod (1993); Prinzivalli (1999). Contrast Bienert (1972), 7–8, who could still see Epiphanius as the first to attack Origen. 85 Cf. Dechow (1988), 298–302, on pre-existence. 86 ZachT 3.402.17–406.12 (5.162–77) employs Method. Symp. 9; cf. Prinzivalli (1995b), 318–25; Layton (2004), 153–7, on Didymus’ awareness but only partial response to his critique of Origen’s doctrine of the resurrection body in PsT. 87 HiobT 1.18.24–19.1. 88 Clark (1992) was thus on the right track but failed to understand the novelty of Evagrius’ extension of traditional notions of incorporeality in prayer, anthropology, and theology; cf. Guillaumont (1962), 61; Ledegang (1999). The conflict does not derive from converts’ need for mental images (Clark (1992), 50 ff.) or a clash between learned and simplisitic spiritualities (Dechow (1988), 105–7) but, if we take Aphou’s confrontation with Theophilus seriously

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been felt any more widely than that of Marcellus, Apollinarius, and Eustathius (whose own orthodox credentials were equally a matter of debate).89 Outside of a very few documents, we find, even in Jerome, a continued, if cautious, use of and respect for Origen.90 The more pressing questions within the dominant and imperially defined theologies of the day would be to locate Origen’s doctrine of God within the emerging Trinitarian paradigms. And here we find not just trajectories of thought but specific apologetic works, such as Didymus’ Commentaries on the On First Principles and an anonymous fivebook Apology, endeavouring to claim Origen as championing the emergent Nicene consensus adopted at Constantinople in 381.91 Didymus’ own role within these debates is somewhat curious. Although he was clearly a significant figure for Jerome both as a commentator and a teacher whom he sought out and delighted in personal association with,92 the praise he lavishes upon his ‘dear Didymus’ as a model of apostolicity and spiritual perfection when translating On the Holy Spirit is so overblown that it clearly serves as part of his denigration of Ambrose in the battle for patronage.93 However, this rhetorical ploy would prove a hostage to fortune, thrown back in his face by Rufinus after his endorsement of Epiphanius’ anti-‘Origenist’ agenda.94 Ironically, the result is that Rufinus is probably more intimately associated with Didymus in the modern mind than he should be. Young’s view that ‘he spent a total of eight years at Didymus’ feet’ is not uncommon95 but the text points rather to eight years in Alexandria, when he associated with a series of famous ascetics:

(Drioton (1915); Clark (1992), 74–5), a dispute over whether the image is lost in embodiment. Theophilus’ initial position is that of Evagrian Origenism, which restricts the image to the immaterial union of the whole rational creation, e.g. Ceph. 6.34; Ep. ad. Mel. 3–6, whereas the traditional anti-anthropomorphite views of Origen and Didymus locate the image in incorporeal intellection, which is just as much a feature of embodied humanity, GenT 1.56.14–58.2; ZachT 2.173.11–26 (2.339–40) (Aphou’s arguments, which draw on Gen. 9:16 and assert that a defective image is no less an image, are entirely consonant with Didymean Origenism). 89 See Dechow (1988), 114–23, on this ‘core of conservatism’ equating anti-Origenism with anti-Arianism. 90 On Jerome’s later commentaries, see Kelly (1975), 292–4, 302–4; cf. Nemesius, who, though aware of anti-Origenist slander (Nat.Hom. 46; cf. Epiph. Pan. 64.2) and critical of his ‘ascents and descents of souls’ (22), utilizes his Comm.Gen. freely, accepting the soul’s preexistence (14). 91 Soc. H.E. 4.25; Phot. Bibl. 117. 92 Jer. Comm.Gal. prol. [PL 26.309a]; Comm.Eph. prol. [PL 26.440a–b]; Vir.Ill. 109; Ep. 84.3. Contrast the much barer notice in his Chronicon (published in 380) prior to this period of personal association, Chron. AD372 [Helm 246.13–17]: ‘Didymus the Alexandrian has written much about our doctrine through secretaries (per notarios). He lost his sight aged five and was also ignorant of the alphabet.’ 93 Jer. D.S.S.Did. prol.; Doutreleau (1987); Layton (2002a). 94 Ruf. Apol. 2.8–9; cf. 1.4; 2.12, 23–5, 43. Almost all the material here derives from the one passage of Jer. D.S.S.Did. prol. 95 Young and Teal (2010), 83; cf. Bardy (1910), 8; Doutreleau (1959), 70; Layton (2004), 14.

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I am the one who lived there [in Alexandria, in contrast to Jerome’s paltry thirty days] for God’s sake for six years, and again after a certain period for another two years, where Didymus dwelt—about whom alone you can pride yourself—and where lived others in no way inferior to him—men whom you did not even know by sight (quos tu ne facie tenus quidem nosti)—, Serapion and Menites, men who are brothers in maturity and manners and learning: where too dwelt aged Paul the disciple of Peter the Martyr: and to come to the teachers of the desert, to whom I used to devote myself more attentively and more frequently (quibus et attentius et frequentius vacabamus), where dwelt Macarius the disciple of Antony and the other Macarius and Isidore and Pambas, all friends of God who taught me the very things which they themselves had learned from God: how much material could I have for boasting from all of these, if such a thing were fitting or useful! But I blush even recounting these, while I wish to show you, not that (as you claim) my teachers failed my natural abilities, but rather – what I grieve over more! – that my natural abilities failed my teachers.96

Didymus’ name may well have only come into play because he was the only teacher Jerome and Rufinus had in common, rather than because he was a towering figure or indeed intimately tied to either pupil. Rufinus can disparage Jerome’s delight in such brief—and primarily literary—contact in contrast to his own rejection of such a dead engagement with texts in favour of the living voices of his ascetic teachers,97 whilst at the same time twisting the knife by constructing his behaviour as if a betrayal. Meanwhile, within the bounds of the controversy, Didymus can also function polemically for Jerome as a hermeneutical wedge divorcing Rufinus’ reading of Origen from the ‘correct’ Origenist one.98 The fourth-century evidence then suggests that Didymus was in fact not the moderate or cautious voice supposed by Orphanos99 but rather a ‘hard-line’ Origenist, albeit one working with very different notions of incorporeality from those of Evagrius.100 However, he was unaffected by this, not because he died prior to the height of the conflict but rather because throughout his lifetime it was a simmering dispute in which he had many ‘Origenist’ allies of varying hues. Concerns about his exegetical method and dogmatic position on minor points like the origin and destiny of the soul were too insignificant to feature in the fifth-century biographies, regardless of whether they would have supported or condemned him for them. It is the sixth century which marks the shift in his standing, as well as that of Origen.101 Reconstructions based on the On the Trinity tended towards

96

97 98 Ruf. Apol. 2.12 Ruf. Apol. 2.12; cf. H.E. 11.7. Jer. Adv.Ruf. 2.16. Orphanos (1974), 255. 100 Dechow (1988), 441, 447, speaks of a ‘Didymian/Evagrian tradition’ constituting ‘Nitrian Origenism’. However, there is a greater theological divergence between the two thinkers than a mere systematic Evagrian tendency. 101 Barsanuphius [PG 39.240, cap.27]; Cyr.Scyth. Vit.Sabae [PG 39.240, cap.28]; Evag.Schol. H.E. 4.38 [PG 39.240–1, cap.31]; Sophron. Ep.Syn. [PG 39.241, cap.33]. 99

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excusing Didymus, envisaging condemnation by mere association,102 and this view has tended to linger, as in Young’s initial assessment of ‘a simple, scholarly churchman, whose subsequent condemnation, for speculations not his own, was most unfortunate’.103 However, the charges are largely fair, though typically unsympathetic to his biblical and doctrinal motivations for propounding such views and ignorant of distinctions between him and Evagrius. Consequently, it is little surprise that most of his works have not survived, nor that the physical condition of parts of the Toura papyri, with their erased pages, suggests a process of active suppression.

‘The Most Open Defender of Origen’ Given Jerome’s description of him as ‘the most open defender of Origen’,104 it may seem puzzling at first that Origen is named only once in Didymus’ extant writings.105 However, even a cursory glance at the Didymean corpus reveals his massive debt to Origen, and it is not without reason that Layton speaks of ‘scholastic Origenism’, in the sense of careful restriction of debate to narrow questions of biblical exegesis refined over generations in defence of his ideas.106 Despite this, Stefaniw has attempted to read both Didymus and Evagrius as proponents of a broader ancient practice of ‘noetic exegesis’, declaring their identification as Origenists ‘not only posthumous . . . but also tendentious and uninformative’.107 And whereas her recognition of the broader social and philosophical background to their exegetical practice is welcome, the claim that ‘[Evagrius and Didymus] themselves did not perceive their work as part of an Origenist tradition or a question of promoting a given set of ideas called Origenist’108 simply cannot be upheld. For Didymus not only operates within the contours of Origen’s thought but he wrote the first apparent Christian non-biblical commentary, On Origen’s First Principles,109 which seems to have read into Origen a Nicene Trinitarian position,110 but on the fall of angels, descent of souls, and so forth he simply declared his views orthodox without revision.111 Thus, Jerome taunts Rufinus that he is excusing as heretical interpolations passages which ‘the clearly Catholic’ Didymus

102

Cf. Bardy (1910), 250–63. Young (1983a), 91; now revised (2010), 98–101, to address some of the issues raised here and by Layton (2004); cf. Doutreleau (1959), 46. 104 Jer. Adv.Ruf. 1.6. 105 In 1 Cor. 16.17–18 [Staab 13.21–3]; cf. EcclT 1.7.34–8.3 on Clement. 106 107 108 Layton (2004), 151–8. Stefaniw (2010), 30. Stefaniw (2010), 30. 109 110 111 Soc. H.E. 4.25.7. Jer. Adv.Ruf. 2.11. Jer. Adv.Ruf. 1.6. 103

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sought to defend as simply too complex for lesser men: for ‘those things that all of the Church denounce, Eusebius and Didymus defend as piously and catholically said’.112 And he will defend his own stance as only ever praising Didymus for his memory and the purity of his faith in the Trinity, not for the rest of his ideas which he wrongly took over from Origen.113 Consequently, Didymus himself or a member of his circle may well have been the author of the anonymous Apology for Origen noted by Photius which shocked the ninth-century patriarch by attempting to defend the, by then, heretical ideas of the pre-existence of souls and the assumption of other bodies (presumably the change from ethereal bodies in Paradise to the earthly ‘garments of skin’, as the author explicitly rejected the idea that ‘rational natures enter into the bodies of irrational ones’). But the defence of Origen is, for the most part, no exoneration from the charges, but an affirmation of the accusation; this man was not thus freed completely from the blasphemous opinions (ºÆçø  H ) of that man. For he both agrees with the pre-existence of souls (łıåH  ªaæ æı΅Ææ Ø ı ºªE), welding together this nonsense with scriptural and patristic sayings (as he supposes), and introduces the assumption of other bodies (øø ¼ººø NªØ I ºÅłØ ).114

Yet, concerning the Trinity, the writer was not only Nicene, but declared Origen’s intent to be so too.115 However, concerning the Trinity this man says none of the mistaken things (Pb H Kçƺ ø ). But he also says about Origen that he did not slip up (KçºŁÆØ) in opinion concerning the Trinity; rather setting himself against the heresy of Sabellius (which had become the great evil of his time) and fighting to establish most clearly the Trinity of persons (c H æø æØÆ K ÆæªÅ ), a Trinity distinct in many ways (ººE æØ ØÆç æıÆ ), it happened that Origen was carried away beyond what was fitting ( æÆ F æŒ ) and into the opposite, whence he seemed to be struck down in advance by the Arian disease.116

This is a particularly important work, as not only does it read Origen according to Didymus’, rather than Rufinus’, paradigm but it also appeals to a tradition of interpretation not identical to the School list but naming Dionysius of Alexandria, Demetrius, Clement, Pamphilus, and Eusebius of Caesarea as witnesses.117 112 Jer. Adv.Ruf. 2.16; cf. Ep. 84.10. The picture is somewhat complicated, though, by Jerome’s allegation that Didymus not Pamphilus was the co-author of Eusebius’ Apology, Adv.Ruf. 3.12; 1.8–10. 113 Jer. Adv.Ruf. 3.27. 114 Cf. Dechow (1988), 160, 255–6; Bienert (1987), 4–5, dates it c.400. 115 116 Phot. Bibl. 117. Phot. Bibl. 117. 117 Such a role for authority is rare within the commentaries but this may be a feature of his more dogmatic works, as we see a twin appeal to Scripture and the ‘ancient churchmen’ in D.S.S. 2 (1).

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Regardless of the original provenance of this Apology, Didymus, in his robust defence of Origen and his decision to commentate on the On First Principles, as if they were themselves a canonical text, clearly claims a conscious succession of thought; and it is this that Jerome recognizes by asking him to write Origen’s missing commentaries.118 However, we would be wrong to see here a claim to succession (diadochē) mediated through a line of teachers; rather, he is Origen’s successor by direct interpretation. The claim is surely to an Origenist biblicism, not a more general Alexandrian one. For all the need to speak now of multiple ‘Origenisms’ rather than a single systematic Origenist doctrine passed on and preserved by tradition—so that both the debate between Peter and Hieracas119 and that between Alexander and Arius120 can in some sense be conceived as intra-‘Origenist’ disputes—we see in Didymus not just an acceptance of many of Origen’s thoughts and interpretations but of the person of Origen himself, as in Eusebius. Despite the fact that both remain first and foremost rooted in Scripture, Origen’s person and works take on the role of a secondary authority; and though neither would use the label, their self-perception may fairly be described as Origenist biblicists, in the same sense that Porphyry and Iamblichus are properly Plotinian Platonists.121 Lack of evidence prevents easy comparison of this with the broad-based ‘Origenism’ of many desert ascetics122 or with other key Alexandrians, especially Pierius ‘the younger Origen’;123 and it is hard to determine either their influence on Didymus’ reading of Origen or indeed to what extent they perceived themselves as Origenists as opposed to spiritually focused exegetes, who metaphysically prioritized the intellectual over the sense-perceptible. Nonetheless, there is one other name with whom he consciously identifies himself, whose exegesis he elaborates, and whom he recommends to his students, namely Philo.124 Unlike fellow ‘Origenist’ Nemesius of Emesa,125 Didymus does not simply preserve Philo’s interpretations through the medium of Origen’s anonymous citation but displays direct knowledge. Significantly, he

118 Jer. Comm.Os. prol. [CCSL 76.5]; cf. the book Didymus wrote for Rufinus on Why Children Die, Jer. Adv.Ruf. 3.28. 119 e.g. Dechow (1988), 109. 120 e.g. Widdicombe (2000), 128–44. 121 Edwards (2001) cogently argues that Origen consistently rejects Plato and that as such his ‘Platonism’ goes little beyond a shared prioritization of the noetic over the sense-perceptible (though probably not of the universal over the particular). 122 Dechow (1988), 99, argues ‘Origenism coupled with anti-Arianism’ is a common characteristic of Egyptian monasticism but assumes that all consciousness of being Origen’s disciples is projected by historians (5). 123 Phot. Bibl. 119. 124 On the Philonic parallels or references, cf. Runia (1993), 197–204; Runia (1998), 335–47; commending the reading of Philo directly to his students, GenT 1.139.10–15. 125 Nem. Nat.Hom. 8; cf. Jaeger (1914) and Skard (1936) on his use of Orig. Comm.Gen.

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will even ignore Origen’s readings on occasion in favour of Philo’s, whose individualized and psychological emphasis he finds conducive to his portrayal of the soul’s ascent to virtue.126 Despite the general tendency to privilege ‘Antiochene’ readings as moral and protreptic in contrast to ‘Alexandrian’ philosophical and Christological speculations, this Philonic turn should not be seen as in any sense a concession to his anti-Origenist contemporaries. For Theodore of Mopsuestia attacks Origen precisely for preferring the Jewish Philo who thought Scripture a lie to the prophets, apostles, and Christ.127 Didymus is a self-styled successor of both Origen and Philo at a period when both were condemned loudly if not widely.

The Most Damning Judgement of All—Lack of Originality For modernity it is not his potential heresy but his derivative thought and lack of originality which render Didymus unworthy of study.128 With the exception of Ayres,129 most have tended to follow Layton in suggesting he represents a scholastic turn, consolidating tradition and minimizing tensions within Origen’s thought.130 Layton rightly questions the modern obsession with originality as a criterion but, through his narrow focus and lack of parallels, his sociological portrait seemingly underplays the novelty of Didymus’ synthesis. There can be no denying that he is prolix and repetitive, with a pedestrian turn of phrase that makes one yearn for the rhetorical flair of a Gregory of Nazianzus or even the biting polemic of an Athanasius. The reality is, though, that when studied in detail, Didymus displays a remarkable creativity within certain frameworks. He never ceases to evoke Origen’s hermeneutical environment but often he breaks with specific interpretations.131 We can trace movements back to Philo,132 forwards to Eusebius of Caesarea.133 As we shall see in later chapters, some areas of Origen’s speculation, such as the identification of the cloaks of skin in Gen. 3:21, are crystallized into incontrovertible 126 Simonetti (1994), 78; Runia (1998), 343–4, contrasts ZachT 3.398.25–400.13 (5.146–50)’s use of Phil. Agr. 133–4 with Orig. C.Cels. 6.16; Hom.Lev. 7.6; Geljon (2007). 127 Theod.Mops. C.Alleg. 4; cf. Runia (1993), 267–9. 128 Simonetti (1994), 77–8: ‘He was a particularly faithful disciple of Origen, and his every page, though less suggestive and brilliant than the master’s, reflects his interpretative method almost slavishly.’ 129 e.g. Ayres (2010), 71: ‘He offers an account of the Persons mutually indwelling as the substance of the others that is surpassed in clarity only when we get (just to be provocative) to Augustine.’ 130 Layton (2004), 5; cf. Young and Teal (2010), 101; Bienert (1972), 22. 131 132 Prinzivalli (1988), 55–94. Runia (1998), 335–47. 133 Daniélou (1963), 160–1; Doutreleau ZachT II, 563n.3.

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dogma, while brief asides such as the allusion to Stoic pre-passion are transformed into major aspects of Didymus’ thought. However, it is his move to flatten the Trinitarian hierarchy so essential to Origen’s thinking that represents the most significant reshaping.134 The shift is Athanasian,135 with its characteristic refusal to view the Son as divine by participation, and consequently has hardly been regarded as novel; but not only does Didymus go beyond Athanasius, anticipating or paralleling Cappadocian reflection,136 but he must be credited with an attempt to redefine Origenism both for his own times and retrospectively. Whether or not we should still see his On the Holy Spirit as directly dependent on Athanasius’ Letters to Serapion, Didymus goes far beyond his bishop, as both Ambrose and Jerome realized in attempting to bring his views to a wider audience.137 The key concept he develops is that of a distinction between beings which participate and those which may be participated in:138 Indeed since God is good, he is the source and origin of all good things. Therefore he makes good those to whom he imparts himself, while he himself has not been made good by another, but subsists as Good: thus he is one to be participated in and not one who participates (capabilis, non capax). His only-begotten Son too, being Wisdom and Sanctification does not become wise, but makes others wise and is not sanctified but sanctifies. Wherefore he too is one to be participated in and not one who participates.139

Language such as ‘only wise’ (Rom. 16:27) is taken as defining the Father as called wise in a fundamentally different sense from all else which merely shares in his wisdom, namely that he is a wellspring of wisdom, that he begets wisdom.140 The universe fundamentally divides in two, not along the traditional division between the sense-perceptible and the noetic or intelligible (though these still remain important categories in his thought), but between 134

Heron (1979), 307–9, noted the significance but because of his focus on D.S.S. saw it as a theological loss rather than the stimulus to the new focus on virtue that I suggest. 135 Anatolios (1998) offers a good introduction to Athanasius’ doctrine of God. 136 Meredith (1995). Beeley (2008) offers a rather different portrayal of Gregory of Nazianzus, whereby the divine unity continues to be predicated primarily of the Father, which would maintain a considerable distinction from Didymus. 137 Doutreleau D.S.S., 25–40; whereas Staimer (1960), 118–33, unconvincingly suggested Didymus’ priority. Ayres et al. D.S.S., 37–40, have recently offered a critique of Doutreleau’s four areas of dependence, adducing unconnected parallels in Cyril of Jerusalem, and it may be that they are right to emphasize the different contexts of their responses. What is clear is that Didymus does indeed go far beyond Athanasius, particularly in the area discussed here which Ayres has since styled the doctrine of the ‘Undiminished Giver’; cf. Ayres (2010); and intriguingly, given my broader thesis of Didymus as representing a movement beyond Origen through a ‘return’ to Philo, it is to Philo that Ayres traces the origins, e.g. Opif. 6.23; 23.69; 24.72; Gig. 25–7. 138 D.S.S. 16–19 (5); PsT 4 Suppl.250.16–20; cf. Athan. Ep. ad Serap. 1.22–3, 27; Heron (1979), 302–4. 139 140 D.S.S. 17 (5). PsT 5.333.4–11.

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God and creation—defined not as uncreated and created but as participable and participating. The Holy Spirit would be admitted by all Christians as belonging to the former class and so his divinity is established.141 Therefore the actual name ‘Holy Spirit’ is not an empty term, but is demonstrative of the underlying essence (subiacentis essentiae), something associated (socia) with the Father and Son and fundamentally different (penitus aliena) from creatures. For since creatures may be divided into invisible and visible, that is incorporeal and corporeal, the Holy Spirit is not one of the corporeal substances—for it is an inhabitant of the soul and sense, a producer of speech, wisdom and knowledge, nor one of the incorporeal ones—for all these are able to participate (capacia) in wisdom and the rest of the virtues and sanctification.142

This represents a massive metaphysical shift from Origen’s chain of being, according to which lower levels participate in successive stages and participation in the three persons of the Trinity can be distinguished.143 In Origen one can see both a differentiated descending ontological participation, whereby God the Father is source of being to all creation, the Son (being less than the Father) is source of reason to the rational creation, and the Holy Spirit (being still less) source of holiness to the saints alone; and a parallel ascending soteriological movement from virtue in the Holy Spirit, through illumination by the Son to union with the Father. Some slight remnant of this dynamic Trinitarianism remains in Athanasius’ maintenance of the prepositional operators—the Father acts through the Son by the Holy Spirit144—and his understanding of ‘of one being’ (homoousios) as implying an asymmetric relationship.145 Whereas in Didymus, this distinction of operation largely disappears and the language ‘of one being’ (homoousios) is simply taken as designating a metaphysical class: anything that is receptive of the same qualities can be styled ‘of one being’.146 He therefore speaks of ‘a single participation (assumptio) in the Trinity’147 and stresses that Scripture defines all three persons as source equally. For God is a well (Ū), and his Word is a well: ‘You have left behind the well of wisdom’ (Bar. 3:12); ‘From you comes the well of life’ (Ps. 35:10); and again God says, ‘They have abandoned me, the well of living water’ (Jer. 2:14–15). And the 141

D.S.S 54 ff.(12–13); cf. PsT 5.297.3–5; In Ps. 17.47a [Mühlenberg fr.148, 1.207.27–208.6]. D.S.S. 10 (4). 143 Torjesen (1989), 338–42; e.g. Orig. Princ. 1.3.5–8; cf. Eus.Caes. Praep.Evang. 7.15. 144 Athan. Ep. ad Serap. 1.30, 35. 145 Athan. Syn. 51; cf. Pettersen (1995), 146–60; Prestige (1959), 213–15; Kelly (1977), 245–6. 146 HiobT 4.402.9–10; ZachT 2.253.10–12 (3.261); cf. Orig. Princ. 4.4.9. Unlike Athanasius, Didymus is happy to apply such language to humanity, PsT 3.130.26–30; GenT 1.62.14–21, and speaks of Christ as having both a soul and a body consubstantial with ours, In Ps. 15.9c–10 [Mühlenberg fr. 97, 1.180.20–5]; GenT 2.214.24–25.1; cf. C.Man. 7. Even in the works typically dated to the 360s and the 370s he anticipates the Constantinopolitan and Evagrian sense. 147 D.S.S. 75 (16). 142

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Holy Spirit is a well, if indeed all graces flow from him and have their beginning from him.148

McGuckin credits Didymus with rescuing Origen’s inheritance for Homoousian thinkers, such as the Cappadocians, and providing an alternative reading of the great exegete to that current in Caesarea.149 This conclusion is probably premature, given the lack of understanding of any of the Cappadocians’ relationship to Didymus,150 but the familiarity of the conflation of these lines of thought should not obscure its original novelty. Certainly, I would see Athanasius as not so much an Origenist in the same vein but rather as exploiting his name at times in order to appeal to ‘Origenist’ ascetic circles, such as that of Antony, to adopt his political as well as theological cause.151 I would suggest that it is precisely this metaphysical shift in flattening the Trinitarian hierarchy which translates Didymus’ conception of the Christian life and journey of the soul from a succession of discrete stages centred around illuminative ascent, as in Clement and Origen, to parallel movements in participative imitation of the divine qualities, allowing a far greater role to virtue.152 It is in attempting to offer a thoroughly Nicene Origenism fit for the fourth century153 that Didymus finds himself propounding what I have styled a ‘virtue-Origenism’. He represents a conscious turn to virtue as his most fundamental definition of humanity, and this brings with it a psychological and individualizing turn which is not so much foreign to, as unimportant within, his master’s thought. Didymus thus breathes new life into Origenist exegesis and more specifically a spirit of moral asceticism exactly suited to the Egyptian sympathies of his day.

‘ DIDYMUS THE INTELLECTUAL ASCETIC ’ Ultimately it is these burgeoning currents of Egyptian asceticism which provide his natural milieu, and this has been gradually noticed by a number 148

PsT 5.297.3–5. McGuckin (2001), 45; cf. Logan (1999). Contrast Beeley (2008), 284. 150 Pruche (1948) argued rather for Didymus’ dependence on the Cappadocians and in particular the influence of Basil of Caesarea’s D.S.S. upon Didymus’ work rather than vice versa. However, DelCogliano (2010) offers a detailed consideration of the two pneumatological works and sees a clear contraction of Didymus’ argument in his Cappadocian contemporary, while also suggesting a specifically anti-Eunomian context of 360–5, some ten years before that of Basil. 151 Athan. Decr. 27; cf. Brakke (1995), 200 ff. 152 Brakke (1995), 145, 198, tentatively argues for a similar shift from illumination to virtue in Athanasius but to do so he probably over-forces the heuristic divide between knowledge and virtue; cf. 192. 153 On the revised scholarly approach to Nicaea and the need to talk more carefully about strategies and ‘Nicene theologies’, cf. Ayres (2004); Behr (2004). 149

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of scholars.154 For all that early stereotyping has sought to distinguish the desert and the academy,155 Didymus the teacher belongs in ascetic circles. It is the leading monastic theorizers of his day who seek him out—Palladius, Rufinus, and Jerome; it is among ascetics that he is read and praised— Evagrius, Ammonius, ‘the orders of the monks’.156 Theodoret’s classification of Didymus and Ephraim ‘among ascetics and followers of virtue’ says more than that they simply were not bishops;157 while it is Rufinus’ connection to the episcopal authority of Athanasius and the rest of the wise men of the city which seems like special pleading to justify his orthodoxy.158 It is probably this context which prompts some of Didymus’ more unusual interests, such as his opposition to the Hieracites. This may well have had less to do with Athanasius’ political machinations159 than an intra-ascetic (perhaps even intra-Origenist) dispute on the materiality of the soul and its origin in virtue. For Didymus’ attacks do not echo those of Athanasius on determinism or the denigration of marriage.160 That is not to say that he has no interest in such issues but rather that he tends to present them in isolation or within an anti-Manichaean context.161 Rather his explicit critique of the Hieracites across the entire corpus focuses on their belief in a material soul: So then [the Ecclesiast] is referring to the origin (ª Ø ) of them all according to what is bodily (øÆØŒ )—it has come ‘from the ground’ (å) (cf. Eccl. 3:20). But the soul is not from the ground even though some are so mad as to think so. See, these argue that it is co-sown (ı Øæ Å ), and almost all heretics (ŒÆŒ Ø) think this. At any rate the Hieracites say that the soul is sown with the body and destroyed with it too.162

If Dechow is correct in reading Peter of Alexandria’s On the Resurrection as primarily attacking Hieracas’ interpretation of Origen, rather than Origen himself, then we see here the same nexus of issues,163 albeit from the apparently contradictory stance of a too-material soul, rather than an immaterial resurrection. As we shall see in Chapter 5, Didymus would have seen precisely this materiality of the soul as the basis for the heretical Hieracite belief that 154

Bennett (1997), 17–19; Layton (2004), 19–26. On the trend, cf. Rubenson (1990), 91–9. 156 See also the brief tale of the anchorite Alexandra who left the city to be walled up in a tomb for ten years, which he recounts to Palladius, Hist.Laus. 5. On the ‘intellectual asceticism’ of Evagrius and the Tall Brothers, cf. Soc. H.E. 6.7. 157 158 Thdt. H.E. 4.(26)29.4–30.1. Ruf. H.E. 11.7. 159 Layton (2004), 17–18. On Athanasius’ campaign against the ‘school’ of Hieracas, cf. Brakke (1995), 44–57. 160 e.g. Athan. Ep. ad Virg. 1. 161 Layton (2004), 17–18, suggests GenT 1.102.4–7 and ZachT 2.108.9–11 (2.64); 2.154.18–25 (2.264) attack Hieracas’ depreciation of marriage anonymously but they fit better the tone of C. Man. 162 EcclT 2.102.23–7; HiobT 4.387.13–388.1; PsT 1.53.23–4. 163 Dechow (1988), 109; cf. Epiph. Pan. 67; 55.5; Ancor. 82.3; Vit.Epiph. 27 [PG 41.57b–60a]. 155

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infants would be denied salvation if they died before gaining knowledge of the truth;164 meanwhile, he seems to extend their principles, which probably separated a resurrection of mind (nous) from the choic, material soul, into a flat assertion that the souls of the wicked are not resurrected to judgement at all but simply pass into non-being. Even a sinner has a deathless (IŁ Æ ) soul and so is never destroyed. For one must not agree with those who say that the souls of the immoral end in non-being (e c k ), as the Stoics suppose among the Greeks and the Hieracites among those who are sort-of-Christian.165

Unlike some of the other named heretics in the extant works, Hieracas seems to have been a somewhat insignificant figure on the wider stage. However, his geographical proximity, his interpretation of Origen, and the repercussions of his mistaken metaphysics for a moral ascetic seem to drive Didymus to give his name a much greater prominence in this context—but only in this context. If this perhaps can be seen as evidence for the concerns of a local intellectual asceticism, how much more the anecdotes deliberately setting out to construct Didymus’ identity with reference to Antony the Great. The very prevalence of the separate traditions of Antony visiting Didymus and consoling him on the loss of his sight by pointing to his deep spiritual vision suggests that Didymus was himself the source of this vignette, and employed it almost as an advert for his lectures. Indeed even blessed Antony consoled this man, with marvellous words. When he came down to Alexandria from the Thebaid to offer testimony with the faith of Athanasius against the Arians, he said to him, ‘Didymus, don’t let it upset you at all that you see without your fleshly eyes. For you only lack the sort of eyes which mice and flies and lizards have. Rather rejoice since you have the sort of eyes that angels have, and with which God is seen, eyes by which a great light of knowledge has been kindled in you.’166

The world view is Origenist with a clear reference to Origen’s doctrine of the spiritual senses which parallel the physical ones and which must be awakened and nurtured towards true apprehension of God and the heavenly realm.167 Didymus’ physical defect is neither to be mourned, nor blamed, but rather becomes a sign of his spiritual prowess. His authority as a teacher thereby rests in his intellectual charisma, the authenticity of his Scriptural insight established by appeal to the reputation and status of the father of Egyptian

164

165 Epiph. Pan. 67.2. PsT 1.53.23–4. Ruf. H.E. 11.7; cf. Jer. Ep. 68.2; Pall. Hist.Laus. 4; Apopth.Pat.R 218; Soc. H.E. 4.25.9–11; Soz. H.E. 3.15.4–5. On the sources and significance of this tradition, cf. Bardy (1910), 3; Rubenson (1990), 173–4; Layton (2004), 19–23. 167 Orig. Comm.Cant. 1; Princ. 1.1.9; cf. Jerome’s connection of this tale to having the ‘eye of the bride’ from the Song of Songs, Ep. 68.2; D.S.S.Did. prol. 166

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asceticism.168 The two men are portrayed, whether accurately or not, as inhabiting a common world, somewhat independent of—or at least more significant than—either institutional or episcopally mandated ecclesial polity. We must thus develop new understandings not only of the use of Origen’s thought in this period but also both the prevailing ascetic and didactic trends.169 Interestingly Rubenson in his brief study of Antony’s Letters has pointed towards a much more intellectual and ‘Origenist’ figure than traditional portraits drawing on Athanasius, but this has not met with universal acceptance.170 It is perhaps ironic, though, that present scholarly interest in ascetic figures, so often motivated by modern sympathies towards an antiintellectual affective spirituality, may well result in a new appreciation of their intellectual depth. All in all, Didymus should probably be accorded a greater significance within Egyptian intellectual asceticism than at present and a lesser worldwide reputation than was once presumed. He is not Leipoldt’s Trinitarian genius nor Bardy’s mediocre recluse—even less an Athanasian stooge providing a veneer of academic respectability—but rather an exegete whose primary concern is to employ Origen’s legacy to counter heresy and depict a framework for the soul’s ascent to virtue. He is a teacher first and foremost, whose condescension to the level of his students in line-by-line exposition of Scripture opens up their transformation through remembered virtue, a virtue simultaneously dogmatic and ascetic, practical and contemplative.

168 Similarly, in another anecdote, it is Antony and his personal relationship with him that Didymus uses to chide the reluctant Palladius, Hist.Laus. 4. 169 Cf. Dechow (1988); Elm (1994); Clark (1999); Goehring (1999). The shift in perceptions of ‘orthodoxy’ derives chiefly from Pachomian relationships to Nag Hammadi texts, Wisse (1978). 170 Rubenson (1990); for a critique, cf. Gould (1995).

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2 Teaching Virtue The key designation which underpins each of the diverse perceptions of Didymus as bulwark against heresy, ascetic guru, biblical commentator, and defender of Origen is that of teacher. And so, before we move on to detailing Didymus’ works and his hermeneutical principles, it is worth briefly considering his conception of ecclesiastical authority, his classroom setting, his presentation of teachers, and finally his understanding of Christ the Teacher as mimetic paradigm.

THE P RIMACY OF THE TEACHER Overviews of the fourth century tend to assume a shift away from charismatic and individualistic notions towards a structured and recognized hierarchy, typically citing Arius’ controversy with Alexander of Alexandria as the breaking point.1 Arius, like Origen before him, seems to have offered public lectures in the city twice a week on Wednesdays and Fridays in addition to his liturgical teaching in his church in Baucalis;2 yet his scholastically constructed self-identity is deemed by Williams already an ‘anachronism’, with the Thalia’s appeal to be judged against such standards as deeply out of step with urban Christianity.3 By the time of Athanasius, we see a determined rejection of any use of the language of teacher (didaskalos), except as applied to Christ alone,4 along with the active suppression of teaching circles such as that of Hieracas in Leontopolis and the invention of Antony as an anti-intellectual saint.5 As Brakke notes, the tone of his Festal Letters of 352 and 367 is striking in its focus on Christ and the Scriptures as the sole teachers of the faith and clearly

1 2 4 5

Williams (1999); cf. Williams (2001), 82–91; Rousseau (2002), 124–52. 3 Epiph. Pan. 3.153.16; cf. Soc. H.E. 5.22 on Origen. Williams (2001), 85–6. On his pejorative use of such vocabulary, see Brakke (1995), 66–70. Brakke (1995); Brakke (1994).

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has in mind particular local ecclesiastical communities such as the Melitians.6 So we might expect either the suppression of academic groups such as that of Didymus or else their assimiliation to his episcopal vision. However, the evidence seems to point to neither. Or at least, if Athanasius did offer his blessing to Didymus’ schoolroom in the hope of bringing at least one such urban study group within the scope of his episcopal authority, as Brakke and Layton suggest,7 then he seems to have failed. Whatever Rufinus’ agenda in asserting a connection between teacher and bishop, it seems clear— as was noted in Chapter 1—that Didymus does not look to the episcopal Athanasius for authorization of his status as authentic teacher of the Scriptures but rather to the ascetic-intellectual, and likely fellow ‘Origenist’, Antony the Great. For all that Athanasius is styled by some a mafioso-like enforcer,8 the propaganda war he began with his Life of Antony to present a deliberately antiintellectual and non-scholastic asceticism as the only authentic Christian philosophy may not have held universal sway. In Didymus’ view, the teacher remains the highest spiritual authority, in much the same vein as Origen,9 with a profound focus on personal spiritual progress as justifying the authenticity of his exegesis and teaching.10 Without knowing more about his context and relationship to Athanasius, it is impossible to be sure whether this represents a more general continued independence of urban study groups, despite the Bishop’s best efforts, or else a realignment through appeals to ascetic independence.11 Certainly by Didymus’ later life, it was the charisma of ascetic figures such as Pachomius or Ammonius which would need to be subjugated to episcopal authority through attempted ordination;12 and it may be naive to suppose that the simple geographical proximity of Didymus’ classroom to his bishops necessitated any greater control than they were able to exert over Evagrius and the Nitrian intellectual ascetics. What is clearer is Didymus’ lack of interest in episcopal authority. References to bishops are few and far between, and episcopal interpretations of a biblical text carry no more or less weight than any other.13 Meanwhile, all episcopal authority remains based on consistency of life and teaching rather than any concept of office, just as it does for all other figures.14 Consequently,

6

Athan. Ep.Fest.(syr.) 2 (352); Ep.Fest. 39 (cop.) (367). 8 Brakke (1995), 199; Layton (2004), 17–18. e.g. Barnes (1993). 9 Cf. Trigg (1981); though such claims fit within a larger conception of ‘apostolicity’; cf. Alviar (1993), 110–11. 10 ZachT 1.77.25–8 (1.343); 3.322.8–9 (4.174). 11 Evagrius subsumes Didymus’ teaching status to his own charismatic ideal of the Gnostic, styling him ‘the great and gnostic teacher’, Gnost. 48 [=Soc. H.E. 4.23.70–1]. 12 Elm (1994), 362; Theoph.Alex. Ep.Syn. [=Jer. Ep. 92]. 13 ZachT 1.64.15–65.4 (1.284–6); PsT 3.148.23–4. 14 EcclT 1.46.13–14; HiobT 2.183.31–4; PsT 5.296.16–19; 1.46.18–26. 7

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in his discussion of ‘elders’ he can elide all distinction between those named in the Old and New Testaments, as well as those ‘who are ranked into the ecclesiastical levels’, including bishops. They all need the same characteristics of leadership, namely ‘monogamy, excellent raising of children and having been fashioned according to the rest of the virtues’, and they are to ‘shepherd the flock not by compulsion but voluntary agreement’.15 And it is entirely in line with this that an interesting fragment noted by Bennett employs Acts 20:34–5 to criticize bishops who exploit their role for financial gain: by doing so, they fail to imitate Christ; moreover, since it is more blessed to give than to receive, ‘giving should be preferred by bishops’.16 By contrast, in his comments on Psalm 14:5, the teacher deserves his pay.17 It is teachers who are the guards of the Church, who have ministering angels and are classed as the perfect: The ‘guards’ of this ‘house’ (cf. Eccl. 12:3) are those deployed to watch over it either by . . . or by their teaching (
Ø
ÆŒÆºÆ fi ). And if you understand this of the Church, then they are the teachers (ƒ
Ø
ŒÆºØ). And in fact angels accompany them. At any rate they said about Peter, ‘It is his angel’ (Acts 12:15). Even the little ones in the Church have angels ‘who always gaze upon the Father’s face’ (Mt. 18:10). And if the little ones have them, how much more do the perfect!18

Whereas elsewhere Peter the Apostle is being developed as a model of the bishop, we see here that for Didymus he remains the perfect teacher and he can thus appropriate details such as this from Acts 12:15 to teachers in general.19 This is not to suggest in any way that Didymus has a fluid conception of authority, nor that he is himself tolerant of the doctrinal diversity that he and such study groups in all likelihood represent. In a lengthy treatment of the closing of the marketplace in Eccl. 12:5, he parses his frequent language of ‘ecclesiastical’ (ecclesiastikē didaskalia) and explains that ‘ecclesiastical’ does not mean Christian in some general sense but orthodox, the ‘official’ teaching (suneleustikē).20 Yet this control of doctrine belongs precisely to the teachers who open or close it as they see fit, depending on whether there are suitable pupils.21

15

16 ZachT 2.152.26–153.18 (2.258–9). In Acts 20.34–5 [Bennett (2001), 71–2]. 18 In Ps. 14.5 [Mühlenberg 1]. EcclT 6.344.19–23. 19 Steiger (2010) notes the focus on Peter in GenT is upon his condescension and the root of both his and Paul’s authority in prophetic participation in the Word of God; cf. GenT 2.153.15–20; 2.246.5–247.26; however, he is perhaps drawn back too much to traditional expectation in concluding that ultimately Peter and Paul form distinct archetypes for Didymus—Peter wielding the institutional charism of the shepherd, Paul the personal charisma of the teacher. 20 EcclT 6.360.20–1; cf. his claims of fidelity to ‘the ancient belief of the synod of the faithful’, in contrast to those who have been ostracized from it, ZachT 3.337.6–10 (4.235). 21 EcclT 6.351.21–352.10. 17

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If we look to the evidence of the brief Minutes of the Dialogue with a Heretic, we see this being borne out in fact as well as theory, as it is Didymus the teacher, rather than some other authority figure such as bishop or abbot, who interrogates the presumed Apollinarian. Although unfortunately it is brief, the tone is strikingly reminiscent of Origen’s Dialogue with Heracleides, which was discovered in the same cave at Toura. The occasion seems official and formal, and it is surely significant both that minutes were recorded which survived into a sixth-century monastic collection and that the second speaker is labelled ‘Heretic’ throughout.

THE SCHOOLROOM SETTING For all that I would argue for an informality of Didymus’ role within emerging Church structures and for an ongoing appeal to the charismatic authority of the teacher, rather than the institutions of episcopacy, this does not equate to informality of style or setting.22 Rather the Lecture-Notes on Ecclesiastes and Psalms, uniquely preserving dictation of Didymus’ lectures on the whole of Ecclesiastes and Psalms 20–44, complete with student questions,23 attest to his highly structured pedagogical setting and technique. Unlike the other Toura works or indeed the catena fragments, which display traces of oral delivery but are essentially literary works, edited and revised to differing degrees, the Lecture-Notes are long and meandering, contain time references, all-too-human exchanges, repetitions, and even accidental recapitulations of lemmata (presumably after a break between lectures). Nelson has made some attempt to reconstruct the timescale24 and one is clearly looking at courses with morning and afternoon sessions (though not necessarily continuously) over a period of weeks. It is hard to know whether we are dealing with a pupil’s private notes or a secretary’s record of lectures, perhaps for a rich patron or for Didymus’ later editorial attentions. What is clear is that Didymus returned to some lecture series and did not attempt to reproduce precisely the same explanations; for his published Commentary on the Psalms, as transmitted in the catenae, clearly represents not just a revision of the extant Lecture-Notes but most likely the revision of a different series of lectures. 22

On ancient reading groups more generally, see Snyder (2000) and Watts (2006). On the questions, see Prinzivalli (1985); Prinzivalli (1988), 105–20. 24 Nelson (1995), 21. This PhD dissertation remains by far the most detailed analysis of the ‘scholastic setting’ of Didymus’ exegesis in the Toura commentaries and contrasts interestingly with Gauche’s (1934) attempt to analyse the educational framework of the De Trinitate via the lens of Gregory Thaumaturgus’ Panegyric of Origen. 23

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The teaching process for these exegetical classes was essentially a continuous lemmatic commentary, with frequent digressions to cover other doctrinal or even philosophical themes incidentally. A short lemma was read out from Scripture, presumably by an assistant or student; Didymus then paraphrased the citation and proceeded to explain it on a number of levels, introducing any appropriate background information, a host of illuminating scriptural parallels, and occasionally a doctrinal excursus; finally, students were able to ask questions which Didymus would answer, generally fairly briefly. The tone suggests a class rather than an individual discussion between teacher and student, and there can be no question of these lectures being intended for catechumens or as a Christian replacement for the standard ancient liberal rhetorical education. To judge from Didymus’ comments, the audience was literate and Christian, able to look up further references by themselves.25 And interestingly for those who may wish to superimpose the curriculum from Gregory Thaumaturgus’ Panegyric upon the fourth-century school, there is little or no suggestion of complementary introductory teaching on ethics or philosophy. Such themes are introduced in the lectures as Didymus deems appropriate and, in the case of philosophical stances, with far more explanation than is typical for biblical matters.26 Consequently, one gains the impression that these courses were intended to stand alone. Nonetheless this need not imply any formal building or post: Origen and Justin Martyr taught in their own homes, while countless philosophers declaimed their lectures in the marketplace. Archaeological evidence from excavations of fourth-century Kom-el-Dikka does point to purpose-built lecture halls near the baths—each with three to four rows of seats and accommodating sixty to eighty people.27 When Palladius visits Didymus in the 380s, he comes to his house (oikos), which significantly Didymus styles a cell (kella). Once when he was forcing me to pray in his house (K fiH YŒø fi ÆPF) and I did not want to, he told me this anecdote: Blessed Antony came into this cell ( N c ŒººÆ Æ Å) three times to see me and when I asked him to pray, he immediately fell to his knees in this very cell; he did not make me repeat my request, and taught me about obedience by his action. So then, if you are following in his footsteps literally and in his way of life, in as much as you live as a monk and a foreigner for the sake of virtue, abandon every contentiousness.28

The force of the anecdote resides in the fact that this is the very spot where Antony fell to his knees and prayed decades before; but where should we locate this settled base and is it where he taught?

25

GenT 1.61.10–11; 1.119.2–4; ZachT 3.364.15–20 (5.29); 3.377.18–23 (5.78). e.g. EcclT 1.16.11–18. On Didymus’ use of an ‘accepted reservoir’ of school examples, see Nelson (1995), 51–82. 27 28 Haas (1997), 155. Pall. Hist.Laus. 4. 26

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Despite the evident possibilities for study on a serious scale among desert anchorites, witnessed by Jerome’s own ascetic practice in Chalcis in the mid-370s,29 and more recent scholarly recognition of ascetic groups’ engagement with surrounding communities,30 we are probably not dealing with either Bardy’s recluse in a Nitrian cave, nor Dechow’s commuter travelling between urban schoolroom and a monastic cell at Cellia.31 Rather, we should look to the neglected urban ascetic movements, as now Layton does,32 but probably with Didymus operating from home rather than an official schoolroom. Jerome’s tour seems to separate his month-long stay with Didymus from his travels in the desert;33 while Rufinus geographically distinguishes two groups of his teachers34—a desert circle of the two Macarii, Isidore, and Pambas; then one nearer the city, comprising Didymus, Serapion, Menites, and Paul (possibly associated with the group of contemplatives on an island to the north of Lake Mareotis mentioned by Evagrius).35 Whatever the precise nature of his ascetic neighbours and contacts, Layton’s portrayal of Didymus’ classroom as ‘a community dedicated to the collaborative investigation of biblical texts’36 belies the lack of continuity and mutuality in this group. With the possible exception of his ‘hearer’ (auditor) Ambrose of Alexandria,37 the main feature of his known students, Jerome, Rufinus, Palladius, is their transience. This was not untypical of non-Christian philosophical ‘schools’ of the time, and there is usually a distinction between an ‘inner circle’ (committed to the school and often delegated to teach introductory material) and a more fluid wider audience.38 The student questions evidence a frequent lack of understanding of key Didymean ideas,39 with Didymus consistently seeing himself as condescending to his students’ level and exhibiting signs of frustration: If you remembered what you heard, you wouldn’t always be bothered by such things!40

29 Kelly (1975), 48 ff. Jerome took a substantial library, employed ‘alumni’ to copy works, undertook serious study with a Hebrew teacher, and maintained an extensive correspondence through Evagrius of Antioch (Ep. 15.5; 5.2; 125.12; 7.1). 30 Goehring (1990). 31 Dechow (1988), 147, based on the doubtful testimony of Ps.-Ruf. Hist.Mon. 20.7(21), 12 (24). 32 Elm (1994), 331–72; Brakke (1995), 57–79; Clark (1999), 33–8; Layton (2004), 15–26. 33 Kelly (1975), 124–8. 34 Ruf. Apol. 2.12. 35 Evag. Pract. 98; cf. Guillaumont and Guillaumont (1971), 706–708n. (Possibly a site with Philonic connection; cf. Philo Vit.Contemp.) On the suburban cells, see Haas (1997), 258–62. 36 Layton (2004), 25. 37 Jer. Vir.Ill. 126. He wrote works against Apollinarius and on Job. 38 Watts (2006), 155–68. 39 e.g. the series of questions on º Ø, Ø E, and ŒÇ Ø, PsT 3.178.32–179.17. 40 PsT 3.226.10.

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Even where a modern commentator has recognized the validity of a question or insight,41 this is lost on Didymus, since for all his awareness of his own limitations, he does not see his lectures as a shared endeavour.

THE ROLE OF THE CHRISTIAN TEACHER The ‘virtue-Origenism’ that Didymus espouses not only prioritizes the role of virtue as both the proximate and ultimate goal of Christian living but also offers a considerable role for the teacher. It must be conceded that Christian thought in general is biblically and ecclesiologically predisposed towards notions of mimetic pedagogy. But, even among the Christologically oriented proponents of a participative ontology, such imitation is cast in different terms and the typological differences can be marked: Origen’s key notion is that of the apostle;42 Gregory of Nyssa and Philo prefer the Mosaic hierophant;43 meanwhile, as we have seen, Athanasius builds up episcopacy, but through appeal to ascetic heroicism. That Didymus, reverting to Clement’s stance,44 prefers to portray both Christ and the perfect Christian as necessarily teachers is therefore instructive. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, Didymus’ consistent hermeneutical landscape is of the transformation of the Christian by virtue and into virtue. Across the most diverse texts he finds through ‘elevated’ exegesis a vision of moral progress which broadly correlates to three states: the initiates, those progressing, and the perfect.45 Such language, directly borrowed from Origen, is rich in overtones from Stoic and Middle Platonist philosophy and also mystery cults,46 and yet it is often the grammatical paradigm which is played 41

Cf. Layton (2000), 277–81, on PsT 3.221.28–222.14. Alviar (1993), 110–11; though Origen can make similar claims to Didymus that the perfect Christian is necessarily a teacher, e.g. Hom.Num. 9.9; cf. Daniélou (1955), 56–63, who deems Origen’s treatment of the role of the teacher as more practically than theoretically orientated, calling upon teachers to strive for perfection for their pupils’ sake. 43 G.Nyss. Inscr.Ps.; Vit.Mos.; cf. Philo Vit.Mos. 44 Clem.Alex. Paed. Contrast Athanasius’ restriction of the title to Christ, Brakke (1995), 66. The Evagrian Gnostic should probably be seen more as angelic than didactic, Ceph. 6.76; Schol. Eccl. 38. 45 ZachT 2.266.11–18 (3.299); GenT 1.69.8–9; EcclT 5.278.21–8. 46 On the Stoic distinction between the homo proficiens and sapiens, see Sen. Ep.Mor. 71.30–6; 72.6–11; by this period Aristotelian æŒ  is thoroughly Platonized through the Stoic lens, Apul. Plat. 2.3 (224); 2.19–22 (246–52); Diog.Laert. Vit. 7.127; Dillon (1977), 301–2, 329. The three-stage cultic initiation (e
æ , e º ª ,  K   Æ) Christianized by Clem.Alex. Strom. 1.(28)176.1–2; Protr. (12)120.1–2, had already been aligned with a tripartite philosophical curriculum of ethics, physics, and epoptics (reading ‘K  ØŒ’ instead of de Lubac’s neologism ‘K ØŒ’) and the Solomonic corpus at least by Orig. Comm.Cant. prol.; cf. Edwards (2002), 140. 42

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up in Didymus’ classroom.47 The advance in virtue parallels the school progress from letters to syllables to true reading and writing. Further, progress in either doctrinal piety or practical virtue is such that it cannot be kept to oneself but must spill over into education.48 Consequently, teaching is not a profession or specific vocation but the proximate goal of all Christians, prior to eschatological unanimity. For they become light out of light (çH KŒ çøe ) in such a way that they enlighten (çøÇ Ø) the rest through their teaching (
Øa B
Ø
ÆŒÆºÆ ).49

We might suppose that this is simply representative of basic Christian sympathy for the more immature in the journey of faith, and indeed this is a common feature of the commentaries. In an elevated reading justifying Abraham’s pretence before Pharaoh that Sarah is not his wife but his sister (Gen. 12:13), Didymus applies the principle that the wise man should share all his possessions. Consequently, even one’s wife, in what is to be understood as the Gospel teaching, must be shared with the pharaohs of the world for their salvation.50 Similarly the doers of fine deeds should lead others under the shadow of the fig tree of their practical virtue and the gnostics invite neighbours under the vine of their wise contemplation of God and his doctrine.51 Elsewhere, however, he goes beyond such compassion and envisages a change in the nature of the wise so that he cannot but teach. The key to this is Didymus’ understanding of illumination as a participative and imitative state (diathesis)—there must be close correlation between action, word, and disposition, with no inconsistency,52 a series of emanating circles of virtue, order, wisdom, and peace.53 One can only become wise by participating in Wisdom and this is most truly achieved after the incarnation by imitation of the humanity of Christ. Although the wise man is only so through accidental participation in Wisdom, his nature is so infused by that Wisdom that his words are necessarily illuminating. The mouth of the just speaks wisdom. Whenever the wise man has been enlightened, he utters illuminating words; for it has been said, ‘The wisdom of a man shall enlighten his face’ (Eccl. 8:1). Whoever speaks this wisdom has the face of his mind enlightened; for ‘The discourse of the pious is wisdom at all times’ (Sir. 27:11).54

47 GenT 1.29.1–6; PsT 2.68.19–26; EcclT 4.217.25–218.3; cf. the distinction between the lay and scientific grasp of astronomy, EcclT 1.10.31–4; between sensible and artistic appreciation of painting, GenT 1.82.6–7. 48 49 ZachT 1.61.15–24 (1.269–70). GenT 1.41.18–19; cf. PsT 3.193.2–6. 50 GenT 2.227.21–9; cf. PsT 2.77.7–12. 51 ZachT 1.61.15–24 (1.269–70). 52 PsT 1.46.18–26; 5.296.16–19; EcclT 1.46.13–14; HiobT 2.183.31–34; Incorp. [PG 39.1109c]. 53 54 PsT 3.227.20–8. PsT 4.255.5–7.

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In this way, as someone becomes united with God through contemplation and virtuous action and is remade according to the Image, he or she also becomes a model for imitation as an image of the Image.55 The just change their pupils just as they have been changed and so they can be compared to seeds which transform the raw material of the earth into their likeness to grow as plants. These [just folk] being numerous he has sown like seeds among the peoples in order that they might share ( ƺøØ) in their virtue. For in the same way as seeds cast into the ground change the earth around them so that it becomes animal offspring and fruit, so too these when sown among the peoples and the nations, bring those among whom they were sown into their own quality ( N c N
Æ ØÅÆ), becoming imitators of their virtue (ØÅa B Iæ B ÆPH).56

Indeed the two metaphors which dominate Didymus’ presentation of the teacher–pupil relationship are those of sowing a seed57 and spiritual fathering,58 both of which he understands scientifically as the application of a vital, creative, and ordering force to a formless base material. Some of Didymus’ language in this context is reminiscent of the Platonic erotic schema outlined in the ‘Mysteries of Diotima’.59 However, as we shall have cause to note continually throughout this work in the constant interplay between biblical and philosophical concepts, this should not be seen as adulteration, nor allowed to control our reading of Didymus. Such metaphors were already part of the popular consciousness and Christian teaching60 and, in this case, it is significant that the Platonic ascent always portrays the one ascending as the active agent; even the Form of the Good itself plays a passive role, as the lover of the good begets from it. By contrast, in Didymus, it is the condescending party who is the active agent, and mimetic participation is thus top-down: the Word is fundamentally active and all humanity is spiritually female (and passive) in relation to him.61 Moreover, the divine initiative always takes precedence: the seed which the teacher sows is received from the Word first and only then sown into others,62 allowing the role of the saint to be reduced to the merely instrumental as in the writing of Scripture.63 There are parallels with the more general ascetic focus on imitation (mimēsis) and the Evagrian Gnostic as ‘salt for the impure, light for the pure’;64 yet Didymus conforms the illuminative model precisely to the classroom teacher: not only is Job’s situation educative and behaviour paradigmatic,65 but his lengthy

55 56 58 59 61 64

Cf. Clem.Alex. Strom. 7.3.16.6, where the gnostic thus transformed becomes a ‘third image’. 57 ZachT 2.263.9–15 (3.289). GenT 1.69.23–70.5; HiobT 2.152.4–19. HiobT 2.151.1–152.1; PsT 2.82.27–83.1; 5.308.22–4; GenT 1.62.21–63.3. 60 Pl. Symp. 201d–212b. Cf. Buell (1999), on Clement of Alexandria. 62 63 GenT 1.63.9–12. HiobT 2.151.1–7. PsT 5.336.4–6. 65 Evag. Gnost. 3; cf. Harmless (2001). HiobT 4.380.16–23.

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speeches of complaint are also portrayed as deliberate lessons to his would-be comforters.66 The ability to teach is something more than just knowledge. It is not enough only to be able to speak wisdom among the perfect: the true Christian must also be able to condescend to the level of those just initiated into the faith; and thus the ‘word of wisdom’ is said to surpass the ‘word of knowledge’ (1 Cor. 12:8) precisely in this ability to teach and become a servant of the Word.67 By contrast, when Origen treats this verse, he sees a movement between modes of participation in the different persons of the Trinity: the ‘word of knowledge’ derives from a basic participation of the entire rational creation in the Word, but once the just have been sanctified in holiness by the Holy Spirit they participate in the Word in a new way as ‘righteousness of God’, which brings them in addition ‘the word of wisdom’.68 Interestingly, Didymus here retains the sense of dynamic progress from knowledge to wisdom, so central to Origen, but he rejects the complex of intra-Trinitarian distinctions and rather relates the movement to a new paradigm outlining relational change against an essential constancy. Teaching, whether divine or human, is always for Didymus at heart a condescension of the higher to the lower for the sake of the lower’s ascent (with perhaps the imagery of John 3:13 lurking in the background). These ideas of Christian holiness, mimetic pedagogy, and teaching as condescension are inextricably intertwined in Didymus’ thought, and result in an unusual reading of Adam. Although it is introduced cautiously at first,69 Didymus understands Eph. 5:32 as implying some moral parity between Christ and Adam and their respective educational relationships with the Church and Eve.70 However, if Adam is seen as truly fallen, this would contradict Didymus’ views of the teacher, and so he represents Adam as condescending to Eve’s level and being exiled from Paradise in order to mediate her restoration. How can the teacher and guide (›
Ø
ŒÆº ŒÆd çŪÅc ) be led into deceit by the woman who is learning (B ÆŁÆ Å )? There are those who defend Adam out of what was said by him; for he said ‘The woman whom you gave to be with me’ (Gen. 3:12); for since he said ‘You gave her to be with me’, knowing that she would be expelled because of her disobedience, he followed (ıÅŒº ŁÅ ) her not in transgression (P ŒÆa ÆæÆ) but to help her ( æe Tçº ØÆ ÆPB ); for often teachers condescend (ıªŒÆÆØ) to the weaker so that they might 66

HiobT 1.33.37–34.5; 3.252.1–253.3; 4.380.4–14; cf. Layton (2004), 75–9. 68 EcclT 6.342.21–343.2; cf. 2.79.9–13. Orig. Princ. 1.3.8. 69 GenT 1.83.25–84.2. 70 GenT 1.105.5–18; 1.100.3–12. Didymus extends the agency of salvation to such condescending teachers, but they serve salvation and are not themselves Saviours and are in no sense of equal honour with Christ; cf. PsT 1.55.18–27. On the Egyptian predilection for Ł d øBæ , see Bardy (1910), 129–30. 67

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accomplish their return ( æçc) from this. And they confirm these things by what was said by Paul, which he related in an elevated sense (IªÆª ) to Christ and to the church, ‘Adam was not deceived, but the woman having been totally deceived was in transgression’ (1 Tim. 2:14). It is the work of an ‘intelligent one’ (ı F),71 when the woman is borne up to the Church and Adam to Christ, to save the sequence of the allegory (e ƒæe B IººÅªæÆ ) and to examine if perhaps the race of men, from whom the Church is made up, using the transgression established a cause (ÆYØ) of the descent of the Saviour, so that he might use the economy (NŒÆ fi ), through which he has become a ‘curse’ and ‘sin’ (cf. Gal. 3:13; 2 Cor. 5:21), not being these things, but having received them because of us.72

Since education is the basis to salvation and it must be by condescension, no one can be self-taught: just as no human being was able to hear the Word naked and unadulterated, but only when mixed with human wordings,73 so too, without a teacher able to condescend to his level, the simple cannot progress.74 Didymus’ soteriological pedagogy is thereby predicated upon grace; teaching is not just about a consistency of word and action but a transcendence of reality— only the one who has ascended beyond the worldly can teach. As long as someone is still among the foundations of the walls or in the middle of ascending them, he is not yet able to proclaim wisdom; he can only just understand it, when he comes to the very tops of the walls, but when he transcends the world, so to speak, when he becomes trans-worldly ( æŒØ ), then he can proclaim wisdom.75

Although teaching is essentially not about content or method but rather about person, Didymus’ pedagogical focus is not on the ascetic model of teacher as text, as Layton assumes,76 but on the pupil and the relationship between pupil and teacher. Education requires not just condescension but timeliness,77 and this is characteristic of the mercy of human teacher, Christ and God alike, in choosing to refute, censure, and encourage (2 Tim. 4:2).78 In his exegesis of Psalm 35:7 (‘You will save men and cattle, Lord’), Didymus explores a range of referents, applying it not only to rational and irrational creatures but also, via the use of John 10.27 and Psalm 22, to different states of people: those who are perfect and behave rationally are the truly human, whilst those still at an elementary level and behaving mindlessly are sheep or cattle.79 Consequently, these different states need

71 A technical term in Didymus for one adept at elevated interpretation; cf. ZachT 3.289.15–19 (4.51). 72 73 GenT 1.93.22–94.10. HiobT 2.158.3–9. 74 75 PsT 5.328.4–6; 5.309.2–11; HiobT 3.218.16–19. PsT 3.140.1–7. 76 Layton (2004), 34–5; cf. Burton-Christie (1993). 77 78 PsT 4.168.20–1; HiobT 2.182.23–31. PsT 4.268.22. 79 PsT 4.236.22–237.11.

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different forms of salvific education by God, which is precisely parallel to the condescending mercy of the Christian teacher fitting his lessons to both the wise and the unthinking. The ‘men’ too are saved by the mercy of God. But then the mercy of God is multiplied and its abundance shown, whenever he also saves ‘cattle’. Just as if you say about a perfect teacher ( æd
Ø
ÆŒºı  º ı) that his goodness is recognized whenever he educates wise and perfect hearers; but then his goodness is multiplied, whenever he condescends (ıŒÆÆÆfiÅ) to the unthinking and tries to introduce ( Nª Ø) them to a better state. Doubtless at any rate the teacher of Christianity (›
Ø
ŒÆº F åæØØÆØF) is ‘under bond to wise and unthinking, Greeks and barbarians’ (Rom. 1:14). He is not only under bond to the wise, but also to the unthinking. And to the wise ‘he speaks wisdom among the perfect’ (1 Cor. 2:6), but to the unthinking he does not speak wisdom, but holds out those teachings (ÆŁÆÆ) which will separate them from ignorance, so that they are no longer unthinking and may later receive wisdom.80

This entails not just empathy81 but the pupil being styled the teacher’s food,82 even a sharing of the same soul. Someone shares his soul with someone, whenever he fashions him to be a certain way according to a quality which he himself has. Therefore, he says, not only are we eager to share the Gospel with you but also our own souls (cf. 1 Thess. 2:4). If someone becomes an imitator of the Apostle and has his every disposition and action, he has received the Apostle’s soul.83

And ultimately, since Christ is the primary teacher, every faithful human soul becomes Christ’s, not just that which he assumed in the incarnation—providing Didymus a very neat loophole for distancing some of the statements attributed to Christ not just from his divinity but even from his perfect humanity. Question: So did the soul of the Saviour sin (cf. Ps. 40:5)? Answer: His soul is entirely moral ( ı
ÆÆ),84 but it would not be if he were to have sinned. In the same way as we speak of the man of God, we also speak of the soul of Jesus. Sometimes we mean by ‘the soul of Jesus’ the actual soul which he assumed (I ºÅç ), sometimes we just mean one which is assimilated (NŒ ØøŁ EÆ) to him, in the same way as is indicated by the saying, ‘All souls are mine’ (Ez. 18:4).85

80

81 PsT 4.237.12–18. EcclT 2.72.10–17; 6.359.19–23. 83 PsT 5.315.23–6. PsT 2.92.13–16. 84 The opposition  ı
ÆE –çÆFº dominates Didymus’ moral vocabulary and builds upon the Stoic distinction between the homo proficiens and sapiens, so central to his doctrine of progress; cf. Sen. Ep.Mor. 71.30–6; 72.6–11. 85 PsT 5.292.32–293.2; cf. PsT 3.131.28–132.3; ZachT 3.301.3–24 (4.91–4). 82

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The Vision of Didymus the Blind

CHRIST THE TEACHER Although Didymus’ extant works offer us nothing like the rich imagery of Christ as teacher and pedagogue found in Clement, the Christological dimension goes beyond a hierarchy of levels of imitative participation.86 The language of condescension, which had become almost technical in Origen and Athanasius,87 is restored to its primary metaphorical context of classroom education;88 but the analogy can now also be employed in reverse—teachers can equally be said to ‘sojourn’ (epidēmein),89 adopting Didymus’ primary metaphor for the incarnation. So this verse (Eccl. 7:20) can be drawn to this conclusion, but it can also be understood differently, that God the Word came to be in the temple—that is the man. And God the Word is also Wisdom, and in this sense there is every improvement. But since I am talking about matters of the economy (a B

NŒÆ ), it is profitable for this to be shown here. The child did not say those things, which he said when he had become a perfect man. Therefore he progressed ( æŒ   s c æŒ ). It must be understood in this way: a teacher or another who has reached a similar level of learning (c B

ÆØ
 ø Ø) condescends (ıŒÆÆÆ Ø) to the pupils who have come to him and who aim at understanding (K ØÅ ); he says those things which those at the elementary level (ƒ Nƪ Ø) are able to hear, not what he himself is capable of, and he is conformed (ıåÅÆÇ ÆØ) to the ignorance of those being initiated (fiB IªÆ fi H Nƪø); and, as if knowing only the very things which he says, he educates ( ÆØ
Ø) them. Therefore as far as the child progresses ( æŒ  Ø), the teacher progresses too; but on the one hand the child progresses in the acquisition of teachings ( æºł Ø ÆŁÅø), while the teacher progresses in demonstration of the potential which was already in him (IÆ
 Ø B K Å
ı ø ).90

The temple, that is, the humanity of Christ, not only physically grows but makes progress in virtue and knowledge through his earthly life. This is not a shortcoming or lack, since such childhood ignorance is not the opposite of knowledge and virtue but the precursor to it. And insofar as God the Word is inseparably entwined with the soul of Jesus as his teacher and pattern, the Word too must progress and change, but only in a relational, rather than a substantial, sense. This is how Didymus deals with kenotic biblical texts whilst preserving the majesty and immutability of the Godhead. Although he sometimes drifts into 86

HiobT 4.380.16–23. Orig. C.Cels. 4.14; 5.12; Comm.Jn. 13.(28)171; Athan. C.Gen. 47; Incarn. 8.1–2; cf. language of çغÆŁæø Æ drawn from patronage relationships, Osborne (1994), 164–84. 88 Orig. C.Cels. 4.12; Athan. Incarn. 15.1. 89 In 1 Cor. 16.10–11 [Staab 12.15]; EcclT 1.42.30–43.2. 90 EcclT 4.221.22–222.6; cf. PsT 1.5.2–9. 87

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older imagery of a composite nature of the God-man,91 he more typically rules out any ontological change as incompatible with divine immutability, in favour of a relational one. So then ‘To the end on behalf of those about to be altered (H IººØøŁÅø)’ (Ps. 44:1). Therefore ‘That is the alteration (IººøØ ) of the right hand of the Most High’ (Ps. 76:11). The right hand of the Most High is immutable (¼æ  ) and unalterable (Iƺºø ). It always exists according to the same things and in the same way; for we do not understand it as anything other than the Saviour. Then how does he alter (IººØFÆØ), let us see: [the right hand of the Most High] condescends (ıŒÆÆÆ Ø) when it teaches ( ÆØ
ıÆ); and then we are really helped (Tç º  ŁÆ), if it condescends. But while the right hand remains in itself, we are not helped.92

Consequently, in becoming poor for our sake (2 Cor. 8:9), God has not actually ceased to be rich. This is because he never was rich in any accidental sense but only insofar as he is ‘chorus-leader of the virtues’ (chorēgos) and they subsist in him.93 His poverty is an aspect of his choice to relate to impoverished humanity and so is contingent on that relationship. As the saints advance, the Word ceases to be poor. And whenever we remain in the poverty and do not advance (
ø ) to receive that wealth, which that man’s poverty graciously bestows, so far as relates to us (e ‹ N A ), he remains poor; for if he has become poor on account of others, in order that they might become rich, whenever those become rich, he is no longer poor.94

This pedagogical paradigm does lead Didymus into areas which would become problematic in the Isochristic controversies of the sixth century. As one moves from relating to the humanity of Christ to his divinity, the Word in some sense ceases to be incarnate.95 As each soul progresses, its relationship with Christ progresses and thus gradually transcends such concepts and titles as kingship,96 even the hieratic mediation of the incarnation itself.97 The stance is not that commonly attributed to Marcellus, since these are only transcended insofar as they applied to Christ’s humanity,98 but the assumption of the humanity of Jesus by the Word seems to become only historically unique. All redeemed 91

92 HiobT 3.265.19–266.18. PsT 5.327.21–5; cf. In Jn. 17.5 [Reuss fr.20, 186]. 94 PsT 1.48.3–19; 5.338.7–9. PsT 1.48.19–22. 95 PsT 1.48.22–5; 2.63.15–19; cf. the distinction between the Word made flesh tabernacling, not dwelling among us, In 2 Cor. 5.12–19 [Staab 28.30–29.10]. 96 PsT 1.4.16–5.12. 97 HiobT 3.266.3–267.2: as one spirit the saints are joined I Ø ø to God. 98 PsT 1.4.7–5.12; 2.111.3–15; GenT 2.215.6–12; IoT 9.25–38; In 1 Cor. 15.24–6 [Staab 8.3–13]. Contrast the frequently anathematized language of Marc.Anc. fr.117; 111–12; cf. Theoph.Alex. Ep.Pasch. AD 401 [=Jer. Ep. 96]; Phot. Bibl. 117. On the wider debate, see Lienhard (1983). Marcellan and Didymean views would coalesce, however, if Marcellus was conceded to be the author of Ps.-Athan. Serm.Fid. and C.Apoll. 93

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souls are Christ’s soul, and indeed all can be called ‘Christs’.99 The language of course derives from Ps. 104:15 and so must be justified by all Christians. Yet in linking this verse to the same moral participation in the Word as the soul of Jesus has, he is far removed from the usage of Cyril of Jerusalem, who talks of earlier Christs as mere types of the true Christ and becoming so by promotion rather than from eternity.100 Didymus does want to temper such language: the redeemed are not properly a ‘Christ’ but only nicknamed such, with Jesus retaining an ongoing special status as precursor and archetype.101 However, it is not difficult to dismiss this as special pleading and read him as if fully anticipating later speculations. His concern, as we might reasonably expect, is to protect himself against contemporary errors such as those of Aetius rather than anticipate future discussion. Thus, in precisely the passage where he begins to argue that the soul of Jesus is unique (monogenēs)—in that it was never under anyone else’s power than his and that through it the Word effected salvation102—he is deflected by the language of uniqueness to defend the significance of the Second Person of the Trinity being not just ‘unique’ but ‘unique or only-begotten Son’ against Aetius.103 And here, to anticipate some of the themes of the heart of this book, I would see Didymus’ specific portrayal of the pedagogical condescension of Christ as representative of a broader shift in his theology from that of Origen. By insisting on the essential equality of the three persons of the Trinity, he repositions certain texts and, to my mind, does not fully realize the systematic consequences. For example, Origen used John 14:28 to prove that the Father transcends the Son,104 and even Nicene theologians such as Athanasius and Gregory of Nazianzus tended to concede it some force as implying the Father’s role as source (archē) of the other persons of the Trinity.105 However, Didymus denies any possibility of comparison between simple substances and insists it must refer solely to the incarnation.106 By reducing the mediatorial role of the Word in response to Arius through the repositioning of these texts, both Didymus and Evagrius prefigure sixth-century Isochristic doctrines. Whereas Evagrius makes the move consciously through a metaphysical focus on the singularity of the truly incorporeal,107 Didymus’ soteriological and protreptic identification of Jesus and perfected humanity seems to elide the distinction accidentally. I would suggest that his more consistent trajectory is to maintain

99 101 104 105 106 107

100 PsT 5.293.1–3; In Ps. 27.8 [Mühlenberg fr.251, 1.258.22–6]. Cyr.Jer. Cat. 11.1. 102 103 ZachT 2.101.1–7 (2.30). PsT 3.221.6–16. PsT 3.221.16–26. Orig. Comm.Jn. 13.(25)151; C.Cels. 8.14–15. Athan. Syn. 28.7–11; G.Naz. Or. 30.7. In Jn. 14.28 [Reuss fr.17, 184]; cf. Ps.-Athan. Serm.Fid. 73, 78 [Schwartz]. Evag. Ceph. 3.72; 4.4, 8–9.

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a concrete individuality, sometimes even ranked according to virtue,108 in which Christ can still be accorded some primacy. And yet it cannot be denied he at least speculates on an eschatological end to numerical multiplicity.109 The concept of the teacher of virtue is then a crucial aspect of the background of Didymus’ thought. It not only determines a good deal of his selfperception and historical context but also plays a significant part in his Christology and anthropology in his post-Nicene ‘virtue-Origenism’. However, before examining how this plays out and the hermeneutical models he utilizes in his portrayal of virtue, we must pause briefly to consider the extent of the works we can safely rely on as genuine; and to recount the details of the finding of the all-important Toura commentaries, to which I have only alluded so far.

108

PsT 3.186.4–12.

109

ZachT 2.268.15–25 (3.308).

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3 Footprints in the Sand Assessing the Didymean Corpus

THE TOURA FIND When Leipoldt and Bardy both came to write their major works, the scholarly focus was dominated by Mingarelli’s eighteenth-century identification of an untitled theological treatise primarily on the Son with the lost On the Trinity. This took centre place within Didymus’ extant corpus, overshadowing the exegetical fragments and even his On the Holy Spirit and Against the Manichees. It formed the basis for Leipoldt’s assessment of the theological importance of Didymus, as well as Bardy’s portrait of the unoriginal systematizing recluse and Gauche’s reconstruction of his pedagogical technique.1 The other works seldom did more than fill out the gaps in the On the Trinity’s framework; consequently the discovery of some 2,016 pages of papyrus in August 1941, when a group of workers were clearing centuries-old rubble from a cave in the western foot of the mountain range at Toura, would revolutionize scholarly conceptions of Didymus. Sadly, the chance nature of the find during routine wartime work meant precise details of the discovery are lacking, and different stories circulate concerning the fate of the works.2 What is known for certain is that before Drioton and Guéraud could intervene to preserve the find, the pages were distributed among the workers and subsequently sold. The Egyptian Museum at Cairo bought back a large part of the collection, while other folios have come to light in Australia, South Africa, Switzerland, France, England, and Germany. 1

Leipoldt (1905); Bardy (1910); Gauche (1934). The preliminary accounts, now largely superseded and tending to focus on the few pages of Origen discovered, may be found in Guéraud (1946), Altaner (1947), Klostermann (1948), Cullmann (1949), de Ghellinck (1949), and Puech (1955). The summary in this chapter is chiefly endebted to Doutreleau (1955); Koenen and Doutreleau (1967); and Koenen and Müller-Wiener (1968). 2

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The codices themselves contained no indication of authorship but the authenticity of their attribution to Didymus is in little doubt. The Commentaries on Genesis, On Job, and On Zechariah were quickly recognized as his through comparison with the evidence of Procopius, the catena tradition, and Jerome respectively. It was only the work on Psalms (and the obviously related work on Ecclesiastes) that provoked dispute, since it offered not a single precise parallel with Didymus’ work as preserved in the Psalms catenae, only a certain broad overlap in ideas. However, the subsequent identification of these two works as ‘lecture-notes’, preserving classroom teaching, and thus distinct in form at least from the published Commentary on Psalms used by the compilers of the catenae, has explained this difference.3 However, even as these connections were being made, Louis Doutreleau and others began to question whether the picture that emerged could be reconciled with the author of the De Trinitate.4 No sooner had Doutreleau cast the first doubts on the compatibility of Mingarelli’s work with the new commentaries than such scholarship as there was took a very different turn5—one which future centuries may judge no less naive—and began to concentrate exclusively on the Toura works.

