The Transitional Program for Socialist Revolution [3 ed.] 0873485246, 9780873485241

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THE TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM FOR SOCIALIST REVOLUTION LEON TROTSKY INCLUDING “THE DEATH AGONY OF CAPITALISM AND THE TASKS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL”

WITH INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS BY JOSEPH HANSEN AND GEORGE NOVACK

Edited b y George Breitman and Fred Stanton Copyright © 1973, 1974, and 1977 by Pathfinder Press All rights reserved First Edition 1 9 7 3 Second Edition 1 9 7 4 Third Edition 1 9 7 7

Manufactured in the United States of America Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 77-78023 ISBN cloth 0-87348-523-8; paper 0-87348-524-6 Pathfinder Press 410 West Street New York, N.Y. 10014

CONTENTS Preface Trotsky's Transitional Program: Its Origins and Significance for Today by Joseph Hansen Transitional and Democratic Slogans as Bridges to Socialist Revolution by Joseph Hansen The Role of the Transitional Program in the Revolutionary Process by George Novack

PART I: DISCUSSIONS WITH TROTSKY BEFORE THE TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM Preparing the Program for the Founding Conference (March 20, 1938) How to Fight for a Labor Party in the U.S. (March 21, 1938) The Struggle Against War, and the Ludlow Amendment (March 22, 1938) A Summary of Transitional Demands (March 23, 1938) The Problem of the Labor Party (April 1938)

5 9 31 38

75 77

90 98 107

PART II: THE DEATH AGONY OF CAPITALISM AND THE TASKS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL 109 by Leon Trotsky PART III: PRECONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS The Political Backwardness of the American Workers (May 19, 1938) U.S. and European Labor Movements: A Comparison (May 31, 1938) "For" the Fourth International? No! The Fourth International! (May 31, 1938) Completing the Program and Putting It to Work (June 7, 1938)

155

160 167 171

"It Is Necessary to Drive the Bureaucracy and Aristocracy out of the Soviets" (July 4, 1938) How Economic Shifts Affect Mass Moods (July 20, 1938) Three Possibilities with a Labor Party (July 23, 1938) "For a Workers' and Farmers' Government" (July 29, 1938) Excerpt from "A Great Achievement" (August 30, 1938)

APPENDIX I: A Transitional Program for Black Liberation APPENDIX II: A Strategy for Revolutionary Youth Notes Index

183 186 189 194 198

200 221 247

262

Preface

The Fourth

International

(World Party

o f Socialist Revolution)

was founded at an international conference held in France in September 1938, one year before the start of World War 11. That conference, later referred to as the First World Congress, adopted a basic programmatic document entitled “The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International,” also known a s the Transitional Program. This book i s about the Transitional Program, containing not only its text but also transcripts of discussions and articles about it by its author, Leon Trotsky. Although it was not founded until 1938, the Fourth International was rooted in a struggle that began in the Soviet Union i n 1923, shortly before the death of Lenin, and then spread throughout the world. This was the struggle for authentic Bolshevism initiated by Lenin and continued by the Left Opposition, led by Trotsky, against the privileged, revisionist Soviet bureaucracy, led by Joseph Stalin. In the first stage of this conflict the Left Opposition tried to reform the Communist (Third) International

a n d its affiliated

parties. This effort

ended

in 1933 when the Stalinists capitulated without a struggle to Hitlerism in Germany, and the Left Oppositionists set out to build a new International and new revolutionary national parties.

At the end of 1937, Trotsky, then exiled in Mexico, thought that the time had come to found the Fourth International, and plans were made to hold an international conference in 1938 to decide this question. I n preparation for the conference Trotsky began work o n several resolutions, later consolidated into the Transitional Program, that would provide the programmatic basis for the new International. I n March 1938 h e held extensive discussions of the projected Transitional Program with leaders of the Socialist Workers Party of the United States, who visited him in Mexico. I n April h e completed the first draft of the program,

6

The Transitional Program

which w a s then submitted for a n international discussion that lasted for several months before the international conference. Trotsky participated i n that discussion by writing articles published in internal bulletins a n d by holding several conversations and interviews a b ou t various aspects of the Transitional Program.

Fortunately, much of Trotsky’s thinking about the Transitional Program w a s recorded by stenographers present at the discussions before and after the completion of the first draft. I n reading these transcripts, it should b e kept i n mind that they were not edited or corrected by Trotsky or the other participants in the discussions, and that Trotsky w as speaking in English, a language that gave him some difficulty, and n o t i n h i s native Russian. This explains why formulations in the Transitional Program and other Trotsky articles translated from the Russian are more precise than those in the transcripts. Trotsky thought that the Transitional Program, correctly understood, would lead the movement to a higher level of political thought and practice. At the same time, h e stressed that its ideas, far from being new, were only a synthesis of the collective experience a n d education of the revolutionary movement over several decades. I n spite of that, the expression of some of these ideas, and the arguments Trotsky presented in support of them, disconcerted or shook up many leaders of the movement, compelling them to reconsider and alter attitudes and premises held for many years. I n fact, Trotsky said in the preconference discussion in June 1938, one reason for the Transitional Program was to “provoke” such reexaminations. I t h ad that effect very quickly with the leaders of the Socialist Workers Party, who changed their positions o n antiwar tactics and the labor party question after thinking over their discussions with Trotsky in 1938, and it h a s exerted a strong influence o n the Fourth International

Program sometimes

ever s i n c e .

remains

a

Four

decades

later,

source of inspiration

o f contention—among

the sections

the Transitional

and

action—and

and sympathizers

of the Fourth International. This is not at all surprising, since the Transitional Program offers an approach or method for coping with the central problem confronting revolutionists in every country—that of “uniting the masses for a revolutionary struggle for power.” During the preconference discussion Trotsky cautioned that the Transitional

Program

a s written

i n 1938

w a s not complete, and

Preface

7

that along with additions i t would require modifications that would b e suggested by experience i n applying the program. Nevertheless Trotsky said at the end of the discussion in August, when the delegates h a d already assembled in France, that the acceptance of the Transitional Program demonstrated in the preconference discussion represented “our most important conquest.” Not all the delegates were in complete agreement with the Transitional Program, an d they debated a number of amendments both major and minor; but they approved the program by an overwhelming majority. After that, they voted by a similar margin to establish the Fourth International then a nd there, rather than postpone it as a minority proposed. (See the minutes of the conference in Documents of the Fourth International: The Formative Years [1933-40], Pathfinder Press, 1973, p . 284.) The first section of this book presents introductory articles by Joseph Hansen and George N ovack, both of whom are leaders of the Socialist Workers Party. Hansen was Trotsky’s secretary in Mexico, 1937-40, and is currently editor of Intercontinental Press. H i s first contribution

w a s written

for this book i n 1 9 7 3 , a n d his

second i s taken from a report h e made to the Twenty-fourth National

Convention

o f the Socialist

Workers

Party

in 1 9 7 1 .

N ovack was secretary of the American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky during the Moscow trials, 1936-38, and i s the author of several books on philosophy and history. His article is based on three lectures given in 1971 at an educational conference in Oberlin, Ohio. Following the Trotsky documents and transcripts in this book we h a v e included

two documents—“A

Transitional

Program

for

Black Liberation” and “ A Strategy for Revolutionary Youth”—as examples of applications of the Transitional Program to today’s struggles. Adopted by the Socialist Workers Party’s Twenty-third N ational Convention in 1969, “A Transitional Program for Black Liberation” i s based on the experience of the civil rights movement and other struggles waged by the Afro-American communities

in the United

States

i n the 1 9 6 0 s . This

program

outlines a revolutionary socialist strategy for Black liberation, centering on the raising of demands for Black control of the Black community. I t is not intended as the last word on the subject; the demands listed here need to b e supplemented by those raised since 1969 by Black G I s , prisoners, feminists, as well a s others that will emerge from future struggles.

8

The Transitional Program

“A Strategy for Revolutionary Youth” was written in 1969 and first appeared under the title “The Worldwide Youth Radicaliza tion and the Tasks of the Fourth International.” It was presented by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International to a world congress of that organization held in April 1969, to open an international discussion of the youth radicalization. Based on the experience of the student movements of the late sixties, the document is an attempt to understand the international youth revolt and its meaning for the socialist revolution. The third edition of this book includes material in Part I that was not available for the first edition, printed here with the permission of the Harvard College Library. The third edition ha s been reannotated and provided with a more comprehensive index, minor corrections have been made in translations from Trotsky’s Russian texts, and minor changes have been made in the transcripts where they were ambiguous or unclear. I t also contains a letter dated May 31, 1938, and an extract dated August 30, 1938, which were not used in previous editions. The introductions by Hansen and Novack have also been modified slightly. The Editors March 1977

Trotsky’s Transitional Program: Its Origins and Significance for Today by J o s e p h

Hansen

I. Among Trotsky’s contributions to revolutionary Marxism, the Transitional Program occupies a place that is in general not well understood. Sectarians w h o claim to b e Trotskyists regard it as scripture. Others, of opposite temperament, consider it to b e outmoded, however applicable it may have been a third of a century ago when it was written. E v e n Isaac Deutscher failed to see its relationship to Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution, although the distinguished historian granted the first presentation of this theory the highest praise as “ a grand prospectus of revolution and a stirring call to action” comparable in 1905-06 to the Communist Manifesto drawn up by Marx and Engels in 1847-48.* I n fact, in his biography of Leon Trotsky, Deutscher dismisses the Transitional Program: “ . . . the Draft Programme, which he wrote for the International, was not so much a statement of principles as an instruction on tactics, designed for a party up to its ears in trade union struggles and day-to-day politics and striving to gain practical leadership immediately.”** w a s , o f course, estimate Deutscher’s opposition i n 1938 to launching the Fourth

with his consistent I t was International.

consistent, too, with his lack of belief that an effective revolutionary Marxist party could b e built in opposition to the Stalinist and Social Democratic organizations, and with his view that Trotsky was quixotic in spending time on such an endeavor. The pleading Deutscher engages in for his own views on these questions in opposition to the course followed by Trotsky thus makes the biography singularly unhelpful in understanding either the Transitional Program or Trotsky’s motives in writing it. Had Deutscher sought to place the Transitional Program i n a * The Prophet

Armed,

Vintage,

New York, 1965, p. 162.

** The Prophet Outcast, Vintage, New York, 1965, pp. 425-26.

10

The Transitional Program

broader historical context he might have reached different conclusions. One of the central concepts in the Transitional Program is stated by Trotsky as follows: The strategic task of the next period—a prerevolutionary period of agitation, propaganda, and organization—consists i n overcoming the contradiction between the maturity of the objective revolutionary conditions and the immaturity of the proletariat and its vanguard (the confusion and disappointment of the older generation, the inexperience of the younger generation). I t i s necessary to help the masses i n the process of the daily struggle to find the bridge between present demands and the socialist program of the revolution. This bridge should include a system of transitional demands, stemming from today’s conditions and from today’s consciousness of wide layers of the working class and unalterably leading to one final conclusion: the conquest of power by the proletariat.

Behind this compact statement lies a long history. The problem of finding a bridge between the “present consciousness” of the masses and the socialist program of the revolution was first posed—so far as I have been able to ascertain—by J . F . Bray, a British economist who drew communist conclusions from the analyses of David Ricardo. In his book Labour’s Wrongs and Labour’s Remedy, published in 1839, Bray wrote: Every step to the establishment of a better system must b e made by those who have grown up under the present system, and who are, therefore, more or less imbued with the depravity and ill-feelings which this system generates. A mere knowledge of the principles of equality is not the only requisite for the establishment of community of possessions. There must likewise exist the requisite feelings and moral qualities, all well developed, and accompanied by high intellectual powers. If, then, a changed character be essential to the success of the social system of community i n its most perfect form—and if, likewise, the present system affords n o circumstances and n o facilities for effecting the requisite change of character, and preparing man for the higher a n d better state desired—it is evident that things must necessarily remain a s they are, unless one of two methods be adopted. Either those w h o commence the n e w system

must

be possessed

o f accumulations

o f capital

sufficient

to

overcome the drawbacks of every kind imposed by the present system, until the superior circumstances created by the new system shall have done their work, and generated a race of human beings widely different in character and habits from those who now exist;—or else some preparatory step must b e discovered and made use of—some movement partaking partly of the present and partly of the desired system—some intermediate

Trotsky’s Transitional Program

11

resting-place, to which society m a y go with all its faults and all of its follies, and from which it may move forward, imbued with those qualities and attributes without which the system of community and equality cannot a s s u c h h a v e existence.*

The “preparatory step” or “intermediate resting-place” proposed by Bray was quite utopian. I n form it consisted of “jointstock companies” or “communities” that could be amalgamated on a national scale. I n content, the scheme would embrace the entire laboring population, a “vast confederation of labor” in which all “able-bodied persons” would be obliged to work. The nation’s labor power would be combined with the nation’s capital by buying out the capitalists through vouchers payable over a period of two decades or s o . The community of labor would operate on the principle of equality in the exchange of commodities, each participant being guaranteed the full value of the product of his labor, less taxes required for the functioning of government. Out of this “intermediate resting-place” would evolve the society of the future.

II. In The Poverty of Philosophy, his famous criticism of the unscientific notions of Pierre Joseph Proudhon written in the winter of 1846-47, Karl Marx quoted at length from what he called Bray’s “remarkable work.”** Marx had two objectives in mind. The first was to explode Proudhon’s claim to originality in thinking of “reforming society by transforming all men into * Labour’s Wrongs and Labour’s Remedy; or, The Age of Might and The Age of Right, by J . F . Bray. (Reprinted by the London School of Economics and Political Science. 1931.) ** The characterization of “remarkable” i s certainly well deserved. I n proof one need only cite Bray’s discussion of the rights of women and children, how they are abused under capitalism, and how this could b e changed in a rational society. Here are some extracts: “ I n connection with this joint-stock system, a s well a s in the more perfect form of community, arrangements might b e made for the support of women and children, without the former being dependent o n their husbands, or the latter o n their parents, for the means of subsistence.” (p. 165.) “ B a d as are the social arrangements

which

leave children

immediately

dependent upon their parents for education and subsistence, a still worse

12

The Transitional Program

actual workers exchanging equal amounts of labour.” The second was to show that the fallacy in Bray’s utopian proposal applied equally to Proudhon’s schema. I t is not necessary here to repeat Marx’s criticism of the economic fallacies in Bray’s “joint-stock system.” His appreciation of Bray’s objective i s , however, worth noting: “We need only reply in a few words to Mr. Bray who without us and in spite of us has managed to supplant M . Proudhon, except that Mr. Bray, far from claiming the last word on behalf of humanity, proposes merely measures which h e thinks good for a period of transition between existing society and a community regime.”*** A year later, in the winter of 1847-48, Marx and Engels proposed transitional measures of a different kind in the “theoretical and practical party programme,” the Communist Manifesto, which they had been commissioned by the Communist League to prepare. First of all, they took an international View. While the proletariat “must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation,” its goal, on acquiring political supremacy, is to speed the liquidation of national differences and antagonisms between people. “United action, of the leading civilized countries at least, is one of the first conditions of the emancipation of the proletariat.” feature in the present system, and one productive of the greater part of the demoralization and vice which surround u s , i s that custom of society which leaves woman dependent upon individual man for subsistence. Woman should b e altogether a s independent of m a n , in respect to her occupation and her maintenance, as man i s independent of her or of his fellow-man. Woman i s not naturally, and never can b e legally, the slave or the property of m a n ; but, in regard to every right appertaining to h u m a n existence, she stands with man on a footing of the m o s t perfect equality. Under the present system, woman i s dependent upon a n d i s regarded

a s inferior

to m a n — s h e

i s b y turns h i s slave a n d h i s plaything—

she h a s n o equal social rights and n o political existence. Spoiled b y a p e r n i c i o u s a n d deficient

education,

half-despised

for the a p p a r e n t w a n t o f

those mental powers which are not permitted to b e called forth a n d exercised, and degraded by her dependent position,—woman i s n o w fixed i n a labyrinth of tyranny and injustice from which s h e cannot b e rescued b y any means which d o not afford her entire independence of the control of her self-styled superior, in the s a m e degree a s h e i s independent of her.” ( p . 167.) * * * The Poverty

of Philosophy,

International,

N e w York, u n d a t e d ,

p. 64.

Trotsky’s Transitional Program

13

Second, they took a revolutionary view. “The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; n o wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas.” Third, they held that the proletariat in power would institute a series of transitional system:

measures

to revolutionize

the

economic

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, b y degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production i n the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces a s rapidly as possible. Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production.

In place of a utopian scheme to buy out the capitalist class, Marx and Engels proposed taking the revolutionary road to power and using that power to overturn the capitalist mode of production. After the experience of the Paris Commune in 1871 they included the necessity of overturning the capitalist state machinery. The political approach taken by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto is stated explicitly: “But every class struggle

i s a political struggle.”

Furthermore,

the “organization

of the proletarians into a class” is their organization “into a political party.” The qualitative difference between the position reached by Bray in trying to solve the problem which h e wa s the first to see i s likewise evident in the ten specific transitional measures advanced by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto a s “pretty generally applicable” in the “most advanced countries”: 1. Abolition of property i n l a n d a n d application of all rents of l a n d to public purposes. 2. A heavy progressive or graduated income t a x . 3 . Abolition of all right of inheritance. 4 . Confiscation of the property of all emigrants a n d rebels.

14

The Transitional Program

5. Centralization of credit i n the hands of the State, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly. 6. Centralization of the means of communication and transport i n the h a n d s of the State. 7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation of wastelands, and the improvement of the soil generally i n accordance with a common p l a n . 8 . E q u a l liability of all to labor. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture. 9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equable distribution of the population over the country. 10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children’s factory labor in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc., etc.

I n “Ninety Years of the Communist Manifesto,” written in October 1937, Trotsky h ad the following to say about these ten demands: Calculated for a revolutionary epoch the Manifesto contains (end of Chapter II) ten demands, corresponding to the period of direct transition from capitalism to socialism. I n their Preface of 1872, Marx and Engels declared these demands to b e i n part antiquated, a n d , in any case, only of secondary importance. The reformists seized upon this evaluation to interpret it i n the sense that transitional revolutionary demands had forever ceded their place to the Social Democratic “minimum program,” which, as i s well known, does not transcend the limits of bourgeois democracy. A s a matter of fact, the authors of the Manifesto indicated quite precisely the main correction of their transitional program, namely, “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes.” I n other words, the correction was directed against the fetishism of bourgeois democracy. Marx later counterposed to the capitalist state, the state of the type of the Commune. This “type” subsequently assumed the much more graphic shape of soviets. There cannot b e a revolutionary program today without soviets and without workers’ control. As for the rest, the ten demands of the Manifesto, which appeared “archaic” in an epoch of peaceful parliamentary activity, h a v e today regained completely their true significance. The Social Democratic “minimum program,” on the other h a n d , h a s become hopelessly antiquated.*

* “Ninety Years of the Communist

Manifesto”

was written a s a n

introduction to t h e first Afrikaans edition o f the C o m m u n i s t i s a v a i l a b l e i n E n g l i s h i n Writings of Leon Trotsky (1937-38) New York, 1976).

Manifesto. I t (Pathfinder,

Trotsky’s Transitional Program

15

Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto in anticipation of an imminent struggle for power. But the revolutionary wave that swept Europe in 1848 ended with counterrevolution victorious. A period of reaction set in that was broken only by the short-lived Paris Commune. The proletarian conquest of power appeared to have been postponed to a remote future. The revolutionary movement advanced, nonetheless. I n the field of theory, Marx and Engels established the materialist conception of history on unshakeable foundations. By fighting for immediate demands in the daily struggle of the workers, the cadres of the Second International won a broad mass base. The huge organizations they constructed fell prey, however, to the influence of the surrounding capitalist society, still in its ascendancy. The aristocracy of labor in particular was neutralized and made conservative by the material concessions the capitalist class was able to grant. The illusion gained ground that capitalism could be reformed, that it might even be possible to reform it to such a degree as to reach socialism by parliamentary means and gradual steps instead of by revolution. As the Social Democratic parties succumbed to reformism, the “maximum” program of socialist revolution gave way completely to the “minimum” program of struggling for reforms, and this minimum became the new maximum. The outcome was the tragic spectacle of these parties supporting “their own” bourgeoisies in World War I .

III. The drift toward reformism met with opposition from figures like Parvus, Rosa Luxemburg, V . I . Lenin, and Leon Trotsky. They saw the possibility of a socialist victory in the near future. On the basis of his theory of permanent revolution, Trotsky forecast that the workers could come to power in a backward country like Russia before the workers won in the advanced countries. Most significant of all, Lenin saw the need to build a combat party to assure that victory, and he set out to build such a party against opposition from all sides. It thus fell to the Bolsheviks to revive the concept of transitional measures and to put

it

to

use

in

Russia.

Lenin’s

article

“The

Impending

Catastrophe and How to Combat It,” written in September 1917, illustrates his approach on this question. I n face of economic chaos and the worsening threat of famine

16

The Transitional Program

resulting from Russia’s involvement in the First World War, Lenin proposed five general measures: (1) Amalgamation of all banks into a single b a n k , and state control over its operations, or nationalisation of the banks. (2) Nationalisation of the syndicates, i.e., the largest, monopolistic capitalist associations (sugar, oil, coal, iron and steel, and other syndicates). (3) Abolition of commercial secrecy. into (4) Compulsory syndication (i.e., compulsory amalgamation associations) of industrialists, merchants and employers generally. (5) Compulsory organisation of the population into consumers’ societies, or encouragement of such organisation, and the exercise of control over it.*

A noteworthy aspect of these proposals is their reasonable nature. They are far removed from the declamations that ultraleft firebrands might have thought appropriate to the situation. And, in fact, most of Lenin’s article consists of a carefully reasoned explanation of the situation facing the country, its causes, and the immediate measures a revolutionary government would take to alleviate matters. Propaganda of this kind dovetailed with the situation and h a d a powerful effect in winning the masses to the program of the Bolsheviks. I n power, the Bolsheviks were not given much opportunity to apply transitional measures. Faced with widespread sabotage by the capitalists and those under their influence, they had to proceed faster than they wished. O n e of the consequences was the necessity to make a retreat later on. This was undertaken under the New Economic Policy, which permitted an expansion of small-scale commodity production, particularly in the countryside.

The first four congresses of the Communist International, which codified and amplified the Bolshevik positions on many subjects, did not draw up a transitional program as such. Perhaps one reason was that the revolution, still fresh in 1919-22, provided a living example that could be studied under the direct guidance of its leaders. Probably other reasons entered in. The capitalist encirclement and the combined efforts of the major world powers to smash the Russian revolution was an immediate, life-and-death question that took precedence over many *Lenin:

Collected

Works, volume

2 5 , p . 333

(Progress,

Moscow, 1974).

Trotsky’s Transitional Program

17

other problems. Moreover, throughout Europe at the time, the possibility of successful proletarian revolutions was very high. The Bolsheviks were assured in advance of strong indirect influence in such upheavals and perhaps a direct subsidiary role in case it became necessary to mobilize the Red Army under Trotsky’s command to help repel a counterrevolutionary assault. The key need at the moment was to win cadres, primarily from the left wing of the Social Democracy, in order to build Communist parties on the Bolshevik model. As Lenin explained at the Third World Congress in July 1921: The first stage in our struggle was to create a genuine Communist party, so that w e could know with whom we were talking and i n whom w e could h a v e complete confidence. At the first and second congresses we said: ‘ O u t with the centrists!’ . . . But now we have to go a bit further. The second stage, after w e have created the party, must b e to learn h o w to prepare the revolution. I n many countries w e have not begun to learn how to win the leadership.*

The first four congresses of the Communist International thus laid heavy emphasis on defense of the first workers’ state in history, on the ripeness of Europe for revolution, on the timeliness of calling for the formation of soviets following the example set by the Russian workers, on the conditions for membership in the Communist International, and s o o n . This was especially true of the first two congresses, when the emphasis, as Lenin explained, was on sorting out and winning the initial cadres. Tactical questions associated with winning leadership of the working class received more detailed attention at the subsequent congresses. Despite the absence of theses or resolutions dealing specifically with transitional

measures

in a comprehensive

w a y , the thinking

of the Bolsheviks on this subject was nonetheless evident in the first four congresses. The “Theses on Tactics” adopted b y the Third Congress refers to the “character of the transitional epoch” that makes it obligatory for all Communist parties to raise to the utmost their readiness for struggle. “Any struggle may turn into a struggle

for p o w e r . ”

“The most important question before the Communist International today,” the theses state, “ i s to win predominating influence * S e e Lenin: Collected Works, volume 32, p. 474 (Progress, Moscow, 1973), for a slightly different translation.

18

The Transitional Program

over the majority of the working class, and to bring its decisive strata into struggle.” Both ultraleftism and opportunism stand in the way of accomplishing this task: The attempts of impatient and politically inexperienced revolutionary elements to resort to the most extreme methods, which by their very nature imply the decisive revolutiOnary uprising of the proletariat, for particular problems and tasks (such a s the proposal that this year’s conscripts shall resist the call-up) contain elements of the most dangerous adventurism and m a y , if they are employed, frustrate for a long time the genuinely revolutionary preparation of the proletariat for the seizure of power. . The parties of the Communist International will become revolutionary m a s s parties only if they overcome opportunism, its survivals and traditions, in their own ranks b y seeking to link themselves closely with the working masses in their struggle, deriving their tasks from the practical struggles of the proletariat, and in these struggles rejecting both the opportunist policy of self-deception, of hushing u p and smoothing over the unbridgeable contradictions, and the use of revolutionary phrases which obscure a clear view into the real relation of forces and ignore the difficulties of the struggle.

As for the old “social-democratic minimum programme of the reform of capitalism,” this “has become notoriously a counterrevolutionary deception.” The Communist parties do not advance a minimum program that seeks to save the structure of capitalism. “The destruction of that structure remains their guiding aim and their immediate mission.” To carry out this mission, the Communist parties advance demands “whose fulfillment is an immediate and urgent working-class need, and they must fight for these demands in mass struggle, regardless of whether they are compatible with the profit economy of the capitalist class or not.” This important point is explained further: I t i s not the viability and competitive capacity of capitalist industry, nor the profitability of capitalist finance to which communist parties should pay regard, but the poverty which the proletariat cannot and should not endure any longer. If the demands correspond to the vital needs of broad proletarian masses and if these masses feel that they cannot exist unless these demands are met, then the struggle for these demands will become the starting-point of the struggle for power. In place of the minimum programme of the reformists and centrists, the Communist International puts the struggle for the concrete needs of the

Trotsky’s Transitional Program

19

proletariat, for a system of demands which in their totality disintegrate the power of the bourgeoisie, organize the proletariat, represent stages in the struggle for the proletarian dictatorship, and each of which expresses in itself the need of the broadest masses, even if the masses themselves are not yet consciously in favour of the proletarian dictatorship.*

Workers’ control of production was considered by the authors of the theses to be the key slogan: Every

practical

slogan

which

derives

from

the economic

n e e d s o f the

working masses m u s t b e channelled into the struggle for control of production, not as a p l a n for the bureaucratic organization of the national economy under the capitalist regime, b u t through the factory councils and revolutionary trade unions. Only by building such organizations, linked together by industry and area, can the struggle of the working masses be organizationally unified and resistance put up to the splitting of the masses by social-democracy and the trade union leaders. The factory councils will accomplish these tasks only if they arise in the struggles for economic ends which are common to the broadest working m a s s e s .

The document takes up the charge that it i s reformist to advance immediate or transitional demands: Every objection to the putting forward of such partial demands, every charge of reformism on this account, i s an emanation of the same inability to grasp the essential conditions of revolutionary action as was expressed in the hostility of some communist groups to participation in the trade unions, or to making u s e of parliament. It i s not a question of proclaiming the final goal to the proletariat, but of intensifying the practical

struggle

which

i s the o n l y way of leading

the proletariat

to t h e

struggle for the final goal. . . . The revolutionary character of the present epoch consists precisely in this, that the most modest conditions of life for the working masses are incompatible with the existence of capitalist society, and that therefore the fight for even the most modest demands grows into the fight for communism.

The document takes up other tasks—the need to appeal to the unemployed (“in present circumstances the army of the unem* I h a v e utilized the translation of excerpts from the “Theses on Tactics” published i n The Communist International 1919-1943, Volume I, J . Degras, ed. ( C a s s , London, 1971). The documents of the first four congresses of the Communist International are not easily available in English, and some of the translations made in the early twenties are hardly adequate.

20

The Transitional Program

ployed is a revolutionary factor of immense significance”), the need to press for “joint action in the struggle for the immediate interests of the proletariat,” the need to prepare to meet the attack of the capitalists with adequate defense organizations. The latter point is of special interest: The bourgeoisie, who boast of their power and their stability, know perfectly well, in the person of their leading Governments, that they only have a breathing space, and that in present conditions any mass strike has the tendency to develop into civil war and into direct struggle for power. I n the proletarian struggle against the capitalist offensive it is the duty of communists not only to occupy the front rank and to instill an understanding of the basic revolutionary tasks, but to create their own workers’ detachments and defence organizations, relying on the best and most active elements in the factories and trade unions, to resist the fascists and dissuade the jeunesse dorée [gilded youth] of the bourgeoisie from exasperating [provoking] the strikers. Because of the extraordinary importance of the counter-revolutionary shock troops the communist party, acting primarily through its trade union cells, must devote special attention to this question, organize a comprehensive information and contact service, keep under constant observation the forces of the white guard, their headquarters, arms depots, connexions with the police, the press, and the political parties, and work out in advance all the details of defence and counter-attack.

The question of transitional demands and measures was considered in greatest detail in connection with working in the trade unions and developing their militancy. This was logical since the Bolsheviks had their eyes on the mass base of the unions. At the Second Congress, held i n J uly-August 1920, the “Theses on the Trade Union Movement, Factory Councils, and the Communist International” stressed the importance of the slogan of workers’ control “exercised through the control of production by the factory committees.” The following three paragraphs from Section I I illustrate the transitional approach taught by the Bolsheviks: 3. The struggle of the factory committees against capitalism h a s as its immediate general object workers’ control over production. . . . The committees in the different factories will soon be faced with the question of workers’ control over entire branches of industry and industry as a whole. B u t since any attempt b y the workers to supervise the supply of

Trotsky’s Transitional Program

21

raw materials and the financial operations of the factory owners will b e met by the bourgeoisie and the capitalist government with the most vigorous measures against the working class, the fight for workers’ control of production leads to the fight for the seizure of power by the working class. 4 . Propaganda in favor of industrial councils must be carried out in such a way as to convince the broad working masses, even those not belonging directly to the industrial proletariat, that responsibility for the disorganization of the economy belongs with the bourgeoisie, and that the proletariat, in demanding workers’ control, i s struggling for the organization of industry, for the suppression of speculation, and against the high cost of living. I t i s the task of the communist parties to fight for workers’ control of industry b y taking advantage of all the circumstances that become issues of the day—from lack of fuel, to breakdowns i n the transportation system—by welding together the m o s t isolated elements of the proletariat around the same objective, and b y drawing i n the broadest layers of the petty bourgeoisie, who are suffering cruelly from the disorganization of the economy and continually becoming more and more proletarianized. 5 . Factory committees cannot replace the trade unions. Only i n the course of the struggle can the committees step outside the limits of the individual factory or workshop and unite on the basis of an entire industry, establishing machinery for the conduct of the struggle a s a whole. The trade unions are already centralized fighting organs, although they do not include such great working masses as the factory committees can, which are looser organizations accessible to all the workers i n an undertaking. This division of function between factory committee and trade union is a result of the historical development of the social revolution. Trade unions organize the working masses for struggle o n the basis

o f the

demands

for higher

wages

and

a shorter

working

day

throughout the country. Factory committees are organized for workers’ control over production, for the fight against economic chaos; they cover all the workers in the factory, but their struggle can only gradually assume a nation-wide character.

The Third Congress of the Communist International met from June 22 to July 12, 1921. Before the congress ended, the First Congress of the Red International of Labor Unions (Profintern) was already in session, its deliberations beginning July 3 and ending July 19. It should be explained that the Bolsheviks had decided to follow a dual tactic in the unions in the capitalist world. Every militant who could possibly do so was to work within the established unions, n o matter how conservative or reactionary the bureaucrats at the head might be. At the same time,

the Communist

International

sought

to establish

unions

22

The Transitional Program

committed to the socialist revolution. These were to be coordinated in the Red International of Labor Unions.* The resolutions and decisions of the First Congress of the Profintern reflect the considerable discussion that took place there on the tasks of Communists in the union movement. I n an introduction which h e wrote for a compilation of the documents immediately after the congress, A. Lozovsky, the international secretary of the organization, said the following about one of the subjects: . the congress paid great attention to the problem of workers’ control. Workers’ control, at a given stage of development of the social struggle, i s a thoroughly practical slogan for workers of all countries. I n this respect a great deal of experience has been accumulated of late. I t i s of course very evident that Russia i n this respect has the greatest experience a n d it is not surprising that the Russian experience . . . was made the basis of the resolution on the question. The congress did not satisfy itself with merely putting the question to the front, but gave a concrete form to it, drew the workers’ attention as to how workers’ control has to be shaped, the methods of approaching it, and gave a practical program i n this matter. We can consider the resolution o n this subject exhaustive.**

If not entirely “exhaustive,” the resolution ( “ O n the Question of Tactics”) did include considerable detail. It has a very modern ring. Some of the sentences and even paragraphs sound like rough drafts of points included by Trotsky in the Transitional Program seventeen years later. A few quotations will illustrate this: The basis for enlarging our influence must lie within the economic struggle. Questions of wages, of securing relief for the war victims, social

*The question arises a s to whether i t was tactically advisable i n 1920-21 for the Communist International to attempt to organize revolutionary, or “red,” u n i o n s . Suffice i t to say that the old-line unions were heavily damaged by the social patriotism of their bureaucratic leaderships i n W o r l d W a r I , that

i n s o m e countries

the u n i o n s

were very w e a k ( i n the

United States industrial unions h a d n o t even been formed o n a m a s s scale), and that the first workers’ state represented a n e w polarizing center of the first magnitude. All t h i s , of course, was before the days of Stalinism. **The Red L a b o r International, published i n The Voice of L a b o r , Chicago, March 1922, p . 8 .

Trotsky’s Transitional Program

23

insurance, unemployment, women and child labor, sanitary conditions in industrial establishments, high prices, the housing question, etc., taxation, mobilization, colonial schemes, financial combinations—all these must be utilized as daily material for organization and militant socialist education. . . . The Fascisti i n Italy, the Technical Aid in Germany, the civil white guard organizations consisting of ex-commissioned and noncommissioned officers in France and in England—all these, identical [in] their aims though different in form of organization, pursue the policy of disorganizing and forestalling all activities of the workers, with the purpose not only to replace the strikers by scabs, but to destroy their organizations and to kill the leaders of the labor movement. Under these conditions the organization of special strike militia and special selfdefense detachments i s a question of life and death to the workers. . . . Under the cover of preventing, as far as possible, economic crisis, they [the bourgeois governments] introduced, in the interests of capital, obligatory courts of arbitration and conflict commissions. Still in the interests of capital, some countries introduced the direct tax on earnings with a view of throwing the weight of the war wholly on the shoulders of the working class, the tax-collectors being the employers themselves. I t i s incumbent upon the trade unions to lead against these state measures, exclusively serving the interests of the capitalist class, a ruthless and merciless battle. . . . While conducting the fight for the improvement of the conditions of labor, raising the standard of life of the masses, and establishing workers’ control over industry, we should always keep in mind that it i s impossible to solve all these problems within the frame of the capitalist system.

. . .

The resolution projects various stages in the development of workers’ control. The most elementary stage is merely the realization gained by the workers through experiences such as war, unemployment, the chaos of capitalist society, the arbitrariness of the bosses, etc., that they must begin to exert their own control in the plants. This primitive stage of workers’ control reveals itself i n sporadic attempts of the workers of each concern to supervise the work, the supply, and conditions of the machinery of production, to determine whether the closing

o f the

factory,

or the curtailing

o f production

are really

based

upon necessity and are not a result of mischievous intention of the owner. . . .

Workers’ control “in its fullest expression” must financial as well a s technical supervision.

include

24

The Transitional Program

Only the full application of financial control reveals to the workers the fundamental basis of the capitalist system. In the process of financial control the workers learn in practice the dependence of their factory upon the banks and national and international financial trusts. The disclosure of the commercial, industrial, and particularly financial secrets gives the proletariat an exact picture of the prime source of the overwhelming sabotage o n the part of the bourgeoisie. . . . The struggle for financial control leads the working class to the immediate and decisive clash with the bourgeoisie whose political power is to a certain extent based on financial power. At this stage, control inevitably takes an evident political aspect and requires political leadership. Meanwhile the increasingly frequent cases of seizure of factories, and at the same time impossibility of managing them without disposing of the financial apparatus, clearly puts before the workers the timely problem of getting hold of the financial system and, through it, of the whole industry. [This 'leads to a struggle for power and social revolution.] . . . the Red unions must pay special attention to the practice of workers’ control, which i s the best preliminary school for the proletariat striving to take power in its own hands.

IV. Three kinds of demands are advanced in the Transitional Program. It is important to understand what they have in common and wherein they differ. Immediate demands involve the day-to-day defense and improvement of the standard of living of the masses; i.e., the issues that give rise to the most elementary form of defensive organization of the masses—militant unions. This is the ground level for revolutionists. Participation at this level of struggle is the prerequisite for everything else. Battles over the standard of living of the masses derive their current acuteness from the growing incapacity of capitalism on a world scale to guarantee even food to its wage slaves. Democratic demands involve the defense and extension of the right to organize independently on both the economic and political levels. Democratic demands are of special importance in the struggle against the retrogressive tendency in modern capitalism to suppress democracy, set up totalitarian regimes, and crush the organizations

o f the m a s s e s . The logical extension

of the proletarian struggle for democracy is the establishment of democracy in the economy itself. Transitional demands are of a broader scope. They are based

Trotsky’s Transitional Program

25

on the incapacity of capitalism to provide for the needs of the working class as a whole. They stress the feasibility of meeting those demands in a society constructed on a rational basis. On the economic level, transitional demands point toward the planned economy of socialism. O n the political level, they center on the need for the workers to establish their own government. Concomitantly they outline the measures required to assure putting such a government in power against the reactionary resistance of the small minority holding a vested interest in the preservation of capitalism. The three sets of demands express the objective needs of the working class in face of the economic, social, and political realities of the capitalist world. Trotsky’s concern to provide a program of that nature for the founding congress of the Fourth International is shown by the very title h e chose for the document. H e named it “The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks o f the Fourth

International.”

( H i s followers came to c a l l it

the Transitional Program for short, and this eventually superseded the original title.) Whether the struggle centers around immediate, democratic, or transitional demands, revolutionary Marxists promulgate methods of battle in which the proletariat is strongest; i.e., utilization of its strategic position in the economic system and mobilization of its numbers on a mass scale. I t should be observed that in the struggle for socialism, immediate, democratic, and transitional demands are but means to an end. I n fighting for immediate demands, for instance, the workers gain organizational

cohesiveness

and battle experience

of prime importance in more far-reaching struggles. However, only as they gain consciousness of their interests as a class d o workers take the goal of socialism as their own and begin utilizing the means open to them to achieve that goal. The rise of a revolutionary party is the surest indicator of the development of this class consciousness, for it places at the disposal of the masses the main lessons of past revolutionary experience (embodied in the theory handed down and developed since the time of Marx and Engels). The party also provides cadres tested in the class struggle and in revolutionary politics. The party in turn enters the revolutionary process as the decisive subjective component, assuring a socialist victory if the objective conditions are ripe for it. The need to construct such a party was what Trotsky ha d in mind when h e wrote, in the opening

26

The Transitional Program

sentence situation

to the Transitional a s a w h o l e i s chiefly

Program: characterized

“The world political by a historical

crisis

of the leadership of the proletariat.” Attention should b e paid to the careful way sectors of the world are separated out in the Transitional Program. The particularity of Trotsky’s analysis matches the complexity of the objective reality as it stood in 1938. Different tasks and different sets of slogans (or differently weighted lgans) are projected for the workers and their allies in the industrially advanced countries, the colonial and semicolonial nations, the bureaucratized workers’ state, and countries where fascist regimes had come to power. Differentiating in this way, Trotsky indicates where to place the theory of permanent revolution. Since this is important in reaching a correct appreciation of how to utilize the Transitional Program is some very important areas, the following preliminary observations may prove helpful. Because of the utterly reactionary role of imperialism on an international scale, historically outdated formations may— despite their antiprogressive character as a whole—occasionally initiate relatively progressive courses of action. A striking example was that of the feudalistic emperor Haile Selassie in resisting the invasion mounted by Italian imperialism in 1935. Certain nationalist regimes have followed comparable courses for brief periods (Chiang Kai-shek against Japanese imperialism, Juan Peron and Lazaro Cardenas against U S . and British imperialism).

In his contributions on the national question, Lenin took account of such possibilities, explained them theoretically, and showed how to take advantage of them politically in advancing the revolutionary struggle for socialism. Trotsky did the same for the obverse situation in which the proletariat in taking power finds itself confronted with the necessity to carry out the tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. H e did this in his theory of permanent revolution, correctly forecasting twelve years in advance the course taken by the October 1917 revolution in Russia. How can this theory be turned to account in advance of the proletariat coming to power? The question is particularly relevant to the countries in the colonial and semicolonial areas, the “third world” as it is called nowadays. Here is what Trotsky said in the Transitional

Program:

Trotsky’s Transitional Program

27

The relative weight of the individual democratic and transitional demands i n the proletariat’s struggle, their mutual ties and their order of presentation, i s determined b y the peculiarities and specific conditions of each backward country a n d , to a considerable extent, by the degree of its backwardness. Nevertheless, the general trend of revolutionary developm e n t i n all backward countries can b e determined b y the formula of the permanent revolution i n the sense definitely imparted to it by the three revolutions i n Russia (1905, February 1917, October 1917).

Trotsky wrote the Transitional Program for the founding congress of the Fourth International thirty-four years ago. In all its major aspects it has withstood the test of time. Its key themes have in fact gained in immediacy. Does this mean that it is a finished work requiring n o further concretization? The answer is no. The Transitional Program itself includes the following admonition: During a transitional epoch, the workers’ movement does not have a systematic and well-balanced, but a feverish and explosive character. Slogans as well as organizational forms should be subordinated to this feature of the movement. O n guard against routine handling of a situation as against a plague, the leadership should respond sensitively to the initiative of the masses.

Trotsky cited as an example the temporary seizure of factories in the sit-down strikes of the mid-thirties. Again, in discussing the question of the impending Second World War, Trotsky said: “It is necessary to interpret these fundamental ideas by breaking them up into more concrete and partial ones, dependent upon the course of events and the orientation of the thought of the masses.” I n another instance, Trotsky called on his followers to work out transitional demands for the allies of the working class: The peculiarities of national development of each country find their queerest expression i n the status urban petty bourgeoisie (artisans

of farmers and to s o m e extent o f the and shopkeepers). These c l a s s e s , n o

matter how numerically strong they may be, essentially are representative survivals of precapitalist forms of production. The sections of the Fourth International should work out with all possible concreteness a program of transitional demands concerning the peasants (farmers) and urban petty bourgeoisie, conforming to the conditions of each country.

28

The Transitional Program

The advanced workers should learn to give clear and concrete answers to the questions put by their future allies.

In still another respect, it is obvious why the Transitional Program must be regarded as an open-ended, not finished, work. The “transitional epoch” referred to in the “Theses on Tactics” adopted at the Third Congress of the Communist International has endured much longer than the Bolsheviks in 1921 had any reason to expect. The main cause of this was the unforeseen rise of Stalinism and the counterrevolutionary role it has played. The protracted nature of the transitional epoch has given rise to extraordinary complications. These made it necessary for Trotsky to bring things up to date in 1938. H e had to bring to the fore the struggle against another imperialist war. H e had to include a whole section on the Soviet Union as a degenerated workers’ state. H e had to deal with fresh complications in the task of building a mass revolutionary Marxist party—on top of the Social Democracy, the Communist International, backed by the power of the Kremlin, now stood as a giant obstacle to the advance of the world revolution. Besides this, it was necessary to stress the revolutionary tasks in the colonial countries, since the impending Second World War would inevitably generate powerful bids for national liberation. In the United States, with the depression and the rise of industrial unionism, the class struggle gave promise of advancing at a swift pace. Not only that. The rise of fascism in Europe demanded consideration of how to prevent it from spreading further and how to overthrow it in those countries where it had already seized power. How do things stand in 1972? We still live in the transitional epoch, this combination on a world scale of the death agony of capitalism and the birth pangs of the classless society of the future. Since 1938, changes have nonetheless occurred, and they are not small ones. On one side of the ledger we can list such items as the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II; the toppling of capitalism in Eastern Europe; the victory of the revolution in China; the postwar upheavals in the colonial and semicolonial world—which are still going on, as the Vietnamese revolution shows in the most dramatic way; the breaking up of Stalinist monolithism; the first attempts at political revolution in East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; the beginnings of a new left opposition inside the Soviet Union; the Cuban revolution, which

Trotsky’s Transitional Program

29

marked the opening of the socialist revolution in the Western Hemisphere; the worldwide radicalization of the youth that began in 1965; the resurgence of the working class in Western Europe as marked—among other signs—by the May-June 1968 events in France; the rise of an international antiwar movement with huge mobilizations, particularly in the United States; the growth of revolutionary nationalism in areas extending from Bangladesh through the Middle East and Africa to Ireland, Québec, the Blacks, Chicanos, and Native Americans in the U.S., to the oppressed nationalities in the Soviet bloc; the first dynamic manifestations of a women’s liberation movement on a world scale. On the other side of the ledger the main item to be listed is the rise of the United States to the status of a super power; that is, to a super counterrevolutionary power. It has succeeded in dealing heavy defeats to the world revolution in such key areas as the Congo (Zaire), Brazil, and Indonesia. It has launched military assaults on Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic. It has backed coups d’état in countries ranging from Iran to Guatemala and Bolivia. Its military outposts dot the globe; and its submarines, armed with nuclear bombs, range the seas. It has dumped 26 million bombs on Indochina. It has a stockpile of nuclear weapons sufficient to destroy humanity several hundred times over. How to contain U.S. imperialism? How to roll it back and replace it with socialism? This has now become a major problem for all of humanity. In the struggle against Stalinism, the developments since 1938 must b e weighed.

Stalinism

i s still strong, a s can be seen from

such events as the ability of the Kremlin to get away with invading Czechoslovakia and the capacity of the Mao regime to smother any tendency seeking proletarian democracy in China. Yet the internal divisions in the Stalinist movement, coupled with the growth o f oppositionist sentiment in the deformed workers’ states, point up the increasing difficulty faced by the bureaucratic caste in postponing a reckoning of accounts with the masses in the form of a political revolution. O n e of the consequences of the decline of Stalinism is that the trend toward

the formation

of revolutionary

tendencies

o f an

independent nature is no w much stronger internationally than in 1938. These and other developments, including tactical questions

30

The Transitional Program

such as guerrilla war, must be taken into account in developing immediate, democratic, and transitional slogans today. George Novack, in his contribution “The Role of the Transitional Program in the Revolutionary Process,” discusses instances in which the Trotskyist movement has responded to events by making corresponding extensions of the Transitional Program, utilizing the method followed by Trotsky. An outstanding case is “The Worldwide Youth Radicalization and the Tasks of the Fourth International” ( “ A Strategy for Revolutionary Youth”). This was unanimously adopted by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International in 1969 and submitted by the world congress of the Fourth International, held that year, for discussion in the world Trotskyist movement. Another is the “Transitional Program for Black Liberation,” which was adopted by the Socialist Workers Party at its national convention in 1969. It has met with a favorable reception among the vanguard of the Black liberation movement in the United States and internationally. How to extend the Transitional Program to new developments s o as to provide correct guidelines for active participation in them i s a task devolving on the revolutionary party, as Novack points out. The party’s success in this is determined by its accumulation of revolutionary experience and by the skill with which it uses the method lodged in the Transitional Program. As can be seen from the various transitional programs outlined above, the main elements of the method are not complicated, although its effective application requires grounding in Marxist theory. The beginning consists of analysis of the contradictory objective reality. From this analysis the direction of movement of the various trends can be determined, making it possible to advance corresponding slogans and lines of action. Further and more accurate adjustments are made in light of the response among the masses and the initiatives they themselves may take. As to whether the method has been used successfully, that must be judged by the outcome in real life. This is the same approach called for in judging the succession of transitional programs already advanced in the history of the revolutionary movement. Trotsky put it as follows: “Programs and prognoses are tested and corrected in the light of experience, which is the supreme criterion of human reason.”* *“Ninety

Years o f the C o m m u n i s t

Manifesto.”

Transitional and Democratic Slogans as Bridges to Socialist Revolution by Joseph

Hansen

I concluded my opening remarks* by pointing out that the chief characteristic of the international situation is its underlying explosiveness; and I cited the example of Bangladesh. I could have mentioned Ceylon. Or the Middle East. Or Africa. Or Santo Domingo in 1965. Or Czechoslovakia in 1968. Or France in that same year. The eruption of mass movements of such scope and dynamism at shortening intervals of time and in widening areas of the world confronts the Trotskyist movement with an immense responsibility. The Fourth International bears the program that can assure a successful outcome to the mass struggle. Yet the resources of the Fourth International remain small. We are still isolated from the big battalions, and in no position as yet to guide the forces that will prove decisive. The problem is to close the gap between the mass forces required to win and the leadership now to be found in nucleus form in the national sections and sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International. There is no lack of advice on how to solve the problem. In fact it can be had at bargain rates from the sectarians, whose main wish is that we would drop dead. The real solution to the problem of bridging the gap between the masses and our program of revolutionary socialism is to be found in the proper application of the transitional method taught us by Trotsky. The method is not complicated. It consists in approaching the masses at whatever level they may stand and in drawing them through progressive struggles and explanations toward a higher level of thought and action, that is, in the direction of socialist revolution. * T h i s i s the concluding portion o f a speech given in 1971. See Preface. 31

32

The Transitional Program

If we think this through carefully we can see that the first linkup must be determined empirically. Moreover, our own wishes, or our own level of class consciousness, must not be permitted to influence our judgment as to the real nature of the current concerns of the masses or the issues on which they are prepared to go into action. Since the ideology of society as a whole is shaped by the ideology of the ruling class, we must be prepared to accept situations in which the masses, or a sector of the masses, will respond only to slogans of quite limited nature. Or, to put it in more revolutionary terms, we ought to look for such situations. If one were to place some of these slogans in the logical sequence of history, rather surprising labels could justifiably be placed on them. In the case of democratic slogans, which are s o important in the struggle against fascism, or against dictatorial regimes of lesser malignancy, or against the erosion of democratic rights in countries that still proclaim adherence to bourgeois democracy, it would b e necessary to call them “bourgeois” or “petty bourgeois.” That should not cause u s to hesitate to use them. In fact an audacious and aggressive attitude in this respect lies at the heart of the Transitional Program and the method it teaches. We are unable to choose the field of battle. In the class struggle, battles break out as consequence of forces over which we have no control at the present stage of our development. Our party, as a revolutionary socialist party, has no choice but to engage in these battles; otherwise it will not grow but will wither on the vine. The audacity in the transitional approach consists in attempting to wrest these slogans out of the hands of the bourgeois politicians, who seek to utilize them to divert the masses into safe, parliamentary channels. As an example, I should like to call attention to the stand our movement took on the Ludlow amendment. In February 1935, Louis L. Ludlow, a member of the Democratic Party who would be described today as a “peace” candidate or a “dove,” introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives to limit the warmaking powers of Congress. The amendment would have required that a national referendum would have to be taken before Congress could declare a foreign war. This resolution gained immense popular support as the threat of World War I I became more and more acute and Roosevelt prepared to take the U S . into the approaching conflict.

Transitional a n d Democratic Slogans

33

Comrade Trotsky proposed that the Socialist Workers Party should offer critical support to the Indiana Democrat’s proposed amendment to the bourgeois Constitution of the United States. After a bit of resistance by some comrades our party adopted this position. Trotsky considered the matter so important that he included a paragraph about it in the Transitional Program. Note carefully: N o matter how one characterizes democratic slogans, we fight for them with proletarian methods of struggle— not bourgeois methods, which consist today at best of parliamentary shadow-boxing. I t may sound paradoxical, but in an imperialist country, in the stage of the death agony of capitalism, a revolutionary socialist party can find itself utilizing proletarian methods of struggle in defense of a slogan that belongs logically to the epoch of the ascending bourgeois revolution. If you would like an example, I can cite: “Self-determination for the Vietnamese people! Withdraw all U S . troops NOW!” To accompany that slogan, we have advocated as the correct method of struggle the mobilization of the largest numbers possible—in the streets. And that has a logic of its own—the logic of independent political action, which clearly points away from parliamentarism toward socialist revolution. If we call democratic slogans “bourgeois” or “petty bourgeois,” we have to add at once that all this really means in the context of the times i s that it has fallen to the revolutionary socialist movement to defend the great historic gains, or historic objectives,

of previous

revolutions—such

a s freedom

of thought,

freedom of the press, freedom to organize, freedom to control one’s own body. If the proletariat and its allies are prepared to defend the democratic gains or democratic slogans of the bourgeois revolution, this is a very positive beginning. W e can join them in that and proceed from this relatively backward ideological level to help the workers reach full class consciousness. If the working class had already reached the level represented by the program of revolutionary socialism, then we would not need any Transitional Program. While I am on the point let me say a word about the relationship between democratic slogans and transitional slogans. As I said, democratic slogans were advanced in connection

34

The Transitional Program

with the bourgeois revolution that cleared away the precapitalist economies to make way for capitalism. They were an expression of the needs of the rising capitalist economy in opposition to the preceding forms. In the period of the death agony of capitalism, the observance of democratic rights operates against the need of capitalism to defend itself against its historic successor, the planned economy of socialism. Transitional slogans, such as a sliding scale of hours and a sliding scale of wages, pertain to the socialist economy of the future and are only realizable under it. Democratic slogans and transitional slogans are related in two ways. The first is that capitalism has reached the point where it becomes more and more incompatible with any form of democracy. The defense and extension of democracy thus become proletarian tasks along with the advancement of transitional measures that go beyond capitalism although stemming from its present point of development. The second and more important way in which democratic and transitional slogans are related is in the method by which we defend and advance them. The method is the same in both instances—the proletarian method of mass struggle. The heart of this method is mobilization of the masses assembled by capitalism as the human basis of its mode of production. The Transitional Program deals with the problem of organizing and developing this type of struggle and carrying it forward to its final conclusion in the victory of socialism. I hope that this makes clearer the fundamental distinction between Trotskyist tactics and strategy and the tactics and strategy say of guerrilla fighters like the Tupamaros. Trotskyism stresses the proletarian method of mass struggle, the intimate connection of this struggle with the socialist goal which it drives toward, and the necessity to keep this goal constantly at the center of the struggle. This, of course, is where the party comes in as the highest living expression of the class consciousness of the proletariat. I have observed that among the sectarian fringes of the world Trotskyist movement an understanding of the nature and meaning of the Transitional Program is completely absent. That is one reason why they are sectarians. The truth is that the transitional approach taught us by Trotsky is more timely today than ever before. In fact it has become of burning actuality.

Transitional and Democratic Slogans

35

Consider, for instance, the youth radicalization. This is a grassroots movement if there ever was one. It was not instigated or fomented by any particular political tendency. It arose out of the class struggle itself as reflected on the campuses and among young workers and young soldiers. Our problem was to link up with it. W e had to do this at the level where the movement itself stood. And having linked up with it, we had to do our utmost to help it advance to a higher stage by a series of proposals leading in logical progression along the road of mass action to the socialist revolution. We faced a comparable problem in the United States in linking up with the rise of Black nationalism, which again was a grassroots movement. The same holds true for the upsurges involving the Puerto Ricans, the Chicanos, and the Native Americans. A current movement of great importance, which is now gathering momentum internationally, is women’s liberation. Once again, our movement, if it is to link up with it successfully, has no choice but to begin at the level of the movement itself and not at a level it has not reached. Because of the uneven development of the class struggle, these movements came into being and became engaged in actions in advance of the radicalization of the industrial workers. They thus represent anticipatory movements. But they have an influence of their own on the process that will lead to the eventual radicalization of the major contingents of the working class, and these movements will ultimately converge with them and increase their striking power. To take an incorrect stand on these anticipatory movements, to fail to apply the transitional method in approaching them, could prove disastrous. W e in the Socialist Workers Party can assure the world Trotskyist movement that we are aware of the danger and will do our part in helping to avoid it. The timeliness of the Transitional Program is shown with almost textbook clarity in the case of Bolivia. A Popular Assembly has appeared on the scene which has the potential of developing into a dual power. This is the opinion of observers ranging from bourgeois commentators to our own comrades in La Paz. In the Transitional Program, Trotsky tells us that the establishment of dual power marks the culminating point of the transitional period, that is , the period between the prerevolutionary situation to be seen in most parts of the capitalist world today

36

The Transitional Program

and the revolutionary situation in which the masses reach a position to make a serious bid for state power. Associated with the establishment of dual power are a whole series of transitional measures such as the organization of committees and councils, the establishment of a workers’ militia, and the arming of the masses to block the threat of a counterrevolutionary coup as the workers strive to win the majority needed to establish a workers’ and peasants’ government.

If the assessments of the potentialities of the Popular Assembly are correct, then our Bolivian comrades face the opportunity of providing the world with a fresh example, in the tradition of the Bolsheviks, of the successful application of the Transitional Program. I should like to close by saying a few words about the Fourth International itself and its prospects. I happened to be in Coyoacan when the Fourth International was founded in 1938. I recall the feeling of elation in the household when the news came that the founding conference had been held and that the Fourth International had actually been launched. Trotsky was deeply satisfied; as if what had been a vexsome problem had finally been successfully worked out. Trotsky had no illusions about the difficulties that faced u s . Stalin was aiming terrible blows at our small movement, and the founding congress itself had met in the somber shadow cast by two murders—the killing of Leon Sedov, one of the key leaders of the Left Opposition, and of Rudolf Klement, the secretary of the world Trotskyist movement, who was in charge of preparations for the founding congress. The Soviet bureaucracy had marked the Fourth International to be crushed in the egg. The Nazi top command agreed. The Roosevelt administration was not unsympathetic to this objective, as was shown by the imprisonment of the leadership of the Socialist Workers Party during World War II. And the trade union bureaucracy in the United States joined with the FBI and the Coast Guard in the McCarthyite period in a witch-hunt aimed at driving every Trotskyist out of industry. Whatever the disagreements on other points, the reactionary tendencies throughout the world found it feasible and perfectly

Transitional a n d Democratic Slogans

37

understandable to make a united front o n a single issue—the battle against Trotskyism. The Fourth International and our party survived those blows and those days of repression and isolation, and today we are coming into position to make big advances. To see what is happening, it is only necessary to compare the decline in strength and prestige of all our opponents i n the left with the rise in standing of the Trotskyist movement. We still face immense difficulties. We still face big internal problems. We are still only a relatively small movement. But I think that when the history of Trotskyism is written, it will be said that with the opening of the seventies the Fourth International had succeeded in assembling the nuclei of cadres required to build the mass parties needed to assure the final victory of the world revolution.

