The Twilight Of A Military Tradition: Italian Aristocrats And European Conflicts, 1560-1800 9781857287042, 1857287045

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The tw ilight o f a m ilita ry trad itio n

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The tw iligh t o f a m ilita ry tra d itio n Italian aristocrats and E uropean conflicts, 1560-1800

G regory H anlon Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia

D Routledge Taylor &. Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK

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First published in 1998 by UCL Press Published 2014 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon 0X14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY, 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint o f the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © Gregory Hanlon 1998 This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. No reproduction without permission. All rights reserved. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 13: 978-1-857-28704-2 (pbk)

Typeset by Best-set Typesetter Ltd, Hong Kong.

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C ontents

List o f figures Preface

vii xi

Introduction

1

1 Knights and corsairs in the M editerranean

9

Originality of M editerranean warfare The clash of great fleets Corsairs and maritime raiding

2 Italy in the age o f Habsburg hegemony, 1560-1620 The Spanish system in Italy Wars of religion in Flanders and France Crusade in H ungary against Islam First challenge: the V enetian-Piedm ontese alliance

3 The Forty Years W ar, 1618-59 The T he The T he

G erm an civil war resumption of the Netherlands W ar war in Italy and its impact Castro W ar, 1642-9

4 The Venetian epic, 160 0 -17 18 T he The T he T he

military potential of the aristocratic republic C andia W ar, 1645-70 M orea W ar, 1684-99 end of empire

9 15 26

47 47 69 81 87

93 93 100 106 134

143 143 149 164 172

v

CONTENTS

5The Spanish crisis and the rise o f Austria, 16 6 0 -17 10 Spanish exhaustion after 1660 Austrian horizons expanding

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6

Profiles and careers Lessons from the encyclopedias M ilitary officers and military ‘enterprisers’ H onour and reputation The pursuit of noble causes

7

The Piedmontese exception The development of the Piedmontese military state The great wars and Piedmontese survival, 1690-1748 Inside the Piedmontese army

8 The G reat Powers and Italian dem ilitarization, 1700-1814 The Italian military low-pressure zone M inor states rearm Parm a Genoa M odena Tuscany The Neapolitan military experiment Bonaparte and the new Italian army

9

The m ilitary im agination Applied Ariosto Towards a disciplinary society? Conclusion: a project for research

Index

VI

179 179 202

221 221 241 261 268

275 275 285 297

303 303 313 314 316 320 321 322 326

329 329 342 356

359

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List o f fig ures

M aps M ap 1.1 Naval bases in the western M editerranean in the seventeenth century (after J . Alcala-famoray Queipo de Llano, “Razon de estado y

geostrategia en la politica Italiana de Carlos II: Florencia y los presidos (1677-81)”, in Boleti de la Real Academia de la Historia, 173, 1976, p. 337J

17

Map 2.1 Political boundaries in Italy, after 1560

48

Map 2.2 Coastal fortifications in southern Italy, after 1600

52

Map 2.3 Principalities and fiefs in northern Italy, circa 1600

55

Map 2.4 M ountains, passes and major fortresses in north-west Italy, circa 1610

56

Map 2.5 Tuscan fortresses and citadels, circa 1620

64

Map 2 .6 H absburg territories and their allies, circa 1620

87

Map 3.1 The campaign against Genoa in 1625

110

Map 3.2 Papal annexations, 1597-1649

135

Map 3.3 Zones ravaged by war in north-central Italy, 1613-59

141

Map 4.1 The Venetian seaborne empire, circa 1620

144

M ap 4.2 Plan of Candia, 1669 (based on Dapper)

162

M ap 4.3 T he Aegean military theatre, 1645-1718

166

M ap 5.1 ‘Friends’ of the king of Spain in central and northern Italy,

1560-1610 (Knights of Santiago, Alcantara, Calatrava and Montesa) (based on Vignau & Chagon, Indice de pruebas de los caballeros que ban vestido el habito de Santiago desde el ano 1501 hasta la fecha (Madrid: 1901); and Vignau & Chagon, Indice de pruebas de los caballeros que han vestido el habito de Calatrava, Alcantaray Montesa, desde el Siglo X V I hasta la fecha (Madrid: 1903) y)

183

Map 5.2 ‘Friends’ of the king of Spain in the Mezzogiorno and the

islands, 1560-1610 (Knights of Santiago, Alcantara, Calatrava and Montesa) (based on Vignau & Chagon)

184

Map 5.3 ‘Friends’ of the king of Spain in central and northern Italy,

1610-60 (Knights of Santiago, Alcantara, Calatrava and Montesa) (based on Vignau & Chagon)

185

V ll

LIST OF FIGURES

Map 5.4 ‘Friends’ of the king of Spain in the Mezzogiorno and the

islands, 1610-60 (Knights of Santiago, Alcantara, Calatrava and Montesa) (based on Vignau & Chagon)

186

M ap 5.5 ‘Friends’ of the king of Spain in central and northern Italy,

1660-1710 (Knights of Santiago, Alcantara, Calatrava and Montesa)

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(based on Vignau & Chagon)

187

Map 5.6 ‘Friends’ of the king of Spain in the Mezzogiorno and the

islands, 1660-1710 (Knights of Santiago, Alcantara, Calatrava and Montesa) (based on Vignau & Chagon)

188

Map 6.1 Origin of south Italian officers, 1560-1710 (based on Encyclopedias. Corrado Argegni, Enciclopedia biografica italiana, vol. 19: Condottieri, capitani e tribuni, 3 vols (Rome: 1936); Luigi Maggiorotti, Uopera del genio italiano all3 estero, 3 vols (Rome 1933-9). Aldo Valori, Condottieri e generali del Seicento (Rome: 1946)J

224

Map 6.2 Origin of north Italian officers, 1560-1710 (based on Encyclopedias)

225

Map 6.3 Origin of Italian officers in Spanish service, 1560-1610 (northern and central Italy) (based on Encyclopedias)

228

Map 6.4 Origin of Italian officers in Spanish service, 1560-1610 (southern Italy) (based on Encyclopedias)

229

Map 6.5 Origin of Italian officers in Spanish service, 1610-60 (northern and central Italy) (based on Encyclopedias)

230

Map 6.6 Origin of Italian officers in Spanish service, 1610-60 (southern Italy) (based on Encyclopedias)

231

Map 6.7 Origin of Italian officers in Spanish service, 1660-1710 (northern and central Italy) (based on Encyclopedias)

232

Map 6.8 Origin of Italian officers in Spanish service, 1660-1710 (southern Italy) (based on Encyclopedias)

233

Map 6.9 Origin of Italian officers in Papal service, 1560-1710 (based on Encyclopedias)

234

Map 6.10 Origin of Italian officers in Papal service, 1660-1710 (based on Encyclopedias)

235

Map 6.11 Origin of Italian officers in Papal service, 1667 (based on Georg Lutz)

236

Map 6.12 Origin of Italian officers in Venetian service, 1560-1710 (based on Encyclopedias)

237

Map 6.13 Origin of Italian officers in Piedmontese service, 1560-1710 (based on Encyclopedias)

238

Map 6.14 Origin of Italian officers in Piedmontese service, 1560-1610 (based on Encyclopedias)

239

van

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LIST OF FIGURES

Map 6.15 Origin of Italian officers in Piedmontese sendee, 1610-60 (based on Encyclopedias)

240

M ap 6.16 Origin of Italian officers in Piedmontese sendee, 1660-1710 (based on Encyclopedias)

241

Map 6.17 Origin of Italian officers in French sendee, 1560-1710 (based on Encyclopedias)

242

Map 6.18 Origin of Italian officers in Austrian sendee, 1560-1710 (based on Encyclopedias)

243

Map 6.19 Origin of Italian officers in Tuscan sendee, 1560-1710 (based on Encyclopedias)

244

Map 6.20 Origin of Italian officers in Genoese sendee, 1560-1710 (based on Encyclopedias)

245

Map 6.21 Origin of Italian officers in M antuan sendee, 1560-1710 (based on Encyclopedias)

246

Map 6.22 Origin of Italian officers in Modenese service, 1560-1710 (based on Encyclopedias)

247

Map 6.23 Origin of Italian officers in Parm an service, 1560-1710 (based on Encyclopedias)

248

Map 7.1 Plan of Turin, 1695 (based on Ancelin)

285

Map 7.2 Piedmontese fortresses, circa 1700

289

Map 9.1 Origin of Italian engineers, 1560-1710

(basedon Encyclopedias)

348

G ra p h s Graph 6.1 Italian military careers, 1560-1710 (incareer segments)