Assessment of the Find While they almost certainly originated from the library of the nearby mid-fifthcentury monastery of St Arsenius (Deir al-Qusayr),6 it is far from clear how and why eight codices of works by Didymus and Origen, along with some minor fragments, found themselves in a cave some twelve kilometres south of Cairo in an area which had been extensively quarried for stone in antiquity.7 The chance nature of the original find may have disturbed the evidence, but given the darkness and lack of signs of inhabitation, it has generally been assumed that the works were hidden there and for some reason were never collected or preserved against further decay. One work seems to have only ever comprised a single quire, but the palimpsests of the seven full codices were found already separated from their original bindings, the lacings of the quires having been carefully cut level with the spine with a sharp instrument; the string itself was often found in the centre of a quire. There is no sign that they might have been eaten away by insects and, 3

4 Gesché (1962), 322–50. Doutreleau (1957). Doutreleau (1959), 87: ‘Dépouillé du De Trinitate, Didyme n’est plus grand chose.’ 6 For a detailed account of the ruins, see Koenen and Müller-Wiener (1968), 53–63. The surviving structures all date from a much later period, and it is impossible to gain an accurate impression of what may have been existence in the sixth century. 7 The cave in which the papyri were found consists of a dome-shaped entrance hall with three narrow entrances leading to elongated rooms. Some 20 to 25m inside one of these, the papyri were found lying against the longer wall under rubble, apparently without any containment or protection. 5

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given the fragility of the papyrus, the work is too delicate to have been that of the modern discoverers. Consequently, these writings must have been carefully removed from the bindings in antiquity, possibly because of the value of such covers. The folios of some quires had been rolled up and fastened, and others intentionally folded, but most of the quires seem to have simply been laid flat. The presence of numerous correcting hands in most of the papyri suggests either a long literary heritage or possession by a community. The palaeography was originally believed to point to a date in the late sixth or early seventh centuries, though Kehl found comparable hands as early as 513,8 which suggests possible links to the sixth-century Origenist controversies but also raises interesting questions about the continuing status of the three sets of presumably unpublished writings, the two series of Lecture-Notes and the Minutes. More significant here is the fact that not only have pages of the Lecture-Notes on Ecclesiastes been washed down, probably deliberately, but also some of the fragments were stuck together. Initially it was suspected that this was the result of unskilled antiquarians soaking rolled-up pages in water to loosen them. However, the discovery of traces of adhesive suggests that they were beginning to be reused for cartonnage in antiquity. This, along with the careful removal of the valuable bindings and the circulation enjoyed by the works, would suggest that the papyri derive from a library and were in the process of being recycled. This treatment has led most scholars to trace their concealment to some form of suppression of Origen’s and Didymus’ writings in the wake of the sixthcentury Origenist controversy,9 from which another party decided to save them, rather than the community’s preservation of valuable texts from Berber invasion. It is difficult to gauge the likely extent of a sixth-century monastic library. However, it is perhaps significant that the Toura papyri contain three works of Didymus apparently never formally published, namely the Lecture-Notes and the Minutes of a Dialogue with a Heretic. These could reasonably be understood as constituting ‘rare’ works and may imply the presence of more common ones in the complete library. Meanwhile, the marginalia point to a process of critical reflection. In this context it may also be significant that each work is a single codex. Originally there was speculation that five codices of the Commentary on Psalms and at least one further codex of both the Commentary on Genesis and the Commentary on Job were missing. However, given the lapse of time since the initial find, it is most unlikely that any of these were originally in the cave as not a single leaf has come to light. One might be tempted to suppose the rest of these works existed in the monastery library. Nonetheless, this could be a rather hasty conclusion. In the case of the work on Psalms 20–44, 8

Kehl PsT IX, 17. Partially censored circulation may have continued for some while before any decision to destroy the works, e.g. the missing GenT 1.77–80 (Nelson (1995), 43–4). 9

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now that it has been identified as ‘lecture-notes’ and a different entity from the Commentary on all the Psalms cited by Jerome and fragmentarily transmitted in the catenae, there is no reason why any further codices should have existed. Moreover, Nautin has suggested that since Procopius of Gaza does not cite any texts from Didymus relating to anything after Genesis 16,10 even if Didymus wrote a second volume to finish the book, it was not in wide circulation in antiquity. This leaves only the Commentary on Job, which Jerome does not refer to as only treating the first part and which would admittedly break off in a very unusual place if it ended with Codex VII. Nonetheless, the Hagedorns suggest that since there are an unusually high number of lines per page in the final quire, this was the whole of the work known to the scribe who copied it. Moreover, the catenae also stop at Job 16:8a, which suggests at the very least that they derive from a common source which concluded in the middle of this chapter.11

Description of the Codices The eight codices are: Codex I (29.516cm, 5 quires, 82 pages)—Origen’s Dialogue with Heraclides and two treatises On the Passover—found complete as a rolled bundle clasped with a fastener. Codex II (2718cm, 6 quires)—Origen’s Homily on the Witch of Endor and extracts from his Commentary on Romans and Against Celsus. Codex III (27.524cm, 24 quires, c.378 pages)—Lecture-Notes on Ecclesiastes—cut in half quite precisely in antiquity with a sharp instrument, the work being done so well that the join is barely visible except where there is secondary damage; a number of quires had then been interleaved and rolled together, some being fastened like this; considerable evidence of illtreatment and insect damage. Codex IV (2723cm, 16 quires, c.260 pages)—Commentary on Genesis 1:1–16:16—of the 222 extant pages, 1–16 are merely fragments, 17–18 severely damaged by insects, meanwhile 77–80, 199–208, and (if they existed) 253–60 are missing; more so than the other codices there are numerous blank pages and this has variously been attributed to deliberate suppression of the text, incomplete copying, or an intention to consult another exemplar where the original could not be deciphered. Codex V (2724.5cm, 22 quires, c.250 pages)—Lecture-Notes on Psalms 20:1–44:4—much more widely dispersed by its discoverers than any other, 10 Nautin GenT I, 13, 21. Only three scholia relate to later chapters, those on Gen. 17:1; 24:2–3; and 32:1–3 (Devreesse Octateuque, 172). 11 Hagedorn and Hagedorn HiobT IV, 11.

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The Vision of Didymus the Blind the latest discovery being made in an American attic in 1982;12 the numbering was determined before much of the work had been examined and so quire 14 was assigned 16 pages when in fact it only has 14 (page numbers 223–4 are therefore purely notional); the hand is the same as that of Codex III, so these at least must have originated from the same workshop. Codex VI (2722cm, 26 quires, 418 pages)—Commentary on Zechariah—a complete work covering the entirety of the prophet and in by far the best state; only pages 213–14, 223–4, and 243–4 are missing, with 415–18 unfilled at the end. Codex VII (31.515.5cm, 26 quires, 412 pages)—Commentary on Job 1:1–16:8—almost complete, though quire 13 (193–208) along with pages 397–400 and 409–12 is still missing, while pages 186–92 and halfway down 229–40 are blank; the middles of the pages have suffered a great deal of insect damage. Codex VIII (28.522cm, 1 quire, 12 pages)—labelled a codex for simplicity; the first two pages (possibly originally 3–4, if a leaf has been lost) are blank except for a doxology on page 2; page 3 begins a Homily on the Psalms, commenting on selected verses from Psalms 125 and 129–133; written and corrected in a single hand, it has the character of a sermon and may represent the private notes of a congregation member;13 pages 8 ff. contain a commentary on John 6:3ff., written in the same hand, which begins in mid-flow; page 12 is illegible. Whereas Doutreleau initially suggested that this constituted a notebook belonging to pious monks, current scholarship divides it into two separate works—PsHomT, possibly by Origen, and IoT, by Didymus—and Kramer speculates that in the exemplar the latter work may have been erased up to page 8 precisely for the purpose of copying the former work.14

In addition to this, the Egyptian Museum has two other fragments from Toura. The first consists of a page and a half of strange writing in abbreviations, possibly a form of stenography, alongside short passages of ordinary writing. The second (PrT) derives not from a codex but a vertical scroll.15 The verso is blank but the recto, despite a good deal of damage, seems to contain two distinct paragraphs, if not works. Lines 1–11 contain a large lacuna but seem to form a homiletic style commentary on James 5:13 and Isaiah 39:8. More interestingly though, lines 12–25 contain what seems to be minutes of a dialogue between Didymus and a heretic (probably an Apollinarist) on the nature of Christ’s soul. Unfortunately, the beginning has been devoured by insects, there is difficulty in determining the speaker, and it ends abruptly. Nonetheless, it throws interesting 12 Mackay and Griggs (1983). The 20 pages in question on Ps. 26:10b–29.2 remain unpublished, except for short sections in Mackay (1989) and Nelson (1995), 106–7. 13 14 15 Kramer Kleine, 24–5. Kramer Kleine, 62n.5. Kramer Kleine, 107–11.

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light on a number of issues and also is the only actual evidence for the name Didymus in association with the Toura papyri.

Dating The dating of the various Toura works is difficult and little can be added here to Layton’s periodization, placing the Commentaries on Job and Genesis in the 360s, the Lecture-Notes on Psalms and Ecclesiastes in the 370s, and the Commentary on Zechariah in the late 380s.16 We can say with confidence that Didymus was well established as a writer by 380—as may be expected of a sixty-year-old!—and that his On the Holy Spirit, which is by no means the first of the dogmatic works, certainly dates from before that of Ambrose in 381 and may be as early as 360–5.17 The turn to virtue and a Nicene Trinitarianism are present in all the works, with even the probably early Commentary on Job (which counters simple ‘Arian’ theses and does not engage with the more developed Anomoean thought of Eunomius) asserting the full divinity of the Holy Spirit, as only the three persons of the Trinity can see hearts.18 There is seemingly little evidence of any real development of Didymus’ thought over the course of the extant works (though On the Trinity would require something of a linguistic shift19). Indeed where aporiai and conceptual tensions exist, often through the impact of competing biblical texts and hermeneutical keys, they are just as likely to be exhibited within the same work; and as a result the approach I have taken here is deliberately synchronic.

WORKS ATTRIBUTED TO DIDYMUS The status of Mingarelli’s On the Trinity has continued to be much disputed. Early commentators tended to follow Doutreleau in dismissing it as incompatible 16 Layton (2004), 6–7. This represents a fair consensus of the scholarship, e.g. Koenen (1962), 81, but only the dating of ZachT has any firm foundation; cf. Doutreleau ZachT I, 23–5; Jer. Comm.Hos. prol. 17 Historically, most scholars have followed Bardy (1910), 21, in dating De Spiritu Sancto to the 370s but DelCogliano (2010) builds on the suspicions of Staimer (1960) and Heron (1971), 17, to argue both for Basil’s dependency on Didymus (implying a date at least prior to 375) and for an anti-Eunomian agenda more specifically appropriate to 360–5. 18 HiobT 1.14.4–25. 19 For example, De Trinitate’s routine invocation of the Cappadocian ‘three persons, one substance’ formula is unparalleled in the Toura works, which habitually explain
ÆØ and P Æ as at least potential synonyms, as in Origen and Athanasius, e.g. PsT 4.275.22–31; In Ps. 113.10–11 [Mühlenberg fr. 1061, 267.23–5]. Athanasius maintained this position explicitly as late as 369; cf. Ad Afros 4; but here Didymus is reasserting it in the late 380s, ZachT 2.110.12–13 (2.73).

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with the genuine Toura works,20 though even in 1962 Koenen pointed out that none of the points raised from the analysis of the Commentary on Zechariah were insurmountable.21 Doutreleau has since reversed his opinion and declared the work Didymean, and a number of scholars tend to the same view.22 However, almost no serious scholarship has been undertaken on the issue since the wider publication of the Toura works, with the exception of Simonetti, who reads Didymus as so wholeheartedly Athanasian that he would have been unable to shift to Cappadocian language of person and substance even after Constantinople.23 My own investigations have proved inconclusive. The reality is that the thought and language are often close but not identical to that of the commentaries. There is not enough that could not be explained by a late dating, wider audience, and difference of genre to rule out Didymus’ authorship; but if we leave Mingarelli’s attribution to one side, nor is there much which would compel a scholar coming to the debate afresh to insist on it. Only if one were to view Didymus as the only significant Origenist thinker in late fourth-century Alexandria would the proximity of thought be telling. In the present work I have restrained my analysis to the undisputed writings, but my suspicion is that a full investigation would reveal either strong Didymean influence upon the author or perhaps excerpting from Didymus’ dogmatic works alongside those of other writers by an editor to produce a summary handbook of anti-‘Arian’ thought.24 This likelihood is particularly significant for any evaluation of Didymus, for it would elevate him from the status of lone voice indulging in archaic readings of Origen to part of a living tradition in the Alexandrian region. It is to this circle that the many works long linked to either On the Trinity or On the Holy Spirit probably belong. They tend not to form part of the modern debate, since the indisputably genuine material already offers a corpus intimidatingly large to most. However, prior to analysis of the Toura commentaries, many attempts had been made to extend the doctrinal corpus of Didymus through the discovery of either linguistic or conceptual parallels, which demand relationship if not shared authorship.25 The strongest claims rest with Ps.-Basil’s Against Eunomius 4–5, which alone among the contested works carries an actual attribution to Didymus

20

Doutreleau (1957); Bienert (1972), 16–20; Ghattas (1996), 27–9. Koenen (1962), 80–105. 22 Doutreleau D.S.S., 42n.1; Gesché (1962), 354n.2; Heron (1972), 226; Young (1983a), 85. Orphanos (1974), 20, and Hönscheid Trin. I, 5–7, leave the question open. 23 Simonetti (1996); Simonetti (1974a). 24 Cf. Bizer (1970), 240. 25 Heron (1972) offers the most comprehensive positive arguments for a wide Didymean authorship; Bienert (1972), 8–20, the most negative, whilst admitting the complex interrelationships between the works; cf. Heron (1989). 21

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within the manuscript tradition.26 A Syriac translation ends with the Latin note, ‘Here end the chapters dictated by Didymus of Alexandria against the Arians’, which at the time of its publication in 1937 seemed perfectly to confirm Bardy’s earlier identification of this work with the two volumes Against the Arians recorded by Jerome.27 Recent scholarship on the work in its own right has revived Dräseke’s thesis of Apollinarian authorship;28 however, the five-point picture of the author drawn up by Risch is a remarkably intriguing fit to the Didymus of Toura: that he was ultra-Nicene, calling the Spirit God (theos) and affirming the Trinity to be consubstantial (homoousia); that he wrote simultaneously against Aetius and Eunomius as well as Marcellus and Photinus, while also opposing pneumatomachian currents; that he had read Porphyry’s logical writing and knew Plotinian philosophy; that he was opposed in principle to sophistic forms of argument and yet not uninfluenced by them; and that he was a conscious successor of Athanasius.29 The last point is the only one which seems at odds with my general reading of Didymus but would fit well with Layton’s. If future scholarship does widen the circle and allow the possibility of Didymus the dogmatist evincing a slightly different style from his commentaries, then debate should probably be reopened on Ps.-Athanasius’ Greater Sermon on Faith,30 On the Incarnation Against Apollinarius,31 and On the Trinity and Holy Spirit,32 which could plausibly be Didymean;33 while Ps.-Athanasius’ On the Holy Trinity 1–3 and Against the Macedonians 1–234 and Ps.-Gregory’s Against Arius and Sabellius35 are more probably just related. All of these interrelated writings belong within ‘Didymean’ currents of thought and should probably be seen as attesting to a wider circle of broadly ‘Origenist’ interpretation which succeeded in reading his ostensibly subordinationist Trinitarian pronouncements on Didymus’ lines as mere anti-Sabellian overemphasis. Moreover, it is to this circle, probably somewhat overlapping with his readership among Egyptian ascetics, where debate may have taken place among equals, such as Rufinus, Evagrius, and Ammonius, that further

26 Considered authentic by van Roey (1960), 423; Doutreleau ZachT I, 19; Heron (1972), 177–94; more cautiously by Orphanos (1974), 21–2; Gesché (1962), 353n.2. 27 Lebon (1937); Bardy (1910), 26–7 on Jer. Vir.Ill. 109; cf. Vir.Ill. 120 listing Didymus as one of those who wrote against Eunomius. 28 Risch (1992), 8–12 and considering only the De Trinitate in relation to the potential Didymean provenance. 29 30 31 Risch (1992), 12. Simonetti (1974b). Cf. Heron (1972), 22–89. 32 Cf. Heron (1972), 232–3. 33 One can probably safely omit Ps.-Jer. Vis.Is.; cf. Altaner (1943); and Ps.-Athan. Dial.Mont.; cf. Bizer (1970); Heron (1972), 4–6; as well as Stülcken’s (1899), 52n.1, barely regarded suggestion of Ps.-Athan. C.Ar. 4. 34 Gunthör (1941); Heron (1973), 118–22. 35 Holl (1904). Despite the important status accorded by Leipoldt (1905), the author of this at least cannot be Didymus himself, given the knowledge of Hebrew.

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study should probably be directed rather than the more fluid circle of Didymus’ actual students.

L I S T O F K N OWN WORKS

Title

Status

Commentaries On Genesis On Exodus On Leviticus On all the Psalms

Extant Fragments Lost Fragments

On Proverbs On Ecclesiastes On the Song of Songs On Job On Hosea On Zechariah On Isaiah On Isaiah 40–66

Fragments? Fragments Fragments Extant Lost Extant Lost Lost

On Jeremiah On Daniel(?)36 On Matthew

Fragments Fragments Fragments

On Luke On John On Acts37 On Romans On 1 Corinthians On 2 Corinthians On Galatians On Ephesians On Hebrews(?) On the Catholic Epistles On Revelation

Lost Fragments Fragments 1 Fragment? Fragments Lost Lost Lost 1 Fragment Latin translation38 Lost

36

Attestation

ZachT 3.404.27 (5.170) ZachT 1.68.29–30 (1.303); Jer. Vir.Ill. 109 Cassiod. Inst. 5

Jer. Vir.Ill. 109 Jer. Vir.Ill. 109 Jer. Vir.Ill. 109 ZachT 1.6.21–22 (1.24) ZachT 1.68.30–31 (1.303); Jer. Comm.Is. prol.

ZachT 2.218.10–11 (3.133); Jer. Vir.Ill. 109 ZachT 2.154.24–25 (2.264) Jer. Vir.Ill. 109 ZachT 2.153.8 (2.258) ZachT 2.200.14–16 (3.73) Jer. Ep 49; Ep. 119.5 ZachT 3.340.13 (4.249) Jer. Comm.Gal. prol. Jer. Comm.Eph. prol. Cassiod. Inst. 8 ZachT 2.200.14–15 (3.73)

Both Faulhaber’s fragments relate to a single verse, Dan. 2:34, and so may come from another work; cf. the numerous texts on 2 Sam. 22:5–15 [PG 39.1116–20] which are generally presumed to come from the Commentary on Psalm 17. A similar situation applies to the single Hebrews fragment but not now that on Rom. 7 (Staab’s fragment may well be from C.Man. but the Comm.Rom. is independently attested). 37 Bennett (2001) edits and translates a fragment preserved in Nikon’s Pandects. 38 The Latin Enarratio was rejected as a florilegium by Bardy (1910), 51–5; cf. Klostermann (1905). The difficulties were explained by Zoepfl (1914) and Staab (1924) through reexamination of catena attributions. Current judgement is split: for authenticity, Orphanos (1974), 22; and against, Doutreleau (1959), 88; Bennett (1997), 28–33.

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Title

Status

Attestation

On Lot and David39 On Origen’s On First Principles

Fragments Lost

Jer. Adv.Ruf. 2.16; Soc. H.E. 4.25

Lecture-Notes On Psalms 20–44 On Ecclesiastes On John Dialogue with a Heretic

Extant Extant Fragments Extant

Dogmatic Works On Dogmas Against the Arians(?)40 Against the Manichees Against Eunomius(?)41 On Sects42 On the Son On the Holy Spirit On the Trinity On the Soul On Faith On Virtues To the Philosopher On the Incorporeal On the Odd Number(?) On the Revelation of God On Why Children Die

Lost Lost Incomplete Lost? Lost Lost Latin translation Lost? Fragments 1 Fragment Lost 1 Fragment 1 Fragment Lost Latin translation43 Lost

D.S.S. 145(32); Jer. Vir.Ill. 109 Jer. Vir.Ill. 109 J.Dam. Sacr.Par. [PG 95.1522a] Jer. Vir.Ill. 120 D.S.S. 19(5); 93(21) ZachT 3.384.12–13 (5.99) Jer. Vir.Ill. 109 Soc. H.E. 4.25.7

ZachT 3.333.12 (4.220)

Jer. Adv.Ruf. 3.28

Detailed information on the published editions of the extant works and fragments is available in Biblia Patristica 7.13–22.44

39 J.Dam. Sacr.Par. [PG 96.248d; 524d; 141c–d]. Many catena fragments relating to the historical books may come from this, since these form three distinct groups relating to the lives of David and Elijah, and the Judgement of Solomon (Devreesse Octateuque, 172–3). 40 Leipoldt (1905), 11, noted the possibility that Jerome’s ambiguous Latin might imply a single work De Dogmatibus Contra Arianos and has been followed by Altaner and Stüber (1978), 280, but not Doutreleau (1959), 73, or Kramer (1981), 743. 41 As Bardy (1910), 23, noted long ago, it is possible that this and the reference to ‘those who have disputed on the nature of the odd number’ might refer not to discrete works. 42 Bardy (1910), 19, suggests that Thdt. H.E. 4.(26)29.1: ‘ŒÆa H I غø B IºÅŁ Æ

ªø ıªªæç  ’ refers specifically to this work. 43 Bogaert (1963). 44 For discussion of the evidence for particular lost commentaries and other works no longer extant, see Leipoldt (1905), 17–23; Bardy (1910), 43–51; Doutreleau ZachT I, 120–6.

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4 Reading Virtue Didymus and ‘Elevated’ Exegesis

To situate Didymus’ exegetical theory and practice fully within the burgeoning field of patristic hermeneutical scholarship would require at least a book in its own right, and indeed the bulk of post-Toura Didymean scholarship has essayed precisely this.1 Nonetheless, a fully satisfying account is yet to emerge, with prior assumptions about the ‘Alexandrian’ and ‘Antiochene’ hermeneutical paradigms, a tendency to focus on the Commentary on Zechariah in isolation, a narrow linguistic approach, and an insistence on rigid uniformity often conspiring to obscure rather than elucidate Didymus’ primary concerns.2 Unlike Origen or Augustine, Didymus offers no lengthy excursus on method and as a result the picture must be painstakingly built up from both comment and usage scattered across the commentaries. He is clearly the sort of exegete targeted by Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia’s late fourth-century critique of allegory, but it would be dangerous simply to read him in opposition to them, despite his own attacks on ‘lovers of the narrative’ (philistores).3 His apparent willingness to serve up a ‘smorgasbord’ of scriptural references or an intertextual ‘kaleidoscopic exercise’ more befitting a human concordance than a theologian grates with those who seek some anticipation of the modern historico-critical method.4 However, if he is taken on his own terms, it is possible to elucidate an approach to Scripture that has at its heart a reading of virtue as the fundamental elevation or ascent to the divine—both the method and the content of an upward drive from the senseperceptible (aisthēton) to the noetic reality (noēton). To Didymus’ own mind 1 Doutreleau ZachT I, 50–68; Bienert (1972); Tigcheler (1977); Simonetti (1983) and (1994), 77–9; Sherman (1995); Stefaniw (2010); cf. Torjesen (1982a), 950–2; Prinzivalli (1986); Hill (2006), 9–20. 2 For a helpful critique of the inadequacy of modern categories of allegorical, typological, and literal readings, see Young (1997b); and of modern attitudes to allegory, see Edwards (2002), 123–52. I find the most constructive approach to be Torjesen (1986) on Origen; cf. Dawson (1992) and (2001). 3 4 e.g. HiobT 1.55.29–56.15. Hill (2006), 9, 12.

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at least, his is no multivalent figural free association but rather a deep reading of the providential condescension of God to humanity in both created history and prophetic Scripture. Perhaps the most significant hermeneutical observation is Bienert’s recognition that, seemingly uniquely among Origen’s successors, Didymus maintains Origen’s own distinction between the language of allegory (allēgoria) and that of ‘elevation’ (anagōgē).5 Despite a lone reference in Clement’s Stromateis,6 Bienert is almost certainly correct to see Origen’s usage of this difficultto-translate term as so novel as effectively to function as a neologism coined to distinguish his practice from philosophical allegorical readings of Greek myths.7 However, in attempting to offer a thorough critique of Doutreleau’s earlier purely dualist reading (which assumed modern concepts of the literal and historical as ‘real’ distinct from ‘unreal’ and saw in de Lubac’s ‘four-fold model’ the only justifiable retrieval hermeneutic),8 I would argue that Bienert unduly overemphasized the separation of rhetorical figure and theological movement; and furthermore, seduced by earlier theories about the philosophical and doctrinal emphasis of ‘Alexandrian’ exegesis, went on to insist on a basic Christological distinction.9 A useful corrective was offered by Tigcheler, who demonstrated that Didymus tends less towards parallel modes of philosophical allegory and Christian elevation10 than to a structured hermeneutical sequence.11 And yet the rigidity of his four-question sequence 1. 2. 3. 4.

What is written on the level of the text? (pros rhēton) What is happening if one considers the facts? (kath’ historian) Can the text be understood figuratively? (kat’ allēgorian) What does the text mean in view of its range and impact? (kat’ anagōgēn)

again concealed the fact that Didymus’ conceptual clarity regarding his exegesis does not relate to terminological precision. His conclusions were further distorted by denying any theological significance to this approach,12 seemingly as part of an overarching critique of those who read overtly theological models into patristic commentators as part of a hermeneutic of retrieval.13

5

Bienert (1972), 68. A concept that can include but is methodologically distinct from the medieval Quadriga’s identification of anagogia with the eschatological meaning of a text. 6 Clem.Alex. Strom. 6.(15)126.2–4. 7 Bienert (1972), 51–68; cf. Neuschäfer (1987), 233–5. For parallels one must turn to later Neoplatonists, e.g. Porph. Sent. 30; Iamb. Myst. 3.7 (114). 8 9 Doutreleau, esp. ZachT I, 51, 56. Bienert (1972), 154–64. 10 Critique of Bienert, Tigcheler (1977), 148–51, 134–6. 11 Tigcheler (1977), 154–8. 12 Tigcheler (1977), 107–12, 146–51; critiqued by Sherman (1995), 19, 92–3, 101. 13 Cf. Tigcheler (1977), 177, 182–3 on de Lubac and Daniélou.

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What Didymus appears to envisage by ‘elevation’ is a series of changes of referent, as one applies a text to higher realities. This movement often occurs through allegory but ‘scientific theory’ (epistēmonikē theōria), i.e. number symbolism,14 or ‘figuration/metaphor’ (tropologia)15 can be employed just as readily to make the move. The theological dualism that Tigcheler explicitly denies to the fourfold hermeneutic16 is found throughout much of Didymus’ work, particularly once one moves beyond the confines of the Commentary on Zechariah; and Didymus himself invokes the transference to ‘elevation’ of the theological value of spirit in a Pauline sense.17 Yet if Didymus’ ‘elevated’ readings are not the anti-literal, anti-historical allegorical flights of philosophical Origenist fancy caricatured by Hanson,18 nor are they the postmodern, multivalent, poetical mysticism that one senses Doutreleau and Sherman wished them to be.19 The concept of heresy dominates Didymus’ thought and with it an objective understanding of truth and morality. For all that, Didymus attempts to sustain as many creative readings of a text as possible; rather than moving towards closed interpretation of given passages, heresy is essentially a hermeneutical error and so the reading of Scripture is a dangerous process—a bad interpretation leads one easily into the snare of Apollinarian syllogisms, while simply missing a change of speaker can make one a Eunomian.20 As Stefaniw has noted, non-literal meanings are not arrived at arbitrarily but are rather motivated by a set of specific interpretive assumptions about both the nature of divine revelation and the nature of the divinity revealed.21 ‘Elevation’ (anagōgē) is a spiritual, but nonetheless deeply technical, forcing of the wording of Scripture to refer to a higher reality, at the prompting of a deliberate, God-given, revelatory obscurity through the use of a traditional

14 For this apparently technical language, see ZachT 1.4.22–3 (1.17); 2.198.20 (3.66); 3.411.22 (5.202); cf. Doutreleau ZachT I, 112–14. 15 e.g. ZachT 2.143.9–10 (2.215): ‘according to the double elevation, the metaphorical (
æØŒc) and the allegorical’. 16 Tigcheler (1977), 181. 17 e.g. EcclT 5.281.5–7; cf. 1.14.3–32; PsT 1.41.26. 18 Hanson (1959), 359–74; cf. Procopé (1996). 19 Sherman (1995), 22–44, offers a good critique of modern historico-critical suspicions of allegory which seems to suggest she would have liked Didymus to be more akin to a modern literary theorist, though she recognizes the distance; although Doutreleau does not make these precise claims, something of this seems to underlie the comparisons with Ephrem (ZachT I, 34) and Cyril (38), perhaps as the only way of salvaging the theological bankruptcy he felt in ‘les abus d’allégorisme de l’École d’Alexandrie’ (58). 20 PsT 2.73.9–17; PsT 5.335.27–336.2. 21 Stefaniw (2010) offers a valuable ‘thick’ sociological description of what she styles ‘noetic exegesis’ in Origen, Didymus, and Evagrius, albeit slightly marred by what I take as a reading of Didymus’ context and intent through the lens of Evagrius. For whereas she is right to see that Evagrius’ exegesis does not explicitly relate itself to either Didymus or Origen (179; 30), Didymus himself is much more conscious of sitting within a scholastic tradition.

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repository of hermeneutical keys. For the tradition Didymus enlists22 comprises not just exegetical principles but rather a series of mutually illuminating biblical texts which can be deployed to unlock the meaning of the verse in question.23 These ‘hermeneutical keys’ prioritize certain Wisdom texts, and thus a primary distinction between ‘Origenist’ and ‘Antiochene’ hermeneutics is the determinative significance accorded the Wisdom tradition, which should probably be seen as a taking over of certain rabbinic stances.24 Certainly, if we look to midrash, Solomon’s role was as the prototype of the rabbinic reader, such that R. Yose could claim it was impossible to understand the Torah prior to Solomon. The three Solomonic texts were often read within this tradition not as hermetic texts but transparent meshalim clarifying obscurity elsewhere,25 with the Song of Songs typically seen as the primary key (though occasionally as a lock whose key was missing). Having learned this approach specifically from his ‘Hebrew master’, Origen should probably be read as performing his usual aggressive cultural takeover, changing the primary referent to the Christological narrative and allowing him to undermine Jewish claims to authoritative interpretation at the same time as he exploits their practice.26 It is against this background that the Song of Songs provides the basic proof of the truth of ‘elevation’, for Origen and Didymus alike, since no one would be so stupid as to understand it literally.27 In the Song of Songs, everything is noetic, mystical and goes beyond the heavens (
Æ Å
 N[Ø], [K]ç
ØŒ, æıæØÆ). At any rate no one, not even the very poor in understanding, comprehends the Song of Songs on the spoken level. Only Seras the Arian wanted to interpret it in this way, when he said that this bride who is hymned in the book was the daughter of Pharaoh. And we have often gone through this book setting out the sayings which cannot be understood on the spoken level (Kd ÞÅ
F).28

22

Unfortunately, the notion of an institutional School at Alexandria continues to encourage perceptions of a rigidly enforced coherent doctrine; cf. ter Haar Romeny (1997), 127: ‘The Antiochene School is perhaps best described as a school of thought (Richtung), rather than an institution (Lehranstalt) such as the School of the Catechists in Alexandria’; whereas I would argue that we are dealing just as much with a ‘school of thought’ in Didymus’ conscious adoption of Origen and Philo. 23 Cf. Orig. Philoc. 2.4 on his ‘Hebrew master’s’ tradition of Scripture as a series of locked doors with mismatched keys. 24 On Origen’s fundamental exegetical strategies as Jewish, see de Lange (1976). 25 Boyarin (1990), 105–7. 26 Cf. Blowers (1988), 113. For the active dispute between R. Yohanan and Origen on the Song of Songs, see Kimelman (1980). 27 ZachT 3.384.25–385.5 (5.101); EcclT 5.311.10–15; cf. Orig. Comm.Cant. prol. [Baehrens 61.22–62.30; 74.30–79.21]; G.Nyss. Hom.Cant. prol. [Langerbeck 3–13]. Interestingly Clement, more reliant on Philo for Jewish traditions, does not quote from the Song of Songs, although his use of Proverbs is prolific and other Wisdom literature substantial, but this may reflect his exoteric practice, rather than the work’s actual status. 28 EcclT 1.6.13–18.

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Similar approaches are evident in fellow ‘Origenists’ Gregory of Nyssa and Evagrius but it is precisely this that the ‘Antiochene’ Theodore denies, apparently reading the Song of Songs as a wedding hymn unfit for Holy Scripture29— a notion which Didymus here expressly equates with Arianism, not simply as a rhetorical ploy,30 but because of his wider equation of the movement from plain to elevated sense with the ascent from the sense-perceptible to the noetic and the flesh of Christ to his divinity. Beyond this difference in canon, we also find difference of technique in that for Theodore the reading of particular texts in certain lights is only transferable as idiom, and so Scripture does not unlock Scripture to the same extent as for Didymus. A good example of a simple hermeneutical key in action is Didymus’ justification of his arithmological amalgamation of biblical typologies and Pythagorean symbolisms:31 this ‘incontrovertible theory’32 is established on principle through a particular nexus of texts which are taken to show that some biblical numbers are historical impossibilities (1 Kgs 19:18/Rom. 11:4 in the light of 1 Kgs 19:10 and Rev. 14:3).33 The assumption is that if numbers somewhere in the Bible must be interpreted contrary to the sense-perceptible narrative, then all biblical numbers can be. Significantly, the collocation of texts is not offered as a rigorous proof but rather as a transferable interpretation whose use in a given situation is determined by evaluating the potential readings it unlocks according to Didymus’ three hermeneutical principles.

T H E AR T O F C OM M E NTARY Although Didymus, like Origen before him, does deal with the hypothesis and authorial context of a work to begin with,34 it is the detailed interpretation of 29

PG 66.699a–700d; on Theodore’s canon, see Hidal (1996), 555–6. The result is a conception of humanity’s primary relationship to God as servant to king, not bride to bridegroom, and its appropriate response as awe rather than love; cf. Quasten (1954). The more moderate Theodoret criticizes Theodore’s rejection anonymously, Comm.Cant. prol [PG 81.29a–b]. 30 Such indirect condemnation of ‘Antiochene’ stances by association is typical of Didymus, as in the connection he makes to Apollinarianism through their shared materialism, EcclT 3.154.1–3. 31 GenT 2.154.4–156.18; EcclT 4.216.23–217.3; PsT 3.156.19–157.7. Didymus’ choice of biblical or Pythagorean derivation is determined by the appropriateness of the resultant reading, not any prior commitment: thus, seven denotes Sabbath rest at PsT 2.88.22–24 but virgin and orphan (since it is neither a product nor a factor of any multiplication totalling one to ten) at PsT 4.260.1; cf. Philo Opif. 99. Cf. Nelson (1995), 154–73. 32 Although widespread amongst ‘Alexandrians’ (e.g. Philo Spec.Leg. 3.180; Orig. Philoc. 3; Hom.Gen. 2.2; cf. Harmless (2001), 525–6 on Evagrian number sybolism), Pythagoreaninfluenced arithmology was rejected by Diod. Comm.Ps. 6.1–31 [CCSG 6.32–3]. 33 e.g. ZachT 2.198.20–199.5 (3.66); GenT 1.35.19–36.7; cf. 2.154.4–17. 34 HiobT 1.1.1–8.13; EcclT 1.5.1–10.9; Orig. Comm.Cant. prol. There is a tendency to oversimplify the methodological distinctions: Mansfeld (1994) offers the best overview of Christian

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verses or part-verses (lemmata)35 which stands at the heart of his exegesis. Such lemmatic exegesis is easily loosed from its immediate narrative context, and indeed one often finds Didymus spending considerably more time expounding a related text he has introduced. It is scriptural idiom—or perhaps we might better say the biblical landscape—which is his prime concern; and this is often found in broad ideas such as the ‘meaning’ of hands or eyes. Contrary to those who read him as if ignoring the sense-perceptible narrative altogether, Didymus does see a relationship between levels of text and meaning. However, this elevated sense does not aim, as some suppose, at the construction of either parallel figurative narratives or doctrinal metanarratives; rather, interpretation is lemmatic or non-continuous on all his hermeneutical levels. Didymus’ approach is not uniform but geared towards the perceived difficulty of the passage in question. Usually, when he receives each lemma, he focuses first on the text, ‘what is spoken’ (to rhēton). This is distinct from the wording (lexis), probably in that it has some connotation of meaning. Employing the Alexandrian recension of the Septuagint as normative,36 he treats any problems of textual variation and grammar, such as punctuation37 or determining the root of an ambiguous verb form,38 and attempts to explain most fundamentally what the passage says, prior to its meaning. Frequently this can be done by simple paraphrase39 or by setting the passage in its immediate context by repeating the verses immediately prior to it.40

anticipations of Proclus’ agenda and stresses its ubiquity in Origen and Eusebius of Caesarea (11–17), as well as Diodore, Theodore, and Theodoret (18–19); meanwhile, the structure of Theodore’s commentaries is still lemmatic—the distinction comes in continued reference to the broader framework (van Rompay (1997), 106) and more substantially in disagreements about a work’s hypothesis (Diod. In Ps. 29.121–78 [CCSG 6.170–2] rejects the LXX titular inscriptions, whereas these form Didymus’ starting-point, PsT 1.23.1–25.2; cf. G.Nyss. Inscr.Ps.). 35 Too little is known about ancient models of literary study to be sure of the ubiquity of the lemmatic or katameric approach prior to Iamblichus; cf. Mansfeld (1994); but it would seem a likely consequence of the rarity of texts that most teaching was geared to oral comment on brief passages. The length of lemmata varies quite dramatically: GenT and ZachT tend towards lemmata of one to three verses, while the other works and especially PsT often treat no more than a few words at a time. Contrast Gregory of Nyssa; cf. Rondeau (1972), 263–4. 36 On Didymus’ relationship to the Alexandrian MS tradition, cf. Ehrman (1986). Despite occasional mentions of the Hebrew (PsT 2.87.18–20) and the translations of Aquila, Theodotion, and others (ZachT 3.341.13–18 (4.254); GenT 2.174.2–3), Didymus rarely uses them to solve exegetical problems. The key is probably the special significance accorded the LXX by Origen as actively suited to the need of Christians by the divine economy (all translations, including the Hebrew, gave no more than one image of the true text), e.g. Ep. ad Afric. 8(4); cf. Barthélemy (1972); Neuschäfer (1987), 111–13. On Didymus’ ignorance of Hebrew, see Kramer and Kramer (1987), 317–18. 37 HiobT 3. 246.14–17; PsT 3.138.29–139.1. 38 EcclT 1.43.9–10, 13–15, 20–1; PsT 3.134.19–22; 3.208.30–1. 39 40 PsT 2.88.27–89.1; GenT 2.216.19–217.1. EcclT 6.358.9–15.

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However, particular words often present a problem and need some exposition.41 There tend to be a number of reasons for this. First, the use of homonyms:42 Didymus never assumes that words have a single meaning independent of context and thus will always treat a range of possible meanings. Sometimes possibilities may be ruled out, but more frequently Didymus will offer alternative, sometimes even apparently mutually exclusive, readings for each homonym.43 Then there is the question of whether a word is being used in a positive or negative sense.44 Didymus’ prime illustrative material is Scripture itself and usually a whole raft of examples will be introduced in order to establish how the unitary voice of Scripture tends to express itself.45 However, this does not preclude the relevance of colloquial usage, and this may be introduced as well as or even instead of biblical testimonia.46 For although he can speak of the ‘idiom of Scripture’,47 he generally assumes that Septuagintal Greek is linguistically close to everyday Koine, and one does not see the same obsession with explaining solecisms and archaisms on the basis of the Hebrew originals that can be found in some commentators.48 More complex tends to be his investigation of the character (prosōpon) of a text.49 According to classical prosopography, each utterance has three characters (prosōpa)—the one speaking, the one spoken to, and what is being said.50 Naturally for Didymus, like most ancient grammarians, it is the identification of the speaker which takes priority, since meaning cannot be understood independently of the one speaking, the habituated manner of his speaking, and the nature of his intended audience.51 However, in comparison with modern exegesis, there is much less emphasis on the particular historical individual and much more on the manner in which biblical figures speak and act representatively of particular ‘types’.52 For example, Ecclesiastes is 41 The preponderance of definitions is perhaps the overwhelming characteristic of Didymus’ exegetical works, and it is a mark of this that all the published editions include an index of his definitions of Greek words. 42 PsT 3.209.1–22; ZachT 2.187.11–29 (3.25–7); cf. Philo Quaest.Gen. 4.23; Orig. Philoc. 9.1. 43 PsT 4.275.12–22; HiobT 3.255.16–257.1. 44 ZachT 2.209.21–210.4 (3.105); EcclT 4.197.26. 45 EcclT 1.45.18–24; PsT 4.262.15–24. 46 PsT 5.334.9–13; EcclT 1.16.4–6. 47 PsT 2.80.26–7; cf. 1.35.17–18 ( Ł). 48 PsT 5.334.7–13. By the fourth century, despite neither Diodore nor Theodore knowing any more Hebrew than Didymus (Schäublin (1974), 28–9), attention to unusual LXX linguistic forms seems to have become an ‘Antiochene’ domain. On this legacy of close attention to the Hebrew nature of divine revelation from Eusebius of Emesa, see Drewery (1978)—albeit often through the witness of the Peshitta rather than the Hebrew itself (Kamesar (1993), 126–75, 192–3; ter Haar Romeny (1997), 128, 130, 139–41). 49 Rondeau (1985), 223–30; cf. Orig. Philoc. 7.1–2. 50 51 PsT 2.110.2–3. EcclT 3.166.5–6. 52 PsT 2.106.14–16; cf. Torjesen (1982a), 949–50 on such ‘archetypal’ reading in Orig. Comm.Ps.

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designated as spoken by ‘the son of David’ (Eccl. 1:1). Didymus, therefore, works through the historical data to identify this as Solomon, since, unlike Absalom and other biological sons of David, Solomon was also David’s son in respect of his teaching, being the wise son of a wise father.53 However, he is also able to draw the initially surprising conclusion that since he bears a name emphasizing his biological descent, his address here—as Ecclesiast to the multitude comprising those at different levels—treats only human wisdom; whereas in the Songs of Songs he is given no human designation, so Didymus can conclude that he no longer speaks in the character of a human being but expounds divine mysteries.54 Such prosopological deductions are a frequent facet of Didymus’ commentaries and should probably be seen as going beyond mere appropriation of the biblical text by the reader, as in his explanation of the inscription to Psalm 24, ‘A psalm for David’: So it has established David as a pattern to imitate. The things which are said are not limited to his character alone but also if another should be found like him. And who is this ‘David’? ‘He who shall carry out all my wishes’ (Acts 13:22), it says. Let the psalm be said about everyone who carries out the wishes of God.55

From this fundamental principle, Didymus draws the highly significant Christological statement that anything spoken by Christ as far as he is man is to be understood equally (qualitatively, not quantitatively) of all the saints and moreover anything spoken by a saint in so far as he is holy is to be understood of the perfect humanity of Christ. And I said that whatever applies (±æ Ç
Æ) to the humanity of the Saviour (
fiH IŁæø fi
F ø
Bæ) applies to the just as well, even if in a diminished and lesser manner. So the verse, ‘Lord, in your power the king shall rejoice’ (Ps. 20:2) refers to every saint.56

It is not just that the saints share a quality with the humanity of Christ but that they actively imitate it as the fullest participation in virtue.57 The effect is well illustrated by examining one of the many psalms which are deemed to be spoken equally out of the character of the ‘lordly man’58 and the saint. For 53

EcclT 1.7.27–9. A similar method but different conclusion is at work in Evagrius’ Scholia on Ecclesiastes, which identify the speaking character as that of Christ. 54 EcclT 1.5.22–6.5; cf. Gregory of Nyssa’s identification of the Ecclesiast as rather the Son of God since he is the true ‘assembler’, Hom.Eccl. 1 [Alexander 280.8–13]. 55 PsT 2.74.12–14; cf. PsT 3.143.20–2. 56 PsT 1.6.13–16. There are parallels to Tychonius’ first rule on ‘the Lord and his body’ but this goes well beyond rhetorical figure, Aug. Doct.Christ. 3.31(44). 57 PsT 1.3.6–7. Only occasionally does Didymus adopt more traditional ideas of Christ expressing solidarity, In Ps. 68.2–3 [Mühlenberg fr.707, 2.75–6]. 58 Didymus’ language of › ŒıæØÆŒe ¼Łæø to refer to Christ in his humanity, PsT 1.11.24–8; 1.5.27–8; D.S.S. 226–30 (51–2), has provoked much discussion but is also found in Athanasius and Gregory of Nyssa and indeed explicitly denied a dualistic purpose at D.S.S. 230 (52); cf. Gesché (1961), 208–9; Heron (1972), 104–7; Grillmeier (1977).

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although a notion of imitation underlies the basic paradigm, the same verse may well have a different sense when taken of the humanity of Christ and of the saints. ‘And you led me down into a mound of death’ (Ps. 21:16). The cry either belongs to the character (KŒ æı) of Jesus or to the character of the holy men who knew in the midst of what evils they found themselves after being lowered into the place of oppression—for ‘you lowered us in a place of evil-doing’ (Ps. 43:20). And those who say this are saints, as the context of that psalm indicates. . . . So if the Saviour said this, it means this: ‘You led me down to the mound of death’ as the Light. I descended into a body, in order that I might die on behalf of all (cf. 2 Cor. 5:14–15), in order that ‘by the grace of God’ I might taste ‘death on behalf of everyone’ (Heb. 2:9). Therefore ‘mound of death’ and ‘body of death’ are meant in one way (
æø) of the other men, but in another way (
æø) of the Saviour; for if the body becomes a body of death whenever the one using it sins, but Jesus did not sin, he has entered into a mound of death in the sense of one which is able to endure death.59

The difficulties do not end there, as quick changes of characters not only occur but are to be expected, particularly in the prophets or Psalms,60 and the resultant confusion commonly gives rise to heresy. For example, Psalm 44:2 (‘My heart has belched out a good word’) may be understood as spoken by the saint or by God the Father.61 However, if one understands it of the Father, it is vital to recognize the quick change of character for verse three (‘I tell my works to the king’), which must be understood of the Son. The Eunomians miss this, and consequently fall into the heresy of believing that the eternal Word is in fact created and needs to be told what to say, as he is not privy to the Father’s divine knowledge.62 Once the basic text (rhēton) has been established or at least its possibilities outlined, one can begin to approach the question of meaning. The meaning on the level of the text (kata rhēton) or on the sense-perceptible level (kath’ historian) comes first, and these can be identical or differentiated.63 Unfortunately, Didymus seldom intends what a modern audience might understand by a literal or historical meaning.64 The sense-perceptible meaning of an eschatological text, for example, resides primarily in its factual logic; while 59 PsT 1.36.17–20, 24–9. On the distinctiveness lightness of the lordly body, see ZachT 1.40.28–41.5 (1.177). 60 PsT 3.149.21–22; ZachT 3.306.13–28 (4.114–15); GenT 2.247.18–20. 61 62 PsT 5.331.9–10. PsT 5.334.15, 335.27–336.2. 63 Identical: ZachT 2.230.1–5 (3.176); distinct: EcclT 1.14.3–23; PsT 3.180.3–181.7. Sherman (1995), 66–74, reacting to Tigcheler’s ties to a historico-critical framework, argues for a greater focus on
e ƒ
æØŒ  as background investigation but is probably over-influenced here by Neuschäfer’s (1987), 292, attempt to separate Origen the praiseworthy philologist from Origen the censurable allegorist. 64 Modern exegetes lacking any philological or rhetorical training have tended to style ‘literal’ merely the ‘authoritative community sense’; cf. Childs (1977).

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its prophetic fulfilment in history is secondary and only warily introduced.65 Often, where Didymus commends the textual level, it is because it has some moral value66 but the sense-perceptible level may also be a doctrinal reading. Indeed it may well have to be rejected because such a statement about the nature of sense-perceptible reality would imply a doctrine out of step with the faith as received from the rest of Scripture. Question: Doesn’t it hold true on the sense-perceptible level (æe
c ƒ
æÆ)? Answer: If you wish to understand it as relating to the sense-perceptible, you derive the doctrine that no man has existed on the earth without sin. But I said that this causes a difficulty for us in relation to John and Jeremiah, unless perhaps you understand that sin according to which it has been said, ‘All sinned’ (Rom. 3:23; 5:12).67

Even more problematically for the casual reader, historia engages the entirety of ancient contextual investigation (to historikon), which more often implies the contemporary ‘scientific’ knowledge of the sense-perceptible world, particularly natural history.68 Thus, understanding the relevant historia accurately is sometimes the key to transcending both text and sense-perceptible reality.69 Moving beyond the sense-perceptible is for Didymus the essence of human existence and destiny,70 so it is hardly surprising that this is the chief aim of his exegesis. Time and again Didymus’ exegesis both teaches and performs the manner of progress in the Christian life,71 of being renewed according to the Image of God by participation in the virtue which wells up from him. However, the manner in which Didymus does this and the precise remit of his technical terminology are the subject of much debate. He employs a whole variety of terms, most frequently elevation (anagōgē), but also understanding (dianoia), spiritual sense, allegory, and tropology. Clearly, they are not Doutreleau’s synonyms but despite Bienert and Tigcheler’s different protestations, they are sometimes used as such. Conceptually, Didymus sees himself as practising not allegorical but ‘elevated’ exegesis,72 possibly because allegory carried with it suggestions of falsehood inappropriate to the Holy Spirit—certainly Theodore of Mopsuestia laid precisely this

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EcclT 3.174.3–9. HiobT 1.52.17–21; 2.184.25–8; GenT 2.151.2–3. The moral interpretation need not be identical with
e ÞÅ
, PsT 3.149.11–13. 67 68 EcclT 4.220.5–9. HiobT 1.103.2–7; PsT 1.45.24–16.46.7. 69 EcclT 1.40.15–20; PsT 5.296.20–31. 70 EcclT 4.238.6–27; PsT 3.140.1–7; ZachT 3.406.17–401.3 (5.179–181). 71 A point well brought out in Layton (2004)’s language of exegesis as ‘mimetic pedagogy’. 72 It is difficult to know whether Origen and Didymus’ opponents’ occasional positive use of Iƪøª, e.g. Diod. Comm.Ps. prol.122–7 [CCSG 6.7], reflects appreciation of this distinction. If so, language of ‘allegory’ and ‘allegorists’ is entirely pejorative, denoting ‘Alexandrian’ failure to avoid the foolishness of Greek myth. 66

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charge of making the Holy Spirit a liar against allegorists.73 However, Didymus is not hostile to the language of allegory as a figure of speech, and the key to elevation is more the sense of dynamic movement within the text by which the divine Word draws the Christian more deeply into his mysteries. Whereas allegory conveys a sense of saying one thing but meaning another, elevation demands that precisely because one thing is said on the base level, a whole range of other things are said on higher levels. Didymus does not speak of subsenses of the text (hyponoiai) but of the understanding or mind of the text (dianoia).74 Elevation is not assumed to be transparent, nor is there any of Theodore’s insistence that the movement should already be implicit in the base text.75 It can be spoken of as forced and there appears to be a technical usage of the phrase ‘take by force’ (biazein),76 presumably on the basis of Matt. 11:12. There is no sense of literary playfulness or exegetical creativity, though, as is seen in warnings against the danger of over-allegorizing77 and the particular danger of ‘talking nonsense’ through inaccurate etymologies.78 The key seems to be finding the allegorical referent explained openly in another part of Scripture79 and then examining the resultant sense according to the principles of truth, coherence, and utility. The danger lies in overpressing the illustration. When discussing the use of analogical metaphor for theology, Didymus stresses that a metaphor does not assume an exact correlation between an image and its subject on all points;80 one must distinguish between likeness and identity, particularly in the case of parables,81 and examples are not to be smoothed away or else they are no longer examples.82 This language is used equally about the ‘elevated sense’, and students are exhorted not to ‘smooth away’ the wording83 or ‘stretch out’ an interpretation to every nuance of the sense-perceptible referent.84 As a result it would be tempting to argue that the relationship of the levels of interpretation is purely metaphorical or analogical. 73 Theod.Mops. C.Alleg. 3; 4 [van Rompay 2.13.18–20; 2.15.3–10]. On the rhetorical figure more generally as pretending one thing but meaning something else, cf. Heracl. Quaest.Hom. 5.15–16; Jer. Comm.Gal. 2 [PL 26.389b–c]. 74 The language of ÆØ is used by both Philo and Clement (Bienert (1972), 52) but Origen and Didymus’ avoidance should probably not be put down to changing fashions, despite Plut. Aud.Poet. 4.19e: ‘what were once called subtexts ( ÆØ) are now called allegories’, but rather Origen’s metaphysical and anthropological substantiation of such exegesis; cf. G.Nyss. Hom.Cant. prol. [Langerbeck 5.7–9]. 75 76 Theod.Mops. In Gal. 4.24 [Swete 1.73 ff.]. e.g. PsT 2.67.26–8; EcclT 6.323.23. 77 78 GenT 1.104.28–105.5. GenT 1.139.9–14; 2.147.15–18. 79 e.g. PsT 3.219.34–220.2, where the meaning of teeth in Ps. 34:16 cannot be derived from that text but must be supplied from the fact that the ruminative powers of the soul are often called its teeth. 80 81 PsT 5.332.26–333.4; 3.201.19–22. PsT 5.318.26–319.6. 82 83 PsT 5.330.3–4. PsT 4.285.19–22; 3.219.34–220.2; cf. Harl (1983), 137. 84 PsT 3.187.4–14.

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However, on many occasions, Didymus seems to presuppose a more fundamental reality to the relationship between the higher and lower senses of the text through the biblical language of shadows and icons.85 And here we reach the heart of his understanding, for it is the elevated sense of Scripture which is the true and primary sense, while the lower levels, including not just the historical narrative but the events which it comprises, are merely the shadow it casts. For all that ancient and modern scholars might disagree, the spiritual depth of the text which elevation opens up is not felt by Didymus to be in any way arbitrary—he aims not to abolish the letter of Scripture but to make it transparent.

D IDYM US’ P R I N C I PL E S O F B I B L I C A L INTERPRETATION On my reading, Didymus’ principles of biblical interpretation are equally those of his model, Origen. Yet since these aspects are rarely the ones emphasized in studies of Origen’s exegetical practice, it seems worthwhile to summarize the logic in detail through a synchronic reading of his works, with only minimal comparative references.86

The Truth of Scripture The ‘God-inspired’87 Scriptures88 are for Didymus first and foremost true. Appropriately styled ‘God’s testimonies’ (Ps. 24:10) because they are 85

ZachT 2.97.19–24 (2.16); HiobT 3.215.26–28a, 31–3. On Origen’s practice, see Harl (1983), 144–5. For a rather different analysis of Didymus, see Tigcheler (1977), 158–75. 87 The allusion to 2 Tim. 3:16 (frequent in both Origen and Didymus, PsT 1.39.23; 4.285.28; EcclT 1.7.9) reflects the fact that it is inspiration of Scripture which opens up Iƪøª in contrast to the mere allegory found in human works, such as the Iliad, EcclT 5.281.16–22; cf. Carlini (1998), 389. 88 The extent of Didymus’ canon remains unsure. He clearly distinguishes between canonical and apocryphal books on the authority of Clement and Serapion (EcclT 1.7.32–8.11) but may well not have in mind the canon of Athan. Ep.Fest. 39, as even c.387 he appears to cite the Shepherd of Hermas and Letter of Barnabas as canonical (ZachT 1.86.24–7 (1.384); 2.234.19–22 (3.196); 3.355.20–1 (4.312)); whereas Athanasius’ early acceptance (Incarn. 3) has already hardened by Decr. 18. Ehrman’s (1983), 11–18, analysis of citation formulae argues that in addition to the entirety of the Athanasian canon (except 2 Jn., 3 Jn., and Phlm.) Didymus employs as authoritative the Shepherd of Hermas (sometimes designated ‘K
fiB ºø fi
B ή
Ååø
fiB —Ø Ø’ or ‘
B —Ø ØŒB ØÆŒÆºÆ . . .
B ή
ÅåÅ
ØŒB’; PsT 2.67.4–5; 4.262.33–263.1; HiobT 2.184.33–185.1; 3.224.22–7), the Letter of Barnabas (PsT 4.262.33–263.1), the First Letter of Clement (HiobT 3.299.22–5), and the Didache (also called ‘K
fiB ˜ØÆåfiB
fiB ºø fi
B ή
Ååø’; PsT 3.227.26–7; EcclT 2.78.22–3). Sadly, Ehrman does 86

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irrefutable,89 Didymus ascribes their primary authorship to the Holy Spirit90 and so will not concede even the suggestion of error, as in the Matthaean genealogy of Christ.91 We are not dealing here with a doctrine of mechanical inspiration but rather a more complex interrelationship both between the Holy Spirit and the human authors and between the Holy Spirit and human history.92 The writing of Scripture is understood not in terms of possession—probably because of Origen’s axiom that only demons override human purposive choice93— but as a cooperative enterprise.94 Where an Old Testament figure is seen as prophesying about Christ, this is not done in ignorance but in full knowledge of what was to come.95 The prophets participate in both the Spirit of Truth and the Word,96 and it is only because they are shown to have become gods themselves as a result of this participation that their words should be contemplated.97 Through the striking image of Psalm 44:2 all the saints, not just the biblical authors, are seen as the pen with which the Word writes.98 In the light of this, there is no concession to any human fallibility; rather, the human author is seen as the recipient of a revelation beyond that recorded, and any lack of clarity in the text was not due to misunderstanding or inability to articulate the revelation they received: Moses glimpsed the fullness of creation

not really consider whether the use of such secondary designations as ‘the Book of Catechesis’ might suggest a more limited status than those Scriptures which are ‘publicly read’; cf. Murat.fr. 71–3. What is clear is that Didymus felt able to base substantive arguments on all these texts and accorded to each an illuminative authority beyond that of ‘customary usage’. He quotes Ign. Rom. 7.2 three times with some force (EcclT 2.81.6–7; 2.86.18–20; PsT 5.297.26–7); but also makes cautious use of works designated ‘apocryphal’; cf. Lührmann (1992)—the most significant is the puzzling Book of the Testament (GenT 1.118.29–119.2; 1.121.22–7; 1.126.24–6; 1.142.28–143.1; 2.149.5–8; HiobT 1.6.17–26; Lührmann (1992), 243–5 assumes a discrete work, Nautin GenT I, 28–9, an accidental conflation of Jubilees with the Ethiopic Conflict of Adam and Eve with Satan); Ascension of Isaiah (EcclT 6.329.21–5); Testimony of Isaiah (PsT 3.218.3–14); Apocalypse of Elijah (EcclT 2.92.5–6; 4.235.25–8); and at least one other ‘apocryphal book’ (PsT 1.46.12–13; ZachT 1.77.19–21 (1.342), possibly 2 Enoch, Doutreleau ZachT I, 375n.2). 89 90 91 PsT 2.81.24–6. EcclT 1.7.9–11. PsT 5.304.1–13. 92 On Origen’s theory of inspiration, see Nardoni (1984). 93 Orig. Princ. 3.3.4; Hom.Ez. 6.1–2; contrast Philo Heres 259, 264. 94 Perhaps we should concede some force to the prefix in Didymus’ habitual use of ıªªæÆç despite its usual currency as simply ‘historian’ or ‘prose-writer’ (according to Liddell and Scott s.v., ªæÆç is used more typically of painters or scribes). Didymus consistently presents Scripture as a work jointly authored by the human who is inspired and the Spirit who inspires, admitting that it can often be difficult to distinguish between the voices of each, PsT 1.7.19–21; 1.12.25. However, this does not present a problem, as, on the basis of Matt. 22:43/ Mark 12:36, he states at PsT 1.8.10–12: ‘If then I say that the saint says this, for example the Psalmist, I am not separating the Holy Spirit from the one who possesses the Holy Spirit; nor do I mean that the one who possesses the Holy Spirit says these things without the Holy Spirit.’ 95 96 GenT 2.214.24–215.1. ZachT 1.4.5–10 (1.15); 2.94.10–16 (2.2). 97 98 ZachT 2.94.23–95.5 (2.4–5). PsT 5.336.4–5.

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on Sinai and so conspires in the obscurity of the Pentateuch,99 while Job fully understood the nature of the incarnation.100 This spiritual origin does not wholly override the significance of the human author, and claims that exploring the hypothesis of a biblical book is peculiarly ‘Antiochene’ are overstated. Didymus always considers it important to treat the question of human authorship prior to studying a particular book or psalm, as this can alert the reader to particular themes, as in the case of the three sons of Kore who sing with the common heart and mind of the apostles and thus foreshadow the eschatological unity of the rational creation.101 Nonetheless, he is more than happy to leave the question open when discussing Job;102 and, when treating Solomon’s authorship of Ecclesiastes, he is more concerned with describing the quality with which Solomon wrote, namely as the wise son of a wise man and as Ecclesiast, than as a concrete historical individual.103 This distinction which Didymus makes between the character (prosōpon) of a Scriptural text and the concrete individual is where the significant break between ‘Alexandrian’ and ‘Antiochene’ practice occurs, but it does not amount to the redundancy of history, despite the claims of Theodore that it abolishes the ‘real facts’. In truth I say that [‘allegorical interpretation’] comes from the pagans and is something which pagan interpreters have invented to abolish their myths and these allegorists have invented to abolish the real facts of the holy Scriptures.104

In the entirety of the Toura commentaries, Didymus only ever questions the historical reality of two events—the Fall account and the building of the Tower of Babel. Yet even in these two extreme cases, Didymus is not completely convinced of their lack of historical foundation. In the case of the Fall, Didymus’ objections105 clearly do not mean that he did not believe in the historical reality of Adam and Eve, as he often styles them ‘first-moulded’.106 Indeed derivative doctrines, such as his argument that Adam should be included among the saints who descended as doctors of the fallen rather than fell through sin,107 are never presented as describing a condescension of the mind to the weakness of the senses.108 His allegory of the tale is thus an additional layer of truth conveyed by Genesis rather than the sole one. It is precisely 99 ZachT 1.6.5–11 (1.23). Both the Ecclesiast’s and Moses’ words have the same balance of exoteric and esoteric intent as Jesus’, EcclT 1.5.23–7. Origen treats Moses similarly in C.Cels. 1.19; Hom.Num. 9.3; 5.1–2. 100 HiobT 1.12.14–18; 1.63.11–16; 4.360.6–19 (foreknowledge of the revelation to David); ZachT 1.56.11–17 (1.247); cf. Orig. Comm.Jn. 6.(4)24; Hom.Gen. 8.1. 101 102 103 PsT 5.296.1–4; 5.331.20–1. HiobT 1.7.32–8.10. EcclT 1.5.15–24. 104 Theod.Mops. C.Alleg. 3 [van Rompay 2.11.8–12]. 105 e.g. GenT 1.106.8–108.16 on the garments of skin (Gen. 3:21). 106 107 PsT 3.156.25–6. GenT 1.100.8–12; PsT 5.313.17–22. 108 For this interpretation of the underlying narrative, see GenT 1.95.18–21. (The earlier account is not extant and was probably found in the missing pages 77–80, Nautin GenT I, 223n.1.)

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because of his lemmatic approach that he can reject as historical the ready sense of individual verses like Gen. 3:7–8 without rejecting the surrounding narrative.109 Meanwhile, he only raises a suspicion about the Tower of Babel, clearly showing that he is not cavalier in his regard for the historical basis of revelation.110 The prime examples of texts which have only a ‘spiritual’, not a ‘senseperceptible’ truth are not those passages modern authors would view as ‘mythical’, but rather metaphors, maxims, and unfulfilled promises.111 The most important example is the commandment ‘Honour your father and mother, in order that it may be well with you and that you might be longlived in the good land’ (Ex. 20:12).112 This promise is not visibly fulfilled and so, since God’s word cannot be false, it must have another meaning. This is the heart of the ‘Alexandrian’ criterion of the ‘impossibility’ of a text, and it most usually applies to biblical promises or to maxims, such as ‘If a tree falls in the south and in the north, it remains in the place where it falls’ (Eccl. 11:3).113 Where an apparent historical fulfilment is rejected or, more often, viewed as partial and limited, it is a hyperliteral sensitivity to textual details at work, rather than anti-historical prejudice.114 For example, Didymus refuses to see the prophecy ‘And you sowed us among the nations’ (Ps. 43:12) entirely fulfilled in the sixth-century diaspora, since the Jews were not scattered ‘everywhere’, but only to Babylon and Assyria.115 Instead, the verse must refer primarily to the saints who act upon the nations, changing them into imitations of themselves, like seeds which transform earth into plant matter.116 Modern misreadings come from the failure to appreciate the significance of Didymus’ doctrine of providence.117 The Holy Spirit is the co-author not only of Scripture but of historical reality—both are vehicles of divine revelation and condescension to the weakness of the human understanding. And so it is not just the biblical depiction but the actual historical events which he sees as 109

110 GenT 1.84.12–20. PsT 1.22.8–10. Cf. Orig. Princ. 4.2.9; 4.3.5. The ancients at least were aware of this, and Theodore singles out such verses as Ps. 21:21; 97:8; Hab. 3:15; Is. 11:6, at C.Alleg. 2 [van Rompay 2.4.5–5.2], explaining them as a characteristically Hebrew form of metaphor. 112 113 EcclT 3.162.21–163.1. EcclT 6.321.1–4. 114 On Origen, see Edwards (2002), 145. On the ‘hyperliteralism’ of spiritualized Zohairic exegesis, see Wolfson (1993), 167; but contrast Clement’s non-lexical focus, preferring the voice of Scripture to the actual text, Dawson (1992), 213–14. 115 PsT 5.316.5–22. Similarly, the prophecy at Ps. 21:18–19 about the counting out of speaker’s bones and the division of his garments is only partially fulfilled at the Crucifixion, since these were Roman soldiers, not Jews, as prophesied, and so its true reference is to Jews and heretics rejecting Christian doctrines and trying to twist particular parts of the wording of Scripture to their own mistaken thoughts, PsT 1.39.10–40.15. 116 PsT 5.316.12–16. 117 HiobT 4.336.2–7. The connection between a hard-line doctrine of providence and elevated exegesis is made with reference to Origen by Harl (1983), 59–74, though she perhaps overestimates the influence of Stoic thought here. 111

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providentially and precisely ordered so as to be most helpful: Job suffered two disasters so that people would recognize the hand of God, not chance;118 he tore his clothes precisely to prevent future accusations that he did not love his children;119 while other texts are deliberately structured to combat the dangers of particular heresies.120 It is precisely because the Holy Spirit is author of both scriptural and senseperceptible reality that there can be no discrepancy between their truth claims.121 Apparent contradictions are thus only that—apparent—and must be resolved by the exegete. Yet this does not introduce a poetic symbolism of free association, nor a tendency towards large-scale meta narratives, but rather a deeply technical interlacing of biblical passages in order to reveal the elevated sense. For the inherent relationships between the referents are always expressed in ways corresponding to the schema of the sense-perceptible narrative at hand. So ‘They sowed fig-leaves’ (Gen. 3:7), as was explained before, when they invent a plausible excuse, but the account (º ª) is consistent (IŒ ºıŁ) with the outline of the narrative (
fiH å Æ
Ø
B ƒ
æÆ). For since the paradisial garden and nakedness and the recognition of this after disobedience have been introduced, the account speaks of a covering being made from leaves, using what is appropriate to the story (
fiH Nο fi
B ØŪø) as is the custom in Godinspired Scripture. For often in the divine teaching the soul is called sometimes a ‘vine’, sometimes a ‘sheep’, sometimes a ‘bride’, and the account introduces the rest in ways corresponding to each (æe ŒÆ
 IŒºŁø). For whenever it suggests [the soul] as a vine, as in ‘Israel is a luxuriant vine’ (Hos. 10:1), then it calls the teachers ‘farmers’ and those who plot against it ‘foxes’.122

Didymus’ method therefore consistently privileges the dynamics and interrelationships expressed in Scripture over static details, and this becomes central to his vision of virtue.

The Coherence of Scripture Didymus’ second principle flows from this unitary authorship—that of consistency.123 It is evidenced on a small scale in the insistence that things must be

118

119 HiobT 1.28.4–17. HiobT 1.33.3–8. A good example here is Scripture’s use of the phrase ‘Son of Man’. This is taken by Didymus as direct opposition to docetic tendencies, since if Jesus had been simply styled ‘man’, he could have been understood as unbegotten, PsT 3.152.33–153.8; GenT 2.184.24–185.1; cf. ZachT 3.336.25–337.5 (4.234). 121 Contrast G.Nyss. Inscr.Ps. 2.12; 2.131–2, distinguishing between history and the Spirit’s account of history; cf. Hom.Cant. prol. 122 GenT 1.86.5–16. 123 On parallels with the Targumic approach, see Harl (1983), 145. 120

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understood in a way befitting the revealed character of the speaker:124 Job is declared not to have sinned with his lips at Job 2:10 (cf. 42:7) so cannot have said anything sinful in his lengthy speeches, and his words must be read in this light.125 And it is precisely this sort of inconsistency which Didymus throws in the face of the ‘lovers of the narrative’ (philistores):126 Some of these things could not have happened in the natural course of things: for it would not belong to the wise man to wistfully utter such curses about a day which has passed and no longer has any existence. And if the lovers of the narrative (çغ
æ) were to remain in the explanation of what is spoken (
fiB
F ÞÅ
F I Ø), they would weaken the courage of the saint, which the devil was unable to weaken, by assuming that he had such great contempt . . . Therefore, since the contents of what is spoken (
a
F ÞÅ
F) do not have a blessed and fitting place for the saint, the verses in question must be contemplated (ŁøæÅ
) according to the principles of allegory (ή
a  ı IººÅªæÆ).127

If revelation is unitary, there must be a single narrative thread (heirmos) to the economy of salvation which interpretations must not fight against;128 and Scripture in its entirety must serve as the context of any given text. The exegete’s task is that of recognizing the integrity of both the body of Scripture and its mind, through attention to interrelationships of verses; while heretics divide the wordings or twist them to their own purposes by reading particular passages in isolation.129 This goes beyond the simple literary principle of authorial continuity— ‘interpreting Homer from Homer’130—the relationship is one of body to soul and the exegetical movement itself is intentional; the means of divine pedagogy not just a preliminary to it. The key image is that of Ecclesiastes 11:2—the truly God-wise, the ecclesiastical man, unlike the Jew or the heretic, must ‘give a portion to both the seven and the eight’, that is both the sabbath rest and the resurrection, both the Old Testament and the New.131 The barrier to this is Ezekiel’s image of the book written both inside and outside—that is in both 124

PsT 5.322.15–17. HiobT 3.210.32–211.3. Correspondingly, the words of those who are not saints do not have to be read as revelatory or true, HiobT 1.103.30–104.13. 126 This language should not be understood as designating a specific group but rather a fundamental attitude (which is his preferred manner of treating heresies). At times it can refer to anthropomorphites, ‘Antiochene’ exegetes, or just the ‘simpler’ readers: what is consistent is their mistakenness, derived from a refusal to move beyond the level of the text. They should not, however, be confused with ‘ƒ ƒ
æF
’, who are simply natural historians and thus contribute illuminating background material, e.g. HiobT 1.103.2–7. 127 128 129 HiobT 1.55.29–56.15. PsT 3.186.2–3. PsT 1.39.29–40.15. 130 Though it is not attested before Porph. Quaest.Hom. 297.16, Neuschäfer (1987), 276–85, traces it back to Aristarchus, and the second-century Galen could apply the principle to interpreting Hippocrates from Hippocrates. 131 EcclT 6.317.16–318.4. 125

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spiritual and sense-perceptible modes: it cannot be read by most Jews, despite the revelation to them of the heavenly alphabet, because of God’s deliberate obscuring of the text with overlying seals; nor by Gentiles, since they simply do not know the letters.132 The most important consequence of this continuity is the maintenance of the invisibility and incorporeality of God on the basis of John 1:18 and 6:46, Col. 1:15, and 1 Tim. 1:17 and 6:16 against references to him walking, sleeping, or indeed demonstrating any qualities, since they presuppose a composite and therefore corporeal being.133 Everything spoken about him in a human manner must be understood in a manner befitting God.134 Although it apparently bears constant repetition, none of Didymus’ pupils seems to have any difficulties with this. However, his assertion that Scripture is fundamentally a singular entity with a solitary theme—the salvation brought about by the sojourning of Christ—was evidently more controversial. The ‘whole God-inspired Scripture’ (cf. 2 Tim. 3:16) is called the ‘head of the book’ (Ps. 39:8); for the summary of Scripture is the citizenship of Christ (æd æØ
F ºØ
Æ). And let it refer to other things in a secondary sense; for unless the sojourning was going to happen, the Ancient Scriptures would not have announced the Gospel in advance. Question: Was this written as applying to the Pentateuch? Answer: It says that all Scripture is a book, whose heading is the goal for which the Scriptures have been given, namely salvation, the sojourning.135

And such was the disbelief of this presumably well-read Christian that he follows up with another question to check that Didymus really means to say that even the creation account has Christ as its theme.136 Modern scholars rightly sense here a distinctive aspect of an ‘Origenist’ or ‘Alexandrian’ paradigm but all too often mistakenly contrast it with an ‘Antiochene’ respect for the narrative integrity of individual books of the Bible.137 Origen and Didymus are no less interested in the integrity of either biblical speakers or authors. For example, a comparison of Didymus’ exegesis of Psalm 21 with that of Diodore and Theodore138 shows the ‘Alexandrian’ respecting the prosopological integrity of what he views as a univocal (monoprosōpos) psalm with a twin reference to Christ’s humanity and the perfect saint throughout; while the ‘Antiochenes’ see changes of reference from verse to verse according to their principle of harmonization. In fact the ‘Antiochenes’ are working with a multiplicity of context as much as Didymus is, with a 132

PsT 4.286.4–14, exploiting Ez. 2:9–10; Is. 29:11–12. ZachT 5.365.5–19 (5.32–3); GenT 2.216.20–217.1; PsT 1.1.8–12; HiobT 4.324.25–30. 134 GenT 1.7A.6–7; 2.159.26–160.17; PsT 1.8.11–12; ZachT 3.365.20–366.8 (5.34–5). 135 136 137 PsT 4.285.28–32. PsT 4.285.32–286.4. e.g. Young (1997b), 21. 138 PsT 1.23.1–56.28; Diod. Comm.Ps. 21.1–282 [CCSG 6.126–37]; Theod.Mops. Comm.Ps. 21.1–43 [CCSL 88a.107–12]. 133

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similar tension between the particular inspiration of a book or individual and the general revelation of the divine economy. The difference comes in the extent of this wider revelatory context: for Didymus and the ‘Alexandrians’ it is Scripture as a whole, with the citizenship of Christ as its summary;139 for the ‘Antiochenes’, the Old Testament has a unity of its own and is fundamentally discrete from the New Testament revelation in Christ.140 Didymus’ Letter to the Hebrews-controlled understanding of the Old Testament is of necessarily shadowy and iconic teachings prior to Christ’s sojourning.141 However, this actually applied only to the majority of people who could not penetrate the mystery of Scripture; while true saints, such as Job, being subject to a single divine revelation, were never ignorant of the coming incarnation.142 Nothing is unrelated to this one purpose, not even the creation account, and so Scripture itself can equally be read as incarnational, the Word become text. It is the body of Christ: the wording is its clothing, the sacred theories and doctrines are the bones which hold everything together, and the meaning behind it is both Christ’s understanding and the understanding of Christ. Just as in one sense the gathering of the faithful could be called the ‘body of Christ’, as the apostolic witnesses indicated, and we said that the vigorous men were the ‘bones’ of this body, so too in turn we say that the God-spirited Scripture itself is the ‘body of the Saviour’, and the ‘bones’ of this body are its vigorous understandings ( Æ
Æ), ideas (Łøæ Æ
Æ) about the rest of the higher understandings. The wordings (ºØ) of Scripture then are its ‘clothes’; for the intellectual meaning (› º ª › ŒÆ
a
c  ÅØ) is ‘clothed’ by the wording.143

Yet we would be mistaken to suppose that this implies a Christological ‘Alexandrian’ reading in contrast to a moral ‘Antiochene’ one. For Christ himself is not the summary of Scripture but his citizenship (politeia).144 Exegesis is fundamentally the exhortation of mankind to a moral life and right understanding of the doctrines of piety so that one may be united in Christ—an idea well brought home on occasions where he does not explain 139 The centrality of this belief to the ‘Alexandrian’ mode of exegesis can be seen in that it is still so vigorously maintained by Cyril, even though on other aspects there is quite some gulf between him and Didymus, e.g. Cyr.Alex. Glaph.Gen. 1.prol. [PG 69.13a] on Christ as the pearl which is hidden in all the Scriptures. It is probably his acceptance of presuppositions like this, rather than his debt to Origen, which moves most readers to class him with the ‘Alexandrians’, despite the greater exegetical parallels with Athanasius and the Cappadocians. Again this represents a shift from Clement, who asserted the lack of contradiction (Strom. 3.(12)83.3–89.1) but preferred to speak of a progressive revelation (Paed. 1.(7)59.1–61.3; Strom. 7.(14)86.3). 140 Theod.Mops. Comm.Zach. 1; 9 [PG 66.501c–505a; 556c–557b]; cf. van Rompay (1997), 108, 122. The strong ‘Alexandrian’ reaction to this is probably a relic of opposition to Marcionites and Valentinians, In 2 Cor. 3.4–6; 3.7 [Staab 22.1–5; 23.28–32]; but may also have been influenced by the need to assert the divinity of the Spirit, D.S.S. 6 (3). 141 142 ZachT 2.97.19–24 (2.16). HiobT 1.12.14–18. 143 PsT 1.39.21–5. 144 PsT 4.285.28–9; contrast the effect of positing the essential and incarnate aspects of the Word as the goal (Œ ) in [Ps.-]Athan. C.Ar. 3.28–9.

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Scripture in an abstract manner but enrols the audience wishing to be saved.145 It is this point that is missed by Simonetti and results in his ill-fated attempt to chart variations in Didymus’ position towards ‘allegory’ across the commentaries.146 Ignoring his own caution that most of these variations can be explained through the nature of the biblical books in question,147 he states that his chief problem with the Commentary on Job is that it is not primarily Christological but moral:148 Job’s role is as the exemplary saint and teacher, explaining by word and action the nature of suffering, sin, justice, and salvation, rather than as a prototype of Christ. However, this is an ‘elevated’ reading of the text.149 Moreover, given what one must presume is Didymus’ judgement of the level of his audience for these works, it is his preferred elevated reading. Didymus’ exposition of the Bible is primarily moral and individualized. Indeed, the same avoidance of Christological typology is found in the LectureNotes on Ecclesiastes, despite what Simonetti sees as its strong defence of anagogical methods,150 and the tone is much closer to Gregory of Nyssa’s virtue-saturated Homilies on Ecclesiastes than Evagrius’ brief Scholia. Similarly, even though the Lecture-Notes on Psalms initially define many Psalms as

145

ZachT 2.181.18–182.1 (2.371). Simonetti (1983), 386: ‘La breve rassegna che abbiamo fatto dei commentari didimiani ha messo in evidenza, quanto al rapporto fra lettera e allegoria, divergenze a volte notevoli fra opera e opera . . . Abbiamo visto infatti come Didimo abbia difeso l’allegoria contro Apollinare, ma al suo tempo non era certo solo Apollinare a criticare l’esegesi alessandrina: tutto l’ambiente antiocheno e, per gran parte, siro-palestinese . . . conduceva una polemica anche aspra contro l’allegorismo alessandrino in nome di un apprezzamento più letterale del testo biblico . . . EcclT ci è apparso il più impegnato in questo contesto, ma anche HiT e GenT variamente vi si connettono; invece ZaT e PsT ne sembrano del tutto estranei.’ 147 Simonetti (1983), 342–3. 148 Simonetti (1983), 358, 388. He assumes that allegory is only used in HiobT to resolve defectus litterae; that the tone is largely moralizing with little recourse to a superimposition of readings; that Didymus rejects opportunities for allegory which he takes elsewhere in the case of number symbolism and hyperbole; that verses which are taken allegorically in ZachT and GenT are understood literally in HiobT; and that an underlying principle of TçºØÆ is introduced into his exegesis. There is no doubt that there is a difference in both literary style and the application of exegetical method between HiobT and the other Toura works, but to see this as a concession to ‘Antiochene’ polemic is to misunderstand the role of Job in this controversy. Although Theodore does seem to have eventually written a Commentary on Job, he appears to have come close to rejecting its Scriptural status, viewing it as immoral in allowing him to curse the day of his birth and grotesquely tainted by its mythological allusions and its use of Greek tragedy as a pattern, PG 66.697a–698d. 149 Like others before him, Simonetti is ill served in trying to move too quickly from Origen’s and Didymus’ language of
e ÞÅ
 and Iƪøª to a simple equation of letter–literal sense and allegory–spiritual sense. Simonetti (1983), 371, maintains this approach despite the fact that, in trying to apply this vocabulary consistently, he (1983), 371, finds himself talking of two levels of the letter, one literal, one allegorical or spiritual. 150 Simonetti (1983). 146

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spoken equally from the character of the Saviour according to his humanity and the just man, Didymus’ primary focus throughout is upon the level of the just man—the character, destiny, and moral progress of the individual. Indeed many of his Christological excursus are seemingly provoked by students’ questions rather than his initial lesson plan. To my mind, Simonetti does not make enough of his observation that Didymus has a penchant for psychological and individual interpretations in preference to traditional Christological and ecclesial ones; and that it is precisely this which drives him towards a moral type of exegesis.151 It almost seems that his working definition of Origenist allegory as only ever allowing a propaedeutic role to the ‘literal’ sense152 has blinded him to the full impact of many of his own observations.153 Consequently, he sees far more concession to the exegetical polemics of the ‘Antiochenes’ than my reading of Didymus with these same observations is able to find.

