The Unwritten Order: Hitler's Role in the Final Solution (History of Nazism) 0752419773, 9780752419770

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THE UNWRITTEN ORDER

ABOUT THE AUTHO R

Peter Longerich is Pro fessor of Modern Gennan History at R oyal Holloway, Uni versity of London, and Director of the R esearch Centre for the H olocaust and T wentieth Century History. He was an expert witness in the celebrated court case involving David Irving and Penguin n ooks.

THE UNWRITTEN ORDER Hitler's Role in the Final Solution

PETER LONGERICH

TEMPUS

First published 2001 I'UBLJSJ-IED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM BY·

Tempus Publishing Ltd The Mill, Brimscombe Port Stroud, Gloucestershire GLS 2QG www.tempus-publishing.com I'UBLJSHED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IJY:

Tempus Publishing Inc. 2 Cumberland Street Charleston, SC 29401 1-888-313-2665 www.arcadiapublishing.com Tempus books are available in France and Germany from the following addresses: Tempus Pubhshing Group 21 Avenue de Ia Rcpubliquc 37300 Jouc-les-Tours FltANCE

Tempus Publishing Group Gusuv-Adolf-StraBc 3 99084 Erfun GERMANY

© Copyright Peter Longerich, 2001

The right of Peter Longcrich to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No pan of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without the permission in writing from the Publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 0 7524 1977 3 Typcscttmg and origination by Tempus l'ubhshing. COVEit ILLU~Tit\TION:

Entry in Himmler's desk book, translation as follows: Fuhrer's Head Quarter: Fuhrer Wolfsschanze 18.XII.41 16 h Jewish question I to be exterminated as partisans New organisation of the Armed SS Lcibstandarte Alpine Div. The expcn reports for the Irving trial which form the basis of the book were translated by Dr Catherine Stodolsky. Additional sections were translated by Dr Robert Vilain who also revised the full text.

CONTENTS PREFACE

NVw l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

'Remove', i'\nnihilate', 'Extirpate' 'Complete removal oftheJews' 'Eradication from the cultural and intellectual life of the Nation' ~ttempting a legal solution to a problem' 'The Jews must be expelled from Germany, from the whole of Europe' ~II measures against the Jews are to be discussed directly with the Fuhrer' 'Granting a merciful death' i'\n attempt at the settlement and regulation of the Jewish Problem' 'Some time in the future we want to ship the Jews out to Madagascar' ~ccording to the will of the Fuhrer' 'The Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia ... must be eliminated' ' ... shoot everyone who even looks oddly' 'It is good if the fear that we are e>."terminating the Jews goes before us' 'We arc e>."Periencing the fulfilment of that prophesy' 'The World War is here, the e>."termination of the Jews must be the necessary consequence' ~ftcr appropriate prior approval by the Fuhrer' 'In this matter the Fuhrer is the untiring pioneer and spokesman for a radical solution' 'The Fiihrer has laid the implementation of this very difficult order on my shoulders' 'In accordance with the wishes of the Fiihrer' 'To be treated like tuberculosis bacteria' 'By removing the Jews'

7 14 15 19 27 31 37 45 47 51 55 57 63 69 75 81 91 95 99 103 109 113 119

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BtnLIOGI~APIIY INOEX

147 158

PREFACE

At the end of 1997 I received an unusual request. My colleague Richard Evans. Professor of Modem History at Cambridge University and Fellow of GoDVJ11e and Caius College, and Anthony Julius, of the London law firm ofMishcon de Rcya, asked if I would be prepared to appear as an expen wimess in the fonhcoming civil action of Irving v. Lipstadt. The background to this spectacular civil action is well known and need not be repeated here in much detail: David Irving, the author of several books on the Nazi period and the Second World War, had begun proceedings against Professor Deborah Lipstadt, Professor at Emory University Atlanta, because in her book, De11yitrg tile Holoca11st, she had ponrayed him as denying the murder of the Jews.• In response, Deborah Lipstadt and her publishers Penguin Books decided not only to take up Irving's challenge and face the charge, but also to take the offensive in their conduct of the case. In other words, they resolved to subject Irving's methods to detailed scrutiny before the coun and make them the true object of the trial. As pan of this strategy, the defence called on a number of historians, who were to demonstrate to tl1e coun just how untenable was Irving's attempt to cast into question substantial aspects of the history of the murder of the European Jews that are generally accepted. The goal that the defence set itselfwas reached: as is also well known, the trial ended in April2000 with Irving's total defeat. For the action of Irving v. Lipstadt the historians who had been engaged as ex"Pen witnesses prepared written reports, some of them very o.ttnsive. In the main submission, Richard Evans dealt in detail wid1 'David Irving. Hider and 1-lolocaust Denial', but there were four funher specialist submissions: a srudy of the history of the construction of Auschwitz by Roben-Jan van Pelt. an architectural historian teaching in Canada; a study by America's leading Holocaust expert Christopher Browning on the source materials a\"2ilable on the subject of the 'final solution'; and my own two O."JlCR reports, the first on 1lle Systematic Character of National Socialist Policy for the Annihilation of the Jews', the second on 'Hitler's Role in the Persecution of d1e Jews by d1e National Socialist Regime'. The two reports prepared by me were therefore concerned \\ith two centra) clements of the history of the murder of the EuropeanJC\\'!1 that ha\"t' repea~ly

7

PREFACE

been challenged by Holocaust deniers, namely the f.1ct that the murd(.·r of the European Jews was the result of the systematic implementation of a ~pccifit: policy, and the f.1ct that this policy was pursued by the highest authority of the 'Third Reich', Adolf Hitler. It was not the purpose of either report to deal \'lith liVing's absurd theses (which were to be refuted ex-pertly and in detail by Richard Evans's report); but to explain the current state of research on the events that we call the 'Holocaust'. These considerations also lie at the root of the present undertaking to publish the report elucidating Hitler's role in the 'final solution' in an ex"tended fonn. At the point when I took on the commission to write a report on Hitler's role in the persecution of the Jews, I anticipated that the experience of appearing as an expert witness in a British Court would be highly interesting but did not e";pect any great insights to emerge from the writing itself. Seen from an academic perspective, the topic 'Hitler and the Holocaust' seemed unattractive for two main reasons. Firstly, however much historians may debate the genesis of the 'final solution', dtey are all agreed that Hitler played a central role in the annihilation of the Je\vs. The way in which he fulfilled this role may be disputed, but the fact dtat he played a role is not regarded by specialists as a problem that is academically particularly interesting or difficult to solve. The desire of so-called revisionists like David Irving to deny Hitler's central role in the murder of the European Jews - despite his well-documented vituperative anti-Semitism and despite his unfettered freedom of action as omnipotent dictator - may be of real interest to political historians, psychologists and the like. But to a historian it is clear that this form of argument relies on simple sleight of hand. The starting-point is the fact that an unambiguous written order from Hitler for the murder of the European Jews does not exist (and may well never have existed). The argument that the socalled revisionists develop from this fact is trivial and misleading: it rests on the spurious suggestion that one can derive from the absence of a historical document a negative conclusion about events; what is not documented is therefore non-existent. Historians arc familiar with this classic trap from their training. There is even a specialist term for it, the argume11111111 rx silemio, or the f.1llacy of deriving f.1rrcaching conclusions about what happened (or did not happen) in history from the absence of documentary evidence. On the other hand - and this is the second reason why I was initially not particularly interested in the topic of 'Hitler and the Holocaust' - the f.1ct that Hitler played a decisive role in developing the policy for murdering the Jews otTers only a very limited explanation for the full extent of what happened. After decades of intensive study of the history of the National Socialist dictatorship, it is perfectly clear that Hitler was the driving force and constant stimulus for radicalizing the persecution of the Jl'Ws. In this area of policy he had

8

l'llEFACE

considerable room for manoeuvre which he employed exactly as he saw fit. Nowadays the vast majority of historians who arc concerned with the history of the 'Third Reich' would subscribe to the theory 'no Holocaust without Hitler'. Or. to argue counterfactually, if Hitler had died in 1940, it is extremely questionable whether the Nazi regime would have followed that fateful path under different leadership, or whether the indubitably destructive energy of the system would have been expended in a different direction. But what does the phrase 'no Holocaust without Hitler' actually exl'lain? Seen in purely logical tenns it denotes a necessary but not a sufficient condition, so tlte phrase 'no Holocaust without Hitler' cannot be reversed to give the thesis 'the Holocaust rook place merely because Hitler willed it'. For the historical event of the Holocaust to occur, a whole series of other conditions had to be fulfilled alongside 'Hitler', and these conditions had to merge into a historical process that produced the event. In fact contemporary scholars are working intensively on identifying explanations for the historical events that we now generally term 'the Holocaust'. Amongst the questions that interest modem historians is the question as to the motivation and mentality of the perpetrators, above all of the functionaries in the SS and the Police and in the German civil administration in the occupied countries. They arc also concerned just as intensively with the problem of the stance taken by the traditional elite groups towards the so-called 'Je\vish question', and with how far they panicipated in tlte genocide - this includes the Generals, the various branches of bureaucracy, the medical profession, scientists and scholars in a wide variety of disciplines (amongst whom also historians), amongst other groups. In addition studies arc being undertaken into the persecution of Jews at regional level, looking at the question of how far local official bodies possessed room for manoeuvre in anti-Jewish policy, and focusing on the relationship between 'centre' and 'periphery'. Scholarship is also keenly interested in how much the general Gcnnan population knew about tltc Holocaust and how it reacted, in the question of whether tltere was a panicularly radical fomt of antiSemitism in Gennany. and if so, what the historical conditions were that led to it. Research is slowly clarifying the link between the persecution of the Jews and other areas of National Socialist policy, such as nutrition, the usc of foreign workers, the occupation ofother countries, and policies relating to tlte relocation of millions of people. Gradually we arc reaching an understanding of how tlte development of policy towards the Jews was influenced by tltesc other areas. and, in reverse, how the 'Jewish question' influenced these areas. too. This list of the imponant topics of contemporary historical research could easily be extended, but even a truncated account shows clearly how any anempt to claim that the murder of the European Jews could be reduced c:-.clusivcly or even primarily to the f.1ctor ofl·litler himself would be \VTong-hcadcd.

9

PREFACE

However, the more I worked on the subject of'I-Iitler and the Holocaust'. the more my initial lack of enthusiasm for it grew into keen interest- ag.tin for two reasons. The first of these is essentially practical in its nature, but has broader implications. Whilst I was preparing the expert witness report, it turned out to be more difficult than I had imagined to assemble the key documents relating to this epochal crime. One might have imagined that a scholar interested in the process of decision-making leading to the 'final solution' could turn to a wellordered repository of central documents - perhaps even to a printed version of the key documents comparable to an edition of diplomatic papers or a collection of cabinet minutes- yet this is by no means the case here. The documents relating to the murder of the European Jews are dispersed in archives literally all over the world. Publication has only been partial, and in so disparate a manner that only specialists are really in a position even to locate such published documents in a reasonable length of rime. This is all the more regrettable because the opening of Eastern European archives in recent years has led to the discovery of a whole series of new sources for the subject, which are only gradually being published, again often in very obscure places. This unsatisfactory situation made the compilation of a report based almost exclusively on original documents preserved in the most varied of archives far and wide a particular challenge. The hearing was to show the great importance of documents from the period in the reconstruction of the historical events by the court. It proved to be the case that most of the questions under debate could only be settled by a precise examination of the relevant documents, and often hours were spent in discussion about the authenticity, dating, original authorship, translation and interpretation of individual papers. In some cases it was even necessary to have documents faxed during the hearing from the relevant archives in various countries - an impressive demonstration of some of the gaps in the documentation of the Holocaust that remain to be closed, especially when one keeps in mind the possibilities of electronic communications. The purely practical challenge that arose from this situation naturally ~ve rise to tlte question of why an event with the historical significance of the l·lolocaust is so comparatively badly documented. It also highlighted the question of the discrepancy between this lamentable state of affairs and the high deb'l'ec of attention that tltis topic has attracted in the media, in politics and in the efforts being made for a culture of remembrance. For me, this discrepancy was one of the most significant experiences of the London hearings. As well as this apparently practical aspect of my work, there was a methodological question closely related to the problems of sources that concerned me as I was compiling my report. This was the question of how best to demonstrate the central role of Hitler in the context of the 'final solution', and above all, once Hitler's key role had been proved, what

10

l'ltEFACE

conclusions could be drawn from it, less in relation to the man himself than in relation to how we should assess the so-called Jewish policy of the regime and its historical significance. Historiography has produced two classic methods of dealing with the problem of the Fuhrer's missing order for the 'final solution'. The first approach consists of the attempt to reconstruct the apparently lost order from other documents, fragments and other indications - in other words, to fiX a date and a place for when and where such an order must in all probability have been issued. The second method is more structurally oriented, and stresses the gradual or incremental nature of the events: it is assumed that the 'final solution' did not result from a single order given by Hitler, and what is stressed is the destructive inherent momentum of the machinery of persecution and annihilation once it had been set in motion. The 'cumulative radicalization' (Hans Mommsen) of the whole process gives only secondary importance to the question of whether and in what way the dictator was himself involved. This is not to say, however, that the historians who take this view question Hitler's responsibility for the whole process. Nevenhcless, on the basis of my own research I had chosen a different approach. I was not concerned with looking for a single order issued by Hitler, neither did I wish to work from the idea that Hitler's involvement in the murder of the Jews was only implicit and to be supposed only on tlte grounds of his position within the Nazi system and of his well-known anti-Semitic stance. Instead, I set myself tlte task of demonstrating via documentary evidence Hitler's almost continuous involvement with this issue, the task therefore of collecting the many individual decisions made with regard to tlte 'jC\vish question' and of establishing from these an overall picture of a policy that was pursued logically and consistently. At the same time, I intended to c:ocplain, at least in outline, the central role of this anti-Jewish policy in the history of National Socialism, and to show the general context for the gradual radic.tlization of the persecution of the Jews in the various phases of the development of the National Socialist regime. If llitler as an individual st1nds at the centre of this, it is not intended to attribute the murder of the European Jews directly to tlte single human being. if th.u is the right word, but to depict Hitler as a decisive exponent of this policy. lksidcs the systematic and comprehensive manner of its execution, what is special and so f.1r historically unique about this crime is the will to total annihilate that drove its perpetrators, a murderous intention that was ex-pressed over and over again internally and in public speeches by tlte leader of tltc Nazi Party, the head of st1te and commander of the anned forces. It is the fact that the perpetrators saw themselves as legitimized by tlte authority of their Flihrcr and were prepared on the basis of this authority to commit a crime of unparalleled magnitude that must serve as the decisive point of depam1re for any c.'-planation II

I'HEFACE

of the historical events- not an account that is restricted to the personal activity of Hitler himself. Whilst the fact that the anti-Jewish policy was continually given authority and impetus by the regime's highest instance does not offer a complete e:o..planation for this policy, it docs make clear its central importance for National Socialism. The 'removal' of the Jews, in whatever manner, the comprehensive 'clearing' of Jews from German society, was the fundamental basis on which the National Socialists intended to erect a racially homogeneous 'community of the people', and at the same time it became the key means of enforcing their rule, first in Gennany, later in Europe. The key role played by Hitler in the decision-making process towards the •final solution', and the fact that as the 'Je\vish policy' was gradually radicalized the protagonists repeatedly appealed to his authority, both of these articulate the central role of the persecution of the Jews in National Socialist politics as a whole. And this is of course the reason why Holocaust deniers so stubbornly challenge Hitler's central role in the genocide. The literature dealing with the causes, the historical conditions and the background for the National Socialists' murder of the European Jews is quite vast, and cannot be summarized here in anything like adequate detail. 2 Hitler's role in this process has naturally been stressed by the so-called intentionalist school, with the object of making Hitler's hatred of the Jews the sole, or at least the main e"l'lanation for what occurred. In this context one might cite authors such as Helmut Krausnick. Klaus Hildebrand or Philippe Burrin, 1 but above all mention should be made of the British historian Gerald Fleming, who, twenty years ago, collected and gave a concentrated analysis of the documents then available on Hitler's central role in the 'final solution'. • On the other hand, despite being more interested in structures and processes than in the individual role of the dictator, the functionalist school has made important contributions to his personal involvement. This is especially true of the moderate functionalists, represented best by Christopher Browning, but is also the case for one of the more radical representatives of this school, Martin Broszat.~ Finally, it is important to make special mention of Ian Kershaw's massive bio!,rraphy of the dictator, which contains the most recent comprehensive depiction of Hitler's role in the National Socialist persecution of the Jews.'' My own contribution to this topic is Politik der lfmidlttmg (71te Policy cfArmiltilatioll), which appeared in 1998.7 It forn1ed the basis of the report compiled for the court case and also therefore of its publication here in book form. The original report on Hitler's role in the persecution of the Jews was significantly e"panded for the purposes of this publication. I have taken the liberty of incorporating large portions of the second report into the text: the nature of the argument links both expert reports closely together, and it seemed sensible to move away from the two-stranded fonn that was determined only by

12

l'ltEFACE

the preparations for the eoun ca~e and to combine both texts once more. Above all. intensive work on the topic of the murder of the European Jews during preparations for the case and during the trial itselfted to a collaborative exchange of views amongst those involved that is in some aspects stilt continuing and has encouraged me to cxl'and the text in various places. For this, and for co-operation of an exceptionally high order during the trial, I should like to dtank in panicular my fellow expen wimesses, Richard Evans, Christopher Browning and Roben Jan van Pelt, as well as Hajo Funke (who as a political scientist shed light on Irving's radical right-wing connections in Gennany). I should also like to thank the Defence's research assistants, Tobias Jersak, Nick Wachsmann and Thomas Skelton-Robinson, and Deborah Lipstadt's legal team. Alongside the collaboration with Andtony Julius and Mark Lipson, my intensive discussions with Richard Rampton (who as Queen's Counsel represented Deborah Lipstadt in Coun) count amongst the most interesting exl'eriences of the whole trial. As an exl'Crienced lawyer, he succeeded time and abrain in surprising the experts with asrute observations, unconventional conclusions and fascinating hypotheses on the history of the Nazi persecution of the Jews, and in making us consider funher. I should also like to thank the directors and staff of the archives whose holdings were consulted during the compilation of the reports: the President of the Bundesarchiv, Harnnut Weber, the Director of the Zentrale Stelle zur Aufklarung von NS-Verbrechen in Ludwigsburg, Willi Dressen, and the Archivist at the lnstimt fiir Zeitgcschichte in Munich, Klaus Lankheit. During the trial itself, they were all prepared to supply urgently required documents from their holdings at shon notice, sometimes within hours. That, too, was a unique exl'erience. Finally, I should like to thank my colleagues and srudents in the Gcnnan Depanment at Royal Holloway, University of London, for their forbearan~ throughout the period of the trial. Peter Longcrich Richmond upon Thames and Munich June 2001

13

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1 'REMOVE', ~NIHILATE', 'ExTIRPATE' HITLER'S ANTI-SEMITIC LANGUAGE

There can be no doubt that Hitler's behaviour throughout his political career - from the end of the First World War until the end of the Second World War - was characterised by radical anti-Semitism. In one way or another, Hitler wished to put an end to the existence of Jews within the 'living space' (Lebensraum) of the German people, and this objective carried a very high priority in his political practice. Of course Hitler's anti-Semitic stance cannot by itself o.-plain the persecution and murder of the European Jews by the Nazi regime. A history of the 'final solution' must nevenheless take account of his central role in the decisionmaking process, not least because Hitler's constant authorization and legitimization of this policy aniculated the central importance of persecuting the Jews for National Socialist policies as a whole. An account of Hitler's role in the genesis of the 'final solution' is complicated by the f.1ct that the dictator avoided the usc of o.-plicit written directives relating to the murder of the Jews, and only issued oral instructions on the subject to a single individual or in front ofa small group of people. When he did speak about the subject, he used fonnulations that certainly left room for interpretation or deliberately concealed the tme state of affairs. Hitler's behaviour in this respect was initially determined by the desire for secrecy. The murder of the European Jews was treated as classified infonnation by the organs of the 'Third Reich' on principk-, which is to say that no public discussion of the topic whatever was permitted.• A" 1-limmler said in his speech to the SS elite in Posen in October taw. destruction for a human being but life for dte bacillus itself; I am no less compelled and legitimated in conducting the battle against tuberculosis by annihilating (vemichten) its cause, because my very existence depends on it. Over thousands of years, the Jew is becoming and has become a racial tuberculosis affecting many peoples. To fight him means to remove (entfemen) him. 8 Hider left no room for doubt that me ultimate goal of National Socialist Jewish policy could only be attained by using violence. In a speech made in April 1921 he shouted: For mis reason solving the Jewish question is the central question for National Socialists. This question cannot be solved delicately; faced with the terrifying weapons of our opponents, we can only solve it by using brute force. The only serious way of fighting is fighting hard. Lord Fisher said, 'if you strike, men strike hard! The only serious fight is one that makes your opponent scream.'9 Hider's involvement in drawing up the NSDAP party programme in 1920 was decisive. Amongst other mings, this programme called for the removal of German citizenship from the Jews and their treatment under 'special legislation for aliens'. As early as 1922 Hitler made a public speech in which he demanded the death penalty for 'any Jew caught with a blond girl'.'" In January 1923, in Munich, he promised, There is no possibility of accommodation here: the Jew and his accomplices will forever remain enemies in the hearts of our people. We know that when they take the helm, our heads will roll; we also know, however, that when we have power in our hands, God have mercy on you! 11 In his bookMeiu Kampf, which appeared in 1926, and especially in a manuscript written in 1928 that remained unpublished until after 1945 (his 'Second Book'), Hitler put his radical views about 'removing' the Jews from Germany in the context of a theory for which he tried to find a historical derivation. 12 According to this theory, the meaning of world history is a permanent struggle between races or peoples for 'living space' (Lebensraum). In this model the Jews, whose particular racial disposition is said to prevent their developing their own territorial state or culture, play the role of parasitic beings, acting together with

