The Vietnam People's Army Under Doi Moi 9789814377874

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PACIFIC STRATEGIC PAPER 7

CARLYLE A. THAYER is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra. His main research interests focus on the domestic and foreign policies of the three states of Indochina . In 1993 he was appointed Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London to write an Adelphi Paper on "The Future of Indochina". Associate Professor Thayer is the author of War By Other M eans: National Liberation and Revolution in Vietnam (1989); co-author of Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (1992); and co-editor of The Soviet Union as an Asian-Pacific Power (1987). Reshaping Regional Relations: Asia Pacific and the Former Soviet Union (1993). and Vietnam and the Rule of Law (1993).

The Pacific Strategic Papers focus on current issues in the field of strategic studies pertaining to the Asia-Pacific region. The series is aimed at a broad readership that ranges from the serious academic specialist to the well-informed observer in the corporate and public sectors. Many of the Pacific Strategic Papers originate from studies conducted by the Regional Strategic Studies Programme (RSSP) of the Institute. Th e Regional Strategic Studies Programme (RSSP) was set up in 1981 to encourage study of various security issues and developments affecting the Asia-Pacific region . The Programme is based at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies under the overall supervision of its Director, who is guided by a regional committee, a Programme Planner, and a Co-ordinator . The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute 's chief academic and administrative officer.

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced , stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 1994 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

The responsibility for (acts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

Cataloguing in Publication Data Thayer, Carlyle Alan, 1945The Vietnam People 's Army under doi m6i . (Pacific strategic papers; no. 7) 1. Vietnam--Armed Forces--History-- 20th century. 2. Vietnam-- Defenses. 3. Vietnam - -Politics and government--19751. Title. II. Series. DS501 I598 no . 7 1994 ISBN 981 -3016-80-9 ISSN 0218-1924 Typeset by International Typesetters Printed and bound in Singapore by Vetak Services

sls94-20224

Contents

Preface

v

I. Introduct ion 1

• The Formativ e Years, 1944-86 • The Army and the Political System • Two Strategic Tasks

2

II. Doi M6i and Its Impact on the Military

14

Politburo Resolutio n No. 2 Withdraw al from Laos Withdraw al from Cambodi a The Chinese Border The Collapse of the Soviet Union

14

• • • • •

Ill. The Period of Strategic Readjust ment • • • • •

Demobili zation Problems of Returning Veterans Rear Service Desertion and Disciplin ary Problems National Defence Expendit ure

6

17

18 20 20 23 23

26 28

31 32

Contents

iv

IV. National Defence in Peacetime • • • • • •

Threats and Threat Perception National Defence Industry Economic Construction Modernization The Military and the Political System Foreign Military Relations

42 42 47 49

55 56 63

Appendices

75

Notes

85

Bibliography

107

Preface

In March 1993 I was asked by Dr Derek da Cunha of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (!SEAS) to prepare a monograph-length study of the Vietnam People's Army in the post-Cambodia period. The first draft of this manuscript took shape in Canberra and was based on materials I had collected over a number of years. The study was then enriched by a field trip to Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand in May, conducted under the auspices of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. A second draft, under the working title, "All-People's National Defence: The Vietnam People's Army Under Doi M6i" , was presented to a workshop on Arms and Defence Planning in Southeast Asia, which was held in Singapore in June under the sponsorship of ISEAS. Based on the comments made at the workshop, I revised my working paper for publication as a Pacific Strategic Paper. After submission, and while the manuscript was being prepared for press, I was permitted to update it to take into account developments until the end of 1993. I would like to acknowledge the comments, suggestions and constructive criticisms which I received from a number of colleagues. In particular, I would like to thank Thai Quang Trung, Nguyen Hong Thach, Professor Chan Heng Chee, Lt . Gen . Boonsak Kamheangridhirong, Col. Dorninador Salac, Anthony Goldstone, Adam Fforde, Robert Karniol, Amitav Acharya, John Chipman, Prasert Chittiwatanapong, Daljit Singh, Burhan Magenda, John Girling, Denny Roy, Truong Truong, and William S. Turley. However, I bear full responsibility for any errors or shortcomings.

vi

Preface

Finally, I would also like to thank Dr Derek da Cunha for the invitation to attend the workshop, and the Ford Foundation for financial support which made my participation possible.

I. Introduction

In 1986 Vietnam embarked on a domestic programme of renovation or doi m6i. The changes ushered in by this process have had a profound impact on the Vietnamese economy and , to a lesser extent , the political system. Less well known are policy changes adopted at the same time which led Vietnam to withdraw its military forces from Laos and Cambodia, to begin the process of normalization of relations with China, and most significantly, to reduce the size of its standing army by demobilizing 600,000 personnel. Vietnam also rewrote its national security doctrine and adopted a more defensive orientation, which it termed "people's war and all people's national defence". This study examines the impact of doi m6i on the Vietnam People's Army (VPA). with particular attention being given to the period after its withdrawal from Cambodia. 1 The study is divided into four chapters. The first provides a brief historical introduction . The second examines changes ushered in during the early years of doi m6i. The third studies the developments since Vietnam 's withdrawal from Cambodia while the final chapter details the present role and functions of the VP A in peacetime.

The Formative Years, 1944-86 The Vietnam People's Army was founded on 22 December 1944. Its strength stood at thirty-four, consisting of thirty-one men and three women. During the next quarter century, the VPA grew in numerical

2

Introduction

size to rank among the largest armies in the world . Throughout this period, the VPA ha s been in almost constant combat. First came an eight-year war against the French , which cu lminated in the victory at Di en Bi en Phu (1946-54) .2 Then followed a decade and a half of ar med struggle to reunify Vietnam ( 1959-75) . Immediately after reunification , Vietnam fou nd itse lf the vict im of attacks launched on its offshore island s by neighbou ring Camboctia . After a brief respite, fighting flared again in 1977 when Cambodia launched attacks on Vietnamese border tow ns. In 1978 Vietnam invaded and occupied that country . China reta liated by launc hing a month -long assault on Vietnam 's north ern border provinces (February-March 1979) . China then kept th e fr onti er in a constant state of tension for an additional eight years . Vietnam 's occupati on of Cambodia lasted a full decade and ended with th e unilat eral withdrawa l of its regular forces in September 1989. Four and a half decades of warfare have transformed the Vietnam Peop le 's Arm y from a small band of armed guerrillas to the world 's fifth largest military force. In 1987, when the VPA was at its peak strength of 1.26 million reg ulars , only the Soviet Union , China, the Uruted States and Inctia had larger regular standing armies. 3 To this number must be added two and a half million reserves, a Border Defence Force of 60,000 and various pararrulitary groups totalling another one and a half million . In sum , in the 1980s Vietnam 's military establishment numbered well over five million or 8 per cent of the country's total population• The growth of the VPA has also brought with it changes in organizational structure as a basically infantry force , supported by heavy artillery , and has branch ed out to develop a number of highly specialized commands ranging from engineers, marines and transport to air defence, cherrucal corps , sappers and signals. 5 Vietnam 's naval and air forces are also included as commands within the Vietnam People 's Army, and they too have grown in size and technological sophistication. Vietnam's navy and air force are the largest in Southeast Asia in terms of the number of ships and planes. Indeed, Vietnam 's air command dwarfs in numbers the forces of all of its immediate neighbours except China . Vietnam 's anti-aircraft and rrussile defence systems are probably the most comprehensive in the region .

The Army and the Political System

The rrulitary in Vietnam ranks as one of the three main centres of power , which include the party and state bureaucracy. At the elite

The Vietnam People's Army Under Doi M6i

3

level, VPA leaders simultaneously occupy high -level party and state posts. Senior VPA officers also serve on the party's Central Committee, Secretariat and Political Bureau. It is estimated that 70 per cent of all VPA officers concurrently hold party membership" and that "almost all of the officers in ... [the VPA) from company level upward have been party members. " 7 For this reason , Vietnam 's military leaders may be termed "dual role elites". The overlapping nature of army-party relations exists at grassroots level as well. In mid-1991 party members in the militia and self-defence force comprised 12.7 per cent while Youth Union members made up 41.2 per cent. 8 Data for Military Region 9 reveals, for example, that almost all of the village and sub-ward military unit leaders are concurrently party members. All 105 of the village and sub-ward secretaries also serve as vi llage and sub-wa rd military unit political officers. 9 The VPA is guaranteed bloc membership on the party Central Committee . Since the Third National Party Congress in 1960 , military representation has fallen at each successive national congress, from 16 per cent (Fourth Congress, 1976), to 13 per cen t (Fifth Congress , 1982) to 7 per cent (Sixth Congress, 1986 ) before rising to 10.2 per cent (Seventh Congress, 1991) . Military personnel are also elected to the National Assembly where they serve on its execu tive organs and policy-making committees. Military representation has hovered at just under 10 per cent for four of the legislatures elected since unification : 54 deputies, or 11 per cent of the sixt h legislature elected in 1976, 49 deputies, or 9.9 per cent of th e seventh legislature elected in 1981 , 49 deputi es, or 9. 9 per cent of th e eighth leg islature elected in 1987, and 38 deputies, or 9.6 per cen t of the ninth legislature elected in 1992. In society at large, the influence of th e military is quite extensive. As a result of universal conscription, which has been in force since 1960, an estimated one out of every three Vie tnamese adult males belongs to a military organization, either th e regular army or one of the various paramilitary forces associated with it. Demobilized soldiers are appointed to leadership posts in their loca l communities; for example, they serve on co-operative boards and on people 's committees. Vietnam's four-million strong veteran community has also been organized into a mass organization to lobby for their needs . The military has long served as a manpower pool for the Vietnam Communist Party . Between 1976 and 1982, 59 per cent of all new party members were recruited from the VP A. An estimated onequarter of all VPA personnel (officers and other ranks) are members of the VCP, accounting for 14 per cent of the total party membership.

4

Introduction

Between 1987 and 1992, 138,875 new members were admitted to the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union , of which 73,947 ' outstanding' members were admitted into the VCP . 10 Within the VPA , there are 2,000 grass-roots union organizations and 7,500 union chapters . 11 Three hundred delegates attended the fourth all-army congress in August 1992 , of which 27 were selected to attend the Sixth National Ho Chi Minh Youth Union Congress Y Of the 300 delegates , 79 per cent were graduates from high schools, and almost 20 per cent were from universities . 13 For most of its existence , the VPA has been led by what might be called ' political generals'. ,. These men were first and foremost party activists and political revolutionaries who began their careers as teenagers . They engaged in a decade or more of anti-colonial agitation , during a period when the party had no regular armed forces . It wa s these revolutionaries who emerged from the underground or from French prisons to assume command over the VPA in its formative years . The influence of these political generals has been indelibly stamped on the Vietnamese mmtary . The VPA is quite literally a ' people 's army ' , as its name suggests, rooted in the peasantry of rural Vietnam. This facet is reflected in the structure of the army , which is organized on three levels:15 militia and self-defence forces at village and city ward level , local forces which serve at provincial and inter-provincial level, and the main forces which are assigned to military regions within Vietnam or which see service abroad in neighbouring Laos and Cambodia. The former are less well armed and trained and constitute a current link with Vietnam 's guerrilla heritage. The main forces , backed by a large ready reserve , form the professional core of the military . From the very beginning, Vietnam 's political generals placed control and policy direction over the military firmly in the hands of the Vietnam Communist Party. Policy for the military has been set unequivocally by the party 's national congress (which meets every five years). and the Central Committee (which meets twice a year) . Day-to-day policy is handled by the Politburo, the party's leadership body, and Secretariat. Policy is executed through either the Central Military Party Committee (CMPC), composed of members of the party 's Central Executive Committee, or the Ministry of National Defence , which directs the General Staff. The VPA's subordination to the Vietnam Communist Party is maintained organizationally by a chain of command, composed of party committees organized vertically, from the Political Bureau and

The Vietnam People 's Army Under Doi M6i

5

CMPC through the army down to company level-' 6 At each echelon, these committees are composed of party members serving in the military. For most of its existence, the army's political officer has been superior to the military commander. For several years after the VCP's Fourth National Congress in 1976, the issue of party control over the military sparked spirited debate and cautious experimentation. At the Fifth Party Congress in 1982, Article 12 of the party statutes governing control over the military was amended. After further in-house discussion, the matter was settled in 1983 when the Political Bureau issued a landmark resolution entitled , "On Renovating and Perfecting the Party's Leadership Mechanism in the Vietnam People's Army and in National Defence Work and On Implementing the One Commander System in the Armed Forces." The introduction of the "one commander system" altered the existing structure of party control in significant ways, giving the unit military commander more decision-making authority . Party committees organized vertically at each level of command from the Central Military Party Committee, through the Political General Department, to basic level were abolished. The position of political officer was also done away with. The executive functions of the party committee at each echelon were assigned to the unit commander, and a new body, the Military Council was created in its place. In 1991, the Seventh Party Congress modified these arrangements yet again, and these are discussed in more detail below . In sum, the VPA was given greater autonomy to conduct its operations and training programmes. Party control over the military continues to be exercised at the top, via the Politburo and Secretariat. In an important change, the Central Military Party Committee is, with one exception, now composed entirely of military officers who are also members of the party Central Committee. The one exception is that the VCP Secretary General also serves as Secretary of the CMPC. Party control over the VP A has long served to retard the emergence of a military caste in Vietnam. For example, in the late 1980s Vietnam's military leaders (and party officials) roundly rejected calls to "depoliticize" the army along the lines of some Eastern European states. Members of the Vietnam People's Army are required to accept the supremacy of the party over the military and are expected to play a political role in Vietnamese society, in marked contrast to other countries which draw a firm line between civil and military affairs.

6

Introduction

Two Strategic Tasks

In March 1982 , the Fifth National Congres of the Vietnam Communist Pa rt y revi ewed Vi e tnam 's dom estic and int e rna tional situation three yea rs after Vi e tna m 's inva sio n of Cambodi a a nd th e imposition of a n an ti-Vie tna m aid a nd trade emba rgo by oth er Southeast Asian states. Th e econo my was in a parl o us stat e, th e VPA was bogged down in a protrac ted co unte r-in surgency conni e! in Cambodia , and Vietnam 's north e rn provinces were kept in a constant stat e of te nsion by Chin ese a bre-rattling. Th e Fift h Congress assigned to th e VPA two trategic tasks: bui ld ing soc ia lism and defe nding th e fa th c rla nd . 17 Under th e task of bui lding ocialism , th VPA w as expected to contribute to economic developm ent by ta king pa rt in a wid e ra nge of productive activities in the agricultural a nd industrial ecto r . Unde r the natio nal defence task, whic h in cl uded int rna! securit y duties , the VPA was expected to ca rry out it s int ernati onalist duti e in Cambodia and Laos, and sta nd read y to repel a econd Chinese a ttac k in the n rth . In orde r to mee t th e manpower needs e ntailed in carrying out the tw in tasks of na ti onal clef nee a nd building so ialism , Vie tnam 's 1960 u niversa l mi lita ry e rvi ce law (as a mended in I 62, and 1965) was redraft ed a nd prom ul ga ted in Ja nu ary 19 2. 1" Males be twee n the ages of eight ee n a nd twe nty -seven were subject to an annual draft a nd mi lita ry se rvi ce for two years . pecialists w ere req uired to serve for four yea rs, while etnnic minoriti es were required to complete onl y two yea rs of se rvice . Wome n who he ld specia l qualifica tions a nd s kill s, whi le not subjec t to co nscription , were req uired to register with th e rese rv es and cou ld be called up for trai ning. Despi te admi nistra tiv e inefficiency, abuses of the law , draft evasion and th e un pop ula rit y of the wa r in Ca m bodia , the VPA apparently has had no seri ous d iffi cult ies in meeting man powe r needs. Rad io Ha noi obse rved o n 16 Octobe r 1986 tha t "the 1986 task of drafting youths into th e a rm y on sc hed ul e with a ll th e qua ntitative quotas [has bee n J met".

Building Socialism

Immediately following reunification , Vietnam 's leaders decided to emphasize the role of the VP A in economic reconstruction. This policy provoked some dissension within the military where in some quarters it was felt that the army 's combat capabilities were being downgraded . However , the Fourth Party Congress reaffirmed the

The Vietnam People 's Army Under D6i M6i

7

VPA's commitment to socialist construction, a task which has been reiterated at each subsequent party congress. A General Department of Economic Construction, equal in status to other departments under the General Staff, was established to oversee the army 's involvement in the agricultural , industrial , transport and communications, and capital construction sectors of the economy. In 1978, in response to events in Cambodia, the Department was abolished and military units were redeployed to the Cambodian border. From 1982 onwards , as the military situation along its northern border stabilized, and as the prospects for an imminent Chinese invasion receded , Vietnam once again re-engaged its military forces in civilian-type reconstruction projects. According to one writer: In some years (1980-1984). the task of production and economic building changed constantly , depending on the increase or decrease in combat duties . Many Army units specializing in production were readmitted into the armed forces after being transferred to various ministries and sectors .... the General Department of Economic Construction , after being dissolved to concentrate on combat duties , was later reinstituted , and so forth. In 1985-1986, the task of production and economic building was stabilized again .. .. 19

In late 1985, according to the then editor of the army's newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan : Since liberation our People 's Army has played a very important role in reconstruction . Now we have several units up to divisional level taking part in economic construction activities. These activities encompass several fields. Firstly , building important projects such as the Pha Lai hydro-electric station. Secondly, contributing to the construction of a number of co mmunications routes and roads . Most roads in the mountains and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail were built by the army. And thirdly , teams building houses and teams working on plantations producing coffee, rubber , sugar can e, and cocoa. Large units are working in the Central Highlands on rubber plantations.20

In 1986, the former General Department of Economic Construction was re-established as the Economic General Department. By 198889, sixteen 3,000-man "economic construction divisions" were created and, along with several engineering regiments, were assigned exclusively to economic work. VPA involvement in the economy at this time included water conservancy, flood control, irrigation and land reclamation projects; construction of new economic zones ; deep-sea fishing and seafood

Introduction

8

processing; the use of defence industri es to produce goods to improve the material conditi ons of soldiers as w ell as manufacturing for export ; and "econ omi c coope rati on with othe r armies·. A measure of th e VPA 's involve me nt in the civilian economy can be gauged from the foll owing. In 1984 , it was estimated that the int ernal sources of reve nu e raised by a rmy units accounted for 19 .5 per cent of the national defe nce budget.l 1 The following year, according to Major Ge ne ral Le Khoa , nearly all defe nce industries were engaged in some form of economic work . amounting to 29.4 per ce nt of th e army 's total annual output .:u Finally, writing in 1986, a military commentator und erlined th e importance of the army's econontic role in this wa y: .. . th e arm y must strive to balance part of its own budget and gradually red uce th e people 's cont ri butions without ceasing to improve its quality and combat strength . The issue of troop participation in building the economy is asserted a a long-tenn and un changed strategic tas k as we ll as a pre ing task in the country 's current econom ic situation.LI

National Defence Vi etnam 's strategic environme nt is. of course, determined by a number of fa ctors, foremost of which is geography and the milita ry disposition of adjace nt states. Vie tnam shares borde rs with three countries: China to th e north , a nd Laos and Ca mbodia to the west. Vietnam 's eastern coast exte nds more than 3,400 kilometres and lies exposed to any powe r possessing the requisite air and naval forces. Vietnamese strat egists have argued that the continental defence of Vietnam is in extricably linked with that of Laos and Cambodia. In Hanoi 's view , Indoc hina forms a ' single strategic battlefield' . ZA The defence of Vietnamese territory is complicated somewhat by conflicting Chinese and Vietnamese claims to two island groups in the South China Sea. The Paracel Islands , located south of Hainan , were invaded and occupied by Chinese forces in January 1974. The Spratly Islands, located east of Ho Chi Minh City, are also claimed by Taiwan and the Philippines which, like Vietnam, maintain garrisons there . Chinese territorial claims based on the Spratlys overlap with Vietnamese claims to offshore waters. The need to defend offshore islands, and to protect offshore resources as well, are new requirements for Vietnam's military. This accounts in part for the phenomenal growth of the Vietnamese navy, which has quadrupled in size over

The Vietnam People 's Army Under D6i M6i

9

the decade and a half ending in 1987. During this same period, as a result of the delivery of Soviet warships , Vietnam developed a Limited capability to conduct military operations in the South China Sea. Given Vietnam 's strategic environment and woeful economic conditions, Vietnamese defence planners and military strategists have argued continually about the size, weapons mix , and structure of the armed forces - a "quantity versus quality • argument. This issue was well summarized by a military commentator. Trung Dung, who wrote in the mid -1980s: As our country is not e ngaged in a major war there is no requireme nt for building up the armed forces as in wa rtim e. Howeve r. o ur country has not e njoyed total pea e ei th er wh e n most co untri es at peace need onl y a certai n num ber of sta nd · by troops. The current situation for our co untry is one in whi c h we arc faci ng a limited war . although at peace ."

The commentator went on to a.rgue that "lhe superior solution· could be found by correctly settling the relationship between "quantity and quality" . In other words, Vi etnam needed to maintain sufficient forces to defeat China 's · multi· fa ceted war of sabotage " and to fulfil its "internationalist duties · in Laos and Cambodia . At the same time, Vietnam had to devise a sufficient mix of main , regional and local forces in each locality to cope with th e varying sec urity situations. A ready reserve force was also necessary to ens ure rapid mobili.zalion in times of emergency .

lntenwtion.alist Duties Vietnam miscalculated regional and world reaction to it s Dece mber 1978 invasion of Cambodia . It expected its actions to be accepted as a fait accompli in short order. When this turned out to be otherwise, and when elements of the international'community moved to revive the Khmer Rouge and develop anti-Vietnamese resistance forces, Vietnam faced the prospects of a debilitating protracted conflict. At its height, Vietnamese troop strength in Cambodia may have reached 180,000-200,000. In August 1981, the then Vietnamese Foreign Minister told this author that it was China's strategy to keep Vietnamese forces in Cambodia indefinitely, thus weakening Vietnam as a regional power . Vietnam knew, he said, that the longer it remained in Cambodia,

10

Introduction

the more the nationalist sentiments of the Cambodian people would turn against his country. In order to counter China 's strategy of "bleeding Vietnam white ' , Vietnam had to open a dialogue with regional states. It was not until 1984, how ever , that Vietnam 's "Cambodianization p lan ' was finally unveiled . Its author was General Le Due Anh . During the dry season months of 1984- 85, main force VP A divisions assaulted and overran all the border base camps occupied by the Cambodian resistance forces. According to military observers, this marked the completion of th e first of a five-phase plan code-named "K-5" (from the Vietnamese k e hoach nam) . Th e remaining phases included: sealing off the border, destruction of the resistance guerrillas. population sec urity , and building up pro-Vietnamese Cambod ian military forces. The majority of the te n main force divisions of the VPA w e re assigned to ope rations in the w est, guarding the border and conducting sw eeps through ene my-pe netrated a reas. In the inte rior, Vi etna mese military training team s and specialized regime nts w e re engaged in providin g local security as w ell as developing the military forces of the People's Republic of Kampuchea . Beginning in 1982, and especially after June 1988 , Vie tnam conducted a se ri es of unilateral troop withdrawals until their final departure in Septe mbe r 1989. After th eir withdrawal , Vietnamese officials released conflicting fi gures on the losses suffered . According to army spokesman , General Tran Cong Man . 40,000 to 50,000 Vietnamese soldiers were killed or wounded in Cambodia during 1978- 88. ' We don 't have final fi gures yet", Ge neral Man stated , ' but it is probable that at least 15, 000 soldiers died and another 30,000 w ere wounded during the ten-year-long Cambodian campaign ' . General Doan Khue reported to the National Assembly , however, that 67,000 Vietnamese were either killed or wounded along the border during the 1977-88 period, with most casualties occurring in 1977-78.26 Other sources placed Vietnamese losses at 25,000 killed and 55,000 wounded during the period 1979-89. Still higher figures were provided by Major General Nguyen Van Thai, who told a Thai reporter that ' about 55,300 were killed, 110,000 were seriously injured , and the other 55,000 were slightly wounded' , making a total of 220,300 casualties during the eleven-year period ending September 1989. 27 General Thai was also quoted as saying, "One hundred per cent of our soldiers serving in Cambodia have come back with malaria' .28 Vietnamese military units were continually posted to Laos throughout the 1960s and 1970s to fight alongside Pathet Lao forces.

The Vietnam People's Army Under D6i M6i

11

They remained in Laos until the late 1980s. In July 1977 Laos and Vietnam signed a twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which legalized the status of these forces .29 In the 1980s, the size of Vietnamese forces in Laos was estimated at four divisions plus assorted support elements, totalling about 50,000. Thai officials reported that one division was assigned to the China border, while two were permanently stationed in southern Laos with responsibility for security in the tri-border region . Other VPA units were assigned internal security duties or to road construction and repair tasks along the east-west road network linking landlocked Laos with Vietnam 's coastal port cities.

Deterring a Second Chinese Attack After the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war, China kept Vietnam 's northern frontier in a constant state of tension. According to Major General Tran Cong Man , in 1985 Chinese artillery shelling of Vietnam 's northern border territory occurred on a daily basis, with the worst pounding reserved for Vi Xuyen district in Ha Tuyen province.30 A stretc h of land fift een kilometres long and three kilometres wide in the district received two to three thousand shells per day . In September 1985 an all-time high was recorded when more than 20,000 rounds w ere fired . General Man also reported that clashes frequently occurred between Vietnamese border guards and Chinese units , up to company level in strength, when they were discovered infiltrating Vi etnam with the objective of sabotage and intelligence gathering. In addition, Vietnam 's border population was subjected to propaganda broadcasts from thirty-five Chinese stations tran smitting in Vietnamese and ethnic minority dialects . The Vietnamese media referred to the situation along the northern frontier as a · multi -faceted war of sabotage " or "neither war nor peace". In order to meet the threat posed by large numbers of hostile Chinese forces, which General Man estimated at eleven regular divisions plus numerous border guard and militia units, Vietnam had to redeploy its main forces , numbering a quarter of a million. These units were posted to the northern border while a sizeable number were also concentrated in and around the Hanoi Capital Military Region. In addition, the majority of Vietnam's economic construction divisions were assigned to this theatre. The necessity of having to deter a Chinese attack was a development that Vietnamese strategists

Introduction

12

had discounted in the pre-1979 years, when no main force units were stationed there, but it became a new and pressing requirement in the decade following the 1979 border war .

