The Undeclared War, 1940-1941: The World Crisis and American Foreign Policy [First Edition]

Citation preview

The Undeclared War

THE WORLD CRISIS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Undeclared W ar 1 9 4 0 - 1 9 4 1

by

WILLIAM L. LANGER and

S. EVERETT GLEASON

Published for the Council on Foreign Relations BY

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS NEW YORK

THE UNDECLARED WAR, 1940-1941 Copyright, 1953, by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in the United States of America All rights in this book are reserved. No part of the book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information address Harper & Brothers, 49 East 33rd Street, New York 16, N. Y. F IR S T E D IT IO N O-C

Library of Congress catalog card number: 53-7738

LIBERIS • NOSTRIS • AMATIS

CONTENTS

PREFACE

xiii

CHAPTER I: THE TRIPARTITE PACT 1. The International Setting 2. Triumph of the Activists 3. Japan on the March 4. The Indo-China Crisis 5. Defense and Retaliation 6. Negotiation of the Pact

i i 3 5 g 16 21

CHAPTER II: AMERICA, BRITAIN AND THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE

33

1. 2. 3. 4.

Defiance Within Limits British Proposals The Issue of Anglo-American Staff Conversations Japan: Counsels of Caution

CHAPTER III: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

HITLER AND THE WEST

A Fateful Setback The Nazi Plan for a Flank Attack The Temptation of Franco The Enigma of Pétain Hendaye and Montoire End of the Gibraltar Dream France, Britain and the United States Collaboration: the First Phase

CHAPTER IV:

MUSSOLINI AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

1. The Advance on Egypt 2. Aggression Against Greece 3. Repercussions of the Greek Conflict 4. The Position of Turkey 5. Sad Epilogue: American “Aid”to Greece vii

33 38 46 48 53 53 57 60 64 75 79 85 95 102 102 105 108 112 116

via

CONTENTS

CH A PTER V :

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

S T A L IN A N D T H E E A ST

The Kremlin and the Tripartite Pact The Lure of the West Nazi-Soviet Altercations Molotov in Berlin Aftermath of the Berlin Conversations

C H A PTER V I:

119

119 121 129 136 141

O N E F O R A LL, A LL F O R O N E

147

1. Defense of the Panama Canal 2. The Use of Latin American Bases 3. A Fresh Start with Mexico 4. Hemisphere Rearmament and Economic Defense 5. The Northern Approaches and Atlantic Outposts

147 *5* *5® 162 i®9

CHAPTER V II: DEFENSE DEMANDS AND CAMPAIGN PROMISES 1. A Momentary Respite 2. Washington’s Autumn Estimate 3. The Choice Between Guns and Butter 4. Preelection Hesitancies 5. Public Opinion Before the Election 6. The 1940 Election

175 *75 *7® 18° !9° *95 202

CHAPTER V III: ORIGINS OF LEND-LEASE 1. In Peril on the Sea 2. The Postelection Slump 3. Britain’s Financial Plight 4. A Message from Mr. Churchill 5. Ten Decisive Days 6. Arsenal of Democracy

213 213 215 225 228 237 244

CHAPTER IX: UNDERWRITING VICTORY: LEND-LEASE i. The State of the Union, January 1, 1941 2. Drafting the Lend-Lease Bill: H.R. 1776 3. Congressional Hearings 4. Enactment of Lend-Lease 5. The Washington Staff Conversations

252 252 254 262 275 285

CHAPTER X: TOKYO: FRUSTRATION AND RETREAT 1. Soviet Noncooperation 2. China: a Thom in the Flesh 3. American Aid to China 4. The Issue of Combined Action 5. The Enigma of Japanese Policy 6. The February War Scare

290 290 292 296 305 311 319

CONTENTS

ix

CHAPTER X I: THE KREMLIN AND THE WORLD BALANCE 1. Captious Partners: Hitler and Stalin 2. The Welles-Oumansky Conversations 3. Matsuoka’s Pilgrimage 4. The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact 5. Final Reckoning

3312 332 335 345 352 355

CHAPTER X II: THE THREAT TO NORTH AFRICA 1. Franco the Intractable 2. Iberian Issues in American Policy 3. The Succession to Laval 4. Weygand and the North African Scene 5. Admiral Leahy at Vichy 6. The Murphy-Weygand Agreement 7. Darlan’s Debut

360 360 363 371 374 37® 37® 3®1

CHAPTER X III: THE BALKAN CRISIS AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1. British Victories in Africa 2. The Balkan Situation and the D onovan Mission 3. The Eastern Cockpit 4. A Three Weeks’ Blitz 5. Rommel’s Rampage

391 391 393 401 408 4*3

CHAPTER XIV: THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC . i. The Aftermath of Lend-Lease 2. Alternatives to Convoy 3. Limits and Limitations of Nonbelligerency 4. The “May Crisis” 5. Unlimited National Emergency

419 419 422 435 444 456

CHAPTER XV: IMPASSE IN THE FAR EAST 1. Strange Interlude 2. The Triumph of Matsuoka 3. Staff Conversations at Singapore 4. The Chinese Bastion

464 464 471 485 488

CHAPTER XVI: THE WORLD IN SUSPENSE 1. Hitler’s Golden Opportunity 2. The Paris Protocols 3. Diplomatic Battle for Turkey 4 The Administration and the Emergency 5. The Threat to Soviet Russia

494 494 497 510 514 524

CONTENTS

X

CHAPTER XVII: A TEMPORARY BREATHER 1. Britain and the Nazi-Soviet Conflict 2. The Issue of American Aid 3. Finland’s War 4. The Polish Problem 5. The Aid Program and the Hopkins Mission

