The Tito-Stalin Split and Yugoslavia's Military Opening Toward the West, 1950-1954 : In NATO's Backyard 9781498539340, 9781498539333

Citation preview

The Tito–Stalin Split and Yugoslavia’s Military Opening toward the West, 1950–1954

The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series Series Editor: Mark Kramer, Harvard University Solidarity: The Great Workers Strike of 1980 Michael Szporer Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945-1989 Edited by Mark Kramer and Vít Smetana The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History Edited by Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, and Barbara Stelzl-Marx The Legacy of the Cold War: Perspectives on Security, Cooperation, and Conflict Edited by Vojtech Mastny and Zhu Liqun Displaced Terror: History and Perception of Soviet Camps in Germany Bettina Greiner Khrushchev’s Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959 Jamil Hasanli Unified Military Industries of the Soviet Bloc: Hungary and the Division of Labor in Military Production Pál Germuska The Concept of Neutrality in Stalin’s Foreign Policy, 1945-53 Peter Ruggenthaler Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism Radoslav A. Yordanov The Power of Dynamic Détente Policies: U.S. Diplomacy between the Military Status Quo and the Transformation of Europe, 1964–1975 Stephan Kieninger The Tito–Stalin Split and Yugoslavia‘s Military Opening toward the West, 1950–1954: In NATO‘s Backyard By Ivan Laković and Dmitar Tasić

The Tito–Stalin Split and Yugoslavia’s Military Opening toward the West, 1950–1954 In NATO’s Backyard By Ivan Laković and Dmitar Tasić

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB Copyright © 2016 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Laković, Ivan, author. | Tasić, Dmitar, author. Title: The Tito-Stalin Split and Yugoslavia’s Military Opening toward the West, 19501954 : In NATO’s Backyard Description: Lanham, MD : Lexington Books, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016020533| ISBN 9781498539333 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781498539340 (electronic) Subjects: LCSH: Yugoslavia—Military relations—United States. | United States—Military relations—Yugoslavia. | Yugoslavia—History—1945-1980. | Military assistance. Classification: LCC DR1258.U6 L345 2016 | DDC 355/.031094970973—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016020533 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Preface vii Acknowledgments xiii 1  Breaking the Ice: An Unofficial Diplomacy

1

2  Toward Signing an Agreement

21

3  Hard Talks: From Military Aid to Military Coordination

33

4  The Balkan Treaty: Toward the New Balkan Alliance

53

5  The Key Year of 1955: Between the Generals and the Politicians

101

6  Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West: Pretext and Context

113

7  Under a Different Light: Reconsiderations and Stagnation of the Military Assistance Program

145

Conclusion 167 Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

181

Bibliography 267 Index 277 About the Authors

285

v

Preface

In his famous speech delivered at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, in early 1946, Winston Churchill declared that an Iron Curtain had descended across the continent of Europe. By all indications, the Soviet Union had finally achieved its goal of securing a warm-water port in European seas—on the Adriatic coast of Yugoslavia and Albania. Unexpectedly, however, Yugoslavia, once the most loyal ally of the world’s first Communist country, broke all relations with its patron and role model and entered into serious militarypolitical relations with the West. In short order, Yugoslavia began to receive considerable amounts of US and British weaponry and military equipment and simultaneously formed a defensive alliance with Greece and Turkey, the two Balkan countries that had become members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in early 1952. Almost overnight, the armed forces of the USSR and its allies found themselves hundreds of miles from the Adriatic. More than 30 Yugoslav divisions blocked the Soviet Army’s path to the Mediterranean. Even though they were armed with used and outdated weapons, they had the benefits of a country and people with a long tradition of struggle against more powerful foes. This book is the first in-depth study of how these events occurred. One of the most important points of departure for the general study of Yugoslavia’s relations with the West in the early years of the Cold War is Darko Bekić’s monograph, Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu (Yugoslavia in the Cold War 1949–1955),1 which provides valuable information about the problems of the Yugoslav-Western militarys’ cooperation during the 1950s. Since its appearance more than a quarter century ago, large numbers of documents have been declassified and made available for researchers. Still, Bekić’s book remains a model of sober research conduct and analysis—and the basis for further inquiry. In addition, two monographs by Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslavija vii

viii

Preface

i Zapad, 1952–1955, Jugoslovensko približavanje NATO–u (Yugoslavia and the West 1952–1955, Yugoslav Approaching to NATO),2 and Nova strategija spoljne politike Jugoslavije 1956–1961 (The New Strategy of Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia from 1956 to 1961),3 are fundamental for the study of Yugoslavia’s role in the early years of the Cold War. These monographs draw on “new” documents found in numerous Yugoslav repositories, including the all-important Josip Broz Tito archive in Belgrade (now part of the Archive of Yugoslavia). In addition, Bogetić is the author of numerous other publications on the same subject.4 Over the past decade, Serbian (Yugoslav) historiography relating to the early years of the Cold War has been enriched by several other studies based largely on sources of Yugoslav provenance. Of particular importance are the works of Bojan Dimitrijević—Jugoslavija i NATO (1951–1957) (Yugoslavia and NATO [1951–1952]), and the Jugoslovenska armija 1945–1954. Nova ideologija, vojnik i oružje (The Yugoslav Army 1945–1954. New ideology, soldier and weapons), as well as Od Staljina do Atlantskog pakta; Armija u spoljnoj politici Titove Jugoslavije 1945–1958. (From Stalin to NATO; The Army in the foreign policy of Tito’s Yugoslavia 1945–1958).5 Moreover, Dimitrijević is also the author of a series of papers examining Yugoslavia’s convergence with the West.6 Ivan Laković’s monograph (Western Military Assistance to Yugoslavia 1951–1958)7 focuses on Western military aid through the Mutual Defense Assistance program (MDAP).8 Yugoslavia’s conflict with the USSR in 1948 remains a very important topic of scholarly inquiry—and rightly so. The consequences of the TitoStalin split were reflected in almost all segments of Yugoslavia’s society. Conflict was not only visible at the political level but also through the entire society, and it led to the dissociation of Yugoslavia from the rest of the Socialist states. The conflict inflicted long-festering wounds on Yugoslav society, some engendered physically as well as psychologically, in the Yugoslavia version of the Soviet GULAG (Chief Administration of Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies), where the attempt was made to cure “Stalinism” by employing Stalinist methods. Only with the passage of time were Yugoslav participants gradually able to share their recollections of what had transpired in places such as Goli Otok. More recently, historians have published studies that examine the phenomenon of the IB (or Information Bureau), as the Cominform was generally called in Yugoslavia.9 Of particular importance for the study of Yugoslavia’s convergence with the West is Lorraine Lees’s book, Keeping Tito Afloat, in which the author provides an overview of the evolution of US-Yugoslavia relations between



Preface ix

1945 and 1960. This book represents the most comprehensive examination of this topic by an American historian.10 The process of Belgrade’s subsequent, if short-lived, reconciliation with the Soviet Union during the 1950s, one that naturally impacted Yugoslavia’s relationship with the West, is the focus of Radojica Luburić’s study, Pomirenje Jugoslavije i SSSR 1953–1955 (Reconciliation of Yugoslavia with the USSR 1953–1955),11 as well as the works of several other authors.12 Copies of many original materials relating to Yugoslav-Western military cooperation during the 1950s have been included in various Yugoslavia and foreign collections. Documents of American origin can be found in Foreign Relations of United States for Years 1948–1960, as well as in a thematic collection, From National Communism to National Collapse, US Intelligence Community Estimative Products on Yugoslavia, 1948–1990. Yugoslav records can be found in Balkan Pact 1953/1954, published by the Military History Institute in Belgrade; Balkan Contractual Relations, Volume III by Miodrag Stojković; as well as Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije 1941–1950 (Documents on the Foreign Policy of Yugoslavia in 1950), edited by Đoko Tripković and Dragan Bogetić. Also of importance is a collection of documents, Zapisnici sa sednica Politbiroa Centralnog komiteta KPJ (11. jun 1945–7. jul 1948.) (Minutes from the Meeting of Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (June 11, 1945–7 July 1948.), edited by Branko Petranović.13 Serbian (Yugoslav) archival holdings on this subject can be found in the Archive of Yugoslavia (collections 9, 15, 50, 112, 130, 160, 507, 512, 513, 703), the Military Archive in Belgrade (collections GŠ-1, GŠ-2, and GŠ-10), the Archive of Josip Broz Tito (collections Office of Marshal of Yugoslavia and the Office of the President of the Republic),14 the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia (collection Political Archive), and the Archive of Serbia (the personal collection of Veljko Mićunović) in Belgrade. The greatest number of US documents related to this topic is stored in the US National Archives (collections RG 59, 84, 218, 273, 319, 330, 334, and 338), the National Security Archive (NSA documents on Yugoslavia) Manuscript Department, and the Library of Congress (Clare Booth Luce, Averell Harriman, and Paul H. Nitze Papers) in Washington, D.C. In addition, British documents housed in the Public Record Office in Kew (collection FOR 371) were of invaluable importance for this research. As a result of the heightened interest in the role of Yugoslavia in the early years of the Cold War and its rapprochement to the West (through the program of Western military aid and the formation of a military alliance with Greece and Turkey), an international conference titled Balkanski pakt

x

Preface

1953/54 (The Balkan Pact 1953/54) was held in Belgrade in 2005, the proceedings of which were published three years later. NOTES 1.  Darko Bekić, Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu. Odnosi sa velikim silama 1949–1955 (Zagreb: Globus, 1988). 2.  Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, 1952–1955. Jugoslovensko približavanje NATO–u (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2000). 3.  Dragan Bogetić, Nova strategija spoljne politike Jugoslavije 1956–1961 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006). 4.  Dragan Bogetić, Koreni jugoslovenskog opredeljenja za nesvrstanost (Origins of the Yugoslav determination for non-alignmentt, Belgrade, 1990; “Vojna saradnja Jugoslavije i SAD” (Military cooperation of Yugoslavia and USA), Istorija 20. veka (History of the 20th Century), 1993; “Odnosi Jugoslavije sa Zapadom tokom 1953. i 1954” (Yugoslav—Western relations during 1953 and 1954), Istorija 20. veka, 2/1995 (History of the 20th Century); “Jugoslovenska politika ekvidistance i problem dalje vojne saradnje sa Zapadom tokom 1955” (Yugoslav policy of equidistance and issue of further military cooperation with the West during the 1955), Vojnoistorijski glasnik 2-3/1997 (Military History Review); “Jugoslovensko približavanje Zapadu u vreme Kominforma” (Yugoslav approachment to the West during Cominform), Istorija 20. veka, 1-2/1998; Ekonomska i vojna pomoć Zapada Jugoslaviji (Western economical and military aid to Yugoslavia), Jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob 1948, Zbornik radova (Yugoslav—Soviet Split, Collection of papers), Beograd, 1999; “Podsticaji i ograničenja na putu normalizacije jugoslovensko—sovjetskih odnosa tokom 1956. godine” (Stimulances and limitations on the way of normalization of Yugoslav—Soviet relations in 1956), Tokovi istorije, broj 3—4/2005 (Currents of History); Podsticajni i faktori ograničavanja na putu savezništva Jugoslavije, Grčke i Turske 1951-1954. godine (Stimulative and limiting factors on the way of alliance of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey), Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Zbornik radova (Balkan Pact 1953/54, Collection of papers), Beograd 2008. 5.  Bojan Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO (1951–1957), Beograd, 2003 (Yugoslavia and NATO (1951–1957)); Bojan Dimitrijević, Jugoslovenska armija 1945–1954. Nova ideologija, vojnik i oružje, Beograd, 2006; Bojan Dimitrijević, Od Staljina do Atlantskog pakta; Armija u spoljnoj politici Titove Jugoslavije 1945–1958, Beograd 2005. 6.  Bojan Dimitrijević, “Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951–1958” (Western military aid toYugoslavia), Istorija 20. veka, 1/1996; “Jugoslovensko-sovjetski vojni odnosi 1945–1948” (Yugoslav—Soviet military relations 1945–1958), Istorija 20. veka, 1/1997; “Jugoslovenska narodna armija u Tršćanskoj krizi 1953. godine” (Yugoslav Peoples Army in Trieste crisis), Istorija 20. veka, 1/1998; “Jugoslovensko ratno vazduhoplovstvo 1945–1951” (Yugoslav airforce 1945–1951), Let, časopis za



Preface xi

istoriju vazduhoplovstva (Flight, Air force history review), Muzej jugoslovenskog vazduhoplovstva, 1/1998.   7.  Ivan Laković, Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951-1958, IICG, Podgorica, 2006.   8.  As well: Ivan Laković, “Operativna problematika rada na zapadnoj vojnoj pomoći 1951–1958” (Operational problematics of Western military assistance deliveries 1951–1958); Istorijski zapisi 1-4/2005 (Ecrits historiques); “Vojna pomoć SAD Jugoslaviji u naoružanju artiljerijskih i oklopno–mehanizovanih jedinica 1951–1958” (US military assistance to Yugoslavia in the armament of artillery and armored units 1951–1958), Vojnoistorijski glasnik 1-2/2005.   9.  Radovan Radonjić, Sukob KPJ sa Kominformom i društveni razvoj Jugoslavije 1948–1950 (Conflict between Communist Party of Yugoslavia with Cominform and Social Development of Yugoslavia 1948–1950), Zagreb, 1975; Vladimir Dedijer, Izgubljena bitka Josifa Visarionoviča Staljina (Joseph Stalin’s Lost Battle), Rijekа 1982; Čedo Štrbac, Jugoslavija i odnosi među socijalističkim zemljama. Sukob KPJ i Informbiroa Yugoslavia and Relations between Socialist Countries. Conflict between CPY and Informbureau, Beograd 1984; Čedo Štrbac, Svedočanstva o 1948. Fragmenti za istoriju (Testimonies about 1948. Fragments for History), Beograd 1989; Đoko Tripković, “Vruće leto 1949. godine” (Hot summer of 1949), Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis (Yugoslav Historical Review), 1–2/2000; and Zbornik radova Jugoslovensko—sovjetski sukob 1948 (Collection of papers Yugoslav-Soviet split 1948), Beograd 1998. 10.  Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia and the Cold War (College Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). In writing this text, we have used the Serbian edition of this book (Lorejn Lis, Održavanje Tita, Beograd, 2003), so the pages we are referring to in the footnotes are given according to it. 11.  Radojica Luburić, Pomirenje Jugoslavije i SSSR 1953–1955, Podgorica, 1999. 12.  Đoko Tripković, “Normalizacija jugoslovensko-sovjetskih diplomatskih odnosa 1953. godine” (Normalization of the Yugoslav-Soviet diplomatic relations 1953), Istorija 20. veka, 1/1994; “Uspon i pad jugoslovensko-sovjetskih odnosa 1956. godine” (Rise and fall of the Yugoslav-Soviet relations during 1956), Istorija 20. veka, 2/1998; “XX kongres Komunističke partije Sovjetskog Saveza I jugoslovensko—sovjetski odnosi” (XX Congress of the Communist party of Soviet Union and Yugoslav-Soviet relations), Arhiv (Archive), 2/2001; Đorđe Borozan, “Posrednik mira između gvozdenih zavesa (Razgovori Tito-Hruščov u Moskvi 1956)” (Peace mediator between Iron curtains (Tito-Khruschev talks in Moscow 1956), Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 1/1997; Isti, “Posrednik mira između gvozdenih zavesa (Razgovori Tito-Hruščov u Moskvi 1956.—II deo)” (Peace mediator between Iron curtains (TitoKhruschev talks in Moscow 1956—Part Two), Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 2–3/1997; Jan Pelikan, “Jugoslavija i Sovjetski savez polovinom 1954. godine. Od normalizacije diplomatskih odnosa do političke saradnje” (Yugoslavia and Soviet Union in mid1954. From normalization of diplomatic relations to political cooperation), Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis, 2/1997.

xii

Preface

13.  Zapisnici sa sednica Politbiroa Centralnog komiteta KPJ (11. jun 1945—7. jul 1948), Beograd, 1995; Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije 1941–1950, Jugoslovenski pregled, Beograd, 1988–1993. 14.  In 2009, the Archive of Josip Broz Tito merged with the Archive of Yugoslavia but kept its internal structure.

Acknowledgments

The story surrounding this book goes back to October 2008 and the conference East-Central Europe in the Cold War, 1945–1989, organized by the Polish Institute for National Remembrance in Warsaw. At the time, we were dealing with complementary aspects of the Yugoslav military’s opening toward the West in the early 1950s. Speaking together, we realized that joining our efforts would help us create a more comprehensive and illuminating publication. At some point between the conference’s panels, Dr. Mark Kramer, director of the Cold War studies program at Harvard University, mentioned that same idea to us. That is why we owe him our gratitude. One of the motivations for entering this project was the deficiency of relevant literature in the English language. Previous works by our colleagues and ourselves in this thematic domain, based on the sources from the archival institutions in Belgrade, were published almost entirely in Serbo-Croatian, so we wanted to make this story visible to a Western audience. Researching and writing the monograph went along with our PhD studies, as well as other academic and nonacademic duties and activities in our respective institutes. That additional effort would not have been fruitful without the support of our families, who sometimes put aside their own needs and expectations so we could focus on this project in the time we could spare from our other commitments. For that we owe them eternal gratitude. The process of research and writing was not, however, as time consuming as “postproduction,” that is, translating and proofreading the text. The fact that we are not native English speakers has significantly hampered our efforts. While we did our best to write the text in “understandable” English, its current form would not have been possible without the help of colleagues who contributed in bringing the text to this condition. We would like to thank Mrs. Candice Adams Roma, who did the first copyediting, and, especially, xiii

xiv

Acknowledgments

Dr. John Treadway from the University of Richmond. Due to his personal work on proofreading, the quality of the monograph’s text was dramatically improved. We owe him a debt of gratitude. In addition, before the text’s submission, Dr. Kramer added a final polish. However, all remaining errors or imperfections found in the pages of this book are entirely ours and solely our responsibility. We would also like to thank Mr. Dimitrije Ostojić, who provided us a photo for the cover page, as well Mrs. Nada Pantelić and Mrs. Marijana Mraović, archivists from the Archive of Josip Broz Tito and the Military Archive in Belgrade, whose affability and assistance went well beyond what was required by their jobs. We would also like to express our appreciation to many other fellow researchers, archivists, and librarians, whose suggestions, remarks, and advice helped us in coming to the end of this road.

Chapter One

Breaking the Ice An Unofficial Diplomacy

Most Western analyses view the Yugoslav Army (YA) as the very backbone of the Josip Broz Tito regime. If the YA and its successor, the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA),1 can be characterized by a specific attribute, it surely was the frequent postwar reorganizations that took place in the immediate postwar years—three altogether between 1945 and 1948. The first, marking the transition from war to peacetime, occurred in 1945. A second, smaller one, followed only two years later in 1947. After the break with the USSR in 1948, the YA undertook a third, more large-scale reorganization in which some military formations were disbanded, new ones introduced, and whole units reformed or relocated from one end of the country to the other.2 The principle of complete reliance on Soviet norms and equipment became the YA’s guiding light in the immediate postwar period. This dependency was reflected in the army’s structure, formation, usage, armament, and equipment. Older Yugoslav military traditions were abandoned, and the doctrine of partisan warfare was neglected, while Red Army drills were introduced and Soviet guidelines and rules of engagement were adopted. Despite the goal of more uniformity and conformity with Soviet norms (including military equipment), the fact is that at the end of the war and in the early postwar period, Yugoslav forces possessed a wide variety of equipment and weapons of disparate origin. Yugoslav, German, Italian, and Allied (American, British, and Soviet) weapons and equipment could be found in YA units. In total, there were 61 types of infantry and artillery weapons with 49 kinds of ammunition of various calibers. Armored units, for example, were equipped with American Stuart tanks and Soviet T-34s. The Yugoslav Air Force possessed Soviet Yak-3 and Yak-9 fighters, Il-2 and American Thunderbolt assault planes, and a German Messerschmitt 109, as well as British Spitfire and Hurricane fighters, a Mosquito reconnaissance plane, 1

2

Chapter One

etc. The same kind of mixed configurations could be found in training and transport aviation, as well as in the Yugoslav Navy. Quality signal systems, radars, spare parts, engineering equipment, and other elements were missing.3 Unfortunately, the Yugoslav military industry did not recover quickly enough to compensate for the country’s dependence on the USSR during the first years. Thus, the first postwar attempts at unification and standardization failed once deliveries from the Soviet Union ceased. After the break with the USSR in 1948, large numbers of World War II trophy weapons were again in high demand, but by then, the lack of spare parts posed a major problem, leading to numerous breakdowns and accidents, especially in the air force.4 Unexpectedly, however, yesterday’s enemy extended the hand of salvation. The West, specifically the United States, took advantage of a unique and totally unanticipated opportunity and through programs of economic and military assistance, helped its new, unusual, somewhat reluctant, and at times suspicious ally. Although the Western military assistance program did, at the decisive moment, contribute to the consolidation of materiel, the protection and correlation of the YA’s equipment, and the strengthening of Yugoslavia’s position vis-à-vis the East, the decision to cooperate with the United States and NATO (after its formation in 1949) was not an automatic or immediate consequence of the conflict with the Cominform. The Cominform resolution was issued on June 28, 1948, while the agreement on US military assistance was signed over three years later, on November 14, 1951. During the intervening period, Yugoslavia faced the possibility of war on numerous occasions. If the armed threats of the Soviet Union and its allies had been realized, Yugoslavia would have been forced to respond with a military equipped with antiquated technology and equipment and, even worse, would have been deprived of necessary military supplies. The recall of Soviet military instructors was meant not only to stop the usual kind of army cooperation but also to demonstrate the essence of all the military assistance programs and systems—their dependence on more long-term and wider political processes that through the dynamics of their development were opening or closing the space for the realization of given projects. With all the controversies that the split caused, the impression remains that the perspective of modernization, which had been initiated in accordance with Soviet military doctrine, was put on hold. While both the East and West were taking steps that would change the nature and appearance of their own armed forces, the Yugoslav military stagnated, precisely at a time when the quality of its combat units could have easily been put to the test. As the broader political and diplomatic framework created conditions for YA’s existing development system to disappear, the formation of a new political direction became a basic precondition for the revival of this pro-



Breaking the Ice 3

cess. Before American tanks could appear in the Yugoslav military arsenal, the Yugoslav state and political order, both of which had been subjected to furious Soviet ideological assault, would have to undergo a major political transformation. On the one hand, an attempt at rapprochement with the capitalist enemy could provoke a serious domestic backlash, especially in certain party and military circles. On the other hand, it could also provoke military retaliation on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies. For its part, the West was initially quite reserved, indeed wary, about the Tito-Stalin feud. It certainly did not rush to embrace far-reaching projects because of the dispute.5 Indeed, Western governments initially tried to fathom what the dispute was all about—or whether it was merely a sham exercise designed to test Western responses. Thus, the West assumed a wait-and-see attitude, while entertaining various what-if scenarios. This, however, had not meant absolute passivity on the part of the West. Quite the contrary: analyses and preparatory activities undertaken during this period paved the way for Yugoslavia’s subsequent rapprochement with the West, especially in military matters. The West demonstrated a tentative willingness to try to exploit an unexpected “gift” (assuming it was not some kind of Trojan horse) and to create conditions for putting mutual military cooperation on the agenda.6 For its part, the Yugoslav leadership had to proceed very cautiously in approaching the West. To be sure, the country was in dire need of new military equipment. On the other hand, the sudden appearance of Western war materiel in Yugoslav military depots would certainly strain Yugoslav’s already frayed relations with the Soviet Union even further. In Tito’s words, “We cannot allow people to say, ‘This is an American tank, and these are the British cannons.’”7 The goal was to do everything possible not to provoke a Soviet attack. In the end, the Yugoslav leadership decided to approach the West only if the following conditions could be met: •  Military assistance will only be a logical continuation of an independent position of the USSR and the West’s clearly defined convergence. •  The USSR and the countries in its sphere of influence will not respond against Yugoslavia on the news about the implementation of this program, except verbally. •  Such a confirmation of changes in foreign policy will extend only as far as the domestic public was willing to accept, without explicit opposition. In 1950, Yugoslavia genuinely feared that a Soviet invasion was indeed a very real possibility. The example of the Korean conflict was particularly disturbing, as it seemed to demonstrate the possibility of starting a local conflict without causing a general war with unforeseeable consequences.

4

Chapter One

In the same year, negotiations that would eventually lead to the delivery of American military assistance began. However, the United States was not the first country that Yugoslavia approached about this issue. In the previous year, Yugoslavia approached France, unsuccessfully, for a loan to procure weapons, neither party publicly admitting that negotiations had actually taken place.8 Yugoslav leaders were of the opinion that if the talks had born fruit there would have been less resistance to having French weapons in Yugoslav arsenals than American ones. Despite the fact that Belgrade’s negotiations with the West were only in their infancy in 1950, Eastern European countries nonetheless commonly believed that Yugoslavia already had reached a solid agreement with the West concerning military aid. A number of decisions made by the US National Security Council (NSC) in 1949 pointed in the direction of incipient Yugoslav-American military understanding. These decisions left open the possibility that in the event of a Soviet attack, Yugoslavia could receive approval to procure American weapons but that they should not be delivered until the actual onset of Soviet or Soviet-instigated aggression.9 In accordance with this decision, US officials undertook analyses of Yugoslav’s military needs, as well as the US ability to satisfy them. While American planners were expecting Yugoslavia to take the initiative on these issues, they nonetheless contemplated creating conditions for a favorable response in advance.10 American historian Lorraine Lees stated that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had information at the time that the Yugoslav government had indeed already unofficially approached the United States with a request for military assistance. The channels through which the actors delivered this request remain unknown, at least without access to CIA Intelligence Memorandum no. 255 of December 9, 1949, which Lees cites.11 If this information is correct, it would have been the first documented occurrence of the Yugoslav authorities requesting American military assistance. Both sides would have conducted this work carefully and out of the public eye, so it should not be doubted that secret and unofficial contacts existed before negotiations found a more regular framework. According to Darko Bekić, a conversation took place between Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, and George Allen, the American Ambassador in Belgrade, which addressed the question of possible military assistance to Yugoslavia. Allen thought that the issue should be discussed directly with Tito, while Acheson preferred a more indirect approach. One possibility was to use the American military attaché to test the waters, without directly raising the question of American aid.12 In July 1950, shortly after the start of the Korean War, Acheson launched the initiative to have American, British, and French military officials coordinate their planning in anticipation of Yugoslavia’s request for military assistance.13 One month later, that request came



Breaking the Ice 5

in a secret and unofficial format from the highest echelons of the Yugoslav government and the political hierarchy. When Eugene Black, the director of the World Bank, visited Belgrade on August 19, 1950, it was none other than Marshal Tito who raised the question of possible military assistance. According to Bekić, Tito’s attitude completely matched the positions of the Pentagon and the NSC, which assumed that any aid would take the form of war materiel—not troops—and that the weapons and equipment should be stored somewhere near the Yugoslav border. About the same time, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended adopting a proposal that could have been made by Tito as well, namely that required war materials should be stored in Yugoslavia itself to facilitate their fast delivery in case of need, as well as the need for coordinating further steps with the British and French.14 In August 1950, another NSC decision provided for Yugoslav military assistance within the legal framework of the Mutual Defense Aid Program (MDAP). Full inclusion in the MDAP, however, required the signing of bilateral agreements based on the principles of common defense and reciprocity, which meant a formalization of Allied relations to some degree. Although the program was designed with NATO allies in mind, its framework was general enough to allow the project’s approval by the US Congress, as well as to preserve the dignity of the Yugoslav side in the eyes of its public opinion. Acheson and Allen individually were extremely active in creating the conditions for initiating the program. The US Congress adopted the amendment to the MDAP statute from the same year, 1950, enabling the government to deliver military aid to countries out of NATO if so doing would increase the security of the United States and the Western military alliance.15 In talks with P. Baudette, the French Ambassador to Yugoslavia, on October 27, 1950, Tito again raised the question of Yugoslavia procuring military equipment from France based on a long-term commercial loan. As mentioned previously, it was thought that a Yugoslav request for defensive weapons, especially anti-aircraft artillery from French sources, would, presumably, have evoked a less negative reaction in the Eastern Bloc. Although it was emphasized that this discussion was only of a tentative nature,16 it would seem that its principal goal was to deflect any attention from the discussions being undertaken in Washington. At the end of October, the Allied Tripartite Commission finished its report concerning military assistance for Yugoslavia, in which it elaborated on the basis for planning peacetime and emergency activities to help Yugoslavia and indicated that Tito, at least officially, had been hesitant to do more.17 Unofficially, however, things were quite different. As a result of the talks between World Bank Director Black, and President Tito and Boris Kidrič that focused principally on economic issues, it

6

Chapter One

was decided to send a Yugoslav negotiating team to the United State to seek World Bank funding for various economic projects. The delegation consisted of Vojin Guzina and Vladimir Velebit, along with two engineers. Negotiations, which lasted several months, yielded no tangible results.18 On the other hand, Velebit’s extended stay in the United States enabled him to come into contact with a group of prominent American politicians and intelligence officers. Among others, there were Averell Harriman, an adviser to President Truman on foreign affairs; Robert Joyce, the deputy chief of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff (PPS); Charles Bollen, future US ambassador to the USSR; influential journalists Joe and Stewart Alsop; Frank Wisner, deputy director of the CIA; Frederick Reinhardt, director of the Office for Eastern Issues, and Franklin Lindsay, an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operative.19 As he recalled subsequently in interviews with Bekić, Bisenić, and Lees, Velebit raised the issue of acquiring “free” military assistance from the United States “on his own initiative.” On November 22, as noted by Bekić and Lees, Joyce and Reinhardt announced that the United States was prepared to deliver large quantities of weapons and equipment to Yugoslavia free of charge.20 The Americans suggested that the Yugoslav authorities send an officer to negotiate the military and technical details of such an arrangement. In response to a telegram from Velebit, Belgrade suggested that he return to Yugoslavia to discuss matters in person. The Yugoslav ambassador in Washington, Vladimir Popović, concurred.21 In meetings held in Belgrade between November 25 and December 3, 1950, Tito, Velebit, Edvard Kardelj, Aleksandar Ranković, and Generals Ivan Gošnjak and Koča Popović (Chief of the Yugoslav General Staff, 1948–1953) agreed to accept the American offer. The General Staff was directed to compose a list of necessary war materials, which Velebit himself translated into English to maintain confidentiality, while General Popović was designated as the officer requested by the Americans with competence to conduct further negotiations.22 On December 4, a somber Tito mentioned the possibility of obtaining military assistance from the United States at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CCCPY).23 Upon returning to Washington, Velebit submitted the lists of required war equipment and, together with Ambassador Popović, continued to work toward realization of the arms delivery project.24 Retired General Ellery Huntington, the former chief of the American military mission in the Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ) during World War II, brought Ambassador Vladimir Popović together with General George Olmstead, the Pentagon logistics officer in charge of military deliveries abroad in 1950.25 Olmsted emphasized that US military circles had been in favor of rendering any possible assistance to Yugoslavia, but as the question



Breaking the Ice 7

had been primarily a political issue, they had hitherto focused their discussions on methods of possible implementation.26 To Popović he explained the decisions of Congress that would place necessary funds at Yugoslavia’s disposal. Next, he discussed the State Department’s political view to provide assistance and coordination of actions in accordance with the Marshall Plan. The State Department’s activities had already been adjusted to war preparations, allowing only the Defense Department to send military assistance to a given country according to the determined specifications and priorities.27 The prevailing legal mechanism, the MDAP, provided for three categories of funds and users, ways, and type of assistance. Although the MDAP form had listed three categories of countries—members of NATO, other Western European countries, and some Eastern (Asian) countries—Huntington observed that the State Department could easily conceive of a fourth category to provide aid for other countries. Tito believed that was in the spirit of the law’s objective.28 Popović, sharing his own viewpoint, answered that Yugoslavia would be willing to accept the American aid but without formal obligations and public discussion, which certainly would have provoked negative reactions from the Eastern Bloc, in which case the United States would have undoubtedly been handed a list of necessary war materials in short order.29 At the bottom of his notepad, the Yugoslav ambassador scribbled that Olmsted and Huntington had left the impression that they were not familiar with “lists that are submitted to the others . . . and that this meeting was organized in order to . . . make us understand that more things couldn’t be obtained without a legal cover.” Mentioning that “these two . . . seek to accommodate our request,” he also wrote that Velebit had been promised an answer within a few days, which would provide the basis for a decision as to whether the future focus of the enterprise should remain in the United States or in Great Britain.30 For the vast majority of the Yugoslav-American military-diplomatic activities at this time, no other sources exist, except Velebit’s previously mentioned published statement to Lees, Bekić, and Bisenić, in which Velebit insisted that he was acting on his own, that is without any formal instructions from Belgrade. Velebit’s assertions notwithstanding, it is difficult to believe that he would have been acting on his own. Previous contacts did in fact exist, and there was already a certain degree of coordination in the activities of all the players. Moreover, Western documents show that the Western “team” worked in coordinated fashion to realize the project and that the Yugoslav reaction to the proposal was prompt, precise, and more or less in accordance with the attitudes of American officials. A spontaneous Yugoslav response at the time is difficult to imagine—especially because everything in Yugoslavia worked slowly and was complicated. The importance of the political functions of the people who were already in contact with Velebit invalidates the

8

Chapter One

possibility that engagement in such sensitive activities was totally “friend” based. Therefore, one must assume that the Yugoslav plan of action presented to Velebit and his collaborators, perhaps “unofficially,” was certainly sanctioned by the Yugoslav leadership and Tito himself. The available sources do not show precisely who was involved in the decision-making process on the Yugoslav side. Despite the voluntarism and easygoing approach to the many important issues and problems that were characteristic of the Yugoslav reality in the postwar years, it is difficult to believe that Velebit, an indisputably capable and intelligent official, was able to alone mastermind one of the most controversial foreign policy projects of the 1950s.31 In the meantime, the American side was contemplating the best—and most cost-efficient—ways to render financial and military assistance to Yugoslavia. In terms of transferring military hardware, there were three basic choices: to draw on the US’s own enormous stockpiles of surplus trophy weapons from World War II, to deliver modern war armament, or to combine the two options. The first would have been relatively easy to accomplish and was a way to get “big dividends for a relatively small investment.”32 The second approach was a bit more complicated, requiring full and official disclosure regarding the entire activity, including the signing of certain bilateral agreements between the United States and Yugoslavia. In December 1950, Democratic Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois presided over Senate hearings concerning President Truman’s proposal to provide financial assistance to Communist Yugoslavia. He calculated that it would cost $176 million per year to maintain one American division in Europe, while for $38 million, the figure recommended by President Truman in his message to Congress on November 29 (albeit for humanitarian aid), the United States could support 32 Yugoslav divisions.33 If Lucas’s estimates, taken together with those of General Omar Bradley, the Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were correct,34 then the figures describing the value of materials intended for Yugoslavia through this program, although astronomical in Yugoslav terms, would have been considered a fairly good economic deal for the United States. According to Velebit, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett and Assistant Undersecretary of the State Freeman H. Matthews had been informed that the number of soldiers in the Yugoslav Army had actually increased from 400,000 to approximately 600,000 in the face of the Soviet threat. The two immediately attempted to arrange emergency deliveries with trophy equipment to achieve initiative on the psychological level (i.e., to show American readiness to furnish Yugoslavia with arms) and to encourage the Yugoslav side to enter into a more formal arrangement.35 In this respect, Ambassador Allen, who had not been informed about these events, followed a similar track in Belgrade.36



Breaking the Ice 9

Although cooperation with Washington was already beginning to bear fruit, the Yugoslav leadership was apparently still not intent to rely solely on the United States for future military aid. At the end of January 1951, Milovan Đilas and Vladimir Dedijer paid a visit to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, with whom they confidentially broached the question of obtaining British military assistance. (It would seem that the British, as well as the French, were unaware of earlier Yugoslav overtures to the United States.) At a short meeting on February 2, 1951, Attlee confirmed the readiness of his cabinet to assist Yugoslavia and, like American officials before him, requested a list of needed equipment and armament, accompanied by notes concerning deadlines, priorities, and other details.37 One month before, at the end of December 1950, Velebit had already submitted his own list to Washington, which included requests for modern fighter planes, artillery, and ammunition.38 General Koča Popović arrived in Washington five months later, in the middle of May, allegedly to visit Ambassador Popović. Because he traveled under his own name and was accompanied by his wife, his visit was clearly in the public view. Velebit had already announced the arrival of General Popović on April 6, as the visit of a top-ranking Yugoslav official with the broadest military competence.39 Popović’s visit served as the first known official step toward acquiring American military support, as Velebit’s previous contacts, however important, had been of an essentially informal and unofficial nature.40 In the period from May 17 to June 13, General Popović had 12 meetings in the Pentagon, where American officers raised a series of strategic and materiel-technical issues.41 At this early stage, Popović, was unwilling to disclose Yugoslav strategic plans or to reveal confidential information concerning the YA’s current situation, disposition, or intentions.42 These meetings showed the conceptually different perspectives between Yugoslavia and the United States. Popović sought modern military equipment and armament, such as jet fighters and the latest tanks, but his hosts, at least at this time, were not willing to offer anything more than a few contingents of trophy weapons.43 Popović felt that Yugoslavia had good and capable soldiers who needed only up-todate war materiel to become a first-class combat force. The American side, however, demurred, easily conjuring excuses and reasons why the delivery of the most modern weaponry was not currently feasible. They emphasized the bureaucratic and administrative problems, the current shortage of some of the equipment that had been requested, and unavoidable time constraints, as well as the already excessive obligations to allies. The Yugoslav chief of staff’s mission in Washington was not going quite as expected.44 Because of his rank and the mandate with which he had come to the United States, Popović at least expected to talk about “all the issues and

10

Chapter One

possibilities of real and effective operational cooperation.”45 State Department officials, however, had presented him with a memo “which emphasize[d] that the issues of materiel aid should be solved in a technical conference, limiting the talks he had come for in advance.”46 Moreover, quite understandably from an American point of view, the US side kept avoiding giving a clear answer regarding the possibility of American military engagement (or intervention) in the case of an attack on Yugoslavia by Soviet satellites or any so-called “Korean scenario,” which only added to Popović’s level of discontent. In an attempt to facilitate negotiations, Ambassador Vladimir Popović organized a dinner with Averill Harriman and Robert Joyce on June 10, 1951. Emphasizing that his presence in Washington was not intended for investigative purposes but rather to achieve concrete agreements on obtaining military assistance, General Popović complained about the low level of his contacts to date and voiced dissatisfaction with “the amount and types of materiel that could be obtained with a short term delivery.”47 Harriman, however, made clear that the logistic support of the United States was being allocated according to the priorities dictated by the current assessments of the situation and contractual obligations to the allies who were also recipients of American aid. He explained that the purpose of the proposed technical conference was not to deny the Yugoslav envoy the opportunity to present an overall view of the issue of mutual military relations (based on the question of military assistance) but rather to create an official institutional framework for planning the content and dynamics of future deliveries. Lastly, he proposed that General Joseph Lawton Collins, the US Army Chief of Staff,48 visit Yugoslavia in person to resolve those issues in direct talks with Yugoslav officials by discussing what concerned Americans the most and to ascertain to what extent Tito was willing to go to improve their mutual relations.49 If Harriman represented the official American point of view, then his Yugoslav hosts found his words anything but reassuring. Clearly, this meant that the preparation for General Popović’s visit to Washington had been inadequate in the extreme, based on an imprecise agreement that contained a number of more abstract intentions rather than concrete plans. General Popović was unhappy to hear that the Americans wanted to send their own representative to Yugoslavia, the US Army Chief of Staff no less, and give him essentially the same kind of mandate that Popović had brought with him to the United States, taking it as an act of disrespect. However, the initiative had already been on the American side. Comments that the regulation of these issues might provoke the East Bloc were considered to be nothing more than an excuse. By preparing to receive the delivery of American military equipment, which by itself could not be kept secret, Yugoslavia had shown itself prepared to deal with such an eventuality. Harriman also advised discussing



Breaking the Ice 11

these issues “in full sincerity” at the forthcoming meeting with General Omar Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who would have the full mandate and authority to discuss them competently.50 At the meeting with Bradley and other top military officials held later in June 1951, a number of strategic topics were discussed in addition to the matter of military assistance. According to one document cited by Darko Bekić concerning the talks, General Clyde D. Eddleman51 reported that General Popović shared a broad range of hitherto unknown information. On June 13, 1951, Eddleman and Popović signed an agreement that envisaged an urgent delivery of military equipment to Yugoslavia, as well as the continuation of negotiations that would take the form of a competent technical conference of military experts.52 The conference would discuss further the materiel needs of the Yugoslav armed forces and prepare a list of weapons and equipment, according to which further deliveries would take place. The final meeting attended by General Popović during his visit to Washington took place at the State Department with US Secretary of State Dean Acheson.53 On that occasion, it was acknowledged that the recent discussions were just the beginning of the process of US-Yugoslav military rapprochement and that many questions Popović had been prepared to answer were not broached by US officials. The two sides signed an agreement concerning the proposed technical conference, but the dates for General Collins’s visit to Yugoslavia were left open, as the Yugoslav government indicated it was not prepared to receive him at that time.54 Acheson questioned his guest about the condition and intention of Soviet satellite forces in the region. General Popović responded that the will of these countries to engage in aggressive action against Yugoslavia could not be doubted and that they were in the process of increasing their level of combat readiness. But he could not estimate the possible timing of an attack.55 Despite Popović’s occasional disappointments, his visit to the United States was largely a success. The general had participated in several highlevel meetings and had negotiated an all-important initial arms delivery, which had a very positive and important effect on Yugoslavia. As noted by Lorraine Lees, the visit marked the Tito government’s first official request for military assistance in accordance with the MDAP.56 Thus, the process of the United States providing military aid to Yugoslavia began in earnest in the first half of 1951. Upon his departure from Washington, Popović stayed in London a few days (June 29–July 3), where he engaged in talks with General Grant and members of the British general staff about the possible delivery of British war materiel. Subsequently, he traveled to Paris, where he met with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe (SACEUR), General Dwight D.

12

Chapter One

Eisenhower on July 10. At the very beginning of their conversation, Eisenhower posed a series of specific questions related to the YA’s strength, the structure of the required assistance and its expected time of arrival, the need for dispersion of supply sources, and personnel and organizational structure. In response, Popović stated that Yugoslavia currently had 30 incomplete divisions at its disposal, with a total strength of approximately 450,000 soldiers.57 He noted that the equipment that Yugoslavia had requested was the required minimum for an effective and active military force, as well as for half a million of trained reservists, but he did specify when the formation of these reserve units would be completed. Concerning the modern arms Yugoslavia anticipated receiving, he expected that training courses for the new weapons would be arranged—but opined, somewhat curiously, that the YA’s initial ignorance of the new equipment should not lead to problems at the outset.58 Eisenhower then moved to the complex of issues that he and most of the Western planners were most interested in: Yugoslavia’s projections of military activities in the sense of coordination and possible alliances with countries whose social arrangements were built on a different ideological background. The Yugoslav general openly responded that doctrinal differences would not represent any obstacle to joint military action, especially in the face of Soviet aggression.59 Thus, he confirmed one of the important principles that later governed Yugoslavia’s relations with Western countries. On the one hand, Yugoslavia would not turn its back on its ideological underpinnings. It would remain true to its interpretation of Marxism and continue to champion the interests of the broader Socialist community. On the other hand, it could and would honestly and honorably collaborate with the West. This position, which many in the West doubted at the time (the heyday of McCarthyism in the United States) but others gradually came to accept, ultimately enabled Tito’s Yugoslavia to work effectively with capitalist countries grouped in NATO. In response to Eisenhower’s query about the possibility of Yugoslav command officers training in Western Europe, Popović responded that he did not see that as a problem. To another question concerning Yugoslav combat morale, which was based at least in part on Tito’s health and ability to remain at the head of the Yugoslav state and military, Popović responded that Tito was not alone at the head of the party, state, and army and that governmental policy would not change in the event of his absence. The present political course, said Popović, was a reflection of the Yugoslav leadership’s collective attitude, and “there is no reason why the temporary inability of the Marshal would change anything.”60 Although such an answer was to be expected, it is difficult to believe, in hindsight, that political life or policies in a Yugoslavia minus Tito would have looked the same. Regardless of the importance and



Breaking the Ice 13

ability of other party and state leaders at the top of the Yugoslav political military and political apparatus, Tito held all the strings of the Yugoslav foreign and internal policy, giving them direction and push. While Popović’s response appeared to have satisfied Eisenhower, the Yugoslav must have known that his answer was not firmly rooted in reality.61 In discussing the severity of the current security situation and the readiness of the Yugoslav people to establish some form of alliance for defense against aggression, the question of the ability of an isolated Yugoslavia to resist a Soviet-sponsored attack was raised. Popović concurred, stating that his people were well aware of the danger, and he reaffirmed the existence of a general consensus in Yugoslavia that if the country were attacked it was willing to band together with ideologically opposed states to offer armed resistance to their former allies.62 By posing the same questions again, Eisenhower was probing Popović about Yugoslavia’s readiness to cooperate with the West in all three levels of the Yugoslav political reality—its current political leadership, “reserve or alternative” leadership, and wider public opinion. As a representative of the first segment, Popović definitely was not a person who could be expected to give a different answer. The American general seemed satisfied, and the conversation then returned to the specific questions concerning Western military assistance and Yugoslav war plans. Popović denied the widely held opinion in the West that Yugoslavia would avoid classic defensive operations and would provide resistance only through guerrilla action. Partisan warfare was certainly a tactic that would be conducted on any Yugoslav territory occupied by any enemy forces, but it was far from being the only Yugoslav defensive tactic. If provided the required equipment and weapons, Popović argued that the YA’s units would be able to stop an enemy’s advance—assuming the full force of the Red Army was not involved. In this case, the defense of the Ljubljana Gap, as a region of special importance for the defense of Northern Italy and the Southeast of France, would have been fully secured. As far as guerrilla warfare was concerned, Popović pointed to the need for equipping and training units planned for this form of resistance, as well, reiterating that this kind of warfare would be secondary in relation to the operations of regular military formations.63 At the end of the meeting, Eisenhower again stressed the importance of Yugoslav rapprochement with the West, at least in strictly military terms, stating that the creation and maintenance of such oriented armed forces could be and should be supported.64 This conversation marked the end of General Popović’s extended tour, which began the period of official and open access to military cooperation with the West. Although initial Yugoslav overtures about securing Western military aid had been made to France and Britain, it quickly appeared that

14

Chapter One

only the United States had the means to provide meaningful assistance. The prevailing logic of the Cold War era (my enemy’s enemy is my friend, and anything that harms the East—i.e., the Soviet Union—helps the West) enabled Yugoslavia to win the support of the country at the head of the global anti-Communist movement—and, in so doing, enabled a “renegade” Socialist country to survive. According to Darko Bekić, Tito held talks with Colonel Ellery C. Huntington Jr., the former head of the American military mission to Tito during World War II at this time. Tito did not explicitly mention Yugoslavia’s willingness to accept American military assistance, but such was implicit in his formulations.65 Considering that Huntington was already involved in preparations for initiating the program to supply aid to Yugoslavia,66 it is not implausible to speculate that more substantive questions were discussed. On August 7, 1951, the much-discussed technical conferences on military assistance finally got under way in Washington D.C., little more than one month after General Popović’s departure from the American capital. The Yugoslav delegation was led by Generals Milo Kilibarda and Miloš Šumonja. According to a document, the Yugoslav negotiating team seemed to make a very good impression on their American counterparts.67 Yugoslavia’s insistence on the delivery of modern war materiel seemed to underscore what General Popović had mentioned to General Eisenhower in Paris only weeks before: that Yugoslavia was determined to prepare for and if necessary to engage in conventional—not only partisan guerrilla—warfare to defend the country against an invasion by Soviet-led forces. The most favorable arrangements—from a Yugoslav perspective—concerned obtaining war materiel in the field of aviation and armored units, while the least favorable concerned artillery and naval armament.68 Later documents from the Yugoslav Military Archive confirm this analysis.69 It should be noted that in some respects, the Yugoslavs were behind in their tactical rethinking by seeking to obtain models of weapons that were no longer being produced. Indeed, even the concept of their use had been completely abandoned by the American military.70 As far as the Yugoslav Navy was concerned, no one could have rightly expected that under the pretext of resisting Soviet aggression, already limited resources would be allocated to precisely that component of the Yugoslav armed forces whose impact and importance in case of war would have been relatively small. Yugoslav negotiators were casting a wide net, hoping to obtain resources that would enable the country to reorganize and modernize all kinds of armed formations—a constant feature of Yugoslav negotiating strategy until the end of the military assistance program. The Yugoslav delegation noted the constructive and positive approach of General Olmsted and his colleagues as far as air weaponry was concerned.



Breaking the Ice 15

The Americans cleared the way for the delivery of jet aircraft. To be sure, such equipment was the subject of current discussions and could be delivered only within the legal framework of a formal bilateral US-Yugoslav agreement.71 Other internal documents regarding Yugoslav’s needs, such as the Memorandum on Assistance for 1951,72 had clauses stipulating that bilateral agreements would go into force from the moment of signing. The contract also sanctioned the establishment of a body to oversee providing military assistance— body that would have been based in Yugoslavia. This prickly issue was one of the most difficult to resolve during the final negotiations on the accession of Yugoslavia to the program of military cooperation with the West. Two months before the start of the technical conferences on military aid, Tito announced the new policy of the Yugoslav government at the fourth plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CCCPY). A few days later, Edvard Kardelj said that General Popović was in Washington, D.C., to explore opportunities for the procurement of weapons and other military equipment. On June 19, the US Defense Department announced that the delivery of military equipment and light weapons to Yugoslavia had begun, which related to the war surpluses being kept in stockpiles. No one noticed that this contingent had been agreed upon before Popović’s arrival in the United States.73 On July 13, Tito announced that Yugoslavia “will procure, and [indeed] already [has] some weapons [from Western sources].” In Užice, on July 21, he also said that Yugoslavia had approached Western countries concerning arms assistance and that the Yugoslav request had been accepted. Thus, Yugoslavia’s pursuit of Western military aid was no longer a secret.74 NOTES 1.  In 1951 the Yugoslav Army was renamed to the Yugoslav Peoples Army. 2.  Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ 1945–1985, Koncepcija, doktrina i sistem opštenarodne odbrane (Development of the Armed Forces of SFRY 1945–1985, Conception, Doctrine and System of General People’s Defense), VINC, Beograd 1989, p. 101. 3.  Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ 1945–1985, Opremanje naoružanjem (Development of the Armed Forces of SFRY 1945–1985, Equipping with armament), VINC, Beograd 1989, pp. 42–47. 4.  Bojan Dimitrijević, Jugoslovensko ratno vazduhoplovstvo 1942–1992 (Yugoslav Air Force 1942–1992), Beograd 2006, p. 71 (hereinafter: B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslovensko ratno vazduhoplovstvo). 5.  “Tito’s defiance of the Cominform does not mean that Yugoslavia had ‘come over’ to the West. Yugoslavia remains a communist state and its negative attitude

16

Chapter One

toward the Western democracies is as yet unchanged. . . . For the first time in the history of the movement, a servant of the international communist movement controlling territory, armed forces and a political organization, had defied, with at least temporary success, the authority of the Kremlin. This example will be noticed by other communists everywhere.” NARA, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council (NSC), Policy papers 1 1–18, Entry 1, Box 2, June 30, 1948, Department of State, PPS 35, Policy Planning Staff, The Attitude of this Government toward the Events in Yugoslavia.   6.  Ivan Laković, Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951–1958, Podgorica, Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 2006, pp. 31–32 (hereinafter: I. Laković).  7. Lorejn Lis, Održavanje Tita, Beograd, 2003, p. 141 (hereinafter: L. Lees).   8.  Darko Bekić, Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu. Odnosi sa velikim silama 1949– 1955 (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), pp. 231–232 (hereinafter: D. Bekić).   9.  NARA, RG 273, E1, box 2, Records of NSC, Policy papers 1 1–18, SD reports to the NSC regarding attitude toward Yugoslavia. 10.  L. Lees, pp. 127, 129–130, 136–137. 11.  Ibid., p. 116. 12.  D. Bekić, p. 159. 13.  L. Lees, p. 128. 14.  D. Bekić, pp. 207–208, 252–253; L. Lees, p. 130. 15.  L. Lees, pp. 136–137. 16.  D. Bekić, p. 223. 17.  L. Lees, p. 141. 18.  Dragan Bisenić, “Svedočenje Vladimira Velebita,” Politika, 27.mart 2001. (Testimony of Vladimir Velebit, Politika daily newspaper, 27. III 2001) (hereinafter: D. Bisenić). 19.  L. Lees, pp. 142–143. 20.  Ibid., p. 144. 21.  Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archive of Yugoslavia), 836 Kancelarija Maršala Jugoslavije (836 Office of the Marshal of Yugoslavia), 1–3-b/790, Ambassador Popović’s telegram dated December 7, 1950, p. 1 (65) (hereinafter: AJ, 836 KMJ). 22.  D. Bisenić, 27.III 2001, pp. 142–150; D. Bekić, pp. 232–233. 23.  D. Bekić, pp. 194, 230. 24.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/789, Note on conversation with General Olmsted during the lunch given by E. Huntington (ret. general), an ex-chief of American the military mission at the Supreme Headquarters of People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, now the president of the “Equity” corporation, New York. Bulović, military attaché, had been present as well, pp. 1–7. 25.  Despite cool relations between the United States and Yugoslavia in the immediate aftermath of World War II, Huntington was one person with whom Yugoslav officials had remained in touch. General George Olmsted (1901–1998) was one of the most agile US logistics officers during World War II. He was in charge of supplying and organizing training camps for “The Free French,” British, and Polish soldiers in Northern Africa in 1942, the distribution of military aid to the USSR from 1942–1943, the logistical support for the preparations for the invasion in Normandy,



Breaking the Ice 17

supplying Chang Khai Shek, and rescuing the American POWs from Japanese camps in China from 1944 to 1945. After the war, he continued with private business but was reactivated in June 1950 and given the responsibility of overseeing the program for providing military aid to American allies. http://www.olmstedfoundation.org/ who-we-are/general-olmsted (October 2005). See more in: Howard Datkin, Soldier, patriot, financier: A biographical sketch of Major General George Olmsted. (The International business classics libarary series), Acropolish Books, 1971. 26.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/789; Note on conversation with General Olmstead, p. 2. 27. Ibid. 28.  Ibid., p. 4. However, such a list had already been prepared in August 1950. 29.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/789; Note on conversation with General Olmstead, p. 5 30.  Ibid., p. 6. 31.  I. Laković, pp. 38–39. 32.  L. Lees, p. 145. 33.  Bojan Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO 1951–1957, Beograd 2003, 14 (hereinafter: B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO); Truman Message to Congress, November 29, 1950, http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=983&st=&st1=. 34.  Vojni Arhiv (Military Archive Belgrade—hereinafter: VA), II section, (sanduk) trunk—115 (hereinafter: S), 269/12 (inventory unit), folder III (hereinafter: f), 86 (document), 4. 35.  L. Lees, 145. 36.  He felt that the Yugoslav leadership should not further complicate the situation because, as the estimated risk from the East grew, it was the same with the formal entering into the Western MDAP. D. Bekić, 243. 37.  D. Bekić, pp. 249–250. 38.  D. Bisenić, 27. mart 2001; D. Bekić, p. 277. 39. Ibid. 40.  D. Bisenić, 27. mart 2001. 41.  VA, Generalštab—2 (hereinafter: General Staff—GŠ), kutija 14 (hereinafter: K), fascikla (folder) 7 (hereinafter: f), document 1\1. 42. Ibid. 43.  B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, p. 17. 44.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/796, pp. 1–9 (194–203). 45.  Ibid., p. 2. 46. Ibid. 47.  Ibid, p. 1. 48.  General J. L. Collins (1896–1987) during World War II fought both in the European and Pacific theaters. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, he was assigned to consolidate Hawaii defenses. Over the next two years he commanded the 25th Infantry Division, with which he carried out the main part of the battle for Guadalcanal. At the beginning of 1944, he took over the command of the XXV Corps, fighting in Europe from D-Day to the end of operations. In the period from August to December 1945 he was US Army Chief of Staff; between 1945 and 1947, deputy of CJCS; and between 1949 and 1953, again Army Chief of Staff (during the Korean War). From 1953 to 1954 he represented the United States in the Military Committee and Stand-

18

Chapter One

ing Group of NATO. After serving as US special representative to South Vietnam from 1953 to 1954, he returned to serve one more year with NATO. http://www. arlingtoncemetery.net/josephla.htm. 49.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/796, pp. 1–5. 50.  Ibid., pp. 3–6. 51.  General Clyde Davis Eddleman (1902–1992) belonged to the line of US airborne officers who throughout their careers have combined operative, administrative, and planning assignments. After World War II, in which he took part in more than 50 combat parachute landings in the Pacific theater, Eddleman was assigned to as chief of the Army War College. He advanced through the Pentagon hierarchy and retired as a deputy Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). He was the commander of IV Division in Germany, commander of the VII Army in Germany, commander of the US forces in Europe, and commander of the Central Army Group of NATO. http:// www.arlingtoncemetery.net/eddleman.htm. 52.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/796, pp. 1–4 (204–207); Bekić, pp. 282, 285–286. 53.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/796, pp. 1–4 (204–207). Perkins, his assistant for European Affairs, and Campbell, the chief of the Balkan Department had been present, while from the Yugoslav side, Ambassador V. Popović accompanied General K. Popović. 54.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/796, p. 3 (206). The Yugoslav ambassador and chief of staff were not particularly excited about its organization but, realizing that it must take place, managed to arrange that it would not be organized in Belgrade. The temporary declining of Collins’s visits, showed that the Yugoslav leadership had not yet been assured in perspectives of the project. That is why they wanted to take the time to clear up their positions before the events would take their inevitable course. 55.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/796, pp. 1–4 (204–207). 56.  L. Lees, p. 153. 57.  These data do not match those presented by Velebit in Washington, but we assume they are more accurate. It is possible that Velebit, to make planners and operatives of the State Department more interested, had used planned and annunciated figures as they already existed. 58.  D. Bisenić, 27 March 2001. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61.  I. Laković, pp. 45–47. 62.  D. Bisenić, March 27, 2001. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65.  D. Bekić, pp. 269–270. 66.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/789, Note on conversation with General Olmsted, pp. 1–7. 67.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/799, p. 1 (77). General Kilibarda, the head of the Yugoslav delegation, had been invited to meet with US Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, former US Secretary of State and then Secretary of Defense. In a political sense, this was one of the conference’s biggest achievements, as it underscored the readiness of the most important officials in the US political and military hierarchy to work for Yugoslav-American military cooperation. Marshall retired from public service one month later.



Breaking the Ice 19

68.  Ibid.; B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavijai NATO, p. 21. 69.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f IV, 32. 70.  For example, when asking for antitank guns, the Yugoslavs were informed that such weapons had generally been withdrawn from production, since the modern concept of antitank combat had assumed the use of very different weapons. In the end, Yugoslavia nonetheless received some of the antitank guns requested, which had been transferred from the stockpiles of World War II surpluses. 71.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/799, p. 1 (77–78); Dimitrijević, pp. 21–22. 72.  Generals M. Kilibarda and G. Olmstead signed this document at the end of September 1951. In it was a clause that all the materiel would be delivered no more than six months from signing. As it happened, the deadline was not met, and the equipment from this list was delivered in only the second half of 1953. VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f IV, 32, p. 5. 73.  D. Bekić, pp. 285–286. 74.  J. B. Tito, Govori i članci (Speeches and Articles), knj. 6, Zagreb, 1959, pp. 48, 164–165.

Chapter Two

Toward Signing an Agreement

During the summer of 1951, despite local opposition that seemed to be more apparent in the West than in Yugoslavia, a mutual willingness to proceed with the agreement on military cooperation had been achieved. Several basic points characterized the American attitude: the need to secure southern and southeastern Europe from further Soviet aggression, with a special emphasis on protecting the Ljubljana Gap; the possibility of using military cooperation to promote closer political ties; and the creation of a control mission to supervise the delivery, distribution, and exploitation of military assistance to Yugoslavia and to coordinate military planning. On August 25, 1951, while returning from a visit to Iran, Averell Harriman, accompanied by the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, George V. Allen, met with Tito, Kardelj, Kidrič, Ranković, and JožaVilfan, the Yugoslav deputy foreign minister in Bled, Slovenia. It was just three weeks after the start of the technical conference in Washington on providing US arms to Yugoslavia. At the meeting, the Yugoslavs put forth their request for jets, tanks, and recoilless artillery, as well as the raw materials that would enable the Yugoslav arms industry to increase domestic production. Harriman detailed the by now familiar reasons why the United States could not accede to all Yugoslav arms requests at that time: the unanticipated demands caused by the Korean conflict, the enlargement of the US armed forces then being undertaken, and America’s considerable military obligations to other countries. The principal point of debate, however, concerned the competence and scope of the control mission being sought by the Americans, the same issue that had raised its ugly head in Washington. While discussing strategic dilemmas posed by a possible general war in Europe and a more localized regional conflict, both of which required different levels of US engagement toward Yugoslavia and 21

22

Chapter Two

Yugoslav military planning, Tito again asserted that Yugoslavia was prepared to join in the defense of Western Europe against Soviet aggression, even if that aggression was not aimed specifically at Yugoslavia. By the same token, an official Yugoslavia pronouncement to this effect could not be made until Belgrade received a similar pledge from Western leaders to intervene on behalf of Yugoslavia in the event of a Soviet-led attack on Yugoslavia itself.1 Subsequent to the meeting in Bled, the US Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, traveled to Belgrade to continue discussions.2 According to Lorraine Lees, before departing for the Yugoslav capital, Collins had consulted with Eisenhower about the main military-strategic interest of the United States in this part of a potential European theater of war and the expectations concerning possible Yugoslav support, or in Eisenhower’s words, “the level of contribution that Yugoslavia [could be given] to the security of my Southern flank.” The CIA, for its part, expected Collins to solve the biggest obstacle so far in the negotiation to date—the issue of scale, mandate, and name of the American military mission in Yugoslavia.3 On October 14, Collins held two meetings with the high-ranking Yugoslav state and military leaders. The first was held at the headquarters of the Yugoslav general staff. The Yugoslav participants included Generals Koča Popović, Peko Dapčević, Ljubo Vučković, Milo Kilibarda, and Miloš Šumonja and Admiral Srećko Manola. In addition to Collins, the American delegation was composed of General F. Partridge and two US military attachés, Colonels Throckmorton and Condon. Dragon Bisenić published the American translation of the minutes from this meeting in an issue of Politika, while the Yugoslav Military Archive is in possession of the Yugoslav minutes.4 Popović opened the first meeting by proposing to discuss topics on the analysis of the Yugoslav war situation in the case of isolated satellite attacks, the materiel issues in the area of military assistance, and the negotiation of other issues of interest. The first two points represented a continuation of talks already undertaken during Popović’s visit to Washington and referred to Yugoslavia’s elaboration on questions directly set in the United States, as well as the official Yugoslav attitude toward their own problems.5 Popović had brought two maps from Washington, both prepared by Colonel E. Kutz, a member of the General Staff Planning Department, showing two variants of American views concerning a possible attack on Yugoslavia by Soviet satellite forces. General Clyde Eddleman, who had presented the maps to Popović, had told his Yugoslav guest that they did not necessarily reflect an “official” American position concerning a possible attack on Yugoslavia, but it was clear that in the event of an attack by satellite forces without Soviet participation, the United States would meet its supply commitments to



Toward Signing an Agreement 23

Belgrade.6 The first map showed the projected plan of offensive operations launched by Eastern satellite countries against Yugoslavia with the aim of occupying all of Yugoslavia within 24 days. It postulated the minimum of troops satellite states would deploy, assuming the use of 9 Hungarian divisions against Zagreb and Rijeka in the north, 11 Romanian divisions heading in the direction of Belgrade, 10 Bulgarian divisions moving toward Skopje, and 4 Bulgarian divisions to be held in reserve along Bulgaria’s border with Greece and Turkey, both NATO allies of the United States. It also anticipated the participation of 4 Albanian divisions in the south.7 American experts assumed that Yugoslav defense forces could field 35 divisions, which according to Vučković’s estimate, would be more than sufficient to repel the attack made by enemy forces therein listed. The proposed plan of the Yugoslav defense assumed three lines of defense. The first line would follow existing state borders and their immediate hinterland; the second would run along the River Sava and further toward Bulgaria; and the third line did not exist in continuity. In the event that enemy forces should succeed in occupying the eastern part of Yugoslavia, American planners assumed organized Yugoslav resistance in three sectors—the northern part of the country, specifically the Alpine territory northwest of the Rijeka; the Bosnian mountains of central Yugoslavia; and the southern parts of Macedonia.8 For his part, Vučković rejected the American premise that enemy forces could gain the upper hand, especially as the Yugoslav units defending the country would substantially outnumber those of the invading foe. He agreed in principle with the directions of the first and second lines of defense but again stressed that the third one, such as the Americans imagined it, was completely unthinkable from either a military or a political standpoint, as it assumed the loss of a substantial part of Yugoslav state territory, if only temporarily.9 Indeed, Kutz’s plan represented a kind of worst-case scenario but one that seemed acceptable to NATO because it assumed that Yugoslavia would continue to resist in the sectors of vital importance for the West, namely in the direction of Ljubljana and Thessalonica.10 The second map assumed the participation of a considerably larger number of units on the attacking side—24 Bulgarian, 33 Romanian, and 28 Hungarian divisions, for a total of 85 in all—which would have given invading forces a nearly 2 to 1 advantage. It was speculated that such a robust enemy force would reach the second line of defense within 15 to 30 days. Vučković again voiced disagreement with the proposed third defensive line. He countered that Yugoslavia would fight to preserve the main force from destruction in lowland areas and from the uninterrupted line of defense along the central mountain massif, losing neither contact among the units of the Yugoslav Army nor with the allies in Italy and Greece. Yugoslavia would be able to

Figure 2.1.   American estimate of the regional army forces in the summer of 1951.

