The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine 3031341627, 9783031341625

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The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Danny Singh

The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Danny Singh

The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Danny Singh Humanities and Social Sciences Teesside University Middlesbrough, UK

ISBN 978-3-031-34162-5 ISBN 978-3-031-34163-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34163-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

The purpose of this book seeks to explain in summary form the reasons for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 and the goals of its main participants, Russia, Ukraine, the United States and allied North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This topic is needed because it harnesses an understanding why this war happened. In Western countries, the mainstream is dominated by a one-sided; propaganda perception of the war in Ukraine in the dichotomy of evil Russia, good Ukraine and the West is rightly on the side of good. There is little explanation why this war has taken place, and of the interests of the parties to the conflict. The book examines the main international relations theories to explain the war. It includes realism, liberalism and constructivism. It is argued that the most useful theoretical tool to understand the war is realism, applied in three of its varieties, classical, offensive neorealism and defensive neorealism. The book also demonstrates how this can be studied from a liberal and constructivist perspective. The cause of this war is largely due to the aggravation of Russia by the West through NATO’s systematic expansion near its borders. Moscow documented that Kyiv’s declared accession of Ukraine to NATO threatened its vital security interests and had taken pre-emptive action, resorting to war and clear abuses of international law. Many works from the West on war provide a dominant narrative from a liberal perspective that tends to support American global policy, including towards Russia. This is a dangerous war of the United States and virtually the entire West against Russia, to the final Ukrainian. v

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I would like to thank my loving family for support whilst writing this book. This includes my gorgeous wife (Sonali) and beautiful children (Ishaan and Shanaya). My father (Gurmit), mother (Palbinder) and brother (Paul) have also encouraged me with my academic career, so thanks to you all. On a professional note, I would like to thank Professor Anthony Lloyd at Teesside University for reading a draft on the overall argument of the book. Thanks to Dr. Anca Pusca for taking an interest in this topic once I approached Palgrave Macmillan. Middlesbrough, UK

Danny Singh

Contents

1 6

1

Introduction References

2

Main International Relations Theories An Explanation of Realism An Explanation of Liberalism Constructivism: An Alternative Explanation Contributions of International Relations Theory References

7 7 24 35 53 56

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NATO During the Cold War and Dissolution of the Soviet Union Formation of NATO The Counterbalancing Warsaw Pact The Economic and Political Demise of the Soviet Union NATO’s Expansionism and Containment of Russia References

67 67 70 71 73 79

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Ukrainian Desire for Political Autonomy and NATO Accession Orange Revolution NATO Membership Action Plan and National Security Strategy

83 83 85

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Western Support for Ukraine United States Motives of the War References 5

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Russian Responses, the Invasion, Sanctions and International Law Russian Retaliation Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February 2022 Just War Debate International Condemnation of the Invasion and Western Sanctions International Law Efforts References Conclusion References

88 92 112 121 121 133 150 157 167 187 209 216

Bibliography

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Index

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About the Author

Dr. Danny Singh is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Teesside University, where he is Course Leader for M.A. in International Relations/M.A. International Relations Applied. He holds a Ph.D. in Politics and Criminology. His research interests include police corruption and anti-corruption in war-torn environments, just war and military ethics, international relations theory and conflict studies. He is author of Investigating Corruption in the Afghan Police Force: Instability and Insecurity in Post-Conflict Societies (Policy Press) and co-editor of Comparative Just War Theory: An Introduction to International Perspectives (Rowman & Littlefield). Dr. Singh’s current book projects are situated within political philosophy and international relations. A book titled Afro-Communitarian Ethics and Foreign Armed Intervention (Springer) is due for publication in early 2024. For forthcoming works, Singh is working on several sample chapters and seeking a book contract on The Failure of Neoconservative Nation-Building in Afghanistan: A Liberal-Realist Muddle and RealistConstructivist Ethics: The “Normative” Morality and Ethics of Western Intervention.

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Abbreviations

BBC CBS CIS CNBC CNN DCFTA ESDP EU G7 GDP ICC ICISS ICJ ICRC ICTY IDPs IMF MAP NATO NDTV OPEC OUN PoWs R2P RTS START

British Broadcasting Corporation Columbia Broadcasting System Commonwealth of Independent States Consumer News and Business Channel Cable News Network Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area European Security and Defence Policy European Union Group of Seven Gross Domestic Product International Criminal Court International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty International Court of Justice International Committee of the Red Cross International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia International Displaced People International Monetary Fund Membership Action Plan North Atlantic Treaty Organisation New Delhi Television Limited Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists Prisoners of War Responsibility to Protect Radio Television Serbia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty xi

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UK UN UNMIK US WMD

United Kingdom United States United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo United States Weapon of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been its largest European intervention since the Second World War. The conflict has devastated major cities in Ukraine as the Russian-armed forces surrounded Kyiv and then captured Mariupol. At the time of writing, according to the United Nations (UN), there have been 24,862 civilian casualties (with 9,083 killed and 15,779 sustaining injuries) via explosive weapons, such as heavy artillery shells, missiles, airstrikes and rocket launch systems.1 Equally, as of early 2023, the number of “refugees from Ukraine recorded across Europe” has reached almost 8 million (7,915,287) with most located in Poland (1,553,707) and almost 5 million (4,905,293) Ukrainian refugees have been listed for “Temporary Protection” or comparable European “national protection schemes.”2 The number of Ukrainians crossing their border to enter European states exceeds 14 million (14,270,682) and over 6.5 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced.3 Russia has been condemned by the international community and sanctions have been placed on the Kremlin and Russian oligarchs. Moreover, 1 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner, “Ukraine: Civilian Casualty Update,” June 19, 2023. 2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Operational Data Portal: Ukraine Refugee Situation,” January 3, 2023. 3 International Organization for Migration, “Ukraine: International Displaced People (IDPs) Estimates,” November 4, 2022.

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Ukraine has been supported by the United States (US) and European states with military equipment and financial and humanitarian aid. Diplomacy has failed. Russian and Ukrainian officials have met in Belarus—a Russian ally—on at least three occasions to create a short ceasefire and open humanitarian corridors to safely evacuate Ukrainian civilians, but the agreements do not consolidate with Kyiv’s political ambitions and thus Russian airstrikes still hit major Ukrainian cities. The purpose of this book is to provide an overview of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and how it has engaged in expansionism policy to further contain Russia in contemporary international affairs with the accession of additional former Soviet states. To attain this objective, the book covers a realist understanding of the initiation and continuation of the current Russia-Ukraine conflict by responding to the research question; how can realism explain power politics of the current Russian invasion of Ukraine? Alternative explanations can be reached with different theories, but realism (and its variations) is selected, and proven when compared with liberalism and constructivism, to understand the dynamics of power politics due to the historical legacy of NATO, the former Soviet Union and its dissolution and the relationship between Russia and Ukraine. It is specifically argued that NATO, Russia and Ukraine pursued realist interests that serve as the main catalyst of this conflict, making diplomacy and collective defence measures difficult to implement. An understanding of classical realism and structural realism during the Cold War is initially presented to harness an understanding of NATO, Ukrainian and Russian geopolitical interests. To reach this argument, the book addresses two further international relations theories—liberalism and constructivism—as competing theories,4 when analysing the role of NATO, Ukraine’s ambitions of accession to the 4 This follows a similar structure with Posen on security of the European Union explained with the tenets of realism, principally structural realism to present the balance of power theory on US unipolarity, which is contrasted with liberalism as a competing international relations theory (Barry Ross Posen, “European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April–June 2006), pp. 149–186). The former theory, realism, presents the debate on how European states have expanded security initiatives since 1999 with the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as an alternative security provider to NATO and the latter theory on how balancing is not required because European states are liberal democracies that share similar liberalist values (Barry Ross Posen, “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,” The International Spectator, Vol. 39, No. 1 (April 2008), pp. 6–9; Posen, “European Union Security and Defence Policy,” pp. 153–164).

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Western Alliance, which has been supported by the West and American motivations of the war, Russian responses, the February 2022 invasion, and international condemnation, imposed sanctions and legal debates against the Kremlin. Although the book examines the events of the Russian invasion of Ukraine from a realist perspective (including most of its variations), this purpose serves to develop an understanding of the conflict, and principally the role of power politics, between NATO, Ukraine and Russia. It will endeavour an analysis of what tenet(s) of realism best explain(s) Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine. In doing so, the book covers the main variants of realism, namely classical realism, structural realism (both offensive and defensive neorealism ) and applies them to the war within the historical and contemporary analyses (Chapters 3–5). Despite a strong leaning towards realism, competing international relations theories—namely liberalism and constructivism—are also presented to provide alternative explanations of the war. The book will later demonstrate the limits of liberalism when analysing the deficits of regime theory, condemnation, sanctions, just war ethics and international legal efforts against Russia. However, the variations of constructivism, namely conventional and critical, also provide valid explanations on the ideational politics of Russian and Ukrainian ideology, historical symbols and myths and language (discourse) that can supplement realist national security interests (the material realities/outcomes). Although the accounts of liberalism and constructivism are less substantive than realism to explain the war, they provide useful explanations of state behaviour, the role of institutional alliances, international law and standardization and socially constructed myths, symbols and accounts of the enemy. The forthcoming chapter presents realist, liberalist and constructivist theories. After a discussion on realism, demonstrating a principal focus on statism, survival and self-help to deal with anarchy by seeking relative gain within the international political system, liberalism is covered. It includes the basis on respecting international law and upholding the rule of law, meaning that even heads of states are accountable for war crimes. This part also engages with the role of other regional security organizations that are pivotal for peace, cooperation, trade and the rules of collective security and self-defence for the absolute advantage of states within the international society. These aspects are relevant to endorse and promote sanctions and international law, and internationally condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It will be argued that regime theory explains how

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international organizations promote rules, norms and standardization that are respected by member states. These rules include the Responsibility to Protect doctrine that has promoted rules to undermine state sovereignty in the event of a state manifestly failing to protect the lives of their civilians by reiterating instruments pertained within Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations on sanctions and potential intervention. The final part of this chapter covers constructivism to outline that identity politics of a state and its principal actors, and how political leaders socially construct and produce ideas such as national security interests and foreign policy.5 Following the discussion of realism, liberalism and constructivism, the role of NATO during the Cold War is covered. This chapter reflects on the structural realist explanations of NATO that attempted to contain the Soviet Union that was met with the counterbalance of the Soviet Union’s allied Warsaw Pact. An overview on the demise of the Warsaw Pact and impact of the Soviet Union’s dissolution follows. The fall of the Iron Curtain placed NATO in an advantageous position for expansionism to further contain and weaken Russia with the accession of former Soviet Union occupied Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Coverage on the role of Ukraine desiring NATO membership and its revolutions that has formed further inimical relations with Russia follows in the subsequent chapter. It is contended that Ukraine wanted to avoid another scenario of the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and changing policies to suit Russian interests by pursuing Kyiv’s national security policy and amended constitution motivated for the security that NATO could provide. The subsequent parts of the chapter cover US objectives of the war and how Russia has distanced itself from the international community due to perceptions of violations of international law from both NATO and the

5 It must be stressed that all the broad tents of realism, liberalism and constructivism as meta-theories span beyond the scope of this book. Therefore, the basis of these three mainstream international relations theories is covered to analyse Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the role of power politics that has undermined regime theory and liberalism. Moreover, the book does not criticize each theory from its own metatheories. For a comprehensive review of the separated components of realism, liberalism and constructivism, consult Robert Jackson, Georg Sörensen and Jörgen Möller, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 69–142, 234–261 or Joseph Grieco, Gliford John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives, Connections and Enduring Questions, 2nd ed. (London: Red Globe Press, 2019), pp. 78–93.

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United States. The political motives of the United States are then brought to attention because it had led to the containment of the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia since the outset of the Cold War, ultimately forming security allies from Canada and Europe with the formation of NATO. Russia’s criticism of NATO and the United States overriding international law to pursue their geopolitical interests are raised with the contexts of Serbia in 1999, Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011. The latter contexts specifically focus on the political stalemate within the United Nations Security Council, Putin’s legal criticism of NATO intervening in Kosovo and Libya and the United States in Iraq to further sway the Kremlin away from the international community and pursue an illiberal authoritarian regime. Russia’s position has undermined the Responsibility to Protect doctrine due to Moscow and often China, protecting the state sovereignty of Syria when under scrutiny of using chemical weapons against civilians to foster amicable relations with Damascus as a crucial Middle East client state. Russia and China share the belief of complying with traditional Westphalian sovereignty and interpret the Charter of the United Nations to protect state sovereignty from the encroachment of other states pursuing their international relations.6 The penultimate analysis chapter builds on the evaluation of Kyiv’s ambitions to provide a discussion on Russia’s security dilemma of potential Ukrainian accession into NATO that would also contain Russia from its western border. This covers Russian responses from namely 2008 to date that has included supporting Georgian separatists, shutting off gas supplies to Ukraine, annexing Crimea, supporting the separatist movements of Luhansk and Donetsk during the Donbass War, and eventually invading Ukraine in late February 2022. The latter has resulted in the further annexation of four oblasts located in the Donbass region, positioned in eastern Ukraine, in September 2022. The discordant relations between Russia and Ukraine are followed by the relevance of international responses of condemnation, sanctions, just war theoretical responses and international legal debates. The international law arguments will address the inability of NATO to directly defend a non-member via a military intervention in Ukraine, and the unlikely viability of holding Putin accountable for the crime of aggression 6 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945, 1 United Nations Treaty Series XVI, Article 2 (4).

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and war crimes. It will be argued that Russia has contravened just war ethics by targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and energy sources that stretches beyond military necessity, but power politics presently, and historically, advocates that just war is merely a justification of war that Putin has marketed to his populace with discourse, myths and symbols. The conclusion argues that a tripartite realism of NATO, Ukraine and Russia is fundamental to understand the conflict that has made collective security measures, NATO’s collective defence for a non-member (Ukraine), diplomacy and accountability for the crime of aggression and war crimes difficult to implement. The shift from NATO’s bipolar balance of power to expanding Western influence has further antagonized Russia. After engaging in alternative liberalist and constructivist explanations, a realist account of the current war is reached because the principal focus rests on power politics to understand the context that can promote better diplomatic relations between Russia and Ukraine.

References Grieco, Joseph, Gliford John Ikenberry, and Michael Mastanduno. Introduction to International Relations: Perspectives, Connections, and Enduring Questions, 2nd ed. London: Red Globe Press, 2019. International Organisation for Migration. “Ukraine: IDP Estimates.” November 4, 2022, https://data.humdata.org/dataset/ukraine-idp-estimates. Jackson, Robert, Georg Sörensen, and Jörgen Möller. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 7th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Posen, Barry Ross. “European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April–June 2006), pp. 149– 186, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410600829356. Posen, Barry Ross. “ESDP and the Structure of World Power.” The International Spectator, Vol. 39, No. 1 (April 2008), pp. 5–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 03932720408457057. United Nations. Charter of the United Nations. October 24, 1945, 1 United Nations Treaty Series, XVI. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Operational Data Portal: Ukraine Refugee Situation,” January 3, 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/sit uations/ukraine. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner. “Ukraine: Civilian Casualty Update.” June 19, 2023, https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/06/ ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-19-june-2023.

CHAPTER 2

Main International Relations Theories

This chapter provides the basis of realism, liberalism and constructivism. These theories will then be utilised to explain the Cold War rivalry between the United States aligned with NATO and the Soviet Union united with the Warsaw Pact, Ukraine’s objectives to join NATO, Russia’s retaliation and the events of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

An Explanation of Realism Realism undertakes a pessimistic perspective of human nature that focuses on a global desire for power and the inescapability of egoism.1 All actions cannot be free of egoism because states, as with individuals, advance their self-interests and are power hungry.2 The basic foundations of realism rest on the calculation of primacy of state interests and “unregulated competition of states,” with states functioning as the highest rational actors seeking power in relative terms within an anarchic international system vying for state survival.3 These aspects of egoistic human nature coupled 1 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1946). 2 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 55–58. 3 Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 7.

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with anarchy, and the absence of a central governing authority, result in constraints on state behaviour in international politics. Based on egoistic human nature and anarchy, international politics is primarily conflictual and competitive. This section is split into four parts. The initial part introduces the older explanations of realism deriving from political and classical realism regarding power politics and the repudiation of diplomacy. This is followed by neorealist assertions of offensive and defensive realists on how states deal with anarchy in the international political system. Subsequently, the realist ethics of mainly prudence and scepticism address calculations of national security interests and problems with stretching ambitious liberalidealism beyond domestic interests. Finally, the theory of realism will be justified as the main lens of international relations theoretical analysis for Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Political/Classical Realism Realism is an archaic theory in international relations. Classical realism focuses on: (i) power among states; (ii) self-interests holding main motivation; and (iii) the negation of a moral outlook to idealism.4 It has roots to ancient Greece and the famous Melian dialogue. The Melian dialogue comprises the Siege of Melos (416 BC) that entailed a war between two rival city-states: Athens and Sparta. This besieging is notably narrated by an Athenian historian and general, Thucydides, who was in exile during the negotiations between the Athenians and heads of Melos. Athens was the superior nation that invaded Melos, the weaker nation, which was positioned in the Aegean Sea (an island east of Greece) inhabited by Dorian islanders.5 The Melian population were ethnically similar to Spartans and opted to preserve neutrality during the war. Once Melos was invaded, the Athenians ordered the Melians to concede to Athens or be slaughtered by a greater army. The Melians would not surrender and stressed they were a neutral city, and thus did not constitute an enemy, meaning Athens should hold no interest to 4 Steven Forde, “International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 1995), p. 143. 5 Thucydides, Speeches from Thucydides, trans. Henry Musgrave Wilkins (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1873), p. 171.

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conquer them. Despite the Melian declaration of neutrality, the Athenian army seized their city, killing their men of military ages, and captured women and children because morality had no place in the real world as the strong conquer and the weak must suffer this tragedy of international politics.6 This example of the Melian dialogue leaves no room for diplomacy.7 This well-cited example of the Peloponnesian War demonstrates that hope and pride are fruitless because it is selfishness and pragmatism that motivate wars.8 The Athenians contended that they had no alternative but to conquer Melos, or they would be perceived as weak. Thucydides contended that Athenian imperialism was justified by Euphemus for rulers to avert ascendancy by others and balance power due to the anarchic structure in international politics as an alternative of profiting or augmenting honour.9 Thucydides endeavoured to supplement anarchy with human nature to moderate realism but recognised that the balance between state interests and morality could not be associated in global politics.10 The Melian dialogue thus offers a traditional context of political realism at odds with liberal-idealism. This pragmatism emphasises the selfish motivations of a sovereign opting to wage war that trumps moral peaceful resolution.11 Early classical realists, notably Thucydides, acknowledged a scientific approach but also asked “normative questions.”12 This structural argument justifying imperialism is ethically vindicated by the need for a state to survive and preserve its standing against threats by force, which has influenced contemporary realist ethics on the selfishness of human nature and state interests.

6 David Kinsella, Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, 10th ed. (Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013), p. 40. 7 Robert B. Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York: Free Press, 1996). 8 Philip Nel, “Theories of International Relations,” in Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa, 3rd ed., eds. Patrick J. McGowan, Scarlett Cornelissen and Philip Nel (Lansdowne, PA: UCT Press, 2006), pp. 23–24. 9 Forde, “International Realism and the Science of Politics,” p. 149. 10 Forde, “International Realism and the Science of Politics,” pp. 145, 154. 11 W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, A History of Political Philosophy: From Thucydides to

Locke (New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2010), p. 13. 12 Forde, “International Realism and the Science of Politics,” p. 143.

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Hobbes later stressed that if a government, civilisation and laws are absent, then human nature would be unrestrained, meaning that a state of nature concerns war between all, including neighbours, in a human struggle to pursue power.13 This results in a security dilemma when states will maximise their security agenda that may include developing new technology or weapons procurement that decreases the security—at least ideologically—of another state(s). Human motives and the prominence of state interests makes realism traditionally hostile to morality even if questioned, but Niccolò Machiavelli in his 1513 work “The Prince” contended that rulers should maintain themselves and the state that cannot be value free and thus contains no room for morality.14 Rather, state behaviour and the actions of statesmen can be changed to amplify rationality to oust morality. For example, imperialist ancient Rome provided a rational response to the system of anarchy and thus warfare was the only method to cope.15 Political outcomes and gain are predicted due to little room for diplomacy, and thus selfish interests drive international relations.16 If diplomacy is utilised, then it merely complements military action. Morgenthau devised six principles of political realism. One, objective laws are rooted in human nature. Two, interests should be defined in terms of power to avert the agenda of statesmen by concentrating on maximising gain and minimising risk. Three, the interest of power is not rigid and universal because it is dependent on each political and cultural context. Four, the recognition on the moral implications of political action that must be sifted through tangible conditions of time and place. Five, refuting a single nation’s moral ambitions and laws to govern the world order. Six, differentiate national interests from legalistic and moralistic perspectives.17 These principles of political realism can form skilful diplomacy to promote stability through the preservation of the balance of power. 13 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or, the Matter, Form, and Power of a Common-Wealth and Ecclesiastical and Civil (London: Green Dragon, 1651). 14 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1985). 15 Machiavelli, The Prince, pp. 11–13. 16 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and

Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). 17 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1948 ed.

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Political realism separates the feasibility from the desirable within a particular space, time and place/political occurrence.18 Hurrell has normatively questioned what can be done within the limits of the political landscape, which constitutes the reality, at a given time—thus sharing traits with Morgenthau’s postulation on practicality.19 Based on this thinking, classical realists would be inclined to stress that moral perceptions are incompatible when a state is faced with the task of considering to wage war or engage with their foreign policy.20 Pragmatism in particular contexts is the bedrock of political and classical realism. Neorealism: Offensive and Defensive Realists Other types of realism are equally prevalent. Structural realists (neorealists) stress that the power of nations is most important within international relations due to the global anarchical structure and lack of trust in international politics.21 State centrism is a principal focus of realism to motivate the interests of state behaviour intending to pursue survival in an anarchical world.22 Waltz contended that a global government is unlikely to surface due to the risk of an international civil war.23 This assertion runs in contravention of liberalist ideals establishing a new Leviathan or a cosmopolitan democracy seeking to apply democratic norms and values globally, as envisioned by David Held,24 due to a breakdown of a functioning global authority to properly govern and regulate state

18 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, brief ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 7. 19 Andrew Hurrell, “Norms and Ethics in International Relations,” in Handbook of

International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE Publications, 2000), p. 137. 20 In contrast, pacifists would argue that war is never morally permissible. 21 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York City, NY: McGraw-

Hill, 1979), p. 97. 22 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1948 ed., p. 13; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 74–77. 23 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 112. 24 David Jonathan Andrew Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern

State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).

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behaviour(s).25 This debate is why neorealists argue that states must adopt a policy of self-help and thus decide for themselves to survive. Morgenthau similarly argued that international relations had to place power politics at the centre of international politics.26 Classical realism and neorealism can be separated. Classical realists focus on the core causes behind war and conflicts because human nature is flawed. It is the overconfidence of political actors that escalate war rather than fear from the structural conditions of anarchy.27 Conversely, neorealists stress that it is the conditions of anarchy within the international political system that produces the engrained roots of war and conflict that is coupled with weak controls and the presence of a competent international authority of global governance. Such modern approaches to realism frame security as the main objectives of states (as the main rational actors) that do not believe in the potential of progress.28 Neorealists, and especially offensive realists, contend that state behaviour is driven by material structures within the global system that creates “security competition,” especially for great powers.29 Mearsheimer, the main protagonist of offensive realism, defines power with its relational toll, meaning that the amount of power stands on the material outcomes and capabilities.30 Offensive realists perceive that the state, and its national interests, must be the main priority because abstract ideals such as promoting or promising human rights, democratic peace and/or just war ethics in intervened states can weaken national and 25 Fiott has presented several criticisms with Kantian cosmopolitan order based on its linear approach and the beliefs of sovereign equality because realists examine the plurality of discreet political communities, based on sovereign inequality, geopolitical time and space (Daniel Fiott, “Realist Thought and Humanitarian Intervention,” The International History Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 [September 2013], pp. 766–782). Based on this realist argument, cosmopolitanism can hinder the strategic realities of separated, unequal and distant, state interests rather than foster democratic peace and the alleged good life. 26 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1948 ed., p. 15. 27 Richard Ned Lebow, “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War,”

Analyse & Kritik, Vol. 44, No. 1 (July 2022), p. 118. 28 Lebow, “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War,” p. 111. 29 Adrian Hyde-Price, “Realism: A Dissident Voice in the Study of the CSDP,” in The

Routledge Handbook of European Security, eds. Sven Biscop and Richard G. Whitman (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 22. 30 John Joseph Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York City, NY: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp. 57–60.

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security interests. In this sense, moral good can also do wrong. Therefore, realists assume that states behave as rational actors that exercise conflictual intentions, meaning that material capabilities matter.31 Rationality is required to analyse and predict trends of behaviour.32 The global anarchic structure lacks a formal and centralised organisation, government or entity to counteract states from pursuing a system of self-help. Self-help comprises states attempting to reach their internal interests and forming competition with other states by evading to reduce or dispose of their primary interests. Competition between states is prevalent insofar that each sovereign state maintains some form of equality within international anarchic system. In sum, the main aspects of realism rest on states operating as rational principal actors and pursue own interests to survive that are built on the preponderance of material outcomes and capabilities.33 For “offensive realists,” the formation of state behaviours in foreign interventions operates as part of offensive military abilities to enhance relative power due to uncertainty and other states enhancing power to threaten other state’s survival.34 Based on this assertion, prevalent uncertainty pushes states to maximise power (even if excessive) to remain secure.35 In other words, states are driven to increase their relative power because this is the most favourable method to maximise a state’s security.36 This increases the likelihood of aggression and war, as a consequence of vying for security, because order mostly serves great powers. As Mearsheimer argues, powerful states seek regional hegemony and attempt to dominate most material resources, namely military and economic, but also strive to constrain or influence the actions and behaviours of smaller neighbouring states with the threat of considerable repercussions if these rules are disobeyed.37 Based on this premise,

31 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (October 1999), pp. 5–55. 32 J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 23. 33 Donnelly, Realism and International Relations. 34 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 3. 35 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 35. 36 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 21. 37 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 49–51.

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great powers have the highest military and economic capabilities and thus constitute the most important players in global politics.38 As a reaction to uncertainty deriving from “anarchy and the security dilemma,” states try to protect themselves by controlling or neutralising their border areas.39 From such realist thinking, wars are initiated because a central authority is absent (anarchy) to protect states and prevent them from warring.40 Snyder similarly noted that “imperial expansion” contains few problems because, as reminiscent of Thucydides’ Melian dialogue, “the strong conquer the weak” due to its benefits.41 A powerful state may thus harm another state so trust is lacking in the international system, which forms uncertainty.42 Hence, major powers are driven “to build regional spheres of influence near their borders” by dominating their neighbours.43 This strategy of conquering, controlling and/or influencing neighbours is easier to achieve than global dominance because the projection of power deteriorates with distance.44 The work of Götz is useful to extend neorealism to consider geographical influence insofar that powerful states will try to “prevent smaller neighbouring states from becoming military bridgeheads or allies of extra-regional powers” due to rivalry from other powers “on its doorstep.”45 The balance of power is what all countries have to deal with so states make calculations concerning power and seek it for own maximisation as a means of survival and relative gain over other rival states.46

38 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 17–18. 39 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30,

No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167, 169. 40 Stephen Martin Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis,” Foreign Policy, January 19, 2022. 41 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambitions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 302. 42 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.” 43 Elias Götz, “Neorealism and Russia’s Ukraine Policy, 1991–Present,” Contemporary

Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2016). 44 Stephen Martin Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 23–24. 45 Götz, “Neorealism and Russia’s Ukraine Policy,” p. 303. 46 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 18.

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Offensive realism is thus based on the uncertainty of states, namely neighbours, and vying for survival to deal with anarchy in the international system that presents the security dilemma. This tenet of realism thus focuses on material factors that are important for states to maximise relative advantage over rival states to survive within an international anarchical world. Great powers, irrespective of regime, will act in a similar way, so it can be contended that offensive realism ignores, or substantially disregards, moralism in international politics. A state pursues self-interests by competition as a means of survival to adapt in the absence of a centralised global authority. This is termed defensive neorealism 47 and it urges states to retain reserved policies to bring about their security.48 Waltz focuses on a structured anarchical system of states measured by their capabilities, meaning that the balance of power for state survival ensures that rivals do not grow too powerful.49 Defensive neorealists take the position that offensive expansion policies downcast states conforming to the balance of power. Waltz defended bipolarity to manage great powers that hold higher capabilities in the international system to avert nuclear war and criticised US incursions abroad.50 This pragmatism was normative, although not identified by Waltz, insofar that the balance of power could manage the bipolarity of great powers by resisting over-extension in the international political system to prevent a nuclear war.51 Posen has taken this debate on structural realism further by studying European states, namely the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).52 Europe has rid of Soviet then allegedly Russian threats with European states bandwagoning with NATO, as a main instrument of US hegemony regarding Eurasian land, and have improved unstable European economies.53 In 47 Conversely, offensive realism places emphasis on how states can maximise power and authority to accomplish security via domination and work towards becoming a hegemon. 48 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 49 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 50 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 51 Adam R.C. Humphreys, “Waltz and the World: Neorealism as International Political Theory?” International Politics, Vol. 50, No. 6 (September 2013), p. 863. 52 Barry Ross Posen, “European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity?” Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April–June 2006), pp. 149–186. 53 Barry Ross Posen, “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,” The International Spectator, Vol. 39, No. 1 (April 2008), pp. 9–10.

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addition to European states arming to mainly please the United States, the unlikely immanent threat from America has still resulted in balancing the unipolarity of US power because even allies find America’s potential international political world uncomfortable.54 This explains why European states, and the European Union, have become more involved in security and started acting autonomously with security threats since the late 1990s to provide an alternative security outlet than NATO.55 To explain the security dilemma more comprehensively, defensive neorealism explains that antagonistic expansion policies endorsed offensively downcast states compliant to the balance of power. Snyder identifies that states seek survival against apparent threats by enhancing armed forces or redrawing borders to frighten rival states.56 Due to anarchy, states pursue modest strategies for security because attempting to gain further power via aggression for expansion usually backfires.57 Anarchy within the international system makes states and their fearful leaders strive for survival, resulting in the enhancement of arms, alliances and attempt to balance against prospective aggressors.58 Offensive realists recognise that the world system is anarchical and thus survival is pivotal for states, but by maximising their relative power rather than pursuing an appropriate segment of power as Waltz previously argued.59 Therefore, defensive realists, unlike offensive realists, prefer balancing than direct war between great powers due to the risks associated. The balance of power was historically applicable with the Cold War bipolar axis, the United States and former Soviet Union, and subsequently growing humanitarian and human rights concerns.60 The bipolar axis of power then formed competition, namely the arms race or threat of nuclear 54 Posen, “European Union Security and Defence Policy,” pp. 149–150. 55 Posen, “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,” p. 12. 56 Snyder, Myths of Empire, p. 11. 57 Valerie Morkeviˇcius, Realist Ethics: Just War Traditions as Power Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 13. 58 Lebow, “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War,” p. 118. 59 Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, “Waltz, Mearsheimer and the Post-Cold War World:

The Rise of America and the Fall of Structural Realism,” International Politics, Vol. 51, No. 3 (April 2014), pp. 295–315. 60 Anja Hanish, “From Helsinki to Afghanistan: The CSCE Process and the Beginning of the Second Cold War,” in The Nuclear Crisis: The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s, eds. Christoph Becker-Schaum, Philipp Gassert,

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power, due to reinforced bipolar burdens within Europe which intensified the security dilemma.61 During the Vietnam War, the United States and its allies supported pro-Western South Vietnam to fight against communism in North Vietnam that was backed by the Soviet Union, China, North Korea and further allies.62 Moreover, in the 1980s, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan aimed to support the crumbling communist regime that was met with the United States allying “with radical Islamism in Pakistan and Afghanistan” to support “a jihad [the Mujahideen] against the Soviet invasion.”63 Therefore, proxy wars and the arms race were fought between two great powers, the United States and former Soviet Union, which constrained international law but direct warfare was averted. During this time, smaller—and indeed weaker—states bandwagoned with great powers to demonstrate their backing for an alliance with expected reciprocal (military and economic) support. Realist Ethics Rather than think of realism as a bold-headed and selfish theory unmarred by ethical considerations, it is of importance to understand the ethics that realists display. To illustrate this point, Morkeviˇcius undermines the “overly simplistic view” that “realists push states into wars” to present the argument that realism considers ethics (when waging war).64 Realist ethics are based on namely prudence, scepticism and reciprocity. Prudence considers political repercussions of perceived “moral action.”65 Based on prudence, realists refrain from evil intent but also sway away from doing good by merely pursuing justice within the

Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach and Marianne Zepp (Brooklyn, NY: Berghahn Books, 2016), pp. 37–38. 61 Robert S. Ross, “Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia,” in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, eds. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 290. 62 Andrew Wiest, Essential Histories: The Vietnam War 1956–1975 (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 9–12. 63 Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan: During the Cold War,” in Superpower Rivalry and Conflict: The Long Shadow of the Cold War on the Twenty-First Century, ed. Chandra Chari (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), p. 58. 64 Morkeviˇcius, Realist Ethics, p. 10. 65 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, brief ed., 1993, p. 12.

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international order. Morgenthau argued that politics and ethics rest on the tension of weak “universal standards” and the multitude of state morality.66 Realists calculate with prudence whether an intervention is in the state’s self-interests, considering the risk of their soldier’s lives and constraint on resources to avoid spending more on finances beyond national state interests.67 States maintain primary interests and it cannot relinquish to morality issues (based on individuals). This challenge rests on normative desires and potential attainments. Even if lives are at stake, political choices whether to intervene are part of decisions who is invoking a threat to the peace that is based on interests and the unavoidable selectivity of protection that often invokes support of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.68 The “logic of consequences” places priority of strategic objectives and behaviour over the “logic of appropriateness” that supports legitimised norms to supersede instrumental or strategic calculations of gain.69 The parameters of possibility are constrained within an anarchic international system that inevitably promotes a culture of self-help and state primacy to survive in international politics. For Walt, war is always feasible so states engage in self-help by seeking security and other gains—with uncertainty on what other states will do later in time.70 In short, states hold primary interests, and a state cannot surrender to morality (based on individuals). It should be acknowledged that realism does reflect moral considerations of dealing with practical issues in the world.71 Realist principles rest on survival, impetus for self-interests—due

66 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), pp. 241–242. 67 Kenneth Neal Waltz, “A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force,” International Security, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring 1981), p. 51. 68 Martti Koskenniemi, “The Place of Law in Collective Security,” Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1996), p. 464. 69 James Gardner March and Johan Peder Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of Inter-

national Political Orders,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), p. 949. 70 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.” 71 Jennifer M. Welsh, “Taking Consequences Seriously: Objections to Humanitarian

Intervention,” in Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, ed. Jennifer M. Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 58.

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to anarchy—and prudence that considers ethics and morality as a complementary measure for national security interests.72 Realists would stress that when vital security issues or economic opulence interests are absent, then norms may have an impact on shaping state behaviour. However, contemporary realists have contended that normative attributes to foreign policy influence inferior national interests, meaning that normative values will be ignored when there are essential national security and economic interests at concern.73 For realists, states function as rational actors. If there are no security or economic interests of concern, then powerful states may provide support to encourage better relations. Some realists act as moral philosophers because they believe in liberalist ideals by heart, but pragmatism is deemed as the predominant factor(s) of national decision-making. For instance, E.H. Carr has discussed what the international political system ought to be but prefers to examine it with a rationalist perspective.74 Carr was writing in the interwar period and the aftermath of the Second World War that observed the fiasco of international institutions and international law that reinvigorated realist notions of states functioning as the main actors in global politics, with the betterment of chasing power politics and material capabilities. Carr had controversially defended the policies of Britain’s Arthur Neville Chamberlain on appeasement towards Adolf Hitler’s of Germany with the premise that Germany’s strength would not hinder principal British interests.75 Hence, especially for classical realists, political and ethical behaviour is condemned to failure except if the practicality and rationality of states are considered. Morality must be filtered within the particular political time and space.

72 Fiott, “Realist Thought and Humanitarian Intervention.” 73 Adrian Hyde-Price, “Realist Ethics and the “War on Terror”,” Globalizations, Vol.

6, No. 1 (March 2009), p. 26. 74 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 135–136. 75 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939. It was Chamberlain’s successor of the leader of the Conservative Party Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill who turned against previous appeasement to prevent Nazi Germany’s territorial ambitions.

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The practicality of state decision-making, behaviour and functionality is based on a state’s resources, structure and geographic position.76 If politicians focus on overly idealistic aspects on what should be, it is hazardous and immoral if it causes political and economic policies that result in states and its populace prone to brutality and coercion from other actors.77 For this reason, prudence is needed for realists to estimate foreign policy conduct; and to appreciate power and anarchy in the international system. Hence, statecraft considers ethics and morality, but it also provides ethical constraints. Realist choices are needed on alternatives for morality to proceed. If there are no choices, then there is no room for morality. Realists look at the constraints and political choices to make calculated rational choices to reflect vital state interests with effort to attach morality and ethics if possible to do so. One such realist thinker, Carr, demonstrated this in his well-known support for the careful/normative realist strand by his emphasis on the need to balance military power with morality when conducting intervention, via maintaining the dialogue of realism and idealism to some degree.78 The reasons behind prudence resulted in scepticism. Realists are sceptical of the production of the “good life” and progression in human development (via economic liberalism or political means).79 International human rights, democratisation and economic liberalisation have been spread by the West undertaking coercion instead of appeal or persuasion that has doubted neoliberal institutionalism.80 Realist scepticism presents contradictions on the idea of crusading that is masked with moral garb. Agreements among a group of democracies does not mean that these agreements or ideals are beneficial for other states. The interests of a state or collection of states can be contained within an international society or multilateral institution to impose “universal” interests on other states.81 “Social morality” can thus serve dominant group interests and enforce 76 Henry Alfred Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers Council on Foreign Relations, 1957), p. 5. 77 Hyde-Price, “Realism: A Dissident Voice in the Study of the CSDP,” pp. 22–23. 78 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919–1939: An Introduction to the

Study of International Relations (New York: HarperCollins, 1939), p. 100. 79 Hyde-Price, “Realist Ethics and the “War on Terror”,” pp. 31–32. 80 Michael Lind, “The Alternative to Empire,” 2006, in Stephen McGlinchey, “Neo-

conservatism and American Foreign Policy,” E-International Relations (June 1, 2009). 81 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939, 2001, p. 71.

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ideals of social justice on subordinate groups as a method to justify and maintain their standing of authority.82 Realist scepticism contradicts imposed democratic imperialism that crosses outside of national security interests. If applying realist scepticism to external interventions, foreign incursions need careful attention due to the contrasting perspectives from discreet political communities that contradict linear cosmopolitan forms of justice and rights.83 By way of illustration, humanitarian intervention contains different connotations and objectives of external states overriding the sovereign affairs of another state to save lives and install democracy and justice that intensify conflict because states hardly share the same principles and assurances.84 When a state contravenes a state’s sovereignty with humanitarian intervention, long-term vows are frequently watered down or belated from the deficiency of “compelling” self-interests that verify commitment.85 In other words, the feasibility and pragmatism to strive for ethical and self-interests (politics) at the forefront of issues, such as humanitarian intervention, are debates that realists pursue on prudence and scepticism.86 Finally, reciprocity is based on the restraint, compromise and shared accommodation between each discreet political community. These communities can pursue political policies to respect other state interests if protecting and promoting own interests.87

82 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939, 2001, pp. 74–75. 83 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939, 2001, pp. 78–80. 84 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1985). 85 Michael Wesley, “Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2 (September 2005), p. 70. 86 Humanitarian intervention has been famously defined by Holzgrefe as a definite or threat of force that perseveres past state borders by either an additional state, or collective group of states, to prevent serious human rights abuses without the volition of state territorial authority where a force has intruded (Jeff L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, ed. Jeff L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], p. 18). 87 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, brief ed., 1993, p. 13.

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Justification and Summary of Realism Based on the points raised in this section, realpolitik is relevant in international politics. The main justification of pursuing the theory of realism to the context of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine rests on the importance of powerful state’s strategic interests and what they do once these are repeatedly threatened. The book adopts the structural realist position that NATO’s expansionism towards Russia’s borders significantly threatened its central strategic interests. This had driven Russian power politics on its periphery, leading to an inevitable invasion of Ukraine. Although this is a matter of intense public debate, the main argument is that power politics, in the context of the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, reflects elements of realism, namely classical and structural, and the Ukraine invasion is undoubtedly a first-order international problem. The realist ethics of scepticism help explain the pitfalls of liberalism regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. As Mearsheimer has argued, Western liberals have wrongly dismissed realism and continually pursued democracy, economic interdependence and the rule of law to promote Ukraine as a Western grip to border Russia.88 Several other realists have convincingly argued that liberalist ideals have proven hazardous to national security interests and foreign policy by ignoring the importance of power politics. To provide one of many examples, Porter has argued that restoring ideals of a liberal order, which is important for US hegemony, has resulted in unattainable ideals merging politeness with the risk of force.89 As will be demonstrated in the book, there are many accounts warranting investigations for war crimes against Russian military conduct but the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has been criticised by Cunliffe due to the prerogative resting on states, meaning that powerful states determine criteria of when and how the doctrine is discharged.90 Walt has also criticised liberalism for heightening risks of perceiving opponents as evil or seeing a state as fully virtuous engaging in “open-ended moral 88 John Joseph Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal

Delusions That Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 5 (September–October 2014), pp. 77–78. 89 Patrick Porter, The False Promise of Liberal Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020), pp. 2–3. 90 Philip Cunliffe, “Dangerous Duties: Power, Paternalism and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. S1 (October 2010), pp. 79–96.

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crusades.”91 Realism, and in particular its classical and neorealist forms, acknowledge the importance of power politics due to an anarchical world that undermines international law, human rights and other standards and provide scepticism of ambitious idealist schemes with promises of ending conflict, inequality and injustice. In sum, realism is based on survival, motivation of self-interests, anarchy and prudence that provide a complementarity approach to diplomacy, ethics and international law but predominantly for national interests rather than saving lives. Realism is grounded on statism, survival and selfhelp. The strands of realism presented reveal similarities on a pessimistic view of human nature, the competitive nature of groups and states focusing on managing chaos in the anarchical international system due to the uncertainty of other state’s actions and or policies.92 Sovereign inequality is a main feature and power politics remain as animals (states) fight without control or containment from a zoo (international organisation). International organisations and globalisation cannot constrain great powers, because states have adequate power to interpret and explain sovereignty to complement their interests.93 Within the jungle (anarchical international system), some animals (states) are a lot stronger than others. Therefore, a collection of animals will have to ally as a group and/or within a zoo against powerful predators to contain them. Therefore, classical realism and structural realism are the most appropriate meta-theories of realism to frame the significance of the argument and intended scholarly contribution relevant for the Russo-Ukrainian war. Realism has been selected as the theory to provide an analysis on understanding the historical legacy of relations between NATO, Russia and Ukraine that has reached the February 2022 invasion. This is to focus on the main tenets of realism, namely classical and structural realism (offensive and/or defensive), to assess which realist theory does it better than others to answer the set research question concerning power politics of the contemporary Russian invasion of Ukraine.