533 533 537 547 551 557

CHAPTER X VIII: THE RACE AGAINST TIME 1. American Preparedness: the Conscription Issue 2. Iceland and the Atlantic Sea Lanes 3. French Africa and the Atlantic Islands 4. The Middle East

568 568 575 580 589

C H A P T E R X IX :

593

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

T H E G O O D N E IG H B O R S

Economic and Cultural Relations The Problem of Military Collaboration Brazil and Defense of the Bulge Mexico and the Question of Naval Bases Panama and Protection of the Canal Ecuador and Peru: the Threat of War Southern Latin America and the Argentine Position

593 596 600 605 610 615 617

CHAPTER XX: JAPAN’S FATEFUL GAMBLE 1. Tokyo’s Crucial Decision 2. American-Japanese Relations 3. Indo-China: the Second Crisis 4. The Extension of Sanctions 5. The Aftermath

625 625 631 641 645 654

CHAPTER XXI: THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE 1. The Setting 2. Military Conversations 3. Questions of Policy and Strategy 4. The Proposed Warning to Japan 5. The Atlantic Charter 6. Repercussions of the Conference

663 663 665 666 670 677 688

CHAPTER XXII: KONOYE’S LAST CHANCE 1. Resumption of Conversations with Japan 2. A Roosevelt-Konoye Meeting? 3. American Preparations for the Worst 4. Restatement of the Japanese Terms 5. Konoye’s Fall

693 693 698 709 713 723

CONTENTS

xi

CHAPTER X X III: THE SHOOTING WAR 1. The Great Dilemma 2. The Victory Program 3. Shoot on Sight 4. Revision of the Neutrality Act

732 732 735 742 750

CHAPTER XXIV: THE MEDITERRANEAN FRONT 1. The Fence-Sitters of Madrid 2. France: the Vicissitudes of Collaboration 3. American Pressure on Vichy 4. North African Mirage 5. Weygand’s Fall

761 761 767 771 776 781

CHAPTER XXV: STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 1. Russia’s Ordeal and the Issue of Aid 2. The Turkish Bulwark 3. The Occupation of Iran 4. The Moscow Conference 5. An Exigent Partner 6. Finland’s Predicament

787 787 798 801 810 820 826

CHAPTER XXVI: AROUND AND AROUND THE SAME CIRCLE 1. Advent of the Tojo Cabinet 2. A War Warning to Japan? 3. Tokyo’s Deadline 4. Japan’s Final Offer 5. Rejection of Plan A

836 836 843 848 855 861

CHAPTER XXVII: IMMOVABLE OBJECT—IRRESISTIBLE FORCE 1. Point Counter Point 2. Washington’s Modus Vivendi 3. Failure of the Modus Vivendi 4. The American Ten-Point Offer

871 871 875 884 894

CHAPTER XXVIII: DAY OF INFAMY 1. Tokyo’s Preparations for War 2. Washington’s Defense Dilemma 3. The Sword of Damocles 4. A Bolt from the Blue 5. The Declarations of War

902 902 911 921 929 937

INDEX

943

PREFACE The surprise attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor, followed by the precipitate declaration of war on the United States by Germany and Italy, brought to an abrupt end a prolonged period of uncertainty and indecision in American public sentiment and foreign policy. The fall of France, more than a year before, and the subsequent threat of a Nazi invasion of England had, to be sure, convinced a majority of Americans of their great stake in the survival of Britain. That conviction had been expressed in the wide­ spread approval of the famous Destroyer-for-Bases Deal of September, 1940, despite the fact that the transaction was tantamount to the abandonment of American neutrality. During the ensuing months it was reaffirmed by popu­ lar support for the policy of all aid to the embattled British, short of war. As embodied in the Lend-Lease Act, this policy clearly involved active Ameri­ can participation in the European conflict on Britain’s behalf. Yet most Americans still cherished the fervent hope that unstinting pro­ vision of military and other aid to the opponents of Hitlerism might spare their country involvement in actual hostilities. They clung to this hope for another full year, despite the fact that militarily the democratic cause fell on ever more evil days. France and Spain, so it seemed, would soon succumb to Nazi pressure and open the way to Axis conquest of Gibraltar, which in turn might well prove the prelude to Axis control of North and West Africa and possibly to a Nazi assault upon the bulge of Brazil. Though Britain withstood the ferocious air attacks of 1940, Hider else­ where scored one signal triumph after another. In the eastern Mediterranean the situation was particularly threatening in the spring of 1941. General Wavell’s initial victory over Graziani’s Fascist forces in Libya was soon un­ done by Rommel’s spectacular advance on Egypt. This coincided with the dramatic Nazi Blitzkrieg which engulfed the Balkans and came to a halt only on Crete and at the portals of European Turkey. Even when, in June, 1941, the Fuehrer overreached himself in the effort to liquidate his erst­ while Soviet ally, neither London nor Washington felt that much consola­ tion was to be derived from this astounding reversal of Nazi policy. Hitler’s victory over Stalin seemed a foregone conclusion and there was every reason to suppose that the Nazis, once they had secured their rear, would again throw the full weight of their military power against the west. xiii

