The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession: Evidence on Mobility and Integration of Bulgarian Migrants in Germany [1 ed.] 3658331097, 9783658331092

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Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik

Vesela Kovacheva

The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession Evidence on Mobility and Integration of Bulgarian Migrants in Germany

Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik Reihe herausgegeben von Danielle Gluns, Universität Hildesheim, Hildesheim, Germany Uwe Hunger, Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften, Hochschule Fulda, Fulda, Hessen, Germany Roswitha Pioch, Fachhochschule Kiel, Kiel, Germany Stefan Rother, Universität Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany

Migration ist eines der zentralen Globalisierungsphänomene des 21. Jahrhunderts. Entsprechend groß ist das Interesse an Fragen der politischen Regulierung und Gestaltung der weltweiten Migration, den Rechten von Migrantinnen und Migranten und der Integration von der lokalen bis zur globalen Ebene. Die Buchreihe ist interdisziplinär ausgerichtet und umfasst Monographien und Sammelwerke, die sich theoretisch und empirisch mit den Inhalten, Strukturen und Prozessen lokaler, regionaler, nationaler und internationaler Migrations- und Integrationspolitik befassen. Sie richtet sich an Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler, Studierende der Geistes-, Sozial-, Wirtschafts- und Rechtswissenschaften sowie an Praktikerinnen und Praktiker aus Medien, Politik und Bildung. Die Herausgeberinnen und Herausgeber werden in ihrer Arbeit durch einen wissenschaftlichen Beirat unterstützt, den die ehemaligen Sprecherinnen und Sprecher des Arbeitskreises bilden: Prof. Dr. Sigrid Baringhorst, Universität Siegen, Prof. Dr. Thomas Faist, Universität Bielefeld, Prof. Dr. Karen Schönwälder, Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung multireligiöser und multi-ethnischer Gesellschaften, Göttingen, Apl. Prof. Dr. Axel Schulte i.R., Leibniz Universität Hannover, Prof. em. Dr. Dietrich Thränhardt, Universität Münster.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11808

Vesela Kovacheva

The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession Evidence on Mobility and Integration of Bulgarian Migrants in Germany

Vesela Kovacheva Hamburg, Germany

Dissertation, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, 2018, disputation on 19 March 2019 (D 6)

ISSN 2567-3076 ISSN 2567-3157 (electronic) Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik ISBN 978-3-658-33109-2 ISBN 978-3-658-33110-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33110-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Responsible Editor: Stefanie Eggert This Springer VS imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Acknowledgements

Shortly before Bulgaria acceded to the European Union in 2007, I migrated to Germany to participate in a master’s programme. Overnight, I became an EU citizen and experienced how this affected my situation in Germany. This personal experience shaped me and motivated me to research the impact of EU accession on Bulgarian migration. Six years after the EU accession, I started my doctoral thesis. I surveyed 401 Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg, and I’m deeply grateful to them for sharing their experiences with me. Many colleagues and friends supported me during my dissertation project. Above all others, I am indebted to my supervisors Dietrich Thränhardt and Thomas Straubhaar. I thank them for their trust, skilful guidance and for being there with help and advice at all stages of the dissertation. I am profoundly grateful to Dita Vogel who supported and advised me during my work as a researcher, believed in my skills, encouraged me to start my doctoral thesis and supported me during all phases of the work. I thank her for showing me what research means. For the generous financial support for my research, I thank the ZEIT Foundation Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius. I sincerely thank all members of the advisory board and the team at the ZEIT Foundation for giving me the chance to participate in the PhD programme Settling into Motion, to get in touch with great scholars all over the world, to learn from and discuss with them. I did my doctoral thesis during my work at the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI). I highly appreciate all my colleagues with whom I worked over the years and who contributed to my work with advice and criticism. I thank the ISMU Foundation for Initiatives and Studies on Multi-ethnicity in Milano for hosting me and in particular Gian Carlo Blangiardo for sharing

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his knowledge on the centre sampling technique. I’m grateful to the Edmund Siemers-Stiftung that supported the fieldwork financially, and to Vladimir and Emilija who were at my side during the fieldwork and interviewed many of the survey participants. The support of all the organisations in Hamburg that permitted me to do the fieldwork in their locations or use their e-mail lists is highly appreciated. These are the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Bulgarian kindergarten and school, the German-Bulgarian association in Hamburg, the Bulgarian café Thrakia, the Bulgarian shop BG Kost, the Bulgarian women and families club, the dance group Zdravets, the organisations Plata, Westend, Vericom, and Evangelische Auslandsberatung. Special thanks also to Elena Kireva, Max Steinhardt and Franziska Sinowski for helpful advice on questionnaire preparation, and Elisabeth Bublibtz for valuable support in the statistical analysis. I am deeply grateful to all colleagues who read earlier versions and parts of the doctoral thesis and gave me thoughtful and inspiring comments, in particular to Ferruccio Pastore, Meike Löhr, Norbert Cyrus, Manuel Assner, Daniel Naujoks and Yasar Aydin. Special thanks to Norbert Kersting for the stimulating discussion during my thesis defence. I thank all the scholars I got to know over the years at conferences for questioning and inspiring my research at the same time. Thanks to the editors of this series for their useful comments and to Alec Crutchley for his diligent proofreading of the thesis. The submission of the doctoral thesis and its defence took place at the University of Münster in March 2019. During the work on my dissertation, my sons Theodor and Daniel were born. Thanks to them, to my husband Vladimir and to my family for being there with their love and patience.

Executive summary

The patterns of Bulgarian migration to Germany since 2007 revisited Bulgarian and Romanian migrants in Germany show particular patterns that contrast with all other immigrant groups. On the one hand, EU2 migrants— Bulgarians and Romanians—have encountered considerable integration challenges in areas such as housing and the labour market. On the other hand, their naturalisation rates have been exceptionally high and considerably above the average. Although high naturalisation rates hint at particularly successful integration in society, Bulgarian and Romanian migrants in Germany have been widely perceived as problematic. The image of poverty migration and EU2 migrants being a burden on the social welfare state has dominated the discourse and has triggered a critical discussion about the social rights of EU migrants. Thus there seems to be a discrepancy between perceptions and realities of EU2 migration to Germany since 2007 that challenges researchers to produce a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of this migration. This study seeks to address this need by focusing on Bulgaria. Bulgaria is small in terms of population but sends a relatively large number of migrants to Germany in relation to its population. In 2017, it was the 16th largest EU country in terms of population but the 5th largest EU nationality in Germany. Various sources, such as official statistics, administrative documents, and scientific reports, have pointed to changing patterns of migration and integration since 2007. They are certainly to be attributed to the acquisition of EU citizenship, as it grants to Bulgarian migrants more mobility, economic, social, and political rights than they had as third-country nationals in the past. EU citizenship as a legal status is thus a means for more legal integration in the receiving country. It unfolded its positive but often unnoticed effects for Bulgarian migration and deserves more scientific attention than it has received so far.

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Better legal integration in the sense of rights creates more opportunities for participation in society. It may thus change patterns of mobility, participation in the labour market and elections, and naturalisation practices. However, acquisition of EU citizenship cannot alone explain the distinct patterns of Bulgarian migration since 2007, as differences from previous EU enlargements and current EU migration indicate. In line with the experience in the 1980s, migratory movements after the 2007 EU accession have been dynamic and mostly of temporary and circular nature. As for other EU migrants in Germany at present, the political participation of Bulgarian migrants is at a modest level. However, Bulgarian migrants tend to inhabit disadvantageous positions in the labour market more often than their counterparts from other EU countries. Furthermore, they have exceptionally high naturalisation rates despite holding EU citizenship status. How can these specific patterns of migration, integration and naturalisation of Bulgarian migrants be explained? The benefits of a time-location sampling survey To address these questions, I carried out a migrant survey at the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013 in Hamburg. It captures the experiences of 401 Bulgarian migrants in relation to migration, labour market participation, electoral participation and naturalisation. The survey is based on a time-location sampling technique that consists of randomly interviewing migrants at selected migrant-oriented meeting points. Time-location sampling has two key advantages compared to other sampling techniques. First, it allows for a probability sample to be drawn from the population of Bulgarian background. A broad set of meeting points of relevance for the Bulgarian population was selected so that each member of the Bulgarian population had a non-zero chance of participating in the study. The meeting points were visited over a particular time period, and visitors were asked at random to participate. The initial sample is biased due to different individual probabilities of inclusion in the sample, and an inverse weighting procedure is applied ex post to address this bias. Based on the weighted sample, it is possible to make inferences about the total Bulgarian population in Hamburg. Second, time-location sampling allows for the population of Bulgarian background to be captured at the local level when a proper sampling frame is missing. Besides Bulgarian citizens who register with the local registration offices, two further groups can be identified among people of Bulgarian background, despite the fact that they are scarcely captured in administrative data: unregistered persons and naturalised persons. Time-location sampling makes it possible to reach them. Given that 12 per cent of the sample were unregistered Bulgarian citizens and 11 per cent were naturalised persons, the survey results point to a significant relevance of both groups for the Bulgarian population in Hamburg.

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The migrant survey further reveals a high relevance of ethnic minorities, with at least one-third of the Bulgarians in Hamburg belonging to an ethnic minority group. Bulgarian Turks are over-represented compared to their share in the population in Bulgaria, while the proportion of Roma corresponds to their relative importance in the Bulgarian population. In light of the sizeable Turkish-speaking community in Germany, this finding suggests that a common language supports migration. To help explain migration patterns, labour market participation, electoral participation, and naturalisation practices, I used descriptive and multivariate analyses. Two subgroups of the sample were compared—migrants who arrived before (pre-accession migrants) and after 2007 (post-accession migrants). Then, logistic regressions were run to show the influence of individual characteristics and institutional arrangements on participation. Analysis reveals that the particular patterns of migration and integration are a result of the interaction between specific institutional settings in the country of residence and distinct features of the country of origin. Institutional arrangements in Germany, such as national policies related to EU citizenship, proved to affect the mobility and participation of Bulgarian migrants considerably. These are, in particular, the transitional periods in the freedom of work, the dual citizenship policy, and the laissez-faire policy related to electoral participation. It can be assumed that these policies affect the other 2007 EU accession country Romania in a similar way. Specific migration relations to Germany in the past and the particular demographic, economic, social, and political situation in Bulgaria at present considerably contribute to the trends in migration after EU accession. They are to be embedded in the broader historical process of the establishment of migrant communities. The process of establishment of a sizeable Bulgarian community in Germany EU accession triggered a new migration wave from Bulgaria to Germany with a significant and enduring increase in migration. New migration from the country of origin took place, but fears of excessive postponed emigration did not come true. Two other factors contributed to a similar extent to the increase but are largely disregarded: redirection of Bulgarian migration from crisis countries during the global economic and financial crisis of 2007 and renewed migration of persons with pre-accession experience in Germany. Previously unregistered migrants became able to obtain residence status more easily than in the past and were captured in administrative data for the first time. Furthermore, previous circular migrants who had practised back-and-forth movements between Germany and Bulgaria to cope with the legal regulations for regular residence became able to settle more permanently. These registration and settlement effects of EU citizenship were most relevant in the first years after EU accession.

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Executive summary

In line with expectations, Bulgarian migrants that hold EU citizenship practice predominantly temporary and circular migration, and have relatively short-term lengths of residence in Germany. The dynamic migratory movements in the first years after EU accession that characterise Bulgarian migration are known from previous EU enlargements as well, for example in the 1980s. In contrast to them, a sizeable proportion of Bulgarian migrants settled, and the Bulgarian population in Germany has substantially increased. This development can be seen in the broader context of the establishment of new migrant communities. Germany has been among the most preferred destinations for Bulgarian migrants for decades, but in the past opportunities for legal migration and permanent settlement were limited. The process of establishment of a sizeable Bulgarian community in Germany started in the 1990s but occurred at a slow pace until 2007. EU accession changed this by opening up more opportunities for legal and permanent migration and thus facilitating the process of establishment of a sizeable Bulgarian community in Germany. The naturalisation practices of Bulgarian migrants give further arguments for the process of establishment of a sizeable Bulgarian community in Germany after EU accession. In contrast to expectations of few incentives for Bulgarian migrants to naturalise, they have much higher naturalisation rates since 2007 than citizens from other EU countries. To a large extent, the high naturalisation numbers can be attributed to a ‘naturalisation hump’: migrants who did not want to renounce their Bulgarian citizenship in the past decided to naturalise after the dual citizenship policy came into force in Germany. The introduction of the dual citizenship policy as of 2007 coincided with EU accession and considerably supported the naturalisation of Bulgarian migrants. Multivariate analysis reveals that permanent settlement is the main explanatory factor for the willingness to naturalise and is indicated by good German language skills, long length of residence, and intention to remain in the long run. The extraordinary proclivity of Bulgarian migrants to naturalise is a sign of their successful settlement in Germany and of a great willingness to participate in society. Perceived discrimination towards foreign nationals is a further decisive determinant of naturalisation, showing that German citizenship is considered a mechanism for overcoming discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Although the positive influence of EU citizenship on an individual’s situation is without doubt, it neither replaces receiving country citizenship nor makes it obsolete. Full legal integration through naturalisation continues to be of relevance, particularly for permanent settlers. They expect practical advantages from naturalisation, such as better job opportunities and secure residence status.

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Naturalisation seems to be less motivated by alienation from the country of origin than is assumed for countries with low economic development, political instability and a high level of corruption. The fact that almost all naturalised persons retained their Bulgarian citizenship hints at its high relevance for the individual. Retention of Bulgarian citizenship is an expression of a willingness to maintain rights and symbolic membership of the country of origin in case of return. Similarly, migrants consider German citizenship as a mechanism for securing rights in Germany when a person leaves the country for a lengthy period of time. The vast majority of those interested in naturalisation attach great importance to the possibility of maintaining their rights in Germany. This finding suggests that legal uncertainty creates strong incentives for the acquisition of German citizenship. Since 2007, Bulgarian migrants have faced twofold legal uncertainty. On the one hand, restricted labour market access in the first years after EU accession limited their economic rights, and on the other hand, contested access to the welfare system in the 2010s put social rights into question. Thus, even in the context of free movement with the right of free entry and residence, the legal rights attached to national citizenship of the country of origin and residence are a great advantage of dual citizenship and motivate EU citizens to naturalise. Integration challenges and potentials in the labour market and political area Concerning their integration, understood as participation in society, Bulgarian migrants have predominantly been perceived as problematic. Integration challenges, such as migration of low-skilled persons with few prospects in the labour market and a high level of vulnerability of Bulgarian workers, have become public knowledge. Many migrants find themselves in disadvantageous positions in the labour market. They work below their level of qualification, have a low income that makes them likely to become dependent on social benefits and are prone to violation of fundamental labour rights. Almost half (45 per cent) of the survey respondents with experience in the German labour market had experienced violations of basic labour standards after EU accession at least once. For example, they were not paid for a couple of days or even months, or had to work considerably longer than agreed. This study provides empirical evidence that the transitional periods—restricting the right to be employed—substantially contributed to this vulnerability of Bulgarian migrants in the German labour market. The requirement for a work permit significantly increases the individual probability of self-employment, undeclared work, and violation of labour standards, as multivariate analysis shows. Self-employment during transitional periods is often involuntary, driven by the absence of a work permit, and constitutes a way of circumventing restricted labour

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market access. Thus labour market restrictions redirect labour market participation to more unfavourable forms rather than preventing it. In light of the challenges related to the quality of employment, potential in the labour market area, such as favourable individual migrant characteristics, has been largely disregarded. A high proportion of persons of prime working age, labour migrants, highly educated, and settlers facilitate labour market integration in the long run. In contrast to the conventional wisdom that unemployed and inactive people leave Bulgaria, the migrant survey shows that a sizable majority of respondents (90 per cent) had work in Bulgaria or migrated directly after completing their studies. Since 2007, most Bulgarians who moved to Germany did so to work, and migration proves to fit the pattern of labour migration much more than that of poverty migration, which is commonly assumed to be dominant. A sizable majority of Bulgarians work or study, and only a minority rely entirely on the welfare system, thus contradicting the image of welfare tourism. The qualification structure of the Bulgarian population resembles an hourglass, with a considerable proportion of people with low (i.e. without vocational training) and high education (i.e. with academic education) whereas the middle level is scarcely present. The large proportion of high-skilled people is to be attributed to the high relevance of educational migration, which has been a main pattern of Bulgarian migration to Germany over time. Moreover, a sizable proportion of respondents (one-third) completed their studies in Germany and acquired crucial country-specific knowledge and language skills. Low-skilled migrants have arrived mostly since 2007 as free movement opened up more opportunities for legal migration than in the past. Low-skilled as well as temporary and circular workers often lack country-specific knowledge and German language skills, which is a barrier to their labour market participation. However, short-term residents may have long-term orientations to settle that are indicated by their intention to remain and a close attachment to the destination country. In the migrant survey, 41 per cent of Bulgarian migrants had long-term orientations to settle permanently despite their short length of residence. Post-accession migration has thus evolved a pattern of classical migration of permanent settlement that favours integration in the long run. In contrast to the labour market area, challenges and potentials in the political area have not yet received much public attention. The electoral participation of Bulgarian migrants is modest, with 28 per cent stating that they would vote if municipal elections were held the next week. Naturalised persons are more interested in electoral participation than those holding Bulgarian citizenship. This finding confirms previous studies on the crucial role of naturalisation for political participation. The survey results further show that the low interest of Bulgarians

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in voting in municipal elections is closely related to a limited awareness of voting rights and a lack of knowledge about parties and their programmes. Both findings reveal substantial potential for mobilisation of Bulgarian migrants as voters that has not been utilised by the laissez-faire policy related to electoral participation of EU migrants in Germany.

Contents

1 Introduction: Becoming EU Citizens – Consequences for Bulgarian Migrants in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 The case of Bulgaria in Migration Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Theoretical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Aims and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Structure of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 3 5 9 11

2 Background: History of Bulgarian Migration to Germany . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Cold War Period (1946–1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Post-Cold War Period (1989–1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Visa Period (1993–2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 The EU Pre-Accession Period (2001–2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 The EU Post-Accession Period (since 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13 13 15 18 22 23 26

3 Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians in Hamburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Surveying Persons of Migration Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Choice of a Time-Location Sampling Method . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Designing the Migrant Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Selection of Hamburg as a Location for the Survey . . . . . 3.3.2 Selection of Locations for Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 Questionnaire Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Fieldwork in Hamburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Sample Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.1 Weighting Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2 Sample Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29 29 31 34 34 35 39 41 44 44 46

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3.5.3 Quality of the Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Migration Patterns: Providing Empirical Evidence Beyond Official Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Explanations for Increased Migration After EU Accession . . . . . 4.1.1 Reasons for Increased Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 Patterns of Post-Accession Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Estimate of the Population of Bulgarian Background in Hamburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Little-known Migrant Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Gender, Age, Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Ethnic Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Motivations for Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.4 Labour Status Before Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Duration of Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.1 Residence Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2 Circular Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.3 Migrants’ Long-term Orientations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Migrants’ Broader Social Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.1 Indicators of Cultural, Interactive and Identificative Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5.2 Views on Social Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Labour Market Integration: Analysing the Impact of Restricted Freedom of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 EU Citizens in the German Labour Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Level of Labour Market Participation: Indications From Administrative Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Quality of Participation: Evidence From the Migrant Survey in Hamburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Self-Employment as a Strategy for Circumventing the Transitional Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Brain Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3 Irregularities Related to Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Regression Analysis on Labour Market Participation . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1 Self-Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2 Undeclared Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.3 Violation of Labour Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

5.4.4 General and Migrant-Specific Factors for Labour Market Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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6 Political Integration: Exploring the Electoral Participation of Recent EU Citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Political Participation of EU Citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Determinants of Electoral Participation at the Local Level . . . . . . 6.3 Electoral Participation of Bulgarian Migrants in Hamburg . . . . . . 6.3.1 Awareness of Electoral Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.2 Willingness to Vote in Municipal Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3 Motives for and against Voting in Municipal Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.4 Regression Analysis on Voting Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

145 147 152

7 Naturalisation: Explaining the Exceptional Willingness of Bulgarians to Naturalise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Naturalisation Practices of EU Citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Structural Determinants of Naturalisation in Germany . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Individual Determinants of Naturalisation for EU Citizens . . . . . . 7.4 Naturalisation Practices of Bulgarian Migrants in Hamburg . . . . . 7.4.1 Motives for and against Naturalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.2 Who is Willing to Naturalise: Descriptive Results . . . . . . . 7.4.3 Regression Analysis on Naturalisation Intentions . . . . . . . 7.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

155 155 160 163 167 168 172 180 186

8 Conclusion: The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Bulgarian Migration to Germany since 2007 Revisited . . . . . . . . . 8.2 The Backlash against EU2 Migration in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 The Need for Future Research on EU Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 Outlook for Future EU Enlargements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

191 191 201 204 206

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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133 133 139 141 141 141

Abbreviations

AAPOR AME AZR BAMF BMI CEE GDP EU EU2 EU8 EU10

EU12 EU14 EU15

EU27 EU28 FRG GDR IOM ISMU OECD

American Association for Public Opinion Research Average Marginal Effects Central Register of Foreigners Federal Office for Migration and Integration Federal Ministry of the Interior Central and Eastern European Gross Domestic Product European Union Bulgaria and Romania, which acceded to the EU in 2007 All EU10 states except Malta and Cyprus All states that acceded to the EU in 2004 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus) EU10 and EU2 EU15 except Germany All states that belonged to the EU before the 2004 accession (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom) All EU member states up to June 2013 EU27 including Croatia, which acceded to the EU on 1 July 2013 Federal Republic of Germany German Democratic Republic International Organization for Migration Foundation for Initiatives and Studies on Multi-ethnicity Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

xix

xx

OR SVR UK UN UNHCR

Abbreviations

Odds ratios Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration United Kingdom United Nations United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 Figure 2.1 Figure 2.2 Figure 2.3

Figure 2.4 Figure 2.5 Figure 2.6 Figure 3.1 Figure Figure Figure Figure

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

Figure 4.5 Figure 4.6 Figure 4.7

Conceptual framework of EU citizenship, migration and integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bulgarian asylum seekers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bulgarian temporary workers in the framework of bilateral agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bulgarian citizens suspected of criminal offences against the Residence, Asylum and EU free movement laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bulgarian students enrolled in the winter term at German universities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inflows, outflows, net migration and stocks of Bulgarian citizens in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Net migration and stocks of Bulgarian citizens in the five migration periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparison of gender and age distribution in the sample against administrative data, in % . . . . . . . . . . Patterns of post-accession migration to Germany . . . . . . . . . Age composition of Bulgarian citizens in Germany . . . . . . Age composition of Bulgarian citizens in Hamburg . . . . . . Educational structure of the population of Bulgarian background in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Educational structure of the population of Bulgarian background in 2018 in comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Male and female respondents by education and German language skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ethnic structure of the Bulgarian migrant population . . . . .

9 17 19

21 24 26 28 51 62 68 69 70 71 72 74

xxi

xxii

List of Figures

Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure

4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12

Figure Figure Figure Figure

4.13 4.14 4.15 5.1

Figure 5.2 Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure

5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11

Figure 6.1 Figure 6.2 Figure 6.3 Figure 6.4 Figure 7.1 Figure Figure Figure Figure

7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

Reasons for migration to Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Labour status before migration to Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . Circular migration to Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Intention to remain in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Intensity of private contacts with persons of Bulgarian, German and other origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Feelings of attachment to Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Difficulties faced in terms of social integration . . . . . . . . . . Perceived barriers to integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annual growth rates in the total Bulgarian population and Bulgarian employees subject to social security contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Business registrations and deregistrations by Bulgarian citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Labour and professional status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Match between formal qualification and job . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sector of employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Monthly income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Income by educational level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Violation of labour rights for selected groups . . . . . . . . . . . . Experience of violation of labour rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Proportion of respondents without a work permit . . . . . . . . Explanatory factors for the employment situation of the individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Awareness of electoral rights at local, national and European levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Awareness of electoral rights and intention to vote in municipal elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General factors and intention to vote in municipal elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Migration-specific factors and intention to vote in municipal elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Naturalisation rates of individual EU countries in 2017, in % . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Intention to apply for German citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Motives for naturalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Motives against naturalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Knowledge of EU citizenship rights when living in another EU member state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76 77 80 81 85 85 86 87

99 100 103 107 108 109 110 113 114 115 115 142 143 144 146 157 167 169 171 174

List of Figures

Figure 7.6 Figure 7.7 Figure 7.8 Figure 7.9 Figure 7.10

xxiii

Knowledge of fundamental EU citizenship rights . . . . . . . . Perceived consequences of EU citizenship for the individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perceived consequences of EU citizenship for Bulgarian migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Retention of Bulgarian citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Discrimination against Bulgarian migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

175 176 177 178 179

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table Table Table Table

3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1

Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 5.6

In- and outflows of Bulgarian citizens in the five migration periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Geographical distribution of Bulgarian citizens in Germany as of 31.12.2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Variables in the questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Centres of interviewing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sample description, weighted and non-weighted samples . . . . Overview of the application of transitional arrangements for Bulgarian workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimate of the population of Bulgarian origin in Hamburg as of 31.12.2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Patterns of migration based on migrants’ attachment to Germany and Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Main indicators of labour market integration for selected nationalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Labour status of the Bulgarian population aged 15–64 . . . . . . Significant determinants of the probability of self-employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Significant determinants of the probability of undeclared work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Significant determinants of the probability of labour rights violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Probability of self-employment, undeclared work and labour rights violations: full results of logistic regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27 35 40 43 48 60 66 82 96 98 119 123 125

126

xxv

xxvi

List of Tables

Table 5.7

Table Table Table Table

6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4

Table 6.5 Table Table Table Table Table

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

Impact of individual groups of variables on the probability of self-employment, undeclared work and violation of labour rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eligibility to vote in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Participation of EU citizens in municipal elections . . . . . . . . . Reasons for and against voting in municipal elections . . . . . . Significant determinants of the intention to vote in municipal elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Intention to vote in municipal elections: full results of logistic regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Naturalisation rates of selected nationalities in Germany . . . . Naturalisation of Bulgarian citizens in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . Significant determinants of the intention to naturalise . . . . . . . Intention to naturalise: full results of logistic regression . . . . . Impact of individual groups of variables on the intention to naturalise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

130 135 136 147 150 151 158 159 181 184 186

1

Introduction: Becoming EU Citizens – Consequences for Bulgarian Migrants in Germany

The eastern enlargements1 in 2004 and 2007 transformed more than 100 million people into EU citizens who enjoy freedom of movement within the European Union (EU).2 Fears of one-way mass migration from new member states emerged (Favell and Hansen 2002) and turned migration into a highly contested issue in the old EU member states. Before the EU enlargements, scholars paid great attention to potential migration from the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the EU153 and produced several forecasts on migration (for an overview, see Faßmann and Münz 2002; Straubhaar 2001). After the EU enlargements, they focused on the actual scale of migration and migration patterns from the new EU member states. Several publications have documented sharply increasing migration and changing migration patterns from the new EU member states since 2004 and 2007 (Black et al. 2010; Galgóczi et al. 2012; Glorius 2013; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2016; 1 Seven

EU enlargements have taken place in the European integration process so far: in 1973 (UK, Denmark and Ireland), 1981 (Greece), 1986 (Spain and Portugal), 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden), 2004 (EU10), 2007 (EU2) and 2014 (Croatia). Following a referendum held on 23 June 2016, the UK left the EU in February 2020, which reduced the number of EU member states to 27. 2 Among these, 28,703,176 citizens of EU2 and 74,035,464 citizens of EU10 countries, Eurostat Database. 3 Abbreviations of EU member states: EU10: all states that acceded to the EU in 2004 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus); EU8: all EU10 states except Malta and Cyprus; EU2: two countries that became EU members in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania); EU12: EU10 and EU2; EU15: all states that belonged to the EU before the 2004 accession (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom); EU27: all EU member states up to June 2013; EU28: EU27 including Croatia, which acceded in the EU on 1 July 2013. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 V. Kovacheva, The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33110-8_1

1

2

1

Introduction: Becoming EU Citizens – Consequences for Bulgarian …

Scholten and van Ostaijen 2018). Scholars emphasise that migration from the CEE countries differs from the classical migration pattern of permanent settlement in the receiving country and is predominantly of temporary and circular character (Favell and Hansen 2002; Glorius 2013). They label it ‘liquid migration’, showing the temporary, fluid and uncertain nature of migration (Engbersen et al. 2010a; Engbersen 2018; Engbersen and Snel 2013). Besides increased migration, scholars point to diversification of migration after the eastern enlargements. Some scholars argue that new migrant groups, such as retired persons, students and family members, became more relevant and exist in parallel to traditional forms of migration (Engbersen and Snel 2013; Glorius et al. 2013). Others highlight the variety of migrant groups in the receiving countries, such as knowledge workers, entrepreneurs, manual workers, persons working in private households, sex workers and trafficked persons, students, non-working spouses and children, and beggars and homeless people (Sert 2018). After the eastern EU enlargements, Germany became a main destination for CEE migrants and experienced for the first time a considerable increase in migration flows in the context of EU free movement (Kovacheva and Cyrus 2020). In particular, Bulgarian and Romanian citizens have made extensive use of the right to free movement and the EU2 countries have become the largest sources of migrants to Germany within the EU besides Poland. Inflows from the EU2 countries have been continuously increasing and have even outnumbered those from the EU10 countries since 2014. The registered Bulgarian and Romanian population thus rose spectacularly from 112,400 in 2006 to more than one million in 2018 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006–2019a). EU citizenship grants to EU migrants more mobility, economic, social and political rights that create preconditions for more participation in the core areas of life and reduce incentives for citizenship acquisition in the receiving country. It is thus assumed that a better legal status after EU accession would lead to more successful integration of Bulgarian and Romanian migrants in Germany and lower interest in naturalisation. In contrast to expectations of smooth integration, concerns about the living situations of EU2 migrants arose in Germany after EU accession. Several publications point to homelessness and unacceptable housing conditions (Böckler et al. 2018; Ratzka and Kämper 2018), as well as insecure and precarious working conditions, unemployment and dependence on welfare benefits (Brücker et al. 2013a, 2013b; Burkert 2014). The disadvantaged positions of EU2 migrants in the core areas of life thus hint at particular challenges related to their integration in the receiving country and challenge the perception of EU citizens as capable of easily integrating in society.

1.1 The case of Bulgaria in Migration Research

3

In contrast to expectations of low interest in German citizenship, the naturalisation rates of EU2 migrants have been exceptionally high since 2007. They reached a peak in 2010 at 11.6 percent for Bulgarians and 8.7 percent for Romanians, and were considerably above the average rates for foreign nationals (2.4 percent) and EU nationals (1.2 percent) (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2007–2019). This naturalisation of EU2 migrants thus reveals new trends in the naturalisation practices of EU migrants in Germany and calls into question the widespread conviction that EU citizens have few incentives to acquire citizenship in the receiving country. The trends of sharply increasing migration, considerable integration challenges and high naturalisation rates remarkably distinguish Bulgaria and Romania from other EU sending countries and call into question perceptions about EU migration. How can these distinct trends after EU accession be explained, and what is the role of EU and national regulations in shaping them? In this study I address these questions and explore how changing legal status from third-country nationals to EU citizens after EU accession affects patterns of migration, integration and naturalisation in the case of Bulgarian migration to Germany. In the next section (1.1), I provide arguments for selecting the case of Bulgaria for the study. Then I present theoretical considerations about the relationship between legal status, migration and integration (section 1.2), formulate the main research questions of the study and introduce the methodological approach (section 1.3). Finally, I outline the structure of the study (section 1.4).

1.1

The case of Bulgaria in Migration Research

Due to their simultaneous EU accession in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania have usually been analysed together. The two countries display similar trends in migration and integration after 2007 but differ considerably in several aspects. Two examples exemplify this. First, ethnic migration characterises both countries, in particular migration of Roma, but the structure of ethnic migration differs. The most prominent ethnic groups are ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, who also constitute a significant migrant group in the Bulgarian migrant population in Germany. Hungarians are the largest minority group in Romania, but it is instead the migration of ethnic Germans (Spätaussiedler) that has characterised the Romanian migrant population in Germany for decades (Horváth 2007). Migration of ethnic Germans does not apply to the Bulgarian case. Second, the labour market participation of EU2 migrants has been increasing, in particular after the end of the transitional periods in freedom of movement of workers as of 2014.

4

1

Introduction: Becoming EU Citizens – Consequences for Bulgarian …

However, Romanian migrants perform on average better on the labour market, while Bulgarian migrants encounter more difficulties, which are visible in higher unemployment rates and higher dependence on welfare benefits (Brücker et al. 2014–2015; Jobelius 2015). Differences in migration and integration patterns provide strong arguments to analyse both countries separately and thus to overcome generalisation tendencies in research on EU2 migration. This study focuses on Bulgaria. Bulgarian migration is of particular interest for research due to its relatively high importance in quantitative terms. Bulgaria is only the 16th largest EU member state in terms of population4 but Bulgarian has been the sixth-largest EU nationality in Germany after Polish, Italian, Romanian, Greek and Croatian since 2014. Despite its quantitative relevance, knowledge on Bulgarian migration to Germany remains scarce. Surveys on potential migration over the years have repeatedly shown Germany to be the number one destination country for Bulgarian migrants (BBSS Gallup International 2006; Eurobarometer 2010; IOM 1993, 1998, 2008). Bulgarian scholars have, however, paid little attention to Germany as a destination (see, for example, Christova-Balkanska and Naydenova 2010; Liakova 2014; Mancheva 2008a, 2008b; Mintchev 2016). Two groups have attracted particular scientific attention: Bulgarian students (Christova-Balkanska and Naydenova 2010; Liakova 2008), and persons belonging to the Turkish ethnic minority (Mancheva 2008b, 2008a). Bulgarian migration has attracted little scientific consideration in Germany as well (Liakova 2014). Until 2007, it had been analysed in the broader framework of East–West migration and in studies on potential migration after EU accession (Dietz 2004; Gächter 2002; Hille and Straubhaar 2001). Since 2007, interest in Bulgarian migration has increased, as is visible in the growing number of publications—scientific reports (Brücker et al. 2014–2015; Böckler et al. 2018; Glorius 2019; Glorius and Lazova 2019; Hanganu et al. 2014; Jobelius 2015; Kovacheva 2014a, 2014b; Kovacheva and Cyrus 2020; Kovacheva and Vogel 2012; Kurtenbach 2013, 2015; Kurtenbach and Bogumil 2014; Matter 2015a, 2015b, 2017; Montag Stiftung Urbane Räume 2012; Pfeffer-Hoffmann et al. 2015; PfefferHoffmann 2015; Thimm 2018; Pfeffer-Hoffmann 2016a; Walther 2014) as well as conference proceedings (Caritas and Malteser 2012; Flüchtlingsrat Schleswig– Holstein e.V. 2014; German Caritas Association 2013; Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Wohlfahrtsverbände in Schleswig 2012, 2014).

4 Population

on 1 January 2017: Bulgaria (7,101,859), Romania (19,638,309) and Poland (37,972,964) (Eurostat 2017). Romania is the 7th largest EU country in terms of population.

1.2 Theoretical Considerations

5

Despite the increased interest in Bulgarian migration, many knowledge gaps exist and need to be filled. Research tends to focus on selected aspects, such as the scope and structure of migration, labour market participation and access to welfare benefits, while leaving other aspects, such as electoral participation and naturalisation practices, largely neglected. Little is known about the reasons for the exceptionally high willingness of Bulgarians to naturalise and the role of the dual citizenship policy, which has been in force for EU citizens in Germany since 2007. Knowledge is also scarce on the electoral behaviour of Bulgarians who only recently acquired voting rights at the local level. Research has been predominantly based on administrative data that capture trends but are of little help in explaining them. Thus labour market statistics point to an effect of transitional periods in the freedom to work at a macro level. However, little empirical evidence on their impact on the individual is available at a micro level. Similarly, migration statistics reveal the increasing scope and changing structure of migration but are less helpful in capturing specific patterns such as circular migration and unregistered migration. Given the numerous little-studied aspects of Bulgarian migration to Germany, the need to better understand this migration is evident. New trends in EU migration to Germany have been associated with Bulgarian migration since 2007: increasing mobility, disadvantageous positions in the labour market and high naturalisation rates. It is argued that they are closely related to the legal status of EU citizenship and its functioning in a specific context. Therefore, the next section introduces theoretical considerations about the relation between legal status and integration, and then presents the research question and the methodological approach of the study.

1.2

Theoretical Considerations

In 1993, a unique type of citizenship was introduced in the European Union: EU citizenship. EU citizenship is additional to national citizenship and does not replace it. This means that persons who hold the nationality of an EU member state are nationals of that country and citizens of the European Union at the same time. Although EU citizenship was officially introduced with the Maastricht Treaty (1993), it has its foundations in the 1950s when the right of free movement and non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality were set up in the Treaty of Rome (1957). At the beginning, only workers were admitted without restriction to the territories of the member states. They constituted a privileged group as they enjoyed virtual equality with national workers (Castles and Kosack

6

1

Introduction: Becoming EU Citizens – Consequences for Bulgarian …

1973; Soysal 1994). Since then, the nature of EU citizenship has been continuously transformed (Kostakopoulou 2008; Kovacheva et al. 2012; Wiener 1998) and expanded, particularly by interventions and proactive interpretations by the European Court of Justice (Carrera and Merlino 2009; Hailbronner 2006; Kostakopoulou 2008). Through the introduction of EU citizenship in 1993, the right of free movement was extended to non-economic groups, such as students, retired and inactive persons. Nowadays, EU citizenship is considered ‘the furthest-going example for a new type of citizenship’ (Castles et al. 2014). Some scholars stress its post-national (Soysal 1994) or transnational character (Bauböck 1994). Other scholars emphasise its limited character and label it quasi-citizenship (Castles and Davidson 2000) or hybrid citizenship (Bauböck 2011).5 Citizenship determines the legal status or the membership of the individual in the nation state (Brubaker 1989; Kymlicka and Norman 1994) and provides for a bundle of rights and duties (Bauböck 2006a). Citizenship in the narrow legal sense refers to the internal aspects of the relation between the individual and the state: citizenship as a status, rights, and duties and practice (Bauböck 2006b).6 Arguing that EU citizenship is a distinct type of citizenship, it determines the legal status of the individual in the European Union and confers a bundle of rights and duties at different levels.7 Within the EU, EU citizens enjoy the freedom to move and reside freely, the right to non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality, to work in the EU Civil Service, to participate in the political process by voting and standing as candidates in European Parliament and municipal elections, to petition the European Parliament and to complain to the European Ombudsman. Outside the EU, EU citizens enjoy the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any other EU country. These rights constitute a powerful and positive symbol of what the European Union means for the individual. Eurobarometer surveys have repeatedly confirmed this by showing that freedom of movement is one of the main positive results of the EU for Europeans (Eurobarometer 2015). In EU countries, EU citizenship creates a legal hierarchy in terms of rights, particularly in the first years of residence. Third-country citizens generally have limited rights, EU citizens have a more extensive bundle of rights, and citizens of 5 In

the multilevel citizenship regime in the EU, there is also national citizenship (birthright membership in an intergenerational political community) and local citizenship (automatic residential membership based on jus domicile) (Bauböck 2011). 6 The term ‘nationality’ is not used as it refers to the external aspect of the relation between the state and the individual and often connotes an ethno-national relation. Nonetheless, citizenship may also be associated with identity (see Joppke 2011). 7 For the effects of EU citizenship on social, economic and political rights from a legal perspective (see Goudappel 2010).

1.2 Theoretical Considerations

7

the country have the full set of rights. Differences between the rights of thirdcountry and EU citizens usually become smaller when the individual obtains permanent residence status. It is generally assumed that more legal rights lead to more participation in society, for example in the labour market and political life (Castles et al. 2014). However, although foreign citizens enjoy equality with the native population in some areas of life, empirical evidence indicates that the actual use of opportunities is substantially below the level for the population as a whole (Entzinger 1999). For example, non-citizens experience higher unemployment on average than German citizens (Hille and Straubhaar 2001; SVR 2013a). EU citizens participate less frequently in municipal elections than German citizens (SVR 2013a). Scholars on citizenship see the reasons for different participation in the very nature of citizenship and emphasise the difference between rights and their actual use. They distinguish between formal and substantive citizenship (Brubaker 1992, 1990), nominal and substantial citizenship (Bauböck 1994), or becoming and being a citizen (Castles and Davidson 2000). Formal citizenship entails a set of civil, social and political rights. Still, the provision of rights is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for substantive citizenship, which refers to the use of these rights and effective participation in the core areas of life (Brubaker 1990, 1992). Considering the distinction between rights and the actual use of them, the application of two concepts of integration is meaningful in this study: legal integration and structural integration (see also NiestenDietrich 2012). The acquisition of rights relates to the legal status (citizenship) of the individual and indicates the level of legal integration in society.8 The acquisition of positions refers to the actual use of the legal status and the actual participation and is indicative of the level of structural integration in society. The distinction between the acquisition of rights and positions is necessary for this study to distinguish the provision of legal rights by EU accession from changes in participation and positions that can be observed after this legal change. In some other studies, both aspects are considered to be structural integration.9

8 When

the legal status of migrants is referred to, the terms of integration and inclusion are used interchangeably (see Thränhardt and Miles 1995). 9 Structural integration is defined as: ‘the acquisition of rights and the access to positions and membership statuses in the core institutions of the immigration society: economy and labour market, education and qualification systems, housing system, welfare state institutions including the health system, and citizenship as membership in the political community’ (Heckmann 2006, p. 15, 2015).

8

1

Introduction: Becoming EU Citizens – Consequences for Bulgarian …

In the following chapters, the term integration refers to structural integration in the sense of participation and acquisition of positions, unless legal integration/inclusion is explicitly mentioned. Other dimensions of social integration that relate to the cultural, interactive and identificative aspects of integration (Heckmann and Schnapper 2003; Heckmann 2006, 2015)10 are not the focus of this study. Full legal integration of migrants means full equality with the non-migrant population in terms of rights (Niesten-Dietrich 2012). It can be achieved through naturalisation. Successful structural integration of migrants means that they participate equally with non-migrants in the core areas of life, such as the educational system, labour market, welfare system and political system (SVR 2010). Although more legal integration is associated with more successful structural integration, there is no automatic link between the two aspects. Legal integration may have an impact on structural integration, but structural integration is not entirely determined by legal integration, as Niesten-Dietrich (2012) argues. Structural integration is a two-sided process that involves both the receiving society and migrants (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003; Penninx 2005). On the one hand, the receiving society interacts through its institutional arrangements, consisting of general public institutions, such as laws, regulations, and executive organisations, along with unwritten rules and practices (Penninx 2003). The institutional arrangements create the structural opportunities for participation of the individual (Penninx 2005). On the other hand, background characteristics, preferences and attitudes characterise the individual. Both migration-related characteristics, such as language, length of residence and intention to remain, and general characteristics, such as age, gender and education, are of relevance and may influence the participation of the individual in society. As a consequence of the interaction between institutional arrangements and individual characteristics, migrants position themselves differently in the receiving country and that may result in different patterns of participation and acquired positions in the core areas of life.

10 Others scholars prefer the concepts of placement, culturation, interaction and identification (Esser 2000, pp. 272–275). Placement is a general sociological concept for the analysis of social integration of individuals into social systems and corresponds to structural integration in the context of immigration (Heckmann 2006, p. 15). Therefore, the notion of structural integration is preferred in the study.

1.3 Aims and Methodology

1.3

9

Aims and Methodology

Based on the theoretical considerations about legal status and integration, it can be concluded that acquisition of EU citizenship by EU accession increased the legal integration of Bulgarian migrants in Germany. EU citizenship as a legal status determines a higher level of legal integration in the receiving society as it grants more mobility, economic, social and political rights. More rights create preconditions for more mobility and participation in the core areas of life, but institutional arrangements in the receiving society and individual characteristics strongly influence the actual use of rights and considerably shape the patterns of migration and integration after EU accession. Based on this conceptual framework (see Figure 1.1), the main research question of this study is: What are the patterns of migration and integration of Bulgarians as EU citizens, and how can they be explained by considering the influence of institutional arrangements in Germany and individual characteristics of Bulgarian migrants?

EU citizenship as a legal status:

Actual use of EU citizenship:

Mobility rights

Migration patterns

Social rights

Labour market integration

Economic rights Political integration Political rights Naturalisation practices

Individual characteristics and attitudes (general and migrationspecific)

Institutional arrangements (laws, regulations, unwritten rules, discrimination)

Figure 1.1 Conceptual framework of EU citizenship, migration and integration. (Source: Own compilation)

More specifically, the questions to be addressed in this study are: • Migration patterns: What are the main patterns of mobility of Bulgarian migrants in the context of free movement? How can increased migration and a changed structure of migration be explained, and what is the role of different forms of migration? • Labour market integration: How have Bulgarian migrants integrated into the German labour market since 2007? What is the role of the transitional periods

10

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Introduction: Becoming EU Citizens – Consequences for Bulgarian …

in the freedom of movement of workers in relation to challenges in the labour market area? • Political integration: How do Bulgarian migrants intend to use their voting rights in municipal elections? What are the motives for and against voting? • Naturalisation practices: How can the exceptionally high naturalisation rates of Bulgarian migrants be explained? What is the role of the dual citizenship policy and the perception of EU citizenship in naturalisation practices? To answer these questions, I made extensive use of documents, reports and administrative data that provided an insight into the patterns of migration and integration at a macro level. In addition to this, I collected original empirical data through a migrant survey in the city state of Hamburg. Survey data shed further light on these patterns by showing how individuals make use of EU citizenship as a legal status at a micro level. The approach of analysing different data sources allowed for the extension of possible insights into the research topic and served as a tool to check and verify empirical results (Flick 2011). The survey aimed to collect empirical data about Bulgarian migrants, whose migration and integration patterns in Germany have rarely been studied so far. The survey was carried out in the city state of Hamburg at the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013. Hamburg was selected as a big city that hosted a large Bulgarian community in 2013: 3,790 Bulgarian citizens, which corresponded to 2.6 percent of the total Bulgarian population in Germany (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2014). By 2018, the Bulgarian population had increased to 7,815 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2019). Hamburg is not one of the cities that are known for encountering severe challenges associated with EU2 migration, such as Berlin, Bremen, Dortmund and Duisburg.11 Thus the city can be considered as average for the Bulgarian population in Germany and apt for exploring general patterns of migration and integration. The survey included 401 persons of Bulgarian migration background. This group encompasses Bulgarian citizens (both registered and unregistered) and naturalised persons who were born in Bulgaria or who have at least one parent born in Bulgaria. In the following chapters, the notion of Bulgarian migrants refers to the population of Bulgarian background, unless it is explicitly stated that the text refers only to Bulgarian citizens. 11 Looking at unemployment rates of Bulgarian citizens, substantial differences are found across German cities. In July 2015, the unemployment rates of Bulgarian migrants were high in the cities Berlin (23 percent), Bremen (27 percent), Dortmund (31 percent) and Duisburg (37 percent). For comparison, the unemployment rate was 12 percent in Hamburg and thus close to the average (Brücker et al. 2015c).

1.4 Structure of the Study

11

As a one-time survey, the survey captures the situation of Bulgarian migrants at a given point in time: individual characteristics, usage, awareness, and perception of EU citizenship rights, migration experience, labour market experience, electoral intentions and naturalisation behaviour. It is not possible to compare two samples obtained before and after EU accession, and thus to show differences in patterns of migration and integration before and after 2007. To allow for conclusions on the consequences of EU accession based on a single survey, two other approaches are applied. First, results for two cohorts in the sample are compared: respondents who arrived in Germany before 2007 (so-called pre-accession migrants) and respondents who arrived after 2007 (so-called post-accession migrants). Where differences in their positions in society are identified, analysis is conducted into how they can be explained, and to what extent they can be attributed to the acquisition of EU citizenship. Second, multivariate analysis is used to explain labour market participation, electoral participation and naturalisation practices of Bulgarian migrants. Logistic regressions provide statistical evidence on the role of relevant determinants—individual background characteristics and institutional arrangements in Germany related to EU citizenship, such as transitional periods in the freedom to engage in dependent work and the dual citizenship policy. Both approaches provide empirically based knowledge about the new patterns of migration and integration since 2007.

1.4

Structure of the Study

The study explores the new patterns of migration and integration that have developed since Bulgaria’s EU accession in 2007. It starts with an overview of migration from Bulgaria to Germany since the 1950s, thus embedding post-EU accession migration into a broader historical context (chapter 2). In search of empirically based explanations of post-EU accession migration, administrative data and results from the survey among 401 Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg are complementarily analysed. The migrant survey is based on a time-location sampling method that allows for a probability sample to be drawn for the population of Bulgarian background at the local level (chapter 3). In the following chapters, the survey findings provide empirical evidence on the relationship between EU citizenship, migration and integration. In chapter 4, the reasons for increased migration since 2007 are discussed, and little-known features of the population of Bulgarian origin in Germany, such as ethnic structure and scope of unregistered movements, are revealed. Then, the labour market situation of Bulgarian migrants under the influence of restricted freedom to work is analysed (chapter 5).

