The Use and Utility of Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy 3031213025, 9783031213021

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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PERSPECTIVES ON WAR, PEACE, AND HUMAN CONFLICT

The Use and Utility of Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy Tim Sweijs

Twenty-first Century Perspectives on War, Peace, and Human Conflict Series Editors

Christine Cheng King’s College London London, UK John Karlsrud Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Oslo, Norway

This Palgrave Macmillan book series invites methodologically pluralist and interdisciplinary approaches to the study of peace and conflict. We aim to bring new knowledge and pathways for understanding conflicts and conflict actors. Thematically, we welcome monographs, strong edited works, and handbooks on peacekeeping, peacebuilding, trauma, war-to-peace transitions, statebuilding, violent extremism, corruption, non-state armed groups, global and regional organisations, and inter-organisationalism relating to conflict management. We are particularly keen on interdisciplinary work – especially where politics and international relations intersect with sociology, anthropology, law, psychology, geography, criminology, technology, gender studies, and area studies. And we are broadly interested in conflict writ large, beyond the bounds of civil and interstate war, stretching over into urban violence, sexual violence, post-colonial reparations, transitional justice, etc. Our goal is not just for your manuscript to be published, but to be read, discussed, contemplated, and acted upon. To that end, we seek research findings that are compelling, and writing that is memorable and immersive. The principal aim of this series is to provide educators and students, decision-­makers, and everyday citizens with contemporary, cutting-edge thinking about the roots of conflict, international responses, and the conditions for just and enduring peace. The series includes unorthodox and cross-disciplinary approaches to these topics, as well as more traditional social scientific and humanistic monographs. We strongly encourage early-career scholars and innovative researchers  – especially those from under-represented backgrounds  – to submit manuscripts for review. All titles in the series are peer-reviewed and we aim to provide rapid and constructive feedback. We also welcome open access arrangements. For an informal discussion for a book in the series, please contact the series editors Christine Cheng ([email protected]) and John Karlsrud ([email protected]). For the correct copy of Palgrave’s book proposal form, please contact Palgrave editor Isobel Cowper-Coles, Editor for International Studies, isobel. [email protected]

Tim Sweijs

The Use and Utility of Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy

Tim Sweijs The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies The Hague, The Netherlands The War Studies Research Centre Netherlands Defence Academy Breda, The Netherlands

ISSN 2945-6053     ISSN 2945-6061 (electronic) Twenty-first Century Perspectives on War, Peace, and Human Conflict ISBN 978-3-031-21302-1    ISBN 978-3-031-21303-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21303-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © The Studio Dog / Getty images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my Grandfather

Acknowledgements

Even though researching and writing this book was fundamentally a solitary endeavour, completing it would not have been possible without the help of many. Words of gratitude are in place. I would like to thank Ruth Deyermond and Jan Willem Honig for their guidance during my PhD research undertaken at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, which forms the basis of this book. Thanks to Ruth for her meticulous eye for detail and her patience. She has almost succeeded in stopping me from using Latin expressions, which are according to Ruth not just old-fashioned but corny. I also no longer indulge in the Continental habit of giving lengthy exposés of scholarly discussions which are not immediately pertinent to the topic under consideration in footnotes (dixit Ruth: ‘If it is not important enough to mention in the main text, then it should not be discussed in the footnotes either’). I am also obliged to Jan Willem Honig, who has had quite a profound impact on the eventual direction of this research project. Jan Willem’s recognition and insistence that strategy should not be seen in isolation from the military, political, and cultural contexts in which it is conceived is reflected in the argument presented in this book. I would like to express my gratitude to Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Lawrence Freedman for serving at the Viva committee and, while treating me to a genuine academic roast, for sharing their insights on how to improve my overall argument and encouraging me to turn the thesis into this book. I would like to thank Peter Viggo Jakobsen for his critical review. The Danes and Dutch do not mince words, I was reminded once again when I vii

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received his comments, but he certainly helped me strengthen my argument. I hope Peter will agree. Thank you to one anonymous reviewer, who reviewed both the initial book proposal and a pre-final version of the manuscript. Her or his constructive criticism helped to refine the argument and polish its presentation in the final stages. Thanks also go out to Hugo Meijer for his valuable input while I was completing the book, not only pointing out potential pitfalls but also pointing out strengths, which was instrumental in sharpening the formulation of the key contributions. I would further like to thank Brian Burgoon for his methodological input during the conception phase of the project; Henk Houweling, for critiquing an early draft and his counsel to focus more on the threat rather than on the time element of ultimata; Paul van Hooft, for inviting me to present my findings to a seminar of PhD students at the University of Amsterdam in the early stages of this project; Ned Lebow, who during a short meeting in one of London’s many coffee bars, told me to stop repeating other people’s arguments and start developing my own; Todd Sechser, for inviting me to participate in a panel on threats, coercion, and war at an International Studies Association’s conference a long time ago; Kelly Greenhill, for chairing that panel and for her useful feedback afterwards; Michael Rainsborough, for his constructive comments; Dan Altman and one anonymous reviewer for their valuable insights and suggestions on a pre-final version of the manuscript; my brother and brother-in-law Olivier Sweijs and Adam Booij, and my former colleague Hannes Roos, for their help with data processing and analysis; Karlijn Velthuis, Adam Meszaros, Giovanni Cisco, Laura Elisa Niemann, and Tara de Klerk for their diligent assistance in preparing the manuscript including the Index; Eleanor Thelen for creating the back- and front-end of the website www. coercivediplomacy.com that provides access to the annexes; and Anne-­ Kathrin Birchley-Brun, Sarah Roughley, and Ruby Panigrahi at Palgrave Macmillan for their help in seeing this manuscript to print. Thank you all. My sincere gratitude goes out to the librarians of the University of Amsterdam, those unsung heroes, who unremittingly entertained my requests for books and documents which they dug up in the Library’s archives. I would also like to recognise my old War Studies friends Jeni Mitchel and Jeff Michaels, who, even if we do not see each other often these days, were important go-to persons during critical stages of this project. There is much more that unites us than our shared fascination for the study of

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war, but I am truly happy that this shared fascination made us meet almost two decades ago in London. Thank you to bosses, department heads, and colleagues, past and present, at the two institutions that employ me, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and the War Studies Research Centre at the Netherlands Defence Academy, for granting me the opportunity to conduct research and write this book alongside my many other responsibilities. Particular thanks go out to Erik Frinking, Stephan De Spiegeleire, Paul Sinning, Frank Bekkers, Michel Rademaker, Rob de Wijk, and Frans Osinga. I would also like to express gratitude to my family, even if very few of them must have known what I was working on for all these years. Without your support, this would not have been possible. My father Coen Sweijs, who died many, many years ago, but who instilled an inquisitiveness, both in me and in my sisters Marijn and Sara and my brother Olivier, from when we were very young. We are fortunate that he left us behind in a position to pursue our interests, academically or otherwise. We still miss him dearly. My mother, Petra Schraa, who, true to her name, stood tall after her husband’s passing and who never wavered in her devoted care for us. My parents-in-law, Mieke and Hans, who welcomed me into their family and who have been similarly a great source of support these past few years, allowing me the use of their pied-a-tèrre in Delft for uninterrupted writing stints and helping maintain, refurbish, and restore practically everything in and around our house (including the nineteenth-century desk this book was written on). My children, Liztophe, Tiberius, and Abel, for being a source of endless joy and for reminding me each and every day of that what genuinely matters in life. Eline, my beautiful wife, whom I fell in love with many summers ago in London and have been in love with ever since. The book would not have seen completion if it were not for her. She listened patiently to my qualms late at night, offered advice, and provided support throughout. She also took the children out on Saturday afternoons or Sunday mornings so I could finally get some work done, that is when we weren’t traversing the park or  travelling the world or otherwise continuing our never-ending conversation. In the end, she even proofread the entire manuscript. Eline, I am fortunate to have found you. This book is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather, Piet Schraa, who never got the chance to complete a research project of this size. In the summer of 1945, shortly after the defeat of Nazi Germany, my

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grandfather attended a musical event in the Royal Orchestra Building in Amsterdam. Afterwards, he was asked to sign a petition of support for one of the largest newspapers of the Resistance during the War. Not one given to paranoia, my grandfather signed the petition. A few years later he received a scholarship to enrol in a PhD programme in the US. His visa application was rejected, however, as it later turned out on the basis of alleged communist leanings. The petition he had signed had been for de Waarheid, the communist newspaper, that was, or at least would be, an extended mouthpiece of the Soviet Union. The fact that my grandfather’s father had been a communist who was murdered by the Nazis must have further raised the suspicion of the intelligence officers handling his case. These were the early years of the Cold War when McCarthyism was taking its first toll. Luckily, my grandfather found another calling: he became a teacher of history in Amsterdam where he taught numerous generations of high school students. After his retirement in 1988, and when I got older, we would travel around and visit many of Europe’s illustrious capitals. My grandfather, born in the pre-internet age and in possession of encyclopaedic knowledge, would tell stories of feudal bloodlines, arranged royal marriages, territorial aggrandisement, and the internecine warfare that plagued our Continent for so many centuries. And now and then, he would return to his own life story, about how his life had taken its course. The rest is history, as they say, and the course of this history made him stay in Amsterdam, without which I would not have written these words. Neither my grandfather believed nor do I believe in the afterlife, but still: Opa, this one is dedicated to you.

Contents

1 The Use and Utility of Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy  1 2 A Genealogy of Ultimata 37 3 Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy 69 4 The Dataset: Data Collection and Coding Procedures 97 5 Ultimata 1920–2020: A Chronological Survey117 6 Ultimata 1920–2020: Patterns and Findings147 7 A Typology of Ultimata171 8 The Dictate181 9 The Conditional War Declaration203 10 The Bluff217

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11 The Brinkmanship Ultimatum229 12 Findings and Conclusions263 Index287

List of Figures

Fig. 5.1 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 6.3 Fig. 6.4 Fig. 6.5

1920–2020: ultimata per decade Outcomes: no compliance, partial compliance, full compliance Outcomes following no or partial compliance: achievement of objectives No compliance or partial compliance and achievement of objectives Strategy of coercer: highest follow up Type of demands

118 149 149 150 151 160

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 5.1 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4 Table 6.5 Table 6.6 Table 6.7 Table 7.1 Table 8.1 Table 9.1 Table 10.1 Table 11.1 Table 12.1

Key coercive diplomacy works, period, focus, and success rate 14 A typology of ultimata 22 Overview of ultimata in dataset 1920–2020 119 Compliance target of coercion and strategy of coercer 152 Achievement of objectives and strategy of coercer 152 Power differences and compliance 155 Explanation of Fisher’s exact test 156 Type of coalition and compliance 162 Type of support and outcome 163 Type of support and outcome with categories collapsed 164 A typology of ultimata 177 Dictate ultimata: cases, characteristics, and outcomes 199 Conditional war declarations: cases, characteristics, and outcomes213 Bluff ultimata: cases, characteristics, and outcomes 224 Brinkmanship ultimata: cases, characteristics, and outcomes 255 The four types of ultimata: description, characteristics, dynamics, frequency, and historical cases 269

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CHAPTER 1

The Use and Utility of Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy

Introduction The history of international relations is rife with ultimata. They have been salient in multiple post-Cold War conflicts, including the First and Second Persian Gulf Wars and NATO’s conflict with the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The Cold War era also provides ample examples of ultimata used in interstate disputes: the Suez Crisis, the Sino-Indian conflict, and the protracted Cyprus standoff, to name only a few. Ultimata featured in the run up to both World Wars and were particularly prominent during the Interwar Period. In more recent years ultimata have been issued in conflicts from the Americas, Europe, and the Middle East on to the Korean Peninsula. In some of these cases ultimata were the prelude to further escalation; in others, they were complied with without further bloodshed. Ultimata have historically been associated with declarations of war, issued as a prelude to war. Yet while war declarations have been going out of fashion since the eighteenth century and have all but disappeared since the Second World War, ultimata continue to be issued by political leaders as part of coercive diplomacy. Why political leaders issue ultimata, with what purpose, and to what effect, has been a central focus of the coercive diplomacy literature. Coercive diplomacy refers to a specific form of state practice, short of war, involving the threat or the actual use of limited force which increases the risk of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Sweijs, The Use and Utility of Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy, Twenty-first Century Perspectives on War, Peace, and Human Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21303-8_1

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escalation to war in order to pressure an opposing party to comply with its demands. In coercive diplomacy, a coercing party (‘the coercer’) threatens another party (‘the target of coercion’) that it will face harm if it does not comply with the coercer’s demands. The key objective in coercive diplomacy is to attain political objectives while avoiding war. Coercive diplomacy involves backing ‘a demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be credible enough and potent enough to persuade him that it is in his interest to comply with the demand.’1 Interest in coercive diplomacy originated in the early days of the Cold War when the nascent nuclear rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union made the question of how to compel an opponent to do your will without having to resort to the large-scale use of military force pertinent.2 Back then groundbreaking work on the use of threats in negotiations was conducted by a group of American scholars working on issues of game theory and nuclear strategy at the RAND Corporation in the 1950s and 1960s. Daniel Ellsberg and Thomas Schelling published a number of seminal papers on the ‘art of coercion’ and the ‘diplomacy of violence’ that analysed the use of military potential to influence the opponent’s behaviour and ‘coerce his decision or choice’ through the threat of harm that could be imposed.3 They introduced the traditional distinction between deterrence and compellence, one that still prevails in Western strategic discourses although not necessarily in non-Western schools of thought.4 Deterrence refers to the act of dissuading an opponent to engage in a certain action. 1  Alexander L. George, ‘Introduction: The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’, in The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition, ed. Alexander L George and William E Simons, 2nd ed. (Westview Press, 1994), 2. 2  Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Third Edition, 3rd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 117–30, 165–78, 196–211, 216–19 esp. 3  Thomas C.  Schelling, Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword (Yale University Press, 2008), xiv, 2; Thomas C. Schelling, ‘An Essay on Bargaining’, The American Economic Review 46, no. 3 (1 June 1956): 281–306; Thomas C.  Schelling, ‘Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War’, Conflict Resolution 1, no. 1 (1 March 1957): 19–36; Thomas C.  Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1981); Daniel Ellsberg, ‘The Theory and Practice of Blackmail’ (Santa Monica California: RAND, 1968), http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P3883.html. 4  Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, ‘From Moscow with Coercion: Russian Deterrence Theory and Strategic Culture’, Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1–2 (23 February 2018), https:// doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1347872; Dean Cheng, ‘An Overview of Chinese Thinking About Deterrence’, in NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice, ed. Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs (The Hague: T.M.C.  Asser Press, 2021), 177–200, https://doi. org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_10.

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Compellence, on the other hand, refers to the act of persuading an opponent to commit a certain act that it otherwise would not consider. Whereas deterrence is ‘indefinite in its timing,’ compellence includes a deadline.5 Building on these theoretical expositions that were illustrated by historical examples, Alexander George, the doyen of the coercive diplomacy literature, further elaborated the study of ‘the use of intimidation, of one kind or another, in order to get others to comply with one’s wishes’ from the 1960s onwards, in the process coining what has become the standard term coercive diplomacy that is part of this book’s title.6 Early on, George distinguished between four types of coercive diplomacy: the try-and-see approach, the gradual turning of the screw, the tacit ultimatum, and the ultimatum.7 The try-and-see approach consists of a demand without any time frame or threat of punishment. In the gradual turning of the screw, a demand is issued with the explicit warning that punishment will be stronger in the absence of immediate compliance. The tacit ultimatum incorporates a demand and a punishment, but does not include a specific time frame, or may not even include the threat of a specific punishment if the threat is conveyed through actions rather than through words. The ultimatum, finally, is the strongest form of coercive diplomacy and incorporates a specific demand on the opponent, a time frame for compliance, and a punishment in case of non-compliance. Ever since, ultimata have been part of the discipline’s standard lexicon, even though systematic attempts to analyse ultimata have been, with some exceptions, few and far between.8 The overall logic of the argument explaining the purpose of ultimata is quite straightforward: coercers resort to ultimata in what is essentially a bargaining process, because rational actors typically prefer negotiated settlements over wars.9 Within that line of thinking, wars ‘usually begin when two nations disagree on their relative strength,’10 in a dispute over the division of goods. Wars result from decision makers’ inability to reach a settlement not just because they cannot determine relative strength but also due  Schelling, Arms and Influence, 73.  George, ‘Introduction: The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’, 2. 7  Alexander L. George, ‘Theory and Practice’, in The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition, ed. Alexander L George and William E Simons, 2nd ed. (Westview Press, 1994), 18. 8   Paul Gordon Lauren, ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’, International Studies Quarterly 16, no. 2 (1 June 1972): 131–65, https://doi.org/10.2307/3013977. 9  James D. Fearon, ‘Rationalist Explanations for War’, International Organization 49, no. 3 (1 July 1995): 400. 10  Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (London: Macmillan, 1973), 246. 5 6

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to uncertainty about each other’s valuation of the interests at stake and, as a corollary, about their willingness to fight over these interests.11 Ultimata then set a concrete anchor point in time, with which the coercer signals a commitment to a preferred outcome both to the opponent and to a wider audience, including domestic constituencies and potential international allies. In so doing, the coercer seeks to put pressure on the opponent, instil a sense of urgency, and convey their resolve. Clear demands leave the target of coercion little room to engage in ‘salami tactics’ and find a way around the commitment of the coercer, while the inclusion of a deadline prevents the target from delaying compliance, and the credible threat of harm will convince the target, ceteris paribus, that compliance is the best option.12 Ultimata constitute strong committing moves on the grounds that they express a public commitment that renders the threat credible through reputation costs.13 The committing effect of ultimata represents one chain in the logic of the argument concerning the use and utility of ultimata proposed by coercive diplomacy scholars. Ultimata unequivocally convey the coercer’s demands and impress the coercer’s resolve on the target. The coercer by ‘tying his hands’ puts his reputation on the line, which makes it less likely that the coercer will backtrack during the course of the conflict, because the coercer will then face punishment from domestic and international audiences.14 Coercers ­therefore knowingly create ‘audience costs’ allowing them to more credibly signal their resolve, because such a public commitment makes them  Fearon, ‘Rationalist Explanations for War’, 400.  Schelling, Arms and Influence, 66; 66–69; Lauren, ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’, 138–41; George, ‘Introduction: The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’, 18; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 29. 13  Schelling, Arms and Influence, 36–55. 14  James D.  Fearon, ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 68–90; James D. Fearon, ‘Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes’, The American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577–92; Alastair Smith, ‘International Crises and Domestic Politics’, The American Political Science Review 92, no. 3 (September 1998): 623–38.; see also Peter J. Partell and Glenn Palmer, ‘Audience Costs and Interstate Crises: An Empirical Assessment of Fearon’s Model of Dispute Outcomes’, International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 2 (June 1999): 389–405; Kenneth A.  Schultz, ‘Looking for Audience Costs’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 1 (February 2001): 32–60; Kenneth A.  Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Michael Tomz, ‘Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach’, International Organization 61, no. 04 (2007): 821–40, https:// doi.org/10.1017/S0020818307070282. 11 12

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less likely to back down.15 The existence and importance of domestic audience costs have generated criticism on different grounds, including lack of historical support for audience costs theory; the relatively small effect of audience costs with ‘the cost of empty threats’ being compared to ‘a penny not a pound’; the notion that military mobilisation is a much more important factor that also has hand-tying effects; and the fact that threats can also work without audience costs.16 In support of the argument that political leaders do face punishment from domestic audiences, authors have argued that threats that are either repudiated or carried out unsuccessfully carry significant costs. Political leaders who either lose a war or retreat, face the prospect of being voted out of office (in democracies) or forcibly removed from power (in democracies and autocracies), or at least forfeit the political capital needed to carry out their domestic political agenda.17 Moreover, coercive diplomacy scholars have singled out domestic support as an important condition for the success of coercive diplomacy. Whereas the loss of domestic support is described as making it harder for political leaders to pursue a strategy of coercive diplomacy, strong domestic support is seen as a contributing factor to the credibility of the threat and the will and ability of the coercer’s political leadership to execute the threat, which is likely to be taken into account by the target of the coercion.18 15  Fearon, ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests’, 69; see also Partell and Palmer, ‘Audience Costs and Interstate Crises’; Schultz, ‘Looking for Audience Costs’; Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy; Tomz, ‘Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations’, 830 esp. 16  Anne E. Sartori, ‘The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes’, International Organization 56, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 121–49; Branislav L.  Slantchev, ‘Military Coercion in Interstate Crises’, The American Political Science Review 99, no. 4 (1 November 2005): 544–45; Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard, ‘The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound’, American Political Science Review 105, no. 03 (2011): 437–56, https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541100027X; Marc Trachtenberg, ‘Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis’, Security Studies 21:1 (March 2012). 17  Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Gary Woller, ‘War and the Fate of Regimes: A Comparative Analysis’, The American Political Science Review 86, no. 3 (1992): 638–46, https://doi.org/10.2307/1964127; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, ‘War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability’, The American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1 December 1995): 841–55, https://doi.org/10.2307/2082512. 18  Alexander L George and William E Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions’, in The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition, ed. Alexander L George and William E Simons, 2nd ed. (Westview Press, 1994), 288. Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War, 35–42; Robert J. Art, ‘Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?’, in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 384–85.

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Similarly, international audience costs have been singled out to be important. Authors have argued that backing down from public commitments can damage a leader’s credibility and carry over time and into other fields.19 Although some have criticised this observation arguing that leaders assess the credibility of opponents from case to case, based on a combination of the interests at stake and the prevailing power balance,20 others argue that there are considerable methodological problems with such a conclusion21 and assert that reputations do matter.22 The role of the ultimatum as a signalling instrument, not only to the target of coercion but also to domestic and other international actors in order to get the target of coercion to comply, is generally agreed to be important. Paul Gordon Lauren, as well as Glenn Herald Snyder and Paul Diesing, for instance, has discussed how ultimata are instrumental in framing the terms of the conflict and rallying support for coercive diplomacy.23 Coercive diplomacy scholars have identified international support for the coercer and isolation of the target of coercion as important factors in the success of coercive diplomacy because, it is argued, a target of coercion is more likely to comply if the target does not receive any external assistance.24

19  Mark J. C. Crescenzi, ‘Reputation and Interstate Conflict’, American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (1 April 2007): 385–89, 394; Alexandra Guisinger and Alastair Smith, ‘Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 2 (April 2002): 175–80, esp; Paul K. Huth, ‘Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment’, Security Studies 7 (September 1997): 72–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429334. 20  Daryl G.  Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Cornell University Press, 2005), 20–28. 21  Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, ‘Reputation and Status as Motives for War’, Annual Review of Political Science 17, no. 1 (2014): 385, https://doi.org/10.1146/ annurev-polisci-071112-213421. 22  Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, ‘Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics’, International Organization 69, no. 2 (ed 2015): 473–95, https:// doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000393. 23  Lauren, ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’, 156–61; Glenn Herald Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 493. 24  George and Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions’, 284; Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War, 35–42; Lawrence Freedman, Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (Oxford University Press, USA, 1998), 14; Art, ‘Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?’, 371.

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Pursuing an ultimatum strategy is seen to be risky, however, because it significantly raises the possibility of war.25 Moreover, from a strictly military point of view, ultimata spoil any potential benefits to be derived from strategic surprise by giving the target of coercion advance warning. This is all the more the case since strategic surprise often results from disbelief on the part of the political leadership that an attack is afoot, instead of inadequate intelligence of an impending attack.26 If ultimata are used by the target of coercion to make defensive preparations and are associated with further escalation, it may seem that a prudent coercer may be ill advised to issue one. This would then be counterproductive from both a military and a political perspective as it either raises the cost of military intervention or leads to withdrawal with all the costs this potentially entails for the political leadership of the coercer. If, on the other hand, an ultimatum is met with compliance, it would certainly be preferable over war, because it allows the coercer to attain their strategic objectives without having to bear the costs and inherent uncertainties associated with using armed force. One of the central questions in the coercive diplomacy literature is therefore whether ultimata tend to be followed by compliance with the demands contained in the ultimatum or with rejection of the demands and escalation.27 It is no coincidence that George identified ultimata as important communicative tools in coercive bargaining processes. Across a range of academic disciplines outside of the coercive diplomacy literature, ultimata have been singled out as important devices in negotiations. Insights, 25  Lauren, ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’, 162; Alexander L.  George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (United States Institute of Peace, 1991), 72. 26  Richard Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Brookings Institution Press, 1983), 18. 27  Art, ‘Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?’; Barry M.  Blechman and Stephen S.  Kaplan, Force without War: U.S.  Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Brookings Institution Press, 1978); Barry M.  Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, ‘Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 1 (1 April 1999): 1–30, https://doi.org/10.2307/2657989; George and Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions’; Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War; Todd S.  Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 28, no. 4 (1 September 2011): 377–401, https://doi. org/10.1177/0738894211413066.

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derived from negotiation and crisis decision-making studies, game theory, and psychology, highlight the multifaceted role of ultimata in bargaining processes. Ultimata fulfil different functions, including establishing a position, signalling commitment, generating pressure and inducing stress, all with an eye towards gaining strategic advantage. Investigators of bargaining behaviour in interstate crises have called attention to ultimata as potential strategic instruments which are employed to affect the decision-making process of the opponent. Ole Holsti, for instance, observes that during crises, the use of ‘ultimata and threats with built in deadlines is likely to increase stress under which the recipient must operate.’28 Authors in the psychological crisis decision-making literature corroborate the view that time pressure-generated stress affects decision-making processes.29 They discuss the role of ultimata as a ‘stressor, emphasizing the mediating role of changes in affective state in influencing cognition.’30 High stress levels, others have argued, increase stereotyping, narrow attention spans, create groupthink, disrupt attempts at problem solving, and thwart the search for alternative courses of action.31 Decision makers are increasingly 28  Ole R Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War (Ontario: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1972), 14. 29  Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (Free Press, 1977), 81; pp. 53–54; 62; Ola Svenson and A. John Maule, Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision Making (Springer, 1993); Matthias Sutter, Martin Kocher, and Sabine Strauß, ‘Bargaining under Time Pressure in an Experimental Ultimatum Game’, Economics Letters 81, no. 3 (December 2003): 341–47, https://doi.org/16/S0165-1765(03)00215-5; Martin G.  Kocher and Matthias Sutter, ‘Time Is Money--Time Pressure, Incentives, and the Quality of Decision-­Making’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 61, no. 3 (November 2006): 375–92, https://doi. org/16/j.jebo.2004.11.013. 30  A. John Maule and Robert J. Hockey, ‘State, Stress and Time Pressure’, in Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision Making, ed. A. John Maule and Ola Svenson (Springer, 1993), 83. 31  Anne Edland and Ola Svenson, ‘Judgment and Decision Making Under Time Pressure Studies and Findings’, in Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision Making, ed. A. John Maule and Ola Svenson, (Springer, 1993), 30; 33; Ole R Holsti, ‘Perceptions of Time, Perceptions of Alternatives, and Patterns of Communication as Factors in Crisis Decision-Making’, Peace Research Society Papers III (1965): 7–12; Janis and Mann, Decision Making, 50; 51; 77–78; Dan Zakay, ‘The Impact of Time Perception Processes on Decision Making under Time Stress’, in Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision Making (Springer, 1993), 60. For an opposing view, see Michael Brecher, International Political Earthquakes (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008).

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c­ oncerned about time and time pressure, tend to increasingly focus on the immediate future, perceive fewer policy alternatives, and overestimate the opponent’s ability to strike swiftly. As a result, decision makers harbour a fatalistic notion of the inevitability of things to come which is not in their power to alter,32 even if it remains unclear whether, as Holsti observed, the generated ‘stress leads to aggression, appeasement, capitulation, attempts to withdraw from the situation, or other types of response.’33 The strategic studies literature has considered the role of time predominantly in the way time pressure affects decision makers’ timing to embark on wars as well as how the passage of time in interaction with other contextual variables, such as political domestic support and geography, shapes strategic behaviour during war.34 In the conflict resolution literature, it is asserted that even in the absence of immediate time pressure (when the deadline has a longer time horizon), ultimata affect decision-making processes through their so-called anchoring effects. William Zartman, for instance, mentions that in conflict resolution ‘when a deadline is set, the impending, rather than the recent, catastrophe is clearly a much more effective anchor.’35 Zartman’s thesis is supported by insights derived from game theory, psychology, negotiation studies, and decision-making sciences which suggest the importance of salience in negotiation situations and the role of various psychological

 Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War, 11–25, 117–123 esp.; Janis and Mann, Decision Making, 77–78. 33  Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War, 22. 34  T.  V. Paul, ‘Time Pressure and War Initiation: Some Linkages’, Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 28, no. 2 (June 1995): 255–76; Stuart Albert, ‘Towards a Theory of Timing: An Archival Study of Timing Decisions in the Persian Gulf War’, in Research in Organizational Behavior, vol. 17 (JAI Press, 1995); Olivier Schmitt, ‘Wartime Paradigms and the Future of Western Military Power’, International Affairs 96, no. 2 (1 March 2020): 401–18, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa005; Andrew Carr, ‘It’s about Time: Strategy and Temporal Phenomena’, Journal of Strategic Studies 44, no. 3 (16 April 2021): 303–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1529569. 35  I.  William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Oxford University Press, 1989), 233. 32

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biases which attach ultimata with anchoring effects.36 Neuroscientists Marc Wittmann and Martin Paulus have also hypothesised that symbolic deadlines activate various brain circuits, thereby affecting the ways in which subjects assess their salient options.37 Salience refers to a striking point or feature which makes it stand out from other options. Ultimata are intended to introduce salience by creating a reference point, around which the opponent weighs the advantages and disadvantages of its options. Setting an ultimatum is a way to assess, affect, and manipulate the reference point of the situation by the opponent and potential supporters in a multilevel signalling game. In this context, political scientist Jack Levy has

36  Peter Cramton and Joseph S. Tracy, ‘Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data’, Papers of Peter Cramton (University of Maryland, Department of Economics— Peter Cramton, 1992), 101–2, http://ideas.repec.org/p/pcc/pccumd/92aer.html; Rachel Croson, Terry Boles, and J.  Keith Murnighan, ‘Cheap Talk in Bargaining Experiments: Lying and Threats in Ultimatum Games’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (Elsevier, 2003), 152, http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v51y2003i2p143-159.html; Daniel Druckman, ‘Determinants of Compromising Behavior in Negotiation: A Meta-­ Analysis’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 3 (1994): 544; Edland and Svenson, ‘Judgment and Decision Making Under Time Pressure Studies and Findings’, 37; William Fuchs and Andrzej Skrzypacz, ‘Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information’, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, no. 4 (November 2013): 219–43, https:// doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.4.219; Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy, and Alvin E Roth, ‘Bargaining under a Deadline: Evidence from the Reverse Ultimatum Game’, Games and Economic Behavior (Elsevier, 2003), http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v45y2003i2p347-368. html; Werner Güth, M. V. Levati, and Boris Maciejovsky, ‘Deadline Effects in Experimental Bargaining—An Experimental Study’, International Game Theory Review 7, no. 2 (June 2005): 117–35; Jack S.  Levy, ‘Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations’, International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 105; Maule and Hockey, ‘State, Stress and Time Pressure’, 83; Alvin E Roth, J Keith Murnighan, and Francoise Schoumaker, ‘The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence’, American Economic Review 78, no. 4 (1988): 812–14; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, no. 4 (1 November 1991): 1039–61, https://doi.org/10.2307/2937956; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions’, The Journal of Business 59, no. 4 (oktober 1986): S251–78; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice’, Science, New Series, 211, no. 4481 (30 January 1981): 453–58; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’, Science, New Series, 185, no. 4157 (1974): 1124–31. 37  Marc Wittmann and Martin P. Paulus, ‘Temporal Horizons in Decision Making’, Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics 2, no. 1 (2009): 1–11, https://doi.org/10.1037/ a0015460.

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called for the construction of ‘a behavioural and framing equivalent to “signalling games” in game theory.’38 Across a range of academic disciplines, it has been empirically demonstrated that ultimata very often become focal points, with considerable effect on decision-making and negotiation processes. Although their effect is mediated by such variables as pay-off structures, power balances, and time pressure, ultimata are widely recognised as key instruments leveraged by bargaining actors to shape and affect bargaining processes. Both in laboratory experiments and in real-life situations, negotiation processes accelerate towards the deadline, with an increase in the number of offers parties make and the number of agreements reached shortly before the deadline, as various scholars have shown.39 Daniel Druckman, author of a meta-analysis of over twenty-five years of laboratory studies, has asserted that ‘all studies reviewed found quicker agreements’ when bargaining took place with a deadline.40 In the organisational sciences deadlines are acknowledged to be important instruments to set objectives, monitor performance, and boost productivity.41 Deadlines ensure that negotiations are not open-ended. This is singled out by game theorists as an important precondition for the settlement of negotiations and is also in line with Parkinson’s famous law, which states that ‘work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion.’42 These different insights, synthesised from a range of disciplines, underline the important, as well as the multifaceted, role of ultimata in coercive bargaining processes. The coercive diplomacy scholarship offers description as well as prescription: not only does it dissect the key factors theoretically and describe their (joint) occurrence empirically, but more often than not it derives  Levy, ‘Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations’, 105.  Cramton and Tracy, ‘Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining’, 101–2; Edland and Svenson, ‘Judgment and Decision Making Under Time Pressure Studies and Findings’, 37; Roth, Murnighan, and Schoumaker, ‘The Deadline Effect in Bargaining’, 812–14. 40  Druckman, ‘Determinants of Compromising Behavior in Negotiation’, 544. 41  Yitzhak Fried and Linda Haynes Slowik, ‘Enriching Goal-Setting Theory with Time: An Integrated Approach’, The Academy of Management Review 29, no. 3 (1 July 2004): 404–5, 407, https://doi.org/10.2307/20159051; Stephen Ghee-Soon Lim and J.  Keith Murnighan, ‘Phases, Deadlines, and the Bargaining Process’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 58, no. 2 (1994): 164; Edwin A. Locke et al., A Theory of Goal Setting & Task Performance (Prentice Hall College Div, 1990), 6–7, 262. 42  C.  Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson’s Law: Or, The Pursuit of Progress: With Ills. by O. Lancaster, 1958, 2; Schelling, Arms and Influence, 73. 38 39

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policy prescriptions, relating to the successful conduct of coercive diplomacy. Largely based on studies of US cases, the Cold War coercive diplomacy scholarship early on identified a limited set of favourable conditions that include the credibility of the threat, the clarity of the demands, a sense of urgency, the strength of motivation, the nature of interests at stake, domestic and international support, and the isolation of the adversary.43 The inclusion of deadlines is invariably seen to play an important role in creating a sense of urgency. The post-Cold War diplomacy scholarship further expanded the scope and depth of the original literature by considering more cases,44 greater geographical variation,45 and variation in the instruments and domains employed in coercive diplomacy,46 by examining particular combinations of favouring conditions in the post-Cold War period,47 the role of nuclear weapons,48 and the effect of various forms of verbal and physical signalling using formal theory;49 by highlighting the importance of interests for outcomes of coercive diplomacy cases in situations of asymmetric power;50 and by introducing finer differentiations in resolve to explain outcomes.51 Without exception, authors in the coercive diplomacy literature caution against generalising any of their findings, always pointing towards the importance of context.52

43  Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War, 107, esp.; Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, esp. 183-184, 191; George and Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions’, 279–88. 44  Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (United States Institute of Peace, 2003); Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’. 45  Lawrence Freedman, ‘Strategic Coercion’, in Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford University Press, USA, 1998). 46  Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause, eds., Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics, 1st edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018). 47  Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War. 48  Todd S.  Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, Reprint edition (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 49  Branislav L.  Slantchev, Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace, Illustrated edition (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 50  Phil Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States, 1st edition (Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2015). 51  Dianne Pfundstein Chamberlain, Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States, Illustrated edition (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016). 52  George, Forceful Persuasion, 82.

