The Universal Treatise

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THJE UNIVJERSAJL TRJEATISE of

Nicholas of Autrecourl

MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS IN TRANSLATION No. 20

EDITORIAL BOARD James H. Robb, L.S.M., Ph.D., Chairman The Rev. Gerard Smith, S.J., Ph.D. The Rev. Richard E. Arnold, S.J., Ph.D. Paul M. Byrne, L.S.M., Ph.D. The Rev. John Sheets, S.J., S.T.D.

Marquette University Press 1131 West \Visconsin Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin

THIB UNKVJERSAL TRIBATISJE of Nicholas of Autrecourt translated by

Leonard A. Kennedy, C.S.B., Ph.D. University of Windsor

Richard E. Arnold, S.J., Ph.D. Marquette University

Arthur E. Millward, A.M. formerly University of Windsor

with an introduction by

Leonard A. Kennedy, C.S.B.

MARQUEITE UNIVERSITY PRESS

�1ILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

1971

Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number: 70-155364 © Copyright, 1971, The Marquette University Press Milwaukee, Wisconsin Printed in the United States of America

Table of Contents INTRODUCTION Life and Works of Nicholas

1

The Universal Treatise .... ..... .... .............. . . . . .. .

2

Prologues .... .. .. . ............ . ... ...................

3

First Treatise: The Eternity of Things .... .......... .. . .

9

Indivisibles ... ...... ....... .. ................. ....... 11 The Vacuum ............... ...... . . . . ............... . 14 Material Substance and Quantity .... ...... .. .......... .

16

Movement .................. . .... .................... 16 Whether Everything Which Appears Is ................. 17 Whether Exactly The Same Thing Can Be Seen Clearly And Obscurely ........................... 18 Beings In The Imagination ........ ..... ............... 19 The Intellect .................................. . ...... 22 Whether The Same Cause Can Produce Specilically Different Effects ........................ .. . 23 Principles Used In The Translation ... . .. .................. 28 Selected Bibliography .......... . ............. . ....... ... 29 THE TRANSLATION OF THE UNIVERSAL TREATISE OF NICHOLAS OF AUTRECOURT Prologues: I

31

II ................ ......... ................... 57 First Treatise: The Eternity of Things ................... .. 59 Indivisibles ........................

71

The Vacuum ...................... .

87

Material Substance and Quantity

95

Movement .... .....................

98

Whether Everything Which Appears Is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Whether Exactly The Same Thing Can Be Seen Clearly And Obscurely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 Imaginable Beings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 124 The Intellect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 Whether The Same Cause Can Produce Specifically Different Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

Introduction LIFE AND WORKS OF NICHOLAS

Nicholas was born at Autrecourt, a village in the diocese of Verdun, France, about 1300. He is known to have lived at the Sorbonne from 1320 to 1327, and to have received the Master of Arts degree, the Baccalaureate in Theology and Laws, and the Licentiate in Theology. He lectured on the· Sentences of Peter Lombard and also on some of the works of Aristotle. In 1338 he was made a canon of the Cathedral of Metz, this benefice being an honorary one which helped to support him while he continued his work at the University of Paris. In 1340 Pope Benedict XII summoned him to the Papal Curia at Avignon to answer charges concerning his teaching. His case was not concluded until 1346, under Benedict's successor, Clement VI. Nicholas was re­ quired to revoke publicly many statements he had spoken or written; his Universal Treatise, and his letters to Bernard of Arezzo, O.F.M., had to be burned publicly in Paris. He was deprived of his Master of Arts degree and was declared unfit to be promoted to the Master of Theology degree. In 1350 he became dean of the Cathedral at Metz. Of the works of Nicholas, two of his nine letters to Bernard are extant. These, along with a letter of Nicholas to a certain Giles, have been published by Lappe. 1 Nicholas' Universal Treatise, and a smaller work Utrum visio creaturae ratwnalis beatificabilis per ver bum possit intendi naturaliter, have been published by Father O'Donnell.2 Short excerpts from other works by Nicholas are found in the list of his statements which were condemned. 3 Nicholas is important in the history of fourteenth-century philoso­ phy. He is most famous for his doctrines which bear similarities to the teachings of David Hume.4 These doctrines, found chiefly in Nicholas' letters to Bernard, indicate scepticism in regard to man's ability to gain sure knowledge of substance or causes, and in regard to man's ability to prove God's existence or to discover a hierarchy in beings. 1

J. Lappe, "Nicolaus von Autrecourt,"

2

J. R. O'Donnell, "Nicholas of Autre­

court," Mediaeval Studies, I (1939) 179-280. s H. Denifle, ed., Chartularium Uni­ versitatis Parisiensis, tom. II ( Paris, 1891) 576-587. 4 H. Rashdall, "Nicholas de Ultra­ curia, a Medieval Hume," Proceed­ ings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S., 8 (1907) 1-27.

Beitriige zur Geschichte der Philo­ sophie des M ittelalters, Band VI,

Heft 2 ( Munster, 1908) pp. 2 ° -14 ° , 24 °-30 °. The two letters to Bernard have been translated into English in H. Shapiro, Medieval Philosophy (New York, 1964) pp. 509-527, and in A. Hyman and J. Walsh, Phil­ osophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1967) pp. 654-664.

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Nicholas' most important teaching in the Universal Treatise, how­ ever, is that all things are eternal. This teaching also involves the con­ sequence that all things repeat themselves in cycles, and leads, too, to a denial of the immortality of the human soul as this immortality had usually been understood. These doctrines were all condemned. However, it should be pointed out that Nicholas claimed that many of the statements attributed to him were not made by him, at least not in the form in which they were stated. He also claimed that they had been made by way of discussion and had not been asserted obstinately. He stated frequently, too, in his letters to Bernard and in his Universal Treatise, that he was dealing only with what was probable, not with what was certain. THE UNIVERSAL TREATISE

The Universal Treatise, usually referred to as the Exigit ordo, was composed about 1340. It has as its intention to call university profes­ sors, especially at Paris, to the study of Christianity and ethics. The means to achieve this end is the discrediting of Aristotle and his dis­ ciple Averroes (1126-1198), the study of whose writings occupied most of the time of these professors. Attacks on Aristotle were by no means unknown; before Nicholas several scholastics had strongly opposed the Stagirite. Nicholas does not think that he can definitely disprove what Aristotle and Averroes taught, but does think that he can show that it is less probable than other doctrines. Accordingly he sets out to contradict a number of Aristotelian tenets, and defends doctrines such as the following as being more probable than what Aristotle and Averroes held: (a) the universe consists of unchangeable atoms, (b) space and time are composed of points and instants respectively, (c) there is a vacuum, (d) material substance and quantity are not really distinct, (e) movement is not anything real, (f) everything is as it appears, (g) the same thing cannot be seen clearly and obscurely, (h) there is not one intellect for all men, ( i) a cause can produce only one effect. In following Nicholas through this project we shall stay close to his own order of argumentation, hoping thereby to facilitate the work of the reader of the translation. Many details, of course, will be omitted. Nicholas is not trying to establish an integrated system of his own but rather to find fault with Aristotelianism. For this reason the vari­ ous doctrines he supports are often isolated teachings whose com­ patibility is not made clear. Moreover. since Nicholas is not demon[2]

strating his own position but simply establishing its probability, he uses arguments which are not demonstrations and even defends posi­ tions which he believes to be false. He takes a set of propositions, which he need not necessarily accept as true, and defends them as more probable than their opposites. He also answers objections against them, and draws conclusions from them.6

ONE Nicholas thinks that the so-called "conclusions" of Aristotle and Averroes are not really demonstrated and that opposite conclusions can just as easily be drawn from the evidence. He has seen men spend their whole lives studying the works of these men and, at the end, know only as much as another person could learn in a short while if he studied things rather than Aristotelian writings. Moreover, while this life-long study goes on, not only is the study of Christian life and of ethics neglected, but these men even give bad example by their quarrels and their worldly lives. Nicholas proposes, then, to find out how much certainty can be obtained about things, and to see whether Aristotle is a good guide. FmsT PROLOGUE, PART

FmsT PROLOGUE, PART

Two

It may be presumptuous for someone like Nicholas to contradict the long-established authority of Aristotle and Averroes. But Nicholas feels that a person is allowed to criticize widely-held opinions if he has a special insight into things. The fact that most men think or act in a certain way is no guarantee that what they think is true or what they do is right. Nicholas does not claim special authority for himself, but claims that he has thought about his views for a long time and has consulted others about them, and thinks that they should be pub­ lished so that all may discuss them. What is it that makes a man's judgment sound? It is his ability to get to the heart of things and his ability to relate particular instances to appropriate general rules. Judgment based on authority is not re­ liable. Even if Cod told someone something, the person would be sure it was true, but would not have evidence that it was true, for 5

For a full treabnent of Nicholas' philosophy, see J. R. Weinberg, Nicolaus of Autrecourt ( Princeton, 1948) . See also J. R. O'Donnell, "The Philosophy of Nicholas of Au­ trecourt and His Appraisal of Aris­ totle," Mediaeval Studies, IV (1942)

97-125. And, for Nicholas' doctrine see E. A. Moody, dan, and Nicolaus Franciscan Studies, 146.

[ 3]

the relation of to nominalism, "Ockham, Buri­ of Autrecourt," 1 ( 1947) 113-

evidence is based on seeing for oneself. Therefore one should not blindly accept the authority of Aristotle without seeing for oneself. Even Aristotle himself contradicted the authority of his predecessors. The only criterion is natural evidence. Nicholas remarks that the Aristotelians may have wanted to sim­ plify things for the sake of the unintelligent, but does not think that this is good policy since it has gone too far. Nicholas now begins a discussion of his chief teaching: that all things are eternal. In order to broach the subject, however, he must begin with a discussion of the good. For Nicholas the universe is good, and things are disposed as they should be. As a craftsman makes things so that they will be good and desirable, so nature disposes things so that they will be good. For example, stones are on the ground so that men may get at them and use them; horses are just the right height for men to ride. If things were not made according to a plan, and therefore good, there would be total chaos. Besides being good, the beings in the universe are interconnected. Every being benefits every other being. Also, every being is related to a first good, for otherwise there would be no explanation of how things have purposes. Also, the whole of the universe is always perfect to the same extent. Were there to be some decrease in perfection nothing could stop it going further and further indefinitely. Besides, if there is a first being which never changes, the goodness which it decides to put in things never changes; hence the total amount remains the same. Nicholas puts forth these teachings about the good merely as probable. He then uses them to show that whatever exists is eternal. Whatever exists is good. Moreover, it is good for the whole universe. Thus the withdrawal of any good would decrease the total goodness. But the total amount of goodness in the universe never changes. There­ fore, everything is eternal. Nicholas contends that his doctrine safeguards universal justice better than Aristotle's. Aristotle seems to say that, after death, men are not rewarded or punished. But, according to Nicholas, there are in each man spirits called sense and intellect. A man is composed of atoms, and at death the atoms, but not these two spirits, are dispersed. In the case of a good man the spirits continue in good condition; in the case of a bad man they continue in a poor condition. Thus, when the spirits are joined once again to different atoms to constitute new men, they benefit or suffer depending on how they behaved in their previous human existence. Or, Nicholas adds, possibly what happens is that the spirits are joined to better or poorer atoms in their new [4]

human existence and benefit or suffer in this way. In any case, the requirements of justice are met better than in Aristotle's system. Nicholas is a little worried that his doctrine, though apparently better than Aristotle's, still is only probable and may also be rejected. But he hopes that faith in Christian revelation concerning the after­ life will prevent anyone being disturbed because of philosophical un­ certainty. Nicholas is at least sure that no one can prove that some beings are not eternal, because there is nothing in the notion 'oeing" or ''good" which demands that it be accompanied by the notion of "cor­ ruptibility." On the contrary, something is more a being and more a good if it is eternal. Nor does the notion of "many beings" demand that it be accompanied by the notion of "corruptibility," since plurality is quite consistent with eternity. One might argue that the notion "corruptible being" is a possible notion, not a contradictory one, and that therefore perhaps being·s are not eternal. Nicholas answers that, since each being is a good, and is demanded for the goodness of the universe, and since the amount of goodness in the universe never changes, the notion "corruptible being" is a contradictory notion. If someone objects that we should be able to see that the notion "corruptible being" is contradictory simply by an inspection of it without resorting to the notion of "good", Nicholas responds that there are many notions which entail consequences which are not obvious to us, and that 'oeing" is one of these notions. Nicholas now mixes a series of arguments in favour of his thesis of the eternity of things with a series of answers to objections against the thesis. In order to clarify somewhat this involved medieval dis­ cussion, the arguments and the objections will be numbered. Argument 1. There are no questions which cannot be answered eventually. But, if things lasted only for a certain length of time, we could not answer the question why they lasted just that long and not for a longer or shorter duration. And, if it is suggested that each being has a different duration, an infinite multiplicity of things will be re­ quired in order for all durations to be represented. But it does not seem possible for there to be an infinite multiplicity of things. Argument 2. Aristotle teaches that for the common good a man should risk death, and yet he holds that a man should love himself more than others. Now, if there is no afterlife, Aristotle is contradict­ ing himself. But Nicholas teaches that there is a certain kind of after­ life, and hence can urge without contradiction that a man risk his life for the common good. The point on which Nicholas opposes Aristotle is not simply the eternity of the world, since Aristotle taught that the world is eternal. [5]

