The United States and China : Competing Discourses of Regionalism in East Asia [1 ed.] 9781443884402, 9781443872737

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The United States and China

The United States and China Competing Discourses of Regionalism in East Asia By

Narayani Basu

The United States and China: Competing Discourses of Regionalism in East Asia By Narayani Basu This book first published 2015 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2015 by Narayani Basu All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-7273-3 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-7273-7

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Acknowledgments ..................................................................................... vii Chapter One ................................................................................................. 1 Introduction a) Regionalism in Perspective b) Regionalism in the context of ‘Region’: Theoretical Perspectives Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 13 US Regionalism in East Asia: Past and Present a) During the Cold War: Bilateralism vs Multilateralism b) The Aftermath of the Cold War c) APEC: Steps toward Regionalisation d) Regionalism: An American Perspective e) Regionalism in Foreign Policy (1989-2014) f) The United States and Security Regionalism in East Asia Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 63 Chinese Regionalism in East Asia: Past and Present a) Regional Discourse in China: A Trajectory b) Regionalism: A Chinese Perspective c) Regionalism in Foreign Policy (1989-2014) Chapter Four ............................................................................................ 117 ASEAN: Platform for Cooperation or Conflict? a) Assessing Its Capability b) ASEAN: A Chinese Perspective c) ASEAN: An American Perspective d) Great Power Transitions & ASEAN Centrality: The Case of the South China Sea Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 167 Regionalism versus Great Power Politics: The Future of the East Asian Regional Order

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Notes .............................................................................................. 183 Index .............................................................................................. 217

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Much has been written about the dynamics between the United States and China in East Asia. The two countries are major players in the region, with the former being an older and more formidable presence than the latter. However, the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen a dramatic change in the geopolitical scenario. The United States is no longer the imposing power in the region that it used to be, even though the Obama administration is doing its best to breathe new life into Cold War alliances. All across East Asia, China is probing at the bilateral ties that the United States has maintained in the region for the last five decades. ‘Great Power Politics’ is the name of this particular game, and it is not a new one. Nevertheless, that is not the point of this book. When I began research on the subject three years ago, I found that it would be easy to dismiss the current geopolitical scenario as ‘Great Power Politics’. Perception plays a major role in foreign policy formulation. At a time when East Asia is at its most fluid, it is equally important to look at how the United States and China view a region that both consider so key to their national interests. How have their perspectives on the region evolved, and what impact have those evolving discourses had on their respective regional policies towards East Asia? Regional discourse is the driver behind the foreign policy moves of the United States and China in East Asia. Understanding it enables an insight into two differing (and sometimes overlapping) regional perspectives and how they play out in East Asian regional institutions and contribute to (or impede) the building of cohesive regional security architecture in the twenty-first century. This is especially significant given the fact that the United States is still (despite its declining power) a global hegemon, and China is, within East Asia, a regional one. My ideas, however, would not be on paper without my professor and former supervisor, Dr. Abanti Bhattacharya. She was a wonderful guide – patient, helpful, supportive and always pushing me to read, investigate and think beyond my own limitations. For this, I offer her my grateful thanks. I would also like to thank the faculty at the Department of East Asian Studies, Delhi University, New Delhi, India. In particular, Dr. Madhu Bhalla and Dr. Madhavi Thampi for making China Studies an immensely fascinating academic field; Mr. Kailash Chand Mathur for his support and

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encouragement in Chinese Language; and Professor Anita Sharma for being such a friendly, sympathetic and approachable Head of Department. I would also like to thank Mr. Prem Pal Singh Jadaun, the librarian at the East Asian Studies Department Library for his wonderful work in assisting a harassed researcher to find her material. The wonderful team at Cambridge Scholars Publishing, especially Amanda Millar, cannot be thanked enough for their accessibility, approachability and helpfulness. To Durgadas, who made me believe in myself at a time when I needed it the most – thank you. My friends are too many to name, but they all provided a lot of joy and encouragement throughout the process of writing this book. I cannot be more grateful for their presence. Last, and perhaps most importantly, I would not have come this far without the unwavering support of my mother, Nalini Menon. She has always been my rock – pragmatic, direct and ever ready with solutions to my problems. To her, I offer the hope of being able to live up to her expectations and, perhaps someday, exceed them. This book is dedicated to her. Narayani Basu New Delhi October 16, 2014

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

Regionalism in East Asia: The Idea that Would Not Go Away As a concept, regionalism is far from new. Even a cursory glance at historical records will show that regions, in terms of empires or spheres of influence, have existed across the globe and over the centuries. Throughout the nineteenth century, different leagues, associations and unions were concerned with the maintenance of security. For instance, in the United States, it was the Monroe Doctrine, while in Europe, the term ‘concert’ was used to highlight the existence of a regional order, based on a balance of political power. During the early years of the twentieth century, the League of Nations was established as the first global security institution, in the aftermath of the First World War.1 Only in the run up to, and the actual duration of, the Second World War was regionalism placed on the backburner. The aftermath of the Second World War left a dire need for new international institutions, leading to the birth of organisations like the United Nations and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Bretton Woods system. The primary reasons behind their establishment remained precisely the same, namely to ensure global security. Cross-regional groupings, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO),the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty (ANZUS) also began to emerge during these years, one of many baby steps that regionalism was to take, and is still taking, following the end of the Cold War in 1989.

1

Louise Fawcett, “Regionalism in World Politics: Past and Present,” Garnett Seminar, PhD School, Brussels, 2008.

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The idea here, however, is not to trace the steps as and when they happened. Instead, regionalism will be used as a connecting thread, linking one chapter to the other.

Regionalism in Perspective It is necessary to first put the many debates surrounding regionalism in context. As a concept, the term ‘regional’, with all its connotations of ‘region’ and ‘regionalism’, is beset by many competing views and very little consensus. Much of the debate is generally focused exclusively on the ‘new’ variety2 of regionalism, the propagation of which gathered pace in the aftermath of the Cold War, and is primarily associated with increased economic integration. However, across these schools of thought, there is a subtly hidden common denominator which postulates that all forms of regionalism must include some kind of interaction, formal or informal. Although much of the impetus for regional initiatives comes unsurprisingly from regional actors, it is noteworthy how influential extra-regional geopolitical forces have been in shaping regional processes, even where they were not intended to be so. In the case of East Asia for example, where the origins of regionalism have been complex and their ultimate outcomes unpredictable, much depends on the dynamic interplay of regional and extra-regional influences such as the United States. In other words, regionalism is not simply a contingent, functional response to the ‘needs’ of international capital, but an essentially political process based on multidimensional economic and strategic factors.3In today’s context, this would imply an association with a programme or strategy and the resultant building of formal institutions linked to it.

2

Alex Warleigh-Lack, “Towards a Conceptual Framework for Regionalisation: Bridging ‘New Regionalism’ and ‘Integration Theory’,” Review of International Economy, Vol. 13, No. 5, December 2006, pp. 750-771. 3 Mark Beeson, “Rethinking Regionalism: Europe and Asia in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 6, December 2005, pp. 969-985.

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Regionalism in the Context of ‘Region’: Theoretical Perspectives Louise Fawcett has rightly asked, ‘What is the regional level?’4 After all, even if not used directly, the term is often variously inferred. Another leading question that arises is: ‘What is a region?’ Fawcett believes the answer to this question lies in the degree of what she calls ‘definitional flexibility’.5 However, for some like Joseph Nye, a region is a group of states linked both by a geographic relationship as well as a degree of mutual interdependence. 6 Peter Katzenstein offers three approaches to defining a ‘region’: (a) material– classical theories of geopolitics; (b) ideational– critical theories of geography; and (c) behavioural theories. Each approach, he argues, contributes to the definition of ‘region’ and that there is no single approach. Katzenstein points to the existence of geographic ‘umbrella philosophies’, illustrating the central point that regions are politically made.7 This theory has different strands. Its political strand views regions as spatial manifestations of capitalist production processes that separate the core from their peripheries, while its cultural strand focuses on regions as collective symbols chosen by groups to dominate specific places in the world. This view is echoed by Fawcett, who has emphasised the importance of an inclusive typology, which includes state-based as well as non-state-based regions, and also those of varying size and composition. 8 Certainly, size and membership are important and sometimes become the engine behind the formation of a regional bloc. An example of this is the Malaysian-inspired East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG), formed with the initial purpose of excluding the United States as a major regional player. In short, defining a region depends on the interpretation of its meaning and the form of its existence. Seeking a definition of ‘region’ allows it to be interpreted as a reference to regionalism. As globalisation spreads across the world, and as security landscapes change, there is today a flourishing body of literature on both the subject and the concept. Depending on the school of thought, a wide variety of perspectives emerge on regionalism. For example, in the 4

Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, 2004, pp. 429-446. 5 Ibid. 6 Joseph Nye, International Regionalism (Boston: Little & Brown, 1968), p. vii. 7 Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia & Europe in the Age of American Imperium (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 9. 8 Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, 2004, pp. 429-446.

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aftermath of the first wave of Western European regionalism during the 1950s and 1960s, the concept of ‘region’ took on a decidedly ‘functionalist’ tenor9 at a general theoretical level. As Mark Beeson has explained, “in terms of theoretical orientation, functionalist explanations have always been preoccupied with explaining how regional processes work and the benefits that flow from their capacity to generate ‘spillovers’. They are less good, however, at explaining the creation of regional orders in the first place.”10More importantly, the 1950s and 1960s experienced what Fawcett calls the ‘first wave’11 of regionalism, characterised by the establishment of regional institutions which represented the Cold War balance of power – such as NATO, SEATO, CENTO and ANZUS. These were driven by calculations of interest during the Cold War. Power and security played major roles in their existence. Economic alliances mostly failed by the late 1960s, further cementing the theory that these regional alliances functioned within a more global context rather than a regional pecking order. The height of the Cold War, from the late 1960s through to the 1980s, saw more familiar examples of emerging regional alliances, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The Cold War was the umbrella under which these institutions were set up; though for the first time, more localised interests had begun to emerge, such as with ASEAN, where the local threat at the time was Vietnam.12 The late 1980s and the onset of the 1990s saw the end of the Cold War and a resulting change in the international order that the world had been accustomed to for the previous three decades. This era saw the birth of the term ‘new regionalism’, an era which this book is primarily concerned with, being a time when new hope propelled the ideas of universal institutions and world peace. Indeed, the mood of these decades was succinctly encapsulated in President George Bush’s speech after the 1991 9

See Ernst B. Haas, “The Challenge of Regionalism,” International Organisation, Vol. 12, No. 4, Autumn 1958, pp. 440-458. 10 Mark Beeson, “Rethinking Regionalism: Europe and Asia in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 6, December 2005, pp. 969-985. 11 Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, 2004, pp. 429-446. 12 Ibid.

Introduction

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Gulf War, when he spoke about the creation of a ‘new world order’. As a result, there was a distinct change in how ‘regionalism’ was viewed as a process. Muthiah Alagappa, for example, chose to view regionalism as an instrument for cooperation, formal or informal, between governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for mutual gain in various fields.13 As ever, the need for a global context in which to position this outlook is important. In this case, it was a fact that the world and the international order had changed. The United Nations’ member states lacked the commitment to take the position of a global security provider that the world needed. Inevitably, this created a vacuum that regional powers and institutions sought to fill. Regional alliances became tagged with the continent of their origin, such as Africa, Asia and the Americas. As can be expected, there was a mushrooming of acronyms during this decade. The common denominator of cooperation continued to exist, but the concept itself began to assume a more multi-dimensional shape. Regional alliances were no longer just about security cooperation, but economic cooperation as well. These not only required the participation of many countries, but also widespread bilateral networking, not just between governments, but between businesses and NGOs.14 The central aim of this new wave of regionalism was slowly emerging – to pursue and promote common goals in one or more shared fields of interest. In the twenty-first century, despite the existence of common denominators and nascent central aims, regionalism is still a layered concept. For example, much of the recent study of regional processes makes a basic distinction between hard and soft regionalism. Soft regionalism alludes to the promotion of a sense of regional awareness or community by consolidating regional groups and networks. Hard regionalism implies the existence of pan- or sub-regional groups, formalised by interstate organisations and networks.15

13 Muthiah Alagappa, “Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework for Analysis,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 21, pp. 359-387. 14 Paul Taylor, International Organisation in the Modern World: The Regional and the Global Process(London: Pinter, 1993); J.H. Mittelman, “Resisting Globalisation: Environmental Politics in Eastern Asia,” in Kris Olds et al (ed.); Globalisation and the Asia-Pacific: Contested Territories(London: Routledge, 1999); Peter Katzenstein, “Regionalism and Asia,” New Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 353-368. 15 Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, 2004, pp. 429-446.

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Another vital distinction is the difference between regionalism and regionalisation. This distinction is particularly important in this book as well. Regionalism refers to the political process in which states drive cooperative initiatives. Regionalisation, by contrast, refers to those processes of economic integration which, even if influenced by state policies, are essentially the uncoordinated consequences of private sector activities. 16 Put simply, regionalisation is a process that flows from regionalism. At its most basic, it is no more than a concentration of activity at a regional level that could shape regions and subsequently give rise to regional groups and organisations. In this way, regionalisation may either precede or flow from regionalism.17 Hettne and Soderbaum have clarified both concepts as being the following: “In the analytical, operational sense…the current ideology of regionalism, is the urge for a regionalist order, either in a particular geographical area or as a type of world order.”Regionalism in this sense is usually associated with a programme and strategy, and may lead to formal institution building. “‘Regionalisation’ denotes the process that leads to patterns of cooperation, integration, complementarity and convergence within a particular cross-national geographical space.”18 Definitive binaries aside, many scholars speak of regionalism and economic integration in the same breath.19 Indeed, there is still a belief that the global integration of production processes means that firms will increasingly demand– and that states will be more willing to supply– regional trade agreements. 20 Based on this, some observers have gone further to suggest that regionalisation is, in fact, a response to globalisation. 21 In this formulation, globalisation refers primarily to the 16

S. Breslin and R. Higgott, “Studying Regions: Learning from the Old, Constructing from the New,” New Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 333-352. 17 Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, 2004, pp. 429-446. 18 Bjorn Hettne and Frederik Soderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness,” New Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 457-472. 19 Raimo Vayrynen, “Regionalism: Old and New,” International Studies Review, Vol. 5, 2003, pp. 25-52. 20 Mark Beeson, “Rethinking Regionalism: Europe and Asia in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 6, December 2005, pp. 969-985. 21 Charles Oman, Globalisation and Regionalisation: The Challenge for Developing Countries (Paris: OECD, 1994), p.10.

Introduction

7

growth of the financial sector, money markets and the transnational restructuring of production, while regionalisation refers to those political initiatives that respond by providing competitive advantage to entire regions. The general claim is that competitive economic pressure is best mediated through regional mechanisms.22 While this may account for some of the economic dynamics that underpinned the second wave of regional integration, it neglects other factors that have influenced regionalism. As Breslin and Higgott have pointed out, one of the glaring omissions of the first wave of theorisation about regions was its failure to take the ‘idea of region’ seriously. In other words, they argue, inadequate attention was paid to the way in which regional identity was conceived and promoted, either internally or in opposition to some notional ‘other’. 23 This is potentially significant because one of the features that has distinguished the European Union (EU), particularly when compared to East Asia, is a more sharply developed sense of regional identity. The ability to translate a nascent regional identity into a more developed ‘regionness’24 is a critical measure of regional development. This has been clarified by Hettne and Soderbaum’s comprehensive study in which they argue that while all regions are subjectively defined to a certain extent, the question of ‘regional identity’ implies judgements about the degree to which a particular area, in various respects, constitutes a distinct entity that may be distinguished as a relatively coherent territorial subsystem from the rest of the global system.25 Thus, depending on the definitions used, a regional frontier may very well cut through a particular state’s territory. It could, for instance, be argued that some parts of China, mainly the coastal areas, form part of an East Asian regionalisation process while the rest of mainland China does not.26Nevertheless, what of East Asia itself? Did it, in the Cold War era, 22

Ibid. S. Breslin and R. Higgott, “Studying Regions: Learning from the Old, Constructing from the New,” New Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 333-352. 24 Bjorn Hettne and Frederik Soderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness,” New Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 457-472. 25 Ibid. 26 Michael Schulz, Frederik Soderbaum & Joakim Ojendal, “Key Issues in the New Regionalism: Comparisons from Asia, Africa and the Middle East.” Available at: https://www.academia.edu/6106976/Key_Issues_in_the_New_Regionalism._Com parisons_from_Asia_Africa_and_the_Middle_East 23

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have a sense of regional identity that allowed academic discourse to give it a shape, a form and a place in the debate on regionalism? An old saying about East Asia during the Cold War called it a ‘region without regionalism.’27This could be disputed, depending on the lens used to study the region. One example is Mark Selden, who argues for the existence of an East Asian regional order, based on trade and the tributary systems, spanning the period as far back as the sixteenth century, reaching its height in the eighteenth century, only to meet its downfall in the midnineteenth century.28 As East Asia entered the twentieth century, Selden argues, the regional order became fractured under the weight of “system disintegration, colonial rule, world wars and revolutions. With the collapse of the regional order, bilateral relations, both colonial and post-colonial, predominated.”29 This viewpoint underlines the trend in the region as the Cold War reached its height during the 1960s and 1970s. That was an epoch when the planet was spatially and ideologically bifurcated into two opposing camps, auguring ill for the progress of regionalism and regional cooperation. 30 The Second World War was the catalyst leading to this global bifurcation. It marked the defeat and dismantling of the Japanese empire and the rise of the United States as the dominant superpower, both in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as globally. It also sparked waves of nationalist-inspired revolutionary and independence movements that transformed the political landscape of the Asian continent. Despite these localised intra-regional conflicts, the East Asian region was located at a critical geostrategic junction for the conduct of the Cold War, as the political interests of the superpowers intersected here, along with those of the resident regional powers, namely China and Japan, together with those of the smaller 27

Zhongqi Pan, “Dilemmas of Regionalism in East Asia,” Korea Review of International Studies, November 2007, pp.17-29. 28 Mark Selden, “East Asian Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics: 16th to 21st Centuries,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2009. Available at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Mark-Selden/3061 29 Ibid. 30 John Agnew, Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power (London: Routledge, 2003); John Agnew, “Emerging China & Critical Geopolitics: Between World Politics and Chinese Particularity,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 51, No. 5, 2010, pp. 569-582. Also see Mark Beeson, “Geopolitics and the Making of Regions: The Rise and Fall of East Asia,” Political Studies, Vol. 57, 2009, pp. 498516.

Introduction

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countries in the region. Of this, the United States’ occupation of Japan and Korea, on the one hand, and the Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese wars and revolutions on the other, are clear examples of Cold War power politics, playing out as they did within the purview of the US-USSR confrontation. Newly established nations, such as China, forged relationships underlined by realpolitik intentions, by playing one superpower against the other, or allying with just the one. In short, postcolonial Asia was characterised by decisive bilateral ties with at least one great power, as well as by the absence of intra-Asian multilateral linkages. Countries on the eastern edge of the Eurasian continent were fighting each other or engaged in civil wars. Amidst this disorder, as in the preceding century, there was scant room for horizontal linkages among Asian nations or Asian societies like China. 31 No meaningful regions could exist in modern day ‘East Asia’. What was more, the decline of the wider concept of the ‘Asia-Pacific’, and the emergence of a more specifically defined ‘East Asia’ was long in the making. At the end of the 1980s when the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was inaugurated, it seemed ideally placed to benefit from and facilitate the post-Cold War preoccupation with economic development and integration. Moreover, as Mark Beeson says, “it held out the prospect of institutionalising and coordinating relations between the ‘miraculous’ economies of East Asia and the ‘AngloAmerican’ nations of North America and Australasia.” 32 The current formulation of ‘East Asia’ has its foundation in the changing pattern of production, trade and investment that occurred toward the end of the Cold War. Specifically, the 1970s marked a watershed for the emergence of East Asia as a region. Economic regionalisation, rather than regionalism, was the predominant pattern set in the 1970s by the post-war economic rejuvenation of Japan. Of regionalism and all its connotations, there was no clear sign, even though the global stage was set in the wake of the China-Soviet rift in the 1960s, the US-China entente of 1971 and the start of the reform era –gaige kaifang– in China under Deng Xiaoping in 1978. These developments opened the way to re-knitting economic and political bonds across Asia and strengthening Asian linkages with the global economy. However, deepening ties across a nascent region, especially 31

Mark Selden, “East Asian Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics: 16th to 21st Centuries,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2009. Also see Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 23-45. 32 Ibid.

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with the establishment of ASEAN, did not automatically imply the birth of East Asian regionalism. As a process, the next milestone in its evolution was the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1997-1998 that affected nearly all of the major East and Southeast Asian countries. As East Asia began to unite in a common goal to protect its financial and economic interests after the crisis, member countries found themselves being protected by China, a neighbour that had hitherto been a suspicious threat on the geopolitical front. With China’s aid, the region began to get back on its feet, and to include Beijing as a lead player in regional economic and geopolitical cooperation. However, China’s establishment as a regional leader led to the creation of a bilaterally-based security architecture which directly conflicted with the United States’ creation of its ‘hub-and-spoke’ security alliances in the region. Arguments such as these are, however, entirely subjective and depend on how the region is viewed. This brings into play the factor of ‘perception’ which has had, especially in East Asia, a role in defining security regionalism. This has been the role of the United States – providing a comparison in its capacity to influence the course of regional integration and identity building in East Asia. Similarly in the case of China, while the aftermath of the Second World War ensured that there was scant room for horizontal linkages among Asian nations or Asian societies, the scenario changed only in the 1970s, with inter-twining processes of regionalisation in the economic sphere and regionalism in the security sphere. In the twenty-first century, the United States and China are two of the biggest players in East Asia. The actions and perceptions of these two countries are, not unnaturally, crucial for global geopolitics, even when they are manoeuvring within a definitive region. From a lay point of view, it is quite clear that in the post-Cold War era, international relations experienced a jolt with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The world now became dominated by the United States, secure in a position of preeminent power. However, the 1990s and the 2000s saw a rising China, growing faster and more aggressively than anyone could have expected. Today, the world looks set to be polarised once again. Already, China is the second largest economy in the world, and the largest Asian economy. Its military power may still be far behind that of the United States, but economically and politically, there is no doubt that China wields considerable influence. For Beijing, its immediate vicinity is vital to its power. Scholars like David Kang have linked this to a historical precedent. China was once known as the ‘Middle Kingdom’, and commanded the homage of its

Introduction

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neighbouring ‘tributary’ states, which included South Korea and Japan. The much-needed help that it provided to its smaller Southeast Asian neighbours during their times of crisis is a position that China has never shown any hesitation in leveraging in order to be noticed as a dominant power. With the South China Sea dispute, and the dispute over territorial sovereignty raging over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Beijing has been totally unapologetic about flexing its military and diplomatic muscles in its own backyard. The United States, meanwhile, has been struggling to project its image of power in a region in which it has been embedded since the Second World War. Materially speaking, the United States’ power is on the wane, even though its military power is streets ahead of any other country on the planet. Bogged down by the fallout of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is mired in a moral quandary, and is fast losing its prestige in the eyes of the world. Nevertheless, the fact is that it is still a security umbrella for East and Southeast Asia. With Vice President Joe Biden undertaking a tour of Southeast Asia in 2013, and President Obama following up on Biden’s tour in April 2014, the United States shows no signs of backing away from East Asia. To put it simply, this is a case of two great powers playing tug of war within one region. The result is a series of questions: How do the two countries look at a region that is so important for them? How does that perception influence their foreign policy moves in the same arena? More importantly, how do they define East Asia? The natural balance of power politics between an established power and a rising one, and its subsequent effects on security regionalism in East Asia is the main focus of this book.

CHAPTER TWO US REGIONALISM IN EAST ASIA: PAST AND PRESENT

The United States emerged from the Second World War as an unrivalled superpower, and grew faster than Europe and Japan in the decade that followed. Its subsequent role in fashioning an open and loosely legalistic international order – built with the cooperation of European and East Asian partners and organised around a system of open markets and security alliances – has provided the foundation for today’s international geopolitics. This being said, there was a marked difference in how the United States went about constructing the new geopolitical order in both the Atlantic and the Pacific regions. In Europe, it chose to establish a multilateral economic and political order, while in Asia it preferred a bilateral security order with loose multilateral relations. This variance in the geopolitical order in the Atlantic and Pacific regions raises several questions that this chapter aims to answer: Why was bilateralism preferred to multilateralism as a regional order in East Asia? How has the American discourse on regionalism shaped up in the post-Cold War era? Has the bilateral model of the ‘huband-spoke’ endured as part of American regionalism in East Asia? What are its implications for the East Asian regional order?

United States Regionalism in East Asia during the Cold War: Bilateralism versus Multilateralism In his comprehensive work on the subject, Victor Cha argues that the reason for the emergence of bilateralism rather than multilateralism in Asia as the dominant security structure had to do with the “power-play” rationale behind the United States’ alliance formation in East Asia. 1 In other words, the United States created alliances in Asia and Europe to 1

Victor D. Cha, “Power Play: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2009-10, pp. 158-196.

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contain the Soviet threat, but a congruent rationale for the alliances in Asia was to prevent the allies’ aggressive behaviour that could entrap the United States in a larger war. East Asia’s security bilateralism today is therefore a historical artefact of the American rationale for constructing alliance networks in Asia at the end of the Second World War. The United States sought relationships with these distant Asian countries not just for defence and deterrence but also to exercise decisive power over their political and military actions. This “power-play” rationale had an implicit yet powerful formative impact on the evolution of the America-centred post-War alliance pattern in Asia. Since restraining the ally was best exercised bilaterally, there was no compelling need to expand the American alliances in Asia into a larger multilateral framework.2 The system of bilateral alliances that was subsequently put in place is known today as the San Francisco System – or more popularly, the ‘huband-spoke’ framework. Here, the United States acts as the centre (hub) of each bilateral partnership (spoke) with little or no interference. Most of these partnerships emerged at the onset of the Cold War, including those with the Philippines (1951), South Korea (1953), Japan (1954), Thailand (1954), and the Republic of China (1954).3 In the words of G. John Ikenberry, during the Cold War, the United States created a new international order built around “the American provision of security and economic public goods, mutually agreeable rules and institutions, and interactive political processes that give states a voice in the running of the system.” 4 This, according to Ikenberry, made the likelihood of an American “empire” being put into place a “structural impossibility.”5 Employing two distinct strands of international relations theory – realist and liberal – Ikenberry explained the making of the United States’ grand strategy during the Cold War era. The realpolitik orientation in American grand strategy at this time was organised around containment, deterrence, and the maintenance of the global balance of power. Facing a threatening 2

Ibid. Ibid. Also see Kevin Placek, “The San Francisco System: Declining Relevance or Renewed Importance?” Quarterly Access, Vol.4, No. 1, 2012, p. 15-20. 4 G.J. Ikenberry, “Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World in Transition,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2005, pp. 133–152. 5 Ibid. 3

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and expansive Soviet Union after 1945, the United States stepped forward to fill the vacuum left by a waning British empire and a collapsing European order to provide a counterweight to Soviet power. The touchstone of this strategy was containment, which sought to deny the Soviet Union the ability to expand its sphere of influence outside its region. America’s balance of power grand strategy yielded a bounty of institutions and partnerships in the decades after 1947. The most important have been the NATO (in Europe) and the United States–Japan alliances in East Asia. This global system of United States-led security partnerships has survived the end of the Cold War, providing a bulwark for stability through the commitments and reassurances they manifest. Indeed, the National Security Strategy released by the Pentagon in 2010 stated that these alliances formed “the bedrock of security in Asia and a foundation of prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.”6 The liberal trend sought to build order around institutionalised political relations among integrated market democracies evidenced in several postwar initiatives such as the Bretton Woods agreements, GATT and World Trade Organisation (WTO), APEC, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the promotion of democracy in Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia.7 Underpinning this strategy is the view that a rule-based international order – especially one where the United States uses its political weight to derive congenial rules – is an order that most fully protects American interests, conserves its power, and extends its influence into the future. This liberal grand strategy has been pursued through an array of policy engagements, which Ikenberry summed up as “open up”, “tie down” and “bind together.”8

6

“National Security Strategy,” US Department of Defense, The White House, May 27, 2010. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy. pdf 7 Ibid. 8 G. John Ikenberry, “America and East Asia,” Aziya Kenkyu, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2004.

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Opening up essentially meant directing the forces of trade and investment, cultural exchange and transnational rule into the politics of strong state rule, creating “strategic interdependence.”9 Tying down referred to inviting other governments to get involved in regional and international institutions, such as APEC or WTO. The purpose here is to create expectations and obligations from member governments in conflict resolution and matters of regional identity. 10 Binding together meant establishing formal institutional links between countries that are potential adversaries, thereby reducing the chance for each country to balance against the other. This comprised the security component of a liberal grand strategy, argues Ikenberry, which allowed states to participate in joint alliances rather than forming balancing coalitions against a potential threat or rival.11 Analysed as a whole, Ikenberry’s model represents a liberal economic regional ‘order’. This does not, however, amount to ‘regionalism’. During the Cold War, the cornerstone of America’s economic regional order was its ties with Japan. The US-Japan alliance provided and still provides, according to Ikenberry,12 the hidden support beams for the wider region. The United States facilitated Japanese economic reconstruction after the war and created markets for Japanese exports. Also, the American security guarantee to its partners in East Asia provided a national security rationale for Japan to open its markets. Free trade helped cement the alliance and, in turn, the alliance helped settle economic disputes.13 The export-oriented development strategies of Japan and the other Asian ‘tigers’ were dependent on America’s willingness to accept imports and huge trade deficits, which the alliance ties made politically tolerable.14 As the Cold 9

Ibid. Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 G. John Ikenberry, “Asian Regionalism and the Future of US Engagement with China,” Policy Report, September 2009. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. Also see G. John Ikenberry, “The Political Foundations of America’s Relations with East Asia,” in Ikenberry and Chung-un Moon (ed.), The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues and New Order (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), pp. 25. 10

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17

War drew to a close, Japan’s enormous benefit from this quid pro quo alliance provided the basis for what came to be termed as the ‘flying geese’ model of economic integration, which formed the pattern of economic East Asian regionalism from the 1970s. However, a significant point is that despite the formation of a regional security order, attempts at forming regional security institutions in East and Southeast Asia never really took off during this period. A few examples are President Roosevelt’s proposed post-war Pacific collective security system, and the Truman and Eisenhower administrations’ ideas about a Pacific security organisation, especially the efforts by Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles to create a Pacific Ocean Pact in 1950 and 1951.15 It was the success of NATO, in the aftermath of the Second World War that has today prompted the question: “What prevented the replication of NATO in Asia?” In order to answer this question, a little hindsight is necessary. The roots of the narrative behind the prevention of a NATO-type body in Asia lay in the formation of SEATO, as part of America’s Truman Doctrine in containing the communist threat. For most countries in the bloc, the threat in question was Communist China. The proof of this lay in the varied membership of the bloc: only two of SEATO’s members, Thailand and the Philippines, were geographically part of Southeast Asia. The other six members – Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, and the United States – came from outside the region. The motive for forming the bloc, nevertheless, was the common denominator for this motley crew of nations, namely containment of the communist threat as part of Cold War politics. Northeast Asia, meanwhile, was the pivot of the particularly complex territorial and geo-political intersection of the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the USSR and the United States, while the Cold War divisions between North and South Korea and between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan had also solidified by the 1950s and remains in place to this day. The geopolitical and geo-economic imperatives of the Cold War had a profound influence on the shape and limits of regionalism in Northeast Asia, where the United States developed major bilateral relationships with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, at the same time as relations even 15

David Capie, “Power, Identity and Multilateralism: Rethinking Institutional Dynamics in the Pacific,1945-2000,”PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, York University, Toronto, Canada, 2003, p. 36.

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between these three ostensibly Cold War allies – but erstwhile coloniser and colonised – remained relatively limited during the early period. By the end of the 1940s, meanwhile, the United States had embarked on a fullscale effort to facilitate the industrial rebirth of Japan, and turn as much of Northeast Asia as possible into a capitalist bulwark against the USSR and Mao’s China. With the onset of the Korean War (1950-1953), the governmental and military institutions and the bureaucratic structures of the United States’ national security apparatus were increasingly consolidated as instruments of regional and global power. In terms of institutionalising and amplifying the United States’ commitment to the Cold War generally, and in Northeast Asia more specifically, the Korean War was an unequivocal turning point. At the same time, a major result of the United States’ strategic engagement with the Northeast Asian region during the Cold War was a network of primarily bilateral security alliances, which in the long term served to inhibit intra-regional cooperation.16 Though the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, considered SEATO to be an essential element in American foreign policy in Asia, it is usually described as a “zoo of paper tigers” and “a fig leaf for the nakedness of American policy.”17 As the Cold War began to peter out in the late 1970s, internal rifts and question marks surrounding its existence began to make their presence felt. In 1977, SEATO was formally dissolved. The example of SEATO as a failure of multilateralism in East Asia has raised a debate among scholars of various schools of thought. From a realist perspective, Crone blames it on the huge power differentials between the United States and its Asian allies (that he calls a condition of “extreme hegemony”18) in the post-war period. Power differentials between the United States and its Asian allies were so huge that there would be no point in a regional security organisation, since the Asian states had little to offer either individually or collectively to such a security grouping. Such a 16

Mark T. Berger and Mark Beeson, “APEC, ASEAN+3 and American Power: The History and the Limits of the New Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific.” Available at: http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv.php?pid=UQ:10795&dsID=mb_mb.pdf 17 John K. Franklin, “The Hollow Pact: Pacific Security and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation,” PhD thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Addran College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Texas Christian University, 1996, p. 1. 18 Donald Crone, “Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganisation of the Pacific Political Economy,” World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4, July 1993, pp. 501-525.

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19

calculation by the United States would have been all the more likely because its policymakers expected their putative Asian allies to remain permanently weak, in contrast to Europe, where its allies were expected to recover sooner or later. Seeing multilateralism as a superficial aid and a needless constraint, the United States preferred bilateralism in its approach to Asian security. Its Asian allies also shunned multilateralism, calculating that it would have lessened their opportunities for “free-riding.”19 However, views such as this are problematic on three grounds. First, as pointed out by Hemmer and Katzenstein, if alliances between great powers and weak states were of little value in early post-war Asia, when the United States’ allies were doomed to remain permanently weak unlike Europe, where the allies were expected to recover, then why did the United States not bring Japan (once a great power) into SEATO? 20 Second, evidence does not show the United States or its allies like South Korea and the Philippines to have been predisposed to a primarily bilateral mode of security cooperation in early post-war Asia, that is the latter half of the 1940s and the first half of the 1950s.21 Third, there is the problem concerning the assumption that the fear of being contained often leads a great power to avoid multilateralism with less powerful states.22 If so, the United States should have had a greater fear of being contained in dealing multilaterally with its European allies since the power gap between them and the United States was smaller, as compared to that between the United States and its Asian allies. It is doubtful that being involved in a regional multilateral institution in Asia would have constrained independent decision-making in the United States, any more than it did in Europe.23

19

Ibid. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is there no NATO in Asia: Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organisation, Vol. 56, No. 3, Summer 2002, pp. 575-607. 21 Amitav Acharya, “Why is there no NATO in Asia: The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism,” Working Paper 05, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, July 2005. 22 G. John Ikenberry, “American Hegemony and East Asia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.58, No.3, 2004, pp. 353-367. 23 Amitav Acharya, “Why is there no NATO in Asia: The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism,” Working Paper 05, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, July 2005. 20

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These issues aside, it is generally agreed (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2005; Acharya, 2005) that the failure of SEATO as an example of multilateralism in Asia stemmed from what Hemmer and Katzenstein have identified as the “malleability of identity.”24 This malleability was based on civilizational, ethnic, racial, and religious ties as well as shared historical memories and was an important cause of the different institutional forms that the United States favoured for its alliances in Europe and Asia during the early years of the Cold War. If race, religion, and shared political institutions helped to put the United States’ European allies in a class ahead of its Asian allies, shared historical experiences similarly helped put certain Asian allies, such as Japan and the Philippines, ahead of the others.25 To this foundation of identity politics was added a layer of constructivism in Acharya’s critique, arguing that in addition to the central role played by perception and identity, the rejection of the pact by four of the five members of the Colombo Powers group (India, Ceylon, Indonesia and Burma) was an important factor behind SEATO’s failure, making it appear irrelevant. In broader terms, the limits of United States’ hegemony and the weakness of multilateralism in the region was reflected in the fact that SEATO was disabled from the outset by internal differences and an absence of any underlying strategic interest around which its members could unite.26 The government of Pakistan began to drift away at an early stage because of a lack of support in its conflict with India and eventually withdrew from SEATO in November 1972. India’s rejection of the proposal of SEATO as an “Asian NATO”27 – with Nehru arguing that it was not so much a collective security mechanism as

24

Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is there no NATO in Asia: Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organisation, Vol. 56, No. 3, Summer 2002, pp.575-607. 25 Ibid. 26 Mark T. Berger and Mark Beeson, “APEC, ASEAN+3 and American Power: The History and the Limits of the New Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific.” Available at: http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv.php?pid=UQ:10795&dsID=mb_mb.pdf 27 “Message to Anthony Eden,” August 1, 1954. In Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 26, Nehru Memorial Trust, New Delhi, pp. 419-423, cited in Amitav Acharya, “Why is there no NATO in Asia: The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism,” Working Paper 05, Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, July 2005.

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a “military alliance”28 that would not give equal representation to all Asian countries – made the organisation flounder further.29 With the US-China rapprochement in 1971 and the waning of the Vietnam War (one of the main reasons for SEATO being formed), the redundancy of the organisation was made clear. It was finally abandoned in 1977. Nevertheless, the idea of equal representation for all Asian countries in a regional institution provided the essence of what would, a decade later, become ASEAN. This was the seed of a nascent Asian regional identity that would soon come into direct conflict with the United States’ greater realpolitik agenda in the region. That is, however, the subject for another discussion. Viewed through hindsight, the objectives of the United States in the region during the Cold War can be narrowed down to three: -

To prevent any potentially hostile state from becoming regionally hegemonic; To maintain a high degree of influence and power-projection in the region; and To promote democratic principles and stability.

The most significant consequence of the Cold War period in general, and the United States’ strategic objectives with regard to East Asia in particular, was that American policy effectively divided the region along ideological lines and established a ‘hub and spoke’ series of bilateral alliances that made closer ties and cooperation within the region more problematic. In other words, as far as East Asia was concerned, not only was there a distinct bias towards bilateralism, but also major constraints to multilateral processes, and formidable potential obstacles to any sort of regional integration. Consequently, the United States’ strategic engagement with East Asia in general, and the continuing importance of its bilateral alliances across the region in particular, has led to widespread scepticism

28

Ibid. Amitav Acharya, “Why is there no NATO in Asia: The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism,” Working Paper 05, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, July 2005. 29

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about the prospects for greater East Asian security cooperation in the future.30

United States’ Regionalism in East Asia: Post-Cold War Period The end of the Cold War presented the United States with several options for pursuing order in East Asia. For this reason, 1989 is the starting point in this book since not only did it mark the end of the Cold War, but it also provides the context in which the importance of multilateralism as a supplement to the bilateral ‘hub-and-spoke’ regional strategy began to be gradually perceived by the early 1990s. The options confronting the United States at that time have been discussed by American scholars, with Christopher Layne putting forth the alternative of “offshore balancer” by withdrawing its forward presence in the region and encouraging a multi-polar balance of power.31 Robert Ross suggested that the United States needed to face the fact that though the Soviet Union had crumbled, China had already emerged as a regional hegemonic power, thus making the East Asian region bipolar.32 However, the United States pursued a hegemonic strategy – one that ensured that the United States remained the “principal guarantor of regional order.”33 The central institutional feature of this strategy was the cultivation of a set of special relationships with key states in the region. In the minds of policymakers, the rationale behind this was quite simple. The United States’ commitment to Asia, in terms of security and maintenance of the bilateral ‘hub and spoke’ system, would serve as a deterrent to potential aggressors, besides providing a backdrop against which peaceful cooperation could take place. The ASEAN would serve as the focus of this security system, as well as a free trade regime, under which the United States would be the primary market for goods manufactured in Asia. It is 30

Mark Beeson, “American Hegemony and Regionalism: The Rise of East Asia and the End of the Asia-Pacific,” Geopolitics, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2006, pp. 541-560. 31 Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Rise,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 5-51. 32 Robert Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1999,pp. 81-117 33 Michael Mastanduno, “Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia,” in Muttiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 151.

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important to note that bilateralism was still vital to the approach of the United States, with its principal bilateral relationship being with Japan. This reflected the continuity between the Cold War and post-Cold War regional strategy of the United States. Similarly, the United States maintained its bilateral alliance structure with South Korea. While approaches towards China varied with successive administrations, the foundation of the United States’ view of East Asia remained ‘hub-andspoke’, designed to assure key regional players that their relationship with the United States was vital. 34 Simultaneously, there was also a shift in thinking among East Asian countries, who now perceived the new security environment as providing fresh prospects for multilateral cooperation. Here, the role of the United States and its established alliance system could become very crucial, as its existence would prevent the occurrence of a security vacuum. In the absence of the need to balance between the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union, regional stability could be promoted via confidence-building measures based on a broader set of security issues. The 1990s thus saw a proliferation of initiatives to expand multilateral cooperation, with ASEAN being the lodestar. However, if East Asia was beginning to reassess its potential as a region, with ASEAN as the central cog in the works, for the United States, the ‘hub and spoke’ system remained the primary basis for its security engagement in Asia in the post-Cold War era. The manner, in which the United States treated multilateral security institutions in East Asia, after the Cold War, was a testament to its hegemonic strategy. While it is true that the United States viewed multilateral initiatives with scepticism during the Cold War, especially after the failures of SEATO and the CENTO, it was more supportive of multilateralism as a complement to bilateral security relationships.35 These were perceived to be more useful ways to engage with the region, without undermining the hegemonic strategy, as security institutions in the region were not yet sufficiently developed to take on a central role in the management and resolution of regional security problems. 36This recognition was somewhat grudgingly accorded in the early years, following the end of the Cold War. In 1992, the US Secretary of State, James Baker, argued it was the ‘hub-and-spoke’ system that had “given form to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

34

Ibid. Ibid. 36 Ibid. 35

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(APEC) process.”37 His speech was significant, given the context, arguing that while Japan would remain the “keystone” of the United States’ engagement in the region, “ties with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN and Australia are the stabilising and strengthening spokes in the fan.”38 The inference was clear – multilateral forums could and would complement the bilateral alliance network, but they would never replace it. The United States’ intent was to serve as the principal source of regional order. This was symbolised and reinforced by its forward military presence in East Asia for an “infinite duration.”39 Through its alliances with Japan and South Korea, the United States gained secure access to Northeast Asia. The result was that by 1995, it was far more confident about the role it was playing in the region, via its ‘huband-spoke’ system. It would use the bilateral alliance system to form a platform from which it could launch a wider, more broad-based strategy of cooperation within the region. Outlined expansively in four separate Department of Defence reports throughout the 1990s, this was to be the United States’ strategy for East Asia, taking bilateral relationships to form the sum of the whole.40 By the end of the 1990s, agreements for naval facilities had been concluded between the United States and Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines.41 The final component of its hegemonic strategy was the commitment to a forward economic presence in Asia, promoting liberal international economic policies in Asian states which were open to the practice of capitalism, and in regional institutions such as APEC.42

37

James Baker, “America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, Winter 1991-1992, p. 5. 38 Ibid. pp. 9-11. 39 United States Department of Defense, “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” Office of International Security Affairs, Washington, DC, February 1995. 40 Ibid. p. 5-6. 41 Robert Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1999, pp. 81-117, 42 Michael Mastanduno, “Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia,” in Muttiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 153.

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APEC: Steps toward Regionalisation? Established in 1989, APEC was designed to promote sustainable economic growth and to strengthen the multilateral trade system through a commitment to open trade, investment and economic reforms among its member economies. However, its creation came in the face of several obstacles, namely: First, the security situation, which at that time was dominated by Cold War rivalries and inter-state conflicts in Southeast Asia. It was only with the waning of the Cold War, the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and subsequently between Vietnam and its neighbours, and China opening up to the global economy that it became possible to create an institution which embraced most of East Asia as well as Oceania and North America. Even then, China’s participation was delayed by the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989. Second, the extreme reluctance of Southeast Asian states to commit to any intergovernmental institution that they perceived as either a potential rival to ASEAN or as an instrument for undermining their sovereignty, or both. As all participants in the negotiations leading to APEC’s creation acknowledged, meeting the concerns of ASEAN would be the key to the successful establishment of a regional institution. After a protracted process, the ASEAN members finally accepted the merits of a new institution – but the price extracted was that APEC should operate according to ASEAN norms of consensus and voluntary compliance, and that an ASEAN state would host its annual meeting every alternate year.43 Its original membership structure, reflecting strong trans-Pacific political and economic ties, was centred on a link between East Asia and the United States. This link was strengthened by the adoption of the Bogor Declaration in 1993-94 that committed the member states to free trade and investment for APEC’s developed members by 2010 and for the developing countries by 2020. In pursuing this agenda, APEC adopted a distinct modality of operation – one that strongly reflected the characteristics of Asian, and particularly ASEAN nations’ approach to economic and diplomatic negotiations, namely: (a) decision-making by consensus, which protected the interests 43

John Ravenhill, “From Poster Child to Orphan: The Rise and Demise of APEC,”UNISCI Paper No. 13, January 2007.

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and sovereignty of the smaller ASEAN economies; and (b) a voluntary liberalisation process, with each nation proceeding at its own pace towards the free trade and investment goals, to be achieved through “open regionalism.”44 This system of voluntary individual action, formally titled, ‘Individual Action Plans’, to achieve the 2010/2020 goals was defined by “concerted unilateralism.”45 Why was there need for an intergovernmental institution, like APEC? At this juncture, it had been recognised that the growth in interdependence among Asia–Pacific countries was generating new frictions, manifested in particular by the United States’ increasing pressure on Japan, Korea and Taiwan because of bilateral trade imbalances, and that a more institutionalised forum might help resolve such problems. Moreover, as tariffs declined in significance, the growth in intra-regional trade had exposed other transaction costs for international traders imposed, for instance, by non-uniform customs procedures, product standards, and the like. Ultimately, too, security concerns entered the picture. An immediate issue was the fear that, as the Cold War wound down, the United States might disengage from the Western Pacific rim. And, the broader expectation of those involved over the years in the trans-Pacific dialogue was that the growth of economic interdependence would enhance the prospects for peace in the region.46 Any suggestion of an exclusively Asian economic regionalisation, such as Mahathir Mohammed’s vision of an East Asian Caucus (EAC) was met with disapproval from the United States as it did not align with its interests in the region. The basic conflict here was that the EAC was specifically designed as an alternative to the United States-led APEC. It was an exclusively East Asian grouping, which deliberately excluded the United States from any participation in East Asian regional processes.47 Hence, supplements to this idea, such as Japan’s proposal to set up an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), were vetoed by the United States. 44 Claude Barfield, “The United States & Asian Regionalism: The Long Road to the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Paper prepared for the ELSNIT Conference on Revisiting Regionalism, October 2011, Switzerland. Available at: http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2012/09801a03.pdf 45 Ibid. 46 John Ravenhill, “From Poster Child to Orphan: The Rise and Demise of APEC,”UNISCI Paper No. 13, January 2007. 47 Baogang He, “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 105125.

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This created, not unnaturally, considerable concern among East Asian countries. It seemed that bilateral and multilateral alliances could not exist within the same regional entity. Mahathir Mohammed’s proposal for an EAC starkly highlighted the fact that the United States was insecure about its own security alliances. Perceptions like this created a fear that the United States’ ‘hub-and-spoke’ system was establishing a zero-sum competition that many countries felt was beyond them. The clearest example where these conflicting interests were displayed was the Asian financial crisis of 1997.

The East Asian Financial Crisis: Crucial Juncture for American Regionalism What was significant about the crisis was not the dynamics of the crisis itself, about which much has been written, 48 but the way in which the United States viewed the region, especially in the context of the responses from the region itself. It was evident that a number of aspects became apparent to East Asian leaders and several perceptions were commonly shared on a regional basis. First, it was widely recognised that the region as a whole was potentially vulnerable to externally generated systemic shocks, over which East Asian nations had little control. Whether “crony capitalists”49 or foreign speculators were more to blame for the crisis was in many ways less important than the implications of their actions. East Asian political practices and economic structures were exposed to the potentially devastating judgments of money market managers and rating agencies from outside the region, raising fundamental doubts about the sustainability of East Asian capitalism in an integrated international economy. The second consequence of the crisis was a widespread feeling of resentment about the highly intrusive policy interventions of the international financial institutions (IFIs). 50 This is especially significant, given the high profile role played by the United States in crisis 48

Jeffrey Sachs & Steven Radelet, “The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies and Prospects,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1998, pp. 1-90.Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/1998_1_bpea_paper s/1998a_bpea_radelet_sachs_cooper_bosworth.pdf 49 Ibid. 50 Richard Higgott, “The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment,” New Political Economy, Vol. 3, No.3, 1988, pp. 333–356.

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management, either directly or through the auspices of the IFIs. The crisis presented the United States – operating largely through the aegis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – with a unique opportunity to forcibly impose the sort of neoliberal reforms it had advocated for a long time, but which had generally been ignored through most of the region.51 Even more significantly, APEC’s concern was its own relative invisibility and impotence throughout the crisis, and that the United States chose to utilise the IMF rather than APEC to push its reform agenda. 52 Thus, the most important long-term consequence of both the financial crisis and the perceived role of the United States in its management may have been to encourage a more narrowly conceived form of East Asian regionalism that intentionally excluded ‘outsiders’ and which effectively repudiated the ‘Asia-Pacific’ idea. 53 As Paul Bowles observes, “the contours of post-financial crisis regionalism are, by state design, aimed at restoring to Asia a greater degree of political power and autonomy vis-àvis the rest of the world, and the US and the international financial institutions it controls, in particular.”54 As mentioned earlier, the attempts to develop an exclusively Asian regionalism (envisioned by Mahathir Mohammed’s concept of the EAC) were seen with disapproval by the United States. Some scholars, like Mastanduno, argue that economic openness is vital to United States’ interests, as is economic interdependence, while “closed regionalism” is not what the United States can work with.55 Indeed, Mastanduno has gone on to argue that the solution to the crisis was found in the United States itself, “…rather than Tokyo or anywhere else.”56

51

W. Bello, “East Asia: On the Eve of the Great Transformation?” Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1998, pp. 424–444. 52 M. Beeson, “Reshaping Regional Institutions: APEC and the IMF in East Asia,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1998, pp. 1–24. 53 P. Bowles, “Asia’s Post-Crisis Regionalism: Bringing the State Back in, Keeping the (United) States Out,” Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2002, p. 245. 54 Ibid. 55 Michael Mastanduno, “Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia,” in Muttiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 151. 56 Ibid. Also see Ellen Frost, “Strategic Engagement or Benign Neglect: Current and Future US Policy Responses to East Asian Regionalism,” paper presented at the Conference on East Asian Regionalism and its Impact, Beijing, China, October 2004.