91 Stephen Martin Walt, “The World Wants You to Think Like a Realist,” Foreign Policy, May 30, 2018. 92 Morkeviˇcius, Realist Ethics, p. 17. 93 Charles E. Ziegler, “Conceptualising Sovereignty in Russian Foreign Policy: Realist

and Constructivist Perspectives,” International Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (May 2012), pp. 400–417.

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Despite a leaning towards realism, liberalism is provided as an alternative international relations theory to foster problems with the inconsistency of international law, regime theory and unheroic bandwagoning, and the fallacy of sovereign equality between states within the international political system. Even though the author is critical of liberalism, the explanations of democratic peace, bangwagoning with NATO and its rules of standardisation, the application of international law, international humanitarian law, collective security, humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect are useful to assess why and how states and international institutions strive for absolute, rather than relative, advantage. Furthermore, constructivism is offered with the purpose to harness an understanding of the beliefs, language, interactions, history, culture and actions of political leaders representing states (social actors), meaning that international politics contains ideational, rather than solely material, forces. This theory intersubjectively explains how states behave and deal with issues such as a security dilemma or anarchy.

An Explanation of Liberalism In contrast to realism, liberalism is based on the mutual cooperation between states to provide better security and economic stability. It includes diplomatic relations within a collection of states that share “sovereign equality” and “multilateral cooperation” to promote collective security and mutual economic advantage.94 This notion of “liberal states” striving for absolute gain includes democratisation to achieve individual autonomy and the constitutional protection of basic civil and political rights and an opportunity to form cooperation and free trade with other democratic states.95 Within democratic states, liberalism promotes individual equality, autonomy and protections of human rights and fundamental freedoms against the state and other private actors. This section is spilt into four components. It initially covers the alleged benefits of democratic peace spanning from utopian liberalism to provide better trade, increased democracies and equitable rights for global citizens 94 Peter G. Danchin and Horst Fischer, “Introduction: The New Collective Security,” in United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security, eds. Peter G. Danchin and Horst Fischer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 5), pp. 1–31. 95 Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 205–208.

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within the international system. This is followed by neoliberalism, regime theory and institutional liberalism to explain how international organisations shape norms and standardise behaviour that result in reciprocal expectations. A specific example of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is provided in the event of the international community responding to atrocity crimes. Finally, a summary of liberalism is provided on its main ideals comprising democratic standards, absolute gain, welfare and human rights ideals and humanitarian intervention. Democratic Peace Theory and Cosmopolitanism Aspects of democratisation and economic liberalism can be traced to former US President Thomas Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points Speech in 1918 that underpinned utopian liberalism. Points 1 and 3 focused on diplomacy and the removal of economic trade barriers to form better relations with the assumption that democratic states that trade with one another are less likely to wage war with one another.96 This was later framed by peace advocates as the democratic peace thesis.97 Doyle contended that the absence of war between democratic states is due to the “mutual respect” of liberty, citizenship rights and political independence to prefer restraint and diplomacy—with such publics being against war.98 Other liberalists similarly argue that large-scale wars are too costly on a society which is why democracies are promoted as a strategy for peace.99 Democracies do not fight each other but fight wars with authoritarian states. For instance, in June 1982, Ronald Reagan’s speech in the United Kingdom parliament called for “a crusade for freedom” against communism and claimed that the Soviet Union was the empire of “evil.”100 “For liberals, the solution is to topple tyrants and spread

96 Thomas Woodrow Wilson, The Fourteen Points Speech (Boston, MA: Squid Ink Classics, 1918). 97 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 98 Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), p. 10. 99 Andrew Moravcik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International

Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997), p. 531. 100 Ronald Wilson Reagan, “Address to Members of the British Parliament,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum, June 8, 1982.

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democracy, markets and institutions based on the belief that democracies don’t fight one another, especially when they are bound together by trade, investment and an agreed-on set of rules.”101 The former Soviet Union allegedly exercised aggressive foreign policy without restrained and peaceful intentions to assert that authoritarianism makes war. Doyle has further stressed that totalitarian regimes infringe all cosmopolitan rights.102 It has been contended that the default status of liberal democratic states produces peaceful relations in comparison with authoritarian states because democracies tend to prefer restraint and diplomacy, and thus the democratic public is usually against war.103 By way of illustration, the United States in Vietnam and German and French publics desired later withdrawal from Iraq. The policy of democratic peace encourages the formation of additional democracies to foster stronger peace that will result in international politics being less conflictual and more peaceful. This was evident in American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War and more so since 9/11 in the Middle East. Terrorism is debatably grown from the deficiency of democracy in the Middle East and US objectives directed democratic peace theory to thwart instability since the end of the Cold War era. Republican liberalism shares similarities with the democratic peace thesis. For Kant, republicanism pertains legitimacy and the ideals for perpetual peace.104 To attain a long-lasting peace, a set of certain basic rights and fundamental freedoms can be shared between states under cosmopolitan law—or what is often referred to as universalism. Cosmopolitans strive for liberal states within a flat moral universe to judge wrongful actions as a package, an independent judiciary and promote all human rights, civil and political rights, avert arbitrary detention and demand democratic elections at home and abroad.105 101 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.” 102 Michael Doyle, “International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect,” Interna-

tional Studies Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 2011), p. 78. 103 Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”; Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism

and World Politics,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151–1169. 104 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (Königsberg: F. Nicolovius, 1795). 105 Hadley P. Arkes, First Things: An Inquiry into the First Principles of Morals and Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

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This cosmopolitan thinking has set standards that have been agreed by a collection of states in international law, e.g. the rule of non-intervention and the respect for sovereignty in the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia. The respect for state sovereignty results in the non-intervention of states forcefully interfering with a government or constitution of another state.106 Peremptory norms ( jus cogens ) function as part of customary international law outlawing piracy on the high seas, the right to life, freedom of torture, abolition of slavery and genocide that have been taken seriously as the gravest crimes by the international community. In the event of a contravention of customary international law, the international community is obligated erga omnes to respond because a violation is deemed an attack on all its members. Russett and Oneal argue that the Kantian influence of democratic states on norms and international institutions concerning the use of force by all states increases these international norms to constrain non-democratic states’ behaviour or by states not member to an international organisation.107 Based on this liberalist notion on the democratic peace ideal, it is also beneficial to constrain rogue states because they can learn democratic peace theory and liberalism. Neoliberalism, Regime Theory and Institutional Liberalism Rather than engage in conflict due to the international anarchical system, neoliberals argue that there are a variety of structures to police and govern state behaviour and a state can lose advantage if they do not cooperate within such structures.108 Keohane asserts that neoliberalism comprises two motives: (i) the benefits of agreements between states that were previously unreached; and (ii) such agreements are difficult to attain.109 States can attain mutual cooperation with other states even if they wish to exploit weaker states. The work of Klein suggests that neoliberalism and democracy can contain anti-ethical standards, but neoliberal 106 Kant, Perpetual Peace. 107 Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence,

and International Organisations (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 181. 108 Alexandros Petersen, Integration in Energy and Transport: Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), p. 66. 109 Robert Owen Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 1988), p. 386.

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policies in the United Kingdom and America were dubiously voluntary, and not opposed, and thus democracy and policies embraced are usually not resisted in strong states.110 States may accomplish mutual cooperation with other states even if they possess intentions to exploit weaker states. According to Oye, this cooperation is likely to commence because the transparency, monitoring of uncooperative behaviour, predictable sanctions, rules and appreciation for the gains form the predictable cooperative relationship.111 In the anarchic international system, international institutions or regimes impact on state behaviour, meaning that cooperation—rather than conflict—is feasible because institutional arrangements and regimes facilitate norms, rules, procedures and expectations that cement international cooperation.112 Norms define “rights and obligations” to set behavioural standards; rules present prescriptions “for action”; and decision-making rests on principal practices for “implementing collective choice.”113 In other words, regimes govern “arrangements” that include a system of mutual norms, rules and procedures to standardise behaviour in approved ways and control its outcomes.114 Although an international organisation may be a permanent institution that exercises rules, norms and procedures on collective security and human rights, a regime can be temporary. For neoliberals, realist shortterm strategies to maximise power and instant calculations of interest should be disregarded, because general obligations sacrifice such interests to expect states to reciprocate as part of a mutual transactional exchange to benefit both parties—even if not obligated to do so.115 110 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Penguin, 2007). 111 Kenneth Akito Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth Akito Oye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 1–24. 112 Stephen David Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes in Intervening Variables,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), p. 185. 113 Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” p. 186. 114 Robert Owen Keohane and Joseph Samuel Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence

(Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), p. 19; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 54. 115 Fred Hirsch, The Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 78.

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Based on regime theory, it can be postulated that institutional liberalism focuses on optimism to maintain peace and mutual cooperation between states within structured governance provided by institutional arrangements. Therefore, international institutions endorse cooperation by promoting these conditions to punish rule-breakers that preserve confidence in amicable behaviours. States within international institutions exercise equality and a hierarchical system is annulled for equivalent diplomacy rights. These international political systems can curb conflict and increase economic advantage by assisting states with diplomacy and intervention on humanitarian grounds, namely in events of persecution and economic struggles. Institutional liberalism intends to reinforce norms by advocating “sovereignty as responsibility” with the use of international organisations, international law and the voice of international and national civil society.116 The United Nations has reinforced institutional liberalism. It has placed pressure on a state’s sovereign responsibilities and failure to protect own citizens from human rights violations and atrocity crimes can eventually lead to Chapter VII collective security. Atrocity crimes within this rhetoric includes war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide.117 Traditional cosmopolitan rights—as presented by Kant—on sovereign independence and non-intervention have also formed the basis of contemporary international law.118 International law and institutional arrangements are encouraged to be respected to ensure that mutual cooperation, standards, rules, procedures and sanctions are followed when states decide with collective security or preventive humanitarian intervention to enter war and police ethical conduct within war. Democracies tend not to wage war on each other and respect international law that provides restraint and diplomacy that is based on mutual norms, obligations and expectations.

116 Anne Orford, “Moral Internationalism and the Responsibility to Protect,” European

Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No. 1 (February 2013), pp. 83–108. 117 United Nations Summit Outcome Document, “2005 World Summit Outcome,” UN General Assembly Doc. A/RES/60/1, 60th session, October 24, 2005, paras. 138– 139. 118 Kant, Perpetual Peace; United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Article 2(4), Chapter I—Purposes and Principles.

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The Responsibility to Protect The United Nations has supported institutional liberalism. It has stressed that a state has sovereign responsibility to enjoy its sovereign status; namely, freedom from external intrusion. However, if a state fails to protect its own citizens from human rights abuses and/or atrocity crimes, Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations can authorise sanctions and potentially collective security. In 2005, the World Summit Outcome provided the fortification of the norms underlying the national and global responsibilities on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).119 Although R2P is not legally binding, its norms are institutionally spread to encourage legal obligations on states in the event of atrocity crimes and other treaties such as the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) and prompting Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The ambitions of R2P utilise liberalist, and institutionalised norms, to protect populations from atrocity crimes and when states manifestly fail to do so, then diplomacy is initially undertaken. There are three pillars of R2P that: (i) place preliminary importance on the state to protect their state and civilian lives; (ii) demand international support if they lack the capacity to protect their citizens; and (iii) collective security procedures can commence under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations if diplomacy under its preceding Chapter VI has been exhausted. The third pillar of R2P can authorise Chapter VII sanctions and a prospective use of force on a case-by-case basis.120 Regional arrangements can be adopted if regional organisations seek consultation and permission from the United Nations Security Council.121 The third pillar has raised scepticism but the preceding International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) claimed that R2P would

119 United Nations Summit Outcome Document, “2005 World Summit Outcome,”

paras. 138–139. 120 Carsten Stahn, “Between Law-Breaking and Law-Making: Syria, Humanitarian Intervention and ‘What the Law Ought to Be’,” Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 19, No. 1 (April 2014), p. 29. 121 Article 53 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations. Regional arrangements may include NATO or the Economic Community of West African States.

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not be used as an excuse for intervening powers to pursue their geopolitical interests under the guise of incursions to protect victims from atrocity crimes.122 R2P reflects cosmopolitan ideology that has been widely endorsed by American and European democratic powers after the Cold War to advocate liberalist values of international constitutionalism.123 The ICISS movement was initiated on the premise that sovereignty would carry specific responsibilities for governments being held accountable for failing to protect and assist civilians in conflict of basic human rights and “survival needs.”124 The ICISS interprets that a state retains its sovereign independence if it holds the responsibility to protect citizens and if it manifestly fails to do, then the state in question must be held accountable for their actions.125 If this social contract embedded on these institutional liberalist norms is breached, then the sovereign rights of a state, namely non-interference from external states, are annulled. In other words, a humanitarian intervention that contravenes the sovereign domestic affairs of a state can be justified if a state continues to fail protecting their civilian lives. Although a humanitarian intervention shares comparable norms with R2P by halting a humanitarian catastrophe to challenge state sovereignty, R2P seeks legitimacy within the rules of the Charter of the United Nations. Liberalists stress that the Responsibility to Protect doctrine advocates international norms to expand the legitimacy of pre-existing international law—principally the Charter of the United Nations and several conventions that prohibit torture and genocide—to prevent the four atrocity crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide. The third pillar of R2P specifically seeks to address “global threats to peace.”126 The language concerns “responsibility” to provide normative weight rather than operate as separate legal duties. 122 Ramesh Thakur, “R2P After Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May 2013), p. 65. 123 Yukiko Nishikawa, “The Reality of Protecting the Rohingya: An Inherent Limitation of the Responsibility to Protect,” Asian Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (November 2020), p. 99. 124 Francis Mading Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild and Ira William Zartman, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996), pp. 1–2. 125 Nishikawa, “The Reality of Protecting the Rohingya,” pp. 98–99. 126 Doyle, “International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect,” pp. 82–83.

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Liberal communitarians also concentrate on attempts to avert serious humanitarian abuses. The earlier work of Mill places emphasis on the notion of freedom to foreign people in a foreign state that is incapable to attain, which would have severe consequences.127 Mill prefers local forces to settle a conflict, but choices of intervention can be negotiated when a protracted civil war causes non-combatant casualties.128 Liberal communitarians would contend that intervention is justified if severe abuses of human rights impact on survival that may entice outsiders option to intervene. Interveners can intervene if decided as a last resort once peaceful and diplomatic resolutions have failed and calculate if the lives saved will outweigh the costs of war with minimal force.129 Thakur supports this liberalist argument with R2P that should only utilise military force as a final option.130 For liberal communitarians, an external intervenor must possess the objective of halting a slaughter and establishing a selfdetermination for the people. By way of illustration, in 1971, India engaged with a humanitarian intervention by invading East Pakistan to protect the mass lives of Bengalis and defeat its “old enemy.”131 Walzer argued that this humanitarian intervention was rapid and legitimate because Bengalis were saved and Bangladesh was accorded their own self-determining state with India enforcing “no political controls.”132 Communitarians warrant intervention to save lives from external forces if local forces fail to bring an end to the civil matter and one group is at the verge of extinction. It can be argued that liberalism shares traits with contemporary just war thinking, particularly communitarian ethics and

127 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: John W. Parker and Son, 1859). 128 Mill, On Liberty. 129 Doyle, “International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect,” p. 77. 130 Thakur, “R2P after Libya and Syria,” p. 73. 131 Michael Laban Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 105. 132 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 1977, p. 105.

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the legalistic paradigm.133 The latter concerns international law and institutional arrangements encourage mutual standards, cooperation, rules, procedures and sanctions as a last resort when states intervene to save lives. The West has set norms like R2P to restrict sovereignty that deviates from the traditional rules of non-intervention established from Westphalia. However, Western norms on limiting sovereignty have caused contradictions between Russia and the West. Due to this frustration of Moscow failing to align with this new humanitarian adaptation to sovereignty, it has aligned with amenable states, such as China, to continue defending the traditional Westphalian standard of sovereignty.134 Summary of Liberalism Democratic peace theorists believe that a collection of democratic states results in an absence of war because these states mutually respect citizenship rights, liberty and political independence.135 Other liberalists have stressed that large-scale and/or protracted wars are too damaging and costly on a society and thus democracies are encouraged as a strategy to ascertain peace.136 According to Kant, republicanism applies to legitimacy and the ideals to nurture perpetual peace.137 Protagonists of the democratic peace theory would attempt to empirically demonstrate how illiberal states can transcend from a challenging rogue state to a peaceful state to join a community of democratic states that are less prone to war.

133 Chapter 5 covers a just war debate that is also applied to the Russian-Ukraine war. Just war theory is not covered in depth here. Although Walzer would claim that just war theory under the legalistic paradigm contains similarities with liberalism by respecting international law, other just war theorists, namely Morkeviˇcius, have argued that just war is, and always has been, war justified for realist interests (Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 1977; Morkeviˇcius, Realist Ethics ). For this reason, it would be unfair to place a full discussion on just war theory within the section covering liberalism. 134 Ziegler, “Conceptualising Sovereignty in Russian Foreign Policy.” 135 Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, p. 10. 136 Moravcik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” p. 531. 137 Kant, Perpetual Peace.

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Kant’s influence of republicanism has been advanced by democratic peace theorists to focus on states bound by norms and international institutions that may consider the use of force to encourage international norms by constraining the behaviour and actions of non-democratic states or by states that are not party to the particular international organisation.138 Based on this liberalist postulation on the democratic peace model, it is also advantageous to restrain rogue states because they can learn democratic peace theory and liberalist values. The work of Mitchell controversially interprets Kant by arguing that war may be necessary to create more democracies in the international political system as a means of fostering republicanism and furthering democratic governments resulting in widespread and enduring peace.139 Although Kant was against the end of republicanism justifying the means with war, regime change has been advocated to establish the formation of additional democratic states—even if by violent means—for better pertinence with an ethics of universality to respect an international order confined by international law.140 As democracies expand, it is assumed that a system in which war is minimised, after some initial fighting to build peace (or in other words, might making rights), can be successful because democracies have better chances of winning wars than autocratic regimes.141 Once states transition to democracies, state sovereignty can be respected resulting in non-intervention for citizens if the state governs and sort problems out themselves.142 The ideals of the democratic peace thesis can intensify a “spillover effect” on aspiring citizens aiming to replicate successful transitions from dictatorship to democracies.143 This can

138 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, p. 181. 139 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “A Kantian System? Democracy and Third-Party Conflict

Resolution,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 4 (October 2002), p. 752. 140 Wade L. Huntley, “Kant’s Third Image: Systemic Sources of the Liberal Peace,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 56, 61. 141 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, p. 275. However, the Cold War fight to

topple for North Vietnamese communist regime was an unsuccessful intervention because Russia and China were powerful allies that eventually contributed to US departure. 142 Kant, Perpetual Peace. 143 Zeev Maoz, “Democratic Networks: Connecting National, Dyadic, and Systemic

Levels of Analysis in the Study of Democracy and War,” in War in a Changing World, eds. Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press), p. 173.

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thus form a domino effect of anti-governmental protests. The Obama administration applauded the call for further democracies in the Middle East from the ripple effect of the Arab Spring starting in Tunisia that spread anti-governmental protest to oust leaders out of power from Egypt, Libya and Yemen and civil uprisings spewed in Bahrain and Syria.144 Regime theory has promoted the ideals of democratisation and the standardisation of states engaging in reciprocal duties and responsibilities. These aspects have transpired to institutional liberalism with the United Nations and international community considering R2P, and principally its third pillar, in the event of a government manifestly failing to safeguard their civilians from atrocity crimes.

Constructivism: An Alternative Explanation Constructivism focuses on norms, language and identity politics that can influence state behaviour. Rather than argue that war is inevitable due to anarchy within the international system, anarchy may exist, but the effects of anarchy depend on the intersubjective meanings attached which means that realist notions of self-help and power politics merely function as institutions, not vital features of anarchy.145 This section on constructivism covers conventional constructivism, national interest and American exceptionalism, and norms, language and social constructs. The main part rests on the context of US-Iranian relations to serve as an example to understand the alternative approach that constructivism brings in contrast to realist assumptions of the security dilemma. This is followed by a summary with an argument presented on the usefulness of constructivism and the addition it can bring to supplement realist explanations of international relations. Conventional Constructivism Conventional constructivists focus on how agents and state identities make outcomes,146 meaning it is the in-between politics of ideas, agency 144 Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud and Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 145 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 146 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 391.

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and identity that are missed in neorealist and neoliberalist theories. Constructivists are critical of these rationalist-based theories and try to bridge incompatible approaches to deconstruct security studies on a “social basis.”147 In this sense, the sociology of global politics examines the normative structures, as well as material outcomes, and how identity constitutes “interests and action.”148 The roots of constructivism derive from sociological thought that concentrates on norms, language and identity politics that has the potential to influence state behaviour. By way of illustration, Giddens provided work on structuration theory and anti-positivism, otherwise known as normative thinking, which influenced constructivism in international relations. Giddens stressed that when studying social or political sciences, the social practices that are “ordered across space and time” provide a better explanation of social action instead of relying on individual experiences and “societal totality.”149 Social actors form the fabric of social sciences because they recreate and express “themselves as actors.”150 This explanation of duality forms the structure and significance of relationships between individuals, as agents and social structures. Structuration theory, as presented by Giddens on the relationship between social structures and agents and Pierre Bourdieu on the field, social, cultural and symbolic capital and habitus spanning the passivity of a social habit to the hexis (myths and symbols embodied to a more permanent and durable standing, serve as constructivism).151 Both theorists analyse the relationship between individual actors and the (social) structures that they function within. According to the work of Giddens, individuals that collectively constitute state behaviour matters to others.152

147 See Sang Tan, “Rescuing Constructivism from the Constructivists: A Critical Reading of Constructivist Interventions in Southeast Asian Security,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 (August 2006), p. 241. 148 Richard M. Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Constructivism and Critical International Theory,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 1998), p. 259. 149 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), p. 2. 150 Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 2. 151 Giddens, The Constitution of Society; Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant, An

Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). 152 Giddens, The Constitution of Society.

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Hence, constructivism originates from sociological thinking that subsequently entered international relations to deliver a method to understand ideational factors. The identities, social practices and interests of states are fundamental to international relations because this can form a sociological analysis of state behaviour within the international political system. This reinforces a variety of implications behind meanings. Meaning, social interaction, and social value are intersubjectively constructed by the perceptions of interests by agents (state actors) contained in international organisations (as part of the social structures). This can be considered within scientific bureaucracies, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, the humanitarian role of the Red Cross in policing the Geneva Conventions and the World Bank on influencing approaches to poverty alleviation.153 Based on this theory regarding reflexivity, agency and structures (as part of structuration theory), anarchy cannot be based on neorealist assertions of self-help. For Wendt, anarchy is an empty container and can only be filled when ideas and structural meanings are placed inside the container.154 The three different cultures to fill the containers of anarchy comprise: conflictual relations (Thomas Hobbes); a pledge for cooperation rather than forming enmity relations (Immanuel Kant); and/or competition with one another (John Locke).155 Wendt does recognise anarchy in the international system, but international relations is rather built on cultural and ideational forms rather than materialistic advantages.156 Wendt contends that if there is global anarchy or weak international cooperation, then state behaviour with others—based on friendship, competition or enmity relations—is down to states themselves, ideational structures and the influences and potential criticism held from civil society and their identity.157 Therefore, constructivist’s research focuses on the objectives, fears, threats, ideas, symbols, identities, cultures, language,

153 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 2. 154 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 249. 155 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 156 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of

Power Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992). 157 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.

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rhetoric and additional components of social reality. Max Weber would have deemed this as social action theory (rational and social) to reach empathetic understanding (Verstehen) of human action and social change, such as analysing the success of Protestants, namely from Calvinism, pursuing eternal salvation (and thus conforming with asceticism) in early European capitalism.158 This provides better scope for optimism, even if merely reaching rationalist reasons, rather than classical realist pessimism. Liberalists focus on the ideas of economic interdependence to form shared peace and neorealists analyse the ideas of multipolarity that forms discourse of states waging war as enemies.159 Although constructivists may appear sympathetic to liberalists on the thinking of ideas, namely shared interests and dialogue,160 the concrete progress of liberal democracies in the world, as asserted by Fukuyama,161 is the liberalist ideas and thinking that constructivists would focus on rather than the shared material advantages. Both material realities and the goals for liberalists and realists are thus based on ideas that inform the respective absolute or relative gains. Wendt’s cultures of anarchy contrast with neorealism to suggest that change becomes feasible because states and individuals can begin debating in novel ways to establish new norms that can be different from previous ones.162 Conventional constructivism thus criticises international anarchy and its associated absence of a central authority that fails to structure state behaviour.163 If linking this postulation with structuration theory, it can be contended that anarchy does not necessarily qualify as a valid social structure that shapes the antagonistic behaviour of states as social agents. This assertion would be contrasted with neorealism with the perception that states function as unequal units within the realms of sovereign inequality—with some states containing higher military and economic capabilities than other states—resulting in self-help and to defend and

158 Max Weber, The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Routledge, 1904/1930). 159 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 135–136. 160 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It.” 161 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 162 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” p. 399. 163 Waltz, Theory of International Politics.

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maintain national self-interests. However, in Anarchy is what States make of it, Wendt challenged this neorealist assertion by stressing that the interests and identities of state actors within the international political system are not confined within the structure of anarchy or units but rather on social practice and interaction.164 There are an assortment of potential choices, even if retained by social structures and practices, in a purported neorealist anarchical world system and thus the assertion of self-help and national interests from the fear and uncertainty of other states is a flawed explanation.165 Neorealism does not consider these features and does not engage with the fact that states can become friends, enemies or compete with one another. Moreover, the assumptions of neorealism on the relationship between anarchy, national security interests and the balance of power do not fully explain Cold War proxy interventions. During the Cold War, the United States in Vietnam reproduced a structural identity as a great imperialist power to utilise military force against another state that held a different (socialist) political regime.166 This interrelationship demonstrates that neorealism, in this war, can be applied to the national interests of the United States that intended to protect its liberal hegemonic status by fighting communism in North Vietnam, which was met with the balance of power insofar that the Soviet Union and China supported the regime. Arkes insisted that US intervention to oust the Northern communist movement to protect the South alongside neighbouring Cambodia and Laos from terror attributed to communist states.167 However, the intervention was for mixed motives. The United States was clearly fighting communism, but the allied European states intervened because they regarded Third World countries as either ex-colonies or economic actors.168 Waltz also criticised American 164 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Makes of It.” 165 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,”

International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), p. 177. 166 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” pp. 173,

178. 167 Arkes, First Things. 168 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” p. 187.

Taking the Vietnam context into consideration, the identity politics demonstrating military might against other nations and different reasons for alliances is applicable to constructivism and thus one could argue that realist-constructivism would be a more accurate term for this Cold War intervention. However, this venture spans beyond the parameters of this book.

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policy of Southeast Asian affairs during the Cold War to intervene in Vietnam because over-extension is part of national impulses and invulnerability that wrongly enters foreign policy.169 Similarly, Morgenthau, a prominent classical realist and the American public strongly opposed the Vietnam War.170 Despite encouraging strategic national interests and calculations to ascertain foreign policy, Morgenthau stressed that Vietnam policies, including nation-building in the South, were ethically short.171 Therefore, realism also considers restraint if an incursion spans beyond national security interests and relative advantage. When constructivists respond to realism, rather than being confined to structural conditions of international politics (i.e. during the Cold War), it is argued that meanings should be associated with anarchy, the balance of power theory, state interests, power politics and efforts to form change in the world.172 Rather than states competing to obtain military, security or economic advantage within an international anarchical structure, which may form foes, friendship and cooperation can be undertaken between states.173 The work of Dessler reiterates that if one takes the realist approach of anarchy at face value, then norms and practices that have a shared meaning and the ability to socialise states within a system will be lost.174 After all, constructivism is based on social norms that results in expected state behaviour to comply with the norms of their given identity.175

169 Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Humphreys, “Waltz and the World.” 170 Lorenzo Zambernardi, “The Impotence of Power: Morgenthau’s Critique of Amer-

ican Intervention in Vietnam,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (July 2011), pp. 1335–1356. 171 Ellen Glaser Rafshoon, “A Realist’s Moral Opposition to War: Hans J. Morgenthau and Vietnam,” Peace & Change, Vol. 26, No. 1 (December 2002), pp. 55–77. 172 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” p. 172. 173 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Makes of It.” 174 David Dessler, “What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?” International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 459–460. 175 Peter Joachim Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 5.

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This identity of norms specifies actions that result in other states recognising that particular identity and thus respond to it within an appropriate manner.176 Neorealists, such as the influential Waltz, have argued that anarchy is part of the international system and thus there are no agreements on arms control and nuclear non-proliferation.177 However, constructivists counter this perspective. Hopf convincingly asserts that if the international system is anarchical, then different states will have a subjective understanding of the absence of an international structure and what to do in this situation.178 Based on this argument, taking anarchy at face value merely forms uncertainty and security dilemmas and thus anarchy can be deemed as an imagery concept because it can be reconstructed to determine meaning and identities to attribute some form of certainty and order. Constructivism intends to promote certainty and improved relations among states with discourse to provide meaning which will result in identities (shared) reducing uncertainty and security dilemmas for peaceful relations due to variables. This approach can offer better calculations from a sociological perspective by focusing on intersubjective meanings and identity politics rather than neorealist claimed scientific empiricism. If there is no study on identities, then constructivists such as Hopf argue that humans would reside in a more chaotic world with uncertainty that is debatably more volatile than anarchy.179 It is important to note that constructivists are not fully opposed to the concept of anarchy in the international system because they remain agnostic to this concept. However, constructivists are critical of neorealist assumptions on the concept of a singular identity comprising the self-interests of states within all times and political spaces as the meaning to deal with anarchy.180 The meaning of self-interests cannot maintain an endless meaning because the balance of power theory become unipolar after the demise 176 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Joachim Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter Joachim Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 54. 177 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 178 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” p. 174. 179 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” p. 175. 180 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” pp. 175–

176.

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of communism in the early 1990s. Ashley contends that neorealism fails to deal with humanitarian intervention and previous mistakes attributing to conflict.181 Anarchy has multiple understandings in the world and thus the actions of states should vary rather than be linearly based on self-help.182 Lebow also argues that realism prevents a better and more inclusive world because it lacks morality and states did eventually escape the Cold War security dilemma.183 Moreover, the “logic of appropriateness” analogy stresses that some types of behaviour are more acceptable than others in certain circumstances.184 Deutsch earlier elaborated on the perceived legitimacy of actions. He stressed that an action, or diplomatic effort, of an actor is deemed legitimate if the identity contains meaning to an intersubjective community.185 Legitimate actions can be linked to foreign policy. Onuf also stresses that the world is moulded by multiple subjective understandings and social ideas that establish self or collective identities.186 For Onuf, states function like individuals residing in a reality that is principally created by themselves to reproduce forms of action on one’s own regulation and other’s previous government for anticipating actions and determining how to act instead of the influence of external material entities.187 The work of Ashley shows that foreign policy is dependent on intersubjective shared symbolic meaning and precedents to understand events and coordinate actions to avoid alternative interpretations.188 In other words, if states are in a position of agency, power or even within 181 Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), p. 286. 182 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” p. 180. 183 Richard Ned Lebow, “The Long Peace, The End of the Cold War, and the Failure

of Realism,” International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), p. 249. 184 March and Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” pp. 951–952. 185 Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (New York: Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Wiley, 1953), pp. 60–80. 186 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, The World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 62–64. 187 Onuf, The World of Our Making. 188 Richard K. Ashley, “Foreign Policy as Political Performance,” International Studies

Notes, (1988), p. 53.

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an alliance, then human beings construct “self and collective identities” within these structures.189 Hence, states can attempt to boost the credibility of their identity politics that derives from domestic politics, internal pressures and a growing civil society with better certainty and legitimacy. Social practices are embedded within such a framework that matters to domestic states. Social practices are reproduced and place meaning on interactions and actions. Constructivists place emphasis on the construction of shared ideas, interests and identities of state actors that mould international relations rather than resting on material forces.190 States can flexibility act beyond the remit of anarchy to engage in social practices and interactions, thus forming intersubjective understandings on state relations. Controls can be interconnected with institutional liberalist rules on the legitimate use of force under the rules of the Charter of the United Nations and broader international law. Constructivism shares liberalist notions of state cooperation because norms are positively accepted with little or no criticism.191 Constructivists take this relationship with rules, norms and laws further than liberalists by focusing on frequent social interaction between state actors to foster stronger compliance with international security.192 When controls are put in place, namely rules and laws, they can be advocated as ideational normative principles, which includes jus cogens. The departure of the Cold War undermined rationalist theories and notably neorealism; hence, as Adler argues, human action and interactions shape the material world.193 Finnemore and Sikkink take this further to highlight that human interaction is shaped by ideational factors rather than material ones and the ideational factors are shared collective intersubjective beliefs and such beliefs construct the interests and

189 Brent J. Steele, “Liberal-Idealism: A Constructivist Critique,” International Studies Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2007), p. 25. 190 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 1. 191 J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” International Studies Review, Vol. 5,

No. 3 (September 2003), p. 335. 192 John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to World Politics, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 237. 193 Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1997), p. 322.

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identities of actors.194 Hopf underlined that identities and practices and intersubjective meanings and reality are fundamental to grasp the social world.195 Even if democratic institutionalism is advocated to reconfigure national policies, the structure of that process takes primacy over agents, meaning that a variety of actors are created, but it is not formed by them.196 Finnemore has argued that the global model of liberalist welfare is merely based on the thin glue of individuals who both interact and select “institutional arrangements” because the norms lack an “ontological status.”197 Wheeler further criticised idealist normative practices of the democratic peace that merely rests on a linear argument of a state becoming democratic.198 Although many liberal values are normative, constructivists further contend that the relationship between social structures and agents results in the potential obedience of norms, rules, values and desired behaviour. National Interest and US Exceptionalism Norms have created international undesirable behaviour with social hierarchies for states “below”—developing states—to adapt policies to advance their position within the perimeter of international society.199 Based on this premise, perceptions of political leaders inform policy, and indeed foreign policy and threats, to shape national interests.200 National interests are thus socially constructed from a state, by means of political officials and elites, through linguistic and cultural sources for a state

194 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Programme in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 4 (June 2001), p. 393. 195 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” 196 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, p. 333. 197 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, p. 148. 198 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International

Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 71. 199 Ann E. Towns, “Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding International Policy Diffusion from Below,” International Organization, Vol. 66, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 179– 180. This study specifically focused on legal sex quotas to increase female legislators in developing states. 200 Mark L. Haas, Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

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to undertake certain decisions or act appropriately to an issue.201 The state encompasses a national identity, and this needs constructing, to offer legitimacy and authority on actions and the state identity in other countries.202 National identity can be identified as the “maintenance and continual reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that form the distinctive heritage of the nation, and the identification of individuals with that heritage and its pattern.”203 In other words, national interests are created in the construction, with the meanings and interpretations, of depictions of global politics that the salience of realist national interests cannot account to “correct national interest” because each threat “always requires interpretation.”204 It is national identity that informs national interest, meaning that a state— whether powerful or not—needs to know what they stand for and believe in prior to understanding own interests.205 Restad has pointed at the study of US “exceptional” identity as a great power influencing US foreign policy with ideational factors, such as what exceptionalism means for the people, to understand interests and preferences when chasing foreign policy objectives.206 The United States has spread its exceptionalism from both World Wars and the Cold War to build a global consensus of a liberal democracy. Therefore, social norms and normative values attribute to undesirable behaviour and national interests are socially constructed to react to such problems that are not necessarily fixed on the national interest, survival and security.207

201 Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1996), pp. 280–281. 202 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” p. 195. 203 Anthony D. Smith, Chosen Peoples (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003),

pp. 24–25. 204 Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” p. 279. Weldes infers this argument with the 1962 Cuban missile crisis that Soviet nuclear missiles did not constitute a direct threat to the United States [and acted as a balance of power], but it was interpreted as a threat to American national interests. 205 Samuel Phillips Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5 (September–October 1997), pp. 28–49. 206 Hilde Eliassen Restad, American Exceptionalism: An Idea That Made a Nation and Remade the World (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 14. 207 Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” p. 279.

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Moreover, constructivists argue that international organisations produce and endorse new norms and teach states, as part of socialisation, which is more effective than political regimes, and the interaction between agents in international institutions promotes socialisation outcomes.208 Reasons and decision-making concerning the use of force are fluid because beliefs change over time. It is the ideas and social norms of agents (states) rather than merely structures (international arrangements or institutions) or unstructures (anarchy) that impact on state’s interests and decisions. If the international society perception is applied, then the rules, understandings and social norms form relationships that states share with other states as part of social realities that provide meaning to material realities.209 This constructivist perspective asserts that the material strategic interests of states are given meaning by the ideational politics shared within an alleged international society. Norms, Language and Social Constructs Onuf provides an additional examination past state centrism and state relations by interrogating how the world has become what it is today, with its social arrangement, and how individuals engage in global affairs.210 To put simply, rules are pivotal to social life and rule, instead of anarchy, which provides the enduring state of world politics. Constructivist theory infers that actors are socially and continually created, or what Onuf coins as the “co-constitution” of agents, and their social structures (environments). If taking this principle into consideration, then international relations functions as a social process. Within the international political system, actors (agents) interact with one another and engage in negotiations to coax their positions on their interests, ideas and also identities. The relationship between social structures and agents fluctuates and structuration theorists focus on this venture, especially the intersubjective understanding that is undertaken during this process. This means 208 Martha Finnemore, “International Organisations as Teachers of Norms: The United

Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation and Science Policy,” International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Autumn 1993), pp. 565–597; Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialisation in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 4 (October 2005), p. 812. 209 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, p. 128. 210 Onuf, The World of Our Making.

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that constructivists believe that change is possible and oppose neorealist assumptions on relations that are dictated by time and place within the international political system. This critical form of constructivism that scholars including Onuf present concentrates on language, speeches and discourse. Rules within a system are moulded by guidelines established and recreated by the language and interaction of social actors. This shapes structures, rule or governance. Actors speak to display their ideas, interests or identity that permit action. The intersubjective meaning of words is important and words cannot mean the same thing in different situations. Wittgenstein’s “language games” focused on how the regular use of language (such as establishing and testing a hypothesis, making a story and acting) brings out the openness of options in utilising and describing language that are part of everyday life.211 Language can be used to form rules. Onuf reflects on Wittgenstein’s analysis to stipulate that speeches can be assertive to: inform, declare or name; directive to offer an order, command or request; and commissive to gratify, commit or promise someone to act or to do something. Speech and language derive from actors (agents) but are shaped by central rules that provide and produce meaning to words displayed and what is done. This is what establishes the rules of the game that stems from speeches to deliver a distinct band of categorical rules that is either assertive, directive or commissive. These three proposed categorised rules would hold no meaning if the importance and meaning of language were absent. To exemplify, a regime may grasp major power and therefore seek to redefine social reality and governance through their administration for subjects to obey its rules. Within a bureaucracy, directive orders are hierarchically streamlined from senior officers to lower officers ranked below them and so forth. To complicate further matters, Wittgenstein previously stressed that facts cannot govern what is regarded as obeying or following rules, meaning there are no definitive grounds to infer whether someone is obeying a rule. Rules and rule-following are thus social constructs. To put another way, the meaning of words or sentences are resultant to the rules of the game.

211 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Publishing, 1953).

Philosophical

Investigations

(Hoboken,

NJ:

Blackwell

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If undertaking this critical constructivist thesis, especially contemplating the importance of language on rules, then hierarchy in international relations can suggest meaning. Power relations would be presumed as asymmetrical and dominant powers, or leaders, maintain their authority and rule with the threat or actual use of force, justification of war and intervention. This does not infer that great powers are impossible to be tamed. Actors enter agreements to compel movement beyond such arrangements. According to Onuf, the world is what we make of it because it is the acts and performances of agents that establish the existent rules, structures and relationships, and it is these features that are interchangeable and reversible.212 Change is possible that contravenes political positivism or positive political theory to identify where, and if, change is required and to work towards the possibility of change. This can reach amicable relations between the West and East as one of many examples. Constructivism also covers the social construction of realities that have meaning to agents. Wheeler explains that money relates to a social construct and thus money retains its collective meaning. In his example, the idea of money is processed from banknotes and coins that appear as pieces of paper containing ink or round coins and if undertaking this initial premise, coloured ink and rounded mental would stand no intrinsic value.213 Within most given societies, money is exchanged as a commodity for goods and services and it retains this commodity-like value due to its the collective meaning of these bits of paper containing ink and metallic round-shaped coins. If society stopped believing and acting on the collectively agreed conception of the worth of money, then money would no longer have any value or purpose within that society. In other words, if norms are missing then a value, action or authority would lack any meaning.214 If proposing this lens of examination to international politics, then constructivists would contend that no relationships are strictly fixed because identities are changeable. Identities can change through interaction and communication, meaning that friends can become enemies and vice versa. This theory rejects that pre-existing alliances—such as the strong relationship between the United States and United Kingdom—fully regulate future relations and behaviours between

212 Onuf, The World of Our Making. 213 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Constructivist Theory,” 2014. 214 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” p. 173.

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both states as realism and liberalism would assume. Instead, constructivists stress that the social practices between states will not always lead to cooperation because war and peace, torture tactics and incongruous cannibalism are social practices.215 An Alternative of Realist Assumptions of the Security Dilemma Realists rightly argue that European states joined the United States and Canada with NATO to balance power by reducing the security dilemma posed by the Soviet Union. However, after the Cold War, additional security dilemmas derived and remained from ill relations of Western states with former Soviet Union states, Iran, North Korea and other branded rogue states. The “negative” identity with words to dehumanise a regime can be disclosed with structuralism theory, which is part of the earlier roots of constructivism. By way of illustration, as a response to 9/11, George W. Bush’s speeches that addressed the Whitehouse on September 12 and 20, 2001, changed from anger and action to resolution by demanding the Taliban to deliver al-Qaeda, offering America access to terrorist camps and acting with justice among US allies.216 The initial speech fortified anger and pain suffered by the United States, but moved to support from alliances and appreciation of support to deter terrorism. The security dilemma of terrorism forms uncertainty that can amend and shape the policies of political leaders. The security dilemma can be dealt with by focusing on the intentions and capabilities of actors to comprehend the motives and show responsiveness towards the other.217 As argued in a conference by Wheeler, the sensibility of the security dilemma can be accomplished with decisionmaking considering how their own past actions have been professed as threatening and malign.218 As a response to the Iranian security dilemma of uranium enrichment policy and Tehran’s nuclear capability, Western 215 Wheeler, “Constructivist Theory.” 216 George Walker Bush, “President Bush Addresses the Nation,” The Washington Post,

September 20, 2001. 217 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 7. 218 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Guest Lecture,” Challenges of Security Cooperation in Europe, October 23, 2012, 13:00–14:30, Aberystwyth University, Main Hall—International Politics Building.