249

Graph 6.2 Chronology7 of Italian military career segments,1560-1720

249

Graph 6.3 Italian nobles in Spanish sendee, 1560-1720

250

Graph 6.4 Italian nobles in Imperial sendee, 1560-1720

250

Graph 6.5 Italian nobles in French sendee, 1560-1720

250

Graph 6.6 Italian nobles in Venetian sendee, 1560-1720

251

Graph 6.7 Italian nobles in Piedmontese sendee, 1560-1720

251

Graph 6.8 Italian military7 careers in m inor states, 1560—1720

252

Graph 6.9 Italian nobles in Genoese service, 1560-1720

252

Italian

nobles

in

M antuan sendee, 1560-1720

Graph 6.11

Italian

nobles

in

Modenese sendee, 1560-1720 253

Graph 6.12

Italian

nobles

in

Parm an service, 1560-1720

Graph 6.10

Graph 6.13 Total Italian casualties, 1560-1700

252 253 254

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P reface

The inspiration for this book sprang from my encounter with a single source, the Compendio Istorico di Sanesi Nobili, a list of accomplishments of Sienese aristocrats, compiled by the canon Antonio Sestigiani in 1695. I had just begun research on a long-term project, funded by the Social Sciences and Hum anities Research Council of Canada, focusing on relations of authority7and deference around Siena in the M edicean period, and knew that I had to acquire information on the background of the city’s patriciate. From the elegant calligraphy surged hundreds of military careers, complete with sendee dates, ranks achieved and often the fate of individuals never fortunate enough to achieve the fame they sought. I had only a gentleman’s knowledge of the maritime campaigns in the Levant, and only passing familiarity with prom inent Italian generals sendng Spain, France and the Empire. H ere was m uch of European history7witnessed and acted out by a great gallery of heroes and rogues, whose num ber tapered off substantially after the middle of the seventeenth century7. W ithout abandoning my ‘official’ research project, I began to collect Sienese data on the subject. The SSHRC has contributed to this book m ore than it knows. I gradually expanded the scope of this study in tandem with a gifted MA student, Elmar Henrich, who wanted to explore the H absburg m onarchies’ reliance on Italians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in both M adrid and Vienna. It was Elmar who ferreted out the Fascist encyclopedias. T heir compilations allow a glimpse of the military7activity of nobles from all over the peninsula. There was no way7 of knowing how reliable they were without looking at the political evolution of the peninsula and the military infrastructure over the long term. This we did by drawing upon the resources, the goodwill and the patience of the people in the Dalhousie University7Killam Library7inter-library7loan departm ent, in particular Gwyn Pace and Kelly Hawley. Libraries on two continents deposited truly won­ drous and rare books into the mail for our purposes over the last few years. In addition, Tom maso Astarita allowed me to consult his valuable tesi di laurea on the Neapolitan garrison army in the period of Spain’s decline, and M artine LambertGorges sent me the typescript of an im portant article on Spanish military orders which is presently in press. T he text of this book was composed pretty much in isolation. Only an unex­

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PREFACE

pected teaching appointm ent at the Ecole Nationale des Chartes and the Sorbonne in 1996 allowed me to bounce the results off the eminent French historians Je a n Berenger, Yves-Marie Berce and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie. Michel Fontenay and Jean-Frangois Pernot were helpful too, on specific points, while Jean-Pierre Bost in Bordeaux provided background assistance. In Britain, Jerem y Black’s encouragement has accelerated the publication process. I owe thanks to Bruce Bonaney, for his appreciated logistical support in my trips to the Robarts Library in Toronto. Marie-Blandine Duclap in Paris has helped this project and all the others in ways too numerous to account for individually. And finally I would like to thank my wife Anne for tolerating periods when I spent long evenings in front of a word processor.

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Introduction

H ilarity erupts - “S hort book!” - w henever I reveal th a t the subject o f this book is Italian w ar heroes: an oxym oron, I am assured, by Italians or foreigners, in Italy an d outside, since “Italians are anything b u t” . V irtually everyone has an idea ab o u t the subject, inspired by superficial knowledge o f battles since the Risorgim ento, such as N ov ara (1848), A dow a (1885), C ap o retto (1917) an d the debacle o f the Second W orld W ar. T h e consensus is th a t Italian society, w hatever its o th e r characteristics, an d for good o r ill, is n o t m ilitarily inclined. Fascist attem pts to transform Italians simply dissolved into tragic slapstick. T his im pres­ sion o f Italian disinclination for fighting has venerable roots an d a long pedigree, dating back at least as far as G uicciardini. H is p o rtray al o f bloodless condottieri cam paigns still holds sway am ong the literati. In the view o f th a t rem arkable historian, Italians w ere co n ten t for m an y years w ith the images o f w ar, b u t n o t its substance, a n d at the critical m o m en t they lacked the resolve to confront the “furore Jrancese”. H is portray al o f m ercenary pseudo-w ar a n d bellicose posturing, “explains” the collapse o f Italian arm ies w hen confronted w ith the F rench inva­ sion o f 1494.1 T his book will therefore address a historical enigm a. After situating the place o f Italian m ilitary com m anders, officers an d adventurers at the close o f the w ars o f Italy in 1 5 5 9 ,1 will ch art th eir progress a n d decline. It is h ard n o t to discern the progressive estrangem ent o flta lia n society from m artial pursuits, over m ore th an two centuries betw een L epanto (1571) an d the invasions by F rench revolutionary arm ies in the 1790s. G iven the extrem e diversity o f the m aterial available, an d the uneven interest o f generations o f historians, som e parts o f this account will be m ore detailed th a n others. T h e treaty o f C ateau-C am bresis in 1559 is p ro b ab ly a good place to begin, for it b ro u g h t to a com plete halt the long series o f regional wars devastating m ost o f the peninsula over m o re th an h a lf a century'. T h e treaty im posed a Pax Hispanica on the peninsula, followed by the dem obilization o f the captains an d their soldiers. If one can argue th a t Italian society was m ilitarily am ateurish at the end o f the fifteenth century, this was certainly u n tru e after two

1 F. G uicciardini, “ S toria d ’lta lia ” , in Opere, V. de C ap rariis (ed.) (M ilan: 1961), p. 434.

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T H E T W IL IG H T O F A M IL IT A R Y T R A D IT IO N

generations of ‘decisive battles’ like Fornovo, R av en n a, M arig n an o an d Pavia, an d o f great sieges like those o f R om e, N aples an d Siena. I f Italy was a battlefield for m ercenaries hailing from A ndalusia to Sw itzerland, nevertheless Italian knights, m ercenaries, militias and cities w ere caught up in the fighting m ore th an they cared. By the tim e o f N apoleon, how ever, the passivity o flta lia n states to his conquering arm ies revealed both a lack o f spirit, an d a lack o f m eans, w ith w hich to resist the invader. T h e peninsula (with the notable exception o f Piedm ont) h ad dem ilitarized to such an extent th a t the Italian states considered organized resist­ ance to be im practical an d hopeless. B onaparte in tu rn cam e to realize the full extent o f it as he strove to create a m odern, efficient, an d disciplined arm y from scratch. O ver a century later, w ould-be Fascist w arlords sought to com plete this process. Italy’s case stands in stark contrast to the general E u ro p ean experience o f the seventeenth an d eighteenth centuries, th a t o f the gradual establishm ent o f p e rm a ­ n en t arm ies, an d the thronging o f aristocracies into them . T h e increase in effective forces was o f an order n o t d ream t o f in the R enaissance. W h e th e r this was a m ilitary ‘revolution’ is a m atter o f debate, the term s o f w hich have been form u­ lated by M ichael R ob erts an d Geoffrey P arker.2 A ndre Corvisier supplies some rough figures for this. A first approxim ation for 1621 gives ab o u t 500,000 m en u n d er arm s, o f w hom 200,000 were situated in E astern an d B alkan E urope. By 1710, this figure, still excluding militias, reached 1.3 m illion soldiers, o f w hom 800.000 at least served in west E uropean arm ies. In F rance alone, there w ere 100.000 m en u n d er arm s in 1635, 200,000 in 1640, an d m aybe 500,000 in 1690, w hen one m an in ten o f age to carry arm s and one gentlem an in th ree was serving in the arm y.3In short, n orth ern E urope arm ed an d regim ented itself ju st as Italian patricians an d feudatories consigned their arm o u r an d w eapons to display cases. T his developm ent has m any im plications for the ulterior evolution o f the p en in ­ sula’s history. W h at effect did it have on the developm ent o f the m o d ern state in Italy? W h a t effect did dem ilitarization have on the dynam ic o f Italian society, for military' careers carry a baggage o f cultural assum ptions ab o u t social discipline, order an d efficiency, technical progress an d oth er ‘virtues’? T h ese are im p o rta n t questions, w ith ram ifications far rem oved from the trad itio n al historiography o f ‘battle history’. T o cite a form ula coined by the Italian m ilitary historian Piero Pieri, w ar constitutes “une certaiwfa(on de voir, de considerer, d'expliquer I’histoiregenerate

’ F or a succinct form ulation o f the argum ent, see the intro d u ctio n to G eoffrey P a rk e r’s p a th b re ak in g book, The army o f Flanders and the Spanish Road (1567-1659): the logistics o f Spanish victory and defeat in the Low Countries’ wars (C am bridge: 1972), pp. 3 -2 1 . 3 A. C orvisier, “ In tro d u ctio n ” , in Guerre etpaix dans VEurope du XVIIe sikle (Paris: 1991), vol. 1, pp. 19-31. J o h n L ynn has recalculated these figures for F ran ce in a re ce n t article, red u cin g them by a q u arter. T h e general trend, how ever, rem ains clear. See J . L ynn, “R ecalculating F ren ch a rm y grow th du rin g the Grand siecle, 1 6 1 0 -1 7 1 5 ” , French Historical Studies, 1994, pp. 8 8 1 -9 0 6 .