22

'COMI'LETE REMOVAL OF THE JEWS'

od1cr Jews in an international conspiracy, who seck to destroy from within the construction of empires of Lebensraum by superior races. Hider describes this 'theory' most clearly in a lengthy section of his 'Second Book': Because they lack their own productive capacity, dtc Jewish people are incapable of establishing their own state territorially. Rather they need the work and creative capacity of other nations as a basis for their own e;\istencc. The very existence of the Jews thus becomes parasitic on the Jives of other peoples. The ultimate goal of the Jewish struggle for survival is therefore the enslavement of productive peoples. To achieve this goal, which in reality represented the struggle for existence ofJewry in all ages. the Jew makes use ofall weapons that correspond to the whole complex of his being. On the domestic level, he fights within individual nations initially for equality, and then for superiority. The weapons he uses for this arc cunning, cleverness, subterfuge, malice, dissimulation, etc., qualities that arc rooted in the very essence of his ethnic character. They are ruses in his struggle for survival, like dte ruses used by other peoples in combat by sword. On the level of foreign policy he attempts to make nations restless, distracting them from their true interests, propelling them into internecine wars. In this way. with the help of the power of money and of propaganda, he attempts to impose himself on them as their master. His ultimate goal is 'de-nationalisation', the promiscuous bastardization of other peoples, the lowering of the racial standards of the best; at dte same time he aims at gaining mastery over this racial hotch-potch through the extirpation (Ausrottung) of the native intelligentsia and its replacement by members of his own people. The end of the Jews' struggle for world domination will tltcrefore always be bloody Bolshevism, which in truth is dte destruction of tlte intellectual elite that derives intimately from the essence of a nation, \vith the result that he can ascend and make himself master of a mankind rendered leaderless. Stupidity, cowardice and wickedness play into his hands. It is in the bastard that he secures for himself the first opening dtat will enable him to break into the body of another people. The end of Jewish domination is always the decay of all fomts of culture, finally even the insanity of the Jew himself. For he is a parasite on a nation and his victory signifies his own end as well as dte deadt of his victim.n

As Mri11 KamJ!f and his 'Second Book' clearly demonstrate, Hitler pero:i\-ed the situation of Germany after the end of the first World War as the consequence of an international Jewish conspiracy: Jews dominated botlt 'international tinance

23

'COMPLETE REMOVAL OF TilE JEWs'

capital' and the Socialist movement, they were responsible for w.u, revolutions, d1e decline of national values and for the pemicious 'mvdng of the raeition of the conseJVative-dominated state apparatus. Which would be the ne>."t group to lose the protection ofcitizenship? And how was one to obtain the Reich~blirgcrrccht or 'rights of a citizen of the Reich' that had been announced but never more precisely defined? And the plan to exclude Jews from economic life was intended not only to provide immediate economic advantages for the middleclasses who were so strongly represented in the ranks of the NSDAP; it was aimed at enabling the NSDAP to intervene directly in the economy. The anti-Je\vish campaign was begun at a point when general dissatisfaction amongst the population - in panicular with the economic situation - was reaching its height. This growing frustration was also making itsclffclt amongst the supponers of the NSDAP. By energetically re-activating their 'Jewish policies', the National Socialist leadership was not only attempting to remobilize the party faithful, it was aiming to recast the whole of public opinion in an antiSemitic mould. By blaming 'the Jews' for the overwhelming problems that were currently mreatening Germany. the Jews would be rigorously severed from the bulk of the general population in all areas of life. In August 1935, Rudolf Hess, Hitler's 'deputy' in Party matters, and Minister of the Interior Frick issued statements in Hitler's name forbidding funher 'individual actions'.) Once again, Hitler's sole concern was tactical: he wanted to rein in anti-Jewish abuses which were causing unrest and indignation in the population. In essence, however, he shared me same goals as the party activists. It was not simply the case that Hitler had made sure that these core antiSemitic demands were taken up by the NSDAP manifesto in 1920; they had been pan of his standard repenoire as a speaker since the beginning of his political career. Since the beginning of the 1920s Hitler had spoken in favour of a ban on 'racial defilement' (a crime that in his eyes even merited the death penalty). He had always declared that permitting Jews to maintain German citizenship was a monstrosity. and he had always wished to exclude the Jews from economic life - in other words, he wished to expropriate Jewish wealth, which he simply declared 'stolen property' belonging to the German people. It is hardly surprising, men, that Hitler played a decisive role in the late summer of 1935 in the design of the Nuremberg laws, whereby in panicular marriage and sexual relations between Jews and non-Jews were forbidden and a 1.pecial, inferior fonn ofcitizenship was defined for Jews. (The party's third demand, the exclusion ofJews from economic life, was to be postponed for a while). The decision to include an anti-Jewish law which cont.1ined the longdemanded prohibition against 'racial defilement' in the neichstag session during the Nuremberg party meeting was made on the evening of 13 September 1935 by a small circle of leading Nazi~ who had brathered to meet Hitler in a Nuremberg hotel.•

32

'ATIEMI'TING A LEGAL SOLUTION TO A l'ltOBLEM'

The official in charge of the Jewish question Qudenreferent) in the Mini!>try of the Interior, Bernhard LOsener, has given a very vivid account of Hitler\ part in creating the anti-Jewish legislation in a memoir written after the war. He describes how he was unexpectedly called to Nuremberg late in the evening of 13 September in order to help with the formulation of a new law.~ On the next day, according to LOsener's account, together with a group of officials from the ministry, he designed numerous drafts for the law which was later called the 'Law for the Protection of German Blood' (Blutschutzgesetz). Minister of the Interior, Wilhelm Frick presented these drafts to Hitler and then brought them back with specific proposals for amendment. On Saturday 14 September, around midnight, Hitler demanded that four alternative drafts be submitted by the following morning. Furthermore, LOsener goes on to say, Hitler now asked the officials to prepare another law, namely a blueprint of a basic law, a citizenship law for the no.'l day. On the following day Hitler decided on one of the drafts for the 'Law for the Protection of German Blood', and had it passed in the Rcichstag, together with the Reich citizenship law that had also been drafted overnight. After these laws were passed, Hitler declared at the Nuremberg Party Conference that the 'Law for the Protection of German Blood' was 'the attempt to solve by legal means a problem, which, if these means failed repeatedly, would have to be transferred by law to the National Socialist Party for its definitive solution'.• He thereby made it clear that he was prepared to usc street terror by Party activists (which he had earlier condemned in public declarations) as an instrument for enforcing his policies. For the following years, there is documentary evidence that Hitler personally directed ami-Jewish policy and regularly intervened in anti-Jewish legislation. The measures in question were mainly concemed with e.xcluding the Jewish minority from the economy, which were mea-.ures that had been postponed at the Nuremberg Party Conference. In the summer of 1936, Hitler charged Goring with preparations for the FourYear Plan, hy which the Gennan economy was to he adapted for war. TI1e memorandum which Hitler sent Goring on this subject clearly shows d1at preparation for \Yar and further radicalisation of ami-Jewish policy were closely associated in Hitler's thinking. Hitler's position in this matter was d1at a war ag.tinst a supposed Bobhevik-Jewish menace was unavoidable: Since the outbreak of the French Revolution, the world has been moving ever f.1ster to\Yards a new confrontation. The most e.xtreme solution to d1is conflict is called Bolshevism and its content and goals are the liquicbtion (Beseitigung) and replacement (Ersetzung) of the hitherto leading social stratum of mankind by international Jewry.'

33

'AlTEMI'TING A LEGAL SOLUTION TO A l'HOIILEM'

In the memorandum, Hitler also e:-:plained that preparations for the coming war against 'international Jewry' should in part be financed by the CA"Propriarion of Jewish property. To this purpose he demanded two new ami-Jewish Ia~: first, a law 'which makes all Jews answerable for the damages inflicted upon the Gennan economy and the Gennan people by individual specimens of this criminal phenomenon'; second, he called for the death penalty for what he called economic sabotage, meaning the accumulation of currency reserves abroad. This demand - as further developments would show - was particularly directed against Jewish 'economic sabotage'. It was satisfied by the 'Law to Combat Economic Sabotage', passed in December 1936, which did indeed call for lengthy prison tenns or the deadt penalty for the illegal transfer of property abroad; in dte following period it was primarily applied against Jews." In order to push through the odter law that Hitler had proposed in his memorandum on the 'Four-Year Plan' - making the whole of Gerntan Jewry comprehensively accountable -a draft of a 'Law Concerning Compensation for Damages inflicted by Jews on the German Reich' was prepared at the beginning of February 1937. After this draft was rejected, because of the anticipated negative implications for the economy, in April1938 Hitler once more had the Finance Ministry draw up suggestions for a special tax for Jews, which could be raised 'when appropriate (for behaviour by individual Jews that is detrimental to the Volk')' .~ However, a proposal of this kind drafted by officials in the ministry was not put into practice because it was once again postponed by Goring. 1" It was only after the November pogrom that the project of levying an atonement payment of billions of marks on German Jews was realized. 11 However, on the other hand, in the spring or early summer of 1937, Hitler decided for a while not to follow up on two important anti-Semitic legislative projects. One was the third decree of the 'Citizenship Law' (Reichsbiirgergesetz), which was to provide, among other things, for a special trades symbol for non-Jewish businesses. As Frick told Goring in February 1937, this decree was to be promulgated on Hitler's specific orders. Nevertheless in June, on Hitler's instructions once more, the decree was not discussed any further, since the incorporation of holding.-; owned by foreign Jews would create complications; it was only enacted one year later. 12 Another plan set aside on Hitler's specific orders, in May, was the project to legislate for a special citizenship document. 11 Hitler continued to be intensely preoccupied with ami-Jewish policy in the years 1936-37, and for tactical reasons was again prepared to be flexible in pressing forward his goals, as is apparent from the different treatment accorded to the various laws, in particular, during this period, to measures for further economic discrimination against Jews. Hitler's reluctance to radicalize the 'Jewish Question' in the years 193()-37 can be attributed to considerations of foreign and economic policy. The Third Reich

34

'ATIEMI>TING A LEGAL SOLUTION TO A PltOBLEM'

had succeeded in gaining a modicum of respectability in its foreign policy. This was manifested in panicular in the German-British Naval Agreement in 1935, and in the fact that the victorious powers of the First World War tolerated Gem1any's transgressions of the Versailles Treaty, both the introduction of general military service in 1935, and the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936.1t found expression above all in the degree ofintemational panicipation in d1e Olympic Games of 1936, and their positive reception. Economically, Hitler and the National Socialist leadership had by no means abandoned d1eir plan for ex-propriating Jewish property, but it was highly debatable whether drastic special measures were the best means ofachieving this in the economic circumstances prevailing in 1936 and 1937. The exclusion of the Jews from the economy could be achieved much more effectively merely by continuing the gradual process ofcovenly plunderingJewish wealth (via special taxation measures, confiscation of wealth in the course of currency checks, and so on), and by forcing Jewish entrepreneurs whose firms had already been fundamentally weakened by widespread discrimination and a significant loss of customers to sell up - at prices, of course, that fully took into account any such decrease in value. So whilst from the outside activity in the field of 'jewish policy' appeared to be relatively quiet during the years 1936 and 1937, the regime was merely waiting for the nex't opponunity to intensify its persecution of the Jews - an intensification in which the dictator himself showed great personal interest.

35

36

5 'THE JEWS MUST BE EXPELLED FROM GERMANY, FROM THE WHOLE OF EUROPE' POGROM AND TOTAL DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS

(1938-1939)

After the end of 1937, concurrent with the National Socialist regime's transition to an expansionist foreign policy, a new and more radical phase in the persecution of the Jews began. Priority was given to the goal of expelling the Jews from Germany; this was principally to be accomplished by means of further discrimination, the direct use of violence and increased economic pressure. With the transition to an overtly expansionist policy, preparations for which had largely taken the form of reassigning personnel in government and at senior levels of the armed forces, the foreign policy considerations that had hitherto hampered an escalation in the persecution ofJews no longer applied. In addition. Gennany's economic position had been consolidated sufficiently for the National Socialists to believe that expropriating the wealtlt of the remaining. mostly 'arianized' Jews could be achieved without e"-posing the overall economy to any significant danger. There was a third reason why persecution was escalated at this point, in this case with a bearing on the internal political simation: the aJL,;eties raised in the population in 1938 by the regime's high-risk foreign policy were once more to be deliberately channelled in tlte direction of the enemy-figures that had been created by the regime itself. aiming at the ultimate 'removal of the Jews' (Engudung) from German society. This more radical course was launched by the strongly anti-Semitic address given by Hitler at the Reich Party Congress in 1937.' Amongst other dtings. in this speech Hitler attacked what in his characteristic anti-Semitic vocabubry he termed 'Jewish-Bolshevist subversion' (jiidisch-bolschewistische Zcrsetzung): the originator of the 'disease' (Krankheit) that was Bolshe\'ism \\~ 'that international parasite on nations, which has for many centuries spread across dte world, only to reach its full destructive magnimdc in our time'.

37

'THE JEWS MUST BE EXPELLED FROM GERMANY, FROM Tl LE WI IOLE OF EUI~OPE'

On 30 November 1937 Joseph Gocbbcls recorded the following in his J.ary about a conversation with Hitler which had taken place the previous day: Talked about the Jewish question for a long time. [ ... 1The Jews must be e:\:pelled from Germany, from the whole of Europe. That will take some time still, but it will happen and must happen. The Fuhrer is finnly committed to this. At tlte beginning of 1938 the Office for Foreign Aftairs of the NSDAP informed the German Foreign Office that in a conversation with Alfred Rosenberg Hitler had dearly declared himself in favour of supponing 'jewish emigration from Germany with all the means at (his] disposal', and that the flood of emigres would be directed principally towards Palestine.2 The territorial ex-pansion of the regime and the radicalization of the persecution of dte Jews were two mutually reinforcing factors. After the Anschluss with Austria in March 1938, National Socialists there, above all in Vienna. bombarded the Austrian Jews with a wave of violence and public humiliation that completely overshadowed the similarly minded activists in the old German territories. However, the consequence of the mass-expulsions of the Austrian Jews that resulted from these acts of violence was that the countries who were potentially to receive them began to regulate the influx ofJews from territories under German control and thereby reduced the chances of completely 'removing' the Jews from Germany as a whole. In addition, the longstanding economic pressures on the German Jews meant that they were now increasingly not in a position to make the necessary steps towards emigration. 1 The overwhelming impression created by the events in Austria motivated the National Socialists in Germany to enforce the expulsion of the Jews not only by introducing new discriminatory legislation - in the first months of 1938 in particular there was a veritable flood of such new measures- but also by intensifying their usc of direct acts of violence.• As early as 1938, as part of measures to accelerate the expulsion of the Jews from Germany, an action to arrest Jews with a criminal record (even an insib'llificant OtJe) was initiated across the whole country. Hitler frequently intervened directly in this action. He personally gave the order to include Jews in a general action against 'asocial elements' (Asoziale), as is apparent from a note made by the Director of the Jewish Department of the SO (the Security Service of the Nazi Party) on 8 June 1938: In a discussion on 1 June 1938 with C [identified by the author as 1-leydrich 1, I was confidentially infonned that on the orders of the Fiihrer asocial and criminal Jews acro~s the Reich were to be arrested and deployed for the purpose of important eanh-moving work.'

38

'TilE JEWS MUST DE EXI'ELLED FROM GERMANY, FROM THE WHOLE OF EUI{OPE'

Hitler was also directly concerned with the propaganda side of the mass arrests. In the course of the ongoing campaign against 'asocial elements' and Jews, Goebbels asserted in a speech that more than 3000 Jews had moved to Berlin in the last few months in order to stir up anti-Semitic feelings. When Heydrich complained to the Ministry of Propaganda that this was false information, he learned that Goebbels had used the falsified figures 'with dte permission of the Fuhrer' .• But the arrests in the German capital degenerated into anti-Jewish violence by party activists egged on by Goebbels, and when this threatened public order and led to critical reports in the foreign press, dte violence was stopped on 22June 'on the Fuhrer's orders', as is clear from a draft report by the Jewish Department of the SD.' Despite the abandonment of the action in Berlin, in a talk with Hitler on 24 July 1938, Goebbels once again confirmed he had the Fuhrer's agreement in principle for a further radicalisation of the persecution. We discuss the Jewish question. The Fuhrer approves my measures in Berlin. What the foreign press writes is insignificant. The main thing is that the Jews must be squeezed out. In 10 years they must be removed from Germany. But in dte interim we still want to keep the rich ones here as a bargaining counter." The last sentence already points to the fact that Hitler, in view of increased international tensions, was beginning to think of using the Gennan JC\vs as hostages. In the months that followed, the regime steered clear of furdter anti-Semitic violence, mostly probably because ofinternational tensions during the crisis over the Sudetenland. Immediately after signing the Munich Agreement, at the beginning of October 1938, the anti-Je\vish violence was resumed in various areas ofGermany as if in response to an order. Before the end ofOctober at least a dozen synagogues were destroyed, the windows of Jewish shops were smashed, Jews were molested, assaulted and in some places even driven from their homes. The pogrom of November 1938 was thus by no means a response by the regime to the attack on dte Gennan diplomat Ernst vom Rad1 by Herschel Grynszpan at the beginning of November in Paris; it was dte release ofa mood of violent anti-Jewish resentment that had been building up for weeks if not months.• The course of the November pogrom of 1938 also clearly demonstrates Hitler\ per..onal initiative. It is highly improbable that dte nC\vs of the death of vom Hath (the event that the Nazis used as an excuse for launching dte pogrom) took Hitler by surprise during the party function in Munich to commemorate the events of 9 November 1923. Rath died in the late afternoon (5.30 pm Gennan time); Hitler had c.'\-pressly sent his personal physician to Paris 'to

39

'THE JEWS MUST BE EXPELLED FnOM GEnMANY, FnOM TilE \VII OLE. OF EUitOI't:::'

consult and send a direct report', according to the Volkischcr Bcobachtt"r. 1" Hitler must therefore have been told the news at first hand in the :aftemoon, and therefore before the party function had begun, like Goebbch., 11 Nazi Party district leader (Gauleiter) RudolfJordan 12 and the Foreign Office, who had bces. In addition, military courts would no longer be responsible for 'criminal offences committed by enemy civilians' at all; these were to be punished by the troops directly as and when they occurred. The 'Guidelines for the Treatment of Political Commissars' signed by Keitel, the Chief of the OKw, on 6 June Ellso corresponded closely to Hider's imtructions: they made provision for shooting this entire brroup of people. The 'Guidelines for the Behaviour of the Troops in Russia' issued on 19 May also matched Hitler's conception of the conduct of the war in the East: they encouraged 'ruthless and energetic intervention against Bolshevik agitators, irreb•tllar soldiers, saboteurs and Jews'. In accordance with the guidelines of 15 March that had been made more rigorous on Hitler's instruction, the Army High Command (OKH)

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'TilE JEWISII-IJOLSHEVIK INTELLIGENTSIA ••. MUST BE ELIMINATED'

and the Reichsfiihrer SS were in agreement about deploying 'special uni~ (Sonderkommandos) of the Security Police and the SD in the army's operational area' and that these were to carry out 'their tasks on their own responsibility', as contained in the order from the OKH dated 28 April 1941.' In order to put this abrreement into practice, Himmler decided on 21 May that Higher SS and Police Leaders were to be deployed in the Eastern areas that were to be occupied, and that 'in order to carry out tasks assigned directly by me', SS and police troops and security police were to be subordinate to the Higher SS and Police Leaders or HSSPF (as regional representatives of 1-limmler who were able to use Himmler's authority to override other branches of the SS and police)." The leaders of the special units received oral instructions from Heydrich shortly before their departure. Their exact formulation is not known, but their substance can be reconstructed on the basis of two written documents by Heydrich.v Heydrich's note to the heads of the Einsatzgruppen (task forces consisting ofSS and police personnel surbordinate to the Reich Security Office or Reichssicherheitshauptant) of29 June referred to the order previously issued orally to foster 'self-cleansing efforts' (Selbstreinigungsbestrebungcn), i.e. pogroms of the Jewish population. These 'self-cleansing efforts by antiCommunist or anti-Jewish groups in the area to be occupied' were, according to Heydrich's instructions, 'not to be hindered'. Instead, they were to be 'initiated without betraying the identity of the initiators, to be intensified where necessary. and to be steered in the right direction'.•" In a further note dated 2 July, Heydrich informed the Higher SS and Police Leaders of 'instructions of the greatest importance issued by me to the special units and commando groups of Security Police and the SO'." Here it once more a question of 'self-cleansing efforts (Sclbstreinigungsversuchc) of anti-Communist or anti-Jewish circles in the areas to be occupied' which were 'not to be hindered', but to be encouraged. abrain 'without leaving a trace'. Furthermore, in the same note from 2 July, Hcydrich listed under the keyword 'executions' those groups of persons who were to be shot by the Einsatzgruppen: K> be c.wcuted arc all: - functionaries of the Com intern (as well as all professional Communist politicians) - the higher, middle and radical lower functionaries of the Party, the Central Committees, the district and regional committees - people's commissars - Jews in Party and State post'> 65