12

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Introduction: Becoming EU Citizens – Consequences for Bulgarian …

Chapter 6 investigates how Bulgarian migrants make use of recently acquired voting rights at the municipal level. Finally, the extraordinary willingness of Bulgarian migrants to naturalise despite holding EU citizenship status is explored (chapter 7). The study concludes with a summary on the lessons learnt from the Bulgarian case in Germany about the transition of migrants from third-country nationals into EU citizens and a discussion on the reasons for different experiences of the eastern EU enlargement compared to previous EU enlargements (chapter 8).

2

Background: History of Bulgarian Migration to Germany

Migration relations between Germany and Bulgaria have their roots in the 19th century when many Bulgarians studied in German cities such as Leipzig and Dresden. These relations intensified in the late 19th century when German schools opened in large Bulgarian cities, and several German-Bulgarian cultural associations were established (Troebst 2013), for example, the German-Bulgarian association in Munich in 1915 (German Embassy in Bulgaria 2013). Since World War II, important political and legal circumstances have changed migration channels,1 and new dynamics of migration with specific migration patterns have developed. Considering these changing migration patterns, the history of Bulgarian migration to Germany can be divided into five periods (Kovacheva 2014a): the Cold War period (1946–1989), the post-Cold War period (1989– 1993), the visa period (1993–2001), the EU pre-accession period (2001–2006) and the EU post-accession period (since 2007). This chapter gives a comprehensive overview of these periods and thus embeds migration after EU accession into a broader historical context.

2.1

The Cold War Period (1946–1989)

During the Cold War, a communist regime existed in Bulgaria. Its establishment (1946) and fall (9 November 1989) marked the beginning and the end of the Cold War period (1946–1989) of Bulgarian migration to Germany. A spirit of banned migration characterised this period. Emigration of Bulgarian citizens was severely restricted by a complicated pass-issuing system and intense border controls. 1 Legal regulations aimed at managing migration, e.g. visa policy, are considered as migration

channels (European Migration Network 2012). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 V. Kovacheva, The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33110-8_2

13

14

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Background: History of Bulgarian Migration to Germany

The land border between Turkey and Bulgaria was mined and there were zones into which no unauthorised person could enter (Apap et al. 2004). Unauthorised departure from the country and failure to return after legal departure were considered crimes for which one could be sentenced in absentia (UNHCR 1994). In contrast to the general stance towards emigration as unwanted, emigration of ethnic minority groups2 such as Jews, Turks and Armenians was encouraged and even ‘prepared’ by the national authorities (Büchsenschütz 2000). Three waves of ethnic emigration took place: in 1946–1951, 1966–1980, and the spring of 1989 when a large number of the Bulgarian Turkish minority in particular left the country (Markova 2010). The political ideology and the East-West division in socialist and democratic countries had a significant impact on migration in this period. Mobility to other communist and Arab countries was desired, whereas migration to Western democratic countries was unwelcome. Following this dichotomy, different migration patterns were established to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Diplomatic relations with the communist German Democratic Republic were established in 1949. Following that, the GDR received temporary migrant workers, political migrants, and students (Poutrus 2005). Nearly 6,000 Bulgarians studied in the GDR from 1951 to 1989, predominantly in East Berlin, Dresden, Ilmenau, Halle, Jena, Potsdam, and Leipzig (Koneva 2014). An attempt to intensify labour migration to the GDR through an intergovernmental agreement was made in October 1961, but it failed as the decision was suspended in 1962 (Gruner-Domic 1996).3 In 1971, a bilateral agreement for visa-free mobility came into force, allowing Bulgarian citizens to travel to the GDR without a visa (German Embassy in Bulgaria 2013). Diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany were established in 1973. The FRG received mostly political refugees fleeing from the communist regime. Their number was estimated at 1,500 (Markova 2010). In the FRG, these migrants were welcomed as freedom fighters and refugees (Münz 1997). From the perspective of the Bulgarian state, they were considered as irregular emigrants. Political refugees usually stayed permanently due to the lack of opportunities to return. As some were sentenced in absentia, they feared imprisonment if they returned to Bulgaria. Besides political refugees, students also migrated to 2 According to the census conducted in 2011, there are two main ethnic minorities in Bulgaria:

Turkish (8.8 percent of the population) and Roma (4.9 percent) (National Statistical Institute 2011). Further minority groups are Armenians and Russians. 3 The agreement was with Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary.

2.2 The Post-Cold War Period (1989–1993)

15

the FRG, but their numbers were low: 81 Bulgarian students were registered in 1975; 121 in 1980; 115 in 1985; and 183 in 1990 (Liakova 2014). Labour mobility barely played a role in migration to the Federal Republic of Germany. In contrast to other European countries such as Poland and Hungary, no bilateral agreement was signed for the recruitment of labour migrants on a temporary basis. Given the few legal opportunities for migration in this period, the scope of migration was at modest levels. In- and outflows to and from the Federal Republic of Germany were below 1,000 persons annually (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2012b). No more than 5,000 Bulgarian citizens were registered in the Federal Republic of Germany between 1967 and 1989 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2012a). The migrants who settled in the Cold War period in Germany are often called the ‘old Bulgarian migration’. Because of the dichotomy of migration flows— temporary to East Germany and permanent to West Germany—it is assumed that most of the old Bulgarian migration settled in West Germany.

2.2

The Post-Cold War Period (1989–1993)

The first years after the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria and after German reunification can be called a post-Cold War period in their migration relations (May 1989–December 1993). The communist regime in Bulgaria officially ended on 9 November 1989 when President Todor Zhivkov was deprived of power. A law from September 1989 had already liberalised travel opportunities by allowing Bulgarian citizens to apply for a five-year passport (UNHCR 1994). Non-return after legal departure from the country was decriminalised. In cases of non-return, a person would thus be subject not to criminal penalties but to administrative measures and fines. The legal and political changes in Bulgaria coincided with historical circumstances in Germany: the reunification of the two German states into one—the Federal Republic of Germany. The German reunification in October 1990 led to de facto open eastern borders where control was virtually absent (Kraler et al. 2009). These political and legal changes marked a turning point in migration relations between Germany and Bulgaria. Migration pressure, which had built up under communism due to strict controls on exit, led to considerable migration from Bulgaria after 1989 (Engbersen et al. 2010b). Migration pressure was strengthened by the unstable economic and political situation in Bulgaria after the fall of the communist regime. Economic conditions deteriorated, disillusionment spread widely, in particular as the renamed communist party won the first democratic elections in 1990 (Markova 2010). Many Bulgarians decided to seek a better and more secure life abroad. Germany became their main destination country (Bobeva et al. 1996; Markova 2010).

16

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Background: History of Bulgarian Migration to Germany

In the post-Cold War period, brain drain emerged as an issue of major concern and was considered ‘one of the most severe economic problems for the near future’ (Straubhaar 2000). The skill ratio of Bulgarian emigration to Germany was the highest among eastern European migrants in the period 1992–1994 (Straubhaar 2000). Many scientists who lost their jobs in the early 1990s emigrated. About 40,000 scientists left Bulgaria between 1990 and 1992 (Straubhaar 2000). Germany became the second-largest destination for them after the US (Bobeva 1997). Besides high-skilled migration, large-scale emigration of Bulgarian ethnic Turks took place. Following the adoption of the new laws in May 1989 and their coming into force in September 1989, 300,000 Bulgarian ethnic Turks left the country (UNHCR 1994). The vast majority of them moved to Turkey, but some migrated further—to Germany and Austria (Sultanova 2006).4 Two circumstances may explain this more distant migration. On the one hand, Bulgarian Turks who migrated to Turkey and were disappointed by the situation there moved on to Germany (Vasileva 1992). On the other hand, after the Turkish border was closed on 22 August 1989 following a decision by the Turkish authorities, migration to Turkey became difficult, and migrants headed to western European countries (Mancheva 2008b). Considering the large community of people of Turkish origin in Germany—which constitutes a major social network—the country logically became an attractive destination for Bulgarian citizens from the Turkish minority. The identification of Bulgarian Turks who migrated from Turkey to Germany in official statistics is difficult, as many naturalised. Almost 236,000 Bulgarian Turks acquired Turkish citizenship, and many of them became dual citizens (Apap et al. 2004).5 In the context of open borders, migration was turbulent and characterised by large numbers of in- and outflows. Nevertheless, due in part to the geographical distance to Germany, the scale of Bulgarian migration was not as significant as for other Central European countries. Very few legal options for mobility were made available to the citizens of the former communist countries, and entry by Bulgarian migrants was mostly considered to be illegal. The asylum system became the main migration channel for Bulgarian citizens to unified Germany in the post-Cold 4 During

the field work in Hamburg one case was documented. A woman with Bulgarian citizenship who belongs to the Turkish minority migrated to Turkey in the early 1990s. Later she moved to Germany where she was working in a retail shop belonging to a Turkish owner. 5 Whether dual citizens are counted as Bulgarian citizens in the German statistics depends on the passport used for registration in the local registration offices. After EU accession, a tendency towards acquisition of Bulgarian citizenship by former Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin was observed (Bogdanov and Rangelova 2012).

2.2 The Post-Cold War Period (1989–1993)

17

War period. Of all Bulgarian applications in Europe, 78 percent were submitted in Germany (UNHCR 1994). Between 1989 and 1993, 96,000 Bulgarians applied for asylum in Germany, with a peak of 31,540 applications in 1992 (Dietz 2004). Asylum seekers accounted for 53 percent of the registered Bulgarian population in 1992 and 40 percent in 1993 (see Figure 2.1). Their proportion dropped considerably after 1994 and has been below 1 percent since 1998. Since EU accession, less than 100 asylum applications from Bulgarian citizens have been registered annually.

35,000

60%

30,000

50%

25,000

40%

20,000 30% 15,000 20%

10,000

10%

5,000

0% 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

0

Asylum seekers Asylum seekers as a proportion of the total Bulgarian population

Figure 2.1 Bulgarian asylum seekers. (Source: Own compilation based on data from BAMF/BMI (2016))

Most of the asylum applications were rejected, and people had to leave Germany (Liakova 2014). A bilateral agreement between Germany and Bulgaria from 1992 allowed the forced return of rejected asylum seekers (Dietz 2004).6 Despite many returns, a quantitatively considerable community of about 30,000 Bulgarians emerged for the first time in migration relations between Germany and Bulgaria. The community in Germany was one of the first Bulgarian diasporas 6 The

bilateral agreement was signed in November 1992 and regulated the return of migrants and their reintegration in Bulgaria. Three professional training centres for unemployed and returned migrants were established and this was assessed as a constructive approach to the problem of reintegrating return migrants (Bobeva 1996a).

18

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Background: History of Bulgarian Migration to Germany

in western European countries (Bobeva 1996b) and paved the way for future migration.

2.3

The Visa Period (1993–2001)

Two events marked the start of a new phase of Bulgarian migration to Germany: the ‘visa period’ (December 1993–February 2001). First, the mobility of Bulgarian citizens was restricted by the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers of the European Community, who put Bulgaria on the ‘black’ visa list of Schengen countries in 1993. The visa requirement created an ‘unusual situation,’ as no EU candidate countries were affected except Bulgaria and Romania (Apap and Tchorbadjiyska 2004; Tchorbadjiyska 2007). Between January 1995 and March 2001, Bulgarian citizens needed a mandatory visa for short-term entries into all Schengen countries, including Germany. Second, as a reaction to the tremendous flow of asylum seekers to Germany and the suspicion that economic migrants were circumventing restrictive legislation under the guise of political asylum, a new German asylum law came into force on 1 July 1993. It introduced an abridged procedure for asylum seekers and complicated the recognition of political asylum for persons who came from so-called ‘safe countries’ (Dietz 2004). Bulgaria was declared a safe country in 1993 and that limited the role of asylum as a migration channel for Bulgarian migrants. The number of asylum applications declined sharply to 3,367 in 1994 and 1,152 in 1995 (BAMF/BMI 2016). The recognition rate for eastern Europeans was below 1 percent (Dietz 2004). Two migration channels gained in importance in the visa period: temporary labour migration based on bilateral agreements and student migration. For the first time in German–Bulgarian migration relations, labour migration was regulated by bilateral agreements that enabled the temporary migration of three categories of workers: contract workers, guest employees and seasonal workers.7 A quota for guest employees of 1,000 per year was set, but it was rarely enforced (Figure 2.2). A fixed contingent of 2,000 work permits per year for posted contract workers was 7 List of agreements: 1) Agreement between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Federal Republic

of Germany on employment of workers from Bulgarian enterprises for execution of labour contracts: signed 12.03.1991, in force since 31.05.1991; 2) Agreement for intermediation of Bulgarian workers for fixed employment in the field of hotels and restaurants and in households; 3) Agreement between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Federal Republic of Germany on employment of workers for enlarging their vocational and linguistic skills—an agreement for foreign workers: in force since April 1992 (Chindea et al. 2008).

2.3 The Visa Period (1993–2001)

19

set, which was increased to 2,500 in 2010. Seasonal work was not bound to an annual quota but was limited to only two sectors—agriculture, and hotels and restaurants. In the 1990s, posted work prevailed. In the 2000s, seasonal workers dominated and outnumbered by far the number of contract workers and guest employees (Figure 2.2).

9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000

5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000

Posted contract workers

2013

2011

2012

2009

2010

2008

2007

2005

Seasonal workers

2006

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2002

2003

2001

2000

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1997

1998

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0

Guest employees

Figure 2.2 Bulgarian temporary workers in the framework of bilateral agreements. (Source: Own compilation based on data from BAMF/BMI (2015, 2016); Notes: Data on seasonal workers up to 2011, on guest employees up to 2012 and posted contract workers up to 2013)

The lifting of some restrictions for foreign nationals to study in Germany in the 1990s opened up a further migration channel—the education policy—and paved the way for significant migration for educational purposes. The long tradition of student migration to Germany8 and the well-established position of the German 8 Educational migration is probably the oldest migration pattern to Germany and can be traced

back to the nineteenth century. In the period 1879–1899, more than 100 Bulgarians studied in Leipzig. In 1914, 580 of 3,000 Bulgarian students abroad studied in Germany (German Embassy in Bulgaria 2013). German schools in Bulgaria made it possible to learn German and later migrate to Germany for purpose of study. Until the beginning of the 1980s, there were eight schools with lessons in German—in the 1990s there were 16. German language was taught in other 27 schools (German Embassy in Bulgaria 2013). For an overview of student migration to Germany from 1898 up to now, see Koneva (2014).

20

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Background: History of Bulgarian Migration to Germany

language9 at Bulgarian schools created strong incentives for student migration to Germany. The number of Bulgarian students at German universities rose from 991 in 1993 to 7,321 in 2001 (Figure 2.4), turning Bulgaria into a significant sending country of students to Germany at that time. A central motive for students to migrate was the search for better economic prospects and a better future. Some students were de facto labour migrants who used studying as a pretext to find a job (Koneva 2014).10 After EU accession, these pseudo students (Scheinstudierende) no longer needed to use student status to reside in Germany (Liakova 2014). In the visa period, migration had a predominantly economic character due to the worsening economic and labour market situation in Bulgaria. The country faced its most severe financial crisis in 1996–1997 with hyperinflation and profound implications for the economy. This situation triggered migration mainly to southern European countries, such as Greece, Spain and Italy. Low legislative barriers, high demand for low-paid work and overall acceptance of illegal foreign workers facilitated migration to these countries (Fihel 2007). Given the few legal opportunities for migration to Germany, such as education and temporary work, the officially registered migratory movements were at modest levels. After a period of negative migration balance, the economic and political crisis in Bulgaria 1996–1997 triggered more inflows than outflows and led to a positive migration balance once more. Apart from officially registered migration, irregular migration played a significant role in migration relations between Bulgaria and Germany between 1993 and 2001. Germany experienced considerable irregular migration from the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in that period (Engbersen et al. 2010a). In Bulgaria, irregular migration to Germany and the involvement of criminal organisations in smuggling were highly debated issues (Bobeva 1996a). Smugglers charged about DM 450 for the transfer of a person, mainly using transit routes via neighbouring countries (Bobeva 1996a).

9 The

popularity of the German language in Bulgaria encourages migration. Linguistically, the two countries are quite distant: Bulgarian is a Slavic language whereas German is a Germanic language. However, German is widespread in Bulgaria and one of the three languages, besides English and Russian, that Bulgarians speak enough to be able to have a conversation (Eurobarometer 2012). Apart from English, German is the language considered most useful for personal development and for children to learn for their future (Eurobarometer 2012). 10 Also in the UK, short-term labour migration was the true motive for migration of some Bulgarian students (Ivancheva 2007).

2.3 The Visa Period (1993–2001)

21

It is assumed that the number of irregular migrants from Bulgaria who were not captured in official statistics was not negligible. Police criminal statistics published annually by the Federal Criminal Police Office give some indication of the relevance of irregular migration. For example, 78 percent of Bulgarians suspected of criminal offences in 1998 were suspects of offences against the Residence, Asylum or EU free movement laws. The proportion of residence-related offences remained high during the visa period, ranging from 63 percent in 1994 to 78 percent in 1998 (Figure 2.3). It dropped considerably after EU accession to less than 2 percent. Data on apprehensions at the border because of illegal entry reveal a similar picture. The number of apprehensions was high in the 1990s and decreased considerably after the abolishment of the visa requirement: from 2,867 in 1994 to 708 in 2000 (BAMF/BMI 2011). It can be plausibly concluded that many Bulgarian migrants resided without registration and that the actual number of Bulgarian migrants in Germany before EU accession was considerably higher than the official data suggest.

90%

12,000

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70% 60%

8,000

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40% 30%

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10% 0% 2017

2015

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Criminal offences against the Residence, Asylum and EU free movement laws committed by Bulgarian citizens Criminal offences against the Residence, Asylum and EU free movement laws as a proportion of all criminal offences committed by Bulgarian citizens

Figure 2.3 Bulgarian citizens suspected of criminal offences against the Residence, Asylum and EU free movement laws. (Sources: Own compilation based on data from BAMF/BMI (2011) and Federal Ministry of the Interior (2012–2018); Notes: No data available for 1999, 2000, 2007 or 2008)

22

2.4

2

Background: History of Bulgarian Migration to Germany

The EU Pre-Accession Period (2001–2006)

Bulgaria started negotiations for EU accession in 2000 and obtained visa-free mobility one year later (Gruber 2000). In April 2001, Bulgaria was removed from the Schengen blacklist, which marked the beginning of the EU pre-accession period (April 2001–December 2006). Bulgarian citizens obtained the right to visa-free entry and three months’ visa-free residence in Schengen countries. The removal of the visa requirement was related to substantial concessions by the Bulgarian government, particularly the introduction of special legislative measures intended to tackle illegal migration of Bulgarian citizens to the EU (Tchorbadjiyska 2007). In the case of compulsory removal or expulsion due to offences being committed, the Bulgarian state had to guarantee that these persons would stay in Bulgaria: they were not permitted to leave Bulgaria, to obtain a new passport, and any previously issued passport could be withdrawn (Tchorbadjiyska 2007). Besides the visa requirement being lifted, which had a significant impact on Bulgarian migration in the 2000s, Bulgarian citizens benefited from the changing political stance towards migration in Germany. Beginning in the 2000s, German migration policies started to display an increased acceptance of migration (Vogel and Kovacheva 2014). For example, the German government introduced the Green Card programme in 2000, which sought to attract 20,000 IT specialists to Germany. The programme was open to both new migrants and international students who had obtained their degrees at German universities. Between 2000 and 2004, 469 Bulgarian IT specialists received work and residence permits (BAMF/BMI 2005), which corresponded to 2.6 percent of about 18,000 IT specialists. Applications from some countries exceeded expectations (Liebig 2004), but Bulgaria was not considered a state of particular interest. Economic growth and decreasing unemployment characterised the Bulgarian financial and labour market situation in the 2000s. Economic instability as a push factor was thus less relevant than in the previous periods. However, substantial wage disparities and differences in employment opportunities and living standards between Germany and Bulgaria persisted and created incentives for migration, particularly labour-related migration. Labour migration in the framework of bilateral agreements that started in the 1990s continued in the 2000s and mainly involved seasonal work. In the context of free entry and the enduring requirement of an official work permit, incentives arose for temporary (often undocumented) work under the guise of tourism. The pattern of tourists from Central and Eastern European countries working in Germany emerged in the 1990s (Fihel 2007). In the case of Bulgaria, the undocumented labour migration emerged in the 2000s,

2.5 The EU Post-Accession Period (since 2007)

23

following the abolishment of the visa requirement.11 In the 2000s, many Bulgarians practised circular migration and stayed in Germany for up to three months. Some used their stays as tourists to work in the shadow economy and without the required work permit. In the context of a visa-free regime, the pattern of temporary and circular migration became more pronounced. Migration for educational purposes remained the main form of mobility, to which the comparatively low study costs and lack of enrolment fees at universities at that time certainly contributed. The highest numbers of first-year Bulgarian students were registered in 2002 and 2003 when one-third of the registered Bulgarian population was made up of students (Figure 2.4). In 2006, Bulgaria was the fifth-largest sending country of students after China, Turkey, Poland and Russia (BAMF/BMI 2008). It was the secondlargest sending country of so-called Bildungsausländer, persons who obtained their secondary education outside Germany (BAMF/BMI 2008). After EU accession, the country fell to rank 18 as a sending country of students and rank 13 of so-called Bildungsausländer in 2018. The relevance of student migration for the Bulgarian migrant population has declined significantly. Students amounted to only 2 percent of the Bulgarian population in 2018 compared to 31 percent before EU accession. Legal opportunities for permanent settlement were scarce, and marriage to a German citizen served as a tool for securing residence status in the pre-accession period. Besides student migration, marriage migration was widely used as ‘an immigration ticket’ in the 2000s (Liakova 2014).

2.5

The EU Post-Accession Period (since 2007)

EU accession in 2007 substantially changed the legal framework for migration and triggered a new period in migration relations: free movement with restricted freedom of work (January 2007–December 2013). Bulgarian citizens obtained EU citizenship status, which provided them with the right to free movement. EU countries were allowed to restrict free movement with transitional provisions, as stipulated in the Accession Treaty from April 2005. Under the influence of public pressure, most of the old EU member states introduced transitional arrangements (Boswell and Geddes 2011) and Germany was not an exception.

11 The pattern of undocumented labour migration under the guise of tourism also existed in the 1990s but was associated with Bulgarian migration to Greece and Turkey (Bobeva 1996a).

24

2

Background: History of Bulgarian Migration to Germany

35%

12,000

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10%

2,000

5%

0

0% 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

14,000

Students

Students as a proportion of the total Bulgarian population

Figure 2.4 Bulgarian students enrolled in the winter term at German universities. (Sources: Own compilation based on data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2006–2019b))

Germany was one of the main initiators of transitional rules applied for the first time to Greece in the 1980s. In the eastern enlargements during the 2000s, Germany restricted access to its labour market again. The political decision was taken in 2005 when the coalition parties CDU, CSU and SPD agreed on the introduction of transitional periods in the coalition agreement from 11.11.2005 (Koalitionsvertrag 2005). The transitional arrangements were introduced in December 2006 following a decision by the German government at the suggestion of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2006). The German government justified them with reference to the unstable labour market situation and high unemployment, arguing that mass migration from the accession countries might intensify these negative developments in the labour market. The 2 + 3 + 2 years rule applied between 2007 and 2013 and restricted labour market access for Bulgarian workers for seven years. In practice, the employment of a Bulgarian citizen as a dependent worker or as a service provider in construction, building, cleaning or interior decoration in this period was bound to a work permit. Liberalisation for three groups of workers—skilled workers with university degrees who took up jobs corresponding to their qualifications, seasonal workers, and persons in vocational training—was announced in 2012. The partial

2.5 The EU Post-Accession Period (since 2007)

25

relaxation was a response to labour shortages in the German economy but also a sign of a changing political stance on migration from new EU member states towards a more liberal one (Kovacheva 2011). Labour demand for high-skilled as well as for medium-skilled workers was pronounced, particularly for engineers, IT specialists, and health care workers and nurses (Federal Employment Agency 2015). Migration statistics reveal considerably increasing migratory movements after EU accession (Figure 2.5). The number of Bulgarian citizens coming to Germany doubled within one year and amounted to 20,900 at the end of 2007. Since then, the inflows have been growing sharply and reached a peak of 86,300 persons in 2015. However, outflows have also grown quickly, with the result that net migration has not grown as fast as gross migration. Besides, it has to be acknowledged that net migration is likely to be overestimated by migration statistics due to returns that are not reported to the residence registration. The migration balance has stayed positive and has risen from 228 persons in 2006 to 39,520 persons in 2015 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006–2019c). The trend of increasing in- and outflows also remained unchanged during the global economic and financial crisis as of 2007. As the German labour market remained stable during the crisis compared to other countries (Elsner and Zimmermann 2016), Germany remained an attractive destination for migration (for more on the labour market situation in Germany during the crisis, see OECD 2013). Germany experienced a short-term economic decline followed by a period of robust recovery (Kahanec et al. 2016). It has thus been a magnet not only for migrants from the accession countries but also from non-EU countries. In 2012, Germany became the secondlargest immigration OECD country after the US, up from eighth place in 2009 (OECD 2014a). These substantial migratory movements contributed to a significant increase in the resident Bulgarian population in Germany. The number of Bulgarian citizens registered on the Central Register of Foreigners has risen spectacularly from 39,000 in 2006 to 337,015 in 2018 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006– 2019a), thus turning Bulgaria into a major sending country. Bulgarians, who had not had a sizeable population in Germany before 2007, became one of the fastest-growing migrant groups in Germany.12

12 Data on the foreign population stem from the Central Register of Foreigners (AZR). According to the Census 2011, there were 75,165 Bulgarian citizens in 2011, which is 9.6 percent less than the population according to the AZR (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2014). The difference between AZR and Census data for Bulgarians is slightly higher than for the EU27 (8.5 percent) and the total population (7.6 percent).

26

2

Background: History of Bulgarian Migration to Germany

4,00,000 3,37,015 3,10,415

3,50,000 3,00,000

2,63,320 2,26,926

2,50,000

1,83,263

2,00,000

1,46,828 1,50,000 1,18,759 93,889 1,00,000 74,869 61,854 53,984 39,05346,818 50,000 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Net migration

Stocks

Inflows

Outflows

Figure 2.5 Inflows, outflows, net migration and stocks of Bulgarian citizens in Germany. (Sources: Own compilation based on different sources: Data on inflows, outflows and net migration stem from local registration offices (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006– 2019c); data on stocks stem from the Central Register of Foreigners (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006–2019a, 2018a); Notes: Due to methodological adjustments, data on in- and outflows since 2016 are not fully comparable with data for previous years)

The transitional arrangements aimed to reduce migration but were not able to do so as they limited employment opportunities for dependent work but not opportunities for self-employment.

2.6

Summary

Migration statistics reveal that legal regulations on migration did affect migration dynamics over time. As expected, limited migration opportunities in the Cold War and the visa period coincided with low migration intensity (Table 2.1). More opportunities for migration in the post-Cold War period and the EU pre-accession period corresponded to increased in- and outflows. Free mobility since 2007 has led to unprecedented flows of Bulgarian migration, both into and out of Germany: about 704,200 cases of Bulgarians arriving in and 429,900 cases of Bulgarians leaving Germany were registered between 2007 and 2018.

2.6 Summary Table 2.1 In- and outflows of Bulgarian citizens in the five migration periods

27

Migration periods

Inflows

Outflows

21,491

14,487

Post-Cold War period (1990–1993)

87,010

51,559

Visa period (1994–2000)

55,048

59,140

Pre-accession period (2001–2006)

68,108

53,986

Post-accession period (2007–2018)

704,253

429,947

Cold War period (1962–1989)*

Sources: Own calculation and compilation based on data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2012a, 2012b, 2006–2019a, 2006–2019c). * The period started in 1949 but statistics are available from 1962 on.

These migratory movements contributed to a trend of positive net migration (Figure 2.6). With the exception of the visa period from 1994 to 2000, inflows outnumbered outflows in all periods. Net migration was at a modest level in the Cold War period (7,000) and accelerated in the post-Cold War period (35,500). In the visa period, the migration balance of officially registered migration was negative (−4,100) but became positive again in the pre-accession period (14,100). After EU accession, net migration (247,500) substantially outnumbered that in the previous periods. Before the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Bulgarian migrant population in Germany was at a modest level. Since then, its number has increased notably in two major waves: after the end of the Cold War (from 4,500 in 1989 to 56,700 in 1993) and after EU accession (from 39,000 in 2006 to 337,015 in 2018). Thus a quantitatively considerable Bulgarian migrant community was established only recently, and Bulgarians constitute a relatively new community in Germany. The increasing migration opportunities mainly since the 2000s have contributed to increased migration to Germany. Despite the geographical, cultural and linguistic distance, Germany has evolved into a leading destination for Bulgarian migrants. It is undoubtedly true that Spain, Italy and Greece are essential destination countries for Bulgarian migrants.13 That notwithstanding, in contrast to them, a significant Bulgarian community was established in Germany a decade 13 The number of Bulgarians in Spain was at a modest level in the 1990s (below 3,000 persons). It rapidly increased in the 2000s from about 10,000 in 2000 to about 125,000 in 2006. Until 2002, Italy hosted less than 10,000 Bulgarians, after which the number of Bulgarians started increasing from about 7,300 to almost 20,000 in 2006. Similarly, less than 10,000 Bulgarians lived in Greece until 2000. Their number started increasing in the 2000s and reached almost 30,000 (Holland et al. 2011, p. 44).

28

2

Background: History of Bulgarian Migration to Germany

4,00,000

3,37,015

3,50,000 3,00,000 2,50,000 2,00,000 1,50,000 1,00,000

56,709

50,000

34,359

39,053

1994–2000

2001–2006

4,548 0

-50,000

1962–1989**

1990–1993

Bulgarian migrants at the end of the period*

2007–2018

Net migration in the period

Figure 2.6 Net migration and stocks of Bulgarian citizens in the five migration periods. (Sources: Own calculation and compilation based on data from Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2012a, 2012b, 2006–2019a, 2006–2019c); * Data on stocks refer to the last year of the period. ** The period started in 1949 but statistics are available from 1962 on)

earlier, at the beginning of the 1990s. In the period 1991–2006, the Bulgarian migrant population ranged between 30,000 and 40,000 persons. These networks facilitated the process of settlement by providing country-specific information and crucial support at the initial stage of migration, and contributed to the significant increase in the Bulgarian migrant population after EU accession.

3

Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians in Hamburg

This chapter introduces the time-location sampling survey carried out among Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg. First, I discuss the challenges in surveying the population of migration background (section 3.1) and the advantages of timelocation sampling for studying the population of Bulgarian origin (section 3.2). Second, I present the survey design, referring to the selection of centres for interviewing and questionnaire preparation (section 3.3) and the fieldwork in Hamburg, including the main challenges faced by field workers (section 3.4). Finally, I outline the weighting procedure used to overcome the initial sample bias, give an overview of the weighted sample and assess its quality (section 3.5). In the concluding section (3.6), I discuss methodological challenges and opportunities pertaining to the sampling technique and examine the extent to which a survey based on this sampling frame is a suitable technique for drawing a sample in a representative way for migrant groups without access to official population registers.

3.1

Surveying Persons of Migration Background

The importance of surveys in migration research has increased and several surveys among migrant groups have been conducted in the past decade (Reichel and Morales 2017). In Germany, representative surveys have usually targeted specific subpopulations, for example asylum seekers (Brücker et al. 2016; Worbs and Bund 2016), students (Hanganu and Heß 2014), naturalised persons (Babka von Electronic supplementary material The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33110-8_3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 V. Kovacheva, The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33110-8_3

29

30

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

Gostomski, Christian 2012), family members (Büttner and Stichs 2014), or Muslims (Haug et al. 2009); or the largest foreign nationalities, for instance citizens from Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece and Poland (Babka von Gostomski, Christian 2010), and citizens from Turkey, Poland and Romania (Babka von Gostomski, Christian 2016). However, results from surveys among foreign nationals are not representative of the migrant population because they do not include important migrant groups, such as naturalised persons (Galonska et al. 2004; Salentin 2014). To capture the population of foreign origin more precisely, with naturalised persons among them, a new statistical category was introduced in Germany in 2005—persons of migration background—which has been captured in the annual population survey Microcensus. In contrast to the classical understanding of the migrant population as encompassing persons with foreign citizenship, the concept of migration background takes into account citizenship, country of birth and origin of parents. Persons of migration background are thus foreign citizens, naturalised persons and German citizens by birth with at least one parent born abroad. Since then, the concept of migration background has developed into one of the most important categories in statistics (Salentin and Schmeets 2017). Surveying the population of migration background proves challenging because no complete list of the population of interest (i.e. no sampling frame) is available. As a result, the population is considered hard to reach (Marpsat and Razafindratsimab 2010). First, administrative data, such as the population registers of the local registration offices, capture current but not former nationality and thus foreign nationals but not naturalised persons, who are counted as German citizens. Hence persons of Bulgarian background, such as naturalised persons who possessed Bulgarian citizenship in the past and German citizens by birth with at least one parent born in Bulgaria, are counted only as Germans. Second, administrative data do not capture persons who do not register with the local registration offices. When persons do not register, this leads to their undercounting in the local population registers; a problem that applies to the EU in general (Poulain 2006).1 1 The

storage of data of EU citizens in the Central Register of Foreigners may be restricted in the future after a complaint by an Austrian citizen who felt discriminated against on the grounds of nationality due to the storage and processing of his personal data in the Central Register of Foreigners. The European Court of Justice judged on 16 December 2008 that Germany’s AZR practice does not satisfy the requirement of necessity laid down by Article 7 (e) of Directive 95/46/EC due to the fact that it does not only process those personal data necessary for the application of the national residence legislation (Peucker and Reiter 2009, p. 5). The German government is exploring the amendments needed for the implementation of the decision of the European Court of Justice. Although it is not clear how Germany is

3.2 The Choice of a Time-Location Sampling Method

31

Besides the non-inclusion of naturalised and unregistered persons, there are difficulties relating to the counting of foreign nationals in administrative data. Different data sources thus point to a different number of foreign nationals; for example, the Central Register of Foreigners often fails to match the population registers (Vogel and Aßner 2011). Both sources point to a different number of Bulgarian citizens in Germany. According to the local population registers, 5,176 Bulgarian citizens were registered in Hamburg in 2012 (Statistical Office of Northern Germany 2013). In contrast, the Central Register of Foreigners documented only 2,816 persons (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2013a). Given these peculiarities of administrative data, only an incomplete sampling frame for persons of Bulgarian background is available and the population is considered hard to reach. How can the broader population of Bulgarian background be surveyed when no adequate sampling frame exists? This chapter presents an alternative sampling method for obtaining a probability sample that is innovative for the German context: time-location sampling. Why time-location sampling is appropriate for collecting sound data for persons of Bulgarian background in Hamburg is discussed in the next section.

3.2

The Choice of a Time-Location Sampling Method

In situations where administrative lists are incomplete, alternative methods of drawing a sample are available. A sample can be drawn based on telephone books (onomastic sampling and random digit dialling sampling), buildings (random walk sampling), aggregation centres (centre sampling technique) and networks (snowballing, respondent-driven sampling, quota sampling) (for a discussion on strategies for sampling migrants, see Salentin and Schmeets 2017). These sampling methods are not promising for Bulgarians. Using telephone books as a sample frame is difficult in relation to Bulgarian migrants for two reasons. First, Bulgarian names are similar to other Slavic names, particularly Russian ones, and so their identification in a screening process is complicated. Second, as a relatively new community present in Germany for a comparatively short time, it is assumed that many Bulgarian migrants are not included in the telephone directory. In general, random walk sampling is deemed inappropriate for surveying countryspecific groups (Salentin 2014). Random walk sampling is considered unfeasible for Bulgarian migrants because their number in the total population is small, and going to comply with the decision by the European Court of Justice, this may result in the register losing its relevance for surveying EU citizens.

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

they are geographically widely spread. Achieving a large sample of the population would take too long. Samples based on networks, such as snowballing and quota snowballing, are widely used in migration research. However, as no probability sample can be achieved on their basis, they are not considered in this work. A probability sample means that the probability of inclusion of each individual is known and is not zero (Schnell et al. 1999). It requires random selection and equal probabilities of being chosen for the different units in the population. Three main techniques have been used to construct probability samples of hard-to-reach populations: time-location sampling, respondent-driven sampling (probability snowballing) and capture-recapture (Marpsat and Razafindratsimab 2010). These are samples that can be extrapolated, i.e. that allow the production of unbiased estimators with a calculable variance (Marpsat and Razafindratsimab 2010). Respondent-driven sampling (RDS) is based on networks and is thus akin to snowballing. In contrast to snowballing, RDS allows for mathematical compensation of unequal network participation. The application of RDS is possible among migrants as they are usually well networked (Hoops et al. 2013). The method has not been broadly applied in Germany due to several implementation and weighting problems (Salentin 2014). The capture-recapture technique implies repeated identification of individuals and has been used to estimate the number of irregular migrants based on police statistics (Vogel and Kovacheva 2008). The sampling technique does not seem suitable for a probability sample of subpopulations (Reichel and Morales 2017). Time-location sampling consists of interviewing persons at selected locations at a given point in time. The technique can be applied for populations defined by activities at these locations (Sudman and Kalton 1986). The method implies that • the population of interest visits a certain number of places that are not much visited by the rest of the population, • these places can be sampled after an exhaustive list has been made of them, • a sample can be taken of the persons visiting those places (Marpsat and Razafindratsimab 2010). A central assumption of time-location sampling is that each person visits at least one of the selected centres so that each person has a non-zero probability of being included in the sample. However, as individuals have different likelihoods of selection corresponding to the frequency of their visits to the locations of the interviews, the sample is biased. The sample bias can be addressed ex post by weighting, which is based on a calculation of the likelihood of each individual of inclusion. Time-location sampling is thus to be distinguished from non-probability

3.2 The Choice of a Time-Location Sampling Method

33

sampling (e.g. convenience sampling in a facility) and facility-based sampling (when a sampling frame of the individuals exists) (Semaan 2010). The time-location sampling method has been used in surveys on the homeless, drug users and homosexual men (Hoops et al. 2013; Marpsat and Razafindratsimab 2010), but is also known in migration research. In Italy, time-location sampling labelled as centre sampling or aggregation centre technique has been employed for 20 years to survey the migrant population including a high share of irregular and unregistered migrants (Blangiardo et al. 2004; Blangiardo 2008; Serrano Sanguilinda et al. 2017). The method was also applied in a study on Italy, Hungary and Portugal (Huddleston and Tjaden 2012). It has been successfully used to reach migrants from a certain nationality, as demonstrated in studies on Egyptian migrants in Milan (Baio et al. 2011), Ghanaian, Egyptian and Ecuadorian migrants in Milan (Localmultidem 2009), and Egyptian and Ghanaian migrants in Italy (Groenewold and Bilsborrow 2008). In a study on Japanese-Brazilian households in Brazil, time-location sampling (called an intercept point survey) was compared with two alternative survey methods: a stratified two-phase survey based on census, and a snowball survey. The study demonstrates that time-location sampling is associated with a higher likelihood of offering representative results for the target population compared to other methods such as snowball sampling (McKenzie and Mistiaen 2009). It can provide close results to the stratified sample based on census data if the sample is reweighted by taking into account individuals who are more likely to visit multiple locations (McKenzie and Mistiaen 2009). The authors suggested selecting many locations and using reweighting to become more representative of the target population (McKenzie and Mistiaen 2009). In Germany, a pilot survey based on time-location sampling was carried out in 2011 among Bulgarian- and Albanian-speaking persons in Berlin (Kovacheva and Vogel 2012). Besides Bulgarian and Albanian citizens, naturalised and unregistered persons were also reached. Although no weighting adjustment was undertaken in the framework of the study, it demonstrates that time-location sampling allows for capturing the population of migration background at the city level (Kovacheva and Vogel 2012). Two time-location sampling surveys were carried out among EU migrants in Berlin, but no weighting procedure was applied. These were conducted among migrants from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and France (Pfeffer-Hoffmann 2016a) and Italy and Spain (Pfeffer-Hoffmann 2016b). The review of surveys using time-location sampling shows that the method has been successfully used at the local (city) level to survey migrant subpopulations. It allows for a large, diverse sample to be obtained, it is reproducible, and findings can be generalised to the target population (Semaan 2010). Considering these

34

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

advantages, I selected the time-location sampling method to sample the population of Bulgarian background in Hamburg.

3.3

Designing the Migrant Survey

3.3.1

Selection of Hamburg as a Location for the Survey

The geographical distribution of the registered Bulgarian population is, to a large extent, comparable to that of the total population. Bulgarian citizens concentrate in the biggest German states (Länder). In 2017, 74 percent of the Bulgarian population resided in five states: North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Hesse, BadenWürttemberg and Berlin (Table 3.1). By and large, this distribution is comparable to that of the foreign population. Bulgarian citizens are overrepresented in Berlin and Hesse and underrepresented in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia (see columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.1). In most of the states, Bulgarians make up between 2 and 4 percent of the foreign population, except for in Bremen where 6 percent of all foreign citizens are Bulgarians. Hamburg is the 13th largest German state in terms of population but the 9th largest for the Bulgarian population, with almost 7,200 Bulgarian citizens, or 2.3 percent of the total Bulgarian population, in 2017.2 The city of Hamburg is not one of the cities that has reported serious integration challenges with Bulgarians, such as Duisburg, Dortmund and Berlin (Brücker et al. 2013a, 2013b). It hosts several universities, which make it an attractive destination for Bulgarians who traditionally migrate to Germany for educational purposes (cf. chapter 2). In Hamburg, a broad set of commercial, religious and cultural centres of relevance to the Bulgarian migrant population can be identified, which is a main prerequisite for a time-location sampling survey. Based on these characteristics of the city, Hamburg is considered suitable for studying the population of Bulgarian origin in Germany. The target population of the survey is the population of Bulgarian background aged 15 or older, living in the city state of Hamburg.

2 Data

from the local population register pointed to a higher number of Bulgarian citizens: 10,002 in 2017 (Statistical Office of Northern Germany 2005–2019).

3.3 Designing the Migrant Survey

35

Table 3.1 Geographical distribution of Bulgarian citizens in Germany as of 31.12.2017 Federal state

Total number of Bulgarian citizens

Bulgarian citizens as a proportion of the total Bulgarian population in Germany

Foreign citizens as a proportion of the total foreign population in Germany

Bulgarian citizens as a proportion of the foreign population in the state

Baden-Württemberg

38,035

12%

16%

2%

Bavaria

47,770

15%

17%

3%

Berlin

35,770

12%

8%

4%

Brandenburg

2,490

1%

1%

2%

Bremen

7,940

3%

1%

6%

Hamburg

7,195

2%

3%

2%

Hesse

39,925

13%

10%

4%

Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania

1,780

1%

1%

2%

Lower Saxony

23,270

7%

7%

3%

North Rhine-Westphalia

67,490

22%

24%

3%

Rhineland-Palatinate

18,310

6%

4%

4%

Saarland

3,885

1%

1%

3%

Saxony

3,620

1%

2%

2%

Saxony-Anhalt

2,845

1%

1%

3%

Schleswig Holstein

6,715

2%

2%

3%

Thuringia

3,375

1%

1%

3%

Germany

310,415

100%

100%

3%

Sources: Own compilation based on data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2018a).

3.3.2

Selection of Locations for Data Collection

Following Sudman and Kalton (1986), three aspects are important when designing a survey: where to sample, when to sample, and how to cope with different probabilities of sampling for different respondents.

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

Where to sample? A central assumption of time-location sampling is that migrants tend to cluster in specific geographic locations and to be regular visitors at certain fixed meeting points and community events (McKenzie and Mistiaen 2009). It is thus possible to adequately reach and cover them at these locations. The main prerequisite of time-location sampling is to identify a sufficiently broad and heterogeneous set of locations so that each person in the target population has a non-zero probability of inclusion. Finding the universe of relevant locations requires extensive ethnographic research (Reichel and Morales 2017). I consider the probability of coming across persons of Bulgarian origin to be much higher at migrant-oriented centres than in public places. Persons of Bulgarian background visit migrant-oriented centres more often, and units of the target population can thus be easily approached. Furthermore, I argue that the population of Bulgarian background in Hamburg engages in activities at migrant-oriented locations and can be successfully surveyed at these locations. I undertook extensive ethnographic research in the city of Hamburg and identified places and organisations that are relevant to the Bulgarian community. Then I prepared an exhaustive list of centres and checked the suitability of each centre in a screening process. After the screening process, I identified the following cultural, religious and commercial places of relevance for the Bulgarian community: the Honorary Consulate of the Republic of Bulgaria; the Bulgarian Church ‘Hl. Kyrill und Hl. Methodius’ Hamburg; the Bulgarian kindergarten and school in Hamburg; the Bulgarian café Thrakia; the Bulgarian shop BG Kost; the GermanBulgarian Association Hamburg; the Bulgarian Family and Women’s Club and the dance club for Bulgarian folk dances, Zdravets.3 Apart from these migrantoriented centres, I identified general locations of relevance for Bulgarian migrants: the central bus station (a terminal with buses departing for and arriving from Bulgaria) and migrant counselling centres with a high proportion of Bulgarian visitors (the homeless shelter, the advice centre for European workers, language courses for Bulgarians, the university structure PIASTA, which targets students at the University of Hamburg). I decided to implement the survey in all the identified centres to achieve a large, diverse sample that reflects the heterogeneity of the Bulgarian migrant population in terms of age, gender, education, length of residence, citizenship, residence status, etc. Problems may occur concerning access to the target population at the selected centres. Some members of the population may not attend the selected centres 3 Small

centres, such as offices of Bulgarian doctors and lawyers, were not included in the survey design.

3.3 Designing the Migrant Survey

37

(Hoops et al. 2013; Muhib et al. 2001; Semaan 2010), or relevant centres may not be visited due to permission for access not being granted (Hoops et al. 2013; Semaan 2010). Concerning the inclusion of centres, collaboration with the selected centres has to be granted in advance. Before starting the fieldwork, I contacted all the centres and asked for permission to conduct the survey. Most of the centres gave their permission and supported the survey by allowing access to their buildings and events.4 No interviews could be carried out at the Bulgarian consulate and the counselling centre for European mobile workers (Servicestelle Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit). Both centres refused to support survey implementation for data protection reasons. A lack of permission from individual centres for the survey may lead to non-inclusion of some members of the population. For instance, 27 percent of the survey respondents stated that they visit the Bulgarian consulate and events organised by it, but no interviews could be conducted at that centre. This example shows the high relevance of the centre, despite the fact that no visits were organised there. It is not possible to determine whether some persons visit only the Bulgarian consulate and thus had a zero probability of being included in the sample. Concerning the inclusion of persons in the sample, it is necessary to check whether some members of the target population do not visit the selected centres and may therefore have a zero probability of inclusion. I argue that as a relatively new community in Germany, most Bulgarian migrants keep contact with persons from their country of origin and visit the selected meeting points and/or events organised at them. However, I also assume that some members of the Bulgarian population probably do not visit the chosen centres for some reason. For example, the second generation of mixed marriages may lack Bulgarian language skills, newcomers are probably unaware of the existence of the centres, and some persons may deliberately avoid contact with their own community or individual centres. A zero probability of inclusion of these groups would violate the underlying assumptions of the probability sample. To reduce the likelihood of non-inclusion 4 Special thanks to the centres that gratefully permitted conduct of the survey in their locations:

the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Bulgarian kindergarten and school, the German-Bulgarian association in Hamburg, the Bulgarian café Thrakia, the Bulgarian ethnic shop BG Kost, the Bulgarian women and families club, the dance group Zdravets, and the counselling centres for homeless persons, homeless accommodation, the organization WESTEND, which organises a German language course for Bulgarians, and Vericom. The Evangelical Advisory Centre for Migrants (Evangelische Auslandsberatung) is thanked for the distribution of the flyer on online survey.

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

and achieve better coverage of the target population, I selected a mixed-mode survey design: face-to-face and web-based data collection. Therefore, in addition to visiting the centres, I used their mailing lists to reach the target population. Sample results show that six persons who filled out the questionnaire online declared that they do not visit any of the listed centres. This finding indicates that the web-based survey successfully reached persons who otherwise would not have been reached, and therefore that the web survey can minimise the probability of non-inclusion. It seems apt for future studies to go beyond the mailing lists of selected centres and to include further mailing lists such as Facebook groups. When to sample? The meeting centres have to be visited regularly over a long period so that each unit of the target population has a non-zero probability of inclusion in the sample. Research shows that many migrants go on vacation in their countries of origin in the summer months (Stadler 2009). Moreover, the ethnographic research in Hamburg showed that many community events take place in the winter months. Therefore, I selected the winter months from December to February for the field work. I visited the centres on selected dates and times over a long period and addressed respondents at random. Two Bulgarian-speaking interviewees supported the field work. Different days and time segments were appropriate for different centres. We visited the Bulgarian kindergarten and school on Saturdays when classes were taking place; the church on Sundays in the morning when it was open to visitors; the Bulgarian shop and Bulgarian café on weekends and Friday evenings. At centres with regular visiting hours, such as the café and shop, respondents were sampled as they arrived and entered the centre so that every visitor had a non-zero probability of being included in the sample. At events, such as Christmas celebrations at the Bulgarian school or Bulgarian church, respondents were sampled within the location before and after the event. When it was not possible to conduct the interview immediately (e.g. because the person did not have time but was willing to participate), a meeting at another place was arranged. What is crucial is to recruit the interviewees in the centres. How should different probabilities of inclusion be dealt with? The challenge in survey research related to inclusion probability is well known (Kalton 2009; United Nations 1993). For time-location sampling, persons who are more closely connected to the community and visit the centres more often are likely to be over-represented. The initial sample is thus biased due to the different probability of inclusion of individuals, and a weighting procedure can be applied

3.3 Designing the Migrant Survey

39

(Baio et al. 2011; MacKellar et al. 2007; MacKellar et al. 1996; McKenzie and Mistiaen 2009). The individual probability of inclusion depends on the number of centres visited by the respondent (positively correlated) and the number of individuals in the population who visit each of the centres (negatively correlated) (Baio et al. 2011). The inclusion probability of respondents is calculated ex post according to the respondents’ attendance profile. First, a weight coefficient of each centre is computed. Second, a weight coefficient is attributed to each respondent. The individual weight of respondents takes into consideration the self-reported frequency of visits to the centres and the weights of the centres. An inverse weighting is applied, meaning that persons who have a lower probability of being included in the sample receive higher weightings and vice versa. It is argued that when suitably weighted, the sampling units will be consistent with the population distribution of the profiles of attendance to the centres selected (Baio et al. 2011). The sample becomes more representative of the target population (McKenzie and Mistiaen 2009).