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des hommes” *T hese issues revolving aro u n d w ar are p reg n an t w ith significance for social history' an d the history' o f behaviour, although it is p rem atu re to assign to dem ilitarization any causal role in the long subjugation o f the peninsula to G reat Pow er politics. T h o u g h the w ork here is the first o f its kind in scope an d direction, the subject is slowly grow ing on the consciousness o f Italian historians, each in their region. W h at I plan here is to survey the secondary' literature, b o th Italian an d foreign over the last century' an d a half. R a th e r th a n a conventional research m on o g rap h based on archival m aterial, this w ork is w h at the F rench sociologist an d epistemologist R a ym ond B oudon w ould call a ‘pre-enquete’, a summary' o f the question aim ing to review some o f o u r preconceptions, an d to reveal some trends. These im pressions can be confirm ed or u n d erm in ed by further research.5Before dealing w ith the m aterial here, though, the historiography o f the topic invites some reflections an d hints at useful directions an d correctives. T h e literature available, quantitatively alm ost inexhaustible, is o f m ixed quality. Previous generations of historians w ere keenly sensitive to military' an d diplom atic history', so we have som e excellent works based on p ro p er archives, explored w ith judicious reflection an d analysis.6O th e r authors, oblivious o f the need to cite sources, w ere co n ten t to repackage historical w riting o f previous centuries. In such cases, the origin o f the inform ation rem ains m ysterious or suspect. G iven the patriotic or celebratory' n atu re o f this literature, some individuals, some events, an d some cam paigns were b etter treated th an others, as m ore glorious, inspiring, or to em ploy the term inol­ ogy o f the tim e, as “w orth rem em bering” . T h e greatest obstacle in collecting p ertin en t local studies has been Italian dislike for the period, although this is changing. T h e R isorgim ento cast the term s in w hich the period is studied. T hese are called the “forgotten centuries” , w here the history o f the peninsula was overshadow ed by events unfolding elsewhere. T h e F rench invasion o f 1494 in au g u rated a p eriod in w hich foreign arm ies o f m ore w arlike lands subjugated an d im posed th eir will on Italians. T h e ir rap id success was a reflection o f Italian m ilitary inefficiency th a t M acchiavelli likened to dilet­ 4 P. Pieri, “ S u r les dim ensions de l’histoire m ilitaire” , Annales: Economies, Societes, Civilisations, 1963, pp. 6 2 5 -3 8 , a t p. 626. 5 R. B oudon, Les methodes en sociologie (Paris: 1969), p. 33. 6 T h e w ork by C am illo M an fro n i on the knights o f S anto Stefano, now over a century' old, com es to m in d as a dispassionate evaluation o f th eir place in m aritim e history, a n d how well th eir actions c o rresp o n d ed to th eir intentions. See C. M anfroni, La marina militare del granducato mediceo (Rom e: 1895). Sim ilarly, the substantial w ork by N . G iorgetti, Le armi toscane, 1 5 3 7 -1 8 6 0 , 3 vols (C itta di C astello: 1916). Less scholarly books include: L. C onforti, INapoktani a Lepanto: ricerche storiche (Naples: 1886); C. R an d accio , Storia delle marine militari italiane, dal 1750 al I8 6 0 , e della marina militare italiana dal 1860 al 1870 (Rom e: 1886); a n d two books by A. B e rnardy a t the tu rn o f the century, derived from p rin te d sources, Venezia e il Turco nella seconda meta del secolo X V II (Florence: 1902), a n d L ’ultima guerra turcoveneziana (1714—18) (Florence: 1902).

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tantism , a degeneration o f the warlike spirit p erv erted by the fam ous condottieri. T h ey preferred bloodless m anoeuvring in chess-like fashion, to the bloody chaos an d risk o f a pitched battle. T hese w arlords h ad w axed fat by prolonging lim ited wars th a t m ade them b oth rich an d indispensable. H istorians o f this century, from F rederick T aylor an d Piero Pieri to M ichael M allett concur, describing the a rt o f w ar o f the condottiere, as a “kind o f giant kriegspiel” . T h e ‘n atio n al’ arm ies invading th e peninsula cam e as pupils to im prove th eir know ledge o f w ar as a perform ance a rt.8 A ccording to the R isorgim ento or nationalist in terp retatio n , refined b u t n ot revised by B enedetto C roce, the m ost influential Italian historian o f the first h alf o f th e tw entieth century, R enaissance condottieri w ielded pow er in a society th a t h ad becom e civilian, or ‘soft’. C ity militias disarm ed, an d states m ain tain ed public o rd er w ith small garrisons. T y ra n t princes an d oligarchic republics h ad good reason to disarm their subjects an d confide their security to m ercen ary w arlords. O nly the condottieri retained the ‘m ilitary spirit,’ a sense o f self-confidence, pride an d prepotenza w ith respect to civilians. T his w ould lead, in the C ro cean idealist language em ployed by Piero Pieri, to a generalized ‘spiritual insufficiency’ o f the social elite as citizens an d as Italians, once the geographical expression th a t was Italy was invaded by a large arm y led by an aggressive prince a n d a w arrior nobility. R isorgim ento historians see the collapse o f the Italian m ilitary spirit as p a rt o f a larger crisis o f national identity an d constitutional w rangling o f petty states unable to place their Italianitd over vested interests an d regional hegem ony.9 M ilitary agents rem aining in Italy (and they were still plentiful) cravenly placed themselves in the service o f foreign princes. W ith o u t adm itting th a t this princely rivalry an d territorial com petition was a kind o f Italian civil w ar, historians felt ra th e r th a t the m ain problem was th a t Italian forces w ere fighting each o th er in w ars w here the only victor could be a foreign m onarch: the king o f Spain, as it tu rn ed out. I am oversimplifying the arg u m en t I have ju st traced. C roce him self noted how the N eapolitan aristocracy perceived the Spanish im perial system th a t em erged from the w ars o f Italy as an opportunity. T h e N eap o litan p h ilo so p h erhistorian lam ented th a t the m em ories o f those actions w ere obliterated in m o d ern 7 I have used a n older volum e o f collected w orks, for the F lorentine statesm an ’s thought. N. M acchiavelli, IIprincipe dell’ arte della guerra, ed altri scritti politici (M ilan: 1961), F. C ostero (ed.). M acchiavelli’s view has b een partially vindicated by a recen t h istorian o f the condottieri, M ichael M allett, w ho writes th a t “Defensive a n d unduly com plex tactics w ere w eaknesses o flta lia n w arfare, a n d the Italian w ars w ould prove over a n d over again th a t a new concept o f w arfare w as em erging, w ith the desire to seek conclusions on the battlefield, to conquer, ra th e r th a n to m anoeuvre for the preservation o f the balance o f p o w er” . M allett th en n uances his ju d g em e n t, a n d rehabilitates som e o f the Italian tactics. See his book, Mercenar­ ies and their masters: warfare in Renaissance Italy (London: 1974), pp. 242ff. 8 T h e term is F rederick Lewis T a y lo r’s, in The art o f war in Italy, 1 4 9 4 -1 5 2 9 (W estport, C onn.: 1973; first publ. 1921), p. 9. See also M . M allett, n. 7 above. T h e classic book on this them e by Piero Pieri is II Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana (T urin: 1952). 9 Pieri, II Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana, p. 341.

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tim es (1924), because the families w ere extinct, or their interests h ad shifted, and th a t this tradition was belittled w hen n ot simply forgotten. H istorians, influenced by the resounding lack o f recent success o f N eapolitan arm s, an d confusing the political reliability o f an arm y w ith the m ilitary attitudes o f a n ation, ren d ered a superficial an d dero g ato ry 'ju d g em en t.10 D espite its m ilitant nationalism , Fascist historiography usually tu rn ed a blind eye to Spanish dom ination in the sixteenth an d seventeenth centuries. T h e period constitutes a real ‘black h o le’ o f lta lia n m ilitary h isto rio g rap h y ." W h en Fascist w riters did exam ine the era, they w ere inclined to prove th a t the m ilitary ‘spirit’ o f Italians survived the long Spanish peace (1560-1700). T h e Spanish im perial system gave Italians a vast th eatre on w hich to display their m artial prowess. S pain’s reach created a zone o f influence th a t m ade the M ed iterran ean an Italian lake, and stretched tentacles o f activity into Flanders, H ungary', G erm any, Spain, the L evant an d far-off Brazil. R eviving the glory o f forgotten m ilitary heroes becam e a p ro p ag an d a vector for the regim e in the 1920s a n d 1930s. O n e title, Condottieri italiani in Germania (published in 1941!) im parts a good im pression o f the tone o f their w ork.1' T h e biographical encyclopedia projects gave perfect scope for this revival; the regim e needed a catalogue o f heroes in every age w ho could m obilize m od ern Italians to em ulation. E m phasizing the past vigour o f the race was a w ay of m asking Italy’s social an d econom ic lag co m p ared to reference countries like F rance, Britain an d G erm any. T h e fascist m aterial is best epitom ized by three sets o f encyclopedias, apparently in ten d ed to com plem ent each o th e r.13T h ey en cap ­ sulated the nam es, place o f origin, dates o f activity an d career cursus o f some 4,000 military' nobles active betw een the reign o f Philip II an d the en d o f the seventeenth century. T h e volum es devoted to military' heroes ap p e ar curious today, b u t they w ere sum ptuous projects in their tim e, lavishly illustrated w ith reproductions of contem porary' works, dram atic nineteenth-century' engravings, an d some period pieces o f upright stern-faced p aragons o f Fascist strength. T h ese beautifully b o u n d volum es continued to ap p e ar in the years im m ediately after the S econd W orld W ar, until this kind o f m ilitant nationalism ev aporated in the 1950s. U nlike their C rocean contem poraries, the com pilers w ere n o t professional academ ic histori­