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Subsequent to the financial crisis, the attempts by East Asian countries – notably Japan, China and South Korea – to work together for monetary regionalism on proposals like the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) have been remarked upon by scholars like T.J. Pempel, who argues that given the depth of historical animosity between Japan, Korea, and China, the fact that they participated in “relatively intimate and institutionalised regional organisations may portend enhanced potential for cooperation among the powers of Northeast Asia.”57 As the 1990s came to a close, the United States was working to ensure that it could keep up its Cold War alliances by putting old wine in a new bottle. In this context, the 1998 US East Asia Strategy Report says: “US alliances in the region have long served as the cornerstone of regional security. In contrast to Cold War-era alliances, they are not directed at any third power but serve the interests of all who benefit from regional stability and security. The United States views the reaffirmation and enhancement of these alliances over the past three years, and the concurrent and complementary development of constructive ties with nonallied states, as evidence of our continued confidence that an integrated network of security relations is in the mutual interest of all Asia-Pacific nations….”58 The point here was that the United States’ alliance system, though established during the Cold War, could in modern times become beneficial to all countries in the region. The idea was taken forward by Dennis Blair, then commander of the United States Pacific Command, and John Hanley, who argued that it was time to move beyond Cold War labels and transform the ‘hub-and-spoke’ system into a wider and more inclusive network of security relations. There was, they argued, no place in the early twenty-first century for “zero-sum, balance-of-power mindsets.” 59 This more progressive outlook should be contextualised. It was the direct result of the need to integrate a ‘rising’ China into the region’s security 57

T. J. Pempel, “Firebreak: East Asia Institutionalises Its Finances,” paper presented to Regionalisation and the Taming of Globalisation? University of Warwick, October 2005, p. 2. 58 US Department of Defense, “United States Security Strategy for the East AsiaPacific Region,” Office of International Security Affairs, Washington, DC, 1998, p. 19. 59 Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley Jr., “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements,” The United States Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 7-17

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architecture, rather than antagonising it at the outset and creating rifts within the region. After the financial crisis, the Southeast Asian and East Asian nations were clear that they were, as far as economics was concerned, on China’s side. At the same time, they did not wish to lose the protection of the United States’ security umbrella. They had no inclination to choose sides between the United States and China.60 The United States had to adapt to the changing circumstances, but it wished to do so without changing its own basis for its presence in the region. So, while the core of United States’ regionalism in East Asia continued to be based on bilateral alliances, multilateral regional cooperation was preferred as a means to strengthen the ‘hub-and-spoke’ alliance system in the post-Cold War era. September 11, 2001 was a date that changed the course of foreign policy for the United States. In terms of the impact on American regionalism in East Asia, this was the beginning of a new era here too. Some things, however, remained the same – the United States’ system of bilateral alliances remained the cornerstone for its engagement with the region. However, these alliances were given a new purpose as the United States, under President George W. Bush, declared a ‘War on Terror’. Post-9/11, the United States stopped being quite so tactful in its approach to the region. “You are either with us or against us in the fight against terror,” declared President Bush.61 The onus was on the Southeast and East Asian countries to support the United States on issues that had global ramifications, such as the new wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Never comfortable with being directly asked to choose sides, some countries in the region were unnerved. However, there were others who took up the gauntlet. What this sudden shift represented was, most significantly, a loss of faith on the part of the United States, in the ability of multilateral institutions to respond to a direct threat. It was now about what came to be known as ‘coalitions of the willing’. This was laid out clearly in the National Security Strategy, 2002. “We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the

60 Alice Ba, “Southeast Asia and China,” in Betwixt and Between: Southeast Asian Relations with United States and China, Evelyn Goh (ed.), Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) Monograph 7, Singapore Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005, pp. 93-118. 61 George W. Bush, November 6, 2001.

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strength of freedom-loving nations…. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions.”62 This aim was further rationalised by the US National Security Adviser, who argued, “The centrepiece of the president’s strategy is our strong forward presence and our commitment to our allies. While US alliances with Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand were formed in response to a common threat 50 years ago, they have always also been about common values and aspirations that bond free nations. Our allies know that we are committed to their defence and to these values, and that is why they have chosen, each in their own way, to give broader regional and global scope to our security cooperation.”63

There are a number of other sources that say much the same thing. The National Security Strategy documents between 2002 and 2010, for example, highlight the importance of Asian alliances as the bedrock for the United States’ regionalism in East Asia, and how they would be rejuvenated in order to push for the former’s greater global agenda. Within American academia, too, there have been some key questions in the regionalism debate with regard to East Asia. How does American academia examine East Asia? To what extent does the model of ‘hard’ bilateralism and ‘soft’ multilateralism persist in the regional discourse of the United States? How has it been impacted by the rise of China and the events of 9/11?

East Asian Regionalism: An American Perspective In the intellectual perspective on East Asian regionalism, the work of Katzenstein and Pempel is seminal. Katzenstein’s study of what he terms ‘porous regionalism’ has allowed him to formulate an elaborate theoretical framework for the study of East Asian regionalism in the United States. Starting with the observation that even in a globalising world, geography and geographic regions still matter a great deal, Katzenstein has argued that regions are porous entities constituting just one element, albeit a potentially important one, of a complex system of multi-level governance

62

The quote is taken from President G.W. Bush’s preface to the “2002 National Security Strategy”, US Department of Defense, Washington, DC. 63 Condoleezza Rice, “Our Asia Strategy,” Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2003.

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in which macro-regions such as Europe interact with sub-national regions, nation-states, and the global order.64 For Katzenstein, a crucial factor in shaping these porous, partly arbitrary regions is the influence of ‘the American imperium’65– the combination of the United States’ overwhelming material, especially military and ideational power. Its hegemony alone, however, is insufficient. For regional cooperation to flourish, the United States needs a major regional ally or client, and such allies exist in only two regions: Germany in Europe and Japan in East Asia. Katzenstein’s primary contention is that regional networks in Asia have been closed and hierarchical, with the United States’ key ally, Japan, at the top of the pyramid. At the same time, he notes recent research that suggests regional production networks are becoming more open and diverse, as networks organised by overseas Chinese join Japanese-organised networks. The diversity of networks, he claims, strengthens the case for characterising regional trade cooperation as ‘informal’.66 While Katzenstein’s work has been critiqued in detail by scholars such as Gregory Noble (2008), 67 it is beyond doubt that he has contributed significantly to the United States’ understanding of East Asian regionalism. In his book, Remapping Asia, T.J. Pempel has focused primarily on political construction, while insisting that geography also matters. Thus, the boundaries of Asia may be fuzzy, but there is surprising agreement on the countries that constitute the core, particularly China. He emphasises political and territorial conflicts as obstacles to cooperation rather than focusing, as Katzenstein does, on the roles and strategies of Japan and the United States. However, he is slightly more optimistic about the prospects for regional cooperation. Pempel notes that East Asia is far richer, more influential, and peaceful than it was a generation ago, and as the chapter

64

Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 12-77. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Gregory W. Noble, “Japanese and American Perspectives of Regionalism,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 8, No.2, 2008, pp. 247-262.

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by Evans shows, regional elites at least, share a widespread sense that Asia is an idea whose time has come.68 Different lenses have been used to survey the evolution of East Asian regionalism, but whether realist or liberal, all scholars are unanimous on the subject of the United States’ global hegemony, following the Second World War.69 Indeed, the hegemonic debate still garners much attention in scholarly discourse, with Michael Mastanduno terming it ‘incomplete’. According to him, the hegemony of the United States is more of a “holding action”70 rather than a progressive strategy – it is, in short, an effort to stabilise the status quo that reflects dominance. A complete hegemonic strategy would require not just preponderant capabilities, but also a degree of acquiescence by other major states in the maintenance of the regional order. However, Mastanduno argues that since the United States does not want to encourage a balancing coalition against its dominant position, it is not clear that it has a strategic interest in the full resolution of differences between, for example, China and Japan. Some tensions among states like these would reinforce the need for a special relationship with the United States. So while Cold War alliances with Japan and other smaller Southeast Asian states have persisted in the twenty-first century, a speed-bump has emerged, as far as China is concerned. Indeed, Ellen Frost has argued that after the financial crisis, the “central point” of American regionalism has been the rise of China. 71 On the one hand, it is not certain that China will mount any kind of revisionist challenge to the hegemony of the United States. Yet, it is equally clear that China remains uncomfortable playing a subordinate role in a regional order centred on the United States. It is, therefore, in this very 68

See T.J. Pempel, Remapping East Asia: The Construction of A Region (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). Also see Paul Evans, “Between Regionalism and Regionalisation: Policy Networks & Nascent Asian Institutional Identity,” in T.J. Pempel, Remapping East Asia: The Construction of A Region (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 200. 69 For examples, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001). Also see John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History, Vol. 150, No.690, April 2006 and G. John Ikenberry, “The Political Foundations of America’s Relations with East Asia,” in Ikenberry& Chung-un Moon (ed.), The United States & Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues and New Order (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), pp. 19-39. 70 Ibid. 71 Ellen Frost, “Strategic Engagement or Benign Neglect: Current and Future US Policy Responses to East Asian Regionalism,” paper presented at the Conference on East Asian Regionalism and its Impact, Beijing, China, October 2004.

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scenario that the United States’ hegemony has paradoxically helped redefine regional identities and concretise regional relations in East Asia. This has been comprehensively detailed by Mark Beeson in various studies. Beeson has argued that while the ‘hub-and-spoke’ alliance system set up by the United States in the aftermath of the Second World War offered a number of benefits to its allies, its hegemonic role has been undermined by its recent shift to more unilateral and bilateral policies, and a greater interest in regional mechanisms and strategies that actually exclude the United States as a consequence.72 An example of this is the American-led ‘war on terror’, which through direct bilateral leverage in the economic sphere is actually undermining its more institutionally embedded, normatively based authority and influence, and encouraging the development of alternative, regional modes of organisation. 73 The crucial change here, according to Beeson, is in the nature of the regional policy of the United States towards East Asia. During the Cold War, the United States was prepared to tolerate a variety of social, political and economic practices of which it did not necessarily approve – if this was the price of ensuring the consolidation of its alliance system across the region. But the end of the Cold War freed it from any such geopolitical obligation. It became less tolerant of alternative economic and political modes of regional organisation and more willing to change them. 74 Nevertheless, it is also true that despite many countries benefitting economically from the overarching order that emerged under United States’ hegemony, older patterns of intra-regional relations in East Asia are beginning to reassert themselves.75 This view is bolstered by scholars like Ikenberry who argue that, during the Cold War, the United States’ view of regionalism was a mix of the realist and the liberal, designed to contain the threat of Soviet communism while extending the umbrella of Bretton Woods’s economic institutions over the global order, an especial

72

Mark Beeson, “American Hegemony and Regionalism: The Rise of East Asia and the End of the Asia-Pacific,” Geopolitics, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 2006, pp. 541-560. 73 M. Beeson and R. Higgott, “Hegemony, Institutionalism and US Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 7, 2005, pp. 1173–1188. 74 Mark Beeson, “American Hegemony and Regionalism: The Rise of East Asia and the End of the Asia-Pacific,” Geopolitics, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2006, pp. 541-560. Also see G.J. Ikenberry, “Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World in Transition,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 5, 2005, pp. 133–152. 75 Ibid.

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case in point being the US-Japan alliance.76 It was, however, through the lens of geopolitics and security that the United States viewed East Asia at the time, preferring to keep regionalism and its key processes on an international and Asia-Pacific canvas, exemplified by the IMF and APEC respectively. With the failure of SEATO and CENTO, there was no real faith in the possibility of regionalism succeeding in East Asia. In the post-Cold War era, however, views of scholars and policymakers began to change. With the change in the global political canvas, there were many new possibilities, but multilateralism was a process that many in the United States were still wary of. Indeed, in 1989, out of fear that multilateral security institutions in Asia would erode the rationale for its bilateral ‘hub-and-spoke’ security alliance system in the region, the United States rejected multilateralism as a “solution in search of a problem.”77 However, when the realpolitik use of multilateralism as a supplement to the enduring bilateral ‘hub-and-spoke’ system in East Asia came to be seen, successive administrations in the United States warmed up to the idea. The extent to which multilateral regional cooperation was welcomed is summed up by Ikenberry, who argued that the post-war order in East Asia was built around “hard” bilateral security ties and “soft” multilateral economic ties.78 The key to the evolution of this view was the continuity of the US-Japan Cold War alliance. This has been termed as the “cornerstone” of the political regional order envisioned for East Asia by the United States, intertwined with the economic regional order, namely APEC and the transPacific investment and trade system.79Not only has this alliance allowed the East Asian region to stabilise after the “hot” wars of the 1950s, it has

76

See G.J. Ikenberry, “Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World in Transition,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 5, 2005, pp. 133– 152. 77 Cited in Amitav Acharya, “Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power and Prospects for Peaceful Change,” in Muttiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 231. 78 G. John Ikenberry, “The Political Foundations of America’s Relations with East Asia,” in Ikenberry and Chung-un Moon (ed.), The United States & Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues and New Order (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), pp. 19-39. Also see G. John Ikenberry, “American Hegemony and East Asia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3, 2004, pp. 353-367. 79 Ibid.

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also allowed the United States to establish an embedded connectivity to the region.80 In this context, Kent Calder81 has outlined the features as: (a) A dense framework of formal, mainly bilateral, security alliances between the United States and key nations of the Pacific; (b) The formalisation of a ‘hub and spoke’ network; (c) An asymmetrical bargain of security and economic benefits to US allies in return for their alliance affiliation; (d) Precedence to Japan in terms of both economic opportunities and security commitments, often referred to as the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’; (e) Qualified support for the Japan peace treaty by other US wartime allies in the Pacific; and (f) Extensive economic benefits to security allies. According to Ikenberry, the ‘hub-and-spoke’ alliance system has played a more general role as the basis of regional political architecture. Alliances are traditionally seen as mechanisms to aggregate power to counter external threats, thereby paving the way for deeper economic integration and political cooperation. American scholars (Tow, Christensen, and Acharya et al) are of the opinion that the United States’ regionalism in East Asia still endures on the foundation of the ‘hub-and-spoke’ alliance system. Tow and Acharya have, in particular, pointed out three reasons behind the continuance of the ‘hub-and-spoke’ security structure, namely: (a) An enduring interest by the United States and its Asia–Pacific allies in sustaining the alliance network based on rationales of orderbuilding that, in turn, are underwritten by ‘alliance mutuality’; (b) Growing recognition that such an alliance mutuality provides this network with its best chance to realise strategic gains during current ‘critical junctures’ of historical and structural change; and (c) A growing capability of the systems’ allies to contribute to United States’ global security strategy.82

80

Ibid. Kent E. Calder, “Securing security through prosperity: The San Francisco system in comparative Perspective,” Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 135–57. 81

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According to Tow and Acharya, these components combine to overcome the dominant realist theoretical axiom that changing threat perceptions, intermittent doubts over alliance credibility and domestic regime changes in allied member-states usually lead to alliance dissolution.83 The debate on the place of the United States within such regional cooperation is still evolving, but in the context of the events of 9/11, Beeson has summed up the regional policy of the United States as, “…What we appear to be witnessing at present is a return to something akin to the logic of the Cold War era in which the United States is selfconsciously linking economic and strategic outcomes. In this case, the United States has made the prospect of bilateral trade deals and continuing access to critically important markets contingent on support for its wider strategic objectives in the ‘war on terror.”84 This debate on different aspects of the United States’ regionalism in East Asia has been reflected to a large extent in its regional strategy towards East Asia, followed by successive administrations since 1989. Arguments along the same theme are often nuanced to take into consideration a number of possible scenarios. For example, Goldstein’s line of argument takes a cue from Robert Ross’ thesis of a bipolar East Asia (that is, United States vs. China), and anticipates that the ‘hub-andspoke’ model of the United States’ regionalism in East Asia will be sustained by and directed towards precluding China from achieving parity with or hegemony over United States’ interests. The bottom line in this case is power balancing in the context of alliance politics.85 The argument is carried forward by Christensen who argues that the ‘hub-and-spoke’ model is a ‘function’ of the rise of China and the US-perceived need to

82 William Tow and Amitav Acharya, “Obstinate or Obsolete: The US Alliance Structure in the Asia-Pacific,” Working Paper 4, 2007, Canberra University. 83 See Stephen Walt, “Why alliances endure or collapse,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1997, pp. 156–80. 84 M. Beeson, “Re-thinking regionalism: Europe and East Asia in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 6,2005, pp. 969–985. 85 Avery Goldstein, “Balance-of-power politics: Consequences for Asian security order,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 171–209. Also see Robert Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1999, pp. 81-117.

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balance Chinese power by sustaining bilateral ties with traditional regional allies.86 Others, such as David Kang, have pointed to the East Asian subcontinent’s historical precedent of power hierarchy, using this as the base to argue that “Asia’s future will resemble its past,” with a strong and relatively aggressive China exercising economic and strategic leadership over Asia.87 Kang’s definition of hierarchy implies “a system of international relations organised around a central, dominant power that involves shared expectations of rights and responsibilities for both the dominant and secondary powers. Nations in this system have a shared set of expectations about state behaviour based on…state preferences and intentions, shared experiences, as well as deep history.”88 Thus, the overwhelming emphasis of the intellectual debate on regionalism in the United States studies remains concentrated on its regional model of bilateral ‘hub-and-spoke’, and can never be retired fully. Nevertheless, the importance of multilateralism in the strategic sphere, hitherto concentrated in the economic sphere, became clear after the events of 9/11. After 9/11, the United States dramatically redefined global security threats – and under the banner of the ‘war on terrorism’, it invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. Since then, it has articulated new ideas about alliances, ‘coalitions of the willing’ and the pre-emptive use of force.89 The renewed emphasis on multilateral cooperation against terrorism, famously summed up by President Bush as “You’re either with us or against us in the fight against terror,” 90 led to a new focus. However, regionalism during this period, with its stress on multilateral cooperation, was merely a process of 86 Thomas Christensen, “China, the US–Japan alliance, and the security dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1999, pp. 49–80. 87 David C. Kang, “Getting Asia wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2003, pp. 57–85. Also see David C. Kang, “Hierarchy, Balancing and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2003/04, pp. 135-160. 88 David C. Kang, “The Theoretical Roots of Hierarchy in International Relations,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3, September 2004, pp. 337-352. 89 US Department of Defense, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: White House, 2002. 90 George W. Bush, November 6, 2001.

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engineering consent, with the ultimate aim of assuring an American public that its executive was not acting alone or in defiance of the common wisdom of the international community.91 This led to a clash in its regional strategy as well as its global strategy. The key question at this juncture has been well articulated by Tow and Acharya: Could the same alliances which are perceived as balancing the rising Chinese power in Asia be justified as integral components in the United States’ global war against terrorism in which China is also an ally?92 In short, would the bilateral alliance structure that was the core of the United States’ regionalism in East Asia be impacted by engineering realpolitik to suit foreign policy objectives? Tow and Acharya perceive the answer to be negative. They argue that the existing regional architecture constitutes the only asset or mechanism available to the United States when it desires to support its global postures with a sustained Asia–Pacific presence and role. This was acknowledged by the Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001, which observed that the contemporary geopolitical setting was “complex and unpredictable” and that allied cooperation in the Asia–Pacific was indispensable in implementing a broader strategy directed toward cultivating and maintaining international stability.93An example of this is WMD (weapons of mass destruction) non-proliferation in which its East Asian treaty allies are prominently involved. The United States is currently working with Japan and South Korea, for example, in responding to an emerging threat from North Korean nuclear capabilities by engaging with them and with China, Russia and North Korea in the Six Party Talks. This ‘bilateralism and multilateralism hybridisation’ strategy94 formed a key feature of East Asian regionalism on the part of the United States, post 9/11. This view has its critics, such as Ellen Frost, who argues that the American view of

91

Simon Tay, “Asia and the United States after 9/11: Primacy and Partnership in the Pacific,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2004. 92 William Tow and Amitav Acharya, “Obstinate or Obsolete: The US Alliance Structure in the Asia-Pacific,” Canberra University, Working Paper 4, 2007. 93 US Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” Washington, DC, 2001, pp. 5–6. 94 William Tow and Amitav Acharya, “Obstinate or Obsolete: The US Alliance Structure in the Asia-Pacific,” Canberra University, Working Paper 4, 2007.

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East Asian regionalism during this period was one of “benign neglect.”95 Examples that back this term may be seen in several high-level remarks made by officials of the Bush administration. Thus, testifying before Congress in June 2004, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly declared that regional cooperation and integration in East Asia were part of an encouraging set of trends that included democracy, the rejection of radical Islam, globalisation, economic development, and peace.96

Evolution of Regionalism in American Foreign Policy in East Asia The full impact of the United States’ regionalism in East Asia can be gauged from the manner in which successive administrations have viewed the region. The end of the Cold War, ushered in by the George H. Bush administration, is a key starting point. This period was crucial, given the context of Bush’s own application of the “New World Order” in his State of the Union address to a joint session of the US Congress on September 11, 1990. Taken literally, ‘New World Order’ refers to any new period of world history experiencing a dramatic change in political thought and global balance of power. It must be seen and applied in the context of the post-Cold War shift towards unipolarity with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the trends of multipolarity seen with the rise of China. This period also saw the narrowing of the ambiguous Cold War definition of the “Asia-Pacific” and the rise of “East Asia” as a distinct regional entity.

The George H. Bush Administration (1989-1993) It is significant to note that Japan and Australia were the prime movers behind the APEC forum, an organisation explicitly designed to tackle narrowly conceived economic issues. APEC’s diverse membership – which, incidentally, included the United States – was drawn from the broad canvas of the ‘Asia-Pacific’ region. It therefore might have been expected that this broad membership would have diluted the issues of 95 Ellen Frost, “Strategic Engagement or Benign Neglect: Current and Future US Policy Responses to East Asian Regionalism,” paper presented at the Conference on East Asian Regionalism and its Impact, Beijing, China, October 2004. 96 US Department of State, “An Overview of U.S.-East Asia Policy,” testimony by James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, June 2, 2004, pp. 1-2.

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regional identity, while allowing a wider space for regional security cooperation. However, APEC’s declining importance in recent years suggests that the factors which might have worked in its favour actually worked against it.97 The suspicious and uncooperative attitude of the United States did not help matters, given the fluid post-Cold War security architecture then prevailing in the Asia-Pacific region. The Bush administration was focusing at that time on maintaining the preponderance of the power of the United States. To this effect, in 1990 and 1992, two key Defence Department Strategy documents, known as the East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI) I and II, portrayed the United States as a “regional balancer”, an “honest broker” playing a “critical stabilising role.” 98 In other words, while the United States would maintain a forward role in terms of military deployment, it would also keep up bilateral relations with smaller Southeast Asian countries as keystones of its regional strategy. Given the imperative to find new justification for retaining the forward presence of the United States in the region, in spite of the end of the Cold War, the Bush administration viewed regional multilateral security forums or institutions as anathemas, precisely because they threatened to undermine the bilateral ‘hub-and-spoke’ alliances that remained at the core of the United States’ East Asian strategy. 99 Indeed, the overwhelming attitude was, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”100 This prompted a change in the official stance regarding the usefulness of engaging with the region via regional institutional mechanisms. Indeed, American disinterest in regional multilateral engagement at the end of the Cold War stemmed from a desire to let sleeping dogs lie and initial concerns that regional undertakings at this level would undermine United States’ leadership. Therefore, whether the initiatives were of the form of Mahathir’s East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) or less radical proposals 97

Mark Beeson & Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “Asia’s Odd Men Out: Australia, Japan and the Politics of Regionalism,” CGSR Working Paper Series No. 196/06, March 2006. Also see, Richard Weixing Hu, “APEC: The Challenge of Remaining Relevant,” Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary Series, No. 1, Brookings Institution, November 2008. 98 US Defense Strategy for 1990s: A Regional Strategy. Available at: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/naarpr_Defense.pdf 99 Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. 100 James A. Baker III, “America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, 1991/1992, pp. 1-18.

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like the APEC proposals put forward by Australia, the United States was decidedly ambivalent.101 In 1990, for instance, US Secretary of State James Baker criticised the notion of regional security dialogues replacing the American ‘hub-andspoke’ network of bilateral alliances in Asia.102 That this attitude prevailed in the policy discourse of pre-financial crisis United States was exemplified by the statement of Assistant Secretary for East Asia, Richard Solomon, in October 1990, “…the nature of the security challenges we anticipate in the years ahead – do not easily lend themselves to regionwide solutions….”103 However, the rigidly bilateral stance of the regional discourse of the United States in East Asia soon softened to include a broader focus on multilateralism. In addition, because of the active American discouragement of regional initiatives like the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) during the financial crisis of 1997-1998, the United States was seen to be disinterested at best and subversive at worst, especially given China’s ready assistance to its stricken neighbours.104 With the lifting of the Cold War superpower rivalry, the United States was forced to adopt a more regional focus in its East Asia strategy. While attempting to maintain its preponderance in this part of the world in the region, it now confronted multiple goals within the region – it had to restrain Japanese militarism, while promoting a more active and responsible role for Japan and the manner in which to deal with growing Chinese power, while trying to balance its post-Cold War commitments

101

Victor Cha, “The New Geometry of Asian Architecture: What Works and What Does Not,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, January 2010. Also see, Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29; Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN+3: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2002, pp. 440455; Mark Beeson, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: After American Hegemony,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 2-2-09, January 2009. 102 See “Security, in Letter and Spirit,” Australian Financial Review, 2 May 1991. 103 Cited in Paul Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism,” Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2000, p. 372. 104 Victor Cha, “The New Geometry of Asian Architecture: What Works and What Does Not,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, January 2010. Also see Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN+3: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2002, pp. 440-455.

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within East Asia. 105 Other problems, such as weapons proliferation, economic integration and environmental security, rapidly acquired a transnational colour and became further incentives for regional cooperation. Not only were multilateral strategies seen as a way to reduce the costs of leadership, but by the 1990s, the power disparity between the United States and regional states was much smaller than at the beginning of the Cold War. Not only was East Asia assuming international importance in economic terms, but the region’s states now had more potential to contribute to the United States’ goal of preserving regional stability. This was reflected in the choices of partnerships for regional alliances. As early as the 1950s, SEATO had failed, partly because of the inability of the region’s states to work together, due to both domestic and intra-regional conflicts. However, by the 1990s, significant regional players like Japan and the ASEAN member countries were genuinely interested in promoting regional cooperation. They saw multilateralism as the key to continuing the economically and strategically vital US engagement in the post-Cold War period. It was around this time that the Bush administration began to moderate its own attitude towards regional multilateral security forums. In a speech in Tokyo in November 1991, Secretary of State James Baker, while reaffirming the centrality of US alliances in the region, acknowledged that “multilateral actions may…supplement bilateral ties….”106 In a subsequent article published in Foreign Affairs, Baker further pointed to the use of multilateral action in regional conflicts, such as in the Cambodian peace process, the South China Sea dispute and on the Korean peninsula, and stated, “…we should be attentive to the possibilities for such multilateral actions without locking ourselves into an overly structural approach….”107 This change in attitude appears to have come about as a result of gathering regional doubts about the continued commitment of the United States to East Asia in the wake of the Cold War. With the cuts in defence spending and the subsequent retraction of the US military’s forward presence in the region, the Bush administration’s presentation of the new strategy had 105

Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. Also see Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 22, No.1, 1997, pp. 86-124. 106 Cited in Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. 107 James Baker, “America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, 1991/92.

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failed to reassure its allies in the region, who were worried that the United States would withdraw into the role of an ‘offshore balancer’. 108 As a result of regional disquiet, the Bush administration, while retaining its key focus on bilateral alliances, began to appreciate the utility of a regional multilateral security forum. This mood was summed up by Baker’s statement to ASEAN leaders, “The form of our presence may have changed, but the substance of our commitment is firm.”109 It may be argued that this cautious support for regional security cooperation represented one avenue for extending the preponderance strategy by political means. In other words, multilateral security forums could supplement the existing regional ‘hub-and-spoke’ security architecture. It also opened up opportunities for actors like Australia, Japan and ASEAN to follow what Crone terms: “a political-economic strategy of dependence reduction through partner diversification.”110 For example, while minimising trade differences with Japan in favour of preserving the sanctity of US-Japan security relations, the administration emphasised the value of regional defence and security cooperation with regard to human rights issues. Indeed, foreign policy machinations under the Bush administration may be termed ‘cautiously realist’.111

The Clinton Administration (1993-2000) The tone of the approach to multilateralism was set by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord, who identified “a commitment to multilateral security dialogue”112 as one of the incoming Clinton administration’s top ten policy goals. The approach was formalised in 1993 by President Clinton embracing a “new Pacific Community”113 as 108 Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, Summer 1997, pp. 86-124. 109 James Baker, Statement to the ASEAN-US Dialogue Session, Manila, Philippines, July 26, 1992. 110 Donald Crone, “Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganisation of the Pacific Political Economy,” World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1993, pp. 501-525. 111 William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security, Cambridge Asia-Pacific Studies Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 190. 112 Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, Joint Press Statement, ASEAN-US Dialogue, Brunei, 1992. Available at: http://www.aseansec.org/2053.htm 113 President Bill Clinton, Speech to the Republic of Korea National Assembly, July 1993.

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one of the pillars of his foreign policy. The shift took concrete shape at the 1993 ASEAN PMC meeting over an informal lunch between dialogue partners and representatives of China, Russia and Vietnam. The group decided to reconvene the following year for what would become the precedent-setting ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). By the time of the first ARF meeting in Bangkok in July 1994, the United States had declared its full backing for the forum. This change in policy perception had been ushered in with the Clinton administration, which had liberals such as Anthony Lake and Joseph Nye at its helm. From its inception, the ARF was designed to engage and if possible manage relations with the major regional powers. Its membership consequently includes all the key countries with a capacity to shape security outcomes in the region. Since the forum was seen as a spin-off from ASEAN, the operational practices, norms and behaviour that were part of the ASEAN grouping’s modus operandi would form the basis of the ARF as well.114 Nevertheless, from the perspective of the United States, the ARF’s contribution to East Asian regional security is still rather limited. For example, Taiwan has not been permitted to participate, with Beijing insisting that “internal Chinese affairs” be kept off the agenda. This has impeded the ARF’s ability to resolve regional disputes, despite obvious implications. Another example is that of the South China Sea, where China has refused to discuss matters with the ARF, preferring to use ASEAN as a platform of dialogue, or preferring bilateral talks with its immediate neighbours. This being said, the enthusiasm for the ARF and regional security forums was part of a policy inclination on the part of the Clinton administration towards ‘value-driven strategy, liberal institutionalism and multilateralism.’115 During its term, one of the major goals for the United States in East Asia was identified as “developing multilateral forums for security consultations.”116

114

Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. 87. 115 Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. 116 Winston Lord, Building a Pacific Community, Statement before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, 12 January, 1995. Cited in Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29.

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With the renewed emphasis on boosting the identity of the United States as an integral Asia-Pacific power, the thrust under the Clinton administration was to present the United States as a regional stabiliser. Policymakers recognised the fragile potential of this transitional period. There was no benefit in opposing, and some gain in supporting, a regional security initiative. The other incentive was a rapidly rising ASEAN, and an American desire to strengthen ties with it. Regional policy discourse could not leave out China and to this end regional security cooperation was even more important because the members of the ARF would have the opportunity to observe whether China would play by the rules in a multilateral security forum. The great hope at the heart of the ARF initiative was not only that China could be engaged, but that it might be socialised into ‘good’ behaviour as a consequence.117 This was the key tenet of the United States’ engagement strategy with regard to China, despite domestic undercurrents within the American policymaking monolith that glanced uncomfortably at issues such as most favoured nation (MFN) status and China’s human rights record, not to mention China’s actions during the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. In 1998, in fact, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Stanley Roth, testified to the fact that “the Chinese are now on board and actively engaged in the ARF is compelling evidence that multilateralism in Asia is coming of age.”118 The Clinton administration’s endorsement of a regional multilateral security dialogue was, however, still accompanied by a strong reaffirmation of the United States’ traditional emphasis on bilateral alliances. Therefore, the foundation of the policy still remained bilateral treaty alliances, military arrangements and the maintenance of a substantial military presence in the region. This was reaffirmed by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 1997, which was issued by the second Clinton administration. First, it restated that existing US bilateral alliances would remain the key components of its deterrence posture in the Asia-Pacific region. Second, it identified China as critical to regional peace and stability and that it would continue to be engaged as a regional 117

Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. 87. Also see Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. 118 Stanley Roth, Testimony before the House International Committee, May 7, 1998. Available at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1998_h/h980507-r. htm

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player and closely monitored. The QDR further underlined ‘security pluralism’ as part of the overall strategy in the region, elaborating it as “cooperative and complementary frameworks within which states can address their security concerns through bilateral and multilateral relationships and dialogues.” 119 The Clinton administration believed that Asia shared enough common security interests with the United Statesto merit the latter’s participation in such processes. These shared interests included regional arms races and nuclear proliferation, conflict prevention and regional peacekeeping. The term ‘engagement’ was used to identify this common approach to regional security. 120 However, what the administration failed to clarify was how bilateralism and multilateralism were related to each other. It also left unexplained “how a preference for maintaining power-balancing alliances could be reconciled with an inclination to seek instruments for threat reduction and region-wide security collaboration,”121 especially after the publication of the East Asia Strategy Review by Joseph Nye, later known as the ‘Nye Doctrine’. The Nye Doctrine was a milestone in the United States’ evolving regional discourse. Taking note of the rise of China and the way that it reconfigured the East Asian regional landscape, the doctrine rejected the idea of the containment of China for two reasons; namely, “If we treated China as an enemy, we were guaranteeing an enemy in the future. If we treated China as a friend, we could not guarantee friendship, but we could at least keep open the possibility of more benign outcomes.”122 The strategy here was what Nye termed “integrate but hedge.”123On one hand, the United States supported China’s membership in the WTO and accepted Chinese goods and visitors. On the other hand, the ClintonHashimoto Declaration of April 1996 affirmed that the US-Japan security treaty, rather than being a Cold War relic, would provide the basis for a stable and prosperous East Asia. 119

Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997. Taken from: http://www.dod.mil/pubs/qdr/ 120 William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security, Cambridge Asia-Pacific Studies Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 186-189. 121 Ibid., p. 189. 122 Joseph Nye, “Should China be ‘Contained?’” Project Syndicate, July 4, 2011. Accessed on October 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/should-china-be--contained-#bom8pRGzXVgjoSUq.99 123 Ibid.

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Nevertheless, with policymakers like Anthony Lake and Joseph Nye at the helm, the regional discourse towards the East Asian region during the Clinton administration was shaped by a liberal paradigm. This was not entirely successful. Fears that this would erode the United States’ influence in the region abounded –put to rest, ultimately, by a rapid rethinking on regional discourse, which led to a compromise between maintaining bilateral alliances and coupling them with multilateral regional initiatives. Vis-à-vis China, the United States adopted a hedgingwhile-containing strategy.124 Containment through the maintenance of US alliances and defence relationships in East Asia provided the fundamental basis of this policy, while the hedge was engagement. Engagement with China was largely carried out in a bilateral context, with a parallel dimension being added in the form of China’s participation in international and regional multilateral institutions. The ARF was one of these regional institutions, along with the WTO and APEC. The overall strategy was summed up by Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s speech to ARF in 1995, when he stated that the reason why the United States was working with the region to build regional cooperation architecture was to “reinforce our treaty alliances and our policy of engagement.”125

The George W. Bush Administration (2001-2009) From the start of the first term of the George W. Bush administration, the emphasis in the regional policy discourse towards East Asia was on maintaining the priority of US hegemony, and containing any potential threat to it. Shaped by a strongly conservative paradigm, the Bush administration was sceptical regarding the use of multilateral forums in regional security, and equally clear about drawing a binary between friends and foes. In a speech during his electoral campaign, Bush announced that “China should be seen as a competitor, not a partner, and treated without ill will but without illusions.” 126 In 2001, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld suggested that it was time for the military to 124

Cited in Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. 125 Opening intervention by Secretary Christopher at ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, August 1, 1995. Available at: http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-17438479/working-toward-secureand.html 126 Tony Karon, “Bush China Policy Defaults to Engagement,” TIME Magazine, July 31, 2001. Accessed on October 25, 2012. Taken from: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,169585,00.html

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orient its strategic thinking towards the objective of containing Chinese regional ambitions in Asia.127 These comments came at a time when SinoUS relations were already tense, in the light of the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO forces and the collision of a US spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea in 2001. The Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001 further stated that the United States had an explicit agenda of boosting its primary presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The Review stated, “the possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region” and that East Asia is an area of “enduring national interest to the US that no other state can be allowed to dominate.”128 In this way, China was indirectly identified as a potential threat to the United States’ interests in the region. The report delineated a sub-region – ‘East Asia Littoral’ – which spanned the south of Japan, through to the Bay of Bengal, wherein the US forward-deployed forces would be more widely dispersed to cope with contingencies. 129 The direct implications of this included the expansion of United States forces in Guam, future deployments of additional aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, the development of more longdistance bombers, and other projects like the Theatre Missile Defence System. It also marked a shift from the previous administration’s policies of hedge-and-contain to encircling and containing a regional rival, namely China. This was a strategy that rested on a renewed and much more focused emphasis on American bilateral alliances and military relationships in the region, aimed at maintaining the preponderance of the United States in East Asia. The Bush administration also ushered in a new ‘rim land’ policy of maintaining closer ties with Australia, Japan and Taiwan, which was enhanced following the post 9/11 ‘war on terror’.130 The trend noticed here can be summed up as change amid continuity. Despite the changes in regional discourse, certain core perspectives remained constant. For instance, Asia continued to be viewed as a strategically important region in which the American objective was to maintain a favourable balance of power, defined by preventing regional 127

Ibid. Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001. Taken from: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf 129 Ibid. 130 Lowell Dittmer, American Asia Policy and the American Election, July 2008, Foreign Policy Research Institute. Taken from: http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200807.dittmer.americanasiapolicyelection.html 128

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domination by any other power. The dynamic nature of Asia’s regional economies was uppermost in the regional discourse of the Bush administration. Therefore, the objective remained to foster regional prosperity, in order to promote access to the Asian markets for American exporters, investors and consumers.131A historical perspective towards the region also prevailed, with regard to conflict management in vulnerable spots like the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. Under the Bush administration, the concern was that an outbreak of regional conflicts in areas like these could lead to destabilising changes in the balance of power, in addition to resisting the spread of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.132 The terror attacks of 9/11 brought about a change in perspective towards the region. The administration now called for a ‘constructive relationship’ with China, terming it a ‘partner’ on all things East Asian.133This volteface in regional rhetoric exacerbated certain trends. First, there was an increase in strengthening bilateral alliances, such as with Japan and the Philippines. Next, despite its ambiguity towards multilateralism, the Bush administration further turned to multilateral institutions such as the ARF and APEC. The subsequent adoption of counter-terrorism as part of the agenda of both these institutions further proved the cementing factor of transnational threats behind multilateralism. Indeed, it was in 2001 that the “APEC Leaders’ Statement on Counter-Terrorism” was issued – the first political document of APEC’s 13-year long history. In 2003, APEC also issued a communiqué on the subject of countering the proliferation of WMDs, while the meeting was also used by President Bush to make a strong statement against the nuclear weapons aspirations of North Korea. However, while there was indeed a slight shift from antagonism towards regional multilateralism to a grudging acceptance of it, there was no doubt that the Bush administration laid much of its emphasis on bilateral 131

Harry Harding, “Change and Continuity in the Bush Administration’s Policy,” in Robert Hathaway and Wilson M. Lee (ed.), George W. Bush and East Asia: A First Term Assessment (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005), p. 32. Also see Evans J.R. Revere, Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, The Bush Administration’s Second Term Foreign Policy toward East Asia, Remarks to Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) Conference, Washington, D.C., May 17, 2005. Taken from US Department of State Archives (2001-2009): http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2005/46420.htm 132 Ibid. 133 Cited in Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29.

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alliances and maintaining the hub-and-spoke system of yore.134 Indeed, the emphasis on the ‘war on terror’ dominated the regional security cooperation agenda to the point that confidence in the influence of the United States in the region was eroded, especially after the declaration of war in Iraq. Further, under the Bush administration’s second term, and shaped by the conservative and neo-conservative paradigm of its functional framework, the emphasis was on selling America’s hard power, far more than its soft power, as far as regional cooperation and confidence building measures were concerned.135 While it is widely argued that the Bush administration’s emphasis was on unilateralism, the view has been countered by scholars like Ralph Cossa 136 who have pointed to the National Security Strategy of both 2002 and 2006, which emphasised the importance of multilateralism and multilateral institutions in the foreign policy of the United States. Indeed, the National Security Strategy, 2006 argued for the “vital role” of regional institutions like the ARF and APEC in “regional security”, and also noted that “new arrangements like the USASEAN Enhanced Partnership…the Six Party Talks and the Proliferation Security Initiative can bring Asian nations together to address common challenges.”137 In short, the Bush administration was particularly supportive of wider Asian multilateral initiatives, insisting on a multilateral approach for the Six Party Talks, for example, in order to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem. 138 Politics and security aside, the administration also used institutions like APEC to further the economic and free-trade agenda, such as the statement issued at Hanoi in 2006 to urge the stalled 134

Ralph A. Cossa, “A Second Term Needs to Focus More on Asia,” Global Beat Syndicate, December 27, 2004. Accessed on November 1, 2012. Taken from: http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/cossa122704.html 135 Robert Hathaway, George Bush’s Unfinished Asian Agenda, May 13, 2005, Foreign Policy Research Institute. Taken from: http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050513.asia.hathaway.bushasia.html 136 Ralph Cossa, “Evolving US Views on Asia’s Future Institutional Architecture,” from Michael J. Green and Bates Gill (ed.), Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition and the Search for Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 41. 137 US Department of Defense, “National Security Strategy,” The White House, Washington, DC, 2006. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov 138 Ralph Cossa, “Evolving US Views on Asia’s Future Institutional Architecture,” from Michael J. Green and Bates Gill (ed.), Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition and the Search for Community(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 33-54.

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proceedings of the WTO at Doha to be brought to a conclusive end. It was also during President Bush’s term in office that the East Asia Summit (EAS) was first convened in Malaysia in 2005. However, while it was clear that ASEAN would retain control of the proceedings of the EAS, the membership of the United States remained in question until 2007.

The Barack Obama Administration (2009-present) When Barack Obama assumed the office of President in 2009, the ideological prism through which East Asia was viewed shifted from being conservative and neo-conservative to neo-liberal. Neo-liberalism emerged primarily as an incisive critique of the Bush administration’s post-9/11 foreign policy. Bearing a similarity to the policies of the Clinton administration, this ideological prism has a marked preference for multilateral approaches in addressing international problems. For neoliberalism to work, the United States must be at the helm of multilateral cooperation. 139 The change in concept led to a change in the regional discourse of the United States towards East Asia. The focus was now on developing a two-pronged strategy: (i) economic regionalisation which was to take the form of the initiative to launch the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); and (ii) a focus on security regionalism, which encompassed a renewed thrust on multilateral cooperation in regional security forums.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Another Platform for Economic Regionalisation? The TPP is an idea that has stemmed from two reasons: the rise of China to economically dominate the regional discourse in East Asia, as well as the failure of the United States to bind the region, in the form of APEC. It came into being in November 2005 when New Zealand, Brunei, Chile and Singapore completed a deal, then known as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement. What the so-called P4 have in common is that they are all small, trade-oriented economies with relatively few barriers between them. In 2008, the United States, Australia, Peru, Malaysia and Vietnam joined the TPP. However, progress was put on hold for two years as the United States, under the newly elected Barack Obama, went in for a review of its trade policy. Nevertheless, the agreement soon 139

Timothy J. Lynch, “Liberalism and Neo-liberalism,” in Inderjeet Parmar et al, New Directions in US Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 53.

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became a top priority for the Obama administration. With countries like Mexico, Canada, Japan and important Southeast Asian countries like South Korea and Thailand actively wanting to join, the TPP could be the answer to the Obama administration’s prayer for economic regionalisation. This is especially so given the fact that China is not a target nor is it a member. This gives the TPP enough room to develop as the kind of regionalisation network that the United States always wanted in the region, but was never able to have. This was highlighted by the National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon, at the Asia Society in New York, in April 2013 when he called the TPP “the centrepiece of our rebalancing” and a “platform for regional economic integration.”140 This being said, it is important to remember that the TPP is still in an embryonic stage, and East Asian regionalisation has had a good head-start, while the United States has attempted to catch up. The TPP is also the first regional mechanism that Obama has not inherited. It aims to further economic integration in the Asia Pacific region, with the current negotiations including Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and the United States itself. The recent entry of Japan in the negotiations has added weight to the TPP being an East Asian regional initiative as well as an Asia-Pacific one.141 This was summarised by then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, who argued for the need to harness the economic dynamism of Asia, and to participate in the construction

140

Thomas Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013.” Complete transcript of his speech on March 11, 2013, available at: http://asiasociety.org/new-york/complete-transcript-thomas-donilon-asia-societynew-york Also see Thomas Donilon, “The President’s Free-Trade Path to Prosperity,” Council for Foreign Relations, April 15, 2013. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/trade/presidents-free-trade-path-prosperity/p31455 141 Shiro Armstrong, “The TPP, APEC and East Asian Trade Strategies,” East Asia Forum, November 14, 2011. Accessed on October 28, 2012. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/14/the-tpp-apec-and-east-asian-tradestrategies/ Also see Peter Drysdale, “Obama’s Regional Summitry,” East Asia Forum, November 14, 2011. Accessed on October 28, 2012. Taken from: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/14/obamas-regional-summitry/

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Source: The United States Post and the US Congressional Research Service

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of the region’s economic architecture.142 The Office of the United States Trade Representative also said as much in 2009: “The TPP will serve to strengthen US trade and investment ties to the Trans-Pacific region, which is a priority, given the economic significance of the region to the United States now and in the future. The TPP will also facilitate trade in the Trans-Pacific region, rationalise existing agreements and support the multilateral trade agenda. In addition, it could serve as a vehicle for achieving the long-term APEC objective of generating a Free Trade Area in the Asia-Pacific.”143 However, a closer look at the TPP, in its present form, may lead to the conclusion that it is, as yet, nothing more than a thinly disguised attempt to counter the influence of a rising China in the East Asian region. What is more, the Obama administration’s lethargic economic performance has received criticism from the very quarters that chose to elect him. In its response, the Obama administration has attempted to reassess TPP participation. This has not been easy, as each member country of the TPP still has its own core areas of interest that are challenging. For example, Vietnam and Malaysia are in conflict about opening their markets for goods and services; Australia has a political issue regarding investor–state dispute settlement over the participation of the United States in free-trade agreements (FTAs). On its part, the United States has insisted that the TPP should be on par with the Republic of Korea–United States (KORUS) FTA. This has not gone down particularly well with the existing P4 members, who wish to maintain the status quo. Besides, while negotiations to solve these issues are underway, these are held in much-criticised144 secrecy, with very little information in the public domain. It is certainly in every member country’s interest to show that a deal suitable for all is about to be laid on the table, but whether the TPP can be brought around to actually doing this looks bleak at the moment. With these roadblocks to progress, it is not likely that the goal of establishing the “21st century 142 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 10, 2011. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century 143 Quoted from Inkyo Cheong, “Negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Evaluation and Implications for East Asian Regionalism,” ADBI Working Paper 428, Tokyo, 2013. Available at: http://www.adbi.org/workingpaper/2013/07/11/5794.trans.pacific.partnership.east.asian.regionalism/ 144 Barry Coates, “Release the TPP Negotiation Documents,” The New Zealand Herald, February 21, 2014. Available at: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.cfm?c_id=466&objectid=11206582

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Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement” will be reached any time soon. The TPP is missing a strong leader and closer cooperation amongst its members. Without these, it will be difficult for it to overcome the obstacles it faces.145 On a larger macro level, the TPP is nothing more than a very thinly disguised attempt to counter the rise of China. However, can its own attempts at regionalisation achieve this goal? No doubt, the TPP is being vigorously promoted to the exclusion of China; and if the United States continues to set the terms and conditions for the development of the TPP, it looks unlikely that China will get the chance to join. That raises the question: Will this be a strategically sensible move? Shire Armstrong’s view is that it will not, on the grounds that the biggest risk of the TPP is that it might divide the region strategically between members and nonmembers, with China on the outside. This, in turn, could lead to an uncomfortable division of the Pacific region right down the middle. Understandably, this is not a scenario that would have many advantages. The TPP is, therefore, at a crossroads as a regional building block. It is indeed part of a larger regional strategy which is being pursued by the Obama administration, but from here, it could go either way. On the one hand, it could result in the economic integration of Asia and the Pacific regions; and on the other, it could create two large trade blocs in one region.146 However, as Barack Obama nears the end of his second term as US President, the sticking points that obstinately refuse to be resolved remain present. What is more, domestic politics on Capitol Hill are also presenting obstacles, with Democrat lawmakers refusing to grant Obama the authority to fast-track the deal.147 With negotiations having concluded on February 25, 2014 in Singapore, and ending in an impasse between member countries, it appears unlikely that the TPP will take concrete shape soon.