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states—such as the United States—could choose to empathise with the Iranians to craft signals that efficiently indicate a pledge to mutual security.219 The barriers to this constructivist solution are the emotional perspectives of other actors involved; their alleged peaceful and defensive self-images; and oppositional ideological fundamentalism. This approach could eventually overcome the historical tensions deriving from the 1979 Iranian Revolution that witnessed the final American-supported monarch being overthrown by extreme left-wing and Islamist movements. Nuclear intentions complemented the security dilemma and raised suspicion of the Islamic Republic’s regime change that marked further sour relations with the West. The Iranian uranium enrichment programme did not meet nuclear safeguards of the nuclear intentions presented by the International Atomic Energy Agency and thus presented a potential threat to international peace and security and sanctions were to be imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.220 These sanctions were in place until Resolution 2231 uplifted them after a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was agreed, but missiles tests raised doubt from Western states in the immediate aftermath.221 More diplomacy can be accomplished if emotional factors are put aside and an understanding on state identity is attempted to be reached. The dialogue between the West, namely the United States, and Iran remains constrained due to the prevailing legacy that has caused the security dilemma between both nations. By way of illustration, on January 3, 2020, Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani was assassinated by a targeted and presidential authorised US-led drone attack in Baghdad. Soleimani was an ally of Bashar al-Assad repressing rebels in Syria and has an influential figure combating Daesh in Iraq and supported Kurdish forces in the fight against Daesh in 2014–2015. Despite the latter two aspects that complied with US interests, the former on allegiance with alAssad and support of the Russian military intervention in Syria resulted in the United States targeting Soleimani with very loose evidence that he was

219 Wheeler, “Guest Lecture.” 220 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696, “Concern at the Intentions of

the Nuclear Programme of Iran,” UN Doc. S/RES/1696, Adopted 5,500th Meeting, July 31, 2006. 221 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, “On Iran Nuclear Issue,” UN Doc. S/RES/2231, Adopted 7,488th Meeting, July 20, 2015.

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plotting to attack several US embassies.222 The United States immediately boasted the realist threat of US military might and branded Soleimani a monster and Iran as a “leading sponsor of terrorism.”223 Moreover, the then US Vice President, Mike Pence, claimed that Iran had acted as a leading state sponsor of terrorism for 20 years but the United States did not intend to force regime change although they would have liked it.224 These negative terms and threats are part of the axis of evil mentality that provides little hope for understanding (constructivism) or diplomacy (liberalism) between both nations. Constructivists could argue that more negotiation is needed because even under realism, countering terrorism (and most notably US national security interests) to thwart Daesh in Iraq and scepticism on what Soleimani was planning required clarity. Certainty was needed on Soleimani’s alleged US plotted attacks and more importantly of al-Assad’s allegiance. Iran serves as an ally of al-Assad.225 Iran retaliated with the firing of 22 ballistic missiles targeted at Erbil and Al Asad Iraqi bases.226 Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, stated that the retaliation was justified under the measure of proportionate self-defence as reflected under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations to defend against aggression (the killing of Soleimani) rather than escalating war.227 However, this response was not sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council and would not gain consent due to the American and British vetoes but Zarif made a convincing argument with the rules and norms of collective self-defence despite the lack of the international legality.

222 Ryan Browne and Paul LeBlanc, “Trump Claims Soleimani Plotted to Blow Up US Embassies,” CNN , January 10, 2020. 223 Daniel L. Byman, “How Terrorism Helps—And Hurts—Iran,” Brookings Institution, January 6, 2020. 224 Michael Richard Pence, “Mike Pence Says Americans are ‘Safer Today’ After Soleimani’s Death,” Interview with Norah O’Donnell, CBS News, January 9, 2020. 225 Ali Nehmé Hamdan, “On Failing to ‘Get It Together’: Syria’s Opposition Between Idealism and Realism,” Middle East Report—Iran’s Many Deals 277 (Winter 2015), p. 29. 226 Alix Culbertson and Connor Sephton, “Iran Fires 22 Missiles at Two Air Bases in ‘Revenge’ for Qasem Soleimani’s Killing,” Sky News, January 8, 2020. 227 Adil Ahmad Haque, “Iran’s Unlawful Reprisal (and Ours),” Just Security, January 8, 2020.

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The containment of Iran, particularly with post-9/11 American foreign policy, arises from suspicion of Tehran’s regime, nuclear capability and authoritarianism. The containment of Iran has not worked to foster better relations between Iran and the United States and thus it could be argued that the West, with NATO, containing Russia is, and will continue to, serve similar suspicions and inimical relations. Summary of Constructivism There are two main variants within the school of constructivism. First, critical theory—or critical constructivism—calls for change by eradicating uncertainty with identity arrangement. Critical theorists argue that identity is part of power, and it is power that always concerns a dominant actor when it is exercised within each social exchange.228 Therefore, all social relations contain a hierarchy, dominant actor or agency and the subordination of some actors that shares similarities with realists and structural realists concerning international politics. However, to add complication, constructionists from the field of sociology—critical social theorists—and most notably Foucault argue that power is not employed by people, groups or sovereign coercive or dominant acts, but power is instead prevalent, dispersed and thus “everywhere.”229 There is thus no agency or structure associated with power because it derives ubiquitously. The origins of where identity has allegedly derived and caused alienation rest at the forefront of critical social theory. Second, conventional constructivists merely offer an analysis of identities that may attribute potential action(s). This component does not try to produce change from its own theory and merely wishes to comprehend the reproduction and effects of pre-existing identities. For instance, Wendt analyses the behaviour of states and argues that anarchy is what states make of it that can ultimately determine friendship, enmity relations or competition between states.230 Critical social theorists would 228 Arturo Escobar, “Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the

Relevance of His Work to the Third World,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 10, No. 3 (July 1984), pp. 377–378. 229 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge (London: Penguin, 1998), p. 63. 230 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It”; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.

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argue that all social practices concern power, domination and some form of alienation for an actor or some actors and thus its agency can be challenged because power is beyond a sovereign, institution or social class. Constructivism suggests that structures and actors within a social structure mutually act upon each other; anarchy must have some meaning; identity is constructed to determine state interests; power is not only material but ideational and discursive; and change in the international system is difficult but feasible. Constructivism does not take rational egoist explanations at face value; rather it looks at the meanings of social practices and identities that have been reached. This theory would counter Waltz’s neorealist assumptions on multipolarity in the aftermath of the Cold War.231 Multipolarity may occur for states such as Japan and Germany to economically rival the United States,232 but this uncertainty rests on overly materialist perceptions rather than ideas and thinking that can better be affiliated with anarchy and the balance of power theory. Structuration theorists, such as Giddens, would argue that relationships between structures—which may constrain behaviour—and actors require an intersubjective understanding.233 Based on the premises made by structuration theorists, anarchy is intersubjective and does not necessarily guide the actions of social actors (states). The relationship between the neorealist structures on anarchy does not determine the social actions of actors within a mechanical way because actors can think about structures to act in novel ways.

Contributions of International Relations Theory Now that a discussion of realism, liberalism and constructivism has been reached, a review of these international relations theories is presented prior to the analysis. Realism and liberalism focus on the material advantages for either relative or absolute gain, respectively. Realism and neoliberalism elucidate the factors on increasing and declining state cooperation but both theories hold a rigid identity on states as rational egoists 231 Kenneth Neal Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” in America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power, ed. Gilford John Ikenberry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 29–68. 232 Christopher Layne, “The Popular Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 5. 233 Giddens, The Constitution of Society.

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that merely reduces explanations to rest on material interests that do not care about the welfare of others.234 The work of Steele identifies the pitfalls of realist and liberalist approaches.235 Realists concentrate on power and state interests, which may override legitimacy if unattainable from vested national security interests are at stake, and liberalists try to prescribe abstract ideals to reality as shared rationality that at times may not assess the repercussions of doing so. A rational egoist lens of the world reflects an identity that does not alter through communication, interaction or institutions. Based on this perspective, shared values, bonding, friendships and/or common obligations are virtually absent. Although neoliberals recommend long-term cooperation, such cooperation and values of regime theory are incompatible if an institution or alliance no longer serves the state’s long-term interests and thus may decide to leave the cooperative arrangement. In contrast to these traditional international relations theories, constructivists contend that it is identities within states that shape interests and if states cooperate as friends, it is on the basis of their shared values and/or bonds. This theory highlights the importance of collective shared meanings that are pertinent to state’s international relations. Social purpose and morality are needed to reach normative legitimacy.236 Constructivists do not focus on a statist unit-level analysis of materialism due to international anarchy within international relations (that neorealism does), but instead studies ideational processes that form own actions, identities and interests within international politics.237 I think that ideational factors, language and social constructs are important factors to analyse the relationship between social structures and agents, which generates intersubjective meaning. However, material factors are part of state decision-making process, whether for relative or absolute gain. Based on my premise, constructivism cannot function in isolation as an international relations theory because it is a sociological rather than a political science theory. Yet, constructivism can complement the 234 Wheeler, “Constructivist Theory.” 235 Steele, “Liberal-Idealism,” p. 37. 236 Marc Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan’s Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 62. 237 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Makes of It,” pp. 29–33; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, pp. 6–7.

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ideational politics, culture and intersubjective meaning behind anarchy, self-interest(s) and the difficulty of states complying with institutional agreements. Constructivism can thus supplement either realism or liberalism to enhance explanations into the justifications of state behaviour, action, inaction and institutional alliances. To support this claim, the work of Jackson and Nexon similarly argue that constructivism comprises “variants” that can share ideas with either realists or liberalists because constructivism is a looser model of associated sociological understanding.238 Therefore, I argue that constructivism is not a theory in itself for international relations, but it adds an approach to analyse discursive power that informs identities and shared norms and this complements neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. For this reason, constructivism is highly useful as an additional to both antagonistic forms of international relations theory—realism and liberalism. Realist ethics of prudence and scepticism raise significant problems with liberalism, namely the expansion of ideals and moral action beyond national security interests resulting in poor calculations of gain and imposing democratisation and social justice in other states.239 Moreover, realists believe in the sovereign inequality of states and anarchical international system that undermines institutional liberalism and the norms presented by R2P. The latter that relies on the United Nations system protecting civilians from atrocity crimes can be vetoed by a permanent member of the Security Council. These are some reasons why realism is the preferred method of analysis for the Russia-Ukraine war that will undermine liberalist efforts. Despite prevalent criticism of liberalism, it is a viable alternative international relations theory that is utilised within this monograph to explain how states and international institutions interact, standardise reciprocal norms, values, rules and behaviour to promote democratic peace and accountability of violating international law. These aspects are presented within the forthcoming analyses sections. Although realism is the preferred international relations theory to explain the power politics of the current Russian invasion of Ukraine, realism is not short of criticism. For instance, the uncertainty from the 238 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, “Constructivist Realism or RealistConstructivism?” International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 2004), pp. 337–341. 239 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: brief ed., 1993, p. 12; Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939, p. 71, Morkeviˇcius, Realist Ethics.

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structural condition of anarchy fails to explain the ideational factors, and particularly language, history, culture and social practices that elucidate the decision-making of states, such as waging war. This book will thus reflect on constructivism for these reasons. As Onuf argues, uncertainty is significantly reduced among actors from social practices within a structured community that in turn increases confidence in the responsive and consequential actions undertaken from others.240 Constructivism promotes predictability to reduce uncertain behaviour that also attains importance when analysing Russia’s incursion of Ukraine. The forthcoming chapters function as the empirical analysis that will address the tenets of realism, and supplementation of liberalism (even though critiqued) and constructivism to explain the war from the desires, objectives and actions from NATO, Ukraine and Russia. In the subsequent chapter, this analysis is shaped by a historical development structure that primarily threads through the tenets of realism, namely classical realism and defensive neorealism.

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CHAPTER 3

NATO During the Cold War and Dissolution of the Soviet Union

After an overview on realism, liberalism and constructivism, the remainder of the book will test the tenets realism in relation to the subsequent chapters. It will also provide insight into some liberalist and constructivist debates to explain the Russia’s incursion of Ukraine. This specific chapter tests structural realism (from its defensive and offensive neorealist forms) by presenting the Cold War balance of power between the United States and its NATO allies and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies until the fall of the Iron Curtain. This is followed by Ukraine’s ambitions to join NATO that was met with Russian retaliation, which ultimately resulted in the February 2022 invasion. The self-interests of all these actors are explained by classical realism on power interests, survival and the relegation of diplomacy. The remaining chapter examines international condemnation, sanctions and international law efforts to challenge Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Formation of NATO In February 1945, the Yalta Conference was hosted by the Soviet Union (Joseph Stalin) to also include the leaders of the United States (Franklin Delano Roosevelt) and the United Kingdom (Winston Churchill) to debate how Germany and war-torn Europe would be reorganised in

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Singh, The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34163-2_3

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the aftermath of the Second World War.1 The dichotomy of Western liberal democracies and Soviet-led communism influencing Europe was greatly debated on how post-war Europe would be shaped. After America’s plutonium implosion fission testing in the Trinity Site, New Mexico, in July 1945, as part of its Manhattan Project, Stalin learned of the United States about to use new advanced weapons against Japan.2 The subsequent Potsdam Conference between these same three states decided the division of Germany, a Soviet-supported group legitimately governing Poland, and disarms Japan in Vietnam by partition at the 16th parallel.3 The United States institutionalised its containment policy of the Soviet Union in 1947 that resulted in the creation of a security pact.4 The Truman Doctrine was initially influenced by US Ambassador to Moscow, George Frost Kennan, encouraging America to patiently, firmly and vigilantly contain the “expansive tendencies” of the Soviet Union and confront their communist allies when posing a risk of obtaining influence.5 The Truman Doctrine was subsequently advocated with speeches by the then US President Harry S. Truman encouraging American commitment for the provision of political, military and economic support to democratic countries under the threat from internal or external authoritarianism and potentially engage distant conflicts.6

1 Serhii M. Plokhy, Yalta: The Price of Peace (New York: Viking Press, 2010). 2 Ferenc Morton Szasz, The Day the Sun Rose Twice: The Story of the Trinity Site

Nuclear Explosion July 16, 1945 (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), pp. 82–85. 3 Uwe F. Jansohn, President Truman and (the Challenge of) the Potsdam Conference 1945 (Auckland: Pickle Partners Publishing, 2015), pp. 29–33. 4 Scott G. Feinstein and Ellen B. Pirro, “Testing the World Order: Strategic Realism in Russian Foreign Affairs,” International Politics, Vol. 58, No. 6 (February 2021), pp. 817– 818. 5 George Frost Kennan, “X Article: The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July 1947), pp. 572–574. 6 Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006, pp. 29–31). This included aid ($400 million) to Greece (and Turkey) due to the Greek civil war comprising a Communist-directed revolt (Communist Party of Greece) and the Democratic Army, backed by the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Albania, against the established Greek government and its Hellenic Army (Eugene T. Rossides, The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1998)).

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During this period, there were several security issues arising from the actions of the Soviet Union and its support for communism in Eastern Europe. The Berlin blockade commencing June 24, 1948, sparked the initial main crisis of the Cold War.7 The Soviet Union blocked Western controlled railway, canal and road access with the condition to lift the blockade if Western powers revoked their introduction of the Deutsche Mark from West Berlin, resulting in Western air forces delivering food and fuel in “Soviet-controlled areas” until the uplift in May 1949.8 In February 1948, the Soviet Union supported the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in a coup resulting in a communist government that suited the Soviets as Czechoslovakia bordered West Germany.9 The United States quickly responded with the Marshall Plan that provided $13.3 billion in aid for the economic recovery of Western European states after the Second World War.10 West Berlin remained part of the occupied allies alongside 12 states occupied by America, the United Kingdom and France that formed West Germany in May 1949.11 Therefore, the growth and support of communism in eastern Europe became an increasing security threat for the liberal democracies of Western Europe and its North American allies, namely the United States and Canada. On April 4, 1949, NATO was formed by the United States, Canada and 10 European states to provide a response to growing security concerns with the Soviet Union, communist societies and potential communist expansion.12 The North Atlantic Treaty considered collective defence with an erga omnes approach by all European and North American signatories vowing to consult threats, defence and aggression against one constituting against all. In doing so, the rule under Article 5 of the

7 Katie Lange, “The Berlin Airlift: What It Was, Its Importance in the Cold War,” US Department of Defence, June 24, 2022. 8 Daniel F. Harrington, Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift and the Early Cold War (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 2012), pp. 70–74, 100–101, 218, 231. 9 Karel Kaplan, The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia 1945–1948 (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1987), pp. viii, 2–4, 23, 69–70. 10 William F. Sanford, The Marshall Plan: Origins and Implementation (Washington, DC: US Department of State, April 1987), p. 11. 11 Benn Steil, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 276, 356. 12 Nigel Thomas, NATO Armies 1949–87 (London: Bloomsbury, 1988).

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NATO Treaty postulates the defence of the alliance if any member of it is attacked.13 However, not all states signed due to primary fears of the Soviet Union and for its containment. Later, many states signed to bandwagon with the United States for military aid and support to enhance Western European defence forces and equipment.14 Turkey and Greece supported the Truman doctrine by joining in 1952 to extend NATO defence towards the Middle East and Caucasian borders of the Soviet Union to bolster its containment.15 West Germany followed accession in 1955 to endure its policy of assimilating Germans in the view of the West with its commitment to engage and host NATO troops with its operations.

The Counterbalancing Warsaw Pact Due to the expansion of NATO with Western European states, the Soviet Union needed to counterbalance its potential containment. In May 1955, as a response to West Germany’s accession to NATO, a collective defence pact was signed in Warsaw (the Warsaw Treaty Organisation) between the Soviet Union and a collection of eastern European socialist republics. The Warsaw Pact acted to condemn liberalisation reforms and intended to strengthen communist parties in the eastern blocs to counterbalance against the threat of NATO. These republics included Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Inspired by the Brezhnev Doctrine, the largest intervention was Operation Danube that initially deployed 250,000 Soviet Army, Polish, Bulgarian and Hungarian-armed forces in August 1968 to cease liberalist reforms and bolster the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.16 Both Warsaw and NATO treaties ensured that there was no direct warfare between the great powers—the Soviet Union and the United

13 Elan Journo, “Why John Mearsheimer Gets Ukraine Wrong,” New Ideal, September 14, 2022. 14 Posen, “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,” pp. 9–10. 15 Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security (Lanham, MD: Rowman &

Littlefield, 1998), pp. 50–51. 16 Günter Bischof, “United States Responses to the Soviet Suppression of Rebellions in the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 2011), pp. 61–80.

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States—to prove that Waltz’s bipolar thesis via structural realism (defensive neorealism) depicted a counterbalance and Cold War security within an international anarchical political system.17 Statism, survival and selfhelp between two great powers resulted in deterrence of direct warfare and thus created security with the use of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact. It is important to note that during these conditions, scepticism of actions, foreign policy, interventions and attributing more sophisticated arms and nuclear arsenals formed uncertainty, a lack of trust and thus formed a security dilemma. Due to uncertainty, United States or Soviet Union interventions with either democratic or communist allies during the Cold War were based on enhancing relative power to rival and weaken the other power. During this era, the United States balanced with the Soviet Union by forming partnerships with “unsavoury regimes” that were prepared “to fight communism.”18 Therefore, classical and defensive realism explains the self-help and security-first relationship between the United States and NATO with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact without both great powers going to direct war due to strategic prudence anticipating a high risk of losses.

The Economic and Political Demise of the Soviet Union Despite the Soviet Union counterbalancing NATO, Albania was against the Czechoslovakia invasion and thus left the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union also started to disintegrate economically and politically. Alongside a growing weak economy, internal protests and democratic reform efforts proceeded. The protracted intervention in Afghanistan (1979–1989) was costly and the 1988 Geneva Accords signalled a withdrawal of the Soviet Army against the Central Intelligence Agency-supported Mujahideen. Moreover, in 1986, the Chernobyl Accident, in now northern Ukraine, due to flawed reactor design and poorly trained staff resulted in a steam explosion and fires. There were 31 recorded deaths and the accident may

17 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York City, NY: McGrawHill, 1979). 18 Charles A. Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine Is a Watershed. Time for America to Get Real,” The New York Times, April 11, 2022.

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have resulted in 4,000 casualties.19 This affected many parts of Europe, and 500,000 personnel were deployed to deal with contamination that cost $68 billion. The withdrawal of a protracted military intervention in Afghanistan and incident at Chernobyl put pressure on the legitimacy of Soviet governance.20 From a political perspective, in January 1987, the late Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev permitted multi-candidate local elections via Demokratizatsiya that created democratisation and a presidency to destabilise communist control within a single party government to help the Communist Party of the Soviet Union proceed with his liberal policies and institutional reforms.21 The Berlin Wall fell in November 1989 and Germany reunified in 1990 to defeat East German communism. Washington persuaded Gorbachev to accept “a united Germany within NATO.”22 Violence formed in Lithuania and Latvia that called for democracy which were met with Soviet tanks. American President, Bush Sr., condemned Soviet reaction and supported the independence of both republics. Eventually, on June 10, 1991, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was elected president of the Russian Federation and on December 8, 1991, he signed the Belovezha Accords at Viskuli to form a union with Belarus and Ukraine to establish the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that ended the Soviet Union and forced Gorbachev to resign from office.23 After a referendum for independence in Lithuania was met with a mild Soviet invasion, Lithuania’s independence was once more recognised by the United States on September 2, 1991. Latvia and other Baltic and Central Asian blocs followed. After the demise of communism in Europe, 19 Daniel Binns, “Our Luck Will Run Out: Build Safe Zone Around Plant or Rigsk a New Chernobyl,” Metro, March 10, 2023, p. 4. 20 Christopher Mark Davis, “Economic Influences on the Decline of the Soviet Union as a Great Power: Continuity Despite Change,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1990), pp. 81–109. 21 Richard Sakwa, “Politics in Russia,” in Developments in Russian Politics, eds. Richard Sakwa, Henry E. Hale and Stephen White (London: Red Globe Press, 2019), p. 6. 22 Michael Cox and Steven Hurst, “‘His Finest Hour?’ George Bush and the Diplomacy and the Diplomacy of German Unification,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 13, No. 4 (September 2010), p. 123. 23 Carolina Vendil Pallin, Russian Military Reform: A Failed Exercise in Defence Decision Making (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 85. Ukraine could have retained neutrality with Russia after they left the Soviet Union via the CIS (Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine Is a Watershed”).

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Fukuyama declared that realist interests for state security could be attained at an international level with the endgame of democratic imperialism.24 This neoconservative thought was interpreted by US political leaders as American global benevolence that enticed states to bandwagon.

NATO’s Expansionism and Containment of Russia Due to the abolishment of the Warsaw Pact and dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia could finally be contained by NATO powers because the structural realist bipolar Cold War axis of counterbalancing had reached an end. During the Cold War, the West was unable to fully contain the Soviet Union due to its resistance but it could now incorporate additional states under NATO’s influence and relocate “military objects closer” to Russia’s “border.”25 States would now start to bandwagon with “values professed by the West” comprising “democracy, human rights” and the rule of law as “ideological fig leaves” for NATO expansionism to establish a “unipolar world.”26 As with the Cold War era, American leaders promoted a robust liberal and strategic “anti-communist narrative” because communism constituted a great threat to American and European powers.27 Regime theory attributed to NATO’s “standardisation” that comprised members sharing common identified standards, rules and guidelines that guarantee “mutual understanding,” “operational effectiveness,” and “practical functionality” that continues to proceed multinational operations.28 Due to NATO’s influence, its members gradually socialised “revolutionary states” by interacting “with the international community.”29 After the demise of the Soviet Union, the rivalry between great 24 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press,

1992). 25 Alexander Lukin, “Chauvinism or Chaos: Russia’s Unpalatable Choice,” Russian Social Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 6 (December 2020), p. 453. 26 Lukin, “Chauvinism or Chaos,” p. 453. 27 C. William Walldorf Jr., “Narratives and War: Explaining the Length and End of

U.S. Military Operations in Afghanistan,” International Security, Vol. 47, No. 1 (July 2022), pp. 102–103. 28 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “Standardisation,” October 14, 2022. 29 Stephen White and Stephen Revell, “The USSR and its Diplomatic Partners, 1917–

91,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 13, No. 1 (September 2010), p. 31.

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powers no longer existed, resulting in the United States promoting democracy to expand its notion of the liberal international order.30 Waltz’s structural realist theory on the balance of power could no longer place the newly dissolved Russia in a position to compete and deter US liberalism and its influence with NATO expansionism.31 This meant that the bipolar international system during the Cold War had come to an end due to the demise of both the Soviet Union and its leadership over the Warsaw Pact. At this point in time, realism was ignored and dismissed as a former “wisdom” that was “utter nonsense today” [after the Cold War].32 Bill Clinton stressed that power politics was to be abandoned by the emergence of a liberal order to promote “decades of democratic peace.”33 NATO continued to reinforce its standardisation to teach and persuade “the former Eastern bloc” of “liberal-democratic norms of security” and “Western security community” power, which socialised their national identities and interests.34 NATO did try to reinforce these values with the May 1997 “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation” that applauded Russian troops supporting NATO-led missions in Bosnia, but it did “not delay, limit or dilute NATO’s opening for the accession of new members.”35 To illustrate this point, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (once of the former Soviet Union) and Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined NATO on March 29, 2004. This indicated that the Western alliance was further containing Russia and Moscow feared losing additional satellite states. With the accession of former communist states from the former Soviet Union and Baltic states, Moscow started to feel threatened with NATO’s 30 Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine Is a Watershed.” 31 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 32 Stanley Hoffmann, “The World; Friends like Russia Make Diplomacy a Mess,” cited in Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times, March 28, 1993, Section 4, p. 5. 33 William Jefferson Clinton, cited in Stephen Martin Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused

the Ukraine Crisis,” Foreign Policy, January 19, 2022. 34 Alexandra Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialisation? NATO and the ‘New Europe’,” International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 4 (October 2005), pp. 973, 983. 35 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “Summary: Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation,” May 27, 1997.

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expansion and bombing against the Bosnian Serbs that could move east closer to Russian borders.36 NATO sought expansion further east. The expansionists argued that more democracies would be formed in Central and Eastern Europe to create a European democratic peace, even if weak military states joined NATO that would not greatly contribute to the alliance.37 NATO enlargement policy was opposed by realists such as Michael Mandelbaum, ex-US Defence Secretary, William James Perry, diplomat George Kennan and initially ex-Secretary of State, Henry Alfred Kissinger.38 The significant historical change since 1945 rested on the Soviet Union supporting the United States and Britain’s anti-Hitler coalition but Moscow then became confronted by Washington and its other Western allies.39 On April 2–4, 2008, NATO considered the accession of Georgia and Ukraine that was backed by the Bush administration but opposed by France and Germany in NATO’s Bucharest declaration summit for overly antagonising Russia and thus NATO states compromised without formal proceedings for membership.40 Georgia and Ukraine had no way of meeting the accession criteria at the time and with key NATO states and Putin on the second day opposing this inclusion; it was decided that both would eventually join the alliance.41 This declaration did not comply with Article 10 of the NATO Treaty because it did not increase the security of Georgia and Ukraine and nor could they strengthen the alliance,

36 John Joseph Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 5 (September–October 2014), p. 78. 37 Stephen Martin Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis,” Foreign Policy, January 19, 2022. 38 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.” However, Kissinger later repositioned his perspective from criticising NATO’s enlargement eastwards that provoked Russia to seize parts of Ukraine to bandwagon with the alliance’s enlargement policy by considering Kyiv as a member (Henry Alfred Kissinger, “Kissinger Backs Ukraine’s NATO Membership, Says Russia Needs the Opportunity to Rejoin International System,” CNBC, January 17, 2023). 39 Konstantin Konstantinowitsch Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation: War of Attrition or Escalation?” Strategic Analysis (November 2022), p. 4. 40 Dmitri Vitalyevich Trenin, “Russia’s Goal in Ukraine Remains the Same: Keep NATO Out,” Al Jazeera America, June 2, 2014; Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, “How to Avoid a New Cold War,” Current History, Vol. 113, No. 765 (October 2014), p. 269. 41 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.”

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but rather antagonised Russia with their proposed eventual admission. NATO’s decision to include both Georgia and Ukraine for membership in the future was deemed by Charap as “the worst of all worlds” because NATO did not provide any “increased security to Ukraine and Georgia, but reinforced Moscow’s view that NATO was set on incorporating them.”42 This 2008 Bucharest Summit has exacerbated a dilemma because there was no explanation of how and when Ukraine would join NATO, which has loomed a protracted threat to Moscow.43 With the United States and NATO supporting Georgia and Ukraine’s accession into the alliance alongside the previous “invasion of Iraq” and later ousting of Colonel Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar alQaddafi in Libya demonstrating American “disdain for international law,” it increased Russia’s “distrust of the West.”44 Moscow claimed that the accession of both states to NATO would form a direct threat that was met with “Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008” that seized Abkhazia and South Ossetia after separatists fought with the Georgian government.45 NATO’s openness for accession encouraged the miscalculation of Mikheil Saakashvili, the then Georgian President, in 2008 to attack South Ossetia containing pro-Russian separatists (in war for years) thinking the West would support Georgia.46 Moscow promptly responded and seized South Ossetia and Abkhazia to support them as self-proclaimed republics. Although a six-point ceasefire brought an end to hostilities in both breakaway regions calling for the withdrawal of both Russian and Georgian-armed forces,47 Russia still operates a 4th Guards Military Base 42 Samuel Charap, “NATO Honesty on Ukraine Could Avert Conflict with Russia,” Financial Times, January 12, 2022. 43 Steven Erlanger, “Ally, Member or Partner? NATO’s Long Dilemma Over Ukraine,” The New York Times, December 8, 2021. 44 Hisham Aidi, “The Russia-Ukraine War: Implications for Africa,” Policy Centre for the New South, Policy Brief, March 2022, pp. 2–3. Mearsheimer has argued that after the Cold War, efforts to expand NATO and the European Union were wrong to immerse ex-Soviet countries like Ukraine into a pro-US liberal democracy to eradicate Putin’s economic and political domination over it (John Joseph Mearsheimer, “John Mearsheimer on Putin’s Ambitions After Nine Months of War,” New Yorker, Interview with Isaac Chotiner, November 17, 2022). 45 Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault,” p. 78. 46 Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine Is a Watershed.” 47 ReliefWeb, “Background: Six-Point Peace Plan for the Georgia-Russia Conflict,” ReliefWeb, August 15, 2008.

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in South Ossetia and 7th Military Base in Abkhazia comprising several thousand Russian troops in each successionist region.48 Once more, the liberal ideology of the West on expansionism to break “apart Russia’s neighbours” was attempting to do the same with Ukraine.49 In response, Russia also adopted offensive realism in Ukraine as it did in Georgia.50 Despite Russia making its point that it would act if NATO pursued expansionism, the Western alliance proceeded with Albanian and Croatian accession in 2009. After Germany’s unification, Mikhail Gorbachev and President Vladimir Putin received only assurances from the United States, and Russia in May 1997 in the Founding Act with NATO, that the North Atlantic Alliance would not redeploy its infrastructure and armed forces to the newly acceded countries.51 According to Walt, these NATO efforts to persuade Russia to avoid worrying despite moving further towards its borders were naïve.52 NATO continued its expansionist policy with the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland on March 12, 1999. Russia could not debate the accession of these states. Based on these events and NATO’s alleged oath and spirit of assurances further spreading to the east, it would be logical to contend that NATO would not pursue Ukraine’s accession as a member. Neoliberalist regime theory explains the rationale behind NATO’s socialisation of expansionism policy to endorse mutual norms, rules, procedures, expectations and obligations for North American and European collective defence. Realism can depict the feeling of Russian uncertainty and a security dilemma from NATO expansionism. Russia is adopting the offensive realist assertions of structural anarchy—attributing uncertainty of the intentions of states—so Moscow seeks power to

48 Zaal Anjaparidze, “Russia Redeploys Troops from its Bases in Georgia and Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 19, No. 42 (March 28, 2022). 49 Lukin, “Chauvinism or Chaos,” p. 458. Former US President, Barack Hussein Obama II, wanted to develop better relations with Russia so overlooked Putin’s aggression in Georgia that later resulted in Putin strengthening Syria’s dictatorship (Journo, “Why John Mearsheimer Gets Ukraine Wrong”). 50 Feinstein and Pirro, “Testing the World Order,” pp. 817–818. 51 Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and

the US Offer to Limit NATO Expansion,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 (April 2016), p. 13. 52 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.”

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primarily survive, causing a struggle for hegemony.53 This threat is mutually reinforcing for NATO. Due to anarchy in the international system, NATO retains its Cold War ideology on realist power, the interests of its members and its lack of trust against Russia. These realist principles explain the expansionist policy of NATO and mutual security dilemma between NATO’s allied members and Russia. As explained by classical realism, the recognition of power and anarchy have formed reciprocal distrust between NATO members and Russia. The further threat of containing Russia has intensified state centrism, self-help and survival resulting in enhancing relative power. This elucidation of offensive neorealism explains Russia’s incursion of Georgia in 2008 as a smaller neighbouring state that was halted by Moscow to avert its growth of military capabilities with the NATO alliance.54 Sovereign inequality is also well-recognised to explain the efforts of NATO to continually contain Russia to avert the rise of their power and the counterbalanced bipolar system of security deterrence during the Cold War era. From a constructivist perspective, the ideas on collective security and related policies are socially constructed by NATO member states and appeal for the accession of states whose national security is under threat. As a collective defence organisation, NATO cannot thwart an attack against a non-member but its members of the alliance (without referring to the North Atlantic Treaty) can encourage the collective security dialogue to threaten an aggressor with punishment by one or a collection of participating community of states.

53 This reality would be supported by Mearsheimer’s postulation of state survival based on becoming the most powerful state for relative advantage over rivals. He contends that fearful of other state intentions, and awareness of an operational “self-help system, states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system” (John Joseph Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York City, NY: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 33). 54 As Mearsheimer and Götz explain, a regional hegemon will attempt to halt a smaller, and weaker, neighbour from attaining further military alliances and capabilities that may threaten its relative power (Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 49– 51; Elias Götz, “Neorealism and Russia’s Ukraine Policy, 1991–Present,” Contemporary Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2016). p. 303.

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Gheciu, Alexandra. “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialisation? NATO and the ‘New Europe’.” International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 4 (October 2005), pp. 973–1012, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050332. Götz, Elias. “Neorealism and Russia’s Ukraine Policy, 1991–Present.” Contemporary Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2016), pp. 301–323, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/13569775.2016.1201312. Harrington, Daniel F. Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War. Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 2012. Hoffmann, Stanley. “The World; Friends Like Russia Make Diplomacy a Mess.” Cited in Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times, March 28, 1993, Section 4, p. 5, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/28/weekinreview/theworld-friends-like-russia-make-diplomacy-a-mess.html. Jansohn, Uwe F. President Truman and (the Challenge of) the Potsdam Conference 1945. Auckland: Pickle Partners Publishing, 2015. Journo, Elan. “Why John Mearsheimer Gets Ukraine Wrong.” New Ideal, September 14, 2022, https://newideal.aynrand.org/why-john-mearsheimergets-ukraine-wrong/. Kaplan, Karel. The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia 1945– 1948. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1987. Kay, Sean. NATO and the Future of European Security. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. Kennan, George Frost. “X Article: The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July 1947), pp. 566–582, https://www.cvce.eu/ obj/the_sources_of_soviet_conduct_from_foreign_affairs_july_1947-en-a0f 03730-dde8-4f06-a6ed-d740770dc423.html. Khudoley, Konstantin Konstantinowitsch. “New Russia-West Confrontation: War of Attrition or Escalation?” Strategic Analysis (November 2022), https://doi. org/10.1080/09700161.2022.2149980. Kissinger, Henry Alfred. “Kissinger Backs Ukraine’s NATO Membership, Says Russia Needs the Opportunity to Rejoin International System.” CNBC, January 17, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2023/01/17/russia-needs-opp ortunity-to-rejoin-an-international-system-kissinger-says.html. Kupchan, Charles A. “Putin’s War in Ukraine Is a Watershed. Time for America to Get Real.” The New York Times, April 11, 2022, https://www.nytimes. com/2022/04/11/opinion/ukraine-war-realist-strategy.html. Lange, Katie. “The Berlin Airlift: What It Was, Its Importance in the Cold War.” US Department of Defence, June 24, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/ News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/3072635/the-berlin-airlift-what-it-wasits-importance-in-the-cold-war/. Lukin, Alexander. “Chauvinism or Chaos: Russia’s Unpalatable Choice.” Russian Social Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 6, (December 2020), pp. 452–466, https:/ /doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2020.1852032.

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CHAPTER 4

Ukrainian Desire for Political Autonomy and NATO Accession

Now that the overview and history of NATO with its intentions to promote its standardised ideals for expansionism towards Russia (with its regime theory) has been reached, this chapter covers the aspirations of Ukraine’s accession ambitions to the alliance. The United States has spearheaded its motives for supporting Ukraine against Russia, whilst Moscow has been pitted against America’s NATO-led expansionism and previous international incursions that contravened international law and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in Serbia, Iraq and Libya, respectively.

Orange Revolution Ukraine has attempted to support a president that is not pro-Russian. This is evident with both Orange and Maidan Revolutions.1 After the November 21, 2004, Ukrainian presidential election that was decided by a run-off vote between leading contenders, Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych (pro-Russian from Donetsk) and Viktor Andriyovych Yushchenko (follower of Western policy), the former won by allegations of electoral

1 The Maidan Revolution is covered in the next chapter because it resulted in Russia’s retaliation of annexing Crimea.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Singh, The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34163-2_4

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fraud.2 Fraud was the “tripwire” for mass public demonstrations, but the main threat was Yanukovych undermining “Ukrainian national identity” in “Ukrainophone Western-Central” parts of the country.3 This sparked the Orange Revolution that consisted of two months of general strikes and civil disobedience in the form of “street protests” desiring “a do-over election,” resulting in a revote as order by the Ukrainian Supreme Court.4 The revote that was observed by national and international observers was deemed as transparent, free and fair, with Yushchenko winning with 52.06 per cent that ended the Revolution after his inauguration.5 Although the European Union, United States and Belarus found the re-election results to be justified, this antagonised pro-Russian circles in Russia and Belarus with Putin claiming that the revolution aimed to destabilise society.6 It was evident that the inauguration of Yushchenko provoked Russia, but the Ukrainian presidential system was replaced with a parliamentary-presidential system of governance that provided the Kremlin influence on blocking Kyiv’s EU and NATO membership aspirations.7

2 Taras Kuzio, “The Orange and Euromaidan Revolutions: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives,” Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2 (December 2016), p. 91. 3 Taras Kuzio, “Democratic Revolutions from a Different Angle: Social Populism and National Identity in Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (March 2012), p. 43. 4 John S. Earle and Scott Gehlbach, “The Productivity Consequences of Political Turnover: Firm-Level Evidence from Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 59, No. 3 (July 2015), p. 710. 5 Christopher John Chivers, “Yushchenko Wins 52% of Vote; Rival Vows a Challenge,”

The New York Times, December 28, 2004. 6 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, “Putin Calls ‘Colour Revolutions’ an Instrument of Destabilisation,” Kyiv Post, December 15, 2011. 7 Oleksandr Reznik, “From the Orange Revolution to the Revolution of Dignity: Dynamics of the Protest Actions in Ukraine,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (November 2016), p. 750.

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NATO Membership Action Plan and National Security Strategy Despite this setback, Ukraine’s continual ambitions securing a non-proRussian president to follow its national interests and Western policy has facilitated its lobby for NATO membership. Ukraine has strived to meet its aspirations for Western support of its democratic status and European security and economic institutions, but this has strained Kyiv’s relations with Moscow.8 Ukraine borders four NATO members and if Russia lost another satellite state from its former socialist bloc, it would also contain Russia from the west of its border. Ukrainians supported the notion of a national referendum to join NATO.9 From June 2019, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy began meeting with NATO and EU officials with the purpose to join both in 2024—that incorporated a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)—to bolster Ukrainian defence capability to dissuade its little brother position from Russia.10 Kyiv placed blatant aspirations to join NATO. In 2019, Ukraine amended its Constitution with its Articles 85, 102 and 116 for accession to NATO and the European Union, which alarmed Russia. Consequently, the armed forces of Russia and Ukraine mounted on each other’s borders.11 However, all 31 NATO members must agree, but France and Germany have been sceptical about it and five NATO members already border Russia and thus Moscow have expressed that Ukraine’s admission would

8 Konstantin Konstantinowitsch Khudoley and Stanislav Leonidovich Tkachenko, “The Modern Foreign Policy of Russia,” Cornell International Affairs Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (November 2009), p. 35. 9 Pavel Polityuk and Natalia Zinets, “Pledging Reforms by 2020, Ukraine Seeks Route into NATO,” Reuters, July 10, 2017. 10 TASS: Russian News Agency, “Ukraine to Apply for EU Membership in 2024, Says President,” Reuters, January 29, 2019. At this point in 2019, it is important to note that pro-Russian candidates during the Ukrainian elections lost by a landslide, which indicates that Putin’s invasion in 2014 to make Kyiv submissive to Moscow has only reinvigorated Ukraine’s pro-Western ambitions and independence (Steven Erlanger, “Ally, Member or Partner? NATO’s Long Dilemma Over Ukraine,” The New York Times, December 8, 2021). 11 It was feared that by Moscow that Ukraine would attempt war like in Donbass in 2014 because Azerbaijan also successfully warred with Armenia in autumn 2020 (Konstantin Konstantinowitsch Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation: War of Attrition or Escalation?” Strategic Analysis (November 2022), p. 5).

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threaten their borders and influence.12 Despite these valid points, the United States continually tried to supress Russia and open its arms to Ukraine to join NATO to undermine Russia’s autocracy.13 The United States have skilfully argued that Putin seeks imperialist expansionism, including Ukraine’s integration, and thus the predominant motivation is the security threat, or fear, of Ukraine joining NATO.14 Some leading academics writing in Foreign Policy argue the same. By way of illustration, Fix and Kimmage have contended that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was supposed to demonstrate how Russia had recovered after the demise of its Soviet empire in 1991.15 This fits an offensive neorealist explanation of Russia maximising its relative power, due to the threat of NATO’s expansionism, to retain its Eurasian regional hegemony. In mid—September 2020, Zelenskyy authorised a National Security Strategy that involved identifying Russia as an aggressor, thus warranting NATO partnership.16 In April 2021, after Russian armed force presence on Ukrainian borders, Zelenskyy requested US President Joe Biden to help accelerate its NATO membership request.17 However, in June 2021, Biden was unsure if Ukraine would join NATO, commenting it “remains to be seen,”18 but Putin chose to deploy additional troops to surround Ukraine instead of waiting. By late November 2021, Ukraine reported that 92,000 Russian troops were near Ukrainian borders. During this time, the United States suspected that Russia might attack Ukraine and thus Biden signalled robust economic sanctions in this event.19 In

12 Alex Finnis, “Why Can’t Ukraine join NATO?” I News, March 3, 2022. 13 Charles A. Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine Is a Watershed. Time for America to

Get Real,” The New York Times, April 11, 2022. 14 John Joseph Mearsheimer, “John Mearsheimer on Putin’s Ambitions After Nine Months of War,” New Yorker, Interview with Isaac Chotiner, November 17, 2022. 15 Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, “Putin’s Last Stand: The Promise and Peril of Russian Defeat,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2023. 16 Alyona Getmanchuk, “Russia as Aggressor, NATO as Objective: Ukraine’s New National Security Strategy,” Atlantic Council, September 30, 2020. 17 Olga Shylenko, “Ukraine’s Zelenskyy on Frontline as Merkel Urges Putin to Pull Back Troops,” CTV News, April 8, 2021. 18 Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr., “Biden Says it ‘Remains to be Seen’ Whether Ukraine Will be Admitted to NATO,” NBC News, June 14, 2021. 19 NDTV, “Soldiers, Separatists, Sanctions: A Timeline of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis,” NDTV , February 24, 2022.