Internal Security The remainder of Vietnam 's military units (those not assigned to the China border or on internationalist duties) were posted throughout the country in permanent garrisons. There, they occupied themselves with routine military training tasks , assisting with public security, and economic prod uction . In the pe riod immediately following uniJication, main force units were tasked with demobilizing the Saigon army (ARVN) , ordnance disposal, running re-education camps, a nd "tracking down and eliminating diehard holdouts •. Armed resistance of any significance in the Mekong Delta and in the lowland area of central Vietnam was basically crushed within a year. The situation in the central highlands was somewhat different. There, an estimated 12,000 or more high landers, known collectively as FULRO (Front Unjfie Liberation Des Races Opprimes, or United Front for the Liberation of the Oppressed Races). conducted a dogged struggle against the new Vietnamese authorities. Initially operating from remote mountainous areas , and then from sanctuaries in Cambodia, FULRO units conducted hit-and-run raids on the homes and offices of government employees. They also conducted ambushes along the main roads to the coast. According to General Tran Cong Man,

IIn 1985] some sma ll groups still ex.ist deep in the jungles of the Central Highlands. Their activities a re inconsidera ble. Now they are without food and face starvation. Nonetheless, it is quite diffi cult to sweep !up] this group. In some areas , there is not enough vigilance by the people, and in some isolated hamlets this gro up (FULRO] can go th ere, obtain food, and force youths to go with them .31 Western observers placed FULRO 's strength at 2,000-2,500 guerrillas in 1986. Day-to-day security duties were undertaken by either the Border Defence Force or a combination of local militia, self-defence forces and units under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. For several years, VP A main force regular divisions made periodic sweeps over the remote hinterland in an effort to wear FULRO units down. At the same time, the Vietnamese press highlighted the increasing

The Vietnam People's Army Under Doi M6i

13

number of defections from FULRO, ranging from war-weary rank-and-file soldiers to prominent members of FULRO's political wing. Vietnamese sources reported that 10,125 FULRO members surrendered to local authorities during the period 1986-90.32 In 1990, 18,000 militia and self-defence force personnel were mobilized to mop up FULRO remnants.33 After fighting twenty-four engagements, a Vietnamese general declared in November that "the FULRO problem has been basically solved" .34 However, Vietnamese press reports the following year indicated that small bands of FULRO guerrillas continued to operate in the Central Highlands (Tay Nguyen) .35 In 1992 , in dramatic circumstances, a FULRO unit operating in Cambodia surrendered to UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) authorities and was resettled in the United States.36 As late as October 1992, Vietnamese military officials continued to mention FULRO operations Y

II. Doi M6i and Its Impact on the Military

In December 1986, Vietnam held its landmark Sixth National Party Congress at which the reform programme , known as doi m6i , was adopted . In the economic sector, Vietnam moved rapidly to divest itself of the rigidities of what it termed the "bureaucratic central planning mechanism" and to eliminate state subsidies to government bodies and personnel. Under the doi m6i programme, Vietnam moved rapidly in the direction of a multi-sector economy; limited political reforms were also initiated at this time. The Sixth Congress also reendorsed the military's two strategic tasks - now defined as national defence and economic construction. Vietnam's economic reform programme had profound implications for the Vietnam People 's Army. Some time during the following year, the VCP Politburo met in secret and initiated a far-reaching policy review.

Politburo Resolution No. 2

In 1987, Vietnam adopted a new national defence policy which was set out in a secret resolution adopted by the Politburo. Subsequent revelations in the Vietnamese press indicate that the resolution was probably entitled "On Strengthening National Defence in the New Revolutionary Stage'' 38 and was adopted between April and June.39 This document is ordinarily referred to as Politburo Resolution No.2. It was not until 1989 that Vietnam's press began to provide fleeting details of Resolution No. 2. Based on these references it is

The Vietnam People's Army Under Doi M6i

15

possible to discern the main points of Vietnam's new defence policy. As the following extracts indicate, Politburo Resolution No . 2 set in train a major force reduction programme, which included the recall of troops stationed abroad. Resolution No. 2 also necessitated the enunciation of a new strategic doctrine - people's war and all people's national defence - which redefined the roles of main, reserve, local and militia and self-defence forces and placed responsibility for building defence zones on the localities. The new doctrine also spelled out new roles for the military in economic activities, new responsibilities for the national defence industry and the development of a new national defence curriculum. The first press reference discovered by the author to specifically mention Resolution No . 2 stated that it was aimed at "achieving close coordination and intimate attachment between the economy and national defence" .40 Shortly thereafter, another source noted, "[in] implementing the ... resolutions of the party Central Committee Politburo, during the past two years, strategies of the national defence task have been readjusted" .4 1 One defence · correspondent, who interviewed senior Vietnamese military officials, reported, "Vietnam is slashing its military force under a major military reduction programme initiated in 1987." 42 As late as 1992, military writers were still underlining the seminal importance of this resolutionY Other references provide these insights. A general overview of the party's new defence policy was provided by Nguyen Van Linh in a speech to an all-army political-military conference: ... the Political Bureau has issued its Resolution No . 2 on national defence work, correctly evaluating the enemy and friendly situations and more thoroughly disseminating the concepts of people's war, of all people's national defence, and of the building of the people's armed forces. On that basis, the Political Bureau has decided on a readjustment of the strategy for national defence. 44 Le Due Anh, speaking to a plenary meeting of the sixth session of the Eighth National Assembly, revealed that Resolution No. 2 had fixed defence expenditures as a set ratio of the national budget for the three-year period 1987-90: In 1987, the Political Bureau issued a resolution on the national defence and army question, including the issues of reductions in troop strength and fixing the ratio of the defence budget to the state's total expenditures through 1990, to enhance the provision of technical support for the army, to improve soldiers'

16

Doi M6i and Its Impact on the Military

living conditions and to help stabilize the national economic situation .45 A d omestic radio report on the Fifth All-Army Party Congress noted , The delegates agreed that in the last five years, the party echelons in the Armed Forces have actively implemented the military duties of Resolution 2 of the party Political Bureau and resolutions of the Central Military Party Committee. They brought back home the entire force which had been on international duty in a friendly country, adjusted the force according to defence strategy, and cut back more than 600,000 soldiers .46 Other scattered references in the Vietnamese defence literature indicated that Resolution No . 2 touched on such issues as creating a "ready reserve" and the reorganization of militia and self-defence forces . This entailed redefining the areas of responsibility at local level between the party, the state and the military . In other words , as one often quoted formulation put it , "the party leads , the administration controls operationally , the military agency serves as an adviser, and the military chief commands local armed forces " ! 7 According to VCP Central Committee member Nguyen Ha Phan: After Political Bureau Resolution 2 was issued , the [Ha Giang) provincial party committee issued a specialized resolution on strengthening the leadership of the party organization echelons vis-a-vis security and national defence and guiding the organization of a security and national defence leadership apparatus in accordance with the new mechanism .... This theme was also stressed by Lieutenant General Nguyen Quoc Thuoc, Commander of Military Region 4 , who noted that Politburo Resolution No . 2 affirmed: Building local national defence is an extremely important task of the party committee echelons, administrations , and people in various localities. This task must be closely linked to their foremost task of developing their localities in all respects so as to promote the development of both tasks. The aggregate strength of the entire people must be mobilized to carry out this task. To carry out this policy, first of all we must develop and consolidate the leadership mechanism .... At the beginning, the building of such a mechanism was not exactly smooth sailing. In some provinces, for various reasons, this mechanism could not begin operations for years after it was set up, and the national defence task was still completely left

The Vietnam People 's Army Under Doi M6i

17

to the local military organs, despite the advent of Political Bureau Resolution 2.49

Under the new all people's defence strategy, provincial and district authorities were responsible for building local defence zones to protect strategic areas and vital economic infrastructur es so In the words of one military write r: As it entered 1990, Son La [province] issued Resolution 1 of th e provincial party committee and Directiv e 15 of th e Standing Committee of the provincial party committee in orde r to carry out Resolution 2 of the Political Burea u co ncernin g th e task of developing provinces and districts into strong defence areas, with special attention to improving cadres' military know ledge .... This year , th e important req uire ment from village a nd subwa rd cadres is that th ey must thoroughl y und e rsta nd th e basic iss ues regarding the party's military lin e, in th e spiri t of Resolution 2 of the Political Bureau , so as to see clearly th e plot and tri cks in the enemy's sabotage strategy ; the ta:; k of building the armed forces (building the militia and se lf-defence forces, and army reserves to be ready for mobili zation) assigned to villages and subwards in the new situation ; th e goals of building combat villages (including drafting combat plans for defe nce of villages and for protection of economic installations); and th e work involved in organizing manage ment , training of rese rve troops for mobilization, and recruitment 5 1

Finally, Resolution No. 2 stressed the issue of training, or what would be later called the new curriculum for national defence instruction. According to General Doan Khue, Resolution No . 2 of the Political Bureau and all resolutions of the party Central Committee's military commission on na tional defence tasks clearly specify: one of th e primary duti es of our troops at present is to consolidate and increase th eir comba t strength, actually and firmly improving th eir general quality . The central and pressing task is to build comprehensiv ely firm and strong primary units . In this connection, w e must renovate the scope, organization and method of troop education and training .52

Withdrawal from Laos In 1987 it was estimated by foreign observers that there were between 53 30,000 and 50,000 Vietnamese troops serving in Laos. Late the following year, the Lao Foreign Ministry announced that all

18

Doi M6i and Its Impact on the Military

Vietnamese troops had left the country. Presumably, this did not include engineer and construction troops . In April 1989, the VPA High Command confirmed that it had withdrawn two infantry divisions which had been stationed in Laos since the 1979 border war with China and that no combat troops were left in the country.54 However , some non-combatant military personnel remained behind to assist in building bridges and roads . In 1989, independent observers estimated the number of these personnel at 10,000-15,000, 55 a figure which dropped to 5,000 the following year s 6

Withdrawal from Cambodia

Vietnam began publicly withdrawing its military forces from Cambodia as early as 1982. These and all subsequent withdrawals were undertaken unilaterally without international verification and were dismissed at the time as mere troop rotations. Nevertheless, outside observers noted a steady decline in VP A force strength from 140,000 (1987) to 100,000 (1988) to 60 ,000-65,000 (1989) .57 By 1988, however, it was clear that a diplomatic settlement was likely and that the Cambodian "end game " was fast approaching. But it was only in June 1988 that Vietnam began its withdrawal in earnest. In May the following year , Vietnam unilaterally declared that all its forces would be withdrawn by September 1989. According to official Vietnamese sources , Vietnam pulled out 24,000 troops between the months of April and July, and withdrew the remaining 26,000 troops during the period 21-26 September .58 Great publicity was accorded to the final withdrawal , which was covered by the world's press but not by neutral international observers. Vietnam 's unilateral withdrawal did not settle the question of whether residual forces remained or whether Vietnam still retained disguised forces and/or military advisers in the Cambodian People 's Armed Forces (CPAF) in Phnom Penh . According to non-communist Cambodian resistance and Thai sources, "some 70-80 ,000 Vietnamese troops , disguised as locals" remained in Cambodia.59 A number of Vietnamese civilian advisers were reportedly attached to various Cambodian government ministries , including defence . Cambodian officers continued to receive military training in Vietnam for at least two more years . At the time of Vietnam's withdrawal , Vietnam and the Soviet Union had built up stocks of arms and equipment to last the CPAF for several years. 60 Vietnam also advised Phnom Penh not to undertake

The Vietnam People's Army Under DOi M6i

19

offensive action which would exhaust these supplies. Instead , according to General Vu Xuan Vinh, head of the Defence Ministry 's International Relations Department, "We advised Phnom Penh to maintain the current level of operations - just to train soldiers .... If they are attacked, to attack back, but not to launch any major offensive". Units of the Vietnamese special forces were reported in action in western Cambodia during the last quarter of 1989 when the noncommunist resistance forces launched a land-grabbing offensive in the Tamar Puok region along Route 69. 61 VPA personnel were reported in Siem Reap the following year .62 Vietnamese troops reportedly reentered Cambodia's Kampot province in March 1991 to fend off Khmer Rouge attacks on the provincial capital. They spent two weeks there before returning home. 63 Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated at the U.S. Senate hearings in April 1991: After the withdrawal, we began to reeeive a variety of reports that I think are reasonably borne out that the Vietnamese left in place thousands of military advisers ... in the 5,000 to 10,000 range .... More recently , we have had indications that the Vietnamese have given apparently the not terribly strong performance of the Phnom Penh military forces, sent in and out military units as various engagements have occurred .... To the best of our information there's still a significant Vietnamese presence in Cambodia.64

After the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia on 23 October 1991, the issue of a residual Vietnamese military presence remained a contentious issue. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was charged, inter alia , with verifying that all "foreign forces• had withdrawn. This it was unable to do, which led to repeated charges by the Khmer Rouge that large numbers of Vietnamese remained in the country.65 UNTAC was unable to act on Khmer Rouge charges because no evidence was provided to substantiate this. After October 1991 , it was the general view among foreign diplomats resident in Cambodia as well as United Nations officials that there were no regular Vietnamese military units in the country. UNTAC officials, however, claimed that elite Vietnamese special force units, disguised as CPAF soldiers, continued to operate in the Siem Reap region as late as March 1992. 66

20

Doi M6i and Its Impac t on the Military

The Chinese Border Afte r th e February -Ma rch 1979 borde r wa r, China kept Vietnam ' s north e rn frontie r tense by conducting a seri es of provocations linked to Vietnamese milita ry opera tions in Cambodia. As noted above, Vi etna mese offi cials called th e Chinese actions "a multi-faceted war of sabotage", and as time w ent on described th e situation along th e border as "neith er peace nor war ". By 1987, how eve r, the Chinese actions had becom e symbolic and highly styli zed , leading the author to liken th e situation to a "phoney w ar ".67 Aft er la te 1987, te nsions decreased noticeably a nd crossborder trade began to develop. By mid-1988 foreign journalists visiting Vietnam w ere told that troop reductio ns along th e border had already begun 6 " Later tha t year , one Germa n correspondent w as told that the number of troops had bee n "reduced by at least half" .69 These force redu cti ons were possible because of a general lessening of te nsions along China's borders with Laos a nd Vietnam , caused in pa rt by Vie tn am 's adoption of a policy of non-provocation. 70 A de (acto cease-fire came into effect on 20 Decembe r 1988 when China halted its artillery attacks.71 Lieutena nt General Le Kha Phieu revealed tha t te nsion along Vi etnam 's borde r with China was "much reduced" and Vi etna m had been withdraw ing forces from the border "since 1986" .72 Compared with force levels in 1979, the strength of the VPA had been reduced by three-quarters (to about 63 ,000) . In late 1990 , Ge neral Le Due Anh reported that the army and local auth orities along the Sino-Vietnamese border were "striving with pa ti ence to re-establish normal ties be tw een the people and armed forces of th e tw o countries". He also noted that "the times of peaceful co-existence and fri endship are beginning to return. Exchanges of goods have replaced ca nnon fire. Acts of fri endship have replaced words of hate". 73 In late 1991, after the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations , it was reported that the VP A had begun redeploying troops from the northern border to the southwest, opposite Cambodia.74

The Collapse of the Soviet Union The disintegration of the Soviet Union during 1989-91 had a major impact on Soviet-Vietnamese relations. 75 Since the signing of the 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, Vietnam had considered the USSR as the corner-stone of its defence and security policies. The Soviet Union had provided Vietnam with approximately one and a

The Vietnam People's Army Under Doi M6i

21

half billion U.S. dollars per year in military assistance during the 1980s. According to calculations for 1985 , Soviet military assistance amounted to about half of Vietnam's total national defence expenditures. 76 Vietnam was totally dependent on the Soviet Union for "big ticket " military items as it did not have a sophisticated national defence industry. The same dependency also existed in their bilateral economic and commercial relationship. In 1990, Vietnam was told by its Soviet benefactors that the "free ride " was over and that Moscow would end virtually all gratuitous assistance. 77 Trade and other forms of aid, given as credits, would have to be repaid at world market prices and in hard currency . Vietnam responded by requesting that rent be paid for the use of Cam Ranh Bay either in U .S. dollars or by a reduction in Vietnam 's debt to the USSR. The Vietnamese proposed US$350-400 million in annual rent. Moscow responded by offering to pay only 10 per cent of what Vietnam had requested . Early in 1991, the Soviets negotiated a new economic and trade agreement with Vietnam. The Soviet Union's economic aid programme was drastically scaled down to US$100 million in credits and US$1 0 million in grants . The Soviet Union also asked for the repayment of outstanding debts, estimated at 10-11 billion roubles. Before any of the newly negotiated agreements could be implemented, domestic chaos in the Soviet Union forced it to default on these new commitments. Vietnam was left to cope as best it could with the sudden disruption of traditional commercial relations and the abrupt termination of Soviet concessional aid . Vietnam's trade with the USSR, as a percentage of total trade, dropped from over 60 per cent in the 1980s to 14 per cent in 1991. The trade imbalance shifted from 4:1 in Russia's favour in the mid1980s to 2: 1 in 1990 and came close to parity in 1991. Attempts to place all transactions on a hard-currency basis failed . In late 1991 the International Monetary Fund estimated the combined impact on Vietnam of the loss of Soviet and Eastetn European non-military aid and trade at 7 per cent of Vietnam's gross domestic product (GDP) . A similar deterioration occurred in Soviet-Vietnamese military relations . By the late 1980s the Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh Bay had been gradually transformed into Moscow 's largest forward deployed naval base outside the Warsaw Pact. In addition to sixteen Badger bombers, four Bears and a squadron of MiG-23s, the Soviets maintained nearly twenty-five surface ships at Cam Ranh, including nuclear-powered attack and cruise-missile submarines. Shore-based facilities included missile loading and handling equipment, ordnance

22

Doi M 6i and Its Impact on the Military

ra nges , mai ntenance depots , and a signals intelligence facility. At its height , four thousand Sov iet military personnel were stationed at Cam Ranh Bay alone. In November 1989, Moscow informed Hanoi that it plann ed to withdraw all its military forces from Cam Ranh and that future military assistance wou ld be cut. The following month the Soviets quietly withdrew a company of naval infant ry and crat ed and shipped out a ll their Badger and Bear aircraft. They also began to reduce th eir naval for ces. In 199 1, th e Soviet Union announced that they would slash their military assistance to Vi e tnam by one-third . Moscow also requested th at all military assistance , incl udin g training at higher military academies , be paid for in hard currency . The USSR had previously sponsored up to 150 Vietnamese students per yea r. At the end of th e year , the last maj or Soviet warship at Cam Ranh Bay returned to Vladivostok . The number of Soviet subma rines stationed there was a lso reduced to two or three. In ea rl y 1992, a number of buildings at the base w ere returned to Vietnamese a uthorities and Russian residents there w ere regrouped into one residential area . The number of military personnel was reduced to less than 1,000. In mid-May 1992, the last of the Ru ssian m ilitary advisers posted to the Vietnamese armed forces departed , thus bringing to an end formal bilateral military co-operation. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that Vietnam was suddenly cut off from an assured supply of military equipmen t, spare parts and ammunition. Vietnam 's economy was so weak , that it was unable to purchase what it needed . Moreover , Vietnam stopped sending its personnel abroad for training because it lac ked the hard currency to pay tuition charges. Vietnam , therefore , had to make do with what it had. Although milita ry relations between Vietnam and the former Soviet Union declined sharply in 199 1-92 , they were not severed completely . In Jul y 1992, the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev , attended the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting in Manila . Th ere he raised with his Vietnamese co unterpart the prospect of a continued Russian presence at Cam Ranh Bay and the transformation of its faciliti es for civilian use. This represented a complete turn around in Moscow 's policy towards Cam Ranh. This issue will be discussed in chapter 4.

Ill. The Period of Strategic Readjustment

Demobilization

Between mid-1987 and late 1990 Vietnam carried out a massive reduction of its regular army. According to official sources, 600,000 soldiers, including 200,000 officers, military specialists and national defence personnel were demobilized, reducing the strength of the VPA to 700,000-800,000 main force regulars. 78 Included in this number were 50,000 Cambodian veterans who were brought home in 198889.79 According to the VPA Chief of Staff, "The [VPA] is reducing its forces in all departments, branches and services though at different scales. This does not mean restructuring." 80 A Western defence correspondent reported, however, that reductions were mainly made to infantry, engineering, administration, logistic units and self-defence forces. The artillery corps, communications, air force, and navy were not affected. 8 1 The reserves were to be built up with demobilized regulars. These forces, also called mobilization reserves, are the first units to be called to active duty in times of emergency. They are organized separately from the militia and self-defence forces . According to one account: At the primary level today, there are a rather large number of reservists (in some rural zones, they account for ten per cent of the population, and in some state agencies, they account for thirty-five per cent of the workers and civil servants) . Each year, the number of reservists increases, because soldiers leave active duty and return home and those who are past military age register for the reserves. 82

24

The Period of Strategic Readjustment

In late 1990, Nguyen Van Linh announced that Vietnam had "successfully effected a great strategic re-adjustment", which also involved a "significant reorganizati on" and reduction in the size of the militia and self-defence forces. "' That sa me year, a Western de fence correspondent reported that the self-defence forces , which had totalled 12 per cent of the population, had now dropped to an estimated 3 per cent. 84 Originally , the militia was to have been excluded from the troop reducti on progra mme and kept at 8 per cent of the population."' But, according to one writer , "a number of localities have 'gone overboard' in redu cing the size of the forces , with the militia and self-defence forces accounting for only one to two per cent of the population" ."" In Military Region 9, it was reported that "to date 1.09 per cent of the population are members of the military region 's coastal militia and self-defence forces ". "' Cuts in the size of the militia and self-defence forces were confirmed by an article in the army journal, which stated that "in many places , the number of troops has been reduced too much . The size of the military and selfdefence forces has been reduced to the point where the forces do not have the strength necessary to carry out their tasks" .sa In December 1990, it was disclosed that because of high unemployment in the civilian sector, demobilization of regular forces had been halted _sY There have been no subsequent public reports of further major force reductions . However , comments made by Vietnamese officials indicate that the VPA will be reduced by natural attrition through retirement and a decreased intake. The Vietnamese have not made clear what they feel is the desirable size of their main forces . Some military officials told Western journalists that the ultimate goal was to reduce the standing force to 500,000 by 1994.90 Others argued that the ideal size of the standing army was one per cent of the total population .9 ' There have been few recent comments on this question. In September 1992, Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam stated, "We have been and will be reducing the size of the army 092 The following year, in a rare interview , Senior General Dao Dinh Luyen, Chief of the General Staff, reported that further cuts in the size of the VPA would continue if the political and economic climate permitted. 93 VP A officials declined to reveal the pace and scope of the cuts while they were progressing. Indeed, conflicting starting dates were given to foreign journalists. 94 In early 1989, officials stated that the VPA would be reduced in size by one-quarter and that 300,000 would be demobbed "in the next few years" 95 Later that same year ,

'1"M Vietnom People's Army Under 061 M61

25

military sources stated variously that the army would be cut by 500,000, 600,000 or 700,000.96 Different time periods were provided for the demobilization process - 40 per cent reduction over the next two years, or a phased reduction of 50 per cent over five years ...The military is organized on three levels: main force (and reserves). local (regular forces assigned to districts and provinces) and militia and self-defence (village and urban ward). while Vietnam is divided geographically into eight military regions . The army's main force comprises fourteen corps headquarters, sixty-two infantry divisions (ranging in strength from 5,000 to 12,500), three mechanized divisions, ten armoured brigades, fifteen independent infantry regiments . ten field artillery brigades, eight engineer divisions . sixtee n economic construction divisions , twenty independent engineer brigades, and two regiments of special forces . The most recent estimates by the International Institut e for Strategic Studies lllSS) place the strength of Vietnam 's regular armed forces at 857,000 , including a.r my (700 ,00Ql.. navy (42 ,000). air (15,000) and air defence (100 ,000) ."" These figures are derived from We tern intelligence assessments provided to the IISS. However , other assessments made available to the author suggest that the strength of the VPA main force has fallen to between 500 ,000 and 600 ,000.w Initial Vietnamese troop reductions were made imperative by the poor state of its economy , including near famine conditions in some areas of northern Vietnam in 1988. The desire to pursue economic reform and economic development in turn led Vietnam to alter it s policies towards Cambodia and China and to seek accommodation . Vietnamese leaders were also inOuenced by Soviet •new politica l thinking• , which argued that military power counted less than economic strength in the contemporary world . 100 Finally , external pressures such as the ASEAN-Ied trade and aid embargo had taken its toll. As regional tensions decreased , particularly along the China border, Vietnam found itself able to justify military withdrawals from Laos and Cambodia and a reduction in the size of its standing army . Vietnam also closely studied the experiences of the Soviet Union . which had pledged to cut its military manpower by 500 ,000, and China , which was then in the process of cutting one million men from its army . Troop reductions to the lowest level would only be possible, some Vietnamese military officials argued . if there wa lasting peace in the region . Three basic approaches were adopted during the demobilization process. 101 First , selected officers and personnel from other ranks

26

The Period of Strategic Readjustment

were retired early on modest pensions. Secondly, soldiers were sent abroad to Europe and the Middle East as civilian guest-workers . In 1989, there were 150,000 Vietnamese working abroad, mostly in socialist countries, of which about 40 per cent were ex-soldiers.102 Between 1987 and 1989, Vietnam's Ministry of National Defence sent more than 25,000 demobilized army personnel and defence industry workers to the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria under labour co-operation programmes. 103 Thirdly, military units were restructured into economic units or engineering and labour teams, which were engaged in a variety of production and/or construction tasks. In 1991, it was estimated that there were four million veterans in Vietnam. 104