145

See Inkyo Cheong, “Negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Evaluation and Implications for East Asian Regionalism,” ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 428, July 2013. 146 Ibid. 147 Ed O’Keefe, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership is in Trouble on Capitol Hill. Here’s Why,” The United States Post, February 19, 2014. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/02/19/why-the-transpacific-partnership-is-in-trouble-on-capitol-hill/

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United States: Security Regionalism in East Asia The year 2011 saw the “return” of the United States to East Asia after a decade of war in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In itself, this was a paradigm shift in policy, as much of the United States’ regional discourse toward East Asia can be divided between the periods of pre- and post9/11.Under the Obama administration, the United States expressed its desire, in very Clinton-like terms, to push for a “Pacific Century”.148In her Foreign Policy article, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said one of the most important tasks facing American statecraft over the coming decade would be to crystallise a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the Asia Pacific region. She argued that, “addressing complex transnational challenges of the sort now faced by Asia requires a set of institutions capable of mustering collective action.” 149 As Clinton noted, “It’s more important to have organisations that produce results, rather than simply producing new organisations.”150 So it was that in 2011, the United States finally joined the EAS, and signed a defence cooperation agreement with Australia that stations US marines at Darwin. The same year saw visits to the region by President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Secretaries of Defense Robert Gates and Leon Panetta, and a step up in American military cooperation with countries in the region. Participation in the EAS, in particular, marked the further recalibration of US foreign policy vis-àvis ASEAN-led multilateral institutions, in an attempt to complement and deepen bilateral ties with Southeast Asian countries – especially Indonesia and Vietnam. In doing so, the Obama administration marked a shift away from its predecessor in forming multilateral security architecture in Asia that would include the United States, besides complementing its bilateral defence and foreign policy commitments.151 The Bush administration, as already noted, was indifferent to regional security cooperation, preferring the flexibility and mobility of bilateral arrangements rather than the institutionalised forms of regional cooperation that ASEAN-led mechanisms 148

Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 10, 2011. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Ralf Emmers, “The US in EAS: Implications for US-ASEAN Relations,” East Asia Forum, November 23, 2011. Accessed on September 30, 2012. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/23/the-us-in-the-eas-implications-for-usasean-relations/

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presented. The Obama administration, on the other hand, has signalled a renewed interest in the region, initially preferring to keep ASEAN in the driver’s seat. Accordingly, it held summit meetings with ASEAN leaders during the APEC forum and the opening of the UN General Assembly in November 2009 and September 2010 respectively. It also acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation by presidential decree in July 2009, thereby opening the door for American membership to the EAS. The participation of the United States in the EAS under the Obama administration is important for three reasons. First, while APEC and TPP focus primarily on an economic and trade agenda, the EAS is a forum for dialogue on “broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern.” 152 Second, the participation of the United States reflects a significant shift in foreign policy under the Obama administration. From the focused view of the 1980s and 1990s that Asian multilateralism was inimical to the interests of the United States and risked undermining its ‘hub and spoke’ alliance system, regional discourse has now placed ASEAN-led institutions at the heart of its foreign policy in Asia. In her November 2011 article, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasised the “importance of multilateral cooperation,” arguing that “we believe that addressing complex transnational challenges of the sort now faced by Asia requires a set of institutions capable of mustering collective action.” 153 Third, heightened American interest comes at a time when China’s views of regional multilateralism have become noticeably less positive. Over the last decade and a half, Beijing has embraced ASEAN-centric institutions as a key part of its regional ‘charm offensive’ and its strategy of engagement with Southeast Asia. However, after the impasse over the South China Sea at the 2010 ARF meeting in Hanoi, China has increasingly seen regional institutional mechanisms as a constraint to its power. 154 This is in stark contrast to the discourse under the Obama administration which is based on the premise that, in East Asia, deepening 152

Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit, Kuala Lumpur, December 14, 2005. Accessed on September 27, 2012. Available at: http://www.aseansec.org/18098.htm 153 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 10, 2011. Accessed on November 15, 2011. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century 154 David Capie and Amitav Acharya, “The United States and East Asia: A New Beginning,” East Asia Forum, November 20, 2011. Accessed on September 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/20/the-united-statesand-the-east-asia-summit-a-new-beginning/

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key bilateral ties and engaging multilateral institutional structures go hand in hand. Indeed, this is the keystone on which the Obama administration has based its foreign policy in East Asia. Its regional discourse is founded on rejuvenating ties with East Asia, based on the ‘hub-and-spoke’ system of bilateral alliances, and engaging with the member countries of East Asia, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Nevertheless, like the Clinton administration, the Obama administration too prefers to encourage a more pan-Pacific oriented type of community building. Initiatives like APEC, ARF and the TPP are clear examples of this. That being so, it is also receptive to the idea of an East Asian Community (EAC), which it indicated by its participation in the EAS, and the great degree of diplomatic attention paid to the region in the form of bilateral visits and exchanges during 2010-2012. In 2013, however, the discourse suffered a slight speed-bump. As crises in the Middle East increasingly claimed American attention, it found it was unable to keep pace in East Asia, leading many countries in the region to question where the much-vaunted ‘pivot’ was going. Security regionalism slowed down sharply, as domestic politics intervened in the path of regionalism. For example, the US government shut-down in October 2013 forced President Obama to call off his trip to East Asia, where he was scheduled to attend APEC, ASEAN and EAS meetings. Though Vice President Joe Biden made an extensive trip to various countries in Southeast and East Asia, the absence of the President himself not only further antagonised his critics, but was a cause of severe concern for several East Asian countries. More importantly, Obama’s absence handed China a fairly large propaganda advantage, revolving around the geopolitical vacuum that the United States had left by not being present. No doubt, in June 2013, President Obama invited his Chinese counterpart for an informal summit on the Annenberg Estate in California where they talked about geopolitics and cyber-security – two broad points of contention – but not much headway had been made in bilateral relations thereafter. Coming on the heels of this highly publicised informal summit, the inability of the American President to attend key East Asian summits was sheer bad timing. With disputes in the South and East China Seas throwing the region into a state of great flux, it was no wonder that the United States’ regional discourse went off-track for a while. To make matters worse, in November 2013, the announcement came of the establishment of a Chinese Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the disputed region of the East China Sea. The ADIZ covered the airspace from the Senkaku and Diaoyu Islands, to the South Korean claims on Socotra Rock. Half the area overlaps a Japanese ADIZ, while also partly overlapping the South Korean and Taiwanese ADIZs. In

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accordance with the terms of the ADIZ, Beijing now demanded that all foreign aircraft intending to fly through the designated area would first have to submit their flight plans to China. The United States tried, rather unnecessarily, to go both ways as far as this issue was concerned. On one hand, it released an official statement which said that American commercial airliners would be advised to comply with China’s demands. On the other hand, the United States State Department stated that China’s establishment of the ADIZ was a “unilateral action that constitutes an attempt to change the status quo in the East China Sea.”155 The United States Defense Secretary, Chuck Hagel, backed up the statement, saying that the Chinese announcement “will not, in any way, change how the United States conducts military operations in the region.” 156 To further buffer its position, two unarmed B-52 bombers were flown through the region, from the American air base at Guam. In a bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in December 2013, Vice President Joe Biden also raised the issue, making it clear that while the United States was fully aware that its stance in the region was being compromised, it would not be pushed too far. Regional discourse towards East Asia was now forgotten in a bigger game of great power politics. However, it now appears that the Obama administration is trying to bring its regional discourse towards East Asia back on track, it being vital to separate concerns regarding China from the discourse about the region. The US President’s recent overtures towards both China and East Asia signal a realisation of this. In April 2014, President Obama went on a weeklong East Asian trip, during which he visited Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines – key countries in the reorientation of the regional discourse of the United States towards East Asia. The prime objective was to compensate for the said absence in the previous year when he was expected to attend key summits in East Asia. In doing so, the United States is hoping to reinforce its commitment to the region by building on the political, security and economic aspects of its rebalancing strategy. So, in Tokyo, in January 2014, President Obama sought to assure Prime Minister Abe that the United States was committed to protecting Japanese interests in the event of Chinese aggression. In South Korea, 155

Press Statement on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, John Kerry, US Secretary of State, Washington, DC, November 23, 2013. Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/218013.htm 156 Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, Washington, DC, November 23, 2013. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16392

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assurances were made with reference to North Korean belligerence. In Manila, President Obama signed a ten-year bilateral military pact which would provide the Philippines with the necessary means of strategic deterrence against China in the South China Sea. However, while security regionalism was reinforced, President Obama was not so lucky in terms of a thrust on economic regionalisation. Neither Japan’s Abe nor Malaysia’s Najib Razak were keen on giving the United States assurances of their commitment to the TPP, citing domestic political pressures. Far more importantly, the Obama administration now appears to be attempting to incorporate China within the parameters of its regional discourse towards East Asia. There have been several examples of this paradigm shift in 2014 alone. In February 2014, for example, China was granted “observer plus” status in the United States- and Thailand-led Southeast Asian joint military exercises, code-named ‘Cobra Gold’. China was also invited to participate in the humanitarian and civil assistance (HCA) portion of the exercise, when 17 members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) assisted in building a school in northern Thailand and also participated in the exercise’s civic health engagements. While the exercises themselves will not lead to an increase in bilateral military transparency between the two countries anytime soon, ‘Cobra Gold’ was a fairly benign and innovative platform for personal interaction. In June 2014, four Chinese ships – the Haikou (a missile destroyer), the Yueyang (a missile frigate), the Qiandaohu (a supply ship) and the Peace Ark (a hospital ship) – set sail to take part in the Hawaii-based Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) international maritime exercise. The RIMPAC exercises have been held every two years since 1971. They offer an opportunity to create at least some counter-measures in favour of a less threatening regional naval environment. This is the first time that the Chinese PLA Navy has sent ships to participate. The inclusion hints at the benefits for China of a more civil, if not necessarily friendly, relationship with its neighbours, as well as with the United States. Indeed, Xinhua has called China’s participation “a positive signal for building trust between China and the United States.” 157 However, signs of caution vis-à-vis the United State are still present – China was excluded from key segments of the exercises, such as carrier operations signals. Nevertheless, though these are baby steps, encouraging China to participate more actively in global governance by integrating it in existing 157

Shannon Tiezzi, “A Historic Moment: China’s Ships Head to RIMPAC 2014,” The Diplomat, June 11, 2014. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/ahistoric-moment-chinas-ships-head-to-rimpac-2014/

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maritime and/or regional governance mechanisms is a realistic step forward. Indeed, as Andrew Erickson and Austin Strange have suggested, the invitation suggests that the United States is pursuing a tacit strategy of “competitive coexistence,” wherein geopolitical tensions do not preclude pragmatic engagement.158 During the Cold War, the United States did not have a multilateral strategy towards East Asia. Regionalism at the time was driven by the realpolitik of containment, and the United States found it easier and more in its interests to maintain bilateral links with key East Asian countries. A number of these ties, especially those with Japan, have survived until the present day; but following the end of the Cold War, the United States found that its role as a global hegemonic power could not guarantee its role as a regional hegemonic one. With the rise of China in the 1990s, East Asian regionalism for the United States began to be driven by two factors, namely maintaining the hegemonic status quo in East Asia and to counter China’s attempts to grab that role for itself. Since then, successive administrations in the United States have used multilateral institutions to implement a realpolitik agenda, while maintaining the key ‘spokes’ of its ‘hub-and-spoke’ strategy. For the United States today, the main lacuna in its regional discourse is the absence of fruitful economic regional ties. In the context of the rise of China and the recognition that China is, for the East Asian region, an economic powerhouse, the failure of APEC and the recent push for the TPP assumes new significance. Indeed, the current geopolitical scenario in East Asia, coupled with China’s undoubted political, military and economic rise, means that there can be no hard and fast pre-defined regional discourse. So far, the Obama administration has remained remarkably open to recalibrating its discourse towards the region, working both to maintain its Cold War system of bilateral alliances, as well as focusing on multilateral cooperation, which is inclusive – albeit cautiously so – of China. Currently, therefore, the United States’ regionalism towards East Asia is at a crossroads. Given China’s economic importance in the region, while ‘hard’ bilateral ties in the realm of security have increased, ‘soft’ multilateralism in economic terms, while not exactly taking a backseat, has remained unchanged.

158

Andrew S. Erickson & Austin M. Strange, “China’s RIMPAC Debut: What does it mean for America?” National Interest, July 3, 2014. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-rimpac-debutwhat%E2%80%99s-it-america-10801?page=show

CHAPTER THREE CHINESE REGIONALISM IN EAST ASIA: PAST AND PRESENT

The context of the emergence of East Asia as a regional entity has been discussed in Chapter 1. Without going further into the circumstances, it would be sufficient to say that, as in the century of colonialism; in postcolonial Asia too, bilateral ties with one of the great powers were decisive, while intra-Asian linkages were largely absent. Countries on the eastern edge of the Eurasian continent were either fighting each other or engaged in civil wars. No meaningful region could exist that is similar to modernday ‘East Asia’. In this condition of post-war disorder, as with the preceding century, there was scant room for horizontal linkage among Asian nations or Asian societies.1 As far as China was concerned, historical precedent had a significant role to play. For a long period, China had been the Middle Kingdom – the historical centre of the world. The mid-nineteenth century, when the Qing dynasty began to crumble due to domestic uprisings and repeated incursions from Western imperialism, saw the beginning of a century of instability and unrest. China therefore never really witnessed a long period of peace during which it could develop and modernise. The death blow to the Qing dynasty in the early years of the twentieth century saw the end of an era and the first birth pangs of an independent republic. During this period, China was carved up among Western powers as the spoils of colonialism, and this continued until the 1920s, followed by an extended spell of civil war. By the time the People’s Republic of China, as we know it today, came into being in 1949,the world was already divided into two power blocs, those of the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, the new People’s Republic of China did not have a concept of regionalism or regional linkages. During the 1960s, China allied itself with 1

Mark Selden, “East Asian Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics: 16th to 21st Centuries,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2009. Also see Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 23-45.

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the Soviet Union – owing to a shared Communist ideology. However, during the 1970s, this changed, and a distinct sense of realpolitik influenced Chinese foreign policy. Two decades later, China would be looking around, seeing its neighbourhood with a new lens. The Cold War did not allow much flexibility as far as global linkages were concerned. If China had not yet looked around to formulate its regional discourse with regard to East Asia, it certainly had a worldview in place, which included the manner in which China viewed East Asia. This was apparent in Mao’s Three World Theory, a concept, which postulated that: (a) the two superpowers of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union, constituted the First World; (b) the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, along with regions such as East Asia formed the Third World; and (c) the developed countries between these two blocs made up the Second World.2The Three World Theory had its origins in Mao’s original articulation of the Two World Theory, which laid out where China’s alliances should be positioned for the duration of the Cold War. To quote Mao: “Internationally we belong to the anti-imperialist front, headed by the Soviet Union. The Chinese people must either incline towards the side of imperialism or that of socialism. There can be no exception to the rule. It is impossible to sit on the fence…. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is our best teacher and we must learn from it.”3 However, as the 1950s progressed into the 1960s and the 2

When Chairman Mao first articulated the theory in February 1974, he omitted a detailed mention of ‘socialist states’ other than the Soviet Union. This was not simply an oversight. Mao apparently had difficulty in placing the Soviet satellite states: to classify them as a Soviet bloc would only admit Soviet leadership and domination in the Communist world; to classify them with the Second World, on the other hand, would blur the ideological line between the capitalist and socialist states. The Chinese leaders later solved the problem by declaring that the ‘international proletariats’ of the socialist states and the ‘oppressed’ people of the developing countries belonged to the Third World. See “Chairman Mao’s theory of the differentiation of the Three Worlds is a major contribution to MarxismLeninism,” Renmin Ribao, November 1, 1977. In any case, the role of the socialist states was only marginal in the PRC’s Three World strategic concept. 3 M.B. Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs (London: Redwood Burn Ltd, 1978), p. 102. Also see Sandra Gillespie, “Diplomacy on a South-South Dimension: The Legacy of Mao’s Three World Theory and the Evolution of SinoAfrican Relations,” in Hannah Slavik (ed.), Intercultural Communication & Diplomacy, DiploFoundation, Geneva, 2004, pp. 109-132.

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alliance between China and the Soviet Union began to show definite cracks, the Two World Theory also began to undergo corresponding changes, becoming the basis of China’s regional discourse in the following decades. Mao proclaimed the existence of an ‘intermediate zone’ – a kind of grey area between the black and white denominators of ‘imperialism versus socialism’. This was not an entirely new thesis. As far back as 1946, Mao had declared in an interview with the American correspondent, Anna Louise Strong,4 that the United States and the Soviet Union were separated by a vast zone which included many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Africa and Asia, including China. By 1964, this view was modified, when Mao divided the middle forces into two categories:(a) a first middle zone, comprising the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America; and (b) a second middle zone comprising the developed countries of Western Europe, along with Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Theoretical divisions like these allowed Mao and China to walk the tightrope between overtly offending the Soviet Union, and seeking relations with other nations with whom it had interests in common. This newly articulated vision began to be seen and heard in China’s foreign policy machinations. The clearest example of this is the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, known as ‘Panchsheel’. These were first introduced by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in 1953. Subsequently, they became part of India and China’s agreements on Tibet, signed in Beijing on April 29, 1954. The principles were as follows:

4

Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty Mutual non-aggression Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs Equality and mutual benefit Peaceful co-existence

Extracts from Mao’s Interview with Anna Louise Strong, August 1946, as cited by Hsuan Chi, IV: 1192-93, cited in S. R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 279-280.

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These principles resonate in Chinese foreign policy across the globe even today. They constituted the foundation of China’s regional discourse as well, underscoring its position as anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist – a country which could stand with others who sought to shake off the shackles of colonialism. This was a bold move during the Cold War, when the world stood so firmly divided, but it was also far removed from the Non-Aligned Movement that defined India, Yugoslavia and other AfroAsian countries. It was a manoeuvre to pull China out of its isolation and embrace a shared sense of identity and solidarity with other former colonies. China’s re-articulation of these principles at the Bandung Conference held in Indonesia during April 18-27, 1955, provided a powerful rhetoric – the Third World had a voice which would resonate in the global arena from now on. The prime importance of the Bandung Conference was certainly sheer symbolism – but for China, it strengthened the platform on which its future regional discourse concerning its surrounding neighbourhood would be based. This trajectory suffered a sharp setback during the 1960s, due primarily to domestic politics. The Cultural Revolution, coupled with factional struggles within the Communist Party, laid China open during the mid1960s and lasted a decade, which has now come to be known as the ‘lost decade’. As the revolution ebbed, leaving a more pragmatic leader, namely Deng Xiaoping in place, China began to reorient its regional discourse towards East Asia again – seeking to restore the sense of regional unity and peaceful coexistence that Bandung had symbolised. This was not easy. China’s relations with ASEAN members5 were damaged by the events of the Cultural Revolution. Indonesia, in particular, was deeply suspicious of Beijing, given its alleged involvement in the Indonesian coup of 1965. China’s continued support of Communist parties across the ASEAN countries also fanned the flames of ASEAN misgivings.

The Evolution of Regionalism in China The 1970s marked a watershed in the resurgence of East Asia as a region, and for the role of China to emerge as its nascent intra-regional leader. However, while East Asia was finding its feet in terms of a regional identity, China did not have a regional discourse ready. The country was 5 Leo Suryadinata, China and the Southeast Asian States (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 1985), pp. 126–31.

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still recovering from the ravages of the Cultural Revolution; the first and most pressing need was to lift China from the political and economic quagmire it was stuck in, and reposition it on the world map. The stage for this was set in the wake of the China–Soviet rift in the 1960s, the US–China entente in 1971 and the start of the reform era (gaige kaifang) in China under the aegis of Deng Xiaoping in 1978. These developments opened the way to the re-knitting of economic and political bonds across Asia and strengthening Asian linkages with the global economy. Intra-regional bonds also began to develop as China deepened its ties with Japan and South Korea, as a start. In 1974, Deng Xiaoping officially articulated China’s more moderate philosophy in a historic speech at the United Nations. In essence, this component of China’s regional and foreign policy discourse was determined by the Chinese perception and analysis of their overall place in the global system. Between 1975 and 1976, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines expanded their cooperative ties with China. The smaller Southeast Asian countries realised that China could not be ignored any longer. This fact was driven home to them during what can only be termed as a difficult year in Southeast Asian regional politics. Vietnam’s intervention in and subsequent occupation of Cambodia, just as the United States and China were putting the finishing touches to their rapprochement, came as a rude shock to all players in the region. For once, the United States and China were united in their opposition to Vietnam’s actions, though they differed in their support of the various resistance factions active within Cambodia, particularly the Khmer Rouge. This was a trying time for the ASEAN countries, with differences regarding the questions: (a) How to respond to Vietnam? And (b) which constituted the larger threat – China or Vietnam? Malaysia and Indonesia were wary about Chinese regional influence, and Thailand and Singapore were concerned about Vietnam. 6 Indeed, China’s role in Southeast Asian politics – and, by extension, in regional politics – at this time was pivotal, setting in place the beginnings of a discourse that could be built upon in the future. As it worked with the ASEAN states – Thailand in particular – to counter Vietnamese, and thereby Soviet, influences in Southeast Asia, China began to prove its mettle as an international player for the first time since its rapprochement with the United States. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping embarked on a tour of the region, seeking political allies against the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and support for its own economic reforms. By killing 6 Alice D. Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st Century Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 4, July/August 2003, pp. 622-647

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two birds with one stone, Deng managed to put China on the geopolitical map, and also bolstered the economic standing of the country.

Regional Discourse in China: A Trajectory As China moved into the 1980s, a clearer regional discourse based on elements of economic regionalisation began to emerge. These elements were incorporated into the overarching Three Worlds Theory. The rationale behind this was the growth of economic linkages between China and East Asia, which in turn led to the growth of region-oriented political institutions. This trajectory was later formally defined as ‘soft regionalism’. Indeed, in their pioneering work, Jeffrey Frankel and Miles Kahler have defined ‘soft regionalism’ as a path to regional political institutions through a functional response to growing economic interdependence among Asia-Pacific countries – that is, politics following economics, serving to manage an interdependence based on economic factors such as trade. 7 This followed from the pragmatism that characterised Deng Xiaoping’s turn at the helm of Chinese politics. Under Deng came the realisation that it was necessary for some people and regions to get rich first, before others could follow. This was embodied in the series of speeches that he gave between 1990 and 1992, during his famous ‘southern tour’ of China. Accordingly, the Seventh Five Year Plan (1986-1990) formally adopted the three economic belts division (sanda jingji ditai) comprising the eastern coastal, central and western regions. Based on their endowments, these regions were assigned specific roles within the larger scheme of things: (a) export-oriented industrialisation and foreign trade in the eastern region; (b) agriculture and energy development in the central region; and (c) animal husbandry and mineral exploitation in the western region.8 The newly industrialising economies (NIEs), which surrounded China such as the small East and Southeast Asian countries like Singapore, Korea and Taiwan among others, were taken as role models on whom China could base its aspirations. But this was not part of a bigger strategy to integrate China into the regional economy. 7 Jeffrey Frankel and Miles Kahler (eds.), “Introduction,” from Frankel and Kahler (eds.), Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in the Asia Pacific (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 1-18. 8 “The Seventh Five Year Plan of the People’s Republic of China for Economic and Social Development,” Beijing Review, Vol. 29, No. 17, 1986, pp. 1-13. Also see “Economic Growth in Different Areas,” Beijing Review, Vol. 29, No. 49, 1986, pp.4-21.

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China had set its sights on economic, political and social improvement but did not, at this time, take a very open-minded view of regionalism or regional cooperation in the realm of security. Deng’s main aim was to put China on the global map and hence promoting a degree of economic interdependence seemed to be the most viable key to doing so. Economic or political issues were to be dealt with bilaterally, for fear of coming under the influence of the United States and Japan, both strongly present in East Asia during these years. Again, this was a trend that would resonate in China’s regional discourse and foreign policy, even three decades later. Another pivotal year in the evolution of China’s regional discourse was 1989. While for the rest of the world, it marked the end of the Cold War, for China, it was the year when the Tiananmen Square massacre took place, effectively cutting off its attempts to comprehensively enter the international arena. Though short-lived, the sanctions imposed on China’s trade and concerns for its human rights’ conditions were a blow to its attempts at establishing itself on the international stage. The incident drew global attention to the cracks in the Chinese armour. China’s anxiety was heightened by the fact that it was dealing with a world that had changed radically. The globe was no longer divided between two poles of power. In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was a distinct power vacuum, with the United States standing as the sole global power. Its presence on the geopolitical map was cautiously acknowledged by Chinese leaders. In an interview in December 1990, China’s foreign minister Qian Qichen said that the world was in a “transitional”9 phase. Though the old order had disintegrated, there was, as yet, no new order to take its place. The priorities of the United States, in terms of regional security, trade and human rights were shifting. It wanted a new quid pro quo status for its erstwhile Cold War allies – trade concessions in return for acknowledgment of existing security arrangements within East Asia. This was not entirely to the liking of ASEAN’s member countries, which desired to change priorities themselves. ASEAN’s collective economy was doing well at the time, and it wanted continued American strategic involvement in the region, since it was wary about its larger neighbour, namely China. This wariness must be put in the context of China’s geopolitical machinations in the region at that time, which were the main drivers behind ASEAN’s own moves at exploring options for regional

9 Cited in Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour (New York: East Gate, 2004), p.142.

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cooperation. 10 In order to do this, however, it had to take China into consideration – it could no longer be ignored. This realisation went both ways. China appeared to have recognised the importance of regional cooperation in both geopolitics and economics. This was evident in the bolstering of Chinese ties with East Asian and Southeast Asian countries during the years preceding the financial crisis of 1997. By 1991, there was relative peace in Southeast Asia; bilateral ties between China and the ASEAN countries had normalised as well. For its part, too, China had begun to recognise the potential of a ‘multipolar’ world; in particular, that of both easing competition and cooperating with the United States. But while it recognised the plausibility of a multipolar world, China was as yet not sure about what steps it should take towards the rest of the region. It knew the positive outcomes of joining regional economic forums, foreign direct investment and opening the market to the benefits of globalisation, but was uncertain about the effects of this on a foreign policy, which it had always tried to keep as autonomous as possible. In 1991, China joined the APEC. By 1992, having normalised relations with ASEAN’s member countries, China was receiving invitations to attend the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meetings.11 As a sovereign state, China, along with Hong Kong and Taiwan as separate economic regions, could participate individually in APEC. China also chose to join the APEC Ministerial Conference in Seoul, South Korea in 1991 12 and took the initiative to work on sub-regional cooperation, establishing: (a) a “Northeast Asian Economic Zone”, consisting of China, Russia, the Korean peninsula and Japan; (b) the “South China Economic Zone”, consisting of China’s southern provinces, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan; and(c) the “Southeast Asian Economic Zone”, consisting of ASEAN and Indochina, with cooperation from China and Japan.13 In 1995, for the first time, China agreed at the ARF meeting to negotiate the South China Sea territorial issue with the concerned countries according to international law. China was also involved in multilateral security dialogue through the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia 10

See Alice D. Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st Century Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol.43, No.4, July/August 2003, pp.622-647. 11 Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour (New York: East Gate, 2004), pp. 140-146. 12 Ibid. 13 Beijing Review, Vol. 35, No. 14, April 6-12, 1992, p. 15. Also see Liu Jiangyong, “Sino-Japanese Cooperation in a Changed Situation,” Beijing Review, Vol.35, No. 14, 1992, pp. 6-12 and p. 17.

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(CSCAP), and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD). As the 1990s wore on, the ‘flying geese’ model, pioneered by Japan, began to break down into a more regionally focused network of trade and services. The diversified regional differences and unbalanced development levels within China, after the Deng Xiaoping era of reform, showed an uneven economic improvement. According to Chinese scholars Li Xing and Zhang Shengjun, this was only to China’s advantage, as it enabled China to cooperate with other countries in almost all industrial sectors.14 Now, it could thus work with mature economies such as Japan and the NIEs, and it could also export its capital and labour to less developed countries in the region. Economic linkages, therefore, became the bridge through which China could build a new regional discourse towards East Asia. As it did so, three domestic trends emerged which would merge with China’s new regional discourse and dominate its foreign policy for the next couple of decades, namely modernisation, nationalism and regionalism. These three trends, which were oriented towards Southeast Asia, the United States, Japan and the Korean peninsula, as well as the issue of Taiwan, have been defined by Quangsheng Zhao as: (i) Modernisation refers to China’s postMao emphasis on economic growth and the shift from ‘revolution’ to ‘modernisation’, towards which China’s foreign policy discourse in the Deng era had a few key principles: (a)‘oppose hegemonism’; (b)‘preserve world peace’; (c) work on China’s ‘reunification with Taiwan’; and(d) step up the ‘drive for China’s modernisation.’ 15 The last principle was considered to be the bottom line of foreign policy, heading into the new decade. Modernisation was believed to be the answer to China’s domestic and external problems. (ii) Nationalism was the driving force behind much of China’s foreign policy discourse in the post-Cold War era, especially in the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre of 1989. (iii) Regionalism emphasised the fact that China remained a primarily regional power, concentrating its political, military and economic activities in the East Asian region, despite its global aspirations.

14 Li Xing & Zhang Shengjun, “One Mountain with Two Tigers: China and the United States in East Asian Regionalism,” Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2010, p. 110. 15 Quangsheng Zhao, “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” World Affairs, Vol. 159, No. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 114-129.

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This three-pronged trend included the following seven phrases:16

-

Lengjing guancha – watch and analyse the developments calmly Wenzhu zhenjiao – secure our own positions Chen zheyingfu – deal with the changes with confidence Taoguang yang hui – conceal our capacities Shan youshouzhou – be good at keeping a low profile Juebu tang tou – never become the leader Yousuo zuowei – make some contributions

The logic here was that if China were to keep a low profile and concentrate on the goal of modernisation, this could possibly be achieved by the twenty-first century and only then could China be said to have succeeded. The advantage of this concept is that it is dynamic enough to be modified and adapted by any change or shift in the composition of political forces in any of the identified ‘three worlds’. More importantly, it also formed the foundation for the evolution of China’s regional discourse with regard to East Asia. From the evolution of Chinese regional discourse can be seen the emergence of economic regionalisation: the rapid development of regional economies symbolised by the rise of East Asian countries and trade and financial cooperation within the region. This trend towards a crystallisation of economic regionalism demanded a higher degree of East Asian integration, the impetus towards this having been provided within the East Asian region by the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998.

The Asian Financial Crisis: Critical Juncture for East Asian Regionalism Not only did the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 hit the most rapidly growing economies in the world, but it was not in the least anticipated. Further, it was a testament to the shortcomings of the international capital markets and their vulnerability to sudden reversals in market confidence. More importantly, from a Southeast Asian point of view, it raised serious doubts about the IMF’s approach to managing

16

Ibid.

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financial disturbances in private financial markets. 17 The stagnation of APEC and ASEAN further contributed to what Richard Higgott has called the “politics of resentment.”18 Neither of these two collections of states was able to provide the help required to the floundering economies of Southeast Asia, thereby inflating the situation to a full-blown socioeconomic crisis. .

What was deemed vital at this point was a “safeguard against a Westerndominated economic system.”19 China, however, faced the crisis from a position of relative economic strength. By 1994, the pegging of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) to the US dollar had led to several serious flaws in the economy, such as the presence of many non-performing loans in the banking system. Nevertheless, though GDP slowed and there was a debt crisis brewing in the country prior to the financial crisis, since China’s foreign investment was in factories on the ground rather than in securities, like most other Southeast Asian countries, it was insulated from the impact of the Asian financial crisis of 1997.Nevertheless, given how closely its currency was tied to the American dollar, Chinese policymakers could see the potential fallout as the crisis spread around the region. The countries in trouble, moreover, were not just China’s competitors but also its major trade partners in the region. Understandably, China felt the need to act and to act fast. From the very beginning, therefore, China actively mobilised the resources it deemed necessary to support its beleaguered neighbours. It participated in the support package for both Indonesia and Thailand. But China’s main contribution lay in refusing to devalue its currency, standing strong against those of its smaller neighbours who were, in panic, devaluing their own currencies. There was no real pressure on China to devalue its currency, and only marginally on their export account which continued to show a large surplus, while capital continued flowing freely into the country. While there was awareness that devaluation could lead to a massive flight of capital from China, due to the Chinese currency’s lockin with the American dollar, its currency did not suffer from net 17 Jeffrey Sachs & Steven Radelet, “The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis,” from Paul Krugman (ed.), Currency Crises (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 105-162. 18 Richard Higgott, ‘The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment,” New Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. 3, November 1998, pp. 333-356. 19 Min Ye, Evolution of China’s Regionalism: From Balancer to Catalyst (Princeton: Department of Politics, Princeton University, 2005).

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appreciation that could damage its standing. China also took up the cause of its Southeast Asian neighbours, choosing to stand against the IMF in its policies to handle the crisis. For example, it argued that the support package given to Thailand should have been larger and with lower terms of conditionality than the IMF had stipulated. In the case of Indonesia as well, China opposed the IMF programme, arguing for the need of fiscal flexibility. Its opinion was much the same as its own foreign policy principles – do not interfere in another country’s internal affairs. For China, the bottom line was that the IMF should prepare an analysis of the situation, offer suitable recommendations and then let the affected country deal with the problem in its own way. These were sensitive and highly nuanced stands, which highlighted a sense of Asian solidarity that Southeast Asian and East Asian countries alike recognised. China’s active and undoubtedly positive role in the Asian financial crisis underscores how important the incident was as a milestone for the development of East Asian regionalism and the integration of China into the new and nascent regional discourse. As Min Ye argues, it “facilitated domestic coalitions for regional cooperation.”20 It was only after the financial crisis of 1997 that China’s continuous economic dynamism changed the regional growth pattern, with a key role being played by increased flows of FDI. This network, based on exchange of trade and capital had a profound impact on East Asian economic development, since it created a “parallel” development for the region.21 This is considered to be a response to the progress of other regional economic blocs such as the EU and the establishment of NAFTA. It was also a component of China’s ‘Good Neighbour’ policy, which was initially put forward in the 1950s, but found fruition only four decades later. Its significance was revealed when Chinese President Jiang Zemin expressed China’s willingness to be a good neighbour, a good partner and good friend of ASEAN nations in his speech at the ASEAN+3 Summit in 1997.22 The emphasis on strengthening economic and security cooperation 20

Ibid. Chen Yu-shi, “A New Paradigm Shift in East Asian Economic Studies,” Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, Vol. 10, December 2002, p. 10. 22 Speech by Jiang Zemin at the 14th National Congress of CCP on October 12, 1992. Accessed on September 15, 2012. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-04/29/content_1447497.htm Also see speech by Jiang Zemin in the 15th National Congress of CCP on September 12, 1997. Accessed on September 15, 2012. Available at: http://www.zhushan.gov.cn/zsdj/wsdx/ddhy/200504/851.html 21

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in the East Asian subcontinent found official mention in the political report of the Politburo Standing Committee in 2002, after the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, where the terms “regional cooperation” and the new “policy of friendship and partnership with neighbouring countries” (yulinweishan, yulinweiban) were laid out in clear terms.23 The Asian financial crisis thus served to strengthen two trends: The first was the emergence of China as being more than the largest neighbour, and an unknown quantity which was known for unwelcome territorial assertions. China now became the pole around which the countries of the region gravitated. The second was a sense of Asian solidarity. It was more important to project East Asia as a single region, with distinct and collective political, economic and social interests. A symbol of this desire was the Japanese proposal for an AMF as the East Asian alternative to the IMF. This was summarily rejected by both the United States and China. However, the takeaway from this was the birth of the idea of an EAC. The term was first espoused by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mohammed Mahathir in the 1980s. His proposal of the EAEG, later renamed EAEC, was an alternative to the APEC, but was struck down almost from its inception by the United States and China. Nevertheless, proposals such as these from countries like Malaysia, which had earlier tried to form Maphilindo as well as the membership of the same countries in ASEAN, were indicative of the importance they attached to ASEAN as regional forums to “amplify their voices.”24

East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: Where did China Fit? The ARF, a subsidiary of ASEAN, illustrated the fact that “the states of East Asia are viewing their security increasingly in regional, rather than global terms, as the region becomes ever more distinct as a differentiated

23

Chen Xiangyang, Zhongguo mu in waijiao (China’s Good Neighbour Policy) (Beijing: shishi chubanshe: Shi Shi Publishing House, 2004), p. 122. 24 Baogang He, “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 105125.

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security complex.”25This was driven home nearly a decade later, when the formal notion of an EAC was finalised in November 2002, by the East Asian Study Group, established by the ASEAN+3.26As a concrete idea, it came into being after the EAS was first held in Kuala Lumpur in 2005. An EAEC was believed to hold out the promise of geopolitical stability as well as economic integration, all within one region.27 It was also a further step towards defining the identity of East Asia as a region. The Declaration made at the conclusion of the inaugural Summit gave a broad outline as to what the participants hoped to achieve, but it lacked the details of what this might entail.28 This was because the idea was nascent, but it served to justify Chinese criticism on the establishment of such a forum. In the view of Chinese scholars, the role of ASEAN is the key to bridging the gap between other East Asian countries and bringing them together. With the added incentive of China’s participation in ASEAN’s efforts to cement regional cooperation, the regional discourse put forward the hypothesis that an EAC would be easier to work towards. A definition of what exactly such a community entails is, however, not laid out clearly in the Chinese discourse, with Zhang Yunling saying, “…Though we call it the East Asian Community, if you read the vision group report, you still can’t understand what kind of community it is. It is based on cooperation programmes rather than a clearly defined structure.”29 In the eyes of Baogang He, on the other hand, the significance of Mahathir’s proposal of the EAEC was the boldest and most assertive attempt to build an exclusive Asian regionalism. The proposal of the EAEC provided an ‘Asian-only’ alternative to the APEC, favouring a return to the notion of a distinctive ‘Asian’ community. It is exclusive in that it prohibits ‘non-Asian’ membership within the region’s 25

Stephen Fitzgerald et al, “In the national interest, Australia are foreign and trade policy, white paper: a commentary and critique,” Asia-Australia Institute, University of New South Wales, 1997, p. 20. 26 Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, ASEAN+3 Summit, Phnom Penh, November 4, 2002. Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv0211/report.pdf 27 Nick Bisley, “East Asia’s Changing Regional Architecture: Towards an East Asian Community,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 4, 2007/2008, pp. 603-625. 28 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit, December14, 2005. Available at: http://aseansec.org/18098.htm 29 Zhang Yunling, East Asian Regionalism and China (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2005), pp.17-25.

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organisations.30 It was a significant indication that some Asian countries increasingly wished it to be seen as a single coherent region. In the words of G. Hook, Mahathir was seeking to “make the group the vector for a shared political and ideological identity embracing a particular geographic space regularly articulated by insiders, outsiders, and peripherals as being inherently different.”31 This vision of an exclusive Asian regionalism has its critics, such as Baogang He, who rendered a comprehensive critique of Mahathir’s vision, saying it is doomed to fail in practice, for two reasons. First, it overlooks the embedded role of the United States in East Asian regionalism and is blatantly anti-American in the sense that all non-Asians are to be excluded from any future regional architecture. Second, it overlooks the overlapping patterns of economic development in the later twentieth century. The states of East Asia are reluctant to exclude important trading partners such as the United States from regional organisations. East Asian security also relies on the United States. China and Japan feel more comfortable in relations with Western countries, especially the United States, than to each other. The Southeast Asian countries also worry about regionalism led by a single regional power, such as China or Japan.32 The ramifications of this are complex. Chinese critics were justified to an extent, when the Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama delineated yet another proposal for a regional economic community headed by Japan33 in 2009, and when the United States chose to join the EAS in 2011.The year 2009 also saw Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd propose a new initiative to build an Asia-Pacific Community. 34 Yet the obstacles that

30 Baogang He, “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 105125. 31 Glenn Hook, “The East Asian economic caucus: a case of reactive subregionalism?” in G. Hook and I. Kearns (eds.), Subregionalism and World Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 230. 32 Baogang He, “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 105125. 33 Yukio Hatoyama, “A New Path for Japan,” The New York Times, August 26, 2009. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27iht-edhato yama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 34 Hadi Soesastro & Peter Drysdale, “Thinking about the Asia-Pacific Community,” East Asia Forum, December 6, 2009. Available at:

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confront the smooth functioning of this forum are so many that the cons far outweigh the pros – territorial disputes, questions of historical sovereignty, and development gaps, being just a few. It is not clear a decade later, whether these obstacles will add to the momentum of the debates on regional community building, or simply divert it.35 As far as China is concerned, it is organisations such as ASEAN +3that enjoy the putative membership of all three major East Asian powers (China, Japan and South Korea),which has confirmed the affinity of smaller Southeast Asian countries to the concept of an integrated “East Asia.”36 Meanwhile, as Chinese policymakers realised the danger to themselves in the backlash of the financial crisis, a new process of regional cooperation was initiated. The East Asian region had always been an arena for the contest between China and Japan. Japan’s earlier proposal for the Asian version of the IMF – the AMF – had been cold-shouldered by both China and the United States. While still reluctant to get involved, the Chinese government’s agreement to take up ASEAN’s invitation essentially forced Japan’s hand – it could not let China gain uncontested leadership in the region. Despite the politics behind the economics, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) of 2001 had two important features. First, it was a network of bilateral swap agreements (BSAs), also referred to as “strands of a spider’s web,”37between the ASEAN countries, China, Japan and South Korea to provide liquidity to central banks in need. Second, it was a regional

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/12/06/thinking-about-the-asia-pacificcommunity/ Also see Richard Woolcott, “An Asia-Pacific Community: An Idea Whose Time is Coming,” East Asia Forum, October 18, 2009. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/10/18/an-asia-pacific-community-an-ideawhose-time-is-coming/ 35 Kyung-Tae Lee, “Where is the East Asia Community Going?” East Asia Forum, March 21, 2009. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/21/where-isthe-east-asian-community-going/ Also see: Jian Junbo, “Why an East Asian Community Matters?” Asia Times Online, October 22, 2009. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KJ22Ad03.html 36 Ibid. 37 Singapore’s second Minister of Finance, Lim Hng Kiang, quoted in Anthony Rowley, “Spider’s Web of Deals Finally Spun,” The Banker, No. 904, June 2001, p. 47.

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surveillance mechanism to monitor exchange rates and sectoral and social policies.38 Therefore, the CMI and the embryonic ASEAN Plus Three (APT) initiative seemed to be the best bet for regional cooperation among the countries of East Asia after the financial crisis. This was shown by the fact that a number of regional cooperative projects have since been launched, on a wide number of issues such as industrial development, food security, environmental technology and human resource development. After China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, regional cooperation did not slow down. According to Min Ye, China’s membership “enhanced regionalism as a focus of China’s foreign policy.”39 Min Ye went on to give three reasons why this would occur. First, WTO membership provided an impetus to multilateral forces in China. The idea here was that since it was not a full member of the multilateral world trade system, its commitment to regional arrangements would not harm its trading status with the rest of the world. Second, the Asian financial crisis and the current Euro-zone crisis have both shown China that the potential risks of fully opening its domestic financial market can best be dealt with through regional monetary cooperation. Third, East Asian countries are increasingly significant markets for China. While the United States remains not only its most important market, and also its major competitor in both security and economic aspects, East Asia is far more important for China.40

38 Chia Siow-Yue, “The Rise of China and Emergent East Asian Regionalism,” from Kokubun Ryosei & Wang Jisi (eds.), The Rise of China and A Changing East Asian Order (Japan Center for International Exchange and the Asia-Pacific Agenda Project, A Brookings Institution Project, 2004), pp. 49-75. Also see Chia Siow-Yue, “ASEAN and Emerging East Asian Regionalism,” paper presented at a seminar on “Towards Asian Integration: The Role of Regional Cooperation” at the Asian Development Bank’s 35th Annual Meeting, Shanghai, May 2002; Chia Siow-Yue, “Regional Economic Cooperation in East Asia: Approaches and Processes,” paper presented at the International Conference on East Asian Cooperation, organised by the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, August 2002. 39 Min Ye, Evolution of China’s Regionalism: From Balancer to Catalyst (Princeton: Department of Politics, Princeton University, 2005). 40 Ibid.

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Not many Chinese scholars can escape this fact. Wang Rongjun has tried to make the point that if the argument that China is a world factory is to hold any water, then a more active interest in globalisation would be in China’s greater interests. But even he cannot deny the fact that regional economic participation is as much in China’s interests, as is a larger interaction with the rest of the world. There are three reasons for this: First, constructive Chinese participation in regional economic initiatives would help reduce conflicts and prevent their emergence. Second, globalisation, while an ideal concept, is not always fair to developing countries. Each must cooperate with other concerned countries in order to secure its interests. Third, being an active coordinator and initiator of regional economic cooperation would enhance regional trust in China, and enable it to play a major role in future. In fact, an overall assessment suggests that active participation in regionalism would be helpful for China’s global strategy.41 Thus, while in the strategic realm, it has been Japan that has pushed the idea of an EAC, there are perceived benefits for China. A more independent Japan and a newer and more cohesive regional organisation like an EAC would be in accord with China’s strategy of striving for a multipolar world, and would also help provide the harmonious environment that China requires to develop as a global power. Additionally, closer regional integration would help China diversify its export markets and reduce its reliance on the United States and Europe.42 In this sense, the importance of regionalisation as part of the Chinese regional discourse in East Asia became evident as the twenty-first century dawned. This was evident from Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech at the ASEAN Business and Investment Summit in 2003, where he said that China’s policy was to be a good neighbour, a good partner, to strengthen ties with its neighbours and improve regional cooperation. China, he said, regarded building “an amicable, tranquil and prosperous neighbourhood in the region” (mulin, anlin, fulin) an important component of China’s own

41 Wang Rojun, “China’s Foreign Trade Policy after WTO Accession,” from Kokubun Ryosei & Wang Jisi (eds.), The Rise of China and A Changing East Asian Order(Japan Center for International Exchange and the Asia-Pacific Agenda Project, A Brookings Institution Project, 2004), pp. 119-139. 42 Jian Junbo, “Why an East Asian Community Matters,” Asia Times Online, October 22, 2009. Accessed on August 20, 2012. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KJ22Ad03.html

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development strategy.43 As part of this strategy, Zhang Yunling points out that East Asia and China must follow an “open regional cooperation.”44 Pang Zhongying has agreed with this, arguing that regional integration has been very important, since the days of the Asian financial crisis, as a means of stabilising China’s surrounding environment, developing China’s economy and dealing with transnational problems.45 The key to this was the creation of FTAs as vehicles for external cooperation within the region. Official policy steps marked the synchronisation between scholarly discourse and policymaking in China. Not only did China sign the China-ASEAN FTA in 2002, but in its first initiative, the Early Harvest Programme (EHP), China provided “many favourable treatments to the ASEAN states to show her benignancy,”46 while viewing the China-ASEANFTA as a confidence-building agreement. At the same time, its East Asian regional discourse prohibits the projection of China as a leader or power within this part of the world, maintaining that China’s greatest interest would be to use such regional cooperation to stabilise and improve relations with other East Asian countries in the region in order to create a good environment for economic development. For China, however, regionalism is still a developing arc. It did not endorse Mahathir’s notion of an exclusively East Asian regionalism against the United States, for it needed to balance its relationship with the United States. 47 China is cautious about the role of the United States, recognising the significant contribution of the United States to its economic development. In the past, China was reluctant to accept Asian multilateral initiatives. For example, it was not a founding member of the APEC and initially opposed the concept of a ‘Pacific Community’. It was also reluctant to engage in multilateral security dialogues such as the ARF. However, the political cost of non-participation in the ARF was much 43 Speech by Wen Jiabao at ASEAN Business and Investment Summit on October 7, 2003. Accessed on August 22, 2012. Available at: http://my.china-embassy.org/chn/zt/dyhzzywj/dmxlfh2003/t300016.htm 44 See Zhang Yunling, East Asian Regionalism and China (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2005), p. 37. 45 Pang Zhongying, “Transformation of China’s Asia Policy: Challenges and Opportunities – A view from China,” Singapore, February 2007. Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/singapur/04601/2007-2/zhongying.pdf 46 Shulan Ye, “China’s Regional Policy in East Asia & Its Characteristics,” Discussion Paper 66, China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, October 2010. 47 Ibid.

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greater for China. As Amitav Acharya has argued, “China will find it far more difficult to spurn United States initiatives to define a set of ‘rules of acceptable behaviour’ if these rules are institutionalised through the ARF.”48 This does not mean that China did not try to take an unconditional lead in matters of perceived national sovereignty. For example, at the first ARF Ministerial Meeting in 1994, China strongly resisted addressing the Spratly Islands issue. This only underlined China’s regional discourse in the realm of security as being governed by notions of nationalism, historical precedent and territorial sovereignty. At the Fourth ARF Ministerial Meeting, held in Malaysia in July 1997, China opposed the proposal that the ARF move from its first phase of confidence-building to its intended second phase of preventative diplomacy. However, China’s position on the ARF has changed and its attitude has become more positive in recent years. Over the years, China has also developed a close relationship with ASEAN. In November 2000, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji advocated the creation of an FTA between China and Southeast Asia within ten years. In 2010, an agreement for a China-ASEAN FTA (CAFTA) was proposed. China also signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation at the ASEAN Summit in Bali in October 2003. Despite a trade deficit with ASEAN countries, China was now seen as an engine of growth for ASEAN and a catalyst for regional economic integration. Thus, economic regionalisation was still the driver underpinning China’s regional discourse towards East Asia, and ASEAN was its lynchpin. Indeed, China’s regional cooperation with ASEAN was aimed towards gaining economic benefits from the regional free trade regime, and towards defusing the fear of a threat from China in the Southeast Asian region. China’s economic development needed overseas markets not only in the United States and Europe, but also in Asia. The East Asian presence of the United States was also a factor that China could not rule out. It was long believed in China that allowing one country to enjoy sole concentration of power without making an attempt to counterbalance it

48 Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, Identity & Institution-Building: From the ASEAN Way to the Asia-Pacific Way,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No.3, 1997, p. 8.

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was “dangerous.”49 Hence, to counter what some Chinese analysts called a “hegemon on the offensive,”50 it would have to increase the pace of its regional cooperation. Put simply, China was now attempting to balance its integration in the global, East Asian, and Asia-Pacific regional contexts. It had not only developed links with maritime ASEAN regionalism, but had also developed friendly relations with ASEAN countries by signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Bali in 2003. However, since its notions of regional security architecture and an East Asia-specific regional discourse differed so fundamentally from that of the United States and the rest of East Asia, its path to security regionalism would not be smooth. In the face of economic regionalisation, how has security regionalism as a process fared in China? Historically, China has always preferred to handle its security issues on a bilateral basis, but this approach changed in the mid-1990s, when it began looking towards multilateral regional cooperation, albeit with great reluctance. Though the reasons behind this vary between Chinese scholars, there are several common denominators. In the first place, Chinese reluctance to be a part of prominent East Asian regional forums, like the ARF, stemmed from what Minxin Pei calls a “Manichean perspective…an unusual degree of wariness and uncertainty.”51 Deng Xiaoping’s diktat, after the Tiananmen massacre of 1989, was that the country should keep as low a profile as possible. Any form of regional cooperation was, therefore, anathema to China. Its regional discourse in the realm of security was characterised at that time by a sharp emphasis on territorial sovereignty and nationalism – a case in point being China’s stance on geographical features like Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal, which would rapidly evolve into geopolitical flashpoints. The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 turned the tables as far as China’s security regionalism was concerned. Staying outside the realm of global interests only damaged national interest, which the Chinese leadership did not allow. Thus the mid-1990s saw a shift in ideological stance– becoming pragmatic and cooperative under Deng – that would enable China to begin formulating its own brand of security regionalism. The beginning of the twenty-first century saw the articulation of concepts such as ‘Good Neighbour’, China’s peaceful rise, 49

Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on US Global Strategy,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116, No. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 343365. 50 Ibid. 51 Minxin Pei, “Assertive Pragmatism: China’s Economic Rise and its Impact on Chinese Foreign Policy,” Proliferation Paper, IIFRI Security Studies Department, Fall, 2006.

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and ‘harmonious world’. These concepts were the foundation of China’s new regional discourse, and part of the tenets of its evolving foreign policy towards East Asia. The motivation behind this policy had three roots, namely political, economic and security. Economically, China felt the need to convince ASEAN member countries that its rising strength was not something to be apprehensive about. Economic interdependence would be mutually beneficial and would avoid international conflict. Therefore, China had to project itself as a viable market with great potential for technology flows and investment. Securitywise, China was aware that the Asia-Pacific region was dominated by the United States and Japan. The primary aim of China’s regional strategy at that time was to project itself as a driver of economic growth and a nonthreatening neighbour – basically, as Tiejun Zhang put it, “to avoid the formation of a coalition of regional countries against the rise of China.”52 The logical segue from this was that China needed to maintain a working relationship with some of the greater powers in the region, as well as with the members of ASEAN. The best way to do this would be to project an image of China being a responsible stakeholder of the regional and international community. However, while this remained the overall aim of successive Communist Party leaderships, China’s regional discourse in the realm of security was often sidetracked by nationalism. Issues that China has believed to be central to its national interests have been sticking points between it and other East Asian countries, hampering the growth of trust and cooperation in the field of security. A key case in point has been the South China Sea, and more recently, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. China’s stance on issues such as these, which it considers to be a question of its territorial sovereignty, has made it difficult for a cohesive regional security discourse to emerge. At the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore in June 2013, the PLA’s Deputy Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant Qi Jianguo’s speech was peppered with catchphrases such as ‘cooperation’, ‘peaceful development’ and the need for a ‘win-win’ outcome to any dialogue on ‘hot-spot issues’ in China’s neighbouring areas. The rider to these bland phrases was not long in 52

Tiejun Zhang, “China’s Role in East Asian Community Building: Implications for Regional and Global Governance,” Institute of Development Studies, January 2007. Available at: http://www.ids.ac.uk/UserFiles/File/globalisation_team/asian_driver_docs/Beijing _Jan07_Zhang_paper

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coming. While China is happy to use dialogue and negotiations as diplomatic tools to resolve these issues, this does not denote what Qi called ‘unconditional comprise’ when it comes to ‘safeguarding national interests.’ In the same breath, he dismissed the idea of arbitration by any ‘international tribunal’ on the issue of patrols by Chinese warships and surveillance vessels in China’s ‘own territory’ – all this, despite China being a signatory to UNCLOS. Indeed, most inquiries at the Dialogue on key security issues – such as whether China disputed Japan’s sovereignty over Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyu chain and the incursion by Chinese troops in India’s Ladakh territory – went largely unanswered. In a nutshell, this has been China’s response in much of the recent past, as it simultaneously beefs up its military muscle in order to match its growing international clout. The domination of Chinese nationalist discourse leaves little room for genuine security regionalism to develop. Indeed, in this case, regionalism is only used as a tool to build a Chinese nation-state. Nationalist grievances about historical humiliation by Japan, for example, make it difficult for China to accept any form of multilateral cooperation with Japan. As Gilbert Rozman points out, “The consequences of China’s great power nationalism, whatever the cause, have been harmful for regionalism.”53 The self-perceived centrality of China in its long history creates psychological barriers for the country’s leadership to get out of the rut of a China-centric framework, to embrace regionalism and grasp and meet peripheral challenges. 54 It is important to note that, from the perspective of historical precedent, China’s erstwhile tributary system consisted purely of a series of bilateral relations lacking the experience of multilateral diplomacy. The personalised form of Confucian diplomacy took international relations as interpersonal relations rather than anything else. 55 All of this has hindered the evolution of security regionalism in China.

53

Gilbert Rozman, “Flawed Regionalism: Reconceptualisng Northeast Asia in the 1990s,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1998, p. 14. 54 Baogang He, “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 105125. 55 Hongying Wang, “Chinese Culture and Multilateralism,” in Robert W. Cox (ed.), The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1997), pp. 145–161.

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The question that arises from this is: How far have perspectives changed in China? Can regionalism – especially security regionalism – be used as a strategy, rather than a process?

Regionalism: Chinese Perspectives The debate about regional policy in China is important, providing an insight to how the Chinese elite have adjusted to their new position as the de facto regional leader. By examining important examples of government and academic commentary, it is possible to evaluate China’s rapidly evolving policies towards the region. Given the authoritarian nature of Chinese politics and the continuing grip of the Communist Party of China (CPC) over many aspects of China’s intellectual and political life,56 it is surprising that the debate over regionalism in intellectual circles is not only open-ended, but very diverse. Official statements on the subject suggest that this is an uncontroversial platform from which China can improve relations with its close neighbours. For example, in 2003, Wen Jiabao declared that, “…China’s policy in guiding its relations with its neighbours is: to become a good neighbour and good partner…to intensify regional cooperation and to push China’s exchanges and cooperation with its neighbours to a new high….”57 In order to gauge the intent behind such statements, it should be remembered that opinions in China about the implications and benefits of regional engagement are divided, reflecting uncertainty about the course of regional development, China’s capacity to influence it and the position of various commentators.58 One of the most important early contributions to the discussion of regionalism in China was by Zhu Feng who said that, despite the attention 56

David M. Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: Is It Changing, and does it Matter?” in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 1–36. 57 Wen Jiabao, Speech at ASEAN Business & Investment Summit, Bali, October 7, 2003. Accessed on September 2, 2012. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/topics/zgcydyhz/dqc/t27711.htm 58 Mark Beeson and Fujian Li, “Charmed or Alarmed? Reading China’s Regional Relations,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 21, No. 53, 2012, pp. 35–51.