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November–December 2021, Washington privately promised considered the deployment of US military advisors to help Ukraine and professed its commitment to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty.20 In December 2021, the European Union threatened Russia with sanctions and NATO supported Ukraine’s ambitions whilst acknowledging that it must not threaten Russia and NATO powers have not undertaken preventive action against the Kremlin.21 If Ukraine managed to join NATO, they would not have to work on increasing their military by an additional 100,000 troops and could end conscription because NATO would provide military strength so that the state could focus on economic and education issues. However, Putin contested the activity of NATO in eastern Europe and prohibition of Ukraine’s accession that was refused by Kyiv. After 2014, and since 2017 with great intensity, the United States military “contingent of 300” soldiers have been involved in rearming Ukraine and training its “enormous allied military in western Ukraine.”22 During this period, there were mounting tensions with Russia that was further equipping military tanks across the border; yet, rotating American troops continued to support the Ukrainian forces and boost the combat training centre.23 From a realist perspective, principally classical realism, Ukraine has vowed to protect its national security interests by putting itself in a better position from uncertain Russia actions. Due to the uncertainty of relations with Russia, Ukraine has applied reciprocity of Western influence to its National Security Strategy (rather than devising its own foreign policy). Kyiv is seeking to enhance its relative power by joining NATO to pursue its self-interests of maximising security. Strategic prudence concerns reducing the risk of soldier’s lives whilst appreciating the foreign policy and power of Russia within an anarchical international system. If Ukraine managed to join NATO, Kyiv would have the military support and power from NATO and its allies to join the counterbalance against 20 Emma Ashford, “The Persistence of Great-Power Politics: What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Geopolitical Rivalry,” February 20, 2022. 21 France 24, “EU Threatens Russia Sanctions as NATO Backs Ukraine,” December 16, 2021. 22 Ben Watson, “In Ukraine, the United States Trains an Army in the West to Fight in the East,” Defence One, October 5, 2017. 23 Charlsy Panzino, “Amid Russia Tensions, US Army Continues to Build Up Ukrainian Forces, Training Centre,” Army Times, June 8, 2017.

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the threat of Russia (rather than directly fighting Moscow or countering their incursions). This point is explained with defensive neorealism . Moreover, from a constructivist perspective, NATO’s socially produced knowledge on collective defence and its protection from Russia would bolster Ukraine’s identity in Europe.

Western Support for Ukraine It may be unfeasible for Ukraine to join NATO, but its fight—as a close NATO partner country—against Russia has been heralded as courageous by powerful NATO states because it continues to weaken Russia. Within two weeks of the invasion, the West provided tantamount weapons for Ukraine, comprising over 17,000 antitank weapons.24 For instance, the United Kingdom Former Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, referred to Winston Churchill’s phrase during the Second World War recalling that dark times are your “finest hour” that will make Ukrainians free from “the brute force of an aggressor.”25 He also stated that Moscow “must fail and be seen to fail.”26 Emotive language concurs with the “logic of appropriateness” to indicate what must occur “for justice,” resulting in rapid policy to punish the aggressor like with Saddam Hussein.27 The United Kingdom has vowed to provide a further £300 million as military aid to Ukraine that will include Stormer anti-craft systems, Brimstone antiship missiles and armoured vehicles.28 On February 8, 2023, the United Kingdom welcomed Zelenskyy with the request for fighter jets and further sanctions on Russia.29 In addition, the United Kingdom has initiated Operation Interflex to help train over 10,000 Ukrainian volunteer armed

24 Tanner Greer, “Realism Must Guide Our Reaction to Russia’s Invasion,” The New York Times, March 18, 2022. 25 Aidan Radnedge, “Ukraine Will Win! Johnson Hails Nation’s ‘Moral Force’ in Speech to its Parliament … and Pledges £300 m to Cause,” Metro, May 4, 2022, p. 7. 26 Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson, “Russia ‘Must Fail and Be Seen to Fail’ If It Invades Ukraine, Says Johnson,” The Guardian, February 19, 2022. 27 Greer, “Realism Must Guide Our Reaction to Russia’s Invasion.”. 28 Reuters, “Britain Promises Further $375 Million in Military Aid for Ukraine,”

Reuters, May 2, 2022. 29 Dominic Yeatman, “UK-Raine,” Metro, February 9, 2023, pp. 1, 3. The Russian Embassy in the United Kingdom has responded that if “Western jets” reach Ukraine, they would be used to as air-raids to target residential areas in the four oblasts annexed

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force in northern England since Russia’s February 2022 invasion.30 Ukrainian volunteers have been engaged with training, including how to use Challenger 2 tanks, at the Bovington Camp in Dorset.31 Similarly, the United States has applauded the resilience of Ukraine thwarting Russian military efforts to capture Kyiv by announcing weapons worth $550 million for Ukrainian armed forces.32 France has already provided anti-aircraft missiles and has stated their intentions to supply air and radar defence systems to Ukraine.33 International enemies of Russia and NATO allies have continually provided aid, weapons and refugee support to ensure that the Ukrainian resistance against Russia continues. These allies, which include the United Kingdom, have delivered air defence systems, namely Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles, that can fire at advancing cruise missiles; Germany has sent “the first of four Iris-T defence system” and the United States is to deliver “national advanced surface-to-air missile systems.”34 Moreover, after weeks of debate, Germany’s Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, has approved the supply of an initial 14 sophisticated Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.35 The United Kingdom has announced that it will send 14 Challenger 2 tanks that should reach Ukraine by March 2023.36 Biden has further pledged an additional $2.6 billion weapons package for Ukraine, which may comprise “100 Stryker combat vehicles and 50 Bradley armoured

in September 2022 that would result in “the death toll of yet another round of escalation” (Kate Nicholson, “Russia Releases Bizarre Statement About Targeting UK After Zelenskyy’s Visit,” Huffington Post, February 9, 2023). 30 Tom Wilkinson, “10,000 Volunteer Soldiers Trained for Ukraine Here,” Metro, February 17, 2023, p. 5. 31 Dominic Yeatman, “With Our Tanks: Ukrainians Train for War on Challengers,” Metro, February 24, 2023, pp. 4–5. 32 Usaid Siddiqui, David Child and Hamza Mohamed, “Russia-Ukraine Latest Updates: US Announces $550 m in Military Aid,” Al Jazeera, August 1, 2022. 33 France 24, “France to Supply Air Defence Systems to Ukraine After Wave of Russian Strikes,” France 24, October 12, 2022. 34 Daniel Boffey, “Ukraine Claims Gains Near Kherson as UK Sends Anti-Aircraft Missiles,” The Guardian, October 13, 2022. 35 Edna Mohamed and Virginia Pietromarchi, “Russia-Ukraine Live News: Germany Green-Lights Tank Deliveries,” Al Jazeera, January 25, 2023. 36 Alexander John Gervase Chalk, “Britain to Send 14 of its Main Battle Tanks to Ukraine,” Reuters, January 15, 2023.

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vehicles.”37 Despite powerful “defensive weapons” being debated as “blatant provocation” towards the Russian Federation by Anatoly Ivanovich Antonov, the Russian Ambassador to the United States, Washington has pledged to supply 31 M1 Abrams battle tanks to Kyiv.38 The deployment of these specialised tanks will provide Ukraine with a military advantage over Russia’s Soviet-period T-72 tanks due to better mobility, durability and firepower, but this now indicates “a Western war against Russia” that could last years.39 Over 40,000 forces of the NATO Response Force have been placed on the borders of Russia’s neighbours, establishing eight multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia to defend its members from potential Russian hostilities.40 It is important to note that Poland is playing a very important role in helping Ukraine during the war, primarily because an estimated 95 per cent of military equipment supplies to Ukraine are delivered through Polish territory. In addition, refugees from Ukraine mainly leave through Poland. By the end of 2022, approximately 9 million refugees had crossed the Ukrainian-Polish border, of which 1.55 million remained in Poland.41 After Ukraine’s independence, Warsaw commenced a strategic partnership with Kyiv to encourage market and democratic reforms and cooperative security.42 Poland continues to support the preservation of Ukraine’s independence and its foreign policy on pro-Western NATO and EU accession to avert Russia’s return to an imperial empire because Moscow

37 Shannon Vavra, “Kremlin Threatens ‘Whole New Level’ of War Over Western Weapons,” The Daily Beast, January 19, 2023. 38 Kate Connolly, “US Poised to Send Dozens of Abrams Tanks to Ukraine in Policy U-turn—Reports,” The Guardian, January 25, 2023; The Moscow Times, “US to Provide 31 Abrams Tanks to Ukraine Amid Russian Warnings,” The Moscow Times, January 25, 2022. 39 Martin Kettle, “Sending Tanks to Ukraine Makes One Thing Clear: This Is Now a Western War against Ukraine,” The Guardian, January 25, 2023. 40 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “NATO’s Response to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” NATO, July 7, 2022. 41 Beyza Binnur Donmez, “Over 9 M Ukrainian Refugees Crossed into Poland Since War Began,” Anadolu Agency, January 11, 2023. 42 Ryszard Zi˛eba, “Strategic Partnership Between Poland and Ukraine,” The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2002), pp. 195–226.

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poses the chief threat to European security so aims to push Moscow away.43 If applying a classical realist perspective, it is in the national interests of NATO states, and particularly powerful ones such as the United States and United Kingdom, that encourage and support Ukraine to continually fight and eventually weaken Russia. The support is with military aid, support for refugees, sanctions and condemnation of Moscow but without direct military intervention from NATO forces, or its member states, in Russia. Due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s neighbours have felt threatened from Putin’s ‘tyranny.’ From a defensive realist position, this has formed a security dilemma that was also prevalent among NATO and its member states against the Soviet Union and its communist allies. Despite opposition from Turkey, Finland expressed its talks in its parliament to seriously consider joining NATO during the Madrid Summit to protect their national security interests and Finland, as well as Sweden, completed the accession talks in July 2022.44 According to Mearsheimer, the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO will only threaten encircling Russia further.45 The potential growth of NATO member states threatens Russia with further containment. Despite these concerns, Putin has stated that he has no problems with Finland and Sweden joining NATO but warned a reaction to the expansion of their military infrastructure.46 On April 4, 2023, Finland officially joined NATO to bring an end to Helsinki’s “military non-alignment” to encircle Russia’s northwest border.47 As explained from an offensive neorealist position, NATO is encircling Russia, and Finland could host a permanent NATO base,

43 Ryszard Zi˛eba, Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy: Problems of Compatibility with the Changing International Order (Cham: Springer, 2020), p. 180. 44 Joe Barnes, “Finland and Sweden Should Not be Allowed to Join NATO, Says Turkey,” The Telegraph, May 13, 2022; John R. Deni, “Sweden and Finland are on their Way to NATO Membership. Here’s What Needs to Happen Next,” Atlantic Council, August 4, 2022. 45 Freddie Sayers, “John Mearsheimer: We’re Playing Russian Roulette,” UnHerd, November 30, 2022. 46 Sky News, “Putin Warns Russia Will Respond if NATO Troops Boosts Finland and Sweden’s Military Strength,” Sky News, May 16, 2022. 47 Tara John, “Finland Joins NATO, Doubling Military Alliance’s Border with Russia in a Blow for Putin,” CNN , April 4, 2023.

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thus increasing Moscow’s security dilemma attributing impulses of incursions as consequences for its non-cooperative smaller neighbours, such as Georgia and Ukraine, which are not directly protected by NATO as members. As evident during the Cold War, the power of Russia and its military and nuclear capabilities still act as a deterrent for direct international military intervention—meaning that strategic prudence from Morgenthau’s classical realism continues to be applied.48 For NATO, interests that promote its regime theory on standardisation and expansionism eastward; Ukraine’s fight against Russia will continue to be supported and must go on. Additional neutral Scandinavian states have joined NATO, with others considering the same, that could further contain Russia. Prior to a discussion on Russian retaliation against Ukraine, global condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and sanctions imposed by the United States and a variety of its NATO allies to cripple Moscow, it is important to discuss American motives regarding this war with Putin pitted against the legality of previous Western interventions.

United States Motives of the War It may appear that the primacy of US interests is to weaken Russia. When undertaking an offensive realist position, if Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is tolerated, then Putin’s glorification and expansionist threats will impose on the United States.49 Future unchallenged Russian aggression will expand its objectives by challenging NATO states, which are US allies, and impend European security. The European Union are sympathetic to US policy, but France, Germany and Italy preserve dialogue at potential compromise with Russia.50 The United States and the West have started defending Ukraine, but it altered to weaken Russia, ensuring that the liberal order is maintained.51 American security interests intend to help “Ukraine defeat Russia” because if the Donbass region is seized by Putin, 48 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), pp. 241–242. 49 Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “What Is America’s Interest in the Ukraine War?” The National Interest, October 30, 2022. 50 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 8. 51 Joseph Robinette Biden, Jr., “President Biden: What America Will and Will Not Do

in Ukraine,” The New York Times, May 31, 2022.

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it will encourage further land-grabbing to threaten neighbouring “NATO allies.”52 America has an enduring dilemma of preventing Putin to repeat this invasion within “the next five or ten years.”53 The United States contains an interest to demonstrate that aggression will be punished and thus the norm of territorial integrity preserved in international law will be reinforced.54 The threat imposed by Russia is sought by the United States and its European allies to thwart Moscow’s relative gain and enhance the security of European states with the institutional liberalism of NATO and the rules of international law, with regime theory, on aggression. Based on this threat of Russian expansionism to NATO allies, the United States has spearheaded economic sanctions on the Kremlin and attempted to weaken Russian military power to undermine Putin’s ability to attack further neighbouring states.55 However, Mearsheimer has been critical on Western policymakers believing that the Ukraine conflict will prolong into a stalemate to weaken Russia to eventually accept a ceasefire that favours America, “its NATO allies” and Ukraine.56 Mark Alexander Milley, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has identified that US strategic interests are to ensure that the Russia-Ukraine war is contained within Ukrainian boundaries and “a kinetic conflict between the” United States armed forces and allied “NATO with Russia” is avoided.57 Under classical realist thinking, and chiefly strategic prudence, containing the war within Ukraine is a strategy for the United States to pursue their foreign policy in Eurasia by maximising gains over the risks of direct warfare. In more wider terms, Biden fears that other “aggressors” around the world, notably China [with Taiwan] could be encouraged by the lack

52 Michael McFaul, “Why Ukraine’s Success is in the United States National Interest,” Atlantic Council, February 4, 2022. 53 Stephen John Hadley, “Russia’s War in Ukraine: How Does it End?” Council on Foreign Relations, May 31, 2022. 54 Tanisha M. Fazal, “The Return of Conquest? Why the Future of Global Order Hinges on Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2022. 55 Lloyd James Austin III, “Austin says US Wants to See Russia’s Military Capabilities

Weakened,” CNN , April 25, 2022. 56 John Joseph Mearsheimer, “Playing with Fire in Ukraine: The Underappreciated Risks of Catastrophic Escalation,” Foreign Affairs, August 17, 2022. 57 Shane Harris, Karen DeYoung, Isabelle Khurshudyan, Ashley Parker and Liz Sly, “Road to War: US Struggled to Convince Allies, and Zelenskyy, of Risk of Invasion,” Washington Post, August 16, 2022.

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of challenges to derail Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to replicate seizing neighbouring territories.58 America is concerned with the recent Chinese military drills around Taiwan’s border, which replicates Russia’s strategy regarding their February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Blinken has insisted that China has demonstrated the viability of using force to accomplish its objectives of rapidly reunifying self-ruled Taiwan to China, which would violate the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.59 Biden stressed that dictators— that includes Putin—need to “pay the price for their aggression” because they will become incentivised to engage in further aggression.60 The United States do not want China’s peer competitiveness status with it to grow stronger so Washington may need to contain China, by defending Taiwan.61 Within the United States administration, it is believed that the credibility of the United States rests on acting against Putin and his abiding autocrats.62 Again, direct confrontation with China, as with Russia, is avoided by the United States because strategic prudence is cautiously applied by Washington. There are also liberalist values that the United States is trying to uphold in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a means to retain the “liberal international order.”63 Antony Blinken, the United States Secretary of State, has stressed that the international order is based on rules that are pivotal for the preservation of peace and security; which are, in turn, tested by Putin’s “unjustified” and “unprovoked” invasion of Ukraine.64 However, there are a range of sources from leading US realist political scientists, namely Mearsheimer and Walt, who argue that Russia was provoked. A 58 Biden, “President Biden: What America Will and Will Not Do Ukraine.”. 59 Anthony John Blinken, “China Has Rejected Understanding with US on Taiwan,

Blinken Says,” Al Jazeera, October 27, 2022. 60 Marc Alexander Thiessen, “Opinion: If Putin Is Allowed to Invade Ukraine, America’s Credibility Would Lie in Tatters,” The Washington Post, February 8, 2022. 61 Sayers, “John Mearsheimer: We’re Playing Russian Roulette.” Mearsheimer further argues that the Ukraine war has distracted the United States from its vital interests of the “real threat”—China—so Washington is working towards separating the relations of Beijing and Moscow (Sayers, “John Mearsheimer: We’re Playing Russian Roulette”). 62 Thiessen, “Opinion: If Putin is Allowed to Invade Ukraine.” However, it is unlikely that the role of the United States as the global police role means that they must always act to save the alleged international order. 63 Shifrinson, “What is America’s Interest in the Ukraine War?”. 64 Anthony John Blinken, “Secretary Blinken’s Press Availability: Remarks,” US

Department of State, March 4, 2022.

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review of Mearsheimer and Walt stresses that they blame the West, and notably the eastward expansionism of NATO and the European Union, for provoking the Russian invasion of Ukraine.65 From the international liberal order perspective, the United States would lose its watchdog, and indeed hegemonic, credibility and the protection of democracies if it failed to comprehensively support Ukraine. In other words, as Biden claimed, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the war between a “democracy” based on liberty and “autocracy” of repression. Based on this premise, failure to help Ukraine would undermine the democratic viability of the United States and their allies.66 Reminiscent of the Cold War, Biden tried to present the war as the confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism.67 The liberal order, which is aligned by international law, presupposes that powerful states must resist using force against the will of weaker states due to the contravention of state sovereignty.68 If the United Nations did not act to avert Russia’s aggression, then the liberal international order and respect for international law—including state sovereignty—would be at risk for both the order and the United States. An American journalist has stretched this argument to Russia seeking territorial expansion to weaken America’s presence and both the authority of NATO and the European Union in Europe.69 Despite Biden’s commitment towards supporting Ukraine militarily and imposing sanctions on Moscow that is further antagonising the Kremlin, it is unlikely that Russia would engage in direct war with America and its allies.70 Due to the involvement of these great powers,

65 Pierre Haroche, “Whose Backyard? Realism and the Shifting Balance of Stakes in Ukraine,” London School of Economics and Political Science, January 9, 2023, p. 1. 66 Joseph Robinette Biden Jr., “Remarks by President Biden on the United Efforts of the Free World to Support the People of Ukraine,” The White House, March 26, 2022. 67 Biden, “Remarks by President Biden on the United Efforts of the Free World to Support the People of Ukraine.” However, the public has not responded to this a war based on ideology and a return to ideological warfare, which includes proxy warfare, as with the Cold War appears unlikely (Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 5. 68 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations , October 24, 1945, 1 United Nations Treaty Series XVI, Article 2 (4). 69 Anne Applebaum, “As War Drags on in Ukraine, is it Time to Talk Compromise? WBUR, June 21, 2022. 70 Shifrinson, “What is America’s Interest in the Ukraine War?”.

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Carr’s prescription of appeasement regarding Britain and Nazi Germany could be employed to prescribe a Russian appeasement of Western power, principally the United States and NATO.71 The threat of these great powers has, so far, meant that Russia and Ukraine are the sole combatants directly active in the war.72 To argue that America’s failure to act against Russian aggression would result in further territorial expansion, and potentially towards NATO allies, is problematic. Even if Russia desired further territorial expansion, its self-interests would have to calculate the losses by considering their national security and whether they could defeat forthcoming aggressors. NATO remains powerful within an anarchical world, with a healthy “combined gross domestic product twelve times that of Russia, which influences Moscow’s “calculations.”73 Based on such calculations, it is unlikely that Russia would expand an attempted European territorial expansion via aggression. Similar with the March 2003 Iraq invasion, the West, spearheaded by the United States, have exercised the “logic of appropriate” doctrine against an “evil autocratic” Putin and thus acted rapidly and on impulse, which is “not prudent.”74 Better assumptions were not sought because under the “logic of appropriateness,” Russia’s “invasion is a violation of the moral norms upon which the European order stands.”75 The West was against the Russian Federation and used language on Putin who “must fail and be seen to fail.”76 From the perspective of idealism, Putin has provoked “moral outrage” that has called for the West to punish or remove him from office but realpolitik suggests that the United States might have to deal with Putin for another decade.77 When balancing power and strategic choices, resistance of further military excursions is prevalent— even for so-called autocratic, and aggressive, states. Based on this realist 71 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York: HarperCollins, 1939). 72 Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe, “Avoiding a Long War: US Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict,” January 2023 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation), p. 5. 73 Shifrinson, “What is America’s Interest in the Ukraine War?.” 74 Greer, “Realism Must Guide Our Reaction to Russia’s Invasion.” 75 Greer, “Realism Must Guide Our Reaction to Russia’s Invasion.” 76 Johnson, “Russia ‘Must Fail and be Seen to Fail’ if it Invades Ukraine.” 77 Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine Is a Watershed.”

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argument, it is unlikely that Russia will seek further aggression against a NATO member state because the alliance has been working hard to establish policies to defend NATO territory—traditionally against Soviet and subsequently Russian aggression. For instance, Biden claimed that the United States “and its allies are fully prepared to defend every single inch of NATO land” after Russia’s annexation of Ukraine.78 I argue that main US interests of both Russia’s incursion of Ukraine and China’s build-up of military forces on the Taiwanese border is that it displays power of both Moscow and Beijing in both material and ideational factors. This is thus a threat to the status of the United States’ hegemonic status, stretching beyond their world policeman role that attempts to preserve the liberal international order. The United States is a power that has cemented idealism within a realist world by promoting justice around the globe, as the international policeman, but America has and needs to play “power politics” when required.79 The United States have attempted to maintain this order by promoting regime theory of rules, norms and standardised behaviour with North American and European allies with NATO to challenge alternative autocratic ideals (from the Soviet Union and later Russia). Realists would analyse America’s world policeman role with scepticism because it cannot deem every act of aggression within the world as a direct threat to the United States. Every conflict in the world does not threaten the United States, but the fear of rival powers—namely Russia and China—is what partially threatens US hegemony. However, the legality of collective defence, international law, the use of force and more narrowly the rules of the Charter of the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty are geopolitically stagnated to hold Russia accountable for their alleged illegal incursion of Ukraine. The same can be argued for China acting as an aggressor against Taiwan. This is partly due to the military power, nuclear threat and permanent UN Security Council membership that both states possess. Therefore, the liberal international order and regime theory of NATO’s standardisation is under threat.80 78 Joseph Robinette Biden Jr., “Biden Warns Putin US Will Defend ‘Every Inch’ of NATO Land after Ukraine Annexation,” New York Post, January 25, 2023. 79 Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine is a Watershed.”. 80 It can also be argued that nuclear non-proliferation has been hindered too; namely,

by the withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 so that Washington could protect itself by developing and testing a National Missile Defence

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Neorealism explains NATO’s limitations of initially combating terrorism and the current consequences of the Ukraine crisis that is due to international politics being guided by clear and defined interests irrespective of the Euro-Atlantic security system’s strong, and shared, values.81 Taking this premise into consideration, the material forces of military might, nuclear and economic capacity, as explained by realism, and ideational factors of reclaiming alleged mainland (both Russia with Ukraine and China with Taiwan), as elucidated by constructivism, provide more pragmatic explanations. Despite the international liberal order and regime theory that punished Germany and Japan with reparations to be paid in the aftermath of the Second World War, aggression persists. One could infer that historical lessons of defeated aggressor states during wars fails to deter future aggression. The United States and Western allies have attempted to punish Russia with international condemnation and economic sanctions but counterbalancing and knowledge on power distribution are important realist factors for consideration. The Western desire to punish Putin for the lives taken in Ukraine will result in further lives lost due to the conflict elongating. The longer it lasts, the harder the impact on the United States dollar, which is the global reserve currency, and undermines America security in East Asia.82 It is thus questionable whether the United States can viably continue imposing sanctions on Russia. The United States, or any powerful state, cannot defend every ally against autocracy. It can, at times, overthrow such governments or cut deals with dictators, but defending foreign democracies spans beyond American interests.83 The liberal order

against incoming missiles from nuclear threats and its blackmail by an aggressive rogue state. Similarly, the Kremlin has suspended Russia’s participation in the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and failed a test of the Satan II intercontinental ballistic missile (Arpan Rai and Emily Atkinson, “Ukraine War News—Live: Russia Threatens ‘Further Countermeasures’ After Satan II ‘Test’,” The Independent, February 22, 2023). 81 Ryszard Zi˛eba, The Euro-Atlantic Security System in the Twenty-First t Century (Cham: Springer, 2018). 82 Due to these factors, the United States must deviate from the “logic of appropriateness” to undertake the “logic of consequence” to guide policy with calculation rather than “emotional reaction” (Greer, “Realism Must Guide Our Reaction to Russia’s Invasion”). 83 Shifrinson, “What is America’s Interest in the Ukraine War?”

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that was pressed, and extended after the Second World War contained state-led violence and encounters that undermined state sovereignty.84 Russian Opposition Towards American and NATO Interventionism A threshold on Russia’s aggression in Ukraine causing a threat to the liberal order in comparison to North Vietnam during the Cold War or the threats imposed by Saddam Hussein in both Iraq invasions is difficult to ascertain. In the March 2003 Iraq invasion, the Bush administration had undertaken the “logic of appropriateness” doctrine due to the “moral outrage” of 9/11 to attack and contain terrorism in the Middle East.85 The Bush administration saw the Iraq intervention as an opportunity with rich oil reserves in the Gulf that were important to US allies in Europe and East Asia, but Saddam Hussein was posing a threat to these strategic regional interests.86 The then US Vice President, Richard Bruce Cheney, argued that if there was a one per cent chance of a terrorist organisation gaining a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), then the United States should act immediately.87 Bush claimed that the Iraqi people deserved human liberty, but the number of deaths and chaos outweighed the notion of liberty.88 Although Putin has voiced concerns with the lack of legitimacy regarding America’s invasion of Iraq, it is imperative to acknowledge that Russia initially supported Washington’s sponsored global war on terror

84 Patrick Porter, The False Promise of Liberal Order: Nostalgia, Delusion and the Rise of Trump (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020), p. 37. 85 Greer, “Realism Must Guide Our Reaction to Russia’s Invasion.” 86 Daniel Deudney and Gilford John Ikenberry, “Realism, Liberalism and the Iraq War,”

Survival, Vol. 59, No. 4 (July 2017), p. 16. 87 Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 88 Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine Is a Watershed.” The same rhetoric of freeing Afghans with a liberal democracy and human rights occurred in Afghanistan that also ended with US withdrawal, a decade after America’s exit in Iraq, which reverted to the return of Taliban de facto governance and a humanitarian disaster. From a realist perspective, good intentions undertaking the “logic of appropriateness” doctrine need to be separated from geopolitical and strategic interests. The latter was based on the United States fighting and containing terrorism, but it was conflated by doing good; namely, liberating Iraqi and Afghan civilians with freedom, democracies, human rights and justice.

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coalition in 2001 for consultation (rather than decision-making).89 Based on this initial cooperation, and from a classical realist perspective, perhaps Carr’s remedy of appeasement could have been employed at this point to prescribe a Russian appeasement of the power of the West, namely the United States and its NATO allies.90 It is also important to note that Putin has, on numerous occasions, been critical on the role of the United States and its Western allies destroying the Cold War balance of power, with the United States using military force, and at times, without authorisation of the United Nations Security Council.91 Although Putin joined the United States and NATO with a coordinative role in its anti-terrorist coalition, he started to see contradictions with Washington contravening international law.92 In 1999 and 2003, Moscow was angered by both NATO and the United States interventions in Serbia and Iraq, respectively.93 Putin claimed that the United States’ driven war in Iraq was unjustifiable because this “use of force abroad” was not “sanctioned by the United Nations” Security Council that contravened international law and did not constitute the war on terror because “there were no international terrorists under Hussein.”94 Despite Saddam Hussein summoning prevalent torture against political opponents, under the auspices and request of the United Nations, an active WMD was not found by the intelligence bureaucracy and deployed UN weapons inspectors.95 Putin’s perspective on Iraq was opposed by the United States and much of the academic community. It was conversely underlined that the situation in Iraq qualified for a humanitarian intervention with the United States upholding a moral duty to do so and an invasion could

89 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 1. 90 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1939. 91 Tisdall, “Vladimir Putin’s Message to the West.” 92 Khudoley and Tkachenko, “The Modern Foreign Policy of Russia,” p. 36. 93 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 2. 94 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, “Iraq War was Unjustified, Says Putin,” ABC News, December 18, 2003. 95 UN Security Council Resolution 1441, “The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait,” UN Doc. S/RES/1441, (November 8, 2002), adopted 4,644th meeting; Mike Pratt, A Just War (Mustang, OK: Tate Publishing, 2013), pp. 11–14.

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have included unilateral intervention with limited allies.96 It was skilfully argued that Iraq had weakened its inherent right of respecting its sovereignty due to the volume and intensity of atrocity crimes perpetrated against own civilians, its neighbouring states and allegedly levied a WMD threat.97 Some hegemonic realists perceived the Iraq intervention as a chance for the United States and its American allies in Europe and East Asia to benefit from Gulf oil reserves, whilst Saddam Hussein was providing a threat to these strategic regional interests.98 Richard Bruce Cheney, the United States Vice President at the stated time, presented the one per cent chance doctrine: of a terrorist organisation obtaining a WMD, meaning the United States had to act instantly.99 Sanctions continued to weaken Iraq but the neo-conservatism of the Clinton administration utilised military power to reinstate hegemonic dominance and American reputation, namely its military might and world police role, was inherited by the Bush administration that was a concern for realists.100 A speedy war with Iraq resulting in few US military casualties under the principle of prudence provided an opportunity to eradicate a prolonged threat in the oil-rich Persian Gulf area. Mearsheimer and Walt persuasively contended that if Saddam Hussein possessed a WMD, it was not appropriate to intervene because the security threat was certainly deterrable, as apparent in the past, and Saddam had no motivation to utilise suspected chemical weapons (or give them to al-Qaeda), and would only do so if Saddam’s “survival” was endangered.101 Put simply, the war with Iraq progressed because Bush and his Republican hawks sought the war by electing to fight, “but did not have to fight” that would lead to needless “high US civilian casualties, significant civilian deaths, a heightened risk of terrorism” and augmented hostility of America within “the Arab and Islamic world.”102 It can be contended that there was no

96 James Turner Johnson, The War to Oust Saddam Hussein: Just War and the New Face of Conflict (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), p. 159. 97 Jean Bethke Elshtain, “A Just War,” Boston Globe, October 6, 2002. 98 Deudney and Ikenberry, “Realism, Liberalism and the Iraq War,” p. 16. 99 Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine. 100 Deudney and Ikenberry, “Realism, Liberalism and the Iraq War,” p. 17. 101 John Joseph Mearsheimer and Stephen Martin Walt, “An Unnecessary War,” Foreign

Policy, Vol. 134 (January–February 2003), pp. 55–56, 58. 102 Mearsheimer and Walt, “An Unnecessary War,” p. 59.

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balance of power at stake for which reason the invasion of Iraq would be unnecessary and debatably futile. However, to the dismay of many realists, Bush and his Republican hawks instead chose to transform Iraq into a democracy to comply with liberalist democratic peace rhetoric and values that saw the revival of unfavoured neoconservatism. The rhetoric of the democratic peace thesis under the Bush Administration in 2004 for a re-election campaign suggested that the Iraq invasion was justified because it had removed a despot to foster a democratic state for peaceful relations. Bush stated that Washington was going to provide democracy throughout the Middle East, because it lacked freedom and “tyrants” needed crushing to establish a “democratic peace” with assistance “in this cause with…allies” of the “American republic.”103 These speeches were inspired by Kant’s perpetual peace, but as a means to justify war (as the ends that Kant opposed) for peace by encouraging additional republican states.104 The Bush administration believed that both wars in Afghanistan and Iraq supported democracies as rational outcomes that warranted justification the backing from US citizens because democratic peace theory developed into the foundation of American discourse.105 The Bush administration’s rationalisation of war promoted freedom with the purpose to institute a conventional US “liberal-democratic imperialism,” buoyancy in military might and cultural obliviousness.106 A postcolonial critique can be made on democratic peace that reflects the conquests of European colonial powers promoting civilisation (or in contemporary times, democratisation) to control and civilise “natives” or “savages.”107 It has been cynically contended that international law was designed, and continues, to function as a colonial pursuit of imperialism 103 White House Press Releases, “Text of President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union Address,” The Washington Post, January 20, 2004. 104 Although Kant framed perpetual peace to advocate just wars fighting for democracies resulting in eventual peace among democracies, he carefully stressed that the means did not justify the ends and thus stressed that wars cannot be waged under the false pretences of morality (Cecilia Lynch, “Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral Guidance in International Law,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 [March 1994], p. 57). 105 Brent J. Steele, “Liberal-Idealism: A Constructivist Critique,” International Studies Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2007), p. 40. 106 Deudney and Ikenberry, “Realism, Liberalism and the Iraq War,” p. 13. 107 Ramesh Thakur, “R2P After Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers,” The

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May 2013), p. 64.

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by legitimising intervention within former colonies after their independence, which was apparent with Belgium endeavouring to civilise people in the Congo.108 Tusan convincingly argues that humanitarian interventions are linked with international law and collective security with all fixated on cultural imperialism enforced by the West on independent European post-communist states and former African colonies.109 Furthermore, in the Munich Security Conference, Putin expressed the impossibility of “the unipolar model” due to “no moral foundations for modern civilisation” that has resulted in “unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions” with the “United States” overstepping “its national borders” to form “greater disdain for the basic principles of international law.”110 In the contemporary world “no one feels safe” because “international law is” not “a stone wall that will protect them” that “stimulates an arms race.”111 Moreover, in 2011, Russia cast doubts on the international legality of the Obama administration exceeding its authorised United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 from protecting civilians112 to regime change, by helping the rebels oust Libyan President, al-Qaddafi.113 NATO played into realist motives with what Paris identifies as a changing “bait and switch” mandate from civilian protection of an area to regime

108 Kevin Grant, A Civilised Savagery: Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa 1884– 1926 (New York: Routledge, 2004); Kevin Grant, The Congo Free State and the New Imperialism (New York City, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2016). 109 Michelle Tusan, “Humanitarianism, Genocide and Liberalism,” Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2015), p. 100. 110 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” Kremlin, February 10, 2007. 111 Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security

Policy.” 112 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, “Imposes Additional Measures in Connection with the Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” UN Doc. S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011), paras. 3–5. 113 Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 2013), pp. 57–66.

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change.114 Russia abstained from this Resolution because it did not object to protecting civilians but was “played with regime change.”115 On February 17, 2011, protesters clashed with Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi’s security forces. Despite Kuperman’s observations on the exaggeration of Western news sources that discredited al-Qaddafi’s armed forces, within the initial week of protesting, it was reported that many deaths occurred, and Libyan security forces were driven out of Benghazi by rebel forces.116 As a response to the alleged forceful actions of al-Qaddafi’s forces, the United Nations Security Council met to authorise the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Under its third pillar, it was consulted that member states should act nationally and via regional organisations to approve the legitimate use of force as a means to protect Libyan civilians.117 During the decision-making process, all 15 members of the United Nations Security Council voted in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1970 to permit a weapons embargo and prohibit travel for the al-Qaddafi family and Libyan politicians.118 Armed malevolent rebels called for the United Nations to enforce a no-fly zone on the Libyan regime’s military aviation. 114 Roland Paris, “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problems of Preventative Humanitarian Intervention,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 21, No. 5 (October 2014), p. 584. 115 Stephen Martin Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis,” Foreign Policy, January 19, 2022. Kuperman has also argued that al-Qaddafi provided several warnings and initially sprayed non-lethal rubber bullets to demonstrators and only became offensive with the disposal of his national armed forces when retaliating to violent rebellion protestors that “threw petrol bombs” and pardoned if they surrendered their weapons and stayed at home decided to join the government (Alan J. Kuperman, “A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1 (July 2013), pp. 109, 113). Protagonists of the Responsibility to Protect and humanitarian intervention movements have argued that NATO had to change its mandate from lighter sanctions to robust protection of civilians because al-Qaddafi’s armed forces became increasingly offensive in rebellion areas but exceeding the mandate has proved controversial for emerging powers, resulting in vetoes and inaction, in Syria (Thakur, “R2P after Libya and Syria,” pp. 61, 70; Nicholas Idris Erameh, “Humanitarian Intervention, Syria and the Politics of Human Rights Protection,” The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 21, No. 5 [April 2017], p. 517). 116 Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments,” Al Jazeera, 23 August 2011. 117 David Luban, “Will Syria Redefine the Just War?” Just Security, 24 September 2013. 118 UN Security Council Resolution 1970, “On Establishment of a Security Council

Committee to Monitor Implementation of the Arms Embargo Against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” UN Doc. S/RES/1970 (February 26, 2011), adopted 6,491st Meeting.

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This initiative was also braced by African countries, the Arab League, and Li Baodong, the then Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, that supported the viewpoints and apprehensions of African and Arab states.119 Subsequently, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 obligated the Libyan authorities to conform with international law, international humanitarian law and human rights to protect civilians.120 This Security Council Resolution intended to pledge the safety of Libyan civilians “by all means necessary” (connoting the use of military force).121 Moreover, the Resolution created the prohibition on all Libyan flights within their airspace excluding the transportation of humanitarian assistance.122 It also imposed a weapons embargo on Libyan authorities,123 outlawed Libyan owned flights or operated aircraft124 and immobilised the regime’s financial assets, which included associates of the Central Bank of Libya, Foreign Bank and the Libyan National Oil Corporation.125 This Resolution changed from diplomatic procedures to sanctions that were more castigatory by exercising the third pillar of the R2P doctrine as a portion of preventative humanitarian intervention. In relation to the third pillar of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, China had voiced resistance concerning the forcible intervention in Libya and it was reported that Beijing would thwart UN action beyond a no-fly zone.126 Despite this fear, Beijing did not block or abstain passively, but Baodong proclaimed that it was impossible to accomplish peace and protect the territorial sovereignty of Libya with the legitimate use of force.127 The

119 UN Security Council Resolution 1970, “On Establishment of a Security Council Committee.”. 120 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, “Imposes Additional Measures in Connection with the Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” UN Doc. S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011), adopted 6,498th meeting, paras. 3–5. 121 Tim Dunne and Sarah Teitt, “Contested Intervention: China, India, and the Responsibility to Protect,” Global Governance, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July 2015), p. 380. 122 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, paras. 6–7. 123 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, para. 13. 124 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, para. 17. 125 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, para. 19, Annex II. 126 Dunne and Teitt, “Contested Intervention,” pp. 380–381. 127 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, p. 10.

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no-fly zone was mandated to protect the assault of additional civilians but NATO subjugated the airspace by targeting Libyan troops that besieged rebels. This resembled the no-fly zone in Iraq128 that braced the precedent of humanitarian intervention.129 Notwithstanding condemnation and sanctions, the Libyan armed forces hunted the rebellion stronghold, Benghazi, to comply with alQaddafi’s message on March 17, 2011, that “we will find you in your closets.”130 In retaliation, NATO sanctioned the strategy to destroy the regime’s capacity to harm civilians. Unlike the interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the incursion in Libya did begin with an authorised UN mandate to legitimately use force to defend civilians and the role of the United States armed forces was limited to circumvent controlling NATO allies, as in preceding interventions, to allow a European lead. France deemed the Benghazi-based rebels as legitimate and thus provided support. France and Britain held that the Responsibility to Protect should apply to Libya because of the swath of refugees leaving the country from violence that would impend border security.131 Both governments and American scholars debated the consequences of failing to intervene. For example, if the United States did not undertake any action, then it could have hampered the rhetorical support of other Arab uprisings and conceivably undermine pro-democratic movements in bordering Egypt and Tunisia.132 Based on this premise, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron—the then president and prime minister of France and the United Kingdom, respectively—considered that military intervention would be fruitful, relatively low cost and accomplished public and

128 UN Security Council Resolution 688, “Iraq Northern and Southern No-fly Zones,” UN Doc. S/RES/688 (April 5, 1991), adopted 2,982nd meeting. 129 Carsten Stahn, “Between Law-breaking and Law-making: Syria, Humanitarian Intervention and ‘What the Law Ought to Be’,” Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 19, No. 1 (April 2014), p. 31. 130 David D. Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, “Qaddafi Warns of Assault on Benghazi

as UN Vote Nears,” The New York Times, 17 March 2011. 131 Jason W. Davidson, “France, Britain and the Intervention in Libya: An Integrated Analysis,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 2013), pp. 310–329. 132 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Fiddling While Libya Burns,” The New York Times, March 13, 2011.

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oppositional party support.133 The process of decision-making was thus grounded on utilising force to protect the rule of law and human rights and was constrained to terminate violence against innocent civilians with inadequate airpower and a UN mandate to prevent civilian casualties.134 Accordingly, the policy resulted in some coalition states directly arming and supporting Libyan rebels that flouted the 1970 and 1973 UN Security Council Resolutions on the arms embargo, travel ban and freezing of assets.135 Paris deployed light arms and ammunition to rebels located in mountainous areas near Tripoli despite the weapons embargoes on the whole state.136 Doha provided 20,000 tons in ammunition and hundreds of troops to support rebels, which was authorised by Western states.137 The mandate to damage the capacity of al-Qaddafi’s regime to harm civilians caused opposition declared by Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa.138 At this point in time, China, Russia, Brazil, India and Germany expressed their disapproval for military intervention but abstained in the concluding UN Security Council vote.139 Ten members of the United Nations Security Council voted in favour of an intervention without a veto from a permanent member of the Council. This, in turn, authorised the deployment of the United States under Operation Odyssey Dawn and the succeeding NATO Operation United Protector assuming the solitary to begin with bombing. On March 19, 2011, NATO’s multi-state coalition started bombing that also encompassed logistical support from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to defend civilians with French jets and the provision of bombers from America and the United Kingdom.140 Doha utilised F-16s and Washington had deployed EA-18G Growler aircraft from Iraq. To comply with the principles of military necessity, together, the coalition of

133 Davidson, “France, Britain and the Intervention in Libya.” 134 Christopher S. Chivvis, Toppling Gaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Interven-

tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. xv, 4–6. 135 UN Security Council Resolution 1970; UN Security Council Resolution 1973. 136 UN Security Council Resolution 1970; UN Security Council Resolution 1973. 137 Sam Dagher and Charles Levinson, “Tiny Kingdom’s Huge Role in Libya Draws

Concern,” Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2011. 138 Thakur, “R2P after Libya and Syria,” p. 70. 139 UN Security Council Resolution 1973. 140 Al Jazeera, “Battle for Libya: Key Moments.”