What Nicholas teaches is that the universe is composed of atoms, each of which is eternally unchanged. The only change which occurs is change in place. This change, of course, is often imperceptible to the senses. Thus Nicholas' theory is based on argumentation, not on ob­ servation. Nicholas upbraids those men who are willing to believe only what they sense. There are many things which are not veriliable through sense experience and yet are true. Clock-wheels move with­ out their movement being perceptible. Tops can spin and seem to be resting. So Nicholas is convinced that his teaching about the eternity of things is quite probable. Nicholas claims that Aristotelians, too, sometimes accept arguments even when they are apparently opposed to sense experience. For ex­ ample, they teach that "species" come from distant objects to the eye, and that sound approaches successively, even though both sight and sound seem to take place instantaneously. Objection 1 . Nicholas' theory makes it difficult to judge whether one thing is nobler than another. Since no new beings are produced, the efficient causality required to produce new beings cannot be used as a criterion of worth. Nicholas replies that, though the objection has some weight, the Aristotelians themselves are not free of problems. For example, the generative power produces a substance ( a child ) and the intellective power produces an accident ( knowledge ) . Now, since a substance is nobler than an accident, the generative power will be superior to the intellect. But this is absurd. Also, some Aristotelians say that God does not produce natural changes as efficient cause, 6 and yet they say that God is the highest being. Also, the individual is superior to its nature, and yet the nature, not the individual, is the source of efficient causality.7 Then, too, when a substance receives an accident, the accident seems to be superior to the substance, since it acts on it. But accidents are not superior to substances. Nicholas thinks that a being can be seen to be nobler than another if it naturally pleases men more, or if it takes greater pleasure in its existence, as a man takes greater pleasure in his being than a horse does in its. Another sign of superiority is evident in the case of the human soul. Since the natures of all things come into it, it is of the same nature as all of them. Hence it is superior to a being to which this does not happen, for example, a stone. The heavenly bodies, too, 6

This is Aristotle's teaching. See W. D. Ross, Aristotle ( New York, 1 959 ) pp. 176- 177.

7

[6]

See pages 196 and 245. ( All refer­ ences to the Treatise refer to the pages of the Latin edition. )

please us and seem to be noble beings; but certainty is not possible here. Argument 3. Belief in eternity is found in all men and is a strong impetus to good behavior. It would not be right for such a belief to be illusory. Objection 2. When someone throws a stone, the stone in flight is different from what it was before being thrown. Now, if the stone is different, there is a change in it. Thus it is not eternally the same. Nicholas' answer is that there is no intrinsic change in the stone. The whole process can be explained by the local motion of unchanged particles. Argument 4. When Socrates dies he can exist in memory. Now, it is more in keeping with the purpose of nature for something to con­ tinue in real being rather than in diminished being (as in memory) . Therefore it is natural for Socrates to exist forever in real being. Objection 8. It cannot be absolutely proven that something con­ tinues in being even if it is apparently always visible. All one can say is that what is seen looks like what was seen in the same place previ­ ously. There is no guarantee that it is the same thing. Nicholas responds that the objection is valid as far as certainty goes, but that it is very probable that all things are eternal if one appeals to his first argument for the eternity of things (that the uni­ verse always has the same amount of goodness, etc.). Argument 5. If things were not eternal, substantial change would take place. There would then have to be such a reality as prime matter. But the arguments given by Aristotle and Averroes for the existence of matter are not demonstrative. One of them is founded on a compari­ son of substantial change with accidental change. But such a com­ parison need not hold. The other argument assumes that there is change from non-being; but this must be established, not assumed. And, even assuming that there is change from non-being to being, it can be accounted for by simply positing being after non-being; it need not come from it in any other sense. Objection 4. Two identical objects never exist at the same time, for the existence of the second would be superfluous. But they can exist successively. Now, if they existed successively, the perfection of the world would not be impaired but rather enhanced because more beings would exist. But in this case some things would cease to be, and thus would not be eternal. Nicholas answers that there is no sense in a being ceasing to be and being replaced by an identical being. There is no point to it. Objection 5. Nicholas will argue later (page 203 ) that men have a natural desire to live forever and that therefore they are eternal. But

[7]

the prologue here raises the objection that some desires are never fulfilled. Nicholas' answer is that desires which are not fulfilled here and now are always fulfilled eventually. Averroists might claim that a man's desire for eternity is satisfied by contemplating an eternal being during his life, though he himself ceases to be at death. Nicholas claims, however, that a man desires not only eternity but also personal eternity. Objection 6. Nicholas will teach later ( page 205 ) that acts of the soul are eternal, the same act belonging now to one individual, now to another. But the prologue raises the objection that we cannot con­ ceive how this is possible. Nicholas replies that he thinks that acts of the soul pass from one individual to another, but that he cannot understand 1ww they do so. He explains, however, that it is true of many things that we know that they are and yet cannot understand how they happen. Argument 6. According to Nicholas, when two things ( for example, two whitenesses ) appear exactly the same to sense and to intellect, they are the same. Thus, when one appears to pass away, it really does not pass away at all; it remains ( in the other individual ) . The one which apparently passes away does not even really appear to pass away; it simply ceases to appear, which is quite a different thing. Thus things are again shown to be eternal. Objection 7. Argument 6 presumes that it is possible for one thing to be in two places at the same time. But this is not possible. Nicholas retorts that the same specific nahue can be in two places at the same time, although a subject numerically one cannot. Objection 8. Nicholas will teach ( pages 198 H. ) that the non­ appearance of something does not prove its non-existence. Now, if this is so, I cannot be sure that a person, whom I see in one place, is not also in another place. Nicholas replies that it is only when indivisibles are scattered that they exist and are not visible. When they are gathered together to form a person, we can be quite sure that the person is only where we see him. Objection 9. If you cannot tell that something is non-existent be­ cause it is not visible, you cannot tell that something is not moving because it does not seem to move. Nicholas agrees with the substance of the objection, but adds that it is possible to tell whether something is moving if the right technique is used. [8]

Objection 10. Nicholas raises an objection against his doctrine of

the good. If a person makes a mistake, his act is not good. But Nicholas has taught that whatever exists is good. Now, how can the act be both good and not good? Nicholas' answer to this objection is that the act is good, absolutely speaking; that is, it is better for it to exist than not exist. Nicholas holds that the existence of whatever is is better than its non-existence, since otherwise everything in the universe would happen by chance. THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND PROLOGUE

The second part of the first prologue was concerned with defend­ ing the teaching contained in the body of the treatise. This second prologue is like the first part of the first prologue, an explanation of why Nicholas wrote his treatise. Nicholas finds fault with those who cannot hear a new idea, and who immediately quote Aristotle to squelch any investigation into principles, for example, the principle that material substance and quantity are really distinct. It is not right simply to quote Aristotle; one should look into the nature of things in themselves. FIRST TREATISE : THE ETERNITY OF THINGS

Nicholas has already dealt at length with this doctrine in the sec­ ond part of the first prologue, which was written after this section now under consideration. There is, accordingly, some overlapping. What seems to oppose Nicholas' teaching about the eternity of things is that we see things ceasing to be. Now, Nicholas says that we really do not see them cease to be; we simply cease seeing them. We cannot prove that they no longer exist. If something is white and then becomes black, we cannot say that whiteness ceases to exist, just as, if the power of movement stops functioning, we cannot say that it ceases to exist. It may be that the whiteness was composed of particles which looked white when they were all together, but now are dispersed and thus are no longer visible. Besides, if something white becomes black, black things also become white; the whiteness which ceases to be in this being comes to be in another being. If you argue that these two whitenesses are specifically the same but not numerically the same, your argument is not a demonstrative one. If the two whitenesses are the same as far as sense and intellect are con­ cerned, difference in location is not sufficient proof of numerical differ­ ence. It might be that, just as something seems to be in many places when mirrors are used and yet is one thing numerically, so two white­ nesses may be in different places and yet be one thing numerically. [9 ]

( This seems to contradict what Nicholas has said earlier [page 195] about individuation. The apparent conflict in Nicholas' teachings con­ cerning individuation will be treated at the end of this introduction. ) Nicholas has now explained how things are eternal even though they seem to change. But his explanation involves admitting the local movement of atoms. A problem now arises whether local movement itself is something real, distinct from the moving atoms. If it is, it comes into being and goes out of being. Thus it is not eternal. Nicholas will explain later ( page 205 ) that movement is not distinct from a moving object; hence it does not come to be or cease to be. How about light? Is it eternal? Nicholas teaches that light is a group of eternal atoms which move very quickly because of their exceptionally penetrative quality. Nicholas holds that things are eternal because the universe is perfect and would be deformed if one of its parts ceased to be. But someone might say that the perfection of the universe is produced by the species of things in it, not by individual things. Nicholas' answer is that, where certain others say that the species exists in each indi­ vidual of its kind, he holds that there is only one individual of each kind. When, for example, two whitenesses are seen, what is really seen is the same individual whiteness in two locations. Nicholas raises again the problem of whether a thing could not be replaced by something exactly like it without lessening the goodness of the universe. Of course this would not lessen the goodness of the universe from one point of view, but Nicholas thinks that it would imply imperfection in God, who would require many acts of causa­ tion rather than one initial one. Nicholas then explains that his theory of the eternal existence of all things is not only probable, but is more probable than its opposite. He also says that the mere examination of the notions "things,, and "eter­ nal" will not yield a conclusion on the matter; one must resort to a study of final causality and goodness. Nicholas also admits that his theory is false because it is contradicted by the Catholic faith, but he sees nothing wrong with supporting it as more probable than its opposite, even if it is false. Having defended his thesis, Nicholas is now ready to show that a great many of Aristotle's teachings are false or irrelevant. Aristotle taught that prime matter exists and that there is motion other than local motion; both of these are false. Aristotle's teaching about acci­ dents should be revised, too, to fit in with Nicholas' atomic theory. Also, since there is no form or matter, questions concerning them become meaningless. [10]