The Role o f the Transitional in the

Revolutionary by George

Program

Process

Novack

I . T H E BACKGROUND AND FUNCTION O F THE TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM The Transitional Program is only part of the fundamental program of the Fourth International. The full constituents of its program are drawn from the entire experience of the revolutionary Marxist movement, from the Communist Manifesto of 1848 to the latest resolutions of the world body. At the same time the Transitional Program is for us the most important and relevant part of the total teachings of our movement because it presents a method of approach and a set of proposals aimed at mobilizing the masses for revolutionary action. It proceeds from the objective conditions and the existing level of consciousness of the workers and other sections of the oppressed to lead them, step by step, through the education they receive in the course of their struggles, to the realization of the necessity for the conquest of power. The Transitional Program was written by Trotsky on the eve of World War I I and adopted by the founding congress of the Fourth International in 1938. The conception of such a program was not new in the Marxist movement. As Pierre Frank explains in his introduction to the French edition, it has such precedents as the list of demands at the conclusion of the Communist Manifesto and the programs of the Second and Third Internationals, of the Bolshevik Party, and of the German Spartacists led by Luxemburg and Liebknecht. This particular document came out of the conditions of the 1930s. The first sketches for such a program of action were written by Trotsky in 1931 when the Spanish monarchy was about to be replaced by a republic, by the Belgian Trotskyists in 1933 after Hitler came to power in Germany, and by the French Trotskyists with Trotsky’s help in 1934 after an attempted coup d’état by the fascists. 38

Role of the Transitional Program

39

The Socialist Workers Party was intimately involved in the production of the 1938 Transitional Program. At Trotsky’s request, a delegation of our leaders went to Mexico City to discuss the contents of the document and work it out together with him. When Trotsky was preparing the draft for the founding congress of the Fourth International h e asked our party to adopt it and sponsor it at the congress, and we did s o . One of our delegates was the reporter on that program at the 1938 congress. The Transitional Program was not engendered exclusively out of the bright thoughts of a single individual. We have n o such abominations as “Mao Tse-tung Thought” in our movement. It was the fruit of the diverse experiences of the sections of the Fourth International in the class struggle of the 1930s and before. Trotsky emphasized this when he wrote in 1938 that the significance of the program is not that it sets up an a priori theoretical scheme or blueprint that the struggles of the masses were obliged to conform to. Rather, it “draws the balance of the already accumulated experience of our national sections and on the basis of this experience opens up broader international perspectives. The acceptance of this program, prepared and assured by a lengthy previous discussion—or rather a whole series of discussions—represents our most important conquest. The Fourth International is now the only international organization which not only takes clearly into account the driving forces of the imperialist epoch but is armed with a system of transitional demands capable of uniting the masses for a revolutionary struggle for power.” The

Fourth

International

remains

the

only

international

movement equipped with this valuable instrument of orientation. The pro-Moscow Communist parties, the Maoists, Titoists, the followers of Castro, the Social Democrats, the New Leftists, the anarcho-spontaneists—none of the other tendencies operating among the anticapitalist forces have developed anything like it. This is one of our advantages over them. One structural aspect of the original Transitional Program is of considerable importance, though this often goes unnoticed by its readers. It is divided into four distinct sections, each referring to different areas of struggle. The first and longest part pertains to the situation in the advanced countries (properly so, because the evolution and outcome of the class struggle there i s ultimately decisive for the cause of world socialism); the second relates to the colonial and semicolonial countries; the third to the fascist

40

The Transitional Program

regimes; and the fourth to the Soviet Union and by extension to other deformed or degenerated workers’ states. T h i s i n itself i s evidence that the Transitional

Program

i s not a

uniform and static set of demands, fixed once and for all, which is to be swallowed whole and mechanically imposed in a stereotyped manner on any and all situations regardless of time, place, and circumstance. Marxist logic teaches that “the truth is concrete.” This rule h as to b e applied to the us e of the Transitional Program as well a s to every other item of our arsenal of ideas. The relevant parts of the program have to be brought forward in accord with an intelligent and informed appraisal of the actual conditions and adapted to the specific state of the ongoing class struggle.

The Transitional Program contains three different kinds of proposals for action. One group concerns human rights and civil liberties granted in many codes of law and constitutions. It calls for granting, reinstituting, or broadening them: freedom of the press and assembly, the right to have unions, and the slogan of self-determination are examples of this type. These are democratic demands, and they can be very explosive under conditions of severe repression and the restriction of rights by an authoritarian ruling power, bourgeois or bureaucratic. Then there are partial or immediate demands, which are connected with the everyday struggles of the masses in defense of their conditions of life and labor: a raise in wages, a relaxation of speedup, an end to a wage-freeze, or an improvement in welfare standards fall into this category. The third category constitutes the heart of the Transitional Program because these demands are directed against the foundations of capitalist property, power, and privilege. I f militantly and massively acted upon by the workers, these can challenge the capitalist regime and move the masses toward the creation of a new and independent base of power. Most of the demands in the program—notably the proposals for a sliding scale of wages and hours, factory committees, workers’ control of production, a workers’ militia, and the expropriation of separate groups of capitalists—belong to the category of transitional demands as such. These are crowned b y the call for the formation of councils, or soviets.

These demands have a central place because they logically build u p to the acquisition

o f power by the workers—the

essence

Role of the Transitional Program

41

of anticapitalist revolution. At the same time the other demands are interconnected with them. The fight for democratic and partial demands in conjunction with the key transitional proposals

can become powerful

accelerators

o f m a s s mobilization.

All depends upon the vigor of the m a s s offensive and the kind of leadership it gets. For instance, the struggle for a n objective like Black control of the Black communities or for independence of the Québécois, which are democratic demands, can set popular masses into motion against the existing centralized state in a nationalist confrontation with highly revolutionary implications. Colossal changes have occurred in the world since the Transitional Program was written and adopted. World War I I was fought; fascism was wiped out i n Western Europe; the colonial revolution has surged up on four continents; there are now fourteen workers’ states instead of one; the U S . has become the Goliath of imperialism and encountered its David in Indochina; neocapitalism h a s developed; nuclear weapons menace the perpetuation of the human race. I n the face of such developments the Transitional Program could not remain as it was, frozen in a fast-changing world situation. It has had to b e amplified, adjusted, concretized to take these upheavals and transformations into account and cope with them. Some slogans have become less directly relevant, while others are more urgent and immediately applicable. Slogans, for instance,

that

deal

with

problems

that

are

paramount

during

periods of economic crisis are not suitable for boom conditions, and vice versa. The demands for the postcapitalist societies can b e made more precise and comprehensive since the resistance to the ultrabureaucratic regimes h a s grown, asserting itself openly in East Germany in 1953, Poland and Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and increasingly within the Soviet Union itself. Further demands will be brought to the fore as the preconditions for an antibureaucratic upsurge for socialist democracy continue to ripen in this sector. The most remarkable fact about the Transitional Program i s not the necessity for such amendments and the character of such adaptations but the substantial validity of its method and contents after three decades of turbulent world history. It is not too much to say that this multipurpose tool kit for revolutionary

42

The Transitional Program

mass action i s more timely, more applicable to the problems posed by this era of permanent revolution, than when it was conceived. I propose to discuss how the Trotskyist movement has sought to explore and explain the new phenomena of our time, utilizing the method of the Transitional Program to answer these new problems. The opponents of Marxism and the New Left critics of Leninism and Trotskyism accuse u s of being dogmatists who endlessly repeat antiquated ideas and advance obsolete formulas without taking into account changed conditions and working out independent solutions to novel problems. The charge is baseless, but then I suppose “any stigma is good enough to beat a dogma with.” Socialist reformism and Stalinism are certainly guilty of dogmatism, formalism, and fossilism in the sphere of theory— and they have other faults. But authentic Marxism has been as creative as it has been self-critical in the twentieth century. It has managed to keep abreast of changing times to a far greater extent that any rival school of thought. Trotsky took note of this aspect of innovation in his 1937 pamphlet Stalinism and Bolshevism. H e there observed that “the Bolshevik party was able to carry on its magnificent ‘practical work’ only because it illuminated all its steps with theory,” the theory of Marxism. But, he said, Marxism is a theory of movement, not of stagnation. Only events on a tremendous historical scale could enrich the theory itself. Bolshevism brought an invaluable contribution to Marxism in its analysis of the imperialist epoch as an epoch of wars and revolutions; of bourgeois democracy in the era of decaying capitalism; of the correlation between the general strike and the insurrection; of the role of the party, soviets and trade unions in the period of proletarian revolution; in its theory of the soviet state, of the economy of transition, of fascism and Bonapartism in the epoch of capitalist decline; finally in its analysis of the degeneration of the Bolshevik party itself and of the soviet state.

I t could have been added that Trotsky himself made prodigious theoretical contributions to Marxism in his celebrated theory of the permanent revolution, in his formulation of the law of uneven and combined development, and in his program for the regeneration of workers’ democracy in a diseased workers’ state. That work has been carried forward by the leaders of the

Role of the Transitional Program

43

Fourth International up to today. In his report to the 1969 world congress on the resolution regarding the “New Rise of the World Revolution” [Intercontinental Press, July 14, 1969], Ernest Germain alluded to some of the problems arising from new developments that the theoreticians of our movement” have been grappling with. H e mentioned Black nationalism in the United States, the economic contradictions of neocapitalism that his own writings have done so much to clarify, the economic problems of the transition from capitalism to socialism, the sociology of the student revolt, the elaboration of a more extensive transitional program for the workers’ states, the analysis of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and state capitalism in semicolonial countries like Egypt, Syria, Burma, and Algeria; and the elements of a transitional program for the youth movement. The task confronting our Canadian cothinkers—of devising a correct program and perspective for the revolutionary forces in Quebec—could be added to this list. Two of these current problems rank high among our own preoccupations. One is the creation of a set of demands for the Black liberation struggle in the U S . The original draft of the Transitional Program does not mention Black nationalism for the reason that it was not an urgent issue and major political factor even in the Black communities in 1938, apart from Garveyism, which had passed its peak. The more militant and politically energetic elements in the Black communities then turned hopefully toward the resurgent industrial unionism. Black nationalist sentiment has crystallized o n an organized mass scale in this country only within the past fifteen years. As it emerged and unfolded, the American Trotskyists have been obliged to follow its successive stages and give a theoretical analysis of its motive forces, principal features, and aims, as well as offer guidelines for effective intervention in its struggles. They were greatly aided in this task by the method of Marxism, the positions worked out by Lenin and the Bolsheviks on the national question in our era, and by the acute previsions of Trotsky contained in the pamphlet Leon Trotsky o n Black Nationalism and Self-Determination [Pathfinder Press, 1972]. Nonetheless, with all these guides, it has been no simple matter to assess the course of the Afro-American struggles over the past period and chart the next necessary steps for its forward movement.

44

The Transitional Program

We can claim a certain amount of success in this theoreticalpolitical work. It is widely recognized in radical circles, Black and white, that the Socialist Workers Party outstripped all other tendencies in grasping the importance of Black nationalism, beginning with the emergence of Malcolm X even within the sectarian bounds of the Nation of Islam, and evolving a proper attitude and alignment in respect to it. The variety and volume of the literature we have published on this subject (including the contributions of George Breitman) and the amount of its sales and circulation attest to that initiative. All this indicates the capacity of our cadres to recognize what is new in a mass ferment and adjust our views, strategy, and tactics accordingly. That would not have been possible without the aid of the theory of the permanent revolution and the law of uneven and combined development, taken from Trotsky’s teachings. The movement for Black liberation is a complex and contradictory fusion of two different trends—a national-democratic thrust of powerful proportions for self-determination, combined with a proletarian struggle against the monopoly capitalist structure. All those who fail to understand the dual character and special of this movement, like the ex-Maoists of the characteristics Progressive Labor Party and sectarians such as the Workers League, are bound to go astray in comprehending its dynamics and orienting correctly toward its line of development. The “Transitional Program for Black Liberation” adopted at the 1969 Socialist Workers Party convention is the latest contribution of our movement to the acute problems facing Black militants at the present juncture. The document advances proposals for the next steps that have to be taken. It explains the necessity for a transitional program of mass action as well as for the formation of a Black party to organize and lead the struggle. It suggests points for the program of such a party. It tries to reply to some objections raised by the reformists and ultralefts, who for different reasons reject the concept of such an approach.

This pioneering program is certainly susceptible of improvement and modification, as the Black struggle deepens, broadens, and intensifies. But it arises out of the experiences of revolutionary struggle both internationally and nationally and seeks to steer the movement toward the goal of emancipation from oppression by helping to organize the ghetto masses into the most formidable force for action.

Role of the Transitional Program

45

Another significant contribution to socialist thought has an international rather than a national scope. This is the document on the worldwide youth radicalization submitted to the 1969 world congress of the Fourth International for discussion [ “ A Strategy for Revolutionary Youth”]. It was written in response to the challenge presented by the youth rebelliousness which has become a major factor in world politics in recent years. The dimensions, depth, and duration of the youth revolt, and the political impact it has h ad in so many countries, are genuinely new and have taken everyone by surprise. Ever since the 1848 revolutions in Europe there have been eruptions by students and dissident youth. Student demonstrations have been a familiar phenomenon in colonial lands for a long time. But the current upheavals far surpass anything that has happened before, both in their extent and their implications, as the May 1970 national student strike in the U S . demonstrated. The document delves into the social and economic causes for the unprecedented scope, intensity, and importance of the student revolts and shows their deep roots in the changes in the processes of production and their influence upon the restructuring of the educational system. This revolt has a durable basis and an irrepressible character. I t will not diminish, despite wide fluctuations, but will mount in vigor. It therefore requires a general orientation, a set of demands, that can steer it in a progressive direction. The projected program revolves around the central strategy of the red, or revolutionizing, university—for example the Black university as adapted to Afro-American needs, or the Francophone university in Québec. This policy is directed against the positions of the reformists, who seek to restrict changes to the purely university issues, isolating developments there from the larger questions of the day; as well as against the ultralefts, who propose to “blow up” the institution; or those who quit the campus for work in the neighborhood or the factory under the slogans of serving the people or proletarianizing the pettybourgeois students. As opposed to these one-sided strategies, the Trotskyists seek to convert the university and other educational institutions into an instrumentality for promoting the transformation of society. This is to be achieved by opening it to the permeation of revolutionary ideas and influences, placing it at the disposal of the most progressive elements in the community and the country, and

46

The Transitional Program

effecting an alliance in action of the students and progressive faculty members with the anticapitalist forces. Obviously, neither the student body nor the faculty of the university can by themselves overthrow the ruling powers and change society. They lack the economic power and social weight for s o tremendous a task. But experience h as already shown that under certain circumstances students and youth are capable of initiating struggles that are not only significant o n their own account but have galvanizing effects upon the mood and movement of other, broader social forces. The purpose of the program of democratic and transitional demands put forward for the youth is to indicate how their actions can be most effectively conducted and geared into the basic issues of the international class struggle. In order to dispel any mystery or mysticism about their uses, let me give several examples of our experiences with slogans of a democratic or transitional type over the past three decades. The Transitional Program contains a paragraph on support to a referendum on the question of declaring war. This is a democratic demand whose fulfillment would permit the people to express their distrust of the imperialist warmakers. This proposal was first formulated in the slogan: “Let the people vote on war.” I t stirred up a bit of controversy in the Socialist Workers Party ranks on the eve of the Second World War. Some comrades felt that this proposal was dangerously reformist and would create and reinforce pacifistic illusions that capitalism and its rulers could preserve the peace and halt their march toward the coming bloodbath. These comrades were mistaken. The campaign for such a nationwide referendum was conceived as a means for alerting and mobilizing large numbers of people against the military preparations. Moreover, it would be accompanied on our part by a Marxist exposition of the root causes of imperialist conflicts. Our efforts did not get beyond the stage of general propaganda for the proposal before Pearl Harbor closed all public debate on the issue. Afterwards, it remained in our assemblage of antiwar slogans and was included in our postwar election programs. However, it met with no wide response during the Korean War, and n o actions were taken in accordance with it. We advanced it again more vigorously as the U S . imperialist intervention in Vietnam unfolded. This time the response was different because of the mass sentiment against the war. Beginning with Dearborn, Michigan, several big cities became

Role of the Transitional Program

47

involved in such referenda. The issue was placed before the electorate on a citywide basis in San Francisco and in Madison, Wisconsin, on the state level in Massachusetts and other places— with usually favorable results. This record illustrates the ups and downs in the status of any component of the Transitional Program. A demand can move from the point of pure propaganda in our press and other media, to agitation, which reaches and influences a growing segment of the population, to action upon it, first in a sporadic and localized way and thereafter on a broader basis. The second example has to do with the sliding scale of wages as a weapon against inflation. This means an automatic rise in wages for all workers in correspondence with increases in the price of consumer goods. This proposal likewise remained in propaganda form in this country until the labor movement went through the experience of inflation during the Second World War and after. The auto workers’ union was one of the first to take up this demand in its negotiations. I t won the “escalator clause” from General Motors in 1948. Ever since, this provision has been one of the principal bones of contention between the bosses and the workers. The bosses try to deny, restrict, or withdraw the “escalator clause”; the workers try to obtain, keep, or extend its application. It provides the only protection between contracts against increases in the cost of living that downgrade living standards. In the last two years the auto workers have partly won it back through their strike, and so have the steel workers. The UAW’s escalator clause falls short in several significant respects. It ties wage raises between contracts to the Bureau of Labor Statistics price index, which favors the employers by underestimating the actual increases in living costs. The union does not back up its agreement with the auto bosses through the formation of consumer committees on prices that can check on the real effects of inflation in the marketplace. Nor does it call for the inspection of the company’s books by the unions. These and other demands in the Transitional Program are linked together in a natural way. For general protection against the ravages of inflation, federal legislation should provide that wages increase in step with rising prices and should cover all workers, organized and unorganized alike. The sliding scale of wages should go hand in hand with the

48

The Transitional Program

sliding scale of hours to combat unemployment. That is arrived at by dividing the total amount of work hours at any given time by the number of available workers. This idea has been popularized at the present stage of the union movement by the slogan of “thirty for forty,” a call for thirty hours of work a week at forty hours pay. The third example is familiar to the whole world as the central slogan of the antiwar movement: “Bring the Troops Home Now.” This is not to be found in the 1938 program, although the idea of bridling the armed forces of an imperialist government and thereby aiding the struggle of its victims is an old one for revolutionary Marxists. The Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance coined this slogan—or at least did most to popularize it. An expert in public relations recently complimented us on its simplicity. “Every word is one syllable and readily understandable by anyone,” h e observed. That aspect hadn’t struck m e before, even though we’ve improved it with the shorter version, “ O u t N ow!” We launched the slogan because i t fitted the situation. It defended the right of the Vietnamese to self-determination free of foreign interference; it opposed U S . military intervention and could lead to its end; and it corresponded to the needs of the American people and the G I s . Yet, despite these merits, in 1965 our party was virtually the only one on the left to put it forward. There has been a continual fight in the antiwar movement to retain this demand. Today, however, it is supported by most of the American people. Here is eloquent testimony to the power latent in a slogan directed against one of the pillars of the capitalist regime: its imperialist foreign policy and the instrument required to implement it. The last example concerns the women’s liberation movement. The 1938 document advises the sections of the Fourth International to work out “with all possible concreteness” sets of transitional demands, not only for the industrial and agricultural workers, but for every part of the population oppressed and exploited by capitalism. The resurgence of women’s liberation is confronting our party with the responsibility for doing just this for that burgeoning movement. However, this task i s not being undertaken in a void and could not b e consummated in a hurry. I n fact, it has barely begun. The spirit and intent of the whole transitional approach is not

Role of the Transitional Program

49

to impose abstract slogans arbitrarily and ultimatistically upon a mass movement that i s still in a state of flux and h a s yet to acquire well-defined

characteristics,

organization,

o r direction.

The essence of our method i s to size up the actual situation and its precise point of development, note the specific problems that most preoccupy the typical participants in the movement, and work out solutions to propose to them. As the Transitional Program states: “The advanced workers should learn to give clear and concrete answers to the questions put by their future allies.” W e speak for the advanced workers—and the oppressed sex is certainly not least among their future allies. Our comrades in the feminist movement first singled out several key issues that had come to the fore—issues that provided a basis for collective action and helped promote the radicalization of women. Among these are the right to free abortion on demand, free birth control information and devices, 24-hour child care facilities, and equal pay for equal work. These served as guides for our activists and have been popularized through our press, meetings, and electoral campaigns. Since then our positions have been further concretized. O n the one hand, these and other demands emerging from the discussions and experiences of the feminists have been incorporated into a more comprehensive program adapted to the requirements of the current stage of the women’s liberation struggle in this country. The 1971 Socialist Workers Party convention adopted this in the form of a resolution entitled “Toward a Mass Feminist Movement” [see Feminism and Socialism, edited by Linda Jenness (Pathfinder Press, 1972)] as it had previously done for the Black liberation and youth movements. This document serves to amplify the program, clarify the strategy, and broaden the perspectives of the feminist struggle. But that has been only one aspect of our work. On the other side, our comrades have supported singling out the demand for the repeal of the abortion laws as the central slogan for action and organization in the first national campaign of the movement. Thus the widening of the program has gone hand in hand with the pinpointing of the main proposal for mass action at that conjuncture.

This two-sided process of programmatic development should be especially instructive. I n this case we can follow, step by step, the way a set of transitional demands i s selected, shaped, and applied in accord with the concrete circumstances and pace of growth of a specific social struggle of immediate relevancy.

50

The Transitional Program

The basic Transitional Program, as well as its more recent adaptations to specific countries and sectors of the revolutionary arena, i s squarely counterposed to the methods of the reformistStalinist tendencies on the one hand, and to the ultralefts of all sorts on the other. Neither of these camps has any need or use for the Transitional Program. Trotsky once explained the main reasons for their indifference or open hostility. The reformists, he observed, have no need for a transitional program because they are content to remain within the ground of the democratic capitalist regime and d o not intend to cross over to the opposite shore in combat for the revolutionary alternative. The ultralefts have n o use for a transitional program because, in their overheated imaginations, they have already leaped over the stages leading to the revolutionary showdown, even though the masses, the principal fighting force, may be lagging far behind. They see no need for a bridge to enable the masses to make the crossing from where they actually are to the barricades and beyond. What both lack is an understanding of the dialectical method and the capacity to apply it to the realities of the evolution of the revolutionary movement. Marxism sees the interconnections and foresees the transitions between the different stages of the struggle. It takes careful note of the nonrevolutionary stages of political development and the corresponding frame of mind of the masses—and the possibility of underlying trends leading toward the emergence of prerevolutionary and directly revolutionary situations. Marxism keeps constantly on the alert for openings in which the elements of the Transitional Program can be inserted to help convert the less radicalized state into a more radicalized one. It therefore serves as a link to connect one stage of the class struggle with another as well as to bring together diverse sectors of that struggle. Without its timely intervention through a capable leadership the whole chain of actions by the masses can dangle in midair, be weakened and disoriented, and come to naught. That has happened many times over the past half century.

What method a third i s itself

importance does the Transitional Program and its of work have in the life of the Fourth International today, of a century after its adoption? The Fourth International in a transitional state in the process of its formation. In

Role of the Transitional Program

51

most places it i s relatively weak in relation to other and older organizations, although it is gaining on them and at their expense. I t i s strong in ideas but poor in material resources. It i s presently engaged in what Ernest Germain, in his report on the “New Rise of World Revolution,” called “the primitive accumulation of cadres.” Meanwhile, there are immense openings for our ideas and the expansion of our influence among the radicalized youth, who are surging forward with the advance of the world revolution. This obliges our forces to participate ever more vigorously and daringly in the arena of action to win the best among these ardent rebels to our banner. Before u s is the task of transforming ourselves, without falling into adventurism, from groups of propagandists for a program and a set of ideas into parties of m a s s action and mass influence implanted in the vanguard of the working class. The indispensable vehicle for effecting that change in the status and prospects of the Fourth International and its respective sections i s the Transitional Program and its method of approach. “The present epoch,” wrote Trotsky, “is distinguished not for the fact that it frees the revolutionary party from day-to-day work but because it permits this work to b e carried on indissolubly with the actual tasks of the revolution.”

I I . THE ROLE O F DEMOCRATIC

DEMANDS

This second talk will discuss the place of democratic demands and slogans in the transitional process. This is necessary because there’s a great deal of misunderstanding and confusion on this subject. A right can be defined as a just claim or title. Democratic rights are those acquired by or belonging to the people as a whole, as against privileges restricted to ruling and possessing classes. Human rights are one thing and recognized civil liberties and legal rights are another. These two categories by n o means coincide in the development of history, either de jure or de facto. A slave h a s n o rights that the master is obligated to respect. H e or she m a y have a claim to human rights in the abstract, but in slave systems no specific civil rights and very few legal rights. Such rights are the possession of a free people, a measure of their actual or prospective self-determination. It is often not realized how much the specific rights we possess are the products of historic development and social struggle. This is especially true of

52

The Transitional Program

Americans, who do not have a lively sense of history and tend to take for granted what has been acquired in the past. For example, we assume without question that people can live wherever they choose, can get up and leave for another location if they don’t like it where they happen to be. But serfs didn’t have this elementary right. They were bound to the land and to the lord. It was only through the emergence of antifeudal and bourgeois conditions of life and labor, which are not much older than half a millennium in western civilization, that a large number of individuals threw off these bonds and assumed the right to go and live where they pleased as well as to sell their labor power freely on the market. Of course, even today the right of free movement is not fully granted. A person can’t exercise that right unless he or she has the material means to do s o . Passports are not always granted to American citizens but can be denied or taken away. I n the Soviet Union people are not allowed to leave the country at will. It’s treason, it’s a capital crime to cross the borders of the Soviet Union without permission of the authorities. And some people dare to call this “socialism”! Our conception includes the elementary democratic right of anyone to go from one part of the planet to another without permission of the authorities. We assume the right to call a mass meeting whenever we choose. Do you know that this right was in medieval times reserved or restricted to the state or the clerical authorities? It’s included in the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution because it was so often denied or violated in colonial days. As we know, large categories of citizens are still not given equal rights. This flagrant denial of justice accounts for the civil rights movement in the United States and in Ireland as well as for the demands of the feminist movement, the homosexual rights movement, and others. There is probably more ferment to obtain and enlarge rights nowadays in this country than at any time in the past. That’s a symptom of a genuine m a s s ferment and one of the hallmarks of the present radicalization. In view of these facts, it’s rather odd that some ultralefts maintain that revolutionists can be indifferent to demands for democratic reforms and accord them no place or importance in the revolutionizing of the masses. I’ve discussed the evolution of democracy in the western world in Democracy and Revolution [Pathfinder Press, 1972]. There, it is pointed out that the mass struggle for democracy in Europe

Role of the Transitional Program

53

began on a very rudimentary basis. The initial demands for democracy in the incipient stages of the bourgeois revolutions were for certain religious rights directed against the Catholic church, which dominated people’s lives and minds. This heretical movement became known as Protestantism or the Reformation. The people demanded the right to choose their own pastors instead of having them designated by 3 lord or a bishop. They wanted to read the Bible in their own language instead of Latin, so that they could understand it. They too were the children of the Lord, yet they couldn’t hear or understand the scripture in which the word of the Lord w a s deposited. I t had to be construed for them by the literate or half-literate priesthood. They wanted their own interpretation of the text. Their constructions of the will of the deity, reflecting their own specific social interests, clashed more and more radically with the ideas and institutions of the old regime. Their dissident religious reinterpretations became the vehicle of social demands. From religious rights the plebeians went on t o demand political, legal, and economic rights: the right to vote; the right to representation in parliament, which was restricted in England, the “mother of parliament,” to the upper classes; the right to a jury trial by peers; and the right to buy and sell commodities, including houses, land, and labor power, which was not possible under an authentic feudal regime. Over the past five centuries the rights amassed by the people through their revolutionary efforts have been considerably enlarged, yet they are still lacking many elementary freedoms— including the right to have a job and earn a living, which is denied under capitalism. The most extreme ultraleft error is the conception that, because this is the epoch of capitalist decay and proletarian revolution, democratic slogans have somehow become outmoded or superseded, and therefore revolutionists cannot advance or even support

them.

A less categorical

version

of this

sectarianism

is

the position, sometimes found in our own ranks, that democratic demands are in and of themselves inferior to transitional ones— less revolutionizing, less important, purely peripheral, and episodic. The democratic slogans, it i s considered, are pettybourgeois, reformist in implication, and not really proletarian. There’s no basis for such a view in the Transitional Program itself. They simply overlook or flout what the text itself says. I pointed out in the first talk that the program’s structure falls into

54

The Transitional Program

four parts applied to different areas of the struggle for the emancipation of humanity in our era. In three of these—the backward countries, the fascist regimes, and the degenerated workers’ state—the struggle for democratic slogans is accorded a most prominent place. It is explicitly stated for the colonial countries that “democratic slogans, transitional demands, and the problems of the socialist revolution are not divided into separate historical epochs in this struggle, but stem directly from o n e another.” All three are linked together. It is emphasized that the struggle for revolutionary democracy by the workers and peasants, primarily for national liberation and agrarian reform, grows over into the struggle for workers’ power in the process of permanent revolution. In the section of the program devoted to the antiwar struggle, three democratic demands are raised that are pertinent to our present situation. These are the proposal to let the people vote on war and peace, the demand to give eighteen-year-olds the right to vote (which

is an

answer

to those

who s a y

that

none

o f the

demands in the program are realizable under capitalism, since this has j u s t been won in the United States), and the call for the abolition of secret diplomacy. The disclosure of the Pentagon Papers made this last point a very popular issue. Thus the various elements in the Transitional Program spring to life in the whole process of history in our time. One by one they become translated from paper and ink into significant stimuli of mass action. Moreover, it would b e rather odd for a party and an International whose program proclaims that it stands for democracy in its own movement, and which fights for workers’ democracy

everywhere,

to be indifferent

to or unconcerned

with

the struggles of the masses for a larger measure of democratic decision-making in every sphere of life. In fact the Trotskyist movement aspires to b e the foremost protector and promoter of genuine democracy against all antidemocratic and authoritarian forces, institutions,

l a w s , and regimes.

H o w do we approach the problem of fighting for democracy in our time? For us, democratic slogans are viewed in the same light, and directed towards the same ends, as the other elements of the Transitional Program. They’re levers for the mobilization of the masses with the aim of improving their situation and at the same time opposing and combating the capitalist state and

Role of the Transitional Program

55

any authoritarian or bureaucratic regime. In conjunction with the most deepgoing proletarian slogans, they can promote the creation of a dual power based on the workers, which can overturn capitalist property and power. This means that democratic slogans, or their partial or total realization under bourgeois or bureaucratic regimes, are not ends in themselves. That’s the outlook and orientation of reformism and opportunism. For revolutionary Marxism, by contrast, the struggle for the attainment of greater democracy in any field i s a means to the establishment of a workers’ power which can really institute a socialist democracy. The purpose of democratic slogans and their implementation in action is to effect a change in the power relations between the classes to the advantage of the exploited and oppressed. I n the second place, w e seek to implement such slogans not merely b y petitions or letters to congressmen but through extraparliamentary action, by the direct intervention of the masses, and not exclusively through the parliamentary mechanism—although we don’t disdain that channel as an auxiliary vehicle that has its uses and value. It is interesting that Sean Kenny, the spokesman for the Irish Republican Army, said yesterday

that the main issue causing the split i n their movement

at their last convention was whether or not the IRA should participate in parliament for revolutionary purposes. Anyone acquainted with the history of the IRA knows what a tremendous change this h a s involved. This rebel group has been in principle against the methods of Leninism, including participation in parliament; and yet through bitter, bloody experience over the past fifty years, they have come to recognize that this type of electoral activity can be an auxiliary arm for the promotion of their movement. This brings the question of the qualitative difference between the defense of democracy, of the rights of the people, and the defense of the bourgeois-democratic regime. These two are quite different and should not be identified. The sectarians do s o unfavorably, while the reformists do so favorably. Marxists do not defend or support any of the bourgeois democracies, which are today all imperialist or satellites of imperialism. We would, of course, fight, even arms i n hand, with proletarian methods of mass action, against any attempts by reactionaries to destroy a parliamentary regime and replace it with an outright dictatorial one, whether Bonapartist, militarist, or fascist. We

56

The Transitional Program

prefer a democratic bourgeois regime, just as we prefer democracy in any and all institutions to an authoritarian setup, because it is more favorable to the organization and struggle of the working class for their emancipation. B u t our historical task is not to maintain the status quo in any of its political structures, but to do away with the rule of the bourgeoisie in all its forms and replace it with a workers’ government. The m a s s struggle for democratic reforms is important because it can facilitate this aim. When democratic slogans, like the republic versus the monarchy, are raised i n public controversy, and the reformists try to keep the campaign within the narrow framework of substituting o n e bourgeois form of sovereignty for another as a way of cheating the workers, Marxists strive to turn the movement in a n opposite direction through stimulating and organizing the revolutionary action of the masses. Thus it can boomerang against the reformists and ultimately get rid of the possessing classes. I n any event, we don’t take a sterile, abstentionist attitude when issues of democracy are before the people. W e are interventionists, we are activists. W e try to take hold of these questions and u se them for revolutionary purposes, to win the sympathy and support of greater and greater numbers of people. All our campaigns for civil liberties in this country, from the exposure of the Moscow trial frame-ups in the 1930s to the Minneapolis labor case and the Bloomington case up to the effort to have an existence and maintain a headquarters in Houston, Texas, had this aim. It’s important to remember that any slogan or demand can be misused, perverted, and curtailed by forces hostile to the interests of the masses. This is especially true of democratic demands. There can be a lot of demagogy and chicanery in regard to them. The Transitional Program warns against the danger that under certain circumstances a democratic slogan can become “ a noose around the neck of the proletariat” because it may serve to restrain rather than to stimulate their autonomous class action and trick them out of gains they have actually acquired. A dramatic example was the conflict between the Constituent Assembly and the Soviets in 1917-18. One of the chief demands of the Bolsheviks prior to 1917 and during the revolution was for the convocation of a constituent assembly to set up a new government after tsarism was overthrown. They were ardent propagandists for this.

Role of the Transitional Program

57

Meanwhile, the masses had formed the Soviets, which in October took the power before the Constituent Assembly could be convened. Then the question w as posed: did the Constituent Assembly have the same usefulness for democracy and for the revolution that it had before the Soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers had actually concentrated the power in their hands and were already proceeding to construct the new order? The Bolsheviks pointed out that the Constituent Assembly had turned into its opposite. I t h ad become the rallying point for all the reactionary and counterrevolutionary elements in the country. By their action in October, by their support to the Soviet power, which genuinely represented the interests of the workers and

peasants,

the Soviets

h a d the right

to take away

from

the

Constituent Assembly elected before October the right to set up an alternative and retrogressive sovereignty. This was done by the dispersion of the delegates. The general warning against the abuse of democratic slogans signifies that n o specific democratic slogan, not even the totality of democratic demands, can be taken i n isolation from the given circumstances or from the rest of the transitional demands. They go hand in hand with the other elements of the program. Democratic slogans must be interrelated and integrated with the others in the Transitional Program, which, as previously explained, is composed of three major ingredients: transitional demands, partial or immediate demands, and democratic ones. All three complement and reinforce one another. As Hegel said, the truth is in the whole, not in any one of its parts. The urging of any particular slogan is a tactical means to the strategic goal of constituting a dual power of the workers that can become the sovereign power. Instructive in this connection i s the following excerpt from “ A Strategy for Revolutionary Youth”: Because of the decay of the capitalist system, a n d the erosion of democratic

conquests,

m a d e i n s o m e instances

a l m o s t two centuries

ago,

m a n y of today’s student struggles begin over the m o s t elementary issues, such a s the right of free speech. However, they tend to develop beyond this level quite rapidly, going beyond the campus, beyond the framework of democratic freedom as conceived i n the most revolutionary phases of capitalism in its rise, reaching into the economic area, and bringing u p problems that can actually be solved only under a socialist system. A clear understanding of this logical progression makes it possible to advance a consistent series of interlocking slogans that can readily be

58

The Transitional Program

adjusted for particular situations. Above all it facilitates the recognition of suitable slogans of this type originating from the ranks in combat.

This brings u s to the misconception that democratic slogans are second-rate stuff that have to be flushed down the drain as quickly as possible—that a red-blooded red will have as little to do with them as possible, if not reject them from the outset. This underestimates their importance. The specific weight of a particular democratic demand, and such proposals in general, depends upon a whole complex of concrete circumstances. Black control of the Black community is an expression of the democratic right of self-determination. Who can tell in advance how explosive this or the comparable demand of the Chicanos can be? Once this type of slogan becomes a motive force among millions of militant Blacks and Chicanos in the major cities of the foremost imperialism or in the Southwest, it can b e the propulsion for insurrectionary actions at a climactic point in the movement for Black or Chicano liberation. Similarly, for that matter, in regard to the liberation of the Québécois. The important point is to recognize the potential of a mass struggle for the extension of democracy. Neither the extent nor the intensity of the results can be measured precisely beforehand because that often depends upon the energy of the intervention of the vanguard. An excellent illustration of the importance of this subjective factor was provided by the action of our Canadian cothinkers through the campaign they undertook against the Emergency Laws last year, when all the other tendencies were inert or went underground. Remember that all our defense cases and campaigns—and they form a very significant part of our activity—are struggles for democratic rights. The point is that we conduct these in a realistic manner befitting socialist revolutionaries.

The role that a struggle for democratic demands can play i s exemplified by the national campaign for full legalization of abortion, which we helped to initiate. This is built around a democratic demand for women’s rights ( a s well a s for human rights, since men and children are also affected by restrictions on abortion). This is presently the key demand of the mass action aspect of the national feminist movement. It’s thoroughly in consonance with the spirit and method of the Transitional Program, because it aims to mobilize large numbers of the oppressed from a particular social layer for concerted action

Role of the Transitional Program

59

against capitalist-clerical repression. The struggle for women’s equality is in itself a struggle for democracy. This example, among others, shows how off the mark any disparagement of the movement for democratic demands i s . It would impede and derail effective participation in vital social struggles. If we took such an approach, as some advise u s to d o , we would be crippled from the start and get nowhere very fast. O r take the campaign of the Student Mobilization Committee for high school rights. Almost all of the demands are democratic demands. That’s the way high schoolers can best be organized at their present point of development. Democratic demands are often all-important in the initial stages of a struggle when the task i s to reach newly awakening people, bring them together, and get them moving on an issue that’s identified with their needs. This brings us to an extremely important observation about the character and function of the Transitional Program. It is not designed as a program for the vanguard; it is part of the program of the vanguard. W e don’t hug it to our bosoms and raise it as a Shibboleth around which we gather as a sect. That’s totally alien to the spirit and method of the Transitional Program. It’s a set of proposals for action and organization offered by the revolutionary party, first for consideration and discussion, and then adoption by the masses or specific sections of them. It’s a tool kit for action. Each one of its recommendations is useful to do a particular job. The underlying and ultimate objective of the application of the Transitional Program in real life is to set masses into motion against the authorities and institutions of capitalist society, culminating in the confrontation of class forces in a showdown struggle for supremacy. A party really concerned with that type of struggle, and resolved to win it, has to involve first thousands, then

millions

in coordinated

action. We’re still a small minority

of propagandists, but we think big! Every piece has to fit into that pattern and serve that goal. The spontaneists, anarchists, sectarians, and schematists don’t have an inkling of what this i s all about because they don’t understand the essence of Marxism and Bolshevism as a guide to action. Action which goes beyond involving small numbers of people, although that is necessary because it’s the basis and beginning of everything else, but action in which vast numbers

60

The Transitional Program

participate. Our emphasis i s always on mobilizing m a s s e s , although w e recognize that propagandizing and agitating for these i d e a s , which take up a lot of our time, energy, a nd resources, is a continuous educational process issuing i n such action.

As a last point, I would like to discuss the place of democratic slogans in three categories of countries. The first concerns the backward countries. The theory of permanent revolution teaches that in countries which have not gone through their bourgeois-democratic revolution, the mass struggles for change inexorably have a combined character. They fuse democratic demands—such as for agrarian reform and for national liberation or unification of the country— with socialist ones. That is the case of Ireland today, where the fight for national liberation and unification, as well as the overthrow of clericalism, is inseparably united with revolutionary working class perspectives and slogans. The people of Bangladesh are at the same point of struggle for their national independence and social liberation. Under such circumstances national-democratic demands and objectives are pushed to the forefront, at least for the initial stage. The second category of countries are the fascist ones. At the time the Transitional Program was written, fascism was spreading like a stain over the map of Europe and in its aggressive expansion was threatening other parts of the world as well. I n those countries where the brownshirts or blackshirts had taken power the oppositional activities of the masses of people and especially the revolutionary elements were reduced to very elementary levels indeed. I n that totalitarian atmosphere, where the right

to survival

was in question,

it w a s a bold gesture

to

express a difference, let alone a dissent. A very interesting episode occurred in 1935. Hitler ha d consolidated his power and coordinated everything in the Third Reich. The labor movement and all oppositional parties had been suppressed. The only organized institution with the slightest autonomy

i n Germany

w a s the Catholic

church.

The C a t h o l i c

bishops got a little crosswise with Hitler’s regime. What the precise issue was I d o not recall, but that’s not important. What was at stake was the right of an uncoordinated body to assert their variant position. Trotsky advised our comrades to support this struggle of the

Role of the Transitional Program

61

church on a democratic basis. H e argued this way: W e are not clericalists in any sense. However, this i s a demand raised by an institution supported by masses of people who are not completely contented with the fascist setup. The conflict can b e used under the given circumstances a s an entering wedge. If the church gets away with its mild defiance of the fascist regime, other, progressive

forces, including

the

revolutionary

o n e s , can take

advantage of the opening, try to widen it a little, show people that something can still be done and fascism is not all-powerful. This is a very instructive example because the bearers of the democratic demand and the immediate beneficiaries of it were completely foreign to everything our movement stood for. I n the fascist countries or any other unrestrained dictatorship, it’s obvious common sense that the struggle for democracy takes first place because the people have no rights they can exercise on their own account. All power is concentrated in the hands of the totalitarian regime, and it is then a matter of life and death to get room to breathe and raise a dissenting voice. Sometimes I wonder what kind of world the sectarians think they live in and what kind of history they ever studied! We who lived during the heyday of fascism know full well how crucial the elementary struggle for democracy can be. Those who maintain that the defense or extension of democratic demands isn’t important don’t live in the real world of class struggle. The third category of democratic slogans referred to in the Transitional Program has to do with the degenerated and deformed workers’ states. In 1938 they applied solely to the Soviet Union; nowadays they have much wider application. Before the Soviet

Union

came

into

being

it

was

assumed

by

many

supporters of socialism that once the workers had taken power and the capitalists and their institutions were eliminated, the struggle for democracy would decline and fade away quite quickly. That has not been the case for reasons we have frequently

explained.

( S e e The Revolution

Betrayed,

b y Trotsky

[Pathfinder Press, 1972], and the last chapters in Democracy and Revolution, by myself.) Not only does the struggle for democracy not stop with the overthrow of capitalism, but in certain respects it can be posed more acutely. Women and members of oppressed nationalities instinctively sense this possibility. They say: “What’s going to happen to u s once the existing system i s replaced by socialism? Are we really going to get what we’re fighting for and what we expect?” They

62

The Transitional Program

are somewhat suspicious and reserved about the prospects of equality after the revolution and want to be shown. The people in the bureaucratized workers’ states have even more urgent reasons to demand their rights. The Transitional Program presents a whole series of demands which are directed against the deprivation of rights in the workers’ states. Since 1938 these have had to be considerably amplified, as is indicated by the first seven demands for the situation there from “A Strategy for Revolutionary Youth”: 1. Freedom of discussion of philosophical, cultural, and scientific questions. The right to express a critical viewpoint. 2. Freedom to discuss historical questions. Let the truth come out! . Freedom to discuss current political issues. . Abolish the censorship. . For the right to organize and demonstrate. . N o political persecution. Let the public, including foreign observers, b e admitted to our trials. 7. Freedom of travel. N o restrictions on sending representatives to visit youth organizations in other countries, or in receiving their representatives on visits.

These specific democratic demands have been added to our transitional program because they have been brought forward in real life by the developing political revolution for workers’ democracy in these countries. We didn’t dream them up. The students, the progressive and antibureaucratic elements, want them, want them in large measure, want them now! That i s why the Fourth International has taken cognizance of them and incorporated them in its transitional program. The elementary law of contemporary history, the law of uneven and combined development, applies not only to sectors of the world which are historically retarded but to the most advanced countries. The Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance maintain that the coming American revolution will be a combination of the anticapitalist movement of the workers for socialism with the struggles of the oppressed national minorities for self-determination. This combined revolution will include all democratic struggles against oppression, such a s the struggle for women’s liberation, for gay liberation, for abolition of the prison system, and so o n . The aims of these democratic struggles can be achieved only through the overthrow of capitalism and the construction of a socialist society. At a recent plenum of the

Role of the Transitiona l Program

63

Young Socialist Alliance National Committee, I heard a Black comrade state: “The majority of mankind is today deprived of elementary democratic rights and wants self-determination.” That expresses an important truth. W e are partisans of the proletarian revolution. W e further understand that the struggle for the proletarian revolution can pass through the struggle for elementary democratic demands, which w e support and implement by our own methods. A durable and thoroughgoing democracy can b e achieved, in either the backward or advanced countries, only through the victory of the working class and its allies, resulting in the overthrow of capitalism. That’s the main thesis of the theory of permanent revolution. And it’s likewise the last word of the Transitional Program on the role of democratic slogans in our epoch.

I I I . QUESTIONS

ABOUT THE PROGRAM

This third talk will deal with some misconceptions about the Transitional Program and try to make clear its pattern as a whole. It’s important not to have a fetishistic attitude towards the Transitional Program. In general, Marxists are opposed to taking a worshipful attitude towards anything in this world, including the deity, moral codes, state institutions, parties, or charismatic leaders. The contents of the program are not engraved on tablets coming down from Mount Sinai, which are henceforth sacred and inviolable. We could hardly have such an attitude towards a program which we ourselves participated in fashioning. When you know how something is made you can have a practical, realistic, scientific attitude toward it.

Some groups claiming to be Trotskyist have a different manner of treating the Transitional Program that accords with their sectarian mentalities. Two such groups are the Socialist Labour League, an English sect inspired by the thought of Gerry Healy, and their American counterpart, the Workers League. Let’s take the attitude of Healy and his disciples toward the role of philosophy

i n the Marxist

movement.

W e believe that a correct philosophical method is indispensable for the analysis

o f the world a n d its phenomena,

including social

and political questions. B u t we don’t make a fetish of philosophy and elevate it to the point where it i s viewed as the be-all and end-

64

The Transitional Program

all of political life. These Talmudists are the reverse of Burnham. If you have read In Defense of Marxism, you are aware that Burnham held the position that philosophy had nothing to do with politics, and dialectical materialism in particular was valueless in dealing with political issues and struggle. The Healyites have turned that false conception inside out. Instead of maintaining that philosophy is of no account in politics, they contend that philosophy i s everything in politics and accuse u s of being “empiricists” because w e insist that the facts of reality as disclosed by social practice are decisive for Marxists. The Transitional Program is not forever fixed and finalized. The Lambertists of the Organization Communiste Internationale (OCI), a group in France formerly associated with Healy, accuse us of tampering with this holy of holies by adding to it and recognizing that great changes have occurred since it was written. When w e propose to modify this or that aspect of the program on the ground that it is not complete, they shriek that we have abandoned Trotsky. Actually, they are the ones who violate the conception and purpose of the program. Neither as a whole nor in application to a particular country is the Transitional Program a static one. That could be deduced simply from the facts that the four categories of countries involved stand on different levels of development—and that there are three distinct categories of demands. So there must be differences among them and in their application. In fact they are constantly being amended by the various national sections, and the American Trotskyists have been one of the most energetic and productive in this respect. illustrates The “Transitional Program for Black Liberation” how we have been working this out. After a listing of a long set of demands there is this concluding remark: Most of the proposals listed above have been brought forward at one time or another in the course of the Black liberation struggle over the past years; others are taken from the experiences of the masses elsewhere in fighting against capitalist domination. A program of this sort cannot b e fully finalized or frozen. It h a s to remain flexible and open-ended, with plenty of room for additions and improvement, as the struggle develops and new problems come to the fore.

Moreover, the demands in the Transitional Program do not comprise the whole of our program. The totality of what we stand

Role of the Transitional Program

65

and fight for extends from the Communist Manifesto through the latest documents of the Fourth International at its congresses, its statements on interim questions, and the decisions and documents of our party. The transitional demands consist of proposals for propaganda, agitation, and action directed toward mobilizing the masses. By and large they cover a distinct period of struggle. This extends from the time when the masses are only preparing themselves to contest supremacy with the capitalists up to the point where they actually d o it. This is the transitional period proper for which the proposals are intended. The actual set of transitional demands presented by the different national sections of our world movement must differ in different countries because the conditions are different, the relationship of social forces is different, the level of development is different. In a colonial or semicolonial country where the bourgeois-democratic revolution h a s barely gotten off the ground, where the peasantry i s the predominant part of the population, and where national independence or unity does not exist, Marxists cannot put forward the same type of transitional program as in an advanced country that has already gone through its bourgeois-democratic revolution, i s a seat of imperialist power, and has a powerful proletariat and industrial development.

Consider the appropriateness of the proposal for a labor party in the United States. The Transitional Program itself contains no mention of a labor party. This problem is peculiar to our country, which is the most politically backward of all the advanced capitalist countries. It is the only advanced country in which the workers have not cut loose from the capitalist parties and formed a political organization of their own, whether it b e Social Democratic, Laborite, or Communist. Even the workers of Canada launched such a party at the beginning of the 19608, the New Democratic Party. Many of them belong to the same international unions of steel workers, auto workers, and teamsters as the workers below the border.

W e adopted the perspective of a labor party as a result of the same discussions on the Transitional Program Trotsky had with our comrades in 1938, though the idea was presented to the party in a separate document and as an independent proposal. Since the labor party proposal was intended to mobilize the masses of

66

The Transitional Program

American workers for an independent political course, we viewed it as a very important transitional demand. Since then the idea has had its ups and downs. At several times it moved to the point of agitation in certain unions. But it has never become a proposal for national action, nor has it been acted upon by any significant section of the U S . trade union movement. Since we favored the formation of a labor party, our task has been limited to propaganda, and unfortunately that’s the way it still is today. W e continue to explain its necessity to the advanced workers. The Workers League takes a different approach. They push it forward as a central slogan for action on any and all occasions, regardless of circumstances. For them it is a universal panacea to be repeated by rote and imposed by ultimatum on any and all mass struggles. They thereby make a mockery of this transitional demand. H ow do we put forward the Transitional Program? We don’t throw it at an individual worker or workers en bloc—“here it is, take it or leave it,” because they’re going to leave it and not take it if it is presented in this manner. Nor do we bring forward proposals all at one time. I compared the program to a multipurpose tool kit, and so we do what a good craftsman does with it. If there’s a particular job to de done, look in the kit for the particular tool that is best suited for the job. Take out of the Transitional Program whatever is timely and appropriate for the degree of development of the mass movement, the consciousness of the masses, their readiness to act on this or that element of the program. And if it doesn’t contain the right one for the occasion, it may be necessary to devise one or two. That is where the art of leadership comes in. It’s one of the tests of a leader or leaders to be able to size up a situation and tell which one of the tools at our disposal can best advance the movement of the masses. You’ll never become a good leader of our movement if you simply proceed by rote without first analyzing the facts in the situation at hand. That determines what demands are in order. There is another misunderstanding about the nature of the Transitional Program. Some think its demands pertain and appeal exclusively to the working class. That’s wrong. This can be verified simply by reading the text of the program, which covers and fits the needs of all sectors of the oppressed: the peasants, youth, women, and sections of the middle classes.

Role of the Transitional Program

67

W e haven’t worked out a program for the American peasants, because we don’t have so many. There are only about 5 million farmers compared with 9.5 million college students in this country. Thus the student population, which is in motion, is more important than the farm population, politically speaking. Indeed several years ago we amended our transitional demand for a new regime from “ a workers’ and farmers’ government” to “ a workers’ government.” I n some areas—for example, in Minnesota—we may require an extensive set of demands for the small farmers in the future as we have had them in the past. However, this is not now a central concern for u s on a national scale. But imagine if that were a lack in the Trotskyist movement of India, where the peasantry is the overwhelming part of the population, the agrarian problem i s excruciating, and there are many struggles between landlords and cultivators. It would be an unforgivable omission for the Trotskyists of India simply to present a program of demands for the proletariat of India and ignore the needs of the peasants. This not only points up the contrast between countries very sharply, but also demonstrates the multiclass scope of the Transitional Program. I n relation to the American scene we have had to work out sets of transitional demands for the different forces involved in social struggle in the current radicalization. This i s explained in the document “Toward a Mass Feminist Movement,” which has seven categories of demands. They are introduced as follows: A revolutionary strategy for the feminist movement must b e based on a program of democratic and transitional demands, rooted i n the needs of the masses

of women,

and part of the broader transitional

program

of the

socialist revolution. A program of struggle around such demands will have a revolutionary logic because it mobilizes masses against the ruling class and its government. To win such demands in full requires a socialist revolution.

The key question facing the revolutionary socialist party, then, i s how to help mobilize masses of women to fight for their own interests. Around what demands and through what forms can this b e done, related to the immediate needs and level of understanding of masses of women? N o full program for the women’s liberation movement h a s yet been worked out, and it is impossible, at this time, to develop such a full program of demands. However, the broad outlines of such a program have begun to emerge and some of the key demands are already clear.

This

i s the

motivation

for the seven

categories.

I n addition,

68

The Transitional Program

there are subcategories of women for whom specific demands are presented in the document. These are women prisoners and women of oppressed nationalities. In this way transitional demands become more and more concretized. W e may soon have a draft of a comparable program for prisoners because the prisons have become revolutionary universities. They are hotbeds of protest and rebellion, as Attica and other prison revolts attest. Indeed, one segment of the mass movement has already been a bit ahead of us on this score. The recent Chicano conference at Denver decided to support the establishment of a union for Chicanos and Chicanas in prison. As you are aware, we have drafted a specific set of transitional demands for Chicano liberation at this particular point of the movement’s development. I t was adopted at our 1971 convention. The purpose of transitional demands, it has been emphasized, is to further the mobilization of the masses. This is pertinent to the controversy within the feminist movement over the merits of the slogans for free abortion on demand versus repeal of all abortion la ws. Both of these demands are good ones and are incorporated in our tool kit. However, that doesn’t solve the tactical question: which one is better suited to bringing the largest number of women together in the first national mass action of the feminist movement? This was the decisive consideration in the judgment of our comrades who selected repeal of all abortion laws. They decided on the less radical slogan at this stage of the development of the movement. They didn’t discard the other one. They simply put it on a different level, for propaganda rather than immediate m a s s action. At the same time that one slogan is advanced to mobilize the largest number of women for action in the streets, the other remains

a s part of our broader

program.

The choice of one rather than the other conforms to the assertion in the Transitional Program that “the achievement of this strategic task [that is, the conquest of power] is unthinkable without the most considered attention to all, even small and partial, questions of tactics.” The more far-reaching demand may be the incorrect one if conditions don’t warrant its broad acceptance and it has less capacity to mobilize masses. The slogan for the formation of soviets is in the program, but if we called for it tomorrow, what response would it get? The most radical demand i s not always the right one, a s the ultralefts and sectarians believe. It is necessary to function in the real world if

Role of the Transitional Program

69

you’re going to b e a revolutionist a n d get rid of this monstrous imperialist power. You can’t substitute your desires or your imagination for the realities of the class struggle. And w e want to be the most realistic of all revolutionaries and revolutionary organizations: to start from what i s , in order to change it most effectively. A realistic revolutionist must cultivate a very keen sense for the timing and placement of correct slogans. It i s indispensable to understand the difference between propagandistic work and proposals for action by large numbers of people.

What is realizable and what i s not realizable from the program under capitalist domination? I pointed out that the right to vote for eighteen-year-olds, which i s in the program, is now i n the United States Constitution. Certain democratic and partial demands can be realized to one degree or another in the course of the struggle under capitalism. B ut other crucial demands have a different dynamic and status. They set the most combative elements of the proletariat into motion and are intended to culminate in a confrontation by the insurgent masses with the capitalist rulers, and the organization of a counterpower. One demand of this type i s workers’ control of production. It i s in the long run incompatible with capitalist control of production. The capitalist profiteers cannot permit the workers in a factory or an industry to have an effective and lasting veto power over the way the industry i s run. O n the other hand, the workers themselves, once they acquire a certain measure of control, either have to go forward to complete control or give up the measure of veto power they have acquired over the decisions of the bosses. One or the other class must come out on top and b e the paramount decision makers. That issue has to b e fought out to the finish.

The following passage of the Transitional Program pertains to this point: From the moment that the committee makes its appearance, a d e facto dual power i s established in the factory. By its very essence it represents the transitional state, because it includes in itself two irreconcilable regimes: the capitalist and the proletarian. The fundamental significance o f factory committees

i s precisely contained

i n the fact that they open the

door if not to a direct revolutionary, then to a prerevolutionary period— between the bourgeois and the proletarian regimes.

70

The Transitiona l Program

The same holds true on the level of political organization. The crowning demand of the Transitional Program i s for the formation of soviets arising from representative committees of action by the masses. Such committees, which constitute a dual power, are likewise incompatible with parliamentary institutions designed to defend the property, power, and influence of the ruling class. It’s their antithesis, whether or not the participants understand that. Once workers’, peasants’, or soldiers’ councils are brought into being, the issue has to b e decided by the further struggle of the contending forces, which can eventuate in civil war. Here is what is said on this matter in the Transitional Program: The slogan of soviets, therefore, crowns the program of transitional demands. Soviets can arise only at the time when the mass movement enters into an open revolutionary stage. From the first moment of their appearance, the soviets, acting as a pivot around which millions of toilers are united in their struggle against the exploiters, become competitors and opponents of local authorities and then of the central government. If the factory committee creates a dual power in the factory, then the soviets initiate a period of dual power in the country.

It’s possible for factory committees, or committees of action of the workers, to be quickly transformed into the equivalent of soviets and take on more and more of the administrative powers in a locality, a region, and ultimately in the entire country. That began to take place in a minimal fashion during the May-June 1968 events in France. The grand strategy outlined in the Transitional Program runs through all the intermediate steps and tactical decisions that its goal requires. The aim is to unite and mobilize the masses in a revolutionary struggle capable of transferring supremacy to them in the nation s o the workers can go ahead and begin building the new society.

The final point concerns the problem of leadership bound up with the formation and reinforcement of the cadres of the revolutionary party. The concluding section of the Transitional Program says: “The present crisis in human culture i s the crisis in the proletarian leadership.” It’s not only the proletariat as a whole that suffers from inadequacy of leadership. After fifteen years of intense action and ferment, the Black liberation struggle

Role of the Transition al Program

71

in the U S . is largely leaderless and disorganized. The lack of leadership is even more obvious in the trade union movement. As for the student movement, S D S , which was the dominant organization among radical students in the 19603, came to a very bad end. The prime responsibility for providing the leadership required for the student movement rests with the Young Socialist Alliance. Cadres, like Rome, are not built in a day. We’ve been working at it in this country now for about forty-three years, and what we have is assembled at this conference. The components of our cadres are formed through prolonged experiences and testing in actual struggles. These take place both in the broader mass movements and in the controversies that periodically beset the revolutionary vanguard when it comes to grips with new turns in the situation and new problems requiring new tactics and new solutions. Through these processes, over a period of time, people are tested, sifted out, and their quality as cadres becomes discernible. The cadres of the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance are the heirs to a mighty tradition, and have a rich treasury of ideas in the field of revolution. This is placed at their disposal when they enter our movement. The present generation h as already begun to assimilate it, apply it, and even add to it in the various transitional programs that have been developed as well as in the documents reprinted in Towards an American Socialist Revolution: A Strategy for the 19708 (Pathfinder Press, 1971). By assimilating the spirit and method of the Transitional Program, by avoiding the pitfalls of opportunism on the one side and sectarianism on the other, they are helping to overcome the crisis of leadership for the revolutionary forces in this country.

PART I:

DISCUSSIONS WITH TROTSKY BEFORE THE TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM

74

The Transitional Program

Toward the end of 1937, when Trotsky began work o n the Transitional Program, his secretary Joseph Hansen sent a message to New York saying that Trotsky hoped he and his American comrades could exchange ideas about the program. But they had recently been expelled from the Socialist Party and were busy preparing for the founding convention of the Socialist Workers Party (December 31, 1937-January 3, 1938), which became the U S . section of the Movement for the Fourth International

(MFI),

the name

used

from

1 9 3 6 to 1938 for the

international organization that preceded the Fourth International. Other important events occurred—in February 1938, the assassination of Leon Sedov, Trotsky’s son and a central leader of the MFI; in March, the third big Moscow trial—and it was not until March 20 that an S WP delegation was able to sit down in Mexico for talks with Trotsky that lasted about a week. The S WP delegates were James P. Cannon, Max Shachtman, and Vincent R. Dunne; also participating were Rose Karsner of the SWP, Diego Rivera of the MFI’s Mexican section, and others. The SWP delegates and Trotsky quickly reached agreement o n two points: that the international conference should be held in June o r July, and that it should definitely establish the Fourth International. The rest of the week they devoted to discussions about the Transitional Program and problems facing the S WP. Transcripts were made of six discussions held between March 20 and 25. Printed here are the transcripts dealing with the Transitional Program—an extract from March 20 and the full text of the March 2 1 , 22, and 23 talks. (The rest have been published in Writings of Leon Trotsky [1937-38], Pathfinder Press, 1976, second edition.) The stenographer was Rae Spiegel, better known later as Raya Dunayevskaya, who explained that the six transcripts consisted of “rough notes” that had not been corrected by the participants; but none of them complained about the accuracy of the transcripts. To safeguard Trotsky’s uncertain status as an alien refugee in Mexico, pseudonyms were used for all the participants in the transcripts (Trotsky was “Crux”), and they were not published during his lifetime; here the actual names have been substituted for the pseudonyms whenever possible. Also published here is a statement o n the labor party which supplemented the remarks Trotsky made in the March 21 discussion. Trotsky s e n t it in April for a meeting of the SWP National Committee that was to discuss the labor party as well as the Transitional Program.