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The expansion and refinement of the literature has certainly expanded the discipline’s horizon in terms of both its scope and the methodological toolkit employed, yet has shed little light on the utility of ultimata. The initial contributions to the coercive diplomacy scholarship described the dynamics of coercive diplomacy in game theoretic terms using historical examples only by means of illustration. This came then to be complemented by a series of small N studies that took an inductive approach and eventually heralded the more recent appearance of studies encompassing a combination of approaches.53 However, the evolution and progress in the scholarship has not led to a rebuttal of the conventional wisdom that coercive diplomacy is a risky endeavour, even though the historical success rate of coercive diplomacy turns out to be mixed. Different scholars relying on different sets of cases and different selection criteria estimate that coercive diplomacy met with compliance by the target in around one out of four,54 two out of seven,55 one out of three,56 two out of five,57 one out of two,58 three out of four,59 and eleven out of thirteen60 of the cases they consider. With one exception (Sechser), all of these works consider only cases that involved the US as the coercer or as part of the coercing coalition (in effect selecting on the most powerful coercer, which may affect success rates), and took place in the post-Second World War era (see Table 1.1). With respect to the use of ultimata, conventional wisdom holds that even in the conduct of coercive diplomacy political leaders generally refrain from issuing explicit threats which tie their hands and publicly commit them to certain policies. Instead, it is often asserted that they are inclined to preserve freedom of action.61 With respect to the utility of ultimata, there is similarly quite some divergence of opinion about their overall success rate. Most authors agree that an important element of any strategy of 53  See also Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Coercive Diplomacy as Crisis Management’, in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, by Peter Viggo Jakobsen (Oxford University Press, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1624. 54  Art, ‘Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?’, 377. 55  George and Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions’, 269–70. 56  With an expanded dataset, see Art, ‘Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?’, 385. 57  Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, 389; Pfundstein Chamberlain, Cheap Threats, 70. 58  Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War, 87. Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War, 6, 172. 59  Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War, 87. 60  Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War, 131–32. 61  Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 214; Snyder and Borghard, ‘The Cost of Empty Threats’, 439; Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, 383.

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Table 1.1  Key coercive diplomacy works, period, focus, and success rate Author

Period

Focus

Success rate: compliance/total cases

Blechman and Kaplan (1978) George and Simons (1994) Jakobsen (1998)

1946–1975

US coercive diplomacy

1941–1991

US coercive diplomacy

24/33 (after 6 months) 13/33 (after 36 months) 2/7

1990–1995

Art (2003) Sechser (2011) Haun (2015) Pfundstein Chamberlain (2016)

1990–2001 1918–2001 1950–2011 1945–2007

Western coercive diplomacy US coercive diplomacy All states US coercive diplomacy US coercive diplomacy

11/13 5/16 87/210 11/23 8/19

coercive diplomacy is to instil a sense of urgency on the part of the target, in which the imposition of time constraints in the form of an ultimatum is instrumental. Some authors therefore consider ultimata to be indispensable elements of a strategy of coercive diplomacy. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, for instance, argues that ultimata belong to a limited set of critical success factors because they maximise threat credibility and reduce the likelihood of ‘misperception,’ ‘miscalculation,’ ‘delaying tactics,’ and ‘counter-­ coercion.’62 Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing assert that verbal threats contained in ultimata are strongly committing which may be issued either as a ‘prelude’ to war or instead as real coercive moves in a bargaining process,63 and Lawrence Freedman argues that ‘the military medium can rarely serve as the political message […] it has to be backed up by political communication’ whether or not in the form of an ultimatum.64 Others express doubt that ultimata exert any effect whatsoever and even find them to be counterproductive because of their purported escalatory risk. George and Simons consider ultimata to be the strongest form of coercive diplomacy but argue that they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for success. Lauren argues that ultimata are seldom successful and if they are only 62  Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 29. See also Blechman and Wittes, ‘Defining Moment’, 10, fn. 19. and Lauren, ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’, 162. 63  Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 215. 64  Freedman, ‘Strategic Coercion’, 1998, 33.

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in the presence of great power differentials.65 George calls for ‘other case work to present a more compelling argument,’66 while Todd Sechser asserts that further research is needed to assess the utility of ultimata.67 It is this gap in our knowledge pertaining to both the use and utility of ultimata that this book seeks to fill. The gap in the extant knowledge derives from two principal problems. The first problem concerns the very limited set of ultimata that has actually been considered. Coercive strategies involving an ultimatum, despite being invariably mentioned in works on coercive diplomacy, are seldom extensively empirically analysed. In fact, Lauren’s study looks at a variety of ultimata but does not offer a systematic empirical historical survey.68 In other scholarship ultimata are never the sole focus of the inquiry. The largest set considered by Snyder and Diesing consists only of six ultimata. These included Germany to Russia, 1909; Austria to Serbia, 1914; Germany to Russia, 1914; Germany to France, 1914; Germany to Czechoslovakia, 1938; and the US to the Soviet Union, 1962.69 Jakobsen considers ultimata used in the context of three conflicts in the post-Cold War era (‘the Gulf Conflict’ 1990–1991, ‘the Yugoslav Wars’ 1991–1995, and ‘Restoring Democracy in Haiti’ 1991–1994).70 In Robert Art and Patrick Cronin’s 2003 edited volume The United States and Coercive Diplomacy various authors do pay attention to the role of diplomacy by deadline including in case studies of Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. However, while the concluding chapter offers a systematic breakdown of the track record of coercive diplomacy success including the favouring conditions, there is no systematic assessment of the utility of ultimata. In other scholarship ultimata are not systematically examined. This belies the fact that they have featured quite prevalently, as I will show, as diplomatic instruments in interstate relations over the past century—but also before that period. The second problem lies with the fact that in line with the disciplinary focus of the coercive diplomacy, the extant scholarship relies on compliance with the demands contained in the ultimata as the sole lens through which to examine ultimata. The scholarship tries to identify a set of factors  Lauren, ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’, 162.  George and Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions’, 288. 67  Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, 383. 68  Lauren, ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’. 69  Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 215. 70  Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War, 131–32. 65 66

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and conditions that make compliance by the target more likely assuming that ultimata are necessarily intended to pressure the target of coercion into compliance. In that sense, ultimata are treated as constituting a single class category of phenomena, while the actual breadth and diversity of other purposes of ultimata are ignored. This is true despite the fact that some participants to the debate, especially Lauren, have acknowledged that coercers may issue ultimata for other ‘purposes,’71 including abiding by a convention ‘to fulfil obligatory warnings or customary procedure,’ whether or not in the form of a conditional war declaration.72 Additional purposes identified include raising an issue in a negotiation process, humiliating an opponent, and preparing one’s own population for war.73 In the crisis and crisis bargaining literature Richard Ned Lebow and Snyder and Diesing, amongst others, have made similar observations about the importance of distinguishing between different types of crises (Lebow) and threats (Snyder and Diesing) on the basis of a combination of purposes, interests, bargaining strategies, and power differences between the actors. Lebow, for instance, speaks of a ‘justification of hostility’ crisis initiated by leaders ‘not to force an accommodation but to provide a casus belli for war’ they have already decided upon.74 In fact, coercers may craft their ultimata so as to be practically impossible to comply with, and the ultimatum merely marks the prelude to further escalation, as also Snyder and Diesing have argued.75 Recognition of such broader purposes is in accordance with older treatments of the various purposes of final warnings in the Western tradition that, judging from the references cited in the coercive diplomacy literature, have generally been disregarded. As I will demonstrate in Chap. 2, a range of political, legal, moral, and religious purposes, as well as a mix thereof, feature quite prominently in reflections on the use and utility of ultimata in Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the early modern period (ca. 1500–1800) and even in the period until the early twentieth century. Ultimata were more than merely a scholarly topic of debate between  Lauren, ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’, 156.  Lauren, 159. 73  Lauren, 156–61. 74  Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 25. 75  Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 215. 71 72

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religious, diplomatic, and legal scholars of the past. In fact, political leaders in both Western and non-Western polities have issued ultimata across a variety of historical and strategic contexts for different purposes, which is largely ignored in the coercive diplomacy literature. This has created a gap in the scholarly understanding of the use and utility of ultimata specifically and of coercive behaviour in the interstate system more generally. These two principal problems, associated with the dearth of historical evidence considered in combination with the narrow concept of utility used, have not served the scholarly understanding of threat behaviour in the interstate system. In fact, they have obfuscated both the purposes, the functions and the effects for which political leaders deploy ultimata. In short, the extant literature mischaracterises the different purposes of ultimata while it has not studied enough of them. Ultimata, this book will show, are issued much more often and have an overall lower rejection rate than is generally assumed. Moreover, in case of rejection, coercers tend to be able to enforce their demands more often than not. From this, the book argues for the existence of different purposes to which ultimata are used and introduces a new typology of ultimata on the basis of a close analysis of ultimata issued over the past century.

Key Contributions This book thus makes three original contributions to the extant knowledge on the use and utility of ultimata. A Genealogy of Ultimata The first original contribution is a historical examination of how ultimata have featured in predominantly Western strategic, political, and legal thought since Antiquity until the present. The examination reveals the existence of a lively and long-standing scholarly debate on the role of final warnings in which scholars cite and discuss each other’s views over a period stretching almost two millennia. The examination provides a concise genealogy of ultimata that traces the lineage of the concept of ultimatum over time, even before the term ultimatum came to be frequently used

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from the early nineteenth century onwards.76 The historical examination reveals that ultimata have served a variety of purposes and fulfil multiple functions that have varied across strategic and historical contexts. The examination also corroborates the argument that a narrow concept of the utility of ultimata which exclusively hinges on the compliance of the target is one that has only gained currency in recent times, coinciding with the emergence of the coercive diplomacy literature after the Second World War. The examination therefore suggests that it is necessary to use a broader concept of utility that does justice to the different purposes for which ultimata are issued. Track Record of Ultimata on the Basis of a New Dataset The second contribution is the introduction of a comprehensive set of ultimata that includes eighty-seven ultimata issued in the period 1920–2020 which serves as the basis for two insights concerning the use and utility of ultimata. The compilation of cases that have thus far been largely ignored in the extant literature provides for a larger evidentiary base for other scholars of state threat behaviour to draw on. The set is compiled on the basis of an extensive examination of conflict encyclopaedias, annual surveys of international relations, media archives, diplomatic history books, and specific conflict case studies. Fully referenced case summaries of the eighty-seven ultimata accompanied by a spreadsheet with numerical data listing key characteristics of the episodes as well as an accompanying codebook are provided in online annexes at the website www.coercivediplomacy.com. The dataset presented in this book shows the breadth and diversity of ultimata and illustrates that political leaders issue ultimata for different purposes and with different effects across a wide variety of contexts. On the basis of this dataset, the analysis presented in this book therefore, first and foremost, demonstrates that political 76  Werner Braun, Démarche, Ultimatum, Sommation; eine diplomatisch völkerrechtliche Studie, (Berlin: G. Stilke, 1930), 46; Hans Asbeck, Das Ultimatum im modernen Völkerrecht. Studie. (Berlin-Grunewald: Rothschild, 1933), 5, fn 1; page 13. The term genealogy is used here first and foremost in its dictionary meaning of ‘the study and tracing of lines of descent’ Oxford Dictionary, ‘Genealogy—Definition of Genealogy in English’, Oxford Dictionaries | English, 4 March 2017, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/genealogy. This study does not represent a genealogical analysis in the Foucaultian tradition, even if it draws inspiration from Foucault’s characterisation of genealogy as focusing on the particular and the historical (see Foucault 1984, 76–77).

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leaders do deploy public and explicit threats in interstate relations that bind their hands to carry out courses of action by a certain moment in time. This specific manifestation of threat behaviour is more salient than has been previously assumed. Second, the analysis confirms that the general track record of such explicit threats in convincing targets to comply, despite being higher than previous authors have argued, is mixed at best. The compliance rate, I will show, is lower than one out of two. Ultimata led to compliance in 43 per cent of the cases and to partial compliance in another 7 per cent. In half of the cases the target of the ultimatum refused compliance. Ultimata can thus be said to constitute a relatively risky strategy for coercers. However, in most of the cases when coercers executed their threat, they have tended to be able to achieve their demands forcefully either after inflicting a limited form of punishment on the target or engaging in full escalation following the target’s refusal. Based on the historical evidence, it is therefore fair to say that ultimata generally constitute dangerous bargaining moves that, absent compliance, are likely to lead to further escalation and armed confrontation, yet that coercers are eventually likely to emerge successfully and achieve their demands. The analysis considers various coercive bargaining strategies used by the coercer and the target of coercion and examines factors that have been identified to favour compliance, including power differences, type of demands, demonstrations of force, type of coalitions, and isolation of the target of the coercion. Except for the relationship between isolation of the target of the coercion and compliance, simple bivariate statistical tests do not offer support for a statistically significant relationship between any of these factors and the decision of the target of coercion to comply. A Typology of Ultimata The combination of the historical survey of the eighty-seven ultimata and the quantitative analysis suggests that macro-level correlations conceal important differences between the purposes of the decision makers and the dynamics of the ultimata episodes. The third contribution is therefore a four-pronged typology that explains the various purposes and dynamics of ultimata. An important caveat needs to be added up front: the book does not treat ultimata as a dependent variable with the goal to identify independent variables that jointly explain variation in the dependent variable. The goal is neither to reach general conclusions about necessary or sufficient conditions under which decision makers resort to particular

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types of ultimata nor to identify general laws that explain the outcomes of all ultimata. What the typology and the accompanying analysis seek to corroborate is the notion that in issuing ultimata decision makers do not always seek—nor do they always expect—compliance by the target of coercion.77 The argument is therefore that assessing the utility of ultimata exclusively on these terms misses an important point. The typology makes clear that the utility of ultimata partly depends on the purposes for which they are issued which vary between the four different types and that assessing their utility should take these differences into account. On the basis of a structured focused comparison of the eighty-seven ultimata and existing typologies in the crisis management literature,78 the existence of the following four ultimata types is proposed: the dictate, the conditional war declaration, the bluff, and the brinkmanship ultimatum. The dictate announces a course of action that the coercer will see through either with or without the cooperation of the target of coercion. Dictates appear relatively frequent in the dataset and are not bound to one particular period. The coercer’s purpose is to achieve a set of objectives without having to fight over them, but in the absence of full compliance, the coercer is willing to do so. The coercer is confident that they are both willing and able to violently enforce their demands should the target of coercion refuse to comply, which the target of coercion is well aware of. The dictate thus constitutes a clear and unambiguous threat. The dictate therefore constitutes an announcement of what leans towards a fait accompli involving a take-it-or-leave-it warning. The conditional war declaration is a final warning preceding a declaration of war. The quintessential characteristic of the conditional war declaration is the fact that the coercer does not expect the final warning to lead to compliance. Rather the conditional war declaration is issued to show that the coercer has exhausted all options. It is an announcement that war is coming and is issued to satisfy a procedural notion of justness and abide by a diplomatic convention. Conditional war declarations appear not very often and are bound to the period leading up to the Second World War. The key point of conditional war declaration ultimata is therefore that they do not constitute compellent threats but are instead announcements that are issued for other purposes.  Building on arguments made by Lebow and Snyder and Diesing, see fn.74 &75.  Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 2005, 67. 77 78

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The bluff is issued by a coercer facing considerable pressure to act because important interests, such as political or military ones, are directly under threat. Weakness on the part of coercer is strongly associated with bluffs, but is not a definitional requirement. The coercer does not expect the target of coercion to comply. The target of coercion does not expect the coercer to be able to violently enforce their demands once the target of coercion refuses to comply. Bluffs are relatively rare. Issuing a bluff may seem irrational from the assumption that an ultimatum is intended to result in compliance. The leadership of the coercer may issue a bluff ultimatum because it wants to communicate that it does not shy away from a fight or because it seeks to distract attention from another issue in order to rally domestic support. The brinkmanship ultimatum, finally, is a coercive threat issued by a coercer that really intends to gain the target’s compliance with the coercer’s demands in a process characterised by a competition in risk taking. Brinkmanship ultimata appear relatively often throughout the period under consideration. The coercer is not merely announcing a course of action they have already decided upon and do not require the target’s cooperation for. The coercer actually plans to pressure the target of coercion into compliance. The ultimatum is intended to effect an actual change in the behaviour of the target, rather than pushing the target into not resisting the coercer’s advance. The coercer, in other words, either needs or wants the target of coercion to collaborate and uses the ultimatum as a signal that non-compliance will be very costly. The brinkmanship ultimatum is thus a genuine compellent threat that is intended to send a strongly committing signal in an ongoing bargaining process (see Table 1.2). The existence of these four types of ultimata is substantiated based on an empirical analysis of ultimata issued over the last century. The analysis makes clear their pivotal but multifaceted role in interstate threat behaviour. It provides a better understanding of the conditions under which decision makers issue unambiguous threats and the various purposes as well as the potential effects for which they tend to do so.

A Word on Method This book deliberately employs a multimethod approach. The examination of state threat behaviour is situated at the crossroads of diplomatic history, political science, and coercive diplomacy as a sub-field of strategic studies to arrive at a better understanding of the use and utility of ultimata

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Table 1.2  A typology of ultimata Type of ultimatum

Description

The Dictate

Announcement of a course of action already decided upon. The coercer’s purpose is to achieve their demands without having to fight. The coercer is confident that they are both able and ready to enforce their demands. This is a take-it-or-leave-it dictate. The coercer does not need the target’s cooperation. A final warning preceding a declaration of war. The coercer does not expect the warning to result in compliance. Sending an ultimatum shows that they have exhausted all their options and signals to their home population, their allies, and to opponents that war is coming. A threat issued by a coercer that is under considerable pressure to act because important interests are threatened. Weakness on the part of coercer is strongly associated with bluffs but is not a definitional requirement. The coercer does not expect the target of coercion to comply and is not able to enforce their demands. An ultimatum issued by a coercer as a strongly committing signal in an ongoing bargaining process intended to put pressure on the target. Fulfilment of the demands involves the cooperation of the target. The ultimatum may serve to bind an international coalition.

The Conditional War Declaration The Bluff

The Brinkmanship Ultimatum

in the contemporary and recent history of statecraft. In developing this argument, the book draws on diplomatic history, ‘to expand [...] the database’ and ensure that the specificities of ultimata episodes are taken into account;79 on political science, to identify similarities and differences between ultimata episodes; and on strategic studies in order to do justice to the dynamic nature of coercive bargaining processes. The study of the use of a strategic instrument in history is used to inform more general insights about the use and utility of that particular instrument. Various scholars have followed a similar approach. Lebow, for instance, has observed that the scholarly study of a phenomenon such as interstate threat behaviour benefits from drawing on multiple perspectives.80 Lebow, as well as others cited below, have argued that the study of the use and the utility of ultimata cannot be conducted ahistorically but should be sensitive to historical context. The approach thus straddles different disciplines 79  John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies’, International Security 12, no. 1 (1987): 3–21. 80  Lebow, Between Peace and War, ix–x.

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in that it seeks to identify patterns rooted in the careful study of historical incidences of ultimata without purporting to establish general laws. On the basis of an in-depth examination of historical ultimata, it examines overall trends and regularities at the level of the key factors involved across different ultimata and then offers a typology of ultimata based on a comparison of dynamics across subsets of cases. This approach is more common in this field of study. Lauren, the only scholar who dedicated a single study to ultimata, suggests two approaches to linking the study of diplomatic history to strategic theory: the first is through extensive case study and the second by taking on one strategic concept and analysing it across different situations in order to enhance our understanding of its meaning and establish its importance to strategic studies.81 At the juncture of political science and strategic studies numerous works have taken one particular strategic concept and examined it across multiple cases.82 Findings derived from such an approach can serve as the building blocks of a ‘middle-range theory.’ Middle-range theories, according to George and Bennet, are deliberately limited in scope; they attempt to explain different subclasses of general phenomena. Middle-range theories attempt to formulate well-­ specified conditional generalizations of more limited scope.83

These theories consist of conditional generalisations and typological theories, a combination of ‘typologies,’ or overviews of different variants of a phenomenon, and ‘theories.’ Researchers using these typological theories ‘seek to identify the various causal mechanisms and pathways that link the independent variables of each “type”, or cell in a typology, with its  Lauren, ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’, 134.  In addition to the works cited in the introduction, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Walter J.  Petersen, ‘Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom’, International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 3 (1 September 1986): 269–94, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600418; Michael Brecher, International Political Earthquakes (University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor, 2008), http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780472024018?auth=0; James L.  Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers Since the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Gordon A. Craig, ‘The Historian and the Study of International Relations’, The American Historical Review 88, no. 1 (1983): 9, https://doi. org/10.2307/1869342. 83  George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 266. 81 82

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outcome.’84 Such typological theories are not meant to be general explanatory theories of wide-ranging phenomena. Instead, they provide mid-­ level explanations of particular phenomena, in this case, by explaining a particular variant rather than all variants of coercive diplomacy.85 Rather than selecting a limited number of cases, an attempt was made to identify as many ultimata as possible issued in the period 1920–2020. This period was selected both to limit the examination of the utility of ultimata to those issued in modern interstate coercive diplomacy and to allow for variation in boundary conditions that affect their use. Views on the legitimacy of armed force, after all, evolved quite considerably in the first half of the twentieth century with ultimata, as we will see, becoming increasingly disconnected from war declarations between the two World Wars. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the greater destructiveness of interstate war shifted attention from Western strategists and practitioners towards coercive diplomacy. Ultimata came to be utilised as diplomatic instruments of strategic coercive diplomacy instead of war declarations. The period 1920–2020 makes it possible to analyse the utility of ultimata across multiple strategic eras and international systems that featured both continuity and change in the uses and purposes of ultimata, including most of the Interwar Period (1920–1939), the Cold War (1945–1989), and the post-Cold War era (1989–present). Existing datasets such as the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset and the Militarized Compellent Threat (MCT) have been used as sources to identify ultimata, in addition to other sources. At the time when the research started, ICB provided case summaries of 470 interstate crises issued between 1918 and 2013,86 but the majority of the incidents in the ICB dataset did not involve coercive diplomacy, and if they did, then the case summaries did not furnish the necessary information to evaluate the dynamics of coercion in sufficient depth. Also, sometimes ultimata were identified when closer inspection revealed that no ultimata had been issued such as in the 1998 Turkey-Syria crisis. The MCT dataset, in turn, contains 210 militarised compellent threat cases, defined as ‘an explicit demand by one state (the challenger) that another state (the target) alter the status quo in some material way, backed by a threat of military force if  George and Bennett, 230, 234.  George and Bennett, 64, 235–37. 86  International Crisis Behavior, ‘ICB Project’, ICB Project, 2016, http://sites.duke.edu/ icbdata/. 84 85

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the target does not comply.’87 The MCT therefore in theory covers a more general category of coercive threats, of which ultimata constitute a more specific subset. The 0.9 version of the MCT dataset provided data but did not offer any case summaries.88 So in addition, a large assortment of sources was consulted to identify ultimata in interstate coercion, including, as noted, annual overviews of international affairs, conflict encyclopaedias, numerous works on coercive diplomacy, media archives of English language newspapers, and conflict and crisis datasets. Sources include the Annual Survey of International Affairs created by the Royal Institute of International Affairs for the period 1920–1963 (1920–1945 by reading each and every volume, 1946–1963 by using the digital search term ‘ultimatum’), the digitised records of Keesing’s Archives for the period 1945–2015 (using the term ‘ultimatum’), the Digital New  York Times Archives, the records of ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Guardian and The Observer using the terms ((‘ultimatum OR deadline’) AND (‘conflict OR crisis OR threat*’)) for the period 1920–2015, complemented later on, with a search for the years 2015–2020 ((‘ultimatum OR deadline’) AND (‘conflict OR crisis’)). The search terms for these media sources were slightly more restrictive in order to identify ultimata issued in interstate conflict and exclude as many ultimata as possible that were issued in other contexts (for example in labour union negotiations). Following that initial search, diplomatic history, conflict surveys and conflict encyclopaedias, and key coercive diplomacy works were researched.89 Concise case summaries varying between half a page and four pages were prepared for every single one of the ultimata that were identified, relying predominantly on secondary sources, including both book-length studies and articles, prepared by diplomatic historians and conflict scholars. Sometimes, if readily available, official primary documents are also cited.  Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, 380.  Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’; Sechser, ‘Replication Data for: Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918-2001’. 89  In addition to the ones mentioned in this chapter, these included Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, International Conflict a Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management, 1945-1995 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997); Robert Lyle Butterworth and Margaret E. Scranton, Managing Interstate Conflict, 1945-74: Data with Synopses (University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1976); Erik Goldstein, Wars and Peace Treaties 1816-Present (Routledge, 1992); John E. Jessup, An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1945-1996 (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998). 87 88

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This is common practice in such comparative undertakings, because of the time-intensive nature of archival work. Political scientist and sociologist Theda Skocpol, for instance, in making the case for this approach, has argued: A dogmatic insistence on redoing primary research for every investigation would be disastrous; it would rule out most comparative-historical research. If a topic is too big for purely primary research—and if excellent studies by specialists are already available in some profusion—secondary sources are appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a given study. Using them is not different from survey analysts reworking the results of previous surveys rather than asking all questions anew […].90

The historian Paul Schroeder, in turn, emphasises the importance of having a solid historical grounding in the subject under consideration. He finds it particularly troubling in these regards that many political scientists, instead of relying on the work of historians, use the historical work of other political scientists, invoking, in colourful terms, the image of ‘brewing tea from already used tea bags.’91 John H. Goldthorpe has pointed out a more principled problem. He argues that historical research in itself yields an interpretation of the ‘relics’ of history rather than a plain description of mere facts.92 Researchers drawing on these interpretations must therefore possess thorough knowledge of the primary sources in order to be able to justify choices for one particular source over another. In response to Goldthorpe’s principled objections, Ian Lustick has proposed that researchers need to acknowledge that historical works are creations rather than discoveries and that this poses challenges ‘for social science consumers of historical monographs, associated with the unavailability in those monographs of a transparently true and theoretically neutral historical record.’93 Lustick admits that there is no simple solution to this problem. 90  Theda Skocpol, ‘Emerging Agenda and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology’, in Vision and Method in Historical Sociology, ed. Skocpol, Theda (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 382. See also the discussion in John H.  Goldthorpe, ‘The Uses of History in Sociology: Reflections on Some Recent Tendencies’, The British Journal of Sociology 42, no. 2 (1991): 224–25, https://doi.org/10.2307/590368. 91  Paul Schroeder, ‘History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit’, International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 71, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539329. 92  Goldthorpe, ‘The Uses of History in Sociology’, 213, 221–24 esp. 93  Ian S.  Lustick, ‘History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias’, The American Political Science Review 90, no. 3 (1996): 613, https://doi.org/10.2307/2082612.

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First and foremost, it is therefore important that researchers are aware of this and proceed carefully in picking their sources and their ‘construction of stylized background narratives.’94 Amongst the different strategies proposed by Lustick ‘quasi-triangulation’ has been employed: case summaries are based on descriptions where the historical sources consulted concurred, an approach which Lustick finds acceptable for ‘simple and discrete comparative historical case studies.’95 These cases have then been analysed using both quantitative and qualitative methods. A case ‘survey method’ has been used to aggregate findings from a ‘heterogeneous collection of case studies,’ for the purposes of both theory building and theory refinement.96 Quantitatively, the absolute and relative frequency between a limited set of variables that have generally been recognised as affecting the outcome of coercive diplomacy has been mapped, and Fisher’s exact tests were run using the statistical analysis software program Stata version 14 to assess whether the relationship between these variables and outcomes is statistically significant. Fisher’s exact test is generally used to test relationships between categorical data (such as power differences between the coercer and the target of coercion and the outcome of coercive diplomacy) in smaller sets of observations.97 The results are described in Chap. 6. Qualitatively, building on the logic of the case survey method, the method of ‘structured focused comparison’ has been applied to analyse all cases on the basis of a series of standardised questions. This allows for the ‘systematic comparison and [ac]cumulation of the findings of the cases possible.’98 The approach taken is ‘focused’ in that it considers only specific aspects of cases. Simple truth tables have been created and typologies derived based on particular combinations of factors, which are associated with both incidences and outcomes of ultimata, leveraging John Stuart  Lustick, 614.  Lustick, 615–16. 96  Robert K. Yin and Karen A. Heald, ‘Using the Case Survey Method to Analyze Policy Studies’, Administrative Science Quarterly 20, no. 3 (1975): 371, https://doi. org/10.2307/2391997. 97  Janet Taylor Spence et  al., Elementary Statistics, 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1983), 239–48; J. Parry Lewis and Alasdair Traill, Statistics Explained (Harlow, England; Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1999), 405–6, 414, 419, http://trove.nla.gov. au/version/10822837; J.H. McDonald, Handbook of Biological Statistics, 3rd ed. (Sparky House Publishing, 2014), 77–85, http://www.biostathandbook.com/fishers.html. 98  George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 67. 94 95

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Mill’s methods of difference and agreement.99 However, as Ragin has asserted in more recent times, ‘different causes combine in different and sometimes contradictory ways to produce roughly similar outcomes in different settings.’100 This, as other scholars, especially those specialising in small N methodologies have argued, should serve as a caution to researchers intending to use these methods.101 Such an approach also implies a deterministic world view, in which causes are either necessary or sufficient (or neither or both), rather than a probabilistic one, in which factors contribute to a certain outcome, instead of determining them.102 Because context is important to understanding the dynamics of ultimata in coercive diplomacy, ‘pattern matching’ and a light form of ‘process tracing’ have been applied.103 Through pattern matching, causal mechanisms were identified on the basis of the cross-case comparison of different ultimata episodes to identify insights that were also found in other episodes.104 Through process tracing in the analysis of the individual cases, causal mechanisms have been identified by mapping steps in the causal chain of episodes.105 Fully referenced descriptions for each and every single one of the eighty-seven episodes rather than only for a select few made it possible to make better-informed judgements about potential similarities and 99  John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (John W.  Parker, 1843), 450–63. 100  Charles Ragin, ‘Turning the Tables: How Case-Oriented Research Challenges Variable-­ Oriented Research’, in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. David Collier and Henry E.  Brady (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 134; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, ‘The Importance of Research Design’, in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. David Collier and Henry E.  Brady (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 87; Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, 506–7. 101  Stanley Lieberson, ‘Small N’s and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases’, Social Forces 70, no. 2 (1 December 1991): 312–15, 318-319 esp., https://doi.org/10.2307/2580241. For the seminal piece, see Arend Lijphart, ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’, The American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 693, https://doi.org/10.2307/1955513 102  James Mahoney, ‘Strategies of Causal Inference in Small-N Analysis’, Sociological Methods & Research 28, no. 4 (1 May 2000): 396, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0049124100028004001. 103  Mahoney, 409. 104  Mahoney, 410. 105  George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 147, 153.

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­ issimilarities of cases that did not solely rely on any abstract characterisd tics. It also allowed for a clustering of ultimata in four different types for which the aforementioned ‘well-specified conditional generalizations of more limited scope’ are offered rather than general laws that apply to all ultimata.106 This multimethod approach is intended to strengthen the robustness of the research findings presented here.

Structure of This Book This book is organised as follows: Chap. 2 offers an intellectual genealogy of the ultimatum from Antiquity up until the Second World War. The chapter surveys the different purposes they served in previous times, situating the coercive diplomacy literature’s focus on compliance with ultimata as the product of a particular historical period. As such, it also lays the foundations for the development of the typology in the second part of the book. Chapter 3 in turn reviews how the coercive diplomacy literature has analysed ultimata, and it contextualises the two principal gaps within the current state of knowledge regarding the use and utility of ultimata. Chapter 4 describes the data collection and coding procedures. Chapter 5 presents a brief survey of ultimata issued in the period 1920–2020 to fill the existing empirical gap. Chapter 6 provides a number of descriptive statistics of the use and utility of ultimata building on general factors identified in the coercive diplomacy literature. Chapter 7 presents and explains the four-pronged typology of ultimata, which are subsequently described in Chaps. 8–11 using an assortment of historical examples. Chapter 12, finally, synthesises and discusses the principal insights on the use and ultimata arrived at in this book.

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Gaddis, John Lewis. ‘Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies’. International Security 12, no. 1 (1987): 3–21. George, Alexander L. Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. United States Institute of Peace, 1991. George, Alexander L. ‘Introduction: The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’. In The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition, edited by Alexander L George and William E Simons, 2nd ed. Westview Press, 1994a. George, Alexander L. ‘Theory and Practice’. In The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition, edited by Alexander L George and William E Simons, 2nd ed. Westview Press, 1994b. George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 2005. George, Alexander L, and William E Simons. ‘Findings and Conclusions’. In The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition, edited by Alexander L George and William E Simons, 2nd ed. Westview Press, 1994. George, Alexander L., and Richard Smoke. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. Gneezy, Uri, Ernan Haruvy, and Alvin E Roth. ‘Bargaining under a Deadline: Evidence from the Reverse Ultimatum Game’. Games and Economic Behavior. Elsevier, 2003. http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v45y2003i2p347-­368.html. Goldstein, Erik. Wars and Peace Treaties 1816-Present. Routledge, 1992. Goldthorpe, John H. ‘The Uses of History in Sociology: Reflections on Some Recent Tendencies’. The British Journal of Sociology 42, no. 2 (1991): 211–30. https://doi.org/10.2307/590368. Greenhill, Kelly M., and Peter Krause, eds. Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics. 1st edition. New  York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018. Guisinger, Alexandra, and Alastair Smith. ‘Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises’. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 2 (April 2002): 175–200. Güth, Werner, M.  V. Levati, and Boris Maciejovsky. ‘Deadline Effects in Experimental Bargaining—An Experimental Study’. International Game Theory Review 7, no. 2 (June 2005): 117–35. Haun, Phil. Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States. 1st edition. Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2015. Holsti, Ole R. Crisis, Escalation, War. Ontario: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1972. Holsti, Ole R. ‘Perceptions of Time, Perceptions of Alternatives, and Patterns of Communication as Factors in Crisis Decision-Making’. Peace Research Society Papers III (1965): 79–120.

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Huth, Paul K. ‘Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment’. Security Studies 7 (September 1997): 72–99. https://doi. org/10.1080/09636419708429334. International Crisis Behavior. ‘ICB Project’. ICB Project, 2016. http://sites. duke.edu/icbdata/. Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. Janis, Irving L., and Leon Mann. Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment. Free Press, 1977. Jessup, John E. An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1945-1996. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998. King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. ‘The Importance of Research Design’. In Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, edited by David Collier and Henry E. Brady. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004. Kocher, Martin G., and Matthias Sutter. ‘Time Is Money--Time Pressure, Incentives, and the Quality of Decision-Making’. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 61, no. 3 (November 2006): 375–92. 16/j.jebo.2004.11.013. Lauren, Paul Gordon. ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’. International Studies Quarterly 16, no. 2 (1 June 1972): 131–65. https://doi.org/10.2307/ 3013977. Lebow, Richard Ned. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. Levy, Jack S. ‘Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations’. International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 87–112. Lewis, J. Parry, and Alasdair Traill. Statistics Explained. Harlow, England; Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1999. http://trove.nla.gov.au/version/10822837. Lieberson, Stanley. ‘Small N’s and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases’. Social Forces 70, no. 2 (1 December 1991): 307–20. https://doi.org/10.2307/2580241. Lijphart, Arend. ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’. The American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 682–93. https://doi. org/10.2307/1955513. Lim, Stephen Ghee-Soon, and J. Keith Murnighan. ‘Phases, Deadlines, and the Bargaining Process’. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 58, no. 2 (1994): 153–71. Locke, Edwin A., Gary P. Latham, Ken J. Smith, and Robert E. Wood. A Theory of Goal Setting & Task Performance. Prentice Hall College Div, 1990. Lustick, Ian S. ‘History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias’. The American Political Science Review 90, no. 3 (1996): 605–18. https://doi.org/10.2307/2082612.