3.3.3

Questionnaire Preparation

The preparation of a questionnaire includes the formulation of research questions, their operationalisation and formulation of questions. In a time-location sampling survey, it is necessary to use short questionnaires (McKenzie and Mistiaen 2009). To cover all topics of interest, I opted for a long questionnaire with 49 questions on 8 pages (see German questionnaire in Annexe A–1 and Bulgarian questionnaire in Annexe A–2). The questionnaire included mostly closed questions and covered the following topics: socio-demographic characteristics, migration experience, settlement indicators, labour market participation, electoral participation, naturalisation practices and knowledge about and perception of EU citizenship (see list of variables in Table 3.2). For the operationalisation of research questions and the formulation of questionnaire items, I reviewed relevant literature. Complementary to desk research, I conducted problem-centred interviews (Witzel 2000) with five Bulgarian migrants and two experts (see Annexe A–3). Previous research shows that the participation of foreign nationals in surveys differs from that of the German population due to different accessibility, language ability for participation and willingness to participate (Blohm and Diehl 2001). Persons without German language skills are difficult to reach by surveys with questionnaires in German (Blohm and Diehl 2001). To increase participation, I

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

Table 3.2 Variables in the questionnaire Blocks of questions

Variables

Socio-demographic characteristics

Age, gender, education, citizenship, marital status, religion, mother language

Migration experience

Year of migration to Germany, length of residence, reason for migration, occupation before migration, previous migration experience in other countries, registration

Settlement indicators

Intention to remain in Germany, private contacts with persons of Bulgarian and German origin, German language skills, remittances

Labour market integration

Labour status, occupation, sector of employment, income, experience of violation of labour rights, satisfaction with job and income

Political integration

Intention to vote in municipal and European Parliament elections, reasons for and against voting

Naturalisation

Willingness to naturalise, reasons for and against naturalisation

EU citizenship

Actual and self-assessed knowledge about EU citizenship rights, perception of EU citizenship

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013.

opted for a bi-lingual questionnaire that I prepared in German and then translated into Bulgarian.5 To apply the questionnaire in different modes of data collection, I designed a paper and online version. As a questionnaire of almost 50 questions is a lengthy one, I put additional effort into increasing willingness to participate. As research shows, readiness to participate depends on the topic of the survey and is higher for issues perceived subjectively as of high significance for the participants (Blohm and Diehl 2001). Therefore, I trained the interviewers to emphasise the topic of the survey as a stimulus for participation. They also explained the survey aims, stressed anonymity and the importance of sharing their personal story. As further incentives, the interviewers handed out a leaflet about their rights as EU citizens6 and invited

5 The

author is a Bulgarian native speaker. Europe, Your Rights, A practical guide for citizens and businesses on their rights and opportunities in the EU’s single market, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/public ation/7984782c-99de-4ab0-b2fd-efeeccf4c52d, checked on 09.07.2020.

6 Your

3.4 Fieldwork in Hamburg

41

respondents to participate in a lottery with four winners.7 Observations during the fieldwork showed that among different incentives, the topic of the study appeared to be most influential for participation. In November 2012, I pre-tested the questionnaire with 20 respondents. Based on their feedback, I rephrased some items to be more coherent and neutral. There are two examples of meaning- and linguistic-related revisions. First, I revised the question on remittances by asking not only whether the respondents send money to their country of origin, but also what the reason for this is. Thus it was possible to distinguish people who transfer money as savings from those who financially support family members or relatives. Second, I revised the question on intention to remain in Germany linguistically. In the pre-test, it became clear that respondents avoided ticking the option ‘intend to stay forever’ (in German für immer, in Bulgarian zavinagi). I changed the response option to ‘intend to stay in the long run’ (in German auf Dauer, in Bulgarian za poctonno) so that corresponded to an indefinite period. In the first week of the fieldwork, I made some minor changes in the questionnaire, but they did not affect the meaning of the questions. For example, in the question on income, a new response option was added (‘no income’) that had not been included in the first version of the questionnaire. Before the revision, the respondent or the interviewer had to note this information additionally.

3.4

Fieldwork in Hamburg

Bulgarian native speakers conducted the fieldwork: the author and two (male and female) recruited interviewers of Bulgarian origin who received training before the fieldwork. Bulgarian speakers were preferred to establish credibility and mutual trust with the respondents. Interviewers were assigned to visit each location during pre-specified blocks of time, depending on the centre. Large events, such as the Christmas party at the Bulgarian kindergarten and school and the Christmas concert in the Bulgarian church, were visited by two interviewers to sample more respondents in a short time. Places with longer working hours (the shop and café) were visited by one interviewer unless there was a special event.

7I

thank the Info Point Europa in Hamburg, an information centre on the EU, which kindly provided the flyers about the rights of EU citizens in both German and Bulgarian. Special thanks also to the ZEIT Foundation Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius for providing the prizes for the lottery: two tickets for an exhibition in the Bucerius Kunst Forum, two vouchers for the Bulgarian shop and two vouchers for the Bulgarian café.

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

Apart from the regular opening hours of the centres, three main events organised in the fieldwork period were visited: the celebration of Student Day in the Bulgarian café (8.12.2012), the Christmas party at the Bulgarian kindergarten and school (15.12.2012) and the Christmas concert in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (22.12.2012). The interviewers documented conversations and comments during the fieldwork. The interviewers approached persons visiting the centres in Bulgarian to establish trust in the initial contact. Respondents had to fulfil two criteria: to be at least 15 years old and of Bulgarian origin. Eligible respondents were asked to take part in the survey by filling out the questionnaire. Respondents might choose between the German and Bulgarian versions and could fill out the questionnaire by themselves or with the assistance of the interviewer. The fieldwork took place between 28 November 2012 and 15 March 2013 and consisted of two sequential stages. In the first stage, the interviewers visited the selected centres regularly and conducted face-to-face and self-administered interviews (December–February). In the second stage, I sent an invitation to the web survey via the mailing lists of the participating centres (middle of January– March): the Bulgarian church (300 e-mails), the Bulgarian school (65 e-mails) and the German-Bulgarian association in Hamburg (53 e-mails). A link to the survey was posted on the Facebook page of the German-Bulgarian association in Hamburg. Information was included in the PIASTA newsletter of the University of Hamburg, which has organised several events on Bulgaria and is regularly visited by Bulgarian students. The number of persons to be interviewed was 400. One centre served as a reference point (church), and the statistical units were distributed to the centres according to the assumed size of the centres. At small centres, a lower number of respondents were to be recruited and vice versa. Table 3.3 documents the fieldwork. In the framework of the 60 visits to the centres, 401 questionnaires were filled out by eligible respondents. Half of the interviews took place in the shop (18 percent), café (17 percent), and school (16 percent). Clustering the centres in groups reveals the following distribution of interviews: 33 percent at commercial centres, 30 percent at cultural and religious centres, 22 percent at educational and advisory centres, 5 percent in public places and 10 percent in other locations. Self-declared information about visits to the centres reveals that the shop, the church and the café are the most visited. This finding means that every second respondent visits one of the three centres. Three modes of data collection were applied: self-administered questionnaires, face-to-face interviews and web-based interviews. More than half of the respondents preferred to fill out the questionnaire by themselves. In one-third of the cases, an interviewer conducted a face-to-face interview. The other 13 percent

3.4 Fieldwork in Hamburg

43

Table 3.3 Centres of interviewing Nr.

Type of centre

1

Consulate

2 3 4

Number of visits for data collection

Number of interviews

Share of interviews by centre

Number of visitors in the centres*

Share of visits by centre (1,447)

Share of visitors by centre (401)

8%

28%

0

0

0

111

School

5

63

16%

126

9%

31%

Church

5

36

9%

193

13%

48%

Café

11

68

17%

173

12%

43%

5

Shop

15

72

18%

226

16%

56%

6

Cultural association

5

25

6%

105

7%

26%

7

Bulgarian families and women’s club

2

0

0

40

3%

10%

8

Dance group

3

23

6%

73

5%

18%

9

Doctors, lawyers, etc.

0

0

0

107

7%

27%

10

Central bus station

5

5

1%

110

8%

27%

11

Advisory centres

7

22

5%

65

5%

16%

12

PIASTA

0

0

0

56

4%

14%

13

Other places

2

35

9%

62

4%

15%

14

Online and snowball

0

52

13%

–

–

–

60

401

100%

1,447

100%

–

Total

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, unweighted sample. * Respondents who declared that they visit the centres often or rarely.

took place online. The interviewers could not observe the interviewing process in 29 percent of the cases as the questionnaire was filled out online or at home.

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

The duration of the interviews was between 20 and 40 minutes. Face-to-face interviews took more time than self-administered questionnaires. Lack of time is a primary constraint of time-location sampling (Hoops et al. 2013; McKenzie and Mistiaen 2009). To overcome this constraint of the method, the interviewers suggested alternative ways of participating. If people were willing to participate but did not have enough time to do so in the centre, they took the questionnaire home with them. Interviewers recommended the Bulgarian version of the questionnaire to persons without excellent German language skills as some of the questions, particularly those measuring attitudes, required a good command of German. Most participants opted for the questionnaire in Bulgarian, whereas only 8 percent preferred the German version. A quarter of the respondents declared that they do not read German at all or have only rudimentary reading ability. This survey finding shows that the application of bi-lingual questionnaires enabled the participation of a considerable share of persons without sufficient German language skills who otherwise would not have participated in the survey.

3.5

Sample Analysis

3.5.1

Weighting Procedure

The main rationale behind time-location sampling is that each person in the target population (H statistical units) visits one or more centres (k centres). Centres are selected and individuals are chosen randomly out of the target population Hj that visits that particular centre (j = 1, 2 …k). Due to different frequencies of attendance at the various locations, persons have different probabilities of inclusion in the sample, which violates the underlying assumption of a probability sample— the equal likelihood of inclusion (Baio et al. 2011; Karon and Wejnert 2012). The individual probability of inclusion depends on the number of the centres visited by the respondent and the number of individuals in the population who visit each of the centres (Baio et al. 2011). The more individuals that visit the centre, the lower weight this centre has and vice versa; and the more centres the unit visits, the lower weight the individual has and vice versa. To adjust for unequal selection probabilities, I applied a weighting procedure based on the inverse of the individual likelihood of attending the locations. An inverse weighting procedure has been applied in several surveys (see a list in Serrano Sanguilinda et al. 2017). Individuals who visit more centres obtain a lower weight whereas individuals who visit fewer centres have a higher weight.

3.5 Sample Analysis

45

In the survey in Hamburg, each respondent declared his/her frequency of visits to the individual centres.8 This self-reported information allowed the computation of individual weights. The attendance was coded and took the values 0 (if the respondent does not visit the centre), 0.5 (if the respondent rarely visits the centre) and 1 (if the respondent visits the centre often).9 For the calculation of the weights of individual centres, a centre that is frequently visited by a heterogeneous population serves as a baseline. Based on ex post analysis of the frequency of visits to the centres, I selected the Bulgarian Orthodox church as a baseline centre. Almost half of the respondents reported visiting the Bulgarian Orthodox church, and it proved to attract a heterogeneous population in terms of age, gender and education. The Bulgarian shop also attracts many visitors but shows an over-representation of ethnic minorities. I calculated the weights of respondents in two steps. First, I computed a weight coefficient for each centre. Second, I attributed a weight coefficient to each respondent, considering the frequency of visits to the centres declared by each respondent and the weights of each centre.10 The individual probability of inclusion p(i) is calculated based on the profile of attendance at the centres u(i) and ex ante weights of centres (based on (Baio et al. 2011). This can be expressed using the following formula: Profile of unit i in terms of centres visited: u(i) = [u1(i), u2(i), u3(i), u4(i), u5(i), u6(i), u7(i)] Weight of unit i: p(i) =

8 Question:

pj ex ante u1*w1 + u2*w2 + u3*w3 + u4*w4 + u5*w5 + u6*w6 + u7*w7

How often do you visit the centres listed below? (Often, rarely and not at all). is in contrast to the Italian survey where attendance is coded with 0 (not visiting the centre) and 1 (visiting the centre). 10 For general information on the computation of weights, see Baio et al. (2011). For details on the computation of weights in this study, see: Annexe B–1, which presents the number of participants per centre. Annexe B–2 exemplarily shows data used for calculation of the attendance profile of seven units. Annexe B–3 presents the proportion of respondents interviewed in centre h who declared that they visit centre j as well. Annexe B–4 documents the final estimates of the relative importance of each centre with respect to the baseline centre, and Annexe B–5 presents the adjusted values of the weights of each centre. The final weights for the seven centres selected for computation of weights are summarised in the last column of Annexe B–5. 9 This

46

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

where: u is the frequency of visits to each centre w is the weight of each centre pj is the ex ante weight of centres As an example, the calculation of weight of unit 22: u22 = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0.5, 0) p22 =

7.25 = 1.47 1∗1.81 + 1∗1.00 + 1∗1.74 + 0∗0.39 + 0∗1.02 + 0.5∗0.80 + 0∗0.74

The weight can be interpreted as the number of individuals in the target population represented by the respondent (Biemer and Christ 2009). However, the weight of unit 22 is rough and unadjusted. Weights have to be adjusted so that the sum of the weights is equal to the number of units in the survey. A minimum threshold of 0.54 and a maximum threshold of 3.00 were set. This means that a person represents at least 0.5 persons and no more than 3 persons of the target population. After the adjustment, the final weight of unit 22 is 0.54, showing that respondent 22 represents ½ a person of the target population. The corresponding weight was assigned to each unit, and the sample was weighted (see the calculation of individual weights for seven units in Annexe B–6). I argue that the weighted sample overcomes the original bias due to different selection probability and allows for extrapolation of sample results to the total population of interest: Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg.

3.5.2

Sample Description

The sample includes 401 persons of Bulgarian background (see column 2 in Table 3.4). Male respondents were slightly more prevalent (52 percent). More than two-thirds of the respondents were of prime working age (25–44). At less than 2 percent, the proportion of older people was low. Half of the respondents had received tertiary education, 35 percent secondary and 14 percent compulsory. Among respondents with secondary education, 16 percent graduated at schools of general education and secondary schools (gymnasium), whereas 20 percent studied at technical or vocational schools. Most respondents were Bulgarian citizens, whereas 18 percent possessed German citizenship. Slightly more than half of the

3.5 Sample Analysis

47

respondents were temporary migrants with residence in Germany of less than five years. A comparison of the main socio-demographic characteristics in the weighted and non-weighted samples reveals intriguing results (Table 3.4). The weighting procedure had a great impact on gender, age, education, length of residence, citizenship and ethnic group. The share of some subgroups increased after weighting, showing that they had a lower probability of being included in the sample and correspondingly received higher individual weights. The groups whose share increased after weighting are men, the age groups 15–24 and 45–64, low-educated persons, Bulgarian citizens, and persons with lengths of residence of up to five years. The decline in the shares of the sample for women, persons aged 25– 44, medium- and high-educated, German citizens, permanent migrants with a length of residence of longer than five years and ethnic Bulgarians means that these groups tend to visit the centres more frequently than the other groups. It is easily understandable that women, young persons and ethnic Bulgarians tend to seek contact with the Bulgarian community more regularly. Two aspects can explain why permanent migrants and naturalised persons are more active in the migrant community than newcomers and Bulgarian citizens. First, wellestablished migrants with a longer length of residence and German citizenship may seek to preserve contacts with the Bulgarian community. Newcomers probably try to gain ground in Germany through more intensive relations with the receiving society than with their own community. Second, newcomers are probably not sufficiently aware of the existing community centres and visit only a few of them. Considerable shifts in the ethnic composition occurred when linguistic and religious characteristics were considered as indicators of belonging to an ethnic minority. Ethnic Turks and ethnic Roma are the two biggest minority groups in Bulgaria. The Roma are Christian-Orthodox or Muslim and speak Romanes, which has many different dialects (Koinova 1999). The Turkish minority speaks Turkish and lives mainly in north-eastern and south-eastern Bulgaria (Koinova 1999). The vast majority of Muslims are ethnic Turks, but there are also other groups like Bulgarian Muslims, Muslim Roma and Tatars (Koinova 1999). The share of Turkish- and Romanes-speaking persons and persons of Muslim confession or other religion increased after weighting. This finding indicates that these groups had a lower probability of being included in the sample and thus received higher weights in the weighting procedure. However, the higher weights may be due to the sample design. The Turkish minority predominantly visits one of the centres of interviewing—the shop owned by Bulgarian Turks—which may lead to higher weights for them and over-coverage in the sample. To address

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

the challenge of inclusion of ethnic minorities in future studies, further centres relevant for Bulgarian Turks should be included.

Table 3.4 Sample description, weighted and non-weighted samples Characteristic

Total number before weighting

Share before weighting (in %)

Share after weighting (in %)

Impact of weighting

Number of respondents

401

100.0

100.0

Male

208

51.9

57.1



Female

193

48.1

42.9



15–24

31

7.7

10.4



25–34

138

34.4

32.7



35–44

147

36.7

35.0



45–54

64

16.0

17.0



55–64

15

3.7

4.2



65+

6

1.5

0.8



54

13.5

24.7



Intermediate 63 (secondary) education (school of general education or secondary school)

15.7

18.0



Intermediate 69 (secondary) education (vocational or technical school)

19.7

19.8



High (tertiary) education

51.1

37.4



Gender

Age

Education Low (compulsory) education (8th class)

205

Marital status Single

154

38.4

41.7



Married

183

45.6

41.6

 (continued)

3.5 Sample Analysis

49

Table 3.4 (continued) Characteristic

Total number before weighting

Share before weighting (in %)

Share after weighting (in %)

Impact of weighting

Widowed, divorced

58

14.5

15.2



No answer

6

1.5

1.6



Children Yes

164

40.9

39.2



No

237

59.1

60.8



Bulgarian

327

81.8

88.4



German

17

18.0

11.5



Other

1

0.2

0.1



Dual citizens (Bulgarian and German)

56

14.0

8.7



Less than 1 year

95

23.7

30.2



2–5 years

135

33.7

35.9



6–10 years

71

17.7

15.3



11–19 years

76

19.0

14.8



20+ years

23

5.7

3.6



Missing values

1

0.2

0.1



310

77.3

62.1



Turkish-speaking

75

18.7

31.4



Romanes-speaking

16

4.0

6.5



Christian-Orthodox

289

72.1

61.8



Muslim

61

15.2

26.2



Other religion

8

2.0

3.0



No religion

43

10.7

8.9



Citizenship

Length of residence

Mother tongue Bulgarian-speaking

Religion

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013.

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

In the next chapters, I use the weighted sample to analyse the migration experience and integration situation of Bulgarian migrants in three areas: labour market integration, political integration and naturalisation. Logistic regressions will be run in the corresponding chapters.

3.5.3

Quality of the Sample

The most significant concern raised against any form of quantitative research is the quality of the sample. Many scholars argue that the quality of a sample should be assessed based on the total sample error (Groves and Lyberg 2011; Quality Standards Working Group 2015; von der Lippe, Peter and Kladroba 2002). According to the total survey error approach, errors in a survey may occur in all steps of survey preparation and implementation and are thus related to two dimensions: the lack of representativeness of the sample (representative dimension) and the erroneous measurement of the phenomenon of interest (measurement dimension) (Groves and Lyberg 2011; Quality Standards Working Group 2015). The representation dimension focuses on coverage, sampling and non-response, whereas the measurement dimension refers to validity, measurement and processing (Groves and Lyberg 2011; Quality Standards Working Group 2015). This section focuses on the representation dimension to assess the quality of the Bulgarian survey in Hamburg. I elaborate on the measurement dimension in the next chapters when I use sample data for multivariate analysis.11 Coverage Coverage shows whether the sample has heterogeneity comparable to that of the total population (Kruskal and Mosteller 1979). A comparison between the demographic characteristics of the sample and the characteristics of the target population is one of the methods for assessing coverage (Lohr 2009). Other authors speak about representativeness, meaning that the sample structure is similar to that of the total population (von der Lippe, Peter 2011). In their overview of representative sampling, Kruskal and Mosteller (1979) suggest speaking about coverage instead of representative sampling when comparing the sample data with the total population. The main population characteristics of the sample and the registered population with Bulgarian citizenship in Hamburg are compared (Figure 3.1). In 2012, the registered Bulgarian population in Hamburg numbered 5,176 and men dominated 11 For

a discussion on measurement errors in migrant surveys, see Aschauer (2009).

3.5 Sample Analysis

51

at 55 percent. The sample’s figure is 57 percent and thus exhibits a similar gender distribution to the administrative data. Most of the registered Bulgarian citizens were aged below 45 years (79 percent). Only 1 percent were older people above the age of 65. The sample data on age distribution approximates the administrative data: 78 percent of persons were below the age of 45 and 1 percent of persons were older than 65. 90 80 70 Sample estimate and 95% confidence interval bars

60 50 40

Administrative data

30 20 10 0 Women

Age 18 to 45

Age 45 to 65

Age 65+

Figure 3.1 Comparison of gender and age distribution in the sample against administrative data, in % (Sources: Own compilation based on different sources: Administrative data from local population register for 31.12.2012 stem from the Statistical Office of Northern Germany (2013); Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013; Notes: No data is available for the population younger than 15, so 18 years of age was taken as a reference point. Calculations of percentages are based on 4,481 persons, excluding 695 persons below 18)

A comparison of sample data and administrative data thus shows that the age and gender characteristics of the sample are close to the values for the total Bulgarian population registered in the population register.12 This result can be interpreted as a sign of good coverage of the target population in the sample. Sampling Sampling error is error caused by observing a sample instead of the whole population. Sampling error can be measured by the mean square error, i.e. the sum of 12 A comparison of other background characteristics, such as education and ethnicity, was not possible due to a lack of reference data.

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

the variance and squared bias. However, as this requires repeated surveys (Eurostat 2008), it is not possible to use it for a time-location sampling survey. To assess the sampling error, we need to analyse factors such as sample size, sample design, sampling fraction and variability within the population. A larger sample size, higher sampling fraction and less variable populations are associated with a lower sampling error (Engel and Schutt 2014). The sample size of the migrant survey in Hamburg was 401 persons. From a statistical point of view, this appears to be a rather small sample. However, considering the target population of less than 6,000 persons, the survey aims to reach a small population. For a population of 5,000 members, we need a sample of 357 to make estimates with a sampling error of no more than 5%, at the 95% confidence level (Monette et al. 2011). The sampling fraction does not affect the sample’s representativeness unless the fraction is large (Engel and Schutt 2014). Any sampling fraction of less than 2 percent can be treated with about the same degree of confidence (Engel and Schutt 2014). In the migrant survey among Bulgarians in Hamburg, the sampling fraction was 6 percent.13 This means that the sample included 6 percent of the registered Bulgarian population in 2012. For smaller populations, if the sampling fraction is more than 5 percent, a correction formula may be used, otherwise the sample may be larger than it needs to be (Monette et al. 2011). For the survey in Hamburg, the correction formula defines a sample size of 372 persons. As this is close to the actual sample size of 401 persons, I did not reduce the sample size ex post. Concerning the sample design, time-location sampling is associated with a different selection probability of units of the target population. To adjust for this different selection probability, an inverse weighting procedure is applied, as described in section 3.5.1. Therefore, assessing sample size, sampling fraction and sample design of the survey among migrants of Bulgarian origin in Hamburg, we can be confident to a large extent of its representativeness. Non-response Non-response errors occur when respondents do not provide information (Gray et al. 2007). This may occur in two ways: when a person does not participate in the survey (unit non-response), and when a respondent does not answer all of the questions (item non-response) (Eurostat 2013). As non-respondents are likely 13 The sampling fraction is calculated on the basis of registered Bulgarian citizens in the sample (88 percent of the respondents were Bulgarian citizens). As 12 percent were not registered in the population register, they are excluded from the calculation.

3.5 Sample Analysis

53

to differ systematically from survey participants, unit non-response is a major hazard in surveys (Engel and Schutt 2014). Response rates indicate the extent to which a survey is affected by this hazard. However, not in all cases does a higher response rate mean better survey quality, and response rates by themselves are poor indicators of non-response error (Schouten et al. 2009).14 Despite this criticism, calculating response rates is ‘a critical first step to understanding the presence of this component of potential survey error’ (AAPOR 2016). Time-location sampling involves sampling and interviewing at unusual places and thus the calculation of response rate is a major issue (Reichel and Morales 2017). Usually, the response rate is the number of complete interviews with reporting units divided by the number of eligible reporting units in the sample (AAPOR 2016). As no complete list of eligible individuals exists in the case of time-location sampling, some assumptions need to be made. I assume that visitors were potential eligible respondents on every visit to a centre and noted their number. When large events took place, the number of potential eligible respondents was approximated. Based on these data, I calculated the response rate in the migrant survey in Hamburg as follows (AAPOR 2016):15 response rate =

complete interviews complete interviews + (refusals + break offs + non − contacts) + other 0.35 =

401 401 + 720 + 36

The overall response rate was 35 percent but this has to be interpreted with caution. It is influenced mainly by non-contacts, in particular at certain events where not all visitors were asked to participate in the survey due to time constraints. The actual response rate is assumed to be higher as some persons visit several centres or the same centres more than once, which may lead to double counting of the same person in the number of non-contacts.16 A more precise indicator of survey quality is the cooperation rate, which is the proportion of all respondents interviewed of all eligible persons contacted (AAPOR 2016). The cooperation rate in 14 Schouten et al. (2009) proposed R-indicators that are suitable for comparison of different surveys and data collection strategies but are not applicable in the case of a single survey such as the migrant survey among Bulgarians in Hamburg. 15 https://www.aapor.org/Education-Resources/For-Researchers/Poll-Survey-FAQ/Res ponse-Rates-An-Overview.aspx, checked on 11.09.2020. 16 The number of non-contacts is calculated as the difference between the numbers of visitors, completed interviews and refused/break offs.

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

the migrant survey in Hamburg is 55 percent, meaning that every second visitor contacted participated in the survey. Both the response and cooperation rates achieved are considered acceptable given the long questionnaire requiring much time for completion. The response rates for in-person and web-based modes were calculated and allowed for comparison of different modes of data collection. Interestingly, response rates for the in-person mode (i.e. self-administered questionnaire and face-to-face interview) and the web-based interview mode do not differ much: 35 percent for the former and 34 percent for the latter.17 Willingness to participate in a time-location survey varies across centres, as shown by refusal rates. The number of refusals was high at the central bus station and in the shop (50 percent) probably due to limited time to participate. Lower refusal rates were documented for religious, cultural, educational and advisory centres (10–12 percent). These results are close to findings from other timelocation surveys. The ICS survey showed higher refusal rates in public places than at centres (Reichel and Morales 2017). In the same line, the ISMU survey pointed to high refusal rates at markets and shopping centres (41–45 percent) and lower refusal rates at institutional and formal places, associations or migrant centres, such as health centres, trade unions, charity centres and municipal help desks (15 percent) (Cesareo and Blangiardo 2011). The choice of locations for interviewing is of particular importance for timelocation sampling as they influence willingness to participate and thus the survey quality. To ensure high participation in the Hamburg survey among Bulgarians, the interviewers offered alternative methods of involvement outside the locations. Visitors without time to participate at the centre were given the questionnaire to take home or a link to the web survey. As a result, 155 questionnaires were taken home, and 89 of them were returned to the interviewers. The response rate is thus 57 percent. Handing the questionnaire out was particularly useful in the shop and at community events where visitors had restricted time. Thus the migrant survey in Hamburg shows that alternative ways of interviewing visitors at selected locations are needed to ensure participation, in particular in the case of long questionnaires.

17 The response rate for the web-based interview mode reflects the definition of the so-called cooperation rate. The cooperation rate is the proportion of all cases interviewed of all eligible units ever contacted (AAPOR 2016).

3.6 Summary

3.6

55

Summary

Testing innovative survey methods is of paramount importance for Germany as traditional methods of data collection, for example those based on population registers, fail to capture the diversity of the population of migration background. To address this methodological gap, I applied a time-location sampling method to survey the population of Bulgarian background in Hamburg. I approached migrants at selected locations under the central assumption that every migrant visits at least one centre and successfully reached subgroups that belong to the population of migration background—registered foreign citizens, naturalised persons and unregistered persons. The experience in Hamburg thus showed that the technique permits successful surveying of the population of migration background at city level. Some challenges of time-location sampling occurred during the fieldwork, in particular due to a lack of permission to survey in some locations and time constraints for participation. Both can lead to non-inclusion of eligible individuals in the sample, which violates the assumption of the non-zero probability of selection. To address this challenge, alternative ways of participating are useful. Persons need to be approached at the locations but then could be allowed to fill the questionnaire out at home or online. Furthermore, the combination of different modes of data collection, including paper and web-based modes, increased the coverage of the survey in Hamburg and showed this to be a promising approach for ensuring good coverage of the population. A comparison with administrative data showed that sample results matched the distribution in terms of age and gender, thus revealing good coverage of the target population. Time-location sampling initially produces a biased sample due to the different selection probability of individuals. An inverse weighting procedure taking the individuals’ attendance profile allows for a probability sample to be obtained. Therefore, it is possible to safely generalise results from the sample to the larger target population, Bulgarians in Hamburg. Whether Bulgarians in Hamburg are typical of the community in Germany is difficult to say. Bulgarians are, however, mostly distributed in the big cities, with Hamburg being one of them (Brücker et al. 2013a). Hence a case study carried out in the city of Hamburg can be considered suitable for providing insights into the community in general. Given the good coverage of the target population and the acquisition of a probability sample, time-location sampling proves to be an apt method for obtaining a representative sample for migrant groups without access to official population registers. The survey among Bulgarians in Hamburg showed that time-location sampling is a reasonable method for surveying individual nationalities at the local

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Methodology: a Time-Location Sampling Survey Among Bulgarians …

level. Single nationalities can be approached at country-specific locations with a high concentration of the target population. In order to do so, it is crucial to explore the target population in advance and to ensure a sufficiently broad set of such locations. Scholars question the efficiency and applicability of time-location sampling in Germany as ‘there is greater manifest pressure of persecution on such groups than in other European states or the United States’ (Salentin 2014). The migrant survey among Bulgarians seems to have been successful, even though substantial migration control characterises the German environment and may hinder people from participating. Both migrants and representatives of the selected centres accepted the survey and supported it. Whether time-location sampling is possible for other subgroups, in particular for migrants with insecure status such as asylum seekers and irregular migrants, or in other German cities, is contextual and has to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

4

Migration Patterns: Providing Empirical Evidence Beyond Official Statistics

Migration considerably increased after Bulgaria’s EU accession (cf. section 2.5). Whereas administrative data give indications of characteristics, such as flows, age and gender, they do not capture the total population of Bulgarian origin and its ethnic composition, and hardly explain the trend of increasing migration. In this chapter, I address these gaps and elaborate on the patterns of migration since 2007, going beyond administrative data. Based on survey results, I discuss the reasons for the considerably increased level of migration in the context of free movement and quantify the role of different subgroups, such as newly induced, renewed and redirected migration (section 4.1). Then I introduce an estimate of the population of Bulgarian origin in Hamburg, including non-registered and naturalised persons (section 4.2) and elaborate on little-empirically explored migrant characteristics, such as ethnic background and reasons for migration (section 4.3). Questioning the perception of predominantly temporary migration in the context of free movement, I analyse migrants’ long-term orientations (section 4.4) and shed light on their broader social integration in Germany, in particular how they perceive and experience integration in German society (section 4.5).

4.1

Explanations for Increased Migration After EU Accession

Migration from Bulgaria to Germany has been on the rise since 2007. It has been characterised by a high level of temporary stays but also positive net migration and a growing Bulgarian migrant population. Whereas 39,053 Bulgarian citizens were registered in 2006 in Germany, their numbers rose spectacularly to 337,015 in 2018 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006-2019a). Similarly, the number of Bulgarian citizens increased considerably in Hamburg: from 1,250 to 7,815 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 V. Kovacheva, The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33110-8_4

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between 2006 and 2018 (Statistical Office of Northern Germany 2005–2019). How can this significantly increased level of migration be explained?

4.1.1

Reasons for Increased Migration

The effect of free movement on migration dynamics depends on specific economic, political and historical conditions (Castles et al. 2014). The explanation for increased migration after EU accession can be found in classical push and pull factors. Economic disparities remained a crucial push factor in the EU postaccession period. The positive economic development in Bulgaria before EU accession ended with the global financial and economic crisis in 2008. The unemployment rate reached 13 per cent in 2013 compared to 6 per cent in 2008 (Hanganu et al. 2014). In particular, ethnically mixed rural areas suffered from increased unemployment, which led to more ethnically and regionally-specific migration (Markova 2010). Bulgarian GDP growth followed the trend for the EU28 countries in the period 2007–2018. The GDP growth rate was high in the first years after EU accession, declined and then became negative during the world economic crisis between 2009 and 2012, and started increasing again from 2013. In 2018, the growth rate of the Bulgarian GDP was above the average of 2.0 for EU28 countries, at 3.1 per cent.1 However, considering GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards, Bulgaria took last place in 2018 (index of 51).2 Income differences between Bulgaria and Germany are still substantial and create incentives for migration. The minimum wage in Bulgaria is the lowest in the EU. In 2018, it amounted to e260 per month in Bulgaria compared to e1,498 in Germany.3 The risk of poverty and social exclusion in Bulgaria was the highest in the EU, although the share has decreased over time. In 2018, 32.8 per cent of the Bulgarian population was at risk of poverty or social exclusion compared to 21.8 per cent on average for the EU27.4 Thus the economic conditions in Bulgaria remain a crucial factor 1 Eurostat, Real GDP growth rate, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init= 1&language=de&pcode=tec00115&plugin=1, checked on 08.07.2020. 2 Eurostat, GDP per capita in PPS, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init= 1&language=en&pcode=tec00114&plugin=1, checked on 08.07.2020. 3 Eurostat, Monthly minimum wages, bi-annual data, https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/ show.do?dataset=earn_mw_cur&lang=en, checked on 08.07.2020. 4 Eurostat, People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=t2020_50&language=de, checked on 08.07.2020.

4.1 Explanations for Increased Migration After EU Accession

59

for migration and have supported mostly economically motivated migration since 2007. Beside the persisting economic reasons for migration, different aspects can explain the considerably increased movements since 2007. First, after EU enlargements, a ‘hump effect’ in relation to migration emerges (Straubhaar 2001). This effect means that migrants realised postponed migration decisions in the short term after the country’s EU accession. Increasing migration can be attributed to new migration from Bulgaria induced by better migration opportunities in the context of free movement. Second, the EU enlargement legalised overnight migrants who were previously residing illegally (Ruhs 2007; Recchi and Triandafyllidou 2010). This de facto legalisation (Vogel et al. 2011) is a one-time statistical effect that is visible immediately after EU accession. Data hinted at such an effect for the UK. Data from the Worker Registration Scheme indicated that 30 per cent of those who applied in the first six months after the 2004 EU accession had already been living in the UK (Gilpin et al. 2006). Scholars argue that in the German case as well, the number of EU citizens registered after 2007 could be partly attributed to the regularisation of migrants already living in the country (Holland et al. 2011; Kahanec et al. 2010). Increasing migration can thus be an effect of registration of previously non-registered migrants. Third, increased migration can be due to the renewed movement of persons with earlier migration experience in Germany. In particular, persons who had previously been unable to secure residence in Germany received incentives to migrate anew and settle under the regime of free movement. Fourth, increasing mobility after EU accession can be attributed to the redirection of migration from other receiving countries due to changes in the institutional or economic conditions in those countries. Scholars estimated that such changes have contributed to 78 per cent of migration to Germany since 2007 (Bertoli et al. 2013). Redirected migration is associated mainly with the differing application of transitional arrangements across the EU and the global financial and economic crisis since late 2007 (Elsner and Zimmermann 2016). However, a differing application of transition rules did not affect Bulgarian migration after EU accession. In contrast to the 2004 EU enlargement when the UK and Ireland opened their labour markets immediately and received many EU8 migrants (Elsner and Zimmermann 2016; Holland et al. 2011), they introduced transitional periods for workers from Bulgaria and Romania. Only Sweden and Finland among the old EU15 member states did not apply restrictions on labour market access for EU2 migrants (Table 4.1). Therefore, redirection of migration flows from the EU2

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countries due to differing application of transitional rules did not take place to the same extent as with the EU8 countries (Holland et al. 2011; Kahanec et al. 2010). Table 4.1 Overview of the application of transitional arrangements for Bulgarian workers Lifting restrictions on free movement

Countries

January 2007 (No restrictions applied)

Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, Finland

January 2009

Hungary, Greece, Portugal, Spain

May 2009

Denmark

January 2012

Italy

January 2014

Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, the UK

Source: Own compilation based on Summary table of Member States’ policies—Workers from Bulgaria and Romania, https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=466&, checked on 13.05.2016.

The global economic crisis affected Bulgarian migration more significantly as it changed the economic conditions in the main destination countries for Bulgarian migrants, such as Spain, Italy and Greece. Unemployment in these countries increased, in particular in relevant sectors for migrants such as construction. Despite the worsening economic prospects, inflows from EU2 countries have continued to intensify since 2008. This is in contrast to the EU8 countries that experienced temporary reductions in migration flows during the crisis (Galgóczi and Leschke 2013). Many EU8 migrants in the UK and Ireland returned to their countries of origin, facilitated by sustained economic improvements and the guarantee of continued labour market access (Papademetriou and Terrazas 2009). In the case of EU2 countries, enormous economic and social differences from EU15 countries remained and contributed to the trend of increasing migration (Galgóczi and Leschke 2013). Instead of returning to their countries of origin, many EU2 migrants decided to move to other countries less affected by the crisis (for detailed analysis on migration and the economic crisis, see Kahanec and Zimmermann 2016).

4.1 Explanations for Increased Migration After EU Accession

4.1.2

61

Patterns of Post-Accession Migration

Increased migration since 2007 can thus be attributed to different patterns of migration, such as newly induced migration after realisation of postponed migration decisions, registration of previously non-registered migrants, settlement of circular migrants and redirection of migration from other countries. The extent to which these patterns contributed to the scope of Bulgarian migration to Germany has been little explored, empirically speaking. I seek to address this gap and quantify the relevance of these patterns: registration, newly induced migration, renewed migration of former migrants, redirected migration from crisis countries, and first migration to Germany after a previous experience abroad. Survey respondents reported on their experience of migration to Germany and other countries, including when they moved to Germany for the first time, how often they had left Germany for more than three months since then, how long they had lived in Germany without interruption, whether they had migration experience in countries other than Germany for longer than three months. The survey results reveal that three groups of migrants shape the pattern of migration after EU accession: First, respondents who migrated for the first time after 2007 and have no previous migration experience either in Germany or in other countries (new migrants); second, respondents who had previous migration experience in Germany before 2007 but settled permanently in the country after EU accession (renewed migrants); third, respondents who did not have migration experience in Germany but in other receiving countries and moved to Germany for the first time after 2007 (redirected migrants). Redirected migrants are migrants who resided in the crisis countries Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus, or in other non-crisis countries. New migration dominated the pattern of Bulgarian post-accession migration to Hamburg (Figure 4.1).5 Almost half of the migrants who arrived after 2007 did not have previous experience either in Germany or in other countries and are thus considered newly induced migrants under the freedom of movement regime. Renewed migration also contributed substantially to post-accession migration. Almost one-third of post-accession migrants had been residing in Germany before 2007 but migrated again after EU accession. Renewed migrants who declared more than two back-and-forth movements between Germany and Bulgaria are

5 For

comparison, 85 per cent of pre-2007 migration is new migration. This means that preaccession migrants less often have other migration experience compared to post-accession migrants, which is understandable given their longer length of residence in Germany.

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considered circular migrants.6 Circular migration accounts for 22 per cent of the post-accession migrants. This finding indicates that settlement of previous circular migrants contributed significantly to increased post-accession migration. Redirection of migration from other countries played a less important but still significant role in the post-accession migration pattern. A quarter of postaccession migrants had previous migration experience in countries other than Germany. They moved to Germany for the first time after 2007, but it was not their first destination country. Most of the redirected migrants mentioned Greece (25), Spain (16), the US (10) and the UK (8). Other destinations included France, Belgium, Russia and the Netherlands (7 for each country), the Czech Republic (6), Denmark, Cyprus, and Turkey (6 for each country), and Italy (4). More than half of the redirected migrants lived in Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus, which are deemed traditional destination countries for Bulgarian migrants and were most severely hit by the global financial crisis. Given the fact that these people moved to Germany after the global financial crisis began in late 2007, they can plausibly be considered redirected migrants from the crisis countries. Redirected migration from crisis countries accounts for 14 per cent of post-accession migrants. Whether Germany is a stopover for them until the economic recovery of these countries or a permanent destination remains to be seen.

11%

New migration from Bulgaria

14% 44%

Renewed migration of circular migrants Renewed migration of migrants with one previous stay in Germany

8%

Redirected migration from Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus

22%

Migration of persons with experience in non-crisis countries

Figure 4.1 Patterns of post-accession migration to Germany. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample. Basis: Post-accession migrants, n = 254) 6 Circular

migration is defined as at least two back-and-forth movements between country of origin and country of destination (European Migration Network 2011).

4.2 Estimate of the Population of Bulgarian Background in Hamburg

63

The survey results do not allow for quantification of the registration effect after EU accession as no question on irregular residence was included in the survey. However, the survey results do provide suggestive empirical evidence when comparing the year of migrants’ first stay in Germany and the year in which their continuous residence began. It is assumed that persons with insecure residence before 2007 registered in the early years after EU accession. Registration and de facto legalisation of residence can be supposed for respondents who had been residing in Germany before EU accession but settled permanently only after EU accession in 2007 and 2008. Such an effect accounts for 9 per cent of the postaccession migrants. The majority of persons who had resided in Germany before EU accession moved again after 2009. Therefore, no legalisation effect is assumed for them. Indeed, not all of these 9 per cent were irregular migrants who had been illegally residing in German territory. I assume that some had returned to Bulgaria and migrated anew after EU accession. However, as Germany did not have regularisation programmes known from countries such as Italy and Greece, this proportion of settlement immediately after EU accession gives some indication of such a legalisation effect. Given also the fact that few opportunities for long-term residence existed for Bulgarian migrants before 2007, it can be plausibly concluded that EU accession was a vital legalisation mechanism for Bulgarian migrants in Germany. Summing up these survey results (Figure 4.1), increased migration after EU accession is mainly due to newly induced migration from Bulgaria. However, the expectations of mass migration from Bulgaria were not realised. Less than half of post-accession migration can be attributed to a ‘hump effect’ from EU accession. More than half of the post-accession migrants had already practised migration, either in Germany or in other countries. For migrants with previous experience in Germany, EU accession served as a legalisation and stabilisation of their residence. For migrants from crisis countries, it allowed for more mobility and facilitated taking advantage of freedom of movement during the crisis.

4.2

Estimate of the Population of Bulgarian Background in Hamburg

Data on foreign nationals do not represent the full picture of Bulgarian migration as two groups are excluded: naturalised and non-registered persons. Naturalised persons of Bulgarian origin are counted as German citizens, whereas nonregistered Bulgarian citizens are not captured in official statistics at all (for a

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discussion on statistical counting of Bulgarian migrants in German statistics, see Liakova 2014). The concept of migration background introduced in 2005 addresses the first group of naturalised persons. According to the Microcensus definition, the population of migration background encompasses foreign nationals and Germans who are born abroad or who have at least one parent born abroad (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2015a). The population of Bulgarian background in 2012 accounted for 105,000 persons in Germany and 6,000 in Hamburg (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2013b). An official estimate produced by the city of Hamburg pointed to 9,402 persons of Bulgarian background in Hamburg in 2015.7 Microcensus data point to 13,000 naturalised persons of Bulgarian origin in Germany, which corresponds to 12 per cent of the total population of Bulgarian background. The number of naturalised persons in Germany has increased since then and amounted to 20,000 in 2018 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2010–2019). However, in relative terms, the proportion of naturalised persons in the population of Bulgarian background declined from 12 to 7 per cent between 2012 and 2018. Microcensus data on naturalised persons of Bulgarian origin for Hamburg are not published and so their proportion in the population is unknown. It is possible to calculate the number of naturalised persons based on Microcensus data on the population of migration background and official data on foreign nationals from the local population register. In 2012, Microcensus data pointed to 6,000 people of Bulgarian background in Hamburg (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2010– 2019). The local population register registered 5,176 Bulgarian citizens (Statistical Office of Northern Germany 2013). The difference indicates 824 naturalised persons of Bulgarian origin, which corresponds to 14 per cent of the population of Bulgarian background in Hamburg. Quantification of the second group, non-registered persons, is much more difficult. In Germany, the obligation to register in the municipality applies to each person living in the country.8 The consequences of non-registration for EU citizens are less severe than for third-country nationals. Whereas for third-country nationals ‘illegal residence’ is a criminal offence and can result in deportation, for

7 The

estimate is based on official registration data and a standardised procedure MigaPro for derivation of migration background that is applied at a city level (Statistical Office of Northern Germany 2016). For comparison, according to Microcensus data, there were 6,000 persons of Bulgarian background in Hamburg in 2012 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2013b). 8 § 11 Allgemeine Meldepflicht, Melderechtsrahmengesetz (MRRG).

4.2 Estimate of the Population of Bulgarian Background in Hamburg

65

EU citizens it is an administrative offence and deportation only occurs in exceptional cases (for example, in case of serious crimes) (Vogel and Aßner 2009).9 For EU migrants, the stimuli for registration are more decisive than penalties. Registration is a prerequisite for regular residence in Germany and has great relevance for daily life. A registration certificate is required to open a bank account, sign a work contract, enrol at university, marriage, etc. Practical reasons thus create strong incentives for registration and therefore the proportion of EU migrants that intentionally avoid registration is expected to be minor. Nevertheless, some groups, such as homeless persons or persons who live at friends’ and relatives’ places, face practical obstacles in registering as they lack a hiring contract required for registration. Other groups, such as tourists and seasonal workers, stay in Germany for a short time and usually do not register. Many Bulgarians are hesitant to contact public authorities or perceive the registration requirement as ‘totalitarian’ (Liakova 2014). Some Bulgarian migrants are thus not registered with the local registration office and are not captured in official registration statistics.10 Due to the under-coverage of non-registered and naturalised persons, the actual number of people of Bulgarian origin in Hamburg in 2012 is much higher than administrative data on foreign nationals suggest. To capture Bulgarian origin in the survey and to estimate the number of people of Bulgarian background, I included several questions such as on citizenship, naturalisation, migration experience and registration at the local registration office. The survey results reveal 11.5 per cent were naturalised persons of Bulgarian origin. Applying this percentage to the registered Bulgarian population in Hamburg in 2012, I estimate the number of German citizens of Bulgarian background at 595 persons (Table 4.2). The majority of respondents stated that they were registered in the municipality. Forty-six respondents declared that they were not registered and two that they did not know. Assuming that 48 persons were non-registered, the survey results point to 11.7 per cent non-registered migrants in the sample.11 The survey thus reveals that non-registration remains an issue of concern for the Bulgarian 9 EU

citizens are not illegal in the sense of the EU return directive, which refers explicitly to third-country nationals (Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council). 10 Also, in other EU countries such as the Netherlands, the actual size of the CEE population is much higher than official registration statistics show, mainly because some migrants are reluctant to register (Snel et al. 2015). 11 A study conducted in Berlin came to a similar share of 12 per cent unregistered persons. Based on police criminal statistics, it was argued that such a share is not implausible (Kovacheva and Vogel 2012, p. 30).

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migrant population even in the EU context. I applied a simple multiplier of 11.7 and estimated the number of unregistered Bulgarians in Hamburg in 2012 to be 606 persons (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Estimate of the population of Bulgarian origin in Hamburg as of 31.12.2012 Components

Data source

Absolute number

As a proportion of the total Bulgarian population

Bulgarian registered population

Official registration data*

5,176

81%

Bulgarian unregistered population

Simple multiplier from the survey: 11.7%

606

10%

Naturalised population (German citizens of Bulgarian origin)

Simple multiplier from the survey: 11.5%

595

9%

6,377

100%

Total population of Bulgarian origin

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted, n = 401. * Data from the local population register (Statistical Office of Northern Germany 2013).