Figure 2.2.   American assessment of the Yugoslav defense lines in the summer of 1951.



Toward Signing an Agreement 25

deploy approximately 45 divisions, which would be combat ready within two weeks of mobilization. Troops were divided into three armies with three army corps, each army responsible for one sector of the front. Collins was particularly interested in the plan for the Yugoslav defense of the vital Ljubljana Gap. According to Vučković, one armored and six infantry divisions were earmarked to defend this vital sector, the maximum number of forces that could be separated for this task. Collins, who seemed satisfied with this response, again praised the Yugoslav defense plan and then turned to the issue of supplying materiel.11 The American chief of staff broached the question of possible Western use of Yugoslavia airfields and plans for their construction. This was clearly a sensitive issue for Yugoslavia. Receiving Western military aid was one thing, while temporarily or permanently assigning parts of Yugoslav state territory for use by foreign armed forces was something else. Aware of Yugoslav sensibilities, Collins said that Western access would be sought only in the case of a general war in Europe and then only for the purpose of refueling planes on the flights back to their bases. In any event, it is important to note that Popović rendered a positive response.12 Thus, even though Western access to Yugoslav airfields was still only a hypothetical possibility, he confirmed

Figure 2.3.   Yugoslav estimate of the regional army forces in the summer of 1951.

26

Chapter Two

Yugoslavia’s willingness to enter the war on the Western side in the case of such a conflict. Although it would be too much to say that Western (i.e., American) distrust concerning Yugoslavia’s willingness to cooperate had been totally assuaged by the positive Yugoslav response, it is clear that the members of the YA general staff were completely aware of what this kind of acceptance meant, and taking the position that Yugoslavia would be on the Western side in the event of war in Europe resulting from Soviet aggression, they sought the strategic partnership and alliance with all its repercussions. Although Collins didn’t go into details, it was obvious what was implied by the construction of the military bases on Yugoslav territory with American assistance—namely, their possible use by Western air forces. For his part, Popović urged that the West strengthen the Yugoslav air force by providing modern aircraft, as well as aiding in the construction of airfields with the appropriate runways to accommodate them. These bases would be one means by which the West could provide Yugoslavia with much-needed materiel supplies.13 In response to Collins’s question about the possibility of Albania taking part in a future conflict, Popović responded that if that country were to initiate hostilities against Yugoslavia, given the poor quality of Albania’s army and the country’s political instability, the YA could liquidate that sector of the front without major difficulties.14 The prospect of losing fertile Yugoslav lands in the north (notably the Vojvodina) presented a much larger problem so that the Western Allies might be asked to provide necessary foodstuffs in additional to military aid. In this sense, he emphasized the importance of maintaining the operational status of communications with Italy, and notably Trieste, which would be of major logistical significance in providing support to Yugoslavia in a future conflict. Collins dismissed the possibility of supplying Yugoslavia through the Adriatic ports because, he argued, maritime routes in the Adriatic would be more susceptible to enemy air and submarine attack.15 This explanation had already been given in discussions between Yugoslav and Western military officials, and until the Yugoslav-Tripartite Conference that was held in Washington in August 1953, any other possibility of providing substantial materiel support to Yugoslavia, except through Trieste in the north and Thessalonica in the south, was decisively rejected.16 Popović was of the opinion that some of Collins’s views were at odds with what he had been told in earlier talks with the United States and Great Britain—namely that the West would render Yugoslavia air support, even in the case of an isolated war. Therefore, he asked Collins what support Yugoslavia could expect from the West in the case of a Soviet attack taking some other European direction. Collins responded that while he did not know the official American position on the issue, it was his opinion that the main attack could



Toward Signing an Agreement 27

not bypass Yugoslavia. If the basic direction of the attack led through the Danube Plain toward Vienna, Yugoslavia would find itself to the immediate left of the line of attack. It was realistic to expect that the Soviets would have, at the very beginning, eliminated this threat on their western flank through the deployment of allied satellite forces or some sort of combined force.17 In his concluding remarks, Collins voiced his side’s satisfaction with what had been achieved so far, emphasizing that the principal aim of his visit was to ascertain the immediate military needs of the YA to be able to argue for US military-technical support to Yugoslavia before Congressional and Senatorial committees. He suggested that a similar agency should be formed in Belgrade to undertake the same kind of work, one whose activities would not in any case assume interference in the life and work of military units but would exist to facilitate the rendering of assistance.18 The second meeting was chaired by none other than Tito himself. Other members of the Yugoslav delegation included Leo Mates, Generals Dapčević and Popović, and Admiral Manola. The American side was represented by Ambassador Allen, along with Generals Collins and Partridge. In general, this meeting confirmed the attitudes revealed at the previous session. Tito emphasized essential differences in the approach to the issues of general warfare and more isolated, regional conflict, considering both as serious threats to Yugoslavia and imposing the need for modernization and stronger materiel supply of its army. Collins said that holding the Ljubljana Gap was a necessary condition in both cases, as it was the best route for the allies to provide food and weapon deliveries. While praising the Yugoslav defense plans, he also noted that their implementation depended on the possibility of supplying war materiels through the Ljubljana Gap, as well as through the southern one, from Thessalonica and the Vardar and Morava Valleys. He reiterated what the West expected from Yugoslavia as a kind of quid pro quo for the assistance that was being requested: namely, the defense of Italy and Greece. Tito responded positively, and with this, the question seems to have been resolved once and for all.19 Then talks moved to the prickly issue of the creation of a American military mission or agency to manage military assistance in the field, and whose composition, mandate, and name were proving to be among the key obstacles to a definitive US-Yugoslav understanding. Tito tried to deflect the issue, contending that the question was not of fundamental importance. Collins and Allen, however, had no intention of leaving it unresolved. In the end, compromise was reached as to the mandate and name of the mission, which did not correspond either by rank or title with teams with the same purposes that had been installed in other countries receiving American military assistance. Tito agreed to the appointment of Brigadier General John Harmony to head

28

Chapter Two

the group, saying that his current assignment in Italy was not of importance for the Yugoslav leadership.20 The question of long-term strategic cooperation between Yugoslavia and NATO was left open. Collins stated that future discussions were undoubtedly desirable, but he stressed that he had no authority to negotiate; pointing out that all he had said in this regard represented his personal, but not official, US government position.21 During his visit to Yugoslavia, Collins also visited the Ljubljana and Skopje army districts and attended military maneuvers that demonstrated both Yugoslav combat readiness as well as materiel defects, whose removal would have genuinely improved the total picture. Maneuvers were held in September and included the participation of armored, infantry, engineering, and airborne units.22 According to Lorraine Lees, the American general was impressed by “the show that Yugoslavs [had] prepared,” and after his return to the United States, he commented in positive terms on his general impressions of the Yugoslav army.23 In any case, Collins’s trip resolved the last serious obstacle standing in the way of coming to agreement on the further distribution of equipment that had been half secretly coming to Yugoslavia. Moreover, tank crews, who left a positive impression during the military exercises witnessed by Collins while crossing the Vrbas River in American Sherman tanks, demonstrated their willingness and ability operate new armament. When he returned to the United States, Collins himself met with Yugoslav ambassador Popović and reiterated his satisfaction with what he had seen during the maneuvers. On November 9, President Truman sent a message to Congress in which he announced his decision to provide military assistance to Yugoslavia to raise the quality of the country’s defensive capability. Not quite one week later, on November 14, 1951, after a period of intensive negotiations, a formal agreement on military assistance between the United States and Yugoslavia was finally signed in Belgrade. Marshal Tito signed on behalf of Yugoslavia.24 The agreement itself comprised seven articles, the first of which provided for continued aid on the part of the West. For its part, the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) was obliged to use received funds for its defense and the promotion of world security and could not redirect any of the aid thus received to a third party without the consent of the US government. Moreover, Yugoslavia declared itself prepared to provide reciprocal assistance relating to the production and transfer of vital raw materials that might at some point be required by the United States. The second article related to what extent the agreement would be made public. On the one hand, it was deemed necessary to maintain the public dimensions of the process as a whole. On the other, it was likewise deemed necessary to maintain secrecy



Toward Signing an Agreement 29

in terms of classified military matters.25 The third article regulated issues of protection of intellectual property and patents that were in connection with military materiel. Each government obliged itself to protect the rights of its citizens and institutions, as well as those of foreign citizens whose rights could be endangered in the actions under its competence. The fourth article concerned Yugoslavia’s financial obligations. The FPRY was to make a token deposit of one dinar for administrative and operational expenses, and of course, any equipment that entered the country as aid was free of customs duties and taxes. The fifth article was related to the functioning of the American monitoring team responsible for the implementation of the program. The FPRY granted full diplomatic status to team members and promised to afford the mission all necessary courtesies, while the United States promised to keep its staff as small as possible. The mission would be operated through the “regular activities” of the American Embassy in Belgrade. The general and imprecise wording of this fifth article was the basis of future misunderstandings. The sixth article obliged Yugoslavia to assist in the development of Western military defenses and to use equipment obtained from the West accordingly. This implied Yugoslav cooperation with NATO, but without an explicit provision that would necessarily compromise Yugoslavia in the eyes of other Socialist countries (i.e., that Yugoslavia had become a new member of the Western military alliance). The seventh article regulated technical aspects of the agreement’s functioning, such as the date of entry, into force and termination, the conditions under which the agreements could be broken. Either party could terminate the agreement at its own discretion, but otherwise the agreement would automatically renew on an annual basis. This provision protected Yugoslavia to a degree from a possible sudden cessation of all aid but left the United States free to change its minds about the fate of the agreed to but still undelivered arms, as well as control over materials that would be delivered after the cancellation of the program.26 The agreement signed on November 14 formalized activities already initiated in formally supplying war materiels to Yugoslavia from Western sources, thus presenting a legal basis for a unique military-diplomatic experiment. The vagueness of some of the agreement’s provisions was not only the result of a rush to come to terms but also reflected the view that if relations between the signatories remained positive, then taking them to an even higher level at some point in the future would not present a problem. The agreement was a rare example of political understanding between ideologically opposed political and economic systems at a time when the Cold War generally imposed certain rules governing military and diplomatic thinking and action. Still, the agreement itself was a kind of direct result of Cold War logic, according to which the dynamics and tactics of the Eastern Bloc’s antagonism

30

Chapter Two

often brought reversals that seemed to cause their players to lose sight of the previously proclaimed aims, replacing, if perhaps only temporarily, highsounding goals and aims with more basic ones—notably survival. After the end of World War II, this was the first example of direct military cooperation between the two ideologically different subjects that was not founded on a commercial basis but rather was an association, if not an alliance, based at least in part on a common threat and mutual vulnerability.27 NOTES   1.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-2-a/95, pp. 7–8; D. Bekić, pp. 303–304.   2.  The American side insisted on his visit even during Popović’s mission, while in Bled Harriman underlined the document on August 25. Definitely, it was concluded that the group of important topics (especially the matter of a control institution stationed in Belgrade) could not be solved through existing concepts of visits and contact with negotiators with limited mandates. A mutually acceptable solution would be found in the direct contact of competent officials. Besides, for Yugoslavia, it was important to demonstrate publicly its willingness to accept the official visit of the representative of US armed forces and thus once more prove its readiness for concrete military cooperation with the West. AJ, 836 KMJ I-2-a/95, 7.   3.  L. Lees, pp. 155–156.   4.  D. Bisenić, 30. III 2001; D. Bisenić, 31. III 2001; VA, II section, K-14, f VI, 1/1.   5.  VA, II section, K-14, f VI, 1/1, pp. 1–2.   6.  Ibid., p. 3.   7.  Ibid., pp. 3–4.   8.  Ibid., pp. 4–5.   9.  Ibid., p. 7. 10.  I. Laković, pp. 52–53. 11.  VA, II section, K-14, f VI, 1/1, pp. 5–11. 12.  Ibid., pp. 12–13. 13.  Ibid., p. 14. 14.  Ibid., p. 15. 15.  Ibid., pp. 16–17. 16.  I. Laković, pp. 55–56. 17.  Ibid., pp. 18–19. 18.  Ibid., p. 20. 19.  D. Bisenić, 1. IV 2001. 20.  Bisenić 2. IV 2001. 21. Ibid. 22.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/799, p. 1 (78). The Yugoslav ambassador in the United States, V. Popović, in his letter from September 5, advised that planned maneuvers should obligatorily contain the use of all the branches of the army. He mentioned that



Toward Signing an Agreement 31

in American military circles a common opinion had existed that the Yugoslav forces could be effectively used mainly in mountainous regions. Throughout an exercise that would include forced river crossings and a wider spectrum of combat operations typical for lowland terrains, there should have been left an impression of readiness for usage of materiel in all kinds of terrain; B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, pp. 34–35. 23.  L. Lees, p. 157. 24.  M. Stojković, Balkanski ugovorni odnosi III, 1946–1996, pp. 225–228. 25.  B. Dimirijević cites an opinion of R. Petković that with this, Yugoslavia succeeded in reaching a certain level of covering up the whole matter, while the United States also had the satisfaction of publicly revealing that Yugoslav joined in the party to its “clients.” B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, p. 37. 26.  M. Stojković, pp. 225–228. 27.  I. Laković, pp 5 9–60.

Chapter Three

Hard Talks From Military Aid to Military Coordination

Before and after the signing of the agreement of November 14, the United States hoped to direct the tempo and nature of military cooperation with communist Yugoslavia. The earlier lists and programs that had provided the basis for rendering assistance in 1951 and the first part of 1952 seemed to reflect more of an American desire to secure Yugoslavia for the Western alliance than to modernize the country’s armed forces. Indeed, the initial programs for military aid had provided only for the transfer of equipment from World War II surplus stockpiles. It was only later in 1952 that the United States seriously considered transferring modern war equipment, notably jet aircraft, which in any case probably could not be delivered until 1954. In the meantime, Yugoslavia received, with a measure of mixed gratitude, older but nonetheless useful equipment.1 In accessing the capabilities of communist Yugoslavia’s armed forces, Western military analysts had recognized numerous materiel and technical shortcomings—notably an almost complete absence of functional heavy artillery together with an air force consisting entirely of antiquated pistonengined planes. These two elements were far from being the only weak components of the Yugoslav arsenal, but they stood out, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and signified, from an American perspective, the low level of readiness for effective resistance in the case of possible Soviet-satellite attacks. In their prior discussions with Western military and political officials concerning military assistance, the Yugoslavs themselves had stressed the lack of heavy artillery and modern aircraft as their most serious military and technical handicaps.2 Even so, the US military assistance program of 1952 took only partial account into the requests made by the Yugoslavia side at the technical conferences in August 1951. On the one hand, the US military aid program opened the door to the gradual modernization of the Yugoslav air 33

34

Chapter Three

force. On the other, it did not come close to satisfying Yugoslav requests for heavy artillery. Thus, Yugoslav planners had to be content with “half a loaf, ”while Yugoslav ground forces, the heart of the Yugoslav military machine, remained almost at the same level as before entering the MDAP. In any case, the United States had a much clearer picture of what the aid program needed to achieve in the future. According to National Security Council reports of July 1952, the US Department of Defense, as a result of President Truman’s personal intervention, had approved additional assistance in the amount of $63 million dollars, originally intended as an advance payment for 1953 but then redefined as a separate miniature program.3 This should enable the consolidation of artillery and armored units of the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA). For its part, the Yugoslav leadership was far from desiring to join the Western military alliance as such. However, the initial negotiating position had been defined by a willingness to accept the prospect of a joint approach to the war effort and talks about its implementation, which should have provided materiel support and at least a conditional protection from NATO. Yugoslav officials knew that, even if the eventual Soviet offensive had taken other European routes, the country would inevitably have to deal with the second wave and all that would have been carried with it, so the only solution for such a development could be found in the deepening cooperation with the West. In this instance, it was up to the United States’ tactical skills to determine how to capitalize on Yugoslavia’s readiness. In early July 1952, the American Generals Eddleman and Olmsted, experienced in negotiating with the Yugoslav military officials and strong supporters of the military assistance to Yugoslavia according to the assessment of Ambassador Popović, arrived in Belgrade with the official proclaimed aim to learn about Yugoslavia’s military needs and the potential of its military industry.4 During scheduled talks with Tito for July 19 in Bled, Undersecretary of Defense F. Nash, who also arrived in Belgrade, and Ambassador Allen, together with two generals, decided5 to discuss the United States’ intention to help implement the approved delivery of 200 tanks and missing basic artillery materiel, as well as to speed up the delivery of jets. In return, Yugoslavia would deliver the materiel to the army units in the northern part of the country so that in the case of Soviet aggression, they would be available for the defense of the Ljubljana Gap and Northern Italy. This approach was adopted from Allen’s proposal, when US Ambassador George Allen opposed Nash’s conditions of assistance by Yugoslav consent on strategic talks. Knowing the psychology of his hosts, Allen knew that any political conditioning would cause a negative reaction from Tito so that a US quid pro quo proposed only the disposition of received materiel. Simply speaking, the alleged openness



Hard Talks 35

hid the intention to make Yugoslav representatives move toward a closer connection with the West, seemingly having the initiative in this direction.6 This approach fully succeeded. When the talks started, Americans demonstrated willingness to further strengthen the program for 1952 and speed up the delivery of jets. Thus, Tito made an expected step, claiming that the assistance reached the level at which the existing system of military aid could become a basis for strategic military coordination when it was time to discuss the modalities of agreed common defense and optimal use of achieved military capacities. American negotiators could not have been more satisfied, especially Allen, since Tito’s approach provided a confirmation of his thoughts regarding the negotiating tactics.7 Since there were serious defense relations between the United States, Great Britain, and France, Tito agreed that the United Kingdom and French representatives should take part in the expected talks, and it quickly became clear that their presence would represent only the decoration to a pure American-Yugoslav agreement. As much as this kept the Americans within the formal allied commitment to NATO, Yugoslavia thought that the reaction from the East would have been less negative if their negotiations with the West were realized by UK and French involvement rather than a direct bilateral agreement with the United States. Although the essence remained the same, binding to the “three powers” rather than to only the most important of them would have sufficient influence on the Socialist bloc’s possible reaction.8 During this visit, the American generals had a series of meetings with the general staff of the YPA, when it had been formulated that the “additional support for the army in 1952” had partially repaired the biggest shortcomings of previous programs. Yugoslav officers seemed to consider the newly approved funds as unsatisfactory, but their attitude was more of a reflection of an awareness about the dimensions of their own materiel and technical lack than any kind of confirmation of the American “stinginess and indifference” toward serious modernization of the YPA. It was clear that the first programs had features of a “trial balloon” and that their further upgrade directly depended on the development of Yugoslav relations with the West, so it was not realistic to expect that the entire need for missing war materiel would have been met at the first step. Yugoslavs knew that the assistance granted so far had not been too costly for the United States, as well as that quantity and specifications of the approved items might have been more in line with their needs, but the Americans had no reason to hurry.9 Yugoslavia’s cooperativeness in building a common European defense against danger from the East had already been clearly defined as the price measuring the military aid, and the dynamics and the eventual meeting of Yugoslav claims was dictated by the gradualism of the entire process.

36

Chapter Three

In August, US Secretary of Defense F. Pace and General Taylor visited Yugoslavia, continuing the contacts that had been creating the basis for future talks on the joint defense plans and proceeding with military assistance. They confirmed that Yugoslavia used properly and had effectively received military equipment and, despite its size, the former military assistance was not enough to pay for all of its needs. On this occasion, since they had planned to conduct only strictly defensive operations it was pointed out that Yugoslavs needed more antitank weapons than the tanks themselves and that, instead of placing emphasis on the development of air force, they would do better to consider relying on the air power of NATO.10 Despite the fact that Pace’s attitudes were clearly tactically and operationally unsustainable, it was obvious that they were a reflection of a broader vision, focusing on the concepts whose main characteristics were the greater reliance on the Western alliance and less on the development of their own forces. Conversations that followed later that month confirmed that these attitudes were really the starting negotiating position of the West, but they were not expected to lack the willingness to adjust some of the aspects to the current conditions, despite their evident inapplicability and unreality. Slowness and conservatism of these talks further contributed to the loss of the United States’ initiative so that its negotiating position, which was quite promising in the middle of the summer of 1952 throughout the further implementation, wasn’t fully utilized. On the other hand, through insight into acquired documents of Western origin, it appeared that the beginning of strategic negotiations represented just as delicate and complex an issue for Western allies in terms of their geostrategic interests and relations. One of the most important issues was the significance of the Yugoslav space to fill in gaps in the line of the southern European defense. Namely, one of the first questions put in the formation of a platform for negotiations with Yugoslavia was who should lead the negotiations—the three powers as the representatives of their states or the NATO alliance as their security structure.11 The British, with French support, insisted on avoiding NATO’s formal jurisdiction, both through the choice of members of the delegation and of the content of its mandate and instructions regarding the specific issues that were expected to be placed from the Yugoslav side. Namely, if the nature of social and state order created a formal basis for the Western Alliance, it would have been, at least, problematic to negotiate the level of alliance with the country with a completely different ideologicalsocial concept. It could, for example, have implied the opening of some potential issues, such as Spain’s participation in NATO (to which Spain was in contrast to Yugoslavia ready and willing), which the British could not accept since it would have compromised their position in Gibraltar.12 The pending Yugoslav-Italian dispute over Trieste could also have limited any nominal



Hard Talks 37

representatives of NATO13 not only because of the formal obligations to protect the interests of its members but also because of the pressure that would have been exerted by the Italian government and public opinion. From the available documents, one can sense that every notion of Trieste must have been left off, wishing that the sensitive issue itself, as the beginning of negotiations, was relaxed of all those potentially contentious points that could have been a stumbling block.14 Admiral Robert B. Carney, chief of NATO forces in the Southeast and with headquarters in Naples, was, logically, in charge to keep negotiations with Yugoslav representatives about the coordination of defensive plans going, at least because the territory of Yugoslavia was part of his area of responsibility. But in the eyes of Western planners, it was exactly his current mandate that made him ineligible for this mission.15 In addition, the location of his command imposed the possibility of stronger Italian influence and pressure, which had already been rated as completely undesired. Thus, despite the weight of Carney’s authority and his place in the command hierarchy, there was a full consensus about his exclusion from this part of the negotiation process.16 The person who should lead the negotiations with the Yugoslavs could not be “wearing a NATO hat,”17 that is, the person had to be selected from the military structures directly subordinated to the Pentagon. General Thomas Troy Handy, the commander of US forces in West Germany and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of American forces in Europe, perfectly fit this profile. In fact, selecting him for this task completely described the atmosphere of fragility and consciousness in which the beginning of negotiations had been prepared. Because even though his current position was not so respected and politically attractive, he was the person whose authority and influence in the top commanding structure of the US Army was at the highest level. Namely, in June 1942, General Handy succeeded General Eisenhower as assistant chief of the general staff, being responsible for operational planning. In September 1943, General Handy became the deputy chief of the general staff until August 1945. In the absence of General George C. Marshall, in his capacity as chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Handy signed the order for the use of atomic bombs against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki.18 In September 1947, Handy officially assumed command of the IV Army with headquarters in Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and two years later succeeded General Lucius D. Clay as the Commander in Chief of the US forces in Europe, with the exception of units stationed in Austria and Trieste. After the appointment of General Matthew B. Ridgeway as the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe in August 1952, Handy became his deputy, where he remained until his retirement in February 1954.19 Being in command in places where decisions of the greatest

38

Chapter Three

importance were made, General Handy had become the person entrusted with the most delicate operative missions.20 In this situation, Handy’s involvement in activities at the conference had to be very small and restricted to only a segment of the military relations, with no mandate for any kind of formal acceptance of obligations.21 He had been expected to find details of Yugoslavia’s defense plans and convince the Yugoslavs in need of integration in the NATO scheme as the best way to get help from Western powers. In addition, he was to try to convince Tito that creating such a base out of Yugoslavia’s defensive plans was essential, which would have been a basic premise of the fighting withdrawal to positions in the central mountainous part of the country, closing the Ljubljana Gap on the north and the Vardar Valley in the south.22 Based on available documents, it was not clear why such a rigid approach of Western delegations had been developed. It was clear, however, that in the case of a real Soviet-satellite attack, the Yugoslav military leadership would have been forced to accept this approach since it would be completely dependent on the West and its aid, but as long as the danger was only hypothetical, it was not likely that anyone in Belgrade would have agreed to this plan. Although this did represent an official position of three powers and NATO, in order for the Yugoslavs to consent to it, however, there should have been much more than classical contingent planning of assistance with a minimum of political commitment offered. Perhaps the opinion prevailed that the Yugoslavs were looking at an upcoming conference as “another good opportunity to press for more arms raid, and come to the discussions with a long ‘shopping list’ of military equipment they think they need.”23 So the potentially positive response should have been conditioned in accordance with the main aims of NATO’s defense in this part of Europe. However, in Yugoslavia, simply holding the conference had been treated as a question of great political importance, and it was more than clear that this act potentially could have much longer ranging implications than the mere availability of missing war materiel. Although the content of military aid had been used as a convenient reason for initiating these types of negotiations, its importance for the Yugoslav leadership definitely had not been such that they would have introduced the country into formal ties with NATO. Therefore, it could be concluded that, at the real beginning, the Yugoslav side should have made it known that in the current political relations, its more formal bonding with institutions of Western alliance was not desirable, having presented it through the manifestation of one completely rigid and repulsive attitude, for which modifications were neither the intention, mandate, nor mood. On November 15, 1952, General Handy and military attachés of the United States, Great Britain, and France visited Tito in Belgrade, which marked the



Hard Talks 39

start of talks on strategic planning and coordination of activities related to the suppression of possible aggression of the Eastern countries toward the rest of Europe and Yugoslavia’s position in the event of such developments. Visits lasted briefly, but their contents, as D. Bekić stated,24 marked the essence of five days of negotiations that followed. Because these few exchanged sentences showed that the two sides not only did not have the same expectations of their course and outcome, but also the level of competence to provide certain information and receive obligations in accordance with their contents was completely different.25 The negotiating position of the tripartite delegation was hindered a few moments, led by the lack of a mandate for any dialogue that exceeded an informational level, having been understood in terms of collection but not giving information. Since the delegation had no authority to suggest or arrange any strategic-operational concept, these discussions for the Yugoslav side had, from the beginning, lost their attractiveness. After talks with Eddleman, Olmsted, Nash, and Pace, it seemed that Yugoslavia’s attitude toward NATO began to grow stronger, so these discussions were entered into with the intention of achieving the clear and comprehensive position inside the plan of military coordination with the West. Because of the awareness that, in the case of a war in Europe, Yugoslavia could not have been kept neutral and clearly formulating the position of commitment on the side of the West, the Yugoslav leadership thought that it would be sufficient for the automatic upgrade to the broader military cooperation. Some important facts were, however, lost from sight. Yugoslav secession from the USSR was not caused or decisively supported by NATO or the United States. For the United States, this development was undoubtedly favorable, but as having been too surprised to act immediately, it took the position of waiting and caution, characteristically common for large and bureaucratic systems when it is necessary to respond to an unexpected event. Without initiative or control over the events from the beginning, NATO was limited to tracking and matching Soviet moves, which made NATO lose the ability to turn the course of events even more to US favor. Western delegation was composed of representatives from the three powers, not from NATO officials who could competently discuss the strategic issues. The performance of the Western negotiating team had not given Yugoslavs any hope of a particularly favorable outcome, by leaving the impression of not taking their current position into account and offering nothing of even proximal reciprocity of a willingness for cooperation. Insisting on the informational character of the talks, from the standpoint of “pulse palpation” of an insecure ally and wider plans for its gradual introduction in the Western orbit might have some reason, but these standpoints were too narrow to on which base the whole strategy toward Yugoslavia. However, assuming the usual Yugoslav distrust

40

Chapter Three

in the West and experience from contacts wherein the constructive approach when the fulfillment of part of their needs had enabled the achievement of many political points, this was a situation that needed more concrete and energetic activity. Perhaps, the incision in the Yugoslav cocoon could have been opened wider if the Belgrade negotiators had come with a different mandate.26 Collecting operational data, as General Handy imagined, did not coincide at all with Yugoslavia’s view on the issue. The negotiating team of Yugoslav forces had a large amount of interesting information for NATO, and it can be said that their revealing was planned for this occasion. In return, a rough introduction with plans of the Western armed forces’ engagement in the event of a Soviet or satellite attack, the plan of coordination with the Yugoslav army, and the plan of supplying Yugoslavia with war materiel was requested. Yugoslavs took the position that an isolated war in Europe was impossible, meaning that an attack on any part of the continent would have marked the beginning of world conflict. In this conception, its significance for the Western allies would have been of great importance, because of the defensive route that leads to Italy and Southern France through the Ljubljana Gap, as well as one to Greece through the Morava-Vardar Valley, was almost impossible to defend in the event that the territory was occupied by an aggressor. On the other side, Western negotiators only wanted to discuss whether there were the conditions for providing any defense of the Ljubljana Gap, and not through the joint engagement with forces from Austria and Northern Italy but only through the provision of materiel assistance. This was twice as bad for Yugoslavia not only because of the dangers of staying in the region without any guarantees from the West of the implementation of a defense plan of the entire state territory but also because of the provided materiel and technical restructuring of the YPA composition in total. By understanding this at the very beginning, Yugoslavia limited itself in the talks to offering only the basic information and the insistence on the impossibility of isolated Sovietsatellite attacks. Another technical issue influenced Yugoslavia’s attitude. Since the Western delegation insisted on its tripartite nature, the Yugoslav leadership decided to require the retention of data and revealed plans that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France be required to guarantee they would not pass the aforementioned data to other members of NATO and that the whole conference would be covered in public under the pretext of discussion on technical military assistance. The required warranty arrived on the third day of work. However, it seemed that the decision to retain data was more of an excuse for the more repulsive attitude toward the Western delegation. In addition, the atmosphere in which the talks were conducted was not particu-



Hard Talks 41

larly promising from the beginning, since Handy’s team was convinced that the conference had been listened to by a third party. Such a claim was based on the continuous influx of instructions that the head of the Yugoslav delegation had been receiving by one aide-de-camp. It turned out that the course of discussions had often been changed just after those interventions, leaving the impression that Tito himself indirectly participated in the conference.27 Its participants interpreted the immediate results of the conference differently. British analysts were thinking that the Yugoslav positions, in light of the current foreign policy situation and the opposition of the Italian military cooperation, would not lead to approaching the Western military alliance, maintaining a more neutral position as much as possible. Immediately after the conference, British Ambassador Sir Ivo Mallet had expressed his doubt in the success of this mission. Praising Handy for the way in which his task was done, Mallet also indicated that it was impossible to achieve any satisfying result with the Yugoslav officials by using this approach. In his words, “it was too much to expect of these people here to show their most treasured military secrets without receiving something solid in return.” It was obvious that, if the next round of talks would have made progress, the Western delegation would have needed to consider the Yugoslav’s expected guarantees (e.g., they would not be left alone in case of an attack, information about NATO’s plans for defense of their northern and northwestern territories, and a precise program of military assistance). He recommended that if one had wanted success, the Yugoslav interlocutors should have been treated as partners in the joint work of defense, without ignoring their needs.28 In a short report to the Department of State on November 20, his American colleague Allen pointed out that the Yugoslavs had not been open to the extent that had been expected. The tone of the conference at times was heightened, especially when Italy had been mentioned in conversation and that the Yugoslavs remained very dissatisfied because of being asked for much more information than offered in return. By his evaluation, Handy demonstrated in these negotiations all the qualities required for this type of work, as well as his performance significantly contributed to raising the American reputation.29 A month later, after talks with Kardelj, a detail had been noted that the negotiations had not brought progress primarily because previously, there had been no precise political agreement about what would have constituted a favorable result. However, he could not have predicted Yugoslavia’s position on this issue and what “kind of political understanding would have been the condition for the fruitful continuation of Handy’s talks.”30 Handy wrote in his report that the talks were not unsuccessful and had opened several new aspects of mutual cooperation. He also said that Yugoslavia wouldn’t have entered the war in the event of a Soviet attack anywhere

42

Chapter Three

else in Europe, had not given a clear answer regarding the entry of Western troops on its territory, and that support of troops engaged for the defense of the northern route could have been effective only under the presumption of their complete re-arming with Western military materiel. According to him, Yugoslavia insisted on the air and maritime support as a condition for continuing cooperation in the operational planning. In his report, he had also recommended taking a rather restrictive position regarding the further deliveries of weapons to Yugoslavia and providing already scheduled deliveries that had been planned, but to condition all the subsequent aid with additional military-political concessions. Based on this report, the American general staff made a decision on future coordination of military plans with Yugoslavia. It included the basic premises on which it would be conducted, pointing out the strong allied involvement in the case of an attack, support that included air and naval operations, and guaranteeing security of its flanks and delivery of materiel assistance. The modus operandi of coordination of operational planning would have been based on the assumption that the Yugoslavs would have accepted a joint plan of action with Allied Forces Command in Austria and Trieste in the north, as well as Greek forces in the southeast. Both plans allowed an indirect connection to Admiral Carney and existing NATO plans. It had also considered that Yugoslavia would participate in joint planning with Carney’s command if the talks were conducted solely by the negotiators from the United States, United Kingdom, and French armies and if they provided the same level of secrecy of the talks before the other NATO allies (especially Italians) that existed during Handy’s visit. Malta, Austria, and Izmir were suggested as the places for such meetings, since Carney’s command headquarters in Naples could not be acceptable for well-known reasons. Special operational conferences would have been later held in Salzburg between the competent American commander as the tripartite representative and Yugoslav delegates with the mandate for detailed operational planning of operations in the northern sector (Austria-Ljubljana). The identical conference would have been held in Athens between the Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish representatives (and, if necessary, separately with Turkish ones) concerning the operations in the south.31 Darko Bekić was rightly reserved about the existence of, as some Western sources indicated, “Yugoslav’s favorable attitude” about the outcome of the conference. In fact, that attitude could not have been more negative, both regarding the immediate reactions and long-term projections that had been based on its results. Yugoslavs rated that the Western negotiators led these talks from the standpoint of the great powers, aiming to impose the unilateral obligations in the framework of cooperation, without showing a willingness to discuss mutual interest with a reciprocally equal commitment



Hard Talks 43

in mind.32 According to the same document, the conference ended without any results because of the domination of opposite attitudes revealed. In addition, the fact that Tito did not receive Handy in a farewell visit and the American general did not even request one, is evidence of the bad atmosphere in which these talks ended. At the session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia (CC LCY),33 held on November 27, 1952, Tito negatively evaluated these negotiations, qualifying Handy as a reactionary and noting that Western negotiators left Belgrade unsatisfied.34 From the standpoint of the potential integration of the YPA in the Western system, it can be said that this conference had been led to its cancellation even before any serious step in that direction was made. Yugoslav disappointment was expressed not only through the absence of a specific strategic-operating agreement but also with the level of displayed understanding and support to its position in the Balkans. The decision to join the talks thus conceptualized had not been easily made, but by doing so clearly represented a call for further promotion of cooperation. NATO, which actually was institutionally excluded from negotiations and the US military structures, had not expressed a particular enthusiasm and desire to use these discussions for closer association with Yugoslavia. They were still taking an attitude of waiting and evaluating intentions and future activities. A lack of mandate of this delegation, which was supposed to have led such important talks, was almost insulting to their interlocutors, making more damage by leaving a bad impression and creating a sense of mistrust. When analyzing their course, it is visible that the Yugoslav party approached them quite broadly, having been ready to talk about a number of issues of common interest but not allowing the conversion of the conference into the mere reporting to Western officers. Handy did not use the achievements that in previous contacts Allen, Eddleman, Olmsted, Pace, Nash, Taylor, and other American representatives managed to accomplish for the deepening of Western influence. Allen’s position that the goals in Belgrade would have been easier to achieve by not harming the local vanity while blackmail and disdain should have been used only as the last resort had been once again proven correct. The way in which he briefed the American generals, as well as the result of their visits, stood in total contrast to the approach and results of Handy’s team. Although Tito’s statement that Yugoslavia “now should not enter the Atlantic Pact”35 had its primary source in the soon changed political-security situation that emerged after Stalin’s death a few months after the conference and an existing Yugoslav ideological concept, it could have been partially ascribed to the disappointment in the slow and hesitant Western policy.36

44

Chapter Three

In the summer of 1953, it was already obvious that General Handy’s mission had made more damage than benefit to the West. During the spring, the overall foreign and political situation changed in a significant extent. Stalin’s death and a series of Soviet peace initiatives had reduced the sense of an imminent threat of war, while the smaller NATO members, now free from the fear of the Soviet tanks, started inhibiting strategic Euro-Atlantic projects and insisting on their specific interests.37 Yugoslavia successfully started negotiations with Greece and Turkey, especially after Tito’s visit to London. With these negotiations, as well with the beginning of normalization of relations with the USSR, it looked like Yugoslavia was rambling from the Western Alliance. Therefore, the United States, in light of the problems in the ratification of the Agreement on the European Defense Community (EDC), the formation of the so-called European Army, and Italian pressure over the Trieste issue tried to find a way to consolidate the situation with NATO. Simultaneously, they tried to prevent Yugoslavia from being alienated and its eventual return to the Soviet camp.38 Yugoslavia’s position had largely influenced the South European position of the Western military alliance, either because providing its security was enabling the defense of a projected direction from Eastern attacks on the south wing, or because it would enable later counterstrikes in the event of Soviet advancement. It was clear that the maintenance of Yugoslavia, somewhere in the Western orbit, had to be of serious importance to American strategists and planners, taken by the premises of the Cold War understanding of politics, where everything not being in favor of an opponent would have been considered to their own advantage. An increase in military aid, in qualitative and quantitative terms, was the simplest and easiest method of conduction, but it could no longer be sufficient to achieve this goal. Creating a basis for broader cooperation on common defensive planning and further political rapprochement had been sought because of the November failure of the Tripartite-Yugoslav Conference, which was meant to fulfill those Yugoslav requests, which were then estimated as the default ones but compatible with existing strategic plans. That would have created the impression of yielding and the readiness to compromise, while in fact, any progress would have been achieved only through more flexible rhetoric based on the same starting position. Although dictated by the contemporary moment, this American attitude was somewhat applicable to the time of a year and a half ago. An impression was created that Handy tried to earn political points by offering the Yugoslavs what they expected, as if the events after Stalin’s death had not left any trace on the political perspective of their country. If the fear of a Soviet attack was visible in the fall of 1952, and in relation to that Yugoslavia was ready to form a stronger connection with NATO, then in the summer of 1953, it became very likely that aggres-



Hard Talks 45

sion would not occur. It had also been realized that the connection with the West should have been held to the extent that would have allowed the gain of economic and military assistance, but without prejudging any substantive integration in the military alliance. However, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had already formed an opinion that the serious involvement of Socialist Yugoslavia in the Western order would have been counterproductive. Therefore, it seemed that a tacit agreement had been reached to ensure the level of Yugoslavia’s connection to NATO, enough to prevent its return to the Soviet side, which was a satisfactory enough diplomatic success to allow its neutrality.39 For the United States, it meant the fastening of a Western defensive strategy in the Northern Mediterranean, while Yugoslavia was provided the opportunity to reorganize its economic and defense system through further enjoyment of economic and military assistance. However, the impression remained that the Yugoslav leadership had a much more clearly defined platform of what was wanted and how to achieve it. In the West, however, a consensus existed only about what had been a highly unwanted outcome and what would have been the minimum measures that should have been taken to avoid it. The passive position of waiting, observation, and postreaction to the situation had been lacking in the creative initiatives that were putting the events under direct control of the West. Thus, it can be said that to a larger extent, the relatively passive position of Western countries contributed to Yugoslavia’s success in its purpose to create and later carry out the work of the neutral and nonaligned policy.40 Regarding the question of military aid, in the middle of July 1953, Yugoslavia received an invitation to send a delegation of the general staff to the talks in Washington, D.C.41 For this occasion, the United States’s platform was in the spirit of the Yugoslav claims that Handy declined, assuming correcting his attitudes on the possibility of isolated war against Yugoslavia and giving a statement of readiness in case of an attack, to provide materiel and operational support. This meant accepting general concepts of war and a common front, and therefore the duty of Yugoslavia’s defense. What occurred unexpectedly was the event that guaranteed the independence and safety of a Socialist state, enabling the further development of Communism in one part of Europe, which definitely did not cause enthusiasm in certain military and government circles.42 In that sense, it should be noted that efforts were made to lessen the expected firmness in negotiations, reflecting the fact that the US delegation comprised officers supporting the aid to Yugoslavia. Also, in preliminary talks, the possibility of a positive response to Yugoslavia’s requests regarding the enlargement of the deliveries had been emphasized. The American press was publishing articles about the opposition of other NATO members toward further assistance to Yugoslavia, strengthening the

46

Chapter Three

impression left by US officials. It seemed that, emphasizing the alleged discord in relation to allied views, the atmosphere should have been created to persuade the Yugoslavs that the United States had serious intentions to establish cooperation with them, even the one surpassing the present framework. It is interesting that the activities on so-called “softening hardness” included an attempt by the United States to suggest the selection of the Yugoslav head of delegation by a publicly expressed expectation for the appointment of General Danilo Lekić, Military Attaché in Washington, D.C. Americans considered that his current position would have excluded the possibility of taking on any hard-line attitudes, since such confrontation with US officials would have, at least, made his later work harder, while the finding of common language could have opened some so far locked door.43 This time, Yugoslavia’s performance was significantly more adequate for real possibilities. What was considered realistic seemed to be quite satisfactory, so the platform was created with the desire to ensure what was really available. In the direct preparations for the conference, the military mission in Washington, D.C., had developed a variety of activities to learn more about the tripartite attitude in all matters that could be on the agenda and to lobby representatives in the relevant circles of the administration to favor the Yugoslav requirements. A few months before the conference began, even before the official invitation was sent to Belgrade, there had been a report on US basic military and political concepts in relation to Yugoslavia, as well as the analysis of future talks’ real character. The report was the main basis of the Yugoslav delegation’s preparation, since it could not get anything more from other sources. As for the second segment of mentioned activities, thanks to timely information about the conference’s organization, the numerous contacts were made with the Generals Eddleman and Powell. Those two generals had directly managed the preparation and organization of the meeting, as well as Generals McAuliffe, Stewart, Partridge, Ramley, Calbon, Stratton, and Ely and Admirals Davis and Cooper, who either were or should have been members of the Tripartite Commission or influenced the formation of the Western platform for discussions. This work gave the results at the conference because during the conference, the most restrictive positions were held by the British General Stratton, with whom the contact was established only before the beginning of the negotiations.44 Lieutenant General Ljubo Vučković, Deputy Chief of General Staff, who headed the Yugoslav delegation at the second meeting of representatives of the Balkan Pact General Staff in Athens June 3 to June 12, 1955, was appointed as the head of the Yugoslav delegation. His appointment in Washington, D.C., was interpreted as a negative response to the previous signals.45 However, the Yugoslav team was aware that the time for large and



Hard Talks 47

spectacular integration had already passed, so their job was to ensure Yugoslavia’s position as a neutral country and retrieve an enhancement of military assistance.46 Yugoslavia’s military attaché made some interesting observations on the performance of the Yugoslav delegation during the talks. Regarding the matter of knowledge and professional capability to draw cognizant conclusions, Yugoslav representatives made a good impression on the Western colleagues, who were furthermore enhanced by the contents of their presentations and competence for elaborating issues of importance. Their mandate was, undoubtedly, wide enough to allow the space for action, and that space was filled with large amounts of data, observations, and valid personal judgments that members of Vučković’s team presented to their interlocutors. However, what remained as a shadow over this picture was the fact that a lot of preparatory work had been carried out unilaterally, being more directed at clarifying what the conference meant for Yugoslavia, while visibly neglecting to consider its repercussions to the United States and NATO. At times, that made the situation appear as a loss from the perspective of what constituted a positive development of aiding Yugoslavia but would also benefit the American side (i.e., would the United States be interested in trying to achieve some goal of its own through such a form of cooperation). Therefore, it often looked that the Yugoslav arguments were losing their force because in the discussions about the importance for the Western side, the Yugoslavs did not have any kind of background knowledge but instead had knowledge concerning Western interests and their need to close the Yugoslav position, which would have enabled more easily achieving some agreements. (As a contrary example, the request for increased military assistance, which was met with willingness, soon extended to the entire re-arming of the YPA.) Besides, the delegation had significant problems in situations where the conversation did not strictly stick to the agenda, when it seemed that it was losing the initiative and security, which was also believed to have been due to inadequate and insufficient preparation.47 The work of the Yugoslav team in the official part of the talks had been made a lot easier by the personal composition of the American delegation. General Clyde Eddleman, who had already led the negotiations with the Yugoslav military and political officials on several occasions, was a supporter of the military aid to Yugoslavia. Looking from that side, he was the most appropriate person to achieve the agreement. After his career was closely linked to the perspective of military assistance to the FPRY and having been personally interested in the issues set to benefit both parties, by not raising the tension, he often enabled the Yugoslav negotiators to get support for their requests in the areas where they would have expected more resistance.

48

Chapter Three

As far as Handy was considered, his position and career would benefit from being restrictive, it might have been that Eddleman held his direct interest in Vučković and his delegation, leaving Washington, D.C., satisfied. However, it should not have been forgotten that the policy of “stick and carrot” came to a peak here, because General Stratton, not Eddleman, led the main word at the finalization and formalizing of results. In any case, these talks were much more constructive than the ones previously held in Belgrade, which were best perceived by the amount of presented data, plans, and thoughts that both sides had unfolded at the conference, as well as the joint conclusions that derived from them.48 For the Yugoslavs, it was important to get a guarantee of logistics and operational support in the case of Soviet aggression, as well as confirmation of their country’s role in the strategic combinations of NATO. Again, it should be recognized that their ranges might have been higher if they were reached last fall, for the simple reason that the danger they were supposed to prevent had then been higher and more likely. Therefore, the Yugoslav side did not seek the main benefit in the strategic connections in the field of possible military operations, but put the emphasis on the need and possibility of materiel supplying their forces, which in this case meant more focus on the technical and logistical aspects of the conference. On the other hand, this new approximation did not provide the United States any particular long-term benefit, because the lack of military arrangements in the Balkan Pact and the outbreak of the Trieste crisis definitely marked the end of the strategic realignment of Yugoslavia to the West.49 The conference, based on the composition and rank of the delegations, as well as the manner in which it convened, should have been grown into another “knocking on the door of NATO.” However, the progress of their work showed that both sides kept aloof regarding such alternatives and had more in mind toward drawing the maximum benefit from the current situation. After Stalin’s death and changes in the Soviet party and state leadership, that situation took on a completely new dimension and content, so the results of the Washington, D.C., negotiations can be considered as the final achievement of both time and sensibility than the basis for further development of relations between Yugoslavia and the West. Military cooperation remained on the level of the weapons’ delivery and staff training for the YPA officers.50 Later on, in November 1954, with the Trieste question solved and after the initiative from the Chief of Staff of the British Armed Forces, Western powers tried to organize a new conference concerning Yugoslavia’s military aid. Their principal aim was to continue coordination of NATO and Yugoslav defense plans on a new basis. One of their strongest arguments concerned the Balkan military alliance to which they decided to demonstrate “tangible



Hard Talks 49

support.” According to US military officials, continuation of military aid to Yugoslavia should have assisted Yugoslav armed forces in becoming a deterrent to Soviet aggression, to be capable to withstand the initial assault, and to be of direct assistance to the defense of the NATO area.51 However, such a conference was never held. NOTES 1.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f IV, 32. 2.  D. Bekić, pp. 417–419. 3.  D. Bekić, p. 417; Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952–1955, Službeni list SRJ, Beograd 2000, p. 32 (hereinafter: D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad). 4.  One of the first investigations concerning this visit was the meeting of these two generals with Ambassador V. Popović on February 15, 1952. Inside one informal conversation, it was mentioned that the time had come “for normal negotiations on operative cooperation, since the lack of it had been creating the obstacles in forming the overall plans and increases doubts at many sides.” Having in mind that it was the first time that the American side had mentioned the need for such a development of relations, Popović telegraphed to Belgrade that the official proposal for the talks on operative cooperation could be expected soon. AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/804, pp. 1–2 (3–4). 5.  Considering the delicacy and importance of planned talks, special attention was paid on their terms and location. British Ambassador, I. Mallet, advised that it should be scheduled for July or August, since all the members of the government, as well as Tito himself, would be much more accessible then, either in Bled or in its surroundings, than throughout the rest of the year. The National Archives, London (hereinafter TNA), FO 371, 102165, Minutes to telegram Ministry of Defense to British Joint Services Mission Washington ELL 407, p. 2. 6.  B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, pp. 67–68; D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, pp. 32–33; D. Bekić, pp. 417–419. 7.  According to D. Bogetić, on July 13, Allen had already reached an unofficial agreement with Tito concerning the Yugoslav entry into wider military negotiations, under the condition of their strict secrecy. Thus made, the agreement had been informal and optional and following talks in Bled had, through their contents, provided the pretext under which it was safe to reveal what had been discussed. Then it would not have appeared as a result of the secret deal with Allen but rather as a regular militarydiplomatic process. In that sense, Allen had an easy task to assure Nash and the generals of the righteousness of his attitude, since the forthcoming meeting in Bled should have only made official the result he had already reached. Allowed tanks and guns, as well as announced jet planes, seemed to have been only a convenient excuse but in no way the reason for Tito’s attitude on the beginning of strategic negotiations. D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 32. 8.  I. Laković, p. 64.

50

Chapter Three

  9.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f IV, 32, pp. 3, 18; VA, II section, S-115, 271/12, f II, 87, pp. 1–2. 10.  B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, pp. 69–70; D. Bekić, p. 421. 11.  TNA, FO 371, 102165, Minutes to telegram Ministry of Defense to British Joint Services Mission Washington ELL 407, pp. 1–2. 12.  Ibid.; TNA, FO 371, 102180, pp. 1–4. 13.  This prediction proved to be right, since despite all the actions to keep the distance between the mandate of the Western delegation and the fragile political issues, there have been a constant tendency of pro-Italian structures to affect it regarding the Trieste problem; NARA, RG 218, Geographic file, CCS 092 Yugoslavia (7–6-48) sec. 18, Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Discussion of Trieste by General Handy JCS 1901/94, p. 2. 14.  For example, the British Ministry of Defense had negatively responded to an American intention on joining the allied troops from Trieste in the campaign of the Ljubljana’s Gap defense, that is, their joining in the joint defensive concept that could have agreed with Yugoslavia about this matter. Citing the line of operative reasons for such an attitude, they repeated that their forces in Trieste had an assignment of protecting the eventual evacuation of the allied staff, as well as that in the absence of any agreed on joint concept of operative cooperation with Yugoslav forces, their engagement would have proven useless. Although it was clear that these troops would not have been engaged in the time sufficient for overcoming mentioned obstacles, the British position remained rigid enough to disable any overlapping of the issues related to the Trieste question with the need for harmonization of strategic defensive plans with Yugoslavia. TNA, FO 371, 102165, Telegram Ministry of Defense to British Joint Services Mission Washington CoS (W) 240. 15.  TNA, FO 371, 102165, Minutes to telegram Ministry of Defense to British Joint Services Mission Washington ELL 407, pp. 1–2. 16. Ibid. 17.  TNA, FO 371, 102180, p. 1. 18.  NARA, Record Group 77, Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Manhattan Engineer District TS Manhattan Project File ’42 to ’46, Folder 5B “(Directives, Memos, Etc. to and from C/S, S/W, etc.).”; Robert J. Maddox, “The Biggest Decision: Why We Had to Drop the Atomic Bomb,” American Heritage, vol. 46 (May–June 1995), no. 3, 70. 19.  http://www.generals.dk/general/Handy/Thomas_Troy/USA.html. http://www .arlingtoncemetery.net/tthandy.htm. 20.  Even for the time he spent as commander of the Fourth US Army in Texas, his appointment coincided with partial publication of data regarding the famous incident with UFOs that were doubted to be of extraterrestrial origin (i.e., shooting down two of them near the town of Roswell, New Mexico, on July 3, 1947. Regardless of the real nature and background of this affair, the fact remains that all of this happened in the area of the Fourth Army, as well as the one FBI document from the mentioned period that indicates that Handy himself was in charge its handling. Knowing that appointment for this function happened immediately after the outbreak of the affair, it could be presumed that there had existed an intention to assign such a delicate task



Hard Talks 51

to someone of unquestionable authority. http://www.majesticdocuments.com/official. documents.foia.php, Roswell Teletype, July 8, 1947, p. 4, Oct. 2005. 21.  TNA, FO 371, 102165, Minutes to telegram Ministry of Defense to British Joint Services Mission Washington ELL 407, p. 2. 22.  TNA, FO 371, 102180, pp. 1–2. 23.  Dispatch of the Canadian Embassy in Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 887, (National Archive of Canada-NAC), RG 25, Acc. 1985–86/019, vol. 324, 962 3–40, p. 1. 24.  D. Bekić, p. 439. 25.  Yugoslav transcript of the conference held in the Military Archive in Belgrade: VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8. As for the US version of the Minutes of the conference, the file had been withdrawn because it contains security-classified information: NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Miscellaneous Lot Files, Lot File No. 59 D 383 (Box 4 of 5), Box 38, Miscellaneous Office to Yugoslav Affairs 1948–1956, Yugo Mil Talks, Handy Report, December 1952. 26.  I. Laković, pp. 69–71. 27.  D. Bekić, p. 439. 28.  TNA, FO 371, 102168, Mallet Letter to Cheetham with Report on HandyMission dated 16 and 19 November 1952, 1. 29.  FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1320–1321, no. 661. 30.  FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1322–1323, no. 663. 31.  NARA, RG 218, Geographic file, CCS 092 Yugoslavia (7–6-48) sec. 18, 650–654. JCS Decision on JCS 1901/95 on Report of Tripartite Exploratory Military Discussions with Yugoslavia. 32.  DAMSPRS, 1955, str. pov, f 3, 332, p. I/559–600 (1–2). 33.  At the beginning of November, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia changed its name to the Union of the Communists of Yugoslavia. 34.  D. Bekić, pp. 444–445. General Handy had confirmed his restrictive attitude toward Yugoslavia and supplying it even in the forthcoming period. During the Trieste crisis, he ordered total cessation of all arranged deliveries from the MDAP, regardless that his move in the Pentagon would be characterized as needless. Knowing that the Yugoslav demonstration had been more dedicated to domestic public opinion than it had in mind the real confrontation with the West about this city, American planners were of the opinion that Yugoslavia should not be alienated further. Stoppage of the deliveries was the exactly one of the moves that had needlessly complicated the later consolidation of the relations, while it did not have any tactical-operative importance in the moment of the given decision; VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f V, 44, p. 1. 35.  D. Bekić, p. 445. 36.  I. Laković, pp. 97–101. 37.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 27, p. 5. 38.  Đ. Borozan, Razgovori Tito-Churchill, 16–21 March 1953, JIČ 1–2/ 2001, pp. 198–199. During Tito’s visit to Great Britain, Eden disavowed Handy’s performance as well as the one of the British representative in delegation regarding the possibility of the outbreak of local war. He said that the official British attitude excluded such a standpoint, as would the Standing Group in Washington. Based on the identical

52

Chapter Three

premises, it was forming the new instructions for the American negotiating team for the next round of military-strategic talks with Yugoslavia. 39.  D. Bekić, p. 532. 40.  I. Laković, pp. 101–102. 41.  D. Bekić, p. 531. 42.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 27, p. 7. 43.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 27, pp. 8–9. 44.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 27, pp. 10–12. 45.  Ibid., p. 9. 46.  I. Laković, pp. 103–105, 145. 47.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 27, pp. 12–14. 48.  For the reconstruction of the conference, the English version of the Minutes have been used, preserved in section II of the Military Archive in Belgrade, S-8, f III, 14. Yugoslav minutes in Serbian are published in the collection of documents Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Beograd, 2005, pp. 354–493. The latter contains the parts of the talks on the certain technical questions that led immediately after the conference. As for the US version of the Minutes of the conference, the files have been withdrawn because they contain security-classified information: NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Miscellaneous Lot Files, Lot File No. 59 D 383 (Box 5 of 5), Box 39, Miscellaneous Office Files Relating to Yugoslav Affairs 1948–1956, Yugo Military Discussions–Tripartite, Washington, August 1953, Folder 1 of 2 (Rpt), as well as Folder 2 of 2 (Minutes). 49.  B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, p. 121. 50.  I. Laković, pp. 145–147. 51.  NARA, RG 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic files 1951–1953, Entry 13, Box 121, CCS 092 Yugoslavia (7–6-48) Sec 24, J.C.S. 1901/127, November 12, 1954, Report by the Joint Strategic Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Resumption of Tripartite (US-UK-French) Yugoslav Military Discussions.