'THE JEWISII-BOLSHEVIK INTELLIGENTSIA .•. MUST BE ELIMINATED'

- other radical clement-; (saboteurs, propagandist.."t of the mass murder that was now underway and that was being carried out by special units specially set up 'by special order of the Fiihrer'. When Hider now spoke ofdte 'extennination' (Vernichnmg) of people, his subordinates must have understood it as it was intended: as direct or indirect instructions for the radicalisation ofdte mass nmrdt.•r already begun. In accordance with this, the special units soon went on to extend their killinb'); to women and children. This extension will be elaborated upon somewhat at this point, since it permits us to draw conclusions about the manner in which the instructions were given and about their nature. The way here was led hy two SS brigadt.•s commanded directly by Himmler with the aid of a special stall: On 19 and 22July these brigades were put at the disposal of the 1-Iight.•r SS and Police Leaders for Russia Centre and Russia South, Erich von dem Bach-Zclewski and Friedrich Jeckcln, 1-limmlcr's immediate subordinates in these areas. 2 In the area behind the central section of the From. it was the SS Cav.llry Brigade that led the policy of extermination into a new stage \vith massacres of hitherto unparalleled scope. This Brigade carried out a first 'ciC'ansing

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operation' in the Pripjet Marshes between 29 July and 23 August under the leadership of Bach-Zclewski, during which more than 25,000 Jews were shot.) Shortly before these two 'actions', Himmler had visited Bar:mmichi where he had issued the following order: ~II Jews must be shot. Jewish women to be driven into the marshes." This order by Himmler introduced the escalation of the murders in the area of HSSPF Russia Centre: the Cavalry Brigade was indeed at first supposed to confine the killings to Jewish men, but the large number of their victims and Himmler's clear signal that women also were in future not to be spared had a radicalising effect on the operations of all units operational in this area. Most ofall this affected the units in the area for which the Einsatzgruppe (EG) B, deployed by Bach-Zelewski, was responsible. It can be proved that Einsatzkommando (EK) 9, shot women and children in the first half of August in Vileyka. 5 According to Alfred Filbert, the commander ofEK 9, the order to shoot women and children had been given to him by Arthur Nebe, the commander ofEinsatzgruppe B.'' Otto Bradfisch, the commander of EK 8, also testified that in the first half of August he had received an order of the Fuhrer's (Ftihrerbefehl) from Nebe, which authorized the shooting of women and children,' and which he had had confirmed personally by Himmler in Minsk in the middle of August.H The earliest point at which the indiscriminate shooting of women and children can be documented in the case of EK 8 is September, but it was intensified from October onwards. • According to its own records, Police Battalion 322 had shot 64 Jewish women in Minsk on 1 September,'" and on 25 September in the context of a 'demonstration exercise' (Lehrtibung), the Battalion performed the formal searching of a village to representatives of the Wehrmacht, police and SD. During this 'exercise', 19 Jewish women were murdered. 11 It was only after this bloody demonstration that special units, the police, the civilian authorities as well as local police began indiscriminate massacres of men, women and children, thousands at a time, in Mogilev 12 Bobruisk, Borissov, Vitebsk and Gomel. 13 City by city, district by district, the entire Jewish population was systematically murdered, with the exception of a small number kept alive to serve as a workforce. EG B reported a total of 45,467 liquidations for their area by the end of October." The First SS Brigade, directly under the command of the HSSPF Russia South, Friedrich Jeckcln, moved on to the murder of Jewish women on the occasion of a 'cleansing action' at the end of July, on the e"'l'licit orders of jeckeln. 1 ~ According to the Brigade's own report 800 people, 'Jews and Jewesses between the ages of 16 and 60', were shot. 11' There followed further mass executions in which Jewish women were also shot!' At the end of August, the Brigade carried out a massacre in Kamenets-Podolsk which exceeded all

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previous 'actions'. According to the event-report of22 August, after speaking to the Quartcnnaster-General of the Army,'" 'in three days 23,600 Jews', men, women and children, 'were shot by one unit sent by the Hoherer SS-und Polizcifuhrer ( HSSPFra· Mtcr this point, Jeckeln continued the massacres, in Berdich~ and in Zitomir' dten widt the murder of the Jews of Kiev in the gorge ofBabi Yar;Z! and dten in Dnepropretovk. ~· By the end of October, he had murdered more than 100,000 people.2' For the special units and police battalions dtat had been deployed in the South sector and which had sometimes already been directly involved in the large 'actions' initiated by Jeckcln, these massacres represented the decisive impetUS for a move to the comprehensive destruction of those Jewish populations. From the beginning of August onwards, Einsatzkommando 4a murdered women in large numbers, and shortly afterwards murdered children. too;!S it ex1:ended these operations in the following weeks.26 In September EK 5 murdered all the Jewish inhabitants of one town,Z' and according to infonnation given by the unit commander, Erwin Schulz, he had been insttuctcd to do this by Otto Rasch, the leader of Einsatzgruppe C, who had himself received the order from Jeckeln.211 EK 6 only began shooting Jewish women in October, which was in Krivoi Rog, after Himmler had been to visit it on 3 October.:. Police Battalion 314 shot women and children as early as July"' Police Battalion 45 did the same from the end ofJuly or early August onwards." Both units were part of the Police Regiment South. The shooting of women and children in dte area of Einsatzgruppe D is documented for dte first time for dte period at the end of August. On about 29 August, in dte region of Jampol, Einsatzkommando 12 shot several hundred women, men and children, 12 and shordy dtercafter, at least three, probably howa"er aU four of dte commandos ofEG D proceeded to murder systematically the entire jL'wish population ofdifferent villages. 1' The decisive order for dte transition to dtis new stage of mass murder came at the end ofAugust or dte beginning ofSeptember from Ono Ohlendorf, according to testimony after dte war by the commander of EK 12, Gustav Nosske, and one ofhis subordinates, Max Drexel." For the period between 30 September and 6 October there is documentary evidence that the Reichsftihrer SS made a tour of inspection in dte Ukraine on which he visited Nikolayev and Cherson, where mass executions took place at that time or shortly thereafter." And in the following mondts EG D continued this murderous process and reported whole areas 'free from Jews· (judenfrei).'" Finally there is Einsatzgruppe A: EK 3 (stationed in Lithuania) and EK 1ilsit made the transition to shooting women and children at dte end ofJuly or at the beginning of August,n EK 2 probably did so during the mondt of August.'" T.1king aU this together, we have the follo,ving picture: some units e..'"tended shooting to women and children as of the end ofJuly 1941, but for others this

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began only in September or early October. Whilst for some units this c.~ension to the murder of women and children was linked directly with murdermg the entire Jewish population in certain districts, in the case of other units, the ornelag between these two levels of radicalisation was several weeks. Those Jews who had survived the first wave of murders (those needed by the Gem1ans as workforces, for example), and those who were enclosed in ghettos, in September and October 1941 became victims of the ghetto liquidation measures that extended through the winter of 1941 -42 and the entire year of 1942. In order to force through this decisive stage of the radicalisation process, the orders given at the beginning of the war had to be ex1:ended over the course of the summer. A reconstruction of the events leads to the conclusion that this was not done by means of a single written order sent to all units at the same time; repeated oral instructions must rather have come from the SS leadership to the unit leaders, who were then to take the initiative themselves and proceed more radically in their shooting programmes. Important stages in this radicalisation process were Himmler's oral instruction of 30 July to drive 'Jewish women into the marshes' and his stay in Minsk on 15 August in which he alluded to the imminent shootings of women and children. From statements made by different unit commanders it is apparent that they were likewise encouraged by their superiors to shoot women and children in August and September (Filbert and Bradfisch by Nebe, Schulz by Rasch, Nosske and Drexel by Ohlendorf). It is also significant here that the HSSPF Russia Centre and Russia South, who were immediate subordinates of Himmler's, took the decisive initiative: by deploying the SS Brigades as well as by the implementing 'major actions' that brought together the EK. police battalions and other units, they increased the numbers of victims to hitheno unparalleled levels, killing women and children as well. In this way, the direct participation in such 'actions' of a large number of units in the Centre and South districts encouraged them to more radical steps. Repeatedly Himmler appeared at the places concerned either shonly before or shonly after the 'major actions' in order to strenbrthen the members of the SS and police in their murderous activities. The extension of the shootings to women and children in the summer and autumn of 1941, which had initiated the murder of the entire Jewish civilian population in the occupied Soviet areas, walt carried out by means of the 'indire~t' method of giving orders. The SS leadership gave a general context for activity which the unit commanders had to fill in using their own initiative and intuition. It seems in fact that it was Himmler, the point at which the various chains of command met, who took the decisive initiative in the extension of the murders of the Jewi-;h civilian population in the occupied Soviet zones. He did so after a decisive meeting on 16July, at which Hitler established the basic

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' .•• SIIOOT EVEI~YONE WHO EVEN LOOKS ODDLY'

outline of the occupation policy and recommended 'shooting everyone who even looks oddly'.,., Himmler was not present at this summit meeting, and was l'ntrusted only with using the police to secure the newly conquered ~tern territories, not with the 'pacification and consolidation of political m.mcrs' in these areas. This may have encouraged him to extend of his own accord the authority and jurisdiction he already had. This he did in two ways. Fi~t. lu.· extended the mass-shootings ofJews, whose victims had so far been jc\vish men of military age, who were all indiscriminately suspected of being plunderers, communists or supponers of the panisans, expanding the range of victims to include the whole Jewish population. By ex"tending what were at first terrorist murder campaigns to the level of genocide, he put into practice during the war itself a policy that the National Socialist regime had originally planed for the time after the war. According to the plans made by the regime.~· the population of the Soviet Union was to be decimated. reduced by some 30 million people, and it was self-evident for them that the members of the Jewish minority were to be the first victims of this policy. What had originally been, in their terms, a utopian plan for the time after the end of the war was now turned into concrete measures by Himmler, since the war could now not be won within a few months, as had been planned. The mass murder of the Jews was in his eyes the first step towards the 'new order', in racial terms, in the conquered territories. The second way in which Himmler ex-pand his own sphere of authority was to extend his jurisdiction as Reichskommissar (Reich Commissioner for the consolid1tion of the Gemtan Volk) to dte Soviet Union. \vithout first beinggi\'ell e>.:plicit authority for this by Hitler. It should be borne in mind dut as Reichskommissar Himmler was responsible not only for dte senlement of Gennan nationals but also, and especially, for dte 'c.xclusion of danuging influences from ( ... ) sectors of dte population who were not truly pan of the Gennan Volk'. At the beginning of September, when the e.'\"tension of dte shootings to include women and children was titlly underway. Hider satisfied Himmler's wishes by declaring that dte occupied Eastern territories now also feU under the jurisdiction of d1e Reichskommissar for me consolidation of the national character." By C.'\1ending the mass shootings, l-limmler had ilierefore succeeded in e~-panding his responsibilities in dte areas of d1e police and the 'Consolidation of the Volk' such that he was now taking a leading role in dte racial 'new ordering' of the occupied areas. At a later point, in a speech to the Reichslciter and Gauleiter on 6 October 1943, and in a speech to the generals on 24 May 1944, Himmler was to use formulations that su~>est that e>.."tending the murders to women and childrt'n was done on his initiative. He was to make it just as clear, ho\\~-cr. dut dlis decisive step was taken within the contc.'\1 of the policies auiliorizcd by Hitler. These speeches will be c.xamined bclow.-z

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What has already been established for the manner in which orders wt:rc: given \vithin the SS and the Police apparatus \viii be tme of Hitler\ concrete instmctions to Himmler: Hitler's instructions allowed him relatively wide scope for action. The Reichsflihrer SS was acting on the basis of general precepts and a general authority, on the basis in fact of a fundamental con~ensus. Much depended on his own initiative and on his own intuition, and he repeatedly made certain that his actions were in accord \vith Hitler's intentions. The rabidly anti-Semitic tenor of Hitler's fundamental instructions for the war of racial destmction indicates his attitude. He did not only agree in principle \vith Himmler in the matter of the 'Jewish question', he validated his actions with his own authority and was fully informed of the murders in the Eastem territories. The SS took no measures whatever to keep the mass murders in the East secret \vi thin the stmcrures of power. The event reports from the USSR- the main source of our information on these mass murders - had a relatively \vide circulation. For example, 45 copies of event- report no. 40 of 1 August 1941 were distributed; they were sent not only to numerous offices of the SS and the Police but also to the Leadership Staff of the Wehnnacht. In a radio telegram to the Einsatzgruppen on 1 August, Gestapo chief Muller, who was responsible for the compilation of event-reports, ordered that 'especially interesting illustrative material' should be sent to Berlin because 'the Fuhrer is to be presented continuously \vith reports on the work of the Einsatzgruppen in the East from here'.41 1lte distribution list of event report no. 128 of3 November 1941, of which there were 55 copies, included the Party Chancellery, which communicated between Hitler and the Party. A folder \vith the first six detailed activity and situation reports submitted by the Einsatzgruppen (July to October 1941) circulated in the Foreign Ministry and was initialled by no less than twenty-two civil servants!' It is therefore not possible to arb'lle that the mass murders by the Einsatzgruppcn were kept secret from other agencies by the Reichssicherheitshauptamt and there is no question that they wt:re available to Hitler. 11te grounds for the mass executions given by the Einc;atzgruppen correspond precisely with the justifications offered by llitler for the e>.:tennination of the 'jewish-Bolshevik complex' before the beginning of the war, and once again they express the fundamental conformity of outlook on the 'jewish question' between Hitler and the SS lcaderc;hip.

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13 'IT IS GOOD IF THE FEAR THAT WE ARE EXTERMINATING THE JEWS GOES BEFORE US' THE START OF DEPORTATIONS, AUTUMN 1941

In the middle of September 1941 Hitler ordered the deportation of d1e jews from the Greater German Reich into ghettos in Eastern Europe. He thereby set in process the deportation plans which he had pursued at the beginning of 1941, without waiting for the original precondition - the military victory over d1e Red Army. Only a month earlier, in the middle of August, Hitler had spoken against 'evacuations' ofJews from Germany.' At the same point, d1e middle of August, he had ~"Piained to the Minister for Propaganda that he had not given up his plans relating to this matter: We were talking about d1e Jewish problem. The FUhrer is convinced that the prophesy he made in the Reichstag - that if the Jews succeeded in provoking another world war he would finish by destroying the Jews - is now being continued. It is coming tme in these weeks and months wid1 almost uncanny cert.1inty. In the East the Jews have had to settle their account: in Gennany they have panly settled and will have to pay even more in fi.uure. 1 On IM September 1941 1-linunler infom1ed Greiscr, the Gauleiter in the: W.trthl·~u. of the following: The Fiihrcr would like the Altrcich and the Protectorate from the West to the East to he emptied and liberated ofJews as soon as possible. As a first stagc,l am therefore trying- hopefully this year still- to tr.mspon the jews of the Altreich and those from the J>rotector.tte into the Eastern territories that have been acquired two years ago; this is in order to push them funhcr Ea.'it in the coming spring. I intend to place about 60,(K)() Jews from the Altrcich and the

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'IT IS GOOD IF TilE FEAR THAT WE ARE EXTEnMINATING TilE JEWS GOE'i llF.FOitl' US'

Protectorate in the Litzmannstadt ghetto, which I understand has e•Jougb room to accommodate them, for the winter. 1 In the following weeks Hitler repeatedly confinned his detennination to deport the Jews from Central Europe to the East. On 6 October he announced to his lunch b'liCSt.'i as he described proposed penalties against the Czechs tlut all Jews from the Protectorate must be 'removed' (entfemt), not just sent to the Generalgouvemement Poland but rather 'immediately sent further away, to the East'.• According to Hitler, however, this was not possible at the moment, because of the shortage of transport capacity. At the same time as the 'Protectorate Jews', the Jews were also to 'disappear' (verschwinden) from Vienna and Berlin. On 25 October Hitler made the following remark at table, after he had once again made mention ofhis 'prophecy' of30January 1939: This criminal race has the two million dead from the World War on its conscience, now hundreds of thousands more. No one can say to me: we can't send them into the morass! Who then cares about our people? It is good if the fear dtat we arc exterminating the Jews goes before us.s The deportations from Germany did in fact begin on 15 October 1941.'· Why did Hitler at this point take the decision to stan on deportations that he had been planning since early 1941, even though the war was not yet won? Leading functionaries of tlte regime were demanding these measures. Amongst others, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Rosenberg, had !>Uggcsted deportations in September as a reaction to Stalin's decision to deport the Volga Germans to the East.' At this point, too, several Gauleiter were demanding that Jews be pushed out of their Jiving area!> in order to create housing for those affected by the bombing raids." For llitler it !>eems that yet another motive played a role: by deporting the Central European Jews he wanted to send a warning to 'world Jewry' (das Wclyudentum)- in the sense of his 'prophesy' of30 January 1939- and thereby prevent the entry of till' United States into the war. The leader..hip of the US, in his opinion, was a puppl·t of 'world Jewry', a theme that was particularly conspicuous in German propaganda in the following few weeks." Hitler's motives become apparent from a memo written on 20 Septcmhl·r by Werner Koeppen, the representative for the Eastern Ministry in llitler's headquarters. Koeppen wrote that Ambassador Steengracht (representative of the Foreign Office in the headquarters of the Fuhrer) had told him that Hitler was considering the question of postponing pos~ible reprh.als (Pressalicn) against the German Jews 'for the eventuality of an American entry into the war' . 1" One of the motives for the deportations of October

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1941, which took place openly and which were registered by the International press, was thus also the idea of using the Jews as hostages. This 1notive had also been involved in the projects of a 'Jewish reservation' in r>oland and a police government on Madagascar. These different motives for the implementation of the deportations appear ~econdary however, when one remembers that from the beginning of his political career Hitler had intended to get rid of the Jews within the German Lebensraum in one way or another, and had pressed forward with plans for mass deportation from the very beginning of the war. With d1e conquest of the cnom10us Soviet area it seemed to him for the first time that a practical possibility was available for the realization of these plans. Hitler's decision in September to deport the Jews from Central Europe did not yet include the resolution directly and systematically to murder them at their destinations in occupied Poland and the Soviet territory (especially Lodz, Riga and Minsk). Evidently Hitler initially clung to the idea ofdeporting these people further to the East once the e:ll:pected military victory over the Soviet Union had been achieved. 11 On 24 September, after a meeting with I-leydrich on the previous day, Goebbcls wrote in his diary, 'we must evacuate the Jews from Berlin as soon as possible'.' 2 l-Ie added that

this will be possible as soon as we have cleared up the military situation in the East. In the end, they should all be transported [to the I camps set up [by the I Bolsheviks. These camps have been constructed by the Jews; what would be more apt now than to have them peopled by the Jews. At a meeting in Prague two weeks later on to October, where Eichmann was 01lso present, Hcydrich said the following:" There arc at this time about 88,000 Jews in the J>rotcktorat as a whole, 4H,OOO of whom ;trc in Prague. 1···1 There have been difficulties because of the evacuations. It was intended to begin on or around 15 October, and to roll out the transports gradually until 15 November, up to the level ofabout 5,000 Jews- from Prague alone. [... ] Minsk and Riga arc to receive 50.000. [... [In the coming days the 5,1K)0 Jews arc to be evacuated from Prague. SSBribr.tdellilm.·r Ncbc and Rasch could take Jews into dtc camps for communiM prisoners in the operational area.'• According to SSSturmbannfiihrcr Eichmann, this measure has already been initiated. [-·I The Gypsies to be evacuated could be brought to Stahlecker in Riga, whose camp is operated along the lines of the one in Sachscnhauscn. As the Fiihi'C'r wishes the Jews to be brought out of Gcnnan territory by the end of dte year if possible, all unsettled questions must be solved immediately.