The sum of the three categories (registered Bulgarian citizens, German citizens of Bulgarian background and unregistered Bulgarian citizens) points to an estimated 6,400 persons of Bulgarian origin in Hamburg in 2012. Among them, 81 per cent were registered Bulgarian citizens, 10 per cent were unregistered Bulgarians and 9 per cent were German citizens (Table 4.2). This result reveals that the population of Bulgarian origin in Hamburg in 2012 is assumed to be 19 per cent higher than official statistics suggest. These results are close to findings from a survey among Bulgarian- and Albanian-speaking persons in Berlin. According to this study, the Bulgarian population in Berlin in 2009 was 18 per cent higher than the official statistics suggested (Kovacheva and Vogel 2012).12

12 The percentage is based on police criminal statistics calculated as suspects in the categories illegal and tourist as a share of the total suspects (Jedermann-Straftaten, key 890,000). For methodological approach, see Vogel and Aßner (2011).

4.3 Little-known Migrant Characteristics

4.3

67

Little-known Migrant Characteristics

Administrative data at federal level shed light on socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender and marital status. Still, the ethnic, social and regional composition of the Bulgarian migrant population remains little-known (Matter 2017). This section documents trends on gender, age and education, and addresses the gaps relating to Bulgarian migration, such as ethnic structure, reasons for migration and situation before migration.

4.3.1

Gender, Age, Education

Administrative data on the registered Bulgarian population in Germany reveal significant changes in migrant characteristics such as gender, age and education after EU accession. In the early 2000s, women prevailed in the Bulgarian migrant population. With EU accession, the gender structure became male-dominated. The proportion of male migrants in Germany rose from 43 per cent in 2006 to 55 per cent in 2018 (Statistical Office of Northern Germany 2005–2019). The same trend applies to Hamburg, where the proportion of men increased from 44 to 52 per cent between 2006 and 2018 (Statistical Office of Northern Germany 2005– 2019). As data at federal level indicate, this change in the gender structure of the Bulgarian population is due to the rapidly rising immigration of men. Whereas men dominated only slightly before EU accession (55 per cent in 2006), they have substantially prevailed in the migration flows since 2007 (for example, 63 per cent in 2014) (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006–2019c). A clear shift in the age structure of the Bulgarian migrant population occurred after EU accession (Figure 4.2). The relevance of two age groups increased significantly: children below the age of 15 and persons of prime working age, i.e. 25 to 55 years. No changes took place in the cohort aged 55–65 and that older than 65. Retirement migration is thus of minor importance. The proportion of children grew remarkably from 5 per cent in 2006 to 19 per cent in 2018. The increasing proportion of children relates to the growing number of children born in Germany. In 2015, there were almost 9,200 persons of Bulgarian background born in Germany compared to only 970 in 2006 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006–2019a). The vast majority of them were children below 6. The proportion of persons of Bulgarian background born in Germany thus increased from 2.5 to 5.9 per cent in the period 2006–2018 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006–2019a). Furthermore, more families with children have arrived since 2007.

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The number of persons of prime working age increased from 61 per cent to 69 per cent (2006–2011) and then decreased to 61 per cent in 2018. The category of young people aged 15 to 25 who accounted for almost 30 per cent in 2006 dropped considerably to 13 per cent in 2018. This decrease is closely related to the role of student migration, which lost its leading position as the main migration channel for Bulgarian citizens. In the past, a Bulgarian citizen could obtain residency much more easily for educational than for economic purposes, which triggered the migration of young people. The free movement of persons opened up further opportunities, particularly for labour and family migration, mostly practised by people of prime working age.

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 0%

10%

20%

30% Under 15

40% 15-25

50% 25-55

60% 55-65

70%

80%

90%

100%

65+

Figure 4.2 Age composition of Bulgarian citizens in Germany. (Source: Own compilation based on data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2006–2019a))

The same trend in the age structure applies to Hamburg (Figure 4.3). The proportion of children below 18 and persons aged between 30 and 60 increased considerably in the period 2004–2018. Thus every fifth Bulgarian citizen in Hamburg in 2018 was a minor. The opposite trend of decreasing proportion applies to the age cohort 18–30, which declined in the same period. Compared to the total foreign population, the Bulgarian population in Hamburg is younger. In 2018, the share of minors among the Bulgarian population amounted to 21 per cent compared to 17 per cent of the total foreign population. The share of persons of main working age (18–45) among Bulgarian migrants was slightly higher (57 per cent) than among the total foreign population (53 per cent) (Statistical Office of Northern Germany 2005–2019). The fact that the

4.3 Little-known Migrant Characteristics

69

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 0%

10%

20%

30%

Below 18

40%

18-30

50%

30-60

60%

60-65

70%

80%

90%

100%

65+

Figure 4.3 Age composition of Bulgarian citizens in Hamburg. (Source: Own compilation based on data from the Statistical Office of Northern Germany (2005–2019))

Bulgarian population is younger compared to the total foreign population is not surprising. Migration is known as an age-selective process in which persons in the first half of their working life migrate more often than persons in the second half of their working life (Wagner 1989). Therefore, given the recent nature of Bulgarian migration to Germany and the development of a sizable Bulgarian community in the 2000s, the dominance of young persons is understandable. Over time, a convergence between the age structure of the Bulgarian population and the total foreign population is expected. Besides those in age and gender, changes are also visible in the educational structure of the Bulgarian migrant population. Microcensus data show a decreasing qualification level of Bulgarians in Germany from 2010 to 2018 (Figure 4.4). The proportion of academics decreased by 13 percentage points, whereas the proportion of persons without professional qualifications increased by 15 percentage points. The share of persons who are still in education, and those with non-academic professional qualifications, remained constant. This shift can be attributed mainly to changes in the qualification level of newcomers. In 2005, university graduates prevailed among the newcomers to Germany from Bulgaria and Romania, whereas in 2010, persons with and without vocational training dominated among newcomers (Brücker et al. 2013a).13 Shifts in the qualification structure of newcomers led to the following qualification structure in 2018. Two-thirds of the population of Bulgarian background 13 No

individual data are available for Bulgarians.

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was still in education or low-educated: almost one-third was still in education, and more than one-third had no vocational training. A minority was highly educated: one-third possessed non-academic or academic education.

2010

33%

2011

32%

2012

21%

28%

2013

31%

2015

30%

29%

19%

30%

30%

2014

18%

23%

25%

20%

27%

23%

22%

30%

20%

18%

34%

20%

18%

17%

2016

31%

36%

17%

16%

2017

31%

36%

16%

16%

2018

31%

36%

18%

15%

0%

10%

Still in education

20%

30%

40%

Without vocational training

50%

60%

70%

Non-academic education

80%

90%

100%

Academic education

Figure 4.4 Educational structure of the population of Bulgarian background in Germany. (Source: Own calculation based on data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2010– 2019))

Compared to other groups, such as EU citizens, as well as the wider population with and without migration backgrounds (Figure 4.5), the proportion of academics among persons of Bulgarian origin is higher. At the same time, Bulgarian migrants more often do not have vocational training and are less often medium-skilled than the reference groups. This qualification structure shows a significant relevance of highly educated persons among Bulgarian migrants but also of those without professional qualifications. The top and bottom of the educational ladder are strongly represented while the medium educational level is rather underrepresented. The increased flows of men and low-educated persons could, to a considerable extent, be attributed to labour market opportunities that became available after EU accession. In the context of restricted freedom of work, it was mainly men and those with low education levels who became self-employed in the construction sector and in seasonal work. These were partly redirected migrants from Spain and Italy with medium qualification levels that lost their jobs in the economic and financial crisis of 2008. The findings from the migrant survey are consistent with administrative data and confirm the transforming structure of the Bulgarian migrant population in

4.3 Little-known Migrant Characteristics

Persons without migration background

18%

Persons from EU28 countries

10%

22%

32%

Persons of Bulgarian background

31%

0%

10%

56%

23%

Persons of migration background

Still in education

71

20%

Without vocational training

16%

39%

26%

15%

28%

36%

30%

40%

50%

13%

16%

60%

Non-academic education

70%

80%

16%

90%

100%

Academic education

Figure 4.5 Educational structure of the population of Bulgarian background in 2018 in comparison. (Source: Own calculation based on data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2010–2019))

terms of age, gender and education. Post-accession migration is dominated by male migrants, which is also mirrored in the gender structure of the sample: 57 per cent male and 43 per cent female respondents. The vast majority of the respondents (85 per cent) were of prime working age (25–54 years), but it has to be kept in mind that no children under 15 were included in the sample. As expected, the proportion of university graduates was higher among pre-accession (61.5 per cent) than among post-accession migrants (27.8 per cent). The sample comprises 43 per cent respondents without vocational training, 20 per cent with non-academic education and 37 per cent with academic education. This qualification structure is very close to the official statistics. It confirms the hourglass structure of Bulgarian migration: wide at the top and the bottom (high- and low-skilled), and narrow in the middle (middle-skilled). The survey provides new empirical insights into the educational structure of Bulgarian migrants. First, it identifies persons who have obtained a qualification in Germany. More than a quarter (29 per cent) of the respondents completed education in Germany, with a higher proportion among pre-accession than postaccession migrants. Second, the survey results reveal intriguing differences between male and female migrants. In the migrant survey, male and female respondents do not differ considerably in terms of age and family status. However, they vary significantly in their educational level and German language skills (Figure 4.6). Compared to men, women are better educated, have more often obtained education in Germany

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and have better German language skills. Half of the women received tertiary education as opposed to only a quarter of the men. Twice as many women studied in Germany as men. More women (56 per cent) than men (33 per cent) assessed their German language skills as good to very good. Statistical analysis shows that gender correlates significantly with the three aspects: educational level, education in Germany and German language skills (p = 0.000), but the correlation effect is rather small (r = 0.268, r = 0.225, r = 0.242).14 Third, the survey findings hint at intriguing differences in terms of mother tongue and religion, which point to ethnic minority belonging. Men more often confessed the Muslim faith and more often spoke Turkish, indicating that more male than female migrants belonged to an ethnic minority. Gender correlates significantly with mother tongue and religion, but the effect is rather weak (r = −.172, r = −0.255).

Good to very good German skills

33%

Poor to fair German skills

33% 11%

No skills to poor German skills

56% 43%

24%

Education in Germany

High education

Women

41%

20%

Men 52%

26% 32%

Intermediate education 16%

Low education 0%

10%

20%

42%

32% 30%

40%

50%

60%

Figure 4.6 Male and female respondents by education and German language skills. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

4.3.2

Ethnic Composition

In the country of origin, the Bulgarian population includes ethnic Bulgarians and several ethnic minorities such as Turks, Roma, Armenians, Russians and Jews. 14 Cohen

(1988) defines effects as: weak (r = .10), medium (r = .30) and strong (r = .60).

4.3 Little-known Migrant Characteristics

73

The census carried out in Bulgaria in 2011 shows that the majority of the population belongs to the ethnic Bulgarian group: 84.5 per cent of 6,680,980. Two big ethnic minorities exist—the Turkish ethnic minority of 588,318 persons (8.8 per cent) and the Roma ethnic minority of 325,343 persons (4.9 per cent).15 According to estimates, the actual number of Roma is much higher and amounts to 700,000 persons, which corresponds to 10 per cent of the Bulgarian population (Arndt 2013; Heuss 2011). The reason for their underestimation in the census is that some members of the minority do not declare that they are part of the minority group (Arndt 2013; Heuss 2011). The extent to which extent ethnic minorities migrate to Germany is an intriguing issue to explore as the perception of predominantly ethnic migration has dominated the public discourse. Providing empirical evidence on the ethnic composition of the migrant population is a difficult task, as German administrative data do not capture information on ethnicity. Indications about the ethnic composition of the Bulgarian migrant population stem from the migrant survey in Hamburg. Two characteristics—language and religion—indicate belonging to an ethnic group (cf. section 3.5.2). Respondents with Turkish language skills or Muslims are considered to belong to the Turkish ethnic group. The number of Turkish-speaking respondents probably includes some Roma and ethnic Bulgarians originating from regions with a high concentration of ethnic Turks. Therefore, the share of Turkish-speaking persons is considered to be a maximum share of the Turkish minority. Among the Muslim respondents, there are probably some Roma and Bulgarian Pomaks,16 but there are also a large number of Turkish-speaking respondents who did not declare a religion. Therefore, the share of Muslims is considered a minimum. Those with Romanes language skills are deemed to belong to the Roma ethnic group. Persons who only have Bulgarian language skills and are of Orthodox religion are considered to belong to the majority group of ethnic Bulgarians. Both indicators of belonging to an ethnic group reveal an increasing relevance of ethnic minorities in the post-accession period. Whereas Bulgarian-speaking persons dominated in pre-accession migration (84 per cent), they made up only 53 per cent of post-accession migrants. Turkish-speaking migrants gained in importance in the post-accession period, when their proportion increased from 14 to 38 per cent. Similarly, more people in the Romanes-speaking group migrated in the post- rather than the pre-accession period (3 and 8 per cent respectively). The 15 https://censusresults.nsi.bg/Census/Reports/2/2/R7.aspx,

checked on 14.07.2020.

16 Pomaks are Bulgarian-speaking people who confess Muslim faith. They are not recognised

as ethnic minority and their number is estimated at about 250,000 persons (Koinova 1999).

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Migration Patterns: Providing Empirical Evidence …

second variable of ethnic belonging—religion—points to a similar trend. Whereas Christian-Orthodoxy—the main religion of ethnic Bulgarians—prevailed in the pre-accession period, the relevance of Islam increased in the post-accession period. Figure 4.7 reveals the following ethnic composition of the Bulgarian migrant population in Hamburg in 2012. The proportion of the Turkish ethnic group is assumed to be between 26 per cent and 31 per cent, whereas the share of the Roma ethnic group is assumed to be at least 7 per cent. The proportion of ethnic Bulgarians is estimated to be between 62 and 67 per cent. Compared to the ethnic composition of the population in the country of origin, the survey shows an over-representation of the Turkish minority. Given the large Turkish community in Germany that may pull migrants from the same linguistic and cultural backgrounds, an over-representation of the Turkish ethnic minority relative to their share in the total Bulgarian population is plausible. The proportion of the Roma ethnic group is comparable to its share in the total Bulgarian population. This survey finding is in line with results from socio-economic data revealing that there is no overrepresentation of Roma among the Bulgarian and Romanian migrants in Germany (Brücker et al. 2013a). Based on sample results, it can be plausibly concluded that almost one-third of the Bulgarian migrant population in Hamburg belongs to an ethnic minority.

90%

85%

80% 70% 60%

67% 62%

50%

Share in the Bulgarian population

40%

Maximum share in Hamburg Minimum share in Hamburg

31% 26%

30% 20% 9%

10%

5%

7%

0% Bulgarian ethnic group

Turkish ethnic group

Roma ethnic group

Figure 4.7 Ethnic structure of the Bulgarian migrant population. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

4.3 Little-known Migrant Characteristics

4.3.3

75

Motivations for Migration

Free movement opened up new migration channels to Bulgarian migrants, particularly in terms of improved opportunities for labour market participation. Despite restricted labour market access for dependent workers, self-employment is an alternative and easily accessible way to participate in the labour market. Thus shifts in motivations for migration to Germany are expected from 2007 onward. The migrant survey in Hamburg explores this issue by asking about the main reason for migration to Germany. It reveals that labour and student migration prevail, while family migration and political migration are less relevant (Figure 4.8). These findings are consistent with results from a study among the EU27 in 2008 that identified economic and educational reasons as the main driving forces of Bulgarian migration (SVR 2013a). Compared to EU27 countries in 2008, Bulgarian migrants moved to Germany more often for economic (57 per cent of Bulgarian migrants versus 43 per cent of EU27 migrants) and educational reasons (23 per cent versus 8 per cent), and less often to join family members (14 per cent versus 32 per cent) (SVR 2013a). To explore shifts in the motivation for migration after EU accession, I compared pre- and post-accession migrants in the sample. Both groups differ widely in their motives for migration (Figure 4.8). Educational and family reasons dominated among pre-accession migrants, while economic reasons prevailed among post-accession migrants. A quarter of Bulgarian migrants moved for economic reasons before EU accession, whereas their proportion increased to more than two-thirds after 2007. The survey thus provides empirical evidence in relation to the expectation of there being more educational and family migration before EU accession when migration barriers existed and an increasing relevance of labour migration in the context of free movement.

4.3.4

Labour Status Before Migration

In addition to self-declared reasons for migration, the results regarding labour and professional status17 before migration further strengthen the establishment of a 17 According to the Eurostat labour force survey methodology, labour status defines whether a person is active (employed, unemployed) or inactive. In terms of professional status, a person can be self-employed, in dependent work or contributing family workers, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/EU_lab our_force_survey_-_methodology#EU-LFS_concept_of_labour_force_status, checked on 15.09.2020.

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Total sample

Post-accession migrants

Migration Patterns: Providing Empirical Evidence …

11%

69%

14%

Pre-accession migrants

10%

20%

Education

30% Economic

40% Family

50%

60%

Political

70%

80%

5%

4%

5%

21%

25%

48%

0%

14%

57%

23%

90%

100%

Other

Figure 4.8 Reasons for migration to Germany. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

new group of economic migrants since 2007. Respondents were asked about their situation before migration, and the survey results show that respondents who came in the pre- and post-accession periods differ considerably (Figure 4.9). Mostly graduates and students migrated to Germany before 2007, whereas it was predominantly workers that arrived after EU accession. The proportion of job seekers and inactive persons who migrated to Germany has not changed since 2007, thus contradicting the perception of migration triggered by unemployment in the country of origin. Mostly working persons and graduates left Bulgaria and decided to move to Germany. The survey results thus provide empirical evidence on the dominance of economic reasons for migration after EU accession. In this aspect, Bulgarian migrants do not differ substantially from migrants from other CEE countries. As expected, labour migration increased under the regime of free movement. However, scholars identify migration of young people as a new feature of post-accession migration from CEE countries (Glorius et al. 2013). In contrast to this, the migration of young people from Bulgaria began considerably before EU accession and has dominated the pattern of Bulgarian migration to Germany for a long time. From 2007 on, labour migration substituted for student migration and became the main pattern of mobility to Germany.

4.4 Duration of Migration

77

Total sample

46%

Post-accession migrants

13%

50%

Pre-accession migrants

16%

34%

0% Dependent workers

10%

20%

Self-employed

31%

4%

30% Students

7% 3%

23%

51%

40%

50%

Job seekers

60%

6% 2%

8% 4%

70%

Inactive persons

80% Other

90%

100%

Missing

Figure 4.9 Labour status before migration to Germany. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

4.4

Duration of Migration

The question of how long migrants are going to stay in the receiving country has attracted much attention in migration research. A distinction is usually made between migration as temporary or permanent phenomena. Scholars argue that the regulatory framework on migration may influence the length of residence of migrants and may determine migration as a temporary or permanent project (Castles et al. 2014). In the case of restricted migration, less circular migration tends to take place: migrants tend to stay for a longer time or even permanently as migration entails high costs and risks (Castles et al. 2014). By contrast, free migration tends to encourage mobility and circular movement. For migration within the EU, it is assumed that free movement reduces permanent migration and facilitates temporary and repeated stays abroad, mainly as continued opportunities to migrate after returning are guaranteed (SVR 2013a). In line with this theoretical expectation, administrative data on length of residence have shown that migration from the CEE countries after EU accession is predominantly of temporary and circular nature. However, such statistical indications provide a snapshot of the residence status of migrants but are not informative about their long-term orientations. For example, although statistics show that migrants who arrived some months ago are temporary migrants, they can intend to remain permanently. Thus migration statistics do not fully coincide with migrants’ long-term orientations, and further empirical evidence on them is needed.

78

4.4.1

4

Migration Patterns: Providing Empirical Evidence …

Residence Status

No formal or legal definition of temporary migration exists in Germany (European Migration Network 2011). In some cases, temporary migration means that a person is allowed to stay in the country only temporarily, such as seasonal workers; in other cases, temporary migration is implicitly based on the assumption of permanent residence (European Migration Network 2011). Thus holders of permanent residence are considered permanent migrants, and those without permanent residence are only temporary in Germany. According to the Freedom of Movement Act,18 EU citizens acquire a right of permanent residence after five years of continued legal residence. Applying this definition, official statistics on length of residence show a declining proportion of Bulgarian citizens with permanent residence in Germany: from 66 per cent in 2006 to 39 per cent in 2014 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006–2019a).19 After the transitional periods in the freedom of work expired, the proportion of permanent residents started increasing and reached 52 per cent in 2018 (ibid.). Although permanent residence declined in relative terms, the absolute number of Bulgarian citizens who have been residing in Germany for more than four years has been continuously increasing: from about 25,700 to 176,700 between 2006 and 2018 (ibid.). The decreasing proportion of permanent migrants in the first years after EU accession is mainly due to the dynamic migratory movements between Bulgaria and Germany, reflected in a significant number of in- and outflows. Emigration in the first four years of residence gives an indication of these migration dynamics. The proportion of Bulgarian citizens who left Germany within the first four years increased from 64 per cent in 2006 to 82 per cent in 2015 (ibid.). The trend of increasing temporary migration becomes even more apparent when analysing emigration within the first year of stay. Every third Bulgarian newcomer left Germany in the first year of stay in 2015, whereas only one in four newcomers did so in 2006 (ibid.). As a result of dynamic migratory movements since 2007, the average length of residence of Bulgarian migrants in Germany declined from 7.6 years in 2006 to 4.6 years in 2014. It started rising again after the end of the transitional periods in the freedom of work and reached 5.6 years in 2018 (ibid.). Still, it is far below

18 §4a

Freizügigkeitsgesetz/ EU. to data availability, four years instead of five years of residence are considered as a threshold for permanent residence. 19 Due

4.4 Duration of Migration

79

the average length of residence for foreign nationals of 15.2 years, showing the recent nature of Bulgarian migration to Germany.

4.4.2

Circular Migration

Various statistical data indicate the increasing relevance of temporary residence of Bulgarian migrants after EU accession. Temporary stays can be associated with increasing circular mobility, but empirical evidence on circular migration is scarce. Administrative data on registration and deregistration with the local registration offices are case-based, and tracing multiple movements of an individual is not possible. To capture circular mobility in the survey, I collected detailed data on experiences of migration to Germany, for example, how often respondents had been absent from Germany for more than three months after their first entry into the country. Circular migration is assumed for those who declared at least two repeated movements to and from Germany. The survey results reveal that 40 per cent had left Germany at least once, and every fourth migrant practised circular migration (Figure 4.10). Persons who entered Germany in the pre-accession period 2001–2006 had the highest incidence of circular migration. This result is not surprising considering the visa-free mobility that supported short-term and repeated stays. A lower proportion of those who arrived before 2000 practised circular mobility. At first sight, the low level of circular migration in the post-accession period is surprising, but it is not implausible. The lower incidence of circularity among post-accession migrants compared to pre-accession migrants could certainly be due to their shorter length of residence in Germany. However, it is also reasonable to assume that free movement transformed previous circular practices into much more permanent residence in the destination country. First, EU accession, which is associated with simplified conditions of stay, may change migration strategies related to circularity. In the past, migrants were discouraged from settling down and were instead urged to keep going back to their country of origin (as, for example, research showed for Poles in Germany (Recchi and Triandafyllidou 2010)). The legal need for circularity to comply with residence law regulations fell away in the context of free movement. Previous circular migrants thus might have settled permanently after 2007, and the migrant survey in Hamburg provides evidence on this effect. The vast majority of respondents who had practised circular migration settled permanently after 2007 (82 per cent). Second, practical reasons for continued residence in Germany despite free movement may encourage permanent settlement. Essential rights and entitlements of EU citizens are still bound to

80

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Migration Patterns: Providing Empirical Evidence …

the right of permanent residence, for example, access to welfare benefits. Whereas permanent EU residents have equal access to welfare benefits with German nationals, the regulatory framework on the receipt of welfare benefits by job seekers and inactive persons is more complicated, and their social entitlements are much more limited (SVR 2013a). Therefore, securing social rights may create incentives for temporary migrants to stay continuously in Germany until they obtain permanent residence status. This interest in permanent residence status could thus reduce circular movements in the first five years of residence.

All respondents

27%

Arrivals 2007 onwards

12%

Arrivals 2001 to 2006

44%

Arrivals until 2000

39%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

Share of respondents who had left Germany at least twice

Figure 4.10 Circular migration to Germany. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

4.4.3

Migrants’ Long-term Orientations

To capture the long-term orientations of Bulgarian migrants in the survey, I collected data on their intention to stay in Germany and attachment to the countries of residence and origin. The survey results on the intention to remain in Germany reveal a high relevance of permanent settlement but also a high level of uncertainty (Figure 4.11). Twice as many respondents intended to stay permanently than temporarily. The proportion of those who did not know how long they were going to stay is significant, showing a high level of uncertainty among Bulgarian migrants. This finding is in line with results from a study in the Netherlands, which also indicates a

4.4 Duration of Migration

81

high level of uncertainty about intentions among Bulgarians to stay compared to other EU migrants (Snel et al. 2015). The desire to remain permanently is more pronounced among pre-accession than post-accession migrants. This result is not unexpected as the likelihood of emigration declines with an increasing length of residence, mainly as ties to the destination country increase.

Total sample

5%

Post-accession migrants

6%

14%

40%

16%

36%

Pre-accession migrants 2% 9%

0%

10%

Up to one year

41%

43%

50%

20%

30%

40%

A couple of years

39%

50%

60%

Permanently

70%

80%

90%

100%

Do not know

Figure 4.11 Intention to remain in Germany. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

Apart from intention to remain, long-term orientations can be captured based on attachment to the country of origin and the destination country. According to Engbersen (2013), two empirical indicators point to the level of attachment: language skills, showing the level of attachment to the destination country, and quantity of remittances, showing the level of attachment to the country of origin. The combination of these indicators define four patterns of migration: temporary, transnational, settlement and footloose migration (Engbersen 2013). The migrant survey in Hamburg collected empirical data on both indicators: German language skills and remittances to Bulgaria. The survey results on remittances show that two-thirds of respondents had a certain level of attachment to the country of origin and the country of residence. More than a quarter sent money home to their families regularly, and more than one-third did this only when necessary. A quarter did not send money home, showing a weak attachment to Bulgaria. Concerning German language skills, 64 per cent assessed their command of German as fair, good or very good, thus showing strong attachment to Germany. Only one-third declared that they do not know

82

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Migration Patterns: Providing Empirical Evidence …

German at all or have rudimentary German knowledge and therefore had rather weak attachment to Germany. A combination of both indicators reveals that more than half of Bulgarian migrants had a strong attachment to Germany (58 per cent) whereas one-third (33 per cent) had a weak attachment. Table 4.3 illustrates the long-term orientations of Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg, as suggested by results from the survey. At 41 per cent, settlement migration prevails, showing that Bulgarian migrants are strongly attached to the destination country (having good German language skills), but weakly to the country of origin (rarely sending money back home). Remarkably, temporary migration applies only to a minority of Bulgarian migrants (12 per cent), who speak few words in German and keep strong ties to Bulgaria by regularly sending money back home. Transnational migration presupposes intense contacts to both country of origin and destination country. This pattern applies to 16 per cent of respondents, who have good German language skills and transfer money to Bulgaria regularly. Footloose migration means weak connections to both countries. It applies to one-fifth of Bulgarian migrants who have poor German language skills and send a small amount of money to Bulgaria. Table 4.3 Patterns of migration based on migrants’ attachment to Germany and Bulgaria Attachment to destination country

Attachment to country of origin

Hamburg survey*

Temporary, circular and seasonal migration

Weak (Poor German language skills)

Strong 12% (Send money on a regular basis)

23%

Transnational migration (bi-national orientation)

Strong (Good German language skills)

Strong 16% (Send money on a regular basis)

13%

Settlement migration

Strong (Good German language skills)

Weak (Send money rarely or not at all)

22%

41%

Dutch study**

(continued)

These results differ from findings on Bulgarian migrants in the Netherlands. In contrast to the Netherlands, Bulgarians in Hamburg more often follow the pattern of settlement migration and less often that of footloose migration (Table 4.3).

4.5 Migrants’ Broader Social Integration

83

Table 4.3 (continued)

Footloose migration

Attachment to destination country

Attachment to country of origin

Hamburg survey*

Dutch study**

Weak (Poor German language skills)

Weak (Send money rarely or not at all)

21%

41%

Sources: Own compilation based on different sources: data stem from the Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401; classification is based on Engbersen (2013). * 9 per cent of the respondents could not be classified due to non-response to the question on remittances. **Dutch study (Engbersen 2013).

The greater relevance of settlement migration in the German case can be partly attributed to the specific pattern of Bulgarian migration to Germany, which is characterised by a high level of student migration. Students are assumed to have good German language skills but few opportunities to transfer money back home. Only in terms of transnational migration do the Hamburg and Dutch studies reveal comparable results of a relatively low relevance of transnational migration. Both indicators from the migrant survey—intention to remain and level of attachment to the sending and destination countries—reveal a high relevance of permanent settlement among Bulgarians in Hamburg: 40 per cent. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that permanent migration is the main pattern of Bulgarian migration to Germany. Despite their temporary residence, many Bulgarian migrants show long-term orientations towards permanent settlement in the country.

4.5

Migrants’ Broader Social Integration

The concept of social integration includes four dimensions: structural, cultural, interactive and identificative (cf. section 1.2). As the acquisition of EU citizenship does not directly affect the cultural, interactive and identificative integration of migrants, the study focuses on structural integration. This section turns to the other dimensions and gives some empirical insights into them.

84

4.5.1

4

Migration Patterns: Providing Empirical Evidence …

Indicators of Cultural, Interactive and Identificative Integration

Cultural integration relates to the acquisition of core knowledge and competences of a culture and society that are needed to interact successfully in a society (Heckmann 2006). In the migrant survey, German language skills indicate cultural integration. Based on self-assessed skills in speaking, reading and writing, I built an index of German language skills for each individual.20 This index shows that pre-accession migrants have better German language skills than post-accession migrants. The index of pre-accession migrants is 5.24, corresponding to good to excellent German language skills, compared to 3.45 for post-accession migrants, corresponding to poor to moderate German language skills. The total index for Bulgarian migrants is high (3.96), indicating good overall cultural integration in the sense of language skills. Interactive integration refers to the inclusion of migrants in the sphere of primary relations and networks in the receiving society (Heckmann 2006). In the migrant survey, private contacts with persons of German, Bulgarian and other origins indicate interactive integration. The survey results show that three-quarters of respondents had daily to weekly private contacts with persons of German origin (Figure 4.12). This finding points to good interactive integration of Bulgarian migrants in the sense of networks. Contacts with persons of another origin are almost as intense as those with Germans. The most intense contacts are kept to persons of Bulgarian origin. One-fifth have few or no private contacts with either Germans or persons of other origins. Identificative integration refers to inclusion in society on the subjective level and relates to feelings of belonging and identification (Heckmann 2006). The questionnaire did not include a question on feelings of belonging and identification with Germany. The questions on motives for and against naturalisation capture the level of belonging indicatively. Respondents indicated to what extent the following statement applied to them: I feel attached to Germany (for respondents willing to naturalise), and I do not feel attached to Germany (for respondents not willing to naturalise). More than half of the respondents interested in naturalisation quoted feelings of attachment as a motive to acquire German citizenship (Figure 4.13). Among those not willing to naturalise, more than one-third reported that they were not interested in German citizenship as they did not feel attached to

20 An index of Speak, Read and Write: 1 ‘no skills’ to 6 ‘very good skills’; the sum of variables Speak, Read and Write was divided by the number of competences, 3.

4.5 Migrants’ Broader Social Integration

Persons of other origins

47%

Persons of German origin

19%

6% 4%

59%

Persons of Bulgarian origin

12%

10%

Several times a week

20%

30%

Once a week

14%

4%3%

70%

0% Daily

85

14%

17%

40%

50%

Several times a month

60% Rarely

70%

7%

7%

6% 3%4%1%

80%

No contact

90%

100%

No answer

Figure 4.12 Intensity of private contacts with persons of Bulgarian, German and other origins. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

Germany. This finding could be interpreted, albeit with caution, as an indication of feelings of attachment.

I do not feel attached to Germany (as a motive against naturalisation)

I feel attached to Germany (as a motive for naturalisation)

24%

27%

15%

19%

32%

23%

9%

20%

20%

13%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Fully applicable

Somewhat applicable

Neutral

Somewhat inapplicable

Fully inapplicable

Figure 4.13 Feelings of attachment to Germany. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401. Basis: naturalised and willing to naturalise respondents: n = 183; respondents not willing to naturalise: n = 216)

86

4

4.5.2

Migration Patterns: Providing Empirical Evidence …

Views on Social Integration

Two questions shed further light on the broader social integration of Bulgarian migrants. First, respondents reported on the areas of social integration in which they had faced difficulties during their residence in Germany (Figure 4.14).21

Gaining access to the health care system or other social benefits Getting my professional qualifiations from abroad recognised

14% 15%

Feeling good in Germany

23%

Adapting to the way of life in Germany

24%

Finding German friends

24%

Being equally treated to persons originating from Germany

27%

Securing my residence

27%

Gaining labour market access

35%

Finding a job

38%

Finding a flat

54%

Communicating in German

64% 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Share of respondents who perceive as difficult in Germany

Figure 4.14 Difficulties faced in terms of social integration. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

The overwhelming majority of survey respondents (94 per cent) declared that they had encountered difficulties during their stay in Germany. The most severe problem was communicating in German and thus an aspect of cultural integration. Respondents also reported several challenges in the structural area related to housing and the labour market: finding a flat, gaining access to the labour market and finding a job. Difficulties related to other aspects of cultural integration (adapting to the way of life in Germany), interactive integration (finding German friends), and identificative integration (feeling good in the county) were less prominent. 21 Question (F12): Living abroad is often associated with difficulties. What do you perceive as difficult in Germany? Multiple answers are possible.

4.5 Migrants’ Broader Social Integration

87

More than a quarter complained that they were not treated equally with persons of German origin, indicating discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Second, respondents reported on their perceptions of barriers to participation for Bulgarian migrants in German society. The survey results indicate that individual characteristics are considered much more important than institutional arrangements in Germany (Figure 4.15).22 A sizable majority of survey respondents identified difficulties participating in the core areas of life in relation to migrants’ education, German language skills and country-specific knowledge. A minority believed that institutional arrangements—restricted labour market access, prejudice against eastern Europeans and foreigners in general—make it harder for Bulgarians to participate in society.

Other barriers

6%

Prejudice against foreigners

27%

Bulgaria is little known in Germany

35%

Prejudice against Eastern Europeans

41%

Restricted labour market access

46%

Low education

65%

Lack of country-specific knowledge

69%

Lack of German skills

88% 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Share of respondents who perceive as barriers to participation

Figure 4.15 Perceived barriers to integration. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

Both questions—individual experience of social integration and perceived barriers to the participation of Bulgarian migrants—show German language skills to be crucial for integration. Discrimination on the grounds of nationality seems to be less relevant but not negligible.

22 Question (F15): Which factors hamper the participation of migrants from Bulgaria in the core areas of life in Germany? Multiple answers are possible.

88

4.6

4

Migration Patterns: Providing Empirical Evidence …

Summary

Both administrative data and the survey data for Hamburg revealed changing dynamics and patterns of migration after Bulgaria’s EU accession. Mobility to Germany increased considerably, but administrative data are of little help in explaining the reasons for this development. The migrant survey in Hamburg revealed that the rise of migration is, to a great extent, due to new migration from Bulgaria. Almost half of post-accession migrants are persons without previous experience abroad who decided to move to Germany after 2007. Thus freedom of movement undoubtedly facilitated new migration from Bulgaria. The fears of excessive postponed migration after EU accession, however, did not materialise. Two further groups significantly contributed to increased migration: renewed migration by persons with pre-accession experience in Germany and redirected migration from other countries, in particular during the global financial crisis. Not only migration dynamics but also the composition of migration have changed considerably since 2007. Administrative data documented shifts in the age, gender and educational structure towards greater migration of male, young and less educated persons. Administrative data are, however, of little help in capturing the population of Bulgarian background, including naturalised and non-registered persons, and their characteristics, such as ethnic background, motivation for migration and migrants’ long-term orientations. The migrant survey reacted to these gaps and provided empirical evidence on little-known features of Bulgarian migration. It revealed a high relevance of both groups in the total population of Bulgarian background in Hamburg in 2012: 12 per cent were unregistered Bulgarian migrants and 11 per cent naturalised persons of Bulgarian origin. In line with expectations about ethnic migration, the survey showed a significant presence of ethnic minorities. At least one-third of the Bulgarians in Hamburg belonged to an ethnic minority group. In contrast to the perception of predominantly Roma migration, migration of Bulgarian Turks proved to be more relevant and even over-represented compared to their share of the population in Bulgaria. Motivations for migration changed with EU accession. Since 2007, labour migration has evolved as a predominant form of mobility and has replaced educational migration, which had dominated for more than a decade. This shift can be related to EU accession, which opened up more regular labour market opportunities to Bulgarian migrants, particularly for self-employment during the transitional periods in the freedom of work. Student migration decreased in absolute and relative terms. However, its high relevance remains a distinctive feature of Bulgarian migration to Germany and distinguishes it from other EU accession countries.

4.6 Summary

89

Concerning the duration of migration, administrative data on length of residence confirmed the expectation of a high relevance of temporary migration in the context of free movement. The proportion of temporary residences increased, but administrative data do not indicate whether this is due to increased circular mobility or due to newly induced migration. The survey revealed a lower incidence of circularity among post-accession migrants than pre-accession migration and settlement of migrants who had practised circular mobility before EU accession. Both effects of EU accession on migration patterns are closely related to the legal need for circular mobility to comply with residence requirements that fell away as of 2007. Residence status as an indicator of duration of migration neglects migrants’ long-term orientations to move or settle. Two indicators measured long-term orientations in the migrant survey: the intention to remain and the level of attachment to the destination and sending countries. Both indicators pointed to the high relevance of permanent settlement for Bulgarian migration. Many Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg have long-term orientations to settle permanently despite their short length of residence. Given the continuously growing number of permanent residents and various indications of the inclination of migrants to settle permanently, it can be concluded that permanent migration has been of high relevance since 2007. EU accession enabled large-scale migration of new migrants, registration of previously unregistered migrants and settlement of circular migrants. It thus facilitated the process of establishment of the Bulgarian community that started in the early 1990s—an effect of EU accession that has been largely unnoticed in the public discource.

5

Labour Market Integration: Analysing the Impact of Restricted Freedom of Work

The focus of this chapter is on the participation of Bulgarian migrants in the German labour market since 2007. After a discussion of the labour market integration of EU citizens in general (section 5.1), I elaborate on the situation of Bulgarian migrants in the context of transitional periods in the freedom of work between 2007 and 2013. I present statistical indicators on the level of labour market participation at an aggregate level (section 5.2) and empirical evidence from the migrant survey on the quality of participation (section 5.3). Finally, I use logistic regression analysis to explore the influence of relevant determinants on the probability of self-employment, undeclared work and violation of labour rights, and pay special attention to the role of the possession of a valid work permit (section 5.4).

5.1

EU Citizens in the German Labour Market

With EU accession, Bulgarian migrants obtained more economic rights in Germany than they had as third-country nationals in the past. EU citizenship conferred on them the right to work, set up a business and provide services temporarily. Furthermore, it allowed them to take up jobs in the public sector, except

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33110-8_5) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 V. Kovacheva, The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33110-8_5

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for some positions involving the exercise of public authority reserved for nationals.1 Thus, in legal terms, Bulgarian migrants are better integrated in the German labour market than before 2007. It is widely accepted that better legal integration of migrants may enhance their labour market integration, i.e. more legal rights may enhance participation and improve migrants’ positions in the labour market. Whether this assumption is empirically confirmed is usually assessed by comparing the level and quality of participation of migrants and non-migrants in the labour market. Labour market outcomes, such as employment rates, unemployment rates, and income levels, indicate the level of participation (OECD 2012). Job characteristics, such as job stability, number of hours worked, whether the job is a good match to the individual’s qualifications and skills, and the specific job held, are indicative of the quality of participation (or job quality) (OECD 2012: 111ff). Furthermore, job quality is associated with respect for labour standards related to working time (hours of work and overtime work), paid annual leave, period of notice, remuneration, health and safety in the workplace, etc. (Kovacheva and Vogel 2012). Indeed, the more inclusive the legal status, the higher the level of participation and the better the quality of jobs. German statistics show that natives tend to have better labour market outcomes than migrants (Burkert and Haas 2014). For instance, the unemployment rate for German nationals was half that of foreign nationals in 2013 (Burkert and Haas 2014). Among foreign nationals, EU citizens usually fare better than third-country nationals and have higher employment rates than non-EU citizens (Granato 2014). In terms of job quality, foreign nationals are more disadvantaged: they more often work in low-skilled occupations and below their qualification level than German citizens (Granato 2014). They more often undertake atypical employment, such as part-time, fixed-term and marginal employment, and solo self-employment, which involves a risk of precarious work (Burkert 2014). Despite having the same legal status as EU citizens, EU migrants from 2004 and 2007 accession countries differ in their labour market positions from migrants from old member states (EU14). The employment levels of EU2 and EU10 migrants are lower than those of migrants from EU14 countries, and unemployment levels are correspondingly higher (SVR 2010). Furthermore, eastern

1 These are typically posts in the diplomatic service, the armed forces, the police and security

forces, the judiciary and tax authorities, https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/work/findingjob-abroad/access-to-jobs-in-the-public-sector/index_en.htm, checked on 11.09.2020.

5.1 EU Citizens in the German Labour Market

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Europeans tend to take marginal and insecure jobs (Engbersen 2013). In particular, EU2 migrants work below their qualification level and are concentrated in sectors that do not require higher educational levels (Leschke and Galgóczi 2015).2 How can these differences be explained? Considering integration as a twosided process of interaction between the receiving society and migrants (Penninx 2007), migrants’ characteristics and institutional arrangements in Germany can explain differences in labour market outcomes among EU migrants. General socio-demographic characteristics, such as gender, age and education, as well as migrant-specific characteristics, in particular language skills, determine participation in the labour market (OECD 2012: 89). The socio-demographic characteristics of Bulgarian migrants have changed since 2007, as shown in section 4.3. The qualification level of migrants has decreased, partly due to the redirection of migration from Spain and Italy during the economic and financial crisis. Many Bulgarian migrants who worked in the low-skilled sector in Spain and Italy moved to Germany and found employment in the low-skilled sector there too, predominantly as seasonal workers and self-employed (Brücker et al. 2013a). In terms of institutional arrangements, national regulations on labour market access affected labour market participation strongly. Transitional periods in the freedom of work and partly in the freedom to provide services postponed full legal integration in the economic area for seven years. In the period 2007–2013, a work permit was required in order to take up dependent work and provide services in the construction sector and related branches, such as industrial cleaning and interior decoration. The work permit requirement had several implications for labour market integration in terms of level and quality of participation: increasing self-employment, bogus self-employment, undeclared work, abuse of posting, precarious working conditions (Cyrus 2006; German Federal Government 2005; Dälken 2012; Galgóczi et al. 2009a; Galgóczi et al. 2012; European Commission 2009; Holland et al. 2011; Krings 2009). Empirical evidence is scarce on the incidence of these irregularities (bogus self-employment, undeclared work and violation of labour rights) and the extent to which the transitional periods are related to them. This chapter seeks to address this issue and to provide empirical evidence on the influence of transitional periods on the labour market integration of Bulgarian migrants. Section 5.2 presents relevant statistical indicators for the level of labour market participation, such as 2 This provides the argument for calling them ‘the new proletariat of Western European labour

markets’ (Favell 2008).

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the activity rate, the employment rate and the unemployment rate. Administrative data are, however, less informative about the quality of participation. Section 5.3 addresses this aspect by providing empirical evidence from the migrant survey. It focuses on self-employment as a strategy for circumventing transitional periods, brain drain, and irregularities related to employment, such as bogus self-employment, undeclared work and violation of labour standards. Even if descriptive data show irregularities related to employment, it still has to be checked whether they result from restricted labour market access or other determinants, such as low educational level and limited German language skills. Therefore, section 5.4 turns to the probability of self-employment, undeclared work and violation of labour standards by applying a multivariate statistical analysis. Three binary logistic regressions test whether the possession of a work permit is related to employment status, i.e. being a salaried worker or self-employed, to the propensity for informal work, and to the probability of experiencing the undermining of labour rights. Finally, section 5.5 summarises the results and concludes on the relation between transitional periods and labour market integration.

5.2

Level of Labour Market Participation: Indications From Administrative Data

Activity rate, employment rate, unemployment rate, dependence on welfare benefits Statistical indicators such as activity rate, employment rate and unemployment rate are indicative of the level of participation in the labour market. Officially published data usually refer to the EU2 countries, and a separate analysis for Bulgaria is often not possible. A special evaluation of the Microcensus for 2011 presents the activity rate and the unemployment rate among the 25–44 age cohort (SVR 2010). The analysis showed that EU2 migrants fared better in the labour market than third-country nationals and EU10 migrants but worse than EU14 migrants. The activity rate3 of EU2 migrants (83.2 percent) was higher than that of third-country nationals (71.9 percent) but lower than that of the population of non-migration background (89.6 percent) and EU14 migrants (87.1 percent) (SVR 2010). In the same vein, the unemployment rate4 of EU2 migrants (6.4 percent) was lower than that of third-country nationals (11.9 percent) but higher 3 The

percentage of economically active population (i.e. employed and unemployed persons) aged 15–64 within the total population of the same age (SVR 2010, p. 104). 4 The percentage of unemployed persons within the total economically active population (SVR 2010, p. 104).

5.2 Level of Labour Market Participation: …

95

than among the population of non-migration background (4.9 percent) and EU14 migrants (5.5 percent). Later publications documented the labour market situation of Bulgarian and Romanian migrants monthly from March 2014 to September 2015 (Brücker et al. 2014–2015). According to the last publication focused on EU2 countries, the employment rate of Bulgarian and Romanian migrants was 64 percent in July 2015 (Brücker et al. 2015b).5 An estimate in the same source pointed to 15 to 20 percent self-employment and seasonal work. Thus 79 to 84 percent of the total Bulgarian and Romanian population aged 15 to 64 are part of the economically active population (i.e. the labour force) (Brücker et al. 2015b). The unemployment rates of EU2 countries differ substantially. Whereas the unemployment rate6 of the Romanian population was low (6.4 percent), among the Bulgarian population (16 percent), it was even slightly higher than that of the foreign population (14.6 percent). After the transitional periods expired, the labour market participation of EU2 migrants changed. Table 5.1 summarises the main trends. The employment rate of EU2 migrants increased from 48.8 to 65.4 percent in the period 2014–2018. It is thus comparable to the employment rate of the total population and above that of foreign nationals and EU28 citizens. The unemployment rate declined from 10.6 to 8.1 percent. It was thus above the unemployment rate of the total population and below that of foreign nationals. In contrast to the employment and unemployment rates, data on welfare benefits reveal a more problematic labour market integration. In 2014, the proportion of recipients of social assistance according to the Second Book of the Social Code (SGB II) among EU2 migrants (15.8 percent) was considerably above the average (9.4 percent) and close to that of the foreign population (17.8 percent). It slightly increased to 16.4 percent in 2018 in contrast to the decreasing trend for the total population and EU28 countries. Many EU2 recipients of social assistance claimed benefits to compensate for low income: 43 percent of EU2 migrants eligible for social assistance according to the SGB II were employed as opposed to 25 percent

5 Since

October 2015, the focus of these monthly reports shifted from EU2 migration to migration in general and asylum migration in particular. This change is to be attributed to the increased migration of asylum seekers in 2015. Between January and August 2015, 414,000 newly arriving asylum seekers were registered, and 231,000 persons applied for asylum compared to 101,000 in the same period in 2014 (Brücker et al. 2015a). 6 The unemployment rate is calculated on the bases of employees, those subject to social security contributions and not as usual on the basis of active persons. Therefore, it is higher than the rate calculated on the basis of the active population (Brücker et al. 2015c).