The Utility of Scripture Didymus’ third principle is that of utility. Matt. 12:36 requires an account for all profitless speech and Didymus generally assumes that human ethical standards must apply even more so to God.154 Therefore, every single word of Scripture must not only be true but useful,155 like a net cast into the midst of human life to trawl out lovers of pleasures and passions.156 There can be no verbal redundancy and even a small detail, such as the distinction between Noah and his family being listed according to gender on entering the ark but paired as husbands and wives on leaving, can lead to 151

Simonetti (1983), 387; Simonetti (1994), 78. e.g. Simonetti (1983), 350: ‘Allegoria, cui la lettera costituisce soltanto l’avviamento propedeutico’. 153 Strangely, though, having charted a possible course through which Didymus the allegorist, troubled by the ‘Antiochene’ complaints, at first concedes more and more ground but then begins to evolve in the other direction, until at the end of his career with ZachT he has overcome the crises and reaffirmed his own loyalty to the traditional exegetical practice of his school, Simonetti (1983), 387, declares: ‘ma ragionare in questo modo sarebbe semplistico’. Moreover, he goes on to reiterate the two other factors at work here: ‘1) inclinazioni personali dell’esegeta; 2) caratteri diversi delle opere bibliche commentate’. Thus, it is hard to know whether he genuinely wishes to give weight to these points, as I would want to do, or whether he is simply keen to exercise due scholarly caution regarding an interpretative hunch. 154 GenT 1.108.19–22. 155 GenT 2.174.13–18. Although this may seem a product of the distinctly Christian doctrine of scriptural inspiration, parallels can equally be adduced among Platonic commentators, such as Hermeias’ treatment of the incidental details of the setting of the Phaedrus, Herm.Alex. In Pl. Phdr. 1.1–20 [Bernard 92], or Olympiodorus’ spiritual interpretation of Socrates’ poisoning, Olymp. In Pl. Phd. 2.8 [Westerink 64]; cf. Stefaniw (2010), 132–3. 156 ZachT 2.269.6–17 (3.310). 152

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substantial exposition: here a sexual ethic that intercourse is only godly when aimed at conception and that conception would be inappropriate in such a time of crisis.157 Hebrew poetic parallelism takes on a rich significance,158 and particular attention is paid to qualifying phrases, such as ‘before you’159 or the difference between ‘hand’, ‘right hand’, and ‘left hand’.160 It may be true to say ‘The eyes of the wise are in his head’ (Eccl. 2:14), but it is so obvious on a senseperceptible level as to be useless, and therefore Didymus unlocks its higher meaning, through 1 Cor. 11:3 and 2:16, as the mind of the wise man participating in Christ—a hermeneutical key employed equally by Evagrius in one of only a few parallels in their treatments of Ecclesiastes.161 This principle of utility extends so deeply that it produces an amusing exchange during one of Didymus’ lectures: when challenged by a student to explain the meaning of the numbering thirty-seven for the psalm in question, the teacher berates his pupil, suggesting that ‘you cannot pay attention to everything’; yet feels compelled to offer an explanation anyway,162 since even the numbers in Scripture are placed there by God.163 It is not that Didymus is ignorant of rhetorical figures, and sometimes he feels ambivalent as to whether a text is best accepted as simple hyperbole or must be ‘forced’ to bring out a more exact correlation on a deeper level.164 However, as with all cases where there is an ambiguity or ambivalence in the base text, Didymus concedes the maximum number of interpretations that his principles of truth, coherence, and utility will allow, while remaining within the limits of ‘ecclesiastical’ faith.165 Utility (ōpheleia) is often assumed to be an ‘Antiochene’ watchword and so Simonetti tends to see Didymus’ usage as an apologetic concession.166 Yet on my reading, Didymus’ response to the ‘Antiochene’ challenge is almost entirely superficial: he indulges in occasional polemical caricatures and wheels out exactly the same ‘hermeneutical keys’ to prove the validity of number theory and the multivalence of Scripture that Theodore and others had found so unconvincing in Philo and Origen. Nowhere does he take seriously their arguments about materiality or cosmology, about the single meaning of Scripture or the distinctiveness of the Old Testament revelation from that of the New. Rather, such assumptions reflect modern prejudices about the nature of the truly useful, and ‘utility’ (ōpheleia) must be seen as intrinsic to both

157

GenT 2.174.18–176.30; cf. ZachT 1.9.13–16 (1.39). 159 GenT 2.220.4–9; cf. PsT 2.87.26–88.8. PsT 5.295.21–2. 160 161 PsT 5.309.23–6. EcclT 1.48.19–26; Evag. In Eccl. 2.3. 162 163 PsT 4.259.32–260.1. PsT 2.108.26–7. 164 165 PsT 4.289.10–16; HiobT 2.174.5–12. HiobT 3.255.16–257.1; PsT 2.88.26–89.7. 166 Simonetti (1983), 362. Consequently, he seems a little surprised when his examination of the unaffected PsT seems to reveal the relationship between the different senses of the text as little more than a paradigm of the means to Christian progress (372). 158

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Origen and Didymus.167 In fact, it is probably the principle of utility which most discomforts modern commentators, as it naturally tends towards a spiritualizing approach to history, which must be personally relevant.168 Didymus does not articulate this thought so clearly, but one can see the results throughout his work: prophecies cannot have a single historical fulfilment,169 and even Jesus’ miracles are not just to be read on a historical level as simple proofs of his divinity but must have a second spiritual fulfilment in the lives of all Christians.170

THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF ‘ E LE V ATE D’ E X E G E S I S

Scripture as Transforming Encounter Ultimately for Didymus, ‘elevated’ exegesis is not about the revealing of a systematic doctrine through symbols,171 nor about a correlation of narrative typologies; rather, it drives the transforming encounter at the heart of ‘virtueOrigenism’.172 The Bible is not only unclear and difficult to interpret but deliberately so.173 Engagement with each text and the problems it throws up is seen as part of the movement into illumination and virtue which each Christian must make: A movement from letter to spirit, from shadow to truth, from the temporal to the eternal, from the visible and ground-loving to the invisible and the heights.174

167

Cf. Harl (1983), 59, 149–51; Neuschäfer (1987), 259–60. 169 Orig. Hom.Jer. 1.2; cf. Hanson (1959), 359 ff. GenT 2.210.23–6. 170 GenT 2.168.14–21; ZachT 1.56.24–57.10 (1.249–51). 171 Young (1997b), 162 ff. offers the distinction of ‘ikonic’ versus ‘symbolic’ approaches but Didymus certainly does not reduce words to arbitrary symbols or tokens but rather subscribes to Origen’s realist theory of signification; cf. Dawson (1998), 28–30. Such an approach is probably more true of Clement, e.g. Strom. 2.(16)72.4. 172 Cf. Louth (1981), 59–60, 64; and Torjesen (1986) on Origen. 173 Cf. Harl (1983), 75–9 on Origen, e.g. Princ. 4.2–3; Philoc. 2.2; 10.2; Nikiprowetzky (1977), 22, on Philo. Contemporary Greek thought had begun to make similar claims about the philosophical canon, especially Aristotle (Galen Comp.Tim. 1.14–16), despite his statements about clarity (Arist. Rhet. 3.1404b1 ff.; Poet. 1458a17 ff.); cf. Mansfeld (1994), 25, 155 ff. Rather than mirroring Christian doctrines of inspiration, this is more a product of later philosophers’ self-understanding as commentators, not original thinkers (Porph. Vit.Plot. 20.68–76). Nonetheless, it is important to note the parallels between the reading schemes and canonical ordering of the Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists and Origen and Didymus’ portrayal of a movement through the Wisdom books (cf. Hadot (1979)), even if it remains unclear how these two streams of thought influenced one another. 174 ZachT 3.347.16–22 (4.280). 168

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Scripture is wearisome, precisely because its purpose is to rouse the soul and all good things must be obtained by toil and effort; it is not an intellectual challenge like that posed by Greek teaching but a spiritual one.175 The task of the exegete is spiritual—the focus of ceaseless prayer,176 only possible through the grace of God177 and limited to the extent of the expositor’s own advancement in the spiritual life.178 The goal of the pupil is not simply to learn a set of doctrines or moral virtues from the teacher but rather to engage with the text. Pupils are frequently called upon to use their own judgement,179 to consider a possibility and, as ‘lovers of the fine’ (philokaloi),180 to seek out further examples in the Scriptures,181 other commentaries,182 or the writings of those such as Philo.183 They become ‘intelligent ones’ (sunetoi)—a seemingly technical language for those adept at elevated exegesis. This is why so much time is spent explicating the detail of particular hermeneutical keys, even when much of what is said is of little immediate relevance to the verse at hand184—the hermeneutical key must be presented whole, if it is to be taken by the student and used elsewhere to unlock a different Scripture. Sherman brings out this point well in talking of ‘Alexandrian’ exegesis as directed towards ‘opening the eyes of the soul’.185 However, she misses both 175 EcclT 1.15.27–16.2; cf. Gregory of Nyssa’s account of the ascent in his On the Inscriptions of the Psalms. 176 ZachT 2.182.23–6 (3.3); 1.1.6–9 (1.1); cf. Orig. Comm.Jn. 10.(28)173. 177 ZachT 3.314.16–19 (4.145). 178 ZachT 1.77.25–8 (1.343); 3.322.8–9 (4.174). 179 ZachT 1.65.27–31 (1.290). Occasionally Didymus does express a personal preference for a particular interpretation, as at PsT 2.88.27–89.1, but this is not intended as final. At most Didymus’ method can be described as a ‘rhetoric of persuasion’, and this raises interesting questions about how he viewed his own authority as a teacher. There is never any suggestion that authority comes from ecclesiastical ordering, and when he is speaking about other teachers, his sole criterion seems to be whether their words match up to their lives, since the crucial aim of education is in fact imitation, PsT 5.296.16–19; 1.49.18–26. His doctrine of accommodation shows his role to be educative rather than instructive, with the teacher condescending to the level of his pupils to draw them on in pursuit of virtue and truth, the advances in which are to be grasped and owned by them, not simply received, EcclT 4.221.26–222.6; HiobT 2.182.23–183.4; PsT 4.237.13–20. 180 › çغ ŒÆº seems to be a technical term for Didymus, naming those students who go beyond the teaching he gives them, and this very choice of language seems to me to epitomize the nature of the task in hand as he saw it. Neither Liddell and Scott nor Lampe notes any use of the noun prior to the fourth century, where Athanasius uses it of devotees of the ascetic life, Vit.Ant. 4, and Epiphanius in a similar sense to Didymus’ as ‘one interested in learning, scholarly’, Pan. 69.4, 9. 181 HiobT 2.143.2–3; cf. ZachT 3.279.6–7 (4.15); 3.390.2–5 (5.118). 182 ZachT 3.377.18–21 (5.78); 3.391.9–12 (5.123). 183 GenT 1.139.9–14; 2.147.15–18. 184 Nelson (1995), 85–6. A good example is his extensive treatment of the homonymity of Gen. 6:3’s ‘being flesh’, GenT 2.152.26–153.14. 185 Sherman (1995), 191: ‘Interpreting the evidence from our reading with this in mind leads us to suggest that another way of characterising the debate about and between Antiochene and Alexandrian exegesis is to say that it was about education. The way in which teaching was imparted was through texts and their reading. In Antioch, we may trace a sort of “read and

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the moral ambit and constraining effects of tradition upon Didymus’ role as educator, tending towards too individualistic a view of the process.186 For Didymus, orthodoxy or the ‘ecclesiastical’ teaching is paramount, and Young’s designation ‘conservative churchman’187 is entirely appropriate to his selfperception, just as much as his Origenism (perhaps even because of his Origenism), if not to his actual status. The exegetical terrain through which he must guide his pupils, therefore, constitutes not just Scripture itself but the contours of previous interpretation, and this is why he not only cites so many other exegetes’ interpretations but also cites them anonymously, whether the interpretation is to be accepted or rejected.188 It is probably not going too far to talk of Didymus’ recognition that exegesis is a communal task and so the teacher is obligated both to read189 and listen190 to the interpretations of others in order to ensure that his own teaching is ‘ecclesiastical’ (though this only happens at the level of peers, rather than between teachers and students). Nonetheless, Didymus does not feel bound by either the authority of an exegete191 or the ubiquity of an interpretation, even among ‘ecclesiastical’ circles. Thus, he can relate ‘our exegetes say this’ and still go on to offer an alternative.192 Similarly, although ‘many of those in the Church’ read a comma in Psalm 30:13, Didymus does not approve.193 ‘Most of our brothers’ introduces a likely explanation,194 but ‘the more popular interpretation’ is implicitly simplistic,195 and yet in his role as teacher condescending to the level of the student this means a greater need for clarification, rather than simple dismissal out of hand. What seems to be the case is that Didymus not only wishes to teach his pupils the true interpretation or interpretations of a passage but also to develop their critical skills in approaching the text.196 He is not simply

apply” model: the text, like a preacher, being concerned with clarifying moral example. In Alexandria it had more to do with uncovering the eyes of the soul in the reader of the text, thus enabling the reader to become part of what the text is about.’ 186 Sherman (1995), 181 and 102. This is most evident in her failure to maintain the distinction between allegory and Iƪøª, perhaps because of only indirect knowledge of Bienert. 187 Young (1983a), 91. 188 PsT 4 Suppl.247.28–9. The only exception is where Eunomius and Apollinaris are concerned, EcclT 3.154.1–17; PsT 2.73.9–17; 1.51.3–52.25; 5.335.27–336.2. 189 190 ZachT 1.21.16–18 (1.95). ZachT 1.64.28–65.4 (1.286). 191 ZachT 1.64.15–65.4 (1.284–6); 2.218.6–12 (3.133); cf. PsT 3.148.23–4, where ‘ÆÆ
ØŒÆd KŪØ’ may refer either to their source in a bishop of Alexandria or their content as regarding clerical orders. Even Paul’s interpretation may be added to, GenT 2.234.31–236.21. 192 193 PsT 3.186.11–21. PsT 3.136.24–6. 194 195 ZachT 3.286.6–14 (4.39); cf. PsT 5.332.9–10. PsT 3.134.11–18. 196 PsT 2.88.27–89.1; cf. Didymus’ ambivalent stance towards evidence he himself introduces from Hebrew experts (PsT 1.10.1–17; 5.295.26–30), Jewish interpretations (ZachT 3.373.26–30 (5.64)), and tradition (ZachT 1.2.1–3, 9–13 (1.5–6)).

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performing exegesis for his pupils but equipping them for exegesis as part of their Christian life.197 Exegesis is fundamentally a moral task, for it is itself the mechanism of ascent.

Exegetical Ascent Just as in Origen,198 the three Solomonic works—Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs—provide not only a whole host of determinative texts for Didymus’ exegesis, but also the pattern for Christian progress and teaching: Proverbs is an ethical work intended for those being initiated; Ecclesiastes is about the created order, intended for those progressing and teaching those at a lower level to despise the world and transitory things, and the more advanced to move through them to the heavenly; while the Song of Songs speaks only noetic things which surpass the world and the heavens.199 Scripture teaches on different levels and it is the exegete’s task to expound as many of these levels as are suitable to his audience.200 This same sense of movement through different levels of revelation is depicted in all manner of biblical metaphors:201 Scripture is like human speech, which has two aspects, the external sound, the voice, and the internal meaning, the reason;202 the wordings ‘perish’ as the reader advances from one moral state to another;203 it is manifold because, according to Eph. 3:10, the Wisdom of God itself is many-hued;204 some hear only the parables outside, while others enter the mystic courtyard and the true meaning of Jesus’ words;205 it is the body of Christ;206 the wording of Scripture is its flesh, and this can bring no profit on its own without the spirit, just as geometrical drawing without reason is less than painting.207 For Origen, it is precisely because reality comprises a series of hierarchies— Trinitarian, cosmological, anthropological—all existing through descent from the truly Real, that interpretation must constitute a hierarchical ascent, not in

197 Layton (2004), 8–10, emphasizes  ÅØ but overplays the narrative dimension and, presumably influenced by Burton-Christie’s (1993) work on the interrelationship of biography and exegesis in apothegmata, overpresses the transparency between teacher and text (34–5). 198 Orig. Comm.Cant. prol. [Baehrens 75.2–79.21]; cf. Princ. 1.3.7–8; Torjesen (1986). 199 EcclT 1.5.30–6.18; cf. 1.9.13–17. 200 Contrast the Evagrian assumption that each Scripture has only a single level, Géhin Schol. Prov. 30. 201 Cf. Orig. Hom.Lev. 1.1. 202 203 EcclT 1.38.20–6; GenT 1.142.24–7. In 2 Cor. 4.3–4 [Staab 24.9–16]. 204 205 ZachT 2.269.6–13 (3.310). ZachT 2.162.21–8 (2.298). 206 207 PsT 1.39.21–5. GenT 2.153.9–14.

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its methodologies but in the very realities being referred to.208 Didymus takes over the resultant hermeneutic and notion of levels of reality,209 but by breaking with Origen’s participative chain of being he changes aspects of the relationships, particularly the role of virtue. Nonetheless, the interpretational hierarchies still form a mystic ladder, as the lower levels are both good in and of themselves and also essential to reaching an understanding of the higher ones; yet by comparison they may appear worthless. For it is impossible to grasp any of the spiritual or high understandings (Å 
ø) without the shadow according to the letter (
B ή
a
e ªæ Æ ŒØA) or the initiatory parts of the preliminary education (
H NƪøªØŒH æÆØø); for it was necessary to beget children from the weaker brides first.210

Here we can see the importance of theological language of elevation as opposed to rhetorical language of allegory.211 The Bible does not simply mean something other than what it appears to say but rather demands an engagement and ascent—the lower levels are indispensable to the Christian, just as learning the alphabet is to the grammarian, and yet such beginnings are of little value when compared with the true fruits of higher study.212 Unlike the charges traditionally raised against Valentinian allegory,213 Didymus’ elevated reading does not offer a higher reading which replaces the lower, but one which builds upon it:214 the elevated sense of Zech. 8:19’s fasting regulations means abstaining from the harmful doctrines of heretics; yet this does not lessen the base requirement to fast from sense-perceptible food; rather, the latter is the model for the former.215 This base role for lower readings means that even when the text does not fit sense-perceptible reality, it must still be examined as far as possible on this level.

208 Dawson (1998), 41–3, illustrates the relationship well through the close connection of Origen’s retention of the ‘bodily’ level of the text to his insistence on a physical embodiment after resurrection. 209 210 ZachT 3.347.8–348.18 (4.279–84). GenT 2.236.8–11. 211 Older Catholic commentators tended to talk of sacramentality, and while this is somewhat tendentious, there is a need to counter readings of oppositional dualities, like that of Nygren; cf. Edwards (2002), 133 ff. 212 GenT 2.236.5–238.23; 1.29.1–6; PsT 2.68.19–26; cf. EcclT 1.8.18–23; 4.216.26–218.4. 213 On Valentinus as privileging experiential knowledge and the self, see Dawson (1992), 128 ff., 238–9. 214 IŒºıŁÆ is often seen as representing a shift from ‘allegorical’ to ‘figural’ exegesis, especially in Gregory of Nyssa and Cyril, through the intersection of competing narratives, e.g. Young (1997b), 262–3; whereas Didymus maintains it without a narrative sense. Dawson (1998), 30–8, rightly recognizes Origen’s deliberate avoidance of parallel narratives but is probably too keen to see his IŒºıŁÆ as meta narrative. 215 ZachT 2.189.6–8 (3.33); cf. 2.117.1–120.4 (2.108–23).

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And this must first be understood according to the sense-perceptible narrative (ŒÆŁ ƒ
æÆ). The ‘torrents’ are not self-originating rivers, since they do not have their source from a spring but from rainwater. All these then flow into the sea and the sea does not appear to have any more water from the flow of the torrents. The account (º ª) has mixed in something that violates (ÆØ ) the sense-perceptible narrative (ƒ
æÆ), so that it also receives an elevation (Iƪøªc). And this is not all, it has added something else: the torrents return to the place whence they came, which does not happen on a sense-perceptible level (ŒÆ
a ƒ
æÆ). Nevertheless, since it is necessary to agree with what was said (
fiH ÞÅ
fiH) as far as possible, we look at it on a sense-perceptible level (‰ Kd ƒ
æÆ) as far as may be admitted (ŒÆ
a
e Kå ).216

This is partly because these lower levels are required by the weaker in faith,217 and Didymus is acutely aware of his obligation towards the majority and the moral imperative for the teacher to condescend to the level of his pupil.218 Thus, even when he treats the story of Hagar and Sarah, where he has Pauline authority for an allegorical reading, he does not neglect the level of the text or its sense-perceptible reference and implications.219 Yet there is also a sense of the lower levels driving the attentive reader up through the exegetical process, ‘elevating’ his or her thoughts.220 Didymus is no relativist221 and his elevated approach should not be confused with modern theories of reader response,222 just as the ‘Antiochene models’ of Diodore and Theodore have little in common with historico-critical methods.223 It is precisely because the act of reading the Bible is a transforming encounter that the inscripturation of the Word of God is as necessary to revelation as his incarnation. For just as the Saviour can only be grasped through his mixing with the flesh, so too the godly and transcendent thoughts of God’s revelation can only be understood by being mixed with human wordings.224 Therefore, both are vital to the life of the Church: the wording and senseperceptible level constitute an outer wall and the elevated sense an inner one, both defending the heavenly city.225

216

217 EcclT 1.14.3–9. GenT 2.168.10–27; 2.168.27–169.2; cf. Orig. C.Cels. 4.71; 6.2. 219 PsT 4.237.13–21. GenT 2.234.31–235.23. 220 EcclT 1.40.15–24; cf. 5.276.19–24. 221 For Didymus’ uncompromising attitude to relativism in all its forms, see his discussion of Protagoras, when rebuking a student, PsT 3.222.17–29. 222 Sherman (1995), with her radical criticism of modern historico-critical exegesis (22–44), seemingly entertained the initial hope of using Didymus to support the recovery of allegory not via Daniélou’s distinction of typology from allegory or de Lubac’s of allegoria facti from allegoria dicti but through literary approaches. However, her epilogue concedes that Didymus’ literalist views are not conducive to the goals of ‘post-modernism’. 223 For a more realistic assessment of ‘Antiochene’ exegesis as ‘methodologically restrictive and theologically weak’, ‘a backward-looking project that failed’, see O’Keefe (2000), esp. 83. 224 225 HiobT 2.158.3–9. ZachT 2.230.1–5 (3.176). 218

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The Didymean World View On the basis of Didymus’ ‘Origenism’, we may perhaps venture to suggest that much of the ‘Alexandrian’ and ‘Antiochene’ exegetical debate would be better construed as primarily a disagreement in terms of: i. scope of contextual consistency (one Scripture versus two Testaments); ii. primacy of particular passages (Wisdom literature versus ‘Historical’ Prophets); iii. exegetical intent (transformation of character versus moral instruction); iv. cosmological reality (a developed angelology prioritizing the noetic versus a materialistic anthropocentrism). This is not to deny the influence of such traditionally cited elements as a methodological conflict between allegory and typology (theōria)226 and a philosophical- as opposed to rhetorical-school setting227 but rather to minimize their contribution to the actual, as opposed to the perceived, distinctiveness of the two groups of commentators.228 Of all these exegetical variables, it is the disjunction in cosmology which is most keenly felt on both sides of the equation.229 The issue is one of spiritualism versus materialism, but not in the modern senses of the words: Theodore accuses his opponents of obsessively introducing the Devil as a personal reality into biblical interpretation; meanwhile, Didymus’ chief exegetical complaint is against a broad-based ‘soulish’ or ‘unspiritual’ world view which insists upon the fundamental materiality of the world, and by extension even of God. It has often been said that we should not understand anthropomorphic statements about God literally (Kd ÞÅ
F), as the anthropomorphites suppose. For

226 Sherman (1995) overemphasizes the contrast, offering a particularly weak portrayal of Theodore. 227 Young (1997b), 169 ff. This distinction’s contribution is largely to anti-allegorical polemic, not method. 228 Paradigms based on abstract philosophical interest versus practical morality or antihistorical versus historical I judge simply misreadings; while that of Platonic versus Aristotelian inspiration (e.g. ter Haar Romeny (1997), 125) actually reflects the shift from third- to fourthcentury thought (Didymus himself evidences the characteristic Aristotelian turn; cf. Daniélou (1963), 161–2; Rondeau (1982), 121; Prinzivalli (1988), 14) and is misapplied to this exegetical controversy through the tendency to compare ‘Antiochene’ exegesis with Origen, rather than fourth-century contemporaries. 229 Thus, the stance taken with regard to the real referents of Genesis is more important than the method, as can be seen by the contrast between Bas.Caes. Hex. and Hom.Ps. Ancient exegetical debate was primarily about referents, only secondarily about method, motivations, and context; cf. Young (1997b), 117, 119–39.

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they wish God even to have a human face, and they say that man was made ‘in the image and likeness of God’ (Gen. 1:26) in the fashioning of his body.230 And he is ‘soulish’ (łıåØŒe) who is neither fleshly nor spiritual. And perhaps the wise of the world are all such. They reckon that they are autonomous (ÆPŁŒÆ
Ø) in the movements and thoughts of their own soul. And because of this they do not receive the things of the spirit; for since they prefer their own things and reckon their own thinking to be great, they do not receive the things of the spirit, deeming them foolishness; for there are some people and there are whole heresies which have been established both among Greeks and among Christians, which say that allegories (IººÅªæÆØ) are foolish, that they are fictions (Iƺ Æ
). And they say that the theorems about intellectual things are false, reckoning all these things to be bodies and sense-perceptible. Therefore these are ‘soulish men’ who do not receive the things of the spirit deeming themselves to be self-controlled and able to contemplate everything by themselves.231

Despite the pejorative label ‘lovers of history’ (philistores), it is not their explanation of the historical or sense-perceptible interpretation which is at fault. For Didymus admits that the interpretations of the ‘friends of the letter’ can be useful, even though they are less spiritual;232 as can be seen by contrast with the total and utter moral bankruptcy of those like Porphyry who insist upon the sense-perceptible interpretation of a Scriptural passage, only to then refute it as falsely spoken.233 Where Christian ‘lovers of history’ are adjudged to go wrong is in not advancing beyond this, not using this historical and sense-perceptible truth as the first step in progressing to the Truth which is God’s and thus spiritual and noetic.234 As we have seen already, Didymus’ elevated reading of Scripture makes sense only in the context of a virtuous ascent from the sense-perceptible to the noetic. And here Didymus reverses the logic—to deny the hermeneutical principle of elevation (anagōgē) is equally a denial of the fundamental spiritual and transcendent reality to which those hermeneutics aimed to ascend.235 This ascription of materialism may well be no truer of his opponents than Theodore’s portrayal of allegorists like Didymus as denying historical realities; yet the fact that there was a real disagreement in world views is found in their respective attitudes towards the angelic order and contrasting interpretations of Gen. 6:2 (‘The angels/sons of 230

PsT 3.199.32–200.1. It is entirely possible that Gesché and Gronewald have been too quick to emend ƒ æçE
ÆØ to ƒ IŁæø æçE
ÆØ here, since, as I read it, Didymus’ complaint is against a general materialistic view that insists on the priority of phenomenal æç rather than purely an anthropomorphic view of God, as is attested by his extension of this discussion to the seven eyes of the inner man. On this basis the MS reading, ƒ æçE
ÆØ, would be an equally useful pejorative party label. 231 232 PsT 4.279.7–14. ZachT 2.197.14–19 (3.65). 233 PsT 2.85.24–7; EcclT 5.281.16–22. 234 Cf. Orig. Hom.Gen. 10.2; Hom.Ex. 1.5; 12.2. 235 Cf. Orig. Princ. 4.3.9; Torjesen (1986), 144.

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God saw that they were fair; and they took wives for themselves of all that they chose’).236 The verse had a long history of both Jewish and Christian debate but became a prime bone of ‘Antiochene’ contention throughout the fourth and fifth centuries, with Chrysostom styling any suggestion of the fall of angels ‘blasphemy’ and Theodoret ‘madness’.237 Instead they developed a clear emphasis on the textual variant ‘Sons of God’ over ‘angels’ and interpreted this via a complex series of proof texts as demanding a purely human coupling between the sons of Seth and the sons of Cain.238 According to a reading like Simonetti’s, where Didymus is in active debate with ‘Antiochene models’, his intent on this verse is unfathomable. He goes far beyond Origen in applying the principle of utility and focusing on a moral purpose to the verse, through his discussion of both the sense-perceptible and allegorical meanings of the seemingly superfluous ‘for themselves’,239 which might seem at first to be considerable concessions to an ‘Antiochene’ hermeneutic. Yet, by contrast, on the key issue of the angelic fall, which demanded careful comment from Ambrose and concession from Cyril, Didymus makes no attempt to counter their objections at all240 and simply focuses instead upon competing theories within his Origenist framework as to how fallen angels could be said to have begotten offspring from women.241 We must, therefore, accept that Didymus’ world view—so antagonistic to the ‘Antiochenes’—was neither negotiable, nor felt to be in need of justification. Where Simonetti sees concession, we must instead revise our assumptions about the importance within his Origenist heritage of the role of the 236

Amirav (2001); Zangara (1982); Wickham (1974); cf. Fraade (1984), on Gen. 4:26. J.Chrys. Hom.Gen. 22.2 [PG 53.187c–d]; Thdt. Quaest.Gen. 47 [PG 80.148a]. Amirav (2001), 313–16: the use of Gen. 4:26 to prove that ‘sons of God’ can mean ‘sons of Seth’, the use of Ps. 81:6–7, Is. 1:2 and Ex. 4:22 to show that divine language can be applied to virtuous humanity and the contrasting language of ‘sons and daughters of men’ as referring to the immoral lineage of Cain (J.Chrys. Hom.Gen. 21 [PG 53.187–9]; Thdt. Quaest.Gen. 47 [PG 80.148a–152a]). On the varied deployment of these same proof texts, see Fraade (1984), 66 ff. This interpretation was viewed secure enough by Theodore to be used itself as a proof text, In Col. 1.15 [Swete 1.266.3–7]. 239 GenT 2.150.25–152.1. This may well reflect a Didymean innovation, as Origen’s use of Prov. 19:11 tends to focus on the importance of harmony rather than divine initiative, Comm.Mt. 12.4; 14.1 [Klostermann 73.21–75.15; 272.30–273.12]. 240 Didymus’ fidelity to Origen here seems somewhat archaic and more in step with Jewish apocalyptic traditions and second-century Christian commentators than otherwise sympathetic contemporaries, e.g. Ambr. Noe 4.8–9 [PL 14.365c–366b]; Cyr.Alex. C.Iulianum 9 [PG 76.956a– d]; Glaph.Gen. 2.(1).2 [PG 69.53c]; Aug. Civ.Dei 15.23; cf. Anon. In Gen. 6.2 [Petit fr.613, 2.74]; Anon. In Gen. 6.2 [Petit fr.617, 2.76]. 241 GenT 2.152.1–23; cf. GenT 1.117.26–118.7; 2.153.19–154.2. He rejects absolutely the view of Philo Quaest.Gen. 92 (Philo takes a different line in Gig. 13–15) that there is physical intercourse between angels and women, leaving open to debate the possibilities of intellectual begetting of monstrous thoughts and demonic possession of the wicked. The cosmological background is clear in Origen’s use of the text, Comm.Jn. 6.(42)217; 13.(37)243–4; 13.(60)425; Comm.Mt. 17.30 [Klostermann 671.22–672.30]. 237 238

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sense-perceptible, the principle of utility, and, above all, a deliberately moral focus.242 What we see in Didymus’ exegesis is a careful maintenance of Origen’s fundamental hermeneutical principles whereby an absolute conviction in the truth, coherence, and utility of Scripture forms the basis of an exegetical ascent through levels of meaning unlocked by ‘elevation’. At times this movement ‘from letter to spirit, from shadow to truth, from the temporal to the eternal, from the visible and ground-loving to the invisible and the heights’243 is reduced to dualistic shorthand;244 yet this should not deny the more fundamental belief in a threefold sense appropriate to the three basic stages of the spiritual ascent—beginners, those progressing, and the perfect. Rather than seeing these paradigms as competing tensions within Origenist thought,245 we should rather see both as illustrative of the centrality of the ascent which has both start and finish and also a range of movement along the way. Where Didymus breaks with his ‘teacher of the churches after the apostles’246 is not in method but an aspect of the world view which controls how these principles are applied. For, as various commentators have noted with surprise,247 he often ignores well-established Christological readings in favour of individualistic psychologizing. Language of intellectual illumination, although not absent, takes a lesser role than in Origen or Clement, whilst virtue comes to the fore. In parallel to his quintessential understanding of God as Creator (dēmiourgos) and the Provident One (pronoētēs),248 the human soul must be both microcosm and microhistory. The economy of salvation is not mythologized through elevated exegesis but appropriated to the individual. The soul’s progress in virtue imitates not only creation—as a flowering of humanity which reshapes the body,249 a bearing of fruit,250 the production of a spiritual crop,251 the begetting of children,252 and even the summoning of dry earth out of water253—but also the history of salvation—each soul must undergo a series of namings,254 a progression of blessings from that of

242 Unfortunately Amirav’s (2001) assessment of the ‘Antiochene’ position is set in contrast to so caricatured a reading of the ‘Alexandrians’ that, despite recognizing that the ‘Antiochenes’ do not really prefigure modern, historical criticism (316), he still sees the split in terms of a moral versus a philosophical approach (318, 314n.11). 243 ZachT 3.347.16–22 (4.280). 244 This is particularly true of the later lemmata on Genesis which tend to offer a simple paraphrase of the text as the ‘ready’ sense and then a lengthier ‘spiritual’ understanding. 245 Crouzel (1989), 79, is typical in dismissing the principles of Princ. 4.2.4–6 as doing little to clarify Origen’s exegesis. 246 Jer. Hom.Jer.&Ez.Orig. prol. 247 e.g. Simonetti (1983) on HiobT and Geljon (2007) on GenT. 248 249 HiobT 2.119.27–8; EcclT 4.211.9–22; PsT 1.51.3–18. EcclT 6.358.7–8. 250 251 GenT 1.69.18–23; 1.30.6–24. GenT 1.104.8–13; cf. 1.112.13–20. 252 253 GenT 1.64.10–27. GenT 1.21.2–5; 1.30.6–13. 254 GenT 1.113.17–114.17.

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Jacob to that of the Bridegroom,255 an Abrahamic calling out of the land,256 an exodus like Israel’s,257 and a Mosaic mountain ascent.258 Such a presentation of Didymus’ elevated exegesis is something of a doubleedged sword to the scholar struggling to grasp his theology from the commentaries: the very abundance and richness of his readings of the biblical text mean that there is never a single right answer, no linearity to his thought, but rather centres of gravity, great doctrines about which his understanding moved and whose force exerts itself upon his interpretations; yet at the same time as exhibiting this unwillingness to offer a systematic presentation, the very multiplicity of his readings allows his concerns and insights to break through time and time again in what are to the modern mind the most unexpected places. Simply living with Didymus’ turns of thought and long meandering expositions reveals not just an exegetical, as opposed to dogmatic, mindset but a focus on humanity, the Christian journey, and the life of virtue, rather than Trinitarian259 or Christological260 issues.

255

256 GenT 1.33.1–7. GenT 2.210.4–23. 258 PsT 5.299.28–300.3. GenT 2.197.20–3. 259 The doctrine of the Trinity is portrayed as the pinnacle of the knowledge of Truth, ZachT 3.372.14–17 (5.57), but it is rarely introduced into the exegetical works except in the very diluted form of stressing that any mention of God implies both Father and Son, PsT 1.40.26–7. This reticence may derive from understanding the Trinitarian vision and corresponding doctrine as an esoteric teaching for the wise; cf. Sinkewicz (2003), xxxiv–xxxvii, on Evagrius. 260 It is this focus on understanding humanity as being made and reformed according to Christ’s pattern that explains the lack of interest in metaphysical Christological problems noted by Gesché (1962), 321, 405–6, and Ghattas (1996), 336. 257

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Part II Didymus and the Doctrine of Virtue

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5 Virtue, Reality, and the Pre-existence of the Soul Although Didymus approaches anagogical exegesis in a more thoroughgoing and scholastically rigorous way than most of his contemporaries, the fundamental movement is common to the broad trends of Origenist hermeneutics and indeed to some non-Christian Platonic commentary. Consequently, it may at first seem unsurprising to find him engaging through it with key notions of virtue.1 However, he does not simply superficially engage with well-worn contemporary themes from either Christian or Hellenistic sources but rather reads the Scriptural anthropology in a significantly new light. The following chapters will explore more fully the content and psychological significance of his reading of virtue but we turn now to his reflections on the ontology of virtue and its implications for his understanding of the preexistence of the soul. It is in traditional vein that Didymus stresses that humanity was fashioned to live according to virtue.2 There is not one of the things which exist that does not have an appropriate goal (
NŒE
 º
), even if that goal is attained through some craft. Nature and craft have a goal and an aim (Œ
); for a vine grows for the sake of man’s blessed enjoyment and a craftsman builds to complete a house because he has the aim of living in it. And lest my speech goes on long, man was fashioned to live according to virtue (¥Æ ŒÆ Iæc ÇfiB).3

Yet this sense of virtue as the goal (telos) and aim (skopos) of human life is no moral platitude. Rather, his beliefs in the goodness of creation, absolute divine sovereignty, and a hard-line providence demand that this is teleologically extended as the chief characteristic of Didymus’ protology4 and eschatology.5 1

Stefaniw (2010), 288. e.g. Plot. Enn. 1.2.1, which defines likeness to God as becoming just and holy and living in wisdom, which is to have one’s nature grounded in virtue. 3 4 HiobT 2.152.23–33; PsT 4.230.27–30; EcclT 1.15.9–10. PsT 3.156.24–8. 5 PsT 5.326.18–327.10. 2

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Thus, the origin and final goal of the rational creation is in virtue—both of which are embodied and active states, despite the assumptions often made about an Origenist penchant for intellectual immaterialism.6 Ultimately this is set within a doctrine of participation7 which distinguishes final essential realities from contingent accidental ones, and virtue must thereby be asserted as a primary category of reality. One can adduce Greek philosophical parallels for much of this, and we shall note a number in passing, but it is important to recognize that Didymus’ explicit ideological horizons are always shaped by intra-Christian issues rather than more general philosophical ones. In fact Didymus’ chief arguments on points of philosophical theory, first principles, or epistemological paradigms are never with Greek philosophers. True, he engages with Plato, Aristotle, Porphyry, Prodicus, Protagoras, Epicurus, and many others8 in the course of the Toura commentaries, yet only ever quite superficially.9 He may introduce their views positively,10 or negatively,11 or simply relate them to a heretical Christian view, as part of the polemical presentation of his opponents,12 but he never really treats their arguments seriously.13 He knows the core of philosophical texts and

6 Daley (2003), 90, is typical, but Didymus clearly defends the reality of the resurrection body at a number of points; cf. PsT 1.1.25–2.2; In 1 Cor. 15.13–20 [Staab 7.17–19]; HiobT 4.378.30–379.18; PsT 3.225.10–13. The hylic matter is not replaced by the fifth substance attributed by Aristotle to the stars; rather, the body’s essence was always susceptible to corruption or incorruption, In 1 Cor. 15.42–3 [Staab 10.1–13]. Although clearly a body, it is not classed hylic (GenT 2.149.1–5), since this is equivalent to fleshly or cosmic (In 2 Cor. 1.11–16 [Staab 17.5–14]), nor is it atomically identical (PsT 5.330.13–18), but rather an angelic body (ZachT 1.53.19–27 (1.234)). 7 On ancient ideas of participation, see Balás (1966). 8 e.g. Plato: EcclT 2.240.12–13 on Ps.-Pl. Def. 411b; Aristotle: EcclT 4.232.23–6 quotes Int. 16b21 and Cat. 3a29 anonymously; Porphyry: attacked in depth, EcclT 5.281.16–22, and in passing, HiobT 3.280.22–8; Prodicus: EcclT 1.16.11–18; Protagoras: PsT 3.222.19–27; Epicurus and Democritus: EcclT 4.209.26–210.1; Isocrates: EcclT 1.42.28–9; Stoics: GenT 1.137.12–18. Such references are far more prevalent in EcclT, and to a lesser extent PsT (which perhaps suggests a characteristic of his classroom style), but appear throughout Didymus’ writings; yet at no point are they as common as in Trin. (which may reflect either a different authorship or a different audience). 9 EcclT 2.86.9–14 introduces both Leucippus and Socrates on the nature of æø but purely to illustrate that the same word can have very different meanings. The appeal is to an aesthetic knowledge shared with his audience which can be presumed upon in the same way as the subsequent references to Gen. 24:67 and Ign. Rom. 7.2, rather than seriously investigated. 10 EcclT 4.235.14–19 employs the Stoic argument that only the wise man is truly a king (Chrysipp. Iure [SVF 3.81.31]), or a priest (Sap. [SVF 3.142.6])—although adopted by Philo Agr. 41 and Clem.Alex. Strom. 6.(17)152.2, its Stoic origins are explicitly recalled by Didymus. Most positive use tends to be of Aristotelian definitions, e.g. EcclT 2.69.10–17, quoting Anal.Pr. 1.47b30 ff.; PsT 1.19.22–5, quoting Anal.Post. 2.89b24 ff.; PsT 2.77.7–11; 5.303.20–1; 5.335.16–17; and what might be termed philosophical commonplace illustrations, e.g. PsT 1.19.16–19; cf. Pl. Symp. 200c. 11 12 EcclT 2.90.18–91.10; cf. Ps.-Arist. Mund. 392a28–30. PsT 4.279.10–14. 13 Nelson (1995), 51–113.

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views which constituted secular education in his time,14 but, beyond a general commitment to the logic of the Organon,15 he is fundamentally uninterested in them.16 The closest parallel seems to be with his attitude to apocryphal Christian works: they may contain something useful and he may even want to call upon them for a supporting argument from time to time; but they are in no way determinative of anything, unlike the ‘irrefutable witness of the Scriptures’, and can indeed be positively dangerous.17 Philosophical views may contain a measure of revelation, since God has revealed himself through ‘common ideas’,18 but they do not even constitute the ‘preliminary exercises’ to the Christian faith, as Clement and many earlier thinkers had claimed,19 much less offer any sort of canon by which to measure the truth of Scripture. Humanity needs a preliminary education prior to contemplating the supercelestial truths of God’s revelation, but this too is offered by and located in Scripture. Christian progress is both through and into Scripture as one moves through different readings, passing from the outer garments and flesh of the ‘spoken part’ and ‘the sense-perceptible meaning’ through the different ideas in the mind of Christ, which are the elevated senses, until one reaches the ‘transcendent elevation’.20 I am not suggesting that Didymus’ vision is uninfluenced by philosophical discourse or even that this influence is unconscious or merely the result of a popularized intellectual axiomatic framework. Yet to read Didymus, as some have, as adding an Aristotelian twist to the heady mix of Clement’s Stoicizing ethic and Origen’s Platonizing metaphysic21 obscures the fact that all human thought consists more truly in the relationships between concepts than their elemental constituency. The relationship between ‘Origenists’ in particular 14

Soc. H.E. 4.25; Soz. H.E. 3.15; Binder (1979) unconvincingly suggests the use of a verserelated florilegium in EcclT. 15 Rondeau (1982), 121; Bennett (1997), 212. This is fairly characteristic of educated fourthcentury thought. 16 The exception to this rule would be Philo, if we were to regard him as a Middle Platonist, as do many classicists (largely on the grounds that he often provides the first extant use of key Middle Platonist ideas or vocabulary), rather than a biblical commentator. 17 EcclT 1.7.32–8.11; GenT 2.149.5–8. 18 GenT 2.183.9–15; PsT 2.79.13–21. 19 HiobT 3.300.10–301.2 attacks Hellenic wisdom, since it does not participate in the Holy Spirit; cf. D.S.S. 43(10); the wise of world are soulish and their mental self-control prevents them receiving the things of the Spirit (PsT 4.279.7–14); ecclesiastic men reduce the arguments of the Greeks to nothing (ZachT 2.235.4–16 (3.198)). Contrast the positive role ascribed to Greek philosophy in Clem.Alex. Strom. 1.(5)32.1–4; cf. Lilla (1971), 9–59; or Philo, though here it is more often portrayed as either dependent on or prefigured in the revelation to Moses, Quaest. Gen. 4.167; Post.Cain. 133; cf. HiobT 2.134.33–135.18. 20 See Chapter 4. 21 e.g. Prinzivalli (1988), 14. Often scholars’ concern has been simply to judge the validity of Didymus’ semantic usage against some philosophical canon, e.g. Sánchez (1991), 170–6; Doutreleau ZachT I, 102: ‘En verité, le stoïcisme de l’In Zachariam est partiel, accommodé, non systématique et plus verbal que réel.’

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and Greek philosophy has too often been described against the background of the concept of ‘adulteration’, which, whether one’s conclusions tend towards the polemic or apologetic,22 necessarily distorts the thinkers’ modes of thought. What we see in Didymus is a conscious engagement, and his direct use of Philo should caution against the idea that just because Didymus encountered a model or concept indirectly or through florilegia, he did not then turn to original sources. Rather, it is the terms of the engagement which must be noted. He does not enter into debate with non-Christian modes of thought on their own terms, nor for their own sake; rather, his opponents are almost always Christians. The two exceptions—his debate with a ‘Greek philosopher’ about the incorporeality of the soul23 and his rebuttal of Porphyry’s critique of Christian allegory24—although attesting to the practice of debate with non-Christians, are entirely apologetic and explicitly relate to the legitimacy of Christian appropriation of what the philosopher and Porphyry regard as true but inherently ‘Greek’ argument or method. Consequently, when he comes to consider whether virtue as primary reality must have an existence beyond its instantiation, we do not find an Origenist Platonist actively engaged in the dialogue between ‘Platonic’ and ‘Aristotelian’ metaphysical stances.25 In asserting that virtue must exist truly and essentially in God in order for it to be appropriated by participation, he had two Christian groups firmly fixed in his sights:26 those who maintained that there were two contradictory first principles at work in creation, chiefly the Manichaeans;27 and those who 22

In the twentieth century both Origenian and Philonian scholarship saw a movement (at the hands of de Lubac and Nikiprowetzky respectively) from their being regarded as thoroughly Platonic and Platonizing thinkers to their recovery as biblical commentators with twin apologetic and spiritual purposes. Although a considerable improvement on our reading of such figures, this movement towards an ‘instrumentalist’ view of philosophy, whereby Greek concepts and vocabulary are appropriated only once detached from context and transformed through a biblical hermeneutic (cf. Layton (2004), on Didymus), is still driven by an apologetic agenda to denigrate any actual influence of Greek philosophy. In the Philonian field, one may point to the dissatisfaction of Runia with his earlier work, e.g. Runia (1998), 330: ‘Il me semble que bien souvent le rôle de la philosophie est plus profond, et qu’elle exerce une influence sur la manière de lire les Écritures.’ On the need for a new evaluation of the purposes of patristic scholarship and the role of the scholar in general, see Young (1995). 23 PsT 1.34.10–22; 4.239.14–19. 24 EcclT 5.281.16–22. The passage is difficult to reconstruct and there is considerable debate as to whether the allegory of Achilles used as an illustration should be understood as a Didymean innovation or else as composed by Origen or Porphyry; cf. Sellew (1989); Beatrice(1995); Carlini (1998). 25 e.g. Plot. Enn. 1.2. 26 Didymus’ approach to heretical views is surprisingly abstract. Almost invariably he seeks to counter a particular line of thought, howsoever it might manifest itself, rather than a group of people. The result is that, despite his frequent attacks on heresy, there is little emphasis on the personal authority or moral integrity of his opponents and so he rarely indulges in the vitriol which characterizes the writings of an Athanasius or an Epiphanius. 27 PsT 2.77.24–78.4; ZachT 3.309.21–3 (4.125).

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argued that people were morally predetermined by their nature, as either bodily, soulish, or spiritual—a view often connected with Valentinus but perhaps erroneously ascribed to the Manichaeans as well by Didymus.28 For his clash with Mani’s followers seems to have been particularly sharp (as one might well expect in late fourth-century Egypt29) and it has left its marks on all the Toura commentaries30 as well as provoking his Against the Manichees.

THE CHRISTIAN CASE F OR THE REALITY OF VIRTUE In opposing the view that there were two first principles—one good, one evil—at work in the universe, Didymus wished to go beyond citing Gen. 1:31 as proof of the goodness of creation.31 He needed to explain the ontology of both virtue and sin in such a way that their reality was not weakened as adequate descriptions of the moral conflict experienced in human life, whilst clearly identifying virtue alone as being from God and ultimately significant. To this end, he makes clear and repeated arguments, largely on the basis of Ps. 9:36 (‘His sin shall be sought; and will not be found’), that sin and evil are fundamentally unreal (anupostatos)—they do not truly exist and have no being of their own outside their performance by a moral agent. So because [sin] is something unreal (Iı Æ
), ‘it is not found’ (Ps. 9:36); for evil is not a substance (
P Æ), rather it has its existence as made in a purposive choice (K æ
ÆØæØ ªªÅÅ åØ e r ÆØ). Again, when the going astray ceases, the evil also departs with it.32

Purposive choice (proairesis) is the basis of all morality, rather than nature: no one can be evil in substance, not even the Devil;33 evil had a beginning and will have an end.34 Such a view had been maintained by the Peripatetics and had been propounded in thoroughly Christian contexts before by Clement and others.35

28

EcclT 6.343.9–22; ZachT 2.132.28–133.5 (2.175); GenT 1.143.14–144.5; cf. Bennett (1997),

90–2. 29

On the Egyptian situation, see Stroumsa (1986); Lieu (1992). Manichaeans named: EcclT 2.88.9–13; 5.274.17–275.2; 5.302.13–16; GenT 2.167.18–23; HiobT 1.64.7–14; 2.134.21–31; 3.288.34–289.6; PsT 4.286.22–31; ZachT 3.309.21–3 (4.125). 31 GenT 1.68.3–22, relating ‘ŒÆºa º Æ’ specifically to the harmony of creation, which is vital to Didymus’ teleological arguments for a single creator, GenT 2.217.23–218.4; EcclT 2.88.16–24. 32 HiobT 2.115.10–15; cf. HiobT 3.222.27–223.4; 4.393.2–10; 4.405.1–5; EcclT 6.334.6–15; 4.226.23–6; PsT 3.141.7; 4.288.22–4; C.Man. 2 [PG 39.1089a]. 33 ZachT 3.413.13–17 (5.210); cf. GenT 1.45.9–15; HiobT 1.2.5–18. 34 35 EcclT 6.333.23–334.2. Karavites (1999), 34–5; Orig. Princ. 2.9.2. 30

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However, unlike Aristotle, Didymus maintained a sharp distinction between this unreality of evil and the nature of virtue.36 But [Job 8:14] is a text which shows clearly that whoever turns the words of Jesus into deeds builds a house that lasts—that is virtue—and the one who clings on to this shall never have this house uninhabitable; for it is necessary for the just man to remain in his virtue, since ‘His righteousness endures to the age of the age’ (Ps. 11:9). But since evil has no reality (Iı Æ ), because of this the worthless man—the one who always exists without order and has nothing firm—is homeless, because of the fact that evil itself is a by-product ( ÆæÆŒ
º
ŁÅÆ); but if someone were to say this about the good man as well, saying that men also acquire virtue through their effort, nonetheless the good itself subsists (çÅŒ ÆPe e IªÆŁ ). So ‘the house of the impious man shall be uninhabitable’; for manifestly truth dissolves deceit.37

For Aristotle, nothing was good or evil in itself. Rather, both terms are simply the measure to which a being or object is directed towards its final cause.38 By contrast ‘Middle Platonists’ and ‘Neoplatonists’ had returned to contemplating the possibility of the Good as an efficient as well as final cause, albeit within the framework of the ‘Neopythagorean’ language of Monad and Indefinite Dyad.39 Such debates equating unity, being, and goodness clearly influenced Christian thinking,40 even though the disjunction between Platonic theories of the Forms or the Neoplatonic triad and the personal agency implicit in the Christian view of God made for key distinctions. Consequently, theologians such as Gregory of Nyssa could equate God with virtue,41 and Solari is quick to assume that Didymus makes the same equation.42 Yet, on closer examination, he probably holds to the earlier, more Philonic, view that God is beyond virtue.43

36

Cf. Evag. Ep. 59. HiobT 3.220.25–221.11. On the homelessness of the wicked, cf. Philo Leg.All. 3.3. 38 Arist. Phys. 1.192a15 ff.; Met. 6.1026b27 ff. 39 Rist (1982), 99. Plot. Enn. 1.8.11 refutes Aristotle’s definition of evil as privation; for him the restoration of the Good as an efficient cause is dependent on the reality of evil as a selfexistent principle, Enn. 1.8.15 (Matter is not a Form or truly an Existent but rather Anti-Form and participable Non-Being, Enn. 1.8.3). 40 God can be defined as Monad and Henad, PsT 5.332.12–13. The impact of Didymus’ subscription to semi-Pythagorean number symbolism, ZachT 3.361.13–22 (5.18), raises important questions despite the fact that he does not introduce the Dyad elsewhere. The ontological and moral supremacy of unity over multiplicity is, however, a constant assumption and potentially his greatest debt to the philosophical tradition, if indeed it is to be adjudged ‘unbiblical’. 41 G.Nyss. Hom.Eccl. 7 [Alexander 406.17–407.5]; Hom.Cant. 3 [Langerbeck 89–90]; Virg. 17 [Cavarnos 314.24–6]; cf. Beat. 5 [Callahan 129.16–22] on evil. 42 Solari (1999), 81. 43 Philo Opif. 8. Plot. Enn. 1.2.1, exploring Pl. Theaet. 176a–b, views the ruling principle of the world soul as the source of virtue but not identical with it and virtue as the mechanism of likeness without constituting that likeness; but the concepts of virtue and God are being used quite differently. 37

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Philo generally locates the continuity of virtue in either the nature of the cosmos, where it is ‘erected like a pillar in imperishable solidity’,44 or the heredity of Seth.45 It is only generic virtue which is imperishable,46 and this may have an almost Formal existence, since human virtue is always an imitation.47 However, for Didymus virtue has an eternal and substantial existence in God. It is not the same as God but it has its being rooted in the Trinity and so has an ensured ontological reality beyond its performance. [Evil] is incapable of subsistence (IÆ ), it has its being in another (K ¼ººø fi åØ e r ÆØ). . . Some in turn say, either in ignorance or more sophistically, that virtue is also like this, that it too has its being in another. But this is a lie; for it exists substantially in God, in the Trinity ( æåØ ªaæ fiH ŁfiH
PØøH, fiB æØØ). By participation in the Trinity (
ı Æ fi b B æØ
) men have the good and the just and virtue. Therefore even if they abstain from it, it is. In God, from whom they themselves have the ability to be earnest, it exists (K fiH ŁfiH, Iç w å
ıØ ÆP
d e 
ıÆE
Ø r ÆØ,  æåØ).48 For it is in God and from there we draw it. So even if we abandon it, the good is in God.49

According to Didymus’ metaphysics God is primarily Source. Virtue (along with other desirable qualities) exists by participation in the divine being, rather than identity with it.50 Whereas the ‘emanationist’ analogy of the Trinity in Origen could distinguish between modes of participation and offer routes to transcending such qualities through a possible equation of the Father with the Source and the Son with Virtue, Didymus conceived the intra-Trinitarian relationships as entirely flat (at least economically). All three persons of the Trinity are Source,51 and there is a single assumption of the Trinity.52 Within the rigid division between Creator and creature in terms of their essential and accidental realities, the participable and that which participates, there can be no creaturely movement beyond virtue. The emphasis is thus not on virtue as a primary category of the divine being but on the divine being as a guarantee of the reality of virtue and on virtue as properly a gift of grace.53 Virtue is the mechanism and proof of divine participation54 to such an extent that when virtue is lost, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are absent,55 but virtue is not the entirety of that participation.56 The 44

Philo Det. 75; Leg.All. 1.59, 97 interprets the Tree of Life as Virtue and the other trees of Paradise as its species; cf. 2.12–13. 45 46 47 Philo Post.Cain. 170–3. Philo Cher. 5. Philo Det. 160. 48 49 50 PsT 2.77.20, 21–4. EcclT 6.334.5–6. PsT 2.77.21–4; 1.48.17–18. 51 52 53 PsT 5.297.3–5. D.S.S. 75 (16). GenT 1.54.3–7. 54 GenT 2.161.24–6. 55 HiobT 4.403.19–24; cf. the link between the seeds of virtue and of the Holy Spirit, PsT 5.298.32–299.1. 56 Parallel statements are made about wisdom, HiobT 4.320.20–321.6, but also about holiness, PsT 3.133.17–21.

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primary analogy Didymus employs is not that of image or archetype but rather that of chorus-leader,57 which is an interesting shift from Origen and all the more significant since freely motivated, rather than drawing on the biblical text. This divine grounding of virtue has a number of consequences: first, virtue is not in the class of future things but in fact eternally present, as ‘everything which is to come is vanity’ (Eccl. 11:8); so it is only by a certain freedom of speech that we can speak of ‘goods which are about to be’, in respect of our personal perspective which has fallen into evil-doing and ignorance;58 secondly, there is no moral relativism, the good is to be chosen and received, even if it is not chosen and received;59 thirdly, virtue’s ontological existence is such as to be infallible and so as far as one holds to virtue, one can also be morally infallible; It does not say this about the state (ø) but about the one who has love. And it continues, ‘Love never fails’; but there’s no significance in saying that virtue never fails, since it does not have the nature to fail. Rather it says this about the one who has been established in virtue; for insofar as he possesses it, he is infallible (¼ ø ).60

and finally, and far more importantly, all virtue and enlightenment in the truth is by participation.61 Those who became light in this way are such not through manufacture (
PŒ KŒ ŒÆÆŒıB) but through participation (KŒ 
ı Æ) in the True Light.62

No one is good in essence other than the Trinity,63 as all understandings and virtues are qualities64 and so there is a limitless potential for moral change both in intensity and over time.65 Nonetheless, virtue’s substantial reality within the divine being means that presence with God prevents one from sinning66 and the call and impulse to virtue are never eradicated,67 while sin ceases to exist the moment one stops sinning,68 and evil is only ever a byproduct.69 These arguments open up clear metaphysical water between Didymus and his two groups of opponents, and resemble many of the lines of thought present in

57 GenT 2.180.10–11; 1.38.18–24; PsT 3.156.1–2; ZachT 2.152.13 (2.256); 2.266.7 (3.299); 3.290.13–18 (4.53); 3.371.15–17 (5.54). 58 EcclT 6.333.5–13. 59 HiobT 2.146.26–8; PsT 2.82.21–4; EcclT 6.336.4–7. Henrichs HiobT II, 97n.69, notes the Stoic parallel, citing M.Anton. Medit. 4.20, but such arguments would have to be put forward by any moral realist. 60 61 HiobT 4.334.3–12. GenT 2.248.4–12; PsT 2.77.21–4. 62 63 GenT 1.39.21–2; cf. EcclT 1.46.6–9. EcclT 4.229.12–13; PsT 1.19.8–12. 64 65 PsT 5.326.19–327.1. PsT 3.179.26–9; cf. ZachT 2.147.3–11 (2.233). 66 67 PsT 2.83.14–20; cf. 4 Suppl.247.2–5. PsT 3.159.4–14; HiobT 2.141.21–33. 68 PsT 3.138.3–5; 4 Suppl.250.24–6. 69 PsT 1.56.1–2; 4 Suppl.250.20–22; HiobT 3.221.3–4.

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Origen and indeed Christian thinkers throughout the ages. However, Didymus does not stop with such abstract statements about the reality of virtue but rather feels compelled to draw out their corollaries for his protology and eschatology.

THE P RE-EXISTENCE OF THE S OUL AS A FUNCTION O F THE ONTOLOGY OF VIRTUE The two doctrines for which Didymus was condemned along with Origen and Evagrius are his beliefs in the pre-existence of the soul prior to its gross embodiment on earth and the final restoration of the entire rational creation to its former state.70 The sixth-century polemic views these as myths erroneously introduced into Scripture from outside the faith,71 and modern scholarship has been quick to endorse this, citing Platonic philosophy as the primary source.72 More sympathetic commentators have tried to excuse one or other of these great thinkers from such error: Doutreleau was quick to point out that the passages in Didymus’ Commentary on Zechariah need not be taken as supporting either pre-existence as condemned or universal restoration;73 and Edwards has argued that Origen’s extant writings do not entertain these theses either.74 However, in each case the implicit assumption is that if such passages did intend these doctrines, their authors would have been clearly guilty of philosophically induced eisegesis.75 I wish to propose a different approach. To my mind it is quite clear that Didymus not only speculated upon but insisted as a cornerstone of orthodox Christian faith the fact that souls have some form of prior existence to their gross earthly embodiment76 and that some of these souls fell sinfully through misuse of their free will, which resulted in their gross embodiment. The scholarly consensus states that this is a tentatively held esoteric doctrine which Didymus maintained but only expounded with great caution and whose impact he minimized in a number of 70 Cyr.Scyth. Vit.Sabae [PG 39.240, cap.28]; Vict.Tunn. Chron. [PG 39.239, cap.29]; Eustrat. Laud. [PG 39.240, cap.30]; Evag.Schol. H.E. 4.38 [PG 39.240, cap.31]; cf. Guillaumont (1962), 136 ff.; Daley (2003), 188–90. 71 Sophron. Ep.Syn. [PG 39.241, cap.33]; Chron.Pasch. [PG 39.241–244, cap.35]. 72 e.g. Hanson (1959); Harl (1987). 73 Doutreleau ZachT I, 81–2. 74 Edwards (2002), 89 ff., esp. 89: ‘Except in a vestigial form which is not heretical, Origen never embraced this doctrine, either as an hypothesis or as an edifying myth.’ 75 Even the better discussions are coloured by these presumptions: Orphanos (1974), 75–93, feels his role is to ascertain whether or not Didymus believed in the pre-existence of the soul, not what he meant by this, nor why he should propound it; Young (1983a), 88–91, seeks to excuse this as a momentary philosophical aberration, an uncritical following of Origen which had little discernible impact on his other thought. 76 HiobT 1.34.23–7.

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works, such as the Commentary on Zechariah.77 Yet not only could Didymus’ adduce ideas of pre-existence in his formal interrogation of a presumed Apollinarist heretic78 but within his classroom his views on pre-existence are clearly uncontroversial; he does not face student questions, nor offer any extended apology against the criticism of non-materialists like Gregory of Nyssa or Basil.79 There are testimonies to the fact that [souls] were introduced into life and knitted together with bodies (N e [
] NªŁÆ  ŒÆd 
E Æ[Ø] ı ºŒŁÆØ) both because of their own evil-doing (Ø N Æ ŒÆŒ Æ) and because of their usefulness to others (Øa e H ¼ººø åæØ
): Jeremiah when he hears, ‘Before I moulded you in the belly I knew you and before you came out of the womb, I sanctified you’ (Jer. 1:5); Jacob and Esau too, about whom God says, ‘I loved Jacob but I hated Esau’ (Mal. 1:2–3; Rom. 9:13), while they still happened to be in the belly; and John ‘leaping and rejoicing’ (Luke 1:44) in his mother’s belly. These things demonstrate that souls are not co-temporal with bodies: for the one rejoices in his mother’s belly and shares in the Holy Spirit from his mother’s belly and one is hated before he is born and another loved—these things do not happen without a cause (IÆØ ø).80

He is confident enough to tackle imaginary objections: Even if someone were to raise the objection as to how pre-existing ( æ
ß æå
ıÆØ) souls desired bodies, which they did not know, it must be said to this man that the word ‘desiring’ is often used in situations where one does not totally desire the thing to which one’s actions lead.81

And to speculate on the nature of an original instrumental body: On the one hand, man was earlier said to have been made in the image (ŒÆ NŒ Æ), which clearly means something immaterial (e ¼ßº
); while on the other hand, since he was also made in another state (K æÆ fi ŒÆÆØ) such that he would need something to use, he needed an instrumental body (OæªÆØŒ
F Æ
), but now they also become ‘of skin’. Proof of this is the saying, ‘For a corruptible body weighs down the soul’ (Wis. 9.15)—the phrase ‘corruptible body’ clearly means this gross body (e Æåf)—then it goes on, ‘and the earthly tent loads down the mind full of thought’—calling an ‘earthly tent’ that which the soul used for its own movements from place to place ( æe a ÆÆØŒa ÆıB ŒØØ) when released from this body. This is a middle part (
) which unites the noetic substance (c 
æa
P Æ) to the gross body; this gross one weighs down (ÆæE) the soul, while the tent loads down (æ Ł

) not the soul but the mind.82 77

78 e.g. Orphanos (1974), 80. PrT. By contrast his views on the resurrection body show both concern to pre-empt criticism and pupils’ disquiet at his explanations; cf. Layton (2004), 152–7. Contrast Evag. Pract. 36. 80 HiobT 1.57.14–58.1; cf. HiobT 1.62.18–22 1.74.27–75.18; 3.261.17–23. 81 82 GenT 2.153.23–7. GenT 1.107.4–15. 79

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At times Didymus does talk of an almost ‘formal’ relationship between the unitary abstract idea and multiple concrete individuals, between Life and lives: for earthly life, which is material and transitory, is in some sense a mere shadow of the primary life above.83 But this cannot be the whole of his intention in the language of pre-existence, as is proven by his emphasis upon descent (kathodos).84 Nor can he be referring solely to the intrauterine moral agency of the foetus:85 for although the foetus is ensouled, its lack of a developed critical faculty prevents it from giving rational assent to the stirrings of passion and so it is both incapable of moral action and not subject to judgement.86 Unlike many other areas of his thought, there is no uncertainty in Didymus’ mind. He does not offer pre-existence simply as the most plausible of a number of alternatives within an area open to speculation, as seems to be the case in Origen;87 even though elsewhere he will limit himself to just such speculative inquiry (zētēsis), such as on the question of neonatal death.88 In fact the suggestion that the soul is co-sown with the body is portrayed not only as a mistaken interpretation of Scripture but a major heresy and one particularly associated with the Egyptian Hieracas.89 Somewhat less stridently, he rejects any form of creationism by insisting that God’s continuing creative activity is only transformative: creation from nothing was limited to the initial creative act described in Genesis 1–2; and since souls are intellectual substances and therefore cannot be transformed from one substance into another, they must have been part of God’s initial creation from nothing rather than his continuing creation.90

83 EcclT 3.193.25–194.1. Certainly Didymus does talk on occasions about noetic substance as a singular creation, GenT 1.21.18–20; PsT. 1.15.26–28. Nonetheless, one passage on the mysterious Stratiotes suggests that they may have held a doctrine of the soul of this nature, and it is clearly condemned by Didymus, PsT 4.277.15–16: ‘For you have given me a soul; I have a soul from you which did not begin from seeds (
PŒ I e  æø Iæå
Å), nor subsist as a reflection (
P ŒÆa çÆØ ıØÆÅ), as the Stratiotic heresy asserts, but “My existence comes from you.” ’ Gronewald PsT IV, 239n.b follows Koenen in understanding this as implying a world soul, ‘Die Einzelseele ist nur ein Reflex der Weltseele, eine Art Spiegelbild, in dem die Weltseele reflektiert ist, und daher nicht wesenhaft.’ Elsewhere Didymus tends to group the Stratiotes with the Hieracites and others who advocated a simple co-sowing of the soul with the body, EcclT 2.102.22–103.1; HiobT 4.387.22–388.1. Possibly one should infer their adoption of a broadly Stoic belief in a material soul, conformed to the world soul; cf. Rist (1969), 256 ff. 84 EcclT 3.175.27–176.3; ZachT 2.270.2–5 (3.312). 85 Some passages such as ZachT 2.263.7–8 (3.288) could be read in this way if taken in isolation. Edwards (2002), 105, attempts just such an explanation of Origen’s treatment of Esau and Jacob and Jeremiah. 86 HiobT 1.20.6–16; cf. EcclT 6.338.25–339.4; PsT 2.93.23–8. 87 Orig. Princ. 1.prol.5; cf. Comm.Cant. 2 [Baehrens 145–8]. 88 HiobT 1.74.6–17; EcclT 3.173.6–22. 89 EcclT 2.102.22–103.1; HiobT 4.387.22–388.1; PsT 4.277.15–16; cf. 1.53.21–4, which condemns the Hieracites for suggesting that the souls of the worthless go into non-being. 90 HiobT 1.56.20–57.13.

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His stance towards a final universal restoration of this noetic creation is less dogmatic, but he seems to have held to it as a reasonable hope, given the nature of God as all-powerful and merciful and that of humanity as purposed for union with him.91 However, these are not doctrines which have simply been imported from Platonism or indeed some popular mythical metanarrative of the immortal soul; rather, they are key corollary points to his understanding of virtue and his search for a theodicy. It is precisely and distinctively his Christian beliefs which have driven him to such conclusions, whether or not he himself drew any parallels with Jewish or Platonic theories.92 It is, as I will have cause to argue again, his ‘virtue-Origenism’ which guides Didymus’ dogmatic principles.

Didymus’ Doctrine of the Pre-existent Soul To a certain degree, like the detail of ‘Gnostic’ myths, both Origen’s and Didymus’ discussion of the pre-existent soul has been studied with an eye for titillation and the supposed ‘exoticism’ of heresy.93 Instead of looking at the role any such views play in supporting major doctrinal points or explaining difficult biblical texts, there has been a tendency to describe them in isolation and in a narrative form never found in either author and arguably of little interest to them. A fair amount of discussion has surrounded Didymus’ sparse comments on a ‘vehicle of the inner man’94 or ‘luminous and instrumental body’95 as distinct from the gross earthly body,96 and has filled in his account with Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic details as if he were committed to their anthropology.97 Consequently the true role pre-existence plays in Didymus’ thought has been obscured. 91

Divine punishment is medicinal (GenT 2.158.20–1) and educational (HiobT 3.267.14–17) and no rational being will ever be reduced to non-being (GenT 2.161.2–9); learning can continue after judgement (EcclT 6.349.9–14) and, at least on occasion, 1 Cor. 15.28, suggests a final union (ZachT 2.268.9–25 (3.307–8); cf. HiobT 3.266.19–26; PsT 1.11.17–23). See also the section The Salvation of the Devil in Chapter 6. 92 Bostock (1987), 259–62, argues cogently for a recognized Jewish cosmological basis to Origen’s speculations; Orig. Comm.Jn. 2.(31)186–92; 6.(12)72–3; Hom.Gen. 12.4. 93 Contrast the lack of interest in Nemesius, who similarly accepts the pre-existence of the soul on the grounds of the Platonic recollection argument (Nat.Hom. 14; 17) but fails to elaborate on this, except to deny Platonic transmigration of the soul from human to animal and vice versa (18) and ‘Origen’s introduction’ of ascent and descent between different orders of soul (22). 94 In 2 Cor. 5.1 [Staab 27.14–22]. For the reading ‘e ZåÅÆ 
F ø IŁæ
ı’ in place of the MS åBÆ, see Henrichs and Koenen (1975), 73–4. 95 In 2 Cor. 5.1 [Staab 27.14–22]: ‘ÆPª
Øb ŒÆd OæªÆØŒe HÆ’; GenT 1.107.6–7: ‘KÅ ÆPfiH OæªÆØŒ
F Æ
’; cf. Orig. C.Cels. 2.60 on the apparitions of the dead. 96 Schibli (1992); Schibli (1989); Henrichs HiobT I, 311–14; Hagedorn and Koenen HiobT III, 257–60; Henrichs and Koenen (1975), 72–4.; Kramer EcclT III, 94–5. Simonetti (1984), 129–40, and Orphanos (1974), 96 ff., are more faithful to the Didymean texts but rely heavily on reconstructions of Origen dependent on similar fleshings out of his statements and the Justinian polemic. 97 e.g. Schibli (1992), 384: ‘Platonic conceptions govern, and not merely influence, Origen’s and Didymus’ interpretation of the creation and fall of man in holy scripture.’ In fact, on the traditional

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The key passage is the discussion of God clothing Adam and Eve with ‘tunics of skin’ (Gen. 3:21), quoted earlier.98 In contrast to Origen’s hesitancy,99 Didymus confidently identifies these as gross corporeal bodies, adducing the parallel from Job 10:11 and maintaining that even if the Scriptures had intended to demean God by having him create clothes, he would not have needed to clothe them himself.100 Man was previously created ‘in the image’ which Didymus had already argued forcibly had to be immaterial, since God was immaterial.101 However, although he is prepared to call this existence immaterial (aülēs) in contrast with earthly existence, it is not disembodied: man ‘needed an instrumental body’ for this pre lapsarian life.102 Wisd. 9:15 provides the hermeneutical key: ‘For a corruptible body burdens the soul and the earthly tent weighs down the mind full of thought.’103 Didymus interprets this parallelism as referring to two discrete concepts and, comforted by 2 Cor. 5:1’s distinction of house and tent,104 speaks of ‘an earthly tent’: the soul uses this to move from place to place when disembodied; it relates to mind in the same way as the body as a whole relates to the soul; and it functions as an intermediary link between the noetic substance and the gross fallen body.105 account (Dodds (1963), 313–21; though contrast Bos’s (2003) ascription to Aristotle himself), the doctrine does not reach its full blossoming until tended to by Proclus, although by that stage the increasingly canonical nature of Greek philosophy meant that the combination of ‘Platonic’ ZåÅÆ and Aristotelian FÆ was read back into Pl. Phaed. 113d; Phdr. 247b; Tim. 41e; 44e; 69c, on the basis of Leg. 10.898e–f, and ascribed to Aristotle; cf. Procl. In Pl. Tim. 3.238.20. The possibility of Christian influence on Neoplatonists should not be discounted, particularly through Porphyry; yet the tendency is to presume a universal priority of Greek thought, as with Dillon’s continual projection of theories first attested to by Philo back into lost Stoicizing Alexandrian Platonists. 98 GenT 1.107.4–108.15. 99 Orig. In Gen. 3.21 [Petit Coisl.fr.121] suggests that these may be nothing more than the body but hesitates because of the difficulty posed by bones in Gen. 2:23 and so tends towards viewing the skins as the addition of mortality, Hom.Lev. 6.2. The identification with the body was more at home in Gnostic circles (Clem.Alex. Strom. 3.(14)95.2; Iren. Adv.Haer. 1.5.5) but had perhaps been assimilated as fully orthodox by Dionysius prior to Didymus, In Cant 1.5–6 [Feltoe 229.5–12]: ‘The “cloak of skin” seems to be the one which is sown onto and added to the earlier pure body (fiH æ
æø fi ŒÆd ŒÆŁÆæfiH ÆØ), with which our peaceful and peace-making Lord clothed man—for Solomon interpreted it like this. On the one hand having been clothed with it through transgression, man was cast out of Paradise; on the other if he intends to enter Paradise again, he should strip it off and change it for the garment of righteousness, for insofar as he had previously worn that, he was found to be “naked”.’ Procop. In Gen. 3.21 [PG 83.221a–b] is almost certainly dependent on Didymus. 100 Didymus does not address Origen’s ambivalence but, aware of the polemic (Method. Res. 1.4.2–3; Epiph. Pan. 64.4; Ancor. 54.2), employs ‘forensic rhetorical techniques’ to present a stark choice between the absurdity of God the tailor and an absolute identification of the ‘skins’ with bodies; cf. Layton (2004), 105–7. The same conclusion is drawn in HiobT 3.277.28–35. 101 102 GenT 1.56.14–57.9. GenT 1.107.6–7. 103 This use of Wisd. 9:15 dates at least back to Dion.Alex. In Cant 1.5–6. 104 Again, Didymus’ hermeneutical key is traditional, since he had ‘read this explanation somewhere’, In 2 Cor. 5.1 [Staab 27.14]. 105 GenT 1.107.7–20.

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These difficult and apparently contradictory designations are rattled off with great speed and no real explanation, and the temptation is to fill them out from parallels in the writings of later Neoplatonists, which have already been read back into Origen by many scholars, which has created a complex narrative myth of the self ’s refrigeration from pure mind to soul to body as a result of satiety.106 Thus, Henrichs, Koenen, Kramer, and Schibli107 see not one but two falls, a fall of mind into soul which is narrated in Gen. 2:7 and then a further fall of soul into body in Gen. 3:21.108 This would be quite close to Plotinus’ description of the soul acquiring first a ‘lighter body’ as it descends through the heavens,109 then a ‘human body’ on earth; or to Porphyry’s progressive darkening and thickening of the spirit as it absorbs moisture from the air.110 Moreover it would justify such judgements on Didymus’ antipathy to the body as: The whole creation account and the fall of the soul may be viewed platonically as the descent of mind to matter. . . the assumption of any body is the result of sin, negligence, and offence.111

However, this is a massive assumption which sits uneasily with much of Didymus’ thought.112 There is no requirement to understand three chronological moments113 and indeed the men . . . de . . . construction seems to associate closely the first two aspects of the creative process, so that ‘in another state’ should be taken qualitatively rather than temporally:

106

Even among scholars who recognize the danger of Koetschau’s policy of preferring not only Jerome’s critiques but also Justinian summaries of sixth-century Origenism to the Rufinian translation of De Principiis, the tendency is to argue that the logic of Origen’s theodicy implies this, e.g. Sfameni Gasparro (1978); Bammel (1989). Crouzel (1989), 89, ascribes the lower element or irrational part of the soul to a first fall. 107 Henrichs HiobT I, 313n–314; Hagedorn and Koenen HiobT III, 257–260n.101; Henrichs and Koenen (1975), 72–4; Kramer EcclT III, 94–5; Schibli (1992), 382–3; cf. Henrichs (1969), 221: ‘den Kern der Anthropologie des Didymos, nämlich seine Lehre von der zweifachen Form der Einkörperung der Seelen’. 108 Certainly Theoph.Alex. Ep.Fest. AD401 [Jer. Ep. 96] seems to presume this reading but interestingly the earlier documents of the controversy, back to Epiphanius, speak only of the fall of angels; cf. Guillaumont (1962), 84–101. The schema is much closer to that of Evagrius than that of Origen or Didymus, though since he is comfortable with the existence of a truly incorporeal creaturely intellect (Ceph. 3.66), he makes no use of the concept of an instrumental body or soul vehicle but speaks of a succession of bodies tied to the succession of worlds (Ceph. 1.24; 2.25, 49), variously distinguished by the ratio of the four elements comprising them (Ceph. 1.68); cf. Guillaumont (1962), 103–16. 109 Plot. Enn. 4.3.15; cf. Dodds (1963), 318. 110 Porph. Sent. 13.8 ff.; Ant.Nymph. 11; cf. Dodds (1963), 318–19. 111 Schibli (1992), 382. 112 Layton (2004), 108–12 (cf. 88–90), shows an awareness of Didymus’ narrative multiplicity and thus is cautious but still concludes that, ‘the body remains for Didymus solely adventitious to the essence of human existence’ (112). 113 Schibli (1992), 383.