Problems of Returning Veterans Vietnam's demobilized veteran soldiers and newly created economic units entered an economy in transition from a state-controlled subsidybased one to a more decentralized multi-sectoral economy. Many enterprises were forced to turn a profit for the first time in order to survive. In the past they had relied on hand-outs from the central government. Now that subsidies had been cut, they were no longer in a position to absorb additional labour. 105 Vietnam's domestic economy was also marked by high unemployment in the urban areas, estimated at between 20 and 30 per cent, 106 and high under-employment in the rural areas. Under state regulations, soldiers were theoretically entitled to return to their former employers; but under the "new economic mechanism" many enterprises were in no position to accept them. Demobilized soldiers were also to be given priority in job training and education (and access to medical care) . However, the vast majority had received only basic education before they were conscripted. 107 They were so poorly educated that great effort appeared necessary to provide them with skills which would make them marketable. Even former peasant farmers found it difficult to get land allocation.108 The problem of demobilized soldiers in the south was particularly severe . Most soldiers who had fought in Cambodia had been conscripted from this region. They were demobilized en masse in a relatively short period of time. Government services at all levels were strained to breaking point to cope with such numbers. According to figures for the period 1976-89, in Ho Chi Minh City 7.2 per cent of all demobilized soldiers were able to find full-time employment,

The Vietnam People 's Army Under D oi M6i

27

24.7 per cent found part-time work, and the remaining 68 .1 per cent worked only intermittently. Of those employed, only 11.5 per cent were hired by government departments or state-owned enterprises. 109 According to an account written before the final troop withdrawal from Cambodia, local authorities had been "directed many times by party and state to arrange jobs for troops especially those who have fulfilled their international duty" . But only a few found employment. The account continued : Many of th em have become a burden to th e ir families beca use of unemployment and , as a result , th ey have enco unt ered quit e a number of difficulties in th e ir mate rial a nd spiritual li ves. Particularly those wh o have return ed to li ve with th eir famili es in major cities have m et with even more acute diffi culti es. 11 0

There were the further problems of corruption and discrimination on the part of local officials, as pointed out by Quan Doi Nhan Dan : Many combatants who scored good aa hievements in combat were not granted priority [for empl oyme n·t]. But , at the same time , many people wh o evaded th e dra ft succeeded in ge tting the right people to he lp th em ge t selec ted for vocati onal trainin g, for work abroad or for w orking in th e Sta te organs. Thi s has seriously und ermined th e confid ence and e nthusiasm of youn g people. Demobilised soldiers are th e last to be hired . Many units hesitate to hire de mobilised soldie rs because th ey are afraid such people will be difficult to supervi se_~ 11

As early as May 1986, in response to mounting socio-economic difficulties, southern military veterans grouped together and form ed a Club of Former Resistance Fighters . 112 The club was initially a mutual aid association dedicated to improving the lives of veterans but after the Sixth Party Congress it began to play a m ore overtly political role . In 1988, after the death of Premier Pham Hung , the club circulated a petition opposing the party's nominee. It began publishing its own newspaper which was ~ighly critical of government and party policies. The paper was suppressed. The activities of the club took on added political significance in 1989-90, as socialism collapsed in Eastern Europe . In early 1990, the club's leader, Nguyen Ho , demanded that the VCP grant the club the status of a legal mass organization. Later in the year, veterans sent hundreds of letters to the party headquarters in Hanoi calling for the re-election of reformist leader, Nguyen Van Linh. Fearing that the southern movement would attract nation-wide support from veterans elsewhere, the party intervened. 11 3 Key club

28

The Period of Strategic Readjustment

leaders were detained while others were co-opted into a new partyapproved body, the Vietnam War Veterans ' Association jVWVA) . The VWV A was then affiliated to the Vietnam Fatherland Front, the body in charge of mass organizations. In 1992, the VWVA was permitted to play a role in the selection of deputies to the National Assembly.

Rear Service

In addition to the problems faced by able-bodied ex-servicemen, there were problems involving rear service support to active military units, families of disabl ed soldiers and th e war dead , 114 and weapons and equipment maintenance . Vietnam's inefficient system of subsidies coupled with poor management techniques failed to cope with the demands placed on it. In 1989, the Ministry of Finance could only come up with twothirds of the amount of money that had been allocated for the military's budget. 11 5 This meant a generalized shortage of all kinds of goods and a marked deterioration in the standard of living for military personnel and their families, as well as in the storage and maintenance of weapons and other equipment. The Rear Service General Department had neither the cash nor goods and supplies to meet the essential needs of the military units . As noted by General Le Due Anh in a statement to the National Assembly in December 1989: Last year, due to the lack of funds for building storage facilities and for maintaining and repairing weapons and equipment , a lot of technical equipment of various types - including rare and valuable items- were left in a state of disrepair. In 1990, unless they are promptly repaired and regularly serviced , some of them - worth billions of dollars, and which are not easy to buy even if money is now available - will have to be discarded .... Even with the 1989 defence budget , our troops have met many difficulties in their life and other activities . If this budget is cut back in 1990, difficulties will increase further . The current situation allows us to reduce the numerical strength of the standing army and the defence budget. Nevertheless, such a reduction should not be made abruptly , but step by step and in a gradual manner. 116

The plight of Vietnam's military was raised by General Doan Khue in a speech to the Seventh Party Congress in mid-1991. He proposed , "that the various welfare policies concerning the army and its rear

The Vietnam People 's Army Under Doi M6i

29

echelons be promptly revised and amended to ensure proper conditions for soldiers to satisfactorily fulfil their duties and to provide incentives to attract outstanding youths into the army" .11 7 General Khue also highlighted maintenance problems: "Also, we need to make arrangements for collecting a very large quantity of weapons, ammunition and equipment that have been deployed so far and now need repair, maintenance and storage for future use". Conditions were very grim. Lieutenant General Le Kha Phieu was quoted as stating that "more than 70 per cent of.. . weapons and ammunition (in storage) have been damaged considerably and are deteriorating rapidly".11 8 According to Lieutenant General Nguyen Trong Xuyen, units stationed in remote areas (along the China border, in the Central Highlands and in eastern Nam Bo along the Cambodian frontier) ... have not been able to practically secure the troops ' food rations and are still encountering many problems. Their clothing and equipment is still poor, their mess and billeting facilities and their recreational instruments are still lacking, and medicines for combatants in primary units are still in short supply.119

In another graphic account, General Xuyen noted: The living conditions of soldiers and cadres are difficult . Soldiers' diet is below the rations determined by the chairman of the Council of Ministers; the quality of their clothes is poor; drugs for specialized therapeutic purposes are in short supply, in particular malaria medicines; the medical corps' equipment is obsolete and insufficient; housing and barracks are old and lacking. Company officers' salaries are not enough to cover their food expenses.'2°

A major review of rear service policy noted that efforts at reform had failed because the basic regulations were thirty years out of date and they had not been modified to suit the new situation. 12 1 This was particularly true of the system of salaries, wages, incentives , special allowances and long service benefits . The review also noted the general failure of the system to deliver set amounts of supplies in sufficient quantity and quality, at a set price, on the date agreed upon. Vietnam's deteriorating conditions contributed to mounting disciplinary problems (see next section), the rise of unsanctioned activity, 122 and a drop in service morale. 123 In sum, military life became less and less attractive when compared with civilian life. 124 Young officers sought transfers or early discharge. The VPA found

30

The Period of Strategic Readjustment

it difficult to recruit candidates for its officer training schools. 125 The quality of the new students was lower than before and 20-30 per cent were dismissed because they lacked the desire to study . 126 Indeed, concern over the future was a "burning social issue" for VPA officers who were slated for discharge or who had been passed over for promotion at a time of force reduction. 127 In February 1990, the Ministry for National Defence took the decision to renovate the logistics system by "monetizing" it. The following descriptions indicate that the new system gave greater flexibility to the units involved, helped to alleviate the situation of chronic shortages, and resulted . in somewhat better material conditions. 128 According to Major General Dang Huyen Phuong, ... in the past, since they were provided in kind according to legal norms, armed forces units had no control over schedules, quantity, and sometimes even quality (because they were compelled to accept deliveries according to set norms). Now that all their food expenses are monetized, units can take the initiative in exploiting the sources of grain, foodstuffs, and fuel offered by the multisector commodity economy in the areas where they are stationed. Units authorized to exploit these sources have directly signed contracts with suppliers .. . ' 29 Also, in the view of Lieutenant General Le Khoa: ... (the] switch from the material supply mechanism to a mechanism of monetizing the systems and standards, decentralizing expenditures to lower-level units has taken place with the development of the market mechanism in the national economy .... The units can buy commodities in accord with their needs, quality is better, and there has been a reduction in waste, losses, and corruption caused by the involvement of too many levels. Transportation expenses have been reduced, and the system of intermediary storehouses has been reduced in size. This has saved a lot of money . 130 While Vietnam's new rear service policy has helped to improve the material conditions of active duty units, Vietnam's cash-strapped economy has placed severe constraints on its maintenance programme. According to one defence analyst, Regional analysts believe the PA VN is currently treading water, focused on simply keeping its equipment operational. Some suggest that stocks of previously supplied spare parts are mostly sufficient to last into 1995, but certain items can only be obtained through cannibalization. 13 1

The Vietnam People's Army Under Di5i M6i

31

Desertion and Disciplinary Problems In the post-Cambodia period, Vietnam's general socio-economic malaise, coupled with the uncertainties engendered by demobilization , led to the rise of disciplinary problems, including draft-dodging and desertion . In late 1989, Le Due Anh noted that "there have been indications of youths balking at joining the army and afraid of becoming an officer" . 132 The following year, an investigation into the causes of desertion by new recruits in the Ta Xanh division in central Vietnam revealed that they were poorly educated, had low political knowledge , and feared what they considered would be a life of hardship and privation . The manner in which conscription was carried out did little to relieve the anxieties of new recruits . In some areas, force was used . Mter arrival at their unit , according to the investigation report, 133 the new recruits were "herded into confined areas surrounded by barbed wire fences and guarded by military and civil police" . This report on Ta Xanh division also noted that wealthy families in one district used their influence to gain exemptions for their children. Another account reported that influential families "used their positions to ensure that their children were assigned to comfortable places when fulfilling their military obligations" . In some cases where the recruits did not receive favoured assignments they simply deserted . 134 A year-end report revealed that the desertion rate was "as high as thirty per cent in some units" .135 Problems of desertion continued to be severe in 1991, even with the introduction of a new military service law which reduced the length of service for ordinary conscripts from three to two years, and which increased the number of deferment categories. 136 At the beginning of the year, a review of the situation in Military Region 2 stated bluntly that "the desertion rate has not declined" . 137 An account of the situation in the Hanoi Capital Military Region noted that "desertion continues to be a problem" because youths with criminal records were being inducted into the army where they incited others to desert. A study of twenty-eight deserters from the Capital Military Region reported that ... twenty-five per cent of these said that they had deserted because the cadres were too militaristic. They said that the cadres did not pay any attention to their lives, looked down on them, and had soldiers go bring in money. Soldiers also desert because their families are poor and have no money corning in.

In mid-year, twenty high-ranking officials in Haiphong were charged with helping their sons evade the draft . Even worse, from the army's

32

The Period of Strategic Readjustmen t

point of view , was that half of those of military age failed to report for the compulsor y medical examinatio n. ' '" A September report on the Tay Nguyen Corps noted that "the annual figure of military 139 deserters recorded in the past five years was 14.1 per cent ". A on based report on th e causes of desertion in Military Region 9, : figures following the "direct study land] exchanges of view " provided cent per twenty-five , ckness homesi to due are nt ce "twenty-fiv e per due to inability to put up with restrictions and difficult living conditions, forty-five per cent due to cadres ' irresponsib ility and unfair treatme nt, and the remaining five per cent due to family influence ". 140 In 1992 Military Region 1 issued in structions to subordinat e echelons "to carry out an extensive drive to find the causes of and 141 formulate concrete measures to limit and finally stop desertion ' . It also noted approvingl y , that 'during the last six months , desertion at units of the region was reduced by fifteen to eighteen per cent as compared to the previous six months'. The following year , it was reported that several units in Military Region 9 ' were able to reduce desertion rate to below four per cent during the first six months of 142 1993 as compared with the same period the previous year•. The eliminated not but reduced problem of desertion, it would appear , was entirely. The same factors which contribute d to the rise of desertion as a major problem during this period also contribute d to the increase 143 of other disciplinar y problems. The most common were theft of of weapons and ammunitio n .'"" sale illegal army property and the The VP A responded to these problems by stepping up political indoctrinat ion and , where necessary , applying punitive measures. Drafted young men who engaged in ' three opposition s• (opposition to the registration , opposition to medical check-up, and opposition to induction orders) were to be punished in three stages: public criticism in their residential areas , coercive labour, and finally , prosecutio n. 145 Reports in early 1992 indicated that these measures were having a remedial effect and that the number of disciplinar y 146 violations was generally on the decline .

National Defence Expenditure

Attempts to calculate Vietnam 's national defence expenditur e are fraught with peril. 147 Until December 1993, both Vietnam's national 148 budget and national defence expenditur es were state secrets.

The Vietnam People's Army Under Doi M6i

33

Secondly, there are problems in securing reliable economic data. For example, during the period when Vietnam was dependent on the Soviet Union, the size of its economy was expressed in terms of net material product (NMP) . Vietnam now produces figures according to the U.N. system of accounts but these are expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). According to an economist familiar with the two systems, NMP figures are typically one-third lower than those for GDP. 149 GDP figures produced for the period when Vietnam was dependent on the Soviet Union have been calculated simply by using this ratio. Secondly, a current set of GDP figures has been produced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the basis of information supplied by Vietnamese authorities. Economists with first-hand working experience in Vietnam believe that these GDP figures underestimate the size of Vietnam's economy. For example, in 1991 the IMF estimated per capita income in Vietnam at US$200 while independent economists placed the figure as high as US$400. 150 To further confuse the issue, the authoritative The Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), provides a third set of GDP figures which differ widely. In 1987, for example , the IISS reported Vietnam's GDP at between US$12.6 billion and US$20.8 billion. Thirdly, there are tremendous difficulties in interpreting data which have been made public. In 1986, for example, the U.S. Department of State estimated that between 35 per cent and 50 per cent of Vietnam's annual budget was spent on defence. 15 1 No dollar amount was given, nor was any explanation offered as to how the figure was calculated. It is not known, for example, if pensions to veterans and/or local contributions to defence were included. This figure apparently excludes Soviet supplies of petroleum oil and lubricants. Taking note of these difficulties , this section will examine the publicly available information on Vietnam's national defence expenditure and attempt to estimate current defence spending. In 1985, one former U .S. Defence Department official calculated that Vietnam's defence expenditure that year was of the order of magnitude of US$1.5 billion. 152 This figure assumed that Vietnam's GDP stood at US$10.2 billion, 153 the national budget amounted to 37 per cent of GDP, and defence expenditure was 40 per cent of the national budget. In other words, based on these figures , defence spending represented 14.8 per cent of GDP. This figure excluded Soviet military assistance.

34

The Period of Strategic Readjustment

The additional difficulty of how to factor in Soviet military aid in these calculations has been acknowledged by analysts working on Vietnamese defence expenditures. In 1988, the IISS noted that "[e]xtensive Soviet military aid makes estimate of the [defence budget] impossible" . 154 It estimated that combined Soviet economic and military aid during 1984- 87 was more than USS 1 bilJion per annum . Data assembled by Thakur and Thayer indicate that Soviet aid for the same period may have been twice as much as the IISS figures . 155 For example , they cite figures released by the Thai National Security Council which indicate that Soviet military aid alone to Vietnam for the 1984-87 period averaged USS 1.5 billion per year , while figures issued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization placed Soviet economic assistance to Vietnam for the 1983-85 period at USS 1 billion per year. 156 Soviet military aid to Vietnam virtually ceased after 1990. A review of the Vietnamese defence literature , including interviews granted by military officials to foreign journalists, provides additional insights into Vietnam's national defence expenditures in the postCambodia period. In 1989, it was revealed that defence spending was about 20 per cent of the budget, excluding pensions for veterans. 157 In 1991, one official claimed that Vietnam was trying to reduce expenditure from 18 per cent of the national budget to 12 per cent. 158 Earlier, another official had noted that if Vietnam reduced its standing army to 600,000 it would lower defence spending to between 12 and 15 per cent of the national budget. 159 The difficulty here lies in calculating the proportion of the national budget to GDP. 160 In 1990, the World Bank published data on Vietnam 's economy which reported that Vietnam's military expenditures •remain large, consuming almost two-thirds of government's current expenditure in 1989" (or 8.3 per cent of GDPI . 16 1 The World Bank report also revealed for the first time annual figures on defence spending for the period 1984-89, expressed as a percentage of GOP. These had been listed in an "other" category in the national budget and varied between 6.6 and 12 per cent each year (or an average of 8.35 per cent over six yearsl . This was the first time that figures were made public on Vietnam's defence expenditure . In 1991, the IISS provided U .S. dollar estimates for Vietnam's defence budget for 1988 (US$2 .54 billion I and 1989 (US$2.32 billion I. 162 No explanation was provided as to how these estimates were derived or whether they included or excluded Soviet military assistance. Since then, further figures have been published by the IISS. Based on the IISS data, defence expenditures may be calculated as amounting

The Vietnam People's Army Under Doi Moi

35

to 18 per cent and 15.9 per cent of NMP in 1988 and 1989 respectively. In absolute terms, the IISS figures appear to overestimate Vietnam's defence expenditures (see Table 1) . In December 1993, for the first time, Vietnam publicly released figures on its national budget, including defence expenditures. Defence expenditures in 1993 were officially put at 3.2 trillion dong or "about 8.4 per cent of the national budget". 163 This figure appears improbable and implies a drop of more than 40 per cent in two years. As noted above, Vietnamese spokesmen placed defence expenditures at around 18-20 per cent of the national budget in 1990-91 and provided a target low figure of 12 per cent. Vietnamese officials have since stated that defence expenditures were increased in 1992 and 1993. At current rates of exchange, defence expenditures of 3.2 trillion dong would amount to US$290 million, a ridiculously low figure . Table 1 shows estimates of Vietnam's defence spending in the last decade, based on the World Bank and IISS data. One of the most detailed statements on ~ietp.am's military budget was made by Le Due Anh when he spoke 'to' a plenary meeting of the sixth session of the Eighth National Assembly in December 1989: Recently, conditions did not exist for us to make the temporary budgetary increases needed for the realisation of troop reduction. Worse still, owing to shortfalls in tax collection and antiinflationary measures, in 1989 the Finance Ministry could barely ensure for the army a budget equal to only 67% of the amount prescribed by the Political Bureau's resolution . This occurred at a time when the army had to buy everything at market prices and when the prices of key items, such as petrol, were three times as high in the second half of the year as they were in the first half .. .. The result was, with more than 70% of the defence budget spent for the support of the soldiers' livelihood , the troops' already difficult Jiving conditions became even more difficult. The minimum food rations of combatants, which were meagre compared even to those of the armies df poor countries of the world, were still not guaranteed. Soldiers' allowances destined for the purchase of necessities of life were also cut by 30-40% .... At present, more than 70% of the defence budget is earmarked for expenditure in support of the livelihood of troops; and less than 30% is reserved for all other activities such as procuring technical equipment, drilling troops, training cadres, carrying on external relations, building national defence projects and carrying out national construction. It can be said that this is an inverse ratio and will inevitably lead to the downgrading of technical

The Period of Strategic Readjustment

36

Table 1 Estimates of Vietnam ' s National Defence Expenditures as Fund e d by the Centra l Government Budget, 1984-93 (In billion US$) Year

GOP*

o/o Def Exp* •

Def Bdgt.

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

10.2-18 .1 10.2-19.4 10.4-20 .4 10.8 -20.8 11.5-22.0 12.4-23.6 13.0-24.7 13 .4-25.4 14.5-27.5 15.5-29.5

7.8 12 .0 7.9 6.6 7 .5 8.3 6.6 6.6 7.5 8.4

.796-1.41 1.22-2 .33 .822-1.61 .713-1.37 .863-1.65 1.03-1.96 .858-1 .63 .884-1.68 1.09-1.82 1.30-2.48

*The lower order GOP figures were calculated on the basis of an IMF estimate that Vietnam 's GOP stood at US$13.4 billion in 1991 , to which the following annual GOP growth rates have been applied: 5.9o/o (1988). 7. 1o/o jl989). 4.5% (1990). 3.0o/o (1991) 8.1o/o (1992) and 7.3o/o (1993). Lower range GOP figures for 1984-87 and higher range GOP figures have been taken from !ISS, the Military Balance , with NMP figures converted to GOP. ''World Bank, Vietnam Economic Report (1990). pp. 22-23 and 141 . The fi gures for defence expenditure for 1990-93 are the author's estimates. The figures for defence expendi ture do not include Soviet supplies of petroleum a nd lubricants, local contributions , th e contributions of military-run production enterprises and units , and pensions for veterans. SouRc Es: The Economist Intelligence Unit , Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Country Report , no. 1 (1993). p . 16; Humphrey Haw ksley , Hanoi , The Times (Lo ndon). 17 April 1989; Murra y Hiebert , "Corps Business", Far Eastern Eco nomic Review, 23 December 1993 , pp . 40-41 ; IISS, The Military Balance, 1987188, p . 175; IISS, The Military Balance, 1988189, p . 180; IISS , The Military Balance, 1989190, p. 178; IISS, The Military Balance 1991192, p . 183; IISS, Th e Military Balance 1992/93, p . 164; International Monetary Fund, VietNam - Recent Economic Developments (5 Decembe r 199 1) ; Borje Ljunggren , ed. , Th e Challenge of Reform in In dochina (Cambridge : Harvard Institute for International Development, 1993). p . 385; Gwen Robinson, "Ta-ta Cambodia, good morning to a quieter Vietnam", Canberra Times , 30 September 1989; J. Andre Sauvageot, "Vietnam, Defence Expenditure and Threat Perception : Defending Comm unist Indochina", in Defence Spending in Southeast Asia , edited by Chin Kin Wah (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987). pp. 281-304; Barry Wain , "Hanoi Congress Set to Continue Reform" , Asian Wall Street journal, 20 June 1991; and World Bank, Vietnam Economic Report (1990) .