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to ‘globalisation’, it had important regional dimensions,59 whereby both economic development and strategic stability could be enhanced through regional processes that would not only directly benefit regional actors, but also lessen the dependence of regions such as East Asia on ‘the West’. This theme has recurred in China’s regional discourse, especially with scholars concerned about the strategic implications of China’s regional engagement. Rear Admiral Yang Yi, former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the People’s Liberation Army National Defence University, and Men Honghua of the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, argue that regional integration offers a way of countering the ‘China threat’ syndrome. 60 Their view is premised on a realistic reading of the supposed strategic implications that flow from China’s economic rise. Yang, in particular, has argued that China should continue Deng Xiaoping’s policy of not assuming too high a profile or leadership position. Consequently, China should not exclude the United States from the region or apply excessive pressure on Japan. Other scholars, such as Xiao Huanrong, advocate using regional mechanisms to enhance China’s overall strategic position. Xiao has argued that multilateral regional policy can allow China to enhance its regional economic and political position, particularly at the expense of Taiwan, while simultaneously reinforcing its emerging global status.61 Similarly, Shi Yinhong contends that China should play a leading role in developing multilateral mechanisms in East Asia that could overcome regional security dilemmas.62 This may be easier said than done, however. Min Ye acknowledges the presence of political and historical barriers that prevent the formulation of a cohesive security discourse. He cites the example of China’s reluctance to cooperate multilaterally with Northeast 59

Zhu Feng, “Guanyu qu yuzhuyi yuquan qiuhua” [“On regionalism and globalisation”], Dangdai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], Vol. 9, 1997, pp. 41–46. 60 Yang Yi, “Jiji tuidong goujian zhoubian hezuo jizhi” [“To Promote the Building of Cooperative Mechanisms with Neighbouring Countries”], Dangdai Yatai [Journal of Contemporary Asia–Pacific Studies], Vol. 1, 2009, pp. 8–11. 61 Xiao Huanrong, “Zhongguo de daguo zeren yudi quzhu yi zhanlue” [“China’s Duty as a Major Power and Regional Strategy”], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], Vol.1, 2003, pp. 46–51. 62 Shi Yinhong, “Dongya de ‘anquan liangnan’ yu chulu” [“The ‘Security Dilemma’ in East Asia and its Way Out”], Nanjing Zhengzhi Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of PLA Nanjing Institute of Politics], Vol. 6, 2000, pp. 48–51.

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Asia, in particular with Japan. For Japan, China has long been an economic threat and a geopolitically destabilising factor in East Asia. The same is true with regard to China’s views of Japan. The strategic mistrust between the two is profoundly deep, and has hampered the progress of regional discourse. Some Chinese scholars have challenged this. Professor Zhang Xizhen of Beijing University, for example, has argued that China should not antagonise but support Japan in playing a leading regional role. According to Zhang, Japan and China should form the core of East Asian regionalism, especially since they can help prevent the monopolisation of the regional order by the United States. Professor Liang Yunxiang, also from Beijing University, similarly argues that China and Japan should seek common interests by constructing a dually-led East Asian regional order. 63 The problem here is that nationalism in the Chinese regional discourse often clashes with historical perceptions of Japan – sometimes heatedly, like the storm created by Ma Licheng’s provocative article ,‘New Thinking on Relations with Japan’ in 2003, 64 which was an intensely personal response to Ma Licheng’s own visit to Japan in 2002, and criticised popular Chinese nationalism against Japan. It called for a ‘new line’ of thought vis-à-vis Japan, much to the horror of Chinese nationalist academics. So strong was popular reaction to this article that Peter Hayes Gries likened it to the ‘winner-takes-all, show-no-mercy style, reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution.’65 Chinese nationalism and emerging Japanese nationalism such as the anti-China protests in 2013 over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands do not bode well, either for bilateral relations or for the East Asian regional order. The questions that arise are: What does an East Asian regional order mean for China? What, more importantly, is meant when one refers to ‘East Asia’? As stated earlier, China started as an independent country with little or no knowledge of regional linkages or regionalism. Most Chinese analysts acknowledge this fact; for many, a cohesive notion of East Asia began to form with the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. There are others who believe that the real eye-opener for China came in the aftermath of the 63

Quoted from Baogang He, “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 105-125. 64 Peter Hayes Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking’ On Japan,” The China Quarterly, No. 184, December 2005, pp. 831-850. 65 Ibid.

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Asian financial crisis. Indeed, the 1990s was the turning point for China as it not only understood but began to engage with East Asia as a region, with the establishment of the APT and the ARF. The search for an East Asian regional identity, in Mohammed Mahathir’s notion of an EAC, was thus tied to China’s own perception and definition of East Asia. Against this backdrop, scholars like Pang Zhongying are very conscious of the importance of a regional definition. Pang calls for the development of ‘East Asia’ based on forms of engagement, rather than vague notions of the “Asia-Pacific”. 66 He emphasises the need for China to develop an Asian strategy that actually contributes to the development of an East Asian sense of identity, encompassing Chinese views regarding the necessity of regional institutions, especially given the presence of the United States. The attitude towards the United States remains one marked by mistrust. In a recent security perception survey by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Chinese participants said that mistrust of the United States among the general Chinese public can be traced to several factors: (i) the growing Westernisation of Chinese values; (ii) the American return to the Asia-Pacific; (iii) economic and commercial disputes such as the US anti-dumping duties against Chinese companies; (iv) the issue of Chinese cyber-attacks on prominent US companies; and (v) negative media propaganda vis-à-vis China.67 Indeed, the realpolitik of having East Asian institutions that exclude the presence of the United States features significantly in Chinese debates on regionalism, especially since its benefits have been reinforced as a consequence of recent tensions between China and Japan in the East China Sea.68 In this context, Wang Yizhou has argued that as a regional mechanism, multilateralism is increasingly being viewed favourably as a means to

66

Pang Zhongying, “Zhongguo de yazhou zhanlue: Linghuo de duobianzhuyi” [“China’s Asian strategy: flexible Regionalism”], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], Vol. 1, 2001, pp. 30–35. 67 US-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2013), pp. 14-15. 68 Mark Beeson & Fujian Li, “Charmed or Alarmed? Reading China’s Regional Relations,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 21, No. 53, 2012, pp. 35-51. Also see John Pomfret, “Dispute with Japan highlights China’s foreign-policy power struggle,” Washington Post, September 24, 2010.

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promote China’s stand on key issues.69 This argument has been extended by Liu Changming and Pang Chunen to emphasise the positive consequences of China’s regional and international engagement in reshaping China’s policy thinking.70 Speaking of multilateral regional engagement, the debate regarding the key institution in Chinese regional discourse is, as yet, unresolved. The official line is that, as far as China is concerned, ASEAN is the lynchpin of its regional discourse towards East Asia. Yet, a number of Chinese scholars are of the view that the potential of ASEAN to provide regional leadership is limited. For example, both Zhongqi Pan and Jin Xide feel that ASEAN’s capacity and willingness to promote integrated regional development is inadequate. 71 Zheng Xianwu is equally sceptical of ASEAN’s ability to become what he calls ‘hexinqu’ (a core area). He suggests that only more pragmatic regional cooperation can provide the basis for effective regional development and integration. 72 For scholars like Sun Xuefeng and Chen Hanxi, however, ASEAN has the potential to improve China’s security position as it will reassure Southeast Asia in particular about its intentions and act as a platform to avoid direct confrontation with the United States over regional hotspots, such as the South China Sea.73

69

Wang Yizhou, “Xinshiji de zhongguo yuduo bianwaijiao” [“China and Multilateralism in the New Century”], Taipingyang Xuebao [Pacific Journal], Vol. 4, 2001, pp. 3–12. 70 Liu Changming and Pang Chuen, “Cong shuangbian zhuyidaoduobianzhuyi: Zhongguo yudong ya guanxi de Xinmoshi” [“From Bilateralism to Multilateralism: A New Model of Relations between China and East Asia Countries”], Shandong Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban) [Journal of Shandong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)] Vol. 5, 2007, pp. 111– 115. 71 Jin Xide, “Dongya hezuo jinru le ‘shenshuiqu’” [“East Asian Cooperation enters ‘Deep Water’], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], Vol. 10, 2008, pp. 16–18. Also see Zhongqi Pan, “Dilemmas of Regionalism in East Asia,” Korea Review of International Studies, November 2007, pp. 17-29. 72 Zheng Xianwu, “Dongya gongtongti yuanjing de xuhuan xingxilun” [“An Analysis on the Unreality of the “East Asia Community”], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], Vol. 4, 2007, pp. 53–60. 73 Sun Xuefeng and Chen Hanxi, “Zhongguo diqu zhuyi zhengce de zhanlue xiaoying” [“China’s Regional Policy and its Strategic Consequences”], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], Vol. 5, 2006, pp. 26–30.

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Regional analysts also regard the emergence of the EAC, described above by Zhang Yunling, to be a key measure of the impact of China’s regional policies. In this context, Liu Zhenye argues that if this potential is to be realised then a sense of regional identity and a ‘we’ feeling must be inculcated – something that would effectively exclude the United States and build upon China’s traditional cultural influence over the East Asian region. 74 The potential for cultural influences to reinforce Chinese influence is taken to even greater lengths by Xue Li, who argues that China should assume the role of ‘kind elder brother’ (renhou xiongzhang) in its dealings with the region, guiding its development and protecting the interests of the weaker Southeast Asian states in particular.75 A comprehensive attempt to portray the complexity of China’s place in East Asia’s growing array of regional forums has been put forward by Su Hao who suggests that the various platforms – ASEAN+1, APT and ASEAN itself – have enhanced cooperation among the three Northeast Asian states and should be viewed as components of a larger process of regional cooperation. He has put emphasis on the APT, which he believes to be the ‘core’ of the ‘walnut’. The ‘shell’ of the walnut is the EAS. The purpose of the ‘shell’ is to protect the ‘core’ from damage – in this case, intervention from the United States.76 Views such as these offer a new way of consolidating China’s historical position at the centre of regional affairs, while reassuring and cooperating with its immediate neighbours, which may have the added bonus of marginalising the United States in the region’s East Asian institutional architecture. Regionalism demands a coherent regional policy, but while one devolves from the other, it is safe to say that both are currently works in progress. However, these debates feature in the shaping of foreign policy, as is evident below.

74 Liu Zhenye, “Dongya gongtongti” bu keneng shi “kaifang de diqu zhuyi” [“East Asian Community can’t be an Open Regionalism”], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], Vol. 10, 2008, pp. 39–42. 75 Xue Li, “Renhou xiongzhang: zhongguo zai yazhou zhenghe zhong de jiaose” [“A Kind Elder Brother: China’s Role in Asian Integration”], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], Vol. 10, 2008, pp. 36–39. 76 Su Hao, “Hutao moxing: ‘10 +3’ yudongya fenghui shuangceng qu yu hezuo jie gou fenxi” [“A Structural Analysis of Dual Regional Cooperation: ‘10+3’ and East Asian Summit”], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], Vol. 10, 2008, pp. 31–34.

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China’s Regional Discourse in Foreign Policy Deng Xiaoping (1989-1997) In the geopolitical domination by the American ‘hub-and-spoke’ security architecture in East Asia, China’s regional discourse did not develop until the 1990s. However, with the introduction of economic reforms in the 1970s under Deng Xiaoping, the rise of China became consonant with its growing power on the world stage. After the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, Deng dictated that China’s leading foreign policy principle should be to ‘hide the sharpness and enjoy obscurity’ (tao guang yang hui) and ‘never take the lead’ (jue bu dang tou) in diplomacy.77 As a result, China kept a low profile, reluctant to participate in regional cooperation initiatives. China also avoided institutionalised, binding economic cooperation as much as it could because this would involve the partial surrender of its economic sovereignty, and would pose a credible national security threat.78 As the 1980s passed into the 1990s, and the worries of China’s neighbouring countries were reduced somewhat, Chinese policymakers began to realise that staying outside the global arena was only damaging national interests. Therefore, the shift in regional discourse at this time was prompted by geostrategic necessities. The shift in ideological and foreign policy exemplified the shift from a rigid, ideologically isolationist stance under Mao to a more pragmatic and cooperative approach under Deng. This shift was formalised with the promulgation of the ‘New Security Concept’. The result of this was an increase in regional cooperation, especially as an important way to pursue a favourable international environment in neighbouring areas, in order to promote improved relations with neighbouring countries. The new concept emerged first during the border and frontier disarmament talks between China and the former Soviet Union, and was crystallised in the report of the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Under the new concept, China settled its border issues with Central Asian countries, and strengthened security cooperation within regional organisations such as the ARF. After the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, in particular,

77

Yang Jiang, China’s Policy-making for Regional Cooperation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 10-13. 78 Ibid.

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China felt the need to banish any lingering mistrust amongst its smaller neighbours, in order to burnish its good neighbourly image.79 Therefore, regional discourse focused on “open regionalism”, which placed it in several different roles. Not only did it become a member of the ARF in 1996, but it also negotiated a declaration on a code of conduct for the South China Sea and formally acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of ASEAN. With initiatives like these, China mended fences with traditional adversaries, strengthened ties with current allies and set out to court the friendship of the undecided. Its vision of open regionalism contrasted with the more formal and exclusive ‘hub-and-spoke’ approach of the United States. The key factor in this new regional trend, according to scholars, was that of gradualism.80 As a vital component in Chinese regional discourse at this time, gradualism found its roots during the Deng era, best summed up in Deng’s famous proverb “groping for stones to cross the river.” 81 Gradualism combined flexibility and pragmatism, and provided a strong scholarly alternative to the United States’ own attitude towards regional institutions in the fallout of the Cold War, with a predominant example being the Clinton administration’s rejection of Japan’s proposal of an AMF in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997.

Jiang Zemin (1997-2002) During the run up to the twenty-first century, China’s regional discourse continued to combine the precepts of open economic regionalism with geostrategic precepts of realpolitik. The New Security Concept remained the theoretical foundation of the regional discourse towards East Asia, 79

Chia Siow-Yue, “The Rise of China and Emergent East Asian Regionalism,” in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi (eds.), The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), p. 52. Also see Hugh DeSantis, “The Dragon and the Tigers: China and Asian Regionalism,” World Policy Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 23-36. 80 Interview with Pang Zhongying, Professor at Renmin & Nankai Universities, China. Interview cited in John Feffer, “China Nurtures Good Neighbour Policy in Asia,” IPS Asia-Pacific News, December 14, 2006. 81 Peng Hong-Cai, East Asian New Regionalism and China, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Conference Presentation at Third Annual CEPII-IDB Conference, Washington, February 2006. Taken from: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/communications/pdf/2006/09100206/penghongpre. pdf

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though it was restructured into a new policy – the Good Neighbour Policy. This was of immense importance during the leadership of Jiang Zemin. In the National Party Congress work report of 1997, it was emphasised that the state “must adhere to the good neighbour policy; it is our country’s consistent policy which has never changed.”82 This was reiterated in the first APT Summit in 1997, and was brought up again in 2003 when Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing stressed that the starting point of China’s good neighbour policy was the country’s friendships and partnerships with its neighbours, and that China was willing to contribute to world peace and development through regional cooperation. The official discourse was contained in official documents, namely the White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development and the White Paper on China’s National Defence, as well as reports and documents of the Party. The importance of East Asia and the development of a regional discourse to merge with an overall grand strategy were shown by their close economic connection, as well as by the region’s political and strategic significance for China.83 Regional discourse highlighted the fact that apart from officially stating the country’s intentions to “build an amicable, tranquil and prosperous neighbourhood,” China had also implemented some measures towards that goal. For example, China signed the ChinaASEAN FTA, and also signed the Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with ASEAN in 2002. 84 Therefore, under Jiang Zemin, the regional discourse became far more aggressive.85 China stood as the host for the APEC Summit in Shanghai in 2001, besides establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In 2002, it advocated ‘free trade zones’ for APT members. The new regionalist emphasis in foreign policy had several contributing factors, according to the body of literature on the subject.

82

Speech by Jiang Zemin in the 15th National Congress of CCP on September 12, 1997. Accessed on November 18, 2012. Available at: http://www.zhushan.gov.cn/zsdj/wsdx/ddhy/200504/851.html 83 Shulan Ye, “China’s Regional Policy in East Asia & Its Characteristics,” Discussion Paper 66, China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, October 2010. 84 Ibid. Also see Zhang Yunling, East Asian Regionalism and China (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2005), pp. 40-65. 85 Yoshifumi Nakai, “Foreign Policy of the Post Jiang Zemin Era,” from Yasuo Onishi (ed.), China’s New Leadership, IDE Spot Survey, Institute of Developing Economies, March 2003, pp. 25-37.

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The first factor was at a global level, referring to the change in the Chinese world outlook itself, as it moved away from a rhetoric insistence on the promotion of a multipolar world order to one which urged the enhancement of global and regional multilateralism. The other factor was at the regional level, specifically what Zhang Tiejun has called a “Greater China” level. The emphasis here was on Taiwan and Taiwanese assertions of national independence under the Democratic People’s Party (DPP). This, Zhang asserts, led China to reaffirm its core national interests, which in turn factor into the development of a regional discourse. This led to a third cause in the regionalist orientation of China’s foreign policy under Jiang Zemin, with China participating more confidently in regional security frameworks such as the APEC, the ARF and the SCO. 86 This regionalist outlook became more pronounced after 9/11, with the improvement in Sino-US relations and the generational change in the Chinese leadership. However, the push for a multipolar world in Chinese regional discourse was more marked than ever, despite the fact that many Chinese experts believed the transitory period towards such a world was going to endure for a much longer time than expected.87 This was summed up by Jiang Zemin, who stated in 1999, that, “…The process towards multipolarisation would be marked by zigzags and will be complicated…”, while simultaneously acknowledging that the trend was irresistible. 88 After the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, the improvement of Sino-US relations gave an impetus to a regionalist emphasis in foreign policy. The articulation of the Bush Doctrine, a strategy shaped by the recognition of security threats and a combination of

86

Tiejun Zhang, “China’s Role in East Asian Community Building: Implications for Regional and Global Governance,” Institute of Development Studies, January 2007. Available at: http://www.ids.ac.uk/UserFiles/File/globalisation_team/asian_driver_docs/Beijing _Jan07_Zhang_paper Also see Suisheng Zhao, China & the United States: Cooperation & Competition in Northeast Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) and Li Cheng, “China in 2000: A Year of Strategic Rethinking,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2001, pp. 7190. 87 Tiejun Zhang, “China’s Role in East Asian Community Building: Implications for Regional and Global Governance,” Institute of Development Studies, January 2007. Available at: http://www.ids.ac.uk/UserFiles/File/globalisation_team/asian_driver_docs/Beijing _Jan07_Zhang_paper 88 Cited in Ibid.

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“radicalism and technology,”89 provided the driver to this impetus. Critics of the Bush Doctrine in China, such as Jing Dong Yuan and Jia Qingguo, argue that in order to prevent the unilateral foreign policy trend of the Bush administration, China needed to look at improving its own regional stance in terms of foreign policy. Therefore, the regional discourse under Jiang Zemin focused extensively on building multilateral ties rather than bilateral ones, while striving for the creation of a multipolar world. Jiang Zemin’s era of foreign policy is marked by a significant regionalist trend in realpolitik orientations. Simply put, regional discourse at the time was marked by China’s attempts to project itself as a responsible major power, by taking the road of peaceful development and promoting harmonious multilateral relations.

Hu Jintao (2003-2012) Under Hu Jintao’s leadership, while it was true that domestic issues were of concern, it was equally true that newer elements were, again, being blended with the older regional discourse. Chinese foreign policy now reflected two important strategies: ‘Peaceful Rise’ (heping jueqi) and ‘Harmonious World’ (hexie shijie). The regionalist drive continued to feature in foreign policy, though there was a sharper emphasis on security cooperation, especially with regard to regional hotspots such as the South China Sea (see Chapter 4). Examples of this could be seen from Hu Jintao and his deputy’s agenda with China’s neighbouring countries. Premier Wen Jiabao first visited Bali, Indonesia in October 2003, for the ASEAN+1 and APT meetings. In a 44-hour visit, Wen attended 20 meetings, put forward 29 collaborative proposals and signed a range of diplomatic documents.90 The end result was a mixed bag, which, despite China’s thrust on a ‘harmonious world’, boded much better for economic regionalisation rather than security regionalism. China now became the first strategic partner of ASEAN to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, calling for greater political consultation, economic cooperation and peaceful coexistence. More than anything else, economic ties flourished between China and East Asia. ASEAN member countries agreed to collaborate with China, in order to exceed the US$100 billion mark for annual trade flows – a move that would go a long way in 89 President George W. Bush’s Preface, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” US Department of Defense, White House, Washington, DC, September 2002. 90 Wenran Jiang, “China makes ‘Great Leaps Outward’ in Regional Diplomacy,” International Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 329-340.

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propelling China closer to the United States’ economic status in the region. Both sides also agreed to push for a China-ASEAN FTA by 2010, which would be the world’s largest FTA, holding a third of the globe’s inhabitants. Hu Jintao also attended the 2003 APEC Summit in Bangkok in November where he capitalised on the United States’ ‘war on terror’ campaign, something that most of East Asia did not support. In contrast to the United States, which was also present at the same summit, China demonstrated the potential of its rapidly growing economy as well as its vast untapped markets. His appearance was low key and essentially loaded with pragmatic objectives, but Wenran Jiang is of the opinion91 that he managed to upstage all the leaders present, besides highlighting China as a willing partner in the web of East Asian regionalism. Reassured, East Asian countries began to capitalise on the economic opportunities that China presented to the region. Indeed between 2000 and 2004, China recorded impressive levels of trade growth with ASEAN countries. Trade with APT member countries, Japan and South Korea also boomed during the same period; for instance, South Korea’s trade with China jumped by 161% during this period.92 In short, China was building on tried and tested precepts in its regional discourse towards East Asia. In 2005, Zheng Bijian articulated a new vision for Chinese foreign policy and, by default, for a regional discourse as well. The concept of ‘Peaceful Rise’ was his brainchild, born from a series of speeches on the subject between 1997 and 2004.93According to Zheng, China’s path is to adhere to peace, rather than to seek hegemony. To quote him, “…modern history has time and again testified to the fact that the rise of a new major power often results in dramatic change in the international configuration and the world order and may even trigger a world war…Such a path is doomed to failure…China’s only choice is to strive to rise and, more importantly, to strive for a peaceful rise.”94 This school of thought found an official voice when Premier Wen Jiabao broached the idea that China was a “big power in reform, rising peacefully.” 95 Nevertheless, the term was officially 91

Ibid. Ibid. 93 Zheng Bijian, “A New Path for China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia.”Speech at the Bo’ao Forum, 2003, in China’s Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian: 1997-2004, Brookings Institution, 2003. 94 Ibid. 95 “Wen Jiabao Addresses Extensive Civilisation Dialogue and Cultural Exchange,” Renminwang, December 10, 2003. Accessed on November 20, 2012. Available at: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/2239366.html 92

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abandoned because of concerns about China’s intentions overseas, and a less intimidating version of the philosophy, namely “peaceful development” was put in place.96 This was possibly also a response to the alarmed cries of an “endangered American primacy” doing the rounds at the time. Whatever the case may be, China now began to work on building a more concrete discourse in security regionalism. Hu Jintao took pains to ensure that China would be projected as a responsible stakeholder in regional politics. Hu’s visit to Pyongyang and his meeting with Kim JungIl in 2005 aimed at highlighting the fact that China was an active supporter of the Six Party Talks, which involved the United States, Korea, Japan and Russia. It was China that convinced the United States not to stand its ground on the threat of not negotiating with North Korea.97Indeed, as the latter’s attention was claimed by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it began to rely more and more on the former to act as a regional peace broker in East Asia, vis-à-vis North Korea. In this context, it was easy enough to pour old wine into a new bottle. This came in the form of the concept of ‘harmonious world’, propounded by Hu Jintao. Derived from the teachings of Confucius, the concept was originally advocated by the Communist Party of China as a policy response to the growing social discontent in the context of China’s rapid economic growth and restructuring. Under the leadership of Hu Jintao, it was upheld as a key precondition for China’s achievement of its strategic goals, for building a moderately well off society (xiaokang) by 2020.98 On a broader scale, the concept referred to a world where countries with different values, cultures and political systems coexisted in peace.99

96 Chien-Min Chao and Chih-Chua Hsu, “The Worldviews of Chinese Leadership and Sino-US Relations,” from Suisheng Zhao, China & the United States: Cooperation & Competition in Northeast Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 96-105. 97 Wenran Jiang, “China makes ‘Great Leaps Outward’ in Regional Diplomacy,” International Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 329-340. 98 Hu Jintao, “Zai Sheng bu ji zhuyao lingdao ganbu tigao goujian shehuizhuyi hexie shehui nengli zhuanti Yantao ban shang de jianghua” [Speech at the Special Workshop of Provincial and Ministerial Leaders on Improving Capability to Build a Socialist Harmonious Society], February 19, 2005. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-06/26/content_3138887.htm 99 Hu Jintao, ‘Build a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity’, September 15, 2005. Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/zt/shnh60/t212915.htm

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This is a standpoint that has several key advantages – not only is it beneficial in improving international standing, but it is also a tool to enable the Communist Party to retain the right of ideological interpretation in domestic politics. The term appeared for the first time in a speech delivered by Hu Jintao on April 22, 2005 at the Asia-Africa Summit Meeting, where he stressed the need to “push for a harmonious world where different civilisations can coexist in good terms, dialogue in equality and develop in prosperity.”100 Hu subsequently advocated the idea at the APEC Summit in Busan in November 2005, during his visits to Seoul and Hanoi in late 2005, and to Washington and Saudi Arabia in early 2006.In December 2005, the Chinese government released a White Paper, titled, ‘China’s Peaceful Development Road’, in which “building a harmonious world” was declared as the “lofty goal of China.”101 These are all in line with an attempt by the Chinese leadership to formulate a regional discourse that would not threaten its neighbours in East Asia, and for many scholars in China,102 it represented a timely vision of world order as the country’s influence continued to expand. Peace, development and cooperation are the three pillars of this new foreign policy precept, and regional multilateralism plays a vital role in making this policy trend viable. The three objectives of these pillars are:

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To achieve collective security through multilateralism, and promote new security ideas based on mutual trust, equality and cooperation; To realise co-prosperity through mutual benefits and cooperation so that an open and fair multilateral trading system is formed wherein developed countries open their markets to developing countries in order to transfer technology and material assistance; and To build a ‘Harmonious World’ using the tools of democracy and inclusiveness.103

Hu Jintao’s Speech at the UN Summit, September 16, 2005. Accessed on November 15, 2012. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t212614.htm 101 China’s Peaceful Development Road (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, December 22, 2005), p. 17. 102 Wang Yiwei, “‘Hexie shijie’ guan gaibian guoji guanxi shijiao” [“The Concept of ‘Harmonious World’ Changes Perceptions of International Politics”], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], December 2, 2005, p. 11. 103 Chien-Min Chao and Chih-Chua Hsu, “The Worldviews of Chinese Leadership and Sino-US Relations,” from Suisheng Zhao, China & the United States:

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The precept of a ‘Harmonious World’ was coined to combat the ramifications of the Western dictum of the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory, first elaborated by Samuel Huntington. However, looking past the cultural conflict elaborated by Huntington’s theory, the web of realpolitik in Chinese foreign policy trends is evident. While acknowledging that power politics was still the undercurrent beneath this new shift in discourse, China continued to stress the importance of multilateral dialogue, exchanges, respect and peaceful coexistence, in order to realise common security (gongtong anquan), mutual prosperity (gongtong fanrong) and harmonious relations (hexie guanxi). Regional cooperation and multilateralism were vital to this foreign policy framework. Under Hu Jintao, regional discourse focused on security cooperation, using regional institutions more extensively than economic regionalism. To cite a case in point, at the November 2002 Summit in Phnom Penh, China and ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, mitigating the fear of ASEAN countries concerning the South China Sea disputes. It was argued by Chinese scholars that the agreement reaffirmed Deng Xiaoping’s original concept of ‘peace and development.’104 At the Bali Summit in 2003, China acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. As China took a leading role in critical concerns such as the North Korean nuclear issue, making greater efforts to solve the issue within a multilateral framework, regional discourse towards East Asia became part of China’s foreign policy. In the face of obstacles, it played the role of mediator between North Korea and the United States, resulting in a joint statement on the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula in September 2005.105In the field of non-traditional security too, China has demonstrated an active attitude towards regional multilateral cooperation, working with institutions such as ARF, especially in the spheres of terrorism, piracy, drug and human trafficking, and environmental and health matters, such as SARS and bird flu. Under Hu Jintao’s leadership, China’s regional discourse towards East Asia began to assume stronger dimensions in the realm of security. Cooperation & Competition in Northeast Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 96-105. 104 Zhang Xiaoming, “The Rise of China and Community Building in East Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2006, pp. 176-190. 105 Wang Jisi, “China’s Changing Role in East Asia,” from Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi (eds.), The Rise of China and A Changing East Asian Order(Japan Center for International Exchange and the Asia-Pacific Agenda Project, A Brookings Institution Project, 2004), pp. 9-10.

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Economic regionalisation strengthened still further, but the thrust on making regional discourse an integral part of foreign policy continued.

Xi Jinping (2012-2014) Xi Jinping took on the mantle of the Chinese leadership in 2012, still continuing along with his premier, Li Keqiang. Two and a half years into his term as leader of China’s Communist Party, the Chinese regional discourse towards East Asia, in the realm of security, has strongly focused on nationalism. The most striking example of this was Xi’s outline of the ‘Chinese Dream’, which has become the hallmark of the Xi Jinping’s administration, and a slogan for the new leadership. According to Xi, the ‘Chinese Dream’ implies a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.106 It is described as the achievement of the “Two 100s”: (i) the material goal of China becoming a “moderately well-off society” by 2020,107which is the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party; and (ii) the modernisation of the Chinese nation by 2049, being the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. The ‘Chinese Dream‘ has four parts: (i) Strong China – economically, politically, diplomatically, scientifically, and militarily;(ii) Civilised China – equity, rich culture and high morals; (iii) ‘Harmonious China’ –amity among all social classes; and (iv) Beautiful China – healthy environment and low pollution.108 The objective is to double the 2010 GDP per capita by 2020 and complete the process of urbanisation by 2030. This would also imply that China would regain its position as a world leader 109 in science, technology, economics and business, while also seeing resurgence in civilisation, military might and culture. Xi’s concept of the ‘China Dream’ is indicative of the rising nationalism in China’s East Asian regional discourse. He has inherited a China that holds the

106

Robert Lawrence Kuhn, “Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream,” The New York Times, June 4, 2013. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/global/xijinpings-chinese-dream.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 107 A Tip of the Hat to Hu Jintao’s concept of a Harmonious World. 108 Ibid. 109 This aspect of the China Dream is a link with China’s “Century of Humiliation.”

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economic upper hand as far as ASEAN member countries are concerned. In terms of security, however, China’s regional discourse towards East Asia has undergone yet another change. Under the Xi Jinping administration, historical precedent is one of the defining factors of China’s perspective of East Asia. Indeed, this is the first time that China has attempted to define its regional discourse in terms of historical and cultural linkages. In their article, Zhang Xiaotong and Li Xiaoyue have elaborated on this concept, whereby China is advancing a new “moralityinterest concept” (Yi and Li).110‘Yi’ can be used to express one’s personal loyalty and code of brotherhood to one’s friends, as well as in person-tostate relations. ‘Li’ basically means ‘interest’, including economic interest. These are new initiatives by Xi Jinping’s administration, especially focused towards developing countries. According to Zhang and Li, it requires China’s economic diplomacy to give priority to ‘Yi’ when it comes to relations with developing countries. 111 As a result, territorial sovereignty has become the central focus of the regional discourse, rendering the geopolitical scenario vis-à-vis East Asia and China more than a little fluid and not just as a question of geopolitics either. As a process, regionalism has been in flux in East Asia since 2009. In 2010, multilateral cooperation in the realm of security suffered a severe setback when the Six Party Talks were not reconvened. In 2012, as the South China Sea dispute reached its zenith, intra-regional politics divided ASEAN, forcing the forum to conclude the meeting without a communiqué for the first time in its history. There have been attempts to revive concepts such as the EAC, which Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama had also proposed in 2009. However, on the whole, regional discourse has been hindered by the fact that China, wielding as it does as much political clout as economic, appears to be at odds with an inclusive vision of East Asia. Despite this, Xi Jinping and his premier, Li Keqiang, have been at pains to express the official line that China wants nothing more than to rise peacefully and have mutually beneficial relationships with its neighbours. Xi has articulated China’s attempt to establish a sense of identity within the world in what he calls a “community of common destiny.”112 Zhai Kun explains this term, “No matter how high China rises and no matter what system or development mode it adopts, it is always 110

Zhang Xiaotong & Li Xiaoyue, “China’s Regionalism in Asia,” The Asan Forum, May 14, 2014. Available at: http://www.theasanforum.org/chinasregionalism-in-asia/ 111 Ibid. 112 Zhai Kun, “The Xi Jinping Doctrine of Chinese Diplomacy,” China-US Focus, March 25, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinafocus.com

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part of that community, rather than being detached from the rest of the world.”113 It is interesting to note that Chinese analysts like Zhai hold this new doctrine to be entirely separate from that of the ‘Harmonious World’, terming Xi’s concept “a more simple, direct, popular and clear way to talk to the world,”114implying that China finally feels ready to send a message to its global and regional audience. China’s regional discourse towards East Asia puts a premium on geopolitical peace and security, but on its own terms and conditions.115 Xi represents a faction of political leadership which believes that in order to preserve their legitimacy at the heart of Chinese power, they must appeal to nationalist pride. This is the basis behind the ‘Chinese Dream’. It also represents the strength of the nationalist trends in Chinese domestic politics. The new leadership’s view is that a more hardline stance needs to be taken with regard to China’s territorial sovereignty, rather than mere rhetoric. In other words, its core interests of security, development and sovereignty will brook no violations. The East China Sea dispute is a comprehensive case in point, since it poses the question that authors Yong Wook-Lee and Key Yong-On have asked in their book, China’s Rise and Regional Integration in East Asia: Hegemony or Community?

The East China Sea Dispute: China, Japan and the Regional Order The dispute in the East China Sea centres on the uninhabited Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan, the Diaoyu in China and the Tiaoyutai Islands in Taiwan, the archipelago has been controlled by Japan since 1895, apart from a period of administration from 1945 to 1972 by the United States. Since the handover of the archipelago to Japan by the United States in 1971, China has disputed the Japanese claims and has asserted its own claims over the islands. The territory is strategically important for both countries, since it is close to key international shipping lanes and rich fishing grounds. There are also oil reserves in the area.

113

Ibid. Ibid. 115 Ibid. Also see Lt Qi Jiangguo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, People’s Liberation Army, China, “New Trends in Asia-Pacific Security,” Fourth Plenary Session, Shangri-La Dialogue, June 2013. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-ladialogue-2013-c890/fourth-plenary-session-0f17/qi-jianguo-a156 114

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Source: Chinese Defence Ministry, EIA & BBC News, 2013

For many, the dispute actually started in 2010, though it has heated up over the past two years. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat rammed a Japanese Coast Guard vessel. In order to get the captain of the Chinese vessel released without investigation, China cut off its supply of vital rare earth minerals to Japan. Bilateral ties were undoubtedly put under strain. Matters have, however, come to a head with two nationalist leaders coming to power in China and in Japan. At a time when diplomatic ties between China and the rest of the region are characterised by

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nationalism, this has led to a severe geopolitical crisis. Japan has also had a revival of nationalism, as seen in the nationalist governor, Shintaro Ishihara’s April 2012 announcement that the Japanese government was in negotiations with the Saitama-based businessman who owned the islands.116 It was the government’s intention, said Ishihara, to purchase the islands, thereby protecting them from China. The issue was then taken up as part of the political agenda by a number of Japanese political parties, including the main opposition party, the Liberal Democratic Party, which announced that it would nationalise the Senkaku Islands if it was voted back to power. Amid this political turmoil, several Hong Kong based Chinese activists landed on one of the disputed islands, defying Japan’s prohibitory orders and asserting Chinese sovereignty over the islands. Their subsequent but brief detention led to a diplomatic uproar between the two countries and a tit-for-tat of sorts, as Japanese nationalists also landed on the islands, asserting Japanese sovereignty. The developments only pushed Japan to clinch the deal with the owner of the islands as fast as possible. At a price of 2.05 billion yen (approximately US$25.95 million), Japan bought the Senkaku Islands. These moves only served to create a chain of events that has resulted in a fluid, volatile situation in the East China Sea. The Chinese foreign ministry was quick to retaliate, accusing Japan of being a “thief” and of “stealing” Chinese territory. 117 Under then Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, it was decided not to heighten the issue further and instead to maintain the status quo. Japan would not station troops closer to China, as the nationalist lobbies in the country were demanding it to do, and it would keep its vigil on Chinese maritime activities from a distance. The Japanese Defence Ministry went on record to make this clear, stating that it was “not feasible to deploy troops to each island” and citing budget

116

Shamshad A. Khan, “An Internal Push in Japan to Nationalise Islands in the East China Sea,” Institute of Defence Studies & Analyses, June 8, 2012. Available at:http://idsa.in/idsacomments/AninternalpushinJapantonationliseIslandsintheEast ChinaSea_sakhan_080612 Also see Shintaro Ishihara’s speech at the Heritage Foundation, “The US-Japan Alliance and the Debate over Japan’s Role in Asia,” April 16, 2012. Available at: http://www.heritage.org/events/2012/04/shintaroishihara 117 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Diaoyu Islands: The Owner and the Thief,” October 22, 2012. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/diaodao_665718/t981211.shtml

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constraints. 118 Japan did not exactly wish for a military confrontation either, especially given then US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta’s message that the United States would take no part or side in this particular territorial dispute. Nevertheless, the damage had been done. China’s state news agency, Xinhua, retaliated with a clear official position, saying that the move to nationalise the Senkaku Islands had thrown bilateral ties into a “scalding pot.” 119 Calling the move ‘illegal’ and ‘invalid’, the Chinese foreign ministry released a statement which read, “This is a serious violation of China’s territorial sovereignty and does serious harm to the feelings of 1.3 billion Chinese. It tramples on history and international law.”120 China followed the announcement with a formal delineation of a territorial baseline around the disputed islands. This was the first time that either country had resorted to this, or to defining the exact geographical location of the territory that China lays claim to. It forms the basis of a legal foundation for China to enforce its claims on the Senkaku Islands. A good deal of diplomatic and military muscle flexing followed, particularly after President Xi Jinping came to power. In keeping with the new regional discourse, China, which had hitherto tacitly maintained the status quo and avoided the 12 nautical mile limit of Japan’s territorial waters around the island, began to conduct almost daily patrols within those very waters. This was a direct throwing down of the gauntlet to Japan. The purpose was not just a reminder as to who controlled these islands, it was also a refusal to accept Japan’s de facto ownership of the Senkaku Islands, officially stated by Hong Lei, a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, who asserted that while the patrols were ‘routine’, “the Japanese side should squarely face the reality that a fundamental change has already occurred in the Diaoyu Islands.”121

118

“Japan to Boost Island Defence Capability Despite Budget Cuts,” Japan Today¸ September 8, 2012. Available at: http://www.japantoday.com/view/politics/japanto-boost-island-defense-capability-despite-budget-cuts 119 “China Focus: Experts Warn Japan against Making a Wrong Move on the Diaoyu Islands Issue,” Xinhua News, Beijing, September 10, 2012. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/10/c_131840990.htm 120 Mure Dickle & Kathrin Hille, “Japan risks China wrath over Senkaku,” The Financial Times, September 10, 2012. Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/babbfa2a-fb2b-11e1-87ae-00144feabdc0.html#axzz 2yC4b80Qi 121 Hong Lei, Press Conference, October 31, 2012. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/

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This is a stance that signals a greater willingness on China’s part to pursue unilateral actions to advance its own claims, while nipping in the bud any challenge to its position. In 2013, China started ramping up its naval capabilities. Shinzo Abe’s new Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government was not far behind, vowing to increase defence spending and refusing to back down from the dispute.122 Both sides were increasingly driven by domestic political pressure, which was in turn fuelled by rising nationalist sentiment. After a year, the better part of which was spent in word spats between Chinese and Japanese military and state officials, China went one step further. In November 2013, it established an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) directly over the Senkaku Islands. This is a prime example of China’s willingness to establish its sovereignty over the islands. Though aimed at Japan, China’s moves undoubtedly stirred the cauldron of regional discord. For one, the Chinese ADIZ overlapped the existing South Korean ADIZ by some 3,000 miles, thereby pulling a reluctant Seoul into the fray. The ADIZ was also seen as a challenge to the power of the United States, an embedded actor in the region. The fly-by conducted by the two US fighter B-52 bombers, albeit unarmed and unescorted, was a signal to China that the United States would not brook any attempts to alter the status quo in the region. Though the United States maintained that the fly-by was part of its military exercise, Coral Lightning, the Pentagon released a statement containing a direct inference to China, saying, “This announcement by the People’s Republic of China will not, in any way, change how the United States conducts military operations in the region.”123 China’s stance in the East China Sea dispute underlines the fact that an economically and politically powerful China does not necessarily imply that it is a country that is ready to integrate itself in an inclusive regional discourse. Indeed, the Chinese leadership continues to maintain that it is perfectly willing to cooperate as far as peace and security is concerned, but it will not brook any violations to its own definitions of territorial sovereignty. Its position on this dispute, as well as that of the South China 122

Ayako Mie, “Onodera to Review Defence Plans, Up Spending,” The Japan Times, December 31, 2012. Available at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/31/news/onodera-to-review-defenseplans-up-spending/#.U0PbmKja46Y 123 Statement by US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Press Release, US Department of Defense, November 23, 2013. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16392

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Sea, has also worried its smaller neighbours. China continues to hold all the cards as far as economic regionalisation is concerned in East Asia, and the open regionalism that flourished under Deng Xiaoping is alive and well in Chinese regional discourse. Indeed, Xi Jinping insisted on this being a mission as far as East Asia was concerned. In many of his key speeches, he has often associated himself with Deng Xiaoping, and has identified his own brand of regional discourse with that of Deng. 124 Security regionalism, never strong in China’s case, has suffered greatly as a result under the Xi administration – broadly taking a backseat in the context of China’s relations with Japan or to great power politics between China and the United States. China has focused its regional discourse on strengthening economic ties across the region, starting with the visits of Xi Jinping and his second in command, Li Keqiang, to important ASEAN member countries in Southeast Asia in October 2013. The idea behind these visits was to put in place a “Maritime Silk Road” through “strengthened maritime economy, environment and scientific and technical cooperation.” 125 This was promoted as part of the “2+7” cooperation framework, which means consensus on two issues– strategic trust as part of the “Good Neighbour” principle, and economic cooperation based on mutual benefits – and seven proposals. These seven proposals included:

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Signing the China-ASEAN Good Neighbour Treaty Effective use of the China-ASEAN FTA and intensive negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Acceleration of joint infrastructure projects Stronger regional financial cooperation Closer security cooperation Intensive people-to-people contacts along with increased cultural, scientific and environmental protection126

People’s Daily, January 14, 2013. Also see People’s Daily, April 3, 2013 and People’s Daily, December 12, 2012. 125 “Li Keqiang zai di shiliu ci Zhongguo-Dongmeng (10+1) lingdaoren huiyi shang de jianghua (quanwen).” [Prime Minister Li Keqiang delivered a speech at the 16th China-ASEAN (10+1) Leaders’ Summit (full text)], Xinhua, October 10, 2013. 126 Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, “China’s New Silk Road Diplomacy,” Policy Paper No. 34 (82), December 2013, Polish Institute of International Affairs. Also see P.

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Given the recent East China Sea dispute with Japan and the deadlocked South China Sea dispute with most of its major Southeast Asian neighbours, these moves suggest that as its economy grows and its external trade ties expand, along with its political clout, China’s ability to influence the outcome of regional geopolitical issues will deepen. 127 Indeed, there appear to be several factors at play here, influencing the shifts in Chinese regional discourse. For one, China’s greater presence in the region is a way to indicate its rising ascendancy on the international stage, as well as in the regional arena. It may also be interpreted as China’s rejoinder to the United States’ much-vaunted strategy of rebalancing towards East Asia. This was only highlighted by China’s high-profile attendance at the APEC, ASEAN and EAS meetings held respectively in Indonesia and Brunei in September 2013. President Obama’s conspicuous absence was skilfully used by China to highlight its own relevance to East Asia, despite US Vice President Joe Biden’s trips to the region only a month earlier. At the ASEAN Summit in Brunei, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang leveraged China’s economic clout in East Asia, promising to boost the levels of investment in the region. With regard to the region’s geopolitical worries, he struck a conciliatory note, saying that China believed that a “peaceful South China Sea is a blessing for all,”128 and that rival claims to the resource-rich waters should be resolved through talks. Li proposed cooperation in seven areas, including active discussions on signing a Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation, and boosting maritime cooperation and exchanges in the field of security. In his remarks at the Eight East Asia Summit the following day, Li promoted a “new security concept”, incorporating comprehensive security, common security, cooperative security and candid dialogue. 129 However, the emphasis on economic regionalisation continued for the rest of 2013, with President Xi Jinping’s presence at the APEC Summit in Bali Parameswaran, “Beijing Unveils new Strategy for ASEAN-China Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 13, No. 21, October 25, 2013, p. 10. 127 Nicholas Thomas, “China-ASEAN Relations: The Core of Asian Regionalism,” in Mark Beeson, Richard Stubbs (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 147-149. 128 Steve Herman & Michael Lipin, “China Offers Closer Ties at ASEAN Summit Skipped by Obama,” Voice of America, October 9, 2013. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/kerry-to-push-china-asean-to-resolve-seadisputes/1765925.html 129 Carl Thayer, “China’s New Regional Security Treaty with ASEAN,” The Diplomat, October 16, 2013. Available at: http://www.thediplomat.com/2013/10/chinas-new-regional-security-treaty-withasean/

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being touted as a great sign that China would help to act as a regional driver for economic growth. At the meeting, Xi called on all regional members to further their economic restructuring, oppose trade protectionism and boost cross-Pacific inter-connectivity. The Chinese president also turned his trip into a platform from which he explained to other regional partners the reasons behind China’s economic slowdown, and assured them that China would bring “opportunities for growth, not the presence of security threats” 130 to Asia and the world. President Xi continued with China’s strong trajectory of economic regionalisation, putting forth several new economic initiatives, including the establishment of an Asian infrastructure development bank, and a new US$ 16.3 billion currency swap agreement between the Chinese and Indonesian central banks. Another example is the projected RCEP agreement, which projects an FTA between ASEAN and China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand – being an East Asian answer to the TPP, in this case, led by China. The Chinese leadership wants negotiations on the agreement to conclude successfully by 2015. 131 China has also put forth several initiatives to beef up security regionalism in East Asia. In his address to the Indonesian parliament on October 3, 2013, Xi proposed a Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation between China and ASEAN. He met with his counterparts, Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak, and secured their agreement to raise bilateral relations to comprehensive strategic partnerships. On October 2, Xi and Yudhoyono agreed to “strengthen security communication and coordination through defence consultations and navy dialogue.”132 Indonesia and China also committed to enhancing bilateral defence ties by conducting joint military exercises and training, and to cooperate in maritime security, defence industry, and non-traditional security areas, such as consultations on counter-terrorism. Xi travelled to Malaysia on October 4, 2013, where he met Prime Minister Rajak and put forward a five-point proposal that included making “full use

130

“Xi’s Southeast Asia Trip Helpful for Asia-Pacific to Stay as World Economy Booster: FM,” Xinhua, October 9, 2013. Available at: http://www.news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-10/09/c_125496981.htm 131 See P. Parameswaran, “Beijing Unveils new Strategy for ASEAN-China Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 13, No. 21, October 25, 2013, p. 10. 132 Carl Thayer, “China’s New Regional Security Treaty with ASEAN,” The Diplomat, October 16, 2013. Available at: http://www.thediplomat.com/2013/10/chinas-new-regional-security-treaty-withasean/

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of the defence and security consultation mechanism,”133 as well as aiming to “increase exchanges between the two militaries, deepen lawenforcement cooperation and join hands in combating terrorism and transborder crimes.”134 In 2014, China’s regional discourse towards East Asia stands poised on the line that divides it from simple great power politics. China’s territorial assertiveness in the South and East China Seas has not only rendered the region unstable, but has created the perfect stage for great power rivalries between itself, the United States and Japan. This was clear from China’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue held in June 2014 in Singapore. Following the speeches by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel that criticised Chinese actions in East Asia, PLA General Wang Guangzhong departed from the script of his prepared speech to accuse the two countries of revealing a “taste of hegemony” and trying to “stir up trouble.” 135 Nevertheless, his official script highlighted a new concept in Chinese security regionalism, namely the revival of the New Security Concept. Xi Jinping announced the New Security Concept during his keynote speech at the fourth summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Shanghai on May 21, 2014. The crux of the concept revolves around a common, cooperative and comprehensive strategy for Asia and a call to move past what Xi termed the “outdated thinking of the Cold War and zero-sum games.”136 Indeed, much of what he says is worthy of being quoted at length: “No country should seek absolute security of itself at the expense of others. We cannot just have security for one or a few countries while leaving the rest insecure…. A military alliance which is targeted at a third party is not conducive to common regional security….No country should attempt to dominate or infringe upon the rights and interests of other countries.”137 In other words, the security of both China and East 133

Ibid. Ibid. 135 Lt. Wang Guangzhong, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, People’s Liberation Army, China, “Major Power Perspectives on Peace and Security in the AsiaPacific,” Fourth Plenary Session, Shangri-La Dialogue, June 1, 2014. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014c20c/plenary-4-a239/wang-guanzhong-2e5e 136 “China Focus: China’s Xi Proposes Security Concept for Asia,” Xinhua, May 21, 2014. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/21/c_133351210.htm 137 Ibid. 134

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Asia is threatened not by unresolved territorial disputes, but by a “zerosum” understanding of regional security that encourages China’s neighbours to focus on these disputes over and above the more positive story of economic growth and integration. According to this line of thinking, the United States and Japan are the real threats to regional security, because of the emphasis they place on territorial disputes and the political and military support they offer to China’s neighbours, which only encourages them to challenge China rather than focus on the positive side of its rise.138 Chinese scholars and analysts, however, put forward the fact that President Xi Jinping’s doctrine is a blend of the old and the new fundamental tenets of China’s security philosophy. The New Security Concept, “Version 3.0” as some call it,139 is the fruition of the concept for regional and national security that has been evolving since 1991. In this context, the New Security Concept must now reflect the Chinese governance theory of improving not only domestically, but also regionally, and China must do its best to make its neighbours feel safer. Only then can China’s rise be constructive for peace, development and cooperation. This analysis always carries a rider aimed at the United States; that is, as Zhai Kun writes, “If the United States continues to stubbornly stick to the doctrine of absolute security, it will probably run into a dead end of hegemony and militarism.”140 An echo of this stance can be found in a Global Times editorial on the United States Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent push to “freeze” provocative actions in the South China Sea. “These suggestions appear to be fair,” reads the editorial, “but even Western media has opined that this is aimed at deterring China…. Washington’s latest suggestions are a trap for Beijing….China will not make trouble, but equally is unafraid of any trouble.”141 This is not to say that all the voices articulating China’s regional discourse are hawkish or antagonistic towards the United States. There are those that speak with reason, like Zhu Feng of the Tokyo Foundation, and Wu Zurong, a researcher at the China Foundation for International Studies. Both agree that cooperation is the only way forward for the United States and China. In his analysis of the Obama administration’s keenness to be the pivot for East Asia, Zhu strikes a somewhat deprecating note, arguing that contrary 138

See David Cohen, “A Clash of Security Concepts: China’s Efforts to Redefine Security,” China Brief, Vol. 14, No. 11, June 4, 2014, The Jamestown Foundation. 139 Zhai Kun, “The Xi Jinping Doctrine of Chinese Diplomacy,” China-US Focus, March 25, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinafocus.com 140 Ibid. 141 “US Biased in Push For S. China Sea ‘Freeze’”, Global Times, July 15, 2014. Available at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0715/c90780-8755343.html

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to popular opinion, “American preponderance in the Asia-Pacific is actually at an all-time high since the end of the Cold War, especially in the light of the enhanced US alliance system, expanding defence partnerships and growing popularity in the region….”142 Zhu argues that in the last few years, China’s East Asian diplomacy has been devoid of vision and creativity, while China’s “insistence on its policies of a ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘harmonious relations’ with its neighbours through material benefit and benevolence, the populism of the Chinese media and nationalism of the Chinese public, as well as a sense of infallibility in China’s foreign policy bureaucracy, have damaged the international image of China’s peaceful rise….”143 If China is to articulate a well-received regional discourse, it would have to avoid confronting or competing with the United States. Wu Zurong has argued along much the same lines, stressing that “cooperation is the single way out for the two powers; there is no other choice.” 144 These trends speak of a country which has found its feet on the global stage, and is using its clout to steer its regional discourse. China has never had a cohesive discourse towards East Asia – indeed, East Asia itself has never had a cohesive identity. The answer to the question of a regional definition of East Asia is still elusive in the debate on regionalism. To get back to the subject at hand, China’s discourse towards the region developed after the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and has always been based on strong economic ties. As a result, economic regionalisation vis-àvis China and East Asia is virtually unshakeable in the twenty-first century. Security regionalism, which has evolved as somewhat of a corollary to economic regionalisation, has remained hollow. China has often used this discourse to further its own national interests. Economic regionalisation is used to act as a palliative to countries that might be concerned by more aggressive stances in regional discourse, as shown by China’s economic leverage over Cambodia while it acted as chair during the 2012 ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh. Indeed, China’s role in multilateral forums such as ASEAN has been to use regionalism as a springboard, while keeping the United States in check. Over the years, a rise in nationalistic trends has manifested itself. This, put together with the 142

Zhu Feng, “US Pivot to the Asia-Pacific and its Impact on Regional Security,” The Tokyo Foundation, June 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/topics/japan-china-next-generationdialogue/us-pivot-and-its-impact-on-regional-security 143 Ibid. 144 Wu Zurong, “Cooperation is the Only Way Out for China and the US,” China – US Focus, July 8, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/cooperationis-the-only-way-out-for-china-and-the-us/

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revival of Japanese nationalism, would lead to the emergence of a volatile situation in East Asia. While modernisation encouraged the development of regionalism, these two strands are obstructed by that of nationalism. Indeed, the questions of nationalism, national interest and sovereignty are key to understanding just how ‘flawed’145 (to use Rozman’s terminology) regionalism is in a country like China. Nationalist sentiments and issues of national sovereignty have emerged in regional relations as well as bilateral foreign policy in the recent tensions between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island chain.146 East Asian countries support regionalism for national interests and state power. China’s position in this context can be seen from the recent developments on the issue of the South China Sea, both bilaterally between China and smaller Southeast Asian countries, and multilaterally between China and ASEAN. On the whole, therefore, Chinese regionalism appears to be not just a fluid concept, but a flawed one.