Discussions with Trotsky

75

Preparing the Program for the Founding Conference March

2 0 , 1938

Trotsky: All the sections have had discussions about the events in Spain, the Sino-Japanese War, the class character of the USSR—and some sections have even had their splits, like the German section. Your theses are known by all the sections, and the same holds true of the French theses.1 The question now is only a matter of putting the text in order.* Cannon:2 There remains the question of preparing the text for the conference. Trotsky: We have here prepared the draft of the program—it’s possible to get it ready within two to three weeks, then to translate it into English and French. Can your declaration of principles be used for the International Conference? Shachtman:3 N 0, it’s more the declaration of a national section. Trotsky: Adolphe has sent out his draft of the statutes. The German section has prepared the thesis on the character of the Fourth International . It was sent to every section three months ago and it is now published in Unser Wort.4 Shachtman: We haven’t received Unser Wort for some months. Trotsky: Perhaps because in your sojourn in the Socialist Party you lost your international connections, and you haven’t yet been able fully to reestablish them. You’ve also had the thesis of Diego Rivera.5 The only objection to b e made against it is that it is too long for the conference. I read your suggestion that I write on the war question in the light of the latest events. I accept this suggestion with readiness—to supplement and concretize our thesis in the light of recent events. We have something of importance to do. It can be done in the *Notes begin

o n page 247.

76

The Transitional Program

next few days. We have here a draft but not enough persons who can translate from the Russian. But what i s missing is a program of transitional demands and slogans. It i s necessary to make a summary of concrete, precise demands, such as workers’ control of industry as opposed to technocracy.6 From time to time it is mentioned in the paper but only in passing. But I believe it is one of the slogans that is very important for the U S . Lundberg writes a book about the sixty families. The Annalist says that his statistics are exaggerated.7 W e must ask for the abolition of commercial secrets—that the workers have the right to look into the bookkeeping—as a premise for workers’ control of industry. A series of transitional measures which correspond to the stage of monopolistic capitalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, with a section corresponding to colonial and semicolonial countries. We have prepared such a document. It corresponds to that part of the Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels which they themselves declared outdated.8 It’s only partially outdated; partially it i s very good and is to be replaced by our conference. Then I also have a draft of a thesis concerning democracy. The gist of it is that democracy is the most aristocratic form of rule— only those countries are able to conserve democracy that have slaves in the world, like Great Britain, whose every citizen has nine slaves; France, whose every citizen has one and a half slaves; and the U . S . — I can’t reckon the slaves, but it’s almost the whole world, beginning with Latin America. The poorer countries, like Italy, gave up their democracy. It’s an analysis of democracy in the light of new events. What is a fascization of democracy? The petty-bourgeois democrats become

bankrupt.

Only

the big o n e s , the greatest

robbers, the

richest slaveholders, etc., remain democrats. Such a posing of the question is especially useful for the U S . Naturally it is not to be written in favor of fascism but in favor of proletarian democracy. Even for the richest country, like the U . S . , democracy is becoming less and less workable. I believe these are almost all w e have as propositions for the International Conference. The other important questions—the burning questions of the class character of the Soviet Union, the Sino-Japanese War, the question of Spain—have already been discussed by all sections. W e are well prepared for the conference. I will prepare, then: (1) transitional demands; (2) the question

Discussions with Trotsky o f democracy;

( 3 ) war; ( 4 ) manifesto

on

the

world

77

situation;

either separately or in the form of one basic pamphlet. . . .

How to Fight for a Labor Party in the U S . March

2 1 , 1938

Cannon: The subject today is the labor party,9 in three aspects: 1) Our general, prinicipled position. 2) The development of Labor’s Non-Partisan League, that i s , the C I O political movement in the trade unions,10 which shows in some respects tendencies to independent political action, toward the constitution of a party; in other places like New York, half such tendencies: labor candidates locally, support of RepublicanFusion, and support of Roosevelt nationally;11 in other parts they endorse all capitalist candidates, mainly through the Democratic Party. 3 ) The question

arises should our comrades

i n the trade unions

we control join the LNPL? What should we do i n unions where we have a small minority? Should we become the champions of the LN PL or should we stand aside in a critical attitude? W e d o not have a final policy. I n New Jersey, for example, w e are experimenting—we h a d the unions join the LNPL and there support a motion for the formation of a party. I n other parts of the country w e haven’t done so. H o w should we conduct ourselves in a more or less developed labor party a s in Minneapolis? I n principle it appears that w e should condemn the whole movement and stand aside, but that i s not a very fruitful policy. I n Minneapolis there i s a fully constituted independent organization, the Farmer-Labor Party. It runs its own candidates i n the state, and nationally it supports Roosevelt. The Stalinists who have been driven out of the trade unions12 have penetrated deeply into the Farmer-Labor Association—this constitutes

a weapon

against

u s in the unions. The [ S W P ] policy

there now is the policy of a bloc of the Trotskyist unions with what they call the “real Farmer-Laborites,” that i s , reformists

78

The Transitional Program

who believe in the FLP and don’t wish the Stalinists to control it.13 How far can we carry such a bloc—how far can we fight for j u s t organizational control? But if our people stand aside, the Stalinists get control. O n the other h an d , if we fight really energetically, a s w e do in the unions, we become champions of the FLP. It i s not a simple question—it’s very easy for people to get lost in the reformist policy. D u n n e : l 4 First, I would say that the Stalinists, in controlling the apparatus of the FLP, control more than j u s t the apparatus— they make it difficult for us in the unions. By our not participating in this party through our trade union connections, it allows the Stalinists and the more reactionary elements in the F LP to have a weapon against u s in the labor movement. We have a definite policy insofar a s our work in the trade unions i s concerned. Our comrades speaking in favor of the FLP have done s o very critically, advising the unions that they can use it only to a certain extent. W e have succeeded in keeping our policy clear from the reformists, but, a s Comrade Cannon s ay s , it’s difficult to say how far we should go in this direction; we cannot take the responsibility for the labor party, and yet w e would have that responsibility thrust on u s by the workers who believe w e can a s efficiently fight there for their members as w e do in the trade unions. Thus far, even the Stalinists’ drive against u s has not been able to shake them yet. The Stalinists, together with a wide section of the progressives, intellectuals, are at one in turning the labor party more and more into a bloc with the Democratic and liberal candidates. Inside the FLP, the Stalinists are trying to keep control by setting up a formal discipline in the FLP, mainly against u s . W e have fought that, demanding democracy in the labor party, and we have been successful. We haven’t been at all successful in preventing a closer bloc with the Democratic Party. W e can’t yet ask the unions to support the SWP as against the FLP. Cannon: I n St. Paul, where the FLP made a deal to support a capitalist candidate for mayor, we put up our own candidate. Trotsky: C a n you explain to m e how was it possible that though the Stalinists control an important section of this party they passed a resolution against fascists and communists? Dunne: That was d o n e in one region. I n certain sections we have Farmer-Laborites who work with us—they were in control of this district as against the Stalinists—we have some comrades there—we tried to shape this resolution in a different way but w e

Discussions with Trotsky

79

were not on the resolutions committee—late at night the resolution was jammed through. Trotsky: The resolution can be used also against us. How is the party constructed? It is based not only upon trade unions but also upon other organizations—because they are progressives, intellectuals, etc. Do they admit every individual, or only collectively? Dunne: The FLP is based upon workers’ economic organizations—trade unions, cooperatives, etc.; farmers’ cooperative organizations; also upon territorial units—township clubs, etc. It also allows for the affiliation of cultural organizations, sick-anddeath-benefit organizations, etc.; also through ward clubs. The Stalinists and intellectuals join through these clubs; they have more control than the drivers’ local of 4,000 members. We are fighting against that—we are demanding that the trade unions be given their real representation—we have the support of the trade unions on this. Trotsky: C a n you tell m e what are the nuances of opinion among our leading comrades on this question—approximately? Cannon: There are nuances of opinion not only among the leadership but also in the ranks. Problems arise in the trade unions especially. A motion is proposed in the unions to join the LNPL. The sentiment, especially in the C I O unions, for this is overwhelming. I think that our policy in New Jersey—that at least in this union we must not oppose joining the LNPL—will have to be adopted. There i s also a tendency in the party that in this LNPL we shall press for the formation of the labor party. I venture to say that the trade union comrades would be most satisfied if they could have that decision. But they haven’t yet faced the difficulties. The dilemma i s that you become the champions of the FLP by having an aggressive policy. We even have one comrade on the state executive committee of the FLP in New Jersey.15 The bureaucrats are putting off the date for formation of the FLP. The policy of Lewis and Hillman is to leave that aside till 1940.16 If our comrade would make an energetic fight, if he could be sincere in advocating the FLP, h e could muster quite an opposition against the bureaucrats. But then the dilemma is that we are championing the creation of an FLP, which we oppose. I n our plenum17 there will be differences of opinion—there will be a tendency to become energetic fighters for the constitution of a labor party. My opinion is that this is the prevailing sentiment

80

The Transitional Program

of the party—to join the LNPL and become aggressive fighters for the constitution of a labor party as against the policy of endorsing capitalist candidates; if we can d o that without compromising our principled position, that would b e best in the sense of gaining influence. We don’t say anything practical to the workers who are ready to take one step forward. The C P now is not championing the labor party; they are a Roosevelt party. The bureaucrats in the trade unions are also blocking the strong movement among the workers for a labor party. I wouldn’t say that the labor party sentiment is Shachtman: so strong among the workers today. Most of the labor party sentiment that might have arisen h as been canalized toward the channel of Roosevelt. We h ad a formidable crisis, and yet the only thing that came out of it i s the hybrid form of labor party in New York.18 I n any case, if you compare 1930 with 1924,19 you can say there is barely a labor party movement now; then there was more real sentiment in the trade unions. I think that if w e don’t have a clear idea for the prospects of a labor party, that w e will make some big political mistakes. I believe a big change is taking place—a breaking-up of the old parties. The biggest political party, the Democratic Party, which has a support of 90 percent of the workers and farmers, is going through a split almost before our eyes. I n Congress the fight i s not between Republicans and Democrats, but between one section of the Democrats and another. There i s very good reason to believe that in the 1940 election we will have a new political setup with the old-line Republicans fused with the Democrats of the South; and the other, the New Deal Democrats, Roosevelt followers plus the C I O , Lewis; that will be powerful enough even to take the bulk of the AFL along. It i s precisely this prospect that keeps Lewis and Hillman from championing a labor party—they are looking for the split in the Democratic Party, in which they will b e able to play a considerable role. That i s why I don’t think there will be real, serious, substantial progress in the LNPL movement toward an independent labor party. It is true that our position is rather a difficult one, but we have had a considerable amount of experience with labor party movements. A generalization may be helped by reference to our Minneapolis situation—I don’t think our growth is due to participation in the FLP movement but through our activities in the trade unions. Nevertheless, as we grow, we necessarily must participate in FLP politics, and I can’t say I’m entirely satisfied

Discussions with Trotsky

81

with the situation there. I can’t say we have proposed any other line of conduct. In effect, in Minneapolis we are in a bloc with socalled honest reformists—who are scoundrels on their own account—who are in a bloc with the Democrats. This bloc i s directed almost exclusively against the Stalinists and against a mechanical control the Stalinists have of the FLP. In action we are indistinguishable from the so-called honest reformists. We are distinguished from the Stalinists, but only insofar as w e are in a bloc with real reformists who vote for the FLP ticket in the state and for the Democrats nationally. I f we are to follow out such a policy of being against endorsing capitalist candidates in favor of FLP candidates seriously, systematically, effectively, I can’t see how we can avoid becoming the champions of a labor party, of taking the initiative, wherever a labor party does not exist, to form one. Unless all signs prove untrue, these labor parties will be a working appendage of Roosevelt just as was the case of the New York American Labor Party supporting Roosevelt nationally and, on a local scale, supporting Republican-Fusion. Once that’s begun I don’t see clearly how w e will avoid the consequences of a policy that was followed in 1924, when we were in the CP, with the added complication that the Stalinist party is in the unions; and while it’s true that they are a Roosevelt party, still, in the unions, they advocate formation of a labor party. Cannon: Not much. I would say that the Stalinists in the first period of the People’s Front had the slogan, “Organize the Labor Party as the American People’s Front,”20 but now it’s only a ceremonial action. At this point they are even against a premature splitting of the Democratic Party. It is not true that the sentiment now is less than in 1924 for a labor party. Then it had no basis in the unions; it was mostly a farmers’ movement. Now the movement i s dominated by the CIO unions. It i s not the old Gompers21 politics. The unions are regimented politically; the sentiment in the ranks for their own party is quite strong. The LNPL is not going out to meet the sentiment of the workers. The policy of Lewis and the bureaucrats is experimental; if the workers will clamor more, they will make concessions to that sentiment. It is a step higher than the Gompers policy. (Stenographer’s note: More argument about the relative strength of labor party sentiment in 1922-24 now took place between Comrades Cannon and Dunne on one side and Shachtman on the other.)

82

The Transitional Program

Trotsky: This question is very important and very complicated. When for the first time the Communist League considered this question, some seven or eight years ago—whether we should favor a labor party or not, whether w e should develop initiative on this score—then the prevailing sentiment was not to d o it, and that was absolutely correct. The perspective for development was not clear. I believe that the majority of u s hoped that the development of our own organization would be more speedy. On the other hand I believe no one in our ranks foresaw during that period the appearance of the CIO with this rapidity and this power. In our perspective we overestimated the possibility of the development of our party at the expense of the Stalinists on one hand, and on the other hand we didn’t see this powerful trade union movement, and the rapid decline of American capitalism. These are two facts which we must reckon with. I can’t speak from my own observation, but theoretically. The period of 1924 I know only through the experience of our common friend Pepper.22 H e came to m e and said that the American proletariat is not a revolutionary class, that the revolutionary class are the farmers and we must turn toward the farmers, not toward the workers. That was the conception of the time. It was a farmers’ movement—the farmers who are inclined by their social nature to look for panaceas—populism, FLPism—in every crisis. Now we have a movement of tremendous importance—the C I O ; some three million or more are organized in a new, more militant organization. This organization—which began with strikes, big strikes, and also involved the AFL partially in these strikes for a raise in wages—this organization at the first step of its activity runs into the biggest crisis in the U S . The perspective for economic strikes i s, for the next period, excluded, given the situation of the growing unemployed ranks, etc. We can look for the possibility that it will put all its weight in the political balance.

The whole objective situation imposed it upon the workers as upon the leaders—upon the leaders in a double sense. O n one hand they exploit this tendency for their own authority, and on the other they try to break it and not permit it to go ahead of its leaders. The LNPL has this double function. I believe that our policy need not be theoretically revised but it needs to be concretized.

I n what

sense?

Are we i n favor of the creation

of a

reformist labor party? No. Are we in favor of a policy which can give to the trade unions the possibility to put its weight upon the balance of the forces? Yes.

Discussions with Trotsky

83

It can become a reformist party—it depends upon the development. Here the question of program comes i n . I mentioned yesterday and I will underline it today—we must have a program of transitional demands, the most complete of them being a workers’ and farmers’ government. W e are for a party, for an independent party of the toiling masses who will take power in the state. We must concretize it—we are for the creation of factory committees, for workers’ control of industry through the factory committees. All these questions are now hanging in the air. They speak of technocracy, and put forward the slogan of “production for use.” We oppose this charlatan formula and advance the workers’ control of production through the factory committees. Lundberg writes a book, [America’s] Sixty Families. The Annalist claims that his figures are false. We say, the factory committees should see the books. This program we must develop parallel with the idea of a labor party in the unions, and workers’ militia. Otherwise it is an abstraction, and a n abstraction is a weapon in the hands of the opposing class. The criticism of the Minneapolis comrades i s that they have not concretized a program. I n this fight we must underline that we are for the bloc of workers and farmers, but not such farmers as Roosevelt. (I d o not know whether you noted that in the official ticket h e gave his profession as farmer.) We are for a bloc only with the exploited farmers, not exploiter farmers—exploited farmers and agricultural workers. We can become the champions of this movement but on the basis of a concrete program of demands. In Minneapolis the first task should be devoted to statistically showing that 10,000 workers have n o more vote than ten intellectuals or fifty people organized by the Stalinists. Then we have to introduce five or six demands, very concrete, adapted to the mind of the workers and farmers and inculcated into the brain of every comrade— workers’ factory committees, and then workers’ and farmers’ government. That’s the genuine sense of the movement. Cannon: Would we propose now that the unions join the LNPL? Trotsky: Yes, I believe so. Naturally w e must make our first step in such a way as to accumulate experience for practical work—not to engage in abstract formulas, but to develop a concrete program of action and demands in the sense that this transitional program issues from the conditions of capitalist society today, but immediately leads over the limits of capitalism. I t i s not the reformist minimum program, which never included workers’ militia, workers’ control of production. These demands

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The Transitional Program

are transitory because they lead from the capitalist society to the proletarian revolution, a consequence insofar as they become the demands of the masses as the proletarian government. We can’t stop only with the day-to-day demands of the proletariat. We must give to the most backward workers some concrete slogan that corresponds to their needs and that leads dialectically to the conquest of power. Shachtman: How would you motivate the slogan for workers’ militia? Trotsky: B y the fascist movement in Europe—all the situation shows that the blocs of the members of liberals, radicals, and the workers’ bureaucracy i s nothing in comparison with the militarized fascist gang; only workers with military experience can oppose the fascist danger. I believe that in America you have enough scabs, gunmen, that you can connect the slogan with the local experience; for example by showing the attitude of the police, the state of affairs in J ersey.23 I n this situation, immediately say that this gangster mayor with his gangster policemen should be ousted by the workers’ militia. “We wish here the organization of the CIO, but in violation of the constitution we are forbidden this right to organize. If the federal power cannot control the mayor, then we, the workers, must organize for our protection the workers’ militia and fight for our rights.” Or in clashes between the AFL and CIO, we can put forward the slogan for a workers’ militia a s a necessity to protect our workers’ meetings. Especially as opposed to the Stalinist idea of a popular front—and w e can point to the result of this popular front: the fate of Spain and the situation in France. Then you can point to the movement of Germany, to the Nazi camps. We must say: You workers, in this city, will be the first victims of this fascist gang. You must organize, you must be prepared. C a n n o n : What name would you call such groups? Trotsky: You can give it a modest name: workers’ militia. Cannon: Defense committees. Trotsky: Yes. It must b e discussed with the workers. Cannon: The name i s very important. Workers’ defense committees can be popularized. Workers’ militia is too foreign sounding. Shachtman: There i s not yet in the U S . the danger of fascism which would bring about the sentiment for such an organization as the workers’ militia. The organization of a workers’ militia presupposes preparation for the seizure of power. This is not yet on the order of the day in the U S .

Discussions w i t h Trotsky

85

Trotsky: Naturally w e can conquer power o n l y when we h a v e the majority of the working class, b u t even i n that c a s e the workers’ militia would be a s mall minority. Even in the October revolution the militia was a small minority. But the question is how to get this sm a l l minority which m u s t be organized and armed with the sympathy of the m a s s e s . H o w can w e d o it? By preparing the mind of the m a s s e s , by propaganda. The crisis, the sharpening of class relations, the creation of a workers’ party, a labor party, signifies immediately, immediately, a terrible sharpening of forces. The reaction will b e immediately a fascist movement. That i s why we must now connect the idea of the labor party with the consequences—otherwise we will appear only a s pacifists with democratic illusions. Then we also h a v e the possibility of spreading the slogans of our transitional program and seeing the reaction of the masses. W e will see what slogans should be selected, what slogans abandoned; but if w e give up our slogans before the experience, before seeing the reaction of the masses, then w e can never advance. Dunne: I wanted to ask one question about the slogan of workers’ access to the secrets of industry. It seems to m e that needs to b e well thought out and carefully applied or it ma y lead to difficulties which w e have already experienced. As a matter of fact one of the ways of reducing the militancy of the workers is for employers—we h a d on e such case—to offer to show u s the books and prove that they are standing a loss (whether honestly or not is not the question). W e have fought against that, saying it is u p to you to organize your business; w e demand decent working conditions. I wonder what then would b e the effect of our slogan o f workers’ access to the secrets

o f industry.

Trotsky: Yes, the capitalists d o [open their books] i n two instances: when the situation of the factory i s really b a d , or if they can deceive the workers. But the question must b e put from a more general point of View. I n the first place, you h a v e millions of unemployed, and the government claims it cannot pay more, and the capitalists

s a y that they cannot m a k e more contributions—we

want to have access to the bookkeeping of this society. The control of income should b e organized through factory committees. Workers will say: W e want our own statisticians who are devoted to the working c l a s s . I f a branch of industry s how s that it i s really ruined, then we answer: We propose to expropriate you. We will direct better than you. Why have you n o profit? Because of the chaotic condition of capitalist society. We s a y : Commercial secrets are a conspiracy of the exploiters against the exploited, of

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the producers against the toilers. In the free era, in the era of competition, they claimed they needed secrecy for protection. But now they d o not have secrets among themselves but only from society. This transitional demand i s a l s o a step for the workers’ control of production a s the preparatory plan for the direction of industry. Everything must b e controlled by the workers, who will b e the masters of society tomorrow. To call for the conquest of power—that seems to the American workers illegal, fantastic. But if you s a y : The capitalists refuse to pay for the unemployed, and hide their real profits from the state and from the workers by dishonest bookkeeping; the workers will understand that formula. If w e say to the farmer: The bank fools you. They h a v e very big profits. And w e propose to you that you create farmers’ committees to look into the bookkeeping of the bank. Every farmer

w i l l understand

that. W e will s a y : The farmer

c a n trust

only himself; let him create committees to control agricultural credits—they will understand that. I t presupposes a turbulent mood among the farmers; it cannot be accomplished every d a y . But to introduce this idea into the masses and into our own comrades, that’s absolutely necessary immediately. Shachtman: I believe it is not correct as you say to put forth the slogan of workers’ control of production nor the other transitional slogan of workers’ militia—the slogan for the examination of the books of the capitalist class i s more appropriate for the present period and can be made popular. As for the other two slogans, it is true that they are transitional slogans, but for that end of the road which is close to the preparation for the seizure of power. Transition implies a road either long or short. Each stage of the road requires its own slogans. For today w e could u s e that of examination of the books of the capitalist c l a s s , for tomorrow w e would use those of workers’ control of production and workers’ militia. Trotsky: H o w can we i n such a critical situation a s now exists in the whole world, measure the stage of development of the worker’s movement i n t h e U.S.? You s a y , it’s the beginning and n ot the e n d . W h a t ’ s the distance—100, 10, 4, how can you say approximately? I n the good old times the Social Democrats w o u l d s a y : N o w w e h a v e o n l y 1 0 , 0 0 0 workers,

later w e ’ l l h a v e

100,000, then a million, and then we’ll get to the power. World development to them was only an accumulation of quantities: 10,000, 100,000, etc., etc. Now we have an absolutely different situation. W e are in a period of declining capitalism, of crises that

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become more turbulent and terrible, and approaching war. During a war the workers learn very quickly. If, as you say, we wait and see and then propagate, then we’ll be not the vanguard, but the rearguard. If you ask m e : I s it possible that the American workers will conquer power in ten years? I will say yes, absolutely possible. The explosion of the C I O shows that the basis of the capitalist society is undermined. Workers’ militia and workers’ control of production are only two sides of the same question. The worker is not a bookkeeper. When h e asks for the books, h e wants to change the situation, by control and then direction. Naturally, our advancing slogans depends upon the reaction we meet in the masses. When we see the reaction of the masses, w e [will] know what side of the question to emphasize. We will say, Roosevelt will help the unemployed by the war industry; but if we workers ran production, w e would find another industry, not one for the dead but for the living. This question can become understandable even for an average worker who never participated in a political movement. We underestimate the revolutionary movement in the working masses. We are a small organization, propagandistic, and in such situations are more skeptical than the masses, who develop very quickly. At the beginning of 1917 Lenin24 said that the party is ten times more revolutionary than its Central Committee, and the masses a hundred times more revolutionary than the ranks of the party. There is not in the U S . a revolutionary situation now. But comrades with very revolutionary ideas in quiet times can become a real brake upon the movement in revolutionary situations—it happens often. A revolutionary party waits so often and s o long for a revolution that it gets used to postponing it. C a n n o n : You see that phenomenon in strikes—they sweep the country and take the revolutionary party by surprise. D o we put forward this transitional program in the trade unions? Trotsky: Yes, we propagandize this program in the trade unions, propose i t as the basic program for the labor party. For us, it i s a transitional program; but for them, it i s the program. Now it’s a question of workers’ control of production, but you can realize this program only through a workers’ and farmers’ government. W e must make this slogan popular. C a n n o n : I s this also to be put forward as a transitional program or i s this a pseudonym for the dictatorship of the proletariat? Trotsky: I n our mind it leads to the dictatorship of the

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The Transitional Program

proletariat. W e say to the workers and farmers: You want Lewis as president—well, that depends upon his program. Lewis plus Green plus La Follette25 as representative of the farmers? That, too, depends upon the program. We try to concretize, to make more precise the program—then the workers’ and farmers’ government signifies a government of the proletariat which leads the farmers. Shachtman: How do you reconcile this with the original statement that we cannot advocate the organization of a reformist labor party? I would like to get clear in my mind what concretely does our comrade do when his trade union is affiliated to the LNPL and he is sent as a delegate to the labor party. There the question comes up of what to do in the elections and it is proposed: “Let u s support La Guardia.”26 Concretely, how does the matter present itself to our comrades? Trotsky: Here we are in a trade union meeting to discuss the affiliation to the LNPL. I will say in the trade union: First, the unification of the unions on a political plan is a progressive step. There i s a danger that it will fall into the hands of our enemies. I therefore propose two measures: 1) That we have only workers and farmers as our representatives; that we d o not depend on socalled parliamentary friends; 2) That our representatives follow out our program, this program. We then map out concrete plans concerning unemployment, military budget, etc. Then I say, if you propose m e as a candidate, you know my program. If you send m e as your representative, I will fight for this program in the LN PL, in the labor party. When the LN PL makes a decision to vote for La Guardia, I either resign with protest, or protest and remain: “ I can’t vote for La Guardia. I have my mandate.” We get large new possibilities for propaganda. The dissolution of our organization i s absolutely excluded. We make absolutely clear that we have our organization, our press, etc., etc. I t is a question of the relationship of forces. Comrade Dunne says we cannot yet advocate in the unions support for the SWP. Why? Because we are too weak. And we can’t say to the workers: Wait till we become more authoritative, more powerful. W e must intervene in the movement as it i s . . . . Shachtman: If there were n o movement for a labor party and we would be opposed to the creation of one, how does that affect the program itself?—-It would still be our transition program. I don’t understand when you say we can’t advocate a reformist party but we do advocate and become champions of labor party

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movements for the purpose of imposing the workers’ will politically. Trotsky: It would b e absurd to say that we advocate a reformist party. W e can say to the leaders of the LNPL: “You’re making of this movement a purely opportunistic appendage to the Democrats.” It’s a question of a pedagogical approach. How can we say that we advocate the creation of a reformist party? We say, you cannot impose your will through a reformist party but only through a revolutionary party. The Stalinists and liberals wish to make of this movement a reformist party, but we have our program, we make of this a revolutionary— Cannon: How can you explain a revolutionary labor party? W e say: The SWP is the only revolutionary party, has the only revolutionary program. H o w then can you explain to the workers that also the labor party is a revolutionary party? Trotsky: I would not say that the labor party is a revolutionary party, but that w e will d o everything to make it possible. At every meeting I would say: I am a representative of the SWP. I consider it the only revolutionary party. But I am not a sectarian. You are now trying to create a big workers’ party. I will help you, but I propose that you consider a program for this party. I make such and such propositions. I begin with this. Under these conditions it would be a big step forward. Why not say openly what is? Without any camouflage, without any diplomacy. Cannon: U p until now the question h a s always been put abstractly. The question of the program h a s never been outlined as you have outlined it. The Lovestoneites27 have always been for a labor party; b u t they h a v e n o program, i t ’ s combinations

from

the top. I t seems to m e that if we have a program and always point to it— Trotsky: First there is the program, a n d then the statutes that assure the domination of the trade unions as against the individual liberals, petty bourgeois, etc. Otherwise it can become a labor party by social composition, a capitalist party i n policy. Cannon: I t seems to m e that in Minneapolis it’s too much an organizational struggle, a struggle for the control of the organization between the Stalinists and u s . W e have to develop in Minneapolis a programmatic fight against the Stalinists in the FLP, as we yesterday utilized the vote about the Ludlow amendment.28 Shachtman:

N o w with the imminence

o f t h e outbreak

of war,

the labor party can become a trap. And I still can’t understand

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The Transitional Program

how the labor party can b e different from a reformist, purely parliamentary party. Trotsky: You put the question too abstractly; naturally i t can crystalize into a reformist party, and one that will exclude u s . But we must be part of the movement. W e must s a y to the Stalinists, Lovestoneites, etc.: “ W e are in favor of a revolutionary party. You are doing everything to make it reformist.” But we always point to our program. And we propose our program of transitional demands. As to the war question and the Ludlow amendment, we’ll discuss that tomorrow and I will again show the use of our transitional program in that situation.

The Struggle and

the

Against

Ludlow March

War,

Amendment

2 2 , 1938

I think that the problem reduces itself to the Shachtman: following as a summary of the discussions we have had in the National Committee [of the Socialist Workers Party]: there is considerable sentiment now in the U S . against the war danger, both among the working class and even bourgeois elements; this sentiment has been strengthened by the war in China, by the Panay incident?9 by the unprecedented military budget of Roosevelt, and by the general instability of the situation in Europe. They feel that the U S . will plunge into a war in two or three years.

Right now there is absolutely n o doubt that 99 percent if not more of the m a s s sentiment against war is purely pacifist. That is perfectly understandable. A revolutionary position on the war is confined to a very small circle of radicals and Marxists. Our problem i s to put forward in practice our basic revolutionary proletarian position toward the war, in contrast to the general pacifist agitation, and at the same time to participate in a broader antiwar movement, which means at the present time to participate in a movement which is , if not fundamentally, then

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91

predominantly, pacifist, even nationally patriotic. The SP [Socialist Party] and the Lovestoneites have now made a combination and have established what they call a Keep America Out of War Committee. Substantially, it is the same as the old Miinzenberg movement—the League Against War,30 etc—except that the programmatic declaration of this Keep America Out of War Committee i s far to the right of the Miinzenberg movement. Trotsky: Who are the leaders of this committee? Shachtman: Norman Thomas, Lovestone, and Homer Martin31 spoke for them, but I don’t know whether Martin is a member of the committee. H e made an antiwar speech, but at the same time a patriotic speech. They have a few retired generals, who are isolationists. How far this movement will develop it is difficult to say. S o far it remains in the hands of this committee; it i s not based upon any organization. They are now planning a national congress. Trotsky: Has the committee any influence now? Shachtman: No. It reflects what the average American stands for—against war in Europe and in Asia and against sending troops out, but when we are attacked, we’ll defend ourselves, etc., etc. We had, for example, one concrete problem in Cleveland, where we have a very active comrade, Cochran.32 The SP and the Lovestoneites organized a mass meeting with Charles Beard33 and Homer Martin as speakers. The SP and Lovestoneites approached our comrade with the proposal that he become a sponsor of this meeting. H e wrote u s asking that we approve it. W e approved it, but not very enthusiastically. Later on in the discussions in the PC [Political Committee], the idea veered the other way, for they had the speakers, we didn’t; Cochran was to be a sponsor but was not to speak. Cannon: That’s not settled yet—we told him to try to speak. Shachtman: But I don’t think he will. Formally the Lovestoneites and Socialists do not have speakers either. W e adopted a program on war in which a number of minimum demands are put forward. On the basis of these demands we drew up a standard resolution to b e adopted in the trade unions and to be circulated everywhere. The position i s extremely difficult, and I don’t think that any of us sees it quite clearly through to the end; and there is great danger that in jumping into a so-called mass movement against war—pacifist in nature—the revolutionary education of the vanguard will b e neglected. At the same time, not to enter the

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The Transitional Program

movement leaves u s still mainly in a propaganda position. The dispute on the Ludlow amendment y o u are already acquainted with. You have seen the motions adopted and those rejected.34 C a n n o n : O n the question of this committee, it came into existence in this way: Norman Thomas invited a couple of dozen individuals to h i s house—writers, old ladies who are in favor of peace, Lovestoneites, and Liston Oak35—but none of us. Oak suggested that we b e invited, but they rejected it. They decided upon a meeting in which such men as La Follette were to speak— you know his policy—and a retired general, and Thomas, and Wolfe,36 who speaks for the Lovestoneites. Some comrades think that we should go into this body. But we didn’t do it. We attacked it. In its very nature it is a caricature of the Barbusse business.37 They are setting up committees in other states and aim at holding a congress in Washington. Their appeal is to the citizens, not the workers. [ H a n d s copy of their appeal to Trotsky.] The other side of the question is the Ludlow amendment. The committee took a position against it. Min'neapolis takes a different policy in the Northwest Organizer,38 and Cochran in Cleveland is opposed to our position on the amendment. More or less, his position is like yours, though h e didn’t know of your letter. The position of the committee since then is a little modified, but still it remains to b e clarified. Then there remains the question whether we should present resolutions against war in the trade unions. We would then introduce such a resolution in Minneapolis and popularize it as the Minneapolis resolution. Dunne: W e already passed the resolution. Cannon: Here it i s . W e wish to have a careful criticism of it. [Resolution is read by all present] Trotsky: I will begin with the Ludlow amendment as a practical question which can introduce us to the general question, I believe, in a concrete way. I can’t agree with the position of the N C , not with the first nor with the second, the motion proposed by Shachtman against the motion of Burnham, and I believe Gould,39 and adopted by the N C . When I wrote about this to Comrade Cannon in a private letter I didn’t imagine at that time that the question would become s o important in the life of the U S . That i s why in this letter I formulated my own position without insisting upon the necessity of reconsidering the question by the American organization. But now from the newspapers and especially from the comrades present here I learned that the question received further development and can play a very great

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93

role. This question, important in itself, is also symptomatic for our policy in general. The NC declaration states that the war cannot b e stopped by a referendum. That i s absolutely correct. This assertion is a part of our general attitude toward war, as an inevitable development of capitalism, and that we cannot change the nature of capitalism or abolish it by democratic means. A referendum is a democratic means, but no more and n o less. I n refuting the illusions of democracy we don’t renounce this democracy so long a s w e are incapable of replacing that democracy by the institution of a workers’ state. I n principle I absolutely do not see any argument which can force us to change our general attitude toward democracy in this case of a referendum. But w e should use this means as we use presidential elections, or the election in St. Paul; we fight energetically for our program. W e say: The Ludlow referendum, like other democratic means, can’t stop the criminal activities of the sixty families, who are incomparably stronger than all democratic institutions. This does not mean that I renounce democratic institutions, or the fight for the referendum, or the fight to give American citizens of the age of eighteen the right to vote. I would b e in favor of our initiating a fight on this; people of eighteen are sufficiently mature to be exploited, and thus to vote. But that’s only parenthetical. Now naturally it would b e better if w e could immediately mobilize the workers and the poor farmers to overthrow democracy and replace it with the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the only means of avoiding imperialist wars. But we can’t d o it. W e see that large masses of people are looking toward democratic

means

to stop the war. There are two sides to t h i s : o n e

i s totally progressive, that i s , the will of the masses to stop the war of the imperialists, the lack of confidence in their own representatives.

They

say: Yes,

w e sent

people to

parliament

[Congress], but w e wish to check them in this important question, which means life and death to millions and millions of Americans. That i s a thoroughly progressive step. But with this they connect illusions that they can achieve this aim only b y this measure. W e criticize this illusion. The N C declaration is entirely correct in criticizing this illusion. When pacifism comes from the masses it i s a progressive tendency, with illusions. W e can dissipate the illusions not by a priori decisions but during common action. I believe that we can say to the masses, we must say to them openly: Dear friends, our opinion is that we should establish the

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The Transitional Program

dictatorship of the proletariat, but you are not yet of our opinion. You believe you can keep America out of war by a referendum. What will you do? You say you do not have enough confidence in the president and the Congress elected by you and that you wish to check them through a referendum. Good, very good, we absolutely agree with you that you must learn to decide for yourselves. The referendum in this sense i s a very good thing, and w e will support it. Ludlow proposed this amendment but h e will not fight for it. H e does not belong to the sixty families, but h e belongs to the fi v e hundred families. H e launched this parliamentary slogan, but this is a very severe fight and can be conducted only by workers, farmers, and the masses—and we will fight with you. The people who proposed these means are not willing to fight for it. W e say this to you in advance. Then w e become by a n d by the champions of this fight. At every favorable occasion w e say: This i s not sufficient; the magnates of the war industry have their connections, etc., etc.; we m u s t check them also; we must establish workers’ control of war industry. But on the basis of this fight in the trade unions we become the champions of this movement. We can say it’s almost a rule. W e must advance with the masses, and not only repeat our formulas but speak in a manner that our slogans become understandable to the masses. The greatest historical example i s the example of the Russian Bolshevik Party.40 I will repeat it because it i s significant. From the beginning of this century until 1917—for almost twenty years—we were fighting against the so-called Social Revolutionaries or Populists.41 Their propaganda was for the expropriation of the soil and its partition into equal lots. W e denounced this program as utopian. W e declared that under capitalism it is impossible and under socialism it i s not a question of partition but of collectivization. The fight lasted for almost twenty years. It took theoretical form in 1883 with the creation of the first Marxist intellectual groups of Plekhanov and Axelrod,42 and it became very

acute in this century. The m o s t important

line o f demarca-

tion was the line of the agrarian program. In 1917 the peasants adopted the program of the SRs—many congresses adopted this program: expropriation of the soil and partition into equal lots among the peasants. What did w e do in this situation? W e declared: You will not adopt our program. Instead you adopted the program of the SRs. That h a s two parts: the expropriation of the soil, which i s an absolutely progressive step; but the other part—the partition into equal lots—is absolutely utopian. But you

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wish to go through this experience. We are ready to take it [this step] with you. But we say to you in advance that the SRs are incapable of realizing their own program. That they are petty bourgeois and thus dependent upon the big bourgeoisie. This is not our program, but we will help you realize it, this program which is complicated by illusions. The situation is now different—it is not a revolutionary situation. But the question can become decisive. The referendum is not our program, but it’s a clear step forward; the masses show that they wish to control their Washington representatives. We say: It’s a progressive step that you wish to control your representatives. But you have illusions and we will criticize them. At the same time we will help you realize your program. The sponsor of the program will betray you as the SRs betrayed the Russian peasants. The last motion of the N C on this question is not correct: that we will vote for the Ludlow amendment in cases where it i s necessary to assure it a majority against the Stalinists—excuse me, but that’s absolutely bureaucratic. How can you at a mass meeting say, “We will stand aside and see how the vote goes”? That’s incomprehensible to the masses. We must become the champions of the movement. We must publish leaflets and explain our full position. At trade union meetings and at farmers’ meetings w e must say that we are the real champions of the movement. But this movement, like the question of the labor party, must be connected with a concrete program, opposing the program of the Lovestoneite-Thomasites. I absolutely agree that we should have nothing to do with the Keep America Out of War Committee. But also on this question we cannot remain in inactive opposition. We must study their program and criticize it. I n this case the most comprehensible, progressive, and revolutionary slogan is the workers’ control of military industry, since everybody knows that they instigate war. We say: Workers, you are developing the industry not for the advance of the fatherland but for the war patriots. Control of the war industry is part of the control of industry in general. [Quotes from leaflet issued by Keep America Out of War Committee and continues:] This is not an American question, as this states, it i s a workers’ question. I believe that we must also consider the slogan that we are not, naturally, opposed to a war against conquerors—but it has to be conducted by an army of workers and farmers under the control of the trade unions, under a government of workers and

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The Transitional Program

farmers. Such an army would not have imperialist aims, but if it were attacked, etc., etc. This program [points to above leaflet] must b e considered concretely. W e point out that it is not a question of “American cooperation for international peace” but cooperation of the American working class with the workers of the other countries for peace. I come back to our transitional slogan, control of war industry and possibly the expropriation of the sixty families, beginning with the expropriation of war industries. Cannon: Do you think that the trade union program should have a point in favor of the Ludlow amendment? Then I believe also that if we cannot directly launch expropriation of war industries, then at least workers’ control of war industries. Trotksy: These people [pointing to leaflet] are not even good pacifists. They say: W e do not want any increase in the army, in armaments. And what exists, is that then all right? W e say that this army that exists is an army against the workers and for war. If they were genuine pacifists they would at least say: Abolish the army. W e wish to change the character of the army—that the workers and farmers be armed, that they get a military education under the control of the trade unions—that’s not pacifist. W e say workers’ control of war industry a s a step toward expropriation— that’s not pacifism. Cannon: What do you mean by the workers’ and farmers’ government? Trotsky: It can be considered from two points of View: as a past chapter in the history of America it can be discussed only hypothetically, and a s a chapter in the education of the masses. Large masses will understand it in a democratic parliamentary sense, but w e will try to explain

it in a revolutionary

s e n s e . But

again we will say: You can’t accept it as a dictatorship of the proletariat and poor farmers. You wish to put on the ballot workers’ and farmers’ candidates. W e will help you. If these candidates are elected and they are the majority, will we take responsibility for their program? N o , n o , their program i s not sufficient. Here is our program. In the Congress w e will remain a minority. Then we begin to underline the necessity not only of independent candidates but of candidates with a program. It is very possible that under our influence and under the influence of other factors there comes to be a government of John Lewis, La F ollette, and La Guardia, and they will name it a labor-farmer government. W e will then oppose it with all vigor.

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97

I n 1917 we proclaimed to the workers and peasants: You have confidence in the SRs and Mensheviks43—then oblige them to take power against capitalism. That was a correct approach. But we remained in opposition against Kerensky.44 Had he broken with the capitalists and made a coalition with the Mensheviks and SRs we would have remained in opposition, but this government to us would have been a step toward the dictatorship of the proletariat. Materially we didn’t have this government— but for the education of the masses, for the separation of the masses from the Mensheviks and SRs, it was very important. We accepted this government against the bourgeoisie and said to the masses: I f you will force them to take power against the capitalists, w e will help you. Shachtman: How do you distinguish between our support of the Ludlow amendment and our attitude toward disarmament programs, international arbitration, etc.? Trotsky: They have nothing to do with one another. The Ludlow amendment is only a way for the masses to control their government. If the Ludlow amendment is accepted and made part of the Constitution it will absolutely not be analogous to disarmament but to inclusion in the right to vote of those eighteen years old. I will say: You boys will tomorrow b e cannon fodder; today you should have the right to vote. That has nothing to do with disarmament, as I will teach these boys not disarmament but revolutionary defense. It’s a democratic means, no more, n o less. Cannon: In such a body as this committee, do you believe it was correct not to join or maneuver in it but directly to attack it? Trotsky: Yes. Criticize them, attack them as not only not revolutionists, but not even pacifists. They are hidden agents of imperialism. Yes, I believe we must attack them mercilessly. I believe if we look at Bryan’s program,45 we will find he was more radical before the war. Then he became secretary of war. But his program was more radical than this committee.

98

The Transitional Program

A Summary

of Transitional March

Demands

2 3 , 1938

Trotsky: In the preceding discussions some comrades had the impression that some of my propositions or demands were opportunistic, and others that they were too revolutionary, not corresponding to the objective situation. This combination is very compromising, and that’s why I’ll briefly defend this apparent contradiction. What is the general situation in the U S . and in the whole world? The economic crisis is without precedent, the financial crisis of the separate states is the same, and the war danger is approaching. It is a social crisis without precedent. For seven, eight, or nine years we believed that American capitalism would show more resistance, but facts have shown that American capitalism, that is, apoplectic capitalism, is possibly nearer to collapse than some others. The American crisis is a social crisis, not a conjunctural one. This social crisis—now called recession— received features of extreme acuteness. It is not the end of the recession. Financial difficulties of the states—naturally the nation is very rich and the state can borrow from the nation, but it signifies that on the basis of the financial crisis we have a crisis of the state. We can say that we have a political crisis of the ruling class. Prosperity is gone; nobody believes it will return. And this fact is reflected in the political crisis of the Democrats and the Republicans. The ruling classes are disorganized, and they look for a new program. Roosevelt’s program is experimental, not to say adventuristic in a capitalist sense. That signifies a most fundamental premise for a revolutionary situation. It is true for the world and it is true for the U.S.—possibly it’s especially true for the U S . Now, the question of the proletariat. We have a very great change in the situation of the working class. I n some articles in the Socialist Appeal and in the New International46 I learned with interest and pleasure that now the feeling of the American

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99

worker that he is a worker is growing; that it is not the old pioneer spirit that he i s a worker only for a time; now h e i s a permanent worker, and even a permanent unemployed. That is the basis for all the other developments in the working class. Then we had the sit-down strikes.47 Those I believe were unprecedented in the labor movement of the U S . As a result of this movement, the creation and growing of the C I O . Also we have the tendency to build the labor party, the LNPL. I do not know sufficiently well the past or present of the labor movement in America. But generally I can say that in 1924 the movement was more imposing, but the social preconditions are incomparably more mature now. That is why the significance of the labor party is more important now. But I will not say that all the conditions are developed to the same degree or to the same level. We can say, if we take the general world situation—the imperialist contradictions; the position of American capitalism; the crisis and unemployment; the position of the American state as an expression of the American economy, of the American bourgeoisie; the political state of mind of the ruling class, the disorientation; and then the position of the working class—we can say, if we take all these into consideration, that the preconditions are more mature for the revolution. Insofar as we advance from these fundamental premises to the superstructure, to the policies, we remark that they are not so mature. The inner contradictions of American capitalism—the crisis and unemployment—are incomparably more mature for a revolution than the consciousness of the American workers. These are the two poles of the situation. We can say that the situation is characterized by an over-maturity of all fundamental social preconditions for the revolution, a fact I personally didn’t foresee eight or nine years ago. On the other hand, this rapidity of the decomposition of the material conditions of the U . S . , the mass consciousness—in spite of the fact that we can here also establish important progress— remains backward in comparison with the objective conditions. W e know that the subjective conditions—the consciousness of the masses, the growth of the revolutionary party—are not a fundamental factor. It depends upon the objective situation; in the last instance the subjective element itself depends upon the objective conditions, but this dependence is not a simple process. W e observed in France during the last year a very important phenomenon,

and very instructive

for the comrades

in the U S .

W e can say the objective situation was almost as mature as in the

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The Transitional Program

U S . The workers’ movement had received a tremendous impetus. The trade unions grew from less than a million to five million during several months. The sit-down strikes in France were incomparably more powerful than in the U S . The workers were ready to d o everything, to go to the limit. O n the other hand we saw the machinery of the Popular Front—for the first time we could demonstrate the historical importance of the betrayal of the Comintern.48 Insofar as for some years the Comintern had become a machine for the social conservation of capitalism, the disproportion between the objective and subjective factors received a terrible acuteness, and the Popular Front became the greatest brake in order to canalize this great revolutionary stream of the masses. And they succeeded to a certain degree. We can’t foresee what will be tomorrow, but in France they succeeded in capturing the movement of the masses, and we see now the results: the movement to the right—Blum“9 becomes a leader, the one who forms national governments, the union sacrée for the war—but it is a secondary phenomenon. The most important is that we have in the whole world, as we have in the U.S., this disproportion between the objective and subjective factor, but it was never as acute as now. W e have in the U S . a movement of the masses to overcome this disproportion; the movement from Green to Lewis; the movement from Walker50 to La Guardia. This is a move to overcome the fundamental contradiction. The C P plays in the U S . the same role as in France, but on a more modest scale. Rooseveltism replaces the Popular Frontism of France. Under these conditions our party is called upon to help the workers overcome this contradiction. What are the tasks? The strategic tasks consist of helping the masses, of adapting their mentality politically and psychologically to the objective situation, of overcoming the prejudicial traditions of the American workers, and of adapting it [their mentality] to the objective situation of the social crisis of the whole system.

I n this situation—taking into consideration the little experience and then viewing the creation of the C I O , the sit-down strikes, etc.——we have the full right to be more optimistic, more courageous, more aggressive in our strategy and tactics—not adventuristic, but to advance slogans that are not in the vocabulary of the American working class. What is the sense of the transitional program? We can call it a program

o f action,

but for u s , for our strategic

conception,

it is a

Discussions with Trotsky

101

transitional program—it i s a help to the masses in overcoming the inherited ideas, methods, and forms and adapting themselves to the exigencies of the objective situation. This transitional program must include the most simple demands. We cannot foresee and prescribe local and trade union demands adapted to the local situation of a factory, the development from this demand to the slogan for the creation of a workers’ soviet. These are both extreme points, from the development of our transitional program to find the connecting links and lead the masses to the idea of the revolutionary conquest of power. That is why some demands appear very opportunistic—because they are adapted to the actual mentality of the workers. That is why other demands appear too revolutionary—because they reflect more the objective situation than the actual mentality of the workers. It is our duty to make this gap between objective and subjective factors as short as possible. That i s why I cannot overestimate the importance of the transitional program. You can raise the objection that we cannot predict the rhythm and tempo of the development, and that possibly the bourgeoisie will find a political respite. That i s not excluded—but then we will be obliged to realize a strategic retreat. But in the present situation we must be oriented for a strategic offensive, not a retreat. This strategic offensive must be led by the idea of the creation of workers’ soviets to the creation of a workers’ and farmers’ government. I don’t propose that the slogan be launched immediately for soviets—for many reasons, and especially because the word h a s not the significance for the American workers that it had for the Russian workers—in order to proceed from this to the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is very possible and probable that in the same manner that w e observed the sitdown strikes in the U.S., w e will observe in a new form the equivalent of soviets. Probably w e will begin by giving them a different name. I n a certain period soviets can be replaced by factory committees, then from a local scale to a national scale. We c a n ’ t foretell, but our strategic orientation for the next period i s the orientation toward soviets. The whole transitional program m u s t fill up the gaps between conditions today and the soviets tomorrow.

Shachtman: Would you elaborate the prospects of war internationally and i n relation to the U S . today? Trotsky: I n this strategic perspective the war signifies, a s Lenin expressed it, a tremendous accelerator of the movement. If the U S . were involved in a war it would at first signify isolation

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The Transitional Program

for u s , but not for years, as in the last war, but only for months. Then a tremendous wave of sympathy for u s will transform our party into a national revolutionary center within a short period. I n this sense the approaching war i s one of the fundamental factors of a prerevolutionary situation and will change the mentality of the American workers i n six months more than we could have done in six years or more. [The war] will create for u s exceptionally favorable conditions, provided we h a v e a strategic attitude, foreseeing it, preparing our own cadres, and are not absorbed only in small questions. Naturally it’s a tremendous acquisition that we are rooted i n the trade unions, but it’s very important n o t to lose our world strategic line. Every local, partial, economic demand must b e an approach to a general demand in our transitional program—especially o n the war question, a s w e mentioned yesterday: the control of war industry and the arming of the workers and peasants. Shachtman: Two other questions: What is our relationship to the farmers? And secondly, what is the party’s relation to the urban middle class? Trotsky: I believe it is a question of explaining to the workers the situation of the farmer and how w e can ameliorate the situation. W e are too weak to devote our forces directly to the farmers, but it is necessary that our workers have a clear comprehension of the situation of the farmer; and there too we must have a transitional program connected to that of the workers. W e have to explain that w e will not impose collectivization, that we hope to convince them; insofar as they wish to remain independent, we will help them through credit; and we begin with the slogan that the state must intervene in favor of the farmers, not the trusts. Then we say: When we are in power, it i s not a question o f violence against you—you will choose y o u r own m e t h o d s . I t i s transitory o n l y in the sense that i t bridges the present situation o f the farmers to the collectivization of

agriculture. B u t we say: If you don’t wish to go further, we’ll wait. With the middle class of the cities it is the s a m e . Insofar as it i s the commercial elements, the little men of industry: You will remain independent. You are now depending upon the trust. You will be dependent upon the state; it will give you commodities and you will sell them. If you wish to transform your shop into a state s h o p , we will arrange the matter with you. We will give you a period to choose, but it will be a good period, as it i s n ot a state in the interests of big capital. You will then b e in the service of the

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103

people. I n America you will at least conserve your social privileges for a time. Naturally we cannot say to the technicians that they will be technocrats—no, we cannot permit a new aristocracy; but they will be an important part of society. Rivera: There is a stratification also among the engineers, who get less money than the plaster men. That means right now they are plain workers an d that is better for u s . Trotsky: The stratification in the professions is very important.

Cannon: What would b e the effect of the war? Shachtman: Supposing it is a European war, into which the U S . does not yet enter? Trotsky: I n that case the U S . will have a postponement of the economic collapse. What i s clear i s that in the countries involved in the war the collapse will come in not four to six years but in six to twelve months, because the capitalist countries are not richer but poorer than in 1914, materially; technically they are richer— they will spend four, five, or ten times more for destruction than they did during the world war [World War I], because the war will begin where the last war finished. The psychological factor—that the old generation that participated in the last war is still living and the traditions of the last war are living—nobody will believe that it will signify happiness, full rights, destruction of militarism, and that production will be for humanity. These lessons exist even in the younger generations. That is why their patience will not last long. And the revolution will come not after four years but much earlier, after some months. I f we enter into this war tempered and steeled, and if we are capable of surmounting the obstacles

of the first period with courage, we will become the

decisive force in the U S . a s elsewhere. Cannon: C a n expropriation be considered as nationalization that used to be spoken of by the reformists? Trotsky: W e must emphasize that if the power i s in the hands of Roosevelt, i t i s not in our h a n d s . We must underline the class element every time. W e must contrast our formula to that of the reformists: nationalization? Yes; but in whose hands? Cannon: How long can the U S . stay out of war, in your opinion? Trotsky: I believe it will not intervene in the beginning, but it does not depend only on the U.S.—it depends on the activity of Japan

a n d the attitude

of Great Britain.

I t i s very difficult

to s a y ,

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The Transitional

Program

but we must count for much shorter intervals than in the last war, when it took them two-and-a-half years to intervene. Now in two-and-a-half years there will be a total collapse. If they wish to influence the war they must intervene in a much scale, in Europe and shorter period and on an unprecedented everywhere, and concentrate forces ten times more powerful than the forces of Wilson,51 who didn’t have ten or more million unemployed. You can say that all these unemployed will be absorbed in the war industry, but that signifies the creation of a terrible pump for absorbing all the riches of the nation. Shachtman: It is your opinion that the Soviet Union will be with one state against another, or the imperialists will allow Hitler to attack on the West and Japan on the East? Trotsky: I don’t believe they will have such a reasonable plan. I believe the war will begin with the Soviet Union in one of the camps and during the war they will smash the Soviet Union—by allies or by enemies does not matter—unless a revolution occurs. Shachtman: Then how explain the change in policy of Great Britain?52 Trotsky: It is an attempt—it is as vital for Italy as for Great Britain, if they can come to an agreement, and, if they do, whether the agreement will last for more than three months; whether Italy will stand back as in the last war and join the stronger or those who seem to be stronger. I have taken up the question of possible alliances and line-ups in case of war in an article for the bourgeois press, but it was not published.53 Perhaps our press will publish it. Shachtman: Now as to the work of the party in the struggle against war. You say, and I think it is correct, that if and when the war breaks out in the U S . the first reaction of the workers will be a terrible chauvinistic wave, and then our party will be made illegal. How did the Russian party function illegally, to what extent did it try to function legally, etc.? Trotsky: The party had at that time a parliamentary fraction, and it had the greatest importance. This fraction was not exactly okay during the beginning of the war, but by and by, under the pressure of Lenin and the growing discontent, they became more revolutionary. Then they were arrested. That was at the beginning of 1915—it left them only six to eight months for activity. You don’t have a parliamentary fraction, but I believe your preparation for illegality is your work in the trade unions—it is the most important school for illegal work. In Minneapolis our

Discussions with Trotsky

105

comrades now have more or less a favorable position and a bloc with the “honest reformists,” but let a war approach and the “honest reformists” will b e the most chauvinistic, and our comrades, even if they are cautious, will be attacked by them; they will break with us and form a bloc with the Stalinists and will accuse our comrades of being spies for Germany and Japan. In other unions we do not have such a favorable position as in Minneapolis—pressure will be put on our comrades in order to eliminate them. That is why we must organize our work in the trade unions for legal and for illegal work, even now. I n order to have time to organize our cadres to replace the bureaucrats, these elements should be more or less illegal, that is, not known as representatives of the Fourth International. I n any case, when the situation becomes more or less sharpened or acute, when our comrades are excluded, a new crew remains to replace them, and I believe this work is the most important preparation for illegal work. Often comrades ask me if we couldn’t create a special school— that’s an artificial creation; but our most important work now is the G P , to penetrate even into the [Political] Bureau.54 We must have in the trade unions representative comrades, openly declaring that they are for the Fourth International, but these comrades will be the first victims of the bureaucracy at the approach or beginning of war, and the official police will leave the work to the trade union bureaucrats to exclude them and deprive them of their means. That is why we must prepare young people, or people who are not so good at speaking but who are good organizers;

they can remain

incognito.

From

this point o f

view you will have a more favorable situation than we ha d in Russia, because it’s absolutely improbable that the government will prohibit the trade unions. They will try to have the cooperation of the trade union bureaucrats, and it will be possible for us to hide—we will have sympathetic elements. And then there will be the big wave of mourning of mothers, and this will be reflected in the sentiment in the trade unions. Then we will say that we warned you what the war is like. At the beginning we can’t be aggressive—it’s almost physically impossible. It will b e sufficient if our comrades do not capitulate to the chauvinist wave. Shachtman: What about the central committee? Trotsky: It is too specific a question to be decided by the general situation; it depends upon the authority of the comrades

106

The Transitional Program

and the conditions of life. Part of the central committee must immediately go underground, and the other part must remain very cautious and try immediately to establish illegal connections. I asked this question from a different point of Shachtman: view: Should the members of the central committee make a public declaration? Trotsky: Yes, some of them must do so, but they must consult an attorney in order to phrase it so as not to give them the ground for court-martial. Yet the declaration should be clear enough for us to be able to say later: We warned you. And this should be supplemented by clearer declarations in the name of the party, illegal leaflets, etc. Some will be arrested and become the symbol for the party’s open activity. What about the paper? Shachtman: Trotsky: Have a paper even without a name; it becomes a point of concentration for the workers, even when the line is not fully developed, even when it just opposes the war. Cannon: I s it advisable for the Socialist Appeal to take this line or i s it better that we let that be suppressed and have another paper? Trotsky: Better let the Appeal be suppressed. Even if the Appeal is not prohibited, I think that another paper should be created. Shachtman: How did the Bolsheviks distribute their propaganda during the war? Trotsky: Illegally. Shachtman: Naturally. Trotsky: Illegal publications; that’s why it’s important [to have] a press. You’ll be lucky to have a mimeograph machine. Karsner:55 Aren’t cultural organizations very useful in such times? Trotsky: Yes, and first the trade unions. [Stenographer’s note: Some discussion was also initiated by Shachtman about the slogan for armed workers controlled by the trade unions. H e stated that with the present relationship of forces w e would b e too weak to accomplish our purpose. If the slogan should be adopted by the trade unions it would become an army against us and would b e taught the same ideology by the bureaucrats as by the government. Trotsky didn’t think the slogan would be accepted by the trade union bureaucracy.]