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'IT IS GOOD IF THE FEAit TIIAT WE ARE EXTERMINATING THE JEWS GOE.'i BEFORE US'

In a first wave of deportations between 15 October and 5 November, 10,000 Jews from the Altreich. 5,000 each from the Protektorat and Vic.-ama, and 5,000 Gypsies from the Austrian Burgcnland, were deported to Lodz 11 in twenty-four transports. Between 8 November 1941 and 6 February 1942, altogether thirty-four different transports went to Riga,•• Kovno,~' and Minsk•• Originally this wave of deportations was to have been stopped by the beginning of December, and was to encompass the deportation of 50,000 people.•• The deportations to Minsk, however, had to be broken otT at the end of November due to problems of transportation. By then approximately 8,000 people had been deported into the Minsk ghetto. The transports to Riga were completed at the end of February, having fulfilled the planned quota of 25,000 people.31 However, in autumn 1941 the RHSNs plans for deportations e>..'tended beyond Central Europe and were aimed at the whole territory under German domination. We can tell from a statement made by Heydrich that at the same time as, or shortly after his decision taken in mid-September to deport the Jews of Central Europe, Hitler took the more far-reaching decision to make preparations for the deportation of all the Jews in territories under German rule. In a letter to the General Quartermaster of the Army of 6 November 194 I, Heydrich defended his explicit assent to the attacks on seven synagogues in Paris that had been perpetrated by a group of French antiSemites in the night of2-3 November. The suggestion to carry out this attack, according to Heydrich, was accepted by me only at the point where the Jews were identified on the highest authority and most vehemently as being those responsible for setting Europe alight, and who must ultimately disappear from Europe. 11 A further indication in favour of a decision to extend the deportations across the whole ofoccupied Europe that was taken in September I94 I is the activity of the 'Jewish c:xpcn' in the Gennan Embassy in Paris, Carltheo ZcitschcJ.D Throught the intervention of Abetz, the Ambassador in Paris, Zcittill as!>umed at the end of October 1941 that dte Serbian Jews who had survived the repressive measures of the Wchrmacht, would be 'removed by ship into dte transition camps in the East'29 This was to happen as soon as 'the technical feasibility within the brcncral framework of the comprehensive solution to dte Jewish Question' was established. Was the deportation ofJews 'to the East' at this time already a metaphor for their planned murder in the extcnnination camps? The current state of research docs not offer sufficient evidence for this conclusion. 10 Until early 1942, in fact, neither the Central European nor the French Jews were sent directly to ex1:crmination camps. Furthermore, these camps were not significantly expanded until early 1942 and early summer 1942. Until the contrary has been proven, one should thus take the statements oflcading Nazis literally -that the intention behind the deportations and the planning of Autumn 1941 was still to deport all European Jews to camps in the occupied Soviet Union, after victory had been achieved. The RSI·I,A;s programme of deportations for GemtanJews, and their broader plans for the deport.1tion of Jews throughout the area under Gcnnan control, were Sl'Cured by a number of administrative mea!>urcs. On I September 1941 German Jews were required by police decree to wear the 'yellow star' with the word 'Jew' on it," after Hitler had given his exl'ress consent to a suggestion of this nature made by Gocbbcls '' few days previously.u At the beginning of November 1941 the Gennan Finance Ministry issued rl'gttlations concerning the acquisition of the wealth owned by 'Jews who arc to be moved in the coming n'onths to a city in the Eastern zone'." This procedure w.1s considerably simplified by the eleventh decree pertaining to the lteichsbtlrb'Crb>esetz (Gennan citizenship law) passed on 25 November... llte efli•cts of this were that the Jews deported to the East lo!>t their Gemtan citizenship when they crossed the German border and everythmg they owned immediately became the possession ofGemtany." Finally, on 23 October a decree of the RHSA in Himmler's name prohibited the emigration of all Jews from the whole area under Gennan rule ... llte decision to take this step was made by the RHSA in the middle of October. It

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was prompted by inforn1ation from the Foreign Ministry to the cfli.·ct that Spanish Jews living in France were intending to leave for Spanish Moro< Ca· This is clear from a document in which Erhard Wetzel, the specialist for racial questions in the ministry for the occupied Eastern territories. offered Heichskonnnisar Heinrich Lohse, who was in charge of the forn1er Baltic States and White Russia. 'gassing apparatus' that is to be put at his dispos:ll by the Chancellery of the Fiihrer. 1 Gas chambers were not in fact erected in Riga. Instead. so-called 'gas-vans' were employed. These gas-vans were developed by the Criminal Police in aununn 194 1.• After a first attempt in which mentally ill patients were killed using engine exhaust gases in an aslyum in Mogilew in September 1941.~ the RSHA took d1e decision 81

'WE ARE EXJ>EIUENCING TilE FULFILMENT OF TIIAT l'ltOI'IU'SY'

that its Einsatzgruppen (or task-forces) would usc mobile gas-chambt·r.,. The SK Lange (Lange Special Unit) had already used such vehicles in winter 1939/1940 to murder asylum inmates in Poland. Now, however, instead of using carbonmonoxide gas bottles as previously, the exhaust of the vehicles \V""..S pumped directly into the passenger-carriage.• At the beginning of November 1941, the first 'test' of such a vehicle took place in Sachsenhausen. About 30 prisoners were killed by e:\:haust fumes.' In the occupied Soviet territories, the bras-vans were first used to kill people in November or early December. By the end of 1941 gas-vans were in use by all four task-forces. 8 At around the same rime, from October or November 1941 onwards, the gasvans were also deployed by the special unit SK Lange in the W.·trthegau to murder Jews. On 8 December the killing began in Chelmno, where gas-vans were established pennanendy- a further variant of an ex1:ennination camp.q While the mass murders using exhaust gases were being prepared or had already been committed in Belzec, the Warthegau, and in the occupied Eastern territories, the Commandant of the Auschwitz concentration camp took another course. In September or December 1941, 600 Soviet prisoners of war and 250 selected sick prisoners were murdered in the basement of Block 11 ofAuschwitz by means of a high concentration of the ex1:remcly poisonous disinfectant Cyclon B. At a later point, in December 1941, a further 900 Soviet prisoners of war were murdered using poisonous gas.•" Writing in Cracow prison after the war, the former Commandant of Auschwitz, Rudolf HoB, described how the question of the most suitable poison-gas to be employed had been discussed on the occasion of a visit by Eichmann. 11 The date of this visit is still not certain - some of his comments indicate the autumn of 1941, others point to a later date, perhaps spring 1942. HoB further states that during the rime that he was not in Auschwitz himself, his deputy used Cyclon B on his own initiative to kill Soviet prisoners of war.•! In November 1941, Topf & Sohne of Erfurt, a company specializing in the construction of crematoria, received the assignment to build an enormous 32chamber furnace in Mogilev in White Russia. This installation was needed - so the company was told - to dispose of corpses hygienically because of the b'Tcat danger of epidemics in the East. As the constrnction was not completed, the ovens which were no longer needed went to Auschwitz.') It is posc;iblc that this crematorium installation was in fact planned as part ofan extermination camp in Mogilev, whose function was taken over by Auschwitz and the Polish ex"termination camps in the following months." Thus, at the end of 1941, preparations were underway klr the construction of extermination camps not only in Auschwitz, but also in Riga, in the area oflodz (Chclmno), in Bclzec, and presumably also in Mogilev, that is, in the area of Minsk, thus in the proximity of all the ghettos that had been chosen as the destinations for the first to third waves of deportations from the Greater-

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Gemun Reich.•~ The parallels in timing between the beginning of the deportations and the preparation and installation of the murder-machinery retk..:t the plan of the Nazi regime to extend the strategy of'Jew-free' (judenfrei) are:b- already implemented in the Soviet Union- to the Polish territories. In certain regions of central importance for the arrangements for the displacement of people in the racist 'New Order', the elimination of those elements of the local Jewish population who were 'unfit for work' was the minimum requirement. In the preceding months, attempts on all sides to develop or tmprove on technologies of mass-killing using gas arc clear indications of comprehensive preparations to extend the scale of mass murder in the near future. (In the case of Auschwitz these preparations were concerned with Soviet POWs and the sick, and not yet primarily with Jewish prisoners)}" However, at this time plans for the systematic mass murder of the Jewish population only e.ll:tended to certain regions. At the same time, though, the intention was still to deport the remainingJews to the occupied Soviet territories after the war. In autumn 1941 regional murders of some parts of the Jewish population were not only earned out in the Warthegau and in the district of lublin, where deportation trains from Gennany were expected, but also in the district of Galicia, part of the Generalgouvemement Poland, and in Serbia. By dte end of 1941 these four regions give a picture as follows: In the Warthegau, after Hider's decision of mid-September 1941 to begin with the deportations ofJews from the Greater Gennan Reich, the first deportation trains began to arrive. 20,000 Jeo.vs and 5,000 gypsies were enclosed in the ghetto at Lodz, which was already filled to over-capacity. At about the same time, probably still in October 1941, dte mass murder oflocal Jews began in the area ofKonin in the southern Warthegau}' In an 'action' lasting several days at the end of November, 700 Jews were killed in gas-vans at the camp ofBomhagen (Kozminek) in the area ofKalisch}" This was carried out by the SK Lange which had already murdered dtousands of mental asylum inmates in gas-vans in the annexed Polish regions in 1939/1940 and in June/july 194J.•• In October 1941, Lange's unit was called to Novgorod by Himmler in order to kill the patients of mental asylums there.3 ' Lange's dri\'er testified that he had been told to chauffeur Lange around dte Warthegau in the amumn of 1941 in order to find a suitable place for a stationary murderinstallation. After a suit.1ble building had been found in Chclmno, Lange's unit started killing jews there, using gas-vans, on 8 December. At first, it was mainly local Jews who had been deported from various areas of the Wardteg;au to Chclmno were killed. From January 1942 onward, however, it was predominantly Polish Jews from the ghetto of Lodz who were put to death at Chclmno. 21 A letter to Himmlcr from Greiser, governor of dte Warthcgau. dated 1 May 1942 gives import.1nt evidence for the reconstruction of the decision to cany out the mass murder ofJews in the W.1rthegau.Z! In this letter Greiscr writes dtat the

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'special treatment of around 1()(),()()(}Jews in my district [which wa~ J authorised by you in agreement with the Head of the Reichsichterheitshaupt:lmt SS Obergnappenfiihrer Heydrich' could be 'completed in the ncJ~."t 2-3 months'. If Himmler and Heydrich had to 'authorise' this mass murder, then at as to be assumed that this suggestion was made by Greiser himsclf.2.' The: murder of the 100,000 people (Polish Jews 'unfit for work') was hence presumably the 'quid pro quo' that Greiser had demanded of Himmler to take approximately 25,()()() Jews and gypsies (instead of the 60,{)()() originally proposed by Himmler) into the ghetto oflodz in October and November 1941. From spring 1941, the audtorities in the Generalgouvemement Poland had been working under the assumption that the Jews in their area would be deported to the conquered Soviet areas in the near funare. In a private conversation of 13 October 1941, Frank renewed his su~>estion to Rosenberg to deport 'the Jewish population of the Generalgouvemement Poland into the occupied Eastern Territories'. Rosenberg responded that there was no possibility of the 'implementation of such resettlement-plans' at the moment. For the furure, however, Rosenberg ex-pressed his willingness to 'promote Jewish emigration to dte East, especially seeing that there is the intention to send all asocial elements of the Reich to the thinly inhabited Eastern Territories? From this point onward, the authorities in the Generalgouvemement Poland began to think about a 'final solution' to the 'Jewish Question' on its own territory. A series of meetings of the leadership of the Generalgouvemement Poland was of great consequence for the general radicalization of policy with respect to the Jews in this area. These were arranged in the district capitals by Frank, immediately following his rerum from Germany (14-16 October in Warsaw, 17 October in Globocnik's district of lublin, 18 October in Radom, 20 October in Cracow, and for the first time in Lemberg, 21 October). At the meeting in Lublin on 17 October, the 'Third Regulation Concerning Restrictions on the Right of to Reside in the Generalgouvemement Poland' was discussed. This regulation introduced the death penalty for leaving the ghetto, and was issued only a few days later.z; On 20 October, at the government meeting in Cracow, Governor Wachter indicated 'that an ultimately radical solution to the Jewish Question is unavoidable, and that no allowances of any kind - such as special exceptions for craftsmen - could be taken into consideration.'u. At the meeting on 21 October in Lemberg, Eberhard Westerkamp, the Head of the Department for the: Interior in the Generalgouvernement Poland, announced, that 'the isolation of the Jews from the rest of the population' should be enforced 'as soon and as thoroughly as possible'. On the other hand, he pointed out that 'the government order has prohibited the establishment of new ghettos, since there was hope that the Jews would be deported from the Generalgouvernement Poland in the near future', even though Rosenberg had unambiguously shattered this 'hope' a few days previously.17

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Wlulc the treatment of the 'jewish Question' at these meetings indicated that the leadership of the Generalgouvemement Poland was pursuing a unified antiJewish policy throughout the region under its control, two districts took the lead in the implement.1tion of the 'final solution'. An important f.1ctor in the preparations for the 'final solution' in the Generalgouvemement Poland was the fact that Galicia was absorbed into its territory on 1August: this was an area in which mass-executions ofJews had taken place on a large scale since the beginning of the war against dte Soviet Union and were continuing. The special commando unit Einsatzgruppc z.b.V. (which had been deployed in this area and became the office of the Commander of the Security Police in the District of Galicia once Galicia had joined the Generalgouvemement Poland) focussed its operations first against a vaguelydefined Jewish elite.2>1 From the beginning of October, however, dte Security Police began to kill members of the Jewish population indiscriminately in Galicia as well. On 6 October in Nadvoma, about 2,000 men, women and children were murdered by members of the Stanislau outpost of the Commanderofdte Security Police in Galicia/' According to a statement made by Hans Kruger, the Chief of the Security Police in Stanislau, this 'action' had been planned down to the last detail at a meeting with the Commander of the Security Police in Lemberg."' From the beginning of October, massacres of this type were carried out almost every week. One that deserves special notice was dte so-called 'Blood Sunday of Stanislau', 12 October 1941, when between ten and twelve dtousandJews were murdered. 11 The Security Police in Galicia were dms following dte same pattern of radicalization as the units in the occupied Eastern Areas, indepcndendy of the political subordination of the district. These mass executions necessarily radicalized the anti-Jewish policy throughout dte Generalgouvcmement Poland Concrete preparations for the mass murder of Je\YS in the Generalgouvemement Poland had also been underway since October in the district of Lublin that bordered on Galicia. This was dte territory which had been planned for a 'Jewish reservation' in 1939, and which in Spring 1942 was to serve as a receiving area for the third wave of deportations from Gennany, as well as for deport.1tions from Slovakia. The SS and Police Commander of the district of Lublin, Odilo Globocnik. played a key role in the murder of Jews in this district. On 13 October. Globocnik met Hinunler1 to speak to him about dte proposal that he had made two weeks earlier to limit the 'influence of the Jews' against whom it was necessary to take steps 'of a security policy nature'. u It was presumably at dtis meeting that Globocnik receiwd the assignment to build the Belz« ex1ermination camp, since at the beginning of November, two to dtrtt wtth after this meeting and aftl'r the 'Jewish Question' had been discussed by dte leadership of the Generalgouvememcnt Poland at several meetings, work began on the consmtction ofBclzec, which was a relatively small group of barracks."

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By the end of the year, the delegated euthanasia personnel of the T4 Organization had arrived in Lublin.}; The killing-capacity ofBelzec was still relatively limited at this point (it was to be considerably e>.:panded early the following year), and the construction of the remaining ex"termination camps in the Generalgouvemement Poland did not begin until early 1942. These facts indicate that by autumn 1941 Globocnik had not as yet received d1e order to prepare for the killing of all Jews in the Generalgouvemement Poland and that his assignment only encompassed the district of Lublin, and possibly also the district ofGalicia..lt· Alongside the events in the Generalgouvemement Poland and the Warthegau a further sequence of regional mass-murders began in October 1941, namely the systematic murderofdleJewish men in Serbia. From the beginningofJuly 1941 onwards d1e German military administration had hostages, communists and Jews shot almost daily to 'avenge' acts of resistance.}' In August, arrests were e:>~."tended to all Jewish men. As was already the case in the Soviet Union, the 'avenging measures' in Serbia were thus directed against the image of the enemy as a 'jewish Bolshevist'. Despite the shootings, the Serbian resistance to the occupying power continued to grow. After twenty-two German soldiers were killed in an ambush, the General in command in Serbia, Hans-Joachim Bohme, ordered on 4 October 'the immediate shooting of 100 Serbian prisoners for each German soldier killed'. as 'a reprisal and an atonemem'. 111 Those to be executed were prisoners of the concentration camps in Sabac and Belgrade, 'principally Jews and communists'.:w About 2,000 Jews and 200 gypsies from these concentration camps were killed between 9 and 13 October...' Bohme's policy of directing his 'avenging measures' against Jews in the first instance had influential support: in a letter of 16 September Martin Luther, the Head of the Gennan Department of the Foreign Office, had directed the representative of the Foreign Office in Bclgrad to treat all imprisoned Jewish men as hostages," and on 13 October 1941 Eichmann had recommended that the entire group of persons in question should be shot.•2 On 10 October Bohme issued the general command 'to shoot 100 prisoners or hostages for every German soldier or ethnic German (man, women or children) killed or murdered', and to shoot 'SO prisoners or hostages for every wounded German soldier or ethnic German'. To be arrested as hostages 'at once' were 'all Communist-;, all male inhabitants suspected of being Communists, all Jews, a certain number of nationalist and democratically minded inhabitants'." In accordance with this scheme, a further 2,200 men were shot a few days later, Jews and gypsies once more among them ... In the two weeks following the order of 10 October, Wehrmacht units shot more than 9,000 Jews, b'YPSies and other civilians.'\ By the beginning of November, H,()()() Jewish men had been executed by the firing squads."' The families of those murdered were interned

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'WE ARE EXJIEIUENCING TI-lE FULFILMENT OF THAT PROPHESY'

in concentration camps during the winter, and murdered the following spring. in ga!>-vans." Despite this rapid increase in mass-murders, it should be observed that in autumn 1941. the mass-murders and the preparations for wide-ranging killing c.1mpaigns were restricted to the Jewish population in the newly conquered former Soviet districts, to the Warthegau, now annexed, to the disaictS of Lublin and Galicia in the Generalgouvemement Poland, and to Serbia. After a total of 5,000 people from five transport trains arriving from Germany had been shot in November 1941 in Kowno on the instructions of the local offices of the security police,.. Himmler ordered Heydrich by telephone on 30 November not to shoot 1,000 Berlin Jews who were already on a transport destined for Riga.~·· This order arrived too late, however, and the Berlin Jews had already been murdered. The fact that Himmler reprimanded Jeckeln, who was the HSSPF in charge and responsible for the shootings, and instructed him in future to keep to the 'guidelines' of the RSHA for the treatment of the Jews deported from Central Europe,50 clearly shows that Jeckeln had acted on his own authority. The shooting ofJews from the area of the Greater German Reich was not authorised at this point. It is important to remember that in September 1941 Hitler had spoken of reserving reprisals against Central European Jews for the event that the USA entered the war.'' Whilst these regional mass-murders were being perpetrated or prepared, in autumn 1941 there was an increasing number of statements being made by leading representatives of the regime that openly addressed the question of dte 'annihilation' (Vemichmng) of the Jews that \vas to come. In a leading article for the joumal Das Reidt of 16 November 1941, Goebbels remmed to the subject of Hitler's 'prophesy' of 30 January 1939 under the title 'The Jews are to Blame' (Die Judcn sind sclmld): We arc now c.'-pcricncing the fulfilment of this prophesy, and Jewry is sutlcring a f.1te that, although hard, is still more than deserved. Here compassion or rl·gret is completely amiss. When he said 'world Jewry is now [undergoing! a gradual process of ex1ermination', with this formulation Gocbbels made clear the fate which was awaiting the Jews who were being deported from German cities over dte past few weeks. Two days later, Rosenberg spoke at a press conference of tlte Minisuy of the E.1stern Territories of what was to come - the 'eradication' (Ausmerzung) of the Jews of Europe: There arc still about six million Jews in the East and this question can only be solved through a biological eradication of all ofEuropcanJewry. The Jewish Question will only be solved for Gennany when the last

87

'WE ARE EXPEIUENCING TJ-IE FULFILMENT OF TIIAT

l'ltOI'I-IE~"Y·

Jew has left German territory, and for Europe when there 1s no longt>r a Jew left standing on the European continent as f.u as the Ural~. I··.) And for this it is necessary to push them beyond the Urals, or othc1wise eradicate them.u Whilst it is true that e.'\."tending the murders to particular areas outside the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1941 was done in the contell."t of the deportation programmes ordered by Hitler, no-one has yet been able to find a direct order for the execution of these new mass murders or for the usc of poison gas. However, it can be indirectly demonstrated that Hitler gave the authorisation of these new mass murders, by looking at the sequence of events. Looking at d1e events of aunnnn 1941 as a whole, it becomes evident that institutions wim regional responsibility, were each, in a systematic manner, attempting to kill a substantial proportion of the Jewish population in their areas with the help of a particular method of murder. In the Warthegau the initiative lay wim Gauleiter Greiser, who had been authorised by Himmler to murder 100,000 persons and did so with the help of gas-vans. The preparations for the murder ofJev.-s 'incapable of work' in the districts of Galicia and Lublin lay in the hands ofGiobocnik, the SS and Police Commandant of Lublin. In Serbia it was first the Wehrmacht that carried out mass executions ofJewish men, and later the initiative passed to the Security Police, who killed the remainder of the Jewish population using gas-vans. In every case, what was being carried out was a planned programme of annihilation. These regional annihilation programmes cannot be seen in isolation as independently running campaigns that had been started on the initiative of the regional authorities. They were instead components of a supra-regional policy that was being guided centrally. As has been pointed out several times, the mass murders in the W.uthcbrau and the district of Lublin were carried out in the context of a comprehensive deportation programme that initially affected only Germany, but whose extension to the whole of Europe had already been anticipated. The regional murder-campaigns were designed to create 'room' for the first waves of deportees in the regions. Greiser and Globocnik were therefore not acting autonomously but had first to seck the abrreement of Himmlcr before they could proceed with the mass murders in Chclmno and Bclzcc. As we have seen, the extension of these murders to the districts of Galicia and Lublin was a process that actively involved the civil administration of the Gcneralgouvernement Poland. The policy of extermination in Serbia was not a unique or isolated development but corresponded to German policy in the occupied Soviet areas, put back a little chronologically. Wchrmacht commander Bohme began with the execution ofJewish men only when the relevant positive instructions from the RI-ISA and the Foreign Ministry had been received. The mass executions in Galicia were abrain at first a component

88

'\VE AltE EXI'EitiENCING THE FULFILMENT OF THAT PROI'IlESV'

of the policy of annihilation in the occupied Soviet areas; later, with the deport.ltions to Belzec, the same methods of murder were used here as had been used in the neighbouring district of Lublin. An important feature common to all four regions (Warthegau, Lublin, Galicia Jnd Serbia) is the usc of gas to murder people. This method of murder fitted into a higher-level policy that can also be demonstrated to have operated in winter 1941-42 in Auschwitz (Cyclon B) and in the occupied Soviet areas (gas-vans). There WdS not only a close correlation between the deportations, the transfer of gas-technology and the beginnings of the murders in the regions; the execution of these complex operations involved a whole series of organizations outside the SS and the Police, such as the Reichsstatthalter in the Warthegau, the civil administration of the Generalgouvemement Poland, the Foreign Ministty. the Wehrmacht and the Chancellery of the Fuhrer. An operation of d1is magnitude could only be carried out in the Third Reich if it was covered by the authority of the Fuhrer himself: he alone, as head of government, leader of the Nazi Party and commander-in-chief of the armed forces had the authority to give instructions to all the offices involved. Whether we should conceive of such authorisation as a single instruction, as a series of orders or as the general empowerment of one of his subordinates (Himmler, for example), and whether the initiative for the policy came from him in the first instance or from someone else - these questions cannot be settled. This does not, however, absolve Hider from responsibility for the C.'\'tension of the mass murders, as is emphasised by the following events.