xiv

PREFACE

The situation at sea was equally depressing. Nazi submarine wolf packs were taking a heavy toll of British and Allied shipping, thus threatening to defeat the very purpose of the Lend-Lease program. Mr. Churchill no longer seriously attempted to conceal his conviction that nothing short of actual American naval and air participation could keep Britain’s life lines open. President Roosevelt and his advisers, though like their compatriots reluctant to face the stark realities, were gradually being driven to the same conclusion. For months on end they repeatedly approached the crucial issue only to shy away from it. The well-known aversion of the American people to war seemed an insuperable barrier to intervention, despite a growing realization that the national interest left no real alternative. Not until the autumn of 1941 did the unrelenting pressure of ugly facts lead the American people to at least tacit acceptance of undeclared and limited war against Germany in the Atlantic. During these agitated and fateful months the Administration was de­ terred from intervention also by the difficulties and delays encountered in the program of war production and national rearmament, and perhaps even more by the continued aggravation of the crisis in the Far East. The clash of American and Japanese interests and objectives was of long standing and had, by 1941, led to so complete a deadlock that in retrospect it is difficult to believe that the conflict could have been resolved otherwise than by war. Ever since Japan’s adherence to the Berlin-Rome Axis through the Tri­ partite Pact of September, 1940, the United States was forced to recognize the high probability that the outbreak of hostilities with Germany would entail a Japanese attack on British, Dutch or American possessions in the Pacific. Furthermore, the President and his associates had to reckon with the ever-present possibility that Hitler would succeed in persuading the Japanese to attack Malaya or the Dutch Indies while by-passing the Philip­ pines. In that event the American Government would have been faced with a serious and difficult dilemma. Since American statesmen and military au­ thorities were agreed that Nazi Germany constituted the primary threat to the national security, it was a matter of great moment to stave off hostilities with Japan as long as possible and to avoid at all costs a military commit­ ment in the Pacific of such magnitude as to hamper eventual operations in the Atlantic or Europe. The agonizing problems presented by American public opinion, by the inadequacy of American military power, by the rapid deterioration of the democratic position in Europe, by the prospect of a Nazi conquest of Soviet Russia, and by the standing menace of Japanese aggression in the Pacific, all contributed to the anxiety, perplexity and vacillation of American foreign policy in the years 1940 and 1941. It is this period and this extraordinarily complicated situation which we review and analyze in the present volume. O ur study, the second part of our

PREFACE

xv

treatment of “The World Crisis and American Foreign Policy,” follows logically and chronologically upon our earlier volume, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940, published in 1952. The nature and purpose of the whole effort, as well as the materials upon which our account rests, have been described at some length in the preface of the earlier volume. It is su­ perfluous, therefore, to restate them here. Completion of the present study has been somewhat retarded by the fact that in the course of the year 1950 we were both recalled to government service, to which thenceforth we were, naturally, obliged to devote most of our time and effort. However, the text of The Undeclared War had already been completed in draft form and consequently only the necessary work of revision and the final polishing of the manuscript were delayed by the intru­ sion of other responsibilities. We have been fortunate in retaining the interest and support of the Coun­ cil on Foreign Relations, which sponsored the entire project, and also of many other organizations, agencies and individuals of whom mention has been made in our earlier preface. To the list should be added the name of Brigadier General John Magruder (R et.), who made available to us certain papers dealing with his mission to China. We gladly take this opportunity to express once again our deep gratitude for the kindness and generosity shown us on all sides, and more particularly to thank Dr. Stetson Conn, of the His­ torical Division of the Department of the Army, who, despite heavy personal as well as official responsibilities, found time to read the whole manuscript and give us the benefit of his great knowledge and critical acumen. Our secretaries, Miss Frances Douglas and Miss Ina Holtzscheiter, have been un­ flagging in their interest and devotion, while our respective wives have been not only tolerant and long-suffering, but ever helpful in the preparation of the manuscript, the reading of proof, and the compilation of the index. It should perhaps be stated once again that this study, like its predecessor, is in no sense a work of official or even semiofficial history. The Department of State, which has reviewed the manuscript, has done so solely in the in­ terest of national security. The few changes it has suggested have been of a minor character and have in no case involved anything to which we, as conscientious historians, felt that exception must be taken. Above all, we should like to emphasize that neither officials of the Government nor any other persons have ever made the slightest effort to influence our interpre­ tations or conclusions. These, like the plan, content and arrangement of the volume, are exclusively our own and we assume sole and complete responsi­ bility for them. Much thought and effort have gone into this account of the world crisis and the development of American policy in its global setting. We can only hope that the contents will prove reasonably commensurate with

XVI

PREFACE

the climactic developments they describe and analyze, namely, the tortured emergence of the United States of America as leader of the forces of light in a world struggle which even today has scarcely abated and is still undecided. W il l ia m L . L an g er S. E v e r e t t G l e a s o n

The Undeclared War

CHAPTER I

The Tripartite Pact i . T h e I n t e r n a t io n a l S e t t in g

During the entire summer of 1940 the fate of Britain and of European democracy hung in the balance. The Nazi conquest of Norway in the face of greatly superior sea power had been followed almost at once by the tri­ umphant sweep of German forces through the Low Countries. At Dunkirk the Allied troops had, to be sure, been in large measure evacuated, but only with the loss of much essential equipment. Early in June the French had made a valiant but forlorn effort to hold on the Somme. In ten days their resistance had been broken, and on June 17 the new Cabinet headed by the aged Marshal Pétain had sued for an armistice. Thereafter Britain stood alone, awaiting the assault of the Nazi power which now controlled much of western Europe, was allied with Italy, and could still count on the co­ operation of Soviet Russia. During the summer Britain’s cause seemed hope­ less. Hitler, while preparing for an amphibious invasion of England on the grand scale, loosed his air squadrons against British shipping, ports and in­ dustrial centers. It was a moot question how long the British, almost com­ pletely unprepared on the ground, could fight off attack from the air. Though the Royal Navy commanded the seas, it too was suffering heavy losses from submarine and air attack, and there was no assurance that it could prevent a concerted and determined Nazi attempt to reach the shores of southern England. Throughout the world the crucial importance of the struggle between Germany and Britain was fully recognized, and those governments which still retained freedom of action plotted their policies according to their esti­ mates of the outcome. The American people, long wedded to isolation and long deluded by hopes of avoiding involvement in foreign conflicts, had fallen into near panic when at last it recognized the magnitude of Nazi power and realized the threat to its own way of life as the British bastion and 1