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the alliance hit the regime of al-Qaddafi’s weapon storage bases, bunkers tanks and armed forces vehicles to significantly deteriorate Tripoli’s military responses.141 NATO claimed that all purposes of military conduct constituted military targets, but the coalition killed innocent civilians with its bombings and failed to inspect one attack in 2012 that killed 34 civilians and wounded 38 Libyans.142 Although NATO’s coalition and robust intervention was sanctioned by the United Nations, it is questionable whether the intervention attempted to protect civilians or acted as a pretence to support, aid and arm rebels and attack all al-Qaddafi’s military and arms compounds. It could be contended that the coalition heavily supported rebellion forces to enforce the West’s regime change interests that smeared the consensus of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.143 In the aftermath of the alleged illegal interventions in Serbia and Iraq and the change of protecting civilians to arming rebels to topple al-Qaddafi in Libya, Russia parted from the West. The latter criticised Moscow for human rights problems that marked alleged interference in the Kremlin’s domestic affairs. At this point, Russia started cooperating with China and India. As Ziegler has convincingly argued, Russia has aligned with cooperative states to contradict Western norms of limiting non-interference sovereign rights.144 One prime example of this would be of R2P that was utilised for debatable regime change in Libya, which is why Russia and sometimes China have vetoed several draft UN Security Council Resolutions to widely intervene in Syria. For instance, since the 2011 Syrian civil war, Moscow and Beijing vetoed draft UN Security Council Resolutions on numerous occasions, which included a block on 141 Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi, p. 86. Military necessity concerns the justification of

attacking, and attempting to significantly weaken, an oppositional armed force and its facilities, including weapons storage unit, barracks and communications structure—often with powerful weapons—with the objective of attaining a “clear military advantage” (Danny Singh, “Undertaking Critical Legal Theory to Examine Just War Intervention: A Smokescreen for Political Ambitions,” in Comparative Just War Theory: An Introduction to International Perspectives, ed. Luís Cordeiro Rodrigues and Danny Singh (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2020), p. 63). 142 David Luban, “Military Necessity and the Cultures of Military Law,” Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 2013), p. 334. 143 Nuruzzaman, “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Doctrine.” 144 Charles E. Ziegler, “Conceptualising Sovereignty in Russian Foreign Policy: Realist

and Constructivist Perspectives,” International Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (May 2012).

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sanctions in February 2017 against the al-Assad regime for using chemical weapons.145 Previously, in October 2011, a draft resolution condemning Syrian repression of protestors was vetoed by Russia and China, with India, Brazil, South Africa and Lebanon abstaining.146 To further demonstrate support for Moscow, Beijing accentuated that the United Nations Security Council must conform to the sovereign rule of non-interference to respect the Charter of the United Nations.147 Russia, and its allies, remained sceptical regarding the international legality of the United States and NATO with its interventions and Moscow noted that the United States and its NATO allies were attempting to preserve a world order that aimed to disregard Russian interests. Despite America’s world police role and anxiety to demonstrate its might to protect rights of the liberal international order, inconsistency is an issue. The interests may have been higher in North Vietnam, Iraq and Libya and more so than the virtually ignored Rwandan genocide. The latter did not embrace America’s lack of public support for intervention, avoidance of international peace support operations from the United States National Security Council and partially the failure in Somalia a few years earlier.148 The liberal order is thus inconsistent that does not thwart aggression, like with pro-Hutu Juvénal Habyarimana, mainly including his family, the Rwandan armed forces and the Interahamwe against helpless Tutsis.149 The order is selectively protected in which some members receive better protection than others with the remit of international law regarding the political choices of exercising collective security against an aggressor constituting a “threat to the peace.”150 Hence, the debate of

145 United Nations, “Russia, China Block Security Council Action on Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria,” United Nations News, February 28, 2017. 146 United Nations Security Council, “France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution 612,” UN Doc. S/2011/612 (October 4, 2011). 147 Dunne and Teitt, “Contested Intervention,” pp. 383–384. 148 Eric James Szandzik, “President Clinton’s Nonintervention in the Rwanda Geno-

cide: An Analysis of US Presidential Foreign Policy Decisions,” World Affairs, Vol. 185, No. 1 (February 2022), pp. 176–179. 149 Tom Streissguth, Rwanda in Pictures (Minneapolis, MN: Twenty-First Century Books, 2007), pp. 28–29. 150 Martti Koskenniemi, “The Place of Law in Collective Security,” Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1996), p. 464.

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protecting the liberal international order is not a viable argument for the United States to present in relation to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. If the United States cannot police every aggressive state and are inconsistent to act, then it is plausible to argue that America do not want the emergence of a regional hegemon deriving from Eurasia. It is debatable whether Russia would fit this place due to its relatively small economy, internal problems and poor relations with many of its neighbours and narrow supply chain of its massive energy resources. Russia is far from capable of the Soviet Union of achieving its status as Eurasia’s hegemon, which is largely down to the loss of land within Eastern Europe. If Ukraine was defeated, Russia would still be a lot weaker than the former Soviet Union during the Cold War era. The only threat Russia would constitute is the increase in perceived threat levels to encourage further balancing by states pitted against Moscow.151 The invasion has, however, bolstered better relations between two of US foes, Russia and China. The latter has provided military, economic and diplomatic support, which has benefitted Beijing trading and market access across to Eurasia with Moscow. Russia will now attempt to further develop relations with non-Western powers, namely China, but does not want to be China’s “junior partner.”152 The threat of China’s economic growth eventually rivalling the United States suits Beijing’s competitive interests. In sum, US motives do not solely rest on maintaining an impossible liberal international order with the selectivity of involvements, but America do not want the current conflict to spill to NATO states for material and ideational reasons. A war between both nuclear powers would bring potential devastation—or at least bring the threat of doing so into a prolonged balancing war with other powers (such as Russia with China and the United States with new allies beyond NATO members). Few have assumed that US-armed forces and Russian nuclear weapons will be deployed, but further escalation cannot be disregarded.153 Former American Secretary of State, Henry Alfred Kissinger, argues that the United States would not want Russia to form a stronger and enduring alliance

151 Shifrinson, “What is America’s Interest in the Ukraine War?”. 152 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 10. 153 Mearsheimer, “Playing with Fire in Ukraine.”

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with China because both Moscow and Beijing perceive Kyiv’s admission calls into NATO a fault created by Washington.154 During the war, Moscow has formed further amicable relations with Beijing that could pit a “Sino-Russian bloc” against the West.155 China has been supportive of Russia’s dilemma with Ukraine moving towards the West and thus Beijing thinks that the United States has set a moral standard concerning Ukraine.156 A new multipolar world that comprises Russia and China in “leadership roles” and despite the alleged fault of the West, and namely NATO, if “Russian power recedes, the West should capitalise” to reshape a European environment “to protect NATO members, allies and partners.”157 The failure of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan from late 2001 until summer 2021 proved American “weakness” and if they lose their support of the war in Ukraine, it would result in “an even greater loss of American influence and to global power balances changes to favour Russia and China.”158 Based on this fear of Moscow and Beijing rivalry to the United States, the same desires of expanding NATO commence, which disregards the initial arguments made by Kissinger, Mearsheimer and Walt. As explained by defensive neorealism , unipolarity is not sustainable because rival powers can balance against an alleged hegemon. This point is evident with the fear of bolstered Russian and Chinese relations to counterbalance the United States as the global hegemon. The United States requires the functionality of NATO’s balancing of power against Russia and Moscow’s potential additional aggression and future incursions. At the same time, as explained from a defensive neorealism perspective, this war could result in another Cold War of two-blocs fighting for power with Russia and China against the United States and its Western allies.159 154 Henry Alfred Kissinger, “Kissinger: US at Edge of War with Russia, China,” Al

Mayadeen, August 13, 2022. 155 Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine Is a Watershed.” 156 Maria Repnikova, “Russia’s War in Ukraine and the Fractures in Western Soft

Power,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy (October 2022). 157 Fix and Kimmage, “Putin’s Last Stand.” 158 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 3. 159 The bigger threat to America is China, rather than Russia, because Beijing can grow

stronger with its access to the Eurasian market and thus Washington will have to weaken that relationship as in the 1970s with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger (Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine is a Watershed”).

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Although it is unlikely that both the United States and Russia will go to war, America and its NATO allies cannot afford to misallocate its resources and time into this conflict that could see Russia build towards its regional Eurasian hegemonic status.160 Walt has stressed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could have been avoided if the United States and allies of Europe had not pushed “liberal idealism” and “relied” on realism, then “the crisis” and previous capture of Crimea would not have occurred.161 Therefore, from a realist perspective, it could be argued that the United States would need to avoid expanding the liberal international order and instead exercise patient containment to avert great powers warring. Due to these perceived threats of Russia undermining the authority of NATO to contain Moscow’s rise as a Eurasian hegemon, the United States has encouraged international disapproval of the incursion and global solidarity with mainly economic sanctions pitted against Moscow.

References Al

Jazeera. “Battle for Libya: Key Moments.” Al Jazeera, August 23, 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/8/23/battle-for-libyakey-moments. Applebaum, Anne. “As War Drags on in Ukraine, is it Time to Talk Compromise? WBUR, June 21, 2022, https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2022/06/21/ukr aine-russia-america-conflict-war-over-applebaum. Ashford, Emma. “The Persistence of Great-Power Politics: What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Geopolitical Rivalry.” February 20, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/persistence-great-power-politics. Austin III, Lloyd James. “Austin Says US Wants to See Russia’s Military Capabilities Weakened.” CNN , April 25, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/ 04/25/politics/blinken-austin-kyiv-ukraine-zelensky-meeting/index.html. Barnes, Joe. “Finland and Sweden Should Not be Allowed to Join NATO, Says Turkey.” The Telegraph, May 13, 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/worldnews/2022/05/13/turkish-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-opposes-finlandsweden/. Biden, Jr., Joseph Robinette. “Biden Says it ‘Remains to be Seen’ Whether Ukraine Will be Admitted to NATO.” NBC News, June 14, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/biden-says-itremains-be-seen-if-ukraine-will-be-n1270807. 160 Shifrinson, “What is America’s Interest in the Ukraine War?” 161 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.”

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CHAPTER 5

Russian Responses, the Invasion, Sanctions and International Law

Now that a historical analysis of NATO and the contestations between Russia and Ukraine have been reached, the book now reaches an analysis of the invasion. It analyses Russia’s retaliation of Ukraine’s national security interests and intentions to join NATO, the February 2022 invasion, a just war debate, international condemnation and sanctions and contravention of international law.

Russian Retaliation As a response to Ukraine’s support for Georgia, liberal EU trade reforms and later objectives to join NATO, Russia reacted. In January 2009, Russia shut off natural gas supplies with Ukraine due to a price dispute to retaliate against the Ukrainian leader, at that time, Yushchenko, diplomatically supporting “Georgia in the August 2008 war” and to demonstrate dissatisfaction within Ukraine.1 To settle the dispute and Russian antagonism, an alleged fairer Ukrainian presidential election in 1 Elias Götz, “Neorealism and Russia’s Ukraine Policy, 1991—Present,” Contemporary Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2016), p. 312. The October 2008 Georgian intervention and gas crisis with Ukraine has resulted in a constrained relationship between Russia and the European Union (Joan DeBardeleben, “Applying Constructivism to Understanding EU-Russian Relations,” International Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4 [March 2012], pp. 418– 419).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Singh, The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34163-2_5

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2010 commenced. The election favoured the Russian friendly president, Yanukovych. Yanukovych attempted to balance between the West and Russia to engage closer proximity to the European Union, but Kyiv’s political system lacked democratic rules, freedoms and human rights and its economic and political system remained influenced by “oligarchic networks.”2 Yanukovych shelved the NATO MAP to retain Ukraine’s non-aligned status. In February 2013, Ukrainian parliament approved a free trade and political association agreement with the European Union. On March 30, 2012, Ukraine was almost brought near to the European Union and its standards. An association agreement would have implemented most EU laws and formed the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) for Ukraine.3 Yet, in late November 2013, Yanukovych suddenly declined to sign these EU agreements at its Vilnius Summit because Kyiv was in the process of signing a customs treaty deal with Moscow instead to appease Russian interests.4 A few days prior to the Vilnius Summit, Kyiv issued a presidential decree to suspend its signature, which was influenced by its large economic relationship with Russia.5 At this time, Ukraine’s economy was declining which is why Yanukovych opted to reject the EU’s accession agreement and take Russia’s more lucrative offer.6 This was marked with the initially non-political and peaceful Revolution of Dignity (Maidan Revolution) (comprising protests against the abuse of power, political corruption, police brutality, influential oligarchs and anti-protest laws) that then called

2 Ryszard Zi˛eba, Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy: Problems of Compatibility with the Changing International Order (Cham: Springer, 2020), p. 181. 3 Zi˛eba, Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy, p. 181. 4 Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, “How to Avoid a New Cold War,” Current

History, Vol. 113, No. 765 (October 2014), p. 268; Arman Grigoryan, “Selective Wilsonianism: Material Interests and the West’s Support for Democracy,” International Security, Vol. 44, No. 4 (April 2022), pp. 158–200. 5 The signature by Yanukovych would have ended its dependence on Moscow and the new association agreement would have forced Kyiv to engage in high costing political and market reforms in relation to the European Union’s democratic standards (Zi˛eba, Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy, p. 181). 6 Stephen Martin Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis,” Foreign Policy, January 19, 2022.

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for Yanukovych’s resignation after “government-organised violence.”7 Yanukovych was driven out of power in February 2014 by several thousand protestors with riot police namely in Kyiv’s Independence Square.8 During the Revolution, the clashes between protesters and the riot police caused the death of 108 protestors and 13 police officers.9 The ousting of Yanukovych not personally aggravate Moscow, but the new Ukrainian government’s pledge “to sign the European Union association agreement” was backed by the European Union and US politicians that numerously travelled and supported the Maidan demonstrators.10 However, due to the West favouring the coup and the United States wanting to help select Yanukovych’s successor, Russia believed that this marked a Westernbacked colour revolution.11 Western support of Yanukovych’s ousting stirred Russia to support a rebellion in the Russian-speaking Donbass area of eastern Ukraine, specifically within the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.12 It can be contended that Ukraine had followed Georgia’s path with the Maidan Revolution to overthrow the pro-Russian regime, and Yanukovych, but Russia again grabbed land—this time, Crimea and intervened in the Donbass region. Late February 2014, Yanukovych and the parliamentary opposition agreed to form a transitional government resulting in the withdrawal of police from Kyiv and a majority vote to remove him from office. Although it has been argued that Russia was allegedly invited by “the democratically elected (although by then ousted) Yanukovych to initially justify Moscow’s decision to militarily intervene in Crimea in March 2014,13 there is little evidence to suggest that Yanukovych requested Russia to annex Crimea. On March 18, 2014, Putin stated in the Russian Duma that it had specific reasons for undertaking this annexation to protect 7 Dmitry Gorenburg, “Editor’s Introduction—The Maidan: A Ukrainian Revolution,” Russian Politics & Law, Vol. 53, No. 3 (September 2015), p. 1. 8 Charap and Shapiro, “How to Avoid a New Cold War,” pp. 268–269. 9 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Accountability

for Killings in Ukraine from January 2014 to May 2016 (Geneva: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2016), p. 9. 10 Götz, “Neorealism and Russia’s Ukraine Policy,” p. 314. 11 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.” 12 Feinstein and Pirro, “Testing the World Order.” 13 Erika de Wet, Military Assistance on Request and the Use of Force (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 6.

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Russian-speaking civilians and Ukrainians—“nationalists, neo-Nazis…and anti-Semites” as “heirs of [Stepan] Bandera, [Adolf] Hitler’s accomplice during World War II” executing the “coup” wanting change “resorted to terror, murder and riots.”14 Putin claimed that the coup in Kiev was orchestrated by neo-Nazis, antisemites, nationalists and anti-Russians with descendants tracing to Adolf Hitler.15 Therefore, Yanukovych’s opinion was not a main factor because Russia deemed the coup illegal. Putin claimed that Russia acted to protect the self-determination of Crimea and Crimeans held that fundamental rights just like Kosovo did.16 However, the United States supported the coup and, according to Mearsheimer, from an offensive realist position, it is Western leaders promoting NATO enlargement, democracy and EU expansion that aggravated inevitable Russian military intervention.17 By spreading democracy, the United States promoted NATO’s enlargement policy.18 Russian scholar, Dmitri Vitalyevich Trenin, argues that Russia felt betrayed by Western partners due to support for “regime change” that was met with Moscow intervening “to protect its vital interests” and perceived by the West “as aggression by a revisionist power.”19 In a famous lecture, Mearsheimer similarly contends that Putin did not accept the balance of power framed by the United States and NATO allies to Ukraine so acted to annex Crimea in 2014.20 Waltz’s defensive neorealist balance of

14 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, “Full Text and Analysis of Putin’s Crimea Speech,” The Nation, March 19, 2014. 15 Simon Tisdall, “Vladimir Putin’s Message to the West: Russia Is Back,” The Guardian, March 18, 2014. 16 Tisdall, “Vladimir Putin’s Message to the West.” 17 John Joseph Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal

Delusions that Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 5 (September–October 2014), p. 80. 18 Charles A. Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine Is a Watershed. Time for America to Get Real,” The New York Times, April 11, 2022. 19 Dmitri Vitalyevich Trenin, The Ukraine Crisis and the Resumption of Great-Power Rivalry (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Centre, July 2014), p. 1. 20 Russia had seized Crimea and there is “no way they’re doing to ever let Crimea

become a NATO base and remember the name of the game here is to make Ukraine part of NATO not happening and” Russia “have taken Crimea” and are willing “to wreck Ukraine so that it can’t be part of the West.” The motivations rest on Russia being “a great power and it has absolutely no interest in allowing the United States and its [NATO] allies to take a big piece of real estate of great strategic importance on its Western border

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power theory specifies the pressures that states are subjected to without explaining the actions of states, thus forming uncertainty and fear.21 As Khudoley highlights, the events of 2014 and the aftermath marked the “Cool War” (that differed from the Cold War that was global war based on global confrontation to defeat oppositional “socio-political” systems) of the West attempting to change Russian policy and challenge its economy with sanctions.22 At this point, Russia faced a security dilemma of having a colossal client state of external powers, via NATO’s Western alliance, on its doorstep.23 The West ignored Russia’s previous concerns with the eastern expansionist policy of NATO since the end of the Cold War and contemporary anger of NATO knocking on its back door, with the prospect of Ukraine joining the alliance.24 NATO enlarging members eastward threatened Russia and Ukraine continued pursuing a Western-backed democracy that undermined Russian principal strategic interests.25 This left Moscow with little choice but to adopt offensive neorealist pressure on Kyiv to avert a “nightmare scenario of being completely pushed out of Ukraine by the West and its institutions.”26 Realpolitik is relevant regarding Ukraine’s ousting of Yanukovych that was met with Putin’s desire to revive the post-Soviet empire by seizing part of Ukraine within an area feared to “host a NATO naval base.”27 Trenin postulated that Moscow’s intervention was “highly professional” to separate Crimea from Kyiv and return it to Moscow that was potentially a strategic move since 2008 when Yushchenko “appealed to NATO” for the Ukrainian NATO MAP

and incorporate it into the West” (John Joseph Mearsheimer, “Why Is Ukraine the West’s Fault?” Lecture, September 25, 2015, 24–25 minutes). 21 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York City, NY: McGrawHill, 1979). 22 Konstantin Konstantinowitsch Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation: War of Attrition or Escalation?” Strategic Analysis (November 2022), p. 2. 23 Götz, “Neorealism and Russia’s Ukraine Policy,” p. 303. 24 Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine Is a Watershed.” 25 Richard Ned Lebow, “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War,” Analyse & Kritik, Vol. 44, No. 1 (July 2022), p. 130. 26 Charap and Shapiro, “How to Avoid a New Cold War,” p. 270. 27 Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” p. 77.

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warranting its accession.28 Russia’s fear of “NATO presence” in Crimea was coupled with Moscow’s pledge to help most Crimean residents who deemed “themselves Russians,” meaning that it could not “retreat.”29 In other words, and from a constructivist explanation, Putin believed that Crimea held stronger cultural ties with Russia rather than Ukraine. Simultaneously, the defensive neorealist balance of power theory explains the hostile relations and war between Russia and Ukraine but does not indicate that Putin is a rational actor and an imperialist.30 Consequently, in mid-March 2014, Moscow annexed Crimea.31 Under structural realism, Russia invaded Ukraine to balance the eastward expansionist objectives of NATO. This, at face value, can initially blame the 2008 Bucharest Summit declaring that Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become NATO members and the West applauding the ousting of Yanukovych. The seizure of Crimea was justified by Putin to protect Russian-speaking people in Ukraine from Kyiv’s “fascist junta” and to return Russian “sacred” land back to its mainland.32 Putin had thus justified annexing Crimea with a “sacred” cause to reclaim this land wrongly surrendered in 1954.33 In this particular context, Wittgenstein’s language games (critical constructivism) can explain how Putin has created a social reality of myths such as land initially belonging to Ukraine, genocide being committed by Ukrainians against Russian identities in eastern Ukraine, and decommunisation and de-Nazification for Russians to obey and support the intervention. It could be contended that Putin intertwined material gains with ideological factors. As Barkin has argued, material politics and rationality that inform foreign policy

28 Dmitri Vitalyevich Trenin, “Russia’s Goal in Ukraine Remains the Same: Keep NATO

Out,” Al Jazeera America, June 2, 2014. 29 Alexander Lukin, “Chauvinism or Chaos: Russia’s Unpalatable Choice,” Russian Social Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 6 (December 2020), p. 458. 30 Pierre Haroche, “Whose Backyard? Realism and the Shifting Balance of Stakes in Ukraine,” London School of Economics and Political Science, January 9, 2023, p. 2. 31 Sten Rynning, “The False Promise of Continental Concert: Russia, the West and the Necessary Balance of Power,” International Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 3 (May 2015), p. 543. 32 Alexander Motyl, “Five Fatal Flaws in Realist Analysis of Russia and Ukraine,” The Washington Post, March 3, 2015. 33 Tisdall, “Vladimir Putin’s Message to the West.”

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and power politics from classical realism can meet with ideas and social construction that inform structures and agents from constructivism.34 Further material factors can be addressed. Crimea and Abkhazia contain long shorelines in the Black Sea region due to transport to the Mediterranean Sea for accessing Syria that is Russia’s sole client state in the Middle East that is mainly dominated and influenced by the United States.35 Moscow felt apprehensive with NATO’s eastward expansion to challenge its hegemonic status in the Black Sea.36 Russia’s attempts to gain further relative power in the Middle East can be explained from offensive neorealism. Perry argued that the rapid expansion of NATO that reached Russia’s border and former President George Walker Bush’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were awful decisions made by American leaders.37 With NATO’s eastward movement of expansionism, the United States continued to strive for missile defence policy in Russia’s neighbouring countries, which namely included Ukraine.38 The West is also against Russia’s invasion because it violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum providing Ukraine the respect of its sovereignty and independence of other states refraining from intervention and using force in Ukraine in exchange to relinquish its estimated 1,900 nuclear warheads inherited from the dissolved Soviet Union.39 In April 2014, the Donbass War was escalated with the establishment of Russian-speaking breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk states in east Ukraine to place “Russian armed forces inside Ukraine.”40 These separatist groups remained supported by Russian troops, irregular combatants and traditional military support (as a hybrid approach) with the purpose

34 J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 7. 35 Babak Rezvani, “Russian Foreign Policy and Geopolitics in the Post-Soviet Space and

the Middle East: Tajikistan, Georgia, Ukraine and Syria,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 56, No. 6 (July 2020), p. 889. 36 Rezvani, “Russian Foreign Policy,” p. 889. 37 William James Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford, CA: Stanford

Security Studies, 2015). 38 Tisdall, “Vladimir Putin’s Message to the West.” 39 Steven Pifer, “Why Care About Ukraine and the Budapest Memorandum,” Brookings,

December 5, 2019. 40 Trenin, The Ukraine Crisis, p. 7; Paul Kirby, “Donbass: Why Russia Is Trying to Encircle Ukraine’s East,” BBC News, May 4, 2022.

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of destabilising the Donbass region. Moscow deployed Russian special forces to insulate the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine by neutralising Ukraine’s garrison and helping pro-Russian Crimeans to control the local parliament, government and law enforcement agencies, enabling a referendum and “reunification with Russia.”41 This was met with a Ukrainian Anti-Terrorist Operation, later replaced by the Joint Operation Force, to fight terrorists supported by Russia to subvert eastern Ukraine.42 This retaliation altered Russia’s approach to begin shelling Ukrainian posts and then invading the region to protect Russian-speaking people that helped Donetsk and Luhansk insurgents regain most of the territory that had been lost during Ukraine’s counterterrorist intervention. To bring an end to the Donbass War, the Minsk Protocol was established in September 2014 to bring an immediate cessation of hostilities that was also signed by the leaders of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics alongside Ukraine, Russia and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Conflict continued and the agreement was updated and mediated by France and Germany in February 2015 to also withdraw heavy weapons from battle, release and exchange prisoners of war and constitutionally reform Ukraine for the self-government of some Donbass areas and reinstate border control to Ukraine.43 The Minsk Agreements were authorised by the United Nations Security Council but were not implemented.44 Therefore, fighting continued and the provisions of both agreements failed. After the removal of Yanukovych who exiled to Russia, the transitional government headed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk was declared illegitimate by Russia, but it signed the European Union trade and political association agreement to reduce tariffs to benefit “the import of goods” and disbanded the riot police.45 The popular Petro Oleksiyovych Poroshenko

41 Trenin, The Ukraine Crisis, p. 6. 42 Hanna Shelest, “After the Ukrainian Crisis: Is There a Place for Russia?” Southeast

European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (August 2015), p. 191. 43 Reuters, “Factbox: What Are the Minsk Agreements on the Ukraine Conflict?” Reuters, February 21, 2022. 44 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 5. 45 Guillaume Van der Loo, A New Legal Instrument for EU Integration without

Membership (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2016), p. 117.

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won the 2014 Ukraine parliamentary elections.46 Poroshenko removed civil servants affiliated with Yanukovych’s regime and began decommunising Ukraine by approving laws to outlaw communist symbols, such as Lenin’s monuments, and rename places initially related to communist themes.47 Putin’s retention of Syria functioning as a client state in the Middle East can be explained. After the initial four years of the Syrian civil war, Syria had lost Aleppo, Deir Az Zor, Deraa, Idlib and Quneitra and was under the additional threat of losing rural areas in Damascus alongside Hama, and Homs to the oppositional rebels.48 Consequently, late September 2015, President Bashar al-Assad requested Moscow’s intervention to destroy terrorists and rebels that reclaimed territory from opposition militiamen.49 Russia openly intervened as “payback” for America’s illegal intervention in Iraq and its role with NATO allies resulting in regime change in Libya.50 This intervention formed a “patron-client relationship” between Putin and al-Assad for Russia to access “gas and phosphate” in Syria in exchange for military and diplomatic support for the retention of al-Assad’s power.51 Russian political scientist, Khudoley, has convincingly argued that Russia has unsettled European strategic 46 Roy Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules,” International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6 (November 2014), p. 1265. 47 Marci Shore, The Ukrainian Night: An Intimate History of Revolution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), pp. 225–226. 48 Mariya Petkova, “What Has Russia Gained from Five Years of Fighting in Syria?” Reuters, October 1, 2020. 49 Andrew Osborn and Phil Stewart, “Russia Begins Syria Air Strikes in Its Biggest Mideast Intervention in Decades,” Reuters, September 30, 2015. 50 Philip Short, Putin: His Life and Times (New York City, NY: Vintage, 2022). 51 Haian Dukhan, “From Syria to Ukraine: Why Desperate Mercenaries Fight for

Putin,” Harmoon Centre for Contemporary Studies, April 1, 2022. Russia has since used Syrian mercenaries in eastern Aleppo—with the Al Beri clan—and in June 2021 deployed them in the Central African Republic. This was to support the Bangui administration against a rebel coalition (Pauline Bax, “Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic.” International Crisis Group, December 3, 2021). Prior to this, Russia appointed Syrian fighters to help the Moscow-aligned ex-warlord, General Khalifa Haftar, militarily and politically in Libya’s civil war against a UN-supported government as part of Western interests “to restore stability” (James M. Dorsey, China and The Middle East: Venturing into the Malestrom [Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019], p. 34). Therefore, Russia has used Syrian fighters as part of their patron-client base from the successful 2015 intervention in Syrian to pursue Moscow’s geopolitical interests.

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stability with the 2014 Ukraine crisis and 2015 intervention in Syria to reach disharmonious and suspicious relations between Moscow and the European Union.52 Other signs of a thorough Russian incursion in Ukraine escalated. Due to Zelenskyy’s continued commitment to join NATO, in December 2021, Putin condemned NATO’s activity in Eastern Europe speculating that the United States contained missiles next to Russia and asked, “how would the Americans react if missiles were placed at the border with Canada or Mexico?”53 Russia demanded that the United States and NATO allies abandoned NATO’s expansionist policy and supply of military action in Ukraine, Central Asia and the South Caucasus.54 NATO is a defensive security alliance but the aggregation of military power around Russia’s borders is not what Moscow “understandably” wants because the United States has tried to keep great powers away from its borders.55 As with the 1962 Cuban missiles crisis that brought both great Cold War superpowers to war when the Soviet Union deployed its forces and missiles with America reacting, the same should be respected with Russia’s objection of Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Therefore, Putin signalled preparedness to intervene in Ukraine if NATO continued with further European accession. Ned Price, the United States Department of State Spokesperson, claimed that if Russia deploys its military might to Latin America, then Washington would “respond swiftly and decisively.”56 Even with a small threat during the Cold War deriving from the ruling Communist Sandinistas in Nicaragua (that contained a population smaller than New York City and thus constituted a tiny country) resulted in President Ronald

52 Konstantin Konstantinowitsch Khudoley. “Russia and the European Union: The Present Rift and Chances for Future Reconciliation.” Stosunki Mi˛edzynarodowe—International Relations, Vol. 52, No. 2 (May 2016), pp. 195–213. 53 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin cited in Andrew Roth, “Putin Accuses West of ‘Coming with Its Missiles to Our Doorstep’,” The Guardian, December 23, 2021. 54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Agreement on Measures to

Ensure the Security of The Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, December 17, 2021. 55 Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine Is a Watershed.” 56 Edward Chase Price, “Department Press Briefing—January 27, 2022,” US Depart-

ment of State, January 27, 2022.

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Reagan organising a rebel force to overthrow the socialist regime.57 Mearsheimer similarly stresses that the United States has “a Monroe Doctrine” to ensure that “the Western hemisphere is our backyard and nobody from a distant region is allowed to move military forces into the Western hemisphere.”58 This was illustrated with the United States reacting to Russia deploying its troops “in Cuba” during the missile crisis because “nobody puts military forces in the Western hemisphere, that’s what the Monroe Doctrine is all about.”59 On the basis of the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States shall continue to undertake collective action if an external power imposes a threat within the Western hemisphere, and indeed within their borders. If the United States was worried about a small country like Nicaragua, then it is understandable why Russia felt uncertain about Ukraine with NATOs eastward enlargement policy. NATO adds new members if all other parties agree but continued eastward to further raise Moscow’s uncertainty. It is useful to point out that under Article 10 of the NATO Treaty, the alliance may invite a European country to join if it is able “to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty” and given that all pre-existing members agree to its accession. Based on this clause, NATO should not press potential European countries to join the alliance if it is to raise insecurity by threatening Russia. Based on the pretence of great powers exercising collective action, Putin claimed that Ukraine was supported to attack the Donbass area that resulted in Russia stationing 100,000 troops, artillery, and tanks within Ukraine’s border.60 In January 2022, Russian troops were deployed in

57 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.” 58 Mearsheimer, “Why Is Ukraine the West’s Fault?” Lecture, 25 minutes. President

James Monroe established the Monroe Doctrine in December 1823 as American foreign policy to oppose European colonialism with any intervention of external powers within the Western hemisphere constituting hostility and potential contravention of peace and security against the United States (Mark T. Gilderhus, “The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 [March 2006], p. 8). 59 If “a powerful China” formed “a military alliance with Canada and Mexico and moving Chinese military forces onto Canadian and Mexican soil and us [the United States] just saying this is no problem we’re all twenty-first century people and worrying about Chinese forces” is “not going to happen” due to the ethos of the Monroe Doctrine (Mearsheimer, “Why Is Ukraine the West’s Fault?” Lecture, 25 minutes). 60 Samuel Charap, “How to Break the Cycle of Conflict with Russia,” Foreign Affairs, February 7, 2022.

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allied Belarus for military training exercises and in retaliation, the United States donated $200 million for Kyiv’s security assistance and condemned the potential Russian invasion of Ukraine. At this time, the deployment of Russian troops and tanks at Ukraine’s border were efforts to ensure that NATO would not expand eastwards.61 The United States and the United Kingdom warned Russia of its potential attack on Ukraine.62 Subsequently, NATO placed troops on standby and Russian military exercises expanded to 6,000 troops and stationed 60 jets near Ukraine and in Crimea. Mearsheimer convincingly argues that Washington pursued “policies towards” Kyiv “that Putin and his colleagues see as existential threat to their country”, which is namely “America’s obsession with bringing Ukraine into NATO and making it a Western bulwark on Russia’s border.”63 He thus blames Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and the current 2022 incursion on the West with its NATO expansionist policy that resulted in Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the full escalation of the war.64 The security dilemma of US support and NATO expansionism to further contain Russia had resulted in Putin adopting offensive realism to seek security by maximising power. On February 17, 2022, fighting ignited in the separatist areas of Donetsk and Luhansk located in eastern Ukraine. Four days later, Putin recognised the independence of both pro-Russian Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic that was followed by initial NATO endorsed economic sanctions.65 The leader of the Luhansk People’s Republic, Leonid Pasechnik, has suggested that it might hold a vote to ask voters if they agree to make the region part of Russia. The Kremlin’s support in Donetsk has also proved a strategic move for Russia to significantly weaken eastern Ukraine.

61 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.” 62 Nadia Kaneva, Alina Dolea and Ilan Manor, “Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding

in the Wake of the Russia-Ukraine War,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy (January 2023). 63 John Joseph Mearsheimer, “The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War,”

Lecture, The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, June 6, 2022. 64 Mearsheimer, “John Mearsheimer on Putin’s Ambitions After Nine Months of War;” Freddie Sayers, “John Mearsheimer: We’re Playing Russian Roulette,” UnHerd, November 30, 2022. 65 John Psaropoulos, “Timeline: A Month of Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Al Jazeera, March 23, 2022.

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Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February 2022 Hostile relations between Ukraine and Russia are evident since the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity marking protests against Yanukovych. This was followed by the Kremlin’s occupation of Crimea from Ukraine, Kyiv’s national security strategy to join NATO and Russia supporting Donetsk and Luhansk separatist combatants in eastern Ukraine sparking the Donbass War. Inevitably, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022.66 The invasion undermined the preservation of the liberal international order that antagonised Russia to ruthlessly attempt to place Ukraine back under its control.67 Russia invaded Ukraine once more to block its NATO accession objectives.68 In a special televised address, Putin explained the objective of the invasion that is termed as a Special Military Operation. Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov, stated that one of the objectives of the Operation was to terminate “NATO’s unlimited expansion and to keep the United States and other NATO countries from achieving total domination in the world arena.”69 Putin claimed that he had met the request of the “people’s republics of Donbass…to hold a Special Military Operation…to protect the people that are subjected to abuse, genocide from the Kyiv regime for eight years” and to “de-Nazify” and “demilitarise Ukraine” that have “committed bloody crimes against peaceful people, including Russian nationals.”70 Putin initiated its Special Military Operation to protect these Russian nationals facing eight years of “humiliation and genocide” by demilitarising Ukraine and bringing those to justice that killed Russian citizens.71

66 Thomas Kingsley and Joe Sommerlad, “Why Did Russia Invade Ukraine? The

Conflict Explained?” The Independent, May 9, 2022. 67 Kupchan, “Putin’s War in Ukraine Is a Watershed.” 68 Walt has convincingly argued that Russia’s “vital interest” of “Ukraine’s geopolitical

alignment” that Moscow is attempting “to defend” by “force” needs to be understood and accepted (Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis”). 69 Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Interview with Rossiya Television Network,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, April 11, 2022. 70 TASS: Russian News Agency, “Decision Taken on Denazification, Demilitarisation of Ukraine—Putin,” TASS, February 24, 2022. 71 TASS, “Decision Taken on Denazification, Demilitarisation of Ukraine—Putin.”

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During this time, Putin retaliated to Ukrainian decommunisation stating that it suited Russia well and what it “would mean for Ukraine” by reclaiming lands allegedly “robbed” from Russia after dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.72 The Rodina translates as Russia’s motherland that was taken by enemies when the Soviet Union fell and the CIS did not hold the ex-Soviet lands together, but betrayed them.73 Putin has claimed that the West, with the use of NATO, is attempting to rewrite history by planting “myths” and thus “partially responsible for the situation in Ukraine.”74 It can be contended that some of the Putin regime’s comments suggest that something other than material or power politics is driving Russian actions. These include but are not limited to identity (“Ukraine has never existed”), imperialism (“we are taking back what is ours”) and ideology (the de-Nazification discourse). Putin mixed religion, namely of the Russian Orthodox Church, and politics to create the discourse and symbolism of one: government, nation, religion, identity and civilisation.75 Russians and Ukrainians being one united community is socially constructed and contradictory. As stressed by Anatoly Sobchak, the Mayor of St. Petersburg, the Soviet Union must remain a single state and the breakaway of Ukraine was a “threat” because it could possess nuclear weapons.76 Putin shares the same ethos that some of the territories that were transferred to Ukraine was illegal. Moscow and Putin also take the views of General Anton Denikin and Zbigniew Brzezinski seriously on Ukraine never being permitted to separate from Russia or else Moscow would lose its Eurasian hegemonic empire. Moscow believes that the West are attempting to transform Ukraine into an anti-Russian state that must be stopped.77 Putin has claimed that Ukraine is not Russia’s neighbour, but an important segment 72 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Putin’s Recognition of Ukraine’s Rebels Ups Ante in Crisis,”

Associated Press News, February 21, 2022. 73 Tisdall, “Vladimir Putin’s Message to the West.” 74 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, “Putin Says the West Is Trying to Re-write History,”

Bloomberg, November 15, 2022. 75 Roland Benedikter, “The Role of Religion in Russia’s Ukraine War. Part 1: A Map of the Situation,” Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Journal for Foreign and Security Policy), Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 2022). 76 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” The President of Russia, July 12, 2021. 77 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 6.

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of Russia’s historical, cultural and spiritual space.78 Based on these assertions, the war is based on the motive of spirit with the goal of esteem to fulfil honour.79 Putin has used this discourse and ideology to wage war against the brother territorial status of Ukraine that has always been placed within Russia’s circle of civilisation.80 It has been argued that Putin wants to recreate a Russian empire reminiscent of the Soviet Union by annexing Ukraine or with pro-Russian “puppet-regimes” resulting in the prevention of pro-EU revolutions and anti-Russian military coups.81 Putin believes the West defeated the Soviet Union and the United States, with its NATO allies, is attempting to weaken Russian again so it invaded Ukraine as revenge.82 This thinking is reminiscent of the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution that ousted pro-Russian Yanukovych. Lebow has contended that Russia is angry with its inferior position than the Soviet Union and it is Western democracy that is weakening Moscow. This is the reason why Ukraine’s press for pro-Western democracy must be halted by Russia. Putin and Russian nationalists do not consider Ukraine as a distinct nation and Putin, reminiscent of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin brutally suppressing Ukrainian nationalism in 1919, has “reannexed Crimea” and militarily supported Russian nationalists in eastern Ukrainian breakaway states.83 From a Western perspective, it is viable to argue that mainstream perceptions in eastern countries, including Russia, provides one-sided propaganda and a strategic narrative on justifying Russia as good and Ukraine as bad. Moscow has attempted to accomplish the war by addressing Ukrainian right-wing nationalism and entrenched roots with Nazism (Bandera and the Azov Battalion serve as examples), which helps to validate the invasion and imperialism with the war objective being

78 Anna Reid, “Putin’s War on History: The Thousand Year Struggle over Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2022. 79 Lebow, “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War,” pp. 117, 128. 80 Benedikter, “The Role of Religion in Russia’s Ukraine War.” 81 Hein Goemans, “Why Does Ukraine Want Russia?” University of Rochester News Centre, February 25, 2022. 82 Lebow, “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War,” p. 128. 83 Lebow, “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War,” p. 128.

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the extinction of the Ukrainian nation (that according to Moscow has historically and culturally belonged to Russia).84 However, Mearsheimer would refute this claim of Russian imperialism because by invading Ukraine, because Putin is not attempting to replicate Soviet imperialist expansion.85 According to him, Putin is not interested in defeating, conquering and controlling Ukraine to integrate it “into a greater Russia,” but Western military (and humanitarian) support from the West is compelling for Ukraine.86 Based on Mearsheimer’s argument, it can be contended that the conflict concerns a balance of power politics rather than the creation of a greater Russia. Putin recognised Ukraine’s nationalism and sovereign status so did not intend to conquer it and integrate it with a greater Russia.87 In this lengthy essay, Putin claimed that Russia is not “anti-Ukraine,” and that “true sovereignty of Ukraine” is only feasible “in partnership with Russia” rather than the “direct external control” that includes the “deployment of NATO infrastructure” and the alliance’s “exercises in Ukraine.”88 Russia’s political narratives of Ukraine rest on the imagination of Ukraine as a family member that must respect Moscow as a big brother or father figure.89 Putin sees Ukraine linguistically and culturally similar to Russia, with Kiev being the initial capital of the mainland and a sacred importance deemed by Russian Orthodox Christians, and possesses good “grain and industrial production” as a strategic location.90 Similarly, Trenin contends that Russia’s Special Military Operation does not seek to annex additional territory, but wants to cease NATO’s

84 A parallel of Russia’s narratives to justify the invasion of Ukraine can be contrasted with America’s strategic liberal narrative to intervene in Iraq because a realist is not obliged to buy either Russian or American narratives. 85 Mearsheimer, “John Mearsheimer on Putin’s Ambitions After Nine Months of War.” 86 Mearsheimer, “John Mearsheimer on Putin’s Ambitions After Nine Months of War.” 87 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,”

The President of Russia, July 12, 2021. 88 Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.” 89 Yulia Kurnyshova and Andrey Makarychev, “Explaining Russia’s War Against Ukraine:

How Can Foreign Policy Analysis and Political Theory Be Helpful?” Studies in East European Thought, Vol. 74, No. 3 (August 2022). 90 Lebow, “International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War,” p. 128.

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expansion—that includes the potential accession of Ukraine.91 At the close of 2021, a Russian draft treaty was presented to an American diplomat in Moscow demanding a formal cessation to NATO’s enlargement in eastern Europe; to permanently cease increased expansion of NATO’s weapons and bases (military infrastructure) within former Soviet Union territory and the cessation of Western military support to Ukraine and the prohibition on “intermediate and short-range missiles” in Europe.92 Despite Russia arguing that it is answering to an “existential threat,” which Mearsheimer would also acknowledge, this pretext masks the “lust for conquest” because Putin has stated that Ukraine does not exist, doesn’t have its own sovereignty and it should thus be reintegrated with Russia.93 It has thus bluntly been argued from the West that Putin has definite imperialist desires and this factor is mainly responsible for the war: by “exporting his despotism into Ukraine by force.”94 Such evidence would appreciate well-established approaches like constructivism or poststructuralism being as insightful as realism to analyse the war. Therefore, realism cannot solely analyse the entirety of the war and further contributions of international relations theory are greatly needed to reflect on this first-order international problem. To support this claim on the validity of constructivism, a brief examination on Ukrainian nationalism can be presented. Ukrainian nationalism has been consolidating since 2014 with the purpose to serve the authorities in Kyiv mainly to establish an anti-Russian attitude in Ukrainian society towards Russia. These are some of the reasons why Russia acted to protect Russian-speaking people in Crimea in 2014 and have intervened in the Donbass region, Mariupol and Kherson. Ukrainian nationalism has also raised dangerous associations for its other neighbours, chiefly Poland,

91 Dmitri Vitalyevich Trenin, “What Putin Really Wants in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, December 28, 2021. 92 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of The Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,” Steven Pifer, “Russia’s Draft Agreements with NATO and the United States: Intended for Rejection?” The Brookings Institution, December 21, 2021. 93 Elan Journo, “Why John Mearsheimer Gets Ukraine Wrong,” New Ideal, September 14, 2022. 94 Journo, “Why John Mearsheimer Gets Ukraine Wrong.”