89

90

15 'THE WORLD WAR IS HERE, THE EXTERMINATION OF THE jEWS MUST BE THE NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE' THE RADICALIZATION OF ANTI-jEWISH POLICY IN DECEMBER

1941

With the declaration of war against the USA on 11 December 1941 the concept of taking the West and Central European Jews 'hostage' became obsolete. At this point the 'final solution' - the systematic murder for all European Jews - was introduced, and Hitler's central role in this last stage ofescalation can once again be demonstrated. On 12 December, one day after declaring war on the USA, Hitler gave a speech to the Pany's Gauleiter and Reichleiter. Referring once more to his 'prophesy' of30January 1939, he announced the 'extermination' (Vernichrung) of the Jews under German domination, as the Gocbbels diaries show:

As far as the Jewish question is concerned, the Fuhrer is determined to make a clean sweep. He prophesied to the Jews that if they once again brought about a world war they would ex-perience their own extern1ination. This was not just an empty phrase. The World War is here, the cx-rennination of the Jews must be d1e necessary consequence. This question must be seen without sentimentality. We are not here in order to show sympathy with the Jews, we must sympathize with our own Gernun people. If the German people has now once again sacrificed as many as 160,()()() lives in the Eastern campaign, then d1e authors of d1is bloody conflict must pay with their lives.' Rosenberg, the German Minster for the occupied Eastern territories, reponed in his diary that on 14 December he showed Hitler the manuscript for an address he was planning to give in Berlin. Rosenberg. who in a press conference of 18 November had openly spoken of a 'biological eradication of the entirety of Jt..'WI)''/ wa.o; now 'after the decision' (i.e. after the declaration of war on d1e 91

'TilE WOitUJ WAlt I\ I lEitE. TilE EXTEIWJ\INATION OF TI IE JEWS MU\T liE 1\ NECE.'>\AitY ~All I\ llr:JU:, 1 UE EXTEitMAINI\TION OF TI-lE JEWS MUST liE 1\ NECE.SSAitv CONSEQUENCE'

Tht Jew will be identified! The same battle that Pasteur and Koch had to light must he fought by us today. Innumerable sicknesses have their origin in one bacillus: the Jew! Japan would also have got it had it remained open any longer to the Jew. We will get well when we eliminate the Jews.•" On 14 Fcbtuary he said to Gocbbcls that he was determined: to be quite ruthless to dear out the Jews in Europe. There was no place here for an access of sentimentality. The Jews have fully deserved the catastrophe that they arc facing today. They will experience their own annihilation with the annihilation of our enemies. We must accelerate this process with cold ruthlessness, and in doing so we shall be rendering an inestimable service to suffering humanity that has been tonurcd by Jewry for thousands of years. •• In my view, the statements made by Hitler between December 1941 and February 1942 arc not the expression of a unique 'basic decision' on the pan of the dictator to destroy the European Jews now that the USA had entered the war. Other leading representatives of the regime had used similar formulations before December 1941 to describe the goal of 'annihilating' and 'c,.."tirpating' the Jews. But Hitler's statements are evidently an important impetus for radicalizing the whole of'Jewish policy' after the United States' entry into the war. To match the radical rhetoric, thoughts of postponing the 'final solution' to the 'Jewish question' (in the fonn of a gigantic deportation programme) until after the end of the war were now receding, and instead possibilities were being sought for extending the murders during the war itsel(

93

94

16 1\fTER APPROPRIATE PRIOR APPROVAL BY

THE FOHRER'

THE WANNSEE CONFERENCE OF 20 jANUARY

1942

The Wannsee Conference of 20 January 1942 served Heydrich's intention to present the mass murders in the various occupied areas as pan of a general plan _ ordered by Hitler and directed by the RSHA - for the •solution to the European jewish Question'. This presentation was to take place in the presence of a number of high-ranking functionaries of the Party and the SS, as well as leading ministerial officials. which allowed Heydrich to ensure that they. and especially the ministerial bureaucracy, would share both knowledge of and responsibility for this policy. The central passage of Heydrich's address concerning the general aims of the future •jewish Policy' is as follows: After appropriate prior approval by the Fuhrer. emigration as a possible solution has been superseded by a policy of evacuating of dte Jews to dte East. These actions (the deportations that had already been begun] are to be regarded merely as practical e:ll:perience here is already being gadtcred that will be of e"1reme importance with respect to dte impending final solution ofthcjcwish Question.• First and foremost. therefore, Heydrich was making it clear dtat dte new •possible solution' had been ell:plicitly authorised by Hitler. On a more detailed level, he was distinguishing precisely between two chronological stages: dte •impending final solution' and the provisional measures intended for tlte n~r future, or •possible interim solutions' (Ausweichmaglichkeiten). In tlte impending •final solution'. according to Hcydrich, a total of II million Jews would be involved, a figure which was broken down by country in a statistical addendum to the transcript. This list not only includes jt.'\vs livin~ in areas under 95

'AFTEit AJ>J>ItQJ>RIATE t>IUOR AJ>I'ROVAL UY TilE FLJJIJtEit"

Gcnnan control, but also those of Great Britain, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and Turkey. Included in the 700,000 Jews for urwccupicd France arc those of the North Mrican colonies. Hcydrich thm dearly distinguished the programme of deportations that had already been ~cl into motion from a far more comprehensive plan, whose execution he c;Jid was 'dependent on military developments', and could therefore only be realized fully after a German victory. According to the transcript, Hcydrich made the follo\ving remarks conccming the 'final solution' that he envisaged: As part of the development of the final solution, the Jews arc now to be put to work in a suitable manner under the appropriate leadership. Organized into large work-gangs and segregated according to sex, those Jews fit for work will be led into dtcsc areas as road-builders, in the course of which, no doubt, a large number will be lost by natural wastage.

The remainder who will inevitably survive, who will certainly be those who have the greatest powers of endurance, he adds, will have to be dealt with accordingly in order to prevent their becoming 'the seed-bed of a new Jewish regeneration.' Initially the Jews were to be taken to 'transit-ghettos', from which they were to be 'transported further toward the East'. Heydrich dtus developed the conception ofa gigantic deportation programme which would only be fully realizable in the post-war period. The Jews who were to be deported 'to the East' were to be worked to death through forced labour, or, if dtey should survive dtese tribulations, they would be murdered. The fate of those 'unfit for work', children and mothers in particular, was not further elucidated by Heydrich. In the context ofhis speech as whole, however, it is clear that these too were to be killed. For as 1-Jeydrich said, he wanted to prevent the survival of a 'seed-bed of a new Jewish reconstruction' at all costs. Heydrich went on to say that 'in the process of carrying out the final solution', dte whole area under German rule would be 'combed through' from West to the East; in the area of Germany. including the Protektorat, these measures would have to have been completed already, by way of 'anticipation'. Here once more the distinction is being made between the 'final solution' realizable only in the long-term, and the smaller, 'anticipatory' steps already underway. Jews over the age of 65, 1-Jeydrich goes on to say, should be removed to an old-people's ghetto (Aitersghetto) in Theresienstadt. This special regulation for the elderly was designed to lend the idea of a labour programme in the East a degree of added plausibility. I-leydrich's e"-position indicates that the RSHA was at this time still proceeding according to the plan, followed since the beginning of 1941, of implementing the 'final solution' after the end of the war in the occupied Eastern areas. Hcydrich also made clear what was understood by the phrase 96

'AFTER Al'l'ltOI'ItiATE I'IUOH AI'I'HOVAL UY THE FUI·JRER"

'final ~olution': the Jewish people were to be annihilated through a combination of forced labour and mass murder. The fact that it was Jewish forced labour that gained importance at the turn of 1941/1942 speaks in favour of taking 1-leydrich's remarks literally. 2 On the other hand, there is no evidence to suggest that there were already plans at this point in time to deport the Jews straight out of Central and Western Europe into extermination camps. On the contrary, the first deportations from non-German countries (Slovakia and France) which began in March and April 1942, as well as the simultaneous 'third wave' of deportations from Germany were not to lead directly to the gas-chambers of the ex"tennination camps. Neither immediately before nor after the Wannsee Conference, but only in late spring 1942 was the capacity of the extermination camps suddenly and hurriedly expanded. The transcript of the Wannsee Conference does however make it clear that the idea of a post-war solution was being firmly adhered to, whilst at the same time there was a debate over the proposal to exempt the Jews in the Generalgouvemement Poland and the occupied Soviet Areas from this general plan and kill them in the short-term. Five weeks prior to the Wannsee Conference Generalgouvemeur Frank had already learned in Berlin that the deportation of the Jews from the Generalgouvemement Poland could not be counted on, even in tl1e mediumto-long-term.} A"> Reichsleiter, Frank was part of the group of people to whom Hitler had announced the impending 'annihilation' of the Jews on 12 December 1941. He drew the consequences of this knowledge at a meeting on 16 December in Cracow: In Berlin they told us what all this trouble was for; we can't do anything with them in the Ostland or in the Rcichskommissariat [Ukraine), liquidate them yourselves! Gentlemen, I must ask you to arm yourself against all considerations of compassion. We must annihilate the Jews wherever we meet them and wherever this is at all possible, in order to maintain the entire framework of the Reich.' The method and time-frame for this mass murder were still open in midDecember 1941, as we can sec from Frank's further remarks: These 3.5 million Jews cannot be shot, we cannot poison them, but we will be able to intervene in such a way that will somehow lead to a successful ex"termination - in the context of the greater measures from tl1e llcich that arc to be discussed. The Generalgouvcmcment Poland must become just as clear ofJews (judcnfrci) as the Reich. Where and how tl1at happens is a matter for the official bodies that we must create and implement, and whose sphere of effect I will infonn you of in due course.

97

'AFTEit Al'l'ltOI'ItiATE l'ltiOit Al'l'ltOVAL BY TilE FOIIIU!H"

The detenninarion of the leadership of the Generalgouvemcmcnt Pol.md to achieve this 'successful extermination' in the short-term within the Generalgouvemement Poland itself is the background to the remarks of the representative of the government of the Generalgouvemement Poland, Secretary of State (Staats-sekretlir) Biihler, near the end of the Wannsec Conference. He stated that the Gcneralgouvemement Poland would: welcome dte initiation of the final solution to this question in the Gencralgouvemement Poland, because the problem of transportation docs not play a decisive role here and because problems related to labour will not obsmtct the course of this action. In addition, the approximately 2.5 million Jews who were to be removed from the Generalgouvemcmcnt Poland 'as soon as possible' were overwhelmingly 'unfit to work'. Buhler followed this with a clear proposal to murder the majority of the Jews of the Generalgouvememcnt Poland in the Generalgouvemement itself. Then they discussed the question of how the Jews of the Gcncralgouvemcment Poland and the occupied Soviet Areas were actually to be 'removed' - in other words, they talked concretely about the methods for murder: In the concluding stages different possible solutions were discussed. Both Gauleiter Dr Meyer [the representative of the Ministry for the occupied Eastern Territories] and Staatssekretlir Dr Biihlcr represented a position in favour of identifying certain preparatory measures as pan of the final solution and actually carrying them out in the relevant areas, whilst at the same time seeing the necessity of avoiding the arousal of disquiet in the population. The transcript docs not give any evidence that a decision was taken on the proposals of Meyer and Biihler at the conference itself.

98

17 'IN THIS MATTER THE FUHRER IS THE UNTIRING PIONEER AND SPOKESMAN FOR A RADICAL SOLUTION' THE ExTENSION OF THE DEPORTATIONS AND MAss MURDERS IN SPRING 1942

After the Wannsee Conference, the RSHA continued planning for the deportation of the Jews from Greater Germany and expanded it to an initial European deportation programme, encompassing a total of six countries in the first instance. In an ex'Press letter to the main and subsidiary offices of the Gestapo of31 January 1942, Eichmann made it dear that 'the recent evacuations of Jews from individual areas to the East' represented 'the beginning of the final solution to the Jewish Question in the Ostmark and in the Protektorat of Bohemia and Moravia.'• From a discussion bet\veen Eichmann and representatives of the main Gestapo offices on 6 May, it emerges dtat a further deportation programme for the whole of Gennany had been set up within the RSHA, namely what 1-leydrich had already announced in November 1941 as 'the third wave'2 Eichmann e:'I.'J>Iained that in the course of this next programme 55.000 Jews would be deported from the territory of the Germany inclusive of the Osnnark and the Protcktorat. He also announced that most of the remaining Jews from the Altreich (Germany within the borders of 1937) would in all probability be forcibly removed to Theresienstadt (which was then being cleared), in the course of the summer or the autumn of 1942. Within the framework of this third wave of deportations, Jewish people from different parts of the territory of the Altreich and from Vienna, as well as Theresienst.1dt, would be forcibly carried offbetween March and June 1942 and brought to a series ofghettos in the district of lublin (in particular lzbica, Piasb. Zamocs and Trawniki). The inhabitants of these ghettos had been deponed to the extermination camp Belzec shortly before. As a mle, the deportation-trains from Germany stopped in Lublin, where those men 'fit for work' were separated 99

'IN TiffS MATTEn TI-lE Flll ln.EH IS TI IE UNTIIUNG I'IONEEit & SI'OKESMAN rR A HADICAL SOLUTION'

out in order to be put to work in the forced labour camp at Majdanck.' There is conclusive proof of forty-three transports, which each usually carried 1.1VJO people. However, there arc indications of further transports, amounting to a probable si.'"tY trains in all.' The deportation of Central European Jews and the e":tennination of the Eastern European jews in spring 1942 followed the same panem as the fir.;t t\vo waves of deportations in autumn 1941 and the winter following. The miserable living conditions in the ghenos in the District of Lublin meant that the great majority of the deportees died within few months of their arrival. Those who survived the conditions of the gheno were generally deponed to e>.:tennination camps in the Generalgouvemement Poland. In March 1942, the deportations were also e>.:tended to t\vo countries outside Gennany. According to the terms of an agreement with Slovakia. young Jews who were 'fit for work' were deported to Majdanek in the district of Lublin and to Auschwitz. Directly after this programme was introduced, and in response to a request from the Germans, the Slovakian government declared their willingness to deport all Slovakian Jews (close to 90,000 people). The deportation offamilies began on 11 April. By June, eleven trains had arrived in Auschwitz and a further twenty-eight had gone to ghenos in the district of Lublin, or the camp at Majdanek.s In France the military administration had decided in December 1941 to send the first hostage-transport of 1,000 Jewish men to the East. Preparations had been made at the beginning ofJanuary 1941, but the convoy was not able to leave because of a lack of transport. After Eichmann had agreed to the deportation of those 1,000 people on 1 March: a discussion within the RSHA of 4 March resulted in a decision to propose the deportation of a further 'c. 5,000 Jews to the East' to the French government. This was recorded by Theodor Dannecker, the expert on Jewish matters in the Paris Gestapo.' Dannecker also told Carltheo Zeitschcl, the Embassy staff-member in charge ofJewish affairs, that Heydrich had given an assurance to the effect that. after the deportation of the first 1,000 people, 'a further 5,()()() Jews would be transported in the course of 1942' and that he had 'agreed that further, even larger transports could be carried out in 1943'." While the first tra11Sport- which left on 27 March 1942 and arrived in Auschwitz 30 March''- was still described as a reprisal against the French resistance, the coming 'hostage-transports' were to be pan of a concrete programme of deport.1tions. The deportation of 5,000 people to Auschwitz that Hcydrich had announced at the beginning of March 1942 was carried out between 5 June and 17 July. At this point these five transports, as well as the transports offamilies from Slovakia that started in April, were already pan of the HSI·INs first European-wide deportation-programme. An important piece of evidence as to the existence of this programme is found in a note from the office of the Slovakian prime minister, Votech Tuka, dated 10 April and concerning a visit by 1-lcydrich.'" On

100

'IN TI US MAlTI.lt TI IE. FUI-IItEit IS TI-lE UNTIIUNG I•IONEEit & SI>OKESMAN FOR A lv.DJCAL SOLVTION'

this occ;uion 1-Ieydrich explained to Tuka that the planned deportation of Slov;~ki,IJI Jews ~ only 'a part of the programme'. At the time, he said, there was J 'h.';.ettlement' ofaltogether 'half a million' Jews 'out of Europe to the East'. Bes1dcs Slovakia, Germany. the Protektorat, the Netherlands, Belgium and France v.ere affected. On 11 June 1942 a discussion took place in the Department for Jewish affairs in the Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt). The German experts on Jewish affairs stationed in Paris, The Hague and Brussels gathered to discus!> the occupied Western European part of the general European deportation programme. Dannecker, the expert for Jewish affairs of the Gestapo in Paris, made a note to himself stating that Himmler had given the order to 'deliver larger quantities of Jews to the Auschwitz concentration camp, to increase the work-force'. 'This is on the primary condition d1at the Jews (ofboth sexes) be between 16 and 40 years old. 10% who arc not fit for work can be sent with them.' Starting on 13 July, 15,000 Jews were to be deported from the Netherlands, 10,(K)() from Belgium and 100,000 from Francc. 11 In parallel with the deportations, the mass murders were extended in the 'reception areas' and elsewhere. Preparations for the 'resettlement' ofJews from the Districts of Lublin and Galicia can be traced back to January 1942.'2 By this time 'resettlement' was clearly a euphemism for their planned mass murder. In mid-March the liquidation of the Lublin ghetto marked the beginning of the systematic murder of those Jews 'unfit for work' in the District of Lublin, which had been in planning since the decision to build the extermination camp Belzec in autumn 1941. 11 The bloody liquidation of the ghettos and the deportations to Bclzcc thus started at precisely the time that the deportation-trains we~ arriving in the area of Lublin from Germany and Slovakia. Like the W.1rthegau the previous year, and like the mass-executions in the ghettos of Riga and Minsk in November and December 1941;~ local Jews we~ murdered in order to make 'room' for the deported Jews. The presence of Himmler in Lublin on 14 March, two days before the clearing ofd1e ghetto. underscores the interest the 1-limmler had taken in the 'Jewish Policy' in dte District of Lublin from the beginning.•s At the same time as the mass murder commenced in the District of Lublin, in mid-March 1942, the SS began the liquidation of the ghettos and the deportations in the District of Galicia.•• The escalation of the extermination policy in this district should not be seen in the context of the prob'Tamme of deportation in Central Europe but in relation to the mass murders in the Soviet Union. Galicia had been occupied by the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941, and was conquered by the Wehnnacht in I 941; from the summer of I 941, and with increased force in October 1941. German units had carried out mass executions, and by the end of I 941 60.000 people had been killed here."

101

'IN TI-llS MATTE~ THE Ftil JJ{EJ~ IS HIE UNTIIUNG I'IONEEit & SI>OKESMI\N FOit A ltADIC.AL \OLt.mON'

Some light is cast on the annihilation policy in these two districts by a remark in Gocbbels' diary from 27 March 1942, according to which 'a barbaric procedure that I will not describe in more detail is being applied, and of the jews themselves there is now not much left.' He says it can be 'established that 60% of them must be liquidated whilst only 40% can be used for work'.'" In this note Gocbbels leaves no doubt about Hitler's responsibility for the mass murder: A penalty will be exacted from the Jews, and whilst it may be barbaric, they have deserved it. The prophecy that dte Fuhrer made for their having caused a new world war is beginning to be realized in the most terrible manner. In these matters we must have no truck with sentimentality. If we did not defend ourselves from dtem, the Jews would destroy us. It is a lifeand-deadt struggle between dte Aryan race and the Jewish bacterium. No other government and no odter regime could summon the force necessary to solve this question across the board. In this matter, too, the Fuhrer is the untiring pioneer and spokesman for a radical solution that is demanded by the very nature of things and which is therefore inevitable. Thank God the war means that we now have a whole series of possibilities that were not possible in peacetime. We must exploit these possibilities. A few days previously Goebbels had reported on a meeting with Hitler: At the end we spoke about the Jewish question once more. In this matter the Fuhrer is still unrelenting. The Jews must be driven out of Europe, if necessary by using the most brutal of means.•• At the same time as the deportations from the Districts of Lublin and Galicia were beginning- in mid-March 1942- in Serbia the SS began the murder of those Jews who had survived the 'retaliatory measures' in the previous autumn. The RSHA informed the Commander of the Security Police in Belgrade of the impending arrival of a gas-van. With the aid of this vehicle, by the beginning of May 1942 about 500 men as well as about 7,000 women and children who had been imprisoned in dte Belgrade camp ofSajmiste were murdered. 21' This meant dtat about 9()0k of all Jews living in Serbia had been killed. The German procedure in Serbia followed the same model as in the Soviet Uniorr, albeit at a slightly later stage: first the Jewish men were shot under the pretext of 'retaliation', and in a later phase their dependants were killed, all of them, in accordance with the plan that had been drawn up.