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On the one hand, man was earlier said to have been made in the image (ŒÆ NŒ Æ), which clearly means something immaterial (e ¼ßº
); while on the other hand, since he was also made in another state (K æÆ fi ŒÆÆØ) such that he would need something to use, he needed an instrumental body (OæªÆØŒ
F Æ
), but now they also become ‘of skin’.114

Orphanos is cautious of committing Didymus to such a double fall and its relegation of notions of body to a third dispensable level.115 In fact, the arguments against such a reading are much stronger than he realized when confronting this passage in isolation prior to the publication of the Commentary on Genesis. First, we should look to context. The previous passage is essentially concerned with rejecting the anthropomorphic view of God he ascribes to the history lovers (philistores).116 Didymus then goes on to consider how the protoplasts could have been clad with gross bodies whilst still in Paradise and concludes that the sequence is purely a product of the narrative form and, in fact, the clothing and expulsion are simultaneous, in the same way as Christ brought the repentant thief to Paradise without his corporeal body.117 Didymus’ main interest is not in establishing what this instrumental body is but rather what it is not. Gen. 3:21 is not a text which opens up hermeneutical possibilities but rather closes them down.118 He sees it as lock rather than key. It serves to prove that Paradise is not an earthly place but a transcendent one, that human destiny (albeit individual and hence corporeal) is not tied solely to our gross physical bodies. Moreover, when we turn more broadly to the wider corpus, the possible suggestion of an aggregation of layers here, with the instrumental body acting as a form of ‘buffer’ between gross corporeal form and immaterial mind, begins to appear anomalous or more probably a misreading of Didymus’ attempt. Other references, even within the Commentary on Genesis, seem to imply a continuity between all forms of embodiment: the categories of the rational creation are there only to be distinguished by the relative thickness of

114

GenT 1.107.5–7. Orphanos (1974), 101–2, envisages a single embodiment and the Adamic fall as resulting in simply a qualitative change to the body, which loses its spiritual powers and becomes gross and hylic. Orphanos does, however, view this as a departure from Origen consonant with his rejection of Origenist Œ æ
, while I would tend to suggest that Origen himself avoided such a double fall and double embodiment. 116 GenT 1.106.10–17. 117 GenT 1.107.20–108.15. 118 The relevant hermeneutical key or lock comprises Gen. 3:21, Job 10:11 and 2 Cor. 5:1, and it is only when commenting explicitly on these three texts that he attempts any explanation of what the other body might be. His primary intention is rather to define earthly bodies as ‘gross’ and representing a change from God’s original purpose and mankind’s ultimate destiny. 115

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their bodies; thus, angels and human souls are the same noetically but angels have a light body, humans a thick one.119 Indeed, the wider mythos usually attributed to the ‘Origenist’ double fall is not only missing but indeed explicitly rejected. As we shall examine in more detail in Chapter 10, there is no place for any doctrine of satiety (koros), which, although probably not held by Origen, had clearly come to be associated with his views by the fourth century.120 For Didymus argues that the eyes of the inner man cannot be satiated by the face of God but rather the reverse: enlightened contemplation of God increases the longing and this noetic light is stamped upon one in such a way that it cannot be lost.121 So, too, Didymus clearly rejects the corollary implication of all embodiment as the result of a prior ‘cooling’ of mind into soul, namely that the entire creation would be sinful. He goes to great pains to establish the sinlessness not only of the human soul (not just mind) united with Christ122 but also of a number of souls who condescend to gross corporeal existence for the sake of others.123 Similarly one may look to the status of the stars: following Origen, and in accord both with many philosophers and popular Egyptian belief,124 Didymus generally views stars as ensouled beings;125 they are not sinners doing penance126 but a higher level of being serving mankind; not divine or to be worshipped,127 nor less than human because they serve them.128 This positive sense to more than the instrumental body is mirrored in his attitude to the resurrection of the body. Although unlikely to satisfy critical proponents of atomic identity, Didymus clearly demands a post-resurrection physicality and embodiment, which does not tally with the presumed Neoplatonist ideals of the myth.129 He does 119

GenT 2.153.20–2. Although Origen probably employed such language (Princ. 1.3.8), Edwards (2002), 93, argues plausibly that since he followed the Philonic sense of being glutted by sensual pleasure (Heres 240), Origen must have been speaking of an embodied condition rather than a cause of embodiment, as in Plotinus; anti-Origenists balked at the language in the light of Plotinus and ‘thus it appears . . . that the Council of 553 condemned him, not for a heresy, but for a word’. Alternatively some ‘Origenist’ ascetics may have read back into a pre-existent state Athanasius’ focus on ascetic negligence as the primal embodied sin back. 121 PsT 2.110.8–12. 122 PsT 1.37.18–21; ZachT 1.63.30–64.3 (1.280–1). 123 EcclT 1.15.5–7; PsT 1.55.23–7; cf. Moses’ descent from the mountain, HiobT 2.181.11–182.1. 124 125 Orig. Orat. 7.1; Princ. 1.7.2. EcclT 1.13.24–6. 126 Scott (1991), 147, on Origen. 127 GenT 1.36.13–14; ZachT 3.382.20–7 (5.95); cf. the rejection of astrology on the grounds that the motion of the stars is demonstrative not causative, GenT 1.36.18–37.6; 1.74.19–76.2; PsT 1.25.11–14. 128 EcclT 1.11.30–12.2. 129 The point is recognized by Schibli (1992), 384–5, but not allowed its full force, and so he outlines an imbalance between protology and eschatology, where the resurrection is a Christian aberration not integrated into the Alexandrian Platonism. The misreading is magnified by the 120

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sometimes lend support to ideas of an ultimate restoration (apokatastasis) in which the end is like the beginning,130 but it seems far more likely that he envisioned a pre lapsarian embodiment rather than a post-resurrection attenuation of the spiritual body. Indeed he speaks elsewhere of the need to clothe it, not cast it off, drawing on a rich vein of Jewish and Christian thought applying to the garments required for heavenly existence.131 Nevertheless, even if we are weighed down by having it, we do not long to (
Ł
F) cast it off but to clothe it with a habitation from heaven (e K
PæÆ
F
NŒÅæØ
).132

Finally, all such theories demand that Didymus’ elevated exegeses of Genesis should be read as a simple unified parallel narrative, extrapolated by allegory. However, close reading shows that Didymus is not identifying a single one-toone allegory but a host of interpretative layers which draw on different details of the text and cannot be simply unified. The unity of revelation is not to be found in the narrative but in the content, ultimately the true expression of God. If Didymus’ elevated reading does not produce a single reading, nor does it produce a narrative, at least not a parallel one. The reality is that Didymus explicitly states and restates that any apparent chronological framework to Genesis 1–3 is purely logical and that we are dealing with simultaneous events, or indeed truths, involving the reality of creation or human psychology.133 Temporal features are used to distinguish logically things which are only conceptually prior to one another.134 So, although Didymus probably did understand two distinct creations, one spiritual, one corporeal, recounted in the double Genesis narrative,135 it is highly unlikely that he separated these events chronologically. His reading was intended to give the soul a moral and intellectual priority over any form of fact that this so-called ‘modification upon the Platonic tradition’ (384) was precisely the point Didymus and Origen failed to articulate in terms acceptable to the fourth-century Church; cf. Guillaumont (1962), 84–101, where his reconstruction of the fourth-century conflict revolves first around the denial of the resurrection of the body and then later that such a body as Origenists proposed was subject to many deaths and possibly reduced to nothing after many cycles. 130 EcclT 6.353.16: ‘The end and the beginning are one’. More commonly Didymus asserts a different form of universalism based on 1 Cor. 15:28, e.g. ZachT 2.268.9–25 (3.307–8), but even here the talk of an end to ‘numerical multiplicity’ (e ŒÆ[a I]æØŁe ºBŁ
) probably does not mean an end to individual substances and personalities but to their multiplicity of purpose, as evidenced by his use of 1 Cor. 1:10; cf. Origen’s maintenance of individuality, C.Cels. 8.72. 131 Cf. Conway-Jones (2011) on a similar appropriation in Gregory of Nyssa, e.g. Comm.Cant. 9 [Langerbeck 271.23–272.1]. 132 In 2 Cor. 5.2–4 [Staab 27.38–28.2]. 133 Sfameni Gasparro (1978), 65–8; Bennett (1997), 140–3. 134 GenT 1.34.6–35.19; 2.145.22–8. 135 On the distinction between the making (
ØE) of the soul and the moulding ( ºÆE) of the body, see HiobT 3.273.15–33; 3.275.31–276.11. Only the former applies to angels, HiobT 3.276.1–2, despite their light body, GenT 2.153.19–23.

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embodiment, not to narrate the chronology of a pre-mundane fall into bodies. The difficulty here of trying to take Didymus’ elevated readings of these passages as the simple word-for-word symbolism of an allegorical narrative is shown by the fact that he does not actually include the noetic creation in his understanding of the Genesis 1 creation account at all. ‘Because on that day God rested from all his works which he had begun to do’ (Gen. 2:3). It specifies, ‘The ones which he had begun’, because not all his works had their beginning on one of the six days: angels and archangels and every noetic substance ( AÆ  
æa
P Æ) did not receive their beginning then. And that this is the case, God himself says in Job, ‘When the stars were made, all my angels praised me with a loud voice’ (Job 38:7).136

If with Schibli and others we are to suppose that Genesis 1 refers solely to the creation of mind, prior to the first fall which separated and ensouled the various minds according to the extent of their sin as angels, human beings, demons, and so on,137 we are left with serious problems with coherence unlikely to have been overlooked in such a significant feature of his thought. As we noted earlier, Didymus warms to the possibility that the stars are ensouled beings who have condescended to serve mankind in this particular way. Yet a purely chronological reading has beings choosing to be stars after the intellectual fall which defines some of the noetic creation as angels, souls, demons, and so on, but before the creation of the human beings they are intended to serve. Didymus’ hermeneutics do not presume a one-to-one symbolism, nor an either-or approach. Genesis 1 refers equally and plurally to the creation of the material universe and the creation of the immaterial part of humanity and the moral ordering of the cosmos and the psychology of the complete human being. The potential for misinterpretation, if one presupposes a Neoplatonic anthropological framework, is considerable. For example, Dodds in his seminal study of Proclus offers a useful interpretation of the role of the astral body: But whereas the Greek theory aims at providing a bridge between soul and body, and accordingly ascribes an astral body to all souls (whether as a permanent possession or as something acquired in the course of the descent to generation), the magician, Hermetist and the Gnostic are trying to make a bridge between God and man; for them the immortal body is acquired by initiation, and by putting it on, man becomes a god.138

The Didymean instrumental body performs neither of these functions: it is not a bridge at all but rather a barrier, a mark of the disjunction between creator and created. Although scholars have been criticized for taking Origen’s view that absolute incorporeality belongs to the Trinity alone as his last word on the 136

GenT 1.76.14–20.

137

Schibli (1992), 383.

138

Dodds (1963), 314.

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subject, it seems to me that the contradictions are more real than apparent, because of Origen’s homonymous use of ‘incorporeal’ as both ‘absolutely incorporeal’ and ‘possessing only a light, invisible body’.139 This homonymity is not original to Origen but already present in Philo and perhaps even symptomatic of a more widespread ancient mindset which equated the terms ‘corporeal’ and ‘material’ with corruption and passibility and so struggled for a language in which to describe discrete entities which were not subject to these.140 However, if one misses the role of the instrumental body and sees it as performing the same bridging function as the Neoplatonic ‘spirit vehicle’, one will misread Didymus’ interpretation of Genesis and by extension his view of the moral life, just as Schibli does.141 Like the Neoplatonists, Didymus draws connections between embodiment and relationship to the divine and he uses a similar vocabulary, but he is making totally different points within a very different context. Any attempt to read him otherwise distorts his thought and blinds one to the appreciation that there is in Didymus a parallel to the bridging motif of the ‘spirit-vehicle’, namely the ‘according to the image’. This is the aspect of humanity which is directly linked to one’s moral distance from God;142 this is what must be purified and reformed as part of the soul’s journey,143 in the same way as the ‘spirit vehicle’ is purged by Neoplatonic theurgy144 in order to restore one’s kinship to something beyond the earthly.

Motivations for a Doctrine of Pre-existence If it is perhaps easy to dismiss attempts to read Didymus’ doctrine here as a narrative myth, it is somewhat harder to counter the charge that it reflects a basic ‘Platonic’ dualism evinced by a notion of the innate immortality of soul, predicated upon its essential immateriality and implying some inherent

139

Orig. Princ. 4.3.15; 2.2.1–2; 1.prol.8. Dillon (1998); esp. 110: ‘The boundary between the corporeal and the incorporeal was not drawn by many ancient thinkers where we might think it should be drawn.’ Philo conceives the essence of the human mind and the ¸ ª
 as IÆ
; yet they are equally said to be composed of FÆ or Fæ åØŒ , Leg.All. 3.161; similarly, the stars do not have a separable body as in Plotinus (Enn. 2.1.4; 4.4.24–7) and yet are IŒæÆ
Ø and IŒæÆØçE, despite being visible, Gig. 8. 141 Schibli (1992), 387: ‘Middle and Neoplatonists developed an intricate system of ontological gradations from nous to soul to body in which the vehicle of the soul was the mediating link. It is not surprising that philosophically minded Christian thinkers as Origen and Didymus should have availed themselves of this system when they attempted to bridge the gap between logos and sarx, the word and the flesh. Their Greek philosophical training, to be sure, created certain tensions, but its usefulness for the explication of Christian doctrine and scripture made it too valuable to be abandoned.’ 142 PsT 4.276.13–18; GenT 1.57.27–58.2. 143 144 GenT 1.59.19–24; 2.210.4–7; PsT 5.320.1–10. Dodds (1963), 319. 140

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divinity.145 Indeed Didymus freely employs the same analogies for the diminution of the soul’s innate power when embodied as Plotinus: namely, honey mixed with wormwood or wine mixed with water.146 In opposition to a number of theories he designates heretical,147 Didymus goes far beyond insisting that the soul does not die with the body148 and frequently defines the soul as ‘deathless’.149 The metaphysics of his underlying argument are not always spelled out, but remain clear. First, names are understood as relating differently to material and immaterial subjects or realities: the former can only sustain a one-to-one equivalence, while intellectual substances can be plurivocal—since the soul is designated by multiple names in the Bible, it must be an incorporeal intellectual substance.150 Secondly, intellectual realities are simple: only matter can support quantitative change151—a change into non-being would represent a quantitative change, which would make death by definition a gross bodily process.152 Elsewhere in the period we see figures such as Athanasius both styling the soul deathless in comparison with the body and insisting that since it was created from nothing, its nature is liable to dissolve into non-being unless it ‘remains’ in the Word.153 However, Didymus is far more rigid and any apparent Scriptural references to the death of the soul are therefore consistently read not as destruction into non-being but rather its ceasing to be such and such.154 When the generous God has brought those he ransomed from Pharaoh and the Assyrian into Gilead and Lebanon, not one of his enemies will still be left, not because they no longer exist—for it is impossible to convert a rational substance into non-being (º
ªØŒc
P Æ N e c k ŒÆÆæłÆØ), even if it has committed many great sins and impieties—but because it is changed into no longer being an enemy and opponent of those ransomed by God.155

145 The key text is Plato’s Phaedo, e.g. 80b: ‘The soul is that which is most similar (›
Ø Æ
) to what is divine, deathless, noetic, uniform, indissoluble and always the same as itself, while the body is most similar to that which is human, mortal, irrational, many-formed, soluble and never the same.’ 146 HiobT 3.288.25–34; cf. Plot. Enn. 1.1.4; 4.7.9. 147 Stoics and Hieracites: PsT 1.53.22–4. 148 HiobT 4.377.11–23; GenT 1.42.12–15; EcclT 2.100.18–23; 2.91.10–16. 149 HiobT 3.288.14–25; 1.34.9–10; PsT 4.276.12; cf. not transitory, EcclT 3.154.17. 150 PsT 2.67.28–68.1; 5.297.11–15. 151 PsT 1.53.16–17; cf. EcclT 2.103.5–12 on å
F, the substrate which supports this change. The basic argument for the simplicity of the eternal goes back to Pl. Phaed. 78c. 152 PsT 1.36.29–37.7. 153 Athan. Incarn. 3–4; cf. Anatolios (1998), 35–7; Steenberg (2009), 167–9. 154 PsT 1.38.21–2; 4.280.34–5; 4.281.1–10; EcclT 2.92.22–4; 2.78.1–13. The same line is taken by the possibly dependent Ambrose, e.g. In Ps. 1.47–8. 155 ZachT 2.268.9–15 (3.307).

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Such reasoning may seem to imply the divinity of the soul: the soul lives in the same way as God,156 was created to share God’s name (that is his definitive qualities),157 and, at one point, is even said to be of the same substance (homoousios) as God. If it only lies in our power to wish for something, while we have no power to achieve the fine thing which we wished, then the good God has sent down souls which are the same in being as himself (a ›

ı Æ Æı
F łıåa) into bodies in vain; for they do not do, nor work for what is dear to him and to them but only wish it.158

Didymus draws far more heavily on contemporary philosophical language and indeed conceptual underpinning for his portrayal of the ‘deathless soul’ than Origen and fails to keep a consistent check on the tensions this introduces to his depiction of the relationship between creature and Creator. When Didymus treats the soul in comparison with God rather than aligning the two against matter or the body, he is quick to stress an ontological gulf,159 while maintaining that the soul is as similar to God as possible.160 The difficulty lies in the lack of an adequate conceptual vocabulary. With his broadly Aristotelian definition of substance (ousia), Didymus is wedded to a single category of immateriality, namely ‘intellectual substance’. It does not apply to abstract concepts such as shape or form (since these have no reality apart from their material existence161) but rather describes intangible realities such as light, the soul, and God.162 The classification ‘intellectual substance’ is not so much a positive description as a negative one. Rather than saying what the nature of the soul or of God is, it describes what it is not.163 A number of passages offer ways of defining the ontological break, but, perhaps unaware of the inconsistency due to the respectability of Middle Platonic views of the soul within Christian circles in contrast to Stoic ones, 156

157 PsT 5.298.8–11. PsT 2.60.7–19; HiobT 3.288.14–25. In Rom. 7 [Staab 4.36]. 159 HiobT 3.302.27–303.4; on the distinction of comparative statements from absolute ones, see PsT 1.15.22–4; 4.276.7–10. 160 HiobT 3.288.21–5. 161 PsT 4.263.15–27: ‘And just as this sort of body has a sense-perceptible aspect (e ÆNŁÅe) and an underlying materiality (oºÅ 
ŒØÅ) and a form of body (r
 Æ
), it is also possible to separate this sort of body from the gross ( Æåø) body. Whenever you understand the three dimensions (ØÆØ) on their own without materiality, this sort of body is not a substance (
P Æ).’ 162 Light: ZachT 1.63.13–14 (1.277); soul: PsT 1.34.16–18; ZachT 2.270.18–24 (3.314); HiobT 1.56.20–34; EcclT 1.45.23–4 ( º
ªØŒc
P Æ); God: PsT 1.34.13–15; 2.84.6. 163 The difficulties Didymus finds himself in because of this substantial equation of light, soul, and God are evidenced in the few passages which seem to suggest that God is not mystical light but physical light, PsT 1.37.2–3. In some sense he wishes to say that the natural state of the mind is light (çH) without any additional materiality (Ø ºØŒe IÆت
) (PsT 1.34.5–7), but he is aware of the dangers of overstepping the bounds of metaphor (1.34.14–18); cf. GenT 2.216.16–217.23 on the divine epiphany to pure mind. 158

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Didymus does not sustain any of them productively. Thus, in his On the Holy Spirit, the invisible creation is clearly distinguished as an ontological category by the fact of their circumscription, even though they transcend gross corporeality: But this Holy Spirit, if he were one of the creatures, would at least have a circumscribed substance (circumscriptam substantiam), just like everything which has been made. For even if invisible creatures are not circumscribed by place and boundaries (loco et finibus), nonetheless they are bounded by the peculiar nature of their substance (proprietate substantiae finiuntur). However, the Holy Spirit, since he is in many, does not have a circumscribed substance.164

Elsewhere, God is briefly said to be beyond intellectual substance, but this falls by the wayside within a sentence;165 and there are forays into establishing a boundary between essential and accidental being.166 What is clear is that Didymus wishes to describe not a dualist cosmology but rather three basic categories of being, though he draws indiscriminately on earlier dualistic models to describe both the upper and lower demarcations. Neither mind nor soul are fragments of the divine nature, but rather represent a class of being which participates differently in the source of being from material substances. Similarly, although the depth of Origen’s commitment to a concept of conditional immortality may have been optimistically overstated,167 Didymus barely hints in this direction. Whereas Origen distinguishes between an immortality inherent in the soul’s construction so that it can bear the gift of true life and that immortality given by divine grace,168 Didymus draws a fainter line between deathless movement and true life, with inherent immortality more akin to the faculty of sight than right contemplation.169 The soul is deathless (IŁÆ
) and has a natural ability to live by which it moves (çıØŒe ÇB ŒÆŁ n ŒØEÆØ). And even the sinner can have this life, according to which he is deathless. The verse, ‘Their hearts shall live’ (Ps. 21:27), does not refer to this natural life now (ÆÅ F B ÇøB B çıØŒB), but to that life which the believer has and the one who knows God has. If their hearts live to the age of the age according to the blessed life, it is apparent that they also remain always according to the substantial life (ŒÆa c
PØÅ Çøc), which is common to sinners and earnest men.170

It is plausible that Didymus’ understanding of both the pre-existence of the soul and a final restoration are vestigially related to the implications of the soul’s immateriality within the non-Christian models he adopts, but they are never presented as pressing corollaries. Other motivations are far more deeply felt. 164 165 168 169

D.S.S. 21(6); cf. Clem.Alex. fr.37; 39 [Stählin 3.219–20]. 166 167 ZachT 3.365.5–12 (5.32). D.S.S. 10(4). Crouzel (1989), 238. Orig. Dial. 21; cf. Clem.Alex. In 1 Pet. 1.9 [Stählin 3.203.20–2]. 170 PsT 1.54.1–5. PsT 1.53.24–54.1.

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Not least of these are particular scriptural aporiai: thus, the argument that it would be better for someone not to be born (Matt. 26:24; Eccl. 4:3) is taken as implying that the individual in question had a personal existence prior to birth which could have been compared;171 equally, when Job presents birth and death as a coming and a going (Job 1:21), it is read in the light of 1 Tim. 6:7 as implying an existence to come from, as well as one to go to.172 The theological motivations require closer scrutiny. For example, belief in the pre-existence of souls also serves to protect the uniqueness of God’s creative act. Curiously, Didymus does not emphasize creatio ex nihilo in his refutation of Manichaeism,173 preferring moral arguments, such as that if quality-less matter were the cause of corruption, then men would be blameless and virtue meaningless.174 However, he does assert that God made the world timelessly from nothing in a single act of will.175 Creation is only described in a temporal manner ‘for the sake of order and harmony’ and ‘because of our weakness’.176 In fact, there is but a single moment of calling being out of nonbeing and all subsequent creation is from one form of matter into another.177 This has less to do with the nature of creation than that of God: he is an ‘active substance’;178 there is no delay between his willing and his will being accomplished;179 and he lacks nothing, so everything which he would wish to create he did create in a single moment.180 Rational souls are not material and therefore cannot be created from the seeds of their parents181 (unlike irrational animal souls),182 nor can they be created anew,183 so they must have been created initially before the gross material bodies in which they will be incarnated. Logically Didymus feels driven to asserting the pre-existence of the soul,184 but he is asserting preexistence as an abstract necessity not a narrative individuality. The closest Didymus comes to providing an individual moral narrative such as is usually sought by commentators is in the foundation of his theodicy. The relevance of a doctrine of pre-existence to theodicy has long been recognized

171

HiobT 1.61.19–62.14. HiobT 1.34.5–35.20; cf. the argument that clothing by God (Gen. 3:21; Job 10:11) implies a prior hypostatic reality which may be clothed (HiobT 3.278.14–21), though this is necessarily supporting, rather than primary, evidence. 173 Didymus does, nonetheless, assert it in other contexts, ZachT 3.322.29–323.2 (4.178). 174 175 176 GenT 2.167.18–23. GenT 1.34.2–3. GenT 1.35.4–9. 177 178 179 HiobT 1.57.2–5. GenT 1.33.23–34.1. PsT 5.303.29. 180 EcclT 2.89.21–9; creation is, therefore, complete and cannot be added to, EcclT 2.87.26–88.9. 181 182 HiobT 1.56.30–4. HiobT 4.377.17–23; EcclT 2.91.10–16. 183 HiobT 1.56.34–57.13. 184 The same argument is found in Nem. Nat.Hom. 17, which also rules out Eunomius’ view that an incorporeal soul is created within the body on the grounds that this would make it corruptible and mortal. 172

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as a key factor in Origen’s exposition,185 whose main focus appears to have been to explain the multiplicity and especially the moral differentiation of creation while asserting the unity in perfection of the creator.186 Something of this is also present in Didymus, who can speak of individuals being born in wickedness or virtue through their own initiative and will,187 and of bodies as effectively chosen insofar as they are appropriate consequences of individual moral choices.188 However, Didymus’ theodical concern is shifted by his very different context from that of his predecessor. Although he tends to recapitulate many of Origen’s refutations of Marcionite and ‘Gnostic’ positions on the imperfection of creation as if still significant,189 Didymus’ Manichaean opponents actually presented a very different challenge. In many ways the attack made on mainstream doctrines of creation was less significant than the challenge to understandings of providence and divine intervention when the power of the supreme Good is limited by an unvanquished opposing force. Thus, one of Didymus’ prime concerns was to sustain a doctrine of providence, and this was supremely important with regard to protology, as can be seen from Evagrius’ summary of his teaching as: ‘Always train yourself to contemplate the doctrines of providence and judgement ( æd æ

Æ ŒÆd Œæ ø º ª
ı)’, says the great and gnostic teacher Didymus. ‘And try to remember the material of these—for nearly all slip up in these matters. On the one hand you will find the doctrines of judgement in the differentiation of bodies and in the world (K fiB ØÆç
æfi A H øø ŒÆd ŒÆa e Œ 
); but those of providence in the ways which lead us back from evil-doing and ignorance to virtue or to knowledge.’190

The extant works are equally quick to show Didymus defining God’s action almost exclusively around the twin poles of creation and providence191 and often railing against those who introduce doctrines of fate or chance.192 Indeed, he goes so far as to insist upon a full-blown theory of individual providence. Just as God creates not just the genus and species but individual animals and rational beings,193 so too he administers his providence individually and universally.194 Gross corporeal existence, with all its pain, misery, toil,

185

186 Crouzel (1989), 205–17. Orig. Princ. 2.9.6. 188 GenT 1.20.8–12; cf. HiobT 1.2.5–23. GenT 1.97.28–98.1; 2.153.23–154.2. 189 GenT 1.68.3–8; 1.91.28–92.6; 2.184.24–185.1; 2.217.29–218.4. 190 Evag. Gnost. 48. On the fact that these º ª
Ø refer specifically to embodiment, see Sinkewicz (2003), xxxvii; on the importance of the concept within Evagrius’ own thought, see Dysinger (2001); e.g. Ad Monach. 132; 135. 191 HiobT 2.119.27–8; PsT 3.239.7–8; EcclT 2.88.29–89.20. 192 EcclT 2.88.16–24; PsT 2.88.10–18; GenT 1.74.19–75.25; HiobT 4.366.26–367.4; ZachT 1.15.19–20 (1.68). 193 HiobT 4.336.2–13. 194 HiobT 4.326.13–14; 4.335.23–336.2; EcclT 2.94.1–5; 4.218.23–219.7. 187

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and suffering, has an educational purpose not just for humanity as a whole, as in Irenaeus,195 but for each and every individual. Consequently, he can explain the deaths of young children on the basis that they did not need much education and so their short time in gross bodies was sufficient for them to advance.196 However, such considerations of the application of providence to individual cases are rare, and deliberately so. The important thing is to establish grounds for maintaining the biblical view of God as both just and all-powerful. This is a point of uncontestable doctrine, but, since his judgements are as deep as the abyss, human beings are incapable of fathoming them in relation to individuals.197 However, it must generally be proven that sufferings and trials are not inflicted on individuals solely as just punishment for their sin. This is where Didymus introduces, at least implicitly, his doctrine of preexistence most frequently throughout his corpus, namely to assert that there are two types of people who suffer: entry into this earthly life was for two reasons, either as an educational punishment or an unselfish model; there are those who fell and those who descended for the sake of others.198 In this sense the uniqueness of the incarnation may seem somewhat imperilled, but it is the absolute union of the soul of Jesus with the Son which is fundamental to Didymus’ doctrine of salvation rather than a notion of sacrificial embodiment. Although, as for earlier authors, it is the figures of Jacob and Esau, of Jeremiah and John the Baptist who provide the most problematic testimonia,199 since they evidence either rational action or moral status prior to birth,200 Didymus’ 195

Iren. Adv.Haer. 3.18.1, 7. Jer. Adv.Ruf. 3.28.45–53; cf. HiobT 1.74.6–22. 197 EcclT 3.194.19–25; PsT 4.235.36–236.12; 5.322.27–323.6; cf. HiobT 1.37.28–38.9. 198 EcclT 1.15.5–7; PsT 1.55.23–27; HiobT 1.57.14–27; 1.62.18–22; 1.74.27–75.16; 3.261.17–23; cf. Philo Conf. 77–8 (if this should be taken of the pre-existent soul, rather than the wise man’s relationship to the body), who seems to speak of some as Ææ
،
F who behave as sightseers in the body. Although many Platonists, such as Cronius, Numenius, and Harpocration, seem to have insisted on a single cause of descent, namely evil (Iamb. Anim. 29 (380)), Alcin. Didasc. 25(178.33–9), with no suggestion of originality, offers four rather cryptic reasons (‘IæØŁ
f 
ıÆ’, by the ‘
ıºØ ŁH’; through IŒ
ºÆ Æ and through çغ
øÆ Æ). Iamblichus himself offered a hierarchy of three motives—voluntary descent for the salvation of the realm, reluctant but willing descent for the correction of one’s own character, and a dragging down by force for punishment (Anim. 29(380)). G.Nyss. Anim.Res. [PG 46.116c] declares it blasphemy to suggest any other reason to enter life than sin. 199 PsT 1.31.21–3; 1.55.25–6; cf. Orig. Princ. 1.7.4. The problem posed by the election of Jacob was already recognized by Paul (cf. Rom. 9:10–14) and his resort to the sovereignty of the divine will was hardly likely to quell serious debate. Philo relies on divine foreknowledge and anticipatory reward of later moral choice, Leg.All. 3.86 ff. Significantly, Origen does not see here just a proof text for a firm doctrine of pre-existence but rather an exegetical difficulty to be solved. And so he not only offers the notorious suggestion that this reflects ‘older reasons’ (Princ. 3.1.22; 2.9.7) but also that Jacob and John the Baptist were in fact angels sent in human form as ministers of salvation (Comm.Jn. 2.(31)186–92). 200 For Didymus’ understanding of the formation of the body between conception and birth, see PsT 5.329.24–8; HiobT 3.276.29–277.11. 196

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interest lies elsewhere. For him the key issue is a reading of the Exile as the apparent indiscriminate punishment of saint and sinner alike—the prophets clearly did not require punishment or purification through captivity but rather went as agents of God’s salvific work, condescending to the level of their countrymen in order to help them. And since I said that it is not necessary for Scripture to mean the problematic things about them literally: Israel was moved from Jerusalem to Babylon in a manner of captivity because they sinned. And Daniel and those three and Joshua son of Nun and Ezekiel and the rest of the Twelve Prophets were there, Haggai and Zechariah. These were not taken into Babylon by a way of captivity (
PŒ ÆNåƺø Æ æ ø fi ), but so that those condemned there might have a share of helpers and doctors. God condemns someone sparingly—that is, he does not allow him to be without a helper. He both sends out angels and makes holy men suffer evil and captivity not because of their own sins, but for the sake of the others’ salvation (
P Øa ±ÆæÆÆ ÆıH, Iººa B ¼ººø ŒÆ øÅæ Æ).201

Indeed, such is the repetition of this distinction of those who fell and those who descended voluntarily that one wonders whether some aspect of Didymus’ own situation had provoked it. One possibility is a context of persecution. Not only had the persecution of Diocletian fallen particularly hard on Alexandria in the years around Didymus’ birth202 but also there were repeated outbreaks of violence both between the different Christian, Greek, and Jewish communities and between Christian factions within the ‘Arian’ struggle.203 Certainly, the doctrinal issues surrounding endurance through persecution were still alive in Didymus’ mind204—the reputations of Peter and Pierius were both tarnished by flight, while the continuing Melitian presence meant an ongoing need for apologetics. Alternatively, one may see asceticism as posing questions about reward, physicality, and holiness which could not be answered

201 PsT 5.313.4–10; cf. PsT 5.315.7–16; ZachT 2.95.21–7 (2.8); HiobT 4.327.32–328.25; GenT 1.100.8–12. Although the entirety of HiobT portrays Job in this light, he is not introduced elsewhere, unlike Daniel, Haggai, Ezekiel, and the others. 202 Eus.Caes. H.E. 8.10; Chadwick (2001), 179–85. 203 Although the tendency of histories of the period is to focus on ecclesiastical disputes, particularly Athanasius’ exiles and returns, there were a significant number of riots and periods of protracted upheaval, whose roots were primarily sociological despite ostensible connection to shifts of power within Christian doctrinal disputes. Simmering tensions broke out into serious violence whenever imperial intervention in city or church administration allowed. Thus, 339 (Athan. Ep.Encycl. 3–4) and 373–4 (Thdt. H.E. 4.18–19) were particularly bad. Probably most significant for Didymus’ lifetime would have been the riots of 356, which continued to flare up until the murder of George of Cappadocia in 361 forced imperial intervention (Soz. H.E. 4.10, 30; 5.7; Athan. Hist.Ar. 55–6; Hist.Aceph. 2.3–10). On the shifting intercommunal alliances and social interaction between these groups throughout the fourth century, see Haas (1997), esp. 121–7, 278–330. 204 PsT 1.50.8–10; 2.82.4–7; 2.62.3–9; 3.209.28–31; 4.255.29–32; 5.324.7–10; cf. EcclT 2.89.13–15; 4.203.26–204.15; ZachT 2.158.7–159.14 (2.281–286); 3.391.1–12 (5.122–3).

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by looking towards purely spiritual blessings and an attitude of indifference to the earthly. These theodical arguments presuppose an individual moral narrative, but Didymus is reluctant to give this any specific form or content. His focus only tends to the cosmological when he is explaining some aspect of the doctrine of God, whether the ontology of virtue, creation, or theodicy. Most of the time his remit is precisely earthly and human, calling people to the virtue which constitutes participation in the divine and reformation according to the Image, rather than seeking to place individuals within a cosmic perspective. Whereas it may be argued that Valentinian myth uses allegory to generalize the particular, Didymus chiefly uses elevation (anagōgē) to appropriate both general truths and historical types to the individual.

The Pre-existence of Souls and the Priority of Virtue Although all these factors contribute to Didymus’ insistence on pre-existence, there is one other impetus which he himself cites as his overriding factor: only the pre-existence of the soul can guarantee the ontological priority of virtue over evil. A similar insistence upon the fact that virtue exists prior to evil is found in Origen and Evagrius;205 yet there is not the same explicit link between this and the pre-existence of the soul in their extant writings. However, the correlation is made much earlier by Philo, albeit in a completely negative sense: he must deny the priority of virtue precisely because there is no prior individual existence, and so he concedes that wickedness is chronologically older than virtue but its junior in power and rank;206 thus, Adam and Eve’s prelapsarian nakedness must be interpreted as a childlike lack of both virtue and vice.207 As so often in Didymus’ extant writings, the idea is only fully articulated once, but its presence is continually felt and so is worth quoting in full:208 And because human affairs did not begin from evil but from virtue (
PŒ I e ŒÆŒ Æ XæÆ
a ήa 
f IŁæ
ı, Iººa I e IæB), he says ‘To the recollection (IÅØ) of the Sabbath’ (Ps. 37:2). When someone becomes in virtue, he recalls that he was once in it (IÆØŒÆØ ‹Ø q
 K ÆPfi B). Further I wish to hint at a deep idea (ÆN ÆŁÆØ ÆŁf º ª
). If the origin (Iæåc) of men and of the soul were from this life (I e 
F 
F ÇB), evil is prior to virtue, and virtue is something acquired afterwards (IƺÅ c). We have a life which is with the body, we have a life also without this body. And the fact that 205

206 Orig. C.Cels. 6.53, 55; Evag. Ceph. 1.41; 2.86. Philo Sacr. 14–17. Philo Leg.All. 2.64; cf. 2.53. 208 Gesché (1962), 360–1, briefly discusses the passage but only attributes it to a conviction that material life was sinful. 207

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when we cast away the body, we become in an incorporeal life (K Iøø fi ÇøfiB) is in every wise clear. But let it be sought if that life was also before the body. It is not obvious, but let there be a speculative inquiry and let it be thought through (
hŒ KØ b çÆæ , Iººa ÇÅ Łø ŒÆd KÆÇŁø). So then, if the life of the rational one derives from material life (B Kº
ı ÇøB), evil is prior to virtue; for we see that having been fulfilled out of evil the word begins. But if, as is truly the case, virtue was prior to evil—for ‘God has made man straight, but they themselves sought out wicked reckonings’ (Eccl. 7:29). And see that the seeking of the wicked reckonings is after the straightness. And virtue causes straightness. ‘A man who is in honour does not abide, he passes away with the unthinking cattle’ (Ps. 48:13). He has not come into man from a cattle-like state (æ
ı), but has gone from a human state into a cattle-like one. And it is absolutely always the case that the fine things are prior to those which are blamed. It is necessary for a skill to exist before the misuse of that skill (åÅ æe ŒÆŒ
å Æ), mistaken knowledge is subsequent to correct knowledge; for how can we say at all that this man is mistaken, if we had not known what is correct? Therefore because of this ‘To the recollection of the Sabbath’. And since keeping the sabbath is living in virtue and living a way pleasing to God and serving by doing what God wants, the life of men began from virtue (I e IæB XæÆ
 H IŁæ ø Çø); but this is not apparent in the more bodily life (K fiB øÆØŒøæÆ fi ÇøfiB); for of the things with body virtue is something which is acquired, it is taught. Wherefore the one becoming in the fine thing recalls.209

I may appear to be making too much of one passage here, and some might suggest that the cautious language Didymus uses in introducing a connection between the ontological priority of virtue and the pre-existence of the soul means that this connection is one he makes after the fact, as it were, rather than undergirding his whole doctrine. However, a throwaway remark in the Lecture-Notes on Ecclesiastes suddenly makes sense in the light of this and proves that the connection was clear to Didymus and simply controversial for his audience. Doubtless at any rate some wish to think about virtue things which they also understand about evil-doing; for it has been said concerning evil-doing that, ‘It was not at the beginning and it will not last for ever’ (Wis. 14:13). For although this was said about idolatry and fornication, it is understood by way of synecdoche about all evil-doing. It is also said that, ‘Injustice deceived itself ’ (Ps. 26:12). The word ‘deceiving’ here means the same as when we say the earth deceives [i.e. disappoints by not delivering a crop], as corn, as vine. And some, namely those who believe in the co-sowing of the soul (
ƒ æd c ı
æa B łıåB å
), say that virtue is such: it did not subsist without the one acting (
PŒ çÅŒ ¼ı 
F Kæª
F
). But this is a lie; for it is in God and from there we draw it. So even if we ourselves lose it, the good is in God.210

209

PsT 4.259.16–31; cf. PsT 3.129.6–15.

210

EcclT 6.333.23–334.6.

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It is precisely those who insist upon the soul being contemporary with the body, that God ‘sows’ both together,211 who also believe virtue to be contingent upon a moral agent. The two errors are understood as connected and, by implication, so is the assertion of the ontological reality of virtue with the preexistence of the soul. The background here is complex and far removed from Origen’s extant references to pre-existence. Clearly the territory is Platonic, specifically the Phaedo, which presents the Theory of the Forms and the pre-existence of an immortal, immaterial soul as necessitating one another212 and experientially proven by the realization that all knowing is most truly a form of recollection.213 There can be little doubt that the combination of the same three elements in Didymus’ argument is hardly coincidence. However, there are some significant differences. First, Didymus does not make use of the Forms elsewhere; Virtue is a solitary exception.214 Similarly the recollection argument is only employed with regard to virtue, not other aspects of knowledge.215 Moroever, these arguments aim to secure not a purely metaphysical priority but an instantiated and experienced one—it is not so much about abstract Platonic Virtue216 as Aristotelian enactment.217 The motivation is a Christian one, namely the reconciliation of the metaphysical priority of goodness with his understanding of the biblical testimonia as indicting all men as sinful from birth. The ontology of virtue outlined above demands its priority and, for Didymus, this cannot be just metaphysically based in God, nor even generically rooted in the historical persons of Adam

211

Contrast Nemesius’ rebuttal of such theories without any reference to virtue but rather employing Ammonius’ insistence that every corporeal requires a principle that holds it together and that this must necessarily be incorporeal, Nat.Hom. 12. 212 Pl. Phaed. 76d–e. 213 e.g. Pl. Phaed. 74a–76c, where prior knowledge of the form of the Equal is deemed a precondition of recognizing examples of equality and yet is not recollected until the moment of reflection. The importance of this argument for pre-existence in antiquity is often underestimated—it is the grounds for acceptance at Nem. Nat.Hom. 14 and rejection at G.Nyss. Anim.Res. [PG 46.112c]; cf. Orig. Comm.Jn. 20.(7)52. 214 Although Didymus can speak of ‘the ideas/forms (NÆØ) and intentions (
ıºØ) written on the hands of God’ (PsT 3.140.11–12) which exist in Christ, since all things were created through him (PsT 3.140.12–19), this Middle Platonist identification of the Forms with the ‘thoughts of God’ which so appealed to Philo (on the development of this shift in the thought, see Dillon (1993), xxxv–xxxvii) has little impact on his thought and serves only to preserve God’s total sovereignty over the entire creative act. Contrast Orig. Princ. 1.4.4, whose primary intent was to preserve the immutability of God by asserting the co-eternity of creation, which Didymus specifically denies, ZachT 3.322.29–323.5 (4.178). 215 PsT 4.257.11–16; 4.259.16–31; cf. 1.54.17–20. 216 Plato himself makes no reference to a form of virtue and we should not be too quick to identify Didymean Virtue with his Good or Fine. 217 PsT 5.327.8–10.

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and Eve, but individually in each and every rational being:218 every noetic substance, every moral agent begins in virtue. This should be particularly true of humanity, as every human being, must have been created in the image of God, not just Adam, or else Didymus would be unable to use the language of image and likeness (Gen. 1:26) as his underlying narrative for the call to moral participation in God after the pattern of Christ. However, this is not the case when one examines either the nature of childhood or the biblical witnesses to birth such as Job 14:4. As will be explored in Chapter 10, Didymus’ precise understanding of original sin is complex, but it may be significant with regard to his belief in the pre-existence of souls that he takes notions of universal sinfulness more seriously than most of his Greek-speaking contemporaries. Something is needed to bridge this gap between metaphysics and experience. This is the role which the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul fulfils: it undergirds not just the uniqueness of the creative act and the justice of providence but the very reality of goodness. It is not primarily a corollary of the necessary immortality and eternity of the soul as a metaphysical subject but rather the rationale for the ontological priority of virtue. Virtue has been lost by the majority of human beings and the moral schema of human life as falling, rising, and standing firm219 applies not just to humanity as a whole but to individuals. Consequently, it is scarcely surprising that the idea is more widely felt in his writings than in those of Origen, where the motivation for his speculation is limited to the biblical aporiai and the need to justify the apparently unfair variety of embodiment.

218

Orphanos (1974), 83, notes the importance of this passage but does not place the same moral emphasis upon it. 219 ZachT 3.391.13–17 (5.124).

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6 The Call to Virtue Earlier commentators tended to see salvation in Didymus as correlated primarily to life in the Spirit, which is certainly an aspect of his dogmatic pneumatology in On the Holy Spirit.1 However, such a prioritization of life is probably truer of Cyril of Alexandria than Didymus.2 In fact, as we might now expect, Didymus locates the moment of salvation in the initial moral movement away from evil, the first decision of the will on its own authority to wish to be saved.3 This salvation must then be lived out or eschatologically extended through a series of progresses as a virtuous conformation to virtue. It is against this theological landscape that the Fall is construed as primarily a loss of virtue4—by eating the fruit, Adam does not gain the promised knowledge of good and evil but rather has his enacted virtue reduced to the mere potential of knowing.5 This is the nakedness which Adam seeks to hide,6 and it is being outside virtue which in itself constitutes the expulsion from Paradise rather than any subsequent separate punishment—to be outside virtue is necessarily to be outside God.7 Similarly, the reacquisition of virtue is no mere preparation for the Christian life but means, in and of itself, a participation in the godly, invisible, and supernatural mysteries,8 having God again9 and becoming a citizen of the heavenly Jerusalem whilst still in the body.10 This ontological and teleological reframing of virtue does not just represent a convenient answer to the sort of Manichaean challenges explored in Chapter 5.

1

2 Heston (1938), 13–14; Bardy (1910), 140–1. Keating (2004). 4 HiobT 1.60.25–31; cf. Orig. Hom.Lev. 9.8. PsT 3.156.17–28. 5 GenT 1.109.14–22. 6 GenT 1.83.1–7; 1.84.20–85.7. The possibility is briefly entertained by Philo Leg.All. 2.60, though throughout this passage he prefers to interpret this nakedness in a neutral sense as not the loss of virtue but a neutral state prior to virtue or vice (2.53–64). 7 GenT 1.87.2–22; HiobT 4.403.19–25; cf. PsT 2.83.19–20. Contrast the Philonic equation of the loss of virtue with death, particularly that of Cain, Leg.All. 1.105. 8 GenT 2.213.18–20. 9 GenT 2.161.24–6; PsT 2.101.25–7. 10 EcclT 1.39.3–8. Philo Leg.All. 3.1 already views virtue as the proper city of the wise. 3

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It introduces a significant shift of emphasis away from that of Origen and Clement, and one that is not necessarily taken even by seemingly supportive contemporary Origenists such as Evagrius. As Torjesen notes in her analysis of Origen’s exegesis of the Psalms, Origen’s own elevated reading applies them to the journey of the soul, which he sees as an educational transformation, one that is purificatory and imitative; by contrast, Eusebius of Caesarea understands this journey as essentially the freeing of the soul from the opposing powers and Didymus focuses on a return to virtue.11 I would argue that this new prioritization of virtue is no isolated feature but a paradigmatic shift—one which we may perhaps trace back to his break with Origen’s Trinitarian hierarchy and which results in a reframing of his anthropology, cosmology, and ontology, as well as his exhortation to Christian living. Virtue is no longer a mere preparatory stage, nor an authentication of one’s claims to illumination: it is the defining characteristic and goal of a humanity created in the image of God. One might suppose that this is a return to Philo. He certainly emphasizes the role of virtue to a greater degree than either Clement or Origen, and one can point to interesting parallels such as man being formed for virtue as the work most akin to himself,12 the portrayal of virtue as the Paradisial state,13 and virtue as both the means of fighting passions and the goal.14 However, his description of the war of the virtues and passions in On the Creation of the World15 and his consistent interpretation of Sarah as primary virtue and Isaac as happiness16 probably militate against reading these passages as a teleology of virtue. His focus is thus more on the tranquillity of mind, happiness, and spontaneous blessings that are subsequent to perfect virtue; though we should not interpose too great a conceptual divide, as this forms an aspect of Didymus’ account too as we shall in Chapter 7. Origen tends to portray God as more essentially mind, Wisdom as the primary conceptualization (epinoia) of the second person of the Trinity,17 and thus illumination as the more important dimension of the call to divinization.18 Although there is a danger of reading too much into the triadic hierarchy he finds in the progression of the Solomonic books of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs from purgation to illumination to union or from ethics to physics to epoptics,19 virtue as a category tends to be limited to these lower levels.20 Didymus, while maintaining this reading of the Wisdom books (thus indicating that this is but a shift of emphasis rather than a sea 11 Torjesen (1982a), 951–4. Nonetheless, the proximity of all such paradigms is evident in the contrast with Augustine, who operates within a very different framework and reads the same Psalms as a lamentation on human weakness. 12 13 14 Philo Leg.All. 1.47. Philo Leg.All. 1.53–8. Philo Leg.All. 3.14–19. 15 16 17 Philo Opif. 81. e.g. Philo Leg.All. 3.218. Orig. Comm.Jn. 1.(21)125 ff. 18 19 Orig. Princ. 1.1.5–7, 9. Orig. Comm.Cant. prol. [Baehrens 74–9]. 20 Orig. Hom.Num. 27.12; cf. Hom.Cant. 2.6.

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change),21 seems to construe all three stages as dimensions of the growth in virtue: one progresses from the avoidance of evil to virtuous action and finally virtuous being—a unitary state which unifies one with all other perfect beings and the Godhead.22 Enlightenment can be subsumed within virtue;23 true virtue is union with God.24 By speaking of the perfection of virtue as an absolute end and goal of creation,25 which culminates in eternal praise26 and union with God, Didymus ensures that virtue in no sense becomes merely a means to an end. The difference is brought out well by a comparison of both thinkers’ treatment of the Delphic injunction ‘Know thyself ’.27 In his Commentary on the Song of Songs, Origen discusses the Solomonic anticipation of the proverb (Song 1:8) at some length.28 Virtue plays a significant role but only in the first and lower sense as the soul regards her affections and actions. This is rapidly transcended by knowledge, which moves from an understanding of God’s creation befitting those progressing to its supreme function, namely knowledge of the Trinity (probably restricted to the perfect). Didymus’ comments by contrast are rather bald, but entirely directed towards virtue: Doubtless at any rate men have directed ten thousand thoughts to that proverb which says, ‘Know yourself ’. It is a single saying, it is short but its meaning is manifold. The one who knows himself, knows that he is begotten and knows that his nature is directed towards the acquisition of virtue (
çıŒ
æe IºÅłØ Iæ B).29

It is not that he abandons Origen’s concept of progress in knowledge. Indeed many of the stages of knowledge that Origen lists are precisely those explored in the rambling exegeses of the Toura works: the corporeality of the soul, its structure, origins, and its relationship to the body; the state of any future embodiment; and the nature of the rational spirits. Similarly, Didymus can speak of an advance in doctrines from the virgin birth, to the incarnation, leading to the doctrine of the Son, and ultimately to the Trinity.30 However, in parallel with Gregory of Nyssa and in sharp distinction from Evagrius, virtue becomes the primary category. In this sense, in parallel to his hierarchical understanding of the universe, prioritizing the invisible creation over the physical, the noumenal over the 21

EcclT 1.5.30–6.23. Indeed, EcclT 3.165.20–3 can still maintain that rationality is the defining characteristic of mankind. 22 23 HiobT 3.224.3–22. PsT 5.311.5–7; EcclT 1.36.26–7. 24 PsT 3.197.3–8; 4.279.23–6. 25 PsT 4.230.27–30. 26 ZachT 3.407.31–408.15 (5.186–7). 27 This saying had considerable status within Christian thought and is given by Cyril of Jerusalem as second only to the nine points of his Creed, Cat. 4.18; cf. Ant.Aeg. Ep. 4.9–12. 28 Orig. Comm.Cant.2 [Baehrens 142–5]. 29 30 EcclT 4.238.6–10. ZachT 2.230.6–11 (3.177); cf. ZachT 2.99.17–24 (2.24).

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phenomenal, virtue must be an interior quality rather than an external one, and growth in virtue is fundamentally portrayed as its interiorization and essential identification with the self. Didymus frequently quotes the text ‘Pursue the just thing justly’ (Deut. 16:20) but he assumes that its sense goes beyond simply achieving a virtuous end by virtuous means and includes a change of essence.31 The originally Stoic conception that there is no intermediate state between good and evil,32 combined with his Aristotelian view of potential and enaction,33 provides the grounds for stating (albeit not as insistently as Gregory of Nyssa)34 that there can be no standing still in virtue: at all times either virtue or vice is being enacted by an agent, with its opposite limited to a potential state; the two cannot be enacted simultaneously, nor can both be merely potential.35 Virtue and knowledge belong to the class of things which must be enacted, they have their being in being actualised (K fiH KæªE ŁÆØ åØ e r [ÆØ]).36

Whether or not this focus can be derived from his broad anti-Eunomian apophaticism or his context as a teacher of ascetics, a large swathe of Didymus’ exegetical exhortations comprise the need appropriately to recognize the providential condescension of God, so that one might progress to an ever more perfect and integrated enacted disposition of virtue. It is only the active mercy of God in condescending towards us like a teacher from his immutable and unalterable majesty which can offer a beginning of understanding, that is the knowledge of the works of providence which brings about the virtuous good.37 Although Didymus does not straightforwardly equate the main sense of Ecclesiastes with learning virtue in the way Gregory of Nyssa’s Homilies do,38 he reads its significance in teaching the nature of things (ta phusika) rather differently from Evagrius’ Scholia. In considering the true nature of the world, the crucial lesson is not simply its vanity in relation to the transcendent but the fact that all sense-perceptible realities (aisthēta) are administered by the providence of God.39 Suffering, no matter

31 ZachT 2.123.22–124.6 (2.139–40); 2.183.16–23 (3.7); PsT 3.155.28–156.1; cf. Orig. Comm. Jn. 28.(13)101–3. 32 PsT 3.199.6–9; 1.22.1–2; 2.84.2–5; cf. SVF 1.566; Philo Ebr. 7; Orig. Comm.Jn. 19.(21)139; 20.(14)112. 33 PsT 3.159.1–14; Arist. Met. 9.1045b26–1052a11. 34 G.Nyss. Vit.Mos.1.5–6. 35 EcclT 2.67.16–26; cf. Orig. In Ps. 118.128 [PG 12.1616b]; Alviar (1993), 96–7. 36 PsT 5.327.9–10. When one adds to this Didymus’ views on the nature of the mind as perpetual movement (ZachT 1.10.5–6 (1.43), ideas of perfection as a total orientation of self rather than a concrete action (PsT 1.51.3–7), and the vast gulf between human and divine perfection (HiobT 3.295.19–33; 3.245.28–246.14), we may seem to be on the cusp of ideas of infinite progress akin to those of Gregory of Nyssa. 37 38 PsT 5.327.21–328.4. G.Nyss. Hom.Eccl. 1 [Alexander 279.20–280.2]. 39 EcclT 1.6.24–8.

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how seemingly incomprehensible,40 does not reveal the hand of chance or a harsh uncaring fate but rather the purposeful educative punishment of God.41 His threats are not signs of his anger but of his philanthropy, since they show that the causal relationship between sin and suffering can be broken by repentance and a return to virtue.42 The parallels with the later works of Gregory of Nyssa43 are suggestive, and it is perhaps time to stop viewing Gregory as something of a lone voice and rather place the two within the broader stream I have been styling ‘virtueOrigenism’. Didymus does not seem to go as far as proposing an identification of virtue with the divine being,44 but the similarities are remarkable. What is more difficult to determine is whether this is the result of a direct influence of one theologian on the other or rather a characteristic result of the ‘Nicene’ flattening of Origen’s hierarchical models of intra-Trinitarian relationships. Regardless, the result for Didymus is that true virtue resides in intentionality:45 there is no virtue in an apparently virtuous action if done for the sake of reputation;46 necessity cannot force goodness;47 any action carried out without the appropriate reckoning is imperfect, even if its completion is perfect.48 Consequently, Didymus can consistently distinguish between levels of response as levels of virtue, and these can be linked to the levels of biblical exegesis: Those thoughts ( Ø) which achieve something agricultural, which plough the earth, which irrigate it, which walk on the plants which have sprung up because of an agricultural purpose—they are ‘cattle’ (cf. 1 Cor. 9:7–11). But as many as have stability (P ŁØÆ) and gentleness (
æÆ Å Æ), though without reason, these are ‘sheep’ which ‘hear only the voice of Jesus’ (John 10:3, 27). They only hear the Scriptures.49

This ties into a broader dynamic of progress which is conveyed via a series of traditional hermeneutical keys. Whereas for Evagrius the stages are fairly clearly demarcated, with two triadic movements from quiet (hēsuchia) to ascetic disciplining of the lower soul to passionlessness (apatheia), then 40

EcclT 3.194.19–195.9; PsT 4.90.4–7. HiobT 3.267.14–17; 4.368.29–370.5; PsT 1.27.8–11; 5.310.3–7. 42 GenT 2.171.1–6; 2.186.9–20. God even hides his goodness from the small who fear him so as to save them by any means, PsT 3.151.27–152.3. 43 Cf. Meredith (1995), 59–61; Konstantinou (1966). The key works are the De Perfectione and De Vita Moysis. 44 G.Nyss. Hom.Eccl. 7 [Alexander 406.17–407.5]; Hom.Cant. 3 [Langerbeck 89–90]; Virg. 17 [Cavarnos 314.24–6]. 45 PsT 3.195.22–9. 46 EcclT 3.196.12–197.9. Didymus does not so much intend a mere exhortation against hypocrisy as the ancient view that virtue must be pursued for its own sake, e.g. Philo Leg.All. 3.167–8. 47 48 GenT 2.172.1–2. GenT 2.179.13–14. 49 EcclT 1.38.16–20; cf. HiobT 1.1.25–2.5; PsT 3.210.22–32. 41

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from contemplation of the logoi to contemplation of intelligible beings to knowledge of God,50 Didymus, like Gregory of Nyssa, seems to describe the fact of ascent in virtue more than its topography.51 The key image is that of the tent, which is taken as implying a plurality, a temporary nature, and above all movement, and is often contrasted with the permanence and singularity of dwelling in a house;52 but there is also a series of steps crushing the Devil,53 of flights of the dove,54 of gradations of movement to and away from God,55 as one changes from one disposition to another;56 a shift from the fleshly to the spiritual,57 from the earthly to the heavenly.58 The image of the ‘sun of righteousness’ (Mal. 3:20) sustains an entire spiritual chronology in terms of the soul’s moral growth59 and progress in illumination;60 while even the notion of the spiritual senses supposes a progressive reawakening.61 Wherever a distinction is made within the biblical text, some sense of progress is understood as implicit, particularly in one’s relationship with God:62 water versus wine;63 eating grass, as opposed to the meat which is the flesh of Jesus;64 cattle who are taught by the voice of Jesus compared with men who receive salvation from God.65 Although God does not change as one’s understanding of him and participation in him through virtue and wisdom increase, one moves from knowing Jesus according to the flesh, to knowing him as only-begotten, to understanding that to see the Son is to see the Father.66 The dynamic range is of a movement into, and a deepening participation in, a virtue that is real, never merely subjective nor relative—‘what is good is to be chosen, even if no one chooses it’,67 and those who offered sacrifice during persecution could not negate their action by merely withholding their intention as they thought.68 Faith is not an abstract alternative to virtue, since as a ‘naked opinion’ it can coexist with sin.69 Yet, at the same time, this character

50 Sinkewicz (2003), xxii–xxxvi; cf. Keating (2004), 192 on Cyril of Alexandria’s dynamic ascent through justification, to sanctification, then to adoptive sonship, to participation in the Spirit, and ultimately to communion in the divine nature. 51 Cf. Heine (1975), 101–8, on Nyssen. 52 HiobT 2.149.25–150.4; PsT 2.58.9–15; 2.96.16–18; 5.299.23–5. 53 54 GenT 1.99.23–8. GenT 2.197.10–17. 55 56 GenT 1.88.8–17. PsT 3.197.1–2. 57 ZachT 3.392.11–19 (5.127); cf. a change from a soulish to a spiritual body, ZachT 3.334.9–11 (4.224); In 1 Cor. 15.44–6 [Staab 10.24–35]. 58 59 GenT 2.210.4–7. PsT 2.57.5–10; ZachT 2.157.2–9 (2.276). 60 ZachT 1.74.8–20 (1.328–9); PsT 3.202.5–16; 1.13.2–14.4; HiobT 2.153.26–154.30. 61 62 ZachT 2.236.13–18 (3.203). Cf. PsT 2.101.22–4. 63 64 65 PsT 2.58.18–22. PsT 2.57.25–8. ZachT 1.27.20–28.5 (1.121–2). 66 PsT 3.131.7–15; cf. the shift from rejoicing in God as saviour, benefactor, and general to rejoicing in him as wisdom, holiness, and righteousness, PsT 3.211.5–7. 67 HiobT 2.146.26–7; cf. PsT 1.9.15–16; 3.222.18–27; 2.82.21–4; EcclT 4.234.6–10. 68 69 PsT 5.324.7–10. IoT 11.31–5.

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ethic demands a change of being or self: virtue must be brought into the ordering principle of the self (to hēgemonikon);70 bravery is only really praiseworthy when it is a state of being rather than a temporary disposition directed at something in particular.71 Hence, the moral life is ultimately directed towards becoming—becoming the love of God, the righteousness of God.72 One aspect of this is the ontological anchoring of virtue in the Godhead, though without a precise identification of the two,73 which we explored in Chapter 5, but we may also observe that the potential for and impetus to virtue become equally important aspects of Didymus’ anthropology.

POTENTIAL F OR VIRTUE Potential for virtue demands free will, and Didymus readily asserts the freedom of all humanity at all times to choose either good or evil.74 This is a central tenet of Didymus’ thought, as of Origen’s before him, and it is disappointing to see how rarely a case is made to support it. His basic arguments are that the giving of laws implies a capacity to obey75 and that virtue would be meaningless without freedom of choice.76 One’s capacity to will a virtuous action can be limited by the consequences of previous choices, as in the case of the involuntary consequences of a voluntary drunkenness,77 and so Didymus restates Origen’s principle of habituation, which is basically a character ethic. So when someone has room for repentance, he is a ‘vessel of clay’ (cf. Jer. 18:1–6) which is able to be remoulded, to be reshaped. But whenever someone has a certainty in habit (ÆØ Å Æ åfiB K Ø) which is almost infallible ( åe IØÆ
 ø fi ) or hard to change (ı  Æ
 ø fi ), then he is a ‘fired pot’.78

However, it is a key point of Didymus’ exhortation that no matter how habituated to evil one becomes, there is always the possibility of repentance and a return to virtue.79 Thus, evil can be said to cause spiritual sterility, but its

70

GenT 2.228.19–22; cf. PsT 4.246.12–15. 72 73 EcclT 3.151.2–18. PsT 3.205.13–20. EcclT 6.334.5–6. 74 ZachT 2.133.21–135.15 (2.178–85); PsT 1.12.2–3; 3.199.9–17; 4.251.36–252.1. 75 PsT 2.77.24–78.4; ZachT 2.133.5–20 (2.176–7). 76 GenT 2.167.18–23; 2.172.1–2; PsT 1.37.19–21; cf. HiobT 1.1.25–2.5; GenT 1.75.14–25— only what is in our power can be praiseworthy or blameworthy. The argument from praise and blame is found in Orig. Princ. 1.5.2. Contrast the longer and more detailed treatment of Nem. Nat.Hom. 56 ff.; cf. Sharples (1983). 77 78 EcclT 5.296.12–18. EcclT 6.344.2–5; cf. EcclT 4.217.10–18. 79 HiobT 4.369.5–9; 4.373.5–21; ZachT 2.147.3–11 (2.233); cf. PsT 3.199.29–32; EcclT 4.226.25–6. 71

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effects are not irreversible.80 The reception of grace is in the authority of one’s own purposive choice,81 and on Didymus’ understanding of Luke 17:21, the impetus to virtue is irrevocably implanted in humanity (if not the entire rational creation). Thus, in commenting upon Job 14:8–9, he can baldly state: He still has an expectation of repentance (
æ  ŒÆ  Æ Æ), even if his trunk—clearly that of man—dies on the rock. For even if sin slams against the soul so that it causes its death and drags it down from the height of virtue—which the trunk represents—, nevertheless it does not cut off the propensity to virtue ( c N Iæ c K
Ø ÅØ Å Æ), as the Lord demonstrated when he said: ‘The kingdom of God is within you’ (Luke 17:21), indicating the indwelling power ( c KŒØÅ ÆØ), which very notion the present reading also teaches.82

As one should already be coming to expect, Didymus does not offer a straightforward explanation of this ‘indwelling power’ but, rather, consistently restates the principle in terms of three points of departure: those of the implanting of common ideas, the existence of conscience, and creation according to the image of God.

Common Ideas In the Commentary on Genesis in particular, Didymus employs the Stoic vocabulary of ‘common ideas’ (koinai ennoiai)83 which exist universally in all people irrespective of their temporal or geographical relationship to the revelation contained in the sojournings of the Word, culminating in the incarnation. They are one of the two sources of revelation,84 represented by the division of the light and darkness in the Genesis account,85 and thus fulfil Didymus’ theological demand that the timeless86 and unchanging87 God should be always revealing himself.88 Generally, the content of this revelation seems to amount to the discernment of good and evil89 or the recognition of 80

EcclT 6.321.10–22. GenT 2.162.5–6. Didymus’ approach to grace and human freedom is not dissimilar to that found in Gregory of Nyssa; cf. Harrison (1992). 82 HiobT 4.370.16–31. 83 SVF 2.154.29–30; Orig. C.Cels. 8.52. Antiochus seems to have equated the Stoic concept to the Platonic Forms (Cic. Acad.Post. 30 ff.; Fin. 5.43) and later Platonists go on to situate these cosmological blueprints within the mind of the Demiurge and read this back into Plato (Alcin. Didasc. 4(155.20–156.22)). Although, Didymus does refer to the NÆØ or ºª Ø of creation in Christ (PsT 3.140.7–19), which seem to equate to the blueprint function of the Forms in the Timaeus, his appropriation of the language of common ideas is rather different, as the rest of this section makes clear, since these are an act of mercy and part of the postlapsarian economy of salvation. 84 85 86 PsT 1.1.1–2. GenT 1.10.A1–4. GenT 2.145.22–8; 1.34.2. 87 88 HiobT 4.352.24–5; PsT 1.1.1–2. PsT 1.3.24–8; cf. ZachT 2.182.8–15 (3.1). 89 GenT 1.10.A1–3. 81

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God as both creator and providential orderer of creation, which leads to reverence and fear,90 but it is also equivalent to the correct understanding of the whole of the Law. For, in one sense, the special revelation, the giving of the Law, does not add anything and no one is left with an excuse.91 The role of the written Law is to help recall the internal (endiathetos) law.92 Nonetheless, Didymus can distinguish between lawlessness and transgression, with the latter a far more serious offence.93 In this context the importance of his appropriation of this idea is not so much to allow an alternative route to faith and virtue,94 nor even to enlist philosophy as the handmaid of theology,95 but rather to set inside all mankind a potential for virtue. The law is set in Adam’s mind so that by discovering virtue within his own being he might advance to the divine life.96 He did not cast [Adam] out in such a way as to be entirely elsewhere – it says, ‘And he made him dwell opposite paradise’ (Gen. 3:24), for God still cares for him and does not forbid him dwelling there. Rather he made him dwell there lawfully ( ø), as has been said before, instilling in him an understanding ( ØÆ) of the laws which forbid evil, which is an introduction to virtue (N ƪøªc F IªÆŁ F), and he did not hide paradise from him. For he did not take the knowledge of what is fine ( c ªH Ø F ŒÆº F) away from him, nor implant in him a forgetfulness of the virtue (º ŁÅ B Iæ B) by which he lived in paradise.97

Moreover this potential is not intrinsic to human nature but rather a gift, or more properly a loan which must be repaid by virtuous action.98 The Word is immanent in the common understandings99 and so they are an act of mercy. So since [Adam and Eve] left him through the transgression (Øa B
ÆæÆ ø), he too has become far away from them, and yet because of his own goodness ( c NÆ IªÆŁ Å Æ) ‘he walks around’ (Gen. 3:8), providing a sense-perception (ÆY ŁÅ Ø), as has been said, in the form of the common ideas (ŒÆ a a Œ Øa K Æ), so that they might turn back to him.100

90

91 EcclT 2.88.25–89.15; GenT 1.85.1–7. GenT 2.183.9–15. EcclT 2.88.25–9. On the sequence of calls to salvation consisting of the common understandings, patriarchs, laws, prophets, Lord, and apostles, see GenT 1.115.15–21. 93 PsT 2.78.23–30; 3.158.3–159.1. 94 Didymus occasionally speaks in these terms of a wisdom according to the Œ Ø d K ÆØ (EcclT 5.276.12–19) or a wisdom ŒÆ a ç Ø (EcclT 5.277.2–6); cf. Clement’s language of divine inspiration sown in all, Strom. 5.(13)87.1–4. However, this is probably to be distinguished from ‘human’ knowledge which is typically denounced as earthly, soulish, and demonic, EcclT 1.33.27–30. 95 Rather Greek philosophy is usually portrayed in close association with pseudonymous knowledge, ZachT 2.233.15–20 (3.192); EcclT 3.158.6–8; 4.227.20–228.2. Contrast Clem.Alex. Strom. 1.(5)32.1–4; cf. Lilla (1971), 9–59; Behr (2000), 148–9; and Philo’s determination to trace Hellenic ideas back to Moses, Quaest.Gen. 4.167; 3.16; Post.Cain. 133. 96 97 98 GenT 1.112.15–20. GenT 1.112.24–113.5. PsT 4.251.8–13. 99 100 GenT 1.125.11–13. GenT 1.87.18–22. 92

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They are not the whole of virtue or of spiritual knowledge, and great emphasis is placed on the superiority of the higher Christian truths,101 but they do represent the correct starting point and, above all, a starting point universally accessible.102 Although the Fall entails a loss of virtue, not everything is forgotten.103

Conscience Many of Didymus’ references to conscience are traditional and go little further than an association with freedom of speech, often through 1 John 3:21, which relates conscience to the heart or mind104 (though 1 Cor. 4:4 functions to limit this perception of virtue relative to God, since even perfect human virtue can only ever be accidental105). However, he does occasionally give the sense of not a human faculty but God being present to human understanding,106 and offers a sense of interplay between this and the common ideas.107 In his most extended extant consideration, Didymus struggles to identify the precise nature of conscience. So if the Saviour was the king whom one should not curse in one’s conscience and also the rich man whom one should not curse in the inner chambers (cf. Eccl. 10:20), in a parallel sense, the conscience ( ıÅ Ø) and the bed of the heart are the same thing. But if the word ‘king’ indicates someone greater and surpassing the other, while ‘rich man’ indicates a lesser . . . , then the conscience is something greater than the bed of the heart. In some way the heart is the human reckoning (º ªØ e IŁæ
Ø ), while conscience is the angel married to the soul by God: ‘with the conscience testifying as well in spirit’ (Rom. 9:1/2:15108). And if it testifies as well as the reckonings, then it is different from them.109

The overall function is on one level accusatory: the conscience or angel or perhaps even the participation in the Holy Spirit prosecutes the soul before 101

PsT 4.279.3–14; 5.332.4–8; HiobT 3.300.10–301.1; EcclT 1.15.32–16.2. 103 PsT 2.79.13–21. GenT 1.113.4–5; cf. HiobT 3.257.4–15. 104 PsT 2.90.27–91.2; 1.46.19–22; 2.74.20–4; 3.204.5–7; GenT 1.92.16–22; HiobT 3.264.17–32; 3.251.17–31; 4.339.19–33. On the function of conscience within the thought of Origen and Augustine, see Stelzenberger (1963); Stelzenberger (1959). 105 HiobT 4.341.5–342.6. 106 GenT 1.95.16–18; cf. Origen’s portrayal of conscience as something transcendent, rather than immanent as in Stoicism, Stelzenberger (1963), 39. 107 GenT 1.125.11–13. 108 Gronewald EcclT V, 160–1, is quick to correct Didymus’ curious citation of Rom. 9:1 to the more appropriate Rom. 2:15 by deleting ‘in spirit’ but it seems to me that the confusion is in Didymus’ own mind and significant, explaining his introduction of 1 John 5:6 and his dilemma as to whether this is a kind of angel or the Holy Spirit; cf. EcclT 5.315.16–21. 109 EcclT 5.315.2–9. 102

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God, but it does so in its own defence, just like Moses explaining that he did not omit telling the people any of the things he heard.110 Thus, whatever conscience is, it is God-given and external to man’s nature; and it plays a role in attempting to educate man in virtue as well as registering his failure in attaining to it. It is not judge or judgement, may even be subject to judgement itself, but is intimately involved in the judgement of the individual. However, when we look to Didymus’ general views on the nature of judgement, the picture is not that of a courtroom judge weighing merits against offences but rather the experience of the same reality in different manners according to the moral status and being of the individual.111 Consequently, we should seek to understand it in the broad framework of Didymus’ thought as an aspect of both human potential for virtue and encouragement to enact it. This correspondence to man’s capacity for virtue is present implicitly elsewhere: repentance is a cleansing of conscience as much as an uncovering of the divine image according to which man was created;112 and as with the common ideas, conscience and the resulting shame at sin committed are not intrinsic to humanity but an aspect of divine mercy and part of the restoration to virtue.113

Image It is no surprise to see the concept of creation according to the image making a substantial impact on the thought of a follower of Origen, but whereas in the earlier Alexandrian’s thought the main emphasis is in the dynamic tension between creation in the image and calling into the likeness of God,114 in Didymus the notion of competing images revealing the character of a man comes to the fore. Didymus does at times assert a sense of movement or progress from an initial image to perfect likeness, particularly in his Commentary on Genesis.115 However, contrary to Solari’s view, this does not dominate his thought in the way Crouzel and Alviar have argued for in Origen;116 and Didymus’ willingness to repeat Origen’s exegesis of Gen. 1:26 without maintaining the consequences of an incomplete initial creation is typical of such 110

EcclT 5.315.10–16. EcclT 2.91.17–92.15; HiobT 3.252.1–253.3. Contrast the forensic model in J.Chrys.; cf. Layton (2004), 101. 112 ZachT 3.348.1–7 (4.282); cf. GenT 1.59.19–24. In Philo Det. 146 conscience can be lost like the Image. 113 GenT 1.83.1–7. 114 Orig. Princ. 3.6.1; cf. Lilla (1971), 108–9; and Behr (2000), 139–41 on Clement’s earlier use of this dynamic (Paed. 1.(12)98.3; Strom. 2.(22)131.2–136.6). 115 GenT 1.58.16–59.5. 116 Solari (1999), 72–3: ‘This distinction becomes the foundation for the entire enterprise of the moral life.’ Cf. Alviar (1993), 18–37 and Crouzel (1956), 217–45 on Origen. 111

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fourth-century readers of Origen as Athanasius and Basil. Thus, he can speak in a loose way about souls as a noetic substance created in the image and likeness of God117 and often implies that likeness was given at the same time as the image and must be equally guarded or uncovered.118 For Didymus the primary hermeneutical key is not so much Gen. 1:26–7 as Psalm 38:7 (‘man journeys in an image’). As a rational being, man always acts upon some reason, whether appropriate or not, and this motivation or purpose is the image in which they walk.119 All mankind exists according to an internal image which is principally either earthly or heavenly but can be categorized according to certain animal stereotypes or indeed the image of man or God.120 This image is not fixed but is rather indicative of free will and changes to reflect best the purposive choices of the individual.121 This concept of the ‘characteristic image’, which one might view as a reification of moral character, unlocks a whole host of apparently metaphorical biblical texts, both those which are generally read as ethical and those which are not.122 Although based on traditional metaphors associating particular characteristics with animals, such as dogs with prostitution and licentiousness, most Didymean references seem to presuppose a deeper spiritual reality.123 Animal images are given the same ontological depth as creation according to the image of God precisely because of the linguistic identity and Didymus’ assumptions about the integrity of the spiritual authorship of Scripture. Being human thus has a moral and metaphysical dimension as well as a purely biological one, and the hermeneutic of the ‘characteristic image’ is used to underpin Didymus’ interpretation of apparently superfluous references to ‘man’ and also to explain how Scripture can speak of the immortal soul as dying, for it does not die in any absolute sense but rather dies to various bestial

117 ZachT 2.270.18–24 (3.314); PsT 3.152.28–32. The move could be understood as a return to Philo, who generally saw the terms as synonyms (Opif. 71), and is paralleled in Gregory of Nyssa (Hom.Opif. 4 [PG 44.136b–d]; cf. Meredith (1989), 39–41). 118 EcclT 6.331.16–332.3; ZachT 2.215.5–7 (3.122). Cf. Layton (2004), 95: ‘While clearly descendent from this line of thought [Clement and Origen’s], Didymus’ depiction of human capacity does not depend upon the distinction between image and likeness; it is implicit within the definition of the image itself.’ 119 120 PsT 4.276.11–277.9. PsT 4.276.13–18. 121 PsT 4.276.15–16; ZachT 3.361.13–22 (5.18). 122 ZachT 2.170.2–6 (2.327); 3.397.17–401.7 (5.142–54); HiobT 1.101.6–103.27; cf. Crouzel (1956), 181–215, on Origen; Evag. Ep. ad Mel. 9. 123 PsT 1.38.13–20; ZachT 3.276.20–277.13 (4.8–9); 3.413.18–23 (5.211); contrast the more metaphorical HiobT 4.333.20–334.16. The same ambivalence is already evident in Origen (contrast the metaphor of Dial. 12–13 with Princ. 3.4.3), but Didymus employs this realistic sense far more frequently and consistently.