145

Gilbert Rozman, “Restarting Regionalism in Northeast Asia,” North Pacific Policy Paper 1, University of British Columbia, 2000. 146 See Wani Yukio, “Barren Senkaku Nationalism and the China-Japan Conflict,” Japan Focus, Vol.10, Issue 28, No. 4, July 2012. Also see Joseph Nye, “Asian Nationalism at Sea,” Project Syndicate, September 3, 2012. Accessed on November 13, 2012. Available at: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ asian-nationalism-at-sea-by-joseph-s--nye

CHAPTER FOUR ASEAN: PLATFORM FOR COOPERATION OR CONFLICT?

A workable form of East Asian security architecture has always remained elusive. Since the end of the Second World War and for the duration of the Cold War, the most important security arrangements were the bilateral ‘hub and spoke’ alliances between the United States and its Asian partners, which spanned the breadth of the Pacific region. This, however, was not for the lack of trying. Several efforts were undertaken to establish regional groupings which, over time, provided the basis for more concrete East Asian security architecture. These included SEATO – an eight member grouping, established in 1955 and dissolved by 1977 – along with Maphilindo and the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). In northeast Asia, the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) – a South Korean initiative, established in 1966 and comprising nine member countries – struggled to survive due to the divergent perceptions and interests of its membership, finally collapsing by 1975. A major reason for this was the interplay of Cold War politics, which effectively erased any space for multilateral regional linkages. Indeed, to the extent that the leaders of these countries looked beyond their domestic agendas of nation building, they usually joined multilateral or global bodies such as the GATT, the IMF and the World Bank, established in the aftermath of the Second World War, rather than attempting to forge more specific regional institutions. These global institutions were the most influential among Asian countries in counterbalancing national agendas with a broader acceptance of collaborative rules for trade, finance and economic development assistance.1 The most notable attempt to crystallise regional collaboration was the ASEAN in 1967. The forum was established by the initiatives of the 1 T.J. Pempel, “Firebreak: East Asia institutionalises its Finances.”Conference Paper presented at the University of South California, March 2006.

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region’s five major players – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. At that time, however, ASEAN was not only very thinly institutionalised, but operated only by slow consensus building. As the 1960s passed on to the 1970s, other formal regional organisations began to criss-cross Asia, but these were mostly “open” organisations with membership across the Asia-Pacific region. Asia’s external boundaries remained, as Katzenstein puts it, highly “porous”.2 Most notable among these “open regional” bodies were APEC, which concentrated largely on trade and economic development, and the ARF, which sought to enhance security cooperation and confidence building measures. Such bodies did not opt for legalised frameworks and extensive secretariats. Instead, “…three core characteristics – informality, consensus, and ‘open’ regionalism – …capture the emphasis of East Asian institutions on process rather than outcome.”3 As such, these organisations reflected the reality that virtually all Asian countries remained highly dependent on US markets for their exports while some also looked towards US military guarantees for their internal security. In fact, security alliances with the US also kept Asia “open” to dependence on non-Asian powers. As Francis Fukuyama recently wrote, “ASEAN does not include China or the other major players in Northeast Asia, and APEC is no more than a consultative body. Asian security is ensured not by multilateral treaties, but by a series of bilateral relationships centring on Washington….”4 It was only towards the end of the Cold War that attempts were made to begin to establish networks that could serve as a semblance of regionalism. Certain developments at the end of the 1980s paved the way for the emergence of East Asian regionalism. The first was the waning of the Cold War, which had long impeded economic collaboration among the countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia, and across the Pacific. Towards the end of the 1970s, the security and economic scenario in East Asia began to stabilise. Hostilities ceased in 2 Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 9. 3 Etil Solingen, cited in T.J. Pempel, “Firebreak: East Asia Institutionalises its Finances,” Conference Paper presented at the University of South California, March 2006. 4 Francis Fukuyama, “Re-Envisioning Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, 2005.

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Vietnam, and between Vietnam and its neighbours; the smaller Southeast Asian economies began to boom, led by Japan, and China opened its doors to the international economy. In turn, this led to the rapid expansion of economic linkages between Northeast and Southeast Asian economies, following the signing of the Plaza Accord in 1985. Adding to this was the powerful, but more informal network of private financial institutions and cooperation, as T.J. Pempel has shown in Remapping Asia: Construction of a Region (2005). According to Pempel, these cooperation arrangements expanded their nationalised production to a regional level, after the Plaza Accord of 1985. As a result, networks of intra-Asian investment and trade expanded. 5 Despite the potential, the first inter-state collaborative networks that emerged were not so much regional as they were transregional. The prime example was APEC, which served as the link between the economies of the western and eastern Pacific rims.6 The 1990s was a decade of remarkable growth for regional institutions. The APEC was strengthened after 1993 with the creation of an annual Leaders Meeting and ASEAN expanded from its five original founding members to include all ten states of Southeast Asia by the end of the 1990s. By 1994, regional security was centralised around ASEAN – a prime example being the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which brought together states from Southeast and Northeast Asia to discuss security issues with representatives from North America, Australasia and Europe. This was soon augmented by inter-regional institutional collaborative ties with the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Forum for East Asia-Latin American Cooperation (FEALAC).7 In parallel with these formal linkages, track-two dialogues also proliferated at a remarkable pace. There were attempts to add some institutional structure to these arrangements. For example, the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) ran from 1990 to 1992, with representatives from all eight North Pacific states, including North

5

Andrew MacIntyre and Barry Naughton, “The Decline of the Japan-led Model of the East Asian Economy,” in T.J. Pempel (ed.), Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 81. 6 John Ravenhill, “East Asian Regionalism: Much Ado about Nothing,” Working Paper 3, Australian National University, Canberra, December 2008, p.4. 7 Christopher Dent, “The ASEM: Managing the New Framework of the EU’s Economic Relations with East Asia,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4, Winter 19971998, pp. 495-518.

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Korea. 8 In 1993, a track-two dialogue oriented towards regional consultation and cooperation resulted in the formation of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). This was also the beginning of a search for regional identity – kicked off by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad’s 1990 proposal for an EAEG. This was almost immediately renamed as EAEC, due to concerns that its original name sounded like an attempt to form a regional trade bloc. Yet, the idea behind the EAEC was to have a collective voice for the regional entity known as East Asia in international trade negotiations, while also countering American hegemony. While the EAEC never got off the ground, thanks to geopolitical machinations, primarily by the United States, Japan and China, the notion of an exclusively regional bloc lingered; it would form the kernel of the APT that was established six years later. As the years passed, the concept of an East Asian regional identity was put on the backburner – APEC was doing well, and track-two dialogues spanning the Asia-Pacific region mushroomed successfully. The turning point came in the second half of 1995, with preparations for the initial ASEM, which was to be held in Bangkok in March 1996. This was to be a biennial dialogue between East Asian states and the EU, and was first proposed by Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1994. It was ASEM that laid the foundations for the development of a more cohesive regional architecture. The requirement for Northeast Asian officials to coordinate meetings with their Southeast Asian counterparts, in order to have a dialogue with the EU, laid a platform for a “functioning if somewhat embryonic”9 East Asian regional cooperative arrangement. The ASEAN member countries asked Japan, China and South Korea to join them as Asian representatives. The tenor of the invitation was deliberately informal. China was worried about being criticised in a regional platform with regard to its human rights record, and Japan was worried about being rebuked by the United States for breaking away from the traditional Cold War bilateral alliance structure. Nevertheless, the foreign ministers of the three countries finally acquiesced and met on the sidelines of the ASEM meeting. However, towards the end of the decade, this creative push for regional collaboration seemed to hit a rather solid wall. The ASEAN, always 8

David Capie, “Rival Regions? East Asian Regionalism and its Challenge to the Asia Pacific,” Asian Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1994, pp. 149-165. 9 Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2002, p. 442.

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subject to criticism for its insistence on informality and consensus-based norms, the much-vaunted “ASEAN Way”, was now being termed stagnant, even by some of its admirers.10 Criticism mounted11 in the face of ASEAN’s blatant inability to handle problems such as East Timor, the 1997 coup in Cambodia, or the Asian financial crisis that swept the region in 1997-1998. These shortcomings led to ASEAN and its related institutions, including ARF at that time, being called “talk-shops”, rather than actual forums which would provide constructive solutions to regional crises. The same was said about APEC, which had not been able to act proactively in the face of the Asian financial crisis. For many, it was the financial crisis, over and above the other issues plaguing the region towards the end of the 1990s that was the turning point. The crisis highlighted the weaknesses of the existing regional institutions. It exacerbated the division between East Asian and ‘Western’ members– primarily the United States– about APEC, the principal transregional organisation. There was now a new incentive for East Asian solidarity, an East Asian community and a need for exclusive East Asian cooperation. As the crisis worsened, the call for a cohesive East Asian community that would cater to the interests of the region as an entity became louder. Economic regionalisation and security regionalism were the needs of the hour, and Northeast and Southeast Asian leaders began to take appropriate steps. In December 1998, the foreign ministers of China, Japan and South Korea met in Hanoi, where South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung proposed the establishment of an East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), to develop a blueprint for regional cooperation. The emphasis was on the formation of a regional bloc that would protect East Asian security and economic interests. This is the story of how Asia, by the mid- to late1990s, though thinly institutionalised by formal governmental links, gained a substantial measure of integration through bottom-up, marketgenerated, networks.12 The overall picture of Asian regionalism by the mid-1990s, according to Pempel, was two-fold. On the one hand, the connections across Asia 10 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001) pp. 194-208. 11 C. Fred Bergsten, “The New Asian Challenge,” Institute for International Economics, Working Paper No. 4 (March 2000), p. 7. Available at: http://www.iie.com/catalog/wp/2000/00-4.pdf 12 T.J. Pempel, “Firebreak: East Asia Institutionalises its Finances,” Conference Paper presented at the University of South California, March 2006.

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remained bottom-up and market driven. They centred on ever more disjointed and segmented networks of production, investment and trade that were responsive largely to corporate market opportunities. As such, though not completely independent of political and governmental considerations, they predominantly involved connections that had been developed and sustained with minimal government involvement. The second trait was that of openness, particularly among the few formal institutions that had been created to include Asian countries on a selective basis, as opposed to such global bodies as the WTO and the IMF. The key regional organisations were created in ways that reflected the ongoing dependence of most of Asia on the US, and to a lesser extent on Western Europe, for both markets and defence.13 The Asian financial crisis left behind a firm recognition of a need to protect regional political and economic interests. The panic exit of capital from the region, and the sudden downslide in the region’s economic value led to a reassessment of the truth behind the much-vaunted ‘Asian miracle’. The crisis had only served to highlight the vulnerability of the region to such occurrences, as well as the lack of a regional forum that could effectively respond to these events. It also highlighted the fact that, despite the diversities of the region in question, certain commonalities existed which served to bind it together – Richard Stubbs has listed them as “experience of warfare; ‘Asian’ values; a distinctive brand of capitalism; common institutions and deeper economic integration”.14 The recognition of these factors in common threw up some questions: How could East Asian economies be protected from the vagaries of global economics in the future? Could a regional political architecture be created that would serve the dual purpose of allowing transnational collaboration while preserving regional autonomy? Questions such as these rejuvenated Mahathir’s proposal for a specifically East Asian grouping, and led to the revival of an attempt to reach for the kind of regionalism that Beeson has termed “reactionary”.15 The APT was the perfect body at this juncture. Not only had the Asian financial crisis coincided with its initial meetings, but it also proved to be a catalyst for institutionalising what had been a tenuous 13

Ibid. Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No.3, 2002, p. 442. Also see Mark Beeson, “ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 2, August 2003, pp. 251-268. 15 Mark Beeson, “ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 2, August 2003, pp. 251-268. 14

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and informal arrangement. Besides adding to the sense of community pervading the region, the crisis had demonstrated the weakness of APEC and ASEAN. Neither forum was able to provide the kind of help that was needed as the crisis progressed from a currency crisis to a full blown socio-economic crisis. The crisis galvanised regional governments into action; there was now a sense that China, Japan and South Korea ought to join forces with the ASEAN member countries, so as to better cooperate on geopolitical and economic issues, besides averting any chance of a future crisis. A third meeting of APT leaders was held in Manila in November 1999, under the banner of ‘East Asian Cooperation’, focusing, for the first time, on eight fields of functional and economic cooperation. The meeting issued a Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation, setting the ball rolling for a series of meetings between foreign and finance ministers. By 2000, two broad trends were becoming evident. The first was the possible institutionalisation of formal links between Southeast and Northeast Asia. The second was the potential development of an East Asian Free Trade Area (FTA). In fact, the primary form of regional collaboration after the Asian financial crisis was in the same realm. The most prominent measure in this regard was the CMI, established in May 2000, to create a regional currency swap mechanism to enable states in the region to protect themselves against any future crises. The CMI created a network out of existing swap arrangements, prompting one analyst to hail it as a “watershed in a new regional financial architecture in East Asia”.16 This was followed by a slew of proposals for financial and economic collaboration, in the form of proposals for free-trade zones with ASEAN overall, as well as specific bilateral FTAs. For example, in November 2001, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed the creation of a free-trade zone with ASEAN within ten years, and formed a negotiating committee to work on its implementation. The sudden proliferation of regional arrangements, oriented towards the newly minted concept of ‘East Asia’, prompted cautious optimism for the future. There was definite hope that economic linkages could progress to geopolitical collaboration. Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong said as much: “I see no problem in APT evolving, if that’s the desire of leaders, into some kind of EAS.”17

16

Pradumna B. Rana, “Monetary and Financial Cooperation in East Asia: A Survey,” Panorama, No. 1, 2002, pp. 17-34. 17 Quoted from Hadi Soesatro, “Asia at the Nexus: APEC and ASEM,” Panorama, No. 4, 2001, p. 22.

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It is significant that despite the general consensus that ASEAN had failed the region in a time of need, the newly projected regional collaborative forums were all ASEAN-centric. The biggest change was that ASEAN member countries decided to include China, Japan and South Korea, being the largest players on the geopolitical chessboard. As China began to grow in political, economic and military clout in the twenty-first century, ASEAN and its spin-offs, like the APT and the East Asia Summit, began to emerge as prime platforms for the interaction of the regional discourses of the two major powers in the region, namely the United States and China. Can ASEAN, as a regional institution, act as a competitive or cooperative arena for the United States and China? How does ASEAN influence or enhance power-balancing in the region? The South China Sea dispute is perhaps the most obvious example of the capability of ASEAN to walk such a tightrope. It represents the one critical hotspot in the region where all parties, internal as well as external to the region, have an interest. However, before discussing the dispute in the light of the suitability of ASEAN as a regional platform, it would be worthwhile to assess ASEAN’s capability in handling economic and geopolitical crises in the last decade.

ASEAN: Assessing its Capability Amitav Acharya says, “International relations theory provides no agreed and definitive way of assessing what constitutes ‘success’ and ‘effectiveness’ in regional organisations.”18 Assessing ASEAN’s capability would depend entirely on the kind of analytical lens used, thereby rendering any opinion subjective. The issue of academic and analytical subjectiveness notwithstanding, it is possible to identify a number of areas where ASEAN has, as a regional mechanism, fallen short of expectations. For instance, it has not been able to respond to crises spanning a decade and a half, including the North Korean nuclear crises of 1993-1994; the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis; the 1997-1998 financial crisis; the crisis in East Timor in 1999; the outbreak of SARS in 2003; or the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. The flaw may lie in the 18

Amitav Acharya, “Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power, and Prospects for Peaceful Change,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 228.

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procedures that make up ASEAN’s approach to decision-making, known as the “ASEAN Way”. The consensus-based approach that ASEAN has employed as part of its modus operandi has been the major obstacle towards the implementation of many of its aims and objectives; the South China Sea dispute of recent months being a particular case in point. This has further stymied ASEAN’s evolution from an institution meant merely for confidence building, to one which can meaningfully exercise preventive diplomacy, leaving critics to dismiss it as a ‘talk shop’.19 This opinion has been qualified by some ASEAN watchers, who have argued that ASEAN’s role as a ‘talk shop’ still has some value, especially in light of the ARF series of foreign ministers’ meetings. Takashi Terada, in particular, has highlighted three points in favour of ASEAN’s role as a leading regional institution. First, the 2011 ARF Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was held in Bali in the midst of growing tension between China and some ASEAN members, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, over maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Although China is yet to show any intention of making a compromise, insisting on bilateral negotiations with other claimants as the only way to resolve disputes rather than utilising multilateral meetings such as the ARF to broker a resolution, the ASEAN meetings have confronted the issue in a more serious manner. Second, the United States’ increased engagement in Southeast Asia, including President Obama’s participation in the EAS in 2011, added a new significance to the ASEAN ministerial meetings. The Obama administration’s commitment to the region, epitomised by slogans such as, ‘The US is back in Asia’, or ‘Pivot to Asia’, is in sharp contrast to the apathetic attitude of the Bush administration evinced by former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s two absences from the ARF in just four years. Finally, ASEAN provides an opportunity for Southeast Asian states to display leadership. For example, in 2011, Indonesia assumed the chairmanship of ASEAN, and was under pressure to host meetings 19

Barry Wain, “ASEAN is Facing Its Keenest Challenges to Date,” Asian Wall Street Journal, February 23, 1998; Murray Hiebert, “Out of Its Depth,” Far Eastern Review, February 19, 1998; Rodolfo C. Severino, “ASEAN in Need of Stronger Cohesion,” Straits Times, December 9, 2006; and Shaun Narine, “ASEAN and the ARF: The limits of the ‘ASEAN Way,’” Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 9, 1997, pp. 961-978.

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successfully after a failure to find a solution to the border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia undermined confidence in its leadership.20 It is certainly true that prior to the Bali meetings of 2011, ASEAN had never successfully acted as an effective shield to protect the interests of its members in territorial disputes. However, the US, playing a key role in placing the disputes on the recent ARF agenda, has confronted China over the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Of significance was the US claim that both parties should provide ‘legal evidence’ to support their territorial claims. This legal approach to territorial disputes, initially promoted by the Philippines, is something China has previously not paid serious attention to. This also highlights the conflict in regional discourses with regard to East Asia and shall be discussed in detail later. To return to the positive aspects of ASEAN as a regional institution, the institution has served as a useful venue for discussing highly sensitive matters, or ‘circuit-breakers’,21 in stalled diplomatic relations. A case in point is the meeting of former Secretary of State Colin Powell with his North Korean counterpart on the sidelines of the ARF meeting in 2004, marking the first high-level state contact between the two countries since Madeleine Albright’s visit to North Korea in 2000. Chinese and Japanese leaders have also met on the sidelines of ARF in 2006, which helped at the time to alleviate a deepening schism in China-Japan relations. Thus, it may be concluded that while ASEAN has been ineffective in handling regional crises, it has also produced certain highly qualified, albeit marginal, successes. Brendan Taylor, among others, points out that the existence of ASEAN has been important for regional stability. Rodolfo Severino has concurred, making the point that, “…partly through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and partly through its own practices, ASEAN has set regional norms for the peaceful relations among states….”22 As an economic powerhouse, however, ASEAN has a different story to tell. It continues to rise in economic clout, its population totalling 600 20 Takashi Terada, “ASEAN’s Talk Shop Function and US Engagement,” East Asia Forum, August 25, 2011. Accessed on November 28, 2012. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/10/asean-s-talk-shop-function-and-usengagement/ 21 Ibid. 22 Rodolfo C. Severino, “ASEAN in Need of Stronger Cohesion,” Straits Times, December 9, 2006.

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million with a combined GDP of USD 2.1 trillion. As a region, it is projected to be one of the world’s fastest growing consumer markets over the next two decades. The ASEAN Economic Community is also projected to come into existence by the end of 2015, thereby effectively creating one of the world’s biggest markets. It is a mixed bag, certainly, but holds potential both in terms of economics and geopolitics. For the United States and China, it is a region that is crucial for the same reasons, as shown by their own perspectives.

ASEAN: A Chinese Perspective According to a monograph by Jing Dong Yuan, while China and ASEAN have moved forward from an era of enmity to one of amity, ASEAN still views China as a “mix of challenges and opportunities”.23 The view, in his opinion, is a legacy of the historical tribute system, wherein much of continental Southeast Asia lived “under the shadow of the Chinese empire”. 24 However, many of the events of the post-Cold War era, particularly the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, have done much to turn the tide in the favour of Beijing. After the crisis, China emerged more confident of its potential leadership role in the region, although it maintained deferential relations with ASEAN, recognising it as the supreme regional institution of East Asia. 25 The New Security Concept (NSC) of the mid-1990s was put forward as a plan for Confidence Building Measures, emphasising cooperative security, peaceful resolution of disputes and multilateral dialogues. According to Jing Dong Yuan, it was measures such as these that have allowed China to assert its influence in the region. However, ASEAN has reacted with a dual strategy: hedging and engagement. With regard to the former, ASEAN countries recognise that a policy of isolating or alienating China is not sustainable and, therefore, opportunities are explored by integrating China in regional

23

Jing-Dong Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for US Interests (PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006), p.23. 24 Ibid., p.24. 25 See Jurgen Haacke, “Seeking Influence: China’s Diplomacy Toward ASEAN after the Asian Crisis,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2002, pp. 13-52. Also see Alice D. Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for the 21st Century,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2003, pp. 622-647.

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political, security and economic arrangements.26 Politically, and in terms of security arrangements, China was initiated into some of the most important regional forums, from APEC to the ARF, while continuing to work bilaterally with ASEAN countries on security issues. Economically, bilateral trade has experienced a significant boom since China established dialogue partnership with ASEAN. Between 2002 and 2012, ChinaASEAN bilateral trade climbed 23.6% annually to US$ 444 billion in 2013, exceeding the 7.6% increase in China’s total foreign trade. That figure has since gone up by 1.2% as of April 2014, to US$ 181.75 billion in the first five months of the year alone.27 By 2015, China and ASEAN are looking at upgrading their total trade figure to US$ 500 billion. The long-term aim is to expand bilateral trade volume to US$ 1 trillion by 2020.28 The implementation of the Agreement of Trade in Goods under the bilateral FTA plan gave a strong push to the development of bilateral trade, because tariffs on the bilateral trade in goods decreased significantly through several years of tariff reduction. These are important indicators of the significance of economic regionalisation in China’s regional discourse with respect to East Asia. More concrete signals can be found in the signing and demarcation of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). The ACFTA came into force from January 1, 2010 with zero tariffs for 93% of the products traded between China and ASEAN-6. The average tariff imposed on products from ASEAN by China was reduced from 9.8% to 0.1%, and ASEAN reciprocated by reducing the tariffs from 12.8% to 0.6% for products from China. In the case of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, zero tariffs on 90% of Chinese commodities are expected by 2015. Currently, ACFTA encompasses a population exceeding 1.9 billion over an area of 14 million sq. km with a US$ 6 trillion GDP and a trade volume of US$ 4.5 trillion. This free trade area is the largest in the 26

Jing-Dong Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for US Interests (PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006), pp. 25-28. 27 See “ASEAN-China Trade Up 1.2%.” Available at: http://www.mysinchew.com/node/98101 Also see “China-ASEAN Trade to Bloom on New Target,” Xinhua News Agency, October 10, 2013. Available at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8421398.html Also see “China-ASEAN Trade up 1.2% in Jan-May,” China Daily, June 9, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/chinadata/201406/09/content_17571849.htm 28 “China, ASEAN to Strengthen Economic and Trade Ties,” China Daily, January 8, 2014. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/business/2014/01-08/96043.shtml

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world in terms of population and territory. The establishment of ACFTA signals the transition of Sino-ASEAN economic cooperation from area and sector cooperation to that of economic integration. In spite of the current global financial crisis as well as ongoing territorial and maritime disputes, the bilateral trade between China and ASEAN, aided by ACFTA’s “zero tariffs” regime, has witnessed a rapid growth since its establishment. According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, bilateral trade between China and ASEAN has surged from US$ 54.77 billion in 2002, to US$ 400.1 billion in 2012, with an average annual growth rate of 22%. The first half of 2013 saw a year on year growth of 12.2% that totalled US$ 210.56 billion, with ACFTA’s stipulated changes already in effect in China and the six original members of ASEAN, namely Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, while Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar will follow suit in 2015. The upgrading of ACFTA is a prominent part of Beijing’s plan, articulated at the ASEAN Summit by Premier Li Keqiang, of creating a ‘diamond decade’ of cooperation between China and ASEAN. It will also serve as a powerful catalyst for enhancing connectivity between ASEAN and China, by providing “hardware links”29 such as roads, railways, water transport, telecommunications and energy, as well as “software connections” 30 in standard systems such as quality control and customs clearance. At present, China is ASEAN’s largest trading partner while the latter remains China’s fourth largest trade partner.31 The expansion of trade in goods was also complemented by an increase in bilateral foreign direct investment. Mutual direct investment has increased rapidly ever since the Investment Agreement came into effect under ACFTA in 2009. According to preliminary statistics, China and ASEAN are well on target for accomplishing the US$ 500 billion target set for 2015, with the bilateral trade volume in 2013 already up to US$ 444 billion. In 2013, the two sides set a new goal at the 10th China-ASEAN Expo in Guangxi, where they agreed to boost bilateral trade to US$ 1 trillion by 2020, and expand bilateral investment to US$ 150 billion over the next eight years. As of June 2013, China’s foreign direct investment in ASEAN countries totalled

29

“Upgrading FTA to feature in building ‘Diamond Decade’ of China-ASEAN relations”, Xinhua News Agency, October 8, 2013. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/business/2013/10-08/83346.shtml 30 Ibid. 31 Wang Yuzhu, “Interdependence and Strategic Construction in China-ASEAN Relations,” Journal of Guangxi University, No. 2, 2007.

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nearly US$ 30 billion, while ASEAN’s investment in China exceeded US$ 80 billion.

Source: China’s Ministry of Commerce, China Daily

These figures speak of the fact that ASEAN and China have significantly increased bilateral interdependence, in terms of economic regionalisation. On issues of non-traditional security as well, ASEAN and China have exhibited what Wang Yuzhu has called a “common identity”, particularly on matters such as anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, ecological issues such as the Greater Mekong River Project, response to the outbreak of the SARS epidemic and transnational crime. 32 This phrase has been picked up by Premier Li Keqiang, who called China’s relations with ASEAN a “common community of destiny”33 at the 10th China-ASEAN Expo, held from September 3 to 6, 2013, in Nanning, the capital of south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.

32 See Wang Yuzhu, “Interdependence and Strategic Construction in ChinaASEAN Relations,” Journal of Guangxi University, No. 2, 2007 and Jing-Dong Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for US Interests (PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006). 33 “Premier Li Keqiang’s Keynote Speech at 10th China-ASEAN Expo,” People’s Daily, September 4, 2013.Available at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8388723.html

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The ASEAN hedging strategy, Chinese scholars claim, is linked to its strategy of engaging with China. Given the “unease and suspicion”34 with which many of the smaller East and Southeast Asian countries regard China, it is sheer pragmatism that allows them to acknowledge that the only way of ensuring that China acts responsibly with regard to critical issues such as the South China Sea is to stress the value of engagement rather than confrontation. Jing Dong-Yuan has identified three areas that concern Southeast Asian states, namely potential economic competition from China, territorial disputes and lack of transparency in Beijing’s defence expenditure. According to Jing Dong Yuan, these concerns have been addressed by Beijing, thereby winning the confidence of the ASEAN countries. 35 However, the key to understanding China-ASEAN relations, according to Chinese scholars is that while China is doing its best to cater to the concerns of ASEAN countries, ASEAN itself has yet to develop its own identity apart from agreements on general principles and processes. The ASEAN countries’ threat perceptions of China vary depending on history, geography and the extent and nature of unresolved disputes. 36 A clear example of this is Cambodia’s support of China in the ongoing South China Sea dispute. At a private meeting in November 2012 between China’s Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, and the 10 member countries of ASEAN, Hun Sen, Cambodia’s leader and the host of the meeting, read out a statement that it was the consensus of the group that the issue of the South China Sea would not be “internationalised.”37 It was the second time in four months that China appeared to have influenced Cambodia, a beneficiary of Chinese development and military aid, to put forward its case. In July 2013, ASEAN failed to issue a communiqué at the end of its conference of foreign ministers after Cambodia refused to allow any mention of the South China Sea. With countries like the Philippines objecting to the “resolution of multilateral problems on a bilateral basis”,38 the dispute has gone a long way in reaffirming the definite fragility of the “ASEAN Way”. 34

Ibid. Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Jane Parlez, “China and Cambodia Stall Move to Quell Asia Disputes over Territory,” The New York Times, November 19, 2012. Accessed on December 1, 2012. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/asia/china-andcambodia-stall-move-to-quell-disputes-in-southeast-asia.html?_r=0 38 Ibid. 35

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As a regional institution, however, ASEAN’s role is still evolving in the eyes of Chinese scholars. Chinese analysts have pointed out that there may be four distinct phases. 39 The first phase began in the late 1970s in response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, wherein ASEAN made singular efforts to seek a peaceful solution of the issue. The Paris Agreement, to which ASEAN made a significant contribution, gave the organisation a high profile in the international diplomatic arena and also provided it with leadership potential in the Southeast Asian theatre. The second phase began in the early 1990s and focused on ASEAN’s efforts to engage major powers in the development of a regional security dialogue that aimed at “socialising” 40 China with regard to the benefits of multilateralism. With the evolution of forums such as the APT and the ARF, major powers in the region were brought under the “ASEAN Way” of gradualism in dispute and conflict settlement. The third phase was characterised by ASEAN’s pursuit of multi-level security dialogues, involving ASEM and the ASEAN FTA. The fourth and current phase involves a move beyond Southeast Asia to launch a region-wide political forum which will include all major East Asian powers. A key example of this is the EAS. Approaches to conflict resolution, however, remain the same, namely gradualism and non-intervention. Chinese analysts feel that, while this approach does have its merits, it is not suitable for solving key regional disputes such as the South China Sea issue. These disputes, Chinese analysts argue, are better tackled on a bilateral basis. While fearing that “…external powers may dilute Beijing’s influence in the region”, 41 Chinese analysts have identified key regional hotspots such as Taiwan, the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea as areas where Chinese influence could easily be undermined, and areas where China simply “does not have room for negotiation.”42 Despite these factors, Chinese scholars continue to underline the fact that for Beijing, ASEAN is an “important centre of 39 Ibid. Also see “Report on China’s ASEAN Policy”, Institute of Contemporary International Relations Project Group on ASEAN Studies, No. 10, October 2002 and Cao Yunhua and Tang Chong, New China-ASEAN Relations (Beijing: China Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2005). 40 Jing-Dong Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for US Interests (PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006). 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. Also see Cao Yunhua and Tang Chong, “ASEAN’S Great Power Balancing Strategy: The Role of China,” from New China-ASEAN Relations (Beijing: China Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2005).

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regional power”43 in East Asia. This has also been highlighted in Beijing’s official policy discourse. In 2013, at the 16th China-ASEAN leaders meeting in Brunei’s capital of Bandar Seri Begawan, China reaffirmed the fact that a united, prosperous and dynamic ASEAN was in its strategic interests. The joint communiqué released after the summit contained a pledge to advance, enhance and deepen the ASEAN-China strategic partnership for mutual benefit, safeguard common interests and “continue to fully and effectively implement the 2011-2015 Plan of Action to implement the Joint Declaration on the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity”.44 Thus, ASEAN’s centrality in the realm of regional geopolitics was emphasised by Beijing. The joint statement maintains that the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) is a “milestone document” which embodies the collective commitment of ASEAN members and China to promote peace, stability and mutual trust, as well as the peaceful settlement of the South China Sea dispute in accordance with the universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).45

ASEAN: An American Perspective In the growth and evolution of a concrete East Asian order, the United States cannot play an insider’s role, even though it has been entrenched in the region since the Second World War. Nevertheless, it may be said that United States has the ability to accelerate or impede East Asian integration. 46 Despite this, or perhaps because of it, the United States’ perspective on ASEAN has varied in accordance with the views of different administrations towards East Asia as a region. The debate on Asia-Pacific regionalism versus East Asian regionalism is still an ongoing one in the United States, and the centrality of ASEAN in American regional discourse towards East Asia has varied correspondingly. For many American scholars, such as Donald Emerson, regional institutions such as ASEAN or the EAS come at the price of blurring the political meaning of “East Asia”, with the inclusion of countries such as New 43

Jing-Dong Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for US Interests (PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006). 44 “China, ASEAN Vow to Achieve Bigger in Ties in Next Decade,” ECNS, October 10, 2013. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/2013/10-10/83598.shtml 45 Ibid. 46 Donald Emmerson, “Asian Regionalism & US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation,” RSIS Working Paper 193, March 2010, Singapore.

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Zealand and India. 47 Policy discourse, such as a special report by the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) on the role of the United States in the “new” East Asia recognises as well that while the United States is a Pacific power, it can never be an “Asian” power. Therefore, it needs to base its efforts on an assessment of “what tables it needs to sit at and when and where it can afford to step aside.”48 An assessment such as this has been sadly lacking in the regional perception of the United States. The focus on multilateralism has fluctuated with successive administrations, since the end of the Cold War. The two Bush administrations remained sceptical about the uses of multilateralism, for example, in favour of bilateral negotiations with the long-term aim of maintaining the preponderance of United States hegemony. In stark contrast, President Clinton’s administration actively embraced the idea of a “new Pacific Community.” 49 While it, too, approached multilateralism from an Asia-Pacific perspective, it backed nascent regional forums such as the ARF, with the aim of cultivating these organisations for security consultations. President Obama’s administration has also focused on a pan-Pacific approach, though it has remained actively open to East Asian community building. Overall, while the approach to East Asia has been subject to countless revisions, the bedrock of the United States’ regional perspective has been the promotion of the ‘hub and spoke’ system of bilateral alliances. Ralph Cossa has traced the reason behind this to three debates in American regionalism: “One is the debate between Asia-Pacific vs. East Asia regionalism and how or if the two can coexist. Another is the future role of Washington’s traditional alliance-oriented strategy in Asia and how this coincides or conflicts with East Asia multilateralism. The third is the debate over institutionalised versus ad hoc multilateralism that is currently playing itself out both globally and within Asia.”50 Going by historical precedent, one denominator which has remained constant in the regional discourse of the United States is that alliances 47

Ibid. Evan A. Feigenbaum and Robert Manning, “The United States in the New Asia,” Council of Foreign Relations Special Report No. 50, November 2009. 49 President Bill Clinton, Speech to the Republic of Korea National Assembly, July 1993. 50 Ralph Cossa, “East Asia Community Building: Time for the United States to Get on Board,” Issues & Insights, Vol. 7, No. 17, Pacific Forum, CSIS, October 2007, p. 2. 48

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come first. This has been true not just for the Clinton administration, but also for that of the current Obama administration. Policy documents and briefs acknowledge that the United States must keep up its historical legacy of Asian pre-eminence, but warn that pre-eminence must no longer be confused with hegemony. They underline the fact that the pre-eminence or primacy of the United States must adapt to the realities of the presence of pan-Asian forums such as ASEAN, APT or EAS. Indeed, with regard to ASEAN, analysts point to the central role ASEAN has played in Asia’s regional processes. Especially in the context of the divergence of views regarding the rise of China and the presence of the United States as an external but embedded power in the region, ASEAN is seen by the United States as an “accepted hub and convener because of its political openness to different partners and because it is neither a competitor nor a threat to these rising powers.” 51 Under the Obama administration, the ASEAN region has assumed a new importance. In the last few years, the administration has: (i) appointed the first US ambassador to ASEAN; (ii) acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC); (iii) attended its first EAS; (iv) strengthened alliances and partnerships with several countries including the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore; (v) engaged a newly reforming Burma; and (vi) unveiled a series of business and economic initiatives to assist Southeast Asian countries, such as the Expanded Economic Engagement Initiative (E3) initiative in June 2013. Apart from harking back to the norms of the Clinton administration, with its focus on pan-Pacific multilateral forums in order to enhance security cooperation, the Obama administration has recognised the significance of East Asia as a regional entity. Taken collectively, ASEAN is an emerging economic powerhouse. Its GDP exceeds US$ 2 trillion (3% of global GDP), with the presence of unusually open economies and substantial FDI inflows, despite the financial crises of 1997-1998 and 2008.It is, with the East China Sea and South China Sea disputes, a vital geopolitical flashpoint, besides being home to some of the world’s most strategically important shipping routes. Economically speaking, ASEAN is developing into an increasingly important region for the United States. Goods trade reached US$ 198 billion in 2013, while services trade in the same period totalled US$ 34 billion in 2012, almost doubling within a decade. The region hosts approximately US$ 189 billion worth of US FDI, as of 2012, led by non-bank holding companies, manufacturing, finance and insurance sectors. It is the fourth largest market for US exports, totalling US$ 92 51 “US-East Asia Relations: A Strategy for Multilateral Engagement,” Asia Society Task Force Report, November 2011.

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billion in 2013, while imports from ASEAN reached US$ 108 billion in the same period.52 These figures are indicative of the fact that multilateralism would, under the Obama administration, be necessary for both security and economic collaboration. The former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, further underscored the point at the US-ASEAN Business Forum in July 2012, when she stated that economic ties have only strengthened in recent years when US exports to ASEAN increased dramatically by 42% from 2009 to 2011, with particularly strong growth in chemicals, petroleum and coal products, and primary metal manufacturing. The United States also continues to have more than twice as much direct investment abroad in ASEAN than in China.53 Indeed, China’s emergence on the geopolitical and economic scene in East Asia has meant that ASEAN and its spin-offs have assumed greater importance. It also implies that, with China holding the economic reins in the region, the United States has been pushed into setting up counter-initiatives like the TPP. However, while United States is trying to unravel some of the knottier issues in the still nascent TPP, it has taken steps in the right direction to shore up economic ties with the members of ASEAN. The E3 announced at the fourth US-ASEAN Leaders Meeting in November 2012 is a case in point. This is an initiative designed to establish a framework for economic cooperation in order to expand trade and investment ties between the United States and ASEAN, creating new business opportunities and jobs in all 11 countries. The explanation of the US State Department in this regard is worth quoting at length, so as to fully understand the goals behind this new initiative: “The E3 identifies specific cooperative activities to facilitate US-ASEAN trade and investment, increase efficiency and competitiveness of trade flows and supply chains throughout ASEAN, and will build greater awareness of the commercial opportunities that the growing US-ASEAN economic relationship presents. By working together on E3 initiatives… the United States and ASEAN are also laying the groundwork for all ASEAN countries to join high-standard trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement.”54

52

Available at: http://www.asean.org/resources/category/asean-statistics US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the US-ASEAN Business Forum, Siem Reap, Cambodia, July 13, 2012. Accessed on October 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/07/195013.htm 54 Factsheet from the Office of the Spokesman, United States Department of Trade, October 9, 2013, Washington, DC. Available at: 53

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The United States has continued building on this throughout 2013 and 2014. It organised the first ever US-ASEAN Business Forum in Cambodia in July 2012, and has eased restrictions on American companies interested in doing business in Burma. The United States is also focusing on developing infrastructure in the region, as shown by the Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity, an initiative launched in 2010 that lays stress on the construction of railways, airports, power plants and information and communication technology (ICT) systems to strengthen regional integration in Southeast Asia. 55 In 2013, at the ASEAN-US Leaders’ Meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan, US Secretary of State, John Kerry, expanded on this goal by describing a “Pacific Dream”,56 characterised by “unprecedented security, economic and social cooperation,” as well as “marketplaces that are open, transparent and accountable.”57 Nevertheless, while ASEAN is seen as the foundation for the progress of regionalism, a perspective on which American and Chinese scholars’ opinions converge markedly, American scholars underline that the emphasis of ASEAN should be to “promote values and build norms…rather than seeking to simply use ASEAN ties with the United States as a means of balancing regional actors such as China.”58 Where, in such views, is the place of the APEC? Its position as a regional forum suffered a severe blow in the fallout of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Though there were opportunities aplenty for APEC to renew its role as a key economic institution in East Asia, it initially offered ‘clumsy’ responses to the crisis, 59 while the Manila Framework Group (MFG) formed under the auspices of APEC to help restore regional financial stability did not live up to expectations. The East Asian members of http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/10/20131009284230.html 55 See “Factsheet: The Growing Prominence of US-ASEAN Trade Relations,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, June 13, 2013. Accessed on 13 May 2014. Available at: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/ 2013/june/us-asean-trade-relations Also see Prashanth Parameswaran, “The Power of Balance: Advancing US-ASEAN Relations under the Second Obama Administration,” World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1, December 2013. 56 John Kerry, Remarks at the US-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, July 1, 2013. Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/07/211377.htm 57 Ibid. 58 “US-East Asia Relations: A Strategy for Multilateral Engagement,” Asia Society Task Force Report, November 2011. 59 John Ravenhill, “From Poster Child to Orphan: The Rise and Demise of APEC,”UNISCI Paper No.13, January 2007.

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APEC, namely China, Vietnam, Thailand, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, the Philippines, South Korea, Hong Kong et al preferred to turn to the nascent APT forum, from where they launched a set of novel initiatives in regional financial cooperation. The same countries similarly demonstrated a preference for alternative mechanisms for trade liberalisation. A decade and another financial crisis later, APEC’s Southeast Asian members continue to engage in regional liberalisation via ASEAN while also negotiating a variety of bilateral trade agreements between ASEAN as a group and its trading partners. Bilateral trade deals involving individual APEC members have mushroomed, with the East Asian members of APEC among the most active proponents of bilateralism. Does this trend of bilateral regionalisation actively rule out hope for a role for APEC in regional cooperation? Some believe that, after the financial crises, negotiating an APEC-wide free trade area will be fraught with difficulties, leaving the bilateral trend as the only source of appeal for countries in the region.60 Besides, if announcements and events in 2013 are anything to go by, it will be a while before APEC is entirely written off. At the APEC Summit held in Bali in October 2013, the leaders of the Pacific Rim economies gathered to push for economic growth and regional integration. At the Summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping said in his keynote speech, “APEC should play a leading and coordinating role in maintaining and advancing an open world economy, and in making sure that the Asia-Pacific continues to serve as an engine for global economic recovery.”61 Indeed, China showed a great inclination towards reviving the APEC, and letting it take the reins of economic recovery in the region. Whether this is aimed at the United States’ initiative of the TPP is not hard to say. In fact, this new openness for a pan-Pacific method of regional collaboration assumes significance in the light of the 2008 global financial crisis, and increasing attempts by the United States to incorporate economic regionalisation as part of its regional discourse. For example, the American push for the development of a Free Trade Agreement in the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), and initiatives for the negotiation of a Trans60

Helen Nesadurai, “APEC & East Asia: The Challenge of Remaining Relevant,” from John Ravenhill (ed.), APEC & The Search for Relevance: 2007 and Beyond, Australian National University, November 2006. 61 APEC Should Play Leading Role in Maintaining Open World Economy: Xi”, ECNS, October 7, 2013. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/2013/10-07/83219.shtml

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Pacific Partnership as a first step towards the formation of FTAAP, has given APEC the status of the most advanced institution for market integration. 62 China is following this up as fast as possible. In Bali, President Xi Jinping clearly stated that as long as several FTAs compete for dominance in the region, APEC should lead and coordinate the negotiations concerning free trade areas. Beijing, he said, would be open to all trade arrangements, with the neatly aimed rider, “as long as these trade arrangements are inclusive.”63 Liu Janren, a research fellow with the National Institute of International Strategy under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said that APEC was more inclusive and more mature when compared to other regional mechanisms, and since all of these aim at creating an Asia-Pacific FTA anyway, all arrangements should be monitored and controlled by APEC.64 Yu Jianhua, deputy international trade representative of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, told delegates at the Asia FTA Forum held in Qingdao on 20 June, 2013, that China must prevent one or a handful of developed countries from dominating any trade negotiations, should they impose their own rules in the region. 65 The question therefore arises that since the TPP – the American counterweight to the APEC – is floundering in tangled sticking points, can APEC be the lynchpin of East Asian economic regionalisation? The answer to this is still somewhat vague. World trade negotiations headed by the WTO have not seen much progress and, against this backdrop, the appeal of bilateral and multilateral trade pacts is infinitely greater. Given the proliferation of pacts such as these, it is perhaps safe to assume that APEC will not be the dominant economic institution for East Asia. Instead, it will have to share the stage with other regional economic institutions like APT and even ASEAN. This is not an entirely negative picture, as it will provide APEC with a new raison d’être and the chance to remain relevant in East Asia.66 What of ASEAN’s ability to stay relevant in East Asian regionalism? The United States and China have both repeatedly and openly stressed the 62

Takashi Terada, “ASEAN’s Talk Shop Function and US Engagement,” East Asia Forum, August 25, 2011. Accessed on November 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/10/asean-s-talk-shop-function-and-usengagement/ 63 “APEC ‘should take lead’ in FTA Talks,” ECNS, October 8, 2013. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/business/2013/10-08/83224.shtml 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid.

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importance of ASEAN as the basis for all regional interaction. However, as China rises, together with American power in the region being called into question, and as nationalism begins to mount in both China and Japan, there is now a definite opportunity for the push and shove of great power politics. It remains to be seen how ASEAN will maintain its centrality in this phase of transitional geopolitics.

Great Power Transition and ASEAN Centrality While the United States, albeit an external power, has been deeply entrenched in the region since the end of the Second World War, the rise of China in the twenty-first century and its emergence as the largest power in Asia, after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, has placed a new spotlight on Asian regionalism. The announcement by then United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in November 2011 that the twenty-first century would be the United States’ “Pacific Century”67 further strengthened the belief that the future of global politics would be located in Asia. Shortly thereafter, the United States’ attention was diverted by crucial wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan. While it dealt with the fallout of these wars, China began to dominate East Asia. Basing its moves on the excuse of historical precedent and territorial sovereignty, China started to assert itself in the region. Its economic advantage notwithstanding, China now revived simmering conflicts – the South China Sea being a case in point – and triggered new ones in the East China Sea. The geopolitical scenario, as a result, has been in a state of flux since 2010, even though China continues to hold the economic reins of the region. As for the United States, under President Obama, it has been pressing for a policy of ‘return’ to East Asia because, for many, the United States never really left East Asia – even though its attention may have been diverted by wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Under President Obama, though, much of the discourse concerning the region is based on ASEAN-centric regional collaboration, with the sole exception being the TPP agreement. For the ASEAN region, however, China is seen as the economic partner that facilitates prosperity, while the United States is the security provider who guards the peace.68 While the former trend crystallised after the Asian 67

Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 10, 2011. Accessed on December 2, 2011. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century 68 Donald K. Emmerson, “US-China Role-Play for ASEAN,” East Asia Forum, November 25, 2011. Accessed on September 15, 2012. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/25/us-china-role-play-for-asean/

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financial crisis in 1997, the latter has been a regional truth since the Second World War. What is more, these trends are still visible today. On its own, and taken collectively, ASEAN is an emerging economic powerhouse. Its GDP exceeds US$ 2 trillion (3% of global GDP), with the presence of unusually open economies and substantial FDI inflows, despite the financial crises of 1997-1998 and 2008. It is, with the East China Sea and South China Sea disputes, also a critical geopolitical flashpoint, besides harbouring some of the world’s most strategically important shipping routes. As a result, it is a region ripe for great power politics, and this is undoubtedly taking place between the United States and China. Economically speaking, however, the advantage lies with China, which capitalised on the opportunity that was presented to it in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. Statistical evidence tells the story. The United States and China both imported 10.1% of ASEAN exports in 2009. 69 They also accounted for nearly equal FDI inflows into ASEAN countries the same year at 10.8% and 10.4% respectively. 70 However, from 2003, America’s advantage over China virtually disappeared. From 2003 to 2008, China’s share of all Southeast Asian trade mushroomed at an astonishing average annual rate of 26%.71In fact, the decade 2002-2012 saw China-ASEAN trade increase almost eight-fold. The volume of trade between China and ASEAN touched US$ 400.1 billion in 2012, which amounted to 10.3% of China’s share of world trade, compared to 7.8% ten years ago. Cross-border investments broke the US$ 100 billion barrier by the end of 2012, amounting to a net increase of US$ 70 billion over the previous ten years.72 Much as it did a decade ago, in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis of 2008, China has proved to be a solidly steady market for goods and services from the ASEAN countries, providing a market worth US$ 78.85 billion of additional goods to ASEAN from 2008-2012. In 2013, trade rose by 10.9% to US$ 444 billion. By May 2014, bilateral trade between China and ASEAN had 69

External Trade Statistics. Available at: http://www.aseansec.org/18137.htm Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Statistics. Available at: http://www.aseansec.org/18144.htm 71 ASEAN Economic Community Chartbook, 2009. Published by the ASEAN Secretariat. Taken from: http://www.aseansec.org/publications/AEC-Chartbook2009.pdf 72 He Weiwen, “China-ASEAN FTAs Not Directed at TPP,” China-US Focus, November 6, 2013. Available at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/financeeconomy/china-asean-ftas-not-directed-at-tpp/ 70

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grown by 1.2%. China is now firmly set as ASEAN’s largest trading partner; while for China, ASEAN is a major investment and tourism destination, besides being its third largest trading partner.73 In comparison, the United States’ trade figures with ASEAN stood at a mere US$ 12.79 billion during the same period, as compared to figures of US$ 7.13 billion for Japan and US$ 10.81 billion for South Korea.74 In a further boost to the prospects for economic integration, negotiations for an FTA between China, Japan and South Korea began in November 2012. The three-way trade talks highlighted the potential of a region accounting for 20% of China’s global GDP and 19% of its regional exports. More significantly, the proposed FTA underscores the competition between China and the United States in delineating Asia’s economic landscape. The FTA is a clear rival to the American vision of economic links with East and Southeast Asia. Though it was a step in the right direction, the talks remained bogged down by political tensions in the region, most notably the disputes in the South and East China Seas. Nevertheless, the fourth round of negotiations took place in Seoul, South Korea, during March 4-7, 2014, illustrating the need to put aside political tensions in order to reap the mutual economic benefits. 75 From the viewpoint of ASEAN, this development will help bring about East Asian integration and further its own interest. The statistics show China to be a leader in providing economic, financial and commercial assistance to the countries that need it. As far as the United States is concerned, while economic linkages with ASEAN have increased, it has a long way to go before it matches the China-ASEAN relationship. This being said, ASEAN is developing into an increasingly important economic region for the United States. The goods trade touched US$ 198 billion in 2013, while the services trade during the same period totalled US$ 34 billion in 2012, almost doubling within a decade. The region hosts approximately US$189 billion worth of US FDI as of 2012, led by non-bank holding companies, manufacturing, 73

“China-ASEAN trade up 1.2% in Jan-May,” China Daily, June 9, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.cn/bizchina/chinadata/2014-06/09/content_17571849.htm 74 Ibid. 75 Shannon Tiezzi, “China-Japan-South Korea Hold FTA Talks Despite Political Tensions,” The Diplomat, March 5, 2014. Accessed on 13 May, 2014. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-japan-south-korea-hold-fta-talks-despitepolitical-tension/

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and the finance and insurance sectors. The ASEAN is the fourth largest market for American exports, accounting for US$ 92 billion in 2013, while its imports to the United States stood at US$ 108 billion in the same year.76 The economic potential of the ASEAN region, however, has led to the mushrooming of various proposals for free trade areas. On a broader AsiaPacific canvas, the TPP77 could well emerge as a regional institution to reckon with in the future, at least as long as the Obama administration is in power. Asia’s steady growth during and after the global financial crisis in 2008 has provided the United States with an opportunity that most developed economies can no longer afford. As a result, since 2009, the cornerstone of the United States’ economic policy has been to boost growth and support the creation of American jobs by increasing exports to a region that currently includes some of the world’s fastest growing economies. The TPP focuses on excluding non-members, such as China. Any agreement on entry would have to be separately reviewed and approved by the United States Congress, leaving China to negotiate bilaterally with the United States and other countries in the region. This has caused China concern, on the score that it would lose its clout in a region where it is seen as hegemonic in its own right. It has also led China to revisit ideas for more consolidated economic regional integration. Since the Asian financial crisis, there has been no dearth of ideas for this. Proposals for ASEAN-centric integration have included a suggestion in 2001to establish an APT-East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA); Japan’s 2006 proposal to establish an ASEAN+6 Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA), which would include Australia, India and New Zealand; and China’s own idea for creating a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), mooted in 2006 at an APEC meeting in Hanoi. In 2011, ASEAN proposed its own model for a regional FTA – the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Working parallel with the TPP, the RCEP was envisaged as a pathway to the establishment of an Asia-Pacific FTA.78 Discussions on the Agreement moved forward

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Available at: http://www.asean.org/resources/category/asean-statistics For details, see Chapter 2: The United States in East Asia: Past and Present 78 Rohit Sinha & Gitanjali Nataraj, “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Issues & the Way Forward,” The Diplomat, July 30, 2013. Accessed on 15 April, 2014. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/regionalcomprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-issues-and-way-forward/ Also see Miriam Manchin & Annette O. Pelkmans-Balaoing, “Rules of Origin & the Web 77

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in 2012, and continued successfully throughout 2013. The year 2014 saw the fourth and fifth rounds of RCEP negotiations, held in Nanning in China (March-April) and in Singapore (June). The talks are expected to conclude by the end of 2015. The RCEP is a comprehensive attempt to consolidate the region economically, taking into account the EAFTA and CEPEA initiatives, with the difference being that the RCEP does not work along the lines of a pre-determined membership. It is based on open accession, enabling the participation of any ASEAN FTA partner (China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia or New Zealand), whenever they may be ready to join. The arrangement stretches beyond the Asia-Pacific in scope, including nations in Central and South Asia and Oceania. The goal here is to achieve a modern and comprehensive trade agreement among members, in terms of goods, services, investments, economic and technical cooperation, and dispute settlement.79 However, the road ahead is not likely to be easy. Both the TPP and RCEP are, at their most basic, indicators of the balance of power politics at work in the economic arena. One FTA is led by the United States, and the other by China. In terms of technicalities, the RCEP would need to address risks, arising from negotiating with partners at different levels of development and varying national interests. A flexibility clause80 is built into the RCEP framework, and could help break an impasse and protect individual national interests, but could also curtail progress in the name of greater liberalisation. The existing five ASEAN+1 and 23 ratified bilateral FTAs, also create a hurdle for the RCEP. The lack of commonality across FTAs and the varying internal policies of member countries could prove difficult to integrate and consolidate.81

of East Asian Free Trade Agreements,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 4273, July 2007. Accessed on April 15, 2014. Available at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-4273 79 Ibid. 80 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Joint Statement, The First Meeting of the Trade Negotiating Committee, May 10, 2013. Accessed on April 20, 2014. Available at: http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statementcommuniques/item/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-jointstatement-the-first-meeting-of-trade-negotiating-committee 81 Rohit Sinha & Gitanjali Nataraj, “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Issues & The Way Forward,” The Diplomat, July 30, 2013. Accessed on April 15, 2014. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/regionalcomprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-issues-and-way-forward/

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As ambitious as these two FTAs are, they do have potential. Working in tandem, they are mutually-reinforcing parallel tracks for regional integration. Their existence further underscores the centrality of ASEAN in the balance of power politics taking place in the region, as well as the existence of closer political ties and regional stability. 82 Nevertheless, while ASEAN is recognised as having facilitated a number of FTAs for closer economic integration in East Asia, there are many overlapping economic arrangements within the ASEAN region, which could – if not handled properly – gradually erode ASEAN ‘centrality’. However, since both FTAs are in the process of being negotiated, their impact on ASEAN as a regional institution remains to be seen. But it can be said that if ASEAN chooses to play its cards wisely, the arrangement could be beneficial. In the field of security, however, East Asia’s geopolitical and historical baggage, past and present, means that the importance of ASEAN’s centrality cannot be overstated.83 At the moment, ASEAN faces several serious security challenges, including disputes in the South and East China Seas, religious and ethnic violence in Sabah (Northern Malaysia) and Myanmar, and the lingering issue of trans-border haze pollution, which affected Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia in 2013. These crises present a direct challenge to the much-vaunted ‘ASEAN Way’, besides highlighting the fragility of the forum. Apart from intra-state and inter-state politics, ASEAN is also confronted with the return of great power politics to the region. The rise of China and the shift of the United States’ attention to East Asia imply that ASEAN will have to tread a fine line in order to maintain its neutrality, as well as its centrality. The growth of China’s political, military and economic clout in the region has reaffirmed the vital nature of the American presence. Beijing’s recent emphasis on territorial sovereignty has divided the region down the middle, in a way that threatens the already tenuous cohesiveness of ASEAN. Such is Beijing’s economic hold over the region that many of the smaller Southeast Asian countries (Cambodia being a case in point) choose to bandwagon or hedge, rather than take direct sides between China and Washington. However, the American lure of a security umbrella for a region troubled by China’s muscular assertions is too tempting to miss. Member countries of ASEAN realise the need to balance the United States and China. Recent American administrations have made a concerted effort to woo the region. Starting 82

Yang Razali Kassim, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of ASEAN Centrality,” RSIS Commentary 116/2012, 4 July 2012, Singapore. 83 Ibid.