Nicholas teaches that actions of the soul are eternal. A thought, for example, is merely an atom or a group of atoms of a special kind, and, if a man thinks, his thought has belonged to another man previously. Nicholas thinks that this teaching will render obsolete most of the third book of Aristotle's On the Soul. Some of the questions raised there will now be meaningless, and others will have to be answered differently. A person's thought passes from him to someone else, and so on indefinitely. Also, all things return in long cycles to exactly where they were, so that history repeats itself. INDIVISIBLES

In accordance with his atomism, Nicholas holds that space consists of points and that time consists of instants. Since the arguments in favor of this doctrine and the answers to objections against it run into one another, they will be numbered for the sake of clarity. And the reader is warned that Nicholas' defense of this doctrine leads him to positions which seem fantastic. Objection 1. Aristotle taught that a continuum is not composed ultimately of indivisbles, but is infinitely divisible. One of his argu­ ments is that, if an object crosses three indivisibles of space, then another object, half as fast, and starting out with it, will cross an indi­ visible and a half in the same time. But there cannot be half of an indivisible. Thus the continuum is not composed of indivisibles. Nicholas' answer to this reasoning is that every object requires one instant to cease being at one point and to begin to be at another point, but that it can take time resting when it is at a point. Thus, when the first object has passed three points, without resting, the second object has come to the first point, rested there one instant, and gone on to the second point. Obj ection 2. Aristotle also argues that if a continuum is made up of indivisible points it will have no magnitude. For, if a point touches a point, it coincides with it. And, if the points in the magnitude do not touch each other, there is no continuum. Nicholas' answer is baffling. He thinks that it is possible for points to touch each other without coinciding because two points can touch with each retaining its own different position. Yet he does not really explain how this is possible. Obj ection 3. Another difficulty is raised by Algazel. If two circles of diHerent radii move together around a common centre, when the large circumference has moved one point, the small circumference has moved through a fraction of a point. But there cannot be a fraction of a point. Therefore a line is not composed of indivisible points.

Nicholas answers that straight lines cannot be drawn from each point on the larger circumference to the centre. Only as many lines can be drawn as there are points on the smaller circumference. When the larger circumference moves through so many points ( as many as there are between points from which straight lines can be drawn to the centre of the circle ) , the smaller circumference moves through one point. Thus the smaller circumference either moves through a whole point or does not move at all; it does not move through a frac­ tion of a point. Objection 4. Another problem in saying that a line is composed of points is saying which point is in the middle. If the number of points is odd, the problem is easy. But, if the number is even, there is no mid-point and the line cannot be divided into halves. Nicholas thinks that one half will be a little larger than the other, but that the difference will be so small as to be negligible. Argument 1. A finite continuum must be composed of indivisibles because, if it were infinitely divisible, it would be composed of an infinite multiplicity of parts, and would thus be infinite in magnitude. Nor can it be argued that a continuum is composed of an infinite multiplicity of parts but that they do not make it infinite in extension because each part is inside another part; for in a continuum some parts are outside of other parts. If these parts are finite in number, they are either divisible or indivisible. If they are divisible, the final multitude of parts will be either finite or infinite. If finite, Nicholas' contention is upheld. If infinite, the continuum will have to be infinite in magnitude. If someone ( with admittedly superhuman powers ) were to divide a finite continuum into its infinite multiplicity of parts and put them together again, the resulting continuum would be infinite in magni­ tude. But this is absurd. Thus a finite continuum is not infinitely di­ visible. Objection 5. Aristotle held that a continuum is infinitely divisible only potentially, not actually, and that therefore it can be actually finite. Nicholas points out, however, that, without actually breaking up the continuum, the intellect can consider all its parts. If these parts are finite in number, Aristotle is wrong. If they are infininte in multi­ plicity, the continuum is infinite in extension. And, besides, it is not right to say that the parts are potential, for even before actual separa­ tion they are different from each other. They are therefore already parts actually, not merely potentially. [12]

Argument 2. If a finite continuum is infinitely divisible, one could keep taking away from it forever. Therefore there must have been an infinite extension before starting. Argument 3. It can be proven that a plane is composed of points because a spherical body, touching a plane at a point, can move over the plane a point at a time. Even if it is objected that the sphere and the plane are not perfect geometrical figures, it must be admitted that the sphere traverses points at least per accidens; thus the argument holds. Objection 6. For any rectangle taken at random, it is not possible to express the ratio of diagonal to side as a rational fraction. But, if diagonal and side were composed of a finite number of points, this should be possible. Nicholas sees the force of this argument, and states that the side and diagonal are composed of points, but of an infinite multiplicity of points. Nicholas is aware that this position seems to undermine the stand he has taken just previously that a continuum must be infinite in extent if it is infinitely divisible. But he says that his position is different, since he holds that, though the continuum is infinitely divi­ sible, it is also composed of indivisibles. Nicholas thus holds that every continuum one can see has an in­ finite multiplicity of indivisible parts. No matter how small a part one can see, it can always be divided. Yet ( beyond our ability to sense it ) there are indivisible parts ultimately. Ob jection 7. If moving objects rested, we would be able to see them do so. Nicholas' answer is that we do not see them rest because we see only groups of indivisibles and groups of points together; the resting would be visible only if single indivisibles and single points were seen. Objection 8. Concerning the divisibility of time, Aristotle argues that, if an object moves through a certain space in an instant, a faster object would move through the same space in a fraction of an instant. But there are no fractions of an instant. Therefore there are no instants in time; it is infinitely divisible. Nicholas answers that the fastest object moves constantly, and that every object, when it goes from one point to the next, does so in an instant, but that other objects are slower than the fastest object be­ cause they rest at the points. This gets around Arisotle's problem. Objection 9. Another argument for the infinite divisibility of time is that an object cannot rest in an instant because to rest means to be the same after as before, and an instant has no after and before. But,

[ 13 ]

if an object cannot rest in an instant, it cannot move in a instant. Therefore, since things move, there are no instants. Nicholas thinks, however, that an instant has duration, just as he thinks that points put together make up a continuum. He therefore is able to answer this objection. Having disproved Aristotle's teaching concerning the divisibility of space and time, Nicholas declares that nearly all Aristotle's con­ clusions in Book 6 of his Physics are invalidated: ( a ) Aristotle taught that in movement the moving object is in neither the terminus a quo nor the terminus ad quem, but partly in both. For Nicholas, a moving object is never partly in both termini; it is in one and an instant later is in the other. ( b ) Aristotle was also wrong in thinking that movement is some­ thing inhering in the moving object, as will be shown later ( page 224 ) . ( c ) Aristotle also said that, in movement, there is no primary part which is changed, since each part is divisible, and the first part of that again divisible, and so on to infinity. But Nicholas can claim that the primary parts involved in movement are the point, the instant, and the atom. ( d ) Aristotle said also that all changed being is preceded by move­ ment. But, according to Nicholas' theory, changed being takes place without movement, since an object going from a to b is in b without passing from a to b. ( e ) The beginning of Book 7 of the Physics stated that everything in motion must be moved by something, and the proof for this assumed that whatever is in motion is divisible. But this assumption is not established. ( f ) Aristotle also claimed that, for every movement, a faster one can be found. This, Nicholas holds, is false, for the being which moves without resting is the fastest-moving thing.

THE

VACUUM

Another anti-Aristotelian doctrine advocated by Nicholas is that a vacuum is necessary in order that motion take place. Argument 1. Othenvise, when something moves, either it will have to occupy the same place as something else, or all things will have to move and be readjusted at the same instant. One might say that motion takes place by the bodies bumped into becoming com­ pressed. But Nicholas says that such compression takes place only by particles coming closer to each other than they were previously. Thus, either there is a vacuum in which they exist only loosely joined, or they are fully compact to start with ( and the same problem re­ mains ) .

[ 14 ]

O b;ection 1 . One teacher in Nicholas' day taught that, when a is moved into the place of b, b moves into the place of a. But Nicholas thinks that it will be easier for what is behind a ( air, for example ) to take its place than for what it bumps into to take its place. O b;ection 2. One of Aristotle's arguments against a vacuum is that local motion in it would take place instantaneously, since there would be no resistance in the medium. Nicholas points out that he does not posit a large vacuum but small vacuums among parts of bodies. Also, according to Nicholas, all mo­ tion takes place instantaneously, although this is not evident because the moving bodies rest along the way. O bjection 3. If water came out of a water-clock when a finger was pressed over the opening at the top, a vacuum would be formed. But the water does not come out. This shows that a vacuum is not possible. Nicholas answers that possibly this kind of vacuum ( a large one ) is not possible. But this does not prove that small vacuums among the parts of bodies are not possible. Nicholas rejects the solution which says that the universe is perfectly full and that, if the water came out, it would make the universe more full since nothing could take the place of the escaping water. O b;ection 4. An inflated bladder cannot be compressed. If there were a vacuum it seems that it would allow the particles in it to con­ tract and the bladder to be compressed. Nicholas replies that there is a vacuum in ordinary air, which allows it to be contracted, but that in the bladder the air has reached the maximum of its compressibility. Or else in the bladder there is a vacuum separated from the particles, but of such a nature that it can­ not be penetrated. Argument 2. It is a fact that things grow. Now, if a person's arm grows, the additional space it occupies is made possible only because of a vacuum. If the space were filled, the arm could not increase in size. Aristotle interprets this increase as being due to the particles al­ ready there increasing in size. But, his position continues, since they are already full particles, they cannot increase in size. Nicholas, how­ ever, has no difficulty in answering this objection. He holds, not that the particles already there increase in size, but that other corporeal particles are added and fill the empty spaces. Argument 3. A jar filled with ashes can receive as much water as if it were empty. This shows that, in a jar filled with water, there are spaces which can be occupied by something else. [ 15]

Argument 4. Since things grow larger, one denying that there is a vacuum will have to prove that other things become more com­ pressed or that somewhere else a larger body becomes smaller in the same proportion. Objection 5. When a displaces b, the space is always occupied, either by a or b. Thus there is no vacuum. Nicholas replies that a vacuum is a space where there is no body or where there is a body which can be displaced. Thus the space oc­ cupied by a is, of itself, a vacuum, even though at the moment it happens to be occupied. MATERIAL SUBSTANCE AND QUANTITY

According to Aristotle, quantity is distinct from material sub­ stance.8 Nicholas again contradicts Aristotle. Total identity, he says, is impossible to prove positively, but there is a negative proof be­ cause no distinction can be proven here. For quantity and substance, when they change, always change together. And plurality is not to be assumed unnecessarily. Similarly, number is not distinct from the things numbered. MOVEMENT

In order to defend his position that everything is eternal, Nicholas must hold that movement, as a reality, does not exist, since movement, of its very nature, is transitory. What Nicholas does is to insist that movement is not distinct from moving objects. In local movement there is an object in one place and at a later time it is in another place. There is nothing else involved, nothing which is successive, part of which has passed and part of which is yet to come. A real existent cannot consist of what was and of what will be, since both of these are non-existent. An objection to Nicholas' position is that, if someone is going to go to Notre Dame, he is always going there; otherwise his going there will end. If it ends, it is not eternal. Nicholas answers that the "going" is not a thing. Hence, when it ends, nothing ceases to be. Nicholas admits that "moving," as he has explained it, exists, but claims that it does not involve the beginning or termination of any positive reality. The same is true of any kind of change. For example, when a per­ son thinks, a thought is present to his mind. But this same thought existed elsewhere all the time. Concerning the identity of material substance and quantity, one might object that, if they are not distinct, they are identical. Nicholas s Metaphysics, V, 1 3.