Chapter Four

The Balkan Treaty Toward the New Balkan Alliance

RESHAPING THE MILITARY-POLITICAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS AFTER 1948 After the end of World War II, the Balkan Peninsula faced a somewhat new geopolitical reality. Italy was definitely expelled from that region. The Yugoslav state moved its border more to the West, this time as a Socialist federal republic and the most faithful Soviet ally. Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria also became close allies of the USSR. In Greece, the bloody and exhausting civil war started, and Turkey tried to continue with its neutral policy. However, the first indications of a future bipolar world order started to emerge at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in 1945. At the end of the Yalta Conference, the Soviets voided the nonaggression agreement of 1925 with Turkey. This development was very important in relation to the future status of the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Also, in June 1945, the Soviets wanted Turkey to hand over Kars and Ardahan, to use the Bosporus and Dardanelles as a base, and finally to make corrections in the Montreaux Treaty. The biggest demands were related to the Straits: •  Straits should be open for all commercial ships. •  Straits should be open for the warships of the countries having access to the Black Sea. •  Straits should be closed for the warships of all countries without an access to the Black Sea. •  The defense of the Straits should be organized together with the USSR. •  The Montreaux Treaty should be revised in favor of the Black Sea countries.1 53

54

Chapter Four

Turkey had refused all demands of finding itself not in a neutral position any longer. With the promoting of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, which offered economic and military help to countries, both endangered by Communist threat or in the process of eliminating it, and by putting the Marshall Plan into practice in 1948, the Western countries decided to confront the Soviet ideological and geopolitical expansion, politically and economically. Turkey was included in the second phase of the Marshall Plan, which helped its economic development. Being alone in a vast sea of Communist states, Turkey and Greece were destined to cooperate. The Turkish government expressed a positive attitude toward the Greek claim for the annexation of the Dodecanese Islands, and with that, it paved the way for the formulation of common diplomatic objectives.2 On the other hand, civil war in Greece made its contribution to the developing instability in the Balkans. Although the National Army (Royalist) and Democratic Army (Communist), under the protection of the United Kingdom, signed the Agreement of Varkiza in February 1945, it was rejected by the Democratic Army and open civil war began soon thereafter. During the 1947 Bled Conference, three neighboring countries, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, reaffirmed their active support for the Democratic Army and decided to establish a joint staff for the coordination of Communist activities. In addition to that, with the agreement concluded in 1946 between Tito and the General Secretary of the Greek Communist Party, Nicholas Zachariades, Tito in a way revived the prewar idea of Cominterna for the establishment of an autonomous Macedonian State. Of course, this was done under the direct influence of Moscow. Greece immediately appealed to the newly established United Nations organization on December 3, 1946, but a Soviet veto ended the matter.3 During 1947, to prevent Soviet supremacy in the region, the United States and the United Kingdom traded roles, and the role of supporting the National Army was left to the United States. The United Kingdom was forced to leave Europe to redefine its own Empire. The United States supported Greece economically, politically, and militarily, which finally led to the defeat of the Greek Communist movement.4 Since Turkey and Greece lie on a traditional Russian path toward the warm seas and since their position was very important for the defense of both the Balkans and the Middle East, Western protection for Greek-Turkish cooperation was assured. Americans initiated the formation of an Army Staff Committee to promote the common defense. The signing of a financial agreement in October 1948 led to the restoration of a direct top-level dialogue. Prime Minister Nikolaos Plastiras and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sophocles Venizelos, as Greek representatives, and Prime Ministers Adnan Menderes and



The Balkan Treaty 55

Fuat Köprülü, as Turkish representatives, initiated that practice. Direct contacts were strengthened by the return visits of the heads of state. In June 1952, King Paul I paid an official visit to Istanbul, and the president of the Turkish Republic, Celal Bayar, returned the visit in December of the same year.5 As a result of the new balance of powers in the Balkans, there was a need for Yugoslavia to normalize relations with its pro-Western environment, especially with Greece. While Yugoslavia and Turkey did not have disputed issues, the burden of recent history made normalization of Yugoslav and Greek relations a bit difficult. A similar case was the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. However, in their case, the vulnerability from any actions from the USSR and its satellites represented a strong enough incentive to put aside the legacy of the past. In the summer of 1950, the Assistant Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Ernest Davis, passed the Greek concrete proposals that would lead to normalizing relations between Yugoslavia and Greece. Greece would give a statement expressing it was ready to accede to the normalization of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, as the government previously agreed in respect to the principle of noninterference in internal affairs. Yugoslavia should have made a public statement that it accepted the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of Greece, as well as a statement that they had not considered any obstacles to the normalization of diplomatic relations. Additionally, Yugoslav authorities should pass a “secret statement” to the Greek government in which they would state that they would not consider the Macedonian question as an obstacle for the normalization of Greek-Yugoslav relations. Davis added that such statements should be secret because they understood that Yugoslavs, because of their internal public opinion, could not give such a statement publicly. However, the Yugoslavs were suspicious of the United Kingdom’s role in normalizing relations between Yugoslavia and Greece. Yugoslav leadership was against such a model for the gradual normalization of relations, deciding it would go through official diplomatic channels.6 Normalization of Yugoslav-Greek relations began in January 1951, through signing of the agreements on railway, postal, telephone, and telegraph traffic. Afterward, on March 15, 1951, they signed an agreement on air traffic, and in April 1951, the trade agreement.7 Yugoslavia had pledged to resolve the existing issue of the repatriation of Greek children and former soldiers of the Communist movement. During 1951, the first links in the cultural area were established (e.g., exchanges of musicians, movies, visiting athletes, journalists, etc.). The main problem in relations between the two countries was the question of the Macedonian minority in Greece for which the Yugoslav side argued that it was exposed to economic pressure and terror, while the Greek government denied its existence, calling them the “Slavic-speaking Greeks.”8

56

Chapter Four

At the end of 1951, Greece and Turkey were trying to join NATO as equal partners. On this occasion, the question of organizing the commands of the Middle East was introduced. Namely, the British insisted that the Turkish armed forces should operate under the command of the Middle East while the Turks insisted on being under the command of General Eisenhower, Chief of NATO forces in Europe.9 At that time, the organization of the Middle East, or Mediterranean defensive bloc, seemed less provocative than the direct involvement of Turkey and Greece in NATO.10 During the meeting between the Yugoslav and US ambassadors, Radovanović and MacGee, at the end of January 1952 in Ankara, the American diplomat was interested in the situation in Yugoslavia. He asked whether the Yugoslav “Communist movement was expansive in its aspirations to expand on other countries” and stressed that the joint military strengthening of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey represented the guarantee against possible aggression.11 In those months, in light of events in Korea, the US military experts did not exclude the possibility of Soviet aggression on Yugoslavia, believing that in the case of such an event, they had to provide assistance to Yugoslavia in arms and even in troops.12 In the events that followed during the visit of General Eisenhower to Turkey, the question of Yugoslavia approaching NATO emerged. Foreign diplomats in Turkey were interested in the possibility of Yugoslavia joining NATO.13 What’s more, they started to spread the news of the talks between Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia, which were related to the common front in Bulgaria. Yugoslav officials had to deny these rumors. The Greek-Turkish rapprochement simultaneously occurred. Greek Prime Minister Venizelos visited Turkey from January 29 to February 5, 1952. On that occasion, issues of further cooperation dominated within the Atlantic Pact. This visit represented the first steps toward overcoming the difficult legacy of the relations between Turkey and Greece. It mainly had a ceremonial character, although the press tried to present it as a break in Turkish-Greek relations that would afterward lead to the resolution of all contentious issues between the two countries. Specifically, the formation of a mixed Greek-Turkish committee was agreed would deal with disputed issues. They also talked about the Cyprus issue, the most sensitive issue between the two countries. Both parties were trying to show that this question did not represent an obstacle for cooperation. The harmonization of common views about the upcoming NATO meeting in Lisbon was agreed and the decision was made that military leaderships should organize mutual visits and consultations as often as they could.14 During the visit of the Greek delegation to Ankara, a meeting had been held, including Yugoslav Ambassador Ljubomir Radovanović, Greek Prime Minister Venizelos, and Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü. At



The Balkan Treaty 57

that meeting, Greece and Turkey openly initiated activities in coordination of defense and the establishment of Allied relations. The Greek Prime Minister stressed that he understood the reasons that dictated Yugoslavia’s attitude toward NATO but there were other ways of coordinating the defense. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs’ proposal was for the general staffs of three countries to be engaged and discuss these matters. Since the Yugoslav ambassador had no authority to respond to these proposals, he used the common phrases of Yugoslavia’s desire to establish friendly relations with Turkey and Greece, which did not satisfy his interlocutors. The attitudes of Köprülü and Venizelos had showed their determination to cooperate with Yugoslavia and to bring the level of Allied relations to attention based on a mutual defense program, which would, keeping in mind joining Greece and Turkey in NATO, rely on NATO programs. At that time, although interested in the establishment of the closest cooperation with the two Balkan states, the Yugoslav leadership, seemingly decided that it was not ready to enter into military alliances.15 Despite the disagreements and unclear Yugoslav attitude toward the West during 1952, the Western economic aid to Yugoslavia had been approved.16 This provided the possibility for Tito and Yugoslavia to strengthen their internal stability. The Western press had speculated about the role of Yugoslavia’s defense and its behavior in case of a Soviet attack. The Yugoslav ambassador in Washington, D.C., Popović, indicated an article from March 10, written by respected foreign policy analyst Homer Biggart, in which it was said Greece’s defense capability largely depended on Yugoslavia’s attitude. The author of the article advocated that Western diplomats should find some kind of agreement between Greece and Yugoslavia.17 At the same time, during a meeting with Greek Prime Minister Venizelos and Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi, Venizelos said that Yugoslavia would certainly defend itself if attacked and that the solution of the Trieste issue should be left to the local population to decide. At this point, the main issue in the relations between Italy and Greece was the determination of the future commander of the Italian, Greek, and Turkish forces within NATO. De Gasperi tried to persuade Venizelos to accept Italian General Castiglione as the commander of the southern NATO forces; however, Venizelos refused. Venizelos said that Italy and Greece had common borders, and therefore, it was inconvenient to have an Italian as a commander. In his opinion, the question of command could be solved only when the issue of Yugoslavia’s participation in the defense of the West was resolved.18 This issue was normally resolved on the last NATO meeting in Lisbon where Eisenhower decided to resolve it within his jurisdiction. Eisenhower had already decided that the land forces of the southern sector of NATO would be under his command; naval forces, under

58

Chapter Four

the command of Admiral Carney based in Naples; and air forces, under the command of General Schlatter.19 At that time, the ninth session of NATO was held in Lisbon. The main question the conference dealt with was the organization of the European Army, which by the end of 1952, should have numbered 50 divisions and 4,000 aircraft. Armies of the newly entering members, Greece and Turkey, had not been counted into these numbers.20 The commander of southern Europe, Admiral Carney, visited Turkey during March. The Turkish representatives requested from the admiral that substantial air support should be provided in the early days of any aggression, while the president of Turkey explained to the admiral the economic situation in Turkey and insisted on more materiel aid. Turkey justified such requests based on the strategic importance of its territory and its role in NATO. During Admiral Carney’s visit, the Turkish press emphasized the importance of Yugoslavia’s participation in the defense of this part of Europe. It was believed that the creation of the Turkish-Greek Command under the US directive would create a favorable atmosphere for cooperation with Yugoslavia.21 Yugoslav-Greek cooperation was intensified during the spring of 1952. In mid-April, the Greek Prime Minister received the Yugoslav ambassador, Radoš Jovanović, when he expressed his satisfaction concerning the relations between the two countries and stressed the importance of the arrival of the Yugoslav military attaché.22 Visits from Ambassador Jovanović and invitations to the members of the Greek parliament to visit Belgrade caused very favorable comments in the Greek press and among politicians. Even some of the Thessalonica newspapers, traditionally nonfavorable for the issue of a Yugoslav Macedonia and the Macedonian minority, gave positive comments. On the issue of Greek-Turkish relations, no one hid their initiatives for further rapprochement, which did not arise from mutual attraction but under the influence of a third factor. On one hand, it was the Anglo-American initiative, and on the other, the common threat of possible aggression. Greek-Turkish relations were burdened with the Cyprus issue. Even though there was an exchange of visits to state delegations, the mood in the press and among people of both countries had not improved. During the visit of the Turkish delegation, the Greek press wrote more information about Yugoslavia’s attitude than about the Greek-Turkish talks. Yugoslavia ought to have been a cohesive force that was missing in Greek-Turkish relations, because “Greeks and Turks believed Yugoslavia more than each other.”23 The crowning moment of previous activities and intensification of normalizing relations between Yugoslavia and Greece was the visit of the Greek parliamentary delegation to Yugoslavia in early July 1952.24 The Greek delegation expressed a very high interest for all forms of cooperation, especially in



The Balkan Treaty 59

the economy.25 It was also agreed that the group of Yugoslav officers would pay an official visit to Greece in September.26 During June and July 1952, Thrace’s defense attracted much attention in the context of Greco-Turkish membership in NATO and the creation of the European Army and the Balkan Pact. According to the Yugoslav allegations, from the United Kingdom came news that the Yugoslav-Greek cooperation would be conducted under the patronage of the United Kingdom, as opposed to the Yugoslav claims that the English did not only help cooperation, but also had made the allegations that Yugoslavia had been more dangerous than the Soviet Union.27 The British in their political game in Southeast Europe interpreted the visit of the Turkish prime minister, Adnan Menderes, and the minister of foreign affairs, Fuat Köprülü, to London as a new political move. This visit came after Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s visit to Turkey, and his preference that NATO should reassume Thrace’s defense, which was greeted both in Greece and Turkey. However, Americans disagreed with this British attitude. Among a certain number of Turkish politicians, an anxiety existed regarding the security of the country, although Turkey was a member of NATO. Because of this anxiety, there was the opinion that the creation of the European Army could contribute to the strengthening of Turkish-Greek relations, as well as to the creation of a regional pact with Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia as members.28 Thrace’s defense represented the most important issue of Turkish foreign policy. The organization of the defense of Turkey and Greece and their mutual defense cooperation, as well as their future relations with Yugoslavia and cooperation with it in defense, depended on the solution of this issue.29 At the same time, the Turkish press wrote about the imminent signing of the defense pact between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, which was promptly denied.30 In the summer of 1952, Yugoslavia launched a parliamentary cooperation with Turkey as well.31 At the same time, on July 18, the Greek ambassador in Yugoslavia, Kapetanides, was briefed that Yugoslavs informed the Americans that they wanted to discuss military matters with the Greeks and Turks. Tito decided that the Yugoslav military delegation would visit Athens soon after the return of the Yugoslav parliamentary delegation, which should have been in Greece in mid-August.32 At that time, Moscow’s Pravda wrote that “Anglo-American imperialists” intended to firmly bind “Tito’s Yugoslavia” to NATO because it attributed an important role in their aggressive plans. That was the line on which preparation of the “military triangle,” Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, began its progress, because Titoists, due to the resistance of the people of Yugoslavia, could not directly join NATO.33

60

Chapter Four

As it had been planned, in August 1952, a Yugoslav parliamentary delegation visited Greece.34 The Yugoslavs started their trip with a clear conviction that there were conditions for the expansion of cooperation. The delegation, led by Parliament speaker Moša Pijade, visited Greece from August 2 to September 3. Everywhere, they encountered a good reception and great honors with everyday press coverage.35 At that time, US officials noted that in Italian political circles, opinions appeared that Italy had broken into diplomatic isolation and that its interests and desires were given little significance in Western countries. There were several reasons for that, including the exclusion of Italy from the North Atlantic Shipping Board, rejection of General Castiglione as Admiral Carney’s deputy, inability of the West to achieve Italy’s admission to the UN, and the tendency that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France made important decisions on restricted meetings and afterward just informed smaller nations. Additional reasons were: military aid, the announced possibility of Yugoslav-Turkish-Greek military cooperation, lack of progress on a Trieste settlement, and larger amounts of military and economic aid to other European countries, whose military contribution to NATO was quite smaller than Italy’s. To avoid Italian alienation, it was recommended that economic aid to Italy should be extended. Italy had to be convinced that defensive arrangements between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey would not assume an antiItalian position, and Albania’s independence should be preserved despite the interests of its neighbors. The most important was the compromise solution of the Trieste issue.36 The official visit of the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and his meetings with Josip Broz Tito in September 1952 caused Yugoslavia to begin emerging from diplomatic isolation and strengthen its foreign policy positions. In his talks with the Turkish and Greek ambassadors in Yugoslavia, Eden welcomed the beginning of bringing together the three Balkan states.37 As planned, in September 1952, the Yugoslav military delegation paid official visits and held talks on cooperation, first in Athens and afterward in Ankara. General Pavle Jakšić, the commander of the Belgrade military district, led the delegation. The delegation participated in informative and important talks on the modalities of cooperation between the two armies in case of Soviet aggression. The Yugoslav delegation rejected signing a military pact, but agreed to cooperate with Greece in case of an attack, with a provision that each army organize the defense of its own territory.38 While the Yugoslavs had a feeling of caution and gradualism in the rapprochement, Turkey and Greece had shown readiness to expedite the process. Turkish Ambassador Köprülü in his farewell visit to Tito on September 26, 1952, suggested that during the return visit to Yugoslavia, Greek and Turkish



The Balkan Treaty 61

officers should come together. Tito considered those visits as part of the usual protocol and that it was better that each delegation should come separately, but he left the possibility for the next meeting of the military delegation to meet protocol coupled with practical work.39 In further contacts, Greek officials had expressed a desire to intensify cooperation. During the visit of Ambassador Jovanović, Greek Prime Minister Papagos had officially stated the position of his government on further developing cordial cooperation in the interest of both their location and peace in the Balkans.40 Yugoslav authorities were especially interested in the results of the visit of Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi to Athens, which was planned for the period from January 8 to January 11, 1953. The Italian government was satisfied with Papagos’s election victory because according to them, previous Prime Minister Venizelos led a duplicitous and hostile policy toward Italy. According to their expectations, Papagos, who had the rank of Marshal as a soldier, would not have an affectionate stand toward the aspirations of Yugoslavia in being a major military power in the Balkans. The adviser on foreign affairs of the Italian prime minister pleaded the case that in the event of aggression against Greece, they would have much greater assistance from Italy than from Yugoslavia. According to this argument, only the massive Allied landings in Italy and Albania could protect Greece. It had been assumed that De Gasperi would present this viewpoint during his stay in Athens.41 Indeed, among the list of issues that were planned for discussion at the upcoming meeting, there were also questions of relations with Yugoslavia, that is, De Gasperi’s attempt to include Italy in the Balkan defense arrangements.42 A visit from the president of the Republic of Turkey, Celâl Bayar, to Greece in November through December 1952 represented a return visit to the Greek king who had earlier visited Turkey. Not a single important issue had been on the agenda, and not one of the government ministers accompanied President Bayar on this voyage. Yugoslav diplomats were present at all of the banquets. The Greek press wrote about the friendship with Turkey, but at the same time, they wrote about the friendship with Yugoslavia. It was noted that the Yugoslav rapprochement with Turkey also obliged Greece to strengthen its relations with Yugoslavia, because an efficient defense of a Balkan Turkey was impossible without the participation of Yugoslavia.43 Yugoslav diplomacy also observed the NATO session in Paris, especially the questions concerning the command system of the Western alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean, where the Mediterranean fleet, which consisted of the navies of France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, was placed under the command of Admiral Mountbatten. The fact that only the American Sixth Fleet remained under the command of Admiral Carney had been interpreted as strengthening British influence and their desire to take over sponsorship

62

Chapter Four

of the Balkan Alliance.44 The Trieste issue was another reason for Yugoslavs to observe Italian reactions closely. In the general discussion over the international situation, De Gasperi said that Italy wanted to cooperate with Yugoslavia and that it had done everything to initiate that cooperation but that Yugoslavia was responsible for failing to react in the settlement over the Trieste issue. However, none of the ministers wanted to enter into a discussion or mention the Trieste issue. Only the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers spoke about the necessity of cooperation between NATO and its member states with Yugoslavia. The decision had been reached that nothing from the discussion about the relations of Yugoslavia and Italy should go public and that nothing regarding Trieste would enter into official records. After these events, Yugoslav officials concluded that the Italian delegation at the NATO meeting suffered a major blow.45 The Yugoslav ambassador in Paris, Srđa Prica, met twice with Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü during his stay in Paris in December 1952. Köprülü intended to visit Rome before visiting Belgrade to hear the opinion of the Italian government. He considered that the issue of Trieste was lower ranking compared to the importance of establishing a common defense.46 On December 20, 1952, during lunch in the Diplomatic Academy, which had been organized on the occasion of the NATO meeting, Prica met with the Greek ministers of foreign affairs and defense, Stephanopoulos and Kanellopoulos, who reported to him that De Gasperi spoke rather bitterly about Yugoslavia but still had to recognize its importance to Europe. In his speech during that lunch, Kanellopoulos devoted a large part to Yugoslavia and stressed that cooperation between Greece and Yugoslavia showed that even those countries that are members of NATO were interested in the common defense of Europe.47 In December 1952, a Turkish trade delegation visited Yugoslavia. The objective of this delegation was described as “a study of opportunities for deepening economic ties between the two countries,” but one of the main topics was to establish a direct air route from Belgrade-Ankara via Thessalonica, due to the air route through Bulgaria for Turkey and Yugoslavia had been closed. It was clear that this direction, at the time, was important not only for economic purposes but also as a strategic direction in case of aggression.48 The crisis in relations between Yugoslavia and Italy was highly located on the priority list of Western countries. Specifically, US officials wanted a solution to the Trieste issue as soon as possible, believing that strengthening the position of De Gasperi in Italy would favorably act in this direction. Yugoslavs considered that Italy did not want a solution to the Trieste issues but to normalize relations with Yugoslavia.49 An article in the New York Times on December 31 said that the plan of “Balkan Entente” should have been viewed with skepticism not only because of historical experience but also because



The Balkan Treaty 63

Yugoslavia was a Communist country with which any agreement would not have much practical significance for Yugoslavia itself. The keynote speaker concluded with the statement, “since neither Greece nor Turkey will take any action without the sanction of . . . NATO, negotiations between Yugoslavia and the two countries do not represent new commitments to the Atlantic forces.” At the same time, correspondents in Belgrade said that the previous negotiations led to agreement on joint defense issues, but some details were left for later, including coordination with the Greek and Turkish obligations under NATO.50 From December 20 through December 27, 1952, a high delegation of the Turkish army led by Generals Tunaboylu and Akçakoca visited Yugoslav armed forces. The host was the chief of the YPA general staff, General Peko Dapčević. Their visit, besides the visits to different units, commands, and the various institutions and factories of the YPA, aimed to better define and prepare future cooperation between the two armies, especially concerning the common defense and cooperation in case of aggression and war with the USSR and its satellites. During these talks, Yugoslavs repeated that specific arrangements should be preceded by agreements at the level of government, which the Turkish representatives agreed. They also exchanged information about the forces of opponents and estimates of their opponents’ intent and variations of the general defensive war plans. Yugoslav representatives had stated their position that in any case, the aggression of any satellites individually, together, or in cooperation with the forces of the Soviet Union would provoke a new world war. In addition, the need to harmonize the plans with Greece, due to the existence of the ground connection, had been imposed. In relation with the aforementioned, General Dapčević informed everyone present that talks with representatives of the Greek armed forces had started on December 27 in Athens. Among Turkish generals, a desire had been present to go further than generalized variants; more accurately, they wanted to hear precisely the variations of Yugoslavia’s war plans, especially in relation to deployments and actual figures in certain directions. That desire, however, did not meet the response of the Yugoslav representatives, who insisted on the need for prior agreements on the level of government. The words of General Dapčević illustrated that “we should move further to the discussions that will provide further operational planning. The strategy is a matter of politicians; we soldiers are dealing with operational work.” In terms of cooperation with Western allies, both the Turkish and Yugoslav representatives agreed that it should be improved particularly in terms of increasing aid. General Tunaboylu expressed the opinion that the Western allies would not remain on the sideline in case of an agreement between the three Balkan states, which already had been demonstrated with the example of Turkey and Greece,

64

Chapter Four

where the Western allies had begun to send military aid after Turkey and Greece had agreed themselves. General Dapčević expressed a more concrete attitude. At that time in Europe, only the three Balkan armies were defending the Mediterranean, and due to that fact, it was logical that Western allies would devote more attention to this part of the world and to actively engaging in the provision of military aid to Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece. The talks were completed with the conclusion that they had been extremely helpful and that the whole stay of Turkish representatives in Yugoslavia proceeded in a friendly atmosphere.51 According to US diplomatic sources, as Bekić quotes, Marshal Tito made an reception for the Turkish delegation. According to the report of the American ambassador in Athens, where General Tunaboylu briefly stayed on his way back to Ankara, Tito had shown vivid interest for rapprochement and close cooperation, even to the level of establishing a joint Yugoslav-Turkish-Greek headquarters.52 Practically at the same time on December 27 through 30, the delegation of the YPA, led by General Miloš Šumonja, visited Athens. Talks were conducted on a similar principle as in Belgrade. General Balodimos, acting chief of the general staff of the National Defense of Greece, headed the Greek delegation. First, they presented data on the forces of satellite states and their capabilities and data on Soviet forces in the satellite countries. A presentation of data on the Greek and Yugoslav forces and their capabilities followed. Although former opponents sat across the table from each other, if Yugoslavia’s support to the Greek Communists during the civil war is taken into account, the talks in Athens were much more detailed and open than those in Belgrade with the Turkish representatives. They included figures, formations, deployment methods, and a number of units in certain directions and a relatively thorough analysis of possible variants of the opponents’ war plans related to the Balkans in general. It was concluded that the goal of future contacts and agreements should be the formation of a stable “Balkan Front,” which should be the basis of a combination of Yugoslav and Greek forces who would later join the Turkish forces. Special attention was paid to the attack route from Bulgaria to Yugoslavia and Greece, grouping of enemy and Allied Forces, and the defensive measures that had already been taken (fortification works). They also adopted the need for active defense, from which, depending on the focus of enemy attack, they could easily perform the offensive. General Šumonja noted the importance of Albania and warned of the dangers coming from it. He stated that a solution to this problem laid in the agreements referred to politicians. He addressed the question of eventual Italian aspirations toward Albania, which in the past had been a prelude to further expansionist actions and the current state of the Yugoslav-Italian relations and the Trieste issue, which prevented the normalization of relations, and thus, influenced



The Balkan Treaty 65

the overall security of Yugoslavia and stability of that part of the front. In relation to that, General Balodimos stated that although the question of Albania was basically a question of politicians, military representatives could propose to their governments, regardless of Albania’s attitude, that on that part of the front, in the case of Soviet-satellite attacks, they could enforce an armed intervention and occupation of Albania. He also expressed his full understanding regarding the Yugoslav-Italian relations on what General Šumonja stated, that the fact that Greeks and Italians were allies was not an obstacle for normal development of Yugoslav-Greek relations. General Šumonja expressed the view that special attention should be paid to security measures that the contents of conversation should not fall into enemy hands. Particularly, he had in mind the Greek contacts with their allies in NATO, a fact only a few people in the Yugoslav circles were aware of. He had also acquainted his Greek colleagues with the content and themes of previously held talks with representatives of NATO and French and Turkish armed forces. Talks were completed with the statement that they were extremely useful and successful and that they represented the prelude for future cooperation.53 THE FIRST STEP: ANKARA Normalizing relations with the West allowed Yugoslavia to obtain economic aid from the US government and the International Bank at the beginning of 1953.54 In parallel with this, the process of rapprochement with Greece and Turkey was already on its way. The Turkish press had devoted great attention to visits from the Turkish military and economic delegations to Yugoslavia. However, the prospect of the inclusion of Italy in the military alliance of Balkan states was not met with support from the press.55 After returning from Paris and Rome, Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü met with the Yugoslav ambassador in Ankara, Radovanović. Köprülü said that the idea of defending the Balkans had been well received in Paris and that Yugoslavia should not be afraid of Italian aspirations. In Rome, Köprülü, despite De Gasperi’s charges, suggested that the question of Trieste should be put aside and collaboration should be on the agenda. He also said that military cooperation between Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia had advanced and that the next steps were specific agreements.56 On the other hand, General Tunaboylu said that the cooperation between Turkey and Yugoslavia was rapidly evolving and that during the spring, they could expect concrete forms. He was a supporter of the Italian involvement in the agreement, stating that, during previous months, the Greek Prime Minister Marshal Papagos grew fond of this idea, as well. According to

66

Chapter Four

General Tunaboylu, Italy had a negative attitude toward the issue of Balkan cooperation, fearing an armed Yugoslavia could endanger Italian interests. However, he doubted the effectiveness of the agreement in which Italians would participate.57 One of the issues that threatened Yugoslav approaching the West was the Trieste issue. According to Yugoslav diplomatic reports from Rome, Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi returned very dissatisfied from the NATO meeting in Paris. There were claims that Anthony Eden tried very hard to impose his Turkish and Greek vision of the Balkan Alliance. De Gasperi failed in his own attempt to impose the question of Trieste, because the Greek and Turkish delegations had strongly opposed. It was concluded that Italian policy suffered a major blow, because De Gasperi based his foreign policy on the military unification of Europe without the participation of Yugoslavia.58 Yugoslav diplomacy had paid special attention to De Gasperi’s visit to Athens that occurred in January 1953.59 According to the notification that the Yugoslav ministry of foreign affairs received from several sources, Greeks had discussed with De Gasperi issues of Yugoslav (i.e., Greek cooperation and issues of Albania). De Gasperi presented the danger that threatened from Communism and asked whether there could be any cooperation with Yugoslavia. He insisted that any cooperation with Yugoslavia had to go through NATO, and with his previous consent. He said that Greece should not view cooperation through its current interests, but through the common view of all Western countries. He pointed out that Tito should not be trusted and that without previous solid commitment, they should not enter into cooperation with him. Greek Prime Minister Papagos said that the cooperation between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia was necessary, that without this cooperation, the Balkans could not be defended, and that the defense of the Balkans was of crucial importance for the defense of Western Europe. Papagos explained that the military talks were under way with Yugoslavia, that Greece would continue these talks, and that he hoped the talks would favorably finish with concrete results. De Gasperi said that Italy and Greece should cooperate on the issue of Albania, which should remain independent.60 At the end, De Gasperi tried to postpone the agreement, relating it with the solving of the Trieste issue.61 However, when De Gasperi left Athens, preparations for the signing of the pact were hastened, which practically neutralized the Italian pressure.62 In this way, Yugoslavia saw the Balkan Pact as an additional element of its military-political security.63 However, in early 1953, it was almost certain that there would not be Soviet aggression, and from Yugoslavia’s point of view, the Balkan Pact started to take a broader meaning in relations with the West than its military-defensive function against the East. Namely, the Yugoslav interest in the Balkan Pact was important for the preservation of economic



The Balkan Treaty 67

cooperation with the West, which would be very difficult to achieve without the Yugoslav moves that would suggest a willingness to join the NATO defense system. Also, in this way, Yugoslavia’s position strengthened relations to Italy in connection with the decision of the Trieste question.64 During the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü to Yugoslavia in January 1953, the problem of Yugoslavia’s attitude toward NATO emerged. The Turkish delegation that was led by Köprülü showed no sympathy for Yugoslavia’s attitude toward NATO. Köprülü felt that future cooperation was the first stage for the final inclusion of Yugoslavia into NATO.65 For the Yugoslavs, joining NATO was unacceptable. It would be considered in the event that NATO would also change in its structure and strategic concepts over time, following the changes and general conditions in the world.66 During the talks of Köprülü and Tito in Belgrade and in Brioni Isles on January 21 through January 22, 1953, they reached an agreement that the principal interest of both countries requires further cooperation by creating an agreement that would allow military support with the Turkish understanding of obligations toward NATO. The necessity of cooperation with Greece had been emphasized to further discussions to get tripartite character, while in regard to relations with Italy the principle of open doors was adopted.67 At the reception at the Turkish Embassy, Köprülü talked with English and French ambassadors, the Italian chargés d’affaires, and the head of the American military assistance staff in Belgrade, General Harmony. In talks with the French and English ambassadors, Köprülü felt undisguised reservation in relation to the results of the talks in Belgrade. Both were alluding that their governments should have been consulted and that they were reluctant to watch over the meetings, which they did not participate in, by emphasizing that in their opinions, it was still too early to make agreements. Köprülü told them that the Balkan allies were mature enough to determine the line of their own policy. The Italian chargés d’affaires asked Köprülü about conversations concerning Italy, and Köprülü presented Yugoslavia’s attitude and said that he agreed with it. He said to General Harmony that Yugoslavia was looking at the United States with full confidence. On January 24, Köprülü received the Greek ambassador in Yugoslavia, Kapetanides, and informed him about the talks. During the talks, Kapetanides demonstrated open dissatisfaction with the attitude of the United Kingdom and France.68 During the meeting between Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović and Greek Ambassador Kapetanides, the ambassador was interested in the continuation of Yugoslav-Turkish military talks. Kapetanides stated that the Yugoslav-Greek negotiations went much further than the negotiations with the Turks because the issue of military cooperation between Yugoslavia and Greece was much clearer.69 On his way back to Turkey, Köprülü visited

68

Chapter Four

Athens, where he expressed a very positive impression. Among Greek officials, there was a feeling of restraint toward Turkey, and especially toward the Turkish position that Italy should be included in negotiations. In Athens, Admiral Mountbatten suddenly arrived, while there were rumors concerning the joint position of the Greeks and Britons who were against Italy’s inclusion in negotiations on the Balkan Alliance. At the reception, Ambassador Jovanović had a long discussion with Ministers Köprülü and Stephanopoulos, who showed him a copy of the joint declaration, which they planned to announce that afternoon on January 29. It stated that there was a friendship with Yugoslavia and that the cooperation would continue. It was concluded that they should enter into a tripartite agreement, but for now, not military but rather an agreement of friendship that in the future would expand. As a reason for such an agreement, they said they did not need to seek NATO’s approval and that the agreement would be extended to military matters when resolved with NATO. Thus, at that time, it became clear that the Yugoslav approaching to the West reached its maximum.70 During February 1953, Western representatives tried to focus on the Italian question because of the consequences it had on the Trieste’s status and the question of Yugoslavia’s attitude toward NATO. So on February 3, Jakša Petrić, from the Yugoslav Embassy in London, talked with MacLachlan, political editor of the Economist. Petrić expressed a number of opinions, such as a proposal to organize a meeting of De Gasperi and Tito, because it was the best way to solve problems. Furthermore, he said that the Italians were angry with the British because they thought that the United Kingdom provided excessive support to Yugoslavia. In addition, the Italians were not reconciled with the fact that they were banned from North Africa, since they wanted to be one of the leading powers in the Mediterranean. MacLachlan said to Petrić that he himself could not clarify how relations between Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece would be harmonized, having in mind that Yugoslavia was not a member of NATO.71 In addition, Undersecretary of the Foreign Office Dixon Pearson came to Rome with a confidential mission. He tried to persuade De Gasperi that there was a need for Italy and Yugoslavia to agree on the issue of the Free Territory of Trieste.72 In respect to that, during the talks between De Gasperi and the US Secretary of State Dulles, De Gasperi suggested that Zone A should be given to Italy with the condition that Yugoslavia receive a free zone in Trieste and Zone B would be placed under joint administration of Italy, Yugoslavia, and the United States. Italian State Secretary De Conela handed over a memorandum to the Americans on the issue of Trieste and Italian aspirations that was written by the “Centro Studi Adriatici,” by which Italy sought natural, historical, and ethnic boundaries in the Julian Alps, Mount Velebit, and the Dinaric Alps. Dulles said to De Gasperi that



The Balkan Treaty 69

Yugoslavia would not accept the proposed solution and suggested that ways be found to come to direct negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia and to make a long-term agreement of friendship, after which it would progress to cooperation on military planning, like in the Greek-Turkish case.73 During that period, a final picture of the future Balkan Alliance started to emerge. Namely, Italy’s, Greece’s, and Turkey’s positions as members of NATO and Yugoslavia as a state outside of NATO influenced the United States to approve the alliance as a political agreement, not as a military alliance.74 In Moscow, there was no reaction yet, but everyone expected a very sharp reaction.75 Soon after Köprülü returned home, Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos arrived in Belgrade on February 3, 1953, where he had a meeting with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović, whom he introduced with a mutual platform of Greek and Turkish governments. By the end of the visit, on February 8, a mutual platform of the future treaty of the three Balkan states had been established. This platform, by its content, was planned to be an agreement of friendship and nonaggression, which represented an important exception from, until then, the always present aspirations of Greece and especially Turkey, to sign a military alliance that would reduce the risk of aggression coming from the Eastern European countries.76 After talks with Popović, Stephanopoulos went to Brioni Isles77 to meet Tito, who reacted very strongly to the sudden turnaround in the Greco-Turkish position.78 At the same time, according to the report of the Yugoslav military envoy to Athens, Vojvodić, the change was caused by pressure from NATO and the Americans, not Greek or Turkish initiatives79 and that the Americans warned Greece that they should not rush into the military pact.80 Yugoslav talks with Stephanopoulos were related to the same issues as with Köprülü. All three countries agreed that their safety and peace required their cooperation in the future political agreement. The agreement should reflect the characteristics of the Balkan situation—the fact that the two countries had obligations to NATO and the third did not want to join NATO. The agreement was left open for subsequent access to other countries under the same conditions. It had been decided that the agreement should not be delayed and that it would be signed probably at the end of February 1953. Tripartite talks between the representatives of the three armies would take place simultaneously.81 Therefore, through the visits of the foreign ministers of Turkey and Greece, preliminary agreements had been carried out, as well as the preparation for the conclusion of the agreement. At the beginning of February, Ljubomir Radovanović, Yugoslav ambassador in Ankara, met with the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Köprülü, and the undersecretary of the ministry of foreign affairs, Nuri Birgi. The signing

70

Chapter Four

of an agreement was supposed to be in Ankara. Ankara would then welcome the Ministers Popović and Stephanopoulos. Köprülü said that the military talks would be conducted on a tripartite manner with the provision that on certain issues the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and France could participate as well, which would represent a Balkan cooperation with NATO allies. The entire diplomatic corps in Turkey received very favorable news about the agreement. Even the Italian ambassador reacted favorably, since that represented an opportunity for them to collaborate. During the talks, Köprülü stated several remarks from the talks with the Soviet ambassador on the reception in Athens. The ambassador said that the Soviet Union was dissatisfied with these actions, because it represented the encirclement of the Soviet Union, and Köprülü said that this agreement was directed against aggression from whichever side it came. If the USSR was in favor of peace, then it had no reason to be against the agreement.82 Turkish President Bayar expressed his satisfaction because the agreement was reached, and the US ambassador congratulated him on their results and that his government approved further work on the agreement.83 On February 19 in Turkish and Yugoslav embassies in Athens, Ambassadors Mostras, Taraj, and Jovanović continued to refine the regulations of future agreement. Work was initiated despite the initial difficulties, delays, and speculations.84 The ambassadors suggested the title Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. Mostras and Taraj had categorically demanded that their attitude toward NATO be entered into an agreement. Article 4 of the Greek proposal states that the contracting parties, in case one of them were attacked, would provide mutual support within the provisions of the UN and that the NATO member states would retain the right to regulate their actions, taking into account their obligations under the aforementioned organization. This formulation had not been acceptable for the Yugoslav side.85 Composition of the project contract was completed in the afternoon of February 21, 1953. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović arrived in Athens, from where on February 25, 1953, he reported to Tito that they had established the text of the agreement and that all the difficulties, mainly caused by American and British influence, had been successfully removed.86 A formal signing of the agreement was performed on February 28 in Ankara. Foreign Ministers Popović, Stephanopoulos, and Köprülü signed the document named the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey, also known as the Ankara Agreement or the Treaty of Ankara.87 In Ankara, on the eve of the signing the Treaty of Ankara, from February 17 through 20, 1953, high military delegations from Turkey, Greece, and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) held their first conference.88



The Balkan Treaty 71

As expected, international reactions were different. The press in the Cominform countries was unanimous in the assessment. Czechoslovakia characterized the Ankara Agreement as “a Balkan war triangle,”89 and Moscow described it as a “block instigator of the war in the Balkans,”90 in Bucharest; they stated the alleged differences between member states and their “masters” (i.e., the United States and the United Kingdom).91 Western reactions were, of course, far more positive. The Israeli press stated that the Ankara Agreement diminished the possibility of Soviet aggression.92 Favorable responses came from Washington, D.C.,93 and Bonn,94 while the Yugoslav Embassy in London received a personal congratulation from Anthony Eden.95 FROM ANKARA TO BLED During the period after the signing of the agreement, a question of relations between the Balkan Alliance and NATO emerged. Although Yugoslavia was against the conclusions being submitted to the approval of NATO, embassies of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France handed over a memorandum to the Greek ministry of foreign affairs in which they requested that Greece and Turkey submit a declaration to the Permanent Council of Ministers of NATO concerning the Balkan Pact. The declaration should have stated that the tripartite agreement was not in contradiction with NATO, that all of the conclusions of the three countries’ national general staffs would be submitted for approval to the commander of NATO forces, General Ridgeway, before the approval of the three governments and according to NATO’s Article 4. It stated that in case of a Soviet attack on any of the countries within the Balkan Alliance, that country was obliged immediately to notify NATO. The same memorandum was submitted to Ankara, but the Turks refused it categorically.96 This small crisis was overcome when the Turks and Greeks made a declaration in which they stated that the Ankara Agreement did not represent the extension of NATO and that previously received commitments from NATO had not been changed by signing the Ankara Agreement. Any military agreement that would affect the NATO plan would be submitted for official NATO approval.97 The immediate threat of a Soviet attack in real terms existed after the publication of the Cominform Resolution at the end of June 1948 and during 1949, but the war conflict in Korea had reduced the danger to the level of political threats. With Stalin’s death, this danger had actually been removed. A Soviet initiative for the normalization of the Yugoslav-Soviet relationship soon followed. Efforts of the Soviet leadership to restore their positions in Yugoslavia had strengthened the confidence and political position of Josip Broz Tito during the negotiations on the military part of the Balkan Pact.98

72

Chapter Four

In March 1953, Tito’s visit to the United Kingdom had a great impact on Yugoslavia’s international position. This visit represented Tito’s personal exit from diplomatic isolation in which he fell after the conflict with Stalin. During this visit, Tito met with Sir Winston Churchill, and their talks were focused on political and military-strategic aspects of cooperation in the defense of the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean (i.e., the southern flank of NATO).99 Also in March 1953, a meeting of permanent delegates of NATO was organized in Paris. Greek and Turkish delegates at the meeting gave information concerning the Ankara Agreement. A Greek delegate explained the Ankara Agreement, presented its provisions, the meaning of cooperation, the defensive character of the accession clause, and the attitude toward NATO. Italians were interested in the relationship of military cooperation of the Balkan allies toward NATO and how Greece and Turkey were providing information to NATO on military matters. In response, the Turkish delegate said that military cooperation with Yugoslavia had been provided under the terms of their obligations to NATO and that the provisions of the contract regulated it. Greece and Turkey would continue to provide NATO with military intelligence and information relating to Yugoslavia, only by consent of Yugoslavia in previously designated form. Other delegates were satisfied with the presentation of the Greek and Turkish delegates and did not ask any specific question. It had been accepted that the Ankara Agreement opened wide perspectives for further development.100 In early April, Admiral Carney visited Athens. In diplomatic circles, it was thought that his stay had to be in relation to the plans for the defense of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey.101 Turkey had been the loudest proponent of attaching the Balkan Alliance to NATO. Turkey planned formally to propose that at the next tripartite meeting, the delegates of NATO should be present as well. In late April, the Yugoslavs rejected this proposal, as well as another proposal that details and conclusions of the conference could be passed to the third party without the consent of all three countries.102 On May 9, 1953, during talks with the minister of foreign affairs, Koča Popović, the Turkish ambassador in Belgrade, Aga Axel, asked for the Yugoslav government’s opinion on the issue of closer cooperation between representatives of the Ankara Treaty and NATO representatives. According to the Turkish government, due to the lack of direct links with NATO, cooperation within the Treaty of Ankara was not at a satisfactory level and specific commitments could not be fulfilled. Koča Popović expressed that these reasons were not justified, and he remained of the opinion that all obligations under the Treaty of Ankara could be specified within the current framework. Popović considered that it was sufficient to work on the



The Balkan Treaty 73

expansion of the forces that wanted to cooperate in the defense against aggression, and in that sense, influence the satellite and the Arab countries.103 Several days later, on May 13, the official position of the Yugoslav government regarding the presence of NATO at the next meeting of three representatives of the general staff was repeated to Axel. Additionally, it was said that Yugoslavia was not obliged by any other treaty and was free to accept any agreement. On the other hand, Greece and Turkey could arrange in advance with their NATO partners before the definitive adoption of the obligations under the tripartite agreement. Axel did not agree with these views in which he saw serious technical complications if they were to be operated separately from the Western powers. He also criticized Yugoslavia’s refusal to consider joining NATO. According to him, the situation was clear: on one side was NATO, who could defend the sovereignty of each member, while on the other side were countries of the Soviet Bloc that should not have been taken into consideration, because they would never separate from the USSR.104 After the formation of the Balkan Pact, the West also began to search for modalities to link the Balkan Pact with NATO. During the visit of the US Secretary of State Dulles to Ankara and Athens, at the end of May 1953, one of the topics was the relationship between NATO and the Balkan Pact. During talks in Ankara, Dulles underlined three main obstacles: •  Italian-Yugoslav relations needed to be improved. •  The negative attitude of Scandinavian NATO members who believed that “the Northern flank of NATO” was unjustifiably neglected in favor of “the Southern flank.” •  The American public opinion that was anxious because of contempt of religion in Communist Yugoslavia. After Ankara, Dulles visited Athens, where he had talks with his Greek colleague Stephanopoulos, Dulles expressed doubts about the sincerity of the Yugoslavs in their binding with the West.105 On June 12, 1953, the president of the Greek government, Marshal Papagos, recommended for Italy and Yugoslavia to put aside their differences and try to reach a mutual agreement on the defense pact against the Soviet Union, which the example of the three Balkan allies showed could be achieved.106 In early June, the Turkish ambassador in Athens, Taraj proposed the establishment of a permanent political body of the Balkan Pact, something similar to bodies already existing in Western Europe, which would be called the political bureau, council, or committee. At its head would be the secretary general, who every second or third year, would be alternately changed. He said that it was irrelevant where the seat of the body would be. Yugoslav Ambassador

74

Chapter Four

Jovanović said that he liked this idea and that it should take place at the upcoming meeting of three ministers.107 The first meeting of the military representatives of the Balkan allies, after the signing of an agreement in Ankara, was held in Athens from June 3 through June 12, 1953. FIRST CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ATHENS, JULY 1953 Military cooperation between the Balkan allies was constantly in the shadow of diplomacy and changes in international relations. In the second half of June, Greek Prime Minister Papagos visited Ankara. The visit was used as an opportunity to emphasize the Greco-Turkish friendship and to stop an embarrassing campaign in the press, and especially to manifest Atlantic unity. In the official communiqué, the Treaty of Ankara was mentioned as a “necessary link in the chain of collective security.” Talks were focused on the needs of an expansion of military, political, and economic tripartite cooperation, and providing the “backrest” of the Balkan Treaty on NATO in a way that would be realistic and thus enhance the effectiveness of the treaty itself. Yugoslav officials noted that the communiqué from the meeting was entirely devoted to NATO and “[gave] the impression as they are defending themselves against complaints that the Balkan contract had influenced their commitment to NATO.” 108 Greek officials said that the tripartite declaration had strong reverberations throughout the world and that the conference of three foreign ministers, scheduled for July 7, would have great importance. It was also said that Greece and Turkey should enter into military cooperation with Yugoslavia as much as NATO itself.109 Soviet efforts for normalizing relations with Turkey created distrust among the allies. Namely, the Soviets offered Turkey a declaration of renunciation of all former aspirations for Kars and Ardahan. The Turkish attitude toward this declaration was positive. The Soviet attempt took place in parallel with Western efforts to strengthen the Atlantic and the newly established Balkan connections. The Greek officials were especially skeptical. They were suspicious of Turkish reluctance about creating a joint defense plan and filing a joint request to increase the supply of war materials to three Balkan countries.110 Next in line was the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and its preparation was given the most attention in all of the three ministries. The venue of the meeting was Athens; however, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović did not attend the meeting due to illness, which threw a shadow on the entire event. Undersecretary Aleš Bebler replaced Popović.111 The absence of Koča Popović was interpreted by the observers and participants as “political illness,” and the meeting began with a degree of skepticism.



The Balkan Treaty 75

At the meeting the followed was done: •  The report on the work of military delegations was accepted, and it was decided that three national general staffs would develop a concrete plan of action. •  The establishment of a special commission that would investigate the possibility of the expansion of mutual economic and cultural cooperation. •  The establishment of the Permanent Secretariat, which would study and provide recommendations to governments on major issues of political and cultural cooperation. On July 11, a joint statement was issued, filled with diplomatic rhetoric. However, the lack of concrete agreement on the important issues of tripartite cooperation was disappointing to analysts. Changes in the Soviet Union were also discussed, but there was a different interpretation of their significance, especially between the Yugoslav and Turkish delegations. Therefore, the opinion prevailed that due to recent changes in Moscow, it was better to wait before aligning the common positions and actions. After the meeting, it was clear that further cooperation in the Balkan Pact would run much more slowly.112 The existing question of creating a Permanent Secretariat remained open for further agreement.113 The meeting of NATO, which was held on July 15, in Paris, as a whole was dedicated to the results of the Balkan Conference, according to a Yugoslav diplomatic source. On that occasion, the Italians acted aggressively and according to their request, another meeting should have been devoted to these issues.114 Based on reports from Ankara on the attitudes of Turkey and Greece after the Athens conference, people gained the impression that the Turkish government, in many things, had changed its political views in the period between the tripartite declaration and the Athens conference. The change of attitude was especially evident in relation to changes in the Soviet Union and its peace initiative, as well as in cooperation with NATO, while the Turks in both cases came closer to the Yugoslav attitude. The Turks left their previous attitude of underestimating the peace initiatives of Moscow. Turkish representatives left their previous position that the accession of Yugoslavia to NATO was the best way. In military matters, the differences between Greeks and Turks had clearly manifested in Athens. The Turks did not support the Greek’s proposal for the formation of a joint military body. This attitude was not caused by a lack of interest for military cooperation but rather by a different view and different interests in the partnership. On the one hand, for the Turks, the biggest problem was the defense of Thrace, and over this issue they had already negotiated with NATO together with the Greeks. On the other hand, to the Greeks the basic problem was the

76

Chapter Four

defense of the Greek-Yugoslav border, which was the matter outside of the framework of general strategic plans of the entire Balkan region. Because of that, the Greeks believed that it could be solved through Yugoslav-Greek bipartite military talks. Impressions started to emerge that the Turks observed the Treaty of Ankara much more widely than the Greeks, to whom the main problem was the defense of the Greek-Yugoslav border. Turks understood the problem as a broader military cooperation in the Balkan sector as a whole, regardless of the junctions of individual fronts.115 Because the defense issues were in the second plan, the Greeks qualified the conference as unsuccessful.116 The press in the United States said that the conference confirmed that Tito refused “to join NATO.”117 Moscow’s press wrote that the Balkan Pact was an integral part of NATO and that in Athens, there had “been masked a military orientation of the negotiations.”118 In that moment, the United States started to project its short- and longterm policies concerning relations with Yugoslavia. For US policy makers, the long-term objective was Yugoslav membership in NATO. According to them, that could be achieved by encouragement of closer ties between Yugoslavia and the nations of the free world, primarily to strengthen the Western defense, but also as a mean to influence foreign and domestic policies of Tito’s regime. Effective Yugoslav integration into the Western defense system should be achieved. The United States’ encouragement of closer cooperation among Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey should be considered as the initial step, provided that the interests and obligations of Greece and Turkey toward NATO were not compromised.119 However, although there was an official stand that Yugoslavia’s geographic position and its armed forces should be exploited for the defense of NATO areas in Greece and Italy, US military officials in the southern command were concerned because of a lack of formal assurances of Yugoslavia’s direct contributions to NATO’s defense plans. Because of the existing Trieste issue, their advice was that, for the present, this could be achieved outside NATO channels.120 During the fall of 1953, Italy started to be mentioned often in connection with the Balkan allies. Among other things, in Italy, there had been a shift in power. Instead of De Gasperi, who lost the elections, the prime minister became Giuseppe Pella. In the second half of September 1953, Greek Prime Minister Papagos visited Rome, which the Yugoslavs interpreted as a gesture of support for Italy.121 Soon after, on October 8, a decision was reached that the Allied forces were to leave the Free Territory of Trieste, resulting in a new crisis in relations between Yugoslavia and the West. Yugoslav leadership considered this sudden decision as a preparation for the definite handover of Trieste to Italy. A diplomatic initiative had been launched to convene the



The Balkan Treaty 77

Quadripartite Conference (i.e., the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, and Yugoslavia) to involve the Security Council and to meet with American officials. Therefore, Koča Popović traveled to Washington, D.C., where he met with US Secretary of State Dulles.122 When Italian Prime Minister Pella visited Turkey in November 1953, the Yugoslav suspicion had just increased. It was believed that the aim of the visit was undermining the Turkish Republic’s confidence toward Yugoslavia.123 A further step toward a better functioning of the Treaty of Ankara was supposed to be the formation of the permanent secretariat. According to the Yugoslav point of view, it had not envisioned that the secretariat would deal with military matters but instead would have the opportunity to provide initiatives for military talks. The Greeks believed that according to the needs, military personnel could attend meetings on an ad-hoc basis.124 The Supplemental Agreement to the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation of the three countries was signed in Belgrade on November 7, 1953, which marked the realization of Yugoslavia’s initiative to create a permanent political body—the Permanent Secretariat.125 Although it was envisaged that the Permanent Secretariat would consist of four commissions (i.e., political, economic, cultural, and military), it was noticed that there was no willingness expressed by all three allies for the efficient functioning of this body and its committees. The agreement alleviated the attempt of drawing Yugoslavia into NATO, because it represented a milder variant of the Greek-Turkish proposal for the establishment of the military committee, with which the Yugoslavs had not agreed. It was accepted that this was a step on the road to full military alliance but not to inclusion in NATO.126 The third conference of military representatives of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey was held in Belgrade from November 10 through November 20, 1953. US officials viewed that the conclusion of the Ankara friendship pact had materially increased military significance and the reliability of Yugoslavia in the case of Soviet-satellite aggression. They also believed that through these arrangements, Tito and his regime hoped to gain some advantages of NATO membership without formally joining. The Washington, D.C., conference and the revealing of some of the most closely kept secrets showed clearly that Yugoslavia was ready to enter into strategic planning with NATO commanders. However, the Yugoslav regime was opposed to any great Western interference in internal affairs. These were the basics of Tito’s policy toward the West.127 Further extension of the Treaty of Ankara, that is, its evolution into the military alliance, became increasingly dependent not so much from the attitude of Italy but from the solution of the Trieste issue, tying it with Yugoslavia’s inclusion in NATO. In late December, Belgrade received a similar diplomatic

78

Chapter Four

message. The Turkish ambassador in Belgrade, Axel, believed that the solution of the Trieste issue represented an obstacle to the conclusion of a military alliance. It was reported from Ankara that despite satisfaction with the progress in military negotiations, a certain number of NATO members were not satisfied with the Balkan Pact because their own policy against Yugoslavia and the solving of Trieste issue. They needed to find a way to bind the Balkan Alliance for NATO since the Greeks and Turks were not able to submit information they received from the Yugoslavs. One of the officials of the French Embassy in Belgrade said that it was not necessary for Yugoslavia to join NATO but that it was important to arrange with SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe, known as the headquarters of NATO). The British ambassador in Belgrade, Helm was the most direct. He said that the resolution of the Trieste issue would make it easier for Yugoslavs to connect with NATO and to continue to work on the Balkan Alliance.128 Greek Prime Minister Papagos and the Greek government had agreed to sign a tripartite military pact as a continuation of the Treaty of Ankara. However, in this case, the Greek government would previously have had to perform a small inquiry at the leading members of NATO, especially those in the United States.129 TOWARD THE MILITARY ALLIANCE AND CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN 1954 In early 1954, Yugoslavia had shown a willingness to cooperate with the West but without joining NATO in order not to provoke Moscow. In this way, while building the road for independent operating in the current conflict between the East and West, Yugoslavia could avoid specific commitments. Relations between Yugoslavia and the West went in the direction of efforts to overcome the “Trieste crisis,” to obtain economic assistance, and to add a defense dimension to the Treaty of Ankara. By the end of 1953, Yugoslavia received $250 million in economic assistance, and in 1954, $60 million more was planned.130 In January 1954 in London, Ambassador Velebit and his Italian counterpart, Brosio, began negotiations with the mediation of the Foreign Office and the US Embassy in London. However, in February, the government of Prime Minister Giuseppe Pella had fallen, and Mario Schelba composed a new one.131 Negotiations on economic assistance and the resolution of the Trieste issue were very dependent on one other. Postponing a solution of the Trieste issue negatively reflected on further Yugoslav economic cooperation with Western countries.132 Meanwhile, US officials continued with the policy of supporting Tito, not forgetting that “Yugoslavia remains a Communist dictatorship with the strength and stability of the regime due in large measure



The Balkan Treaty 79

to Tito’s dominant position.” The Balkan Pact, or Yugoslav-Turkish-Greek Entente, was a means of weakening Soviet power in the Balkans and as an example to the other Balkan nations. The existence of the Balkan Pact should be exploited and development encouraged.133 In addition, US officials considered the Balkan Pact would increase its importance, especially in political and military spheres. As long as Yugoslavia stayed out of NATO, the Balkan Pact would be “one of the basic instruments through which Tito will seek to enhance his prestige and respectability both internally and internationally and to gain a certain measure of indirect participation in NATO planning.” It would also strengthen the trend toward a closer Yugoslav identification with the West, as opposed to the third-power concept.134 Ideological signals from internal party relations in Yugoslavia had further complicated the Yugoslav foreign policy positions. The Đilas case stirred the spirits among Yugoslav Communists, despite assurances that Yugoslavia would not worsen relations with the West or return to the circle of Soviet satellites. From the Yugoslav point of view, the whole case represented a threat to the unity of the country and its defensive power, although campaigning under the pretext of the struggle for democratization and liberalization.135 In mid-January 1954, the Turkish side reiterated its earlier stance that it: •  Expected further extension in the direction of the Alliance. •  Expected continuation of the work of “soldiers.” •  Respected Yugoslavia’s attitude toward NATO. •  Expected that the defense plans of the Balkans should be coordinated with NATO. •  Expected the Trieste issue to be left aside as a conditio sine qua non for further cooperation with NATO.136 Led by General Hamović, the Yugoslav military delegation visited Greece in January 1954, and in February and March 1954, the Greek side paid return visits. The Yugoslav military delegation, headed by General Hamović, also visited Turkey. Greek Prime Minister Papagos visited France and the Netherlands in January, and talks with him during his journey through Yugoslavia were an opportunity to assess views of the Balkan relations among NATO allies. According to the reports of Yugoslav diplomats, the Greeks estimated that the Yugoslav policy of approaching the West was sincere and that a return to the Cominform was not likely. They also highlighted France’s positive comments about the Balkan Alliance.137 However, the Trieste issue and the US position still had a huge influence on further inter-Balkan bonding, bringing it to a serious deadlock. Not incidentally, the Greek and Turkish diplomats in London and the Turkish

80

Chapter Four

diplomats in Washington, D.C., had suggested the inclusion of Yugoslavia in NATO, because remaining outside NATO prevented better cooperation.138 In their statements, representatives of the United States emphasized the issue of Trieste. Any strengthening of relations between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey was welcomed, but the Trieste crisis temporarily impeded cooperation.139 For the same reason, for US officials Yugoslav’s joining NATO was not probable in the near future. For them, military planning with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as Yugoslavia’s participation in the Treaty of Ankara provided the means of tying Yugoslavia into Western plans for regional defense.140 On the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Ankara, February 28, 1954, the foreign ministers of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey exchanged telegrams, emphasizing further improvement of cooperation.141 Soon after, the Fourth Conference of Military Experts was held in Ankara from March 24 until April 1. Among the allies themselves, there were some disputes; primarily it was the Cyprus issue in the relations between Greeks and Turks. At one point, the Greek side tried to gain the support of the Yugoslavs by making an analogy to the Trieste issue.142 Difficulties emerged between the Yugoslavs and Greeks over the free zone in the port of Thessalonica, which was important for the Yugoslav economy,143 as well as the writing of the press in the Yugoslav federal unit—the Republic of Macedonia—which had insulted all that is Greek, according to the Greeks, and thus hindered the establishment of good relations.144 The Yugoslav authorities were frowned on because of the visit of German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to Greece and Turkey in early April 1954. Yugoslavia had been bypassed.145 The crisis in relations between the Balkan allies had been removed by the Yugoslav diplomatic offensive in the spring and summer of 1954, when Yugoslav President Tito visited Turkey and Greece.146 TITO’S DIPLOMATIC BREAKOUT: VISITS TO TURKEY AND GREECE Tito’s visit to Turkey had been planned during 1953. A large number of exchanges of notes, suggestions, and elements related to the protocol preceded the visit itself. Preparations were needed to collect materials (e.g., Tito’s speech on the foreign policy of Yugoslavia and the importance of the Balkan Pact, newsreels, etc.). In addition, special correspondents of major Yugoslav newspapers were sent to Turkey.147 However, the visit was postponed for the next year and coincided with NATO’s anniversary. The official Yugoslav



The Balkan Treaty

81

stance was that the anniversary should be given a moderate and balanced approach.148 The Turkish officials considered the visit of the Yugoslav president as an important catalyst for further development of the Balkan Alliance and an exit from a specific dead end.149 The visit was planned from April 12 through April 18, 1954. Josip Broz Tito had talks with President Bayar on April 13. During the talks, he launched into a series of questions related to the Berlin Conference, the Yugoslav refusal of formal accession to NATO with the modalities of the Yugoslav positions, the European Defense Community (EDC), the Treaty of Ankara (further extension toward the conclusion of a military pact), and the Trieste issue. President Bayar spoke about Turkish participation in the Treaty of Ankara, the Turkish-Pakistani Pact, and the issue of Trieste. Minister of Foreign Affairs Köprülü confirmed the consent of the two presidents in the assessment of the international situation and that NATO and the Treaty of Ankara were the basis for Turkey’s foreign policy.150 Tito’s initiative went toward further development of the Treaty of Ankara and full military alliance, without Yugoslavia’s entry into NATO, but with a cooperative approach to the project of the EDC. Tito said that the Yugoslav attitude toward NATO was not eternal and that in case of danger from aggression from the East, Yugoslavia was ready to adjust its position in accordance with the situation and needs of Europe’s defense.151 Foreign ministers conducted their talks on April 17. Yugoslav Minister Koča Popović stressed the need for revisions to the conference of ministers of foreign affairs for creation of the Permanent Secretariat, further talks over the Yugoslav-Turkish economic cooperation, and the creation of the Balkan Institute, as well over issues of the European Economic Community. Turkish Minister Birgi spoke of Tito’s position concerning Yugoslavia’s attitude toward NATO.152 Since the Trieste issue represented a major obstacle to turning the Treaty of Ankara into a military pact, the Yugoslav side was able to convince the host that the problem’s resolution was in progress and expected to be near the signing of the agreement.153 A publicly stated commitment that the Treaty of Ankara would grow into a military pact led to a stormy reaction the international community. The Americans were the first to express surprise and frustration. They briefly reported that the decision to create a military pact was in contradiction with the State Department’s policy. What’s more, prior to that, they had Turkish assurances that such an outcome would not occur. At that time, such development did not suit US policy in any scenario. Simultaneously, the negotiations about Trieste were in progress, and the Italian parliament was to ratify the agreement of the EDC. Successful resolution of these problems had opened the door for Italy into the Balkan Alliance, which would reduce the role of Yugoslavia, and firmly link the Treaty of Ankara to

82

Chapter Four

NATO.154 The views expressed in Ankara caused an outcry in Greece because they were presented without their participation and input.155 On April 20, there was a meeting in the State Department concerning the Treaty of Ankara. Italian diplomat Dr. Mario Lucioli objected strenuously to the statement of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović regarding an agreement to extend the Balkan Alliance into a full military alliance.156 However, despite official statements about the firm allied relations there had been a certain dose of distrust. The Greek ambassador to the FPRY, Kapetanides, visited the Yugoslav ministry of foreign sffairs during Tito’s visit to Ankara and inquired about the progress of the Ankara talks.157 Ambassador Kapetanides received concrete information the following week on April 24, 1954, personally from Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović. Popović had underlined the cordiality of reception they had received, that the talks took place “with the full sense of the participation of the third partner—the Greeks,” and that nobody could prevent “fruitful tripartite cooperation,” by what he thought of as malicious interpretations coming from Italy. Kapetanides pointed out certain surprises in Athens “because of lack of coordination,” due to comments that Greece, as a promoter of triple cooperation, was “now getting behind.” Popović had admitted that more could be done in terms of informing the Greeks but that all the texts and statements in this regard were completely clear and unambiguous.158 Tito’s visit to Turkey was the subject of negative comments in the newspaper Novoe Vremja. Soviets expressed that the initiative to transform the Treaty of Ankara into a military alliance came from Yugoslavia under US pressure that the initiative was a demonstration of Washington, D.C., and that the goal was the transformation of the Balkans into the US offensive base. In contrast, from Washington, D.C., arrived news that the Balkan cooperation was not paid much attention in the media and that the United States did not want to further strengthen the Balkan Pact because of unresolved issues with Italy over Trieste. Tito submitted a report about the visit to Turkey to the Federal Executive Council (federal government) on April 27, 1954. When he reviewed the “political” part of his visit, he stressed the effort to preserve Yugoslav “independence” and spoke on subjects about which he had talks with the Turkish president.159 Tito’s visit to Turkey happened under complex international circumstances and was accompanied by speculation about further development of the Treaty of Ankara. Italians were leading negative media campaigns with speculation by presenting comments regarding doubts over the sincerity of Yugoslavia approaching the West and pointing out the lack of Yugoslav criticism toward the East. Also, Italians were using the EDC argument, that is, the refusal to ratify the agreement in the case of Yugoslavia gaining advantage in the Western defense system, which started to echo in the US State Department, where