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with the second term of former president George W. Bush and continuing with the current Obama administration, the United States has, among other things, appointed its first ambassador to ASEAN, acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), attended its first East Asia Summit, forged strategic partnerships with Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines and engaged with a newly reforming Myanmar. Under President Obama, the United States has also embarked on its “forward-deployed diplomacy”84 strategy in the region, shown by Hillary Clinton’s attendance at the ASEAN Regional Forum of 2011 and her landmark visit to Myanmar in December 2011. The current Secretary of State, John Kerry, has also envisaged the revival of what he termed the “Pacific Dream”. 85 But issues such as the escalating territorial dispute over the South China Sea have seen individual member countries such as Myanmar and Vietnam actively balancing China and the United States. For ASEAN itself, as a regional institution, this implies trouble. This fact was underlined by Singapore’s Foreign Minister, K. Shanmugam, who warned in 2012, that any American attempt to “contain” China would alienate key Southeast Asian countries and might end up creating “a new reality for the region”.86 This has been reiterated by watchers of the region, such as former Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore, who have argued that ASEAN’s only possible strategy at the moment would be to be “friends with both and adversary to neither.”87 In other words, the ultimate aim would be to “bring the major powers (particularly the US and China) together and embed them in a cooperative framework…thereby reducing the deficit of trust.”88

84

Benjamin Ho, “ASEAN Centrality: Year of Big Power Transitions,” RSIS Commentary 028/2012, February 2012, Singapore. 85 John Kerry, Remarks at the US-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, July 1, 2013. Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/07/211377.htm 86 K. Shanmugam, “New Directions: Singapore Politics and Foreign Policy,” Keynote Opening Speech of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 8, 2012. Taken from: http://csis.org/files/attachments/120208_Shanmugam_speech_singapore.pdf 87 Amb. Tommy Koh, cited in Yang Razali Kassim, “The New Great Game: ASEAN’s Balancing Act,” Fair Observer, March 6, 2012. Available at: http://www.fairobserver.com/article/new-great-game-asean%E2%80%99sbalancing-act 88 Amb. Tommy Koh, cited in Benjamin Ho, “ASEAN Centrality: Year of Big Power Transitions,” RSIS Commentary 028/2012, February 2012, Singapore.

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This will not be easy. Though in theory, all major players in the region acknowledge the importance of ASEAN as a focal point, in practice, its centrality has been regularly called into question in the twenty-first century. Apart from the proliferation of FTA proposals, and the game of great power politics, there has also been a growth in regional security institutions. The United States’ bilateral alliances are becoming increasingly energised, and the Japan–China–Republic of Korea trilateral cooperation framework has been institutionalised. In addition, there has been a desire to establish new frameworks, such as the United States– Japan–China policy framework. The evolution of these other regional institutions may marginalise ASEAN and it may lose its status as the “core” of East Asian regionalism. The key here is to maintain its institutional centrality and, in order to this, ASEAN needs to remain institutionally viable, while preventing both the United States and China from dominating ASEAN-led forums. Cases such as the South China Sea dispute have not failed to put the viability of ASEAN in doubt. The fallout of the dispute also underscores the fragility of ASEAN’s consensus-based method of decision-making, and shows the geopolitical divide between the United States and China in stark relief.

The South China Sea Dispute: ASEAN’s Centrality versus Great Power Politics The South China Sea dispute is at best complicated. There are, fundamentally, two kinds of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The first involves claims of sovereignty over individual land features, based on the countries’ historical presence in the region, their occupation and administration of the islands, as well as maps. The second concerns the size of the maritime zones that can be assigned to the different features.89 Under UNCLOS Article 121, the islands in the South China Sea that are above sea level at high tide and which can support human habitation or independent economic activity are given either an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or a continental shelf, which can extend up to several hundred nautical miles from the coast. Within this designated area, the country with sovereignty over such islands has exclusive rights to the natural resources they contain, such as fish and hydrocarbons. The 89 “Stirring up the South China Sea: Regional Responses,” Asia Report 229, International Crisis Group, July 24, 2012, p. 5.

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claimants to the region are six, namely Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, China, Taiwan and Vietnam. There are overlapping claims to the islands in the region, and to other small geographical features, though the most contentious are the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Pratas Islands, the Macclesfield Bank and the Scarborough Shoal. Governing this is a body of international law that is, at best, incredibly complicated and difficult to interpret. To top it all, the United States’ rebalancing with regard to Asia under the Obama administration has expanded the scope of the dispute, from being purely regional to one that could impact a larger area. The United States is deadlocked with China over the interpretation of international law regarding the balance of coastal states and international rights in EEZs. While it has long been a zone of contention among a number of littoral states in the region, China claims sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea, which is believed to contain large oil and gas deposits, besides straddling key international shipping lanes. The extent and vagueness of China’s claims to the South China Sea, along with its muscular diplomatic posturing, has rattled other claimants. However, China is not alone in stoking tensions. The other claimants, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, are not only forcefully pursuing their claims; they are also enlisting outside allies in the regional dynamics, in particular the United States. In addition, unique historical narratives, as well as domestic political and economic situations, influence how each country responds to China’s actions. As Beijing’s economic and political clout grows, other claimant countries have also been experiencing their own economic and nationalistic growth. With this, comes a greater willingness to assert territorial claims. No wonder, then, that the last two years (20122014) have been particularly vociferous at the regional level, with countries like Vietnam and the Philippines being especially adamant in resisting China’s territorial claims. Therefore, while tensions have mounted between China and the Philippines on the one hand, and China and Vietnam on the other, China and the United States face a deadlock over the issue. The most recent tensions stem from the 2009 joint submission to the United Nations by Vietnam and Malaysia regarding a section of their extended continental shelves in the area. China responded by submitting an objection to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), decrying Vietnamese and Malaysian claims to the area, on the grounds of its own sovereignty. China’s claims are based on the strength of the contentious ‘nine-dash line’ map, which depicts a Ushaped line encompassing the majority of the South China Sea, including most of the Spratly and the Paracel Islands. The map, originally from the

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era of the Kuomintang government in the Republic of China in 1947, is an ambiguous one, and has raised concerns among other regional claimants as to the veracity of China’s “historical rights”. The official line is that China has ownership over the island features, the territorial waters, EEZs and continental shelves within the nine-dash line. In a corollary, China further claims that it holds sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the waters, seabed and subsoil of the region.90 In its claims to the South China Sea, China has resorted to exerting historical and cultural precedents. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in 2012, General Qi Jiangguo of the PLA stated firmly that China would not, under any circumstances, compromise its “national interests”.91 In June 2012, China’s State Council had raised the administrative status of the seas to the level of a city, which it calls Sansha and which is located in the disputed Paracel Islands. This move indicates Beijing’s growing aggressiveness and unilateralism, which clearly go against the spirit of the 2002 DOC (Declaration of Conduct of parties), a multilateral political document agreed upon by the ASEAN and China that calls for resolution of “territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat of force.”92

90

“2012 ⸜2㚰29侭Ể帿埴ἳ埴⃍妨Ṣ㳒䡲♠㖍⢾Ṍ悐” [“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on 29 February 2012”], Chinese Foreign Ministry. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1199309.shtml Also see M. Taylor Fravel, “Clarification of China’s claim?” The Diplomat, March 5, 2012; “Stirring up the South China Sea (I),” Asia Report No. 233, International Crisis Group, April 23, 2012, pp. 3-4. 91 Lt Qi Jiangguo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, People’s Liberation Army, China, “New Trends in Asia-Pacific Security,” Fourth Plenary Session, Shangri-La Dialogue, June 2013. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-ladialogue-2013-c890/fourth-plenary-session-0f17/qi-jianguo-a156 92 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed on November 4, 2002 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia by the Foreign Ministers. Complete Text Available at: http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm

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Source: BBC News (2012)

A statement issued by the US State Department a month later reiterated the statement in the light of the separate incidents of the Scarborough Shoal and the upgrading of the administrative level of Sansha City, on one of the Paracel Islands (known in China as Xisha), from a county to a prefecture and the establishment of a new military garrison there.93 The US statement called for the unity and leadership of ASEAN in resolving the issue, stating that all parties “clarify and pursue their territorial and maritime claims in accordance with international law, particularly the Law of the Sea Convention”.94 China responded with a foreign ministry statement to express “strong dissatisfaction and resolute opposition” to the American statement, reiterating its own “indisputable” sovereignty over the South

93

“South China Sea: Troubled Waters,” The Economist, August 6, 2012. Available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/08/south-china-sea 94 Press Statement, US Department of State, Washington, DC, August 3, 2012. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/196022.htm

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China Sea and adjacent waters.95 The year 2013 ushered in a period when China focused its attention on beefing up its naval muscle. By the end of 2012, China had transferred 11 decommissioned warships, including two destroyers, to the country’s maritime surveillance agency. These included the two Type 051 (Luda I-class) guided missile destroyers– Nanning and Nanjing– as well as surveillance ships, tugs and ice-breakers. Their purpose was to “alleviate the insufficiency of vessels used to protect maritime interests”.96 The move was in line with what appeared to be a direct policy shift with regard to China’s territorial sovereignty claims. In an interview with the Chinese media 97 published on December 29, 2012, Major General Luo Yuan, the deputy secretary general of the China Society of Military Science and a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), made it clear that China’s “self-restraint” might not last much longer. Luo made it clear that though China’s policy prior to 2012 had been one of self-restraint with a focus on common development, none of the countries that the policy was aimed at responded to Beijing’s initiative. Instead, they chose to highlight the disputes by undertaking “unilateral anti-Chinese acts”, such as in the case of the Diaoyu and Senkaku Islands, and the Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island).98 National interest and territorial integrity have become keywords for China as far as disputes in the South and East China Seas are concerned. In June 2014, President Xi Jinping reiterated the point yet again, whilst hosting the leaders of India and Myanmar in Beijing. He used the occasion to outline China’s diplomatic policy: “Sovereignty is the reliable safeguard and fundamental element of national interest. Sovereignty and territorial integrity should not be infringed upon,” Xi said, adding, “This is a hard principle that should not be cast aside at any time.”99 95 Statement by Spokesperson Qin Gang of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, August 4, 2012. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t958226.htm 96 J. Michael Cole, “China’s Maritime Surveillance Fleet Adds Muscle,” The Diplomat, January 3, 2013. Accessed on May 25, 2013. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/chinas-maritime-surveillance-fleet-adds-muscle/ 97 Interview with Luo Yuan, China Youth Daily, December 29, 2012. Accessed on May 25, 2013. Available at: http://military.china.com/important/11132797/20121229/17607986.html 98 Ibid. 99 Teddy Ng, “Xi Jinping Attacks Concept of Global Hegemony, in Dig at United States,” South China Morning Post, June 29, 2014. Available at:

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These were, and still are, troubling signs for the United States. Indeed, the Obama administration has made it very clear that China’s actions in the region are not appreciated. In her remarks to the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2012, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton stated, “…As a Pacific nation and resident power, the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law and unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea. We do not take a position on competing territorial claims over land features there, but we remain intensely focused on conduct involving these claims.” 100 This was reiterated in July 2014 by Michael Fuchs at the Fourth Annual South China Sea Conference, “Some call us ‘outsiders’ and tell us not to intervene in regional issues. But they ignore that for decades, the United States has been a Pacific power, integral to regional peace and stability, and that our interests are directly affected by what happens across the Asia-Pacific.”101 China’s moves in the region are clear signs that it is capable of undermining the American strategic goals as far as East and Southeast Asia are concerned. Far more disturbingly, the dispute has stirred up further rifts between China and smaller Southeast Asian countries in the region, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, and has created several knotty problems for ASEAN. The schisms between China, Vietnam and the Philippines are elaborated upon to gain a clearer perspective of just how easily bilateral tensions can throw ASEAN off course.

China and Vietnam China and Hanoi have already fought twice over disputed islands, in 1974 and 1988, resulting in China’s occupation of the Paracel Islands. This legacy of conflict has raised the stakes and increased the political and emotional sensitivity of the issue in both countries. 102 While generally http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1542702/xi-jinping-attacks-conceptglobal-hegemony-dig-united-states 100 Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Remarks to the ASEAN Regional Forum, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, July 12, 2012. Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/07/194987.htm 101 Michael Fuchs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Remarks at the Fourth Annual South China Sea Conference,” CSIS, Washington, DC, July 11, 2014. 102 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea: Regional Responses,” Asia Report, No. 229, July 2012.

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prevalent in territorial disputes, nationalist sentiments in Vietnam run particularly high in its disputes with China and put pressure on the government to stand up to Beijing.103 Yet the benefits of maintaining an economic relationship with China have been too enticing for Hanoi to ignore. Over the last three decades, Vietnam has balanced its nationalism in politics with its need to maintain potent economic relations with its large neighbour. Economic ties with the ASEAN region and the United States notwithstanding, Beijing’s influence in Vietnamese economics has been huge, from granting preferential loans and trade deals to boosting Hanoi’s industrial and agricultural sectors.104 However, in the twenty-first century, things have changed. China and Vietnam share a rather large trade deficit, and an even larger trust deficit. Economically speaking, the statistics are promising, despite the imbalance in trade relations. 105 The import-export average growth rate is 33.95%. China remained Vietnam’s largest trade partner in 2013, with a total turnover reaching US$ 50.21 billion, up 22% year-on-year, according to statistics from Vietnam Customs.106 Bilateral trade turnover is expected to reach US $60 billion in 2015, though in strictly geopolitical terms, a peculiarly action-reaction regional dynamic exists between the two countries, playing a major role in heightening tensions between them. Since 2009, when tensions flared up, following all claimants’ submissions of claims in the South China Sea to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Vietnam has been especially assertive. However, Hanoi has carefully managed its diplomatic 103

Justin Ho Cheng Lun, “Sino-Vietnamese Tensions in the South China Sea,” East Asia Forum, December 15, 2012. Accessed on December 27, 2012. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/12/15/sino-vietnamese-tensions-in-the-southchina-sea/ 104 International Crisis Group, “Stirring Up the South China Sea: Regional Responses,” Asia Report No. 229, July 24, 2012. 105 Vietnam’s trade deficit with China in 2013 stood at around US$23.7 billion in 2013 – an increase of 44.5 percent compared to 2012. Specifically, in 2013, Vietnam spent US$ 36.95 billion on imports from China, while it transported some US$ 13.26 billion worth of goods to China. During the same period, imports from China accounted for 28 per cent of Vietnam’s total import value, while exports to China accounted for 10 per cent of the total export value. 106 “China Remains Vietnam’s Biggest Trade Partner in 2013,” China Daily, Xinhua News Agency, January 29, 2014. Accessed on February 16, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/chinadata/2014-01/29/con tent_17264283.htm

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ties with China to prevent the sovereignty disputes from affecting bilateral relations. This has not been an easy task, especially since historical precedent has governed much of how Vietnam views the South China Sea dispute. China’s and Vietnam’s South China Sea claims overlap the most, and they claim more of the sea than any other country, so each side views the other as its primary competitor. Tensions between the two over the South China Sea were particularly high from 2009 through mid-2011. In response to Vietnam and Malaysia’s joint submission of their territorial claims in the South China Sea to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in May 2009, China submitted its nine-dashed line map, in which two dashes cut through Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The map renewed fears in Vietnam and other claimant states that China intended to claim not just the island features, but all of the waters inside the nine-dashed line. Adding to these fears were two incidents at sea that supported Vietnamese perceptions of Chinese hostility. In May 2011, a Chinese marine surveillance ship cut the cable of an oil and gas survey vessel operated by Vietnam’s state-owned energy firm, PetroVietnam, in Vietnamese waters. The next month, a Chinese fishing boat cut the cable of a Vietnamese seismic survey vessel, ramping up the diplomatic dispute between the two countries and fuelling nationalist demonstrations in Vietnam. In June 2012, Vietnam’s National Assembly passed a new maritime law that included a clear statement of Vietnamese sovereignty over insular features of the South China Sea. This action was highly provocative to China, whose subsequent release of oil concession blocks off the coast of Vietnam and recent moves to establish Sansha City and a military garrison in the Paracels were responses to this Vietnamese provocation. The year 2013 also saw the escalation of tensions between the two countries as Vietnam accused Chinese vessels in the South China Sea of firing at a Vietnamese fishing boat, off the Paracel Islands. In the face of China’s growing naval presence, Hanoi has stepped up military modernisation by increasing its own defence budget, purchasing military equipment from Russia and tentatively enhancing defence ties with the U.S. In 2013, despite agreeing to enhance cooperation with China in several areas, Vietnam received the first of six advanced submarines from Russia. The Varshavyanka class (Project 636M) diesel-electric submarines boast the use of advanced stealth technology, extended combat range, and the ability to strike land, surface and underwater targets. The procurement of the kiloclass submarines, in combination with the addition Su-30 fighter aircraft

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also purchased from Russia,107 point to Hanoi’s focus on beefing up its military muscle, and ramping up its anti-access capabilities in the South China Sea. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2013, Prime Minster Dung of Vietnam gave a keynote speech which highlighted the need for ‘strategic trust’ in the region. Indeed, one particular line in his address was especially revealing: “To build strategic trust, we need to abide ourselves by international law, uphold the responsibilities of nations, especially of major powers, and improve the efficiency of multilateral security cooperation mechanisms.”108 In this spirit, Vietnam also turned to ASEAN and the US to “internationalise” the dispute.109 This was an effective tactic. The United States capitalised on Vietnam’s evident need of an ally in the region, with President Obama announcing a comprehensive partnership between the two countries in July 2013. 110 This was followed in December by the announcement of an US$ 18 million maritime assistance package to Vietnam, including the purchase of five new boats for the Vietnamese Coastguard.111 Since then, China has abandoned what has been termed by observers of the region as its “small-stick diplomacy,”112 instead taking a more aggressive route to conveying its dominance over the region. In May 107

Vietnam has purchased 12 of these planes, which will be delivered in three batches of four planes throughout 2014-2015. 108 Prime Minister Dung, Keynote Speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Singapore, June 2013. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-ladialogue-2013-c890/opening-remarks-and-keynote-address-2f46/keynote-addressd176 109 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea: Regional Responses,” Asia Report, No. 229, July 2012. 110 “Remarks by President Obama & President Truong Tan Sang of Vietnam after Bilateral Meeting,” Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington, DC, July 25, 2013. Accessed on April 24, 2014. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/25/remarks-president-obamaand-president-truong-tan-sang-vietnam-after-bilateral-meeting 111 “Joint Press Availability with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh,” US Department of State, The White House, Washington, DC, December 16, 2013. Accessed on April 24, 2014. Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218747.htm 112 James R. Holmes, “China Abandons Small-Stick Diplomacy,” The Diplomat, May 10, 2014. Available at: http://www.thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinaabandons-small-stick-diplomacy/

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2014, the Chinese state-owned oil and gas firm CNOOC positioned an oil rig, Haiyang Shiyou-981, in waters claimed by both China and Hanoi. In response, Vietnam sent ships to the area, prompting a skirmish which led to six Vietnamese soldiers being injured. Beijing’s response to the crisis was that China was “deeply surprised and shocked” by the “intensive disruptions of a Chinese company’s normal oil drilling in waters administered by China.”113 Vietnam’s actions “seriously violated China’s sovereignty, rights and jurisdiction,”114 added Xinhua. Despite Beijing’s pious response to this fresh crisis, Hanoi persevered in its claims fiercely and tenaciously, with its foreign ministry releasing a statement which read, “Vietnam has again confirmed that the area where Haiyang Shiyou-981 has operated since early May belongs to Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf. Operations of the rig and escort ships of China over the past two months in the area are totally illegal, infringing regulations of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS.”115By July 2014, China had withdrawn the controversial oil rig from Vietnam’s EEZ and Continental shelf, on the pretext that it wished to avoid the onslaught of typhoon Rammasun that was blowing in through the South China Sea. China’s decision to go ahead with the positioning of the oil rig, especially after Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Hanoi last year, when he promised to promote bilateral cooperation, is puzzling. It also runs counter to President Xi Jinping’s widely proclaimed policy of maintaining regional peace and stability. These on-again, off-again tensions promise to add a whole new dimension to multilateral politics in the region, as well as to the balance of power between the United States and China.

China and the Philippines China’s occupation of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in late 1994 was an event that significantly shaped Philippine thinking on the South China Sea, particularly after Manila discovered Chinese-built structures on 113

“China requires Vietnam to stop any form of disruptions of Chinese company’s operations,” Xinhua, May 8, 2014. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/09/c_126478766.htm 114 Ibid. 115 Statement by Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Le Hai Binh, May 5, 2014. Quoted from “China Withdraws Oil Rig from Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone,” The Economic Times, July 22, 2014. Available at: http://www.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/internation/world-news/chinawithdraws-oil-rig-from-vietnams-exclusive-economiczone/articleshow/388845435.htm

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the reef in 1995. It caused serious antagonism between the two countries at the time, especially since the structures were later expanded and fortified. The year 2011 saw the heightening of geopolitical tensions between China and the Philippines over prospecting for hydrocarbons in the disputed area. China responded by increasing the presence of its vessels in the area surrounding the Paracel and Spratly Islands. This resulted in a standoff between the Philippines and China in early March 2011, when a Philippine vessel conducting a seismic survey in natural gas-rich Reed Bank was approached by two Chinese marine surveillance ships that moved aggressively to force it to leave the area.116 The Reed Bank incident was one of the first in a series between Chinese and Philippine vessels in 2011. In response, the Aquino government began to intensify diplomatic efforts, accelerate military procurement and refer to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea” in all official communications. President Aquino declared in July 2011 that “what is ours is ours” in reference to the Reed Bank.117 This declaration has set the tone for the Philippines’ efforts to exercise its sovereign rights, including enforcement of its fisheries code and oil and gas exploration, within its EEZ. Since April 2012, the Scarborough Shoal has been the source of a standoff between government vessels of the Philippines and China. It is a large atoll surrounded by a reef with a lagoon that stretches for approximately 150 kilometres. It is valuable because the lagoon and the surrounding waters are rich in fish and other marine life which have been exploited by fishing vessels from both China and the Philippines for decades. The Scarborough Shoal is located 124 nautical miles (nm) from the Zambalies Province in the Philippines and 472 nm from the coast of China. It is within the 200 nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claimed by the Philippines from its main archipelago. This is a classic case of a territorial sovereignty dispute. The Philippines asserts that it has exercised effective occupation and effective jurisdiction over the Shoal since independence in 1946. To reinforce this claim, it points out that it built a lighthouse on the Shoal in 1965 and that it has conducted surveys and research in the waters surrounding the Shoal. China asserts that Scarborough Shoal and its adjacent waters have been Chinese territory for generations and that it discovered the Shoal, incorporated it into its territory and exercised jurisdiction over it. Further, 116

Ian Storey, “Trouble and Strife in the South China Sea Part II: The Philippines and China,” China Brief, Vol. 8, No. 9, Jamestown Foundation, April 28, 2008. 117 President Benigno Aquino III, State of the Nation Address, July 25, 2011. Official English Translation Available at: www.gov.ph/2011/07/25/benigno-saquino-iii-second-state-of-the-nation-addressjuly-25-2011-en/

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China also claims that the Shoal is included in the Zhongsha Islands, one of the four archipelagos inside China’s infamous nine-dash line map to which it has historical claims of sovereignty. Beijing’s argument here is that the Philippines never disputed Chinese jurisdiction until 1979. In 2012, bilateral relations plummeted with a standoff that began in April 2012. Manila dispatched its largest warship to investigate the sighting of Chinese fishing boats, which prompted China to deploy marine surveillance vessels to prevent the arrest of its fishermen. 118 When the warship was replaced by Coast Guard ships, vessels from both sides engaged in a two-month standoff, with repeated efforts to soothe the situation failing and bilateral economic relations have been hit as a result. The standoff was supposed to end in June 2012, when both sides pulled back their vessels, but soon after that, Chinese boats were spotted again in the Shoal. The incident tested the Philippines’ own stand on territorial sovereignty versus national interest. Though President Aquino had pledged to send the Filipino Coast Guard right back to the Shoal if there was another incursion, some within the country also voiced concerns over negative repercussions in the domestic economy.119 In mid-May, Foreign Secretary Del Rosario called on business leaders to “take a position of patriotism that what is ours is ours and we will stand for it. It is possible that everyone will need to make a sacrifice.”120 Despite this bravado, and the fact that both sides have agreed to boost bilateral trade to US$ 60 billion by 2016, it does not seem likely that the Philippines will sacrifice its territorial claims for an economic relationship with China. Nevertheless, Manila has made all the right moves since 2012. It has engaged in bilateral discussions with China; it has appealed to ASEAN; it has assessed its options under UNCLOS; it has also, albeit unsuccessfully, appealed to the United States for a guarantee of assistance in case China uses force. In March 2014, the Aquino government went to the United Nations, with Manila submitting nearly 4,000 pages in arguments calling for the Permanent Court of Arbitration to restrain China’s grab for 118

Trefor Moss, “China’s not-so-hard Power Strategy,” The Diplomat, June 28, 2012. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2012/06/chinas-not-so-hard-powerstrategy/ 119 “Palace: Chinese still buys Philippine bananas,” Sun Star, May 27, 2012. Available at: http://www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/local-news/2012/05/27/palacechinese-still-buys-philippine-bananas-223709 Also see “In Philippines, Banana Growers Feel Effect of South China Sea Dispute,” The Washington Post, June 11, 2012. 120 “DFA Chief Calls for Patriotism,” The Philippine Star, May 17, 2012. Available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/807416/dfa-chief-calls-patriotism

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territory in the West Philippine Sea. “It is about defending what is legitimately ours,” Foreign Affairs Secretary Del Rosario said at a briefing in Manila, “It is about guaranteeing freedom of navigation for all nations. It is about helping preserve regional peace, security and stability.”121 This latest attempt to curb China’s moves in the region comes as Manila is negotiating a defence pact with the United States which would let United States boost its troop’s presence in the Philippines and build facilities inside military bases there. It also came a day after Chinese vessels ordered a civilian Philippine vessel away from Ayungin Shoal, in waters disputed by both Manila and Beijing. Indeed, tit-for-tat moves between the two countries has continued throughout much of 2014, from February, with the latest being the capture of a Chinese fishing boat, along with its crew, off Half Moon Shoal in the Spratly Islands. In June, news122 came that China was building artificial islands in the South China Sea, near the Spratly Islands, which it calls Nansha. Manila immediately called for all claimant states in the region to halt any construction activities that might raise tensions. There is some difficulty with China’s argument that it has sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal based on the inclusion of the Shoal within China’s historic claim to Zhongsha Islands, otherwise known as Macclesfield Bank. First, Scarborough Shoal is geographically at a considerable distance from Macclesfield Bank. Second, under international law, Macclesfield Bank may not be subject to a claim of sovereignty because it is completely submerged. As claims to maritime zones can only be based from land or from islands, it would not be easy for China to argue that Scarborough Shoal falls within any maritime zone claimed from Macclesfield Bank. More than at any other time, the ongoing dispute has done serious damage to ASEAN’s claims of being able to handle important regional issues and to act as a driver for regional integration. This is not surprising. The ASEAN’s track record as a mediator in conflict resolution is not a brilliant one. However, currently, the decision making process is hampered by emerging divisions in the region, as countries begin to hedge their bets in 121

Joel Guinto and Norman P. Aquino, “Philippines Sues China to Assert Claim Over Gas-rich Waters,” Bloomberg Business Week, March 30, 2014. Available at: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-03-29/philippines-calls-china-threat-tosecurity-over-isles-squabble 122 Joel Guinto, “China Builds Artificial Islands in South China Sea,” Bloomberg Business Week, June 19 2014. Available at: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-06-19/china-builds-artificial-islands-insouth-china-sea

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the game of power politics. The major regional player in this instance is, of course, China. With China drawing closer to countries like Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, other countries like the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei have been somewhat alienated, leaving a vacuum which the United States has been quick to fill. In particular, Cambodia’s economic dependence on China for aid and investment made its chairmanship of the ASEAN in 2012 a tricky one. Bilateral trade between Cambodia and China is expected to double between 2012 and 2017 to US$5 billion, while China is also now the largest aid donor to Cambodia.123 In July 2012, the summit of foreign ministers of ASEAN in Phnom Penh ended amid tense disagreement over how to address territorial claims in the sea. The United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, who attended the talks, pressed for the discussion of a multinational agreement to ease tensions – a move opposed by China, which prefers to negotiate with each nation separately. Meanwhile, the Southeast Asian nations argued over how hard to press the Chinese, with countries such as Cambodia resisting any steps that would embarrass China, and the Philippines pushing for a harder line. The resulting clash of interests resulted in the inability to decide even the language for the concluding communiqué, which is issued at the end of such summits and is used as the final record of events. The split also laid bare the deepening inter-state rifts between member countries of ASEAN as far as China is concerned, and also shrouded the famous ‘ASEAN Way’ in doubt. Right after the ASEAN Summit in 2012, for example, the Cambodian ambassador to the Philippines was sent packing by Manila, after he accused Manila and Hanoi of playing “dirty” in their attempts to put the South China Sea on ASEAN’s agenda. A failure on this scale was “unprecedented” 124 in ASEAN’s 45-year history, said ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, who went on to 123 Joshua Kurlantzick, “South China Sea: From Bad to Worse,” Council for Foreign Relations, July 24, 2012. Accessed on August 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-bad-worse/p28739 China has since pledged another US$ 548 million in aid to Cambodia for infrastructure and irrigation systems. In April 2013, agreements covering US$ 500 million in soft loans and US$ 48 million in grants were signed when Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen visited China and met Premier Li Keqiang. 124 Cited in Patrick Barta, “ASEAN Summit Breaks down over South China Sea Disputes,” The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2012. Accessed on November 29, 2012. Available at:

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outline the need for ASEAN to “consolidate and coordinate positions if it wants to take on the global community”. 125 In fact, the failure of the Phnom Penh Summit signalled the failure to resolve not only the South China Sea dispute, but also other measures that were on the agenda at the summit, such as the proposal for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) which is scheduled to come into existence in 2015. It is now unlikely that the AEC will either start on time, or even be effective. Apart from having a severe regional impact, the failure of the talks in Phnom Penh was in many ways also a setback for the United States, which has long tried to fortify ASEAN as a regional bloc able to present a unified front against expanding Chinese influence. The United States’ announcement of US$50 million in fresh funding for the Lower Mekong Initiative, a three year old project to provide financial and technical support to countries along the Mekong River, was seen as an attempt to reassert the United States’ role in the region.126 In fact the United States’ efforts to strengthen ASEAN unity appeared to backfire at the summit, after the United States repeatedly called on China to join ASEAN leaders for South China Sea talks, only for the talks themselves to fall apart due to internal ASEAN squabbling. The ASEAN’s centrality in the matter of regional cooperation is touted by every player involved in East Asia, from China to the United States. Nevertheless, while economic regionalisation highlights the fact that ASEAN is, as a forum, at the heart of proposals for any FTA to be set up in the region, security regionalism is another story altogether. There, the danger is that ASEAN’s centrality may be led astray by the vagaries of great power politics. The varying reactions from leaders across the region underscore this fact. For example, in November 2012, Premier Wen Jiabao of China stated, “We do not want to give over emphasis to the territorial disputes and differences, and we don’t think it’s a good idea to spread a sense of tension in the region”.127 Reading between the lines, not only does China

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303919504577524133983292716 .html 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. 127 “China Values South China Peace, Stability,” China News, SINA, November 21, 2012. Accessed on December 23, 2012. Available at: http://english.sina.com/china/2012/1120/528895.html

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wish to avoid internationalising the issue, it is also keen that no supranational body– in this case ASEAN– should take decisions regarding matters of its territorial national sovereignty, which is the prism through which it views the South China Sea region. Another example is that of Philippine President Aquino, who lodged a formal protest against Cambodia, arguing that the Philippines have “the inherent right to defend its national interests when deemed necessary”.128 Hanoi’s standpoint is much the same as that of Manila, thereby adding another complex layer to what is already a rather volatile situation. Nevertheless, what may be concluded from the spectrum of varied reactions resulting from the Phnom Penh Summit is that ASEAN members attach a greater price tag to their sovereign, individual and national interests, than to multilateral or regional interests. Bilateral agreements saw a greater role in the ASEAN Summit of 2012, with key disputed documents such as the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea remaining undiscussed. Therefore, till today, the Declaration remains a rubber stamp without any legal binding force, freeing nations of any obligations. In September 2013, attempts were made again to discuss the possibility of a Code of Conduct. A series of high level ASEAN meetings culminated in Suzhou, China on September 15, 2013, ending positively– according to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs –with an agreement to seek “gradual progress and consensus through consultations”. 129 Several other measures that could hopefully pave the way for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea were set in motion during these meetings, namely the 6th China-ASEAN Senior Officials’ Meeting and the 9th Joint Working Group Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. In what was clearly an attempt to beguile ASEAN members with its commitment to the geopolitical arena, China proposed a maritime emergency helpline between itself and ASEAN member countries, as well as a joint maritime search and rescue sandbox. A working plan for implementing the Declaration of Conduct (DoC) from 2013 to 2014 was

128 Ellen A. Quismorio, “Philippines to Defend its National Interests,” Manila Bulletin Newspaper, November 19, 2012. Accessed on December 23, 2012. Available at: http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/382212/ph-to-defend-national-inter ests#.UNrwouT5ySo 129 Deep Pal, “A Code of Conduct for the South China Sea?”The Diplomat, September 25, 2013. Available at: http://www.thediplomat.com/2013/09/a-codeof-conduct-for-the-south-china-sea/

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approved at the meetings.130 However, as yet, the agreement exists only on paper with no deadlines or details about the joint working group that would carry out the task, if it comes into existence. This being said, the latest ASEAN Summit, held in Naypidaw in Myanmar in 2014, showed faint signs of hope. Coming on the heels of an American call to “freeze” provocative acts in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, the joint communiqué issued by the ASEAN foreign ministers on August 10, 2014 was a sign that claimants and non-claimants alike were putting aside hardline stances, in order to keep ASEAN together at the helm of regional affairs. The communiqué rebuffed the United States overtures as well as China’s proposed joint statement on progress moves that were wholly supported by Myanmar, ASEAN’s chair for this summit, and peace-broker Thailand. The ASEAN and China, meanwhile, agreed to cooperate on three important issues: (i) need to speed up ongoing negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea; (ii) in the new round of meetings at the working group, scheduled for mid-October 2014 in Bangkok, the two sides agreed to set up a joint eminent and expert group to identify related commonalities and work on a suitable draft for a Code of Conduct (CoC); and (iii) ASEAN and China also agreed to intensify consultation on measures to implement the DoC, aimed at an “early harvest” for negotiating efforts for a CoC. In a significant departure from the disastrous way Cambodia handled the ASEAN Summit in 2012, the regional forum insisted on mentioning the latest tensions in the Paracel Islands in March 2014, rather than sweeping the incident under the carpet. Given the immense flux in the region, national interests have often come in the way of regional interests. The ASEAN is torn between maintaining its centrality and balancing two great powers. So far, the adage that trying to please everybody pleases nobody has held true. This raises several questions. What is the status of the regional discourses of the great powers in question? Can ASEAN act as a competitive or cooperative arena for the United States and China? Are the regional discourses connecting or colliding? Can great power politics divert the course of regionalism vis-àvis the United States and China?

130

“China to Promote Maritime Cooperation with ASEAN Countries,” People’s Daily, September 16, 2013. Available at: http://english.people.com.cn/90883/8401271.html

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ASEAN: Platform for Cooperation or Conflict? The ASEAN was set up as a multilateral forum, with the aim of promoting cooperation among its members. However, while economically it has succeeded in some measure, its report card in terms of geopolitical security is not a good one. With the rise of China against the embedded power of the United States in the region, great power politics is playing havoc with the notion of regional security governance. The obstacle here lies in China’s obstinate refusal to participate in finding a multilateral solution to a multilateral dispute. Beijing’s standpoint on the issue has never really changed. It has always insisted on bilateral negotiations with individual Southeast Asian countries. In fact, the Chinese government holds that “major regional security issues related to territorial dispute are best handled by bilateral negotiations rather than by multilateral means”. 131 This position has been well summed up by Abanti Bhattacharya, “Though China accords multilateralism a more central place in Chinese foreign policy, it however subordinates it to the principle of sovereignty”. 132 In other words, the resolution of the South China Sea dispute has been crippled from the beginning on account of China’s limited multilateralism and its strong emphasis on the principle of national sovereignty. To add to the present crisis, China has unilaterally gone ahead and laid claim to almost the whole of the South China Sea. This has clearly rendered China’s multilateralism redundant in foreign policy formulation.133 It has also thrown ASEAN’s role as a platform for regional cooperation in severe doubt, and has subordinated an East Asian regional discourse to the whims of foreign policy. This is in direct contrast to the United States regional discourse, which propagates a multilateral approach towards both geopolitics and economics. The United States has never changed its attitude towards a system of bilateral alliances with smaller Southeast and East Asian states, but it has always preferred a multilateral system of regional cooperation. For example, while President Obama openly asserted that, in case of a war in the South China Sea, the United States would stand with Japan, he was careful to make it clear that this was no change in policy, nor was it a 131

Abanti Bhattacharya, “South China Sea Dispute: The Farce of Chinese Multilateralism,” IDSA Commentary, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, July 31, 2012. Accessed on November 14, 2012. Available at: http://idsa.in/idsacomments/SouthChinaSeaDispute_AbantiBhattacharya_310712 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid.

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particularly confrontationist attitude,134 only an application of the terms of a United States-Japan security treaty which was already in place. In July 2014, the United States Department of State made it clear that “strengthening regional institutions…is one of the most consequential undertakings in terms of American interests”. 135 The State Department also called for a renewed emphasis on ASEAN-centric institutions, like the EAS and the ARF, in which to discuss and resolve political and security issues.136 The disputes that are rendering the geopolitical scenario so volatile make it clear that the East and Southeast Asian region is crisscrossed with layers of historical precedence, national interests and territorial sovereignty. Each Southeast Asian country has bilateral relations that are framed in the context of these three aspects. Their ties with a country such as China are often viewed through these three prisms. With the entry of the United States in the region following the Second World War, it is now difficult to conclude anything apart from the fact that the United States is an entrenched power in the region. As China rises geopolitically and economically, its regional discourse has often conflicted with that of the United States. With regard to key regional issues like that of the South China Sea, China prefers to act bilaterally, while acting multilaterally in the case of economic or trade agreements. On the other hand, the United States, and some of its allies in the region such as Vietnam, has propagated a multilateral approach to both geopolitical and economic problems. The end is essentially the same, namely to safeguard national interests in the area. The means chosen by both the countries in question– namely the United States and China – is different; that is, multilateral versus bilateral. In this context, ASEAN is a platform on which two regional discourses with essentially the same objective interact. This naturally leads to an impasse insecurity regionalism while, going by facts and figures, a flourishing trend in economic regionalisation may be seen between the two countries.

134

“Obama Reaffirms US-Japan Defense Commitment,” Voice of America, April 25, 2014. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-reaffirms-usjapan-defense-commitment/1900046.html 135 Daniel R. Russell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Speech at the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, July 28, 2014. Available at: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/07/229872.htm 136 Ibid.

CHAPTER FIVE REGIONALISM VERSUS GREAT POWER POLITICS: THE FUTURE OF THE EAST ASIAN REGIONAL ORDER

While the termination of the Cold War ended some conflicts and localised others in various parts of the world, the same cannot be said about East Asia. In fact, the post-Cold War scenario in the region has been marked by the rise of China, and mounting nationalism in countries like Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Several analysts have therefore projected this as the emergence of a region in flux, where regional rivalry, great power politics and localised conflict will be prevalent. The events of recent years have turned these projections towards reality. Of late, the regional security environment in East Asia has begun to change considerably, ushering in an era of “power shifts”. 1 Much of the transitions of power stem from a resurgence of economic development among the East Asian regional players. For example, in 2011, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest economy, expected now to overtake the United States in 2020. Countries like India and South Korea have also begun to accelerate in terms of economic growth. Power transitions, driven by economic resurgence, have led to instability in the strategic landscape as well, throwing up a number of security challenges that confront the region. To name just one, the rapid pace of military modernisation and expansion among the region’s countries has been unprecedented. The Chinese defence budget, for instance, is now the second highest in the world, while many other East Asian countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore have considerably increased their investment in 1

Takeshi Yuzawa, “The Roles of Regional Security Institutions in the Era of Power Shift: The Implications for Japan-China Relations,” The Tokyo Foundation, August 29, 2012. Available at: http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/topics/japanchina-next-generation-dialogue/roles-of-regional-security-institutions-in-the-eraof-power-shift/

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defence. Given the simmering historical animosities in the region, it is no wonder that nearly all these countries are still concentrating on beefing up their maritime muscle. Broadly speaking, the strategic landscape in East and Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War era has been dominated by three trends: (i) the preponderance of the United States and its hub-and-spoke system of bilateral alliances; (ii) China’s political, economic and military rise; and (iii) the proliferation of multilateral regional platforms, dialogues and other mechanisms, mostly centring on ASEAN. Geopolitical hotspots in the region, primarily in the East and South China Seas, have also been active, fuelled by regional perceptions of an aggressively rising China, and its subsequent friction with Japan, the United States and smaller Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam and the Philippines. Against this background, the United States has, under President Obama, reinvigorated its presence in the region, using its system of bilateral alliances for leverage. The changing balance of power in East Asia has thus placed the security order under great pressure. Economically speaking, the region is one of the most dynamic in the world. It houses China, which has emerged as the biggest regional economy and the second largest global economy. The members of ASEAN also constitute a major economic powerhouse. A number of multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements have mushroomed over the years, centred on ASEAN and driven by China. Nevertheless, the geopolitics of the region is a little more complex. For example, the rise of China can be interpreted as both a boon and a challenge. While it is undoubtedly a huge economic driver for the region, China’s economic growth is highly dependent on overseas markets for energy and other resources. This makes maritime communication and navigation, running right through the South China Sea, incredibly important for China. Consequently, as China’s economic and political clout rises, it is focusing on developing the Indo-Pacific littoral along its coastal borders, in order to protect what it calls its “national interests”. This entails beefing up its military and naval muscle, and the development of a watertight A2/AD (area-access/area-denial) capability, as a deterrent to compensate for any weaknesses that the PLA Navy might possess. Not unnaturally, this has alarmed the United States, which is concentrating on breathing fresh air into its entrenched presence in East Asia and the AsiaPacific. This also underscores the possibility of friction between a rising power and a status-quo power and between a nascent maritime power and an established maritime power.

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China’s rise, particularly under the Xi Jinping administration, has been marked by an upsurge in nationalism. The narrative of the ‘China Dream’ will probably become a classic example of this debate. In fact, it lays emphasis on the rise of China after 170 years of humiliation, clearly presenting a Chinese alternative to United States hegemony – directed not so much at the world, but at East and Southeast Asia. Calling this situation ‘Sinocentric’ would not be far off the mark, though it is not new – the tianxia discourse of olden times placed China at the centre of its cosmology . However, its significance and challenge to the East Asian security order lies in its presentation by President Xi Jinping and the new Chinese leadership as an alternative to the existing United States power. A palliative to this new and rather harsh projection of Chinese power in the region was provided by Chinese President Xi Jinping, who proposed a new model of great power relations at the Sunnylands Summit held in the Annenberg Estate in California in June 2013, wherein the first and foremost point is to avoid the kind of violent collision between rising and status quo powers that led to two world wars in the last century. According to the idea behind this model, China would like to cooperate, wherever possible, with the United States in solving problems in Asia. There are, however, several other points in President Xi’s theory that have not gone down quite so well with the United States. For example, he harked back to Hu Jintao’s insistence that the United States respect China’s “core interests”. This is not palatable to President Obama, who seeks to use universal norms such as rule of law and just governance to guide the building of an East Asian community. China’s unilateral action in the East and South China Seas, based on claims of historical precedence, is not in accordance with United States ideals. What is more, the United States’ strategy of ‘rebalancing’ in East Asia has not gone down well with Chinese elites who feel it is allying with Japan when it comes to the China–Japan discord. They also point to the American intransigence and hostility towards North Korea during the recent tensions on the Korean peninsula. 2 In other words, since the United States is making such concerted attempts to dominate the region at the expense of China, the latter has had no option but to strengthen its national power.3

2

Wang Jisi, “How is a New Model of Great Power Relations Possible?” The Asan Forum, July 19, 2013. Available at: http://www.theasanforum.org/views-on-whatshould-come-next-after-the-obama-xi-summit-and-other-introductory-summits-in2013/ 3 Ibid.

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This is not only a marked shift away from the previous Chinese administrations’ theories of ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘harmonious world’, but is a direct attempt to establish an East Asian region led by China. William Callahan, in a lecture on ‘Nationalism and Diplomacy’ in 2013, has summed it up thus: “In this vision of expanding Chinese political and economic influence in Asia, shared beliefs and norms of mutual cooperation, traditional Sino-centric ideals of governance…are all emphasised.”4 This strongly nationalist element in the Chinese regional discourse on East Asia has only deepened the widening geopolitical rifts across the region, most notably in the East and the South China Seas. China not only sees the United States as a threat, but also views its allies, like the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan, with great suspicion. It is the United States’ hand that most Chinese elites detect behind the recent tension in the East and South China Seas, arguing that the return of the United States to East Asia has emboldened countries like the Philippines, and Japan.5 The hub-and-spoke bilateral alliance system is seen by many Chinese observers as a relic of the Cold War, “in which seeking communication and cooperation far precedes resorting to confrontation and conflict”.6 A security perception survey conducted in 2013 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace showed that the majority of the Chinese elite interviewed found the United States to be the root cause of all tensions in the region. In January 2014, Xinhua published an editorial which called for the Obama administration to recognise the fact that the “pivoting, or rebalancing, is not working well and needs to be updated”.7 The editorial tore into the United States pivot strategy, claiming that it was rooted in the “firm determination to guarantee that US hegemony and security interests remain unchallenged”.8 The United States had also “actively thrust itself into regional maritime disputes between China and countries like Japan and the Philippines, portraying itself as a neutral party, but actually siding with its allies,”9 the only solution being that the United States must “revisit 4

William A. Callahan, “Nationalism and Diplomacy,” Critical Issues Seminar Series: Summary of Talk, November 6, 2013. 5 Ibid. 6 Deng Yushan, “Build Trust To Avert Tragedy,” Xinhua, May 7, 2012. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-05/07/c_131573482.htm 7 “Time for the US to revisit ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy,” Xinhua, January 29, 2014. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/voices/2014/01-29/99291.shtml 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid.