111 B. C roce, Sloria del regno di Napoli (Bari: 1972; first publ. 1924), pp. 9 9 -1 0 1 . 11 P. del N egro, “ L a storia m ilitare dell’ Italia m o d e rn a nello specchio della storiografia del N ovecento” , Cheiron, 1995, pp. 11-33. V. M a rian i & V. V aran in i, Condottieri italiani in Germania (M ilan: 1941). 13 T h e volum e com piled u n d e r the direction o f C . A rgegni, Encielopedia biografica italiana, vol. 19: Condottieri, capitani e tribuni (Rom e: 1936), included Italian m ilitary figures from m any periods, from the m iddle ages to the eighteenth century. T h is w as a u g m e n ted considerably by A ldo V alori in his co m p lem en tary w ork in the sam e collection, Condottieri e generali del Seicento (Rom e: 1940) a n d re p rin ted after the w ar in 1946. T h e several volum es o f Luigi M aggiorotti, L ’opera del genio italiano all’ estero, 3 vols (R om e: 1933-9), while m ore lavishly illustrated, follow ed the sam e general form at.

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ans, b u t rath e r w ere soldiers, an d good Fascists whose w ork echoed the ideology o f the P arty .141 d o u b t their university credentials because o f the proliferation o f errors o f dates, reigning m onarchs, a n d the frequent confusion o f the Spanish an d A ustrian branches o f the H absburgs. A m ultitude o f easily detectable prin ter errors, w hich derived from typesetters w orking from m anuscripts, co m pounded the flaws in erudition. T h e errors o f detail are com pensated in p a rt by the sheer enthusiasm o f the com pilers w ho, in th eir eagerness to expand the project an d prove the eternal m ilitary vitality o f the Italian race, inserted notices o f officers o f w hom they knew virtually nothing. T h ey also included m any conspicuous incom ­ petents, a sprinkling o f court soldiers an d captains o f u rb an m ilitia, some o f w hom m ay never have fired a shot in battle. T h ey included nobles hailing from regions u n d er the sovereignty o f Italian states, th a t is, Savoyards an d D alm atians, an d some cosm opolitan aristocrats living outside Italy, o f w hom Prince E ugene o f Savoy is the m ost brilliant exam ple. P ride o f place in these volum es was n everthe­ less allotted to actors in prim arily ‘Italian ’ wars, especially o f V enetians fighting T urks in the A egean. D el N eg ro ’s characterizatio n o f Fascist historians, th a t they w axed longingly over the lives a n d gestures o f great figures w ho possessed “laforza del carattere”, is apt in this reg a rd .15 T h ey w ere all deem ed virtuous, these scions o f Italian families serving in E u ro p ean arm ies. In the inim itable rhetoric o f the regim e, Aldo V alori praised the w orld o f Italian m ilitary nobles active in a lan d th o u g h t dead to arm s an d evoked how they gloriously carried the nam e o f Italy to other, m ore fo rtu n ate (!) countries w here w ar was present a n d felt, w here there was the will an d the possibility to cultivate th a t art; lands w here lively political energies w ere ferm enting, b u t w hich lacked brilliant an d experienced m ilitary leaders th a t Italy possessed in a b u n ­ dance. Italian generals an d captains show ed to all the w orld, th ro u g h their judicious use o f arm ed m ight, all the energy' an d all the capacity o f a people an d o f a state.16Fascist rhetoric frequently evoked futurist im ages o f force an d energy, an d the poet M arin etti m ight have recognized his influence. T h ey echoed the highly charged B aroque rhetoric o f the literary sources they w ere using, often discernible in their im ages an d their prose. T his heroical style was a v arian t o f an

14 A system atic search o f bibliographical reviews c o n ta in ed in the Archivio Storico Italiano, the Rivista Storica Italiana, the Nuova Rivista Storica, the Rivista Storica Lombarda, a n d the Archivi Storiciper le Provincie Napoletane betw een 1935 a n d 1948 u ncovered n o t the slightest trace o f these writings. A lengthy historiographical essay o n early m o d ern Italy by P. F. Palum bo, “ F orm azione e sviluppo degli studi di storia m o d e rn a in Italia” , Archivio Storico Italiano, 1941, pp. 1 54-82, does n o t m en tio n these projects. A ldo V alori thanks in passing the “assiduous a n d resourceful researchers in the archives” , to w hom he a ttrib u te d the precision a n d the thoroughness o f the in form ation provided. T h e people he m entions, various dottori, avvocati, a n d even a count, b e a r n o academ ic o r archival affiliation. See V alori, Condottieri e generali del Seicento, p. vii. 13 D el N egro, “L a storia m ilitare dell’ Italia m o d e rn a ” , Chevron, 1995, pp. 11-33. 16 V alori, Condottieri e generali del Seicento, pp. vii-xx.

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older aesthetic tradition, celebrating m ilitary culture an d valour, in the way it extolled “a w hole flowering o f heroism , sacrifices, brilliant initiatives, honourable gestures an d deeds; one can still perceive at once the infinite vitality o f the Italian tem peram ent, always vigorously present a n d active w herever the love o f great adventure an d the sense o f m ilitary h o n o u r calls” .17 D espite the intellectual an d m ethodological shortcom ings o f these fascist p ro p a­ gandists, an d the naively celebratory n atu re o f th eir labour, they w ere hardly wrong. In retrospect, they were perfectly correct to p o in t o u t th a t h u n d red s of high-ranking Italians w aged w ar for the H absburgs from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. T hese officers, n o t 1condottieri’ in the purely m ercenary sense o f th a t w ord, played a conspicuous p a rt at the highest levels o f the S panish an d A ustrian im perial systems. U ncovering traces o f th eir activity an d influence is not difficult. T h e ir vocations reveal som ething ab o u t the cosm opolitan n atu re o f the Italian aristocracy, an d the w ay it identified w ith the H ab sb u rg C atholic cause th a t the R isorgim ento neglected or deprecated. Italian patricians an d feudal lords retained their m ilitary traditions an d refurbished them w ith every new generation. M oreover, service to the H absburgs was n o t the attrib u te solely o f the N eapolitan, Sicilian or M ilanese aristocracy, over w hich the king o f Spain was the legitim ate sovereign. T h e appeal o f the Flanders an d H u n g aria n theatres lured young m en aw ay from their Ligurian, T u scan , Em ilian, U m b rian an d even T erraferm a palazzi• A nother im p o rtan t direction o f this specifically C atholic activity lay in the appeal o f the m aritim e m ilitary orders, o f M alta an d o f S anto Stefano. T h eir raiding and am phibious cam paigning reach ed paroxysm ic levels d u rin g the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, an d their activity' rem ain ed notable until the 1720s. W h at escaped the fascist authors entirely, an d therefore is m y purpose here, is th a t their com pilations reveal a startling decline o f m ilitary activity abruptly aro u n d the m iddle o f the seventeenth century. Italian states virtually ceased m aking w ar against each other after the curious C astro W ar (1642-4), an episode o flta lia n history that has yet to find a m o d ern historian. M ost o f these states w ere no longer capable o f w hat the n ineteenth century' w ould call ‘g ran d politics’ of alliances an d arm ies, an d contem poraries like B otero w ere conscious o f it. W h at is m ore im portant, Spanish exhaustion in the afterm ath o f the T h irty Y ears W ar, coupled w ith A ustrian fiscal lim itations, deprived the Italian military' aristocracy o f its traditional outlets. T his, an d a deep, prolonged crisis o f the M ed iterran ean econom y, provoked a dem ilitarization o f the u p p er reaches o f Italian society th at continued apace until the tim e o f N apoleon. E xcept for the Piedm ontese, who followed w hat one m ight call the n o rth E u ro p ean m odel, Italian elites lost interest in m ilitary affairs. W hile the decline o f Italian m ilitary activity is m y prim ary' interest here, the chief difficulty is to dem onstrate an absence. W h a t follows is therefore a hypothesis in need o f verification by p ro p er em pirical m ethods using m ore systematic 17 Ibid.

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sources, a stage to w hich I will allude in the conclusion. I elaborate this hypothesis by n arratin g events, w hich I bolster episodically by elem entary quantitative evalu­ ation o f desultory sources that, like the encyclopedia biographies, allow m e to m ake rough generalizations. N arrative is the m ost ap p ro p riate form o f explica­ tion, since the process u n d er exam ination follows a chronological progression, subject to the im pact o f events unfolding in different E u ro p ean states. T h ere is an o th er com pelling reason to ad o p t the narrative, perh ap s even m ore pressing th an the first. M uch o f w hat follows will be tied to the political an d m ilitary history o f E urope from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. R eaders will find little there th a t is new. H ow ever, the political an d military’ context o f the various Italian states in the period is n o t generally know n, even to Italians. Even w hen I cover fam iliar territory, it will som etim es be from an unfam iliar Italian perspective. T h e narrative serves to provide a loose factual fram ew ork u p o n w hich every analysis m ust ultim ately h a n g .18

18 Law rence S to n e ’s a rg u m e n t in favour o f historical narrativ e suits this p a rtic u la r topic well, I think. See, “T h e revival o f n arrative. Reflections on a new O ld H istory” , Past and Present 8 5 , 1979, pp. 3 24.