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Table 5.1 Main indicators of labour market integration for selected nationalities 2014

2015

2016

2017

2018 65.4%

Employment rate EU2

48.8%

51.3%

55.4%

57.5%

EU28

48.4%

49.6%

51.0%

52.3%

55.7%

Foreign nationals

45.2%

43.8%

44.3%

47.1%

49.3%

Total population

64.0%

64.0%

65.4%

66.3%

66.9%

10.6%

11.3%

10.4%

9.3%

8.1%

Unemployment rate EU2 EU28

10.4%

9.9%

9.2%

8.2%

7.5%

Foreign nationals

14.8%

14.6%

15.0%

13.5%

12.9%

Total population

7.5%

7.1%

6.8%

6.2%

6.1%

Proportion of recipients of SGB II benefits in the population EU2

15.8%

18.5%

17.8%

16.7%

16.4%

EU28

11.6%

12.1%

11.2%

10.4%

10.2%

Foreign nationals

17.8%

17.6%

19.4%

21.1%

21.1%

Total population

9.4%

9.3%

9.3%

9.2%

9.2%

Sources: Own compilation based on data from Brücker et al. (2015–2018); data for December, except for 2018 (the latest data published are for May 2018).

among all foreign nationals (Brücker et al. 2018). The dependence on social assistance despite employment indicates that many EU2 migrants work, but that their income level is low, and this makes them dependent on the welfare state. Scholars see the reasons in the significant low-paid sector in Germany, which absorbs many eastern Europeans (Werner 2017, 2018; Martinsen and Werner 2018). Bulgarian and Romanian migrants also differ in the level of reception of welfare benefits, with the former more often dependent on social assistance than the latter. In 2015, the proportion of persons on social assistance benefits among Bulgarian migrants (28.2 percent) was significantly higher than among the Romanian population (11.6 percent) and even above that of the foreign population (16.4 percent) (Brücker et al. 2015b).7 How these differences can be explained is a question to be explored further. 7 Since

October 2015, the monthly report on migration monitoring has dealt with the labour market integration of migrants in general and has no special focus on Bulgarian and Romanian migrants (Brücker et al. 2015b; Brücker et al. 2015–2016). Therefore, they are not presented in detail. For October 2015, they confirmed previous indications that EU2 migrants fare better in

5.2 Level of Labour Market Participation: …

97

Labour status Administrative data for the period 2005–2017 reveal changes in the labour status of Bulgarian migrants after EU accession (Table 5.2). Corresponding to the growth of the Bulgarian population from 39,000 to 310,400 between 2006 and 2017, the number of workers and unemployed persons also increased. About 127,000 Bulgarian citizens worked in 2017: 106,800 employees subject to social security contributions and 20,300 marginally employed. In contrast to the increasing working population, the number of students declined considerably from 12,800 in 2005 to 7,300 in 2016. Substantial changes in the labour status of Bulgarian migrants are also visible in relative terms (Table 5.2). The population aged 15–64 declined during this period from 93 to 80 percent of the total Bulgarian population. This decrease in relative terms can mainly be attributed to the increase of children below 15 from 5 percent in 2006 to 18 percent in 2017. Analysing the situation of the population of working age, i.e. those aged 15 to 64, a clear shift from education to employment is visible. The proportion of students decreased considerably from 35 percent in 2005 to 3 percent in 2016, showing that student status gradually lost its relevance. Over time, the proportion of workers (defined as employees, subject to social security contributions) remained stable, ranging between 25 and 28 percent. Not until after the expiration of the transitional measures at the end of 2013 did the proportion of dependent workers start to increase, reaching 43 percent in 2017. Marginal employment ranged between 7 and 9 percent in the period 2013–2017, the years for which data are published. Thus every second Bulgarian migrant in 2017 was a dependent worker. Concerning unemployment, the statistics show a slightly increasing proportion of unemployed persons from 5 percent to 10 percent (2005–2017)8 and a steep increase in the number of job seekers from 8 percent to 21 percent (2011–2017). Dependent work To explore whether the transitional periods are related to dependent work, statistical data on dependent work and migration stocks were analysed. In the context of transitional periods, growth in dependent work is expected to be slower than growth in migration stocks. After the expiration of the transitional measures, terms of employment and unemployment rates compared to the foreign population but worse than the total population in Germany (Brücker et al. 2015b). 8 The share of unemployed persons among the Bulgarian population aged 15–64 differs from the unemployment rate of Bulgarian migrants, which amounted to 16 percent in July 2015 (Brücker et al. 2015c). This can be attributed to different definitions of unemployed and unemployment rate.

39,053

46,818

53,984

61,854

74,869

93,889

118,759

146,828

183,263

226,926

263,320

310,415

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

46%

46%

45%

45%

46%

47%

48%

51%

53%

55%

56%

57%

57%

248,365

212,500

187,059

154,211

125,972

103,682

83,239

67,129

56,232

49,665

43,369

36,225

36,312

Absolute

80%

81%

82%

84%

86%

87%

89%

90%

91%

92%

93%

93%

93%

106,784

89,995

72,205

52,917

32,297

25,840

19,925

15,819

13,865

12,459

10,906

9,971

9,118

% of Absolute total pop.

Employees

43%

42%

39%

34%

26%

25%

24%

24%

25%

25%

25%

28%

25%

% of 15–64

− − − − − − −

− − − − − − −

20,257

19,239

16,375

11,194

8%

9%

9%

7%

7%

−

−

9,389

% of 15–64

Absolute

Marginally employed

23,973

21,356

16,177

10,843

6,209

4,282

3,095

2,438

2,090

1,666

1,606

1,630

1,723

Absolute

Unemployed

10%

10%

9%

7%

5%

4%

4%

4%

4%

3%

4%

4%

5%

% of 15–64

52,679

47,390

36,847

23,839

13,601

9,144

6,658

−

−

−

−

−

−

Absolute

Job seekers

21%

22%

20%

15%

11%

9%

8%

−

−

−

−

−

−

% of 15–64

3% −

−

4%

5%

6%

7%

9%

12%

15%

19%

24%

34%

35%

% of 15–64

7,311

7,325

7,231

7,223

7,226

7,486

7,997

8,696

9,544

10,504

12,170

12,794

Absolute

Students

−

48,565

54,307

59,030

63,462

57,190

46,075

40,875

31,581

25,996

20,353

12,454

12,677

Absolute

Other

−

23%

29%

38%

50%

55%

55%

61%

56%

52%

47%

34%

35%

% of 15–64

Sources: Own compilation based on: data on Bulgarian population (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006–2019a); data on employees of Bulgarian nationality subject to social security contributions for 2005–2012 (Federal Employment Agency 2014), and for 2013–2017 (Federal Employment Agency 2018); unemployed Bulgarian citizens (Federal Employment Agency 2005–2017); Bulgarian students (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006–2019b); the column ‘other’ is calculated by subtracting employees, the marginally employed, job seekers and students from the population aged 15–64.

39,153

2006

% of total pop.

Absolute

Total population aged 15–64

5

2005

Female population

Total population

Table 5.2 Labour status of the Bulgarian population aged 15–64

98 Labour Market Integration: Analysing the Impact of Restricted …

5.2 Level of Labour Market Participation: …

99

70%

64%

60% 50% 36%

40% 26%

30%

30% 25%

25% 19%

14%

20% 9% 10%

4%

9% 20%

11%

15%

15%

2008

2009

14% 21%

25%

26%

24%

25%

24% 16%

18%

2016

2017

0% -10%

2005 0%

2006 0%

2007

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Growth of Bulgarian population Growth of Bulgarian employees subject to social security contributions

Figure 5.1 Annual growth rates in the total Bulgarian population and Bulgarian employees subject to social security contributions. (Sources: Own calculation based on data on Bulgarian population (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006–2019a); data on employees of Bulgarian nationality subject to social security contributions for 2005–2012 (Federal Employment Agency 2014), and for 2013–2017 (Federal Employment Agency 2018))

dependent employment is expected to grow more rapidly than migration. This development occurred for EU8 migrants, showing that former self-employed and persons not counted as employed successfully took up employment after the end of the transitional periods (Baas et al. 2011). Among Bulgarian migrants, dependent work has increased faster than migration since 2011, i.e. even before the expiration of the transitional periods. The earlier increase in dependent work can be attributed to the liberalisation of transitional periods for the highly qualified, apprentices and seasonal workers in 2012. Shifts in dependent work and migration stocks are particularly visible in 2014 and 2015 (Figure 5.1). Dependent employment rose after the end of the transitional period by 64 percent compared to a 25 percent increase in the total Bulgarian population in 2014. In 2015, dependent work grew faster (by 36 percent) than migration stocks (by 15 percent). In the context of free movement of labour in 2016 and 2017, the growth of dependent employment closely resembles that of migration stocks. Migration stocks and dependent employment developed similarly for Romanian migrants. In the first years after the end of the transitional periods, the number of Romanian employees increased considerably faster than the Romanian population. In 2016 and 2017, dependent work and migration stocks grew in a similar way (Federal Employment Agency 2018). These trends provide

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strong indications that the transitional arrangements affected the development of dependent work between 2007 and 2013 by limiting its growth. Self-employment The annual statistics of business notifications (Gewerbeanzeigestatistik) capture only flow data on registrations and liquidations of businesses and not the total number of self-employed for the respective year. The number of self-employed Bulgarian migrants is thus unknown. The statistics reveal a ‘boom of trade registrations’ among EU2 and EU8 migrants after the respective EU accessions (Kay and Günterberg 2015). From 2004 to 2013, the number of registered businesses increased from 262 to 18,606 (for Bulgaria) and from 541 to 24,270 (for Romania) (Kay and Günterberg 2015). In 2014, the annual balance of registered Bulgarian businesses became negative (Figure 5.2), showing a decreasing relevance of self-employment. The absolute number of registrations continuously decreased to about 700 in 2017. After the transitional periods expired as of 2014, the number of business registrations declined more rapidly among EU2 than EU8 migrants, thus confirming the influence of the transitional periods on self-employment (Kay and Günterberg 2015). Therefore, the statistics of business notifications suggest a strong relation between self-employment and transitional periods.

25,000 20,000

22,856 19,413 17,785

15,000

12,292

11,472 9,698

10,000

9,072 7,850

7,069 7,219

5,071 5,000 0

2013

2014

-5,000 -10,000

2015 -1,774

2016 -1,222

2017 -150

-7,121 Registrations of one-man business

Liquidations of one-man business

Balance

Figure 5.2 Business registrations and deregistrations by Bulgarian citizens. (Sources: Own calculation based on data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2013–2018))

The absolute number of self-employed Bulgarians is unknown. Estimates for 2011 based on Microcensus data pointed to a higher self-employment rate of

5.2 Level of Labour Market Participation: …

101

EU2 migrants (13.7 percent) than that of the population without migration backgrounds (11.7 percent) but lower than that of EU14 (15.8 percent) and EU10 migrants (18.6 percent).9 A later estimate for 2014 pointed to 15 to 20 percent self-employed and seasonal workers among EU2 migrants (Brücker et al. 2015c).10 From 2006 to 2012, the number of registered seasonal workers increased from 1,293 to 7,753 for Bulgaria (all within the hotel and catering industry), but this increase is not comparable to that for Romania: from 51,190 to 194,107 seasonal workers (BAMF/BMI 2014).11 The proportion of seasonal work is relatively low, and thus self-employment among Bulgarians is assumed to be close to 20 percent. Posted work Freedom to provide services applies to persons who temporarily pursue their activity in the receiving country where the service is provided, under the same conditions as are imposed by that country on its nationals. It means that a worker is employed in one EU country but sent by the employer temporarily to carry out work in another EU country. Due to gaps in official statistics, many forms of employment, such as posted work and temporary agency work, which are overwhelmingly relevant for EU migrants, are statistically not captured (Burkert 2015). The number of A1 certificates provides an indication of the scope of posted work (Dälken 2012). In 2011, a publication by the German Federal Government reported that 175,432 A1 certificates were issued for four sectors in Germany: shipping, slaughtering, meat processing and construction of buildings (German Federal Government 2011). Compared to countries such as France and the Netherlands, where most posted workers came from countries with high wages, posted workers in Germany came mainly from new EU member states, and posted work in Germany is related mostly to wage undercutting (Bosch 2012). According to a report of the European Commission, 75 percent of posted workers in Germany in 2009 were from the new EU8 and EU2 member states (European Commission 2011). The number of Bulgarian posted workers is unknown but, given the low number of certificates for posted work issued to Bulgarian citizens in the country 9 The

self-employment rate is calculated for the population aged 25–64 as the proportion of self-employed in the economically active population (SVR 2010, p. 107). 10 In Table 5.2, self-employed persons are included in the category ‘other’, which includes also inactive persons. 11 With the abolishment of the work permit requirement as of January 2012, no admission procedure is applied at the Central Placement Office of the Federal Employment Agency (BAMF/BMI 2015). Thus seasonal workers from Bulgarian and Romania have not been statistically captured since 2012.

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of origin (4,366 in 2009), it seems to be relatively small. Since 2010, the number of postings has significantly increased and reached 414,200 postings to Germany in 2014 (European Commission 2015). Despite relatively low numbers, concerns about abuse of posted work arose. Abuse of posting takes place in cases when ‘letterbox’ companies without actual economic activity are established in the sending countries to hire cheap labour. In other cases, chain posting of workers (Kettenentsendung) takes place although it is prohibited by law, i.e. a person is posted on a regular basis. Abuse is further assumed when posted workers have been employed under the conditions in the country of origin, despite having been residing in Germany for longer than 24 months12 (Federal Ministry of Finance 2006). Abuse of posted work is associated with dumping wages, evasion of social security contributions, tax evasion and undermining of labour rights. For example, social security contributions are typically paid based on the minimum wage in the sending country and not the paid wage (Winter 2014).

5.3

Quality of Participation: Evidence From the Migrant Survey in Hamburg

5.3.1

Self-Employment as a Strategy for Circumventing the Transitional Periods

In the study, respondents gave information about their labour status13 in Germany and their current job (form, sector of employment and income), if they were employed. At the time of the survey (end of 2012–beginning of 2013), 71 percent of the respondents were employed, 9 percent unemployed, 11 percent students and 8 percent inactive (Figure 5.3). Migrants who settled in Germany before and after 2007 did not differ considerably in their labour status. Pre- and postaccession migrants had comparable levels of participation in the labour market at the time of the survey: 74 percent of the former and 72 percent of the latter. Slightly more post-accession migrants (10 percent) than pre-accession (6 percent) were unemployed. The share of students was comparable among both cohorts. 12 In

their first 24 months, posted workers pay social security contributions in their countries of origin (Dälken 2012). 13 Labour status indicates whether a person is employed, unemployed or inactive (student, retired etc.). Professional status applies only to employed persons and distinguishes employees, self-employed without employees (own-account worker), and self-employed with employees (employer).

5.3 Quality of Participation: Evidence From the Migrant Survey in Hamburg

103

Posted work amounted to 3.4 percent. Only 1 percent of the respondents were retired persons. Looking at professional status, the proportion of self-employed persons was remarkably high (34 percent) and close to that of dependent workers (38 percent).14

Total sample

38%

Post-accession migrants

31%

41%

Pre-accession migrants

0%

34%

56%

10%

Dependent workers

20%

30%

Self-employed

18%

40%

50%

Unemployed

60%

9%

11%

8%

10%

11%

7%

6%

70%

Students

12%

80%

9%

90%

100%

Inactive

Figure 5.3 Labour and professional status. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

Various factors contribute to the high relevance of self-employment among Bulgarians. Legal changes in the regulatory framework considerably contributed to the increase of self-employment. In 2004, the reform of the Crafts Code (Handwerksordnung) abolished the requirement for a master craftsman’s certificate (Meisterbrief ) for 53 out of 94 craftsmen’s trades, making self-employment more easily accessible for migrants (Cyrus 2006). Usually, migrants are more often self-employed than non-migrants (Brixy et al. 2011). In particular, migrants from states with a larger self-employment sector have a higher self-employment rate in the country of residence (Yuengert 1995). However, in this respect, Bulgaria and Germany do not considerably differ from each other. The self-employment rates calculated as a percentage of total employment were below the EU average in both countries: 11 percent in Bulgaria in 2010 (European Commission 14 Compared to estimates on self-employment of about 20 percent, the high proportion of self-employed in the sample (34 percent) is surprising. However, trade registrations increased particularly in some German regions (Dietz 2005). It can be assumed that Hamburg as a big city is one of these regions, which makes the higher proportion of self-employed people plausible.

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2013) and 11.6 percent in Germany in 2012 (OECD 2014b). Therefore, the country of origin cannot alone explain the inclination of Bulgarian migrants to be self-employed. Difficulties in taking up salaried work due to insufficient language skills, a lack of recognition of professional qualifications or discrimination lead to a higher inclination of migrants toward self-employment (Brixy et al. 2011). In this sense, self-employment does not necessarily signal occupational upward mobility (SVR 2010, 2013a). In the context of restricted freedom of work with a simultaneous introduction of freedom of establishment, migrants tend to use alternative ways into the labour market such as self-employment. In particular, newly arriving migrants without work permits are assumed to pursue entrepreneurial activity based on a trade licence (Gewerbeschein) to circumvent the restricted freedom of work. In these cases, self-employment is considered an employment alternative for migrants and an opportunity to integrate into the labour market (Brixy et al. 2011; Constant and Zimmermann 2004; SVR 2010, 2013a). For other migrants, selfemployment is a way out of illegal work in the shadow economy and legalisation of their work (Dietz 2005). Transitional periods in the freedom of work led to increasing self-employment in Germany (Baas et al. 2011; Elsner and Zimmermann 2016), as well as in other EU countries that made use of them (Galgóczi et al. 2012). For the UK, which applied transitional arrangements for the EU2 but not for the EU8 countries, data from the Labour Force Survey showed that in the period 2004–2009, 46.2 percent of EU2 migrants were self-employed as opposed to only 11.4 percent of EU8 migrants (Kausar 2011). To analyse the relationship between self-employment and transitional periods in Germany, scholars compare the employment of preand post-accession migrants. Post-accession migrants, i.e. migrants who moved to Germany after EU accession, tend more often to be self-employed than preaccession migrants, which hints at the effect of the restricted freedom of work and self-employment as a strategy to circumvent the transitional periods (SVR 2010). As expected, administrative data revealed that post-accession migrants from EU2 and EU10 countries had considerably higher self-employment rates than migrants who arrived before EU accession: 30 percent for EU10 and 20 percent for EU2 countries (SVR 2010). Brenke and Zimmermann (2007) compared pre- and postaccession migrants and revealed that a much larger proportion of post-accession migrants were self-employed compared to pre-accession migrants. In a later study, (Brenke et al. 2009) found statistical evidence that post-accession EU8 migrants are more likely to be self-employed than salaried workers. Furthermore, they have a higher probability of being self-employed than natives and other migrant groups that arrived earlier in Germany (Brenke et al. 2009).

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In line with indications from administrative data, the migrant survey among Bulgarians in Hamburg points to a higher relevance of self-employment for post-accession than pre-accession migrants. Whereas only 18 percent of the pre2007 migrants were self-employed, this applied to 41 percent of the post-2007 migrants (Figure 5.3). However, it is necessary to analyse more thoroughly whether self-employment is a result of the free choice of the individual, or whether migrants used self-employment as a coping strategy to circumvent the work permit requirement: It is important for individuals to be able to make a free, informed choice as to whether or not they wish to be self-employed. (…) [Otherwise], this leads to abuses ranging from evasion of social security contributions, through tax evasion and abuse of labour rights, to undeclared work. (European Economic and Social Committee 2013)

The requirement for a work permit may distort the genuinely free choice and motivate migrants without a work permit to choose self-employment as a strategy for gaining access to the labour market. Administrative data are of little help in determining whether Bulgarian migrants decide to run businesses of their own free will or not. The migrant survey in Hamburg sought to provide empirical evidence by collecting data on work permits. The possession of a work permit gives tentative indications of whether migrants choose to run businesses of their own free will.15 The survey reveals that 88 percent of the self-employed respondents do not possess a valid work permit. It can be plausibly argued that the vast majority of self-employed chose self-employment as a strategy to circumvent transitional periods. Only a minority of 12 percent who possess a work permit are assumed to have become self-employed based on free choice. Furthermore, the self-employed are represented mainly in low-skill sectors that are more easily accessible for newcomers: transport and logistics (39 percent), construction (25 percent) and trade, hotels and tourism (15 percent). Few self-employed people provide services in knowledge-intensive sectors (2 percent).

15 The question was posed only to respondents with Bulgarian citizenship (356 out of 401 respondents), as naturalised persons have unrestricted access to the labour market as German nationals. For the analysis, German citizens were included as possessing a work permit as they inherently have unrestricted access to the labour market and do not need a work permit.

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Brain Waste

A match between qualification and job The issue of brain waste has attracted much attention in research on postenlargement migration (Galgóczi et al. 2009b, 2012; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010, 2016). Brain waste is assumed when migrants work substantially below their qualification level.16 EU2 migrants often work under their qualification level and are concentrated in sectors that do not require higher education levels (Leschke and Galgóczi 2015). Their chances of progressing out of low-skilled into middle-skilled jobs are poor. In contrast to other EU migrants, they are just as likely to be employed in elementary jobs after ten years in Germany as they were at arrival (Granato 2014). To explore whether Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg have jobs that correspond to their formal qualification level, survey respondents noted their current position in an open question. Afterwards, qualitative data from the open question were coded in three categories: low-skilled, medium-skilled and high-skilled occupation. In line with previous studies (Burkert 2015), more respondents declared low-skilled than high-skilled jobs (Figure 5.4). A slight majority of high-educated migrants (58 percent) have a job corresponding to their educational level. The rest (42 percent) are affected by a mismatch between their qualification and job: 19 percent have medium-skilled and 22 percent low-skilled jobs. With 58 percent in low-skilled jobs, a high proportion of migrants with intermediate education are working below their educational attainment. These figures should be considered as indicative and should be interpreted with caution due to the high level of uncertainty in the coding of open question data. Nevertheless, they suggest considerable brain waste among Bulgarian migrants. Sector of employment In general, low-pay sectors attract EU migrants disproportionately: the hotel and restaurant industry, private households, administrative and support service activities, agriculture, and construction (Leschke and Galgóczi 2015). In accordance with this finding, survey respondents concentrate in the low-skilled sectors, with two-thirds of working persons represented in the construction, transport, logistics and security sectors, and commercial services, trade, hotels and tourism (Figure 5.5). Post-accession migrants seem to be more disadvantaged in terms

16 The issue of brain waste is also discussed by using terms such as overeducation, dequalification, skill downgrading, deskilling, etc.

5.3 Quality of Participation: Evidence From the Migrant Survey in Hamburg

All working persons

High education

46%

22%

19%

Intermediate education

23%

58%

58%

Low education

0%

31%

40%

61%

10%

Low-skilled occupation

20%

30%

107

2%

33%

40%

50%

Medium-skilled occupation

60%

70%

80%

6%

90%

100%

High-skilled occupation

Figure 5.4 Match between formal qualification and job. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample. Basis: working respondents, n = 329)

of sectors of employment. Whereas pre-2007 migrants are more equally distributed across different industries, post-2007 migrants concentrate mainly in two low-skilled industries: the transport, logistics and security sector (38 percent), and construction (21 percent). A time effect certainly explains this sectoral distribution. Newcomers tend to work in low-skilled sectors in their first years of residence and progress out into more qualified jobs over time. However, both sectors—transport and logistics, and construction—are easily accessible for the self-employed, which may lead to a concentration of newcomers in them. Income Respondents gave information about their monthly individual gross income.17 The results show a high proportion (60 percent of respondents) of low earners with an income below e2,00018 (Figure 5.6). This finding is comparable with results from administrative data. In 2013, half of men in full-time employment from EU2 countries were in the low-wage sector (Burkert 2015). A higher proportion of pre-accession (84.5 percent) than post-accession migrants (71 percent) have personal earned income. Both groups differ considerably in the relevance of two aspects: persons without income and persons who earn 17 The question was posed to all respondents irrespective of their employment situation. Thus students and inactive persons are also included. 18 For West Germany in 2013, low-income earners are defined as persons in full-time employment with an income below e2,062 monthly (Burkert 2015, p. 50).

108

100%

5

2% 11%

90%

80%

Labour Market Integration: Analysing the Impact of Restricted …

2% 3%

2% 5% No answer

5% 1%

8%

14%

4%

15% 16%

Linguistics, literary studies, humanities, social and economic science, media, art and culture

Health, social services and education

70% 13%

Company organisation, accounting, law and administration

60% 38% 50%

Commercial services, trade, hotels and tourism 30%

22%

Transport, logistics and security 40% Natural science, geography and computer science

4% 30%

10%

7% Construction and architecture 21%

20%

10%

14%

17%

Manufacturing

6% Agriculture, forestry and horticulture

11%

10%

Post-accession migrants

Total sample

7% 0% Pre-accession migrants

Figure 5.5 Sector of employment. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample. Basis: Working respondents incl. students, n = 329)

more than e3,000. Respondents who arrived in the post-accession period more often lack an income (15 percent) compared to migrants from the pre-accession period (1.4 percent). On the other side of the equation, there were more high earners receiving more than e3,000 among pre-accession migrants (25 percent) compared to merely 4 percent of migrants who came after 2007. This finding shows that persons who have stayed longer in Germany fare better financially than newcomers. To some extent, this finding can be explained by the length of

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residence as the labour market situation of migrants improves over time (Granato 2014).

Total sample

11%

Post-accession migrants

15%

Pre-accession migrants 1%

0% No income

38%

22%

40%

32%

10%

€1,000 or less

20%

25%

15%

30%

€1,001 to €2,000

5%

40%

11%

50%

10%

14%

3%4%

14%

25%

60%

€2,001 to €3,000

70%

14%

80%

€3,001 or more

90%

100%

No answer

Figure 5.6 Monthly income. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

It is not possible to confirm whether the disadvantageous income situation of Bulgarian migrants can be explained with reference to working hours as the survey does not include such data. It is possible to compare the educational level and income of the respondents. Income level varies across the groups (Figure 5.7). As expected, persons with high education fare best in terms of income, followed by persons with technical or professional qualifications. Persons with primary education and general secondary education have the lowest income. Remarkably, the proportion of low-paid workers among the highly educated is high. Almost half of highly educated Bulgarian migrants earn below e2,000 monthly, pointing to the rather disadvantageous labour market position of highly skilled Bulgarians.

5.3.3

Irregularities Related to Employment

Bogus self-employment Freedom of establishment includes the right to take up and pursue activities as a self-employed person permanently in the receiving country under the same conditions as its own nationals. Abuse of freedom of establishment is often called bogus self-employment. There is no EU-wide definition of what bogus self-employment

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Higher education

5%

Secondary education (professional)

10%

Secondary education (general)

20%

0%

10%

23%

20%

30%

40%

7% 1% 13%

20%

50%

€1,001 to €2,000

16%

30%

40%

13%

€1,000 or less

8%

38%

21%

Primary education

No income

28%

4% 0%

21%

50%

€2,001 to €3,000

60%

70%

16%

0%5%

80%

€3,001 or more

12%

90%

100%

No answer

Figure 5.7 Income by educational level. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

is (European Economic and Social Committee 2013). The forms of abuse range from evasion of social security contributions, through tax evasion and undermining labour rights to undeclared work (European Economic and Social Committee 2013). In Germany, bogus self-employment takes place when persons are registered as self-employed but provide their services to a single client (Cyrus 2006). Fellmer and Kolb (2009) call them self-employed workers and document that they mostly work in the construction sector. Bogus self-employed people are typically employed on the basis of contracts for work (Werkverträge) as the last link in a chain of subcontractors. Contract work is unproblematic until it is extensively used to circumvent social and labour standards, and produce wage dumping (Winter 2014: 48). Identification of bogus self-employment is a difficult task as it requires detailed information about business activities. Gathering such information was not possible in a broad survey on integration as in the migrant survey in Hamburg. With the aim of finding traces of bogus self-employment among Bulgarians, survey respondents were asked about the size of the enterprise they work in. According to statistics on business notifications, the majority of newly registered businesses are sole traders (78 percent of all registered trades in December 2014 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2015c)). Therefore, it is expected that the majority of self-employed people in the sample are sole traders. In contrast, only 30 percent of the respondents work on their own and do not have additional employees.

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Almost two-thirds of the self-employed declared that they worked in an enterprise with additional employees. However, as administrative data indicate, only 22 percent of newly registered businesses have additional employees. It can thus be plausibly concluded that the difference of 42 percent encompasses de facto employees integrated in the enterprise under the guise of self-employment.19 Undeclared work In the context of transitional periods, abuse of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services took place in the form of undeclared work, bogus self-employment and abuse of posting (Cyrus 2006; German Federal Government 2005; Dälken 2012; European Commission 2009; Galgóczi et al. 2009b; Galgóczi et al. 2009a; Galgóczi et al. 2012; Holland et al. 2011; Krings 2009). In countries that granted full labour market access to EU migrants, the incidence of undeclared work decreased. For example, this is shown in the UK experience with EU8 migrants since 2004, and the Dutch experience after lifting restrictions on labour market access in 2007 (European Commission 2009). The UK experience showed that 30 percent of all registered workers in the first six months after the 2004 enlargement had already been residing in the UK and had probably done undeclared work (Gilpin et al. 2006). In Germany, scholars criticised the transitional measures as they hampered the legalisation of undeclared work after EU accession and legal access to the labour market for newly arriving migrants (Cyrus 2006; Dietz 2005). The limited access to regular employment encouraged EU migrants to use undeclared work as an alternative way of accessing the German labour market. The incidence of undeclared work among migrants from the new EU member states thus increased (Cyrus 2006; European Parliament 2006; Galgóczi et al. 2009b; Krings 2009). As EU migrants do not fear deportation if they are detected, the costs of informal work for them are lower compared to third-country nationals; this increases their inclination to work in the shadow economy. Undeclared work encompasses ‘any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to public authorities, taking into account differences in the regulatory system of Member States’ (European Commission 1998, 2007). This definition excludes criminal activities and work that does not have to be

19 It is worth noting that during the fieldwork 14 cases were documented of migrants who falsely claimed to have a work permit even though they actually possessed a trade licence issued to self-employed persons (Gewerbeschein). The fact that every tenth self-employed person did not know about the documents required for labour market participation shows a high level of unawareness of the individual economic situation.

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declared (European Commission 2007). Undeclared work in the shadow economy is work without paying taxes or social security contributions. Due to its sensitivity and thus an expectation of many non-responses, no question about undeclared work was included in the survey. Instead of this, information was collected indirectly in a question on violation of labour rights. Respondents with work experience in Germany stated whether they had experienced a violation of labour rights in the past five years (2008–2012). Among the seven basic labour rights that were listed, the one indirectly capturing undeclared work was: ‘I had to work without a working contract and was not covered by the social security system’. As undeclared work is associated with evasion of taxes and social security contributions, this answer is considered to be an indicator of undeclared work. Respondents who selected this answer had worked without a contract for some period of time between 2008 and 2012. According to the survey results, this applies to 31 percent of persons with work experience in Germany. This means that every third Bulgarian had worked in the shadow economy in the last five years. It is important to note that this proportion captures experience in the 5-year period and not at the time of the survey. Therefore, it cannot be considered as an indicator of the incidence of undeclared work in 2012 but rather as a sign of a high level of undeclared work among Bulgarian migrants in the post-accession period. Violation of labour rights Concerns about the vulnerability of EU migrants in terms of remuneration and working conditions arose not only in Germany and Austria but also in countries where no formal restrictions on labour market access existed for EU8 migrants, for example in the UK and Ireland (Galgóczi et al. 2009b; Krings 2009). This finding hints at difficulties in enforcement of labour rights for mobile EU workers as an EU-wide problem. Also, in the Nordic countries, an empirical study documents precarious working conditions for migrants from the CEE countries (Friberg and Eldring 2013). In Germany, restricted freedom of work promoted undermining of labour standards related to remuneration and working conditions. Underpayment and poor working conditions, particularly in the meat industry, made headlines in the media (Cyrus 2005; Krings 2009). Advisory centres warned that EU migrants were severely affected by violations of labour standards, such as wage dumping, unpaid work, unpaid overtime and weekend work, special payments (e.g. for renting or materials), excessive overtime, lack of social security contributions, no sick pay, dismissal as a result of illness, work accidents or pregnancy (Winter 2014). In the Hamburg survey, Bulgarian migrants reported whether they had experienced a violation of basic labour rights in the past five years (2008–2012). Of 349

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113

respondents with labour market experience in Germany, almost half (45 percent) declared that they had faced violation of their labour rights in the last five years. Post-accession migrants were more often affected than pre-accession migrants. Half of the post-accession migrants had experienced a breach of labour rights as opposed to only one-third of pre-accession migrants. Recent migrants thus more often experience undermining of labour standards relating to remuneration and working conditions than persons with a longer length of residence in Germany. This result coincides with findings from a survey among Bulgarian and Albanian migrants in Berlin in 2012, showing that short residence, low education, poor German language skills and few social contacts with Germans are risk factors for violations of labour rights (Kovacheva and Vogel 2012). The survey captured a high incidence of breaches of labour standards among Bulgarian and Albanian migrants in Berlin (Kovacheva and Vogel 2012). Among Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg, four groups experienced violation of labour rights more often than other groups (Figure 5.8): persons not registered with the local registration office, persons without a work permit, undeclared workers, and the self-employed.

Regular workers Undeclared workers

27% 78%

Dependent workers Self-employed

35% 57%

Registered persons Unregistered persons

43% 72%

Post-accession migrants Pre-accession migrants

51% 31%

Persons with a work permit Persons without a work permit

27% 59%

Post-accession migrants Pre-accession migrants

51% 31%

Persons with labour market experience

45% 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Share of respondents who experienced violation of labour rights in the last 5 years

Figure 5.8 Violation of labour rights for selected groups. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample. Basis: Respondents with labour market experience in Germany, n = 348)

Payment of wages is the most contested labour right, accounting for 37 percent of 304 reported cases of violation. Many respondents declared that they had not received their salaries for a couple of days or even for months, or had worked

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substantially longer than arranged without being compensated for overtime work (Figure 5.9).

Other violation

5%

No wage increase

8%

Worked considerably longer than arranged

17%

No paid annual leave

6%

Threatened with dismissal in case of illness

6%

Wages not received for a couple of months

15%

Wages not received for a couple of days

17%

Work without safety devices and protective equipment

12% 0%

2%

4%

6%

8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20%

Share of respondents who experienced labour rights violations

Figure 5.9 Experience of violation of labour rights. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample. Basis: respondents with labour market experience in Germany, n = 348)

5.4

Regression Analysis on Labour Market Participation

As the descriptive analysis of the sample demonstrates, there seems to be a relationship between the possession of a work permit and the incidence of selfemployment, undeclared work and labour rights violations. The proportion of respondents without a work permit was considerably higher among the selfemployed, undeclared workers and workers who experienced violations of labour rights compared to the reference groups of dependent workers, regular workers and those who had not experienced violations of labour rights (Figure 5.10). It can thus be assumed that possession of a valid work permit is a strong determinant of the employment situation of the individual. To explore the extent to which a valid work permit matters for labour market participation, I used regression analysis. Binomial logistic regressions were run to quantify the relative influence of relevant explanatory factors on the probability of self-employment, undeclared work and labour rights violations, one of these being possession of a work permit.

5.4 Regression Analysis on Labour Market Participation

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Workers who experienced labour rights violations

59%

Workers who had not experienced labour rights violations

27%

Undeclared workers

87%

Regular workers

41%

Self-employed Dependent workers 0%

88% 30% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Share of respondents without work permit

Figure 5.10 Proportion of respondents without a work permit. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

Age Gender Education Family status Networks Ethnic minority Professional status Undeclared work

Reason for migration Pre- or post-accession migration Length of residence German language skills

Residence status (registration) Labour market access (work permit)

Migrant-specific factors

General factors

Following Kovacheva and Vogel (2012), two main groups of factors may explain the employment situation of the individual: general and migrant-specific (Figure 5.11).

Figure 5.11 Explanatory factors for the employment situation of the individual. (Source: Own compilation based on Kovacheva and Vogel (2012))

Migrant-specific factors apply to persons born abroad and cover the reason for migration, German language skills, length of residence, residence status (being registered with the local registration office or not) and labour market access (possessing a work permit or not). Irrespective of the origin, general factors affecting the employment situation are age, gender, education, family status, networks,

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belonging to an ethnic minority, professional status (dependent worker, selfemployed without employees and self-employed with employees) and carrying out undeclared work.

5.4.1

Self-Employment

Determinants of and hypotheses about the probability of self-employment The first binomial logistic regression tests the probability of Bulgarian migrants to choose self-employment as opposed to salaried jobs. Only respondents who declared that they were working are included in the analysis. The dependent variable has a value of 1 if a person is self-employed, and 0 if he or she is not self-employed (meaning that the person is a dependent worker). The dependent variable is regressed on a series of explanatory variables known from the literature. General factors, such as age, gender, education, marital status, having children, and networks, may explain the proclivity of migrants for self-employment. Men are more often self-employed than women (Brixy et al. 2011; Constant and Zimmermann 2006). Persons of prime age have a much higher probability of becoming self-employed than young and elderly persons so that the likelihood of self-employment is concave with age (Constant et al. 2007). Married persons are more likely to be self-employed, whereas having children influences the probability of self-employment negatively (Constant and Zimmermann 2006). The self-employed have higher education than the population of the same age (Brixy et al. 2011; Constant et al. 2007). However, studies reveal that education is not a statistically significant determinant of self-employment (Constant and Zimmermann 2006; Constant et al. 2007). Networks promote self-employment in two ways. First, when there are many self-employed people in the network, this can be a motiving factor for becoming self-employed. Second, networks increase the social capital of those who take part in them (Brixy et al. 2011). Ethnic enclaves are a further relevant determinant of self-employment (Le 1999). Given the high self-employment rates among the Turkish population in Germany (Constant et al. 2007), the Turkish minority group may have a higher probability of self-employment than ethnic Bulgarians. If the hypothesis about the role of ethnic enclaves holds, the Roma ethnic group may also have a higher propensity for self-employment than ethnic Bulgarians. Among the migrant-specific factors, legal status at entry matters. Migrants who used the employment channel to come to Germany are more likely to be

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in salaried work than refugees and migrants who arrived through family reunification (Constant and Zimmermann 2005). No empirical studies have been found about the relation between self-employment, language skills and length of residence. However, self-employment requires a certain level of integration in society in terms of language acquisition, knowledge about the labour market, the legal and tax system (Werner and König 2001). As these skills improve with increasing length of residence in the country, both better language skills and a longer duration of residence may positively influence the probability of self-employment. A negative relationship between work permit possession and self-employment is assumed. As a valid work permit enables Bulgarian migrants to take up dependent work, work permit holders do not need to use self-employment as an alternative way of accessing the labour market. A study in the UK provided empirical evidence on this assumption, showing that the removal of labour market restrictions had a significant adverse effect on the incidence of self-employment among EU2 migrants (Ruhs and Wadsworth 2018). Expecting that post-accession migrants are more affected by the work permit requirement, a dummy variable has been added to distinguish the specific time of migration: before or after EU accession. Annexe C–1 presents the variables included in the regression. Based on these indications from the literature, it was hypothesised that the following characteristics positively influence the probability of self-employment: male gender, main working age, labour reasons for migration, higher education, frequent social contacts with persons of German origin, a longer length of residence, post-accession migration, good German language skills, and belonging to an ethnic minority group. It was also hypothesised that possession of a work permit is negatively related to the probability of self-employment, meaning that persons with regular labour market access are less likely to be self-employed than those without a work permit. Results: explanatory factors for participation in self-employment The model on self-employment explored whether this professional status is an occupational alternative for Bulgarian migrants due to their restricted labour market access. Table 5.3 summarises results of the regression analysis for statistically significant variables (for full regression results, see Table 5.6).20 Regression 20 Results from the logistic regressions are presented in the form of Odds ratios (OR) and Average Marginal Effects (AME). Odds ratios are widely accepted in migration research and show how the probability of the three events (being self-employed, being an undeclared worker, and experiencing labour rights violations) changes when the value of the independent variable changes. A coefficient of 1 means that the odds do not change at all. A coefficient of less than 1 indicates that the probability is reduced once the independent variable is changed.

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results show that possession of a work permit is a strong and statistically highly significant determinant of the probability of being self-employed. Persons who possess a work permit are 46 percentage points less likely to be self-employed than those who do not possess a work permit. It can thus be plausibly concluded that self-employment constitutes an alternative to salaried work for migrants affected by the transitional measures. The survey provides evidence that a certain level of permanent settlement in the country is required to be self-employed. Good German language skills and a long length of residence indicate settlement in the receiving country and are statistically highly significant. This finding implies that migrants with some German language skills and with an increasing duration of residence in Germany are more likely to be self-employed than those without any German language skills and with a short length of residence. Remarkably, migrants with excellent German language skills do not have a higher probability of self-employment, indicating that language skills are concave with self-employment. The reason for migration is also related to the proclivity for self-employment. Persons who migrated for work or joined their family are more likely to be selfemployed compared to persons who migrated for educational reasons. It can be assumed that students can obtain more country-specific skills during their studies, which allows them to more easily find salaried work. Regression results do not confirm the assumed influence of belonging to an ethnic minority. Whereas Christian-Orthodox and Muslim migrants do not differ in their self-employment proclivity, migrants who declared other religions or no religion have a lower probability of self-employment. In line with previous studies, education does not determine the probability of self-employment. Also, age, gender and intensity of private contacts with Germans do not have a significant influence on undeclared work. Thus general factors play a subordinate role in the probability of self-employment and migrant-specific factors matter much more. In particular, the lack of a work permit and a certain level of settlement in Germany in terms of language skills and length of residence promote self-employment.

A coefficient of more than 1 indicates that the odds increase. Contrary to OR that reflect the degree of unobserved heterogeneity in the model, AME can be interpreted as effect measures (Auspurg and Hinz (2011); Mood (2010)). Therefore, regression results are discussed on the basis of AME while OR are presented complementarily without detailed discussion. AME show the change in the probability of the three events if the independent variable changes by one unit, whereas all the other variables remain constant.

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Table 5.3 Significant determinants of the probability of self-employment Factor (vs. reference category)

Probability of self-employment compared to reference category

Interpretation

Significance

No religion (vs. Christian-Orthodox)



Having a religion other than Islam or Christian-Orthodox, or no religion, decreases the probability of self-employment by 19.9 percentage points.

**

Economic and family reason for migration (vs. education reason)



Being motivated by ** economic or family reasons for migration increases the probability of self-employment by 23.8 and 23.0 percentage points respectively.

Increasing length of residence



Every additional year of *** residence increases the probability of self-employment by 2.5 percentage points.

Poor to fair German language skills (vs. no German language skills)



Having poor to fair *** German language skills increases the probability of self-employment by 23.3 percentage points.

Work permit (vs. no work permit)



Having a work permit decreases the probability of self-employment by 46.4 percentage points.

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

***

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Labour Market Integration: Analysing the Impact of Restricted …

Undeclared Work

Determinants of and hypotheses about the probability of undeclared work The second logistic regression model explores the probability of undeclared work. The dependent variable is a binary variable, which takes the value 1 if the respondent had worked without a contract in the last five years, and the value 0 if he/she had not. Respondents with labour market experience in Germany were considered irrespective of their current employment status. Therefore, the analysis also includes students and inactive persons with work experience. The dependent variable is regressed on a series of explanatory variables (see Annexe C–2). Some of them are known from earlier studies to be important determinants of whether a person undertakes undeclared activities. Richardson (2006) distinguishes three groups of determinants of undeclared work: demographic (age, gender, education, occupational status), economic (income level, income source, marginal tax rates, sanctions and probability of detection), and behavioural (complexity, fairness, revenue authority initiated contact, compliant peers and ethics or tax morale). The migrant survey in Hamburg, which was designed as a broad integration survey and did not focus explicitly on undeclared work, covers only demographic determinants (e.g. age, gender, education), and economic determinants (e.g. income level and employment status). Descriptive statistics from the Eurobarometer surveys on undeclared work show a prevalence of undeclared work among men, young persons, the selfemployed, students, and the unemployed (Eurobarometer 2007, 2014). Regression analysis finds statistically significant results for men, the self-employed, and the unemployed as being more often involved in undeclared activities (Fegatilli 2009). A survey on undeclared work in five countries, Germany amongst them, reveals that men are more likely to carry out undeclared work than women (Pedersen 2003). The probability of carrying out activities in the shadow economy falls with age, and marital status does not seem to have any significant importance (Pedersen 2003). Better educated persons are more compliant than less educated ones (Feinstein 1991; Richardson 2006), but education was not confirmed as a statistically significant factor by the Eurobarometer survey, for example (Fegatilli 2009). In the study by Pedersen (2003), educational level is negatively correlated with undeclared work but only in some of the countries studied. Concerning occupation, the self-employed, skilled workers and students are significantly more likely to carry out undeclared activities (Pedersen 2003). Activities in social networks are a way of coming into contact with people who want to buy informal activities (Merz and Wolff 1993; Pedersen 2003). Not only contacts at work but also in social surroundings promote informal activities (Merz and Wolff 1993).

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Therefore, more intense social contacts are associated with a higher probability of carrying out undeclared work than less intense social contacts. Based on these indications from earlier studies, it was hypothesised that young persons, men, less educated people, self-employed persons, single persons, and persons with more intense private contacts to Germans are more likely to work in the shadow economy. Apart from these general factors, migrant-specific factors may also influence the probability of undertaking undeclared work. Studies on undeclared work usually focus on the phenomenon in the population without a particular focus on migrants (Feld and Larsen 2010; Lamnek et al. 2000; Merz and Wolff 1993; Pedersen 2003). Therefore, empirical evidence on the influence of migrant-specific variables is scarce. A report by the European Commission on the transitional periods states that restrictions on labour market access may exacerbate levels of undeclared work (European Commission 2006). Therefore, persons without a work permit and post-accession migrants are assumed to carry out undeclared activities more often than persons with a work permit and pre-accession migrants. Labour migrants may be more likely to undertake undeclared work than migrants who moved for education and family reasons. The rationale behind this assumption is that where the primary motive for migrants to migrate is work, this makes them more prone to engaging in undeclared activities than migrants whose chief reasons for migration are not related to work. Hypotheses for the influence of language skills and length of residence can be formulated a priori. Migrants with poor German language skills and a short length of residence are assumed to be undeclared workers more often than those with good German language skills and a long length of residence. The explanation is that persons with poor language skills and a short length of residence are less able to find regular work and thus are more likely to get involved in undeclared work. Results: explanatory factors for participation in undeclared work The regression analysis on undeclared work aimed to explain the probability of undertaking undeclared activities. Table 5.4 presents results for significant variables. Possession of a work permit is a highly significant determinant of the probability of undeclared work. Persons with a valid work permit are 22 percentage points less likely to undertake undeclared work than persons without a work permit. This result confirms the expected negative relation between a work permit and undeclared work. Apart from a work permit, the employment status of the individual has a strong and statistically highly significant effect. Persons whose primary activity in Germany is not employment are more likely to practice undeclared work than those

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who are predominantly employed, regardless of whether they are dependent workers or self-employed. This result implies that students and inactive persons are almost 50 percentage points more likely to work undeclared than salaried workers and the self-employed (for detailed regression results, see Table 5.6). The proclivity for undeclared work is further related to the reason for migration. As expected, labour migrants have a higher probability of being in undeclared work compared to those who migrated for educational purposes. Family migration does not have an influence. Belonging to an ethnic minority seems to be correlated with undeclared work. Persons whose native language is Turkish or Roma are more likely to work in the shadow economy than persons whose mother tongue is Bulgarian. The effect is not very strong but statistically significant. Married persons also have a lower proclivity for undeclared work that is in line with earlier studies. General characteristics, such as age, gender, education and networks, cannot explain the proclivity for undeclared work. Migrant-specific characteristics, such as length of residence and language skills, are also not decisive for involvement in undeclared work.

5.4.3

Violation of Labour Rights

Determinants of and hypotheses about the probability of labour rights violations The third logistic regression model explores the probability of experiencing a violation of labour rights such as working hours, annual leave, overtime, and working health and safety. In the questionnaire, respondents were asked whether they had experienced a violation of labour rights in the last five years by listing seven labour rights. One of the labour rights infringements was working without a working contract and not paying contributions to the social security system. This answer option indicates undeclared work. Working without a contract is excluded as an example of a breach of labour rights and is considered to be a factor influencing the probability of experiencing violations. Undeclared workers are assumed to be more affected than those in regular employment (Kovacheva and Vogel 2012). The dependent variable is a violation of minimum labour standards. It takes the value 0 if the respondents did not declare non-respect of labour rights, and the value 1 if otherwise. The dependent variable is regressed on a series of explanatory variables (see Annexe C–3). The advisory centres Faire Mobiltät, which help EU migrant workers, document cases of labour rights violations in terms of low wages, nonpayment of wages, and insecure working conditions (Dälken 2012). Persons with

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Table 5.4 Significant determinants of the probability of undeclared work Factor (vs. reference category)

Probability of undeclared work compared to reference category

Interpretation

Significance

Married (vs. single)



Being married decreases ** the probability of undeclared work by 14.2 percentage points.

No religion (vs. Christian-Orthodox)



Confessing religion ** other than Islam and Christian-Orthodox, or no religion increases the probability of undeclared work by 23.0 percentage points.

Turkish- or Roma-speaking (vs. Bulgarian-speaking)



Being Turkish- or *** Roma-speaking increases the probability of undeclared work by 2.5 percentage points.

Inactive persons incl. students (vs. workers)



Being a student or other *** inactive person increases the probability of undeclared work by 49.4 percentage points.

Economic reason for migration (vs. educational reason)



Being motivated by *** economic reasons for migration increases the probability of undeclared work by 28.6 percentage points.

Work permit (vs. no work permit)



Having a work permit *** decreases the probability of undeclared work by 21.5 percentage points.

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

a short length of residence in Germany, without German language skills or knowledge about Germany, are particularly affected (Dälken 2012). A study among

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Bulgarian- and Albanian-speaking migrants in Berlin revealed that some population groups are assumed to be more vulnerable to a violation of labour standards than others: women, persons with low education, weak networks, and persons in undeclared work (Kovacheva and Vogel 2012). Apart from these general characteristics, some migrant-specific characteristics may make individual groups more vulnerable in terms of labour rights: short length of residence, insufficient language skills and insecure residence status, i.e. lack of registration at the local registration office (Kovacheva and Vogel 2012). A study in the Nordic countries found that individual factors, such as gender, schooling and length of residence, have no substantial effect on the probability of experiencing exploitative working conditions. But structural factors matter a lot: atypical employment, lack of trade union representation, and working for household clients double the odds of experiencing exploitative working conditions (Friberg and Eldring 2013). Results: explanatory factors for the violation of labour rights The model on violation of labour rights explored the probability of experiencing a violation of labour rights. Table 5.5 summarises results for significant variables. Undeclared work is a strong and highly significant determinant of labour rights violations (for detailed regression results, see Table 5.621 ). Migrants who work in the shadow economy are 35 percentage points more likely to be affected by labour rights violations than those in regular work. Interestingly, possession of a work permit does not have a significant effect.