The Vietnam People's Army Under Doi M6i

37

equipment and fighting means, and will as a matter of course directly affect the fighting strength of our army .... Even with the 1989 defence budget, our troops have met many difficulties in their life and other activities. If this budget is cut back in 1990, difficulties will increase further. The current situation allows us to reduce the numerical strength of the standing army and the defence budget. Nevertheless, such a reduction should not be made abruptly, but step by step and in a gradual manner.' 64 Quite clearly, 1989 was a very difficult year for the VPA. Calls were made to increase the defence budget to take into account the additional overhead costs of pensioning off and providing housing and other amenities to demobilized soldiers. Western analysts estimated that the defence budget would have to be increased by 10 per cent. 165 General Le Due Anh later commented, It is really not simple at all, because we have to solve many policy problems that require huge funds; mq careful preparations while we have no temporary conditions ·for· increasing some budgetary funds for personnel strength reduction. We have had to reduce the national defence budget step by step along with personnel strength reduction. ' 66

The IISS placed Vietnam's defence expenditures in 1988 at US$2.54 billion and US$2 .32 billion in 1989, whereas the calculations in Table 1 place defence expenditures at US$0.863 billion and US$1.03 billion, respectively . This illustrates the problems involved in estimating Vietnam's national defence expenditures from figures presently available. According to Le Due Anh, only 30 per cent of these figures was reserved for the procurement of equipment, training and drill, external relations, building national defence projects and capital construction. This meant that in dollar terms the VP A only had US$259-762 million (1988) and US$309-696 million (1989) for these purposes. The above discussion does not take il}to account that all units and enterprises under the authority of the Ministry of National Defence were charged with raising their own funds and becoming as selfreliant as possible. The extent of the military's budgetary contribution is unclear. 167 According to Major General Tran Cong Man, the military's share of economic resources "does not exceed more than fifty per cent of the national budget".168 One Vietnamese radio broadcast noted that, "Over the past five years, production units in the entire army have remitted nearly 137 billion dong to the state budget" . 169 The army newspaper also reported,

38

The Period of Strategic Readjustment

"In 119901 th e sphere of lmilit a ryl economic accounting units, profits reached 24 billion dong. More than 19 billion dong was contributed to the budget , exceeding the plan . This was an increase of 10-20 pe r cent as compa red with last year ". 110 It is likely that some funds were retained by va ri ous unit s to meet urge nt needs. In 1993, the military ent erprises w e re report ed to have earn ed 1.5 trillion dong, of which 150 billion w as re mitted to th e ce ntral gove rnment and 140 billion was retained by the Mini stry of Defen cc. 171 Acco rding to anothe r account , "In 1990 , economic units working under th e cost accounting system of the army made dozens of million dong in profit , contributing to army funds to build shelters for heavy guns and to improve the soldie rs' living condition ". 112 This appears to be th e likely future patte rn , as indicated by this report : Full usc must be made of th e stre ngths of eac h unit a nd locality , pa rti c ul a rl y th e key eco nomic sec to rs, in o rd e r to generat e la rge centrali1.ed sources of reve nues . But this mus t not affect th e comba t readin ess tas ks o r th e training periods, contents. or progra ms. In 1992 , an effort must be made to have a product value of 1.2 billion don g, with a n increase of 40 per cent a year beginning in 1993. Of this, 55 pe r cent must be used to improve th e li ves of th e troops , imple ment the social policies, and purchase w ea pons a nd eq ui pme nt fo r combat readiness training . 111

Additiona l funds (in cash and kind) were raised at the local level , as the following examples illustrate: - Not onl y th e Defe nce Ministry is in need of a national defence budge t, but all sec tors and localities are required to have their own defence budgets to ma ke contributions to national defence expe nditures. 174 - Training expenses can be paid for in part from the national defence budget and th e national defence funds (of the localities and independe nt bases). or they can be added to production costs (for production a nd business units). 1" - Besides the support funds of the central echelon, these (national defence) factories and enterprises receive notable amounts of investment funds from locaJ budget funds reserved for nationaJ defence . 176 - The Ministry of National Defence must unify the military uniforms, helmets, and insignias for the militia and self-defence forces (the localities are responsible for expenditures and budgets) . 177 -We ourselves must rely on the funding provided by the centraJ echelons and, at the same time, must develop the spirit of self-

The Vietnam People's Army Under Doi M6i reliance in all ministries, sectors, localities , and army units. It is necessary to generate income from local sources, to strictly practice thrift , and to enhance the efficiency of all national defence activities. 178 - The military cannot rely on the state for everything but must itself make an effort to improve living conditions and increase its budget with the aim of maintaining the strength of the armed forces and participating in building the country . In this sense, not only will there be defence enterprises that are engaged in economic activities and that are tied to the new mechanism but there will also be a large military force that participates directly in building the economy. 179 - Party committee echelons and local authorities have provided funds and materials worth billions of dong (outside the national defence budget) to train the local troops, reserve forces, and militia and self-defence forces . 180 - Economic-national defence troops have been selected in accord with the standards, and they have bee.q organized and trained just like regular troops. The basic difference is that only a minimum amount of money is being taken from the defence budget (enough for weapons and equipment) . The units themselves provide money to pay for the food, clothing, medicines, cultural products, and discharge allowances. Initially, the localities helped pay for some of the expenses. 181 -Despite a very limited budget, in 1991 and the first six months of 1992, the province [Dong Thap) has allocated a large sum of money for various national defence and security projects at the border, consolidated various border defence posts, built army barracks, and increased the personnel of the standing national defence and security forces at various border villages . The party committees and administration at all levels had paid attention to implementing the army's welfare policy, had launched movements to build houses for and give gift savings accounts to war veterans, and had actively resolved cases of army's welfare policy beneficiaries that had remained unsettled from the past wars of resistance. 182 - Many provinces and cities such as Khanh Hoa, Phu Yen, Quang Nam-Danang, Dac Lac ... have paid for transportation expenses or provided transportation and have supplied more rice and money to military cadres going to school. A number of localities have opened passbook savings accounts for draftees. In 1991, the military region spent more than 1 billion dong to care for the families of servicemen on active duty and to complement the welfare policies for war invalids, and families of fallen soldiers. 183

39

40

The Period of Strategic Readjustment - Expenses [in building provincial defence zones and producing rudim entary weapons] will be defrayed chiefly by localities; the General Department of National Defence Industry and Economy, the Ge neral Technical Department, and the military region commands are responsible for giving assistance. The extent of assistance provided by the Ministry of National Defence is based on the percentage of the national defence budget earmarked by th e state for this task and on the design output of the rudime ntary-weapons production system. 184

Throughout 1989-91 , in the lead up to the Seventh National Party Congress , there were numerous complaints in the Vietnamese press abo ut the inadequacy of the defence budget to meet current needs . According to Senior Lieutenant General Dang Vu Hiep , In recent years, thanks to the state readjustment of the military budget and great efforts of va rious units, th e army has built more living quarte rs a nd has produced co nstruction materials for sale to cadres to build or repair houses by themselves. However , this has yet to meet current demands. 185

Other reports indicated that funds were so limited that many army units could not afford to purchase oil and spare parts to maintain their equipmen t, and that living standards were falling and desertion was on the ri se. 186 In late 1990, General Le Due Anh declared bluntly that funding was not enough "to meet minimum needs ". 187 There were even complaints that agricultural co-operatives were withholding taxes from th e central government and spending the money "for commercial purposes not related to national defence work". 188 Based on scattered references in the Vietnamese media, it would appear that th e 1991 defence budget was not increased substantially (see Table 1). At the start of the year Lieutenant General Nguyen Trong Xu yen described the 1991 defence budget as "limited" . 189 Another commentator noted, "c urrent national defence budget constraints are reasonable and indispensable". None th eless, th ere is a limit to the national defence budget, beca use if one goes beyond these fairly permissible limits, one will face either an economic or national defence crisis. Therefore, the most positive and quickest way to cope with the harsh conditions created by national defence budget constraints lies in being able to review and adjust so capital is concentrated on targeted [priority] projects. 190

In March 1991, Phan Doan Nam argued that it was "necessary to cut military expenditures to increase the budget for economic building but military budget slashing and troop reduction must not

The Vietnam People 's Army Under D6i M6i

41

be allowed to affect the defence posture of our country" .191 At the year's end, the army newspaper reported that "from the figures contained in the report on the defence budget presented to the National Assembly, we can see that the projected expenditures cannot meet even the bare minimum requirements of the army" .192 The paper went on: We would like to suggest that the National Assembly considers adoption of a defence budget capable of realizing the following goals: ensure that the army receives its rations in full and of the prescribed quality, stabilize the living conditions of soldiers, and, at the same time , satisfy the army's pressing need for techniques and equipment and meet the requirements of the military welfare policy ...

The military eventually won an increase. This was endorsed by a resolution adopted by the eleventh session of the Eighth National Assembly, and a resolution "on national defence and security" was adopted by the VCP Central Committee 's Third Plenum (18-29 June 1992) . On this basis, the chairman of the Council of Ministers favourably considered a report by the Ministry of National Defence on the defence budget, technology, equipment purchases and other policies affecting the VPA. Thus, the Council of Ministers decided "to raise the 1992 national defence budget" .193 In mid-1993, Deputy Prime Minister Phan Van Khai announced that state revenues during the first six months had increased "by a relatively enormous margin compared with the same period last year" and part of the increase in the central budget "will be put aside to satisfy the newly-emerging needs of national defence and security" .194 These were identified as strengthening Vietnam's defences in the South China Sea. 195 At year's end, a draft budget for 1994 was published. These figures revealed that the Ministry of Defence was seeking a 49 per cent budget increase to 4. 7 trillion dong, or 16 per cent of recurrent expenditure. 196

IV. National Defence in Peacetime

Threats and Threat Perception

During the period of strategic readjustment (1986-90), Vietnam elaborated its defence doctrine of "people's war and all people's national defence" . According to a review of this doctrine, 197 ten major policies had been implemented as part of the strategic readjustment programme: 1. We have studied and supplemented the strategic decisions by the Ministry of National Defence and the various military regions and military corps. We have also guided the various provinces in formulating new combat plans to deal with different circumstances, to cope with the outside enemy, to prevent the dark schemes and acts of sabotage of counter-revolutionaries at home , and to closely link national defence with national security.

2. We have initiated a basic personnel cutback programme and have improved the fighting strength of the armed forces, especially the various armed services, armed branches, and combat units , bearing in mind the need to attach importance even to agencies, schools, and establishments in charge of combat support services. 3. We have reorganized a step further the militia and self-defence forces in the direction of limited quantity, better quality, and compact organization ... We have developed the role of the militia and self-defence forces in safeguarding political stability and in maintaining security and order at grass-roots installations. 4. We have initiated a programme for building the reserve force, have formulated a reserve troop mobilization plan for each

The Vietnam People 's Army Under Doi M 6i

43

echelon and each locality, have completed the registration of a relatively large number of reservists and ha ve conducted an experimental reserve troop mobili za ti on programme in a numbe r of localities. 5. We have made efforts to accelerate military training and have attac hed importance to the tacti cal and tec hnica l ski lls of small · sized detac hments. 6. We have guided a pilot project for building a num ber of comprehensively firm a nd powe rful regim ents to suppo rt an accelerated expansion programme aimed at improving th e quali ty of the armed forc es. 7. We have accelerated th e tas k rela ted to military science a nd technology in acco rdance with th e pa rty 's mili ta ry thinking by keeping it in line with th e rea l situa ti ons in th e co unt ry and the armed forces and by linking it with a rm y building, training, and combat readiness ... 8. We have continued to improve th e e9 ucational system , have reorganized th e network of schools and academies , have reviewed the student e nrolment system , and have improved th e curri cu lum , contents, and training methods .... 9. We have adopted a new logistical supply syste m based on th e

new economic managem ent mechanism to promptly meet th e needs of soldiers, especially those entrusted wit h a combat mission .... 10. We have concentrated efforts on resolvi ng some short· comings in technical equipment s upply a nd on overcoming some discrepancies between combat gear and combat support equipment, between repair dem ands and repair fac ilities , and between maintenance needs and th e availability of storage facilities . We have supplied additional equipment to units on permanent combat duty and have also recalled a la rge volume of weapons, ammunition and equipment for repair , maintenance , and storage .

During the five-year period of strategic readjustment , the main threats to Vietnam 's security came from two major "hot spots" Vietnam's border with China, and the Spratly Islands- which could erupt at any time and escalate into local armed conflict or eve n full-scale war. Vietnam also listed the "strategy of peaceful evolution · as a major threat. In response , Vietnam adopted a policy of "ending and preventing armed conflicts from bursting into wars• by "applying measures of maximum self-restraint so as to avoid intensifying and spreading

44

National Defence in Peacetime

hostile activities". 19 " According to th e "National Defence Tasks and Guidelines, 1991-95" : Since 1987. we have advocated th e policy of self-restraint , intensified th e propaganda ca mpaign to motivate the Chinese people and troops to cease hostilities and restore normal relations , gradually red uced th e scale of conflicts by not resorting to gun battles a ll th e time. and made th e Chinese people and troops clearly und erstand our goodw ill and practi cal deeds, thus creating conditions for ending the war. This is, of course, a dangerous and difficult ideologica l struggle. Our troops have had to endure and even though th ey have at times questioned th e situation , th ey have always scrup ulously implemented th e policies of the higher echelons. By late 1989, according to Le Due Anh , the security situation in the two "hot spots" had become "stable for the time being". Vietnam then began to stress "the strategy of peaceful evolution" as a major threa t to its national security. As party Secretary General , Nguyen Van Linh , put it : There are st ill si mmerin g hotbeds th at ca n easi ly explode into loca li zed arm ed con fli cts or full -scale wars. This is because lour] enemies have still not given up their sinister schemes to be implemented against the Vietnamese revolution and the revolutions of th e three Indoc hinese countries as a whole through th e app lication of mainly economic. political, and psychological measures and by mea ns of loca lized armed aggression, localized nibbling attac ks, and wars of aggression on various scales, including large-scale ones which, though unlikely to occur in the nea r futur e, cannot be completely ruled out. .. This strategy uses mainly peaceful evolution ... while always remaining ready to use military for ce in various forms whenever the need arises, such as partial armed conflict, low intensity conflict, proxy war, and limited war. 199 The Seventh National Congress (June 1991) reconfirmed that Vietnam 's national defence strategy must "meet the objective requirements of defeating several forms of sabotage activities and modern war of aggression, including the 'fourth generation war', of reactionary imperialist forces". According to Major General Nguyen Van Phiet: Today, the factors threatening our socialist regime's existence and our fatherland's independence stem not only from certain counter-revolutionary armed violence in the country, or from the deterrent, aggressive military strength of imperialism from the

The Vietnam People 's Army Under Doi Moi

45

outside ; they are also shaped and influenced by our country's weaknesses and deficiencies in the economic, social, political, ideological, cultural, educational, and artistic fields as well as and in our life-style . These are weaknesses and deficiencies caused by the socio-economic crisis. Pursuing their scheme of abolishing socialism, hostile forces inside the country and imperialism are deepening our weaknesses and carrying out many policies and tricks of sabotage, confrontation, and aggression against our people in all domains of social life . In conjunction with applying military deterrence, they are implementing the "peaceful evolution" strategy, launching attacks and sabotage activities in the economic, political , ideological, educational , and cultural fields and in daily life, while colluding with reactionary forces inside the country for the purpose of overthrowing the present political regime. They are concentrating on undermining the unity among the party, state, people, and armed forces , and on inciting enmity among nationaliti es [sic).... These are th e factors threatening the security of our regime and endangering the independence and sovereignty of the Vietnamese fatherland . This could even be called .an undeclared ; non-shooting "war of aggression" .200

In sum, in the present period, Vietnam identifies low-level or limited conflict as the most likely threats to Vietnam's security. 201 Such conflicts could arise from disputes along its land and sea borders, offshore territories in the Eastern Sea (South China Sea) , or as a result of deliberate instigation by "imperialist and reactionary" forces employing the "strategy of peaceful evolution". Vietnam's repeated references to "the strategy of peaceful evolution" indicate its increased sensitivity to the possibility that external pressures mounted by an opponent could find support in Vietnam by groups dissatisfied with the pace of reform. Or to put it another way, domestic economic reform could trigger political instability which an external enemy might seek to take advantage of. Witness the strong assertion made by General Doan Khue that Vietnam is the deliberate target of such a strategy: Following the failure of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the adversary forces , on the one hand , have been expanding the results of their victory in those countries, and, on the other, [have been) stepping up their offensive against the remaining socialist countries, which include Vietnam. Their plot and action are aimed at accelerating the combined use of unarmed and armed measures against us to undermine in a total manner our politics, ideology , psychology, way of living , and so on, and encircling, isolating, and destroying us in the

46

National Defence in Peacetime economi c fi e ld , wit h th e hope that they could achieve so-called "peace ful evolution " and mak e the revolution in ou r cou ntry deviat e fr om its co urse. Th ey have been trying to see k, build , and deve lop reactionary forces of a ll kinds within ou r cou ntry ; at th e sa me tim e to nurture and bring back groups of armed reactionaries within our cou ntry ; and to combi ne armed activities with politi ca l ac ti vities, hoping to transform the socio-economi c cri sis in our co untry into a politi ca l cri sis and to incite rioting a nd overthrowing w he n opportu nities arise . They may also look for exc uses to effec t an interve nti on , to carry out partial armed agg ression , or to wage aggressive wars on various scales . Our peopl e thu s ha ve th e task of dealing with and being ready to deal wit h any circumstances caused by the adversary forces : peace ful evolution, riot and overthrow , encirclement , bloc kade , surpri se attacks by a rm ed forces, agg ressive wars on various scales. The politico-ideological front is a hot one to fight back the "peaceful development " and to defend the fatherland .202

A year later , General Khue again declared that "hostile forces are attempting to wipe out socialism and revolutionary gains of our people ". He further charged that exiled Vietnamese ' with support from the imperialists" were trying to contact domestic reactionaries in order to destabilize and undermine the government. 203 In order to prepare for such contingencies Vietnam has assigned its best trained and equipped regular forces (and reserves) to defend its most vital areas, 204 which include offshore islands , oil and gas exploration zones and border regions (for example , the Central Highlands , the Plains of Reeds , Long Xuyen quadrangle) . In addition , each military region, province and district must designate its own strategic areas and turn them into special defence zones. This includes offshore islands , urban industrial zones , and border regions. In Military Region 4, for example , three separate defence areas have been identified: the sea (a national defence "hot spot ' ), cities along National Highway 1, and the mountain and forest area.205 Military Region 5 has designated the Paracel and Spratly island arc hipelagos and th e tri -border region where Vietnam joins Laos and Cambodia , as sensitive defence zones. 206 Military Region 9 has identified th e sea area (which includes five archipelagos where foreign fishing vessels often intrude) and the southwest border with Cambodia as special defence zones .207 These defe nce zones have been fortified and efforts made to link economic production and military defence . According to General Doan Khue , "in peace time , each hamlet and commune should have only a squad or platoon, each village a company .... Agencies, factories ,

The Vietnam People's Army Under D6i M6i

47

schools and streets also need some self-defence forces to protect themselves and help defend the areas" .208 In the initial stages of limited conflict, the responsibility of meeting and countering an external attack would rest with local forces and militia and selfdefence forces. At a later stage, the main forces, supplemented with ready reserves, would be employed. According to the "National Defence Tasks and Guidelines, 1991-95": The building of provincial and city defence networks and key defence areas must continue to be regular and over a long time. However, if war breaks out, this task will surely testify to the superiority of people 's war in which each locality can engage in production and combat, cope with all forms of war, fight the enemy with all three categories of troops, engage in combat while mustering more fighting strength both in terms of manpower and material and technical bases, secure land and air defences and gradually broaden sea defence. Finally, Vietnam had to be prepared to meet "all eventualities", including subversion, rebellion, blockade, biological warfare, "localized armed aggressions and war of aggression ... [and] round-the-clock surprise massive , lightning air , sea and ground assault conducted by enemies with high-tech weapons • .209 Vietnam's "people's war and all people 's national defence" strategy is a doctrine which attempts to integrate all aspects of Vietnamese society- economic, social , cultural , political, military, internal security and foreign relations- in defence of the homeland and socialist regime. 210 Annual exercises are held to test the ability of military units to carry out their defence tasks in designated areas.

National~encelndu~

Vietnam 's dependency on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for modern weapons and equipment, coupled with its own low level of economic development, has resulted in a situation where •our army's equipment is, in general, ahead of our economic development level, it can definitely not be emancipated from the country's economy" .2 11 As a result Vietnam also possesses a rather primitive national defence industry which is able to manufacture small arms (including machine guns and rocket launchers), ammunition (such as 82mm mortar shells). and a few spare parts but little else. Vietnam does not have the means to build a Chinese-style defence industry.212

48

National Defence in Peacetime

The termination of Soviet military assistance has forced Vietnam to re-evaluate the role and priorities of its national defence industry. "Recently" , reported a March 1991 radio broadcast , "the duty of the national defence industry consisted of manufacturing equipment and w eapons for troops, while also producing medical items for selfsuffi ciency and maintaining the existence of the national defence forces " _m Another source described th e industry's role in this way : "our country 's defence industry has focused on serving the task of providing technical support for and maintaining the existing technical military equipment". 2 14 In late 1989, General Le Due Anh announced that "the institutes of research on military technology will be reorganized into unions in charge of research on production technology to serve both national de fence and social economy" . Vietnam 's national defence industry q uickly took to production activities related to the civilian economy , as the following account indicates: ' In recent years, the defence factories have produced increasingly greater quantities of civilian goods. If in 1986 consumer goods accounted for only 50 percent of the total value of production , in 1990 that ratio had increased to 89 percent. Meanwhile , the factories have continued to fulfil the national defence tasks assigned them ....215 What about production for the army's needs? According to Nguyen Van Linh , in a speech to an all army political-military conference , th e national defence industries would be developed "gradually" and Vi etnam would "secure enough defence equipment and weapons for long-term use" .2 16 When and how this would be done was not indi cat ed . But in the meantime, in order to curtail wastage, breakdowns and losses , stress was placed on stockpiling , storing and maintaining military equipment and on standardization of weapons. The subject of the national defence industry was a controversial one as the VCP began preparations for its Seventh National Congress. One broadcast stated bluntly that the party 's draft "Strategy for Soc io-Economic Stabilization and Development Up to the Year 2000 has failed to come up with a precise solution, particularly an inv estment solution, for the national defence industry, and a training policy for young workers" .217 The matter was finally settled and the new policy incorporated in the Central Military Party Commission's report on "National Defence Tasks and Guidelines, 1991-95". This document stated: We have replanned a step further the network of national defence factories , strived to consolidate the existing ones, satisfactorily

The Vietnam People's A rmy Under Doi M 6i

49

completed th e half-fini shed projects, made in -depth investme nt in so m e fac tori es ... to m a inta in a nd improve th e weapo n manu facture industry ... . We should consolida te and step by step deve lop th e netwo rk of na tio nal defe nce industri es re leva nt to th e develop me nt of th e na ti onal eco nom y .... We must maintai n and consolidate th e network of nati onal defence industries a nd raise th e q uality of na tio nal defe nce p rod ucts w hile, a t the same tim e, ac ti ve ly prod ucing eco nomi c goods w ith eve r be tt e r qu alit y a nd eff icie ncy. ""

In 1993, mid-way during thi s pla nnin g pe riod a nd on th e eve of a mid -term party confe rence call ed to rev iew po licies set by th e Seventh Party Congress , Defe nce Mini ste r Doa n Khu e ca ll ed for Vi etnam to ta ke steps to deve lop a master pla n fo r th e defence industry and for the gove rnment to prov ide a n "approp ri ate" budge t so tha t it could move tow a rd s se lf-suffi ciency in mee tin g defence needs.2 19

Economic Construction

Vi etnamese m ilitary unit s have bee n engaged in "building sociali sm " and "economic constructi on " tasks sin ce uni fica tion . In th e decade up to 1986, arm y units of corps (b in h doa n ) size were assigned to new economic zones, stale fa rms and fo rests, hyd roe lec tri c a nd water conse rvancy p rojects, buildin g roads and oil a nd gas expl oration. By 1989, there were sixteen specia li zed economi c construc ti on di visio ns. One unit , of roughly 12,000 me n , w as giv en responsibility fo r completing the Hoa Binh hydroelectric project north wes t of Hanoi. Brigades and smaller sized units planted rubbe r, co ffee a nd tea . Some demobilized units retained th eir offi cers and became, in effect, reserve units engaged in economic w ork . The scope and nature of the military's involvement in production activiti es underwent a fundamental change only in the late 1980s wh en Vi etnam' s economic reform p rog ramme , doi m6i, took effe ct.220 The army 's involvem ent in economic activities aroused deba te as to its efficacy. According to Quang Da u, som e people argued tha t the army had achieved "satisfactory results" beca use it had reached a degree of self-suffici ency and was abl e to contribute to national defence by making financial contributions to the state. 221 There w ere other considerations, as stated by one writer : The kind of opinion holding that th e army 's economic work is

50

National Defence in Peacetime

inefficient is based on the arithmetical calculation method of "using revenue to cover expenses and making a profit" as the sole measure, without considerin g each specific form of production and economic building activiti es of each specific category of unit.. .. Th e kind of opinion judgin g that the army's production a nd economic building activities ha ve yielded fine resu lts maintains that.. . it is also unreasonable to use this formula as th e sole yardst ick for judging the efficiency of the production and economic building activities of the army, especially of the arms-producing defe nce enterprises and the units stationed in stra tegic a reas. 222 Others said that the army's involvement in economic construction actually resulted in a net loss because even profitable enterprises received subsidies from the state. Dau co ncluded : The recent reorganization of military economic building units and enterprises has forced these establishments to implement business accounting and to apply a system of self-reliance . Specifically, the announcement made by the Department of Finance in the Ministry of National Defence on its cut in financial support has prompted these establishments to request subsidies for several more years in order to prepare themselves for seeking capital and self-sufficiency ... . The army is now fully aware of th e need to participate in economic building in order to contribute to the state budget and become partially self-sufficient. The Party Central Committee Military Commission 's Resolution No 33 has addressed this with unmistaken clarity .... [In future] the army must necessaril y engage in economic building. Army units should participate in production in order to improve their living conditions and should engage in various fields of the eco nomy like water conservancy , communications, agriculture, forestry and fisheries during their tours of duty in remote areas. As far as economic building forces are concerned, the system of combining military service with labour duty can be applied to them. During the two-year period ending in August 1989 so many military e nterprises had become involved in economic production activities that the Economic General Department had to be reorganized four times .223 According to Dau, almost all enterprises and factories under the VPA's Technical General Department "have produced economic goods which have accounted for 40-50 per cent of their production output". Another source estimated that the army raised 20 per cent of its revenue from internal sources. 224

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It would be instructive at this point to make a brief case study of the army's involvement in economic construction tasks in one military region , Military Region 9 (MR9). There, the Vietnam People's Army developed two forms of economic work. The first consisted of units specifica lly tasked with full-time economic production. In 1989 there were seventeen such units , including enterprises, state farms and state forestry groups. 225 These units operated under the same government regulations for state enterprises. They were required to take responsibility for "total accounting, [ensure thei r own] living conditions and accumulating investment capital while simultaneously deducting profits to regulate general payments for the military region's national defence requirements". The second type of economic work involved regu lar units engaging in small-scale agricultural production in areas around their ca mps, as well as limited co-operation with units engaged in full-time work. Figures for 1988 indicated that th e total value of production by both types of units amounted to 4 .2 billion dong . Army units in the first category produced lumber, bricks, tiles and nails for domestic use and coconut fibre rugs for export. They also reworked sheet metal , provided transportation services and engaged in various projects. The profits derived from these activities amounted to 1.4 billion dong . Of this amount, 418 million dong (29 .8 per cent) was transferred to the military region to be used to purchase tyre tubes , fuel , iron and steel and service vehicl es. Military Region 9 also set aside funds for social welfare and for the construction of new headquarte rs and barracks. The military units which engaged in agricultural activities produced grain , meat, fish sauce, vegetables, fruit, sugar-cane , and coconuts, gathered firewood , and raised fish , farm animals and poultry. The total value of such activities, for which data were available, amounted to 2.8 billion dong. Major General Cao Van Dom, Chief of the Military Region 9's Rear Services Department , stated that such economic activity was necessary in order to compensate for food .shortages. In 1988, according to General Dom, Military Region 9 itself received only one-fifth to one-quarter of the prescribed food ration for its troops, while troops on duty in Cambodia received only 40-45 per cent of the set rations . This shortfall was made up for by economic activity . Military Region 9 spent 20 per cent of its profits to provide meals for troops; 30 per cent to expand production; and 32 per cent for capital construction and repair of barracks, vehicles and artillery sheds and warehouses, upgrading hospitals and dispensaries; 6.5 per cent for maintenance supplies and replacement parts; 7 per cent as