The Balkan Treaty

83

they had already begun to realize the Yugoslav insistence on neutrality.160 In May, a clearer picture emerged regarding the attitudes of the West over the development of the Treaty of Ankara into a full military alliance. Western representatives, especially the British, on several occasions mentioned that they evaluated positively the creation of the Balkan Pact but that the timing was not right and that they should wait for the solution of the Trieste issue. The British ambassador to Yugoslavia, Ivo Mallet, pointed to the need for Yugoslavia to join the EDC. Although from the Greek and Turkish points of view, joining the military alliance was only a matter of time. There was a feeling of restraint caused by the Americans. Using diplomatic pressure, they tried to postpone the conclusion of an alliance. Namely, US ambassadors in Belgrade and Athens were instructed to make official démarches whose main purpose were to influence the Greek and Yugoslav governments to restrain themselves on the subject of a Balkan military alliance. Despite the fact that the United States supported creating close relations among Balkan nations, they considered that hasty progress would endanger the resolution of the Trieste issue. In light of Tito’s expected visit to Athens, both Marshal Tito and Marshal Papagos had been advised to limit themselves to general statements.161 At the same time, Greek diplomats repeated that the unpleasant impression had been caused by the fact that Greece had not been consulted over the content of the discussion regarding the transformation of the Treaty of Ankara to a military alliance and that Greece would be in favor of delaying the signing of military obligations. At the same time, Greek diplomats had been investigating the possibility of Greece’s counting on Yugoslavia’s support regarding the Cyprus issue.162 However, US officials considered that progress in the Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish Entente would force the United States to take a position about the relation between this alliance and Greek and Turkish commitments under NATO. Also, an issue of associating Yugoslavia informally with appropriate NATO commands existed. Because they were expecting Italian opposition to these efforts, US officials counted on further Yugoslav influence on the Balkan satellites. Their conclusion was that if the Trieste issue could not be resolved through a negotiated settlement, it would be difficult to prevent a military alliance between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, since they considered it vital for their own national security. In general, further integration of Yugoslav military potential in the Western defense was vital for US interests.163 During a meeting at the State Department, Italian Ambassador Alberto Tarchiani expressed concern over the fact that the United States had not applied enough pressure in Ankara concerning the announcement of the imminent signing of the full military alliance. In addition, he stated that the Italian side believed that Tito did not want a solution to the Trieste issue. He pointed

84

Chapter Four

out the difficult situation for the Italian government over the questions of the European Defense Community, the budget, and some important bills.164 Meanwhile, in relation to further steps in implementing US policy toward Yugoslavia, the Balkan military alliance had been pointed out as one of the “major problems.” A need for guidance “from higher authority on the question of the US’s attitude toward development of the Balkan Entente into a full military alliance . . . and the compatibility of such an alliance with Greek and Turkish commitments as NATO members” was indicted.165 On May 31 in London, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia signed the agreement for the settlement of the Trieste issue by dividing the two existing zones between Yugoslavia and Italy. It remained that the United States and the United Kingdom would press Italy to agree with this decision.166 Meanwhile, preparations for Tito’s visit to Greece were already under way.167 Expectations of Tito’s visit were great. After the initial outcry over the statement and agreement that occurred during Tito’s visit to Turkey, where according to their own opinion, the Greeks had been omitted, their official representatives in NATO announced the continuation of the Ankara negotiations and the impending signing of the military agreement.168 The French expected the signing of the treaty in the near future, although they had been opposed to further military approaching of the Balkan allies.169 The Foreign Office did not expect the signing of the treaty during Tito’s visit to Greece but rather later, during the July meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs.170 The official Yugoslav visit to Greece happened from June 2 through June 6, 1954. In a similar atmosphere to that in Ankara, two marshals and Presidents Tito and Papagos held their talks. Papagos pointed out the need for friendship and converting the tripartite agreement into a military alliance. According to the Greek point of view, this alliance had not been related in any way to the Trieste issue, that any kind of aggression against one of the members also represented an attack on all three, and that the position of the alliance in relation to NATO or the EDC should be defined. At the end, he suggested the creation of the Consultative Assembly of the Balkan Nations. Tito confirmed the need for cooperation between the Balkan nations; he said that Yugoslavia did not use the Balkan treaty to strengthen its position in the Trieste issue and that the ministers of foreign affairs and experts should work toward creating the military alliance. He then moved to general questions about the dangers of aggression and the Soviet policy after Stalin’s death, which according to him had only changed form. He also addressed Papagos’s proposal on cooperation in the Balkans and the relationship with NATO that came down to the refusal of accession, but also for understanding the existence of such organizations,



The Balkan Treaty

85

the need for cooperation, and even the possibility of entering NATO in case of an event in which the FPRY became extremely threatened.171 While in Athens, Papagos and Tito had official talks, and Turkish Prime Minister Menderes visited the United States, where he met with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. One of the reasons for his visit was the eventual consent of the United States for Turkey and Greece to sign a military treaty with Yugoslavia. Again, the problem arose about the modalities of the fulfillment of allied obligations in case of an execution of the military agreement. The problem represented the issue of how Greece and Turkey, as NATO members, would respond in the case of Yugoslavia’s attacking Italy. Americans took advantage of the Turkish economic difficulties and exerted a strong pressure on Menderes to slow down the signing of any military agreement.172 A turnaround happened at that time. Turks, unlike the Greeks, who were showing a cooperative approach, became very restrained. The same question, a potential Yugoslav attack against Italy, appeared in the New York Times, which led to sharp reactions from the Yugoslav embassy, which in protest said the historical fact was that Yugoslavia had never attacked Italy.173 A joint communiqué from the Tito-Papagos talks was supposed to satisfy NATO and build a harmonious tripartite formula for further political and military agreement, which Turkey agreed with through its ambassador in Athens. Marshal Papagos proposed the formation of the Triple Consultative Assembly, which would consist of an equal number of members of parliaments in the three countries. Tito agreed with this proposal, because thus, the military aspect of the talks had been mitigated and given the political character that suited both the presidents.174 The American press in June 1954 was more positive than during Tito’s visit to Turkey earlier, especially in terms of the three countries’ commitment to signing a military alliance; the New York Times commented that Tito’s visit represented a strengthening of the front against aggression.175 Tito’s visits to Turkey and Greece represented the continuation of the Yugoslav president’s international diplomatic activities that began after Stalin’s death.176 The connectedness of Tito’s visit to Turkey and Greece were beyond doubt; each trip was one part of Tito’s entire diplomatic activity during the spring of 1954. The results of Yugoslavia’s strengthened position in international relations were evident. Visits represented a step forward toward further refinement and development of the Balkan Pact in the direction of Yugoslav interests and the relation of Yugoslavia with the West, as well as future relations with the the new rulers in Moscow. Experiences from these visits were important for building Tito’s diplomatic abilities and capabilities, which would undoubtedly express their full strength in the years to come when he skillfully maneuvered between the East and West. For Yugoslavia, the near

86

Chapter Four

future represented the time of “hard negotiations and short-term compromises” over the Balkan Pact.177 The results of Tito’s visits to Ankara and Athens urged the US government to evaluate the present status of the Balkan Pact, the Italian position, and advancement toward full military alliance. Especially since June 29, when the drafting session in Athens began, US officials characterized the Balkan Pact as a “wonder drug injection to cure the old ills and provide friendship on a three-way basis.” The basic problems for the US government regarding the Balkan Pact were: •  Integration of the Balkan Pact into NATO in case of further Italian objections. •  Prevention of the Balkan Pact’s infringing on the Turkish and Greek responsibilities and obligations as NATO members. •  Obtaining Italian cooperation. •  Influence of the Balkan Pact on US commitments under NATO. A solution to these problems would make the Balkan Pact “advantageous to the cause of the West.” They also expected the successful end of the drafting sessions in Athens.178 “On the other side of the globe,” followed a period of normalizing Yugoslav relations with the USSR. On July 1, 1954, Tito received the Soviet Ambassador Valykov, who presented him with a letter from Khrushchev. Everything indicated that the Soviet Union urgently needed to normalize its relations with Yugoslavia to influence the upcoming decision to create the Balkan Alliance.179 In the period that followed, intense negotiations were held over the text of the agreement. The shadow of the unresolved Trieste issue flew hovered over this process. The US attitude had a great stake in all of this. Perhaps, this was best described by one interesting statement from an unnamed American official in June 1954, which the Israeli ambassador in Yugoslavia, Yoran, conveyed to Yugoslav officials. The American reportedly said, “We are aware that mother is pregnant and we know that the child will be born. We know that the child will be healthy, but still do not know whether it will be lawful or illegitimate.”180 During the process of drafting the agreement, there had been a number of disagreements. Thus, for example, the Yugoslav side had been “unpleasantly surprised” by the Greek text—it did not contain the core of the agreement. According to the provisions of this draft, the Yugoslav commitments to NATO were greater than those of the members of the alliance, the creation of some “transitional arrangement” was anticipated, etc.181 On the other hand,



The Balkan Treaty

87

Turkish officials showed indifference; they suggested the delay or had not submitted their proposals in time.182 The Turkish proposal had been characterized as a tool for the Yugoslav’s “pulling in,” while the Yugoslav side had de facto refused integration of the Balkan treaty into NATO.183 The talks held in Athens on June 28, 1954, revealed the different visions over key issues of activating of the allied obligations. Those were liabilities of Greece and Turkey in the event of aggression against the Yugoslav territory, which was unacceptable for Greece and Turkey, and Yugoslavia’s obligations toward Greece and Turkey, as members of NATO in the event that they be the first ones attacked, which was unacceptable for Yugoslavia.184 At the talks in Athens on July 5, disputes led to the interruption of the meeting, and it had been decided that the controversial parts of the contract would be harmonized by diplomatic means. The Greek proposal for the foreign ministers meeting on July 17 in Bled, where they would sign a treaty of alliance, was accepted.185 However, a new challenge followed. On July 7, Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü said to the Yugoslav diplomats in Ankara that the Italians requested to enter the Balkan Alliance and asked that the Yugoslav side consider this question.186 The Yugoslav side interpreted this request as intending to include Yugoslavia in the defensive system of NATO.187 US officials were already examining the question of Italian entrance into the Balkan Alliance and, from their point of view, the “desirability of Italian membership in the Balkan Pact” existed. Assumptions were that the resolution of the Trieste issue would be reached soon, that the Italian government would remain in democratic hands, and that the United States would favor Italian membership. They considered Italy as the most developed and industrialized country in the region and that the other three countries could supply it with raw materials and agricultural products. Italy was in a position that it could provide a bridge between the EDC and European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on one hand, and the Balkan Pact on the other, being a leader in the imagined southeastern European community.188 In July, Yugoslav military attaché to Athens, Vojvodić, met with General Dovas. Dovas said that the Greeks wanted a strong alliance but that they had a dilemma—a strong Balkan Alliance and weak links with NATO, or the solid position in NATO and a weak Balkan Alliance. He expressed his faith in the success of the conference and agreed that the issue of relations between the Balkan Alliance and other organizations would be discussed at the end.189 The Greeks were interested in the details of restoring full diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the visit of the new Soviet Ambassador Valykov to Tito. However, the Yugoslavs were very interested about the details of Papagos’s visit to West Germany and the content of the talks held there. Both remained deprived of the information.190

88

Chapter Four

On July 11, Turkey requested a postponement of the ministerial meeting under the pretext that the terms were unacceptable due to “administrative reasons.” The real reason was the United States pressured Turkey to postpone the meeting until the ambiguities in the negotiations related to the Trieste issue could be resolved, as well as finding the appropriate formula for cooperation with NATO.191 In Belgrade on July 14, it had been announced that the conference of ministers of the three countries was postponed due to insufficient time for its preparation.192 In this situation, Greece assumed the role of mediator by sending a message to Ankara and Belgrade. Marshal Papagos expressed concern because of “the unpleasant development of the negotiations,” stating that he sent the message to the president of Turkey, as well, in hopes that the date of the meeting would be established.193 Tito said that he understood the anxiety but was not fully convinced that it had been unavoidable, adding that the military alliance was necessary and that the meeting of ministers had to be precise. Taking into consideration the visit of the emperor of Ethiopia to Yugoslavia, it could happen around August 10.194 Again, different diplomatic combinations and nuances in connection with a military alliance became visible, although the United Kingdom, through its ambassador in Yugoslavia, Mallet, had claimed that their aim was not Yugoslav’s entrance into NATO and that the question of Trieste and the Balkan Alliance were separate issues.195 The main actors were still the United States and Italy. Both were determined to sign the agreement but only after the resolution of the Trieste issue, which would open the way for the Italian association to the Balkan Pact and its stronger binding to NATO. Therefore, the importance of Yugoslavia in the Balkan Pact would be reduced, and thus, it would get closer to joining NATO. Unlike Turkey, Greece did not stall or request some special conditions for entering into the military alliance.196 Military cooperation between the Greeks and Yugoslavs took place unhindered. According to the previous agreement, from June 9 through June 15 in the town of Strumica, the first conference of neighboring army commanders was held—Greek First and Yugoslav Third Army. These armies were supposed to achieve common action in defense of the sensitive Strumica direction. A month later, the second conference was held from July 27 to August 1, this time in Thessalonica. Despite the misunderstandings and diplomatic tactics, a meeting over certain specific arrangements for signing the alliance was more and more probable. In late July, the emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, paid in an official visit to Yugoslavia. His visit marked the start of more intensive Yugoslav cooperation with third-world countries. A former metalworker, Communist, and revolutionary, Josip Broz Tito quickly found common language with the African autocrat. Experience in the antifascist struggle and great suspicion over the Italian policy only helped their relationship to go beyond the relationship of two heads of state and turned into a long-lasting friendship. On the



The Balkan Treaty

89

example of relations with Ethiopia, one of the basic principles of Yugoslav’s foreign policy and policy of nonalignment clearly manifested later on—the principle of peaceful and active coexistence.197 CONFERENCE IN BLED, AUGUST 6–9, 1954, AND THE SIGNING OF THE MILITARY AGREEMENT Issues that preceded the signing of a military agreement, disagreements, and the influence of the great powers had been clearly demonstrated in Birgi’s statement, the secretary of the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs, on his journey to Bled. He said that Turkey’s postponing of the agreement’s signing had been caused due to waiting for NATO’s official opinion, adding that the Yugoslavs in relation to Italy were oversensitive.198 On the other hand, General Dovas expressed a firm determination to conclude an agreement during the meeting in Bled.199 In the circumstances, filled with misunderstandings, talks, and short-term compromises, a ministerial conference was held in Bled from August 6 through August 9, 1954, where a military alliance between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia was concluded.200 The Yugoslav proposal relating to the obligations had been accepted (i.e., Yugoslavia should be left to give a final word). With this, Yugoslavia succeeded in its intention that the Balkan Alliance should remain exclusively a defensive organization, independent of NATO and complying with the principles of the UN.201 In relation to the establishment of the Balkan Consultative Assembly, the Turkish and Greek sides remained aloof, pointing out that they did not have authorization over this issue and that it should be approved by both parliaments, which meant that the two NATO members would have been more interested in the military than in the political aspects of the cooperation. The differences also showed in the publication of the official communiqué of the meeting.202 However, the main issue of the Bled conference—the question of the conclusion of a military alliance—was solved on August 9, when the Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Republic of Turkey was signed, with a duration of 20 years.203 During the meeting in Bled, another meeting had been held at which representatives of the national general staffs discussed a range of current issues, not including the draft agenda for the impending the first conference of the chiefs of staff. At a meeting of military experts (Generals Vučković, Coşkun, and Dovas), Turkish representatives asked about the question of cooperating with NATO and the question of joint command. General Vučković responded that in the FPRY, a problem of cooperation with NATO did not exist and that

90

Chapter Four

all possible deals would arise in direct contact with NATO, while respecting the Greek and Turkish membership in the Western military alliance, as well as their obligations arising from it. In case of a deterioration of the overall situation, the direct cooperation of a NATO–Balkan Pact could be achieved. In relation to the joint command issue, the Turkish representative was concerned in what manner, without joint command, would any offensive operations of allied armed forces be conducted. Vučković said that all plans would be made in time of peace and that, therefore, there was no question of command but coordination.204 The Yugoslav National Assembly (i.e., Yugoslav Parliament) ratified the Bled agreement in October 1954.205 Reactions to the signing of the Balkan Alliance were different depending on who they came from. Italian officials expressed concern for Albania; the Bulgarian representative in Italy expressed the official position that the Balkan Pact was aimed against Bulgaria and Albania. Interestingly, for the first time, press in the Cominform countries didn’t issue official comment relation to the whole matter.206 From September 1 through September 9, 1954, Turkish President Celal Bayar came for an official visit to Yugoslavia soon after the signing of the military alliance. This visit could indicate that the relations between allies were good. Bayar arrived at the port of Rijeka on September 1, and then went to Belgrade by train, where he met with J. B. Tito; on September 5, they attended the military parade at the airport in Zemun. Then Tito and Bayar traveled by train to Sarajevo, visited Zenica, Zagreb, Ljubljana, and then stayed on the Brioni Isles.207 There they had official talks over the issue of the EDC. Tito pointed out the Soviet’s efforts for normalizing relations and Bayar spoke on the issue of Cyprus, which he said Greece had submitted “on the international political stage in a very unfavorable moment.” Tito reacted with the opinion that he would use friendship and his allied role to influence Greece in order not to weaken the existing friendship and alliance.208 Meanwhile, the first conference of the chiefs of the general staffs of the Balkan Pact countries was held from September 20 through September 29 in Athens. The question of Cyprus increasingly emerged in the forefront of the GrecoTurkish relations. The Turkish ambassador requested an urgent admission, even before Bayar’s visit, to inform Yugoslavia of the Turkish stance on the Cypriot issue and to get the Yugoslav position on it, as well.209 At the beginning of September at his farewell visit, British Ambassador Ivo Mallet requested the Yugoslav side to be against placing the Greek proposal on the Cypriot issue on the agenda of the UN General Assembly.210 Greek ambassador Kapetanides also wanted to know the details of discussions conducted during the Bayar visit.211 At the same time, international relations were marked by the failure of the EDC project by the French parliament’s refusal to ratify it.



The Balkan Treaty 91

In early October, the United States and the United Kingdom urged Italy to accept the solution of the Trieste issue in accordance with the tripartite agreement signed on May 31, 1954. In Italian political circles, it caused turmoil. However, just at this time, on October 5, 1954, the Trieste issue was removed from the agenda with the adoption of the memorandum of agreement between Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia about the Free Territory of Trieste. According to the provisions of the agreement, the Free Territory of Trieste would be divided, minorities were guaranteed their rights, the border traffic would be regulated, and Trieste would be declared a free port. These agreements improved the economic cooperation between the two neighbors, who were on the verge of conflict. Soon after, Italy became Yugoslavia’s most important trade partner.212 In talks with Ambassador Jovanović, Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos expressed satisfaction with the resolution of the Trieste issue and conveyed that the international circles believed that Italy should enter the Balkan Alliance. Yugoslavia’s position was that cooperation could evolve without entering Italy into the Balkan Alliance. Over the issue of Italy, Stephanopoulos added that Greece would not make a decision without prior consultation with Yugoslavia.213 The first secretary of the British embassy in Belgrade, King, said that Yugoslavia’s remaining outside NATO after the decision over the Trieste issue was unreasonable.214 Even in the fall of 1954, plans for Yugoslavia’s increased allegiance to the West had not been abandoned. According to US officials, the military talks of the three countries did not produce good results, and therefore, it had been expected that Tito would agree to a stronger attachment to the West.215 Almost a week after the signing of the agreement that ended the Trieste issue, the US ambassador in Yugoslavia, Riddleberger, had a meeting with the Joint Chief of Staff’s chairman, Admiral Radford. They discussed current issues of continuing military aid to Yugoslavia and command relationships between NATO and the Balkan Alliance. They agreed that a need existed for the closest coordination possible between NATO and the Balkan Alliance. Although Greece and Turkey, as NATO members, had agreed to relations with NATO, the Yugoslav case was very specific. US officials had observed that one of the reasons for Yugoslavia’s split with the Soviets was the Soviet’s dominant position and Yugoslav resistance against the “integration within the structure of the Soviet bloc military machine.” Yugoslavs wanted to maintain an independent position. The terms of the Balkan Pact were in favor of such an attitude because they gave each partner an equal voice in a joint decision. US officials also observed that military development within the Balkan Pact, which would promote the mechanisms of mutual command, would proceed slowly. As far as Yugoslavia was concerned, the Balkan Pact

92

Chapter Four

command structure could not serve as the channel for military planning with the West.216 In early November 1954, the Yugoslav embassies in Ankara and Athens received a letter from the Yugoslav ministry of foreign affairs (state secretariat for foreign affairs) in which some signs of falling behind in the development of tripartite cooperation had been pointed out. This had been reflected in: •  The development of international relations. •  The relation of understanding the role and importance of the Balkan Alliance, namely, Greeks and Turks wanted to direct the union’s strategic plans toward the United States and NATO. •  The processes that influenced weakening of the relations of Turkey and Greece. Therefore, the analysis of these phenomena and opinions based on a realistic assessment of further cooperation had been requested.217 A few days later, the Greeks expressed their attitude toward the Balkan Alliance. The Greek government had been interested, in principle, in the continuation of the Balkan Alliance, but on concrete issues, they did not see the possibility of serious cooperation on a tripartite basis. The dominant feeling in Athens was distrust in Turkey and fear of possible rapprochement of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.218 Simultaneously, as a continuation of previously initiated talks, from November 4 through November 12, 1954, the fifth tripartite conference of the military representatives of the Balkan Pact countries was held in Athens. A further step in the development of allied relations would have been the establishment of the Consultative Assembly of the Balkan Alliance and the meeting of foreign ministers. The Yugoslav side insisted on the need to organize the meeting of ministers on the second anniversary of the treaty.219 The Yugoslav foreign ministry sent dispatches to all embassies and consulates about the directions of the Yugoslav foreign policy. General conclusions emerged that signs of cooperation in developing triple cooperation in the Balkan Alliance had deteriorated, the independent role of Yugoslavia in relation to the Balkan Alliance should be strengthened, and the implementation of decisions taken in Bled would soon be implemented.220 However, relations among the Balkan allies cooled. The end of 1954 denoted the delay and did not promise much. NOTES 1. Emruhan Yalçin, The Developments After the Second World War and Their Effects on the Turkish Foreign Policy and on the Balkans, Balkanski pakt 1953/54,



The Balkan Treaty 93

Zbornik radova sa međunarodnog naučnog skupa (9. i 10. novembar 2005, Beograd), Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Beograd 2008, pp. 34, 44 (hereinafter: E. Yalçin); (The Balkan Pact 1953/54, Conference Proceedings (November 9–10, 2005) Institute for Strategic Research, Belgrade 2008).   2.  Dimitrios Katsikostas, The Post War Environment in the Balkans and the Trilateral Treaty of 1953, Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Zbornik radova sa međunarodnog naučnog skupa (9. i10. novembar 2005, Beograd), Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Beograd 2008, p. 55 (hereinafter: D. Katsikostas); (The Balkan Pact 1953/54, Conference Proceedings (November 9–10, 2005) Institute for Strategic Research, Belgrade 2008).   3.  D. Katsikostas, p. 53.   4.  E. Yalçin, p. 43.   5.  D. Katsikostas, p. 55.   6.  Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archive of Yugoslavia-AJ), 836 Kancelarija Maršala Jugoslavije (836 Office of the Marshal of Yugoslavia), KMJ, I-6/1 (hereinafter: AJ, 836 KMJ).   7.  AJ, 836 KMJ, I-5-b, br. 95216/53.   8.  AJ, 836 KMJ, I-3-b/286. Elaboration on Yugoslav-Greek relations, August 1952.   9.  Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije (Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia—DAMSPRS), Politička arhiva (Political Archive—PA) F. 88, god. 1952, Pov. br. 14; i, DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, god. 1952, Broj. 926. 10. Jordan Baev, Bulgaria and the Balkan Pact 1953–1954, Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Zbornik radova sa međunarodnog naučnog skupa (9. i 10. novembar 2005), Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Beograd 2008, p. 239 (hereinafter: J. Baev); (The Balkan Pact 1953/54, Conference Proceedings (November 9–10, 2005) Institute for Strategic Research, Belgrade 2008). 11.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 89, god. 1952, Pov. br. 56. 12.  J. Baev, pp. 238–239. 13.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, god. 1952, Pov. br. 13; DAMSPRS, PA, F. 89, god. 1952, Pov. br. 90; DAMSPRS, PA, F. 89, god. 1952, Pov. br. 91. 14.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, god. 1952, Pov. br. 196, i DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, god. 1952, br. 43216. 15.  Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, pp. 37–38. 16.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 75, god. 1952. D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, pp. 21–25. 17.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, god. 1952, br. 212. 18.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 30, god. 1952, Pov. br. 51/52. 19.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, god. 1952, Pov. Br. 291. The note from the talks between Soldatić (counselor of the Yugoslav embassy in Rome) and British Press attaché Hebbelwait and News Cronicle correspondent Mackenzie, March 6, 1952. 20.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, god. 1952, br. 291/52. 21.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 88, god. 1952, Pov. br. 176. 22.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 30, god. 1952, br. 39.

94

Chapter Four

23.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 29, god. 1952, Pov. Br. 120. The report of the Yugoslav consul in Thessalonica Popović, 1 June 1952. 24.  Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zbornik dokumenata, Vojnoistorijski institut, Beograd, 2005, Document no. 1, p. 159 (hereinafter: Balkanski pakt 2005); (The Balkan Pact 1953/1954, Collection of documents, Vojnoistorijski institut, Beograd, 2005). 25.  AJ, 836 KMJ, I-2-a/36, Grčka. 26.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 30, god. 1952, br. 49926. 27.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 30, god. 1952, Br. 69. 28.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 88, god. 1952. The report of the Yugoslav Embassy in Turkey, June 18, 1952. 29.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, P. Pov. 367. The information of the Yugoslav ambassador in Ankara Radovanović, June 30, 1952. 30.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, god. 1952, Br. 136. 31.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 89, god. 1952, Br. 369. The information of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Ankara Radovanović, July 2, 1952. 32.  AJ, 836 KMJ I-3-b/286. 33.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 81, god. 1952. 34.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 30, god. 1952, Pov. br. 79. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens Jovanović, 7 September 1952. 35.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 29, god. 1952. 36.  NARA, RG 59, Department of State, Decimal file 1950–54 from 661.54/4– 1350 to 661.91/1 1–954, Box 2947, Department of State, Assistant Secretary, Letter of Mr. Bonbright to the Secretary, September 4, 1952. 37.  D. Bekić, pp. 425–427. 38.  In relation with the visit to Athens, further readings, D. Bekić, pp. 432–433. 39.  AJ, 836 KMJ, I-2-a/115, br. 2/7–1052. The note on talks between Tito and Keprili, September 26, 1952. 40.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 30, god. 1952, Br. 178. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens Jovanović, November 22, 1952. 41.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 39, god. 1952, Br. 352. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens Jovanović, December 3, 1952. 42.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 39, god. 1952, Str. pov. br. 106. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens Jovanović, December 10, 1952. 43.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 2, p. 161. 44.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, god. 1952, Br. 198. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens Jovanović, 17 December 1952 and DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1952, Br. 131 The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Tel Aviv Bratić, December 20, 1952. 45.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, god. 1952, Br. 1005. 46.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, god. 1952, Str. pov. br. 200. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Paris Prica, December 18, 1952, and DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, god. 1952, Str. pov. br. 201. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Paris Prica, December 19, 1952. 47.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 68, god. 1952, Br. 2694. 48.  AJ, 836 KMJ, I-2-a/116.



The Balkan Treaty 95

49.  AJ, 836 KMJ, I-2-a/116. 50.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1952, br. 994. 51.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 3, p. 162; VA, GŠ-2, k. 14, f. 8, reg. br. 2/1, Minutes of the meeting between Yogoslav and Turkish military delegations. Belgrade 20, 24, and 27 December 1952. 52.  Compare D. Bekić, p. 457, footnote 118, within the declassified documents of former Archive of Josip Broz Tito; there is no information concerning the official reception of the delegation of Turkish armed forces. 53.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 30, god. 1952, Br. 203. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens Jovanović, December 28, 1952. 54.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, pp. 55–56. 55.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 96, god. 1953, Br. 1. 56.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, Br. 2. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Ankara Radovanović, January 3, 1953. 57.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 95, god. 1953. The report of the Yugoslav general consul in Istanbul Žarković, January 8, 1953. 58.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 39, god. 1953, Br. 1. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Rome Velebit, January 3, 1953. 59.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 29, god. 1953. 60.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 39, god. 1953, Pov. br. 58. 61.  D. Bekić, p. 492. 62.  D. Bekić, p. 492. 63.  D. Bekić, p. 488. 64.  Dragan Bogetić, Podsticajni i faktori ograničavanja na putu savezništva Jugoslavije, Grčke i Turske 195 1–1954. godine, Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Zbornik radova sa međunarodnog naučnog skupa (9. i 10. novembar 2005, Beograd), Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Beograd 2008, p. 65 (hereinafter: D. Bogetić, Podsticajni i faktori ograničavanja na putu savezništva Jugoslavije, Grčke i Turske); (The Balkan Pact 1953/54, Conference Proceedings (November 9–10, 2005) Institute for Strategic Research, Belgrade 2008). 65.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 5, p. 247. 66.  D. Bogetić, Podsticajni i faktori ograničavanja na putu savezništva Jugoslavije, Grčke i Turske. p. 67. 67.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953. 68.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Ankara Radovanović on his talks in Ankara with Keprili, January 25, 1953. 69.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 6, p. 250. 70.  Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archive of Yugoslavia), 837 Kancelarija Predsednika Republike (836 Office of the President of Republic—KPR), KPR, I-5-c/ Balkanski savez, Str. pov. 14. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens Jovanović, January 28, 1953 (hereinafter: AJ, 837 KPR). 71.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 23, god. 1953, br. 41627. 72.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 22, god. 1953, br. 54. 73.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 78, god. 1953, br. 42210.

96

Chapter Four

  74.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, Br. 70. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Rome Gregorić, February 12, 1953.   75.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953.   76.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 79.   77.  Small archipelagos near the coast of Istria, summer residence of Josip Broz Tito.   78.  D. Bekić, pp. 496–497.  79. Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 7, p. 251.   80.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 8, p. 252.   81.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-c, Str. pov. br. 45.   82.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 95, god. 1953.   83.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, Br. 92.   84.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-c, Str. pov. br. 26.   85.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, Br. 27.   86.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 38.   87.  VA, GŠ-2, k. 16, f. 3. reg. br. 1, Tekst Ankarskog sporazuma od 28.02.1953. Ugovor o savezu, VA, GŠ-2, k. 16, F. 3, reg. br. 1/4. AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-c, Balkanski savez. Ugovor o prijateljstvu i saradnji između Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije, Kraljevine Grčke i Republike Turske zaključen je i potpisan 28. februara 1953. u Ankari. (The Text of the Ankara Treaty) Also: AJ, 130–206–209.   88.  D. Bekić, p. 497.   89.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, br. 34, 37 i 39.   90.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, br. 46.   91.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, br. 42 i 57.   92.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, br. 59.   93.  VA, GŠ JNA, VII odeljenje, k. 374, F. 1, reg. br. 2. Report no. 37.   94.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, Pov. br. 231.   95.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 23, god. 1953.   96.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, Str. pov. br. 42. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens Jovanovića, March 12, 1953.   97.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, br. 47.   98.  Further readings: Radojica Luburić. Pomirenje Jogoslavije i SSSR 1953– 1955: Tematska zbirka dokumenata. Istorijski intitut, Podgorica, 1999. (Reconciliation between Yogoslavia and USSR 1953–1955, Collection of documents, Insitite of History, Podgorica, 1999.   99.  Đorđe Borozan, “Jugoslovensko-britanski razgovori u Beogradu 1952. i Londonu 1953. godine,” Istorija XX veka br. 2/1997, pp. 113–127 (Ðorđe Borozan, “Yugoslav-British Talks in Belgrade 1952 and in London 1953”) hereinafter Ð. Borozan, Jogoslovensko-britanski razgovori; D. Bekić, pp. 499–500; D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, pp. 83 i 111. 100.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 95, god. 1953. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Ankara Radovanović, April 1, 1953. 101.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, Br. 55. 102.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-b/Turska. 103.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-b/Turska, Str. pov. 213.



The Balkan Treaty 97

104.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 26, p. 322. 105.  D. Bekić, n.d. pp. 508–509. 106.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-b/Grčka. 107.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, br. 99. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens Jovanović, June 8, 1953. 108.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 54. 109.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, br. 115. 110.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 54. 111.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 56. 112.  See: D. Bekić, pp. 527–528. 113.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 57. 114.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, br. 1480. 115.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, br. 412. 116.  VA, k. 374, f. 1, red. br. 2, telegram br. 91. 117.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, br. 388. 118.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, br. 400. 119.  NARA, RG 59, Box 2842, July 15, 1953, Draft NSC Policy Statement, United States Policy toward Yugoslavia. 120.  NARA, RG 59, Department of State, Decimal file 1950–54 from 661.66/1– 1450 to 661.6826/3–3151, Box 2842, August 2, 1953, Draft NSC Policy Statement and Staff study on Yugoslavia. 121.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 87. 122.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 66. 123.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 94, god. 1953, Br. 670. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Ankara Pavićević, November 21, 1953. 124.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-b/Grčka, Pov. br. 389. 125.  VA, GŠ-2, k. 17, f. 4, reg. br. 4. The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Analysis of the Ankara Treaty, March 1954. 126.  Also, D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 86. 127.  NARA, RG 59, Department of State, SD Central file 1950–1953. E 1227, Box 36, Miscellaneous Office Files Relating to Yugoslav Affairs, 1948–1956, NSC 5406, Progressive Drafts and Comments, Folder 1 of 4, December 1, 1953, Draft for NSC Staff Consideration Only, Statement of Policy on United States Policy toward Yugoslavia, General consideration. 128.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 66. 129.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1953, br. 299. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens Jovanović, December 11, 1953. 130.  D. Bekić, pp. 597–599. 131.  Isto: D. Bekić, p. 598. 132.  Further readings concerning the Trieste issue: D. Bogetić, pp. 124–141. 133.  NARA, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council (NSC), Policy Papers 5406–5409, Entry 1, Box 29, NSC 5406, January, 26, 1954, National Security Council, United States policy toward Yugoslavia. 134.  NARA, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council (NSC), Policy Papers 5406–5409, Entry 1, Box 29, Annex to NSC 5406, January, 26, 1954, Na-

98

Chapter Four

tional Security Council, United States Policy toward Yugoslavia, NSC Staff Study on United States Policy toward Yugoslavia. 135.  Further readings concerning the “Đilas case”: D. Bogetić, pp. 120–124. 136.  AJ, 837 KPR I-5-b/Turska, Str. pov. 9/54. 137.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 68. 138.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 70. 139.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1954, Pov. 78. i DAMSPRS, PA, F. 27, god. 1954, Str. pov. br. 78. 140.  NARA, RG 59, Department of State, SD Central file 1950–1953. E 1227, Box 36, Miscellaneous Office Files Relating to Yugoslav Affairs, 1948–1956, NSC 5406, Progressive Drafts and Comments, Folder 1 of 4, January 21, 1954, Draft for NSC Staff Consideration Only (Planning Board), Statement of Policy on United States Policy Toward Yugoslavia, General consideration. 141.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 70. 142.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 26, god. 1954, br. 93. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens Jovanović, March 27, 1954. 143.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-b/Grčka, Pov. br. 9890/1. 144.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-b/Grčka, Pov. broj 43070. 145.  D. Bekić, p. 601. 146.  D. Bogetić, Podsticajni i faktori ograničavanja na putu savezništva Jugoslavije, Grčke i Turske. p. 77. 147.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 75. 148.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 74. 149.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1954, Br. 322. 150.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 60, p. 630. 151.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, pp. 142–143. 152.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-2/2. 153.  D. Bogetić, Podsticajni i faktori ograničavanja na putu savezništva Jugoslavije, Grčke i Turske. p. 77. 154. Ibid. 155.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, pp. 143–144. 156.  NARA, RG 59, Department of State, SD Central file 1950–1953. E 1285, Lot File No. 58D367, Box 15, Subject Files Relating to Italian Affairs 1944–1956, 420.04 Yugoslav/NATO Balkan Entente 1953, April 20, 1954, Memorandum of Conversation on Yugoslav Press Statement at Ankara. 157.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 77. 158.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 64, p. 643. 159.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 78. 160.  D. Bekić, p. 605. 161.  NARA, RG 59, Department of State, SD Central file 195 0–1953. E 1227, Box 39, Miscellaneous Office Files Relating to Yugoslav Affairs, 1948–1956, Lot File No. 65D/94, May 11, 1954, Demarche. 162.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 20, god. 1954, br. 612. 163.  NARA, RG 59, SD Central file 1950–1953. E 1227, Box 36, Miscellaneous Office Files Relating to Yugoslav Affairs, 1948–1956, Lot File No. 59D/383, Opera-



The Balkan Treaty 99

tions Coordinating Board 1954, May 6, 1954, Draft-Operations Coordinating Board, Washington 25, D.C., Progress Report on NSC 5406/1, United States Policy toward Yugoslavia. 164.  NARA, RG 59, Department of State, SD Central file 1950–1953. E 1285, Lot File No. 58D367, Box 15, 420.04 Yugoslav/NATO Balkan Entente 1953, May 21, 1954, Memorandum of Conversation on Balkan Pact. 165.  NARA, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council (NSC), Policy Papers 5406–5409, Entry 1, Box 29, Progress Report on NSC 5406/1, May 25, 1954, National Security Council, Progress Report on United States Policy toward Yugoslavia by the Operations Coordinating Board. 166.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, pp. 138–139. 167.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 82. 168.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1954, The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Paris Prica, April 24, 1954. 169.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 20, god. 1954, br. 642. The report of the Yugoslav Ambassador in London Velebit, June 1, 1954. 170.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 20, god. 1954. The report of the the Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy in London Milanković, May 31, 1954. 171.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 67, p. 646. 172.  D. Bogetić, Podsticajni i faktori ograničavanja na putu savezništva Jugoslavije, Grčke i Turske. p. 80. 173.  D. Bekić, p. 610. 174.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 146. 175.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 86. 176.  Borozan Jugoslovensko-britanski razgovori, pp. 113–127. 177.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 119. 178 NARA, RG 59, Department of State, SD Central file 1950–1953. E 1285, Lot File No. 58D367, Box 15, 420.04 Yugoslav/NATO Balkan Entente 1953, June 30, 1954, United States Government, Office Memorandum on Balkan Pact. 179.  D. Bekić, p. 612. i D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 148. 180.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-c/Balkanski savez, Br. 32. 181.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 74, p. 659. 182.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 146. 183.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 147; D. Bekić, p. 645. 184.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 147. 185.  D. Bekić, p. 645; D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 148. 186.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 149. 187.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 149. 188.  NARA, RG 59, Department of State, SD Central file 1950–1953. E 1285, Lot File No. 58D367, Box 15, 420.04 Yugoslav/NATO Balkan Entente 1953, July 7, 1954, United States Government, Office Memorandum on Italy and the Balkan Pact. 189.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 79, p. 665. 190.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 81, p. 673. 191.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 150; D. Bekić, p. 645. 192.  D. Bekić, p. 646.

100

Chapter Four

193.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 82, p. 675. Also, D. Bekić, p. 646. 194.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 83, p. 676. Also, D. Bekić, p. 646. 195.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-b/Velika Britanija, Str. pov. 495. 196.  Balkanski pakt 2005, pp. 94–95. 197.  Dmitar Tasić, “Otkrivanje Afrike, jugoslovensko—etiopski odnosi i počeci jugoslovenske afričke politike 1954–1955” (Discovering Africa, Yugoslav—Ethiopian relations and beginnings of Yugoslav African policy 1954–1955), Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1950–1961 (Collection of papers, Yugoslav foreign policy 1950–1961), INIS, Beograd 2008, p. 516. 198.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 93, p. 708. 199.  VA, GŠ, II section, k. 375, F. 1, reg. br. 1, br. 124. The report of the Yugoslav military attaché in Athens Vojvodić, August 5, 1954. 200.  D. Bekić, pp. 646–648. D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 151. 201.  D. Bekić, pp. 646–648. D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 151. 202.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-c/Balkanski Savez. Yugoslav project of the Protocol from August 4, 1954. 203.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Documents no. 95 and 96, p. 722. 204.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 94, p. 709. 205.  AJ, 130–614–1011, br. 1134. 206.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 99. 207.  AJ, 837 KPR I-3-a/Turska, k. 190. 208.  AJ, 837 KPR I-3-a/Turska, k. 190. 209.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 101, p. 736. 210.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 20, god. 1954. 211.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-b/Grčka, Pov. br. 412295. 212.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, pp. 140–141. 213.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1954, Br. 362. 214.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 59, god. 1955, Br. 415743. 215.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1954, Br. 1239. 216.  NARA, RG 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman’s files, Admiral Radford 1953–1957, Entry 48, Box 17, 091, J.C.S. 1901/127, October 13, 1954, Talking Paper—Discussions with Ambassador Riddleberger. 217.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 69, god. 1954. 218.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 102. 219.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 104. 220.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 53, god. 1954, Pov. br. 416311.

Chapter Five

The Key Year of 1955 Between the Generals and the Politicians

PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER COOPERATION AND THE CONFERENCE OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ANKARA, FEBRUARY 28–MARCH 2, 1955 The project of the EDC failed to link Western diplomatic efforts to the Balkan alliance, and thus, Yugoslavia brought NATO back into focus.1 In that process, the most active participant was Turkey. Before his journey to Italy, Turkish Prime Minister Menderes informed the ambassadors of the Balkan allies about the Turkish attitude to invite Italy to enter the Balkan alliance. During January and February, this had caused diplomatic correspondence between the main actors of this event to intensify. However, Italy had not been officially asked to enter the Balkan Pact, but its officials expressed a willingness to do so if invited. Yugoslavs did not sympathize with this willingness, while the Greeks felt that the question of Italy and the Balkan Pact should not be put forth until the three partners had reached a definite agreement. In contrast, the Western allies were happy to watch the eventual accession of Italy to the Balkan alliance.2 Meanwhile, Greek-Yugoslav military cooperation continued to develop. From February 8 through February 16, 1955, the third conference of the commanders of the Greek First and the Yugoslav Third armies was held in Skoplje. At that time, the cooperation between member states of the Balkan Pact encountered challenges from the increasing tension in Greek-Turkish relations, as well a strong influence from international interest, especially the West who sought to diminish the importance of Yugoslavia within the Balkan alliance.3 In those days, on February 11, after nearly two months of absence, the Yugoslav leader, Josip Broz Tito, returned from an important trip to India and Burma. This trip, as well as meetings with the local politicians, opened 101

102

Chapter Five

entirely new horizons to Tito and his associates. From the Balkans, Yugoslav politics had stepped into the world scene, and its leader experienced a political and spiritual transformation. In the future, in what would be characterized as the “out of blocks” policy of peaceful coexistence, Tito and his associates would see the only acceptable interpretation of the “Yalta fifty-fifty agreement from ten years earlier.”4 The second anniversary of the Treaty of Ankara signing had been an opportunity to mark that date. The conference was held in Ankara in accordance with the Bled Treaty, and during it, an evident contradiction emerged. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović talked about the existing danger of obstacles to world peace, and Köprülü talked about the issue of binding other countries to the Turkish-Iraqi pact, while the Greek Minister Stephanopoulos had positively assessed the Turkish activity in the Middle East. Despite the differences, the agreement on the establishment of the Balkan Advisory Assembly had been signed, and a decision to found the Balkan Institute had been adopted as well as an agreement about the tripartite conference on economics. On his return to Belgrade, Koča Popović expressed satisfaction with the achievements because Menderes’s conception of the necessity of coordinating plans with NATO on the Balkan Pact had been rejected. Western diplomats positively assessed the Ankara conference.5 Soon after, from April 5 through April 14 in Belgrade, the sixth conference of representatives of Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish general staffs was held. In the view of US officials, the solution of the Trieste issue had established the foundation for Italian-Yugoslav rapprochement and had cleared the way for “planning and actions with respect to other phases of US policy toward Yugoslavia.” As for the Balkan Pact, the United States “assumed [a] sympathetic attitude toward the development of the Balkan Entente into a formal military alliance.” Although it did not provide organic connections with NATO, it indirectly aligned Yugoslavia with the “general scheme” of Western defense. However, the first signs of reconsideration in US policy emerged. For US officials, the so-called normalization in Soviet-Yugoslav relations was not seen as being a danger from Yugoslavia’s returning into the Soviet sphere of influence but rather as an announcement of a new, neutralist policy of nonalignment with either the Soviet or US bloc. They called for “continuing alert scrutiny” on these developments in order to align with US policy or to give “timely, basic reconsideration.”6 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand, had been in favor of revising the continuation of Yugoslavia’s military aid in case “the Yugoslavs reject proposals for informal planning coordination with NATO and persist in confining their commitments to the West within their present narrow interpretation.” One of the indications of shifts in Yugoslav foreign policy that had caused the reaction of the Joint



The Key Year of 1955 103

Chiefs of Staff was the above-mentioned statement of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popović and Yugoslavia’s refusal to start closer cooperation between Balkan Pact and NATO.7 A need for maintaining Balkan cooperation and seeking a third way between the two blocks had increasingly become the credo of Yugoslav foreign policy. That tendency had been vividly illustrated in the report from the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Vidić, of the talks with the Greek and Turkish ambassadors on May 5, 1955. The Greek ambassador said that no differences existed between NATO and the Balkan Pact, after what Vidić stated were Yugoslav arguments, stressing that Yugoslav allies did not understand Yugoslavia’s “anti-block policy.”8 A visit from Turkish Prime Minister Menderes to Belgrade on May 4–9, 1955, had served as a clear manifestation that the disagreement continued. On that occasion, Turkish and Yugoslav officials expressed opposite views on the international situation and the role of the Balkan Pact in this context. Turkish failure in an attempt to pull Yugoslavia into the Western military arrangements had been obvious and, in a way, had caused Menderes to raise questions concerning suitability and the further development of the Balkan Pact. Suspicions that usually existed between Greece and Turkey had been illustrated by strong Greek interest in relation to subjects and the course of discussions—a clear manifestation of an ever-present Cyprus question. Yugoslav officials reported their observations that Menderes’s visit was forced from the Turkish side with the clear aim of closer connections to Yugoslavia with the Western defense arrangements. Moreover, the Turks had demonstrated their inherent inflexibility, lack of understanding of the Yugoslav antiblock policy, more extreme positions than those of the US administration, and sensitivity to Yugoslav reservations. However, according to Yugoslav assessments, this intensification could not cause a crisis in tripartite cooperation.9 After this visit, frequent articles in the Turkish press showed the Turkish official’s statements in which Yugoslavia had been declared guilty for the delay in the cooperation of the Balkan allies.10 Soon after, a shock that would show a large dose of skepticism and suspicion in the relations of the Balkan allies followed. On May 13, just days after Menderes’s departure, ambassadors of Western countries in Belgrade (i.e., the United States, Great Britain, France, Greece, and Turkey) were informed that by the end of May, a high Soviet government delegation would come to Belgrade. Their surprise was very visible despite the detailed, rational, and tranquil argumentations of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Koča Popović that this visit would not constitute a change in Yugoslav foreign policy, but due to the help that Western countries provided to Yugoslavia, would represent “the victory of all peaceful forces.” Popović asked Western diplomats to keep the

104

Chapter Five

information secret for 24 hours until Moscow and Belgrade had proclaimed it officially.11 However, the Turkish ambassador in Belgrade, Sadi Kavur, expressed surprise since the Turkish Prime Minister had visited Yugoslavia only four days earlier and, as an ally, had not been provided with this information. The following day, May 14, one other important news item remained in the shadow of the upcoming Soviet visit to Belgrade—the signing of the agreement of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Warsaw, better known as the Warsaw Pact.12 On May 20, when the Turkish ambassador officially handed over the memorandum of the Turkish government regarding the upcoming visit of Khrushchev, titled a “friendly warning,” the extent of Turkish discontent became clear. The upcoming visit had been described as a Soviet propaganda maneuver to break the unity of the West and as an expression of the Soviet’s desire to assure the world that Yugoslavia was on the Soviet’s side.13 Meanwhile, on several occasions, Greek Ambassador Philon had requested an official reception regarding the upcoming Soviet visit.14 In the West, public speculation began about the upcoming visit. It had been assessed as a continuation of the Soviet diplomatic offense, whose aim was to create a cordon of neutral states between the Soviet satellites and the West. The second half of May was reserved for coordination and joint diplomatic activity in Western countries regarding the upcoming visit. From Tito’s public appearances and his meetings with other Yugoslav officials, Western diplomatic representatives gained a sense of groundless fear about the possible return of Yugoslavia to the Eastern Bloc.15 In the official talks during a Soviet visit (May 26 through June 3, 1955), the Balkan Pact was mentioned as one of the most important issues. Tito stated inter alia that he was aware that the Balkan Pact had not been welcomed in Moscow but that the time had come in which he saw his function in activities bringing Balkan nations closer to each other and that they should not prioritize military activities nor strengthen them. He also noted that Yugoslavia and Turkey parted ways on issues of future development of the pact and that Yugoslavia would continue to be resolutely against entering Italy into the Balkan Pact. According to his opinion, the future of the pact depended on the international situation, but he rejected the possibility that Yugoslavia would initiate its abolition. The fact that Tito devoted a considerable part of his presentation to international activities in Third World countries was yet another indicator of the direction of the new Yugoslav policy. Several days after the Soviet delegation met, Burmese Prime Minister U Nu came to visit Yugoslavia and at the end of June, so did Indian Prime Minister Nehru.16 Again, the question of Cyprus emerged in the foreground of relations between the Balkan allies. In fact, Greece intended to bring the Cyprus issue



The Key Year of 1955 105

before the UN, despite US suggestions not to.17 In July 1955, Koča Popović had suggested to Tito to deliver the current Yugoslav position on the Balkan Pact.18 Within NATO, voices of concern appeared over such developments in the Balkan Pact. In early September, according to the reports from Bonn, before leaving for Moscow, German Chancellor Adenauer met with the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), General Alfred Gruenther. General Gruenther spoke about the weakening of NATO and that this had resulted in the deteriorization of the Balkan Pact and spoiled relations with Greece and the United Kingdom, which all went in favor of the Soviets.19 Due to the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, the Balkan Pact had been increasingly brought into question. When the Greek majority in Cyprus demanded unification with Greece, the Turkish government, supported by the United Kingdom, reacted strongly. Contrary to the Greek demands for unification, or Enosis, Turkey delivered the request for division—Taksim. In September, large riots broke out in Constantinople (Istanbul). A total of 4,000 shops, 100 hotels and restaurants, and 70 churches, whose owners were Greeks, were destroyed or damaged in a pogrom. A rapid decrease of the Greek community in Turkey soon followed.20 According to Greek claims, demonstrations were organized, and the Turkish government was liable for these incidents.21 The Greek side expected Yugoslavia’s support in mediation. The Greeks believed that the conditions for continuation of tripartite cooperation involved: •  An explanation of the events in Istanbul and restitution for it •  Resignation of Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu from office and further political engagement •  Relocation of the NATO command post from Izmir •  Renunciation of Turkish interference in the Cyprus issue and allowing it to be resolved between Greece and Great Britain These conditions soon brought a complete blockade in the work of the Balkan Pact.22 The State Department assessed that the Greek-Turkish dispute had caused damage both to NATO and to the Balkan Pact. The Greeks even gave up participation in the maneuvers of NATO troops, because they feared that Turkish commanders could foment conflict between Turkish and Greek troops.23 Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Edvard Kardelj received Greek Ambassador Philon on September 22, 1955. During his reception, Philon stated that Greece was not able to give up the Cyprus issue and that the issues were presented to the UN; thus Greece found itself in a situation of canceled Turkish friendship. He also stated that Turkey had entered the Balkan Pact primarily

106

Chapter Five

guided by its interests and aspirations to include Yugoslavia in NATO. Regarding violent acts in Turkey, the ordinary statements about the readiness of the Turkish government to make compensation could not satisfy the Greek government. The Greek ambassador had requested guarantees for the Greek minority in Turkey. Kardelj promised to provide support to the Greeks diplomatically, for which the directives were given to the Yugoslav ambassador in Turkey to influence the Turkish government in improving its relationship with Greece.24 Thus, in addition to its position between the East and West, Yugoslavia found itself in the role of mediator between the two allies in their dispute.25 This led to shifts in focus in relations between the allies and to a stronger Yugoslav-Greek bilateral cooperation—namely, in the border area between the two countries toward Bulgaria, where the defensive position had already been constructed according to earlier agreements.26 In addition, the Yugoslav officials announced that the Greek side proposed cooperation between the two countries in nuclear energy research.27 Yugoslavs continued to work on issues concerning mail, private rights, the work of the Bureau of the Balkan Secretariat, and the Statute of the Balkan Institute.28 However, the Greek-Turkish disputes continued throughout October 1955. According to Yugoslav diplomatic sources, during talks with Secretary of State Dulles, Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos insisted that the United States pressure Turkey in relation to the Cyprus issue for them to compensate for the damage caused to the Greek community in Turkey. He also stated that the Greeks would not participate in NATO’s actions until the Turks corrected their position.29 The issue of compensation to the victims became a Greek prerequisite for the commencement of the process of reconciliation.30 According to previous agreements, from October 17 through October 24 in Thessalonica, the fourth conference of the commanders of the Greek First and Yugoslav Third armies was held. In November 1955, American Secretary of State Dulles visited Yugoslavia. Although brief and courteous—for just one day—this visit had great significance. It had been the first visit of a US Secretary of State to Yugoslavia. In direct contact, Tito was able to clarify some doubts that existed regarding the course of new Yugoslav foreign policy. Dulles was most interested in Tito’s position regarding future relations with the East and West. There, he received assurances about Yugoslavia’s strict neutrality; Tito also affirmed that other Eastern European countries had the right to choose their social and economic order without interference. That statement echoed strongly in the international community. Dulles had openly wondered whether such a foreign policy of Yugoslavia could be used to resolve the conflict in the Middle East, where Yugoslavia could take the role of mediator between Israel and Arab countries. These negotiations would be led according to the model in



The Key Year of 1955 107

which the Trieste issue had been resolved—without direct negotiations but through intermediaries. Tito approved in principle, stressing the delicacy of the dispute and the need to investigate it well. In relation to the Balkan Pact, Tito pointed out Yugoslav efforts to focus on economic and cultural cooperation, in addition to the military one. Dulles had warned that the depth of the Greek-Turkish conflict could lead to war, and he was interested in the way and extent to which Yugoslavia would be able to assume the role of intermediary and energetically act in the direction of a solution to the conflict. Tito, however, did not share such optimism.31 In a memorandum to the US Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had provided a military “reevaluation” of the strategic importance of Yugoslavia. They had stated that three general military alliances, at that moment, were open to Yugoslavia. In case of a pro-West Yugoslavia, the entire area of NATO’s southern defense would move farther east, giving NATO several initial advantages. However, according to intelligence estimates (NIE 3 1–255), this course of action was unlikely. In case of a pro-Soviet Yugoslavia, NATO would be deprived of important depth and forces for the defense of Italy and Greece. This course of action was also unlikely (NIE 3 1–2-55). The third course of action represented a flexible position. In this course of action, in a possible war conflict, both the West and the Soviets would be deprived of actual possession of the Yugoslav territory. Tito would act neutrally, allowing that in any moment, he could join the war pursuing his own interest. As long as Soviet-Yugoslav relations continued to improve “Yugoslavia’s wartime usefulness to the West is uncertain and its adherence to the Balkan Pact commitments in time of war is doubtful.” Nevertheless, in case of aggression, Yugoslavia would defend its territory, and the total effect of this course of action would benefit the West. However, the flexible position of Yugoslavia, as in the third course of action, according to NIE 3 1–2-55, had already been adopted and would stay active for as long as Tito remained alive.32 The proposal from the April meeting in Belgrade for the next meeting of military representatives—the seventh tripartite conference—that should have taken place in Ankara during November 1955 never happened. The crisis in Greek-Turkish relations and the gradual change in Yugoslav foreign policy represented two main reasons for stopping further tripartite cooperation. However, the outbreak of the crisis in Greek-Turkish relations caused Yugoslavia to cease being the only suspect for the crisis within the Balkan Pact. Greeks had preconditioned the next Balkan Pact ministerial conference by the payment of compensation for destroyed property of the Greeks in the September pogrom. There were negotiations over the time and place of the meeting, but everything was postponed until the next year.33 Greek-Yugoslav cooperation continued to move on as planned; however, during December 1955, there were small misunderstandings over the Macedonian issue.34

108

Chapter Five

THE SLOW DEATH OF THE BALKAN PACT The end of Balkan cooperation has marked the following year. The protocols and terms of previous agreements had been ratified automatically. There were efforts for the exchange of military visits in which Greece was particularly interested.35 Small changes occurred in the US policy toward Yugoslavia, as well. Creators of the American policy stated that the far-reaching objective of tying Yugoslavia into the Western system had not been attained and that there were no indications that it would happened. They predicted that, in case of general war, Yugoslavia would remain neutral. Yugoslav armed forces would be used as a means of preserving the regime rather than protecting Northern Italy or carrying out NATO defense plans. Nevertheless, they gave significant importance to the Balkan Pact as a means of connecting Yugoslavia to the West.36 As a permanent companion of Balkan cooperation, misunderstandings reached their climax with clashes in Cyprus in early June 1956. Greek diplomatic sources reported that in these conflicts, a huge number of Cypriot Greeks had been killed.37 However, the Turkish side considered the Greeks responsible, accusing them of conducting anti-Turkish policy.38 At the same time, preparations were carried out for Tito’s visit to Greece. It happened from July 24 through July 30, 1956, as a private visit to the Greek royal couple on the island of Corfu, under the pretext of a vacation. This visit was very important to the Greeks because it highlighted the friendly character of relations between the two countries. In addition, they emphasized the importance of Yugoslav-Greek cooperation regardless of the situation in the Balkan Pact.39 The political part of Tito’s visit to Corfu represented a meeting with Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis on July 27. During that meeting, Tito said that during talks with the Soviets he launched the issue of the Balkan Pact. He received the response that the Soviets “do not have anything against the Balkan Pact as a factor of peace and economic, political, and cultural cooperation in the Balkans.” Tito added that in his opinion, the Balkan Pact was the only way for three countries to cooperate and overcome antagonism that existed between some of the members. In relation with the conflict in Cyprus, Tito expressed support for the initiation of the issues in the UN. It had been emphasized that further consolidation of the Yugoslav-Greek cooperation would persuade Turkey to change its views. Tito pointed out that he would personally write to President Bayar.40 On August 29, 1956, a Greek aide-memoire was brought from Athens by Ambassador Pavićević. It concerned the Balkan Pact and the Cyprus issue. The aide-memoire resulted from an agreement between President Tito and Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis during their talks in Corfu. It clearly stated



The Key Year of 1955 109

Greece’s commitment in refusing to leave its compatriots without support at the time of their struggle for freedom.41 Tito’s visit to Greece on July 1956 caused Turkish suspicion over Yugoslavia’s intentions in the context of the Turkish-Greek conflict in Cyprus. For Tito and Yugoslavia, it had been the extension of cooperation, somewhat reinforced toward Greece but only as part of foreign policy activity, that had represented a minor importance compared to Tito’s trip to India and meeting with Khrushchev.42 In late 1956, publically, Greek diplomats spoke declaratively on the Balkan Pact, that is, that Greece did not intend to cancel the alliance, while the Turkish side was more interested in the character of Yugoslav-Greek bilateral relations. In December 1956, at a session of NATO, Greek Foreign Minister Averoff had stated that the Balkan Pact was dead and could not be revived until the Cyprus issue was resolved and that only a Greek-Yugoslav bilateral cooperation would compensate for the Balkan Pact.43 Over time, the West became adjusted to Yugoslav “neutralism.”44 Meanwhile, Cyprus became a weak spot for further Balkan cooperation. The Greek ambassador to Yugoslavia, Tsakalotos, stated on June 18, 1958, that “Turkey ceased to be a friend, began to be an enemy,” and that it had been a blow for Balkan cooperation. That same year, on October 15, President Bayar of Turkey, during a reception for the Yugoslav ambassador to Turkey, Miloš Carević, said that Carević came at a time when the path of cooperation had been blocked by “a black cat.” This metaphor represented the Cyprus issue, and Bayar hoped that it would be resolved and cooperation renewed and expanded.45 In March 1959, when Tito was returning from a visit to India, he met with Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis. An interesting event occurred then that definitely illustrated Yugoslav’s foreign policy orientation. The Cyprus issue had already started to resolve itself. The Greek side insisted that the official statement would express that Tito “received with satisfaction” Karamanlis’s report on the solution of the Cyprus dispute, because it gave independence to Cyprus, improved Greek relations with the other interested countries, and strengthened peace in the world,” by which Yugoslavia would pay tribute only to Greece. The Yugoslav delegation refused to publish such a communiqué but had already made the proposal of a more moderate statement that placed Cyprus itself in the center. At the same time, the question of the Balkan Pact had been elegantly removed from the agenda.46 Next year, the resolution of the Cyprus issue had definitely been achieved based on the renunciation of all claims—Greek, Turkish, and British—and by declaration of an independent republic of Cyprus.47 The Balkan Pact had not been canceled officially. Yugoslavia did not want to cancel the pact publicly mostly because of the pressure from the Soviet Union, whose officials claimed that the Balkan Pact was in the service of

110

Chapter Five

NATO. Canceling would represent a confirmation of Soviet claims.48 Yugoslav diplomat, Leo Mates, as Bekić quotes him, said that during 1961, an attempt was made to renew cooperation between the Balkan allies by exchanging diplomatic notes. Greece and Turkey agreed, but the exchange was carried out without publicity. For Mates, further history of relations remained unknown, according to his claims.49 NOTES  1. Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 106  2. Balkanski pakt 2005, pp. 106–108.   3.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 20, god. 1955, Str. pov. Br. 3.   4.  D. Bekić, p. 674.  5. Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 109; D. Bekić, p. 742; D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 233.   6.  NARA, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council (NSC), Policy Papers 5406–5409, Entry 1, Box 29, Progress Report on NSC 5406/1, April 21, 1955, National Security Council, Progress Report on United States Policy Toward Yugoslavia by the Operations Coordinating Board.   7.  NARA, RG 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic files 1951–1953, Entry 13, Box 121, CCS 092 Yugoslavia ( 7–6-48) Sec 26, April 28, 1955, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense on US Military Policy Toward Yugoslavia.   8.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 112.  9. Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 112. 10.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 199. 11.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, pp. 200–201. 12.  D. Bekić, p. 695. With full right Bekić wonders whether the Yugoslav officials have been manipulated with such a timing of events that equally had great international significance where sensationalism of one was used to conceal the other. 13.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 199. 14.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 113. 15.  Further readings concerning the Yugoslav and Soviet activities preeceded the reconciliation. D. Bekić, pp. 667–703. 16.  For further readings concernig the topics and results of the Soviet visit, see D. Bekić, pp. 705–734. 17.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 21, god. 1955, Br. 933. The report of the Yugoslav ambassador in London, Velebit, July 27, 1955. 18.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-c/Balkanski Savez. 19.  DAMSPRS, PA, F.52, god. 1955, Str. pov. 828. 20.  Ričard Klog, Istorija Grčke novog doba (History of Modern Greece), CLIO, Beograd 2000, pp. 153–155. 21.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 115.