[16 ]

explains that, considered as regards what they represent outside the mind, they are identical, but, considered as signs of concepts ( that is, ways of considering things ) , they are different. There is, then, a mental distinction but not a real distinction. We can have many con­ cepts of the same thing. For example, the length and width of a body belong to the same body and thus are not really distinct, though they are conceptually distinct. Is Aristotle taught that not all appearances are true. This teaching also is attacked by Nicholas, who holds as the more probable opinion that everything evident to the senses is true. If a man with a fever tastes sugar as bitter, it is bitter. Some wish to admit this position of Nicholas but only after adding the proviso "if the medium and the sense organ are properly disposed, and if there is a proper distance between the sense power and its ob­ ject." But Nicholas rejects this proviso, since one must trust the senses in order to be sure the proviso is met. Nicholas admits that mistakes can be made when partial appear­ ances are mistaken for full ones, as when one thinks the sun is smaller than the earth, or when one is dreaming and mistakes for reality that which he dreams. Hence, everything evident to the senses is true if it appears in a full light. If it were not, man would have no certitude at all. What truth is there when the man with the fever tastes sugar as bitter? Because of his fever, he tastes something in his own sense organ which is really bitter. Nicholas must face the problem of how a person is sure that what he senses appears to him in a full light. Nicholas thinks that man has a spontaneous conviction that what is evident to him is true; he can­ not prove such a statement as a conclusion from previously demon­ strated truths. He will be mistaken sometimes ( as when he dreams ) but is able later on to correct these mistakes ( as when he wakes up ) . As concerns evidence present to him when he is awake, he trusts his spontaneous conviction. If someone is not satisfied with this explana­ tion, he must say that man has no full certitude. Nicholas points out that men do not have contradictory appear­ ances. They simply have different appearances, or more or fewer appearances. Error occurs when one thinks or says what actually exceeds the appearances he has. Therefore there is no possibility of contradictories being true at the same time. WHETHER EVERYTHING WHICH APPEARS

9

Metaphysics, IV, 4-6.

[17 ]

9

What Nicholas accepts as evident are: ( 1 ) sensible objects; ( 2 ) acts which we experience in ourselves; ( 3 ) sell-evident principles; ( 4 ) conclusions depending on sell-evident principles. And the ulti­ mate reason why these evidences are to be accepted is because the intellect accepts them with pleasure, while it is opposed to what it sees to be false. We cannot prove that what is evident is true; we can only accept it as true because the intellect finds it pleasurable. We cannot prove all things; our first truth must be accepted without proof, for proof involves the use of previous truths, and no truths are previ­ ous to the first truth. Nicholas' position is that not many things can be known for cer­ tain. For example, as concerns matters of experience ( a magnet at­ tracts iron ) , it is not possible to be sure that what has happened will go on as it has in the past. Such assurance would be only opinion, not certainty.

WHETHER EXACTLY THE SAME TIIlNG CAN BE SEEN CLEARLY AND OBSCURELY It might seem that, concerning the question of whether all appear­ ances are true, Nicholas' answer is not really different from Aristotle's. Yet Nicholas' has a consequence which Aristotle's did not have. In defending the position that all appearances are true Nicholas does not hold that contradictories can be true. He does not hold, for example, that, if something is seen by one man as blue and by another as white, it is both blue and white. Nevertheless he does say that the two men see different things. One sees a white thing; the other sees a blue thing. The same holds true of clear and obscure knowledge. If an act ( say of vision ) is clear at one time and obscure at another, Nicholas says that what is seen first is something different from what is seen later. This means that the same object cannot be seen clearly and obscurely. For Nicholas there is a proportion between an act and its object. To a certain kind of act corresponds a certain kind of object. If an act of seeing is bright, its object is bright. If the act of seeing is dull, its object is dull. Thus there cannot be two acts by which the same object is seen. Many striking conclusions follow from this position : ( a ) God knows what we know, He has the same kind of act of knowledge as we have. And He has only the certainty which we have. God's knowledge differs from ours only in that He knows more things. ( b ) And, if Nicholas' theory is true when applied to two acts of the same power, it is just as tme when applied to acts of two different powers. Hence no two knowing powers can grasp the same object. [18]

( c ) Also, when an object ( say whiteness ) is seen, every object like it ( every whiteness like the one seen ) is seen. By seeing one whiteness in one place, a person sees every whiteness everywhere in the world. ( d ) Also, there cannot be two different acts of the intellect grasp­ ing the same object. Therefore every concept of a thing has a different formality or reality corresponding to it in the thing. The categories are thus really or formally distinct. ( e ) If two people have different intellectual ability, they can never know the same things. If someone sees something from close up, and another from afar, they cannot see the same thing. And, since God understands better than we do, He cannot know any of the things which we know. ( This seems to contradict what Nicholas has said in [a] ) . BEINGS IN THE IMAGINATION

For Nicholas, imaginary beings exist just as truly as beings seen by the external senses, but they are a different kind of reality. Objects of the imagination exist before they are imagined just as sensible objects exist before they are sensed. For an object of sense is more closely related to the act of sensing than is an object of imagination to the act of imagining, and, if the more closely related object does not pass away when the act ceases, then the less closely related object will not pass away either. Also, what we imagine is known by God always; thus it always exists. Nicholas next deals with a number of consequences of his doc­ trines, or problems arising in connection with them, or other teach­ ings related to them: ( a ) First comes a problem concerning God's knowledge. Since things are finite, they can be known fully by a finite power. But God, being infinite, cannot know what a finite power knows. How, then, does He know things? It seems that He knows Himself directly, and other things indirectly. ( b ) There is a distinction between the object of knowledge and the act of understanding. The object is what we see, but the act of knowing in itself does not resemble its object. Besides, the object as known is less perfect than the object in itself, but sometimes the act of knowing is more perfect than the object in itself. ( c ) By objective being Nicholas means a thing as known. By sub­ jective being he means a thing in itself. There are thus many objective beings and one subjective being of each thing. The higher the intel­ lect, the closer the objective being is to the subjective being. [ 19]

( d ) Nicholas again ( see pages 194-195 ) argues that things are eternal because when something ( for example, whiteness ) ceases to be in one place in continues to be in another place ( where there is whiteness ) . And the same act of seeing sees both whitenesses at the same time. How can whiteness cease to be in England and remain in Paris? Because its individuating principle leaves it. But the individuating principle does not make one whiteness in any way unlike another. It merely locates the whiteness in a certain spot. To say that the white­ nesses are in any way different is to raise insuperable difficulties. For example, if to see one whiteness clearly is to see another clearly, as has been proven, then one can see clearly a whiteness infinitely distant simply by looking at a whiteness nearby. Now, unless they were abso­ lutely identical, this could not be. Individuation, for Nicholas, does not necessarily bring about numerical difference. A plurality of whitenesses is not possible because the existence of the second would be superfluous. Or, if you say that two are better than one, by the same token an infinite multiplicity would be better than a finite number. But an infinite multiplicity is not possible. There­ fore there is only one whiteness. Nicholas' doctrine raises a serious problem. If I am in Paris looking at whiteness, by numerically the same act, according to Nicholas, I see numerically the same whiteness in England. If the whiteness in Paris is destroyed, the act of seeing it remains because by this same act I see the whiteness in England. But then there would be evi­ dence of seeing whiteness in Paris, even after the whiteness was de­ stroyed. And what is evident is true. But this would not be true. Thus Nicholas' criterion of certitude would be invalidated. To avoid this difficulty some say that a man seeing whiteness in Paris does not see it in London because the object of knowledge must be an efficient cause of its own being known. But Nicholas points out that the whiteness in Paris could suffice as efficient cause. And, once it is seen, one sees immediately the whiteness in London, since it is the same whiteness. Besides, God could cause a person to see whiteness and he would see it; the whiteness need not be the efficient cause of its being seen. Nicholas goes on without solving this important problem. ( e ) If someone says that the same object can be seen by several acts, which, for example, succeed one another, Nicholas objects that a power can produce only numerically one act. For, if it could produce more than one, why would it produce this one rather than any other?

[ 20 ]

It would produce all the acts at once, which is contrary to experience. So whiteness is known always by the same act. And, in general, from a cause comes numerically only one effect, and this effect is always produced, though not necessarily in the same place. And, since the cause always produces, the effect is eternal. ( f ) There is a problem how an accident is produced now in one substance and now in another. Nicholas explains, however, that it is not "transported" from one substance to the other, but that it ceases to be in one substance and in the next instant is in the other substance. ( g ) Nicholas admits that some things are corruptible in the sense that they appear here now and elsewhere later. They are not really corruptible, of course, since they remain in existence all the time. However, Nicholas runs into a problem in defending this doctrine. He has taught ( pages 164-165 ) that a plurality of whitenesses is not possible because there cannot be two things of the same kind. Now, how can he reconcile this with his assertion that individuals come and go? If individuals come and go, there must be individuals. And, if there are individual whitenesses, there is a plurality of whitenesses. Nicholas· answer is that, though there is a sense in which there are many whitenesses, there is a stronger sense in which there is only one. Nicholas has already taught that there are many individual white­ nesses and one specific nature of whiteness ( pages 195, 245-46 ) . But now he teaches that this is not incompatible with there being only one whiteness numerically. Similarly, he teaches that whiteness is com­ mon to both bright whiteness and dull whiteness, the difference being that in dull whiteness it is mixed with blackness; yet somehow the whiteness in the two cases is numerically one. Nicholas therefore teaches that individual whitenesses require indi­ vidual efficient causes to explain why they are here rather than else­ where. Yet individuality of location, and individuality in relation to efficient cause, are compatible with basic unity, not only specific but also numerical. How can this be? Nicholas compares individuation to movement. As movement is not anything real in a thing, so neither is individuation. That is, when a thing appears in a certain place or ceases to be in a certain place, nothing new comes into existence or goes out of existence. The nature and its individuation are different in concept, as are material substance and quantity, but they are not really distinct. ( h ) An interesting doctrine of Nicholas is that, since there cannot be two things alike, greater brightness is not produced by adding together equal amounts of light. And, consequently, if lights of dif­ ferent intensity are joined, the amount of light given off is that of

[ 21 ]

the light of highest intensity. Nicholas admits, however, that this seems to contradict experience. ( i ) Since there can be only one thing of a kind, every individual is identical with its species. Thus individuals are required for the perfection of the universe. ( Nicholas explains that the individual as such is required for this perfection but that its location in a particular place is not required for this perfection except while the thing is there. ) ( j ) Another consequence of Nicholas' teaching about the eternity of things concerns the eternity of powers; for example, in a human being. Since a power remains eternally unchanged, it cannot develop. Thus, when a boy grows, his powers do not really develop, as ordi­ narily understood. At each moment they are replaced by other, more developed, powers. Thus, the will which performs a deed immediately ceases to be, and therefore a person is rewarded or punished for the deeds performed by a will not his own.

THE

INTELLECT

This section is directed especially against the teaching of Averroes that there is one intellect for all men. The arguments of Nicholas, how­ ever, are unusual, not at all like those of, say, Thomas Aquinas. Nicholas says that men have different intellectual capacities, and that every faculty always works according to its peak capacity, and that therefore all men do not have the same intellect. Nicholas takes quite seriously the statement that a power always works at peak capacity. He even says that, when a person thinks less clearly than he did an hour previously, he does so with a different intellect. Also, since some intelligibles are harder to understand than others, they will be understood by different intellects in the same person. In fact, there are as many intellects as concepts. A problem arises in this latter case, however, for how can an intellect compare two intelligibles if it can understand only one of them? Nicholas thinks that, as long as both intellects are in the same soul, the problem is settled, provided there is a third intellect whose object is the difference between the two intelligibles. ( Nicholas seems to think that it is possible to know the difference between two intel­ ligibles without knowing the intelligibles. ) Why cannot men know an infinite multiplicity of things at the same time? Because thinking is accompanied by activities of the sense powers, and these, since they involve matter, interfere with one an­ other and thus limit the intellechial activities corresponding to them.