21 Results from the logistic regression are presented in form of Odds ratios (OR) and Average Marginal Effects (AME). Odds ratios are widely accepted in migration research and show how the probability of the three events (being self-employed, being an undeclared worker, and experiencing labour rights violations) changes when the value of the independent variable changes. A coefficient of 1 means that the odds do not change at all. A coefficient of less than 1 indicates that the probability is reduced once the independent variable is changed. A coefficient of more than 1 indicates that the odds increase. Contrary to OR that reflect the degree of unobserved heterogeneity in the model, AME can be interpreted as effect measures (Auspurg and Hinz 2011; Mood 2010). Therefore, regression results are discussed on the basis of AME while OR are presented complementarily without detailed discussion.

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Table 5.5 Significant determinants of the probability of labour rights violations Factor Probability of labour Interpretation (vs. reference category) rights violations compared to reference category

Significance

Increasing age



Every additional year of ** age increases the probability of labour rights violations by 0.6 percentage points.

Muslim (vs. Christian-Orthodox)



Being a Muslim * increases the probability of labour rights violations by 23.5 percentage points.

Turkish- and Roma-speaking (vs. Bulgarian-speaking)



Being Turkish- and ** Roma-speaking decreases the probability of labour rights violations by 14.6 percentage points.

Undeclared work (vs. no undeclared work)



Carrying out undeclared *** work increases the probability of labour rights violations by 34.5 percentage points.

Economic reason for  migration (vs. educational reason)

Being motivated by * economic reasons for migration increases the probability of labour rights violations by 16.0 percentage points.

Good to very good  German language skills (vs. no German language skills)

Having good to very ** good German language skills increases the probability of labour rights violations by 18.5 percentage points.

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

1.013

0.966

Age in years

0.890

High

1.401

÷

0.540

(0.096) 0.330

−0.068

(0.104) 1.202

(0.108) 2.859 (0.095) 4.901

0.043 −0.199**

0.338

(0.078) 0.535

−0.014

(0.003) 1.029

−0.004 0.044

(0.051) 1.140

0.002

Private contacts with persons of German origin (ref: Daily)

Turkish or Roma

Mother tongue (ref: Bulgarian)

Other or no religion 0.213

Islam

Religion (ref: Christian-Orthodox)

Married

Family status (ref: Single)

1.435

Medium

Education (ref: Low)

Model 2 Probability of undeclared work

0.025***

0.230**

0.153

−0.142**

−0.157

−0.090

0.004

0.017

(0.098) 0.317

(0.112) 1.769

(0.112) 4.156

(0.064) ÷

(0.118) 0.455

(0.082) 0.385

(0.003) 1.043

(0.096)

(0.127)

(0.114)

(0.098)

(0.003)

(0.068)

(continued)

−0.146** (0.072)

0.093

0.235*

−0.127

−0.153

0.006**

−0.031

Odds ratios; Marginal effects (Standard errors)

Model 3 Probability of labour rights violations

(0.055) 0.810

Odds ratios; Marginal effects (Standard Odds ratios; Marginal effects errors) (Standard errors)

Model 1 Probability of self-employment

5

Gender (ref: Male)

General factors

Variables

Table 5.6 Probability of self-employment, undeclared work and labour rights violations: full results of logistic regressions

126 Labour Market Integration: Analysing the Impact of Restricted …

Model 2 Probability of undeclared work

6.560

6.173

1.230

4.393

Work

Family or other

Length of residence in years

Post-accession migrants (dummy)

Reason for migration (ref: Education)

Migrant-specific factors

Undeclared work

0.238**

0.176

0.025***

0.230**

(0.121) 1.897

(0.008) 1.113

(0.116) 3.977

(0.099) 10.655

÷

2.394

÷

(0.059) 1.188

−0.026

Students and inactive persons

÷

Employment status (ref: Dependent worker) 0.472

0.805

Rarely

(0.078) 2.273

−0.011

Self-employed

0.916

0.084

0.014

0.149

0.286***

0.494***

−0.097

0.023

0.108

(0.110) 1.470

(0.009) 0.978

(0.098) 1.761

(0.093) 2.781

10.312

(0.066) 1.959

(0.065) 0.976

(0.070) 0.724

(continued)

(0.134)

(0.008) 0.057

(0.095) −0.003

(0.095)

(0.050)

(0.102)

(0.073)

(0.072)

(0.089)

0.087

0.160*

0.345***

0.102

−0.004

−0.047

−0.100

Odds ratios; Marginal effects (Standard errors)

Model 3 Probability of labour rights violations

(0.089) 0.497

Odds ratios; Marginal effects (Standard Odds ratios; Marginal effects errors) (Standard errors)

Model 1 Probability of self-employment

Weekly

Variables

Table 5.6 (continued)

5.4 Regression Analysis on Labour Market Participation 127

Model 2 Probability of undeclared work

0.562 Chi2 13,080/ Sig.0.109

0.020

−3.406

261

0.449

0.462

0.617

Chi2 5,853/ Sig.0.664

Constant

N

Pseudo R2 McFadden

Pseudo R2 Cox & Snell

Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke

Hosmer-Lemeshow Test

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ÷ variables not included in the model.

0.415

0.400

272

−3,912

−0.464*** (0.056) 0.194

(0.082) 0.267

Work permit

0.233*** 1.126

6.185

2.570

Good to very good

Chi2 4,398/ Sig.0.820

0.493

0.370

0.333

274

−4.612

−0.215*** (0.079) 0.567

(0.089) 2.558 (0.100) 3.970

−0.005 −0.176*

−0.084

0.185**

0.107

(0.082)

(0.080)

(0.071)

Odds ratios; Marginal effects (Standard errors)

Model 3 Probability of labour rights violations

5

Poor to fair

(0.080) 0.964

Odds ratios; Marginal effects (Standard Odds ratios; Marginal effects errors) (Standard errors)

Model 1 Probability of self-employment

Language skills (ref: No skills to very bad)

Variables

Table 5.6 (continued)

128 Labour Market Integration: Analysing the Impact of Restricted …

5.4 Regression Analysis on Labour Market Participation

129

The probability of being confronted by non-respect of labour rights increases with increasing age. It is higher for persons with good to very good German language skills compared to the reference group without German language skills. Remarkably, the variables on ethnic minorities—religion and mother tongue—show opposing effects. Whereas Muslims have a higher probability of experiencing labour rights violations, Turkish- and Roma-speaking persons have a lower likelihood. However, the result for religion is significant at the 10% level and thus has to be interpreted with caution. The variable for the mother tongue is considered more reliable as language competencies such as Turkish enable access to the sizeable Turkish-speaking community in Germany. The regression results thus reveal that ethnic groups are less likely to be affected by a violation of labour rights than ethnic Bulgarians.

5.4.4

General and Migrant-Specific Factors for Labour Market Participation

Goodness of fit and robustness check All three models were checked for robustness by including further variables in the analysis: citizenship, intention to remain in Germany, networks with persons of Bulgarian origin, marital status (only in model 1 and 3), having children. The findings remain robust against these control variables. An alternative regression model tested the robustness of model 3. The labour right ‘wage increase’ was excluded from the list of labour rights that changed the distribution in the dependent variable. It means that persons who declared that they had not received any wage increase are not considered as having experienced labour rights violations. The effect size of statistically significant variables remains comparable in both models, pointing to the robustness of the initial model. Different indicators for goodness of fit allow for the quality of the models to be assessed. First, Pseudo R2 statistics define values higher than 0.4 for Cox and Snell-R2 as good, and values higher than 0.5 for the Nagelkerke-R2 and higher than 0.2 for McFadden-R2 as very good (Backhaus 2011). All three indexes from the regression analysis point to the models being of very good quality. Second, a Hosmer-Lemeshow test checks whether the Null hypothesis is true, i.e. whether the observed event rates match or do not match expected event rates in subgroups of the model population. Following Backhaus (2011), the Chi-square should be low, and the significance level greater than 70 percent. A non-significant Chisquare indicates that the data fit the model well.

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General vs. migrant-specific factors Additional models were run to explore whether general or migrant-specific factors better explained the incidence of self-employment, undeclared work and labour rights violations. The models cover only general or migrant-specific factors, and Pseudo R2 statistics indicate their explanatory power. The results in Table 5.7 show that migrant-specific factors are particularly relevant for the professional status of the individual and determine the probability of self-employment. They matter less for the probability of undeclared work and violations of labour rights. In particular, possession of a work permit, the reason for migration and the level of German language skills influence labour market participation in terms of professional status and job quality. Whether the person migrated to Germany before or after EU accession is of no relevance. Rather general and less migrant-specific factors explain the probability of undeclared work and violation of labour rights. Among general factors, factors that are not directly related to employment, such as age, gender, education, family status and networks, are only marginally influential. What matters are job-related factors, such as employment and professional status, and carrying out undeclared work. Table 5.7 Impact of individual groups of variables on the probability of self-employment, undeclared work and violation of labour rights Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Self-employment Undeclared work Violation of labour rights

General factors

0.296

0.468

0.457

Migrant-specific factors 0.573

0.343

0.233

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample.

5.5

Summary

Postponed legal integration in the economic area proves to have considerable implications for the labour market integration of Bulgarian migrants. In the migrant survey, the proportion of persons without a valid work permit was 59 percent. Some of them were students who are allowed to work up to 120 days annually without a work permit. The majority were workers, and the lack of a work permit strongly influenced their labour market positions. During the transitional periods, new patterns of labour market integration emerged. Self-employment increased extensively and became a decisive employment

5.5 Summary

131

form, in particular among post-accession workers. Administrative data showed that growth in dependent employment was slower than growth in migration stocks. Immediately after the expiration of the transitional arrangements, dependent work increased more rapidly than the migration stock. That is the result not only of newcomers taking up dependent work but also self-employed people moving into salaried employment. The migrant survey confirmed previous studies’ indications that post-accession migrants tend to be self-employed more often than pre-accession migrants. Going beyond previous findings, it revealed that the vast majority of self-employed people did not possess work permits (88 percent), indicating that their genuinely free choice of being a dependent worker or self-employed was limited. It can thus be plausibly concluded that self-employment was used to gain regular access to the labour market and constituted a strategy for circumventing the transitional periods. Regression analysis also provided statistical evidence for this. Logistic regressions revealed that the possession of a work permit is a strong determinant of form of employment. The propensity for being self-employed increases considerably when migrants do not possess a valid work permit. Apart from changing the employment pattern, the transitional periods prove to promote irregularities related to labour market participation. The migrant survey showed that the incidence of bogus self-employment, undeclared work and violation of labour rights among Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg was not negligible. Regression analysis provided statistical evidence that these phenomena are much more likely to be attributed to the work permit requirement than to migrants’ socio-demographic characteristics. Possession of a work permit is a strong determinant of the labour market situation of the individual. Migrants who do not possess a work permit are more likely to be self-employed and to undertake undeclared work. Undeclared workers are more likely to be affected by the undermining of labour rights. At first sight, there does not seem to be a direct relationship between the possession of a work permit and violation of labour rights. However, a lack of a work permit indirectly influences the probability of experiencing labour rights violations as it drives migrants into undeclared work. During the transitional periods, challenges arose in the labour market. However, they were related to quality of employment rather than the level of participation. The majority of Bulgarian migrants participated in the German labour market but took predominantly disadvantageous positions. Newcomers were often bogus self-employed and undeclared workers. In the survey, 42 percent of selfemployed persons were bogus self-employed, and 31 percent of the Bulgarian migrants had experience in the shadow economy after EU accession. A sizable proportion worked below their qualifications, in low-skilled sectors and earned

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low income, which indicates considerable brain waste among Bulgarian migrants. At 45 percent, violation of basic labour standards was widespread and affected not only workers in disadvantageous positions but also well-established workers. With the end of the transitional periods, the requirement for a work permit fell away, and dependent work subsequently increased. Some undeclared workers and bogus self-employed changed to dependent work, which certainly improved their labour market situation. In the absence of institutional barriers to labour market participation such as the work permit requirement migrants’ background characteristics will become more relevant. Low-skilled persons that are ready to accept unfavourable conditions will persist in their disadvantageous positions in the labour market. Medium and high-skilled persons are assumed to have easier access to jobs of a good quality than in the past. Whether the labour market integration of Bulgarian migrants will improve over time or whether informal barriers to integration such as discrimination, which seems to currently be in force, will also affect their labour market positions in the future remains to be seen.

6

Political Integration: Exploring the Electoral Participation of Recent EU Citizens

As a result of EU accession, Bulgarian migrants obtained voting rights in municipal elections in Germany for the first time. In this chapter, I elaborate on the intention of Bulgarian migrants to use these rights and provide empirical insights into a little-studied area of integration. I start with an overview of the electoral participation of EU citizens in general (section 6.1) and determinants of migrants’ voting behaviour (section 6.2). Then I turn to the electoral participation of Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg and present results from the migrant survey on the level of awareness of voting rights among Bulgarian migrants, their intention to vote in municipal elections and the motives for and against voting (section 6.3). Finally, I use logistic regression to analyse the influence of various determinants on the intention of Bulgarian migrants to vote in municipal elections and provide statistical evidence on the role of general and migration-specific factors.

6.1

Political Participation of EU Citizens

Political integration is a crucial dimension of structural integration. Integration in the sense of participation refers to different types of activities relating to the management of the collective affairs of a given political community (Martiniello 2005, 2006). These activities can be conventional, such as voting or running for election, and less conventional, such as protests, demonstrations, boycotts, petitions, etc. As legal status makes a difference to migrants mostly in terms of conventional activities such as voting, the focus of analysis lies on electoral participation. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33110-8_6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 V. Kovacheva, The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33110-8_6

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The actual use of voting rights (i.e. voter turnout) is considered a good indicator of political integration (Cyrus 2008; Cyrus and Vogel 2008; Martiniello 2005). Participation in electoral politics depends mostly on the political opportunity structure (Bauböck 2006c; Martiniello 2005, 2006), particularly on access to voting rights and citizenship (Martiniello 2009). Universal suffrage for citizens at the national, regional and local levels is guaranteed in all EU member states whereas voting rights for non-citizens are limited. Non-citizens are, as a rule, excluded from national elections. Electoral rights at the regional and local levels depend on their citizenship and country of residence. Since the introduction of EU citizenship in 1992, EU citizens living in another EU member state have the right to stand as candidates and to vote in local and European Parliament elections. In contrast, the voting rights of non-EU citizens vary across the EU. Out of 29 countries (EU27 member states, Norway and a few cantons in Switzerland), 19 allow third-country nationals to vote at the local and regional levels depending on the administrative structure of the country (Huddleston et al. 2011). In Germany, the debates on migrants’ voting rights continued during most of the 1980s (Groenendijk 2008). Two attempts to introduce local voting rights for non-citizens at regional (Länder) level in Hamburg and Schleswig Holstein were annulled by the Federal Constitutional Court in the early 1990s as unconstitutional (Groenendijk 2008). According to the German Court, the constitutional clause granting voting rights to the German people had to be interpreted as covering only persons of German nationality (Groenendijk 2014). Another opportunity for introducing local voting rights to non-citizens occurred in the early 1990s. The Council of Europe adopted the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level in 1992, but Germany did not sign it, mainly because of constitutional concerns (Groenendijk 2014). As a consequence, Germany does not grant non-EU migrants electoral rights and excludes them from electoral participation (see Table 6.1). There is thus an enormous democratic deficit in the country as a substantial part of the population has no political rights and cannot take part in the forming of the political will (Thränhardt 2008). That contains ‘high discriminatory conflict potential’ (Dimitrov 2012) and can lead to dissatisfaction among migrants, alienation from German politics and orientation to the country of origin (Assimenios 2001). To vote in Germany, EU citizens have to be 18 years old for the European Parliament elections, and 16 or 18 years old depending on the state for municipal

6.1 Political Participation of EU Citizens

135

Table 6.1 Eligibility to vote in Germany Eligibility to vote

German citizens

EU citizens

Non-EU citizens

European elections (EU level)

Yes

Yes

No

National elections (federal level)

Yes

No

No

Regional elections (Länder level)

Yes

No

No

Local elections (municipal level)

Yes

Yes

No

Source: Own compilation.

elections.1 A prerequisite is a three-month registered residence in the municipality. Voting rights, however, do not automatically lead to their actual use. The general trend among migrants, whether naturalised or foreign nationals, is that their voter turnout at the local level tends to be below the average (Saalfeld 2011; Martiniello 2009; Wüst 2003, 2004, 2002, 2010, 2003). EU citizens are not an exception and have made little use of their voting rights in municipal elections so far (Groenendijk 2014). After amendments to the German constitution and electoral laws of the individual states, the first municipal elections in which EU citizens participated took place in 1995 (Storz and Wilmes 2007). As the electoral laws in Germany do not foresee special evaluations, reliable data on the political participation of EU citizens are absent (Storz and Wilmes 2007).2 Estimates point to 20 to 30 percent voter turnout for EU migrants, which is considerably lower than the turnout of German electors (Assimenios 2001; Storz and Wilmes 2007). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the participation rates of EU citizens in four German cities were below those of the German population and decreasing over time (see Table 6.2). For instance, in Hamburg, only 16 percent of the eligible EU citizens voted in 2002 as opposed to 57 percent of the eligible German citizens. Voter turnout decreased in the period 1997–2011 for both groups: from 22 to 16 percent for EU citizens and from 69 to 57 percent for German citizens. EU citizens are reluctant not only as voters but also as candidates in municipal elections. The number of EU citizens elected as councillors is low. A study on the migration background of councillors in big German cities shows that only 0.4 1 In 11 of the 16 states the minimum age for voting at the local level is 16: Baden-Württemberg,

Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg Western Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia, https://www. machs-ab-16.de/wahlen-ab-16-in-deutschland/, checked on 15.09.2020. 2 At EU level, no data on the electoral participation of EU citizens are collected (European Commission 2012). Statistical indications of the voting behaviour of EU citizens stem from exit polls, the level of registration on the electoral rolls and the number of non-nationals elected as councillors (Groenendijk 2014).

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percent of the councillors are EU citizens (Schönwälder et al. 2011). A qualitative study among EU citizens in Hessen in the early 2000s also reveals a low level of participation of EU citizens as candidates in municipal elections (Shajanian 2001). Table 6.2 Participation of EU citizens in municipal elections Elections

Year

German citizens

EU citizens

All eligible voters

Berlin

1995

68.6%

23.5%

67.6%

1999

65.5%

17.9%

64.4%

2001

68.1%

21.6%

66.9%

2006

57.7%

14.0%

55.8%

Bremen

Hamburg

Stuttgart

2011

60.6%

11.8%

57.5%

1999

62.0%

17.0%

61.1%

2003

62.9%

26.5%

62.2%

2007

58.6%

16.1%

57.0%

2011

57.0%

14.2%

55.3%

1997

68.5%

22.0%

66.8%

2001

71.1%

19.0%

69.2%

2004

68.5%

26.0%

67.1%

2008

63.3%

18.3%

61.2%

2011

57.2%

16.2%

55.1%

1999

50.1%

22.5%

47.7%

2004

52.3%

18.0%

48.7%

2009

53.7%

14.9%

48.7%

Source: SVR (2013a).

In European Parliament elections, EU citizens residing in another EU member state have the option of voting for candidates in their country of origin or their country of residence. To vote for the German candidates, EU citizens have to register on the electoral roll. Once registered, they do not need to register again and are automatically included on the electoral roll. The registration level has remained stable over time. It accounted for 7 percent of the eligible EU citizens in 1994, 2004 and 2009, except for 1999 when merely 2 percent registered (SVR

6.1 Political Participation of EU Citizens

137

2013a).3 In 2014, 172,110 of 3.1 million EU citizens registered on the roll, corresponding to 5.6 percent of EU citizens (Bundeswahlleiter 2015). As EU citizens register on their initiative, it can be assumed that the majority vote (Wüst and Diehl 2011; Wüst 2006). However, this cannot be expected for persons who were automatically registered by the authorities, so the actual share of EU voters is probably lower (SVR 2013a, p. 111). As at the municipal level, EU citizens have the right to stand as candidates for the European Parliament. In 2014, 15 EU citizens ran for office in the European elections in Germany, but they were not successful (Bundeswahlleiter 2015, pp. 26–50). Electoral data show that the participation of EU citizens in German politics is low both as voters and candidates. Research provides further insights into their political participation. Research in Germany has become interested in the voting behaviour of migrants with the rise in naturalisations since the late 1990s and the introduction of jus soli (principle of birth) in the citizenship law in 1999 (Wüst and Diehl 2011). Major topics have been political interest, voting behaviour and political preferences (SVR 2013b). Studies have mostly focused on naturalised persons (Wüst 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004; Müssig and Worbs 2012). Other studies have dealt with political participation of individual groups (third-country nationals (SVR 2013b); Greek, Italian, Turkish and German youth (Weidacher 2000); Turkish migrants (Sezer and Brüssow 2014)); and electoral participation in individual cities (naturalised persons in Hamburg in 2000, (Klinger 2001); in Stuttgart 2009 (Haußmann 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Schwarz 2004); in Bavaria (Data4U 2017)). EU citizens have drawn little attention in electoral research so far. Only a few empirical studies have been conducted on their voting behaviour. An example is a survey on the municipal elections in Stuttgart in 2009. It points to lower electoral participation of EU citizens compared to naturalised persons and Germans without migration backgrounds (Haußmann 2009b). EU citizens represented 11 percent of the eligible population but only 3 percent of the actual voters (Haußmann 2009b). Differences exist among countries of origin. EU citizens from Eastern Europe have the lowest participation rate (8.1 percent), followed by Southern Europe (13.4 percent) and Northern Europe (18.8 percent) (Haußmann 2009c).4 3 The

lower registration in 1999 is attributed to the failure of the German authorities to automatically register EU citizens that had been previously registered in 1994 (Connolly et al. 2006, pp. 44–45). 4 According to the UN definition of regions, Eastern Europe refers to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia; Southern Europe includes Croatia, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain; and Northern Europe encompasses Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden and the UK, https://unstats.un.org/ unsd/methodology/m49/, checked on 11.09.2020.

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At 3.5 percent, the voter turnout of Bulgarian migrants was unusually low compared to migrants from France (30 percent), the Netherlands (40.8 percent) and Luxembourg (66.7 percent) (Haußmann 2009c). What is further known about the voting behaviour of EU citizens are their party preferences. EU citizens who arrived in Germany before 2000 prefer the Social Democratic Party and the Alliance ‘90/The Greens while new EU migrants mostly from CEE countries prefer the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) (SVR 2016). Still, the reasons for the low electoral participation of EU citizens are understudied. Scholars attribute them mostly to a weaker interest in politics compared to third-country nationals (Haußmann 2009a; Weidacher 2000). The considerably low electoral participation of EU citizens shows the difficulty of mobilising them as voters (Haußmann 2009a). Municipalities or parties could increase the electoral participation of EU citizens with special measures (SVR 2013a). However, measures to activate EU citizens as voters are unusual in the German context and have not been taken. Given the significant number of EU citizens eligible to vote in Germany, the scarce knowledge of their electoral behaviour is striking. There were 2.9 million EU citizens eligible to vote in the European Parliament elections in 2014 (Bundeswahlleiter 2014). That corresponded to 5 percent of all voters. The number of EU citizens eligible to vote at the municipal level cannot be neglected either. It is even higher than for European Parliament elections, as in 10 German states the minimum age required to vote at the municipal level is 16 instead of 18. It is known that EU citizens in Germany tend to participate in elections less than other groups, but empirical evidence on the reasons for this is missing. To address this research need, I explore the political participation of Bulgarian migrants in the following chapter. The chapter starts with an overview of the determinants of electoral participation (section 6.2) and then turns to results from the migrant survey (section 6.3). First, it documents the extent to which Bulgarian migrants are aware of their voting rights as EU citizens, whether they are willing to make use of them at the municipal level, and what the motives are behind these intentions. Second, a logistic regression explores the factors influencing the intention of Bulgarian migrants to vote in municipal elections. Results indicate which general and migration-specific characteristics most determine willingness to vote. The chapter concludes with considerations about the mobilisation potential of Bulgarian migrants in terms of political participation.

6.2 Determinants of Electoral Participation at the Local Level

6.2

139

Determinants of Electoral Participation at the Local Level

At the macro level, features of the electoral system influence the political participation of migrants. In Germany, the electoral roll for municipal elections includes EU citizens who do not need a registration.5 Automatic registration is considered more beneficial to the migrants than in countries where a previous application for registration on the electoral roll is required (European Commission 2012). Furthermore, individual letters with information on the electoral proceedings are sent by post to eligible persons. The individual letters aim at encouraging political participation (European Commission 2012).6 These features of the German electoral system create favourable conditions for the involvement of EU citizens in local elections. However, scholars criticise the political opportunity structure in Germany as generally lacking incentives for migrants’ participation in elections (Wüst and Diehl 2011). Mobilisation of the immigrant vote by political parties is one of the factors for political participation (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001) as, for instance, a study of the municipal elections in Denmark in 1997 empirically confirmed (Togeby 1999). German parties, however, have only reluctantly attempted to mobilise the immigrant vote (Wüst and Diehl 2011). At the micro level, more or less classical factors in political science influence voting behaviour: political ideas and values, previous involvement in politics in the country of origin, feeling of belonging to the receiving or sending country, knowledge of the political system and institutions, social capital, and density of networks (Martiniello 2005, 2009). Central to research on electoral participation is the Civic Voluntarism Model developed by Verba et al. (1995). According to this model, resources, attitudes towards politics and access to networks are the main sets of factors determining political participation (Verba et al. 1995). Resources such as better education and higher income enhance political participation (Bohne 2010; Bueker 2005; Diehl and Blohm 2001; Doerschler 2004). Completed education in the receiving country is associated with more information about the political system and parties (Wüst 2000), and may thus also increase participation. This assumption is empirically confirmed by a study in the US that found 5 Apart from Germany, the following countries automatically enter EU citizens on the electoral

rolls: Austria (except Burgenland), Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden (European Commission 2012). 6 A study of the local elections in Brussels held in 2000 found that a mere 9.6 percent of EU citizens registered to vote, even though they were informed by regular mail about their right to vote (Jacobs et al. 2002).

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higher political participation among migrants educated in the US than among those educated abroad (Cho, Wendy K. Tam 1999). However, these individual resources have less explanatory power for the electoral participation of migrants than that of the majority of the population (Saalfeld 2011). Political attitudes such as greater interest in politics and feelings of political efficacy also matter (Verba et al. 1995). Political efficacy is related to the subjective perception of their political competence (Müssig and Worbs 2012). Persons who consider their political competence to be high are more politically active than those who assess it as low (Müssig and Worbs 2012). Political efficacy may be particularly low in the first years of residence as migrants are not sufficiently aware of the political culture or even language in the receiving country (Hammer 1990). Over time, migrants go through a socialisation process and adapt to the political environment, which can influence their probability of voting (Bevelander 2015). Concerning networks, both networks related to the country of origin and to the country of residence play a role, but studies point to different effects. Whereas some studies find that both types of networks positively influence political participation (Berger et al. 2004; Tillie 2004), others point to a more substantial influence of networks in the receiving country than those of the sending country (Diehl 2005; Jacobs et al. 2004). Besides resources, networks and political attitudes, further individual sociodemographic characteristics are relevant for voting behaviour (Martiniello 2009; Müssig and Worbs 2012). These characteristics can be general or distinctive to migrants (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009; Wüst 2004). General characteristics are age, gender and labour status. Being male (Müssig and Worbs 2012; Tillie 2004), older (Müssig and Worbs 2012; Wüst 2004) and employed (Müssig and Worbs 2012; Tillie 2004) is associated with greater interest in politics than the reference groups (female, young and unemployed). Migration-related characteristics include citizenship, German language skills, length of residence, migration experience, etc. German citizens are politically more interested than non-citizens (Müssig and Worbs 2012). Good command of the German language and a longer length of residence increase political interest (Diehl and Blohm 2001). Twenty years of residence in Germany constitute ‘a crucial value’, as persons who have been in the country for this period have the greatest interest in politics (Müssig and Worbs 2012). Furthermore, generational status and belonging to an ethnic minority7 (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 7A

study in the US revealed that non-white persons are less active in elections than white persons and this gap increases for the second and third generation (DeSipio 1996, quoted in Wüst 2004).

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141

2001), and other forms of participation, such as church attendance and union membership (Wüst 2004), influence voting behaviour. Migrants’ own migration experiences imply higher electoral participation as studies in the UK and Germany show (Saalfeld 2011).

6.3

Electoral Participation of Bulgarian Migrants in Hamburg

6.3.1

Awareness of Electoral Rights

Knowledge of electoral rights is a prerequisite for electoral participation. Respondents were asked whether it is true or false that as EU citizens they have the right to stand as candidates and to vote in municipal, federal and European Parliament elections. EU citizenship does not grant the right to participate in national elections. A quarter of respondents (28 percent) incorrectly thought that EU citizens have the right to vote or stand as candidates in federal elections. A sizeable minority of respondents (46 percent) correctly said that it is false that EU citizens have the right to vote or stand as candidates in elections to the national Parliament. Respondents were even less informed about local and European Parliament elections. Almost one-third correctly said it is true that EU citizens have the right to vote or to stand as candidates in municipal elections. Slightly more than onethird accurately identified that EU citizens have the right to vote or to stand as candidates in European Parliament elections. A comparison with findings from a Eurobarometer survey brings these results into perspective. According to results from 2015, Bulgarians are less aware of their electoral rights than EU citizens on average (see Figure 6.1). Bulgarians surveyed in Hamburg are even less informed about their rights than Bulgarian participants in the Eurobarometer survey.

6.3.2

Willingness to Vote in Municipal Elections

Intention to vote in municipal elections To explore the political participation of Bulgarian migrants, a political actions approach has been applied. According to this approach, respondents give information about the political activities they have already exercised (actual voting) or intend to exercise (willingness to vote) (Steinbrecher 2009). Questions on voting intentions lead to a higher estimation of electoral participation than those about

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67% 67%

European Parliament voting rights 39%

51% 54%

No national voting rights 46%

47% Local voting rights

54% 32% 0%

Bulgarians in Eurobarometer

10%

20%

30%

All in Eurobarometer

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Bulgarians in the Hamburg survey

Figure 6.1 Awareness of electoral rights at local, national and European levels. (Sources: Own compilation based on: Bulgarians in the Hamburg survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401; Eurobarometer data for 2015 (Eurobarometer 2016))

actual voting in the past (Steinbrecher 2009). Nevertheless, given the very recent EU citizenship acquisition and the short length of residence of Bulgarian migrants in Germany, I opted for a question on voting intentions instead of actual voting in the past. Expressed voting intentions differ from actual voting behaviour. Actual participation in elections may be either higher or lower (Rogers and Aida 2012). Many who express an intention to vote do not vote and, more surprisingly, many who said that they would not vote do vote (Rogers and Aida 2012). Respondents reported on their intention to vote in municipal elections as well as on their motives for and against voting. Almost half of the survey respondents said that they would not vote in municipal elections, whereas slightly more than a quarter expressed a willingness to vote. Less than a quarter did not know whether they were going to vote (Figure 6.2). To put these results into perspective, we can compare them with results from a survey among third-country nationals in Germany (SVR 2013b). This survey reveals a comparable proportion of non-voters (42 percent vs. 49 percent among Bulgarians) but a much higher percentage of persons willing to vote (48 percent vs. 42 percent among Bulgarians). At 9 percent, the proportion of undecided people among third-country nationals is minor. The share of undecided Bulgarians (23 percent) is thus not negligible and points to a high mobilisation potential for Bulgarian migrants. As Figure 6.2 further shows, awareness of electoral rights is associated with a higher willingness to vote. Respondents who were aware of local political rights were almost twice as willing to vote as those who were not aware. The high

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143

percentage of respondents who were unaware of their voting rights but interested in municipal elections as well as the high proportion of undecided people show a substantial potential for increasing awareness and mobilisation among Bulgarian migrants.

Respondents unaware of local voting rights

23%

Respondents aware of local voting rights

51%

40%

All respondents

45%

28%

0% Willing to vote

10%

26%

15%

49%

20%

30%

40%

Not willing to vote

50%

23%

60%

70%

80%

90% 100%

Do not know

Figure 6.2 Awareness of electoral rights and intention to vote in municipal elections. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

General characteristics of voters and non-voters The survey findings show that voters and non-voters in municipal elections differ in their socio-demographic characteristics (Figure 6.3). In contrast to expectations, women are slightly more interested in voting than men. Findings on age and occupation are in line with previous studies. As assumed, older persons are more willing to vote than younger ones. The age cohorts 45–54 and 65+ expressed the highest willingness to vote. The youngest aged between 15 and 24 had the lowest interest in municipal elections. The proportion of undecided people varied correspondingly: from 3 percent among persons aged 55–64 to 41 percent among persons aged 15–24. Employed persons expressed the highest willingness to vote, whereas unemployed persons expressed the lowest willingness. Results for students and inactive persons were close to that for working persons. The survey confirms the Civic Voluntarism Model that indicates that greater resources correlate with a higher willingness to vote. Better education supports political participation. Respondents with tertiary education are more willing to

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vote than those with primary and secondary education. In all groups, the proportion of undecided persons was high, ranging between 19 and 27 percent. Qualifications obtained in Germany and higher incomes also promote interest in municipal elections. Inactive Students Unemployed Self-employed Dependent workers

26% 26% 17% 28% 31%

€2,001 or more €1,001 to € 2,000 euro €1,000 or less

30% 26%

51% 47% 37% 56%

23% 14% 23%

51%

34% 26%

Tertiary education Secondary education Primary education

25% 24% 30% 20% 22%

53%

40%

Education in Germany No education in Germany

65+ 55-64 45-54 35-44 25-34 15-24

49% 50%

40% 53%

37%

26% 21% 44%

18%

19% 27% 20%

54% 30%

50% 66%

17%

23% 25% 30% 55%

41%

30% 27%

Total

39%

10%

31%

57%

28% 0%

3% 21% 22% 21%

53% 49%

4%

Female Male

17%

74% 33%

45%

16%

49% 20%

Willing to vote

30%

40%

50%

Not willing to vote

23% 60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Do not know

Figure 6.3 General factors and intention to vote in municipal elections. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

Migration-related characteristics of voters and non-voters In terms of migration-related characteristics, the survey among Bulgarian migrants largely concurs with earlier studies. Legal status8 makes a significant difference to the intention to vote (Figure 6.4). Persons with German citizenship and those undergoing the naturalisation procedure (59 percent) have the highest inclination to vote. Willingness to vote correlates with interest in German citizenship. 8 Legal

status captures information about citizenship (Bulgarian or German) and intention to acquire German citizenship. Three categories were identified: naturalised persons and those in the naturalisation procedure, persons willing to naturalise, and persons not willing to naturalise.

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Respondents willing to naturalise were twice as interested in voting as those not willing to naturalise. This finding shows that interest in citizenship, i.e. full legal integration, goes hand in hand with political participation. Settlement aspects, such as length of residence, intention to remain, language skills and networks, are also closely related to the inclination to vote. Willingness to vote is positively associated with length of residence. It was the lowest among newcomers with a residence duration of less than a year and highest among persons who had been residing in Germany for more than 20 years. In the same vein, intention to remain in the long run correlates with a higher inclination to vote. Migrants who intended to stay in Germany permanently had a slightly higher willingness to vote than those who intended to remain only temporarily. Better German language skills are also associated with a higher inclination to vote. Networks related to the sending and the receiving country can be strong or weak, measured by the intensity of private contacts with persons of Bulgarian or German origin. Persons with intense (i.e. daily) contacts with Germans were more willing to vote than those with less intense contacts. In the case of networks with Bulgarians, the result is the opposite. Respondents with intense (i.e. daily) contacts with their own community had a lower interest in elections than those with less intense contacts with Bulgarians. Thus strong networks with persons from the destination country seem to be more supportive of voting than strong networks with persons from the sending country. Full legal integration in terms of naturalisation and permanent settlement associated with a long length of residence, an intention to remain in the long run, good German language skills and intense private contacts with Germans go hand in hand with a higher interest in electoral participation.

6.3.3

Motives for and against Voting in Municipal Elections

In the Hamburg survey, Bulgarian migrants reported on their reasons for and against voting in municipal elections. These reasons refer to political attitudes, such as political interest, political efficacy and party identification (Steinbrecher 2009). Persons who said they would vote in municipal elections stated their main motives for voting. As Table 6.3 shows, the very fact of being entitled to the right to vote and the desire to exercise that right is the greatest motivating factor. Perception of voting as important is a further chief motive for voting. These results point to a high level of political efficacy of voters. In contrast, political interest seems to be less relevant. Interest in politics in general and in local politics in particular motivated about one-third of the voters. Party preferences are

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Less than weekly contacts with Bulgarians Weekly contacts with Bulgarians Daily contacts with Bulgarians

33% 39% 24%

Less than weekly contacts with Germans Weekly contacts with Germans Daily contacts with Germans

50% 39% 53%

25% 29% 30%

Good to very good German skills Poor to fair German skills No to poor German skills

60% 39% 50%

20%

41%

17% 26%

20% 27% 19%

55% 55% 54%

21%

25% 25%

41% 58%

34% 30%

More than 20 years 11 to 19 years 6 to 10 years 2 to 5 years Up to one year

15%

32%

39%

Do not know Permanently A couple of years

17% 21% 23%

12% 25% 0% 31% 30% 15% 26%

75% 35% 32% 60% 55%

34% 38% 25% 19%

Naturalised and in naturalisation procedure Willing to naturalise Not willing to naturalise and undecided

20%

59% 58%

17% 0%

Willing to vote

10%

21% 20% 25%

48%

32% 20%

30%

Not willing to vote

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90% 100%

Do not know

Figure 6.4 Migration-specific factors and intention to vote in municipal elections. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401)

even less important, which is not unexpected given the short length of residence of Bulgarian migrants in Germany. Persons who did not intend to vote reported on their motives against voting. A lack of knowledge about the parties and their programmes was of relevance for more than half of the respondents who were unwilling to vote. This shows a low level of political efficacy and high potential to motivate non-voters by informing them about the political system and institutions. A lack of political interest is also a barrier to political participation. Many respondents did not intend to vote as they were not interested in local politics or politics in general. Party and media political campaigns would not be likely to mobilise these non-voters. Difficulties related to the voting procedure were of minor relevance. Other reasons against voting mentioned in the survey were lack of time and lack of trust in politicians. Two findings are particularly intriguing when comparing the reasons for and against voting. First, political interest seems to be more a barrier of than a motive for voting, but the results are more or less comparable. Political interest determines voting intentions for about one-third of the respondents. Political efficacy

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147

Table 6.3 Reasons for and against voting in municipal elections Reasons for voting

Voters

Reasons against voting

Non-voters

I’m generally interested in politics.

31%

I’m generally not interested in politics.

35%

I’m interested in local politics.

36%

I’m not interested in local politics.

41%

I consider the role of municipalities to be important.

43%

I do not consider the role of municipalities to be important.

4%

I have certain party preferences. 19%

I do not have certain party preferences.

25%

My vote is important.

54%

My vote is not important.

8%

I have this right and want to exercise it.

63%

–

–

–

–

The procedure is too complicated, long.

4%

–

–

I do not know the parties and their programmes.

54%

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample, n = 401. Basis: Respondents who intended to vote = 137; respondents who did not intend to vote or were undecided about it = 264. Notes: Multiple answers were possible. – This statement was not listed in the response options.

seems to be much more relevant. For a majority of the voters, the perception of the vote as important was a decisive motive for electoral participation. For a majority of the non-voters, a lack of knowledge about the political system in Germany hampered electoral participation. This finding implies that in the case of Bulgarian migrants, the franchise supports political participation, and more political efficacy is needed to enhance it.

6.3.4

Regression Analysis on Voting Intentions

Regression model and hypotheses As shown in section 6.3.2, voters and non-voters differ in terms of general and migration-related characteristics. Multivariate analysis tests which of these characteristics significantly influence intention to vote. Two groups of factors are considered:

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• General factors: age, gender, education, education in Germany, income, knowledge of voting rights, • Migration-related factors: legal status, length of residence, intention to remain in Germany, German language skills, private contacts with persons of German and Bulgarian origin,9 religion, mother tongue. Considering results from earlier research, it was hypothesised that: • Older persons, men, better-educated persons, persons with higher incomes and those who know about their voting rights at the local level would be more inclined to vote in municipal elections. • Naturalised persons, those willing to naturalise, persons with a longer length of residence, those willing to stay in Germany permanently, persons with better German language skills and more intense private contacts with persons of German and Bulgarian origin would be more inclined to vote in municipal elections. • Ethnic minorities would be less inclined to vote in municipal elections. A binary logistic regression on the intention to vote in municipal elections tested these hypotheses. Only persons who answered with ‘yes’ (coded as 1) or ‘no’ (coded as 0) were included in the analysis, whereas respondents who did not know whether they were going to vote were not considered. The number of cases totals 275 instead of 309 due to missing responses to the question on income. I checked whether the 34 non-respondents differed in their sociodemographic characteristics from the other respondents. This was not the case, and their exclusion from the analysis should not distort the results. Annexe C–4 summarises the independent variables used for the logistic regression. They are socio-demographic characteristics both in general and distinct to migrants. For methodological reasons, the model does not consider other important factors for electoral participation such as political interest and political attitudes. As two separate questions were posed to respondents who were willing and unwilling to vote, results on motives for and against voting cannot be included in the regression analysis.

9 Further

migration-related factors, such as birth in Germany, were not included due to a low variance in the sample. Due to the recent nature of Bulgarian migration to Germany, the proportion of persons born in the country is negligible. Only five respondents were born in Germany.

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149

Results from the regression analysis Table 6.4 presents the variables that significantly influence the intention of Bulgarian migrants to vote. Table 6.5 documents the complete results from the regression analysis. The regression analysis reveals that most general and migration-related factors are not influential. What mostly matters for the intention to vote in municipal elections is the legal status of the individuals, meaning their citizenship and intention to naturalise. The survey reveals that legal status strongly determines willingness to vote and positively influences electoral participation. This result is in line with previous studies on citizenship acquisition and political participation, which found a positive relationship between citizenship in the receiving country and voting behaviour (Bevelander 2015; Just and J. Anderson 2012; Maxwell 2010; Messina and Lahav 2006; Togeby 1999). According to the survey, naturalised persons have the highest probability of voting, followed by those willing to naturalise, then persons who are not interested in German citizenship. Naturalised persons are 57 percentage points more likely, and those who intend to naturalise 18 percentage points more likely, to vote than the reference group of persons not willing to naturalise. This finding confirms the assumed role of citizenship in electoral participation, showing that citizenship in the country of residence promotes a higher level of political participation. Two further factors are influential but not as significant as legal status: awareness of electoral rights and education completed in Germany. In line with expectations, persons who are aware of their right to vote in municipal elections are more willing to vote. Political participation thus presupposes an awareness of electoral rights. The finding about having completed education in Germany is more surprising. Previous research found that education in the receiving country increases knowledge about the political system and political parties, and thus may lead to more active electoral participation (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Wüst 2000). In contrast to these studies, and surprisingly, having studied in Germany has a negative influence on the intention of Bulgarian migrants to vote. This result has to be taken carefully, given the low significance level and the small-scale sample. The influence of the other general factors (gender, education and income) is only minor and hardly significant. Similarly, migration-related factors, such as length of residence, intention to remain, German language skills, and networks, cannot explain the voting behaviour of Bulgarian migrants. Ethnic Bulgarians, Bulgarian Turks and Roma do not differ significantly in their intentions to vote. It can thus be concluded that belonging to an ethnic minority is of minor relevance and hardly significant to the voting intentions of Bulgarian migrants.

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Table 6.4 Significant determinants of the intention to vote in municipal elections Factor (vs. reference category)

Intention to vote compared to reference category

Interpretation

Significance

Naturalised and undergoing naturalisation (vs. not willing to naturalise)



Being naturalised or undergoing the naturalisation increases the inclination to vote in municipal elections by 56.7 percentage points.

***

Willing to naturalise (vs. not willing to naturalise)



Being interested in naturalisation increases the inclination to vote in municipal elections by 18.3 percentage points.

***

Knowledge of  municipal voting rights (vs. no knowledge of municipal rights)

Knowledge of municipal * voting rights increases the inclination to vote in municipal elections by 11.7 percentage points.

Education in  Germany (vs. no education in Germany)

Having completed education in Germany decreases the inclination to vote in municipal elections by 17.3 percentage points.

*

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Robustness check and goodness of fit The robustness of the model was tested by adding additional variables such as marital status, labour status and reason for migration. They did not change the results, showing the stability of the model. According to the goodness of fit indexes (see Pseudo R2 values in Table 6.5), the model is acceptable (Backhaus 2011). A Hosmer-Lemeshow test points to the model being of good quality, with a low Chi-square (3.746) and a significance level higher than 70 percent (0.879) (Backhaus 2011).

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Table 6.5 Intention to vote in municipal elections: full results of logistic regression Intention to vote (no = 0; yes = 1) Variables

Regression coefficient

Odds ratio

Average marginal effect

Gender (ref: Male)

0.424

1.529

0.076

Age in years

0.027

1.027

0.005

Medium

−0.398

0.671

−0.069

High

0.215

1.240

0.040

0.372*

−0.173*

General characteristics

Education (ref: Low)

Education in Germany −0.990 Income (Ref: e1,000 or less) e1,001–e2,000

−0.103

0.902

−0.018

More than e2,001

−0.391

0.676

−0.066

Knowledge of municipal voting rights

0.668

1.949*

0.117*

Migrant-specific characteristics Legal status (ref: Not willing to naturalise) Willing to naturalise

0.962

2.616***

0.183**

Naturalised or in procedure

2.907

18.302***

0.567***

1.017

0.003

Length of residence in 0.017 years Intention to remain (Ref: Several years) Permanent

−0.180

0.836

−0.032

Do not know

−0.348

0.706

−0.061

German language skills (ref: No skills to very poor) Poor to fair

−0.635

0.530

−0.110

Good to very good

0.133

1.142

0.025

Private contacts with persons of German origin (ref: Daily) Weekly

0.627

1.871

0.117

Rarely

−0.334

0.716

−0.057

Private contacts with persons of Bulgarian origin (ref: Daily) (continued)

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Political Integration: Exploring the Electoral Participation …

Table 6.5 (continued) Intention to vote (no = 0; yes = 1) Variables

Regression coefficient

Odds ratio

Average marginal effect

Weekly

0.296

1.344

0.053

Rarely

0.351

1.421

0.063

1.286

0.044

1.360

0.054

Religion (ref: Christian-Orthodox) Islam or other religion 0.251 Mother language (ref: Bulgarian) Turkish or Roma

0.308

Constant

−2.345

N

275

Pseudo R2 McFadden

0.206

Pseudo R2 Cox & Snell

0.246

Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke 0.325 Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

6.4

Summary

This chapter explored the intention of EU citizens from Bulgaria to vote in municipal elections. The survey revealed that Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg have a low level of political participation, with only every fourth person willing to vote in municipal elections. What can certainly be said is that legal status is the greatest determinant of the electoral participation of Bulgarian migrants. Naturalised persons have by far the highest probability of voting. Persons willing to naturalise are more interested in elections than those not willing to acquire German citizenship. However, the gap in their voting intentions is smaller than between naturalised persons and those not willing to naturalise. Naturalisation can thus be considered a mechanism for political integration. Political integration presupposes full legal integration. The very fact of being enfranchised motivates the majority of Bulgarian voters. This finding implies that the franchise through EU citizenship may lead to more active political participation. However, the franchise does not automatically result in a higher level of electoral participation. Despite electoral rights, many Bulgarians abstain from voting as they are not interested in politics. The opportunities

6.4 Summary

153

for mobilisation of these voters seem to be rather low. In contrast, migrants who lack knowledge about German parties and their programmes, and those who are undecided, have a greater potential for mobilisation. Their share among Bulgarian migrants is high, which can be attributed to the relatively short length of residence of Bulgarian migrants in Germany and the fact that they obtained voting rights only recently. Over time, the community’s level of political awareness is expected to increase. In the short run, political mobilisation of EU migrants through information campaigns may enhance knowledge about the political system and thus encourage them to seize their opportunities to vote. Such a debate about the political mobilisation of EU migrants could be helpful to attract migrant voters but until now has only reluctantly been engaged with in Germany.

7

Naturalisation: Explaining the Exceptional Willingness of Bulgarians to Naturalise

In this chapter, I examine the exceptionally high willingness of Bulgarian migrants to acquire German citizenship. First, I juxtapose the naturalisation behaviour of Bulgarian migrants against other EU citizens in Germany (section 7.1). Afterwards, I outline structural and individual determinants of naturalisation (section 7.2 and 7.3) and explore their relevance for Bulgarian migrants. Then the survey results shed light on the intention of Bulgarian migrants to naturalise and the motives for and against this intention (section 7.4). Finally, logistic regression provides statistical evidence on the influence of various determinants on the intention to naturalise, such as legal, symbolic and settlement factors.