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its pivot policy, stop its mess-making allies and play its due responsible role in the region.” 10 The editorial is representative of a fairly wideranging section of Chinese elites who see the United States’ moves in East Asia, particularly in the East and South China Seas, as part of a wider desire to “cage” 11 China and fanning the flames of what they call a “fabricated China threat theory”.12 These elites see the United States as projecting a dual face to the world, such that, “While the outer layer of Washington’s logic indicates an adaptable and farsighted global colossus, the inner layer betrays a sclerotic and myopic super-power trapped by recent history in a confrontational mindset and blinded by outmoded realism to China’s peaceful orientation.”13 Debates such as these in Chinese regional discourse cover five main issues:14 -

Broad regional strategy and United States–China relations United States defence doctrine and policies (especially the Air-Sea Battle Concept, or ASBC) The United States military presence in Asia (including basing, deployments, and exercises) United States policy toward the South China Sea territorial disputes, and The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative

This was clear at the Shangri-La Dialogue held in June 2014, in Singapore, where China came down heavily on both Japan and the Philippines over their actions in the East and South China Seas respectively. At the Dialogue, China lamented the bilateral “trust deficit” 15 that had arisen

10

Ibid. “Dynamic Asia needs US to Reshape Anachronistic Policy,” Xinhua, April 23, 2014. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/voices/2014/04-23/110729.shtml 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 See Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the US Pacific Pivot,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 38, November 2013. Also see “USChina Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & China Strategic Culture Promotion Association, 2013. For electronic copies of this report, visit: CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs 15 “Top Chinese Diplomat Slams Abe at Singapore Summit,” The Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2014. Available at: 11

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between itself and the East Asian countries, and argued that President Xi Jinping’s new “Asian security concept” was focused on “coordination, cooperation, political sustainability, and commonness.” 16 However, a Global Times editorial was not so politically correct, stating, “China…has the right to safeguard its sovereignty. Meanwhile, any country that confronts China has to bear the consequences.”17 Nationalism in Chinese diplomacy and great power frictions form the root cause behind the tensions that currently pervade the region, as well as the simultaneous shift and strain in regional geopolitical ties. For example, China’s relations with Japan have been severely strained since 2010, over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. On the other hand, President Xi Jinping’s visit to South Korea in July 2014 was heavily symbolic of the changing historical Cold War alliances in East Asia. For one, it was seen as a distinct snub to North Korea, a sign of China’s growing frustration with its unpredictable ally. For another, it was a visit where both South Korea and China crystallised their mutual concerns over another regional rival, namely Japan. The visit came at a time when Japanese relations with both countries were at their lowest ebb for many years, and signalled the presence of a crack in the hub-and-spoke system. It was also a response to the Japanese announcement on June 30, 2014, that Tokyo had the right to go to battle in defence of its allies. What was more, as President Xi Jinping touched down in Seoul, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced the unilateral lifting of selected sanctions in North Korea as the result of talks with Pyongyang over its kidnapping of Japanese nationals. The partnerships of China and South Korea, and Japan and North Korea are odd couples, but the announcements and state visits sent out the message that geopolitical ties are changing in East Asia. It also proves, yet again, that security regionalism in East Asia is not built on the kind of solid foundation that economic regionalisation rests on. As a process and as a trend, security regionalism has always been on tenuous ground – great power politics and regional rivalry, mixed with a healthy dose of domestic nationalism has reaffirmed this. By now, East Asia is uncomfortably aware that it is caught in the crossfire between the two largest players in the region, namely the United States http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2014/05/30/top-chinese-diplomat-slams-abe-atsingapore-summit/ 16 Ibid. 17 “US biased in push for S. China Sea ‘freeze’,” The Global Times, July 15, 2014. Available at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/2014/0715/c90780-8755343.html

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and China. The importance of this region to both countries has been amply elaborated upon, but East Asia has assumed even greater importance under the administrations of President Xi Jinping and President Barack Obama. The evidence of this includes: the ‘return’ of high-level strategic American attention to East Asia after nearly a decade; American membership in the EAS in 2011, and the re-launch of the TPP initiative; China’s sea trials of its new aircraft carrier, Liaoning; and its assertion that the South and East China Seas are part of its “core interests” (hexin liyi). These collective moves, on the part of both countries, have led to the development of two trends: -

A redefinition of East Asia, with a return to cultural, nationalistic and historical precedents A shift in the overall regional discourse between China and the United States, from the economic to the politico-military

These are trends that work against each other at the best of times. China is redefining East Asia according to historical precedents that establish Beijing as the leader of the region, by asserting that areas in international waters are part of its own territory and national waters. The United States, on the other hand, appears to be attempting to redefine East Asia in a manner that is inclusive of, rather than exclusive of, China. However, it is doing so by adhering to a well-used track that emphasises a multilateral approach. President Obama’s administration is building on similar activities undertaken during the Clinton and Bush Jr administrations. Three policy features can thus be noted from the United States’ moves in the region: the strengthening of its bilateral alliances and security partnerships in the region; more intensive engagements with the emerging power centres in the region, such as China and India; and more direct and active participation in the development of regional multilateral institutions. The focus has been on maintaining and expanding multilateral ties, strengthening regional institutions like ASEAN, getting an economic foothold in the region with initiatives like the TPP and the E3, and making a concerted attempt to include China in politico-military endeavours across the region, such as the joint military drills it has held together with countries in East and Southeast Asia. For the first time, the United States also invited China to participate in crucial joint military exercises held in collaboration with some of the smaller countries of Southeast Asia, such as the RIMPAC and Cobra Gold, in 2014. The shift comes at a time when the brand of American security regionalism is faltering, leading to a sharp rise in Southeast and East Asian uncertainty vis-à-vis the United States. This

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must be seen in the context that China’s actions during 2010-2014 have been, as David Arase pointed out,18 directly against the theory of “peaceful rise” that it has been expounding since 2005. Nevertheless, while it was not allowed to participate in core subject training, the fact that an invitation was extended implies a cautious attempt to integrate China into the American understanding of East Asia, rather than consciously projecting it as an antagonistic ‘other’. Despite this, the United States has been equally clear about its stand on the disputes that are shaking the region. The flight of two unarmed American B-52 bombers through the airspace of the East China Sea is an open assertion of the power of the United States and the fact that it holds as firmly as Beijing onto its notions of sovereignty. In an interview to CNN, in July 2014, former President Bill Clinton summed up the American stand on the disputes rather neatly. “One of the big differences,” he said, “is that the United States believes that we should have these issues…resolved in a multilateral forum where the small countries are not disadvantaged by being smaller than China. And the Chinese believe that all these things should be subject to what they call a bilateral resolution, where the small countries believe that they wouldn’t have a chance trying to negotiate against China, just one country against the Chinese.”19 This is a fundamental area where the two regional discourses, Chinese and American, diverge sharply. The Chinese do not have any faith in a multilateral forum as far as security issues are concerned. While it may publicly call for ASEAN-centric regional security architecture, China has always promulgated the use of bilateral talks when it comes to security issues. No wonder, then, that midway through the second decade of the 2000s, East Asian security regionalism is subject to the machinations of great power politics between China and the United States. There is an almost never-ending list of questions, mostly centring on what prospects the future holds for an East Asian regional order. ASEAN seeks to retain and sustain its leadership. China is pushing for a role as economic driver, with a focus on maintaining territorial sovereignty and national interest in the realm of security. The United States, under President Obama, is reasserting its claims to leadership. Thus there is a genuine fear that the region might be polarised as the United States and China become increasingly adversarial in their regional discourses concerning East Asia. 18

David Arase, “East Asian Regionalism at a Crossroads,” The Journal of Social Science, Vol. 75, Nanjing University, 2013, pp. 5-38. 19 Bill Clinton, Interview with CNN, July 21, 2014. Transcript available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/21/politics/bill-clinton-interview

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In the face of so many conflicting factors, what does the future hold for an East Asian regional order? There are two contingencies on which the possibility of a cohesive order depends, namely: -

-

The ability of the United States and China to find a middle path in their respective regional discourses towards East Asia, which they can use to maintain a level of cooperation, rather than conflict, in the region, and The ability of ASEAN to maintain its centrality in the face of great power politics

The term ‘cohesive order’, in this context, refers purely to the security regionalism in East Asia. Great power politics has not, so far, managed to derail the economic networks linking the region, which has never had a problem with building and maintaining networks of economic interdependence. The spectacular growth enjoyed by East and Southeast Asian economies for the last twenty years may have hit a speed bump in the form of the financial crisis of 2007-8, but since then, they have continued to do well, albeit at slower and more sedate rates. Over time, East Asia has become one of the centres of the global economy, with the twin forces of regionalisation and globalisation resulting in flows of trade, capital and investment across the region. The statistics of the economic linkages spread across the region have been amply documented and, despite the bilateral tensions that have rocked and are still rocking the region, have not faltered. Indeed, the annual Bilateral Investment Treaty talks between the United States and China were held on course in 2013, being a pragmatic decision to continue to increase investment between the two countries, and a decision to stay on the economic course, no matter how ruffled the geopolitical waters might be. It appears as if both presidents, Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, have realised the need to find a middle path for their countries’ respective regional discourses. There is a call in both countries to acknowledge the need for cooperation rather than conflict. In fact, at the moment, the only deadlock is in the realm of security regionalism. As far as economic and trade linkages are concerned, the numbers are in favour of a stronger bilateral relationship. The two countries are set to become each other’s largest trade partners by 2022.20 China will, by then, become the largest importer in the world, with its 20

US-China Economic Relations in the Next 10 Years: Toward Deeper Engagement and Mutual Benefit (China-US Exchange Foundation: June 5, 2013). Available at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Foreword.pdf

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imports from the United States expected to surpass US $530 billion, three times the current figure. By then, American exports to China are projected to create 1.81 million new jobs in the country and the value of China’s exports to the United States is expected to grow to US$ 805 billion. 21 However, progress toward the kind of great power relations model that President Xi Jinping advocated during the Sunnylands meeting is hampered by nationalism in the Chinese regional discourse toward East Asia. Security regionalism has remained hollow, both bilaterally and regionally. Can ASEAN be of use in solving this impasse? The previous chapters might have revealed that this is easier said, than done. The persistence of acute conflicts involving major and regional powers, the spread of nuclear weapons and missile systems, and lingering historical suspicions and animosities has only been compounded by the weak regional institutionalisation in East Asia. Ironically, the very fact that security regionalism has always been hollow has drawn more attention to the possible role that ASEAN could play as a provider of regional security governance. As a pan-regional forum, there can be no doubt that, in the immediate post-Cold War world, ASEAN played a vital role in providing a multilateral support system in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific, bridging the gap that could have easily developed in the region during a critical period of strategic transition. Over the years, however, ASEAN’s mode of multilateralism, especially in the realm of regional security, has grown increasingly less effective. Indeed, security regionalism has suffered at the hands of great power politics. The key question here is, though ASEAN may not be neutral, can it be the fulcrum of a regional balance of power? This is not a question with a clear answer. While great power politics is certainly one part of the equation, it is not the whole sum. It may certainly be said that the ascent of China, for example, has been a factor in throwing security regionalism off course, but the issue does not boil down to a balance of power. Evelyn Goh writes that the “main challenge is how to harness China and other powers to some collective authority, or to embed them within stable structures of interstate cooperation…to protect the orderly functioning of international life along agreed rules and norms.”22

21

Ibid. Evelyn Goh, “ASEAN-led Multilateralism and Regional Order: The Great Power Bargain Deficit,” The Asan Forum, May 23, 2014. Available at:

22

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ASEAN did provide an inclusive, informal option for regional security cooperation, based as it was on equality and consensus. In the post-Cold War world, it provided a legitimate platform for the entrenched American presence in East Asia. President Clinton made great use of this, using ASEAN and its related spin-offs like ARF, as a method and means to update Washington’s regional alliances, while reaffirming the United States’ central commitment to the region. ASEAN did much the same for Beijing, providing a suitable context for China to enter the international arena. China capitalised on the opportunity presented by the ideals that ASEAN lived by – sovereignty, non-interference, non-use of force and non-traditional security cooperation – in order to showcase its early theories of ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘harmonious world’, and integrate itself peacefully into the East Asian region. However, as the strategic landscape began to change over the years, ASEAN’s role began to come increasingly under question. There are no enforcement mechanisms in ASEAN’s style of functioning, for example. Its very informality assured countries like China and the United States that they would not be bound by formal agreements, and could pursue unilateral policies whenever and wherever necessary – which China has made full use of as far as the East and South China Seas are concerned. The ASEAN’s conflict avoidance norm has also allowed Beijing to avoid addressing the South China Sea disputes altogether, while its emphasis on consensus as the core of the ASEAN Way allowed Beijing to pressurise Phnom Penh into not issuing the traditional ASEAN Joint Communiqué in 2012 over the South China Sea dispute. Though ASEAN can be faulted for these technicalities, which have led to critical consequences, it is undoubtedly at the centre of a Gordian knot, as far as politics in East Asia is concerned. Not only has it created a suitable platform for China’s regional integration, but it has also legitimised the presence of the United States in East Asia. This has led to some awkwardness for the East Asian states, over the question of what role they should play in what has been called an ‘imbalance’ of power.23 They face the dichotomy of taking sides or being sidelined – neither of which is a particularly pleasing prospect. Considering China’s economic http://www.theasanforum.org/asean-led-multilateralism-and-regional-order-thegreat-power-bargain-deficit/ 23 Mohan Malik, “China and Strategic Imbalance,” The Diplomat, July 14, 2014. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/china-and-strategic-imbalance Also see Evelyn Goh, “ASEAN-led Multilateralism and Regional Order: The Great Power Bargain Deficit,” The Asan Forum, May 23, 2014. Available at: http://www.theasanforum.org/asean-led-multilateralism-and-regional-order-thegreat-power-bargain-deficit/

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grip over the region, and the security umbrella that the United States provides, it is clear that both powers have distinct advantages for all regional players and, therefore, choosing definitive sides is not a rational option for them. ASEAN has not been particularly helpful in solving this dilemma either, highlighting a wide gap between aspiration and reality. The ongoing South China Sea dispute has highlighted the fact that as a regional forum, ASEAN is no longer neutral and is subject to the machinations of great power politics. 24 To make matters worse, recent developments have underscored the fragility of ASEAN Way. To cite an example from the South China Sea dispute, the decision by the Philippines to bring its dispute with China over the Scarborough Shoal before the Hamburg-based International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has served to highlight ASEAN’s evident disunity in the face of a much more powerful China. Intra-state examples exist as well, with those who agreed to submit their joint territorial disputes to third-party arbitration turning to the International Court of Justice, as was the case with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, over their island disputes with each other. There is no doubt that mutual distrust is currently flourishing among individual member countries of ASEAN – with the most recent examples being the haze over Singapore and Malaysia, due to palm plantation fires in Indonesia in 2013, and the apparent failure by ASEAN countries to share information on the missing Malaysian Airlines Flight 370. The trend of looking elsewhere for help in times of dispute has not strengthened ASEAN’s position as a provider of regional security governance. See Seng Tan has rightly pointed out that ASEAN has institutionalised and deepened its dependence on outside powers through the plethora of regional institutions that centre on it. 25 Institutions like the APEC, the ARF and the EAS are, in themselves, tacit admissions of East Asia’s inability to counter its growing security challenges on its own steam. What is more, security regionalism in East Asia is rapidly being complicated by regional rivalries and simmering historical animosities. No 24 This has been openly acknowledged, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 31, 2014, by Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Thailand. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/-/media/Documents/Events/ShangriLa%20Dialogue/SLD%2014/Special%20Sessions/Special%20Session%204.pdf 25 See Seng Tan (ed.), Regionalism in Asia, Vol. III: Regional Order and Architecture in Asia (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009). Also see See Seng Tan, ASEAN: Going it Alone? Not Quite(E-International Relations Publishing, July 2, 2014). Available at: http://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/02/asean-going-it-alone-notquite/

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longer is it only about the United States and China. The last three years have led to the emergence of a nascent security triangle consisting of the United States, China and Japan. Tensions between the three have been exacerbated by a number of events, many of which took place in 2013 alone: the flare-up of China and Japan’s conflict over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; Beijing’s controversial declaration of an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea; new fishing regulations in the South China Sea; and the near-collision of the USS Cowpens with a vessel accompanying the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning in the South China Sea. From the events between 2010 and 2014, it is safe to say that the smaller East Asian and Southeast Asian states neither have the power nor the political will to mediate or otherwise intervene in this triangle. The Phnom Penh ASEAN Summit of 2012 only proved that ASEAN-centric channels would not be helpful in negotiating a modus vivendi among the great powers. Indeed, being caught in the crosshairs of great power politics is only serving to polarise ASEAN, with member countries finding it incredibly difficult to either hedge against or engage with all external players.26 This has led many to question the relevance of ASEAN’s centrality in the regional security architecture, or its contribution to providing any kind of platform for great power cooperation.27 This leaves the United States and China to try and find a middle path of sorts in their respective regional discourses towards East Asia. While it is true that, historically speaking, East Asian security regionalism has been hollow as far as Washington and Beijing are concerned, it is now equally true that the two countries have been trying to find that elusive point at which cooperation can be attained, rather than conflict. The Sunnylands Summit between presidents Obama and Xi in early June 2013 represented the clearest example of two competing visions of East Asian regional order. This was not, as Michael Green has written, entirely conscious28 – the meeting was touted as a platform for the two leaders to get to know each other informally and work through the issues that formed the knot at 26

See Seng Tan, ASEAN: Going it Alone? Not Quite(E-International Relations Publishing, July 2, 2014). Available at: http://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/02/aseangoing-it-alone-not-quite/ 27 Amitav Acharya, “The End of ASEAN Centrality,” Asia Times Online, August 8, 2013. Available at: http://www.asiatimesonline.com/2013/08/08/the-end-ofasean-centrality/ 28 Michael J. Green, “Two Competing Visions of Asian Regional Order at Sunnylands,” The Asan Forum, July 19, 2014. Available at: http://www.theasanforum.org/us-perspective/

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the centre of Chinese and American ties – from North Korea to cyberespionage. What emerged from the summit was a revealing image of two very different perspectives of East Asia, and two fairly divergent prospects for bilateral relations in East Asia. The mutual agreement was that there must be a new model of great power relations, with the essence being to avoid the kind of friction that would ordinarily be inevitable between rising and status quo powers. Since then, both the United States and China have worked towards finding as smooth a path as possible. Both went ahead with the Bilateral Investment Treaty talks, asserting that going ahead with the talks was the pragmatic thing to do, especially since both share burgeoning economic ties. In July 2014, the sixth meeting of the China-United States Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) was held in Beijing – yet another platform for bilateral talks to exchange views and to work out plans for advancing United States–China relations through the coming year. The potential for future cooperation, especially on key issues like the economy and trade, climate change, anti-terrorism, transnational crimes, cyber-security and maritime affairs, is great. Unfortunately, this vision comes with both American and Chinese terms and conditions, listed throughout this book, which neither party finds entirely palatable. A quick look through Chinese literature on the subject reveals that Chinese academics and members of the intelligentsia feel the same way. In his article for the Tokyo Foundation, Zhu Feng writes, “Secretary Clinton’s bold pronouncement that the twenty-first century will be America’s Asia-Pacific century is destined to be an empty promise without substantive engagement between the United States and China.”29 Zhu calls Washington’s perception of a “security dilemma” in the region the most damaging aspect of the Obama administrations regional discourse. Wu Zurong takes the same line, calling for sustained dialogue and cooperation between the two major powers, because, “…what the US is doing in fulfilling their treaty obligations with Japan and the Philippines can only provide them with opportunities to exploit differences between China and the US for their own selfish interests.”30 He adds, “It [the US] 29

Zhu Feng, “US Pivot to the Asia-Pacific and its Impact on Regional Security,” The Tokyo Foundation, June 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/topics/japan-china-next-generationdialogue/us-pivot-and-its-impact-on-regional-security 30 Wu Zurong, “Cooperation is the Only Way Out for China and the U.S”, ChinaUS Focus, July 8, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/2014/07/08/cooperation-is-the-only-way-out-forchina-and-the-us/

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can never daunt China, nor help the resolution of any problems there, but will damage US credibility in China and poison the atmosphere of SinoUS relations.” American literature yields much the same bent. Writing of China’s security treaty with ASEAN (see previous chapter), Carl Thayer argues that, “China’s treaty with ASEAN appears exclusivist, aiming at drawing a circle around China and Southeast Asia.”31 Zachary Keck has argued that while Beijing may vehemently denounce hegemonic actions in others, namely the United States it, “increasingly embraces it in action”.32 There is, then, somewhat of a deadlock in the respective regional discourses, with both China and the United States. This impasse has sent forth voices33 which call for the need for ASEAN to step up to regional security governance. As long as the major powers, namely the United States and China, do not reach a point where a road to cooperation can be negotiated, ASEAN’s role, by virtue of its presence in the region, will be repeatedly called into question. Kishore Mahbubani, in his presentation at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue, was correct when he said, “The future of ASEAN rests in the hands of Washington and Beijing.” 34 East Asian regionalism, then, stands today at a difficult crossroads, facing a fundamental test of whether economic linkages will prove stronger than geopolitical challenges, based as they are on historical animosities, balance of power and regional rivalries. 31

Carl Thayer, “China’s New Regional Security Treaty with ASEAN,” The Diplomat, October 16, 2013. Available at: http://www.thediplomat.com/2013/10/chinas-new-regional-security-treaty-withasean/ 32 Zachary Keck, “China’s Growing Hegemonic Bent,” The Diplomat, June 26, 2014. Available at: http://www.thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-growing-hegemonic-bent/ 33 See Evelyn Goh, “ASEAN-led Multilateralism and Regional Order: The Great Power Bargain Deficit,” The Asan Forum, May 23, 2014. Available at: http://www.theasanforum.org/asean-led-multilateralism-and-regional-order-thegreat-power-bargain-deficit/ Also see the transcript for the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue, IISS Asia Security Summit, Singapore, May 31, 2014. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/-/media/Documents/Events/ShangriLa%20Dialogue/SLD%2014/Special%20Sessions/Special%20Session%204.pdf 34 Kishore Mahbubani, Dean & Professor in the Practice of Public Policy, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. Transcript for the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue, IISS Asia Security Summit, Singapore, May 31, 2014: “Special Session 4: ASEAN & the Emerging Security Order.” Available at: http://www.iiss.org/-/media/Documents/Events/ShangriLa%20Dialogue/SLD%2014/Special%20Sessions/Special%20Session%204.pdf

NOTES

Introduction 1. 2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

Louise Fawcett, “Regionalism in World Politics: Past and Present,” Garnett Seminar, PhD School, Brussels, 2008. Alex Warleigh-Lack, “Towards a Conceptual Framework for Regionalisation: Bridging ‘New Regionalism’ and ‘Integration Theory’,” Review of International Economy, Vol. 13, No. 5, December 2006, pp. 750-771. Mark Beeson, “Rethinking Regionalism: Europe and Asia in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 6, December 2005, pp. 969-985. Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, 2004, pp. 429-446. Ibid. Joseph Nye, International Regionalism (Boston: Little & Brown, 1968), p. vii. Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia & Europe in the Age of American Imperium (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 9. Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, 2004, pp. 429-446. See Ernst B. Haas, “The Challenge of Regionalism,” International Organisation, Vol. 12, No. 4, Autumn 1958, pp. 440-458. Mark Beeson, “Rethinking Regionalism: Europe and Asia in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 6, December 2005, pp. 969-985. Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, 2004, pp. 429-446. Ibid. Muthiah Alagappa, “Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework for Analysis,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 21, pp. 359-387. Paul Taylor, International Organisation in the Modern World: The Regional and the Global Process(London: Pinter, 1993); J.H. Mittelman, “Resisting Globalisation: Environmental Politics in Eastern Asia,” in Kris Olds et al (ed.); Globalisation and the Asia-Pacific: Contested Territories(London: Routledge, 1999); Peter Katzenstein, “Regionalism and Asia,” New Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 353-368. Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, 2004, pp. 429-446.

184 16.

17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26.

27. 28.

29. 30.

31.

32.

Notes S. Breslin and R. Higgott, “Studying Regions: Learning from the Old, Constructing from the New,” New Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 333-352. Louise Fawcett, “Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, 2004, pp. 429-446. Bjorn Hettne and Frederik Soderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness,” New Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 457-472. Raimo Vayrynen, “Regionalism: Old and New,” International Studies Review, Vol. 5, 2003, pp. 25-52. Mark Beeson, “Rethinking Regionalism: Europe and Asia in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 6, December 2005, pp. 969-985. Charles Oman, Globalisation and Regionalisation: The Challenge for Developing Countries (Paris: OECD, 1994), p. 10. Ibid. S. Breslin and R. Higgott, “Studying Regions: Learning from the Old, Constructing from the New,” New Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 333-352. Bjorn Hettne and Frederik Soderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness,” New Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 457-472. Ibid. Michael Schulz, Frederik Soderbaum & Joakim Ojendal, “Key Issues in the New Regionalism: Comparisons from Asia, Africa and the Middle East.” Available at: https://www.academia.edu/6106976/Key_Issues_in_the_New_Regionalism ._Comparisons_from_Asia_Africa_and_the_Middle_East Zhongqi Pan, “Dilemmas of Regionalism in East Asia,” Korea Review of International Studies, November 2007, pp.17-29. Mark Selden, “East Asian Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics: 16th to 21st Centuries,” The AsiaPacific Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2009. Available at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Mark-Selden/3061 Ibid. John Agnew, Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power (London: Routledge, 2003); John Agnew, “Emerging China & Critical Geopolitics: Between World Politics and Chinese Particularity,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 51, No. 5, 2010, pp. 569-582. Also see Mark Beeson, “Geopolitics and the Making of Regions: The Rise and Fall of East Asia,” Political Studies, Vol. 57, 2009, pp. 498-516. Mark Selden, “East Asian Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics: 16th to 21st Centuries,” The AsiaPacific Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2009. Also see Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 23-45. Ibid.

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Chapter Two 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

16.

17.

Victor D. Cha, “Power Play: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2009-10, pp. 158-196. Ibid. Ibid. Also see Kevin Placek, “The San Francisco System: Declining Relevance or Renewed Importance?” Quarterly Access, Vol.4, No. 1, 2012, p. 15-20. G.J. Ikenberry, “Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World in Transition,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2005, pp. 133–152. Ibid. “National Security Strategy,” US Department of Defense, The White House, May 27, 2010. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security _strategy.pdf Ibid. G. John Ikenberry, “America and East Asia,” Aziya Kenkyu, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2004. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. G. John Ikenberry, “Asian Regionalism and the Future of US Engagement with China,” Policy Report, September 2009. Ibid. Ibid. Also see G. John Ikenberry, “The Political Foundations of America’s Relations with East Asia,” in Ikenberry and Chung-un Moon (ed.), The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues and New Order (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), pp. 25. David Capie, “Power, Identity and Multilateralism: Rethinking Institutional Dynamics in the Pacific, 1945-2000,” PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, York University, Toronto, Canada, 2003, p. 36. Mark T. Berger and Mark Beeson, “APEC, ASEAN+3 and American Power: The History and the Limits of the New Regionalism in the AsiaPacific.” Available at: http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv.php?pid=UQ:10795&dsID=mb_mb. pdf John K. Franklin, “The Hollow Pact: Pacific Security and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation,” PhD thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Addran College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Texas Christian University, 1996, p. 1.

186

18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26.

27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

Notes Donald Crone, “Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganisation of the Pacific Political Economy,” World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4,July 1993,pp. 501-525. Ibid. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is there no NATO in Asia: Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organisation, Vol. 56, No. 3, Summer 2002, pp. 575-607. Amitav Acharya, “Why is there no NATO in Asia: The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism,” Working Paper 05, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, July 2005. G. John Ikenberry, “American Hegemony and East Asia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.58, No.3, 2004, pp. 353-367. Amitav Acharya, “Why is there no NATO in Asia: The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism,” Working Paper 05, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, July 2005. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is there no NATO in Asia: Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organisation, Vol. 56, No. 3, Summer 2002, pp.575-607. Ibid. Mark T. Berger and Mark Beeson, “APEC, ASEAN+3 and American Power: The History and the Limits of the New Regionalism in the AsiaPacific.” Available at: http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv.php?pid=UQ:10795&dsID=mb_mb. pdf “Message to Anthony Eden,” August 1, 1954. In Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 26, Nehru Memorial Trust, New Delhi, pp. 419423, cited in Amitav Acharya, “Why is there no NATO in Asia: The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism,” Working Paper 05, Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, July 2005. Ibid. Amitav Acharya, “Why is there no NATO in Asia: The Normative Origins of Asian Multilateralism,” Working Paper 05, Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, July 2005. Mark Beeson, “American Hegemony and Regionalism: The Rise of East Asia and the End of the Asia-Pacific,” Geopolitics, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2006, pp. 541-560. Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Rise,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 5-51. Robert Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1999, pp. 81-117. Michael Mastanduno, “Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order:

The United States and China

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48.

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Notes P. Bowles, “Asia’s Post-Crisis Regionalism: Bringing the State Back in, Keeping the (United) States Out,” Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2002, p. 245. Ibid. Michael Mastanduno, “Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 151. Ibid. Also see Ellen Frost, “Strategic Engagement or Benign Neglect: Current and Future US Policy Responses to East Asian Regionalism,” paper presented at the Conference on East Asian Regionalism and its Impact, Beijing, China, October 2004. T. J. Pempel, “Firebreak: East Asia Institutionalises Its Finances,” paper presented to Regionalisation and the Taming of Globalisation? University of Warwick, October 2005, p. 2. US Department of Defense, “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” Office of International Security Affairs, Washington, DC, 1998, p. 19. Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley Jr., “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements,” The United States Quarterly, Vol.24, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 7-17. Alice Ba, “Southeast Asia and China,” in Betwixt and Between: Southeast Asian Relations with United States and China, Evelyn Goh (ed.), Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) Monograph 7, Singapore Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005,pp. 93-118. George W. Bush, November 6, 2001. The quote is taken from President G.W. Bush’s preface to the “2002 National Security Strategy”, US Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 2002. Condoleezza Rice, “Our Asia Strategy,” Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2003. Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 12-77. Ibid. Ibid. Gregory W. Noble, “Japanese and American Perspectives of Regionalism,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2008, pp. 247262. T.J. Pempel, Remapping East Asia: The Construction of A Region (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). Also see Paul Evans, “Between Regionalism and Regionalisation: Policy Networks & Nascent Asian Institutional Identity,” in T.J. Pempel, Remapping East Asia: The Construction of A Region (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 200. For examples, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001). Also see John J.

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Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History, Vol. 150, No. 690, April 2006 and G. John Ikenberry, “The Political Foundations of America’s Relations with East Asia,” in Ikenberry and Chung-un Moon (ed.), The United States & Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues and New Order (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), pp.19-39. Ibid. Ellen Frost, “Strategic Engagement or Benign Neglect: Current and Future US Policy Responses to East Asian Regionalism,” paper presented at the Conference on East Asian Regionalism and its Impact, Beijing, China, October 2004. Mark Beeson, “American Hegemony and Regionalism: The Rise of East Asia and the End of the Asia-Pacific,” Geopolitics, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 2006, pp. 541-560. M. Beeson and R. Higgott, “Hegemony, Institutionalism and US Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 7, 2005, pp. 1173–1188. Mark Beeson, “American Hegemony and Regionalism: The Rise of East Asia and the End of the Asia-Pacific,” Geopolitics, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2006, pp. 541-560. Also see G.J. Ikenberry, “Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World in Transition,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 5, 2005, pp. 133–152. Ibid. See G.J. Ikenberry, “Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World in Transition,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 5, 2005, pp. 133–152. Cited in Amitav Acharya, “Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power and Prospects for Peaceful Change,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 231. G. John Ikenberry, “The Political Foundations of America’s Relations with East Asia,” in Ikenberry and Chung-un Moon (ed.), The United States & Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues and New Order (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), pp. 19-39. Also see G. John Ikenberry, “American Hegemony and East Asia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3, 2004, pp. 353-367. Ibid. Ibid. Kent E. Calder, “Securing security through prosperity: The San Francisco system in comparative Perspective,” Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 135–57. William Tow and Amitav Acharya, “Obstinate or Obsolete: The US Alliance Structure in the Asia-Pacific,” Working Paper 4, 2007, Canberra University. See Stephen Walt, “Why alliances endure or collapse,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1997, pp. 156–80.

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Challenge of Remaining Relevant,” Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary Series, No. 1, Brookings Institution, November 2008. US Defense Strategy for 1990s: A Regional Strategy. Available at:http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/naarpr_Defense.pdf Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. James A. Baker III, “America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, 1991/1992, pp. 1-18. Victor Cha, “The New Geometry of Asian Architecture: What Works and What Does Not,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, January 2010. Also see, Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29; Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN+3: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2002, pp. 440-455; Mark Beeson, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: After American Hegemony,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 2-2-09, January 2009. See “Security, in Letter and Spirit,” Australian Financial Review, 2 May 1991. Cited in Paul Midford, “Japan’s Leadership Role in East Asian Security Multilateralism,” Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2000, p. 372. Victor Cha, “The New Geometry of Asian Architecture: What Works and What Does Not,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies, January 2010. Also see Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN+3: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2002, pp. 440-455. Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. Also see Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 22, No.1, 1997, pp. 86-124. Cited in Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. James Baker, “America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5, 1991/92. Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, Summer 1997, pp. 86-124. James Baker, Statement to the ASEAN-US Dialogue Session, Manila, Philippines, July 26, 1992. Donald Crone, “Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganisation of the Pacific Political Economy,” World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1993, pp. 501525. William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security, Cambridge Asia-Pacific Studies Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 190.

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123. 124. 125.

126. 127. 128.

Notes Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, Joint Press Statement, ASEANUS Dialogue, Brunei, 1992. Available at: http://www.aseansec.org/2053.htm President Bill Clinton, Speech to the Republic of Korea National Assembly, July 1993. Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalisation in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p.87. Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. Winston Lord, “Building a Pacific Community,” Statement before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, 12, January, 1995. Cited in Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalisation in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. 87. Also see Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. Stanley Roth, Testimony before the House International Committee, May 7, 1998. Available at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1998_h/h980507-r.htm Report of the Quadrennial Defence Review, May 1997. Taken from: http://www.dod.mil/pubs/qdr/ William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security, Cambridge Asia-Pacific Studies Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 186-189. Ibid. p. 189. Joseph Nye, “Should China be “Contained?” Project Syndicate, July 4, 2011. Accessed on October 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/should-china-be--contained-#bom8pRGzXVgjoSUq.99 Ibid. Cited in Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. Opening intervention by Secretary Christopher at ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, August 1, 1995. Available at: http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-17438479/working-towardsecure-and.html Tony Karon, “Bush China Policy Defaults to Engagement,” TIME Magazine, July 31, 2001. Accessed on October 25, 2012. Taken from: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,169585,00.html Ibid. Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001. Available at:

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http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf Ibid. Lowell Dittmer, American Asia Policy and the American Election, July 2008, Foreign Policy Research Institute. Taken from: http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200807.dittmer.americanasiapolicyelection.html Harry Harding, “Change and Continuity in the Bush Administration’s Policy,” in Robert Hathaway and Wilson M. Lee (ed.), George W. Bush and East Asia: A First Term Assessment (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005), p. 32. Also see Evans J.R. Revere, Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, The Bush Administration’s Second Term Foreign Policy toward East Asia, Remarks to Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) Conference, Washington, D.C., May 17, 2005. Taken from US Department of State Archives (2001-2009): http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2005/46420.htm Ibid. Cited in Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2004, pp. 17-29. Ralph A. Cossa, “A Second Term Needs to Focus More on Asia,” Global Beat Syndicate, December 27, 2004. Accessed on November 1, 2012. Available at: http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/cossa122704.html Robert Hathaway, George Bush’s Unfinished Asian Agenda, May 13, 2005, Foreign Policy Research Institute. Taken from: http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050513.asia.hathaway.bushasia.html Ralph Cossa, “Evolving US Views on Asia’s Future Institutional Architecture,” from Michael J. Green and Bates Gill (ed.), Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition and the Search for Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 41. US Department of Defense, “National Security Strategy,” The White House, Washington, DC, 2006. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov Ralph Cossa, “Evolving US Views on Asia’s Future Institutional Architecture,” from Michael J. Green and Bates Gill (ed.), Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition and the Search for Community (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 33-54. Timothy J. Lynch, “Liberalism and Neo-liberalism,” in Inderjeet Parmar et al, New Directions in US Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 53. Thomas Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013.” Complete transcript of his speech on March 11, 2013, available at: http://asiasociety.org/new-york/complete-transcript-thomas-donilon-asiasociety-new-york Also see Thomas Donilon, “The President’s Free-Trade Path to Prosperity,” Council for Foreign Relations, April 15, 2013. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/trade/presidents-free-trade-pathprosperity/p31455 Shiro Armstrong, “The TPP, APEC and East Asian Trade Strategies,” East Asia Forum, November 14, 2011. Accessed on October 28, 2012.

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149. 150. 151.

152. 153.

Notes Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/14/the-tpp-apec-andeast-asian-trade-strategies/ Also see Peter Drysdale, “Obama’s Regional Summitry,” East Asia Forum, November 14, 2011. Accessed on October 28, 2012. Taken from: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/14/obamasregional-summitry/ Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 10, 2011. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_centu ry Quoted from Inkyo Cheong, “Negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Evaluation and Implications for East Asian Regionalism,” ADBI Working Paper 428, Tokyo, 2013. Available at: http://www.adbi.org/workingpaper/2013/07/11/5794.trans.pacific.partnership.east.asian.regionalism/ Barry Coates, “Release the TPP Negotiation Documents,” The New Zealand Herald, February 21, 2014. Available at: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.cfm?c_id=466&objectid= 11206582 See Inkyo Cheong, “Negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Evaluation and Implications for East Asian Regionalism,” ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 428, July 2013. Ibid. Ed O’Keefe, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership is in Trouble on Capitol Hill. Here’s Why,” The United States Post, February 19, 2014. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/02/19/why-thetrans-pacific-partnership-is-in-trouble-on-capitol-hill/ Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 10, 2011. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_centu ry Ibid. Ibid. Ralf Emmers, “The US in EAS: Implications for US-ASEAN Relations,” East Asia Forum, November 23, 2011. Accessed on September 30, 2012. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/23/the-us-in-the-easimplications-for-us-asean-relations/ Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit, Kuala Lumpur, December 14, 2005. Accessed on September 27, 2012. Available at: http://www.aseansec.org/18098.htm Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 10, 2011. Accessed on November 15, 2011. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_centu ry

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David Capie and Amitav Acharya, “The United States and East Asia: A New Beginning,” East Asia Forum, November 20, 2011. Accessed on September 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/20/the-united-states-and-the-eastasia-summit-a-new-beginning/ Press Statement on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, John Kerry, US Secretary of State, Washington, DC, November 23, 2013. Available at: http Statement by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, Washington, DC, November 23, 2013. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16392 Shannon Tiezzi, “A Historic Moment: China’s Ships Head to RIMPAC 2014,” The Diplomat, June 11, 2014. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/a-historic-moment-chinas-ships-head-torimpac-2014/ Andrew S. Erickson & Austin M. Strange, “China’s RIMPAC Debut: What does it mean for America?” National Interest, July 3, 2014. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99srimpac-debut-what%E2%80%99s-it-america-10801?page=show

Chapter Three 1. Mark Selden, “East Asian Regionalism and its Enemies in Three Epochs: Political Economy and Geopolitics: 16th to 21st Centuries,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2009. Also see Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 23-45. 2. When Chairman Mao first articulated the theory in February 1974, he omitted a detailed mention of ‘socialist states’, other than the Soviet Union. This was not simply an oversight. Mao apparently had difficulty in placing the Soviet satellite states: to classify them as a Soviet bloc would only admit Soviet leadership and domination in the Communist world; to classify them with the Second World, on the other hand, would blur the ideological line between the capitalist and socialist states. The Chinese leaders later solved the problem by declaring that the ‘international proletariats’ of the socialist states and the ‘oppressed’ people of the developing countries belonged to the Third World. See “Chairman Mao’s theory of the differentiation of the Three Worlds is a major contribution to Marxism-Leninism,” Renmin Ribao, November 1, 1977. In any case, the role of the socialist states was only marginal in the PRC’s Three World strategic concept. 3. M.B. Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs (London: Redwood Burn Ltd, 1978), p. 102. Also see Sandra Gillespie, “Diplomacy on a South-South Dimension: The Legacy of Mao’s Three World Theory and the Evolution of Sino-African Relations,” in Hannah Slavik (ed.), Intercultural Communication & Diplomacy, DiploFoundation, Geneva, 2004, pp. 109-132.

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4. Extracts from Mao’s Interview with Anna Louise Strong, August 1946, as cited by Hsuan Chi, IV: 1192-93, cited in S. R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung(New York: Praeger, 1963), pp.279-280. 5. Leo Suryadinata, China and the Southeast Asian States(Singapore: National University of Singapore, 1985), pp. 126–31. 6. Alice D. Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st Century Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 4, July/August 2003, pp. 622-647. 7. Jeffrey Frankel and Miles Kahler (eds.), “Introduction,” from Frankel and Kahler (eds.), Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in the Asia Pacific (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 1-18. 8. “The Seventh Five Year Plan of the People’s Republic of China for Economic and Social Development,” Beijing Review, Vol. 29, No. 17, 1986, pp. 1-13. Also see “Economic Growth in Different Areas,” Beijing Review, Vol. 29, No. 49, 1986, pp. 4-21. 9. Cited in Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour (New York: East Gate, 2004), p.142. 10. Alice D. Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st Century Asia,” Asian Survey, Vol.43, No.4, July/August 2003, pp.622-647. 11. Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behaviour (New York: East Gate, 2004), pp. 140-146. 12. Ibid. 13. Beijing Review, Vol. 35, No. 14, April 6-12, 1992, p. 15. Also see Liu Jiangyong, “Sino-Japanese Cooperation in a Changed Situation,” Beijing Review, Vol.35, No. 14, 1992, pp. 6-12 and p. 17. 14. Li Xing & Zhang Shengjun, “One Mountain with Two Tigers: China and the United States in East Asian Regionalism,” Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2010, p. 110. 15. Quangsheng Zhao, “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” World Affairs, Vol. 159, No. 3, Winter 1997, pp. 114-129. 16. Ibid. 17. Jeffrey Sachs & Steven Radelet, “The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis,” from Paul Krugman (ed.), Currency Crises(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 105-162. 18. Richard Higgott, ‘The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment,” New Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. 3, November 1998, pp. 333356. 19. Min Ye, Evolution of China’s Regionalism: From Balancer to Catalyst (Princeton: Department of Politics, Princeton University, 2005). 20. Ibid. 21. Chen Yu-shi, “A New Paradigm Shift in East Asian Economic Studies,” Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, Vol. 10, December 2002, p. 10. 22. Speech by Jiang Zemin at the 14th National Congress of CCP on October 12, 1992. Accessed on September 15, 2012. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-04/29/content_1447497.htm Also see speech by Jiang Zemin in the 15th National Congress of CCP on September 12, 1997. Accessed on September 15, 2012. Available at:

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http://www.zhushan.gov.cn/zsdj/wsdx/ddhy/200504/851.html 23. Chen Xiangyang, Zhongguo mu in waijiao (China’s Good Neighbour Policy) (Beijing: shishi chubanshe: Shi Shi Publishing House, 2004), p. 122. 24. Baogang He, “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 105-125. 25. Stephen Fitzgerald et al, “In the national interest, Australia’s foreign and trade policy White Paper: A commentary and critique,” Asia-Australia Institute, University of New South Wales, 1997, p. 20. 26. Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, ASEAN+3 Summit, Phnom Penh, November 4, 2002. Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv0211/report.pdf 27. Nick Bisley, “East Asia’s Changing Regional Architecture: Towards an East Asian Community,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 4, 2007/2008, pp. 603-625. 28. Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit, December14, 2005. Available at: http://aseansec.org/18098.htm 29. Zhang Yunling, East Asian Regionalism and China (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2005), pp.17-25. 30. Baogang He, “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 105-125. 31. Glenn Hook, “The East Asian economic caucus: a case of reactive subregionalism?” in G. Hook and I. Kearns (eds.), Subregionalism and World Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 230. 32. Baogang He, “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 105-125. 33. Yukio Hatoyama, “A New Path for Japan,” The New York Times, August 26, 2009. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27ihtedhatoyama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 34. Hadi Soesastro & Peter Drysdale, “Thinking about the Asia-Pacific Community,” East Asia Forum, December 6, 2009. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/12/06/thinking-about-the-asia-pacificcommunity/ Also see Richard Woolcott, “An Asia-Pacific Community: An Idea Whose Time is Coming,” East Asia Forum, October 18, 2009. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/10/18/an-asia-pacific-community-anidea-whose-time-is-coming/ 35. Kyung-Tae Lee, “Where is the East Asia Community Going?” East Asia Forum, March 21, 2009. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/21/where-is-the-east-asian-communitygoing/ Also see: Jian Junbo, “Why an East Asian Community Matters?” Asia Times Online, October 22, 2009. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KJ22Ad03.html 36. Ibid.

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37. Singapore’s second Minister of Finance, Lim Hng Kiang, quoted in Anthony Rowley, “Spider’s Web of Deals Finally Spun,” The Banker, No. 904, June 2001, p. 47. 38. Chia Siow-Yue, “The Rise of China and Emergent East Asian Regionalism,” from Kokubun Ryosei & Wang Jisi (eds.), The Rise of China and A Changing East Asian Order (Japan Center for International Exchange and the AsiaPacific Agenda Project, A Brookings Institution Project, 2004), pp. 49-75. Also see Chia Siow-Yue, “ASEAN and Emerging East Asian Regionalism,” paper presented at a seminar on “Towards Asian Integration: The Role of Regional Cooperation” at the Asian Development Bank’s 35th Annual Meeting, Shanghai, May 2002; Chia Siow-Yue, “Regional Economic Cooperation in East Asia: Approaches and Processes,” paper presented at the International Conference on East Asian Cooperation, organised by the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, August 2002. 39. Min Ye, Evolution of China’s Regionalism: From Balancer to Catalyst (Princeton: Department of Politics, Princeton University, 2005). 40. Ibid. 41. Wang Rojun, “China’s Foreign Trade Policy after WTO Accession,” from Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi (eds.), The Rise of China and A Changing East Asian Order (Japan Center for International Exchange and the Asia-Pacific Agenda Project, A Brookings Institution Project, 2004), pp. 119-139. 42. Jian Junbo, “Why an East Asian Community Matters,” Asia Times Online, October 22, 2009. Accessed on August 20, 2012. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KJ22Ad03.html 43. Speech by Wen Jiabao at ASEAN Business and Investment Summit on October 7, 2003. Accessed on August 22, 2012. Available at: http://my.chinaembassy.org/chn/zt/dyhzzywj/dmxlfh2003/t300016.htm 44. See Zhang Yunling, East Asian Regionalism and China (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2005), p. 37. 45. Pang Zhongying, “Transformation of China’s Asia Policy: Challenges and Opportunities – A view from China,” Singapore, February 2007. Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/singapur/04601/2007-2/zhongying.pdf 46. Shulan Ye, “China’s Regional Policy in East Asia & Its Characteristics,” Discussion Paper 66, China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, October 2010. 47. Ibid. 48. Amitav Acharya, “Ideas, Identity & Institution-Building: From the ASEAN Way to the Asia-Pacific Way,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No.3, 1997, p. 8. 49. Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on US Global Strategy,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116, No. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 343365. 50. Ibid. 51. Minxin Pei, “Assertive Pragmatism: China’s Economic Rise and its Impact on Chinese Foreign Policy,” Proliferation Paper, IIFRI Security Studies Department, Fall, 2006.

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52. Tiejun Zhang, “China’s Role in East Asian Community Building: Implications for Regional and Global Governance,” Institute of Development Studies, January 2007. Available at: http://www.ids.ac.uk/UserFiles/File/globalisation_team/asian_driver_docs/Bei jing_Jan07_Zhang_paper 53. Gilbert Rozman, “Flawed Regionalism: Reconceptualisng Northeast Asia in the 1990s,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1998, p. 14. 54. Baogang He, “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 105-125. 55. Hongying Wang, “Chinese Culture and Multilateralism,” in Robert W. Cox (ed.), The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1997), pp. 145–161. 56. David M. Lampton, “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process: Is It Changing, and does it Matter?” in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 1–36. 57. Wen Jiabao, Speech at ASEAN Business & Investment Summit, Bali, October 7, 2003. Accessed on September 2, 2012. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/topics/zgcydyhz/dqc/t27711.htm 58. Mark Beeson and Fujian Li, “Charmed or Alarmed? Reading China’s Regional Relations,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 21, No. 53, 2012, pp. 35-51. 59. Zhu Feng, “Guanyu qu yuzhuyi yuquan qiuhua”[“On regionalism and globalisation”],Dangdai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], Vol. 9, 1997, pp. 41–46. 60. Yang Yi, “Jiji tuidong goujian zhoubian hezuo jizhi” [“To Promote the Building of Cooperative Mechanisms with Neighbouring Countries”], Dangdai Yatai [Journal of Contemporary Asia–Pacific Studies], Vol. 1, 2009, pp. 8–11. 61. Xiao Huanrong, “Zhongguo de daguo zeren yudi quzhu yi zhanlue” [“China’s Duty as a Major Power and Regional Strategy”], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], Vol.1, 2003, pp. 46–51. 62. Shi Yinhong, “Dongya de ‘anquan liangnan’ yu chulu” [“The ‘Security Dilemma’ in East Asia and its Way Out”], Nanjing Zhengzhi Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of PLA Nanjing Institute of Politics], Vol. 6, 2000, pp. 48–51. 63. Quoted from Baogang He, “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 105-125. 64. Peter Hayes Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking’ On Japan,” The China Quarterly, No. 184, December 2005, pp. 831-850. 65. Ibid. 66. Pang Zhongying, “Zhongguo de yazhou zhanlue: Linghuo de duobianzhuyi” [“China’s Asian strategy: flexible Regionalism”], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics],Vol. 1, 2001, pp. 30–35. 67. US-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2013), pp. 14-15.

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68. Mark Beeson & Fujian Li, “Charmed or Alarmed? Reading China’s Regional Relations,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 21, No. 53, 2012, pp. 35-51. Also see John Pomfret, “Dispute with Japan highlights China’s foreign-policy power struggle,” Washington Post, September 24, 2010. 69. Wang Yizhou, “Xinshiji de zhongguo yuduo bianwaijiao” [“China and Multilateralism in the New Century”], Taipingyang Xuebao [Pacific Journal],Vol. 4, 2001, pp. 3–12. 70. Liu Changming and Pang Chuen, “Cong shuangbian zhuyidaoduobianzhuyi: Zhongguo yudong ya guanxi de Xinmoshi” [“From Bilateralism to Multilateralism: A New Model of Relations between China and East Asia Countries”], Shandong Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban) [Journal of Shandong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)] Vol. 5, 2007, pp. 111– 115. 71. Jin Xide, “Dongya hezuo jinru le ‘shenshuiqu’” [“East Asian Cooperation enters ‘Deep Water’”], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], Vol. 10, 2008, pp. 16–18. Also see Zhongqi Pan, “Dilemmas of Regionalism in East Asia,” Korea Review of International Studies, November 2007, pp. 17-29. 72. Zheng Xianwu, “Dongya gongtongti yuanjing de xuhuan xingxilun” [“An Analysis on the Unreality of the “East Asia Community”], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations],Vol. 4, 2007, pp. 53–60. 73. Sun Xuefeng and Chen Hanxi, “Zhongguo diqu zhuyi zhengce de zhanlue xiaoying” [“China’s Regional Policy and its Strategic Consequences”], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics],Vol. 5, 2006, pp. 26–30. 74. Liu Zhenye, “Dongya gongtongti” bu keneng shi “kaifang de diqu zhuyi” [“East Asian Community can’t be an Open Regionalism”], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics],Vol. 10, 2008, pp. 39–42. 75. Xue Li, “Renhou xiongzhang: zhongguo zai yazhou zhenghe zhong de jiaose” [“A Kind Elder Brother: China’s Role in Asian Integration”], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics],Vol. 10, 2008, pp. 36–39. 76. Su Hao, “Hutao moxing: ‘10+3’ yudongya fenghui shuangceng qu yu hezuo jie gou fenxi” [“A Structural Analysis of Dual Regional Cooperation: ‘10+3’ and East Asian Summit”], Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], Vol. 10, 2008, pp. 31–34. 77. Yang Jiang, China’s Policy-making for Regional Cooperation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 10-13. 78. Ibid. 79. Chia Siow-Yue, “The Rise of China and Emergent East Asian Regionalism,” in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi (eds.), The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), p. 52. Also see Hugh DeSantis, “The Dragon and the Tigers: China and Asian Regionalism,” World Policy Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 23-36. 80. Interview with Pang Zhongying, Professor at Renmin & Nankai Universities, China. Interview cited in John Feffer, “China Nurtures Good Neighbour Policy in Asia,” IPS Asia-Pacific News, December 14, 2006.