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states as it progresses towards virtue, which is being properly human or in the image of God: So ‘And if the man lives for many years, he will delight in them’ (Eccl. 11:8)—that is if he acts in this way as a man, if he does not become ‘comparable to cattle’ (Ps. 48:13), nor a ‘mare-mad horse’ (Jer. 5:8), or ‘lacking in understanding like a mule’ (Ps. 31:9).124 The direction of his free-will sometimes draws him into a beastly character, sometimes into a divine state. And if he undergoes many changes, he endures many deaths—and insofar as they are to the better they are praiseworthy deaths but insofar as they are for the worse, they are worthless and to be censured.125

A misreading of texts like this may well be responsible for anti-Origenist allegations of metempsychosis126 but a physical reincarnation is specifically rejected: ‘And may the Lord not seek it again’ (Job 3:4). For it was fitting for the saint to pray that he might drive the rational things towards virtue and no longer suffer a fall to a worse state (K
d åæ Æ ŒÆ [] Æ Ø)—for it would not be to the same— as those introducing a change of bodies (  ø ø Ø) suppose.127

Although Didymus can utilize more traditional ideas such as linking the image of Gen. 1:26 to man’s capacity for particular non-physical activities of the Trinity such as ruling,128 he generally interprets the language of divine image within the framework of the ‘characteristic image’ outlined above.129 Mankind’s purpose and destiny is to act from a divine purposive choice, through participation in the divine being—this is being created according to the image. Occasionally Didymus speaks of the divine image as being lost or replaced by that of the earthly or choic130—a concept which would play its part in Epiphanius’ condemnation of Origenism.131 The logic derives from a traditional

124

125 EcclT 6.332.1–3. EcclT 2.101.24–8. For Christians the suggestion that a once human soul might transmigrate into an animal body was particularly abhorrent, whilst transmigration from human to human had at least to be entertained on the basis of John the Baptist’s identification with Elijah; cf. Edwards (2002), 97–101. Even among Platonists there was a disagreement as to whether Plato was to be understood literally or figuratively on transmigration into beasts; cf. Nem. Nat.Hom. 18. 127 HiobT 1.59.22–9. Any apparent ambiguity here is resolved by In Iob 10.21 [PG 39.1145d]: ‘And this teaches a very fine doctrine, that whoever has departed life once returns (K
ÆÆ æçØ) no more to this life (N  e  ), as those who marvel about transmigration of bodies (  øÆ  Ø) say in their myths.’ It is hard to know whether Evagrius’ comments (Ceph. 1.24; 2.25, 49; 3.78; 5.11), should be interpreted in similar vein or did indeed imply a corporeal change over a succession of worlds; cf. Guillaumont (1962), 106–8, 114–16. 128 129 GenT 1.57.9–25. EcclT 2.101.22–102.2. 130 GenT 2.193.15–19. Chous is literally the nature, substance, or material substrate in bodily existence, that which is receptive of qualities and contributed by the father in conception (EcclT 2.103.5–12), but ‘choic’ more usually implies the demonic and immoral. 131 e.g. Epiph. Ep. ad Jn.Jer. [=Jer. Ep. 51]. The issue does not appear to have been raised prior to 394 and so may well indicate the specifically Evagrian emphasis on the image as incorporeal unity itself (Ep. ad Mel. 3–6; Ceph. 6.34), especially as Epiphanius has Rufinus and Palladius in his sights at the time; on the shifting charges, see Dechow (1988), 243–71. 126

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insistence on the fact that only the Son is substantially the image of God, whereas all others accidentally participate in this through the Son’s intermediation;132 and from his more novel equivalence between image and habitual purposive choice. Thus, it would seem to make sense that images would change rather than coexist in conflict.133 Nevertheless, he generally prefers language of veiling,134 suggesting that the image of God remains present to all, even though he would quantitatively distinguish those in whom this is actually visible, since they have guarded this image properly.135 So too this being ‘in the image’ (Gen. 1:27), as long as it is not drowned out (K
Øåı ÆØ), bears the honour (IÆ) of the first fashioning ( B
æ Å ÅØ ıæªÆ), but whenever evil and depravity are heaped up, it needs sweeping, in the sense of what was said in the Gospel (cf. Luke 15:8)—that is the word of repentance—in order that having peeled back the overlying mist ( c K
ØŒØÅ Iåºf) we might reveal the marks of the image ( f 
ı B NŒ ).136

This idea of at least a double image—a ‘characteristic’ one which is active, a teleological one which is veiled—representing a double moral character does in fact make a deeper sense of Didymus’ understanding of free will and the purposive choices which manifest it. For although free will is construed as the freedom to choose either good or evil,137 it is not ambivalent or ambiguous. It was given precisely so that man might choose the good.138 There is an inherent directedness as well as an accidental choice of direction. The same is true on an ontological level: virtue and sin are not equal choices but rather an acceptance or rejection of what actually is. The face of the inner man,139 which is the vocabulary Didymus usually employs to locate the image (in that it is immaterial and does not belong to man as a synthesis140) is hidden by ignorance and sin.141 Shame at the loss of virtue veils it rather than destroys it.142 Insofar as the divine image cannot be destroyed, it serves not just as a moral indicator143 but an active principle, the 132

GenT 1.58.3–16; cf. Orig. Hom.Gen. 1.13; C.Cels. 6.66. Didymus does in fact allow for the ready coexistence of multiple bestial images in a single person, EcclT 4.232.8–22; but this is really a product of his understanding of unity and multiplicity as essentially moral phenomena, PsT 4.277.5–9. 134 In 2 Cor. 2.15 [Staab 20.4–24]. The same ambiguity is already present in Origen; cf. Princ. 4.4.9, where it must be restored from seeds, and Hom.Gen. 13.3–4, where it must merely be revealed. 135 ZachT 2.215.5–14 (3.122–3); EcclT 6.331.15–19. Interestingly, guarding this divine image does not imply divinity but rather true humanity. It is this which defines the soul of Jesus as ‘Son of Man’, PsT 3.152.30–2. 136 137 GenT 1.59.19–24. EcclT 1.45.17–18. 138 139 EcclT 1.47.22–3; 4.238.9–10. EcclT 4.233.15–27. 140 141 142 GenT 1.56.14–18; PsT 5.302.3–5. PsT 5.302.3–8. PsT 5.320.1–2. 143 This aspect is generally more to the fore when Didymus uses language of the soul becoming conformed to Christ rather than the Image of God, GenT 1.57.27–58.2. The apparent 133

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seeds of virtue as well as its fruit, ensuring that one can always cease behaving bestially if one wishes.144 For it has been said, ‘The kingdom of the heavens is within you’ (Luke 17:21). For we have a propensity towards virtue (K
Ø ÅØ Å Æ
æe Iæ ), which he has called ‘kingdom’. By contrast what is hurtful and destructive comes upon us from outside, so too the shame of sin. For man being made ‘in the image’ of God has the seeds of the beautiful ( a
æÆ Æ F ŒÆº F) in him.145

One could be tempted to identify these three concepts, as all are somehow aspects of divine immanence present to the highest part of man’s nature and directing him to the acquisition of virtue. However, Didymus resists such a systematic approach time and again, particularly in his anthropological reflections. He works equally comfortably with a basic trichotomy or dichotomy according to his immediate focus and will vacillate between Platonist and Stoic psychologies. At times he seems to collapse the Origenistic concepts of mind and spirit, as Evagrius does systematically; yet elsewhere he holds them apart. This seems to me to highlight not so much a willingness to speculate, as may be argued in the case of Origen, as a preparedness to use a whole variety of intellectually respectable concepts and terms alongside the richness of biblical metaphor to illustrate tendencies and dynamics. Didymus’ anthropology makes no attempt to describe a static complexity but solely to depict man as an arena of moral conflict, predicated on a fundamental ordered or disordered hierarchy. Consequently, a simple identification is likely to be unhelpful and to elide certain distinctions, such as the fact that creation according to the image is prelapsarian,146 while both conscience and common ideas seem to have a more remedial function, seemingly making up for a deficiency caused by the covering or impairment of the face of the inner man.

tension could be resolved by seeing an extension of a permanent feature of one aspect of the human being to the entirety, with the soul being seen here as the arena of moral conflict between two forces, the earthly and the heavenly, fleshly and spiritual; cf. In 1 Cor. 15.44–46 [Staab 10.14–35]. However, it is by no means clear that Didymus always has this in mind, so the tension should perhaps be allowed to stand. 144 EcclT 2.96.*2–*4; cf. G.Nyss. Virg. 12 [Cavarnos 300.13–301.10]. 145 HiobT 2.141.21–30. Henrichs HiobT II, 85n.59 connects this linguistically and conceptually to Stoic notions of the innate goodness of humanity (SVF 1.566; 3.235), which rests upon NŒø Ø, Iç æÆ, and the ºª 
æÆ ØŒ; cf. Rist (1969), 69–77, 186–9. However, this naturalizes the concept of image too far for Didymus. Image is not identical with mind but rather a supernatural shaping or calling to virtue as participation in the Trinity. It is divine mercy, not human nature, which makes this return possible (GenT 1.90.9–14; 1.112.24–113.5); it is simply that the essence of human nature is the arena for this merciful action. 146 GenT 1.107.4–5.

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T H E SA L V A T I O N O F T H E DE V I L These broad conceptions of virtue and evil have consequences for other aspects of Didymus’ doctrine, such as the salvation of the Devil. There are a number of passages within the corpus which offer at least an incipient universalism. He insists absolutely on the role of divine punishment as educational and merciful, and also prioritizes 1 Cor. 15:28 ‘When God shall be all in all’ as his definition of the end of creation.147 Yet, when Didymus treats the fate of the Devil in a speculative excursus in the Commentary on Job, he does not adduce this conceptual framework, nor indeed universalistic texts; rather, it is the Devil’s rationality which implies the potential to repent. If he has the ability to reflect (ØÆ E ŁÆØ), it must be sought (ÇÅ Å  ), whether perhaps he might not also have the ability to repent ( Æ E). For reflecting and repenting are subsequent to thinking ( E). And as reflecting lies within the power of his will (K fiB  ıº Ø), perhaps repenting does too. Let the one who does not allow these things see, lest without noticing it he establishes God as the cause of [the Devil’s] evil-doing—for this happens, if he does not possess reason and mind (ºª  ŒÆd  F).148

His impetus here is to sustain the goodness and justice of God and by implication the ontological reality of virtue compared with the insubstantiality of evil. Even the Devil, who alone can be said to have no excuse for his sin,149 who is the forefather of evil150 and the source of evil in others,151 does not truly have the impulse to sin from himself, since it is nothing; it is non-being. He was made good and receptive of virtue and only turned aside from this vocation to virtue by a purposive choice.152 Since repentance is the experiential basis for the claim that no one is substantially evil,153 Didymus argues that if one can biblically prove that no one is evil by nature, then all rational beings must be capable of repentance. It is the metaphysical priority of virtue which is driving the argument. It may well be that it is to divert just such lines of thought that Nemesius of Emesa explicitly and unusually removes repentance from the rational sphere in his On the Nature of Man. Rather, he insists that repentance belongs primarily to the body, not the mind: just as the immortalization of the body is granted by God for the sake of the soul, so repentance is granted to the soul

147 PsT 5.328.19–23; 1.11.17–23; 3.183.23–5; 3.190.17–22; 5.326.14–19; 5.299.28–33; 2.101.22–4; 2.102.17–21. Orig. Comm.Jn. 1.(16)91 shows that he considered this the Scriptural basis of I
ŒÆ  Æ Ø and also that he was not the originator of this terminology; cf. Princ. 1.6.2. 148 149 HiobT 1.18.24–19.1. GenT 1.94.19–20. 150 151 GenT 1.95.26–96.1. HiobT 4.348.31–349.5; 1.63.4–6. 152 153 HiobT 1.2.9–18; C.Man. 11 [PG 39.1101c]. C.Man. 15 [PG 39.1105a].

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for the sake of the body. Both characteristics of the resurrection life are thereby unique to humanity, since it alone has a composite nature.154 For Didymus, however, the logic is inescapable: whereas the seeds of virtue remain forever present to the mind, even if obscured or forgotten, evil can have no extension beyond its present enactment.155 Evil ceases to have any influence upon the moral agent the moment it is rejected.156 Repentance as such is more a matter of remembering virtue than being pardoned, a cooperative exchange between God and the intellect rather than a free gift, and such a mechanical process cannot be limited. It is the nature of virtue as essentially real and ontologically infallible, existing as it does from God,157 rather than any quality of his humanity or will, which can bring about a stable habituation so complete that it may act as a defence against evil,158 something akin to moral infallibility.159 The just become immutable (atreptoi) insofar as they possess justice.160 Part of the key here is Didymus’ definition of the rational mind as always moving, which should probably be seen as relating thought, reflection, and repentance as much as their etymological proximity. The moving mind can find no stability except in what exists essentially in God and even here a perfect habituated participation in essential virtue is not ontologically infallible: And we did not mean this, that the virtuous one cannot fall (I 
ø ), but that it is hard for him to fall (ı  
ø )—only of his own choice (
Ææ Æı e) would he fall outside the hand of God.161

By this logic, there must be a greater probability of the Devil’s return to virtue than there was of his original fall. Didymus makes no other case for the salvation of the Devil and certainly does not imply here that it is necessary.162 Nonetheless, and in spite of his use of the vocabulary of investigation (zētēteon), his language is surprisingly strong in demanding that there is at least the possibility of his repentance, and it would be easy to understand how many Christians would take offence at this. He seems to go beyond Origen, who claimed that his arguments were misrepresented in his

154

Nem. Nat.Hom. 7. EcclT 6.334.6–15; HiobT 2.115.10–15; cf. 4.361.9–26; 3.304.34–305.5. The only consequence to be dealt with is the captivity of death, and it is precisely here that Didymus locates his theory of atonement, with Christ alone being free in Hades and needing to rescue even the holiest of saints, PsT 4.238.30–7; HiobT 4.374.26–375.28; cf. Orig. In Rom. 5 [PG 14.1049c–1052b]. 157 PsT 2.77.21–4; HiobT 4.334.6–12. 158 PsT 1.22.1–2; 3.218.19–23; HiobT 2.140.27–141.10. 159 HiobT 2.149.25–150.26; In 2 Cor. 13.11 [Staab 44.1–8]; PsT 4 Suppl.247.1–5; cf. the soul of Christ, PsT 1.43.9–17. 160 161 PsT 1.43.13–15. HiobT 2.150.13–17. 162 Only the punishment of the Devil is guaranteed, PsT 2.85.22–4. 155 156

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own lifetime.163 Although no extant texts undermine this, evidence has usually been adduced from Jerome’s critique of those who teach this view in secret but deny it in public.164 However, as Satran has argued, it is almost perverse to read these comments about both the heresy and dishonesty of his contemporaries as a veiled attack on Origen.165 Though he was unaware of Didymus’ work, it is in precisely this direction that Satran turned for explanation, citing ‘the intricate network of relationships which tied various Origenists to the monasteries of Rufinus and Melania on the Mount of Olives’, which because of their close association with Jerome would be likely to provoke the fiercest attacks as he sought to distance himself from their tainting.166 It is unclear whether Didymus wrote a Commentary on Daniel, as the two known catena fragments both relate to Dan. 2:34 and so could derive from another work, while no mention is made of a Commentary on Jonah.167 However, given his willingness to make such bold statements specifically about the repentance of the Devil rather than universal restoration as an abstract idea, it is likely that he would have at least considered an elevated reading of the kings of Nineveh and Babylon as the Devil. One hint at such a possibility survives: in an extended passage which associates Nineveh, Tyre and Sidon, Sodom and Gomorrah, Assyria, and Babylon with the illusion of security felt by sophists and heretics,168 Didymus describes the final submission of the heretical Tyre—an inheritance that is inevitable precisely because no one is evil in substance:169 When that over-proud power has been cast down into the sea and consumed by fire, the first substrate (
æH  
Π) which is left over will be inherited by the Lord, since it was his creation (
ÅÆ); for so too all the nations will become 163

Orig. Ep. ad Alex.; cf. Crouzel (1973). Scholars have generally been reluctant to take Origen’s word on the subject and tend to assume that Jerome’s attack on an anonymous reading of Nebuchadnezzar as a type of the Devil and thus to be restored after repentance (Comm.Dan. 1 [CCSL 75a.809–11]) is taken directly from Origen’s lost Stromata, e.g. Grant (1972); against the likelihood of this, Satran (1989), 175–7; cf. Edwards (2010), who suggests that Origen only ever intended the final acquiescence of the Devil to divine rule rather than his salvation. 164 Jer. Comm.Jon. [CCSL 76.407–8]. 165 Satran (1989). 166 Satran (1989), 175. 167 The extant works only mention Nebuchadnezzar in the context of idolatry, and the King of Nineveh not at all—though the Ninevites as a whole are frequently used as an example of repentance, and that the worst threats of God can be averted without injuring the divine sovereignty, since they are intended as educative, e.g. GenT 1.116.21–3; 2.171.13–16; 2.185.5–9; 2.189.11–13; HiobT 2.123.11–20; ZachT 3.353.25–7 (4.305). 168 ZachT 2.203.9–206.2 (3.85–92). 169 ZachT 2.206.3–5 (3.93); cf. ZachT 2.268.9–15 (3.307) on the ultimate changing of the Pharaoh and King of Assyria, i.e. the Devil, so that he ceases to be an enemy of those ransomed from him, where again the key lies in the fact that a rational substance cannot be destroyed into non-being. For Origen’s classic insistence that at least the final section of the prophecy against the Prince of Tyre (Ezek. 28:11–19) must apply to a spiritual power rather than any human ruler, cf. Princ. 1.5.3; C.Cels. 6.44.

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his inheritance, when they have turned away from every superstition and polytheistic error.170

Here, it is the ‘first substrate’ which will be inherited by the Lord and, although this could be taken simply in the sense of the redemption of the created ‘stuff ’ of Tyre, it may just as readily invoke the long Origenist tradition of styling the Devil the ‘first creation’.171 Universalism this may be, but of such an impersonal nature, removing all subjectivity, as to offer no hope. The argument here, as in the one incontrovertible passage we have—that from the Commentary on Job—concerns not a positive assertion of universal salvation but the unreality of evil and the goodness of God as creator. It is a consistent feature, not just of Didymus’ refutation of Manichees, but his whole understanding of virtue and the Christian life, that no being is evil by nature, since this would make God the source of evil and give evil a substantiality it does not possess. In fact, it may well be that it was precisely this individual consideration of the Devil rather than a more general focus on 1 Cor. 15:28 that led to such widespread condemnation of Didymus in contrast to the continued approval of other universalists such as Gregory of Nyssa.

IMPETUS TO VIRTUE —THE P OS I TIVE RO LE OF THE P ASSIONS The impetus to virtue is not found in mere mental assent to truth as modelled in the various intermediaries of revelation, whether creation itself or the prophets or the sojourning of Christ. Despite the occasional suggestion that impassioned existence is a product of the Fall,172 man is not defined in purely mental terms.173 The moulding of the body was not a fall174 and so it is not to be escaped from but rather changed both morally and physically into a spiritual body, presumably akin to the instrumental body used in Paradise.175 Moreover, the irrational passions are even conceded a positive role as intended to provide the impetus to respond to divine revelation. Didymus generally follows the widespread philosophical assumption that the passions are negative, since irrational, that they disorder the hierarchy of 170

171 ZachT 2.207.10–15 (3.97). e.g. Orig. C.Cels. 6.42–4; Comm.Jn. 2. PsT 3.193.12. 173 PsT 1.42.8–28; 2.67.22–5; GenT 1.54.22–4; ZachT 3.323.11–15 (4.179). 174 PsT 3.129.4–6; cf. 4.256.23–6’s use of Wisd. 1:14. 175 PsT 4.263.25–264.5. His thought here has much in common with Gregory of Nyssa, e.g. the Philonic reflections on Moses’ priestly vestments as an allegory of the need to transform the body into an ethereal cloak through virtue prior to entering heaven in Vit.Moys. 2.191. 172

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the soul, disturb the mind, and are the basis of and impetus to sin: pleasure is the cause of the Fall, the hypothesis of sin, and to be despised;176 one’s aim should be to mortify the body so as to eliminate its desires;177 passion darkens the vision of the mind,178 and virtue is impossible while passions buffet the soul.179 However, this should not be taken as offering a purely negative account of the emotions and bodily or psychological impulses. Although making no effort to employ either the biblical or contemporary philosophical vocabulary in any systematic fashion, Didymus clearly distinguishes between three forms of ‘emotion’: the traditional reference of passion (pathos) to a disordered and disordering emotion (typically fear and desire, grief and pleasure),180 a neutral form of movement, which may involve an innate tendency to blossom into passion (in which case it is styled pre-passion), and a positive emotion directed towards an appropriate object. This more nuanced account of ‘emotional psychology’ is more common to Greek philosophy than many of the cross references cited by patristic scholars might suggest. The debate has traditionally been viewed as one between the models of passionlessness and limitation of the passions—Stoic apatheia and Aristotelian metriopatheia. However, the reality is that few philosophers ever transcended the ambivalence felt since Plato; his earlier dialogues, like the Phaedo and Theaeteus, seem to advocate removal, the Republic and Timaeus control of passions, and a few passages in the Laws and elsewhere even offer a positive role for the ‘lower goods’.181 Thus, Aristotle’s understanding of metriopatheia merely accepts the fact of impassioned human nature—the passions are still fundamentally a cause of error, since they have a natural tendency to irrational excess.182 Meanwhile, the Stoics, at least from the time of Chrysippus, had conceded a positive role to certain emotional impulses such as joy, wishing, and reverence (eupatheiai).183 Although ancient debate tended to polarize the two positions184—because of its general failure to conceive the issue as one of the unity as opposed to the multiplicity of the soul, rather than the role of the passions per se—recent scholarship has been quick to point out the proximity of the conclusions of the two systems.185 Consequently, the position of Philo, which draws heavily on both traditions186 and at times seems to offer 176

177 GenT 1.83.19–25; cf. EcclT 5.294.3–295.5. GenT 1.71.6–12. 179 HiobT 2.125.16–21. EcclT 6.323.1–6. 180 e.g. Cic. Tusc. 4.11–22; Diog.Laert. Vit. 7.110–14. 181 e.g. Leges 1.631b ff.; cf. Dillon (1983a), 508. 182 Arist. E.N. 5.1105b19 ff. 183 Cic. Tusc. 4.12–13; Diog.Laert. Vit. 7.116. The scholarly debate has been quite complex; cf. Rist (1969), 25–36; Sandbach (1989), 59–68; Dillon (1983a), 508–10; Sorabji (2000), 45–52. 184 Cic. Acad.Post. 1.38; Plut. Virt.Mor.; Sen. Ira. 185 Sandbach (1989), 63; Dillon (1983a), 510. 186 On  æØ
ŁØÆ, see Philo Abr. 256–7; on I
ŁØÆ, see Leg.All. 3.129; Agr. 10. Alcinous’ Platonizing reading of Aristotle offers the same ambivalence by distinguishing between tame 178

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a conceptual movement from limitation of passion while one is advancing to a necessary passionlessness in the wise man,187 is not as inconsistent as it may appear. It is in this context that Didymus speaks of a passion which is not to be blamed but is in fact an imprinted impulse to virtue:188 the wise man has an eagerness, longing, and love for good things;189 the mind has a proper love for those sights which correspond to its mental nature;190 there is a godly love (erōs) to progress in virtue;191 desire is good when it proceeds from a correct understanding of something; anger is appropriate when it is rational.192 Clearly the Platonic and Neoplatonic extension or analogy of erotic fervour to the soul’s relationship with higher realities plays some role, particularly as transformed by Origen’s reading of the Song of Songs.193 And it is this that leads Layton to describe Didymus’ understanding of moral progress as ‘saturated with desire’.194 Although he recognizes an important aspect of Didymus’ thought, Layton’s focus on such short sections of his corpus distorts the priority and so his language here is rather strong. The drive is not to be enacted ‘passionately’,195 and even the anger of the perfect does not accomplish righteousness.196 In fact, we seem to be close to the qualified passionlessness advocated by Gregory of Nyssa and Evagrius, where, although their vocabulary is Stoic, the conception of both these thinkers is not. The driving force is more their prioritization of the mind and the rational part of the soul within broadly Platonic psychologies and the Aristotelian definition of mind (nous) as passionless (apathēs) in order that it might be the source of movement.197 For Gregory speaks of the psychological faculties as being created by God to be useful198 and the Fall as not the addition of irrational powers but rather their disordering, so that

passions, which are natural, necessary, and proper to man and should be moderated, and wild passions, which are contrary to nature, arising from perversity and bad habits, and are always to be removed, since they do not admit a mean, Didasc. 32.4 [186.15 ff.]; cf. Pl. Resp. 9.589a–b. 187 Philo Leg.All. 3.129–134; cf. Dillon (1977), 151. The same model is found in Clem.Alex. Strom. 6.(9).71.1–75.3; 6.(14)111.3; and Nem. Nat.Hom. 40. 188 GenT 2.165.20–21. Nem. Nat.Hom. 37 designates three levels of pleasure according to two criteria—the natural and necessary, the natural and unnecessary, the unnatural and unnecessary. 189 EcclT 5.293.13–20. 190 EcclT 1.44.4–8. 191 ZachT 3.407.31–408.9 (5.186). 192 EcclT 2.128.6–11. Philo Leg.All. 3.127 describes how purified reason can direct anger so that the irrational aspect is removed, but even this is to be transcended by the Mosaic sage (3.131 ff.). 193 Orig. Comm.Cant. prol. [Baehrens 67]. Clement seems not to have gone much beyond a distinction between ZæØ and K
ØŁıÆ as rational and irrational movement respectively, Strom. 4.(18)117.5. 194 195 Layton (2004), 49. EcclT 1.43.27–8; HiobT 4.348.14–22. 196 197 EcclT 5.295.1–2. Cf. Arist. Phys. 8.256b24 ff. 198 G.Nyss. Virg. 12 [Cavarnos 297.24–299.16].

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they become uncontrolled:199 the positive power of love in the Song of Songs is thus properly a ‘passionless passion’.200 Meanwhile Evagrius’ definition of passionlessness does not remove anger and desire but rather purifies them201 for there is an appropriate desire for virtue and an appropriate anger against demons.202 The distinction is perhaps the less pronounced degree of conflict between rational and irrational soul in Didymus than in Platonic and Peripatetic psychologies: the movements of the irrational powers are just as neutral, at least in potential, as those of the rational faculty, and the underlying conception seems more akin to the Stoic one. Didymus does not, however, employ the technical language of eupatheiai at all, which is out of keeping for his usual reference to philosophical vocabulary. The one occasion noted by Doutreleau, for all its clear ethical and psychological context, seems to envisage not the stimulus to virtue but rather the healthy state of the soul which results from the concatenation of virtues: For where there is freedom from disturbance (I ÆæÆÆ) in one’s thoughts and an ordered state of the soul (  ƪÅ ŒÆ  Æ Ø łıåB), the sweetness of truth and its beauty are revealed. This truth is evident especially whenever the calm which derives from the concatenation of the virtues (I ÆŒ º ıŁ ø H Iæ H) leads and peace (Næ Å) takes the helm, and those who have chanced upon so great and such a kind of positive passion (P
ÆŁÆ) are happy and joyful.203

Consequently, Didymus seems to have adopted the concept after it had already been assimilated to the biblical narrative. The obvious candidate is Philo, who performed a biblical transformation of the Stoic positive passions,204 such that pity can be styled ‘the most necessary passion’,205 and all passions help man if properly used, biting the soul.206 The easiest transition, and perhaps Philo’s motivating factor, is the Septuagint’s usage of ‘reverence’ (eulabeia) in a clearly positive but emotional sense. Arguably, one might see the Didymean usage as purely biblical or at least only fleshed out by its popular Aristotelian overtones. However, in his treatment of the conversion of Ascalon and Abraham’s ecstasy, where both are presented as paradigmatic 199

G.Nyss. Hom.Opif. 18 [PG 44.192a–193d]. 201 G.Nyss. Hom.Cant. [Langerbeck 23.9–12]. Evag. Pract. 78. 202 Evag. Pract. 24; 86; cf. Sinckewicz (2003), xxxi. 203 ZachT 2.189.27–190.5 (3.35); Doutreleau ZachT II, 630n.3. Cf. ZachT 2.189.8 (3.33); while 2.181.18–23 (2.371) again makes a moral connection but even more clearly envisages a state of good psychological health associated with salvation. 204 Philo Quaest.Gen. 2.57. Philo may in fact have gone beyond his sources, as this is the first recorded usage of ‘bites’ or ‘contractions’ as a eupathic counterpart (Sorabji (2000), 345), and elsewhere he offers a positive role to   ØÆ, Virt. 178 ff.; contrast Pl. Resp. 9.577e; Arist. E.N. 9.1166a10 ff. On the interrelationship of Scripture and philosophical models in Philo’s language of virtue, see Alexandre (1998). 205 Philo Virt. 144. Contrast the traditional Stoic rejection of pity, Špidlík (1978), 257–8. 206 Philo Leg.All. 2.8. 200

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emotional crises precipitating a moral transformation of the self, we seem far closer to Stoic technical language. For in the Commentary of Zechariah, he offers a spiritual interpretation of Zech. 9:5 in which the biblical language of ‘fear’ (phobos)—glossed as simple dread of experiencing the same fate as the Tyrians in his literal paraphrase—is redefined as ‘reverence’ (eulabeia), a form of ‘watchful mind’, and understood anagogically as the mechanism which converts Ascalon from the blindness which resulted ‘from the worst pleasure and the other passions’ ‘so that he may be numbered among those who have obtained virtue’.207 This is no abstract state but parallel to Gaza’s grief-stricken pangs of repentance. Similarly, in the Commentary on Genesis, the dark fear which accompanies Abraham’s ecstasy is described as ‘a godly fear with reverence’208 which is characteristic of insight (theoria) into the transcendent mysteries; and again there is no effort to appeal to Didymus’ more general language of ‘fear of the Lord’ not implying an ‘impassioned’ (pathētikos) fear. Given the Philonic model of passionlessness as the ideal for the wise man, along with the centrality of the concept to Clement and such contemporary figures as Gregory of Nyssa and Evagrius, who otherwise have much in common with Didymus,209 it is perhaps significant that Didymus avoids the language of apatheia. One might have supposed that at least the Philonic paradigm of a staged progress from control of the passions to their elimination would have fitted much of what he had to say about the moral life. This hesitancy may have been due to the general Christian suspicion that such language was too strong for the biblical ideal of peace for the created order and could only be properly applied to God himself.210 Thus, in contrast to his brother, Basil tends to reserve the term for God as beyond even resurrected humanity and, for all his apparent advocacy of the concept as an ascetic ideal, Athanasius’ Life of Antony prefers to style this in the originally Epicurean vocabulary of a lack of disturbance (ataraxia).211 Linguistically at least, Didymus resembles Athanasius,212 but in fact he differs considerably on the emotional control necessary to such moral stability: where Athanasius rejects laughter and sadness,213 Didymus distinguishes between blameworthy and praiseworthy forms of laughter, connecting the latter to the joy of the Spirit.214 ZachT 2.208.19–25 (3.102); cf. ZachT 3.209.6 (3.103): ‘PºØÆ ºÆ’. GenT 2.230.22–5. 209 Clement: Lilla (1971), 103 ff.; Gregory of Nyssa: O’Keefe (1989); Evagrius: Guillaumont and Guillaumont (1971), 98–112. 210 Špidlík (1978), 263–4. In the West, the language becomes linked to Pelagianism and is denounced by anti-Pelagians as impossible for humanity, Jer. C.Pelag. prol.; Aug. Gest.Pelag. 6(16). 211 Špidlík (1978), 264. 212 PsT 4.279.19–25; HiobT 3.306.25–9; ZachT 2.171.15–172.2 (2.332). 213 Athan. Vit.Ant. 14; Jer. Tract. in Ps. 83 [CCSL 78.99]. 214 EcclT 2.71.3–29; 5.312.10–15; cf. Philo Praem. 31; Bennett (1999). 207 208

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The explanation may well lie in Didymus’ extension of the exercise of virtue from a purely moral and preliminary stage to the major category of Christian life. The passions, or at least the straining of the soul which underlies them, represent the psychological motor towards virtue,215 and since virtue is never transcended, nor are the passions. Virtue is not, as many Middle Platonists understood it, a power to constrain the passions216 but rather the dispositional goal at which the passion-producing faculties should aim. It is not the straining of the soul which is wrong but rather the morally mixed nature of its object. Most things are not wholly desirable but rather have unpleasant elements mixed in, such as drinking, and strictly speaking only Jesus is a proper object of desire and love.217 Consequently, Didymus has far less interest in training the passions (or rather the lower faculties), whether through music, rhythm, or habitual practices as commended by Posidonius,218 than in determining the appropriate goal of a unitary psychology. This might seem a curious conclusion in that Didymus goes on to relate both the positive passions and the process of disordering which results in sin to the Platonic doctrine of a tripartite soul. The key is in the imagery of hierarchical control or direction, related to discrete powers or faculties of the soul. Anger and desire are not only to be evaluated morally according to their object but according to the keeping of their appropriate places within the hierarchy of the soul. Desire is thus a ‘virtue’ of the ‘concupiscible’ power of the soul, but if it grows beyond this through lack of mental control, it in turn disturbs the mind and develops into a passion.219 Psychologically, the genesis of virtue is precisely parallel to that of sin, even though ontologically the former involves participation and the latter does not. Someone could also understand these things by interpreting them metaphorically ( æ
º ªH) as relating to the perfection of the soul: for it is necessary for a certain passion (
Ł ) to occur first in the soul, then in this way become a disposition (ØŁ Ø) and so rush into action (K
d c
æAØ ›æB ÆØ)—we are talking not about the sort of passion which is censured ( P e łª ) but that impulse (›æ ) which is like an imprint of the soul towards what is virtuous (KŒ 
ø Ø B łıåB K
d Kæ ); though these processes can also occur from the opposite. So these three things are the offspring of what is moral (
ıÆ ı)—let us leave aside for now the pre-passion (
æ
ŁØÆ) which has as it were an inclination towards what is indifferent (‰ Þ
c N a IØç æÆ).220 215 Cf. Max.Conf. Thal. 1 [PG 90.269], where the passions, once transformed, become useful for the acquisition of virtue. 216 Plut. Virt.Mor. 444d–445e. The position may have derived from Cleanthes’ definition of virtue as a   of the soul to live according to reason, SVF 1.563. 217 PsT 5.297.15–32; cf. EcclT 2.74.25–75.2. 218 219 Posidonius ap. Galen Plac. 453.13–454.7; 443.9–11. EcclT 6.337.8–11. 220 GenT 2.165.17–23.

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However, when we compare a similar move found in Apuleius, conflating the Aristotelian concept of virtues as middles with Plato’s tripartite soul, the relative monism of Didymus becomes apparent. For Apuleius, the operation of mind should produce wisdom rather than stupidity or unlimited vanity; that of anger should produce courage rather than irascibility or meekness; that of desire a certain lack of restraint rather than miserliness or prodigality.221 Didymus treats the three powers more holistically and describes the pathology of a sin in terms of the breakdown of the hierarchical relationship between the faculties rather than an inappropriate exercise of one part of the soul. The fact that he is apparently making the same connections between facets of one-time discrete philosophical systems must not disguise the fact that he makes those connections differently and for different purposes. What Didymus never does is provide a coherent account of the soul which might sustain his ambivalence about the passions and emotional behaviour as a whole. Rather, he adapts traditional philosophical and biblical vocabulary enough to provide a series of loose frameworks for his key exegetical approach: namely, to explain the variety of Scriptural usage of emotional vocabulary, not in terms of the context of its human authors, but through a basic indifference qualified by its object and intention. Didymus’ resultant focus is exhortative rather than descriptive, but by treating affective as well as discursive movements as an internal impetus towards virtue, and not just sin, there are important corollaries for his treatment of progress and the nature of resurrected humanity. Didymus’ reading of ancient thought on the soul as ‘self-moving’ shifts away from the Platonic emphasis on the sense that this movement derives from no external origin towards a focus on the very fact of its movement222—an idea which equally undergirds much of Gregory of Nyssa’s writing on virtue and epektasis. Thus, Didymus tends towards an understanding of human progress as infinite and largely avoids any attenuation of the redeemed to a purely intellectual existence.

221 Apul. Plat. 2.4(225–7); cf. Dillon (1977), 330. On the authenticity of De Platone and De Mundo, see Harrison (2000), 174–80. 222 e.g. ZachT 1.10.5–6 (1.43).

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7 Numbering the Virtues THE CONTENT OF VIRTUE By his opting to employ the philosophical language of virtue (aretē) for his main presentation of the meaning of Christian living, one might suspect Didymus of buying into a philosophical ethic wholesale. Indeed, the fact that he wrote a number of ‘philosophically titled’ works such as his To the Philosopher and On Virtues seems to show him engaging both formally and conceptually with his non-Christian predecessors. All we know of the On Virtues is a brief aside in the Commentary on Zechariah. We have often demonstrated through many examples that, while the virtues are middle states (
ø), vices are deficiencies (Kºº łØ ) and excesses ( æ ºÆd) of these, as we wrote in the treatise (ºªø fi ) On the Virtues.1

This definition of virtues as moderate and vices as the excess or lack of a particular quality suggests a Christian appropriation of Aristotle.2 Consequently, it seems worth spending some time in this chapter exploring both Didymus’ vocabulary and his conceptual framework in relation to nonChristian ethics.

Borrowing from the Stoics: The Cardinal Virtues Didymus’ vocabulary is littered with ‘quasi-philosophical’ phrases, terms which originated within a particular school of thought but had long since been widely taken up by other traditions or indeed popular usage: moral judgement only belongs to the province of what is in our power (eph’ hēmin);3 humanity is

1

2 ZachT 3.333.10–12 (4.220). e.g. Arist. E.N. 2, 1108b11–1109b1. HiobT 1.1.32–5; PsT 1.12.3. The term does not of course have the same significance for Didymus as for Stoic thought, since there is no equivalence between Stoic ƒæ
Ææ
Å and Didymean æØÆ. 3

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rationally and morally self-sufficient (autexousios);4 moral decisions lie in the realm of purposive choice (proairesis).5 He is quick to adopt the widely accepted Stoic terminology of four cardinal virtues—righteousness, prudence, moderation, and courage6—but there appears to be no real engagement with the content or motivation of Stoic understandings, nor is even the language introduced with any regularity or thoroughness.7 Rather, it serves as a shorthand to demonstrate that true virtue rests in a totality of virtues, as his audience could assume that by specifically mentioning these four he implied all other forms.8 When Didymus is actually choosing to talk generically, he prefers a dualism which we will explore later but which is sometimes defined as righteousness and wisdom.9 Thus, the doctrine would seem to be no more than a concept familiar to his audience which he can exploit. However, even here there is need for caution. According to Evagrius, Didymus differentiated between a natural unity to virtue and an experienced plurality relative to the powers of the soul. Again [Didymus] used to say that on the one hand virtue is one by nature, but on the other it takes particular forms (N ØEŁÆØ) in the powers of the soul; for sunlight is also indivisible (IåÅ
Ø), but is naturally divided by the doors through which it enters.10

This could be taken as the relative progress of individual souls but more likely corresponds to the views of Philo, Apuleius, and others, which tied the originally Stoic doctrine of the cardinal virtues to the tripartite Platonic psychology.11 On their understanding, prudence, moderation, and courage 4 ZachT 2.135.11–15 (2.185); EcclT 2.94.16–19; PsT 4.276.15–16. Though the word can equally be used with strong negative connotations (EcclT 2.68.15–16; PsT 4.279.7–14), since Christian freedom is not self-sufficient in the Stoic sense because of grace and dependence on the activity of a transcendent ¸ª rather than the natural emanation of an immanent one. 5 EcclT 1.45.17–18; GenT 2.162.5–6; PsT 2.78.1–9; 4.251.14–16. The complexity of Didymus’ usage of such ‘philosophical’ language is well brought out by Bennett (1997), 205ff., examining his use of æÆØæØ in the context of Aristotle, Origen, and Epictetus. 6 PsT 2.59.6–7; ZachT 2.183.16–23 (3.7); cf. Jer. Ep. 66.3 [= SVF 3.296]: quattuor virtutes describunt Stoici . . . prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam. 7 Didymus does not locate other virtues within the framework of the cardinal virtues, e.g.
ªÆºłıå Æ (HiobT 3.257.3–9) and
æØÅ and Pªø
Å (HiobT 3.258.7–259.6); and his examples vary: ZachT 3.360.25–361.4 (5.16) speaks of courage, temperance, piety, and generosity; HiobT 4.313.13–18 sets humility and fear of the Lord alongside temperance, bravery, and righteousness. This is much as one would expect, since the Stoic definition had long been popularized and probably lost much of its epistemological significance: Philo Leg.All. 1.63 and Post.Cain. 134 employ the four-ness of virtue to unlock a moral reading of particular verses, while Post.Cain. 91 and Sacr. 27 emphasize the countless myriad of specific virtues; cf. Dillon (1977), 149–50. 8 ZachT 2.183.16–20 (3.7); GenT 1.26.17–20. 9 EcclT 2.70.22–71.2; PsT 3.156.3–5; cf. ZachT 2.163.17–164.5 (2.301–2); 2.101.21–6 (2.33). 10 Evag. Pract. 98. 11 e.g. Philo Leg.All. 1.70–2; Apul. Plat. 2.4–7(225–9); both of which develop the correlation laid down in Pl. Resp. 3–4.

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are the virtues of the rational, concupiscible, and irascible powers respectively, while righteousness is the virtue of the ordered hierarchical relationship which should exist between them; and it is precisely this which Evagrius claims to have taken over himself, albeit via Gregory of Nazianzus rather than Didymus: Since the rational soul is tripartite (æØ
æF ) . . . whenever virtue occurs in the rational part (K fiH ºªØØŒfiH
æØ), it is called prudence (çæÅØ ) and understanding (Ø ) and wisdom (ç Æ); when it occurs in the concupiscible part (K fiH K ØŁı
ÅØŒfiH), it is called moderation (øçæÅ) and love (Iª Å) and self-control (KªŒæØÆ), when it occurs in the irascible part (K fiH Łı
ØŒfiH), courage (Iæ Æ) and patience ( 
). However, when virtue occurs in the whole soul, it is called righteousness (ØŒÆØÅ).12

Didymus’ extant works do not articulate this, but, as we saw earlier, he can speak in the not unrelated language of ‘anger’ (thumos) being a ‘virtue’—that is an appropriate function—of the ‘irascible part’ (thumoeides), not the rational.13 The tendency of the theory is towards an elevation of righteousness to a higher or generic function,14 and Didymus sometimes reads scriptural references this way. Often in the divine teachings the name ‘righteousness’ indicates virtue in general (c ŒÆŁºı Iæc); though there is also a specific (NØŒc) virtue so-named ‘righteousness’. If we say that there are four generic virtues (ƃ ªØŒÆd IæÆd)— courage, righteousness, moderation and prudence—, then one of the virtues is indicated through the word ‘righteousness’.15

Such an expansion of the language of righteousness is also opened up by the texts ‘become the righteousness of God’ (2 Cor. 5:21) and ‘sun of righteousness’ (Mal. 3:20), both of which Didymus understands as implying more than the specific virtue of righteousness and something more akin to practical virtue. Thereby, the duality of virtue—the ethical and the intellectual—so readily apparent in the Toura texts can be seen, not as a denial of the Stoic position, but rather as a reworking in light of later reflections. Indeed, although Solari’s Christological conclusions seem overstretched, one could suppose an anthropological parallel whereby this twin focus on wisdom and righteousness could be correlated to the virtues appropriate to the spirit and soul. However, righteousness is not the only specific ethical concept which Didymus reads in a generic way. The same ambivalence is found in the vocabulary of courage, injustice, and deceit,16 and so this could equally be seen, not as reflecting 12

13 Evag. Pract. 89.1, 2–6. EcclT 6.337.8–11. On righteousness as the pinnacle of virtue outside this framework, see Theognis 147–8; Cic. Nat.Deorum 1.4. Elsewhere Philo derives the primacy of ØŒÆØÅ through an equivalence with the Pythagorean principle of NÅ , Spec.Leg. 4.230–1. 15 PsT 2.59.4–7; cf. EcclT 2.93.6; 2.71.1–2; PsT 4.256.16–17; ZachT 2.107.26–108.2 (2.62); HiobT 4.393.17–19. 16 Iæ Æ: HiobT 1.85.18–24; I ŒØÆ: HiobT 4.393.14–19; º : HiobT 4.408.7–18. 14

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the deep structure of his ethics, but rather, given the rarity of the word virtue (aretē) within the Septuagint,17 a standard exegetical manoeuvre to open up hermeneutical possibilities through the principle of homonymity.

Borrowing from Aristotle: Virtues as Means More obviously central to Didymus’ portrayal of virtue is his wholehearted subscription to the Aristotelian definition of virtues as middles or medium states between two vicious extremes—a notion already well exploited in a biblical context by Philo, Clement, and others.18 Each of the virtues lies as a middle (
Å) between two vices, between an excess ( æ ºB ) and a deficiency (Kºº łø ): take courage and moderation, the one is a middle state between audacity and cowardice, the other between licentiousness and insensibility; so too piety has an excess in superstition and a deficiency in impiety.19

The doctrine is essentially ‘philosophical’, though popular enough by the fourth century to perhaps seem ‘scientific’ truth rather than speculative theory. Didymus does find biblical support for the idea in his reading of God’s promise of the land between the river of Egypt and the Euphrates (Gen. 15:18–19), but we seem to be dealing here with a clear-cut instance of eisegesis.20 Outside of the scope of Aristotelian virtues, Didymus does not try to define Christian virtues, such as love, as middles between two opposing vices. He does speak of three states of fear, but along Stoic lines of an indifferent, a proper, and an improper use, so it is perfect fear (namely that of God) which is to be chosen, not an intermediate state.21 However, Didymus’ interest in the doctrine is not superficial on any reading of his thought. He repeatedly draws the corollary point that the vices cannot be found in a single individual, whereas the virtues can.22 Indeed, he goes beyond this, employing another respectable Stoic line of thought to insist that the virtues necessarily co-inhere and mutually entail one another.23 The key here is that the Aristotelian 17 Prior to the Maccabean literature, only Isa. 42:8, 12; 43:21; 63.7; Hab. 3:3; Zech. 6:13; Wisd. 4:1; 5:13. 18 Arist. E.N. 2, 1108b11–1109b1; cf. Philo Deus 162–5; Post.Cain. 101; Abr. 147; Clem.Alex. Paed. 2.(1)16.4. 19 ZachT 3.360.26–361.2 (5.16); cf. ZachT 3.333.3–12 (4.219–20); EcclT 4.215.3–15; PsT 4.233.8. 20 GenT 2.234.18–25. 21 HiobT 1.86.8–32; PsT 1.47.3–11. Yet one should also note that he can equate such perfect fear with reverence, HiobT 4.344.29–345.4, and he does cite reverence as a middle between superstition and impiety, GenT 1.27.24–28.2; ZachT 3.360.26–361.2 (5.16). 22 PsT 2.89.25–7; 3.197.15–21; GenT 1.26.14–17. 23 See the section The Concatenation of the Virtues in this chapter, pp. 162–8.

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definition of virtues as middles is actually made to serve and flesh out Didymus’ metaphysical belief in the priority of unity and his definition of all human virtue as participation in Virtue whose source is God. In defining the good he follows paths well trodden by the philosophers: he exploits Stoic language of indifferents (adiaphora)24 to support his intention ethic;25 he enters into contemporary debates between Aristotelian and Platonic positions as to the goods necessary for happiness on their terms,26 accepting that there are three classes of good—external goods, such as money and possessions, physical ones, such as health, and the virtues;27 and it is no surprise that with his moral realism and prioritizing of the noetic, he distinguishes between true goods and those only reckoned good28 on the basis that only what is productive of good can be authentically good and that as such it will be incapable of coexisting with what is evil.29 The familiar lines of debate have necessarily shaped his thought, but it is difficult to be sure as to whether this engagement has determined his overarching exemplarist ethic, which stresses the reality of Virtue itself, its role as an active principle, and an understanding of human virtue as participation; or whether his prior biblically motivated commitment to such a metaphysic has predisposed him to accept the similarly undergirded ethics of Plato. There can be no doubt that there are similarities between Didymus’ treatment of virtue and the ascent to the Form of the Fine propounded in the mysteries of Diotima in Plato’s Symposium, but is this congruence or dependence?

Christian Virtues: Humility and Fear of the Lord Certainly Didymus does not reduce his understanding of Christian virtue to simply philosophical concepts. Reference to cardinal virtues is merely shorthand; and yet by comparison with Evagrius and his preference for biblical language, especially that of chastity and gentleness,30 the register of Didymus’ moral vocabulary remains determinedly Hellenistic. There is room for love, love of one’s neighbour, and especially compassion,31 which sit uneasily with many classical representations of the sage as independent and unaffected by the fundamentally indifferent sufferings of others. However, it is all too easy to exaggerate 24

EcclT 1.34.27–8; 2.82.10–14; 2.85.9–28; cf. GenT 1.98.3–13. EcclT 3.167.4–168.1. 26 Dillon (1977), 44; Arist. E.N. 1.1098b8 ff.; SVF 3.96. 27 EcclT 3.150.3–10; HiobT 1.42.8–19; cf. Orig. Comm.Rom. 5 [Scherer 130.2–5]. 28 HiobT 3.247.15–21; 1.49.22–31. 29 PsT 2.93.21–3; EcclT 3.150.10–14; 6.335.20–6. 30 Evag. Pract. prol. 8; Eulog. 11.10; cf. Sinkewicz (2003), xxvi–xxxi. 31 PsT 3.205.12–18; HiobT 1.52.17–21; ZachT 1.47.32–48.1 (1.208); cf. generosity ( ŒØøØŒc æÆ æØ ), ZachT 3.333.3–9 (4.219). 25

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Greek philosophy as unfeeling, when the novelty of the Christian Gospel was not so much its call to love as the call to love indiscriminately, rather than within the rules of reciprocity. Didymus rarely gives depth to the notion of sympathy or compassion beyond the injunction not to laugh at others’ misfortune32 and a general sense of solidarity within humanity. It is the promotion of humility and fear of the Lord that opens up clearer waters between Didymus’ theology and Plato or Aristotle. The metaphor of the house in Job 12:5 provokes an interesting list of virtues, mixing Greek and Christian priorities: It is necessary to understand houses in the plural as the multitude of virtue: temperance is a house, bravery is a house, meekness and the rest, just as it has been said, ‘Fear of the Lord is the holy man’s stronghold’ (Prov. 10:29); so too righteousness.33

Whenever Didymus encounters meekness (praotēs), humility (tapeinōsis), or lack of arrogance (atuphia), he does not pass over it or simply equate it with the non-Christian view of fame and status as indifferent.34 He even explicitly rejects the Aristotelian definition of meekness or the good-tempered nature (praotēs) as a mean between an excess of anger and a lack of it, which is surprising given his usual approval of this language of virtue as a middle state: So ‘the meek’—that is those who have meekness ( æÆÅÆ), those who have accomplished a lack of anger (IæªÅ Æ)—‘shall inherit the land’ (Matt. 5:5); for the one without anger is ‘meek’. For one must not pay attention to those who say differently that someone is meek if he becomes angry with those things with which one should become angry. That sort of meekness is too worldly-minded ( ºØØŒøæÆ) and rhetorical ([ÞÅ]æØŒ). What then? The moral man ( ıÆE ) is without anger (IæªÅ ); for it was also said in the previous verses, ‘Cease from anger and forsake wrath’ (Ps. 36:8).35

Whereas Aristotle is concerned that the term ‘meek’ seems too much like a deficiency and declares those who do not become angry appropriately fools, Didymus styles such a form of meekness ‘too worldly-minded and rhetorical’: the virtuous man should be entirely free from anger; anger is only acceptable as a pre-passion.36 The key is Christological, with particular focus on the explicit command ‘Learn from me for I am humble and lowly of heart’ (Matt. 11:29):37 Christ in his humanity is the model and pattern of virtue, just as in his divinity he is its source;38 Christ as teacher is not just a philosophical sage in the line of Socrates or as Seneca presents himself in his Letters to Lucilius but a unifying 32 34 35 37

33 HiobT 2.142.11–22. HiobT 4.313.13–18; cf. ZachT 3.360.25–361.4 (5.16). EcclT 4.205.15–21; PsT 1.28.11–15; cf. Špidlík (1978), 86–9. 36 PsT 4.246.2–5; cf. Arist. E.N. 4.1125b26 ff. EcclT 5.294.8–20; PsT 2.110.22–3. 38 ZachT 3.280.6–7 (4.19). ZachT 1.53.12–18 (1.233); 2.101.1–7 (2.30).

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figure; the redeemed are to be made like Christ and made one with him to such an extent that there is a total equivalence between what may be said of Christ in his humanity and the perfected saints.39 While Didymus does not pass over examples of humility, he actively introduces the concept of the fear of the Lord on a regular basis.40 His stimulus is of course biblical and unsurprisingly Solomonic—‘The fear of the Lord surpassed everything’ (Sir. 25:11), alongside Psalm 33:10 and 18:10. His concern to present himself in what we might style a ‘philosophically respectable’ manner seems to show through in his a priori belief that fear is necessarily a bad thing (though one might more charitably point to the biblical witness of 1 John 4:18). Yet he does not focus on the purely emotional status of fear as its negative trait, though this is evidenced in the language of ‘passive’ (pathētikos),41 but rather tends towards redefining its meaning as an equivalent term which may have both proper and improper objects.42 And from [the magnitude and beauty of created things], it is possible to know that there is someone who exceeds what is visible. And next we grasp a fear of God. The fear of God is not passive ( ÆŁÅØŒ ), it is in no way a bogey-man. If someone is afraid lest they are punished and for this reason does not do something evil, that is not perfect fear. This is the one which ‘Perfect love casts out’ (1 John 4:18). And he explains what sort it casts out: ‘Because fear contains punishment, the one who is afraid has not been perfected in love’. If someone abstains from evil and seems to do good entirely because of fear, he does not truly do good. At any rate if some deceitful argument were to persuade him that there is no punishment, he would no longer fear God. That sort of fear was despised in the persecutions, since it was not born of love.43

That said, he does not reduce his understanding of ‘reverential fear’ to that found in non-Christian thinkers and he does ascribe a positive if only initiatory role to fear in its raw and passive sense.44 Indeed, the Christian must become the Fear of God in Christ in the same way as becoming his Wisdom and Righteousness.45 As such, fearing God is something that Didymus and all Christians aspire to and which is rarely found.46 39

PsT 1.6.13–16. EcclT 4.218.18–21; 2.89.7–15; GenT 1.63.27–64.27; PsT 1.47.3–11; 2.82.14–20; ZachT 1.58.16–22 (1.257). On Clement’s recovery of the language of Christian fear in the face of Basilides (Strom. 2.(8)36.1–4), see Karavites (1999), 129–31. 41 EcclT 4.218.18–21; cf. Clem.Alex. Strom. 2.(7)32.1–33.4: rational versus irrational. 42 HiobT 1.86.8–32 tries to isolate three forms of fear—passive fear, which is negative, holy fear, which is positive, and a middle state, as found in 2 Cor. 11:3; cf. PsT 1.47.3–11; 3.181.15–18; HiobT 4.344.29–345.6. 43 EcclT 2.89.7–15. 44 The ‘little ones’ have only a passive emotional fear of God but God seeks to build upon this rather than ignore it by initially concealing his goodness and mercy, PsT 3.150.18–20; 3.151.27–152.7. 45 46 EcclT 4.218.19–21. PsT 2.82.16–20. 40

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Thus, in stating that fear of the Lord is the highest virtue and ‘second to nothing, not even love’,47 Didymus is not simply prioritizing notions of reverence and piety familiar from Aristotle but rather demonstrating that his ethic is participatory, unitive, and above all personal.48 The Christian does not relate to virtue as abstracted but in its perfect instantiation in Christ and its source in the triune Godhead. Fear, as Didymus understands it, properly implies a relationship with God and on the basis of Isa. 26:18 it is the mechanism by which the Word impregnates the soul with the seeds of salvation.49

THE DUALITY OF VIRTUE One of the most readily apparent features of Didymus’ exegetical comments on virtue is their close relationship to biblical dualities: wherever two of anything are mentioned in the lemma under consideration, Didymus will offer at least one moral interpretation: ode and psalm,50 fig tree and vine,51 two mountains.52 For both virtue and vice are seen as double, having two forms, split into practical and intellectual aspects.53 It is not the concept but its frequency which is striking,54 and it is not a great stretch to seeing this emphasis as polemically motivated in opposing a contemporary perception of Eunomius as asserting the sufficiency of doctrine for perfection—an idea which Heine has suggested lies more firmly at the foundations of Gregory of Nyssa’s turn to virtue and doctrine of infinite progress than any mystical vision.55 The language Didymus employs is rich and, although not always synonymous, readily locates the point of division: between the practical and the intellectual (dianoētikē)56 or contemplative (theōrētikē);57 between moral

47

PsT 1.47.9–10. Even in philosophies which propounded an element of personal divinity through the role of the demiurge, this was usually transcended at some point. For example, Alcinous envisages a purificatory process by means of virtue which unites the sage with the Demiurge, who is virtuous, but he is to be distinguished from the supercelestial Zeus, who is beyond virtue, Didasc. 28 (181.36–45). 49 50 GenT 1.63.24–64.24; cf. ZachT 1.58.7–15 (1.256). PsT 2.105.21–3. 51 ZachT 1.60.22–7 (1.266); HiobT 3.307.23–30. 52 ZachT 1.91.26–92.5 (1.409). 53 EcclT 2.70.23–4; 2.93.18–21; ZachT 1.91.26–92.5 (1.409). 54 Philo Leg.All. 1.57; Vit.Contemp. 1–3; Clem.Alex. Paed. 1.(1)3.1–3; cf. Špidlík (1978), 283. 55 G.Nyss. C.Eun. 3.9 [Jaeger 284–6]; cf. Heine (1975), 174–90. 56 HiobT 1.5.36–6.1; PsT 5.311.5–7; EcclT 2.70.22–9; ZachT 3.404.20–1 (5.169). 57 HiobT 3.307.23–7; ZachT 3.388.12–13 (5.112); EcclT 5.302.1–4; PsT 1.46.20–2; cf. 2.57.5–6: ‘ æƌ،e ŒÆd ŁøæÅ
ÆØŒe ’. 48

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virtues and doctrines of piety;58 between ethical and intellectual;59 ethical and the mystic;60 ethics and epoptics;61 action and contemplation;62 practical virtue and mystic elevation;63 virtues and godly thoughts;64 doing what is necessary and thinking pious doctrines;65 the practical and the gnostic life.66 The tendency is, of course, to see in this division a simple appropriation of earlier ethical models, and three in particular spring to mind:67 Aristotle’s distinction of intellectual virtues, such as wisdom, insight, and prudence, from practical virtues like generosity and temperance; the ‘Alexandrian’ progression from ethical purgation to intellectual illumination evidenced by Clement and Origen; and the fourth-century Christian portrayal of the ancient dilemma between social engagement and quietism as a choice between the active and contemplative lives. However, although Didymus employs all of these models to interpret particular biblical texts, his more consistent portrayal of virtue is quite different.

Aristotle’s Practical and Intellectual Virtues Given his commitment to other aspects of Aristotelian ethics, it is no surprise that early editors felt that Didymus’ vocabulary here continued to reflect a purely Aristotelian framework.68 The practical and intellectual dichotomy sometimes seems to be reducible to a simple opposition between action and knowledge. Thus, Gronewald notes the Nicomachean ring to: Virtue is cut in two into practical ( æƌ،c) and intellectual (ØÆÅØŒ) virtue. Intellectual virtue is that wisdom whereby we think what we ought to think (çæF
 a çæÅÆ), namely pious doctrines. Practical virtue on the other hand is such as to train one in keeping the commandments (æÅØ KºH IŒBÆØ)—for the one who keeps the commandments has practical virtue, he has virtue through his deeds.69

58

59 PsT 2.105.23–7; EcclT 2.93.18–22. ZachT 2.173.27 (2.341). 61 PsT 1.36.12–13. ZachT 2.183.7–10 (3.5). 62 63 GenT 2.156.12–18. ZachT 2.164.1–5 (2.302). 64 65 ZachT 2.147.12–18 (2.234). ZachT 1.27.9–11 (1.119). 66 ZachT 2.184.16–23 (3.11); cf. 2.183.7–10 (3.5). 67 Other paradigms of duality were of course available: Plotinus’ distinction of civic and purificatory virtues, Enn. 1.2.1–3; cf. Eus.Caes. Dem.Evang. 1.8.1–4; or Philo’s lower virtue derived from labour and higher virtue as supernatural gift, Leg.All. 3.135; or his distinction between Judah and Issachar as that between having virtue and enacting it, where, in contrast to Didymus, the latter is the lower level, since it requires a degree of materiality, Leg.All. 1.79–84. 68 Henrichs HiobT I, 41n.17. Contrast Kehl PsT IX, 44–5, who recognized the Philonic ‘Alexandrian’ framework but assumed a hierarchical polarity. 69 EcclT 2.70.23–6; cf. Gronewald EcclT II, 31n. 60

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The language may be Aristotle’s70 but the terms of reference have been transformed71—wisdom here is not framed in Peripatetic terms but as doctrinal orthodoxy, while practical virtue does not relate to ethics but to the acquisition of virtue through obedience (‘He has virtue through his deeds’). We are dealing with modes of approach to virtue, not two forms of virtue.72 This shift is sometimes disguised by the fact that Didymus employs the same terminology to depict two arenas of virtue and these arenas still relate closely to earlier distinctions of thought and action, mind and body. The shift is evident in the way in which the duality of mode can be applied to both arenas of virtue: practical virtue has an insight and an understanding whereby one can judge what is ethical; the contemplative person and life have a correlative insight of their own which is to it as knowledge of letters is to grammar or introductory theorems to philosophy.73 The same broad dualities listed above can be applied to each arena of virtue in isolation. Not only does godly life as a whole have a practical and an intellectual element but each element has practical and intellectual aspects. We are dealing not with two areas of human social interaction but rather two modes of participation in God. Related to this is a metaphysical extension of the intellectual or noetic arena. The alternative designations—mystic, contemplative, or gnostic virtue, epoptics, and mystic elevation—speak to the fact that aretē dianoētikē is not simply a discursive or intuitive mental faculty but rather reflects the higher order of the universe. This close relationship between his portrayal of virtue, the nature of the cosmos, and the levels of exegesis is perhaps seen in the distinction between gnostic leaders and shepherds who teach an unelevated practical life: And perhaps apostles and prophets, teachers and evangelists are those who teach the way of Christ gnostically (ªøØŒH ) and intelligently (ıH ), while the shepherds are those who live the practical life and focus on good deeds, who teach the faith and understanding of the Christians without elevated readings (PŒ IŪ
ø ).74

Thus, the levels relate to the surface or narrative facticity of the text and the elevated true reality of its sense, to the sense-perceptible world and the noetic order.75

70

Arist. E.N. 1.1103a4 ff. Philo Leg.All. 1.57 similarly adapts Aristotle’s language to imply nothing more than that virtue is both intrinsically good and useful. 72 One passage seems to identify the distinction as between direct mental contemplation and the instrumental use of the body: PsT 2.105.23–106.3; cf. the Philonic distinction of Moses from Aaron, Leg.All. 3.135. 73 74 PsT 3.157.11–24. ZachT 3.289.15–19 (4.51). 75 Cf. ZachT 2.230.16–20 (3.179). 71

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‘Alexandrian’ Progress Both Clement and Origen portray the Christian life as progress from moral virtue to intellectual truth and sometimes beyond to mystic union with God. The concept is far more developed in Origen, where deliberate parallels are drawn between this three-stage hierarchy and his cosmology, anthropology, and Trinitarian theology.76 Although strictly speaking a tripartite model, mystic union is discussed so rarely that by and large a hierarchical duality between virtue and knowledge, ethics and physics, body and soul appears. These parallel hierarchies are so ingrained in Origen’s exegesis that they are often taken over wholesale by Didymus. Thus, the renaming of Jacob represents an advance from the ethical to the contemplative: Jacob, which is translated ‘heel-striker’, represents the ascetic disposition (e IŒÅØŒe) and that opposed to the passions, while Israel (which he was renamed by God, who does not do anything without a purpose) represents the contemplative one (e ŁøæÅØŒe) and the purity of mind with which he sees God, which occurs after ethical success (c MŁØŒc ŒÆæŁøØ)—for Israel is translated ‘mind which sees God’.77

A clear advance is demanded to take virtue beyond action to contemplation and praise and even to knowledge of the fine, the truth.78 Moreover, the qualities of this ascent are often assumed to be cumulative—to have attained one level implies having previously attained the lower ones. Having a pure judgement guarantees the purity of one’s actions.79 Similarly, in the treatment of Zech. 9:9, becoming the daughter of Jerusalem is read as an addition to becoming the daughter of Zion: For Jerusalem has pre-eminence over Zion, and because of this her daughter over Zion’s daughter, since the one is ordered just to rejoice, while the other is ordered to proclaim as well. For it is possible for the one who has only accomplished the practical life (
 æƌ،e ŒÆæŁÆ ) to rejoice, while the one who has contemplation (F Łøæ Æ å ) proclaims in addition to rejoicing since she has the supernatural gift (e  æçıb åæØ
Æ) of the Holy Spirit, that is ‘the word of wisdom and knowledge’ (1 Cor. 12:8).80

76 Edwards (2002), 135–44; cf. the Plotinian model where lower virtues belong to the synthesis, not the soul itself (Enn. 1.1.10), and even the ultimate practical virtue belongs to the lower world (Enn. 1.1.12). 77 78 GenT 1.114.6–12. PsT 2.96.6–8. 79 PsT 2.95.13–17. In fact, this passage illustrates well the danger of reading one author according to a previous paradigm, for here Didymus does not equate ªø
 with doctrinal truth or illumination but with the virtuous disposition or prudence which underpins moral virtue. 80 ZachT 2.219.10–15 (3.137). Interestingly, the previous paragraph (ZachT 2.218.22–219.6 (3.136)) makes the same point about higher levels of the soul’s activity necessarily implying the lower ones but applying these precise images to a three-stage model rather than a two-stage one.

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Moreover, just as in Origen, this hierarchy of the soul’s ascent seems to correlate to other hierarchies: thus, the two walls in Isa. 26:1 are hierarchically distinguished and, in turn, the advance from the outer to the inner defences of the Church is portrayed as the movement from a literal reading of Scripture to a spiritual and elevated one, from the understanding of Jesus and the incarnation to that of the Trinity and God the Word, from ethical teaching and keeping the commandments to pious contemplation of the doctrines of truth, from sensual knowledge of the phenomenal world to the scientific contemplation of noetic and incorporeal realities.81 Yet, at least on occasions Didymus seems to suggest that he is breaking with the metaphysic and so we witness him collapsing or even reversing the hierarchies.82 For all that he can say virtue leads to knowledge,83 he is at least as ready to state that knowledge leads to virtue.84 This goes beyond diatribes against hypocrisy85 and the Letter of James’s requirement to translate deed into action,86 although these do feature heavily. In fact, there is a correspondence between the two—humanity can begin from correct moral disposition or from right understanding; both are required and indeed mutually entail one another, but there is no strict advance from righteousness to truth. This is evident from the elevated understanding of the inscriptions of the Psalms: Therefore if the beginning and concept of the beginning of the skill occur from work (I e æªı), it is ‘a psalm of a song’; but whenever someone who has begun from contemplation (I e B Łøæ Æ ) seizes a love of living according to virtue, it is ‘a song of a psalm’.87

The concept of progress is quintessential to Didymus’ understanding of Christian life, but it is a parallel progress within both aspects of virtue—

There, the daughter of Zion is etymologically linked to the soul which fixes its gaze on what is fine, on what is invisible and eternal—i.e. the contemplative or intellectual stage—and this implies a practical keeping of the commandment, since it is this that enlightens the eyes of the soul (Ps. 18:9); while the daughter of Jerusalem is a level beyond even this, namely the soul which sees the peace passing all understanding—probably denoting a unitive stage (cf. ZachT 2.259.6–12 (3.277)). Clearly, the notion of ascent is more basic to Didymus’ thought than any identification of the stages of that ascent. 81 ZachT 2.230.1–20 (3.176–9). 82 Contrast Evagrius’ fidelity to hierarchical advance, albeit redefining the stages the ascent: ıå Æ is the precondition of the practical life which through agonistic asceticism establishes first control of the concupiscible, then the irascible power; the subsequent I ŁØÆ (though imperfect in this life) is the precondition for the gnostic life which ascends from contemplation of the ºªØ to that of intelligible beings to the knowledge of God; cf. Sinkewicz (2003), xxii–xxxvi. 83 GenT 2.213.18–22; cf. the idea that there can be no knowledge without virtue, EcclT 5.293.13–20. 84 GenT 2.151.18–20; 1.115.7–11; cf. 1.122.6–7 on the importance of intention. 85 86 ZachT 2.183.24–184.15 (3.8–10). EcclT 6.317.25–318.4. 87 PsT 3.130.4–6; cf. PsT 3.130.7–10 distinguishing IÆŒºıŁ Æ from IŒºŁÅØ .

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moral and doctrinal. For example, the elevated reading of Abraham’s wives sees a progress of the soul from begetting children on the inferior to the superior—the relationship with Hagar is a necessary stepping stone to a fruitful relationship with Sarah. However, this is not an advance from virtue to illumination: Sarah represents both moral virtue and intellectual understanding, while Hagar is the preliminary to both.88 Indeed, not only has virtue shifted to be parallel with knowledge, but it even subsumes illumination within itself and becomes Didymus’ primary category: virtue itself is both mystical and ethical,89 practical and intellectual;90 it is not just righteousness but correct faith (orthē pistis) and right belief;91 its forms comprise not just the moral virtues but also the doctrines of piety;92 virtue is humanity’s divinely appointed purpose and destiny;93 unity with God is by virtue alone.94

The Practical and the Contemplative Lives Christianity’s change of status in the fourth century alongside the rise of ascetic withdrawal to the desert provoked many Christians to develop earlier philosophical discussions95 on the role of the wise man in civic affairs in terms of a conflict between the practical and contemplative lifestyles.96 Of Didymus’ contemporaries, Gregory of Nazianzus’ writings perhaps reflect best the 88 GenT 2.242.7–9; cf. Philo’s ascent from Hagar as the type of preliminary virtues to Sarah as perfect or primary virtue, Leg.All. 3.244; Cher. 5. 89 PsT 1.36.12–13; ZachT 2.183.7–10 (3.5). 90 PsT 5.311.5–7: ‘The “salvations” of Jacob can be the specific virtues (ƃ ŒÆ r Iæ[Æd]) or the two virtues—the practical and the contemplative ( æƌ،c ŒÆd ØÆÅØŒ), the contemplation (Łøæ Æ) of the truth and the practical accomplishment of praiseworthy deeds’; cf. HiobT 1.5.35–6.1. 91 EcclT 2.93.7–9; cf. HiobT 4.320.5–18, which defines wisdom in ethical terms as the abstention from evil (Job 28:28). 92 PsT 2.105.23–7; cf. ZachT 3.396.2–5 (5.137). 93 HiobT 2.152.23–33. 94 GenT 2.161.24–6; 2.234.1–4; cf. HiobT 1.72.33–73.19, for a further variation on Origen’s schema, whereby purity leads to participation and only then to knowledge. 95 Plato as usual sets the terms of reference, particularly through his disparaging remarks on Å
ØŒ and ºØØŒc Iæ (Phaed. 82a); cf. Philo’s contrast of the Therapeutae with the Essenes in Vit.Contemp. 96 Even within aristocratic circles, one may thus contrast Gregory’s asceticism (and similarly that of Paulinus and Prudentius in the West), which presented contemplation as an intellectual and aesthetic pursuit of God (albeit under rigorous disciplines of fasting, silence, and vigils), much in the line of the otium of an Aristotelian or Ciceronian gentleman, with that of his friend Basil and his mentor Eustathius of Sebaste, which emphasized manual labour, self-sufficient community life, and a rejection of notions of slavery and class. (The danger presented by so radical a break with the social order was apparent to the Council of Gangra, which condemned the latter, Soz. H.E. 3.14.30–37; Rousseau (1994), 74–5.) The contrast is well brought out by McGuckin (2001), 87–98.

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contradictory pulls of this Christian dichotomy between contemplation (theōria) and action (praxis), as his own life was very much an oscillation between engagement and withdrawal, between the throne and the mountain.97 For Gregory these two approaches to God represented competing choices,98 and his self-image as dedicated contemplative frustrated by the abuse of ties of reciprocity by first his father, then his friend Basil,99 was intimately tied to a visionary experience of Virginity and Moderation (Sōphrosunē), in which he dedicated himself to their cause.100 Didymus too employs the fashionable language in talking not just of practical and contemplative virtue but of the practical and the contemplative lifestyle (bios).101 Moreover, he sometimes seems to suggest that they are not just conceptually but concretely separable. The one thus styled ‘the house of God’ is according to another understanding the body of Christ which comprises and is constituted by many limbs: at any rate his eyes are those who have chosen a contemplative life (ƒ ŁøæÅØŒe  º
Ø), just as his hands are the practical ones (ƒ æÆŒŒ ), who perform the works of virtue.102

In fact, this merely represents temperamental starting points103 and differentiated progress across the modes of participation in divine virtue rather than a discrete choice. Here Didymus goes on to break the paradigm by aligning ‘intelligent’ (sunetoi) hearers—namely those adept at elevated exegesis—with Christ’s ears and the ‘earnest’ (spoudaioi) with his feet. Rather, the two dispositions are ‘connatural’.104 As we saw earlier in his interpretation of ‘ode’ and ‘psalm’, the two forms of participation in God are related and only endow one with the beauty of the Bride of the Song of Songs when they are mutually reinforcing.105 Moreover, although he shows little interest in ecclesiastical affairs and politics, Didymus could never countenance a life of total contemplative withdrawal. As we saw in Chapter 2, his understanding of the

97 Cf. Otis (1961). At times, true to his revisionist autobiographical tendencies, he in fact suggests that he actively chose a middle way, G.Naz. Carm. 2.1.11.310–11: ‘
Å Ø qºŁ KæÅ
ØŒH ŒÆd
تø, H
b e ı, H b e åæÅe çæø.’ 98 G.Naz. Carm. 1.2.8; 2.1.11.277–309. 99 Cf. G.Naz. Carm. 2.1.11.337–49, 386–425. On Gregory’s relationship with his father, Gregory the Elder, his enforced ordination, and his stormy friendship with Basil of Caesarea, including his reluctant consecration, see McGuckin (2001). 100 G.Naz. Carm. 2.1.1.195–210; 2.1.45.251–62; cf. McGuckin (2001), 61 ff. on the relationship of these accounts to rhetorical set pieces on the choice of career, such as Lucian’s dream. His outbursts against Basil (Carm. 2.1.11.479–83) lament the loss of aesthetic asceticism as much as the enforced separation from his friend. 101 102 ZachT 3.388.6–13 (5.112). ZachT 1.52.19–23 (1.229). 103 Cf. Nem. Nat.Hom. 39, which speaks of two types of mind with an inclination either to action or to contemplation. 104 105 PsT 1.46.19–22. PsT 3.135.9–13.

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Christian ideal is that of the teacher; personal progress towards God must be shared by condescension with others. What we see continually is that there are a series of dualities inherited from tradition and employed as hermeneutical keys to unlock a moral meaning within ostensibly descriptive narrative imagery. However, once the sense has been unlocked the duality is not maintained. Rather, Didymus’ epistemology and metaphysics move resolutely towards a unifying unity. Everything speaks to him of progress, and progress towards a single goal. The duality of virtue, albeit linked to understandings of the human person, Scripture, and cosmology, is not maintained as a stable hierarchy, but habitually collapsed. Here, as elsewhere in his thought, Didymus moves from an experienced plurality to a purposed unity.

THE UNITY OF VIRTUE Strikingly, this basic unity which Didymus repeatedly introduces is located differently according to context, which suggests that it is the notion of unity which is conceptually prior for him and thus to be sought, rather than that he is driven to this conclusion by the evidence presented.106 The recognition of a fundamental unity to virtue alongside a difficulty in identifying it was in fact a constant theme of Greek philosophy, as becomes apparent in Plato’s Laws, where it is deemed essential for guardians of the state to teach this unity, but the Athenian Stranger and Clinias never succeed in identifying it.107 With some hesitation one may suggest four broad conceptions of the unity of virtues in ancient thought: first, a real identity of each virtue with its fellows; secondly, the idea of particular virtues as parts that together constitute virtue proper as a whole; thirdly, the positing of a single virtue as a prerequisite for proper enactment of the others; and finally, a teleological congruence. Each of these ‘broad conceptions’ is represented in ancient thought by a variety of more nuanced expositions. Thus, the historical Socrates appears to have advocated the first position, positing a real identity of virtue with knowledge (epistēmē) rather than a purely genus–species relationship;108 while the Platonic ‘Socrates’ of the dialogues displays a more varied stance, insisting in the Laches that courage cannot be considered in isolation, suggesting that self-control entails all the 106 One may draw parallels with the Pythagorean privileging of unity as identical to the good (imputed to Plato by Arist. Met. 1.988a14–17) and later readings of Plato’s Parmenides; cf. Orig. Princ. 2.1.1. 107 Pl. Leg. 12.963c–d; 965c–966a. 108 Xen. Mem. 3.9.5; Arist. M.M. 1.1182a15 ff.; E.E. 1.1216b2 ff.

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other virtues in the Gorgias, and establishing that piety is a part of justice in the Euthyphro.109 Early Stoics advocated the third conception via a theory of mutual entailment, but later Stoic thinkers were equally willing to support this by employing the second and fourth as well;110 whereas Aristotle, by contrast, seems to have employed a combination of the second and third conceptions, admitting both the unity of the genus and the indispensability of prudence or reason to any virtuous enterprise.111 Didymus’ exegetical works do not approach the question directly and so it is no surprise to find him utilizing several of these conceptions and indeed introducing notions of unity in multiplicity on two levels: first, that of virtue as a quality existing over and above the discrete virtuous actions which comprise it; and secondly, that of a singular virtuous quality subsuming within itself all other partial qualities usually designated virtues.

State and Action Didymus’ most basic movement from the observable plurality of virtue and ethical action to his logically demanded unity is that from discrete actions to the unitary state or disposition of the agent. If you were to understand it as regards the practical virtues (K d H æƌ،H IæH), the truth of the practical virtues is judged from one’s disposition (KŒ B

ØÆŁø ), that is if someone follows it precisely because it is just. Hence the verse ‘Pursue the just thing justly’ (Deut. 16:20), pursue the just thing itself justly, pursue the action ( æAØ) of the just with a disposition (ØÆŁø ) of righteousness.112

The two lifestyles—the practical and the contemplative—are composed of discrete virtuous actions and thoughts,113 but these may only be styled virtuous in a limited sense, since the truth of them must be judged by the underlying disposition or character. Discrete actions are a preliminary stage in the advance towards a unitary virtuous disposition.114 Partly as with the hierarchical dualities he reads in Scripture, the move is urged by his wish to understand particular texts as essentially moral.115 However, it does also fit his broader portrayal of a character ethic rather than a legalistic or social-contract understanding of virtue. There is something of a genus–species relationship between virtuous state and virtuous action—one highlighted by the language of ‘virtue’ and ‘specific 109 110 112 115

Pl. Lach. 199c–e; Gorg. 507a–c; Euthphr. 12c–d. 111 Stob. Ecl. 2.63.6 ff. [SVF 3.280]. Arist. E.N. 6.1144b18–21, 29–30. 113 114 PsT 3.155.29–156.1. EcclT 5.302.2–4. PsT 2.79.21–2. PsT 5.311.5–7.

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virtues’ (aretai kat’ eidos)116—and the same is true of intellectual virtue, which comprises partial theorems and specific doctrines. A single virtue is not selfsufficient; only together do they build the house (cf. Prov. 14:1).117 Yet, because of the concept of habituation it is not the apparently composite nature of virtue but the state or character of the agent which is all important. We are more in the realm of the stable Stoic disposition (diathesis) than the groping Aristotelian habit (hexis): virtuous and sinful actions are not weighed against one another, but rather the state of the individual forms the basis for all moral assessment.118 Consequently, a single sin can undermine a lifetime of good works, in the same way as a helmsman’s momentary lapse in concentration dooms the whole ship;119 while the apparent coherence of a heresy cannot mitigate its mistake in first principles.120 Although this may seem surprising, Didymus was in fact following a welltrodden path, as this is the essential thrust of the Stoic paradox that there are no degrees of virtue or vice,121 and in both cases it is the consequence of assuming a unitary moral disposition. Similarly, a sinful action exercises its power not externally upon others—as any suffering inflicted is indifferent— but internally upon the agent. Sin harms only the sinner.122 Within this ethical framework, repentance is a change of state and thereby effectively removes the moral force of any previous sinful state.123 In accordance with traditional emphasis, Didymus does want to prioritize baptismal repentance and grace,124 and crucially he stresses the importance of ecstasy as the beginning of repentance and progress in virtue.125 In this way, although the Christian journey is in ontological terms a return to self and thus introverted, experientially it is an ecstatic drawing out of oneself by divine initiative.126 But his broad framework means that this is hard to maintain consistently and, though at times he draws on earlier distinctions between levels of sin,127 such ideas merely sit superficially upon his general themes.