Discussions with Trotsky

The

Problem

o f the April

Labor

107

Party56

1938

The question of the labor party has never been a question of principle for revolutionary Marxists. We have always taken our point of departure from the concrete political situation and the tendencies of its development. Several years ago, before the crisis of 1929 and even later, until the appearance of the C I O , we could have hoped that the revolutionary, that is, the Bolshevik, party would develop in the United States parallel to the radicalization of the working class, and succeed eventually in becoming the head of it. Under those conditions it would have been absurd to occupy oneself with abstract propaganda in favor of an unheralded “labor party.” The situation since that time, however, has radically changed, and it would be inexcusable to close our eyes to it. The powerfully developing trade unions, under the conditions of a deepening crisis of capitalism, will project themselves all the more irresistibly upon the road of political struggle and thus upon the road of crystallization into a labor party. If the official leaders of the trade unions, in spite of the imperious voice of the situation and the growing pressure of the masses, hold back on the question of a labor party, it is precisely because the deep social crisis of bourgeois society now imparts to the question of the labor party a considerably greater sharpness than in all preceding periods. Nevertheless, we can with sufficient assurance predict that the resistance of the bureaucracy will be broken. The movement in favor of a labor party will continue to grow. Any revolutionary organization occupying a negative or neutrally expectant position in relation to this progressive movement will doom itself to isolation and sectarian degeneration. The Socialist Workers Party, section of the Fourth Internationa l , clearly realizes the fact that by virtue of unfavorable historical reasons its own development lagged behind the radicalization of

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The Transitional Program

proletariat; and precisely because of wide layers of the American this, the problem of creating a labor party is placed upon the order of the day through the whole course of development. The Socialist Workers Party does not, however, limit itself, as do the Stalinists, Lovestoneites, etc., to an abstract slogan for a labor or farmer-labor party, and still less can it admit unprincipled top combinations to occur under cover of this slogan—it advances a program of transitional demands in order to fructify the mass movement in favor of a labor party. Preserving its own full organizational and political independence, the Socialist Workers Party carries on systematic and irreconcilable struggle against the trade union bureaucracy, which resists the creation of a labor party, or attempts to convert it into an auxiliary weapon of one of the bourgeois parties. Explaining and propagandizing its program of transitional demands in the trade unions, at meetings, and so forth, the Socialist Workers Party indefatigably exposes, on the basis of the living experience of the masses, the reformist and pacifist illusions of the trade union bureaucracy and its Social Democratic and Stalinist allies.57 When and how the labor party will be formed, and through what stages and splits it will pass, the future will disclose. Defending the labor party from the attack of the bourgeoisie, the Socialist Workers Party does not and will not, however, take upon itself any responsibility for this party. I n relation to the labor party in all stages of its development, the Socialist Workers Party occupies a critical position—it supports the progressive tendencies against the reactionary, and at the same time irreconcilably criticizes the halfway character of these progressive tendencies. For the Socialist Workers Party, the labor party should on the one hand become the arena for recruiting revolutionary elements, on the other a transmissive mechanism for influencing ever wider circles of workers. I n its very essence the labor party can preserve progressive significance only during a comparatively short transitional period. The further sharpening of the revolutionary situation will inevitably break the shell of the labor party and permit the Socialist Workers Party to rally around the banner of the Fourth International the revolutionary vanguard of the American proletariat.

PART II:

TH E DEATH AGONY O F CAPITALISM AND THE TASKS O F THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Trotsky completed the first draft of the Transitional Program in April 1938. On April 15, he wrote to James P. Cannon, “Without your visit to Mexico, I could never h a v e written the program draft because I learned during your visit many important things which permitted me to be more explicit and concrete.” Later in the month the S WP National Committee voted to endorse the general line of the Transitional Program and to sponsor it, as Trotsky had requested, for submission to the preconference discussion of the MFI, which lasted from April to September. The text presented here is the final draft, as edited after being approved by the founding conference of the Fourth International in September. A few minor improvements in the translation h a v e been made for the present edition.

110

The Death

Agony of Capitalism

and the Tasks of the Fourth International by Leon Trotsky

The objective prerequisites

for a socialist revolution

The world political situation as a whole is chiefly characterized by a historical crisis of the leadership of the proletariat. The economic prerequisite for the proletarian revolution has already in general achieved the highest point of fruition that can be reached under capitalism. Mankind’s productive forces stagnate. Already new inventions and improvements fail to raise the level of material wealth. Conjunctural crises under the conditions of the social crisis of the whole capitalist system inflict ever heavier deprivations and sufferings upon the masses. Growing unemployment, in its turn, deepens the financial crisis of the state and undermines the unstable monetary systems. Democratic regimes, as well a s fascist, stagger on from one bankruptcy to another. The bourgeoisie itself sees no way out. In countries where it has already been forced to stake everything upon the card of fascism, it now

toboggans

with

closed

eyes

toward

an economic

and

military catastrophe. I n the historically privileged countries—i.e., in those where the bourgeoisie can still for a certain period permit itself the luxury of democracy at the expense of national accumulations (Great Britain, France, United States, etc.)—all of capital’s traditional parties are in a state of perplexity bordering on a paralysis of will. The New Deal, despite its initial pretentious resoluteness, represents but a special form of political perplexity, possible only in a country where the bourgeoisie succeeded in accumulating incalculable wealth. The present crisis, far from having run its full course, has already succeeded in showing that New Deal politics, like Popular Front politics in France, opens no new exit from the economic blind alley. International relations present n o better picture. Under the increasing tension of capitalist disintegration, imperialist antag111

112

The Transitional Program

onisms reach an impasse at the height of which separate clashes and bloody local disturbances (Ethiopia, Spain, the Far East, Central Europe) must inevitably coalesce into a conflagration of world dimensions. The bourgeoisie, of course, is aware of the mortal danger to its domination represented by a new war. But that class i s now immeasurably less capable of averting war than on the eve of 1914. All talk to the effect that historical conditions have not yet “ripened” for socialism is the product of ignorance or conscious deception. The objective prerequisites for the proletarian revolution have not only “ripened”; they have begun to get somewhat rotten. Without a socialist revolution, in the next historical period at that, a catastrophe threatens the whole culture of mankind. It is now the turn of the proletariat, i.e., chiefly of its revolutionary vanguard. The historical crisis of mankind is reduced to the crisis of the revolutionary leadership.

The proletariat

and its leaderships

The economy, the state, the bourgeoisie’s politics and its international relations are completely blighted by a social crisis characteristic of a prerevolutionary state of society. The chief obstacle in the path of transforming the prerevolutionary condition into a revolutionary one i s the opportunist character of proletarian leadership: its petty-bourgeois cowardice before the big bourgeoisie and its perfidious connection with it, even in its death agony. I n all countries the proletariat is wracked by a deep disquiet. The multimillioned masses again and again enter the road of revolution. But each time they are blocked by their own conservative bureaucratic machines. The Spanish proletariat has made a series of heroic attempts since April 1931 to take power into its hands and guide the fate of society. However, its own parties (Social Democrats, Stalinists, Anarchists, POUMists)—each in its own way—acted as a brake and thus prepared Franco’s triumphs.58 I n France, the great wave of sit-down strikes, particularly during June 1936, revealed the wholehearted readiness of the proletariat to overthrow the capitalist system. However, the leading organizations (Socialists, Stalinists, Syndicalists), under the label of the Popular Front, succeeded in canalizing and damming, at least temporarily, the revolutionary stream.

Death Agony of Capitalism The unprecedented

w a v e o f sit-down strikes

113

and the amazingly

rapid growth of industrial unionism in the United States (the C10) i s the most indisputable expression of the instinctive striving of the American workers to raise themselves to the level of the tasks imposed on them by history. But here, too, the leading political organizations, including the newly created C I O , do everything possible to keep in check and paralyze the revolutionary pressure of the masses. The definite passing over of the Comintern to the side of the bourgeois order, its cynically counterrevolutionary role throughout the world—particularly in Spain, France, the United States, and other “democratic” countries—created exceptional supplementary difficulties for the world proletariat. Under the banner of the October revolution, the conciliatory politics practiced by the People’s Front dooms the working class to impotence and clears the road for fascism. People’s Fronts on the one hand—fascism on the other; these are the last political resources of imperialism in the struggle against the proletarian revolution. From the historical point of view, however, both these resources are stopgaps. The decay of capitalism continues under the sign of the Phrygian cap in France a s under the sign of the swastika in Germany.59 Nothing short of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie can open a road out. The orientation of the masses i s determined first by the objective conditions of decaying capitalism and second by the treacherous politics of the old workers’ organizations. Of these factors, the first of course is the decisive one: the laws of history are stronger than the bureaucratic apparatus. N o matter how the methods

of

the

social

betrayers

differ—from

the

“social”

legislation of Blum to the judicial frame-ups of Stalin—they will never succeed in breaking the revolutionary will of the proletariat.60 As time goes o n , their desperate efforts to hold back the wheel of history will demonstrate more clearly to the masses that the crisis of the proletarian leadership, having become the crisis in mankind’s culture, can b e resolved only by the Fourth International.

The

minimum

program

and the transitional

program

The strategic task of the next period—a prerevolutionary period of agitation, propaganda, and organization—consists in overcoming the contradiction between the maturity of the objective

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The Transitional Program

revolutionary conditions and the immaturity of the proletariat and its vanguard (the confusion and disappointment of the older generation, the inexperience of the younger generation). It is necessary to help the masses in the process of the daily struggle to find the bridge between present demands and the socialist program of the revolution. This bridge should include a system of transitional demands, stemming from today’s conditions and from today’s consciousness of wide layers of the working class and unalterably leading to one final conclusion: the conquest of power by the proletariat. Classical Social Democracy, functioning in an epoch of progressive capitalism, divided its program into two parts independent of each other: the minimum program, which limited itself to reforms within the framework of bourgeois society, and the maximum program, which promised substitution of socialism for capitalism in the indefinite future. Between the minimum and the maximum program, n o bridge existed. And indeed the Social Democracy has n o need of such a bridge, since the word socialism is used only for holiday speechifying. The Comintern has set out to follow the path of the Social Democracy in an epoch of decaying capitalism: when, in general, there can b e n o discussion of systematic social reforms and the raising of the masses’ living standards; when the bourgeoisie always takes away with the right hand twice what it grants with the left (taxes, tariffs, inflation, “deflation,” high prices, unemployment, police supervision of strikes); when every serious demand of the proletariat, and even every serious demand of the petty bourgeoisie, inevitably reaches beyond the limits of capitalist property relations and of the bourgeois state. The strategic task of the Fourth International lies not in reforming

capitalism

but in its overthrow.

Its political aim is the

conquest of power by the proletariat for the purpose of expropriating the bourgeoisie. However, the achievement of this strategic task is unthinkable without the most considered attention to all, even small and partial, questions of tactics. All sections of the proletariat—all its layers, occupations, and groups—should be drawn into the revolutionary movement. The present epoch is distinguished not because it frees the revolutionary party from day-to-day work but because it permits this work to be carried on indissolubly with the actual tasks of the revolution. The Fourth International does not discard the program of the old “minimal” demands to the degree to which these have

Death Agony of Capitalism

115

preserved at least part of their vital forCefulness. Indefatigably, it defends the democratic rights and social conquests of the workers. But it carries on this day-to-day work within the framework of the correct actual, that is, revolutionary, perspective. Insofar as the old partial, “minimal” demands of the masses clash with the destructive and degrading tendencies of decadent capitalism—and this occurs at each step—the Fourth International advances a system of transitional demands, the essence of which i s contained in the fact that ever more openly and decisively they will b e directed against the very foundations of the bourgeois regime. The old “minimal program” i s superseded by the transitional program, the task of which lies in systematic mobilization of the masses for the proletarian revolution.

Sliding scale of wages

and sliding scale of hours

Under the conditions of disintegrating capitalism, the masses continue to live the impoverished life of the oppressed, threatened now more than at any other time with the danger of being cast into the pit of pauperism. They must defend their mouthful of bread, if they cannot increase or better it. There is neither the need nor the opportunity to enumerate here those separate, partial demands which time and again arise on the basis of concrete circumstances—national, local, trade union. But two basic economic afflictions, in which is summarized the increasing absurdity of the capitalist system—that i s , unemployment and high prices—demand generalized slogans and methods of struggle. The Fourth International declares uncompromising war on the politics of the capitalists, which to a considerable degree, like the politics of their agents, the reformists, aims to place the whole burden of militarism, the crises, the disorganization of the monetary system, and all other scourges stemming from capitalism’s death agony upon the backs of the toilers. The Fourth International demands employment and decent living conditions for all. Neither monetary inflation nor stabilization can serve as slogans for the proletariat, because these are but two ends of the same stick. Against a bounding rise in prices, which with the approach

of war will assume

an ever more unbridled

character,

one can fight only under the slogan of a sliding scale of wages. This means that collective agreements should assure an automat-

116

The Transitional Program

ic rise in wages in relation to the increase in price of consumer goods. Under the menace of its own disintegration, the proletariat cannot permit the transformation of an increasing section of the workers into chronically unemployed paupers, living off the crumbs of a disintegrating society. The right to employment is the only serious right left to the worker in a society based upon exploitation. This right today is being shorn from him at every step. Against unemployment, “structural” as well as “conjunctural,” the time is ripe to advance, along with the slogan of public works, the slogan of a sliding scale of working hours. Trade unions and other mass organizations should bind the workers and the unemployed together in the solidarity of mutual responsibility. O n this basis all the work on hand would then be divided among all existing workers in accordance with how the extent of the working week is defined. The average wage of every worker remains the same as it was under the old working week. Wages, with a strictly guaranteed minimum, would follow the movement of prices. It i s impossible to accept any other program for the present catastrophic period. Property owners and their lawyers will prove the “unrealizability” of these demands. Smaller, especially ruined capitalists in addition will refer to their account ledgers. The workers categorically denounce such conclusions and references. The question is not one of a “normal” collision between opposing material interests. The question i s one of guarding the proletariat from decay, demoralization, and ruin. The question is one of life or death of the only creative and progressive class, and by that token of the future of mankind. If capitalism i s incapable of satisfying the demands inevitably arising from the calamities generated by itself, then let it perish. “Realizability” or “unrealizability” i s in the given instance

a question

o f the relationship

of

forces, which can be decided only by the struggle. By means of this struggle, n o matter what its immediate practical successes may be, the workers will best come to understand the necessity of liquidating capitalist slavery.

Trade

unions

i n the

I n the struggle workers

now

transitional

epoch

for partial and transitional

more than

ever before

need

mass

demands, the organizations,

principally trade unions. The powerful growth of trade unionism

Death Agony of Capitalism

117

in France and the United States i s the best refutation to the preachments of those ultraleft doctrinaires who have been teaching that trade unions have “outlived their usefulness.” The Bolshevik-Leninist stands in the front-line trenches of all kinds of struggles, even when they involve only the most modest material interests or democratic rights of the working class. H e takes active part in mass trade unions for the purpose of strengthening them and raising their spirit of militancy. H e fights uncompromisingly against any attempt to subordinate the unions to the bourgeois state and bind the proletariat to “compulsory arbitration” and every other form of police guardianship—not only fascist but also “democratic.” Only on the basis of such work within the trade unions i s successful struggle possible against the reformists, including those of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Sectarian attempts to build or preserve small “revolutionary” unions, as a second edition of the party, signify in actuality the renouncing of the struggle for leadership of the working class. It i s necessary to establish this firm rule: self-isolation of the capitulationist variety from mass trade unions,

which

i s tantamount

to a betrayal

o f the revolution,

is

incompatible with membership in the Fourth International. At the same time, the Fourth International resolutely rejects and condemns trade union fetishism, equally characteristic of trade unionists and syndicalists. (a) Trade unions d o not offer, a n d , in line with their task, composition, and manner of recruiting membership, cannot offer, a finished revolutionary program; in consequence, they cannot replace the party.

The building

of national

revolutionary

parties

as sections of the Fourth International i s the central task of the transitional epoch. (b) Trade unions, even the most powerful, embrace no more than 20 to 25 percent of the working class, a n d , at that, predominantly the more skilled and better-paid layers. The more oppressed majority of the working class i s drawn only episodical1y into the struggle, during a period of exceptional upsurges in the labor movement. During s u c h moments i t i s necessary to create organizations ad hoc, embracing the w h o le fighting m a s s : strike committees, factory committees, a n d , finally, soviets. o f the top layers expressive ( c ) A s organizations

of

the

proletariat, trade unions, as witnessed by all past historical experience, including the fresh experience of the anarcho-syndicalist unions in Spain, developed powerful tendencies toward

118

The Transitional Program

compromise with the bourgeois-democratic regime.61 I n periods of acute class struggle, the leading bodies of the trade unions aim to become masters of the m a s s movement in order to render it harmless. This i s already occurring during the period of simple strikes, especially i n the case of the mass sit-down strikes which shake the principle of bourgeois property. I n time of war or revolution, when the bourgeoisie i s plunged into exceptional difficulties, trade ters. Therefore, the

union leaders sections

u s u a l l y become bourgeois

of the

Fourth

International

minisshould

always strive n o t only to renew the top leadership of the trade u n i o n s , boldly and resolutely in critcal moments advancing new militant leaders in place of routine functionaries an d careerists; but a l s o to create in all possible instances independent militant organizations corresponding more closely to the tasks of mass struggle against bourgeois society, and, if necessary, not flinching even in the face of a direct break with the conservative apparatus of the trade unions. If it b e criminal to turn one’s back on m a s s organizations for the sake of fostering sectarian fictions, it is n o less s o to passively tolerate subordination of the revolutionary mass movement to the control of openly reactionary or disguised conservative (“progressive”) bureaucratic cliques. Trade unions are not ends in themselves; they are but means along the road to proletarian revolution.62

Factory

committees

During a transitional epoch, the workers’ movement does not have a systematic and well-balanced, but a feverish and explosive character. Slogans as well as organizational forms should b e subordinated to this feature of the movement. O n guard against routine handling of a situation as against a plague, the leadership should respond sensitively to the initiative of the m a ss es. Sit-down strikes, the latest expression

o f this k i n d o f initiative,

go beyond the limits of “normal” capitalist procedure. Independently of the demands of the strikers, the temporary seizure of factories deals a blow to the idol, capitalist property. Every sitdown strike poses i n a practical manner the question of who i s boss of the factory: the capitalist or the worker? If the

sit-down

strike

raises

this

question

episodically,

the

factory committee gives it organized expression. Elected by a l l

Death Agony of Capitalism

119

the factory employees, the factory committee immediately creates a counterweight to the will of the administration. To the reformist criticism of bosses of the “economic royalist” type like Ford63 in contradistinction to “good,” “democratic” exploiters, w e counterpose the slogan of factory committees as centers of struggle against both the first and the second. Trade union bureaucrats will as a general rule resist the creation of factory committees, just as they resist every bold step taken along the road of mobilizing the masses. However, the wider the sweep of the movement, the easier will it be to break this resistance. Where the closed shop has already been instituted in “peaceful” times, the committee will formally coincide with the usual structure of the trade union, but will renew its personnel and widen its functions. The prime significance of the committee, however, lies in the fact that it becomes the militant staff for such working class layers as the trade union is usually incapable of moving to action. It is precisely from these more oppressed layers that the most self-sacrificing battalions of the revolution will come. From the moment that the committee makes its appearance, a d e facto dual power i s established in the factory. By its very essence it represents the transitional state, because it includes in itself two irreconcilable regimes: the capitalist and the proletarian. The fundamental significance of factory committees i s precisely contained in the fact that they open the doors if not to a direct revolutionary, then to a prerevolutionary period—between the bourgeois and the proletarian regimes. That the propagation of the factory committee idea is neither premature nor artificial is amply attested to by the waves of sit-down strikes spreading through several countries. New waves of this type will be inevitable in the immediate future. It is necessary to begin a timely campaign in favor of factory committees, in order not to be caught unawares.

“Business

secrets”

and

workers’

control

of industry

Liberal capitalism, based upon competition and free trade, h a s completely receded into the past. Its successor, monopolistic capitalism, not only does not mitigate the anarchy of the market but o n the contrary imparts to it a particularly convulsive character. The necessity of “controlling” economy, of placing state “guidance” over industry, and of “planning,” i s today

120

The Transitional Program

recognized—at least in words—by almost all current bourgeois and petty-bourgeois tendencies, from fascist to Social Democratic. With the fascists, it is mainly a question of “planned” plundering of the people for military purposes. The Social Democrats prepare to drain the ocean of anarchy with spoonfuls of bureaucratic “planning.” Engineers and professors write articles about “technocracy.” In their cowardly experiments in “regulation,” democratic governments run head-on into the invincible sabotage of big capital. The actual relationship existing between the exploiters and the democratic “controllers” is best characterized by the fact that the gentlemen “reformers” stop short in pious trepidation before the threshold of the trusts and their business “secrets.” Here the principle of “noninterference” with business dominates. The accounts kept between the individual capitalist and society remain the secret of the capitalist: they are not the concern of society. The motivation offered for the principle of business “secrets” is ostensibly, as in the epoch of liberal capitalism, that of free “competition.” In reality, the trusts keep no secrets from one another. The business secrets of the present epoch are part of a persistent plot of monopoly capitalism against the interests of society. Projects for limiting the autocracy of “economic royalists” will continue to be pathetic farces as long as private owners of the social means of production can hide from producers and consumers the machinations of exploitation, robbery, and fraud. The abolition of business secrets is the first step toward actual control of industry. Workers no less than capitalists have the right to know the secrets of the factory, of the trust, of the whole branch of industry, of the national economy as a whole. First and foremost, banks, heavy industry, and centralized transport should be placed under a magnifying glass. The immediate tasks of workers’ control should be to explain the debits and credits of society, beginning with individual business undertakings; to determine the actual share of the national income appropriated by individual capitalists and by the exploiters as a whole; to expose the behind-the-scenes deals and swindles of banks and trusts; finally, to reveal to all members of society that unconscionable squandering of human labor which is the result of capitalist anarchy and the naked pursuit of profits. No office-holder of the bourgeois state is in a position to carry

Death Agony of Capitalism

121

out this work, n o matter with how great authority one would wish to endow him. All the world was witness to the impotence of President Roosevelt and Premier Blum against the plottings of the 60 or 200 families of their respective nations. To break the resistance of the exploiters, the mass pressure of the proletariat i s necessary. Only factory committees can bring about real control of production, calling in—as consultants but not as "technocrats"—specialists sincerely devoted to the people: accountants,

statisticians,

engineers,

scientists,

etc.

The struggle against unemployment is not to be considered without the call for a broad and bold organization of public works. But public works can have a continuous and progressive significance for society, as for the unemployed themselves, only when they are made part of a general plan, worked out to cover a considerable number of years. Within the framework of this plan, the workers would demand resumption, as public utilities, of work in private businesses closed as a result of the crisis. Workers’ control in such cases would b e replaced by direct workers’ management.

The working out of even the most elementary economic plan— from the point of view of the exploited, not the exploiters—is impossible without workers’ control, that i s , without the eyes of the workers penetrating all the open and concealed mechanisms of capitalist economy. Committees representing individual business enterprises should meet at conferences to choose corresponding committees of trusts, whole branches of industry, economic regions, and, finally, of national industry as a whole. Thus, workers’ control becomes a school for planned economy. On the basis of the experience of control, the proletariat will prepare itself for direct management of nationalized industry when the hour for the eventuality strikes. To those capitalists, mainly of the lower and middle strata, who of their own accord sometimes offer to throw open their books to the workers—usually to demonstrate the necessity of lowering wages—the workers answer that they are not interested in the bookkeeping of individual bankrupts or semibankrupts but in the account ledgers of all exploiters as a whole. The workers cannot and d o not wish to accommodate the level of their living conditions to the exigencies of individual capitalists, themselves victims

of their own regime. The task i s one o f reorganizing

the

whole system of production and distribution on a more dignified and workable basis. If the abolition of business secrets i s a

122

The Transitional Program

necessary condition to workers’ control, then control is the first step along the road to the socialist guidance of the economy.

Expropriation

of separate

groups

o f capitalists

The socialist program of expropriation, i.e., of political overthrow of the bourgeoisie and liquidation of its economic domination, should in no case during the present transitional period hinder us from advancing, when the occasion warrants, the demand for the expropriation of several key branches of industry vital for national existence, or of the most parasitic group of the bourgeoisie. Thus, in answer to the pathetic jeremiads of the gentlemendemocrats about the dictatorship of the 60 families of the United States or the 200 families of France, we counterpose the demand for the expropriation of these 60 or 200 feudalistic capitalist overlords. I n precisely the same way we demand the expropriation of the corporations holding monopolies on war industries, railroads, the most important sources of raw materials, etc. The difference between these demands and the muddleheaded reformist

slogan of “nationalization”

lies i n the following: ( 1 ) we

reject indemnification; (2) we warn the masses against demagogues of the People’s Front who, giving lip service to nationali~ zation, remain in reality agents of capital; (3) we call on the masses to rely only upon their own revolutionary strength; (4) we link u p the question of expropriation with that of seizure of power by the workers and farmers. The necessity of advancing the slogan of expropriation in the course of daily agitation in partial form, and not only in our propaganda in its more comprehensive aspects, is dictated by the fact that different branches of industry are on different levels of development, occupy a different place in the life of society, and pass through different stages of the class struggle. Only a general revolutionary upsurge of the proletariat can place the complete expropriation of the bourgeoisie on the order of the day. The task of transitional demands is to prepare the proletariat to solve this problem.

Death Agony of Capitalism

Expropriation of the private banks state-ization of the credit system

123

and

Imperialism means the domination of finance capital. Side by side with the trusts and syndicates, and very frequently rising above them, the banks concentrate in their hands the actual command over the economy. I n their structure the banks express i n a concentrated

form

the entire

structure

o f modern

capital:

they combine tendencies of monopoly with tendencies of anarchy. They organize the miracles of technology, giant enterprises, mighty trusts; and they also organize high prices, crisis, and unemployment. I t is impossible to take a single serious step in the struggle against monopolistic despotism and capitalistic anarchy—which supplement one another in their work of destruction—if the commanding posts of banks are left in the hands of predatory capitalists. I n order to create a unified system of investment and credits, along a rational plan corresponding to the interests of the entire people, it i s necessary to merge all the banks into a single national institution. Only the expropriation of the private banks and the concentration of the entire credit system in the hands of the state will provide the latter with the necessary actual, i.e., material, resources—and not merely paper and bureaucratic resources—for economic planning. The expropriation of the banks in no case implies the expropriation of bank deposits. On the contrary, the single state bank will be able to create much more favorable conditions for the small depositors than could the private banks. I n the same way, only the state bank can establish for farmers, tradesmen, and small merchants conditions o f favorable, that i s , cheap, credit. E v e n more important, however, is the circumstance that

the entire economy—first and foremost large-scale industry and transport—directed by a single financial staff, will serve the vital interests of the workers and all other toilers. However, the state-ization of the banks will produce these favorable results only if the state power itself passes completely from the hands of the exploiters into the hands of the toilers.

The picket line/ defense the

arming

o f the

guards/

workers’

militia/

proletariat

Sit-down strikes are a serious warning from the masses, addressed not only to the bourgeoisie but also to the organizations of the workers, including the Fourth International. In 1919-

124

The Transitional Program

20, the Italian workers seized factories on their own initiative, thus signaling to their “leaders” the news of the coming of the social revolution. The “leaders” paid no heed to the signal. The victory of fascism was the result. Sit-down strikes d o not yet mean the seizure of factories in the Italian manner; but they are a decisive step toward such seizures. The present crisis can sharpen the class struggle to an extreme point and bring nearer the moment of denouement. But that does not mean

that a revolutionary

situation

comes on at o n e stroke.

Actually, its approach i s signalized by a continuous series of convulsions. One of these is the wave of sit-down strikes. The problem of the sections of the Fourth International is to help the proletarian vanguard understand the general character and tempo of our epoch and to fructify in time the struggle of the masses with ever more resolute and militant organizational measures. The sharpening of the proletariat’s struggle means the sharpening of the methods of counterattack on the part of capital. New waves of sit-down strikes can and undoubtedly will call forth resolute countermeasures on the part of the bourgeoisie. Preparatory work is already being done by the confidential staffs of big trusts. Woe to the revolutionary organizations, woe to the proletariat if it is again caught unawares! The bourgeoisie is nowhere satisfied with the official police and army. I n the United States, even during “peaceful” times, the bourgeoisie maintains militarized battalions of scabs and privately armed thugs in factories. To this must now b e added the various groups of American Nazis. The French bourgeoisie at the first approach of danger mobilized semilegal and illegal fascist detachments, including such a s are in the army. N o sooner does the pressure o f the E n g l i s h workers once again become stronger, than immediately the fascist b a n d s are d o u b l e d , trebled,

increased tenfold to come out in bloody march against the workers. The bourgeoisie keeps itself most accurately informed about the fact that in the present epoch the class struggle irresistibly tends to transform itself into civil war. The examples of Italy, Germany, Austria, Spain, and other countries taught considerably more to the magnates and lackeys of capital than to the official leaders of the proletariat. The politicians of the Second64 and Third Internationals, as well a s the bureaucrats

o f the trade

unions,

consciously

close

their eyes to the bourgeoisie’s private army; otherwise, they could

Death Agony of Capitalism

125

not preserve their alliance with it for even twenty-four hours. The reformists systematically implant in the minds of the workers the notion that the sacredness of democracy i s best guaranteed when the bourgeoisie is armed to the teeth and the workers are unarmed. The duty of the Fourth International i s to put an end to such slavish politics once and for all. The petty-bourgeois democrats— including Social Democrats, Stalinists, and Anarchists—yell louder about the struggle against fascism the more cravenly they capitulate to it in actuality. Only armed workers’ detachments, who feel the support of tens of millions of toilers behind them, can successfully prevail against the fascist bands. The struggle against fascism does not start in the liberal editorial office but in the factory—and ends in the street. Scabs and private gunmen in factory plants are the basic nuclei of the fascist army. Strike pickets are the basic nuclei of the proletarian army. This i s our point of departure. In connection with every strike and street demonstration, it is imperative to propagate the necessity of creating workers’ groups for self-defense. It is necessary to write this slogan into the program of the revolutionary wing of the trade unions. It is imperative wherever possible, beginning with the youth groups, to organize groups for self-defense, to drill and acquaint them with the use of arms. A new upsurge of the mass movement should serve not only to increase the number of these units but also to unite them according to neighborhoods, cities, regions. It i s necessary to give organized expression to the valid hatred of the workers toward scabs and bands of gangsters and fascists. I t is necessary to advance the slogan of a workers’ militia as the one serious guarantee for the inviolability of workers’ organizations, meetings, and press. Only with the help of such systematic, persistent, indefatigable, courageous agitational and organizational work, always on the basis of the experience of the masses themselves, is it possible to root out from their consciousness the traditions of submissiveness and passivity; to train detachments of heroic fighters capable of setting an example to all toilers; to inflict a series of tactical defeats upon the armed thugs of counterrevolution; to raise the self-confidence of the exploited and oppressed; to compromise fascism in the eyes of the petty bourgeoisie and pave the road for the conquest of power by the proletariat. Engels defined the state as bodies of “armed m e n . ” The arming

126

The Transitional Program

of the proletariat is an imperative concomitant element to its struggle for liberation. When the proletariat wills it, it will find the road and the means to arming. I n this field, also, the leadership falls naturally to the sections of the Fourth International. The

alliance

o f the

workers

and

farmers

The brother-in-arms and counterpart of the worker in the countryside i s the agricultural laborer. They are two parts of one and the same class. Their interests are inseparable. The industrial workers’ program of transitional demands, with changes here and there, i s likewise the program of the agricultural proletariat. The peasants (farmers) represent another class: they are the petty bourgeoisie of the village. The petty bourgeoisie is made u p of various layers, from the semiproletarian to the exploiter elements. I n accordance with this, the political task of the industrial proletariat i s to carry the class struggle into the countryside. Only thus will it be able to draw a dividing line between its allies and its enemies. The peculiarities of national development of each country find their queerest expression in the status of farmers and, to some extent, of the urban petty bourgeoisie (artisans and shopkeepers). These classes, n o matter how numerically strong they may be, essentially are representative survivals of precapitalist forms of production. The sections of the Fourth International should work out with all possible concreteness a program of transitional demands concerning the peasants (farmers) and urban petty bourgeoisie, conforming to the conditions of each country. The advanced workers should learn to give clear and concrete answers to the questions put by their future allies. While the farmer remains an “independent” petty producer, h e is in need of cheap credit, agricultural machines and fertilizer at prices h e can afford to pay, favorable conditions of transport, and conscientious organization of the market for his agricultural products. But the banks, the trusts, the merchants rob the farmer from every side. Only the farmers themselves, with the help of the workers, can curb this robbery. Committees elected by small farmers should make their appearance on the national scene and, ' jointly with workers’ committees and committees of bank employees, take into their hands control of transport, credit, and mercantile

operations

affecting

agriculture.

Death Agony of Capitalism

127

B y falsely citing the “excessive” demands of the workers, the big bourgeoisie skillfully transforms the question of commodity prices into a wedge to b e driven

between

the workers

and farmers

and between the workers and the petty bourgeoisie of the cities. The peasant, artisan, or small merchant, unlike the industrial worker or office or civil service employee, cannot demand a wage increase corresponding to the increase in prices. The official struggle of the government with high prices is only a deception of the masses. But the farmers, artisans, and merchants, in their capacity of consumers, can step into the politics of price-fixing shoulder to shoulder with the workers. To the capitalist’s lamentations about costs of production, transport, and trade, the consumers answer: “Show us your books; we demand control over the fixing of prices.” The organs of this control should b e committees on prices, made u p of delegates from the factories, trade unions, cooperatives, farmers’ organizations, the “little m a n ” of the city, housewives, etc. By this means the workers will be able to prove to the farmers that the real reason for high prices is not high wages but the exorbitant profits of the capitalists and the overhead expenses of capitalist anarchy. The program for the nationalization of the land and collectivization of agriculture should b e s o drawn that from its very basis it should exclude the possibility of expropriation of small farmers and their compulsory collectivization. The farmer will remain owner of his plot of land as long as he himself believes it possible or necessary. In order to rehabilitate the program of socialism in the eyes of the farmer, it is necessary to expose mercilessly the Stalinist

methods

of collectivization,

which

are dictated

not by

the interests of the farmers or workers but by the interests of the bureaucracy.65 The expropriation of the expropriators likewise does not signify forcible confiscation of the property of artisans and shopkeepers. O n the contrary, workers’ control of banks and trusts—even more, the nationalization

of these

concerns—can

create

for the

urban petty bourgeoisie incomparably more favorable conditions of credit, purchase, and sale than is possible under the unchecked domination of the monopolies. Dependence upon private capital will be replaced by dependence upon the state, which will b e the more attentive to the needs of its small co-workers and agents the more firmly the toilers themselves keep the state in their own hands The practical participation of the exploited farmers in the control of different fields of the economy will allow them to decide

128

The Transitional Program

for themselves whether or not it would be profitable for them to go over to collective working of the land—at what date and on what scale. Industrial workers should consider themselves dutybound to show farmers every cooperation in traveling this road: through the trade unions, factory committees, and, most importantly, through a workers’ and farmers’ government. The alliance proposed by the proletariat—not to the “middle classes” in general but to the exploited layers of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, against all exploiters, including those of the “middle classes”—can be based not on compulsion but only on free consent, which should be consolidated in a special “contract.” This “contract” is the program of transitional demands voluntarily accepted by both sides.

The struggle against

imperialism

and war

The whole world outlook and consequently also the inner political life of individual countries i s overcast by the threat of world war. Even no w the imminent catastrophe sends violent ripples of apprehension through the very broadest masses of mankind. The Second International repeats its infamous politics of 1914 with all the greater assurance since today i t i s the Comintern which plays first fiddle in chauvinism. As quickly as the danger of war assumed concrete outline, the Stalinists, outstripping the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois pacifists by far, became blatant haranguers for “national defense.” The revolutionary struggle against war thus rests fully on the shoulders of the Fourth International. The Bolshevik-Leninist policy regarding this question, formulated in the thesis of the International Secretariat ( “ W a r and the Fourth International,” 1 9 3 4 ) , preserves all of its force today. I n

the next period a revolutionary party will depend for success primarily on its policy on the question of war. A correct policy i s composed of two elements: an uncompromising attitude on imperialism and its wars and the ability to base one’s program on the experience of the masses themselves. The bourgeoisie and its agents u s e the war question more than any other to deceive the people by means of abstractions, general formulas, l a m e phraseology: “neutrality,” “collective security,” “arming for the defense of peace,” “national defense,” “struggle against fascism,” and s o on. All such formulas reduce themselves

Death Agony of Capitalism

129

in the end to the fact that the war question, i.e., the fate of the people, is left in the hands of the imperialists, their governing staffs, their diplomacy, their generals, with all their intrigues and plots against the people. The Fourth International rejects with abhorrence all such abstractions, which play the same role in the democratic camp as in the fascist: “honor,” “blood,” “race.” But abhorrence is not enough. It is imperative to help the masses discern, by means of verifying criteria, slogans, and demands, the concrete essence of these fraudulent abstractions. “Disarmament”?—But the entire question revolves around who will disarm whom. The only disarmament which can avert or end war is the disarmament of the bourgeoisie by the workers. But to disarm the bourgeoisie, the workers must arm themselves. “Neutrality”?—But the proletariat is nothing like neutral in the war between Japan and China, or a war between Germany and the USSR. “Then what is meant i s the defense of China and the USSR?” O f course! But not by the imperialists, who will strangle both China and the USSR. “Defense of the Fatherland”?—But by this abstraction, the bourgeoisie understands the defense of its profits and plunder. We stand ready to defend the fatherland from foreign capitalists, if we first bind our own capitalists hand and foot and hinder them from attacking foreign fatherlands; if the workers and the farmers of our country become its real masters; if the wealth of the country is transferred form the hands of a tiny minority to the hands of the people; if the army becomes a weapon of the exploited instead of the exploiters. I t is necessary to interpret these fundamental ideas by breaking them u p into more concrete and partial ones, dependent upon the course of events and the orientation of thought of the m a sses. I n addition, it is necessary to differentiate strictly between the pacifism of the diplomat, professor, and journalist, and the pacifism of the carpenter, agricultural worker, and charwoman. I n one case, pacifism is a screen for imperialism; in the other, it is the confused expression of distrust in imperialism. When the small farmer or worker speaks about the defense of the fatherland, h e means defense of his home, his family, and other similar families from invasion, bombs, an d poisonous g a s . The capitalist and his journalist understand by the defense of the fatherland the seizure of colonies and markets, the predatory increase of the “national” share of world income. Bourgeois

130

The Transitional Program

pacifism a n d patriotism are shot through with deceit. I n the pacifism and even patriotism of the oppressed, there are elements which reflect on the one hand a hatred of destructive war, and on the other a clinging to what they believe to b e their own good— elements which we must know how to seize upon i n order to draw the requisite conclusions. U s i n g these considerations a s its point of departure, the Fourth International

supports

every, even i f insufficient,

demand,

if it

can draw the masses to a certain extent into active politics, awaken their criticism, and strengthen their control over the machinations of the bourgeoisie. From this point of View, our American section, for example, critically supports the proposal for establishing a referendum o n the question of declaring w a r . N o democratic reform, i t i s understood, c a n by itself prevent the rulers from provoking war w h e n they wish it. I t i s necessary to give frank warning of this. B u t notwithstanding the illusions of the masses i n regard to the proposed referendum, their support of i t reflects the distrust felt by the workers and farmers toward the bourgeois government and Congress. Without supporting a n d without sparing illusions, i t i s necessary to support with all possible strength the progressive distrust of the exploited toward the exploiters. The more widespread the movement for the referendum becomes, the sooner will t h e bourgeois pacifists m o v e away from it; the more completely will the betrayers of the Comintern b e compromised; the more acute will distrust of the imperialists become. From this viewpoint, i t i s necessary to advance the demand: electoral rights for men an d women beginning with the age of eighteen. Those wh o will b e called upon to die for the fatherland tomorrow should have the right to vote today. The struggle against war m u s t first o f a l l mobilization of the y o u t h .

begin

with

the

revolutionary

Light must b e shed upon the problem of war from a l l angles, hinging upon the side from which i t will confront the masses at a given m o m e n t .

W a r i s a gigantic commercial enterprise, especially for the war industry. The “ 6 0 families” are therefore first-line patriots and the chief provocateurs of war. Workers’ control of war industries i s the first step in the struggle against the “manufacturers of war.” To t h e slogan of the reformists: a tax o n military profits, w e counterpose the s l o g a n s : confiscation of military profits a n d

Death Agony of Capitalism

131

expropriation of the war industries. Where military industry is “nationalized,” as in France, the slogan of workers’ control preserves its full strength. The proletariat h a s as little confidence i n the government of the bourgeoisie a s in an individual capitalist. Not o n e ma n and not on e penny for the bourgeois government! Not an armaments program but a program of useful public works! Complete independence of workers’ organizations from military-police control! O n c e and for all w e m u s t tear from the h a n d s of the greedy and merciless imperialist clique, scheming behind th e backs of the people, the disposition of the people’s fate. I n accordance with this w e d e m a n d : Complete abolition of secret diplomacy; all treaties and agreements to b e made accessible to all workers a n d farmers; Military training and arming of workers and farmers under direct control of workers’ a n d

farmers’ committees;

Creation of military schools for the training of commanders among the toilers, chosen by workers’ organizations; Substitution for the standing army of a people’s militia, indissolubly linked up with factories, mines, farms, etc. Imperialist war i s the continuation and sharpening of the predatory politics of the bourgeoisie. The struggle of the proletariat against war i s the continuation a n d sharpening of its class struggle. The beginning of war alters the situation and partially the means of struggle between the classes, but not the aim a n d basic course. The imperialist bourgeoisie dominates the world. I n its basic character the approaching war will therefore be an imperialist war. T he fundamental content of the politics of the international proletariat will consequently b e a struggle against imperialism a n d its war. I n this struggle the basic principle is: “the chief enemy i s in your o w n country,” or “the defeat of your o w n (imperialist)

government

is the lesser e v i l . ”

B u t n o t all countries of the world are imperialist countries. O n the contrary the majority are victims of imperialism. S o m e of the colonial or semicolonial countries will undoubtedly attempt to utilize the war i n order to c a s t off the yoke of slavery. Their war will b e n o t imperialist but liberating. I t will b e the duty of the international proletariat to aid the oppressed countries i n their w a r against the oppressors. The same duty applies in regard to

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The Transitional Program

aiding the USSR, or whatever other workers’ state might arise before the war or during the war. The defeat of every imperialist government in the struggle with the workers’ state or with a colonial country is the lesser evil. The workers of imperialist countries, however, cannot help an anti-imperialist country through their own government, n o matter what might be the diplomatic and military relations between the two countries at a given moment. If the governments find themselves in a temporary and, by the very essence of the matter, unreliable alliance, then the proletariat of the imperialist country continues to remain in class opposition to its own government and supports the nonimperialist “ally” through its o w n methods, i.e., through the methods of the international class struggle (agitation not only against their perfidious allies but also in favor of a workers’ state in a colonial country; boycott, strikes, in one case; rejection of boycott and strikes in another case, etc.). I n supporting the colonial country or the USSR in a war, the proletariat does not in the slightest degree solidarize either with the bourgeois government of the colonial country or with the Thermidorian bureaucracy of the USSR.67 O n the contrary, it maintains full political independence from the one as from the other. Giving aid in a j u s t and progressive war, the revolutionary proletariat wins the sympathy of the workers in the colonies and in the USSR, strengthens there the authority and influence of the Fourth International, and increases its ability to help overthrow the bourgeois government in the colonial country, the reactionary bureaucracy in the USSR. At the beginning of the war the sections of the Fourth International will inevitably feel themselves isolated: every war takes the national masses unawares and impels them to the side of the government apparatus. The internationalists will have to swim against the stream. However, the devastation a n d misery brought about by the new war, which in the first months will far outstrip the bloody horrors of 1914-18, will quickly prove sobering. The discontent of the masses an d their revolt will grow by leaps and b o u n d s. The sections of the Fourth International will b e found at the head of the revolutionary tide. The program of transitional demands will gain burning actuality. The problem of the conquest of power by the proletariat will loom i n its full stature.

Before exhausting or drowning mankind in blood, capitalism befouls the world atmosphere with the poisonous vapors of

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national and race hatred. Anti-Semitism today is one of the more malignant convulsions of capitalism’s death agony. An uncompromising disclosure of the roots of race prejudice and all forms and shades of national arrogance and chauvinism, particularly anti-Semitism, should become part of the daily work of all sections of the Fourth International, as the most important part of the struggle against imperialism and war. Our basic slogan remains: Workers of the World Unite!

Workers’

and farmers’

government

This formula, “workers’ and farmers’ government,” first appeared in the agitation of the Bolsheviks in 1917 and was definitely accepted after the October revolution. I n the final instance it represented nothing more than the popular designation for the already established dictatorship of the proletariat. The significance of this designation comes mainly from the fact that it underscored the idea of an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry upon which the Soviet power rests. When the Comintern of the epigones tried to revive the formula buried by history, the “democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry,” it gave to the formula of the “workers’ and peasants’ government” a completely different, purely “democratic,” i.e., bourgeois content, counterposing it to the dictatorship of the proletariat.68 The Bolshevik-Leninists resolutely rejected the slogan of the “workers’ and peasants’ government” i n the bourgeois-democratic version. They affirmed then and affirm now that

when

the party

o f the proletariat

refuses

to step

beyond

bourgeois-democratic limits, its alliance with the peasantry i s simply turned into a support for capital, a s w as the case with the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries in 1917, with the Chinese Communist

Party in 1 9 2 5 - 2 7 , a n d a s i s n o w the c a s e with

the People’s Front in Spain, France, an d other countries.69 From April to September 1917, the Bolsheviks demanded that the SRS and Mensheviks break with the liberal bourgeoisie and take power into their own h a n d s . Under this provision the Bolshevik Party promised the Mensheviks an d the S R s , as the petty-bourgeois representatives of the workers and peasants, its revolutionary aid against the bourgeoisie; categorically refusing, however, either to enter into the government of the Mensheviks a n d SRs o r to carry political responsibility for it. If the M e n s h e v i k s and the SRs had actually broken with the Cadets

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The Transitional Program

(liberals) and with foreign imperialism, then the “workers’ and peasants’ government” created by them could only have hastened and facilitated the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.7O But it was exactly because of this that the leadership of petty-bourgeois democracy resisted with all possible strength the establishment of its own government. The experience of Russia demonstrated, and the experience of Spain and France once again confirms, that even under very favorable conditions the parties of petty-bourgeois democracy (SRs, Social Democrats, Stalinists, Anarchists) are incapable of creating a government of workers and peasants, that is, a government independent of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the demand of the Bolsheviks, addressed to the Mensheviks and the SRs—“Break with the bourgeoisie, take the power into your own h a n d s ! ” — h a d for the masses tremendous educational significance. The obstinate unwillingness of the Mensheviks and SRs to take power, s o dramatically exposed during the July days, definitely doomed them before m a s s opinion and prepared the victory of the Bolsheviks.71 The central task of the Fourth International consists in freeing the proletariat from the old leadership, whose conservatism is in complete contradiction to the catastrophic eruptions of disintegrating capitalism and represents the chief obstacle to historical progress. The chief accusation which the Fourth International advances against the traditional organizations of the proletariat i s the fact that they do not wish to tear themselves away from the political semicorpse of the bourgeoisie. Under these conditions the demand, systematically addressed to the old leadership— “Break with the bourgeoisie, take the power!”—is an extremely important weapon for exposing the treacherous character of the parties and organizations of the Second, Third, and Amsterdam Internationals.72 The slogan “workers’ and farmers’ government” i s thus acceptable to u s only in the sense that it had in 1917 with the Bolsheviks, i.e., a s an antibourgeois and anticapitalist slogan, but i n n o case in that “democratic” sense which the epigones later gave it, transforming it from a bridge to socialist revolution into the chief barrier upon its path. Of all the parties and organizations which base themselves on the workers and peasants and speak i n their name, we demand that they break politically from the bourgeoisie and enter upon the road of struggle for the workers’ and farmers’ government. O n this road we promise them full support against capitalist

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reaction. At the same time, we indefatigably develop agitation around those transitional demands which should, in our opinion, form the program of the workers’ and farmers’ government. I s the creation of such a government by the traditional workers’ organizations possible? Past experience shows, as has already been stated, that this is, to say the least, highly improbable. However, one cannot categorically deny in advance the theoretical possibility that, under the influence of completely exceptional circumstances (war, defeat, financial crash, m a s s revolutionary pressure, etc.), the petty-bourgeois parties, including the Stalinists, may go further than they themselves wish along the road to a break with the bourgeoisie. I n any case, one thing is not to b e doubted: even if this highly improbable variant somewhere, at some time, becomes a reality and the workers’ and farmers’ government in the above-mentioned sense is established in fact, it would represent merely a short episode o n the road to the actual dictatorship of the proletariat. However,

there

is

no

need

to

indulge

in

guesswork.

The

agitation around the slogan of a workers’ and farmers’ government preserves under all conditions a tremendous educational value. And n o t accidentally. This generalized slogan proceeds entirely along the line of the political development of our epoch (the bankruptcy and decomposition of the old bourgeois parties, the downfall of democracy, the growth of fascism, the accelerated drive of the workers toward more active and aggressive politics). E a c h of the transitional demands should, therefore, lead to one and the same political conclusion: the workers need to break with all traditional parties of the bourgeoisie in order, jointly with the farmers, to establish their own power. I t is impossible in advance to foresee what will be the concrete stages of the revolutionary mobilization of the masses. The sections of the Fourth International should critically orient themselves at each new stage, and advance such slogans as will aid the striving of the workers for independent politics, deepen the class character of these politics, destroy reformist and pacifist illusions, strengthen the connection of the vanguard with the masses, and prepare the revolutionary conquest of power. Soviets

Factory committees, as already stated, are elements of dual power inside the factory. Consequently, their existence is possible

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The Transitional Program

only under conditions of increasing pressure by the masses. This is likewise true of special mass groupings for the struggle against war, of the committees on prices, and all other new centers of the movement, the very appearance of which bears witness to the fact that the class struggle has overflowed the limits of the traditional organizations of the proletariat. These new organs and centers, however, will soon begin to feel their lack of cohesion and their insufficiency. Not one of the transitional demands can be fully met under the conditions of preserving the bourgeois regime. At the same time, the deepening of the social crisis will increase not only the sufferings of the masses but also their impatience, persistence, and pressure. Ever new layers of the oppressed will raise their heads and come forward with their demands. Millions of toilworn “little men,” to whom the reformist leaders never gave a thought, will begin to pound insistently on the doors of the workers’ organizations. The unemployed will join the movement. The agricultural workers, the ruined and semiruined farmers, the oppressed of the cities, the women workers, housewives, proletarianized layers of the intelligentsia—all of these will seek unity and leadership. How are the different demands and forms of struggle to be harmonized, even if only within the limits of one city? History has already answered this question: through soviets. These will unite the representatives of all the fighting groups. For this purpose, n o one has yet proposed a different form of organization; indeed, it would hardly b e possible to think up a better one. Soviets are not limited to an a priori party program. They throw open their doors to all the exploited. Through these doors pass representatives of all strata drawn into the general current of the struggle. The organization, broadening out together with the movement, is renewed again and again in its womb. All political currents of the proletariat can struggle for leadership of the soviets on the basis of the widest democracy. The slogan of soviets, therefore, crowns the program of transitional demands. Soviets can arise only at the time when the mass movement enters into an openly revolutionary stage. From the first moment of their appearance the soviets, acting as a pivot around which millions of toilers are united in their struggle against the exploiters, become competitors and opponents of local authorities and then of the central government. If the factory committee creates a dual power in the factory, then the soviets initiate a period of dual power in the country. Dual power in its turn i s the culminating point of the

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transitional period. Two regimes, the bourgeois and the proletari a n , are irreconcilably opposed to each other. Conflict between them i s inevitable. The fate of society depends on the outcome. Should the revolution b e defeated, the fascist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie will follow. In case of victory, the power of the soviets, that i s , the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist reconstruction of society, will arise. Backward

countries

of transitional

and

the

program

demands

Colonial and semicolonial countries are backward countries by their very essence. But backward countries are part of a world dominated by imperialism. Their development, therefore, h a s a combined

character:

the

most

primitive

economic

forms

are

combined with the last word in capitalist technique and culture. I n like manner are defined the political strivings of the proletariat of backward countries: the struggle for the most elementary achievements of national independence and bourgeois democracy i s combined with the socialist struggle against world imperialism. Democratic slogans, transitional demands, and the problems of the socialist revolution are n o t divided into separate historical epochs in this struggle, but stem directly from one another. The Chinese proletariat h a d barely begun to organize trade unions before it h a d to provide for soviets. I n this sense, the present program i s completely applicable to colonial and semicolonial countries, at least to those where the proletariat h a s become capable of carrying o n independent politics. The central tasks of the colonial and semicolonial countries are the agrarian revolution, i.e., liquidation of feudal heritages, a nd national independence, i.e., the overthrow of the imperialist yoke. The two tasks are closely linked with each other. I t i s impossible merely to reject the democratic program; i t i s imperative that in the struggle the masses outgrow it. The slogan for a national (or constituent) assembly preserves its full force for such countries as China or I n d i a . This slogan must b e indissolubly tied up with the problem of national liberation and agrarian reform. A s a primary step, the workers must b e armed with this democratic program. Only they will be able to summon a n d unite the

farmers.

On

the

basis

o f the

revolutionary

democratic

program, i t i s necessary to oppose the workers to the “ n a t i o n a l ” bourgeoisie. Then, at a certain stage in the mobilization of the masses under

138

The Transitional Program

the slogans of revolutionary democracy, soviets can and should arise. Their historical role in each given period, particularly their relation to the national assembly, will b e determined by the political level of the proletariat, the bond between them and the peasantry, and the character of the proletarian party policies. Sooner or later, the soviets should overthrow bourgeois democracy. Only they are capable of bringing the democratic revolution to a conclusion and likewise opening an era of socialist revolution. The relative weight of the individual democratic and transitional demands in the proletariat’s struggle, their mutual ties and their order of presentation, is determined by the peculiarities and specific conditions of each backward country and, to a considerable extent, by the degree of its backwardness. Nevertheless, the general trend of revolutionary development in all backward countries can b e determined b y the formula of the permanent revolution in the sense definitely imparted to it b y the three revolutions i n Russia (1905, February 1917, October 1917).73 The Comintern h a s provided backward countries with a classic example of how it i s possible to ruin a powerful and promising revolution. During the stormy m a s s upsurge i n Ch in a in 1925-27, the Comintern failed to advance the slogan of a national assembly, and at the s a m e time forbade the creation of soviets. (The bourgeois party, the Kuomintang, was to replace, according to Stalin’s p l a n , both the national assembly and soviets.) After the masses h a d been smashed by the Kuomintang, the Comintern organized a caricature of a soviet in Canton. Following the inevitable collapse of the Canton uprising, the Comintern took the road of guerrilla warfare and peasant soviets, with complete passivity on the part of the industrial proletariat. Landing thus in a blind alley, the Comintern took advantage of the SinoJapanese War to liquidate “Soviet China” with a stroke of the pen, subordinating not only the peasant “Red Army” but also the so-called Communist Party to the very same Kuomintang, i.e., the bourgeoisie.74 Having betrayed the international proletarian revolution for the sake of friendship with the “democratic” slave-masters, the Comintern could not help betraying simultaneously also the struggle for liberation of the colonial masses, and, indeed, with even greater

cynicism

than did the Second International

before it.

On e of the tasks of People’s Front and “national defense” politics is to turn hundreds of millions of the colonial population into

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139

cannon fodder for “democratic” imperialism. The banner on which i s emblazoned the struggle for the liberation of the colonial and semicolonial peoples, i.e., a good half of mankind, has definitely passed into the hands of the Fourth International.

The program o f transitional in fascist countries

demands

It is a far cry today from the time when the stategists of the Comintern announced the victory of Hitler as being merely a step toward the victory of Thalmann. Thalmann has been in Hitler’s prisons now for more than five years. Mussolini has held Italy enchained by fascism for more than sixteen years.75 Throughout this time, the parties of the Second and Third Internationals have been impotent not only to conduct a mass movement but even to create a serious illegal organization which might b e to some extent comparable to the Russian revolutionary parties during the epoch of tsarism. Not the slightest reason exists for explaining these failures by reference to the power of fascist ideology. (Essentially, Mussolini never advanced any sort of ideology.) Hitler’s “ideology” never seriously gripped the workers. Those layers of the population which at one time were intoxicated with fascism, i.e., chiefly the middle classes, have had enough time in which to sober up. The fact that a somewhat perceptible opposition is limited to Protestant and Catholic church circles is not explained by the might of the semidelirious and semicharlatan theories of “race” and “blood,” but by the terrific collapse of the ideologies of democracy, Social Democracy, and the Comintern. After the massacre of the Paris Commune, black reaction reigned for nearly eight years. After the defeat of the 1905 Russian

revolution,

the toiling

masses

remained

in a stupor for

almost as long a period.76 But in both instances the phenomenon wa s only one of physical defeat, conditioned by the relationship of forces. In Russia, in addition, it concerned an almost virgin proletariat. The Bolshevik faction had at that time not celebrated even its third birthday. I t is completely otherwise in Germany, where the leadership came from powerful parties, one of which had existed for seventy years, the other almost fifteen. Both these parties,

with

millions

of

voters

behind

them,

were

morally

paralyzed before the battle and capitulated without a fight. History has recorded n o parallel catastrophe. The German

140

The Transitional Program

proletariat w a s not smashed by the enemy in battle. I t was crushed by the cowardice, baseness, and perfidy of its own parties. Small wonder then that it h a s lost faith in everything in which it h a d been accustomed to believe for almost three generations. Hitler’s victory in turn strengthened Mussolini. The protracted failure of revolutionary work in Spain or Germany i s but the reward for the criminal politics of the Social Democracy and the Comintern. Illegal work needs not only the sympathy of the masses but the conscious enthusiasm of their advanced strata. But can enthusiasm possibly be expected for historically bankrupt organizations? The majority of those who come forth as emigré leaders are either demoralized to the very marrow of their bones, agents of the Kremlin and the GPU, or Social Democratic ex-ministers, who dream that the workers, by some sort of miracle, will return them to their lost posts.77 I s it possible to imagine even for a minute these gentlemen in the role of future leaders of the “antifascist” revolution? And events on the world arena—the smashing of the Austrian workers, the defeat of the Spanish revolution, the degeneration of the Soviet state—could not give aid to a revolutionary upsurge in Italy and Germany. Since for political information the German and Italian workers depend in great measure upon the radio, it is possible to say with assurance that the Moscow radio station, combining Thermidorian lies with stupidity and insolence, has become the m o s t powerful factor in the demoralization of the workers in the totalitarian states. I n this respect as in others, Stalin acts merely as Goebbels’s assistant.78 At the s a m e time the class antagonisms which brought about the victory of fascism, continuing their work under fascism too, are gradually undermining it. The masses are more dissatisfied than ever. Hundreds and thousands of self-sacrificing workers, in spite of everything, continue to carry on revolutionary mole-work. A new generation, which h a s n o t directly experienced the shattering of old traditions and high hopes, h a s come to the fore. Irresistibly, the molecular preparation of the proletarian revolution proceeds beneath the heavy totalitarian tombstone. But for concealed energy to flare into open revolt, it i s necessary t h a t the

vanguard of the proletariat find new perspectives, a new program, and a n e w , unblemished banner. Herein lies the chief handicap. I t i s extremely difficult for workers i n fascist countries to make a choice of a new program. A program

i s verified

by experience.

A n d i t i s precisely experience

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141

i n m a s s movements which is lacking in countries of totalitarian despotism. It is very likely that a genuine proletarian success in one of the “democratic” countries will b e necessary to give impetus to the revolutionary movement o n fascist territory. A similar effect is possible by means of a financial or military catastrophe. At present, it i s imperative that primarily propagandistic, preparatory work b e carried o n , which will yield large-scale results only in the future. One thing can be stated with conviction even at this point: once it breaks through, the revolutionary wave in fascist countries will immediately have a grandiose sweep and under n o circumstances will stop short at the experiment of resuscitating some sort of Weimar corpse.79 I t i s from this point onward that an uncompromising divergence begins between the Fourth International and the old parties which outlive their bankruptcy. The emigré People’s Front i s the m o s t malignant and perfidious variety of all possible People’s Fronts. Essentially, it signifies the impotent longing for a coalition with a nonexistent liberal bourgeoisie. H a d it met with success, i t would simply have prepared for the proletariat a series of new defeats of the Spanish type. A merciless exposure of the theory and practice of the People’s Front is therefore the first condition for a revolutionary struggle against fascism. O f course,

this d o e s n o t m e a n

that

the Fourth

International

rejects democratic slogans a s a means of mobilizing the masses against fascism. O n the contrary, such slogans at certain moments can play a serious role. But the formulas of democracy (freedom of press, the right to unionize, etc.) m e a n for u s only incidental or episodic slogans i n the independent movement of the proletariat, and not a democratic noose fastened to the neck of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie’s agents (Spainl). As soon a s the movement assumes something of a m a s s character, the democratic s l o g a n s will b e intertwined with the transitional o n e s ; factory committees, i t m a y b e s u p p o s e d , w i l l a p p e a r before t h e o l d

routinists rush from their chancelleries to organize trade unions; soviets will cover Germany before a new constituent assembly will gather i n Weimar. The same applies to Italy a n d the rest of the totalitarian and semitotalitarian countries. Fascism plunged these countries into political barbarism. B u t i t did n o t change their social structure. Fascism i s a tool i n the h a n d s of finance capital and not of feudal landowners. A revolutionary program should base itself o n the dialectics of the class struggle, obligatory also to fascist countries, and n o t o n the

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The Transitional Program

psychology of terrified bankrupts. The Fourth International rejects with disgust the ways of political masquerade which impelled the Stalinists, the former heroes of the “third period,”80 to appear i n turn behind the m a s k s of Catholics, Protestants, Jews, German nationalists, liberals—only in order to hide their own unattractive faces. The Fourth International always and everywhere appears under its own banner. It proposes its own program openly to the proletariat i n fascist countries. The advanced workers of all the world are already firmly convinced that the overthrow of Mussolini, Hitler, and their agents and imitators will occur only under the leadership of the Fourth International.