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Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. This is due to the final stages of the Second World War (1943–1945) when the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) a paramilitary insurgent wing following the fascist and nationalist leader, Stepan Bandera, initiated war on these neighbours, and were mainly responsible for ethnically cleansing non-Ukrainians, resulting to the mass murder of an estimated 100,000 Poles with axes, knives, sticks, pitchforks, sickles and scythes in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia.95 These followers collaborated with Nazi German occupiers to target tens of thousands of Jews throughout Ukraine. In contemporary Ukraine, the authorities openly praise Bandera’s legacy and perspectives, which has debatably embarrassed neighbouring Hungary and Poland from its western border. For instance, on January 1, 2023, the Ukrainian authorities celebrated Bandera’s birthday, which was sharply criticised in Poland that has strongly supported Ukraine since its February 2022 invasion by Russia.96 Ukraine’s Ambassador to Germany, Andriy Melnyk, sparked anger from Poland and Jewish groups after defending Bandera by claiming he “was not a mass murderer of Jews and Poles.”97 In Mariupol, comprising 425,000 residents, Bandera is deemed a national hero by nationalist Ukrainians and his name is chanted as the father of Ukraine defending the city.98 The Azov Battalion that fought against pro-Russian forces in the 2014 Donbass War are far-right extremists defending Mariupol and applaud Bandera.99 Once Yushchenko entered office as Ukrainian president in 2005, he awarded Bandera the “Hero of Ukraine” title and many monuments, museums and streets are named to honour him, but in eastern Ukraine that largely believes

95 Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe, ´ Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist—Fascism, Genocide, and Cult (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2014), p. 271. 96 Clara Weiss, “Ukrainian Parliament, Army Leadership Celebrate Birthday of the Fascist Mass Murderer Bandera,” World Socialist Web Site, January 5, 2023. 97 Andriy Melnyk, “Ukraine’s Envoy to Germany Irks Israeli, Polish Governments,” Deutsche Welle, July 2, 2022. 98 Roman Goncharenko, “Stepan Bandera: Hero or Nazi Collaborator?” Deutsche Welle, May 22, 2022. 99 Roman Goncharenko, “The Azov Battalion: Extremists Defending Mariupol,” Deutsche Welle, March 16, 2022. Based on this premise, Russia has stated that the Azov battalion function as Ukrainian nationalists, and criminals, and were not eligible for prisoner exchanges, but it still commenced in September 2022 (Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 6).

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in “Soviet historiography,” perceive Bandera as a Nazi collaborator.100 Despite these allegiances, Poland has continued to support Kyiv’s antiRussian policy. Warsaw has thus disregarded anti-Polish nationalism and fascism in western Ukraine fighting Poles with the OUN, its insurgent army and followers of Bandera and overlooked Kyiv’s human rights and democratic abuses and the economy being driven by oligarchs that corrupted the Ukrainian state.101 Therefore, Poland is more concerned by the huge threat posed by Russia and its encroachment of Ukrainian territory.102 In March 2022, Putin announced the deployment of 16,000 Syrian irregular combatants.103 Syrian fighters have joined not necessarily from Putin’s request or al-Assad’s call to bolster its relations with Moscow, but the mercenaries deployed overseas by the Syrian regime helps the fighters earn money, given the poor economic situation in Syria.104 Moscow has claimed that the Syrian fighters are “volunteers from the Middle East” to show to the West that the Kremlin has a client state in that region, and supports their 2015 intervention.105 Russia’s previous support for Syria is a strategy to bolster, and retain, patron-client relations. The same is occurring in the Ukraine invasion with al-Assad demonstrating his appreciation for Russia’s intervention to retain his power.106

100 Goncharenko, “Stepan Bandera: Hero or Nazi Collaborator?” 101 Zi˛eba, Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy, p. 180. 102 Prior to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland has called for enhanced security guarantees from powerful NATO members such as the 2018 initiative of an American-Polish military base to be named “Fort Trump” that was withdrawn by Trump to avoid provoking Moscow (Giorgio Cafiero, “As Russia Threatens Ukraine, Poland’s Role in NATO Evolves,” Al Jazeera, July 18, 2022). 103 Guy Faulconbridge, “Putin Says Russia to Use Middle East Volunteer Fighters,” Reuters, March 11, 2022. 104 Dukhan, “From Syria to Ukraine.” 105 Dukhan, “From Syria to Ukraine.” At this time, Donald Trump, the leader of

the American Republican Party, respected Putin, but sanctions were placed in Moscow after alleged electoral interference in 2016 to harm Hilary Clinton’s Democratic Party to benefit Trump (Journo, “Why John Mearsheimer Gets Ukraine Wrong”). 106 Looting opportunities in Syria has now declined so mercenaries are willing to fight overseas for money (Dukhan, “From Syria to Ukraine”).

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In addition, Chechen troops have pledged their loyalty to fight alongside Russian armed forces against Ukraine.107 Unlike Syria that holds Russian armed forces, South Ossetia soldiers initially refused to fight in Ukraine despite being conscripted to do so from Russia’s 2008 occupation,108 but there are other sources suggesting that both Georgianoccupied territories, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, have been conscripted and actively fighting in Ukraine.109 As part of Russian relative gains, the siege of Mariupol—a Russianspeaking city—has also been a strategic move to extend access to the Black Sea.110 Mariupol is located between the Donetsk and Luhansk ministates and Russian-annexed Crimea that would provide construction of a “land bridge” to support military attempts into Ukraine, and create a definitive line of control of Russian land in Ukraine.111 The Russian blockade of the Black Sea ports is denying ships with Ukraine’s wheat supplies (amounting 10% of the world’s wheat supplies) and namely sunflower oil. Russia has besieged this city of over 200,000 remaining civilians by halting access to water, food and medicine and have shelled maternity wards and shelters hosting displaced persons. Russian armed forces halted humanitarian provisions from reaching Mariupol by bombing an evacuation corridor and blocking aid convoys with the use of banned cluster munitions and prohibited explosive weapons.112 Walzer, a prominent just war theorist, has argued that Ukrainians have chosen to fight rather than be liberated by Putin and Russia’s invasion, and namely besieging Mariupol, has violated the Geneva Conventions because the invasion has failed “to fight in ways that avoid

107 Al Jazeera, “Chechen Leader Kadyrov Claims He Travelled to Ukraine,” Al Jazeera, March 14, 2022. 108 JAM News, “No Bulletproof Vests and Equipment—Soldiers from South Ossetia Refuse to Fight in Ukraine,” JAM News, April 1, 2022. 109 Tengo Gogotishvili, “Volunteers from Occupied Georgian Lands Perish in Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Caravanserai, January 20, 2023. 110 Olena Ivantsiv, Kateryna Iakovlenko and Tetiana Bezruk, “At Night I Dream of

Mariupol: Nine Accounts of Surviving a Russian Siege,” The New York Times, April 6, 2022. 111 Eric Levitz, “Why Putin Has Brought Hell to Mariupol?” Intelligencer, March 23,

2022. 112 Bonnie Docherty, “Russian Forces Are Using Weapons Widely Banned Across the World, Says Harvard Law Expert,” Harvard Law Today, March 3, 2022.

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or minimise civilian casualties.”113 It can be inferred that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” that includes innocent civilians from an inferior state because morality has little place with power politics.114 This is part of tragedy in international relations that Thucydides depicted with “Athenian imperialism” in the “Melian dialogue.”115 At the same time, when analysing Russian media such as TASS, Putin is protecting Russian-speaking breakaway states that have been subjected to Ukrainian fighting since 2014. A constructivist argument can be made to postulate that the social identity of Russian-speaking states is utilised as an appeal by Putin to attain support from Russian-controlled and influenced areas. Although Russia may have failed to topple the Ukrainian government and instal a puppet leader, it is now pursuing realist self-interests and foreign policy, as a debatable consolation prize, to advance relative power over Ukraine and its access to the east and south of its borders. Russian troops are encircling Ukrainian special forces in Lyschansk, Rubizhne and Severodonetsk to seize the Donbass area.116 On May 9, 2022, to mark the annual Victory Day, Putin drew parallels of bravery to defeat the Nazis during the Second World War with “a pre-emptive response to an aggression” needed in Ukraine to avert NATO’s expansion and its support from the United States and Western allies.117 Within this speech, Putin also claimed that far-right neo-Nazis were a threat to Russian-speaking people residing in Ukraine. Russia has used past analogies with the objective to misinterpret Ukraine as a threatening state that is dominated by a political neo-Nazi ideology that requires neutralization from an antifascist Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine.118

113 Michael Laban Walzer, “The Just War of the Ukrainians,” The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2022. 114 Robert B. Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York: Free Press, 1996). 115 Thomas Bertram Lonsdale Webster, Athenian Culture and Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), p. 229. 116 Markus Parekh and Chanel Zagon, “Russia-Ukraine Latest News: Putin 25km from Encircling Elite Ukrainian Unit in Major Donbass Victory,” The Telegraph, May 24, 2022. 117 Associated Press News, “Russia Marks WWII Victory Overshadowed by Ukraine,” Associated Press News, May 9, 2022. 118 Kurnyshova and Makarychev, “Explaining Russia’s War Against Ukraine.” Moreover, on the annual Victory Day in 2023, Putin claimed that Russia “has repulsed international

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Despite this Russian justification of collective security and success with the invasion, Putin is allegedly opposed from unsatisfied generals due to poor military progress with the invasion in Ukraine.119 With the size of the Russian army at an estimated 1 million active troops and 2 million reserve personnel against an estimated 250,000 Ukrainian armed forces, Moscow expected to conquer Kyiv.120 To reinstate public confidence of the invasion, Putin signed a decree to increase the size of Russian armed forces in Ukraine by 137,000 in early 2023.121 Initially, Russia conscripted 134,000 people at the outset of the intervention, another 127,500 last fall and has now issued a decree for a further 120,000 eligible citizens aged 18–27 from November 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022 for military service.122 At most, 190,000 Russian soldiers were initially deployed to Ukraine.123 This corroborates Mearsheimer’s argument that Russian intentions are also based on “military capability” and thus this deployment and the reserve size could not conquer the entirety of Ukraine, because they lacked the capacity to do so.124 In 1939, Germany invaded Poland with an estimated 1.5 million soldiers, which is what would be needed to conquer and integrate Ukraine into a greater Russia.125 However, Russian civilian dissent has terrorism” and “will protect the [Russian-speaking] inhabitants of Donbass” as a means to “ensure…security” (Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, “Russia ‘Honours’ Unity at ‘Key Turning Point’,” China Daily, May 10, 2023). 119 Teresa Gottein Martinez, “Bracing for a Coup: Russian Generals Look to Oust Putin over Tensions within Kremlin,” Express, May 5, 2022. 120 Kieran Devine, “Russia-Ukraine Crisis: How Big Are Their Militaries?” Sky News, February 24, 2022. 121 Amar Mehta, “Putin to Increase Size of Russian Armed Troops by 137,000 Starting in 2023,” Sky News, August 25, 2022. 122 TASS: Russian News Agency, “Russia to Start Fall Conscription on November 1, Plans to Call Up 120,000 People,” TASS, September 30, 2022. 123 Patrick Wintour, “Russia Has Amassed Up to 190,000 Troops on Ukraine Borders, US Warns,” The Guardian, February 18, 2022. 124 Mearsheimer, “John Mearsheimer on Putin’s Ambitions After Nine Months of War;” Sayers, “John Mearsheimer: We’re Playing Russian Roulette.” Based on this argument, it can be contended that Putin did not want to conquer Kyiv but wanted to threaten Ukraine’s capital to coerce Zelenskyy to alter Ukraine’s policy on NATO membership. 125 Sayers, “John Mearsheimer: We’re Playing Russian Roulette.” Based on Sayers’ reflection on Mearsheimer, Russia held a limited objective: to make Ukraine neutral by taking swaths of land from its eastern part and destroying their infrastructure and economy.

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been reported with protestors refuting this first military mobilisation since the Second World War, resulting in the error of enlisting people without combat experience, thousands feeling Russian borders and the detention of over 2,300 anti-mobilisation civilians.126 In Russia, most older people, rich people, security forces and governmental workers support the incursion of Ukraine, but people under 30 and in higher education do not.127 In June 2022, NATO increased the deployment of troops and arms in its eastern region.128 In contrast, Russia and Belarus held a summit that equipped the Belarusian armed forces with new weapons.129 The build-up of Russia and NATO armed forces and weapons (and potentially nuclear weapons in Belarus) cannot be entirely disregarded, which means that the signing of new nuclear non-proliferation treaties is unlikely. Putin has declared that Russia will place strategic nuclear weapons in neighbouring Belarus as a warning to NATO concerning its military aid for Ukraine.130 In September 2022, Zelenskyy engaged in a victory tour over Kharkiv city that had been allegedly reclaimed by Ukrainian armed forces that was encouraged by Biden for demonstrating clear “significant progress.”131 Despite assumed Ukrainian success, Russian armed forces stormed their partly controlled Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions to collect votes on a referendum that annexed the regions to guarantee the protection of Russian-speaking civilians and mobilise a further 300,000 reservists.132 Russia has imposed martial law in all four occupied regions.133 On October 5, 2022, the Laws on the Accession of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia were signed over by Putin 126 Al Jazeera, “No to War! Anger over Troop Conscription Rages in Russia,” Al Jazeera, September 26, 2022. 127 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 7. 128 Steven Erlanger, “NATO Will Sharply Increase the Number of Troops on Standby,”

The New York Times, June 27, 2022. 129 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 5. 130 David Ljunggren, “Putin Says Moscow to Place Nuclear Weapons in Belarus, US

Reacts,” Reuters, March 26, 2023. 131 Daniel Binns, “Zelenskyy on Victory Tour of Reclaimed Kharkiv City,” Metro, September 15, 2022, p. 13. 132 Daniel Binns, “Voting at Gunpoint,” Metro, September 26, 2022, p. 5. 133 Mark Trevelyan, “Putin Demands All-Russia War Effort as He Declares Martial Law

in Occupied Ukraine,” Reuters, October 19, 2022.

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to belong to the Russian Federation that have been vowed to be protected by Russian armed forces by all means necessary.134 Russia has made alleged gains in Luhansk and is moving towards security more of eastern Ukraine, but it has been speculated by the West that Moscow has deployed 97% of its total armed forces.135 It is feared that a repeat of Soviet compulsory military training could commence.136 An offensive realist explanation could explain this Russian strategy of expanding its control within the east and south of Ukraine, bordering Russia, to bolster its relative power over Ukraine. During the Cold War, both the Soviet union and the United States attempted to weaken the ideology of each region, but Russia’s Special Military Operation is attempting to retain Ukraine under its influence of Russian policy, similar to Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.137 This Operation, rather than labelled war, has been stated by Putin to deliver justice to Ukraine’s alleged genocide perpetrated against Russian-speaking populations residing in Ukraine (including Donetsk and Luhansk) over the last eight years.138 It is clear that the objectives of Russia’s Special Military Operation have altered to fully control the four annexed “oblasts” in eastern Ukraine, ensuring that Kyiv becomes neutral and loses its association with NATO.139 According to Mearsheimer, Putin did not intend to conquer the four oblasts prior to the February 24, 2022, invasion,

134 Lawrence Richard, “Putin Signs Laws Annexing 4 Ukrainian Regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia,” Fox News, October 5, 2023. 135 Isabel Keane, “Russia Has 97 Per Cent of Its Troops in Ukraine But Is Struggling to Advance: UK,” New York Post, February 15, 2023. 136 Amy Gibbons, “Russia ‘May Send Cannon Fodder After Kherson Loss’,” Metro,

November 14, 2022, p. 7. 137 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 3. 138 Egburt L.J. Fortuin, “Ukraine Commits Genocide on Russians: The Term

‘Genocide’ in Russian Propaganda,” Russian Linguistics, Vol. 46 (September 2022), pp. 313–347. There is little evidence to suggest that Russian-speaking civilians within these areas of the Donbass region have been on the verge of extinction and thus would not qualify as a just intervention as per Walzer’s third rule of disregard on saving a community from serious human rights abuses (Michael Laban Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 5th ed. [New York: Basic Books, 2006]). Instead, from a Western perspective, it could be argued that the objective of the war is to exterminate the Ukrainian nation. 139 Mearsheimer, “John Mearsheimer on Putin’s Ambitions After Nine Months of War.”

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but the war escalated this ambition.140 The uncertainty of Kyiv’s high Western support explains Moscow’s excessive maximisation of power in terms of territory to serve strategic geographical foreign policy for better accessing the Mediterranean Sea. However, it is important to acknowledge that many Western writers argue that Russia has annexed Ukraine to illustrate that the United States is toothless beyond Western Europe to demonstrate that Russia, and China, would lead the new “multipolar international order.”141 China and Russia are also great powers in the post-Cold War era, meaning that the world is multipolar rather than unipolar.142 This argument is based on Russian imperialism and the building of a new empire to compensate for the losses with the Soviet dissolution in 1991. From this debate, the illegal occupation of Crimea also rests on European and US opposition against Putin. On October 9, 2022, the $3 billion Crimean Kerch bridge that was erected in 2018 stretching 12-miles linking Russia to annexed Crimea, for supplies and troops, caught fire.143 A day later, Putin blamed Ukraine of terrorism and retaliated with missile strikes in Zaporizhzhia that killed 13 and injured an estimated 87 civilians.144 According to Russian Press Secretary of the President, Dmitry Peskov, attacks conducted by Ukraine on Crimea and the newly, and debatably illegal, annexation of areas within the Donbass region constitutes “strikes…on Russian soil,” which is “potentially extremely dangerous” for “global European security.”145 The United States Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, has warned against Ukraine attempting to recapture Crimea that would result in

140 Mearsheimer, “John Mearsheimer on Putin’s Ambitions After Nine Months of War.” 141 Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, “Putin’s Last Stand: The Promise and Peril of

Russian Defeat,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2023. 142 Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou, “Waltz, Mearsheimer and the Post-Cold War World: The Rise of America and the Fall of Structural Realism,” International Politics, Vol. 51, No. 3 (April 2014), pp. 295–315. 143 Robert Greenhall and Robert Plummer, “Crimea Bridge Attack Arrests as Market in Donetsk Region Attacked,” BBC News, October 12, 2022. 144 BBC News, “Ukraine War: ‘Russian Attack’ on City Claimed by Moscow Kills 13,” BBC News, October 10, 2022. 145 Dmitry Peskov, “Kremlin on Discussion of Supplying Arms to Kyiv for Strikes on Russian Soil,” TASS, January 19, 2023.

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“a red line” for Putin that could intensify the conflict.146 Blinken has stressed that Washington is not encouraging Kyiv to try and retake the annexed peninsula from Moscow.147 Despite this sensible advice, Ukraine expects continued Western support and sanctions to weaken Moscow’s economy and its military, with Kyiv receiving sophisticated weapons to retake Donbass and potentially Crimea.148 Russia has deployed soldiers on the beaches of Crimea and in-built trenches due to the fear of Ukraine retaking “the annexed peninsula.”149 Moreover, the continual sophisticated military equipment and aid provided by NATO allies to Ukraine is increasing to continue with its defence against Russia. Russia’s Security Council has also stated that Ukraine’s desired fast-track NATO membership would result in World War III.150 Furthermore, since the outset of the war, Russia has found it difficult to defeat a stubborn Ukraine so has resorted to ruthlessness, such as destroying their “electric grid” to cause supplementary economic and human suffering (as a means to obtain advantage).151 By way of illustration, on October 15, 2022, a Russian military strike targeted and damaged a principal energy facility near Kyiv that has left many residents without electrical power.152 It has been reported that Russian bombardments targeting infrastructure have diminished Ukrainian power stations, causing blackouts.153 An estimated 40% of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been extremely damaged and Russia may leave the deal of providing safe passage to grain carriers from Ukraine in the Black Sea due

146 Joe Barnes, “Anthony Blinken ‘Warns Ukraine’ Against Retaking Crimea,” The Telegraph, February 16, 2023. 147 James Kilner, “Joe Biden Prepared to Arm Ukraine to Help Recapture Crimea,” The Telegraph, January 19, 2023. 148 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 8. 149 Joel Taylor, “The Russians Dig In: Putin Fortifies Crimea’s Beaches over Fears of

Kyiv Strike,” Metro, March 7, 2023, p. 13. 150 TASS: Russian News Agency, “Ukraine’s Joining NATO Can Lead to World War III—Russia’s Security Council,” TASS, October 13, 2022. 151 Mearsheimer, “John Mearsheimer on Putin’s Ambitions After Nine Months of War.” 152 Sabra Ayres, “Russian Missile Strike Damages Key Power Site New Kyiv, Says

Ukraine Grid Operator,” Associated Press News, October 15, 2022. 153 Max Hunder, “A Blackout Blitz,” Metro, October 19, 2022, p. 17.

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to alleged Ukrainian attacks on Russian warships.154 The Kremlin has targeted Ukrainian homes with a “100-missile attack,” leaving millions without power that has also affected neighbouring Moldova.155 It has been estimated that seven million Ukrainians have been left without power after new Russian missile strikes.156 In one of many instances of Russian drone attacks, in December 2022, a launch struck two energy services in Odesa, a seaport located on southwest Ukraine, resulting in its closure, 1.5 million civilians “without power” and destabilisation of grain exporting.157 The Russian Federation is attacking the energy infrastructure of Ukraine to gain an advantage to force a surrender, but it could also be deemed as ener-cide because it is civilians who suffer from power outages, especially during the winter.158 Furthermore, Russian airstrikes have hit main Ukrainian cities and after a large prisoner swap between both states that exchanged “218 detainees” (that included “108 Ukrainian women”), Zelenskyy has encouraged Ukrainian armed forces to capture additional Russian prisoners.159 There has been a video on social media that purportedly displays Ukrainian armed forces shooting 10 immobilised Russian soldiers, which has resulted in the Russian Ministry of Defence demanding an investigation for war crimes.160 Ukraine has retaliated by targeting an oil reservoir

154 Amanda Macias and Holly Ellyat, “Russia Resumes Participation in Ukraine

Grain Export Deal; Ukraine’s Energy Infrastructure ‘Seriously Damaged’,” CNBC News, November 2, 2022. 155 Dan Sabbagh, Isobel Koshiw and Lorenzo Tondo, “Stray Russian Missiles Feared to Have Landed in Poland,” The Guardian, November 15, 2022. 156 Catherine Byaruhanga and James FitzGerald, “Ukraine War: 10 Million without Power After Russian Strikes,” BBC News, November 18, 2022. 157 Pavel Polityuk, “Drone Strikes on Ukraine Port City Hit Grain Exports,” Metro, December 12, 2022, p. 13. 158 To help with Russia’s invasion heavily declining Ukraine’s economy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has provided a £12.7 billion loan to Kiev as part of a four-year deal to provide microfinance and reconstruction support (Metro, “IMF Loan Boosts War-Hit Finances,” Metro, March 23, 2023, p. 15). 159 Sam Meredith, “Explosions Reported in Cities Across Ukraine; Zelenskyy Urges Troops to Take More Russian Prisoners,” CNBC News, October 18, 2022. 160 Daniel Boffey, “Russia Says Ukrainian Soldiers Executed Prisoners of War in Donbass Region,” The Guardian, November 18, 2022.

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and airport holding military planes in Kursk, south Russia, which borders Ukraine.161 During the battle over Bakhmut, eastern Ukraine within Donetsk Oblast of the Donbass region, there has been no electricity and water supply since August and October 2022 respectively.162 In late July 2022, Russia had captured the Vuhlehirska Thermal Power Plant located in southeast Bakhmut and subsequently had taken control of Ukrainian barricades nearby the Butivka Coal Mine once Ukraine withdrew forces within this area southwest of Avdiivka.163 In early January 2023, the Wagner Group, headed by Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch, mercenary and close aide of Putin, has granted amnesty for the release of the initial round of convicts if they fought for longer than six months with the group.164 However, the Russian Defence Ministry has attempted to disburse both convict and elite Wagner forces in Bakhmut to deteriorate Prigozhin achieving further power in the Kremlin.165 Due to Prigozhin growing his forces to 40,000 convicts, the Russian Defence Ministry has heavily restricted the ability of Prigozhin to appoint convicts and obtain ammunition as a measure for him to depend on the Russian Defence Ministry.166

161 Jamey Keaten, “Russians Reeling as Drones Set Another Airbase Ablaze,” Metro, December 7, 2022, p. 15 162 Al Jazeera, “Mapping the Battle for Ukraine’s Bakhmut,” Al Jazeera, January 20,

2023. 163 Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson and Frederick W. Kagan, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment,” August 21, 2022. 164 Caitlin McFall, “Russia’s Wagner Chief Frees First Round of Convicts Who Traded Jail Time for War in Ukraine,” Fox News, January 5, 2023. 165 Arpan Rai and Maryam Zakir-Hussain, “Ukraine-Russia News—Latest: Putin and

Wagner Group Reach ‘Boiling Point’ in Bakhmut Rivalry,” The Independent, March 13, 2023. 166 Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. Kagan, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 12, 2023,” Institute for the Study of War, March 12, 2023, p. 1. Prigozhin and his forces allegedly seized Bakhmut. However, in late June 2023, the Wagner Group mercenaries headed from Ukraine towards Moscow but halted the mutiny when the President of Belarus, Alexandr Grigoryevich Lukashenko, brokered Prigozhin’s pardoning for criminal charges and exile to Belarus with some Wagner forces integrating into the Russian armed forces (Sky News, “Russia rebellion: Wagner Group troops to be absorbed into Russian military as mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin heads to Belarus,” Sky News, June 25, 2023).

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On January 13, 2023, the Russian Federation claimed that it captured Soledar, a salt-mining town, by using aircraft, artillery and missiles for a few weeks.167 The motives of Moscow seizing Soledar is to enable its armed forces to sever Ukrainian supply lines in Bakhmut and subsequently block and enclose Ukraine’s units. Russian troops have encircled Bakhmut with constant gunshots and explosions, meaning residents are unable to access the city centre.168 Zelenskyy has alleged that Ukrainian soldiers have killed 1,100 Russian armed forces and wounded an estimated 1,500 in one week within March 2023, with Russia claiming it had killed 220 Ukrainian forces in one day.169 Taking control over the entirety of Bakhmut would be a step closer at securing the entirety of Donetsk and it could also permit Russian armed forces to head towards Ukrainian strongholds, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, within the Donbass region.170 The battles in Bakhmut and Soledar provide evidence that the conflict shows little or no sign of deescalating. Russia has received support from a variety of actors and some democracies like India, Brazil and Israel have not sided in favour or against Moscow. In December 2001, Putin visited Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Damodardas Modi, to signify Russian-India trade cooperation (including oil), with India refusing to engage with imposing sanctions against Russia and avoiding to voting for condemnation of Moscow in the United Nations.171 India ensures that it does not isolate Russia because it is profoundly reliant on Russian-made fighter jets, tanks and other military equipment; Russia constantly supported India within the United Nations over the Kashmir crisis and it is fighting over the contested Himalayan border with China.172

167 Pavel Polityuk and Vladyslav Smilianets, “Russia Says Its Forces Capture Soledar in East Ukraine,” International Business Times, January 13, 2023. 168 Peter Beaumont, “Bakhmut Burning: Fires Everywhere as Russians Close in on City’s Capture,” The Guardian, March 2, 2023. 169 Paul Godfrey, “Zelenskyy Claims 1,100 Russian Soldiers Killed in Bakhmut,” United Press International, March 13, 2023. 170 Yury Fedorov, “The Bakhmut Conundrum,” Novaya Gazeta Europe, January 18,

2023. 171 Anjana Pasricha, “India Remains Steadfast in Partnership with Russia,” Voice of America News, December 20, 2022. 172 Somdeep Sen, “Why Is India Standing with Putin’s Russia?” Al Jazeera, March 14,

2022.

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Alongside support from Chechnyan rebels and the Syrian armed forces, Moscow’s Vostok week-long military exercise has received an additional 2,000-armed forces, 300 army vehicles, 21 planes and 3 warships from China and troops from Algeria, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Syria, Tajikistan.173 Moreover, Iran is sending long-range ballistic missiles that range from 200 to 400 miles and further drones to Russia.174 An estimated 18 long-range armed drones have been delivered to the Russian navy.175 Six of these states include former Soviet nations, which infer that Russia is receiving support despite international condemnation of the invasion. Although Russia is accomplishing an advantage, the principle of military necessity is outweighing distinction and proportionality, which raises a useful just war debate.

Just War Debate Just war theory engages with the military ethics of waging war, conduct within war and justice and accountability in the aftermath. In relation to the rules of initiating warfare ( jus ad bellum), there are six principles. These comprise: a legitimate authority—that is usually a sovereign or other higher organisation—to permit a country to wage or enter war; a just cause that avoids domestic or collective gain; proportionality to consider the expected harms of war without undermining the objectives of initiating war; the right intention to be presented by statespersons; a reasonable chance of success; and to be pursued as a last resort.176 The conduct within war ( jus in bello) covers military necessity, distinction and discrimination, and proportionality to maximise military advantage and reduce civilian casualties. Military necessity assesses if a preemptive target qualifies as an acceptable military objective to also balance

173 Metro, “Smiling Putin on Manoeuvres with China,” Metro, September 7, 2022,

p. 12. 174 James Kilner, “Iran to Send Russia Long-range Ballistic Missiles—Sparking Calls for

Israel to Arm Ukraine,” The Telegraph, October 16, 2022. 175 Dan Sabbagh and Nechirvan Mando, “Iran Smuggled Drones into Russia Using Boats and State Airline, Sources Reveal,” The Guardian, February 12, 2023. 176 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II–III (London: R & T Washbourne, 1911); Gregory Reichberg, Thomas Aquinas on War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 114–155, 173–174.

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the “requirements of humanity.”177 A military purpose can be defined as an object that promotes military action and where a form of its destruction or seizure provides a certain military advantage.178 The destruction or capture of a distinct object is a reasonable military objective only if it is established imperative to secure a rapid submission of the opposition. To exemplify, a TV or radio station serving entertainment purposes would not be eligible as a valid military objective and thus its demolition or capture would not constitute efficient military action. Conversely, if the station served a dual purpose of entertainment and/or information but also functioned as a command structure enabling military communications and support for ethnic cleansing, then its obliteration or seizure could be considered acceptable under the rule of military necessity. The rule of distinction is necessary to distinguish a belligerent actor to ensure that combatants and non-combatants are separated. Moreover, militaristic goals, places and/or protected property must also be recognised. Under customary international law, this policy is to ensure that indiscriminate attacks beyond the parameters of military purposes are circumvented.179 There are several examples of indiscriminate attacks that range from aerial bombardment, besieging a residential area even if attempting to repel potential opposition armed forces and disdain of military goals or belligerents within the jurisdiction. Combatants can only participate in conflict if they are dressed in a distinctive uniform, have a military command structure, hold weapons and perform military functions in accordance with laws and the customs of war to prevent prejudice of executing international humanitarian law.180 Under humanitarian law, it is legally impermissible to engage in hostilities in an oppositional 177 Jan Römer, Killing in a Gray Area Between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights: How Can the National Police of Colombia Overcome the Uncertainty of Which Branch of International Law to Apply? (Berlin: Springer, 2010), p. 68. 178 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 United Nations Treaty Series 3–4, Article 52. 179 Dražan Djuki´c and Niccolò Pons, “Entries: Distinction,” in The Companion to International Humanitarian Law, eds. Dražan Djuki´c and Niccolò Pons (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2018), p. 307. 180 Jann K. Kleffner, “Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law,” in The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 3rd ed., ed. Dieter Fleck (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2013), p. 225.

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uniform and the taking of hostages are forbidden methods of conduct in warfare. The rule of proportionality considers the military purpose of targeting with civilian casualties and property damage.181 War causes civilian casualties and civilian and private property is often destroyed, but it must not be unwarranted in contrast to the military advantage obtained from striking a specific target.182 By way of illustration, it would have been morally unacceptable for NATO to conduct strikes against Belgrade with nuclear devices to eliminate Miloševi´c’s military infrastructure and intelligence.183 The rule of proportionality is distinctly identified to constrain attacks that cause excessive civilian casualties and property damage in contrast to concrete and direct predicted military advantage.184 However, under Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, the rule of proportionality does not define what qualifies as “excessive” that makes calculations on civilian casualties and prevalent property damage subjective.185 There are narrow and wide approaches to the proportionality doctrine.186 If applying the narrow principles, then proportionality considers the harms of those liable to some degree of harm and the wide doctrine concerns innocents who are regarded liable to harm.187 The belief of all combatants in war qualifying as morally liable to the loss of their lives and suffering does consider such actions disproportionate

181 Terry D. Gill, “Trapped: Three Dilemmas in the Law of Proportionality and Asymmetric Warfare,” in Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2015, ed. Terry D. Gill (The Hague: Asser Press, 2016), p. 178. 182 Francisco Forrest Martin, Stephen J. Schnably, Richard J. Wilson, Jonathan S. Simon and Mark V. Tushnet, International] Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Treaties, Cases and Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 536. This is a grey area because there is no threshold of what number of civilian casualties and other damages constitute an abuse of the proportionality doctrine. 183 John Janzekovic, The Use of Force in Humanitarian Intervention: Morality and Practicalities (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 52–53. 184 ICRC, Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions, Article 5 (b). 185 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating

to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). 186 Jeff McMahan, “Proportionality in the Afghanistan War,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2 (June 2011), pp. 144–145. 187 Jeff McMahan, “Liability, Proportionality, and the Number of Aggressors,” in The Ethics of War: Essays, ed. Saba Bazargan and Samuel C. Rickless (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 3.

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because proportionality principally pertains innocent people who do not qualify as legitimate targets and thus are not liable to attacks. However, McMahan stresses that armed forces casualties also matter and therefore war can be disproportionate.188 The quantity of purported unjust combatants are oppositional armed forces that are killed, but this could be disproportionate to the anticipated benefits.189 The principles of discrimination and proportionality regulate the laws of armed conflict that raises an ethical debate from traditionalists and revisionists. Traditionalists provide a contentious methodology to these principles. If soldiers are fighting in war, they lose their right to life and the protection of their liberty.190 This is due to reciprocal means because soldiers threaten the lives of others they are fighting so when agreeing to fight for an army, they become a “dangerous man,” resulting in the abandonment of their right to life.191 Conversely, non-combatants do not carry the same danger as combatants and thus do not threaten other people’s lives and thus maintain their rights to life and liberty, which means they should be immune from attack. If considering Walzer’s supposition on combatant equality, the notion of discrimination would defend combatants fighting for an unjust cause and morally doing nothing wrong when soldiers kill just combatants. Revisionists are in opposition to the combatant equality debate of unjust combatants fighting for unjust causes that they cannot reimburse the deaths and atrocities committed against their directed victims.192 Revisionists have opposed this perceptive with the assumption that just combatants still retain the right to life, even when engaging in hostilities.193 Hence, either the entirety of armed forces or some alleged unjust soldiers should not have their right to life and liberty protected, which presents pivotal debates on proportionality. It is unclear, however, who decides between the just and unjust combatants; potentially, this would

188 McMahan, “Proportionality in the Afghanistan War,” p. 145. 189 McMahan, “Liability, Proportionality, and the Number of Aggressors,” p. 3. 190 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2006, p. 136. 191 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2006, pp. 142, 145. 192 David Rodin, War and Self-Defence (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002); Thomas Hurka,

“Proportionality in the Morality of War,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, no. 1 (January 2005), pp. 34–66. 193 Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

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be on either the legalistic paradigm to legitimately thwart aggression, individual or collective self-defence and/or to protect a group from extinction with a sanctioned humanitarian intervention.194 If it is based on Western preconceptions and namely the legalistic paradigm, then atrocities committed by Ukrainian armed forces against Russian soldiers would not contravene the law of armed conflict, but if the other way round—it would. McMahan argues that war does not create new moral standards, meaning that conduct in warfare can be perceived just or unjust.195 The moral rules of killing people outside of war is the same, such as killing in individual self-defence or defending others.196 For revisionists, people, which includes soldiers, should maintain their basic rights to life and liberty that exist in both times of war and peace, but laws and institutions regulating law are also morally significant.197 It is morally impermissible for unjust fighters to attack just combatants and their population.198 “Moral parasites” corrupt “conventional morality” as a means to sustain their aggression by transforming morality as a weapon to suit “the unjust.” This contention rises the tactics utilised by an unjust side that is overlooked by Walzer.199 Based on this revisionist premise, it is recommended that it is best for unjust combatants to surrender their arms. Taking this revisionist criticism further, many Westerners would believe 194 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations , October 24, 1945, 1 United Nations Treaty Series XVI, Articles 2 (4) and 51; Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2006, on his three rules of disregard; (i) a state may wage intervention when a faction is facing a national liberation struggle for independence; (ii) a state can intervene when a third country unfairly intervenes in the domestic affairs of a particular country; and (iii) intervention is permissible when a community is struggling for survival from grave human rights violations. The third rule of disregard may counter the previous two rules based on fighting for the right to self-determination. 195 McMahan, Killing in War. 196 Rodin, War and Self-Defence; Jeff McMahan, “War as Self-Defence,” Ethics & Inter-

national Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March 2004), pp. 75–80, https://doi.org/10.1111/j. 1747-7093.2004.tb00453.x. 197 Seth Lazar, “Just War Theory: Revisionists Versus Traditionalists,” Annual Review

of Political Science, Vol. 20 (May 2017), p. 40. 198 McMahan, Killing in War. 199 Shyam Ranganathan, “Just War and the Indian Tradition: Arguments from the

Battlefield,” in Comparative Just War Theory: An Introduction to International Perspectives, eds. Luís Cordeiro Rodrigues and Danny Singh (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), p. 189.

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that Russia’s causes of war in Ukraine are unjust and thus their purposes of attacking towns leading to unintended, and potentially intended, harm to civilians, as non-combatants, is not justified. According to Luban, the notion of an international society that is based on the sovereign political equality and egalitarian rights of all, and individuals in states, are controlled by international law and rules, but are tarnished by the uncertainty on calculating imminent threats that permit pre-emptive war and legal self-defence.200 Based on this issue raised, it could be contended that NATO’s expansionism eastward, ousting of Yanukovych resulting in the Maidan Revolution and failure of the Minsk Agreements do not warrant the legitimate self-defence or rules of preemptive war declared by Putin on Ukraine. Although the West was at fault, as corroborated by Mearsheimer and Walt, Russia could have waited and negotiated further prior to the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. If undertaking Luban’s thesis on the clarity of heinous human rights violations to permit legal humanitarian intervention by other states to challenge a state’s sovereignty,201 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would also be unjustified. It is important to raise both just war and intertwined liberalist perspectives on the Russia-Ukraine war, but the traditionalist legalistic paradigm, revisionist ethics of just combatants and the idea of sovereign equality of states cannot fully comply to this war because it concerns a great power. The great power, Russia, maintains its permanent seat within the United Nations Security Council, meaning that the international law of the Charter of the United Nations is hardly applicable due to the threat of Moscow’s veto power. Moreover, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty cannot bring the alliance to help Ukraine because the latter is not a member of the alliance. Within a realist world, there is sovereign inequality of states that regrettably means that international law, human rights and the ethics of armed conflict can be circumvented by great powers if they get in the way of their national interests and foreign policy. By no fault of its own, the United Nations is thus a facilitator of great power’s interests. Russia has clearly engaged with the crime of aggression with its incursion regarding Ukraine to contravene the rules of jus ad bellum, but 200 David Luban, “Preventative War,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 3 (June 2004), pp. 207–248. 201 David Luban, “The Romance of the Nation-State,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer 1980), pp. 392–397.

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Moscow has argued that the Special Military Operation has justified its invasion to save Russian-people speaking within the Donbass region from genocide.202 In relation to the latter, Russia might controversially argue that the incursion thus constitutes a humanitarian intervention. As with the rules of jus in bello, the conduct of warfare from Russia has contravened the Geneva Conventions, especially the Fourth Convention on the relative treatment of civilians and property during war, due to targeting civilian infrastructure and energy resources leaving “millions without power in freezing temperatures.”203 Ukrainian soldiers have also committed atrocities against Russian armed forces, namely executing prisoners of war,204 and it can be argued that once war commences, all parties undermine jus in bello rules, namely military necessity expands beyond proportionality and the rule of distinction. From a classical realist perspective, just war is the justification to wage war and its ethics are regularly violated by putting national interests first. However, if one was to still uphold the revisionist and consequentialist debates of just war theory, then it can be postulated that powerful states within the international society, the United Nations and other regional security arrangements carry political power over decision-making. Even if believing in an international order, decisions may have double standards and inconsistently applied and thus can still violate international law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. A liberal international order or the promotion of regime theory to standardise norms and reciprocal behaviour, which includes the respect for international humanitarian law and just war ethics, is not feasible within a realist world built on the power politics and the sovereign inequality of states. Despite this useful realist argument raised, regime theory that standardises norms—even if international law cannot be applied due to political reasons—has harnessed the mutual reciprocity of namely Western

202 TASS, “Decision Taken on Denazification, Demilitarisation of Ukraine—Putin.”

However, there is little evidence to suggest that the extinction of Russian-speaking people within the Donbass region is significant. 203 United Nations, “Russia’s Energy Grid Attacks, Torture in Ukraine, Could Be Crimes Against Humanity: UN Rights Probe,” United Nations News, March 16, 2023. 204 Emmanuel Grynszpan and Faustine Vincent, “Ukraine’s Military Accused of War Crimes Against Russian Troops,” Le Monde, April 9, 2022.

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states to condemn and impose sanctions on Russia’s alleged illegal invasion of Ukraine.

International Condemnation of the Invasion and Western Sanctions After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, international condemnation against Moscow has attributed to supporting Kyiv. Despite the United States declaring its potential direct involvement in the war, in late 2021, the American administration stressed that it would not participate directly in the war in Ukraine and thus would engage through sanctions, intelligence support and aid.205 Sanctions have been placed on the Russian regime and affiliated oligarchs. These sanctions have targeted individuals to impact on senior entrepreneurs and top government officials.206 Within a fortnight of the invasion, the West imposed 3,600 sanctions towards Russian companies; affluent individuals; Russia’s Central Bank had their dollar and euro reserves frozen; and Russian planes were not permitted in US, “Canadian and European airspaces.”207 American sanctions targeted Russian banks to plummet Moscow’s stock exchange by 45%.208 Economic sanctions have weakened the rouble and the stock market closed in early March 2022. The previous Western-based sanctions on Russia following Crimea and Donbass in 2014 were limited to influence Moscow’s policy, but the current sanctions are aimed at excluding Russia from the international economy.209 Further sanctions followed from the European Union banning Russian state-owned media and civilian aircraft from EU airwaves and airspace whilst Russian forces headed towards Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson.210 Britain has placed sanctions on 12 people who are relatives and friends of

205 Emma Ashford, “The Persistence of Great-Power Politics: What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Geopolitical Rivalry,” February 20, 2022. 206 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 2. 207 Tanner Greer, “Realism Must Guide Our Reaction to Russia’s Invasion,” The New

York Times, March 18, 2022. 208 Jude Sheerin, “As It Happened: Ukraine Deaths as Battles Rage on Day One of Russian Invasion,” BBC News, February 25, 2022. 209 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 4. 210 Psaropoulos, “Timeline: A Month of Russia’s War in Ukraine.”