52

National Defence in Peacetime

liquid funds and 4.5 per cent for welfare support , bonuses and labour protecti on. Later , a national army-wide conference on production and economic wo rk concluded that "it is unnecessary now to argue whether the army should engage in economi c work or not but primarily on how to produce effective resu lts" .226 The same conference also concluded that "the army can rationally use part of its forces, a portion of mac hin e a nd eq uipment capacity and a fixed amount of time to engage in production and economic work [in accordance with Politburo Resolution No. 2]" . Th ere were basically three different ways that the military could be involved in economic ac tivities : through national defe nce production enterprises w hich produce military goods as their first priority and the n civilian p rod ucts for the domesti c market; as specialized economic units, such as general corporations and corpora tion s; and through regular army production installations whose operations are designed to improve the living conditions of the troops .227 In March 1989 the Council of Ministers issued Directive 46, a major n ew polic y regarding the military ' s role in eco no mic construction. This directive required that all VPA production and economic building units and defence enterprises conduct their affairs under the independent economic accounting system.228 At the same time , the VPA's General Economic and Technical Department (Tong Cue Kinh Te va Ky Thuat) was renamed National Defence Industry and General Technology Department (Tong Cue Cong Nghiep Quae Phong va Kinh Te) . As a result of the March 1989 decision , nine major VPA economic building units were converted into co rporatio ns and general co rp orations and subject to th e same sta te laws as civilian ent erprises. 229 In other words , they were given legal status and were now able to open bank accounts (including foreign currency accounts). to form legal associations, or enter into joint ventures with Vietnamese or foreign partners . At the end of 1989 more army units engaged in economic activities were transformed into corporations , general corporations or other types of enterprises.230 The army newspaper summed up the results of five years of economic activity in this way: The results obtained by th e army units excl usively engaging in production and economi c building during the five years from 1986 to 1990 were still modest but already encouraging. They built a zone devoted to the excl usive planting of new rubber trees on 1,872 hec tares, thus increasing the rubber area to 4,736

The Vietnam People 's Army Under D6i M6i

53

hectares, including 1,000 hectares for trading purposes, and produced 400 tonnes of dried lat ex in 1990. They se t up a forestry zone in the Long Xuyen quadrangle; planted 2,000 hectares of new cajuput (a plant which produces aromatic oil]; and dug thirty-eight km of fresh -water canals in th e Plains of Reeds. They built sea dikes for land recla mation , opened virgin lands , and built for the country valuable new economic zo nes such as Con Thoi jin th e 3rd Military Region) and Due Co and Play Can lin the Central Highlands). They grew I ,200 hectares of coffee , 200 of which have become productive . They efficie ntly participated in the construction of major key projects of the state such as the Hoa Binh and Dray H'linh hydroelectric power plants , the Lao Cao apatite mining area , the Quy Hop tin mining area, the railroad to the Na Duong and Nui Hong coal min es , and the Quanh Ninh coa l mining regio n. They built 400 km of assorted highwa ys and dug I ,000 km of ca nals and ditches , excavating more than 17 million cubic metres of earth for construction purposes in the Mekong River delta. They completed and handed over more than 3 10 ,000 square metres of assorted dwelling houses jmost of th em grade 1- 2 homes). They ext rac ted over I million tonnes of coal , 50 ,000 of which were exported . They caugh t 10,000 tonnes of sea fish and exported 800 tonnes . They repaired 600 seagoing ships of various types !including 105 ships of foreign cou ntries) . The bloc of regu la r arm y units produced 28,000 tonnes of meat on th e hoof and 13,000 ton nes of fish . Each soldier produced 60 kg of gre e n vegetab les annually ' " In 1993 it was reported that 70,000 so ldiers (12 per ce nt of the entire standing army] were employed full-time in various comme rcia l enterprises. 232 Local militia units w e re reported to have set up at least 160 enterprises while the VPA main fo rce had "a lmost 60 o rganization s engaged in economic activities that have been established in the form of general corporations, corporations , and scientifi c and production federations and that have been assigned to more than ZOO primary level enterprises· .m In 1993, the total number of army-run commercial enterprises was put at more than three hundred , ranging fr om construction firms to garme nt factories, hotels and nightclubs , and joint ventures with foreign companies. 2 '14 These military-owned units were involved in maintaining coastal dikes in Con Thoi ; and managing coffee, tea and rubber plantation s in the Central Highlands and eastern Nam Bo , a raw paper plant in Ha Tuyen province, and the Nam Can specialized shrimp breeding area . Military units were also involved in such large-scale projects as the Pha Lai and Vinh Son power projects; the Vung Tau oil and gas exploration zone; the Truong Son north-south highway (from

54

National Defence in Peacetime

Nghe Tinh to Gia Lai-Cong Tum and Dac Lac); Route 279 (from Quang Ninh to Son La and Lai Chau); the road connecting Haiphong with Cat Ba; and various rail lines (such as those linking Minh CamTien An , Mai Pha-Na Duong, Chi Linh-Pha Lai, Quan Trieu-Nui Hong, and Cao Son-Mong Duong) . The most notabl e of these new enterprises was the Truong Son General Construction Corporation. 235 Its main concern was with capital construction, particularly power plants and road and rail repair. But the corporation branched out into such areas as exporting coal and marble, coffee growing, transportation of goods (such as tin and coal). and general support services. 236 The corporation employed 7,000 persons (four-fifths of whom were military personnel) in nineteen enterprises. 237 In 1991 the Truong Son General Construction Corporation was assigned the major responsibility for the north-south power line, the largest project since the construction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In 1992, it was reported that the Truong Son General Construction Co rporation had set itself the goal of increasing its profits from 62 billion dong to 80 billion dong, of which 4.3 billion dong (or 5.4 per ce nt) w ould be remitted to the state budget. The Ministry of National Defence took 30 p er cent of the corporation's 1990 profits. Another interesting example of the military 's involvement in economi c production activities concerns the VPA's Special Operations Branch . In 1992, it was reported to have entered into several joint ve ntures in gemstone mining in Nghe An province .238 At the sa me time, units of the Special Operation Branch were assigned responsibility for protecting the Bim Son Cement Factory and the mining sites, thus combining the "two stra tegic tasks ". Finally, as noted by one report, "army factories, which began to produce consumer goods in the 1980s on a small scale, massively broadened their production in 1991 and 1992".239 Among the consumer items produced by military-operated factories were a variety of electrical and mechanical goods, such as electric fans, 240 lathes, jute polishers, hydraulic presses, bicycle and motor-cycle parts, oil cookers, detonators, electricity metres, and fluorescent lamp bulbs. Other army enterprises assembled television, radio-cassette recorders and computers, ready-made garments or produced paper, cement, buses and heavy trucks. According to Brigadier General Tran Trong Toan, deputy director of the Defence Ministry 's Economic Affairs Department, the army's commercial activities netted US$25 million in 1990, and was expected to jump from US$79 million in 1922 to US$111 million in 1993. 241

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Modernization

Soviet military aid to Vietnam included relatively modern weapons systems and equipment (for example, long-range artillery , battle tanks , radar , surface-to-air missiles, and jet aircraft). This produced an imbalance in the VPA 's force structure and posed dilemmas for military planners. As noted by a senior military official , We cannot demand that our army be provided with any modern types of weapons and equipment , nor can we use the weapons and equipment on hand in the way that others normally do . We cannot build our tactics to fight the enemy on the basis of what will be obtained in the distant future. "'

Part of the solution, as noted above , lay in the graduaJ modernization of Vietnam's own national defence industry in line with th e development of the national economy. Until such time , Vietnam had to continue to produce traditional or rudimentary weapons, such as mines, spikes, grenades and booby traps . "The National Defence Tasks and Guidelines, 1991-95" set the following as intermediate priorities: We must improve the manufacture of small arms in the direction of further modernization, produce necessary spare parts and materials required for the maintenance of weapons and equipment in tropical and seaside regions, and start building some factories to tum out products of urgent need '"

But Vietnam could not allow the imperatives of modernization to dictate its military strategy . The solution was to combine Vietnam 's own doctrine of people 's war with modern weapons. According to General Doan Khue , "Facts have shown that, to counter a modern enemy, there must not necessarily be aJI the modern weapons and technical equipment• .u.. Or, in the view of a military commentator. "our all people national defence system should aJso constantly enhance its modernity in its own way ": Our traditional viewpoint is that the adversary 's modem weapons and means do not necessarily have to be countered with equaUy modem hardware . Moreover , we are in no condition to do so. However , we do not adhere to the simplistic concept that antimissile missiles could be shot down with rifles. Our army and people are experienced in modernizing weapons and technical equipment in their own way . On the one band, we must bring into full play the effectiveness of the weapons and means capable of countering the adversary's more modem weapons and means, using them in a combined manner to neutralize and destroy

56

National Defence in Peacetime

th e agg ressor's modern weapons in diverse conditions. On the oth er hand , we must concentrate our resou rces on improving, prod ucing , or purchasi ng new weapo ns and means fully capable of countering and destroying the adve rsary's most modern and dangerou s means. Th e essence of thi s pa th is to combine "moderni zing" soldiers' and citize ns' standard of using weapons and technica l equipment wi th the selective moderni zation of the weapo ns and mea ns themselves 2 " In th e aftermath of th e Gulf W ar, elements of Vietnam 's military establishme nt began to press forward their a rgume nts that tlie time had com e to begin modernizing .246 According to the main proponent of this view, VPA Chief of Staff General Dao Dinh Luyen , We are just now developing (our capabilities) . But we also aim at producing not only munitions but also weapons to arm the three services - we have regular forces , reserve forces, local forces and guerrilla or defence units. We have also obtained modern technology in order to improve, perhaps, in defe nce industries. Electronics is one example (which we must develop step-by-step , gradually) ...247 General Luyen also advocated "if n eed be " purchasing weapons systems from other countries to make up for areas of technological deficiency . Of course, this would be constrained by the shortage of funds , but in General Luyen 's view , "Towards th e e nd of this century we shall have achieved the set target: that is , to have a regular and modern armed for ces". For Vietnam 's military moderni zers to succeed in attaining their targe t, three conditions would appear necessary: the modernizers would have to be promoted to the highest positions within the VP A, the VPA would have to enhance its influence within the political system in gen eral and the party apparatus in particular , and Vietnam would have established new military relations with countries capable of assisting its mode rni zation programme .

The Military and the Political System In 1989, Vietnam was shaken by the disintegration of communist ru le in Easte rn Europe. In August , for example, VCP leaders reacted c ritically and negatively to the Solidarity Movement in Poland . Whe n the Movement took over the government, Vietnam denounced the event as a 'counter-revolutionary coup d 'etat" . At hom e, Vietnam moved to silence the advocates of pluralism and

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multi-party democracy. Vietnam 's leaders were also fearful of calls to depoliticize the military .248 In reacting to events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe , Vietnam 's political elites fell back on ideological orthodoxy. Th e VCP Central Committee rejected political pluralism at the Sixth Plenum held on 20-29 March 1989, and condemned imperialism for undermining the socialist bloc at the Seventh Plenum (15-24 August 1989). The army strongly endorsed the resolutions of both plenums. Fo r example, Senior General Le Due Anh argued: Pursuing socialism and Marxism-Leninism , firmly grasping the dictatorship of the proletariat and intensifying party lead ership are the renovation principles set forth by the party Central Committee 's Sixth and Seventh Plenums which must be under· stood from the viewpoint of renovation and must be aimed at no other targets than the national independence, freedom , and happiness of the people.249 The upheavals in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the challenges to ideological orthodoxy that they provoked in Vietnam , served to reinforce party-army relations. The party 's statutes were amended and the state constitution was c hanged to redefine the military's political role and the party' s control over the military. In brief, the VPA was charged with defending Vietnam's socialist one· party political system. Top military leaders not only endorsed the party's line , but a lso advocated firmer efforts to oppose the strategy of peaceful evoluti on . Le Due Anh , for example , was quoted as saying , "Vietnam's army could not remain divorced from politics and must make greater efforts to promote national renewal ". In his view , "the army cou ld not remain isolated from the country's political problems at a time when Vietnamese socialism was under attack" .250 To take anoth er example, the army newspaper editorialized: The imperialist forces ' present scheme - which they hope will work - lies in their attempts to carry out a ' peaceful evol ution" aimed at restoring imperialism in those parts of the world where the socialist system has already been established .... Western countries are using pluralism and the multiparty system - an attribute of bourgeois democracy - as a deadly political weapon to discredit the communist party and then eliminate the latter's leading role, and to eventually deliver power into the hands of anti-socialist forces ... .

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National Defence in Peacetime Thus , through "political pluralism " the imperialist forces have tri ed by all means to gradually change the political nature of the socialist system . They regard this political manoeuvre as the most important spearhead , beca use in their belief, if they can change a politica l system then they can c hange everything .. .. The imperialists have therefore chosen the tactic of "silk worms eating mulberry leaves" to begin by degenerating one Eastern European socialist country into a moderat e capitalist country and then advancing towards degenerating other Eastern European countries. 25 1

The army firmly condemned the notion that it should be "depoliticized". 252 One military writer argued , "there has appeared the 'theory' about the 'non-party' character of the army as a complement to political pluralism". He continued: The class character of the socialist state and army inevitably requires the permanent and undivided leadership of the communist party in all fields , political , ideological and organizational. Without the communist party 's leadership , there can be no socialist democracy and state nor a new-type army of the working class. Political realities in the world over the past few months show that to persist in the socialist path , it is indispensable to promote and consolidate the leadership of the communist party. To deny that leadership means to replace it by another leadership and to follow another path. Realities in Vietnamese history have also demonstrated that the party leadership, the people ' s contribution and the state management of the army are essentially unified in the same system . That unity has become a valuable tradition that cannot be broken by force, for it is the sum total of a long revolution and revolutionary war during which millions have laid down their lives. In th e new stage, the Vietnamese army must be better than ever before to carry out Uncle Ho's teachings, namely , to be loyal to the party, loyal to the co untry and loyal to the people. In other words, it must unconditionally submit to the party leadership, hold high Marxism-Leninism and be ready to fight and make sacrifices for the independence and freedom of the fatherland and for the success of socialism.253

In the lead up to the Seventh Party Congress (November 1990early April 1991), basic-level party organizations in the military flexed their political muscles and suggested various changes in the

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national defence and security section of the party's draft congress documents. Indeed, a good illustration of the military 's political role in Vietnamese society can be provided by the extracts of some of these discussions. They were grass-roots affairs which reviewed draft documents to be submitted to the Seventh Congress: - The party chapter members expressed concern that th e chapter on national defence [in the draft Platform on Socialist Construction in the Transitional Period) did not say anything on the orientations for building the armed forces, "thus leaving everyone with the impression that the armed forces have been on the downgrade and national defence has been deprived of its significance ". Report on discussions held by party chapters in the Mobilization and Organization Department of the VPA General Staff. 25" - The first question is as follows: Should national defence, security and foreign policy be included in the same chapter? There are two different views here ... Meanwhile , not a single word of Chapters two and three have been used to define the strategic objective of defending the fatherland .. .. One of the issues arousing interest and igniting debate among many people is "the quality of troops". Summary of new ideas contributed to the issue of national defence and the army raised in the party's draft platform. 255 - Many people suggested that Chapter four on national defen ce and foreign policy should present more clearly the viewpoints on, and guidelines for, contents of building the people 's army into a regular modern army .... Chapter four should be divided into two chapters: one on national defence and the other on foreign policy. Summary of views of basic party organizations in Military Region 7.256 - In assessing the causes thereof [of the current socio-economic crisis). th e draft report says that we are the main cause. To say this is evasive and vague , and the leading role of the party and the state has not been expounded . We should say that the main causes are that our party and state have made serious mistakes and had serious shortcomings .. .. Statement by Lt. Col. Ha Trang Truy , deputy chief political officer of Sao Vang Infantry Divisional Group .257

The grass-roots meetings were followed by the first round congresses of party organizations in the military. These were organized at central, regional and provincial levels; within the services and branches of the VP A and Ministry of Defence; at military command and corps levels; and in various military academies and research institutes. These congresses serve to illustrate the closeness of party-

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army ties and the army's role in the political process. Each firstround congress selected delegates to attend the national all army party congress. After the conclusion of the first-round congresses, the Fifth All Army Party Organi zation Congress was convened on 23-27 April 1991. It was attended by 324 delegates representing all party organizations in the military. 258 Three draft party documents were discussed: "Platform for Socialist Construction in the Transitional Period", the "Strategy for Socio-Economic Stabilization and Development Up to the Year 2000" and the Central Committee's "Political Report". Calls for a restructuring of Chapter Four of the party's platform dealing with national defence and security were adopted .259 In the end , the Congress reached "high agreement on the main contents, standpoints, and major principles in the draft [party] documents" .260 The all army congress called on the military to have "absolute faith" in the leadership of the Vietnam Communist Party and to become an "active arm" of its policies. The Congress also reaffirmed the VPA's determination to "defend the party and the socialist regime" in the face of complex world developments and attacks from "hostile forces", both within and outside Vietnam.261 At the conclusion of the Congress, fifty-eight official (and five alternate) delegates were chosen to attend the Seventh National Party Congress.262 The military, therefore, represented 4.9 per cent of the 1,176 delegates to the Congress. 263 It was at the Seventh National Party Congress that the declining military representation on the VCP Central Committee was reversed for the first time since 1960. Fifteen members of the VPA were elected to the 146-member Central Committee (a list of these members may be found in Appendix q , or 10.2 per cent (an increase from 7 per cent at the previous national congress held in 1986). 264 An analysis of personnel changes in military representation brought about by the Seventh Party Congress reveals that none of the regional military commanders who were on the previous Central Committee were reappointed. This led David Elliott to conclude that "there are no entrenched regional military networks centred around an individual , though it does not exclude the possibility that the new regional military commanders represent well-established military interests at the centre". Elliott also noted a shift in military representation away from the Ministry of National Defence and towards the military services (for example, the navy and air force) and the military's own corporate interests. Here , Elliott highlighted

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the appointment of the Director of the General Staff's Rear Service General Department, General Nguyen Trong Xuyen: As any student of military sociology will attest, an increase in the influence of the General Staff signifies a rise in military influence at the expense of broader state control. The rear services, or supply branch, is also a telling indicator because this branch is responsible for seeing that the military gets what it needs from the total goods available in society. It probably has a role in the increasingly active military involvement in the economy, especially through direct or indirect establishment of trading enterprises controlled by the military.265

At the same time that the military's representation was increased, the party statutes were amended to make clear that the military remained subordinate to the party. 266 References to the onecommander system were dropped . Article 28 placed the armed forces under the "absolute, direct control" of the party in all fields, a toughening of the previous formulation which stated that the armed forces were under the party's "direct, centralized , and unified control in all fields ". The 1986 statutes which said that military commanders must "respect and maintain close relations " with loca l party administrations was changed to read that the party "leads and builds" the armed forces, and military units throughout the country are placed under the "leadership of the local party organs in all fields" (see Appendix A) . In a major post-congress development, the VCP Central Committee's Third Plenum (August 1992) restored the system of party committees in the military. According to Quan Doi Nhan Dan, "Renewal and rectification of the army's party committee is aimed at strengthening the absolute and direct leadership of the party over all aspects of the army and at guaranteeing the party 's continuing strict control over the army" .267 Military members on the party Central Committee also served on its higher executive and administrative organs. The most senior VP A officers were appointed to the Politburo: Secretariat and Central Military Party Commission (CMPC; Dang Uy Quan Su Trung Uong) . Generals Le Due Anh and Doan Khue were elected to the second and fifth positions in the thirteen-member Politburo, marking an elevation in status for the military.268 Anh was also elected to the Secretariat, which had been pared down in size from thirteen to nine members. However, at a party plenum which met in mid-1992 , Le Kha Phieu (Director of the Political General Department) was appointed as an additional representative from the military.269

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Six VPA officers have been identified as members of the CMPC : Le Due Anh (First Deputy Secretary), Doan Khue (Deputy Secretary), Dao Dinh Luyen, Le Kha Phieu, Nguyen Nam Khanh, and Nguyen Trang Xuyen Y" In September 1991 , Luyen and Phieu were appointed , respectively , Chief of the General Staff and head of the Political General Department. The following year Phieu was appointed to the Secretariat and promoted to the rank of Senior Lieutenant General , along with Nguyen Trang Xuyen (head of the Logistics General Department) .211 After the Seventh Party Congress, the role of the military in society was further enhanced by amendments to the state constitution (see Appendix B) . For example, under the terms of Article 12 the VPA for the first time was placed in the same legal position as other state bodies. The military and state were charged collectively with scrupulously implementing and preventing violations of the constitution and laws. Article 44 suggested that the military had been assigned an enlarged role in internal security matters . In a change of wording from the 1980 text, it referred to the VPA as the "backbone" of Vietnam's ' all people's national defence and public security " system .272 The military was also made more responsible to state organs. Article 45 declared, for example, that the armed forces were 'duty bound to defend the socialist regime ". Article 84 granted the National Assembly the power to adopt "special measures to ensure national defence and security" while Article 98 included the VPA among the organizations that could be questioned by the National Assembly. Changes in the party statutes and state constitution appear to be in part a reaction to events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union where the party had lost control over the armed forces . In the case of Vietnam, it would appear that senior party-military officials had agreed to take charge of managing their own house . The military was given undiminished bloc representation in the National Assembly elected in July 1992, amounting to 38 seats (or 9.6 per cent) .273 Among the prominent military deputies in the current National Assembly are Le Due Anh (see below), Doan Khue (Minister of National Defence), Le Kha Phieu (head of the Political General Department), Dam Van Nguy (Commander of Military Region 1), Dao Dinh Luyen (Chief of the General Staff Department), Dang Quan Thuy (Commander of Military Region 2), Nguyen Trang Xuyen (Ministry of National Defence), Phan Thu (head of the National Defence Industry and Economic General Department), and Pham

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Van Tra (Commander of Military Region 3). All are members of the party's Central Committee elected in June 1991. In October 1992, General Le Due Anh (now probably retired from the active list) was elected President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. He and General Doan Khue were also appointed to the newly created National Defence and Security Council. General Dang Quan Thuy was elected one of the three vice-chairmen of the National Assembly's Standing Committee, and appointed head of the National Assembly's National Defence and Security Committee. The importance of the military's political role in Vietnamese society was underscored in October 1993, on the eve of the mid-term party conference scheduled for December (later postponed to late January 1994) . At that time, the Central Military Party Committee held a meeting to consider the Central Committee's draft political report to the mid-term conference. The enlarged meeting was chaired by General Doan Khue and included not only party Central Committee members working in the armed forces , but also leading cadres from the Ministry of National Defence, general departments, research centres and other institutions associated with the VP A. One report indicated that the meeting "set aside one day to discuss the parts dealing with the general evaluation, directions, and duties, including the section on the renovation of the political system, party building work , security, national defence , and the situation and duties in the future" .274 Another account stated that the Central Military Party Committee meeting "called for more efforts to supplement and perfect the party Central Committee 's draft political report" .275 The VPA's current influence on the political system can be judged by the policies adopted when the mid-term party conference meets.