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CHAPTER 2

A Genealogy of Ultimata

Introduction Ultimata have been employed by political and military leaders in conflicts throughout history. Even before the term came to be commonly used from the nineteenth century onwards, ultimata featured as final warnings issued prior to either the declaration of war or the actual initiation of violent hostilities. These final warnings typically contained a series of grievances and demands, an explicit or implicit time limit for compliance, and a threat of punishment. Their purpose was not only to convince, or rather coerce, an opponent while avoiding war but also to communicate and legitimise the violent course of action set upon by giving an opponent fair warning in advance. Consideration of ultimata from a broader historical perspective offers a better understanding of the various functions and purposes they have been ascribed in different strategic contexts. This chapter offers a concise ‘genealogy’ of the ultimatum by providing an overview of how this concept has featured in a Western scholarly discussion that stretches out over two millennia. The term genealogy is used in its dictionary meaning to reflect this chapter’s focus on tracing the ‘lines of descent.’1 Its use should not be taken to imply that this is a genealogical 1  Oxford Dictionary, ‘Genealogy—Definition of Genealogy in English’, Oxford Dictionaries | English, 4 March 2017, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/genealogy.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Sweijs, The Use and Utility of Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy, Twenty-first Century Perspectives on War, Peace, and Human Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21303-8_2

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analysis in the tradition of the twentieth-century French philosopher Michel Foucault, even if it draws inspiration from Foucault’s characterisation of genealogy as focusing on the particular and the historical.2 The historical examination, with its long time frame, reveals that ultimata have served a variety of purposes and fulfil multiple functions that have varied across strategic and historical contexts. The term ultimatum derives from Western roots, as I will show, but the use of ultimata has been confined neither to Western polities nor to the Westphalian era. In fact, ultimata appear in many conflicts between non-­ Western polities, issued in often elaborately ritualised ceremonies. Such ceremonies not only served to send a signal to opponents and to domestic audiences, but were also meant to elicit the approval of the gods. Ultimata are typically tangentially discussed in scholarship addressing war declarations and war commencement.3 The Aztecs, for example, around 1500 current era (CE), were willing to trade in strategic surprise and any potential benefits to be derived from it, for the chance of achieving their strategic objectives without having to wage war. The Aztecs therefore publicly presented their opponents with a series of three warnings to submit to their demands through emissaries. The first and second warnings targeted the political leadership of the opponent, each warning followed by a twenty-day interval. The third and final warning was directed at the military leadership. The warnings were accompanied by an assortment of gifts—swords and shields. If the opponent still failed to comply, the Aztecs would attack.4 The notion of a final warning that conveys a set of demands, a threat of punishment, and a temporal delay prior to the launch of hostilities also appears in conflicts in other places and periods. Frederic Baumgartner reports that the practice surfaced in the Middle East in the seventh century CE, where the successors of Muhammed typically issued a final 2  Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 76–77. 3  Frederic J. Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Maurice Rea Davie, The Evolution of War: A Study of Its Rôle in Early Societies / by Maurice R. Davie, Yale Publications in Economics, Social Science and Government 1 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press; London, 1929), chap. L; Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 4  Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 26–27; Davie, The Evolution of War, 295; Rudolf Holsti, The Relation of War to the Origin of the State (Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1914), 41.

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warning to their opponents to surrender before initiating hostilities three days later.5 In West Africa (in present-day Nigeria) the Gannawari tended to observe what fellow tribes referred to as a ‘knife-sharpening’ period of three days prior to launching an attack.6 Baumgartner relates how chiefs in East Africa (in present-day Tanzania) sent final warnings by dispatching a messenger who presented the opponent with a bullet and a shovel. If the opponent opted for the shovel, it signalled its willingness to negotiate about any demands put to it. If not, violent hostilities ensued.7 Likewise, in Australia, the Kaiabara tribe sent a boomerang with a shell attached to it, to the enemy. The latter would either accept both items and indicate a time and place for battle or return the boomerang and break the shell on a stone indicating surrender.8 In South East Asia, the Malays’ way of declaring war was described as issuing a ‘legal demand bound with a threat,’ thereby leaving the opponent a way out.9 Similar customs existed amongst Indian tribes in Columbia.10 These examples are illustrative rather than exhaustive of the prevalence of the practice of providing opponents with a final warning. In places as far flung as Bangladesh, Taiwan, Indonesia, New Guinea, the Fiji Islands, Honduras, and California, it was customary for tribes to present formal notice prior to attacking, although it is unclear whether in these cases, the notice was merely meant as an announcement of the war already decided upon or as an actual final warning to comply with a set of demands.11 Various observers, including Johan van der Dennen, remark that final warnings were bestowed upon enemies only in ritual forms of war, which tended to be less lethal—but not necessarily more prevalent—than their non-ritual variety.12 It is not entirely clear when the term ultimatum entered the Western diplomatic lexicon. It is likely that the term was not used prior to the seventeenth century, only gaining more frequent deployment in the early  Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe, 19.  Davie, The Evolution of War, 292. 7  Davie, 292. 8  Davie, 294–95. 9  Davie, 293. 10  Holsti, The Relation of War to the Origin of the State, 40–41. 11  Holsti, 40–41. 12  Johan MG van der Dennen, ‘Ritualized “Primitive” Warfare and Rituals in War: Phenocopy, Homology, Or…?’, Default Journal, 2005, 15; Davie, The Evolution of War, 294; Holsti, The Relation of War to the Origin of the State, 23; Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 29, 41. 5 6

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nineteenth century.13 In this period, an ultimatum merely referred to the final statement or a final demand in negotiations, reflecting its origin in the Latin word ultimus.14 As will be discussed, however, the use and utility of ultimata was already a topic of discussion, in writings that have been preserved from Antiquity onwards, even if the term ultimatum was not yet in existence. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the meaning of the term ultimatum evolved in diplomatic and popular parlance. The ultimatum came to be defined as a set of specific demands accompanied by a deadline and a threat that typically, but not necessarily, involved the use of armed force should the recipient of the ultimatum reject the demand.15 Until the early twentieth century, diplomats and legal scholars debated whether ultimata were similar to war declarations, a similarity that was ultimately rejected. While ultimata reached their heyday in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they persist as tools of modern statecraft, even though official war declarations largely disappeared after the Second World War.16 With war increasingly considered taboo as a way of settling state disputes, the attention of practitioners and strategists shifted towards new ways of attaining national strategic objectives short of actually going to war. From then onwards, ultimata were increasingly and

13  Werner Braun, Démarche, Ultimatum, Sommation; eine diplomatisch völkerrechtliche Studie, (Berlin: G. Stilke, 1930), 46; Hans Asbeck, Das Ultimatum im modernen Völkerrecht. Studie (Berlin-Grunewald: Rothschild, 1933), 5, fn. 1, 13. 14  Online Etymology Dictionary, ‘“Ultimatum”’, Online Etymology Dictionary, 22 March 2017, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=ultimatum. 15  Asbeck, Das Ultimatum im modernen Völkerrecht. Studie—Berlin-Grunewald, v–vii; Ernest Mason Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (London, Longmans, 1932), 100, http://archive.org/details/guidetodiplomati00satouoft. This observation is supported by a reading of a sample of descriptions of ultimata in the early 1800s that appeared in popular English language media; see ProQuest Historical Newspapers, ‘Advanced Search: “ultimatum” in ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Guardian and The Observer’, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, 22 March 2017, https://search.proquest.com/hnpguardianobserver/results/2CFE87E0A5A84B16PQ/1?accountid=11862; see also Stefan Kadelbach, ‘Ultimatum’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Max Planck, October 2015), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199 231690-e422. 16  Brien Hallett, The Lost Art of Declaring War, 1st paperback (University of Illinois Press, 1998); Tanisha M. Fazal, ‘Why States No Longer Declare War’, Security Studies 21, no. 4 (October 2012): 557–93, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2012.734227. See also Oona A.  Hathaway et  al., ‘War Manifestos’, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY, 15 September 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3037538.

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predominantly considered as part of coercive diplomatic strategies in the context of interstate conflict. In the course of the evolution of conventions, practices, and laws of armed conflict from before the current era (BCE) up to the present, practitioners and scholars have thus reflected on various aspects of ultimata. The current chapter provides a synthetic and concise overview of these reflections. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part offers an examination of views on ultimata tracing a lineage that runs from Antiquity to the Second World War. Presented in a chronological order, this part touches upon a number of principal themes including the status, the morality, the legality, and the strategic utility of ultimata. The purpose of the historical examination in the first part of the chapter is to highlight the existence of various functions and purposes of ultimata that have been discussed outside the realm of the coercive diplomacy literature.

Ultimata from Antiquity Until the Second World War Ultimata in Antiquity In the Western tradition, issuing final warnings has been part of a long practice whose origins trace back to Ancient Rome. In Ancient Rome, declaring war was circumscribed by a detailed set of rules, which included providing the opponent with a final warning. Roman leaders, prior to declaring war and launching an attack, dispatched a group of four heralds to the opponent spearheaded by the chief herald who bore the title pater patratus (literally: the ‘chief of completion’17). The heralds belonged to an advisory body of priests called the fetiales who advised Roman senators on international affairs and were responsible for declaring war. Upon arrival, the chief herald issued a formal demand for satisfaction (the rerum repetition or clarigatio) to the opponent accompanied by a threat of military punishment. The opponent was then given thirty days to respond. After that period, the chief herald called on the Gods to witness the unjustness of the opponent and its refusal to comply with Rome’s demands (the testatio deorum). Three days later, he issued a formal war declaration—after 17  Roger Pearse, ‘The Office of “Pater Patratus” in Roman Religion’, Roger Pearse (blog), 21 February 2013, n. 5, http://www.roger-pearse.com/weblog/2013/02/21/the-officeof-pater-patratus-in-roman-religion/.

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a war vote in the Senate—followed by the symbolic act of throwing a spear into enemy territory (the indictio belli).18 In later times, war was voted upon prior to the communication, the waiting period was abolished, and failure to comply triggered an immediate war declaration.19 The fetial process satisfied a notion of justness as it provided opponents with either a way out of war or else ample warning time to prepare for war. Rich criticises that view claiming that the procedure was propagated by Roman writers and portrayed to be standard practice, whereas the presentation of ultimata was the exception rather than the rule.20 Roman politician and author Cicero asserted in the first century BCE—in a phrase that future scholars would cite over and over again—that ‘no war is just, unless it is entered upon after an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or warning has been given and a formal declaration made.’21 The Romans built on traditions descended from the Hellenic world, where inter-polity relations were bound by various diplomatic conventions even if these conventions were not as thoroughly codified yet as in later times.22 In the Hellenic world a war that started without prior warning was called polemos akeryktos (literally: a ‘war without herald’), which was considered to be a separate and reprehensible category of war.23 Notwithstanding such apprehensions, both the Greeks and the Romans regularly commenced wars without sending a final warning first, not only against barbarians for whom the prior notification was not considered necessary, but also in civil wars, in wars of self-defence, and in situations where 18  Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 27; Claude Eilers, Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World (BRILL, 2009), 21–24; Dimitar Apasiev, ‘Imperium Militiae (I)’, Iustinianus Primus Law Review 1, no. 8 (2014): 4–5; Yvon Garlan, La Guerre Dans l’Antiquité, 3e éd. revue et augmentée (Paris: Nathan Université, 1999), 30–31. 19  Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 28; F. W. Walbank, ‘Roman Declaration of War in the Third and Second Centuries’, Classical Philology 44, no. 1 (1949): 18; J. W. Rich, Declaring War in the Roman Republic in the Period of Transmarine Expansion (Latomus, 1976), 58–59. 20  Rich, Declaring War in the Roman Republic in the Period of Transmarine Expansion, 58, 103–6. 21  Marcus Tullio Cicero, ‘Cicero: De Officiis’, www.constitution.org, 22 March 2017, para. 36, http://www.constitution.org/rom/de_officiis.htm. 22  On the role of heralds and the customs of warnings and war announcements in Ancient Greece, see Frank Adcock and D.  J. Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, 1st edition (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975), 152–153,184, 202; Derek J.  Mosley, Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece (Steiner, 1973), 84. 23  Garlan, La Guerre Dans l’Antiquité, 30; Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees, and Michael Whitby, eds., The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, 1 edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 190, 540.

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hostilities had already taken place.24 Despite the notion of justness playing an important role in the Roman discourse about war, the demands presented in the clarigatio were generally not meant as a first offer to be further discussed in negotiations, but rather meant as demands to be satisfied in full. The rejection of these demands, with or without the hostile treatment of the Roman heralds, was then taken as an act to justify war.25 Ultimata in the Middle Ages With the decay of the Roman Empire, and the transition to the Middle Ages, the role of final warnings is at first rarely addressed in the preserved writings on inter-polity conflict. They are initially only very tangentially discussed in the emerging body of Christian scholarship on just war, in which authors are generally more concerned with questions of who is entitled to declare war and the conditions under which they legitimately do so.26 Saint Augustine does not explicitly talk about either final warnings or declarations in the fifth century.27 Isidore of Seville observes that declarations are necessary for wars to be just in the seventh century. He does not elaborate whether declarations should be preceded by final warnings, but does approvingly cite Cicero’s adage of a formal demand for satisfaction. Isidore writes: ‘a just war is that which is waged in accordance with a formal declaration, and is waged for the sake of recovering property seized or of driving off the enemy.’28 The need for a formal declaration is taken up  Coleman Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Vol. 1 (London: MacMillan, 1911), 40–41, http://archive.org/details/internationallaw01philuoft; Coleman Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1911), 197–99, http://archive.org/details/ internationallaw02philuoft. 25  Claude Eilers, Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World (Brill, 2009), 22, fn 17; S. E. Baldwin, ‘The Share of the President of the United States in a Declaration of War’, The American Journal of International Law 12, no. 1 (1918): 188; M. De Secondat, Reflections on the Causes of the Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire (Oxford, 1823), 62, http://archive. org/details/reflectionsonca00montgoog. 26  Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 71; Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe, 25–29; William Belcher Ballis, ‘The Legal Position of War: Changes in Its Practice and Theory from Plato to Vattel’ (The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1937), chap. 2. 27  Ballis, ‘The Legal Position of War’, 43; Saint Augustine and Marcus Dods, The City of God, Vol. 2. Translated by Marcus Dods (Edinburgh T. & T. Clark, 1913), 222–23, http:// archive.org/details/cityofgodtransla02auguuoft. 28  Ballis, ‘The Legal Position of War’, 45; Isidore of Seville, The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, trans. Stephen A.  Barney et  al. (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 359. 24

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by Gratianus in the Decretum Gratiani from around 1140, but there is no mention of final warnings in his writings,29 nor in those of Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica published in 1274.30 While the writings of these authors have been preserved over time, records about the practice of issuing final warnings and declarations over that entire period are scant and murky. There are some accounts of how Charlemagne, the first Holy Roman Emperor, would present his enemies in Central Europe with a final warning prior to launching an attack in the eighth and ninth centuries.31 In addition, sieges of beleaguered towns surrounded by walls were circumscribed by a set of conventions. The offensive party would send a final warning to the defending party inviting it to surrender on favourable terms that typically included sparing the lives of the town’s inhabitants. If the latter rejected the offer, and the offender would eventually manage to successfully break through its defences, its inhabitants would be slaughtered.32 By the twelfth century, a convention started emerging amongst high-­ ranking European noblemen to deliver a defiance prior to launching an attack. A defiance explicitly identified the reasons for the war and constituted an announcement of hostilities. The Holy Roman Emperor, the Pope, and local kings attempted to enforce such practices as a means to control feudal conflicts—so-called private wars—fought amongst their subjects, and issued various laws for that purpose. Defiances were typically issued by aristocrats challenging each other because, as Baumgartner reports, ‘war among feudal nobles was private war, while public war was fought between sovereign princes, but for several centuries the emperor was the only prince so acknowledged.’33 In France, under threat of royal punishment, parties were obliged to observe a forty-day waiting period between serving the defiance and initiating hostilities under the 29  Ballis, ‘The Legal Position of War’, 45; Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge University Press, 1977), 62, fn.24. 30  Aquinas Thomas, The ‘Summa Theologica’ of St. Thomas Aquinas, Part II. (QQ. XLVII.LXXIX) (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1912), 500–503, http://archive.org/ details/summatheologi09thom. 31  Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe, 17–18. 32  Clifford J. Rogers, The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology (Oxford University Press, 2010), 493–94, 202, 315, 326, 338; Maurice Hugh Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (Routledge & K. Paul, 1965), 103, 119–22; Maurice Keen, Medieval Warfare: A History (OUP Oxford, 1999), 154. 33  Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe, 22–23, 44–45, 49; Ballis, ‘The Legal Position of War’, 32–33.

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Quarantaine du Roi, a length of time that, interestingly, would later reappear in sixteenth-century conflict. The Catholic Church played an active role in promoting and enforcing these rules.34 In 1128, Alphonso VII of Castile decreed that an interval of nine days was to be observed between the defiance and the initiation of armed hostilities. In 1187, Frederick Barbarossa, a later Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, set the required waiting period at three days. Nys remarks that such prescriptions were regularly issued and re-issued to promote their adherence to by their subjects.35 This was also codified in the Golden Bull, an imperial decree issued by one of Frederick’s successors, in 1356.36 As Jan Willem Honig suggests, sending prior warning of battle would fit well with the strategic behaviour of the time because the conventions of late medieval war generally precluded opponents from trying to gain strategic advantage through strategic surprise.37 Thus from the late twelfth century onwards, providing opponents with a final warning and a time interval before commencing violent hostilities started to become part of the standard repertoire of European polities even if not every polity felt bound to adhere to this norm.38 Armed bands of mercenaries, for instance, certainly did not abide by this norm.39 Based on these accounts, the order of events can be said to have typically transpired as follows: prior to initiating violent hostilities, the attacking party dispatched heralds to the opponent. The heralds presented a list of grievances and warned that failure to satisfactorily address the

34  Ernest Nys, Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius (Londres et New  York: Trübner & co, 1882), 56–57, 62–63, http://archive.org/details/ledroitdelaguer00nysgoog; Ballis, ‘The Legal Position of War’, 36–39. 35  Nys, Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius, 59, 64; Percy Bordwell, The Law of War between Belligerents; a History and Commentary (Chicago, Callaghan & co., 1908), 15–16, http://archive.org/details/lawwarbetweenbe00bordgoog. 36  Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe, 23; Charles IV, ‘The Avalon Project: The Golden Bull of the Emperor Charles IV 1356 A.D.’, Text, The Avalon Project Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, 23 March 2017, para. 17, http://avalon.law. yale.edu/medieval/golden.asp. 37  Jan Willem Honig, ‘Reappraising Late Medieval Strategy: The Example of the 1415 Agincourt Campaign’, War in History 19, no. 2 (1 April 2012): 123–51, https://doi. org/10.1177/0968344511432975. 38  Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 71; Nys, Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius, 106, 108. 39  Maurice Keen, Chivalry (Yale University Press, 1984), Ch xii, 217–239.

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grievances would result in war.40 These warnings sometimes resembled modern-day ultimata giving a time period before compliance but, as often as not, constituted straightforward declarations of war. Similar to in Ancient Greece and Rome, the convention of sending final warnings did not apply to conflicts against, in-the-eyes-of-Europeans, heretic—or pagan—people.41 By the end of the Middle Ages the custom of using heralds—who consciously modelled themselves after the fetiales, their Roman predecessors—to convey such messages had received nearly universal following amongst European polities, a custom that lasted until the mid-­ seventeenth century.42 Ultimata from the Renaissance to the Late Nineteenth Century In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the topic of final warnings and waiting periods prior to declaring war received a surge in attention primarily from diplomats, political advisors, and legal scholars, less so from military strategists. Some of the authors writing on final warnings approached the subject working from within the confines of academia. Many, however, did so on the basis of public service experience working as military, diplomatic, and/or legal advisers to governments around Europe. All took an active interest in formulating rules of war to regulate violence between polities, as is shown by an illustrative rather than an exhaustive overview of perspectives of key authors from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. My initial selection of key authors was informed by Baumgartner’s impressive overview in Declaring Early War in Modern Europe.43 It is remarkable, though, as I found upon close examination of the primary literature, that the various authors working within this tradition—that stretches over two millennia—are familiar with one another’s work and invariably cite each other. In the mid-sixteenth century, Pierino Belli, who had served as a military commander in the Holy Roman Empire, and had later acted as a senior  Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 71–72.  Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages, 48–51. 42  Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe, 29; Fedor Fedorovich Martens, Traité de droit international, vol. III (Paris: Chevalier-Marescq et cie., 1883), 203, http:// archive.org/details/traitdedroitint01martgoog; Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955), 32, http://archive.org/details/renaissance diplo00matt. 43  Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe. 40 41

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political adviser to the duke of Savoy, authored a treatise on military affairs. Belli asserts that wars need to be declared and that declarations of war need to be preceded by a limited waiting period for moral reasons.44 Belli cites a reference to an imperial decree (probably the Golden Bull from the fourteenth century) that stipulates a waiting period of three days but does not prescribe it as the required interval.45 Niccolò Machiavelli, adviser to the rulers of the city-state Florence, writing in the first half of the sixteenth century, does not discuss the topic of final warnings in elaborate detail in any of his major works. He suggests only in a side remark that the Romans usually did not observe a waiting period but were rather inclined ‘to take the field immediately with their armies, and to promptly meet the enemy, and give him battle.’46 In a book on the history of Florence, Machiavelli praises the historical custom of offering previous notice, but observes that it is now ‘considered a brave and prudent act to assail an unprovided enemy.’47 Alberico Gentili—a prominent Italian scholar and an adviser to the Spanish embassy in London—disagrees in a book published at the turn of the seventeenth century. He condemns the use of surprise attacks and, reacting to the demise of the custom of giving prior notice, writes that a final warning should include a limited waiting period both for what were considered metaphysical reasons and for secular reasons. Metaphysical reasons are rooted in the Christian notion of the existence of an almighty God. Secular reasons derive their legitimacy from an emerging law of nations.48 For both of these reasons he considers it crucial that a final warning allows the opponent with a final opportunity to settle the dispute peacefully by accommodating the demand, since it is not only morally just

44  Pierino Belli, De Re Militari Et Bello Tractatus, Vol. II: The Translation by Herbert C.  Nutting (Clarendon Press, 1936), chap. Introd., 15a; Nys, Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius, 107; Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe, 74. 45  Belli, De Re Militari Et Bello Tractatus, pt. II, Ch. viii, 80. 46  Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses (The Modern Library, 1950), 299; Niccolo Machiavelli, The Art of War, trans. Henry Neville (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015). 47  Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe, 56; Niccolo Machiavelli, History of Florence, by Niccolo Machiavelli: Chapter II, 2017, https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/ machiavelli/niccolo/m149h/chapter18.html. 48  Alberico Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres: The Translation of the Edition of 1612, by John C.  Rolfe, and an Introduction by Coleman Phillipson (Clarendon Press, 1933), Introd., 38-39, bk. II, i, 135.

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but also essential to the peaceful regulation of inter-polity relations.49 Gentili argues that ‘it is the part of beasts to make war immediately’50 and that such wars are therefore ‘unjust, detestable and savage.’51 Neither Belli nor Gentili considers it necessary to issue prior notice to unlawful opponents (such as pirates), to those considered public enemies by imperial or papal decree, to previous enemies, to the allies of enemies that provide the enemy with support, or in wars of self-defence.52 The notion of giving prior notice was then further developed by various predominantly legal thinkers from across Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Dutch humanist Hugo Grotius distinguishes between conditional and absolute declarations of war.53 Conditional declarations of war are tantamount to final warnings as they establish a ‘demand for restitution,’ rather than ‘proclamation[s] or edict[s]’ which are absolute.54 Grotius holds that these declarations, whether conditional or absolute, are necessary to show that they represent the will of the state (either of the leader or of the population at large) and that this distinguishes a public or a solemn war from other types of wars.55 Grotius does not consider an interval necessary but can imagine instances in which it should be considered mandatory: This also is not true, that war cannot be waged at once upon being declared… By the law of nations, in fact, no interval of time is required after the declaration. Nevertheless, it may happen that, from the character of the affair, by the law of nature some time may be required, as when restitution or punishment for a guilty person has been sought, and this has not been refused. In such a case, time must be granted in order that that which has been sought may be properly performed.56  See also the discussion in Nys, Le droit de la guerre et les précurseurs de Grotius, 107.  Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres, bk. II, i, 133. 51  Gentili, bk. II, Chapter ii, 140. 52  (Belli 1936, Introd., 15 a, part II, xi; Gentili 1933, Introd. 39a, bk II, ii, 136-141). 53  Hugo Grotius and Stephen C. Neff, Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace: Student Edition (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 345. 54  Grotius and Neff, 345. 55  Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace: Including the Law of Nature and of Nations, Edited and with an Introduction by Richard Tuck, from the Edition by Jean Barbeyrac (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), 2005, bks 3, Chapter 3, http://oll.libertyfund.org/ titles/1877; Grotius and Neff, Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace, 346–47; Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe, 92–93. 56  Grotius and Neff, Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace, 347. 49 50

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Other authors make arguments along similar lines, including the German jurist Samuel von Pufendorf, who does not talk about intervals,57 and the Irish lawyer Charles Molloy, who elaborates the notion of an interpellation or a demand for satisfaction as a final warning under the law of nations,58 both writing in the second half of the seventeenth century, as well as the Scottish professor Gershom Carmichael and English professor Thomas Rutherforth, writing in the first half of the eighteenth century. Like Grotius, Carmichael distinguishes between pure (rather than absolute) and conditional declarations, contending that the latter is associated with a demand for restoration of property and precedes the outbreak of war by some interval of time. […] The aim of a conditional declaration is to make known that what we claim as rightly ours or as owed to us, cannot be obtained without military force.59

Carmichael argues that a final warning containing the demands to be satisfied needs to be issued, except when acting in (various forms of) self-­ defence or when punishing an opponent for previously committed wrongs since a warning could undermine one’s ability to do so.60 Rutherforth claims similarly that conditional declarations should precede any actual declarations which in turn should be issued prior to waging war—which are two different acts.61 He considers this to be the quintessential difference between perfect versus imperfect and solemn versus unsolemn wars,

57  Samuel Freiherr von Pufendorf, James Tully, and Michael Silverthorne, Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 168–167, par. 3 & 7. 58  Charles Molloy et al., De Jure Maritimo et Navali: Or, A Treatise of Affairs Maritime, and of Commerce … (London: Printed by John Walthoe …, 1744), 15–17, http://archive. org/details/dejuremaritimoet00moll. 59  Gershom Carmichael, Natural Rights on the Threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment: The Writings of Gershom Carmichael [1724], ed. James Moore, trans. Michael Silverthorne (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), 200. 60  Carmichael, 200–201. 61  T. (Thomas) Rutherforth et  al., Institutes of Natural Law: Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius de Jure Belli et Pacis, Read in S.  John’s College, Cambridge (Whitehall, [Pa.]: Printed for William Young, bookseller and stationer, no. 52 South SecondStreet, Philadelphia, 1799), 551–52, http://archive.org/details/institutesofnatu02ruth.

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terms that only apply to wars between nations thus declared.62 This theme recurs in the works of other authors.63 Dutch jurist Cornelis van Bijnkershoek, president of the High Court of the Netherlands, holds that war declarations are not necessary—while relating many examples of wars begun without declarations—but does stipulate that the initiating party include a final warning.64 ‘War may be justly begun upon the denial of a just demand,’ van Bijnkershoek contends.65 The Swiss professor Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui likewise stresses the importance of delivering a final warning from the perspective of justice.66 He discusses similar themes as previous authors but differentiates between conditional and/or absolute declarations on the one hand and publications of war on the other. Declarations are meant to communicate the warning to the opponent as well as to the entire world, while publications serve as a signal to domestic audiences that the enemy is the target of the warning.67 The Swiss-born Emmerich de Vattel, who worked as a diplomat in the service of the government of Saxony,68 builds on and expands the work of the German philosopher Christian Wolff.69 Writing in the mid-eighteenth century, de Vattel, too, distinguishes between conditional and simple declarations of war.70 He recommends that both contain a threat—‘in order to bring the enemy to more equitable sentiments’—as well as grievances to be addressed in order to prevent war from breaking out.71 De Vattel explicitly pays attention to strategic considerations in his treatment of ­conditional announcements stating that a final warning should not ‘give  Rutherforth et al., 485–89, 549–50.  Molloy et al., De Jure Maritimo et Navali, 4–6. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, bks 3, Chap. 3; Grotius and Neff, Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace, 346–47; Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe, 92–93. 64  Bordwell, The Law of War between Belligerents; a History and Commentary, 36–37; Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe, 54. 65  Cornelis van Bijnkershoek and Peter Stephen Du Ponceau, A Treatise on the Law of War (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1810), 7; for the whole discussion see 6–17. 66  Jean Jacques Burlamaqui and Thomas Nugent, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law (Printed at the University Press, by W. Hilliard, 1807), 187–88; see also 184. 67  Burlamaqui and Nugent, 189–90. 68  Béla Kapossy and Richard Whitmore, ‘Vattel: Life and Works—Online Library of Liberty’, 2008, http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/vattel-life-and-works. 69  Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe, 141–42. For the passages of Wolff’s work relevant to the necessity and rationale of final warnings, see Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum: The Translation. Volume Two (Clarendon Press, 1934), 364–73. 70  Emmerich Vattel, ‘Vattel: The Law of Nations: Book III’, 23 March 2017, para. 53, http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel_03.htm. 71  Vattel, paras 52, 60. 62 63

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the enemy time to prepare for an unjust defence.’72 The initiating party should therefore feel free to prepare for battle and directly strike from a position of strength if the opponent refuses to comply. De Vattel thereby emphasises both the strategic and the moral rationale of a final warning. He states that by being issued prior to any hostilities, it provide[s] for our own safety, and equally attain[s] the object of a declaration of war, which is, to give an unjust adversary the opportunity of seriously considering his past conduct, and avoiding the horrors of war, by doing justice.73

In the early nineteenth century, the British author Robert Plumer Ward does not consider a declaration necessary prior to starting hostilities as long as the opposing party has been given a final opportunity to satisfy any demands and is aware of the consequences should it refuse to do so. However, this does not apply when an opponent exhibits ‘threatening attitudes and dangerous provisions of hostility.’74 If the opponent is not expected to comply, it seems that neither conditional nor absolute declarations are necessary in Plumer Ward’s view, succinctly captured in his observation that ‘as a statement […] of complaint, and demand of redress, it can answer no purpose and avert no danger.’75 In the second half of the nineteenth century, Russian diplomat and scholar Friedrich Martens rejects the necessity of giving prior notice as long as it is clear to all parties that violence is likely to break out. He thus condemns surprise attacks but does not assert an obligation to issue a final warning. He also asserts that the rejection of a final warning—which he refers to using the term ultimatum—is similar to a declaration of war. Martens writes: Sometimes the beginning of a war is determined by the rejection of an ultimatum sent by one of the powers to another. This rejection is equivalent to a war declaration.76  Vattel, para. 60.  Vattel, para. 60. 74  Robert Plumer Ward, An Enquiry into the Manner in Which the Different Wars in Europe Have Commenced, during the Last Two Centuries, by the Author of The History and Foundation of the Law of Nations in Europe, 1805, 2. 75  Ward, 4. 76  Martens, Traité de droit international, III: 205, 203–7. In my own translation of the original French which reads: Quelquefois le commencement de la guerre est déterminé par le rejet d’un ultimatum envoyé par l’ une des puissances à l’autre. Ce rejet équivaut à une déclaration de guerre.’ 72 73

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British lawyer William Edward Hall, at the turn of the century, rejects the view that it is ‘necessary to give some preliminary notice of intention’; he considers it imprudent to allow the opponent to make defensive preparations and observes that ‘no one asserts such quixotism to be obligatory.’77 Despite the ambition of many of these authors to offer policy prescriptions with real-world relevance, theory and reality sometimes parted ways. Plumer Ward, who examines the ways in which wars have started from approximately 1600 to 1800, does not offer precise figures, but claims in flowery prose that the ‘dazzling maxims’ about how to properly commence a war received little follow up in practice.78 His brief descriptions, in fact, paint a picture of a great number of wars begun without official declaration. Yet, his analysis also reveals that many of these wars were preceded by diplomatic communications which included a set of demands, a threat, and a deadline for compliance.79 Even if Plumer Ward does not consider such communications conditional war declarations, they certainly come close to the modern concept of ultimata. Hall confirms that in the seventeenth century absolute declarations were quite rare.80 Stephen C. Neff, on the other hand, asserts that such declarations were quite common from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century that they then significantly decreased in the period afterwards, only to return to the fore again sometime after 1850.81 Similarly, the British Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel John Frederick Maurice, in a review of the period 1700–1871, reports that war declarations were fewer than ten in number, but he does not include ultimata in his count.82 Baumgartner criticises the accuracy of Maurice’s coding, but does not present any evidence that would refute Maurice’s general thesis.83 Hall, on the contrary, who also refers to Maurice’s work, concurs 77  William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press; London: H.  Frowde, 1895), 391, 398–99, http://archive.org/details/treatiseonintern 00hallrich. 78  Ward, An Enquiry into the Manner in Which the Different Wars in Europe Have Commenced, during the Last Two Centuries, by the Author of The History and Foundation of the Law of Nations in Europe, 5. 79  Ward, 9–48. 80  Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 394–95, fn.1. 81  Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 110. 82  Sir John Frederick Maurice, Hostilities without Declaration of War: An Historical Abstract of the Cases in Which Hostilities Have Occurred between Civilized Powers Prior to Declaration or Warning from 1700 to 1870. (H.M.  Stationery Office, 1883), 4, https:// archive.org/details/hostilitieswith00maurgoog. 83  Baumgartner, Declaring War in Early Modern Europe, 4–5, fn. 9 & 11.

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with his overall assertion that war declarations were few in that period.84 Bordwell relates that many wars were undeclared because they were waged against states joining the enemy’s side.85 Oona Hathaway et al., based on an extensive collection of war manifestos (public articulations of the reasons for going to war), report a decline in war declarations from 1775 onwards, citing multiple reasons including a decline in interstate war within Europe in the nineteenth century, the emergence of new, more direct modes of communication, the collapse of a ‘shared sense of community’ resulting in ‘the breakdown of […] a cooperative communicative practice,’ and the shift in target audience from sovereign to the general population.86 At the same time they also report a shift in their purpose: Whereas before the primary purpose of issuing manifestos was to satisfy the sovereign’s obligations before God and his fellow sovereigns, with the need to rally popular support serving as only a secondary goal, popular support now became the crucial factor.87

Neff reports that war declarations and ultimata became diplomatic devices of choice again only during the second half of the nineteen century.88 One explanation that he proposes is that war was explicitly seen as a ‘clash of competing state wills’ and as a ‘duel’ circumscribed by a set of customs and regulated by a set of rules which nation-states started to codify during that period.89 In contrast to the civilian experts, military strategists rarely discuss final warnings. In the nineteenth century neither Antoine-Henri Jomini nor Carl Von Clausewitz had much to say about final warnings. Final warnings do not feature in Jomini’s chapter on the relation of diplomacy to war,90 and Von Clausewitz is also largely silent on the subject. More indirectly, however, both military strategists do consider the role of either tactical or strategic surprise in war (though attaining surprise in reality was difficult according to Von Clausewitz), which—it can be deduced—is spoilt by

 Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 392, 395–96, fn. 2.  Bordwell, The Law of War between Belligerents; a History and Commentary, 37–38, 39–41. 86  Hathaway et al., ‘War Manifestos’, 1167–68. 87  Hathaway et al., 1169. 88  Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 105, 110, 185. 89  Neff, 185, 186. 90  Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War (Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1971), chapter 1, 13-38, http://archive.org/details/artwar00mendgoog. 84 85

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final warnings.91 Their lack of consideration of ultimata represents the rule rather than the exception amongst students of military strategy of previous time periods. While a non-finding is harder to substantiate than a finding (the absence of evidence is, as the saying goes, not the same as the evidence of absence), no treatments of ultimata in any (overview) works on military strategy and conflict were discovered.92 Military strategists focus either on understanding various fundamental aspects of war and strategy or on what can be considered tactical and/or operational matters (e.g. battlefield formations and the building of fortifications) but not on the role of ultimata. This was probably due to the ways in which the disciplinary dividing lines between the civil and the military domains were drawn, the precise demarcations and the underlying causes of which I will not go into here. The discussion amongst civilian experts (some of whom had some military experience), which initially predominantly focused on the moral and legal aspects of transmitting final warnings, increasingly came to encompass strategic considerations as well. These considerations included the rallying of support of domestic and foreign audiences, the sending of a signal to third-party actors, the benefits of achieving objectives without having to fight, and the potential risks associated with surrendering the advantages of military surprise. The trend in which strategic considerations gained in importance continued during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This period also saw renewed attempts by leaders of state to institutionalise the convention of sending a final warning including a standard waiting time, similar to the Golden Bull more than 500 years earlier.