2

THE UNDECLARED WAR

British Fleet seemed doomed to disaster. President Roosevelt, who for some time had been warning of the dangers inherent in the European situation, had at once (June io) proclaimed the Charlottesville program, committing the material resources of the nation to the opponents of aggression. Since, however, these resources had not yet been harnessed for war, the amount of assistance afforded Britain during the summer of 1940 was extremely lim­ ited. Not until Hitler seemed on the verge of invading England did the President finally consent to trade fifty over-age American destroyers for base rights in Britain’s American possessions. Therewith the British secured sub­ stantial reinforcement for defense and, what was perhaps more important though less tangible, added assurance that the United States would throw ever greater weight behind resistance to the Nazis. After the Destroyer Deal American neutrality was hardly more than a technicality; the United States had clearly aligned itself with resistance to Nazi aggression. But many months were still to pass before American support could be­ come fully effective. W ar production was only getting under way and as yet no conclusive measures had been taken to raise an army even for national and hemisphere defense. In these circumstances it was but natural that the chief concern of the Administration should have been the protection of its own and neighboring shores, and that it should have staked its hopes on Britain’s capability to withstand unaided the shock of invasion, should that come. Furthermore, Washington could not overlook the fact that the crisis confronting the nation was not a European, but a world crisis. Asia, like Europe, was in turmoil, for since 1937 Japan had been engaged in unde­ clared war against Nationalist China and had, with increasing effrontery, been challenging the Far Eastern position and interests of the United States as well as those of the European powers. The British, the French and the Dutch were none of them capable of withstanding Japanese pressure. The first two powers had been obliged to close the supply routes into China through Burma and Tonkin, while the latter was confronted with Japanese demands on the Netherlands Indies which seemed to presage an early ad­ vance into the southwest Pacific. In China itself European nationals were exposed to obloquy and abuse; foreign interests—American as well as Euro­ pean—were blandly disregarded or flagrantly violated by the Japanese mili­ tary. In the summer of 1940 the only hope of restraining or obstructing the Japanese seemed to lie in a strong American policy, for which, in fact, there was much clamor throughout the land. But the Administration, while will­ ing to resort to half measures in the hope of deterring the Tokyo extremists, refused to take decisive steps. The President and his advisers were quite aware that the problem of the Pacific could not be considered apart from that of the Atlantic, but they had decided that the more formidable and menacing of the two great expansionist powers was Germany, not Japan.

THE TRIPARTITE PACT

3

Consequently they resisted whatever temptation they may have felt to throw the weight of American sea and industrial power against Japan, and deter­ mined, so far as possible, to avoid a major crisis in the Far East until the situation in Europe had been clarified. However, the course of events in the Far East depended more upon Japan than upon its opponents. It is therefore essential to analyze developments in the Pacific area in order properly to understand and evaluate the over-all American policy. 2. T r iu m p h

of t h e

A c t iv is t s

Ever since 1937 the Japanese militarists, who had engineered the attack on China, had been eager to join hands with the Nazis. Both powers re­ garded Communist Russia as an enemy and looked upon the great European colonial nations—Britain and France—as obstacles to the realization of their dreams for domination in Europe and Asia. But a German-Japanese coali­ tion, which might well have led to war with the European sea powers and would inevitably have estranged the United States, held little attraction for the Japanese imperial court and was generally opposed by Japanese naval authorities, by most of the bureaucracy, and by important commercialindustrial interests. For many months Japanese official circles had engaged in violent controversy over this issue, until in August, 1939, Hitler’s uncere­ monious conclusion of his pact with Stalin brought the conflict in Tokyo to an abrupt end. During the winter and spring of 1939-1940 the Japanese Government had pursued a cautious and inconclusive policy, awaiting like many other Governments the outcome of the war in Europe. Hitler’s resounding victories of the spring and summer of 1940 stirred the Japanese expansionists as nothing before. Their campaigns in the vastness of China had not forced the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek into sub­ mission and there was litde prospect of subduing China so long as foreign powers—notably Soviet Russia, Britain and the United States—continued to give the Chungking Government material support. As against the dreary outlook in China, alluring vistas opened before the Japanese in southern Asia and the Pacific. Defeated France was the possessor of the rich states of Indo-China, while the vanquished Netherlands held the East Indies, from which Japan could hope to secure oil and other much-needed strategic ma­ terials. To many Japanese it seemed almost criminal to let slip so golden an opportunity for assuring the present and future needs of the national econ­ omy. Britain was hardly in a position to obstruct Tokyo’s plans for a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and there was at least doubt whether the United States would offer determined opposition. On the other hand Ger­ many, as the victor over France and the Netherlands, would clearly have something to say with respect to French and Dutch colonial possessions. All th e more reason for the Japanese activists to seek an arrangement with the master erf Europe.