102

18 'THE FOHRER J-IAS LAID THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS VERY DIFFICULT ORDER ON MY SHOULDERS' THE ExTENSION OF THE .EXTERMINATION POLICY TO THE WHOLE OF EUROPE IN SPRING AND SUMMER

1942

A further escalation of the extermination policy can be observed in the period between May and June 1942. Previously the mass murders had been restricted to individual regional areas and had been represented as responses to problems arising in these areas by the responsible authorities. Now, from May and June 1942, the ell:termination policy was ell:tended to d1e entire area under German control. By the middle of 1942 the authorities had come to understand dlat dle mass murders were no longer regionally limited advances in d1e direction ofdle 'final solution' that was to be accomplished in its full scope only after d1e end of the war, but that an intensification and ell:tension of these murders was now intended to achieve this 'final solution' during the course of the war itself. and that it was to be achieved using the killing-machinery originally intended for mass murders in the separate regions. At the end of May/june 1942, the systematic mass murder of Jews in d1e District-. of Lublin and Galicia was extended to all Districts of the Gcneralb'Ouvemement Poland. The killing of the great majority of Polish Jews bears all the signs ofan operation executed according to a plan. It is significant dut IISSPF Friedrich-Wilhehn Kriigcr was appointed State Secretary for Security in May, and that the order of3 June that established his new position gave him the mandate to take charge of all 'jewish Nfairs'. 1 In May. the cxtennination amp Sobibor was opened, while Belzec was closed temporarily from d1e middle of April until the end of May so that its killing capacity could be e.\."tended. In May. or in June at the latest, the constmction of a d1ird C.\."tennination camp, Treblinb. had began in the District of Warsaw. 2 In the District of Lublin, systematic deportations from the local districts began in May, independently of the arrival of transports from Central Europe.' These transports were going to Sobibor, where

103

'11-IE FUilltEit liAS LAII> TilE IMI'LEMENTATION OF HilS VEitV DIFFICULT OIUlEU ON M'l

~HOULDEttS'

the deportees were murden.'CI. From the end of May, the transport.., from the District of Cracow to Bclzcc started: The start of deportations from the other disoicts was delayed by a ban on the usc of transportation that was impo.;cd in mid-June because of the imminent summer offensive on the Eastl'nl front. At a meeting dealing with police matters in Cracow, there was b>Cncral agreement that 'the problem ofJewish resettlement is forcing us to make a decision' as HSSPF Kruger put it. Mtcr the han on the use of transportation had been lifted, the 'action against the Jews' was to be 'implemented with greater intensity'.' The deportations from d1e District of Cracow to Bclzcc were resumed immediately following the lifting of the ban. At this point, Sohihor was shut down until October because of repairs being carried out to d1e railway line; in the meantime. larger gas-chambers were being installed there. For the other four districts of the Gencralgouvemement Poland the picture is as follows: Between 22 July and 12 September 1942 250,000 people were deponed from the Warsaw Ghetto to Trehlinka, where they were murdered. At d1e end ofjuly me deportations to Bclzec from the districts of Lublin and Galicia resumed;• at me beginning of August, the deportations from the District of Radom to Treblinca began.' The systematic murder of me Jews in the annexed area of Upper Silesia also began in mid-May. By August 38,000 people would be deponed, 20,000 to the gas-chambers of Auschwitz, the rest to forced labour camps.• In May 1942 a founh wave of deportations from Germany was set in motion. The transports to Minsk were resumed: about 26,000 people were brought to Minsk from the area of the 'Greater German Reich' in twentythree transports between May and September.~ However, the modus operandi of the exterminations was new. The deportees were no longer imprisoned in ghettos; instead, the trains went on to a station ncar the estate of Maly Trostincz; there almost all of the deportees were shot on the spot or poisoned in gas-vans.•• Between August and December the remaining transports in the fourth wave of deportations from Germany went, almost without exception, !>traight into the extermination camps of Auschwitz and Treblinka. 11 Similarly, from June onwards the Jews arriving from Slovakia and the District of Lublin, were no lonbrcr brought to ghettos but were deponed straight to the extermination camps ofSobibor. 12 The new stage in the escalation that began early in 1942 led to the abandonment of the concept of 'transit-ghettos' for Jews coming from Central Europe. Another consequence of this further radicalisation was that between 4 and 15 May the Jews who had been deported to Lodz from Central Europe in the previous autumn - the almost II,()()() people who had survived the devastating conditions in the ghetto - were murdered by gas-vans stationed in Chclmno." In May the civil authorities and the SS in the occup1ed Soviet zones bcbran a

104

"TilE fUIIHLH I lA'> LAID TilE IMI'LEMEI\ITATION OF

Till~

VEitY DIFFICULT OltDEit ON MY SI·IOULDEJlS"

new w:~ve of murders, which ended, in the summer, with the almost total desouctiou of the Jewish civilian population.•• On 28 July Himmler wrote to Gottlob Ucrger, the head of the main SS office, 'the occupied Eastern zones are bc::ing clean~cd of Jews. The Fuhrer has laid the implementation of this very difficult order on my shoulders. In any case, no-one can relieve me of the resporbibility.' From mid-July the programme of deportations from Western Europe had been set in motion. These transports went to Auschwitz. The trains from Slovakia had also now been redirected to Auschwitz, as the first of the founhwave trains from Germany had been. After the completion of provisional gaschambers in two fann houses (Bunkers I and II), what had been begun in May in Minsk and in June in Sobibor now took place in Auschwitz from 4 July onwards: beginning with the transports from Slovakia, the SS now staned to murder the majority of the deponees in the gas-chambers immediately after their arrival and after a 'selection process' had taken place on the ramp.'; In July 1942, after the transportation ban had been lifted, the Europe-wide programme ofdeportations and killings had thus come fully into operation. Tite individual clements of this programme, and their co-ordination widtin a system designed for complete ex"termination is manifest. This system may be characterised as follows: definition of Jews, deprivation of their rights, and expropriation; concentration in transition camps and ghenos; deportation; deliberately engineered high mortality rate in dte phase of concentration and deponation; selection of those 'fit for work'; murder of those 'unfit' for work or those not needed for work via mass-executions or by means of gas: 'ex"termination through work'; strict secrecy; systematic covering of traces. Immediately after 1-linunler had convinced himself during an inspection tour of Auschwitz in July'• that the cxtennination probrramme had begun, he established on 19 July a concrete schedule for the c."EJtS'

before dte murders were decisively ex1:ended {at end of April and the beginning of May 1942), Himmler met Heydrich seven times in three places withm the space of a week: first in Berlin on 25 April, twice on 26 April (at the second of dtese meetings Kurt Dalucge, the chief of the Order Police, was also pre~ent), and on 27 April; then in Munich on 28 and 30 April, and on 2 May in Prague for which Himmler made a special journey. This series of discussions was framed by two longer meetings between 1-Iimmler and Hitler, which took place on 23 April and 3 May 1942 in the Fuhrer's headquarters ... Whether or not the Europe-wide ~'tension of the murder of the Jews was indeed discussed by Hider and the leadership of the SS in a series of meetings at this time is initially only a maner for speculation, and must be examined by further research. It is quite possible that the escalation of Jewish persecution that began in May gained a further impetus from the assassination attempt on Heydrich (27 May) and his death (4 June), and that this drove those responsible to push their plans ahead more vigorously. The fact that responsibility for the death of one of those most heavily responsible for the persecution of the Jews should first and foremost be laid at the door of 'the Jews' was, in the twisted logic of the National Socialists, perfectly obvious. As a reaction to his death, 1,000 Jews were deported from Prague to Maidanek 'in retaliation'/" and Himmler made it clear in his speech to the police and SS chiefs on the occasion ofHeydrich's funeral in Berlin that the programme of murders was to be completed as soon as possible: 'The migration of the Jewish people will be done with within a year. Then no more of them will be migrating'. 21 In the period around the second half ofApril 1942, the previous modus operandi for the mass murder of the Jews was altered: up to this point, the Jews of Central Europe had been deported to the Eastern European ghettos, where the local Jewish population labelled 'not fit for work' had been murdered. Now, in the period between April and July, a step-by-step European-wide murder programme was to be set in motion. Those Jews no longer fit to work would be deponed directly to the extermination camps, while those who could still work were to be killed by the most strenuous work under the most extreme conditions. This programme included the murder of those who had been previously spared, those Central European Jews already deported to the East. A direct order by Hider initiating this entire program has not been found. It is however unthinkable that these last steps in the escalation of'Jewish policy' of the Third Reich could have taken place without Hider's express consent. From the beginning of the Russian campaign, Hider had expressed himsclfin the most drastic manner imaginable about the 'solution' to the Jewish question, and he would continue to do so until the end ofhis life. 22 As has been demonstrated, Hider had been constantly involved with 'Jewish policy' in its individual phases, he had issued important orders in this area himself and had even occupied himself with details. Over and over again, I 1itler

106

'n·IE FUI-IRf:Jt I lAS LAID TI IE IMI'LEMENTATION OF THIS VEltY DIFFICULT OltDEit ON MY SHOULDERS'

had personally radicalised the persecution of the Jews or recommended such radicalisation: he had urged the mass executions of Poles and Jews in 1939-40; he had repeatedly pushed forward the deportation plans in the years 1939 to 1941; his precepts had decisively influenced the ideological campaign against the Soviet Union; he had pushed forward the deportation of the Central-European Jews from 1941 onwards, and by means of various statements after 1941 he had demanded the 'annihilation' of European Jews. Finally, it has been made evident that the extension of the policy of extemtination beyond the occupied Soviet areas from autumn 1941 onwards was a complex undertaking that involved not only many SS and police offices but also a whole series of organisations beyond Himmler's sphere ofinfluence- such as the German occupation audtorities, the Foreign Ministry, various other ministries of Germany. the huge organization of the German railway, and many others. Only Hitler had the authority to bring together these various organisations to carry out a complex task. It was also in this phase,just as in the years between 1933 and 1939, dtat Hider repeatedly slowed down the very radicalisation of the anti-Jewish policy that he himself had decisively accelerated, doing so when it came into conflict widt other clements of his policy. Thus in the autumn of 1939 he put a stop to the N isko project, and in the spring of 1941 he stopped funher deportations into the Generalgouvemement Poland because they interfered with military campaigns. Himmler's order for the provisional cessation of the mass executions of German Jews, given at the end ofNovember 1941, will have been in accordance with dtc intentions of Hitler, who at that point was still hesitating about having the Central and West European Jews murdered as well as the East European Jews. However, such measures for restricting the persecutions were always taken abrainst the backt:,'Totmd of tactical considerations; they were provisional in nature, and must always be seen in the general context of dte policy of ell:termin:nion that was decisively determined by Hitler. Even in this phase, the terminology used by Hitler and other leading Natiorul Socialists still maintained the idea ofan 'evacuation' (Aussiedhmg. EvaJ...·uicnmg) or 'resettlement' (Umsiedlung) in the East and a 'territorial final solution' to be found after the end of the war 'outside Europe'. An ~mple is Gocbbels' diary entry for 27 April 1942: I spoke with the Fiihrer once again in great det.1il about the Jewish question. I-I is point of view on this problem is unrelenting. l-Ie wants to drive the Jews out of Europe altogether. And that is the right dting to do. The Jews have brought so much misfomme upon our Continent that dte most severe punishment that could be imposed upon them would still be too mild. l-limmler is at the moment carrying out a great resettlement of Jews from German cities to the Eastem ghettos.

107

'TilE FUI lltEit liAS LAID TI IE IMI'LEMENTATION OF TillS VEitV DIFFICULT OIU>Eit ON MY ">110UlllEitS'

Hitler e"-prcssed himselfsimilarly again on 29 May 1942, according to C.oebbels: [one must I liquidate the Jewish threat at all costs. ( ... 1 Therefore thl· Fuhrer docs not at all want the Jews to be evacuated to Siberia. There, even under the harshest conditions they would still undoubtedly represent a vital force. He would rather resettle them in Central Africa. There they would live in a climate that would certainly not make them strong and resistant. In any case, it is the Fuhrer's aim to make the whole ofWcstern Europe free ofJews.v As we have already seen, Goebbels had been infonned of the mass murders in d1e Generalgouvemcment Poland since March 1942, and had described Hitler as the originator of this policy.~4 That both he and Hitler still clung to the idea of a 'resettlement' of the Jews in April and May of that year can be attributed either to the consistent usc of 'camouflaging' tenninology,,!; or to the fact that even d1ose who were responsible for the mass murders up to this point persisted in d1e view that d1e real 'final solution' would take place at a later point and that it would only be adopted in full after the end of the war, so that the murders so far were only 'provisional' measures, or 'anticipations' of the 'final solution'.::t·Only in spring and early summer 1942 was it gradually realized that the 'final solution' was to be implemented during the course of the war itself. The statements about possible 'resettlement projects' that Hitler made after d1is point. that is from the summer of 1942, are thus unquestionably diversions meant to deceive his listeners. This is true, for example, of his remarks during the evening of24 July 1942, when Gocbbels tried to make his guests believe that the Fuhrer had nothing to do with the murder of the Jews that was being rumoured.

Mer the end of the war, he will rigorously adopt the stance that says he will smash to pieces city after city if the filthy Jt-ws don't come out and emigrate to Madagascar or some other Jewish national state 1···1 When it was reported to him that Lithuania was also free ofJews, that was therefore significant,l" At this point the Foreign Ministry had already closed its files on Madagascar five months earlier. This had been done in February, referring explicitly to a decision taken by 1-Jitler.ll
pc:ech an Munich (30.7.27), pp. 4281l:. 20.

Ibid~

I, no. 62. spc:ech in Stuttgan (15.8.1925), p. 145; ibid., I, no. 65, anicle

111

the ViilkiMIIrt

&obachttr (17.925). p. 155; ibid., I, no. 72, \pec:ch in Wismar (K.Ifl.25), p. 172. 21. lbad.,l,11o. 62. spc:ech in Srun~n (15.8.25), p. 145; ibid., I. no. 72, \pec:ch 111 Wi\mar (K.I0.25), p. 172. 22 Ibid. 11/1, no. 102, speech in Munich (9.4.27); ibid., 1111, no. 140, ~pec:ch in Munich (3.6.27), p. 340.

23. Ibid., IIIII, no. 34, spc:c:ch 111 Mumch (10.10.2H), p. 136; samilar Matc:mc:nt ihid., 11/1, no. 153, 'peech 111 Freil~si11g (3.727). 24. Ibid., 1111. 110. 159, speech

111

Mumch (30.7.28), p. 433: ib1d., 111/1, 110. 2, 'pecch an Berlin

(13.7 .28); ibid.,lll/3, no. 14, .Jnicle in the lllllltrinlrt lkobatlllrt (K2.1930), p. Kl. 25. lbad., I, no. 57, spc:c:ch in Zwicbu (15.7.1925), p. 125; abid., no. 34, 'pe!\:ch

126

111

Mumch

NOTES

(Ill 10.1 ':l.bl), p. 143. 26. 1b•d.,l, 110. 65, anicle 111 the Viilkistllrr &obad11rr (17.9.1925), p. 153. 27. lh1d .• 11/1, no. 146, speech in Munich (13.6.1927), p. 369. 28. lb1d.. 111/1, no. 39, sp«'Ch in

Au~burg

(25.10.28), p. 177; ibid., 111/1, No. 61, speech in

Nuremberg (3.11.28), p. 307.

29. lbJd.,ll/1, no. 144, spccch in Nuremberg (9.627), version A. p. 363; ibid., II/I, no. 10. circubr for the org:nnzation ofdte Nazi Party in Austria (20.726), p. 31. 30. Ibid., 11/1, no. 159, speech in Munich (30.7.27), p. 428; ibid., II/I, no. 235, spccch in Munich (24.2.28), p. 674; ibid., III/I, no. 13, speech in Munich (31.8.28), p. 42. 31. Ibid., II/I, no. 159, speech in Munich (30.7.27), p. 431. 32. lbtd .• 11/1, no. 235, speech in Munich (24228), p. 674. Similar statement, ibid .• lVI. no. 159, SjX.'CCh in Munich (30.7.27), p. 431. 33. Ibid., II/I, no. 159, SjX.'CCh in Munich (30.7.27), p. 431. 34. J>aui,At!fotalld, pp. 236fT. 35. Hitler, Rtdm, IV/I, no.'J!-), speech in Bielefeld (16.1.30), p. 110; ibid., IV/I, no. 96, ~-pccch in Kaiscrslautem (26.4.31); ibid., IV/2, no. 67, speech in GieBcn (9.11.31); ibid., IV/2, no. 70. speech in Dannstadt (13.11.31); ibid.,IV/3, no. 4, spct.'Ch in L:mgo (8.1.32). 36. Ibid., III/I, no. 97, spccch at a Nazi Party rally in Munich (29.8.30), p. 371. 37. Ibid., IV/I, no.l4, spccch in Munich (25.10.30), p. 31.

CHAPTER3 I.

Viilkistlrcr Btobad11rr, 7.4.33.

2.

Gmchmann,)riSiiz, p. 12(1.

3.

Ta.~iic/rrr G«bbds, 26.3.33.

4. 5.

Rc·iclukarazlri!RQ,timm..l111itlcr; 1/1, p. 271. VOikistlrcr lkt>batl11rr, 7.4.33.

6.

'Ge\etz zur Wit.-derherstellung des Uemfsbcamtennnns' 1='law for the ltonrution of the Pmf~,ional Civil Senice'(, RGBI, I, 175; 'Gt.-sctz Ober d1e Zulassung zur Reclusanwaltsclufi'

I ='L1w concerning Adnussimt to the Bar'(, RGB/, I, 188. 7.

'Ge~tz C\'b"Cn dil' Obcmlllnng dcutschcr Schulen und Hoch.\Cimlen' 1='law ~·nsr the

K.

Ovci'JMIJlUiation ofGcnnan Schools an Univcrsnics'l. RGBI. I, 225. Sl·c alMI\'e, p. 28.

'). Rricll•k•llt:lri!RQ.timll~l/ Hir/rr, Ill. 323. 10. lhld.,l/1, 6'1!-)11: II. Lun~rkh,J\,/itik, pp. 46f[

12. Rridukat~zlri/Rrgim"tl? 1-litlrr, 112. 865.

CHAPTER I.

Lcm.,'C'rich, Pc~litik, pp. 47fl: and 5Jf[.

2.

Ibid .. pp. 70f[.

127

4

NOTES

3. liZ, l>.tny-Chancellory. Rund"hrcilx•n 4. Ta.I/Cbiitlttr G«bb.-ls, 14.9.38. 5. RtitiiSministnimn da lm1m1. 6. Rlnrirag dtr Frrilttit, p. 113.

n 1(>4/35 (9.8.35); UAU, n 4311/6112.

7.

l·lillm Dntkstltrift.

8.

I~GBI 1936. I. 999 (1.12.36). Although dte death penalty wa~ never pronounced, m many imcmccs lengthy prison temts were imposed (cf. Fischer. Sdtadu, pp. 199f.).

9.

Barkai, Boyi..'IHt, pp. 126f; details in: 8AU. R 21.3 1.('/J?. For this and the other two anu-J~'WI~h legal proposals which were deferred. sec Adam.judmJIOiitik, pp. 1591I.

10. NG 4030, Memorandum from dte l~eachsfinanzministerium (25.4.38;) Genschel, 1-ftlriingrmg, pp. 150£. II. Decn:oe of 1211.38 (I~GBII, 1579).

12. Adam,Judmpolitik, p. 100. 13. Ibid., p. 165.

CHAPTERS I.

2

Rtitl/Jtaglmg in Niimbtrg 1937, pp. 3661I. Memorandum Clodius (Dcpanrnent of Trade) for Rt.ftrat Dn•IS(IIfand, ADAP,

sen~~

D. vol.5,

no. 579 (28.1.38). 3.

For the situation in !>pring 1938, sec the summary in l..ongerich, Politik, pp. 1550:.

4.

For dC!3ils, sec ibid., pp. 159ti.

5.

OS, 500-1-261.

6.

OS, 500-1-645, a note by Hagen from 30.6.38 on the discussion widt Uemdt a.~ well as further matcrul on dtis subject in the same file. For the speech by Gocbbcls, scc ViilkiKIIer Brobarluer,

21.6.38. 7.

OS, 500-1-261 (29.6.38),lettcr to SO-Fuhrer Obcrabschmtt Siid.ln the final copy corrected to

8.

Tagdnitlltr' Gorbbtls. 25.7.38. For d1e background to the November pogrom, sec the \Ummary ml..ongerich, l'olitik, pp. 1900:.

'on higher ordcn'. 9.

10. VOikisd1tr &obatlllcr, 9.11.38. II. Tagrblitlltr' G«bbtls, 10.11.38: 'm the aftemoon the death of the Gennau diplom~t vum Hath

j,

announced'. 12 Jordan, Erltbt, p. 180. 13. In the \tudy by Dr0scher (Rtitltskrisl411n«lll), winch i\ based on the files of the German Fureagn Office, n becomes clear (pp. 79f.) that the nCM of the death

11111!>1

have reached I htlcr vaa

ltibbcntrop before 8 pm and that the Foreign Office was infimued in the cunrsc of the afternoon that 11 was cxpc:ctcd d1at he would dae on the \ame day. 14. Tagtbiidtcr G«bbds, 10.11.38. Titc origanal ph!be: tran!>latcd by 'Thing; arc really now'

j,

uncrrum. The fact that l·hder had au intem.ivc di\CU\!>IOII with Gocbhcls hefi1re hl• ldi the roomts confinuc:d by dtc tc!>Umony at Nuremberg by the Chief of Police, Vtlll Ehcr.;tein: IMT, XX.320

128

NOTES

15.