The Key Year of 1955 111

22.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-b/Grčka, broj 412464. The note of talks with the Greek ambassador in Belgrade Philon, September 17, 1955. 23.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 59, god. 1955, br. 414004. 24.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 129, p. 860. 25.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 117. 26.  VA, GŠ-2, k. 18, fas. 5, reg. br. 1/58. 27.  DAMSPRS, PA, F. 21, god. 1955, br. 412174. 28.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 117. 29.  DAMSPRS, PA, F.21, god. 1955, br. 566. 30.  DAMSPRS, PA, F.59, god. 1955, br. 4140044. 31.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, pp. 261–265; Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 119. 32.  NARA, RG 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic files 1951–1953, Entry 13, Box 121, CCS 092 Yugoslavia (7–6-48) Sec 27, November 9, 1955, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense on US Military Policy toward Yugoslavia. 33.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 121. 34.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 122. 35.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 122. 36.  NARA, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council (NSC), Policy Papers 5601–5602, Entry 1, Box 39, NSC 5601, January 9, 1956, National Security Council, United States Policy toward Yugoslavia. 37.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-b/Grčka, br. 48619. 38.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-b/Grčka, br. 411932. 39.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 124. 40.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 124. 41.  AJ, 837 KPR, I-5-b/Grčka. Greek Aide-Memoire on Balkan Pact and Cyprus issue. 42.  D. Bekić, pp. 667–734. 43.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 126. 44.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 261. 45.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 126. 46.  AJ, 837 KPR I-2/1 1–9. 47.  Vojna enciklopedija, tom 4, Kipar, p. 349. 48.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 128. 49.  D. Bekić, p. 737.

Chapter Six

Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West Pretext and Context

UNFULFILLED THREAT: THE SOVIET-SATELLITE MILITARY INTERVENTION AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA After issuing the Resolution of the Cominform in June of 1948, and when Yugoslavia’s resolute resistance followed, the question regarding Stalin’s response to the challenge of his authority immediately was put on the table. One of the possibilities was the Soviet-satellite aggression against Yugoslavia. The aim of aggression would involve a regime change in Yugoslavia, which would permanently and firmly link Yugoslavia with the countries of the “people’s democracy.” Although the American diplomatic and intelligence circles noticed certain changes in the attitude of Yugoslav officials during 1947 and the first months of 1948 (e.g., urgent consultations of ambassadors, saving measures, expansions of the border zone toward the satellite countries, food shortages, an increase of the personal security of the Yugoslav leaders, etc.), they did not connect the booming of Yugoslav-Soviet antagonism with them.1 However, on the first signs of possible friction, they began closely monitoring any developments. One of the first signals had been the readiness of the Yugoslav leadership to resolve property disputes with the United States. In June 1948, they agreed to solve the problems of American claims such as the question of compensation from the Lend and Lease Agreement and other types of assistance before the formation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the question of Yugoslavia’s assets blocked in the United States.2 On June 30, 1948, the American military and naval attaché in Belgrade recommended “the boldest possible exploitation” of any crossing of Yugoslavia—the cornerstone of the Soviet satellite buildings. He had also recommended providing support to Tito but only at his request, which agreed with the CIA suggestion, stating that Tito 113

114

Chapter Six

would probably postpone addressing the West until there were some ways of reconciliation with the Soviet Union. In the case of the Soviet’s refusal, he would be forced to seek Western support against Soviet retaliation.3 The question was whether and how the Soviet Union planned military intervention against Yugoslavia.4 The manner in which the Soviet Union intended to deal with the Yugoslav rebels did not exclude military action. On the other hand, the Soviets were not disposed with effective disciplinary action against Tito except military intervention that Tito would try to avoid at all costs. However, the Soviet’s decision to overthrow Tito with military interventions would depend on more than international relations but the Yugoslav move as well. The fact that such Soviet actions would result in worsening conditions in international relations, which would bring the world to the brink of conflict, also represented the largest obstacles for such developments.5 It was certain that Tito’s regime had been counting on this possibility, so by the end of 1948 and during 1949, it undertook a series of measures that aimed to improve the country’s defense capabilities. The Yugoslav-Soviet break found the Yugoslav Army in a degree of organization and deployment, focused on the defense against attacks from the West.6 While the borders to the West were carefully guarded and prepared for the defense, the borders toward the eastern countries were not, as if they did not exist at all. Security was loose, traffic almost uncontrolled, border posts and other infrastructural facilities few and undeveloped.7 The reaction of the Yugoslav state and military leadership was very fast, and its consequences were far-reaching. During the following years, numerous relocations of units had been carried out, such as the command of the Military Aviation College, with its supporting institutions and training air wings, had been relocated from Pančevo to Mostar; the Air Force Officer’s School, from Kovin to Ljubljana; 184th wing, from Ljubljana to Banja Luka; 32nd air division, 109th and 103rd wing, from Sombor to Pleso airport near Zagreb; and 117th fighter wing from Pula to Zemun.8 A defense relying on the mountain masses, south of the Sava and Danube Rivers, had been prepared. In addition, Yugoslavs revived the doctrine of guerrilla fighting, which had been neglected in the years of blindly copying Soviet models. A command of partisan detachments had been founded, together with a large number of smaller partisan units, intended for local defense and action in the enemy’s rear. Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo became the head of the Staff of Partisan Detachments, the political commissar was Mijalko Todorović, and the chief of staff was General Rudolf Primorac. The Presidium of the National Assembly of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) brought a secret decree in putting the country in a position of general readiness.9 Due to the need for effective action, the coordination committees for national defense for each of the federal republics had been formed.10



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 115

In July 1949, the process of reorganizing the Yugoslav Army and the Corps of the National Defense of Yugoslavia and transitioning to new formations and new mobilization plans had begun. The current mobilization plan, Adriatic, had been amended and renamed to the program Pearl.11 Since the Soviet-satellite attack was expected from the north and the east, the Yugoslav government and military leadership was aware that they could not provide effective defense in the northern plains of Vojvodina and Slavonia. The precise plans for mobilization had been made,12 as well as detailed reviews of available resources in agriculture, industry, raw materials, cattle, transportation assets, human resources, road and rail networks, and port facilities with the aim of preparing for attack and organizing a successful defense. In addition, they made plans to evacuate the administrative apparatus and the military-capable population to the interior. The region of Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro would be evacuated to Bosnia and Herzegovina; there were 580,000 people, of which 466,000 males and females were under the age of 18.13 One of the serious issues on the agenda was locating the existing industrial capacities, especially those where production was of unusual importance to the army, as in war and in peace.14 The first crisis occurred in the middle of August 1949 when the Soviet authorities submitted a note for abolition of Russian emigrants in Yugoslavia who were very active in the intelligence war against the FPRY. The note was accompanied by movements of Soviet troops in the area around Timisoara in Romania and Szeged and Baja in Hungary.15 At the same time in May 1949, in a report to the joint ad-hoc committee (composed of representatives of the CIA and the State Department and intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy, and Air Force), it was concluded that, despite the deterioration of the international situation, the Soviet military intervention in 1949 was not likely. While attempting to act against NATO and the military assistance program, the Soviets would give special attention to the Scandinavian countries, Yugoslavia, and Iran, which would not lead to military action of even a local character.16 At the end of 1949, in the CIA’s assessment, it was said that despite the fact that Moscow was aware of the dangers of “Titoism,” a military intervention against Yugoslavia would not be taken until the Kremlin was fully convinced that the United States would not intervene militarily.17 One of the first questions to be raised was whether war plans of armed intervention against Yugoslavia existed in the East. According to Béla Király, Commander in Chief of the infantry of the Hungarian army from 1949 through 1950, who wrote an essay based on his recollections, the Soviet Union and its satellites were planning an attack on Yugoslavia in 1949. All preparations (e.g., a military buildup, exercises, and the final war game based on the actual plan of attack) had been concluded by the spring of 1951, but then were abandoned18 due to the United States’

116

Chapter Six

response in Korea, However, Hungarian historian László Ritter doubted Király’s claims and brought forth several interesting arguments: •  No Russian (Soviet) or other satellite country’s archival source or other memoirs have substantiated Király’s statement that Stalin would have made a decision to attack Yugoslavia. •  Military buildup of Hungarian and other satellite armed forces had not been inspired by Stalin’s military plans against Yugoslavia. •  The Hungarian army never received a war plan from Moscow against Yugoslavia; on the contrary, they made their own war plan based on a false assumption that Yugoslavia had joined the imperialist camp and thus had become a threat with hostile and aggressive intentions toward Hungary. •  Borders were fortified to slow down and stop a massive offensive coming from Yugoslavia. •  The subject of an alleged military exercise held in 1950 was not an invasion on Yugoslavia but rather predicated on stopping and repelling an attack from Yugoslavia.19 Although the measures for the military buildup of the satellites included the introduction of classic offensive weapons such as modern tanks and jet planes, Soviet advisers insisted on constructing large-scale fortifications against Yugoslavia along the entire border, despite Hungarian protests based on increasing defense expenditures in the period when the Southern Defense System had been constructed.20 On the other hand, events that occurred on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border after June 1948 showed that the Soviets did have a clear intention and plan on how to deal with Yugoslavia’s rebellion. In July 1948, by Moscow’s request, on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border, Bulgarians initiated their first intelligence operation Zvezda (Star). The goal of this operation was to establish several clandestine channels for distributing anti-Tito propaganda materials. Soon after, as a Yugoslav response, the first larger units were deployed on the Yugoslav side (i.e., the 16th infantry division, which was relocated from Štip to Dimitrovgrad). One thing led to another, and to the end of 1948, more than 300 border incidents occurred on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border. Within the Bulgarian border troops, new units had been established in three districts alongside the border. During 1949, three operational posts of military intelligence had been founded in Vidin, Slivnica, and Dupnica, from where secret agents were infiltrated on Yugoslav territory. After denunciation of bilateral treaties, in 1950, the two governments exchanged several diplomatic notes, accusing each other of organizing serious border incidents with human casualties. The Bulgarian leadership appealed for Soviet help, and in 1950,



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 117

a special Soviet delegation after three months of inspection recommended construction of several defense lines, 20 km in depth along the borders of Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece, and redeployment of several larger units from the interior closer to the border.21 The same thing happened along the Romanian-Yugoslav border.22 According to Soviet claims, during Operation Zvezda, during the period from June 20, 1953, to October 20, 1953, 21 infiltrations had been conducted through 13 infiltration points. Those were 52 Yugoslav emigrants who dispersed 62,300 copies of Cominform newspapers, as well as 29,000 pamphlets, cartoons, and other propaganda materials.23 Along with Operation Zvezda, Operation Strela (Arrow) had been initiated to establish connections with Cominform supporters in Yugoslavia and gather intelligence data.24 Based on the above information, it could be concluded that in fact, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria expected a Yugoslav attack. However, to what extent the construction of these defense systems actually had on a military function in the prevention of armed aggression coming from a neighbor-traitor who started coquetting with Western imperialists is really questionable. Among other things, these defensive structures had a strong psychological function in creating a picture of Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary as being vulnerable countries since the enemy (Yugoslav) attacks had been expected at any moment.25 Besides, its function of controlling the border region should not have been overlooked not only in preventing infiltration of enemy agents and saboteurs but to a greater extent in deterring its own citizens from trying to escape. Besides border incidents and various provocations, Yugoslav intelligence paid special attention to movements and maneuvers in the border region. During 1950, in areas around the towns of Szeged, Nagykanizsa, Baja, and Kaposvar in Hungary, several maneuvers were organized with participants from Hungarian and Soviet armed forces. Simultaneously, Romanians organized maneuvers around the towns of Oršava and Turn Severin. The same thing was happeing in Bulgaria, where units of the First, Sixth, and Seventh divisions had organized maneuvers each month from August until October in the areas of Kyustendil, Gorniya Dzhumaja, Vidin, Kula, and Belogradchik. Otherwise, Bulgarian units were deployed near the border of Yugoslavia. Usually, those units were stronger than units from the interior of the country.26 What did this situation of “neither war nor peace” on the borders of Yugoslavia look like? From 1948 until 1953, an intelligence war occurred on the eastern borders of Yugoslavia. A number of border incidents (e.g., opening fire on the neighboring territory, crossing over small military units, demolition of boundary stones, ambushes, murders of civilians and border guards, violation of airspace, etc.) were accompanied by inserting organized groups or individuals. Thus, the Yugoslav authorities in their most intensive period,

118

Chapter Six

until 1951, caught 504 people who were trying to infiltrate with different intelligence or subversive tasks, including sabotage and terrorist actions.27 Often conflicts occurred with the inserted groups of the Yugoslav Cominform émigrés and agents of intelligence services of surrounding countries. During 1948 and 1949, from the neighboring Cominform countries, 118 incursions of intelligence groups occurred, mostly from Hungary—59, Albania—36, and Bulgaria—21.28 Thus, only on the Bulgarian border in 1953, from April to November, up to 35 conflicts with the inserted groups occurred. However, in most cases, the inserted groups were unable to extract. Four of their members were captured, and one was killed. In these conflicts, one soldier of the Corps of National Defense of Yugoslavia (CNDY—a formation, which, among other things, was responsible for the security of state borders) was killed.29 On the Yugoslav borders with the Cominform countries from June 1, 1948, to December 31, 1955, 28 people were murdered, 51 wounded, and 37 kidnapped. Of that number, 18 members of the CNDY were killed, 38 of them wounded, and 8 kidnapped. Most of these incidents happened on the border of Albania.30 When the review of border incidents and violations of territory and airspace in the period 1948 through 1952 are taken into account, it is visible that the total number was constantly increasing and that the peak had been reached during 1952: •  1948 (from July to the end of the year): 74 incidents •  1949: 442 incidents •  1950: 936 incidents •  1951: 1,517 incidents •  1952: 2,390 incidents Starting in 1949, most of the incidents occurred on the Yugoslav-Hungarian border and the number amounted to: •  1949: 149 incidents •  1950: 342 incidents •  1951: 793 incidents •  1952: 1,591 incidents There are still no archival documents to prove that the USSR and East European satellites were preparing an invasion on Yugoslavia in late 1949 through early 1950.31 The rumors of the possible Soviet-satellite aggression



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 119

on Yugoslavia began spreading again intensively after the war in Korea had started. A possible Balkan conflict had the same scenario as the Korean one. However, as in the previous case, there was no direct indication of a possible war conflict, except rumors, provocations, and intelligence operations. Both estimations from the Soviets and the United States were not in favor for that course of events. The reports of the Soviet military advisers in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania stated that armies of these countries had not been ready for serious military operations against Yugoslavia. The CIA estimated that from the end of 1950, it was said that the strength of satellite armies, Yugoslavia’s neighbors, had grown substantially during that year. Nevertheless, their effectiveness would depend on the Soviet aid and command. In NATO, from service estimations of March of the same year, satellite armies would not be ready for serious action for a couple more years.32 According to the Yugoslav estimates, the total strength of the Soviet army in Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria was 100,000 soldiers. There were only 35,000 of them in Austria. There were: •  Three army divisions and one air force division in Hungary. •  Two infantry, one tank, and one air force division in Romania.33 However, Tito and his comrades were not relaxed. On one occasion in September 1950, a former British representative at Tito’s headquarters during World War II, Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, and Tito met informally in Belgrade. During dinner, they talked about a possible Soviet-satellite invasion. Maclean noticed that his host was more preoccupied than during the most difficult days of war. Although the approach of winter would postpone the Soviet attack, Yugoslavia’s circumstances were extremely difficult. Increased production of armament had serious overall effects on the Yugoslav economy; the ambitious five-year plans had been thrown away, and on top of everything, a drought occurred that could cause serious food shortages. Tito also expressed readiness to purchase armament from the United States and the United Kingdom. He considered Soviet action against Berlin more likely to happen, but regardless of that, they would continue to prepare for eventual springtime action against Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Maclean stressed Tito’s determination to overcome all of the enumerated difficulties.34 The possible threat of serious drought to the ability of the Yugoslav government to resist Soviet military action had been recognized by US officials (i.e., acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson), who recommended that all possible steps should be taken to meet the Yugoslav food requirements.35

120

Chapter Six

According to the US National Security Council, by the end of 1949, there were four possible Soviet courses of action: •  Continuation and intensification of political, economic, and psychological pressures connected with attempts to induce an internal revolt with possible attempts of assassinations on Tito and his lieutenants. •  Guerilla operations within Yugoslavia sponsored from the outside. •  Military intervention by satellite armies only. •  Direct Soviet military intervention with or without assistance from satellite armies. According to US experts, Yugoslavia’s armed and security forces would be able to withstand any guerilla operations or satellite military intervention, but in the case of a full-scale Soviet intervention (i.e., together with satellite forces), Yugoslavia’s defenders could not withstand long enough or at all, without the possibility of replenishing their military equipment from Western sources. Yugoslav leadership knew that their army, although strong in numbers,36 had not been prepared for effective resistance. Lack of tanks, heavy armament—especially artillery, radar, communication devices, spare parts, and jet planes—increased every day and started to diminish its combat effectiveness and readiness. The other side already began a serious operation to build up satellite armed forces. During the constitutive meeting of the East European economic organization (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [CMEA]) in January 1949, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin stated that it was hardly likely that a major war in Europe would start in the next seven to eight years. Nevertheless, after the Korean War broke, he changed his opinion and started to insist for a more effective military buildup of the satellites. Actually, serious multilateral military cooperation began after a secret summit held on Stalin’s initiative on January 9 through January 12, 1951, in Moscow. All East European political and military leaders indisputably supported the idea of establishing a coordination committee for the buildup of the armed forces in the countries of the people’s democracy. Concrete figures for an increase of wartime and peacetime combat strengthening of East European armies had been offered, as well as a plan for their rearmament in the period from 1951 through 1954. Marshal Nicolay Bulganin became the chairman of the coordination committee. The recommendations for Bulgaria suggested that the wartime personnel staff of the Bulgarian armed forces had to be increased from 350,000 to 400,000. During the following years, a lot of mechanized tanks, air force, and naval divisions and naval coastal batteries had been intensively built up, accord-



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 121

ing to the Soviet model. New field manuals, regulations, and other directive documents were introduced as well. After 1951, all military exercises were carried out with the participation of Soviet advisers and in the presence of military delegations from other satellite countries. Thus in May 1955, when the final document was signed in Warsaw, it marked the end, not the beginning, of the buildup in the strength of the satellite armed and security forces and their integration in the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet model was undisputed.37 According to the statements of Yugoslav officials, the military buildup of Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian armed forces represented a violation of the Paris Peace Treaty, since the armies of those countries were limited in numbers and strength, due to their previous alliance with the Third Reich.38 Despite a tendency to observe many historical phenoma only from the local point of view, not insisting on the broader picture or consciously disregarding it, it is impossible to avoid the fact that in most cases, small countries were involved in complex political combinations of the great powers. Socialist Yugoslavia was no different. Stalin’s policy in the Balkans was only part of his “grand geopolitical chess,” where the Balkans were a “zone of geopolitical rivalry.” According to the NKVD’s (Народный Kомиссариат Bнутренних Дел, People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) General Pavel Sudopatlov, in 1951, Molotov had stated that Stalin’s moves in Europe (i.e., such as the tightening of relations with Yugoslavia and causing the Berlin crisis) were aimed at distracting attention from the Far East, where the Chinese Communists had won the civil war against the Chiang Kai-shek Nationalists. In June 1950, when war broke out in Korea, the plans for military intervention against Yugoslavia were dropped, if there had even been any serious plans.39 However, the CIA’s estimation from February 1951 brought out that there was a possibility of intervention against Yugoslavia that spring but with no certain evidence that a decision to begin operations had been reached. Due to the intensive military buildup, satellite capabilities and readiness for military action had been increased. According to the estimation, if the Soviet Union had decided to attack Yugoslavia during the same year, it would have been carried out by satellite forces with “unofficial Soviet assistance.”40 At the same time, an identical conclusion was brought up by the chief of Yugoslav military intelligence, Admiral Srećko Manola, who on one occasion told the US military attaché that he did not have any knowledge of military activity in satellite states to indicate a preparation for attack.41 However, Yugoslavia gained its place in the Western defense arrangements, although it never formally joined NATO. By receiving Western military assistance, it partially compensated for the technological backwardness, and by binding with Greece and Turkey through the Balkan Pact, Yugoslavia temporarily tied itself to Western defense plans. Thus, Yugoslavia filled the

122

Chapter Six

gap that existed on the southern flank of the Western alliance. Involuntarily, but obviously, Yugoslav divisions were placed at the disposal of the Western military planners. However, the formation of the joint command as one of the crucial steps that, perhaps, would move the Balkan Communist Protestants closer to the Western military alliance had not happened. The Yugoslav party and military leadership were particularly sensitive on this subject by refusing to consider it even within the Balkan Pact. Any similar arrangement (i.e., connecting to the command of NATO or the construction of a joint command of the Balkan Pact) would go in favor of long-term, as well as short-term, American political projections. However, in the end, American planners had to be satisfied with a short-term goal (i.e., Yugoslavia’s remaining beyond the reach of the Soviet Union, maintaining its independent status to exercise influence on Soviet satellites, which at one point would follow Yugoslav’s example). In early 1956, it was already clear that “the more far-reaching objective of tying Yugoslavia into the Western system and ensuring its effective contribution to free world power in case of war in Europe, chiefly through a larger-scale military aid program and the growth of the US and Western influence, had not been attained and there are no indications that it is attainable.”42 When the party leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries received information about the results of the Belgrade talks between Tito and Khrushchev, they concluded that 40 Yugoslav divisions were neutralized and that the United States could no longer count on them. As for the Balkan Pact, it had been said that because of the changes that had occurred in world politics, Yugoslavia would insist on its cultural and economic but not military component.43 One thing is certain; in the period that followed, the Yugoslav party, state, and military leadership continued to construct defensive systems and mechanisms, which resulted from the events from 1948. Despite the reconciliation achieved in 1955, the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR would never reach the level of intimacy that existed until the Resolution of the Cominform. Radical changes in doctrine and war plans had not occurred. Yugoslavia’s military industry had continued to develop in the central and mountainous parts of the country. Not even the interruption of Western military aid in 1958 and closer contacts with Third World countries dramatically influenced the development of specific defense mechanisms and doctrines incurred, as a result of divergence from Soviet policies and experiences. An institutional connection with the Atlantic Pact would inevitably lead to a state in which the ideological, political, economic, and military monopoly of Yugoslav Communists would be compromised, which would lead to their departure from power. Tito recognized this in time, and in many ways, it had influenced the formulation and construction of the “nonalignment” policy.



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 123

THE ROLE OF THE US DEPARTMENT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE The fifth article of the agreement between the US government and the FPRY on military assistance enabled the functioning of the American team for monitoring and administering the program, the American Military Assistance Staff (AMAS). A relatively vague entry largely represented the legal basis for the majority of the problems that had emerged throughout the activity of this department.44 Namely, a bad experience with the Soviet military instructors, as well as information about the experiences of other countries in which similar teams had been installed, forced the Yugoslav leadership to take this issue more seriously and rigidly than other countries who joined the program. The control missions, which were an integral part of any military assistance program, enabled infiltration in the recipient country’s army, providing not only better information about the operational execution of a program but also performing many more subtle and significant activities. As the assistance program consisted more of different and, for the recipient, new and unknown items, the need for educational and control work, regarding their use in the units, was more strongly imposed. Teams who were monitoring the implementation of these programs, often through the operational regulation of the issue, managed to bring representatives of their armed forces or civilian experts from their own payroll to take instructing or supervisory positions. This enabled them access to the most unique data and information, so in this way, the representatives carried out intelligence activity and gave excellent results. A second, and far more important, aspect of their installation had been a role that, owing to the wider political climate and the nature of the program, they received in the chain of command and in operational units that were equipped by this manner. Legalizing and legitimizing the presence of the control team led to a stronger connection with the primary users of new materials, making them the official persons whose competence often surpassed unit officers, thus weakening their authority and command capacity. Yugoslavs possessed information that, in the event of commencement of war operations, a large number of satellite military forces would be commanded by current Soviet military instructors and that such a trend was noticed in similar Soviet teams’ presence in the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA).45 On the other hand, military missions that were responsible for overseeing the implementation of programs and regulating their administrative and operational problems, by their very composition, could not pretend to any substantive competence in relation to such programs. They had no authority to suspend or qualitatively and quantitatively amend anything, but all activities in which the mission had been engaged could be subsumed under

124

Chapter Six

the category of getting the technical parts of the work done.46 With its screen, these teams got the reason and justification for their presence in a foreign territory, and this presence should be used to its maximum. However, the maximum decisively depended on the nature of the program, from a legal and diplomatic framework, which had been in place at the beginning, or a later willingness and ability of the parties to change the scope or substance of the frame therein. The fifth member of the military assistance contract had been something unsatisfactory to the United States, which had been trying to change it throughout the time of the program’s realization. It turned out that the Yugoslav tightening and insistence on such a dimension was not a result of current tactics but rather a well-defined approach to the problem, knowing their decision and determination to persevere.47 The American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), delegated to all armies that had been users of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), had several important features. The MAAG consisted of representatives of the US armed forces directly subordinated to the Pentagon and delegated to the military structures of recipient countries. It provided direct contacts and interaction between the armies, starting from the gradual influence of information and advices, but inevitably leading to the control, and even command subordination, of the recipient. In this way, there would have been a unique intelligence and organizational bridgehead created, enabling a fast and reliable system to obtain information on all aspects of military reality and preventing the restriction of the standard methods. This meant that it took place at the hot spot; any appeal to military intelligence that had supposedly been conducted under the pretext of advisory missions that would have been sent via regular ways had to undergo a long bureaucratic procedure that would have made their contents senseless to a considerable extent. Yugoslavia’s attitude on this issue was extremely hard during the negotiations. While the Americans did not expect it, Yugoslavia managed to fight for a favorable solution. Therefore, it was considered important to provide any written basis of the existence of such a team, hoping that the subsequent upgrades of its numerical status and competence would enable stronger bonding of Yugoslavia to the United States and NATO.48 A junior partner in this business had been aware that the current situation went smoothly, so the insistence on this point later turned out to be sufficient enough to disable the development of these institutions to the extent characteristic for other participants in MDAP. The fifth article of the agreement on American military aid to Yugoslavia arranged the existence of this body on a substantially different basis than was common in contemporary practice. The AMAS was placed under the direct command of the head of the diplomatic mission in Yugoslavia, which



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 125

meant changes in its hierarchy and subordination, which, in turn, withdrew completely different competences and possibilities of action. This disabled the direct installation in YPA’s system, leading to a completely different approach for the job, with the initial position significantly hampered. Second, from its name, which was agreed to be the American Military Assistance Staff (AMAS), were deleted entries indicating a certain degree of autonomy in the work. The terms “group” or “mission” were replaced by “staff” (staff personnel), which underlined the dependent character of this service, not giving it the weight of the nominal performer of its activities. In addition, its actual strength, which had been agreed on just before signing the agreement, represented one more US concession to Yugoslavia, because accepting that its count was 15 officers and as many clerks, its number was reduced to one third of the usual composition, and the agreement stated even explicitly that it must be as small as possible.49 Insisting on its later increase was a real political issue, because, although it was clear that this number had been sufficient to perform the work scheduled,50 the real reason for the existence and function of these teams was in much more serious activities than the administration of the technical part of the program. Yugoslavs were more than aware of this, so in the later period, they allowed only cosmetic changes, and even those only after long and hard military and diplomatic wrangling. AMAS consisted of five sectors (i.e., staff, general department, and army, naval, and aviation departments) and was made up of 30 people. On average, officers stayed about two years in Yugoslavia, then moved to other duties. According to Yugoslav data, 162 people—4 generals, 66 officers, 84 noncommissioned officers, and 8 military officials—had passed through this department.51 Brigadier General John Harmony was the first chief and remained in that position until December 4, 1953, when he was replaced by General P. Heins. To the Yugoslav contemporaries, Harmony left the impression of being a garrulous, intrusive, and ambitious officer who seemed quite suitable to perform the assigned job. It had been noted that he was proud of his rank and status and that he could be quite successful if one took care of his vanity, as it had been observed that he “wants to play a role of important person.” There was also noted persistence in promoting his views and proposals, which was roughly insisted on when he got refused, but reaffirming them again later by himself or through his subordinates. He showed great interest and energy at work, far more than other subordinated officers, which as he had often been exceeding his mandate, usually led to rather unpleasant situations. Otherwise, he was considered a flexible man who did not come to abrupt relations and was willing to yield when he felt that the rigidity of his attitudes could lead to a needless raising of tensions.52

126

Chapter Six

In the middle of 1953, Harmony launched a series of initiatives that should have led to formally matching his department with the participants of other missions in the MDAP, which would have their origination in the change of the service name and its numerical status. The Yugoslav authorities neither wanted nor had any reason to fulfill this request. The most critical foreign policy period, whose dangers led Yugoslavia to access the military assistance program, had already passed, while the basic functioning of the program itself was plunged into crisis due to complications related to the final solution of the Trieste question. In light of these events, compliance with this request would not be of any use and was given a negative answer. Harmony tried several times to ensure the change in the status of the department, but each time yielded no results and felt that he spent too much personal authority so that his further stay was not promising a particular perspective.53 General Heins, who replaced him, slightly increased the numerical composition of AMAS,54 except for the internal communication, the old name, and therefore, the level of the mission, remained unchanged. Serious increases to AMAS’s staff had been the subject of a series of talks between Ambassador Riddleberger and Yugoslav officials in 1955 and during the visit of Deputy Undersecretary of State R. Murphy. The American request to raise the number of members of the department to 60 was finally satisfied.55 The next year General Waters replaced Heins, who had very poor communication with the Yugoslav military officials; it seemed that even during the last period of the program, things were working better in the AMAS-YPA headquarters.56 At the beginning, a disproportion occurred between declared and actual capabilities and competencies of the American department. Its representatives insisted on their allegedly decisive role in matters of scale and efficiency of aid, but the practice had shown that, as the program was concerned, their role had been only mediating and administrative and that their real tasks were of quite a different character.57 In terms of military assistance, it performed four main tasks. The first had been related to informing the Yugoslav departments receiving military assistance of the arrival of foreign ships with transported materials, as well as of its types and quantity.58 They also carried the Yugoslav authorities’ reclamations on the received items to the US command and provided that, upon review of relevant items in the Yugoslav bases, only if they themselves were convinced that mentioned reclamations were justified.59 Elaboration of annual assistance to local military officials was supposed to represent their main activity, which had been used as a basis for seeking various information from the YPA. Such requests, when placed, went to the smallest tactical and technical details and were persistent at getting answers. However, soon it turned out that their impact on the implementation of the program had been almost symbolic, coming down to the opinion



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 127

accompanying the Yugoslav request to be sent to Washington, D.C. That is why Yugoslav officials did not attribute too much importance to their claims about how hard they were working and what a responsible job they were accomplishing.60 Ascribing these stories as the reason for the enlargement of staff, they answered that for the job they were doing, as proposed by the text of the agreement, their number was fully sufficient.61 The fourth segment of AMAS’s work had been related to regulating the departure of Yugoslav trainees to education and training in the US and European NATO bases, based on Yugoslav proposals and their eventual acceptance from the Pentagon. This activity implied determining types of courses and seminars, the number of participants, and solving administrative problems.62 Emphasis was placed on sending as many people as possible and proposing the broadest programs in relation to the estimated Yugoslav needs, but the realization of those forms of education for which the YPA was especially interested in (i.e., higher command and tactical training courses to handle modern types of weapons) were extremely complicated.63 This was apparent especially in relation to training the jet pilots in the period of expected first deliveries of the jet fighters. The AMAS’s work had been characterized by some basic tendencies and characteristics of its staff. The lack of technical knowledge on the problems of specific weapon types was noted, as well as reluctance to engage in providing specific technical explanations. Usually, it was justified by the excuse that they, by specialty, were not technicians, but as it turned out neither the knowledge of tactical nor operational issues was their strong side; their hosts concluded that, in most cases, they belonged to the intelligence sector.64 If the few incidents are excluded, their behavior toward elder YPA troop officers was correct, and they did not start or accept the political discussions about the YA and state in general, and in public appearances, they had been followed by generally positive opinions. Members of the AMAS were somewhat leaving the impression of frugality, which, according to Yugoslav beliefs, bordered with scantiness, because whenever possible, they avoided spending even the smallest sums of money. For example, when American ships delivered a contingent delivery of equipment from the MDAP, it was assumed that the AMAS officer must attend and supervise the unloading and rendering. At that time, he resided in one of the hotels in the port, but as long as the ship was at anchorage, he checked out of the room and slept in a cabin.65 Since the unloading lasted only a day or two, while the later material control procedures lasted much longer, some big money probably could not have been saved, but such practice remained during the entire period of the program. As for the visits to units and institutions of the YPA, they again were limited to ports and material rendition bases. However, since there had been

128

Chapter Six

further shipments from the base to the units, their requirements for visiting and control grew.66 The largest number of misunderstandings and problems emerged from this issue. According to the agreements that were reached with US officials, the largest part of the materials were intended for army units of the Fifth Army District, which presumed the ability and the right for visiting them. That request was soon extended to other units, either under the pretext that it was necessary to determine how the materials of Western origin ended up in their depots, or to get to know their status and needs for better planning of the next quota. Yugoslav officials had tried to minimize these visits’ achievements, endorsing them when it was possible, only to the units prepared in advance.67 Following the example of work in other countries, the AMAS staff tried to impose to their hosts a permanent notification system, which included the submission of reports on the reception of material, its current and planned location, mode of use, etc. Except for the data concerning the total number of equipment received for materials intended for army and air force effectiveness, the following had been required: •  To which units, where, and how the materials had been rendered •  The relation between the composition of reserve and active •  Direct submission of reports on the state of complete equipment (including Soviet and those of national origin) •  Submission of detailed data about the formation and composition of individual occupation categories and information about the condition and combat readiness level Notwithstanding the generally stated position on overruling their claims when it was possible, it seemed that even the relevant headquarters of the YPA could not count on such detailed reports.68 The close cooperation of this body with the Department for Economic Assistance, also at the American embassy, had been noticed, especially when the AMAS intelligence activity, in relation to the capacity and potential of the Yugoslav military industry, coincided with debates about the loans sought by Yugoslavia for its development. From the available documents, however, it was not possible to conclude which position General Harmony held at these meetings, or whether his view was affirmative or negative.69 Members of AMAS constantly underlined the need for additional engagement of foreign instructors for certain technical specialties. Although these requirements were usually rejected for the aforementioned political reasons, it was clear that they had a foundation in the real needs of the troops that



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 129

were adopting new materials. A few cases, when these suggestions had been accepted and a small number of foreign experts or technicians were received, showed that their engagement was more than necessary and useful and that those regulated a multitude of problems that, having relied only on local staff, would have been hardly resolved.70 However, it was clear that such a practice had been a question of political decisions on a much higher level, decisions that sanctioned a form of stronger attachment to the land of the aid’s donor, so a few episodes, regardless of their positive outcome, did not turn into the rule that the department wanted. How it affected the overall ability for Yugoslavia to use the newly arrived materials and how it had improved the existing image to a significant extent remains only in the domain of speculation. The Yugoslav officers assessed relations as correct between the AMAS staff and members of the YPA’s department for reception of military aid.71 In the beginning of the American service, between 1951 and 1952, a certain restraint had been expressed on both sides, but as the program unfolded, the relationships became more open.72 Mutual communication had been expressed through correspondence, personal contacts, meetings, and conferences and usually took place in the offices of the Yugoslav counterpart service. Intimate personal relations with the Yugoslav military officers who, at least on paper, were doing the same job, the US representatives did not manage to establish, although such tendencies had been manifested. Yugoslavs, most probably, had the instructions not to engage in getting too close to American staff, either from fear of possible recruitment (intelligence) or because of the desire to preserve the existing level of data secrecy. It was only later concluded that this practice had not contributed to better work of the Yugoslav (and even the US) teams. Even more, it led to the loss of an opportunity for affirmation of Yugoslav views and needs through direct contact with representatives of the service, which, formally and in practice, represented the United States as the aid’s donor.73 However, as all other representatives of the United States in Yugoslavia, the AMAS employees were treated as current allies but never as friends or strategic partners. A different ideological sign, on which both sides insisted, presented too great a barrier; the time they had at their disposal was too short to overcome it, and so on. This issue confirmed that the overall impression of America, its policies and world position, were still negative. Secrecy was a characteristic of the YPA’s representatives at all hierarchical levels of its command structure. If they had somehow grown accustomed to American planes and tanks with a red star on the turrets, the presence of a number of American officers and experts in their environment was still hard to swallow. For them, regardless of all the current common interests, they were only exponents of the “class enemies,” and such sensibility was not easy to change.

130

Chapter Six

It should be said that, according to Yugoslav testimony, international and foreign political events, which often had significant repercussions on the program itself in terms of concrete impact on the planning and implementation of assistance through cancellations, stoppage, or delays of deliveries, had not visibly influenced the behavior of the AMAS staff with Yugoslav officers, at least not according to the colleagues from the department for the aid’s reception.74 For example, during the Trieste crisis, their military professionalism and apparent indifference to politics had been underlined constantly, making it a constructive attitude that enabled the functioning of services during the period when deliveries of the materials were fully broken and anti-American mood was more than present in all spheres of life in Yugoslavia.75 As stated, the AMAS carried out its legal intelligence activities in two main ways—one, asking for reports from the relevant agencies and commands of the YPA, and two, the visits of its units, bases, and school centers. Although these activities were formally explained by the need to introduce the state of the Yugoslav army system for further assistance planning, as well as the control of using and maintaining materials already delivered, it quickly turned out that the interest of American military personnel went much further. The Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia holds the document from 1955 that contains the list of data related to the YPA, which the AMAS had requested by that year.76 In planning programs, especially when rearming of the Zagreb army district (Fifth Army District) started, AMAS requested and received information about the series of each unit and institutions that had entered the re-arming program, providing data related to local participation in arming and equipping units envisaged for the reception of American war materiel. The main emphasis was placed on the Zagreb Military District’s units, which, given the importance of the direction that the defense presented their assignment, were some of the main recipients of assistance. However, as these materials had been distributed to units outside of the Zagreb and Ljubljana army districts, it provided the AMAS staff an opportunity to expand its field of intelligence work. The accessible Yugoslav documentation showed no trace of their protest because of such Yugoslav practice, probably because it led to the opportunity for a legitimate manifestation of interest and problems of these units, as well as greater opportunities to obtain information about them. Yugoslavs were aware that the visits and tours of units and institutions of the Fifth Army District could not be avoided, but they made the maximal difficulties to it, trying to reduce the AMAS pressure through submitting written reports on the state and quantities of American war materiel. This, of course, could not satisfy the Americans, so they continued to insist on personal insight and control of weapons and equipment deployed outside the originally envisaged formations.



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 131

Wrangling on this issue lasted until the end of the program, developing into a constantly present problem, which neither side in real terms expected a positive solution. It had been used as an always available reason for raising tons of aggravation in relations. Although, from time to time, the Yugoslav command offered the possibility of visiting some units from the army, it was not of particular interest to the AMAS because it meant visits to previously prepared formations, which did not allow creating realistic images of their condition. Therefore, the AMAS staff emphasized the desire to visit the YPA units by their criteria, always announcing them on short notice, and such requests were answered negatively in most cases. The AMAS developed a wide range of activities, aimed at gathering information regarding educational problems of the YPA. Its representatives submitted a series of data on the annual reception of recruits in the army’s division at Zagreb, annual training plans, and information about the education system of officers and noncommissioned officers, as well as plans for organizing specialized courses.77 Provided data had been related to system maintenance and the supply of other army districts, deployment, and engagement of officers who had completed courses in the United States and European NATO bases, quarterly reports on the state of ammunition in storage and the use of American ammunition for shooting practice, and data on the level of territorial antiaircraft defense, indicating the need for its implementation. The denial of information was based on the attitude that they represented the internal affairs of competent command of the armed forces but that their discovery was of importance for further conducting the program.78 The interest of the AMAS personnel was directed to many segments of the life and work of the Yugoslav air force. During the planning of military assistance and re-arming of aviation units, a series of organizational information and information-related radar service connection issues, the storage of gasoline and aviation technical materials, the deployment of weather equipment, the maintenance of aircraft equipment, and a number of teaching activities were submitted.79 Organizing data was related to the air force’s structural composition, the number of aircraft bases, the technical area and storage of materials, composition and organization of air divisions, the organization of the YAF commands and technical supply department, the YAF’s perspective development plan, and the state of the numerous air force aviation units. In addition, the available information concerning the relationship between the number of available pilots and usable aircraft, the total actual strength of personnel in the YAF, and the number of available pilots and directions of their schooling were provided. It enabled access to information about deployment of aircraft from the assistance program and the prospects of construction and renovation of existing airports, as well as possibilities for the formation of

132

Chapter Six

an air corps.80 Yugoslavs were aware that the AMAS was forming YPA officer personnel files, which according to Bojan Dimitrijević, contained about 6,500 files of officers and noncommissioned officers so that there was a fear of the possible outflow of confidential information and possibly undergoing the US influence of officers who were already in contact with the armies of the Western allies.81 The Yugoslav navy’s part in military aid was significantly lower than that of other branches of the YPA, but it did not affect the interest of this department for its problems. The ports’ defense plans had required the number of minefields by type, number, and location, existing and predicted storage systems, plans of priority and the existing trained manpower for laying mines in the event of war, existing and planned minesweepers, and the perspective of mine production in Yugoslavia. Part of these requests came after submitting the Yugoslav coastal mining plan, which represented a response to an earlier request. Apparently dissatisfied with its content, members of the navy department of the AMAS turned out a detailed list of necessary information about Yugoslavia’s vision for passive coastal defense, but from the available documents, the Yugoslav response could not be recognized.82 AMAS interests in the YPA had widely exceeded the issue of military assistance, whether in the sphere of its planning, implementation, or delivery. Their interest for a large number of strictly organizational data, which was more the department of military attachés, strengthened suspicion toward the AMAS and its staff, as being members of the intelligence not the technicaloperative sector. In most cases, that provided the continuation of refusing to fulfill their requests whenever possible, creating practices that, when giving answers to a US request, the priority was to determine first if it was possible to waive the positive response, and only then, if it was justified or not. There were even recorded cases that, in the statements of some relevant commands, some requests were rejected although the procedure imposed on exactly the opposite function regarding the obligations and the needs of the YPA. It meant that any possibility for a negative reaction was automatically used, as if it were the objective itself.83 Thus, the YPA’s command structure, slowly but surely, gained a bureaucratic tendency to generalize and simplify the treatment of AMAS, knowing that, generally speaking, the Yugoslav officials had a tendency to display a repulsive attitude toward it. They knew that their superiors would rarely criticize them for that, while any accepting of the AMAS initiatives that were not strictly agreed on, would have been judged as a mistake. The general opinion was that they were “intruders and spies,” so there was no desire to take advantage of their activities for local goals.



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 133

A large amount of the information was coming out of the domain of provided assistance, but the lack of Yugoslavia’s cooperation was visible also. Yugoslavs often acted as if it were enough just to present a need for a product or program for it to find its place in the next plan of assistance. The favorable opinion of the AMAS members certainly could not have offered guarantees for the realization of a project but could have given gravity to the Yugoslav requests, while the atmosphere in which they worked was far from friendly and encouraging to give their support to the plans of the host. Visits to YPA units and institutions were one of the main AMAS activities.84 The largest part of their visits, as were planned, were carried out regarding control of the state and use of war materials in the Fifth Army District. Of the total 285 visits to the army by the end of 1955, 197 visits were to this army, of which at an army level, 19 visits had been organized, 48 corpus, 83 divisions, and 17 visits to the logistics base. Outside Zagreb Army District, 88 visits had been organized to the units that had these materials or were intended for re-arming through US military aid. There were 24 recorded visits to bases for material rendition, 19 to schools and training centers, 6 to military institutions, and 5 to factories. By the end of 1954, 16 requests for visits to the army had been refused.85 Given the level of aviation materiel in military assistance, as well as its specificity and importance, it was natural that its monitoring and control of using modes attracted special attention. Such visits were organized through nine logistics operative segments: visits to air bases, depots (38), schools (11), factories (10), workshops (4), radar observing stations and positions, which were more than 10, the air institutions (4), training camps, and specialized courses. Since the American officers and civilian experts had permanent permission to work in the air force base at the airport of Batajnica, the number of visits to any of the bases in existing Yugoslav documentation is unclear. However, it was probably at least twice the number of visits to other bases since during the aforementioned period, 87 visits had been organized. The nature of these visits was often dictated by certain specific situations, so it was not possible to plan them. It was not at all pleasant to Yugoslav officials, due to disabling the possibility to put the “last minute shine” over the real situation’s image, while the AMAS had been quite fit to have access to events in the main air base of the YPA. According to available Yugoslav data, until the end of 1955, more than 170 visits to the units and institutions of YAF were realized.86 Visits to the navy had been related to the ships from the Yugoslav navy, schools, depots, workshops, shipyards, and exercise units. There were more than 30 visits registered, which had generally been more focused on the

134

Chapter Six

inspection of depots and shipyards than on navigable units. According to documents from the archives of the ministry of foreign affairs, no requested visit was declined, while the members of the AMAS had not shown interest in attending the ship firing exercises, to which they had been invited by the navy’s representatives.87 Regarding the conduct of the AMAS members during the visits to the troops, everything happened under the watchful eyes of Yugoslav officers. So there were times when a haughtily arrogant attitude toward the local officers had been expressed, which was attributed to a desire to leave the impression that they were the owners of the equipment, with a right to detailed inspection, control, and supervision. Regarding various matters, the officers often checked the accuracy of statements of the commanders of regiments, divisions, and armies and their statements through the inquiring soldiers and noncommissioned officers. In this way, they could get a clearer view of a particular issue, but it also deteriorated the atmosphere in relations, which had not been particularly friendly anyway. These cases were regularly reported so that Harmony, Heins, and Waters were often invited to the general staff to explain this behavior.88 In short, an AMAS tendency was noted to obtain the status of full-right inspectors and advisers, while their hosts had no plans to allow anything more than the level of viewers and administrative performers.89 During the entire period of the program, 768 visits were made to units and facilities of the YPA. As the program progressed, their frequency grew, so there were only 194 visits in the last year of the program, which was almost five times more compared to 1952, when there were only 40.90 It should be primarily attributed to the difference in the quantity of materials received at the beginning and the end of the period of military assistance, but also to the persistence and agility of the AMAS members, who were able to establish the system’s performance during six years of work. In the same period, the YPA had been visited by 23 different delegations from the United States, consisting of generals and senior officers to the representatives of the ministry of foreign affairs and business people from the military industry due to “offshore” procurement with Yugoslavia. The AMAS provided organizational, intelligence, and technical assistance, especially if the delegation was tied to issues of military assistance.91 PARTICIPATION OF OTHER NATO COUNTRIES IN THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA Although mainly being oriented toward the United States, Yugoslavia expected, requested, and received military assistance, although to a much lesser



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 135

extent from other Western countries. Members of the Yugoslav military delegations negotiated with a number of representatives from the European NATO members, hoping that by dispersing its requests for military materiel it would gain a higher level of quality and quantity of shipments. These negotiations were partly related to the shipment of arms and ammunition, as well to gaining the licenses for producing certain types of weapons and equipment. Cooperation had been recognized in two ways—one, through direct bilateral negotiations and, two, through the tripartite committee for military assistance to Yugoslavia. The United States used all its influence to direct its allies into cooperating with Yugoslavia through a joint body established in October 1950. Through this body, it could provide not only an international aspect for the entire program, which was particularly important for the expostulation of programmed assets in the domestic public and Congress, but also for monitoring and channeling the intentions and activities of France and the United Kingdom regarding their provision of military assistance to Yugoslavia. Namely, these two countries were also beneficiaries of the extensive program of US military assistance; however, either content or structure of this assistance did not correspond with their expectations in all cases. This was not only related to the military surpluses and equipment left behind from World War II, since they also had at their disposal large stocks of technologically obsolete war materials, but also on specific types and models of contemporary weapons they had received (or more probably, they were forced to receive). In addition, they had all necessary capacities and raw materials for their own production. Through the assistance program, something similar could be achieved in Yugoslavia’s case. A new perspective of relaxing their stocks and surpluses had opened, or more precisely, a release of materials that already started to represent a burden. Moreover, through shipments of these weapons and equipment, they ensured achieving their economic interests, whether those were related to the negotiations on the loan for purchasing armament itself, which Yugoslavia and France held in the period from 1949 to 1951, or as a way to infiltrate Yugoslavia’s economic area. The questions of prewar debt, as well as the financial claims of the nationalized French companies after 1945, were also closely connected to these negotiations. It is not necessary to stress that such projections of European allies cooperating with Yugoslavia did not find approval in Washington, D.C. Of course, one of the reasons was the altruistic tendency to protect a small and poor country from exploitation caused by its unfavorable foreign policy position, but also because of the clear vision that the parity connection of Yugoslavia to several large NATO countries decreased the possibility of influence on its policy. The United States, as the main creator of the NATO policy, did

136

Chapter Six

not deliberate nor did it allow such development. Therefore, it put strong pressure on representatives of these countries in relevant structures of the alliance to align their activities in this field with the American interests and to deliver military assistance to Yugoslavia on the same basis as the United States. That meant that France and the United Kingdom needed to abandon their economic combinations for the sake of the uncertain possibility of political profit, that is, to embark themselves into the game for which they, regarding their internal problems and obligations they had toward NATO, did not desire, nor did it promise them some special and great opportunities. Administration of the system providing military assistance through a bilateral agreement remained a mask for the United States through the tripartite committee that covered their activities so that there was not, except at the beginning period, any operational autonomy regarding planning, programming, and implementing the shipments of war materiel to Yugoslavia. Therefore, for the European countries, participation in the program represented more of a marketing move for the preservation of their reputation and status as a great power than it enabled them to gain some concrete benefits in the diplomatic or economic plan. Numbers specifying quantities and the value of the materials shipped by these countries into Yugoslavia largely confirm this opinion.92 According to D. Bekić,93 France, among the first, had sent a certain amount of military equipment to Yugoslavia. This shipment came in the fall of 1951, and it encompassed 1,200 machine guns cal. 7.92 mm, 100 howitzers of 105 millimeters with 70,000 shells, and 70 guns of 150 millimeters with 20,000 shells. These materials, originating from the stocks of war booty of German weapons from World War II did not leave the impression of great assistance; however, the French counted on this to open the door to the conclusion of what they thought was a favorable contract on a loan for shipping armament and military equipment, on which they had been unsuccessfully negotiating since 1949. Additionally, establishing the tripartite committee forced France to adjust its plans to the allies’ interests, which, actually meant their subordination to the American vision of this problem. Americans doubted that the subject of shipment based on this loan would become part of the armament they had delivered to France for their operations in Indochina, which would mean that their military industry should at least partially finance a French diplomatic-commercial project.94 By drawing clear differences between assistance, which should be distributed through the tripartite committee, and whose content had been determined in advance, and commercial contracts, which treated military materiel outside of its framework and the framework of the allies’ obligations within NATO, the United States made the French offer much less attractive for Yugoslavia, especially concerning the basic part of the program. However, the United Kingdom tried to protect the French po-



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 137

sition. They considered that the negotiations on purchasing French weapons on these bases represented a good way for completely introducing Yugoslavia into the Western orbit. Western inspectors would “on the spot examine Yugoslav needs for weapons and equipment,”95 and, most importantly, that would ensure Western European influence on a level that could counteract the American one. Insubstantiality of such stands soon proved in the form of a determined American rejection to share control over the program with anyone that, according to the premises of the strategy of the wedge, supported the exercise of their diplomatic activities in Eastern Europe. French-Yugoslav contracts on commercial loans, which encompassed compensation for nationalized French assets in Bor mines and compensation for debts from the period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, had been finally signed on April 14, 1951. This agreement provided a credit of 5,000,000 francs, during the period from 1951 to 1954, when war materials had been delivered, intended mostly for artillery. All armament and equipment received based on this credit had been of German origin, that is, they represented war-booty materiel from the last phases of World War II.96 According to the document quoted by D. Bekić, it encompassed one ammunition factory as well.97 The United Kingdom played a significantly greater role in the military assistance program for Yugoslavia. During the summer of 1951, two Yugoslav high military delegations visited London. The first was led by Lieutenant General Voja Todorović, and, during the three weeks of negotiations (May 11 through June 6), they created a basic arrangement within which they should urgently deliver missing materiel for the Yugoslav aviation.98 On his return from negotiations in Washington, D.C., from June 24 to July 4, Chief of General Staff General Koča Popović had intensive discussions with the representatives of the British military establishment.99 They talked over the problems of shipment not only of materials from the stocks but modern military equipment as well, from helicopters to jets, and modern antiaircraft (AA) artillery and tanks of the postwar generation. The result was the list, containing materials valued at 6,305,000 £100 ($17,000,000), which should have been delivered to Yugoslavia as free assistance. The list contained 200 antitank guns of 57-millimeters with 37,000 shells, 900 portable radio stations (MK 18 and MK 48), 143 Mosquito airplanes (types NF MK 38, FB MK VI, and T MK III), radar for airplane identifications, etc. The greatest part of the materiel list was delivered according to the plan, but it was also noted that some airplanes were delivered uncompleted intentionally, that is, there were traces of removing missing equipment immediately before their delivery. This opinion from the command of the Yugoslav air force gained significance when in 1952, assistance was approved in the amount of 500,000 £, and within which it was possible to obtain only mentioned missing equipment for

138

Chapter Six

Mosquitoes.101 When we add that, for the previous year, the list contained a clause according to which 80 Mosquito FB MK VI would be delivered after repair in the value of approximately 2,000 £ per piece. This sum would be subtracted from the amount of 6,305,000 £. It may be concluded that the British found a relatively cheap, and in the case of the second list, almost free method, for a short period and in almost symbolic volume, to present themselves as a donor of the military materiel to Yugoslavia. It is interesting to note that Yugoslavs were those who requested types of war materiel. Namely, Yugoslavs, in several instances, mentioned that they were interested in getting trucks, helicopters, tanks, and radio equipment, whether through the assistance program or through commercial arrangements, but also licenses for the production of jets and their engines, as well as 20-millimeter and 40-millimeter ammunition for AA artillery. At first, the British answered vaguely to the Yugoslav negotiators that they would meet these requests but with some delay, which depending on the issues, varied from six months to three to four years. It turned out that the British still did not have a clearly defined view of their position in the overall system of the supply of Yugoslav forces with war materiel and that they may have committed themselves to only the shipments of those weapons and equipment that either by its specification or by quantity could represent a more significant engagement. Yugoslavs understood that transportation means, workshops, mining equipment, and helicopters would be delivered only in the framework of the commercial arrangements. Seventy tanks, type Centurion, weighing 50 tons, might be considered only after a four-year period, 40 jet fighters only after a year, and licenses for producing jet fighters only after getting technical data and after making a strategic study. For 52 20-millimeter and 30-millimeter three-barrel Polsten gun intelligence radio trackers, it had been said “something will be found when our experts come,” and a license for producing 20-millimeter and 40-millimeter ammunition was rejected with the reserve that it might become part of some future commercial contract. On all these questions, a negative answer was given later.102 Seeing that the United States was completely overtaking equipping the Yugoslav army, the United Kingdom alone realized that there was no space for their program, or the senior ally made that clear to them. For some time after, Yugoslav tried to expand its reduced military cooperation with the West, reduced in practice to cooperating with the United States or the United Kingdom. They did base their efforts on the fact that the country after World War II sold the license for producing jet fighters to the USSR, and it requested, based on this benchmark, the same opportunity for itself. In relations between Yugoslavia and the West, this matter raised quite a lot of noise during July 1955, when information was leaked that General Zdenko



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 139

Ulepič, as the head of the military and technical delegation, negotiated with the representatives of the Soviet military industry to purchase the license for a MIG-15, the jet fighter made exactly on the basis of the mentioned British aircraft.103 In available documents, there is no answer on the question if this information expressed the true intentions of the Yugoslav leaders or if it pressured Western countries in order for them to take a more cooperative attitude toward the Hunter airplane license. It may, however, be considered that the other variant was more probable. Moreover, there was no doubt that Yugoslavs were well aware that taking such a far-reaching step would jeopardize their relations with the West in greater measure than they were prepared to allow. Regardless of the existence of groups in the army and in the party that would greet the return to the Eastern system, normalizing the relations with the USSR still was too far away and its possibility still hid numerous uncertainties and obstacles. One such drastic move would have brought into question the very Yugoslav negotiating position, not to mention repercussions to the further activities regarding the Western military assistance program. By giving stimulus to the activities regarding gaining a license for producing jet fighters in this way, Yugoslavia, however, did not manage to protect the finalization of this project, partly due to the conditions of its industrial potentials, and partly due to its international position that had been characterized as neutral in relation to the profiled military-political blocks. Attempts to provide a license for the aircraft Goblin and Vampire had the same destiny,104 as well as the French jet fighter Mystere IV A.105 Negotiations for the license for Hunter had gone rather far away. In January 1953, information arrived that Yugoslavia’s request had been approved. General Bubanj traveled to England on January 23 because of this information to presumably discuss the details, but this never happened.106 The given explanation why, which stated that producing jet fighters was rather expensive and a technologically complicated process, for which the Yugoslav industry and military industry still were not prepared,107 had a realistic basis in the Yugoslav economic conditions. From its level of development, it really would have been more cost effective to use jet fighters from the MDAP system that arrived free than to adopt materials that were already obsolete in its country of origin and all with an uncertain outcome. However, this issue also outlined the Western strategy that, regardless of its possibilities, and especially due to the confidence in its long-term political orientation, Yugoslavia stayed in a constant dependent position from NATO, without giving permission for at least the prospective of its independence in a military regard. At the same moment, the mere desire for such independence showed Yugoslav’s ready apprehension of military-technical issues, that is, their subjective approach characteristic for many aspects of Yugoslav postwar history,

140

Chapter Six

which did not contribute to its reputation as a serious negotiator. Planners of the tripartite committee, who started their shipments with piston-engine Mosquitoes and Thunderbolts, instead of Hunters or Sabers jets, demonstrated not only their knowledge of reception possibilities of Yugoslavia’s armed forces but also graduation that enabled later upgrade of this system in compliance with the modern trends. However, this approach had its full justification in the mentioned sense only at the beginning of the implementation of this program, that is, in the period when Yugoslavia completely needed any kind of experience regarding exploitation of jet fighting aviation. When Thunderjets became part of the Yugoslav air force in considerable numbers, and especially when IRAN108 procedures of its maintenance were adopted, the political aspect of disapproving licenses completely expressed itself. Separation from the USSR had been sufficient for retrieving and using jet fighters, but their permanent possession, based on the domestic production, required much more.109 NOTES 1.  L. Lees, p. 78 2.  L. Lees, p. 79. 3.  https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/assessing-the-soviet-threat-the-early-cold-war-years/ docs.html, Document n. 84. Daily Summary Excerpt, June 30, 1948, Implications of Possible Approach to West by Tito. 4.  Further readings: Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Zbornik radova, Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Beograd 2008, između ostalih radovi: Jordan Baev, Bulgaria and the Balkan Pact 1953–1954, pp. 237–250, László Ritter, War on Tito’s Yugoslavia? The Hungarian Army in Early Cold War Soviet Strategies, pp. 251–281, Victor A. Gavrilov, The Balkan in the Context of the Soviet-Yugoslav Relation in the Late 1940s–Early 1950s, pp. 219–225; Guštin, D., Prebilič, V., The Intervention That Never Happened: Yugoslavia under the Threat of Soviet Intervention 1948–1953, Exiting War. Post Conflict Military Operations, 6th International Conference Military History Working Group, Bratislava–Chateau de Vincennes 2007, pp. 290–305; Dmitar Tasić, “Neostvarena pretnja (Mogućnost sovjetsko-satelitske agresije na FNRJ 1948–1953)” (Unfullfiled threat (Possibility of Soviet—satellite aggression on FPRY 1948–1953), Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 1/2009, pp. 81–98. 5.  https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/assessing-the-soviet-threat-the-early-cold-war-years/ docs.html, Document n. 107. ORE 48–49, November 18, 1948, The Trends of SovietYugoslav Relations. 6.  Vojni Arhiv (Military Archive—VA), Arhiv Jugoslovenske narodne armije (Archive of the Yugoslav People’s Army—JNA), k. 13, f. 1, br. 2/6, Plan of the grouping of Yugoslav Army armed forces according to the plan code name Maximum/initial



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 141

operational plan code name Steel/General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, I Direction—I Department.   7.  VA, JNA, Komanda KNOJ i GJJ (Command of the Corps of National Defense of Yugoslavia and Yugoslav border troops—CNDY), Inv. br. 372 5–216, Report of the Command of CNDY to Ministry of National Defense (YA General Staff) classified n. 1095, August 3, 1948.   8.  VA, Arhiv JNA, k. 12, f. 4, br. 8/1, Order for dislocation of Yugoslav Air Force units, YA General Staff, I Direction—I Department, classified n. 1607, September 28, 1949.   9.  Branko Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988 (History of Yugoslavia 1918–1988), Knjiga III, Beograd, Nolit, 1988, p. 235 (hereinafter: B. Petranović). 10.  VA, Arhiv JNA, k. 540, f. 1, br. 5/1, Decision on composition of Coordination Committees for National Defense in governments of Federal republics, President of Government of FPRY, Minister of National Defense, classified n. 412/49, March 31, 1949. 11.  VA, Arhiv JNA, k. 670, f. 2, br. 5/1, Order for the reorganization of YA and CNDY, transfer to the new formations and new mobilization plan, YA General Staff, III Direction—I Department, classified n. 1927, July 27, 1949. 12.  Bojan Dimitrijević, Od Staljina do Atlantskog pakta; Armija u spoljnoj politici Titove Jugoslavije 1945–1958, ISI, Beograd 2005, p. 167 (hereinafter B. Dimitrijević, JNA od Staljina do Atlantskog pakta). 13.  VA, Arhiv JNA, k. 541, f. 2, br. 4/1, Report of the National Defense Commission of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Supreme Command Council, classified n. 3, January 5, 1951. 14.  VA, Arhiv JNA, k. 539, f. 2, br. 2/1, Minutes of the conference concerning the evacuation of industry, September 13, 1949 (present: Josip Broz-Tito, Franc Leskošek, Krsto Popivoda, Koča Popović, Ljubodrag Đurić, Svetislav—Ćeća Stefanović, Milo Kilibarda). 15.  B. Petranović, p. 231. 16.  https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/assessing-the-soviet-threat-the-early-cold-war-years/ docs.html, Document n. 132. ORE 46–49, May 3, 1949, The Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1949. 17.  https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/assessing-the-soviet-threat-the-early-cold-war-years/ docs.html, Document n. 151. Daily Summary Excerpt, December 5, 1949, Comments on Soviet Plan Against Tito. 18.  Bela Kiraly, The Aborted Soviet Military Plans against Tito’s Yugoslavia, in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in Historic Perspective, Brooklyn College Press, New York, 1982, pp. 273–288. 19. László Ritter, War on Tito’s Yugoslavia? The Hungarian Army in Early Cold War Soviet Strategies, Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Institute za strategijska istraživanja, Beograd 2008, pp. 251–281 (hereinafter: L. Ritter). 20.  L. Ritter, p. 273. The depth of each of the three belts varied from 10 to 25 km. The main defense belt consisted of reinforced concrete pillboxes and other fortified positions to house machine guns, mortars, antitank guns, and light artillery, as well as

142

Chapter Six

observation and command posts. By the end of the construction, it consisted of 2,408 pillboxes and other fortified positions, 90 battalion and 25 company defensive areas, 201 section and 146 squad bases, and 963 obstacle centers to military operations, as well as several hundred mock constructions. 21. Jordan Baev, Bulgaria and the Balkan Pact 1953–1954, Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Beograd 2008, pp. 237–250 (hereinafter: J. Baev). 22.  L. Ritter, p. 273. 23.  Т. В. Волокитина, Г. П. Мурашко, А. Ф. Носкова, Т. А. Покивайлова, Москва и восточная Европа. Становление политических режимов советского типа 1949–1953. Очерки истории, Российская политическая энциклопедия, Москва, 2002, стр. 370. (hereinafter: Москва и восточная Европа. Становление политических режимов советского типа 1949–1953). 24.  Москва и восточная Европа. Становление политических режимов советского типа 1949–1953, стр. 370. 25. In the following years this principle became extremely visible in Albania, where the Enver Hoxha regime organized massive construction of concrete bunkers. These bunkers were spread all over the country, becoming a visible remainder of Albania’s endangered position against its revisionist and imperialist neighbors—Yugoslavia and Greece. 26.  АЈ, КМЈ, II–5–a–1/21. Information on increase of military effectives, measures on borders and airports—received from CNDY. 27.  B. Dimitrijević, JNA od Staljina do Atlantskog pakta, стр. 211. 28.  VA, JNA, Komanda KNOJ i GJJ, Inv. br. 371 8–22, Overview of the infiltrated agents from the countries of peoples democracies after the Resolution of Cominform. 29.  VA, JNA, Komanda KNOJ i GJJ, Inv. br. 371 8–17, Overview of the clashes with bandits on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border during 1953. 30.  VA, JNA, Komanda KNOJ i GJJ, Inv. br. 371 8–17, Overview of assassinations, woundings, and kidnapping from June 1, 1948, until December 31, 1955. 31.  V. Gavrilov, p. 220. 32.  V. Gavrilov, pp. 220–221. 33.  АЈ, КМЈ, II–5–a–1/21. Information on increase of military effectives, measures on borders and airports—received from CNDY. 34.  NARA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, Army—Intelligence Project Decimal Files 1949–1950, From 014.33 Yugoslavia to 813 Yugoslavia, Box 200, CSGID 350.05 Yugoslavia January 1, 1949, through 1950, Report by Fitzroy McClean of his Meeting with Tito, September 7, 1950. 35.  NARA, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council (NSC), Policy papers 1 1–18, Entry 1, Box 2, NSC 18/4, October 16, 1950, National Security Council Progress Report by the Secretary of State on the Implementation of United States Policy Toward the Conflict Between the USSR and Yugoslavia (NSC 18/4) and Economic Relations between the United States and Yugoslavia (NSC 18/2), Memorandum for Mr. James S. Lay, Executive Secretary, National Security Council. 36.  According to the data of the CP SU Politburo from the end of 1949, the Yugoslav army totaled 500,000 men—V. Gavrilov, p. 221.



Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West 143

37.  J. Baev, pp. 242–243. 38.  J. Baev, p. 244. 39.  V. Gavrilov, pp. 221–222. 40.  NARA, RG 273 Records of the National Security Council (NSC), Policy Papers 1 1–18, Entry 1, Box 2, Background Documents on NSC 18, February 24, 1951, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates, Subject: NIE-29, Yugoslavia. 41.  NARA, RG 59 Department of State, Decimal File 195 0–54, From 661.65/ 4–1350 to 661.81/1 1–954, Box 2947, 24 February 1951, Telegram of the US Ambassador in Belgrade George Allen to the Secretary of State. 42.  NARA, RG 273 Records of the National Security Council (NSC), Policy Papers 5601–5602, Entry 1, Box 39, NSC 5601, January 9, 1956, National Security Council, United States Policy Toward Yugoslavia. 43.  J. Baev, p. 248. That was the exact comment of Vulko Chervenkov expressed in June 1955 to his comrades from the Bulgarian Communist leadership. 44.  M. Stojković, p. 227. 45.  VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8, p. 33. 46.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f IV, 32, pp. 10, 12, 16. 47.  I. Laković, pp.186–189. 48.  DAMSPRS, 1955, Str. pov, f III, 332, I/32 8–329. 49.  Ibid., p. 2. 50.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f IV, 32, p. 12. 51.  VA, II section, K-21, f III, R-3, pp. 12–13. 52.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f IV, 32, p. 16. 53.  B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, pp. 155–156. 54.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f V, 39, p. 16. 55.  DAMSPRS, Str. pov, 1955, f II, 213, 214, 220, 291, 298, 300, 302, 319. 56.  I. Laković, pp. 189–192. 57.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f IV, 32, p. 10. 58.  Ibid. 59.  Ibid., pp. 10–11. 60.  Ibid., pp. 11–12. 61.  Ibid., p. 12. 62. Ibid. 63.  VA, II section, K-21, f III, R-3, p. 8. 64.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f IV, 32, p. 13. 65. Ibid. 66.  Ibid., pp. 13–14. 67.  I. Laković, pp. 193–194. 68.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f IV, 32, pp. 14–15. 69.  Ibid., p. 14. 70.  Ibid., pp. 15–16, 19; VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f V, 39, p. 17. 71.  VA, II section, K-21, f III, R-3, p. 16. 72.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f V, 39, p. 16. 73.  VA, II section, K-21, f III, R-3, pp. 15–16.

144

Chapter Six

  74.  Ibid., p. 16.   75.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f IV, 32, p. 13.   76.  DAMSPRS, 1955, Str. pov, f III, 332, I/33 7–344.   77.  DAMSPRS, 1955, Str. pov, f III, 332, I/33 7–344, p. 5.   78.  Ibid., pp. 5–7.  79.  Ibid.   80.  Ibid., pp. 1–2.   81.  B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, pp. 65–66.   82.  DAMSPRS, 1955, Str. pov, f III, 332, I/34 7–349, pp. 1–2.   83.  DAMSPRS, PA, 1953, f 79, 8, 414379.   84.  DAMSPRS, 1955, Str. pov, f III, 332, I/35 0–361.   85.  Ibid., pp. 1–5.   86.  DAMSPRS, 1955, Str. pov, f III, 332, I/36 2–366.   87.  DAMSPRS, 1955, Str. pov, f III, 332, I/36 7–368.   88.  DAMSPRS, 1955, Str. pov, f III, 332, I/35 0–361.   89.  I. Laković, pp. 200–203.   90.  VA, II section, K-21, f III, R-3, pp. 10–11.   91.  VA, II section, K-21, f III, R-3, pp. 11–12.   92.  I. Laković, pp. 211–213.   93.  D. Bekić, p. 318   94.  Ibid., p. 232   95.  Ibid., p. 233.   96.  DAMSPRS, Str. pov, 1955, f III, 332, Military assistance, p. 2 (1588).   97.  D. Bekić, p. 279.   98.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, 355, pp. 1–2; B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, p. 22.   99.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, 355, pp. 1–2; D. Bekić, p. 301; B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, p. 19. 100 101.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, 355, pp. 1–2. 102.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, 335, pp. 1–2. 103.  D. Bogetić, pp. 219–221. 104.  B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, p. 22. 105.  VA, II section, S-115, f I, 1093 (55), pp. 1–2; VA, II section, S-115, f I, 1998 (95), p. 2. 106.  VA, II section, S-115, 269/12, f IV, 10, p. 6. 107.  DAMSPRS, Str. pov, 1955, f II, 288. 108.  IRAN—Inspection and repair as necessary. 109.  I. Laković, pp. 213–217.

Chapter Seven

Under a Different Light Reconsiderations and Stagnation of the Military Assistance Program

The improving relations with the USSR could not have continued without serious consequences on the military assistance coming from the other side of the Iron Curtain, especially at the meetings held in Belgrade, Moscow, Yalta, and the Brioni Isles, that marked the Yugoslav foreign policy activities during 1955 and Western officials’ responses to their occurrence and content. Since the beginning of the military aid project, the United States had been faced with the narrowing and reducing of their strategic intentions and premises for their realization. In the early 1950s, there was a tendency toward the gradual inclusion of Yugoslavia in NATO, but the middle of the decade brought serious doubts, which reemerged with the intention of Yugoslavia’s leadership to return to the Soviet camp. Since the military assistance program depended on the approval and a positive opinion of many political and military factors in the American administration, it is not difficult to assume that, to a large number of them, this work looked pointless and counterproductive. The program functioned due to a slight counterweighting on the scale of American political interests, being based on Yugoslavia’s negative attitude toward the Eastern Bloc and its politics, and was fed by the hope of gradual inclusion in the formal system of allied obligations under the auspices of NATO. A different perception of Yugoslavia’s intentions and its diplomatic activities in 1955, which ranged from clearly expressed (more accurately, repeated) intention to stay away of any kind of integration into the Western military alliance, to the fast and publicly effective detente with the USSR, impaired the balance to a serious extent.1 The American side could not expose that this reconciliation had been welcomed in Yugoslavia with much easier acceptance and more genuine sympathy than had ever been the case with the policy of relying on the West. Based on the issue of military assistance, its planners made clear that Yugoslavia 145

146

Chapter Seven

had lost its previous level of need, which would have forfeited any important segment of foreign policy, and therefore, causing the loss of the previous importance of the bilateral American-Yugoslav relations. For example, as much as the head of the American Military Assistance Staff (AMAS), General Harmony, was dissatisfied with his status, he had never been treated with such open hostility as was the case with his successors Heins, Watters, and Walter. His staff had played a much more constructive and significant role than was the case later, regardless of the fact that the exact question of the military mission’s mandate was among the main excuses for slowing down and the eventual stoppage of deliveries in 1955.2 Although the later period had brought the delivery of types and models of weapons of the most highsounding names and reputation, the fact remained that they represented only a consequence of the previously built system, implemented with specific goals and intentions. When the situation began to change substantially, technical and superficial corrections were not sufficient to make the whole program adapt to the new situation. Designed and activated with the intention to bring certain benefits in the expectations of a Soviet attack and fear of its immediate commencement, this system hardly fit to the changed foreign policy blend in the course of one of its protagonists.3 The benefit that the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) had received from this system had neither cause nor motive in its commencement. It should not be any wonder that a serious and far-reaching delay in reorganizing and modernizing its notes caused the reduction of the amount of delivered materiel, and then almost the dissolution of deliveries and did not give the state diplomacy a sufficient reason to adjust its overall direction to allow at least a continuation of the program in some changed form. A clearly expressed intention to escape all forms of addiction to the West, in which military assistance represented one of the most exemplar components, brought the delivery of military materiel to a stalemate in 1955. Conversations that Koča Popović and Tito had with Riddleberger and Heins on these issues did not provide any results, while the visits of R. Murphy and J. F. Dulles only calmed the verbal dispute. As sources indicated, the level of delivery after all these contacts remained at a much lower level than was the case up to the first half of 1955.4 As said, the excuse for this kind of development was found at the most convenient place—the mandate and size of the AMAS. Yugoslavs constantly degraded its importance and function, and army officials strove to use the received war materiel in a way belonging to the “border area” of the bilateral agreement. Namely, the equipment had been disposed according to the plan of peacetime and war formations as they existed in the Yugoslav mobilization plans. It meant that part of the assets would have been used in the



Under a Different Light 147

regular peacetime units to conduct training and other regular activities, while the other part would have ended up in depots and warehouses, dedicated to equipping units that would have been formed in case of war. Since the bilateral agreement of 1951 assumed the obligation of using, not stocking, the aid materiel, the Yugoslav side was constantly under pressure to put the equipment to use. In that case, it would have been more easily available to AMAS control but would have also provided a greater dependence on the army units to receive equipment. US representatives insisted on this because these materials should not have been a lasting gift to Yugoslavia, but effective only in the period in which the Yugoslav policy existed to the interests of the donor country. Delivering a lesser quantity of spare parts, ammunition, accessories, and tools and asking Yugoslavia to constantly keep this equipment in use, the United States expected that the life span of the materiel would be much less than the Yugoslavs needed. They too hoped that its resources would run out at a sufficient speed to keep the recipient in a position of constant need for continued deliveries. However, the YA’s leadership did not plan to quickly use the items from this program. A division on the war and peacetime units was in line with the emphasis on the needs of the defense of the Ljubljana Gap as the obligation accepted from the Western allies, and indeed allowed creating solid materiel and a technical basis for equipping units in the Fifth Army District. In addition, in this way, a considerable amount of equipment would have been kept from wear, representing a source for extending the equipping of peacetime units and the retention of the achieved level of their firepower. Preserved in this way, war materiel from military aid could have been later used on other sectors and thus spread the range of the program to fields that were not predicted by the initial agreement. At the beginning of the program, when the majority of the delivered weapons originated from either war surpluses or from not being particularly valuable materiel, the Americans did not insist on materiel dispersion, implicitly allowing leakage to other units. As the equipment would have quickly run out anyway, regardless of the place of use, as well as that Yugoslavia would have been significantly more bonded to the Western military alliance, it seems that Americans had calculated that the program would have probably continued equipping all army units. During the mid-1950s, when it had become clear that the YugoslavWestern relations would not develop in this direction, the competent services in Washington, D.C., logically, through diplomatic representatives and the AMAS, increased the pressure on Yugoslavia. Yugoslavs had been expected to provide not only a more comprehensive insight into disposing of the war materiel, but in all aspects of the plans for its usage, with the aim of achieving a greater impact on their formation and implementation. For the aid

148

Chapter Seven

donor, this had been particularly important, as more of the program began to include the modern, sophisticated, and expensive war equipment, which such resources, although being used, were relatively far from being exhausted. Simply speaking, the United States did not favor the unconditional delivery of equipment that would have remained in the mode of exploitation longer than planned, that is, that could represent a serious source of Yugoslav military power after eventual changes in the direction of foreign policy.5 At the meeting between Riddleberger and Tito on April 22, 1955, the American ambassador said that at the last NATO meeting in Paris, Yugoslavia’s behavior encountered the undivided condemnation of member countries. A decision was reached that further deliveries would be blocked until this issue was resolved in a satisfactory way. Tito tried to minimize it, categorizing it as a technical problem in the communication of competent services, but Riddleberger kept on, stating that this represented a serious political issue, not a technical one.6 Again, he repeated this attitude during the talks with Tito on April 257 and May 10 with Koča Popović.8 He had been presented with Yugoslavia’s willingness to allow for the increasing number of mission members, but the United States also required a submission of precise data on the approved resources and delivery plans, as well as the implementation of already approved programs. The question of how much the AMAS personnel had been the excuse, rather than a motive for the tensions rising, can be seen in an almost comic situation that followed at the meeting. Therefore, when it turned out that the United States, which had raised tensions by requiring the increase of the number of military representatives, insisted that six officers come to Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav government approved 15, which more than doubled that number.9 However, it would be wrong to think that the American ambassador was against Yugoslavia’s support. Submitting the report to Congress after the visit of the Soviet delegation, he pleaded for the continuation of economic and military support. He justified his attitude by recent events that proved that Yugoslavia remained an independent country and, as such, still represented an example to the other Communist states to follow its lead to try to separate from the USSR.10 In the vision of American officials, Yugoslavia still was the bearer of the wedge strategy in the Eastern part of Europe. However, on his return to Belgrade, Riddleberger kept pressing ahead with the issue of military assistance. Obviously, he was aware that Washington, D.C., took the more restrictive course on military assistance, which had been especially visible in refusing to provide any information about the amount of approved funds and items provided under the programs during 1955 through 1956. As Bogetić stated at the meeting with Tito, Riddleberger asked about the further compatibility of Yugoslav and Western military points of view on



Under a Different Light 149

this issue as a basis for military aid, mentioning its suspension as the ultimate consequence of continuing such a Yugoslav policy. Tito proposed that these issues should have been discussed at the meeting between the representatives of the tripartite powers and Yugoslavia, at the level of deputy ministers of foreign affairs. Although they accepted a proposal, the Western powers did not want to give this meeting publicity through the participation of their high-ranking representatives. From their point of view, such a move would create a specific consequence and would additionally strengthen Yugoslavia’s position in light of the announced Yugoslav-Soviet talks at the highest level.11 Therefore, it had been agreed that the conference would be held at the level of ambassadors, at a significantly lower level than the Yugoslav side wished. Anyway, it was illusory to expect that when Yugoslavia had clearly announced its plans to abandon approaching NATO on both the issues of formalizing ties and coordinating operational plans, the Western powers would increase its ratings by sending a high-level delegation to a conference that was not likely to provide any agreement of greater importance. Srđan Prica, the state undersecretary, presented the Yugoslav positions at the conference, held June 24–27 in Belgrade, while Ambassadors Riddleberger, Coulet, and Roberts represented the views of the tripartite powers. The first day of the conference passed in taking views on a number of current international issues, especially the question of Soviet intentions and the background of its foreign policy, the German question, and the question of the status of the Yugoslav interbloc position. Although these topics had general character, even in this part of the talks, a clear conceptual disagreement between Prica and his interlocutors could have been noticed. Prica had stated that the reasons for the new Soviet peace initiatives should have been sought with their understanding that the existing policy could not have ensured the achievement of their goals. He considered the Soviet peace initiatives as a positive fact that should be used in reducing the tensions between opposing blocs (especially considering Yugoslavia), and not to interpret them as an expression of weakness and withdrawal to create space for further confrontation. Actually, his statements had the aim of promoting Yugoslavia’s position of nonbinding to any of the existing blocs, adding that the current position, though not without many threats to peace, was much more favorable than several years ago and that Yugoslavia would not worsen it by provoking one of the blocs through more substantial binding to the other.12 In other words—no entering into further harmonizing operational plans with NATO in the wake of the Washington Conference in August 1953 or any other form of mutual institutional convergence had been planned. If that meant that military aid

150

Chapter Seven

would have to come under a question mark, the Yugoslavs were ready for such a development. However, Riddleberger intended to press this issue, especially since the military assistance program had represented the most concrete form of the Yugoslav-American military cooperation and, thus, turned out to be the area of the biggest Yugoslav dependence from the United States. Regardless of the warning signs, the military assistance program remained an important instrument of American policy in Yugoslavia, so he had expected to persuade the local authorities to make the requested concessions in favor of its extension. Basing his position on the fact that as of January 1, 1955, Yugoslavia had received over 66 percent of the total agreed-upon aid,13 he explained in detail the US requirements and the dissatisfaction with the Yugoslav refusal to provide requested information regarding the use of weapons and received equipment. In addition, he stressed the lack of coordination in the further creation and implementation of operational plans and relations to the AMAS.14 Due to this fact, Yugoslavia had reached the top of the list of American military materiel recipients.15 Although Prica tried to avoid discussion of these issues, qualifying them as technical, the American ambassador pressed ahead, asking the Yugoslav government the official statement of what form of concrete agreement on the issue of military assistance could be achieved at present. Riddleberger offered a few alternatives.16 However, Prica completely rejected his insistence on the establishment of a “close connection between military assistance and military plan,”17 repeating that Yugoslavia’s position excluded the general coordination of military plans, but that a more efficient delivery of assistance could have given some information of an operational nature. Emphasizing the specific position of Yugoslavia in the Cold War, Prica said that the existing form of assistance proved to be quite satisfactory and provided a number of benefits to both parties. The only possible coordination of military plans, from the Yugoslav point of view, was at the level of the Balkan Pact.18 Moreover, to Riddleberger’s statement that a serious and comprehensive program of military assistance had been currently in existence based on assumptions and without guarantees, Prica answered that the “current cooperation with our allies represents a good guarantee for the future. In 1948 you have not had neither such guarantees.”19 Needless to say, the American ambassador could not be satisfied with such a development.20 The failure of these talks made the holding of the technical conference useless. The Yugoslav side had clearly demonstrated an unwillingness to coordinate their defense plans with NATO, so the upgrade of military assistance on these grounds was not possible. On the other hand, the inability to use



Under a Different Light 151

the program as a basis for further military and diplomatic negotiations with Yugoslavia had not yet led to the termination of the West’s diplomatic efforts in this direction, although it became clear that, in the changed international balance of powers, such initiatives seemed to have almost no success. Alluding to Tito’s open criticism of the United States made in a speech at a public meeting in Karlovac regarding the issue of the control of American weapons, Riddleberger announced in August that the military and economic assistance to Yugoslavia could have been dismissed.21 In addition to control, the problem of relocating the rearmed Fifth Army District reemerged, particularly since this action had been carried out without the knowledge of the United States. The issue of redefining military assistance because of its incompatibility with the modern needs of the YPA, being more related to the quality than the quantity of war materiel, was then officially relaunched.22 A visit from Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy, who came to Belgrade at the end of September, had the purpose of solving these issues.23 According to the materials of previous progress and perspectives of military assistance prepared for this conference, Yugoslavia was ready to abandon the equipping of war units and to obtain equipment for peacetime troops. This attitude was more a consequence of awareness that further annual programs, if formed in the forthcoming period, would not have included any assets approaching the outcomes from the programs in 1953 and 1954. Since it was obvious that this represented an introduction to the last interval of the program, they should have planned and executed the deliveries of contingents still fitting its framework and whose implementation was desirable.24 Murphy, as well as Riddleberger at the ambassador conference a few months earlier, tried to put insight into the Yugoslav military plans as the basis for further development and approval of military aid, along with harmonizing these plans with NATO’s strategic concepts. Obviously, emphasizing this defined request had not been an ultimate goal of the US negotiator. Even in the time when it was thought that a direct Soviet attack was a possibility, the Yugoslav state and army leadership looked for a dose of reciprocity and equality for the disclosure of their strategic concept. It was illusory to expect that in times of normalizing relations with the USSR, Yugoslavs would have allowed insight into their military plans only to stay in the military assistance program, which had already begun to feel like a ballast. Since Murphy’s initiative, as well as in some previous occasions that received an openly negative response, a compromise was found in the formulation of the Yugoslavs establishing an adequate system of informing the American military representatives regarding the assistance, while the United States would continue to deliver military equipment but to a significantly decreased extent.25

152

Chapter Seven

After the failure of the conference of ambassadors and Riddleberger’s talks with Yugoslav officials, the United States expected such an outcome, even leaving the impression that Murphy’s request for linking issues of harmonizing defense plans and programs of military assistance was only for the purpose of providing the ultimate outcome. However, the final abandonment of coordinating military assistance with the Yugoslav strategic plans meant de facto abandonment of the program itself, because its existence only to meet the Yugoslav needs in war materiel without adequate reciprocity certainly could not represent an activity of interest to the United States.26 Although the Yugoslavs submitted their draft of the assistance program for that fiscal year during 1956, the deliveries of materiel were related only to the contingents planned by the earlier programs. According to the agreement that was later made with AMAS personnel, that department was supposed to make the four-month delivery plans, which eased the reception and planning, but it was a clear indicator of the reduced activities as well. Yugoslavs insisted on an ultimate plan for all the remaining deliveries but received only these quarterly programs, having also been caused by the favorable opinion that Yugoslav politics27 could not get anything. In July 1957, the last updated delivery plan had been presented, which also did not include all the equipment from the previous lists. It did not include a plan for delivering equipment to land troops; for navy units, the plan predicted a possibility of taking over three minesweepers in France during August, which would have fulfilled the program for the navy, at least in primary funds. According to this document, completion of the aircraft delivery could be expected in September 1959, while the other equipment intended for aviation should arrive by the end of the year.28 Ironically, the delivery of the F-86E supersonic jet fighters, which lasted during the period from 1956 through 1958 and resulted in the introduction of the YAF’s 43 such planes,29 represented the most attractive, and for the Yugoslav side, most representative part of the aid program. These aircraft, which remained in active use until the 1970s, did not have to play a role named by their planners. Their appearance in the Yugoslav sky marked the effective and final completion of one interesting military-political project. The total value of distributed military aid, according to Yugoslav estimates, amounted to $890,693,957, of which $746,477,822 was received by the Yugoslavs. For the land troops, $518,242,523 had been planned, or 58.5 percent; for the air force, $333,421,434, or 37 percent; and for the navy, $39,030,000, or 4.5 percent.30 Finally, through these programs, eight full divisions of land troops were rearmed, as well as different army parts of the Fifth Army District, which got ammunition for about 65 days of combat.



Under a Different Light 153

The Yugoslav air force had formed: •  1 helicopter squadron of S-51 (10 aircraft) •  1 fighter-bomber division of F-47 piston-engine aircraft (4 wings with 125 aircraft) •  1 transport wing of C-47 (20 aircraft) •  1 training wing of T-33A jets (25 aircraft) •  1 RT-33 reconnaissance wing (20 aircraft) •  2 F-86E fighter wings (43 aircraft) •  2 fighter-bomber divisions of F-84G jet aircraft (6 wings with 167 aircraft) In addition, there was a radar network with the appropriate signal equipment, electronics, and ground navigation resources. Concerning the completed vessels, the navy received: •  1 patrol boat •  3 minesweepers of 400 tons •  4 minesweepers of 137 tons •  1 partially or fully equipped destroyer “Split” •  4 escort destroyers •  training ship “Galeb” •  24 small patrol boats •  6 major patrol vessels •  72 torpedo boats •  28 medium and small minesweepers •  6 large sweepers •  24 river minesweepers •  3 river patrol boats •  18 coastal patrol boats •  31 auxiliary ships •  1 armored river craft •  61 navigable amphibious units •  9 coastal radars.31 THE END OF THE MILITARY AID PROGRAM By the mid-1950s, further arming and equipping of the YA with weapons and war materiel of exclusively Western origin had become a serious political problem for the Yugoslav leadership. Changes in Soviet foreign policy caused by the conclusions drawn from the Korean adventure, Stalin’s death,

154

Chapter Seven

and the struggle for power that followed led to the drastic changes. Détente with the USSR had a double negative repercussion for the program, partly because it brought into question the official reasons for its existence and partly because the program itself represented the brake to further rapprochement with the East. Americans were becoming more and more suspicious, looking at the change of tone in relations to a country whose armed forces were being equipped, a country at which the delivered weapons should have been directed. They analyzed it through the prism of doubt, judging the scope, content, and perspectives of the program.32 A relatively short time had passed since its activation; the atmosphere in which the decisions were made about its implementation was full of mistrust and opposing positions, so it took very little to impair this rather fragile balance. Great political events of the time, such as Khrushchev’s stay in Belgrade, were a convenient excuse for the change of formulation of the existing assistance policy’s course, from its full termination through the reduction to its setting on a completely different basis. However, its strategic incompatibility with the long-term plans of the American and Yugoslav governments had been a much larger problem and the source of doubt in its usefulness, creating a milieu in which the media “bombs,” as mentioned during Khrushchev’s visit, exploded in full power. On the other hand, the USSR’s contacts with the FPRY, on the level of policy, diplomacy, military, or party, were also remembered and commented on in the same style, creating a sensibility that was far from optimistic in terms of future military cooperation between Yugoslavia and the West. Machinery that was put in operation should not have been turned off by force, but it had already become apparent that, in the existing conditions, no serious amounts of new fuel would have been added.33 Yugoslavs began to treat the program as a serious political ballast, threatening to undermine all the benefits that its implementation had. No matter how they used it to support their negotiating position in contacts with the USSR, they knew that, if those contacts were to calm tensions and improve relations, its form and essence should have been redefined in terms of reducing or abandoning. Having in mind the bitterness and anger in the tone of Soviet and Eastern Bloc officials at the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of October’s revolution in 1957 regarding US assistance to Yugoslavia in wheat,34 one does not need too much imagination to know what their opinion was concerning the jet fighters, artillery, and tanks of American origin in the Yugoslav army. Besides, this program belonged to those political projects that clearly indicated a political orientation in terms of “alliance-hostility,” and the designated enemy in this case was someone with whom, after all complications, Yugoslavia wanted normal and closer relations. The nature of the



Under a Different Light 155

program consequently conditioned its future; created as a result of the convergence to the West, it arrived in the period of stagnation as a consequence of normalizing relations with the East. All three parties were aware of that and had already started preparations for a time after its termination. This development had been dictated by many reasons—some of which were difficult to recognize, while others were prevailing and decisive—and only in their joint action might have been sought as the basis for leaving the system; yet, this entire period represented the basis of one of the most important sources of armed power modernization of Yugoslavia. Regardless of everything that happened at the end of the 1940s and early 1950s, the détente of the USSR had still been the fruit of not only political and diplomatic needs, but the intimate desires of the Yugoslav leadership, especially the lower party structures, who the conflict and strife with the “older brother” had always considered temporary and unsustainable in a longer term perspective. Possibly radical Cominform opposition had been relatively, quickly, and effectively isolated and disabled, but the pan-Slavic spirit of closeness with everything that was Russian, enhanced by the sense of belonging to the same political-ideological project, was still present and recognizable. Honestly, it had not been sufficient by itself to change the course of official policy but created the atmosphere in which certain information would have been easier to accept, and, later, to act on accordingly. Relying on the US military assistance program in the years of the immediate threat of war had its many excuses; however, as time passed, its realization began to open many perspectives that, in the long run, did not look particularly suitable for the Yugoslav party and the political leadership. For the promotion of an independent foreign policy and the policy of peaceful coexistence with existing blocs, Yugoslavia needed at least a minimum of military power as a potential aid to foreign policy. This, again, meant that armed forces must have been at satisfactory operational-tactical-technical levels, which could have not been achieved by relying on the domestic economy and its resources and capabilities. Therefore, the selection of a strategic partnership in terms of military alliances was imposed as a conditio sine qua non of a serious foreign policy. From 1949 through 1951, the dilemma solved itself. Ultimately being threatened by one bloc, Yugoslavia was forced to seek the support from the other. Nevertheless, when the immediate danger had passed, the time came when the decisions from this domain would not have been made only from necessity and compulsion. They were based on the assessment of the possibilities and perspectives of both super powers and their military alliances at the possible conflict. This choice was more dependent on the factors of significantly more normal decision making, marking the beginning of a policy

156

Chapter Seven

that in the long term clearly determined Yugoslavia’s military and foreign policy orientation.35 According to the available documents, Yugoslavia formed an opinion about the current situation, potentials, and possibilities for the conduct of war of both military blocs. Regardless of the sympathies and antipathies, mathematics did not speak in favor of NATO.36 It seemed that 8 years since the founding of the alliance, its 15 members in Europe had 30 active and 15 reserve divisions, as opposed to 175 Russian and 65 satellite divisions. The numeric inferiority of the Western alliance in aircraft totaled approximately 3,000, compared to the estimated 19,000 Russian and 2,500 of the satellites. The ratio in tanks was more informative, and the Soviet submarine fleet enjoyed the reputation of the most powerful in the world. What is more important hydrogen and atomic bombs were no longer the United States’ exclusive property so that the picture of potential conflict looked pretty bleak for European allies in NATO. Such estimates had not been taken into account in the American economic and mobilization potentials, not because their authors were not aware of them, but because they were made for the situation of potential conflict on European ground, that due to the destructive power of weapons scheduled for use, would have limited duration, at least in theory, to the first attack and the possible response to it. If trusted to mentioned figures, regardless of what the Americans would have been able to mobilize at their territory, it was unlikely that this would have had an impact on the fate of the European theater of war in the first decisive phase of the conflict. In short, the prospect of nuclear war, which would have certainly been the form of direct military clash between NATO and the Soviet Union and its satellites, had not predicted its longevity, when a strong economy and large human resources, protected from war destruction, could have been expressed, especially not as triumphal as was the case in the World War II.37 A few years later, a more comprehensive assessment38 that partly took into consideration the changes that had occurred in developing strategic and tactical aviation in the countries of the Western Bloc, again confirmed the main trends with regard to volume, concentration, and distribution of military units in the eventual European theater of war. According to these data, NATO had 42 against 72 divisions of the Eastern Bloc at its disposal in peacetime; seven days after the beginning of the mobilization, NATO could have had 104 against an estimated 195 Eastern divisions, and after a month, 186 divisions opposed to the 330 of the East. At the direction of the projected attack of the Eastern Bloc in central Europe, the balance of power odds were two to one in favor of the East (i.e., 45 to 22 Western divisions, while the more precise schedule provided the numbers of three to one, due to the geographic grouping of the Eastern Bloc countries). Similar projections had been estimated



Under a Different Light 157

for the other three potential theaters of war (i.e., the Middle East, Far East, and the Arctic) so that generally, the Eastern Bloc enjoyed a clear superiority in land forces over its opponent. When added to the fact that combat in the contemporary battle concepts, which included the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, had been theoretically possible to successfully act offensively, even at a one-to-one ratio of forces, then the image of superiority increases in clarity. Regardless of the political-ideological preferences, the Yugoslav leadership, had mixed emotions regarding both the United States and the USSR, calculating the good and bad sides of the strategic alliance with either. Ideology had been one of the aspects that had taken part in this calculation, but by far was not the only or most important one. Yugoslavia was aware that the choice of military strategic partners, if not dictated by the attack or the danger of it, must have been conditioned and made according to the active force and potential of all alternatives. It was clear that Yugoslavia’s position, at least in relation to the current balance of military power and military forces of both alliances, was such that during the 1950s, the USSR had won in the arms race, significantly surpassing its Western opponents. What was more important was there were no indicators that could have pointed to change in the trend in the near future. An opinion of the Soviet’s military dominance had been created, which, at least seemingly, was the fruit of not only the current state of affairs but also of formulated long-term reality and established on the basis that could have guaranteed it a long life. On the other hand, remaining in or leaving the MDAP provided a dilemma that was related to its fate, regardless of eventual global conflict. The Western military assistance program was the only source of strategic modernization of the Yugoslav armed forces, despite all the obstacles and sluggishness in its implementation, and as such, represented the opportunity to become a permanent basis for moving relations with NATO to a higher level of partnership and dependence. That would have inevitably led to a loss of the Yugoslav interbloc position and the normalization of relations with the USSR and to endangering the ideological-political project of internal state and social development, which was particularly concerning. Its abandonment would have meant dealing with unknowns in a period when, while not yet fully consolidated in its relations with the East, Yugoslavia would have remained with armed forces whose modernization and technical shaping had stopped halfway, and even directed to the contrary. The first approach represented a number of clearly visible and well-known consequences, which were unacceptable to the Yugoslav leadership, while the second offered certain opportunities for preserving the state and ideological priorities, that is, the withdrawal and concessions on grounds that were deemed not of the same importance.

158

Chapter Seven

In any case, it all implied that, regardless of the way this problem would have been resolved, Yugoslavia would have gone through the integration in one of the two dominant military systems, if not in the sense of absolute acceptance of strategic and military-political doctrine, then certainly in the extent of accepting materiel and technical culture, as well as the rules of using approved weapons systems and dictated inter-army and interstate relations in the fields of exploitation of the abovementioned materials. In addition to these reasons, which have found their foundation in international policies and relations between small and large countries, some operational and technical issues have also greatly influenced Yugoslavia’s decision to abandon this program. The entire course of its implementation was filled with delivery delays, foot-dragging in negotiations, distrust between the project holders on both sides, as well as its direct executors in the field.39 A sufficient operational and strategic connection to the materiel arriving from the West had not been created. Received materials had not played that important role in promoting the program for any kind of its political, diplomatic, or economical superstructure in the future. It remained as a burden to Yugoslavia’s leadership, having failed to be sufficiently compelling to making a difference in some decisions. Giving up military aid was so easy and devoid of any sentimentality, having created the impression that its existence presented only an episode that would not be gladly remembered, having ended before the types and amount of received materials passed the critical line, after which they would have become something that could not have been so easily abandoned.40 In practice, as had already been said, the whole process began to enter a phase of termination in 1955. On August 27, in a conversation with Koča Popović,41 Ambassador Riddleberger mentioned possibly reassessing the whole question of military assistance for Yugoslavia, stating that since it had derived from 1951 and 1953, given the changed circumstances, the assistance program matched the current needs to a lesser extent. At the meeting with Leo Mates, Yugoslavia’s ambassador to the United States, Dulles also expressed the view that reducing the threat of war might have resulted in the revision of military aid,42 for 1955 was characterized by the gradual decrease in the deliveries of assistance in both contents and quantities.43 This trend was partly changed the following year, but its general line remained the same. Already in October 1956, when Eisenhower’s famous statement was published, the delivery of 200 previously agreed-upon jet fighters and other military equipment to Yugoslavia immediately stopped, while the aid in wheat was still delivered according to plan.44 This message came directly after the Tito and Khrushchev talks at the Brioni Islands and Yalta, which on the other side of the Atlantic had not been well received. Although the analysis of this mes-



Under a Different Light 159

sage argues that it was only a concession to conservative forces in Congress and that, de facto, there was nothing that the previous agreements on military assistance had not contained,45 just reaching for these paragraphs that would allow aid to be suspended, reduced, or postponed, indicated the serious intention and willingness to act accordingly. However, the Yugoslav side was the one that made the first decisive step to exit the MDAP. An opinion prevailed in Belgrade that the current program had begun to drift toward too much political damage and that the security situation did not warrant “suffering the damage.” Through a series of statements from the summer of 1956, Tito revealed Yugoslavia’s readiness to renounce military assistance. It happened in the climate of constant delays and checking its reasonability and content by the US Congress and administration, while confronted with the consequences of the situation in which, formally, should have been grateful for the deliveries of military materiel that factually ceased. It became clear that continuing the program would have been possible only in conditions of serious political turning to NATO and the West, for which Tito and Yugoslavia’s leadership had neither the desire, nor the serious political need. A good part of the commanding generals and the top of the party from the beginning did not match pro-Western policy.46 However, their position would have hardly been of any importance hadn’t Tito, according to Đilas’s testimony, felt “the anguish and sorrow”47 against the project that, from a strictly military standpoint, did not only save the combat usability of his armed forces but also laid the foundations of its modernization. Tito had directly announced his decision to terminate the military aid program to Ambassador Riddleberger during the meeting at Brioni Isles on December 6, 1957. According to Dragan Bogetić, the American diplomat accepted Yugoslavia’s position that for both sides, the program had produced more problems in developing bilateral relations than political benefits. He also said that the Yugoslav singlesided act of refusing further assistance would have negatively reflected on the United States’ international prestige. Therefore, it had been decided to give this act a form of “agreed termination of assistance.”48 During its duration, the program had been spread on various spheres of military cooperation, but the speed of its quenching brought many activities into question that had so far been automatically conducted. For example, when both sides had already agreed to end the program, on August 11, 1958, adviser to the embassy in Belgrade, Elim O’Shaughnessy, on one occasion had to draw the attention of his interlocutors to the fact that the United States had been currently visited by one of Yugoslavia’s military delegation. They had been there to purchase war materiel based on the Memorandum of Agreement on Off Shore Procurements (1954), based on the agreement from November 1951.49

160

Chapter Seven

The period of direct military assistance ended with a joint statement on the agreement of the cessation of military assistance signed December 9, 195750 (i.e., by the communiqué on its cessation from December 12, 1957).51 However, its ratification and exchange of notes were prolonged until August 25, 1959,52 and on December 17, 1959,53 the Yugoslav federal government ratified the agreement. During this period, the American-Yugoslav military cooperation was based more on article 106 of the Law of the MSA54 than on the appropriate bilateral agreements between the two countries, which due to some unclear questions about certain points, waited for quite some time to become official. According to this agreement, the following agreements had expired: •  Delivery of food for Yugoslav armed forces (signed in 1950) •  Delivery of raw materials and other materials for Yugoslav armed forces (1951) •  Military assistance (1951) •  Availability of dispositive surpluses of materials and equipment (1955) •  Special assistance programs from 1955 In addition, Yugoslavia had accepted the protocol-type obligations that stated received equipment would be used only for the implementation of the UN’s objectives, that eventual waste and surpluses would be brought back to the United States, and that they would provide the American embassy in Belgrade the information concerning the implementation of these provisions. It assumed the obligation would not give away the mentioned materials, as well to further implement the agreed system of security measures to prevent disclosure of confidential items or other kinds of compromising military equipment.55 Provisions concerning the offshore procurements were changed by the Memorandum of 1954, in the sense that it stopped being a complement to a main program, but became a relevant system by itself. However, as it can be seen from the documents, an agreement on military assistance had not only been a framework that enabled the implementation of the prescribed clauses, but also evidence of the benevolence of Yugoslavia and the United States to maintain an enviable level of military cooperation, regardless of their ideological signs. Because of its disappearance legal problems to this cooperation did not arise, but what had disappeared was the atmosphere where the institutions of American administration, economy, and military felt that their actions of meeting Yugoslavia’s wishes were completely in accordance with the spirit of the US foreign policy. After the dissolution of the agreement, all that went by relatively established ways began to meet a large number of bureaucratic obstacles. In short, a task, for which a low level

Under a Different Light 161



technical military delegation was in charge a few years back, now overstep in the domain of public diplomacy at the government’s level.56 In this way, each transaction became difficult and complicated and, in most cases, was canceled as unpayable. “Everything is expensive and difficult to obtain”57 had become the most common explanation for the stagnation of materiel of the Yugoslav armed forces at the end of the 1950s. NOTES 1.  I. Laković, p. 168. 2.  DAMSPRS, Str. pov, 1955, f II, 213, pp. 1–4; B. Dimirijević, pp. 168, 171; D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 215. 3.  Ibid., pp. 215–216. 4.  Overview of deliveries of military materiel in tones shows a drastic decline of the quantity of received materiel in the second half of 1955 and that a similar trend continued throughout the next year. Picture for the period May 1955–September 1956 looks as follows: Table 7.1. Period

Quantity (tons)

May 1955 June 1955 July 1955 August 1955 September 1955 October 1955 November 1955 December 1955 January 1956 February 1956 March 1956 April 1956 May 1956 June 1956 July 1956 August 1956 September 1956

DAMSPRS, PA, 1956, f 83, 29, 423631, pp. 5–6. DAMSPRS, PA, 1956, f 83, 27, 47163, p. 2. 5.  I. Laković, pp. 169–171. 6.  DAMSPRS, Str. pov, 1955, f II, 213, pp. 1–4.

5,600 7,080 350 600 3,700 690 1,000 1,600 600 500 575 650 1,975 750 700 700 750

162

Chapter Seven

  7.  AJ, 837 KPR I-3-a SAD, Note on the conversation between Comrade President and US Ambassador Mr. Riddleberger, April 25, 1955, in Beli Dvor. During this meeting, Tito, for the first time, started an initiative for the June meeting with Western representatives, where such a question could have been examined in more detail. He repeated Yugoslav interest for the continuation of the program of military assistance but also pointed out that he would understand if the Americans changed priority if there should occur a difference in the political judgment of it. Such underlining of consequential interest had not been anything else but the acknowledgment of the decreased importance that this program currently had for the Yugoslav leadership.   8.  AJ, 837 KPR I-5-b SAD. Note on conversation between State Secretary Koča Popović and US Ambassador Mr. Riddleberger, held on May 10, 1955.   9.  DAMSPRS, Str. pov, 1955, f II, 220, pp. 1–2; VA, II section, S-855, f II, 24, pp. 1–4. 10.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 211. 11.  Ibid., p. 213. 12.  AJ, 837 KPR I-5-c, Stenographic notes from the meeting between ambassadors of the United States, United Kingdom, and France with Comrade Prica, Belgrade, June 24–27, 1955, pp. 1–10; D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, p. 214. 13.  AJ, 837 KPR I-3-a SAD, Note on the conversation between Comrade President and US Ambassador Mr. Riddleberger, June 25, 1955, in the Beli Dvor, p. 1; D. Bogetić, p. 196. 14.  Ibid., pp. 41–49. Regarding the major problems, the US ambassador mentioned the relocation of the Ljubljana Army units without the knowledge and approval of the United States and NATO; regardless of that, the Western allies took an obligation to equip mentioned units for defending the Ljubljana Gap. Furthermore, technical equipping of the other units had been representing a process that could not have been endlessly pursued without clear insight in its course and the results, which could be obtained only through a standardized system of informing about the state, rules of engagement, storage, and maintenance of received materiel. Riddleberger insisted that the whole program had been conditioned by the mutual obligations in the defense of the given sector so that the government had been financing and equipping part of their units engaged there. Besides, he mentioned that the lack of coordination in military planning was disabling the qualitative changes in the structure of the aid program, since the existing system of planning and deliveries had more of its quantitative component in mind. 15.  AJ, 837 KPR I-5-c, Stenographic notes, p. 55. 16.  Ibid., p. 63. Those variants have been the formal introducing with the base premises of the Yugoslav military politics in order to adjust the program of military aid to its contents, description of the units equipped with American materiel in case of war, information of certain units and their needs in case of war, and, as the last and the worst solution, “we’ll give you what we can, so you make what you can.” According to his words, the program was currently proceeding by this former method. 17.  Ibid., p. 55. 18.  Ibid., pp. 60–62.



Under a Different Light 163

19. Ibid., p. 62. Prica continued to firmly criticize the American side for not making the difference between the aid mentioned for the NATO members and the one for Yugoslavia. He underlined that it was even more complicated and harder to understand in the beginning of the mentioned program, but the US government had understood it correctly and conducted the politics that proved to be right. 20.  AJ, 837 KPR I-5-c, Stenographic notes, p. 66. 21.  AJ, 837 KPR I-5-b SAD, Note on conversation between S. Prica, Undersecretary of State, with US Ambassador, Mr. Riddleberger, August 8, 1955; AJ, 837 KPR I-5-b SAD, Note on conversation between S. Prica, Undersecretary of State, with US Ambassador, Mr. Riddleberger, August 16, 1955. 22.  AJ, 837 KPR I-5-b SAD, Note on the conversation between State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, K. Popović, with US Ambassador Mr. Riddleberger, August 27, 1955; DAMSPRS, Str. pov, 1955, f II, 291, pp. 1–2; ibid., 298, pp. 1–2; ibid., 300, pp. 1–2; ibid., 302, pp. 1–3. 23.  It is interesting to mention that the Murphys visit was, according to the Yugoslav analysts, treated more as the final creation of the State Department’s attitude toward Yugoslavia, which had still been “fluid.” As a “troubleshooter” for the Eisenhower administration, R. Murphy, who had visited Yugoslavia in September 1954 to solve the Trieste Crisis, had an assignment this time to settle the conditions for the visit of J. F. Dulles. It could follow only if the success had been secured in advance, meaning the agreement that would settle the United States-Yugoslav relations on the new, but more long-lasting, basis. Looking through this glass, Murphy’s visit had the purpose of being the “reconnaissance and vanguard,” on whose result significantly depended the further course of US politics toward the FPRY; AJ, 837 KPR I-3-a SAD, Robert Murphy’s visit, pp. 1–3. 24.  DAMSPRS, Str. pov, 1955, f III, 332, p. I/25 1–255; ibid., p. I/39 0–411. 25.  AJ, 837 KPR I-3-a SAD, Note on conversation between Comrade President with the Deputy of the Undersecretary of State for foreign affairs, Mr. Robert Murphy, August 27, 1955; AJ, 837 KPR I-3-a SAD, Addition to the note on the conversation with Murphy August 27, 1955; AJ, 837 KPR I-3-a SAD, Note on conversation between Comrade President with the Deputy of the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Robert Murphy, September 29, 1955; AJ, 837 KPR I-3-a SAD, Document without title, signature, and date containing Murphy’s question to General I. Gošnjak during the talks on 29 or 30 September 1955; AJ, 837 KPR I-3-a SAD, Text of confidential memorandum on the conclusions during Murphy’s visit; AJ, 837 KPR I-3-a SAD, Note on the conversation of our journalist with US Ambassador Riddleberger October 10, 1955. 26.  D. Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad, pp. 229–232; DAMSPRS, Str. pov, 1955, f II, 319, pp. 1–2; AJ, 837 KPR I-3-a SAD, Text of confidential memorandum on the conclusions during Murphy’s visit. 27.  DAMSPRS, PA, 1957, F 93, 411134. 28.  VA, II section, S-855, f IV, 66; VA, II section, S-855, f IV, 68. 29.  VA, II section, K-21, f III, R 3, p. 14.

Chapter Seven

164

30.  VA, II section, K-21, f III, R 3, pp. 1, 4. Annually, planned values of the program were: Table 7.2. Year

Amount (U.S. Dollars, $)

1951 1952 1953 1954 1955

122,545,058 188,198,509 257,688,220 257,875,082  64,387,088

31.  VA, II section, K-21, f III, R 3, pp. 1–4. 32.  VA, II section, S-855, 4722, f 4, 67, p. 1. 33.  I. Laković, p. 218. 34.  AJ, 507, f III, 74, pp. 5–24. 35.  I. Laković, p. 219. 36.  DAMSPRS, PA 1956, f 67, 21, 424055, pp. 1–4; DAMSPRS, PA 1957, f 75, 10, 28667, pp. 2, 4–25. 37.  I. Laković, p. 220. 38.  VA, S-865-c, 545, 3, pp. 9–13. 39.  DAMSPRS, PA, Str. pov. 1955, f 3, 332. Material for the meeting with Mr. Murphy. Problems in work with military aid, pp. 1–22. 40.  I. Laković, pp. 221–222. 41.  AJ, 837 KPR I-5-b SAD, Note about the conversation of the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs K. Popović with US Ambassador Mr. Riddleberger, August 27, 1955. In fact, after the failure of the diplomatic initiative for further strategic bonding between Yugoslavia and NATO through coordination of defensive plans, and especially after Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia and the failure of the ambassadors conference, it was clear that the military aid program could not represent a base for further super structuring of military and political relations. In his appearances from the first half of 1955, Riddleberger often used the possibility of revision, decrease, and stoppage of the program, trying to persuade the Yugoslav side to more important concessions. During the summer, it was concluded that acceptance of aid for Yugoslav had no such attractiveness as it had a few years before, so during Murphy’s visit, the quiet fading of this program had already become official; DAMSPRS, PA Str. pov 1955, f 3, 332, Materiel for the conference with Mr. R. Murphy, Open questions, p. 2. 42. Ibid. 43.  DAMSPRS, PA, Str. pov. 1955, f 3, 332. Material for the meeting with Mr. Murphy. Problems in work with military aid, p. 3. 44.  DAMSPRS, PA 1956, f 83, 29.423631, Motives of Eisenhower’s message, pp. 1–2. 45.  Ibid., Internal objections, pp. 1–2. 46.  B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, p. 174.



Under a Different Light 165

47.  Milovan Đilas, Druženje sa Titom (Socializing with Tito), Beograd 1990, p. 76. 48.  Dragan Bogetić, Nova strategija spoljne politike Jugoslavije 1956–1961, ISI, Beograd 2006, pp. 110–111 (hereinafter: D. Bogetić, Nova strategija spoljne politike Jugoslavije). 49.  VA, II section, S-855, 4722, f 5, 83, p. 1. 50.  D. Bogetić, Nova strategija spoljne politike Jugoslavije, p. 111. 51.  VA, II section, K 21, f 3, R br. 3, United States’ military aid, p. 1. 52.  DAMSPRS, PA 1959, f 112, 424874, p. 1. 53.  DAMSPRS, PA 1959, f 112, 427244, p. 1. 54.  VA, II section, S-855, 4722, f 5, 83, p. 1. 55.  DAMSPRS, PA 1959, f 112, 427244, pp. 1–4. 56.  DAMSPRS, PA 1959, f 112, 33817, pp. 1–2. 57.  B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, p. 172.

Conclusion

Studying military assistance problems most often implies following the consequences of major political decisions that in clearly visible times define the foreign policy of a country. Whether we are talking about “guns and ammo” or highly sophisticated weapons of mass destruction, this form of military cooperation always represented a standard step in developing allied relations, established for neutralization or defense from some common threat. The bigger the threat, the readiness of the richer and more powerful partner increased to open and make its funds and arsenals available, but it also influenced the weaker one to subject its own ideas and activities to the interests of the one whose help it expects or receives—not only common needs of the participants in the program but also specific interests of every individual through military assistance systems, enabling later researchers to locate and identify them, as well as to follow dynamics of their actualization through realization of the program—that is, to oversee all perspectives and possibilities that opened in front of it. Due to their close connection with the most important political processes, these programs may often serve as some kind of litmus of certain processes, because all indicators obtained by their analysis may relevantly be applied to deeper and, for history, more significant activities brought to them. The more the 20th century progressed, this thesis gained weight if for no other reason than due to the astronomical prices of items that were distributed over these programs. Regardless of the problem of their internal use, the decision on their transfer to someone from outside was always an act taken in those situations when it would have been estimated that political and security benefits greatly exceeded the market value of the material, making it the basis to further develop interrelationships. On the other hand, it was precisely their market value that dictated behavior of the weaker partner, because the higher their price and the more necessary the item, the willingness of the weaker 167

168

Conclusion

partner to meet the demands and interests of the donor increases. In this vortex, not only reasons for the initiation of such programs but also more or less hidden wishes and aspirations of the participants to use the program for some of their ideas and projects, which sometimes did not correspond with pronounced initiating goals, would show themselves. Therefore, we are often witnesses of the situations in which it seems like a true war not with someone who is against all these ammunitions purchased, but with those from which it is taken or to whom it had been given. Therefore, it turns into or at least it tries to turn into some kind of Trojan horse, which through some small backdoor someone wants to put under its control the one to whom, declaratively, they only want to help. Their content often is saying more than any report and analysis of discussions and conferences about their strategic intentions and plans, making realistic possibilities about integration and incorporation since their very first moment visible and recognizable. Briefly, it enables providing answers to numerous questions of military-diplomatic reality of the studied period, but they also ask to approach them with the same seriousness and thoroughness required by the historical processes through which we more easily perceive and interpret them. It is the rule that such programs represent the consequence of clearly defined foreign policy orientation. However, when we talk about a program that was the basis of the material-technical modernization of the Yugoslavian armed forces in the 1950s, then the process in which all rules were alternately violated and confirmed opened in front of us, moving from apparently unbelievable and unexpected turns at individual levels, toward their merging into one rather proper and, from today’s point of view, completely ordered and coherent system. Studying it represents some sort of attempt of inverting the usual steps—not only does that occurrence of certain subjects need to be explained by the process that by its use led to determine, but by the nature and characteristics of that item, the wider process within which it found itself at a certain place. In years when conflict with “countries of national democracy” occurred, Yugoslavia, just through this program, in the event of potential escalation of conflicts, tied itself to the West and NATO. On the often asked questions—how close was its actual formal joining the Western military alliance and which moment represented the point of greatest closeness—the answer may be searched in seemingly gray and monotonous labels of tanks, airplanes, and other “scrap” that was delivered over this program. Content of the military assistance, with its quality and quantity, clearly reflected strategic intentions of the donor. Regarding that, we may distinguish several levels: •  The intention to minimally help in the measure that would be sufficient not to lose the fighting ability of Yugoslav forces.



Conclusion 169

•  The intention to establish a system that would, in the event of need, enable the integration of Yugoslavia and its army into a common defense concept. •  The intention to incorporate Yugoslavia and its army into the strategic, operational, and technical concept of NATO. The characteristic of the first and dominant level represented the delivery of military material surpluses from the last phase of World War II, whether it was war booty or little used or new weapons and equipment of the same generation from large stocks in America and the Western Europe. Regarding their amount and real quality, they represented a significant segment of every postwar military assistance program, being more useful for the donor because of the costs of storage, maintenance, or destruction, since it was conceptually already obsolete or its change was planned. This type of assistance had great significance for the recipient because, through it, the recipient was satisfying the need for basic armaments and equipment, that is, for an increase of the overall firepower of its units. What should be mentioned is that it did not change anything in terms of modernizing and integrating wider strategic concepts, since an obsolescence of materials and technology through which this system is distributed conditioned inferiority in relation to the contemporary armies and ensured only maintenance of the bare minimum of combat usability. It is enough to take a glance at the types of armament the United States put at Yugoslavia’s disposal and then compare them with the cognition on the time period when it was in operational use in the US Army to get a relatively solid notion of how much a part of this program was long-term strategy and how much of it was instant military-political tactics. Upgrades to the system represented deliveries of armaments and equipment that are still in use in operational units of the donor country. Their appearance in the military assistance structure usually points to the recipient’s aspiration to push the armed forces to be sufficiently and technically equipped and compatible with its own strategic-operational system. Therefore, in the event of war, it may be trusted with greater confidence regarding the possibility to implement a wider range of combat activities in cooperation with the allied units. A good indicator of such perceptions of the Yugoslav Army’s position was represented by a shipment of F-84G, T/RT-33, and F-86E jet fighters and M-47 tanks, as well as some types of infantry weapons and radar equipment. What represented the greatest military assistance had been related to the distribution of the type of war materials that matched the needs either of its own first-line units or those of the NATO allies (i.e., shipment of the modern military technique on whose performance relied the actual conception of conducting war operations, either offensive or defensive). The presence of these materials in the military assistance program represented the sign of a clear intention or even agreement on the recipients’ integration into the basic

170

Conclusion

strategic system (i.e., evidence of an increased foreign-policy relation to the level of not only friendship but also agreed alliance). We did not find in this research traces of such perceptions of Yugoslavia not because there were not clear and formulated intentions of the United States, but because the overall dynamics of the interrelationships flowed in a direction that could not bring its increase to this level. That was confirmed in multiple instances by the lack of adequate materials in the military assistance system. Yugoslavia wanted neutrality, and the West wanted to approve this neutrality to the limits satisfactory for it. This refers to the fact that the hands of the party that received assistance are not completely tied, and in any case, its destiny is not predetermined by entering into the program. Programming, reception, and distribution of materials that represent the subject of the assistance were done in compliance with the levels of the situation’s urgency that initiated the entire process; therefore, estimating its assent reasons for further persistence did not deepen or expand the base of the program. In the case of Yugoslavia in the 1950s, it was obvious that only one period of immediate and probable war threat coincided with the duration of the military assistance program that should have reduced or, at least, mitigated that threat. In that period, it was possible to analyze the conditional willingness of the Yugoslav leadership to enter into wider strategic combinations with the United States and NATO, considering the country’s defense from external aggression the ultimate task rather than conservation of its internal order. However, when the moment passed, that is, when it was estimated that the direct military intervention most probably would not happen, both parties at their own pace and in their own manner abandoned the activities that would lead to upgrading the military assistance system with a more meaningful and wider allied relation. This was particularly relevant for the Yugoslavs, where, to some extent, bureaucratic slowness and ideological distrust toward the donor opened the space where it was possible to keep planning and distributing the types and quantities, as well as rules for using military materials, within safe scope, that is, disabling it to exceed the qualitative and quantitative threshold after which the assistance was considered less as a friendly gift and more as a loan of a creditor. Modernizing armed forces of the country’s recipient is in direct dependence on the type of political decisions that are defining not only militarydiplomatic orientation but also those that are related to projecting the future foreign policy’s course and state engagement in international relations. Division of the world in two blocs clearly differentiated systems with scientific, technical, and logistic possibilities for developing modern armament concepts for the rest of the planet, which did not have any relevant potential to do so, made the selection regarding the perspective of military modernization



Conclusion 171

rather simple. If one wanted an army that would be modern according to the criteria of the time, he or she should choose one of two possible strategic allies not only because this would guarantee safety or military superiority but because this would enable achieving the only valid criteria of the level of modernization of any army in the 20th century, that is its level of technical equipment and the quality and quantity of military materials and rules for its use. One way or another, surpluses from the stocks could always be gained, and the fact remains that the level of combat readiness could be raised to an enviable level. Nevertheless, if one looks at the problem on the level of categories, then he or she must notice that not all strengthening is modernization, nor does every modernization instantly bring a drastic increase of military power. However, regardless of current turns and improvisation, they trace the only safe way into stability and reliance of the military system long term, and their ranges at the same time represent the final limits of the overall military strengthening, materially but also regarding the tactical and operational plan. Modernization represents a constant process, which every slowdown or arrest turns into a potential source of later serious problems and difficulties. When related to a system searching the rate of its validity in comparison with what it considers to be an international standard, consequences of the bad mark on this test are paid by jeopardizing the security and international position of the country it belongs to. Military assistance systems cannot completely modernize any army, but usually, they represent a good introduction into military cooperation that leads to their institutionalization and conduct in compliance with relevant and globally valid rules. However, since such cooperation fits into the existing large systems, it inevitably carries danger from the loss of part of state sovereignty, whether regarding its transfer to an organization that guarantees its implementation or hegemony of this organization as such. Reasons for failing to keep the pace in modernizing Yugoslavian armed forces, as well as discontinuing their material-technical development, can be found in the dilemma of sovereignty or the modern army. Comprehending its military and technical inferiority in relation to the USSR and neighboring Socialist countries, Yugoslavia upgraded its policy of finding support and protection in the West by accessing the military assistance program. Although it seemed rather unthinkable in the moment when ideological, diplomatic, and military confrontation of two confronted blocs had been already tightened, this step enabled modernization of Yugoslavian armed forces and also significantly strengthened its international position at the time. War materials, arriving in the country in these years, were the sign of readiness for cooperation of one Communist country and the leader of a global anti-communist movement, whose interests at that historical moment had been close enough to enable partial disregard of the ideological differences.