[ 22 ]

WHETHER THE SAME CAUSE CAN PRODUCE SPECIFICALLY DIFFERENT EFFECTS

Nicholas defends the doctrine that a cause can produce only one kind of effect. The proof is that, if a cause produced an effect less noble than another effect, some of its power would be superfluous; and this is unfitting in a perfect universe. A corollary is that two causes cannot produce one effect. For the higher of them will produce a greater effect, the lesser a lesser effect; hence they cannot produce the same effect. And it cannot be claimed that the two causes produce an effect greater than either of them, since then there would be no way of proving that any effect, however exalted, is beyond the power of any two causes. But, if an effect cannot be produced by two causes, there seems to be no necessity for many causes working together. The higher alone would suffice. Nicholas asserts, however, that, though two causes can­ not produce the same simple effect, they can produce a complex effect, such as Socrates, who is composed of bones, flesh, etc. One cause would produce the bones, another the flesh, and so on. A great many conclusions follow from these doctrines. ( a ) One fire cannot produce another. Since, according to previous teaching, there are no two things exactly alike, the fires will be un­ like. Suppose the fire caused is more intense than the fire causing it. Since an effect comes from only one cause, the first fire is the only cause of the second. But, since the second is greater than it, the first cannot be the cause of the second. Nicholas' position is that a heating power is in some way joined to a fire and that this heating power causes the effect. And, according as the effect is greater, the heating power coming into play is greater. ( b ) It seems also that an animal cannot beget its like. It is not equal to its offspring, since no two beings are equal. It is not superior, except incidentally, since an inferior animal can beget offspring as well as a superior one can. Nor is it inferior, since the lower cannot cause the higher. Hence the effect must be produced by some higher being. ( c ) If an effect seems to depend on the condition of the material worked upon, what really happens is not that poor material makes a particular cause produce an inferior effect, but that, because of the material, an inferior cause is at work. ( d ) Averroes is wrong in holding that the same effect ( mice ) is caused by different causes. The effects are not really the same but are slightly different; therefore the causes are slightly different. [ 23 ]

( e ) Knowledge is not caused by its object and a power of the soul, for no effect has two causes. Nor is the object in any way the cause, since the effect ( knowledge ) is usually something superior to the object. ( f ) God is not the total cause of all things, since, like other causes, God has only one effect. And God is not the partial cause of all things, because things can have two causes only in certain cases. Also, God produces nothing, because any creature is finite and thus out of proportion to an infinite cause. ( g ) If a cause can produce only one effect, how can the will be free? For it cannot be free unless it can produce opposite effects. Now, there are as many wills as there are volitions, just as there are as many intellects as concepts. Thus, no volition is capable of producing op­ posite effects. Nicholas cannot see how free will is possible. Nicholas now switches to a new topic. People who see white see it a little different objectively. Yet what they see is subjectively the same. 1 0 So, too, white and black are subjectively the same. For there are any number of degrees of perfection of eyesight. When white is looked at, what is seen ranges from bright white to black. Thus the same subjective being can give rise to such disparate objective beings. And Nicholas makes the startling statement that in reality there is only one subjective being in the universe. This subjective being is God. There is a difficulty in saying that blackness is merely the objective knowledge of white by a person with poor sight. For persons with good sight know blackness better than persons with poor sight. So blackness has, it would seem, a subjective being different from the subjective being of white. Nicholas answers, nevertheless, that there may be two orders of knowers. Those with first-order knowledge are in touch with the one subjective being, and white and black are two different objective be­ ings for them. But, for the second-order knowers, what serves as a quasi-subjective being is the objective being of the first-order knowers. These second-order knowers then know black and white as if they were two different subjective beings, but, in reality, they are not. It seems strange to speak of one person knowing another person's knowledge, but it should be remembered that for Nicholas knowledge is a thing, an atom or a group of atoms. Hence, presumably it can be known. 1

° For

Nicholas, the objective being of a thing is the being it has as an object in the mind; its subjective

[24]

being is the being i t has i n itself, outside the mind.

In these first-order and second-order knowers it would seem that the first-order knower is higher because he is closer to the subjective being of things. And yet the second-order knower seems higher be­ cause it is harder to know knowledge than it is to know things. Nicholas answers that the second-order knower is stronger but that he is less noble because the dignity of knowledge is measured by the object more than by strength. Nicholas finishes by considering a variety of only loosely related topics: ( a ) An intellect can know intuitively or abstractively. The human intellect knows abstractively. Intuitive knowledge is different from abstractive knowledge in that it is clearer. ( b ) Can a person with good vision see as well at a distance as a person with poor vision close up? If so, different powers will have the same object; but this cannot be.11 Nicholas says that in the power of sight are two powers, the power of the soul and the corporeal power that unites the spirits. The latter powers in the two men are unequal, but the former powers are numerically the same power. Hence there is only one power with the same object. ( c ) The object of the intellect is a universal. To the objective uni­ versal in the intellect there corresponds a subjective universal outside the mind. It may or may not be one with all other universals. It can be known more or less well in objective being. ( d ) Nicholas wants to simplify logic by reducing the kinds of sup­ position to two : formal and material. In formal supposition, a term is taken for what it signifies, as is "human" in "Socrates is human." In material supposition, a term is taken in itself, as in "

I, 10; 1 100a12.

[40]

and sense remain. An infinite number of times these will be in the same excellent condition in which they were in the good man, ac­ cording as those indivisibles will be re-assembled an infinite number of times. In this very fact lies an advantage for a good man over an evil man, who will recover his evil condition an infinite number of times just as the other his good condition." Or, one might say that, when that subject is said to decay, those two spirits will take up their abode in another subject composed of more perfect atoms; and, since the subject would be more adaptable, intelligibles would come to [ the spirits] more than before. Before God I pray that these remarks exert no evil influence on anyone. For although in my opinion they appear far more probable than what Aristotle said, yet, just as for a long time Aristotle's state­ ments seemed to be probable, though now perhaps their probability will be lessened, so someone will come along and undermine the probability of these [ statements of mine] . Let us also hold fast to the law of Christ and believe that there never occurs a rewarding of the good or a punishing of the evil except in the manner stated in that holy law. But to return to the main point: Any conclusion that can be known when formulated in terms of being can be known through the concepts of being or of the consequences of being. But the con­ clusion "Not all things are eternal" is formulated in terms of being and cannot be known through such concepts. Therefore it cannot be known and consequently you cannot say that that conclusion has been demonstrated by the Peripatetics. The major premise is known. According to my opponent meta­ physics is a science embracing all fields, 2 6 and, because of this prop­ erty, by means of transcendental propositions it seeks truth concern­ ing any recondite proposition at all. The minor premise is clear. For [ the conclusion] cannot be known through the concept of being, be­ cause the concept of being seems rather to argue for eternity than for deficiency and corruptibility. Neither [ can it be known] through the concept of good; rather, [thinking] in terms of [good] argues for the opposite, for it is better for any being at all to be eternal than not to be [eternal] , as it seems. Neither [ can it be known] through [ the concept of] plurality, because plurality and distinction in beings are consistent with the eternity of being. Nevertheless, it might seem to someone that this conclusion would be knowable even in concepts of being, or at least that the ex26

Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI, 3; 1060b 31.

[41]

188

istence of such a [non-eternal] being is possible. The argument runs as follows: "Every being which does not contain an incompatibility in its concept is possible; but there is nothing incompatible in the concept of a corruptible being, because there is no incompatibility in the concepts that something exists now and that it does not exist later." The answer is as follows. What contains an incompatibility in none of its concepts is possible. Thus the major premise is true, but not the minor. The minor, indeed, is not true if one admits that "corruptible being" contains an incompatibility in its concepts, that is, if one says that "a corruptible being which is part of a whole that is always perfect to the same extent" contains an incompatibility and contradiction. ( Keep in mind what was said above in the argu­ ment running "Every perfect whole, etc."2 1 ) If you should say "Every impossibility in secondary concepts reduces to an impossibility in a primary concept," I say that this is true when speaking of a primary concept which it is possible for us to have insofar as reality is con­ cerned; but there is no need for the reducing always to be such that we have an evident reduction to a primary concept which we actually possess. There is another argument for the main point. It is strengthened by supposing what the adversary Averroes says in Book 2 of the Metaphysics, that there is no question which the human intellect can never answer. 28 This is the argument: "The conclusion that there would be some question which the human intellect could never an­ swer, or which might even seem unanswerable to every intellect, does not seem probable. Thus it is when, for instance, things are caused in a segment of eternity. Suppose a definite duration, for instance a hundred years. The question arises why things have not been caused with a greater length of duration; and it does not seem that that ques­ tion can be solved. 29 It seems then that they are caused with every degree of duration. But this seems to be impossible since, whatever finite degree of duration be granted, there are still infinite degrees between it and eternity. Therefore [things have been caused ] with either every degree of duration ( which seems to be impossible, as has been said ) or certain particular degrees [ which has also been ruled out] ." Likewise there is an argument against Aristotle, who posits that things pass from being to non-being absolutely. For Aristotle posits 27

2a

Page 185. II, comm. 1; in Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commcntariis ( Ven­ ice, 1 562-7 4 ) vol. VIII.

20

[ 42]

This argument is recounted by Al­ gazel. See S. Van den Bergh, ed. , Averroes' Tahafut Al-Tahafut ( Lon­ don, 1 954 ) vol. I, p. 1 .

that friendly relations towards another proceed from what a man desires for himself/r n he also posits that for the sake of the common good a virtuous man ought to expose himself to death.:n Now, then, how can these [propositions ] be reconciled so that it can be argued in this way? Nothing in whose eyes its own existence is most highly desirable ought to perform an act tending to the destruction of its own existence. But this is the case here according to him. Not so, however, according to the conclusion that we posit. For it gives better reason for urging that one should die for the common good than does his conclusion previously mentioned, since we have not posited a change to non-being absolutely. "If these arguments . . . ," 3 2 Now, as for acts of the soul, in a special treatise on the soul3 3 we shall investigate more closely whether there is one intellect for all men and, if so, whether there is numerically one act of under­ standing, or more; and so on concerning some other matters. But I do not want at the moment to take much trouble to remove all doubts arising about the proposed conclusion. I hope that some­ where else I shall have need to speak again about this matter; and should there be no need, I shall write pertinent special treatises. It should be noted that I said before 3 ·1 that when a thing is said to be in the process of dissolution, this is nothing but the separation of the particles which are dispersing and parting. Although this is clear enough in some cases, still it is not in all cases so clear to the senses as it is when grain is separated from chaff. Now, one should know that there are some men who are willing to accept only those propositions that come into sense experience. Thus, when it is said that a whiteness is disintegrating, if they saw that minute whitenesses, like mustard seeds, were separating, they would then believe the statement. Such men are always asking "How is this?" and are unwilling to believe unless a man gives a sense demonstration of it. Nevertheless, not all truths are so demonstrable by us. Thus some men, by abstraction and analysis, see many things which these fellows never see, and are well aware that not all things are of such a nature as to come in this way into sense experience. Now, use your imagination, and you will have something like the dispute in which men are now involved. In some counhy everyone is blind from birth. Some among them are eager for knowledge and aspire after truth. Sooner or later one [of these] will say: "You see, s o Nicomachean Ethics, IX, 4; 1166al ff. s1 Nichomachean Ethics, III, 6; 1 1 1 5a 33.

32

These last three words are quoted from page 203. The prologue was written after the treatise proper. 33 Page 253. s i Page 187.