91  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Tenth Printing (US) (Everyman’s Library by arrangement with Princeton University Press, 1993), bk. 3, chap. 9, pp.  233–234 & bk. 6, chap. 3, pp.434–435; Jomini, The Art of War, chap. 4, pp. 209, 216; Michael I. Handel, Clausewitz and Modern Strategy (Routledge, 2012), 62–66. 92  Publius Flavius Vegetius, Concerning Military Matters: A 5th Century Epitome on Roman Warfare and Military Principles (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012); George T. Dennis, Three Byzantine Military Treatises (Dumbarton Oaks, Research Library and Collection, 1985); Victor Davis Hanson, Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome (Princeton University Press, 2010); Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton University Press, 2010); Rogers, The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology.

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Ultimata from the First Hague Peace Conference to the Second World War At the turn of the century, national representatives came together in The Hague in the Netherlands to attempt to codify the laws of war, at a moment in time that neither declarations of war nor final warnings were considered necessary within prevailing interpretations of the laws of war.93 At the First Hague Conference of 1899 it was only agreed that all parties should attempt to reach a peaceful solution through third-party mediation prior to commencing war, with the major caveat ‘as far as circumstances allow’ added.94 But in the years after, the role of final warnings and declarations became to be more elaborately circumscribed by legal experts. This was partially prompted by indignation about the 1904–1905 Russo-­Japanese War which had started, at least in the eyes of many observers, with a Japanese surprise attack, and helped put the commencing of hostilities onto the agenda of the Conference.95 In this context, the legal scholar Lassa Oppenheim offers a definition for the term ultimatum asserting, in what would soon be regarded as one of the standard texts of international law, that it is the technical term for a written communication by one State to another which ends amicable negotiations respecting a difference, and formulates, for the last time and categorically, the demands to be fulfilled if other measures are to be averted. An ultimatum is, theoretically at least, not a compulsion, although it can practically exercise the function of a compulsion, and although the compulsive means, or even war, can be threatened through the same communication in the event of a refusal to comply with the demand made.96

Oppenheim thus categorically rejects that ultimata are similar to war declarations. The topic is also taken up by the authoritative Institute for International Law in Ghent, which passed the following resolution in 1906 and called on nation-states to adopt it:  Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 183.   The First Hague Peace Conference, ‘The Avalon Project—Laws of War: Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I); 29 July 1899’, Text, The Avalon Project Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, 1899, Art.2, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_ century/hague01.asp. 95  Douglas Howland, ‘Sovereignty and the Laws of War: International Consequences of Japan’s 1905 Victory over Russia’, Law and History Review 29, no. 1 (1 February 2011): 68–77. 96  Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, International Law, A Treatise: War and Neutrality, vol. II (London: Longmans and Co, 1906), 30–31, 102–5. 93 94

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1. It is conformable to the exigencies of international law, to the loyalty which nations owe to each other in their mutual relations as well as to common interest of all states, that hostilities should not commence without previous and unequivocal notice. 2. Such notice may take the form of a declaration of war pure and simple, or that of an official ultimatum by the state desirous of beginning war. 3. Hostilities should commence only after the expiration of such a period of time that the rule of previous notice shall not be considered to have been eluded.97

Ultimata subsequently featured on the agenda of the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, attended by representatives of all the great powers of that period as well as of many other states. In discussions about the proper way in which to start a war, France proposed that while wars required an official declaration, ultimata were merely optional. In other words, no party was obliged to observe a time interval. The Netherlands then proposed an amendment adding a required interval of twenty-four hours between the declaration and the commencement of hostilities. France, however, argued that any interval would allow an opponent to prepare militarily and that this dictated that neither an ultimatum nor a waiting period was required. Despite support for the Dutch motion from Russia and a number of smaller powers, the Dutch amendment was narrowly defeated.98 The attempt at the Second Hague Peace Conference to establish a general fixed standard for waiting periods or the length of deadlines therefore failed.99 The proceedings thus eventually culminated in the Preamble and Article I on the Opening of Hostilities of the Third Hague Convention of the Second Hague Peace Conference, which read: Considering that it is important, in order to ensure the maintenances of pacific relations, that hostilities should not commence without previous 97  The Institute of International Law, ‘Resolutions Adopted by the Institute of International Law, at Ghent, in September, 1906’, The American Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 (1907): 485, https://doi.org/10.2307/2186186. 98  James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, The Conference of 1907, Volume 1, Plenary Meetings of the Conference (Oxford University Press, 1920), 131–136, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Hague-Peace-Conference_1907V-1.pdf Annex B; James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, The Conference of 1907, Volume 3, Plenary Meetings of the Conference, vol. 3 (New York, Oxf. Univ. Press, 1920), 253–255, http://archive.org/details/proceedingsofhag03inteuoft Annex 19–22; Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 183–84. 99  Braun, Démarche, Ultimatum, Sommation; eine diplomatisch völkerrechtliche Studie, 55.

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warning; […] The contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without a previous and explicit warning in the form of either a declaration of war, giving reasons, or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.100

Declaring war prior to commencing hostilities was thus considered compulsory. Ultimata, however, were rendered optional and no time interval was set between the moment of declaring and initiating war. Still, in the years immediately after the Second Hague Peace Conference, states would issue ultimata which they sometimes followed up with declarations of war on several occasions. This reached its dramatic zenith with the outbreak of the First World War when ultimata and counter-ultimata captured states in a spiral of escalation which eventually culminated in war.101 Meanwhile, popular attitudes vis-à-vis war had already started to change in the late nineteenth century as reflected in rising support for anti-war movements. The horrors of the First World War gave further impetus to this development. The first attempts to more strictly constrain if not yet fully outlaw war, as well as the threats associated with it, were made.102 Signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations, founded after the First World War, accepted ‘obligations not to resort to war’ and in Article 11 expressed the intention to collectively address ‘any war, or threat of war […] to safeguard the peace of nations.’103 Ultimata were not specifically mentioned in the Covenant. The Interwar Period saw the conclusion of various treaties aimed at constraining and sometimes even outlawing the recourse to the use of armed force as a viable policy instrument in interstate relations, most notably the Geneva Protocol of 1924, the Locarno Treaty of 1925, and the

100  The Second Hague Peace Conference, ‘The Avalon Project—Laws of War: Opening of Hostilities (Hague III); October 18, 1907’, Text, The Avalon Project Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, 1907, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague03.asp. 101  Asbeck, Das Ultimatum im modernen Völkerrecht. Studie—Berlin-Grunewald, 75–78; Eugenia V. Nomikos and Robert Carver North, International Crisis: Outbreak of World War I (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977). 102  Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide (Plume, 2012), 215; John Mueller, ‘Changing Attitudes Towards War: The Impact of the First World War’, British Journal of Political Science 21, no. 01 (January 1991): 1–28, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400006001. 103  The League of Nations, ‘The Covenant of the League of Nations’, 31 December 1924, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.

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Kellogg-Briand Treaty of 1928.104 While none of the treaties explicitly outlawed the use of ultimata, in spirit they committed states to settle disputes by ‘pacific means’ and ‘abstain from any act which might constitute a threat of aggression.’105 In this context, national leaders preferred to sever the association of ultimata with war, partially out of a desire to circumvent the taboo on war, and thereby prevent interference from the League.106 As a corollary to this development, a lively scholarly and diplomatic debate ensued that started to lay out in greater detail the various ‘function[s] and form[s]’ of ultimata,107 although the topic was initially predominantly approached from an international legal perspective. The two German scholars Hans Asbeck and Werner Braun discuss ultimata with reference to two other diplomatic terms: the démarche and the sommation. A démarche is an original French term that also appears in English writings, which may best be translated as ‘diplomatic protest’ and as such is a more generic term. States typically deliver a démarche to another state when they feel they are suffering unjust treatment. The démarche lays down the grievances and demands the situation to be reversed and is generally delivered in person but is not necessarily as severe as an ultimatum.108 A sommation, or ‘summons,’ refers to a demand from a powerful state to a much weaker state in situations in which it is clear that the summoner will be able to enforce its demands if the summoned refuses. A sommation may or may not include a time limit while the threat may or may not be implicit.109 Ultimata are consistently defined by an assortment of French, German, and Italian authors of the time as constituting the final demand for unconditional compliance, offered by a negotiator on behalf of a state and often accompanied by a time limit and the 104  Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon Press, 1963), 66–73. 105  Government of the United States, ‘The Kellogg-Briand Pact: Treaty between the United States and other Powers providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.’, 1928, Art.2, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbpact.asp.; The League of Nations, ‘Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes’, 2 October 1924, Art.8, https://www.wdl.org/en/item/11582/. 106  Nikolas Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 18; Asbeck, Das Ultimatum im modernen Völkerrecht. Studie—BerlinGrunewald, 39–57, esp. 57. 107  Ingrid Detter, The Law of War, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 10. 108  Asbeck, Das Ultimatum im modernen Völkerrecht. Studie—Berlin-Grunewald, 11–12; Braun, Démarche, Ultimatum, Sommation; eine diplomatisch völkerrechtliche Studie, 42, 42–45. 109  Braun, Démarche, Ultimatum, Sommation; eine diplomatisch völkerrechtliche Studie, 73.

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threat of punishment in case of non-compliance, which increases the chances of war.110 None of these three elements are fixed: ultimata may contain various demands, various time limits, and also various types of threats, although these typically involve the use of armed force. It is asserted that the demands contained in ultimata are by their nature expressed in clear and unequivocal terms in the form of a precisely formulated statement which can be clearly accepted or rejected by the receiving state. Ultimata, moreover, are expressions of the will of one or multiple states vis-á-vis another state. Ultimata can be dictated by states or groups of states but can only be targeted at single states. If multiple states are addressed, an ultimatum is considered to constitute multiple ultimata. Ultimata may be transmitted either in words or in writing, or in a mixture of both. The similarity of ultimata and conditional war declarations— which was so central in earlier work about ultimata—is discussed and ultimately rejected. If ultimata contain the threat of war, then, if their terms are not complied with, no further declaration or material actions need to be undertaken for a state of war to exist. However, it is inferred, some states issue threats that due to their form and substance can be considered ultimata, even if they do not include an explicit threat of war. Such ultimata contain a demand and an implicit or explicit time limit while leaving the nature of the threat ambiguous, by, for instance, expressing the intent to use all possible means in case of non-compliance.111 In that case, it is unclear whether a state of war exists. A further distinction is made between simple and qualified ultimata. The former does not identify the precise nature of the threat, but the latter does, as the American scholar Philip Marshall Brown observes on the eve of the Second World War: An ultimatum may be simple or qualified. It is simple, if it does not include an indication of the measures contemplated by the Power sending it. It is qualified, if it does indicate the measures contemplated, whether by retorsion, or reprisals, pacific blockade, occupation of a certain territory, or war.112 110  Braun, 40; 42–45; 50–56, 73; Asbeck, Das Ultimatum im modernen Völkerrecht. Studie—Berlin-Grunewald, 9–11. 111  Braun, Démarche, Ultimatum, Sommation; eine diplomatisch völkerrechtliche Studie, 64; Asbeck, Das Ultimatum im modernen Völkerrecht. Studie—Berlin-Grunewald, 8. 112  Philip Marshall Brown, ‘Undeclared Wars’, The American Journal of International Law 33, no. 3 (1 July 1939): 540, https://doi.org/10.2307/2190801. Brown paraphrases Oppenheim, for the original, Oppenheim, International Law, A Treatise: War and Neutrality, II: 135.

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The legality of ultimata that include the threat of armed force is also debated during this period. Some authors argue that the Kellogg-Briand Pact, despite banning policies that can upset international peace, only puts constraints on the use of ultimata—whether accompanied by the threat of armed force or not—but does not prohibit it.113 Even if they are more often than not dangerous instruments, it is asserted that ultimata can also serve the purpose of peace by giving fair warning before the threat is implemented, thereby providing a final way out. Additionally, they send a signal to the international community that something is afoot, as Asbeck argues: The ultimatum can absolutely serve the interest of peace, both in its function as providing fair warning and as marking the transition towards justified coercive measures, but also as an emergency signal to the League of Nations and above all as an instrument (“a sanction”) from the League itself.114

Others, at the time, argue that threats of force—which include ultimata—are simply illegal. The International Law Association, an international non-government group of legal experts, adopted the Budapest Resolutions on the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1934. Article 2 stated that ‘a signatory State which threatens to resort to armed force for the solution of an international dispute or conflict is guilty of a violation of the Pact.’115 The reality of international relations of the 1930s, however, meant that the Budapest Resolutions, like the various treaties concluded in the 1920s, would receive little follow up in the years immediately after. Accordingly, the period featured numerous ultimata consisting of a set of demands and a fixed deadline accompanied by various types of explicit or implicit threats of the use of violence which often fell short of full declarations of war, as will be examined in the following chapter. The practice is indicative of the broader meaning of ultimata that really took root during the Interwar Period after having been subject of extensive discussions in the decades  Asbeck, Das Ultimatum im modernen Völkerrecht. Studie—Berlin-Grunewald, 57.  Asbeck, 61. In my own translation of the original German which reads: ‘Das Ultimatum kann eine durtchaus im Interesse des Friedens liegende Wirkung entfalten; sowohl als faire Warnung und Übergangsverfahren zu gerechtfertigten ZwangsmaBnahmen wie auch als Notsignal an den Völkerbund und vor allem als Werkzeug (“MaBnahme”) des Bundes selbst.’ 115  Manley O. Hudson, ‘The Budapest Resolutions of 1934 on the Briand-Kellogg Pact of Paris’, The American Journal of International Law 29, no. 1 (1 January 1935): 93, https:// doi.org/10.2307/2191054; Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law, 17–19. 113 114

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before. It did not mean that the relationship between ultimata and war disappeared altogether, however. Following the demise of the League of Nations and the failure of the various treaties to commit states to find peaceful ways to settle their differences, states continued to issue ultimata in the form of conditional war declarations, in line with the First Article of the Third Hague Convention of the Second Hague Conference, especially in the process leading to the outbreak of the Second World War.

Conclusion The analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates that ultimata have featured in a wide variety of inter-polity conflicts across recorded history, both in- and outside the context of the Westphalian state system. The analysis highlights the existence of a vast range of views on the various purposes and functions of ultimata which have significantly evolved over time, and it informs the examination of ultimata in the subsequent chapters. In the Western tradition, a long lineage connects Roman reflections on the use and utility of final warnings to the deliberations of the diplomats at the two Hague conferences of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The lineage runs through the writings of Church Fathers in the early Middle Ages and the attempts of practitioners and legal scholars in the late Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Early Modern Period to codify the rules of armed conflict. In this Western tradition, ultimata were traditionally associated with demarcating the dividing line between war and peace. As such, they have often been discussed in close reference to declarations of war, though some authors discern different purposes. Ultimata have been principally conceived of as fulfilling the function of a final warning that serves either moral or strategic purposes—and often a combination thereof. From a moral perspective, ultimata were seen to satisfy the notion that the opponent ought to be provided with a final way out in order to avoid war and otherwise be provided with advance notice of the consequences should it decide otherwise. As such, the party issuing an ultimatum fulfilled a procedural notion of justness which was required, according to various authors over the ages, first under the authority of one or multiple deities worshipped in that particular polity and, in later periods, also under the authority of an emerging body of international law. From a strategic perspective, ultimata, it was argued, if complied with, made it possible to attain strategic objectives without having to wage war. Ultimata also served as an announcement both to domestic and to

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third-­party audiences, either to rally support and prepare them for war or to warn them not to interfere. The wisdom, and on that basis the obligation, of sending ultimata was disputed however, because of the inherent risk that they spoiled any advantages derived from surprise attacks. In fact, the analysis suggests that political leaders in various historical periods, despite lofty statements to the contrary, did not necessarily abide by the convention of sending ultimata, neither in Antiquity nor in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Early Modern Period. Presenting ultimata to adversaries that were viewed as less civilised was not considered necessary often on the grounds that these adversaries adhered to another religion. It suggests that ultimata were more salient in ritualised forms of conflict which were considered by the participants to be bound by certain rules. The notion of a final warning—or an ultimatum, as really became the standard term over the course of the nineteenth century—is thus present in discussions that often concern the commencing of war starting from Antiquity all the way through to the Second World War. Proponents hold that ultimata provide a final opportunity to find a settlement and prevent war from breaking out and render a war just or legal under commonly held—always evolving—norms of justice and international law. Opponents reject any moral or legal obligation to issue such warnings because they allow the opponent to prepare militarily and they unnecessarily spoil strategic surprise. Both camps distinguish three target audiences: the opponent (principally its leadership but also its population), domestic audiences of the coercer, and the world at large, including potential allies and opponents. There is also a distinct trend in which strategic considerations come to occupy a more central role in discussions about the use and utility of ultimata. The precise form of such warnings receives little attention and the precise time interval is seldom discussed after the sixteenth century, in contrast to centuries previously when rulers attempted to impose a standard three-day waiting period. This changed again in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when ultimata once again capture the attention of legal and diplomatic experts, but attempts to codify the time interval as a means of regulating interstate conflict fail. The similarity between ultimata and conditional war declarations is rejected during the Interwar Period. Instead the term ultimatum increasingly refers to a broader universe of threats in interstate relations, in line with the incremental evolution in perspectives on the (im)permissibility of war as an instrument of

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national policy. Even if this evolution was incremental in nature and had been going on for an extended period of time, the Second World War marked the beginning of a new era in which the use of threats in interstate relations short of war received a surge in attention and ultimata were increasingly discussed in that context which is the topic of the next chapter.

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proquest.com/hnpguardianobserver/results/2CFE87E0A5A84B16PQ/1?ac countid=11862. Pufendorf, Samuel Freiherr von, James Tully, and Michael Silverthorne. Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law. Cambridge University Press, 1991. Rich, J. W. Declaring War in the Roman Republic in the Period of Transmarine Expansion. Latomus, 1976. Rogers, Clifford J.  The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology. Oxford University Press, 2010. Russell, Frederick H. The Just War in the Middle Ages. Cambridge University Press, 1977. Rutherforth, T. (Thomas), St. John’s College (University of Cambridge), John Adams Library (Boston Public Library) MB (BRL), William Young, and John Adams. Institutes of Natural Law: Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius de Jure Belli et Pacis, Read in S. John’s College, Cambridge. Whitehall, [Pa.]: Printed for William Young, bookseller and stationer, no. 52 South Second-Street, Philadelphia, 1799. http://archive.org/details/instituteso fnatu02ruth. Sabin, Philip, Hans van Wees, and Michael Whitby, eds. The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare. 1 edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Satow, Ernest Mason. A Guide to Diplomatic Practice. London, Longmans, 1932. http://archive.org/details/guidetodiplomati00satouoft. Scott, James Brown. The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, The Conference of 1907, Volume 1, Plenary Meetings of the Conference. Oxford University Press, 1920. http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Hague-­Peace-­ Conference_1907-­V-­1.pdf. Scott, James Brown. The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, The Conference of 1907, Volume 3, Plenary Meetings of the Conference. Vol. 3. New  York, Oxf. Univ. Press, 1920. http://archive.org/details/proceeding sofhag03inteuoft. Stürchler, Nikolas. The Threat of Force in International Law. Cambridge University Press, 2007. The First Hague Peace Conference. ‘The Avalon Project—Laws of War: Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I); 29 July 1899’. Text. The Avalon Project Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, 1899. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague01.asp. The Institute of International Law. ‘Resolutions Adopted by the Institute of International Law, at Ghent, in September, 1906’. The American Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 (1907): 485–86. https://doi.org/10.2307/ 2186186.

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The League of Nations. ‘Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes’, 2 October 1924a. https://www.wdl.org/en/item/11582/. The League of Nations. ‘The Covenant of the League of Nations’, 31 December 1924b. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp. The Second Hague Peace Conference. ‘The Avalon Project—Laws of War: Opening of Hostilities (Hague III); October 18, 1907’. Text. The Avalon Project Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, 1907. http://avalon.law. yale.edu/20th_century/hague03.asp. Thomas, Aquinas. The ‘Summa Theologica’ of St. Thomas Aquinas, Part II. (QQ.  XLVII.-LXXIX). London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1912. http://archive.org/details/summatheologi09thom. Vattel, Emmerich. ‘Vattel: The Law of Nations: Book III’, 23 March 2017. http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel_03.htm. Vegetius, Publius Flavius. Concerning Military Matters: A 5th Century Epitome on Roman Warfare and Military Principles. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012. Walbank, F. W. ‘Roman Declaration of War in the Third and Second Centuries’. Classical Philology 44, no. 1 (1949): 15–19. Ward, Robert Plumer. An Enquiry into the Manner in Which the Different Wars in Europe Have Commenced, during the Last Two Centuries, by the Author of The History and Foundation of the Law of Nations in Europe, 1805. Wolff, Christian. Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum: The Translation. Volume Two. Clarendon Press, 1934.

CHAPTER 3

Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy

Introduction The Second World War heralded two major, albeit contradictory, developments for ultimata as instruments of statecraft. The first development was the founding of the United Nations and the renunciation, albeit qualified, of force as an instrument of international policy. This first development turned the tide against threats of force in a manner already partially presaged by the 1934 Budapest Articles of the International Law Association, even if the legal status of threats would continue—and still continues—to be the subject of debate among practitioners and scholars, while states would continue to resort to them. The second development was the growing interest on the part of both of these communities in the use of threats of force to attain strategic objectives without having to wage war in the context of the ever-increasing destructiveness of contemporary wars. This prompted interest in the use and utility of ultimata as coercive threats and gave rise to the genesis of a body of literature that would become known as coercive diplomacy. The first section briefly describes the first development to offer a better understanding of the international legal context of the use of threats of force in general and of ultimata in particular in interstate relations. The second section then turns to the second development and reviews the most important perspectives on ultimata in the coercive diplomacy literature in greater detail. It thereby provides an overview of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Sweijs, The Use and Utility of Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy, Twenty-first Century Perspectives on War, Peace, and Human Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21303-8_3

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the state of the art of the knowledge of ultimata, identifies key tendencies, insights, and deficiencies in that literature, and sets the stage for the contributions of the subsequent chapters.

Changing Views on the Threat of Force in Interstate Relations After the period of the 1920s and 1930s, in which many states employed armed force without calling it war, the emphasis in post-Second World War legal writings shifted from war to armed force. Following the horror of the two World Wars, the founding charter of the United Nations committed its member states in Article 2 (4): To refrain from the threat or use of armed force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.1

War declarations, although not war itself, went swiftly out of fashion after the Second World War. One explanation is that states sought to avoid any legal entanglements associated with such declarations that themselves were the product of the incremental proliferation and codification of the laws of war.2 In this reading, states no longer used declarations of war to publicly articulate a war’s political purpose and delineate the demarcation between legitimate activities that fit within the framework of the war’s political purposes and unjustified transgressions in these regards.3 In addition, for the first time in history, not just the mere use of armed force but also threats to use armed force were essentially outlawed. The precise definition of a threat was, however, not further elaborated upon, which was left for later.4

1  The United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations’, 26 June 1945, http://avalon.law. yale.edu/20th_century/unchart.asp. 2  Tanisha M.  Fazal, ‘Why States No Longer Declare War’, Security Studies 21, no. 4 (October 2012): 558; see also 589, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2012.734227. 3  Brien Hallett, The Lost Art of Declaring War, 1st paperback (University of Illinois Press, 1998), 83. 4  Nikolas Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 25; Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon Press, 1963), 364.

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The International Law Commission was asked to draft an international criminal code concerning offences against peace in the 1950s. Despite producing many drafts, the commission did not succeed in coming up with a definition nor with a demarcation of the role of threats in interstate relations that was accepted by member states.5 The United Nations General Assembly’s definition of aggression which was approved in 1974 does not include a reference to threat but instead merely talks about armed force.6 Threats of force were not included in the definition of aggression in the founding Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998 nor in the 2010 Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in Kampala.7 Legal experts meanwhile held various views on the legality of threats. Some asserted its illegality under international law if the actual use of armed force threatened with was illegal under the terms of the UN charter (if not in case of self-defence or if authorised by the UN Security Council).8 It was argued that ‘if the words “threat of force” are to have any meaning,’ then ‘a blatant and direct threat of force, used to compel another state to yield territory or make substantial political concessions (not required by law), would have to be seen as illegal under article 2(4).’9 Others raised questions about the ambiguity of Article 2 (4) and asserted that—given the prevalence of threats in interstate relations—the moratorium on threats could hardly be considered to be part of customary international law.10 Threats were seen as useful devices because ‘skilfully managed 5  Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law, 28–34; Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ‘Definition of Aggression General Assembly Resolution 3314—An Introductory Note’, accessed 30 March 2017, http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/da/da.html. 6   United Nations General Assembly, ‘Definition of Aggression General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX)’, 14 December 1974, 143–44, http://www.un.org/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3314(XXIX). 7  International Criminal Court, ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (International Criminal Court, 2002), https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf; International Criminal Court, ‘The Official Records of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, 31 May -11 June 2010’ (International Criminal Court, 2011), sec. Annex, p.18, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/OR/ RC-11-ENG.pdf. 8  Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 364, 432. 9  Oscar Schachter, ‘The Prohibition of Force’, in Recueil Des Cours, Collected Courses 1982, ed. Academie de Droit International (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 139. 10  Romana Sadurska, ‘Threats of Force’, The American Journal of International Law 82, no. 2 (April 1988): 249, https://doi.org/10.2307/2203188.

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threats can ritualize aggression’ and can thereby ‘provide an outlet for the human propensity to violence and effectively defuse it.’11 In the few cases brought by states before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which included the UK versus Albania in 1949, Nicaragua versus the US in 1986, and the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of 1996, the ICJ did not set out a unified and elaborate view on the status of the threat of force.12 In the 1986 ruling the court merely reiterated Article 4(2) and in the 1996 opinion it stated that ‘if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal—for whatever reason—the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal.’13 Meanwhile, in the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, which entered into force in 1980, treaties were declared to be void if signed under the threat of force.14 Nikolas Stürchler found in a detailed review of the practice of threats of armed force in the post-­ Second World War period that states generally take a more nuanced view of the permissibility of threats. The crux lies in the difference between ‘threat[s] against aggression’ and ‘threat[s] of aggression.’15 If a threat is judged to be issued in self-defence and/or in the service of preventing the outbreak of war—and the broader purposes of peace and security—then it is justified. If a threat merely fuels crisis dynamic leading it to spiral out of control, it is viewed as illegal.16 Threats to use force are thus not necessarily always condemned under international law,17 although in the post-­ Second World War period, as Stürchler asserts, ‘the classic ultimatum is entirely enclosed by broader parameters of illegality.’18 It is in this international legal context that states would continue, albeit less frequent as I will show, to deploy threats of armed force in the interest of achieving their objectives without going to war.

 Sadurska, 267.  Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law, 65–91, esp. 90–91, 255. 13  International Court of Justice, ‘Advisory Opinion: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’, 1996, paras 37–50, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf. 14  United Nations, ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties, Signed at Vienna 23 May 1969, Entry into Force: 27 January 1980’, 1980, paras 51–52, https://treaties. un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf. 15  Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law, 270. 16  Stürchler, 265–70. 17  S.M. Wood, ‘Use of Force, Prohibition of Threat’, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law [MPEPIL], June 2013, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/ law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e428. 18  Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law, 259. 11 12

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The second development that prompted interest in the use of threats to attain national objectives was a series of fundamental changes to the global strategic context in which political leaders operated. These included the advent of rapid worldwide communication and transportation, the emergence of long-distance strike capabilities, and especially the invention of atomic weapons in the mid-1940s. As a result, the destructiveness of Industrial Age interstate war progressively started to dawn on practitioners and scholars. Waging war, especially between nuclear powers, was increasingly a less salient option for political leaders. Scholars offer a variety of explanations citing the advent of nuclear weapons rendering interstate war prohibitively costly,19 the role of changing norms and values rendering war illegitimate,20 and the confluence of different structural long-term drivers rendering war less attractive overall.21 This in turn incentivised practitioners and scholars to develop and reflect on new strategies for ‘forceful persuasion’ in order to attain political objectives without using armed force.22 Ultimata thus reappeared as a topic of study in the context of the Cold War era but this time as a strategic rather than a legal instrument. In this context, the majority of the coercive diplomacy scholarship has tended to focus on deterrence, with only a fraction singling in on compellence. A search on the academic database JSTOR for all items articles in the categories ‘history,’ ‘international relations,’ ‘military studies,’ ‘peace and conflict studies,’ and ‘political science,’ using the search key ‘deterrence’ in July 2022, yields a total of 41,120 returns; a similar search using ‘compellence,’ on the other hand, returns only 4574 returns. In the post-Cold War era, there has been a mild surge of interest in compellence, manifested in both qualitative and quantitative studies of this phenomenon, which will be discussed in the second part of this chapter. This is also illustrated by the search results of the JSTOR database using the exact same search key but then only for the period after 1 January 1990 that yields 29,714 19  Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz (Florence, MA: Free Press, 1991), chap. 1. 20  John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Basic Books, 1989), chap. 5. John Mueller, The Remnants of War, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). 21  Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (Penguin Group US, 2011); Joshua S.  Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide (Plume, 2012). 22  Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (United States Institute of Peace, 1991).

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returns for deterrence and 3980 for compellence, meaning that 72 per cent of the articles on deterrence that are featured on JSTOR and 87 per cent of the articles on compellence were published after the end of the Cold War. Over the whole period, ultimata have featured as a core concept in the coercive diplomacy scholarship, as I will show, even if that was not matched with a comprehensive empirical examination of their use and utility.

The Use and Utility of Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy: Arguments and Evidence After the Second World War, the scholarly discussion became less concerned with the definition of ultimata. The coercive diplomacy scholarship moved away from discussing ultimata in reference to war declarations, no longer lingering on any of the legal or moral aspects of the matter that were still so salient in the centuries prior. The focus now came to lie more squarely on utility and the conditions under which such threats tend to be successful at convincing targets into compliance. For the first time, the outcomes of ultimata received explicit treatment. The scholarly work thus not only addressed the demands contained in ultimata but also identified and further elucidated the key parameters affecting the outcome of ultimata in the context of coercive diplomacy.23 A review of the key arguments

23  Because the focus of this book is on coercive diplomacy and threats that specifically raise the spectre of war, this literature review will not examine the extensive literature on various types of economic coercion. For a seminal work, see David Allen Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton University Press, 1985). See also Robert A. Pape, ‘Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work’, International Security 22, no. 2 (oktober 1997): 90–136, https://doi. org/10.2307/2539368; Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, third edition (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009); T. Clifton Morgan, Navin Bapat, and Yoshiharu Kobayashi, ‘Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES Dataset’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 31, no. 5 (1 November 2014): 541–58, https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213520379; Henry Farrell and Abraham L.  Newman, ‘Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion’, International Security 44, no. 1 (1 July 2019): 42–79, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351; Francesco Giumelli, ‘Targeted Sanctions and Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century’, in NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020: Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice, ed. Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs, NL ARMS (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2021), 349–63, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_18.

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proposed by these authors will also prove to be informative for the assessment of the use and utility of ultimata in the following chapters. Against the background of the nascent nuclear rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, the issue of how to compel an opponent to do your will without having to resort to the large-scale use of military force became of principal interest.24 Groundbreaking work on the use of threats in negotiations was conducted by a group of American scholars working on issues of game theory and nuclear strategy at the recently founded think tank RAND in the 1950s, at the start of the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, Daniel Ellsberg and Thomas Schelling published several seminal papers on the ‘art of coercion’ and the ‘diplomacy of violence’ that analysed the use of military potential to influence the opponent’s behaviour and ‘coerce his decision or choice’ through the threat of harm that could be imposed.25 As Schelling was in the process of developing and formulating his ideas, Daniel Ellsberg gave a series of lectures titled ‘The Art of Coercion: A Study of Threats in Economic Conflict and War’ at the Lowell Institute in 1959. Ellsberg published the opening lecture a decade later in 1968 in a paper titled ‘The Theory and Practice of Blackmail.’26 My discussion here concentrates on Schelling simply for the reason that Schelling has been the most influential game theorist with the greatest impact on deterrence and compellence debates. Coercion is different from simply taking something from the opponent through the sheer use of force. Instead, it relies on getting the opponent to give up what is demanded from it. As such, it is akin to the difference between ‘deterrence and defence, between brute force and intimidation, between conquest and blackmail, between action and threats.’27 Whereas 24  For an overview of the development of this particular field as a corollary to the development of nuclear strategy, see Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Third Edition, 3rd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 117–30, 165–78, 196–211, 216–19 esp. 25  Thomas C.  Schelling, Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword (Yale University Press, 2008), xiv, 2; Thomas C. Schelling, ‘An Essay on Bargaining’, The American Economic Review 46, no. 3 (1 June 1956): 281–306; Thomas C.  Schelling, ‘Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War’, Conflict Resolution 1, no. 1 (1 March 1957): 19–36; Thomas C.  Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1981); Daniel Ellsberg, ‘The Theory and Practice of Blackmail’ (Santa Monica California: RAND, 1968), http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P3883.html. 26  Ellsberg, ‘The Theory and Practice of Blackmail’. For background, see Tom Wells, Wild Man: The Life and Times of Daniel Ellsberg, 1st ed. (US: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 122–29. 27  Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2.