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Putin, which has included his ex-wife, alleged girlfriend—Alina Kabaeva— and first cousins.211 The Russian rouble further tumbled, and the European Union authorised further financial sanctions alongside the provision of $554 million for Ukrainian military aid. The indirect involvement of NATO allies “in the war is breathtaking” that has included tens of billions of US dollars in value of arms, aid, surveillance and tactical intelligence to Ukraine’s armed forces, monthly payments of billions of dollars to support Kyiv’s budget, and excruciating sanctions inflicted on Russia.212 Ashford, a prominent political scientist, has argued that indirect involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war was the right choice to avoid warring “with a nuclear-armed Russia,” meaning that engaging directly with Russia would be too costly.213 By pursuing sanctions, the West has also made economic sacrifices such as the increase on the price on gas and oil. In addition, the International Monetary Fund approved $1.4 billion, and US Congress agreed $13.6 billion for Ukraine’s military and humanitarian aid.214 The United States had headed military support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia whilst encouraging all states to do the same. This has included members of NATO and the European Union. The alleged “sham” referendums in the four southern Ukrainian regions have been criticised by Group of Seven (G7) leaders215 as contravening international law and the process, and alleged ownership by Russia, has not been internationally recognised.216 On October 11, 2022, the G7 stated that Russia had “blatantly” contravened “the United Nations Charter,” it is illegitimate “to change Ukraine’s borders” with the demand for Russia to “cease all hostilities,” condemnation of Belarus

211 William Booth, “Britain Places Sanctions on Putin’s Alleged Girlfriend, Ex-Wife, Cousins,” The Washington Post, May 13, 2022. 212 Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe, “Avoiding a Long War: US Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict,” January 2023 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation), p. 5. 213 Ashford, “The Persistence of Great-Power Politics.” 214 Andrea Shalal, “IMF Approves $1.4 Billion in Emergency Funding for Ukraine,”

Reuters, March 10, 2022. 215 The G7 is an international political forum that includes the membership of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. 216 Clothilde Goujard, “G7 Leaders Condemn ‘Sham’ Referendums in Occupied Russia,” Politico, September 24, 2022.

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“permitting Russian armed forces” access and support and frozen assets from Russia will be used to pursue accountability and rebuild Ukraine.217 NATO’s Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, claimed that the “sham” referendums intended “to further escalate the war,” have “no legitimacy” and NATO will provide further support and aid to “strengthen the Ukrainians on the battlefield.”218 Despite this legal criticism, Putin has continued to defend the objectives of the Special Military Operation to “help the people of Donbass.”219 The United States has requested the United Nations Security Council to condemn the referendums to dismiss Russian unification and obligate Russian armed forces to leave the regions.220 Peskov claimed that the G7 scheme to rebuild Ukraine with Russian frozen assets, including foreign and gold exchange reserves, transactions related to the assets and reserves of the Bank of Russia, constituted “as international racketeering” and “legalising previously committed theft.”221 Putin has also retaliated against sanctions and condemnation endorsed by neighbouring NATO allies. This has included halting Gazprom gas supplies to both Poland and Bulgaria,222 and Putin has issued a list of “unfriendly countries” for inimical actions against Russia.223 The United States has bolstered its lead role over the West by coordinating action with NATO, the European Union and the G7 to help Ukraine.224 The sanctions and condemnation placed on Russia follow regime theory and liberalist ambitions for

217 The United Kingdom Government, “G7 Leaders’ Joint Statement on Ukraine: 11 October 2022,” Gov.UK, October 11, 2022. 218 Jens Stoltenberg, “NATO Chief Condemns ‘Sham’ Referendums,” RT World News, September 24, 2022. 219 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, “President of Russia V. Putin on the Final Plenary Session of the 19th Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, October 27, 2022,” President of Russia, October 27, 2022. 220 Daphne Psaledakis and Simon Lewis, “US Asks UN Security Council to Condemn Russia for ‘Sham’ Referendums in Ukraine,” Reuters, September 27, 2022. 221 Dmitry Peskov, “Pure Racketeering: Kremlin Slams G7 Ploy to Restore Ukraine Using Stolen Russian Assets,” TASS: Russian News Agency, October 12, 2022. 222 Samuel Webb, “Energy Experts Fear Poland Will Turn to ‘Dirty Coal’ After Russia Cuts Off Gas Supplies,” The Independent, May 2, 2022. 223 Al Jazeera, “Russia Issues List of ‘Unfriendly’ Countries Amid Ukraine Crisis,” Al Jazeera, March 8, 2022. 224 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 3.

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Moscow’s enemies to collectively weaken the Kremlin. Despite unprecedented sanctions hitting Russia, many leading merging economies have retained neutrality and China, India, Indonesia and many African, Arab and Latin American states continue with Russian business relations.225 In terms of diplomatic efforts, Zelenskyy intended to compromise with Russia to bring a cessation to the invasion. In March 2022, a tentative 15-point draft peace deal was negotiated between Russia and Ukraine to attain a ceasefire.226 The drafted conditions comprised Kyiv to reach its neutrality by renouncing its ambitions to join NATO, accept restrictions on its army size and to no longer agree to host international military bases or arms as part of receiving protection from America, Britain and Turkey in exchange for Moscow’s security assurances.227 These conditions are reminiscent of the late 2021 Russian draft treaty “to prevent dangerous military activity.”228 Article 6 of the Russian draft treaty attempted to press for all NATO member states to commit to the refrainment from additional “enlargement of NATO,” which includes “the accession of Ukraine” and other states.229 However, these March 2022 negotiations that contained principles of the December Russian draft treaty failed from both sides with Russia stressing that Ukraine must accept the annexation of the four south and east oblasts as legal whilst Ukraine has demanded the demobilisation of all Russian soldiers in Ukraine, including Crimea.230 Late May 2022, a four-day meeting was held at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.231 At this meeting, Henry 225 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” pp. 3–4. 226 James Crisp, “Russia and Ukraine ‘Draw Up 15-Point Peace Plan’,” The Telegraph,

March 16, 2022. 227 Max Seddon, Roman Olearchyk and Arash Massoudi, “Ukraine and Russia Explore Neutrality Plan in Peace Talks,” Financial Times, March 16, 2022. 228 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of The Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.” 229 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Agreement on Measures to

Ensure the Security of The Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.” 230 Henry Alfred Kissinger, “Henry Kissinger: Why I Changed My Mind About Ukraine,” UnHerd, January 18, 2023. 231 David Walsh, “Davos 2022: What to Expect from the World Economic Forum’s Most Consequential Meeting in 50 Years,” Euronews, May 23, 2022.

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Kissinger stressed that negotiations within the next few months are needed to avoid a new war being against Russia rather than Ukrainian freedom to understand the realpolitik of Ukraine to act as “a neutral buffer state” instead of a “frontier of Europe.” It was urged that Ukraine give Russia territory.232 This includes Ukraine agreeing a neutral status and non-nuclear status in a trade-off for security guarantees if third parties are present and a referendum is put in place.233 However, half a year later, in the Davos 2023 World Economic Forum, via video link, Kissinger recommended that Russia must be provided with the opportunity to re-join the global system that follows a peace agreement in Ukraine.234 Kissinger also stated that the United States should continue to support Ukraine until a peace accord is accomplished and that Ukraine can someday, be granted accession to NATO.235 He stressed that Ukraine’s membership to NATO is only feasible once peace is achieved with Russia.236 Kissinger reversed his thinking of Ukraine avoiding its NATO accession ambitions and surrendering parts of its territory to Russia because there is now no point, and it is too late, to keep Ukraine “neutral.”237 Based on Kissinger’s diplomatic opinions, it can be contended that he initially recommended an immediate peace deal with Russia which meant sacrificing Ukrainian land in exchange for peace and that the West pursuing Kyiv’s ambitions to join NATO was a cause of the hostile relations between Moscow and the West. Yet, since the escalation of the invasion and US-led and NATO allied support for Ukraine, Kissinger has reversed his opinion to argue that Western-led backing, spearheaded by the United States, should continue until a peace agreement is negotiated. Therefore, Kissinger was previously against Ukraine joining NATO,

232 Henry Kissinger cited in Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “Henry Kissinger: Ukraine must give Russia Territory,” May 23, 2022. 233 Arpan Rai and Tom Batchelor, “Zelenskyy ‘Prepared to Discuss Neutral Status,’ as Oscars Hold Moment of Silence over War,” The Independent, March 28, 2022. 234 Henry Alfred Kissinger, “Kissinger Backs Ukraine’s NATO Membership, Says Russia Needs the Opportunity to Rejoin International System,” CNBC, January 17, 2023. 235 Kissinger, “Kissinger Backs Ukraine’s NATO Membership.” 236 Kissinger, “Henry Kissinger: Why I Changed My Mind About Ukraine.” 237 Henry Alfred Kissinger, “Kissinger Says Russia War Validates Ukraine’s NATO Bid,”

Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, January 17, 2023.

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but has changed his mind from avoiding a war, which is now undergoing, meaning that a “neutral Ukraine” is “no longer” feasible or “meaningful.”238 There have also been fears of Russian troops around the Chernobyl Power Station that could release nuclear radiation to affect the majority of Europe. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is Europe’s largest plant and is located in south-east Ukraine (which remains under Russian occupation since March 2022) with Ukrainian personnel running the facility. The nuclear power plant has been under threat from both Russian and Ukrainian armed forces fighting within the area.239 The plant is at the frontline of direct Russian and Ukrainian attacks. Whilst the plant’s six water-cooled reactors are shut down, nuclear fuel could scorch if the power supply is shut and further damaged.240 Russian missiles have allegedly shut down the plant for the sixth occasion, with back-up systems operating to avoid another Chernobyl disaster.241 The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Rafael Grossi, has called for both sides—Russia and Ukraine—to establish and commit to a demilitarised zone within the plant’s active parameters.242 In mid-November 2022, further peace talks are ongoing with Zelenskyy addressing a G20 Summit on a 10-point peace plan to end the war.243 The peace formula includes: nuclear and radiation safety, food and energy security, release of detainees and deportees, restoration of justice and “territorial integrity” by implementing the Charter of the United Nations, anti-ecocide, inhibition of escalation and withdrawal of Russian troops as an end to the war.244 As a response, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Lavrov, speaking in Bali, Indonesia, claimed that the “problems” rest “with the Ukrainian side” 238 Kissinger, “Henry Kissinger: Why I Changed My Mind about Ukraine.” 239 Ben Tobias, “Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant: EU Provides Anti-radiation Tablets to

Ukraine,” BBC News, August 30, 2022. 240 Jennifer Rankin, “Zaporizhzhia Is Playing with Fire, Says UN Nuclear Chief, as Blasts Reported,” The Guardian, November 20, 2022. 241 Binns, “Our Luck Will Run Out,” Metro, March 10, 2023, pp. 1, 4. 242 Binns, “Our Luck Will Run Out,” p. 4. 243 Tara Subramaniam and Jack Guy, “Russia’s War in Ukraine,” CNN , November 15,

2022. 244 Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “President of Ukraine Presented 10-Point Peace Formula at G20 Summit,” Rubryka, November 15, 2022.

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that is “refusing negotiations and putting forward conditions that are obviously unrealistic.”245 Lavrov also claimed that Russia wishes to further negotiation with the UN to remove farm export barriers even though they have not been directly beset by Western sanctions.246 On February 24, 2023, China has attempted to bolster its global image as a peace leader. Beijing has designed a 12-point peace plan that encourages a rapid cessation of hostilities.247 It includes respecting the territorial sovereignty of both Russia and Ukraine, ending Cold War mentality, endorsing a cessation of hostilities, recommencing peace talks, resolving the growing humanitarian crisis, safeguarding prisoners of war and civilians, enabling grain exports, lessening strategic risks, ceasing unilateral sanctions, protecting the stability of industrial and supply chains, encouraging post-conflict reconstruction and ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants.248 Belarus has been part of these recent peace talks agreeing with China’s position leading calls for a ceasefire and political settlement, but nothing is contained on how Russian-occupied regions should proceed.249 Ukraine does not wish to pursue any peace deal that requires ceding territory to Russia and although Beijing’s peace plan respects the sovereign territory of both warring states, it does not call for Russian troops to leave occupied Ukrainian regions.250 Russia has claimed that it is not the right time to pursue China’s peace plan and Biden has claimed that the Plan solely benefits Russia and it is irrational that China is negotiating the unjust war.251

245 NDTV, “Ukraine’s Conditions for Restarting Talks ‘Unrealistic’: Russian Minister,” NDTV , November 15, 2022. 246 Sky News, “Ukraine War Latest: Zelenskyy Sets Out 10-Point Peace Plan—As Discontent Grows on Russian TV,” Sky News, November 15, 2022. 247 Siba Jackson, “Ukraine War: China Unveils 12-Point Peace Plan as It Calls for Ceasefire,” Sky News, February 24, 2023. 248 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis,” February 24, 2023. 249 Metro, “Putin’s Allies Call for Peace…But No Sign of a Withdrawal,” Metro, March 2, 2023, p. 6. 250 John Haltiwanger, “Russia Shoots Down China’s Peace Plan for the Ukraine War as Beijing Becomes More Entangled in the Conflict a Year into the Fighting,” Insider, February 27, 2023. 251 Haltiwanger, “Russia Shoots Down China’s Peace Plan for the Ukraine War.”

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In December 2022, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, the United States and the EU have arranged to cap maximum prices of $60 per barrel of Russian oil, but Zelenskyy has claimed that Moscow would still earn £81.3 billion per annum.252 In early February 2023, another price cap from the G7, EU and Australia have lowered oil prices to $45 per barrel and $100 per barrel for premium to crude trading, namely diesel, has hit Russia.253 The European Union has prohibited EU vessels carrying Russian-related petroleum goods except if the goods are acquired at the same value or below the agreed price cap.254 Although sanctions have undermined Moscow’s economy and living standards, the Russian economy is market-based, unlike during the Soviet Union, so economic collapse is unlikely due to Russia’s adaptability and the soaring prices of oil exportation.255 It has been reported that Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrank by 2.1% in 2022 with a forecast of 0.3% growth in 2023 that is due to the huge increase in gas and oil prices to compensate for the decline of namely 25% of gas exportation.256 Russia controls energy supplies and is creating pressure in EU countries struggling with rising energy costs—despite Russia wanting to retain positive “energy relations” with the European Union.257 The Russian Chairman of the State Durma, Vyacheslav Viktorovich Volodin, has claimed that Western sanctions will be very costly and unsustainable and if NATO ceased to support Kyiv, then Ukraine’s armed forces would disband within one day.258 The West could not obtain support from Saudi Arabia who are profiting from the war.259 Washington has suspected 252 Metro, “Oil Price Cap Will Only Fund Russia War, Warns Zelenskyy,” Metro, December 5, 2022, p. 15. 253 Council of the European Union, “EU Agrees on Level of Price Caps for Russian Petroleum Products,” Council of the European Union: Press Release, February 4, 2023. 254 Reuters, “Factbox: G7-led Coalition Price Sets Price Cap on Russian Oil Products,” Reuters, February 4, 2023. 255 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 7. 256 Grégoire Sauvage, “Why Is the Russian Economy Holding Up Against Western

Sanctions?” France 24, February 23, 2023. 257 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 9. 258 Vyacheslav Viktorovich Volodin, “Response to Minister of Foreign Affairs of

Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba,” Russian Foreign Ministry of Affairs, June 21, 2022. 259 Michael Day, “Saudis Announce Vast Oil Profits on the Back of Putin’s War in Ukraine, as US Influence Wanes in Middle East,” November 2, 2022.

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that Riyadh is helping Moscow fund the war in Ukraine by increasing oil revenues and reducing oil output by daily 2 million barrels after the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) plus group, which included Saudi Arabia and Russia.260 Western leaders may have shunned Russian oil, but it is Saudi Aramco that become to profit the most.261 Based on these factors and Biden’s plea for OPEC+ to seize petroleum cuts and the increase of oil prices, it is hard to cement a fixed price for exportation of Russia’s gas and oil. Despite exhaustive efforts imposing sanctions, security concerns and Zelenskyy’s acknowledgement that Ukraine is unlikely to attain NATO membership, Zelenskyy has refused to surrender Mariupol and has arguably retaken the Kherson region, as a major “strategic port city,” from Russian occupation.262 Yet, Ukraine has faced a setback since the recent referendums of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson voting for Russian unification and Putin is retaliating for the damage caused to the Crimean Kerch bridge (Fig. 5.1). The same can be argued with Russian setbacks due to the Chervone, Nova Kamyanka, Novogrygorivka and Novovasylivka settlements based in the Beryslav district of north-east Kherson being reclaimed by Ukrainian armed forces.263 Russian troops withdrew their armed forces from Kherson in November 2022 to mark Ukrainian celebrations.264 Despite the fall 2022 successful counteroffensives by Ukraine in Kherson and Kharkiv, Putin’s September 2022 annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts indicates that “this war is nowhere near a resolution,” with fighting ensuing almost 1,000 kilometres of front lines.265 260 Susan Davis, Asma Khalid, Jackie Northam and Adrian Florido, “Saudi Arabia Aims to Raise Price of Oil, Ignoring Biden’s Pleas,” National Public Radio, October 14, 2022. 261 Philippa Nuttal, “Saudi Arabia Is the Biggest Beneficiary of the War in Ukraine,” Newstatesman, May 16, 2022. 262 Cara Anna, “As Mariupol Hangs On, the Extent of the Horror Not Yet Known,” Associated Press News, March 22, 2022; Yaroslav Lukov, “Kherson: ‘Heavy Fighting’ as Ukraine Seeks to Retake Russian-Held Region,” BBC News, August 30, 2022; James FitzGerald, “Ukraine War: Putin Endorses Evacuations from Occupied Kherson,” BBC News, November 5, 2022. 263 Boffey, “Ukraine Claims Gains Near Kherson as UK Sends Anti-Aircraft Missiles.” 264 Peter Beaumont, Luke Harding, Pjotr Sauer and Isobel Koshiw, “Ukraine Troops

Enter Centre of Kherson as Russians Retreat in Chaos,” The Guardian, November 11, 2022. 265 Charap and Priebe, “Avoiding a Long War,” p. 1.

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Fig. 5.1 Map of Russian military control and regained Ukrainian territory266

According to Pope Francis, the Kremlin has harshly retaliated with the invasion that is due to “NATO barking at Russia’s door” and has twice urged Zelenskyy to avoid fighting back.267 Based on this opinion and Russian rules of engagement, it can be argued that Russia has violated international humanitarian law and Zelenskyy is fighting for far more than a little brother status with the Kremlin. Walt has contended that Ukraine should announce that it will be a neutral state (as previously from 1992 to 2008) that will not join NATO.268 This would not be ideal for Kyiv, but it is located next door to a great power.269 I agree that this would pose a viable diplomatic solution for Russian forces to 266 BBC News, “Ukraine in Maps: Tracking the War with Russia,” BBC News, November 14, 2022. 267 Barbie Latza Nadeau, “Pope Francis Says NATO Started War in Ukraine by ‘Barking at Putin’s Door’,” The Daily Beast, May 3, 2022. 268 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.” 269 Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis.”

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leave Ukraine, but over one year of NATO countries militarily and financially supporting Ukraine’s resistance alongside Zelenskyy’s pledge to join the alliance would now be very difficult to concede. For these reasons and previous hostile relations between Russia and Ukraine since 2014, diplomacy is unlikely to bring an end to the invasion.270 Russia will only accept improved relations with the West if Moscow needs what they are offering.271 Russia is not desperate to re-join Western institutions as it did from 1992 to 2003 and Zelenskyy has understandably refused the terms of the March 2022 15-point plan because it favours Russia more than Ukraine and Biden is sceptical of the February 12-point plan because it does not benefit Ukraine. The latter does not call for Russian troops to withdraw troops from Ukrainian occupation, mainly in the east of its territory.

International Law Efforts From an international legal perspective, collective security obligations have labelled Russia as the aggressor with a commitment from the international community to condemn, sanction and constrain the aggressor in an attempt for it to modify its invasion policy.272 However, the assumption on sufficient power of a cooperating alliance to overpower the military might of the aggressor is questionable and only Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty can make preventive intervention compulsory.273 Even though NATO has condemned the invasion and labelled Ukraine as “a close NATO partner,” Ukraine “is not covered by the security guarantee” within the Treaty.274 Based on NATO’s position for Ukraine’s 270 It has been argued that if Ukraine’s accession to NATO is vetoed from Russia’s invasions in 2014 and 2022, then it would undermine the sovereignty of Ukraine and encourage “Putin to commit further aggression” (Elan Journo, “Why John Mearsheimer Gets Ukraine Wrong,” New Ideal, September 14, 2022). Based on this Western thinking, compromises of the West are likely to be unnegotiated with Russia. 271 Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Questions as Part of the 100 Questions for the Leader Project at the Yevgeny Primakov School,” Moscow, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, May 23, 2002. 272 Abramo Fimo Kenneth Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1960). 273 Article 5 has only been invoked once in the Alliance’s history, which was as a

response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 274 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “NATO’s Response to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” NATO, July 7, 2022.

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protection, I argue that strategic prudence should apply to NATO’s extension of security guarantees, rather than attempting to appease the United States, because the alliance cannot guarantee security for Ukraine. To weaken Russia’s military aviation, Zelenskyy pleaded with US Congress for a no-fly zone over Ukraine’s skies with additional weapons to strengthen Ukrainian capacity to fight Russian airpower.275 Yet, NATO claims a no-fly zone would bring their “forces into direct conflict with Russia” to intensify the war for states involved. It is also alleged that the United States will not provide intelligence for Ukraine to locate senior Russian military commanders and ministers as it could escalate a wider war by “provoking the Kremlin to retaliate against the United States and its allies,” which would exacerbate the threat of direct war between both “nuclear powers.”276 Russia still perceives its nuclear weapons as a guarantor of its security and peace “among great power,” namely to deter the United States from the threat or attack against Moscow.277 The threat of a nuclear power going to war is a strong reason why NATO is not directly intervening in Ukraine. Both America and Russia have shown commitment of winning the war so the United States may join the war to win or prevent Ukraine from losing.278 If Russia is desperate and is losing an eventual protracted war, it could resort to its nuclear weapons that could engage US armed forces.279 Since the outset of this conflict, the threat of nuclear use has been presented by Putin and the potential deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons has been speculated by the West.280 In my opinion, both scenarios of the United States joining the war and Russia utilising nuclear weapons are unlikely because deterrent factors are

275 Melissa Quinn, “Zelenskyy Calls for No-Fly Zone over Ukraine in Emotional Plea to US Congress,” CBS News, March 16, 2022. 276 Shane Harris and Dan Lamothe, “Intelligence-Sharing with Ukraine Designed to Prevent Wider War,” The Washington Post, May 11, 2022. 277 Anya Loukianova Fink and Olga Oliker, “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons in a Multipolar World,” Daedalus, Vol. 149, No. 2 (Spring 2020), pp. 37–38. Even if Russia lost the war in Ukraine and became weakened, it would still possess nuclear weapons and military capability (Fix and Kimmage, “Putin’s Last Stand”). 278 Mearsheimer, “Playing with Fire in Ukraine.” 279 Mearsheimer, “Playing with Fire in Ukraine;” Sayers, “John Mearsheimer: We’re

Playing Russian Roulette.” 280 Charap and Priebe, “Avoiding a Long War,” p. 3.

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strong with both Washington and Moscow, so restraint (complying with reciprocity) is most likely. Mearsheimer has also argued that if Russia used nuclear weapons, it would be in Ukraine and the latter does not have a nuclear arsenal so deterrence is abolished, and the United States would not respond with nuclear weapons against Russia.281 If this unlikely scenario occurred, then I agree that Washington would not utilise a nuclear arsenal against Russia in retaliation. Therefore, defensive realism and strategic prudence have been applied by NATO and its powerful allies to arm, finance and equip the Ukrainian armed forces to prolong the fight against Russia (with NATO members avoiding direct warfare). Khudoley has convincingly argued that Russia and the West have confrontational relations that have been aggravated by the February 2022 war in Ukraine, and thus a lengthy war is envisioned.282 Polish neorealist, Zi˛eba, has similarly contended that the “acute geopolitical rivalry” between Russia and the West to influence Ukraine has formed “military confrontation.”283 At the same time, if implementing a no-fly zone or sharing intelligence to kill Russian senior military personnel, the loss that could be incurred would involve both the United States and Russia entering direct warfare dragging their allies into further destruction. Hence, strengthening the balance to counter the strength of Russia is the preferred approach by NATO and Western powers. In relation to the Bucha civilian killings, the labelling of a genocide requires investigation from a prosecutor.284 If genocidal intent is proved, it would place further pressure on the international community to intervene erga omnes (towards all) correspondent to customary obligations.285 There have been further allegations of a prison attack killing 50 Ukrainian prisoners of war in Russian-occupied Donetsk resulting in

281 Sayers, “John Mearsheimer: We’re Playing Russian Roulette.” 282 Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation,” p. 1. 283 Ryszard Zi˛eba, “The Ukraine Crisis as the Rivalry for Spheres of Influence Between

the West and Russia,” International and Security Studies, January 2020. 284 George Wright, “Russia’s War: Do Bucha Killings Amount to Genocide?” BBC News, April 7, 2022. 285 Marco Longobardo, “Genocide, Obligations erga omnes, and the Responsibility to Protect: Remarks on a Complex Convergence,” The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 19, No. 8 (September 2015), pp. 1199–1212.

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Zelenskyy calling for a UN inquiry of war crimes.286 Moreover, Turkey is a NATO member that is also neutral to Russia, and has not invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention to prohibit Russian naval military warships from passing through two straits in the Black Sea.287 Due to the nuclear power, military strength and permanent membership within the United Nations Security Council that Russia possesses, it is difficult for NATO powers to intervene with the justification of international law. If NATO was to intervene, it can do so legally with authorisation from the United Nations Security Council.288 It is important to note that Putin is critical of the legality of NATO with numerous references to the alliance’s 78-day airstrikes over Belgrade regarding the situation in Kosovo in 1999 that did not consult authorisation from the United Nations Security Council.289 Regarding the Kosovo crisis, Serbian police and armed forces targeted Kosovar Albanians under Operation Horseshoe as part of Serbian ethnic cleansing policy that resulted in a humanitarian rescue by NATO.290 NATO was concerned with Serbian presidential policy of oppressing Kosovar Albanians that could have resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe and thus another Srebrenica massacre within the Balkans region was in the making. A quick response was required to wage a war from Western third-party states for the protection of civilian lives. At face value, the rapid response would comply with Walzer’s legalistic paradigm considering rules within the Charter of the United Nations.291 A pre-emptive response can be justified from aggression that concerns any imminent threat or use of force posed by one state against another, warranting self-defence by the victim state and law enforcement by the international

286 Peter Beaumont, “Prison Attack That Killed Ukraine PoWs a War Crime, Says

Zelenskyy, Amid Calls for UN Inquiry,” The Guardian, July 30, 2022. 287 Mark Nevitt, “The Russia-Ukraine Conflict, the Black Sea, and the Montreux Convention,” Just Security, February 28, 2022. 288 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VIII: Article 53. 289 Jade McGlynn, “Why Putin Keeps Talking About Kosovo,” Foreign Policy, March

3, 2022. 290 Michael Laban Walzer, Arguing About War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 99–102. 291 Michael Laban Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

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society.292 It could be argued that Walzer’s third rule of disregard was defended because Operation Horseshoe mandated the Serbian police and armed forces to hunt and cleanse Kosovar Albanians that justified NATO’s humanitarian rescue.293 However, the legalistic paradigm that respects international law and principally the Charter of the United Nations was contravened that raises scrutiny on Walzer’s third rule of disregard. The United Nations system was averted due to the threat of the likely Russian and Chinese vetoes at the Security Council that demonstrated the constrained relations of Washington with both Moscow and Beijing.294 As part of contemporary international law, Article 53 (1) of the UN Charter plainly states that regional security arrangements from organisations are only permitted if consent is given from the Security Council. Moscow initially backed Belgrade, which is why NATO averted direct UN Security consent, fearing the Moscow veto, and thus NATO executed a 78-day bombing campaign for ostensibly just war reasons to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.295 Although Malone and Wermester correctly doubt the legality of the collective security intervention in the former Yugoslavia that is largely due to the failure of conforming with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter,296 Wheeler contended that awaiting international endorsement from the United Nations system was rightly abandoned because human lives needed to be saved.297 Just war ethicist, Walzer, stressed that Serbia had a preceding track record of human rights violations with Bosnia and ethnic cleansing was happening with apparent Serbian armed forces on Kosovo borders resulting in fleeing refugees, and therefore military

292 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 1977, 61–62. 293 Walzer, Arguing About War, pp. 99–102. 294 Yanan Song, The US Commitment to NATO in the Post-Cold War Period (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 105; Michael Mandelbaum, “A Perfect Failure: NATO’s War Against Yugoslavia,” Foreign Affairs, 78, no. 5 (September–October 1999). 295 Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. xiv. 296 David M. Malone and Karin Wermester, “Boom and Bust? The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2000), p. 48. 297 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 41.

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intervention was defensible and certainly compulsory.298 This supposition positions intervention for ascertaining humanitarian means. The collective group of states were part of NATO and the alliance bombed the former Yugoslavia because NATO’s collection of states, which included the United States and the United Kingdom, endorsed the bombing raid despite circumventing permission from the United Nations Security Council that suspiciously contravened international law.299 As an alternative to international law, NATO advocated humanitarianist dialogue to offer just and moral reasons for a military intervention to defend a small group from genocide.300 During NATO’s bombing campaign (24 March–10 June 1999), the legitimate targets comprised a mixture of Serbian military boundaries and communications that debatably evaded infringing the principles of discrimination and military necessity. However, these attacks contained indiscriminate attacks against trains, buses, a bridge, hospital, refugee convoy and a state-owned television and radio station leading to civilian casualties.301 NATO’s Operation Allied Force airstrikes had killed a projected 489–528 Serbian and Albanian civilians.302 The military necessity and proportionality principles, which form part of the basis on the laws of armed conflict, are in dispute because targets are warranted if they will substantially weaken the opposite military even if there are some civilian fatalities. This creates a principal debate on the rule of proportionality. This rule is a legal principle that regulates the rules of conduct within contemporary warfare that was challenged with NATO’s three-month long aerial attacks. By way of illustration, on April 23, 1999, Radio Television Serbia (RTS), a national television and radio station, was targeted and demolished because the station suspiciously served military communications to 298 Michael Walzer, Arguing About War, p. 99. 299 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and Inter-

national Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 228; Daniel Fiott, “Realist Thought and Humanitarian Intervention,” The International History Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 (September 2013), p. 770. 300 Christina Gabriela Badescu, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Security and Human Rights (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 1. 301 Heike Krieger, The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974–1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 51. 302 Krieger, The Kosovo Conflict and International Law, p. 323.

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over 100 relay Serbian sites and incited propaganda encouraging Albanian hatred.303 The striking of RTS resulted in 16 civilian casualties and wounded a further 16 people, but approximately 120 employees were working in the RTS building that raises the debate whether the notion of proportionality was flouted.304 These civilians were killed for media coverage spanning three hours that was debatably disproportionate but NATO’s airstrikes did not constitute negligence for further investigation.305 Based on this case concerning RTS, it can be contended that the legality of targeting the Belgrade Station was flawed. In relation to NATO’s intervention in the former Yugoslavia, the bombing campaign satisfied the principle on the likelihood of accomplishment that resulted in Miloševi´c’s aptitude to rapidly retreat Serbian troops in Kosovo. However, the strategy of NATO targeting and obliterating military instruments was unlikely to cease violence and suppression. Moreover, NATO should not have been placed in a position to function as a substitute for the legitimate authority of the United Nations and the safe return of refugees could not be distinctively achieved by the alliance’s bombing strategy.306 It has similarly been argued in line with the just war rules of jus ad bellum (rules initiating warfare) that the NATO mission failed to act as the legitimate authority, lacked the right intentions, contained no probability of success, did not act as a last resort and aborted the respect for proportionality.307 Despite these useful countermeasures deriving from just war ethics, NATO still affirmed humanitarian justification and simultaneously military gain under the principle of military necessity. To conform to McMahan’s understanding on the lesser evil, the inadvertent costs of 303 Nina Burri, Bravery or Bravado? The Protection of News Providers in Armed Conflict (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015), p. 151. 304 Daniel Thürer, International Humanitarian Law: Theory, Practice, Context (Hague: Hague Academy of International Law, 2011), p. 80. 305 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), “Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” ICTY , 2000, paras. 50, 90–91. 306 Carl Ceulemans, “The NATO Intervention in the Kosovo Crisis: March–June 1999,” in Moral Constraints on War: Principles and Causes, 2nd ed., ed. Bruno Coppieters and Nick Fotion (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), pp. 211–212, 216. 307 Boris Kashnikov, “NATO’s Intervention in the Kosovo Crisis: Whose Justice?” in Moral Constraints on War: Principles and Causes, 2nd ed., ed. Bruno Coppieters and Nick Fotion (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008).

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harming innocent civilians acts as a subsidiary measure of military warfare that thus becomes easier to defend military necessity.308 The bombing of RTS state station would be part of realist intentions of states targeting property to bring a war to an earlier close, but as argued by Walzer’s theory on non-combatant immunity, intentionally targeting civilian populaces and property is not morally or ethically justified.309 NATO’s policy was directed at Miloševi´c’s armed forces and communication structures that qualified as military necessity, but the civilian casualties and collateral property damage hampered the wide proportionality doctrine. Furthermore, Operation Allied Force engaged with aerial bombardment to extend the initial zero-combatant casualty war that hindered the principle of chivalry, namely the reciprocal risk of the warrior’s code.310 Thakur, a leading political scientist, has stressed that the lengthy aerial bombing campaign conducted by NATO signified “humanitarian bombing” despite both words contending one another, meaning that the normative element of humanitarian intervention had been weakened.311 Collateral damage over a long period of time and civilian casualties resulted in several cases being heard at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the European Court of Human Rights to consider the rule of proportionality.312

308 McMahan, “Proportionality in the Afghanistan War,” p. 147. 309 John Yoo, “Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (1977),” Hoover Institution,

February 6, 2019. 310 Only two US servicemen were accidentally killed in night-time training (Neil C. Renic, Asymmetric Killing: Risk Avoidance, Just War, and the Warrior Ethos [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020], p. 3). 311 Thakur, “R2P After Libya and Syria,” p. 65. 312 To provide one instance, the Behrami and Behrami v. France case was based on

the aftermath of two children playing with undetonated cluster munitions in March 2000, Mitrovica. One child died and the case was brought to the European Court of Human Rights by the surviving, and injured, brother and his father (Behrami and Behrami v France 78166/01 [1999] ECHR 182; 71412/01 [2007] 45 EHRR SE10, May 2, 2007). The Court affirmed that the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was not applicable because the contracted parties of Kosovo Force (KFOR) was mandated under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (UN Security Council Resolution 1244, “Establishment of an Interim Administration for Kosovo,” UN Doc. S/RES/1244 [June 10, 1999], adopted 4,011st meeting). Based on this premise, the European Court was incompatible to judge with previous or current UN operations. The Court was resistant to decide over its competence to hear UN brigades because they operated under UN Security Council authorised mandates rather than under

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The main contention rests between military necessity and proportionality. The United Nations failed to protect in Kosovo so NATO stepped in due to wide-scale refugees escaping to neighbouring countries and suppression that affirmed a strong threat to international peace and security outside the capacity of internal affairs.313 The United Kingdom Prime Minister, Tony Blair, at the time, claimed that military operations that have a convincing chance of success can carefully be proceeded,314 which signifies realist standards on calculations and prudence. Three months later, Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary-General, argued that the rapid response provided by NATO did not consent with the UN Security Council regarding the crisis in Kosovo and thus contravened international law; yet it stopped systemic ethnic killings, whilst establishing a dangerous precedent on ignoring UN consent and flouting international law.315 Annan explicitly contended that NATO delivered peacekeeping with more “teeth” due to their regional quick and decisive security response.316 This startled the global South on the premise that humanitarian intervention could be implemented at will by great powers for all humanitarian concerns.317 This is the reason why Annan called for an improved “normative consensus” regarding intervention. The Kosovo Commission investigated NATO’s intervention and stated that it was illegal but legitimate. Although Article 39 of the Charter of the United

the responsibility of states (Marko Milanovi´c and Tatjana Papi´c, “As Bad as It Gets: The European Court of Human Rights’s Behrami and Saramati Decision and General International Law,” International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 2 [April 2009], p. 267). 313 Tony Blair, “Doctrine of the International Community,” Global Policy Forum, Speech at Chicago Economic Club, April 22, 1999. 314 Luban, “Will Syria Redefine the Just War?” 315 Kofi Annan, “Annan’s Peace Plan for Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations, March

2012, p. 4. 316 Eirini Lemos-Maniati, Peace-Keeping Operations: Requirements and Effectiveness; NATO’s Role (Brussels: NATO, June 2001), pp. 7–8. 317 Alex J. Bellamy, “Kosovo and the Advent of Sovereignty as Responsibility,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 2009), pp. 163–184. The third pillar of R2P acted as an emerging rule of “negative sovereignty” that posed a threat to the internal affairs of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations states insofar that human rights are goals that are not always currently attainable (to these states).

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Nations on Security Council approval was overridden, the Commission perceived it a legitimate intervention because a humanitarian rescue was sincere, to exercise humanitarian intervention (by the collection of external states against the volition of Serbia). This verdict by the Commission was ascertained by the alleged failure of the Serbian state to avoid atrocity crimes and prevalent human suffering. Therefore, the Independent Commission on Kosovo has raised an interesting debate on regional arrangements executing humanitarian intervention that is unauthorised by Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. This understandably contravenes international law and the Charter of the United Nations, but it can be deemed lawful under the rule of necessity that is part of international law norms to defend a state that does not harm relations between countries or the international community.318 Despite NATO infringing Article 25 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations that circumvented UN Security Council consent and approval, the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was subsequently permitted with agreement, and legitimacy, by UN Security Council Resolution 1244.319 Based on the eventual backing of the United Nations, the military intervention in the former Yugoslavia was illegal but later justified by the Security Council with the deployment of UNMIK. It seemed that Bill Clinton and Tony Blair evaded the United Nations system, with some backing by the United Nations Secretary-General, to hone the norms of international law in to conveniently act beyond the parameters of seeking consultation and approval from the United Nations Security Council when there is clear evidence of grave breaches of international human rights and international humanitarian law. In this context, the waging of the intervention by NATO was partially a last resort. It is difficult to reinterpret a just cause and its unclear relationship with international law. The interventionist measure applied by NATO planned to necessitate the use of international force if states botched to meet their sovereign end of the responsibility to protect bargain to safeguard their

318 International Law Commission, “Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,” fifty-third session, A/56/49(I)/Corr.4, 2001, Article 25 (1). 319 UN Security Council Resolution 1244, “Establishment of an Interim Administration for Kosovo.”

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own civilians.320 It was now clear that if the United Nations Security Council fails to act, then a collection of states (including with a regional arrangement) that are alarmed by atrocity crimes can respond. The two main problems for Putin and the global South, however, rests on violation of international law (by not attaining consent from the United Nations Security Council) and the undermining of state sovereignty in which powerful states can utilise morality as a veneer to pursue their geopolitical interests.321 Therefore, humanitarian intervention is principally connected with the legitimacy of collective action, but overdue intervention can have devastating repercussions. Human rights interventionism exposed the catastrophes to deal with starvation hitting Somalia due to the elongated civil war and UN feeble intervention in Rwanda, but accomplished the protection of civilians with NATO’s intervention in Serbia concerning the Kosovo crisis, condemning governments mistreating their own civilians.322 The legitimacy of an intervention rests on consultation and authorisation from the United Nations Security Council that can be condemned or praised by preventing a genocide. In relation to the latter, under the constructivist lens of international relations theory, powerful NATO states would have faced scrutiny if they failed to promptly intervene, meaning that identity politics is bolstered with interventionism to avert genocides. The 1990s witnessed two shocking humanitarian catastrophes in the Balkans and East Africa, which initiated political confrontations from NGOs and other non-state actors.323 This preventative humanitarian intervention did not alarm Walzer.324 The bombing orchestrated by NATO was a response to ethnic cleansing as a concerted effort to sought negotiations with Miloševi´c. As a contested just war traditionalist, Walzer contended that intervention should be forbidden when a government oppresses its civilians and is only permitted

320 Michael Doyle, “International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect,” International Studies Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 2011), p. 80. 321 The latter is evident with the March 2003 US-led coalition invasion of Iraq. 322 Michael Wesley, “Toward a Realist Ethics of Intervention,” Ethics & International

Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2 (September 2005), pp. 64–65. 323 Michelle Tusan, “Humanitarianism, Genocide and Liberalism,” Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2015), p. 90. 324 Michael Laban Walzer, “Kosovo,” Dissent, Summer, 1999.

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when the community and government is profoundly weakened.325 For revisionists, including David Luban, the emphasis moves from the nationstate to the strong defence of human rights, with the use of violence if considered necessary, when a state lacks approval from its population.326 Luban later stressed that it is “hyper-power” states that influence decisionmaking on interventionism, chiefly America—as the global hegemon—on preventative war, over the decisions of other states.327 The United States and NATO directed their interests on Enlargement Policy to expand the alliance with ex-communist blocs whilst allowing for normative and moral standards—in this context, ethnic cleansing in Kosovo—that is similar to classical realists.328 Another revisionist, McMahan, contended that Clinton utilised NATO to limit the casualty rate of American armed forces by enforcing aerial attacks—to avert another Somalia—and prevent a Rwanda, but many aerial raids were imprecise and killed 500 noncombatants.329 Killing innocent non-combatants is disproportionate, but the counterfactual number of estimated lives saved with the bombing campaign protected more Kosovar Albanians than the civilian casualties to comply with the wide doctrine of proportionality. Therefore, both traditionalist and revisionist just war theorists would have reinforced NATO’s intervention. However, as Putin argued, the United Nations system was avoided. The United Nations Security Council was not consulted due to the peril of the latent Russian and Chinese vetoes at the Council that exemplified American constrained relations with both states.330 Under international law, Article 53 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations plainly states that regional arrangements from organisations or agencies

325 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 1977. 326 Luban, “The Romance of the Nation-State.” 327 Luban, “Preventative War.” 328 Luca Ratti, “Post-cold War NATO and International Relations Theory: The Case

for Neo-Classical Realism,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (November 2008), pp. 81–110. 329 Jeff McMahan, “Humanitarian Intervention, Consent, and Proportionality,” in Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover, ed. N. Ann Davis, Richard Keshen and Jeff McMahan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 63–65. 330 Song, The US Commitment to NATO in the Post-Cold War Period, p. 105; Michael Mandelbaum, “A Perfect Failure: NATO’s War Against Yugoslavia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5 (September–October, 1999).