[43 ]

189

sirs, how we cannot walk straight along our way, but rather we fre­ quently fall into holes. But I do not believe that the whole human race is under such a handicap, for the natural desire that we have to walk straight is not frustrated in the whole race. So I believe that there are some men who are endowed with a faculty for setting them­ selves straight.'' Another will say : "Your supposition goes right against experience. What would that faculty be? Not intellect, for we have that, and we still do not walk straight. Not taste, not smell-these senses effect nothing." And indeed, through his metaphysical argument based on natural desire, he will not be able to make the other assent to what he says because he will not be able to make something appear to his senses. He could not do this unless he made him see, thus bestowing on him the power of sight. Nevertheless, he himself will have certitude through his metaphysical argument, and he will know that many things can exist which are not naturally fitted to reach their senses; at least there is no incompatibility [here] . So I have here arguments probable enough to conclude that the conclusion about the eternity of things is probable. Some perhaps will withhold belief because I cannot show that those minute white­ nesses come and go like seeds; but that is no reason for a denial. They will perhaps make the mistake of saying that I am denying what is self-evident, as that ignorant blind man would say to his knowledgeable fellow. Let these men take note that there are many things which are not naturally evident to sense. Thus, as perhaps will be said later in the treatise on indivisibles, 3 5 in a clock there is a certain wheel that moves, but, no matter how fixedly one watches it, he would not see it move. Similarly, the faster an arrow moves in the air, the less its movement is seen. And so, it seems, its motion could be accelerated so much that it would not be evident. For boys play with certain toys, like a top, or a hoop with or without a string; and, the faster these move, the less they are said to move, to the point that, when one of them is moving very fast, it seems that it is at rest, and the boys say that it is sleeping. This also ought to carry special weight because, according to those who hold Aristotle's conclusions, there are many things which cannot be readily imagined at first sight; nevertheless men because of Aris­ totle's pronouncements ( or, let us say, giving them more credit, be­ cause of reasons which they have not known how to fathom ) have ended by scorning imagination and clinging to reason. They say, 3�

Page 196.

[44 ]

indeed, that, if there is a mountain visible twenty leagues away, this is because it causes certain realities which they call "species." These multiply themselves through the whole intervening distance, so that they are infinite in number and [ can be produced] an infinite number of times; and thus they go on multiplying until they reach the sight. And the whole process takes place in an instant. In sound the production is successive and yet it seems to happen suddenly. They also posit a memory which retains the forms of non-sensory concepts which sometimes move [ the memory] and sometimes do not; and many such things. Now, for our part, we do not set down that some such things [as species] are caused by objects from scratch. We simply say that, when an object is present to the vision, and the eye is open, etc. ( under­ stand that these are simultaneous ) , some reality is now present to the soul which previously was not present [ to it] , though it existed. Nor do we say that particular atoms are released, but just that, as if by some special motion, 36 what is there imagined is sometimes present to this thing, sometimes not. And perhaps, if God grants, I shall compose a special treatise on the soul, where more will be seen about these matters. And so we shall have said that things which are called permanent are eternal. ( "Now, if the . . . , etc." ) 3 7 If things are posited to be eternal, as above, it will not be clear how the worth of one thing over another can be proven; for it will not be proven from the efficient causality required to produce some new being. It is true that a difficulty also arises for those who posit generation and corruption, according to the mind of Aristotle. For, according to this, the conclusion seems to be that the generative power in man would be nobler than the active intellective power, since every active power whose effect is nobler seems to be nobler. Now, this is the case; the effect of [ the generative power] is a sub­ stance; the effect of [ the intellective power ] is an accident. But, according to Aristotle, every substance is nobler than any accident. 3 8 From this, in conjunction with the other points set down above, the argument could be derived that natural things are eternal, because otherwise you would be left with the absurdity that the generative power would be nobler than the active intellective power. Likewise, according to them the argument of efficient causality does not suffice [ to prove nobility] because God is the noblest of 36 37

See pages 205 and 225. A reference to page 206.

38

[45]

Metaphysics, IV, 2; 1003bl 7. Aver­ roes, De Anima, II, comm. 2, in Averrois . . . C ommentarium . . in . . . De Anima . . . ( Cambridge, Mass., 1953 ) .

190

beings, and yet according to them, several of them at least, he is the efficient cause of nothing according to its natural appearances. Likewise, the rank of individual seems nobler than the specific nature, since it is later in generation, and things which are thus later:w in generation seem to be prior in perfection, as Aristotle seems to say in Book 8 of the Physics;4 0 and yet it does not seem to have any efficient causality. Likewise, the receiving of some quality or accident, whatever it may be, does not seem to be a sufficient argument [ to prove nobility] because every agent is nobler than the recipient [of an action] (On the Soul). 4 1 Therefore they encounter a difficulty in solving that prob­ lem with certainty. In keeping with the thought stated above about the eternity of things, it might conjecturally be said that, just as in the case of taste that flavor is called better which is more attractive to the taste, and in the case of vision that color, so in the case of the intellect that being seems nobler and more perfect which pleases it more and in which it naturally delights more, or which gives itself greater pleasure because of its nature. Now if you compare a man to an ass or a horse, and a horse to a stone, the one has a natural satisfaction and pleasure in being this rather than that. As a man knows that somehow the likenesses of all things come to him, so he knows that somehow he seems to be all things. And, as it is in natural sense-objects, that things move towards things of the same nature, as fire to the fire in the concave part of the moon's orb, and earth towards the centre, so it does not seem that those beings which thus come to the soul would come except because of a certain sameness of nature. This seems to give evidence about nobility and perfection. That capacity does not seem to be in the stone, for which 191 reason there are no indications by which we might know it is in it. Therefore man is nobler and more perfect than a stone. I have spoken about sameness in nature; what I have said, I believe to be true; and so the person who speaks about the earth so that paltry ideas come to men's souls seems in some fashion himself to have a soul of the same nature, and therefore paltry. Concerning the heavenly bodies, with respect to shape, quantity, motion, light, and that change in beings which seems to be a con­ sequence of changes of the heavenly bodies, we conjecture that there is nobility there, and so they give us much pleasure; and we con­ jecture that they would be more pleasing and satisfying if we knew 39

Read posteriora for posterior in line 27.

40 41

[46]

26 l a l 3. III, 5; 430a l 8.

everything in them. But in this case I do not see that demonstrative reasons are possible. Nevertheless, what has been said is sufficient to answer the question. Therefore, things are eternal. Indeed, this can be further proved as follows : "Nothing should be called absolutely false which binds together the whole multitude of men with a view to communal actions and generally to the goal of the whole human race; for this arrange­ ment of the universe would not seem to be fitting or right. But all men, of whatever sect they be, unite in good works because of their belief in eternity; therefore this [belief] ought not to be called abso­ lutely and altogether false." But now we encounter two ways of speaking. One would say that [ things] pass over to non-being and later return. And, though this way would be, absolutely speaking, closer to the truth, yet the op­ posite is said to have been the mind of Aristotle, for in Book 5 of the Physics he says: "Things whose substance perishes do not return numerically the same." 4 2 The second way encountered would deny a transfer to non-being, and here, as is certain, the proposition [ that things are eternal] would be conceded. But against this conclusion about the eternity of things there arises a difficult argument. When a man throws a stone, there exists in the stone, which moves when the man's hand leaves it, either something which did not exist previously ( and there [you have] the contention, it seems ) or nothing ( which cannot be asserted because the in­ divisibles which are in the stone naturally move downward ) . I t can be answered that there is nothing there which did not exist previously. This is Plato's teaching, as reported by the commentator Averroes in Book 4 of the Physics. 4 3 According to Plato, the motion of the stone is produced because the hand moves and the stone yields to it, part of the air yields to the stone, that part of the air is sup­ planted by another part which moves the projectile; and this continues to some point determined by the amount of the air which first yielded or by its motion in a particular pattern. Or it might be said that there is present in the stone something that was not present before, but yet existed, just as according to absolute truth and the Catholic faith there are some things, angels for example, who do not have a being circumscribed in space but only a determined location; that is, they are present in one place in such a way as not [to be present] in another. 42 43

V, 4; 228a3 ff. IV, comm. 68; in Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis (Ven-

[ 47 ]

ice, 1.562-74 ) vol. IV. The reference is to Plato, Timaeus, 79.

192

The principal conclusion is further proved as follows : "A thing ought not to be posited to endure in diminished being rather than in absolute being, but rather the other way round, since absolute being is more in keeping with the intent of nature. But, when Socrates is said to be decayed, he still endures materially in diminished being, for example, in memory. Therefore, etc." Likewise I raise an argument which perhaps will be shown not to be valid. It would follow that, in the case of a whiteness which we see, we would not be certain that it would have the same identity now as before, because it is not sufficient to argue that the present whiteness and the former whiteness are completely united in sense experience. Now, according to [ the arguments] men use, this is not sufficient because, if I take two equal whitenesses, Socrates' white­ ness and Plato's whiteness, these are completely united in sense ex­ perience and yet are not simply one whiteness, as [men] admit. Nor is identity of site or place sufficient, because in numerically the same place different things can succeed one another. By such inference I do not see that there could be another argument except by reason­ ing [this way] : "It was previously, therefore it is now, and so it has the same identity now as previously." And this reasoning would be proved through the arguments adduced above for the eternity of things: "Every part of a whole that is always perfect to the same extent always exists, etc."H And let no one think it ridiculous to make use of the arguments adduced above4 5 concerning the eternity of things. For they are meta­ physical, and such are most certain, as Aristotle says in the preface to the Metaphysics. 4 6 ( Not only, as the expositors say, are they cer­ tain from the nature of the matter, but also as regards us, if there were someone naturally fitted to use them. ) Hence they depend upon propositions which are not received by sense except incidentally. Moreover, if things passed from non-being to being, it would fol­ low that there would have to be something to act as subject ( which would be matter ) , and something which would be form in the being; for such is Aristotle's description of generation. 4 7 But there is no necessity for matter to exist. For this [necessity ] would result chiefly from two arguments. The first would be Aristotle's, 4 8 as it seems: "A substantial change is comparable to an accidental change, but in the latter there must be something acting as subject to the termini of the change. For example, if something changes from whiteness to blackness, there is given a surface which acts as subject to both white44

Pages 186. Pages 186 ff. • 0 I, 2; 982b2.

45

4

1 48

[ 48]

Physics, I, 7; 190bl ff. Physics, I, 7; 190a33 ff.

ness and blackness." But, admitting that in accidental change a sub­ ject is necessary, this argument requires the positing of matter only because accidents, according to Aristotle, 4 9 are beings only in a rela­ tive sense, so that they can have no independent existence. It does not follow from this that the same holds true in substantial genera­ tion. For Aristotle also, in Book 7 of the Metaphysics, 50 seems to mean that accidents are beings only because they belong to a being. The other argument in proof of prime matter seems to be the Commentator's. 5 1 If there were no prime matter, one of two things would follow: either [something] would be changed without change, or the change would be based upon non-being. Now, either there is change or there is not. If there is not, and it is certain that something is changed from non-being to being, then it will have been changed without change. If there is change, then it has as subject either non­ being ( and thus [you have] another unsuitability ) or the terminus a quo or the terminus ad quem ( and each is false because these are the limits of the change ) . Therefore [ there is] something besides these, and that is called matter or subject. It is certain that to those who posit the eternity of things this argument proves nothing. It assumes as known that something is being changed from non-being to being, which would be denied it. Nevertheless, supposing that I posited generation and corruption in things, as men generally do, I would still not be positing prime mat­ ter. I would reply to the argument with the premise that by this statement "This being is being changed in substance" I understand merely "This being is, and previously it was not." Nor do I mean therein something other than non-being and being; or, if something, I would mean a relationship founded in being. If you should reply, "This means that being is acquired through change," I would say, "If this is true, it ought to be understood so as to mean: 'A being which is changed is and previously it was not.' " And [now] for the replies. Since he who says "This being is being changed" seems always to understand something by way of subject, I would say: "Remove that verb 'is changed', and substitute all the appearances, and see if from them a subject is necessarily inferred." According to [my opponents] the appearances are: a thing is which previously was not, or a thing is not which previously was. Accord­ ing to them this is known or, more truly, inferred. But, now, on the basis of these propositions a subject would never be inferred. If you say, "The ancients agreed that nothing arises from nothing," 5 2 I should 49 11 0

Ibid. VII, l; 1028al0 ff.