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Knights and corsairs in the M editerranean

Originality o f M editerranean warfare T h e galley as a w arship was so particularly suited to the geographical features o f the M e d iterran ean region th a t its essential characteristics changed little in two thousand years. T h e advantage o f the o ared vessel was th a t it could m ove even in the calm w eather th a t bedevilled sea travel in the M ed iterran ean . A stan d ard galley possessed two m asts retain in g lateen (triangular) sails, an d was propelled by twenty-five to thirty oars p er side. Its narro w hull was ju st wide enough to fit benches for three or four oarsm en p e r oar, separated by a central walkway. T h e vessel, w hich lay less th an a m etre above the w ater-line in the centre, h ad an upraised stern co ntaining co m m an d an d steering functions an d a raised bow platform for artillery an d storage. All these characteristics enh an ced its m ano eu v ­ rability, enabling it to circle its target a n d ‘b ite’ it at the right spot (the side of an o th e r oared vessel, the bow or stern o f a roundship). A com m on b u t n o t universal feature w as the bro n ze spur on the bow th a t hooked on to an enem y ship a n d provided sim ultaneously a walkway for the b o ard in g p a rty .1T h e vessel h ad such shallow d rau g h t th a t it could o p erate close to shore, or be b eached w ith no difficulty. T hu s, the galley served b etter a m ilitary function th an a com m ercial one. Built in a sim ilar m a n n er in B arcelona, V enice an d C onstantinople, galleys from all over the M e d iterran ean w ere used side-by-side by their captors an d som etim es chan ged hands several times. T h e crucial innovation in the sixteenth century' was the replacem ent o f the trirem e, w here oarsm en on three levels each w ielded a single oar, by a galley fitted out w ith a single ban k o f oars, each pow ered by several m en. Such a system

1 J . F. G u ilm artin , Gunpowder and galleys: changing technology and Mediterranean warfare at sea in the sixteenth century (New York: 1974), p. 61. 2 M . A ym ard, “C hiourm es et galeres dans la secondc m oitie d u X V Ie siecle” , in II Mediterraneo nella seconda meta del ‘500 alia luce di Lepanto, G . B enzoni (ed.) (Florence: 1974), p p. 71 -9 4 . See in p a rticu la r p. 90. J o h n F rancis G uilm artin nuances this by exam ining m odifications o f galley construction from T u rk ey , to V enice a n d Spain. See Gunpowder and galleys, p. 212.

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enabled the vessel to carry' m ore oarsm en, an d increased its speed. By the late sixteenth century', the crow ding was truly daunting. M en w ere cram m ed into every nook an d cranny, from the oarsm en chained to the benches, to the soldiers an d seam en gripping the gunw ales an d the platform s. A n o rm al com plem ent com prised 150 to 250 oarsm en, fifty seam en an d a variable n u m b e r o f soldiers an d officers. A typical galley forty m etres (133 ft) long m ight co n tain 300 to 400 m en, packed into 200 o r 250 square m etres (2 150-2700 sq ft).3T h e large n u m b e r o f soldiers, seam en and oarsm en, these last som etim es salaried a n d liable to be arm ed, m ade it possible for galleys to ap p ro a ch the m o re vulnerable p arts o f an enem y ship an d overw helm the defenders. O nly very good gunners could fire accurately from m ore th an a few h u n d red m etres an d guns w ere generally unable to sink ships. N either the attacking ship n o r its target could release m o re th a n one salvo before collision. It sufficed for the galley to co n n ect to its victim , hold fast in o rd er to get enough m en ab oard , an d support th em w ith missile fire o f swivel guns, arquebuses an d arrow s.4T h e galley could do this effectively even w hen the victim was a roundship, because until the seventeenth century these w ere g en er­ ally slow-moving, unw ieldy an d cum bersom e, w ith th eir only advantage being their higher sides. M ost m erch an t ships su rren d ered w ith o u t a struggle, h o p in g for lenient treatm ent. ’ T h e galley’s strength in m an po w er was also its ch ief draw back. It consum ed provisions at a rate com m ensurate w ith the n u m b er o f people w edged into it, an d extrem e crow ding m ade disease a likely occurrence. T h e overw helm ing filth an d stench o f the vessel w ere breeding grounds for typhus. T h e d an g er was offset only by constant exposure to the sun and w ind, since the canopies d rap e d over the hull only becam e com m on in the seventeenth century. Fresh w ater was a scarce an d precious com m odity, requiring frequent halts along the coast to replenish the barrels, a procedure know n as the acquata or the aiguade. A bove all, the n arrow , low galley was unable to keep to sea in b ad w eather, an d was red u ced to o p eratin g for a few m onths in the sum m er an d au tu m n . T h e requirem ents o f crews, o f eq uip­ m ent (oars, canvas, masts, rope, food) an d also the short navigational season m ade galleys d ependent up on their bases. A fleet’s range o f operations was in inverse p roportion to its size, such that a large fleet could n ot venture very far. O n ly a few M ed iterran ean ports w ere capable o f collecting the massive stores req u ired for a m ajor operation, building or repairing galleys an d casting o rd n an ce, holding crews available an d com bing the h in terlan d for m ore. O nly three g reat centres

3 M . A ym ard, “C hiourm es ct galeres” , in II Mediterraneo nella seconda mela del ‘500, p. 78. 4 T h e re are several good sources on galley w arfare: G u ilm artin , Gunpowder and galleys, p. 61. See also J. R. H ale, “M en a n d w eapons: the fighting p o ten tial o f sixteenth-century V e n etian galleys” , in War and society: a yearbook o f mililaiy history, B. B ond a n d I. R o y (eds) (L ondon: 1975), pp. 1-23. M ore recently, see F ran co G ay, “C onsiderazioni sulle navi dell’ ordine di S anto Stefano” , in Le imprese e i simboli: Contributi alia storia del Sacro Militare Ordine di S. Stefano (s. X V I-X IX ) (Pisa: 1989), pp. 9 9 -1 2 2 . ’ P. E arle, The corsairs o f Malta and Barbary (L ondon: 1970), pp. 136fF.

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could support w hole navies: B arcelona, V enice an d C onstantinople. N aples, M essina, G enoa, an d M alta w ere staging areas able to store supplies an d crews, b u t few other cities played an im p o rta n t role.6 Im agine the arrival in p o rt o f a h u n d re d galleys, a n u m b e r frequently cited in the late sixteenth century! T h a t was the equivalent o f 30,000 or 40,000 m en, m ore th a n the largest E u ro p ean arm ies, and entirely dep en d en t u p o n local stocks o f food as they spent long m onths in p ort w aiting for developm ents. Forty th o u san d m en equalled the daily food req u ire­ m ents o f a m ajo r E uropean city o f the time. T o com pensate for the logistical fragility o f the galley fleet, C hristian arm adas eventually included roundships containing food, w ater, am m unition an d the m yriad im plem ents required to rep air ship dam age or lay siege to coastal forts. Fleets an d flotillas still h ad to halt every three or four days to replenish w ater, to take on fresh provisions, an d to rest the crews. D ep endency u p o n the resources o f the coast an d islands was an o th er lim itation, b u t galleys h ad rem ovable rudders p erm itting them to be beach ed in a p redicam ent, w ith their guns pointing m en ­ acingly out to sea, while the precious crews scram bled ashore for safety. T h e shallow d rau g h t allow ed raiding parties to lan d in a tw inkling on the b each, to storm a castle or a port. W orking close to shore in a w ay n o t possible for sailing ships, galleys could perform valuable w ork in a siege, firing their can n o n at vulnerable flanks o f a fortress, an d draw ing aw ay defenders.' T h ey could disem ­ b ark their valuable heavy guns to b a tte r a fortress from the landw ard side; an d their crews could dig entrenchm ents or p articipate in assaults. Conversely, a fleet th reaten ed by a larger one could b each itself u n d er the guns o f a friendly fortress, an d be unapp ro ach ab le by sea. G uilm artin ventures th a t the m ain purpose o f assem bling a galley arm ada, ap a rt from offering com bat to any enem y navy', was to cap tu re enem y bases th a t w ould support friendly fleets thereafter. Such was the purpose o f the H ispanoItalian attack on D jerb a in 1560, the invasion o f M alta in 1565, the O tto m a n invasion o f C yprus in 1570, the V en etian attack on N avarino in 1572, an d the Spanish expedition against T unis the sam e year. R em oval o f th reaten in g bases in the h ea rt o f their shipping routes m otivated the T urkish invasion o f C rete (1645), an d attem pts against Algiers (1545 an d 1600) an d P enon (1563) by the Spaniards. T hese shoreside targets w ere m ore w orthw hile objectives th an the destruction of an enem y fleet arrayed in battle o rd er.8 T h e naval history o f the p eriod was nevertheless p u n ctu ated by clashes o f galley fleets, usually the size o f squadrons, b u t occasionally m uch larger. A surprised galley fleet in dispersed o rd er w ithout the advantage o f w ind h a d no chance o f w inning. Its only defence was to veer tow ards the enem y, an d deploy in a lineabreast form ation, a solid front o f prow s a n d cannon. T his form ation took hours to achieve an d m u ch discipline an d luck to m aintain, since keeping form ation 6 G u ilm artin , Gunpowder and galleys, p. 100. 7 Ibid., p. 76fF. 8 Ibid., p. 98ff.