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are only permitted if approval is decided from the United Nations Security Council. Moscow was allegedly supporting the Serbian government, and thus NATO executed a 78-day bombing campaign, without direct consent from the United Nations, for ostensibly just war motives to prevent a humanitarian calamity.331 Alongside Putin, international law scholars have interrogated the legality of collective security intervention regarding the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo due to failure of conforming with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.332 Despite the United Nations General Assembly exercising the rare Resolution 1950 (exclusive referral from the Council) condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and calling for Putin’s immediate withdrawal of armed forces,333 the tentativeness of both: labelling Russian atrocities genocide; and applying collective security law remain a vexed area. Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, an attack on a NATO member is to be measured as an attack against all NATO members and thus the remaining NATO allies will help the member that has been attacked. However, Ukraine is not a NATO member and thus does not qualify to obtain NATO protection under these founding principles of the alliance. Moreover, the United Nations Security Council is forcefully engaged in the selectivity of intervention by refraining to do so when faced with the dilemma of great power politics. This is because of Russia’s standing as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and it is not a signatory of the Rome Statute and thus does not recognise the competence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to cooperate with war crimes and higher atrocity crimes investigations. There have been allegations raised on Russians adopting Ukrainian found children from basements in Mariupol and the Donbass region to raise “children of the state” as Russians, which has been criticised by human rights advocates.334 Russia has allegedly been reported of holding an estimated 6,000 Ukrainian children from guardians containing debatable care rights with the intention of instilling “political re-education” in 331 Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo, p. xiv. 332 Malone and Wermester, “Boom and Bust?” p. 48. 333 Shelley Inglis, “Russia Is Blocking Security Council Action on the Ukraine War—

But the United Nations Is Still the Only International Peace Forum,” The Conversation, March 7, 2022. 334 Sarah El Deeb, Anastasiia Shvets and Elizaveta Tilna, “How Moscow Grabs Ukrainian Kids and Makes Them Russians,” Associated Press News, October 13, 2022.

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a minimum of 43 camps and facilities within Russia and Crimea.335 As a response, the ICC Prosecutor, Karim Khan, has released arrest warrants for a handful of Russians allegedly responsible for the mass kidnapping Ukrainian children and shelling civilian infrastructure.336 In relation to the unlawful deportation and transfer of children from occupied parts of Ukraine to Russia, Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Russian Children’s Rights Commissioner, have been issued arrest warrants by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II for specifically contravening Articles 8 (2) (a) (vii) and 8 (2) (b) (viii) of the Rome Statute.337 Putin has also been indicted for failing to control military subordinates for conducting the unlawful transfers of children and Lvova-Belova has been accused of engaging in such acts directly with or through others.338 These acts constitute war crimes that alongside crimes against humanity and genocide, can be investigated by the ICC to attempt to bring Russian forces accountable for such crimes committed in Ukraine.339 This would be difficult because the origin of these investigated war crimes on the abduction of children and damage to civilian infrastructure in Ukraine committed by Russian forces derived from the initial invasion against Ukraine in February 2022, which constituted aggression. After the amendment of the ICC Statute in 2018, the crime of aggression has been defined and added to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide as a fourth international crime. The Court did so by adopting the definition on the crime of aggression from the 2010 Review Conference of the Statute in Kampala, constituting a state using armed force against the sovereignty, independence or integrity of another 335 Stuti Mishra, “Russia Held 6,000 Ukrainian Children for Re-education,” The Independent, February 15, 2023. 336 Julian Borger, “ICC to Issue First Arrest Warrants Linked to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” The Guardian, March 13, 2023. 337 International Criminal Court, “Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issue Arrest Warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova,” ICC: Press Release, March 17, 2023. 338 Articles 28 (b) and 25 (3) (a) of the Rome Statute (United Nations General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Last Amended 2010). ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6, July 17, 1998). 339 Unlike the previous territorial criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the ICC does not have a UN Chapter VII mandate, cannot try in absentia, but countries that have signed the Rome Statute can limit Putin’s movement (Howard Morrison, “War in Ukraine: Sky News at One,” Sky News, March 20, 2023, 13:30–14:00).

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state.340 However, the crime of aggression is “significantly more restrictive” than the ICC exercising its jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide insofar that the ICC only has the competence to prosecute individuals for aggression if their state has joined the ICC and granted the Court jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.341 Although Ukraine accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC, Russia has not signed the ICC and does not recognise the competence of the Court, meaning that the Court is unable to prosecute Russian military or political leaders for the crime of aggression.342 The International Court of Justice called for Russia “to immediately suspend the military operations” in Ukraine whilst it works on a decision to hold the Kremlin accountable for genocide.343 However, even if a case is reached the World Court holding Russia liable for genocide, it is likely that Moscow would ignore the recommendations and reparations. This postulation is based on the Reagan administration contravening international law when supporting the Contras to overthrow the communist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua without US Congress approval.344 On November 15, 2022, stray missiles have hit Przewodów, an eastern Polish village bordering Ukraine, which killed two agricultural workers.345 This incident is undergoing investigation whether the missile attack was directly launched by Russia or an “Ukrainian anti-missile defence system” to defensively hit a Russian missile.346 Poland’s Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, has held an urgent meeting within its 340 International Criminal Court, “How the Court Works,” International Criminal Court, 2020. 341 Claus Kreß, “On the Activation of the ICC to the Definition and Interpretation of International Crimes,” in The Rome Statute of the ICC at Its Twentieth Anniversary: Achievements and Perspectives, ed. Pavel Šturma (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2019), p. 51. 342 Anthony Dworkin, “Aggression on Trial: The Tricky Path Towards Prosecuting Russian War Leaders,” European Council on Foreign Relations, December 19, 2022. 343 International Court of Justice, “Allegations of Genocide Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),” Press Release, No. 2022/11, March 16, 2022. 344 The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America (1986) International Court of Justice (ICJ), 14. 345 Dan Sabbagh, Isobel Koshiw and Lorenzo Tondo, “Stray Russian Missiles Feared to Have Landed in Poland,” The Guardian, November 15, 2022. 346 Harry Taylor, Gloria Oladipo, Léonie Chao-Fong, Martin Belam and Samantha Lock, “Russia-Ukraine War: Poland Raises Military Readiness After Two Die in

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government on national defence and security issues and as a NATO member may consult with other members under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty to determine the threat and insecurity of any parties.347 Peskov has denied any Russian involvement, but NATO ambassadors will prepare for a meeting.348 On November 16, 2022, US President Biden has claimed that “it is unlikely in the lines of the trajectory that [the missile(s)] was fired from Russia.”349 Whilst NATO and Poland have not blamed Ukraine, Stoltenberg and Polish President, Andrej Duda, claimed that the missile was possibly triggered by a “Ukrainian air defence missile” struck against a Russian cruise missile attack.350 If NATO still decide that Article 4 is applicable to Poland—at their request as the threatened party—then NATO members would decide if a threat is present and further action to counter it. It must be noted that Article 4 does not place pressure on NATO members to act, as with Article 5, because it is based on consultation and not necessarily action. This can be demonstrated in February 2020, with Turkey when their soldiers were killed from a Syrian attack in which NATO consulted, recommending compliance “to the 2018 ceasefire” without undertaking action.351 Hence, if the Baltic states, Poland or Romania were attacked by Russia, then under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, the alliance would have to defend them.352 There is a peculiar paradox that the United States and the European Union claim by supporting Ukraine as an independent and democratic country. However, this support for Zelenskyy and Ukraine’s armed forces has undermined its status as a democracy due to atrocities committed in

Blast within Borders Following Russian Strikes Across Ukraine—Live,” The Guardian, November 15, 2022. 347 Piotr Skolimowski, Natalia Drozdiak and Natalia Ojewska, “Poland Says Russian-

Made Rocket Caused Blast Near Ukraine Border,” Bloomberg, November 15, 2022. 348 Federica Marsi and Ali Harb, “Russia-Ukraine Live: Deadly Explosion in Poland Sparks Concern,” Al Jazeera, November 15, 2022. 349 Joseph Robinette Biden Jr., “Missile That Hit Poland Is Unlikely to Have Been Fired from Russia, US President Joe Biden Says,” Sky News, November 16, 2022. 350 Jon Henley, “Missile That Hit Poland Likely Came from Ukraine Defences, Says NATO,” The Guardian, November 16, 2022. 351 Jens Stoltenberg, “Statement by the Secretary General After Article 4 Consultations,” NATO, February 28, 2020. 352 Sayers, “John Mearsheimer: We’re Playing Russian Roulette.”

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Donbass, Kherson and Mariupol. Therefore, Russia’s violations of international humanitarian law may be apparent, but Ukrainian troops are doing the same. In Donbass, Ukrainian forces have been violating the Minsk peace agreements since 2014 and persecuting their citizens on the basis of speaking Russian on a daily basis and have chosen a course of secession to Russia, for fear of Ukrainian nationalism. Furthermore, Ukraine’s ambitions becoming a democracy is seriously undermined by petty and grand corruption. By way of illustration, in a study, Ukraine civilians perceived high levels of extortion, but 61% of Ukrainians suggested that they would also take a bribe if they were a public official receiving poor wages, and most rejected a fixed Weberian bureaucratic system that would undermine opportunities to engage in petty corruption.353 Recently, the Deputy Head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office, Kyrylo Tymoshenko, resigned alongside another 10 resignations and summary dismissals, resulting in some politicians calling for American aid to Ukraine to be limited.354 These allegations against the integrity of Ukraine’s senior government that has seen politicians and ministers of parliament allegedly embezzle funds, notably international aid for the war, to purchase mansions and luxury cars.355 Based on these examples of petty and grand corruption, it could be argued that the former rests on a culture of corruption to get things done, which circumvents a red-tape Weberian bureaucracy, and the latter is due to a lack of accountability, competence and independence of a strong judiciary and anti-corruption agencies. In a recent study, it is found that corruption in Ukraine is a central, and deepened, social crisis and is different to corruption in other Western states that is unmet with robust anti-corruption policy.356 The roots of corruption in Ukraine are also linked to transnational organised

353 William L. Miller, Åse B. Grødeland and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina, A Culture of Corruption? Coping with Government in Post-Communist Europe (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), p. 165. 354 James

Waterhouse, “Ukraine War: Zelenskyy’s Government Launches AntiCorruption Drive,” BBC News, January 17, 2023. 355 Adam Taylor, “Ukrainian Journalists Are Uncovering Ukrainian Corruption,” The Washington Post, January 26, 2023. 356 Olena Busol, Oleksandr Kostenko and Bogan Romanyk, “The ‘Crisis-Type’ Phenomenon of Corruption in Ukraine,” Baltic Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2022), pp. 36–41.

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crime.357 Kyiv has been renowned for becoming a hub for prostitutes, drug addicts, rogues and several criminal gangs control many enterprises, including banks, and are sponsors of politicians and criminal gangs are protected.358 As theorised by Roubini, corruption has similarly permeated both Ukrainian public and private spheres that has resulted in a lack of trust and uncertainty in the market, thus plummeting Kyiv’s economy.359 There have been legally documented efforts to combat corruption in Ukraine. This includes a Supreme Anti-Corruption Court, ratifying the United Nations Convention against Corruption and domestically passing both civil and criminal conventions against corruption in 2006 and 2007 respectively. However, the anti-corruption framework fails from corrupt practices that become “a forced norm” and citizens must regularly bribe a judge to attain the legitimate decision of a court.360 Moreover, the legacy of Ukraine’s state transition from socialism under the Soviet Union to an immediate open market economy facilitated the extension of organised crime and corruption. This was due to the breakdown of state structures and Soviet controls undermining law and authority, and reoriented relationships with the external world that opened “the economy and the society.”361 Therefore, a legal solution, including the implementation of collective security law, could be contested as idealistic at this stage and, as Morgenthau argued, national interests must be separated from legal and moral perspectives.362 NATO is a defence organisation to protect its members from an external enemy attack that binds the founding of the alliance, but Ukraine is not a NATO member. In other words, power politics must truthfully be acknowledged because false hopes cannot wish away

357 H. P. Zharovska, “Modern Realities of Transnational Organised Crime in Ukraine,” Scientific Bulletin of Chernivtsi University, Vol. 724 (2013), pp. 120–125. 358 Phil Williams and John Picarelli, Organized Crime in Ukraine: Challenge and Response, United States Department of Justice, December 2002, Doc. No. 198321, 2000-IJ-CX-0006, p. 2. 359 Nouriel Roubini, “The Shadow Banking System Is Unravelling,” Financial Times, September 21, 2008. 360 Busol, Kostenko and Romanyk, “The ‘Crisis-Type’ Phenomenon of Corruption in Ukraine,” pp. 37, 40. 361 Williams and Picarelli, Organized Crime in Ukraine, pp. 6–7. 362 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and

Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).

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the necessity of power policies in international politics.363 Mearsheimer later contended that the United States and European allies wrongly perceive international politics as liberalist to pursue the rule of law when, in fact, realism holds high relevance—as evident with Russia’s retaliations to Ukraine.364 Similarly, Lukin has claimed that the West merely spread human rights, democracy and the rule of law as a smokescreen to strengthen the appeal for states to join Russia’s containment.365 In other words, Western militaristic foreign policies can contain liberal and imperialist drivers. Classical realists would address the principle of scepticism that contradicts great powers attempting to spread liberalist ideals as part of their moral crusades.366 Putin has the authority to make decisions based on Russia’s authoritarian political system that permits his illiberal conservatist global and anti-Western worldview.367 The West has retained most power after attributing to the demise of the Soviet Union and weakening Russia that has influenced Putin to allegedly restore heights and glory of the Soviet Union by making Russia more globally respectful and powerful.368 Rynning has also convincingly contended that NATO has failed to create concert between Europe and Russia insofar that Moscow has challenged Western liberal “restoration” and its eastward extension by intervening in Georgia in 2008 and “unlawfully” annexing Crimea in 2014.369 Similarly, Journo stresses that Putin’s aggressive authoritarian regime is evident with its 2014 annexation of Ukrainian parts.370 Russia’s foreign policy has become aggressive as a response to NATO and EU expansionism 363 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, In Defence of the National Interest (New York: Knopf, 1951). 364 Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” pp. 77–78. 365 Lukin, “Chauvinism or Chaos,” p. 453. 366 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 1948 ed.; Adrian Hyde-Price, “Realist Ethics

and the “War on Terror,” Globalizations, Vol, 6, No. 1 (March 2009), p. 31; Stephen Martin Walt, “The World Wants You to Think Like a Realist,” Foreign Policy, May 30, 2018. 367 Michael McFaul, “Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy,” International Security, Vol. 45, No. 2 (April 2020), pp. 114–117. 368 Stephen Kotkin, “What Putin Got Wrong About Ukraine, Russia, and the West,” interview by Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, Foreign Affairs, May 31, 2022. 369 Rynning, “The False Promise of Continental Concert,” p. 552. 370 Journo, “Why John Mearsheimer Gets Ukraine Wrong.”

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and efforts to upset the United States as the global hegemon.371 Putin’s foreign policy has undermined the “democratic peace” and North American and European regime theory of cooperation with Russia. Moscow seeks re-globalisation with its authoritarianism and belief of multipolarity to dismantle the Western-dominated liberal international order.372 This blatantly hinders liberalism. Putin is not caving into international legal standards with Western repercussions—namely, condemnation and sanctions—for an illegal invasion that did not exercise the rule of self-defence to wage war ( jus ad bellum) by attaining consent from the United Nations Security Council.373 Moreover, Russian armed forces have used prohibited weapons and targeted civilians that has contravened the rules and law of conduct within warfare ( jus in bello).374 Putin has retained his illiberal rule by ensuring that Ukraine does not join NATO, with moves such as encouraging Yanukovych to concede Ukraine’s NATO MAP in 2010, because democracy would spread to states that are geopolitically important for Russia to thwart the Kremlin’s regime. This approach has challenged regime theory, namely the ideology of Northern American and European “democratic peace” to further evidence that condemnation, sanctions and illegality of the Russian invasion and actions have not ceased the conflict. Based on these arguments, classical and structural realism explains the strategic interests of vested state interests and reaches an understanding of Moscow and Kyiv relations, meaning that holding Russia accountable for the invasion and war crimes seems unviable due to their standing in international politics. The interests of the United States rest on preservation of the liberal international order, which includes the promotion of regime theory with NATO allies, are impractical. Under a defensive neorealist lens, the threat of Russia forming an enduring alliance with China, enabling their market access and military support, would work towards potential further incursions of NATO members. This could enhance Moscow’s regional Eurasian hegemonic status to threaten the United States and its allied European security. This war is based on the

371 Feinstein and Pirro, “Testing the World Order,” pp. 817–818. 372 Benedikter, “The Role of Religion in Russia’s Ukraine War.” 373 Charter of the United Nations, Article 51, Chapter VII . 374 For a thorough explanation on the rules of jus ad bellum and jus ad bello, as part

of just war theory, see Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 1977.

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balance of relative power—resting on either the United States weakening Russia or vice versa by maintaining or changing the world order. The war is ravaged by almost 30 years of confrontation and the depletion of resources is inevitable for all parties involved that could shift towards a new relative power balance in the world system, signifying “a new world order.”375 Taking this into consideration, America’s unipolarity deriving in the early post-Cold War era is now flawed and balancing from both the United States with NATO members and Russia with China explains the dynamics of the defensive realist perspective of the war.

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CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

This book has been structured to respond to the research question on how realism explains the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The tenets of realism that best explain the power politics of the invasion include classical realism and structural realism (both offensive and defensive neorealism ). It has provided an international relations theoretical debate to the contemporary Russian invasion of Ukraine with detail on some of the historical relations between both states and NATO. The book lays out some of the historical background of the war, and its pursuit up until the time of writing. The argument is that varieties of realism can illuminate the actions of NATO, Russia and Ukraine. This is not to say that realism explains all relevant events better than all other theories, but alternative explanations—such as liberalist or constructivist—provide elucidations on regime theory, international law, and identity politics—but an understanding of power politics means that it is not always, and entirely, socially produced. There is some truth that national security interests produce foreign policy and is thus socially constructed by political leaders and societal interests.1 Russian actions, and foreign policy, is based on their illiberal non-Western authoritarian political regime. This has been driven by 1 Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1996), p. 276.

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identity politics on Ukraine’s existence, imperialism regarding reclaiming mainland territory and the ideology of de-Nazification and repercussions for decommunisation. In other words, Putin believes that Russia is merely reclaiming its land as evident with the referendums of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson and previous annexation of Crimea in 2014. The analysis has covered a range of Putin’s speeches on the status of Mother Russia and Ukraine as its little brother or son over the last decade to advocate Russians with power thinking they have a right to influence over areas historically and even “spiritually” aligned with it as “one nation” or “one people.”2 Therefore, NATO expansionism cannot linearly explain Russia’s incursion of Ukraine. In relation to Ukraine, the Orange and Maidan Revolutions can be explained with the threat of Yanukovych to Ukrainian national identity and desire for Western policy as a means of viability towards EU and NATO accession. This means that constructivism, and potentially post-structuralism, could also explain some of the decision-making and actions of Russian and Ukrainian revolutions other than solely material or power politics. Despite this needed counterargument, the book has tested the main tenets of realism regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to demonstrate that classical realism and both offensive and defensive neorealism best explain the war. The inclusion of alternative international relations theories has proved useful to demonstrate that constructivism has some role to play on ideational politics, myths, symbols, political discourse and beliefs. Language games are instrumental for marketing war to the populace that Putin, Zelenskyy and the West have entered on Ukraine being “the good,” Russia being “the bad” and the West supporting the “good” to stop further Russian imperialism.3 Despite this portrayal of the war in Western mainstream media, events show the limits of liberalism, principally the stagnated role of the United Nations and international law

2 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” The President of Russia, July 12, 2021. 3 Constructivism is highly useful to also interrogate Putin’s justification of Russia’s Special Military Operation to save Russian-speaking people from genocide in the Donbass region, because there is futile evidence to support these claims that have been marketed to the Russian population. Therefore, the just war debate of a humanitarian intervention from Russia to save Russian-speaking people in the Donbass region and the targeting of Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure stretches beyond military necessity and contravenes proportionality.

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failing to fully hold Putin accountable for violations of international humanitarian law.4 Classical realism explains statism, survival and self-help that have been exercised by the United States with its allied cooperation of NATO members, Russia (post-Warsaw Pact) and Ukraine. The events from the Cold War era have further escalated the security dilemma between the relations of Russia and Ukraine. The Kremlin has continued to support both separatist rebellion movements in Luhansk and Donetsk located in eastern Ukraine and the referendums have reclaimed further territory from Ukraine. Putin has (re)acted with the hunger for further power (as explained by the pessimistic view of human nature) to strip parts from eastern and southern Ukraine as a response to the security dilemma presented by NATO’s expansionist encouragement.5 This has formed Moscow uncertainty on Ukrainian ambitions to join the counterbalance of NATO against Russia and to remain the hegemon over the Black Sea for accessing the Mediterranean Sea for Syria. Syria is the only client state in the Middle East that Russia has secured, and Moscow has bolstered its relations with Beijing because both regional hegemons believe in multipolarity to rival the global hegemony of the United States. At the same time, defensive realism explains Ukraine’s desirable accession to NATO and seeking support from its members to reclaim Mariupol and areas of the Donbass region due to the legacy of Crimean annexation, the Donbass War and Yanukovych’s allegiance to Russian interests. Although the mid-November 2022 incident of stray missiles striking Poland marked the initial instance of a NATO member being affected by the war, given Russia’s power and the initial responses of the United 4 This is not to say that liberalism is entirely fruitless because regime theory and institutional liberalism explains why states and international organisations, including NATO and the United Nations, establish and obey standardised rules and pursue accountability for states that contravene international law. 5 In this context, Putin’s policy on Ukraine is driven by his human nature of glorification and the lust for power that has resulted in the pursuit of relative gain without considering strategic prudence and restraint. Under this explanation of classical realism, as proposed by Morgenthau, great powers at times engaged in self-help and disregard restraint and obscure calculations of the benefits and risks of over-extension (Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). p. 15). This is evident with the Russian invasion of Ukraine because the Special Military Operation has exceeded one year of fighting against a resilient and Western-backed Ukraine, resulting in Moscow’s high military deployment, expenditure and military casualties.

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States, Poland and NATO dismissing the strikes from the Russian armed forces, it is unlikely that Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty will result in action beyond condemnation. Therefore, this book has responded to the research question to validate how classical realism and neorealism (both offensive and defensive realism) explain the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the latter’s resistance aided by the support from NATO powers. To put simply, classical realism explains the power, neglection of morality and subordination of diplomacy between NATO members wanting to contain Russia and Moscow and Kyiv pursuing their selfinterests for survival. This is advanced by an understanding on structural realism suggesting that the sovereign inequality of states within an anarchical international system results in the belief of worst-case scenarios of rival discreet political communities thus intensifying uncertainty and a lack of trust. By understanding offensive realism, the security dilemma places states to pursue relative gains to provide leverage over competing states. These forms of realism are pivotal to understand the conflicting interests of NATO, Ukraine and Russia that have amounted to the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine arising from the Kremlin’s fear of containment and losing control of a post-Soviet satellite state. The war in Ukraine functions as the West’s confrontation with Russia and a peace settlement has a low chance of bringing the war to a close in the near future.6 If war is to be brought to a close, Ukraine should not be a proxy or buffer zone representing the actual confrontation between the West and Russia. As similarly argued by Zi˛eba, Ukraine should not be used as a bargain between the United States and Russia, representing the West’s and Russia’s rivalry.7 Preventive intervention in Russia could prove costly for Western powers which is why NATO members continue to support Ukraine financially and militarily without direct intervention. Similarly, Russia would have to take care of declaring war, rather than an invasion, with Ukraine due to NATO’s troop and weapons presence among its borders. Morgenthau’s strategic prudence will always be presented when faced by Russia. This was evident during the Cold War with its larger predecessor (the Soviet Union), whilst NATO powers encourage Ukrainian resilience to 6 Konstantin Konstantinowitsch Khudoley, “New Russia-West Confrontation: War of Attrition or Escalation?” Strategic Analysis (November 2022), pp. 8–9. 7 Ryszard Zi˛eba, “The Ukraine Crisis as the Rivalry for Spheres of Influence between the West and Russia,” International and Security Studies, January 2020. p. 190.

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try and further weaken Russia. A direct intervention regarding the rules of collective security is difficult to implement due to the uncertainty of NATO powers having the capacity, and willingness, to defeat Russia as the identified aggressor. NATO provides collective defence for its members to protect each other, and it would be difficult to justify directly defending Ukraine with the use of force against Russia. At the same time, legal stalemates can be addressed that undermine regime theory, and liberalism, of mutual norms, rules, procedures, obligations and expectations. Russia has control over the Black Sea because Turkey remains neutral. Russia does not recognise the competence of the ICC on war crimes and Moscow has ignored the call from the World Court to suspend its military operations in Ukraine. R2P is non-legally binding and its most punitive third pillar merely highlights the instruments of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Russia is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and thus any form of humanitarian intervention could not commence against Moscow because it would veto such calls and Russia is not killing their own civilians. Based on this argument made, it can be contended that international legal arguments have done little to bring an end to the war. Although the Russian crime of aggression and targeting of Ukrainian civilian infrastructure constitute contraventions of just war ethics, the international political position of Moscow that is increasingly being supported by China and other powerful allies has thwarted international legal and just war concerns. Russia has been placed in a position to attain self-help and survival to avoid further containment from Ukraine’s admission into NATO. Russian scepticism of NATO and Ukrainian ambitions could remain due to the uncertainty of other state’s actions, as confined within an anarchical international system because NATO’s interests are to protect its members as a collective defence organisation rather than function as a central authority. At the same time, powerful Western states and neighbours will fear Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forming further incursions. This is evident with Scandinavian states now declaring their interests to join NATO. Zelenskyy knew the rules of the game that was well informed from the build-up of Russian forces on its borders from late 2021 to February 2022 but he continued to pursue joining NATO that suited both NATO and Ukrainian realist interests. With Ukraine pursuing its realist interests, but as a lesser power, it could be argued that the rules of the game dictated by larger and influential powers, namely Russia, are

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of importance. The Kremlin does not want further containment from its neighbour and signalled its response with the previous interventions in Georgia and Crimea. However, the United States and its European followers continued with Ukraine’s status as a NATO ally country that has intensified conflict with Russia rather than working to make Ukraine neutral to rebuild relations with Moscow. As explained from the classical realist principle of scepticism, Putin already distrusts the United States and NATO in relation to questioning their legitimacy on the bombing of Serbia (1999), intervention in Iraq (2003) and change of mandate resulting in regime change in Libya (2011) and thus Moscow feels a security threat from NATO and Kiev’s potential future accession. It must be acknowledged that there is no guarantee that Ukraine’s neutrality by NATO’s membership objectives would form reconciliation with Russia because a few years of Kyiv’s neutrality did not prevent the Crimea intervention.8 The legacy of Yanukovych’s allegiance to the Kremlin and annexation of Crimea are events that Zelenskyy is trying to avoid and thus it is hard to merely serve as a puppet leader for Russian interests. As an unfortunate consequence of this tripartite realism, it is Ukrainian civilians that are paying the price whilst NATO powers pursue their geopolitical interests by attempting to contain and weaken Russia with the provision of tantamount military and humanitarian aid. Strategic prudence and rules of collective security (namely having the capacity to defeat an aggressor with the help of allies) have been miscalculated by Zelenskyy and Western allies. NATO is a collective defence organisation that provides defence against external attack, but Ukraine is not a NATO member. By a similar vein, Putin is allegedly under pressure from army generals who are displeased with the slow progress that the Russian army are making in Ukraine when outnumbering their troops by 5 to 1 and are resentful of mobilised conscription. The real beneficiaries with relative gains over Russia are NATO due to Finland’s membership and the current process of ratifying Sweden’s accession that could later host NATO military bases; additional sanctions weakening the Kremlin; and military support of Ukraine tainting Russian military progress—whilst avoiding to directly engage in the conflict. 8 Hanna Shelest, “After the Ukrainian Crisis: Is There a Place for Russia?” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (August 2015), pp. 199–200.

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In this situation, the great tragedy with international politics is that NATO has continually pursued expansionism eastward among Russian borders to sway away from its initial Cold War bipolar counterbalance against the Soviet Union to conform Western influence to severely contain, and antagonise, Moscow. Notwithstanding Georgia and Ukraine not meeting the requirements to join NATO in 2008, Britain compromised with both states to stress that they would eventually join the alliance.9 Despite Russia’s immediate response in 2008 with Georgia concerning Abkhazia and South Ossetia and 2014 in Ukraine regarding Crimea, Western leaders remained supportive of Ukraine’s National Security Strategy vying for NATO membership. In 2019, Ukraine amended its Constitution to include joining NATO and the European Union as its principal strategic interests. The tragedy is that these avoidable actions attributed to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine that has now made it increasingly difficult for Ukraine to join NATO as a member because it would further antagonise Moscow. Furthermore, based on the Western robust support for Kyiv to defend its territory, it is unlikely that Ukraine can or will be supported to become a neutral state to rebuild its severed relations with Russia. The United States and its European allies of NATO have presented a dominant narrative from a liberal perspective to promote a “logic of appropriateness” that actually supports American global policy, including towards Russia. Under the model of the “logic of consequences,” this is a dangerous consequentialist war of the United States and almost the entire West against Russia, to the last Ukrainian. Perhaps the defensive realist balancing of power could be reinvigorated to better understand the realpolitik of great powers in international politics to encourage stronger diplomatic relations between Russia and Ukraine. This can avoid the losses incurred by Ukraine, Russia and NATO. For Ukraine, this includes the loss of civilian lives, losing its ministates located in the east and south and departing from its neutral status. For Russia, this comprises international condemnation, sanctions, civilian protests and confutative military stagnation. For NATO, it has further antagonised Moscow that has made diplomacy between its member states and Russian allies extremely difficult to accomplish. Even if 9 Stephen Martin Walt, “Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis,” Foreign Policy, January 19, 2022.

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diplomacy is attained, it is unlikely to establish long-lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine that may either become a frozen conflict or both states may re-enter war.

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Index

A Abkhazia, 76, 77, 127, 140, 215 Afghanistan, 17, 71, 72, 99, 102, 106, 111 al-Assad, Bashar, 50, 51, 109, 129, 139 al-Qaddafi, Muammar, 76, 103, 104, 106–108 Anarchy, 3, 8–10, 12, 14–16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 35, 37–43, 46, 52–56, 77, 78 Annan, Kofi, 175 Annex(ation), 4, 5, 97, 123, 124, 132, 136, 145, 160, 165, 185, 210, 211, 214 B Bakhmut, 148, 149 Balance of power, 2, 6, 10, 14–16, 39–41, 45, 53, 67, 74, 100, 102, 124–126, 136 Bandera, Stepan, 124, 135, 138, 139 Bandwagoning, 15, 24 Battalion, Azov, 135, 138

Belarus, 2, 72, 84, 132, 143, 144, 150, 158, 163 Berlin blockade, 69 Biden, Joe, 86, 89, 93–95, 97, 143, 146, 163, 165, 167, 182 Bipolarity, 15 Black Sea, 127, 140, 146, 170, 211, 213 Blair, Tony, 175, 176 Blinken, Anthony, 94, 145, 146 Bourdieu, Pierre, 36 Bucharest Summit, 76, 126 Bush, George W., 49, 72, 127 C Carr, E.H., 19–21, 96, 100 Ceasefire, 2, 76, 93, 160, 163, 182 Charap, Samuel, 76, 96, 122, 123, 125, 131, 158, 165, 168 Charter of the United Nations, 4, 5, 30, 31, 43, 50, 51, 95, 97, 109, 154, 155, 162, 170, 171, 176, 178, 179, 186, 213 Chernobyl, 71, 72, 162

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Singh, The Tripartite Realist War: Analysing Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34163-2

257

258

INDEX

China, 5, 17, 33, 34, 39, 93, 94, 97, 98, 105, 107–111, 131, 145, 149, 150, 160, 163, 186, 187, 213 Civilian casualties, 1, 101, 107, 141, 150, 152, 172–174, 178 Classical realism, 2, 3, 8, 11, 12, 56, 67, 78, 87, 92, 127, 209–212 Clinton, Bill, 74, 176, 178 Cold War, 2, 4, 5, 7, 16, 26, 31, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 49, 53, 67, 69, 71, 73, 74, 76, 78, 92, 95, 99, 100, 110, 111, 125, 130, 144, 145, 163, 187, 211, 212, 215 Collective defence, 2, 6, 69, 70, 77, 78, 88, 97, 213, 214 Collective security, 3, 6, 24, 28–30, 78, 103, 109, 142, 167, 171, 179, 184, 213, 214 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 72, 134 Communism, 17, 25, 39, 42, 68, 69, 71–73 Constructivism (conventional), 3, 35, 38 Constructivism (critical), 36, 48 Corruption, 122, 183, 184 Cosmopolitanism, 12, 25 Crimea, 4, 5, 83, 112, 123–127, 132, 133, 137, 140, 145, 146, 157, 160, 180, 185, 210, 214, 215 Crimes against humanity, 29, 31, 180, 181 Cuba, 131

D Decommunisation, 126, 134, 210 Democratic peace, 12, 24–27, 33, 34, 44, 55, 74, 75, 102, 186 De-Nazification, 210

Diplomacy, 2, 6, 8–10, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 50, 51, 67, 72, 167, 212, 215, 216 Discourse, 3, 6, 38, 41, 47, 102, 134, 135, 210 Donbass, 5, 92, 123, 128, 131, 133, 137, 141, 145, 146, 148, 149, 156, 157, 159, 179, 183, 211 Donbass War, 5, 127, 128, 133, 138, 211 Donetsk, 5, 83, 123, 127, 128, 132, 133, 140, 143, 144, 148, 149, 165, 169, 210, 211 Doyle, Michael, 24–26, 31–33, 177

E Energy, 6, 110, 146, 147, 156, 162, 164, 210 European Union (EU), 2, 16, 76, 84, 85, 87, 90, 92, 95, 121–124, 128, 130, 157–159, 164, 182, 185, 210, 215

F Finnemore, Martha, 37, 43, 44, 46, 54 France, 69, 75, 85, 87, 89, 92, 106, 128, 158, 174 Fukuyama, Francis, 38, 73

G Gas, 5, 121, 158, 159, 164, 165 Geneva Conventions, 37, 140, 152, 156 Genocide, 27, 29–31, 109, 126, 133, 144, 156, 169, 172, 177, 179–181 Germany, 19, 53, 67–70, 72, 75, 77, 85, 89, 92, 96, 98, 107, 128, 138, 142, 158

INDEX

259

Giddens, Anthony, 36, 53 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 72, 77 Group of Seven (G7), 158, 159, 164

J Johnson, Boris, 88 Just war theory, 33, 150, 156, 186

H Hegemony, 13, 15, 22, 78, 86, 97, 211 Hobbes, Thomas, 10, 37 Hopf, Ted, 39–42, 44, 45, 48 Humanitarian intervention, 19, 21, 24, 25, 29, 31, 32, 42, 100, 103–106, 154–156, 174–177, 210, 213 Hyde-Price, Adrian, 12, 19, 20

K Kant, Immanuel, 26, 27, 29, 33, 34, 37, 102 Kherson, 137, 143, 157, 165, 183, 210 Khudoley, Konstantin, 75, 85, 92, 95, 100, 110, 111, 125, 128–130, 134, 143, 144, 146, 157, 159, 160, 164, 169, 212 Kissinger, Henry, 20, 75, 110, 111, 160–162 Kosovo, 5, 106, 124, 170, 171, 173, 175–179

I Institutionalism liberalism, 30 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 30, 31 International Criminal Court (ICC), 179–181, 213 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 173, 174 International humanitarian law, 24, 105, 151, 156, 166, 176, 183, 211 International law, 3–5, 17, 19, 23, 24, 27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 43, 55, 67, 76, 83, 93, 95, 97, 100, 102, 103, 105, 109, 121, 151, 155, 156, 158, 167, 170–172, 175–179, 181, 209–211 International order (liberal), 74, 94, 95, 97, 109, 110, 112, 133, 156, 186 Iran, 49–52, 150 Iraq, 5, 26, 50, 51, 76, 83, 96, 99–102, 106–109, 136, 177, 214

L Lavrov, Sergey, 133, 162, 163, 167 Libya, 5, 35, 76, 83, 105, 106, 108, 109, 129, 214 Luban, David, 104, 108, 155, 175, 178 Luhansk, 5, 123, 127, 128, 132, 133, 140, 143, 144, 165, 210, 211

M Machiavelli, Niccolò, 10 Maidan Revolution, 83, 122, 123, 135, 155, 210 Mandelbaum, Michael, 75 Mariupol, 1, 137, 138, 140, 165, 179, 183, 211 McFaul, Michael, 93, 185 McMahan, Jeff, 152–154, 173, 174, 178 Mearsheimer, John, 12–14, 22, 75, 76, 78, 86, 91, 93–95, 101, 110, 111, 124, 125, 131, 132, 136,

260

INDEX

137, 142, 144–146, 155, 168, 169, 185 Membership Action Plan (MAP), 85, 122, 125, 186 Military necessity, 6, 107, 108, 150, 151, 156, 172–175, 210 Mill, John Stuart, 32 Minsk Agreements, 128, 155 Monroe Doctrine, 131 Montreux Convention, 170 Morgenthau, Hans, 7, 10–12, 17, 18, 21, 40, 55, 92, 184, 185, 211, 212 Mujahideen, 17, 71 Multipolarity, 38, 53, 186, 211

N National Security Strategy (Ukraine), 85–87, 133, 215 NATO accession, 70, 85, 130, 133, 161, 167, 211 NATO expansionism, 2, 4, 22, 73, 74, 77, 86, 95, 132, 155, 210 Nazism, 135 Neoliberalism, 25, 27, 53 Neorealism (defensive), 3, 15, 16, 56, 71, 88, 111, 209, 210 Neorealism (offensive), 3, 78, 127 Nicaragua, 130, 131, 150, 181 No-fly zone, 104–106, 168, 169 North Atlantic Treaty, 69, 71, 78, 97, 167, 179, 182, 212 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 2–7, 15, 16, 23, 24, 30, 49, 52, 56, 67, 69–78, 83–93, 95–100, 103, 104, 106–112, 121, 122, 124–127, 129–137, 139, 141–144, 146, 152, 155, 158–161, 164–179, 182, 184–187, 209–215 Nuclear non-proliferation, 41, 97, 143

Nuclear weapons, 110, 134, 143, 168, 169

O Oil, 99, 101, 140, 147, 149, 158, 164, 165 Oligarchs, 1, 122, 139, 157 Onuf, Nicholas, 42, 46–48, 56 Orange Revolution, 83, 84 Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 165 Over-extension, 15, 40, 211

P Peloponnesian War, 9 Peskov, Dmitry, 145, 159, 182 Poland, 1, 68, 70, 77, 90, 137–139, 142, 159, 181, 182, 211, 212 Poroshenko, Petro, 128, 129 Prigozhin, Yevgeny, 148 Proportionality, 150, 152, 153, 156, 172–175, 178, 210 Prudence, 8, 17–21, 23, 55, 71, 87, 92–94, 101, 168, 169, 175, 211, 212, 214 Putin, Vladimir, 5, 6, 75–77, 84–87, 91–94, 96, 98–100, 103, 123–126, 129–137, 139–146, 148, 149, 155, 158, 159, 165, 168, 170, 177–180, 185, 186, 210, 211, 214

R Reagan, Ronald, 25, 131, 181 Reciprocity, 17, 21, 87, 156, 169 Refugees, 1, 90, 91, 106, 171, 173, 175 Regime theory, 3, 4, 24, 25, 27, 29, 35, 54, 73, 77, 83, 92, 93, 97,

INDEX

98, 156, 159, 186, 209, 211, 213 Relative gain/power, 3, 13, 14, 16, 38, 71, 78, 86, 87, 93, 127, 140, 141, 144, 187, 211, 212, 214 Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 4, 5, 22, 24, 25, 30, 31, 83, 104–106, 108, 176 Rwanda, 109, 177, 178, 180 S Saakashvili, Mikheil, 76 Saddam, Hussein, 88, 99–101 Sanctions, 1, 3–5, 28–30, 33, 50, 51, 67, 86–88, 91–93, 95, 98, 100, 101, 104–106, 108, 109, 112, 121, 125, 132, 139, 146, 149, 154, 157–160, 163–165, 167, 186, 214, 215 Saudi Arabia, 164, 165 Scepticism, 8, 17, 20–23, 30, 51, 55, 71, 97, 185, 213, 214 Second World War (World War II), 1, 19, 68, 69, 88, 98, 99, 124, 138, 141, 143 Security dilemma, 5, 10, 14–17, 24, 35, 41, 42, 49, 50, 71, 77, 78, 91, 92, 125, 132, 211, 212 Serbia, 5, 83, 100, 108, 170–173, 176, 177, 179, 214 Soledar, 149 Soleimani, Qasem, 50, 51 South Ossetia, 76, 77, 140, 215 Soviet Union, 2, 4, 5, 7, 16, 17, 25, 26, 39, 49, 67–75, 91, 97, 110, 127, 130, 134, 135, 137, 144, 164, 184, 185, 212, 215 Special Military Operation, 133, 136, 141, 144, 156, 159, 210, 211 State sovereignty, 4, 5, 27, 31, 34, 95, 99, 177 Structuration theory, 36–38

261

Syria, 5, 35, 50, 104, 108, 109, 127, 129, 130, 139, 140, 150, 211

T Taiwan, 93, 94, 97, 98 Thucydides, 8, 9, 14, 141 Trenin, Dmitri, 75, 124–128, 136, 137 Truman Doctrine, 68, 70 Turkey, 68, 70, 91, 160, 170, 182, 213

U Ukraine Constitution, 85, 215 Ukraine nationalism, 135–137, 183 United Kingdom (UK), 25, 28, 48, 67, 69, 88, 89, 91, 106, 107, 109, 132, 158, 159, 164, 172, 175 United Nations Security Council, 5, 18, 30, 51, 100, 104, 105, 107, 109, 128, 155, 159, 170, 172, 176–179, 186, 213 United Nations (UN), 1, 5, 29, 30, 35, 55, 95, 100, 104–109, 129, 149, 154–156, 163, 170, 171, 173–180, 210, 211

V Vietnam, 17, 26, 39, 40, 68, 99, 109

W Wagner (Group), 148 Walt, Stephen, 14, 18, 22, 23, 26, 74, 75, 77, 94, 95, 101, 104, 111, 112, 122, 123, 131–133, 155, 166, 215 Waltz, Kenneth, 11, 15, 16, 18, 38–41, 53, 71, 74, 124, 125

262

INDEX

Walzer, Michael, 32, 33, 140, 141, 144, 153, 154, 170–172, 174, 177, 178, 186 War crimes, 3, 6, 22, 29, 31, 147, 170, 179–181, 186, 213 Warsaw Pact, 4, 7, 67, 70, 71, 73, 74 Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), 99–101 Weber, Max, 38 Wendt, Alexander, 35, 37–41, 43, 52, 54 Wilson, Woodrow, 25 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 47, 126

Y Yanukovych, Viktor, 83, 84, 122–126, 128, 129, 133, 135, 155, 186, 210, 211, 214 Yeltsin, Boris, 72 Yushchenko, Viktor, 83, 84, 121, 125, 138 Z Zaporizhzhia, 143–145, 162, 165, 210 Zelenskyy, Volodymyr, 85, 86, 88, 93, 130, 142, 143, 147, 149, 160, 162, 164–168, 170, 182, 210, 213, 214 Zi˛eba, Ryszard, 90, 91, 98, 122, 139, 169, 212