51 52

[ 49]

Averroes, Physics, I, comm. 68. Aristotle, Physics, I, 4; 187a27.

193

reply : "If by this proposition the ancients meant to denote the natural order which exists among beings ( for when one being is generated, another decays, and so nothing is generated without being preceded by something to which the emergent being had a natural ordering in its emerging ) , then their meaning would be true on that inter­ pretation. But, if by the aforementioned proposition they meant some­ thing else, they would be contradicted." So, granted that I posited generation and corruption in things as is commonly done, yet I would not posit prime matter, and I used to say so before there occurred to me the conclusion about the eternity of things. Concerning what has been said before, a doubt is raised by re­ calling a certain argument previously touched upon to some extent, namely, that it seems that eternity cannot be demonstrated from the concept of plurality, since there are in nature as many things as are possible ( as was said above ) , 5 3 but corruptible things are possible ( as it seems and as was asserted above ) .5 4 So one might argue as follows: "Just as the existence of an individual object is possible in nature so is that of its equal. But neither will exist at the same time [ as the other] because the other would be superfluous. Therefore, they will exist in succession. In this way the universe will remain always perfect to the same extent, and it is better thus by substitu­ tions in that one may posit as large a plurality as is possible." In this way they could answer the argument I gave above55 for the eternity of things, for it is known, through the reasoning given, that some things are corruptible because they pass into non-being. Therefore, either [the corruptible things] are those things which are always in evidence ( which is false and contradicts sense experience ) or they are those things which are not always in evidence. And then either they have non-being when they are in evidence ( which is against sense experience ) or they have non-being when they are not in evidence ( and this would be the contention ) . To this argument, which seems to do away with the eternity of things, I have a reply. When it is said that one must posit a plurality, I am ready to agree, although it ought not to be posited unneces­ sarily, as they themselves admit. 5 6 But I say that eternity does not seem to do away with plurality because, though you imagine as many things as you like, they can still be eternal. Concerning this point, indeed, it was objected that we [ can ] imagine some individual equal [to another ] . But here I say that plurality ought not to be posited except to reveal the First Being. Now, since the other is altogether 5 :1 f>-& 5 ,,

Page 187. Page 188. Page 186.

56

[ 50]

Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, III, 4; 665b l5.

equal, they are identical in relation to the First Being; and so to posit corruption would be pointless. Likewise, one individual object does not exclude another. If you say it does, this is only because the second would be superfluous and so the existence of one is as good as if there were a pair of things. It was argued that it seems that man's natural desire for eternity is not in vain.5 7 But a counter-argument is raised, first, because we see that many things are in vain. For example, someone has a natural desire to be somewhere and yet he will never be there. This is no obstacle; nay, rather it seems to confirm the proposition. That natural desire is a thing that will always be, and, though the journey to a particular thing may not follow now, it will follow on another occa­ sion. So even now [ the desire] is not in vain. Therefore you must know that on this subject I picture [ the situation] as follows. Each thing is in the first place intended by nature for its own sake, so that each thing has, so to speak, its own divinity and its own goodness, and it is for this that it is intended by nature in the first place. In the second place, as regards a secondary intention, a con­ nexion is found in some way among beings so that one is for the sake of another. Now, then, it would seem unfitting for the secondary purpose of the thing never to be achieved. But, if at some time it is not achieved, [that] does not seem unfitting, because the first purpose for which it was intended by nature remains. This could be said here. Hence that desire is something which at some time will be followed by movement towards Notre Dame. Some, however, from the Rue Fouarre, 58 might perhaps want to make a different rejoinder to the argument given. When it is said "Then the natural desire would be in vain," they might say : "Not so, for men achieve their purpose. They contemplate eternity, for they have it in the intellective soul, which Aristotle 5 9 ( as they claim for themselves ) posited as eternal." But this does not hold good because not only do men desire eternity, but they desire it in such a way that each desires to achieve it in a manner proper to himself.60 But accord­ ing to them the intellective soul is common, so as to be numerically one in all men.6 1 But a doubt is raised over the statement that the natural desire to go to Notre Dame ( and in general with regard to other acts of the soul ) 6 2 is present now to one individual and now to another. There57

Page 203. The University of Paris was located there. 59 On the Soul III, 5; 430a22. ao For alio in line 9 read modo.

61

58

62

[51]

This was taught by Averroists, of whom there were many at Paris. See E . Gilson, History of Christian Phil­ osophy in the Middle Ages ( New York, 1 954 ) pp. 387 -402, 521-527. Page 205.

l94

fore, let us determine that mode of presence. My opinion is that that mode cannot easily be explained or determined. But this [difficulty] is not peculiar to the one who posits eternity in things, but happens to others also. For it is not evident, if the intellect is numerically one in all men, what mode of presence it has with respect to each individual. Also-and this seems better known-it is not evident what is meant by the statement "An accident inheres in a subject." Hence, it is true that the intellect somehow seems to abstract this concept of inherenre from certain things, as when it says that skin inheres in the bones, and afterwards it applies [ the concept] to accident and subject as if imag­ ining that it belongs there, but the truth about the real situation is not evident. Similarly one does not posit the inherence of intelligence. What, then, its mode of presence is in this world, it is not easy to say. Hence in some matters he have a concept, as it were, through a con­ cept that a thing is or if it is, but do not have a concept of its essence or properties. It would be like a blind man's being told by a being that cannot lie ( and the blind man would know this [veracity] , as was said above ) 63 that white is the most beautiful of colours, for example. The blind man would know this to be true, and yet would not know how to attach to his statement any meaning as regards essence or property. So in this case we satisfactorily conclude that the act of understanding is now present in this individual ( indeed, it seems to be evident enough ) , and yet we cannot describe the presence. Another argument for the eternity of things applies especially to those who posit a plurality of formal causes in the same subject. 64 For, according to them, when the whiteness in a wall is said to give place to blackness, it does not pass away insofar as what appears is con­ cerned, because it does not appear except as regards something com­ mon to itself and to another whiteness equal to it ( hence they are completely united in sense-experience ) . Now, insofar as it is the same as another whiteness, it does not pass away except as regards the sin­ gular [ concerned], which is an extrinsic consideration. Therefore, since it does not pass away as regards the being which appeared-and it is not evident that it passes to non-being as regards other being-it seems that it does not pass to non-being in any way. It seems that those who posit a plurality of formal causes ought easily to be converted to a belief in eternity. For, according to them, when it is said "The white­ ness which was in the wall is destroyed," one ought to say that nothing that was there has been destroyed, although nothing appears there of what appeared there previously. However, what ought to be said 1 95 about this plurality of formal causes is not now among the matters falling within our scope. 63

Page 184.

64

[ 5 2]

The Scotists.

Nevertheless, incidentally, it seems to me that it may be more prob­ able to say that in the whiteness of Socrates and the whiteness of Plato there is some one thing in reality itself, one thing which, isolated from anything subsequent to it, is of itself in no way differentiated in the two; and that I call the specific nature. That this would be the case is shown. Granted that some devise many highly abstract arguments, I do not think that any is more prob­ able than the following: "Things that are completely identified in sense experience and in the intellect have a real unity. For, where the intel ­ lect makes a discovery in reality so that it can point out that this [ ob­ ject] has two existences, it then says that there is plurality there. Where [ it can point out that it has] only one, there it must assert unity. Now, since they are completely one in sense experience and in the intellect, it is evident that the intellect cannot point out this thing twice without repetition. But this is the case. Assume two equal white­ nesses. These are completely identified in sense experience and in the intellect." But you will say: "The major premise is true if they are completely identified in sense experience and in the intellect so that the intellect has neither an a priori nor an a posteriori means of positing a differ­ ence. But this is not the case here; on the contrary, the intellect posits a difference on the basis of different locations. For it is evident to the intellect that one thing cannot be in several places at the same time.'' I retort with a question about the major premise which we as­ sumed before, namely, that what are in themselves completely iden­ tified in sense experience and in the intellect are in some way one thing in reality itself. Either this assumed [premise] is necessarily true, or it can be untrue. If the first, tbe contention [is established] , because you readily grant the minor premise. But, if the assumption can be untrue, then we shall have no certainty that something is the same now as previously, because unity in sense experience and in the intellect will be inconclusive. Unity of place is inconclusive because different things can succeed one another in the same place. Also, no identity ought to be rejected except the one about which your argument draws a conclusion, arguing from the difference in location. But [ this identity concerns] only a subject numerically one, or the formal constitution of a subject which is numerically one. It is true that such a thing cannot be in several places, but it is not true that the specific nature cannot. But it seems that I shall prove not only identity as regards species between these whitenesses but an absolute identity, because the same [ 53 ]

kind of argument proves that this whiteness is completely the same now as before. For it seems that the only way of showing this, as was said above, is that in sense experience and in the intellect it is exactly the same. 6 5 But this argument is inadequate to prove that a particular whiteness is completely the same now as before. Or we might say: "We have a way of proving identity, and because no way comes to mind of proving diversity, therefore we do not posit it." And then this falls short of full certainty.

196

Here, though, we do have a means of proving diversity, namely, [diversity] of location. Therefore we have proved identity in nature and diversity on the individual level. That level does not come as such into sense experience, for this whiteness is seen only according to something common to itself and another whiteness equal to it. Hence, concerning [individuality ] , 6 6 we have, as it were, a concept that it is, but we do not have a concept of its essence or a concept of its properties, as was said above, in the case of the blind man. 6 7 If someone who could not lie ( and this [veracity] were known to the blind man ) were to address him and tell him that white is the most beautiful of colours, the blind man would have a concept of the fact but would not have a concept of its content. Hence, if he were asked ''What do you mean?", he would say: "I don't know." Therefore, when it is asked whether [ the individual] , taken as such, is nobler than the nature, the question cannot be fully settled since the concept which ought to be the means of settling that question lies hidden. Neverthe­ less, whichever may be said, I do not see that it has impossible conse­ quences. If it is said that [it is ] nobler, on the other hand it seems not to have a function. [But] this is not an obstacle, because neither is the nobility of God dependent upon some [function] in Him different from Himself. Thus the [individual] itself sets an end, and its function is like an end because all that precedes it exists for it. Were it said that it is less noble, there is no great difficulty in what was said concerning things later in generation being more perfect, 68 because in our view there is no generation. And, granted that there were, I do not see that that rule could be proved except by induction in some instances. And such inductions, when they are not confirmed by a cause, are like Priscian's argument : "If there is order in some, there is order in all." But enough of this for the present. Perhaps I shall dis­ cuss it at greater length elsewhere, for the confirming of this conclu­ sion will prepare men's minds to a great extent for the conclusion 65 611

Aclcl sit cadem after omnino in line 32. Rt•acl ipso for ipsa in line 4 1 .