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slowed the fleet speed to ab o u t tw o knots. It was virtually im possible to m ain tain a com pact form ation o f m ore th an sixty galleys abreast. C h an g in g direction required superhum an efforts from the en d galleys to keep up. Elsew here an accordion effect bun ch ed galleys up o r spread th em ap art, o p en in g dangerous gaps to the enem y, w ho was assured victory if allow ed to attack from the side. A second line o f reserve galleys m ade it possible to stop som e o f the gaps. M oreover, they could attach themselves to the rear o f a friendly galley an d feed reinforce­ m ents into the m elee com bat taking place on its deck.9 W hen galleys fought each other they p aired off an d accelerated at the last m inute to close. G unnery7exchanges w ere n ot crucial because only the nim ble an d accurate V enetian gunners w ere capable o f two salvoes or m ore, from the great bronze pieces m ounted on the bow. In the sixteenth cen tu ry good bro n ze guns w ere expensive an d rare, like the g reat h an d -carv ed stone balls they fired. T h e single bronze piece was usually flanked by a couple o f iron ones o f lesser calibre. A n assortm ent o f sm aller swivel pieces m o u n ted on the forecastle o r the stern and loaded w ith stones or m etal pellets an d shards, accom panied those. T h e Spanish an d H ispano-Italian galleys in particu lar bristled w ith o rd n an ce, like a floating castle, in contrast to the nim bler V en etian equivalents, w ith th eir sm aller d etach ­ m ent o f soldiers.10A fter the b rief exchange o f salvoes, a m elee on the deck o f the target ship decided the outcom e. In this terrible throng, C h ristian troops h a d the relative advantage o f m ore body arm our: breastplates, helm ets, thigh guards of plate. T h ey w ere variously arm ed w ith arquebuses, pikes, longsw ords, crossbows and longbows. A rquebusiers w ere easy to train an d th eir w eapons w ere effective at short ranges, though they w ere so slow to reload th a t each carried a sw ord an d dagger too. T h e T urkish recurved bow was still a red o u b tab le w eapon an d rem ained in service throu gh ou t the seventeenth cen tu ry a n d even after. Bows w ere accurate, pow erful and rapid, b u t it took years to train an effective archer, an d in a long battle they w ould tire. N um b ers being equal, the advantage b e­ longed to those higher up, particularly on the bow superstructure looking dow n onto the deck o f the target ship." A t L epanto the V enetians introd u ced a secret w eapon that, if it d id n o t spell the dem ise o f galley fleets for m ore th an a century, at least in tro d u ced a self-defeating logic. Francesco D uodo fitted o ut twelve cum bersom e m e rc h an t galleys, the galeasses, w ith four times the hull displacem ent o f a n o rm al galley, an d packed the sides w ith cannon and swivel g un s.12F o r m uch o f the cam paign, they h a d to be tow ed by the lighter (sensile) galleys, despite the efforts o f up to 500 oarsm en. T h ey provided a stable platform for hund red s o f soldiers an d gunners. By th eir size an d

9 G u ilm artin , p. 73fF. 10 I bid., p. 175fF; p. 212ff. 11 I bid., p. 149; See also H ale, “M e n a n d w eapons” , in War and society, pp. 1-23; a n d G ay, “C o nsiderazioni sulle navi” , Le imprese e i simboli, p. 103fF. 12 M . M o rin , “L a b attaglia di L ep a n to ” , in Venezia e i Turchi: Scontri e confronti di due civilld (M ilan: 1985), pp. 2 1 0 -3 1 , a t p. 219.

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arm am en t, an d th eir ability to spew projectiles from the sides an d the bow, the six galeasses p resen t at L epan to inflicted crippling losses on the T u rk s.13 Galeasses figured in every C hristian fleet thereafter, an d even n o rm al galleys tended to increase in length an d arm a m en t in the subsequent decades. B ut the increased operating cost lim ited their num bers. T h e price o f food m ore th an quintupled in the sixteenth century', reducing the ‘cost-effectiveness’ o f galleys as w arships.14A T u scan version, built aro u n d 1600, reportedly carried 36 heavy guns an d 64 pierriers, an d 1,200 m en. It m ust have been ruinous to operate, and unlikely to catch any p re y .10T h e increased size also nullified the ship’s m anoeuvrability, an d thus its offensive capacity. Som e im provem ents after L epanto, such as the in tro ­ duction o f a th ird m ast, m ade the galeass faster, b u t it could n o t operate in d ep en d ­ ently. It functioned instead as a floating gun-platform for use in set-piece battles. T h e evolution tow ards the galeass in au g u rated a new p eriod defined by the im portance o f ship-borne artillery'. T h e next stage was the ap p earan ce after 1590 o f the im proved N o rth Sea roundship, the bertone, as the Italians called it. A typical English one displaced 300 to 500 tons, b ro a d a n d rou n d , a three-m aster w ith square sails an d a crew o f only ab o u t sixty m en. It could carry 30 o r even m ore can n o n all aro u n d it, an d still leave room to tran sp o rt soldiers an d cargo. Such ships were n o t invulnerable to galleys, for expert gunners could disable one from afar, before closing in on its vulnerable stern. O n e Italian galley squad ro n was able in 1637 to capture an entire D u tch convoy, com posed o f such vessels.16O v er tim e their agility im proved, and by 1650 galleys served as adjuncts to fleets o f roundships. T h e teeth o f the still unw ieldy bertone consisted of the m any iron cannon it contained. A sixteenthcentury revolution in casting techniques in n o rth ern E urope m ade it possible to m ultiply the n u m b e r o f cheap cannon. T h ey were heavier, bulkier, less accurate an d m ore dangerous th an the bro n ze guns com m only in use as the m ain gun on w arships. Because there w ere so m any o f them , the quality o f gunnery suffered. H ow ever, the sheer n u m b e r o f these guns transform ed seaborne w arfare.17 Logistical requirem ents for the concentration o f num erous galleys could be d aunting for sixteenth-century adm inistrators. Since they w ere n o t large ships, the

13 Ibid, p. 219. 14 G u ilm artin , Gunpowder and galleys, p. 273. 15 See G ay, “C onsiderazioni sulle navi” , in Le imprese e i simboli, p. 112, for details on T u sc an galleys a n d galeasses. T h e m o nstrous galeass co n tain in g 1,200 m en is m en tio n ed by G ino G u arn ieri, b u t I have never e n co u n tere d its presence in any accounts, if indeed it ever existed. See G . G u a rn ieri, I cavalieri di Santo Stefano, nella storia della marina italiana (1562­ 1859) (Pisa: 1960), p. 80. , 16 R . C. A nderson, “T h e T h irty Y ears’ W a r in the M e d ite rra n e a n ” , Mariner’s Mirror, 1969, pp. 4 3 5 -5 1 , a t p. 440. w O n the im p act o f iron c a n n o n on naval w arfare, see G uilm artin, Gunpowder and galleys, p. 175fF. F or the a p p ea ran c e o f the bertone a n d V e n ice ’s a d ap tatio n to it, see A. T en e n ti, Piracy and the decline o f Venice, 1 5 8 0 -1 6 1 5 (L ondon: 1967, first publ. 1961), p. 53ff.

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hulls could be built quickly a n d fairly cheaply, if seasoned tim b er was on hand. T h e V enetians an d T urks proved this by constructing large fleets o f th em in short order. Philip II o f Spain (1556-98) created fleets o f galleys at B arcelona an d at N aples, in bo th cases using large num bers (153 in 1587) o f expensive G enoese craftsm en, caulkers and carpenters, u n d er the expert direction o f G enoese over­ seers.18F or quality' construction at reasonable cost, it was necessary to have forests situated close to the coast for the tran sp o rt o f tim b er to the shipyards, like the D alm atian forests at the disposal o f the A rsenal in V enice. By far the m ost expensive and laborious p a rt o f any galley expedition was to find the oarsm en. In m edieval V enice, sendee at the o ar was a duty in cu m b en t on able-bodied m en, an d m obilization stripped the shops an d w orkshops o f m erch an ts an d artisans. T h e increase in u rb an living standards m ade artisans so recalcitrant th a t by the m id-sixteenth century, m any oarsm en w ere im pressed seam en, cap tu red pirates or convicts, recruited from as far aw ay as Bavaria. By 1580, w hen V enice was com m itted to floating m ore th an a h u n d red galleys, the quality' o f the w orkforce declined.19By 1592 only the pilot (or lantern) galleys, equivalent to flagships, were using crews o f freem en; all the others used convicts an d prisoners chained to their benches w here they lived perm anently. T h e V enetians som etim es solved their m anpow er problem s by scooping hapless villagers off the G reek coast.20 Spanish fleets w ere similarly strapped. T h e great cost o f m ain tain in g galleys at sea tem pted m any captains to cut corners at the expense o f the oarsm en. F ood rations th at w ere balanced an d copious enough for the seam en an d the soldiers, were lim ited to bread and w ater for them .22T h e atrocious conditions caused m an y oarsm en to fall sick an d die, m aking it necessary' to renew th em continually. T en e n ti affirms th a t serious negligence or indiscipline on the p a rt o f the captains or sofiracomite was rare, b u t it was com m on for them to m ake unofficial trips an d u n au th o rized halts, to smuggle co n trab an d goods or engage in u n au th o rized trade. T hese adm inistrative headaches led the Spanish to suspend efforts to build their ow n fleet an d tu rn to entrepreneurs, prim arily G enoese, w ith galleys for hire. Indeed, the private agents kept their galleys cleaner, w ith b etter conditions for the crew in order to avoid the costly search for oarsm en. T h e crow n leased vessels from ow ners w ho built and com m an d ed them as an investm ent. Studying a