172

Conclusion

Even though this meant the possibility of promoting a certain ideological coexistence, during this period, both the United Stated and Yugoslavia emphasized differences and irreconcilability over this matter, stressing the wider international context was the sole reason for this level of closeness in intergovernmental relations. By the end of the 1940s, with Yugoslavia breaking out from the organization of the Socialist countries, the United States saw an unexpected and unplanned possibility for a political breakthrough in the East European area, with all the military and diplomatic benefits it carried. Apart from strategic complications and aggravation of the potential Socialist break toward Northern Italy, Yugoslavia’s political move from the East could become an example for the remaining East European countries to exit from the Soviet orbit. At the time, interbloc confrontation had already reached a level where every occurrence like this seriously disturbed the established balance, and, if it did not become a factor of significant superiority or inferiority, then at least it would be seen as a factor of substantial initiative or passivity. On the other hand, Yugoslavia had an important strategic position. It had enabled not only the obstruction or inhibition of the eventual Soviet offensive toward Lombardi and further toward East and South France but also, in initiating operations in the central part of the Europe, represented the base for carrying out counterattacks to the side or to the back of the aggressor. The American governmental authorities, who appeared rather stunned by this development, relatively quickly started creating the platform on which it would base its onward policy in relation to Yugoslavia and that would be defined according to these premises. Yugoslavia had to keep in mind the consequences of its withdrawal from the Socialist bloc—this left Yugoslavia rather unprotected from the possibility of the potential Soviet-satellite attack. Its doctrinal position did not allow an automatic transition to the opposite side. However, with this corpus of ideologically different (and even more than that) countries, there needed to be a certain system of mutual military and political relations formed that would act as a preventive measure for suppression of the aggressive intentions of the East but that also would not go back to the internal social and political organization. Furthermore, dynamics of this approximation had to be adjusted not only to the existing readiness of the West but also to the willingness of the domestic politics and military public for such a turning point and, more importantly, possible Soviet reaction. Even though it would be logical that entering into the system of military arrangements would be one of the first activities after abandoning its ideological alliance with the East, it was accessed only when the conditions that would strengthen Yugoslavia’s position were achieved, instead of additionally complicating it. Therefore, Yugoslavian



Conclusion 173

governmental authorities therefore had to carefully weigh and measure the moment when they would access this work, considering a number of factors that might affect its nature and its further course. As a hegemon of the Western military alliance, the United States also estimated the levels of using different forms of military cooperation with Yugoslavia, not imposing its content as a prerequisite for its political support. Yugoslavia, which would be politically and militarily integrated into NATO, would certainly contribute to stabilizing its south flank. However, even if this could be possible, it would mean that the essential ideological and political moment directed toward other Socialist countries in Europe would be lost, as well as the possibility of their separation from the USSR or at least their relations within the East Bloc that had been based on the positive Yugoslavian experience. Any form of military connection between NATO and Yugoslavia would, anyway, have in its root Yugoslavia’s willingness to be engaged with the West in the event of a mutual conflict; therefore, its internal organization gave special severity to establishing the allied relations, creating the political effect of “keying” into the East European corpus of countries. Hand in hand with later changes in the Soviet state administration after Stalin’s death, this policy enabled Yugoslavia to strengthen its international position, reorganize and modernize its armed forces, provide financial funds for part of its economic projects, and go through this period with unimpaired internal organization, drawing the most it could from the area bordered by its ideological concepts and possibilities that were at its disposal. Seen through these military-diplomatic activities, the military assistance program was something very sensitive to every change in the political and military balance. Due to that fact, its development strictly followed the curve of developing wider political, economical, and military relations. That is why it had been a kind of mirror, where the difficulties of these processes were reflected. Emerging as a consequence of the political approach of the West, this type of military cooperation had a different meaning and purpose1 for both participating parties. For the United States, as a strictly military plan, one of its main priorities was that through the program, the Yugoslav army was gradually introduced to the Western system of procedures, nomenclatures, and regime of use and maintenance of the military equipment, which more or less was part of its allies grouped in NATO. Through an increase of a qualitative scope of delivered contingents of war materials, the YPA slowly started to harmonize its material-technical perception with the Western view of the problem, becoming more compatible with the NATO doctrine in both content of its arsenal and regime of its use. Although the delivered equipment was always one or more generations older than the equipment used in the parent army, this material was conceptualized on the same operational-logistical

174

Conclusion

premises, creating the background for convergence and standardization of the procedures that led to later integration into the framework of the Western military alliance. While there still was the possibility of its upgrade by the political decision on further integration, the United States connected almost all of its activities on this plan to the military assistance program as the highest range of bilateral relations with Yugoslavia. However, the Yugoslavs were giving more tactical than strategic significance to the program. In the time when its army had been left with equipment and armaments, insufficient in quality and in quantity to confront potential attacks of neighbors with or without the participation of the USSR, the military assistance program represented almost the only source of acquiring missing war technology. Conscious of the danger on their north and east borders, the Yugoslav leaders could not allow further materials and technical stagnation of their army assets, even if that meant that they would enter the area of their close “class enemy.” Choosing between ideological and national components of independence, accession into the Western military assistance program was clearly determined to be a higher priority. Therefore, it is understood that the great eagerness and interest for the content and functioning of this program when a rather symbolic quantity of armament, which did not represent any kind of special intensification for the YPA or a significant loss for the United States, had been delivered. At that time, the military assistance program was willing to defend national sovereignty at any cost, even if that meant exceptions from the firm ideological line. In the later period, Yugoslavia significantly modernized its system of armaments through the MDAP, introducing it to the types and models of weapons the officers could only imagine before the foreign affairs situation changed and resulting in a decline in Yugoslavia’s enthusiasm for this program, although this change was not the result of aggravation of relations with the donor. Knowing the US system’s final point of departure, Yugoslav governmental authorities took care to always keep a distance in relation to the activities that may lead in that direction during the functioning of this program, even if that distance might jeopardize the functioning of the program itself. Treatment of the AMAS personnel had been the best indicator of such sensibility. Although aware of the fact that the domestic military industry had not been even remotely able to provide the necessary amount of modern military assets, the Yugoslav leaders set about to modernize and reorganize the YPA not in compliance with the criteria that would represent an ideal regime of its equipment. For them, the criteria that determined their form of political connection with the West had been the highest allowed, implementing the necessary military reforms. It became clear why an attitude of reservation to this system had always been sustained. The Yugoslav governmental authori-



Conclusion 175

ties’ main dilemma had been to what degree to allow development of military cooperation so that it would not grow into complete dependence on the West. Not minding that it seemed that, under the pressure of immediate threat by the East’s military aggression, willingness had been expressed for something like this. The changes in international circumstances influenced relations between the West and Yugoslavia to the extent that such projections were abandoned and forgotten at their earliest phase. From that moment onward, in the military assistance program, Yugoslavs found the way to equip their army assets in a way that would not be upgraded in the political sense and that did not cost anything or did not oblige them to anything in particular. However, the army itself did not possess such flexibility, which had characterized high-state diplomacy. Its material needs could hardly be met when the program had been terminated, and any system that could substitute it was nowhere in sight. The majority of items from its content represented materials from the stocks of the war booty military equipment. These materials were more than welcome to fill the gaps of the existing armory. When the delivered contingents started to contain, in greater part, equipment and armaments from postwar and contemporary series, the significance of the program had been increased because apart from the quantitative base, it also became the base for qualitative reorganization of the YPA’s material-technical assets. That reorganization had been, however, one of those processes that did not last, but its quantity had been determined through constant movement and changes. In the case of Yugoslavia, that meant that by abandoning one system on which reorganization had been based without replacing the new one, the great part of the already achieved results would be decreased or lost. Something that had been needed greatly to get to a satisfactory level, during the process of slowing down and stopping it lost its momentum, causing the next repeated activation to be a waste of time. In the domain of modernizing the military formation, such arrests and stagnations had been precisely the category that marked the difference between stable and modern military systems and those who had not been at that level yet. By this program, the Yugoslav army was significantly improved, but its frameworks never achieved those gauges that would be sufficient for its full and comprehensive reorganization and modernization. In relation to its assets only, its content had been imagined to attract and direct toward greater systematic incorporation into the Western military and political mechanism, indicating all those benefits that the YPA itself would have from such development. However, material balance of the YPA had been neither the sole nor the main reason for approaching the West; therefore, it would not be realistic to expect that it would stay in such a milieu strictly for its modernization. After the cessation of the immediate threat from the Soviet or satellite attack, stagnation and backwardness of the military aid

176

Conclusion

had been already more bearable and politically more acceptable than earlier. Achieving the balance between confronted military-political blocs, Yugoslavia was prepared to sacrifice its perspective of thorough modernization of its military assets in order to maintain this position. Although during the period, serious and recognizable moves had been made in relation to the conditions before accession to the program, there remained an impression that at its end, it remained a shadow of great backwardness from what had been defined as a new contemporary standard. For its achievement, however, it needed more than what Yugoslavia was prepared to give. The YPA had to go through the new period of stagnation and backwardness, but it was already not threatened by such sinister consequences, as was the case at the beginning of the previous decade. Equipment and armaments delivered in the previous period had been sufficient in its quality and quantity to enable relatively acceptable “bridging” of intervals, to the point of setting the new strategic supply system. The individual quality of the equipment from the MDAP, on its part, often was at such a high level that it not only survived the atmosphere and political milieu through which it came to the YPA, but it is still used to this day. Activities, through which its operationalization had been performed, especially reflected the sensibility with which the operatives of both sides accessed this work. Conceiving the program as an endless source of everything its army lacked, the Yugoslav officials often expected more than would be possible to get from it, often without even respecting the postulates the program itself relied on. Requests for military equipment and armaments almost every time were constantly motivated by the awareness of its own shortages. However, Yugoslavia rarely thought of how the donor would benefit from such development too, losing sight that military assistance was one causal political project, more conditioned and determined by the interests of the one who provides the help than by the wishes and needs of its recipients. Ignoring these interests was usually a product of inert bureaucracy and rigidity that usually was more than unnecessary. Such rigidity and hostility had been a clear indicator of the personal experience of the program by the Yugoslav military—a measure of its acceptance and signpost of its perspective. Relations with the United States for military assistance have been, for example, during the whole period, marked by constant reserve. Yugoslavs believed that the AMAS was an institution dealing more with intelligence than logistical matters, and such a picture was something that was closing the door before its members, treated them as spies, denying them access to any information they could find possible, and guarding and hiding all data that could be hidden and presenting only as little as needed to be given. On the other hand, such a conspiracy level often was more than irrelevant, because any operative from the military-intelligence sector from the lists of the



Conclusion 177

requested armaments and equipment could completely see not only instant materials and technical situations of the YPA but also the level of awareness and thoughts of its planners. Moreover, with this hostility, the opportunity to present a positive image of the state and military had been missed and therefore enabled, if nothing else, a more meaningful and enforceable program of military deliveries. In Yugoslavia, it seemed as if they did not realize that the whole project depended on a large number of different military-political factors; therefore ignoring any of them could hardly bring some improvement in what represented the only systematic framework of the army’s reorganization. On the other hand, the same bureaucratized and shortsighted perception of the program by the part of American services at all levels had complicated its conduct, as well—whether it was about the regime and content of the shipment or the possibilities of strategic upgrade of the program. It sometimes may have seemed that for those services, the program itself had been more improbable and more blurred than had been the case with their Yugoslav equivalents. Starting from the general anti-communist stands, many American officials did not only agree with the existence of the program, but they also, not believing in its long-term perspective, considered it to be their obligation to take more restrictive stands, which often were not in line with American policy. Knowing that such appearances would not put their personal carriers and positions into question, as if they did not have in mind that this may close the doors and disable finishing those projects that already had been started and turn on a completely different basis, losing in that way initiative and control over events. Moreover, such actions in Yugoslavia were instantly recognized as evidence of a lack of willingness to cooperate. The proponents of the hard ideological line, who never reconciled with this form of military and political relations with the West, gave materials and reasons for taking an even more repulsive stand. “Secrecy” from the Western delegation at the first tripartite Yugoslav diplomatic conference, as well as suspension of shipments during the Trieste crisis at the operating level, had been only one of numerous examples of this phenomenon. As much as it was modern and atypical for its time, the Western military assistance program to Yugoslavia was nevertheless based on the premises of more conservative, military-political conceptions, which on both sides meant almost identical bureaucratic surprise and confusion at best, but also opened resistance and unacceptability in the worst case. Even though these factors did not have a decisive influence on the destiny and perspective of the program, to a great extent, they defined forms, scope, and modalities of its further operation, making the final result weaker than what had been indicated by the real possibilities at its beginning.

178

Conclusion

Drawing the line at the end of this activity, both the United States and Yugoslavia had reason to be satisfied by the activity and its achievements. Shipments of military materials enabled further political influence of Yugoslavia but also of countries that might follow its footsteps, demonstrating American willingness to support independence from the USSR that would not be conditioned by an automatic change of internal social order. Moreover, one more prosaic and tangible goal had been achieved. The disposition of delivered material improved the defense of highly important strategic directions that were critical to the defense of Europe, and this for a price much lower than the one that would be related to the engagement of its military assets on the same task. Yugoslavia, on its part, through it got confirmation of the West’s support to its independent position in this part of Europe, strengthening its position toward the Socialist bloc of countries and the USSR as creator of their foreign policy. Apart from the fact that materials and technical segments of the program helped more through reorganizing certain branches of its army and additional reinforcement of other branches of the armed forces, the program provided the conditions for bypassing the most critical period after the break with Stalin, as well as the basis for future normal functioning when the situation settled down. Although unspoken, this program had a more than favorable effect on the development of Yugoslav armed forces, significantly increasing the level of their combat readiness. Regarding Yugoslav governmental authorities, nobody expected more from it. As for the other mode of Yugoslavia associating with the West, the Balkan Pact, Darko Bekić rightfully stated, “in its more mature diplomatic analyses Western powers did not give much of an importance to the Balkan Pact.” He also added that the Department of State considered that the lastingness of the Pact would depend on the further course of normalizing Yugoslav-Soviet relations.2 The Soviet-Yugoslav split in 1948 led to Yugoslavia turning toward the West. That, in a fact, opened a new front within the Cold War. Fearing from the possible Cominform military intervention, Yugoslavia entered into an initially political and subsequently military or defense arrangement with Western countries. The United States and the rest of the West, first surprised with the intercommunist conflict, assessed its political, economic, and military support to Yugoslavia as politically and strategically important. Due to that assessment, the West supported Yugoslavia’s independence, taking into account, despite their ideology and politics, military reasons as well. Yugoslavia’s military power represented an important counterweight on a scale that measured the military potential of the Cold War great powers on South European, Mediterranean, and Balkan battlefields. After avoiding the danger from the East, Josip Broz Tito assessed that the geographic and new militarypolitical position of Yugoslavia had created a stable position for negotiating



Conclusion 179

over Yugoslavia’s relations with the great powers, neighbors, and countries in the wider region. The Yugoslav agreements with Greece and Turkey went from a political— Ankara, February 1953—to a military alliance—Bled, August 1954. In fact, the creation of the Balkan Pact represented Yugoslavia’s inclusion into the Western defense system. For Yugoslavs, the Balkan Pact had been suitable only in terms of providing its security. From the Soviet side came claims that Yugoslavia’s joining the Balkan Pact had been inspired not by the need for protection from the Soviet-satellite intervention, but by the need for strengthening its position in disputes with Italy over Trieste. It should be noted that normalizing relations wth Greece opened possibilities for cultural and other kinds of communication and cooperation.3 However, the military and economic aid was kept even after the visibly diminishing threat from the East. In addition, the demands to formally join the Western defense structures were avoided. Yugoslav foreign policy was traveling through a narrow passage between needs for its safety and the interests of the great powers. The West also tried to involve Italy in the Balkan Pact. That created some good conditions because Western representatives started to take pay attention to Belgrade’s attitudes, while being involved in the solution of the “Trieste issue.” The strategic importance of the Ljubljana Gap, together with the changes in Yugoslav foreign policy, had a significant influence on the benevolent attitude of leading Western countries, as well as the dynamics of the YugoslavItalian dispute solution over Trieste. The policy of the Balkan Alliance imposed obligations to the YPA in creating defense plans in case of Cominform military intervention. Following its own Cold War agenda, the Soviet initiative for normalizing relations with Yugoslavia started with the intention of alienating Yugoslavia from the West and its return to the “camp,” in fact making it possible for Yugoslavia and Tito to keep their distance from the West. Simultaneously, with Western efforts to include Yugoslavia in NATO, Yugoslavia tried to avoid such obligations, especially the consequences that would certainly occur. After the Greco-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, Yugoslavia had taken a new role as reconciliator of parties in a dispute that had strengthened its foreign policy positions and created the foundation for Yugoslavia to become the central state of the Balkan Pact. Also, Yugoslavia’s alliance with Greece and Turkey gave an opportunity to Tito to connect its independent policy with similar tendencies in Asia and Africa, thus choosing the way between two confronted blocs when the Balkan Pact became inactive. With normalizing relations with the USSR, journeys to India and Burma in 1955, and a meeting with Naser

180

Conclusion

and Nehru in 1956, Tito focused his attention outside of Europe and chose the third way. On the other hand, Yugoslavia’s role as an inspiration of changes was brought under question. Events in Hungary and Poland, and later on in Czechoslovakia, demonstrated that the USSR would not easily allow abandoment of its “camp.” Viewed internally, the Balkan Pact influenced the development of ideological dilemmas, causing a feeling of discomfort within the Communist party, as well as with Tito. Namely, the Party and country in general needed to explain why it had kept its distance from the USSR, and especially the alliance with ideological opponents and Western military aid. Despite the diminished significance of the Balkan Pact, successful maintenance of the independent position had decreased the internal need for ideological justification. Actually, the foundations of the new Yugoslav foreign policy orientation was created during this period. NOTES 1.  B. Dimitrijević, Jugoslavija i NATO, p. 172. 2.  D. Bekić, p. 648. 3.  Victor A. Gavrilov, The Balkan Pact in the Context of the Soviet-Yugoslav Relations in the Late 1940’s Early 1950’s, Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Institute for strategic researches, Belgrade 2008, pp. 219–225 (hereinafter, V. Gavrilov).

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

TRIPARTITE: YUGOSLAV CONFERENCES IN BELGRADE AND WASHINGTON, D.C. The First Tripartite-Yugoslav Conference in Belgrade, November 15–20, 19521 The conference started on November 16, 1952. General Thomas Handy and General Peko Dapčević, chief of staff, led negotiating teams. Members of the Tripartite delegation were also Rear-Admiral Good, Brigadier Generals Giffin and Brown, interpreters Colonel Osmanski, Captain Lord, and Lieutenant Galloway, as well military attachés of Great Britain and France in Yugoslavia, Bird and De Chezelles, respectively. Apart from Dapčević, members of the Yugoslav party were Vice Admiral Josip Černi as a representative of the navy, Major General Miloš Šumonja from the General Staff, Colonel Vlaisavljević from the Command of the Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense, Colonel Bosnić from the Second Directorate of the General Staff, and Colonel Đukanović from Directorate of Logistics.2 On the basis of an aide-memoir,3 delivered to the Yugoslav military leadership a month earlier, the members approached the issue that marked the entire first day—the review of strategic and tactical plans. It concerned especially the plans for defending Ljubljana Gap and the possibility of coordinating forces with neighboring countries and members of NATO or under the NATO influence to determine the most appropriate form of allied support. General Šumonja highlighted that satellite countries had organized their divisions according to Soviet formation, that is, that they had 10 to 13,000 soldiers.4 The Hungarians had 20 divisions, out of which 15 were infantry, 2 armored, 1 motto mechanized, and 1 antiaircraft. However, within their infantry divisions, they also had one tank 181

182

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

battalion, equipped with modern Soviet T-34 tanks. The Romanians had 24 divisions, out of which 15 were infantry, 3 mountain, 3 armored, 3 artillery, and 1 mechanized, as well as 6 cavalry regiments capable of converting into armored-mechanized units. The Bulgarians had 14 divisions—12 infantry and 2 armored; they also had planned to convert their 3 cavalry regiments into mechanized ones. Albania possessed 3 divisions and 1 armored regiment. To these forces, 10 Soviet divisions needed to be added, located in the countries mentioned as well as in Austria. Those were differences in relation to the American data, because Handy said that the Soviets, according to their knowledge, in the countries immediately surrounding Yugoslavia had no more than 6 divisions, but he was presented with their present formation, so he had to agree with Yugoslavia’s standpoint. It was concluded that overall land forces, which might be engaged in the attack on Yugoslavia, counted 71 divisions, 10 of which were Soviet, and 61 divisions of the Satellite forces.5 Concerning the satellite countries, this number should have been significantly increased in six days after the announcement of mobilization, because it was estimated that, for example, Hungary might form 10 to 15 divisions from its reserves, and Bulgaria 12 more.6 General Dapčević stressed that according to their structure, these forces, especially divisions of the first echelon and armored-mechanized units, were directly oriented toward Yugoslavia, that is, toward the borders of Greece and Turkey. It was also emphasized that, regarding favorable relief and the good condition of traffic infrastructure of neighboring countries, there were great opportunities for quick engagement and logistic support of these troops, which additionally complicated Yugoslavia’s situation.7 When Handy requested information on the satellite armies’ material supply level, Dapčević said that the Soviets overtook that job and that their work was more than good, according to data available to him. As an illustration, he mentioned an example of the locomotive factory in Czepel near Budapest, which had been converted into a factory for producing T-34 tanks8 that indeed greatly facilitated their supply with this weapon, which was most important for offensive actions. Followed by the statement that a significant increase was noted in the number of active soldiers under arms, Šumonja substantiated this with by data that Hungary had approximately 64,000 soldiers in 1948, and in 1952, that number was close to 266,000, while in Romania that number, for the same period, increased from roughly 168,000 to nearly 482,000 soldiers.9 Dapčević also added that, if this picture is reinforced with the remark that satellite countries had more tanks, heavy artillery, and aviation, which were almost completely lacking in the Yugoslav arsenal, the statement “absolute superiority” imposed itself.10



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

183

Figure A.1.  Yugoslavia’s estimate of neighboring armies’ actual strength with their mobilization possibilities in the fall of 1952.

While negotiations continued, Dapčević and Šumonja presented their knowledge of engineering construction carried near the Yugoslav border, which, according to their opinion, aimed at making so-called “platzdarm”11 for attack, that is, logistically prepared field premises from which the first offensive attack might be done.12 Concerning Hardy’s question about the expected time of the attack, they did not have an answer. The exposure had been continued by describing the construction and transportation infrastructure that should be used in the case of the attack on Yugoslavia. Newly constructed communication infrastructure was mainly oriented toward the Yugoslav border and in the directions expected strike. It was conspicuous that at least one railroad whose construction was done by some of the countries that were allies to the USSR was built according to the Soviet’s dimensions of the railway track.13 It was as obvious that those railways were in military function for providing direct transportation of troops and materials from the territory of the USSR to potential Yugoslav battlefields. Construction of other railway roads in compliance with the European standards stressed only the military character of those mentioned above.14 Regarding the airports, it was said that

184

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

a total number was 223, of which 95 were operational, 88 were auxiliary, and 23 were under construction. Satellite countries had 17 airports, compared to 1 Yugoslav airport, where runways were adjusted for jet airplanes.15 Yugoslav generals stressed the high-combat quality of Hungarian and Bulgarian units, as well as their preparedness to fight against Yugoslavia due to the traditional animosities and territorial aspirations. They thought that Romanians should be persuaded to take some actions since they did not have any territorial aspirations.16 However, they had no doubts that the Soviets would have any special problems in persuading the Romanians to fight against Yugoslavia, regarding the level of discipline they enforced among their allies, but also regarding the fact that, in the event of an attack on Yugoslavia, most of these units would be led or controlled by Soviet military instructors.17 Regarding combat reserves, the Yugoslav generals presented data showing their level corresponded with the Soviet offensive tactics, that is, a “combat kit” for one army operation meant human and material resources for a strike of 150 to 200 kilometers deep. According to the Yugoslav data, each army had at its disposal reserves of material for three to four such operations.18 For a securing rear, which was an issue of interest for Handy’s team, police forces and units of NKVD were provided. Only in Romania, they counted approximately 110,000 people, but that did not exclude the possibility of their engaging for strictly military assets as well. The fall of combat morale and the potential occurrence of the “fifth column” could be expected only in the case of military operations taking an unfavorable course.19 Handy expressed a statement that “this anyway is not purple situation” and the Western military industry was obligated to deliver missing war materials to all endangered regions, but that this also implied a long time period and inability to distribute this equipment all at once to interested recipients. Dapčević replied that, like the Soviets who are first arming front echelons, giving them the most modern weapons, so Americans should have in mind that the first line of defense in the Balkans was held by Yugoslavia. It was rather illogical to expect Yugoslavs to defend the area that closes the passage to Italy and, at the same time, to give modern weapons to Italy and not to Yugoslavia. The American general answered on this provocation that the purpose of his visit was to collect information and opinions and that he would see Dapčević’s remark through this prism.20 Further discussion had been related to Yugoslavia’s willingness to conduct the war. It was said that Yugoslavia assigned 20 to 25 percent of their national income for defense and their people completely supported this decision. The willingness to resist foreign aggressors, as well as the practical nonexistence of the “fifth column,” which would more likely occur in case of some Western countries, Dapčević estimated as one of the most important factors of Yugoslavia’s optimism.21



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

185

The second day of the conference, especially at its first part, had been characterized by diversity in the approach to negotiations. By presenting on the first day its estimation of the Eastern Bloc military forces and their logistic abilities, the Yugoslav delegation expected from the representatives of the three powers to express their opinions on the matter.22 This had been particularly related to data on the Soviet forces, because it would be logical that Americans had such data at their disposal. However, Handy rejected this possibility, stating that members of his team may later present a summary view on those matters. More importantly, he said that Yugoslavia, apart from getting help with materials it had been receiving at the moment, in the case of a satellite attack (without official engagement of the Soviet troops), may count on only air and naval support from the countries of NATO. He stressed that he did not have authorization to undertake any obligations for support in operations to the north or south of Yugoslavia.23 Dapčević reconciled with the fact that he could not move his interlocutors from their positions, but he stressed that such a standpoint would greatly narrow following negotiations.24 The continuation of talks was a bit more substantial nevertheless. General Šumonja revealed his cards with different variants of Soviet-satellite attack,25 stating that he may not state these activities without the knowledge of possible steps of the allied forces in Austria. They replied by requesting him to state the manner in which he would use his forces, which was according to the tripartite standing that Yugoslavs should completely reveal their plans. There were several strategic assumptions on the possible attack that had moved from a series of partial strikes at different battlefields to simultaneous, frontal offensives in the European sector. Summarizing the experiences from the previous two wars, Šumonja expressed the stand that the aggressor would have a certain initial advantage, as well as that coordinating defense activities would have a key significance for its suppression.26 In this case, the discussion on historical background was used as the basis for questioning if there was a possibility for evacuating Yugoslav forces, according to the Serbian experience from World War I, but Dapčević rejected the idea decisively.27 The picture of a Communist government and its army in exile in the West was not a solution that was acceptable for the Yugoslav administration at that time, putting aside the paradox of such a situation. Handy added that the mentioned slowness of American operations, characteristic of both World War I and II, had been the matter of the past and the conditions at that moment were that the US reaction, either in accordance with allied obligations or in accordance with daily events, would be almost momentarily.28 After this introduction, Šumonja presented one of the variants of a possible satellite offense. A basis for his estimation represented the existing number of 61 opponent divisions that according to the mobilized estimate could be doubled in 7 to 10 days, that is, they could reach between 120 and 130. The

186

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

attack on Yugoslavia would not be complete without attacks on Turkey and Greece, since according to Yugoslav estimations it wasn’t possible to perform a politically cost-effective, isolated attack. Yugoslavia’s assessment was that it would be necessary to separate 60 to 70 divisions, while the remaining part would be engaged in operations toward Turkey, Greece, and Austria. This meant that 30 satellite or Soviet reserve divisions should reinforce the existing forces, but regarding logistic, communicational, traffic, and organizational opportunities, their activation and probability of timely use at a Yugoslav battlefield was not brought into question.29 In addition, Šumonja presented the direction and possible strength of opponents. Three corps would be active in the Zagreb direction—forces of 10 to 11 divisions from Hungary to Belgrade with 9 to 10, while reserves of the first echelon would count 6 to 7 divisions. From Belgrade’s direction, 12 to 13 divisions, with 12 divisions in reserve, would attack from Romania. From the direction of Sofia (Bulgaria), 10 to 11 divisions would attack toward the Niš and Belgrade. Toward Skoplje, 9 to 10 divisions would attack with 4 to 6 divisions in reserve. From Albania, a total number of 5 divisions would be engaged in Kosovo or in Montenegro, if possible, against Greece as well.

Figure A.2.   Yugoslavia’s estimate of directions of potential Soviet-satellite attack in the fall of 1952, with number of forces engaged.



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

187

Different combinations, especially regarding redeployment of units from Hungary toward Austria or their replacement with Soviet troops, as well as the possibility of engaging forces from Bulgaria and Romania against Turkey and Greece, gave invaders the upper hand.30 Šumonja stressed that the aggressor’s main task, apart from a breech in depth, would be destroying the defender’s manpower, and because of this, regardless of the dominant line of attack or favorable relief and manpower superiority, they could undertake a general attack along the whole border, that is, to force the YPA to deploy in a cordon defense system.31 That meant that there was a small possibility of massing of forces only in certain sectors, because in case of a successful defense in neighboring areas, these units would perform counterattacks from flanks and the rear. As an example, it was suggested that, regardless of the depth of the breach through Ljubljana Gap toward Trieste, a successful defense at the central direction would give the opportunity for a counterstrike toward Hungary.32 Therefore, it had been the interest of the Eastern countries to perform one general and wide attack to completely engage Yugoslavia’s defense forces in all sectors, leaving them with no possibility to regroup and redeploy reserve forces. The projection of tripartite negotiators followed the general scheme that the concentration of Soviet-satellite units at the northern direction, their breach toward the North Adriatic Sea by taking over Trieste and Rijeka, and destroying or cutting off northern forces from the majority of the YPA would achieve satisfactory results that would justify the attack.33 Regarding the terrain, initial successes were easiest to achieve in this direction, while neighboring sectors, where operations would be conducted as well, not even closely guaranteed such a speed of progress. That did not mean merely exposing flanks and the rear but also stretching the supply lines, which in Yugoslavia, due to rather bad traffic infrastructure, were not at all favorable. According to the Yugoslav standpoint, this should confirm its stand that just looking at the geographic map excludes the possibility of an isolated and limited attack.34 Such activity would have brought a huge change in the European strategic balance, and its results, if not soon followed by some larger operations, could not justify such a large military engagement. According to D. Bekić, the Western delegation concluded that Yugoslavs did not provide them with significant information and did not reveal their plans for defense for two reasons: one, because the guarantees of confidentiality of talks had not arrived yet and, two, because their psychological profile of “Balkan confidentiality” required strict reciprocity regarding provision and disclosure of data. Since Handy’s team could not provide reciprocity nor had any intention of doing so, they entered the second half of the conference with rather lowered aspirations. The guarantee finally arrived on November 18. In

188

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

their conversation with Kardelj, the ambassadors of three countries, however, had an impression that at that point even noncompliance with the agreement, that is, disclosure of information on the existence of talks, would slightly comfort Yugoslavia.35 It was true that their disclosure would set up a new series of assaults in satellite media and once more give rise to an outbreak of hostility expressed by Socialist governments, but it was also a fact that such a condition for Yugoslavia did not represent anything new or unusual. Since publication of the Resolution of Cominform in 1948, such assaults were launched almost daily; therefore, the Yugoslav administration got used to them to a certain extent. Therefore, it had been probably estimated that in the overall atmosphere formed this way, one more such incident would not be of such great importance. On the other hand, this would leave an impression of strengthening Yugoslavia’s significance for the West, which would largely strengthen its position in relation to the USSR and its allies, as well.36 The third day of the conference started with long-awaited and delayed exposition of tripartite representatives on the Western view of plans and possibilities of the Eastern countries to attack Yugoslavia. Using several maps, a bit older and with borders before World War II, General Brown outlined the formation, scope, and possible directions of operations. His estimates differed significantly from those presented earlier by Generals Dapčević and Šumonja, because he stated, for example, that satellite countries had at their disposal no more than 42 divisions, each having 7 to 9,000 people, which may be strengthened by at most 6 Soviet divisions. Compared to Yugoslavia’s estimate (61 plus 10 of 10 to 13,000 soldiers each), this represented a significantly different view that might have several different implications. It could not have been possible that the Western delegation could have had such a wrong picture of the condition of military forces of the Eastern Bloc, but their minimizing could be used for suppressing more serious Yugoslav requests, and it could serve as a means to make Yugoslavs disclose more information. Anyway, it had been stated that the current actual strength of satellite armies counted 809,000 while 30 days after the announcement of mobilization, this number would increase to 1,380,000 soldiers.37 Regarding their material equipment, Brown said that satellite divisions were far from the level of Soviet units.38 Earlier, General Dapčević presented data that since 1950 these troops were integrated into a Soviet logistic scheme; then this statement of the American general may be viewed as confirming a completely different impression and thinking of military preparedness of the Eastern armies. It was also said that the officers’ corps of these forces, partly due to the ideological purges and partly for some other reasons, had been on a rather low professional level and that such conditions could not be improved quickly.39



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

189

The discussion that followed, again, was mostly concerned with the nature of a potential attack.40 Šumonja asked Brown whether he thought that an isolated attack was the most probable scenario. The discussion opened, which, at least in Šumonja’s indications, was leading to recognizing that this variant was probable. On counterquestions of what Yugoslavia would do in the event of a Soviet attack in Western Europe, Dapčević answered that Yugoslavia would actively participate in its suppression.41 It may be interesting to mention that the Western negotiators often used the Korean example as evidence of a possible isolated satellite attack and that they considered such a development in Yugoslavia possible. Here an analogy with Korea had one more important feature, which maybe was not familiar to the Yugoslav military and political administration. Although the USSR was not officially engaged in this conflict, its regular units largely participated in operations (note the engagement of the 64 corps of fighter aviation during the whole war period),42 and these participations could not remain unknown to American military circles. Therefore, in making strategies for any future case, they equalized the actual participation of the USSR forces with their official position, forestalling this way as a possibility to take away the reason to intervene. Dapčević was satisfied with this as well, so he said that the situation, in which the standpoint of Yugoslavia was that in case of the potential aggression in Western Europe, Yugoslavia would answer by general mobilization, “evolved more,” and that therefore, he expected an evolution in the Western approach to the matter on which they discussed.43 Handy was probably already too bored to repeat his answer on such attempts to exceed what he thought was the term of tripartite delegation. In continuation, it had been said that Yugoslavia wanted to get precise data on the Western intentions, given almost the initiation of strategic negotiations with Greece and Turkey, but, except for the encouragement to start these negotiations as soon as possible, nothing was given from the Western delegation.44 Tripartite information on satellite air forces and their disposition assumed that those forces totaled 1,696 planes, with 38,630 technical personnel. There were 203 training and unidentified aircraft, 342 MIG-15 jet fighters, 365 types of piston engine fighters, 17 jet bombers, 387 piston engine bombers, 68 reconnaissance aircraft and the same number of transportation aircraft, and 246 fighter-bombers. The total number of airports was 124, out of which 12 were first-class airports. Expressing his doubts about the precision of these data, Colonel Vlaisavljević presented that this number needed to be significantly higher, and, as an illustration, he mentioned a disproportionate number of training aircraft in relation to the overall number.45 Regarding possible directions of an attack, Brown limited himself to the two most important directions for NATO—Ljubljana-Zagreb, aimed at

190

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

mastering the northern part of the country and creating conditions for further advancement toward Italy, and Vardar’s Valley, which in case of a general war, would open advancement toward Greece.46 Šumonja expressed interest for a plan of activities of the NATO air forces in the case of such development, but he was not provided with a specific response.47 Further conversation went toward prattling about the possibility of the Yugoslav forces’ maritime supply, where one more conceptual difference had been stressed. Tripartite’s delegation insisted that quality supply might be done only through Trieste and Thessalonica, where materials would be transported to Trieste from ports on the Tyrrhenian Sea by railroad and to Thessalonica by sea.48 Yugoslav ports at the Adriatic Sea had a secondary importance, partly due to the insufficient capacity for reloading, and partly due to the poor communication connections with the hinterland. By focusing their attention on Trieste, that is, the Thessalonica direction, the Western planners requested from the Yugoslavs to concentrate their efforts on protecting those sectors that would be of immediate significance for NATO members, that is, for Italy and Greece. No matter what, the Yugoslavs tried to prove that an active defense in these sectors with defense on others had been tactically and politically impossible; however the attitude of their counterparts remained unchanged. The Yugoslavs realized that their value was seen only as much as it contributed to the achievement of the global interests of NATO, while its particular interests were not of great importance. Second, disqualifying the Adriatic direction for supply led toward an easier achievement of one less prosaic goal—reducing, even minimizing, the significance of the Yugoslav war fleet and, therefore, funds as well that should be delivered to this part of the armed forces within the military assistance program. Therefore, it may be said that later highlight of disadvantages of the Adriatic Sea under the pretext of its exposure to submarine activity from Albanian ports and air attacks from bases in Hungary and Austria had more purpose of verbal justification or excuse.49 In continuation, Captain Lord presented the disposition of Soviet and satellite naval forces, which was the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the navies of Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. The strength of Soviet ships was estimated at 358 different kinds of vessels. Two of them were warships, 7 cruisers, 21 destroyers, 58 submarines, 143 patrol boats, 3 minelayers, 16 landing ships, and 40 auxiliary ships of different purposes. Romania had 53 warships or ships that might be used for combat. These were mostly old and technologically obsolete vessels that operationally did not represent a force on which one might count seriously. There were 4 destroyers, 4 submarines, 3 gunboats, 3 river gunboats, 6 torpedo boats, 1 processed yacht, 2 minesweepers, 2 auxiliary ships, 13 smaller patrol boats, 13 tugs, and 2 minesweepers,



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 191

whose construction was not finished at that time. Bulgaria had 53 warships: 1 destroyer, 31 submarines, 2 minelayers, 16 minesweepers, and 3 auxiliary ships. The Albanian Navy consisted of 14 torpedo boats, 3 minesweepers, 12 patrol boats, and 2 auxiliary ships, or 31 vessels in total.50 In total, these numbers confirmed the opinion that the standpoint on nonsafety of the Adriatic supply direction, especially regarding threats from the sea, was more political than of a serious tactical military nature. If one considers the naval force of the American Sixth fleet, stationed in Mediterranean waters, as well as the available ships of other Mediterranean members of NATO, then it could easily be presumed that the Eastern European fleet would not have serious chances of success. If the precondition had been added for initiating such operations to pass undisturbed through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, for which the orientation of Turkey and Greece was not probable, then the action designed makes no sense. Its expediency potentially would exist in case of a land attack on the whole territory of the Balkan Peninsula, but that would mean opening a general war, as only one possibility, Yugoslav negotiators insisted from the very beginning. In all other situations, the only force in the Mediterranean that might cause trouble to maritime lines of supply of Yugoslavia by the Adriatic was the Albanian Navy, although it could hardly respond to the task, according to the above-mentioned figures. Regarding the naval forces of the Western allies in the Mediterranean, despite a directly asked question by General Dapčević, no data were given.51 Afterward, Admiral Černi started his presentation on Yugoslavia’s view of military-strategic issues in the Adriatic Sea and the Mediterranean, pointing out that a higher level of danger for transport convoys existed in the Aegean Sea than in the Adriatic, regarding the closeness of Bulgarian airports in the valley of Marica. If adequate protection would be provided from the naval actions, passage through Otranto and the Adriatic Sea could be considered equally suitable.52 Regarding logistics centers, Yugoslavia’s coast had 10 good ports (Trieste, Pula, Rijeka, Bakar, Zadar, Šibenik, Split, Kardeljevo, Dubrovnik, and Zelenika), connected by the railroad with the inland. Its overload capacity (without Trieste) amounted to approximately 15,000 tons per day, while the estimated material needs amounted to 315,000 tons monthly, which meant that the daily overload did not need to exceed 10,500 tons. The sparseness of these ports enabled the dispersion of convoys and their lesser endangerment by air or submarine attacks. Their defense represented work for which help was requested; therefore, Černi repeated the request for this type of assistance in vessels and related materials. He particularly highlighted that the priority was escort and patrol boats, submarine hunters, minesweepers, destroyers, and navy aviation.53 On the issue of the navy aviation, he explained that it, of

192

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

course, would not be stationed on carriers, but on airports on land, whether on the coast or on islands.54 Since Dapčević and Černi criticized the concept of supply through Ljubljana and Thessaloníca, Handy asked if the Western planners might have gotten the wrong picture of the quality of communications that led over these directions. The response to that (for the umpteenth time) was that the mentioned communications in peace represented the best traffic infrastructure. However, at the same time, those were main directions of the expected enemy offensive, so in the case of military operations their use for strategic supply would be at least seriously brought into question. Ports on the Dalmatian coast were not so well connected with the hinterland, but communications in their rear were completely satisfying the need for transporting 10,500 tons of materiel daily.55 It was rather obvious that the Western negotiators would not give up concentrating on either the defense or supply in those two directions and that other variants did not interest them. On the other hand, Yugoslavia’s delegation also did not want to back down, so the discussion was continued by Colonel Osmanski’s presentation and the question of, regarding the necessary quantity of materials, whether Yugoslav ports had the capacity to receive 21 cargo ships of the Liberty type with military escort and whether the Adriatic could guarantee security for such a large number of ships.56 What Admiral Good considered impossible, General Dapčević considered realistic. It was clear that both of them expressed maximal standpoints, because they were aware that no compromise could be achieved on these matters. Colonel Vlaisavljević opened the aviation segment by reviewing peace and potential Soviet and satellite war formations. In peace, Hungarian forces counted 7 aircraft divisions, Romanians and Bulgarians had 6 each, while Albania had one incomplete regiment. In war conditions, these formations could be doubled from the bases in Austria and Hungary. This would count a total of 48 aircraft divisions, of which 33 would be engaged toward Yugoslavia. In peacetime, jets accounted for 20 percent, while it was estimated that in the case of war, it could reach up to 40 percent. One division in war formation counted 140 aircraft. Regarding the average range of their aircraft, which was around 900 km, these forces could operate over the whole Adriatic Sea and even over the Italian territory. In case of the initiation of hostility, Vlaisavljević said that Yugoslavia wished for NATO air forces to coordinate with Yugoslav aviation to perform strategic and operational tasks, while tactical and operational support to the troops on the ground would be undertaken by Yugoslav aviation.57 General Giffin mentioned that a large part of the mentioned airplanes actually represented the first defense line of the USSR because they consisted of the formations of fighters, foreseen to block or inflict losses to the NATO bombers before they reached Soviet airspace.



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 193

Colonel Đukanović opened discussions about logistical matters. He explained that Yugoslavia had certain materiel-technical reserves at its disposal but that they were far from sufficient. As a main problem, he noted a lack of tanks, heavy artillery, radar, antitank guns, ammunition, fuel, means of transport, and spare parts. They had received aid from Western Allies that, partly, improved this condition, but even this aid was not completely delivered. Following the exposition of General Brown, he expressed that reserves for three months, as in case of satellite armies, would satisfy YPA needs, although the optimal would be collecting reserves for a six-month period.58 The situation was even more difficult due to the drought that had caused a great reduction in the food reserves for the army. The expected ally’s supplies were supposed to encompass the material that the Yugoslav military industry was not able to produce itself.59 Commenting on the previous discussion, Đukanović emphasized the importance of the Adriatic ports in Dalmatia, strengthening his arguments based on a study of Yugoslav railroads. In this sense, Yugoslavs placed a request for equipment that would enable either modernizing port facilities or reconstructing mentioned railroads and traffic roads, but also for trucks as the main means of transportation for materials from ports to the troops.60 He also repeated how vulnerable communications between Trieste–Ljubljana–Zagreb–Belgrade and Thessalonica–Skopje–Niš–Belgrade were in the case of war. Đukanović announced the construction of the railroad from Kardeljevo to Sarajevo and confirmed the plan’s existence for construction of the Belgrade-Bar railroad. According to his words, there was a great problem in the fact that existing railway roads were mostly narrow in gauge, which greatly reduced their capacity. Special attention was given to the Belgrade-Bar railroad, for which it was said that, if they could get help in machines, rails, bridge construction, and other specific materials, its construction could be finished in somewhat more than three years.61 General Handy answered that if the allied forces were able to maintain continuous supply to Yugoslav units, then an accumulation of materiel reserves seemed useless.62 This seemed completely unsustainable for Yugoslav officers, especially from an operational point of view. Establishing a continuous supply is possible only in later phases of the operation, after achieving air superiority and completely securing rear lines. At the beginning, the army needed to have materials on hand so they wer not left without them during the most critical period. It seemed that Handy constantly had in mind the political aspect of his mission, and this meant an evasion of accepting any kind of obligation or argument that would imply their reception in the future. This made negotiations even harder, because they often resulted in futile discussion on

194

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

standpoints that were attacked by military-operational views and defended by political arguments and vice versa.63 On the fourth day of the conference, General Šumonja explained the strength, capacities, organization, and possibilities of the Yugoslav armed forces. On matters of army units, he stressed the lack of certain weapon systems compared to satellite divisions, especially stressing lack of tank battalion. The same, if not worse, situation was in respect to the heavy artillery and modern air forces. Regarding strength, he said that the peace formation of the YPA comprised 35 divisions, out of which 6 were aircraft, 3 armored, and 26 infantry, and these should be added with a guard division. In the war situation, the YPA would be enhanced with 16 divisions of reserves. If units of the Corps of National Defense of Yugoslavia, (Yugoslav’s analog to the Soviet Internal Army) and police were excluded, there were around 450,000 people under arms, and after mobilization, this number could be increased to over a million soldiers. It was also noted that almost one million trained reserves would be left outside the regular formation.64 He continued exposing data regarding the transportation equipment, mentioning that there were more horse carts than trucks, and then the conversation went in the direction of explaining the Yugoslav division’s organization. Neither he nor General Dapčević wanted to answer the question of the peace army-corps organization, uttering that this had been irrelevant because during the war, because these units would be subjected to significant changes.65 Dapčević also did not want to give data on the organization of artillery, infantry, and armored units. Long and fierce discussions were held over this issue, and the result was that the Yugoslav negotiators did not want to meet the requests of their guests in an area in which they were particularly interested in.66 While they talked about information related to the conditions and intentions of the satellite armies, there was still the possibility of providing data because it was considered that the Allies would get those data themselves. However, when the subject of conversation became the organization and structure of the YPA, the “buttoned-up” tripartite team could not hope to get anything interesting.67 Colonel Bird tried to get information on domestic sources of military equipment; however, General Dapčević answered him sharply that he could not count on such data. Insisting that such data would be necessary for precise planning of the assistance, also did not find any understanding. 68 Conversation then returned to the mobilization-logistic theme. Dapčević explained that Yugoslavia’s mobilization plan implied a four-day period for the basic units, and seven to ten days to form the reserve. After this period, Yugoslavia could have over one million people under arms.69 At this point, General Šumonja presented one of the variants of action of Yugoslav forces. The Yugoslav general highlighted that Yugoslavia’s concept of de-



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 195

fense considered that an isolated satellite attack was impossible and that all combinations had been directed toward solving the problems of the general Soviet-satellite attack. That implied an elastic defense on all directions, which should have been carried out by 80 divisions, out of which 50 would have been Yugoslav, 20 Greek, and 10 Turkish, enforced by the NATO forces from Austria and Italy.70 On Ljubljana’s direction, which had been most important for NATO, there were positioned rather strong forces enhanced with reserves of the Supreme Command, which would account for 12 divisions.71 Since this was the direction with high strategic as well as logistic significance, its defense represented one of the main Yugoslav priorities. The defense of the center was closely connected with the defense of the Ljubljana direction. Regardless of the strength and the size of the units operating in this part of the front, Šumonja presented the stand that a large concentration of defense forces would be counterproductive because those units would be subjected to a rather strong attack that probably would lead to their destruction.72 Therefore, by combining an elastic defense in the north and a counteroffensive from the center and Austria on the flanks and rear of the opponents’ forces, invasion would not be just blocked, but the more significant tactical initiative would be achieved.73 Logistically, such a concept affirmed Yugoslavia’s idea of the Dalmatian ports as a basis for supply, because this way the railroad from Genoa to Trieste and further toward Zagreb and Belgrade would not only be immediately endangered but its operability, as one of the primary goals of the air attack, would be seriously put into question. He concluded that there were two variants providing guarantees to Yugoslavia that every attack would mean activating NATO forces, because in this case, there was the possibility of defending the whole Balkans or accepting the possibility of an isolated attack. In that case, Yugoslavia alone would deal with the attack that could hardly be repelled. From the allied standpoint Yugoslavs expected them to overtake bombing targets in the satellite countries, as well as from naval forces in the Mediterranean to take action in accordance with their capabilities.74 If it happened, Handy agreed that the attack would most likely be a general one, but regarding the Korean experience, other variants also needed to be taken into consideration.75 Šumonja went back into his exposition by remarking that the YPA did not plan to maximally or firmly hold its first front line, because this way, it would risk its complete destruction in lowland regions.76 He said that the main resistance, with counterattacks, would be organized on the Sava-Morava line, while the potential third line would go by the rim of the Bosnian and Slovenian mountains.77 However, he refused to elaborate on this argument,78 in accordance with the intention to give the tripartite delegation just a glance .

196

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

into certain war plan possibilities interesting to NATO, simultaneously allowing further details to be left as the subject for future negotiations with the Western team with greater competencies.79 One of Handy’s typical questions was if a division in the northern direction would withdraw or it would resist to the last man.80 At first, the answer was that it depended on the overall allied-Yugoslav concept of cooperation in defense, that is, the level of allied engagement and received Yugoslav obligations.81 Later, however, they often returned to this matter and used it as evidence of the lack of an open allied approach to Yugoslav’s question. Anyway, whether the YPA forces would withdraw to the west or to the south depended solely on the actions of the NATO units in Austria, because if the Western Allies would accept active defense on their part of the battlefield, Yugoslavs would be prepared to engage their troops for a counteroffensive in the direction of the Balkans.82 This was a crucial question of Yugoslav’s defense, because without activating the NATO forces, it was not possible to plan a more serious counterattack, and without opening this possibility, no concept of defense could have a more permanent character. After the break, a long and tiring discussion between Dapčević and Handy started over the nature and range of previous negotiations, as well as their further perspectives. It was obvious that during this break, the Yugoslav delegation decided to take a maximally firm stand. Previous negotiations did not meet their expectations; therefore, their continuation in the same manner, most probably, would not bring anything new. Therefore, they decided once more to try to force the Western side to a more constructive approach that would reflect in presenting at least the personal stands of their members about strength, formation, and intentions of the NATO units in the region. Discussion lasted almost two hours. Dapčević and Šumonja stressed that, as far as they were concerned, the tripartite team received much more information than it gave, and this information was more than sufficient for forming their database. If General Handy did not have some other proposition for continuing negotiations, they may be terminated as well.83 Handy intervened by attempting to, by its authority of the high official of the US army, influence the change of this stand, but the Yugoslav delegation allowed only the list of questions the Western planners had been most interested in to be submitted, but they refused to give immediate answers. The list contained 24 questions in the area of strategic and tactical plans of Yugoslav’s defense.84 Handy understood that all this inevitably led to a dead end; therefore he had to withdraw, so they scheduled the break, after which General Brown was supposed to present the current disposition of the allied forces in Trieste and Austria.



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 197

Such a cold spell and rising tone didn’t come unexpectedly. The Yugoslav delegation expected that negotiations would be characterized by a certain level of information exchange. However, with the way things had been happening, an impression was gained that more and more Yugoslavs were getting into the unfavorable position of applicant for support and that their concept of partnership was not at all interesting for the Western representatives. Instructions that had been coming to Dapčević’s team during the negotiations obviously were directed to stop this practice at all costs, even if it meant terminating negotiations. It was clear to Handy that such a development would not be favorable for his mission as well; therefore, it had been decided to meet the Yugoslav’s requests, even if only symbolically.85 General Brown said that one combined American-British brigade was positioned in Trieste, as well as one American regiment, which in total amounted to 5,000 men. In Austria, there were two brigades: one French and one British, as well as one American antitank detachment.86 Šumonja questioned if these forces, which were representing an equivalent to one strengthened division, should, and to which extent, be strengthened, Brown answered that he was entering the sphere of political matters. After the usual strain, Brown confessed that there were no announcements for their increase and that in case of a Soviet attack, they would probably withdraw into mountain areas, leaving Yugoslavia’s left flank open.87 Dapčević used this to highlight that this all meant that either NATO did not have a strategy for defending Austria or it did not want to set closer relations with Yugoslavia and establish functional coordination with its forces in defense.88 It became clear to Handy that further continuation of the negotiations would not take them anywhere; therefore, it was proposed to finish for the day. On the fifth and last day, negotiations lasted no longer than 40 minutes. Handy spoke about possible future negotiations and offered a scheme for their organization. It encompassed several levels, from current bilateral contacts over tripartite-coordinated planning to combined and regional-operative planning.89 This meant that he presupposed making stronger connections that would enable fitting Yugoslavia into a standard NATO concept of materialoperational cooperation. Dapčević immediately said that these had been political matters and that, if the agreement would be achieved regarding them at the governmental level, military delegations would easily regulate their operations. He estimated that the five-day talks provided to the Western officers a good opportunity to familiarize themselves with the Yugoslav stance, as well as that presented information had been enough for shaping an image of the current situation, needs, and plans of the YPA.90 Handy agreed that negotiations were useful and successful, as well as that his delegation would

198

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

respect the agreement on keeping its secrecy.91 After the usual courtesy statements and invitations for future cooperation, the conference ended. The Second Tripartite-Yugoslav Conference in Washington, August 24–28, 195392 Along with General Vučković, in Yugoslavia’s delegation, there were Generals Lekić, Dasović, Bubanj, and Poglajen; Rear Admiral Pecotić; Colonels Bosnić, Dulić, Kofler, and Jeričević; Lieutenant Colonels Lolić and Šešerinac; an interpreter, Lieutenant Brovet; and civil servants, Dr. Bruner and Dr. Vodušek. The tripartite delegation consisted of representatives from the United States, Generals Lemnitzer,93 Eddleman, and Harmony; Lieutenant Colonels Lee and Cocke; and Captain Posich. General Stratton and Commodore Casey represented Great Britain, and Generals Ely and Stehlin and Captain Poncet represented France.94 The predetermined agenda had seven items:95 • The tripartite and Yugoslav estimates of Soviet and/or satellite threats to Yugoslavia • The tripartite’s position regarding military support to Yugoslavia in case of a Soviet and/or satellite attack • The state of military preparedness, mobilization plans, and logistic possibilities of Yugoslav forces for opposing a Soviet and/or satellite attack • Tripartite and Yugoslav concepts for defending Yugoslavia • Yugoslavia’s defense plans, with special attention on Northern Yugoslavia • Military support requested by Yugoslavia (i.e., operational support and logistical support) • The basis for further military talks with Yugoslavia The working part of the conference started on August 24, 1953. Expressing welcome for the presence of the highly competent delegation of the Yugoslav armed forces, General Lemnitzer outlined an estimate that defending Yugoslavia from potential Soviet aggression was not only their obligation but it was a matter of great importance for the United States, Great Britain, and France. This stand was supported by the fact that not only defending Northern Italy but also the entire south flank of NATO would not be possible without Yugoslavia playing an active role. Its willingness to oppose the Soviet threat by any means, as well as the military diplomatic arrangements, concluded with Greece and Turkey, confirmed its importance and value for the West. Therefore, military and economic assistance delivered to Yugoslavia in the previous three years had been a clear sign of constant and visible care of the



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 199

three countries for its safety. Although the military support program contributed to the visible materials and technical consolidation of the YPA, it could not even come close to guaranteeing the YPA’s survival in the case of a Soviet or satellite war threat. According to his words, the conference’s goals were to determine a functional system of material equipment of the Yugoslav armed forces, as well as to provide operational support to its assets. General Lemnitzer highlighted that the Western negotiators did not have the authority to accept some final and definite obligations but that they did have authorization for contingent military planning, that is, creating an organizational intelligence based on the support that would be provided to Yugoslavia in case of a war.96 It was obvious that even the level of competence of the Western delegation, defined in this way, was something Yugoslav negotiators vainly expected from Handy’s team in Belgrade. On the same trail were Lemnitzer’s standpoints that, since the potential conflict would be the beginning of the general war, this meeting would determine the importance and scale of Soviet and satellite military preparations, as well as to create conditions for encompassing Yugoslavia’s defense plans into a wider NATO strategy for defending Europe, especially its south and southeast parts. General Vučković underlined that Yugoslavia’s expectations regarding these negotiations referred to establishing a common defense line in Europe, as well as through negotiations, they would come to firm agreements and deals regarding this matter. After a short break, they moved on to discuss tripartite and Yugoslav’s estimates of the Eastern threat. The American estimate of the Eastern Bloc’s forces, eventually engaged in the attack on Yugoslavia, was between 35 and 40 divisions. Looking from the north, they considered that one of the main strikes would come from Hungary and East Austria, and their goal would be conquering and establishing control over the territories north of the Sava River to provide further progress toward Northern Italy. This offensive would have three main segments: one, break through toward Belgrade, with participation of three to five Soviet divisions; two, break through in the direction of Ljubljana-Trieste (ten divisions, six to seven of which would be Soviet, and the rest would be Hungarian); and three, securing communications in the Belgrade-Zagreb area, with four to five Hungarian divisions.97 The focus would be placed on taking Belgrade. For that purpose, six to eight Romanian and Soviet divisions would advance from the direction of Timisoara. In line with this, from Sofia, another group of three to four Bulgarian divisions would advance toward Niš, and one part of these forces would continue toward Belgrade. An offensive from the direction of Ćustendil toward Skopje was expected as well, with participation of three to four Bulgarian

200

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

divisions. The goal of the last group would be to cut off the southern part of Yugoslavia, merging with the Albanian forces and creating a base for further operations toward Greece. Reserves were estimated at four to five divisions that would completely consist of Soviet troops, and they would be divided in half in the regions of Sofia and Budapest. According to US estimates, troops planned for the attack on Greece could be combined at an approximate strength of 12 to 15 divisions, while their use remained unknown for the Western planners. If the operations were successful, especially in the northern part of the battlefield, Soviet and satellite forces would conduct the action of conquering positions on the Adriatic coast, isolating the remaining part of Yugoslav forces on the mountainous terrain of the central and southern part of the country. Their later liquidation could be overtaken when operations on the other fronts allowed dislocation of the necessary forces.98 Forces of the Eastern Bloc had significant aviation assets at their disposal, stationed in Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and the southern part of the USSR, with the primary goal of neutralizing the Yugoslav air forces, secure communication lines, and support the land troops. Half of these forces

Figure A.3.   American estimate of directions of the possible Soviet-satellite attack on Yugoslavia in the summer of 1953.



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 201

consisted of fighters, one third were light bombers, and the rest were fighterbombing, transportation, and reconnaissance aircraft.99 Although General Vučković agreed that such a concept could represent one of the possible scenarios of the offensive, he noted that it did not contain precise data on the strength of the Soviet and satellite units. Presented by Colonel Bosnić, Yugoslavia’s estimates predicted that Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Albania together had 60 divisions in peace formation: Bulgaria 15, Romania 24, Hungary 20, and Albania 4. Bulgarians had organized their forces into four army groups, Romanians in three military districts and one independent corps and Hungarians into seven corps. It was estimated that each division had approximately 8,000 people, and each was strengthened with one tank battalion. In the event of war, this number could be increased from 20 to 26 divisions in 30 days, thanks to the Soviet system of full mobilization. The Yugoslav situation was additionally complicated by the fact that necessary war materials for the above-mentioned units were already provided.100 These data corresponded to those presented to the members of Handy’s team, and the only difference was noted in estimating the peace strength of the satellite land division. In Lemnitzer’s question of the conditions of the

Figure A.4.   Yugoslav estimate of peacetime strength of the regional army forces in the summer of 1953.