The U S S R and problems o f the transitional

epoch

The Soviet Union emerged from the October revolution as a workers’ state. State ownership of the means of production, a necessary prerequisite to socialist development, opened up the possibility of rapid growth of the productive forces. But the apparatus of the workers’ state underwent a complete degeneration at the same time: it was transformed from a weapon of the working class into a weapon of bureaucratic violence against the working class, and more and more a weapon for the sabotage of the country’s economy. The bureaucratization of a backward and isolated workers’ state and the transformation of the bureaucracy into an all-powerful privileged caste constitute the most convincing refutation—not only theoretically but this time practically— of the theory of socialism in one country.81 The USSR thus embodies terrific contradictions. But it still remains a degenerated workers’ state. Such i s the social diagnosis. The political prognosis has an alternative character: either the bureaucracy, becoming ever more the organ of the world bourgeoisie i n the workers’ state, will overthrow the new forms of property and plunge the country back into capitalism; or the working class will crush t h e bureaucracy and open the way to

socialism. To the sections of the Fourth International, the Moscow trials came not as a surprise and not as a result of the personal madness of the Kremlin dictator, but a s the legitimate offspring of the Thermidor. They grew out of the unbearable conflicts within the Soviet bureaucracy itself, which in turn mirror the contradictions between the bureaucracy and the people, as well as

Death Agony of Capitalism

143

the deepening antagonisms among the “people” themselves. The bloody “fantastic” nature of the trials gives the measure of the intensity of the contradictions and, by the same token, predicts the approach of the denouement. The public utterances of former foreign representatives of the Kremlin who refused to return to Moscow irrefutably confirm in their own way that all shades of political thought are to b e found among the bureaucracy: from genuine Bolshevism (Ignace Reiss) to complete

fascism

( F . B u t e n k o ) . 3 2 The revolutionary

elements

within the bureaucracy, only a small minority, reflect, passively it i s true, the socialist

interests

o f the proletariat.

The fascist,

counterrevolutionary elements, growing uninterruptedly, express with ever greater consistency the interests of world imperialism. These candidates for the role of compradors consider, not without reason, that the new ruling layer can insure their positions of privilege only through rejection of nationalization, collectivization, and monopoly of foreign trade in the name of the assimilation of “Western civilization,” i.e., capitalism. Between these two poles, there are intermediate, diffused Menshevik-SRliberal tendencies which gravitate toward bourgeois democracy. Within the very ranks of that so-called “classless” society, there unquestionably exist groupings exactly similar to those i n the bureaucracy, only less sharply expressed and in inverse proportions: conscious capitalist tendencies distinguish mainly the prosperous part of the collective farms (kolkhozi) and are characteristic of only a small minority of the population. But this layer provides itself with a wide base for petty-bourgeois tendencies

of accumulating

personal

wealth

at the expense

of

general poverty, and are consciously encouraged by the bureaucracy. Atop this system of mounting antagonisms, trespassing ever more on the social equilibrium, the Thermidorian oligarchy, today reduced mainly to Stalin’s Bonapartist clique, hangs on by terroristic methods.83 The latest judicial frame-ups were aimed as a blow against the left. This i s true also of the mopping up of the leaders of the Right Opposition, because the right group of the old Bolshevik Party, seen from the viewpoint of the bureaucracy’s interests and tendencies, represented a left danger.84 The fact that the Bonapartist clique, likewise in fear of its own right allies of the type of Butenko, is forced in the interests of selfpreservation to execute the generation of Old Bolsheviks85 almost to a m a n , offers indisputable testimony to the vitality of

144

The Transitional Program

revolutionary traditions among the masses, as well as to their growing discontent. Petty-bourgeois democrats of the West, having but yesterday assayed the Moscow trials as unalloyed gold, today repeat insistently that there is “neither Trotskyism nor Trotskyists within the USSR.” They fail to explain, however, why all the purges are conducted under the banner of a struggle with precisely this danger. If we are to examine “Trotskyism” as a finished program, and, even more to the point, as an organization, then unquestionably “Trotskyism” is extremely weak in the USSR. However, its indestructible force stems from the fact that it expresses not only revolutionary tradition but also today’s actual opposition of the Russian working class. The social hatred stored up by the workers against the bureaucracy—this is precisely what, from the viewpoint of the Kremlin clique, constitutes “Trotskyism.” It fears with a deathly and thoroughly well-grounded fear the bond between the deep but inarticulate indignation of the workers and the organization of the Fourth International. The extermination of the generation of Old Bolsheviks and of the revolutionary representatives of the middle and young generations has acted to disrupt the political equilibrium still more in favor of the right, bourgeois wing of the bureaucracy, and of its allies throughout the land. From them, i.e., from the right, we can expect ever more determined attempts in the next period to revise the social regime of the USSR and bring it closer in pattern to “Western civilization” in its fascist form. From this perspective, impelling concreteness is imparted to the question of the “defense of the USSR.” If tomorrow the bourgeoisfascist grouping, the “faction of Butenko,” s o to speak, should attempt the conquest of power, the “faction of Reiss” inevitably would align itself on the opposite side of the barricades. Although it would find itself temporarily the ally of Stalin, it would nevertheless defend not the Bonapartist clique but the social base of the USSR, i.e., the property wrenched away from the capitalists and transformed into state property. Should the “faction of Butenko” prove to be in alliance with Hitler, then the “faction of Reiss” would defend the USSR from military intervention, inside the country as well as in the world arena. Any other course would b e a betrayal. Although it is thus impermissible to deny in advance the possibility,

in strictly

defined

instances,

of a “united

front”

with

Death Agony of Capitalism

145

the Thermidorian section of the bureaucracy against open attack by capitalist counterrevolution, the chief political task in the USSR still remains the overthrow of this same Thermidorian bureaucracy. Each day added to its domination helps rot the foundations of the socialist elements of the economy and increases the chances for capitalist restoration. It i s in precisely this direction that the Comintern moves as the agent and accomplice of the Stalinist clique in strangling the Spanish revolution and demoralizing the international proletariat. As in fascist countries, the chief strength of the bureaucracy lies not in itself but in the disillusionment of the masses, in their lack of a new perspective. As in fascist countries, from which Stalin’s political apparatus does not differ save in more unbridled savagery, only preparatory propagandistic work i s possible today in the U S S R . As in fascist countries, the impetus to the Soviet workers’ revolutionary upsurge will probably b e given by events outside the country. The struggle against the Comintern in the world arena is the most important part today. of the struggle against the Stalinist dictatorship. There are many signs that the Comintern’s downfall, because it does not have a direct base in the GPU, will precede the downfall of the Bonapartist clique and the Thermidorian bureaucracy as a whole. A fresh upsurge of the revolution in the USSR will undoubtedly begin under the banner of the struggle against social inequality and political oppression. Down with the privileges of the bureaucracy! Down with Stakhanovism!86 Down with the Soviet aristocracy and its ranks and orders! Greater equality of wages for all forms of labor! The struggle for the freedom of the trade unions and the factory committees, for the right of assembly, and for freedom of the press, will unfold in the struggle for the regeneration and development of Soviet democracy. The bureaucracy replaced the soviets as class organs with the fiction of universal electoral rights—in the style of HitlerGoebbels. It is necessary to return to the soviets not only their free democratic form but also their class content. As once the bourgeoisie and kulaks were not permitted to enter the soviets, so now it is necessary to drive the bureaucracy and the new aristocracy o u t of the soviets. In the soviets there is room only for representatives of the workers, rank-and-file collective farmers, peasants, and Red Army personnel. Democratization of the soviets is impossible without the

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The Transitional Program

legalization of soviet parties. The workers and peasants themselves by their own free vote will indicate what parties they recognize as soviet parties. A revision of planned economy from top to bottom in the interests of producers and consumers! Factory committees should be returned the right to control production. A democratically organized consumers’ cooperative should control the quality and price of products. Reorganization of the collective farms in accordance with the will and in the interests of those who work there! The reactionary international policy of the bureaucracy should be replaced by the policy of proletarian internationalism. The complete diplomatic correspondence of the Kremlin should be published. Down with secret diplomacy! All political trials staged by the Thermidorian bureaucracy should be reviewed in the light of complete publicity and controversial openness and integrity. Only the victorious revolutionary uprising of the oppressed masses can revive the Soviet regime and guarantee its further development toward socialism. There is but one party capable of leading the Soviet masses to insurrection—the party of the Fourth International! Down with the bureaucratic gang of Cain-Stalin! Long live Soviet democracy! Long live the international socialist revolution!

Against

opportunism

and unprincipled

revisionism

The politics of Léon Blum’s party in France demonstrate anew that reformists are incapable of learning anything from even the most tragic lessons of history. The French Social Democracy slavishly

copies the politics o f the German

Social Democracy

and

goes to meet the same end. Within a few decades the Second International intertwined itself with the bourgeois-democratic regime, b e c a m e i n fact a part o f it, a n d i s rotting with i t .

a w a y together

The Third International has taken to the road of reformism a t a time when the crisis of capitalism definitely placed the proletarian revolution on the order of the day. The Comintern’s policy in Spain and China today—the policy of cringing before the “democratic” and “national” bourgeoisie—demonstrates that the Comintern is likewise incapable of learning anything further or of changing.

The bureaucracy

which

became

a reactionary

force

Death Agony of Capitalism

147

in the USSR cannot play a revolutionary role in the world arena. Anarcho-syndicalism in general has passed through the same kind of evolution. I n France, the syndicalist bureaucracy of Léon Jouhaux has long since become a bourgeois agency i n the working class.87 In Spain, anarcho-syndicalism shook off its ostensible revolutionism and became the fifth wheel on the chariot of bourgeois democracy. Intermediate centrist organizations centered about the London Bureau represent merely “left” appendages of the Social Democracy or of the Comintern.88 They have displayed a complete inability to make head or tail of the political situation and draw revolutionary conclusions from it. Their highest point was the Spanish POUM, which under revolutionary conditions proved completely incapable of following a revolutionary line. The tragic defeats suffered by the world proletariat over a long period of years doomed the official organizations to yet greater conservatism and simultaneously sent disillusioned pettybourgeois “revisionists” in pursuit of “new w a y s . ” As always during epochs of reaction and decay, quacks and Charlatans appear on all sides, desirous of revising the whole course of revolutionary thought. Instead of learning from the past, they “reject” it. Some discover the inconsistency of Marxism, others announce the downfall of Bolshevism. There are those who put responsibility upon revolutionary doctrine for the mistakes and crimes of those who betrayed it; others who curse the medicine because it does not guarantee an instantaneous and miraculous cure. The more daring promise to discover a panacea and, in anticipation, recommend the halting of the class struggle. A good many prophets of “new morals” are preparing to regenerate the labor movement with the help of ethical homeopathy. The majority of these apostles have succeeded in becoming themselves moral invalids before arriving on the field of battle. Thus, under the guise of “new ways,” old recipes, long since buried in the archives of pre-Marxian socialism, are offered to the proletariat. The Fourth International declares uncompromising war on the bureaucracies of the Second, Third, Amsterdam, and Anarchosyndicalist Internationals, as on their centrist satellites; on reformism without reforms; on democracy in alliance with the GPU; on pacifism without peace; on anarchism in the service of the bourgeoisie; on “revolutionists” who live in deathly fear of

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The Transitional Program

revolution. All of these organizations are not pledges for the future but decayed survivals of the past. The epoch of wars and revolutions will raze them to the ground. The Fourth International does not search after and does not invent panaceas.

I t takes its stand

completely

on Marxism

as the

only revolutionary doctrine that enables one to understand reality, unearth the cause behind the defeats, and consciously prepare for victory. The Fourth International continues the tradition of Bolshevism, which first showed the proletariat how to conquer power. The Fourth International sweeps away the q uacks, Charlatans, and unsolicited teachers of morals. I n a society based upon exploitation, the highest morality i s that of the social revolution. All methods are good which raise the classconsciousness of the workers, their trust in their own forces, their readiness for self-sacrifice in the struggle. The impermissible methods are those which implant fear and submissiveness in the oppressed in the face of their oppressors, which crush the spirit of protest and indignation or substitute for the will of the masses— the will of the leaders; for conviction—compulsion; for an analysis of reality—demagogy and frame-up. That is why the Social Democracy, prostituting Marxism, and Stalinism, the antithesis of Bolshevism, are both mortal enemies of the proletarian revolution and its morals. To face reality squarely; not to seek the line of least resistance; to call things by their right names; to speak the truth to the masses, n o matter how bitter it may be; not to fear obstacles; to be true in little things a s in big ones; to base one’s program on the logic of the class struggle; to b e bold when the hour for action arrives—these are the rules of the Fourth International. I t ha s shown

that

i t could swim

against

the stream.

The approaching

historical wave will raise it on its crest.

Against

sectarianism

Under the influence of the betrayal by the historic organizations of the proletariat, certain sectarian moods and groupings of various kinds arise or are regenerated at the periphery of the Fourth International. At their base lies a refusal to struggle for partial and transitional demands, i.e., for the elementary interests and needs of the working masses as they are today. Preparing for the revolution means, to the sectarians, convincing themselves of the superiority of socialism. 'l‘hey propose turning

Death Agony of Capitalism

149

their backs o n the “old” trade unions, i.e., to tens of millions of organized workers—as if the masses could somehow live outside of the conditions of the actual class struggle! They remain indifferent to the internal struggle within reformist organizations—as if one could win the masses without intervening in their daily strife! They refuse to draw a distinction between bourgeois democracy and fascism—as if the masses could help but feel the difference on every h a n d ! Sectarians are capable of differentiating between but two colors: red and black. S o as not to tempt themselves, they simplify reality. They refuse to draw a distinction between the fighting camps in Spain for the reason that both camps h a v e a bourgeois character. For the same reason they consider it necessary to preserve “neutrality” in the war between Japan and China. They deny the principled difference between the U S S R and the imperialist countries, and because of the reactionary policies of the Soviet bureaucracy they reject defense of the new forms of property, created by the October revolution, against the onslaughts of imperialism. Incapable of finding access to the masses, they therefore zealously accuse the masses of inability to raise themselves to revolutionary ideas. These sterile politicians generally have n o need of a bridge in the form of transitional demands because they do n ot intend to cross over to the other shore They simply dawdle in o n e place, satisfying themselves with a repetition of the self-same meager abstractions. Political events are for them an occasion for comment but not for action. Since sectarians, a s i n general every kind of blunderer and miracle-man, are toppled by reality at each step, they l i v e i n a state o f perpetual

exasperation,

complaining

about “ t h e regime” and “the methods” and ceaselessly wallowing in small intrigues. I n their own circles they customarily carry o n a regime of despotism. Th e political prostration of sectarianism serves to complement, shadowlike, the prostration of opportunism, revealing no revolutionary vistas. I n practical politics, sectarians unite with opportunists, particularly with centrists, every time in the struggle against Marxism. Most of the sectarian groups and cliques, nourished on accidental crumbs from the table of the Fourth International, lead an “independent” organizational existence, with great pretensions

but without

the least chance

for success. Bolshevik-

Leninists, without waste of time, calmly leave these groups to their own fate. However, sectarian tendencies are to be found also

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The Transitional Program

in our own ranks and have a ruinous influence on the work of the individual sections. I t i s impossible to make any further compromise with them even for a single day. A correct policy regarding trade unions is a basic condition for adherence to the Fourth International. H e who does not seek and does not find the road to the masses i s not a fighter but a dead weight to the party. A program i s formulated not for the editorial board or for the leaders of discussion clubs but for- the revolutionary action of millions. The cleansing of the ranks of the Fourth International of sectarianism and incurable sectarians is a primary condition for revolutionary success.

Open the road to the woman Open the road to the youth!

worker!

The defeat of the Spanish revolution engineered b y its “leaders,” the shameful bankruptcy of the People’s Front in France, and the exposure of the Moscow juridical swindles—these three facts in their aggregate deal an irreparable blow to the Comintern and, incidentally, grave wounds to its allies: the Social Democrats and Anarcho-syndicalists. This does not me a n, of course, that the members of these organizations will immeliately turn to the Fourth International. The older generation, naving suffered terrible defeats, will leave the movement in significant numbers. I n addition, the Fourth International i s certainly not striving to become an asylum for revolutionary invalids, disillusioned bureaucrats, and careerists. O n the contrary, against a possible influx into our party of pettybourgeois elements now reigning in the apparatus of the old organizations,

strict

preventive

measures

are necessary:

a pro-

longed probationary period for those candidates who are n o t workers, especially former party bureaucrats; prevention from holding any responsible post for the first three years, etc. There i s not and there will not b e any place for careerism, the ulcer of the old Internationals, in the Fourth International. Only those who wish

to l i v e for t h e movement,

and

n o t a t the expense

of the

movement, will fi n d access to u s . The revolutionary workers should feel themselves to b e the masters. The doors of our organization are wide open to them. Of course, even among the workers who had at one time risen to the first ranks, there are not a few tired and disillusioned ones. They will remain, at least for the next period, as bystanders.

Death Agony of Capitalism

151

When a program or an organization wears out, the generation which carried it on its shoulders wears out with it. The movement i s revitalized by the youth, who are free of responsibility for the past. The Fourth International pays particular attention to the young generation of the proletariat. All of its policies strive to inspire the youth with belief in its own strength and in the future. Only the fresh enthusiasm and aggressive spirit of the youth can guarantee the preliminary successes in the struggle; only these successes can return the best elements of the older generation to the road of revolution. Thus it was, thus it will be. Opportunist organizations by their very nature concentrate their chief attention on the top layers of the working class and therefore ignore both the youth and the woman worker. The decay of capitalism, however, deals its heaviest blows to the woman as a wage earner and as a housewife. The sections of the Fourth International should seek bases of support among the most exploited layers of the working class, consequently among the women workers. Here they will find inexhaustible stores of devotion, selflessness, and readiness to sacrifice. Down with the bureaucracy and careerism! Open the road to the youth! Turn to the woman worker! These slogans are emblazoned on the banner of the Fourth International.

Under

the

banner

of the

Fourth

International!

Skeptics ask: But has the moment for the creation of the Fourth International yet arrived? I t i s impossible, they say, to create an International “artificially”; i t can arise only out of great events, e t c . , etc. A l l o f these objections

merely s h o w t h a t skeptics are n o

good for the building of a new International. They are good for scarcely anything at all. The Fourth International h as already arisen o ut of great events: the greatest defeats of the proletariat in history. The cause for these defeats is to be found in the degeneration and perfidy of the old leadership. The class struggle does not tolerate an interruption. The Third International, following the Second, is dead for purposes of revolution. Long live the Fourth International!

But has the time yet arrived to proclaim its creation? . . . the skeptics are not quieted d o w n . The Fourth International, we answer, h a s no need of being “proclaimed.” I t exists and i t fights.

I s it weak? Yes, its ranks are not numerous because it i s still

152

The Transitional Program

young. They are as yet chiefly cadres. But these cadres are pledges for the future. Outside of these cadres there does not exist a single revolutionary current on this planet really meriting the name. If our International is still weak in numbers, it is strong in doctrine, program, tradition, in the incomparable tempering of its cadres. Whoever does not perceive this today should in the meantime stand aside. Tomorrow it will become more evident. The Fourth International, even today, is deservedly hated by the Stalinists, Social Democrats, bourgeois liberals, and fascists. There is not and there cannot be a place for it in any of the People’s Fronts. I t uncompromisingly gives battle to all political groupings tied to the apron-strings of the bourgeoisie. Its task— the abolition of capitalism’s domination. Its aim—socialism. Its method—the proletarian revolution. Without internal democracy—no revolutionary education. Without discipline—no revolutionary action. The internal structure of the Fourth International is based on the principles of democratic centralism; full freedom in discussion, complete unity in action. The present crisis in human culture i s the crisis in the proletarian leadership. The advanced workers, united in the Fourth International, show their class the way out of the crisis. They offer a program based on international experience in the struggle of the proletariat and of all the oppressed of the world for liberation. They offer a spotless banner. Workers—men and women—of all countries, place yourselves under the banner of the Fourth International. I t is the banner of your approaching victory!

PART III:

PRECONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS

After writing the Transitional Program, Trotsky participated in various ways in the international preconference discussion: by more talks with visitors, which were again transcribed by stenographers, by letters, and by articles. Presented here are six more transcripts, dated May 1 9 and 3 1 , June 7, and July 20, 23, and 29; a letter to Prague dated May 31; a n article dated July 4; and a n extract from an article dated August 30, which was only four days before the international conference. All of these were published a t the time in the S WP’s internal bulletins or its public press, except for a part of the July 23 transcript, which is published by permission of the Harvard College Library. The nature of Trotsky’s contributions to the discussion was partly dependent on the people who interviewed o r talked with him, and since most of them were visitors from the U . S . the talks revolved around the issues being debated in the S WP. Trotsky’s thinking o n the Ludlow amendment had been quickly accepted by both the leaders and the members, b u t there were very sharp disagreements over the labor party. A large number of members were opposed to advocating a labor party, and the two positions were submitted to a national party referendum and a discussion that lasted all summer. Although the method of the Transitional Program was obviously connected with the labor party dispute, the S WP leaders and Trotsky thought it best to separate the vote on the two questions. Trotsky’s patient answers to questions (a favorite was “Can the transitional demands be achieved under capitalism?”) and his comradely, pedagogical exposition of all the ideas he was asked about undoubtedly influenced the outcome of the SWP referendum, where more than 90 percent of the members supported the Transitional Program and 60 percent supported the new labor party position. The 1938 discussion was a uniquely effective educational experience for the Fourth International as a whole. Politically, ideologically, and methodologically, it rivaled the discussions held at the first four world congresses of the Comintern, in Lenin’s

time.

That

is why,

like them,

154

i t is still worth

study.

Preconference Discussions

155

The Political Backwar dness of the American Workers May 1 9 , 1938

Trotsky: I t is very important to make precise some points concerning the program in general. How can a program be built consistently? Some comrades say that this program draft in some parts i s not adequate to the state of mentality, the mood of the American workers. Here we must ask ourselves if the program should be adapted to the mentality of the workers or to the present objective economic and social conditions of the country. This is the most important question. We know that the mentality of every class of society is determined by the objective conditions, by the productive forces, by the economic state of the country, but this determination is not immediately reflected. The mentality is in general backward, delayed, in relation to the economic development. This delay can be short or long. In normal times, when the development is slow, in a long line, this delay cannot produce catastrophic results. To a great extent this delay signifies that the workers are not equal to the tasks put before them by objective conditions; but in times of crisis this delay may b e catastrophic. In Europe, for example, it took the form of fascism. Fascism is the punishment for the workers when they fail to take power. Now the United States enters into an analogous situation with analogous dangers of catastrophe. The objective situation of the country i s in every respect, even more than in Europe, ripe for socialist revolution and socialism, more ripe than in any other country in the world. The political backwardness of the American working class is very great. This signifies that the danger of a fascist catastrophe i s very great. This is the point of departure for all our activity. The program must express the objective tasks of the working class rather than the backwardness of the workers. It must reflect society as it is, and not the backwardness of the working class. It is an instrument to overcome and vanquish the

156

The Transitional Program

backwardness. That is why we must express in our program the whole acuteness of the social crises of the capitalist society, including in the first line the United States. We cannot postpone or modify objective conditions which don’t depend upon u s . We cannot guarantee that the masses will solve the crisis; but we must express the situation as it is, and that is the task of the program. Another question is how to present this program to the workers. It is a pedagogical task, a question of terminology in presenting the actual situation to the workers. Politics must be adapted to the productive forces, that is, the high development of the productive forces; the paralyzing of these productive forces by capitalist forms of property, the increasing unemployment, which is becoming deeper and deeper—the greatest social plague. The productive forces cannot develop any longer. Scientific technology develops, but the material forces are declining. It signifies that society becomes poorer and poorer, the number of unemployed greater and greater. The misery of the masses deepens, the difficulties become greater and greater for the bourgeoisie and the workers; the bourgeoisie has no other solution except fascism, and the deepening of the crisis will force the bourgeoisie to abolish the remnants of democracy and replace them with fascism. The American proletariat will be punished for their lack of cohesion, willpower, courage, by a fascist school for twenty or thirty years. With an iron whip the bourgeoisie will teach the American workers their tasks. America is only a tremendous repetition of European experience. We must understand this. This i s serious, comrades. I t i s the perspective for the American workers. After the victory of Hitler, when Trotsky wrote a pamphlet, Whither France? the French Social Democrats laughed,

“France

i s not Germany.”

But

before

the victory

of

Hitler h e wrote pamphlets warning the German workers, and the Social Democrats laughed, “Germany is different from Italy.”89 They paid n o attention. Now France comes nearer each day to a fascist regime. The same is absolutely true for the United States. America i s fat. This fat from the past permits Roosevelt his experiments, but this is only for a time. The general situation is totally analogous; the danger is the same. It is a fact that the American working class has a petty-bourgeois spirit, lacks revolutionary solidarity, is used to a high standard of living; and the mentality of the American working class corresponds not to the realities of today but to the memories of yesterday.

Preconference Discussions

157

Now the situation is radically changed. What can a revolutionary party d o in this situation? I n the first place give a clear, honest picture of the objective situation, of the historic tasks which flow from this situation, irrespective of whether or not the workers are today ripe for this. Our tasks don’t depend on the mentality of the workers. The task is to develop the mentality of the workers. That i s what the program should formulate and present before the advanced workers. Some will s a y : good, the program is a scientific program; it corresponds to the objective situation—but if the workers won’t accept this program, it will b e sterile. Possibly. But this signifies only that the workers will b e crushed, since the crisis can’t be solved any other way but by the socialist revolution. If the American worker will not accept the program in time, h e will b e forced to accept the program of fascism. And when we appear with our program before the working class, we cannot give any guarantees that they will accept our program. W e cannot take responsibility for this . . . w e can only take the responsibility for ourselves. W e must tell the workers the truth; then w e will win the best elements. Whether these best elements will be capable of guiding the working class, leading it to power, I don’t know. I hope that they will b e able, but I cannot give a guarantee. But even in the worse case, if the working class doesn’t sufficiently mobilize its mind and its strength at present for the socialist revolution— even in the worst case, if this working class falls as a victim to fascism, the best elements will say, “ W e were warned by this party; it was a good party.” And a great tradition will remain in the working class. This is the worst variant. That is why all the arguments that we cannot present such a program because the program doesn’t correspond to the mentality of the workers are false. They express only fear before the situation. Naturally, if I close my eyes I can write a good rosy program that everybody will accept. But it will not correspond to the situation; and the program must correspond to the situation. I believe that this elementary argument is of the utmost importance. The class consciousness of the proletariat i s backward, but consciousness i s not such a substance as the factories, the mines, the railroads; it i s more mobile, and under the blows of the objective crisis, the millions of unemployed, it can change rapidly. At present the American proletariat also enjoys some advantages because of their political backwardness. I t seems a bit

158

The Transitional Program

paradoxical, but nevertheless it is absolutely correct. The European workers have had a long past of Social Democratic and Comintern tradition, and these traditions are a conservative force. Even after different party betrayals, the worker remains loyal because h e has a feeling of gratitude to that party which awakened him for the first time and gave him a political education. This is a handicap for a new orientation. The American workers have the advantage that in their great majority they were not politically organized, and are only beginning now to be organized into trade unions. This gives to the revolutionary party the possibility of mobilizing them under the blows of the crisis. What will the speed be? Nobody can foresee. We can see only the direction. Nobody denies that the direction is a correct one. Then we have the question, how to present the program to the workers? It i s naturally very important. We must combine politics with mass psychology and pedagogy, build the bridge to their m i n d s . Only experience can show u s how to advance in this or that part of the country. For some time we must try to concentrate the attention of the workers on one slogan: sliding scale of wages and hours. The empiricism of the American workers has given political parties great success with one or two slogans—single tax, bimetalism, they spread like wildfire in the masses.90 When they see one panacea fail, then they wait for a new one. Now we can present one which is honest, part of our entire program, not demagogic, but which corresponds totally to the situation. Officially w e n o w have thirteen, maybe fourteen million unemployed—in reality about sixteen to twenty million—and the youth are totally

abandoned

i n misery.

M r . Roosevelt

insists o n

public works. But we insist that this, together with mines, railroads, etc., absorb all the people. And that every person should have the possibility of living in a decent manner, not lower than n o w , and we ask that Mr. Roosevelt and his brain trust propose such a program of public works that everyone capable of working can work at decent wages. This is possible with a sliding scale of wages and hours. Everywhere we must discuss how to present this idea, in all localities. Then we must begin a concentrated campaign of agitation s o that everybody knows that this is the program of the Socialist Workers Party. I believe that we can concentrate the attention of the workers on this point. Naturally this is only one point. I n the beginning

Preconference Discussions

159

this slogan i s totally adequate for the situation. But the others can b e added as the development proceeds. The bureaucrats will oppose it. Then if this slogan becomes popular with the masses, fascist tendencies will develop in opposition. W e will say that we need to develop defense squads. I think in the beginning this slogan (sliding scale of wages and hours) will b e adopted. What is this slogan? I n reality it is the system of work in socialist society—the total number of workers divided into the total number of hours. But if w e present the whole socialist system it will appear to the average American as utopian, as something from Europe. W e present it as a solution to this crisis which must assure their right to eat, drink, and live in decent apartments. It is the program of socialism, but in a very popular and simple form. Question: How will the campaign be conducted? Trotsky: The campaign will go somewhat in this fashion: You begin agitation, say, in Minneapolis. You win one or two unions to the program. You send delegates to other towns to the respective unions. When you have come out with this idea from the party to the unions you have won half of the fight. You send it to New York, to Chicago, etc., to the corresponding unions. When you have some success you convoke a special congress. Then you agitate that they force the bureaucrats of the trade union to take a position for or against. A wonderful opportunity for propaganda opens up. Question: Can we actually realize the slogan? Trotsky: It is easier to overthrow capitalism than to realize this demand under capitalism. Not one of our demands will b e realized under capitalism. That i s why w e are calling them transitional demands. I t creates a bridge to the mentality of the workers and then a material bridge to the socialist revolution. The whole question

i s how to mobilize the masses

for struggle.

The question of the division between the employed and the unemployed comes u p . W e must find ways to overcome this division. The idea of a fixed class of unemployed, a class of pariahs—such an idea is absolutely the psychological preparation for fascism. Unless this division is overcome in the trade unions, the working class is doomed. Question: Many of our comrades fail to understand that the slogans cannot b e realized. Trotsky: I t i s a very important question. This program i s not a new invention of one man. I t is derived from the long

160

The Transitional Program

experience of the Bolsheviks. I want to emphasize that it is not one man’s invention, that it comes from long collective experience of the revolutionaries. It is the application of old principles to this situation. I t should not be considered as fixed like iron, but flexible to the situation. The revolutionaries always consider that the reforms and acquisitions are only a by-product of the revolutionary struggle. I f we say that we will only demand what they can give, the ruling class will give only one-tenth or none of what we demand. When we demand more and can impose our demands, the capitalists are compelled to give the maximum. The more extended and militant the spirit of the workers, the more is demanded and won. They are not sterile slogans; they are means of pressure on the bourgeoisie, and will give the greatest possible material results immediately. In the past, during an ascending period of American capital, the American workers won on n o more than the basis of empirical struggle, strikes, etc. They were very militant. Given the fact that capital was ascending, capitalism was interested in satisfying the American workers. Now the situation is totally different. Now the capitalists have n o prospect of prosperity. They are not afraid of strikes, because of the large number of unemployed. That is why the program must embrace and unite both parts of the working class. The sliding scale of wages and hours does j u s t that.

U S . and European Labor A Comparison May

Movements:

31, 1938

Question: In the ranks of our party, the question which seems most disputed in relation to accepting the program of transitional demands is that dealing with the labor party in the United States. Some comrades maintain that it is incorrect to advocate the formation of a labor party, holding that there is no evidence to indicate any widespread sentiment for such a party; that if there were such a party in process of formation, or even widespread sentiment, then we would meet it with a program that

Preconference

Discussions

161

would give to this movement a revolutionary content—but that in View of the lack of such objective factors this part of the thesis is opportunistic. Could you clarify this point further? Trotsky: I believe that it is necessary to remind ourselves of the most elementary facts from the history of the development of the workers’ movement in general and the trade unions in particular. In this respect we find different types of development of the working class in different countries. Every country ha s a specific type of development, but we classify them in general. In Austria and in Russia especially, the workers’ movement began as a political movement, as a party movement. That was the first step. The Social Democracy in its first stage hoped that the socialist reconstruction of society was near, but it happened that capitalism was strong enough to last for a time. There was a long period of prosperity, and the Social Democracy was forced to organize trade unions. In such countries as Germany, Austria, and especially Russia, where trade unions were unknown, they were initiated, constructed, and guided by a political party, the Social Democracy. Another type of development is that disclosed in the Latin countries—in France and especially in Spain. Here the party movement and the trade union movement are almost independent of one another and under different banners—even to a certain degree antagonistic to one another. The party is a parliamentary machine. The trade unions are to a certain degree in France— more in Spain—under the leadership of anarchists. The third type is provided by Great Britain, the United States, and more or less by the dominions. England is the classic country of trade unions. They began to build trade unions at the end of the eighteenth century, before the French revolution, and during the so-called industrial revolution. (In the United States, during the rise of the manufacturing system.) In England the working class didn’t have its independent party. The trade unions were the organizations of the working class—in reality the organization of the labor aristocrats, the higher strata. In England there was an aristocratic proletariat, at least in its upper strata, because the British bourgeoisie, enjoying almost monopoly control of the world market, could give a small part of the wealth to the working class and so absorb part of the national income. The trade unions were adequate to extract that from the bourgeoisie. Only after a hundred years did the trade unions begin to build up a political party. This is absolutely contrary to

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The Transitional Program

Germany or Austria. There the party awakened the working class and built up the trade unions. In England the trade unions, after centuries of existence and struggle, were forced to build up a political party. What were the reasons for this change? It was due to the complete decline of English capitalism, which began very sharply. The English party is only a couple of decades old, coming into prominence especially after the World War. What is the reason for this change? It is well known that it was due to the abolishing of England’s monopoly control of the world market. It began in the eighties of the nineteenth century with the competition of Germany and of the United States. The bourgeoisie lost its ability to give the leading strata of the proletariat a privileged position. The trade unions lost the possibility to improve the situation of the workers, and they were pushed onto the road of political action because political action is the generalization of economic action. Political action generalizes the needs of the workers and addresses them not to the parts of the bourgeoisie but to the bourgeoisie as a whole, organized in the state.

Now in the United States we can say that the characteristic features of English development are presented in even more concentrated form, in a shorter period, because the whole history of the United States is shorter. Practically, the development of the trade unions in the United States began after the Civil War, but these trade unions were very backward even compared with the trade unions of Great Britain. To a great degree they were mixed trade unions of employers and employees, not fighting, militant trade unions. They were sectional and tiny. They were based on the craft system, not [organized] according to industry, and we see that it is only during the last two or three years that the genuine trade unions developed in the United States. This new movement is the C I O . What is the reason for the appearance of the C I O ? It is the decay of American capitalism. In Great Britain the beginning of the decay of the capitalist system forced the existing trade unions to unite into a political party. I n the United States the same phenomenon—the beginning of the decline—produced only the industrial trade unions; but these trade unions appeared on the scene just in time to meet the new chapter of the decline of capitalism, or—more correctly—we can say that the first crisis of 1929-33 gave the push and ended in the organization of the C I O .

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But scarcely organized, the CIO meets the second crisis, 1937-38, which continues and deepens. What does this fact signify? That it was a long time in the United States before the organization of trade unions, but now that genuine trade unions exist, they must make the same evolution as the English trade unions. That is, on the basis of declining capitalism, they are forced to turn to political action. I believe that this is the most important fact of the whole matter. The question reads, “There is no evidence to indicate any widespread sentiment for such a party.” You will remember that when we discussed this question with other comrades there were some divergences on this question. I cannot judge whether sentiment for a labor party exists or not, because I have n o personal observations or impressions; but I do not find it decisive as to what degree the leaders of the trade unions or the rank and file are ready or inclined to build a political party. It is very difficult to establish objective information. We have n o machine to take a referendum. We can measure the mood by action only if the slogan is put on the agenda. But what we can say is that the objective situation is absolutely decisive. The trade unions as trade unions can have only a defensive activity, losing members and becoming more and more weak as the crisis deepens, creating more and more unemployed. The treasury becomes poorer and poorer, the tasks, bigger and bigger, while their means, smaller and smaller. I t is a fact; we cannot change it. The trade union bureaucracy becomes more and more disoriented, the rank and file more and more dissatisfied, and this dissatisfaction becomes greater and greater the higher were their hopes in the C I O , and especially in view of the unprecedented growth of the CIO—in two or three years, four million fresh people on the field, facing objective handicaps which cannot be eliminated by the trade unions. In this situation we must give an answer. If the trade union leaders are not ready for political action, we must ask them to develop a new political orientation. If they refuse, we denounce them. That is the objective situation. I say here what I said about the whole program of transitional demands. The problem is not the mood of the masses but the objective situation, and our job is to confront the backward material of the masses with the tasks which are determined by objective facts and not by psychology. The same is absolutely correct for this specific question on the labor party. If the class struggle is not to be crushed, replaced by demoralization, then the

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movement must find a new channel, and this channel is political. That is the fundamental argument in favor of this slogan. We claim to have Marxism or scientific socialism. What does “scientific socialism” signify in reality? It signifies that the party which represents this social science departs, as every science, not from subjective wishes, tendencies, or moods but from objective facts, from the material situation of the different classes and their relationships. Only by this method can we establish demands adequate to the objective situation, and only after this can w e adapt these demands and slogans to the given mentality of the masses. But to begin with this mentality as the fundamental fact would signify not a scientific but a conjunctural, demagogic, or adventuristic policy. O ne can ask why we didn’t foresee this development five, six, seven years ago. Why did we declare during the past period that we were not willing to fight for this slogan of the labor party? The explanation is very simple. We were absolutely sure, w e Marxists, the initiators of the American movement for the Fourth International, that world capitalism had entered into a period of decline. That is the period when the working class is objectively educated and moves subjectively, preparing for the social revolution. The direction was the same in the United States, but the question of direction i s not sufficient. The other question is the speed of its development; and in this respect, in view of the strength of American capitalism, some of u s , and myself among them, imagined that the ability of American capitalism to resist against the destructive inner contradictions would be greater and that for a certain period American capitalism might us e the decline of European capital to cover a period of prosperity before its own decline. How long a period? Ten to thirty years one could say? Anyway I , personally, didn’t see that this sharp crisis, or series of crises, would begin in the next period and become deeper and deeper. That i s why, eight years ago, when I discussed this question with American comrades, I was very cautious. I was very cautious in my prognosis. My opinion was that we couldn’t foresee when the American trade unions would come into a period where they would be forced into political action. If this critical period started in ten to fifteen years, then we, the revolutionary organization, could become a great power directly influencing the trade unions and becoming the leading force. That is why it would have been absolutely pedantic, abstract, artificial, to proclaim the necessity for the labor party in 1930, and this

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abstract slogan would have been a handicap to our own party. That was at the beginning of the preceding crisis. Then, that this period would be followed by a new crisis even more deep, with an influence five to ten times more profound because it i s a repetition! Now we must reckon not by our prognosis of yesterday but by the situation of today. American capitalism is very strong, but its contradictions are stronger than capitalism itself. The decline came at American speed, and this created a new situation for the new trade unions, the C I O , even more than the AFL. I n this situation it is worse for the C I O than the AFL, because the AFL is more capable of resistance, because of its aristocratic base. We must change our program because the objective situation i s totally different from our former prognosis. What does this signify? That we are sure the working class, the trade unions, will adhere to the slogan of the labor party? No, we are not sure that the workers will adhere to the slogan of the labor party. When we begin the fight we cannot b e sure of being victorious. W e can only say that our slogan corresponds to the objective situation—the best elements will understand, and the most backward elements who don’t understand will be compromised. I n Minneapolis we cannot say to the trade unions, “You should adhere to the Socialist Workers Party.” I t would be a joke even in Minneapolis. Why? Because the decline of capitalism develops ten, a hundred times faster than does our party. I t i s a new discrepancy. The necessity of a political party for the workers is given by the objective conditions, but our party i s too small, with too little authority to organize the workers into its own ranks. That

i s why we m u s t say to the workers,

the m a s s e s , you m u s t

have a party. But we cannot say immediately to these masses, you must join our party. I n a mass meeting five hundred would agree on the need for a labor party, only five agree to join our party, which shows that the slogan of a labor party i s an agitational slogan. The second slogan is for the more advanced. Should we use both slogans or one? I say both. The first, independent labor party, prepares the arena for our party. The first slogan prepares and helps the workers to advance and prepares the path for our party. That i s the sense of our slogan. W e say that we will not be satisfied with this abstract slogan, which even today is not s o abstract as ten years ago because the objective situation is different. It is not concrete enough. We must

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show to the workers what this party should be: an independent party, not for Roosevelt or La Follette, a machine for the workers themselves. That is why it must have its own candidates in the elections. Then we must introduce our transitional slogans, not all at once, but as occasion arises, first one and then the other. That i s why I see absolutely n o justification for not accepting this slogan. I see only a psychological reason. Our comrades, in fighting against the Lovestoneites, wanted our own party and not this abstract party. Now it i s disagreeable. Naturally the Stalinists will say we are fascists, etc. But it is not a principled question; it is a tactical question. To Lovestone it will seem that w e lose face before the Lovestoneites, but this is nothing. We orient not according to Lovestone but according to the needs of the working class. I believe that even from the point of view of our competition with the Lovestoneites it i s a plus and not a minus. I n a meeting against a Lovestoneite I would explain what our position was and why we changed. “At that time, you Lovestoneites attacked u s . Good. Now in this question, which was so important to you, we have changed our mind. Now what do you have against the Fourth International?” I am sure we will prepare a split in this manner among the Lovestoneites. I n this sense I see n o obstacles. Before finishing—a correction in the formulation of the question: The labor party proposal i s not a part of the program of transitional demands but i s a special motion. Question: In a trade union does one advocate a labor party, vote for it? Trotsky: Why not? I n the case of a trade union where the question comes up, I would get up and say that the need for a labor party is absolutely proved by all the events. It is proved that economic action is not enough. We need political action. I n a union I would sa y what counts i s the content of the labor party— that i s why I reserve something to say about the program—but I will vote for it. Question: The workers seem absolutely apathetic about a labor party; their leaders are doing nothing, and the Stalinists are for Roosevelt. Trotsky: B u t this is characteristic of a certain period when there i s no program, when they don’t see the new road. I t i s absolutely necessary to overcome this apathy. I t is absolutely necessary to give a new slogan. Question: Some comrades have even collected figures tending

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to prove that the labor party movement is actually declining among the workers. Trotsky: There is a major line and then minor oscillations, as for example the moods in the C I O . First aggressiveness. Now in the crisis the CIO appears a thousand times more dangerous than before to the capitalists, but the leaders are afraid to break with Roosevelt. The masses wait. They are disoriented; unemployment is increasing. I t is possible to prove that the sentiment has decreased since a year ago. Possibly the Stalinist influence adds to this, but this i s only a secondary oscillation, and it is very dangerous to base ourselves upon the secondary oscillations since in a short time the major movement becomes more imperative and this objective necessity will find its subjective expression in the heads of the workers, especially if we help them. The party i s a historic instrument to help the workers. Question: Some of the members who came from the Socialist Party complain that at that time they were for a labor party and were convinced i n arguing with the ‘Trotskyists that they were wrong. Now they must switch back. Trotsky: Yes, it is a pedagogical question, but it is a good school for the comrades. Now they can see dialectical development better than before.

“ F o r ” the Fourth N o ! The Fourth May

International? International!

3 1 , 1938

Dear Comrade:91 The proclaiming of the Fourth International seems “premature” to you. You consider that it is more “modest” and more accurate to retain the name “Movement for the Fourth International.” I cannot agree with this at all. This name seemed pedantic, unfitting, and slightly ridiculous to me even two years ago, when it was first adopted. The experience of the last two years has fully proved it a mistake. The best proof lies in the fact that it has not been accepted a t all. N 0 one calls us by this name.

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The bourgeois press, the Comintem, the Social Democrats, all speak in one voice simply of the Fourth International. N o one sees the little word “for.” Our own organizations with minor exceptions act likewise, calling themselves sections of the Fourth International. This is so, in any case, with the French, the Germans, the Russians, the Americans, the Mexicans, the Cubans, and others. Only Sneevliet and Vereecken92 have fashioned their banner out of the little word “for.” But this very fact best emphasizes the mistake in the old name, a name which to the overwhelming majority proved absolutely impracticable. You are completely in accord with m e that the Fourth International is being built only by us, that n o other grouping i s capable of fulfilling or will undertake to fulfill this task. O n the other hand, I least of all am inclined to close my eyes to the fact that our International is still young and weak. But this i s no reason for renouncing our name. In civilized societies a person carries one and the same name in childhood, in adulthood, and in old age, and this name merges with his individuality. To you the little word “for” seems an expression of political “modesty.” To m e it seems an expression of indecision and lack of self-confidence. A revolutionary party that i s not sure of its own significance cannot gain the confidence of the masses. The circumstance that class enemies as well a s wide circles of workers already refer to us as the Fourth International shows that they have more confidence in this “firm” than some of the skeptics or semiskeptics in our own ranks.

It seems to you that the name Fourth International will prevent sympathetic or semisympathetic organizations from approaching u s. This is radically wrong. We can attract others to us only by a correct and clear policy. And for this we must have an organization and not a nebulous blot. Our national organizations call themselves parties or leagues. Here, too, it could be said that the “proclaiming” of a Revolutionary Socialist Party in Belgium makes it more difficult for sympathetic or semisympathetic groupings to approach u s . I f the principle of “modesty” is to be observed, our Belgian party, for instance, should have been called “the movement for a Revolutionary Socialist Party.” But I think that even Comrade Vereecken would not agree to such a ridiculous name! Why then in our international organization should we apply principles different from those in our national organizations? I t is unworthy of a Marxist to have two

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standards: one for national politics and the other—for international. N o doubt in Belgium, as in any other country, groups could arise that are sympathetic to u s but are not yet ready today to enter formally into our ranks. W e must be ready to establish friendly relations with them, and, if they wish, to include them within the framework of the Fourth International on the basis of sympathizing organizations, that i s , with a consultative vote. You point to the fact that w e have not as yet made a theoretical analysis of the latest stage of imperialism, etc. But if this i s an argument against “proclaiming” the Fourth International, it i s no less an argument against the existence of national parties. Again two standards! But the Fourth International as a whole is undoubtedly much better equipped theoretically and to a much greater degree assured against vacillations than any of the national sections separately. The relation between theory and practice bears not a one-sided but a two-sided—that i s , dialectical—character. We are sufficiently equipped theoretically for action; at any rate much better than any other organization. Our action will push our theoretical work forward, will arouse and attract new theoreticians, etc. The Fourth International will never spring from our hands ready made like Minerva from the head of Jupiter. I t will grow and develop in theory as well as in action. Let m e remind you that the Communist League was created by Marx and Engels before they wrote the Communist Manifesto. That the First International was created before the appearance of the first volume of Capital.93 The Second International—before the publication of all the volumes of Capital. The Third International existed etc.

during

its best period without

a finished

program,

The historic process does not wait for “ fi n a l , ” “finished,” “exhaustive” Marxian research. We had to take a position on the Spanish revolution without awaiting Marxist studies on Spain. The war will demand an answer from u s irrespective of whether or not our theoreticians have issued one, two, or three volumes of research work. Just a s war cannot be postponed until the discovery of the most perfect weapon, so the revolution and the Fourth International cannot b e postponed until the appearance of the m o s t perfect

theoretical

work. Theory

i s very important.

But

pedantic fetishism of theory is good for nothing. The paradox lies in the fact that those who call themselves “for

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the Fourth International” in reality carry on an ever-sharpening struggle against the Fourth International. In the example of Sneevliet this is most clear. H e is “for” the POUM and “for” the London Bureau and in order to retain his equilibrium h e is, in addition, “for” the Fourth International. We have no need for such confusion. The policy of Sneevliet only compromises the Fourth International in Holland as well as internationally. In Spain Sneevliet’s policy took the form of direct strikebreaking at the most critical moment. And all this is covered up by the little word “for”! Vereecken’s policy i s only 51 percent of Sneevliet’s policy. The question stands not very much different with Maslow.94 All of them are “for.” In reality they all carry on a struggle against the basic principles of the Fourth International, furtively looking to the right and to the left in search of such allies as can help them overthrow these principles. W e cannot permit this at all. W e must devote the greatest attention to all the vacillating and immature working class groupings that are developing in our direction. But we cannot make principled concessions to sectarian-centrist leaders who want to recognize neither our international organization nor our discipline. “ That means you want a monolithic International?” someone will say i n holy fear. No, least of all that, I will reply calmly to this suspicion. The entire history of the Fourth International and of each of its sections shows a constant, uninterrupted, and free struggle of points of view and tendencies. Bu t as our experience testifies, this struggle retains a sane character only when its participants consider themselves members of one and the same national and international organization which h as its program and its constitution. W e can, on the other hand, carry on a comradely discussion with groups who stand outside of our organization. But as the experience with Sneevliet and Vereecken indicates, the discussion inevitably assumes a poisoned character when some leaders stand with one foot in our organization, the other—outside of it. To allow the development of such a regime would b e suicidal. Because of all these considerations I stand completely for calling ourselves as we are called by the workers and by class enemies, that is, the Fourth International! L. Trotsky

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171

and

7 , 1938

Trotsky: The significance of the program is the significance of the party. The party is the vanguard of the class. The party is formed by selection from the most conscious, most advanced, most devoted elements, and the party can play an important historical political role, disproportionate to its numerical strength. I t can b e a small party and play a great part. For example, in the Russian revolution of 1905, the Bolshevik faction had not more than ten thousand members, the Mensheviks ten thousand to twelve thousand; that is the maximum. At that time they belonged to the same party, so that the party as a whole had not more than twenty thousand to twenty-two thousand workers. The party guided the soviets throughout the whole country, thanks to correct policy and to cohesion. It can be objected that the difference between the Russians and the Americans, or any other old capitalist country, was that the Russian proletariat was a totally fresh, virgin proletariat, without any tradition of trade unions, conservative reformism. It was a young, fresh, virgin working class which needed direction and looked for this direction; and in spite of the fact that the party as a whole had not more than twenty thousand workers, this party guided twenty-three million workers in the fight. Now, what is the party? In what does the cohesion consist? This cohesion is a common understanding of the events, of the tasks; and this common understanding—that is the program of the party. Just as modern workers cannot work without tools any more than

the barbarians

could, s o in the party

the program

is

the instrument. Without the program every worker must improvise his tool, find improvised tools, and one contradicts another. Only when w e have the vanguard organized upon the basis of common conceptions can we act. One can say that we didn’t have a program until this day. Yet we acted. But this program was formulated under different articles, different motions, etc. In this sense the draft program

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doesn’t represent a new invention; it i s not the writing of one man. It is the summation of collective work up until today. But such a summation i s absolutely necessary in order to give to the comrades an idea of the situation, a common understanding. Petty-bourgeois anarchists and intellectuals are afraid to subscribe to giving a party common ideas, a common attitude. I n opposition they wish moral programs. But for us this program is the result of common experience. It i s not imposed upon anybody, for whoever joins the party does so voluntarily. I believe it i s important in this connection to underline what we mean by freedom in contradiction to necessity. It is very often a petty-bourgeois conception that we should have a free individuality. It is only a fiction, an error. We are not free. We have no free will in the sense of metaphysical philosophy. When I wish to drink a glass of beer, I act as a free man, but I don’t invent the need for beer. That comes from my body. I am only the executor. But insofar as I understand the needs of my body and can satisfy them consciously then I have the sensation of freedom, freedom through understanding the necessity. Here the correct understanding of the necessity of my body is the only real freedom given to animals in any question, and ma n is an animal. The same holds true for the class. The program for the class cannot fall from heaven. W e can arrive only at an understanding of the necessity. In one case it w a s m y body, in the other it is the necessity of society. The program is the articulation of the necessity, which we have learned to understand; and since the necessity is the same for all members of the class, we can reach a common understanding of the tasks. The understanding of this necessity is the program. W e can go further and say that the discipline of our party must b e very severe

because

w e are a revolutionary

party

against

a

tremendous bloc of enemies conscious of their interests. And now we are attacked not only by the bourgeoisie but by the Stalinists, the most venomous of the bourgeois agents. Absolute discipline is necessary, but it must come from common understanding. If it is imposed from without, it i s a yoke. If it comes from understanding, it is an expression of personality, but otherwise it is a yoke. Then discipline is an expression of my free individuality. It is not opposition between personal will and the party, because I entered of my free will. The program too is on this basis, and this program can be upon a sure political and moral basis only if we understand

i t very well.

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The draft program i s not a complete program. W e can say that in this draft program there are things which are lacking a nd there are things which by their nature don’t belong to the program. Things which don’t belong to the program are the comments. This program contains n o t only slogans but also comments and polemics against the adversaries. But it i s not a complete program. A complete program should have a theoretical expression of the modern capitalist society in its imperialist stage—the reasons for the crisis, the growth of unemployment, and s o o n . I n this draft this analysis i s only briefly summarized in the first chapter, because w e have written about these things in articles, books, and s o o n . We will write more and better. But for practical purposes what is said here i s enough, because we are all of the same opinion. The beginning of the program i s not complete. The first chapter i s only a hint and not a complete expression. Also the end of the program i s not complete, because we don’t speak here about the social revolution, about the seizure of power by insurrection, the transformation of capitalist society into the dictatorship, the dictatorship into the socialist society. This brings the reader only to the doorstep. It is a program for action from today until the beginning of the socialist revolution. And from the practical point of view what is now most important is how can we guide the different strata of the proletariat in the direction of the social revolution. I have heard that now the New York comrades are beginning to organize circles with the purpose of not only studying and criticizing the draft program but also elaborating ways and means in order to present the program to the m a s s e s ; and I believe that i s the best method which our party can utilize.

The program is only the first approximation. It is too general in the sense in which it i s presented to the international conference in the next period. I t expresses the general tendency of development in the whole world. We have here a short chapter devoted to the semicolonial and colonial countries. W e have here a chapter devoted to the fascist countries, a chapter on the Soviet Union, and s o o n . It is clear that the general characteristics of the world situation are common because they are all under the pressure of the imperialist economy, but every country has its peculiar conditions, and real live politics must begin with these peculiar conditions in each country and even in each part of the country. That i s why a very serious approach to the program is the first duty of every comrade in the United States.

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The Transitional Program

There are two dangers in the elaboration of the program. The first i s to remain on general abstract lines and to repeat the general slogan without real connection with the trade unions in the locality. That is the direction of sectarian abstraction. The other danger i s the contrary, to adapt too much to the local conditions, to the specific conditions, to lose the general revolutionary line. I believe that in the United States the second danger is the more immediate. I remember it most especially in the matter of militarization, armed pickets, etc. Some comrades were afraid that it is not real for the workers, etc. In the last few days I read a French book written by an Italian worker about the rise of fascism in Italy. The writer is opportunistic. H e was a Socialist, but it is not his conclusions which are interesting but the facts which he presents. H e gives the picture of the Italian proletariat in 1920-21 especially. It was a powerful organization. They had 160 Socialist parliamentary deputies. They had more than one-third of the communities in their hands—the most important sections of Italy were in the hands of the Socialists, the center of the power of the workers. No capitalist could hire or fire without union consent, and this applied to agricultural workers as well as industrial. It seemed to be 49 percent of the dictatorship of the proletariat; but the reaction of the small bourgeoisie, the demobilized officers, was terrible against this situation. Then the author tells how they organized small bands under the guidance of officers and sent them in buses in every direction. In cities of ten thousand in the hands of the Socialists, thirty organized men came into the town, burned up the municipal buildings, burned the houses, shot the leaders, imposed on them the conditions of working for capitalists; then they went elsewhere

and repeated the same i n hundreds

and hundreds of towns, one after the other. With these systematic acts of terror they totally destroyed the trade unions and thus became bosses of Italy. They were a tiny minority. The workers declared a general strike. The fascists sent their buses and destroyed every local strike, and with a small organized minority, wiped out the workers’ organizations. After this came elections, and the workers, under the terror, elected the same number of deputies. They protested in parliament until it was dissolved. That is the difference between formal and actual power. All the deputies were sure that they would have power, yet this tremendous movement with its spirit of sacrifice was smashed, crushed, abolished, by some ten thousand fascists, well-

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organized, with a spirit o f sacrifice, and good military leaders. I n the United States it might b e different, but the fundamental tasks are the same. I read about the tactics of Hague. It is a rehearsal of a fascist overthrow. H e represents small bosses who became infuriated because the crisis deepened. H e h a s his gang, which i s absolutely unconstitutional. This i s very, very contagious. With the deepening of the crisis it will spread all over the country, and Roosevelt, who is a very good democrat, will say, “Perhaps it is the only solution.” I t was the same in Italy. They had a minister who invited the Socialists. The Socialists refused. H e admitted the fascists. H e thought h e could balance them against the Socialists, but they smashed the minister too. Now I think the example of New Jersey is very important. We should utilize everything, but this especially. I will propose a special series of articles on how the fascists became victorious. We can become victorious the same way, but we must have a small armed body with the support of the big body of workers. We must have the best disciplined, organized workers, defense committees, otherwise we will be crushed; and I believe that our comrades in the United States don’t realize the importance of this question. A fascist wave can spread in two or three years, and the best workers’ leaders will be lynched in the worst possible way, like the Negroes in the South. I believe that the terror in the United States will be the most terrible of all. That is why we must begin very modestly, that is, with defense groups, but it should be launched immediately. Question: How do we go about launching the defense groups practically? Trotsky: It is very simple. D o you have a picket line in a strike? When the strike i s over we say we must defend our union by making this picket line permanent. Question: Does the party itself create the defense group with its own members? Trotsky: The slogans of the party must be placed in quarters where we have sympathizers and workers who will defend us. But a party cannot create an independent defense organization. The task i s to create such a body in the trade unions. We must have these groups of comrades with very good discipline, with good, cautious leaders, not easily provoked, because such groups can be provoked easily. The main task for the next year would be to avoid conflicts and bloody clashes. We must reduce them to a minimum with a minority organization during strikes, during

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peaceful times. In order to prevent fascist meetings it i s a question of the relationship of forces. We alone are not strong, but we propose a united front. Hitler explains his success in his book. The Social Democracy was extremely powerful. To a meeting of the Social Democracy h e sent a band with Rudolf H e s s . H e says that at the end of the meeting his thirty boys evicted all the workers and they were incapable of opposing them. Then he knew h e would b e victorious. The workers were organized only to pay dues. N o preparation at all for other tasks. Now we must d o what Hitler did except in reverse. Send forty to fifty men to dissolve the meeting. This has tremendous importance. The workers become steeled, fighting elements. They become trumpets. The petty bourgeoisie think these are serious people. Such a success! This has tremendous importance—as s o much of the populace is blind, backward, oppressed, they can be aroused only by success. W e can arouse only the vanguard, but this vanguard must then arouse the others. That is why, I repeat, it is a very important question. I n Minneapolis, where we have very skilled, powerful comrades, we can begin and show the entire country. I believe that it would b e useful to discuss a little this part of the draft, which i s not sufficiently developed in our text. I t i s the general theoretical part. I n the last discussion I remarked that the theoretical part of the program, as a general analysis of society, is not given completely in this draft but is replaced by some short hints. O n the other side, it does not contain the parts dealing with the revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the construction of society after the revolution. O n l y the transition period is covered. We have repeated many times that the scientific character of our activity consists in the fact that we adapt our program

n o t to political conjunctures

o r the thought

or

mood of the masses as this mood is today, but we adapt our program

to the objective

situation

a s i t i s represented

b y the

economic class structure of society. The mentality can b e backward; then the political task of the party i s to bring the mentality into harmony with the objective facts, to make the workers understand the objective task. But we cannot adapt the program to the backward mentality of the workers; the mentality, the mood is a secondary factor—the prime factor is the objective situation. That is why we have heard these criticisms or these appreciations that some parts of the program do not conform to the situation.