18 D . G o o d m a n , Power and penury: government, technology and science in Philip IPs Spain (C am ­ bridge: 1988), p. 100. 19 T en e n ti, Piracy and the decline o f Venice, 1580 -1 6 1 5 , p. 108. 20 A. E. V acalopoulous, The Greek nation, 1 4 6 3 -1 6 6 9 (New B runsw ick, N ew Jersey: 1976), pp. 85 -9 0 . 21 T en e n ti, Piracy and the decline o f Venice, 1 5 8 0 -1 6 1 5 , p. 1 16ff. 22 J . J . H e m ard in q u er, “V ie m aterielle et co m p o rtem en ts biologiques, bulletin no. 11: A p ro p o s de ra lim e n ta tio n des m arins, sur les galeres de T o sc an e au X V Ie siecle” , Annales: Economies, Societes, Civilisations, 1963, pp. 1141-9. 23 All o f these problem s o f m an n in g the galleys are illustrated in the article by M aurice A ym ard, “C hiourm es et galeres” , in II Mediterraneo nella seconda meta del ‘500, pp. 71—94.

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contract betw een K in g Philip II o f S pain an d the G enoese adm iral an d en tre p re­ neu r G ian A n d re a D o ria in 1566, G uilm artin underscores the fiscal rationale for the m o n a rc h to lease a flotilla for 2,000 ducats annually p e r galley, at an an n u al interest rate o f 14 p e r cent (with inflation ru n n in g at aro u n d 4 p er cent) on the u n p aid balance. F or the en trep ren eu r, an asiento for a galley was also a m eans o f realizing h id d en profits, such as having access to jealously g u ard ed currency export licences, o r th e righ t to p urchase Sicilian grain free o f taxes an d duties, for resale elsew here a t a profit. G enoese captains an d com m anders did n ot hesitate to tran sp o rt m erchandise o r smuggle cash w henever the occasion presented itself, even w hen this was forbidden in the co n tract.24 Including all the h idden costs, Spain p aid ab o u t 10,000 ducats annually for the op eratio n o f a G enoese galley during the L ep anto era, w hich G uilm artin m aintains was ten p e r cent m ore expensive th a n op eratin g a Spanish on e.23 T h o m p so n counters th a t the G enoese alternative was ch eaper, m ore efficient a n d clearly preferable w hen there was n ot enough m oney available to finance a larger S panish fleet, even in the 1630s w hen a single galley cost 18,000 ducats annually.26 C onsiderations o f sovereignty still spurred the S paniards occasionally to build an d o perate th eir own ships, despite the g reater expense. A t L ep an to ab o u t ten p e r cent o f the entire C hristian n a \y consisted o f ren te d galleys belonging to G enoese entrepreneurs, w ho w ere co n ­ spicuous at the division o f the spoils. T h ey purveyed galleys to Spain d u rin g the entire seventeenth century'.27

The clash o f great fleets It is easy to forget th a t w hen historians speak o f the Spanish fleet, they refer mostly to Italian galleys based in N aples an d Sicily, w ith others ren ted from G enoese and R o m an entrep reneu rs. A dd to those the T u scan , Papal an d Savoyard auxiliary 24 T h is could also have a negative im p act o n m ilitary operations. D u rin g the D je rb a cam p aig n o f 1560, w here priv ate galleys o u tn u m b e red state vessels 31 to 16, ow ners avoided exposing th eir capital w henever possible, a n d w ere m ore inclined to attack m e r­ c h an t ships th a n enem y galleys. See C . M on ch ico u rt, L ’expedition espagnole de 1560 contre Pile de Djerba (Paris: 1913), p. 89. 25 G u ilm a rtin , Gunpowder and galleys, p. 34. 26 I. A. A. T h o m p so n , War and. government in Habsburg Spain, 1 5 6 0 -1 6 2 0 (London: 1976), p. 86ff. 27 F or exam ple, the king o f S pain a tte m p ted twice to create a S ard in ian flotilla by recourse to such naval e n trep ren eu rs. In 1639, four galleys w ere provided by the G enoese G iovan A ntonio Sauli, costing 15,000 d ucats each for six m o n th s service. See F. F. O lesa M unido, La organizacion naval de los estados mediterraneosy en especial de Espana durante los siglos X V I y X V II, 2 vols (M adrid: 1968), vol. 1, p. 380ff. A sim ilar co n tra ct to provide eight galleys was passed soon after w ith the G e n oese-born prince o f M elfi, G iovanni A n d re a D oria. O nly two o f his personal galleys ever saw service, a n d despite provisions in the c o n tra ct stipulating th a t the officers o u g h t to be native S ardinians, the G enoese pred o m in ated . See G . Sorgia, “Progetti p e r u n a flotta sardo-genovese nel Seicento” , Miscellanea di Storia Ligure, 1966, pp. 177-90.

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flotillas in Spanish pay, an d the enorm ous V en etian navy, it becom es ap p aren t th a t the great m ajority o f the C atholic fleets in the M ed iterran ean , p robably m ore th an 70 p er cent, w ere in reality Italian, w ith seam en an d soldiers o f p red o m i­ nantly Italian origin. T h e peninsula, m oreover, was the ap p ro p riate base from w hich to strike at the h eart o f the O tto m a n E m pire, the B arbary p irate coast from T unisia an d T ripolitania to present-day Algeria, an d the hostile G reek an d A lba­ nian coast. Italy, ra th e r th an Iberia, was the Spanish bulw ark in the M e d ite rra­ nean, the staging area for the great fleets. T urkish ascendancy at sea, the outcom e o f the runn in g battle o f Prevesa in 1538, lim ited S p ain ’s chances to reduce these p irate bases. Spanish expeditions against th em were nevertheless largely Italian affairs, conceived an d directed from Italy, w ith M essina being the ideal p o rt for assem bling m en an d ships.28 T h e first offensive project was an operation against T ripoli at the end o f 1559, organized by the V iceroy o f Sicily, M ed in a Celi, an d involving the Spanish flotillas, the K nights o f M alta, a G enoese contingent, a few Papal galleys an d the new T u scan navy. B arbary galleys could only o perate in conjunction w ith T urkish ones in sum m er, an d for the rest o f the year they w ere on their own. T h e fleet leaving Syracuse in D ecem ber consisted o f 47 galleys, four galiots a n d three galleons, w ith supply vessels ferrying 12,000 Spanish, G erm a n an d Italian sol­ diers. A lm ost all the galleys w ere Italian or co m m an d ed by Italians, w ho co m ­ prised ab o u t h alf the soldiery too. Bad w eath er forced them to w ait in M alta until F ebruary 1560 w here 2,000 m en w ere lost to illness. In early M arch , M ed in a Celi an d G ian A ndrea D oria chose to occupy the island o f D jerb a instead o f T ripoli, an d the troops th a t w ere disem barked there fell to building a fort to serve as a p erm a n en t base. In response, the T urkish galley fleet left C onstantinople in April, earlier th an the H ispano-Italians th o u g h t possible. It arrived off D jerb a on 11 M ay, weeks before it was expected. T h e consequence was so predictable th a t the scattered C atholic fleet gave no th o u g h t to form ing a p ro p er battle deploym ent. M any C hristian soldiers w ere still on the island, an d the galley co m m an d ers’ only instinct was to escape in a ‘sauve quipeut. T h e T urks took h alf the galleys a n d m ost o f the supply ships. M edina Celi readied a relief force o f 14,000 troops (again largely Italians) in Sicily to rescue the stran d ed troops on D jerba, a n d launched new galleys to replace those lost, b u t they d ared n ot attack the T urkish fleet. A t the end o f Ju ly the D jerba garrison su rren d ered for lack o f w ater. A fter that, the com bined T urkish and B arbary navy cruised w ith im punity off the coasts of T uscany before raiding the southern coast o f Sicily an d b u rn in g the city of A ugusta. T h ey probably captured ab o u t 7,000 prisoners in these raids alone.29

28 T h o m p so n , War and government in Habsburg Spain, p. 17. 29 T h e m ost detailed a n d scholarly study o f the D je rb a expedition, based p artially on T urkish a n d A ra b sources, is by M on ch ico u rt, L ’expedition espagnole de 1560 contre Pile de Djerba. F or the raids on Sicily, see K . Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571): vol. IV. The sixteenth centuryfrom Julius I I I to Pius F (P hiladelphia: 1984), p. 765. See also D ennis M ack Sm ith, A history o f Sicily, vol. 1: medieval Sicily, 8 0 0 -1 7 1 3 (London: 1968), p. 129fF.