116

ZachT 3.404.20–1 (5.169); 3.396.3 (5.137); PsT 5.311.5–7. HiobT 2.149.10–15. 118 Stoic virtue was defined not by its causal consequences but as ever-increasing conformity to nature, Long (1986), 189 ff., and this was appropriated to the ¸ª by Philo, Conf. 63; Leg.All. 3.96. 119 120 EcclT 5.290.*16–*21; cf. HiobT 2.149.15–22. PsT 2.77.24–78.4. 121 122 Diog.Laert. Vit. 7.127. EcclT 5.300.23–301.4; 5.290.*14–*16. 123 124 PsT 1.21.19–20; HiobT 4.361.9–26. PsT 3.156.17–28; 5.302.12–13. 125 PsT 3.137.3–18; 3.181.2–7; cf. 4.283.26–284.2; Mousalimas (1993). 126 One may compare the argument that although it is peace which is natural to human nature and disorder which is an addition, HiobT 3.308.2–5, peace as experienced is the result of repentance, HiobT 3.308.10–16, and the fruit of the Holy Spirit, HiobT 3.306.28–31. 127 GenT 1.136.3–12; HiobT 4.365.2–32; EcclT 2.74.1–17. 117

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The Concatenation of the Virtues Didymus does not just locate the point of unity in the moral agent but also in the virtues themselves—there is a thread (heirmos) of correspondence (just as within the Scriptures themselves) which unites individual virtues and godly thoughts.128 Thus he frequently states that the virtues reciprocally entail one another (antakolouthein).129 This was a common enough thesis in ancient philosophy. It was originally stated in its dogmatic form by the Stoics130 but owed much to earlier Socratic and Platonic thought on a unifying virtue such as prudence131 and was then developed later by Middle Platonists and others.132 It is, however, rather unfortunate that the tendency of scholars has simply been to isolate and identify the concept as ‘Stoic’ and assume that explains everything.133 Not only was the doctrine harmonized with a Platonic view of the soul as tripartite,134 despite its origins as an extension of the Stoic psychological monism (in the sense of both its

128

ZachT 2.147.12–18 (2.234). Cf. Kehl PsT IX 118n. in 2.7–10; 136–137n. in 7.3–13; Henrichs, HiobT I, 38–39n.15; 39n.16; Doutreleau, Gesché, and Gronewald PsT I, 45n.a; Solari (1999), 81–3. Although the last correctly observes ‘it must be kept in mind that, on the one hand the later Stoics had modified their view of the soul under the influence of the Platonic three powers of the soul, and that, on the other, the theory of the interdependence of the virtues was an idea already domesticated by Didymus’ Christian predecessors’ (82), he fails to heed his own caveat and makes no attempt to examine earlier Christian or non-Christian usage, which results in a gross oversimplification of a conflict between ‘Stoic’ interdependence and an ‘Aristotelian’ division into genus and species. 130 SVF 3.295–304, 373–5; Diog.Laert. Vit. 7.125–6: ‘[The Stoics] say that the virtues mutually entail one another (IÆŒºıŁE IºººÆØ ) and that whoever has one virtue has them all; for their precepts are all common . . . For the virtuous one both contemplates and enacts what must be done. But what must be done must also be chosen, and endured, and distributed, and awaited; so that if one does some things deliberately, and some in a spirit of endurance, and some selectively, and some patiently, they are both prudent (çæØ
 ) and brave (IæE ) and righteous ( ŒÆØ ) and moderate (çæø). And each of the virtues has its own particular focus on which it is focuses; for example, courage is about what must be endured, while prudence is about what must be done and what must not be done, and what belongs to neither; and similarly all the rest are concerned with what is appropriate to them.’ 131 Strictly speaking, there is only an entailment of virtues in the Gorgias’ definition of selfcontrol or the Nicodemian Ethics’ one of prudence, rather than a mutual entailment, but Middle Platonists would read these texts through the lens of Stoic views on this point and identify full IÆŒºıŁ Æ. 132 For the key role of Antiochus of Ascalon in this process, cf. Dillon (1977), 52 ff.; Cic. Fin. 5.67. Philo attests to the frequency of the maxim ‘whoever has one virtue has them all’ (Vit.Mos. 2.7), and can envisage this unity both on the basis of a genus–species model (Sacr. 84), on the grounds that no single virtue is sufficient (Leg.All. 1.97), and through the reciprocity of the benefits gained (Vit.Mos. 2.7). Cf. Plot. Enn. 1.2.7; Porph. Sent. 32.4. 133 Henrichs HiobT I, 38–39n.15; Nautin GenT I, 75n.2; Daniélou (1968), 126. Kehl PsT IX, 118n. in 2.7–10 is more cautious; while Horn (1970), 16, speaks more realistically, though somewhat unhelpfully, of ‘die platonisch-peripatetisch-stoische Lehre von der Antakolouthie der Tugenden’ and then to complete the picture proffers an example from Epicurus. 134 Alcin. Didasc. 29 (182.15–183.16); Apul. Plat. 2.6 (228). 129

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material constitution and moral direction),135 but it had been thoroughly Christianized by Clement and Origen, and taken on by such figures as the Cappadocians, Ambrose, and Chrysostom.136 Didymus’ usage is, in fact, remarkably bald.137 He does not feel the need to justify or indeed explain the concept to his audience. Most of the time he is content merely to cite it as axiomatic that all virtues reciprocally entail one another and proceed to use the principle to elaborate upon other points, such as the disruptive and chaotic tendencies of vice.138 Therefore the just man is one, even if he has all the virtues; for evil-doing divides those who have it; for it is not possible for one person to have all the evil-doings. So the coward cannot be rash, the superstitious impious, the rogue mindless.139

Equally, when he encounters biblical images that combine multiplicity and unity, he expects the principle to be self-evident to his audience so that he can move swiftly on to identify the image with virtue. And since the virtues mutually follow upon themselves (IÆŒºıŁFØ ÆıÆE ) and whoever has one virtue also has them all, the woven crown is not a single stone.140

The language would certainly be familiar not just to readers of non-Christian philosophy but to readers of Clement and Origen too. For Clement tends to use the terminology of reciprocal entailment (antakolouthia)141 to articulate notions of a hierarchy of progress as the Christian moves from faith to knowledge142 and the appropriate complementary functioning of the cardinal virtues to complete a virtuous action.143 Despite his frequent references and even his identification of this with salvation itself,144 Clement barely goes beyond the notions of progress found shorn of philosophical terminology in the Shepherd of Hermas.145 Thus, what

135 Long (1986), 200: ‘Virtue is a kind of “knowledge” or “art”. It is a unitary disposition of the soul which can be analysed into four primary virtues: practical wisdom, justice, moderation and courage. Each of these is defined in terms of knowledge: for instance courage is “knowledge of things which should be endured”. To have this knowledge or the knowledge which belongs to any particular virtue it is necessary to have the knowledge constitutive of virtue as a whole.’ 136 Clem.Alex. Strom. 2.(9) 45.1–7; G.Nyss. Beat. 4 [Callahan 117–19]; Ambr. Parad. 3.22; J.Chrys. Prov.Dei 13.11–21; Ps.-Mac.Aeg. Hom. 40.1 [PG 34.764a]. 137 e.g. PsT 3.135.9–11; 1.11.9–10. 138 e.g. ZachT 3.361.5–12 (5.17); GenT 2.169.21–170.4. 139 PsT 2.89.25–7. This point is often made by Middle Platonists (Alcin. Didasc. 30 (183.17–31)) and seems to have been read back into Arist. E.N. 4.1126a11–13. 140 PsT 1.11.9–10; cf. ZachT. 2.100.32–101.4 (2.30). 141 Lilla (1971), 83–4, is so concerned to prove that Clement’s source is not directly Stoic, but rather Philonic or Middle Platonist, that he omits actually to explore what he means by it. 142 Clem.Alex. Strom. 2.(9)45.1–7; 6.(14)108.3–4; 4.(26)163.3–4. 143 144 Clem.Alex. Strom. 2.(18)80.4–5. Clem.Alex. Strom. 2.(18)80.1–3. 145 Herm. Vis. 3.8.7, 9.

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we find in Clement is not really a development of the non-Christian understandings of the unity of the virtues and their reciprocal entailment but rather the exploitation of concepts familiar to his audience in order to elaborate the relationship between various aspects of Christian living.146 And indeed it seems to me that the key to these parallels is not an identification of the Christian God with the Good of the philosophers but rather Clement’s ‘gnostic’ taking on the mantle of the sage. Meanwhile, Origen uses such language less frequently but to more effect. On occasions it serves to correct an apparent biblical overemphasis on a particular quality147 but it can also be given a Christological bent—the virtues mutually entail one another because they all have their existence in the existence (hupostasis) of Christ148—or even more provocatively utilized as a defence of the unity of God against his Marcionite, Valentinian, and ‘Gnostic’ opponents.149 By appealing to Rom. 7:13 and Luke 6:45 he sought to give scriptural foundation to the ancient view of a generic understanding of goodness within which justice and holiness were species.150 Thereafter, he could insist that the Law as just (Rom. 7:12; Matt. 7:18 and 12:33) was intrinsically good and the just God of the Old Testament necessarily good and therefore not to be distinguished from the Father revealed by Christ.151 Nonetheless, we should be no more ready to assume that Didymus is employing this terminology in the same manner as his Christian forebears than that he is slavishly following Stoic usage from some 600 years previous. What Didymus could count on was that such language and concepts were already available in a Christian doctrinal context. In his Commentary on Genesis, Didymus does provide some logical and biblical basis for his own position.152

146

This illustrative usage is particularly to the fore when Clement tries to explain the different categories of causes, Strom. 8.(9)30.2. 147 Orig. In Luc. 12.42 [Rauer fr.200.1–10, 312–13] on the need for both faith and prudence. 148 Orig. Comm.Ser.Mt. 63 [Klostermann 145.10–146.12]; In Mt. 25.1 [PG 17.304a–b]. 149 Horn (1970), 5–7; cf. 26–8 for the impact of such ideas on Augustine’s conception of the Trinity (Trin. 6.3.6). 150 Orig. Princ. 2.5.4. 151 Horn (1970), 7–8, argues that Origen has here failed to appreciate the difference implicit in Aristotle’s definition of the genus–species model: a man, a horse, and a cow may all be species of the genus ‘living things’ but they are different from each other (Arist. Cat. 1a6–10). In fact, Origen’s positive proof of the unity of God rests upon his understanding of aspective multiplicity (K ØÆØ) of a simple intellectual substance; appeal to the genus–species model merely constitutes a refutation of his opponents’ insistence upon a necessary duality inherent in the qualifications ‘just’ and ‘good’. 152 This key discussion actually encompasses GenT 1.26.4–29.17 and, as is often the case in such extended treatments of a theme by Didymus, draws together most of his divergent approaches to a topic with little sense of clear progression or even the elimination of apparent incompatibilities.

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For it is impossible for those in evil-doing to ever agree (›
çæBÆ ); for evil-doing is a confusing thing (ıªåıØŒe) and alien to unity (Kø

IººæØ). Virtue is unifying ( E) since it has reciprocal entailment (IÆŒºıŁ Æ). For the self-controlled man is also brave and prudent and just, and whoever has one virtue also has the rest, just as is also the case in the Beatitudes in the Gospel: for whoever has what is productive of one beatitude (e ØÅØŒe e
ÆŒÆæØ
F) also has those qualities which are productive of the rest.153

The key biblical text is Matt. 5:3–11 (the Beatitudes) and a more extended use of this is made in the Lecture-Notes on the Psalms.154 To the modern reader the identification of these blessings with a single individual is by no means clear and so an argumentational step is clearly missing which Didymus could expect his audience to supply. However, Didymus is not alone in drawing this conclusion: a similar interpretation is found in contemporary thinkers, such as Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, and John Chrysostom.155 And although we may postulate a common source, perhaps even a lost exegesis of Origen’s, the association was probably already a developed tradition by this period, given the different ways in which these near-contemporary authors make the connection and the variety of applications they draw from it. Thus, Ambrose sees a series of steps to virtue (‘gradus virtutum’), all of which begin from and are entailed by poverty, which he interprets as contempt for worldly things; the order of charity then involves abandoning one’s sin, tempering one’s habits, mourning the past, and beginning to eat justice. Chrysostom by contrast argues that Job shows exemplary and perfect virtue without having heard the prophets, evangelists, and priests or even a teacher and that therefore the soul must have a natural propensity to virtue which will succeed if it is not actively derailed by sin and wickedness; however, to make his case, he feels he must prove that Job meets the requirements of all the beatitudes, illustrating each of the virtues in turn. The logical argument is initially that familiar from non-Christian authors: the cardinal virtues cannot be perfectly enacted individually; one requires prudence, righteousness, self-control, and courage to complete an entirely virtuous action.156 The virtues are thereby contingent upon one another, and whoever properly exercises one should implicitly have the rest. As had already become traditional, this Aristotelian position, for all its Stoic formulation, is qualified by an insistence upon this only being true of the perfect action or the perfect agent.

153 155 156

154 GenT 1.26.14–27. PsT 3.186.25–8. G.Nyss. Beat. 4 [Callahan 117–19]; Ambr. Exp.Luc. 5.50–68; J.Chrys. Prov.Dei 13.11–21. GenT 1.26.26–27.17; cf. EcclT 3.151.4–8.

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Whoever has one virtue perfectly (º ø ) also has the rest—I say ‘perfectly’ because people are often at an initiatory state (K NƪøªfiB) or still progressing ( æŒ fiB).157

In those who are still progressing along the paths of virtue, there remains a certain separation of both degrees and qualities. Listen: the virtues reciprocally entail one another (IÆŒºıŁFØ) so that whoever has one has them all. We understand this in the case of the totally perfect one (K d F ¼ªÆ º ı). But whenever someone is still progressing (K fiH æŒ Ø), he sometimes has one more superior (K ØŒæÆæÆ) virtue, the one from which he began or about which he busied himself (K Æ), as is also the case with skills: you often see a grammarian and a musician and a doctor, and he has one more superior skill to which he directs his entire inclination (‹ºÅ c Þ ).158

Solari has argued that Didymus is actually working from two epistemological bases here, utilizing different philosophical arguments, and thus arrives at an impasse.159 However, as is often the case, by choosing to look solely at the origins of philosophical concepts, he misses the fact that these two lines of thought had long been combined in thinkers such as Apuleius and Alcinous.160 The mental leap had already been taken and if indeed there is a logical contradiction inherent in connecting these originally disparate notions, it was not obvious to Didymus or his contemporaries.161 So by the time we reach Didymus with his use of an originally Aristotelian definition of the virtues as means and the vices as excesses or deficits162 as a basis for the more traditionally Stoic notion of a precise concatenation of virtues, rather than a mere mutual assistance, his approach, though more developed, is hardly novel. So, far from struggling with incompatible systems, Didymus argues that it is only because the individual virtues are means that 157

GenT 1.26.24–6; cf. Apul. Plat. 2.6(228); Alcin. Didasc. 29(183.15–16). Interestingly, later Peripatetics seem to have rejected the distinction of perfect and imperfect virtues allowing them to deny a strict reciprocality, Diog.Laert. Vit. 5.30. 158 PsT 3.186.21–5; cf. PsT 1.14.10–21. 159 Solari (1999), 82–3. 160 On the reattribution of the Didascalicus to MS-attested Alcinous rather than Albinus (author of the Isagoge), see Dillon (1993), ix–xiii. 161 Although one should not push such thinkers into the framework of a systematic linear intellectual development, I believe one can observe a trend away from regarding the concatenation of virtues as an abstract doctrine (logically derived from a monistic psychology and embodied only in the wise or perfect man) towards locating it as the grounds for moral exhortation (focused on an ascent to an ontologically necessitated unitary principle). Attention is thus shifted to the idea of progress, frequently portrayed triadically, towards an undisrupted unitary state but which is actually often disturbed either by incorrect judgements or irrational urges of the passions or both. Moreover, one can see a thorough integration of the Stoic terminology into independently developed concepts such as that of virtue as a mean or vice as the disruption of the hierarchy of a tripartite soul. 162 ZachT 3.360.26–361.4 (5.16); 3.333.10–12 (4.220).

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they are compatible with one another and may be found in a single individual at all.163 Yet Didymus is not primarily interested in a contingent unity, nor indeed a mere compatibility of the virtues. He envisages the necessary reciprocality of the early Stoics but shifts the ontological derivation from the unity of the soul of the agent to a unity of purpose and a unity of process by which we participate in virtue, both of which are grounded in God. This is a step that many Christian authors do not make. Thus, Clement for all his language of concatenation seems to understand something more like a hierarchical progression and mutual assistance, which would not be out of place in the mouth of Plato’s Socrates.164 Meanwhile, Lactantius is entirely happy to stop at saying that the wise man cannot be unjust, nor the fool wise.165 Didymus, however, presses on, largely expecting his audience to make this leap implicitly. He introduces the idea of single goal or purpose to which all virtues—indeed all people—are directed,166 but only skates around the idea of truth as singular as ontologically necessitating a unitive approach.167 Elsewhere, the unity is often portrayed as that of a part to a whole: in particular, when Didymus employs analogies from other disciplines, such as medicine.168 However, it is clear that this is not a material unity and so one should give priority to his images which portray it as essentially a harmony. ‘The house is at peace’ (Job 5:24) when the understanding (ØÆ Æ ) is unconfused (Iıåı) and unwearied (IŒÆ
ı), when virtue accomplishes peace because of the virtues mutually entailing one another (IÆŒºıŁE); for there is nothing unharmonious (I
çø) in the moral man ( ıÆ fiH).169

Harmony is not just a happy state but rather one of Didymus’ key definitions of his protology and eschatology, as is clear in his elevated reading of the separating and gathering of the waters in Gen. 1:9: So the God of all things orders what has been divided to be gathered into harmony (N ı
çø Æ)—that is the intention ( æŁØ ) of God the benefactor.170

The multiplicity of virtue in its earthly and partial state almost appears to be a form of remedial condescension akin to the condescensions or sojournings of the Scriptural revelation and the incarnation. So too the rational creation (a ºªØŒa), since they were in evil-doing, were not able to reach their goal (º ), the longed for limit (e åÆ OæŒe), unless 163

GenT 2.169.21–170.4. Evagrius although not speaking of IÆŒºıŁ Æ envisages just such a hierarchical progression from faith to fear to abstinence to perseverance and hope to impassibility to love to natural knowledge to theology and ultimately to blessedness (Pract. prol.). 165 166 Lact. Inst. 5.17. GenT 1.27.15–17; 1.28.19–22. 167 168 GenT 1.28.2–11. PsT 3.186.21–5; cf. GenT 1.29.1–10. 169 170 HiobT 2.148.30–149.4. GenT 1.28.22–4. 164

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different progresses ( æŒ Æd) occurred, which are the gatherings of the waters; for the perfection which comes after progress (
a c æŒ c º øØ ) orders them to come ‘into one congregation’ (Gen. 1:9). So what happened does not oppose the order, but, just as there is this order which leads to the completion of the order, there is a certain economy (NŒ
Æ) which prefigures ( æØÆı FÆ) the rational creation, so far as they can be, so that they might also reach the goal in this way.171

The Theological Significance of the Unity of Virtue There are a number of ways Didymus develops this theme to make significant theological points. Perhaps the first and most obvious is to explicate a theology of progress or ascent: one must progress from discrete actions to an interior disposition towards a specific virtue; from partial theorems to true contemplation; from specific virtues to generic virtue; from either practical or contemplative virtue to a more holistic approach which encompasses both modes of participation. The progress is more essential to his thought than the different stages on the way, but essentially all progress in virtue is both towards what is unitary and inherently unifying. Each aspect of ethics and doctrine constitutes an enlightenment (also termed a day according to Didymus’ mystical chronology), but the destined state of humanity is one of continuous enlightenment or unbroken day. The situation is progressive, sometimes even sequential, but ultimately unifying in its movement into unity. But it is also possible to understand it in this way: since the virtues have a connection (ıçØÆ) with themselves—for each is enlightening (çøØ)—a single length of days comes out of their reciprocal entailment (IÆŒºıŁø ), it is not cut short . . . Therefore that day of the blessed is unbroken (IØŒ  ).172

It is little surprise that Didymus goes on to locate this perfect unity of virtue in Christ. Thus, although the path of virtue requires the realization of this unity in all Christians, it is found first and foremost in Christ, and in all others in a secondary sense by imitation and participation. And it is no paradox that the head of one man receives all the crowns. For if there is a crown for each virtue, or rather each virtue is a crown, and the perfect one (ºØ ) has all the most beautiful habits (a º Æ Ø ), since the virtues follow upon themselves (IÆŒºıŁıH ÆıÆE ), the one who has them all wins many crowns—primarily ( æŪı
ø ) that is the man assumed by God the Word (› IƺÅ
çŁd  e F ŁF ºªı ¼Łæø  ), and secondarily those who imitate him (ƒ
Ø
ÅÆd ÆPF) and those nicknamed ( æƪæı
Ø) 171

GenT 1.29.10–17.

172

PsT 1.14.8–15.2.

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‘Christs’ because of being sharers (
åØ) concerning which it has been said: ‘Christ is the wisdom and power of God’ (cf. 1 Cor. 1:24).173

Crucially, this is imitation and participation in the humanity of Christ—‘the man assumed by God the Word’—not imitation and participation in the second person of the Trinity. This is probably necessary because of the way in which Didymus views the invisible and immaterial Trinity as being the source of virtue rather than possessing it, so that their relationship to it is of a totally different order from that of the created sphere. For we do not call him rich in virtues in the same way as the holy men; for he is the chorus-leader of the virtues (› åæŪe H IæH), he is the one by participation (fiB
åfiB) in whom the virtues actually subsist (ç ÆÆØ).174

By contrast, the humanity of Christ has only a chronological and quantitative advantage.175 The significance of this role given to the human personhood of Jesus is missed by Solari and causes him to go too far in propounding an identification of the Word with virtue.176 This attractive but distorting picture seems the result of enforcing a more systematic approach on our exegete than he actually follows. Nonetheless, Solari is right to observe how Didymus’ emphasis on the divine unity would provide a solid ontological and epistemological framework for this aspect of his moral system. Moreover, his distinction between the essential qualities of the Trinity and the accidental qualities of the created order, derived by participation, would offer a natural way of understanding the breach between the logical necessity of the unity of the virtues and the observed reality of their incomplete and partial manifestation in humanity. Indeed, Origen does seem to offer this solution,177 though interestingly he does not apply it consistently or with the rigour one might expect of a key epistemological consideration. The closest Didymus comes is the identification of Christ with justice,178 which elsewhere he can portray as the primary or generic virtue.179 However, the former point is probably more the result of his love of the phrase from Mal. 3:20, ‘sun of righteousness’, upon which he bases his whole portrait of ‘true’ time as movement into illumination, and thereby

173

ZachT 2.100.32–101.7 (2.30). PsT 1.48.16–18; cf. GenT 1.5B.13–6A9. 175 Didymus does not always seem to maintain the distinction. Sometimes he seems to impute to the incarnate Christ what strictly speaking might only be said of God, PsT 1.53.11–16; elsewhere he comes close to attributing to God the exercise of virtue, GenT 1.108.19–22. 176 Solari (1999), 83–6. Rather, all three persons are justice, wisdom, etc. (D.S.S. 45(11); 94(22)) but only as source (PsT 5.297.3–5). 177 Orig. Comm.Jn. 32.(11)127; C.Cels. 5.39. 178 GenT 2.213.18–20; PsT 3.205.7–12; 4.234.6–9; ZachT 2.100.10–15 (2.27); 2.107.23–108.2 (2.62). 179 PsT 2.59.4–7. 174

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union with God; whereas the latter is a philosophical commonplace which Didymus does not utilize substantively elsewhere and should probably be viewed as merely the influence of the lemma under consideration. In the one passage where Didymus explicitly relates the unity of the virtues and that of the Godhead it is on the far less profound level of deriving a monistic theology from the harmony of doctrines and virtues. Therefore in this way, if someone goes round all the doctrines and all the virtues and discovers their reciprocal entailment (IÆŒºıŁ Æ) and the whole creation ( AÆ c Œ Ø), and through that creation (Œ 
Æ ) he would know the fashioner (Å
Øıæªe), of what sort of power he is.180

This is simply an extension of his proof from the harmony of creation181 and perhaps shows Didymus’ prime concern as an opposition to dualism, particularly Manichaeism, rather than an exposition of virtue per se. If Didymus makes little connection between the unity of virtue and that of the Godhead, he is much quicker to draw parallels and even causal relationships between this and two other favourite stances: the intended unity of the self or human person; and the intended unity of humanity as a whole. The goal of the Christian soul is often portrayed in the Epicurean language of peace or freedom from disturbance (ataraxia): the just man is at rest182 and this freedom from disturbance is divinization.183 Sin is essentially for Didymus a disordering of the soul, a conflict of its powers, a turning away from God in the form of a quest for multiplicity. By contrast, virtue, as both practical morality and right belief and doctrine, is represented as necessarily unifying, ordering, and redirecting the soul towards God in peace. It is precisely the mutual reciprocity of the virtues which achieves this: ‘The house is at peace’ (Job 5:24) when the understanding (ØÆ Æ ) is unconfused (Iıåı) and unwearied (IŒÆ
ı), when virtue accomplishes peace because of the virtues mutually entailing one another (IÆŒºıŁE); for there is nothing unharmonious (I
çø) in the moral man ( ıÆ ø fi ).184

In one interesting passage, he speaks of the concatenation of the powers of the soul as the basis for this peace. Question: [What then does it mean] ‘There is no peace for my bones’ (Ps. 37.4)? Answer: Whenever the powers (ı
Ø ) of the soul follow upon one another (IÆŒºıŁFØ), they are at peace. Whenever the irascible part (e Łı
ØŒe) is not at variance (
c ØÆÆØÇfi) with the rational (e ºªØØŒ), nor the concupiscible (e K ØŁı
ÅØŒe) with the mind, then there is peace.185 180 181 182 184 185

EcclT 4.229.25–230.1. HiobT 3.241.15–18; GenT 1.91.28–92.6; EcclT 4.229.21–230.3. 183 HiobT 4.394.33–395.3. PsT 4.279.23–5. HiobT 2.148.30–149.4; cf. ZachT 2.189.24–190.5 (3.35). PsT 4.262.9–15.

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However, he does not really seem to be employing the Middle Platonist ascription of particular virtues to the tripartite soul but rather concatenation as a loose metaphor for the harmonious hierarchy of the soul’s faculties. What is clear is that he equates peace with harmony and unity, and that mutual entailment is the unifying mechanism.186 This necessarily unifying quality of goodness is not just internal but external too. The earnest are united with one another as well as with themselves, so that they can be said to have a single mind and judgement.187 The prime examples are the three sons of Kore mentioned in the inscriptions of the Psalms, who through the inspiration of the Spirit receive a single soul and heart so that they chant in union.188 On one occasion Didymus goes beyond this and offers a metaphysical reading of these texts: here, humanity is fundamentally a single substance whose multiplicity is merely the product of accidental qualities; consequently, when people are glued to the Lord and become one spirit with him, when they attain virtue perfectly, they lose their multiplicity; they are one and become one towards God precisely because their present multiplicity exists only in their possession of opposite qualities or varying degrees of virtue.189 What we see here is not the derivation of the unity of virtue from a monistic psychology as in Stoic thought, nor in fact a generic or practically necessitated unity (though Didymus does use both these lines of argumentation when it suits him) but a fundamentally teleological one. All the virtues, just like all the Beatitudes, have a single goal or purpose, namely union with God, such that they are like the different gates in a city, all leading to the same point.190 To have any virtue perfectly is to be united with God. Although the one who fears the Lord lacks nothing, these [sc. people who refrain from sin through fear of punishment] do not lack nothing, because they do not have the perfect love which casts out the aforementioned fear (cf. 1 John 4:18), which is none other than participation (
ı Æ ) in God. For ‘God is love’ (1 John 4:8). And just as the one participating in righteousness is just, so too the one who has drawn near this love and become one with it (£ æe ÆPc) is a child of wisdom, a son of love.191

It is a teleology of ordering and harmony which happens on a series of levels by participation in some greater unity, in a manner akin to a set of Russian dolls. Virtue unifies the individual soul, which unites him to other Christians; together they form a single soul of Christ by a process of assimilation to him through participation, made possible by the model of his ‘unique’ soul’s union with him; and the Christ is the source of union with God. 186 PsT 4.262.11–15; cf. Philo Opif. 81 and Cher. 12, where virtues cause tranquillity of mind; Alcin. Didasc. 29(182.15–19), where virtue is also harmonizing and thus steadfast. 187 188 GenT 1.27.19–21. PsT 5.296.2–4; 5.331.20–2. 189 190 191 PsT 3.197.11–23. GenT 1.27.15–19. PsT 3.197.5–8.

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And we said that [all who hope in the Lord] are those who work for the good through a longing for the promises. Therefore these are ready to be made brave and be strengthened and draw near to God. Being united with him (Œºº
ø) each becomes one spirit with him. And if each of those united to the Lord becomes one with him (£ æe ÆP), whenever there are many united with him, all become one spirit by means of participation (æ ø fi
ı Æ ).192

In this way we see that the diverse ways Didymus reads virtue and virtues out of Scripture, whether as singular species, or a duality, or as a concatenation, move towards an ascent into unity. All that is of God is both unitary and unifying, because its ultimate source and destination is his unity, which becomes in Didymus’ hands a more basic category than his Trinitarian nature. His protology and eschatology give only passing mention to distinct roles for the three Persons and much of this is only repetition of traditional themes.193 More fundamentally God’s first creation (poiēsis) of the heart was in some sense unitary with no differentiation, while it is only when hearts are moulded (eplasthē) by God that there is individuation,194 and the end of creation is that all rational beings should become one just as the Father and the Son are one.195 The shift in Didymus’ presentation of virtue from his Origenist paradigm seems to parallel the shift in his presentation of the Trinity. Virtue, illumination, and union are to be found side by side rather than in a graduated hierarchy correlated to Spirit, Son, and Father. The relationships are horizontal rather than vertical, and the divine unity evident in Didymus’ understanding of Trinitarian operation and substance becomes central to human divinization. The human destiny to become gods is by participation in the One and is achieved through the unifying harmony which is found in the concatenation of the virtues.196 If this analysis is correct, then Didymus could equally have chosen to subsume ethical unity to illuminative unity within his post-Nicene metaphysics. Indeed, this might seem the more natural route for a reader of Origen and Clement. That he does not may have much to do with the atmosphere of his times. The emergence of wide-scale monastic and ascetic movements with their paeans of virtue and virginity tended to place virtue over knowledge as the authenticating sign of their Christian philosophy, even if they allowed a more considerable role to the intellect than is often thought. Moreover, there is a strong reaction against Eunomian intellectualism. Although it is more typically seen as a springboard to Cappadocian apophaticism, as in Gregory of 192

PsT 3.156.13–16. e.g. maintaining indirect creation through the Son and Spirit in order to explain Job 10:8 against those who would propose an anthropomorphic view of God, HiobT 3.274.11–26; cf. PsT 1.1.12–15. 194 PsT 3.178.30–2. On the Philonic distinction between making (  ÅØ ) and moulding ( ºØ ), see ZachT 3.323.16–29 (4.180–1); HiobT 3.273.15–274.6. 195 196 PsT 3.179.2–3. HiobT 3.224.3–18. 193

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Nazianzus’ Theological Orations, Heine may not be entirely unjustified in seeing Gregory of Nyssa’s turn to virtue in terms of an anti-Eunomian epistemology, and from what we know of Didymus’ writing from ancient biography and the extant work, his thought is no less marked by an antiEunomian agenda.197

197

Heine (1975), 174–90; cf. PsT 1.51.15; EcclT 4.215.25–6.

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Part III Didymus and the Doctrine of Sin

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8 Psychology and the Pathology of Sin If his understanding of virtue is the key to certain aspects of Didymus’ metaphysic and in particular his presentation of both the source and goal of human being, then his understanding of sin is basic to his general portrayal of anthropology and psychology. Orphanos offers a good review of the relevant texts available to him at the time,1 but although he recognizes that man’s essence is for Didymus—just as we may expect of any follower of Origen’s— defined in terms of moral tensions, he continues his account as if Didymus were attempting to provide a scientifically or philosophically systematic idea of man, rather than depicting the battleground upon which the dynamics of virtue and sin are played out. The relationship between spirit and flesh as ontological and moral categories is by no means simple, and for all his protestations about the goodness of creation—not only theoretically2 but as grossly instantiated in its parts and as a harmonious whole3—the wise man who transcends the moral sphere of the flesh is still to some degree constrained by his embodiment. Nonetheless, Didymus’ consistent hermeneutical trajectory is towards an individualized psychological reading. Part of his difficulty stems from the widespread acceptance of the axiom that all change is necessarily from a higher to a lower state or vice versa.4 Perfection is thus articulated in the language of rest and freedom from disturbance, which is the culmination of the concatenation of perfectly enacted virtues. However, the ‘scientific’ definition of the soul which Didymus inherits alongside this is as ‘selfmoving and always moving’5—change is thus basic not just to the human body 1

2 Orphanos (1974). PsT 3.140.7–19; cf. 4.256.23–6. GenT 1.68.4–22; 1.41.23–5; EcclT 3.154.11–16. God created both the underlying matter and its form, PsT 4.284.22–5; he created individuals, not just classes of beings, HiobT 4.336.2–22. 4 Orig. C.Cels. 4.14. HiobT 1.1.25–2.3 does distinguish types of change and movement, and shows that he only has any interest in those that can be controlled. 5 ZachT 1.10.5–6 (1.43). Nem. Nat.Hom. 11 traces this back to Thales, but the key text for most ancient thinkers was Pl. Phdr. 245c–e. Didymus does not, however, follow the whole of Plato’s logic here, as the concept of self-movement is closely connected to the belief that the soul is an ungenerate first principle—a status Didymus accords to the Father alone (though PsT 3

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but to the soul and mind, and mental movement is intrinsic to the ideal humanity, not just its fallen state.6 The issue was no less problematic for Hellenistic philosophers than for Christians as they attempted to describe human emotion and psychology, and its tendency is evident in the widely assumed inevitability of a cycle of embodiments as necessarily consequent on the immortality of the soul.7 Didymus does not fully embrace the rational–passionate psychological dichotomy which by his time had become the controlling reading of Plato,8 although he never escapes its influence; but rather tends towards a more monistic view of the soul. Virtue and vice are defined as intentional dispositions, albeit in the latter case a technically involuntary one;9 and so there can be no weighing up of sins against virtuous actions in divine balance scales.10 Morality is a matter of character and state, such that one always has either virtue or evil in action and the other in potential.11 We have seen that evil is ontologically defined as the absence of the good and that it is inherently insubstantial, existing only in the activity of the moral agent.12 Yet, when it comes to virtue, Didymus’ approach is simultaneously to 5.298.8–11 styles the life of the soul not as something participating but participable). It is because the soul is primordially self-moving that it can be assumed to be always moving. For later interpretation of this thought, see Alcin. Didasc. 25(178.15–23); Herm.Alex. In Pl. Phdr. 102.10ff. (where the key interpretative issue is whether this argument applies to just the world soul, rational souls, or all souls). 6 The dilemma is paralleled in Nemesius, who can assert that the soul is incapable of rest since this would be its destruction (cf. Nat.Hom. 16) so that he must distinguish movements of the passionate aspect of the soul from actual passion according to magnitude (35) and yet wishes to portray contemplation as the stillness of the mind (39). Similarly, Philo equates both pleasure (Leg.All. 3.160) and the soul (Leg.All. 3.234) with constant motion. G.Nyss. Hom.Cant. 8 [Langerbeck 252.9–253.3] tries to distinguish two types of mutability; Vit.Mos. 2.243–4 paradoxically identifies rest and movement; cf. Heine (1975), 53–9; Balthasar (1995), 153 ff. Evag. Ceph. 6.85 seems to identify movement and the Fall. 7 Alcin. Didasc. 25(178.34–9). 8 Cf. Dillon (1993), 139, who traces it back to Xenocrates. This bipartition does not displace the language of a tripartite soul but reshapes it as the struggle between the higher rational part and the two lower irrational parts. 9 EcclT 5.296.10–297.1; PsT 1.26.1–3; cf. G.Nyss. Hom.Opif. 16 [PG 44.177d–185d]. The
ŒıØÅ of vice was a common Platonic theme, deriving from Socratic epistemology (Leg. 5.731c; Prot. 345e), and implies not so much that vice is involuntary, in the modern sense of being necessary and inevitable, but rather that it cannot be willed but proceeds from a mistaken judgement. Interestingly, it is wholeheartedly rejected by Philo, who distinguishes between voluntary wickedness, which is almost impossible to cure, and involuntary ignorance, which is easy, Sacr. 48; meanwhile, Origen ascribes to demons a willing choice of sin for its own sake rather than as a means to an end, Comm.Jn. 20.(22)179–80. 10 11 EcclT 5.290.*16–*21. PsT 3.159.1–14. 12 Despite HiobT 3.281.19–28 and C.Man. 2 [PG 39.1089a], Didymus makes less use of the identification of evil with non-being (e c Z ) as a category than Origen, e.g. Comm.Jn. 2.(13) 91–9. He prefers the language of non-existent (I ı Æ) and the analogy of a by-product (PsT 1.56.1–2; 4 Suppl.250.20–2; HiobT 3.221.3–4; cf. Orig. C.Cels. 6.53) or an interlude in a play, HiobT 4.393.9–10. Generally, his distinction remains an Aristotelian one between essence and accidence, PsT 2.77.19–28, albeit with a very different view of the nature

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deny the metaphysical truth of Aristotle’s assertion that the good too only exists in the activity of the agent, and to adopt it as experientially accurate: virtue must be enacted and not simply possessed;13 all virtue is a movement of the soul and thus dynamic rather than static. This moral anthropological landscape opens the way for the rehabilitation of not just psychological movements14 but full-blown emotions as the impetus to virtue, as we saw in Chapter 6. It is in this light that we turn now to examine how Didymus explicates the dynamics of his anthropology and psychology according to different traditional models as prompted by the text under consideration, and offers a pathology of sin undergirded by his reconceptualization of the Stoic notion of pre-passion, before turning in the final chapter to a doctrine for whose development Didymus was once famous, namely original sin.

ANTHROPOLOGY AS A F RAME FOR VIRTUE Didymus’ definition of man follows the classical schoolroom language going back to Aristotle and widely accepted by earlier Christians, namely ‘a mortal rational animal’15 and more particularly one ‘receptive to mind and knowledge’,16 capable of learning skills.17 Although showing occasional leanings towards the Platonic emphasis on the soul as the true man,18 he generally prefers to side with Aristotle in locating true humanity in the synthesis or composite of two substances:19 God was not just responsible for creating the of virtue and the good, rather than dealing seriously with the Plotinian and Origenist concepts of being and non-being. 13 PsT 2.68.1–6; cf. 3.198.20–32 on the corollary point that no one can be good unwillingly. 14 On the necessity of mental movement for contemplation, see PsT 5.312.1–4; contrast Nem. Nat.Hom. 39. 15 PsT 3.143.19; EcclT 4.213.13–14; ZachT 3.275.16–17 (4.3). On ancient anthropologies, see Spanneut (1957), 166–76. 16 PsT 1.52.1–4; cf. Arist. Top. 1.7.103a27; 2.5.112a17–19; Clem.Alex. Strom. 8.(6)18.5–7; Orig. C.Cels. 4.99. 17 GenT 1.140.5–10. Nem. Nat.Hom. 7 attributes the addition of this capacity for learning arts and sciences to the wish to distinguish man from such creatures as nymphs who rely solely on innate knowledge. Didymus employs it to demonstrate the capacity to learn virtue, omitting classical ideas of laughter and sociability, where Nemesius retains them. 18 GenT 1.54.22–4; cf. Pl. Alc. 130c; Phdr. 245e; Phaed. 115d; Orig. C.Cels. 7.38; Eus.Caes. Praep.Evang. 7.40. By contrast, a materialist such as Apollinarius asserted absolutely that ‘the soul is not the man’ and dismissed all question of any actions of the soul after death (In Ps. 118.50 [Mühlenberg fr.224, 1.88.1–14]), though he still remained constricted by the Pauline concept of ‘ F K Æ挒, Dem. fr.72 [Lietzmann]. 19 Cf. Orphanos (1974), 33–42. A similar balance between accepting the ‘general consensus’ that the soul is more important than the body and the body is the soul’s instrument, while emphasizing man as the embodied synthesis, is found in the contemporary ‘Origenist’, Nemesius

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two elements of humanity but their synthesis;20 the body was not a result of the Fall and so must be resurrected;21 and there are numerous human activities which cannot be allocated to the body or soul in and of themselves but only to the composite together.22 However, as we noted earlier, beyond the ready employment of such basic schoolroom definitions, Didymus is not motivated by the philosophical debates of his day. Rather, his primary focus is to present an intellectually credible reading of the biblical passages which he takes to be definitive of anthropology and psychology. As Layton has noted,23 it is the Gospel according to John’s description of Judas’ betrayal of Christ which forms the matrix for his understanding of the psychological processes involved in sin and the anthropology which he believes necessary to sustain that. One may readily contrast the stance of Nemesius of Emesa, who offers a taxonomy of classical anthropologies and then analyses their proximity to Christian orthodoxy:24 although the biblical data as interpreted by tradition is still viewed as primary, there is a distinct concern to relate this to contemporary philosophical debate. Didymus’ approach is rather to borrow philosophical language and definition to fit his exegesis without thought of any systematic corollary. His vacillation is between competing biblical models rather than philosophical systems, and when it is examined more closely, it becomes apparent that his chief aim is not to define man in and of himself but to describe an appropriate context for humanity’s struggle for virtue. In other words, his anthropology is not dogmatically predetermined but rather the frame for his understanding of virtue.25

A TRIPARTITE PSYCHOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY? My point is perhaps best explained through a brief study of Didymus’ psychology. The scholarly tendency has been to find in Didymus’ psychology a (Nat.Hom. 1–9), who like Gregory of Nazianzus plays up man’s linking role between the noetic and sense-perceptible creations, Nat.Hom. 4. 20 21 ZachT 3.323.12–15 (4.279). PsT 3.129.4–6. 22 PsT 3.153.21; 5.336.12–15; cf. EcclT 3.165.21–3. Whether or not it was originally motivated by such concerns, this emphasis forms a key part of Didymus’ anti-Apollinarian exegesis; cf. Ghattas (2004), 48–9. 23 24 Layton (1999); Layton (2004), 128–34. e.g. Nem. Nat.Hom. 1. 25 One may draw parallels with Gregory of Nazianzus’ ‘theological anthropology’, which closely correlates cosmology and anthropology, so that humanity (and more precisely the soul) is fundamentally the mixed medium between the angelic and demonic creations and can move in either direction through action and contemplation; cf. Ellverson (1981). McGuckin (2001), 44–5, speculates that Gregory may have heard Didymus while in Alexandria and cites this as a possible area of influence.

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much clearer adoption of a Platonic schema than is the case even for Origen, and thereby provide the grounds for a thoroughly Platonic reading of Didymus’ entire anthropology. At first glance the issue is simple: Didymus repeatedly affirms a tripartite understanding of the soul. However, this is not actually a prior adoption of a philosophical stance which he then reads into Scripture but rather a convenient illustration upon which to hang his understanding of the biblical account of an inner struggle. It is the fact that this model is simply a useful illustration not a dogmatic belief which explains his willingness to supplement it with other models and language, rather than some inherent uncertainty or open-endedness to his thought here. The evidence for Didymus’ adoption of the Platonic model of a tripartite soul, comprising a rational (to logistikon), an irascible (to thumikon), and a concupiscible element (to epithumētikon) is at first quite strong. Several times he describes the soul as three-powered and delineates the three elements in the traditional vocabulary.26 The soul is three-powered (æØ Æ), as many have said . . . We have an irascible (ŁıØŒc ) power, a rational one (ºªØØŒc ) and a concupiscible one (K ØŁıÅØŒ ).27

When this is set alongside his use of the image of the charioteer in anthropological and psychological contexts,28 it may appear that we are dealing with a wholesale adoption of the Platonic doctrine of the soul as recounted in the Phaedrus and the Republic.29 However, Didymus not only rejects the Timaeus’ distinction between the distinct and lesser creators of the body and irrational soul (the gods rather than the Demiurge),30 but also the distinctive aspects of the Platonic account. In the Republic, the three-ness of the soul is argued on the basis of separate and contradictory agents, contributing to the psychology

26

The latter point is significant since it ties Didymus to the Platonic model rather than other tripartite schemata, e.g. Plot. Enn. 2.9.2, where the uppermost part is constantly directed to the unfallen sphere, the lowest to earthly things, with a middle part intermediating between the two. Plato himself talks of three æ, but these were soon read as ı Ø through the lens of Aristotle, Anim. 2.414a29 ff. 27 EcclT 6.337.11, 14–15; cf. EcclT 4.238.11–12. The vocabulary had already been employed by Clement (Strom. 5.(12)80.9) and Origen (C.Cels. 5.47), but in neither case does it have a marked impact on their psychology. However, it should not be assumed that such concepts were universally acceptable to Christians, even amongst those usually counted ‘Platonists’. Thus, Gregory of Nyssa clearly rejects the model (Anim.Res. [PG 46.49c ff.]; Hom.Opif. 8 [PG 44.144d]) in favour of a closer identification of the soul and mind. 28 PsT 3.143.2–6; 2.100.27. 29 Schibli (1992), 383, draws great significance from the language of weighing down in Didymus’ use of Wisd. 9:15 and the verbal parallel in Pl. Phdr. 247b. The similarity would not have been lost on Didymus, but there is no reason to suppose that the Platonic text would have controlled his reading, and he never elaborates the verse with further Platonic metaphors. 30 Pl. Tim. 41a–d. According to Didymus, even the irrational hylic souls of animals are made by God, GenT 1.43.8–17.

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of an action.31 Although both Didymus and Plato construed the human soul as an incorporeal substance,32 for all Plato’s assertions of the soul’s simplicity and uniformity, the difference in stances towards material creation means that the Platonic soul is more distinctly tripartite than Didymus is prepared to admit.33 In fact, even as Didymus explicitly introduces Plato’s stance towards this ‘thicker and divisible’ soul in order to explain how the effects of anger upon the mind are felt by the whole soul, he subtly shifts its emphasis, turning instead to the analogy of the intangible attributes of a flower: Question: The soul is ‘disturbed’ (ÆæŁÆØ)? Answer: Some wish to say that the soul is three-powered; they call it thicker and divisible ( Æå æ b ŒÆd æØc ). They call the rational part mind; for this is receptive to learning (K ØÅ ŒØŒ ), this can have knowledge (ª HØ ). The irascible part does not receive knowledge, but sometimes it obeys the rational part, it is obedient, but it does not have learning. And just as whenever the winds of the air blow well, the boat, which does not have such movement, becomes obedient to the helmsman and does not oppose his skill, since the winds are not opposite, so too the irascible part obeys in turn the rational part, since it does not have reckoning itself. Therefore someone would not be mistaken in calling the rational part mind. The soul is all the things coming together at the same time (‹ºÆ b –Æ ı ºŁ Æ). And take an example. It is possible to take a flower. The flower has such a colour, but that is not the flower. It also has such a scent, but the scent is not the flower. It also has such a shape. Therefore the flower is all these things taken together. So whenever we say: ‘The flower is sweet-smelling’, we indicate only part of it—that it sends out the sweetest breath. And again if we call it bitter, we indicate only the flavour of it. The flavour is not the flower, but the flower is everything together.34 31

Pl. Resp. 4.436a–441a—the fundamental analogy is that of the citizens of the city, with each part of the soul representing one of Plato’s three classes, which emphasizes the independence and discrete self-interest of the parts over against Stoic analogies drawn from single natural objects with multiple qualities. Plato reaches the same position from an anatomical argument in Tim. 69d–71e. 32 PsT 1.34.10–11; In Jn. 4.24 [Reuss fr.3, 178]; cf. PsT 1.21.24 ‘¼ßº’. Didymus is however less comfortable with this language than with that of noetic or rational substance as one can see from the caution with which he introduces the suggestion that the soul was originally ‘incorporeal in its primary substrate’ (which I read as a qualification of the manner of incorporeality rather than a mere temporal marker) and therefore free from every place, GenT 1.91.1–11. Unlike most later Platonists (Apul. Plat. 1.9(199); Plot. Enn. 4.4.2.25), Plato does not seem actually to employ the term IÆ directly, but it is understood as implicit in the Phaedo’s insistence that the soul is noetic, invisible, uniform, incomposite, and indissoluble (78c–80b). 33 For Plato’s localization of the parts of the soul within the body, see Tim. 69c–72d. On the probably early shift towards understanding this tripartition as more effectively a bipartition between the rational and the passionate, see Dillon (1993), 139. The tension within Plato’s presentation becomes most readily apparent in later arguments as to whether the lower or irrational parts of the soul properly constitute human personhood or are lost in the process of ascent; cf. Galen Plac. 9.9.8–14; Procl. In Pl. Tim. 3.234.8ff.; Dam. In Pl. Phaed. 1.77. Although Didymus can speak of hylic animal souls as possessing irascible and concupiscible powers, EcclT 6.337.15–19, it is not necessary to infer that he ascribed such a hylic lower soul to the human bloodstream. 34 EcclT 3.142.22–143.2.

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On the evidence of Iamblichus, this is not an original idea but a Stoicizing turn. For despite their materialistic view of the soul, the Stoics insisted on a monistic psychology and described the interrelation of these powers as like the sweetness and fragrance of an apple.35 Equally, Didymus’ use of the chariot metaphor is to draw out the aspect of control, of an implicit hierarchy within the soul.36 However, the Phaedrus’ account emphasizes not so much the role of the charioteer as the innate and necessarily contradictory characters of the two horses and their relative contributions to the action of the person engaged in a homoerotic relationship.37 Whether one construes the horses as the rational and irrational soul being governed by mind or the irascible and concupiscible parts steered by reason, the human soul is fundamentally and irrevocably disordered. The competence of the charioteer can only compel an involuntary obedience in the ill-natured horse. By contrast, Didymus insists upon the goodness of all the powers of the soul when directed towards their natural object38 and only speaks of disordering in terms of the disruption of hierarchical relationships; and this is as true of man’s anthropological constitution as his psychological one. Indeed, there is even an explicit relationship between the proper ordering of spirit, soul, and body and the appropriate hierarchical use of the three powers of the soul: When the soul is in a good state, when it follows the spirit and has the body following itself, it has all its powers, which are three; the rational part rules; and the soul has the irascible power following the rational part—for it grows angry with reason—and the concupiscible power too—for it desires with a correct thought so that it abstains from worthless desires. For if Scripture called the desire of the just ‘wholly good’ (Prov. 11:23), the desire of the rest is not wholly good.39

35

Iamb. Anim. 11(368). PsT 3.143.2–6; 2.100.27. More common than the image of the charioteer is the interpretation of horse and rider as body and soul, ZachT 2.256.16–21 (3.270); PsT 3.181.3–7, similarly that of helmsman and ship, ZachT 2.270.2–7 (3.312). The latter is too common to be traced back to Pl. Leg. 12.961e, where the rational soul and senses are equated to captain and crew. However, the helmsman metaphor in the passage cited (PsT 3.142.25–9) does seem to rely on the conceptual background of the Phaedrus. For while the boat is the irascible part and the helmsman the mind, the unidentified wind is presumably the concupiscible part, which is capable of controlling the irascible and indirectly harming the mind (PsT 3.143.3–6). Here, as in the Phaedrus, there is a clear distinction between the level of control able to be exerted on the two lower parts of the soul. 37 Pl. Phdr. 246a–249c, 253c ff. 38 PsT 1.8.25. Here Didymus draws closer to later Platonist speculation on divine souls, e.g. Plot. Enn. 6.7 (1–15), which argued for a composition parallel to the human but properly orientated towards the noetic universe; thus, Alcin. Didasc. 25(178.39–46) ascribes to the gods a tripartite soul comprising e ŒæØØŒ or ª øØŒ , e ›æÅØŒ or ÆæÆÆØŒ , and e NŒØøØŒ ; cf. Numen. fr.18 [des Places] on the soul of the Demiurge. 39 EcclT 2.128.6–11. 36

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Man’s self-knowledge is to understand that he has been natured for virtue and that this is constituted by a correct anthropological and psychological hierarchy: He knows that the soul rules in him and the body is ruled, and in turn that in the soul the rational part rules, while the concupiscible and irascible parts are ruled. If these things happen to the contrary, it is very evil. That sort of soul, if it is ruled by the body and the body rules, is destruction for that man; and if the rational part is ruled by anger or by desire, the rule itself is illegal.40

At best we are dealing here with the adoption of a Platonic model through the revisionist lens of Middle Platonists who followed Posidonius and Antiochus in conflating Platonic and Stoic features in their psychologies.41 Thus, it seems likely that Posidonius adopted the three Platonic elements not as portions of the soul or in any way localized in the body, despite his materialism,42 and broke with Chrysippus in asserting that a unitary substance need not entail a unitary faculty;43 each faculty involves an appetency (orexis), but these are natural to humanity rather than distortions of it;44 human failure is thereby not simply equated with mistaken judgement but with the disordering of the relationship between appetencies and faculties.45 In parallel with these later systems, Didymus feels equally happy to refer to other mental processes, such as memory, contemplation, and sense perception, as powers of the soul more or less indiscriminately.46 He is comfortable with the language of appetencies (orexeis) and an appetitive faculty alongside the concupiscible and irascible powers, which can be neutral or even embrace lust and anger.47 Even his students can introduce further concepts into the Platonic schema, asking whether the scriptural reference to ‘stomach’ refers to the generative power.48 He frequently introduces the ‘Stoic’ language of the ruling faculty (to hēgemonikon)49 and seems to delineate this from mind as a further subset of rational operation.

40

EcclT 4.238.9–14. On Posidonius, see Kidd (1971); on the Middle Platonists, see Dillon (1977). 42 Posidonius ap. Galen Plac. 461.4–6. 43 Posidonius ap. Galen Plac. 476.2–6; 501; cf. Kidd (1971), 203. 44 Posidonius ap. Galen Plac. 399; 438–9. 45 Posidonius ap. Galen Plac. 452.3–10; 448.11 ff. 46 PsT 3.202.34–203.3; 3.144.1–3; cf. HiobT 4.339.3–7; 4.358.24–359.4. Life is a faculty of the heart and soul in just the same way as sight belongs to animals, PsT 1.54.1–5; cf. the corporeal animal soul providing ‘Stoic’ çÆ ÆØŒc and ›æØŒc Œ ÅØ, GenT 1.48.20–49.6. 47 Irrational animal need: PsT 1.53.7–9; 1.45.9–11; GenT 1.140.13–15. Lust: PsT 2.76.15–17; 2.91.12–14; 5.291.33–292.1. Anger: ZachT 2.138.15–18 (2.195); cf. ZæØ ÆŁÅØŒ, ZachT 2.139.2 (2.200). 48 PsT 3.143.6–13. 49 GenT 1.20.18–21; 1.97.8–9; ZachT 1.45.28–46.2 (1.198). Although at one point distinctively Stoic (cf. Diog.Laert. Vit. 7.159), the language was widely taken up in a loose sense as defining the role of the rational part by many thinkers, particularly Philo. The concept had already been 41

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So ‘golden’ must be understood in this verse as the mind; and if the spoken word is ‘silver’, you should understand ‘gold’ here as the thought, and ‘purest gold’ as the ruling faculty (e ª ØŒe ) which is the treasure-chest and guard of the ‘golden’.50

What distinguishes Didymus from his contemporary Nemesius, whose own presentation of the faculties is heavily influenced by Galen, is not the admission of so many originally disparate terms but rather their indiscriminate application. Whereas Nemesius’ division of the soul is highly systematic, Didymus is more akin to Clement’s readiness to veer between asserting three basic faculties and ten.51 Although perhaps more in line with Aristotle’s ‘infinite parts’ of the soul52 than the traditional Stoic eight-part model (comprising the governing faculty, the five senses, voice, and reproductive ability53), the shift is constantly away from competing agencies within the soul and towards a more monistic psychology. One of his hermeneutical keys inherited from Origen equates ‘bones’ to the various powers of the soul which should hold the soul together as a unity with a singularity of purpose, even a concatenation, derived from harmony.54 There is also little of the Platonic disparaging of sensory knowledge,55 despite his acceptance of the soul’s pre-existence, its spiritual senses, and knowledge as remembering; rather, sense perception is a lower but neutral form.56

thoroughly Christianized, e.g. Clem.Alex. Strom. 6.(16)134.1–137.1; 2.(11)51.6; Orig. C.Cels. 4.66; G.Naz. Or. 2.19. Didymus remains closer to the Stoic concept than its Platonist assimilation, as he still locates it in the breast not the head, EcclT 1.15.18. 50 EcclT 6.360.14–16. Orphanos (1974), 154–7, is surely right in arguing contra Gesché, Doutreleau, and Solari that it is not equivalent to F despite the fact that the biblical language of ‘bosom’ and ‘head’ can be interpreted as either. (On the equivalency of F and ŒÆæ Æ, see PsT 1.53.18–20; 2.84.24–5). 51 Three: Clem.Alex. Strom. 3.(10)68.5; ten: Strom. 6.(16)134.2; 2.(11)50.3 (even here there is variation, as in the first list the Holy Spirit is named; in the second, a mere spiritual faculty); cf. Spanneut (1957), 166–76. 52 Arist. Anim. 1.411a26–b3; cf. 3.432a22–b3. 53 Diog.Laert. Vit. 7.110. The number was not, however, fixed (unlike the Platonist models where the number three seems to take precedence over the precise elements); cf. Tert. Anim. 14.2: seventeen. 54 PsT 3.202.31–4; 3.211.24–8; HiobT 1.105.28–9; cf. Orig. Dial. 21. 55 e.g. Pl. Phaed. 84a. Philo is generally negative: e.g.Leg.All. 3.182 describes both sense perception and pleasure as properly hostile to the soul despite their relationship to it, which is thus akin to that of a flatterer or courtesan. Didymus retains some elements of this: thus, on one reading, it is sense perception which is responsible for the Fall in that it is misled by the Devil and misleads the mind in turn, GenT 1.95.18–21; cf. Philo Leg.All. 2.49–50. However, sense perception is at worst the medium rather than source of sin. 56 The fact that it is not definitive of man (EcclT 3.165.20–3; GenT 1.140.5–10) should not obscure its utility within the common life, EcclT 4.208.24–5. The basis for the shift may well be Origen’s doctrine of spiritual sense perception which is not to be confused with direct intellection or intuition; cf. C.Cels. 1.48; Dillon (1986).

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One may be tempted to explain this variety as the result of merely incidental and insignificant remarks in the course of his commentaries,57 but in fact the nature of the soul forms the subject of countless Didymean excursus, and he wrote a lost treatise On the Soul. Rather, we must surely admit that for Didymus the key datum of the soul to be explained is its need for a hierarchical order as the basis for virtuous action; and indeed this should be no surprise, given that his exegesis of Gen. 1:26 follows Origen in locating the rule over the animal creation which comprises the essence of the ‘image of God’ as a psychological not environmental process.58 Hierarchy is intrinsic to Didymus’ presentation both of body and soul59 and of the three powers of the soul, but it may just as easily be the hierarchy of mind (nous) over reason (logos)60 or of thought (to noēma) over what is spoken (to lekton)61 as rational over irrational. His teachings on the soul are necessarily unsystematic but nonetheless consistent, not in points of detail, but rather the landscape for moral choice which they describe. Unfortunately, the mere references to a tripartite soul have been used by some as proof of Didymus’ essentially Platonic anthropological framework and allowed to control the interpretation of his pronouncements. For example, the fact that Didymus identifies the rational part of the soul with the mind62 and explicitly states that such parts are not corporeal divisions of the soul, but only aspects of its function or powers, is taken as proving that he does not really envisage a trichotomous anthropology.63 This would be true if Didymus were a Platonist, for unlike a number of his contemporaries such as Gregory of Nazianzus64 he does seem to rule out the idea of the mind as a separate part of 57 Cf. Špidlík (1978), 105, who notes Clement’s similar willingness to set the Stoic psychological terms alongside Platonic ones without a real commitment to either, e.g. Strom. 5.(12)80.9. 58 GenT 1.57.9–25; cf. Philo Opif. 69. 59 This conception of the soul as ruling and the body to be ruled is Didymus’ primary datum, EcclT 2.85.22–5; 4.225.6–12; PsT 3.227.23–5; 4.232.29–31; ZachT 2.257.4–6 (3.271). It is by no means original (Pl. Phaed. 79e–80a), nor confined to dualist systems (Arist. E.N. 8.1161a30 ff.); rather, it is Didymus’ repetition and emphasis which are significant. 60 61 ZachT 2.97.14–15 (2.15). PsT 5.335.15–21. 62 PsT 3.142.29–30; 4.236.30–4. 63 e.g. Henrichs, HiobT I, 177n.95 (‘Didymos sieht den Menschen als ganzen dichotomisch, d.h. er wertet den F als Kraft der Seele, welche wiederum als Führerin dem Körper gegenübergestellt wird.’); Doutreleau, ZachT I, 88–90. Leipoldt (1905), 66, makes an even more basic error to reach the opposite conclusion by confusing references to a tripartite soul with a trichotomous anthropology; cf. the critique by Kehl PsT IX, 169. 64 Gregory can appeal to the trichotomy of HÆ, łıå, and F as generally accepted truth (Or. 30.21); despite his occasional ambivalence, the mind is more usually a distinct part of man rather than an aspect or power of the soul (Carm. 1.1.10, esp. 56–8: ‘K d  ¼ØŒ KØ ÆæŒø fi Ł, łıåc b ŒÆd F x K ÆØåø fi , ÆæŒe b  ØŒ, ‰  NŒg ŁF’, with an antiApollinarian agenda). For all his rejection of Platonic metempsychosis (Carm. 1.1.7.32–52— perhaps with an eye towards Origen too), his understanding of man as an intermediary between the angelic and earthly creations draws him far closer to Plato in talk of ‘K ªaæ ÅŒ FÆ, e c ŁÅ IØ  Kd I ææ’ (Carm. 1.1.7.72–3), where it is not just the image but the substantial receptacle for the image which is divine.

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the human person.65 He has subsumed the concept of mind to a basic body– soul dualism. However, Didymus is not a Platonist, and his anthropological question is not whether mind and soul should be separated but whether spirit and soul should be. The crux is not the relation of rationality to the divine or the location of the image, as in Philo, but those verses which place spirit and soul side by side.66 On the one hand according to the first view each of us is made up of soul and body, but on the other there are those who say that man is made up of three things—soul, body and spirit—which they also argue for using an apostolic saying: ‘May the God of peace sanctify you perfect and complete, spirit and soul and body’ (1 Thess. 5:23). For they do not consider it coherent to speak of the Holy Spirit as needing to be made complete, since it has not been natured to enter into weakness.67

The apparent vacillation continues: trichotomists bring in Rom. 8:16 to distinguish the Holy Spirit from human spirit; dichotomists respond by suggesting that here spirit should be understood as judgement (gnōmē) or a synonym for soul; but, undeterred, the trichotomists then return to Dan. 3:86 to show that the human spirit must be distinct from soul; while their opponents respond with the simple dualism of Matt. 10:28.68 This apparent caution does not reflect any real uncertainty but rather Didymus’ pedagogic method. In matters of exegetical dispute (though interestingly not doctrinal argument) Didymus frequently offers his readers or students the arguments for and against a particular reading on an equal basis, and only in later argument do we find that he himself treats one interpretation as unambiguously correct. Critically for understanding his own thought, the excursus ends here and he returns to his original point: namely, that the word ‘man’ is a homonym because it refers to a composite, and that the parts are more properly designated according to the Pauline vocabulary of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’.69 Therefore, this does not represent a resolution of the matter in favour of a dichotomy and we should rather be guided by such unambiguous pronouncements as that salvation must belong to all three parts;70 and that there is a double hierarchy between the elements, with soul following spirit just as body should follow soul.71

65

Nonetheless, mind is something distinctive, PsT 1.15.10–11. Nautin GenT I, 141n.1, attributes the key discussion to the fact that Philo employed a trichotomy of body, soul, and mind, and located the image in the mind. However, in this definition of humanity, the motivation is surely rather the ambiguity of the New Testament references to soul, body, and person, which Didymus, like Origen, resolves by emphasizing 1 Thess. 5:23; cf. Comm.Mt. 13.2 [Klostermann 178.19–30]; Dial. 6–8. On Origen’s anthropology more generally, see Crouzel (1989), 87 ff. 67 68 GenT 1.55.11–19. GenT 1.55.19–56.9. 69 70 71 GenT 1.56.9–12. PsT 1.15.13–19. EcclT 2.124.22–8; 2.128.1–11. 66

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Spirit designates something specific, real, and distinct from the soul, ‘the hidden man of the heart’,72 and it cannot be reduced either to a biological sense of breath as vital force (as when applied to irrational animals73) or to the presence of the Holy Spirit within a person.74 It is not the Irenaean faculty limited to the saints75—a thesis which Origen at least entertains76—but something universal assumed by the Word. We confess that God the Word has sojourned (e Łe ºª K Ø  ÅÅŒ ÆØ), having assumed a perfect man (ºØ ¼ Łæø  I غÅçÆ), comprising soul, body and spirit.77

The Platonizing interpretation of Doutreleau falsely equates this with the trichotomy of body, soul, and mind typical of anti-Apollinarian polemic78 and, failing to recognize Origen’s earlier soteriological axiom,79 collapses it back into an effective dichotomy only extended for the sake of apologetic.80 Even Orphanos will only concede a trichotomy of ethical terms,81 while in strict ontology he sees a break with Origen to a simple soul–body dualism.82 The issue probably lies in Didymus’ understanding of the ‘image’, which is related to, but not identical with, the mind.83 His anthropology is dynamic not just metaphorically but essentially, and so it is the relationships between the parts of the person, not the static realities, which are to the fore.84 It is when considering the fallenness of the body that the language of spirit disappears, for body must first be conformed to soul before soul can be conformed to

72 ZachT 3.324.1–6 (4.182). At GenT 1.54.24–5 this text from 1 Pet. 3:4 is applied to the soul, but importantly the verse is not functioning as a subject for inquiry, but rather as part of a basic hermeneutical key to prove that Scriptural reference to ‘man’ is not limited in reference to the earthly composite. 73 GenT 2.191.16–17. 74 D.S.S. 241–3(55); cf. PsT 3.139.2–14. By anagogy the Church too must be conceived of as tripartite, PsT 3.226.24–5. Certainly, in antiquity Didymus was attacked for asserting the presence of spirit as a third substance in man against the more general consensus that this was simply the grace of the Holy Spirit, Genn. Eccl.Dogm. 20 [PL 58.985b]; cf. J.Chrys. Hom.1Thess. 11.2 [PG 62.463]. 75 76 Iren. Adv.Haer. 5.6.1; 5.9.1. Orig. Orat. 10; Princ. 1.3.5. 77 ZachT 3.337.8–10 (4.234). Ghattas (2004), 48, notes the use of the language of ºØ ¼ Łæø  by Vitalis, leader of the Dimoiritae, to denote solely body and soul (Fid. fr.172 [Lietzmann 273.11–14]; cf. Epiph. Pan. 77.23) and suggests that Didymus represents an orthodox recovery. 78 Doutreleau ZachT I, 88; cf. Epiph. Ancor. 119.5: ‘he assumed a complete (ºØ ) man, soul and body and mind and everything’; G.Naz. Carm. 1.1.10. 79 80 Orig. Dial. 7. Doutreleau ZachT I, 89–90. 81 82 Orphanos (1974), 42–59. Orphanos (1974), 73. 83 Contrast the anthropology of Gregory of Nyssa, which offers a simpler, more intellectual picture of the soul and as a result struggles to explain the relationship of passions to such an intellectual substance; cf. Meredith (1989), 47–50. 84 In 1 Cor. 15.44–6 [Staab 10.14–35]; cf. Orphanos (1974), 69; Solari (1999), 76–7.

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spirit: man is only truly tripartite in his flowering in virtue, which is precisely the point at which his nature becomes unitary. The ‘almond’ has two layers outside the edible part: the shell and then the bitter bit, the outer husk. The outer husk can be the body; for it is bitter, since it is inclined towards pleasures. The shell-like husk is the soul, for it is vigorous and great; and inside is the edible part, the spirit. So when that saying of the Apostle’s prayer was fulfilled, when he wrote: ‘May the God of peace sanctify you, your spirit and soul and body, complete’ (1 Thess. 5:23), then ‘the almond flowered’ (Eccl. 12:5); for in flowering it has these three. So man flowers, when he advances in virtue, when he has his ‘body reshaped’ so that it becomes ‘conformed to the body of Christ’ (Phil. 3:21).85

We are thus encountering neither a reading of Platonism into the biblical text, nor even a concern to present a systematic psychology or anthropology, but rather the use of popular conceptions to elucidate the divine economy’s fundamental call to virtue. Didymus can exploit the sense in which ‘Platonic’ vocabulary distinguishes humanity from the animal creation, but this is never more than an aside;86 he introduces ‘Stoic’ language of a ruling faculty at will and without a simple equivalence, and when describing sense operation prefers ‘Stoic’ terminology.87 Nonetheless, the Middle Platonist psychology is most apparent, precisely because of its hierarchical nature, which offers the ethical aetiology for him to articulate a staged dynamic movement towards either sin or indeed virtue.88 ‘And keep anger from your heart’ (Eccl. 11:10). Anger (Łıe) is not a virtue of the heart but of the irascible part (F ŁıØ F). So it means this: do not let anger get into your rational element or mind (fiH ºªØØŒfiH ı ŒÆd fiH fiH), even if sometimes that sort of movement (Œ ÅØ) occurs in your irascible part, ‘keep it from your heart’. And it is separated ‘from your heart’ when it does not even brush against it . . .

85

EcclT 6.358.1–9. On the hylic irrational soul of animals which perishes with the body, see PsT 1.45.9–11; EcclT 2.91.10–16. 87 GenT 1.48.20–49.6; cf. ZachT 3.323.23–9 (4.181), where the soul is said to be moulded throughout man so that the whole man shares its sense-perceptible power. Whereas the vocabulary of the ª ØŒ was appropriated by many later Platonists, the ubiquity of the soul remains fundamentally Stoic. By contrast, Plato’s account in the Timaeus (44d–e, 69c–72d) locates the rational part in the head and the lower powers in the body deliberately separated by the neck, and so later Platonists like Alcinous could use this physical separation as the basis of the argument that the rational and passionate powers are different, Didasc. 24(176.37–40). 88 I would thus contrast Didymus’ usage from that of Evagrius, where the tripartite schema is indeed central to his anthropology, Pract. 89; cf. Špidlík (1978), 104–5; Driscoll (1999), 143–5. It is thus no surprise that the Evagrian system is far more rigid in its classifications and characterizing than Didymus’ broad emphasis on tensions and dynamic progress. 86

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The mind ( F) is continually indicated in Scripture by the name ‘heart’ (ŒÆæ Æ). So it means this, if ever you grow angry, do not transfer the anger into your heart, lest the anger becomes a disposition ( ØŁØ). Even if you have a desire suddenly occur in your concupiscible part (K fiH K ØŁıÅØŒfiH), do not transfer it into the mind and rational part; for it will be a disposition and no longer a passion or a pre-passion but evil-doing (PŒØ Ł j æ ŁØÆ Iººa ŒÆŒÆ).89

The pathology of a sin is thus a series of stages of disordering, each requiring an act of mental assent or at least the failure of the ordering faculty to limit the development.90 In this way Didymus is able to depict a sense of natural inevitability, akin to the growth of a cancer, whilst at the same time maintaining that sin remains a moral choice always within the purview of a free will which has not been enfeebled as in Augustine. For this is the situation he finds in the narrative of Judas’ betrayal of Christ. There is no polar opposition between two realities, namely an irrational and a rational soul, as the materialist Apollinarius seems to have found in his reading of the Phaedrus myth,91 but rather the exercise and mutual interrelationships of powers of the same noetic substance.92 The soul is for Didymus above all a moral arena, the earth capable of producing virtue and vice, not because it consists of two warring principles but because it has a singular underlying reality (hupokeimenon).93

89

EcclT 6.337.7–11, 19–24. PsT 1.43.20–5. The distance Didymus has moved from Plato here is readily apparent through a comparison with the depiction of the evolution of the tyrant, Resp. 9.571a ff. 91 Ps.-Athan. C.Apoll. 1 [PG 26.1144c]. 92 Although Didymus can say that the mortal part of man is held in common with irrational creation and indeed › Ø with it (EcclT 2.99.1–12), it seems highly unlikely that he intended to suggest the existence of two souls within man, namely a material irrational soul and an immaterial intellectual one, as Schibli (1989), 180n.10 assumes. Crouzel (1989), 89, does suggest that Origen’s thought is characterized by the addition of the lower soul after the primitive fall; yet, although in discussing the possibility of an evil element in the human constitution at Princ. 3.4.1–2, Origen explores what is probably Clement’s combination of traducianism with creationism as teaching ‘two souls’ (Strom. 6.(16)135.1–4; 7.(12)79.6–7), this does not strike me as the most convincing reading of Origen, and so there is no need to read it into Didymus. As Orphanos (1974), 120, notes, passages which might imply a separate irrational soul such as HiobT 1.47.1–3 and PsT 3.144.1–3 are easily understood on the basis of distinct powers of a single soul. Ps.-Athan. C.Apoll. 1 [PG 26.1144c–1145a] (probably Didymus) attacks Apollinarius for deriving just such a ‘fleshly soul’ without any basis in Scripture or common reckoning; and this should be understood not as a consequence of his ‘Alexandrian’ Christology but his ‘Asiatic’ materialism. If Didymus did suppose an exact parallel with the impassioned animal soul, then this too, being material, would constitute part of the embryological growth and perish with the body at death, EcclT 2.91.10–16. However, it is clear that the rational soul which predates birth and continues after death (EcclT 2.100.20–3) continues to exist in an impassioned state without its gross, earthly body (HiobT 1.83.29–84.5). 93 PsT 1.21.23–8. 90

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I N T E R N A L STI M U LI TO S I N Given the positive role conceded by Didymus to certain passions,94 it is not emotion or non-intellectual movements of the soul per se which provide the stimulus to sin. The psychological state correlating to virtue and indeed caused by it consists of neither passionlessness (apatheia) nor moderated passion (metriopatheia) but rather an ordered series of hierarchies which result in a unidirectional harmony. The movements of both the lower and higher powers of the soul are to be shepherded, rather than limited or rejected.95 It is the search for multiplicity which is the source of evil96 and so pleasure is multicoloured, while true desire of the Saviour is singular.97 If we accept that Didymus attributes neither God’s creation of the body, nor indeed any separate irrational soul, to the Fall, then both the rational and irrational movements are natural to ideal humanity. Yet, given that only such movement as comes under the active control of the rational faculty can be construed as moral and that there are innate and indelible stimuli towards virtue, it may seem that the path to virtue should be easy. However, for all his at first surprising lack of interest in the ascetic detail by which it is acquired,98 Didymus repeatedly states on the basis of Gen. 3:19 that for mankind virtue is only won by toil.99 So virtue is something toilsome and as a result the heart of men is attentive towards what is evil. Because of this he says, ‘All the days of your life you will eat your bread in sweat’ (Gen. 3:19), which would not be said to the angels—for the matters of virtue are enacted more easily among them.100

The key concept is that of the growth or development of passion. Pre-passions, as we shall see, are natural, neutral, and confined to the appropriate faculty of the soul. However, if not actively managed,101 these may develop into true passions, which though not evil in themselves are its necessary prerequisite, disturbing the reasoning faculty so that it consents to sinful thought and 94

See the section Impetus to Virtue—The Positive Role of the Passions in Chapter 6. GenT 1.140.10–23; EcclT 1.38.26–8. 96 97 EcclT 4.231.16–232.26. PsT 5.297.15–19. 98 Practical advice is limited to: times for eating, EcclT 5.285.27–286.3; 5.310.1–4; bridling words, HiobT 2.185.5–28; the importance of silence, PsT 4.267.29–31; warning against those who befriend monks for the wrong reasons, PsT 4.266.18–20; the danger of presuming the constancy of one’s own virginity, PsT 2.92.24–7; and possibly penance for nocturnal emissions, PsT 4.233.4–6. 99 GenT 1.104.4–17; PsT 4.274.24–5; EcclT 1.44.28–45.2; 3.150.5–6; cf. Philo Sacr. 35–6; 41; though at Leg.All. 3.135 he asserts that virtue acquired through labour is in fact a lower form (Aaron) and that Moses represents a higher virtue which is given as a gift by God without effort; Orig. Hom.Ex. 5.3. 100 GenT 1.104.14–17. The controlling role of this passage is shown by such verbal reminiscences as PsT 3.143.13–15; ZachT 2.172.25–7 (2.337). 101 EcclT 6.337.20–4; 5.294.8–20. It is basic to most ancient definitions of ŁÅ that, unchecked, they tend to irrational excess: Arist. E.N. 2.1105b19 ff. 95

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action. The effect of passions, particularly anger and fear, is to disturb the mind,102 so that its strength fails and the divine light is no longer present for the inner man.103 In this way passions serve as a ‘cataract’ for the mind;104 they conceal the reason,105 drive mad one’s spiritual rider,106 and deprive one of the presence of God.107 Consequently, although even full-blown passion may be controlled at any stage by correct reasoning, it is precisely this which the passions prevent, thus establishing a character ethic of habituation. That means as long as the soul is buffeted hither and thither by passions ( e

ÆŁH æØçæÆØ z  ŒIŒE), you cannot ‘sow in tears’ in order that ‘you might harvest in joy’ (Ps. 125:5), nor can you ‘sow into righteousness’ (Hos. 10:12).108

The savagery of the passions must, therefore, be broken by ascetic effort, not just an act of intellection.109 The ‘cloak of skin’ is not the source of emotional behaviour but rather an aspect of its disordering: it is the confusion of the hierarchies which when properly ordered make one truly human.110 It is not necessarily so; hence, it can be sanctified,111 but it is inherited in a disordered state analogous to the congealing of milk due to birth from succession,112 and so a form of ecstasy—a standing outside of self which is in fact a return to true self—is necessary to break with this and begin the path to virtue.113 The result is a two-tiered account, as we shall see when we come to examine Didymus’ conception of original sin—a distinction between a theoretical, ordered anthropology and psychology in which both irrational stirrings of the soul and the body have a positive role and the experienced reality of inverted hierarchies which must be broken as virtue is acquired. This is bolstered by Didymus’ use of the Aristotelian concepts of activity (energeia) and potential (dunamis) to portray the opposing qualities of virtue and vice as discrete and incompatible states.114 Consequently, despite affirming the goodness of material creation against both the explicit dualism of the Manichaeans and the implicit dualism of classical Greek ontologies, such as that of the Timaeus with its descending levels of craftsmanship (the uncreated Forms, the

102

103 PsT 3.142.16–18; 3.222.12–14. PsT 4.266.7–11. 105 HiobT 2.125.16–21. PsT 3.193.10–12. 106 107 ZachT 3.409.11–17 (5.191). PsT 2.110.22–3. 108 109 EcclT 6.323.4–6. Philos. [PG 39.1109a]. 110 HiobT 3.262.8–18; EcclT 6.332.1–3. Although Didymus most often uses man as a negative term (ZachT 3.352.4–10 (4.298)), he still retains earlier notions of humanity as an ideal category, PsT 3.152.17–32; cf. Philo Gig. 34; Orig. Hom.Num. 24.2. 111 In this life: HiobT 2.135.20–9; PsT 3.209.2–4; EcclT 6.358.7–8; Resurrection: GenT 2.149.1–5; PsT 3.129.4–6; In 1 Cor. 15.42–3 [Staab 10.1–13]. 112 113 HiobT 3.277.11–25. PsT 3.181.4–7. 114 PsT 3.159.1–14; cf. C.Man. 12 [PG 39.1101a]. By eating the fruit, Adam does not gain the knowledge of good and evil but has his enacted virtue reduced to the mere potential of knowing, GenT 1.109.14–22. 104

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immortal Demiurgic creation, and the mortal godly creation), Didymus is able to adopt many traditional stances towards the experience of passion. Any shift of emphasis is largely due to the focus on the mind’s role in the growth of a passion. Passions are not the only means of disturbing the mind. This may be done directly through unfitting reckonings and enthymemes. The heart is destroyed, whenever the thought comes from outside the corresponding state (ø B ŒÆƺººı ŒÆÆø). Meanwhile it is disturbed (ÆæÆØ), if it has any confusion ( åıØ ). It happens that I am disturbed by entertaining reckonings and enthymemes which are not fitting (c

æŒ Æ).115

The potential pathology of ill-constructed and inappropriate rational argument is equated to that of the passion: its point of access is neutral, namely the reasoning process, but through false argument or suppressed premises it disturbs the mind in order to lead it into error; if entertained briefly, it causes confusion; if allowed to last, it destroys the soul’s participation in truth and virtue and in a sense destroys the soul itself. The key concept is that of disturbance (tarachē).116 The sin contingent on inappropriate response to either passion or reckoning is in both cases rational.117 Both forms are ultimately predicated on the sense of deception, and simply have different starting points for their pathologies. Consequently, despite Didymus’ love of 1 Cor. 9:27 (‘I beat up my body and enslave it’),118 it is not without reason that he styles ‘the doctrines of piety’ as the remedy for passions and habits.119 Here again Didymus collapses the distinction between the practical and the contemplative, the ethical and the intellectual. By extending virtue from a preliminary stage in the progress of the soul to its ultimate goal, he induces a corresponding anticipation of what in other thinkers constitutes the illuminative stage: that is, virtue and wisdom run side by side in his thought rather than sequentially. The danger of the passions lies neither in their corporeality nor their basic influence on the soul, but rather in that they suggest an illusory reality dominated by the material and minimizing the truly significant. The basis of evil is deceit, which is the worst passion;120 and although pleasure is the 115

PsT 4.266.25–7; cf. PsT 4.289.12–16; In 2 Cor. 12.7–9 [Staab 42.21–2]. PsT 1.43.16–17. 117 The body itself can never be the ÆNÆ of sin, as only the soul is subject to God’s commandments—the body’s role is purely instrumental, PsT 1.38.2–7. 118 EcclT 2.74.25–6; 2.128.1–2; GenT 2.224.16–20; PsT 2.105.27–106.2; 4.232.29–31. As one has come to expect, the verse is far more often given an abstract sense as asserting the soul’s rule over the body (PsT 4.261.22–6) and man’s consequent fitness for battle with the opposing powers (ZachT 2.257.4–6 (3.271)) than used to describe ascetic discipline or virginity (ZachT 2.111.15–20 (2.80)). Carrying around ‘the death of Jesus in one’s body’ (cf. 2 Cor. 4:10) is primarily a state of mind or moral attitude, PsT 2.102.28–103.3. 119 120 EcclT 6.325.25–326.2; cf. PsT 5.312.1–4. GenT 2.152.15–16. 116

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immediate basis for sin in Genesis 3, it is so through the deception of the Devil which puts what is pleasant in place of the good.121 This obvious but unprepossessing point highlights the gulf between Didymus’ and Augustine’s thought on the nature of sin. Although it is an oversimplification to view Augustine as introducing the concept of will (and indeed he maintains an intellectual degradation alongside corruption of the will122), Didymus’ emphasis is almost entirely upon sin as epistemological—it remains throughout a question of knowing. The vitiation of human nature in the Adamic Fall and through individual habituation to sin is solely a mental one, albeit one deriving more often than not from our gross body and sense perceptions. Didymus’ condemnation of passion and pleasure is not, therefore, equivalent to Augustine’s attacks on lust (libido or concupiscentia), and so he is able to maintain a more positive attitude to the body and to marriage than Augustine. Yet this qualification should not be misread as a break with the fourthcentury ascetic trends. The fact that the battle for virtue is essentially a mental one does not draw Didymus into a more Aristotelian definition of happiness to include the possession of bodily and material goods as well as the virtues themselves.123 His focus on the disposition of the agent means that even mixed motivation must be transcended: the virtues must be a primary goal rather than a secondary by-product, honey rather than wax.124 The effect of this dual assertion of the goodness of the material creation without it being productive of human happiness is apparent is his treatment of sexual intercourse. In his controversy with the Manichaeans, Didymus actually suggests that intercourse is not inherently sinful and Christ’s soteriologically vital sinlessness would not have been compromised by sex. However, this apparent optimism about the body is then heavily qualified by the need that such intercourse would have had to have been timely (i.e. at a point in the woman’s cycle when she may have conceived), for the express purpose of reproduction, in the context of a single marriage, and neither in a time of danger, nor a time of prayer.125 Although such a scenario is not only not punishable but even on a level with virginity,126 it is so only because one is avoiding even the appearance of hunting for pleasure.127 Equally, although Didymus often asserts that it is possible to please God while still in the body, eating and drinking are only acceptable as long as one does not take any sense-perceptible enjoyment, one eats at the right time of day (not the morning), and only until satisfied.128

121 122 123 125 127

GenT 1.83.7–11; cf. Evag. Pract. 42. Aug. Lib.Arb. 3.(18)52 ff.; Trin. 12.7 ff.; Dihle (1982), 123 ff. 124 EcclT 6.335.20–6. PsT 1.34.22–35.4. 126 EcclT 5.274.17–22; 2.75.3–24. EcclT 5.274.14–17. 128 EcclT 5.274.10–14. EcclT 2.74.25–75.2; 5.310.1–9.