4

THE UNDECLARED WAR

Even the moderate Yonai-Arita Cabinet, which had governed Japan from January until July, 1940, had been forced by military and other pressures to take steps toward reopening negotiations for a military alliance with Ger­ many. But apparently the Army had no faith in an Administration which had systematically opposed the German connection. On July 16 the High Command engineered the downfall of the Cabinet and arranged for a new Government under Prince Fumimaro Konoye, with General Hideki Tojo as Minister of War and Yosuke Matsuoka as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Prince Konoye, related to the imperial family, was a well-known and popu­ lar politician, apparently well intentioned, but naive and notoriously weak. At the time of his appointment he was much enamored of totalitarianism and much preoccupied with the transformation of Japan into a single-party state. Such ideas were certainly not antipathetic to the Army, which banked heavily on Konoye’s prestige and popularity. Most members of the Konoye Cabinet had been associated with the armed forces or the administration in Manchuria, and therefore reflected the views and aspirations of the so-called Kwantung clique. General Tojo was well known as a dynamic Army leader and one of the deepest-dyed expansionists. Foreign Minister Matsuoka, on the other hand, was just about to come into his own. He had spent his youth and had obtained most of his education in the United States, and liked to pose as an exponent of friendly relations be­ tween Tokyo and Washington. The development of his policy warrants grave doubt on this score, though in truth it is not easy to follow the gyra­ tions of this extraordinary person. Matsuoka proved himself a man of nimble mind and unbridled energy, but unaccountable, unreliable, and erratic. To quote one of his subordinates, Konoye was like a shy squirrel sheltered in the deep forests, while Matsuoka was a stormy petrel, delighting to spread its wings over the foaming sea.12As the executive agent of the Japanese High Command the new Foreign Minister was to have a rare opportunity to dis­ play his “brilliance.” Being extremely loquacious, he could not long keep his counsel. To an American correspondent he proclaimed that democracy was finished, that totalitarianism was bound to win, and that there was no room in the world for two systems. He left no doubt whatever that the new Japa­ nese Cabinet was going “hell bent for the Axis and for the New Order in Asia,” and that it would ride roughshod over British and American interests.* The Konoye Cabinet lost no time in drafting a program for action, a pro­ gram which was enshrined, on July 26 and 27, 1940, in two key documents. The first of these was entitled Outline of Basic National Policy, and the sec­ ond Gist of Main Points in regard to Dealing with the Situation to Meet the 1 Toshikazu Kasc: Journey to the “Missouri” (New Haven, 1950), 4°*432 Grew Diary (M S.), July 21, 1940, reporting Matsuoka’s remarks to Wilfred Frcisohrr; also Joseph C. Grew: Ten Years in Japan (New York, 1944)* 3*4 ; Sir Robert Craigie: Behind the Japanese Mask (London, 1946), Chapter XVIII.

THE TRIPARTITE PACT

5

Change in World Conditions. Main points of these plans provided for the establishment of “an unshakable national structure such as conforms to the new world situation,” on which Japan could “march forward toward the realization of the national policy by mobilizing the total strength of the na­ tion.” As usual, settlement of the China Incident was given first priority among the objectives of foreign policy. The Cabinet decided that this end, so im portant to the establishment of the New Order in Asia, could be ac­ complished only by cutting Nationalist China’s supply lines from the outside world. This in turn involved the “settlement” of southern problems: “to strengthen policies towards French Indo-China, Hongkong and the Settle­ ments, to check assistance to the Chiang regime and root out the feeling of enmity toward Japan.” “The diplomatic policy” toward the Netherlands East Indies was also to be reinforced, so that Japan might obtain important raw materials. Since, obviously, this program was bound to meet with opposition from other powers, the Konoye Cabinet was obliged to provide for that eventual­ ity. I t therefore decided “to foster a strong political tie with Germany and Italy, and to take active steps in the adjustment of diplomacy towards the Soviet Union while maintaining a firm front towards the United States.” Apparently there was considerable discussion of this last item, but Matsuoka succeeded in persuading Konoye and others of his colleagues that the threat of an American embargo on supplies essential to Japan obliged the Tokyo Government to seek alternative sources of such supplies in the southern re­ gions and that, in order to secure a free hand in the south, it was necessary not only to ally with Germany and Italy and to reach agreement with Soviet Russia, but to take a “resolute position” with respect to the United States. These important decisions having been reached, the Government on August i, 1940, issued a public announcement foreshadowing the introduction of a totalitarian system and proclaiming, in more or less veiled terms, its inter­ national program: Japan’s foreign policy, which aims ultimately at the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia, will be directed, first of all, toward the complete settlement of the China affair, and to the advancement of the national fortune by taking a farsighted view of the drastic changes in the international situation and by formulating both con­ structive and flexible measures to meet these changes.* 3. J a pa n

on t h e

M arch

The policies elaborated by the Konoye Government on July 26-27, 1940. were not to be taken up seriatim, but to be pursued concurrently. It was 3 Text in Documents on American Foreign Relations, III (1940), 253 ff. The texts of the key documents are to be found in the Tokyo War Crimes Documents, Exhibits 541 and 1310. They were discussed in detail by General Tojo in his defense memorandum (Exhibit 3655, pp. 36, 181 ff.). See also Feis: The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, ■95°)> Chapter XI.