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military action in itself is aimed at defeating the opponent’s strength, its coercive use is aimed at the opponent’s interests and its capacity to absorb hurt. Coercion is only applicable in non-zero-sum game situations in which the interests of the two parties are not diametrically opposed. If they would be, there would be no room for bargaining and therefore no room for coercion.28 The use of military force, in essence, is therefore not a substitute for the process of bargaining, but rather part of this process.29 In this equation, military force serves a different purpose than military victory per se. Rather it is ‘the influence that resides in latent force […], the bargaining power that comes from its capacity to hurt.’30 Schelling distinguished between deterrence and compellence as two different types of coercion. Deterrence refers to the act of persuading an opponent to refrain from a certain action. Compellence, on the other hand, refers to the act of persuading an opponent to commit a certain act that it otherwise would not consider. Whereas deterrence is ‘indefinite in its timing,’ compellence includes a deadline.31 In order to persuade the opponent to comply with its demands without having to actually resort to force, the coercing party needs to master the art of commitment. Here it can purport to be irrational and risk-acceptant. It can also signal its intent to the opponent by creating costly material commitments, for instance, through a large-scale mobilisation of its armed forces. The coercer can also publicly commit itself to a certain course of action, for instance, through public statements and ceremonies which create reputation costs if the coercer shies away from carrying out its threat.32 One of the problems is the difficulty of formulating threats that are unambiguous in nature and leave no room for misinterpretation. This difficulty may incentivise targets of coercion to employ ‘salami tactics’ and engage in limited violations of the terms of the demands that are real but so minor in nature that they do not seem to make it legitimate for coercers to follow up on their threat.33 Schelling therefore argues that coercers need to create the threat of war that leaves something to chance which can be of instrumental value both in deterrence and in compellence.34 This  Schelling, 3–4.  Schelling, 16. 30  Schelling, 30. 31  Schelling, 73. 32  Schelling, 36–55. 33  Schelling, 66; 66–69. 34  Schelling, 99–109; Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187–203. 28 29

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notion refers to the possibility of war, not through deliberate decision on the part of the coercer, but due to elements of friction that are out of his hands. Crisis situations are characterised by confusion and miscommunication, and the process of decision is ‘imperfect’ which raises the spectre of war.35 Capitalising on this mechanism of friction, coercers can convey that they are not bluffing and signal that they are risk acceptant, thereby trying to render their threat credible. Coercers can also create a situation in which they lose ultimate control over whether war will occur. This leaves it up to the target of coercion to either stand firm and accept the probability of war or give in. Coercers create this shared risk, through ‘irreversible manoeuvres or commitments.’36 Verbal communication is not sufficient, Schelling states. Coercers not only have to communicate that they are willing to go to—and over—the brink, they will actually have to do so.37 Ultimata, in this reading, are signalling devices that may create important public commitments, but need to be accompanied by shows of force, in order to achieve compellence. Also belonging to the group of scholars working on issues relating to nuclear strategy and nuclear crisis management was a scholar named Alexander George. At RAND between 1948 and 1968, and at Stanford University from 1968 onwards, George attempted to move beyond a purely game theoretic perspective to the study of using threats to attain one’s objectives, by systematically deducing a number of insights from a review of a limited set of case studies in a qualitative manner. In his study of ‘the use of intimidation, of one kind or another, in order to get others to comply with one’s wishes,’38 he coined the term that in the following decades would become the standard term for this phenomenon: coercive diplomacy. Given George’s importance for the development of the field of coercive diplomacy, it is worth dwelling on his work at greater length. George, drawing on Schelling’s concepts of deterrence and compellence, distinguishes between defensive and offensive uses of coercion and limited his conception of coercive diplomacy specifically to ‘defensive uses’ of the strategy,39 which he defined as an attempt to persuade an opponent to stop  Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201.  Schelling, 194. 37  Schelling, 200. 38  Alexander L. George, ‘Introduction: The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’, in The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition, ed. Alexander L George and William E Simons, 2nd ed. (Westview Press, 1994), 2. 39  George, 7. 35 36

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or undo an action. This is the opposite of demanding an opponent to give something up that is already his—which is the offensive use (and included in Schelling’s concept of compellence)—which George considers pure blackmail. Coercive diplomacy, in George’s reading, is different from deterrence in that it comes as a response to an action which it seeks to alter instead of being aimed at preventing an action which has yet to take place. Coercive diplomacy, according to George then, is a defensive strategy whose purpose is to back a demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be credible enough and potent enough to persuade him that it is in his interest to comply with the demand.40

George seeks to identify those factors that affect the success of coercive diplomacy and distinguishes between contextual variables and favouring conditions. The contextual variables shape the environment in which policymakers practise coercive diplomacy. These contextual variables may be seen as constraining or enabling factors that policymakers will need to take into account in deciding whether to engage in coercive diplomacy at all; if they decide to do so, then they can turn to the favouring conditions to inform the content of an effective coercive diplomacy strategy.41 As contextual variables George lists global strategic environment, type of provocation, image of war, unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy, and isolation of the adversary. George cautions that these factors are context dependent and that this list therefore may not be exhaustive.42 Global strategic environment refers to the nature of the international system and the considerations that shape the decisions of the involved parties, including other strategic interests that may take priority over the stakes involved in the current crisis and may affect the settlement terms, such as the future relationship with the crisis actors or third parties. Type of provocation refers to the nature of the provocation that the perpetrating party engaged in in the first place, for example, the occupation of foreign territory, covert  George, 2.  Jakobsen’s distinction between contextual variables and favouring conditions is followed here; see Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 20. 42  Alexander L George and William E Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions’, in The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition, ed. Alexander L George and William E Simons, 2nd ed. (Westview Press, 1994), 270–74. 40 41

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support for terrorist groups or the installation of certain weapon systems, and how easily this provocation can be reversed. Image of war refers to the societal reception of war. Unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy refers to whether one state or a group of states are engaging in coercive diplomacy. Isolation of the adversary refers to whether the target of coercion receives allied support. In The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy George describes nine favouring conditions that—as he emphasises—may contribute to the success of coercive diplomacy since none of these conditions is by itself either sufficient or necessary for success. These nine conditions are clarity of the objective (is it clear what is being demanded from the target of coercion?); strength of motivation (what is the level of motivation of the coercer?); asymmetry of motivation (how does the level of motivation of the target of coercion and coercer compare?); sense of urgency (what is the target of coercion’s perception of the sense of urgency on the part of the coercer?); strong leadership (does the coercer have forceful political leaders?); adequate domestic support (is there sufficient support at the domestic front for the coercive strategy adapted by the coercer?); adequate international support (is there sufficient support at the international level for the coercive strategy adapted by the coercer?); unacceptability of threatened escalation (does the target of coercion fear escalation to unsustainable levels of impact?); and clarity and certainty concerning the precise settlement terms of the crisis both for the target of coercion and for the coercer.43 Against the background of this long list of conditions, George lists four types of coercive diplomacy that have been outlined in the introductory chapter: the try-and-see approach, the gradual turning of the screw, the tacit ultimatum, and the ultimatum.44 The try-and-see approach basically consists of a demand without any time frame or threat of punishment. In the gradual turning of the screw, a demand is issued with the explicit warning that the punishment will be stronger in the absence of immediate compliance. The tacit ultimatum incorporates a demand and a punishment, but does not include a specific time frame or may not even include the threat of a specific punishment if the threat is conveyed through actions rather than through words. The ultimatum, finally, is the strongest form of coercive diplomacy and incorporates a specific demand on the  George and Simons, 279–88.  Alexander L. George, ‘Theory and Practice’, in The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition, ed. Alexander L George and William E Simons, 2nd ed. (Westview Press, 1994), 18. 43 44

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opponent, a time frame for compliance, and a punishment in case of non-­ compliance. George lists a number of risks associated with ultimata. First, the target of coercion may consider the ultimatum to be either a bluff or a humiliation and reject it, in which case the coercer needs to follow up on its threat or risk losing its credibility. Second, the target of coercion may take the ultimatum seriously but, rather than acceding to the demands, strike pre-emptively. Third, the target of coercion may not reject the ultimatum entirely but may abide only partially by the terms of the ultimatum in the hope of getting the coercer to not follow through on its threat. Reviewing seven occasions at which the US engaged in coercive diplomacy, he identifies four uses of tacit or regular ultimata (Pearl Harbor (1941), Laos (1960–1961), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the Persian Gulf (1990–1991)) and finds them to be successful in only two cases (Laos and the Cuban Missile Crisis) and unsuccessful or even counterproductive in the other two cases (Pearl Harbor and the Persian Gulf). George therefore concludes: ‘As our evidence stands, we can only express doubts that ultimata are required and leave it to other case work to present a more compelling argument.’45 Following in the footsteps of Schelling and George, numerous scholars have examined the conduct of coercive diplomacy from a myriad of both theoretical and empirical angles.46 While generally using George’s framework in one way or another, nearly all authors reject George’s distinction between defensive and offensive strategies (principally because it is hard to  George and Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions’, 288.   Paul Gordon Lauren, ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’, International Studies Quarterly 16, no. 2 (1 June 1972): 131–65, https://doi.org/10.2307/3013977; Glenn Herald Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Brookings Institution Press, 1978); Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War; Lawrence Freedman, Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (Oxford University Press, USA, 1998); Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, ‘Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 1 (1 April 1999): 1–30, https://doi.org/10.2307/2657989; Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Robert J.  Art and Patrick M.  Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (United States Institute of Peace, 2003); Todd S. Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 28, no. 4 (1 September 2011): 377–401, https://doi. org/10.1177/0738894211413066. 45 46

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make in practice), conceiving of coercive diplomacy or ‘strategic coercion’ broadly as ‘the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices.’47 Lauren, in the one article in the coercive diplomacy literature exclusively dedicated to ultimata, scrutinises ultimata in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries across a wide variety of cases. Lauren describes coercive diplomacy as a strategy to affect an ‘opponent’s will rather than […] his military capabilities.’48 Lauren shares the observation that prompted the underlying study, in that he notes the lack of a strict definition of ultimata and the entire absence of any attempt at systematic analysis of their incidence. In reflecting upon earlier definitions, he finds them to be either imprecise or excessively narrow or much too broad and general to be of much use. Lauren considers ultimata to be much too particular in nature to be simply defined as a warning or a threat. The content of an ultimatum does not need to be entirely straightforward; nor, in his view, need an ultimatum to be necessarily associated with war, as they traditionally were. Lauren defines an ultimatum as a communication issued by one state or group of states to another which threatens to employ coercive measures unless compliance with formulated demands is forthcoming within a certain time limit.49

Lauren’s definition contains three basic elements: a specific demand, a time frame, and a threat of punishment. The demand specifies what is required of the target of coercion. Implicit in the demand is the requirement of unconditional acceptance. The time frame stipulates a limit within which the target needs to either abide by the requested demands or offer a formal reply to the ultimatum. The threat of punishment encompasses a promise that absent compliance the threatening party will take harmful measures in the future. Ultimata may include a (written) introduction and/or a conclusion offering reasons that seek to legitimise the ultimatum and incentives to stimulate compliance. Lauren identifies a time limit as a core element of his ultimatum trinity and considers a sense of urgency mediated by time pressure as a vital factor. 47  Lawrence Freedman, ‘Strategic Coercion’, in Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, ed. Lawrence Freedman (Oxford University Press, USA, 1998), 15. 48  Lauren, ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’, 135. 49  Lauren, 137.

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A refined understanding of ultimata will take into account analytical differences between different types of ultimata, which, according to Lauren, include, amongst other things, the nature and scope of the demands and the different incentive structures of the coercer and the target of coercion. Lauren therefore distinguishes between several types of ultimata which involve threats running on a spectrum from mild to severe and may even include ‘threats of escalating a war.’50 On this spectrum he distinguishes between ‘threats of the non-violent break in negotiations,’ ‘threats of the nonviolent breach of agreements in force,’ ‘threats involving the demonstration of force,’ ‘threats of compulsive settlement by force short of limited invasion,’ ‘threats of limited armed invasion,’ ‘threats of war,’ and, finally, ‘threats of escalating a war.’ Furthermore, the objectives—or ‘purposes’—for which an ultimatum is issued are crucial in determining ‘the particular degree of violence, extensiveness, or urgency in each requisite element of an ultimatum.’ Lauren, furthermore, attempts to distinguish between actual rather than publicly stated purposes of ultimata. A common purpose of all ultimata is that they are intended to signal firm resolve and act as a final word. As variable purposes, Lauren lists ‘to bring an issue to the fore,’ ‘to express the amount of concession,’ ‘to fulfil obligatory warnings or customary procedure,’ ‘to manipulate opinion and mobilise resources,’ ‘to humiliate an opponent,’ and ‘to prepare prudently for self-defence.’ Lauren highlights the role of words in conveying a sense of urgency. In addition, in passing he also mentions factors such as capabilities, intentions, levels of motivation, and scope of the demands and adds that contextual variables such as troop movements and reputation are relevant in rendering the message both meaningful and credible. Lauren says very little about the actual success rate of ultimata and he does not conduct a systematic analysis of the historical record. He does, however, provide ample examples for each type of ultimatum and concludes by explicitly warning about the inherent escalatory effects of ultimata. Without further substantiating this claim, Lauren claims: Particularly when employing ultimata, coercive diplomacy has seldom been successful (and even then almost exclusively by states with a very substantial power differential over their opponents).51  The terms in quotation marks that follow come from the discussion in Lauren, 145–61.  Lauren, 162.

50 51

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In Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises, Snyder and Diesing consider the nature of bargaining within the context of interstate crises from the late nineteenth century onwards. The essence of coercive bargaining lies in persuading an opponent to do what he otherwise will not do through ‘a threat of harm whose effects he considers worse than the sacrifice or behaviour change that is being demanded of him.52 The authors question whether in the process of bargaining ‘actions sometimes speak louder than words’ and argue that verbal threats may in fact be strongly committing.53 The ability to signal commitment towards one’s opponent is of crucial importance in the bargaining process. Any successful commitment consists of three elements: first, one has to make the committing act; second, one has to communicate that act; and third, one’s opponent needs to comply as a result of that communication. Snyder and Diesing distinguish between the committing threat, which creates a new commitment; the warning threat, which reinforces a previously existing threat; and the bluff, which neither creates a new commitment nor asserts an old one. In their sample of sixteen crises, they primarily find threats of the second and third type (warning threats and bluffs) rather than committing threats, which is what ultimata in essence are. This can be explained, they argue, by the fact that policymakers do not like to commit themselves in advance to any course of action. With regard to ultimata, Snyder and Diesing pay specific attention to the ways in which states strategically place time limits on the length of bargaining. They propose that decreasing utility of gains over time may incentivise conflict actors either to reach agreement swiftly or alternatively to delay agreement.54 In addition, they describe different formal models of bargaining, including utility and strategic interaction models, and attempt to create a link between the two types of models in describing how a sequence of interactions produces different payoffs.55 Furthermore, they assess the time-dependent effects in the outcome of crises and find that in many cases time pressure prompts bargaining parties to act in the face of impending catastrophe. Actors, however, do not necessarily respond as predicted by formal theoretical models, since they stall as often in  Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 23.  Snyder and Diesing, 214. 54  Snyder and Diesing, 37. 55  Snyder and Diesing, 52–61. 52 53

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situations that have chances of ameliorating as they do in desperate situations. Perceived time pressure, moreover, derives more from expected costs than from expected gains, underscoring the fact that traditional utility models overlook at least part of the picture.56 Snyder and Diesing conclude that ‘time is a complex variable in bargaining,’ with greater relevance to bargaining between governments than to internal decision-making processes, although adding that ‘its relevance is ambiguous.’57 They point out that the passage of time is a pre-requisite to render clear the balance of power as well as the nature of intentions and motivations to the conflict parties. At the same time, however, the passage of time may also lead to an entrenchment of the commitment of the opponent. Snyder and Diesing note that coercers, at least in the cases they examine, often do not seek to shorten the period in which the bargaining takes place. The cases in which decision makers do seek to shorten the length of bargaining processes may therefore point towards a more general rule, they propose: when a conflict party is confident in its own resolve and dominance and also trusts that this is recognised as such, ultimata may be the instrument of choice. Other reasons for issuing ultimata, listed by the authors, are to prevent the participation of other actors, to get oneself ready for conflict, and to prepare popular opinion for the likelihood of war.58 In their sample of sixteen crises, Snyder and Diesing consider a total of six ultimata, all issued by a fully committed state. The six ultimata were Germany to Russia, 1909; Austria to Serbia, 1914; Germany to Russia, 1914; Germany to France, 1914; Germany to Czechoslovakia, 1938; and the US to the Soviet Union, 1962. The authors contend that the three 1914 ultimata were merely the ouverture to a course of action that the initiating parties were intent on pursuing anyway and were meant to satisfy ‘the convention of the time.’59 So, according to the authors, was Germany’s 1938 ultimatum to Czechoslovakia, although the unexpected involvement of third parties (France, Great Britain, and Italy) meant that Germany received what it wanted without actually having to go to war. The other two cases—Bosnia 1909 and Cuba 1962—are interpreted as real coercive moves in a bargaining process. In the Bosnia case, Germany was ready to fully support Austria-Hungary in case of non-compliance as was the US in  Snyder and Diesing, 77–78, 79.  Snyder and Diesing, 491, 492. 58  Snyder and Diesing, 493. 59  Snyder and Diesing, 215. 56 57

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the Cuban case, but in both cases the Russian and Soviet governments complied. Snyder and Diesing’s suggestion that ultimata can be construed either as fig leaves that are merely used as pretexts for wars already planned or as actual coercive moves seems sensible. Unfortunately, they do not really make clear how to distinguish one type from another. Moreover, the very small number of ultimata that they actually examine in order to corroborate their distinction suggests that additional empirical work is necessary to determine how ultimata feature in other eras and contexts. Also after the end of the Cold War, scholars continue to analyse coercive diplomacy and the role of ultimata therein. Barry Blechman and Tamara Wittes consider eight post-Cold War cases in which the US used armed forces in support of political objectives in an article titled ‘Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy.’60 They exclude instances in which ‘dogs may not have barked,’ only including those in which the US ‘deliberately and actively’ used its armed forces to ‘threaten or to conduct limited military operations.’61 The cases were Panama (1989–1990), Iraq (1990–1996), Somalia (1992–1995), Macedonia (1992–1999), Bosnia (1992–1999), Haiti (1994–1996), North Korea (1994–1996), and Taiwan (1996). Blechman and Wittes argue that a combination of the character of the threat—including its urgency, whether it includes tangible actions and is clearly communicated—and the context in which it is made determine its credibility. Whether the target of coercion complies is, furthermore, determined by the difficulty of the demands it is presented with, which, in conjunction with the credibility of the threat, determines the anticipated costs of compliance and non-compliance. They identify these three factors—context, character of threat, and difficulty of the demand—as the prime enabling variables. While these enabling variables may render the threat credible, the actual potency of the threat is important as well: if the target of coercion believes that the coercer will actually carry out the threat, the punishment contained in the threat must be potent enough to convince the target of coercion that non-compliance will bear more costs than compliance.62 Blechman and Wittes mention the use of ultimata in conveying a sense of urgency but argue that the most important role of an ultimatum is to lessen chances of misperception and miscalculation as an ultimatum  Blechman and Wittes, ‘Defining Moment’.  Blechman and Wittes, 5. 62  Blechman and Wittes, 6–11. 60 61

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clearly spells out to the target of coercion what is demanded by when.63 The evidence with respect to the conveyance of a sense of urgency, whether or not through the use of a deadline, is mixed, however, and according to these authors did not play a decisive role in any of the eight cases they have looked at.64 Contrary to these authors, ultimata are considered to be essential instruments by Peter Viggo Jakobsen. He examines coercive diplomacy practised by Western states in his 1998 book titled Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War. He defines coercive diplomacy as a strategy involving the use of a threat of punishment and/or limited force short of full-scale military operations to persuade an actor to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon.65

Jakobsen seeks to improve on the framework proposed by George, which, he contends, was too much tailored to the particular setting of the Cold War period, and the level of aggregation of the variables making it difficult to test them against the empirical record. Jakobsen identifies the following elements to be essential for coercive diplomacy to be successful: a threat to use force which will defeat the opponent both swiftly and at low cost (which will render the threat credible); a deadline for compliance (to maximise the credibility of the threat and reduce the possibility of ‘misperception,’ ‘miscalculation,’ ‘delaying tactics,’ and ‘counter-coercion’ on the part of the opponent); an assurance that no future demands will be made (in order not to dis-incentivise the opponent to comply); and an offer of carrots (as a way for the opponent to comply while saving face).66 Jakobsen furthermore argues that states will be willing to resort to using force as a function of the nature of the threatened interests (vital, strategic, stability, and moral/ideological); the prospects of military success (balance of forces, likelihood of hostile great power involvement, the extent to which both coercer and target of coercion are vulnerable to (military) coercion, and counter-coercion); and the level of domestic support (as an aggregate of public opinion and support from important interest groups).67 Testing his ideal policy against the empirical record of  Blechman and Wittes, 10, fn. 19.  Blechman and Wittes, 27. 65  Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War, 17. 66  Jakobsen, 29; 25–30. 67  Jakobsen, 35–42. 63 64

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thirteen cases in three conflicts in the post-Cold War era (‘the Gulf Conflict’ 1990–1991, ‘the Yugoslav Wars’ 1991–1995 and ‘Restoring Democracy in Haiti’ 1991–1994) in which Western states used coercive diplomacy, he finds his ideal policy to be successful in at least eleven of them.68 Moreover, he asserts that the predictive accuracy of the combination of the three factors that account for willingness of states to threaten and use force, although not 100 per cent, is good enough to merit further examination.69 Jakobsen highlights various aspects of ultimata, most important amongst which is the reduction of ‘the risk of misperception and miscalculation’ and ‘the scope for delaying tactics and counter-coercion.’70 Jakobsen identifies the speed with which a threat can be carried out as an important element in the strategic calculus. In addition, he discusses in more detail the lengthening of the time horizon as a critical factor in shaping the outcome, on the basis that the target of coercion should be convinced that compliance is a one-off act. Finally, he admits that the static nature of his framework is a potential limitation suggesting as a remedy that it should be applied repeatedly over the course of a crisis because the value of the variables may change over the duration of any coercive bargaining situation. Jakobsen calls for more empirical work to examine his conclusions on the use and utility of ultimata. His approach exemplifies the shift in focus from the legal legitimacy of interstate threats to the utility of these threats while highlighting the dynamic nature of coercive bargaining processes and the need to examine them in closer detail. Lawrence Freedman also participates in the debate on the why’s and ways of coercive diplomacy in the post-Cold War period, contributing a series of useful analytical distinctions in an edited volume titled Strategic Coercion in 1998. Freedman proposes a different term for coercive diplomacy which he coins strategic coercion. Strategic coercion, as mentioned earlier, is defined as ‘the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices.’71 Strategy is often interpreted to refer to the use of force by a political actor to impose its will upon an opponent. The concept of coercion, in turn, refers, according to the Oxford definition cited by Freedman, to ‘the application of force to  Jakobsen, 131–32.  Jakobsen, 137. 70  Jakobsen, 29. 71  Freedman, ‘Strategic Coercion’, 1998, 15. 68 69

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control the action of a voluntary agent.’72 In other words, coercion is used to affect the autonomous calculation of an opponent. In instances in which a party either exercises total control over an opponent by means of the use of military force or enjoys its voluntary consent, strategic coercion does not come into play. Freedman thus proposes a spectrum with consent at one end and control at the other end with strategic coercion somewhere in between. Successful strategic coercion requires that the target of coercion believes that non-compliance automatically results in the implementation of the threat issued by the coercer. This hinges on whether the coercer is able to credibly convey or signal their message to the target of coercion. In signalling their intentions, the coercer could solely rely on the movement of their armed forces. This, however, may in itself not suffice and the coercer will need more direct, less unambiguous, forms of communication in order to ensure that there is no misinterpretation of what it demands from the target of coercion. In fact, Freedman asserts that ‘the military medium can rarely serve as the political message […] it has to be backed up by political communication.73 The success of strategic coercion depends on how the target of coercion perceives and frames reality and how receptive the target is to being pressured by the coercer. The target of coercion must believe that the coercer possesses the intent and the ability to do so. In addition to the threat being clearly defined and communicated, factors such as the ability of the coercer to follow up on his threat, the nature of the interests at stake, and the level of support of allies, both mentioned by Freedman, are essential to rendering a threat credible. Timing matters too. A coercer issuing a firm ultimatum at the outset may antagonise and inflame an opponent disproportionately, creating an escalatory dynamic, and raising enforcement costs for the coercer. However, a coercer employing an initial cautious wait-and-see approach may be taken to be weak by the opponent, thereby rendering threats that are issued afterwards less credible. Freedman concludes that within this triangle, a constant readjustment of interpretations and assumptions of the behaviour of the opponents takes place, re-­ emphasising his contention that the study of strategic coercion should incorporate the ways in which actors perceive reality and ‘their grasp of how their opponents construct their own reality.’74 Freedman does not  Freedman, 15.  Freedman, 33. 74  Freedman, 36. 72 73

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explicitly discuss ultimata but identifies important lessons for the study of ultimata. Chief amongst these are that strategic coercion is an interactive process; strategic coercion takes place within the context of a larger international power structure and historical setting; strategic coercion is a multifaceted game which includes intra-group bargaining; and finally, strategic coercion is not a science and definitely involves art and skill. In 2003 Robert Art and Patrick Cronin edited a book titled The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, in which they analyse US coercive diplomacy between 1990 and 2001.75 Art defines coercive diplomacy as the use of ‘military power short of war to bring about a change in a target’s policies or in its political makeup’ or ‘the attempt to get a target—a state, a group (or groups) within a state, or a non-state actor—to change its objectionable behaviour through either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force.’76 Art includes the diplomatic use of threats and the demonstrative use of force but excludes full-blown wars.77 The book contains eight case studies of US coercive diplomacy in the post-Cold War era: Somalia (1992–1994), Haiti (1994), North Korea (1994), Bosnia (1995), China (1996), Iraq (1990–1998), Kosovo (1999), and terrorism (1993, 1998, 2001). In the conclusion, out of the eight cases Art considers only two cases to be a success (Bosnia and Haiti), five cases a complete failure (Kosovo, North Korea, Somalia, Iraq, and counter-terrorism in the 1990s up till 2001), and one case ambiguous (China over Taiwan).78 Art offers two analyses: in the first analysis he counts eight instances of coercive diplomacy, and in the second sixteen cases. The difference is explained by the fact that in the second analysis he subdivides Iraq, Somalia, and terrorism in multiple instances of coercive diplomacy. The overall record is fairly similar.79 Art notes that the greater the number of favouring conditions, as identified by George, the higher the likelihood of success, and the smaller this number, the higher the likelihood of failure.80 Art does not explicitly discuss either the use or the utility of ultimata in his review, even  Art and Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy.  Robert J. Art, ‘Introduction’, in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 5, 6. 77  Art, 9. 78  Robert J.  Art, ‘Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?’, in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Robert J.  Art and Patrick M.  Cronin (United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 376–383. 79  Art, 385–387. 80  Art, 383–385. 75 76

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though the various authors in the edited volume do pay attention to the role of diplomacy by deadline in their case treatments of Iraq, Haiti, North Korea, Bosnia, Kosovo, China, and Afghanistan. Overall, combining the cases of George and the cases discussed in the book, he finds that coercive diplomacy has a very limited success rate: it was successful in one-third (32 per cent) of the twenty-two cases but failed in almost half.81 Art concludes that both positive inducements and a strong denial capability contribute to the success of coercive diplomacy but ‘by no means guarantee success,’82 while there is no relationship between the types of demands and the outcomes. Finally, Art notes that it is possible that these findings may suffer from selection bias effects because the set includes only highly visible cases. Most recently, Todd Sechser has attempted to expand the evidentiary base for the study of coercive diplomacy in interstate relations. He has analysed the track record of coercive diplomacy and more specifically of compellence, on the basis of an overview he has compiled of 210 militarised compellent threats issued between 1918 and 2001. Sechser defines militarised compellent threats as ‘an explicit demand by one state (the challenger) that another state (the target) alter the status quo in some material way, backed by a threat of military force if the target does not comply.’83 Sechser reports that ‘challengers achieved full compliance in 87 of the 210 compellent threat episodes (41.4%) in the dataset.’84 Sechser offers various descriptive statistics of the success rate of coercive diplomacy including bivariate correlations between regime types, capability differences, demonstrations of force, and outcomes. He finds that there are no substantial differences between the success rates of different regime types, while demonstrations of force are correlated with a greater likelihood of success. He also reports that whereas coercers are likely to possess stronger military capabilities as measured by their annual military expenditures, stronger coercers taking on weaker targets of coercion tend to have lower success rates than weaker coercers taking on stronger targets of coercion.85 With respect to ultimata, Sechser observes, agreeing with Snyder and Diesing, that ‘compellent threats rarely carry an explicit deadline (though one is sometimes implied), since leaders often prefer to retain policy  Art, 387.  Art, 401. 83  Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, 380. 84  Sechser, 389. 85  Sechser, 389–91. 81 82

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flexibility in crises.’86 Sechser also asserts, however, that while ‘one might conjecture that compellence is more likely to be effective when a firm deadline accompanies the threat, […] this claim is better suited as empirical proposition to be tested rather than a definitional restriction.’87

Conclusion During the first half of the twentieth century, ultimata started to be discussed in relation to threats of armed force rather than in reference to war declarations, against the background of changing views on the legitimacy of the use of armed force in interstate relations. The end of the Second World War and the founding of the United Nations marked an important caesura even though the evolution in the prevailing perspectives had been incremental rather than punctuated in nature. Threats of the use of armed force were officially outlawed in the founding Charter of the United Nations, yet official international legal bodies and experts of international customary law remained divided over the status of the scope of the moratorium on threats to use armed force. At the same time, in the context of the increasing destructiveness associated with industrial and nuclear war, a community of scholars started to examine the various ways in which decision makers could harness threats of armed force in order to attain strategic objectives short of war. Their focus was no longer on the various legal implications associated with threats of armed force, but rather with the strategic effects that could be obtained by them. Ultimata, consisting of a demand, a threat to use armed force, and a deadline, occupied an important role in the scholarship that emerged during the Cold War and that became known as coercive diplomacy. The scholarship that deals with ultimata thus evolved from being predominantly concerned with moral and legal arguments about the use of ultimata to increasingly also encompass strategic considerations related to their utility, until after the Second World War the two discussions branch out in two different disciplines, one concerned with international law and the other with coercive diplomacy. The initial contributions to the coercive diplomacy scholarship described the dynamics of coercive diplomacy in (game) theoretic(al) terms using historical examples only by means of illustration. This came then to be  Sechser, 383.  Sechser, 383.

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complemented by a series of small n studies of ‘forceful persuasion’ that took an inductive approach88 and eventually heralded the more recent appearance of studies encompassing a combination of approaches. The scholarship in this literature is very much focused on utility, often narrowly understood as compliance on the part of the target of coercion, while authors invariably try to identify those factors that are associated with compliance. The salient determinants of success or failure of coercive diplomacy that are identified relate to the type of interests at stake; the nature of the threat; the cost appetite and the sense of urgency of the coerced; relative power capabilities and the balance of forces; the reputation of the coercer; the demonstration and show of force; the regime type; the level of domestic and international support; the clarity of the demands and the settlement terms; and positive inducements.89 This is an amalgam of factors across different levels of analysis. These include contextual features (relating to the environment), actor attributes (some at the level of the state, and others at the group or the individual level), and relational aspects (at the level of the dyad). Some of these factors are material and tangible in nature, whereas others are immaterial and intangible. Finally, some factors are relatively fixed and static, whereas others emerge dynamically in the process of bargaining. As a corollary, it can be expected that coercive diplomacy by ultimatum is met with different outcomes depending on a complex interplay of factors and according to different pathways perhaps as a result of which authors do not reach consensus on a specific set of factors that are associated with success. Unsurprisingly, the historical success rate of various forms of coercive diplomacy based on different sets of cases has a mixed record ranging from compliance in around one-third to eleven out of thirteen of the cases that are considered. There is no consensus on the usefulness of ultimata. Some consider them indispensable, while others consider them risky. Overall, the coercive diplomacy scholarship is largely, although not exclusively, US-centric in nature, with many of the works examining cases that involve the US. With one exception, ultimata are never the principal focus of examination and the number of ultimata  George, Forceful Persuasion.  Schelling, Arms and Influence; George and Simons, ‘Findings and Conclusions’, 279–88 esp. Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 183–84, 191 esp. Blechman and Wittes, ‘Defining Moment’, 6–11 esp. Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War, 107 esp. Freedman, ‘Strategic Coercion’, 1998, 17 esp. Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War, 25–30, 35–42 esp. Art, ‘Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?’, 383–85 esp. 88 89

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analysed is invariably small—the largest set of ultimata systematically examined is six. While nearly all authors emphasise the dynamic nature of coercion which needs to be understood in the context of the interactive and sequential process of coercion, a comprehensive empirical examination of the use and utility of ultimata is lacking. Even though various objectively measurable factors, such as capabilities and demonstrations and uses of force, are typically considered, other, more subjective factors, most notably the actors’ perceptions, despite the fact they are mentioned, are generally not taken into account. With one exception, most of the coercive diplomacy scholarship, although careful not to draw general conclusions, eventually considers the utility of ultimata from the viewpoint of whether the target of coercion complies with the demands contained in the ultimatum. The coercive diplomacy scholarship on ultimata can therefore be said to suffer from two principal deficiencies: first, it considers only a relatively small set of historical ultimata; second, in line with its disciplinary focus, it relies on a narrow concept of utility in considering whether ultimata are successful or not. The next few chapters introduce the method used to collect a dataset of ultimata that covers a much broader set of cases in the period 1920–2020 (Chap. 4), offer a chronological survey (Chap. 5), evaluate patterns in outcomes (Chap. 6), and argue for the existence of different types of ultimata with different purposes (Chaps. 7–11).

References Art, Robert J. ‘Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?’ In The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin. United States Institute of Peace, 2003a. Art, Robert J. ‘Introduction’. In The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin. United States Institute of Peace, 2003b. Art, Robert J., and Patrick M. Cronin. The United States and Coercive Diplomacy. United States Institute of Peace, 2003. Baldwin, David Allen. Economic Statecraft. Princeton University Press, 1985. Blechman, Barry M., and Stephen S. Kaplan. Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. Brookings Institution Press, 1978. Blechman, Barry M., and Tamara Cofman Wittes. ‘Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy’. Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 1 (1 April 1999): 1–30. https://doi.org/10.2307/2657989. Brownlie, Ian. International Law and the Use of Force by States. Clarendon Press, 1963.

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Byman, Daniel, and Matthew C. Waxman. The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might. Cambridge University Press, 2002. Ellsberg, Daniel. ‘The Theory and Practice of Blackmail’. Santa Monica California: RAND, 1968. http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P3883.html. Fazal, Tanisha M. ‘Why States No Longer Declare War’. Security Studies 21, no. 4 (October 2012): 557–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2012.734227. Freedman, Lawrence. ‘Strategic Coercion’. In Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases, edited by Lawrence Freedman. Oxford University Press, USA, 1998a. Freedman, Lawrence. Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases. Oxford University Press, USA, 1998b. Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Third Edition. 3rd ed. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. George, Alexander L. Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. United States Institute of Peace, 1991. George, Alexander L. ‘Introduction: The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’. In The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition, edited by Alexander L George and William E Simons, 2nd ed. Westview Press, 1994a. George, Alexander L. ‘Theory and Practice’. In The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition, edited by Alexander L George and William E Simons, 2nd ed. Westview Press, 1994b. George, Alexander L, and William E Simons. ‘Findings and Conclusions’. In The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition, edited by Alexander L George and William E Simons, 2nd ed. Westview Press, 1994. Goldstein, Joshua S. Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide. Plume, 2012. Hallett, Brien. The Lost Art of Declaring War. 1st paperback. University of Illinois Press, 1998. International Court of Justice. ‘Advisory Opinion: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’, 1996. http://www.icj-­cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf. International Criminal Court. ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’. International Criminal Court, 2002. https://www.icc-­cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ ea9aeff7-­5752-­4f84-­be94-­0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf. International Criminal Court. ‘The Official Records of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, 31 May -11 June 2010’. International Criminal Court, 2011. http://www.icc-­cpi.int/ iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/OR/RC-­11-­ENG.pdf. Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. Lauren, Paul Gordon. ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’. International Studies Quarterly 16, no. 2 (1 June 1972): 131–65. https://doi.org/10.2307/3013977.