Rl·•dc.j·WJ••~ndalcner (litc:ro~lly

'Director of Propaganda for d1c Reich') was Gocbbds' officul

function m \he leadership of the

NSDAI~

16. BAA. N$ 3fi13, publi~hed in JMT, XXXII, 20ff.. 17. Below

.YJIIIJJIII,

p. 136; Schallenncicr (pc:rsonaladjutant on Himmlcr's stall), affidavit, 5.7.46:

SS-(A)-5, lMT XLII. 5 I Iff.. l8. On d1c: rcponang by the Nazi press. sec Obst, Rticlukristallrraclrr, pp. 65f. and Benz. Riidifa/1, pp. I-IlL Concemmg the damage, sec Popplow, Novnrrbtrpogtom; d1e rc:pon of Obc:rstaaiSaJlwalt

E1sc11.1Ch on the destruction of a shop between 9 and 10. I 1.38, published in P~aold!Runge.

Kristallrraclll, pp. 125([; a first attempt to set lire: to the synagogue in Windeckc:n was made as early as 9.11 - sec: Kingreen, LarrJiebm, p. 132; Kropat, KristallrUillll, p. 27, for the: whole of 1-l~'Ssen

on 9. I 1.38.

19. BAB, NS 3()113, publi~hed in JMT, XXXIl, 20-29. 20. Tagrbiiclrt Goebbtls, I I. I 1.3~. 21. Telegram, 2.56 am, BAB. BDC Schumacher Coll~-cnon, 240/1.

22. Telex, I I.5(, pm, 374PS. published in JMT, XXV. 3n: telegram. I.20 am, 3051-PS. pubhshed ibid., XXXI, 516([. 23. For details

~'C

Hcydrich's figures at the

m~'Cnng

on 12.11.38 (note 30) and d1e rc:pon of d1e

Highest Pany Coun (note 93). For details of the pogrom itself and its efTc:cts, sec in pmicular Obst, Rriclukristallrtaclll and Longerich, Politik, pp. 202([. 24. According to Goring in the discussion of 6 December (next note). 25. Published in: Aly/1-lcim, Ord111mg. 26.

Announc~-d by order ofthe Fiihrcr's Deputy, no.

1/39 g. 17. I .39, 069-PS, I.\IT, XXV. 131([ ('On

my adVIce, the Fuhrer has made the following d~-cisions relating to the Jewish question ... '). 27. s,.,[rm·clrr (Walk). lll, 154. 2~.

RGIJI1939, l, SM.

29. RMBiiV 1291, 16.6.39. 311. 18U.-PS, /;\IT, XXVIII, 499ff.. 3 I.

rw the origins of the Schacht plan,~ ~ingancn, Hi[{dristmt~· pp. 127([; Fischer, Sdradrt. pp 2160:.

32. Sch.1cht \\~given ronscm dunng a talk with Hider in Munich: AD!Il'. series D. \'01. 5, no. 654. nndall'\lll\lle to the draft of a telegram by Wield, 12.12.3!!. 33.

nAn. 25-01, 66-1 I, Rnblcc's note to Schacht on23.1 1.38 with the oudme ofd1e pmj(('l. Dcwls of the J'lan .uulthe negotiation~ arc in a note by Schacht, 16.1.39, ib1d, pubh~hed m .1!141'. '>~.'ric\

c. vol.5, 110. 661. s~'C also Wcinganen, Hilj'ilris/111{1!· 135([.

3-1. l!!ll.-I'S,f,\ff, XXVIII, 4991t. 35. IID!IP, !oeries D. vol.4, no. 271.

3(,. IID!IP. \C'ril"i D, \'ol. 4, no. 158. 37. Speech madc on january 30, publi\hed in Doman!!>, Hitlrr,Jl. 1047([ (dle ~ ated h~ pp. 1055-5!!).

129

NOTES

I.

CHAPTER

6

CHAPTER

7

BAD. NS tSalt/842.

I. JansentWcckbcc:ker, Stlbstsdmtz; the main objectives of die Gennan occupational pohcy in

Poland arc o.-pbined in Broszat. 1\>lmpolitik, :md more recently in Majer, Fmndt.7.41,andEM47. 22. Pohl. Ostgaliziflr, pp. 54ff. and Mu~1al, Elrmrrrre, p. 172. Mu~1al doc~ not give ~ufficicnt weight to uuwnvcs for pogroms that ~tcmmed from the Gcnnan ~ide. 23. EM 112. 24. EM Kl and EM 112. 25. EM 19. 26. Sonderkommando (SK. ~pecial connn~ndo) lb: Dvir"k. 1150 victim' (EM 24, Ezcrg;tali,,

132

NOTES

I /ulgc.,,u,, pp. 271 fl); Emsaczkommando (EK. operational comnw!do) 2 Riga. 2000 victims.

s.•me murdered by the La1Vian auxiliary police (EM 24);Jelgoava, 160 viclims, some of whom \\cr.. women and children (ZSL,J1207 AR ln9/66,Judgcmem LG Oorunund, 8.7.88); at che bq;mmng ofJuly EK 3 organi!>Cd ma.s.o. \hooting> Oagcr-rcpon 1.1241, OS, 500-1-25) in d1e ft1111fic:mons of the city of Kovno; according 10 Jager's list. 2930 Jc:wish men and 47 \\vmen were \hoL From 7 July, Jager ~nt on, a group of men from his unit 'an co-q~CJ2Uon wich che ur.luuni:u1 panr'l.ln'l' also bc.-gan to carry our mass execunons outside ofKovno, in che course of which, m the momh ofJuly, over 1,400 pt."Ople, overwhelmingly Jc:wish men, wen: murdc:ml 27. On 24, 25 and 27 June, in Garsden, Krottingcn and Pobngcn (immediately across d1e border wuh Lithuania) the milt e.xc:cutcd 201, 214 and Ill civilians rcspecrivcl~ d1e vast majority of whom were J~'Wish men (OS, 500-1-758, telex from the Gcst1po office in lilsit from 1.7.41, and EM 14). During the following days firnher 'cleansing actions' followed, in whrch. according 10 the situation repon of 18Jul~ 3302 pt."Ople had been shot (EM 19, EM 24 md EM 26; sec also Jnd~:emem LG Ulm from 29.8.58, published inJ•uriz, no. 465). The fact dut in d1e n:pons of

the many shooting> carried out later in the border areas only che dcadJS ofwomen, old men and children are noted, but nor those of men of military :Jb'l:, is evidence dut all Jc:wtSh men of chis ag~."-group had inde~-d

been murdeR-din the first wave of shooting> (sec p. 71).

28. SK 7a: Vik'Yka, c:nd ofJune: I beginmng ofJul~ 'd1c: whole of male Jewry was liquidated" (EM 50); Vitebsk, c:nd ofJuly I beginning of August. 332 victims (EM 50; Judgcmelll LG £s5m of 29.3.65. published injriJiiz XX. no. 588); SK 7b: IJorisov,Jul~ md in d1e area ofOrslu/MogJicv. end of July bc.'ginning of August (Og: Dobromil. 30.6, at IL"a!>t 80 VICtims (ZSt.• 204 Alt 125&'(16, lndictmc:m of .30.1.68 :u!d

Judgt>mcm LG Ttibingcn, 31.7.19 (EM 14); Zitmmr,July.three 'actions' with o\'c:r 6(KIJC\\1Sh mrn. 7 August. a fi1nber 402\-ic1i~ (ZSt., 114 Alt-Z 269/00, final report SK 4a, 30.12.1'X,_.). SK 4b: Vinni~ 5C'C\ll1d IWfofjul):. at lc3\t 1110 v1ctilll\ (rb1d.). 30. EM 17, 9.7.41. The umtreponcd m EM 43 from5.tl.41. 'hc-twc:cn21 ..JI.7.4ll.C)J7J'C'lplewcre

133

NOTES

liquidated'. 31. SK lOa: Kodyma. 1.8.1941, 98victim~ (MA,Iu-1 2WII-488, OgoJTCCk. Eiruaugrr•ppnr, pp. t:;Jf. and Krausnick. Eiruatzgmppni!Tmppt. pp. 238f.); SK lOb: CzemowiiZ, panicipation in ma\.Jm: of Romanian 1ro0p5. 8 and 9.7.41, 100 victims (NOKW 51l7 and 3453, see alw Ogorreck. Ei1U11tzgr11ppn1, pp. 154£. At the end ofJuly Ein.'i31Zgl'Uppc: D repom.-d dtat in dtc: cily. 'of about 1200Jews am:stcd. 682 were shot in collaboration with the Romanian JX,Iice' (EM 45); SK I b. Kishinc:v. up to the beginning of August 'so far 551 Jews' had bc:c:n shot (EM 45); SK lib lighina. 7.8.41, ISS victims (EM 45; StA Munich, 115 Ks Ga-c 71, lndicmtc:nt of 19.H.71); EK 12: l'bbtschins~ 20and 21.7.41, 94 victims (EM 61: StA Munich 119cjs l/69,lndictmc:m of 28.10.72). 32. Pohzcibaaillon 309: on 27 June dte battalion had already canied out a massacre: in Bial)"Stok in which at least 2,000jews. including women and children. wc:rc: killed. Mc:mbc:rs ofdtc battalion drm-e at least 500 people into dtc: synagogue and murdered dtem by setting fire to dte building (Judgement LG 'Wuppenal 24.5.73, ZSt., V 205 ARZ 2W60). Polizc:ibataillon 316: Baranovichi,

second half ofjuly. SC\-eral hundred dead (ZSt.,ll202 AR-Z 16&'59, disposition ofdtc: public prosecutor Dortmund, 8.11.68;Judgcmc:nt LG Freiburgof 12.7.63, published in)11stiz, XIX. no. 555; Polizeibaaillon JCrl: Brc:st-Lirovsk. 12.7., several dtousand Jewish civilians (note, public prosecutor's oft"JCc: LUbeck. 9.9.65, ZSt., AR-Z 82/61).

33. Also in EM 26. On Himmler's journey see also dte diary of his personal assisant, Brandt, 30.6 (DAB, NS 19/3957). 34. OS, 500-1-25 (also ZSt., Dole. SU 401). On dtis, also EM II (SPSD =Sitllnllriupolizei and SO). 35. EM 21 oft3.7.1941; ZSt.,ll202 AR 72a160,Judgemc:nt LG Berlin of6.5.66. 36. On dte visits of30.6 and 9.7, sec: Brandt's en~ment diary (BAD, NS 19/3957) and the diary ofBach-Zelcwslci (DAB, R 2(V45b). 37. For deails sec Longmch, Politilt, pp.349f£. 38. WO»'I27, Knegsagebuch (KTB, war diary), Police Battalion 322, 9.7.41. 39. W 0»'128, file relating to KTB.Poi.IJd. 322.

40. W 0»'127, KTB Poi.Bd. 322, 8.7.41. 41. Angrick a al., T"lfbuch, pp. 334ft; Judgement of dte Landb~~:ncht ISochum ag;.in~t members of 1\Jlsce Battalion 316 also involved in dti~ massacre (LG Bochum ofl,.M,S, ZSt.. ll202 Alt-Z J(lfVS9).

CHAPTER I. 2.

12

221-L IMT, XXXVIII. pp. 861£. Kn~tat,~~:bucb of the umt

staff. published 111 Urunr El1rr, p. 30. Tlrc c.Jvalry brig;.dc: Wol\ 11111

fonnally consntutcd until2 August, from

twO cavalry rc:gjmcnts.

J. Fuulltcpon of 13.8.41, published m Urunr El1rr, pp. 2241£; Fantcr, Cnkl1t, p. Ifill. 4.

STA \\blfenbtind, (12 Nd\ Fb2. 12611.

5. Judgement LG IJcrlin, 22.Ml2

(publi~hcd 111 )mtiz,

XVIII, no. 540); ZSt., II 202 Alt 1'bll-l.l,

Judgement LG IJcrlin, 6.5.6(). On EK 9 5CC Ogorrc:ck, Eilu.rtztn1ppn1, pp. Jlll,l£. 6

ZSt.. 202 Alt-Z 73/(,J, vol. (,, JS80f[, 22.211HJ6; sec aho the intcmJg:lllllll offillx:n on23.9.71

134

NOTES

(ZSt.• 201 AH-Z 7(i59, vol. II, 7563ff.). 7.

ZSt. 201 An-z 76159,8.10.71 (vol. II, 76051T.).

ll

At another point Uradfisch said d1at dtc: same: information had bc:c:n gi\'en him by Himmlc:r btc:r an Mogilc:v: StA Munchc:n. 22 Ks 1/1961, vol. I. 136tr, 22.4.58.

s, minme of27.8.41. 20. In early September. 'I ,303 Jews. including t\7(nvomen over the age of 12'. wc.'re c.xccnh:cl (F..M 1!8); sec also BAD. NS 33122. tde.x HSSPF Somh. 5.9. 21. 19.9.41. more than 3,(}(1() vicnms (EM 106). 22. 29.9.41, 33,771 victims (according to EM 106). For Babi Var. see RieB. M~Wolitik. pp. 376ff.. 25. Judgement LG Darmstadt, 29.11.1968. On the shooungs m Bclaja Cercov Sl.>e al~o the teStimony of the luftwaffe soldier Friedrich Wilhelm Liebe. 14.6.1665 (liZ. Gd 01.54, 49). The whole process IS doC\Imented in detail in: TiroS(' ll't'll' rlrr Days, pp. 137ff.. 26. Fastov, August. 'all d1e Jews from d1e 3g\-'S ofl2 to 60, in total252 heads' (EM 80, I 1.9.41; ZSt., 114 Alt-Z 269/fJJ, final report. 30.12.68). Furdaer massacres include Radomyschl, 6.9, 1,668 vicnms (Judgement LG Darmstadt, 29.11.68 and EM 88); Zitomir. several shootings in August, includmg 3145 victims on 19.8 alone (EM 106). 27. Bogusbv, 15.9, 322 victims, which is to say all the inhabitants of the town; Uman, 22 to 23.9 (according to information from the unit, 1412 victims); Cybulow, 25.9. 70 victims, J>ercjeslas, 4.10, 537 victims, KoshcwatoJC, 'all the Jews in the town' (all details from EM 119). See also the summary inforrnatron on the murders perpetrated by EK 5 in EM Ill (8.800 Jewish victims) and EM 132 (15,110 victims in all). 28. ZSt... 201 AR-Z 76159, vol. 6, pp. 58ft, 22.3.1971. Sec also ibid., vol. 2. pp. 375f., 7.2.1957, ibid., vol 4, application for prior investigation. 29.12.1969. On this sec also 204 AR-Z 2W59, Indictment of30.12.1964. On dlc questioning of Schulz. sec also Ogorreck, Ei11sa1zgmi'J'f"• pp. 190ft. 29. Terlkommando Kronbergcr (EM 135); DiniStkalnrdrr. 30. First near Kovcl on 22 July: ZSL, 204 AH-Z 1251/65 D. SchluBvennerk Baycrisches landesknmrnabmt 19.12.77.1n addition, repon.' IJAU. NS33!22. telexes 1-JSSJ>F South of21.!!, 24.8, 27.8 widl repo~ on shooangs by 1Jattalion314. 31. Shepctovb (end ofJuly. all Jewish inhabitants); ~lavuta (552 victim\); Smlylkov (471 dead) and Bcrdtshev (1,000 V1ctims): ZSL, II 204 Alt-Z 1251!(,5; BAB.

N~

33!22 telex 1-JSSI'f HrMia

Soudl, 19.8 (for Sbvuta). 32. Statement of N~kc. 9.4.62 (StA Munich, 119 c J~ 1/(,9, vol. 4, pp. 4!1211); ~tatcment of Max Drexel, 17.4.62 (vol. 2. pp. 13211), ~tatcment of Karl Becker, 22.9.61 (vol. 3, pp. 27411) a\ wdl.l\ the statement of Erwin Harsch. 1.12.47 (vol. 7, pp. 1611411). Cf. al'iO Ognrrcck. tiillsa/zgn'l'/11'11, pp. 1.57ff_ 33.

ArullJ~'W.

SK JOb, 2!1.8 'about 3f)() Jc.'WS and Jewesses', r.e. all the Jews in the town, were

~hut

(NOKW 1702. repon of3.9.41; NO 4'1)2, t~timony by Jtohcrt Uarth, 12.9.47); Dnlll1\\3ry, EK 12. mthc middle of September all dre Jc:wi\h mhabitanl\, abuut 1,51111 people, and 1.0011 Jc.'\Yl> from the

~urronndmg lOWJI\

were murdered m two action' (StA Munich, 119 c Js 1/(,9,

lndrctmcnt, 2!1.10.70 and Judb'CIIICnt LG Mumch, IK.II.74); Nrkolajew, SK lla, end of September, all d1c

mlubrtanl~

of the: ghetto, about 5,0011 people (StA Mnmch. II'J c J~ 1/69),

lndrctmc:nt 28.10.70); Chef\On, SK II a, end ofScptc:mhc:r beginning of October, all the Jc:wi'h

136

NOTES

mh.1hn.mts (SIA Munich, 118IU 268, Indictment, 8.3.66; BAM, JU·I 20-11/488, rcpon on d1e dCIIVIry ofSK I Ia 111 Chcrwn from 22.810 10.9.41). J.l ZSt. II 213 AI~ 1902/66, Hauptaktc XI, questioning of Nos.~kc. 13.3.69, 26101T; similarly also

ZSt, II 213 AR 1902166, Korrcspondcnz-Aktc, vol. 2. 597ft:, 24.5.71; questioning of Orad. 17 4.62 (ibid., 2, 132ff.); on the totimony ofNosskc, see Ogorrc:ck. Eiruarzgmppn1. pp. 2071£.. 35. Breianan.Ail'l!itf(l, pp. 213f.; BAB, NS 19!3957.

36. EM 95, EM 116; activ1ry and situation repon no. 6, NO 2656 (published in EinsiJJZgruppcn

s.mjrtullioJ/1, pp. 222ff. & 232). 37. Jiiger-Bencht, OS, 500-1-25; Judbocmcm LG Ulm. 29.8.58, published m}ustiz, XV. no. 465. 38. llus mm had already liquidated 18.000 Jews. or had them shot by Latvian auxiiWics at the bcg~nning of September

(EM 96).

39. Sre foomotc 206. 40. Gerlach, Monlr, pp. 46ff.. 41. UAB, It 4311!687a. Lammers to ltoscnbcrg, 6.9.41. 42. Sec below, pp. 121f. 43. OS• .500-1-25, copy in ZSt, Dok. UdSSit No. 401. 44. Browning. Fi11al Sollllio11, p. 74.

CHAPTER

13

I.

Note for Frick on Eichmann's announcement in the Ministry ofPropaganda. 15.8.41, published

2.

Ta.l!fbiicllrr G«bbds, 19.8.41.

3.

BAU, NS 19/2(>55, publish~-d in En11orrl/llt~ (Longcrich), p. 157.

4.

UAB. It (YJ4a.note by Koeppen.

5. (,,

M""'''•~¥.25.10.41.

7.

Krirxsta,\'fllllcll Briilll(\\1111, p. 144.

N.

L.111gcrich, P.>litik, pp. 432(.

9.

ll>lll., I'P· 431 f..

in: RriciiSmillisttrillm, p. 303.

Trial Eichmann, doc. 1544, Heydrich to Hnmnler, 19.10.41.

10. BAB,IHV34a, 21.9.41. II. Thl·re i~ no documentary cvtdence fi•r the thc~is that Hitler decided m summer 1941 to murder .111 the EuruJ>ean Jew'>, :b it ts Jlllt forward by Hilberg. Aktill Rti1111anl and Urcimwm, ...tJrlulrd (who only ~cc' here the nnplementation ufa fundamental dcctsion taken e;uher). lkamc of the chmnoluh'Y· close inVl"itig;ttion dues not ~uppon statements often used in dns ronleXt. such ..,. that hy HoR claiming that llnnmler had passed on a d~'CISIOn to this t'ffcct nudt' by the n\hrcr in ~unnner 1941 (Cum mandant. p. 1837ff.), or that by Elchntann numtaining tlut an order \\ith the !>allle content had been pas.~ to hun in Scptt'mbcr or October by ll(')drich (Tri.JI Eichrrun".

VII, JmO:).

H~'Ynch\

'authonz.mun' by Goring on 31.7.41 tu m.akt' 'prqw-aaons' k'JI'

~

'complete ..uluuon of the J~'Wi~h Question' in Eumpe (710-I'S,l.\IT, XXVI, 266i[), refers tu the plan k1r deponation~. and i\ not the instn1ct1on to COIIIIIIIl 111.1.'' murdt'r 111 ~ ch request to the Gennan missions in the three countries from 10.11.1941. Tite agreement of the: Jtumanian, Croatian and Slovakian governments was received by telc:x from the Gennan Hc:ads of Mission in Bucharest, Agram and Prc:Bburg on 13.11.1941,20.11.1941 and 4.12.1941. Luther mfonned Eichmann about the: results of his efforts 011 10.1.1941. See IJrowning. Sol11tion, pp. 67f..

CHAPTER 1.

14

Fric:dlander. Origiru, pp. Ill fr.