8

THE UNDECLARED WAR

The [Dutch] Governor General does not realize that the present situation is so seri­ ous that if he remains so old-fashioned as to be concerned with diplomatic formulas only, the existence of the Dutch East Indies will be in danger, and he can not keep pace with the changing situation. He openly tried to do his utmost to evade political problems. He evinced not the slightest sign of fervor to try to sound out the true inten­ tion of the Japanese Government towards the Dutch East Indies. In as much as he does not understand our real idea of friendly relations between the two countries, it is no use for us to continue the negotiations with such a Governor General. It has made me feel that I have come all this way in vain.10

The details of the ensuing long and tedious discussions need not detain us here. Kobayashi remained at his post until the outlines of an oil agree­ ment were reached on October 16, 1940, but the details of this agreement were left for further negotiation. The Japanese had begun by asking for 3.000. 000 tons of oil annually, a fivefold increase over what they had there­ tofore been getting. The Dutch had declared such quantities beyond their productive capacity and eventually the Japanese had been obliged to com­ promise on much more modest figures. They were promised a spot sale of 33,000 tons of aviation gasoline, as against the 400,000 tons annually that they had proposed. Furthermore, their demand for 1,100,000 tons of avia­ tion crude was scaled down to 120,000 tons, and their demand for 1.000. 000 tons of other crude oil was reduced to 540,000 tons. Nothing came of their efforts to secure a measure of control over the oil industry, while their suggestions for “friendly cooperation” in the larger sphere were po­ litely ignored.11 The State Department estimate that the Japanese would not for the pres­ ent attack the Netherlands Indies thus proved sound. The Tokyo Govern­ ment did succeed in securing some additional oil from the Indies, but it had not forced the issue of “friendly cooperation,” which the Netherlands au­ thorities knew only too well was designed as the first step toward the integra­ tion of their Pacific possessions in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Evidently the Japanese did not as yet feel the need for extreme measures and furthermore considered themselves too unprepared to risk conflict with the great sea powers. Before taking further action against the Indies they undoubtedly thought it necessary to secure their flank. Tokyo’s main effort, therefore, was directed toward French Indo-China, where in fact the Japanese secured their first resounding and fateful success. 10 Tel. from Kobayashi to Matsuoka, September 13, 1940 (Toyko War Crimes Docu­ ments, No. 2748A[6]). 11 Van Mook: The Netherlands Indies and Japan, 49 ff., reviews the negotiations in some detail. We have used also a long review despatch of November 27, 1940, by Mr. Achilles, American Chargé d*Affaires assigned to the Netherlands Government-in-Exile ; a memo by the President of the Standard Vacuum Oil Company, September 27, 1940 (Morgent hau Diaries, MS., Vol. 318, pp. 155 ff.); and the news reports in the New York Herald Tribune, August 16 and 29, 1940, and The New York Times, August 30, September 13 and 25, 1940.

THE TRIPARTITE PACT

7

decision to close the Burma Road and withdraw from Shanghai. Mr. Hornbeck, the State Department’s chief adviser on Far Eastern affairs, was con­ vinced that the Japanese would not make a sudden attack on the Indies or Singapore unless driven to desperation, and perhaps not even then. If they advanced at all, he held, they would do so in a series of steps designed to safeguard their flank. Evidently Secretary Hull and the President accepted this estimate, for the Administration refused to go beyond the public declara­ tions of April, 1940, in favor of the status quo in the Indies. In reply to Dutch pleas for postponement of any further oil embargo, Under Secretary Welles remarked that, even Dutch interests would not be served by “an [American] attitude of complete supine acquiescence in the continuing and ever-enlarging policy of Japanese aggression in the Pacific region.” T These remarks were hardly called for, since the Netherlands authorities were determined to resist Japanese pressure to the best of their ability. At the end of July, 1940, the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo, General Pabst, was informed by the Japanese Foreign Office of Japan’s intention to increase substantially its demands for oil from the Indies and to send an imposing delegation to Batavia to negotiate a general settlement. The Dutch agreed, but managed to delay the arrival of the mission for some weeks. Not until the end of August was the appointment of Mr. Kobayashi, the Japanese Minister of Commerce and Industry, as head of the mission announced, and not until September 12, 1940, did he arrive in the Indies with his large and impressive staff.' From the Japanese records now available it is reasonably clear that Tokyo naval authorities were much opposed to the use of force against the Nether­ lands Indies at this time, feeling as they did that Japan was not yet prepared to face a conflict at sea with the United States and Britain.' Under the cir­ cumstances the Kobayashi Mission was not authorized to press its demands to the limit. The Netherlands authorities persisted in evading all proposals or suggestions for political agreements and even for general economic ar­ rangements. They took the stand that Japanese demands for oil should be discussed with the oil companies, but that Japanese desires for a share of control in those companies could not be met. After his first conversations in Batavia, Minister Kobayashi reported to Matsuoka in great discourage­ ment: 7 Tel. from Kennedy, August 6, 1940; memo from the Australian Minister in Wash­ ington, with comments by Mr. Hombcck, August >14, 1940; memo of conversation be­ tween Mr. Welles and the Netherlands Chargé d’Affaires, September 24, 1940. We have used also a memo of conversation between Secretary of the Treasury Morgcnthau and Sir Andrew Agnew, Chairman of the British Petroleum Board, September 3, 1940 (in Morgenthau Diaries, M S., Vol. 302, p. 152), and the Stimson Diary (M S.), September 11, 1940, reporting a conversation with Mr. Hombcck. 9 Hubertus van Mook: The Netherlands Indies and Japan (New York: 1944), 44-46; Grew Diary (MS.), August 3 and 24, 1940. 9“Kido Diary,” August 10, 1940 (Tokyo War Crimes Documents, No. 1632HH).