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Everywhere I ask what s h o u l d w e d o ? M a k e our program fit the objective situation or the mentality of the workers? A n d I believe that this question m u s t b e put before every comrade w h o says that this program i s n o t fit for the American situation. This program i s a scientific program. I t i s based o n an objective analysis of the objective situation. I t cannot b e understood by the wdrkers as a whole. I t would b e very good if the vanguard would understand i t i n the next period and that they would then turn and say to the workers, “You must s a v e yourselves from fascism.” W h a t d o w e understand by objective situation? Here w e m u s t analyze the objective conditions for a social revolution. These conditions are given in the works of Marx and Engels and remain in their essence unchanged today. First, Marx o n e time said that n o one society leaves its place until it totally exhausts its possibilities. What does this signify? That w e cannot eliminate a society b y subjective will, that we cannot organize a n insurrection like the Blanquistsf’5 What do “possibilities” signify? That a “society cannot leave”? S o l o n g a s a society i s c a p a b l e of developing the productive forces and making the nation richer, it remains strong, stable. That w a s the condition with s l a v e society, with feudal, and with capitalist society. Here we come to a very interesting point, which I analyzed previously in m y introduction to the Communist Manifesto. Marx and Engels waited for a revolution during their lifetimes. Especially in the years 1848-50 they expected a social revolution. Why? They said that the capitalist system, based o n private profit, h a d become a brake u p o n the development o f the productive forces. W a s this correct? Y e s a n d n o . I t w a s correct i n

the sense that if the workers had been capable of meeting the needs of the nineteenth century and seizing power, the development of the productive forces would have been more rapid a n d the nation richer. But given that the workers were not capable, the capitalist system remained, with its crisis, etc. Yet the general l i n e ascended. The l a s t war (1914-18) w a s a result o f the fact t h a t

the world market became too narrow for the development of the productive forces, and each nation tried to repulse all the others and to seize the world market for its own purposes. They could not succeed, and now we see that capitalist society enters into a new stage.

Many say it was a result of the war, but the war w a s a result of the fact that the society exhausted its possibilities.The war was

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o n l y a n expression of i ts i n a b i l i t y to further e x p a n d . After t h e w a r t h e historic crisis b e c a m e deeper a n d deeper. Capitalist development everywhere w a s prosperity a n d crisis, b u t the s u m m a t i o n of t h e crises a n d prosperity h a d been an ascendency. B e g i n n i n g with t h e wa r w e see th e cycles of crisis a n d prosperity forming a declining line. I t signifies n o w that this society h a s exhausted totally its inner possibilities and must b e replaced by a new society, or the old society will go into barbarism just a s the civilization of Greece and Rome—because they had exhausted their possibilities and no class could replace them. T h a t i s the question n o w and especially i n th e United States. The first requisite n o w for a new society i s that the productive forces m u s t b e sufficiently developed i n order to give birth to a higher one. Are the productive forces sufficiently developed for this? Yes, they were developed sufficiently in the nineteenth century—not a s well as n o w , but sufficiently. Now especially in the United States it would be very easy for a good statistician to prove that if the American productive forces were unleashed now, today, they could be doubled or tripled. I believe that our comrades should make such a statistical survey. The second condition—there must b e a new progressive class which is sufficiently numerous and economically influential to be able to impose its will upon society. This class is the proletariat. It must b e the majority of the nation or must have the possibility to lead the majority. In England the working class is the absolute I’majority. I n Russia it wa s a minority, but it had the possibility to lead the poor peasants. I n the United States it is at least half of the population, but it h as the possibility to lead the farmers. The third condition is the subjective factor. This class must understand its position in society and have its own organizations. That

is the

condition

which

is now

lacking

from

the

historic point of view. Socially it i s not only possible b u t an absolute necessity, i n the s en s e that it i s either socialism or barbarism. T h a t i s the historical alternative. We mentioned i n the discussion that M r . Hague i s not some stupid old m a n w h o imagines some medieval system exists i n his town. H e i s a n advance scout of the American capitalist class. J a c k London wrote a book, The Iron Heel.96 I recommend it now. I t was written in 1907. At that time it seemed a terrible dream, but now it is absolute reality. H e gives the development of the class struggle in the United States, with the capitalist class retaining power through terrible repressions. It is a picture of

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fascism. The ideology h e gives even corresponds with Hitler. I t is very interesting. I n Newark the mayor begins to imitate Hague, and they are a l l inspired by Hague and by the big bosses. I t i s absolutely certain that Roosevelt will observe that now in the crisis h e c a n d o nothing with democratic means. H e i s n o t a fascist, a s the Stalinists claimed in 1932. But his initiative will b e paralyzed. What can he do? The workers are dissatisfied. The big bosses are dissatisfied. H e can only maneuver until the end of h is term and then say goodbye. A third term for Roosevelt i s absolutely excluded. The imitation of [Hague by] the Newark mayor has tremendous importance. I n two or three years you can have a powerful fascist movement of American character. What is Hague? H e has nothing to d o with Mussolini or Hitler, but he is an American fascist. Why i s h e aroused? Because the society can n o longer b e run by democratic means. I t would of course b e impermissible to fall into hysteria. The danger of the working class being outrun by events is indisputable, but w e can combat this danger only by energetic, systematic development of our own activity, under adequate revolutionary slogans and not by fantastic efforts to spring over our own heads. Democracy i s only the rule of big bosses. We must understand well what Lundberg showed in his book, that sixty families govern the United States. But how? By democratic means up until today. They are a small minority surrounded by middle classes, the petty bourgeoisie, workers. They must have the possibility of interesting the middle classes in this society. They must not b e desperate. The same holds true for the workers. At least for the higher strata. If they are opposed they can break the revolutionary possibilities of the lower strata, and this is the only way of [making democracy work]. The democratic regime is the most aristocratic way of ruling. I t i s possible only for a rich nation. Every British democrat has nine or ten slaves working in the colonies. The antique Greek society was a slave democracy. The same in a certain sense can b e said of British democracy, Holland, France, Belgium. The United States has n o direct colonies, but they have Latin America, and the whole world is a sort of colony for the United States—not to speak about appropriating the richest continent and developing without a feudal tradition. It is a historically privileged nation, but the privileged capitalist nations differ from

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the most “pariah” capitalist nations only from the point of view of delay. Italy, the poorest of the great capitalist nations, became fascist first. Germany was second because Germany h a s no colonies or rich subsidiary countries, and on this poor base exhausted all the possibilities; and the workers could not replace the bourgeoisie. Now it i s the turn of the United States—even before Great Britain or France. The duty of our party is to seize every American worker and shake him ten times so he will understand what the situation i s in the United States. That is not a conjunctural crisis but a social crisis. Our party can play a very great role. What i s difficult for a young party in a very thick atmosphere of previous traditions, hypocrisy, is to launch a revolutionary slogan. “It i s fantastic,” “not adequate in America”—but it is possible that this will change by the time you launch the revolutionary slogans of our program. Somebody will laugh. But revolutionary courage is not only to be shot but to endure the laughter of stupid people who are in the majority. But when one of them is beaten by Hague’s gang, h e will think it is good to have a defense committee, and his ironic attitude will change. Question: Isn’t the ideology of the workers a part of the objective factors? Trotsky: For u s as a small minority this whole thing is objective, including the mood of the workers. But we must analyze and classify those elements of the objective situation which can b e changed by our paper and those which cannot be changed. That i s why we say that the program i s adapted to the fundamental, stable elements of the objective situation, and the task i s to adapt the mentality of the masses to those objective factors. To adapt the mentality is a pedagogical task. We must be patient,

etc. The crisis

of society

i s given

a s the b a s e of our

activity. The mentality i s the political arena of our activity. We must change it. We must give a scientific explanation of society, and clearly explain it to the masses. That i s the difference between Marxism and reformism. The reformists h a v e a good smell for what the audience wants—as Norman Thomas—he gives them that. But that i s not serious revolutionary activity. We must h a v e the courage to be unpopular, to say “you are fools,” “you are stupid,” “they betray y o u , ” a n d every o n c e i n a w h i l e with a s c a n d a l l a u n c h o u r i d e a s with p a s s i o n . I t i s necessary to s h a k e the worker from time to

time, to explain, and then s h a k e him again—that all belongs to

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the art of propaganda. B u t i t m u s t b e scientific, n o t b e n t to the m oods of the m a s s e s . We are the m o s t realistic people because w e reckon with facts, which cannot be changed b y the eloquence of Norman T h o m a s . If w e win immediate success w e swim with the current of the masses, and that current is the revolution. Question: Sometimes I think that our own leaders don’t feel these problems. Trotsky: Possibly it is two things. One is to understand, the other to feel it with muscles, fibers. I t i s necessary n o w to be penetrated by this understanding that we must change our politics. I t is a question not only for the masses, but for the party. I t i s a question not only for the party, but also for the leaders. We had some discussions, some differences. I t is impossible to come to the position at the same time. There are always frictions. They are inevitable and even necessary. That was the reason for this program—to provoke this discussion. Question: How much time should we allow for this discussion among the leaders? Trotsky: I t is very difficult to say. It will depend on many factors. We cannot allow too great a deal of time. We must now accomplish this new orientation. I t is new and old. I t i s based on all p a s t activity, b u t now it opens a new chapter. I n spite of errors, frictions, a n d fights, now a new chapter opens and we must mobilize all our forces upon it with a more energetic attitude. What is important, when the program i s definitely established, i s to know the slogans very well an d to maneuver them skillfully, so that in every part of the country everyone uses the same slogans at the same time. Three thousand can make the impression of fifteen thousand or fifty thousand. Question: Comrades may agree abstractly to this program, but do we have experienced comrades to carry out slogans in the masses? They agree abstractly, but what can I do with the backward workers in my union? Trotsky: Our party is a party of the American working class. You must remember that a powerful proletarian movement, not to speak of a powerful proletarian revolution, has not occurred in the United States. I n 1917 we wouldn’t have had the possibility to win without

1 9 0 5 . M y generation

w a s very y o u n g . During twelve

years we had a very good chance to understand our defeats and correct them and to w i n . B u t even then we lost again to the new bureaucrats. That i s why we cannot see whether our party will directly lead the American working class to victory. I t i s possible

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The Transitional Program

that the American workers, who are patriotic, whose standard of living i s h i g h , will have rebellions, strikes. O n one side Hague, the other Lewis. That can l a s t for a long period, years and years, a n d during this time our people will steel themselves, become more sure of themselves, and the workers will s a y , “They are the o n l y people capable of seeing the path.” O n l y war produces war heroes. For the beginning we h a v e excellent elements, very good m e n , seriously educated, a good staff, and not a small staff. I n this more general sense I am totally optimistic. Then I believe that the change in the mentality of the American workers will come at a very speedy rhythm. What to do? Everybody i s disquieted, looking for something new. It i s very favorable for revolutionary propaganda. W e m u s t remember not only the aristocratic elements but the poorest elements. The cultivated American workers have a plus and a minus, such as English sports—it is very good but also a device to demoralize the workers. All the revolutionary energy was expended in sports. It was cultivated by the British, the most intelligent of the capitalist nations. Sports should be in the hands of the trade unions, as a part of the revolutionary education. But you have a good part of the youth and women who are not rich enough for these things. We must have tentacles to penetrate everywhere into the deepest strata. Question: I think the party has made a great advance since the last convention. Trotsky: A very important turn has been accomplished. Now it is necessary to give this weapon a concentrated action. General, dispersed agitation doesn’t penetrate into the minds of the uneducated. But if you repeat the same slogans, adapting them to the situation, then repetition, which i s the mother of teaching, will act likewise i n politics. Very often it happens not only with the intellectual but with a worker that h e believes that everybody understands

what

h e h a s learned. I t i s necessary

to repeat with

insistence, to repeat every day and everywhere. That is the task of the draft program—to issue a homogeneous impression.

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“ I t I s Necessary to Drive the Bureaucracy and Aristocracy

out of the Soviets”97

July

4, 1938

On the subject of the slogan which appears at the head of this article I have received some critical remarks which are of a general interest and therefore merit an answer not in a private letter but in an article. First of all let us cite the objections. The demand to drive the bureaucracy and the new aristocracy out of the soviets disregards, in the words of my correspondent, the sharp social conflicts going on within the bureaucracy and aristocracy—sections of which will go over to the camp of the proletariat

a s stated

in another

section

of the same

thesis (the

draft program). The demand (to drive out the bureaucracy . . . ) establishes an incorrect (“ill-defined”) basis for disfranchisement of tens of millions—including the skilled workers. The demand is in contradiction to that section of the thesis which states that the “democratization of the soviets is impossible without the legalization of soviet parties. The workers and peasants themselves by their own free vote will indicate what parties they recognize as soviet parties.” “ I n any case,” continues the author of the letter, “there d o not appear to be any valid political reasons to establish an a priori disfranchisement of entire social groupings of present day Russian society. Disfranchisement should b e based on political acts of violence of groups or individuals against the new soviet power.” Finally, the author of the letter points out also that the slogan of “disfranchisement” is advanced for the first time, that there has been no discussion on this question, that it would be better to defer the question for thoroughgoing consideration subsequent to the international conference. Such are the reasons and arguments of my correspondent. Unfortunately I can by n o means agree with them. They express

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The Transitional Program

a formal, juridical, purely constitutional attitude on a question which must b e approached from the revolutionary-political point of view. I t is not at all a question of whom the new soviets will deprive of power once they are decisively established; we can calmly leave the elaboration of the new Soviet constitution to the future.

The question

i s h o w to get rid of the Soviet bureaucracy

which oppresses and robs the workers and peasants, leads the conquests of October to ruin, and is the chief obstacle on the road to the international revolution. W e have long ago come to the conclusion that this can be attained only by the violent overthrow of the bureaucracy, that is , by means of a new political revolution. O f course, in the ranks of the bureaucracy there are sincere and revolutionary elements of the Reiss type. But they are not numerous, and, in any case, they do not determine the political physiognomy of the bureaucracy, which i s a centralized, Thermidorean caste crowned by the Bonapartist clique of Stalin. W e may b e sure that the more decisive the discontent of the toilers becomes, the deeper will the differentiation within the bureaucracy penetrate. But in order to achieve this we must theoretically comprehend, politically mobilize and organize the hatred of the masses against the bureaucracy as the ruling caste. Real soviets of workers and peasants can come forth only in the course of the uprising against the bureaucracy. Such soviets will b e bitterly pitted against the military-police apparatus of the bureaucracy. Ho w then can we admit representatives into the soviets from that camp against which the uprising itself i s proceeding? My correspondent—as stated already—considers that the criteria for the bureaucracy and aristocracy are incorrect, “illdefined,” since they lead to the a priori rejection of tens of millions. Precisely in this lies the central error of the author of the letter. I t i s not a question of a constitutional “determination” which i s applied on the basis of fixed juridical qualifications, but of the real self-determination of the struggling camps. Soviets can arise only in the course of a decisive struggle. They will be created by those layers of the toilers who are drawn into the movement. The significance of the soviets consists precisely in the fact that their composition is determined not by formal criteria but by the dynamics of the class struggle. Certain layers of the Soviet “aristocracy” will vacillate between the camp of revolutionary workers and the camp of the bureaucracy. Whether

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these layers enter the soviets, and at what period, will depend o n the general development of the struggle and on the attitude which different groups of the Soviet aristocracy take in this struggle. Those elements of the bureaucracy and aristocracy who in the course of the revolution go over to the side of the rebels will certainly find a place for themselves also in the soviets. B u t this time not as bureaucrats and “aristocrats,” but as participants in the rebellion against the bureaucracy. The demand to drive out the bureaucracy can in no case b e counterposed to the demand for the legalization of soviet parties. In reality these slogans complement each other. At present the soviets are a decorative appendage to the bureaucracy. Only the driving out of the bureaucracy, which is unthinkable without a revolutionary uprising, can regenerate the struggle of various tendencies and parties within the soviets. “The workers and peasants themselves by their own free vote will indicate what parties are soviet parties”—the thesis says. But precisely because of this it i s first of all necessary to banish the bureaucracy from the soviets. I t is, moreover, untrue that the slogan represents something new in the ranks of the Fourth International. Possibly the formulation is new, but not the content. For a long time we held to the point of view of reforming the Soviet regime. W e hoped that by organizing the pressure of the advanced elements, the Left Opposition would b e able, with the help of the progressive elements of the bureaucracy itself, to reform the Soviet system. This stage could not b e skipped. But the further course of events at any rate disproved the perspective of a peaceful transformation of the party and the soviets. From the position of reform w e passed to the position of revolution, that is, of a violent overthrow of the bureaucracy. But how can the bureaucracy be overthrown and simultaneously given a legal place in the organs of the uprising? I f we think through to the very end the revolutionary tasks which face the Soviet worker and peasant, the slogan which stands a t the h e a d of this article m u s t b e recognized a s and urgent. That i s why the internacorrect, a s self-understood

tional conference, in my opinion, should sanction this slogan.98

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The Transitional Program

How

Economic

Shifts July

Affect

Mass

Moods

2 0 , 1938

Question: What influence can “prosperity,” an economic rise of American capitalism in the next period, have upon our activity as based on the transitional program? Trotsky: I t is very difficult to answer because it is an equation with many unknown elements, magnitudes. The first question is if a conjunctural improvement is probable in the near future. It is very difficult to answer, especially for a person who does not follow the charts from day to day. As I see from the New York Times, the specialists are very uncertain about the question. In last Sunday’s issue of the New York Times, the business index showed a very confused tendency. During the last week there was a loss, two weeks before a rise, and so o n . If you consider the general picture, we see that a new crisis has begun, showing an almost vertical line of decline up until January of this year; then the line becomes hesitant—a zigzag line, but with general declining tendency. But the decline during this year is undoubtedly slower than the decline during the nine months of the preceding year. I f we consider the preceding period, beginning with the slump of 1929, we see that the crisis lasted almost 31/2 years before the upturn began, with some smaller ups and downs, lasting 41/2 years—it was Roosevelt “prosperity.” I n this way the last cycle was of 8 years, 31/2 years of crisis and 41/2 years of relative “prosperity,” 8 years being considered as a normal time for a capitalist cycle. Now the new crisis began in August 1937, and in nine months has reached the point which was reached in the preceding crisis in 21/2 years. It is very difficult to make a prognosis now concerning the time, the point of a new rise. If we consider the new slump from the point of its deepness, I repeat, the work of 21/2 years is completed by the crisis, yet it has not reached the lowest point of the preceding crisis. If we consider the new crisis from

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the point of view of time—nine years, or seven, eight years, it would be too early for a new upturn. That is why I repeat that prognosis is difficult. I s it necessary that the new crisis should reach the same point—the lowest point—as the preceding crisis? I t is probable, but it is not absolutely sure. What is characteristic of the new cycle is that “prosperity” did not reach the high point of preceding prosperity, but from that we cannot make in an abstract manner a conclusion about the nadir. What characterizes the Roosevelt prosperity i s the fact that it was a movement mainly of the light industries, not of the building trades, the heavy industries. This made this movement develop in a very limited fashion. That is precisely the reaSon why the breakdown came s o catastrophically, because the new cycle did not have a solid basis of heavy industries, especially of the building-trades industries, which are characterized by new investments with a long-term perspective, and so on. Now we can theoretically suppose that the new upturn will include more than building industries—the heavy industries in general—in view of the fact that despite consumption during the last period the machinery was not renewed sufficiently, and now the demand for it will be greater than during the last conjuncture. It is possible it can give a greater, a more solid upturn than the preceding one. It is absolutely not contradictory to our general analysis of a sick, declining capitalism causing greater and greater misery. This theoretical possibility is to a certain degree supported by the military investment in public relief works. It signifies from a large historical point of view that the nation becomes poorer in order to permit better conjunctures today and tomorrow. We can compare such a conjuncture with a tremendous expense to the general organism. It can be considered as possibly a new prewar conjuncture, but when will it begin? Will the downward movement continue? It is possible—probable. In that sense we will have in the next period not 13 or 1 4 million, but 15 million unemployed. In this sense. all we said about the transitional program will be reinforced in every respect, but we are adopting a hypothesis of a new upturn in the next few months, in half a year or a year. Such a movement may be inevitable. To the first question, if such an upturn can be more favorable to the general perspective before our party, I believe we can answer with a categorical yes, that it would be more favorable for us. There cannot be any reason to believe that American capitalism

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The Transitional Program

can of itself in the next period become a sound, healthy capitalism, that it can absorb the 1 3 million unemployed. But the question is—if we formulate it in a very simple and arithmetical form—if in the next year or two years the industries absorb 4 million workers from the 13 million unemployed, that will leave 9 million. Would that be favorable from the point of view of the revolutionary

movement?

I

believe

we

can

answer

with

a

categorical yes. We have a situation in a country—a very revolutionary situation in a very conservative country—with a subjective backwardness on the part of the mentality of the working class. In such a situation, economic pickups—sharp economic pickups, ups and downs—from a historical point of view have a secondary character, but in the immediate sense have a profound effect on the lives of millions of workers. Today they have a very great importance. Such shake-ups are of very great revolutionary importance. They shake off their conservativeness; they force them to seek an account of what is happening, what is the perspective. And every such shake-up pushes some stratum of the workers onto the revolutionary road. More concretely, now the American workers are at an impasse—in a blind alley. The big movement, the CIO, has no immediate perspective, because it is not guided by a revolutionary party and the difficulties of the CIO are very great. From the other side, the revolutionary elements are too weak to be able to give to the movement a sharp turn to the political road. Imagine that during the next period 4 million workers enter the industries. It will not soften the social antagonisms—on the contrary. It will sharpen them. If the industries were capable of absorbing the 13 million or 11 million unemployed, then it would signify for a long period a softening of the class struggle; but it can only absorb a part, and the majority will remain unemployed. Every unemployed person sees that the employed have work. H e will look for work and, not finding any, will enter into the unemployed movement. I believe in this period our slogan of the sliding scale can receive very great popularity; that is, that we ask for work for everybody under decent conditions—in a popular form: “We must find work for all, under decent conditions with decent salaries.” The first period of a rise—economic rise—would be very favorable, especially for this slogan. I believe also that the other very important slogan of defense, workers’ militia, etc., would also find favorable soil, a base, because through such a limited

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and uncertain rise—the capitalists become very anxious to have immediate profits, and they look with great hostility on the unions which disturb the possibility of a new rise in profits. I n such conditions I believe that Hague would be imitated on a large scale. The question of the labor party before the trade unions: Of course the C I O through a new prosperity would have a new possibility of development. I n that sense we can suppose that the improvement of the conjuncture would postpone the question of the labor party. No t that it will lose its whole propagandistic importance, but it will lose its acuteness. We can then prepare the progressive elements to accept this idea and b e ready when the new crisis approaches, which will not be long in coming. I believe that this question of Hagueism has a tremendous importance, and that a new prosperity, a new upturn, would give u s greater possibilities. A new upturn will signify that the definite crisis, the definite conflicts, are postponed for some years, in spite of the sharp conflicts during the rise itself. And we have the greatest interest in winning more time, because we are weak and the workers are not prepared in the United States. But even a new upturn will give us a very short time—the disproportion between the mentality and the methods of American workers in the social crisis, this disproportion is terrific. However, I have the impression that we must give some concrete examples of success and not limit ourselves only to giving good theoretical advice. I f you take the New Jersey situation, it is a tremendous blow not only to the Social Democracy but to the working class. Hague is j u s t beginning. We also are j u s t beginning, but Hague i s a thousand times more powerful. . . .

Three

Possibilities July

with

3 Labor

Party99

2 3 , 1938

Trotsky: Of course the question of the labor party cannot b e considered independent from the general development in the next period. I f a new prosperity

comes for some time and postpones

the

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The Transitional Program

question of a labor party, then the question will for some time become more or less academic; but we will continue to prepare the party in order not to lose time when the question again becomes acute. But such a tremendous prosperity is not very probable now, and if the economic situation remains as now, then the party can change in a short time. The most important fact we must underline is the total difference in America in comparison with a working class from Europe. In Europe—let us say in Germany before Hitler, in Austria, France now, Great Britain— the question of a party for the workers was looked upon as a necessity; it was a commonplace for the vanguard of the working class and for a large stratum of the masses themselves. I n the United States the situation is absolutely different. In France, political agitation consists of the attempts of the G P to win the workers, of the SP to win the workers, and every conscious or semiconscious worker stands before a choice. Should h e adhere to the SP or the G P or Radical Socialist Party?100 For the Radical Socialist Party it is not such a problem, since that is mostly for the foremen, but the workers have to choose between the SP and the C P . I n the United States the situation is that the working class needs a party—its own party. It i s the first step in political education. We can say that this first step was due five or ten years ago. Yes, theoretically that is so, but insofar as the workers were more or less satisfied by the trade union machinery, and even lived without this machinery, the propaganda in favor of a working class party was more or less theoretical, abstract, and coincided with the propaganda of certain centrist and communist groups, and so on. Now the situation has changed. It is an objective fact in the sense that the new trade unions created by the workers came to an impasse—a blind alley—and the only way for workers already organized in trade unions is to join their forces in order to influence legislation, to influence the class struggle. The working class stands before an alternative. Either the trade unions will b e dissolved or they will join for political action. That is the objective situation, not created by us, and in this sense the agitation for a working class party becomes now not an abstract but a totally concrete step in progress for the workers organized in the trade unions in the first instance and for those n o t organized at all. I n the second place it is an absolutely concrete task determined by economic and social conditions. I t would be absurd for us to say that because the new party issues from the political amalgamation of the trade unions

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it will of necessity be opportunistic. We will not invite the workers to m a k e this same step in the same way as abroad. Of course if we h ad any real choice between a reformist party or a revolutionary party, we would s a y this is your address (meaning the revolutionary party). But a party is absolutely necessary. It is the only road for u s in this situation. To say that we will fight against opportunism, as of course we will fight today and tomorrow, especially if the working class party had been organized, by blocking a progressive step which can produce opportunism, i s a very reactionary policy, and sectarianism is often reactionary because it opposes the necessary action of the working class. We can imagine in schematic form three types of labor party in the United States in the next period. The first type: an opportunistic, confused, loose party; the second possibility: an opportunistic but sufficiently centralized party, directed by fakers and careerists; the third possibility is a centralized revolutionary party, where we have the leadership. We do not expect to have a clear and pure type. There will b e different stages, different combinations, different parts, different kinds of labor party, etc—but in order to present more clearly the situation and our tasks, we can consider these three types. If the party is loose enough to accept us, it would be stupidity not to enter. If w e enter with the possibility of working in it as a party, then the labor party is a loose opportunistic party. The fact that such a party accepts us itself signifies that the opportunists are not strong enough to eliminate us. It signifies good conditions of a sort. (I consider now that we enter a s a party—that conditions become s o critical that a labor party is formed, and that we, the Socialist Workers Party, enter as a section. This would be an extremely favorable situation.) Then it can be a labor party created in a less critical period, in less turmoil, in rather calm conditions, quiet conditions, with the predominance of the conservative reactionary leaders, with a more or less centralized machine which will keep us out as a party. Then, of course, we continue existing as a party outside such an opportunistic party, and w e consider only the possibility of penetrating such a labor party—but as a party we remain outside such a centralized, opportunistic party. If in the labor party w e become the predominant tendency, a revolutionary tendency with the leaders our leaders, the ideas our ideas, etc., then we become the advocates of centralizing this

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The Transitional Program

loose party. We demand that the workers eliminate the fakers, etc. It is the third type, the last stage of evolution, the stage in which our party dissolves in this labor party in such a manner that it determines the character of the labor party. In the first step we say: “Workers, you need your own party.” Concerning the [projected Farmer-Labor] party in Newark, you say that it is not the kind of party you need. Change this party. Replace the leaders. I n what manner we say this depends upon the circumstances. The comrades are absolutely right when they say we should tell the workers the truth, but that doesn’t signify that every moment, every place, we state the whole truth, starting with Euclid’s geometry and ending with socialist society. We do not have the right to lie to them, but we must present to them the truth in such form, at such time, in such place, that they can accept it. And precisely here we have the very important question of illegal work. The war approaches, and we must prepare ourselves for illegal work. Many comrades have discussed the question. W e must educate ourselves for illegal work, but we forget that illegal work must be done in the New York [American] Labor Party. It is the first illegal work to b e done, and we cannot educate ourselves for illegal work outside reality. The leaders of the labor party are the political police of the ruling class. Now they stop u s where the democratic police of Roosevelt themselves cannot stop u s . H e permits everybody to meet, everybody to speak what h e wishes, but h e can allow us this freedom only because h e h as at his disposal not only constitutionally organized police, but also very solidly organized police in the American Federation of Labor, the police of the C I O , the La Guardia Labor Party of New York, etc. They repulse u s from the workers, and the question is not what will we do when the official police of Roosevelt declare us illegal, but right now what should we do in order to eliminate the handicap which i s presented by the police of the trade unions, labor parties, etc.? How can we enter the labor party if we declare ourselves members of the Socialist Workers Party? That depends on circumstances. I n order to enter into illegal revolutionary work, I change my passport, change my name, and don’t declare that I am a member of the Socialist Workers Party. I am submitted absolutely to the discipline of my o w n party, but when it comes to the others, w e owe the fakers nothing. As to the Roosevelt police, it is the same. I f we have the possibility, through trade unions, of introducing our comrade into the labor party—the reformist

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treacherous labor party—it is a very important factor. Then suppose we have a fight. They will expel him. For the workers who delegated him it will be an exemplary fight. For nonmembers who send into the labor party a member of the Socialist Workers Party independently of the fact that he i s a member, they are not interested in the party, but have a high estimation of the individual. Then h e says, “Yes, I am a member of the Socialist Workers Party.” You know in the tsarist courts we had a division of work. O f ten comrades arrested, one would declare h e was a member of the party, denounce capitalism, and denounce the rulers. Nine others would say, “ I am absolutely nothing; I have nothing to do with this party.” The police would not have enough evidence and would have to turn them loose. Then they would go back to work in the trade unions. The declaration of the one member had a tremendous influence in the country. We must act absolutely the same way now in trade unions and in our own party. I t i s the genuine preparation for the new, more difficult illegal work. A comrade who enters the labor party a s a known Socialist Workers Party member must be a whole lot more cautious. I t i s n o t opportunism; the others will supplement him, but nevertheless h e will say, “ I am absolutely loyal to the statutes of the party. I don’t claim I agree with you, but you see that I am loyal.” H e merely leaves it to the others to supplement his work, and, of course, in the nucleus of our own party h e gives them instructions as to how to d o it—not in order to betray the workers but to fool the police, the capitalists, the labor fakers. Lenin is very often quoted on this.101 W e must penetrate the masses despite the rascals, the traitors. W e must fool them as we fool the police. I believe that now our comrades don’t accomplish this division of work sufficiently, that often our comrades work together with the reformists, bureaucrats of trade unions, against the Stalinists. The situation is such in Minneapolis, Los Angeles, everywhere almost that our comrades have penetrated the trade unions and shown themselves to b e good workers, honest, devoted functionaries of the trade union movement. They are appreciated by the old routiners of the trade unions better than the Stalinist fakers. We utilize this opposition between them and the Stalinist Charlatans and careerists. I t is absolutely correct that w e to a certain degree support

the progressive

(in reality conservative)

elements

against

the Stalinist disrupters, but we must supply supplementary help. Comrade Skoglund, President of Local 544, cannot make a

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The Transitional Program

speech in the name of the Fourth International himself, for h e must b e a bit more cautious.102 However, his attitude must b e supplemented immediately by a good organized nucleus; and if the direction of the trade union i s not good and a member of ours is expelled, Skoglund says, “ I am opposed to expulsion.” But Skoglund is himself not expelled. I believe that the most fighting elements in the trade unions should b e our youth, who should not oppose our movement to the labor party but go inside the labor party, even a very opportunist labor party. They must b e inside. That is their duty. That our young comrades separate the transitional program from the labor party is understandable because the transitional program is an international question; but for the United States they are connected—both questions—and I believe that some of our young comrades accept the transitional program without good understanding of its meaning, for otherwise the formal separation of it would lose for them all importance.

“For

and Farmers’ a Workers’ Government”103 July

2 9 , 1938

Question: Which is preferable of the two slogans: “workers’ government” or “workers’ and farmers’ government”? Trotsky: I believe it i s a very important error to h a v e accepted the formulation, “workers’ government,” instead o f “workers’ and

farmers’ government,” and I believe the basis of this error i s onehalf sectarian misunderstanding. One can oppose the slogan of “workers’ government” with the same arguments used against “workers’ and farmers’ government,” for you can say that Green i n conjunction

with Lewis—that

i s not our government.

W e can

say that Green plus Lewis plus La Follette, as a representative of the petty bourgeois and peasant—that is not our government. I n that sense we can condemn the slogan of “workers’ government” as not sufficiently clear. So good, we can condemn it as well as “workers’ and farmers’ government.” If we accept the slogan of

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“workers’ government” then all of our other slogans, our whole strategy and tactics, will give a concrete meaning to the slogan. This slogan will become very popular and clear: “You workers must take the power.” Then we give this program, which excludes [ a Green-Lewis-La Follette government] as a power which we could accept and support. But then we have deprived ourselves of the possibility of saying to the poor farmers, “It will also be your government.” The farmers play a very important role in the United States. In England, this is not a very important question because the workers are the overwhelming majority. In the United States the question of “workers’ and farmers’ government” is very important. Why deprive ourselves of the possibility in the rural districts to say, “This government would be yours? That is our drive, on the basis of progress; what can you object, farmers? What are your propositions, etc.?” Question: Don’t you think the misunderstanding or mistake arises also from a misunderstanding of the transition program itself? The idea back of limiting the slogan is that farmers don’t have the same interest as workers, that they will come into conflict. Trotsky: O f course the workers and peasants, the workers in general, the peasants in general, don’t have the same interests. The farmers are not a class, but a series of layers, of social strata beginning with semiproletarian elements and ending with exploiters, big farmers, etc. The slogan “workers’ and farmers’ government” doesn’t include for u s the whole peasantry or farmers. W e indicate that by our slogan we will introduce a political delimitation in favor of the poor farmers against the rich farmers. The bourgeois democrats as well as the fascists are interested in representing the farmers as a unit and, through the higher stratum of the farmers, which is totally bourgeois, in keeping the lower stratum under control. Contrariwise, we are interested in introducing a wedge, to omit here the higher stratum and to attract to us the lower. When we say “workers’ and farmers’ government” in our propaganda, we add every time that we mean the exploited farmers, not exploiters, not the farmers who have agricultural workers—they are not our allies. In this sense we can say that the more successful we are, the more closely would be the alliance between the workers and the lower strata of the farmers. It is very possible on some questions we will have the support

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The Transitional Program

even of the middle farmers. W e can even say that we can have some success with some of the higher classes, but with the radicalization of our measures, especially during the seizure of power, they will be repulsed. But during the radicalization of our activity when we are before the seizure of the power and especial1y after seizure of the power, the middle elements of farmers can also be repulsed for a certain time, because the fluctuation of the farmers is tremendous—towards the workers, many times against, and only through this fluctuation can we definitely win the exploited majority of the peasants for alliances with them for building up socialist society. In this sense we should understand this slogan in a dynamic perspective and not as an agreement with a definite class for an indefinite time. The important thing is that we ourselves understand and make the others understand that the farmers, the exploited farmers, cannot be saved from utter ruin, degradation, demoralization, except by a workers’ and farmers’ government, and that this is nothing but the dictatorship of the proletariat, that this i s the only possible form of a workers’ and farmers’ government. By and by we must give this understanding to the agricultural workers and to the semiproletarian farmers—that their own government cannot be conducted by La Follette and other bourgeois, only by revolutionary workers. The farmers themselves are absolutely incapable of creating their own government. This fact is confirmed by all of history from the middle ages down. Every time they are led by the burghers, the radical burghers. When the peasants began a movement, it was a local movement. Only the burghers gave national character to the Reformation, but all the peasants remained as local sects. The same was true politically of the peasants’ government—the feudal system was vanquished i n France only under the guidance of the Jacobins, and the J acobins were petty bourgeois of the cities.104 The same in Russia. Victory w a s assured

o n l y b y the workers. T h e s a m e i n G e r m a n y .

Hitler,

with petty intellectuals, succeeded in winning the support of the p e a s a n t s . T h e peasants themselves were guidance of fascists or c o m m u n i s t s , awaited

ready to follow t h e s a l v a t i o n , a n d Hitler

was more successful; but Hitler’s movement began a s a movement of the towns. Naturally it finished under the inspiration of finance capital. We must thoroughly understand ourselves that the peasants and farmers, who economically represent a survival of the pro-

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ductive system of the middle ages, can have n o guiding role in politics. They can decide only through the cities; better, they c a n be guided only by the workers. Bu t it is necessary to pose this slogan before the peasants themselves. We s ay you m u s t not choose as your alliance the bourgeois, but the workers, w h o are your brothers. And this government would be your government, of workers a n d poor farmers—not of all farmers, but poor farmers. Question: The question came u p of whether i t wouldn’t b e proper under given circumstances in the United States to u s e the term “nationalization” rather than “expropriation,” nationalizing coupled on to the idea of being without compensation. The term “nationalization” is a common one and has been emphasized by workers’ movements. For example, the miners put on their program “nationalization of the mines.” The railroad workers put on their program “nationalization of the railroads.” Would it be better to enlist their support for “nationalization without compensation?” Trotsky: The slogan “expropriation” in the program does not exclude compensation. I n this sense, w e often oppose expropriation to confiscation. Confiscation excludes compensation, but expropriation can include compensation. H o w much compensation i s another question. For example while agitating we can be asked, what will you do n o w , transform the owners an d bearers of power into tramps? No, we will give them decent compensation necessary for their life, insofar as they are unable to work—that is, the older generation. I t i s not necessary to imitate the R u ssians . They suffered intervention from m a n y , many capitalist nations; it deprived them of the possibility of giving compensation. We are a rich people in the United States, and when we come into power w e will give compensation to the older generation. I n this sense it would n o t b e favorable to proclaim confiscation without any compensation. I t i s better to u s e expropriation than confiscation, because expropriation can b e equal to confiscation, but can include also some compensation. We should show that we are not a revengeful people. I n the United States it i s very important to show that it i s a question of material possibilities, but we will not personally destroy the capitalist class. Expropriation and nationalization—I believe we can use both. Expropriation is very important because it signifies an act of revolutionary will. They are the owners of means which should belong to the community. It is necessary to expropriate

198

The Transitional Program

them. Nationalization can signify as in England the mines, in France the military industries—a voluntary agreement between the owners and government. The owners became participants in the nationalized property, and many of them in France, for example, became richer than before, for they were saved from bankruptcy. That i s why we can use, I believe, the alternatives i n our agitation, the words expropriation and nationalization, but underline the word expropriation. W e can say to the miner, you wish nationalization. Yes, it i s our slogan. I t i s only the question of conditions. I f the national property i s too burdened with debts against former owners, your conditions can become worse than now. To base the whole proceedings upon a free agreement between the owners and the state signifies ruin of the workers. Now you must organize your own government in the state and expropriate them. Good. W e will not condemn them to pauperism. W e will give them something to live o n , etc.

Excerpt

from

“ A Great August

Achievement”105

30, 1938

The Russian Left Opposition originated fifteen years ago. Correct work on the international arena does not add up a s yet even to a complete decade. The prehistory of the Fourth International properly falls into three stages. I n the course of the first period, the Left Opposition still placed hopes in the possibility of regenerating the Comintern, and viewed itself as its Marxist faction. The revolting capitulation of the Comintern in Germany, tacitly accepted by all its sections, posed openly the question of the necessity of building the Fourth International. However, our small organizations, which grew through individual selection in the process of theoretical criticism practically outside of the labor movement itself, proved as yet unprepared for independent activity. The second period is characterized by the efforts to find a real political milieu for these isolated propagandist groups, even if at the price of a temporary renunciation of

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formal independence. Entry into the Socialist parties immediately increased our ranks, although in respect to quantity the gains were not as great as they could have been. But this entry signified an extremely important stage in the political education of our sections, which tested themselves and their ideas for the first time face to face with the realities of the political struggle and its living requirements. As a result of the experience acquired our cadres grew a head taller. A not unimportant conquest was also the fact that we parted company with incorrigible sectarians, muddlers, and tricksters who are wont to join every new movement in the beginning only to do everything in their power to compromise and paralyze it. The stages of development of our sections in various countries cannot of course coincide chronologically. Nevertheless, the creation of the American Socialist Workers Party can b e recognized as the termination of the second period. Henceforth the Fourth International stands face to face with the tasks of the m a s s movement. The transitional program is a reflection of this important turn. Its significance lies in this, that instead of providing an a priori theoretical plan, it draws the balance of the already accumulated experience of our national sections and on the basis of this experience opens up broader international perspectives. The acceptance of this program, prepared and assured by a lengthy previous discussion—or rather, a whole series of discussions—represents our m o s t important conquest. The Fourth International is n o w the only international organization which not only takes clearly into account the driving forces of the imperialist epoch, but i s armed with a system of transitional demands capable of uniting the masses for a revolutionary struggle for power. W e d o not need any self-deceptions. The discrepancy between our forces today and the tasks on the morrow i s much more clearly perceived by us than by our critics. But the harsh and tragic dialectic of our epoch is working in our favor. Brought to the extreme pitch of exasperation and indignation, the masses will find n o other leadership than that offered them by the Fourth International.

APPENDIX I : A Transitional Program for Black Liberation

It is becoming more and more clear to increasing numbers of Afro-Americans that nothing less than a revolution in this country will bring about the liberation of Black people. As a result, a great deal of discussion i s going on over how to make a revolution and how to relate present-day struggles and demands to the goal of changing society as a whole. In providing answers to these questions, the experiences of the rest of the world revolutionary movement can be immensely helpful. They teach that the most effective road to revolutionary victory is through developing a rounded program of mass struggle—and organizing a mass political party around militant action on that program. How can these lessons best be applied at the present stage of the struggle for Black liberation in the United States? That i s the all-important question this document proposes to discuss and answer. What d o the developments of the past fifteen years demonstrate? The struggle for Black liberation h as taken giant steps forward

since the 1955

Montgomery

b u s boycott touched off the

contemporary phase of the movement. I t h a s given AfroAmericans a heightened sense of dignity, worth, and destiny as a people. I t has made the claims of the Black masses into a paramount and unpostponable issue in American life and politics. I t has acquainted the whole world with the intolerable conditions of the more than 22 million Afro-Americans and their determination to end the racist system and to win selfdetermination. More recently, it has propelled Black nationalism from deeply felt resentment against injustice and inequality into a powerful and ascending force in the Afro-American communities. 200

Program for Black Liberation

201

I n the conclusion to his biography of Sammy Younge, J r . , the first Black college student to die in the Black liberation movement, SN C C leader James Forman summed up the situation ' in the following terms: “The history of resistance to the most unique colonization experience known to mankind shows that the sixties must b e recorded as an accelerating generation, a generation of Black people determined that they will survive, a generation aware that resistance is the agenda for today and that action by people is necessary to quicken the steps of history.” Black Americans have participated in plenty of actions since 1955—and these struggles have been responsible for whatever advances have been achieved. But it is painfully evident that all the struggles over the past decade and a half have not succeeded in improving the living and working conditions of the masses of Black people or eliminating the worst abuses inflicted daily upon them. Only a few favored individuals from the Black upper crust have benefited from the tokenism through which the white possessors of power and wealth have tried to dampen or buy off the militancy of the masses. A pile of economic statistics confirms what almost every AfroAmerican knows from personal experience. Blacks are subjected to many forms of discrimination, have much lower incomes and fewer job opportunities, get lower wages, live in rotten housing, have bigger rates of unemployment, and receive inferior education. Just one figure from the bottom of the heap shows what the score i s . Forty percent of the nation’s 9.5 million citizens on welfare are Black. I n some states monthly welfare payments amount to as little as $40 for a family of four. I n New York City, 80 percent

o n welfare

are Blacks or Puerto

Despite the heightened oppression

and

the

Ricans.

consciousness of the nature of this

awareness

of the

failure

of the

policies

pursued in the past, n o clear alternative conception ha s yet emerged from the Black community on what h as to b e d o n e to bring better results. Although repeated uprisings in the Black communities have indicated time and again the existence of a deepgoing m a s s radicalization, little headway has been made i n organizing the ghetto masses into an effective force for struggle. Instead, the gunning down of Black leaders, the assassinations of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, J r . , the repression of the Black Panther Party, and the lack of m a s s agencies of struggle have bred a widespread feeling of frustration, which exists in the Black community on all levels.

202

The Transitional Program

The fraud o f Black capitalism Meanwhile the chief political representatives of American capitalism are not silent or inactive. They have no intention of removing the causes of discrimination, poverty, and misery. These are built into their system of racist oppression and economic exploitation. They have shown by the use of police and state and federal troops over the recent years that they are ready to resort to the most brutal and bloody repression to put down Black protest. I n order to maintain their rule, they strive to keep Blacks divided amongst themselves and separated from potential allies among the whites. They expect to keep Blacks in their place by alternating cheap concessions (tokenism) with repressions. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations banked on the passage of a few civil rights bills and a fake war on poverty to calm and appease the growing militancy. These have not worked. No w the more conservative Nixon administration has announced the development of a “black capitalism.” The essence of this program i s that the principal lending institutions, backed by government loan guarantees, are supposed to help set up and encourage different sorts of small business enterprise by Black individuals or groups. Not much has yet been done along this line. But the idea of creating a puny Black capitalism alongside the gigantic edifice of white capitalism and in competition with it is a pure fantasy and a cruel hoax. While it may benefit a few Black businessmen, it will fool very few Black people. Today almost all Black businesses are tiny family operations, catering to a ghetto clientele and providing a meager income for their owners and a few jobs for others. About 25 percent of Black firms are barber shops and beauty parlors. One out of every forty Americans is a proprietor, while only one Black in a thousand is. For show-window purposes, Nixon and his henchmen may aid and establish a few more Black-operated enterprises—which will remain in debt to their financiers. But they will not narrow the colossal discrepancy between white capitalist ownership and the layer of Black proprietors. The predominant trend of American economy is toward accelerated concentration of business and industry in fewer and bigger monopolies. This cuts down small white business as well as blocking the growth of Black business. A sprinkling of new Black firms cannot alter or reverse this process. They will remain petty and shaky marginal enterprises while the major banks, industries, insurance companies, chain

Program for Black Liberation

203

stores, and real estate interests stay in white hands and keep on fleecing the Black communities. Nor do the corporations which control the job market have any compelling reasons to better wages or working conditions for their Black wage-slaves or eliminate the higher rate of unemployment among Black workers and youth. S o long as the capitalist system prevails, Afro-Americans have the right to demand equal, if not greater, access to capital resources, credits, and loans so they can go into business on their own as well as into factories, offices, and government positions. Cooperatives may help some Black communities to lessen the parasitic grip of the white bloodsuckers and acquire a larger measure of autonomy over minor aspects of their economic life. But this is quite different from expecting that the present owners and controllers of the United States will satisfy the needs of the Black community or that Black capitalism will solve or even alleviate the most pressing problems of Black people, such as housing, education, employment, and poverty. A fundamental transformation of the whole economic, social, and political system is required for this.

The liberal

approach

The liberal Black leaders, from Whitney Young and Roy Wilkins to Ralph Abernathy and Bayard Rustin, advocate extensive reforms for the benefit of Black people. The trouble is that they expect to see these concessions come from Democratic and Republican party politicians, the very agents of the capitalist ruling class which has bred racism for centuries, upholds it, and i s its main beneficiary at home and abroad. These gradualists and reformists keep their ideas and activities within the limits of the established order which they are committed to serve. They resemble the house-slaves and handkerchief-heads who came cap in hand begging “massa” for favors. The more astute white capitalist politicians and their Black stooges are aware that any breakaway from the two-party system to the left is a danger to them. That is why they back the campaigns and build up the reputations of Black Democrats like Mayor Carl Stokes of Cleveland and Mayor Richard Hatcher of Gary. Such Black men are nominated and put in office not to serve the welfare of the Black community, but to head off the mounting demands for change, to co-opt and corrupt Black

204

The Transitional Program

nationalist sentiment if possible, and turn it back into channels which are safe and secure for the white supremacists. The first major action of Mayor Stokes was to increase payroll taxes to raise money so that more cops could b e hired to maintain control over the Black community. And Mayor Hatcher admitted his administration has little control over what happens to Black people in Gary. “There is much talk about Black control of the ghetto,” h e said. “What does it mean? I am mayor of a city of roughly 90,000 black people—but we do not control the possibilities of jobs for them, of money for their schools, or state-funded social institutions. These things are in the hands of U S . Steel Corporation, the county department of welfare and the State of Indiana.”

The positions

o f the revolutionary

nationalists

To one degree or another almost every Afro-American shares the sentiments if not the ideology of Black nationalism. The spectrum of the Black nationalist movement comprises a wide variety of political positions and trends, ranging from those on the extreme right, who want to build Black business, through the purely cultural nationalists, to the revolutionary left wing. Today hundreds of thousands of Black men and women look forward to the Black revolution as the road to liberation. In the vanguard are the rebellious Black youth in the ghettos, the streets, and the campuses who are absorbing ideas and inspirations from the Third World revolutions, the teachings of Malcolm X, and their own experiences in struggle. The most advanced recognize that capitalism is the source and support of racism and that it is necessary to abolish capitalism in order to attack racism at its roots. This rapidly growing revolutionary consciousness means that increasing numbers of Black people, especially among the youth, are ready to devote their lives to the building of a revolutionary movement to win power for the masses and overturn this system. They are now forced to grapple with the extremely complex problem of how this can be done. Without a correct and realistic perspective for carrying on the liberation struggle, based on a clear understanding of the objective conditions in the United States today, thousands of excellent revolutionary cadres run the risk of disorientation or wasting time and energy while trying to reach the goal of emancipation. Numerous revolutionaries see the necessity and desirability of

Program for Black Liberation

205

breaking away, once and for all, from both the Democratic and Republican parties and forming an independent Black party which will not only enter candidates in election campaigns but mobilize the Afro-American communities in action to attain community demands. However, they d o not yet see clearly how to link struggles for the pressing immediate needs of the Black people with the revolutionary goal of overturning the whole racist capitalist system. I n their search for an answer to this difficult problem they swing from one extreme to the other without finding a logical and practical connection between the two ends. Thus at one time they talk about armed struggle by small, highly disciplined, and trained groups of militants as the only really revolutionary method of action. When they run up against the unrealism of guerrilla-type actions in the United States, where the scale of revolutionary struggles demands huge and much more complex commitments of forces, they fall back to spasmodic and uncoordinated activities associated with the largely spontaneous struggles that flare up in the community over issues that often do not appear to be far-reaching. Many militants who have grasped the need to overturn the system as a whole feel that in participating in such battles they are merely marking time while they search for the formula that will put a successful revolution on the agenda in the United States. I n order to work out a strategy and tactics that can realistically hasten a revolutionary showdown, it is necessary first of all to understand where the Black liberation struggle actually stands today. What

stage

i s it i n ?

I n the country as a whole, a struggle for government power by the working class is not an immediate perspective. This obviously holds true for the white workers, who remain relatively quiescent politically and still tied in with the Democratic Party machinery through the union bureaucracy. Without the white workers, the movement for Black liberation cannot realistically pose an immediate struggle for government power. I t i s true, of course, as the mass uprisings indicate, that the Black masses are more ready to fight for their rights against the authorities than any other sector of American society. But it requires the active backing and participation of the majority of the population to achieve government power. This stage h a s not yet been reached

in the

United

States.

Moreover,

the political

understanding of the Black masses today is far less advanced than their combative frame of mind. Despite their bitterness,

206

The Transitional Program

nine-tenths of the Black voters cast a ballot for the Democratic candidate for president in 1968, as they did in 1964. The truth is that we stand in a preparatory period. Once this is thoroughly understood, the problems begin to fall into place. The first big problem is how to break the hold of the white supremacist politicians upon Afro-Americans. The solution lies in promoting the formation of an independent mass Black political party.

The second big problem is how to get Afro-Americans in their majority to move faster and farther along the road to revolution. The solution lies in formulating and fighting for a program that can help transform the general discontent and general militancy of the Black masses into an organized, cohesive, consciously revolutionary force. By presenting and fighting for such a itself into an program, a small vanguard can transform influential power among the masses. The next section of this document presents proposals along this line, many of which have already been brought forward by various elements in the movement.

SUGGESTED PROGRAM O F MASS STRUGGLE The motivation for a program of revolutionary mass struggle must be the self-determination of Afro-Americans. Like all oppressed nationalities, Black people can achieve their freedom only by taking their destiny in their own hands: “Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow.” This means that Black people must form and unify their own organizations of struggle, take control of the Black communities and all the institutions within them, and conduct a consistent fight to overcome every form of economic, political, and cultural servitude and inequality generated and enforced by the decadent, racist capitalist society.

A . Black

control

o f the

Black

community

I t is a basic democratic principle that a people should have the right to decide its own affairs. Therefore the central demand of the liberation forces is for Black control of the Black community. This is an indispensable step towards freeing the Black masses from domination by the white racists who benefit from their exploitation.

Program for Black Liberation

207

The demand for Black control of the Black community has a number of attributes which give it an extremely powerful potential for mobilizing the masses in a revolutionary direction. The demand for Black control has been raised spontaneously in thousands of struggles across the country. I t i s obviously a demand which speaks directly to the needs and present understanding of Black people. At the same time, Black control of the Black community is a democratic demand. I t is based on something which even the ruling class says it believes in—the right of people to have democratic control over their own lives and communities. Thus the resistance the power structure puts up against this struggle will help to expose the hypocrisy of the ruling class on one of the central issues which it uses to brainwash and enslave the masses—its proclaimed adherence to democracy. At the same time, the struggle for Black control is profoundly revolutionary, because it poses the question of who will have decision-making power over Black people: themselves or the capitalist rulers. The realization of this aim can build Black fortresses which will be centers of Black counterpower to the white power structure in the principal cities of the United States. As they develop within the Black communities, struggles targeted to win control over specific institutions and agencies can pave the way and prepare increasing numbers of people for the all-inclusive goal of total control of their community. These partial struggles, carried out around issues such as Black control of the schools, can b e extremely important because through them encouraging victories can be won. These victories, even if limited to specific areas, can help to raise the confidence of the community in its own power and lay the basis for broader future struggles.

The following demands can help promote this process: 1. Replace police occupation of the Black community with a community-controlled police force drawn from residents of the community. 2. Black control of all government funds allocated to the Black community and control over all plans for renovating and constructing housing and other communal facilities and improvements. 3. Community control over all institutions in the Black community, such a s hospitals, welfare centers, libraries, etc.

4. Establish community councils to make policy decisions and

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The Transitional Program

administer the affairs of the Black community. These councils should be composed of representatives elected by workers in various community institutions—factories, hospitals, educational institutions—as well as delegates elected on a block basis. The local councils or boards of control should be joined together on regional, state, and national levels, the aim being to create a National Council of Black Communities. This should be composed of elected, not appointed, delegates representing the local constituencies. Such a National Council could work out common policies and speak with one voice on all matters affecting the communities as a whole and their relations with all other forces and agencies. It would thus exercise far more authority than any single community could. To prevent the National Council from bureaucratic usurpation of power, elections should be held regularly and delegates should be subject to recall at any time, s o that they remain under the control of the local committees they represent.

B. Formation

of a Black political

party

The indispensable instrument for organizing and carrying on effective struggle for such demands, achieving complete control over the Black community, and moving forward to Black liberation, is an independent Black political party. Its program would b e designed to use the immense wealth created by working people, Black and white, not for imperialist war and the enrichment of a few but for the needs of the majority. The main purpose of a Black party is to lead Afro-Americans in political and mass action. But its progressive proposals would attract support from other sections of the population which suffer from the evils of capitalist rule. A Black party would expose and challenge the do-nothing policies of the Democrats and Republicans and present an alternative to them not only by participating in elections but by organizing effective community actions. It would take the initiative in promoting the self-mobilization of the Black people and forming alliances with students, poor white people, workers, and all other forces interested in radical change. I t could play a vanguard role in bringing revolutionary ideas to all sections of the country.

Program for Black Liberation

C . Key planks in a party Domestic

209

program Policy

1. I t is the duty of society to provide well-paid jobs for all. A shorter workweek with no loss in pay to spread the available work. Unemployment insurance at full wages for everyone eighteen or over, whether or not they have held jobs before. 2. Transfer the funds from the war budget to launch a multibillion-dollar crash program of public works, to build schools, hospitals, better public transport, parks and recreation facilities, nurseries, libraries, and housing. Give Black workers priority on all jobs connected with the construction program. 3. A $3 an hour minimum wage with guaranteed protection of this minimum against increases in the cost of living. 4. Put an immediate end to hunger and malnutrition through a guaranteed annual income which can assure everyone, including the old, sick, and disabled, adequate living standards. 5. Abolish all taxes on incomes of $7,500 an d under. Abolish all sales taxes, which discriminate against the poor. 6. Make free, quality medical care available to all citizens. Expropriate the drug monopolies and medicine profiteers. Undertake a large-scale program to train Black people a s doctors and nurses. 7. Organize self-defense units to protect the Black community and its organizations. Oppose gun laws which leave Black people defenseless and unarmed while white cops and racists assault members of the Black community. 8 . Investigate

the

financial

records

of

all

landlords

and

businesses operating in the Black community, and tax their superprofits to help finance improvement projects for the community.

9. Extend credits to Black cooperatives and small businesses. 10. Enforce and tighten all existing housing codes. N o tenant to pay rent exceeding 10 percent of his total income. 11. Expropriate any firm which discriminates against Black people. 12. Elect price committees to inspect and police prices in the neighborhoods. 13. Review the cases of and release all Black prisoners, because they have not received fair trials. All Black people to be tried by a jury of their peers as guaranteed by the Constitution, that is, by other Black people.

210

The Transitional Program

Military

and Foreign

Policy

1. E n d the draft. Exempt Black youth from military service. 2. Bring the G I s home from Vietnam immediately. The Black m a n ’ s struggle i s here at home. 3. Take a referendum on the attitude of the Black community toward the Vietnam War and all foreign wars. 4. Support the constitutional right of G I s to speak out against the war and discrimination in the armed forces. An immediate end to all discrimination in the armed forces. 5. Self-determination for the Vietnamese and all Third World peoples. Solidarity with the liberation struggles of all oppressed nationalities. 6. E n d government assistance to all oppressive regimes from South Africa to South Vietnam. Dismantle all foreign military bases. Black

Education

The Black community should have control of its entire educational system, from the nursery school through college. This can be accomplished in the following ways:

The educational

system

1. Election of community control boards to supervise schools in the Black community. 2. The establishment of an educational system and curriculum which meets the needs of Black children, prepares them for future economic security, gives them a knowledge of themselves and an understanding of the true history and culture of Black people. 3. Parent involvement in every phase of school life. 4. Institute a crash program to train Black administrators and teachers. Preferential hiring of Black teachers and administrators.

5. Community groups should b e entitled to use school facilities to promote activities of benefit to the community and the Black liberation struggle. 6. Offer a full program of adult education. 7. Dismiss all school officials who victimize or insult students on racial grounds. 8. Introduce special tutoring programs for all students who have fallen behind in their studies.

Program for Black Liberation

211

High schools 1. Establish student policy-making boards to run student activities in the high schools, handle disciplinary problems, and participate in the general supervision of the schools. 2. Hold regular full assemblies to discuss school problems and ascertain the will of the students. 3. Maintain the rights of all students and teachers. These should include: freedom of expression, freedom to organize, to pass out literature, freedom from censorship of school newspapers, freedom of assembly, and the right to invite any outside speakers, regardless of their political views. 4. An end to disciplinary expulsions. 5. An end to the tracking system—special tutoring for all students who fall behind. 6. A rounded Black studies program, which will teach AfroAmerican history and literature truthfully and throw light on the real nature of capitalist racism. 7. Upgraded job training programs. Adequate preparation for all students desiring to attend college. 8. A guaranteed job for all high school graduates.

A Black university The Black community should have universities which are related to the needs of Black people, to their struggle against oppression, and to their development as a nationality. Third World university students and faculty should b e able to shape their

own

educational

destiny

and

provide

training

in all the

skills and professions required by the Black community. The following demands to accomplish these ends have already been raised in the campus struggles: 1. Autonomous Black studies and Third World studies departments, adequately financed and with complete control of curriculum, facilities and policies in the hands of Third World students and faculty. 2. Representatives of Third World groups on all policy-making bodies. 3. Availability of university facilities for use by the community, and their expansion in the Black community. 4. Free university education for all Third World students who desire it, with full expenses paid by the government and scholarships available to all who need them. 5. Guaranteed jobs for all graduates.