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KNIGHTS AND CORSAIRS

Key

■ Milan

■ Spanish naval bases • Allied naval bases O Enemy bases

MaT% J

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Valcncia^^^^ ■adlZ

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Sibraitara^T^-^—« --^ ® Cartagena TangicrMW ^ *ar Almeria 7 ^P . Velez T W Alhuccmas Larache ^ H * "« O ra n / Melilla Mazalquivir • La Mamora

I''inal^*^G4 A good relation o f the conflict betw een V enice a n d the Uskoks is found in the article by Fulvio R . B abudieri, “ Gli U scocchi: L oro form azione e loro attivita a te rra ed in m a re ” , in Le genti del mare Mediterraneo, R. R agosta (ed.) (Naples: 1981), vol. 1, pp. 4 4 5 -9 8 .

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fleet o f p riv ateer ships op eratin g u n d er his orders, considerably larger th an the royal squadro n o f galleons an d galleys. T h e official p retex t o f such a build-up was to pro tect the coast from p irate raids. H is preferred vessels, how ever, w ere n o t the faster galleys, b u t the roundships. H e visited E ngland once to study these new ships, an d h a d 12 o f th em built, an d sailed w ith F rench seam en. At least on this fleet, the personnel w ere p aid on tim e, the eq u ip m en t was o f good quality, the captains w ere co m p eten t a n d the operations w ere conducted quickly an d boldly. In 1616, this ‘p riv ate’ sq uad ro n consisted o f 17 galleys an d five vessels, co m p ared to the N aples galley sq uad ro n o f 16 units. Five o f his vessels once scattered a T urkish fleet o f 55 galleys. By 1620 O su n a ’s navy consisted o f 23 sailing ships, assem bled against the express orders o f K ing Philip III. T h e reasons for his eventual dow nfall th a t y ear h ad m u ch to do w ith his strong-arm policy against V enice using his private navy in lieu o f the official Spanish one. H e concen trated a battle fleet consisting o f 17 sailing vessels an d 33 galleys off Brindisi in 1617 in order to intim idate V enice to conclude its w ar w ith A ustria. V enice an d Spain cam e w ithin an inch o f w ar, p ro d d ed by the initiatives o f the viceroy. T o pay for this force, O su n a b row b eat N eapolitans into paying for it. H e o rd ered on his own authority a levy o f 12,000 troops an d 20 sailing ships, spent over a m illion ducats on this, an d an o th e r 600,000 ducats o f secret funds. H e overstepped the line by using soldiers o f the N aples tercio to fight ab o ard his flotilla an d by p reten d in g th at some o f the galleons an d slaves w ere his, an d selling them to the G row n.1 C oastal fortresses in so uth ern Italy an d the islands continued to h arb o u r corsairs thereaf­ ter. T h e re w ere 20 corsair captains b ased in T ra p a n i alone in 1675-8, although it is difficult to determ ine w ho their preferred targets w ere.137 Q u ite a p a rt from the stakes o f high politics, w here the republic gam bled resolutely, V enetian shipping was continually harassed by the large bertoni after 1600. M ost o f th em w ere sailed by Protestants, prim arily the D u tch an d English, b u t som etim es also by the M altese an d Tuscans. T h e Protestants were in ten t on taking m ost o f the L evant com m erce aw ay from V enice, an d they com bined piracy w ith legitim ate trading. U n en cu m b ered by ideological baggage, they ten d ed to seize every o pportunity th a t presen ted itself, an d they h ad some willing accom plices am on g the Italian princes, like G ra n d D uke F erd in an d o o f T uscany, or C harles E m an uel o f Savoy, w ho offered L ivorno an d V illefranche to them as bases. W hen the king o f E ngland m ade peace w ith Spain in 1604, these English privateers w ent into D utch service, using T urkish bases. V enetian ships trad in g along the S panish coast w ere also considered legitim ate targets. V en etian traders, w ho once d om in ated the econom y o f Puglia, gradually retreated in to the A driatic. M erchants from the lagoon city began to em ploy D u tch an d English roundships to carry their cargoes to the L evant an d to the A tlantic. V enice’s shipbuilding industry an d the m aritim e freight business w ere notable victims o f this evolution, 13:1 A nderson, Naval wars in the Levant, pp. 77 -8 9 . 136 A nderson, Naval wars in the Levant, p. 90fF. 137 B ono, Corsari nel Mediterraneo, p. 65.

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despite shipbuilding subsidies gran ted by the republic. T h e quality o f local crews deteriorated. A fter 1610 the Serenissima decided to hire foreign ships an d to build its own bertoni. In 1619 the V enetians h ad at their disposal 50 galleys an d 50 bertoni. T h ey built m ore galeasses th a t were pow erfully arm ed. All these m easures m ain ­ tained V enice as an im p o rtan t m aritim e pow er until mid-century', b u t the cost o f such pow er increased dram atically.1 T h e great days o f M ed iterran ean piracy w ere over after 1680, though it was still endem ic in the region until the conquest o f Algiers by F rance in 1830. T h e prohibition o f attacks on the O tto m a n E m pire by Louis X IV in 1679, w hich he enforced on the knights o f M alta, is p ro b ab ly the decisive date. T h e galley squadrons gradually disappeared after 1700, an d the galley as a w arship a century' later. T h e ir long twilight attests to th eir continued usefulness in the M e d ite rra­ nean, w here the long beaches an d the irregular w ind m ade navigation by sailing vessels aleatory. M oreover, these w ere the vessels o f small or p o o r states w ith few available seam en.139G radually the m aritim e pow ers w ith th eir large fleets o f m enof-war (a developm ent after 1660) supplanted the little squadrons o f galleys m aintained by the Pope, T uscany, G enoa, Savoy an d the Spanish dom inions.

158 T en e n ti, Piracy and the decline o f Venice, pp. 5 3 -8 4 , a n d p. 138ff. m J . M eyer, “G ens de m er en M e d ite rran e e au X V IIe siecle: la F ran ce et l’E spagne, essai de co m p araiso n ” , in Le genii dal mare mediterraneo, vol. 2, pp. 9 0 5 -3 6 .

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C h apter 2

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Italy in the age o f H absburg hegem ony, 1560-1620

The Spanish system in Italy T h e treaty o f C ateau-C am b resis in 1559 betw een France an d the E m pire, ending over six decades o f in term itten t w arfare, left Spain in uncontested control o f Italy through its hold over Sicily, N aples an d M ilan. U ltim ately, this strength rested on Spanish naval suprem acy in the w estern M ed iterran ean , an d on a netw ork of naval bases an d friendly ports stretching from A ndalusia to the straits o f O tran to , an d encom passing the Balearic islands along w ith Sardinia, Sicily an d Corsica. O nly a relatively short stretch o f the coast o f Provence, w ith the F rench bases of T o u lo n a n d M arseille, was in potentially hostile hands. T h e success o f Spanish and Im perial arm s in the peninsula did the rest. V enice w ithdrew from the contest in 1530. F ra n ce’s Sienese ally w as overw helm ed by H ispano-Im perial troops w ith T u scan backing in 1555, an d the P apal States fell into line after the d eath o f the C arafa Pope P aul IV in 1559.1 Both F rance a n d Spain placed garrisons in P iedm ont, the latter to provide an effective bulw ark for Spanish pow er in M ilan. A n alliance w ith G en o a fu rth er buttressed S p ain ’s central strategic position in L om bardy. T h e republic’s prosperity d ep en d ed on the lucrative asientos, or supply contracts of the Spanish m o n arch y .' F ree passage to M ilan th ro u g h L iguria was an axiom o f Spanish policy, an d each tim e th a t access was th reaten ed , the king held G en o a a little m ore tightly. Spain helped the republic secure the restless island o f Corsica, w hose nobles plotted w ith the F rench an d the T urks to throw off the G enoese yoke.3 T uscany an d the Papal States w ere kept respectful by strong 1 T w o general political histories o f Italy are still very useful. T h e m ost detailed is still R om olo Q u a zz a , Storia politica d'Italia: preponderanza spagnuola (1559-1700) (M ilan: 1950, first publ. 1938). Also, see the ab u n d an tly illustrated L ’ltalia nell’ eta della controriforma, 1559­ 1700; Storia d’ltalia, vol. 2, N ino V aleri & V ittorio de C ap rariis (eds) (T urin: 1965). 2 See F e rn a n d B raudel on the place o f G e n o a in intern atio n al com m erce a n d finance, in Civilisation materielle, economic et capitalisme, X V e-X V IIIe siecles: vol. 3, Le temps du monde (Paris: 1979), pp. 130-44. 3 R. E m m anuelli, Genes et I’Espagne dans la guerre de Corse (1559-1569) (Paris: 1963), p. 13ff. E m m an u elli’s b o o k illustrates w ith m eticulous detail the vital support th a t S pain was p re p a re d to give to G e n o a in exchange for the rep u b lic’s good offices.

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THE TW ILIG H T OF A MILITARY TRADITION

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