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about eternity as related above. 6 9 For, when whiteness is said to give place to blackness, it does not cease appearing insofar as it was like some other whiteness. Nevertheless, previously nothing else appeared, and so as much appears now as did before. [There may be] those who still have doubts about the argument first adduced for the eternity of things. 70 In its minor premise it was said that it does not follow that, if something does not appear, there­ fore it does not exist. It can be objected : "Then, if you are in one place, 7 1 we would not be certain you were not in another, because it does not follow that, if you do not appear there, you do not exist." The answer, indeed, is that we shall be certain enough, because, while you exist as an individual, you are not elsewhere. For, when there are posited those things which an appearance will follow, the appearance is posited as it follows them. Now, this is the case, for we do not posit in the instance given indivisibles which are scattered, but we posit that they are gathered together so that they are 7 2 here when the indi­ vidual is here, and elsewhere [ when he is elsewhere] . There is another reason, too. It is evident that you are now in one spot. Positing this, it is evident to the intellect that you are not else­ where, because it is unintelligible that one individual would be simul­ taneously in several places. Therefore, according to this, it would not be proved by non-appearance. But there is still a doubt from another source : according to this, it could not be proved that a moving object is not always in motion, be­ cause it will not follow that, because i t does not appear to move, therefore it does not move, as in [ the case of] a certain clock-wheel, which moves without appearing to. My answer is that you are speak­ ing either of an individual sense object which moves in a straight line ( and then it is known not to be moving because it appears here now as previously, and thus is here now as previously, and so is not else­ where; as [ was said] above ) 73 or of one which moves with a circular movement ( then it is not entirely certain whether it is moving unless this appears post factum; for example, if some mark were placed on that clock-wheel, then it would be evident that the mark had changed when movement had previously been present ) . Now, an argument is raised against some bases of the above dis ­ cussion. A basis was the concept of good. Now, it seems that it cannot provide a sure argument in things because men sometimes judge the false to be true. Thus a person's act is spoiled, and thus it would seem better for it not to exist. I say that, even though it is evil or imperfect Pages 186 ff. 1o pages 198 ff. 1 1 Omit non after te in line 18.

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in some respect, yet absolutely it is better for it to be than not be. Consequent on that judgment are some good movements and some good operations, the existence of which is better than their nonexist­ ence. Let that be our answer, even though it seem to destroy one of the arguments given above. 7 4 Hence, unless we wish to say that every­ thing happens by chance, it seems to me true ( according to 7 5 the imperfect concepts which we now use ) that there is nothing in the universe whose existence is not better than its nonexistence. And per­ haps he to whom the false judgment is attributed ought rather to wish to exist with this state of affairs than not exist at all, with no actions whatever. 76

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THE

BEGINNING OF THE SECOND PROLOGUE

To Master Odo, 7 7 and to all others who want to seek the truth and accept it. When my mind in its deliberations turned to thinking of those who call themselves searchers of truth as it is found in natural appearance, [ I found] one matter among others which of itself is very displeasing to any lover of truth. For those who would claim to proceed discursive­ ly to diverse conclusions by [reasoning from] acts which we experience in ourselves and from principles self-evident from their terms agreed so much with the mob that their final solution in their investigations was in accord with the conclusions and words of Aristotle and his commentator Averroes. They used these as principles, and gave them such great credence that they considered it entirely irrational to argue against someone denying their conclusions, as though to argue against such a one were to argue with a half-wit. Lest I seem to seek glory jn imputing falsity to these I have been speaking about so that thereby I might appear to the people as a corrector of errors, I adduce some examples and some probable conjechues which ought to suffice in this matter. The first is this. When for the first time the doctors of this univer­ sity heard that some people were asserting it as probable that material substance and quantity are not really distinct, 78 I heard from the elders among them that it was unfitting to argue against such people be­ cause they denied self-evident principles. But I have a query. They though that to be a principle either simply because it was said by Aristotle-in which case the contention [is established] -or because the intellect grasps it naturally as soon as it understands the terms, or because it is something we experience within ourselves. But neither [ of these last] can be said, because either there would then be no question about such a proposition or, if there were, its solution would be quite easy. And yet their master Aristotle, whom they wish to fol­ low so closely, said that this is a very difficult problem, and accord­ ingly lists it among the most difficult problems in Book 3 of his Meta­ physics, near the beginning. 7 9 Briefly let the argument be as follows : "One should not think it irrational to argue with someone upholding the other side of a very difficult problem. It would not be called very difficult unless each part of it were difficult, either in itself or by reason of the arguments ap71

This may be Gerard Odo. See His­ toire Litteraire de la France, XXIV ( 1896) 349.

William of Ockham, Sentences, lib. IV, q. 4 ( Lyons, 1494-96) f. R viii ff. 7 9 III, l ; 996al2 ff.

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parently leading to its solution. But, as has been said, it is a very diffi­ cult problem whether substance and quantity are really the same. Therefore it must not be rational to judge that it is irrational to argue against someone upholding the other side. If they have thought this to be a principle whereas ( as is clearly shown by Aristotle, whom they follow implicitly ) it is not, it is most likely that they act similarly in other matters, so that, especially since they have no arguments and have always used Aristotle's conclusions as principles, they will say that men deny principles when a man merely asserts conclusions which are true but different from those usually held. Let each person, then, leave these [supposed principles ] aside, and take care to persuade his soul that the true philosopher should distinguish himself from the crowd by not accepting some things as principles merely because they are commonplace." There is a second example which confirms the contention stated above. The doctors who gather to keep occupied fill books during their deliberations and compose long courses in expounding the words of Aristotle. But, if the precise cause of their accepting Aristotle's words as true is an evident reason, it seems utterly superfluous for them to thus set aside the consideration of things and turn to a man's words. For no one doubts that [the purpose] could have been accomplished in a shorter time if each person gave his reason for holding a con­ clusion. The third example concerns teachers who settle fully scarcely one out of ten arguments in their questions. They merely allege a statement of Aristotle or of his Commentator for the major or minor proposition. Yet, as would be evident to one looking at their books, the propositions are not know from their terms, nor are they such as the intellect spon­ taneously assents to, nor [ do they concern] something which we ex­ perience in ourselves. My mind has seen all these things and more like them, and it thou ght that there was error in them and no little deception. Moved by a charitable zeal, I thought that their opinion needed help. God knows [that I was ] not [moved] by love of glory, but by the belief that, when there is a search based on principles, tm th will reign in the soul and there will not be room for falsehood any longer. And so I proposed, among other things, to show against these mis­ guided persons that there are some conclusions which it is certain that Aris totle taught and which they do not call into doubt, but which they could not know at all. In the course of this there were a great many conclusions which will be examined, not by settling them but questioning them.

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FIRST TREATISE : THE ETERNITY OF THINGS

We must investigate the eternity of things especially. And first partially under this form: "Can our intellect state a conclusion that is certain from the fact that some things absolutely permanent are not eternal, those things of which it is commonly said that they are gene­ rated and decay or that they are subject to alteration and the move ­ ment of growth?" The proof deals first with things in which, as it seems, it is more obvious that there is a passage from non-being to being and from being to non-being, as in [ the case of] sensory quali­ ties. But it should be known at the outset that it can be shown in two ways that we do not know this conclusion: «Not all things are eternal." [We can] either show that the opposite is true; or show that the only arguments which appear sufficient to show the proposed conclusion are not sufficient. Hence it is possible that someone might think this an open question because the first way is ruled out but not the second. Therefore we shall begin with the second way. No intellect, to which it is certain and evident that something exists at some time, can say for certain at a later time that that thing does not exist, unless it has some argument with the power to induce a knowl­ edge of that negative proposition asserting that the thing which existed previously no longer exists. In the case of sensory qualities which exist now, the intellect is, or can be, certain that they exist. Therefore at a later time it ought not to deny the thing's existence unless it has some argument with the power to induce the knowledge of this negative proposition. The major premise is known, since the intellect, as a ra­ tional power, ought not to change from the extreme of an affirmative proposition to the negative extreme without an inherent reason for the change, since there is no self-evident principle. For, take a proposition about a thing previously existing which is said to be non-existent: "The whiteness does not exist.', My question is whether that [proposition] 8 0 is known to you from its terms, or is first known through experience as something you experience in yourself. Not in the first way, be::ause it would be always known to you, and so its truth was known t o you when the opposite was a fact; even in the absence of sensation that negative proposition would be known once its terms were understood. Nor in the second way, for all we experience in ourselves is that, before blackness takes over, there seems to be a cessation of the act of appearing that we had, so that we no longer experience in ourselves the act of seeing that we had before. Therefore, since [ the proposition] is not known as a principle, it must be as a conclusion, and so by virtue of some argument. so Read illa for alia in line 41.

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But there is no argument inducing a knowledge of this negative proposition that a thing, or whiteness, does not exist. For both propo­ sitions of that argument would be known either from their terms or through experience. I shall prove that it is not from their terms be­ cause, if they were known from their terms or were dependent on such, such a proposition would always be understood once they were under­ stood, and thus in the absence of whiteness itself one would have cer­ tainty about it. Therefore [the proposition] must be known through experience, from sensory acts which we experience in ourselves. Therefore, the proposition "This whiteness does not exist" is assumed on the basis of either a positive sense act or the cessation of a sense act which at first was experienced with regard to whiteness. Not from the first, because that would point rather to the existence of the whiteness than to its non-existence. Therefore from the second, that is, from the cessation of an act which at first was experienced with regard to the whiteness. If, therefore, there is produced some suitable argument leading to the conclusion that the whiteness which formerly existed exists no longer, it seems to be the one stated. This is clear also from the fact that what the intellect seems to naturally resort to when asked about a proposition is what serves as an argument for the intellect in regard to the proposition. But when it is asked if water is hot, men at once resort to an act of touch. When it is asked if this wall is white, it resorts to an act of sight. And similarly in other cases. With some young men a more adequate argument might seem to be: "Because blackness inheres, therefore whiteness does not." But the intellect cannot use this as a primary argument because, if the intellect says that on the advent of blackness whiteness is removed, this is only because it sees that on the advent of blackness the sense of sight loses the appeareance of whiteness. Thus it seems that the argu­ ment ought to be declared the one into which all others are finally resolved, and the one which seems to suffice by itself. It would be tedious and useless to discuss all the arguments that could be given, and it is customary enough that the argument be taken for granted that is more probable and more suitable for the question at issue. And if there is another, 8 1 he who claims he is certain of his concl usion should propose [this argument]. Otherwise we should be forced to wander through almost endless arguments. Similarly, it has been proven well enough that there is no other argument, or, if there is, that it reduces to this one as the basic argument. Now, indeed, it is shown that the cessation of appearance is an in­ adequate argument to conclude that a thing does not exist. Let us 81

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phrase the argument so as to make its force more apparent by argu­ ing: "Everything which previously appeared to a sense but now does not appear, no matter what the sense fixes its attention on, no longer exists. But this is the case with the whiteness which previously ap­ peared, but now does not appear. Therefore, etc." The incon�lusivc­ ness of this reasoning can be shown in three ways. The first of these ways seems to me to be more probable than the others, even tlwugh I do not have an evidently demonstrative conclusion. Here it is: '·As concerns the major premise, let it be said that it does not contain truth. For natural forms are divisible into their smallest units in such a way that these, when divided off from the whole, could not perform their proper action. And so, though they are visible when existing in the whole, they are not visible when dispersed and divided or sepa­ rated. For this is true even according to the mind of Aris tot� :' Yvhen he says8 2 that natural beings have maximum and minimum limits." The second way would be to say that the case is analogous \·.'iLh the power of movement, which sometimes performs its act and sometimes is at rest. When it functions, it appears. When it is at rest, it then 200 does not appear, but it is not therefore said to be destroyed. The same could be said of all other powers. [If the contrary is true, ] then a man is said to be destroyed when those of his faculties are at rest which relate to his principal function. And, when this happens in all the parts of some region, then the world is said to be destroyed as far as that region is concerned. So it has been countless times, an