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Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Yoshiharu Kobayashi. ‘Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES Dataset’. Conflict Management and Peace Science 31, no. 5 (1 November 2014): 541–58. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213520379. Mueller, John. Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. Basic Books, 1989. Mueller, John. The Remnants of War. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. Pinker, Steven. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. Penguin Group US, 2011. Sadurska, Romana. ‘Threats of Force’. The American Journal of International Law 82, no. 2 (April 1988): 239. https://doi.org/10.2307/2203188. Schachter, Oscar. ‘The Prohibition of Force’. In Recueil Des Cours, Collected Courses 1982, edited by Academie de Droit International, 133–49. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985. Schelling, Thomas C. ‘An Essay on Bargaining’. The American Economic Review 46, no. 3 (1 June 1956): 281–306. Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword. Yale University Press, 2008. Schelling, Thomas C. ‘Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War’. Conflict Resolution 1, no. 1 (1 March 1957): 19–36. Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press, 1981. Schultz, Kenneth A. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge University Press, 2001. Sechser, Todd S. ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’. Conflict Management and Peace Science 28, no. 4 (1 September 2011): 377–401. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894211413066. Snyder, Glenn Herald, and Paul Diesing. Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978. Stürchler, Nikolas. The Threat of Force in International Law. Cambridge University Press, 2007. The United Nations. ‘Charter of the United Nations’, 26 June 1945. http:// avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/unchart.asp. United Nations. ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties, Signed at Vienna 23 May 1969, Entry into Force: 27 January 1980.’, 1980. https:// treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-­1 155-­ i-­18232-­english.pdf. United Nations General Assembly. ‘Definition of Aggression General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX)’, 14 December 1974. http://www.un.org/ga/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3314(XXIX).

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Van Creveld, Martin. The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz. Florence, MA: Free Press, 1991. Wells, Tom. Wild Man: The Life and Times of Daniel Ellsberg. 1st ed. US: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. Wilmshurst, Elizabeth. ‘Definition of Aggression General Assembly Resolution 3314—An Introductory Note’. Accessed 30 March 2017. http://legal.un. org/avl/ha/da/da.html. Wood, S.M. ‘Use of Force, Prohibition of Threat’. In Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law [MPEPIL]. June 2013. http://opil.ouplaw.com/ view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-­9780199231690-­e428.

CHAPTER 4

The Dataset: Data Collection and Coding Procedures

Method The following sections describe the definition and operationalisation of ultimata and the rationale of the time period under consideration and explains the procedures followed in compiling the dataset, including the search strategy and the inclusion criteria, the drafting of case summaries, and the coding process.

Definition and Operationalisation of Ultimata As discussed in previous chapters, coercive diplomacy refers to a specific form of statecraft which involves the threat or the actual (limited) use of force by the government of one state to pressure the government of another state to comply with a set of demands. In line with this principal focus of the coercive diplomacy literature, only ultimata are considered that involve the threat of the use of military force from one state government to another. Within this scope, ultimata are defined as consisting of a specific demand or set of demands, a time frame for compliance, and a threat of punishment in case of non-compliance. The threat of punishment consists of the use of military force. Relying on this definition, a dataset of ultimata has been compiled for the period 1920–2020 in order to assess their use and utility in interstate coercive diplomacy. In order to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Sweijs, The Use and Utility of Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy, Twenty-first Century Perspectives on War, Peace, and Human Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21303-8_4

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do this, a number of definitional ambiguities had to be clarified in order to determine whether episodes that could be understood as ultimata merited inclusion in the dataset. These ambiguities relate to the war-peace dichotomy, the status of a state, the explicitness of the demands, the threat of punishment, and the deadline. Peace Versus War Settings Coercive diplomacy is generally considered to take place in settings short of war before two or more belligerents have either declared war or initiated major armed hostilities against each other.1 The demarcation between war and peace settings is not always very clear cut, however, for two principal reasons. First, the increasing obsolescence of official war declarations during the period under consideration means that in many cases participants do not always unequivocally acknowledge the beginning of a state of war. Second, in the absence of official markers set by the participants, it is hard to establish objective, generic thresholds that demarcate the condition of peace from the state of war, because thresholds vary from one context to the next. For instance, the invasion of a state’s territory by a large cohort of armed forces generally constitutes an act of war such as the invasion of Poland by Germany in 1939 (which was preceded by an ultimatum even if it was never formally transmitted; see case #36) or the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. However, Japan’s incremental military expansion in mainland China in the 1930s was generally not considered to constitute war until the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge incident which heralded the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Ultimata issued in the period prior to the Marco Polo Bridge incident are therefore included in the dataset (see cases #21 and #23–#27). Generally, while ultimata issued prior to the outbreak of full-scale hostilities are therefore included, ultimata issued during what is generally considered an active war setting have been excluded. An example of the latter sort is the 1945 Potsdam ultimatum issued by the coalition of Allied Powers against Japan. In distinguishing between peace and war settings, the consensus view of the start date of the war was followed, relying on the Correlates of War

1  Thomas C.  Schelling, Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword (Yale University Press, 2008), 2; Lawrence Freedman, Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases (Oxford University Press, USA, 1998), 15.

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project (COW)2 and on key scholarly works on the specific conflict in question, which are cited in the footnotes accompanying the written case summaries of each ultimatum. State Versus Non-state Actors In assessing interstate coercive diplomacy, cases involving ultimata issued by the government(s) of one or more states against the government of another state are included. Coercive diplomacy involving non-state actors, either on both sides or on one side (with the other side being a state entity), is excluded because my primary interest lies with state-on-state threat behaviour, and it is reasonable to assume that the dynamics of ultimata episodes involving non-state actors are not necessarily similar to those involving states. The latter involve interactions between the governments of sovereign states which rule over populations and geographically demarcated territories within an institutionalised form of governance which is typically recognised by other states. Various sources offer lists of states in the international system at any given year, often from the early nineteenth century onwards. Recurring criteria for inclusion of states on these lists are the presence of an institutionalised form of governing authority, a minimum size of the population of at least 500,000, the presence of diplomatic representations of at least two major powers, and/or membership in an international organisation (either the League of Nations or the United Nations).3 In deciding whether to include a state, the Polity Project was consulted, which assesses political regime characteristics and transitions from 1800 to 2018. It describes a state as a ‘recognized central authority for a (potential) social unit that is delimited spatially through the identification of formal, territorial borders’ featuring ‘more or less institutionalized authority patterns.’4 In a few exceptional cases it was decided to 2  Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Whelon Wayman, Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-State, Extra-State, Intra-State, and Non-State Wars, 1816-2007 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010). 3  Correlates of War Project, ‘State System Membership (V2011)—Correlates of War’, Folder, 2011, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership; Stuart A.  Bremer and Faten Ghosn, ‘Defining States: Reconsiderations and Recommendations’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 20, no. 1 (1 February 2003): 21–41, https://doi. org/10.1177/073889420302000102. 4  Monty G Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013, Dataset Users’ Manual’, 2015, 1.

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include cases of coercion involving state-like entities that are not listed in the Polity dataset because these entities largely functioned like states and fulfilled the requirements of the Polity criteria, while the dynamics in the disputes can be considered to be similar to the dynamics of interstate coercion. These cases include Armenia and Georgia in the early 1920s, in the short time window following the Russian Revolution in 1917 and their annexation by the Soviet Union in 1921/1922 (see cases #1, #2, #6, #7, and #8 in the online annexe), Syria in the 1920s, after its independence and prior to it becoming a French Mandate State (see cases #4 and #5), and Republika Srpska in the mid-1990s, after it had been established in 1992 in the civil wars that erupted after the dissolution of Yugoslavia (see cases #74, #76, and #77). The Demand-Threat-Deadline Trinity A final ambiguity relates to the explicitness of the demand-threat-deadline trinity. The quintessential feature of an ultimatum is that it conveys clearly and unambiguously that the target needs to execute a set of actions by a certain moment in time to avoid punishment. In order to exclude threats that come with non-explicit compellent demands from my dataset, cases are only included in which the coercer presents the target of coercion with one or multiple demands that explicitly identify what the target needs to do, whether that refers to resuming diplomatic relations (Poland to Lithuania, 1938, see case #30), withdrawing military forces from an island (Eritrea to Yemen in 1995, see case #80), or halting the broadcasting of propaganda over loudspeakers stationed at the border (North Korea to South Korea in 2015, see case #86). Furthermore, the threat needs to identify the consequences that will follow should the target decide not to comply. Here, the military component of the threat can be explicit or implicit, as long as it is apparent to the target of coercion that the coercer threatens to use armed force absent compliance. The threat criterion is defined less strictly simply because sometimes ultimata are framed in more general terms while the military threat is implied based on other variables including the mobilisation of military forces. Several ultimata mention ‘grave consequences’ for which ‘the responsibility’ is squarely put at the feet of the target government, as, for instance, in the cases of Italy to Greece in 1940, China to India in 1965, and Thailand to Cambodia in 2008 (see, respectively, cases #43, #65, and #85). If it is clear from the context that deadlines are set but that

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no military consequences are implied, as, for example, during the negotiations between the international community and Iran over its nuclear programme in the 2000s, the incident is excluded.5 The threat must be compellent rather than deterrent in nature, in line with Schelling’s observation that deterrent threats are not accompanied by deadlines, because they are aimed at preventing actions of the coerced.6 Finally, the deadline needs to identify a specific moment in time, which can be expressed in terms of hours, days, weeks, or, on rare occasions, months. It can also be expressed in terms of ‘now’ if accompanied by a clear set of demands and an implicit or explicit military threat, as, for instance, happened in the ultimatum of the Allied Powers to Germany in 1920 or the US to Afghanistan in 2001 (see, respectively, cases #3 and #83). In order to ensure that only actual ultimata were considered, compellent demands that were accompanied by implicit or explicit threats of violence but without a deadline were excluded, as well as compellent demands that were accompanied with a deadline but without an implicit or explicit threat of violence. Strategic Versus Tactical Tactical ultimata—or ultimata issued by a military officer vis-à-vis an opponent in a localised setting without the involvement of a national government—are also excluded. This is done in order to confine the scope of the analysis to ultimata issued in interstate coercion with regard to issues of national importance involving senior governmental leadership. At the same time, it also prevents the list of ultimata from expanding endlessly to involve tactical battlefield situations which in themselves provide a very interesting topic of study but lie outside the scope of this book. Time Period and Search and Research Strategy Having thus further conceptualised and operationalised the definition of an ultimatum, historical cases of ultimata issued in the period 1920–2020 5  Arms Control Association, ‘Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran | Arms Control Association’, 21 March 2016, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-ofNuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran; Shreeya Sinha and Susan Campbell Beachy, ‘Timeline on Iran’s Nuclear Program’, The New York Times, 21 March 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/ interactive/2014/11/20/world/middleeast/Iran-nuclear-timeline.html. 6  Schelling, Arms and Influence, 73.

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were identified. This historical time period was selected on the basis of a mixture of substantive and pragmatic considerations. Substantively, my interest concerned the use and utility of ultimata in modern interstate coercion outside the context of an ongoing war. The year 1920 rather than 1918 or 1919 has been chosen as a starting point so that ultimata issued during hostilities that could still be conceived of as part of the First World War would be excluded. Moreover, norms regulating the use of armed force changed considerably in the first half of the twentieth century and ultimata became increasingly disassociated from declarations of war in the Interwar Period. This trend continued in the post-Second World War era, with the increasing destructiveness of interstate war further boosting interest amongst Western strategists and practitioners in coercive diplomacy. As a result, ultimata were deployed as diplomatic instruments of strategic coercion rather than as declarations of war. The overall time period therefore allows for the study of ultimata across multiple strategic eras and international systems that featured both continuity and change in the uses and purposes of ultimata, including most of the Interwar Period (1920–1939), the Cold War (1945–1989), and the post-Cold War era (1989–present). For pragmatic reasons, this time period was selected because initially the goal was to rely on the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset which at the time when the research was started provided case summaries of 470 interstate crises issued between 1918 and 2013.7 This, it was expected, would provide the empirical basis to research the use and utility of ultimata. Interstate crisis, according to the ICB project, is defined as (1) a change in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive (…) interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities, that, in turn, (2) destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system-global, dominant or subsystem.8 During the research process, however, it became clear that the ICB dataset, despite being a rich source of information, did not allow for the 7  International Crisis Behavior, ‘ICB Project’, ICB Project, 2016, http://sites.duke.edu/ icbdata/. 8  Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (University of Michigan Press, 1997), 4–5.

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collection of the information necessary to study ultimata. For one, the ICB dataset contains many incidents that did not involve coercion. This is because crises not always are the result of implicit or explicit coercion but can, amongst others, be triggered by a military act without any immediate coercive objective. In addition, even if the crisis involved coercion of some sort, the case summaries offered by the ICB project did not always provide sufficient detail to assess the dynamics of coercion and to evaluate whether the crisis included an ultimatum. Finally, as discussed below, in some cases when the ICB summaries made explicit mention of an ultimatum, on closer inspection it turned out that the crisis did not involve an ultimatum at all. Subsequently, a wide variety of literatures to identify ultimata in interstate coercion, including annual overviews of international affairs, conflict encyclopaedias, numerous works on coercive diplomacy, media archives of English language newspapers, and conflict and crisis dataset, was consulted. More specifically, the entire series of the Annual Survey of International Affairs created by the Royal Institute of International Affairs for the period 1920–1963 was examined. The annual surveys provide dense write-ups of developments in international relations, with emphasis on diplomatic affairs and matters of war and peace. For the period 1920–1945, each volume was given a close read to identify ultimata. For 1945–1963, the by then digitised records were searched using the search term ‘ultimatum’, a search term that was also used for the digitised records of Keesing’s Archives for the period 1945–2015. The Digital New York Times Archives as well as the records of ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The Guardian and The Observer, have been searched using the terms ((ultimatum OR deadline) AND (conflict OR crisis OR threat*)) for the period 1920–2015 which was at a later stage complemented with a search for the years 2015–2020 with the terms ((ultimatum OR deadline) AND (conflict OR crisis)). The search terms for these media sources were slightly more restrictive in order to identify ultimata issued in interstate conflict and exclude as many ultimata as possible that were issued in other contexts such as labour union negotiations. In addition, key coercive diplomacy works, as well as conflict encyclopaedias, have been consulted.9 During the 9   Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, International Conflict a Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management, 1945-1995 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997); Robert Lyle Butterworth and Margaret E. Scranton, Managing Interstate Conflict, 1945-74: Data with Synopses (University Center for

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course of the research, a new dataset called Militarized Compellent Threats (MCT) was published online.10 The MCT dataset contains 210 militarised compellent threat cases, defined as ‘an explicit demand by one state (the challenger) that another state (the target) alter the status quo in some material way, backed by a threat of military force if the target does not comply.’11 The MCT dataset therefore in theory covers a more general category of coercive threats, of which ultimata constitute a more specific subset. However, the MCT dataset that was published online only offered a 0.9 version, did not offer written case summaries, and did not specify whether ultimata had been issued. The MCT could therefore only be used for heuristic purposes but not as a source of information to ascertain whether ultimata were included. The analytical framework of the MCT dataset, which assesses compellent episodes on a variety of aspects, including actors, date, type of demands, use of force, and outcome, was used to inform the operationalisation of the structured focused comparison framework to assess the use and utility of ultimata, which is elaborated below. Inclusion of Cases and Case Summaries Ultimata were referred to more often than expected, especially, but not exclusively, in public media sources. Searching the digital archives of the New York Times, with the search key ((ultimatum OR deadline) AND (conflict OR crisis OR threat*)), while filtering for World articles for the period from 01-01-1920 to 07-08-2015 yielded, for instance, 6175 articles at the time of the research.12 This number was then narrowed down to the number of cases to 200–300 possible ultimata appearing in the context of interstate disputes. Subsequently, in-depth historical case International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1976); Erik Goldstein, Wars and Peace Treaties 1816-Present (Routledge, 1992); John E.  Jessup, An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1945-1996 (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998). 10  Todd S.  Sechser, ‘Replication Data for: Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918-2001’, IQSS Dataverse Network, 19 March 2013. 11  Todd S. Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 28, no. 4 (1 September 2011): 380, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0738894211413066. 12  New York Times, ‘NYTimes.Com Search’, 2015, http://query.nytimes.com/search/sit esearch/?action=click&contentCollection®ion=TopBar&WT.nav=searchWidget&modu le=SearchSubmit&pgtype=Homepage#/%28ultimatum+OR+deadline%29+AND+%28confl ict+OR+crisis+OR+threat*%29%29/from19200101to20150807/allresults/1/allauthors/ newest/World/.

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studies were consulted to determine whether the ultimatum merited inclusion based on the criteria contained in the definition. A similar procedure was followed while assessing the other sources. Ultimata were only included if they could be verified by at least three independent sources. A number of possible Japanese ultimata in the 1930s, for instance, were not included since only a single, often vague, reference was found to their incidence. This is not only due to the dearth of Western literature on these ultimata but also due to limitations of the author’s own linguistic abilities, as a result of which it was not possible to consult, amongst others, Japanese, Chinese, or Russian scholarly language sources. In more recent time periods, possible ultimata which had been flagged by other sources were sometimes excluded simply because upon closer inspection no ultimatum was found. This was, for instance, the case in the 1998 Turkey-Syria crisis by the ICB project. While a non-finding is harder to corroborate than a finding, the following procedure was applied to ascertain whether an ultimatum did or did not take place, taking the Turkey-Syria crisis as an example: in addition to closely examining the documents cited by the source in question, various other sources were consulted including contemporary news accounts of the crisis and in-­ depth historical case studies. Proceeding in this manner, eighty-seven ultimata were identified that merited inclusion. For each ultimatum a short case summary varying in length from half a page to—on some occasions—four pages. Whenever possible the text of the ultimatum has been included. The case summaries address the key factors that are commonly associated with the use and utility of coercive diplomacy. The summaries offer a short account of the preceding history of conflict and discuss the content of the ultimatum including the nature of the demands, the type of threat and the deadline, and the regime types of the coercer and the coerced. They also touch upon the international context including the support offered by other countries, the balance of forces, and the involvement of international organisations. They furthermore describe whether the coercer and the coerced demonstrated and/or used armed force during the episode, the number of fatalities incurred by both parties, and the eventual outcome. It turned out to be impossible to gauge levels of domestic support with an appropriate degree of accuracy within the scope of this research project. These factors were evaluated based on a coding scheme that incorporates both qualitative and quantitative assessments. The case summaries provide the empirical basis for the quantitative analysis and the structured focused comparison of the factors associated with the use and utility of ultimata.

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The Coding Scheme The coding scheme was created in an iterative process. Initial choices about the categories and their operationalisation within the coding framework were tested on the cases and subsequently adjusted and refined in order to accurately capture the diversity both within and across the ultimata. In creating the coding scheme and in assigning scores, the ICB dataset, the MCT dataset, the National Material Capabilities Index, and the Polity dataset have been used. Ultimatum, Demand, Threat, Deadline Each ultimatum in the dataset is listed with a number from 1 to 87 which is awarded chronologically starting from 1920 onwards, with the date that the ultimatum was issued provided in dd-mm-yyyy format. Ultimata contain a set of demands, a threat of armed force, and a deadline. The demands contained in ultimata are wide in scope and varied in nature. Demands are distinguished in the following five different categories: (1) territory, (2) regime, (3) policy, (4) reparations, and (5) violence and arms. The categories mirror those but are not entirely similar to the ones in the MCT dataset, which distinguishes between territory, leadership, policy, reparations, and other.13 Territory frequently appears as part of the demands in ultimata. The category territory includes demands to cede control of territory and/or transfer sovereignty, to withdraw people and/or military equipment from an area, to grant basing rights, and to allow the stationing of foreign military forces and/or their transit. The category regime is used rather than leadership because demands can also concern the appointment or dismissal of lower levels officials as well as be related to infringements on the regime’s sovereignty. The category regime includes demands to dismiss members of the senior leadership of the regime as well as lower-ranking officials, to renounce royal claims, to appoint particular individuals to the senior leadership, to embed foreigners into the civil service, and to accept submission to a mandate or a protectorate. Instead of the category other, which is not very distinctive as a standalone category, the category policy contains all policy-related demands which are not covered in the other categories. This category includes demands to change one or multiple policies that extend across a variety of  Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, 384.

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domains, which include political issues (suppress political demonstrations; allow public gatherings; host, postpone, or adapt the terms of a plebiscite; change or reject a particular law); social issues (protect people and interests; expel individual(s), release prisoners, hand over the bodies of deceased persons); economic issues (adopt new currency; accept and respect the terms of a joint business venture; irrigate more land; promote economic integration; restore navigation signals); security issues (grant safe passage, free from interference, to vehicles and vessels; close off supply lines; provide weapons to societal factions; close down terrorist camps); ideological issues (stop insult or halt a provocation); diplomatic issues (re-establish relations and/or upgrade the official status of the relationship); and international inspections (allow an international commission to conduct a criminal inquiry or weapon inspectors to verify disarmament efforts). Reparations for (perceived) committed wrongs lie at the heart of many different coercive attempts involving ultimata. The category reparations includes demands to offer material or immaterial reparations for perceived wrongs, including offering monetary reimbursement, extending formal apologies, paying tribute, prosecuting and/or punishing citizens, and participating in negotiations to settle differences. Finally, violence and arms are included as a standalone category because in a relatively sizeable proportion of cases these appear as central demands in the ultimata. The violence and arms category includes demands to cease armed hostilities and/or disarm, including the handover of weapons, the elimination of weapons and weapon programmes, and the reduction of force numbers. If ultimata contain multiple demands, multiple demands are coded. The coding scheme makes no preconceived judgements as to which demands concern interests that are more vital than others. The nature of the threat contained in the ultimatum is described in the case summary of the ultimatum but is not coded on any scale. The deadline of the ultimatum is listed in hours. The Coercer and the Target of Coercion The coercer and the target of coercion are listed with their name as they are registered in the Polity dataset.14 Only cases involving ultimata issued  Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013, Dataset Users’ Manual’; INCSR, ‘Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2014, INCSR Data’, 2016, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html; and for cases after 2014, INCSR, ‘Polity V Annual Time-Series, 1800-2018, INCSR Data’. 14

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by the government(s) of one or more states against the government of another state are considered. In multinational or coalitional coercive diplomacy, other coercers are mentioned as secondary coercers, while the state with the greatest capabilities is listed as the primary coercer. Three coalition types are distinguished: unilateral (if there is one coercer), bilateral (if there are two coercers), and multilateral (if there are three or more coercers). The Berlin Deadline crises of 1958/1959 and 1961 are the only cases featuring a single coercer (the Soviet Union) targeting multiple targets of coercion (France, the UK, the US, and Western Germany). These are counted as only two ultimata because the Western states coordinated their actions and operated like a block led by the US. The strongest state, the US, is listed as the primary target of coercion. Regime Type The regime type of the coercer and the target of coercion are also considered using the polity2 regime score of the Polity dataset. This is a composite score of democratic and autocratic features of the regime which runs from −10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic). The Polity Project assesses regimes on both democratic dimensions (institutionalised procedures for preference expression for citizens about policies and political leaders; institutionalised constraints on the exercise of executive power; and protection of civil liberties) and autocratic dimensions (restriction and competitiveness of political participation and constraints on the chief executive). For both of these dimensions, they receive a score. The polity2 regime score is the sum of the two scores. Regimes exhibit both democratic and autocratic features and can be classified as fully democratic, autocratic, or anocratic (a regime characterised by a mix of democratic and autocratic features). While the polity2 regime score is a commonly used measurement to assess and classify regimes, it has also been the subject of critique because of its composite nature that sometimes obfuscates the existence of real differences between institutional features of regimes both within and across these higher-order classifications. As a first and rough indication of regime type, however, it is fit for purpose here, as it serves as the basis for further in-depth analysis.

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Material and Military Capabilities To assess the capabilities of the primary coercer, the composite indicator of national capabilities (CINC) score of the National Material Capabilities dataset is used. The CINC score is based on three dimensions consisting of two indicators each: demographic (total population and urban population), industrial (primary energy consumption and iron and steel production), and military (military personnel on active duty and military expenditures over the past five years). The CINC score is based on the sum of the six scores calculated as a share of the total set of capabilities in the international system.15 The ability of capabilities indices to adequately capture power has been critiqued on several grounds,16 but it is generally acknowledged that material capabilities do matter and that the political leadership of coercers and targets of coercion generally do factor in capability differences as a major consideration in their decision-making processes.17 In this study, the CINC score offers a first rough approximation of the material capabilities of the coercer, which is the basis of further more in-depth analysis. Material capability differences are calculated by subtracting the CINC score of the target of coercion from the CINC score of the coercer. On the basis of the result, the coercer is judged to be stronger or weaker. If there is no score, because the state has no data for that particular year in the National Material Capabilities dataset, then a stronger/weaker judgement has been made based on an assessment of the available evidence. To assess the military capabilities of the primary coercer 15  The Correlates of War Project, ‘National Material Capabilities v4.0’ (The Correlates of War Project, 2010); The Correlates of War Project, ‘National Material Capabilities v6.0’ (The Correlates of War Project, 2018). For the period 1920-2015, v4.0 was used. For the period 2015-2020, v6.0. Correlates of War Project, ‘The National Material Capabilities Data Set (v4.0) 1816-2007’. J. David Singer, ‘Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985’, International Interactions 14, no. 2 (mei 1988): 115–32, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050628808434695. 16  Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton University Press, 2004), 2, 4, 21. 17  Daryl G.  Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Cornell University Press, 2005), 20–28.; Glenn Herald Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 184; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 35–42.

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and the target of coercion, the annual military expenditures from the National Material Capabilities dataset are used. A similar procedure was followed to assess whether the coercer is stronger or weaker. International Support for Target of Coercion The international support offered to the target of coercion by third-party states can come either in verbal form (e.g. through a leader making a public statement of support) or in material form through the provision of (military) equipment and/or armed forces. Alternatively, if no third-party state lends support to the target of coercion, the ultimatum is coded as no support. Involvement League of Nations or United Nations The active involvement of the League of Nations or the United Nations in the process is registered. Active involvement encompasses more than public statements by representatives of these organisations but requires an active role during the crisis prevention, crisis escalation, and/or crisis resolution stages of the incident. Demonstration and Use of Force Coercer and Target of Coercion Demonstrations and uses of force by the coercer are also included. Demonstrations of force refer to the mobilisation of the coercer’s forces and/or military manoeuvres prior to or after the expiration of the deadline. This is similar to the demonstration of force variable of Sechser,18 which captures in a simple and straightforward manner demonstrations of force and is easier to understand than the more elaborate crisis management technique category of the ICB dataset.19 In a similar way, again following Sechser,20 the demonstration and use of military force prior to or after the expiration of the deadline of the ultimatum are recorded both for the coercer and for the target of coercion.  Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, 384.  Variable 7 CRISMG in Michael Brecher et  al., ‘International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook, Version 11’, 1 February 2016. Brecher and Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis. See also Barry M.  Blechman and Stephen S.  Kaplan, Force without War: U.S.  Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Brookings Institution Press, 1978), 12–13. 20  Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, 384. 18 19

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Ultimatum Dynamics: Strategies, Responses, and Outcomes Strategic coercion is a dynamic process in which the coercer and coerced act and react in an interactive sequence of moves and countermoves. Ultimata serve to convey the final warning, following which, absent full compliance, the coercer may opt to use their armed forces either to punish the coerced or to forcefully attain their objectives. Yet ultimata in real-­ crisis situations, contrary to those issued in ultimatum games in laboratory simulations, do not always mark the final stage of negotiations. In many cases, also absent full compliance, ultimata are followed by an additional round of negotiations, sometimes with a limited military probe in between. Case studies are well suited to provide a detailed account of the dynamic nature of these processes: the case summaries presented in the annexe provide an overview of the various moves and countermoves, including the histories leading up to the ultimatum. In order to get a better sense of this process from a comparative perspective for all eighty-seven ultimata, the analytical framework needs to capture the interactive nature of the bargaining process. In some cases, the bargaining process is characterised by a single move and countermove, but in other cases this process can stretch over a longer series of moves. Because such bargaining processes can extend over many rounds, for the sake of parsimony the analytical framework distinguishes between two rounds of bargaining. Round one covers the initial first response of the target of coercion to the ultimatum and the first follow-on response of the coercer. Round two covers the second response of the target of coercion and the second follow-on response of the coercer. The first response of the target of coercion covers whether or not the target complies with the demands of the ultimatum. Building on the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the MCT dataset, the following three outcomes are distinguished: The first category is no compliance, when the target of coercion does not comply. The second category is partial compliance, when the target of coercion complies with some of the demands. The third category is full compliance, when the target of coercion complies with all the demands contained in the ultimatum.21 Following the initial reaction of the target of coercion (which can be either no compliance, partial compliance or full compliance), the coercer can pursue multiple courses of action. Four courses are distinguished: escalation, punishment, negotiation, or end. Escalation refers to the course of  Sechser, 385. See also the discussion in Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War, 67–71.

21

112 

T. SWEIJS

action when the coercer ends the negotiations, opts for control, and uses large-scale force in the form of the deployment of military forces that invade the territory of the target of coercion in order to forcefully achieve their objectives. Punishment refers to the course of action when the coercer continues the bargaining process, but uses military force to inflict damage on the opponent with the explicit purpose of changing the calculus of the target of coercion and getting the target to comply with the demands contained in the ultimatum. This is in line with Freedman’s notion that the target of coercion is a voluntary agent, whose decisions the coercer attempts to influence, rather than an agent whose actions are fully controlled.22 Negotiation refers to the coercer continuing the bargaining process without using military force, and end, finally, represents the coercer ending the bargaining process and the episode coming to an end. The coercer can pursue any one of the four options regardless of the nature of the response of the target of coercion. In other words, the coercer can decide to escalate if the coercion is unsuccessful (no compliance or partial compliance), but the coercer can also escalate if the coercion is successful (full compliance). Even if the latter course of action may seem to make little sense theoretically, this does occasionally happen in the set of eighty-seven ultimata, as, for instance, in the case involving Japan and France in August 1940 (see case #46). Similarly, the coercer can, and is likely to, end the bargaining process after having achieved their objectives (full compliance), but the coercer can also end the bargaining process and withdraw after the target of coercion has refused to satisfy some or any of the demands (no compliance) (as happened during the two Berlin Deadline Crises in 1958/1959 and 1961; see cases #59 and #60). The bargaining process can be completed in two ways. First, the coercer can either escalate or end the coercion. The overall response of the target of coercion is then measured by the first response of the target of coercion (no compliance, partial compliance, full compliance). Second, if the coercer either punishes or negotiates, the bargaining process enters a second round, which is described using a similar framework. The overall follow-­ on response by the coercer is assessed by looking at the highest magnitude of response during the entire bargaining process, which runs (on a scale of descending magnitude) from escalation to punishment to negotiation to end. For the target of coercion, the overall response is  Freedman, Strategic Coercion, 15.

22

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measured by considering its final response (no compliance, partial compliance, full compliance). Finally, in cases of no or partial compliance by the target of coercion, it is coded whether coercers eventually achieve their demands by considering whether the coercer achieves their objectives fully, partially, or not at all. Here the MCT trichotomy is followed which distinguishes between full, partial, or no compulsion,23 although the term achievement of objectives rather than compulsion is used because the coercer does not always rely on actual compulsion to achieve their objectives.

In Lieu of a Conclusion An online annexe accompanying this book provides the formal codebook at www.coercivediplomacy.com. The next chapter offers a survey of the ultimata in the dataset.

References Arms Control Association. ‘Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran | Arms Control Association’, 21 March 2016. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-­of-­Nuclear-­Diplomacy-­With-­Iran. Bercovitch, Jacob, and Richard Jackson. International Conflict a Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management, 1945–1995. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997. Biddle, Stephen. Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton University Press, 2004. Blechman, Barry M., and Stephen S. Kaplan. Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. Brookings Institution Press, 1978. Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. A Study of Crisis. University of Michigan Press, 1997. Brecher, Michael, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, Patrick James, and David Quinn. ‘International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook, Version 11’, 1 February 2016. Bremer, Stuart A., and Faten Ghosn. ‘Defining States: Reconsiderations and Recommendations’. Conflict Management and Peace Science 20, no. 1 (1 February 2003): 21–41. https://doi.org/10.1177/073889420302000102.

 Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, 385, 398.

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Butterworth, Robert Lyle, and Margaret E.  Scranton. Managing Interstate Conflict, 1945–74: Data with Synopses. University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1976. Correlates of War Project. ‘State System Membership (V2011)—Correlates of War’. Folder, 2011. http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-­sets/state-­system-­ membership. ———. ‘The National Material Capabilities Data Set (v4.0) 1816–2007’, 2015. http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. Freedman, Lawrence. Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases. Oxford University Press, USA, 1998. Goldstein, Erik. Wars and Peace Treaties 1816-Present. Routledge, 1992. INCSR. ‘Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800–2014, INCSR Data’, 2016. http:// www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. ———. ‘Polity V Annual Time-Series, 1800–2018, INCSR Data’, 2020. http:// www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. International Crisis Behavior. ‘ICB Project’. ICB Project, 2016. http://sites. duke.edu/icbdata/. Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice. Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. Jessup, John E. An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1945–1996. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998. Marshall, Monty G, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. ‘Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2013, Dataset Users’ Manual’, 2015. New York Times. ‘NYTimes.Com Search’, 2015. http://query.nytimes.com/ search/sitesearch/?action=click&contentCollection®ion=TopBar&WT. nav=searchWidget&module=SearchSubmit&pgtype=Homepage#/%28ultimat um+OR+deadline%29+AND+%28conflict+OR+crisis+OR+threat*%29%29/ from19200101to20150807/allresults/1/allauthors/newest/World/. Press, Daryl G.  Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats. Cornell University Press, 2005. Sarkees, Meredith Reid, and Frank Whelon Wayman. Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-State, Extra-State, Intra-State, and Non-State Wars, 1816–2007. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010. Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword. Yale University Press, 2008. Sechser, Todd S. ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’. Conflict Management and Peace Science 28, no. 4 (1 September 2011): 377–401. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894211413066. ———. ‘Replication Data for: Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’. IQSS Dataverse Network, 19 March 2013.

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Singer, J.  David. ‘Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985’. International Interactions 14, no. 2 (mei 1988): 115–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050628808434695. Sinha, Shreeya, and Susan Campbell Beachy. ‘Timeline on Iran’s Nuclear Program’. The New  York Times, 21 March 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/middleeast/Iran-­nuclear-­timeline.html. Snyder, Glenn Herald, and Paul Diesing. Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978. The Correlates of War Project. ‘National Material Capabilities v4.0’. The Correlates of War Project, 2010. ———. ‘National Material Capabilities v6.0’. The Correlates of War Project, 2018.

CHAPTER 5

Ultimata 1920–2020: A Chronological Survey

Introduction A survey of ultimata issued between 1920 and 2020 highlights that the nature of ultimata is reflective of the particular historical and strategic contexts in which they appear. Assessments of their utility are served by better—larger, richer, more granular—datasets based on a closer examination of their historical incidence. This chapter provides a concise survey of the eighty-seven ultimata based on the dataset and the case narratives which have been compiled as described in the method chapter to address the existing empirical gap in the literature and showcase the variety of ultimata issued over the past century. In total, eighty-seven ultimata were issued in the period 1920–2020. Three waves of ultimata can be distinguished in the 1920s, 1930/1940s, and 1990s respectively. This, perhaps unsurprisingly, strongly correlates with the findings on the frequency of militarised compellent threats.1 With the exception of the 1980s, each decade saw at least two ultimata throughout the entire period (see Fig. 5.1 and Table 5.1). If one thing is certain, it is that political leaders have used ultimata much more frequently 1  Todd S.  Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 28, no. 4 (1 September 2011): 377–401, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0738894211413066.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Sweijs, The Use and Utility of Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy, Twenty-first Century Perspectives on War, Peace, and Human Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21303-8_5

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Number of Ultimata 1920-2020 30%

25 22 (25%)

25%

19 (22%)

20 16 (18%)

20% 14 (16%)

15

15% 10 10%

7 (8%) 5 2 (2%) 0

2 (2%)

3 (3%)

2 (2%)

1920-1930 1930-1940 1940-1950 1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1990-2000 2000-2010 2010-2020

5%

0%

Fig. 5.1  1920–2020: ultimata per decade

than has been commonly assumed including an assortment of ultimata that have neither been identified nor been analysed in the coercive diplomacy literature. To provide a better understanding of the actual cases that underlie these figures, the section provides a concise overview of the eighty-seven cases, presented in chronological order. References are only provided in the case of quotations. More elaborate and fully referenced case summaries describing the content of the ultimata and the coercive dynamics of each incident in greater detail can be consulted online at www.coercivediplomacy.com.