2. See p. 85f. 3. NO 365, published in Kr.tusnick.JrrdnrK'!fo/gllltf, pp. 337f.. Wc:ac:J wrote that thc:rc: wm: 'no reservations • about using 'Brack's useful aids' for the: murder of Central European Jews '1!.-ho were: not capable: ofworking. Wetzc:l was obviously not completely infonnc:d ~t dtc: pobt~CD of dte ltSHA, which at this point had not yet begun to make: direct plans for dte murder of the: Central European Jc:ws. The: fact dtat dte Security Police: in the: Baltic States also shot 6.000 jc:\\'s from Gc:nnany in Novc:mbc:r 1941, in conttavc:ntion of dtc: 'guidelines' uf dte ltSI-IA could also

be: panty due to Weael"s false: infonnation. See below, p. '67. 4. Titis process was rc:construeted on dte basis of witness !>tatc:ments. Sec: Bc:c:r, Elrnrwurw. p. 407: 5.

Staatsanwaltschaft Munchc:n. Ankbge ~n Karl Wolff (ZSL, ASA 137). &-er, Em,.;cklrmg. p. 408: statement by Widmann of 11.1.60, 202 AltZ 151/159. 33ff: Ebbinghauslllrc:isslc:r, Eml(lnlrmg, testimony by N.N. Akinow.a 011 18.11.46.lengthy quotatim. ibid., pp. 88fr.. In addition, sec: statement by Georg Frc:nac:l, 27.8.70, and AI~ N. Stepanow (then Director of the: psychiatric hMpial in Mogilew). 20.7.44, bodt in StA Munich.

Zentralc:r Untersuchunlt'\'Organg 9. 6. Uc:er, E11nrwklr11~. pr. 409fT: in addition, see statement by Wadm:um in ZSL. 202 Alt-Z 1.52159.

I'P· 3311:, 11.1JIO. lk-er. Ermr;tklmt~· p. •Ill. K. E\-en bc:f\,rc: Chnstmas 1941 more: vehicles wc:n: driven from lkrlin to ltrp to Em~apuppc: A. Sc:e Uc:er, Errnrwklrmg. p. 413. For SK 4a (Einsatgruppc: C), sec IJc:er, Elrnroitklrmg. p. 412. For EK K (Ernsatzgruppc: 8). sec: the: statem~'Dt by Otto Matonoga, 8.64).6.45 to the- So\'IC't 7.

rnvc:su~tors

(StA Munich, Zc:ntralcr Unter;uchtm~"Organg 9). According to the testimony of

witnc\s, EiU'i.1tzgnrwe D used :a p-v.m :at the: end of 1941: sec: lkc:r. EnruVIIlurrg. p. 413: LG Milnchc:n, 119 c Js 1/69, Jtadgc:mcnt; statement by Jeckc:ln of 21.12.45 (published in Wilhelm, EiriStltzg"'l'l't' NTnrppr, 54K). Natiilltals!~ialististlu- MtiS.fflriMrr~•· pp. 1101T J»rc:ssac. Kmrraroritrr, pp. 41f.; Czech, K.tklrdatiurn, pp. IISfr.; Hr:urdhubc:r. ~¥Wand ll.arcz, Dit mtr lfr.\wllr~. in Adler et at.• Arrsclr,;t;:, Pr· 17f. CAJ~rrmarrdarrr, pp. 144fr.. Ibid., p. 183. tlllt'

').

10. 1I. 12.

139

NOTES

13.

~. NnlloliMai,I'JI. Jsa:.

14. See Aly. Fi11al Scl111i1111, pp. 323ft:. 15. Gerlach, ruilmr. 16. In this ronto."t, see Hider's ~tllements in the run\·crsation abo111 'Ea.,tem qu~-stion,' on

1(, July

(IMT, XXXVIII. 86fT.. 221-L).

17. Kershaw, Firl41 Scllllill, p. 65. In 1942 infonnation to the eff~-ctthatthe Jew.. of the Dr\trict of Konin, 3000 people in all, had been S)"itematically murdered got through to the United Suto. This was conlinned by a German in\'cstig;ttive proceeding (~"C ZSt., 206 AR-Z 22!V73). 18. Judgement. LG Srungan. 15.1:1.50. pnhlish~-d in}11stiz, VII. 231a. 19. Aly, Firl41 Sclmi1111, pp. 70fT.. 20. l'ltO. HW ltY.32. 4.10.4 I. 21. Statement of Lange's driver, Jruriz, XXI. no. 594, LG Bonn, Judgement. 23.7.65: Nariorl41st>zialistisdr~-.\IIISS('III•itlllrgnr,

pp. I lOfT..

22 Fwdrinmu, p. 278.

23. TI1e repon ofd1e Gestapo in Lodz ('Judenrum') also points to the central role ofGreiser: see Fwdrinmu, p. 285. 24. Din1S114grlmdr, 14.10.41. 25. lbrd., esp. pp. 427£. The regulation was back-dated to 15.10. Published in. r'iiS(trisrmu, pp. 128f.. 2l>. liZ, MA 120. m brief in DiniSitllgtb11clr,. p. 436. 27. liZ. MA 120, 111 bnefin Ditrrstl4gtbrKir , p. 436. 28. Pohl, Osrgalizitrr, pp. 140II. TI1e abbreviation 'z.b.V.' means 'zur beo;onderen Verwendung', for ~pecial pu~.

The unit consisted of members of the Security l'olice in the

Gencralgouvemement Poland and was deployed in thrs area. Typical of this pha.w is, for example, me 'Intelligence-Action• m Stanisbu on 3 August in which 600 men were shot (Judgement LG Munster. 31.5.1968, 5 Ks 4/65, liZ. Gm 08.0!1). 29. l'ohl, Ostgalizinr, p. 138. 30. liZ, Gm 08.08, Judgement LG Munster, 31.5.68, 5 JU 4/65, ~utement by the Head of the outpost Kriiger. vol. 30, pp. 96f. 31. On Sumsbu, sec Pold, Ostgalizinr, pp. 144fT.. 32 Dinwtk41nrdCT. 33. UAU. UDC-File Globocnik. Lcucr to Himmlcr of 1.10.11J4 t. Cf. J>uhl,l.lllllill, p. WI. 34. ZSL, 208 AI~-Z 252/SIJ, vol. 6, pp. I 179, ~utement ofSuni\law Ko~k. Start ofcon\lructinn w,,, 1.1 I.4 I. J>ubli~hed in NS-MQSS(IIIiilrmgm, pp. I52f.. Tregenu's stud}\ lklz«, conlirm' dri~ dJte. 35. Accordmg to ArJd, Btu«, p. 17, the lirst group of the 'Euthanasia' pcr~nnnd arrrved

111

Udzcr

between drc end of October and the end of December. 36 l'ohl. Llrbli11, pp. 101 and 105f.. 37. Manoschek. Srrbim, pp. 43f.. 38. lbrd., pp. 49ft. 39. Ibid .• pp. 71JII. TI1e order originally mcrnroned 2,11111 victim\, but the ligure Wa\ rar~c.l by IIIII Jfter .-mother Gem1an soldier dr~-d. 40. Jbrd .• pp. 86fT.. 41. NG 3354; Manoschek. S.:rbrm, p. 104

140

NOTES

·12 NG JJ54: Manoschek. Srrbim, p. 102.

43. Ibid.. pp. 84f.. ·l-1. lbtd .. pp. 96f..

45 Ibtd. p. 86. 46. I'M. Inland Jig 104, lkricht lbdemacher 7.11.41; Manoschek. Snbiert, pp. 1021I. 47 Lonj.,'Crtdt,l'o/itik, 460.

48. Safnan, Eitlmtarm-Miillllfl, pp. 153(. 49. 'Deportatoion ofJ~·ws from lkrlin - no liquidation' (Dimstkalmdrr). Aldiough the: order only referred concretely to the: tr.msport from lkrlin, it led to a temporary halt being ailed to the liquidations ofJ~-w.. from die area of die Greater Gcmian Reich in the Baltic States. The: mere fact that Himmler was in the c:~.'tcnsive area of die FUhrer's headquarters dunng his tc:lcphonc:call of 30 November does not pcnnitthe conclusion diat die order came from Htdc:r. In faa. it was only after the

tclephone-c~llthat

die two were to meet and discuss the m.tttc:r at length

(Dimstkalmdrr). 50. Dimstkall'lrtlrr, 30.11., 1.12. 11. 4.12.41 .tnd 1'1~0. HW 16'32, 1.12. u. 4.12. 51.

s~-c

p. 76.

52. Draft of the speech quo"-d in Wilhelm. Rtwl'ltpolitik. p. 131 from I'M. J>ol XIII, 25, VMRcpon~: draft.). Sec also the notes ofa reporter ('strictly confidential infomutional report') from

this press conference: 'llic number ofjews in this entire area ts cstnnatc:d at 6 Million. brougflt across the Urals in the course of the: year or othcrw&- became somehow victim to extermination': Hagemann. PrasrlrrrkiiiiJ1, p. 146.

CHAPTER I.

Ta.flf/Jiidrt'T GS-1517./MT, XXVII. 27011:. Difllstk.tlrrrcii'T.

4.

5.

15

Ndther thi~ note nor Hider's ~tatemenL~ on 12 December em be adduo:d .tS proof of a 'basic dc:ci,ion' on llider's part to c:~rry ont the murder of all Enropcan jC\~ in the cootcxt of the d~·darauon of war a~in~t the USA. as d~'S Gerlach, HumU«-Korifrm~: (on dus !Itt Longmch.

C..

H>litik, 1'1'· 46611:). D.•m.tms, II, IH21.

7.

Ibid .• II. PI'· IR21lf..

H.

lllilki.tt-lrrr lfn>l~l(lllrr, 2(1.2.42, pnhlish~-d 111 Domaru~. II. 1~.

'). M,,,,>f,';l,rr. 27.1.42 10. lhld .• 22.2.42. II.

Ta.~rrl•iidri'T G,!C'I,f~ofs.

15.2.42.

CHAPTER I.

16

PM. Inland II g. In, no. Ill, pnhlish~-d 111 Enrr.•nlm~ (Lo~h). pp. &>II.

141

NOTES

2. On d1c: forced labour complex at d1i\ period, sec Longcrich, A>lilik, pp. 47(, a:. 3. Ditrlsttagt1111tll, pp. 457£. 4. Ditrurragtl,tlr, I 6.12.1941.

CHAPTER I.

2

17

1Cl63-l,S, published m EnriMI1111g (l.ongcrich}, pp. 165f. Sc:c: also d1c: 'Guidelines for the tc:chnic:al implc:menution of the: evacuations of Jews from the: Gc:nralgouvc:mc:mc:m' (ltichdanic:n zur tc:clmischc:n Durchtuhnang dc:r Evakuic:rung von Judc:n m das Gc:nc:ralgouvc:mc:mmt),ltZ. Collection of Edicts ofd1c: Gestapo Wiirzburg. publi~hc:d in Adler, Mtrudr, pp. 191£. Transcript of a mc:c:ting on 9.3.43, Eichmann Trial, doc. 119, published in Em1Ml111!~ {Longcrich),pp. 167~

3. Note: by Reuter, Dc:panmmt for Population and Wc:lf:uc: (Abltillll!f Btt,qll.m,rgnrrrmr 1111d Flir»~gr), 17.3.11942, quoted from Adlc:r, 11rnrsitriSftllh, pp. SOf.. 4. Sec: Longerich. Polilik, pp. 484ft. 5. Ibid., p. 492. 6. Klarsfdd, Vldl)', p. 43. 7. Note: by Dannc:cker, 10.3.41, 1216-IU:, published in IOarsfeld, Vrdry, pp. 374£. ltecord by Zeitschel, 11.3.42. published in Klarsfeld, Vld1y, p. 375. IOarsfeld, Vrdry, pp. 34ft to. Mon:shet-Archivc:, Givat Haviva, Israel (copy from the ~ Sure Archive, 114-7-3011),

8. 9.

published in T~ Slomuk)dr ZUiov. ~a Dok11111tr11)', Uratislava 1949. II. Note by Dannccker 15.6., IU: 1217, publtshc:d in IOarsfdd, Jliclry, pp. 379ff.; cf. Klarsfc:ld's interepmation, ibid.. pp. 66£. 12 llohl, Z.,Win, 109fT; L\'OV Sure Arcluve, R 37 (Sudthauptmann Lemberg), 4-140,nolc: in file: of 10.1.1940 concerning the mcctmg of the administration of d1e di\trict (copy in the: USIIMM 13. 14. 15. 16.

Washint.'IDn); Pohl, OSfltlli:itll, pp. J80f[. Safrian, Eitlrnran-Minrw, pp. 150ft. Fleming. Hirkr, pp. 87fE. Dimstwltrulrr, 14.3.42 llohl. Ostgali:im, pp. 17'Jfi.

17. llold, Ostgalizim, p. 104. 18. Ta.fll'biidlft' Gotbbtls. 27.3.42. 19. lbid...20.3.1942. 20. ManMChc:k. Strbiftr, pp. J6CJfi.

CHAPTER

18

1. VOGG. 1942, pp. 321fE, 'lnsmtCtton Conccmmg 1hc: Tran\fc:r ofDu1i~'l> In 1hc: Su1c: Sccrc:ury for Sc:cunty (ErbR iibcr die: Obcrweastmg von Dic:nstgesch~flc:n auf den Sta.tl~~krcL'ir f'iir da' Sachc:rhei~n); c£ llohl, urbli11, p. 125.

142

NOTES

2.

Ar~d.

J.

l'ohl, L11bli11, pp. 1201[.

Btlzu, pp. 3711:.

1\>hl. Lubli11, p. 122; l'ohl, Ostg;~lizim, p. 195.

5.

Dinutlagtbtllll.

6.

And. Btlz«, 126£. 3!0tT..

7.

Ibid., 393tT..

8.

Stembacher, A11stltll'i1Z, 271iff..

9.

Details in Longcrich,l\llitik, p. 490.

10. Judgcmem LG Koblenz 21.5.63, ~hootmg., ~'C

publish~-d

in }tutiz XIX. no. 552 (Heuser ase). On the

also d1e: Acti\1ty Reports of dte II. Platoon, Waffc:n-SS Bd. z.b.V., published in

UtiStrt Btrt, pp. 236ff.. II. Details m Longerich, Politik, p. 490. 12. Buchler. Ckponatiott. 13. Wille:, Dt:tisiOIIS, pp. 335£. 14. Longerich, Politik, pp. 51 Iff.; Pohl, Ukraittr. Gerlach, Morrie, pp. 6!01L 15. Czech, Kalmdari11111. 16. Longcrich, Politik, p. 508. 17. BAD, NS 19/1757, published in Emtordllt!f,(Longcrich), p. 201. Ill. BAB, NS 19/2655. Ganzenmiiller to Wolff on 29.7.1941. 19. It is not dear from Himmler's notes what was discus'it'd at dtC5C mecDIIg."i. Tite only c:xccpoon i~ hi~

repon to Hider on 3 May: from the notes by Himmler dt.ll ha\'e been preserved. it

eme'b't.'S that the topic was matters relatmg to the Waffen-SS; but other, non-military sut;~ were also discussed, which Himmler did not record (Dimstkalnulrr. p. 415. note 6). 20. Schmidt-1-lanmann, Tstlt«llosloll'akti, p. 362. 21. Himmler, Grlrtimmlrtt, p. 159. 22. See ~'Sp. cbs. II; 13, 14, 15. 17, 20, 21. 23. Ta.l!fl•iidrtr G,lfli/IC'Is, 27.4.42. 24. Seep. 102. 25. Tite f.lctthat there was a languJb..:-regulation within dte National Socialist ~tena. acronbng ro which

mas~

lll\tanc~.

murder of Jews

\v.IS

to

b~· d~'SCribed a.~ ·~ulement',

em be sh0\\11 m

I1W1}

For C.'\"3ml'le,the command post of8achtsschis.o;aray, a unu-~tauon ofdte ~hrmacht

mthe nccupk'd Sovtet Umon not~-d intts activity repon of 14.12.1941 dte murder of the Jew\ li\"in~ in

th.n are.t: 'Tite Jews who had been restdmg here were not rich ;md lived m a rdatl\~1)·

m1KINmanner. Th~· S.D. carried out the ~hooting of the Jews on 13.12.1941.' In the reran. the wunl ·~hootiug' (Ersclne6ung) \Vol~ Cl"OS\cd out by hand and repbccd by dte W\W 'n::;ndcmcnt' (AtMil-dlung) (Z~t. Dok. USA. 29). The commander of the Secltrity Police and dte SO in Wlute ltuthenia issued an mstmctron on 5.2.1943 111 winch he ordered dte "rcsenlcrnmt' of dte Jew'> living in

dt~· city of Sluzk.

The order continues, 'm dte resettlement ~ite dtcre are two d11chc5..

E.tch drtch •~ worked on by a group of ten kaders and men, rehevcd t'\"t'J)' two ht.lnrs. 'llte order also d~·tenuined who was to be respomible klr 'distribming canrid~' oo w ~lt'llt ~ite' (ZSt., [)(lk. USSI~. 107). 1-limmler nsed the wurd 'reseulcment' (UmsiNiung) in a d.lCUrnent from July 1942, for c:.'\"3mplc. to order the murder of dte brgc-

143

lll~JO"tV ,l( d1e jt'\vs

rn

w

NOTES

Gc:neralgouvc:mement Pobnd by the end of that year (sec: foomote 17). 26. The so-called 'Schlegdbergcr Note' can be used in suppon ofdtis argument only wnh \C:I) strong reservations (BAB, R 22152). In a note located in the records of th~ ReichsjustiZJmmsterium, a ci\'11 scmmt in this ministry. possibly Secretary of State fr .anz Schlegdbergcr himself. noted dtat Lammers the Head of the Rcidtskanzlci, had infomtcd him that

me Fuhrer had 'repeatedly infonned hun ILammers I that he wished it to be dear th.ll Ul~

solution to the Jc:wi~h question had been postpon~-d until after the war. In accordance widt tlus.

m the opimon ofl~eichsminister Lammers, the current discussions have only a th~'Oretical v.aluc. He is ho\\'1.'\'er concemed abo,·e all to pu'Vent ftmdamental dectsioiLs being taken widtont h~ knowledge on the basas of a surpnsc repon from another quaner.' The note is undated and unsigned. The date and authorship cannot be estabhshed widt anything approachmg cenaimy. Th~ document conveys

the infomtation dtat Lammers's was SIIJlpost~l to have at that pomt, bnt

it docs not say when Lammers received this infonnation from Hitler. If the document i~ dated

me Wannsce Conference (20 January 1942), the information that Hitler waJit~-d to postpone me 'solunon to me JC\\ish question' until after the war is of no particular imponance. before

If it is of a later date. and if one assumes dtat it contains accurately dte mfonnation mnrmly

possessed by Lammers, dtc:n there is reason to think that the fonnulation 'solution to the Jewish

me problem of'mixed-racedJ~'WS' that had not been decided c.'Ven after the Wannsce Conference, and which was me object of discussion between the relcv;ant minisnies (including me Justice Ministry). However, if one assumes that me document was written in spring 1942. and dtat me formulation 'solution to the Jewish qu~'Stton' indeed refers to the question' refers to

'Jewish question' as a whole, and if one supposes dtat Schlcgclbergcr was reporting Lammers com:cdy and dtat Lammers was rcporang Hider correctly, then this document can only be antcrprctcd in

me same way as Hider's remarks to Gocbbels in April and May- as an expr~'Ssion me murders dut had already been earned out of hundreds of

of Hader\ conception dtat

mousands of people in btcm Europe did not yet represent the real 'final solution', and that mis would take place at a latcr datc and only be completed aftcr the end of the war.

27. l'ickcr. TISlllgtsprlitM. 28. lnfonnation from Rademacher to Biclfeld, 102.42, publi~hcd 111 Urcchtken, MaJa..~kar, p. 279.

CHAPTER

19

Tagrbiitllct Gotbbtls 30.5.42. 2. Dt11tslllia111ls Riist1111g, 20-22.9.42. p. 189. I.

4.

Tagrbiftl•cr Gocbbtb, 30.9.42. DomJru~. II, pp. 19131T. p. 1920. Unlc:r repcatcd tins thrc~t m another ~pccch on HNovember 1942 (abid., 19331T. 1937).

3.

5.

Sec foomotc 2.

(l.

NO 1611; published an fac~nnle 111 Grabiu/Schc:fficr, SJIIITtll, p. 17'J.

7.

IJAB. NS 19/2')1.

H.

1-lilbcrg. lfmidlllm~. p. 761.

9.

ltautk.11ho, Fi1111111d, pp. 82f_

144

NOTES

10 Bru\\1llng, SCIIutiCIII, pp. 115fT.: for the exchange of documents on d1is topic, see PM. Inland llg 200. II. PM.Inl.md llg 177, ltibbcmrop to Luther, 25.8.42. 12 lb,d., note by Lud1er, 21.8.42.: Inland llg 208, letter from Eichmann to the Foreign Minisay,

25.9.42. 13. PM. Inland Jig 183, ~pccch note by Lmhcr, 10.9.1942: Chary, Bu/gdritl, pp. 113fr: Browning. 5o>llllt011, p. 123. 14. PM. Inland llg 177, ~pccch note by Lmher,11.9.42: Carpi. Resaw, p. 717.

15. PAA. Inland Jig 190. Suhr w Rademacher, 11.7.42: Carpi, Notes, pp. 738fT.. 16. PM. Inland II g 208, note by Lmhcr fi>r von Wcizsacker v. 2·t9.42. 17. Sec p. II I. 18. StaatsmJrm« II, pp. Iliff., note of25.9 on the discusston of24.9, pp. 118£ 19. StiJtltsllt