10

THE UNDECLARED WAR

mirai Decoux was instructed to resist any attempt by the Japanese to land forces, the Vichy Government decided to pick up the threads of the CatrouxNishihara conversations, that is, to accept discussion of Japanese require­ ments, but only in return for Tokyo’s recognition of French sovereignty and of Indo-China’s territorial integrity. It was Vichy’s hope that by this ap­ proach some time could be bought during which American support might be enlisted.14 On August 5, 1940, concurrent with the despatch of the French reply to Tokyo, the Vichy Foreign Office instructed Count Saint-Quentin, the Am­ bassador in Washington, to inform the United States Government confi­ dentially of the Japanese demands and indicate that “the resistance of the French Government to the Japanese demands would necessarily depend to a large extent on the nature and effectiveness of the support which the Ameri­ can Government would be disposed to give it.” Apparently this important matter was referred at once to the President. Of the discussions in the White House nothing is known, but on August 6, 1940, Mr. Dunn, Political Ad­ viser of the State Department, gave the French Ambassador an oral reply. To quote Mr. Dunn’s notes: I told the French Ambassador that we have been doing and are doing everything possible within the framework of our established policies to keep the situation in the Far East stabilized; that we have been progressively taking various steps, the effect of which has been to exert economic pressure on Japan; that our Fleet is now based on Hawaii, and that the course which we have been following, as indicated above, gives a clear indication of our intentions and activities for the future. I also raised with the French Ambassador the question whether it would be practicable for the French to delay discussions with the Japanese with respect to Indo-China for a period.

Saint-Quentin at once remarked that this reply would probably not enable the French Government to resist the Japanese demands and that it would in all likelihood be impracticable to delay the negotiations: He went on to say that in his opinion the phrase “within the framework of our established policies,” when associated with the apparent reluctance of the American Government to consider the use of military force in the Far East at this particular time, meant that the United States would not use military or naval force in support of any position which might be taken to resist the Japanese attempted aggression on Indo-China.

Mr. Dunn made no effort to gainsay this interpretation of his words, where­ upon the Ambassador reported to his Government that there was no pros­ pect of active American aid against Japan.1* 14 Private Diaries of Paul Baudouin, 187-88; François Charles-Roux: Cinq mois tragiques aux Affaires étrangères (Paris, 1949), 250-51; Decoux: A la barre de l’Indo­ chine, 94. 15 Tel. from Murphy (Vichy), August 4, 1940, reporting the coining French démarche; aide-mémoire from the French Embassy in Washington, August 6 ; memo from Mr. Dunn

THE TRIPARTITE PACT

11

Although the State Department scrupulously avoided holding out hope of armed assistance to the French, Ambassador Grew was at once instructed to call on Matsuoka and point out to him that the United States Government was “seriously perturbed” by the reports of Japanese demands on IndoChina. The Ambassador was to recall Secretary Hull’s statements of April 17 and May 11, 1940, regarding the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands Indies, and to indicate that in the view of the Washington Government the same doctrine applied also to Indo-China. Matsuoka de­ clined to discuss the matter, but suggested that the newspaper reports were greatly exaggerated. He then remarked confidentially that the French Gov­ ernment had already accepted the Japanese demands in principle. While this observation was perhaps technically correct, it certainly conveyed an erroneous impression and may well have prejudiced the State Department against the French policy.*16 Despite Ambassador Saint-Quentin’s remarks to Mr. Dunn, the Vichy Government decided to do everything possible to stall off the Japanese, and so informed Washington. Furthermore, an effort was made by the French to enlist German support against Tokyo.17 The Germans expressed sympathy but refused to intervene, so the Vichy Government had to manage as best it could. O n August 9 and 10 the French Ambassador in Tokyo had several conversations with officials of the Japanese Foreign Office. The latter were somewhat more conciliatory but nonetheless insistent. They evaded French demands for political guarantees and refused to be pinned down by concrete specifications as to the numbers of troops and types of airfields they en­ visaged.16 At Vichy the reports of Tokyo’s obduracy provoked a minor crisis. Gen­ eral Weygand, the Minister of Defense, initially favored out-and-out resist­ ance, relying on figures produced by the Chief of Staff of the Colonial Forces to prove that such resistance was feasible. M. Lémery, the Minister for Colonies, and other members of the Cabinet took the same stand. But M. Baudouin challenged the figures of the military, contended that resist­ ance was simply impossible, pointed out that in any case resistance would to Under Secretary Welles, August 6, 1940; Private Diaries of Paul Baudouin, 188, 193; Charles-Roux: Cinq mois tragiques, 251-52, giving the text of Saint-Quentin’s report, which corresponds completely with the American record. 16 Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, II, 289-90; tel. to Grew, August 6, and tel. from Grew, August 7, 1940; memos of conversation between Mr. Hamilton and M. Truelle of the French Embassy, August 7, 8, 1940. London and Chungking were informed of the American démarche in Tokyo, which was followed a few days later by a similar British step (tel. to Johnson, August 14; tel. to Kennedy, August 15, 1940). 17 Conversation of General Huntziger with General Stülpnagel, August 8, 1940, in La délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice (Paris, 1947), pp. 106 ff. lê Japanese Foreign Office memo (Toyko War Crimes Documents, No. 985A) ; Private Diaries of Paul Baudouin, 193, 198-99; Charles-Roux: Cinq mois tragiques, 252-53.