Foreign Military Relations Prior to 1991, Vietnam 's foreign milita~y relations were basically confined to those with the Soviet Union, Indochina , the Eastern European socialist states, Cuba, India , and Indonesia. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe provided virtually all of Vietnam's military equipment, spare parts and training . Vietnam's relations with India and Indonesia involved mainly the exchange of military attaches and high-level delegations. By late 1990, Vietnam's substantive military relations with the USSR had begun to wither away. When its military agreement with

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the Soviet Union expired at the end of 1990 it was not renewed.m The only Soviet military aid and credits made available to Vietnam subsequently were those left unspent from 1990. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991, Russia moved to readjust its military commitments to Vietnam to suit its own means. As Russia could no longer afford to provide military equipment gratis or at concessiona1 rates, it offered to sell what Vietnam needed for hard currency. 277 In May 1992 , formal bilateral military cooperation was brought to an end with the return to Russia of its last military adviser. 278 In the meantime, Russia further reduced its military presence at Cam Ranh Bay. Shore facilities which were no longer needed were returned to the Vietnamese authorities. Russia's policy towards Cam Ranh Bay underwent a reversal during the course of 1992. At the beginning of the year , Moscow requested formal discussions with Hanoi to negotiate a final withdrawal from Cam Ran h. Yet in July , the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev , announced in public after meeting with his Vietnamese counterpart , Nguyen Manh Cam, that "negotiations" on a continued Russian presence had begun. He also noted, "We are not necessarily rushing to leave .. .. New terms for preserving the facility will, of course, be determined" .279 Kozyrev's public statement provoked a flat denial by Foreign Minister Cam, who stated that "[since the collapse of the Soviet Union] we have not met to discuss a new basis for our relationship ... [there is only] an agreement in principle to discuss the issue towards the end of the year [1992]" .280 In October/November 1992 a Russian vice-minister for defence paid an unpublicized visit to Hanoi to initiate discussions on Cam Ranh. 28 1 He proposed that Russia be permitted to maintain a small military presence at the naval base while other areas of Cam Ranh Bay could be opened for commercial activity. Russia also offered to pay an annual rent of US$60 million, with the sum deducted from Vietnam's outstanding debt of $10 billion roubles. The meeting proved inconclusive and both parties agreed to meet in Moscow in mid-December.282 The December talks were aborted as a result of President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Beijing in the middle of that month and press reports that Moscow had agreed to sell arms to China valued at US$1.8 billion, including twenty-four Sukhoi Su-27 fighter aircraft. 283 In the meantime, the status quo prevailed.284 According to Vietnamese military sources, Russia insisted on staying in Cam Ranh until 2004 when the existing agreement would expire. 285

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The new Russian interest in prolonging their stay at Cam Ranh Bay and turning over its fa cilities for commercial use raises difficult questions for Vietnam (see Appendix Dl . On the strategic level . Vietnamese leaders are casting about for a strategy to deal with China . They are concerned ahout Chinese naval modernizati on and provocative actions in th e Gulf of Tonkin and the Spratly Island s. But Vietnamese leaders are reportedly n ot sanguine about the ability of Russia to act as a count erweight to China. Russian publi c statement have been far from reassuring. Vietnam is also anxious to ensure a continued supply of military equipment and spare parts for its armed forces at affordable pri ces. As these forces were originally equipped by the Soviet Union , Ru ssia would be the obvious source . But here , the issue is complicated by Vietnamese indebt edness to Ru ssia and the poor state of its economy . Vietnam ha s limited bargaining power. Its military is dependent on Russian equipment and system s and needs Russian co-operati on if the Vietnam Peopl e 's Army is to be modernized . Moscow has pointed out that continued Russian military co-operation is essential if Vietnam is to maintain and strengthen its armed forces . Vietnam has respond ed by pointing out that any future Russian development as a regional power is tied to access to Cam Ranh . One defence journalist ha s speculated that a compromise agreement is likely in which Moscow retains its military presence through at least partial payment s in new arms and spare parts.28" Between September 1989, when Vietnamese military forces made their formal withdrawal from Cambodia , and the signing of th e Cambodian peace agreement in October 1991 , Vietnam and Cambodia had regularly exchanged military delegations and celebrated their respectiv e founding anniversaries . For example , at the time of th e VPA withdrawal in 1989 , Cambodian Minister of National Defence, General Tie Banh , visited Military Regions 7 and 9 in southern Vietnam . General Nguyen Qu yet, head of the VPA 's General Political Department , also visited Phnom Penh from 4 to 8 July 1990 to attend a conference of th e politica l departments of the two armies. ln March the following year , General Quyet ' s Cambodian counterpart , General Bou Thang , paid a return visit. ln mid-year , Vietnam sent a military delegation led by Senior Lieutenant General Tran Van Quang to attend cere monies in Phnom Penh marking the 40th anniversary of the Cambodian People 's Armed Forces (CPAFI. In J uJy 1991 , a delegation of CP AF' s Propaganda and Training Department visited Vietnam. The last publicly recorded exchange took place in September . on the eve of the peace agreements, when

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a de lega tion representing th e organ iza tion se rv ice of the General Politi ca l Depa rtment paid a wo rk ing visi t to Viet nam . Finally , in Decem ber 1992 Cambod ia n officia ls he ld ceremo nies in Phn om Penh to mark th e 48th fou nd ing a n nive rsa ry of th e Viet nam People's Arm y . In Jun e 199 1, after th e Cam bod ia n fa ct ions had decla red a ceasefire in advan ce of a peace set tl eme nt , Vietn am 's Foreign Mi nister Nguye n Co Thac h gave an in terv iew in w hich he said Vietnam wo uld respect th e d ecision by the Cam bod ian pa rties "to te m porarily stop receiving foreign milita ry aid ". Th ac h also too k note of repo rts th at China 's Foreign Minister had sa id th at m ili tary aid from his country had bee n suspend ed since August 1990: We we lco me tha t sta te me nt. This means that all count ries suppl ying arms to th e Cam bod ian parties have admjtted that the two Ca mbodia n parties have agreed to stop receiving mjlitary aid . Toge th er w ith Laos a nd Thai land , Vi e tnam stands ready to preve nt fore ign co untri es fr om shipping weapons to the Ca mbodia n parties via its territ ory '"

As noted above, elite Vietnam ese un its conti nued to operate in Cambodia aft er the October 199 1 peace ag reemen t. Howeve r , after the deploym ent of UNT AC troops, other than Khmer Rouge claims, there w ere no credible reports that Vie tnam was supplying arm s or oth er military equi p ment to its ally . It wo uld appear that some tim e aft er March 1992, Vietnam withd rew its spec ial fo rces and terminated w hateve r covert military relations hip it had with the government in Phnom Penh . Howeve r , military a ttac hes con tinued to be posted in each other 's capitals. In 1992-93 Vietnam readjusted its relations w ith Can1bodia. In February, it w as reported that VPA Chief of Staff General Dao Dinh Luye n visited th e Central Highlands to ensure tha t border troops w ere prepared in case the Khmer Rouge resumed hostilities against Vi e tn a m . ~ As pre-election violence and a rmed clashes erupted in th e Cambodian countryside, Vietnam took steps to seal its border with Cambodia , even p reve nting the return to Vietnam of ethnic Vietnam ese residents . In June , Vietnam turned a cold shoulder to Prince Chakrapong and his follow ers wh en th ey fle d to Vietnam after their a ttempted secessionist movement in Cambodia 's eastern prov inces failed . After the formation of the Kingdom of Cambodia there have been no reports that consideration is being given to restoring military contac ts or military co-operation betw een Cambodia and Vietnam . 2 8

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Indeed , Cambodia is no longer an ally of Vietnam but a neutral and non-aligned state. Potential sources of friction between them include border demarcation disputes , conflicting maritime territorial claims and the status of ethnic Vietnamese resident in Cambodia . Vietnam and Laos , in contrast , have continu ed to mainta in close political and military relations since the announced withdrawal of Vietnamese units in late 1988. Lao leaders continue to assert that their 1977 treaty with Vi etnam is still operative. In May 1993, for example , the Lao Vice- Foreign Mini ster stated in a n interview that, "The Lao-Vietnam treaty is still val id . W e consider it vital for us too. It is vital in term s of history a nd neighbourliness a nd cooperati on ".289 In late March and early April 1993 th e Lao Prim e Minister Kh a mtai Siphandon visited Vietnam . In Nove mber, Vietna mese Preside nt Le Due Anh was accorded a red carpet welcome in Laos. Vie tna m provides Laos with US$4.1 million in aid , one-q ua rter of w hi ch is non-refundable and the re mai ning, int eres t free. 290 Laos and Vietnam have continued to maintain milita ry rela tions after the departure of VPA unit s. Both continue to exc hange military attaches . Each year , in October, one side hosts a visit by the oth er side 's General Politi cal Depa rtme nt. 29 1 Othe r milita ry exc hanges include a friend ship v isit by a hi gh-leve l Lao milita ry delegati on led by Major Gene ral Choummali Sai-gnason , th en First Deput y Mini ster of National Defence (Septembe r 1989) a nd a working visit by a delegation from th e Lao People's Arm y Info rmation a nd Training Department (August 1991 ). The Lao Minister of National Defence, Choummali Sai-gnason , accompani ed hi s Prime Mini ster to Vi etnam in 1993. At the m ost recent visit by a VPA General Political Department delegation, Lao radio reported : They th en discussed th e direction an d pla n of co-operati on a nd mutual assistance in th e sp here of pa rt y and political wor k in the ranks of th e a rmi es in th e nex t s tage w ith a view to e na bling the army of eac h co untry to s uccessfully fulfi ll its duties a nd fruitfully consolida te a nd stre ngth en the spec ial solida rity a nd all-round cooperati on betwee n th e two co untri es a nd two armies of Laos and Vietnam .'92

The process of disintegration among the socialist states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union provoked debate in Vietnam about future national security policy. Although priority was assigned to the normalization of relations with China, the party leadership was divided about whether or not to lean towards China militarily . One group, centred in the VP A, advocated going beyond m e re 293 normalization and re-establishing formal military-security ties . The

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majority view within the VCP was that Vietnam should pursue an omni-directional foreign policy and seek good relations with all countries as the best guarantee of its security. In September 1990, in a major breakthrough, Chinese and Vietnamese leaders held a secret summit in Chengdu, in southern China. Reportedly, China offered to replace the entire Soviet aid programme to Vietnam with one of its own in return for which Vietnam would agree to "co-ordinate" its foreign policy and develop closer political ties with China. 294 The Chinese offer provoked heated dispute within the VCP which was not resolved until the Seventh National Party Congress in June 1991. The Congress jettisoned Politburo member and Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, the main opponent of the military's pro-China line. After the Seventh Party Congress, General Le Due Anh, secondranking Politburo member and then Minister for National Defence, visited China to press for normalization. Agreement was reached and in November 1991 a summit was held in Beijing at which twelve years of estrangement were brought to an end. It was at this summit, or immediately after, that Vietnam pressed China to expand the relationship to include security guarantees or a form of military alliance. China rebuffed these approaches, stating that China and Vietnam could be "comrades but not allies" . Following the normalization of party and state relations, the VPA and the Chinese PLA (People's Liberation Army) have taken determined steps to restore relations . In February-March 1992, for example, then Major General Vu Xuan Vinh, head of the VPA's External Relations Department, went to China to discuss "the restoration and development of friendship between the armed forces of the two countries" . General Vinh held discussions with Senior Lieutenant General Chi Haotian, the PLA's Chief of the General Staff. A return visit by Major General Fu Jiaping, head of the PLA's Foreign Affairs Bureau, took place in May. The question of Chinese arms sales to Vietnam may have been discussed at this time. 295 This was followed by the exchange visits of the defence ministers. General Doan Khue visited Beijing in December, where he met not only his counterpart but CCP (Chinese Communist Party) Secretary General Jiang Zemin. During his visit, General Khue was careful to thank his hosts for their past "precious assistance and support", a formulation which suggested that Vietnam was seeking to acquire Chinese arms and equipment. General Khue added that he hoped that existing problems (territorial disputes) would not prevent the strengthening of bilateral relations and that such differences should be solved through negotiations. 296

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China 's Defence Minister , Senior Lieutenant General Chi Haotian , reciprocated with a nine-day visit to Vietnam in May 1993. General Chi visited the command staffs in Military Regions 5 (in the centre) and 7 (south) . A joint statement issued at the end of his visit stated , 'friendly relations between the two countries are historic and should be developed ". This suggested to one analyst "that China may be about to fill the arms and equipment gap left by the ending of Soviet military assistance to Vietnam ".297 Subsequently , General Yu Yongbo , director of the PLA 's Genera] Political Department , held talks in Hanoi with his counterpart , General Le Kha Phieu . on mutual co-operation between th e two armies , including political work . When General Yu met party chief Do Muoi , the latter stressed that the ' armies and the people of Vietnam and China are uniting in national defen ce and construction ... ." 298 China is not th e onl y former adversary with whom Vietnam ha s opened military relations. In 1990 , a year before the Paris peace agreements on Cambodia were adopted , Thailand and Vietnam began th e process of opening direct contacts betw een their military establishments. In March General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh , then Commander-in -Chi ef of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) and Supreme Commander of th e Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) paid a one-day visit to Hanoi for discussions with General Doan Khu e and Gene ral Tran Van Quang . both of whom w ere th en Deput y Ministers for National Defence . Ge ne ral Chavalit was also received by Le Due Anh , then Minister for National Defe nce , and Do Muoi , Secretary General of th e VCP .''~'~ In May , General Doan Khue paid a return visit to Ba ngkok where he held discussions on Cambodia with General Chava lit and other senior RTAF officers. The two generals agreed ' to exc hange military attaches , step up exchanges of commanding office rs and regularly share military information ' .In June of th e following year , General Sunthon Khongsomphong , Supreme Commander of the Thai Armed Forces and chairman of the National Peacekeeping Council, visited Vietnam at the invitation of General Doan Khue . During the course of the visit , General Sunthon held discussions with Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach which touched upon a broad range of issues , including Cambodia , piracy , overlapping territorial claims, the release of Thai fishermen imprisoned in Vietnam and the exchange of military attaches . General Sunthon reportedly proposed joint naval exercises to combat piracy and to prevent incidents at sea. He also proposed a joint commission to explore and develop resources in areas where the tw o sides had

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overlapping te rritorial claims in th e Gulf of Thai land .)()' In August . a delega tion from the Thai Nati onal Defen ce College was hosted by the VPA 's Military Ins titute .3"z In January 1992, Ge neral Suc hinda Kraprayoon , Commande r-in· Chief of th e Roya l Thai Army , paid a three-day visit to Hanoi, during whic h he held separate discussions with Senior Lieutenant General Dao Dinh Luye n, VPA Chief of the Ge neral Staff. Defence Minister Doa n Khue, Prime Ministe r Vo Van Kiet . a nd President Le Due Anh .J0.1 Ge neral Suchi nda 's visi t was preceded by cont roversial public remarks that he still regarded Vietnam as a threat to Thailand and that he wanted to visit Cam Ranh Bay .Jno& When the Vietnamese declined his request, General Suchinda responded by repeatedly inviting Vietnamese offi cials to visit Thailand where they would be free to go anywhere, including Thailand 's sensi ti ve border areas. VPA officials we re also inv ited to atte nd the ann ual Thai-U.S. Cobra Gold joint exercises as observers . 105 General Suchinda ra ised a wide range of issues during his visit: assistance in opening a branc h of th e Thai Military Bank. housing for a Thai military attache , the establishme nt of a joint fishing venture to ope rate in d isputed waters. the leasing of Cam Ranh Bay, and the sensitive issue of alleged Vietnamese covert support for refugees living in northeastern T haila nd . and alleged Thai support for right -wing anti -communist Vietnamese exi les. With respect to the latt er, Suchinda invited VPA officials to visit Thailand and inspect whichever area th ey chose to dispe l susp icions .General Suchinda furt her proposed tha t a hot-line be set up between Hanoi and Bangkok to exchange information a nd to settle disputes when they arose. Fi nall y, perhaps the most startling proposal was Suchinda's suggestion th at Thailand and Vietnam should exchange military equipment. He proposed that Thailand supply parts from its Chinese T- 69 tanks in exchange for F-5 jet parts which Vietnam had captured in 1975 and still held in storage >l0 7 Vietnam politely declined the request to attend the Cobra Gold exercise and requested that the Thai navy refrain from involving itself in the fishing dispute . Vietnam also expressed an interest in learning more about the role of the Thai army in rural developme nt. The demise of Suchinda's military government did not disturb the development of Thai- Vietnam military relations . By early 1993, military attaches had been exchanged .3011 In January , General Wimon Wongwanich, commander of the RTA , went to Hanoi on a two-day visit to get acquainted with General Dao Dinh Luyen , VPA Chief

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of Staff. He was also received by Defence Minister Doan Khue , Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam, and Deputy Prime Minister Phan Van Khai. The two sides discussed Cambodia and the possibilities of forging a "new military friendship ". General Wiman also affirmed that the Thai Government was not supporting any anti-Vietnamese resistance group. 309 In May, General Luyen led a military delegation, comprising eight generals including the Deputy Chief of Staff and the deputy commanders for the navy and air force, on a return visit to Thailand. General Luyen expressed interest in the Thai system of military education and raised the possibility of assistance from Thailand in this area.310 Thailand responded affirmatively, and in August a joint delegation of the National Defence Study Institute and the National Defence College paid a five-day visit to Hanoi.311 Thailand then hosted in November a visit by a delegation from Vietnamese military institutes and colleges, led by Lieutenant General Nguyen The Bon, VPA Deputy Chief of Staff. The Vietnamese visited the National Defence Study Institute and service institutes for the army, navy and air force .312 Vietnam and France have quitely developed military ties. In January 1992, a delegation from the French National Assembly's National Defence Commission visited Hanoi.313 It held discussions with its counterpart, the External Relations Committee, had working sessions with General Tran Van Quang, Deputy Minister of National Defence, and General Hoang Minh Thao, director of the Institute of Military Strategy. In November, during the goodwill visit to Haiphong by the French frigate, Nivose, it was revealed that France had posted a military attache to Hanoi.314 According to a Vietnamese official, the French frigate 's visit was designed to show that Vietnam had diversified its military relations on the eve of the visit to Hanoi of Chinese Premier Li Peng.315 In August 1993, two Royal Malaysian Navy patrol craft paid a three-day port visit to Ho Chi Minh City, the first visit of its kind. 316 In addition to the newly established military relations with China, Thailand, France, and Malaysia , Vietnam has long-standing military ties with India and Indonesia. These have mainly been confined to the exchange of defence attaches, high-level military delegations and ministerial-level visits . In the case of India, Vietnam has twice hosted goodwill visits by the Indian navy , once in 1983 and again in 1988. India and Vietnam have a long established programme of exchanges at staff college level between the National Defence College of India and Vietnam 's Higher Military Institute. Vietnam is presently giving

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consideration to posting its officers to India for English language train in g. :m Throughout the 1980s, Indonesian - Vietnamese military relations took place at eith er chief of staff or ministerial level. In October 1991, the first contact at staff college level was initiated with the visit to Hanoi by a delegation from the Indones ian military academy , AKABRI, led by its deputy principal. Indonesian- Vi etnamese military relation s appear to have entered a new phase as a result of the visit of the Assistant Commanderin-Chief of the Indonesian armed forces , Lieutenant General Teddy Rusdy, to Vietnam in late 1991. 318 General Rusdy and his group paid a working visit to the VPA 's National Defence Industry and Technology General Department. After this visit , the Indonesian defen ce attache in Hanoi revealed that Vietnam had requested tec hnica l assistance from Indonesia , particularly specialist help in the repai r and maintenance of military equipment. m lndonesia agreed to conduct a detail ed study of the matter . Vietnam also sought Indonesian involvement in its development programmes in the mining sector. Indonesia 's Department of Defence and Security and a private company a re reportedly investigating joint investment in Vietnam 's coa l sector . In 1993, the defence ministers of Indonesia and Vietnam paid reciprocal visits. General Murdani visited Hanoi in February , while Doan Khue visited Jakarta in June. After high-level discussions , which included separate meetings with Indonesia 's President, Vice President and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Khue paid a working visit to Surabaya. Khue 's interest in the activities of the naval shipbuilding company there indicates that Vietnam is investigating the possibilities of enlisting foreign partners in ship construction in Vietnam. 320 It would appear that Vietnam has discreetly entered the arms market. In 1992, for example, Vietnam purchased nine Aero L-39 Albatross jet trainers from the Czech and Slovak Republics. 321 For the moment, Vietnam must pick and choose carefully. It has not lost entirely access to its traditional arms suppliers in the former Soviet Union (Russia and Ukraine) and Eastern Europe; it only lacks the hard currency to make major purchases. In an effort to maintain, refurbish and extend the life of existing stockpiles, Vietnam has approached Indonesia for technical assistance. The recent opening of diplomatic relations with Israel raises the possibility that assistance may be sought from this quarter in upgrading Soviet/Russian platforms and systems. Vietnam appears to be testing

The Vietnam People 's Army Under Doi M6i

73

the waters for new suppliers. China, Thailand, India and Indonesia are potential sources of spare parts and equipment. For the foreseeable future , however, the VPA will remain a poor man's army capable only of defending Vietnam's territorial integrity and maintaining internal security but little else . The VPA is unable to project significant power in a regional setting in order to wield political influence. It is likely, therefore , that Vietnam will resort to diplomacy and economics to achieve national goals.

Appendices

Appendix A

THE AMENDED PARTY STATUTES CHAPTER 6 Party Organizations in the Vietnam People's Army and the Vietnam People's Public Security Force ARTICLE 28 The VPA and the Vietnam People's Public Security Force are placed under the absolute, direct leadership of the party in all respects, according to a regulation established by the Party Central Committee. The party leads and builds the VPA and the Vietnam People's Public Security Force to make them firm and strong politically, ideologically and organizationally. They are absolutely loyal to the fatherland , whole-heartedly serve the people, act as a core force, together with people throughout the country to firmly defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland, maintain political security and order and safety and participate in national construction. Organs of party committees, in the framework of their functions, help party committees supervise and control the party building task and mass mobilization work in the VPA and the Vietnam People's Public Security Force . ARTICLE 29 Party organizations in the VP A are organized vertically and operate according to the party's platform and rules as well as other resolutions of the Party Central Committee.

78

Appendices

The Military Commission of the Party Central Committee is appointed by the Party Central Committee and comprises a number of Party Central Committee me mbers working in and outside the army . The Military Commission of the Party Central Committee is placed unde r the leaders hip of th e Party Central Committee , with th e Political Bureau and Secretariat providing permanent leadershlp. The commission is respon sibl e for he lping th e Party Central Committee with issues concerning national defence and military lines and tasks, as well as for providing leadership over the work of the entire army in all fi elds. The executive committee of party organizations at all levels is elected by the party organization congress for each level and is responsible for providing co mpre hensive leadership over subordinate units . In special cases, it is appointed by the higher party comm ittee echelon , as specified by the Party Central Committee. The Political General Department is in c harge of party-related work and political tasks to be ca rried out in the entire army _ It operates under the leade rship of th e Secre tariat and the permanent leadership of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee. At each level, there are political organs and political cadres in charge of the party 's ideological and organizational tasks , under the direct leadership of the party committee at that leve l and under the guidance of a higher political organ. ARTICLE 30 Party organizations at local military organs and local army units are placed under the leadership of local party committee echelons in all fields . At the same time , they are responsible for implementing higher military commissions ' resolutions on all-people national defence and local military tasks. Higher political organs are to coordinate with local party committee echelons in providing guidance over the implementation of party-building and mass mobilization work to be carried out by the local armed forces. ARTICLE 31 Party organizations in the Vietnam People's Public Security Force are determined by the Party Central Committee . SouRcE: "Rules of the Vietnam Communist Party Adopted by the Seventh National Congress of Party Delegates on 27th June 1991 ". Tap Chi Cong San . July 1991.

Appendix B

THE ARMY AND THE 1992 AMENDED STATE CONSTITUTION CHAPTER 4

ARTICLE 44 The defence of the Vietnamese socialist homeland and the maintenance of national security is a cause of the entire people. The State consolidates and strengthens the system of defence by the entire people and of people's security, the core role being played by the people's armed forces; brings into play the combined strength of the nation to firmly safeguard the homeland. State offices, economic or social organizations and all citizens are duty-bound to discharge their obligations with respect to defence and security as provided by the law. ARTICLE 45 The people's armed forces owe absolute loyalty to the homeland and the people, have the duty to be prepared to defend the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the homeland, national security and social order and safety, to defend the socialist regime and the gains of the revolution, and to join the entire people in building the country. ARTICLE 46 The State builds up a regular, combat-trained and gradually modernized people's revolutionary army, reserve forces and powerful local militia forces on the basis of the combination of construction

80

Appendica

with defence, of the strengt h of the people 's armed forces with that of the entire people and of the strength of the tradition of national unity against foreign aggression with that of the socialist regime. ARTICLE 47

The State is to build up regular , well -trained gradually modernized people's revolutionary security forces , relying on the people and serving as a core for the people ' movement to defend national security and social order and safety. ensure political stability and citizen 's right to freedom and democracy , protect people 's lives and property and th socialist property, and prevent and fight against the various kinds of crimes. ARTICLE 48

The State fosters the people 's patriotism and revolutionary heroism , en ures people 's education in defence and sec urity . enforces compulsory military service, and an appropriate policy with regard to soldiers' fam.ili s, build up the defence industry , provides equipment to the armed forces , combines national defence with economic development and vice versa , ensures the material and moral conditions of life of officers and soldiers, defence workers and employees, build powerful p ople 's armed forces and constantly strengthens the ability to defend the country. SouRcE: Hien Phap Nuoc

Cor~g Hoa Xa Hoi Chu Nghia Vret Nam J992!Hanoi : Nha Xuat Ban Phap Ly va Nha Xual Ban Su Thai , 19921. pp. 28-30.

Appendix C

MILITARY REPRESENTATION ON THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE (N =15/146, or 10.3 per cent)* Le Due Anh, General, member of the Politburo, President Nguyen Thoi Bung, Lt. Gen., Deputy Chief of the General Staff Nguyen Chon, Col.-Gen ., Deputy Chief of the General Staff Nguyen De, Lt. Gen., Commander MR9 Nguyen Nam Khanh, Col.-Gen., Deputy Chief of the General Political Department Doan Khue, General, Minister of National Defence, Chief of the General Staff, member of the Politburo Dao Dinh Luyen, Col. Gen., Vice Minister of National Defence Pham Thanh Ngan, Maj. Gen., Commander of the Air Force Dam Van Nguy, Lt. Gen., Commander MRl Le Kha Phieu, Lt. Gen., Deputy Chief of the General Political Department Phan Thu, Lt. Gen ., Chief of the General Department for Defence Industry and Economy Dang Quan Thuy, Lt. Gen., Commander MRZ Pham Van Tra, Lt ., Gen., Commander of MR3 Bui Thanh Van, Lt. Gen., Commander MR7 Nguyen Trong Xuyen, Lt. Gen., Vice Minister of National Defence

82

Appendices

Le Minh Huong , Maj . Gen. , Vice Minister of the Interior Pharn Tam Long , Lt. Gen ., Vice Minister of the Interior Bui Thien Ngo , Lt . Gen .. Vice Minister of the Interior

•1n January 1994, the Central Committee was expanded by the inclusion of an additional twenty members. Five incumbents were retired. Among the new appointees were Major Generals Dao Trong Lich , Commander MR2 , and Nguyen The Tri , Commander MR3. Military representation on the Central Committee remained essentially the same (10 .6 per cent) . At the same time , Central Committee member Lieutenant General Le Kha Phieu was promoted to full membership on the Politburo. SouRcE: "The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam", Vietnam Courier, no. 21 Uuly 1991). p. 18.

Appendix D

VIETNAMESE POLICY ON CAM RANH BAY Text of interview between Le Mai, Deputy Foreign Minister, and Harish Mehta, Business Times (Singapore), 10 March 1993. Q: At a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Manila last year, the foreign ministers of Russia and Vietnam reportedly held talks on leasing the military facilities at Cam Ranh Bay to the Russian Navy. Can you elaborate on the outcome of the talks?

A: There was a meeting between the Russian and Vietnamese foreign ministers, but there was nothing about an agreement or talks or negotiations about Cam Ranh. Cam Ranh has always been a Vietnamese military base. In the past, we gave some facilities to the Soviet naval fleet there. Since then, the situation has changed. The role of military bases all over the world is not as important as in the past. So , that is not much of a priority for discussions between Russia and Vietnam, or between Vietnam and other countries. Q: But, is the Russian Navy currently leasing the military facilities at the military base at Cam Ranh Bay? Reportedly, the Russian military presence at present has been reduced. A: We are giving them some facilities, which they are using occasionally.

84

Appendices

Q : A top Vietnamese leader was quoted in the press as saying that Vietnam would be willing to offer the military facilities at Cam Ranh Bay to Western countries . Is the offer still open?

A: That appears to be a misquotation . Vietnam 's ideas are that it would be best not to have any foreign country using any military base. Q: Are you saying that it is Vietnam's policy not to have any foreign bases on its soil? A: Yes, that is our very strict position . We don't want to have any foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil. It is best for small countries like ours not to have foreign military bases on our soil. That is why Cam Ranh has always been a Vietnamese base , and we are maintaining our sovereignty over that base. But, I think the best thing to do is turn Cam Ranh into commercial use for economic development. Q: Has Vietnam developed some ideas about the conversion of Cam Ranh military base for commercial use? A: Of course, we are talking about that. But you see , it takes some time. For instance , we have several ports such as Danang and Vung Tau, but we do not have enough money to put into these commercial ports.