7.1

Naturalisation Practices of EU Citizens

Naturalisation leads to full legal integration in the receiving country in the sense of full social, economic and political rights. It can thus be assumed that legal status and the rights attached to it matter considerably for the naturalisation inclination of the individual. The better legal status of EU citizens is believed to create disincentives for the acquisition of national citizenship in the receiving country and is reflected in lower naturalisation rates of EU citizens compared to third-country nationals. Since 1980, that is, even before the introduction of EU citizenship, EU nationals in several member states have had lower naturalisation rates than nationals from non-EU countries (Clarke et al. 1998). The harmonisation of the status of EU citizens living in other member states through EU citizenship in 1992 made Electronic supplementary material The online version of this chapter (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33110-8_7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 2021 V. Kovacheva, The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33110-8_7

155

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national citizenship less attractive for EU migrants (Simon 2012). Some scholars see the explanation for the naturalisation behaviour of EU citizens in the very nature of the European Union: ‘The relevance of citizenship and naturalisation decreases with the stability of blocs of countries and the openness of borders. In a stable bloc like the EU, this is hardly relevant’ (Böcker and Thränhardt 2006).

The naturalisation rates of EU citizens were low even in countries with particularly favourable naturalisation conditions, such as in the ‘Dutch naturalisation paradise’ of the mid-1990s (Böcker and Thränhardt 2006). German naturalisation statistics confirm the general trend across the EU. With utilised naturalisation potential1 at 1.7 percent, foreign nationals from EU countries had the lowest naturalisation rates in 2018, compared to foreign nationals from Africa (7.4 percent), Asia (6.0 percent) and America (3.3 percent). The socalled utilised naturalisation potential (ausgeschöpftes Einbürgerungspotenzial) is a naturalisation rate calculated on the basis of the number of foreign nationals who have been residing in Germany for more than ten years, thus narrowing down the number of persons eligible for naturalisation. Length of residence is a main criterion together with language skills, but they are not taken into account in the calculation (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2015b). Naturalisation rates can be also calculated on the basis of the total foreign population of the respective nationality. However, this indicator of naturalisation behaviour may be distorted in the case of increasing migration flows as these flows directly reduce the naturalisation rate even though the population eligible for naturalisation does not increase (Reichel 2011). This constraint holds in the Bulgarian case as net migration to Germany increased considerably after EU accession from about 230 persons in 2006 to 21,724 persons in 2013 (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2015d). Indeed, naturalisation rates based on the total Bulgarian population show only slightly increasing naturalisation rates from 1.0 percent in 2007 to 1.2 percent in 2013, whereas naturalisation rates on the basis of eligible Bulgarian citizens (with a length of residence of longer than 10 years) paints a picture of steadily increasing naturalisation rates. Naturalisation data point to intriguing differences between migrants from old EU15 and new EU10 member states. The naturalisation rates of the new

1 In

this chapter, naturalisation rates refer to the utilised naturalisation potential.

7.1 Naturalisation Practices of EU Citizens

157

EU10 migrants are above the average naturalisation rate for EU citizens, whereas migrants from the old EU15 countries naturalise below the average level (Figure 7.1).

Austria

0.3

Italy

0.9

France

1.2

Spain

1.4

Croatia

1.4

Greece

1.4

EU nationals

1.9

Foreign nationals

2.2

Lithuania

2.3

Poland

2.5

Czech Republic

2.6

Slovakia

2.7

Hungary

2.9

Latvia

3.8

Estonia

3.9

Bulgaria

6.3

Romania

8.3

UK

9.9 0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Figure 7.1 Naturalisation rates of individual EU countries in 2017, in %. ( Source: Own compilation based on data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2018b). The calculation is based on the number of persons eligible for naturalisation)

In the period after EU accession from 2004 to 2018, the naturalisation rates of most of the new EU member states declined. In contrast to this development, Bulgarian and Romanian migrants displayed an increasing trend over time and the highest inclination among EU citizens to naturalise. One year after EU accession, the naturalisation rate was 7.3 percent for Bulgarians and 8.0 percent for Romanians as opposed to only 1.6 percent for EU nationals and 2.3 percent for the total foreign population (see Table 7.1). The trend of higher naturalisation rates has persisted over time. Before 2007, about 400 Bulgarians naturalised annually. After EU accession, naturalisations started increasing and reached about 1,600 cases yearly (Table 7.2). Remarkably, many more women acquired German citizenship than men: 62.3 percent of Bulgarian women compared to 53.5 percent of women among all naturalisations in 2018. The naturalisation rate was close to the average before EU

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Table 7.1 Naturalisation rates of selected nationalities in Germany

Bulgaria

2004

2008

2011

2013

2018

2.8%

7.3%

10.9%

9.2%

4.9%

Romania

3.2%

8.0%

7.6%

6.5%

6.9%

EU nationals

1.0%

0.9%

1.0%

1.0%

1.7%

Foreign nationals

2.8%

2.2%

2.3%

2.3%

2.2%

Source: Own compilation based on data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2007– 2019). The calculation is based on the number of persons eligible for naturalisation.

accession but rose considerably from 2.8 percent in 2004 to 10.9 percent in 2011. It gradually declined after 2011 (to 4.9 percent in 2017) but remains at a high level. For comparison, the naturalisation rate for the other 2007 accession country Romania developed similarly in the same period. It increased from 3.2 percent in 2004 to 7.6 percent in 2011. After a slight decrease after 2011, it rose again to 8.3 percent in 2017. Naturalisation data reveal a considerably increasing willingness of Bulgarian migrants in Germany to naturalise despite holding EU citizenship. This finding is in contrast to expectations of low interest in German citizenship among EU citizens. Several studies show lower naturalisation levels of EU citizens compared to citizens from non-EU countries (Diehl and Blohm 2003; Hagedorn 2001b, 2001a, 2001a; Weinmann et al. 2012; Weinmann et al. 2013; Worbs 2008). They usually explain differences in the naturalisation behaviour of EU and non-EU citizens with reference to their different legal status. EU citizenship is commonly accepted to provide almost equal rights to German nationals, which reduces the incentives for naturalisation. The behaviour of Bulgarian migrants calls this popular belief into question. Generations of migrants from the old EU countries, for instance, Italy, have lived in Germany without becoming German citizens (Thränhardt 2017). Migrants from the new EU countries do not have such generational experience, which could explain their higher naturalisation inclination (Thränhardt 2017). Furthermore, the dual citizenship policy for EU migrants that came into force in Germany in 2007 may support the decision to naturalise. However, knowledge about the naturalisation practices of EU citizens and their incentives or disincentives to naturalise is scarce. In particular, the role of EU citizenship in the naturalisation decision is under-researched. It can be plausibly assumed that knowledge and perception of EU citizenship influence willingness to naturalise.

7.1 Naturalisation Practices of EU Citizens

159

Table 7.2 Naturalisation of Bulgarian citizens in Germany Total number

Men

Women

Proportion of women

Utilised naturalisation potential

2004

404

160

244

60.4%

2.8%

2005

400

154

246

61.5%

4.0%

2006

409

143

266

65.0%

4.1%

2007

468

148

320

68.4%

4.6%

2008

802

259

543

67.7%

7.3%

2009

1,029

344

685

66.6%

9.0%

2010

1,447

461

986

68.1%

11.6%

2011

1,540

535

1,005

65.3%

10.9%

2012

1,691

543

1,148

67.9%

10.1%

2013

1,790

639

1,151

64.3%

9.2%

2014

1,718

595

1,123

65.4%

7.7%

2015

1,619

539

1,080

66.7%

6.6%

2016

1,676

630

1,046

62.4%

6.3%

2017

1,739

613

1,126

64.7%

6.3%

2018

1,830

690

1,140

62.3%

4.9%

Source: Own compilation based on data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2007– 2019).

Given the fact that there is little understanding of the role of EU citizenship in relation to naturalisation and the intriguing discrepancy between the expected and actual naturalisation behaviour of Bulgarians in Germany, their naturalisation behaviour deserves closer attention. Therefore, this chapter explores the naturalisation behaviour of Bulgarian migrants with a particular focus on the role of EU citizenship. It starts with theoretical considerations about structural (section 7.2) and individual (section 7.3) determinants of naturalisation. Then the willingness of Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg to naturalise is explored (section 7.4) by looking at motives for and against naturalisation. Four groups of individual determinants are studied: legal aspects, such as knowledge about and perception of EU citizenship status; symbolic aspects, such as discrimination and feelings of affiliation with Germany; as well aspects related to permanent settlement in Germany, such as length of residence and intention to remain; and background characteristics, such as age, gender and education. Finally, a binary logistic regression tests which of these factors most determine the naturalisation intentions of Bulgarian migrants

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in Hamburg. The chapter ends with a discussion of the meaning of this exceptional interest of Bulgarians in legal integration and the relation between EU and national citizenship (section 7.5).

7.2

Structural Determinants of Naturalisation in Germany

Research identifies various structural determinants of naturalisation behaviour that are related both to the county of origin and the country of residence. In the country of residence, the opportunity structure in terms of citizenship policies and their implementation is a crucial determinant of naturalisation. Citizenship policies set the conditions under which an individual can naturalise, such as residence requirements, language requirements and the possibility of retention of one’s original citizenship. The Citizenship Law 2000 improved naturalisation opportunities by reducing the required length of residence from 15 to 8 years. Later, new requirements such as a language test (2006) and naturalisation tests (2008) were introduced. Requirements for naturalisation do not depend on legal status, except for ethnic Germans from the successor states of the former Soviet Union and other eastern European countries (Spätaussiedler). They automatically receive German citizenship after successful application for the status of Spätaussiedler (late resettler as a consequence of the Second World War) (Worbs et al. 2013). Only since 1996 has the procedure for recognising German ethnicity involved proof of language skills (Worbs et al. 2013). EU citizens have to fulfil the same residence and language requirements for naturalisation as third-country nationals. However, a significant difference concerns the acceptance of dual citizenship. Whereas EU citizens in Germany have been allowed to retain the citizenship of their country of origin since 2007, thirdcountry nationals are permitted to do so only in exceptional cases. The German citizenship law of 1999 entitled EU citizens to preserve their original citizenship where there is reciprocity between the country of origin and residence (Hailbronner 2012; Thränhardt 2008). Reciprocity existed between many of the EU member states (Worbs 2008, p. 26), for example between Germany and Italy as of 2002, and Germany and France as of 2003 (Böcker and Thränhardt 2003, p. 125). With the implementation of the EU directive of 2007, the opportunity for dual citizenship for EU citizens was further strengthened as they were allowed to preserve their citizenship irrespective of the principle of reciprocity. As of 2007, EU citizens have been allowed to acquire German citizenship without renouncing the citizenship of their country of origin.

7.2 Structural Determinants of Naturalisation in Germany

161

It is widely acknowledged that the acceptance of dual citizenship affects naturalisation decisions. It reduces the costs of naturalisation associated with renouncing one’s original citizenship. Many studies have confirmed empirically that acceptance of dual citizenship increases the propensity to naturalise (JonesCorrea 2001; Mazzolari 2009).2 In the same vein, several studies have revealed that non-acceptance of dual citizenship in Germany is an important motive against naturalisation (Anil 2007; Böcker and Thränhardt 2003, 2006; Diehl and Blohm 2001; Worbs 2008). In particular for EU citizens, non-acceptance of dual citizenship was a main barrier to naturalisation as remigration to the countries of origin was of particular relevance (Thränhardt 1999b). Apart from citizenship policies themselves, their implementation plays an important role. The citizenship laws in Germany are adopted at a federal level by the Bundestag upon approval by the Bundesrat (Hailbronner and Farahat 2015). In an administratively decentralised federal state such as Germany, the subnational authorities of the states are responsible for the administration of naturalisation policies, such as naturalisation procedures and decisions (Lämmermann 2013; Thränhardt 2001).3 Administrative practices vary across the German states (Hofhansel 2008), often due to substantially differing regulatory guidelines for the application of the law (Hailbronner 2012) (on the scope of discretion at a state level, see Lämmermann 2013). These differences resulted in a considerable variation in naturalisation rates among the states (Thränhardt 2017). In the 1990s, Hamburg had one of the highest naturalisation rates (Hagedorn 2001b). From 2012, the city-state became the state with the highest level of naturalisations (Thränhardt 2017). In 2015, it ranked in the first place with a naturalisation rate of 3.8 percent compared to 2.8 percent on average for the federal state (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2017). For comparison, Bavaria registered the lowest naturalisation rates in 2015 (1.7 percent), followed by Baden-Württemberg (1.9 percent) and Berlin (1.9 percent) (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2017). Political stances regarding naturalisation and the following information policy in the states have a significant impact on the outcomes of naturalisation policies, as Hagedorn showed in her analysis of naturalisation procedures in the German states (Hagedorn 2001a). Information about the naturalisation procedure, its costs 2 Some

studies revealed contrary results (Dronkers and Vink 2012; Yang 1994). However, it has to be kept in mind that the latter study explored the effect of acceptance of dual citizenship in the country of origin whereas the former focused on the country of residence (Vink et al. 2013, 4). 3 The German case contrasts with administratively centralised countries such as Italy, the Netherlands and Canada, where local authorities only have executive functions and operate on behalf of a national decision-making institution (Caponio 2010, p. 174).

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and benefits, is a factor influencing naturalisation behaviour (Böcker and Thränhardt 2006; Weinmann et al. 2013). Information campaigns that directly address the eligible population positively affect the propensity for naturalisation for two main reasons. First, they make people aware of naturalisation requirements and benefits (Weinmann et al. 2013). Second, a deliberate invitation to apply for naturalisation strengthens the feeling of being welcomed in Germany and thus positively affects the decision to naturalise (Weinmann et al. 2013). Information campaigns took place in Berlin and Hessen (Caponio 2010), in Stuttgart (Weinmann et al. 2013) and Hamburg (Çelikkol and Kersten 2012). In Hamburg, the mayor of the city, Olaf Scholz, who is a member of the German Social Democratic Party, launched a naturalisation campaign, sending personal letters to invite 137,000 eligible migrants to apply for German citizenship (Çelikkol and Kersten 2012). The naturalisation campaign was accompanied by an extensive information campaign, in which volunteers informed people about naturalisation requirements and benefits, and provided support during the procedure (Çelikkol and Kersten 2012). Furthermore, a naturalisation ceremony in the city hall is regularly organised (Çelikkol and Kersten 2012). These ceremonies are considered as a signal, showing that people are officially welcome as Germans (Weinmann et al. 2013). Apart from structural opportunities in the country of residence, scholars see naturalisation inclination as being determined by features of the country of origin, particularly its economic development and political stability. People from countries with precarious security and economic conditions are more prone to naturalise than people from rich and secure countries (Thränhardt 2017). Migrants from medium- and under-developed countries are on average more likely to apply for citizenship than those from highly developed countries. They also show a lower intention of returning to the country of origin (Vink et al. 2013). A greater gap between the standards of living in rich and poor countries makes naturalisation much more important and probable (Böcker and Thränhardt 2006). Considering GDP per inhabitant in PPS as an indicator of living standards, the standard of living in Bulgaria is far below that in Germany and is the lowest in the EU. In 2014, the GDP per inhabitant in PPS in Bulgaria was 45 compared to 124 in Germany.4 The income differences between the two countries are also considerable. In 2014, the minimum wage in Bulgaria was e1.04, compared to e8.50 in Germany (Jobelius 2015). Following the argumentation of Böcker and Thränhardt, the income gap is expected to increase the naturalisation inclinations of Bulgarian migrants in Germany. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec001

14&plugin=1, checked on 11.09.2020.

7.3 Individual Determinants of Naturalisation for EU Citizens

163

In sum, the structural opportunities in both the receiving and sending country create a highly favourable context for naturalisation of Bulgarian migrants in Germany. A substantially lower standard of living in Bulgaria and the dual citizenship policy for EU citizens in Germany may facilitate the naturalisation decision. In Hamburg, where the survey among Bulgarian migrants was carried out, a positive political stance towards naturalisation and, since 2011, the active campaign promoting naturalisation may additionally increase the naturalisation incentives for Bulgarians.

7.3

Individual Determinants of Naturalisation for EU Citizens

The increasing willingness of Bulgarian citizens to naturalise does not seem to be the single effect of the adoption of the dual citizenship policy as there has not been a corresponding increase in the naturalisation rates for other EU member states, as visible in Figure 7.1. Explanations of naturalisation behaviour should thus be sought in the individual preferences and attitudes of migrants, which are decisive determinants of the decision to naturalise. After a literature review, four groups of individual determinants influencing naturalisation were defined: • legal aspects related to EU citizenship, such as knowledge about EU citizenship rights and the perceived value of EU citizenship; • symbolic aspects related to EU citizenship, such as perceived discrimination and negative attitudes towards foreigners; • permanent settlement aspects, such as contacts with Germans, feelings of affiliation with Germany and intention to remain in the long run; and • socio-demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, length of residence, education and income.

Legal aspects The first group of determinants is related to the legal aspects of naturalisation.5 Perceived costs, benefits and meanings of naturalisation are probably the most direct determinants of naturalisation decisions (Yang 1994). It is widely accepted 5 In

contrast to previous empirical research, it was not asked whether persons expect benefits from naturalisation (Witte 2014) but rather whether they are aware of their rights as EU citizens and whether this legal status is valuable to them.

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that the intention to naturalise is influenced by the expected benefits of citizenship acquisition, such as better travel opportunities, secured residence status, better economic prospects and full political rights (Wunderlich 2005). In particular, interest in political rights is an important motive for deciding to naturalise (Diehl and Blohm 2003, 2008; Kahanec and Tosun 2009; Prümm 2004; Söhn 2008; Wunderlich 2005). If only a few benefits are attached to naturalisation, the interest in it is low; see, for example, a study among Turkish migrants in Berlin (Anil 2007). In Germany, long-term migrants enjoy an extensive set of rights. Following the introduction of EU citizenship, legal equality between so-called ‘denizens’ and Germans is almost complete (Fick 2017). It is thus assumed that for EU citizens, few legal incentives for naturalisation exist due to their virtual legal equality with German citizens. EU citizens are entitled to vote in municipal elections, but the right to vote in the state (Länder) and national elections is preserved for German citizens. Gaining political rights is assumed to be the chief motive for EU citizens to obtain a German passport. With the exception of these political rights at the state and federal levels, there are few practical benefits of German citizenship that could create sufficient incentives to naturalise. In order to make a difference for the individual, EU citizenship rights have to be known and understood. Knowledge about rights is a prerequisite for perceiving the legal advantages of EU citizenship status.6 It can thus be assumed that migrants without sufficient knowledge about EU citizenship rights have greater incentives to naturalise as they expect more legal benefits from the acquisition of German citizenship. Even knowing about the rights of EU citizens in Germany, migrants may hold different perceptions about the value of such rights for their situation. If they do not perceive EU citizenship as valuable for their individual situation or the Bulgarian community as a whole, German citizenship may be associated with advantages that are not provided by EU citizenship. Thus a low value attached to EU citizenship may lead to a higher willingness to naturalise. As the opportunity for dual citizenship is granted by law only to EU citizens, acceptance of dual citizenship seems to be attached to EU citizenship status. Several studies point to low naturalisation rates of EU citizens in Germany despite dual citizenship (Böcker and Thränhardt 2006; Weinmann et al. 2012; Weinmann et al. 2013; Worbs 2008). Hailbronner (2012) argues that despite having the privileged position of being able to maintain their own citizenship, few EU citizens acquired German citizenship due to ‘no substantial need or interest to acquire 6 In

the questionnaire, the level of real knowledge about EU citizenship rights is measured by listing specific rights of EU citizens residing in another EU member state, such as the right of permanent residence after five years of continued stay and electoral rights. Respondents were asked to identify which of them they were entitled to.

7.3 Individual Determinants of Naturalisation for EU Citizens

165

German citizenship, due to the secure residence status and the participatory rights granted by Union citizenship’ (Hailbronner 2012). Whether the right to retain the citizenship of the country of origin influences naturalisation intentions depends on individual preferences and attitudes on the one hand, and expected disadvantages in the country of origin on return or visits, on the other. Symbolic aspects The second block of determinants is related to symbolic aspects of naturalisation. The main symbolic motives are identification with the country of residence and perceived discrimination (Hochman 2011). Identification with the country of residence is usually associated with a higher inclination to naturalise (Diehl 2002; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Maehler et al. 2008; Maehler 2012; Prümm 2004; Söhn 2008; Worbs 2008; Wunderlich 2005). Concerning discrimination, some studies point to a negative impact of discrimination on naturalisation (Hochman 2011; Portes and Curtis 1987) whereas other studies find a positive relation between discrimination and naturalisation intentions (Witte 2014). Negative attitudes towards foreigners and experience of hostile attitudes discourage naturalisation (Kahanec and Tosun 2009; Portes and Curtis 1987). Discrimination is often discussed in relation to the naturalisation behaviour of EU citizens from the new EU member states in Germany. The restricted freedom of work for seven years has been considered a source of discrimination that can explain the naturalisation behaviour of migrants from the new EU member states in this period (Thränhardt 2008; Worbs 2008). If this is a valid motive, the end of the transitional periods should have decreased naturalisation of migrants from the new EU member states (Thränhardt 2008). Furthermore, a negative discourse on Bulgarian migration may have resulted in feelings of discrimination and inferiority among Bulgarians. Before EU accession, fears of large-scale migration and negative effects of EU2 migration made the headlines in German media. In 2007, a contested debate began on reception of welfare benefits by Bulgarians and reached a peak in 2013 when the slogan ‘Whoever cheats gets away’ (Wer betrügt, der fliegt) was coined (Jobelius 2015). The negative image of Bulgarian migration that has been created (Wagner 2018) may have resulted in feelings of discrimination and inferiority despite EU citizenship. Bulgarians perceive themselves as being disadvantaged because of existing resentments and see German citizenship as a way out of this discriminatory situation (Kovacheva 2014b). Diehl and Blohm (2003) call this ‘status inconsistency’ and argue that migrant groups experiencing discrimination and feelings of inferiority have greater incentives to naturalise despite their legal status as EU citizens:

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In a country such as Germany, where migrants enjoy almost the same rights as legal residents, status inconsistency seems to play a much more important role in the decision to ‘change flags’ than the rather meager legal incentives to become a citizen. For migrants from EU countries who lack this motivation, naturalisation is a rather meaningless thing to do because their ethnic group membership is no longer a source of discrimination and feelings of inferiority. (Diehl and Blohm 2003)

Settlement aspects Apart from legal and symbolic aspects, settlement in the receiving country matters for naturalisation (Huddleston and Tjaden 2012; Reichel 2011; Reichel and Perchinig 2015).7 Indicators showing permanent settlement in the receiving country include the length of residence (Reichel and Perchinig 2015), intention to stay in the country (Diehl and Blohm 2003, 2008), speaking the language of the host country at home (Vink et al. 2013), home ownership (Diehl 2002; Kahanec and Tosun 2009), having close German friends (Constant et al. 2008, 2009; Diehl and Blohm 2003; Wunderlich 2005). The more settled the person, the higher the willingness to naturalise. Socio-demographic characteristics The fourth group of determinants encompasses individual socio-demographic characteristics. In the 1930s, Bernard (1936) argued that individual characteristics, such as education, occupational status and income, or, as he called them, ‘cultural factors’, are important determinants of naturalisation. Since then, many studies have explored the relationship between individual background characteristics and naturalisation such as, for instance, age, education, marital status, occupation, income (Constant et al. 2008, 2009; Chiswick and Miller 2008; Portes and Curtis 1987). Characteristics that positively affect the propensity to naturalise are: being female, better educated and arriving at a younger age (Constant et al. 2008, 2009), being born in the country of residence (Diehl 2002; Kahanec and Tosun 2009), having family members who are naturalised (Street 2013, 2014).8 7 Other scholars analyse the role of individual integration, see Diehl and Blohm (2003, p. 158):

‘We argue that even when migrants earn only few legal advantages by acquiring citizenship, naturalisation rates will be high among individuals who belong to a group with a low social status but who have achieved a high level of individual assimilation’. 8 At the macro level, intergenerational motives to naturalise are high in countries without jus soli citizenship as was the case in Germany before 1999. The new citizenship law and the introduction of the jus soli principle for children born in Germany removed a key motive for parents to naturalise (Street 2014). For analysis of the family context, see Street (2013, 2014). For details on family-related motives for naturalisation, see Wunderlich (2005).

7.4 Naturalisation Practices of Bulgarian Migrants in Hamburg

7.4

167

Naturalisation Practices of Bulgarian Migrants in Hamburg

This section presents the survey results on naturalisation. Respondents gave information about their citizenship, intention to naturalise (if not already naturalised) and motives for and against the acquisition of a German passport. German citizens comprised 18 percent of the respondents. The rest of the 329 respondents stated whether they intended to naturalise (Figure 7.2). The proportion of those interested in naturalisation was higher than those not willing to naturalise.9 Every third respondent was undecided.

4.9 Yes, and I have already applied for it.

16.4

Yes, but I have not applied for it. 35.6 16.4

No, I do not intend to naturalise.

I haven't thought about naturalisaon. I do not know. 26.7

Figure 7.2 Intention to apply for German citizenship. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, unweighted sample; Basis: All respondents except German citizens, n = 329)

Among German citizens, 28 respondents obtained a German passport before 2007, with the earliest naturalisation taking place in 1978 and the latest in 2006. Four persons obtained German citizenship by birth before 1990. They naturalised in a different legal context as third-country nationals and are thus not considered in the following analysis. Therefore, a subsample of 373 respondents was used, 9 It

can be assumed that almost all of the applicants will successfully acquire German citizenship. Before application, the requirements for naturalisation are taken into consideration and ineligible persons are not encouraged to apply. Therefore, respondents who have already applied for German citizenship and are thus currently in the naturalisation procedure were added to the category of naturalised persons.

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including Bulgarian citizens and naturalised persons who became Germans after 2007.

7.4.1

Motives for and against Naturalisation

Motives for naturalisation The distinctions between pragmatic, instrumental or legal motives on the one hand, and emotional, identificatory or symbolic motives for naturalisation on the other hand, are well established in migration research (Diehl 2002; Witte 2014; Worbs 2008). The gain and loss of rights is often discussed as instrumental, pragmatic or legal motives. Gaining acceptance is usually addressed as being part of emotional, identificatory or symbolic motives. Based on this distinction, the survey measured three groups of motives related to: • acquisition of rights (better travel opportunities, secure residence status, better job opportunities and full political rights), • maintenance of rights (maintenance of rights if absent from Germany for a longer period of time and possibility of retention of Bulgarian citizenship), • affiliation to the country of residence (attachment to Germany10 and envisaged future in Germany). Respondents who naturalised after 2007, those who were undergoing the naturalisation procedure or who intended to apply for German citizenship assessed the importance of each motive for naturalisation. Concerning the acquisition of rights, the incentives for EU citizens to naturalise are usually considered to be low because, in legal terms, they are virtually equal to German citizens. However, when asking about specific rights, pragmatic reasons seem to play an essential role in the naturalisation considerations of Bulgarian migrants (see Figure 7.3). Better job opportunities seem to be the most decisive factor for naturalisation. More than two-thirds of the respondents declared this to be a very important motive for the acquisition of German citizenship. As EU citizens enjoy virtually equal access to the public and private sectors (with some few exceptions) to German nationals, aspirations for better job opportunities signal that economic

10 Attachment to Germany means sense of belonging to a locality rather to a group of people. It is translated in Bulgarian as ‘cvpzan c’; in German as ‘verbunden mit’.

7.4 Naturalisation Practices of Bulgarian Migrants in Hamburg

See his/her future in Germany Feel aached to Germany

60% 23%

Retenon of Bulgarian cizenship is possible

56%

Fairly important

21%

14% 2%

26%

6%

21% 17%

62%

20%

Slightly important

36% 30%

8% 5%

24%

38% 10%

13%

24%

69%

Travel opporunies

Very important

14%

30%

26%

Secure residence status

7%2%

21%

47%

Beer job opportunies

0%

28% 33%

Maintenance of rights if absent from Germany

Full polical rights

169

40%

50%

Not important at all

60%

70%

8% 6%

9%

16%

80%

90% 100%

Do not know

No answer

Figure 7.3 Motives for naturalisation. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample; Basis: Naturalised respondents, those undergoing naturalisation and those willing to naturalise, n = 177)

rights are considered insufficient for successful labour market integration. Acceptance in society may influence labour market prospects, and German citizenship is perceived as an instrument for increasing this acceptance. A high proportion (62 percent) declared a desire for a secure residence status as a driving motive for naturalisation. Although EU citizenship grants unrestricted access to German territory and no residence permit is required to stay in the long run, securing residence status in the country through German citizenship is perceived as very important. This result, which at first sight is striking, can be explained by the very nature of EU citizenship. It entitles EU citizens to rights during their stay in Germany, but these rights are lost if one is absent from the country for more than two years. Furthermore, access to some social benefits is bound to permanent residence. Contrary to the expectation that access to full political rights is crucial, only a quarter of respondents assessed full political rights as being very important when considering naturalisation. Moreover, for every fifth respondent, political rights were not important at all. The comparatively low relevance of political rights can be attributed to the short duration of residence of Bulgarian migrants. It is assumed that interest in national politics is low in the first years of migration and increases with an increasing length of residence. It is thus expected that political motives, such as participation in federal elections, will become more important with a growing length of residence in Germany.

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Better travel opportunities motivated one-third of the respondents interested in German citizenship. This relatively high relevance of travel opportunities can be explained in relation to the still unfavourable travel opportunities for Bulgarian citizens outside the EU compared to other EU countries. In particular, the US is an important destination country for Bulgarian citizens, but a visa is still required for entry, creating a substantial barrier to mobility.11 German citizenship implies the abolishment of this mobility barrier. Not only access to rights but also the maintenance of rights in both the receiving and sending country play a role for naturalisation intentions. The maintenance of rights in the country of origin requires retention of the original citizenship. Every second respondent emphasised retention of Bulgarian citizenship as very important. The maintenance of rights in the country of residence may be relevant particularly for migrants who do not consider settling permanently in Germany.12 The survey results show that the maintenance of rights in Germany (47 percent) is almost equally important to migrants as the maintenance of rights in Bulgaria (56 percent), which are secured if dual citizenship is obtained. Concerning motives related to affiliation to Germany, 60 percent wanted to naturalise as they saw their future in Germany. Only 23 percent saw feelings of attachment to Germany as decisive. Feelings of attachment to Germany were not important at all or only slightly important to one-third of the respondents. It is mostly pragmatic reasons that motivate migrants to naturalise. Bulgarian migrants perceive EU citizenship as insufficient for securing their residence status and providing sufficient labour market opportunities. German citizenship is thus considered to be an instrument for gaining more security and better economic prospects. An intention to remain in Germany in the long run is a further strong incentive to naturalise. Motives against naturalisation Respondents who did not intend to naturalise or were undecided reported on their motives against the acquisition of German citizenship. There are three groups of reasons related to:

11 In the migrant interviews conducted before the survey, travel opportunities outside the EU were emphasised as a driving factor for naturalisation. 12 Response option in the questionnaire (F25, E): ‘I want to maintain my rights in Germany in case I will be absent from the country for a longer period of time’ (In German: Ich will meine Rechte in Deutschland behalten, für den Fall, dass ich vom Land für längere Zeit abwesend bin).

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• the naturalisation procedure (not fulfilling the naturalisation requirements, high costs of the procedure), • legal status (no difference from the current legal status, no acknowledgement as an equal German citizen even with a German passport, no wish to renounce Bulgarian citizenship), • affiliation to Germany (no attachment to Germany, no future planned in Germany).

Do not see his/her future in Germany Do not feel attached to Germany

30%

8%

24%

15%

16%

23%

23%

No acknowledgment as a German even with a German passport

27%

23%

8%

No difference from the current status

28%

20%

10%

Do not want to renounce current citizenship

The costs are too high Do not fulfil the requirements

53%

7% 9% 11% 10% 10%

21% 19% 16%

49%

15%

20%

20%

38%

16%

18% 20%

9% 9% 10%

21% 23%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% fully applicable

somewhat applicable

somewhat inapplicable

fully inapplicable

do not know

no answer

Figure 7.4 Motives against naturalisation. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample; Basis: Respondents not willing to naturalise and undecided, n = 196)

Motives related to legal status are dominant. In particular, the perceived lack of opportunity to retain Bulgarian citizenship (see Figure 7.4). More than two-thirds of the respondents were not interested in naturalisation as they did not want to renounce their Bulgarian citizenship. This high proportion suggests that retention of citizenship is crucial when considering naturalisation. However, it cannot be interpreted as a sign that respondents were not aware of the legal opportunity to retain their current citizenship. The other two status-related reasons also largely influence the naturalisation decision. Almost half of the respondents did not see any difference from their current legal status and were thus not interested in naturalisation. It can be concluded that these persons perceive EU citizenship as providing sufficient rights, and no further rights bound to German citizenship are considered necessary. Half

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of the respondents believed that they would not be acknowledged as an equal German even with a German passport and were thus not willing to naturalise. This result indicates that naturalisation is not seen as helpful in gaining acceptance in society. Motives related to affiliation to Germany are as relevant as status-related ones. More than one-third of the respondents did not feel attached to Germany or did not see a future in Germany and were thus not interested in German citizenship. Formal reasons related to the naturalisation procedure are of minor importance. Only 16 percent did not want to naturalise as they did not fulfil the requirements and 20 percent as the costs of naturalisation were too high. For half of the respondents, costs did not matter at all. This is not surprising given that fact that naturalisation fees in Germany are comparatively low (e255 compared to e1,500 in Greece or £1,360 in the UK) (Thränhardt 2017). Barriers related to the naturalisation procedure are thus not the decisive reasons against obtaining German citizenship—it is dependent rather on the perceived value of EU and German citizenship. Rights bound to EU citizenship are considered sufficient, and at the same time acquisition of German citizenship is not seen as helpful in gaining acceptance as a German in society.

7.4.2

Who is Willing to Naturalise: Descriptive Results

Socio-demographic characteristics Based on results from previous studies, a higher willingness to naturalise is assumed for women, young people and better educated people. Men, older people and the less educated are assumed to have a lower proclivity to naturalise. The survey results for Bulgarians in Hamburg confirm that women are more interested in naturalisation (50 percent) than men (45 percent). This result coincides with German naturalisation statistics, which show a high proportion of naturalised women among Bulgarians (two-thirds in 2015). In terms of age, the age cohort 25–34 showed the highest naturalisation inclination (57 percent). As assumed, the youngest (age cohort 15–24; 32 percent) and elderly (age cohort 55–64; 33 percent) had a lower inclination to naturalise. Descriptive statistics confirm the expectation about a positive relationship between education and naturalisation. People with tertiary education were mostly willing to naturalise (57 percent), followed by persons with primary education (44 percent) and professional education (43 percent). People with general secondary education or gymnasia education had the lowest willingness (27 percent).

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Settlement aspects In the Hamburg survey, four indicators of permanent settlement were included: length of residence, intention to remain, perceived relevance of long-term settlement and private contacts with Germans. It was hypothesised that persons with a longer duration of residence, who intend to stay in Germany in the long run, who attach importance to long-term settlement and who have intense private contacts with Germans are more inclined to naturalise. Descriptive statistics confirm the expectations. As expected, the longer the length of residence, the higher the inclination to naturalise. Two-thirds of the respondents with a residence of longer than five years intended to apply for German citizenship. In contrast, only one-third of respondents who had been residing in Germany for less than five years intended to obtain a German passport. Likewise, respondents willing to stay in Germany permanently were much more interested in German citizenship (64 percent) than those who intended to remain only temporarily (33 percent). Concerning private contacts with Germans, the proportion of those willing to naturalise was highest among persons with regular contacts with Germans: once a week (64 percent) to many times monthly (85 percent). Willingness to naturalise among persons with daily contacts and infrequent contacts were similar (less than 50 percent). Legal aspects: knowledge of EU citizenship rights It was hypothesised that migrants who are aware of their rights as EU citizens in the receiving country would be less willing to naturalise. Two sets of questions capture knowledge of EU citizenship rights. The first set refers to the specific rights of EU citizens living in another EU country, whereas the second includes fundamental rights granted to EU citizens, mainly free movement rights. The first set of rights includes the rights of EU citizens living in other EU member states: the right of permanent residence, electoral rights at municipal, national and EU levels, and the right to equal treatment. Respondents reported whether each of these rights was true or false (see Figure 7.5).13 Every second respondent knew about the right to be treated equally with citizens of the country of residence and the right of permanent residence after five years of continuous stay. Less known was the right to vote in municipal elections and the right to vote in European Parliament elections. Persons willing and those not willing to naturalise differed slightly in their level of knowledge, and most of the rights 13 The statement on voting rights in national elections was formulated as ‘EU citizens have the right to vote and stand as a candidate in national elections’. As this statement is false (EU citizens do not have national voting rights), the answers were recoded.

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were almost equally known. Substantial differences were found only in relation to national and municipal elections. Persons interested in naturalisation were much better informed about voting rights than those not interested in German citizenship.

Proporon of respondents who were aware of the rights, in %: 59% 59% 58%

EU cizens have the right to be treated equally to cizens of the country of residence. EU cizens have the right to vote and stand as candidates in European Parliament elecons.

38% 41% 37%

EU cizens have no right to vote and stand as candidates in naonal elecons.

41%

45%

32%

EU cizens have the right to vote and stand as candidates in municipal elecons.

23%

43%

EU cizens obtain permanent residence rights in a member state in which they have resided uninterrupted for five years.

57% 52% 0%

All respondents

51%

10%

Willing to naturalise

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

64% 70%

Not willing to naturalise

Figure 7.5 Knowledge of EU citizenship rights when living in another EU member state. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample; Basis: All respondents excluding German citizens who acquired citizenship before 2007, n = 373)

The second set of rights includes fundamental EU citizenship rights: the right to travel freely and reside, to work in another EU member state, to transfer social rights across the EU, to consular protection outside the EU, to petition EU institutions, and to participate in Citizens’ Initiatives (see Figure 7.6). Fundamental EU citizenship rights of free travel, residence and work, and the right to petition are well known, with more than two-thirds of the respondents stating that they were aware of them. This result is not surprising given the fact that survey respondents have already made use of these rights. Less known were the right to diplomatic and consular protection outside the EU and the right to participate in Citizens’ Initiatives. Less than half of the respondents were aware of them. Respondents willing to naturalise were better informed about their fundamental rights as EU citizens than those not willing to naturalise. Bulgarian migrants seem to be better informed about their fundamental rights as EU citizens (travel, residence, work and social protection) than specific rights in

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Proportion of respondents who were aware of the rights, in %: EU citizens have the right to participate in Citizens' Initiatives (Initiatives allow one million EU citizens to call directly on the European Commission to bring forward an initiative of interest to them.

44% 47% 41% 69% 75%

EU citizens have the right to petition the European Parliament and complain to the European Ombudsman.

65%

EU citizens outside the EU have the right to be protected by the diplomatic and consular authorities of any other EU country.

45% 41% 48%

EU citizens have the right to transfer social security rights among EU member states (e.g. pension contributions, unemployment benefits).

49%

54% 61%

68%

EU citizens have the right to work (for new EU member states after a transition period).

78% 61% 89% 93% 87%

EU citizens have the right to move freely within the EU and to reside in other EU member states.

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% All respondents

Willing to naturalise

Not willing to naturalise

Figure 7.6 Knowledge of fundamental EU citizenship rights. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample; Basis: All respondents excluding German citizens who acquired citizenship before 2007, n = 373)

their country of residence (permanent residence, franchise and equal treatment). Whereas 32 percent were aware of fundamental EU citizenship rights, only 22 percent were aware of specific rights when living in another EU country.14 Similarly, the proportion of those not aware of EU citizenship rights at all was much lower for the fundamental rights (4 percent) than for the specific rights in the receiving country (11 percent).15 This result is not surprising as the principle of free movement was heatedly debated in the EU accession process, mostly related to restrictions on labour market access. However, it reveals a low level of awareness of rights, which are relevant to life in the country of residence, and thus the urgent need for this to be enhanced.

14 These 15 These

are respondents who correctly identified all rights or all except one. are respondents who correctly identified none or only one of the rights.

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Legal aspects: perception of EU citizenship Two questions relate to the perception of EU citizenship. First, respondents declared whether EU citizenship had positive practical implications for the individual. It was assumed that persons who perceive EU citizenship as having practical benefits for their situation would be less willing to naturalise. Remarkably, Figure 7.7 reveals the opposite result. Migrants interested in naturalisation more often saw practical benefits in EU citizenship than those not willing to naturalise. It can be assumed that persons who are well informed about their rights as EU citizens are also well informed about rights attached to German citizenship and are thus interested in naturalisation. Those who do not see any advantages in EU citizenship are assumed to be more sceptical about the benefits of German citizenship.

'The fact that I’m an EU cizen has praccal consequences for me.'

Willing to naturalise

32%

Not willing to naturalise

24%

All respondents

10%

4%

34%

27%

0% Fully applicable

43%

17%

38%

20%

Somewhat applicable

30%

40%

Do not know

50%

13%

11%

60%

13%

70%

Somewhat inapplicable

8%

12%

13%

80%

10%

90%

100%

Fully inapplicable

Figure 7.7 Perceived consequences of EU citizenship for the individual. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample; Basis: All respondents excluding German citizens who acquired citizenship before 2007, n = 373)

Second, respondents declared whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that Bulgarian migrants in Germany gained more rights and entitlements after becoming EU citizens. It was hypothesised that persons willing to naturalise would be more sceptical about EU citizenship and would not believe that Bulgarians gained more rights and entitlements after 2007. Surprisingly, Figure 7.8 shows the opposite result. A higher proportion of migrants interested in naturalisation agreed with the statement than migrants not willing to naturalise. It can be

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177

assumed that persons that are sceptical about the gains resulting from EU citizenship are also much more sceptical about the benefits of German citizenship and are thus not interested in naturalisation. 'Bulgarians have more rights in Germany than before 2007.'

Willing to naturalise

52%

Not willing to naturalise

36%

All respondents

28%

43%

0% Fully agree

28%

10%

20%

Somewhat agree

17%

17%

28%

30%

40%

Do not know

50%

60%

12%

15%

70%

Somewhat disagree

7% 1%

80%

10%

90%

8%

5%

100%

Fully disagree

Figure 7.8 Perceived consequences of EU citizenship for Bulgarian migrants. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample Basis: All respondents excluding German citizens who acquired citizenship before 2007, n = 373)

Legal aspects: retention of Bulgarian citizenship The survey respondents declared how important the possibility of retaining their citizenship was when thinking about naturalisation.16 It is assumed that in a situation where there is a dual citizenship policy, persons who perceive retention of their original citizenship as important would be more willing to naturalise. Figure 7.9 shows that for every second person retention of Bulgarian citizenship was fully important. In contrast, merely every tenth person considered dual citizenship as fully unimportant. Differences between migrants willing and not willing to naturalise were minor. Symbolic aspects Two symbolic aspects identified in the literature were included in the Hamburg survey: discrimination despite EU citizenship status and negative attitudes towards foreigners in general. Acquisition of German citizenship is assumed to be a tool 16 Irrespective

of the declared intention to naturalise, respondents were asked to assess the importance of dual citizenship for them when considering naturalisation.

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'I consider retenon of my Bulgarian cizenship as important.'

Not willing to naturalise

Willing to naturalise

56%

All respondents

55%

0% Fully important

10%

20%

Somewhat important

21%

30%

40%

Neutral

50%

60%

7%

10%

18%

70%

Somewhat unimportant

9%

9%

13%

16%

53%

80%

14%

11%

90%

2%

6%

100%

Fully unimportant

Figure 7.9 Retention of Bulgarian citizenship. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample; Basis: All respondents excluding German citizens who acquired citizenship before 2007, n = 373)

for establishing status consistency and a mechanism for overcoming group discrimination based on foreign nationality in general and Bulgarian nationality in particular. Therefore, a positive relationship was hypothesised: persons who perceive group discrimination against Bulgarian migrants in Germany and persons who perceive negative attitudes towards foreigners would be more inclined to naturalise. Respondents declared whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: ‘In Germany, people of non-German origin are not treated fairly’.17 Of the respondents, 27 percent agreed with the statement. Migrants willing and not willing to naturalise did not differ substantially. Four statements were listed to measure group discrimination. Respondents had to assess whether they agreed or disagreed with these statements (Figure 7.10).18 17 In German: ‘In Deutschland geht man nicht offen mit Menschen nicht-deutscher Herkunft um’. 18 Discrimination is measured by an item battery with four statements on differential treatment. As this set of items for measuring discrimination has not been applied in a migrant survey in a similar way, it is important to check the internal consistency and dimensionality of the scale before using them for analysis. The internal consistency shows whether the items measure the same construct and ranges between 0 and 1. The statistical test for the items points to a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.710, which indicates relatively high internal consistency of items. The removal of any item would result in a lower Cronbach’s alpha and so all items are used for further analysis. Furthermore, the dimensionality of the scales was checked.

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Only a minority of the respondents fully agreed that Bulgarian migrants have access to their rights equal to other EU citizens, are as welcome as all other EU citizens, are treated equally to German citizens, and have equal chances to participate in the core areas of life as persons of German origin. The proportion of those who disagreed was much higher. For instance, 25 percent entirely disagreed that Bulgarian migrants have equal access to their rights compared to other EU citizens, whereas only 11 percent fully agreed. Persons willing and not willing to naturalise only slightly differed in the perceived discrimination against Bulgarians. Respondents interested in naturalisation believed more often that Bulgarian migrants were not discriminated against in Germany in terms of access to rights, actual use of rights, equal treatment and acceptance in society. Persons not willing to naturalise were more sceptical, and a higher proportion felt that Bulgarians were discriminated against. For instance, 18 percent of persons interested in naturalisation believed that Bulgarians had access to their rights to the same level as all other EU citizens, as opposed to only 5 percent of those not willing to naturalise.

Bulgarians have equal chances of participating in the core areas of life compared to persons of German origin (e.g. labour market, education).

17%

27%

Bulgarians are treated equally to German citizens. 4% 9% 8%

Bulgarians are just as welcome in Germany as all other EU citizens. Bulgarians have the same access to their rights as all other EU citizens do.

6%

11%

16%

13%

23%

27%

12%

21%

20%

52%

37%

13%

29%

29%

25%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Fully agree

Somewhat agree

Neutral

Somewhat disagree

Fully disagree

Figure 7.10 Discrimination against Bulgarian migrants. (Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample; Basis: All respondents excluding German citizens who acquired citizenship before 2007, n = 373)

According to the factor analysis, the scale is unidimensional. Based on that, both Likert scales seem to be appropriate. An index for each set of questions was created considering the response to each of the items.

180

7.4.3

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Regression Analysis on Naturalisation Intentions

As discussed in section 7.3, several legal, symbolic, settlement and sociodemographic factors influence intentions to naturalise. Section 7.4.2 presented descriptive results from the survey among Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg. They point to differences between migrants willing to naturalise and those not willing in terms of age, gender and education, but also in relation to length of residence, intention to remain and intensity of private contacts with Germans. Both groups differ in their knowledge of EU citizenship rights and perceptions of the consequences of EU citizenship. Differences also exist in terms of perceived group discrimination and perceived negative attitudes towards foreigners in Germany. Which of these determinants significantly influences the intention to naturalise was investigated in a multivariate procedure. First, results from a binary logistic regression on the intention of Bulgarians in Hamburg to naturalise are presented. Second, there is an exploration of which block of factors—legal aspects, symbolic aspects, settlement aspects or socio-demographic characteristics—most influence the inclination to naturalise. Results from the regression analysis Multivariate analysis allows for controlling for a variety of factors that influence naturalisation intentions. Several factors were tested in a binary logistic regression. Data stemmed from the time-location sampling survey with 401 respondents in Hamburg, where 11.6 percent held German citizenship. After data processing, the logistic regression included 351 respondents.19 Survey respondents who declared that they were unwilling to naturalise or were undecided comprise the group ‘persons not willing to naturalise’. Respondents who reported having naturalised after 2007, being in the process of naturalising or being interested in naturalisation comprise the group ‘persons willing to naturalise’.20 The dependent variable has the value 0 (no intention to naturalise) or 1 (intention to naturalise). The independent variables used for the logistic regression are presented in Annexe C–5. Table 7.3 summarises the variables that significantly influence the intention to naturalise, whereas Table 7.4 presents complete results from the regression analysis. 19 Due to missing answers to individual questions, 20 persons cannot be considered in the regression analysis. 20 Research shows that migrants who are naturalised and migrants who express the intention to naturalise are more similar to each other and differ from migrants who do not want to acquire German citizenship (Constant et al. 2009).

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Table 7.3 Significant determinants of the intention to naturalise Factor

Significance

Interpretation

Knowledge about EU citizenship *** rights

Knowledge of every additional EU citizenship right increases the inclination to naturalise by 5.5 percentage points.

Perceived value of EU citizenship for the community

**

Perception of EU citizenship as granting more rights to Bulgarians increases the inclination to naturalise by 4.6 percentage points.

Importance of dual citizenship

***

Attaching importance to retention of Bulgarian citizenship increases the inclination to naturalise by 6.2 percentage points.

Perceived negative attitudes towards foreigners

***

Perceived negative attitudes towards foreigners in Germany increases the inclination to naturalise by 14.8 percentage points.