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81. Peng Hong-Cai, East Asian New Regionalism and China, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Conference Presentation at Third Annual CEPII-IDB Conference, Washington, February 2006. Taken from: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/communications/pdf/2006/09100206/pengho ngpre.pdf 82. Speech by Jiang Zemin in the 15th National Congress of CCP on September 12, 1997. Accessed on November 18, 2012. Available at: http://www.zhushan.gov.cn/zsdj/wsdx/ddhy/200504/851.html 83. Shulan Ye, “China’s Regional Policy in East Asia & Its Characteristics,” Discussion Paper 66, China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, October 2010. 84. Ibid. Also see Zhang Yunling, East Asian Regionalism and China (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2005), pp. 40-65. 85. Yoshifumi Nakai, “Foreign Policy of the Post Jiang Zemin Era,”from Yasuo Onishi (ed.), China’s New Leadership, IDE Spot Survey, Institute of Developing Economies, March 2003, pp. 25-37. 86. Tiejun Zhang, “China’s Role in East Asian Community Building: Implications for Regional and Global Governance,” Institute of Development Studies, January 2007. Available at: http://www.ids.ac.uk/UserFiles/File/globalisation_team/asian_driver_docs/Bei jing_Jan07_Zhang_paper Also see Suisheng Zhao, China & the United States: Cooperation & Competition in Northeast Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) and Li Cheng, “China in 2000: A Year of Strategic Rethinking,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2001, pp. 71-90. 87. Tiejun Zhang, “China’s Role in East Asian Community Building: Implications for Regional and Global Governance,” Institute of Development Studies, January 2007. Available at: http://www.ids.ac.uk/UserFiles/File/globalisation_team/asian_driver_docs/Bei jing_Jan07_Zhang_paper 88. Cited in Ibid. 89. President George W. Bush’s Preface, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” US Department of Defense, White House, Washington, DC, September 2002. 90. Wenran Jiang, “China makes ‘Great Leaps Outward’ in Regional Diplomacy,” International Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 329-340. 91. Ibid. 92. Ibid. 93. Zheng Bijian, “A New Path for China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia.”Speech at the Bo’ao Forum, 2003, in China’s Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian: 1997-2004, Brookings Institution, 2003. 94. Ibid. 95. “Wen Jiabao Addresses Extensive Civilisation Dialogue and Cultural Exchange,” Renminwang, December 10, 2003. Accessed on November 20, 2012. Available at: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/2239366.html

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96. Chien-Min Chao and Chih-Chua Hsu, “The Worldviews of Chinese Leadership and Sino-US Relations,” from Suisheng Zhao, China & the United States: Cooperation & Competition in Northeast Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 96-105. 97. Wenran Jiang, “China makes ‘Great Leaps Outward’ in Regional Diplomacy,” International Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 329-340. 98. Hu Jintao, “Zai Sheng bu ji zhuyao lingdao ganbu tigao goujian shehuizhuyi hexie shehui nengli zhuanti Yantao ban shang de jianghua” [Speech at the Special Workshop of Provincial and Ministerial Leaders on Improving Capability to Build a Socialist Harmonious Society], February 19, 2005. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-06/26/content_3138887.htm 99. Hu Jintao, ‘Build a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity’, September 15, 2005. Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/zt/shnh60/t212915.htm 100. Hu Jintao’s Speech at the UN Summit, September 16, 2005. Accessed on November 15, 2012. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t212614.htm 101. China’s Peaceful Development Road (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, December 22, 2005), p. 17. 102. Wang Yiwei, “‘Hexie shijie’ guan gaibian guoji guanxi shijiao” [“The Concept of ‘Harmonious World’ Changes Perceptions of International Politics”], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], December 2, 2005, p. 11. 103. Chien-Min Chao and Chih-Chua Hsu, “The Worldviews of Chinese Leadership and Sino-US Relations,” from Suisheng Zhao, China & the United States: Cooperation & Competition in Northeast Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 96-105. 104. Zhang Xiaoming, “The Rise of China and Community Building in East Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2006, pp. 176-190. 105. Wang Jisi, “China’s Changing Role in East Asia,” from Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi (eds.), The Rise of China and A Changing East Asian Order(Japan Center for International Exchange and the Asia-Pacific Agenda Project, A Brookings Institution Project, 2004), pp. 9-10. 106. Robert Lawrence Kuhn, “Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream,” The New York Times, June 4, 2013. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/global/xi-jinpings-chinesedream.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 107. A Tip of the Hat to Hu Jintao’s concept of a Harmonious World. 108. Ibid. 109. This aspect of the China Dream is a link with China’s “Century of Humiliation.” 110. Zhang Xiaotong & Li Xiaoyue, “China’s Regionalism in Asia,” The Asan Forum, May 14, 2014. Available at: http://www.theasanforum.org/chinas-regionalism-in-asia/ 111. Ibid.

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112. Zhai Kun, “The Xi Jinping Doctrine of Chinese Diplomacy,” China-US Focus, March 25, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinafocus.com 113. Ibid. 114. Ibid. 115. Ibid. Also see Lt Qi Jiangguo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, People’s Liberation Army, China, “New Trends in Asia-Pacific Security,” Fourth Plenary Session, Shangri-La Dialogue, June 2013. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-ladialogue-2013-c890/fourth-plenary-session-0f17/qi-jianguo-a156 116. Shamshad A. Khan, “An Internal Push in Japan to Nationalise Islands in the East China Sea,” Institute of Defence Studies & Analyses, June 8, 2012. Available at: http://idsa.in/idsacomments/AninternalpushinJapantonationliseIslandsintheEa stChinaSea_sakhan_080612 Also see Shintaro Ishihara’s speech at the Heritage Foundation, “The US-Japan Alliance and the Debate over Japan’s Role in Asia,” April 16, 2012. Available at: http://www.heritage.org/events/2012/04/shintaro-ishihara 117. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Diaoyu Islands: The Owner and the Thief,” October 22, 2012. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/diaodao_665718/t981211.sh tml 118. “Japan to Boost Island Defence Capability Despite Budget Cuts,” Japan Today¸ September 8, 2012. Available at: http://www.japantoday.com/view/politics/japan-to-boost-island-defensecapability-despite-budget-cuts 119. “China Focus: Experts Warn Japan against Making a Wrong Move on the Diaoyu Islands Issue,” Xinhua News, Beijing, September 10, 2012. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/10/c_131840990.htm 120. Mure Dickle & Kathrin Hille, “Japan risks China wrath over Senkaku,” The Financial Times, September 10, 2012. Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/babbfa2a-fb2b-11e1-87ae00144feabdc0.html#axzz2yC4b80Qi 121. Hong Lei, Press Conference, October 31, 2012. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ 122. Ayako Mie, “Onodera to Review Defence Plans, Up Spending,” The Japan Times, December 31, 2012. Available at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/31/news/onodera-to-reviewdefense-plans-up-spending/#.U0PbmKja46Y 123. Statement by US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Press Release, US Department of Defense, November 23, 2013. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=16392 124. People’s Daily, January 14, 2013. Also see People’s Daily, April 3, 2013 and People’s Daily, December 12, 2012. 125. “Li Keqiang zai di shiliu ci Zhongguo-Dongmeng (10+1) lingdaoren huiyi shang de jianghua (quanwen).” [Prime Minister Li Keqiang delivered a speech

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at the 16th China-ASEAN (10+1) Leaders’ Summit (full text)], Xinhua, October 10, 2013. 126. Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, “China’s New Silk Road Diplomacy,” Policy Paper No. 34 (82), December 2013, Polish Institute of International Affairs. Also see P. Parameswaran, “Beijing Unveils new Strategy for ASEAN-China Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 13, No. 21, October 25, 2013, p. 10. 127. Nicholas Thomas, “China-ASEAN Relations: The Core of Asian Regionalism,” in Mark Beeson, Richard Stubbs (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 147-149. 128. Steve Herman & Michael Lipin, “China Offers Closer Ties at ASEAN Summit Skipped by Obama,” Voice of America, October 9, 2013. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/kerry-to-push-china-asean-to-resolve-seadisputes/1765925.html 129. Carl Thayer, “China’s New Regional Security Treaty with ASEAN,” The Diplomat, October 16, 2013. Available at: http://www.thediplomat.com/2013/10/chinas-new-regional-security-treatywith-asean/ 130. “Xi’s Southeast Asia Trip Helpful for Asia-Pacific to Stay as World Economy Booster: FM,” Xinhua, October 9, 2013. Available at: http://www.news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-10/09/c_125496981.htm 131. See P. Parameswaran, “Beijing Unveils new Strategy for ASEAN-China Relations,” China Brief, Vol. 13, No. 21, October 25, 2013, p. 10. 132. Carl Thayer, “China’s New Regional Security Treaty with ASEAN,” The Diplomat, October 16, 2013. Available at: http://www.thediplomat.com/2013/10/chinas-new-regional-security-treatywith-asean/ 133. Ibid. 134. Ibid. 135. Lt. Wang Guangzhong, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, People’s Liberation Army, China, “Major Power Perspectives on Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific,” Fourth Plenary Session, Shangri-La Dialogue, June 1, 2014. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014c20c/plenary-4-a239/wang-guanzhong-2e5e 136. “China Focus: China’s Xi Proposes Security Concept for Asia,” Xinhua, May 21, 2014. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201405/21/c_133351210.htm 137. Ibid. 138. See David Cohen, “A Clash of Security Concepts: China’s Efforts to Redefine Security,” China Brief, Vol. 14, No. 11, June 4, 2014, The Jamestown Foundation. 139. Zhai Kun, “The Xi Jinping Doctrine of Chinese Diplomacy,” China-US Focus, March 25, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinafocus.com 140. Ibid.

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141. “US Biased in Push For S. China Sea ‘Freeze’”, Global Times, July 15, 2014. Available at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0715/c907808755343.html 142. Zhu Feng, “US Pivot to the Asia-Pacific and its Impact on Regional Security,” The Tokyo Foundation, June 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/topics/japan-china-next-generationdialogue/us-pivot-and-its-impact-on-regional-security 143. Ibid. 144. Wu Zurong, “Cooperation is the Only Way Out for China and the US,” China – US Focus, July 8, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/cooperation-is-the-only-way-out-for-china-andthe-us/ 145. Gilbert Rozman, “Restarting Regionalism in Northeast Asia,” North Pacific Policy Paper 1, University of British Columbia, 2000. 146. See Wani Yukio, “Barren Senkaku Nationalism and the China-Japan Conflict,” Japan Focus, Vol.10, Issue 28, No. 4, July 2012. Also see Joseph Nye, “Asian Nationalism at Sea,” Project Syndicate, September 3, 2012. Accessed on November 13, 2012. Available at: http://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/asian-nationalism-at-sea-by-joseph-s--nye

Chapter Four 1. T.J. Pempel, “Firebreak: East Asia institutionalises its Finances.”Conference Paper presented at the University of South California, March 2006. 2. Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 9. 3. Etil Solingen, cited in T.J. Pempel, “Firebreak: East Asia Institutionalises its Finances,” Conference Paper presented at the University of South California, March 2006. 4. Francis Fukuyama, “Re-Envisioning Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, 2005. 5. Andrew MacIntyre and Barry Naughton, “The Decline of the Japan-led Model of the East Asian Economy,” in T.J. Pempel (ed.), Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 81. 6. John Ravenhill, “East Asian Regionalism: Much Ado about Nothing,” Working Paper 3, Australian National University, Canberra, December 2008, p.4. 7. Christopher Dent, “The ASEM: Managing the New Framework of the EU’s Economic Relations with East Asia,” Pacific Affairs, Vol.70, No.4, Winter 1997-1998, pp.495-518. 8. David Capie, “Rival Regions? East Asian Regionalism and its Challenge to the Asia Pacific,” Asian Security, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1994, pp. 149-165. 9. Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2002, p. 442. 10. Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001) pp. 194-208.

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11. C. Fred Bergsten, “The New Asian Challenge,” Institute for International Economics, Working Paper No.4 (March 2000), p.7. Available at: http://www.iie.com/catalog/wp/2000/00-4.pdf 12. T.J. Pempel, “Firebreak: East Asia Institutionalises its Finances,” Conference Paper presented at the University of South California, March 2006. 13. Ibid. 14. Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No.3, 2002, p. 442. Also see Mark Beeson, “ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 2, August 2003, pp. 251-268. 15. Mark Beeson, “ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 2, August 2003, pp. 251-268. 16. Pradumna B. Rana, “Monetary and Financial Cooperation in East Asia: A Survey,” Panorama, No. 1, 2002, pp. 17-34. 17. Quoted from Hadi Soesatro, “Asia at the Nexus: APEC and ASEM,” Panorama, No. 4, 2001, p. 22. 18. Amitav Acharya, “Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power, and Prospects for Peaceful Change,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features(CA: Stanford University Press, 2003),p. 228. 19. Barry Wain, “ASEAN is Facing Its Keenest Challenges to Date,” Asian Wall Street Journal, February 23, 1998; Murray Hiebert, “Out of Its Depth,” Far Eastern Review, February 19, 1998; Rodolfo C. Severino, “ASEAN in Need of Stronger Cohesion,” Straits Times, December 9, 2006 and Shaun Narine, “ASEAN and the ARF: The limits of the ‘ASEAN Way,’” Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 9, 1997, pp. 961-978. 20. Takashi Terada, “ASEAN’s Talk Shop Function and US Engagement,” East Asia Forum, August 25, 2011. Accessed on November 28, 2012. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/10/asean-s-talk-shop-function-and-usengagement/ 21. Ibid. 22. Rodolfo C. Severino, “ASEAN in Need of Stronger Cohesion,” Straits Times, December 9, 2006. 23. Jing-Dong Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for US Interests (PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006), p.23. 24. Ibid. p.24. 25. See Jurgen Haacke, “Seeking Influence: China’s Diplomacy Toward ASEAN after the Asian Crisis,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2002, pp. 13-52. Also see Alice D. Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for the 21st Century,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2003, pp. 622-647. 26. Jing-Dong Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for US Interests (PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006), pp. 25-28. 27. See “ASEAN-China Trade Up 1.2%.” Available at:

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29.

30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45.

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http://www.mysinchew.com/node/98101 Also see “China-ASEAN Trade to Bloom on New Target,” Xinhua News Agency, October 10, 2013. Available at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8421398.html Also see “ChinaASEAN Trade up 1.2% in Jan-May,” China Daily, June 9, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/chinadata/201406/09/content_17571849.htm “China, ASEAN to Strengthen Economic and Trade Ties,” China Daily, January 8, 2014. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/business/2014/01-08/96043.shtml “Upgrading FTA to feature in building ‘Diamond Decade’ of China-ASEAN relations”, Xinhua News Agency, October 8, 2013. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/business/2013/10-08/83346.shtml Ibid. Wang Yuzhu, “Interdependence and Strategic Construction in China-ASEAN Relations,” Journal of Guangxi University, No. 2, 2007. See Wang Yuzhu, “Interdependence and Strategic Construction in ChinaASEAN Relations,” Journal of Guangxi University, No. 2, 2007 and JingDong Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for US Interests (PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006). “Premier Li Keqiang’s Keynote Speech at 10th China-ASEAN Expo,” People’s Daily, September 4, 2013.Available at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8388723.html Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Jane Parlez, “China and Cambodia Stall Move to Quell Asia Disputes over Territory,” The New York Times, November 19, 2012. Accessed on December 1, 2012. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/asia/chinaand-cambodia-stall-move-to-quell-disputes-in-southeast-asia.html?_r=0 Ibid. Ibid. Also see “Report on China’s ASEAN Policy”, Institute of Contemporary International Relations Project Group on ASEAN Studies, No. 10, October 2002 and Cao Yunhua and Tang Chong, New China-ASEAN Relations (Beijing: China Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2005). Jing-Dong Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for US Interests (PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006). Ibid. Ibid. Also see Cao Yunhua and Tang Chong, “ASEAN’S Great Power Balancing Strategy: The Role of China,” from New China-ASEAN Relations (Beijing: China Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2005). Jing-Dong Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for US Interests (PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006). “China, ASEAN Vow to Achieve Bigger in Ties in Next Decade,” ECNS, October 10, 2013. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/2013/10-10/83598.shtml Ibid.

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46. Donald Emmerson, “Asian Regionalism & US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation,” RSIS Working Paper 193, March 2010, Singapore. 47. Ibid. 48. Evan A. Feigenbaum and Robert Manning, “The United States in the New Asia,” Council of Foreign Relations Special Report No. 50, November 2009. 49. President Bill Clinton, Speech to the Republic of Korea National Assembly, July 1993. 50. Ralph Cossa, “East Asia Community Building: Time for the United States to Get on Board,” Issues & Insights, Vol. 7, No. 17, Pacific Forum, CSIS, October 2007, p. 2. 51. “US-East Asia Relations: A Strategy for Multilateral Engagement,” Asia Society Task Force Report, November 2011. 52. Available at: http://www.asean.org/resources/category/asean-statistics 53. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the US-ASEAN Business Forum, Siem Reap, Cambodia, July 13, 2012. Accessed on October 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/07/195013.htm 54. Factsheet from the Office of the Spokesman, United States Department of Trade, October 9, 2013, Washington, DC. Available at: http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/10/20131009284230.h tml 55. See “Factsheet: The Growing Prominence of US-ASEAN Trade Relations,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, June 13, 2013. Accessed on 13 May 2014. Available at: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/factsheets/2013/june/us-asean-trade-relations Also see Prashanth Parameswaran, “The Power of Balance: Advancing US-ASEAN Relations under the Second Obama Administration,” World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1, December 2013. 56. John Kerry, Remarks at the US-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, July 1, 2013. Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/07/211377.htm 57. Ibid. 58. “US-East Asia Relations: A Strategy for Multilateral Engagement,” Asia Society Task Force Report, November 2011. 59. John Ravenhill, “From Poster Child to Orphan: The Rise and Demise of APEC,”UNISCI Paper No.13, January 2007. 60. Helen Nesadurai, “APEC & East Asia: The Challenge of Remaining Relevant,” from John Ravenhill (ed.), APEC & The Search for Relevance: 2007 and Beyond, Australian National University, November 2006. 61. APEC Should Play Leading Role in Maintaining Open World Economy: Xi”, ECNS, October 7, 2013. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/2013/1007/83219.shtml 62. Takashi Terada, “ASEAN’s Talk Shop Function and US Engagement,” East Asia Forum, August 25, 2011. Accessed on November 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/10/asean-s-talk-shop-function-and-usengagement/ 63. “APEC ‘should take lead’ in FTA Talks,” ECNS, October 8, 2013. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/business/2013/10-08/83224.shtml

The United States and China 64. 65. 66. 67.

68.

69. 70. 71.

72.

73.

74. 75.

76. 77. 78.

79. 80.

81.

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Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 10, 2011. Accessed on December 2, 2011. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century Donald K. Emmerson, “US-China Role-Play for ASEAN,” East Asia Forum, November 25, 2011. Accessed on September 15, 2012. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/11/25/us-china-role-play-for-asean/ External Trade Statistics. Available at: http://www.aseansec.org/18137.htm Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Statistics. Available at: http://www.aseansec.org/18144.htm ASEAN Economic Community Chartbook, 2009. Published by the ASEAN Secretariat. Taken from: http://www.aseansec.org/publications/AEC-Chartbook-2009.pdf He Weiwen, “China-ASEAN FTAs Not Directed at TPP,” China-US Focus, November 6, 2013. Available at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/financeeconomy/china-asean-ftas-not-directed-at-tpp/ “China-ASEAN trade up 1.2% in Jan-May,” China Daily, June 9, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.cn/bizchina/chinadata/201406/09/content_17571849.htm Ibid. Shannon Tiezzi, “China-Japan-South Korea Hold FTA Talks Despite Political Tensions,” The Diplomat, March 5, 2014. Accessed on 13 May, 2014. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-japan-south-korea-holdfta-talks-despite-political-tension/ Available at: http://www.asean.org/resources/category/asean-statistics For details, see Chapter 2: The United States in East Asia: Past and Present. Rohit Sinha & Gitanjali Nataraj, “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Issues & the Way Forward,” The Diplomat, July 30, 2013. Accessed on 15 April, 2014. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/regional-comprehensive-economicpartnership-rcep-issues-and-way-forward/ Also see Miriam Manchin & Annette O. Pelkmans-Balaoing, “Rules of Origin & the Web of East Asian Free Trade Agreements,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 4273, July 2007. Accessed on April 15, 2014. Available at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-4273 Ibid. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Joint Statement, The First Meeting of the Trade Negotiating Committee, May 10, 2013. Accessed on April 20, 2014. Available at: http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statementcommuniques/item/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-jointstatement-the-first-meeting-of-trade-negotiating-committee Rohit Sinha & Gitanjali Nataraj, “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Issues & The Way Forward,” The Diplomat, July 30, 2013. Accessed on April 15, 2014. Available at:

210

82. 83. 84. 85.

86.

87.

88. 89.

Notes http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/regional-comprehensive-economicpartnership-rcep-issues-and-way-forward/ Yang Razali Kassim, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of ASEAN Centrality,” RSIS Commentary 116/2012, 4 July 2012, Singapore. Ibid. Benjamin Ho, “ASEAN Centrality: Year of Big Power Transitions,” RSIS Commentary 028/2012, February 2012, Singapore. John Kerry, Remarks at the US-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, July 1, 2013. Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/07/211377.htm K. Shanmugam, “New Directions: Singapore Politics and Foreign Policy,” Keynote Opening Speech of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 8, 2012. Taken from: http://csis.org/files/attachments/120208_Shanmugam_speech_singapore.pdf Amb. Tommy Koh, cited in Yang Razali Kassim, “The New Great Game: ASEAN’s Balancing Act,” Fair Observer, March 6, 2012. Available at: http://www.fairobserver.com/article/new-great-game-asean%E2%80%99sbalancing-act Amb. Tommy Koh, cited in Benjamin Ho, “ASEAN Centrality: Year of Big Power Transitions,” RSIS Commentary 028/2012, February 2012, Singapore. “Stirring up the South China Sea: Regional Responses,” Asia Report 229, International Crisis Group, July 24, 2012, p. 5.

90. “2012 ⸜2㚰29侭Ể帿埴ἳ埴⃍妨Ṣ㳒䡲♠㖍⢾Ṍ悐” [“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on 29 February 2012”], Chinese Foreign Ministry. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/fyrbt_602243/t1199309.shtmlAlso see M. Taylor Fravel, “Clarification of China’s claim?” The Diplomat, March 5, 2012; “Stirring up the South China Sea (I),” Asia Report No. 233, International Crisis Group, April 23, 2012, pp. 3-4. 91. Lt Qi Jiangguo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, People’s Liberation Army, China, “New Trends in Asia-Pacific Security,” Fourth Plenary Session, Shangri-La Dialogue, June 2013. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-ladialogue-2013-c890/fourth-plenary-session-0f17/qi-jianguo-a156 92. 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed on November 4, 2002 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia by the Foreign Ministers. Complete Text Available at: http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm 93. “South China Sea: Troubled Waters,” The Economist, August 6, 2012. Available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2012/08/south-chinasea 94. Press Statement, US Department of State, Washington, DC, August 3, 2012. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/196022.htm 95. Statement by Spokesperson Qin Gang of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, August 4, 2012. Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t958226.htm

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96. J. Michael Cole, “China’s Maritime Surveillance Fleet Adds Muscle,” The Diplomat, January 3, 2013. Accessed on May 25, 2013. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/chinas-maritime-surveillance-fleet-addsmuscle/ 97. Interview with Luo Yuan, China Youth Daily, December 29, 2012. Accessed on May 25, 2013. Available at: http://military.china.com/important/11132797/20121229/17607986.html 98. Ibid. 99. Teddy Ng, “Xi Jinping Attacks Concept of Global Hegemony, in Dig at United States,” South China Morning Post, June 29, 2014. Available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1542702/xi-jinping-attacks-conceptglobal-hegemony-dig-united-states 100. Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, Remarks to the ASEAN Regional Forum, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, July 12, 2012. Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/07/194987.htm 101. Michael Fuchs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Remarks at the Fourth Annual South China Sea Conference,” CSIS, Washington, DC, July 11, 2014. 102. International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea: Regional Responses,” Asia Report, No. 229, July 2012. 103. Justin Ho Cheng Lun, “Sino-Vietnamese Tensions in the South China Sea,” East Asia Forum, December 15, 2012. Accessed on December 27, 2012. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/12/15/sino-vietnamesetensions-in-the-south-china-sea/ 104. International Crisis Group, “Stirring Up the South China Sea: Regional Responses,” Asia Report No. 229, July 24, 2012. 105. Vietnam’s trade deficit with China in 2013 stood at around US$23.7 billion in 2013 –an increase of 44.5 percent compared to 2012. Specifically, in 2013, Vietnam spent US$ 36.95 billion on imports from China, while it transported some US$ 13.26 billion worth of goods to China. During the same period, imports from China accounted for 28 per cent of Vietnam’s total import value, while exports to China accounted for 10 per cent of the total export value. 106. “China Remains Vietnam’s Biggest Trade Partner in 2013,” China Daily, Xinhua News Agency, January 29, 2014. Accessed on February 16, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/chinadata/2014-01/29/ content_17264283.htm 107. Vietnam has purchased 12 of these planes, which will be delivered in three batches of four planes throughout 2014-2015. 108. Prime Minister Dung, Keynote Speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Singapore, June 2013. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-ladialogue-2013-c890/opening-remarks-and-keynote-address-2f46/keynoteaddress-d176 109. International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea: Regional Responses,” Asia Report, No. 229, July 2012.

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110. “Remarks by President Obama & President Truong Tan Sang of Vietnam after Bilateral Meeting,” Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington, DC, July 25, 2013. Accessed on April 24, 2014. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/25/remarks-presidentobama-and-president-truong-tan-sang-vietnam-after-bilateral-meeting 111. “Joint Press Availability with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh,” US Department of State, The White House, Washington, DC, December 16, 2013. Accessed on April 24, 2014. Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/12/218747.htm 112. James R. Holmes, “China Abandons Small-Stick Diplomacy,” The Diplomat, May 10, 2014. Available at: http://www.thediplomat.com/2014/05/china-abandons-small-stick-diplomacy/ 113. “China requires Vietnam to stop any form of disruptions of Chinese company’s operations,” Xinhua, May 8, 2014. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/09/c_126478766.htm 114. Ibid. 115. Statement by Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Le Hai Binh, May 5, 2014. Quoted from “China Withdraws Oil Rig from Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone,” The Economic Times, July 22, 2014. Available at: http://www.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/internation/world-news/chinawithdraws-oil-rig-from-vietnams-exclusive-economiczone/articleshow/388845435.htm 116. Ian Storey, “Trouble and Strife in the South China Sea Part II: The Philippines and China,” China Brief, Vol. 8, No. 9, Jamestown Foundation, April 28, 2008. 117. President Benigno Aquino III, State of the Nation Address, July 25, 2011. Official English Translation Available at:www.gov.ph/2011/ 07/25/benigno-saquino-iii-second-state-of-the-nation-addressjuly-25-2011-en/ 118. Trefor Moss, “China’s not-so-hard Power Strategy,” The Diplomat, June 28, 2012. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2012/06/chinas-not-so-hard-powerstrategy/ 119. “Palace: Chinese still buys Philippine bananas,” Sun Star, May 27, 2012. Available at: http://www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/local-news/2012/05/27/ palace-chinese-still-buys-philippine-bananas-223709Also see “In Philippines, Banana Growers Feel Effect of South China Sea Dispute,” The Washington Post, June 11, 2012. 120. “DFA Chief Calls for Patriotism,” The Philippine Star, May 17, 2012. Available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/807416/dfa-chief-callspatriotism 121. Joel Guinto and Norman P. Aquino, “Philippines Sues China to Assert Claim Over Gas-rich Waters,” Bloomberg Business Week, March 30, 2014. Available at: http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-03-29/philippinescalls-china-threat-to-security-over-isles-squabble 122. Joel Guinto, “China Builds Artificial Islands in South China Sea,” Bloomberg Business Week, June 19 2014. Available at:

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http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-06-19/china-builds-artificialislands-in-south-china-sea 123. Joshua Kurlantzick, “South China Sea: From Bad to Worse,” Council for Foreign Relations, July 24, 2012. Accessed on August 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-bad-worse/p28739 China has since pledged another US$ 548 million in aid to Cambodia for infrastructure and irrigation systems. In April 2013, agreements covering US$ 500 million in soft loans and US$ 48 million in grants were signed when Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen visited China and met Premier Li Keqiang. 124. Cited in Patrick Barta, “ASEAN Summit Breaks down over South China Sea Disputes,” The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2012. Accessed on November 29, 2012. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303919504577524133983292 716.html 125. Ibid. 126. Ibid. 127. “China Values South China Peace, Stability,” China News, SINA, November 21, 2012. Accessed on December 23, 2012. Available at: http://english.sina.com/china/2012/1120/528895.html 128. Ellen A. Quismorio, “Philippines to Defend its National Interests,” Manila Bulletin Newspaper, November 19, 2012. Accessed on December 23, 2012. Available at: http://www.mb.com.ph/articles/382212/ph-to-defend-nationalinterests#.UNrwouT5ySo 129. Deep Pal, “A Code of Conduct for the South China Sea?”The Diplomat, September 25, 2013. Available at: http://www.thediplomat.com/2013/09/acode-of-conduct-for-the-south-china-sea/ 130. “China to Promote Maritime Cooperation with ASEAN Countries,” People’s Daily, September 16, 2013. Available at: http://english.people.com.cn/90883/8401271.html 131. Abanti Bhattacharya, “South China Sea Dispute: The Farce of Chinese Multilateralism,” IDSA Commentary, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, July 31, 2012. Accessed on November 14, 2012. Available at: http://idsa.in/idsacomments/SouthChinaSeaDispute_AbantiBhattacharya_3107 12 132. Ibid. 133. Ibid. 134. “Obama Reaffirms US-Japan Defense Commitment,” Voice of America, April 25, 2014. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-reaf firms-us-japan-defense-commitment/1900046.html 135. Daniel R. Russell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Speech at the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, July 28, 2014. Available at: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/07/229872.htm 136. Ibid.

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Chapter Five Takeshi Yuzawa, “The Roles of Regional Security Institutions in the Era of Power Shift: The Implications for Japan-China Relations,” The Tokyo Foundation, August 29, 2012. Available at: http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/topics/japan-china-next-generationdialogue/roles-of-regional-security-institutions-in-the-era-of-power-shift/ 1. Wang Jisi, “How is a New Model of Great Power Relations Possible?” The Asan Forum, July 19, 2013. Available at: http://www.theasanforum.org/viewson-what-should-come-next-after-the-obama-xi-summit-and-other-introductorysummits-in-2013/ 2. Ibid. 3. William A. Callahan, “Nationalism and Diplomacy,” Critical Issues Seminar Series: Summary of Talk, November 6, 2013. 4. Ibid. 5. Deng Yushan, “Build Trust To Avert Tragedy,” Xinhua, May 7, 2012. Available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-05/07/c_131573482.htm 6. “Time for the US to revisit ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy,” Xinhua, January 29, 2014. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/voices/2014/01-29/99291.shtml 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. “Dynamic Asia needs US to Reshape Anachronistic Policy,” Xinhua, April 23, 2014. Available at: http://www.ecns.cn/voices/2014/04-23/110729.shtml 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. See Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the US Pacific Pivot,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 38, November 2013. Also see “US-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & China Strategic Culture Promotion Association, 2013. For electronic copies of this report, visit: CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs 14. “Top Chinese Diplomat Slams Abe at Singapore Summit,” The Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2014. Available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2014/05/30/top-chinese-diplomat-slams-abeat-singapore-summit/ 15. Ibid. 16. “US biased in push for S. China Sea ‘freeze’,” The Global Times, July 15, 2014. Available at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/2014/0715/c90780-8755343.html 17. David Arase, “East Asian Regionalism at a Crossroads,” The Journal of Social Science, Vol. 75, Nanjing University, 2013, pp. 5-38. 18. Bill Clinton, Interview with CNN, July 21, 2014. Transcript available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/21/politics/bill-clinton-interview

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19. US-China Economic Relations in the Next 10 Years: Toward Deeper Engagement and Mutual Benefit (China-US Exchange Foundation: June 5, 2013). Available at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Foreword.pdf 20. Ibid. 21. Evelyn Goh, “ASEAN-led Multilateralism and Regional Order: The Great Power Bargain Deficit,” The Asan Forum, May 23, 2014. Available at: http://www.theasanforum.org/asean-led-multilateralism-and-regional-orderthe-great-power-bargain-deficit/ 22. Mohan Malik, “China and Strategic Imbalance,” The Diplomat, July 14, 2014. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/china-and-strategic-imbalance Also see Evelyn Goh, “ASEAN-led Multilateralism and Regional Order: The Great Power Bargain Deficit,” The Asan Forum, May 23, 2014. Available at: http://www.theasanforum.org/asean-led-multilateralism-and-regional-orderthe-great-power-bargain-deficit/ 23. This has been openly acknowledged, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 31, 2014, by Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Thailand. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/-/media/Documents/Events/Shangri-La%20Dialogue/ SLD%2014/Special%20Sessions/Special%20Session%204.pdf 24. See Seng Tan (ed.), Regionalism in Asia, Vol. III: Regional Order and Architecture in Asia (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009). Also see See Seng Tan, ASEAN: Going it Alone? Not Quite(E-International Relations Publishing, July 2, 2014). Available at: http://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/02/asean-going-italone-not-quite/ 25. See Seng Tan, ASEAN: Going it Alone? Not Quite(E-International Relations Publishing, July 2, 2014). Available at: http://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/02/aseangoing-it-alone-not-quite/ 26. Amitav Acharya, “The End of ASEAN Centrality,” Asia Times Online, August 8, 2013. Available at: http://www.asiatimesonline.com/2013/08/08/the-end-ofasean-centrality/ 27. Michael J. Green, “Two Competing Visions of Asian Regional Order at Sunnylands,” The Asan Forum, July 19, 2014. Available at: http://www.theasanforum.org/us-perspective/ 28. Zhu Feng, “US Pivot to the Asia-Pacific and its Impact on Regional Security,” The Tokyo Foundation, June 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/topics/japan-china-next-generationdialogue/us-pivot-and-its-impact-on-regional-security 29. Wu Zurong, “Cooperation is the Only Way Out for China and the U.S”, ChinaUS Focus, July 8, 2014. Available at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/2014/07/08/cooperation-is-the-only-way-out-forchina-and-the-us/ 30. Carl Thayer, “China’s New Regional Security Treaty with ASEAN,” The Diplomat, October 16, 2013. Available at: http://www.thediplomat.com/2013/10/chinas-new-regional-security-treatywith-asean/

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31. Zachary Keck, “China’s Growing Hegemonic Bent,” The Diplomat, June 26, 2014. Available at: http://www.thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-growinghegemonic-bent/ 32. See Evelyn Goh, “ASEAN-led Multilateralism and Regional Order: The Great Power Bargain Deficit,” The Asan Forum, May 23, 2014. Available at: http://www.theasanforum.org/asean-led-multilateralism-and-regional-orderthe-great-power-bargain-deficit/ Also see the transcript for the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue, IISS Asia Security Summit, Singapore, May 31, 2014. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/-/media/Documents/Events/Shangri-La%20Dialogue/SLD %2014/Special%20Sessions/Special%20Session%204.pdf 33. Kishore Mahbubani, Dean & Professor in the Practice of Public Policy, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. Transcript for the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue, IISS Asia Security Summit, Singapore, May 31, 2014: “Special Session 4: ASEAN & the Emerging Security Order.” Available at: http://www.iiss.org/-/media/Documents/Events/Shangri-La%20Dialogue/SLD %2014/Special%20Sessions/Special%20Session%204.pdf

INDEX

ACFTA. See ASEAN-China Free Trade Area Acharya, Amitav, 37, 124 ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) Establishment of, 59 Geographical location of, 59 Air-Sea Battle Concept (ASBC), 171 Alagappa, Muthiah, 4-5 Albright, Madeleine, 126 Alliance networks Construction of, 14 Annenberg Estate, 59 APEC, see Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APT, see ASEAN Plus Three ARF, see ASEAN Regional Forum Arase, David, 174 Area-access/area-denial (A2D), 168 Armstrong, Shiro, 56 ASEAN, see Association of South East Asian Nations ASEAN Economic Community, 127, 161 ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) Statistics, 128 Origins of, 128-129 Implications of, 130 ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, 133 ASEAN Joint Communique 2012, 177 ASEAN Plus Three, 120, 124 ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) Meeting, 45 ASEAN Regional Forum, 45, 48, 51, 59, 79, 118-119

ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 58, 83, 93, 100, 126, 146 ASEAN Way, 178 Definition of, 125 Crisis in, 145 ASEM. See Asia-Europe Meeting Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), 119120 Asia-Africa Summit, 99 Asian regionalism, critique of, 28 Asian and Pacific Council Asian Financial Crisis, 1997-1998 Importance of, 27 Consequences of , 27 Impetus for regionalism, 72 Role in regionalism, 72 China’s role in, 72 Aftermath of, 75 Trends following, 75 Aftermath of, 122 Impact on APEC, 123 ASEAN, 123 Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), 27, 42 Asia-Pacific Decline in concept of, 9 US hegemony in, 15-23 Regional institutions in, 18-19 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Concept, 25 Membership of, 25 Creation of, 25 Expansion of, 119 Role in Asian financial crisis, 121 Challenges to, 25

218 Rival to ASEAN, 25 Decline of, 41 Statement on CounterTerrorism, 2001, 50 Position in regional discourse, 138 Relevance of, 140 Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), 117 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Creation of, 117 Rise of, 46 Expansion of, 119 and US, 69 and China, 69 and Southeast Asia, 126 Role in regional cooperation, 69 Shortcomings of, 121 Role in East Timor , 121 Cambodia, 121 Asian Financial Crisis Centrality in East Asia, 133 American perspective of, 133 Role in power politics, 145 Challenges to, 145, 177 Impact of great power politics, 145 South China Sea dispute, 160 conflict resolution Regional security cooperation, 177 Ideals of, 177 Spin-off institutions, 177 ARF EAS ASPAC. See Asian and Pacific Council Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), 117 Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty (ANZUS), 1 Ayungin Shoal, 159 Bandung Conference, 66

Index Baker, James, 44 Critique of regional security dialogues, 42 Statement to ASEAN leaders, 1992, 42 Baogang He, 77 Beeson, Mark, 9, 37, 128, see Intellectual perspectives of Hub and Spokes System reactionary regionalism’, 128 Benigno, Aquino, 157-158, 162 Bhattacharya, Abanti, 164 Biden, Joe, 11, 60 Bilateralism, 23-24 Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), 175, 180 Bogor Declaration, 25 Bowles, Paul, 28 Breslin, S., 7 Bretton Woods System, 15 Bush, George W., 4 ‘War on Terror’, 30 Administration of, 48-52 Bush, George H. ‘ New World Order,’ 40 Administration of, 40-44 Bush Doctrine Definition of, 95-96 CAFTA. See China-ASEAN Free Trade Area Callahan, William, 170 Calder, Kent, 37 Cambodia, 114, 131 and China, 160 and ASEAN, 160-161 as Chair of ASEAN Summit, 2012 Impact on regional security, 160-161 US-China relations, 160-161 US-ASEAN relations, 160161 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 170 CENTO. See Central Treaty Organisation

The United States and China Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), 1, 35 CEPEA (ASEAN+6 Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia), 143 Cha, Victor, 13 Chen Hanxi, 90 China Rise as regional leader, 10, 33 Historical precedent, 10 Challenge to the United States, 33 as the Middle Kingdom, 63 collapse of Qing dynasty, 63 Emergence of republic, 63 World view, 64 -65 pre-Cultural Revolution post Cultural Revolution, 67 Rift with Soviet Union, 67 Entente with United States, 67 During reform era, 67 and Southeast Asia, 70 and ASEAN, 70, 81, 84, 96, 100, 125, 131, 133, 163 China-ASEAN FTA, 109 16th China-ASEAN meeting, 133 ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, 133 and APEC, 70 perspectives on APEC, 138 and ARF, 70, 81 and Southeast Asia, 152 and the United States, 8183, 96, 169 summit at Sunnylands, 2013, 169 new great power model, 169 and Japan, 85, 87, 106, 172 and North Korea, 98-100 and South Korea, 172

219

and South China Sea dispute, 100, 131, 162 Perspectives on South China Sea dispute and Malaysia, 111 and Cambodia, 131, 160 and Indonesia, 111 and Vietnam, 153-155 economic ties security ties bilateral trade defense ties South China Sea and Philippines, 157-159 South China Sea geopolitical ties economic ties and East Asia, 114 Security regionalism economic regionalization Six Party Talks, 98 Regional discourse, 71 post Cold War Perspectives on regional discourse, 71, 86-89 Evolution of regional discourse, 72 Shift in regional discourse, 94 National Party Congress Work Report, 1997 White Paper on Chinese Peaceful Development White Paper on China’s National Defense Accession to WTO, 79 Regional participation, 79 Regional discourse in 21st century, 80, 84 Development strategy, 80 economic linkages in East Asia FTA with ASEAN, 81 Early Harvest Programme, 81

220 Approach to security regionalism, 83 New Security Concept, 112 Change in regional discourse, 83 Good Neighbour Policy Harmonious World Peaceful rise Rise of nationalism, 84-85, 101 Multilateral regional engagement, 90, 125 Open regionalism, 93 Economic regionalization, 93 Reorientation of regional discourse, 95 post 9/11 Impact on China-US relations, 95 China-ASEAN FTA (CAFTA), 82, 109 China-ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting, 162-163 China-Japan relations, 85, 87, 106 history of, 85 China Society of Military Sciences, 151 Chiang Mai Initiative, see Monetary regionalism Impact on regionalism, 123 ‘Chinese Dream’ Definition of , 101 Concept of, 101 Objectives of, 101 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 151 Clinton, Bill Administration of, 44-48 Interview to CNN, 174 Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration, 47 Clinton, Hillary, 136, 140, 146, 152 Cobra Gold, 61 Cold War End of, 4, 17, 21-22, 69 Consequences for regionalism, 21

Index Change in international order, 4 Impact on East Asian regionalism, 118 Global impact, 69 ‘Competitive Coexistence’, 62 Communism, 17 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), 112 Coral Lightning, 108 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), 70, see Track-Two Dialogues Cossa, Ralph, 51, 134 Cultural Revolution, 66-67 Crone, Donald, 44 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 100 Definition of, 133 Progress in, 163 Deng Xiaoping, 9, 83 Administration of, 92-93 Southern tour, 68 Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, 84, 104, 106, 108, 151, 179 Dulles, John Foster, 17-18 E3 initiative, 135-137, 173 East Asia Concept of, 123 As a regional entity, 63 Evolution of, 63 Change in definition of, 123 Regional order, 88 and the United States, 89 Security architecture, 117 post Second World War during Cold War Regional security, 167 Power shifts, 167 Post Cold War, 167-168 East Asia Strategy Review, 47 EAC. See East Asian Caucus East Asian Caucus (EAC), 27, 42, 76

The United States and China East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), 76 East Asian Community, 59 need for, 121 role in regionalism, 121 East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG), 3, 120 EAEC. See East Asian Economic Caucus EAEG. See East Asian Economic Grouping EAFTA. See East Asian Free Trade Area East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA), 123, 143 Early Harvest Programme, 81 East Asian littoral, 49 East China Sea, 59-60, 84, 104, 179 see Maritime Disputes Historical precedent, 104 Contestants, 104 Origins of, 104 Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), 59 US-China relations, 60 Impact on regional order, 104 Current status, 104 East Asian Study Group, 76 East Asia Summit, 52, 124, 178 East Asia Strategic Initiative, 1990, 41 East Asia Strategic Initiative, 1992, 41 East Asian Vision Group, 121 East Timor, 124 Evans, Paul, 33 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, 156 Fawcett, Louise, 3 Flying Geese Model, 17 Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), 119 ‘Forward-deployed’ Diplomacy, 146 Free Trade Agreements KORUS, 55

221

Free-Trade Agreement in the AsiaPacific (FTAAP), 139, 144 Frost, Ellen, 31, 33 Fuchs, Michael, 152 Fukuyama, Francis, 118 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1, 15, 117 Gaige Kaifeng. See Deng Xiaoping Globalisation, 3, 175 Goh Chok Tung, 120 Goh, Evelyn, 176 Goldstein, Avery , 37 Good Neighbour Policy, 74, 94, 109 Great Power politics, 109, 164, 168 impact on East Asian regional order, 109 impact on China-US relations, 109 Gulf War, 4 Hagel, Chuck, 60 Half Moon Shoal, 159 Harmonious World Theory, 98-99 Concept of, 98 Advantages of, 98 Objectives of, 99 Hatoyama, Yukio, 77, 108 Hettne, Bjorn, 6 Hexin Liyi, 173 Higgott, Richard, 72 Hub and Spokes Definition of, 14 Role in, 15 Balance of Power Containment Role of the United States, 23 Features of, 36 Continuity of, 36 Reasons for, 37 Intellectual perspectives on, 37 Significance of, 51 Hong Lei, 107 Huntington, Samuel, 100 Huangyan Island, 151 Hu Jintao, 96-101, Administration of, Ideological basis, 96

222 Regional discourse, 96 Peaceful Rise Harmonious World Ikenberry, G. John, 14 Concept of Grand Strategy, 16 Definition of US-Japan security alliance, 16 Individual Action Plans, 26 International Monetary Fund, 35, 72, 117, 122 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 178 Ishihara, Shintaro, 106 Japan, 93, 172 Jiang Zemin, 74 Administration of, 93-96 Ideological basis of, 93 Regional discourse, 95-96 Jin Xide, 90 Jing Dong Yuan, 127 Joint Working Group Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration of Conduct, 163 Kang, David, 10, 38 Katzenstein, Peter, 31-32, 117-118 Keck, Zachary, 180 Kelly, James, 40 Kerry, John, 113, 137, 146 Koh, Tommy, 146 Korean War, 18 Significance of Law of the Sea Convention, 151 Layne, Christopher, 22 League of Nations, 1 Li Keqiang, 109-110, 130, 156 Liang Yunxiang, 87 Liaoning, 179 Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, 106 Liu Changming, 89 Liu Zhenye, 90 Lower Mekong Initiative, 161 Lord, Winston, 44 Lu Xing, 71 Luo Yuan, Major General, 151 Ma Licheng, 88

Index Macclesfield Bank, 159 Mahbubani, Kishore, 180 Malaysia Airlines, MH 370, 178 Manila Framework Group, 138 Mao Tse-Tung Three World Theory, 64 Interview with Anna Louise Strong, 65 Maphilindo, 75, 117 Maritime Silk Road, 109 Mastanduno, Michael, 28, 31-33 Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity, 137 Men Honghua, 87 Mohammed, Mahathir, 26, 28, 42, 75, 120, 122 Monroe Doctrine, 1 Min Ye, 79 Mischief Reef, 83, 157 Multilateralism, 21-24, 30, 35, 38, 51, NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Area Nansha, 159 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Party Congress Work Report 1997, 94 National Security Strategy, 2002, 51 National Security Strategy, 2006, 51 New Security Concept, 92, 113, 127 ‘New Pacific Community’, 134 Noble, Gregory, 31-32 Noda, Yoshihiko, 104 Non-Aligned Movement, 66 North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), 15, 74 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 1, 17 Northeast Asia, 17 Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), 70 North-east Asia Economic Zone, 70 North Korea, 172, 180 Nuclear crisis in, 124

The United States and China North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) Nye Doctrine, 47 Nye, Joseph, 3 Obama, Barack, 60, 165 Administration of, 52-56 Ideological basis of, 52 OECD. See Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 15 ‘Pacific Century’, 57, 140 Pacific Community, 44-45 ‘Pacific Dream’, 146 Pacific Rim Economies, 138 Pacific Ocean Pact, 17 Panchsheel Agreement Principles of, 65 Pang Chunen, 89 Paracel Islands, 149, 153-154, 157, 163 Peaceful Rise Theory. See Zheng Bijian Pempel, T.J., 29, 31-32, 122 Philippines, 157-160 and ASEAN, 159 and United Nations, 159 and United States, 159 Phnom Penh, 160-162, 179 Pitsuwan, Surin, 161 Plaza Accord, 119 Powell, Colin, 126 Proliferation Security Initiative, 51 Pyongyang, 98 Quadrennial Defense Review 1997, 47 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, 39, 49 Qi Jiangguo, Lt., 84, 149 Qian Qichen, 69 Qing dynasty, 63 Quangshang Zhao, 71

223

UNCLOS. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 159 United States, 13, 35, 108 and ASEAN, 143, 177 and Asia Pacific, 46, 49 and China, 46, 61, 110, 113, 140, 147, 152, 173, 175, 177, 180 and East Asia, 18, 24, 62, 110, 118, 141, 143, 146, 173 and Northeast Asia, 18 and Japan, 35 and Southeast Asia, 125 post Cold War, 22, 44 hegemony, 24 post 9/11, 34, 50 ‘return’ to East Asia, 57-58, 169 Security regionalism, 61 Role in territorial disputes, 126 U.S.-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, 51 U.S.-China entente, 9 U.S.-Japan security alliance, 16 U.S.-East Asia Strategy Report 1998, 29 Razak, Najib, 111 Reed Bank, 157 RCEP. See Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Region,3, 7 Regionalism New Variety, 3 First Wave, 4 Second Wave, 4 Third Wave, 4 West European, 4 New regionalism, 4 Hard,4-5 Soft, 4-5, 68 post-financial crisis, 28 Open regionalism, 90, 92-93 Closed regionalism, 28-29

224 Intellectual perspectives on, 3133 Alternative models of, 34 Challenges to, 35 Regionalisation, 6, 26, 175 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 109 Inception of, 144 Concept, 144 Goals of, 144 Members of , 144 as indicator of power politics, 144 Challenges to, 145 Impact on ASEAN, 145 Regional Identity Origins of, 21, 120 Debates on, 21 Regional initiatives, 42 Regional institutions, 119 Regional Security, 17 Regional security trends, 168 Rice, Condoleezza, 126 Rim-land policy, 48-49 Rim of the Pacific military exercise, 61 RIMPAC. See Rim of the Pacific Rosario, Del, 158-159 Ross, Robert, 22, 37 Roth, Stanley, 46 Rozman, Gilbert, 114 Rudd, Kevin, 77 Rumsfeld, Donald, 49 San Francisco System, 14 Sansha City, 150, 154 Scarborough Shoal, 83, 151, 178 SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation See Seng Tan, 178 Selden, Mark, 8 Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, 84, 104, 106, 108, 151, 179 Seventh Five Year Plan, 68 Severino, Rodolfo, 126 Shangri-la Dialogue 2013, 84, 155 Shangri-La Dialogue 2014, 112, 171

Index Shi Yinhong, 87 Six Party Talks, 39, 51, 98, 103 Soderbaum, Frederik, 6 Solomon, Richard, 42 South China Sea, 10, 58, 70, 92-93, 103, 124, Sovereignty issues in, 147 Historical narratives, 147 Conflicts over, 147 Impact on balance of power politics, 149 ‘nine-dash line’, 149 and ASEAN, 178 Southeast Asia, 160 South China Economic Zone, 70 Southeast Asia Economic Zone, 70 South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), 1, 17-20, 35, 43, 117 Failure of, 18-20, 43 Causes Impact Perspectives South Korea, 108 Spratly (Xisha) Islands, 149, 157 Strong, Anna Louise, 65 Stubbs, Richard, 122 Su Hao, 91 Sun Xuefeng, 90 Sunnylands Summit 2013, 169, 176, 179 Taiwan Strait Crisis, 46, 83 Taylor, Brendan, 126 Thayer, Carl, 180 Theatre Missile Defense System, 49 Three World Theory, 64-65 Tiananmen Square, 69, 91, 124-125 Tianxia, 169 Tow, William, 37 Track-Two dialogues North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD), 119 Council for Security Cooperation in the AsiaPacific (CSCAP), 119 Trans-Pacific Dialogue, 26

The United States and China Trans-Pacific Partnership, 52-56, 59, 136, 139, 143, 171, 173 Concept of, 52 Purpose of, 53 Significance of, 143 and US-China relations, 143 Challenges to, 52, 55 Two World Theory, 64 UNCLOS. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United Nations, 4 United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 154 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 159 United States in East Asia, 18, 21-22, 24, 33, 43-44, 50, 57-58, 108, 110, 125-126, 141, 146, 169, 174-175 in Asia-Pacific, 46, 49, 113 and Japan, 35 post 9/11, 39, 50 and China, 46, 48, 140-141, 175-177, 180 and ASEAN, 46, 135-137, 143, 161 Security regionalism, 61-62 US-ASEAN Business Forum, 137 US-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, 51 US-ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting, 137 USS Cowpens, 179 US-East Asia Strategy Report 1998, 29 Vietnam, 118 and China, 153 and ASEAN, 155 and the United States, 155

225

Wang Rongjun, 79 Wang Yizhou, 89 Warren, Christopher, 48 Weapons of Mass Destruction, 39 Wen Jiabao, 80, 96, 162 West Philippine Sea, 157, 159 White Paper on Chinese Peaceful Development, 94, 99 White Paper on China’s National Defense, 94 WMD. See Weapons of Mass Destruction World Bank, 117 World Trade Organisation, 15, 48, 51, 122 World War I, 1 World War II, 1, 8, 17 WTO. See World Trade Organisation Wu Zurong, 180 Xi Jinping, 60, 109, 112, 138-139, 151, 156, 172 Administration of, 101-104 ‘Chinese Dream’. See Chinese Dream Xiao Huanrong, 87 Xue Li, 90 Yang Yi, Rear Admiral, 87 Yoshida Doctrine, 36 Yudhoyono, Susilo B., 111 Zambalies Province, 157 Zhai Kun, 103 Zhang Shengjun, 71 Zhang Tiejun, 94 Zhang Xizhen, 87 Zhang Yunling, 76, 90 Zheng Bijian, 97 Zheng Xianwu, 90 Zhongsha Islands, 158 Zhongqi Pan, 90 Zhu Feng, 86, 114, 180