NOTES 1. There is a paucity of scholarly writing on the VPA in the post-

2.

3. 4.

5.

1986 period. The most recent book is dated that year . See Douglas Pike , PA VN: People's Anny of Vietnam (London: Brassey 's Defence Publishers , 1986). The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) has published four other studies: 1. Andre Sauvageot , "Viet nam , Defence Expenditure and Threat Perception: Defending Communist Indochina ", in Defence Spending in Southeast Asia, edited by Chin Kin Wah (Singapore : ISEAS, 1987). pp . 281-304; Vo Nh an Tri , "The Combination of Economic Construction wit h Nat ional Defence ", and Nayan Chanda , "Defence and Development in Vietnam" , in Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia , edited by 1. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun Cheong (Singapore: ISE AS , 1988). pp. 322-39, and 340-54 respectively; and Hollis Hebel, "The Vietnamese Military 's Changing Role ", in Southeast Asian Affairs 1993, edited by Dalj it Singh (Singapore: ISEAS, 1993). pp. 364- 72 . For an official history , see Ban Nghien Cuu Lich Su Quan Doi Thuoc Tong Cue Chinh Tri , Lich Su Quan Doi Nhan Dan VietNam (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 1977). which covers the period from the Nghe Tinh Soviet movem ent in 1930 to the capture of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. See also Greg Lockhart , A Nation in Arms: Th e Origins of the People's Army of Vietnam (Sydney : Allen and Unwin , 1989). International Institute for Strategic Studies, Th e Military Balance 1987-1988, pp . 14 , 33 , 145 , 156, and 175-76. These may be over-estimates. In 1990 it was reported that the size of the self-defence forces fell from 12 per cent of the population to 3 per cent , and that the militia stood at 8 per ce nt (1989) . Vietnamese military w riters have placed the si ze of the militia and self-defence for ces at 1- 2 per cent. Reserves are stated to be 10 per cent of the population . See Gwen Robinson , "Big military cuts in Vietnam ", A sia -Pacific Defence Reporter (July 1990). pp . 7 - 9; Gwen Robinson , "Ta -ta Cambodia , good morning to a qu ieter Vietnam ", Canberra Times, 30 September 1989 ; Phu c Nguyen , Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 20 December 1990; Lu u Thang, Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 20 December 1990 , w hich provides figur es for Military Region 9; and Lieutenant Colone l Le Dung Sam , Tap Chi Qu ae Phong Toan Dan (February 1991). pp. 88- 93. For background , see Carlyle A. Thayer , "Vietnam ", in Military Civilian Relations in South -East Asia , edited by Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (Singapore and New York : Oxford University Press, 1985). pp. 234- 66 .

86

Notes

6. Ge neral Nguye n Dinh Uoc, Deputy Direc tor of th e Institute of Military Hi story , quoted by Jari Lindholm , Helsingin Somat , 26 September 199 1. 7. Senior Li eu te nant Genera l Hoang Minh Thao, "On the Party 's Ro le Vis-a- Vi s th e Arm y" , Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 4 February 1991. 8. "Report of the Pa rty Centra l Committee's Mi litary Commission on the Im p le me ntatio n of the 1986- 90 National Defence Tasks and Guidel ines and th e Tasks for th e 1991 -95 Five-Year Period ", Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (June 199 1). pp. 40- 5 1. This is cited herea ft er as "Na ti ona l De fe nce Tasks and Guide lines , 1991 -95". 9. Luu Thang , Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 20 Dece mber 1990. 10. Editoria l, "Outstandingly Carry ing on th e Revolutionary Undertaking of Youth s of th e Prev ious Generation , Youths in the Army Stead il y Move Forward ", Quan Doi N han Dan , 27 August 1992. 11. Voice of Vie tn am Ne twork (Hanoi). 27 August 1992 . I 2. Le Thanh and Nguyen Anh Trinh , station correspondents , on Voice of Vietnam Network , Hanoi , 30 Septembe r 1992. 13. Doa n Khu e, speech to th e Fourth All Army Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union Congress, Voice of Vietnam Network , Hanoi, 27 August 1992 . 14. W illiam S. Turley, "Origins and Deve lopme nt of Communist Military Leadership in Vietnam ", A rmed Forces and Society 3, no . 2 (Winter 1977) : 2 18-47. 15. Bui Hong Thai, Tap Chi Quae Phong Toan Dan Uanuary 1991). 16. D. M . FitzGe rald , Th e Vietnam People 's Army: Regularization of Command, 1975- 1988, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 48 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre , Australian National University , 1989) . 17. See Carlyle A. Thayer , "Vietn am 's Two Strategic Tasks: Building Socialism and Defe ndin g th e Fatherland ", in Southeast Asian Affairs 1983, ed ited by Pushpa Thambipillai (Si ngapore : !SEAS, 1983). pp. 299-324. 18 . "Tim Hieu Luat Nghia Vu Quan Su ", and "Luat Nghia Vu Quan Su" , Nhan Da n, 11 January 1982; and Dang Vu Hiep , "Thoroughly Understand th e Scrupulous Compliance wi th the Military Service Law", Tap Chi Co ng San (February 1982). pp. 48-52 and -64 . 19. Thieu Quang Bien , "How Can th e Efficiency of the Army 's Prod ucti on and Economic Building Be Correct ly Assessed?" Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 12 August 199 1. 20. Author 's interv iew with Major General Tran Cong Man , Hanoi , 8 November 1985. 2 1. Se nior Ge neral Le Trong Tan , in an addr ess to the Third Conference of Good Fina ncia l Manage m ent Units , Hanoi Domestic Service , 23 September 1985.

Notes

87

22. Major General Le Khoa , "The Production and Economy Moveme nt in the Army ", Nhan Dan , 23 September 1985. 23 . Trung Dung , "Concerning the Matter of Building the Peopl e 's Armed Forces ", Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan (September 1986) . 24. A point first made by Gen . Yo Nguyen Giap , in N hiem Vu Quan Su Truoc Mat Chuyen San Tong Phan Cong (Uy Ban Khang Chie n Hanh Chinh Ha Dong , 1950), and since reiterated . See General Hoang Van Thai , "Ve Quan He Hop Tac Dac Biet Gi ua Ba Dan Toe Dong Duong", Tap Chi Cong San (January 1982), pp. 17- 24. 25 . Trung Dung , "On th e Issue of Building the People' s Armed Forces", Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan (September 1986). 26. Quoted by Jacqu es Beka ert , Bangkok Post , 11 July 1989. 27. Major General N guye n Van Thai , quoted by Kawi Chongkitthawon (Ho Chi Minh City ), Th e Nation , 20 September 1989 . 28. Louise William s, "Nation out of cash and out of wars" , Sydney Morning Herald, 23 September 1989. 29. See Carlyle A. Thaye r , "Laos and Vietnam: The Anatomy of a 'Special Relati onship '", in Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and Society of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, edi ted by Martin Stuart-Fox (New York : St . Martin 's Press, 1982), pp. 245-73. 30. Author 's interview with Major General Tran Cong Man , Ha noi, 8 November 1985. 3 1. Ibid . 32. Agence Fran ce Presse (AFP), (Hanoi) , 10 May 199 1. 33. Thai Thanh Sinh , "Safeguarding Public Security and Order at the Grass Roots: A Basic Task of th e Militia and Self-Defence Forces at Prese nt", Hanoi Dom esti c Serv ice , 28 March 199 1. 34. Ge ne ral Ph an Hoan , Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (February 1991 ), pp . 43-45. 35. Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 9 May 1991 , cited by AFP, Hanoi, 10 May 1991. 36. Nate Thayer , "The forgotten army ", Far Eastern Economic R eview , 10 September 1992 , p p. 16-22; and Robin Davies, "The Last ' Lost' Patrol", Phnom Penh Post , no. 14 (2 - 15 Jul y 1993), p. 3. 37. See Lieute nant Ge neral Phan Hoan , "Firmly Maintaining Sec urity and Consolidating Na ti onal De fence in th e 5th Military Region ", Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (October 1992 ), pp . 45- 50 . Ge nera l Hoan is commander of Milita ry Region 5. 38. Editorial , Quan D oi N han Dan , 6 July 1989. 39 . Se nior Lieutenant General Dang Vu Hiep , Tap Chi Qu oc Phong Toan Dan (July 1989) . In September 1987 Nguy en Va n Linh addressed a conference of high -level military cadres. In th e co urse of his prese ntati on , Linh m e ntioned an important "Politburo resolution on nationa l d efence tasks in th e prese nt peri od " (Nghi

Notes

88

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48 . 49. 50.

51. 52 . 53.

54. 55 . 56. 57.

quyet cua Ba chinh tri ve nhiem vu quae phang trang giai daan hien nay) . The speech was only published three years later: Nguyen Van Linh, May Van De Quan Su Va Quae Phang Trang Su Nghiep Dai Mai (Hanoi : Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 1990). pp . 7-21. Bui Dinh Nguyen , "Military Region 9 Coordinates National Defence with the Economy ", Nhan Dan , 10 April 1989. Senior Lieutenant General Dang Vu Hiep, Tap Chi Quae Phang Toan Dan (July 1989). Robinson, "Big military cuts in Vietnam" , p . 8. Lieutenant General Nguyen Quoc Thuoc , Tap Chi Quae Phong Taan Dan (May 1992) . Voice of Vietnam , 27 December 1990. Hanoi Home Service , 26 December 1989. Hanoi Domestic Service , 26 April 1991. Senior Lieutenant General Doan Khue, Hanoi Domestic Service , 28 June 1989. Writing in Tap Chi Quae Phang Taan Dan (February 1991) . Writing in Tap Chi Quae Phong Taan Dan (May 1992) . General Doan Khue, Quan Dai Nhan Dan, 30 August 1990; Hanoi Domestic Service, 2 April 1991 quotes Duong Ngoc Nang from Military Region 2 party organization as emphasizing that Politburo Resolution No. 2 dealt with the question of "building provinces and cities into firm defence areas" . Vo Hong Nhan also noted that Dong Thap province "has elaborated a basic defence plan and a plan to build itself into a solid defence zone in accordance with Political Bureau Resolution 2", Tap Chi Quae Phang Toan Dan (September 1992). Cam Hung, Tap Chi Quae Phang Taan Dan (April 1991) . Writing in Tap Chi Quae Phang Taan Dan (March 1991) . International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1987188, p. 176; and The Military Balance, 1988/89, p . 181 ; and Kyada (Hanoi). 12 April 1989, placed the figure at 30,000. Kyada (Hanoi). 12 April 1989, citing "Western estimates". International Institute for Strategic Studies , The Military ·Balance, 1989190, p. 179. International Institute for Strategic Studies , The Military Balance, 1991/92, p. 184. International Institute for Strategic Studies , The Military Balance, 1987188, p . 176; The Military Balance, 1988/89, p . 181 ; and The Military Balance, 1989190, p . 179. Non-commun ist resistance officials provided estimates of VPA strength ranging from 30,000 to 7080,000 for the period prior to Vietnam's final withdrawal.

Notes

89

58. Major General Nguyen Van Thai, quoted by Kawi Chongkitthawon (Ho Chi Minh City), The Nation , 20 September 1989; and General Tran Cong Man, interviewed by Jacques Bekaert, Bangkok Post , 11 July 1989. 59. Tai Ming Cheung and Murray Hiebert, "Coming home", Far Eastern Economic Review , 28 September 1989, p . 24. 60. Nick Cumming-Bruce, "Vietnam distances itself from communist ally in Cambodia", The Guardian, 18 December 1990. For a discussion of Soviet-Cambodian military relations at this time, see Carlyle A. Thayer, "Indochina" , in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, eds., Reshaping Regional Relations: Asia-Pacific and the Former Soviet Union (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp . 216-22 . 61. "PAVN troops in Cambodia" , jane's Defence Weekly, 10 February 1990, p . 217; Michael Richardson , "Hanoi Army Reported in Cambodia", International Herald Tribun e , 21 February 1990; "Vietnamese forces back in Cambodia" , The Guardian, 24 February 1990; Nate Thayer, "PAVN troops push back rebels" Jane 's Defence Weekly, 3 March 1990, p . 373; Nate Thayer , "Deserters prove Vietnam's role" Jane 's Defence Weekly, 10 March 1990, p . 414; and James Pringle, Phnom Penh, "Hanoi 'phantom' army carries on war in Cambodia", The Times (London) , 16 March 1990. 62. Nick Cumming-Bruce, "Vietnam distances itself from communist ally in Cambodia". 63 . Jean-Claude Chapon, AFP (Kampot), The Nation, 5 April 1991. 64. AFP (Washington), The Nation, 13 April1991 ; and Radio Australia, 12 April 1991. 65. Voice of the Great National Union Front of Cambodia, 13 February 1992. For subsequent Khmer Rouge claims, see Voice of the Great National Union Front of Cambodia, 9 March 1993, and 1, 25 and 28 May 1993. Just prior to the May elections, UNTAC identified at first three and then five additional former Vietnamese soldiers living in Cambodia. UNTAC sought their repatriation to Vietnam. Vietnam refused. Som Sattana, United Press International (UPI) (Phnom Penh), 1 March 1993; Reuter (Phnom Penh), 1 March 1993; Sheila McNulty, Associated Press (Phnom Penh), 1 March 1993; AFP, "Phnom Penh refuses to expel former Hanoi soldier", Daily Telegraph, 3 March 1993; and Mark Dodd, Reuter (Phnom Penh), 9 March 1993. 66. Hugo Gordon, "Hanoi's secret forces fight Cambodia rebels", Daily Telegraph; and Associated Press , Oddar Meanchey, "Hanoi Troops in Cambodia, UN Says" , International Herald Tribune , 9 March 1992.

90

Notes

67. Carlyle A. Thayer, "Security Issues in Southeast Asia: The Third Indoch ina War" (Paper delivered to the Conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, co-sponsored by the Peace Research Centre , the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies , Australian National University , Canberra , 12-14 August 1987) . 68. Gene ral Tran Cong Man , cited in Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 July 1988. 69. Erhard Haubold, "Fii r Vietnams soldaten gibt es nur braunen , mit Sand vermischten Reis und alten Fisch ", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 December 1988. 70. Le Due Anh , interviews with Tap Chi Quae Phong Toan Dan , Hanoi Domest ic Service, 4 December 1989; and Quan Doi Nhan Dan , AFP (Hanoi), 23 December 1990. See also "National Defence Tasks and Guidelines, 1991-95", pp . 40-51. 71. Kyodo (Hanoi), 12 April 1989. 72. British Broadcasting Service (BBC) World Service , 17 April 1989. 73. AFP (Hanoi), 23 December 1990; see also Voice of Vietnam , Hanoi Home Service, 21 December 1991 , which noted that "the adjustment and deployment of forces on a national scale have also been carried out". 74. AFP (Hanoi), 21 December 1991. 75. For an historical overview , consult Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam (London : Macmillan Publishers, 1992). A discussion of Soviet-Vietnamese military relations may be found on pp . 115-33 . See also Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam 1945-1992 (Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1993), which contains a postscript bringing the account forward . 76. J. Andre Sauvageot , "Vietnam , Defence Expenditure and Threat Perception", pp. 283-84. Robinson , "Big military cuts in Vietnam ", p . 8 states that estimates for Soviet military aid in 1989 amounted to US$1.3 billion . 77. As noted by Nguyen Van Linh in a speech to an all army politicalmilitary conference, "we shall no longer enjoy international subsidies"; Voice of Vietnam , Hanoi Home Service , 27 December 1990 . According to Thai Quang Trung, Vietnam was firs t made aware of Soviet difficulties in October 1986 when Mikhail Gorbachev met with Truong Chinh in advance of the Sixth VCP Congress. Gorbachev told his guest that the USSR was in serious diffi culties and would no longer be able to sustain military asistance to Vietnam. Remarks made to the workshop on Arms and Defence Planning in Southeast Asia, Singapore , 19 June 1993.

Notes

91

78. "National Defence Tasks and Guidelines, 1991-95"; and Le Due Anh, cited by AFP (Hanoi), 23 December 1990, who reported that 100,000 officers alone were demobilized. Vietnamese force reductions were recorded two years later by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in its The Military Balance, 1992193, p. 164, which gives a figure of 857,000 including all three services . 79. Kyodo (Hanoi), 1 November 1990. 80. Robert Karniol, Interview with Senior General Dao Dinh Luyen, jane 's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, p. 32. 81. Robinson, "Big military cuts in Vietnam", p. 9. Kyodo (Hanoi), 1 November 1990 reported, to the contrary, that reductions had been carried out in the air force, navy, and regional forces. 82. Lieutenant Colona! Le Dung Sam, Tap Chi Quae Phong Toan Dan (February 1991), pp. 88-93. 83 . Nguyen Van Linh, addressing the all army political education conference; Vietnam News Agency, 28 December 1990. 84. Robinson, "Big military cuts in Vietnam", pp. 7-9. 85 . General Hoang Van Thai, cited in Robinson , "Ta-ta Cambodia, good morning to a quieter Vietnam". 86. Phuc Nguyen, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 20 December 1990. 87. Luu Thang, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 20 December 1990. 88. Bui Hong Thai, Tap Chi Quae Phong Toan Dan (January 1991), pp. 43-49. 89. AFP (Hanoi), 18 December 1990. 90. Ibid.; and Lieutenant General Le Kha Phieu, deputy commander in Cambodia, interviewed by Michael Williams for BBC World Service, Newsreel Program, 17 April 1989. Tai Ming Cheung and Hiebert, "Coming home", p. 24, quotes Major General Tran Cong Man as saying that the target of 500,000 could be achieved by 1992. 91. Kyodo (Hanoi), 12 April 1989, quoting a High Command official; and Humphrey Hawksley, "Jobs Problem Faces Hanoi's Legion of 'Vietnam Veterans'", The Times (London), 17 April 1989, quoting General Tran Cong Man. · 92. Quoted by Reuter (Hanoi), The Nation (Bangkok), 9 September 1992. 93. Karniol, interview with Senior General Dao Dinh Luyen. 94. Kawi Chongkittahowon, The Nation (Bangkok), 20 September 1989; and Kyodo (Hanoi), 23 September 1989. 95. Major General Tran Cong Man, cited by Joseph De Rienzo, "The Challenge of Peace in Vietnam", Canberra Times, 1 May 1989; and Michael Richardson, "Where will all the soldiers go?" Pacific Defence Reporter (March 1989), pp. 36-38.

92

Notes

96. Loui se Wi lliam s, "Nation out of cash a nd out of wars" , Sydney M orning Herald, 23 September 1989; Kyodo (Hanoi) , 12 April1989 ; and Kyodo, Hano i, 23 September 1989. 97. Robinson , "Ta- ta Cambodia , good morning to a quieter Vietnam "; and Robin son , "Vietnam find s peacetime has its ow n challenges" , Canberra Tim es, 24 Ma y 1990. 98. Intern ati onal Institute for Strategic Stud ies, Th e Military Balance, 1993/94, draft . 99. Estim ates by Fre nch and Au stra lia n military anal ysts made availab le to the aut hor in m id -1993. It is not clear if air d efence forces are inc luded in th ese fi gures. In la te 1993 , Colone l Duong Due Th uc, a spokesman for th e Min istry of Defe nce , repo rted that 12 per cen t (o r 70 ,000) of Vietnam 's regu lar forces we re employed in comme rcia l ac tivi ties. This implies a mai n fo rce strength of 58 1,000 . 100 . Ca rl yle A. Thayer, "The Soviet U nion and Indoc hina ", Ln Soviet Foreign Policy in Transition , edited by Roger E. Kanet, Deborah Nutter Min er , and Tama ra J. Res ler (Cambridge: Cam b ridge Unive rsity Press , 1992). pp . 236- 55. See also the remarks by Colone l Bui Tin , cited in Ri chardson , "Whe re w ill all the soldie rs go?", pp . 36-38. 10 1. Jospeh De Ri enzo, "The Challenge of Peace in Vietnam ". Materia l in the followi ng two paragrap hs is taken fro m this source un less otherwise noted . 102. Haw ksley , "Jobs Proble m Fa ces Hano i's Legion of ' Vietnam Veterans' ". 103. Vietna m News Age ncy , 7 J uly 1989. 104. Hiebert , "Confi ned to barrac ks" , Far Eastern Economic Review , 13 June 199 1, p . 28 . 105 . Senior Lieutena n t General Dang Vu Hiep, "Some Issues Re lating to the Policy Ai med at Achieving the Tas k of Bu ilding the Arm y and Consolida tin g National Defence in the New Situation ", Tap Chi Quan D oi Nhan Dan Uuly 1989) . 106. Louise Williams, "Nation ou t of cash a nd out of wars" , Sydney M orning Herald, 23 Sep tembe r 1989. · 107. Lieutenant Ge nera l Nguyen Thoi Bung, interview with Saigon Giai Phong, 5 August 1989. 108. Pham Min h Chau , "We Should Not Call fo r Military Mobiliza tion Without Concrete Measures", Qua n Doi Nhan Dan , 29 Jul y 1989. 109. Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 8 September 1989 . 110. Pham Mi n h Chau , op. cit . 111. Cited by Louise Williams , "Natio n ou t of cas h a nd out of wars ", Sydney M orning Hera ld , 23 September 1989.

Notes

93

112. This section is drawn from Carlyle A. Thayer , Vietnam , AsiaAustralia Briefing Papers 1, no . 4 (Sydney : The Asia-Australia Institute , University of New South Wales , 1992) : 45-46 . 113. According to Bui Tin , "Just before their congress last June, the party leaders retired hundreds of generals and colonels whom they suspected as a threat to their power. " International Herald Tribune , 21 October 1991. 114. Le Due Anh , interview with Tap Chi Quae Phong Toan Dan , Hanoi Domestic Service , 4 December 1989. 115. Le Due Anh, statement to the National Assembly Sixth Session 8th Legislature, 25 December 1989. 116. Carried by Hanoi Home Service , 26 December 1989. 117. Carried by Voice of Vietnam , Hanoi Home Service, 25 June 1991. 118. Cited by Jacques Bekaert , "VN Army Moving with the Times", Bangkok Post, 11 January 1992. 119. Lieutenant General Nguyen Trong Xuyen , "Struggle in 1991 to Firmly Maintain and Stabilize Troops' Living Standard", Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 7 January 1991. 120. Interview with Lieutenant General Nguyen Trong Xuyen, ViceMinister of National Defence , Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 20 December 1991. 121. Senior Lieutenant General Dang Vu Hiep, "Some Issues Relating to the Policy Aimed at Achieving the Task of Building the Army and Consolidating National Defence in the New Situation" , Tap Chi Quae Phong Toan Dan Uuly 1989) . 122. Individual soldiers stole weapons and supplies for resale . Military vehicles were used illegally to transport civilian goods, using the protection afforded their red licence plates. In one notable case, airplane frames were undervalued and sold . Police raids in mid1989 uncovered military units in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City which raised funds by showing pornographic videos; see Murray Hiebert , "The Joy of Marx", Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 August 1989, p. 23. 123. Xuan Minh , "Problems in Implementing the Military Service Law and Officers Law of the VPA" , Quan D oi Nhan Dan , 11 December 1990. 124. Nguyen Dinh Xuan , "Is the Army Still Attracting Youths?" Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 14 August 1991. 125. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Te Nhi, Tap Chi Quae Phong Toan Dan Uanuary 1991). pp. 66-70 . The Army Infantry Academy in Son Tay saw its enrolment drop from 3,500 to 1,000; see Robinson , "Big military cuts in Vietnam ", pp. 7-9 . The elite military-run Institute for Science and Technology had difficulty filling its entry

94

126. 127 . 128.

129.

130 . 13 1. 132 . 133. 134. 135. 136.

137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143.

144.

Notes quota of one hundred . See Murray Hiebert. "Defeated by Victory", Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 June 1991, p. 24. Lie ute nant Colonel Nguye n Te Nhi , Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan Uanuary 199 1). pp . 66- 70 . Le Ba Thi nh . speaking on Voice of Vie tnam , Hanoi Home Service , 21 Septe mbe r 1990. More than three yea rs late r, how ever, medical facilities for army veterans w ere still unde r·finan ced ; see William Brannigan, Thuy An , "Ha noi 's Asy lums : War Never Ends, Ill Veterans Relive Traumas in Impove ris hed Surroundings•, Washington Post , 23 Octobe r 1993. Majo r Ge ne ral Dang Huye n Phuong , "Let Us Continue to Improve the Renovation of the Logistic Supply Methods' . Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 2 1 September 1992. Writing in Quan Doi Nhan Dan . 23 Marc h 1992. Robe rt Ka rniol, "PAVN Strives to Modernize in a Climate of Austerity ", jane's Defence Weekly, 3 April 1993, p. 18. Le Due Anh , interview with Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan , Hanoi Domesti c Service , 4 Decembe r 1989. Voice of Vietnam , Hanoi Home Service, 12 March 1990. La Ba Tinh , Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 14 November 1990. Military so urces cited by AFP, Hanoi , 18 December 1990. Ame ndme nts to the 1981 Law on Military Service were adopted by the National Asse mbly on 21 Decembe r 1990; for the text , see Nhan Dan , 5 January 1991. On the enlargement of deferments , see interv iew with Colonel Vu Phong, Deputy Chief of Staff, office of Ho Ch i Minh City 's Military Command , by Minh Thang , ' What is New in 1992 Troop Recruitme nt?" Tuoi Tre , 11 January 1992. Major General Nguyen Huu Doa, Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 28 February 1991. Hiebert , "Defeated by Victory ·, p. 24 . Voice of Vietnam , Hanoi Home Service, 12 September 1991. Do Tu Vien , "Desertion : Its Causes and Measures to Overcome It" , Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 19 September 1991. Voice of Vietnam, 18 November 1992. Voice of Vietnam, 5 August 1993. In answer to the question why troops still violated discipline, one writer commented, "The negative things that take place in society do directly affect the observance of discipline in the army." See Major General Le Toan , Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 19 March 1992. Dao Loc Binh, station editor, Voice of Vietnam, Hanoi Home Service, 29 May 1990; and Anh Thao, "Management of Weapons, Equipment in Military Region 7 Currently Shows Neglect, Lack of Strictness", Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 11 February 1991.