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E X T E RN A L STI M U L I TO S I N—D E M O N S , HERETICS AND S OPHISTS

The Role of Demons Although few Greek philosophers ever espoused the absolute indifference of ‘higher beings’ towards humanity that characterizes Epicurus, there remains a significant gulf between the role of daimones, heroes, and gods in Hellenistic and Christian thought.129 Even in Porphyry and Iamblichus, whose turn towards Persian and Egyptian magical texts may well have been influenced by Judaeo-Christian thought on angels and demons, daimones display an ambivalent morality, rather than functioning solely as stimuli to sin.130 Within the ascetic currents of fourth-century Christianity the ambit and extent of demonic temptation was very much a live issue,131 and we see in Didymus the maintenance of Clement and Origen’s interest in particular strains of Jewish demonology and the implication of demons in many psychological processes. Much criticism of their so-called ‘allegory’ pertained to the continual introduction of demons into the narrative paradigms of the Bible—instead of using elevated readings to explain superhuman characters as ciphers for natural or psychological forces in the manner of Stoic exegesis of Homer, Didymus and Origen tend to introduce the Devil as both personality and agent within apparently natural or psychological accounts. As such, the Devil as a discrete moral agent is implicated in almost all psychological processes.132 Pre-passions and passions do not simply occur within the soul but are actively engendered by the Devil and his associated powers.133 Didymus conceives the struggle against sin not just as a psychological need to cure a habituated pathology but as a spiritual conflict with demons. These are not alternative frameworks but complementary ones.134 Not only is the Devil the first source and father of evil,135 but he is also its continuing agent. He alone is without excuse, since all others derive evil from him directly or indirectly.136 Consequently, other forms of temptation are

129 Perhaps the most interesting extended discussion of Æ  from Middle Platonist circles is Apuleius’ De Deo Socratis. 130 Porph. Ep. ad Marc.; Iamb. Myst. 131 Ant.Aeg. Ep. 6.3–7; Evag. Pract. 31; cf. Guillaumont and Guillaumont (1971), 38 ff.; Evans (1982), 99 ff. on Augustine. 132 Cf. Orig. Comm.Jn. 20.(36)326–37; 20.(40)378; Blanc Comm.Jn. IV, 21–2. 133 PsT 3.222.4–6. 134 Cf. Evagrian discussion, which may at first seem simply to equate the two conceptions through the equivalence of language of thought and evil spirit; yet demons also make physical attacks (Antirr. 4), and so cannot be reducible to psychological phenomena; cf. Sinkewicz (2003), xxv. 135 136 GenT 1.95.29–96.1; PsT 2.78.7; 2.84.5. GenT 1.94.19–95.1.

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generally understood as his instruments or operations.137 The development of pre-passion into passion and then into sinful disposition and evil action is not just an internal process but an opportunity for the Devil, and each stage is met with the injunction from Eph. 4:27 (‘Do not allow room for the Devil’). The base narrative is that of the Johannine account of Judas’ betrayal.138 By reading John 13:2 and 13:27 as two discrete stages within a process, Didymus is able to explain the ascent of the wicked spirit (Eccl. 10:4) into the soul, from the first stirrings of pre-passion, through a psychological process, until conformity to evil is articulated as the indwelling of the Devil, parallel to the virtuous indwelling of the Word.139 This gives vivid expression to Didymus’ agreement with the Stoics that virtue and vice are incompatible states140—the Devil must be removed and replaced with divine indwelling. The Bride in the Song of Songs says: ‘Get up out, North wind, and come, South wind’ (Song 4:16). She sends the wicked power away from her. The wicked power was in her. When she did what is ‘evil’, the evil before the faith, before her calling, she had the North wind tabernacling in her (cf. John 1:14).141

Generally Didymus wishes to say that it needs no great effort:142 So just as light dawning and reaching here, where there is darkness, dissolves the darkness—for darkness disappears in the presence of light, and when virtue shines, the evil in its way goes—, so too when righteousness appears and rescues those who ask him, every injustice is destroyed.143

However, at other points, this process of habituation to evil-doing and the indwelling of the Devil seems to become almost intrinsic to one’s being: Whenever someone has space for repentance, he is a clay ‘vessel’ (cf. Jer. 18:1–6) which can be remoulded, reshaped. But when at last he has certainty in a habit (ÆØÅÆ K Ø) which is almost infallible or hard to change, then he is a ‘pottery vessel’.144

The pottery vessel cannot be remoulded and so must be broken (Jer. 19:10–11) and, on the basis of Isa. 30:14, this breaking is so total that even the shards are totally useless.145 A similar conceptual incongruity lurks behind his indiscriminate use of metaphors of sterility and procreation. Sometimes, as in the exegesis of the 137 GenT 2.152.20–3; 2.157.4–11. He is the source of fear and confusion, PsT 3.222.4–6; implants crooked reckonings, PsT 4.267.25–7. 138 Cf. Layton (1999). 139 EcclT 5.294.8–20; cf. Orig. Comm.Jn. 32.(2)19–25; 32.(22)281–5. 140 EcclT 3.150.11–14; PsT 3.199.6–9; cf. Orig. Comm.Jn. 20.(14)112; though this only applies to fully rational beings such as adults, children, and animals, EcclT 6.338.25–339.4; PsT 2.94.16–18; 2.90.13–18. 141 142 EcclT 6.321.10–14; cf. ZachT 1.29.17–25 (1.129). PsT 4 Suppl. 250.24–6. 143 144 145 PsT 3.138.3–5. EcclT 6.344.2–5. EcclT 6.344.5–12.

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Song of Songs passage above, the Devil’s effect on the soul is to impose a temporary sterility by closing the spiritual ovaries of the soul146—the choice is between bearing true offspring through Christ and the virtues or none at all; while elsewhere the soul may beget offspring by either of the two competing principles of virtue and vice.147 The first metaphor fits more neatly in to his overarching metaphysic with its singular first principle, while the latter— which we encounter more frequently—accords with his more dualistic experiential account of virtue and vice. Although the struggle with demons is spiritual warfare within the moral arena,148 it is not a war between good and evil, and certainly not between God and the demons. The battle is providentially ordered by God and although the Devil was not made to be the Devil by God,149 he nevertheless fulfils a role within the divine economy. The portrayal in the Book of Job is taken as basic to his agency and thus his power is viewed as both limited150 and contingent upon God giving people over to his testing,151 even though the war against humanity is his own152 and one motivated by jealousy.153 The fact that there is no testing without the consent of God is ‘a dogma of truth’.154 Two aspects of this are found side by side: in the first, evil or suffering is conceived as purely indifferent, happening to the worthless and earnest alike,155 and in this sense God guards the saints and diminishes their physical sensation;156 in the second, suffering is purposeful, serving as a punishment for the worthless and a contest for the saint, who must enter the kingdom like an athlete157 because virtue involves enduring pains for God.158 This idea of testing is fundamental to Didymus’ portrayal of progress in virtue,159 and he can even speak of the saint’s eagerness for testing as a prologue and foundation of his heavenly citizenship.160 Patience is the key lesson of salvation, the Stoicized courage modelled by Job.161 Consequently, although progress in virtue can be said to protect one from external causes

146

147 EcclT 6.321.17–22. EcclT 2.81.3–8; GenT 1.99.1–15. PsT 3.195.17–20; 4.275.12–17. The weapons of truth are virtues, pious thoughts, mysteries, and doctrines of truth, PsT 2.101.5–6. 149 150 EcclT 2.88.10–11. EcclT 5.293.25–294.1; HiobT 3.245.2–7. 151 152 HiobT 1.16.30–3; 3.285.1–8; PsT 4.278.5. HiobT 3.245.4–8. 153 154 HiobT 1.2.9–34; 1.3.34–4.1. HiobT 1.27.30–3; 1.23.18–26. 155 HiobT 3.211.16–19. 156 HiobT 2.163.9–14. But even here there must be sensation or else there could be no courage, HiobT 3.289.32–290.1, and so it is wrong to suggest that the martyrs had no feeling, HiobT 2.171.16–20. 157 HiobT 1.83.11–18; cf. PsT 1.27.27–28.4. 158 HiobT 2.164.7–18; PsT 3.218.24–9. 159 HiobT 3.296.33–297.16; 2.136.1–137.18; GenT 1.122.4–10. 160 GenT 2.196.27–8. 161 In 2 Cor. 1.6 [Staab 15.17–20]. On Job’s courage as closer to Stoic ŒÆææÆ than Aristotelian I æÆ, see Layton (2004), 80–3. 148

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of sin, such as the Devil,162 it nonetheless increases the degree of contest. Demonic temptation is not limited to the preliminary steps in virtue but actually is a sign of growth towards perfection. Whenever someone holds strongly to the word (ºª ) and gate of the word (cf. 1 Cor. 16:9) and enacts them, he has many opponents. The Devil himself opposes him, wishing to prevent the help which comes from the activity of the word, as do sophistic men and other evil men.163

This brings out the sense of the fact that, for all the language of warfare, sin is specifically denied to be the result of external force.164

Other Agents Demonic agency is by no means the only stimulus to sin, and plenty of space is left for human wickedness, particularly that of heretics and sophists. The language of heresy is central to Didymus’ portrayal of ecclesiastic orthodoxy and, although he is not so polemical as many of his contemporaries in his depiction of heretics, they are nonetheless not just mistaken but purposefully deceiving in their views through a wilful misreading of the thread of Scripture.165 As such they are just as much agents of temptation and evil as the demons.166 Perhaps a little more surprising is the fact that at least equal billing is given to sophists.167 We are not to understand here a self-designated profession or even rhetoricians in general168—the antithesis between philosopher and sophist is so old that the latter is almost always a pejorative term.169 Rather, this choice of label for his opponents is illustrative of both Didymus’ selfperception as an agent of truth and his underlying presentation of evil as 162

HiobT 2.150.15–26. PsT 2.63.19–25; In 1 Cor. 16.8–9 [Staab 12.7–14]; cf. G.Nyss. Inscr.Ps. 2.203. 164 165 PsT 4.240.29–30. EcclT 5.302.13–16. 166 ZachT 3.350.13–18 (4.292). On Clement’s treatment of heresy, see Karavites (1999), 50 ff. 167 ZachT 1.91.13–16 (1.407). 168 PsT 3.160.16–19; dialecticians are acceptable, since they use the demonstration of what is false to reveal the truth, PsT 4.278.29–34. 169 The philosopher–sophist antithesis is at least as old as Plato’s Gorgias and Sophist (cf. Aristophanes’ disparaging portrayal of Socrates himself as a sophist in the Nubes) and is appropriated by Philo, Post.Cain. 150. The Second Sophistic movement may well have sparked some of the antagonism evidenced by Middle Platonists (Alcin. Didasc. 35(189.12–15)), but this could reflect a wider recognition of Protagorean relativity as the principal enemy of all philosophical realists (35(189.15–22)). At one point Didymus even makes conscious use of this tradition by adducing the parallel comments of Aristotle (‘› ø çغç’) on ‘çØØŒÆd K åºØ’ (EcclT 4.226.23–4 alluding to Arist. Int. 17a37). Even when Didymus employs the term sophism purely illustratively to describe the particular form of syllogism, there remains a disdain which does not apply to the apodeictic or dialectic, EcclT 4.240.7–18; PsT 1.51.19–52.3. 163

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deception.170 One might expect that siding so vocally with Plato over Philostratus on this matter is part of a wider programmatic agenda to establish the character of Christianity as the ‘true philosophy’ in the manner of Justin Martyr or Clement, but in fact Didymus makes only sparse references to this well-worn theme.171 Nonetheless, sophists are said to lead their brothers into impiety through deceit by incorrect application of the wording;172 their deception thus has an air of credibility173 but is essentially false and eristic, and so divides the harmonious things of truth in the same way as heresy.174 This is not just a condemnation of worldly wisdom, though Didymus is happy to indulge in that from time to time,175 despite a certain hesitancy as to the fate of the naturally wise and virtuous non-Christian.176 Sophistry is particularly marked by a deliberate multiplicity,177 which denies the fundamental unity of both the truth and intended humanity,178 and makes the sophist many-faced like the Devil.179 Indeed, so strong is the connection that sophists can be compared to horses ridden by the wicked powers,180 and it is the sophists who defend idolatry.181 Sophistry is not just a sin182 but the spur to the primal sin,183 connected with irrational pleasure184 and boastful self-sufficiency.185 The danger lies in the subtlety of those able to make God’s commandment and his Scriptures the basis of sin. Knowing that someone is a sophist is one thing and comprehending his sophistries another. For even the one who is on his guard lest he falls under sophisms, who knows that he is dealing with a sophist, even he is not altogether able to solve his sophistries. And true discovery is detecting his art, making his deceit apparent.186

170 Much the same process is already apparent in Philo, e.g. Leg.All. 3.64, where sophistry is the mechanism of pleasure’s deception of the mind; Leg.All. 3.41, where one must be freed from sophistic thoughts as well as corporeal necessities; Det. 72–4. However, there is no move to give this a particularly demonic context, unless one wishes to read something into the exegesis of the King of the Amorites as a sophist, Leg.All. 3.232. Cf. Tert. Apol. 47.2; Orig. Comm.Cant. 2. 171 There are, nonetheless, a few references to the çغçÆ of Paul, PsT 3.206.24 and EcclT 2.83.24; cf. EcclT 3.165.16–17. 172 GenT 1.127.19–23; cf. PsT 2.93.28–94.8; ZachT 3.307.25–308.8 (4.119). 173 174 GenT 1.141.21–3. EcclT 5.303.1–6; cf. EcclT 6.357.6–8. 175 HiobT 3.225.13–30; 3.300.10–301.2; EcclT 1.33.24–34.4; 2.123.20–1. 176 EcclT 2.98.1–6. 177 As with Didymus’ entire ethic, intention is of paramount importance, and so it is not the error of sophistry which is inherently sinful so much as the deliberate clinging to error in the face of truth, HiobT 2.126.14–127.22. 178 179 EcclT 4.234.2–6. EcclT 4.231.16–24; cf. In 2 Cor. 11.13–15 [Staab 39.24–40.17]. 180 ZachT 2.256.22–257.2 (3.271); 3.327.28–328.8 (4.199). Origen uses the same image of those who persecute the Church, Hom.Ex. 6.2; C.Cels. 4.32. 181 182 ZachT 3.281.4–5 (4.22). ZachT 2.203.9–21 (3.85). 183 184 GenT 1.82.12–15; In Rom. 7 [Staab 3.21–31]. ZachT 2.170.6–12 (2.327). 185 186 ZachT 2.256.22–257.1 (3.271); 3.328.3–15 (4.199–200). EcclT 4.231.6–10.

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As such, alongside the Devil and heresiarchs, the sophist is the natural opponent of the Christian teacher187—just as Elymas the Mage was for Paul188—for it is only the Word of God which demonstrates the unreality of the apparent strength of sophists, eristic men, and evil spirits.189 The extent of this condemnation of sophists may at first seem surprising but perhaps reflects the vitriol of philosophical sources from the Second Sophistic era.190 A fairly sober but ultimately damning example is found at the end of Alcinous’ Teaching Guide to Plato, which outlines the distinction between the sophist and philosopher as one of manner—the sophist prefers to seem rather than be noble—and of subject matter—the philosopher treats of true being, the sophist of non-being.191 This derivation could explain an otherwise curious point. Although there should be no ontological comparison between the relationships of the Word to virtue and the virtuous and of the Devil to evil and the wicked, the same prosopological reciprocality is found in exegesis. It is not just that Didymus’ elevated readings tend toward an equation of all stimuli to evil—the Devil and the opposing powers, evil thoughts and passions, evil men, heretics, and sophists192—but that all that is said of men as being wicked is taken as strictly applicable to the Devil and wicked powers193 and vice versa. These things seem to be said about the Devil or about every wicked and opposing power and soul sharing (å Å) in the same evil-doing—for things which are receptive of the same things are consubstantial (a ªaæ H ÆPH ŒØŒa › Ø KØ ). And if something is said about the Devil as wicked, as an evildoer, it is possible for this evil-doing to be said about another wicked power.194

The argument here is from the shared participation in an essential reality by consubstantial moral agents.195 However, evil is not an essential reality; it is in fact non-existent. Alcinous may offer a basis for understanding this, through his insistence that non-being is not the contrary of being, nor the pure negation of being, but rather expresses a secondary relation to something else contingent upon actual

187

PsT 2.63.19–25. On sophistry as characteristic of those teachers who seek to control rather than shepherd their flock, see ZachT 3.291.15–292.2 (4.57). 188 ZachT 2.141.2–11 (2.205). 189 PsT 4.282.33–4; cf. ZachT 2.203.12–14 (3.85); 2.205.19–22 (3.91). 190 Interestingly, Apuleius, despite his close association with the Sophistic movement (Sandy (1997)), is keen to present himself as more of a philosopher and goes on to distinguish two forms of rhetoric, the higher of which is essential for both good government and pedagogy (Plat. 2.8–9 (231–4); cf. Dillon (1977), 333). 191 Alcin. Didasc. 35(189.12–17). 192 GenT 1.60.14–21; ZachT 2.256.22–257.1 (3.271); 3.280.8–282.3 (4.20–4); 2.232.4–20 (3.187–8); 2.203.9–204.5 (3.85–6). 193 194 EcclT 4.234.25–8. HiobT 4.402.5–15. 195 In 2 Cor. 6.14–16 [Staab 32.8–20].

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being.196 In other words, non-being is participable. Although Didymus can employ the language of non-being, he usually speaks of evil as non-existent (anupostatos),197 but it may be that earlier Christian or non-Christian predecessors opened up avenues of thought which were too hermeneutically rich to be ignored despite their uncomfortable relationship to his standard metaphysic. Nonetheless, Didymus seems to go beyond this by prioritizing the Devil in the same manner as Christ as participable source. Sinners are not just handed over to the Devil;198 desires make one a child of the Devil.199 Just as the virtuous are the body of Christ, those who have fallen from the correct teaching are the tail of the Devil,200 the heretic is his eye, the charlatan his hand.201 The virtuous feed on true doctrine, which is the flesh of Christ, the impious on the flesh of the snake, which is godless doctrines and false opinions.202 We seem to be dealing here not with a modification to his metaphysic but rather the overextension of a hermeneutical key ultimately based on an ontological relationship which in fact effectively distorts that ontology. Certainly, it is as a hermeneutical principle or rule of allegory that we find it quoted approvingly by Augustine as the seventh of Tychonius’ Rules,203 that the Devil is the head of the impious, who are in some sense his body. There, the suggestion is that such a notion is required to distinguish between the two aspects of Isa. 14:2, as only part of it can apply to the Devil, and it is explicitly made to parallel the rule about the Lord and his body.204 However, the connection in both cases seems more by way of metaphor than ontological participation. Rather, we should perhaps look to Acts 13:10; for once the indwelling Sin (Rom. 7:20) is read specifically as the Devil, the result is a close parallel between the cooperation of the Holy Spirit with the virtuous and the Devil with evil-doers.205 Such usage highlights the unsystematic nature of Didymus’ thought. Again we find him less the philosopher, and more an exegete expounding his own brand of ‘virtue-Origenism’. Despite his insistence on the unreality of evil, its impermanence, and its ultimate nothingness, being just a deprivation of the Good, he wishes to maintain the reality of evil as a competing sphere of the moral life, encompassing its tragic dimension. Consequently, he overinvests its ontological reality in a creature, albeit a long-lived and little changing creature. Elsewhere, he takes it as axiomatic for establishing the divinity of the Son and Holy Spirit that there are two classes of being—those which possess qualities essentially and those which possess them accidentally; the latter participate and the former are participated in. Origen’s graduated chain 196 Alcin. Didasc. 35(189.18–27). On the development of Pl. Soph. 253e–254a, 257b–259b as the background to this passage, see Dillon (1993), 209–10. 197 e.g. PsT 2.77.20; 3.141.7; HiobT 2.115.10–15; 3.222.27–223.4; EcclT 6.334.6–15. 198 199 ZachT 2.141.2–16 (2.205–6). PsT 2.70.20. 200 201 PsT 1.55.27–56.2. ZachT 3.321.14–18 (4.172). 202 203 ZachT 2.119.5–16 (2.120–1). Aug. Doct.Christ. 3.37(55). 204 205 Aug. Doct.Christ. 3.31(44). In Rom. 7 [Staab 5.35–6.4].

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of being is broken and replaced by two states. By failing to draw out the corollaries of this and merely repeating what were probably traditional exegeses dependent on the older ontological principles, his metaphysical proofs of the Spirit’s divinity point to the Devil as essentially evil rather than accidentally so. The immediate consequence of being ‘able to be received’ (capabili) is to be unchanging (incontrovertibile), and the consequence of being unchanging is to be eternal.206 No creature can dwell in the heart and sense, except God and his Word in the Holy Spirit.207

In summary, we might suggest that the complex and eclectic picture Didymus offers both of the soul and human person, as well as the trials they face, is not as arbitrary as it might first seem. For all that it cannot be completely harmonized in all its details, we see a broad thrust to his exegetical comments which drives towards precisely the same sort of unity that we found in the consideration of virtue in Chapter 7. The concept of an ordered unity takes precedence over all else. It is not just the fundamental nature of virtue but the nature of the soul and person which have been created for that virtue. By contrast, sin is essentially a staged process of disorder. And whereas reality as true virtue underpins the ordering, it is unreality as illusory deception which causes the confusion of disorder. These seem to be the base conceptions around which his judgement of exegetical appropriateness is structured, and they take on different textures and appearances according to the rich fabrics of Greek culture and Christian reflection that the biblical passage in question suggests.

206

D.S.S. 56(12).

207

D.S.S. 106(24).

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9 The Doctrine of Pre-Passion We have already begun to examine something of Didymus’ attitudes towards affective impulses, emotions, and passions, and key to this psychology is his language of pre-passion (propatheia). It is by now one of the most studied aspects of Didymus’ thought, and earlier imbalances towards a purely linguistic study of pre-passion as a function of Didymus’ Christology1 have been met by the conceptual treatment of Sorabji2 and the narrative analyses of Layton.3 Nonetheless, a fairly close examination of Didymus’ doctrine in the context of earlier Christian and non-Christian usage should not only throw light on his presentation of psychology and understanding of sin but also upon his relationship to Greek philosophy, which has been an ever-present counterpoint to this book. The parallels we have examined so far seem to show that Didymus makes more use of non-Christian philosophical vocabulary and concepts than simple appeal to a ‘scientific terminology’4 but stops well short of wholesale adoption or even engagement with any contemporary philosophical ethic. Layton, provoked largely by his own reconstruction of Didymus’ doctrine of pre-passion, has argued that the commentaries repeatedly evidence the remodelling of classical concepts through the lens of the biblical narrative, largely because of his derivative acquaintance with such ideas through the medium of Origen.

1 Gesché (1962), 148–98; Ghattas (1996), 242–9; Kramer and Krebber EcclT IV, 157–9; Hagedorn, Hagedorn, and Koenen HiobT III, 237–239n.45. 2 Sorabji (2000) offers a conceptual study of Stoic theories of emotion, which explicitly treats Didymus, albeit briefly at 351–2, as part of a more widespread Christian adoption of Stoic models. Unfortunately, he did not have access to the full range of Didymean usages and, partly in order to explain the transmission of the vocabulary to Jerome, advocated a greater role in Origen’s thought than I would allow. 3 Layton (2004), 114–34, draws together most of his earlier work, Layton (1999); (2000); (2002b). 4 Runia (1998), 335 ff. tends towards the view that Didymus merely uses philosophical vocabulary in an unsophisticated, instrumentalist sense as a ‘langage de raison’; cf. 338: ‘Didyme n’est en aucune façon une anima naturaliter philosophica, certainement pas autant que Philon.’ However, he probably overstates his conclusions because of the apologetic constraints of his personal shift from viewing Philo in this manner to wishing to present a more profound influence of Greek philosophy on his thought (329–30).

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The introduction of propatheia into Christ’s vigil [by Origen] introduces a thin wedge of independence from Stoic ethics, and the coloration of the surrounding biblical narrative begins to seep into the concept . . . Didymus does not seem to have direct contact with the function of propatheia in Stoic writings and depends completely on Origen’s use of the concept. In this way, he obtains the psychological concept already attached to scriptural narratives, along with this resonant ambiguity.5

The thesis is certainly most plausible with regard to pre-passion, where the discrete effects of the Gethsemane and Judas narrative arcs can be discerned, but feels somewhat forced elsewhere. In particular, his repeated fashionable emphasis on narrative as Didymus’ primary exegetical mode distorts the reality of his lemmatic approach and reliance on hermeneutical keys comprising the nexus of mutually enlightening relationships between a number of isolated biblical verses.6 Rather, whilst conceding the obvious pre-eminence of the Bible over either experience or rational inference, Didymus appears to undertake a more conscious remodelling of philosophical language and concepts. In particular, I would suggest that it is not Origen’s stretching of the terminology of prepassion to fit biblical archetypes which results in an inherent ambiguity unconsciously exaggerated by Didymus but Didymus’ wish to express a psychological continuum which moves him to a more Philonic usage. Moreover, I view Didymus rather than Origen as the key figure for Christian usage of both term and concept.

USAGE OUTSID E DIDYMUS Prior to Sorabji, a narrow, linguistic focus had obscured the fact that Didymean pre-passion belongs to a major area of Stoic psychological debate.7 Gesché, finding only a single Philonic parallel8 and Plutarch’s physiological usage,9 concluded that Didymus’ understanding was not influenced by 5

Layton (2004), 123. Eph. 4:27 forms just such a key with John 13:2 and 13:27 to describe the manner of demonic attack and is taken over as such from Orig. In Eph. 4.27 [Gregg fr.20.4–15]; hence the ‘surprising frequency’ with which Didymus introduces this verse either in isolation or in parallel with these others in his Old Testament commentaries and the fact that he ‘regularly deploys the text without additional explanation—as if the Apostle’s admonition were self-explanatory’, Layton (1999), 532. 7 Sorabji (2000), esp. 343 ff.; cf. Layton (2000), 263–5; Layton (2004), 114–19. The Stoic debate is attested only in Latin or tantalizing fragments. 8 Philo Quaest.Gen. 1.79. 9 e.g. Plut. Symp. 4.2.4, 666c–d (physical response to thunder); Sanit. 11, 127c–d, 128b (first symptoms of a fever), traced back to Democritus (Sanit. 14). 6

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non-Christian sources.10 More recently, Layton has reached the same conclusion, not through ignorance of the Stoic framework but by insisting that Didymus’ sole knowledge of the word and concept derived from Origen. Consequently, Didymus is seen to accept the vocabulary already coloured by its place in certain biblical narratives and, in extending the concept, unwittingly to undermine the Stoic epistemology on which it depends. The Stoic conception of passions as part of their psychology of action entailed a restriction of that term to only deliberate psychological states, an idea we find replicated in Origen’s and Didymus’ language of the assent of the ruling power to an impulse or impression. Consequently, despite the lack of evidence, it seems clear that late Stoic psychologies11 developed the idea of pre-passion to account for emotional impulses outside the control even of the perfect reasoning of the sage. Its primary purpose was thus apologetic, as is seen in the defence of Chrysippus’ thought against Posidonius by Seneca.12 As Inwood puts it: Since every passion is (the result of) an act of assent, any affective reaction which an agent has to something in his environment which cannot be considered, even in principle, to be the result of an assent will lose its claim to be called a pathos . . . Any affective reaction which is completely beyond the voluntary control of an agent is therefore not a passion in the proper sense of the word.13

Stoic thinkers could not construe such involuntary affective reactions as solely physiological because of the importance their system placed upon the role of the soul (albeit a material one) in perception.14 Moreover, as an involuntary state, the only affective state outside the control of the Stoic sage, the most that could be done in terms of moral response is to reject such a pre-passion and refuse any assent to it, thus preventing it developing into a passion.15 Rist would see this as a reversion to a pre-rational stage of the sage’s moral disposition,16 and passages like Seneca’s analogy with scarring might seem to support this.17 However, Inwood would prefer to understand it as simply a fact of the perfected soul. What is already incipient in Chrysippus as the physical contractions and expansions of the mind,18 prior to the two distinct value judgements necessary to constitute a passion (first, that good or bad is at hand; secondly, that it is

10

Gesché (1962), 190; cf. 188–92. On the difficulty of dating this development, cf. Rist (1969), 37–53. 12 e.g. Sen. Ira; cf. Sorabji (2000), 66 ff., esp. 72. 13 Inwood (1985), 175, 176. Cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.64, 66, 80, 83; 4.14, 65; Sen. Ira 2.2.2; 2.4.1; Epictetus ap. Aul.Gell. N.A. 19.1. 14 Plutarch’s emphasis is entirely polemical. 15 Sen. Ira 2.4.1, 2; cf. Epictetus ap. Aul.Gell. N.A. 19.1. 16 Rist’s views cited from correspondence, Inwood (1985), 307n.236. 17 18 Sen. Ira 1.16.7. Cf. Galen Plac. 2.8.4; 3.5.43–44; 3.1.25; Sorabji (2000), 38–40. 11

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appropriate to react),19 becomes in Seneca’s hands a complex psychological theory. For he equally attempts to reconcile Zeno’s portrayal of passions as disobedience to reason with Chrysippus’ view that they are merely the product of mistaken reason.20 Consequently, one can distinguish at least three stages: first, the first movements prior to passion (which are described in terms of both mental and corporeal shocks and are inevitable21); secondly, a mistaken assent that it is appropriate to react in the circumstances; and finally, a willing disobedience even to this mistaken rationalizing of one’s behaviour in which the emotions are carried off.22 Within Stoic thought and engagements by other philosophical traditions there appears to have been some difficulty in asserting such a position whilst maintaining a monistic psychology. [Plutarch] takes the not unreasonable view that such reactions are really passions, but that the Stoic commitment to a monistic psychology would not allow them to admit it.23

Consequently, it is only really in Posidonius’ non-monistic variant on Stoic thought that the idea is elaborated without problems.24 For he is able to distinguish irrational passions such as emotion in animals, emotions evoked in humans by wordless music, and unjustified tears.25 For our purposes, it is of little importance whether the Stoic doctrine is really tenable, but simply the fact that it was expressed and would have gained some currency within ancient thought patterns could well have made it attractive to thinkers such as Philo, Origen, and Didymus in dealing with their exegetical aporiai. The key Christian text for all the commentators is Origen’s treatment of Psalm 4:5, where he uses the term pre-passion three times to explain a form of anger which is involuntary and without rational control and so not sinful. Again in another way the designation anger, from which the word ‘Be angry’ is derived, indicates something deliberate (
Ø æÆØæ
ØŒe), which some defined as a yearning (ZæØ) to mete out vengeance upon those who seem to have acted unjustly. But it also shows clearly something involuntary (IæÆæ
), which some call a pre-passion (æ ŁØÆ) that occurs, and in the case of some stimulations (KæŁØ E ) drags on to the anger which we defined previously. Therefore the other sort of ‘Be angry’, if we were to understand it in that sense—I mean the involuntary form which occurs as a pre-passion—is not a sin which is destructive of what is fine (± æ
ÅÆ I
ø
ØŒe r ÆØ
F ŒÆºF); . . . thereby 19

20 Cf. Sorabji (2000), 29–33. Cf. Sorabji (2000), 61. 22 Sen. Ira 2.3.2; 2.4.1. Sen. Ira 2.4.1. 23 Inwood (1985), 178; cf. Sorabji (2000), 68; e.g. Plut. Virt.Mor. 449a–b. 24 Posidonius ap. Plut. Libid. 6. 25 Seneca attempts to construe all three as only pre-passions at Ira 1.3.7; 2.2.3–6; and 2.3.2 respectively. 21

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the whole of what is said is such: ‘As far as you are angry and it happens to you, though you do not have reckonings (ºªØ f ) towards this, nonetheless do not add that which results from them; do not let anything blameworthy (łŒ
) follow upon that which is not blameworthy when it happens’; this is shown clearly in the ‘And do not sin’. Therefore here too the argument knows a certain sort of anger which is not a sin, one which is passive and productive of evil (ÆŁÅ
ØŒc ŒÆd ŒÆŒØÅ
،) but does not derive in any way from what is in our power (Ie
F Kç E).26

Didymus takes over precisely this interpretation; but whereas for him the language of pre-passion controls and extends the conception,27 Origen sees it as no more than a parallel to what he is saying—prepassion is not his own terminology for this distinction but that of unnamed individuals or groups. The same is true of the only other extant reference, in the Commentary on Ephesians: The unpurposed action (IæÆæ
), which some call a pre-passion (æ ŁØÆ)—that will befall even the perfect who suffer something unpurposed (IæÆæ

Ø  åı Ø) in the face of the sort of misfortunes that provoke them to anger.28

Previous studies have failed to give due weight to the fact that Origen, though familiar with the concept and happy to employ it in differentiating between voluntary and involuntary passions, distances himself from this particular vocabulary, perhaps recognizing it as alien to his Christian audience or suspected of carrying unwanted baggage. Sorabji assumes that he is working within a solely Stoic framework and that linguistic parallels lie behind Rufinus’ Latin;29 and yet extant Greek passages debating this question of an inevitable and involuntary affective disposition which should not be censured avoid the word pre-passion.30 Such avoidance would be particularly significant, since Origen had read the seminal Stoic text on the subject, Chrysippus’ On the Passions.31 26

Orig. In Ps. 4.5 [PG 12.1141d–1144b]. EcclT 5.294.8–14: ‘Even as his prior entry occurs, that is the one according to what is called pre-passion (æ ŁØÆ), do not give it room, lest it remains and becomes a passion ( Ł ). Then again even if passion occurs, still more resist it and do not give it room, lest it becomes an immoral disposition (Ø Ł Ø çƺÅ), and finally at the end do not allow it to become action (æAØ). Paul meant this when he took a saying from the Psalms, “Be angry and do not sin; what you say in your hearts, gouge out in your beds”. And he says, “Do not let the sun set on your anger, nor allow a space for the Devil”.’ 28 Orig. In Eph. 4.26 [Gregg fr.19.68–75]. On the retention of the MS æ ŁØÆ against Gregg’s emendation, cf. Layton (2000), 267n.18. 29 Sorabji (2000), 343, 346–9; e.g. ‘primi motus’ in Orig. Princ. 3.2.2. Layton (2004), 122, notes the lack of the vocabulary in his key texts and, despite suggesting it may reflect the original, seems really to assume that this is an editorial decision of the translator (193n.38). 30 Orig. Princ. 3.1.4; In Ps. 38.4 [PG 12.1388d]; In Ps. 54.5 [PG 12.1465a–b]. 31 Orig. C.Cels. 1.64; 5.57; 8.61. 27

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The only other significant Christian usage is by Jerome. In five passages he cites the idea of propatheia or propassio as a specifically Greek term which distinguishes emotions or affections that are involuntary, natural to the human state, and, if not morally indifferent, then at least not deserving of punishment.32 Between pathos ( Ł ) and propatheia (æ ŁØÆ)—that is, between passion and pre-passion (propassionem)—there is this difference, that passion is deemed a fault: pre-passion, although it bears the blame of a beginning (initii culpam), is not however held in reproach (non tenetur in crimine). Therefore whoever sees a woman and his soul is titillated, this man has been struck by pre-passion. But if he consents and makes a disposition about the thought (de cogitatione affectum fecerit), just as has been written in the book of David: ‘They crossed into a disposition of the heart’ (Ps. 72:7), he has crossed from pre-passion to passion, and this man does not lack the will to sin (voluntas peccandi) but the opportunity. Therefore whoever sees a woman for lust, that is if he gazes at her in order to lust after her, in order to arrange to do it, that man is rightly said to have committed adultery with her in his heart.33

What I find significant is that in these passsages where he introduces the terminology, Jerome seems to be following a Didymean line, and indeed the connection is to Didymus’ key idea of transitory sexual arousal. When following Origen directly, as in his own treatment of Eph. 4:26 on the distinction of two forms of anger, he avoids it.34 Layton assumes that Jerome is entirely dependent on Origen but that he introduces a hardening of prepassion which is refined during the course of his anti-Pelagian writings to explicate universal sinfulness.35 The difficulty for his theory is that the refinement predates this conflict, and I would argue that it is Didymus who provides the transitional interpretation. Jerome does not take over the entirety of Didymus’ application of pre-passion, in particular the Christological dimension; rather, the appeal to him is the ascetic problem of sexual temptation. As we shall see, it is in this psychological arena that Didymus concedes a ‘stain’ to pre-passion which is lacking in his Christological application, and by emphasizing just the one strand Jerome hardens pre-passion into ‘the fault of beginning’. The source that tends to be overlooked is Philo.36 The fragment dismissed by Gesché37 can now be extended from the Armenian: Why did Seth’s son, Enosh, hope to call the name of the Lord God? ‘Enosh’ is interpreted as ‘man’. And this is now taken not as a mixture, but as the logical part of the soul, the mind, to which hope is peculiarly fitting, for 32 Jer. Comm.Mt. 1, 4 [PL 26.38c–39a; 197a–b]; Comm.Ez. 6 [PL 25.168d]; Ep. 79.9; In Ps. 15.7 [CCSL 78.377]. 33 Jer. Comm.Mt. 1 [PL 26.38c–39a]. 34 Jer. Comm.Eph. 2 [PL 26.510b–c]. 35 Layton (2002b), 291–2. 36 Layton (2004), 114, seems to be unaware of these passages, asserting that ‘Origen provides the earliest extant attestation to propatheia as a technical term for an affective experience.’ 37 Gesché (1962), 189–90.

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irrational animals are bereft of hope. And hope is a certain anticipation of joy; before joy there is an expectation of good.38

The original Greek of this last line is preserved in Antony Melissa: Hope is a sort of pre-passion (æ ŁØ
Ø ), a joy before joy, since it is an expectation (æ ŒÆ) of good things.39

Not only could Philo assume that his intended readership would make enough sense of pre-passion as a psychological rather than physiological term to hinge his definition of hope upon this, but he already seems to be placing prepassion on a discursive continuum. Philo makes more use of the Stoic language and conceptual framework than Origen, and in his treatment of Abraham’s mourning of Sarah offers the model for mitigating apparent emotional overreactions by the saints. ‘And Abraham came to beat his breast in mourning for Sarah’ (Gen. 23:2). A pre-passion and not a passion of Abraham has been shown through these words. For it has not been said that he beat his breast in mourning, but that he came to beat his breast. The verse ‘Abraham stood up from the corpse’ (Gen. 23:3), without first saying that ‘He beat his breast’ also shows this clearly.40

Here pre-passion is clearly distinguished from passion and implicitly assumed to be either morally neutral or at least less censurable than full-blown passion; it is a beginning or an unfulfilled intention. Philo’s main concern is to present the patriarchs according to the Greek icon of the sage, and he is just as happy to justify Abraham’s actions here according to Aristotelian standards of moderation rather than passionlessness.41 Philo does not really attempt to integrate the two psychologies but rather employs the appropriate supporting epistemological framework to suit the particular portrait of saint as sage.

DIDYMUS ’ OWN USAGE It would be futile to repeat the admirable consideration of all the usages in the Didymean corpus found in Gesché and Ghattas.42 Consequently, it seems wise 38

Philo Quaest.Gen. 1.79 [Marcus’ translation]. Philo Quaest.Gen. 1.79 ap. Ant.Mel. Sent. [PG 136.789a]. 40 41 Philo fr. [Wendland 78]. Philo Abr. 256–7. 42 Gesché (1962), 148–87, only treated the then available parts of PsT; Ghattas (1996), 242–9, adds individual considerations of the other passages in PsT, as well as those in EcclT. Layton’s work is less helpful here, as he approaches the passages with Stoic models already in mind. 39

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simply to offer a summary of their conclusions supported by just a couple of the most significant passages. For Didymus, pre-passion is different from passion. It is: the first of four stages of sin (pre-passion, passion, disposition and evil-doing);43 a natural emotion; free from blame; temporary; a characteristic of all mutable creatures; only ever a beginning; not a continuous state; a beginning of a process of arousal from which sin may follow. Albeit a natural state for creaturely existence, a proof of nature, it is also the means by which the Devil attacks the human soul and requires a moral rejection, a refusal to give pre-passion a place, in order to refrain from developing into sin.44 Therefore that soul is unique (ªc ) to him compared with the rest because it alone has the always being joined with him (
e Id ıEÆØ ÆP
fiH). No reckoning, nor enthymeme, nor disturbance (
ÆæÆå) separates it from him; for even if it was disturbed, the disturbance was limited to pre-passion; for this was shown clearly through the ‘now’, because it indicates through the ‘now’ not the time according to breadth, but the singular moment, that which is not a time. Every time has three intervals. But the ‘now’ does not have this; for it is an instant of time. ‘He began to be astounded and sore troubled’ (Mark 14:33). As far as he is ‘beginning’ it is possible to understand it as pre-passion and not cowardice; for pre-passion is a proof of nature (ç ø ºªå ), it is not a quality which makes one worthless or earnest, unless one receives in addition the things which come after it, so that it is no longer pre-passion. For these things have often been defined precisely by us, namely that there are four stages: pre-passion alone acquits from any charge (KŒºÆ
 ), it does not subject someone to a charge; but passion subjects one to a moderate charge (
æø fi KŒºÆ
Ø); while disposition (Ø Ł Ø ) is evil-doing (ŒÆŒÆ); and much worse the action (æAØ ) which is added to it.45

This interpretation of Mark 14:33 hinges on Origen’s fuller treatment, distinguishing between Scripture saying that Christ began to be afraid and that he actually was afraid, while using Heb. 4:15 as the evidence that Christ could not have truly experienced fear.46 The issue is not so much the immutability of the Word as the perfection of Christ’s humanity—freedom from fear in the face of 43 Contrast Hagedorn, Hagedorn and Koenen HiobT III, 238–239n.45, who assert that Didymus employs a three-stage schema, identifying disposition and evil-doing. On the basis of such passages as EcclT 6.337.23–4 alone this is indeed a possible reading, but elsewhere Didymus clearly distinguishes between mental assent to sin and the actualization of that sin (EcclT 5.294.10–11; PsT 1.45.21–5). One may draw a parallel with Jerome’s discussion at Comm.Mt. 1, where mental assent to passion leads one to a level where not the will to sin but only the opportunity is lacking, and though this state is clearly culpable, it is not as culpable as when the sinful action itself has been committed. Didymus does, however, seem to outline a three-stage schema of virtue, GenT 2.165.17–23. 44 45 Ghattas (1996), 259; cf. 248–9. PsT 1.43.15–25. 46 Orig. Comm.Ser.Mt. 90 [Klostermann 205.14–207.6].

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death was essential if Christ was not to appear less than Socrates or Cato, as is already evident in the Johannine account of the passion and Heb. 5:7’s reduction of fear to reverence (eulabeia). Philo had already used similar arguments to clear the patriarchs of any taint of inappropriate passion,47 and their extension to Christ was an obvious move. It is not clear whether Origen has a wider psychological conception distinguishing between blameworthy emotions and the beginnings of those emotions: as has been noted earlier, the fact that this key passage survives only in Latin translation disguises any use of tell-tale terminology, such as that of prepassion. However, the language of ‘beginnings’ (principia) is precisely that employed by Seneca to express Stoic thought in Latin.48 The same solution is favoured by Jerome;49 and while his account follows Didymus in more clearly underpinning this with a psychology of pre-passion, this language is introduced more as a relevant point of interest than an opportunity to develop a key idea in his thought. For Didymus, with his more whole-hearted talk of pre-passion, these texts not only cease to be problematic but in fact take on considerable positive Christological importance. To his mind, if there was no potential for moral decline and sin within Christ, then there is nothing praiseworthy in his sinlessness and no soteriologically essential conquest over sin and death. Thus, there must have been a state of crisis within the incarnation which could have led to sin but in fact did not, because of the Saviour’s active pursuit of virtue. It is this role that Didymus attributes to pre-passion. It represents the consequence of human mutability and free will, the possibility that Christ could sin, and also the reality that he did not.50 Pre-passion is the arena of Christ’s moral struggle against the Devil and the opposing powers or, as Layton puts it, designates ‘the point at which an agent became a moral being’.51 In the language of Hebrews, there must be a real ‘tempting’ for there to be any meaning to Christ’s ‘being without sin’. Therefore if you understand it as spoken from the character (KŒ æ ı) of the Saviour—for he has come as far as pre-passion, he has not been found amid passions. At any rate Jesus ‘began to be astonished and to be sorely troubled’ (Matt. 26:37). Such things happened to him as far as a beginning. We are not saying that pre-passion occurs in what is immutable (I
æ
ø fi ); for we do not call anything else immutable besides the Trinity. Therefore since the soul, which Jesus assumed, is different from the Trinity, it naturally admits pre-passion (çıŒ å ŁÆØ æ ŁØÆ) and a beginning of being astonished and sorely troubled.

47

Philo fr. [Wendland 78]. Seneca speaks of principia proludentia alongside ictus, agitatio, and primus motus (Ira 2.2.1–2.4.2); cf. Sorabji (2000), 66 ff. 49 50 Jer. Comm.Mt. 4 [PL 26.197a–b]. PsT 1.43.12–25. 51 Layton (2000), 262–3. 48

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And I quote an apostolic verse: ‘Instead of the joy set before him he endured the cross, having despised its shame’ (Heb. 12:2). Unless he was in a state of prepassion and shunned it, there was no brave deed (Iæƪ ŁÅÆ), nor prize (pŁº).52

This tempting cannot be merely a physiological experience, nor even an aspect confined to Christ’s irrational soul, for two reasons: first, from a soteriological standpoint, the human reason needed to be redeemed;53 and secondly, on an exegetical level, being ‘sore troubled’ could only be properly said of the rational part of the soul. Hence those who adduce to Jesus a merely appetitive power (OæŒ
ØŒc ÆØ) which is said to be irrational (¼ºª) are refuted. For an irrational animal cannot begin to be astonished, much less sore-troubled (Matt. 26:37); for being soretroubled is something alien to animals.54

However, as Layton notes, here Didymus is going well beyond the Stoic position and is reducing full-blown passionate experience to pre-passion in order to exonerate Christ.55 The temptation is to dismiss this as apologetic special pleading. However, as we have seen earlier, Didymus is drawn towards a more monistic psychology precisely in order to avoid presenting sin as purely the consequence of embodiment and the stirrings of the irrational soul. Enthymemes play a parallel role to pre-passions and it is thus the concept of deceptive disturbance which is archetypal for sin rather than embodied emotion.

P R E - P A S S I O N A N D TH E PS Y C H O L O G Y O F V I R TU E It is easy to see how such a Christological usage offered Didymus an apparently satisfactory explanation of the relevant biblical texts and made a positive contribution to Christian understandings. This has been well documented by Gesché and Ghattas, but Layton is right to distinguish between Origen and Didymus, suggesting that where the former ‘restricts his use of the propatheia to demonstrating the compatibility of biblical language with Stoic ethics’, the latter ‘attempted a more thorough integration of the doctrine of propatheia into moral psychology’.56 52

PsT 4.282.2–7. Didymus clearly states that it is the sinner’s soul which is the cause of sin, not the body, since that is not rational and cannot be subject to the commandments; the body is only an instrument of the sinful soul, PsT 1.38.1–7. Consequently, it is primarily the soul, not the body, which must be redeemed. 54 55 56 PsT 5.293.7–9. Layton (2000), 276, 282. Layton (2000), 267, 271. 53

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Not only does Christ’s psychology not deviate from what is possible to any human being in his or her pursuit of virtue57 but it is the archetypal state achieved by a mimetic participation by all the saints. Christ is the writing copy for the saints. Thus, Christ’s sinlessness is not unique in quality but only in temporal continuity. It is indeed the necessary ultimate state of all the redeemed. This logic is shown most clearly in Didymus’ exegetical maxim that whatever is said about the Saviour according to his humanity applies equally to all the saints.58 As a result, Didymus’ view of humanity is broadly optimistic. Unlike some Christians, he insists that the truly virtuous do exist. Anyone can mentally refuse to give in to the urgings of pre-passion and thus avoid the moral decline into sin; consequently, many of Didymus’ remarks are aimed at exhorting his audience to do so. It is equally possible to speak of people who wish to be wholly pure and who consider even pre-passion as a stain on their character and wish to be free of it. You know that the word ‘great’ is one of those terms which is in relationship to something. Thus to the one who wishes to be wholly pure (›ºŒ ŁÆæ) even the smallest of sins seem to be great. And I once took such an illustration: if a cloak has often got a stain (Þ) from elsewhere, even if someone touches it, even if he handles it, it does not seem to receive another one. But if it has come straight from the loom, even the slightest touch of the fingers seems to be a blemish (H ), seems to do something unclean to it. Therefore the wholly pure man deems even the small matter in reckoning (
e æÆåf K ºªØ fiH) a great sin. It is also possible to say thus an understanding which can benefit everyone: compared to practical sin, sin in reckonings is very slight. If someone looked on a woman with desire and limited his urge (ZæØ) to pre-passion, he will not carry out the practical sin. Therefore if pre-passion itself is removed, someone is cleansed from a great sin, purified from practical sin.59

Layton is quite right to see here a break with the Stoic conception. Didymus equates pre-passion with ‘sin in reckonings’, which by Stoic definitions is clearly a passion, as some level of rational assent is involved. However, this is the result not of the transformational effect of its assimilation to the biblical narrative but of Didymus’ integration of the concept into his own psychology. Whereas Origen, with all his reading of Chrysippus,60 seems to make a cautious apologetic appeal to pre-passion to invoke a little philosophical respectability for his mitigation of biblical references to anger, Didymus

57 This point is missed by both Gesché (1962), 158 ff., and Ghattas (1996), 251–3, and renders much of their debate about whether PsT 3.221.28–33 refers to Christ or the saints irrelevant. 58 PsT 1.3.6–8; 3.130.22–5. 59 PsT 2.76.15–17; cf. EcclT 4.206.21–3. 60 Orig. C.Cels. 1.64; 5.57; 8.61; Princ. 3.1.2–3; Orat. 6.1.

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wishes to exploit the ambivalence of affective dispositions in later Stoicism. Didymus’ entire psychology is geared precisely to articulating the continuum which Layton sees as a conceptual mistake.61 In this way he is closer to Philo’s talk of hope as a pre-passion.62 Not only is hope a clearly rational state, but it is a positive one, and in Philo’s definition an anticipation of joy. Philo is using the Stoic vocabulary far outside its original purposes to describe not an anomalous situation in the imperturbable disposition of the sage but rather the first stage of a progressive development within human psychology. Didymus’ overall presentation of virtue and sin is delineated against his opposition to proponents of morally fixed natures. His concern is continually to maintain a dynamism to the moral life. The soul is always moving and prepassion is the concept he uses to give this movement a moral dimension. There is a staged ascent to both sin and virtue, and it is this ascent that is important. Precisely because it is a directed impulse, one can explain the apparent inevitability of sin, but at the same time assert how readily this process could have been stopped. The ascetic context which Layton notes in connection with Jerome63 was no less significant for Didymus. Indeed, much of the time one suspects that Didymus was fighting against a general suspicion that the battle against sin had already been lost at the first onset of pre-passion, and so needed to emphasize the fact that the process of sin could be stopped at all.64 It is also good that it says: ‘Whenever he falls, he shall not be dashed to pieces’ (Ps. 36:24). Even if some slip occurs, he does not provide ‘a place for the Devil’ (Eph. 4:27), so that he might not totally destroy him and dash him to pieces. Someone saw a woman with desire as far as pre-passion; he seemed to fall, but he was not dashed to pieces; for only when he yielded to following the reckoning (IŒºıŁB ÆØ
fiH ºªØ fiH) and the desire of beauty conquered him, was he dashed to pieces, did he fall down entirely. Such are the elders who raged against Susanna.65

This idea that the road to sin is neither inevitable nor one-way has profound consequences. And so, although sin is repeatedly said to be a state,66 it cannot be a continuous or passive one. Sin is not for Didymus the brokenness of creation but a continual turning away from God, a state which must be constantly re-enacted. The case for virtue is not the same, since it has an ontological reality

61

62 63 Layton (2000), 281–2. Philo Quaest.Gen. 1.79. Layton (2004), 133. PsT 4.263.9–12: ‘The goadings of the reckonings and desires, these cause bruises (ºøÆ ). It is necessary to heal them quickly. Someone saw a woman with desire. He had a bruise. Let it be healed, let him limit his anger to a pre-passion (åæØ
B æÆŁÆ ); for in this way desire would not begin to smell, nor cause a sore. But if the understanding (Ø ØÆ) persists in [such emotion], these things cause both a sore and a stench and unpleasant things.’ 65 66 PsT 4.252.31–5. HiobT 2.115.10–15; GenT 1.87.2–18. 64

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in the divine being,67 but, nonetheless, virtue has a fragility in its human instantiation, precisely because of the stages of psychological ascent. It is virtue enacted that protects against evil,68 whilst the mere absence of evil is something else.69 In using the term pre-passion in this way it is important to note how the Stoic doctrine has been altered by its new Christian context—in particular, as a result of the way in which a Christian psychology is framed by the biblical language of temptation and, for the Alexandrians especially, the central cosmological role of Satan and the opposing powers. However, the shift to including the entire human psychology and particularly the mind within this conception is not accidental. The dual origin of stimuli to evil as physiological and mental is much older than Didymus and, despite Layton’s pleading,70 Sorabji is quite right to note a clear connection between pre-passions or first movements and evil reckonings in Origen.71 However, this is neither the betrayal of his committed Stoicism that Layton assumes, nor a true development, as Sorabji argues,72 but rather an indifference to the Stoic position on Origen’s part. He is already committed to a different understanding of the stimuli to sin and simply borrows Stoic language to improve his intelligibility at moments when there is a convergence of thought. In Stoic theory all emotions were always held to be cognitive;73 yet they were distinct from reckoning per se: this was far more closely connected with the assent to pre-passion, which changed it into passion. Consequently, the initial movement or disturbance of the soul was more in the manner of an appearance or mental datum—which, given the materiality of the soul, caused a physical shock, and was thus passive—rather than a thought or reckoning which suggests some active input. Whether this subtle distinction was simply lost on many Christian thinkers, as Sorabji supposes,74 or actively rejected as incompatible with an immaterial view of the soul is unclear: certainly, Augustine viewed the distinction between pre-passion and passion as purely verbal, since he felt the initial movement was already a reckoning.75 Once 67

68 EcclT 6.334.3–6. PsT 1.22.1–2; In 1 Cor. 15.54–6 [Staab 11.21]. 70 PsT 3.199.15–16; 2.94.16–18. Layton (2004), 192n.22. 71 Orig. Princ. 3.2.4; Comm.Mt. 11.15 [Klostermann 58.14–59.24]; Comm.Cant. 3 [Baehrens 211.10–19]. 72 Sorabji (2000), 346–7: ‘Origen’s shift is a major one. We may possibly make it more intelligible by thinking of it as a change of focus from Seneca’s first movement, the shock, to its cause, the appearance. But Stoic appearances are still different from Christian thoughts, and are not subject to the Christians’ questions . . .“Did you let it linger?” “Did you enjoy it?” “Did you put yourself in the way of it?”.’ 73 Cf. Sorabji (2000), 17–28. As a result, animals could only have analogues of passions such as
ÆæÆå, e.g. Phld. Diis 11.12–34; 13.19–41. 74 Sorabji (2000), 355. 75 Aug. Quaest.Hept. 1.30. It is only by allowing desiderium, appetitus, and delectatio to precede consensus in un-Stoic fashion that Augustine can articulate a sufficiently developed account of internal sin to maintain the justice of God in condemning all humanity. 69

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they are viewed as evil thoughts or reckonings it is but a short step to identification with external temptation by demons, the language of suggestiones.76 Didymus closely identifies pre-passion with a disturbance (tarachē) of the soul,77 which is apparently cognitive, and he seems to have little time for the physiological aspects which were the subject of intense ancient speculation, such as blushing or involuntary erections.78 Whereas in Origen the source of these evil thoughts is still imprecise, Didymus’ thoughts are more developed. Sadly, he does not outline the doctrine systematically in the extant works and it tends to surface either to solve an exegetical difficulty or as the basis of moral exhortation. Nonetheless, there seems to be little question but that pre-passions are a purely natural phenomenon, resulting from human nature. It is unclear as to whether Didymus has in mind only the gross corporeal nature of this world or whether he would include instrumentally embodied rational existence. One can fall into sin without any outside assistance, but these phenomena also provide a window of opportunity for demons to use in tempting the soul, and so Didymus tends to use the language of Eph. 4:27 (‘Do not give a place to the Devil’) to describe the efforts involved in preventing pre-passion developing into passion and sinful disposition and action. This is perhaps clearest in his treatment of the case of Judas, where one can see two levels of demonic involvement: first, the suggestion of the pre-passion and then, the possession of the impassioned sinner. For example at any rate such things have also been said about Judas: first he cast it ‘into his heart to betray’ the Lord (John 13:2), then it says: ‘After the morsel Satan entered into him’ (John 13:27), he did not enter before, but cast the beginning of pre-passion (Iæåc
B æ ŁØÆ ) into his heart; when he found the pre-passion remaining so that it was no longer pre-passion but even the worst disposition, Satan seized the opportunity, the place (cf. Eph. 4:27) of entering into him.79

Nonetheless, Didymus is still happy to describe this in more traditional terms: At any rate these crooked reckonings (ºªØ d) are implanted in the soul by the Devil; for he has been called: ‘A snake, a crooked serpent’ (cf. Is. 27:1).80

76 Orig. Princ. 3.2.4; Aug. Serm.Dom. 1.12.34; J.Clim. Scal. 15.62. However, Origen also views at least some first movements as solely the result of one’s natural constitution, Princ. 3.2.2. 77 PsT 1.43.16–17; 1.33.28–9; 4.279.25–6; 5.302.9–11. 78 Arist. Mot.Animal. 11.703b5–11; cf. Anim. 3.432b29–433a1; Aug. Civ.Dei 14.25. There may be an oblique reference to the latter at PsT 4.233.4–6 (see n. 100, below in this chapter). 79 80 EcclT 5.294.15–20. PsT 4. 267.24–6.

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DIDYMUS ’ MOTIVATION FOR DEVELOPING T H E CO N C E P T Although Didymus did not produce his doctrine of pre-passion from thin air, he does not seem to be part of a wider Christian group who made use of the idea. In fact, he seems to me to be adopting a novel solution to problems arising in contemporary Christology and psychology.81 Gesché argued for a fairly wide Christian usage, citing Origen, Didymus, the author of the Lecture-Notes on the Psalms, and Jerome.82 However, as has been noted, Origen may have been a key source for Didymus, but he did not himself approve the term; Didymus has now been properly accepted as the author of the Lecture-Notes; and it is unlikely that Jerome is acting independently when he borrows the Greek concept for his exegesis of precisely those verses that concerned Didymus and Origen.83 So, this actually appears to be a remarkably isolated Christian adoption by a solitary Alexandrian and his successor. Sorabji too is keen to evoke a far-reaching Christian development of the Stoic psychology, though perhaps with greater justification on the basis of his conceptual approach, and includes such thinkers as Evagrius84 and Augustine,85 as well as many of the later ascetico-mystic writers from pseudoMacarius to John Climacus. However, it is in fact striking how clear the line of influence is even in the authors he cites. One can scarcely argue for a widespread independent Christian utilization of these particular Stoic doctrines, and even Sorabji notes the ‘Alexandrian’ focus of his authors.86 Layton may acknowledge the greater innovation of Didymus, but for him this represents a mere anomaly within scholastic Origenism. Not only is the Didymean transformation of the term merely a function of his reading the Bible through the lens of Origen, but he is also presented as less aware than his students of the tensions inherent in this expansion of the concept.87 I would prefer to paint a rather different picture,88 one which does justice to the frequency with which Didymus uses both the language and conceptual 81 Strikingly, the concept is not only rare amongst Christians but also among later Greek philosophers: the only other author to employ the noun prior to the sixth century is Damascius, In Pl. Phaed. 285.7; 286.1; 288.4. 82 Lampe offers two more citations from the Commentaries on the Psalms of Diodore of Tarsus and Cyril of Alexandria. Yet the Commentary transmitted under Diodore’s name has been, probably correctly, attributed to Didymus by Mariès (1914), which leaves Cyril as the only independent witness, and it seems more than likely that he was familiar with, though not wholeheartedly approving of, Didymus’ works. 83 The only other Christian occurrence of propassio is Isid.Hisp. Diff.Verb. 431 quoting Jer. Comm.Mt. 1 [PL 26.38c–39a], but a wider approach should also investigate the use of primi motus, principia, etc. 84 85 Sorabji (2000), 357 ff. Sorabji (2000), 367 ff. 86 87 Sorabji (2000), 343. Layton (2004), 133. 88 Ghattas (1996), 242, does stress that no other Fathers used the term as extensively as Didymus and is quick to distinguish Origen’s psychological use of such language from Didymus’

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framework of pre-passion. When one considers the sheer number of usages (forty-one in the extant Didymean corpus),89 it becomes clear how closely associated this doctrine must be with one single name, at least until new evidence is found. This is an innovative and important attempt by a largely derivative exegete to confront contemporary issues in Christology and ethics. It seems typical of our author that such innovation should be framed by three important horizons, namely a lemmatic approach to the Bible with an emphasis on specific verses and words, a speculation or comment of Origen which the Adamantine himself leaves unexplored, and a wide but superficial knowledge of ancient philosophical speculation. Rather than there being a widespread Christian dialogue with Stoic psychology, there seems to have been sporadic and superficial interest from Alexandrians such as Philo and Origen prior to Didymus; and, thereafter, a wider adoption of the concept into Christian anthropology and Christology by thinkers known to have read Didymus’ work, namely Jerome, Evagrius, and Augustine. Yet the long-term legacy was to be through these later figures— particularly Augustine in the West and Evagrius in the East—rather than through Didymus, and so his particular emphases and indeed the term itself seem to have faded from view.90 Didymus’ innovative role can be partially explained by the shifting of virtue to a central position within his thought. This generally provokes a more individualistic and psychological exegesis in Didymus than Origen, often aided by a fresh investigation of Philonic lines. Didymus tends not to engage in discussion between competing philosophical positions but rather focuses exclusively on intra-biblical debate with other Christians, and it is in this context that most scholars have pointed to Apollinarianism as the chief motivating factor.91 This idea’s most vital Christological significance comes in Didymus’ assertion against Apollinarius that Christ possessed a fully rational soul and yet did not sin. According to the Apollinarian line of thought, creaturely nature, being

Christological focus. However, he is only aware of the usages cited by Gesché and seemingly has no suspicion of the Stoic background. 89 EcclT 4.206.23; 4.221.21; 5.294.18, 19(bis); 5.295.9; 6.337.24; PsT 1.33.28; 1.43.18, 21(bis), 23(bis); 2.76.16(bis); 3.221.33(bis), 34; 3.222.8, 9, 11, 14; 4.252.33; 4.263.11; 4.279.25, 26; 4.282.3, 4, 5, 7; 5. 293.4, 7, 10(bis); GenT 2.165.23; In Ps. 54.6–7; 76.5; 76.19–21; 87.17–18 [Mühlenberg fr.573a, 2.10.4; fr.793a, 2.120.7, 9; fr.803a, 2.125.4; fr.878, 2.165.9]. 90 I suspect that Sorabji was unfortunately kept from this conclusion, since Didymus was probably only pointed out to him by Knuutilla at a relatively late stage and he only explicitly references three passages, in marked contrast to his usual thoroughness. 91 Kramer and Krebber EcclT IV, 157 (‘Didymos betont die Lehre von der æ ŁØÆ so stark, weil sie ihm für die Polemik gegen Apollinarios wichtig war.’); Gesché (1962), 118–22; Ghattas (1996), 242. Layton (2004), 124–5, 133, offers the more nuanced view that the doctrine was not fashioned in response to Apollinarius but rather was conveniently at hand, and through use in this context shifted emphasis to include rational judgements.

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fundamentally mutable, would be incapable of sinlessness; logically, therefore, only the immutable divine power of the Word taking the place of the rational soul or mind in the incarnation could possibly guarantee Christ’s sinlessness (itself a prerequisite for human salvation).92 By introducing the notion of prepassion as a state of crisis endemic to creaturely existence, yet not of itself sinful or in any way morally censurable, Didymus is able to reverse the lines of argument. Moreover, he seems to feel the concept is biblically justified on the basis of such texts as Mark 14:33 and John 12:27.93 He expands upon Origen’s interpretation of the ‘beginning to’ experience passion and argues that it is implicit from this and the clear assertion of Christ’s sinlessness in Heb. 4:15 that this affective emotion cannot have developed any further. Christ’s sinlessness is a major theme in Didymus’ work, but particularly in the Lecture-Notes,94 and it is difficult not to see this as a response to Apollinarian polemic. So, the fact that the concept of pre-passion is so frequently articulated to justify this sinlessness while asserting Christ’s rational human soul suggests that it too is a response to Apollinarius’ speculations of the 360s and 370s. In one passage Didymus even introduces this doctrine in explicit relation to Apollinarius’ views. For although his exegesis does not seem at first to be connected to his views on pre-passion, and rather outlines a form of ignorance which is not the opposite of knowledge but the precursor to it, the term prepassion is used to summarize the import of what he has just said. The one such as this, ‘Who will do good and will not sin’ (Eccl. 7:20), is not a man on the earth. I wish to take a higher understanding (łÅº
æÆ Ø ØÆ); but do not ascribe ignorance of the beautiful (IØæŒÆºÆ) to me. Concerning Jesus alone it is said: ‘Before wicked things are advanced, he will pick out the good’ (Isa. 7:15). Only the child, the one according to Jesus, the one who ‘has not known sin’ (2 Cor. 5:21), that is purposeful choice (æÆæ Ø) of what is wicked, chose the good, while all the rest did so after knowing this wickedness which is honoured, not the type which is blameworthy (Kłª) but the one which is elementary (N ƪÅ). ‘Therefore there is no man who will do good and will not sin’. After sin all have the good, but the sort of sin which has been described, that which precedes (æßçØ
ÆÅ) virtue.

92 e.g. Apoll. Ad Iul. fr.150–1 [Lietzmann]. Thus a sympathetic reading of Apollinarius (e.g. McCarthy Spoerl (1993), 422) can see here the soteriological imperative behind his ¸ ª – æ Christology in the face of the theoretically mutable Word proposed by early ‘Arians’ (or at least this was understood to be the case by Arius’ enemies such as Alexander of Alexandria (Ep.Encycl. 8 [Opitz 3.U.4b]), though in Arius’ eyes it seems likely that the Word’s virtuous exercise of free will brought about a practical immutability much as Didymus claims for Christ’s humanity). Admittedly, this seems to imply that Christ had no free will, and thus the central notion of man’s free will had been corrupted. However, Apollinarius defended himself against this charge by arguing that the creator of free will could not by definition corrupt it, Dem. fr.87 [Lietzmann]. 93 PsT 5.293.6–11. 94 PsT 1.12.20–4; 1.26.7–11; 1.37.17–21; EcclT 4.221.18–21; ZachT 1.63.34–64.3 (1.281). The key text is 2 Cor. 5:21.

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Behold, many who seem to have some facility of intellect and who have paid attention to their own aptitude think they know everything; and whenever they begin to recollect those things, which they think they know, they find themselves in such great ignorance that they renounce their learning. And we know this by experience: often I reckoned that a particular volume was easy to apprehend, and it became evident that it was harder than everything to understand its sense. This sort of ignorance is prior to understanding (KØ
Å ); and it is not the opposite of understanding, but before understanding. At any rate the one who thinks he knows something, unless he thus discovers himself as knowing nothing, cannot receive knowledge. Therefore there is only one, about whom this is said: ‘Before wicked things are advanced, he will pick out the good’. Therefore even if it does not seem to be the case to Apollinarius and those with him, their dogma is done away with. ‘Before wicked things are advanced’: he was never able to sin, because, only reaching the stage of pre-passion, he does not stretch this out into disposition.95

Here, in one of only three cases in the extant corpus, Didymus actually names Apollinarius, and yet Apollinarius is by no means the focus of the passage. His name is brought in at the end almost as an aside, and my impression is that Didymus’ exegesis here is intended to show that a correct doctrinal understanding functions as a prophylactic against heresy; correct understanding of the biblical text always avoids heresy rather than needing to engage with it (a concept in keeping with the traditional understanding of heresy as a departure from ecclesiastical truth, rather than a speculative exploration of uncharted territory). Didymus is not here engaging with Apollinarian thought, nor is he indoctrinating his pupils with anti-Apollinarian argument. Rather, the doctrine is explained as fully necessary to the exegesis of Eccl. 7:20, and as an afterthought the teacher mentions that such a correct understanding circumvents Apollinarius’ whole mistaken chain of thought. Viewing Apollinarius’ thoughts as the impetus Didymus needed for reflection upon this theme would explain the frequency with which the doctrine of pre-passion is found in the two sets of Lecture-Notes, which are also the main location of his explicit and implicit rebuttal of Apollinarianism. This analysis might also explain the reluctance of both Origen and Jerome to employ the concept more widely. For in their respective times, before and after the Apollinarian crisis, there was not the same need for a precise articulation of Christ’s psychology. However, it is important to note that the doctrine of pre-passion did not remain for Didymus purely a piece of anti-Apollinarian apologetic but formed an essential part of his psychology and portrayal of virtue and sin. The other key influence is surely his concern to maintain free will against Manichaeans and those who asserted a doctrine of fixed moral natures. Indeed, it is probably 95

EcclT 4.221.2–21.

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these competing stimuli that account for the equivocation in Didymus between viewing pre-passion as entirely sinless in a Christological ambit but, within the psychology of the saints, as introducing the slightest of stains. By wholeheartedly embracing a principle of pre-passion, Didymus is able to outline an understanding of sin which would have had much to commend it to those of an ascetic disposition. Both mental and emotional stirrings are essentially neutral but only in that they may direct one to virtue or to sin. They are intrinsic to human nature and yet the mechanism of divine grace as well as demonic temptation. The tragic propensity to sin is thus acknowledged, without a Manichaean anti-materialism, while the possibility of virtue is very much open to those able to battle against confusion and limit it to the lower parts of their soul, those who wage war not against flesh and blood but against powers and principalities.96 From the initiate to the perfect there are grades of behaviour to be attained and the emphasis from a human perspective is exhortative—never give up; even if someone seems to slip, as long as they limit the process, they will not fall;97 even if anger or desire occur, do not let them ascend to the mind; if they ascend to the mind, do not let them become ways of thinking; if they become ways of thinking, do not act upon them.98 The intention is, nonetheless, ultimately doctrinal rather than practical—to portray a logically coherent backdrop for ascetic ideals against elitist models positing natural necessity, rather than to offer specific help to Christian ascetics on how one is to prevent the blossoming of sin out of the seed of pre-passion. Whereas a writer such as Evagrius goes to great lengths in suggesting exercises and a clear schema of how wicked reckonings develop out of each other or indeed can be resisted by opposing them to each other,99 Didymus seems content simply to exhort his students not to allow room for the Devil and to keep passion from the mind. His sole piece of advice is to keep silent.100 96 This is the chief call to arms of Didymus himself, as shown by his frequent exploitation of Eph. 6:12, PsT 3.195.17–20; 4.275.14–17; GenT 2.166.6–13; 2.224.14–21; cf. EcclT 2.81.20–6; ZachT 1.43.21–44.2 (1.189). 97 PsT 4.252.33–5, 4.263.10–12. 98 EcclT 6.337.8–11. 99 Evagrius specifies eight ºªØ  which assail the soul (Pract. 6) through demonic suggestion (80); although naturally stirring up the passions, they only become sin when assented to (74–5): opposing them requires studying their sequence (50) and times of attack (11–12; 23; 25), playing them off against one another (30–1; 57–8) and citing particular Bible verses against each demon (Antirr.). 100 A possible exception is found in PsT 4.233.3–6: ‘Often they consider transgressions at night and as soon as it is day they do them. But it is necessary to ŒÆ
ÆıªBÆØ even if a transgression has sometimes occurred “in the bed”. For this is what the Word orders: “Be angry and do not sin; what you say in your hearts, in your bed ŒÆ
ƪÅ
” (Ps. 4:5). For if you ŒÆ
ÆıªB
, the Devil does not find “room” (cf. Eph. 4:27).’ There is ambiguity here both in what has happened and in the remedy. Although the verse is traditionally translated ‘keep silent’, ŒÆ
ƪÅ
 often means ‘feel compunction’; cf. Lampe s.v. ŒÆ
Æ

ø. The context is an

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If the Devil suggests wicked or crooked reckonings (ºªØ f ), let the one who repents not hear them, like some deaf and dumb man, let him not understand them, let him not provide the hearing of his inner man, but let him be like a mute, like a deaf and dumb man not opening his mouth.101

anagogical interpretation of Ps. 35:5 which earlier identifies the bed with the body, but the preceding verse is back to a more literal bed-bound dreaming. It is plausible that Didymus is here referring to repentance in the vexed monastic topic of nocturnal emissions but it could equally be his usual silence as limiting the pathology of passion. 101 PsT 4.267.29–31; cf. PsT 4.273.2–12; 4.279.25–6.

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10 Interpreting ‘Original’ Sin Prior to the discovery of the Toura commentaries, Didymus’ name was widely associated in dogmatic histories with the development of the Western doctrine of ‘original’ sin.1 On the basis of Bardy’s analysis of the catena fragments and Against the Manichees, alongside the now suspect On the Trinity’s language of the ‘ancient sin’,2 Didymus was seen as a precursor of Western doctrine, somewhat out of tempo with his Eastern brothers, subscribing to a truly hereditary view of sin rather than the so-called ‘Greek’ doctrine (essentially an affirmation that Adam’s sin had universal penal consequences, such as corruption and death).3 Since the publication of the commentaries, scholarship has tended either to repeat this line,4 ignoring Didymus’ fundamental moral optimism and insistence upon the actual righteousness of individuals,5 or to insist that Didymus did not actually propound any notion of Adamic sin, referring all discussion of ‘original’ sin to the pre-mundane fall of souls.6 However, both readings are distortions of what is actually a very nuanced and tentative exploration of human solidarity in Adamic sin which strives to balance a strong emphasis on free will with a real notion of the ‘sin according to the succession’.7 Didymus’ exegetical dilemma is to explain how men can be viewed as simultaneously just and sinful (or at least stained by dirt in some way) without

1

Rondet (1972), 88–9; Testa (1970), 45–75. Bardy (1910), 132–8; cf. Trin. 2.12; 3.17 [PG 39.680a–b; 876a]. 3 Bardy (1910), 134–5, remarks that such precision regarding original sin is very surprising, as the doctrine was not as developed in the East as the West, and suggests that this may have been a factor in Didymus’ popularity in the West; cf. Kelly (1977), 351 (though he poses an interesting problem, as because of poor revision between editions he does not distinguish between the authentic Didymus of the catenae and C.Man. and the author of the De Trinitate, but assumes a single authorship designated Ps.-Didymus). 4 e.g. Beatrice (1978), 209–12. 5 HiobT 4.390.30–391.24; PsT 2.74.24–75.15; GenT 2.152.30–153.5. 6 e.g. Baudry (1996); Baudry (2000), 137–61. 7 Cf. the brief treatment of Koenen (1978), 160–1, which concludes that ‘free-will and selfresponsibility are fully retained in this system’ and ‘original sin is not yet the antipole of free-will’ (161). 2

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perpetrating deliberate sins; and, moreover, how Christ in his humanity is alone exempt from this stain without being removed from the arena of moral conflict.

DIDYMUS AND PRE-MUNDANE S IN For all his insistence on pre-existence and the assumption that at least some people descended to earth because of their (presumably pre-mundane) sins, Didymus does not seek to explain any of the classical loci of ‘original’ sin in these terms. For as shown in Chapter 5, this theory functions somewhat differently within Didymus’ and probably Origen’s thought from the way most commentators suppose. First, it does not replace a doctrine of the Adamic Fall. As we have seen, Didymus’ objections to details of the Genesis 3 account do not reduce the drama of Adam, Eve, and the Serpent solely to a universal psychological process. The account is taken as both universal and particular and historical—there is no dichotomy but neither is there a simple narrative parallelism between these ‘trans-epochal’ and ‘historical’ readings.8 Thus, the work of Baudry, already disadvantaged by his reliance on the Commentary on Genesis alone, is further marred by an a priori hermeneutical error that the ‘Platonist’ Didymus must reject a literal Fall.9 Secondly it does not provide an account of universal human sinfulness. Kelly assumes of Origen that the theory entails, of course, the abandonment of any doctrine of corporate sinfulness, for it suggests that if human beings are sinful from birth, their wickedness is the legacy of their own misguided choices in the transcendental world, and has nothing to do with the disobedience of any one first man.10

However, the reality is that he grossly oversimplifies the situation in portraying a simple choice between Adamic sin and pre-mundane sin.11 This is 8

Bennett (1997), although focused solely on the Contra Manichaeos, rightly distinguishes two interlaced interpretative accounts which he labels ‘historical’ and ‘trans-epochal’ but remains unclear on how these interact and function (143). Sfameni Gasparro (1978), 43–82, has a similar problem with Origen’s treatment of Adam. She recognizes the double reference (66–8) but does not integrate this into her analysis, which prioritizes the idea of the ‘colpa antecedente’ and its Platonic overtones. 9 Baudry (1996), 172; cf. 177, 181. 10 Kelly (1977), 181. 11 Bennett (1997), 141–2, despite accepting the fact that the pre-existence of souls or trans-epochal account sits alongside a historical interpretation of Gen. 3, still ascribes to the trans-epochal account justification for the subjection of souls to the Adamic penalty. However, this is based on a reading of the Contra Manichaeos rather than a full consideration of Didymus’ corpus.