The First Wave: The 1920s The first significant wave of ultimata took place in the 1920s when states issued a total of twenty-two ultimata in interstate coercion. The ultimata issued in the 1920s featured an array of cases and causes. These included the expansion of the Soviet Union and Turkey into the Caucasus in 1920 and 1921; various attempts by predominantly Western colonial powers to protect their position in extra-European territories; multiple demands for war reparations by the victorious powers of the First World War on the defeated, as well as a number of border incidents in continental Europe; a

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Table 5.1  Overview of ultimata in dataset 1920–2020 Nr.

Case

Year

1

The Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan to Armenia Soviet Russia to Armenia Allied and Associated Powers to Germany France to Syria France to Syria Turkey to Armenia Soviet Russia to Armenia Turkey to Georgia Allied and Associated Powers to Germany Czechoslovakia to Hungary Allied and Associated Powers to Germany Czechoslovakia to Hungary Italy to Greece Great Britain to Turkey Great Britain to Egypt Greece to Bulgaria Soviet Union to China Foreign Powers to China Great Britain to North Yemen Great Britain to Egypt Japan to China Soviet Union to China Japan to China Japan to China Japan to China Japan to China Japan to China Germany to Austria Germany to Austria Poland to Lithuania Germany to Czechoslovakia Poland to Czechoslovakia Hungary to Czechoslovakia Germany to Czechoslovakia Italy to Albania Germany to Poland Great Britain to Germany France to Germany Soviet Union to Lithuania Soviet Union to Latvia

1920

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1921 1921 1921 1921 1921 1923 1924 1924 1925 1926 1926 1928 1928 1928 1929 1931 1932 1932 1937 1937 1938 1938 1938 1938 1938 1939 1939 1939 1939 1939 1939 1940 1940 (continued)

120 

T. SWEIJS

Table 5.1 (continued) Nr.

Case

Year

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

Soviet Union to Estonia Soviet Union to Romania Italy to Greece Japan to France Great Britain to France Japan to France Japan to France Japan to France Japan to Thailand Great Britain to Finland Great Britain to Hungary Great Britain to Romania Great Britain to Egypt Soviet Union to Romania Great Britain to France Netherlands to Indonesia Netherlands to Indonesia Great Britain and France to Egypt Soviet Union to US Soviet Union to US Dominican Republic to Haiti Turkey to Cyprus Cyprus to Turkey Greece to Turkey China to India Turkey to Cyprus Cambodia to North Vietnam Libya to Tanzania United Nations to Iraq US to Iraq US to Iraq US, France, Great Britain, and Russia to Iraq US, France, Great Britain, and Russia to Iraq NATO to Republika Srpska NATO to Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina NATO to Republika Srpska United Nations to Republika Srpska United Nations to Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana to Lesotho Eritrea to Yemen

1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1940 1941 1941 1941 1941 1941 1942 1945 1941 1947 1948 1956 1958 1961 1963 1964 1964 1964 1965 1967 1970 1979 1990 1991 1992 1993 1993 1994 1994 1994 1995 1995

79 80

1994 1995 (continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) Nr.

Case

Year

81 82 83 84 85 86 87

NATO to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia NATO to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia US to Afghanistan US to Iraq Cambodia to Thailand North Korea to South Korea Saudi Arabia to Qatar

1998 1999 2001 2003 2008 2015 2017

prolonged dispute between the Soviet Union and China involving a jointly managed railway; and Japan’s intensification of its military campaign to extend its territorial reach in mainland China. In 1920 and 1921, both Turkey and the nascent Soviet Union issued multiple ultimata against much weaker neighbouring states Armenia and Georgia in their quest for territorial expansion in the Caucasus. The Soviet Union aspired to formally annex their territories and pressured their leadership to cede power. Armenia was first presented with an ultimatum— carrying a time limit of three days—by the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan on 28 April 1920 demanding the withdrawal of Armenian military forces from Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur and the protection of Tatars living in Armenia, or otherwise it would ‘consider itself in a state of war with the republic of Armenia.’2 After Armenia refused, the Soviet Union stepped in and issued a follow-up ultimatum demanding Soviet Russian control over Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan and right of passage for Soviet forces over Armenian railroads. Armenia did not respond and Soviet Russian forces invaded Armenia to secure their demands. On 9 November that same year, Turkey also presented Armenia with an ultimatum containing a deadline of twenty-four hours demanding, amongst other things, the cession of Alexandropol, the handover of weapons, and the withdrawal of Armenian forces. Armenia refused but was forced to submit to its opponent’s will following a crushing military defeat. On 29 November Soviet Russia presented Armenia with an ultimatum demanding the immediate handover of power. While Soviet forces marched on Yerevan, the Armenian government complied. A few months later, on 22 2  Michael P.  Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998), 18.

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February 1921, Turkey issued an ultimatum to Georgia demanding the immediate handover of Artvin Ardahan. The Georgian regime, isolated internationally, first complied but soon reneged after it struck a deal with the Soviet Union which eventually resulted in its annexation. Continental Europe also featured multiple ultimata in the early 1920s including those presented by the Allied Powers to Germany (1920, 1921), Czechoslovakia to Hungary (1921), Italy to Greece (1923), and Greece to Bulgaria (1925). The victorious Allied and Associated Powers issued multiple ultimata to Germany over disarmament issues and war reparations for the First World War, otherwise threatening to occupy German territory. Germany complied with the July 1920 ultimatum concerning the disarmament protocol, but rejected the March 1921 ultimatum concerning war reparations following which the Allied Powers occupied German territory and implemented new sanctions. It also accepted the terms of the London Ultimatum of 5 May 1921 concerning war reparations, disarmament issues, and the punishment of war criminals. Two additional ultimata in Europe were issued in a dispute evolving around fears of Hungary’s neighbours, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, over the restoration of the Habsburg monarchy in Hungary. Twice in a period of six months in 1921, the former King Charles I returned to Hungary to claim his throne and twice the members of the Little Entente mobilised their forces and put pressure on the Hungarian government to expel him and to permanently rescind his royal claims. Each time Czechoslovakia took the lead and, on its own, presented ultimata to Hungary, demanding, amongst other things, that Charles I leave the country immediately—one time doing so even after he had already left the country. The disputes between Italy and Greece (1923) and Greece and Bulgaria (1925) both involved border skirmishes that subsequently escalated into more serious, eventually internationalised incidents. In the first case, also known as the Corfu Incident, an Italian general was murdered while on a demarcation mission of the Greek-Albanian border. The Italian government issued an ultimatum with a deadline of twenty-four hours, the content of which very much resembled Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia of 1914 that had carried dramatic and far-reaching consequences. When Greece only partially complied, Italy bombed, invaded, and occupied the Greek island of Corfu. The Council of the League of Nations appointed an international commission of inquiry to investigate the issue, which ruled largely

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against Greece. Greece agreed to pay reparations, following which Italy withdrew its forces from Corfu. In the 1925 Greek-Bulgaria case also known as the War of the Stray Dog,3 two Greek border guards were killed in a cross-border shooting with their Bulgarian counterparts. The Greek government presented an ultimatum demanding compensation and an answer within forty-eight hours. Prior to the expiration of the deadline, Greek forces bombed and invaded Bulgaria. Eventually, following considerable international pressure, Greece retreated and paid damages to Bulgaria. The ultimata issued in these two border episodes reflected coercive moves in a bargaining process. Despite the balance of power favouring the coercer, it was not clear that the coercer would be able to enforce the demands contained in the ultimatum in case of refusal. In both episodes, the coercer opted for a punishment strategy, in the second episode even prior to the expiration of the deadline. In both episodes, international involvement soon contained the incident preventing the further escalation of the dispute once violence had broken out. And in both episodes the coercers decided to accept the final verdict of the commissions of inquiry, rather than forcefully pursue the issue further even if the commission’s ruling had not been in its favour. Another set of ultimata in the 1920s was issued by colonial powers to the governments that were nominally and/or partially in charge of the territories that the colonial powers administered, or sought to administer, in the Middle East and, in the Western designation of the time, the Far East. Cases include France to Syria in 1920; Great Britain to Egypt in 1924 and 1928; Great Britain to Turkey in 1924; Great Britain to North Yemen in 1928; and the Foreign Powers to China, also known as the Taku Ultimatum in 1926. These ultimata revolved around issues of sovereignty and authority (Syria and Egypt), the demarcation of territory (Turkey and Yemen), and safe sea lines of communication (China). In all these cases, the power differences between the coercer and the target of coercion were considerable. The targets of coercion generally complied, but in case they did not, the coercers relied on the forward deployment of their armed forces to either punish the target of coercion (as in the case of Great Britain to Egypt and Yemen) or simply enforce their demands (France to Syria). External involvement in these cases was limited, except for the dispute 3  Sometimes this incident is referred to as the War of the Stray Dog, with reference to claims that the first border guard was killed when he chased his dog that had strayed into Bulgarian territory. I have not been able to find any reliable source to substantiate this claim.

124 

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between Great Britain and Turkey which was resolved in negotiations involving the Council of the League of Nations. Further east, in the second half of the decade, two ultimata were issued in 1926 and 1929 by the Soviet Union to the regional and national governments of China. The parties quarrelled over the management of the jointly operated Chinese Eastern Railways (CER) and over sizeable outstanding fees owed by local Chinese armed forces to the CER. Both of the ultimata reflected real coercive moves in a bargaining process. In both of the CER episodes, the coercer, confronting an internally divided target of coercion, was able to achieve most of their demands—the first time after negotiations, and the second time after invading Chinese territory and wreaking large-scale havoc, including destroying infrastructure and killing thousands of Chinese. Finally, towards the end of the decade, Japan issued its first ultimatum to China in 1928, as part of a Japanese campaign to extend its control over the Chinese mainland. The Japanese ultimatum was characteristic for the prolonged coercive campaign that Japan would execute in the following decade. The form of the ultimata of the first wave in the 1920s reflected the diplomatic conventions of the previous century as they were typically—if not always—presented in a formal note, in which the coercers identified the wrongs committed by the target of coercion and elaborated their complaint, formulated a series of demands, and identified a specific deadline for compliance. In line with the general trend that war was increasingly considered an illegitimate instrument in the conduct of interstate relations—especially between European states, less so in their interaction with colonial subjects—these ultimata were not conditional war declarations, but warned, sometimes explicitly although more often implicitly, that the coercer would resort to armed force absent compliance. As such, these ultimata typically represented coercive attempts although some of them really took the form of dictates when stronger powers, including France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Turkey, sought to impose their will on smaller powers. The objectives of the coercers, as manifested by the nature of their demands contained in the ultimata, reflected a number of key concerns of the decision makers of the period. First and foremost, they involved issues that had not been satisfactorily dealt with in the peace treaties signed after the First World War. States quarrelled over control over territory, over war reparations (which were forcefully imposed by the victorious on the defeated), and over issues involving sovereignty of newly born or nascent states and the composition of their regimes. At the same

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time, considerable (military) power differences existed amongst both declining and rising great powers and the smaller powers that were located either immediately adjacent to their borders or in their colonial spheres of influence over which they still held military sway. Except for four ultimata, all ultimata contained two or more demands. While two cases were presented by multilateral coalitions, all the other cases involved coercers operating unilaterally, even though sometimes other states showed various degrees of support for the coercer during the bargaining process. Overall, the length of deadlines varied significantly with a number of cases involving immediate deadlines (‘now’), one case twelve hours, and the remaining cases either twenty-four, forty-eight, seventy-two or ninety-six hours, in addition to one that extended to one week. In a limited number of cases the coercer eventually decided to backtrack, either following international pressure or negotiations with the target, and typically after the coercer had resorted to using some form of limited armed force. In the remainder of the cases, either the target of coercion complied with the demands of the coercer or when the target did not comply, the coercer escalated and attained the demands contained in the ultimatum objectives violently.

The Second Wave: 1930–1942 The 1930s and early 1940s featured a second burst of ultimata in the context of Japanese efforts to extend its control in Asia on the one hand and the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe on the other. A total of thirty-one ultimata were issued. Most ultimata were communicated in written form, sometimes accompanied by a verbal message, but a sizeable minority was merely conveyed verbally. The latter were particularly prevalent in situations in which a much stronger coercer tried to put pressure on the target’s decision makers by issuing take-it-or-leave-it ultimata accompanied by very short deadlines. Reflecting a temporary breakdown of the emerging taboo on the use of armed force in interstate relations, threats contained in the ultimata very explicitly mentioned the use of force, including not only the armed invasion of the country but also the destruction of the target’s armed forces and/or population. The demands often concerned what are commonly considered critical interests concerning national sovereignty and/or territory. In Asia, Japan continued its expansion into China, spurred on by its military establishment which reflected the intense militarisation of Japanese

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politics. Japan issued a series of ultimata in the 1930s, including the 12 November 1931 ultimatum demanding control over the strategically important Nonni Bridge; the 27 January 1932 ultimatum demanding a formal apology and the protection of rights of Japanese residents of Shanghai; the 18 February ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Shanghai; and the ultimata of 17 and 26 July 1937 over, amongst other things, the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Papaoshan, Lukouchiao, and Peking. The sequence of events of these ultimata episodes followed a similar pattern. In this campaign, forward-­ deployed armed forces would issue ultimata in seemingly localised settings which would nonetheless scale up to the strategic level and involve the national governments on both sides. Even if the target of coercion refused, the coercer’s armed forces were able to overcome any resistance they encountered and to achieve their demands forcefully. Once the Chinese decided they would no longer accept further Japanese infringement after receiving yet another ultimatum in July 1937, the Japanese chose to further escalate and launched a full-scale offensive on key Chinese cities which marked the beginning of the Pacific War. On the European continent, the second wave of ultimata coincided— not coincidentally, of course—with the outbreak of the Second World War. In the second half of the 1930s, under Adolf Hitler’s stewardship, Germany’s territorial designs first extended to neighbouring countries harbouring large German-speaking minorities, but soon thereafter came to apply to nearly the whole of Europe. Rather than launching full-scale military attacks, Germany initiated a campaign of coercion issuing ultimata first against Austria (February and March 1938) and then Czechoslovakia (September 1938 and March 1939) followed by Poland (August 1939). Germany’s initial ultimata against Austria and Czechoslovakia reflected moves in an ongoing bargaining process. The second series of German ultimata were announcements of what amounted in practical terms almost to faits accomplis which left the target of coercion, given Germany’s military superiority in combination with short deadlines, little freedom of choice, even if compliance meant surrendering sovereignty. In the case of Austria, the German ultimatum issued on 12 February 1938 included the appointment of two Austrian Nazis to the government, and the closer integration of the two countries, while leaving the Austrian leadership three days to comply. Austria decided to comply. The following month, Germany issued another ultimatum in response to announcement of an Austrian referendum over a possible Anschluss with Germany, which

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had taken the German leadership by surprise. On 11 March 1938, it dispatched a series of increasingly threatening messages demanding the resignation of the Austrian chancellor, the appointment of more Nazis to the cabinet including to the post of prime minister, different terms for the referendum, and additional freedoms for Austrian Nazis. The demands finally culminated in an ultimatum issued in the early evening. The ultimatum, with only a one-hour deadline, warned that 200,000 German forces would enter Austrian territory absent compliance. Even though the Austrian leadership officially refused to give in, they realised the hopelessness of their predicament, and lacking any international support, they publicly stated that they would not defend themselves against the German invasion. The next day German forces invaded Austria upon which Austria’s Anschluss with Germany was declared. In the case of Czechoslovakia, Germany demanded the cession of Sudetenland adding a deadline of four days in negotiations on 24 September 1938 that involved Great Britain and France as intermediaries. Despite initial Czechoslovak refusal, it saw itself forced to comply after a meeting of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Munich in late September. Only a few months later, in March 1939, the Czechoslovak leadership was invited to Germany. Upon their arrival around midnight, while Slovakia was declaring its independence, they were told that German forces would invade Czechoslovakia at 06:00 a.m. The choice was simple: collaborate and surrender to Germany or face obliteration. The psychological pressure was enormous and the prime minister and foreign minister yielded in order to prevent bloodshed. Austria and Czechoslovakia—which both received little to no international support—decided to comply with Germany’s demands rather than face annihilation. Germany’s coercive strategy saved it the cost associated with fighting. Germany then turned to Poland planning to annex the Danzig corridor as well as other parts of Poland in order to protect, or so it claimed, German minorities living in Poland. Great Britain and France again acted as intermediaries. Germany issued an ultimatum to that extent with a deadline of twenty-four hours through France and Great Britain on 28 August 1939, but it refused to transmit the terms to Poland officially. Still, after the expiration of the deadline, Germany asserted Poland’s failure to comply, engineered a border incident, and attacked Poland. Germany eventually defeated and occupied Poland but only after fighting a bloody war. The German invasion of Poland prompted counter-ultimata by Great Britain and France on 3 September which, with deadlines of only

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a few hours, and little prospect of changing Germany’s policies, amounted to conditional war declarations that marked the beginning of the Second World War. In the run up to that worldwide conflagration, however, a number of other countries had also started deploying ultimata, seeking to achieve strategic objectives through the use of coercive diplomacy. Poland coerced Lithuania in an ultimatum demanding the ‘restoration of normal relations’ in March 1938.4 Lithuania complied. Czechoslovakia was on the receiving end of multiple ultimata. Both Poland and Hungary presented the beleaguered country with ultimata in September 1938 and March 1939 (at the same time it was targeted by Germany). Poland demanded that Czechoslovakia cede two large territories as well as referenda over the transfer of other regions and special rights for Polish-speaking citizens. It expected compliance within twelve hours. ‘In case of refusal or failure to respond,’ the Polish government would ‘hold the Czechoslovak Government solely responsible for the course of events.’5 Czechoslovakia complied. Hungary demanded special rights for Hungarian citizens, the provision of weapons to Hungarian organisations, and the handover of territory. When the Czechoslovak government accepted all demands except for the provision of weapons, Hungary escalated and achieved its objectives. Italy targeted Albania in April 1939 and Greece in October 1940 with ultimata aimed at the annexation of both countries. Italy finally managed to achieve its objectives but only after the countries refused compliance and put up a strong defence. In the case of Albania, it issued an ultimatum with a deadline of six days demanding it allowed Italian control over ports, airports, and roads, the stationing of Italian forces on Albanian territory, and the appointment of Italian representatives in the Albanian government. The Albanian king refused and following negotiations Italian forces invaded the country. In the case of Greece, Italy demanded Italian control over key strategic territories with a deadline attached of only three hours. The Greek government refused and Italy attacked. It only managed to 4  George Sakwa, ‘The Polish Ultimatum to Lithuania in March 1938’, The Slavonic and East European Review 55, no. 2 (1 April 1977): 204–5. 5  Lewis Bernstein Namier, Europe in Decay: A Study in Disintegration, 1936–40 (Macmillan, 1950), 300. In my own translation of the original text which was written in French; the final sentence of the original ultimatum read: ‘En cas de refus ou d’absence de réponse, le Gouvernement polonaise tiendra le Gouvernement tchécoslovaque pour seul responsible de la suite des événements.’

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achieve its objectives, however, with German assistance, after Greek forces had managed to push back the Italian forces in a Greek counter-offensive launched in mid-November 1940. On the other side of Europe, in mid-June 1940, the Soviet Union presented three ultimata in short succession to the Baltic States, starting with Lithuania and continuing with Latvia and Estonia, demanding the formation of a new government and the unfettered access to Soviet troops to their territory. All three ultimata had deadlines attached of less than twelve hours, while Soviet forces stood ready along the borders to invade the countries. All three targets complied. That same month, the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum with a deadline of twenty-four hours to Romania, demanding the cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Also in this case, the target’s decision makers saw little alternative despite the grave consequences of compliance, when they were confronted with the coercer’s power preponderance and their own international isolation. In June 1941, after the Soviet Union had joined the Allied side, Great Britain issued ultimata that amounted to conditional war declarations against Finland, Hungary, and Romania demanding that they ‘withdraw from all active participation in hostilities’ within a week or the British government ‘will have no choice but to declare the existence of a state of war between the two countries.’6 As was expected, none of the countries complied and Great Britain officially declared war on all three of them. Other ultimata of the period included an ultimatum of 3 July 1940 from Great Britain to Vichy France (after France was invaded by Germany) to hand over the French naval fleet, a substantial part of which was anchored in the French naval base Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria. Negotiations between the local commanders, who were in touch with their governments, ensued throughout the day, but when by the end of the afternoon the French commander, per instructions of his government, refused the ultimatum, the French fleet was largely destroyed. Great Britain also issued an ultimatum to Egypt in 1942 demanding the installation of a pro-Allied government, with which the Egyptian king complied only after British armed forces, which were still present in the former British colonial subject, stormed his palace. In Asia, meanwhile, Japan continued its military expansion as a part of which the Japanese government presented the French government with a 6  Keesing’s, Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1941, vol. IV, Part I (Keesing’s Limited, 1941), 4935.

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series of ultimata on 19 June, 30 August, and 19 September 1940, and, one year later, on 14 July 1941. The various ultimata episodes followed a typical pattern in that Japan would present a set of demands related to access and transit rights coupled with a deadline and a threat that absent compliance Japan would no longer respect French sovereignty over French Indochina. The Japanese government’s hand was sometimes forced by local Japanese commanders on the ground who operated quite autonomously. The government was nevertheless involved in all the negotiations during which French representatives would unsuccessfully seek to enlist international assistance. These negotiations were then followed either by immediate French compliance or by French protests and Japanese withdrawal of the ultimatum and/or limited punishment, but these episodes always concluded with negotiations culminating in an agreement on Japanese terms. Japan also invaded Indochina’s neighbouring Thailand after the Thai government refused to comply with a Japanese ultimatum of 8 December 1941 demanding full right of passage for Japanese forces over Thai territory. Many of the ultimata issued in the 1930s and the early 1940s involved a coercer presenting the target of coercion with what could be characterised as decrees: in the context of a military power preponderance in the coercer’s favour, the coercer had mobilised their military forces along the target’s frontiers or had even already forward deployed them inside the country. The coercer’s demands were essentially non-negotiable in nature and concerned the annexation of large swathes of territory if not the entire country. Rejection of the demands would result in swift and decisive escalation by the coercer, resistance against which was likely to result in defeat. The deadlines accompanying such ultimata tended to have shorter time horizons, ranging from, on many occasions, mere hours to—on one occasion—seventy-two hours. Three coercers—Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union—successively implemented a similar ultimatum strategy suggesting that their coercive successes only incentivised them to further pursue their objectives aggressively, because targets seemed to be prone to coercion. A minority of the ultimata during this period constituted conditional war declarations issued by France and Great Britain. Ultimata of the conditional war declaration type were not so much actual coercive attempts as they were final warnings, to abide by a convention and fulfil a notion of fair procedure, which by its observance conferred legitimacy on the subsequent decision for war.

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The Period 1945–1989 The Second World War did not mark the definitive breaking point for prevailing perceptions of war as an illegitimate instrument in interstate relations. These had been slowly evolving to that viewpoint already since the beginning of the twentieth century—if not earlier, as discussed in Chap. 3—even if these views had been suspended in the polarised environment of the late 1930s and 1940s. Rather, the Second World War gave additional momentum to the enshrinement of this view in the evolving body of international law. Attention now shifted to the use of force and the threat thereof rather than war, the resort to which by states now came to be even more sharply circumscribed in international law. War declarations virtually disappeared in the aftermath of the Second World War, and then so did conditional war declarations. Ultimata, however, continued to be used in the conduct of coercive diplomacy by coercers, albeit certainly not as frequently as during the interwar period. The decrease may be ascribed to a combination of factors which include the aforementioned growing condemnation of explicit threats of force in the aftermath of the Second World War, the greater involvement of international organisations in international disputes, and the concomitant pressure to solve disputes peacefully, as well as the polarised bipolar alliance system and the nuclear balance that characterised the later stages of the Cold War which certainly changed the strategic calculus of potential would-be coercers. Coercive behaviour from states directed at other states within the two power blocs was constrained by the two great powers the US and the Soviet Union, at the same time as coercive behaviour between the two blocs risked upsetting a precarious nuclear balance. Against this background, the Cold War period featured a variety of ultimata issued in conflicts in different places across the globe, while their overall number decreased drastically to fifteen in a forty-five-year period. Two ultimata episodes took place in the final stages of the Second World War between non-warring parties in coercive campaigns of short duration which included the Soviet Union versus Romania and Great Britain versus France. On 28 February 1945, the Soviet Union presented the Romanian king with an ultimatum with a deadline of only two hours demanding the appointment of a new prime minister threatening that otherwise ‘the independence of Rumania can no longer be guaranteed.’7 Romania, which  Robert Bishop and E. S. Crayfield, Russia Astride the Balkans (R.M. McBride, 1948), 176.

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hosted more than one million Soviet forces, had little choice but to comply. Great Britain issued an ultimatum to France over unrest in France’s former colony Syria, demanding that the French forces were ‘to cease fire and to withdraw to their barracks’ without delay and transfer power to the British forces until negotiations between the Syrians and the French were resumed and order restored.8 France grudgingly complied. Another three ultimata were issued by (former) colonial powers seeking to hold on to or regain their privileged positions in colonies or former colonies, including the Netherlands against Indonesia (1947 and 1948) and France and Great Britain against Egypt (1956). These attempts failed after the target refused to comply and with strong international pressure on the coercers to back down in the context of changing views on the legitimacy of colonialism and on (former) colonial powers using force or threats of force trying to preserve their interests. The episodes foreshadowed a period in which ultimata episodes were often characterised by significant levels of internationalisation through the involvement of external states and/or international organisations. Towards the end of the decade, the Soviet Union issued two ultimata in a three-year period which prompted what is commonly referred to as the two Berlin Deadline Crises (1958, 1961). The Berlin Deadline Crises are the only two examples of a single powerful state using ultimata to coerce a (military) coalition of states in this overview of ultimata issued between 1920 and 2020. The ultimata represent real coercive bargaining moves that introduced a set of demands (work out a solution for Berlin with Eastern Germany), included a deadline (six months), and conveyed a military threat. The ultimata triggered real crises with heightened danger of war and were only resolved after the Soviet Union backtracked on the ultimatum and constructed the Berlin Wall overnight to stop the exodus of East Germans into West Berlin. The 1960s also featured various other coercive attempts. The Dominican Republic issued an ultimatum to Haiti on 28 April 1963 with a deadline of twenty-four hours after the latter invaded its embassy in Haiti’s capital Port-Au-Prince to arrest opposition members who had sought asylum. Following the involvement of the Council of the Organization of American States in an extensive bargaining process that lasted for weeks, Haiti largely 8  Emile Chabal and Robert Tombs, eds., Britain and France in Two World Wars: Truth, Myth and Memory (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 188; ‘To Intervene—De Gaulle Asked to Withdraw Troops’, Examiner, 1 June 1945.

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complied and the conflict did not further escalate. In East-Central Asia, China issued an ultimatum to India in September 1965 demanding that India dismantle military posts and return citizens and livestock. The deadline was three days, but following mobilisation of the armed forces on both sides, an exchange of accusations, and an extension of the deadline, China retracted its ultimatum when it announced that India had complied, something India denied. Also during the 1960s, several ultimata were issued by Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece in the protracted, multi-actor conflict in March and August 1964 and in 1967, over the protection of Turkish and Greek communities living in Cyprus. In all four ultimata involving Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, what appeared to be tactical problems on the ground escalated into strategic standoffs that came to involve the key national security decision makers in the national capitals and at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in New York. The internationalisation of the bargaining process and the involvement of the great powers contributed to containing the conflict, reining in the coercers while at the same time getting the targets of coercion to comply with demands for the protection of communities, and eventually preventing its further escalation, although each time the risk of a regional conflagration was real. The final two episodes of this period took place in the 1970s including one ultimatum issued by Cambodia against North Vietnam over the presence of the latter’s forces on Cambodian soil (1970) and another issued by Libya to Tanzania over the latter’s involvement in the war in neighbouring Uganda (1979). Both ultimata were rejected in the context of power differences favouring the target of coercion and the coercer’s inability to subsequently enforce their demands. In the end the coercer achieved nothing. With few exceptions, virtually none of the ultimata in the Cold War period specifically mention the term war. The term war was at times used, for instance, in the verbal communication of the Soviet leadership in the Berlin Deadline Crises, but typically leaders preferred to speak of force or hinted at it. Apart from this commonality, the ultimata are characterised by a great diversity in terms of the issues at stake, the length of deadlines, the power differences between the coercer and the target of coercion, the international coalitions that they were part of, and the ability of the coercer to achieve its objectives. Multiple ultimata were issued as part of coercive attempts aimed at ending ongoing violence, protecting minorities, restoring control, and the withdrawal of forces, including Great Britain-France

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(1945), the Netherlands-Indonesia (1947), the Dominican Republic-­ Haiti (1963), and the protracted Cyprus standoff (1964, 1967). Some featured clear brinkmanship, most visibly in the Berlin Deadline Crises (1958, 1961) which started out as a Soviet attempt at coercing the West but twice resulted in a Soviet retreat from the brink when the target of coercion coalesced and refused compliance. Similarly, the China-India 1965 episode also featured an ultimatum intended to raise an issue and put pressure on the target of coercion, only to be withdrawn when the target decided to stand fast. There are several cases in which the coercer is merely trying to dictate what it wants without having any actual further intent of negotiating about this. These cases include the Soviet Union vis-­ à-­vis Romania (1945), the Netherlands to Indonesia (1948), and Great Britain and France to Egypt (1956). All three featured very short deadlines, a clear set of demands, and what coercers expected to be military superiority of already deployed troops to enforce the demands should the target of coercion decide not to comply. While the Soviet ultimatum was followed with compliance, the ultimata of the Netherlands and Great Britain and France were rejected. The coercers then escalated but were forced to withdraw following international pressure and did not achieve any of their objectives. Overall, what is particularly striking is the relatively infrequent use of ultimata over the period, certainly compared to the 1920s and 1930s, which cannot be seen in isolation from the structural developments, discussed in Chap. 3, which acted as constraints on coercive behaviour. Once some of these structural constraints loosened, states, especially Western ones, would again re-engage in coercive behaviour and deploy ultimata on a variety of occasions.

The Third Wave: The 1990s The end of the Cold War heralded the third wave of ultimata consisting of fourteen ultimata, thirteen of which were issued by multilateral coalitions, twelve of which spearheaded by Western states. Most of these episodes took place in the Middle East and the Balkans. In addition, two ultimata were issued in disputes by Eritrea against Yemen and by South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana against Lesotho, in the mid-1990s. The UN was either directly or indirectly involved in all these episodes. A combination of factors helps explain the sudden surge in ultimata deployed in the conduct of coercive diplomacy in the 1990s. The end of the bipolar system, as discussed in the previous section, which served as a constraining

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factor on the prevalence of coercive diplomacy in the days of the Cold War, appears to be one important factor. Another factor was the fact that a coalition of Western states, many of which were hesitant actually to use force, were grappling with the question of how to put a stop to the violence that erupted in the aftermath of the Cold War. In this context, coercive diplomacy proved a salient and acceptable, if not always successful, strategy. Two ultimata in this third wave were issued as part of a multilateral effort led by the US against Iraq in 1990 and 1991, the first demanding, in the context of a UN Security Council Resolution in late November 1990, that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait by mid-January or member states were authorised ‘to use all necessary means.’9 Iraq rejected ‘the ultimatum and the threats,’10 after which an air campaign commenced. A second ultimatum was issued on 22 February demanding Iraq carry out the ‘immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait’ by noon the following day or face the deployment of ground forces.11 Iraq again rejected these terms, and coalition forces invaded Kuwait. Three days later Iraq announced its willingness to comply with the UNSC resolutions. What makes the case (or cases) of the coercion of Iraq particularly interesting is the fact that it contains all the elements often identified for successful coercion. But despite the military power balance strongly favouring the coercer, the relative isolation of the target of coercion, the use of unambiguous threats— ultimata—which were backed up by a conspicuous military build-up, and relatively limited demands, the target of coercion did not give in. It suggests that the perception of the target of coercion—how the target perceives the threat and whether the target believes the threat to be credible—and the ability to muster sufficient political will are crucial factors to the outcome. At the same time, the ultimata largely succeeded in binding an international coalition of coercing states which were able to forcefully attain their objectives once the target of coercion refused to comply. 9  Micah L. Sifry, ed., ‘The U.N. Resolutions: The Complete Text’, in Gulf War Reader (Random House Value Publishing, 1997), 156. 10  Keesing’s, Keesing’s Worldwide, Approval of UN Resolution 678 Authorizing Use of Force, p.  37870, vol. Volume 36 (LLC—All Rights Reserved Keesing’s Record of World Events (formerly Keesing’s Contemporary Archives), International, © 1931–2006 Keesing’s Worldwide, LLC—All Rights Reserved., 1990). 11  Micah L. Sifry, ‘The Ultimatum (Statement of February 22, 1991)—George Bush’, in Gulf War Reader (Random House Value Publishing, 1997), 350.

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Iraq’s policies were to remain a bone of international contention which would involve another series of ultimata in the 1990s issued by a smaller coalition of states led again by the US, over the implementation of a no-fly zone in the summer of 1992, with which Iraq complied, and in early 1993 over the removal anti-aircraft systems, with which Iraq seemed to comply, but then defected. The coercers executed a series of bombings following which Iraq complied. The third ultimatum, also in early 1993, demanded that UN weapon inspectors were allowed to do their work. Again, punishment was meted out following Iraq’s refusal, which eventually prompted Iraq to accept the no-fly zones and, for the time being, allow UN weapons inspectors. The episodes illustrate that even when the coercer seeks to issue clear, unambiguous threats, the target of coercion can still resort to salami tactics by only partially complying, especially if the verification of compliance is difficult, or by first complying and then subsequently reneging. A similar dynamic was at play in Europe in the multiple ultimata issued by an international coalition in the Balkans in the 1990s aimed at getting the fighting parties to stop using violence, including in early February 1994, when, after a deadly attack on a market in central Sarajevo, NATO demanded that the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serbs either withdraw or hand over control to the UN all heavy weaponry around Sarajevo. The deadline was eleven days. The target of coercion complied. Another ultimatum was issued to protect Goražde, one of the UN-established safe areas, demanding that the Bosnian Serbs remove heavy weapons within four days. Only after Russian pressure, did the Bosnian Serbs comply. The following year, in May 1995, the UN Commander in Bosnia publicly announced an ultimatum demanding that the Bosnian Serbs cease attacks on Sarajevo, hand over the heavy weaponry they had stolen from UN-protected storage sites, and withdraw their remaining heavy weaponry from the exclusion zone surrounding Sarajevo or face air attacks. The Bosnian Serbs did not comply and NATO executed limited air strikes on ammunition depots. Bosnian Serb forces then bombarded UN safe areas and took hundreds of UN personnel hostage in a successful attempt at counter coercion. The overall UN commander ordered his commander in Bosnia from New York to ‘definitely avoid any action which may degenerate into confrontation.’12 12  Bernard Janvier, ‘Letter from Gen Janvier to Gen Smith on B-H Strategy—Document 13—19950602’, 6 February 1995.