Importance of affiliation with Germany

***

Attaching importance to affiliation with Germany decreases the inclination to naturalise by 6.3% points.

Length of residence

***

Every additional year of residence increases the inclination to naturalise by 1.3 percentage points.

Intention to remain (permanently)

***

Intention to remain in Germany permanently increases the inclination to naturalise by 27.3 percentage points.

Importance of long-term settlement

***

Attaching importance to long-term settlement in Germany increases the inclination to naturalise by 14.4 percentage points. (continued)

By and large, the regression model confirms the assumption that legal, symbolic and settlement aspects correlate with the inclination of Bulgarian migrants to naturalise (see Table 7.3). It was hypothesised that knowledge about EU citizenship rights and perception of EU citizenship status influence the intention to naturalise. The survey results reveal a significant but rather small influence of these determinants. The perceived value of EU citizenship to the individual has no

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Table 7.3 (continued) Factor

Significance

Interpretation

Private contacts with persons of German origin (rare)

***

Rarely being in contact with persons of German origin increases the inclination to naturalise by 23.8 percentage points.

Age

**

Every additional year of age increases the inclination to naturalise by 0.06 percentage points.

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

impact. Contrary to expectations, knowledge about EU citizenship rights and the perceived value of EU citizenship for the community show a positive relationship to the intention to naturalise. This finding implies that being aware of EU citizenship rights in the receiving country and considering EU citizenship as valuable for the Bulgarian community is associated with a higher willingness to naturalise. How can this striking finding be explained? It can be assumed that migrants who are well informed about their EU citizenship rights are also aware of the advantages of national citizenship in the country of residence. The advantages of national citizenship persist despite the indisputable benefits of EU citizenship. Migrants who attach greater importance to the opportunity to retain their original citizenship are more willing to naturalise. However, the effect is rather small. Persons who perceive dual citizenship as an important motive for naturalisation are 6 percentage points more likely to be interested in citizenship acquisition than those who do not see dual citizenship as a chief motive for naturalisation. This result confirms the positive relationship between dual citizenship and the inclination to naturalise but points to a relatively smaller influence compared to other determinants. Results regarding symbolic aspects point to a strong and highly significant influence of discrimination and feelings of attachment to Germany but, contrary to expectations, reveal the negative impact of the latter. Only one aspect of discrimination—perceived negative attitudes towards foreigners in general—has a positive and statistically significant influence and thus supports the inclination to naturalise. Migrants who believe that in Germany people of non-German origin are not fairly treated are 15 percentage points more likely to be interested in naturalisation. Perceived group discrimination against the Bulgarian community is also positively related to a willingness to acquire German citizenship but is

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not statistically significant, meaning that this factor is not influential. Citizenship acquisition can thus be seen as a mechanism for overcoming general discrimination based on nationality rather than status inconsistency due to discrimination against Bulgarian migrants as EU citizens. Remarkably, feelings of attachment to Germany have a negative relation to the intention to naturalise. This finding seems to contradict the expectation that persons who feel attached to Germany would be more interested in German citizenship. However, the questions do not capture the level of attachment of the individual to the locality but the importance of attachment as a motive for or against naturalisation. Migrants who regard feelings of attachment as important when considering naturalisation are less inclined to naturalise. This can be interpreted as a sign that those persons do not feel sufficiently attached to Germany and are thus not willing to naturalise. Inversely, migrants who do not express great importance to attachment to the locality are more inclined to naturalise. It can therefore be plausibly concluded that for Bulgarian migrants willing to naturalise, feelings of attachment to Germany play a minor role and those who rate attachment as important are more reluctant to express interest in citizenship acquisition. The survey reveals a strong and highly significant influence of settlement aspects. The intention to remain permanently in Germany and rare private contacts are strong determinants of the propensity to naturalise. Persons who intend to stay permanently in Germany are 27 percentage points more likely to be interested in citizenship acquisition than those who intend to stay for several years. Respondents who rarely have private contacts with persons of German origin are 24 percentage points more likely to be willing to naturalise than the reference category, those with daily contacts. Contrary to expectations, persons who rarely have private contacts with Germans are more interested in German citizenship than those who have daily private contacts. An explanation could be that those people are interested in having frequent contacts with Germans and regard German citizenship as an instrument for achieving this. Increasing length of residence and seeing one’s future as being in Germany also positively influence the intention to naturalise. Persons who declared that seeing their future as being in Germany is an important motive for naturalisation were more inclined to naturalise. This finding indicates that long-term settlement is an essential driver of naturalisation. Except for a weakly significant negative relationship between age and naturalisation intentions, no relationship between socio-demographic characteristics and naturalisation intentions is observed.

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Table 7.4 Intention to naturalise: full results of logistic regression Intention to naturalise (no = 0; yes = 1) Variables

Regression coefficient

Odds ratio

Average marginal effect

Knowledge of EU citizenship rights

0.395

1.484***

0.055***

Perceived value of EU citizenship for the community

0.330

1.391**

0.046**

Perceived value of EU citizenship for the individual

0.029

1.029

0.004

Importance of dual citizenship

0.450

1.569***

0.062***

Legal aspects

Symbolic aspects Perceived group discrimination

0.072

1.075*

0.010

Perceived negative attitudes towards foreigners

1.073

2.924***

0.148***

−0.455

0.634***

−0.063***

0.092

1.097***

0.013***

Importance of attachment to Germany Settlement aspects Length of residence

Intention to remain (ref: Several years) Permanent

1.885

6.585***

0.273***

Undecided

0.272

1.312

0.039

Importance of long-term settlement in Germany

1.040

2.829***

0.144***

Private contacts with persons of German origin (ref: Daily) Weekly

0.408

1.504

0.055

Rarely

1.782

5.942***

0.238***

1.573

0.062

Socio-demographic characteristics Gender (ref: Male)

0.453

(continued)

7.4 Naturalisation Practices of Bulgarian Migrants in Hamburg

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Table 7.4 (continued) Intention to naturalise (no = 0; yes = 1) Variables

Regression coefficient

Odds ratio

Average marginal effect

Age

−0.040

0.961**

−0.006**

−0.578

0.561

−0.081

0.220

1.246

0.031

Education (ref: Low) Medium High Constant

−8.301

N

351

Pseudo

R2

McFadden

0.379

Pseudo R2 Cox & Snell

0.407

Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke

0.545

Classification results (hit ratio in %)

80.4

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample. Level of significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Robustness check and goodness of fit A model that tests other relevant variables that may be related to the probability of naturalisation allows for checking the quality of the initial model. The tested variables are language skills, ethnicity, income, German schooling, being born in Germany, age at migration, German language skills, family status, having children, and the intensity of private contacts with Bulgarians. No statistically significant results for the tested variables were found, and no changes in the results occur, showing the stability of the model. Next, the overall fit of the logistic regression model was investigated based on the following statistical measures of the goodness of fit: Pseudo R2 statistics, classification results and Hosmer-Lemeshow test. Three indexes of goodness of fit give indications of quality of the model: McFaddens-R2 , Cox and Snell-R2 and Nagelkerke-R2 . Pseudo R2 statistics define values higher than 0.4 for Cox and Snell-R2 as good, and values higher than 0.5 for Nagelkerke-R2 and higher than 0.2 for McFadden-R2 as very good (Backhaus 2011). All indexes from the regression analysis—McFaddens-R2 (0.379), Cox and Snell-R2 (0.407) and Nagelkerke-R2 (0.545)—show that the model is of very good quality. Finally, a Hosmer-Lemeshow test was run. Following Backhaus (2011), the Chi-square value should be low, and the significance level greater than 70%. The Chi-square

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value is 3.349, with a level of significance 0.911, which shows that the model is of good quality. Comparing the four groups of determinants Separate regression models allowed for an indication of the individual relevance of the four groups of variables. The regression analysis was thus repeated including only one group of variables each time in the following order: Model 2 for settlement aspects, Model 3 for legal aspects, Model 4 for symbolic aspects and Model 5 for socio-demographic characteristics. The values of the Pseudo R2 of these models, which are a measure of the quality of the model, were compared. As Table 7.5 indicates, the R2 values of the individual models 2, 3, 4 and 5 show that intention to naturalise is mostly explained by settlement aspects. This result implies that intention to naturalise is mostly determined by aspects that are not directly related to the legal status of the individual. The more settled the migrant, the greater the interest in citizenship acquisition. Legal aspects are also important determinants of naturalisation. The finding that knowledge about EU citizenship rights and perception of this legal status as valuable go hand in hand with a higher willingness to naturalise indicates that migrants still attach importance to national citizenship in the receiving country despite the almost full-fledged legal rights and entitlements of EU citizens. Symbolic aspects and background characteristics explain to a lesser extent the naturalisation intentions of Bulgarian migrants. Table 7.5 Impact of individual groups of variables on the intention to naturalise

Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke

Model 2 Settlement aspects

Model 3 Legal aspects

Model 4 Symbolic aspects

Model 5 Background characteristics

0.370

0.077

0.045

0.052

Source: Bulgarians in Hamburg Survey 2013, weighted sample.

7.5

Summary

Naturalisation statistics reveal a considerably higher interest among Bulgarian migrants in German citizenship compared to other EU citizens. Despite holding EU citizenship status with full-fledged EU citizenship rights, Bulgarian migrants

7.5 Summary

187

have exceptionally high naturalisation rates. This discrepancy calls into question expectations about the naturalisation behaviour of EU citizens. A plausible explanation could be the different migration experience of Bulgarians compared to previous EU migrants. Old EU citizens such as Italians and Greeks have a long-term generational experience of residence in Germany without becoming German citizens. Furthermore, their employment relations in the 1970s and 1980s were characterised by a high level of stability, for example in terms of job tenure. The average job tenure of migrants in the early 1990s was long and comparable to that of Germans: 7.3 years for Greek and Italian migrants, and 9.1 years for Spanish migrants (Thränhardt et al. 1994). Social welfare organisations such as the Caritas Association, Diakonie and the Workers’ Welfare Association (Arbeiterwohlfahrt) provided crucial support (Thränhardt 2009) and thus contributed to a stable framework for migrants. Their relatively good integration in the labour market and welfare system might have reduced incentives to naturalise. Bulgarian migrants as a community with relatively short-term experience in Germany lack such long-term generational experience. They have to manage in a completely different environment that is characterised by a high level of legal uncertainty created by restricted labour market access and the high flexibility of the labour market, which has been established since the 2000s. Legal uncertainty also exists in the social area. Access to the welfare system was politically highly contested in the 2010s and was eventually restricted by law. A federal law at the end of 2016 limited access for job seekers and inactive persons from EU countries in the first five years of their residence. Full legal integration through naturalisation thus appears more appealing to Bulgarians. This assumption is mirrored in the main motives for naturalisation expressed by respondents in the migrant survey. They associate German citizenship with practical advantages, such as secure residence status, better economic prospects and better travel opportunities. These advantages are, in fact, not unconditional and may be lost in cases of absence from the country or as a result of political changes. An example is the recent decision of the UK to leave the EU, which has motivated many British citizens to naturalise. Furthermore, being citizens of a former communist country, Bulgarians may perceive EU citizenship as a fragile legal status. People that underwent the end of the Communist Bloc after 1989 may view the European Union as unstable and likely to break up in the future, which would consequently dissolve EU citizenship. Indeed, when asked whether the EU will exist in 25 years, a quarter of respondents were sceptical and believed that the EU would not exist in 25 years. For them, EU citizenship is a fragile status and this may facilitate naturalisation.

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The migrant survey revealed that many individual determinants matter for naturalisation intentions. What most explains the willingness to acquire German citizenship are indicators of permanent settlement: the intention to remain in the country in the long run and the importance attached to long-term settlement. People willing to settle were also willing to naturalise. The survey further confirmed that the possibility of retaining citizenship of the country of origin eases the decision to naturalise. As also shown by naturalisation data, most of the naturalised persons retained Bulgarian citizenship.21 Dual citizenship is thus definitely a decisive factor contributing to more naturalisation decisions. However, the dual citizenship policy applies to all EU citizens but did not lead to a considerable increase in their naturalisation rates. Knowledge and perception of EU citizenship may provide an explanation for the differences between Bulgarian migrants and other EU citizens. It is assumed that as recent EU citizens, Bulgarians are not aware of their rights or do not consider them to be valuable, which creates incentives to naturalise. The survey did not confirm this assumption. There is a relation between EU citizenship and naturalisation, but it is instead a positive one. Being aware of EU citizenship rights and regarding them as valuable results in greater interest in German citizenship. What does this finding imply for the relationship between EU and national citizenship? EU citizenship is not going to make national citizenship obsolete, as the survey among Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg shows. Despite the indisputable benefits of EU citizenship, several advantages of national citizenship in the receiving country seem to remain and create incentives for the naturalisation of EU citizens. National citizenship is assumed to be of particular relevance for EU migrants who consider returning to their country of origin for lengthy periods of time. National citizenship serves as an instrument for securing rights and taking advantage of them in case of remigration. Despite a positive perception of EU citizenship, experiences of discrimination against EU citizens may influence willingness to naturalise. Bulgarian migrants have been confronted with discrimination more often than EU migrants from the EU15 countries. Discrimination is associated particularly with restricted freedom of work through transitional periods and controversial debates on the integration of EU2 migrants in Germany. Indeed, the majority of respondents perceived that Bulgarian migrants were discriminated against in terms of access to their rights as EU citizens, acceptance in society, equal treatment and equal participation 21 In 2014, 98.9 percent of naturalised Bulgarians retained their Bulgarian citizenship (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2015b). This corresponds to the general trend for EU citizens, who usually retain their original citizenship.

7.5 Summary

189

chances. However, multivariate analysis showed that this perceived discrimination against Bulgarians does not significantly influence naturalisation. What influences the inclination to naturalise much more is perceived general discrimination against foreigners in Germany. Thus German citizenship is seen as a tool for crossing the boundary between foreigners and Germans rather than for overcoming the status inconsistency of Bulgarians as EU citizens. Naturalisation means full legal integration in the receiving country. It creates prerequisites for successful integration in the labour market and political life, and is thus a decisive step towards broader societal integration. Legal integration through German citizenship is a distinct pattern for the Bulgarian migrant population that distinguishes it from other EU citizens, particularly those from the old EU member states. Their exceptional willingness to naturalise points to a considerably high willingness of Bulgarians to participate in society. The inclination to naturalise is determined by a mix of settlement, legal and symbolic factors. Amongst them, the wish to settle in the long run, the favourable citizenship policies in terms of dual citizenship and the perception of discrimination against foreign nationals in Germany are most relevant. To what extent these factors are relevant for EU citizens in general and what can motivate EU citizens to naturalise is to be empirically explored in future studies. Naturalisation research repeatedly shows the indisputable advantages of naturalisation for the individual and society. In this light, the naturalisation practices of EU citizens deserve much more scientific attention than they have received until now. In particular, the reasons for and consequences of low naturalisation rates of EU citizens need to be thoroughly studied.

8

Conclusion: The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession

The EU accession in 2007 changed patterns of mobility and integration of Bulgarian migrants in Germany considerably. While some effects of EU accession have received much attention in the public discourse, others have remained almost unnoticed. For example, integration failures, such as homelessness and precarious working conditions among Bulgarian migrants, have attracted much more attention than integration successes, such as high naturalisation rates. Thus the image of Bulgarian migration as a threat has been established in the public discourse since 2007. Given the one-sided perception of Bulgarian migration to Germany, I sought to scrutinise more thoroughly and explain the distinct patterns of migration and integration of Bulgarians since 2007. In this concluding chapter, I summarise the main findings of the study and present survey-based evidence on the effects of EU accession on migration, labour market integration, political participation and naturalisation of Bulgarian migrants in Germany (section 8.1). Then, I compare the eastern enlargement in 2007 with previous EU enlargements and explain the severe backlash against EU2 migration in Germany in the 2010s (section 8.1). Finally, I outline the need for future research on EU migration (section 8.3) and discuss policy options for future EU enlargements (section 8.4).

8.1

Bulgarian Migration to Germany since 2007 Revisited

Many trends of migration and integration since 2007 apply to both of the EU2 countries Bulgaria and Romania: increasing mobility and registered migrant population, difficulties in the housing and labour market areas and high naturalisation rates. Despite these similarities, the two countries differ in their population structure and migration relations with Germany, which may have influenced © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 V. Kovacheva, The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33110-8_8

191

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Conclusion: The Unnoticed Effects of EU Accession

developments after EU accession. To minimise the impact of these countryspecific features on the analysis of the effects of EU accession, I decided to focus on one of the EU2 countries—Bulgaria. Two reasons motivated the choice of Bulgaria. First, Bulgaria sends more migrants in relation to its population compared to Romania. Second, research on Bulgarian migration is still scarce, although Germany has traditionally been a leading destination country for Bulgarian migrants. Besides the trends of increasing migration and difficulties in the labour market area, the study explored aspects that have received little scientific attention until now: electoral participation and the naturalisation practices of Bulgarian migrants. The study thus provided a more comprehensive understanding of post-accession migration from Bulgaria to Germany and the transition of Bulgarian migrants from third-country nationals into EU citizens after EU enlargement. Survey-based evidence on post-accession migration To explain the distinct features of Bulgarian migration to Germany since 2007, I analysed various sources: relevant literature, administrative data and original data from my own migrant survey. The migrant survey took place at the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013 among migrants of Bulgarian origin in Hamburg. It was based on a time-location sampling technique that consists of randomly interviewing people at selected meeting points. Meeting points in Hamburg, such as the Bulgarian Orthodox church, the Bulgarian school, a Bulgarian shop, a Bulgarian restaurant, a Bulgarian folk dance group, etc., were visited, and visitors were asked to fill out a standardised questionnaire. In total, 401 Bulgarian migrants participated in the survey and gave information about their socio-demographic characteristics and experiences as EU citizens: their migration and labour market experiences, voting intentions, naturalisation practices, and knowledge about and perception of EU citizenship. I selected time-location sampling as it has two key advantages compared to other sampling techniques (see chapter 3). First, it allowed for a probability sample to be drawn from the population of Bulgarian background. To make sure that each member of the target population had a non-zero chance of participating in the study, a wide set of meeting points of relevance for the Bulgarian population was selected. The meeting points were regularly visited over a long period to increase the probability of inclusion, and visitors were asked to participate at random. The initial sampling bias due to different individual probabilities of inclusion in the survey was addressed ex post by applying an inverse weighting procedure. Based on the weighted sample, inferences could be drawn about the overall Bulgarian population in Hamburg.

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Second, time-location sampling allowed for the capture of the population of Bulgarian background at the local level in the absence of a proper sampling frame. Besides Bulgarian citizens registered with the local registration offices, two further groups belong to the population of Bulgarian background but are scarcely captured in administrative data and migrant surveys: unregistered persons and naturalised persons. The time-location sampling method allowed for the successful capture of both hard-to-reach groups and revealed 12 per cent unregistered and 11 per cent naturalised persons. The high proportion of both groups among the Bulgarian migrant population in Hamburg points to the urgent need for their inclusion in future studies. The successful conduct of a time-location sampling survey among Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg shows that its application in the German context is possible. Time-location sampling is particularly apt for investigations at the local level and for nationalities or migrant groups for whom a sufficiently broad set of locations for interviewing exists. The technique is associated with a higher level of reliability of research findings compared to non-probability sampling, which scholars commonly use in migration research, and thus has enormous potential for migration research that still has to be explored. Explaining patterns of migration and integration: the role of national policies After a historical overview of Bulgarian migration to Germany (see chapter 2), the study revealed that trends in migration and integration considerably changed after EU accession. Still, some of them have been largely unnoticed. Since 2007, the migratory movements have been dynamic and have contributed to a steadily increasing Bulgarian population in Germany. Labour migration became the main form of mobility, and self-employment had a central role during the transitional periods. Many Bulgarian migrants did find employment in the labour market but showed a high level of vulnerability. Political participation in the sense of electoral participation began, even if at a low level, and naturalisation rates have been high despite EU citizenship. The acquisition of EU citizenship directly contributed to these trends by increasing the legal integration of Bulgarians in the receiving country. EU citizenship means more legal integration in the sense of more legal rights—mobility, economic, social and political—than Bulgarian migrants had in the past. More rights create more opportunities for mobility and participation in the core areas of life, such as the labour market and political life (see more on concepts in section 1.2). However, more legal rights did not automatically lead to more successful participation in society, as the experience in the labour market and political area indicates. It can be concluded that there is not an automatic relation between the

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acquisition of rights and acquisition of positions. Thus EU accession by itself cannot explain the changing patterns of migration and integration since 2007. The new trends in migration and integration after EU accession are a result of the interaction between particular institutional arrangements in Germany and the country-specific characteristics of Bulgaria as a sending country. The process of establishment of the Bulgarian community in Germany had a central role in shaping the new trends in migration since 2007. The establishment of the Bulgarian community started in the early 1990s but took place at a slow pace because of restrictive migration policies. EU accession facilitated the process of establishment considerably as it enabled more permanent settlement and naturalisations than in the past. Institutional arrangements, such as national policies related to EU citizenship, proved to affect the mobility and participation of Bulgarian migrants more considerably than Bulgaria’s country-specific characteristics. These are in particular the transitional periods in the freedom of work, the dual citizenship policy and the laissez-faire policy related to electoral participation of EU citizens. They encouraged irregularities in the labour market, high naturalisation rates and low electoral participation of Bulgarian migrants. As Romanian migration shows comparable trends of problematic labour market integration and high naturalisation rates, it can be assumed that national policies affected the other 2007 EU accession country similarly. Scope of migration: new emigration as one of several reasons for the migration wave EU accession triggered a new migration wave from Bulgaria to Germany with a significant and enduring increase in migration. Newly induced emigration from Bulgaria has enhanced the scope of migration since 2007 significantly. The study revealed that new migration from the country of origin took place, but that fears of excessive postponed emigration did not come true. In the migrant survey in Hamburg, new migration from Bulgaria accounted for less than half of post-accession migration (see chapter 4). Two other factors contributed to a similar extent to the increase but are usually disregarded. First, redirection of Bulgarian migration from other EU countries took place during the global financial crisis. In contrast to other EU migrants who tended to return to their countries of origin during the global financial crisis, Bulgarian migrants largely moved from crisis countries, such as Spain, Italy and Greece, to Germany. This experience suggests that free movement unfolded its positive effects for intra-EU mobility in a time of crisis. It allowed EU migrants

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to adjust to worsening economic conditions in crisis countries and to freely move to non-crisis countries. Second, the renewed migration of persons with pre-accession experience in Germany contributed to increased migration since 2007. EU citizenship abolished the requirement for a residence permit for Bulgarian migrants, and the legal reason for using circular migration to cope with legal regulations fell away. Thus previously unregistered migrants became able to obtain regular residence status more easily than in the past and were captured in administrative data for the first time. This registration effect of EU citizenship acquisition was most influential in the early years after EU accession. Furthermore, previous circular migrants who had practised back-and-forth movements between Germany and Bulgaria to cope with legal regulations on regular residence became able to settle more permanently. This settlement effect of EU citizenship acquisition has been largely neglected because of the increased temporary and circular movements in the context of free movement. However, the settlement effect of EU accession is considered to be strong and has considerable implications for the migration pattern in the long run. Structure of migration: migrants’ characteristics predominantly favourable for integration EU accession triggered significant shifts in the structure of Bulgarian migration, in particular in terms of education, ethnic belonging and motives for migration. Some groups gained in importance, and other groups became less relevant, which points much more to structural changes in the migration pattern than to its diversification. Diversification in the sense of inclusion of new groups that did not migrate in the past seems to be less relevant. Free movement eased the migration of low-skilled persons who had few legal opportunities for migration in the past. As a consequence, many low-educated persons have arrived since 2007. Given the predominantly high-skilled migration before EU accession, the current qualification structure of the Bulgarian migrant population has an hourglass structure. It has a high proportion of people with low education (i.e. without vocational training) and high education (i.e. with academic education). The medium level of non-academics with vocational training is underrepresented. Migration of ethnic minorities has increased since 2007 and the image of ethnic migration has dominated in German media. The migrant survey confirmed the great relevance of ethnic minorities, with at least one-third of the Bulgarians in Hamburg belonging to an ethnic minority group (see chapter 4). In contrast to the perception of predominantly Roma migration, the Turkish ethnic minority

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outnumbers the Roma minority. Bulgarian Turks are over-represented compared to their share of the population in Bulgaria while the proportion of Roma corresponds to their relative importance in the Bulgarian population. This finding is to be attributed to the sizeable Turkish-speaking community in Germany that may provide crucial support to Bulgarian Turks and Turkish-speaking Roma in their first years of residence. The study thus indicates that a common language plays a decisive role in facilitating ethnic migration from Bulgaria. The background characteristics of the Bulgarian migrant population remain relatively favourable for their integration: a high proportion of persons of main working age, students and the highly educated. The relatively favourable characteristics are, to a large extent, due to the high relevance of educational migration, which has been a distinct feature of Bulgarian migration to Germany over time. Since 2007, work has mostly motivated Bulgarians to move to Germany. In contrast to the conventional wisdom that unemployed and inactive people leave Bulgaria, the migrant survey showed that the sizable majority of respondents had work in Bulgaria or migrated directly after having completed their studies. Thus migration proved to fit less the commonly assumed pattern of poverty migration, and much more the pattern of labour migration. Free movement promotes temporary and circular movements, giving rise to arguments to call EU citizens practising freedom of movement movers instead of migrants. In line with expectations, Bulgarians migrants practiced predominantly temporary and circular migration after EU accession and have relatively short-term lengths of residence in Germany. In this regard, they undoubtedly constitute European movers. People with short lengths of residence often lack country-specific knowledge and German language skills, which may be a barrier to their integration. However, length of residence as an indicator of duration of migration neglects migrants’ long-term orientations to settle. Short-term residents may intend to settle permanently. According to the migrant survey, almost half of the Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg have long-term orientations to settle permanently in Germany. Post-accession migration has thus evolved a pattern of classical migration of permanent settlement that favours a high level of integration into society. The dynamic migratory movements in the first years after EU accession that characterise Bulgarian migration are known from previous EU enlargements as well, for example in the 1980s. In contrast to them, a sizeable proportion of Bulgarian migrants settled in Germany and the Bulgarian population has considerably increased. This development is part of the broader process of establishment of the Bulgarian community in Germany and is also known in other new migrant communities. Germany has been among the most preferred destinations for Bulgarian

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migrants for decades, and a small Bulgarian community lived in Germany before EU accession. After EU accession, it constituted an important network for new migrants. EU citizenship enhanced the previously limited legal opportunities for regular migration and permanent settlement and thus enabled the establishment of a substantial Bulgarian community. Apart from networks, the economic situation in Bulgaria strongly facilitated migration. Despite positive macroeconomic development in the 2000s, Bulgaria continues to have the lowest living standard in the EU. Economic reasons still motivate many Bulgarians to emigrate and lead to predominantly labour migration since 2007. Labour market integration: the negative consequences of the transitional periods Bulgarian migrants have been perceived as problematic in terms of labour market integration. The study revealed that their overall labour market integration is better than perceived (see chapter 5). It has been largely neglected that the sizable majority of Bulgarians integrate smoothly into the labour market. They work or study, and only a minority rely entirely on the welfare system, thus contradicting the image of welfare tourism. Integration challenges in the labour market cannot be neglected, but they relate much more to the quality than the level of participation. This means that Bulgarian migrants usually work, but the conditions of their employment raise concern. Many migrants work below their level of qualification and have a low income, which makes them likely to become dependent on welfare benefits, such as income support for persons on low incomes. Indeed, the proportion of Bulgarian workers that claim benefits to compensate for low incomes has increased disproportionally compared to that of persons claiming unemployment benefits (Martinsen and Werner 2018). Furthermore, working conditions may fall short of labour standards prescribed in labour law. Almost every second Bulgarian migrant with experience in the German labour market had been confronted with a violation of basic labour standards at least once after EU accession, as the migrant survey in Hamburg showed. For example, they were not paid for a couple of days or even months, or had to work considerably longer than agreed. This high percentage reveals the high level of vulnerability of Bulgarian migrants in the German labour market. Their vulnerable situation is visible in low wages, employment far below their qualification level and violations of core labour rights. The extended social rights that Bulgarians enjoy as EU citizens in Germany may contribute to reducing this vulnerability, but the actual use of social rights has been highly contested, in particular access to welfare benefits for job seekers and homeless people.

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The study provided empirical evidence that the transitional periods—restricting the right to be employed—substantially contributed to the vulnerability of Bulgarian migrants in the labour market. The work permit requirement significantly increased the individual probability of self-employment, undeclared work and violations of labour rights, as statistical analysis showed (see multivariate analysis in chapter 5). Self-employment among Bulgarian migrants during the transitional periods in the freedom of work was often involuntary. It constituted much more a way of circumventing restricted labour market access than the free choice of the individual. Therefore, labour market restrictions redirected labour market participation to more unfavourable forms rather than prevented them. Disadvantaged labour market participation raised concerns not only about the situation of migrants but also the impact on the German labour market and social system. In the 1980s, Greek, Spanish and Portuguese migrants were affected by transitional periods, but no similar trend of a high level of vulnerability of workers emerged. The relatively better labour market integration of EU migrants in the 1980s is to be attributed to different institutional settings at that time. The German corporatist system until the 1990s was characterised by a high level of stability of employment relations and inclusion in the welfare system, and the labour market integration of EU migrants thus took place smoothly in this well-regulated system (Thränhardt 1999b; 2006). In the 1980s and early 1990s, EU migrants enjoyed a high level of protection in the workplace, equal standards with German workers and were largely integrated into the welfare system. Since the 1990s, the German labour market has been characterised by increasing flexibility in the sense of more flexible working arrangements and by a growing low-wage sector. Bulgarian migrants find employment in this flexible labour market that, to a large extent, explains the differences in their labour market positions compared to their counterparts in the 1980s. Political integration: high mobilisation potential of Bulgarian migrants as voters With EU citizenship acquisition, Bulgarian migrants obtained electoral rights in Germany for the first time. This enfranchisement paved the way for their political participation, which, however, remains little studied and mostly unknown. It is well known that EU citizens tend to use their voting rights at the local level modestly. The Hamburg study confirmed this trend for Bulgarian migrants as well: only every fourth Bulgarian would vote if municipal elections were held next week. Low interest in municipal elections is closely related to limited awareness of voting rights. Knowledge about voting rights is a significant determinant of voting intentions, as multivariate analysis showed, and the level of awareness among Bulgarians is low (see chapter 6). Only a minority know about their voting

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rights in municipal elections, and the proportion of voters among them is higher than among those unaware of their electoral rights. Irrespective of insufficient knowledge about their electoral rights, the main barrier to voting for Bulgarian migrants is a lack of knowledge about German parties and their programmes. This finding shows a substantial potential for mobilisation of Bulgarian migrants as voters that has not yet been utilised. There have been a few attempts to mobilise EU migrants as voters in municipal elections in general, and the laissez-faire approach related to the electoral participation of EU migrants is closely related to their overall low level of electoral participation. In line with previous research, German citizenship proved to be the most important determinant of migrants’ voting intentions. Naturalised persons are more interested in elections than Bulgarian citizens, as the migrant survey in Hamburg showed. Thus full legal integration through naturalisation goes hand in hand with more political participation. Nevertheless, this finding does not mean that the franchise of foreign nationals does not matter. On the contrary, the very fact of being enfranchised is the biggest motivation for Bulgarian migrants to vote, irrespective of their legal status as German or foreign nationals. This finding implies that the franchise itself is a powerful driving force for the electoral participation of EU citizens and supports voices pleading for the enfranchisement of non-EU migrants at the local level. Naturalisation: high willingness to naturalise as a sign of successful settlement It is commonly believed that their almost equal rights to German nationals create disincentives for EU citizens to naturalise. EU citizenship acquisition thus should have discouraged Bulgarian migrants from naturalising. In contrast to these expectations, 41 per cent of the survey respondents were interested in German citizenship. As shown in chapter 7, Bulgarian migrants have much higher naturalisation rates than other EU nationalities. The naturalisation rates have increased since 2007, which can, to a high degree, be attributed to a ‘naturalisation hump’. Migrants who did not want to renounce their Bulgarian citizenship in the past decided to naturalise after the dual citizenship policy came into force for EU citizens in Germany in 2007. The introduction of the dual citizenship policy coincided with EU accession. The dual citizenship policy for EU citizens considerably supports naturalisation but cannot alone explain the extraordinary willingness of Bulgarians to naturalise. As multivariate analysis revealed, permanent settlement in the country is the main explanatory factor of the willingness of Bulgarian migrants to naturalise. Permanent settlement is indicated by a good command of German, a long length of residence and intention to remain in the long run. Despite the indisputable

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positive impact of EU citizenship on the individual, it neither replaces national citizenship nor makes it obsolete. Full legal integration through naturalisation remains of relevance, particularly for permanent settlers who expect practical advantages from the German passport, such as better job opportunities and secure residence status. The study showed that perceived discrimination against foreign nationals is a further decisive determinant of naturalisation, showing that German citizenship is considered a mechanism for overcoming discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Despite their status as EU citizens, Bulgarian migrants in Hamburg perceived discrimination as highly relevant for their situation. Only a minority of respondents agreed that Bulgarians have equal access to their rights compared to other EU citizens, are just as welcome as all other EU citizens and are treated equally to German citizens. These findings hinted at a high level of insecurity and discrimination, which motivate Bulgarians to naturalise. Full political rights are of minor relevance, despite the fact that this is usually assumed for EU citizens interested in naturalisation. The extraordinary willingness of Bulgarian migrants to naturalise is a sign of their successful settlement in Germany and of a great willingness to participate in society. Naturalisation seems to be less motived by alienation from the country of origin than can be assumed for countries with low economic development, political instability and a high level of corruption. The fact that almost all naturalised persons retain their Bulgarian citizenship hints at its relevance for the individual. Retention of Bulgarian citizenship is an expression of willingness to maintain the rights and symbolic membership of the country of origin in case of return. Similarly, German citizenship proves to be a mechanism for securing rights in Germany in case of prolonged absence from the country. For the majority, the possibility of maintaining rights already acquired in Germany in case of prolonged absence from the country is an essential motive for naturalisation. Thus, even in the context of free movement with the right of free entry and residence, the legal rights attached to national citizenship of the country of origin and residence constitute a great advantage of dual citizenship and motivate EU citizens to naturalise. Although EU citizenship has indisputable benefits for the individual, the legal security attached to national citizenship still creates strong incentives for recent EU citizens to naturalise.

8.2 The Backlash against EU2 Migration in Germany

8.2

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The Backlash against EU2 Migration in Germany

In Germany, the EU enlargements have usually sparked a backlash against migration from EU accession countries. Fears of excessive migration appeared in the 1950s when Germany was afraid of an influx of Italian migrants, and later in the 1980s, when Greece (1981), and Spain and Portugal (1986) joined the EU. In the 1980s, these fears led to restrictions on the freedom of work for mobile EU citizens for the first time. Once in the country, EU migrants were considered to be capable of smoothly integrating into German society. Even when they faced integration challenges in the past, for example as the children of Italian migrants did, the public did not take much notice of these challenges (Thränhardt 2002). In the 1990s, many EU migrants worked below the prevailing wages and under exploitative working conditions in the construction sector and outcompeted local workers (Thränhardt 2002; Hunger 2000, 2001). As a consequence, concerns about the labour market integration of EU migrants emerged and triggered the first critical debate on EU migration in Germany since 1968 (Thränhardt 1999b). The eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007 revived common concerns about excessive migration after EU accession and problematic integration in the labour market. However, the discussions on the consequences of the eastern EU enlargements were controversial as never before (Kroh 2005).1 The critical discussions on EU migration intensified significantly after Bulgaria and Romania became EU member states in 2007. In 2013, the Association of German Cities warned that German cities had experienced ‘considerable migration’ from the EU2 countries, and the ‘considerable problems of a large part of the migrants are not to be neglected by referring to well-integrated Romanians and Bulgarians’ (Association of German Cities 2013). A controversial debate on poverty migration (Armutszuwanderung) and welfare tourism (Sozialtourismus) from Bulgaria and Romania started and shaped the public discourse substantially in this decade. The debate on poverty migration increased in intensity so much that welfare tourism (Sozialtourismus) was selected as the ugliest word of the year in 2013 (Unwort des Jahres).2 Media coverage on EU2 migration in the 2010s has been dominated by topics such as low-skilled migration, excessive reception and abuse of welfare 1 The

Nordic EU enlargement involving Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 went virtually unnoticed. Neither did concerns about migration arise, nor were transitional periods in the freedom of work introduced. This can be attributed to the high economic standard of the accession countries and their overall positive perception in German society. 2 An article from 14.01.2014 ‘Sprachbewusstsein: “Sozialtourismus” ist Unwort des Jahres’; https://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/sprachbewusstsein-sozialtourismus-ist-unwortdes-jahres-12751032.html, checked on 11.09.2020.

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benefits, problematic integration of Roma, homelessness, poor housing conditions, and precarious work. Thus a negative image of Bulgarian and Romanian migration has been established in the German media (Wagner 2018). Three factors may explain the significant critical stance on EU2 migration in Germany. First, the very nature of the EU enlargements may explain the backlash against migration from new member states. The EU enlargements usually transformed a significant number of people into EU citizens, and this changed the migration space within the Union substantially (on the EU as migration space, see Baganha and Entzinger 2004; King 2002; Koslowski 1998; Recchi 2005). Scholars speak about the internalisation of migration processes through an EU enlargement (Thränhardt 2006). The EU enlargements lead to the ‘inclusion of former outsiders into new insiders’, and this process has been the cause of great controversy in Germany over the decades (Thränhardt 1999a). In the first years after the creation of the European Community in the 1950s, cultural distance from citizens of the member states concerned German society. In particular, the perception of cultural distance from Italians persisted over time, but since the 1990s at the latest, Italians have been accepted as an equal part of European culture (Thränhardt 2006). EU migrants from western European countries were considered more similar than non-EU migrants and were thus associated with a lower likelihood of conflict (Koslowski 1994). In contrast, eastern European migrants faced substantial xenophobia in the 1980s, along with Turks and North Africans (Koslowski 1994). By the end of the Cold War, the status of eastern European migrants had been devalued, and they were conceived of as problem groups (Thränhardt 2002). This perception meant that the inclusion of Bulgarians and Romanians as insiders in the EU was fiercely contested. Second, new patterns of mobility emerged after the 2007 EU enlargement and fuelled the controversial debates on EU2 migration. The 2007 EU accession led to a much higher level of mobility and more permanent settlement of EU citizens than in the past. In the 1980s, the migratory movements from the new member countries Greece, Spain and Portugal were dynamic but predominantly of temporary and circular character. Few Italians moved to Germany in the context of free mobility and only for a short period (Straubhaar 2001; Hille and Straubhaar 2001). In the 1980s as well, Portuguese, Spanish and Greek workers moved to the north in small numbers (Castles et al. 2014; Hille and Straubhaar 2001). The expected flood of new migrants who would stay permanently thus did not materialised. Migration from western European countries to Germany until the 1990s took place mostly in the framework of bilateral agreements that were signed in the period 1950–1970: with Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), and Portugal (1964). Even the extension of freedom of movement rights led to only a slight

8.2 The Backlash against EU2 Migration in Germany

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increase of intra-EU migration in this period (Favell 2008). Migration from EU15 countries in the context of free movement continued at a low level and became positive only after the global financial crisis of 2007. In contrast to the southern EU enlargements in the 1980s, eastern Europeans have extensively used their free movement rights in the 2000s and 2010s. In particular, EU2 migrants have high mobility rates: 20 per cent of the Romanian and 13 per cent of the Bulgarian population aged 20 to 64 were living in another EU member state in 2017. In the year of EU accession, this proportion was much lower: only 7 per cent for Romania and 5 per cent for Bulgaria (Eurostat 2018). Germany became a leading destination country for mobile EU2 citizens. Similar to the southern EU enlargements, the migratory movements from the EU2 countries have been dynamic and predominantly of temporary or circular nature. However, in contrast to the 1980s, net migration has been positive, and the size of the population originating from the EU2 countries has considerably increased in Germany. This large-scale migration has been taking place unmanaged in the context of free movement and fuelled worries about increasing competition in the labour market and stretching local services, such as the welfare system, housing, education and health. Transitional periods for seven years aimed to prevent excessive migration from the new EU member states to the German labour market. Despite these, many EU migrants, in particular from Bulgaria and Romania, moved to Germany and found employment in the labour market. Many EU2 migrants worked in the low-paid sector and under exploitative working conditions, thus fuelling the debate on the labour market integration of EU migrants in Germany. Third, the German experience of previous EU enlargements shows that the mobility and economic rights of EU migrants have caused controversial debates in the past. The 2007 eastern enlargement added a new dimension to the common concerns around EU migration in Germany—the social dimension. EU2 migration fuelled the first critical debate on the social rights of EU migrants in Germany. The increasing levels of welfare benefit claims by EU2 migrants in the early years after EU accession triggered a heated debate about welfare tourism and poverty migration to Germany. The Association of German Cities warned that European poverty migration ‘has never taken place to such a high degree’ and that it posed ‘tremendous challenges’ to German cities (Association of German Cities 2013). Bulgarians and Romanians have been accused of migrating to Germany with the primary aim of taking advantage of the welfare system and even abusing it. EU migrants’ access to welfare benefits became a highly contested issue in the 2010s. In particular, the question of whether job seekers and inactive EU migrants should be entitled to welfare benefits in the first five years of residence led to a

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controversial legal discussion on the social entitlements of EU migrants. German authorities were afraid of uncontrolled migration into the social system and closed the legal ‘loophole’3 for such migration with a law. The new legal regulation as of 2017 excludes job seekers and inactive EU migrants from welfare benefits such as social assistance in the first five years of residence in Germany.4 Thus the distinct features of EU2 migration that distinguish it from previous EU enlargements considerably contributed to the severe backlash against this migration in Germany. Perceived cultural distance from EU2 migrants, significantly increasing migrant communities and controversial debates on the social rights of EU migrants made the inclusion of Bulgarians and Romanians as fullfledged and accepted EU citizens in Germany much more difficult than the inclusion of EU citizens in the past.

8.3

The Need for Future Research on EU Migration

Studying Bulgarian migration after EU accession revealed that knowledge gaps still exist in studies on EU migration. In particular, integration in the sense of participation deserves more scholarly attention than it has received until now. Exploring barriers to labour market integration faced by recent EU migrants Although highly educated persons are capable of smoothly integrating into the labour market, Bulgarian medium- and high-skilled migrants have often experienced deskilling and violations of labour rights. Favell considers eastern Europeans as the new proletariat in the western European labour markets (Favell 2008, as quoted in Engbersen 2013). Disadvantageous positions in the labour market could be the result of adjustment problems in the early phase of migration, but also due to discrimination. As participation in the labour market is a key area of integration that facilitates integration in other areas of life, the need for more understanding of integration challenges is clear. It is important to thoroughly explore the barriers to labour market integration that recent EU migrants

3 The Federal Social Affairs Minister Andrea

Nahles argued that the law is a measure for closing the loophole for uncontrolled immigration into the social system (see an article on www. dw.com, Bundesregierung will Sozialhilfeanspruch für EU-Ausländer begrenzen, 7.10.2016). 4 Political rights of EU migrants have not been contested in Germany until now. In contrast to other EU counties such as France and the Netherlands, the extension of political rights to EU migrants ‘in the 1990s found neither opposition nor much interest, reflecting the dominant pro-European consensus’ in Germany (Thränhardt 1999a).

8.3 The Need for Future Research on EU Migration

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face, and to examine the extent to which discrimination on the grounds of nationality actually occurs. Comparative studies on the labour market experience of western and eastern Europeans may facilitate exploring the extent to which extent EU citizenship makes citizens of some member states more secure in their legal status than citizens of other member states, as Maas (2009) suggests. Besides the role of migrants, with their background characteristics and preferences, employers as actors in the process of labour market integration deserve more scientific attention, in particular aspects related to recruitment and working conditions. Exploring the low level of electoral participation of EU citizens Voter turnout among EU migrants in municipal elections is considerably low, signalling that EU citizens have political rights but do not effectively make use of them. Given the significant number of EU citizens in Germany, the lack of academic attention to their political participation is striking. The migrant survey among Bulgarians in Hamburg gives first insights into the possible explanations, pointing to low awareness of voting rights and a lack of knowledge of German parties as the main barriers to voting. However, as the Bulgarian community is characterised by relatively short-term residences, these explanations appear to be country-specific and less pertinent to EU migrants in general. More empirical research on the electoral participation of EU migrants is needed to understand the reasons behind the low level of voter turnout and to help mobilise EU migrants as voters at the local level. Exploring the low interest in German citizenship among EU citizens Given the positive effects of naturalisation on the individual, the need for a better understanding of the naturalisation practices of EU citizens is clear. The low interest in naturalisation among EU migrants is usually attributed to their almost equal rights to German nationals. Bulgarian migrants call this explanation into question by showing an extraordinary willingness to naturalise despite EU citizenship. The migrant survey in Hamburg reveals permanent settlement and perceived discrimination against foreign nationals as the main driving forces for naturalisation among Bulgarians. Permanent settlement and dual citizenship promote the naturalisation of Bulgarians but seem to be less relevant for western European migrants. More empirical research with an explicit focus on EU migrants is needed to expand knowledge in this field, in particular on incentives and disincentives for the acquisition of national citizenship of the receiving country in the EU context.

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8.4

Outlook for Future EU Enlargements

Full-fledged status from the very beginning: positive effects are underestimated Turkey, Macedonia, the western Balkan countries—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia as well as Kosovo—are all potential future EU members. What can we learn from the case of Bulgaria for future EU enlargements? EU citizenship as a legal status increases the legal integration of migrants as it opens up more opportunities for participation in society. It is associated with simpler mobility, more secure residence status, easier labour market access and more labour market opportunities, more social entitlements, suffrage at the municipal level, more favourable naturalisation conditions. EU citizenship is undoubtedly an inclusive legal status, but its contextualisation in the nation state through national policies may reduce or strengthen its potential effects on integration. The social dimension of EU citizenship was limited at national level. A federal law as of 2017 limited non-working EU migrants’ access to social entitlements in the first five years of residence and thus their legal integration in the German welfare system. German policies followed the European Court ruling that allows the exclusion of job seekers and inactive persons from welfare benefits until they acquire the right of permanent residence. The current developments contrast with the situation in the 1990s when EU posted workers obtained more economic rights in the receiving country. The EU Posted Workers Directive came into force in 1996 and strengthened the economic rights of EU posted workers by introducing minimum standards in the receiving country. At that time, social considerations such as the risk of xenophobic attacks outweighed economic considerations (Hunger 2001). At present, economic considerations seem to outweigh social considerations. The fear of pressure on local budgets if many EU migrants claim welfare benefits prevails over arguments such as guaranteeing a decent minimum standard of living and limiting the risk of xenophobic attacks against EU migrants in precarious living situations. The limited access to the welfare system increases the risk that EU citizens who do not participate in the labour market and are excluded from state social assistance will get into precarious life situations. The study of Bulgarian migration provided empirical evidence that German national policies—transitional periods in the freedom of work and the dual citizenship policy—clearly have consequences for migrants’ integration. Restricted labour market access redirected labour market participation from regular employment to self-employment, precarious and irregular work. It made migrants

8.4 Outlook for Future EU Enlargements

207

more vulnerable to exploitation, and the German labour market in general more susceptible to such abuses. At the same time, more inclusive citizenship policies have positive consequences for naturalisation and political integration. The legal possibility of retaining citizenship of the country of origin strongly supports naturalisation decisions. After naturalisation, political participation may also increase. On the one hand, this may be because naturalised persons are more interested in voting in municipal elections, and on the other hand, it may be because only German citizenship confers electoral rights at the national level. Thus full-fledged EU citizenship immediately after EU accession is potentially more beneficial for the labour market and political integration than is usually assumed. In contrast, transitional periods redirect problems and delay integration. The findings from the study indicate that not only sending, but also receiving countries could benefit from full-fledged status immediately after EU accession. Costs and benefits of free movement: the two sides of the coin From a European perspective, Bulgarian migration is a sign that EU citizenship works well. Bulgarians are highly mobile EU citizens, making use of the right to free movement more extensively than most other EU nationalities: 3.6 per cent of the Bulgarian population migrated after EU accession, and this is the highest percentage after Romania and Lithuania (Fic et al. 2016). Germany has received many Bulgarian migrants who are both movers and settlers. Some of them encountered problems in the economic, social and housing areas that have given rise to a difficult discussion about the costs of EU migration. German society overwhelmingly benefits from EU migration as most migrants successfully integrate into the labour market. It bears the costs when EU migrants face challenges and rely on the welfare system or seek support in the low-threshold help system of advisory centres and charity organisations. The costs and benefits of EU migration are the two sides of the coin of ‘free movement’. Efforts to benefit from migrants who smoothly integrate while trying to leave it to Bulgaria to cope with more problematic groups such as the less educated with few prospects in the German labour market can be characterised as a cherry-picking strategy. This strategy is likely to fail as it may redirect lowskilled migration to more problematic forms rather than prevent it. Neglecting people in disadvantaged positions may pose severe problems for the receiving country, in particular related to acceptance of migration and social cohesion in the cities. Therefore, instead of a cherry-picking strategy, another approach for addressing integration challenges is at least as promising at the national and local levels—actively supporting migrants’ integration in the receiving country.

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