212

The Transitional Program

Th e

Black

Workers

Because of the role they play in production, Black workers are potentially the most powerful sector of the Black community in the struggle for liberation. As the victims of inequality in the economy, Black workers have already begun to organize separately on the job to advance their interests and protect their rights. The unity of Black and white workers is indispensable to combat and overthrow capitalism. But where white workers are privileged and Black workers are penalized, Black unity in action must precede and prepare the ground for Black-white unity on a broad scale. Black caucuses in the unions can fight against discrimination in hiring, firing, and upgrading and for equality of treatment in the unions themselves, as DRUM and other Black caucuses in Detroit and elsewhere are undertaking to d o . Where they are part of organized labor, they should strive to democratize the unions, regenerate their progressivism, and eliminate white job-trust conceptions and practices. These aims can be furthered through the following demands: 1. Rank-and-file democratic control of the unions. Elimination of all racist practices in the labor movement. 2. Preferential hiring and advancement of Black workers, and free access to apprentice training programs, the skilled trades, and higher-paying supervisory posts. 3. For an escalator clause in all union contracts to assure automatic wage adjustments to keep up with the rising costs of living. 4. For a thirty-hour week with n o reduction in pay. 5 . For speedier grievance procedures. N o restrictions on the right t o strike.

6 . E q u a l rights a n d treatment for all Black union members. 7 . Complete independence of the unions from government interference. Repeal of all antilabor laws. 8 . Workers’ control of industry through factory committees elected by the workers o n the job.

Most of the proposals listed above have been brought forward at one time or another in the course of the Black liberation struggle over the past years; others are taken from the experiences of the masses elsewhere in fighting against capitalist domination. A program of this sort cannot be fully finalized or frozen. It has to remain flexible and open-ended, with plenty of

Program for Black Liberation

213

room for additions and improvements as the struggle develops and new problems come to the fore. The whole point of the program is to provide a guide for the organization and action of the Afro-American masses which can lead toward the goal of Black liberation with the maximum of gains en route. ‘ The Black liberation movement i s bound to play a vanguard role in the coming American socialist revolution both by its example of combativity against the racist power structure and by the stimulus its struggles will give to actions of other sectors thrown into opposition to the ruling capitalist class. The strategy of the Black liberation movement hinges on the achievement of two tasks. One is the unification and mobilization of the Black masses for revolutionary action. The other is the weakening of the enemy forces. Since Afro-Americans constitute a minority of the population in the United States, it will be necessary to find ways and means to take advantage of potential social divisions among the whites and thereby reduce the original unfavorable odds. This can b e done by drawing on part of the poor and working class whites, as well as sympathetic students and intellectuals, into an alliance of action while some other sections of the white population are neutralized. Those parts of the program suggested above which not only correspond to the needs of the Blacks but will likewise benefit prospective political allies among the white majority can serve to further these long-range aims of a realistic revolutionary strategy.

Revolutionary

strategy

and

tactics

How does the program outlined above fit into the strategy and tactics of a socialist revolution in the United States? At first sight most of the points appear limited in nature. Many of them concern rights and liberties guaranteed to every citizen by the Constitution. O r they propose broadening these rights, a s , for example, establishing the right of Black control of the Black community. They can be defined as “democratic demands.” Other points concern guaranteeing jobs, hourly wages, annual income, a thirty-hour week, social benefits such as adequate medical care. Others involve independent political action, the defense of the Black community, organization of Black power. For reasons which will be explained below, these can be defined as “transitional demands.”

214

The Transitional Program

Taken point by point, the program can seem modest, perhaps even feasible under capitalism if one were to take at face value the propaganda about capitalism standing for democracy, a good living, and a free world. Particularly to b e noted about the demands is that they have either already appeared in the Black communities, in some instances with quite broad backing, or they are easily understood and appreciated by wide groups and, with correct leadership, could serve as rallying slogans for very massive struggles. This is a first prerequisite for any program for revolutionary struggle. That is, above all, the program must be based on the objective needs of Black people. But how does such a program tie in with the struggle to overturn capitalism and build a socialist society in America? To understand this, it is necessary to bring in some general considerations. On a world scale, capitalism as an internationally integrated system for the production and distribution of basic necessities is in its death agony. I t offers little to most of humanity but grinding poverty, hopeless insecurity, declining opportunities, increasingly repressive regimes, and endless wars, each more horrifying than the last. A number of countries have already torn loose and set out on the road to building socialism, whatever the difficulties, hardships, and setbacks caused in the final analysis by the povertystricken level at which they had to begin and the efforts of the capitalist powers to injure and destroy them. The relationship of forces between capitalism and socialism on a world scale has changed to such a degree in the past fifty years since the first successful socialist revolution in Russia that even the United States

i s , at bottom,

on the defensive.

That

i s the basic reality,

despite the decades of prosperity arising out of the victory in World War II and the preparations for World War I I I , and despite the colossal military force at the command of the American capitalist rulers. What is to be observed all over the world is that mass struggles of any considerable scope now tend to collide with the capitalist system a n d , with proper leadership, have the potential to break through the barriers of capitalism and cross over into struggles for socialism. This tendency is so strong, so deeply imbedded, that examples can b e cited throughout the Third World where a struggle for such democratic demands as national independence and a

Program for Black Liberation

215

thoroughgoing agrarian reform h as moved in the direction of a struggle for socialism. I n Cu b a, Vietnam, and China these struggles have culminated in actual revolutionary overturns of the capitalist system. While the tendency for big mass struggles to move toward socialism is especially striking in the Third World, it is also operative—with certain modifications—in the industrially advanced capitalist countries. Under the impulse of serious problems affecting their lives in general and their standard of living, masses of working people can become engaged in struggles of a militant nature, the logic of which i s to disregard the limitations of capitalism and to seek solutions that can actually be worked out only if socialism is instituted. This gives these struggles a “transitional” nature. Beginning with a limited challenge to the rule of capitalism, they move logically toward the creation of a new revolutionary power in opposition to the capitalist government. The key demands being raised in the Black liberation struggle today, such as Black control of the Black community, jobs for all, and self-determination of Third World people, have this quality of being transitional in nature. They are rooted in the needs and present understanding of the Black community, yet they have a revolutionary logic because the capitalist system does not have the capacity to meet them. A new, more rational, more productive system is required. O n the ideological level such transitional demands constitute a means of bringing the level of understanding of the broad masses under capitalism to the higher level required to understand consciously the need for socialism. The present-day struggles around these demands for changes in the system can lead to and become part of the overall struggle for power. The mobilization of the masses thus takes place as a process, with each struggle awakening, educating, inspiring, and organizing new layers toward revolutionary consciousness and action. Several examples will suffice to show this logical development. Unemployment i s a familiar enough phenomenon in the Black communities. I t is easy for a Black youth, for instance, to understand why h e should have a guaranteed job opportunity. When great numbers of youths face the same situation, a point can b e reached where they can engage with some militancy in common action in support of jobs for all. The problem i s obviously n o longer an individual problem, as

216

The Transitional Program

the capitalists seek to picture it and to maintain it. Its true nature has come to the surface. I t i s a problem involving society as a whole, demanding an overall solution. Where are the jobs to be found? O n e possibility i s to take all the current jobs and reduce the hours on each job sufficiently to make room for everyone seeking employment. To maintain living standards, however, current yearly incomes must be guaranteed despite the reduced workweek. What power can enforce such a solution? Quite clearly, only the government can do this. Since the present government will resist this collective way of solving the problem, the question arises as to whom it really represents, and why it should not be removed to make way for a government that will guarantee jobs for all. More questions arise. The solution demands economic planning on a national scale and the placing of human needs above profitmaking. Consideration of the socialist alternative to capitalism has thus been placed on the agenda. Thus the demand for jobs can under certain circumstances have very far-reaching consequences. The actions spearheaded by Black students on campuses across the country give another indication of the potential role of struggles around transitional demands. The demand for increased or open enrollment of Third World students has already been shown to have far-reaching implications. Significant gains towards increasing Black enrollment can and have been made within the present educational structure, but the struggle for open enrollment—that is, for college education for all who want it— will not be s o easy for the system to fulfill. Certain key questions are immediately raised by this demand: Where are the resources for such a vast expansion

o f educational

facilities to come from? How will adequate jobs b e found for all the students upon graduation? If persistently pursued, struggles around this demand call into question the capitalist economic structure itself. Because of its built-in need for large pools of low-paid, unskilled labor, capitalism is not constructed to absorb the costs and consequences of higher education for the most exploited sector of the working force. From the standpoint of moving the revolution forward, struggles such as those that have been taking place on the campuses—whether they end in victories or not—can inspire and

Program for Black Liberation

217

lead to demands with more far-reaching implications than w a s apparent in the original issues. The Black community as a whole has supported and received inspiration from the example set by the Black students in struggles for self-determination. The fight for autonomous Black studies departments, for example, has helped pave the way for struggle for control of other institutions in the Black community. If there can be Black control of Black studies departments in the universities, why not Black control of the public schools, Black control of the police, and Black control of the community? The impact which these Black student struggles have already had can be seen in the fact that they have succeeded i n bringing about unprecedented unity in action between Blacks and other national minorities including Chicanos, Oriental-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Indians. They have likewise attracted support from many radical white students and even, in one small but significant instance, from a progressively led union local of oil workers in the Bay Area. The movement of Black and Third World students i s a clear example of how a struggle in a limited arena under present conditions can help to expose the system and lead to bigger and broader efforts. Struggle is the school of the masses and the means for clarifying their consciousness of what has to be done. All the demands that bring them into action for their own aims are worth raising, fighting for, and incorporating into an overall revolutionary strategy and program. The strategy of advancing the Black liberation struggle through the development of transitional demands i s fundamentally different

from both the reformist

and ultraleftist

concepts o f

what to do. The reformists View capitalism as so powerful and entrenched that it cannot b e overturned, at least for a long time to come. From this pessimistic outlook, they conclude that the best that can be accomplished i s to improve the lot of the poverty-stricken masses a little, either by persuading or pressuring the rulers. The ultralefts see capitalism as completely finished, not only a s to perspectives

but i n capacity

to survive. They see it as standing

by inertia, requiring only a slight push to make it collapse. They dream of bringing this about by galvanizing the masses through clever or extremely revolutionary propaganda—which oftentimes turns out to b e mere rhetoric—or by a small heroic group undertaking a spectacular action which, by setting an example,

218

The Transitional Program

will prove contagious, setting the masses in motion in some kind of spontaneous way. Against both the reformists and ultralefts, revolutionary Marxists View capitalism a s having entered the epoch of its death agony, yet as still retaining considerable capacity to defer the final showdown through violent means, through a few conceskeeping the masses from sions in some instances, through gaining an understanding of politics, and through blocking the organization of a revolutionary party deeply rooted among the masses and endowed with a competent leadership. As against both the reformists and ultralefts, the revolutionary Marxists seek to take advantage of the basic weakness in the position of the ruling class. This lies in the deep-going tendency of all serious social struggles in this epoch to involve government power and to raise the question of who should exercise this power, n o matter how limited these struggles may be, or may appear to be, at the beginning. The revolutionary Marxists propose a strategy based on this fact. The succession of transitional demands suggested above corresponds to the course of struggle repeatedly observed in the world today. To pose these demands in their logical succession, to try to organize battles along this line, helps to develop an understanding of the main existing tendency in the class struggle, thereby advancing the political understanding of the masses and hastening the stage when a final showdown with the racist capitalist system becomes a realistic possibility.

The goal of liberation: capitalism

or socialism?

The program of a movement or a party is a means to an end— and for a revolutionary movement that end means the replacement of the prevailing system of racist oppression by a free and equal society. What kind of socioeconomic organization can enable the Black liberation movement to achieve selfdetermination and a better life for all Afro-Americans? Black nationalists have very varying attitudes on this crucial question. O n the right are some who believe in building up Black capitalism. To the left are those revolutionaries who have come to understand that only a socialist society can solve the fundamental problems of the Black masses. Many nationalists are disinclined to take any definite position on this matter. We will settle that when we come to it, they say. However, this is not the

Program for Black Liberation

219

sort of issue that a movement seriously committed to the abolishment of racist oppression can evade or leave indefinitely hanging in midair. A realistic decision on what kind of economy can succeed the present system of exploitation in the United States cannot be made in an arbitrary manner. The possibilities have been restricted by great historical factors which have been at work over a long stretch of time. Foremost among these factors i s the level of economic development which determines the character and the goals of the contending forces. This point can be made clearer by comparing the situation which confronted the movement for Black emancipation in the mid-nineteenth century with that of today. At that time the main immediate oppressors of the Black people were the Southern slaveholders, while the Afro-Americans in bondage were mostly cultivators of the soil. The objectives of that revolution were to destroy chattel slavery and to provide the freedmen with the economic, social, and political means for their liberation and advancement. What happened, as everyone knows, was that the slave power was smashed during the Civil War and Reconstruction and the slaves given their formal freedom. But since the Northern capitalist conquerors denied them the promised “forty acres and a mule” and other prerequisites for their economic independence and the exercise of political power, the Blacks could be thrust back into a new state of servitude, from which they suffer to the present day. Today, the main oppressor of the Afro-American i s the capitalist class. The vast majority of Black people no longer live on plantations in the rural South or work in the fields. They are packed into city slums where they make their living—if they are not thrown on welfare—by working in capitalist enterprises. They are surrounded on all sides by the capitalist owners who fleece them as employers, loansharks, bankers, landlords, and merchants. In order to win liberation, the revolutionary movement must overthrow these exploiters, whose system breeds and sustains racism and oppression. Because Afro-Americans are both an oppressed nationality and the most heavily exploited segment of the American working class, the Black liberation movement has a twofold character. I t is at one and the same time a nationalist

220

The Transitional Program

movement for self-determination and a proletarian struggle against the capitalist possessors of wealth and power. Afro-Americans have been the principal victims of the profit system at all stages of its development in North America over the past four hundred years. They were enslaved and shipped across the Atlantic to raise staple crops to enrich the planters. They are still laboring for the profits of others today, although in the cities rather than the countryside and for capitalists rather than slaveholders. The hour has struck when an end must be put to all forms of exploitation and servitude. Full and definitive liberation cannot be achieved except through abolishing the private ownership of the means of production by the corporations and banks. This measure is mandatory, whether Afro-Americans decide to exercise their right of self-determination through the creation of a separate Black nation or within the context of the creation of a single socialist republic along with insurgent white workers and other anticapitalist forces. The transitional program of a genuinely revolutionary movement must have a clear and conscious goal which guides all its activities and lights the way for its followers. It must b e designed to satisfy the needs of the working masses and place them in control of their own affairs. While promoting a transition from national oppression to self-determination, it will of necessity advance the transition from capitalism to socialism. Through this second emancipation Black America will not only have effected its own liberation, but promoted the liberation of all oppressed peoples from racism, capitalism, and imperialism.

APPENDIX

A Strategy

II:

for Revolutionary

Youth

A fresh generation of revolutionary youth has come upon the world scene and is playing an ever more important part in its politics. Over the past decade, a movement has grown from symptomatic indications of a mood of rebellion against a number of rotted institutions into a powerful revolt of youth on a global scale. The social group most affected by this process of radicalization up to now has been the student population, which, owing to its increasing social weight and its sensitivity to world politics, has taken on greater and greater importance. The student youth do not reflect in a direct way the interests of the class to which they belong, or to which they will belong, but reflect primarily the contradictions and class struggles of society as a whole. The student radicalization mirrors and announces the current crises of the world capitalist system—hence its characteristic strengths and weaknesses. The powerful student radicalization has shown its capacity to serve as a transmission belt speeding the development of a radical political consciousness among other social layers of the same generation. I n several countries it has triggered mass action by the working class as a whole. The growing combativity and revolutionary élan of this new generation have been proved many times over, in all three sectors of the world revolution. I n Czechoslovakia the student movement played a central role in initiating the struggle for socialist democracy during the spring and summer of 1968. I n Pakistan the students touched off a social crisis of revolutionary proportions which brought down the regime of Ayub Khan. I n Mexico in the summer and fall of 1968 mass student demonstrations around basic democratic demands led to 221

222

The Transitional Program

a sympathetic response from the masses of Mexico City and precipitated a political crisis for the Diaz Ordaz regime. In France in May 1968 the student revolt catalyzed the biggest general strike in history and precipitated a revolutionary situation. The May-June events in France provided a graphic demonstration of the fact that not even the main centers of capitalism can avoid the dynamic effects of the student radicalization. These lessons have not been lost on the capitalist ruling class internationally. While the bourgeoisie and their echoers in working class circles decry the “conflict of generations,” the “generational gap,” and even “symbolic parricide,” the issues posed by the youth in revolt are not primarily generational ones. They clearly reflect the major class conflicts of our time. The fundamental significance of this unprecedented radicalization of the youth is the emergence of new forces, ready, willing, and able to enter the arena of class struggle on the side of the colonial peoples and the working class and to give battle to world imperialism and its accomplices, who falsely claim to speak in the name of the working class and its allies. The new wave of radicalization began during the late fifties in response to the upsurge of the colonial revolution, the new rise in the Afro-American struggle in the U . S . , and in reaction to the Khrushchev revelations of Stalin’s crimes and Moscow’s suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956. It was furthered by the Algerian revolution and given added impetus by the revolutionary victory in Cuba. It reached a qualitatively higher stage when U . S . imperialism escalated the Vietnam War, making Vietnam the focal point of the international class struggle. Millions of young people around the world rallied to the defense of the Vietnamese people.

The radicalization of the youth is of crucial importance to the Fourth International and its sympathizing organizations. It poses a major challenge to the entire world Trotskyist movement—how to provide leadership for it and win the best of the new generation to the banner of the Fourth International. Whether the Trotskyist current in a country is a small nucleus or an established tendency of some strength, this central task remains unchanged. To recognize and carry o u t this task is central

next

to the work and orientation

period.

of the International

in the

Strategy for Revolutionary Youth

1. Root

causes

and

of the worldwide

common

youth

223

features

radicalization

The political character of the radicalization of the new generation i s rooted on the one hand in the crisis of imperialism and on the other in the correlative crises of Stalinism and the Social Democracy—the historically bankrupt major tendencies in the workers’ movement. The new generation is achieving political understanding during the most intense period of social convulsion in this century. In Vietnam it has seen modern imperialist war in all its brutality. In a few brief years it has witnessed big revolutionary upheavals and counterrevolutionary bloodbaths. Current history consists of a succession of upheavals; and not even the United States is immune, as the ghetto uprisings and campus revolts bear witness. The economic contradictions of imperialism are the underlying source of the social explosiveness of our era. Even while there has been a prodigious expansion of the productive capacities of the advanced capitalist countries in the past two decades, the gap between the rich and the poor nations has steadily widened. Successful revolutions in China, Cuba, and North Vietnam, along with the destruction of capitalist relations in Eastern Europe and North Korea, have removed vast areas from the sphere of direct imperialist exploitation. Political instability and the threat of revolution in one colonial country after another have inhibited capitalist investment in these sectors. At the same time competition between the major industrial powers for a larger share of the world market steadily intensifies. These

economic

contradictions

are

intertwined

with

the

necessity felt by imperialism to halt any further advances of the world revolution. The efforts of the imperialists to maintain their exploitation and oppression and crush revolutionary movements h a v e been the prime factor in radicalizing the youth in both the advanced capitalist countries and the colonial countries. While the example set by the insurgent youth in their challenge to capitalism h a s affected the youth in the workers’ states, the dissidence in these areas has been engendered primarily by the efforts

o f the

bureaucratic

caste

to maintain

their

privileged

positions and totalitarian rule. The continuing crisis of world Stalinism has been a powerful factor in radicalizing the youth in both the Soviet bloc and the capitalist countries. The prestige and authority of the Kremlin have considerably diminished since 1956. The Sino-Soviet

224

The Transitional Program

conflict, the Cuban revolution, the Vietnam War, and finally the invasion of Czechoslovakia have all contributed to the disintegration of Stalinist monolithism. The counterrevolutionary implications of the doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” and the “parliamentary road” to socialism, and the grotesque abuses committed by a privileged bureaucratic caste, have become increasingly obvious to growing numbers of radical youth. The Social Democracy is equally disqualified in the eyes of the new radical generation. The Social Democrats have become so thoroughly identified as guardians of capitalist rule that they have no attraction for the youth. Their youth organizations, with rare exceptions, are, like the Communist Party youth organizations, empty shells with few active members or followers. The new generation has come into politics under the impetus of a succession of victories. The Chinese, Algerian, Cuban, and Vietnamese revolutions and the advancing Afro-American liberation movement have been key rallying points and sources of imspiration and emulation. The new generation has seen defeats, some of them bitter and tragic as in the case of Indonesia. But it has not undergone the numbing experience of such terrible and. enduring catastrophes as the rise of Stalinism and fascism before the Second World War and the betrayals by the Communist leaderships in Western Europe following that war. Most of them were too young to have had direct experience with the early years of the cold war. Many recall the victory of the Cuban revolution as their initiation into political life. The dissident youth in the workers’ states have grown up during the erosion of the power and influence of Stalinism and are obliged to come to grips with all the problems involved in the antibureaucratic struggle. While the interlocked crises of imperialism and of the historically superseded leaderships of the working class have shaped the basic political development of the student radicalization, they do not suffice to explain the social weight of the current student movements. Students have often engaged in forays in the past without causing much concern to the capitalist rulers or the bureaucratic regimes of the Soviet bloc. The enhanced social weight and political impact of the student movement derive from the fundamental changes that have taken place in the sphere of education under pressure from the scientific, technological, and industrial advances involved in the “third industrial revolution.” These developments call for a more

Strategy for Revolutionary Youth

225

highly educated and technically qualified type of personnel, which is capable of innovating, developing, and operating the most complex, up-to-date means of production and destruction. These economic conditions require larger numbers of bettereducated people not only among the administrators and superintendents of the productive processes, but also in the work force at all levels of industry and trade. Higher educational and cultural standards flow from higher levels of productivity and greater “capital intensity.” The steady rise in the norms of qualification all along the line has greatly altered the character and structure of higher education, particularly in the more advanced countries over the past twenty years. I t has also resulted in the increasing proletarianization of white-collar workers as intellectual labor i s introduced into the productive process on a larger and larger scale and the relative weight of unskilled manual labor is reduced in the productive process. O n a world scale, and in most individual countries, the facilities for higher education and the size of the student body are undergoing explosive expansion. According to the latest U N E S C O figures, between 1950 and 1963-64 the student population in the world’s colleges and universities more than doubled. In France it multiplied by 3.3; in West Germany, by 2.8; the U S , 2.2; Italy, 1.3; China, 6; Czechoslovakia, 3.2; the USSR, 3; East Germany, 2.8; Turkey, 3.7; Colombia, 3.5; India, 2.2. The high school population has increased even more during the past fifteen years. This turbulent growth has created more problems than it has solved. O n the one hand, the educational setup has not been reshaped quickly enough or thoroughly enough to suit the requirements of the ruling class in the capitalist countries and the experts entrusted with looking after its interests. O n the other hand, the demands imposed upon the university in transition from the old ways to the new have generated great dissatisfaction among the student body and sections of the faculty. The students’ feeling of alienation resulting from the capitalist form of the university, from the bourgeois structure and function of higher education

and the authoritarian

administration

of it, h a s become

more and more widespread. This dissatisfaction has led to confrontations and sharp collisions with both the academic administrators and the authorities over them. The university has consequently been plunged into a severe and permanent state of

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The Transitional Program

crisis, which cannot be overcome short of a revolutionary transformation of the social order. I n view of the rapid turnover of college “generations,” these clashes touch layer upon layer of students in a relatively short period of time. They find that the university i s often not equipped to train them in the skills they need to find employment, or that it insists upon molding them according to the crassest needs of big business or the bureaucratic regime. I n any case, the university i s not designed to impart the most elementary truths about living society. I n complicity with the established authorities, it tries to hide or to distort these truths and even to insist on falsifications. The insistent demands of the students for freedom of political inquiry and activity and control over the universities they attend bring on the now familiar head-on confrontations with the academic officials and the ruling class or bureaucratic caste which stands behind them. While the specific issues—whether on or off the campus—which incite or rally the students to action vary considerably from one country to another, and even from one university to another, their movements are strikingly similar in pattern. The rebellious students find themselves arrayed against the powers that be and confronted with a showdown struggle. Thus the sitdown occupation of the Belgrade university in June 1968 precipitated a national political crisis in Yugoslavia, as did the demonstrations of the French students a month earlier. The student demonstrations in West Germany, Japan, Pakistan, Egypt, and California have had powerful political repercussions. I n the last two decades, as it has grown in size, the student population has strikingly altered in complexion in several important ways. 1. The time spent as a student has appreciably lengthened. Millions of young adults now spend their most productive and energetic years in the university environment. Many family restraints have been left behind, and they are not yet restricted to holding down a job to earn their livelihood. They have access to more information than the ordinary citizen, and time to absorb and discuss its implications. 2 . They are concentrated in educational institutions or areas to a degree exceeding the work force in all but the most giant factory complexes. The overwhelming majority of these educational institutions throughout the world are located in the major urban industrial centers, where the working class is also

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concentrated and where the decisive battles for power will take place. 3 . While the composition of the student body in the capitalist lands is still preponderantly middle class in origin, there has been some influx ( a significant one in the United States) from working class backgrounds. 4 . Social distinctions and stratifications within the student body are not so sharply defined as they were twenty or thirty years ago. A college degree no longer means that the holder automatically becomes a government functionary, a small businessman, or a member of the professions. Under today’s advanced technology, a college graduate will more likely become a highly paid technician or a skilled worker in the productive apparatus. H e has nothing to sell but his more qualified labor power, and no perspective of escaping the essential condition of a wage worker. These circumstances tend to link him more closely to the industrial working class. The attitudes of university students are more and more influenced by this situation, s o that growing numbers tend to identify with the status awaiting them after graduation rather than with their family origin. 5 . The owners and organizers of the economy are far more dependent for the operation of their enterprises upon the qualified personnel coming from the higher educational institutions and are therefore far more concerned about their moods, attitudes, and political orientations. 6 . Students have stronger ties than previously with the rest of their generation in the high schools, factories, and draftee armies, making their radicalization a more serious matter for the rulers. Regardless of class, youth are subject to more or less the same restrictions imposed by the norms of patriarchial bourgeois society, norms which usually prevail even in the countries that have abolished capitalist property relations. They are subject to laws, such as those dealing with the same discriminatory political rights, military conscription, and social restrictions. These factors help to cement the ties between various social strata of the generation. All these conditions taken together give the student population impressive social and political significance. The opinions and actions of this social layer have great impact on national life. The new features of academic life are most evident in such powers as the United States, Japan, highly industrialized Germany, and the Soviet Union. But all countries which compete

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in the world market or the military arena are subjected to their presence and pressures to one degree or another. The pace of the global radicalization of the students, the ways in which it is refracted through diverse issues, and the depth of its impact vary considerably in the developed capitalist countries, the workers’ states, and the colonial lands. Nonetheless, the intensity and impact of the student demonstrations in Paris and Tokyo, Mexico and Brazil, Egypt and Pakistan, Poland and Czechoslovakia, testify to the universality of the phenomenon. The almost instantaneous world communications network and the degree of international travel play a large role in this continuing universalization. The rebellious youth in one area rapidly copy the methods, take up the slogans, and study the political lessons of struggles in other areas. The general admiration for heroes such as Che, and the common inspiration drawn from the Vietnamese revolution, are indices of a surprising degree of homogeneity in the youth vanguard the world over. They speak a common language. The international interdependence of political ideas and experiences is key to understanding the current student radicalization as a world phenomenon, despite the variations determined by national particularities. Given the various social and political factors outlined above and the explosive character of our epoch, the current student radicalization is not j u s t a conjunctural phenomenon, but a permanent one that will be of continual concern to the revolutionary movement from now o n .

I I . Ideology

and politics of the student

radicals

The student radicals exhibit a broad spectrum of ideological tendencies and political positions. For the most part, they disdain the Stalinism of the Moscow school and the reformism of the Social Democracy. The treacherous, class-collaborationist role of Stalinism and Social Democracy is responsible for the fact that the student radicals as they gain political understanding have n o mass workers’ parties to turn to, to learn the traditions and organizational and political norms of revolutionary politics. The new generation of radicals begins by rejecting Stalinism and Social Democracy, and bypassing them in action. I n doing so they usually come to see themselves initially not so much as a clearly defined alternative ideological current but as an alternative political vanguard, united in action around particular issues.

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I n their quest for a new ideological basis, the student rebels originally resurrected some of the primitive notions which had been tested and found wanting i n earlier periods of socialist and labor history. The emphasis placed by the Cuban leaders on practice and their discounting of theory helped to foster this trend. The new radicals initially neglected scientific theory and a carefully worked-out political program of struggle in favor of pragmatic expedients. These served as a charter for impressionism and opportunism, and later as an excuse for adventurism. I n place of democratic centralism, “participatory democracy” and decentralization were advanced as nostrums. Under these banners, however, small, uncontrolled cliques often manipulated movements in an undemocratic way. They substituted spasmodic actions, “propaganda of the deed,” or “revolutionary style” for patient and persistent organization of the revolutionary forces. The radical student movement goes through different organizational stages and forms, but these are not necessarily consecutive. Thus while in one country the student movement may evolve from a “student unionism” phase, through an anarchistic “participatory democracy” stage, to a stage where it sees itself a s made up of various ideological tendencies, in another country all these various forms and stages may well overlap to a greater degree, or exist simultaneously. Many of the radical student currents failed to recognize, or denied, the decisive historic role of the working class and its revolutionary vanguard party. The essence of their position was repudiation of Marxism in the field of ideology and Leninism in the sphere of organization. O n the key question of Stalinism, over which many had begun their course to the left, they were unable to explain its nature as the historical antithesis of Leninism.

The basic weaknesses of many of the student radicals— instability, ultraleftism, and inability to solve the organizational question—are rooted in the social nature of these currents. The same conditions which enable them to quickly reach a high level of political sensitivity—more leisure, less job discipline—make it more difficult for them to understand the need for a permanent organization, long-term strategy, and patient and persevering political action. The result was the paradoxical phenomenon of large numbers of young people moving to the left of the Communist and Social Democratic parties in their temper and activities but remaining

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deficient

in

their

theoretical

equipment

and

organizational

concepts.

For example, a layer of the new radicals in the West drew inspiration from the views of C . Wright Mills, Herbert Marcuse, and others, who doubted the capacity of the working class to serve a s the prime historical agency for social change, denying that it possessed the revolutionary potential ascribed to it by Marxist theory. They disqualified the industrial workers. I n the advanced capitalist countries they interpreted the twenty years of relative quiescence as evidence of a permanent structural characteristic of the working class. In the workers’ states, they held the workers to be incapable of breaking the rigid bureaucratization. I n the colonial world, they noted that workers were often a relatively privileged layer compared to the poor peasantry, and drew the conclusion they were thus incapable of leading revolutionary struggles. They identified the working class movement with the Stalinist and Social Democratic organizations and union officialdoms. They initially saw the possibility of victorious revolution in the postwar period only in the colonial world, where the peasantry remains preponderant. The general crisis of bourgeois ideology and the repulsive aspects of bourgeois society that have started many radical youths in search of collective political solutions induced others, often known as “hippies” or “beatniks,” to seek an individual means of maintaining personal freedom without overturning capitalism. Some have reached utopian positions, believing that bourgeois society can be transformed through love and unselfishness. This tendency toward petty-bourgeois escapism and selfindulgence, the search for a new “life style,” has its political reflection country.

in the various

anarchistic

tendencies

that exist in every

However, the political outlook of the radical students h a s not remained static. I t has begun to evolve quite rapidly in the past two years. The various currents have been exposed to all contending schools of thought in the radical milieu, have gone through intense internal disputes and sometimes bitter factional alignments, and started to regroup. Maoism, spontaneism, neoanarchism, state capitalism, Castroism, and Trotskyism have all won adherents and left their marks on the activists and their organizations.

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The new radicals often attempt to combine theoretical and ideological elements from all the various political currents in the working class. But after a time, the march of events and experience

in struggle

compel many

of them to define and further

clarify their positions. Political tendencies emerge which basically reflect the different currents in the world labor movement. The thrust of the youth radicalization has been away from the opportunism of the Moscow wing of Stalinism and the Social Democracy. But lacking mass organizations with principled class struggle traditions from which they can learn, and frustrated b y the limitations placed on the role a student vanguard can play, the biggest danger in the student movement becomes one of ultraleftism. Competing with and systematic polemicizing against these various opponent currents is an essential part of winning

the

best

elements

to

the

banner

of

revolutionary

Marxism. The various weaknesses which are often seen among the new radicals and their organizations, however, come nowhere near outweighing their strengths: 1 . By and large, national and international politics absorb the new generation of radicals. Often unacquainted with extensive mass mobilizations in their own living experience, many have had to arrive at revolutionary conclusions through independent critical thought, and have had to work out solutions on their own to important and complex problems. 2 . The days of Communist and Socialist youth organizations primarily concerned with social activities and sports contests are gone. The best of today’s radical youth are attracted to the revolutionary youth groups and join them because of the militant actions they initiate or take part in, around the most burning political issues of the day, and because of their political programs,

their

international

perspectives,

their

seriousness

toward theory. 3 . Above all, the current radicalism of the youth is characterized by the rebirth of an authentic internationalism, the kind of solidarity that is the complete opposite of the narrow bureaucratic nationalism of the Stalinist movement. The greatest impetus to this development has been given by the Vietnamese and Cuban revolutions. The courage of the Vietnamese in resisting the aggression of American imperialism helped bring into being a worldwide effort on their behalf. The Cubans contributed to this revival by setting an example in their own appeals, by Che’s call

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for “two, three, many Vietnams,” and by their insistence that the best way to defend a revolution under attack from imperialism i s to spread it to other countries. The new radical generation i s aware that it confronts a common enemy in imperialism, the capitalist ruling class of the United States in the first place. It has already shared a series of common political experiences in the struggle against imperialism (Cuba, Vietnam). International campaigns are readily geared together and joint actions rendered more effective by the ease of communication and travel in the world today. 4. One of the most promising characteristics of the student radicalism i s its anti-authoritarian bent, its lack of respect for tradition and its readiness to challenge and question most of the hallowed norms, rules, and regulations of the past. I n its search for answers to problems which it did not create, the new generation is willing to consider with an open mind precisely those solutions which have been regarded as heretical and taboo. I n fact, whatever is opposed by the state, school, parents, church, employer, or bureaucracy is thereby recommended to the rebels.

5. Many young radicals are groping toward a revolutionary Marxist understanding of national and world politics. Leaving aside those who reject Marxism and Leninism out of prejudice, without seriously studying and testing them, most of them are earnestly striving to make their way in a confused, experimental way through the fog of lies and distortions spread by the capitalist agencies as well as the falsifiers of Marxism. They may b e temporarily diverted into the blind alleys of Maoism, neo-anarchism, or ultraleftism, but bit by bit they are rediscovering the truths of Marxism and learning how they apply to contemporary

reality.

It is these qualities of the new radicalization, and its development outside of, and as an alternative to, the organizational forms of Stalinism and Social Democracy, which give it key importance for the world Trotskyist movement. It i s the existence of broad currents with these political strengths that makes it possible and crucially important to build broad unitedfront organizations for struggle around specific issues. It i s also these political strengths that open unparalleled opportunities to win large numbers of this new generation to revolutionary Marxist youth organizations, and the very best of them to the revolutionary party.

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I I I . Strategy

233

of the red university

Radical student circles are hotly debating the central question of orientation. What should be the direction and objectives of the student struggle? What kind of relationship should the student movement seek with the broader struggle of the working masses and oppressed nationalities? What sort of program should the revolutionary vanguard put forward for the student movement? The reformist tendency maintains that students should concern themselves primarily with narrowly defined university issues— grades, courses, the quality of education, living conditions, narrow campus politics. They see struggles around such issues in isolation from the crisis of capitalist society as a whole. They counterpose such limited struggles to the inclinations of the politicalized students themselves to take up issues of key concern to the world, such as the war in Vietnam. At the opposite end of the spectrum stand the ultralefts. Most of their strategies come down to turning the energies of the student body away from the academic milieu altogether, to leaving the campus and taking the student activists to the factory gates or into the “community,” to distribute leaflets proclaiming the need for revolution. The Maoists epitomize this in the slogan “Serve the People.” Both of these orientations should be rejected as one-sided and sterile. The revolutionary youth vanguard, to b e effective, must put forward a program that transcends the campus in its goal, but at the same time includes it; that connects student demands with the broader demands of the class struggle on a national and international scale, that shows students how their own demands relate to these bigger struggles, are an integral part of them, and can help to advance them. The program put forward by the revolutionary youth must tie together the long-range perspectives and daily work of a revolutionist in the school arena. The program put forward by the revolutionary youth i s one that mobilizes for struggle around the basic issues of the world class struggle and the needs of the student population itself. The student population is not homogeneous. Students come from varying

class backgrounds

with

widely

differing

interests,

and they are on many different levels politically. Their only homogeneity consists of their common position a s students in a capitalist society and university—or a bureaucratically deformed workers’ state. Many politically advanced students, in the course of struggles

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around diverse issues, come to comprehend the need to gain control over their education and educational institutions, and to recognize that this goal can be fully satisified only with the revolutionary transformation of society. But they puzzle over a way of formulating the objective so as to tie it in with the current struggles in society as a whole. How can the battles over prevailing educational conditions be linked with the desired goal of completely transforming society? It is difficult for them to see how their fight as students fits into the general fight against capitalism. This is a source of frustration and of searches for shortcuts to the revolution, which, in turn, breed opportunism and ultraleftism. During the massive student protests in Yugoslavia in June 1968, the Belgrade students summarized their demands with the call “For a Red University!” This formulation was very apt in their situation. They meant that Yugoslavia i s supposed to have a socialist educational system but that actually it has been shaped to fit the interests of the ruling bureaucracy. Consequently the Yugoslav students face problems that are quite comparable to those faced by students in the capitalist countries. To solve these problems, they demanded that the Yugoslav educational system be transformed to what it ought to be—let the bureaucratic university give way to a “Red” university. This idea was also advanced by radical students in some of the capitalist countries and adapted to their situations. “For a University that Serves the Working People—for a Red University!” With this basic orientation radical students seek to answer the questions: “What kind of education shall students get? Toward what ends should this education be directed? Who shall control the educational facilities? What layers in society should the educational institutions serve?” The concept of the red university means that the university ought to be transformed from a factory producing robots into an organizing center for anticapitalist activities, a powerhouse for revolutionary education, an arena for mobilizing youth in a struggle for the complete transformation of society. The red university concept, as it has appeared on the campus up to this point, is a big advance over slogans which refer to the narrower goal of student-faculty control over the university. The struggle for autonomy and self-administration is only one aspect of a rounded program aimed at helping students to understand the role of the university under capitalist domination, to educate

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them to the need for a socialist revolution and to enlist them in the movement to bring the broadest layers of this generation into the struggle for that revolution. Included in the concept of the red university is the need to counter the teaching of bourgeois ideology, which goes under the name of “education,” whether in the field of sociology, philosophy, economics, psychology, or whatever. Revolutionary students must understand the need to confront the prestige and authority of the capitalist university and its normally procapitalist faculty on its own level of theory and ideology. They must fight against converting knowledge and its acquisition into a mystique, the concept that higher education is something reserved for a select and highly intelligent few and not accessible or comprehensible to the working masses. The university as an instrument in the class struggle—a red university—is opposed to the liberal view of the university as a sanctuary of a privileged minority, remaining aloof from the social and political controversies in the rest of society. The resources of the university should be made available to the exploited, the poor, and the oppressed. Students and faculty should have an absolute right to invite anyone they please to address them on any subjects they wish. They should be free to establish close ties with the working class organizations and parties, the minorities, and the popular masses, becoming a source of information and enlightenment for them. The strategy of seeking to convert the capitalist university into a red university has special application in reference to oppressed national minorities. The need for one or more leading centers of higher education has been felt at some stage by every powerful movement of an oppressed people for self-determination. I n the struggle for national freedom in the epoch of the death agony of capitalism, a university shaped for the special needs of an oppressed nation serves as a symbol and an agency for developing national consciousness and national culture in a way most conducive to overcoming narrow nationalist limitations and perspective. For both the struggle an international giving democratic and socialist reasons, the demand for the establishment, extension, and improvement of such facilities under nationalist control must be fought for by the revolutionary vanguard. In Belgium the demand for Flemish universities in Flanders, notably at Louvain, won broad support among the Flemish-

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speaking population, and a struggle over this issue even brought down a government cabinet in Belgium. I n the United States, owing to the rise of Black nationalism as an increasingly strong force among the Afro-Americans, the red university concept has appeared in the variation, “For a Black University!” The insistence of Black students upon greater access to higher education, upon control over the curricula, finances, and professors in independent facilities where they can study their own culture and history, upon the inclusion of courses of and upon opening the particular interest to Afro-Americans, doors to Third World students has led to university and high school battles from one end of the country to the other. Backed up by direct actions involving both Black and white students and faculty members, the actions aimed at forcing the school authorities to concede on these issues have exposed the determination of the white supremacist rulers to maintain control over their educational factories. These efforts have also awakened many students to the revolutionary implications of Black nationalism and the lengths to which the capitalist class will go to oppose the Afro-American struggle for liberation. As is shown by its origin, the call for a red university is similarly applicable to student struggles in the Soviet bloc. The universities in the workers’ states have acted as prime centers for expressing grievances of the populace against the bureaucratic regimes. I n their recent struggles, the Polish, Yugoslav, and Czechoslovak students have advanced concrete demands stemming not only from their own particular problems but also from those facing the entire working class and its allies. Prominent among these have been the call for political freedom, workers’ control

of production,

a n d an end to social inequalities.

I n the colonial and semicolonial countries the concept of the red university can readily b e linked with the traditions of radicalism and the struggle to establish or to preserve university autonomy. There the students are now playing, as they have often done in the past, a role of first-rate importance in the struggle for revolutionary

goals. They

have undertaken

actions

that rapidly

bring them into conflict with antidemocratic regimes, that soon involve issues going beyond the universities and lead to the mobilization of popular support among the workers, peasants, and other oppressed sectors of the people. The battles engaged in by the radical students of Mexico,

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Brazil, Bolivia, Pakistan, India, Egypt, Mali, Turkey, and a number of comparable countries show how universal this pattern is.

I V . A program of democratic transitional demands

and

The universities and high schools are all the more important because of the size of the forces involved; their mood of combativity; the actual struggles they themselves initiate; their location in the big cities, where the greatest potential forces for revolution are assembled; their ties to the workers, peasants, and plebeian sectors; and their readiness to include issues going far beyond immediate campus problems. I n addition to all this, experience h a s repeatedly shown how valuable the universities and high schools are, both a s testing grounds for the education and development of young radicals and as sources of recruitment to the revolutionary party. An impressive example of the possibilities opened up by a correct policy is provided by the international campaign which was organized b y student militants in a number of key countries in support of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front and its struggle against American imperialism. To launch the solidarity campaign, international connections in university circles were utilized. Through agitation and action around this issue, hundreds of thousands of students became politicalized and radicalized. The attempts to organize large numbers of students in demonstrations on behalf of the Vietnamese revolution frequently posed the right of the students to use university facilities for ends that outraged the authorities, bringing the students into collision with them. Political issues were thus brought to the fore in sharp form. These confrontations i n turn mobilized more students

in the defense

o f their democratic

rights

and further intensified the struggle. The validity of the political approach outlined in the founding document

o f the world Trotskyist

movement,

The Death Agony of

Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International, has received striking confirmation in the struggles involving the students. What is now required is to apply this approach in a better-planned and more thorough way, working out a set of democratic and transitional demands for application in this field as it stands today.

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from, or countercannot be isolated The student struggles posed to, the political issues arising out of the world class struggle as a whole. Neither can the struggle for the red university b e isolated from the task of building a “red” youth organization with links to a “red” Leninist party. Similarly, the program of democratic and transitional demands arising from the student struggles is organically linked to the rest of the transitional program as outlined in the founding document and developed since then. The program of demands for the student movement represents a concrete application of the general approach outlined in The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International. The ultimate objective of the Fourth International i s to link the student struggles with the struggles of the workers and national minorities at their present levels of development and to orient them toward a combined drive for state power, bringing into the struggle all the forces opposed to the capitalist or bureaucratic regimes.

Proceeding from the existing state of development and level of consciousness of the students, these demands express their most urgent needs and grievances, directing them in the most effective way against the institutions and authorities that have come under fire from the students themselves. In mobilizing around such slogans, young militants can come to understand the validity of the transitional program as a whole and become educated to the necessity of a fundamental change in the entire capitalist system. Because of the decay of the capitalist system and the erosion of democratic conquests, made in some instances almost two centuries ago, many of today’s student struggles begin over the most elementary issues, such as the right of free speech. However, they tend to develop beyond this level quite rapidly, going beyond the campus, beyond the framework of democratic freedoms as conceived in the most revolutionary phases of capitalism in its rise, reaching into the economic area and bringing up problems that can actually b e solved only under a socialist system. A clear understanding of this logical progression makes it possible to advance a consistent series of interlocking slogans that can readily be adjusted for particular situations. Above all, it facilitates the recognition of suitable slogans of this type originating from the ranks in combat. A combined demand for free education and for a decent

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standard of living—to which everyone h as a democratic right but which can b e provided only in a socialist society that ha s overcome the limitations of the capitalist system—is offered in the following series of suggestions for students in orienting their actions: 1. A university education for everyone who wants one, the full expense to b e underwritten by the government. 2. N o maximum age limit on free education; no limitation on the number of years a person may continue in school, or resume school after dropping out, postgraduate studies included. 3. Decent housing for students. 4. An annual salary for all students, adequate to their needs and safeguarded against inflation by automatic compensating increases. 5. Guaranteed jobs for students upon graduation.

I n the struggle by students for control over their own education the following list of “student power” demands have been advanced to one degree or another in various universities internationally: 1. Abolish government-controlled student organizations. Recognize the right of students to organize and govern themselves according to their own free choice. 2. Joint control by students and faculty over the hiring and firing of faculty members and administrative officials. 3. Let the students themselves democratically decide what subjects should b e taught. 4. Abolish the powers of professors and administrators to arbitrarily penalize students. 5. Freedom of political association for students and professors. 6. The right to utilize university facilities to promote educational and cultural activities of direct interest to organizations of the working class, peasants, oppressed nationalities, and plebeian masses . I n the struggle for political freedom on the campus, some of the following slogans have become central issues in major confrontations: 1. University autonomy, to be won or to be kept inviolate. 2. Repeal of all laws infringing civil liberties. End the witchhunt 3. The police and all other repressive forces to b e strictly banned from entering university grounds and buildings.

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The Transitional Program

4. Dismiss all government officials responsible for victimizing students, workers, national minorities, political dissidents. 5. Dissolve the special police forces and secret political police. 6. Release all the political prisoners. 7. Abolish the censorship, whether official or “voluntary,” of the press, radio, television, and the arts and sciences. 8. For freedom of the press, freedom of association and organization, freedom of speech, assembly, petition, and travel, and the right to engage in demonstrations. I n student struggles directly involving national minorities, the fight for their rights comes sharply and specifically to the fore, as has been dramatically shown in the United States in relation to the struggle for Black liberation. The issues arise most often around violations of democratic rights, or battles to establish them. They are not confined to the university level but extend throughout the educational system to the primary grades. Consequently struggles in this field immediately affect the oppressed communities as a whole to a much greater degree than is the c a s e with majority groups, and the issues are more easily seen as involving much broader questions concerning the perspectives of a national minority in a decaying capitalist society. Because of this, the possibility of student struggles having catalytic effects in the minority communities deserves special attention. The slogans in this field can be summarized in the following categories:

1. Recognition of the right of the oppressed national minority communities to control their own public affairs, including education from kindergarten up. 2. Representation of national minorities on all policy-making or policy-implementing bodies of the schools. 3. Against racism and great-power chauvinism. For truthful teaching of the history and culture of oppressed national minorities in all schools, with periodic reviews by educational committees elected by the oppressed national minorities. 4. Recognition of the unconditional right of a national minority to use its own language in the educational system. training educational government-financed 5. Unlimited through postgraduate study for oppressed national minorities. 6. Establishment of adequately financed, independent, university-level educational facilities under control of national minorities.

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A special area of concern to students i s the relationship between the school administration and the giant corporations and their government. For big business and the military, the university constitutes an indispensable recruiting ground. Linked with this is the role of the universities in highly questionable research projects undertaken in the “public interest.” I n connection with antiwar campaigns, where a natural connection is easily seen, important struggles have been initiated in this area. Typical slogans fall into the following sequence: 1. E n d the ties between the university and the military. 2. Abolish secret research by the university for the government.

3 . Abolish secret subversion by government agencies of student organizations. 4 . Expose the ties between university officials and big business by making public all investments, holdings, and contracted projects of the university and of all directors, trustees, and administrators. 5 . Abolish research of special interest to big business. 6 . N o recruiting of personnel on the campus by the big corporations. 7 . Lower the voting age and the age limit o n holding public office. Old enough to fight, old enough to vote and to have a voice in deciding public affairs.

The permanent perspective of large armed forces in the capitalist countries, aimed against the colonial revolution and the workers’ states and available for domestic repression, makes the following

central

demands

important

to student

youth as well as

working class youth and youth of national minorities. 1. Defend the democratic rights of all youth conscripted in the army. N o restrictions on soldiers exercising their full citizenship rights. 2. Abolish capitalist conscription. I n countries suffering totalitarian regimes as in Spain, South Africa, and elsewhere, the universities have repeatedly demonstrated their importance as incubating centers of organized revolt. The experience in Spain is now particularly rich in showing how the efforts of students to break the grip of government-sponsored student organizations and to organize along independent lines parallels similar efforts by the working class and interlocks with them.

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The Transitional Program

Here the campus struggle centers around a single broad demand: For university autonomy! As already indicated, this can readily be formulated in particular slogans that grade into slogans transcending the struggle on the campus and connecting up with broader issues involving the workers, peasants, and plebeian masses in the cities. The situation i s symmetrical to this in most of the workers’ states. Here the student struggle naturally follows the orientation of .pointing up the contrast between the official socialist ideology and propaganda and the lack of anything resembling the socialist democracy which Lenin stood for and explained in State and Revolution. As shown in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union itself, the sequence of demands tends to go as follows: 1. Freedom of discussion on philosophical, cultural, and scientific questions. The right to express a critical viewpoint. 2. Freedom to discuss histOrical questions. Let the truth come out! 3. Freedom to discuss current political issues. 4. Abolish the censorship. 5. For the right to organize and demonstrate. 6. N o political persecution. Let the public, including foreign observers, b e admitted to all trials. 7. Freedom of travel. N o restrictions on sending representatives to visit youth organizations in other countries or in receiving their representatives on visits. 8 . Eliminate self-perpetuating social inequalities and the special privileges of the bureaucracy. 9. Return to revolutionary internationalism. 10. Solidarity with the struggles of the oppressed in other lands. Youth radicalism is not restricted to college and university levels. I t h a s widely permeated the high schools and in some places even the upper primary grades. High school students in numerous countries have turned out by the thousands in the mobilizations against the Vietnam War and have been among their most enthusiastic and energetic supporters. The high school students organized i n CAL (Comités d’Action Lycéen) played a major role in the actions before, during, and following the MayJune 1968 events in France. At a certain point in the development of every revolutionary youth organization, its ability to organize, lead, and win over

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decisive layers of high school youth becomes a key test. Revolutionary socialist youth organizations must take the lead in organizing the secondary school youth, fighting with them for their rights and seeking to coordinate their activities with other sections of the anticapitalist struggle. Scheduled to enter the higher institutions of learning or go in large numbers into the factories, these young activists will provide an invaluable ferment of militancy and socialist consciousness in both arenas. To put forward and fight for such slogans and goals, to advance them in a way to take full advantage of openings and opportunities, requires a Marxist leadership that is politically alert, tactically flexible, and able to avoid falling into either opportunistic adaptation to the student environment or into ultraleft sectarianism.

V. The revolutionary and the party

youth

organization

The scope of the current student radicalization presents an unprecedented opening for expanding the influence and cadres of the parties of the Fourth International. Hundreds of thousands of young radicals no longer intimidated by the poisonous propaganda of Stalinism are ready to listen with open minds to the views of Trotskyism. Tens of thousands have already accepted large parts of the Trotskyist program. Their aversion to Stalinism and the Social Democracy makes it possible for an honest revolutionary alternative

to gain ascendancy

among

decisive sections of the

new radicals. Substantial numbers of them can be recruited fairly rapidly into the ranks of the Fourth International. The experience of the world Trotskyist movement during the past few years has shown that its work among the youth can most effectively be carried forward through revolutionary socialist youth organizations fratemally associated with the sections of the Fourth International but organizationally independent of them. The Trotskyist forces in various countries vary greatly in size, and they are in different stages of growth and development. Different tactics will have to be used to reach the goal of constructing a revolutionary socialist youth organization— including participation in other youth formations. But all such activity should be seen as a tactical step toward the construction of such an organization.

244

The Transitional Program

I t i s important to note that the social and political analysis of the student movement today and the world situation in which it is developing shows the objective basis for such independent revolutionary socialist youth organization. The independent youth organization can attract radicalizing young people who have not yet made up their minds about joining any political party of the left and who are not yet committed to the Bolshevik perspective of becoming lifetime revolutionists, but who are willing and ready to participate in a broad range of political actions together with the revolutionary party and its members. I t can lead actions and take initiatives in the student movement in its own name. It can serve as a valuable training and testing ground for candidates for party cadre status, and make it easier for them to acquire the political and organizational experience and education required for serious revolutionary activity. Membership in the revolutionary socialist youth organization enables young radicals to decide their own policies, organize their own actions, make their own mistakes, and learn their own lessons. Their form of organization also has many advantages for the revolutionary party itself. I t provides a reservoir for recruitment to the party. It helps prevent the party from acting as a youth organization and from lowering the norms of a Bolshevik organization on discipline, political maturity, and level of theoretical understanding to the less demanding levels of an organization agreeable to the youth.

V I . The tasks o f the among the youth

Fourth

International

Three interrelated tasks are indicated by this analysis of the sweep of the radicalization of the youth. These are: 1. To win the leadership of the radical youth in the spheres of both ideology and action. 2. To build strong Marxist youth organizations. 3 . To draw new cadres from the youth to replenish the ranks and supply fresh energy to the leadership of the sections of the Fourth International. The Trotskyist youth have greater possibilities of leading substantial forces in action than any other tendency i n the radical movement. I n several countries they have already proved

Strategy for Revolutionary Youth

245

capable of initiating and directing movements of considerable proportions and significance. One example is the worldwide campaign undertaken in defense of the Vietnamese revolution. Another is the role played by the Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire in the historic May-June 1968 days in France. A third is the ideological influence of the Fourth Internationalists in the movement led by the National Strike Council of the Mexican students. No tendency can hope to root itself in and gain political leadership of the radical youth that does not fully and audaciously participate in the front ranks of its ongoing struggles, whatever shortcomings they may have. At certain points the youth movement can only progress through action, and the absence of action can condemn it to prolonged division and sterility. The Trotskyist youth must set the example in practice, as well as in theoretical concepts and political pronouncements. However, there is an abundance of activism, of readiness to struggle and sacrifice, among the ranks of youth. What is most lacking in the new generation is theoretical training, political clarity, and a correct line of struggle. This side of the revolutionary socialist youth movement is of decisive importance for its further development. Growing recognition of this will become registered in the widening influence of Trotskyism. The superiority of the Trotskyist movement over its opponents and rivals comes from its sound Marxist foundations, its Bolshevik traditions, its programmatic comprehensiveness and correctness, its adherence to socialist internationalism. These features likewise constitute its chief attraction to radicalizing youth. While spreading the ideas of Trotskyism among the youth with whom they participate in united combat, the Fourth Internationalists

must

seek

to construct

a

revolutionary

Marxist

youth

organization that will systematically educate its members a nd followers Trotskyist

among

i n the m e t h o d s , doctrines, a n d positions o f the movement, from its o r i g i n s . A l l the results o f activity

the youth can

b e jeopardized if the organizational

requisite for t h i s educational

work i s neglected.

Work among the youth i s not an e n d in itself. I t reaches fruition i n the impetus given to the construction or reinforcement of the revolutionary parties that will b e capable of leading the working c la s s to victory. The sections of th e Fourth International are a s yet too s m a l l to l e a d the m a s s e s

i n their o w n n a m e

and under

their ow n banner i n a decisive struggle for power. Their work h a s

246

The Transitional Program

a preparatory and predominantly propagandistic character involving limited actions. Their task now i s to win and educate decisive numbers of the radical youth in order to equip them for the greater task of winning leadership of the revolutionary elements among the working masses. To fulfill that function adequately, the youth recruits must thoroughly assimilate the organizational concepts politically and its methods of constructing of Bolshevism homogeneous and democratically centralized parties. The construction of such parties in the struggles that are erupting i s the only means of overcoming the crisis of leadership which i s the central contradiction of our epoch. Government authorities the world over, whether in the advanced capitalist powers, the workers’ states, or the colonial world, are becoming increasingly concerned over the unrest among their youth, which is becoming more and more unmanageable. Their worries are justified. This rising generation has already manifested a tremendous potential for radical activity and a powerful will to change the status q u o . Whoever succeeds in winning the allegiance of the most intelligent and devoted activists among the rebel youth holds the key to the future. For they will play a major role in making history and deciding the destiny of mankind for the rest of the twentieth century. Insurgent students in a number of countries have already shown how their initiative in confronting the established powers can serve to stimulate struggle i n other sectors of society. The young workers will be in the forefront of the movements to break the grip of the bureaucratic machines in the unions and will set an example for the older generation in their militancy and interest

i n revolutionary

politics.

The Fourth International cannot afford to default i n what is its central task today—winning and assimilating the best of the rebel youth. A good start has already been m a d e i n a number of countries. I t is now imperative to build o n these achievements. This requires better coordination of the activities of t h e youth groups o f the different sections a n d c l o s e r collaboration o n s u c h projects a s antiwar and defense c a m p a i g n s a n d the d e v e l o p m e n t

of new openings for the movement internationally. The aim i s to enable the Fourth International to become t h e recognized voice, organizer, a n d leader of the y o u t h , w h o are called upon to advance the world revolution.

NOTES

1. I n the second stage of the Fourth International’s “prehistory” (193338), the leadership had to contend with a number of tendencies that sought to change the positions of the movement in a sectarian or ultraleft direction. Among these were groups advocating abstention toward the civil war in Spain and the Sino-Japanese War, and abandonment of the movement’s position that the U S S R was a degenerated workers’ state which revolutionaries should defend against imperialist attack at the same time they worked for a political revolution to overthrow Stalinism and restore workers’ democracy. “ T h e s e s ” refers to the resolutions adopted at the founding convention of the SWP and a t the second national

congress

o f the Internationalist

Workers

Party

( P O I ) , French

section of the M F I , October 30—November 2, 1937, most of which were printed in the SWP and POI public press at the t i m e . 2. J a m e s P . Cannon (1890-1974) was an IWW organizer, a leader of the left wing i n the Socialist Party, and a founder of the American Communist Party. H e became a supporter of the Left Opposition when he was a C P delegate to the Comintern’s Sixth World Congress i n Moscow i n 1928. Expelled from the C P , h e helped to found the Militant i n 1928, the Communist League of America (Left Opposition) in 1929, and the Socialist Workers

Party

i n 1938.

H e w a s national

secretary

o f the S W P a t

the time of these discussions, and later that year served as a delegate to the founding conference of the Fourth International, where h e was elected to its International Executive Committee. 3. M a x Shachtman

( 1 9 0 3 - 7 2 ) w a s o n e o f the founders

o f the Militant,

the CLA, and the SWP, as well as editor of several books and pamphlets by Trotsky. H e was a delegate to the founding conference of the Fourth International and was elected to its International Executive Committee. After renouncing the movement’s position on the Soviet Union and splitting with the SWP in 1940, h e organized the Workers Party, later renamed the Independent Socialist League, which h e led into the Socialist Party i n 1958.

4. A d o l p h e w a s a pseudonym of Rudolf Klement (1910-38), who had been a secretary of Trotsky in Turkey and France and w a s n o w administrative secretary of the MFI’s International Secretariat and was 247

248

The Transitional Program

in charge of preparations for the founding conference. H e was kidnapped by the Soviet secret police in Paris in July 1938, and his dismembered body w a s found in the Seine shortly before the founding conference. U n s e r Wort (Our Word) was the paper of the Internationalist Communists of Germany (IKD), the German section of the MFI; it was published in exile.