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obvious to Origen’s more sensitive commentators, whom Kelly pillories,12 not only from the Commentary on Romans but also the justification of infant baptism in the Homilies on Leviticus and Luke, which invoke a notion of inherited infant impurity, entirely distinct from pre-existence.13 Didymus does not seem to entertain the range of possibilities which Origen sustains, particularly concepts of divine repayment for foreseen future behaviour or intra-uterine moral agency,14 but consistently argues for a double motivation for gross corporeal existence—either because of personal sin or condescension to help others.15 Whatever its form, pre-mundane sin can only be corporately rather than individually responsible for the gross embodiment of human souls. These condescending souls, such as Jeremiah and John the Baptist, are exempted from pre-mundane sin and commit no earthly sins, and yet they can be said to sin in the particular sense of the word Didymus reads into Rom. 3:23. If you wish to understand it as relating to the historical level (
æe ƒæÆ), you come to the belief that there is no man begotten on earth without sin. But I said that this causes a difficulty for us regarding John and Jeremiah, unless perhaps you understand it as referring to that sin, according to which it has been said: ‘All sinned’ (Rom. 3:23; 5:12).16

The pre-mundane fall functions not to affirm universal sinfulness but to establish divine justice (the state of each corresponds to their pre-mundane actions17) and above all the temporal priority of virtue and goodness against the Manichaeans.18 Once we acknowledge that the vocabulary and concepts noted by historians of doctrine run counter to Didymus’ general tone, which is essentially one of moral exhortation based on the premise that it is in the power of one’s free will to choose the good, and that the most obvious aspect of his own thought to explain our solidarity in sin, namely the pre-existence of souls, does not even come into play here, it seems curious that ideas of ‘original’ sin are present at all. One would really expect to place him with Clement of Alexandria as teaching the complete innocence of newborns and 12 Kelly (1977), 181; cf. Crouzel (1989), 209: ‘Origen’s doctrine of original sin is not confined to what we are now discussing and contains statements which were at the time traditional and long would so remain: the impurity of the child at birth is for him the reason why baptism is necessary and justifies infant baptism in particular; this impurity is linked with the carnal act that brought him into existence etc. So it is only one explanation among others of the original fault that is linked with the pre-existence.’ 13 Orig. Hom.Lev. 8.2–3; Hom.Luc. 14.3–5; Comm.Rom. 5 [PG 14.1011b–1012c; 1029d– 1030c; 1047b–c]. 14 Edwards (2002), 105. 15 16 HiobT 3.261.17–23; PsT 1.55.23–7; cf. ZachT 2.95.17–20 (2.7). EcclT 4.220.6–9. 17 18 HiobT 1.56.20–9; GenT 1.97.24–98.1; cf. 1.20.8–18. PsT 3.129.8–13; 4.259.16–31.

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subsuming such problematic texts as Job 14:4–5 entirely to Job 1:21;19 or to hide behind the mysteriousness of Pauline solidarity in Adam, as does even Origen to some extent.20 Yet I believe we can trace the process whereby Didymus comes to explore the problem in greater detail than other extant sources. The key to this is that almost all Didymus’ discussions are essentially controversial and apologetic. As in Against the Manichees, his pronouncements on the inheritance of a taint from Adam are intended to mitigate his opponents’ charges on the evil of the world, rather than introduce them. Whenever he encounters a text asserting universal sinfulness or the sinfulness of a saint, Didymus experiences it as problematic, not as constructive, and thus his excursus are intended to defuse the texts rather than exaggerate their significance. Yet Didymus is not usually satisfied with a mere apologetic veneer. He does engage in casuistry on occasion, suggesting that the saints’ references to their own sins are merely humility,21 so that they are not thought to have reached their great state by their own power alone, or are a providential spur to encourage others to imitate them.22 But such comments are the exception: more often than not, Didymus engages in a lengthy and conceptually wide-ranging treatment of the problem, as is the case in his commentary on Job 9:30–1, where he introduces in turn four different models of original sin.23 The impetus to this serious engagement is primarily Didymus’ massive exegetical and doctrinal debt to Origen. This brought with it the Adamantine’s conflict with Valentinianism and his opposition to determinism, particularly the suggestion that there are three orders of humanity, the spiritual, the soulish, and the fleshly, with only the soulish able to experience moral change.24 Origen offered a double riposte: he not only emphasized free will but also universal sinfulness, via the Levitical legislation of purification and the notion that the saints were not always holy, but holy only after a point of repentance.25 However, whereas at least in the extant works Origen does not go much beyond this, Didymus had to reinterpret these ideas in the light of a vigorous Manichaeism. This dual matrix of anti-heretical debate seems to me to explain best how Didymus took seriously texts which other commentators quickly explained away, developing ideas only nascent in Origen to advance a doctrine somewhat at odds with the rest of his system. If this is true, it is equally possible that Augustine’s later and more developed formulations actually arose from antiManichaean exegesis rather than any residual Manichaean pessimism. 19 Clem.Alex. Strom. 4.(25)160.1–3; 3.(16)100.1–7, although he does affirm that all adults except for the incarnate Word are sinners, Paed. 1.(2)4.2. 20 Orig. Comm.Rom. 5 [PG 14.1029b–d]; Hom.Lev. 8.3. 21 HiobT 3.250.16–30; 4.360.21–33. 22 23 In Ps. 50.1–2 [Mühlenberg fr.532, 1.368.20–369.11]. HiobT 3.260.1–263.31. 24 25 Orig. Princ. 3.1; cf. Alviar (1993), 37 ff. Orig. Hom.Luc. 2.2.

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‘ SI N AND DIRT’ When we turn to the key passages which explicitly introduce the language of Adamic sin, it quickly becomes apparent that Didymus employs the same overarching hermeneutical distinction but offers a number of competing and not necessarily compatible models according to which this may be understood. His hermeneutic consistently supposes levels of sin, or more specifically a distinction between culpable sin and an irreprehensible dirt. This in itself was not new. Clement of Alexandria had posited four levels of sin relative to one’s gnostic progress,26 but he did not apply this to a hereditary notion. Origen is the more immediate source, as can be seen both linguistically and from the choice of proof texts,27 but as is often the case with the relationship between Origen and Didymus, what is a mere speculation in the former’s thought is developed and takes on a far more significant and structured role in the latter’s.28 Within the mundane framework, the overarching idea is a distinction between deliberate sin voluntarily enacted by a free moral agent and something else.29 On no account does Didymus wish to say that the saints were guilty of deliberate transgression, for this would undermine their value as models,30 and yet ‘all have sinned’ (Rom. 3:23; 5:12). Taking over Origen’s hermeneutical key with its typical attention to precise wording, Didymus locates this distinction in the separation of ‘dirt’ (rhupos) from ‘sin’ (hamartia).31 One person would say that dirt (Þ
) and sin (± ÆæÆ) show clearly the same thing, while another says the dirt is lesser than sin.32

On the basis of Isa. 4:4 the stain of dirt requires purification, while that of blood necessitates divine judgement and punishment. Whereas most Christians simply equated dirt with the consequences of sin,33 Didymus not only employs Origen’s exegesis to describe a category of sinfulness which carries no

26

Clem.Alex. Paed. 1.(2)4.3; Strom. 4.(12)83.2; 4.(17)106.4. Orig. Hom.Luc. 14.4, where Isa. 4:4 is the hermeneutical key to unlock Job 14:4. 28 In the extant writings Origen does not develop this at great length but merely uses it to demonstrate the need for baptism and indeed infant baptism, Hom.Luc. 14.5. Testa (1970), 55, sees this hermeneutical trajectory as fundamentally ‘Platonic’, reducing original sin to a consequence of human nature. However, what he is really objecting to is the fact that Origen maintains the intact nature of free will, Princ. 1.prol.5; Comm.Rom. 1 [PG 14.866c–d]. 29 On the difference between sins and unwilling slips, see HiobT 4.341.24–8; and on the different types of lesser sins, see HiobT 1.36.33–37.10. 30 Cf. Job’s role as an impression (åÆæÆŒæ) and type (
) of courage (I æ Æ), HiobT 1.43.15–22. 31 32 Orig. Hom.Jer. 2.2. HiobT 4.365.2–5. 33 Clem.Alex. Paed. 3.(9)48.2; Bas.Caes. Enarr. in Is. 1.38 [PG 30.192b–193c] (cf. 1 Pet. 3:21 and Jas. 1:21). Didymus employs these more traditional forms as at GenT 1.47.18–27; 1.89.9–10; ZachT 1.47.22–51.13 (1.207–24). 27

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blame but also correlates this to the Pauline language of Adamic sin,34 so that the universality of sin is an aspect of our solidarity with Adam and in particular the succession (diadochē).35 This Adamic or ‘original’ sin can then be used as a hermeneutical key to unlock problematic texts about the sins of the saints, so that in fact the very harshness of Job 14:4 (‘No one is pure from dirt, not even if his life upon the earth is a single hour’) actually serves to mitigate concepts of universal sinfulness.36 Crucially, Didymus makes this distinction qualitative, not quantitative: dirt is not a slight sin but a form of falling short of God and virtue for which one is not responsible and which does not incur punishment. Job is not just slightly sullied but immersed in dirt without truly sinning.37 In this way Didymus introduces ‘original’ or Adamic sin into his exegesis far more often than his predecessors, but to maintain humanity’s freedom to choose the good rather than to emphasize their fallenness—which is probably why he employs so many models of original sin ranging from that of a stain from sexual intercourse to simple creaturely mutability.

Tainted by Sex Early Encratite circles seem to have espoused the view that all newborns inherited culpable sin from Adam through sexual generation, with the male sperm transmitting both a physical and moral infection, identified with the biblical language of dirt (rhupos).38 Consequently, such sects entirely condemned both intercourse and marriage as sinful. However, in the East, despite the burgeoning interest in asceticism, such anti-cosmic ideas were radically rejected by so-called allegorists and literalists alike.39 It is largely to the West that we must look to find support for a biologically transmitted taint,40 though generally with some attempt to preserve the goodness of marriage.41 Didymus and Origen are exceptions.42 34 This does not prevent Adam also serving as a paradigmatic figure whom sinners imitate, as he does for Pelagius, HiobT 4.354.29–32; cf. Origen’s parallel interpretation of Adam in 1 Cor. 15:22 and Rom. 5:14 as designating humanity, C.Cels. 4.40. 35 HiobT 4.366.2–4: ‘the one who has the sin of Adam (F ` a e ± æÅ Æ) according to the succession (ŒÆa ØÆ åc)’. 36 Most theologians took Job 14:4 as affirming the universality of actual sin, e.g. Bas.Caes. Hom.Ps. [PG 29.332c–d]; Bapt. [PG 31.1536c]. 37 38 HiobT 3.261.14–17. e.g. Clem.Alex. Strom. 3.(16)100.5. 39 Cf. Testa (1970), surveying Clement, Athanasius, and Cyril in Alexandria, as well as the ‘Antiochene’ Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret, and John Chrysostom. 40 e.g. Tert. Anim. 22.2; 40.1, Cypr. Ep. 64.5; Ambr. Apol.David 2.71; Excess.Sat. 2.6. 41 e.g. Tert. Monog. 42 Ambrose and Jerome should perhaps be understood within the context of Origen’s and Didymus’ thought rather than that of their Western predecessors as both read the two Alexandrians’ works extensively. For the argument that Ambrose’s Apol.David and the interpretation of

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For Origen, the chief motivation seems to have been the attempt to understand the Levitical requirement for purification after childbirth43 and the correlating practice of infant baptism.44 This is where he introduces the differentiation of sin and dirt, so that both sacrifice and sacrament purify the child not from actual sins but the ‘dirt of birth’ which relates to the biological succession from Adam.45 Such arguments, problematic for modern thinkers, in fact made good sense according to Origen’s understanding of biology. Elsewhere it is clear that he followed Aristotle in ascribing to the female provision of the raw matter and to the male the ordering principle (logos spermatikos).46 This is not to be confused with the human soul, which is either direct from the hand of God or enters the body having existed prior to the world, unlike in materialist or traducianist positions.47 Neither the body nor soul are evil or deformed of themselves, but the ordering principle has been corrupted by Adam’s loss of virtue and moral distance from God; and because he only had intercourse with Eve after the Fall the male line has passed on this disordered principle,48 which is particularly vulnerable to demonic attack.49 Didymus, in controversy with Manichaean views, seems to follow similar lines of thought and accept that being the product of sexual intercourse somehow taints even an innocent soul sent to sojourn upon earth for the sake of others. Thus, it is vitally significant that Christ is born of a virgin and not from intercourse. For it was necessary for him coming to the salvation of men not to receive a body from intercourse ( c KŒ ı ıÆ F H Æ ºÆ E) . . . Again, if he had assumed a body from intercourse, not having the difference (e
ÆæźºÆª ), he too himself would have been considered to be liable (
Łı) to that sin, from which all those born from Adam according to succession (ŒÆa ØÆ åc) arise.50

the key verse Ps. 50:7 are based upon Origen and Didymus, see Hadot (1976), 205–55. Also on the debt of Augustine to Ambrose here, see Burns (2001), 71–97. 43 Cf. Laporte (1997), 438–44. 44 Orig. Hom.Luc. 14.3, 5. 45 Orig. Hom.Lev. 8.3. 46 Orig. Comm.Jn. 20.(2)3; C.Cels. 1.37; cf. Arist. Gen.Animal. 726a35; 729a28–31. 47 e.g. Tert. Anim. 40–1; cf. Rondet (1972), 51 ff.; Apoll. In Ps. 50.7 [Mühlenberg fr.90, 1.34.14–35.6]. Laporte (1997), 442, however, takes a different view and reads Orig. Comm. Rom. 5 as accepting traducianism, at least ‘as a plausible hypothesis’. 48 Orig. Comm.Rom. 5 [PG 14.1047a–b]. 49 Orig. Comm.Jn. 20.(36)326–8, 333; Hom.Ex. 8.4. 50 C.Man. 7, 8 [PG 39. 1096a, 1096b–c]. Didymus makes the same point outside a controversial context, In 1 Cor. 15.44–6 [Staab 10.14–15]: ‘Since the body is sown from the union of male and female, it is fair to say that both dishonour (IØ Æ) and weakness (IŁ ØÆ) surround it’.

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However, we cannot simply equate such notions with Encratite views, as, even in Against the Manichees, Didymus draws back from a fully biological view of the transmission of real sin and concupiscence. Thus, he interprets the apparent reference to ‘nature’ (phusei) in Eph. 2:3 as a voluntary state incurring liability to anger which can be changed, rather than an incontrovertible biological or ontological fact. The expression ‘by nature’ (ç  Ø) in question does not mean ‘naturally’ (ŒÆa ç Ø) but ‘truly’ (IºÅŁ Æ fi ). For the verse says, ‘We were truly children of anger’ (Eph. 2:3), showing clearly that those who sin are truly subject to anger. But just as someone becomes a ‘child of anger’ according to nature when they enter upon evil-doing, so too once they change they become a child of truth and virtue.51

Moreover, he not only makes an ad hoc defence of marriage, which one can exercise virtuously after the sojourning of Christ,52 but explains in detail how both the saints and indeed hypothetically Jesus himself could have sex within marriage without incurring sin, as long as they did so for the purpose of bearing children rather than seeking after pleasure.53 What we see in such arguments tends to be the differentiation of Jesus from the rest of humanity, rather than any move to condemn either intercourse or bodily existence.54 For what is so ‘light’ a ‘cloud’ (Isa. 19:1) not bearing the weight of sin (æ ± ÆæÆ) other than the flesh of Jesus? This flesh was not constituted by the union of the male with the female which is very heavy (ÆæıÅ), but by ‘the Holy Spirit coming upon’ a virgin who had no experience of a male and whom ‘the power of the most high overshadowed’ (Luke 1:35), so that what was begotten without marriage might be holy.55

The virgin birth and the idea of a taint attaching to intercourse allow Didymus to maintain Christ’s co-humanity in both physical and moral respects56 whilst explaining how he is only ‘in the likeness of a body of sin’ (Rom. 8:5).57 In part, the connection of sex to the Adamic Fall is simply traditional.58 Even earlier commentators, uninterested in the link, felt that they had to acknowledge it. For example, Clement emphasizes the fact that intercourse was not sinful in 51

52 C.Man. 3 [PG 39.1089c]. C.Man. 8 [PG 39. 1096b–c]. EcclT 5.274.22–275.6; GenT 2.235.2–7. 54 There are no essential earthly goods and evils; rather, everything is dependent on use and disposition, HiobT 1.49.22–50.5, which may be categorized into four types, EcclT 3.167.11–14. 55 ZachT 1.40.28–41.5 (1.177). Interestingly, Origen was far less concerned with excluding Jesus from the stain of dirt. Hom.Lev. 12.4 suggests only Jesus is unblemished, but elsewhere he took the use of the plural in Luke 2:22 as showing Christ’s need for Levitical purification, Hom. Luc. 14.3. 56 57 PsT 1.45.6–12; 1.37.19–21. C.Man. 8 [PG 39.1096b]. 58 Didymus can designate pleasure, most probably sexual pleasure, as the cause of the Fall (GenT 1.83.19–25), even though he more frequently portrays the passions necessary to the experience of such pleasure as a consequence of, rather than precursor to, sin (PsT 3.193.10–12). 53

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itself but as a breaking of the commandment.59 Consequently it was an appropriate concession to make to his Manichaean opponents in the exegesis of the key Pauline language of the ‘flesh of sin’, and one which served to remove the foundation to their claims that such language implied the fundamentally evil nature of matter itself. Didymus takes the arguments further than his predecessors, utilizing their appropriateness to the Christological dimension of his problem, but their rarity in his corpus as a whole shows that they did not provide a definitive answer, and he was just as quick to introduce other models.

Tainted by Bodily Existence Related to this model of sexual transmission is the suggestion at times that the brute fact of bodily existence is tied to both the consequences of Adamic transgression and the inclination towards evil present in all but Christ.60 The key here is that although Didymus ascribes a light instrumental body to all the noetic creation, including Adam and Eve in Paradise,61 the gross embodiment in thick earthly flesh is a direct consequence of Adam’s sin and one visibly transmitted to all his descendants.62 Therefore, to be bodily incarnate is to be contaminated by dirt regardless of one’s actions. Perhaps then, since it is possible to go in this life not only because of sins ( Ø ± ÆæÆ), but also to help others ( Ø Tçº ØÆ ¼ººø), like John, say, or Jeremiah, it is because of this that he says, ‘Even if I am pure in my actions ( Øa
æ ø), nonetheless I have dirt (Þ
)’ (Job 14:4). For the earthly place is dirt as compared with the pure life (
æe c ŒÆŁÆæa Çø), not in itself; just as it was also said, ‘Before you, Lord, all our righteousness is like a menstrual rag’ (Isa. 64:5).63

59 Clem.Alex. Strom. 3.(12)88.1–89.3. Cf. Protr. (11)111.1–2, where he attributes the origin of sin to  , and on the basis of Strom. 3.(17)103.1–4 it is possible that he intends this to be understood as sexual. Origen Hom.Lev. 12.4 notes that father and mother are defiled by conception as well as the offspring, which places the emphasis on sexual pleasure rather than biological transmission. Cf. Cyr.Alex. Adv.Anthrop. 8 [PG 76.1092], which locates the problem in the fact that Adam and Eve conceived in a state condemned to death, and Max.Conf. Thal. 61 [PG 90.628b–c], which speaks of ‘the law of birth according to pleasure’. 60 Baudry’s (1996) somewhat confused account is essentially just an analysis of this model based on the assumption that Didymus is advocating the Platonic myth of the soul imprisoned in a body. As a result he rejects the idea that Didymus in any way allowed that humanity inherited the sins of the fathers, stressing simply the inheritance of corporeal, mortal conditions (esp. 180). 61 GenT 1.107.4–7. 62 GenT 1.106.24–6; 1.107.4–20; HiobT 3.277.28–31; cf. Daniélou (1970), 154–64. 63 HiobT 3.261.17–28.

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Even the most innocent and virtuous need saving from ‘the body of lowliness’. The one journeying in innocence (IŒÆŒÆ fi ), the one existing in the aforesaid successes says, ‘Ransom me’ (Ps. 25:11). Even if I am amid such great achievements and with your co-operation (fiB fiB ı æª Æ fi ) all the things of virtue are accomplished for me, nonetheless you have still burdened (K
åŁ Ø) me with ‘the body of lowliness’ (e H Æ B Æ
Ø ø) (Phil. 3:21), I am still ‘in the place of oppression’ (Ps. 43:20); so ‘Ransom me’.64

The body is hard to bear, even if it is for the sake of others,65 and there is at least some sense in which the hylic, the gross materiality, must be separated from the mind. So at some point the man melts away (Œ ÆØ), at some point the material (e ºØŒ) falls away from the understanding and the heart, so that the mind no longer has anything woven together with it (Ø
æ

º ª ), but is entirely immaterial (
fiÅ ¼ßº) as it was also at the beginning (‰ ŒÆd c Iæåc 
ÅæŒÆØ).66

Didymus is not thereby advocating the popular Platonic myth of the soul as imprisoned in the body,67 nor indeed the Manichaean view of matter as both disordered and disordering and thus intrinsically evil.68 For the earthly body can be sanctified, and sin is fundamentally seen as mental.69 Indeed, given the large role afforded to incorporeal demons and fallen angels whose sins are far greater than those of men,70 it could hardly be otherwise. Didymus stresses the goodness of the earthly creation and its remedial rather than punitive role.71 Nonetheless, it is not just vanity by comparison with the heavenly,72 and a source of temptation,73 but also has a deleterious effect on the soul embodied. The very mixing of noetic and corporeal dilutes the power of the soul.74 64

65 66 PsT 2.97.21–4. HiobT 1.58.1–4. PsT 1.35.2–4. The body is moulded providentially for unity with the soul by God, HiobT 3.288.34–289.6; and it is specifically not the moulding of the body which constitutes as the Fall as most scholars suppose but the change brought upon it by the protoplasts’ sin, PsT 3.129.5–6. 68 GenT 2.167.18–23. Although Didymus clearly identifies this view with Mani, it was more definitely espoused by Stoics (Diog.Laert. Vit. 7.134) and then read into Pl. Tim. 50d by a number of ‘Middle Platonists’ (Alcin. Didasc. 8.2–3(162.29–163.3); Numen. fr.52 [des Places]; Hermogenes; cf. Tert. Adv.Herm. 23.1; Calcid. In Pl. Tim. 298). Manichaean ideas seem to have been more influenced by the concept of a malign celestial influence and thus emphasized astrology, Man. Ceph. 69(167.23–30; 168.1–7; 169.9–13). On this whole issue, see Bennett (1997), 84–9. 69 PsT 1.38.1–7; In Rom 7 [Staab 5.4–7]; EcclT 6.323.2–7; HiobT 3.307.30–3. 70 HiobT 1.24.1–3. 71 GenT 1.112.9–21; PsT 4.256.23–6; cf. 2.86.13–14. 72 HiobT 3.216.13–23; EcclT 3.154.11–17. 73 The world tempts humanity to set it up as an idol in God’s place, HiobT 3.220.1–6; EcclT 3.149.1–150.1; the Fall itself can be described as the search for complexity, with materiality as the basis for differentiation, EcclT 4.231.12–232.26. 74 Although weakened, the indwelling power of the soul is not destroyed, HiobT 4.370.10–31. 67

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But it is clear, that being greater (Œæ ø) than the body, when [the soul] exists unmixed (I ªø) with it, it has a purer (ŒÆŁÆæøæÆ) and more absolute ( NºØŒæØ æÆ) activity (Kæª ØÆ). And let there be an everyday illustration of this to show that greater things are diminished when mixed with lesser ones, for example honey mixed with wormwood is diminished, also wine mixed with water.75

This shift from a light instrumental body to a gross corporeal one entails a change of sight from spiritual vision to earthly vision,76 a twisting of the senses,77 and a veiling of the inner man.78 On the basis of Wisd. 9:15 humanity is weighed down79 and the body blocks the contemplation of the truth.80 So the saint must respond by beating up the body in accordance with 1 Cor. 9:27.81 Although Didymus can use ‘material’ and ‘dirtying’ (rhupoun) as synonyms,82 we are probably not speaking here of physical change and bodily processes. Didymus has little interest in these and focuses rather on those impulses which could be combated by a disciplined mind.83 So, in fact, he limits the impact of the traditional role of corruption and death in this Adamic inheritance. Even the language of the flesh as ‘a mound of death’ is taken as denoting immoral usage rather than physical mortality.84 By using his distinction of sin and dirt, Didymus is able to maintain the antipathy towards bodily life and sensual pleasures so common in his day,85 while avoiding declaring the body actually evil or a source of sin. Our gross bodies, as they are, are the consequence of original sin and transmit a certain impurity and moral weakness even to the few virtuous souls who did not fall.86 More than this, they are the arena of moral conflict, which is not so much a battle between body and soul as between two dispositions of the soul played out in its relationship to the body—the soul should rule the body and thus prevent the natural pre-passions developing into actual passions or yet worse into dispositions and actions. It is the disordering of the psychological hierarchies which drives one to sin and can be exploited by the Devil, rather than the body or lower powers of the soul themselves. But such is Didymus’

75

HiobT 3.288.25–34. The language is redolent of Plato, e.g. Phlb. 52d; Phd. 66a, and precisely these metaphors are used by Plotinus, Enn. 1.1.4; 4.7.9. 76 77 GenT 1.82.7–18. GenT 1.83.7–19. 78 79 PsT 5.302.3–8; 5.320.1–3. PsT 2.107.28–108.3; GenT 1.107.7–15. 80 81 In 2 Cor. 4.7 [Staab 25.9–14]. PsT 5.291.18–24; ZachT 2.111.15–20 (2.80). 82 ZachT 1.51.12–13 (1.224): ‘having nothing material (ºØŒe) or which stains (Þı
F)’; cf. Clem.Alex. Paed. 2.(10)92.1. 83 Sin and virtue only relate to a Kç  E, HiobT 1.1.25–2.3; GenT 1.75.17–22. Jesus is free from evil reckonings and mental disturbance, PsT 1.43.15–17, but not bodily change, e.g. tiredness, GenT 2.214.24–6. 84 C.Man. 5 [PG 39.1092c]; PsT 1.36.17–38.7. 85 Brown (1988) still offers an excellent overview. 86 On the weakness of human nature, see HiobT 3.258.21–6; 1.12.30–2.

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emphasis on the unity of the human person that by mortifying his body87 the saint can discipline his mental processes, shepherd his sense perception,88 and not allow room for the Devil. The body is not sinful or evil, but neither is it clean or desirable. It is the arena of moral conflict only necessitated by human failure and so is rightly lamented but not censured.89 For most, matter merely manifests the creature’s moral distance from God,90 but for the saints, the morally perfect, it actually creates a moral distance, yet only in order that this gulf might be bridged for others.91 Matter is somehow more than a symptom of sin but less than a cause.

Tainted by Involuntary Sin Didymus says much about involuntary, hidden and mental sins92 and from these accounts one would not really be tempted to identify them with a doctrine of original sin. And yet this is precisely what he does on a number of occasions. He would say, that if I sin deliberately (
æÆØæ ØŒH), woe is me, and if—as we have recounted previously—I have only the sin of Adam out of the succession (KŒ ØÆ åB), I still shall not be able to lift up my head in the same way as when every dirt (Þ
ı) has been removed. For some sins are immoral (çÆ ºø) as a result of our intent (
æÆØæ ø), while others are different in the sense we said before; and punishment (ŒºÆØ) follows the ones as a result of intent, but for the ones due to ignorance (K IªÆ) purification (ŒŁÆæØ) is owed.93

From the standpoint of a systematic theology this would be hard to fathom, but such an exposition is manifestly not Didymus’ purpose. In the light of his call to virtue, things are much clearer. He is not so much making a positive identification of involuntary sins as a negative one. He has no real interest in describing these involuntary sins, only in establishing a clear-cut morality based upon intention. Intention is everything in discerning the morality of an 87

88 PsT 4.282.18–19; 1.37.26–9. GenT 1.71.6–12; 1.119.23–6. This is the sense in which Didymus understands Job as cursing the day of his birth without impugning the goodness of the God who made his body, HiobT 1.58.22–59.9; 3.289.21–6. 90 On evil as distance from God, see GenT 1.87.2–18. Although ‘original’ sin applies to souls which descended as well as those that fell, Didymus does not always have this in mind and, when trying to establish God’s righteousness, will shift the emphasis to pre-existent moral character and speak of some being born in wickedness and others in virtue through their own initiative and will, GenT 1.20.8–12; HiobT 1.2.23–34. 91 Cf. HiobT 1.56.16–62.14. Thus, in an interpretation of John 14:31 the sinless Jesus does not need to rise to proceed to salvation, but he does need to go with the disciples towards it, not just for their sake but his own, GenT 1.109.24–110.18. 92 PsT 2.75.27–76.22; 4.261.35–262.3; 4.272.9–21; HiobT 1.36.33–37.10; 1.50.16–34; GenT 2.158.3–6. 93 HiobT 3.283.13–25. 89

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action, to such an extent that evil or selfish intention can make an ostensibly virtuous action sinful.94 Necessity cannot force people to do good, for by definition such an action lacks intention and is no longer good.95 By asserting the ontological insubstantiality of evil, alongside a concept of habituation, Didymus shifts the emphasis from action to character and thus arrives at a pathology of sin which combines a certain element of inevitability with a repeated choice of the free will. Above all this pathology allows one to distinguish between levels of sinfulness96 and allocates a role to involuntary or unwilling ‘sins’, which have a consequential effect distancing the agent from God and so must be overcome in order for the agent to pursue virtue but which are not culpable in and of themselves. These can take the form of the stirrings of emotion, as when Christ began to be astonished and sorely troubled,97 or environmental factors, such as one’s upbringing: For just as someone born of an idolater does not have sin (± ÆæÆ) while he is an infant, but he has this very thing, the fact of being born of such people, as if a pollution (u
æ ºı e), for their rearing is blameworthy (


B), so too in the case of the saints it is necessary to understand an unwilling transgression (
Ææ
ø Æ På Œ Ø).98

Not all involuntary sin can be equated with Adamic or original sin but, rather, Didymus is struggling with a nexus of ideas prompted by different biblical texts. His difficulty is shown by the fact that when treating the case of the saints, he seems to identify pre-passion with moral pollution, the source of concupiscence and perhaps the consequence of Adam’s sin: The soul of the saints is said to sin in this way, whenever it becomes in prepassion. And we have often used that illustration: if a cloak that is already dirty (e Þı
øŁb) takes some pollution (Øa ºı e) from being touched, it does not show at all. But if you take my wholly clean cloak, which has come straight from the loom, even if you touch it lightly, it is said to have been polluted (

º ŁÆØ).99

However, elsewhere the concept of pre-passion is employed to maintain the absolute sinlessness of Christ, while establishing the possibility that he could have sinned and the reality of his mutable soul’s moral struggle and victory.100 Pre-passion is here merely a ‘proof of nature’, an aspect of created, rather than fallen, humanity.101 As a result, this appeal to involuntary sin as Adamic is not particularly successful or coherent. Rather, it speaks to Didymus’ mitigating intent and his resolve to focus on the present moral conflict rather than its past history. 94 96 98 100

95 GenT 1.124.28–125.6. GenT 2.172.1–2. 97 EcclT 5.294.8–20; PsT 1.43.21–5. PsT 4.282.2–7; 1.43.20–5. 99 HiobT 3.282.26–33. PsT 5.293.3–6; cf. PsT 2.76.13–17. 101 PsT 3.222.8–12; 4.282.2–7; cf. 1.43.12–17. PsT 1.43.21–2.

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Tainted by Childish Ignorance Didymus’ emphasis on intention presupposes rationality as a basis for both virtue and sin. Children, however, are not rational beings and therefore cannot make a deliberate decision to choose the good.102 They are innocent but not virtuous,103 and Didymus interprets this within his overarching hermeneutic as entailing dirt but not sin.104 Unlike Augustine,105 Didymus does not construe childhood as sinful on an experiential basis. Rather, he looks to two points of doctrine: first, the fact that ethics are character-based and participative, with virtue a function of distance from God; and secondly, that the doctrine of pre-existence implies an individual falling away from virtue—even those who descend are stripped of knowledge and virtue by their descent into gross bodies. But it is also necessary to understand intelligently (ı H) the sin of succession (e B ØÆ åB ± æÅ Æ), the one according to Adam, which is unintelligently brought forward by those men. For even the saints, even if they have entered into life for no other reason, in their childhood have dirt (K fiB
ÆØ ØŒfiB ºØŒÆ fi e Þ
 åıØ), which is not sin (± æÅ Æ). This is the sense in which it was said about Samuel, ‘And Samuel, before even knowing God’ (1 Sam. 3:7). He was ignorant of God because he was an infant, not because he had evil, but because he had not yet had any recognition of reason (K
ªøØ ºªı). And you shall understand intelligently the verse ‘All sinned’ (Rom. 3:23; 5:12), if you understand it of the things done in ignorance (a ŒÆ ¼ªØÆ), the things done in childhood (a ŒÆa c
ÆØ Œc ºØŒÆ).106

On some occasions Didymus seems to go even further and portray this childhood foray into sin not only as excusable but necessary.107 But you know that I interpreted the verse once and I said that not every sin harms (ºÅ çæ Ø) the one who performs it, then too I used such an image— imagine a painter who is learning his craft; he paints many images badly (P ŒÆºH) and this is not the sort of sin which brings censure (łª). He paints

102

PsT 2.91.8–94.18; HiobT 1.20.6–16. Without reason there can be no sin, PsT 1.38.1–7; 2.93.23–8; GenT 1.96.4–7. 103 EcclT 6.338.24–339.4; HiobT 1.4.33–5.16; PsT 2.94.16–18; cf. In 1 Jn 3.9–10 [PG 39.1792bc], which argues that children are not properly said not to sin, since ‘they are prevented from sinning by their age, not by virtue’; their sinlessness is natural (I
e ç  ø), not a result of a disposition (KŒ ØÆŁ ø), and thereby morally neutral. Consequently, it is unclear whether children dying young are to be resurrected to life or to judgement, In Jn. 5.20 [PG 39.1648a]. Contrast Philo’s stance on childhood as subject to uncontrolled desires until educated, Spec.Leg. 1.313; 4.68; Leg All. 1.9–10, 100. 104 105 106 HiobT 3.260.23–261.5. Aug. Conf. 1.7. HiobT 3.260.23–261.5. 107 Similar lines of thought may have existed in Origen on the basis of such tantalizing hints as Hom.Jer. 5.15.4–5: ‘For it is not possible for man to grasp the true and pure doctrines from the start (IæåBŁ )’, but they are not so developed.

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badly for this reason, so that he might learn to paint well. But it is necessary to do many things mistakenly ( ÆæÅ ø), in order that thus someone might readily achieve the aim (Œ
) which he has for his work . . . So in this way you would say that everyone who is born on earth has this sin, not the one which is in opposition to virtue (c KÆØı Å fiB Iæ fiB), but the one which brings someone to virtue. Doubtless at any rate sometimes we say that someone trying hard (
ı ÇÆ) to paint an image, who has just begun the art and paints badly, paints better than someone who has already spent a long time in the art, if that one paints carelessly due to laziness (KŒ ÞÆŁı Æ); and if you compare one work with the other, the careless man’s work is better; but if you consider their intent (c
æÆæ Ø), the one who painted worse painted better.108

Here, we may seem to be coming close to a modern understanding whereby moral formation is connected to both our evolution as a species and individual growth and maturity. However, Didymus’ exegetical concern and his cosmological presuppositions change the frame of reference dramatically. We are dealing with an excuse, a mitigation of the sins of the saints, rather than a constructive engagement with the metaphor of craftsmanship. Experiential knowledge of sin as part of the journey to virtue is not a feature of humanity, but fallen humanity, and so Jesus is an exception.109 Only the child, the one according to Jesus, the one who ‘has not known sin’ (2 Cor. 5:21), that is an intent for wicked things (
æÆæ Ø H
ÅæH), chose the good first, while all the others did so after knowing this wickedness which is valued (
ÅæÆ Æ Å c Ø ø Å)—that is not the one which is blameworthy (K
łª) but that which is initiating (c Nƪ Å). ‘Therefore there is no man who will do good and will not sin’ (Eccl. 7:20). After sin all have the good, but the aforementioned sort of sin, the one which exists prior (
æßçØÆ Å) to virtue.110

Didymus conflates this emphasis on learning through failure with traditional metaphors illustrating the importance of judging by relative standards111 and then awkwardly imposes his own cosmology: And let’s use this as an illustration: say there are a hundred steps and if someone who was on the hundredth step were to go down three steps, he would be said to be lacking, yet someone who started on the first and went up to the third would not be blamed ( c ł ª ı). Therefore the one who has gone down the hundred, even if he does not leave the steps, is nonetheless surely in a certain dirt ( Ø KØ Þ
ø fi ).112

108 110 112

109 EcclT 4.220.9–14, 18–25. PsT 1.30.1–8; GenT 2.215.6–12. 111 EcclT 4.221.5–10. cf. EcclT 4.220.9–221.1; 3.164.11–27; PsT 2.82.11–14. HiobT 3.261.5–14.

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Humanity here seem to have descended all one hundred steps in their premundane rational existence and forgotten virtue.113 During corporeal life they must learn, or, more accurately, remember, the paths of virtue so that they ascend and grow in participation according to the Image.114 Hence, Didymus achieves a certain ambivalence towards childhood, which allows him to hold his various texts in tension and ultimately deliver a message of moral exhortation—‘the sins of the saints are a path towards virtue’115—without grappling profoundly with the concept of failure being necessary to progress.

Tainted by Mutability A number of passages seem to come close to some modern interpretations which invoke human finitude as the basis for sin and, since universally experienced, analogous to a doctrine of original sin. But he also teaches the mutability of the nature of men (e æ
e B ç  ø H IŁæ
ø) through the ‘You have not made me scot-free (IŁfiH) from lawlessness (I Æ)’, at the same time both offering an example of moderation and showing that there exists a sin according to the succession of Adam which is common to men. And we are not saying this, that the saints are subject to a fall (
Œ ØÆØ fiB
ÆæÆ Ø) in the sense of their deliberate choice (ŒÆa
æÆæ Ø), but in the sense of the succession (ŒÆa ØÆ å), as has been said.116

Here we see an echo of Clement’s insistence that perfect sinlessness belongs to the Trinity alone, as only they are essentially good. And, indeed, Didymus feels equally able to explain the impurity of the celestial creation in terms of the enormous ontological gulf opened up between God and his creation purely on the basis of essential versus accidental and indeed participatory goodness. For he knew that ‘the stars are not clean (P ŒÆŁÆæa) before you’ (Job 25:5b) and what was said by those who had accomplished righteousness: ‘Before you all our righteousness is like a menstrual rag’ (Isa. 64:5). For, as compared with you, the judge who is righteousness, even if we have righteousness, we have it faintly (I Æıæa) compared with you. Paul too saying ‘I am not conscious of anything to myself ’ and adding ‘but I have not been justified in this’ (1 Cor. 4:4) shows the weakness of the begotten nature (e B ª ÅB ç  ø IŁ ).117

The sentiment clearly appeals to Didymus, and perhaps more so than his rarer references to a sexual taint; yet within his usual terms of debate it is actually very unsatisfactory. Although this equation of mutability and sin would 113

114 EcclT 4.221.22–222.6; PsT 1.5.2–9. PsT 4.259.16–31; ZachT 2.172.3–8 (2.333). 116 HiobT 3.282.34–283.10. HiobT 3.282.16–24. 117 HiobT 3.295.19–33; cf. Orig. Princ. 1.7.2, where they are tainted not by sin but by gross embodiment (pace Scott (1991), 147). 115

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resolve the difficulty regarding such figures as Adam, Jeremiah, and John the Baptist, it would impute a sinfulness to the soul of Jesus which he elsewhere avoids. For Christ’s soul is theoretically mutable118 and yet, as we have seen, Rom. 8:5 is taken as excusing the humanity of the Saviour from sin according to the succession.119 Equally, sin is said not to have existed from the beginning nor until the end, whereas creaturely mutability is logically never-ending.120 What this illustrates is Didymus’ discomfort with the models he has set out and indeed the whole concept of a taint attached to the saints. Partly this discomfort is dogmatic, since it seems to undermine human free will, and partly it is paraenetic. Didymus’ main concern throughout his commentaries is really moral exhortation, and so he continually stresses the insubstantiality of evil, the importance of resisting the temptation of the Devil, and the fact that the path to virtue is open to our free choice. He is quick to emphasize the cooperative role of divine grace and indeed will ascribe all virtuous action to God, but this grace so infuses our nature that it may even appear natural. The implanting of the common ideas and the role of the conscience, which is often portrayed as divine or angelic rather than an aspect of our psychology, allow all people the possibility of true virtue and right understanding. The giving of the law, the incarnation, and indeed the entire working out of divine providence only reinforce this basic natural revelation. Any doctrine of original sin may seem to undermine his exhortatory programme, whereas by interpreting the sins of the saints not as actual sins but an emphasis upon the supreme goodness of God and the importance of humility—and indeed higher moral standards—among those who are progressing in virtue, Didymus is able to subordinate problematic texts to his paraenetic intentions. But there is no need to be surprised, if the blessed one says one thing to his friends but another to God. For only if he called himself both just and a sinner while speaking to the same person, would there be any contradiction. Therefore with moderation (

æØÅØ) to God he says that compared with God’s purity he has been dyed in dirt ( çŁÆØ K Þ
ø fi ), but towards men he argues differently saying: ‘I know that I shall be revealed as just’ (Job 13:18).121

Moreover, this notion of a vast ontological gulf between the divine and the created, between the immutable and the mutable, is no ad hominem argument, but indeed the more profound direction of Didymus’ metaphysic. For although God is often called a noetic substance122 and indeed mind,123 he actually surpasses all noetic substance124 and can only be known in a negative fashion.125

118 120 122 124

119 PsT 4.285.20–1. C.Man. 7–8 [PG 39.1093d–1096c]. 121 PsT 4.245.21–5. HiobT 3.262.26–263.3. 123 PsT 2.84.6; 1.34.13–16. PsT 5.333.16–19. 125 ZachT 3.365.5–8 (5.32). PsT 1.52.3–13.

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What we see in Didymus is not what historians of dogma expect. He is neither the forerunner of a Western doctrine of original sin, nor does he remove the significance of the Adamic fall by reducing it to myth or replacing it with a pre-mundane drama of the individual fall of pre-existent souls. Equally, we are dealing here with doctrines of gross embodiment and indeed creatureliness which are more nuanced than much scholarship on ‘Origenism’ assumes. He attempts to take seriously the biblical concept of solidarity in Adam without compromising a fundamental belief in the freedom of human free will. Gross bodily existence and the succession of Adam thus become both a sign and source of sin; yet neither is reprehensible and indeed the former has a positive dimension because its purpose is educative and ultimately redemptive. The body is thus treated as indifferent but in the sense of being both good and bad rather than basically neutral, as can be seen by Didymus’ harnessing of the views that creation is good but Job’s lament of his birth is not a sin against the Creator. The first Adam was not created immature but those born from his succession are immature, inheriting unordered (though perhaps not disordered) anthropological hierarchies. Throughout all this, there is little firm dogmatic conclusion, and Didymus’ deeper concerns are always to accommodate the full scriptural testimony and to describe the broad-brush dynamics of human existence. Sin—in both the form of a deliberative choice of evil and of a falling short of virtue—is thus taken seriously as an obstacle in the ascent through virtue to virtue. For all the prompting of the common ideas and conscience implanted by God, there is a tendency to experience sin in the process of learning virtue, as well as a vulnerability to the Devil, which usually leads to the habitualization of sin to such an extent that the will to do good is then weakened. However, it is vital to his considerable refutation of those who believe in fixed natures that virtue is in the authority of one’s purposive moral judgement126 and that one is always free to choose, despite the apparent effects of habituation;127 for free will is precisely what makes virtue praiseworthy.128 Consequently, at no point does this existential crisis of sin have real ontological depth and so his portrayal of humanity’s response to virtue is deeply optimistic.

GenT 2.162.5–6; ZachT 2.133.5–20 (2.176). The attack on fixed natures is particularly evident in GenT 1.143.14–144.5; EcclT 6.343.9–22; ZachT 2.132.28–133.5 (2.175). 127 PsT 3.199.9–14; HiobT 4.369.5–9. 128 GenT 1.75.14–25; HiobT 1.1.35–2.3. 126

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Afterword There can be little doubt that Didymus deserves his place within wider analyses of the fourth century and hopefully this brief work will add to the picture accessible within English scholarship. I have tried to suggest not only that Didymus represents an important line of interpretive continuity back to Origen but also that he is distinctly a man of his time. Within the context of an urban ascetic schoolroom which attracted a wide variety of transient students, he expounded the Scriptures through a hermeneutic of elevation, drawing his hearers into the deeper truths of the God who both created and oversees all. While pupils sought to extol his knowledge and skill as self-taught or God-taught,1 he rather acknowledged the importance of a teacher and a tradition, the essential means of progress. For, despite the divine authorship of all nature and history, their revelation could only be opaque to those who had not been initiated.2 His vision is individualizing and virtue-orientated, and best described as ‘virtue-Origenism’ in contradistinction to the Eusebian and Evagrian developments of the same tradition. This turn to virtue is not unique within the period and may well reflect larger trends. There is a confluence of ideas within the fourth century, drawing on the streams of both practical Christian experience and dogmatic development—from the emergence of asceticism as the authentic Christian life and the panegyric of virginity to a post-‘Arian’ focus on the gulf between Creator and creation and a deliberate turn against perceived Eunomian intellectualism—all of which may have proven fertile soil for a wider appreciation of the theological role of virtue. Certainly, the stimuli towards his ‘virtue-Origenism’ noted here seemingly come from many directions, not least Didymus’ idiosyncratic engagement with Manichaeism through the lens of Origen’s rebuttal of Valentinianism. Yet it results in an attempt to read the Scriptures in a way Didymus may justify as faithful to Origen, consonant with ecclesiastical doctrine, and helpful to the students in his classroom.

1

Ruf. H.E. 11.7.

2

ZachT 2.164.8–11 (2.304); PsT 4.288.1–4.

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Where we might have expected an Origenism challenged by the legacy of Methodius’ and others’ critique of Origen’s speculations on the pre-existence of the soul, the nature of the resurrection body, and the salvation of the Devil, we instead find a teacher, and perhaps a wider group with him, focused entirely on incorporating the new Trinitarian orthodoxy into the wealth of exegetical traditions that preceded it. In the face of fourth-century Nicene and later Constantinopolitan claims, not only Origen’s doctrine of God but his wider spiritual theology required considerable reformulation, given his deep commitment to the interrelationship of his Trinitarian analogy with all aspects of doctrine. In reappropriating Origen for a new theological era, changes are inevitable, just as they were in Origen’s own reappropriation of Philo for Christianity. So it is that, amidst the complex shading of Didymus’ depiction of virtue and sin, we see the two primary movements of Origen’s participatory anthropology being redefined: the dynamic ascent from image to likeness is given a psychological focus, drawing the language of ‘image’ more towards moral indicator than ontological potential; while the hierarchical basis to Origen’s correlated triads is undermined, suggesting parallel rather than sequential aspects of the journey of the soul—virtue is no longer a propaedeutic or purificatory ethical exercise leading to illumination but the goal of humanity. Arguably, similar shifts are found in Gregory of Nyssa3 and to different effect in Evagrius, which is probably more suggestive of Didymus responding to the theological spirit of his age from within a similar context than any direct dependence. The Evagrian response is particularly interesting in this regard. For despite his willingness to praise Didymus as a ‘great and Gnostic teacher’,4 he draws little from him constructively. Instead, he responds to the problems by locating the image not within or as a property or aspect of an incorporeal essence, as do Origen and Didymus, but in the quality of incorporeality itself: Christian progress is, therefore, to the restoration of something fully lost in embodiment.5 In redeploying Origen’s triadic exegeses, the lower stages of the correlated triads become a product of this loss and must now necessarily be transcended in the restoration of an absolute unity of undifferentiated, incorporeal, numerical identity.6 Consequently, in complete contrast to Didymus, the sense of a hierarchical movement from purgation to illumination to union seems to become much stricter and more intense. Whereas Layton tends towards a picture of the scholastic Didymus closing gaps within an Origenist hermeneutical tradition, seeking ‘to eliminate—not to cultivate—the aporiai that a biblical philosophy would present to his circle’,7 to my mind he is engaged in a much more creative project. Didymus’ broad 3 4 6

cf. von Balthasar (1995), 117–19, on the image, and 20n.26, on loss of correlation. 5 Evag. Gnost. 48. Cf. Guillaumont (1962), 37–40. 7 Evag. Pract. 18; 49. Layton (2004), 163.

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instincts typically take him in an individualizing and psychologizing direction, which is resourced from within the Alexandrian tradition—a Philonic turn supporting the turn to virtue. Thus, it is independent reading of Philo that brings him to integrate the originally Stoic concept of a pre-passion far more fully into his psychology than Origen, shifting the role of pre-passion from that of physiological anomaly to common starting point for affective dispositions, whether virtuous or sinful. Notions such as his presentation of original (or ‘Adamic’) sin or his speculations on the soul of Christ reveal a theologian engaging with the challenges of the day, whether Manichaeism or Apollinarianism, albeit one working within a relatively narrow intellectual stream, which apart from his pneumatology seems to have had little direct impact on others. Even within his own context, the resulting overall picture is by no means systematically coherent. Some areas bear the marks of ideas still being worked out and assumptions not always recognized for what they are. Others suggest a deeper sense in which Didymus’ explanations and levels of interpretations are often intended more as contradistinctive rather than definitive. Like Gregory of Nyssa’s more mystically charged works, the details of this virtue anthropology describe the fact of the soul’s ascent more than its topography8—a moral life that is quintessentially dynamic, capable of virtue, yet tragically blossoming into sin. In outlining a number of key issues in his understanding of virtue and sin, I have attempted to give some sense of Didymus’ theological trajectory. It remains to be seen whether Didymus’ individualistic and psychological reading of the Scriptures and determined opposition to Manichaeism results in an entirely anthropocentric theology of works. This certainly is not his intent and, even as he elides the distinction between the soul of Christ and that of the saints and their salvific condescension, he attempts to maintain its uniqueness as that which has never been separated from the Word. However, by changing the nature of this union to virtue, he loses much of the complexity of Origen’s thought and is denied the possibilities Gregory of Nyssa exploits through the identification of Christ with virtue. Hopefully, in passing I have also alerted the reader to something of the complexity of Didymus’ relationship to Greek philosophy, and this may serve as some slight caveat to some of the more cavalier generalizations about both Origenist and Alexandrian theologies. Although it is not controlling or determinative of his exegesis and doctrine, Didymus does go beyond a mere instrumental use of technical vocabulary in a quasi-scientific style. Parallels from ‘Middle Platonists’, such as Apuleius and Alcinous, reveal more than an indirect influence through his reading of Origen and Philo. He may have little abiding commitment beyond perhaps the preliminaries of Aristotelian logic but, in his Origenist willingness to ‘despoil the Egyptians’, many philosophical concepts

8

cf. Heine (1975), 101–8, on Nyssen.

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and terms are adapted to his own anthropology, with sometimes interesting consequences: from the categories of virtue and the originally Stoic notion of mutual entailment (antakolouthia) which support his basic movement towards a unifying unity to the ‘Middle Platonist’ and Stoic language with which he articulates a monistic psychology, that is the necessary background to the affective movements towards virtue or sin and the means of their dispositional habituation through a series of self-reinforcing ordered or disordered hierarchies. However, there remains much to be done. It has not been possible to offer an overview of the entirety of Didymus’ thought, and my focus on the centrality of virtue has necessarily obscured other epicentres, such as his absolute insistence on the nature of God as simple, incomposite, and unreceptive of quality, and his unique Christology. Didymus’ doctrine of God requires a proper consideration in its own right, along with his treatments of creation and providence. A substantial examination of his Trinitarian thought could well throw further light on the relationship of both the Toura Commentaries and On the Holy Spirit to wider works such as the anonymous On the Trinity and pseudo-Basil’s Against Eunomius 4–5. His precise theological relationship to Athanasius, the Cappadocians, and Evagrius remains intriguing. Meanwhile, much useful information will probably be revealed by the consideration of isolated exegetical trajectories and the development of particular hermeneutical keys. Tychonius’ Rules may be unique in their presentation, but the aural nature of ancient learning lends itself to precisely this style of formulation, as we see in the rhetorical exercises; and how much more so in a teacher who was even more reliant on his prodigious memory than most. In all this I have said little about Didymus’ own character as a faithful Christian. For all his occasional irritation with his students, both the art of exegesis and the love of others which is required to condescend to teach it are deeply spiritual tasks that he does not undertake lightly. He is well aware of the high cost of teaching, for he sees in both Christ and Adam an enormous price paid for the sake of others.9 Perhaps it is not inappropriate to conclude by sharing his closing plea to his readership from the end of On the Holy Spirit, which may serve as a suitable apologia for the infelicities of both his own theology and this account. But even if perhaps someone were to wish to read this book, we pray that they purify themselves from every evil deed and their worst thoughts, so that they can understand what we have said with an enlightened heart and, being full of holiness and wisdom, forgive us, if anywhere the result of our efforts has not fulfilled our desire, and think only of the intention with which something was said, not the words with which it was expressed. For just as we boldly claim to

9

GenT 1.83.25–84.2.

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have a sense of piety as far as our own conscience says, so too we simply confess that in as much as it is a question of elegance of language, rhetorical facility and the flow and structure of the speech, we are far from the target. Indeed our efforts when discussing the holy Scriptures were to understand piously what had been written and pay no attention to our inexperience and the limitations of our speech.10

10

D.S.S. 277(63).

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Bibliography Abbreviations of journal and periodical titles follow the conventions laid down by L’Année Philologique: bibliographie critique et analytique de l’antiquité gréco-latine (Paris: Les Belles Lettres).

Works of Didymus Binder, Gerhard (1980), Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zum Ekklesiastes, Vol. 1.2: Erläuterung, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 26 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Binder, Gerhard, and Michael Gronewald (1979), Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zum Ekklesiastes, Vol. 5: Kap. 9.8–10.20, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 24 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Binder, Gerhard, and Leo Liesenborghs (1979), Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zum Ekklesiastes, Vol. 1.1: Kap. 1.1–2.14., Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 25 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Doutreleau, Louis (1962), Didyme l’Aveugle: Sur Zacharie, 3 vols, Sources Chrétiennes 83–5 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf). Doutreleau, Louis (1992), Didyme l’Aveugle: Traité du Saint-Esprit, Sources Chrétiennes 386 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf). Doutreleau, Louis, Adolphe Gesché, and Michael Gronewald (1969), Didymos der Blinde: Psalmenkommentar, Vol. 1: Ps. 20–21, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 7 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Gesché, Adolphe, and Michael Gronewald (1969), Didymos der Blinde: Psalmenkommentar, Vol. 3: Ps. 29–34, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 8 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Gesché, Adolphe, and Michael Gronewald (1969), Didymos der Blinde: Psalmenkommentar, Vol. 4: Ps. 35–39, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 6 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Gesché, Adolphe, and Michael Gronewald (1970), Didymos der Blinde: Psalmenkommentar, Vol. 5: Ps. 40–44.4, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 12 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Gronewald, Michael (1968), Didymos der Blinde: Psalmenkommentar, Vol. 2: Ps. 22–26.10, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 4 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Gronewald, Michael (1977), Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zum Ekklesiastes, Vol. 2: Kap. 3–4.12, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 22 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Hagedorn, Ursula, Dieter Hagedorn, and Ludwig Koenen (1968), Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zu Hiob, Vol. 3: Kap. 7.20c–11, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 3 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Hagedorn, Ursula, Dieter Hagedorn, and Ludwig Koenen (1985), Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zu Hiob, Vol. 4.1: Kap. 12.1–16.8a, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 33.1 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt).

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Bibliography

Henrichs, Albert (1968), Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zu Hiob, Vol 1: Kap. 1–4, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 1 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Henrichs, Albert (1968), Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zu Hiob, Vol. 2: Kap. 5.1–6.28, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 2 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Hönscheid, J. (1975), Didymos der Blinde: De Trinitate, Vol. 1: Kap. 1 (Meisenheim: Hain). Kehl, Aloysius (1964), Der Psalmenkommentar von Tura: Quaternio IX (Pap. Colon. Theol. 1), Papyrologica Coloniensia 1 (Cologne: Westdeutsch Verlag). Koenen, Ludwig, and Johannes Kramer (1970), Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zum Ekklesiastes, Vol. 3: Kap. 5–6, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 13 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Koenen, Ludwig, Gerhard Binder, and Leo Liesenborghs (1969), Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zum Ekklesiastes. Vol. 6: Kap. 11–12, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 9 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Kramer, Bärbel (1985), Kleine Texte aus dem Tura-Fund, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 34 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt) [reprinted from ZPE 16 (1975), 164–213, ZPE 32 (1978), 201–11, and ZPE 46 (1982), 97–111]. Kramer, Johannes, and Bärbel Krebber (1972), Didymos der Blinde: Kommentar zum Ekklesiastes, Vol. 4: Kap. 7–8.18, Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 16 (Bonn: Rudolf Habelt). Mingarelli, Joannes A. (1863), ‘Didymi Alexandrini De Trinitate Libri Tres’, in J.-P. Migne, Patrologiae Graecae Cursus Completus, Vol. 39, 139–992. Nautin, Pierre, and Louis Doutreleau (1976/8), Didyme l’Aveugle: Sur la Genèse, 2 vols, Sources Chrétiennes 233/44 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf). Prinzivalli, Emanuela (2005), Didimo il Cieco: Lezioni sui Salmi, Il commento ai Salmi, Letture cristiane del primo millennio 37 (Milan: Edizioni Paoline). Seiler, Ingrid (1975), Didymos der Blinde: De Trinitate, Vol. 2: Kap. 2.1–7 (Meisenheim: Hain). Zoepfl, F. (1914), Didymi Alexandrini In Epistolas Canonicas Brevis Enarratio, Neutestamentlische Abhandlungen 4.1 (Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchandlung).

English Translations of Didymus’ Works Delcogliano, Mark, Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, and Lewis Ayres (trs) (2011), Works on the Spirit: Athanasius the Great and Didymus the Blind (New York: SVS Press). Hill, Robert C. (tr.) (2006), Didymus the Blind: Commentary on Zechariah, The Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press).

Catenae Editions Cramer, J. A. (1844), Catenae Graecorum Patrum in Novum Testamentum, 8 vols (Oxford: Typographeo Academico). Devreesse, Robert (1959), Les anciens commentaires grecs de l’Octateuque et des Rois (fragments tirés des chaînes), Studi e Testi 201 (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana).

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Devreesse, Robert (1970), Les anciens commentateurs grecs des Psaumes, Studi e Testi 264 (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana). Faulhaber, Michael (1899), Die Propheten-Catenen nach römischen Handschriften, Bibliche Studien 4.2–3 (Freiburg: Herder). Faulhaber, Michael (1902), Hohelied-, Proverbien- und Prediger-Catenen, Theologische Studien der Leo-Gesellschaft 4 (Vienna: von Meyer). Hagedorn, Ursula, and Dieter Hagedorn (1994–2000), Die älteren griechischen Katenen zum Buch Hiob, Vol. 1, Patristische Texte und Studien 40/48/53 (Berlin: de Gruyter). Harl, Marguerite (1972), La chaîne palestinienne sur le Psaume 118, 2 vols. Sources Chrétiennes 189–90 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf). Karo, Georg, and Hans Lietzmann (1902), ‘Catenarum Graecarum Catalogus’, in Nachrichten der Kgl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen (Göttingen: Hortsmann) 3.319, 1–66, 299–350, 559–620. Mühlenberg, Ekkehard (1975–8), Psalmenkommentare aus der Katenenüberlieferung, 3 vols, Patristische Texte und Studien 15/16/19 (Berlin: de Gruyter). Petit, Françoise (1986), Catenae Graecae in Genesim et in Exodum, Vol. 2: Collectio Coisliniana in Genesim, Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca 15 (Turnhout: Brepols). Petit, Françoise (1992–5), La chaîne sur la Genèse: édition intégrale, 3 vols, Traditio Exegetica Graeca 1–3 (Leuven: Peeters). Reuss, Joseph (1966), Johannes-Kommentare aus der griechischen Kirche, Texte und Untersuchungen n.f. 89 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag). Staab, Karl (1933), Pauluskommentare aus der griechischen Kirche aus Katenenhandschriften gesammelt, Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen 15 (Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchandlung).

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Ayres, Lewis (2004), Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Ayres, Lewis (2010), ‘The Holy Spirit as the “Undiminished Giver”: Didymus the Blind’s De Spiritu Sancto and the Development of Nicene Pneumatology’, in D. Vincent Twomey and Janet E. Rutherford (eds), The Holy Spirit in the Fathers of the Church: The Proceedings of the Seventh International Patristic Conference, Maynooth, 2008 (Dublin: Four Courts Press), 57–72. Balás, David L. (1966), ı Æ ¨F: Man’s Participation in God’s Perfections according to Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Studia Anselmina 55 (Rome: Herder). Balthasar, Hans Urs von (1995), Presence and Thought: An Essay on the Religious Philosophy of Gregory of Nyssa, trans. M. Sebanc (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press) [Fr. orig., Présence et pensée: essai sur la philosophie religieuse de Grégoire de Nysse (Paris: Éditions du Beauchesne, 1988)]. Bammel, Caroline P. H. (1989), ‘Adam in Origen’, in Rowan Williams (ed.), The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 62–93. Bardy, Gustave (1910), Didyme l’Aveugle. Études de Théologie Historique (Paris: Éditions du Beauchesne). Bardy, Gustave (1937), ‘Aux origines de l’école d’Alexandrie’, RecSR 27, 65–90. Bardy, Gustave (1942), ‘Pour l’histoire de l’école d’Alexandrie’, Vivre et Penser 2, 80–109. Barnes, Timothy D. (1993), Athanasius and Constantius: Theology and Politics in the Constantinian Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Bartelink, G. J. M. (1987), ‘Les rapports entre le monachisme égyptien et l’épiscopat d’Alexandrie (jusqu’en 450)’, in º ÆæEÆ: Hellénisme, judaïsme et christianisme à Alexandrie. Mélanges offerts au P. Claude Mondésert (Paris: Éditions du Cerf), 365–79. Barthélemy, Dominique (1972), ‘Origène et le texte de l’Ancien Testament’, in Jacques Fontaine and Charles Kannengiesser (eds), Epektasis: mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal Jean Daniélou (Paris: Beauchesne), 247–61. Baudry, Gérard-Henry (1996), ‘Le péché des origines selon Didyme d’Alexandrie’, MSR 53.2, 163–82. Baudry, Gérard-Henry (2000), Le péché dit originel. Théologie Historique 113 (Paris: Éditions du Beauchesne). Beatrice, Pier Franco (1978), Tradux peccati: alle fonti della dottrina agostiniana del peccato originale, Studia Patrististica Mediolanensia 8 (Milan: Vita e Pensiero) [English summary 304–10]. Beatrice, Pier Franco (1995), ‘Didyme l’Aveugle et la tradition de l’Allegorie’, in Gilles Dorival and Alain le Boulluec (eds), Origeniana Sexta: Origen and the Bible. Actes du Colloquium Origenianum Sextum (Chantilly, 30 août–3 septembre 1993) (Leuven: Leuven Univeristy Press), 579–90. Beeley, Christopher A. (2008), Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Beeley, Christopher A. (2012), The Unity of Christ: Continuity and Conflict in Patristic Tradition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). Behr, John (2000), Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

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Index Adam 39–40, 69, 120, 128–9, 190 n. 114, 229 Against Eunomius 4–5 (pseudo-Basil) 52–3, 242 Alcinous 152 n. 48, 162 n. 134, 166, 176 nn. 6, 7, 181 n. 38, 198–9 allegory 57, 65–6, 69–70, 75–6, 84–5 Ambrose of Alexandria 10, 35 Ambrose of Milan 11, 18, 86, 109 n. 154, 163–5, 226 nn. 40, 42 Ammonius the Tall 10, 27, 31 anagōgē see elevated exegesis anthropology 120–34, 175–88 Antony the Great 10, 15, 26, 28–9, 31, 122 n. 27, 193 n. 131 Apollinarianism 33, 58, 99, 177 n. 18, 186, 188, 216–19 Apology for Origen 21–2 Apuleius 144, 146, 162 n. 134, 166, 198 n. 190 Arianism 8, 12, 15, 44, 51, 115, 217 n. 92 Aristotle: anthropology 177–8, 227 impact on Didymus 91–2, 110, 123, 241 moderation of passion (metriopatheia) 139–40, 207 passions 189 n. 101 potential 190 sophists 196 n. 169 soul 183 virtue 3, 95, 144, 145–54, 160, 177, 192 Arsenius 11, 47 Athanasius: attribution of pseudonymous works to Didymus 53 condescension 42 freedom from disturbance (ataraxia) 142 immortality of soul 109 relationship to Didymus 13, 16, 24–9, 31 on teachers 30–1 Trinitarian metaphysics 25, 44 virtue 2 Augustine of Hippo 10, 188, 192, 199, 213–15, 234

demons 193 exegesis 3, 36, 59 n. 27, 74 n. 139, 121, 231 n. 82 dynamic of progress 153, 155 illumination 87 philosophy 128 n. 95, 197 sex 226 n. 38, 228 sin 223–5 soul 182 n. 49, 183 n. 51, 184 n. 57, 188 n. 92 unreality of evil 94 virtue 148, 236 Commentary on Origen’s On First Principles 18, 20–2 common ideas (koinai ideai) 92, 127–9 condescension 39–40, 105, 114–15, 123, 167–8 of Adam 39–40 of biblical co-authors 68–9 of Christ 42–3, 105 of teacher 39 conscience 129–30 creation 24–5, 87–8, 93–6, 100, 105–7, 112–13, 127–8, 170, 172, 175, 177–8, 230 Cyril of Alexandria 11, 74 n. 139, 82 n. 214, 86, 120, 125 n. 50, 229 n. 59 dating of Didymus’ works 12 n. 46, 24, 51 Devil 84, 94, 135–8, 193–200, 209, 214, 219–20, 231–2 dialogues 12, 33, 93 Diodore of Tarsus 62 n. 48, 65 n. 72, 73, 83 Dionysius of Alexandria 17, 102 nn. 99, 103 disposition (diathesis) 37, 97, 123, 160–1, 176, 187–8, 212 dynamic progress 3–5, 25, 36–41, 43, 66, 81–3, 87–8, 121, 124–6, 155–7, 168–73, 186–7, 212–13 from Proverbs to Ecclesiastes to Song of Songs 81, 121–2 from sense-perceptible to noetic 56, 78–9, 87, 122–3 initiate, progressing, perfect 36, 87, 165–6

Basil of Caesarea 11 Catechetical School of Alexandria 5, 12–16, 59 n. 22 Chrysippus 182, 203–5, 211 Clement of Alexandria: concatenation (antakolouthia) of virtues 163–4, 167

elevated exegesis (anagōgē) 4, 56–88 (esp. 57–60), 116 embodiment 17 n. 88, 82 n. 208, 91, 102–8, 138, 192, 214, 229–32, 234–6 double cause of gross embodiment 98–9, 105, 114–15, 223 tunics of skin 102

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Index

Encratites 226, 228 Epicurus 91, 193 Epiphanius 10, 17–18, 103 n. 108, 132 episcopacy 31–2 eschatology 45, 90–1, 98, 101, 172, 175–6 Eunomians 58, 152, 172–3 Eusebius of Caesarea 15, 23, 121 Evagrius: anthropology 187 n. 88 demons 193 descent of the soul 103 n. 108, 113 dynamic of progress 124–5, 156 n. 82 exegesis 60, 76, 77, 81 n. 200 gnostic 38 incorporeality-based Origenism 19–20, 44, 132 n. 131, 240 passions 140–1, 215, 219 pre-existence of the soul 98 reader of Didymus 10, 113, 146, 216 soul 176 n. 6 transmigration of soul (metempsychosis) 132 n. 127 tripartite soul 146–7 Trinity 88 n. 259 virtue 116, 122–4, 146–7, 149 evil see sin

distinct from human spirit 185–6 fully divine 24–6, 199–200 homonyms 62, 185 humanity of Christ 42–3, 63–4, 125, 168–70, 209–10, 216–18, 235

Fall 102–7, 116–19, 133, 222 of angels 85–6 historicity 69–70 as loss of virtue 120, 129 freedom from disturbance (ataraxia) 142, 170, 175 free will 126, 131, 133, 209, 218–20

literal meaning 64–5, 69–71, 75–6, 82–3 lovers of the narrative/history (philistores) 56, 72, 85, 104

Gregory of Nazianzus 11, 26, 44, 147, 157–8, 184 Gregory of Nyssa: anthropology 186 n. 83 concatenation (antakolouthia) of virtues 163–5 critique of pre-existence of the soul 114 n. 198 exegesis 36, 60, 71 n. 121, 76 heavenly clothing 138 n. 175 image 131 n. 117 passions 140–4 virtue 2, 95, 122–5, 152 ‘virtue-Origenism’ 5, 240 Gregory Thaumaturgus 34 Hieracites 27–8, 100 nn. 83, 89, 109 n. 147 Holy Spirit: author of history 70–1 author of Scripture 68

Iamblichus 61 n. 35, 114 n. 198, 181, 193 image 38, 102, 108, 119, 130–4, 184, 186–7 incarnation: of Christ 42–5, 114, 127 of souls see embodiment incorporeality 19, 44, 107–8, 110–11, 240 instrumental body 99, 101–8, 138, 231 Irenaeus 114, 186 Jerome: attack on advocates of salvation of the Devil 137 Didymus 8–11, 27 dispute with Rufinus 17–21 own ascetic scholasticism 35 pre-passion (propatheia) 206, 209, 212 translation of On the Holy Spirit 11 John Chrysostom 86, 130 n. 111, 163–5 koros see satiety

Manichaeism 93–4, 112–13, 190, 223–4 dualism 170, 224, 230 personal confrontation 12, 112–13 sex 192, 227 Marcellus of Ancyra 43 marriage 27, 192, 226, 228 materialism (opposition to) 84–5, 104 Methodius of Olympus 17 Middle Platonism: curriculum 36, 78 n. 173 descent of the soul 114 n. 198 impact on Didymus 93–5, 101, 241–2 matter 230 n. 68 sophists 196 n. 169 soul 110–11, 182, 187 virtue 143, 162, 171 Minutes of the Dialogue with a Heretic 33, 48, 50–1, 99 Nemesius of Emesa: action and contemplation 158 n. 103 definition of humanity 177 nn. 17, 19, 178 Origenism 22 origin of soul 101 n. 93, 112 n. 184, 118 n. 211

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Index salvation limited to humanity 135–6 soul 175 n. 5, 176 n. 6, 177 n. 14, 183 virtue 126 n. 76 Neoplatonism 95, 101–3, 108 noetic exegesis see anagōgē number symbolism 58–9 On the Holy Spirit 11, 18, 24–5 On the Trinity (Mingarelli) 10–11, 46, 47, 51–2, 221, 242 Origen: Adamic sin 222–3 anthropology 185–6 apostolic model 36 concatenation (antakolouthia) of virtues 163–5 condescension 42, 223 conscience 129 n. 104 demons 193 descent of the soul 101–5 Devil as first creation 138 dynamic progress 39, 121–2, 130–1, 153, 155–7, 240 elevated exegesis (anagōgē) 57–9 exegesis 3, 56–88, 121, 240 illumination 87, 121, 234 n. 107 image 130–1 immortality of the soul 111 incorporeality 108 pre-existence of the soul 98, 100, 112–13, 222–3 pre-passion (propatheia) 201–18 salvation of the Devil 137 sin 222–3, 225–6 sophists 197 n. 170 soul 183, 188 n. 92 spiritual senses 28, 183 n. 56 stars 236 n. 117 Trinitarian metaphysics 25, 44, 81–2, 96 universal salvation (apokatastasis) 135 n. 147 virtue 2, 3, 116, 126, 169, 194 n. 140 Origenisms 3–4, 19–23, 239–40 anti-Origenist debates 17, 19–23, 98, 103 n. 108, 105 n. 120, 132 ascetic Origenism 26–9 Isochristic controversies 43–4 scholastic Origenism 16, 20–3, 80, 240–1 Palladius 8–10, 13, 27, 34 participation 24–5, 37–8, 68–9, 93–4, 96–7, 120, 132–3, 149, 171–2, 198–200 passions (pathē): development 189–90, 208–10 disturbance 138–9, 142–3, 190, 214 effects 190–2 moderation (metriopatheia) 139–40, 189

271

positive role 138–144 product of Fall 138 removal (apatheia) 139–42, 189 Peter of Alexandria 17, 27 Philip Sidetes 13–14 philistores see lovers of the narrative/history Philo: exegesis 3, 36, 78 n. 173, 86 n. 241, 240–1 image 131 n. 117 impact on Didymus 23, 93, 240–1 incorporeality 108 Jacob and Esau 114 n. 198 passions 139–42 philosophy 128 n. 95 portrayed as source of allegorists’ errors 23 pre-passion (propatheia) 202–7, 209 recommended by Didymus 22, 79 sophists 197 n. 170 soul 176 n. 6 virtue 95–6, 116, 120 nn. 6, 7, 121, 146–9, 154 n. 71 philosophy 91–4, 110–11, 128, 138–44, 145–73, 175–8, 201–10, 241–2 Plato: anthropology 185–8, 231 n. 75 cited by Didymus 91 dualism 108–9, 229–30 Mysteries of Diotima 38 passions 139–43 sophists 196 n. 169 soul 175 n. 5, 176, 177 n. 18, 180–6 theory of Forms 118, 127 n. 83 transmigration of soul (metempsychosis) 132 n. 126 tripartite soul 143–4 virtue 3, 149, 157 n. 95, 159–60, 162 Plotinus 3, 90 n. 2, 91, 103, 109, 181 n. 38, 231 n. 75 Porphyry 72 n. 130, 85, 91, 93, 103, 193 Posidonius 143, 182, 203 pre-passion (propatheia) 139, 188, 201–20, 233, 241 Proclus 60 n. 34, 101 n. 97, 107, 180 n. 33 Procopius of Gaza 47, 102 n. 99 progress see dynamic progress propatheia see pre-passion Protagoras 83 n. 221, 91 providence 70–1, 87–8, 112–14, 123–4, 127–8, 195 questions 33–6, 41, 73, 76, 79–80, 99, 170–1, 180 repentance 126, 135–6, 161 resurrection 27–8, 105–6, 138, 178, 240

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Index

Rhodon 14, 17 Rufinus 8–10, 13–14, 17–21, 27, 31, 35 salvation: always possible for rational creation 126–7 by condescension of teacher 39–40 of Devil 135–8, 240 of infants 27–8, 100, 114 possible end of numerical multiplicity 45, 172 universal restoration (apokatastasis) 98, 101, 106, 135–8 satiety (koros) 104–5 Scripture: authorship 68–9 body of the Saviour 74, 81 canon 67 n. 88 coherence (akolouthia) 71–6 utility (ōpheleia) 76–81 sex 76–7, 192, 226–9, see also marriage sin: Adamic sin/sin according to succession 190, 221–38, 241 definition as excess/lack 145 Devil 193–4, 198–200, 214 distinct from dirt (rhupos) 225–37 fundamentally unreal (anupostatos) 94–7, 135–6, 176, 198–9 habituation 126–7, 160–1, 190, 192, 194–5 involuntary sins 232–3 primarily rational 190–2 sinlessness of Christ 105, 209–10, 216–18, 234–7 sinlessness of saints 105, 211, 224–6, 230, 234–7 universal sinfulness 222–6 Socrates (ecclesiastical historian) 8, 10, 13 Solomonic writings 59, 62–3, 69, 81, 121–2 Song of Songs 59–60, 140 sophists 196–9 soul: deathless 109–11, 131–2 diminished by embodiment 108–9, 230–1 immateriality 27–8, 101–9, 112, 116–19, 180 intrinsically changing 175–6 pre-existence 20–1, 98–119, 222–3, 240 of stars 105 transmigration (metempsychosis) 132–3 tripartite 143–4, 146–7, 162–3, 178–88 see also instrumental body; pre-existence of soul Sozomen 8–9, 13 speculative inquiry (zētēsis) 100, 116–17, 135 spiritual senses 28, 231 Stratiotes 100 n. 83

Stoicism: cited by Didymus 91 n. 10 common ideas 127–8 concatenation (antakolouthia) of virtues 162–3, 166–7, 171, 242 exegesis 193 language of progress 36, 41 n. 84 matter 230 n. 68 mortality of soul 109 n. 147 positive passions (eupatheiai) 139, 141 pre-passion (propatheia) 201–16, 241 progressing (homo proficiens) 36, 41 n. 84 removal of passions (apatheia) 139 soul 110, 181–3, 187 virtue 123, 145–8, 160, 161, 194, 195 world soul 100 n. 83 student questions see questions suffering 114, 124, 135, 195 teaching: Christ as model 41–5 condescension 39–42, 242 goal of Christian life 30–3, 36–41, 158–9 lectures 15 schoolroom 33–6 scriptural focus 78–81, 92 teacher as model 38, 40, 78–81 Theodore of Mopsuestia: critique of allegory 56, 60, 65–6, 69, 70 n. 111, 77, 84–7 critique of use of Philo 23 exegesis 73–4, 83 Theodoret 8–10, 13, 27, 86 Theophilus of Alexandria 17, 103 n. 108 Toura discovery 1, 46–51 Trinity 20–1, 24–6, 39, 44, 88 n. 259, 96, 122 Tychonius 63 n. 56, 199 union 18 n. 88, 25, 101, 121–2, 171–2 of male and female 227–8 of soul of Jesus 114, 172 of Sons of Kore 171 see also sex unity of virtue 159–73, 197, see also virtue: concatenation (antakolouthia) of virtues Valentinianism 82, 94, 116, 164, 224 vehicle of inner man (ochēma) see instrumental body virgin birth 227–8 virtue: always possible 126–7, 135–6, 211, 238 cardinal virtues 145–8 Christ as chorus-leader 43, 97, 168–70 concatenation (antakolouthia) of virtues 141, 145, 162–8, 170–1

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Index definition 3–4, 97, 120–6, 145–73 distinct from childish innocence 234–5 exists essentially 93–8, 116–19, 136, 148–9 goal of humanity 90, 122, 182 God/Trinity as source 25–6, 96, 117, 120, 136, 167, 212–13 mean/middle state 145, 148–9, 150, 166–7 needs human enaction 176–7 relation to passions 142–3 relation to tripartite soul 146–7, 181–2 union with God 171 wisdom 24–5, 37–8, 42, 63, 124–5, 144, 146–7, 151–9, 191–2, 196–8

273

God the Word 24, 37, 42, 81, 121 Holy Spirit 24–5 speak wisdom among the perfect 38–41 see also common ideas; illumination Wisdom literature 59, 81, 121–2, see also Solomonic writings Xenophon 159 n. 108 Yohanan, R. 59 n. 26 Yose, R. 59 Zeno 204, see also Stoicism zētēsis see speculative inquiry