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The sequence of ultimata in the Balkans highlights various relevant aspects. First, the multilateral nature of the coalition, the diverging and often hesitant national views on the applicability of force that existed within this coalition, and the complexities associated with a multi-actor theatre of operations complicated the coercive endeavour from the start. Eventually the target of coercion was able to exploit the lack of alliance cohesion in this post-Cold War environment. The often tactical nature of many of the demands contained in the ultimata allowed the target of coercion to engage in salami tactics even though the coercers deliberately and explicitly framed their demands in the form of an ultimatum. These tactics made it less likely that the already hesitant coercers would escalate in full, rather than engage in some more limited, form of military punishment. If they opted for limited punishment, the target would often comply, but only for a limited period of time. Finally, despite the coercers’ overall military superiority, the target was at some point able to counter-coerce the coercers, threatening the coercers’ forces on the ground. Three years later, after the Dayton Agreement of 1995 had formally ended the Bosnia War, NATO issued another ultimatum, this time aimed at coercing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) into stopping its violent harassment and killing of Albanian Kosovars in Kosovo. On 13 October 1998, NATO demanded that the FRY comply with an immediate ceasefire within ninety-six hours. The FRY’s President Milošević complied with the ultimatum and assented to an international 2000-strong-observer force as well as to overflights by NATO, leading US President Clinton to declare that NATO’s resolve had ‘moved Milošević from the battlefield to the bargaining table.’13 When civilian massacres at the hands of FRY forces started again in subsequent months, NATO issued an ultimatum in late January 1999, calling on the parties to comply with UNSC resolutions to cease and enter into negotiations, otherwise would launch air strikes. The negotiations ended unsuccessfully in mid-March, after the deadline had been pushed back repeatedly, and NATO launched an air campaign on 24 March that would last until 10 June 1999, destroying much of Serbia’s economic infrastructure and killing hundreds of civilians according to

13  Keesing’s, Keesing’s Record of World Events, February, Yugoslavia, March 1998, 6th ed., vol. 44 ((formerly Keesing’s Contemporary Archives), Keesing’s Worldwide, LLC—All Rights Reserved, 1931–2013, 1998), 42580.

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vNGO estimates.14 The FRY only accepted a joint EU-Russia proposal, after it had been deserted by its main supporter Russia, it had suffered considerable damage following an extended period of bombing, and when the threat (though not the actuality) of a ground invasion became a real prospect. A strategy of coercion thus nearly morphed into a strategy of control. The two remaining ultimata of the decade were issued in Africa and the Middle East. Following a coup by the king of small and landlocked Lesotho in August 1994, the presidents of Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe issued an ultimatum to the king with a deadline of seven days to reinstate the prime minister, threatening with economic and military sanctions. Negotiations followed in an extended bargaining process involving multiple extensions of the deadline and repeated stalling by the king. Only when the South African National Defence Force conducted a show of force along the border with Lesotho on 9 September did the king finally comply. In 1995, Eritrea issued an ultimatum to Yemen over sovereignty over the Hanish al-Kabir island, part of a group of about ‘40 hot, dry, mostly uninhabited islands, islets and rocks’ in the Red Sea.15 When Yemen permitted the construction of tourist facilities and deployed 200 soldiers for protection, the Eritrean government demanded that Yemen withdraw all military forces and civilians from the island within one month. Four days after the expiration of the deadline, after various unsuccessful negotiations, Eritrea attacked the island with over 2000 forces and 45 vessels gaining control before agreeing to a ceasefire. The vast majority of the ultimata in the 1990s were issued in what were essentially three conflicts pitting predominantly Western powers vis-à-vis targets of coercion in Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo Wars, showing that coercers were likely to apply an ultimatum strategy repeatedly. Ultimata served as a binding element around which multi-member coercive coalitions could coalesce. Threats of the use of force featured explicitly across these ultimata. The appearance of deadlines with longer time horizons stands out: in addition to a number of deadlines of twenty-four, forty-eight, and ninety-six hours, there are one-week deadlines (twice), ten-day deadlines 14  International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report: A Report from the Independent International Commission on Kosovo. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 93, 94. 15  Jeffrey A.  Lefebvre, ‘Red Sea Security and the Geopolitical-Economy of the Hanish Islands Dispute’, Middle East Journal 52, no. 3 (1 July 1998): 368.

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(twice), a one-month deadline, and even one deadline of forty-seven days. These ultimata with longer deadlines typically involved more interaction in the lead up to, and sometimes even after, the expiration of the deadline. Nearly all ultimata were characterised by real attempts by coercers to pressure targets to comply with a set of demands while not having to go to war to achieve them.

Into the Twenty-First Century: 2000–2020 The stabilisation of the conflicts in the Balkans marked the return of peace to the European continent, thereby removing one of the immediate theatres in which Western coalitions had been so actively engaging in coercive diplomacy by ultimatum. The US continued to make use of ultimata in coercive diplomacy, this time, however, largely going at it alone, preferring to bypass what it considered needlessly cumbersome alliance decision-­ making procedures. Since the turn of the century until 2020, states have issued ultimata on five different occasions. These include the US to Afghanistan (2001) over the extradition of Osama Bin Laden and dismantling his terrorist infrastructure; the US to Iraq (2003) involving the latter’s alleged weapons of mass destruction programme; Thailand to Cambodia (2008) over a territorial conflict involving a temple; North Korea to South Korea (2015) in the context of their long-standing conflict; and a Saudi-led coalition, consisting of Bahrain, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to Qatar (2017) over a variety of Qatar’s policies. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the US dispatched a private démarche to Afghanistan’s Taliban regime on 17 September 2001 followed up by a public ultimatum three days later when President Bush publicly demanded that the Taliban extradite ‘all the leaders of Al Qaeda’ and provide ‘full access to terrorist training camps,’ warning that they ‘must act, and act immediately.’16 When neither private nor public pressure managed to coerce the Taliban, the US invaded Afghanistan on 7 October, removed the Taliban regime, and killed Osama Bin Laden in neighbouring Pakistan in 2011, to withdraw only after a two-decade insurgency waged by the Taliban, upon which the Taliban swiftly returned 16  Bush, George W., ‘George W. Bush Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress United States Capitol Washington DC, September 20, 2001’, C-SPAN.org, 20 September 2001, http://www.c-span.org/video/?c4487624/bushs-20th-sept-speech.

140 

T. SWEIJS

to power. The episode shows that even very explicit threats accompanied by clear demonstrations of force by an evidently stronger coercer over what Western audiences would generally consider non-vital demands for the target may not necessarily translate into compliance by the target of coercion. Soon after 11 September, the US government designated Iraq as part of the ‘axis of evil.’17 It started pressuring Saddam Hussein to allow renewed weapon inspections of its suspected nuclear programme in a diplomatic campaign that culminated in an ultimatum issued together with Great Britain and Spain demanding that ‘Saddam Hussein and his sons […] leave Iraq within forty-eight hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing.’18 Two days later, the US invaded Iraq. After the invasion, Saddam Hussein and his two sons went into hiding. His sons were killed by US forces in the summer of 2003. Saddam Hussein was captured nine months after the invasion in mid-December 2003 and executed by the Iraqi government in December 2006. Unrelated to the conflict in the Middle East, an old border demarcation dispute between Thailand and Cambodia over sovereignty over the Preah Vihear temple complex escalated in the second half of 2008. When the temple was awarded World Heritage Site status by the UN, both countries started building up their military presence along the border and clashed repeatedly in limited altercations. Cambodia issued an ultimatum in mid-October 2008, demanding that Thai forces withdraw by noon the next day or Cambodia would attack.19 Thailand did not comply. The following day both sides incurred a small number of casualties in cross-­border shootings, but soon the tension was defused, and the International Court of Justice ruled in 2013 that the complex fell under Cambodian jurisdiction. 17  Bush, George W., ‘State of the Union Address 2002’ (The White House, 29 January 2002), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/2002012911.html. 18  Bush, George W., ‘President George W. Bush—Address to the Nation on Ultimatum To Saddam Hussein’, 17 March 2003, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/wariniraq/gwbushiraq31703.htm. 19  ‘Cambodian PM Gives Thailand Border Ultimatum’, Reuters, 13 October 2008, h t t p : / / w w w. r e u t e r s . c o m / a r t i c l e / 2 0 0 8 / 1 0 / 1 4 / u s - c a m b o d i a - t h a i l a n d -­ idUSTRE49C1JZ20081014; Wang Yan, ‘Hun Sen Sets Tuesday Noon as Ultimate Time for Thai Troops Withdrawal from Border Area’, http://news.xinhuanet.com, 14 October 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/14/content_10192033.htm.

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In August 2015 North Korea attempted to coerce its overall militarily more powerful neighbour South Korea. Following a mine explosion that had injured two South Korean soldiers, a series of cross-border shootings, and the broadcasting of anti-North Korea messages through loudspeakers along the demilitarised zone, North Korea issued an ultimatum stating that it ‘would launch a strong military action unless it [South Korea] stops psychological broadcasting towards the north and dismantle all means for psychological warfare within 48 hours.’20 Both countries mobilised their armed forces but agreed to negotiations shortly after the expiration of the deadline, reaching an agreement not long thereafter. Qatar, finally, received an ultimatum from a Saudi-led coalition on 22 June with a deadline of ten days and containing thirteen demands including halting its alleged funding for terrorist groups, terminating support for the media channel Al Jazeera, reducing its relations with Iran, and agreeing to monthly compliance checks. Compliance would seriously infringe on Qatar’s sovereignty. Qatar rejected the ultimatum upon which the coercing coalition replaced its thirteen demands with six general principles that largely traced the more specific demands of the ultimatum. The crisis stabilised through international involvement of regional actors such as Kuwait and key international actors. Qatar managed to successfully internationalise the crisis cultivating close relations with the US, the UK, France, Turkey, and Iran using economic and military equipment deals and taking place in joint exercises. Finally, in early 2021, the coercers backtracked and the parties agreed to solve the crisis at the al-Ula summit. Four of the five ultimata in this final period were issued by coercers largely operating independently, although the US did receive assistance and support from allied nations, especially from Great Britain in 2003, with the only exception being the Saudi-led coalition ultimatum to Qatar. This one aside, the four ultimata featured short deadlines—ranging from immediate to forty-eight hours—and were intended to put pressure on the decision makers within the target’s regime. Only one ultimatum contained territorial demands, while the others concerned matters of regime and policies. In all these four episodes, force was used. The US, despite its 20  Simon Mundy, ‘North Korea Orders Troops on to High Alert’, Financial Times, 21 August 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/c40f93c4-47b9-11e5-b3b2-1672f710807b,Au thorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2Fc40f9 3c4-­4 7b9-­1 1e5-b3b2-1672f710807b.html&_i_referer=&classification=conditional_ standard&iab=barrier-app#axzz3jotPqFlZ.

142 

T. SWEIJS

overwhelming power preponderance, did not manage to coerce its targets into compliance and only achieved its stated objectives after fully escalating and invading the country. The coercive attempts by weaker coercers in the other two cases did lead to negotiations, only one of which led to compliance with the coercer’s demands (North Korea-South Korea) and the other to retreat (Thailand). In all cases, external players were either actively involved or attempted to involve themselves in the negotiations— with varying degrees of success—a trend that was already visible in the 1990s.

Conclusion What insights can be gained from this survey? First and foremost, the survey corroborates the notion that political leaders have used ultimata much more frequently than has been commonly assumed. Second, it showcases the existence of a significant amount of variation between ultimata in terms of the purposes for which they are issued, the dynamics that they generate, and the outcomes with which they meet. Third, the survey reveals that although ultimata have appeared throughout the period, they have done so with varying frequency. While it is likely that there are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions under which political leaders issue ultimata, this chapter has built on Chap. 3 to explain the frequency of their use as being affected by various structural systemic and ideological incentives and constraints. These have been associated with prevailing perspectives on the use of coercion and force in interstate relations, the structure of the international system, and the opportunity costs for leaders of resorting to threats, themes that will be taken up in greater depth in subsequent chapters. Overall, both the purpose and the content of the ultimata are representative of the strategic concerns of the decision makers of the era in which they are issued. War reparations, territorial control, and issues associated with the target’s political regime, including its sovereignty, are particularly prevalent in the 1920s. Strategic coercion is still quite commonly practised during this decade, but the term war is seldom used. Ultimata were used as proper coercive signalling devices, rather than announcements of wars the coercer was set upon waging. In the lead-up to the Second World War, territory, sovereignty, and the protection of minorities featured prominently amongst demands contained in ultimata. The ultimata were

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143

sometimes part of coercive bargaining moves in an ongoing negotiation, but as often as not, they were used to justify a course of action that the coercer intended to carry out anyway. The use of force was not merely hinted at, but it was explicitly included in the threat in many of these ultimata. In the Cold War period, the number of ultimata dwindled drastically, in line with a number of developments in the international system that constrained the prevalence of coercive threat behaviour. In keeping with the times, most of the ultimata did not contain the term war. Several ultimata concerned sovereignty and territory, involving attempts by Western powers to protect their positions in former colonies. Other ultimata issued during the Cold War feature an assortment of purposes, with only two involving the broader standoff between East and West. The 1990s saw a resurgence in the use of ultimata predominantly by multi-­ member coalitions seeking to coerce targets into refraining from violence, withdrawing from territory, or handing over weapons. The threat of force, in this context, was used explicitly. The 2000s and 2010s, subsequently, featured five ultimata, four of which represented bargaining moves while a fifth merely constituted an announcement of a course already set upon. Decision makers employing ultimata in this most recent period were straightforward about the consequences and the threat of force was explicit across four of the five cases. At the same time, the negotiation processes involving the coercer and the target of coercion became increasingly internationalised over the course of this period. The examination of the particularities of individual ultimata episodes within a chronological perspective thus, and perhaps unsurprisingly, suggests that the content of ultimata and the dynamics of ultimata episodes are not time invariant, but reflect the era they appear in. What is not clear, however, is whether the outcomes of ultimata episodes are similarly time variant or whether there are regularities across the entire set of ultimata that hold over time. This will be assessed in the following chapter. The survey thus fills an important empirical gap in the coercive diplomacy literature at the same time as it refutes an important assumption in that literature. In addition, it suggests two other avenues of inquiry into the use and utility of ultimata based on the variation encountered. The first avenue analyses whether there are any regularities that hold across cases and across time. The second avenue considers whether ultimata represent different phenomena rather than belonging to a single overarching category. The next two chapters will pursue these two lines of inquiry.

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References Bishop, Robert, and E. S. Crayfield. Russia Astride the Balkans. R.M. McBride, 1948. Bush, George W. ‘George W.  Bush Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress United States Capitol Washington DC, September 20, 2001’. C-­SPAN.org, 20 September 2001. http://www.c-­span.org/video/ ?c4487624/bushs-­20th-­sept-­speech. ——— ‘President George W.  Bush—Address to the Nation on Ultimatum To Saddam Hussein’, 17 March 2003. http://www.americanrhetoric.com/ speeches/wariniraq/gwbushiraq31703.htm. ——— ‘State of the Union Address 2002’. The White House, 29 January 2002. https://georgewbush-­w hitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/ 01/20020129-­11.html. Reuters. ‘Cambodian PM Gives Thailand Border Ultimatum’, 13 October 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/14/us-­c ambodia-­t hailand­idUSTRE49C1JZ20081014. Chabal, Emile, and Robert Tombs, eds. Britain and France in Two World Wars: Truth, Myth and Memory. Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. Croissant, Michael P. The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998. Emmons, Alex. n.d. ‘Saudi Arabia Planned to Invade Qatar Last Summer. Rex Tillerson’s Efforts to Stop It May Have Cost Him His Job.’ The Intercept, 08012018. https://theintercept.com/2018/08/01/rex-­tillerson-­qatar-­ saudi-­uae/. Fazal, Tanisha M. ‘Why States No Longer Declare War’. Security Studies 21, no. 4 (October 2012): 557–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2012.734227. Filkins, Dexter. ‘A Saudi Prince’s Quest to Remake the Middle East’. The New  Yorker, 2 April 2018. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/ 04/09/a-­saudi-­princes-­quest-­to-­remake-­the-­middle-­east Hallett, Brien. The Lost Art of Declaring War. 1st paperback. University of Illinois Press, 1998. International Commission on Kosovo. Kosovo Report: A Report from the Independent International Commission on Kosovo. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Janvier, Bernard. ‘Letter from Gen Janvier to Gen Smith on B-H Strategy— Document 13—19950602’. 6 February 1995. Keesing’s. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1941. Vol. IV.  Part I.  Keesing’s Limited, 1941. ——— Keesing’s Record of World Events, February, Yugoslavia, March 1998. 6th ed. Vol. 44. (formerly Keesing’s Contemporary Archives), Keesing’s Worldwide, LLC—All Rights Reserved, 1931–2013, 1998.

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February, Yugoslavia Keesing’s Worldwide, Approval of UN Resolution 678 Authorizing Use of Force, p.  37870. Volume 36. LLC—All Rights Reserved Keesing’s Record of World Events (formerly Keesing’s Contemporary Archives), International, © 1931–2006 Keesing’s Worldwide, LLC—All Rights Reserved, 1990. Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. ‘Red Sea Security and the Geopolitical-Economy of the Hanish Islands Dispute’. Middle East Journal 52, no. 3 (1 July 1998): 367–85. Mundy, Simon. ‘North Korea Orders Troops on to High Alert’. Financial Times, 21 August 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/c40f93c4-­47b9-­11e5-­b3b2-­16 72f710807b,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft. com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2Fc40f93c4-­4 7b9-­1 1e5-­b 3b2-­1 672f710807b. html&_i_referer=&classification=conditional_standard&iab=barrier-­ app#axzz3jotPqFlZ. Namier, Lewis Bernstein. Europe in Decay: A Study in Disintegration, 1936–40. Macmillan, 1950. The National. ‘Qatar: Deadline Shifts in Gulf Crisis’. Accessed 20 May 2022. https://www.thenational.scot/news/15387742.qatar-­d eadline-­s hifts-­i n­gulf-­crisis/. Sakwa, George. ‘The Polish Ultimatum to Lithuania in March 1938’. The Slavonic and East European Review 55, no. 2 (1 April 1977): 204–26. Al Arabiya English. ‘Saudi Arabia’s FM: AlUla Declaration Ends Dispute with Qatar, Restores All Ties’, 5 January 2021. https://english.alarabiya.net/ News/gulf/2021/01/05/Saudi-­A rabia-­s -­F M-­A lUla-­d eclaration­ends-­dispute-­with-­Qatar-­restores-­all-­ties. Sechser, Todd S. ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’. Conflict Management and Peace Science 28, no. 4 (1 September 2011): 377–401. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894211413066. Sifry, Micah L. ‘The Ultimatum (Statement of February 22, 1991)—George Bush’. In Gulf War Reader, 349–50. Random House Value Publishing, 1997a. ——— ed. ‘The U.N.  Resolutions: The Complete Text’. In Gulf War Reader, 137–56. Random House Value Publishing, 1997b. Examiner. ‘To Intervene—De Gaulle Asked to Withdraw Troops’. 1 June 1945. Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. Qatar and the Gulf Crisis. Oxford University Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197525593.001.0001. Yan, Wang. ‘Hun Sen Sets Tuesday Noon as Ultimate Time for Thai Troops Withdrawal from Border Area’. http://news.xinhuanet.com, 14 October 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-­10/14/content_10192 033.htm.

CHAPTER 6

Ultimata 1920–2020: Patterns and Findings

Introduction While the previous chapter unearthed the existence of a rich variety of ultimata, it did not directly address one of the central questions of the coercive diplomacy literature concerning the utility of ultimata from the viewpoint as to whether there are general factors that lead to compliance by the target of coercion. This chapter examines whether there any generic patterns in the use and utility across the entire set of ultimata over the whole period under consideration. Relying on a narrow concept of utility, it evaluates whether ultimata are more likely to lead to compliance taking into account those factors commonly associated with the outcome of ultimata, including whether the coercer demonstrates and uses force, the differences in military capabilities between the coercer and the target, the type of demands contained in the ultimatum, the nature of the coercing coalition, and the degree of isolation of the target of coercion. This chapter thus puts to empirical test the question raised by coercive diplomacy scholars whether ultimata tend to be followed by escalation or by compliance, and assesses the factors associated with these outcomes. The chapter proceeds as follows: it first considers the number of times ultimata have met with compliance or rejection and the frequency with

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 T. Sweijs, The Use and Utility of Ultimata in Coercive Diplomacy, Twenty-first Century Perspectives on War, Peace, and Human Conflict, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21303-8_6

147

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T. SWEIJS

which the coercer still managed to achieve their objectives over time. It also examines the types of strategies coercers have typically pursued in achieving these objectives and whether they have continued to negotiate, have executed some limited form of punishment, or have escalated fully to forcefully impose their will. It then assesses which conditions have been associated with either compliance or rejection and looks at power differences between the coercer and coerced, demonstrations of force, the nature of the coalition, and the degree of isolation of the coerced using simple bivariate statistical tests. The results are reported both in absolute numbers and in percentages to describe patterns across the dataset. The operationalisation of these factors has been explained in the method chapter and in an online annexe at www.coercivediplomacy.com, and will be only briefly revisited whenever appropriate in this chapter.

Outcomes: Compliance and Objectives Achieved The track record of the overall set of all eighty-seven ultimata combined is mixed. In thirty-seven (or forty-three per cent) of the cases, ultimata were met with full compliance, in six (or seven per cent) with partial compliance and in forty-four (or fifty-one per cent) cases with no compliance (see Fig. 6.1).1 There are no clear trends over time in the rate of compliance with ultimata although there is one peak of full compliance during the outbreak of the Second World War with fourteen cases of full compliance between 1938–1941 versus ten cases of no compliance and one case of partial compliance. However, in the fifty cases in which the target of coercion did not comply or only partially complied with the demands of the coercer, the coercer managed to achieve their objectives fully in twenty-eight cases (or in fifty-­ six per cent of the cases of no or partial compliance). In another seven cases (or fourteen per cent of the cases of no or partial compliance), the coercer managed to partially achieve their objectives, while in only fifteen cases (thirty per cent of the cases of no or partial compliance) the coercer attained none of their demands (see Figs. 6.2 and 6.3). There are no clear trends over time to be reported.

1  If figures do not add up to hundred percent, it is due to rounding errors: full compliance = 0.42528. Partial compliance = 0.068965. No compliance = 0.50574.

6  ULTIMATA 1920–2020: PATTERNS AND FINDINGS 

Overall Compliance

50 45

149

60%

44 (51%) 50%

40

37 (43%)

35

40%

30 30%

25 20

20%

15 10

10%

6 (7%)

5 0

no compliance

partial compliance

full compliance

0%

Fig. 6.1  Outcomes: no compliance, partial compliance, full compliance

Objectives Achieved

30

28 (56%)

50%

25

40%

20 15

15 (30%)

10

30% 20%

7 (14%)

5 0

60%

10%

not achieved

partially achieved

fully achieved

0%

Fig. 6.2  Outcomes following no or partial compliance: achievement of objectives

Strategies: Escalate, Punish, Negotiate, End The coercer can pursue four courses of action following the response of the target of coercion. The coercer can immediately opt for escalation (end the bargaining process, implement a strategy aimed at control to

150 

T. SWEIJS

No or Partial Compliance: Objectives Achieved 30

60%

26 (52%)

50%

25

40%

20 15

15 (30%)

30% 20%

10 5 0

4 (8%)

3 (6%)

no objectives achieved

objectives partially achieved 0

objectives fully achieved

objectives partially achieved

2 (4%) objectives fully achieved

10% 0%

1

Fig. 6.3  No compliance or partial compliance and achievement of objectives

forcefully achieve objectives), punishment (continue the bargaining process, but use limited military force to affect the target’s decision calculus), negotiation (continue the bargaining process without the use of military force), and end (end the episode). In twenty-nine of the cases (thirty-four per cent of all cases), coercers did not use any force and ended the episode. In twelve cases (fourteen per cent of all cases), the coercer reverted to negotiation. In seventeen cases (twenty per cent of all cases), the coercer used a punishment strategy, and in twenty-nine cases (thirty-three per cent of all cases), the coercer escalated fully (see Fig. 6.4). In twenty-eight of the thirty-seven cases of full compliance, the coercer ended the episode after the target of coercion complied immediately. In two cases—both involving Japan and France in August and September 1940—the coercer still punished the target even after the latter had already complied. In seven cases, the target of coercion complied but only after extended negotiations. In the six cases of partial compliance, the coercer escalated and punished each on two occasions and negotiated and ended

6  ULTIMATA 1920–2020: PATTERNS AND FINDINGS 

Strategy of Coercer

35 30

151

29 (33%)

29 (33%)

25 20

17 (20%)

15

12 (14%)

10 5 0

escalate

punish

negotiate

end

Fig. 6.4  Strategy of coercer: highest follow up

the episode each on one occasion. In the forty-four cases of no compliance, the coercer escalated in twenty-seven cases, punished in thirteen, and negotiated in four cases (see Table 6.1). A pairing analysis of the association between particular strategies and the coercer achieving their objectives reveals several regularities (see Table  6.2). In twenty-two cases of full achievement of objectives, the coercer relied on escalation, while in another six cases the coercer achieved their objectives after implementing a punishment strategy. In the seven cases that the coercer achieved their objectives only partially, this was four times after escalation, once after punishment, once after prolonged negotiations, and once after ending the episode. In the fifteen cases that the coercer failed to achieve any of the objectives, only three times did the coercer resort to escalation, eight times to punishment, and four times to negotiation. The three cases of escalation that backfired were the Netherlands versus Indonesia (1948), the Suez Crisis (1956), and Cambodia versus North Vietnam (1970). In three of the eight punishment cases—two involving Japan versus China in 1932 and 1937 and the third one the international coalition of states versus Iraq in 1990–1991—a subsequent ultimatum was issued in another episode and, after rejection of that ultimatum, the coercer still managed to achieve their objectives. The four cases of negotiation involved Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1920 (which

152 

T. SWEIJS

Table 6.1  Compliance target of coercion and strategy of coercer Strategy coercer

Escalate Absolute Relative Punish Absolute Relative Negotiate Absolute Relative End Absolute Relative Total Absolute Relative

Overall compliance No

Partial

Full

Total

27 31%

2 2%

0 0%

29 33%

13 15%

2 2%

2 2%

17 20%

4 5%

1 1%

7 8%

12 14%

0 0%

1 1%

28 32%

29 33%

44 51%

6 7%

37 43%

87 100%

Table 6.2  Achievement of objectives and strategy of coercer Strategy coercer

Objectives achieved No

Escalate Absolute Relative Punish Absolute Relative Negotiate Absolute Relative End Absolute Relative Total Absolute Relative

Partial

Full

Total

3 6%

4 8%

22 44%

29 58%

8 16%

1 2%

6 12%

15 30%

4 8%

1 2%

0 0%

5 10%

0 0%

1 2%

0 0%

1 2%

15 30%

7 14%

28 56%

50 100%

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153

were taken over by the Soviet Union), the two Berlin Deadline Crises (1958–1961), and the Saudi-led coalition against Qatar in 2017. These numbers convey several relevant insights pertaining to the utility of ultimata, albeit at a very aggregate level. Most conspicuously, those who hold the opinion that ultimata constitute a risky strategy do so not without reason.2 After all, ultimata are met with compliance in less than half of the cases, and coercers either see themselves forced to backtrack or, on most occasions, resort to violence if not full escalation. At the same time, if coercers are indeed willing to execute their threat in case of refusal, in the majority of the cases they do tend to achieve their objectives. In case of no or partial compliance, the coercer still managed to achieve their demands in full in twenty-eight cases (thirty-two per cent of all ultimata), and seven cases partially (eight per cent of all ultimata). Only in fifteen cases (seventeen per cent) did the coercer not manage to achieve anything. In other words, out of all eighty-seven ultimata episodes between 1920 and 2021, coercers were able to achieve their objectives with or without the cooperation of the target in sixty-five (or seventy-five per cent) of the cases fully, and in another seven cases (or eight per cent) partially, making for a total of eighty-three per cent. This essentially means that in only fifteen of the cases (or seventeen per cent) the coercer ended up with nothing. Three of those cases involved further escalation in an ultimatum episode that followed shortly thereafter and eventually resulted in the coercer achieving their demands forcefully. Taking these three cases also into account yields a track record of eighty-six per cent of the coercer overall achieving their objectives in part or in full, even if in a large number of cases this involved the deployment of large-scale force. Two important methodological considerations are in place to put these insights into their proper context. First, it is likely that a strong self-­ selection effect applies to these cases. Coercers embarking on an ultimatum strategy are resolved and confident because they have reasons to be resolved and confident which is often—although not always, as discussed below—based on their stronger military capabilities, on their assessment that the target will give in to the pressure, and on their ability to violently impose their will should the target refuse. Second, the reported results are by no means intended to imply that the presence of these conditions will necessarily prompt a coercer to issue an ultimatum. In other words, 2   Paul Gordon Lauren, ‘Ultimata and Coercive Diplomacy’, International Studies Quarterly 16, no. 2 (1 June 1972): 162, https://doi.org/10.2307/3013977.

154 

T. SWEIJS

decision makers can always decide to pursue another strategy for instance by simply seizing what they want without issuing an ultimatum.3 As discussed in the introductory chapter, in political science terms, the analysis is not concerned with necessary or sufficient conditions for coercers to issue an ultimatum. It may be possible to say something about the conditions under which ultimata are issued and the conditions under which they are likely to succeed within this sample of ultimata, but there is no real control group of cases without ultimata to compare the chain of events and the eventual outcomes to. Bearing these caveats in mind, it is worth taking a look at the role of differences in military capabilities, the types of demands involved, the nature of the coalition, and the isolation of the target in affecting the outcome of coercion within this set of eighty-­seven ultimata.

Power Differences Most, if not all authors, have found that differences in military strength between the coercer and the target are a key factor in the decision-making calculus of the latter to comply because such capability differences render the threat credible.4 In the eighty-seven ultimata episodes, coercers are militarily stronger measured by their annual military expenditures in a total of seventy-two (eighty-three per cent) cases. Stronger and weaker coercers, however, have comparatively similar success rates, even if, counterintuitively, the weaker coercers tend to do marginally better in terms of getting a target of coercion to comply: forty seven per cent versus forty two per cent (see Table  6.3). Sechser finds an even stronger, and statistically significant, relationship between weaker coercers being more likely to succeed at compelling stronger targets, for all militarised 3  Daniel W.  Altman, ‘Red Lines and Faits Accomplis in Interstate Coercion and Crisis’ (Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015), http://dspace.mit.edu/ handle/1721.1/99775. 4  Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, ‘Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 1 (1 April 1999): 6–11, https://doi.org/10.2307/2657989; Alexander L.  George, ‘Introduction: The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy’, in The Limits Of Coercive Diplomacy: Second Edition, ed. Alexander L George and William E Simons, 2nd ed. (Westview Press, 1994), 2; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 29; Glenn Herald Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 191.

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155

Table 6.3  Power differences and compliance Military power difference Stronger Weaker Total

No compliance

Partial compliance

Full compliance

Total

Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative 37 7 44

51% 47% 51%

5 1 6

7% 7% 7%

30 7 37

42% 47% 43%

72 15 87

100% 100% 100%

Percentages are reported for the rows, relative within group of stronger/weaker coercer, except for total

compellent threats, that is, those with and those without an ultimatum.5 If stronger targets of coercion refused compliance, the weaker coercer still managed to achieve their objectives in about half of the cases. In one case of partial compliance, the weaker coercer managed to fully achieve their objectives (Hungary to Czechoslovakia, 1939). In three out of the seven cases of no compliance in which the coercer was weaker, it still achieved their objectives after escalation. In four other cases, the general or local military balance of power favoured the target of coercion, rendering the prospects of attaining their objectives in case of refusal very unlikely. These included Cambodia to North Vietnam (1970), Libya to Tanzania (1979), and Cambodia to Thailand (2008). In all the other cases, coercers were stronger or at least able to credibly threaten the target of coercion. To test whether the findings about the relationship between power difference (stronger/weaker) and compliance are due to chance or not, a Fisher’s exact test was run on the data. Fisher’s exact test can be used to assess whether the frequency distribution of two different sets of variables is independent or not. It does so by comparing the observed frequency distribution (the sample) to a theoretical frequency distribution (the hypothetical population) in which the variables are independent. In this case, this essentially means that the theoretical distribution of ‘compliance’ is exactly similar for ‘weaker’ compared to ‘stronger.’6 Fisher’s exact test is 5  Todd S.  Sechser, ‘Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 28, no. 4 (1 September 2011): 389, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0738894211413066. 6  This also applies to the expected frequency of ‘stronger’ and ‘no compliance’ and ‘weaker’ and ‘no compliance’ and ‘stronger’ and ‘partial compliance’ and ‘weaker’ and ‘partial compliance.’

156 

T. SWEIJS

Table 6.4  Explanation of Fisher’s exact test Y

X Total

0 1

Total

0

1

a c

B D

a + b c + d

a + c

b + d

n

generally used to test relationships between categorical data (such as power differences between the coercer and the target of coercion and the degree of compliance) in small sets of observations such as this dataset. Fisher’s exact test yields a single probability score. It is an exact test because it calculates the precise probability of observing the current—or a more extreme—frequency distribution arising purely by chance, instead of offering an approximation of the probability as, for instance, the commonly used Pearson’s chi square test does.7 The test is based on the following logic: for simplicity’s sake, imagine there are two variables X and Y that each can take on two values, 0 and 1. This yields the frequencies a, b, c, d which can be plotted in a 2 × 2 table (see Table 6.4). The probability that the observed frequency distribution with values a, b, c, d is drawn from the theoretical frequency distribution where both variables are independent can then be calculated using the following formula8:

7  Janet Taylor Spence et  al., Elementary Statistics, 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1983), 239–48; J. Parry Lewis and Alasdair Traill, Statistics Explained (Harlow, England ; Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley, 1999), 405–6, 414, 419, http://trove.nla.gov. au/version/10822837; J.H McDonald, Handbook of Biological Statistics, 3rd ed. (Sparky House Publishing, 2014), 77–85, http://www.biostathandbook.com/fishers.html. 8  Richard Lowry, ‘Concepts and Applications of Inferential Statistics: Subchapter 8a. The Fisher Exact Probability Test’, 2017, http://vassarstats.net/textbook/index.html; Eric W. Weisstein, ‘Fisher’s Exact Test’, Text, 4 March 2017, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/ FishersExactTest.html; Stata 14, ‘Tabulate Twoway—Two-Way Table of Frequencies’, 4 March 2017, http://www.stata.com/manuals13/rtabulatetwoway.pdf; McDonald, Handbook of Biological Statistics, 77–85.

6  ULTIMATA 1920–2020: PATTERNS AND FINDINGS 

  a  c !/ a ! c!    b  d !/ b! d !) Pr  

n!  a  b !  c  d !



157

 a  b !  c  d !  a  c !  b  d ! n! a ! b! c ! d !

.

The probability Pr∗ thus reflects the a priori chance of observing the frequencies in the sample under the assumption that they are drawn from a population in which there is no statistical dependence between both variables. For every alternative combination a, b, c, d we can define a similar probability Pr. Fisher’s exact probability score is then given by p   Pr, where the sum is taken for all possible combinations of a, b, Pr  Pr

c, d that give the same marginal distribution, and a lower probability Pr, than the one observed. The statistical analysis software programme Stata Version 14 has been used to calculate Fisher’s exact test probability score. To accept or reject the null hypothesis that both variables are independent in the population, typically a threshold probability of five or ten per cent (p