5 . D i e g o Rivera (1886-1957) was the renowned painter who helped obtain asylum in Mexico for Trotsky in 1937. His draft thesis on problems of development in Latin America was published in the October 1938 issue of Clave (Key), a Fourth Internationalist magazine published i n Mexico. H e quit the Fourth International in 1939 and later became a Stalinist; Trotsky’s discussion of their differences is in Writings of Leon Trotsky (1938-39). was an American program and movement that 6 . Technocracy achieved a vogue in the early years of the depression, particularly i n the middle class. I t proposed to overcome the depression and bring about full employment b y rationalizing the U S . economy and monetary system under the control of engineers and technical experts—all this without class struggle or revolution. The movement eventually split into left and right wings, with the latter developing fascist tendencies.

7 . Ferdinand Lundberg’s 1937 book America’s Sixty Families documented the existence of an economic oligarchy in the U S . headed by sixty families of immense wealth. H e brought the work up to date in 1968 under the title The Rich and the Super-Rich. The Annalist was a n American “magazine of finance, commerce and economics,” 1913-40. 8 . The Communist ( 1 8 1 8 - 8 3 ) a n d Frederick

Manifesto Engels

was written in 1847 by K a r l Marx (1820-95), the cofounders

o f the modern

socialist movement. Trotsky reviews the Manifesto, discussing both its partially outdated and its still fully relevant sections, in “Ninety Years of the C o m m u n i s t Manifesto,” October 30, 1937, i n Writings of Leon Trotsky (1937-38). 9 . The SWP discussion o n the labor party had the following history: I n 1929, the first national conference of the Communist League of America voted i n favor of advocating the formation of an independent labor party based o n the trade unions i n America. I n 1931, the second CLA conference, partly under Trotsky’s influence, changed this position, deciding that it would b e wrong to advocate such a party. I n both cases, the

emphasis

was

o n advocacy;

revolutionaries

were

n o t barred

from

working inside labor parties where they existed or arose. I n 1938, the S W P ’ s founding convention routinely reaffirmed the 1931 CLA position against advocacy. although its members h a d been working for s o m e time i n labor party organizations such a s existed i n Minnesota. I n 1929 a n d 1931 there h a d been little pro-labor party sentiment i n the American labor movement, b u t by the mid-thirties s u c h sentiment began to develop

Notes

249

considerable strength, especially i n the new industrial u n i o n s . I n Minnesota the Farmer-Labor Association (or Farmer-Labor Party, FLP) was able to take over the state government; i n New York the American Labor Party h a d the support of the most important unions; and elsewhere the economic recession of 1937 had spurred new interest in independent labor political action. After the SWP convention, its leaders began to discuss the possibility of changing its anti-advocacy policy. Trotsky favored such a change, and h e welcomed the opportunity to discuss the question, which to him was directly related to the methodology of the Transitional Program a s a whole. 10. The C I O (Committee of Industrial Organizations) was formed in October 1935 as a committee inside the conservative American Federation of Labor (AFL) to promote the unionization of the unorganized mass industries, which the AFL had largely ignored up to then. Labor’s N onPartisan League (LNPL) was set up i n April 1936 as the political arm chiefly of the C I O international unions, although some non-CIO unions joined it too. LNPL presented itself as an important step toward independent political action, but the main motive of its leaders w a s to provide the C I O with a non-Democratic Party vehicle for supporting the Democratic candidates in the 1936 elections. I t declined in influence after the C I O leaders split over the 1940 presidential election, and ended u p a s the lobbying arm of the United Mine Workers. The C I O unions were expelled from the AFL in 1938 and set u p a rival labor federation, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, which survived until 1955, when it merged with the AFL to form the AFL-CIO. 11. Republican-Fusion w a s a coalition between New York “progressive” Republicans and “good government” reformers against the Democratic Party’s corrupt Tammany H a l l machine in the mid-thirties. Franklin D . Roosevelt (1882-1945) was Democratic president of the U S . four times, 1933-45. His “ N e w Deal” reforms (relief projects, welfare, social security, etc.) were unable to restore the economy to predepression levels until World War II, but they enabled h i m , with the help of the union bureaucrats, Stalinists, and Social Democrats, to contain the radicalization of the workers and their allies a n d to keep it from reaching an independent political form.

12. “ T h e unions”

Stalinists

refers

who

to a transitory

have

been

l o c a l situation

driven

o u t o f the

in Minnesota;

trade

actually, the

Communist Party’s influence i n the labor movement nationally h a d never been a s great as i t was in 1938. 13. A “ b l o c o f t h e Trotskyist

unions”

other A F L a n d C I O u n i o n s i n M i n n e s o t a a n d its a l l i e s i n the u n i o n m o v e m e n t .

refers to the Teamsters and

under the influence

of the SWP

14. V i n c e n t R . D u n n e (1890-1970), after m a n y years of activity i n the IWW and the C P , w a s o n e of the founders of the Left Opposition and the

250

The Transitional Program

S W P . H e was a leader of the Minneapolis truck drivers’ strikes i n the thirties, and one of the eighteen SWP and Teamsters leaders prosecuted in 1941 and imprisoned for their antiwar activity. 15. I n N e w Jersey, LNPL helped set up a state committee to convene a farmer-labor party in the future, but the party itself was never created. 16. John

L.

Lewis

(1880-1969)

was

president

o f the

United

Mine

Workers, 1920-60, and principal leader of the C I O from its beginning until his resignation in 1940. Sidney Hillman (1887-1946) was president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. By 1938 h e had long ago “transcended” the socialism of his youth and was the second most important figure in the C 1 0 . 17. Plenum refers to a plenary (full) session of the SWP’s National Committee. The next one was scheduled for late April 1938. 18. The hybrid form o f labor party i n N e w Y o r k w a s the American Labor Party, which was formed in J u l y 1936 a s a device for channeling to the New Deal the votes of the socialist-minded garment workers who traditionally refused to vote for a capitalist party. 19. 1 9 2 4 refers to a previous labor party m o v e m e n t . A number of local groups united i n Chicago i n 1919 a s a national labor party, which later took the n a m e Farmer-Labor Party i n order to attract agrarian support. The y o u n g C P became involved i n 1922 a n d , under the direction of the Pepper-Ruthenberg faction, took control of the FLP convention i n 1923. T h i s led to the withdrawal of m o s t non-CP u n i o n elements. The party’s n a m e w a s changed to Federated Farmer-Labor Party. T h e r e m a i n i n g non-CP elements, n o w mainly agrarian, wanted the FFLP to support the candidacy of Robert M . La Follette, Wisconsin’s Progressive Republican senator w h o was preparing to run as the candidate of a third capitalist party i n 1924. The Pepper-Ruthenberg leadership wanted to l i n k u p with the La Follette movement, b u t this led to an uproar i n the C P , a n d the question w a s submitted to the Comintern for a n opinion. Its opinion w a s t h a t support of La Follette would b e rank opportunism. The C P decided to r u n its o w n ticket (Foster a n d Ford) a n d used its majority

i n t h e F F LP

executive committee to vote an FFLP endorsement of the C P candidates. The non-CP forces then q u i t the FFLP and joined the La Follette movement, a n d the FF LP disappeared. La Follette got 4,825,000 votes o n the Progressive ticket, about 17 percent of the total cast i n 1924. 20. The

People’s

Front,

or

Popular

Front,

was

the

name

for

coalitions between the workers’ parties a n d liberal capitalist parties, initiated b y the C P s i n S p a i n a n d France i n 1935 a n d approved as the C P policy for all other countries later that year b y the Seventh World Congress of t h e C o m i n t e r n . The People’s Fronts i n S p a i n a n d France were both elected to office i n 1936, b u t i n m a n y countries, i n c l u d i n g t h e U S , t h e liberal parties were not responsive to the People’s Front

Notes

251

invitations of the Stalinists. B y 1938 the American C P had decided that the Democratic Party was a People’s Front all by itself, and was working within it. 21. Samuel Gompers (1850-1924) was a conservative craft unionist and president of the American Federation of Labor "for thirty-six years. His political policy for the AF L was to endorse neither capitalist party but to “reward your friends and punish your enemies” by supporting or withholding support from specific capitalist candidates. 22. J o h n Pepper was the pseudonym of a Hungarian adventurer who wormed his way into the leadership of the American C P , where h e masterminded the C P ’ s fiasco with the FLP. H e helped to expel the Left Oppositionists i n 1928 before being expelled himself in 1929 a s a Right Oppositionist. Since Trotsky had fought against Pepper’s line i n the Comintern, and Cannon, Shachtman, and Dunne had fought against him i n the American C P , his designation a s “our common friend” is sarcastic. 23. I n N e w Jersey the Democratic mayor of Jersey City, Frank P . Hague (1876-56), was using governmental power and police violence, in cooperation with company-hired thugs, to prevent the C I O from organizing. Picketing was forbidden, and distributors of union leaflets were jailed or run out of town. To charges that h e was denying unionists their elementary civil rights guaranteed by the law, Hague replied, “ I am the l a w . ” Trotsky regarded Hague as an incipient fascist. 24. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870-1924) restored Marxism a s the theory a n d practice of revolution i n the imperialist epoch, after it had been debased by the opportunists, revisionists, and fatalists of the Second International. H e initiated the Bolshevik tendency, which was the first to build the kind of party needed to lead a working class revolution. H e led the first victorious workers’ revolution in 1917, and served as the head of the first Soviet government. H e founded the Communist International a n d helped elaborate its principles, strategy, a n d tactics. H e prepared a fight against the bureaucratization of the Russian C P a n d the Soviet state, b u t died before h e could carry i t out. 25. William

Green

( 1 8 7 3 - 1 9 5 2 ) w a s a conservative

craft

unionist and

president of the American Federation of Labor for twenty-eight years. Robert M . L a Follette, J r . (1895-1953), of the Progressive Republican dynasty i n Wisconsin, w a s himself a U S . senator and the son of the Progressive presidential c a n d i d a t e of 1924. 26. Fiorello

H. La Guardia

( 1 8 8 2 - 1 9 4 7 ) , after s e r v i n g a s a R e p u b l i c a n

congressman from N e w York for m a n y years, became mayor of N e w York City, 1934-45, w h e r e a t different times h e w a s supported by Republicans, Democrats,

the American

Labor Party, Stalinists, Social Democrats, and

fascists.

27. T h e L o v e s t o n e i t e s

were a right-wing faction i n t h e American C P ,

252

The Transitional Program

), until they were expelled in 1929 for headed by Jay Lovestone (1898sympathizing with the Right Opposition, headed by Bukharin and Rykov i n the USSR. For the next decade they existed as a separate organization notable for its opportunism. They disbanded early in World War II. Lovestone entered the service of the U S . labor bureaucracy a s an anticommunist expert, becoming chief advisor on foreign policy to AFLC I O President George Meany. 28. The Ludlow amendment was a proposed amendment to the U S . Constitution that would require a direct referendum by the people before the U S . government could declare war. I t was introduced in the House of Representatives by Democrat Louis Ludlow (1873-1950), of Indiana, and in the U S . Senate by La Follette, of Wisconsin. I n the House it was defeated by a close vote in January 1938. Earlier that week a Gallup public opinion poll showed that 72 percent of the American people favored the amendment. Most of the C I O unions supported it too, while the Stalinists and the Roosevelt administration were bitterly opposed.

29. The U S S . Panay was reported bombed and sunk by Japanese planes in the Yangtze River, China, in December 1937. 30. W i l l i Mtinzenberg (1889-1940) was and cultural enterprises for the Kremlin. Fascism was the U S . affiliate of one Stalinists in 1937 and was found dead German invasion.

31. Norman American

Thomas

Socialist

Party

(1884-1968)

in charge of many propaganda The League Against War and of these. H e broke with the in France at the time of the

was the reformist

and its candidate

for president

leader of the s i x times, 1 9 2 8 -

48. Homer Martin (1902-68), a former preacher, was elected president of the United Auto Workers in 1936. H e tried to lead the UAW back into the AFL, with Lovestone’s help, and when h e was prevented from doing s o by the membership, h e led a small split—off i n 1939, which eventually degenerated into a racket run by gangsters. 32. Bert member

Cochran

(1917-

o f the S W P National

) joined the CLA in 1934 and was a Committee

from

1938

until 1 9 5 3 , when h e

was expelled for violating discipline in a faction struggle. H e later became a resident at Columbia University’s Institute o n Communist Affairs. 33. C h a r l e s

Beard

( 1 8 7 4 - 1 9 4 8 ) was a well-known

American

historian,

educator, and author.

34. The SWP “motions” o n the Ludlow amendment were a s follows: I n January 1938 the Political Committee voted, with Burnham dissenting, to oppose the Ludlow amendment because of the pacifist illusions it generated. Trotsky sent a letter i n February, supporting Burnham’s position and saying: “The referendum i s an illusion? Not more and not less an illusion than universal suffrage and other means of democracy. Why can we not use the referendum as we use the presidential

Notes

253

elections? . . . The referendum illusion of the American little m a n h a s a l s o i t s progressive features. O u r i d e a i s n o t to turn a w a y from i t , b u t u t i l i z e t h e s e progressive features w i t h o u t t a k i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e

illusion.” (The full text i s i n Writings of Leon Trotsky [1937—38].) The Political Committee then took u p the amendment a g a i n , refusing to participate i n any campaigns for i t and directing S W P members i n t h e unions to abstain when i t was voted o n , except that they should vote for i t when they h e l d the balance of power between the pro-Ludlow forces o n one side a n d the Stalinists a n d patriots o n the other. This was the official SWP position a t the time of the discussions in Mexico, which Trotsky found useful for illuminating the method of the Transitional Program.

35. Liston Oak (1895-1970) was a U S . journalist who broke with Stalinism over the Spanish civil war in 1937. H e wrote for the Socialist Appeal briefly before shifting to the Social Democracy. 36. Bertram

D . Wolfe (1896-1977)

a n d o f the Lovestone

faction.

was a leader of the American C P

H e became

a n anticommunist.

37. Henri Barbusse (1873-1935) was a pacifist novelist who joined the French C P , wrote biographies of Christ and Stalin, and sponsored amorphous antiwar and antifascist committees and congresses used by the Stalinists as showcase substitutes for genuine struggle.

38. The Northwest Organizer was founded in 1935 as the newspaper of the Minneapolis Teamsters. Designed to reach out to militant Teamsters of an eleven-state area west of Ohio, it was edited by SWP members. 39. James

Burnham

(1905-

) w a s a leading

intellectual

and member

of the SWP Political Committee. H e broke with the SWP in 1940 and later became a propagandist for McCarthyism and other ultraright movements.

Nathan

Gould

(1913-

) was a youth

leader

of the SWP and a

delegate to the founding conference of the Fourth International. H e left the SWP in 1940 and dropped out of politics soon after. 40. The Bolsheviks led by Lenin began in 1903 as a faction i n the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. Later, after a split, they became a separate party. Following the 1917 revolution, they changed their name to the Communist Party. Party (SRs) was founded in Russia in 41. The Social Revolutionary 1900, emerging in 1901-02 as the political expression of all the earlier populist currents; it had the largest share of influence among the peasantry prior to the revolution of 1917. It opposed the Bolshevik-led October revolution.

(1856-1918) and Paul Axelrod (1850-1925) 42. George Plekhanov were founders and inspirers of the Russian Social Democracy. They split with Lenin in 1903 and became leaders of the Menshevik faction.

254

The Transitional Program

43. The Mensheviks were a faction, led by Julius Martov, that was opposed to the Bolsheviks in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party i n 1903. As a separate party, they supported the post-tsarist capitalist government in 1917 and opposed the revolution led by the Bolsheviks. 44. Alex

.nder

( 1 8 8 2 - 1 9 7 0 ) w a s associated

Kerensky

with the Social

Revolutio .ary Party right wing and was prime minister of the government overturned by the soviets in 1917. Bryan

Jennings

4 5 . William

( 1 8 6 0 - 1 9 2 5 ) 'was Democratic

candidate

for president of the U S . in 1896, 1900, and 1908. H e made pacifist declarations but supported Wilson’s entry into World War I , after resigning as secretary of state over a tactical disagreement. 46. The Socialist Appeal was the SWP’s official paper, 1938-41, when it was renamed the Militant. The New International was the SWP’s monthly magazine from 1938 until 1940, when its editors left the SWP and continued the magazine on their own. I t was replaced by the Fourth International, later renamed International Socialist Review. 47. Sit-down strikes, where the workers occupied the point of production, occurred in several countries before France and the U S . in 1936. I n 1934 this tactic was used by miners in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland, and by tobacco workers in Greece. I n 1935 it was used by copper miners in Spain, coal miners in Wales and Scotland, and textile workers in India. 48. The Communist tional)

was organized

International

(Comintern,

under Lenin’s leadership

Third

Interna-

i n 1 9 1 9 as the revolution-

ary successor to the Second International. Under Stalin’s leadership it was dissolved i n 1943 as a concession to his imperialist allies in World War I I . 49. Léon

Blum

( 1 8 7 2 - 1 9 5 0 ) was the head o f the French

Socialist

Party

in the thirties and premier of the first People’s Front government in 1936. 50. J a m e s

Walker

(1886-1957)

was the conservative

Democratic

mayor

of New York from 1926 until 1932, when h e resigned as the result of a legislative investigation. 51.

Woodrow

Wilson

(1856-1924) was

Democratic

president

o f the

U.S., 1913-21.

52. The “change i n policy of Great Britain” was the shift from the old democratic rhetoric to a policy of accommodation with Germany and Italy (“appeasement”). Before the Nazi takeover of Austria in February 1938, Britain had pledged to “protect” Austria; afterward, Britain opened up negotiations with Italy and Germany. I n September the Munich pact was consummated.

53. This refers to an article, “Before a New World War,” August 9, 1937. Part of it had appeared i n Liberty, November 13, 1937, but the other part

Notes

255

was not to be printed i n English until the July 1938 issue of the Yale Review. The full article appears in Writings of Leon Trotsky (1936-37). 54. Trotsky wanted the SWP to intervene inside the C P , its chief rival on the left. The C P had many thousands of members who were not hardened Stalinists and could be won away because of the political gyrations of the Stalinist leadership. For letters on this subject, see Writings of Leon Trotsky (1938-39), second edition. 55. Rose Karsner (1889-1968) was a founder of the American C P , the CLA, and the SWP. She was James P . Cannon’s close political collaborator and companion from 1924. 56. Trotsky sent this statement to the SWP with the following note: “This i s a rough draft of a statement, or rather a suggestion for a draft. The statement should be made more concrete with reference to the existing labor parties, in the sense, for example, of Burnham’s article in the New International. I’m sending this short document in order to make more precise what I stated in the discussion here on the labor party.” Burnham’s article, “The Labor Party: 1938,” appeared in the March 1938 New International. When expanded, Trotsky’s statement served as the basis of an SWP resolution submitted to the membership for a referendum vote.

57. Social Democrats was the name used by all Marxists before World War I . Since then, it is applied to reformists and opportunists and their organizations, usually affiliated to the Second International.

extended from heroic attempts proletariat’s 58. The Spanish militant defense of the new Spanish republic, established in 1931, against monarchists and right wing republican regimes, through a civil war against the fascist Franco forces, 1936-39. Trotsky’s views of these years are collected in The Spanish Revolution (1931-39) (Pathfinder, 1973). P O U M i s t s belonged to the Spanish Workers Party of Marxist Unification (POUM), a centrist party created b y ex—Left Oppositionists and ex—Right Oppositionists in 1935. I t joined the People’s Front government of Catalonia in 1936. 59. A Phrygian or liberty cap is a closely fitting conical cap identified with the French revolution and republicanism. The swastika was used a s a religious and mystical symbol for thousands of years before the Nazis used it to represent their racist “victory of Aryan m a n . ” 60. Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) became a Social Democrat in 1898, joined the Bolshevik faction in 1904, and was a member of its Central Committee from 1912. H e was commissar of nationalities in the first Soviet government and became general secretary of the C P in 1922. Lenin called in 1923 for his removal from that post because h e was using it to bureaucratize the party and state apparatuses. After Lenin’s death in 1924, Stalin gradually eliminated his major opponents, starting with

256

The Transitional Program

Trotsky, until h e became virtual dictator of the party and the Soviet Union in the 19305. i s opposed to parliamentary action and 63. Anarcho-syndicalism political parties. I t envisions a new social order created and then managed by independent trade or industrial unions. I n Spain, where the anarcho-syndicalists were initially the strongest grouping on the left, they ended up by supporting the bourgeois People’s Front government. 62. See Leon Trotsky o n the Trade Unions, Pathfinder, 1975. 63. Henry Ford (1863-1947), the reactionary auto manufacturer, was one of the capitalists designated as “economic royalists” by the New Dealers and the Stalinists. 64. The Second International was organized in 1889 as the successor to the First International. I t was a loose association of national Social Democratic and l a b o r parties, uniting both revolutionary and reformist elements. Its strongest and most authoritative section w a s the German Social Democracy. Its progressive role had ended by 1914, when its major sections violated the most elementary socialist principles and supported their imperialist governments in World War I . 65. Stalinist methods o f collectivization. Until 1927, Stalin rejected the Left Opposition’s proposals for increased industrialization combined with a campaign for collectivization of agriculture. Then Stalin was confronted with a kulak “grain strike” and went o n a crash program of forced collectivization and bureaucratically accelerated industrialization. Peasant opposition to this ruthless course brought the country to the brink of disaster. 66. “War and the Fourth Leon Trotsky (1933-34).

International”

i s reprinted in Writings of

67. Thermidor was the month in the new French calendar when the revolutionary J acobins, led by Robespierre, were overthrown by a wing of t h e revolution

that was reactionary

b u t did n o t g o s o far a s to restore the

feudal regime. Trotsky used the term as a historical analogy to designate the seizure of power by the conservative Stalinist bureaucracy within the framework of nationalized property relations. See his essay “The Workers’ State, Thermidor and Bonapartism,” in Writings of Leon Trotsky

(1934-35).

68. Epigones are disciples who falsify and corrupt the teachings of their leader; Trotsky used the term for the Stalinists, who claimed to b e Leninists. Before 1917 Lenin thought that the next Russian revolution would b e based on a “democratic dictatorship o f the proletariat and the peasantry,” that is, an alliance between the workers and the peasants within the framework of a bourgeois democracy. I n 1917 h e replaced that with the perspective of a dictatorship of the proletariat

Notes

257

(workers’ state) supported by the peasantry. The evolution of Lenin’s thinking o n this question i s traced by Trotsky in The Permanent Revolution (Pathfinder, 1974) and in the essay “The Three Conceptions of the Russian

Revolution”

69. The C h i n e s e Chinese revolution Bukharin leadership bourgeois-nationalist 70. T h e

Cadets

i n Writings

of Leon

Trotsky

(1939-40).

Communist Party i n 1 9 2 5 - 2 7 led the second to defeat by following the orders of the Stalinof the Comintern and helping to bring to power the Kuomintang, headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

(Constitutional

Democratic

Party)

were

a Russian

bourgeois party committed to a constitutional monarchy and moderate liberalism. Led by Miliukov, they briefly dominated the capitalist provisional government after February 1917. 71. The July days (July 1917) began with spontaneous demonstrations by Russian workers and soldiers; but they ended with a temporary setback to the revolution and heavy repression of the Bolsheviks by the Kerensky government, which was supported by the Mensheviks and SRs. 72. The Amsterdam International was the popular name of the Social Democratic-dominated International Federation of Trade Unions, with headquarters i n Amsterdam. 73. The Marxist theory of permanent revolution elaborated by Trotsky states, among other things, that in order to accomplish and consolidate even bourgeois-democratic tasks such as land reform i n a n underdeveloped country, the revolution must go beyond the limits of a democratic revolution into a socialist one. The working class, the most powerful and consistently revolutionary class, tends to take the lead, and when it comes to power i t begins to carry out the tasks not only of the democratic revolution but of the socialist revolution as well. Such a revolution will therefore not take place i n “stages” (first a stage of capitalist development to be followed at some time in the future by a socialist revolution), but will be continuous, or “permanent,” passing immediately to a postcapitalist stage. See The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects by Leon Trotsky (Pathfinder Press, 1974). Trotsky

7 4 . Leon

o n China

(Monad,

New York, 1 9 7 6 ) is a collection

of

writings from 1925 to 1940, including Trotsky’s Problems of the Chinese Revolution

75.

Adolf

(1932).

Hitler

was

(1889-1945)

the

head

of the German

National

Socialist Party (Nazis) and author of Mein Kampf (My Struggle). H e established a fascist regime in Germany in 1933 and committed suicide at the

end

o f World

War

II. Ernst

Thalmann

( 1 8 8 6 - 1 9 4 4 ) , German

CP

leader, unquestioningly and docilely carried through the Kremlin’s fatal policy from 1929 to 1933. The Stalinists kept the ranks of the working class divided and thus permitted Hitler to come to power without a battle. H e died i n a N a z i concentration

c a m p . Benito

Mussolini

( 1 8 8 3 - 1 9 4 5 ) , the

258

The Transitional Program

founder of fascism in Italy, started his career as a left-wing socialist; h e became a chauvinist during World War I . With the support of the Italian bankers a n d industrialists, h e came to power in 1922. H e was killed by Italian partisans while attempting to flee Italy. was the first example of a workers’ 7 6 . The Paris Commune government. I t was in power from March 18, 1871, to M a y 28, 1871, just seventy-two d a y s , before it was overthrown in a bloody series of battles. The 1 9 0 5 Russian revolution grew out of discontent over the RussoJapanese War. Severe repression followed this unsuccessful revolution. 77. The GPU was the Soviet secret police, also known at various times as Cheka, N K V D , MVD, KGB.

78. Joseph Paul Goebbels (1897-1945), founder and editor of the Nazi journal Der Angriff, was minister of propaganda for the Nazis following 1933. 79. Weimar was the small town where the government of the German republic was organized in 1919. The Weimar Republic lasted until Hitler assumed full power in 1933.

80. The “third period,” according to the schema proclaimed by the Stalinists in 1928, was the final period of capitalism. The Comintern’s tactics for the next six years were marked by ultraleftism, adventurism, sectarian “red” unions, and opposition to the united front. I n 1934 this ultraleft binge was ended and replaced by the People’s Front (1935-39). The “first period” was 1917-24 (capitalist crisis and revolutionary upsurge); the “second period” was 1925-28 (capitalist stabilization). 81. “Socialism i n one country” was a theory proclaimed by Stalin in 1924 and later incorporated into the program and tactics of the Comintern. I t became an ideological cover for abandoning revolutionary internationalism in favor of narrow nationalism, and was used to justify converting the Communist parties throughout the world into docile pawns of the Kremlin’s foreign policy. For a critique by Trotsky, see his 1 9 2 8 b o o k The

Third

International

After

Lenin (Pathfinder,

1974).

82. I g n a c e R e i s s was a GPU agent who broke with Stalin i n the summer of 1937 a n d joined the Fourth Internationalists. H e was murdered by GPU agents i n Switzerland in September 1937. F yodor Butenko

w a s a Stalinist

diplomat

w h o defected

to fascism i n February

1938, announcing in Rome that h e represented a widespread fascist sentiment i n the U S S R . 83. Bonapartism was a term Trotsky used to describe a dictatorship, or a regime with certain features of a dictatorship, during periods when class rule i s not secure; it is based on the military, police, and state bureaucracy rather than on parliamentary parties or a mass movement. Trotsky s a w two types—bourgeois and Soviet. For an analysis of the

Notes

259

latter, see his 1937 book The Revolution Betrayed (Pathfinder, 1974). 84. The Right Opposition or right wing of the Russian C P , led by Bukharin and Rykov, opposed Stalin’s ultraleft policies i n 1928-29. Its leaders capitulated and in 1938 were executed after the third Moscow trial. 85. Old Bolsheviks before 1917.

were the old guard of the party, who had joined

86. Stakhanovism was a special system of speedup and rationalization of production introduced in the Soviet Union in 1935, which led to great wage disparities and widespread discontent among the workers. 8 7 . Léon

Jouhaux

( 1 8 7 9 - 1 9 5 4 ) was

general

secretary

of the French

labor movement when h e rallied it to the cause of the imperialist war in 1914. 88. The London Bureau was a loose association of centrist parties not affiliated to either the Second or Third International, but opposed to the formation of a Fourth International. Among its members in 1938 were the British Independent Labor Party, the German Socialist Workers Party, the French Workers and Peasants Socialist Party, and the Spanish Workers Party of Marxist Unification. The London Bureau disappeared with the outbreak of World War I I . 89. Leon Trotsky o n France (Pathfinder, 1978) contains Whither France? and other writings about the 1934-39 period. Trotsky’s pamphlets and articles on Germany from 1930 to 1940 are reprinted in The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany (Pathfinder, 1977). 90. Single tax is a phrase associated with Henry George (1839-97), an American journalist, economist, and reformer. H e proposed that the national state should appropriate rent by a single tax on land. Bimetallism is a monetary system based on two metals, usually gold and silver. Bimetallism was formally adopted by the U S . in 1792, although in reality the money system was monometallic. The populist movement of the late nineteenth century agitated for a silver standard, but in 1900 the Gold Standard Act was passed. 91. This was a letter to Georg Kopp, a leader of the Czechoslovak section of the Movement for the Fourth International, in Prague. 9 2 . Henricus

Sneevliet

(1883-1942)

w a s a founder

o f the Dutch

and

Indonesian CPs. H e left the C P in 1927, and his group joined the Left Opposition in 1933. H e broke with the MFI early in 1938 over differences on the Spanish civil war, trade union policies, and perspectives for the Fourth International. Trotsky’s accusation that Sneevliet w a s guilty of strikebreaking in Spain related to Sneevliet’s support of the P O U M ’ s prohibition of a pro-MFI faction in its ranks. Sneevliet was arrested and ) executed by the Nazis in World War I I . Georges Vereecken (1896-

260

The Transitional Program

w a s a sectarian leader of the Belgian section. H e was s o strongly opposed to constituting the Fourth International in 1938 that h e resigned a few days after reading Trotsky’s letter.

(International Workingmen’s Associa93. The First International tion) was organized by Marx and Engels i n 1864 and w a s dissolved by them in 1876. Marx’s Capital was published in 1867. 94. Arkady Maslow (1891-1941) was a central leader of the German C P , expelled i n 1927 because a s a supporter of Zinoviev he defended the Russian United Opposition. H e briefly belonged to the International Communist League in the mid-thirties, when h e was exiled in France. after Louis-August Blanqui (1805-81), advocated 95. Blanquists, armed insurrection by small groups, as opposed to the Marxist concept of mass action. Blanqui participated in every French uprising from 1830 through the Paris Commune, spending thirty-five of his seventy-six years in prison. 96. The Iron H e e l , one of London’s socialist novels, takes the form of an unfinished manuscript discovered in the fourth century of the socialist era. The document, which ends in 1932, describes the smashing of the U S . labor movement and civil liberties by a fascist regime in the period 1912-32. 97. I n the preconference discussion Joseph Carter, a member of the SWP National Committee, introduced an amendment to delete from the Transitional Program’s chapter on the Soviet Union the following passage: “As once the bourgeoisie and kulaks were not permitted to enter the soviets, so now it is necessary to drive the bureaucracy and the new aristocracy o u t of the soviets. I n the soviets there is room only for representatives of the workers, rank-and-file collective farmers, peasants, and Red Army personnel.” Carter sent Trotsky a letter motivating his amendment, printed in the SWP internal bulletin, and Trotsky replied with an article intended for all MFI members. Carter had been associated with Burnham at the SWP’s founding convention i n a resolution denying that the Soviet Union was any longer a degenerated workers’ state. I n 1940 h e was with Shachtman and Burnham when they split away from the SWP over this question. 98. After Trotsky’s letter, the SWP Political Committee voted to introduce an amendment deleting the disputed passage until i t had received further discussion following the international conference. This amendment was rejected at the conference. 99. Trotsky’s remarks here were preceded by a report o n the discussion over the labor party being conducted at the time in the SWP and the Young People’s Socialist League (Fourth Internationalists). The report

Notes

261

was given b y Jack Weber (1896), an SWP leader in New Jersey, who also answered several questions asked b y others present during the discussion with Trotsky. 100. The Radical Socialist Party was the principal capitalist party in France during the period between World Wars I and I I . I t was neither radical nor socialist, but a liberal capitalist party roughly comparable to the Democratic Party in the U S , with the difference that it had an anticlerical tradition and was a stronghold of freemasonry. 101. Lenin said, “These men, the ‘leaders’ of opportunism, will n o doubt resort to every device of bourgeois diplomacy and to the aid of bourgeois governments, the clergy, the police and the courts, to keep Communists out of the trade unions, oust them by every means, make their work in the trade unions as unpleasant as possible, and insult, bait and persecute them. We must be able to stand up to all this, agree to make any sacrifice, and even—if need be—to resort to various stratagems, artifices and illegal methods, to evasions and subterfuges, as long as we get into the trade unions, remain in them, and carry on communist work within them at all costs.” (“Left-wing” Communism—an Infantile Disorder, in volume 31 of Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 55.) Works, Progress Collected 102. Carl Skoglund (1884-1961), president of Minneapolis Teamsters Local 544 (1938-40), emigrated to the U S . from Sweden in 1911 and joined the SP in 1914. H e was a founder of the American C P , the CLA, and the SWP. I n November 1938 the SWP chose him as its third member of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International. 103. I n drawing up a program of action adapting the Transitional Program to American conditions and needs, a majority of the SWP Political Committee adopted the slogan “workers’ government” in preference to the one used in the Transitional Program (“workers’ and farmers’ government”). Cannon introduced an amendment to u s e the Transitional Program’s slogan for the U S . too, and this was one of the issues debated in the preconference discussion. C a n n o n ’ s amendment was approved by the membership. I n 1967 an SWP convention voted to change this position and adopt the “workers’ government” s l o g a n .

104. The J acobins were the m o s t radical political faction i n the French revolution. They dominated French politics from the overthrow of the Gironde in 1791 until Thermidor i n 1794.

105. This i s an excerpt from Trotsky’s article “ A Great Achievement,” summarizing his views, at the end of the preconference discussion, on the significance of the Transitional Program and its place in the development of the Fourth International. The full article appears in Writings of Leon Trotsky

(1937-38).

Index Abernathy, Ralph, 203 Abortion, 49, 58, 6 8 Adolphe. See K l e m e n t Affirmative action, 212 AFL (American Federation o f Labor), 80, 82, 84, 165, 192, 249n.10 AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial O r g a n i z a tions), 249n.10 Algeria, 43, 222, 224 American Labor Party (ALP), 80, 81, 192, 250n.18 American socialist revolution, c o m b i n e d character of, 62-63 America ’s Sixty Families (Lundberg), 83, 248n.7 Amsterdam International, 134, 147, 257n.72 Anarchists, 112, 117, 125, 134, 147, 161, 256n.63 A n n a l i s t , The, 76, 83, 248n.7 Anti-Semitism, 133 Antiwar movement, 46-47, 48, 222, 23132, 237, 241, 242, 245 Antiwar program, 48, 54, 95-96, 128-33, 210, 241

Burma,

43

B u r n h a m , J a m e s , 63, 92, 253n.39 Business secrets, 120, 209 Butenko, Fyodor, 143, 144, 258n.82 Cadets (Constitutional Democratic Party, Russia),

Antiwar referendum, 46-47, 130, 210. See also Ludlow a m e n d m e n t Arbitration, 177 Arming of proletariat, 125-26 Attica,

Black liberation struggle, 35, 43-44, 58, 71; transitional program for, 200-220 B l a n q u i , Louis-August, 177, 260n.95 Blum, Léon, 100, 113, 121, 146, 254n.49 Bolivia, 35-36, 237 Bolshevik-Leninists, 133 Bolsheviks, 16, 94-95, 104-6, 133-34, 171, 253n.40 Bolshevism, 42 Bonapartism, 143, 258-59n.83 Bray, J . F., 10-12 Brazil, 29, 228, 237 Breitman, George, 44 Bryan, William J e n n i n g s , 97, 254n.45 Bureaucracy: Soviet, 36, 132, 142-46, 18385, 256n.67; trade union, 36, 71, 205. See also AFL; C I O ; Political revolution Bureau of Labor Statistics, 4 7

133-34, 257n.70

C A L (Comités d’Action Lycéen, France), 242 C a n a d a , 58, 65. See also Québécois liberation C a n n o n , James P., 74, 75-106 passim,

68

Austria, 161 Axelrod, Paul, 94, 253n.42 Ayub Khan, 221

110, 247n.2

Capital (Marx), 169 Capitalism, development of, 111-12, 1777 8 , 1 7 9 - 8 0 , 186-88,

Backward countries, program for, 137-39 Bangladesh, 31, 60 Banks, 1 2 3 Barbusse, Henri, 92, 253n.37 Beard, Charles, 91, 252n.33 Belgium,

214

Cardenas, Lazaro, 26 Careerism, 118, 150-51 Carter, Joseph, 260n.97 Castro, Fidel, 39 Catholic church, 53, 60-61, 139 Ceylon, 31 Chiang Kai-shek, 26, 257n.69 Chicano liberation, 29, 58, 68, 217 Children, rights of, 11m

1 7 9 , 235-36

Bible, 53 Bill of Rights, 5 2 Bimetalism, 158, 259n.90

263

264 Transitional Program China, 9 0 , 129, 137, 225, 252n.29. See also Chinese revolution; Communist Sino-Japanese War; International; Sino-Soviet conflict Chinese revolution: of 1925-27, 133, 138, 257n.69; of 1949, 28, 215, 223, 224 C 1 0 (Congress of Industrial Organizations), 8 4 , 162-65, 188, 189, 250n.16, 252n.28. See also Labor’s 251n.23, Non-Partisan League Civil War, U . S . , 162, 219 Class consciousness, 25, 99-101 Clave, 248n.5 Coast Guard, 36 Cochran, Bert, 9 1 , 9 2 , 252n.32 Collectivization of agriculture, 127-28, 256n.65 Colombia, 225 Communist International (Comintern, Third International), 169, 254n.48; and betrayals, 100, 113, 145; and Chinese revolution, 138, 146; and “democratic dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry,” 133; and fascism, 124-25, 139, 140; first four congresses of, 16-24; and reformism, 114; and Spain, 146; and unions, 21-22. See also People’s Front Communist League (of Marx and E n gels), 169 League of America, 82, Communist 247n.2, 247n.3, 248-49n.9 Communist Manifesto, The (Marx and Engels), 9, 12-15, 38, 65, 76, 169, 248n.8 Communist Party: China, 133, 257n.69; France, 100, 112, 180, 253n.37; Germany, 257n.75, 260n.84; Spain, 112; U . S . , 77-79, 80, 81, 89, 100, 247n.2, 249n.12,

150n.19,

251n.20,

251n.22,

255n.54 Congo (Zaire), 29 Congress, U . S . , 32, 80 Conscription, 241 Constituent Assembly (Russia), 56-57 Constitution, U . S . , 33, 52, 69, 209, 213,

The, 25, 109-52, 237, 238. See also Transitional Program Defense organizations, 2 0 , 2 3 83-85, 12326, 175-76, 188-89, 209 Democracy: bourgeois, 55-56, 7 6 , 9 3 , 113, 124-25, 146, 179-80; trade union, 212; workers’, 242. See also Democratic centralism; Democratic demands; Soviets Democracy and Revolution (Novack), 52, 6 1 Democratic centralism, 152 Democratic demands, 2 4 , 3 2 , 4 0 , 51-64, 213; in fascist countries, 60-61, 141; and transitional demands, 33-34, 53-54 “Democratic dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry,”'133, 256-57n.68 Democratic Party (U.S.), 7 7 , 7 8 , 8 0 , 8 1 , 203-4, 205, 251n.20 Deutscher, Isaac, 9 Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 222 Disarmament, 9 7 , 129 Dominican Republic, 29, 3 1 DRUM (Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement), 212 Dual power, 35-36, 136-37 Dunayevskaya, Raya (Rae Spiegel), 7 4 Dunne, Vincent R . , 7 4 , 78-79, 8 1 , 9 2 , 24950n.14 East Germany, 28, 4 1 , 225 Economic uptums, 187-88 Education, 210-11, 23839. See also Red university Egypt, 4 3 , 226, 228, 237 Emergency Laws (Canada), 58 Empiricism, 158, 160 Engels, Frederick, 9 , 12-15, 7 6 , 125, 177, 248n.8

Entry, 199 Escalator clause, 4 7 , 212. See also Sliding scale of wages and hours Ethiopia, 26, 112 Expropriation, 122, 123, 130-31, 197-98, 209

252n.28

Cooperatives, 203 Credit, 209 Cuba, 29, 215, 222, 223, 224, 229 Czechoslovakia, 28, 29, 4 1 , 221, 224, 225, 228

Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International,

Factory committees, 20-21, 69-70, 117, 118-19, 212

Farmer-Labor Party: Minnesota, 77-81, 89; of 1924, 250n.19, 251n.22 Farmers, program for, 126-28. See also Workers’ and farmers’ government Fascism, 113, 120, 155, 156, 260n.96; in America, 8 4 , 124, 175, 179; and de-

Index fense organizations, 123-24; democrati c struggles under, 60-61; rise of, in Germany, 176, 257n.75; rise of, in Italy, 23, 174-75 Fascist countries, program i n , 139-42 FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) , 36 First International, 169, 260n.93 Ford, Henry, 119, 256n.63 Forman, James, 201 Fourth International: prehistory of, 19899; program of, 39; launching of, 9 , 74, 110, 167-70; development of, 31, 36-37, 50-51; v s . other Internationals, 147-48; future of, 151-52; and youth radicalization, 244-46. See also Revolutionary party Fourth International, 254n.46 France, 76, 131, 179, 196, 225; fascists i n , 124, 156; 1968 events i n , 31, 70, 222, 242, 245; parties i n , 190; People’s Front

i n , 99-100,

1 1 1 , 1 1 2 - 1 3 , 133,

134,

146 Franco, Francisco, 112, 225n.58 Frank, Pierre, 38 Freedom, Marxist concept of, 1 7 2

Garveyism, 43 “Generation g a p , ” 222 Germain, Ernest, 43, 51 Germany, 161, 227, 257n.75, 258n.79; fascism i n , 60-61, 113, 139-42, 176, 180, 196; and World War I I , 104, 129. See also E a s t Germany; West Germany G I s , rights of, 210 Goebbels, Joseph P . , 140, 145, 258n.78 Gompers, Samuel, 81, 2 5 l n . 2 1 Gould, Nathan, 92, 253n.39 _GPU, 140, 145, 147, 258n.77 “Great Achievement, A,” 198-99, 261n.105 Great Britain, 76, 103, 104, 124, 161-62, 179, 182, 254n.52

Green, William, 88, 194, 195, 2 5 l n . 2 5 Guaranteed a n n u a l income, 209 Guatemala, 29 Guerrillaism v s . mass struggle, 3 4 Guevara, Ernesto (“Che”), 228, 231 Gun l a w s , 209

Hague, Frank P . , 84, 178, 179, 189, 25ln.23 Haile Selassie, 26 Hansen, Joseph, 7 4

265

Hatcher, Richard, 203, 204 Healy, Gerry, 6 3 Hegel, Georg, 5 7 Hess, Rudolf, 176 High school students, 59, 242-43 Hillman, Sidney, 79, 80, 250n.16 Hitler, Adolf, 60-61, 145, 176, 196, 257n.75 Holland, 1 7 9 Homosexual rights, 5 2 House of Representatives, U.S., 32, 80 Housing, 209 Hungary, 28, 41, 222, 242 Illegality, 104-6 Immediate demands, 24, 40 “Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat I t , The” (Lenin), 15-16 Imperialism, 123, 128-33, 179, In Defense of Marxism, 64 India, 67, 137, 225, 237 Indochina, 41. See also Vietnam Indonesia, 29 Inflation. See Price committees; Sliding scale of hours and wages Intercontinental Press, 4 3 Intemationalism, 1 2 Internationalist Communists of Germany (IKD), 248n.4 Internationalist France),

Workers

Party

(POI,

247n.1

International Socialist Review, 254n.46 Iran, 29 Ireland,

2 9 , 60

Irish Republican Army, 55 Iron

Heel,

The (London),

178-79, 260n.96

Italy, 76, 104, 139, 225; rise of fascism i n , 123—24,174-75, 180 Jacobins, 196, 261n.104 J a p a n , 103, 104, 129, 149, 226 Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire (France),

245

Johnson, Lyndon B., 202 J o u h a u x , Léon, 147, 259n.87 July days (Russia, 1917), 134, 257n.71 Karsner, Rose, 74, 255n.55 Keep America O u t of W a r Committee, 91, 95 Kennedy, John F., 202 Kenny, S e a n , 55 Kerensky, Alexander, 97, 254n.44 Khrushchev, N i k i t a , 222

266

Transitional Program

King, Martin Luther, J r . , 201 Klement, Rudolf (“Adolphe”), 3 6 , 7 5 , 247-48n.4 Korea, 29, 4 6 , 223 Kuomintang, 138, 257n.69

Labor party, 65-66, 77-90, 107-8, 189-94; need for, 163, 190; program of, 166; revolutionaries i n , 87-90; three types of, 191-92; Trotskyist advocacy of, 8283, 160-61, 164-67, 248-49n.9 Labor’s Non-Partisan League (LNPL), 7 7 , 79-81, 83, 88-89, 249n.10 Labour’s Wrongs and Labour’s Remedy (Bray), 10, 11m, 12 La Follette, Robert M . , 250n.19 La Follette, Robert M . , J r . , 8 8 , 9 6 , 194, 195, 251n.25 La Guardia, Fiorello H . , 8 8 , 9 6 , 251n.26 Lambert, Pierre, 65 Land reform, 127-28, 256n.65 Leadership, revolutionary, 6 6 , 70-71,

Mensheviks, 97, 133-34, 171, 254n.43 Mexico, 7 4 , 221-22, 228, 236, 245 Mills, C . Wright, 230 Minimum program, 14, 18, 114-15 Minimum wage, 116, 209 Montgomery bus boycott, 200 Moscow trials, 5 7 , 7 4 , 113, 142 Movement for the Fourth International (MFI), 7 4 , 110 Miinzenberg, Willi, 9 1 , 252n.30 Mussolini, Benito, 139, 140, 257-58n.75

National assembly, 138 Nationalization, 103, 122, 127, 131. See also Expropriation National Liberation Front (Vietnam), 237 National question, 26 National Strike Council (Mexico), 245 Nation of I s l a m , 44 Native Americans, 29, 217 Neutrality, 129 111-13 New Deal, 111 League Against W a r a n d Fascism (U.S.) New Democratic Party ( C a n a d a ) , 65 91, 252n.30 New Economic Policy, 16 Left Opposition, 36 New International, 9 8 , 254n.46 “New Rise of the World Revolution” Left-Wing Communism—an Infantile (Germain), 43, 51 Disorder (Lenin), 261n.101 Lenin, V . I., 15, 2 6 , 43, 87, 193, 251n.24 New York Times, 186 Leon Trotsky o n Black Nationalism and “Ninety Years of the Communist Manifesto,” 14, 30n, 7 6 , 177, 248n.8 Self-Determination, 4 3 Lewis, John L . , 7 9 , 8 0 , 8 8 , 9 6 , 194, 195, Nixon, Richard M . , 202 250n.16 Northwest Organizer, 9 2 , 253n.38 Liebknecht, Karl, 38 Novack, George, 30 London, J a c k , 178, 260n.96 London Bureau, 147, 259n.88 Oak, Liston, 92, 253n.35 Lovestone, J a y , 9 1 , 252n.27 Old Bolsheviks, 143, 144, 259n.85 Lovestoneites, 89, 9 1 , 95, 166, 251-52n.27 Opportunism, 18, 146-48, 174 Lozovsky, S o lom on A . , 2 2 Organization Communiste InternatioLudlow, Louis L . , 3 2 , 252n.28 nale ( O C I , France), 64 Ludlow amendment, 32-33, 8 9 , 92-97, Oriental-Americans, 217 252n.28, 252-53n.34 Lundberg, Ferdinand, 7 6 , 8 3 , 179, 248n.7 Luxemburg, Rosa, 15, 38 Pakistan, 221, 226, 228, 237 Panay, U . S . S . , 90, 252n.29 Malcolm X , 4 4 , 201, 204 Paris Commune, 13, 14, 139, 258n.76 Mali, 237 Parliament, 55 Marcuse, Herbert, 230 “Participatory democracy,” 229 Martin, Homer, 9 1 , 252n.31 Parvus, A . L., 15 Marx, Karl, 9 , 11-15, 76, 177, 248n.8 Pentagon Papers, 54 Maslow, Arkady, 170, 260n.94 People’s Front, 8 1 , 8 4 , 100, 112-13, 133, Maximum program, 15, 114 250-51n.20; and colonial countries, Meany, George, 252n.27 138-39; a n d fascist countries, 141. See Medical care, 209 also France; Spain

Index Pepper, J o h n , 82, 251n.22 Permanent revolution, 9, 15, 26, 138, 257n.73; and Black struggle, 214-15; and democratic demands, 54, 60, 63. See also Backward countries Perén, Juan, 26 Petty bourgeoisie, exploited layers of, 27-28, 126-28 Philosophy, 63 Planned economy, 121-22, 1 4 6 Plekhanov, George, 94, 253n.42 Poland, 28, 41, 228, 242 Police in Black community, 239, 240 Political revolution, 28, 41, 183-85, 247n.1 Popular Assembly (Bolivia), 36 Popular Front. See People’s Front POUM (Workers Party of Marxist Unification, Spain), 112, 147, 255n.58 Poverty of Philosophy, The (Marx), 11 Price committees, 127, 209 Prisoners, 68, 209 Profintern (Red International of Labor Unions), 2122 Progressive Labor Party (PLP, U.S.), 44 Proletarian methods of struggle, 25, 3334 Prophet Armed, The (Deutscher), 9n Prophet Outcast, The (Deutscher), 9n Protestantism, 53, 139, 1 4 2 Proudhon, Pierre Joseph, 11-12 Public works, 121, 209 Québécois liberation, 41, 43, 45, 59

Racism, struggle against, 200-220, 240 Radical Socialist Party (France), 190, 261n.100 Reconstruction, 219 Red-baiting, 78-79 of Labor Unions Red International (Profintem), 21-22 Red university, 45-46, 233-37 Reformation, 53 Reformism, 14, 15, 180, 217. See also People’s Front; Social Democrats Reiss, Ignace, 143, 144, 184, 258n.82 Religious rights, 53, 6 2 Republican-Fusion ticket, 77, 81, 249n.11 Republican Party (U.S.), 203, 205, 208 249n.11, 251n.26 Revolutionary party, 15, 25-26, 87, 11718, 171, 187-88, 243-44. See also Bol-

267

sheviks; Fourth International; Sociali s t Workers Party Revolution Betrayed, The, 6 1 Ricardo, David, 10 Right Opposition (USSR), 143, 259n.84 Rivera, Diego, 74, 75, 103, 248n.5 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 32, 77, 83, 8 7 , 98, 249n.11 Russian revolution: of 1905, 27, 139, 258n.76; of 1917, 16, 26, 27, 85, 133-34, 142, 253n.40, 253n.41, 254n.43, 254n.44 Rustin, Bayard, 203 SDS (Students for a Democratic Society, U.S.), 71 Second International, 15, 169, 256n.64. See also Social Democrats Sectarianism, 117, 148-50, 174 Sedov, Leon, 36, 7 4 Self-determination, 210 Shachtman, Max, 74, 75-106 passim, 247n.3 Single tax, 158, 259n.90 Sino-Japanese War, 75, 138, 1 4 9 conflict, 223-24 Sino-Soviet Sit-down strikes, 27, 99, 100, 112-13, 118, 254n.47 Skoglund, Carl, 193-94, 261n.102 Sliding scale of wages and hours, 47-48, 115-16, 159-60, 188, 209, 212 Sneevliet, Henricus, 168, 170, 259n.92 Democrats, 8 6 , 114, 120, 134, Social 255n.57; and fascism, 124-25, 139, 140, 156, 174-75; in France, 112, 146; and

organization of unions, 161; rejection of, by youth, 224; in Spain, 112; in U S , 74, 91, 167. See also Mensheviks; People’s Front; Second International Socialism in one country, 142, 258n.81 Socialist Appeal, 98, 106, 254n.46 Socialist Labour League (SLL, Great Britain),

63

Socialist Party. See Social Democrats Socialist Workers Party (U.S.), 62, 71, 74; and antiwar movement, 32, 46, 48, 90-92, 250n.14; and Black liberation, 43—44; and Chicano liberation, 69; and farmers, 102, 261n.103; and Fourth International, 199; and labor party, 77-83, 88-90, 107-8, 192-94, 248n.9; and Ludlow amendment, 252-53n.34; and middle class, 102-3; and Transitional Program, 110; and women’s liberation, 35, 49; and World War I I , 36, 101-

268

Transitional Program

2, 103; and youth radicalization, 35 Social Revolutionary Party (SR8, Russia), 94-95, 97, 133-34, 253n.41 South Africa, 210 Soviet democracy, 1 4 5 Soviets, 14, 56-57, 70, 101, 136, 145; bureaucracy and, 183-85 Soviet Union, 29, 75, 142, 222, 225, 247n.1; program for political revolution i n , 145-46; and World War I I , 104, 129, 132. See also Bureaucracy Spain, 112, 117, 133, 147, 161, 255n.58 Spartacists (Germany), 38 Sports, 182 Stakhanovism, 145, 259n.86 Stalin, Joseph, 113, 138, 255-56n.60 Stalinism, 29, 124-25, 127, 223-24, 256n.65. See also Bureaucracy; Communist International; Socialism in one country

Stalinism and Bolshevism, 42 State, Marxist theory of, 1 4 State and Revolution (Lenin), 242 Stokes, Carl, 203, 204 “Strategy for Revolutionary Youth, A ” (SWP), 45, 57-58, 62, 221-46 Student Mobilization Committee (SMC), 59 Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), 201 Students, 34, 35, 130, 221-32 Syria, 43 Tactics, 68-69, 114 Technical Aid (Germany), 23 Technocracy, 76, 83, 248n.6 Thalmann, Ernst, 139, 257n.75 Thermidor, 132, 142, 143, 256n.67 “Theses on Tactics” (Comintem), 17,

of, 69-70, 116, 159; relation of, to democratic demands, 33-34, 53-54 Transitional epoch, 17, 28 Transitional Program, 38-40, 110, 11152; additions to, 27-30, 64-68, 173; and colonial countries, 137-39; Deutscher o n , 9; and farmers, 27-28, 66-67, 12628; and fascist countries, 139-42; and labor party, 83, 87-88; and mass action, 59-60, 115; and mass con155-59, 163-64, sciousness, 100-101, 176-77; method of, 30, 31-34, 50, 66; of, 10-24, 38, 159-60, 171-72; precursors and war, 128-33; and workers’ states, 142-46 “Transitional Program for Black Liberation” (SWP), 44, 64, 200-220 Leon, 9, 15, 26, 38-39 Trotsky, Tupamaros (Uruguay), 3 4 Turkey, 225, 237 Ultraleftism, 18, 217-18, 229 Unemployment, 19, 87, 115-16, 158-60, 201, 203, 209 UNESCO (United Nations Educational, and Cultural OrganizaScientific, tion), 225 Unions, 20-24, 116-18, 160-67, 212 United Auto Workers (UAW), 47 United States, 29, 76, 98, 201, 225; fascists i n , 84, 124, 175, 179; labor movement i n , compared with Europe, 160-63; political backwardness in, 15558, 180-82; and World War I I , 101-2, 103-4

United States Steel Corporation, 204 University autonomy, 234, 239, 242 Unser Wort, 75, 248n.4 USSR. See Soviet Union

19n

“Theses o n the Trade Union Movement, Factory Councils, a n d the Communist International” (Comintem), 20 Third International. International

See

Communist

“Third period,” 142, 258n.80 Thomas, Norman, 91, 92, 95, 180, 181, 252n.31 “Toward a M a s s Feminist Movement” (SWP), 49, 67-68 Towards a n American Socialist Revolution (Barnes et al.), 7 1 Transitional demands, 10, 13-14, 24-25, 40, 83-84, 114, 213, 215-17; realizability

Vereecken, Georges, 168, 170, 259-60n.92 Vietnam, 29, 46, 210, 215, 223, 224, 231, 232 Vote, eighteen-year-olds’ right to, 93, 9 7 Walker,

James,

100, 254n.50

“War a n d the Fourth 128

International,”

W e be r , J a c k , 2 6 0 - 6 1 n . 9 9 Weimar, 141, 258n.79

West Germany, 225, 226 Whither France?, 156, 259n.89 Wilkins, Roy, 203 Wilson, Woodrow, 104, 254n.51

Index

269

Wolfe Bertram D., 92, 253n.36 World War I I , 28, 32, 36, 38, 41, 46 Women’s liberation, M n , 35, 48-49, 67Writings of L e o n Trotsky (1937-38), 74 68, 151 Workers’ and farmers’ government, 96Young, Whitney, 203 97, 133-35, 194-97, 261n.103 Younge, Sammy, J r . , 201 Y o u n g Socialist Alliance (YSA, U.S.), Workers’ control, 14, 19, 23-24, 76, 212; and industrial secrets, 85-86, 119-120; 48, 62, 63, 7 1 Youth, 151, See also Students and planned economy, 121-22; realizability of, 60-70; of war industry, 130 Youth organization, revolutionary, a n d Workers League, 44, 63, 66 revolutionary party, 243-44 Workers’ states, 61-62, 142-46, 236. See Yugoslavia, 226, 234 also Bureaucracy; Political revolution World War I , 15, 16 _ Zaire, 29

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS A g a i n s t I n d i v i d u a l Terrorism T h e Age of P e r m a n e n t Revolution The Basic Writings of Trotsky Between Red a n d White T h e Bolsheviki a n d World Peace (War a n d t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l ) T h e C a s e of Leon Trotsky T h e C h a l l e n g e of the Left Opposition (1923-25) (incl. The New October, of Lessons Course, of Civil War, and Problems

Toward

Socialism o r Capital-

ism?) The Crisis of the French (1935-36)

Europe and America: Speeches o n Imperialism Fascism:

What

It Is and

Section Two H o w to

Fight It T h e F i r s t F i v e Years of t h e Communist

International

(2 v o l s . )

T h e History of t h e R u s s i a n Revolu~ t i o n (3 v o l s . ) In Defense of Marxism

Lenin: Notes for a B i o g r a p h e r Lenin's Fight Against Stalinism

BY LEON TROTSKY* O n the Paris C o m m u n e O n t h e Trade U n i o n s O u r Revolution T h e P e r m a n e n t Revolution a n d Results a n d Prospects Portraits,

Political and

Personal

P r o b l e m s of Everyday Life a n d O t h e r Writings o n C u l t u r e a n d Science T h e Revolution Betrayed T h e S p a n i s h Revolution (1931-39) Stalin

T h e S t a l i n School of F a l s i fi c a t i o n The Struggle

Against

Fascism

in

Germany Terrorism and Communism T h e i r M o r a l s a n d O u r s (with essays by John Nouach)

D e w e y a n d George

T h e T h i r d I n t e r n a t i o n a l After Lenin T h e T r a n s i t i o n a l Program for Socialist Revolution (incl. T h e D e a t h A g o n y of C a p i t a l i s m a n d t h e T a s k s of the Fourth I n t e r n a tional)

Leon Trotsky S p e a k s Literature a n d Revolution Marxism in Our Time

Trotsky’s D i a r y i n Exile, 1935 Women a n d t h e F a m i l y W r i t i n g s of Leon Trotsky (1929-40) (12 v o l s , to be completed in 1977)

Military Writings

The Young Lenin

( w i t h V.I. L e n i n )

M y Life 1905 O n Black N a t i o n a l i s m a n d SelfDetermination O n B r i t a i n (incl. W h e r e I s B r i t a i n Going?)

O n C h i n a (incl. P r o b l e m s of the Chinese

Revolution)

O n the J e w i s h Question O n Literature a n d Art

In p r e p a r a t i o n :

The C h a l l e n g e of t h e Left Opposit i o n ( 1 9 2 6 - 2 9 ) ( i n c l . T h e Platform

of t h e Opposition) K r o n s t a d t (with VI. Lenin) On France

(incl. Whither France?)

The W a r Correspondence of Leon Trotsky

* T h i s list includes o n l y books a n d p a m p h l e t s b y Leon Trotsky published i n t h e United States a n d i n p r i n t a s of 1977.