Notes

95

145. Colonel Vu Phong , interviewed by Minh Thang, "What is New in 1992 Troop Recruitment?" Tuoi Tre, 11 January 1992. 146. Major General Nguyen Van Phiet, "Applying Results of Study on Democracy-Discipline Measures in Air Defence Service", Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 17 March 1992 . 147. Drafts of this section were circulated to Professor William S. Turley (Southern Illinois University), Dr Truong Truong (Univer· sity of New South Wales). Dr Bill O'Malley (Office of National Assessments). Dr Adam Fforde (ADUKI Pty Ltd .) and others. Th e author acknowledges comments made but assumes responsibility for errors of fact or judgment. 148. Discussions with Mai Thuc Lan , chairman of th e National Assembly 's Economics, Planning and Budget Committee; Ngo Ba Thanh , chairman of the National Assembly 's Legislative Uudiciary) Committee , Hanoi , November 1991 ; and discussions with staff members of the National Asse mbly 's De partment of National Defence and National Security , Hanoi , May 1993. 149. Adam Fforde, ADUKI Ply Ltd ., perllOnal communica tion to the author, 23 June 1993 . Tht> discussion in the following paragraph relies on insights provided by Dr Fforde . 150. Vietnam News Agency re ported on 14 Dece mber 1993 that Vietnam 's GOP had increased from USS470 per head in 1991 to USS565 in 1993. 151. United States Department of Stat e , Vietnam: Background Notes (Washington , D.C.: Bureau of Pu b lic Affairs , July 1986) . One writer places the lower figure at 30 per cent. See Michae l Sontheimer, "Socialist Land Tries Capitalism", Die Zeit, 24 March 1989, pp . 32-33. It is not clear whether the "national budget " refers to total budget expe nditures or just current expenditure. 152. J . Andre Sauvageot, "Vietnam , Defence Expenditure and Threat Perception : Defending Communist Indochina ·, p. 284. 153. International Institut e for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1987188, p . 175, provides a GOP figure of US$19 .4 billion for 1985. 154. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1988189, p . 182; and repeated in The Military Balance, 1989/90, p . 179. 155. Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer , Soviet Relations with India and Vietnam, 1945- 1992 (Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1993). pp. 124 and 190- 92. 156. Ibid. 157. Robinson , "Ta-ta Cambodia, good morning to a quieter Vietnam" ; Robinson, "Vietnam finds peacetime has its own challenges" ; and Hawksley , "Jobs Problem Faces Hanoi's Legion of 'Vietnam

158. 159. 160 .

161.

162 . 163. 164. 165. 166. 167.

168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174.

175. 176. 177. 178.

Veterans '" . Again , this report did not make clear whether the budget included all expenditures or just current expenditure. Barry Wain , "Hanoi Congress Set to Continue Reform" , Asian Wall Street journal , 20 June 1991. Robin son , "Ta ·ta Cambodia , good morning to a quieter Vietnam ". One Weste rn aid official who has worked in Vietnam estimated that in th e 1990s the national budge t may have fallen from a third of GOP to less than a quarter. Private discussion , Copenhagen , 21 July 1993. Th e decline in the ratio of the budget to GOP has also bee n menti oned in a private communication by a Western economi st with lo ng experience working in Vietnam. World Bank , Vietnam Economic Report (1990) . p. 23 . I am grateful to Anthony Goldstone of Th e Economist Intelligence Unit for bringing these figures to my attention . International Institute for Strategic Studies , Th e Military Balance, 1991192, p . 183 . Murray Hiebert, "Corps Business" , Far Eastern Economic Review. 23 December 1993, pp . 40. Carried by Hanoi Home Service, 26 December 1989. Robinson, "Vietnam finds peacetime has its own challenges". Senior General Le Due Anh, Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (December 1989) . One senior government economist told the author that military enterprises were "a law unto themselves" and that no one outside the military had any idea how much they were producing and earning; interview, Hanoi , November 1991. Tai and Hiebert, "Coming home ", p . 24 . Voice of Vietnam, 20 July 1991 . This is equivalent to USS13 million at the official exchange rate . Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 27 February 1991. Hiebert . "Corps Business" , p . 40 . Vietnam Television Network , 28 July 1991. Major General Le Toan, Quan Doi Nhan Dan . 19 March 1992. Nguyen Van Linh , May Van De Ve Quan SuVa Quoc Phong Trong Su Nghiep Doi Moi (Hanoi : Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 1990). p . 87. Lieutenant Colonel Dong Minh Tai , in Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (November 1990) . Captain Doan Hung Minh , writing in Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (December 1990) . Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 20 December 1990. Colonel Le Hoe , writing in Nhan Dan , 12 January 1991.

97

Notes

179. Nguyen Van Man, Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan !february 1991). 180. Major General Nguyen Hai Bang , Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (March 1992). 181. Lieutenant General Phan Thu , Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (March 1992). 182. Vo Hong Nhan , Tap Chi Quae Phong Toan Dan (September 1992). 183. Lieutenant Ge neral Phan Hoan , commander of MRS, writing in Tap Chi Quae Phong Toan Dan (October 1992). 184. Lieutenant Colonel Do Bang Doan , Tap Chi Quae Phong Toan Dan (October 1992) . 185. Writing in Tap Chi Quoc Ph ong Toan Dan !July 1989) . 186. UPI, The Nation (Bangkok) ; and Bangkok Post , 2 July 1990. 187. Interview with Quan Doi Nhan Dan , quoted by AFP (Hanoi). 23 December 1990. 188. Lieutenant Colonel Lai Ngoc Hai , "Agricultural Taxes , the

Commodity Economy in Agri culture and the Need to Ensure Food Supply for the Army ", Tap Ch i Quae Phong Toan Dan (October 1990) . 189. 190. 191. 192. 193.

194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199.

200.

Writing in Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 12 January 1991. Colonel Le Hoe , writing in Nhan Dan , 12 January 1991. Writing in Tap Chi Cong San (March 1991) Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 20 Decembe r 1991. Senior Lie ute nant General Nguye n Trong Xuyen, Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 9 October 1992; and Agen ce France Presse (Hanoi) . "Vietnam concerned over Asia n arms race ", Straits Times , 30 April 1993, reported that Vietnam "last year disclosed that it had cut its defence budget less than anticipated due mainly to tensions with China ". Voice of Vi etnam, 14 July 1993. Economist Intelligence Unit , Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Country Report , no . 1 (1993), p. 24. Hiebert , "Corps Bu sin ess", p . 41 . "National Defence Tasks and Guidelines, 1991-95" . Le Due Anh , interview with Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan, carried by Hanoi Domestic Se rvice, 4 December 1989. Nguyen Van Linh , "Consolidate Peace , Uphold Vigilance, and Develop the Integrated Strength for National Defence", Tap Chi Quae Phong Toan Dan (December 1989). Major General Nguyen Van Phiet , "Applying Results of Study on Democracy-Disc ipline Measures in Air Defence Service", Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 17 March 1992. "Fourth generation war" refers to the psychological warfare directed at the population and the

98

201.

202.

203. 204.

205.

206.

207.

208.

209 .

210.

Notes

destru ction and sabotage of the indu strial, political and social infrastru cture of the targeted count ry. See Q .S., "On the Socialist, Modern All -People's National Defence of Vietnam" , Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (May 1992) , pp . 39- 42 and 90. Le Bang , "Build the People's Armed Forces and the Vietnam Peop le' s Army in th e Directi on of Renova tion" , Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (June 1991) ; and Major Ge ne ral Nguyen Hai Bang , Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (March 1992), pp. 3-8. Ge nera l Doa n Khu e, "U nderstanding the Resolution of the Third Ple num of th e VCP Central Committee : Some Basic Issues Regarding th e Party' s Military Line in the New Stage ", Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toa n Dan (Augu st 1992) , pp . 3- 15 and 45 . Dean Khue, w ritin g in Quan D oi Nhan Dan , 24 November 1993. Mobilized reserve for ces are located in all provinces, cities and special zones. Reserve forces can be assigned to the regular force as necessary to conduct mobile combat operations throughout the country (militia and self-defence fo rces always remain in their localities). See Senior General Dean Khu e , "Consolidating and Building Mobiliza tion Reserve Forces and Militia and Self-Defe nce Forces of Good Quality Everywhere to Contribute to Building Strong Defence Areas", Hanoi Domestic Service , 28 June 1989. Major General Nguyen Quoc Thuoc, "The Experience of the 4th Military Region - Changes in the Building of the All-People National Defence in the 4th Military Region ", Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (May 1992) , pp . 49-53; and Lieutenant General Ngu ye n Quoc Thuoc, interview with Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 22 February 1992. Lieutenant General Phan Hoan , "Firmly Maintaining Security and Consolidating National Defence in the 5th Military Region ", Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (October 1992), pp. 46-50. Major General Tran Minh Phu , "The 9th Military Region Develops and Defends its Sea Area ", Tap Chi Quoc ?hong Toan Dan (September 1992). pp . 60-66. Senior General Dean Khu e, "Consolidating and Building Mobilization Reserve Forces and Militia and Se lf-Defence Forces of Good Quality Everywhere to Contribute to Building Strong Defence Areas ", Hano i Domestic Servi ce, 28 Ju ne 1989. Q .S., "On the Socialist , Modern All People 's National Defence of Vietnam" , Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (May 1992). PP- 39-42 and 90. For a recent exposition of this view , see the summary of Do Muoi's speech to a conference on 1993 national defence work , in Voice of Vietnam , 11 November 1993.

Notes

99

211. Senior Lieutenant General Dang Vu Hiep . "Some Impo rt ant Experiences in Building the People 's Army During th e Past Several Years ' . Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (December 19901. pp. 48-54 . 212 . Jari Lindholm . "Shortage of Money Threatens Weakening of the Vietnamese People 's Army 's Fighting Capability ". Helsingin Somal . 26 September 1991 ; and Hiebert . "Defeated by Victory · . p . 24 . 213 . Voice of Vietnam . Hanoi Home Service . 11 March 1991 . 214. Le Hoe, ' The Defence Industry in th e New Situation ". Nhan Dan . 4 November 1991 . 215. Ibid . 216. Voice of Vietnam , Han oi Home Service . 27 Dece mbe r 1990 . 217. Voice of Vi etnam . Hanoi Home Servi ce . II March 199 1. 218 . ' National Defence Tasks and Guidelines . 1991 - 95 ". 219 . Doan Khue , writing in Quan Doi Nhan Dan . 24 Nove mber 1993. 220. Khanh Le , Quan Doi Nhan Dan . 12 May 1991 . 221. Quang Dau . Quan Doi Nhan Dan . ca rried by Hanoi Hom e Servi ce . 13 August 1989. 222 . Thieu Quang Bi e n . "How Can the Efficiency of th e Arm y's Production and Economic Building Be Correctly Assessed?" Quan Doi Nhan Dan . 12 August 1991. 223. Quang Dau , Hanoi Home Service . 13 August 1989. 224 . Former Senior General Le Trong Tan. cited by Hiebert , in "Defea ted by Victory" , p. 24 . 225. Binh Dinh Nguye n , "Military Region 9 Coordinates Nati ona l Defence with the Economy ", Nhan Dan. 10 April 1989. Unless otherwise noted , all quotations dealing with Military Region 9 in this section are from this source . 226. Quang Dau . Hanoi Home Service. 13 August 1989 . 227. Lieutenant General Professor Phan Thu . Tap Chi Quae Phong Toa11 Dan !February 1991 ). pp . 38-42. 228 . As outlined in Deci sion 217 of the Council of Ministers . See Thie u Quang Bien . ' How Can the Efficiency of the Arm y's Producti on and Economic Building be Correctly Assessed 7 ' Qua11 Doi Nhan Dan, 12 August 1991 . 229. Quang Dau , Hanoi Home Service . 13 August 1989. 230. Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (October 1990) . 231. Thieu Quang Bie n . ' How Can the Efficiency of the Arm y's Production and Economic Building Be Correctly Assessed 7 " Quan Doi Nhan Dan . 12 August 1991 . 232. Hiebert . "Corps Business' . p . 40 . William Branigin . "Hanoi ·s Enterprising Army , Budget Cuts Put Soldiers in Business: From Fish to Hotels ", 17 October 1993. reported a figure of 66 .400 .

100

233. 234. 235 .

236. 237.

238. 239. 240.

241. 242.

243 . 244.

245.

246. 247.

248.

Notes In 199 1, Hiebert reported that 62,000 soldiers were employed ; see Hiebert , "Soldiers of Fortune", p . 27. In othe r words, there has been more than an II per ce nt increase in the number of soldiers empl oyed in commercial activiti es du rin g this two-year period . Kh a nh Le , Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 12 May 1991. Branigin , "Hanoi 's Enterprising Army" . For background , see Colone l Tran Due Nghia , "Truong Son Building Genera l Corporation : Program to Renew Technical Equipment in the Years of 1990- 1995", Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (October 1990). pp. 67-69. Voice of Vietnam , Hanoi Home Service , 2 February 1992. Hi ebert, "So ldi e rs of Fortun e", p. 26 . These included nine corporations, six e nterprises, one state farm , one state forest unit , one bridges and roads constru ction unit and a voca tional middle sc hool. See Lieutena nt Colonel Nguyen Duy Tuyen and Man Ha Anh, "About Organizing Part y Leadership in an Army Unit Specialized in Economic Construction ", Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (March 1991). pp. 34-36. Interview with Major General Nguyen Tu Cuong by Quang Dau , in Quan Doi Nhan Dan , I March 1992. Vietnam News Agency, 21 February 1993 . Including the popular e lectric fans Thien Nga (Swan). Thang Tam (August) and Sapa, all of which won gold medals at Vietnam 's 1992 industrial goods fair. Branigin, "Hanoi 's Enterprising Army ". Senior Lieutenant G eneral Dang Vu Hiep , "Some Important Experiences in Building the People 's Army During the Past Several Years ", Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (December 1990). pp . 48-54. "National Defence Tasks and Guidelines , 1991-95". General Doan Khu e, "It is Necessary to Correctly Understand the Guiding Thoughts on Military Training in the Curren t Situation", Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Dan (Ma rch 1991) , PP- 3-7. Q.S., "On the Socialist, Modern All People 's National Defe nce of Vietnam ", Tap Chi Quoc Phong Toan Da n (May 1992). pp. 39-42 and 90. Wain , "Hanoi Congress Set to Continue Reform ". Robert Karniol , interview with Se nior General Dao Dinh Lu yen, typescript , 8 March 1993, p . 7. Mr Karniol kindly provided the author with a copy of the interview typescript , w hich is more extensive than the acco unt subsequently published in jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, p . 32 . For comments on Poland and Czec hoslovakia , see Hong Thanh Quang, Quan Doi Nhan Dan , 4 March 1990.

Notes

101

249. Writing in Tap Chi Quae Phong Toan Dan (December 1989) . 250. Report of interview by Quan Doi Nhan Dan, carried by AFP (Hanoi), 23 December 1990. 251. Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 13 September 1989. 252. See Le Quang, "The 'True Nature' of the So-Called Depoliticization of the Army", Tap Chi Quae Phong Toan Dan (November 1990). 253. Major General Tran Xuan Truong, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 6 June 1990. 254. Voice of Vietnam, Hanoi Home Service, 7 January 1991. 255. Trung Tin, "National Defence and the Army in the Transition Period", Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 24 January 1991. 256. Hong Son, "Activities of Basic Party Organizations of the 7th Military Region", Saigon Giai Phong , 7 February 1991. 257. Voice of Vietnam , Hanoi Home Service, 7 March 1991. 258. Voice of Vietnam Network (Hanoi), 29 April1991. The first congress was held in June 1960, the second in November 1976, the third in January 1982, and the fourth in October 1986. 259. Report on major developments during the first two days of the Fifth All Army Party Congress; Hanoi Domestic Service, 24 April 1991. 260. Voice of Vietnam Network (Hanoi), 27 April 1991. 261. Letter to the military, published in Quan Doi Nhan Dan, cited by AFP (Hanoi) , in The Nation (Bangkok), 29 April 1991. 262. The All Army Congress declined to renominate three military officers who had served on th e VCP Central Committee elected in 1986 (Le Ngoc Hien, Vice Minister of Defence; Nguyen Quoc Thuoc, MR4 Commander; and Nguyen Minh Chau, head of an anti-smuggling committee) . See "Delegates Dumped", Far Eastern Economic Review , 30 May 1991. 263 . There were 1, 176 delegates to the Seventh Congress, representing 2.3 million party members throughout the country. 264. Carlyle A. Thayer , "Institutional Change : Background to the Vietnamese Economic Reforms" (Paper delivered at the Conference on Indochinese Development, Macquarie University, North Ryde, New South Wales , 13-14 November 1992). 265. David Elliott, "Vietnam 's 1991 Party Elections" , Asian Affairs 19, no. 3 (Fall 1992), p. 164. 266. For a discussion of the military and 1976 party statutes, see Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam ", in Military-Civilian Relations in SouthEast Asia, edited by Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (Singapore : Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 245-48 . 267. Quoted by AFP (Hanoi), 7 September 1992. 268. Thayer, "Institutional Change: Background to the Vietnamese Economic Reforms" .

102

Notes

269. Politburo member Nguyen Due Binh was also added at this time . 270. Lieutenant General Le Hai has also been identified as a member but he is not on the VCP Central Committee. 27 1. Vietnam News Agency, 31 July 1992. 272 . For a discusion of the military and the 1980 state constitution, see Thayer, "Vietnam ", pp. 241-43. 273. "Cuoc Bau Cu Dai Bieu Quoc Hoi Khoa IX Da Dien Ra Tot Dep Trong Khong Khi Ngay Hoi Lon Cua Nhan DanCa Nuoc", Nhan Dan , 21 September 1992. 274. Voice of Vietnam Network, Hanoi, 21 October 1993. 275. Voice of Vietnam Network, Hanoi, 24 October 1993. 276. Hiebert, "Defeated by Victory", p . 24. 277. Jari Lindholm, "Shortage of Money Threatens Weakening of the Vietnamese People 's Army's Fighting Capability", Helsingin Somat, 26 September 1991 . 278. Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 June 1992. 279 . AFP (Manila) , 22 July 1992; and Cameron Stewart, The Australian, 23 July 1992. 280. See the discussion in Carlyle A. Thayer, "Indochina", in Reshaping Regional Relations: Asia-Pacific and the Former Soviet Union, edited by Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (Boulder: Westview Press , 1993), p. 208. 281. In October 1992 a well-placed Vietnamese source, quoting a Russian Embassy official, told the author that a Russian military delegation had arrived in Hanoi unannounced that month to open negotiations. This was later confirmed by Robert Karniol, in "Trade Dispute Halts Cam Ranh Talks", jane 's Defence Weekly, 20 March 1993, p. 12 . 282. Ibid. Interestingly, the Khmer Rouge radio station reported that in November the Russian Ambassador in Hanoi had held discussions concerning possible arms sales to Vietnam ; see station commentary (Clandestine). Voice of the Great National Union Front of Cambodia, 11 November 1992. 283. Karniol, "Trade Dispute Halts Cam Ranh Talks". 284. "Staying On" , Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 January 1993, p. 9. 285. Author's interview with Lieutenant General Vu Xuan Vinh, Hanoi, 12 May 1993. The Russian Federation assumed all obligations entered into by the former Soviet Union under the terms of the 1978 treaty. 286. Karniol, "Trade Dispute Halts Cam Ranh Talks" . It was subsequently reported that General Dao Dinh Luyen, Chief of Staff, would visit Russia and the Ukraine to shop for military equipment and to ask for an increase in rental payments for the use of

Notes

287. 288. 289.

290. 291.

292. 293 .

294. 295.

296. 297. 298.

299. 300. 301.

302. 303.

103

Cam Ranh Bay; see "Rent Collector" . Far Eastern &anomie Review . 11 November 1993, p . 9. Voice of Vietnam, 10 June 1991. Reuters (Kontum), "Hanoi Edgy On Border Instability". International Herald Tribune, 24 February 1993. Author 's interview with Soubanh Srithirath , Vice Minister of Foreign Affiars , Lao People 's Democratic Republic . Ministry of Foregn Affairs , Vientiane , 4 May 1993 . 'Donations. But No Flowers· . Far Eastern Economic Review , 3 June 1993, p. 9. The year 1990 appears to be an exception; otherwise see Vietnam News Agency, 17 October 1989; Lao National Radio , Vientiane . 23 October 1991; Vietnam News Agency , 21 October 1992; and Lao National Radio , Vientiane . 2 November 1993. Vitthayou Hengsat Radio Network , Vientiane, 27 October 1993 . See the discussion in Carlyle A. Thayer , "Sino-Vietnamese Relations: Ideology Versus National Interest " (Paper presented at the European Vietnam Studies Conference on "European Research on Vietnam : History , Economy, Foreign Relations and Culture" , Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen , Denmark , 19- 21 August 1993) . Terry McCarthy. Canberra Times, 17 December 1990; and Alan Boyd , Weekend Australian, 5-6 January 1991. Jacques Bekaert , interviewed on BBC, Dateline East Asia , 31 July 1992, in Singapore, Foreign Broadcast Monitor 176/92, I August 1992, pp . 8-9. Xinhua News Agency , 8 December 1992 . Economist Intelligence Unit , Indochina : Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Country Report, no . 2 (19931. p. 18. Vietnam News Agency , 5 December 1993; Xinhua News Agency . 4 December 1993; and "Dong Chi Tong Bi Thu Do Muoi Tiep Doan Dai Bieu Tong Cue Chinh Tri Quan Giai Phong Nhan Dan Trung Quoc" , Nhan Dan, 6 December 1993. Voice of Vietnam . Hanoi Home Service, 26 March 1990. "Relations Warm Up", Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 June 1990 . p. 9; and Thai Army Television Channel 5, 28 May 1990 . Korkhet Chanthalertak , The Nation (Bangkok). 8 June 1992; and "Bangkok, Hanoi to Exchange Military Attaches· . Far Eastern Economic Review , 20 June 1991 , p . 12 . Vietnam News Agency , 17 August 1991. Reuter (Hanoi) . 6 January 1992; Vietnam Television Network , 6 and 7 January 1992; Radio Thailand Network , 8 January 1992 ; The Nation (Bangkok) , 8 and 9 January 1992; Vietnam News Agency . 9 January 1992; and Bangltalt Post, 9 January 1992.

104

Notes

304. Th e Nation (Bangko kl. 21 December 1991. 305. Th e Nation (Ba ngko k) , 8 Ja nua ry 1992; and Boris Vinogradov , l zvestiya, 11 Ja nua ry 1992 . 306. Murray Hie bert , "Building a rapport •, Far Eastern Economic Review , 30 Ja nua ry 1992, p. 19. 307. The Nation (Ba ngko k) , 8 Ja nuary 1992; Bangkok Post, 8 January 1992; Radio Thaila nd Network , Bangko k, 8 January 1992; Bangkok Post, 9 Ja nua ry 1992; and "Thai Army Ove rture to Vie tnamese •, Far Eastern Economic Review , 23 January 1992 , p. 14. 308. Vie tna m New s Age ncy , 30 Dece mbe r 1992; and Thai Army Televisio n Channel 5, 15 January 1993. 309. AFP (Hanoi). 14 January 1993; Re uter (Ha noi). 16 January 1993 . 310. Bangkok Post, 4 May 1993; and discussio n with a Thai senior milita ry off ice r who too k part in the discuss ions, Singapore, 19 June 1993. 3 11 . Vie tnam New s Age ncy , 30 August 1993. 312. Vie tnam News Agency, 22 Nove mbe r 1993. 3 13. Vie tna m New s Age ncy , 31 Ja nuary 1992. 314. AFP (Hai Phong). 24 Novembe r 1992; a nd Re uter (Hanoi) , 24 and 25 Nove mber 1992 . 315. AFP (H a noi) , 25 Nove mbe r 1992. 316. Vietna m New s Age ncy , 2 August 1993 . 317. Author 's interv iew with Lieute na nt Genera l Vu Xuan Vmb , Hanoi, 12 May 1993. 318. Vietna m 's Ministe r of National Defe nce, Doan Khue , used the expressio n "new step "; Vie tnam Television Network , Hanoi , 15 Dece mber 1991. 319. Radio Republic of Indonesia , 14 Ma rch 1992. 320. While in Surabaya , Khu e boarded and inspected a naval warship; see Radio Re public of Indonesia , 6 June 1993. As early as 1990, it was reported that Vie tnam had wanted to expand its navy but could not do so beca use of budget constraints; see Robinson , "Big military cuts in Vietnam ", pp . 7- 9. Chinese commentary on Vietnam' s Seventh Party Congress (June 1991) noted that Vietnam "is planning to build its navy into an armed force composed of naval vessels, submarines, and a naval air force with a long-range combat ability , within twenty to thirty years". See Ni Xiayun and Wu Kechuan, "Seventh Communist Party of Vietnam National Congress Attracts Attention", Shijie Zhishi (Beijingl. no. 15 (1 August 1991), pp . 13-14. During the goodwill visit of the French frigate Nivose in November 1992, Vietnamese sources were quoted as saying that Vietnam needed a modern warship like the Nivose to defend the Spratly Islands. In May 1993, the author was informed

Notes

105

by Hanoi-based diplomatic sources that Vietnam had approached the Australian Defence Industries to enquire about the construction of a cutter-size vessel at its Ba Son shipyard. The ship was to be equipped with surface-to-surface missiles. 321. Karniol, "PAVN Strives to Modernize in a Climate of Austerity", p. 18. 322. Ibid .

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Pacific Stateglc Paper 1

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1990 Pacific Strllteglc Paper 2

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