12

THE UNDECLARED WAR

lead to the total loss of Indo-China, and pleaded that some sort of agree­ ment was imperative.19 The Foreign Minister had his way; on August 15 the Vichy Government despatched new proposals to Tokyo. These proved highly irritating to Matsuoka, who threatened to drop the negotiations “and execute military actions.” As the crisis approached its climax, both Tokyo and Vichy turned to the Germans for support, but neither was given en­ couragement.20 On the evening of August 16, 1940, the French Cabinet concluded that further resistance was inadvisable, and on the following day M. Baudouin explained to the American Chargé d’Affaires that “in the absence of any material support from Great Britain and the United States as distinguished from the enunciation of principles” France felt obliged to yield. He warmly disclaimed German pressure on Vichy and declared the entire episode “a terrible blow.” The Chargé d’Affaires, according to the French version, ex­ pressed his deep understanding of France’s plight and stated that “it would be vain to expect from the American Government anything other than a verbal condemnation of Japanese initiatives.” M. Baudouin thereupon sug­ gested that Washington warn Japan that the military occupation of IndoChina must be purely temporary. This suggestion was then transmitted to Washington and on August 21 elicited from Under Secretary Welles a state­ ment to the French Ambassador, which the latter reported as follows: We understand the situation of position to come to its assistance, it for according military facilities that its occupation be temporary, would be a violation of the status insist upon.21

the French Government and, since we arc not in a we do not feel that we have the right to reproach to Japan. But, if we were to recommend to Tokyo we would be accepting the principle of it. But this quo, the maintenance of which we shall continue to

For the purposes of the present study it is unnecessary to review all phases of the final negotiations. The French stood by their demand for political assurances and did what they could to delay and restrict their concessions to the Japanese. Matsuoka, in turn, maintained his threatening attitude and let it be understood that it was the High Command of the Canton Army which insisted on Indo-Chinese facilities as necessary to promote its cam19 Private Diaries of Paul Baudouin, 198-99; Général Maxime Weygand: Mémoires: Rappelé au service (Paris, 1950), 336-39; Charles-Roux: Cinq mois tragiques, 253; Maurice Martin du Gard: La carte impériale (Paris, 1949), 427. 20 Tel. from Ambassador Ott to the German Foreign Office, August 15, 1940 (Tokyo War Crimes Documents, No. 4029E) ; La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d*Armistice, 131. 21 Text in Charles-Roux: Cinq mois tragiques, 255; summary in The Private Diaries of Paul Baudouin, 203-4, 21 These statements were referred to in detail in a French memorandum reviewing the Indo-China crisis, transmitted in a tel. from Matthews, September 19, 1940. The tel. from Murphy, August 17, 1940, is in the State Department files, but we have been unable to locate any record of Mr. Welles’s conversation with Ambassador Saint-Quentin on August 21, 1940.

THE TRIPARTITE PACT

13

paign against China. Finally, on August 29, 1940, Matsuoka and Ambas­ sador Arsène Henry signed a political accord, under the terms of which the Tokyo Government recognized the “permanent French interest in IndoChina,” while the Vichy Government in its turn recognized the “preponder­ ance of Japanese interest in that area.” This agreement, however, was to go into effect only after the conclusion of a military arrangement, to be nego­ tiated at Hanoi, the capital of Tonkin.2* Almost before the ink was dry on the political agreement, General Nishihara on August 30, 1940, presented Governor General Decoux with the text of a military accord, requesting or rather demanding French signature by September 2 (midnight) at the latest. The Japanese emissary and his aides were “ insolent, haughty and angry,” and insisted that negotiations be opened forthwith. Decoux replied that he needed time to decode the text of the Tokyo agreement and that he had no instructions from Vichy, whereupon Nishihara told him “to stop sleeping, to get busy, or take the conse­ quences.” ** The Governor General, however, was not to be intimidated. He had in fact been urging Vichy to refuse military concessions on the plea that they would make Indo-China a Japanese satellite, and had been arguing that Japan would not dare use force, in view of the attitude of other powers. Supported by the local military commander. General Martin, Decoux was quite prepared to offer armed resistance, though he had only a few planes and some antiquated tanks.*4 Acting on his own, the Governor General on September 2 rejected the Japanese ultimatum, whereupon Nishihara announced that the military oc­ cupation of Indo-China would begin on September 5. Meanwhile, however, Vichy had appealed to Tokyo, which disavowed Nishihara. The situation was somewhat eased and by September 5 an agreement in principle was ar­ rived at, the details to be discussed by the respective military staffs. The French negotiators exerted themselves to delay these discussions as long as possible, in the hope that support from the western powers might yet serve to deter the Japanese. In the interval the situation again grew tense. The Japanese Canton Army was on the frontier, eager to advance on the colony; the Chinese Government, for its part, was threatening to send in forces if the French Government permitted the Japanese to use Indo-China as a base of attack on Yunnan; finally, the Siamese Government was pressing long­ standing claims to Indo-Chinese territory west of the Mekong River.*5 22 Japanese Foreign Office memo (Tokyo War Crimes Documents, No. 985A) ; Private Diaries of Paul Baudouin, 211-23; tel. from Matthews (Vichy), August 17, 1940. 23 Report of Mr. Nicholson to Secretary Morgenthau, quoting Decoux’s account, Sep­ tember 21, 1940 (Morgenthau Diaries, MS., Vol. 308, pp. 239 ff.) ; Decoux: A la barre de PIndochine, 103. 24 Decoux: A la barre de FIndochine, 98-101; du Gard: La carte impériale, 428; testimony of General Martin (Procès de M. Pétain, Paris, 1945, p. 277)* 23 Decoux: A la barre de VIndochine, >107 ff., 132 ff.; Charles-Roux: Cinq mois tragiques, 260 ff.; tels, from American representatives at Hanoi, August 31; Saigon, September 4; Chungking, September 3; and Tokyo, September 6, 1940.

14<