202

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

weapons and equipment of the satellite armies, it was answered that it partly consisted of the German and Soviet weapons from World War II, as well as modern Soviet weapons. Replacing the old materials with the new ones was visible, especially the modern T-34 tanks and jet aviation.101 The difference in data on the number of potentially engaged satellite formations was obvious. According to Lemnitzer’s words, the Western countries knew that Bulgaria had deployed three army groups with 10 divisions near the borders with Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, while Yugoslavs knew of the existence of the fourth one, located in the interior of the country. They substantiated this fact by the statement of Turkish and Greek military officials from the last negotiations, since they had the same data on Bulgarian forces.102 In continuation, Vučković presented the disposition of Soviet divisions in the region. There were ten divisions, three in Austria, three in Hungary, and four in Romania.103 Lemnitzer was particularly interested in the data on jet aviation of the satellite countries, especially the existence of MIG-15 jet fighters within their air force. Confirming this information, General Bubanj presented several interesting data. In Romania, there were one Soviet and one Romanian air division with these aircraft. In one Hungarian and one Soviet division, rearmament of these aircraft was in progress. Bulgarians, out of two air divisions, had one fully equipped with MIG-15s and the other was half equipped. For clarification, it was elaborated that one Soviet air division in war conditions consisted of 3 air wings, each consisting of 40 aircraft. Peacetime unit strength was 80 to 100 aircraft. Fighter aviation mainly consisted of MIG-15s, while fighter bombers and light bombers mainly were piston-engine aircraft.104 Organization and logistics was such that satellites were left to do limited tactical and operational activities, while wider, strategic engagement at the overall battlefield represented the Soviet’s obligation. NATO, which could not count on an adequate number of aircraft concentrated in the sector, needed to resolve this problem by the combined efforts of all allied air formations. Lemnitzer knew that such relations had placed the Soviets into a more favorable position, and he cared to completely clarify the relations of this advantage. He showed particular interest in a number of MIG-15s, since this aircraft represented the highest achievement of the current Soviet air technology and it was superior to the contemporary Western competitors, apart from the F-86 Sabre. Experience from the Korean War confirmed their high quality; therefore, this model’s appearance in a sector was treated with utter seriousness, because in the event of an inadequate reaction could lead to seriously lagging behind the potential opponent. Since Yugoslavs tried to obtain F-86s through the MDAP, the presence of the MIG-15s in the air forces of the neighboring countries practically supported their requests. It was also stressed that the Soviet officers would command a significant number of all types of satellite



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 203

units, while some Soviet units would be incorporated into formations of the satellite armies.105 After these clarifications, General Vučković started with exposing the Soviet-satellite threat to Yugoslavia, which he put into the context of starting a coordinated attack at the overall European front. Soviet military diplomatic initiatives in the previous couple of years went from starting the Korean crisis to peacemaking activities, promoting peaceful coexistence, and stating that there was no possibility of an attack in Europe. He characterized those as part of the plan to weaken attention. He underlined Yugoslav’s willingness to involve itself in every such action, because his country would inevitably come under the strike of the offensive coming from the East.106 The variant of the attack under the Soviet’s command, which implied a simultaneous strike on three directions—Vardar, Danube, and Sava—in most parts corresponded to the projection presented by General Lemnitzer. Immediate tasks during and after achieving these goals would be cutting off Yugoslavia from its allies and neutralizing its armed forces. Secondary tasks would be to quickly overtake Trieste and Rijeka and connect with Albanian troops. Thus, the basis for the incursion into Northern Italy would be created, as well as for any potential incursion into Greece and taking control over the Aegean Sea.107 The attack in the northern direction would start in Hungary and Austria with forces of 8 to 10 divisions from the first echelon. The second echelon would consist of four to six divisions, which, depending on the force of resistance, would be engaged toward Ljubljana or Villach. Total strength of troops in this sector was estimated at 20 to 24 divisions.108 The attack in the central direction would imply a break through into Bosnia toward the Adriatic Sea, overtaking Belgrade, and further progress toward the south. To do that, troops would be deployed in South Hungary and West Romania. From South Hungary, they would go through Baranja toward Srem. Further on, the troops would be divided into those that would continue through the valley of Drina toward the sea and those that would start their operations toward Belgrade. These forces would consist of six divisions. Larger forces were expected from the direction of Romania, where after crossing the Danube, 9 to 10 divisions would advance straight to Belgrade and through the valley of Morava. This road would enable establishing a connection with Bulgarian forces. The total estimate of the forces of the first two echelons and their reserves in this sector amounted to 27 to 30 divisions.109 The third strategic direction was the southern or Niš-Skopje direction. Apart from the mentioned Romanian forces, which were four to six divisions strong, that would progress from the north through the valley of Morava toward Niš; engagement of Bulgarian forces was planned as well. For operations from Niš to Belgrade 6 to 8 Bulgarian divisions, 10 to 12 divisions for

204

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

Figure A.5.   Yugoslav estimate of directions for a possible Soviet-satellite attack in the summer of 1953.

the offensive from Niš toward Skopje, and 4 to 6 divisions for the advance from Kyustendil toward Skopje would be employed. With the reserves, 26 Bulgarian divisions would participate in the offensive. The second echelon would contain 6 to 8 divisions that could be used either against Greece or Yugoslavia.110 In total, the general offensive would entail the participation of 75 to 80 divisions, and the level of direct Soviet participation would depend on equipment and the estimated success of the satellite formations. From the point of view of the YPA’s readiness and capabilities, this was the worst possible scenario, because all variants, in which surprise would be achieved by the attack with only peacetime contingents or half-mobilized troops, had been rejected as expectedly unsuccessful, which was explicitly confirmed to Lemnitzer after he repeated the question.111 After the break, General Stratton made the remark that estimates of the satellite countries’ strength of the armies, presented by Lemnitzer and Vučković, differed greatly. In a discussion that followed, it became clear that opinions had been rather close when it came to the North and Center-North sectors, but the differences increased when they analyzed the Center-South and South



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 205

sectors. Yugoslav estimates were based on intelligence data, knowledge of traffic communications, and mobilization-logistic organizations of their neighbors, while it seemed that tripartite negotiators founded their standpoint on intelligence data only. The discussion did not give any particular results, but it showed that Yugoslav officers had a much better knowledge of warfare in the Balkans, while their interlocutors did not even know of the existence of some important directions that could represent the line of a possible breakthrough. Agreements on an estimate of satellite forces in these sectors, achieved with representatives of the general staffs of Greece and Turkey, gave additional support to Yugoslav stands. At the level of the overall battlefield, total discrepancy in presented data reached around 20 divisions; therefore, this matter was left as an important problem in future planning.112 The general then presented the Western point of view for defending Austria and Northern Italy, that is, operations that the allied forces would perform at the left of Yugoslav’s flank. For Yugoslavs, this had particular importance, because apart from parsimonious information in the form of personal opinions expressed by General Brown during the conference in Belgrade, that they would probably withdraw and leave the Yugoslav flank undefended, there was no officially expressed stand of NATO on plans in this sector. A Soviet attack was expected toward the passes of Tarvisio, Plocken, Dobbiaco, and Brenner, which would allow access to Northern Italy. The regional road network would enable the use of five divisions, at most, in the direction toward the Tarvisio pass, while the terrain toward Plocken and Dobbiaco allowed for engagement of even a fewer number of divisions. Successful defense of these lines not only prevented a breakthrough toward Lombardy but also disabled a strike from the rear and flank against Yugoslav forces; therefore, their defense was considered a key for success of the common defense plans in this part of the battlefield.113 In principle, Vučković agreed with this standpoint, but he mentioned that for Yugoslavia, the way these troops would be used was more important than the very directions of the attack graded by their expediency. He considered that the defense lines themselves should follow the natural directions of the relief, but he postponed the discussion of this matter for later.114 During the second day of the conference, negotiators discussed possibilities, readiness, mobilization plans, and logistic capacities of the Yugoslav armed forces. General Lemnitzer, who led the tripartite team on the first day, gave his place to General Clyde Eddleman, whose constructiveness and tendency to solve, not complicate, existing questions and problems soon became prominent. General Franc Poglajen, head of the Yugoslav department for reception of the military assistance, started presenting organizational data regarding land

206

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

forces of the YPA. It was divided into 4 army districts in peaceful conditions, which consist of 8 corps. A divisional structure implied 12 infantry divisions, 4 mountain divisions, 1 guard division, and 3 armored divisions, to which 6 independent mountain battalions were added, 1 detachment in the Free Territory of Trieste, 1 armored brigade, and 1 tank regiment. There were also 2 cavalry regiments, 10 antitank, 12 anti-aircraft, and 11 independent artillery regiments, as well as 3 tank, 5 artillery-reconnaissance, and 7 anti-aircraft battalions. Regarding noncombat units, there were 6 engineering, 5 signal, and 1 transportation regiment; 10 engineering, 12 signal, and 9 transportation battalions; and 1 battalion for road construction and 1 for railroad construction, as well as several engineering detachments. After mobilization, the YPA would have 11 corps, combined into 4 army groups, which would consist of 33 infantry and 8 mountain and guard divisions. Out of these forces, there were 14 independent mountain brigades; 3 armored divisions; 5 armored brigades; 5 cavalry regiments; 26 artillery, 19 antitank, and 13 anti-aircraft regiments; 38 anti-aircraft battalions; and 5 battalions for artillery-reconnaissance. The remaining number consisted of 17 engineering, 2 pontoon, and 6 signal regiments; 23 engineering, 9 pontoon, 7 NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical defense), 37 signal, 33 transportation, and several other battalions for maintaining the communication infrastructure, as well as 9 engineering detachments. According to the plan, these forces should be gathered in 7 to 10 days from announcing mobilization, which was implemented on the territorial principle. In peaceful conditions, land forces of the YPA counted approximately 400,000 troops, while in the war, the planned amount counted roughly to 1,300,000 of armed personnel.115 Regarding divisional organization, there were two basic types. The “new” type implied units in the Ljubljana army that were in the phase of rearmament, while the “old” type encompassed all the existing divisions. Their light weapons were domestically produced. Regardless of the division specialties they could be used in all terrains. Peacetime division strength was between 7,000 to 8,000 people, and in war conditions, it would go up to 12,000, while the projected strength of the “new” divisions counted 13,500 soldiers during the war. In the event of war, border units would be absorbed by the infantry formations from the rear.116 The transportation system was a combined type: up to one-third motor and two-thirds horse-drawn vehicles. Military service lasted two years, and recruits were called for the service twice a year. The annual contingent amounted to 130,000 people. At the end of his exposition, General Poglajen described a school system for reserve and active officers of the YPA.117 General Viktor Bubanj presented the condition of the Yugoslav air force. According to existing figures, it engaged 5 percent of the overall manpower



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 207

of the YPA, and it should have achieved the full planned strength in 1957. The plan implied the existence of 7 air divisions divided into 24 air regiments, with almost 840 aircraft in the first and close to 460 aircraft in the second and the third lines. One airborne brigade was also part of the YAF. However, the current condition was far from these figures. Peace composition in 1953 through 1954 consisted of three fighter, one fighter-bomber, and one bomber air division; and two reconnaissance and one transportation regiment, as well as adequate support units. The difference between peace and war formation could be seen only in the number of engaged people and equipment, since for financial and organizational reasons, formation of the new units was not provided. Fighter planes made up 50 percent of the air forces and bombers and fighter-bombers, 40 percent; the remaining number were transportation, reconnaissance, and training aircraft. In peace conditions, strength was around 28,300 soldiers, noncommissioned officers and officers, and this number would reach the number of 56,240 in the event of war. Command of the YAF was the branch of the ministry of defense, and two corps commands were directly subordinated to it. Corps were further divided into divisional, regimental, and squadron levels. When excluding the civil sector pilots, the number of available pilots amounted to approximately 2,400. That meant that their number was much higher than the number of usable aircraft. The network of airports was unsatisfactory with only 8 airports usable for jet aircraft, but in the mentioned development plan, by 1957, 23 such airports would be provided.118 After Bubanj’s presentation, Admiral Pecotić presented a series of data on the organization of the Yugoslav navy. Peace strength was almost 30,000 people, and military service lasted three years. In war conditions, there was an expected engagement of nearly 50,000 soldiers and sailors, but this increase did not mean a proportionally higher number of vessels but only strengthening of the coastal basis. The only vessels that were planned for mobilization were 80 fishing boats, which because of their wood construction, were planned for cleaning mines. The number of the remaining ships stayed the same and counted 4 escort destroyers, 7 patrol boats, 18 minesweepers (11 wood and 7 metal construction), 55 torpedo boats, 8 minelayers, 9 tankers, 30 scows of different types, 1 school submarine, the training ship Galeb, 1 river monitor, and 12 river minesweepers. In peace conditions, the coastal defense had 23 batteries equipped with 76- to 180-mm guns, and after mobilization, their number would increase to 51 batteries with the same armament. The navy had approximately 5,000 underwater mines. Pertaining to minefields it had 50 kits of antimagnetic, 31 kits of acoustic, and 140 kits of anticontact equipment. Pecotić highlighted that the lack of power generators increased

208

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

the picture of insufficient antimine protection. Apart from this, in arsenals, there were approximately 450 torpedoes and 3,500 depth charges. Through the MDAP came 20-, 40-, and 76-mm marine guns. There was an average of one kit of munitions for each, while reserves of kits for M-7 rocket launchers, 114-mm caliber, amounted to only 4 kits. Navy air forces had only 6 aircraft, 4 of which were domestic and 2 British hydroplanes. Ships were organized into squadrons that had destroyers, torpedo boats, minesweepers, and patrol boats. There were three navy districts: Northern—from the Italian border to Zadar; Central—from Zadar to the island of Mljet; and South—from Mljet to the border with Albania. There were coastal artilleries, smaller types of minesweepers, and patrol and one detachment of torpedo boats in each. Apart from these, there was the command of the river navy. The navy was under the direct command of the chief of the general staff of the YPA.119 Besides Yugoslavia, Pecotić presented the condition of Albanian naval forces, which possessed 14 torpedo boats, 5 minesweepers, 12 patrol boats, and 2 support boats. During 1951, they received five minelayers from Romania and a number of mines from the USSR. They also had 2 regiments of naval infantry and 5 detachments of coastal artillery. He also presented activities recorded on the Sasano and Valona bases, for the probable purpose of their conversion into submarine bases. Overall, it was concluded that the opponents’ forces in the Adriatic Sea did not represent a serious threat, as well as that they could be rather quickly dealt with in the event of initiating operations.120 Colonel Kofler continued exposition and presented organizational data on differences between the “old” and the “new” type of division, stating the precise structure by troop level, as well as a large number of materiel and technical information related to their armament, munitions, and corresponding equipment. Afterward, the organization of the armored division, armored brigade, and mechanized infantry regiment was explained, while the organization of the cavalry and mountain units was left to be dictated and submitted in writing to save time.121 Eddleman thanked everyone for such a comprehensive and detailed report and opened discussion on matters that were of interest for the members of the tripartite delegation. General Stratton asked questions regarding the mobilization plan over 5 to 7 days, and it was explained that this was the period necessary for gathering the units, while its engagement at the front required an additional 10 days. That meant that the overall period, from the announcement of mobilization to the activation at the battlefield, would be 17 days at most. Vučković described in detail the procedure for duplication of peace divisions in two war divisions.122



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 209

Stratton also opened a series of questions concerning the air force. He asked why the land forces mobilized over one million soldiers and air forces only 50,000. In the budget, this relation looked rather different, because, for example, 75 percent of assets intended for the YPA through the MDAP in 1952 were for the development of aviation. Bubanj also noted that the Yugoslav air force had 430 fighter planes but that the lack of spare parts represented a serious problem. Further, on Stehlin’s question, he described the system of education of pilot and technical staff in active service as well as in reserve, from basic to staff levels. Regarding radar, a lack of adequate equipment existed as well. Regarding the significance of early detection of enemy aircraft, competent commands of NATO should pay particular attention on this matter. Stehlin expressed interest in future construction of airports as well, and Bubanj stated that the existing jet air bases in Pula, Zadar, Mostar, Zagreb, Batajnica, and Skoplje had been insufficient or inadequate; therefore, they started construction of new airfields. Eddleman followed this conversation by remarking that it would be necessary to organize the sending of a greater number of cadet pilots for training in the NATO countries, because their training in the event of war would be impossible and this might lead to the deficit of pilots in the Yugoslav air force.123 After this, a discussion was started on data about the Yugoslav navy presented by Admiral Pecotić. It was related to the question that Eddleman and Captain Poncet asked about the nature of the ships that should be mobilized for cleaning mines, the readiness of the Yugoslav destroyers and the level of training of their crews for convoy escorts, and the usability of barges for transporting troops and materials, as well as the possibility of a Yugoslav merchant fleet to supply the country during war. It was answered that, of the mentioned ships for antimine warfare, 30 were on rivers and 20 were intended for the sea and only 20 to 30 may be converted into regular minesweepers, while the rest would have auxiliary functions. At the moment, destroyers could not answer the task of the convoy escort satisfactorily due to their obsolescence and lack of the appropriate equipment. Within a year, with the installation of the necessary instruments and armament finished, whose shipment was expected through the military assistance program, the picture would look completely different. Barges were of different types, partly provided for docking only in ports, but they were mostly appropriate for landing both in ports and on beaches, which significantly facilitated the reception of large quantities of materiel. Once more, he looked back at the command staff of the Albanian navy, for which it was said that it mainly consisted of current Soviet military instructors and counselors, as well as that part of the Albanian navy personnel that were currently being educated in the USSR. The Yugoslav military leaders still did not know the scope of works in the Albanian navy bases.124

210

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

After this, Eddleman elaborated on the Western standpoint of Yugoslav’s logistic problem. In the event of war, tripartite forces had an obligation to supply NATO members, but also Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, and this represented a serious problem regarding the level of safety in the Mediterranean. This meant that sea routes toward the north and east Mediterranean probably were not suited for the purpose; therefore, the strategy of supplying the Balkans should be planned. In Yugoslav’s case, this implied defining monthly needs in types and categories, as well as planning their distribution according to the expected front line for the given period. This also meant the need for organizing a series of meetings regarding logistic services, where the agenda of shipping the programmed materials would be determined. Additional problems represented the diversity of equipment and armament that was in use in the YPA, and which should be resolved by unification by efforts of the domestic military industry regarding artillery ammunition and light weaponry, while the shipment of the remaining materials would be an obligation undertaken by NATO. This was particularly related to the weapons and equipment for which serial production was suspended; therefore, their replacement needed to be done in compliance with the needs of logistics and operational uniformity. Regarding transportation, it was clear that it would be done partly by Yugoslav ships. Therefore, this imposed the need to train their crews in procedures during convoy operations, which was particularly related to warship crews that were supposed to take part in these convoys. What were the means for receiving and the overloading capacity of Yugoslav ports, warehouses, and transportation was posed as a question, especially in the part that enabled the supply of the North sector, which was mainly directed to the railroad network from Genoa toward Trieste.125 In addition, there was a question of applicability and to what degree of supplying by air, which is considered as the future of this service, especially in those urgent situations when there was some logistical problem that needed to be resolved in the shortest possible time. Eddleman again was not insisting on an immediate opening of the discussion on these matters, but he considered it necessary to point out their existence and repercussions derived from them. His standpoint reflected the stand of NATO on overtaking crucial mechanisms of maintaining the Yugoslav military’s mobility that would gradually lead Yugoslavia into a completely dependent position. At that moment, Yugoslavia depended on the West as the only source of modern equipment, necessary for reorganizing and modernizing its armed forces, but the systematic binding, which would be the consequence of such defined relations, still was out of Yugoslavia’s plans. Yugoslavia needed a certain amount of materials for implementing limited-range plans, and its leaders were prepared to overtake a minimum of the necessary obligations in this regard. However,



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 211

upgrading this system led to the exact development of international relations clearly defined as not in Yugoslav’s interest; therefore, Vučković left the discussion for some other time after hearing and accepting Eddleman’s arguments in principle.126 It was agreed that journalists, who knew about the conference, would not be told about the presence of British and French officers (although Lekić noted that the journalist from the United Press already knew the names of all the members of the Western delegation), and there would be official press statements.127 It was interesting that this standpoint was exactly what representatives of the United States insisted on; despite the significance that this conference had for preservation of their position in Eastern Europe they did not enjoy the publicity regarding the support of one Socialist country. In these years, Senator Joseph McCarthy brought to the peak his anti-Communist campaign; therefore, as much as Eddelman was inclined to the military support to Yugoslavia, he himself knew that this did not represent the general attitude in the greater part of the military and political structures in the United States. The discussion on strategic tripartite and Yugoslav concepts of defense was scheduled for the third day of the conference, as well as discussion on the Yugoslav defense plan with special attention given to the defense of the northern part of the country. General Vučković referred to the need for common coordination of defense activities, recognizing, in its recent absence, the crucial lack of all previous defense plans. He thanked everyone once more for the previous economic and military support, which had significantly strengthened the Yugoslav army and positively influenced the overall Yugoslav willingness to continue with the policy of active resistance to potential aggression that would come from the East. To this regard, he stressed that delivery of the mentioned military aid should be intensified and its scope should be increased, since Yugoslavia had borders with the satellite countries, which already received significant amounts of modern military materiel from the hegemon of their alliance. This way, Yugoslavs would overcome the problems caused by the diversity of armament and equipment, as well as bring the overall composition of the YPA to the organizational and logistical level of the Zagreb and Ljubljana armies. Willingness of the Yugoslav military industry to take part in the “offshore” system of orders could represent one of the segments of activities designed this way with the aim of common defense.128 General Vučković expressed satisfaction about the military and political engagement with Greece and Turkey, which largely secured the right flank of Yugoslavia’s defense front. In this sense, General Lemnitzer’s statement that defending Northern Italy represented a significant factor of Yugoslavia’s defense plan left a bad impression, because it indicated that Austria’s defense

212

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

would be abandoned or only partially implemented, which would leave the northwest Yugoslav border unprotected. The situation was even more complicated by the unresolved matter of Trieste, which in current conditions made any kind of military cooperation with Italy impossible.129 Explaining the strategic significance of Yugoslavia, he briefly repeated that it had unified Europe’s defense system in the Balkan area. It prevented Soviet penetration toward the Adriatic Sea and the Mediterranean and further penetration toward Lombardi and Southern France. Its fall would disable a unified European defense and would create conditions for a much easier advancement of the Eastern Bloc forces toward West Europe.130 According to the strategic plan of Yugoslavia’s defense, the main aim of the enemy would be cutting off Yugoslav forces from their allies on its flanks, and only after this, would they start liquidation of remaining Yugoslav resistance. The geographic position of Yugoslavia implied its partial surrounding, which would open different possibilities for achieving such goals. The length of the borders was much too long for effective defense with existing forces, but it was said that these forces in a reverse case would not be engaged for a cordon defensive approach. Instead, the first strike should be received by smaller units with the aim of revealing the main directions of the enemy advancement in order to oppose it by stronger forces waiting in the rear. Successful and active defense was the only guarantee that the front would be held on the northern and southern directions, where conditions existed for direct contact with the Allies. That meant that Yugoslav forces would be divided into three groups and deployed accordingly in each direction. Yugoslavs would not insist on defending unfavorable plains in the north of the country, while they would construct a permanent system of defense fortifications inside the central mountainous region.131 In continuation, Admiral Pecotić elaborated on the significance of the Adriatic Sea, highlighting that since one of the goals of the land operations was to prevent Eastern forces from breaking through toward the Mediterranean, there was no need to speak much of the need for its defense. Disabling access to the Adriatic Sea would prevent the possibility of establishing a Soviet navy stronghold in the Mediterranean. Pecotić expressed the standpoint that if a Soviet or satellite engagement on the Adriatic should occur, it would primarily be directed toward Yugoslav lines of supply, ports, shipyards, and naval bases. This type of activity could be achieved after penetration of their land forces in the rear of the coastline, near the river mouths or after a combined air-amphibious assault. Pecotić himself did not go deeper into analyzing this matter, realizing that it really did not have the same significance, at least compared with the air forces or matters related to land forces.132 General Vučković was concerned regarding Lemnitzer’s statement on Austria; he expressed that it greatly aggravated the Yugoslav situation, because



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 213

it would expand its already extended front lines at the expense of Yugoslav reserves, which would reduce the possibility for planned counterattacks. Vučković expressed Yugoslav’s attitude on the need for holding the positions in Austria because allied withdrawal in this sector would have widespread consequences for the overall system of defending the region.133 Eddleman accepted Vučković’s arguments, but he said that with the existing forces, it would not be possible to hold the front. However, General Lekić said that this matter had its political aspect as well as military. If the possibility of a Soviet advance into Italy from the north existed, the strategic significance of the Ljubljana Gap and its defense would decrease.134 Yugoslavia considered the potential engagement of Italian forces as a matter of NATO and mutual planning with Yugoslavia, and not a question for the Italian general staff, which represented a negative answer to Eddleman’s question if Yugoslavia expected deployment of Italian forces inside Austrian territory.135 This provocation had been intended for pulse checking of Yugoslav officials on the matter of military cooperation with Italy after solving the Trieste issue, and the answer, however, could be observed as satisfactory. Presenting the Western standpoint of the strategy for Yugoslav’s defense, Eddleman expressed compliance with Yugoslav guidelines, regarding geographic orientation as well as their general significance in a wider European context. He spoke positively on Yugoslav’s standpoint of a unique, flexible, and active defense, stating that this complied with the tripartite thinking of this matter, and he particularly highlighted the significance of a coordinated cooperation on border sectors. Following his exposition, Vučković said that the Balkan allies had agreed on the formation of a defense line from the Danube to the Aegean Sea, provided that defending that line was of crucial importance for the stability of the whole central and southern sector. Areas on the north and east from the Danube River represented a suitable ground for amassing armored-mechanized forces, which excluded the possibility of a successful defense, but the river itself represented a serious barrier that provided great defense possibilities. It was stressed that the strongest strike was expected from Hungary and East Austria; therefore, the largest defense forces were positioned in those directions. In this discussion, one more interesting question was introduced. Summing up the overall Yugoslav position, Eddelman proposed the military occupation of Albanian territory to avoid activities of its units in the rear of the southern and central front, and Vučković, previously stating that he would be more inclined to see Albania as an ally in the common fight against aggression, stressed that Yugoslavia could not tolerate the existence of a hostile southern neighbor. From a military point of view, this represented a strategic and tactical necessity, and it seemed that the tripartite attitude, at least at that moment, respected this reality despite its possible political repercussions.136

214

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

The American general repeated that it was in Western interests to preserve Yugoslav territory as much as possible, to maintain combat readiness of the largest number of available YPA units, and to provide maximum logistic and operational NATO support. A detailed plan of action could not be made at this conference, but Eddleman highlighted the readiness of NATO’s naval and air assets to be involved in eventual operations, since their force and positions in the Mediterranean allowed such a course of action.137 Although he did not speak about more closely defining the “operational” part of the support, he had determined it as naval and air support that gave an impression that the American general had satisfied Yugoslav expectations. An agreement on concrete aspects of this matter went deeper into the field of allied relations, and neither side was prepared to insist on them. For limited goals, like cooperation in the Ljubljana sector and enlargement of the military assistance program, stated estimates had been more than sufficient. In summarizing the previous discussion, General Lekić stated that they achieved agreement in principle on strategic matters, while the operationalization of some of them should be discussed on a different level. He stressed the need for the YPA to enlarge the assistance program, highlighting that the development of the Yugoslav navy and air force would allow the reduction of latter engagement of relevant types of NATO forces.138 Moving on to the fifth item of the agenda, that is, Yugoslav’s plan of defense with a focus on problems in the northern sector, General Stratton presented conditions and planned activities of allied forces in Austria, and his statement corresponded to the data presented by General Brown in Belgrade. Units stationed in the British occupation zone consisted of three strengthened infantry battalions, without tank or artillery support. Since their region of activities covered the area directly behind the central reef of the Julian Alps and Karavanke Mountains, their retreat to the Italian-Austrian border would endanger the Yugoslav flank. A similar situation would happen in case of an American retreat from their sector toward the north. Since there was no political decision on their strengthening, this contingent could not provide serious resistance to Soviet forces, already present in Austria, which consisted of approximately five divisions, according to British estimates. As for American forces in Austria, they were lacking one battalion to reach the level of a regiment. One should not doubt that a missing political will for strengthening of Western forces in Austria would soon be found if the estimations would point on actual danger of the Soviet attack. However, in the existing conditions, Yugoslavs should be “informed” that they had to count on the existing units, which could be strengthened by forces mobilized in Italy within its allied obligations toward NATO. Eddleman and Stratton both repeated the inten-



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 215

tion for British retreat under combat to the Tarvisio and Brenner passes, as well as Kufstein in the northwest in the American case. They also expressed the view that for defending its Alpine border, Yugoslavia would be sufficient with even minimal forces due to the nature of the terrain, which itself did not allow a greater massing of the opposing troops. For Yugoslavs this was not much of a comfort, but since it was clear that they could not get more than this, Vučković did not insist on continuing the discussion over the matter.139 Afterward, General Poglajen presented an exhaustive analysis of Yugoslav war formations. On the East front, stretching from the Danube to the Greek border, 3 corps were deployed, consisting of 11 infantry and 1 armored division; 5 brigades of mountain infantry and 1 tank brigade (currently in formation); 2 cavalry, 6 antitank, 6 artillery, and 2 anti-aircraft regiments; 6 engineering battalions; and other support units. The Central front was supposed to be defended with three corps, consisting of 12 infantry divisions, 2 armored brigades and 2 cavalry, 7 antitank, 7 artillery, 2 anti-aircraft, and 4 engineering regiments. On the northwest, 3 corps were deployed, consisting of 11 infantry and 1 armored division, 1 tank brigade and 1 brigade of mountain infantry; and 1 cavalry, 1 anti-aircraft, 6 antitank, 5 artillery, and 3 engineering regiments. Reserves of the Yugoslav Supreme Command consisted

Figure A.6.   Yugoslav defense deployment in the summer of 1953.

216

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

of 2 corps, whose strength were 7 infantry and 1 armored division; 1 armored brigade and 8 brigades of mountain infantry; and 8 artillery, 5 antitank, and 6 engineering regiments.140 The first line of defense was on the border and in the immediate rear. It followed the Bulgarian border to the Danube, then by the Danube to the mouth of the Drava, then from the Drava to Mura and further to the Austrian border. The second line followed the line of Vardar, Južna, and Velika Morava, at the town of Aranđelovac; it turned west to the Sava River, from where it went all the way to Zagreb; then it stretched along with the communication Zagreb– Maribor border toward the border of Austria. The third line of defense went from Bitolj–Šar planina–Ibar–Maljen–Medvednik–Spreča–Banja Luka–Bosanski Novi–Karlovac–Žumberak–Zidani Most–Možirje–Dravograd. Between these lines, antitank defense had been organized, but its construction was not yet finished.141 Disposition of forces on the northwest direction had been of particular interest for Western officers. From the mentioned units on this sector, five divisions represented the first echelon of the first line, three were deployed in the direction of Nađkanjiža–Zagreb, two were in the area of Maribor, and the rest were deployed deeper. The task of the units of the first echelon was to inflict losses and hold or slow down enemy advancement, to reveal the main directions of attack, and to create conditions to perform the counterattack. The second echelon should disable sudden attacks on some of the possible directions and prevent deeper penetration, as well as enable concentration of defense forces for counterattacks. According to the situation, an activation of reserve troops could be expected, whether to strengthen the units of the first line or to occupy the second one and receive forces of the first echelon in their withdrawal. Regarding units of the second echelon, three divisions were located near Ljubljana. A massing of the forces in the depth of the left flank was necessary to go in line with a potential concentrated enemy attack in the direction of Nađkanjiža–Zagreb, where the terrain enabled the mass use of armored units endangering Zagreb as an important crossroads on the communication line toward Rijeka and Trieste. An initial mass concentration toward Ljubljana from the direction of Maribor was not possible due to the inconvenience of the terrain for defense operations, because the hardly passable mountain area would limit the speed of the aggressor’s advance to the speed of infantry. A large number of Yugoslav units were in this area as well, because from there it was possible to organize fast and efficient counterattacks on the flank and the rear of the enemy if it achieves some greater progress in the Zagreb direction.142 Eddelman was interested in whether troops withdrawing in the East sector to the positions behind Vardar would cut the logistic contact with Greece.



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 217

Figure A.7.   Yugoslav defense lines in the summer of 1953.

But he was answered that this problem was solved by opening the railroad through Bitolj, as well as by the relevant agreement reached with the general of staff of Greece.143 It seemed rather unbelievable that one staff officer and planner of Eddleman’s caliber could miss the existence of such an important traffic communication. Therefore, the background of his question could previously be viewed as an attempt to influence the Yugoslav side not to leave the Vardar front. The withdrawal of Yugoslav forces on the lines behind Vardar would leave Thessalonica vulnerable to a direct attack from the north, and since its occupation meant an establishment of Soviet control over the west coast of the Aegean Sea and getting the base for naval operations, it was logical that the Western planners attempted to prevent such development in every way possible. Eddleman tried to improve the bad impression that his elaboration of the allied conditions and intentions in Austria left by mentioning the possibility of activating Italian units that had been under the command of NATO, whose rearmament and training was under way. By highlighting the quality of the Italian Alpine brigades, which could play an important role in the mountainous regions of Austria, he tried to minimize the negative effect allied withdrawal in this sector could produce. In the same context, Stratton stressed

218

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

that British withdrawal could go only by the line of the Tarvisio, as well as that they needed to hold the front at any cost and that the strategy of defense of this region would fit into the general plan of defending Europe as one of the priorities.144 Regardless of the mentioned activities, Lekić replied that Yugoslav’s left flank remained open and exposed, which would inevitably disturb the described battle order. A transfer of troops from reserve to this line would reduce the possibilities for a strong counterattack toward Hungary, but it would also increase the obligation of the Allies to provide material supplies to additional Yugoslav units in this sector.145 It seemed that for Yugoslav negotiators Eddleman’s “consolation” was harder by the possibility of a more serious engagement of Italian units on their left flank, as well as a political advantage that the Italian side would achieve from such a development. Trying not to disdain the combat quality of Italian forces in a manner that would be offensive for their American ally, Lekić stressed the strong influence of the Communist party of Italy in their army, which created a basis for a serious fifth column and low combat morale. It was noticed that Vučković’s team refrained from giving such openly negative statements on Italy, its policy and military potential, as part of an ongoing discussion in Belgrade. The standpoint common among Yugoslav officers regarding the historically confirmed incompetence of the Italian armed forces, which, with the exception of Mussolini’s invasion into Ethiopia, in the last hundred years entailed defeat after defeat in literally every battlefield where they fought, could not be hidden. Therefore, Lekić suggested that if the Allies could not take a more active role in this sector, they should hold only the position to which they intended to withdraw, and the YPA would overtake the whole work as its obligation, under the condition that materiel support is provided to it. Although Eddleman tried to mitigate Lekić’s comments by countering with statements that according to the inspection Eddleman personally conducted during his last visit to Italy, the level of combat readiness of the Italian army had been at a satisfactory level, the Yugoslav representatives maintained an impression that even the mere mention of Italy in any positive context was sufficient cause for sarcasm.146 The fourth day of the conference started with Eddelman’s summary of the previous results of the discussion. They achieved an agreement on three matters: one, tripartite forces considered defending Yugoslavia as one of their priorities; two, a potential attack could happened only within the general war; and three, in the event of an attack Yugoslavia would be provided with operational and logistical support. Vučković and Lekić agreed, so they started discussing the sixth issue on the agenda, that is, military support that was necessary for Yugoslavia to fulfill its military plans.147



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 219

In general, it consisted of three categories—materiel of domestic production, armament, and equipment received from Soviets, as well as the means received from the Western Allies through the MDAP. Such heterogeneity had caused numerous logistical problems, and at the same time, due to the unevenness of quality of the same items, it put into question tactical and operational usability of units equipped with these materials. Therefore, it was decided to try to withdraw the outdated materials from World War II from active use, as well as the ones of Soviet production—first due to obsolescence and deterioration, and later due to the conceptual differences and overall military-political situation.148 The intention was to equip the units modeled by the Ljubljana army, whose firepower had been considered as a model. Namely, firepower of the Soviet division, according to Yugoslav estimates, implied consumption of 68,250 kg of battle materiel per minute. Yugoslav’s division of the “old” type could count on only 31,840 kg per minute. Satellite divisions, were brought up to the Soviet level, while even the firepower of the Ljubljana division, established on the new basis, hardly reached the number of 53,665 kg per minute.149 As the main reasons for such low indicators of Yugoslav units of firepower, Dasović stated complete or partial lack of rocket-propelled grenade launchers; recoilless artillery of 57-, 75-, and 105-mm; 76- and 90-mm selfpropelled guns; field guns of 76-mm; and howitzers of 105- and 155-mm, as well as anti-aircraft guns of 40- and 90-mm. The desired state, like in the Ljubljana army, implied the existence of two artillery regiments of 155-mm guns, two howitzer regiments with weapons of the caliber 203 mm, one antiaircraft regiment armed with 90-mm guns, and double-barreled cannons of 40 mm, as well as two regiments of self-propelled artillery of 90 mm. Regarding territorial anti-aircraft defense, at the moment it was organized around only three Adriatic ports. To organize anti-aircraft protection in the same manner for all the major ports, it was necessary to establish 15 battalions with antiaircraft guns of 90 mm and 17 with double-barreled 40-mm guns. The same armament was provided for anti-aircraft protection of airports. Dasović stated that Yugoslavia needed armored forces that should be organized according to the principle of having one armored division per army group, one armored brigade per corps, and one battalion per division, as was the case with the organizational structure of the Ljubljana army. The situation was particularly unfavorable in the field of signals, where on the battalion level, with the existing quantity of radio equipment, the staff could communicate with one company only, and transportation possibilities were limited by the fact that of all available vehicles, two-thirds were horse-drawn carts and only one-third were motor vehicles. On the divisional level, this created a concerning picture that for transportation of troops and materials, only 36

220

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

trucks were available, while all other transportation needed to be done with horse-drawn carts. The situation was even worse due to the fact that the above-mentioned numbers marked the quantity of vehicles that were available in ideal conditions, while in reality it varied between 10 and 15, which, for illustration, meant an engagement of only a couple of trucks in the whole infantry regiment.150 Dasović also said that the Yugoslav military industry had mastered producing artillery peaces up to the level of 76-mm guns and 82- and 120-mm mortars. It could provide army units with uniforms, shoes, antitank and antiinfantry mines, engineering equipment, and similar materiel; therefore, from the Western Allies, they expected support in raw materials, which implied powder, steel, copper, etc. Yugoslavia’s financial situation would not allow their purchase at the market; therefore, the shipment of these items was expected through the military assistance program as an addition to its pure military-technical segment.151 The rearmament of units of the Ljubljana army could be finished by 1956. However, the problem represented low firepower of other units, whose reorganization should start immediately, without waiting for the planned reform of the Ljubljana army to be finished.152 This represented a change from the previous Yugoslav stance (at least regarding contacts with the Western Allies) because bilateral agreements provided shipment of equipment and armament that was mostly intended for the forces of the Fifth Army District (i.e., the Ljubljana army). However, Vučković and Lekić explained to Eddleman’s team that, if the process maintains its existing pace, the total reorganization of the YPA could not be finished before 1972, which was more than unacceptable for the Yugoslav military and political leadership. Although they tacitly accepted the fact that part of the materials from the MDAP went to the units not planned for defense of the Ljubljana Gap, for the first time they presented an attitude that the program of rearmament would go parallel in the whole YPA.153 To this regard, General Dasović presented the basic material needs of other armies as well, and these totalled 385 recoilless cannons of 75 mm, 144 howitzers of 203 mm, 751 howitzers of 105 mm, 1,440 double-barreled antiaircraft guns of 40 mm, 1,254 self-propelled cannons of 90 mm, and 1,660 Patton M-47 or M-48 medium tanks.154 Then he stressed the need for fuel, gasoline tanks, and spare parts for already purchased or received equipment. General Dasović illustrated the attention given to the Yugoslav military needs saying that apart from 26 to 27 percent of national income and assets of the MDAP, the YPA spent 31 percent of economic aid of the United States as well, either in direct use or as raw materials.155 After Dasović, Admiral Pecotić stated the needs of the Yugoslav navy, which regarding complete ships, counted three destroyers, nine minesweep-



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 221

ers, and two submarines. Apart from this, he stressed the request for armament of the existing vessels, more precisely 2 destroyers, 6 frigates, 11 bigger and 6 smaller patrol boats, and 6 minesweepers of 250 and 6 of 90 tons, as well as 30 amphibious vessels. The list encompassed 18 kits for mine clearance, 36 kits for contact mines, 300 contact mines, 1,250 contact mines with antenna, 750 magnetic mines, and 800 river mines. Munitions needs encompassed 78,840 shells for guns of 3-inch caliber, 240,000 40-mm shells, 225,000 of 20-mm caliber, 100,000 rockets for M-7 launchers, radar equipment for coastal installations, and 165 motors for torpedo boats that were in construction.156 General Bubanj presented requests of the Yugoslave air force, which by 1957 should consist of four fighter divisions and three fighter-bombing divisions, two reconnaissance and one transportation regiment, as well as one airborne brigade of four battalions. Fighting units should have at their disposal 840 aircraft: 576 fighters, 432 fighter-bombers, 56 reconnaissance aircraft, 48 aircraft for anti-submarine combat, 80 transporters, 80 helicopters, 162 training aircraft, and 230 aircraft for signal and other activities. In addition to this number were other aircraft in pilot schools and centers for training of flight personnel. He also stressed the need for 49 radar for 21 positions of early warning and 7 central installations, 6,085 different motor vehicles, and 1,378 radio devices of different types. If it would be supplied with fuel and spare parts, such an air force could perform up to 700 to 900 combat flights a day.157 Such aircraft estimates started from the assumption that, in the event of war, 24 Soviet and satellite aircraft divisions would be engaged, which implied around 2,000 aircraft, and more than half of them were jets. With 840 aircraft, the Yugoslave air force would be in a position 3 to 1 in favor of the aggressor, but this number should be sufficient for the minimum of successful defense. Second, air forces of this proportion represented the condition for adequate support for troops on the ground, since Yugoslavia’s concept of cooperation implied one land army. The air force designed this way was supposed to be engaged in tactical-operational tasks, while strategic air operations would be conducted by NATO’s air forces.158 The Yugoslav air force consisted of 176 fighter aircraft in the first-line squadrons and 96 in school centers, mostly from World War II: S-49C, F-47, and Jak-9P. Equipping these units with American F-84G Thunderjet jet fighters had just been started. It did not resolve the problem, because, although superior compared to the mentioned aircraft, Thunderjet was primarily a fighter-bomber, inferior in close air combat against MIG-15 and Jak-23 Soviet fighters.159 Therefore, they requested 576 classic fighter planes, whether American F-86E Sabre, British Hawker Hunter, or French Dassault Mystere IV. Bubanj highlighted that Yugoslavia was interested in producing these

222

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

aircraft by license. The MDAP for 1952 and 1953 did not contain categories of fighters at all, which Yugoslav considered as a great failure.160 Fighting-bomber formations had around 190 aircraft, mostly Soviet Iljushin or American Thunderbolts, and their resources were supposed to expire in 1958 at the latest. Through the MDAP shipment 301 F-84Gs had been provided, while the needs of the air force counted 432 of these aircraft. Bubanj suggested that of those 301 fighter-bombers, only 201 should be delivered and that the remaining number should be reprogrammed into 100 fighter planes. Besides, he stated that Yugoslavia did not have modern reconnaissance aircraft, but that it used British Mosquito aircraft for that purpose, which by 1957 would be out of use; therefore, it needed 96 reconnaissance aircraft, as well as 48 Grumman AF-2W and AF-2S aircraft for formation of an anti-submarine regiment.161 Within the air force, conventional bombers formed a division of 60 Mosquito FB MK-VI aircraft, which, when new materials arrived, should be reorganized into a fighter-bomber division. Transportation units had 24 aircraft, and most of these were Soviet Li-2, that is, copies of the American Douglas C-47. Although the shipment of 20 C-47s was provided, Yugoslavia needed at least 60 of these aircraft to resolve air transport issues. Helicopter forces should get 10 aircraft through the MDAP, but this number was more than insufficient, especially for supporting land forces. So 70 of them had been requested. The list concluded with the request for 32 patrol aircraft intended for the navy.162 Regarding radar, the YPA had five Soviet radar systems of the older type and one American AN/TPS-1D. Through programs for fiscal 1952 and 1953, 25 AN/TPS-1D radar systems had been arranged, but the need for 24 additional was expressed.163 In continuation, a series of questions were asked, which all aimed additionally to explain Yugoslavia’s requests. Of the mentioned 576 fighter planes, one wing of 48 aircraft should have consisted of aircraft for night and interceptions in all meteorological conditions, if possible F-94s, while it would be desirable for the rest of the interception air force to consist of F-86E Sabre. Part of the transportation air forces were used for civil purposes during the peace period, and these were included in the mentioned figure of 80 requested aircraft. Regarding fighter-bombers, the difference of 132 aircraft between projected Yugoslav needs and the number provided by the MDAP represented a frequent topic of discussion with General Harmony’s department in Belgrade, but no final agreement was reached. To give a clear picture of the planned composition of the Yugoslav air force, it was said that, out of 1,314 fighter planes, 576 were fighters, 432 fighter-bombers, 96 reconnaissance, 152 train-



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 223

ing, and 48 anti-submarine. Bubanj agreed with Eddleman that if they wanted to achieve that, the order and content of provided shipments in the program for 1954 needed to be changed. He noted that, if the previous practice would be continued, Yugoslavia would not receive any modern fighter planes before 1956. Eddleman, however, noted that, as much as these requests were justified, they were falling within the framework of the MDAP and directed his interlocutor on solving these matters through direct contact with Generals Poglajen and Harmony.164 Discussion further led to matters of the naval air force, underground fuel storage, and modernizing the existing vessels. Pecotić said that Yugoslavia spent 40 million dollars on construction of 2 destroyers, as well as 6 frigates of 650 tons with a maximum speed of 30 to 35 knots. Eddleman noticed that Yugoslavia’s requests for submarines intended for training of crews of escort destroyers and other anti-submarine units could hardly be justified. For them, Yugoslavia could get, for example, 600 two-barrel 40-mm anti-aircraft guns. However, the Yugoslav delegation firmly, although it could be said stubbornly, insisted on the submarines as a serious Yugoslavia need. Western representatives tried in vain to explain that two submarines in any case could not represent a serious item in the arsenal and, apart from the fact that their existence demanded high maintenance costs, they led to a reduction of the budget for other more important fields of military support.165 Promoting the Western standpoint on the need to emphasize the development of land forces and part of the tactical air force, which would be supplied by NATO, Eddleman represented the line that would lead directly to the dependence of the YPA on the Western Alliance in the measure that could seriously affect the position of Yugoslav foreign policy. Of course, Vučković, Lekić, and Pecotić were not dilettantes to think that with two submarines they could achieve some significant level of modernization and independence of their navy. However, insisting on the versatility of the program of YPA’s rearmament in all its branches was a matter of political attitude to constantly highlight Yugoslavia’s need for maximum independence, even if this would go at the expense of concrete military interests. As much as Eddleman was right when stating the technical aspects and shortcomings of such a designed program, Yugoslav’s delegation stood by their wide requests of material assets for the whole composition of armed forces, regarding their importance for Yugoslavia primarily and not for NATO. Such rigidly set negotiation platforms could not contribute to soften the Western standpoint on matters for which a consensus could not be reached earlier, and it may be said that it brought more harm than good.166 In any case, Eddleman played a rather constructive role, suggesting that Yugoslav officers’ models of weapons according to their performances were

224

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

on the level of those requested by Yugoslavs but were a lot cheaper, that is, which for the same price offered better technical-tactical characteristics.167 Sensing that the tensions were raised unnecessarily, Vučković accepted justification of most of Eddelman’s suggestions, stating that the submitted list was only paper subjected to changes, and suggested to schedule a technical conference where such matters could be discussed. Eddleman did not have authorization to accept any similar obligations; therefore, he limited himself to accepting the proposed list as the sum of authentic Yugoslav needs, as well as he would forward it to the competent bodies for further review.168 Afterward, the last segment of discussions was related to supplying the Yugoslav army during the war operations. Its materiel needs amounted to around 11,300 tons per day for armies organized according to the old principle, of which at least 788 tons would be of foreign origin. If all formations of the YPA achieved the level of the Ljubljana army’s, the consumption would be increased to 13,703 tons, 9,884 of which were from foreign sources.169 These numbers meant that the Yugoslav division would use 268 tons of materiel per day, of which 187 tons would be items from international support. They came to these figures by estimating not only domestic resources and estimated consumption but also on the expectations that Yugoslav agricultural and industrial areas would be cut off in the first days of the war.170 Regarding consumption of materiel across the sectors, daily needs of the South sector amounted to 2,948 tons, out of which 2,047 would be foreign, but if these units would be raised to the level of the Ljubljana army, their consumption would be increased to 3,586 tons per day. The Central sector would use 3,216 tons (2,244 of foreign origin), or 3,744 if those units would be reorganized according to the mentioned model. The Northwestern sector was supposed to have the consumption of 3,216 tons, of which 2,244 would be foreign. Reserves of the Supreme Command were estimated to be 1,876 tons per day, of which 1,308 would be from abroad.171 The supply system was organized according to the standard principle from higher to lower structural circuits, that is, from the rear toward the front lines. A basis for supply of units engaged in the South sector were around Priština and Kosovska Mitrovica, for the Central sector in the region of Užice–Čačak, and for the North sector near Ogulin, while reserve bases for the Supreme Command were in the area of Sarajevo. A dispersion of supply lines had been suggested that implied a Genoa–Trieste–Rijeka route for the North sector, Adriatic ports and communications in the rear for the Central sector, and finally, for the South sector, the port of Thessalonica, combined with the existing road–railroad network toward Yugoslavia. Yugoslav ports Bar, Zelenika, and Dubrovnik had an overload capacity of 7,400 tons per day, with a decrease of 25 percent in war conditions amounted to 5,500 tons. These ports



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 225

Figure A.8.  Directions and basis for supply of the Yugoslav defense sectors in the summer of 1953.

were intended for the basis of supplying both the South and Central sectors. For supply of the North sector, the ports of Bakar, Rijeka, Pula, and Trieste were planned.172 Regarding the capacity of the road network, the routes to the bases in the South sector did not have any railroads, and roads had a bandwidth of around 6,550 trucks per day. Traveling toward Čačak and Užice, the railroad had the capacity to transport 1,730 tons per day, as well as driveways that provided traffic for 3,604 trucks per day. From Zadar and Split toward adequate bases, the railroad held the capacity of 4,300 tons and driveways whose bandwidth capacities were 7,440 trucks. Toward the Northwestern sector 2,800 tons per day could be delivered using railroads, while 10,404 trucks could use driveways. The biggest problem was the supply of the southern forces from the Adriatic coast, but the agreement with Greece partially solved this matter using the Thessalonica–Gevgelija–Skopje and Volos–Kožani–Bitolj railroads. The construction of the railroad through Volos–Larisa–Amindeon–Kačanik– Priština and Bar–Belgrade, which were either provided or the works on their construction were in progress, should have enabled a final solution to this

226

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

logistical issue. The estimated daily needs of the forces in the Central region amounted to 2,224 tons per day, and the Sarajevo railroad had the capacity of only 1,730 tons; therefore, the construction of the Kardeljevo–Sarajevo– Vinkovci railroad line was imperative, which from the narrow gauge would be extended to the gauge of regular size. Although the direction of Genoa– Rijeka with its capacity was completely satisfactory, due to its geographic distance, it could not be used for supplying the troops in the Central bases— especially not in the southern sector. Therefore, the construction of the mentioned railroads needed to be done in a rather short period if they wanted to create a network of satisfactory communications for these regions.173 General Bubanj presented the need of the Yugoslav air force that amounted to 1,600 tons per day as well as 400 tons of munitions and bombs and the same amount of different technical materiel. Estimation of losses was 15 to 20 aircraft per day, and the domestic production could compensate for 10 to 15 percent of those losses in aircraft and equipment. He said that the construction of the underground factories was in progress, and annually they could produce 400 to 500 aircraft. The basis for supply of the Yugoslav air force corresponded to that intended for the land forces, and they were placed around Kosovska Mitrovica for the South sector, in the region Sarajevo– Užice for the Central sector, between Zadar and Kardeljevo for the coastal area, and in the Ogulin–Bihać–Knin triangle for the Northwest.174 Regarding the vulnerability of railroad communications, General Stratton asked if it might be more reasonable to develop a driveway network, but Vučković, noticing that driveways were also subjected to destruction from the air, stated that Yugoslavia, even if it had adequate roads, could hardly engage a sufficient number of trucks for supply.175 Eddleman followed with the opinion that it was important to hold Otranto and Yugoslav ports open and usable, because large amounts of materiel from the eastern Italian coast could be transported by small but fast boats, which under the protection of the night would be a relatively difficult and uninteresting target and individual losses would not greatly disrupt the supply system. If the adequate antiaircraft defense would be organized in ports, such scenarios could provide the appropriate quantities of supply, and as confirmation, he mentioned the American experience in the Philippines, where similar tactics were successfully implemented despite air force inferiority.176 Although such opinions could not be objected to, it had been almost diametrically opposite to the a priori rejection of any use of the Adriatic as an inappropriate and insecure direction of supply, as the matter was considered by Handy’s delegation almost half a year earlier. Anyway, it was clear to Eddleman that this represented a more academic discussion than discussing a real problem. If the situation in which Yugoslavia would find itself in the



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 227

war conflict with the East ever occurred, and the West was willing to supply it materially, both Handy and Eddleman would use all possible roads and means, regardless of whether they were secured or not. This way, speculating possibilities and probabilities served as a mean to achieve geopolitical advantages.177 Since the projected loss of 10 to 15 aircraft per day led to the total amount of 500 aircraft per month, that is, around 3,000 per year, Commodore Cassey was interested in knowing if the Yugoslav air force had the possibility to mobilize and train pilot personnel in the numbers that would be sufficient to manage the new aircraft. Bubanj removed doubts, stressing that Yugoslavia already had around 2,400 trained pilots. Eddleman agreed that this represented a solid reserve of flying personnel.178 On the fifth, the last day of the conference, participants remained in discussion about further military negotiations between the Western countries and Yugoslavia. Operational planning, as the most important segment of such designed talks, should be organized at the level of the relevant field commands, that is, staffs of the operational units in certain geographic or strategic sectors. Pointing out the potential interlocutors inside the NATO, Eddleman briefly described its European structure, placing special focus on the Mediterranean region as a military strategic area of the highest significance for Yugoslavia. At the head of command of the South flank, with headquarters in Naples, was Admiral Fechteler, the previous commander of the naval operations in NATO. The air force command under General Schlater was also subordinated to him, stationed in the same town, but the naval command was especially under the jurisdiction of Admiral Fechteler and under the direct management of the Supreme Allied Command for Europe, Admiral Lord Mountbatten, with its headquarters on Malta. Eddleman recommended Yugoslav officers to establish contact with these allied institutions regarding operationalization of the principal agreements achieved at this or similar meetings. This was particularly related to the implementation of the agreements in war conditions, when these commands had even more autonomy in their work.179 Logistic issues have been divided into those related to the problems of preparing Yugoslavia and its armed forces for defense during the peace period and those dealing with the delivery of war materiel after the initiation of the operations. Problems of the first category should have been solved within the existing systems, which were already more or less operational, thanks to the participation in the MDAP. The second category, related to Yugoslavia’s war supply, fell in the range of immediate operational activities of NATO. That meant that, after the outbreak of war, every logistical support represented a military question, especially if its operationalization meant participation of military assets regarding a convoy escort or antisubmarine and anti-aircraft

228

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

protection, as well as any other form of engagement of the military forces. The government of the country, having expected help, should have had an appropriate military-economic mission in the donor country that would have had to deal with regulating these problems. Regarding peace supply, it should remain in the domain of tripartite-Yugoslav cooperation, which meant retaining the previously bilateral nature of the US aid program provided to Yugoslavia, with British and French participation to serve only as a cover.180 Vučković agreed with Eddelman’s point of view, specifying that the Yugoslav armed forces and institutions would cooperate with NATO in all segments of the program. He also hoped that the technical conference, where aspects of re-arming Yugoslav forces would be studied and where the appropriate arrangements would be agreed, would be held as soon as possible. He agreed that the Soviet threat was not as imminent as it was in the previous period, but that it still existed for Yugoslavia as much as for any other European country. He expressed the Yugoslav leadership’s standpoint that their country must not be outside of the wider defense context because that would prevent aggression or enable its later suppression. The level of confidentiality of the presented data should testify on the honesty of Yugoslavia’s intentions, because, as Vučković said, “such information is given only to the true allies.”181 Eddelman promised that their confidentiality would be guaranteed, but that information about the conference itself must not and need not be hidden, especially not from the American allies in the Balkans—Greece, Turkey, and Italy. Vučković immediately intervened regarding the first two countries, saying their representatives were already familiar with some of the data mentioned in the discussions that resulted in signing the Balkan agreement, but he strongly objected to disclosing any information on strength, disposition, plans, and perspectives of the YPA to the Italian officials, because there was no basis to consider this country as a “friend.”182 Eddleman agreed and said that he hoped that Yugoslav and Italian war plans regarding the SlovenianAustrian sector could be agreed upon to create a competent and appropriate defense strategy. Final coordination of war plans would be done on the level of competent commands of the YPA and Western countries within NATO, although they did not demand Yugoslav political membership in this organization, they may and must have certain political implications. To this regard, he recommended that Yugoslav officials cooperate with General Gruenther’s commands, as head of the command for Europe, and Admiral Mountbatten, as commander of the NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean.183 However, there was no progress as would be expected based on the fiveday talks and it became obvious as soon as the memorandum was drafted. Its text remained out of reach, but certain information could be found in the report that was submitted after the conference on activities of the Yugoslav



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 229

military mission in the United States regarding Washington negotiations.184 It is stated that the change of mood toward the Yugoslav delegation occurred immediately after concluding the conference. While drafting the memorandum, Western representatives tried to include only the minimum of NATO’s obligations, as well as to diminish the political effects of the meeting. On the matter of preventive military actions toward Albania, Western representatives tried to deny freedom of action to Yugoslavia, although General Eddleman himself initiated this matter. The same document stated, at least in wording, that the Western representatives went so far that they threatened by rejecting the memorandum as a whole if their formulations were not accepted. However, for Yugoslavs, this conference was rather favorable; therefore, they took a firm stance that they would also rather leave the finished document without signing it than to allow the distortion and devaluation of the conference results. It succeeded. Since it was more important to the Americans not to worsen relations, they instead found a way to disavow General Stratton, although they named him to manage the redrafting of the memorandum.185 Regarding later events, and also complications that occurred regarding Trieste, this conference suddenly got publicity, and Yugoslav’s delegation was not even escorted properly when they were leaving. Due to the harsh Italian reaction, it was considered that there was no need to tighten the relations, and it was expected that Yugoslavs would not give much attention to this matter. In addition to the mentioned memorandum, documents from this meeting were supplemented with an ad-hoc report from the intelligence committee consisting of tripartite forces and Yugoslavia, who tried to form a common estimate of the strength and formation of Soviet and satellite forces in the region. Commonly adopted estimates on the number of Soviet formations in this part of Europe totaled seven divisions: Bulgaria had 14 to 15; Romania 13, plus 8 brigades that had the capacity to reorganize into a division; Hungary had 15; and Albania had 3. Mobilization capacity enabled formation of 20 to 23 divisions within the first 30 days, and the level of their accoutrement was inconsistent, since Yugoslav representatives considered newly formed divisions would be completely equipped and prepared for combat, while the tripartite standpoint was that these troops could not be considered as the firstline forces, at least not in the first phases of combat activities.186 The list of requested armament and equipment consisted of three segments: land forces, air forces, and navy. Requests of land forces consisted of 138 points related to transport and towed vehicles, tanks, artillery, radar and signal equipment, engineering, and logistical and signal materiel, as well as spare parts and workshop installations.187 Air force needs were grouped in programs that were already confirmed by 1954, and the list of requests for the period from 1955 to 1959 was also listed. They were divided into nine

230

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

Figure A.9.   Common estimate of strength of the regional army forces after mobilization in the summer of 1953.

projects, which in detail pictured the current strength and shortcomings of the Yugoslav air force, but also directions for its future development.188 Naval matters were divided into seven parts, which contained requests for already constructed vessels, as well as armament and equipment for those that were under construction in Yugoslav shipyards, minesweepers and minelayers, motors for patrol boats, coastal radar, and spare parts.189 To the Western planners, a review of the organization of certain Yugoslav units was submitted, such as mountain infantry divisions, mountain infantry brigades, and cavalry regiments, as well as the strength and evaluation of their firepower with the list of armament they had.190 Also, in the special meetings with Generals Stewart and Calhoon, Vice Admirals Cooper and Tyre and Colonel Haas, additional issues were elaborated such as specific matters related to the range and dynamics of shipment of materials intended for Yugoslav units and Yugoslav possibilities of being involved to the offshore purchase program.191

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 231



CONFERENCES OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL GENERAL STAFFS OF YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE, AND TURKEY The First Tripartite Conference in Ankara, February 17–20, 1953 On the eve of signing the Ankara Treaty, February 17 to 20, 1953, a conference of high military delegations of Turkey, Greece, and the FPRY had been organized in Ankara.192 Turkish military officials expected significant results from this meeting.193 On behalf of the host, Turkish Defense Minister Kurtbek, Generals and Admirals Okan, Tahan, Iskilipligil, Uçaner, Ozak, Akçakoca, and Sunay were present. Leaders of the Greek delegation were Generals Dovas and Papathanassiu. The YPA delegation consisted of Generals Vučković and Šumonja and military attachés in Athens and Ankara, Colonels Vojvodić and Akšamlija.194 The agenda with three points was adopted: an exchange of data on the Soviet Union and satellite countries’ armed forces, defense capabilities of all three countries, and defensive plans of all three countries. In relation to the first item on the agenda, they adopted the principle that more attention would be given to the data coming from the neighboring country whose forces had been the subject of analysis. It had been concluded that the forces of the Cominform countries amounted to: • • • • • • • •

Bulgaria: 15 divisions in peace, 21 to 25 in war Romania: 16 to 18 divisions in peace, 25 to 30 in war Hungary: 18 to 20 divisions in peace, 20 to 25 in war Albania: 3 to 4 divisions in peace, 6 to 7 in war Czechoslovakia: 13 to 15 divisions in peace, 21 to 30 in war Poland: 16 to 18 divisions in peace, 30 to 35 in war USSR: 170 to 180 divisions in peace, 500 to 600 in war In total: 251 to 270 divisions in peace, 623 to 725 in war Air force:

• • • •

Bulgaria: around 450 aircraft, of which 90 were jets Romania: 338 to 380 aircraft Albania: 36 to 50 aircraft Soviet Union: 20,000 aircraft, of which 70 percent were jets

Soviet air force units were grouped according to the fronts. The two armies were in the West, two in Odessa and Romania, two in the Caucasus, two in the Far East, and an unknown group in the center. It had been important that

232

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

the Soviet Union begin with constructing airports for jet aircraft in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. In relation to the defense capabilities of all three countries, the Turkish representative, General Tahan, started the discussions. He had presented the Turkish vision of possible war plans of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Turkey had to face the potential opponent on four fronts: Thrace, the Black Sea, Eastern—from the direction of the Caucasus and Southern—and from the direction of Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The aim of the combined USSR and satellite action on the Thrace Front and the Black Sea was capturing the Straits and Thrace. In the Eastern and Southern Front, Soviet forces acted independently with the aim to reach the Mediterranean shores near Iskenderun. Of these, the most important fronts were Thrace and the Eastern. The peacetime status of the Turkish army was 16 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 6 armored brigades, and 6 infantry brigades; 50 percent of the peacetime army was located in Thrace and in the area of the Straits, 33.4 percent was on the Eastern front, and 16.6 percent was in the interior against possible airborne assaults and as a reserve. After the official proclamation of mobilization, infantry brigades developed in divisions so that during wartime, the Turkish army would consist of 25 divisions and 6 armored brigades. The Turkish air force had just begun to re-form and in that moment, together with the navy, was far weaker than the enemy forces. General Papathanassiou presented the Greek variant. Greece had two separate fronts—one toward Albania and the other toward Bulgaria. The main difficulties of organizing an effective defense were a great depth of the country and the possibility of enemy airborne operations and guerrilla activities. Because of these activities, there was a need for strong forces with an emphasis on mountain units. Most of the Greek forces were deployed in the north of the country. In the event of war, Greek land forces would increase from 10 to 12 infantry divisions. Armored units were the strength of a division. In addition, Greece possessed forces for combat against airborne assaults and guerrillas. The air force was in the process of reforms and the number of airplanes was increasing. They were not sufficient to defend the country, but represented the tactical support for land force units. According to the assessment of the Greek representatives, Greek naval forces were not sufficiently developed. Greek armed forces were grouped as follows: • 1 infantry division for the defense of Crete • 2 infantry divisions toward the Albanian front • 9 divisions toward Bulgaria, 1 of them armored On behalf of the Yugoslav delegation, General Šumonja started the presentation. He said that Yugoslavia had a long terrestrial border, of which



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 233

the biggest part was the joint border with Cominform countries. The Yugoslav battlefield consisted of three interrelated fronts: Western, Central, and Southern. The YPA forces in peacetime amounted to 26 infantry and 3 tank divisions. In wartime, that number rose to 42 infantry and 3 tank divisions. The total number of divisions would rise from 26 to 42 within 5 to 7 days from the time of beginning mobilization. The division was able to fight on mountainous ground as well on flat ground. The strength of the division in wartime was about 12,000, and in peacetime between 7,000 to 8,000 men. The air force and navy were in a reconstruction phase. The largest amount of aid arrived from the United States. On each of the fronts, one-third of power had been grouped. The deployment was set so that forces could act in more than one direction. In relation to the third point of the agenda—defensive plans of each country—General Tahan described the problems of defense, which had been caused by the long borders, the character of terrain, and a small number of soldiers. Because of the importance of Thrace and the Straits, most of the Turkish forces had been deployed there. General Papathanassiou introduced the guests with the deployment of Greek forces. The Greek plans provided the active defense both to Albania and to Bulgaria, with planned offensive operations. General Vučković presented the Yugoslav war plans. Before going to the main part, he expressed his desire to devote some time to the talks concerning the interaction. In connection with Albania, General Vučković said that such an opponent could not be left in the rear. In his wider exposure, General Šumonja described the importance and characteristics of Northern or ZagrebLjubljana, Central and Southern or Niš-Skoplje direction, and eventually, the grouping of allied and enemy forces. Yugoslavia’s official stand was that any attack on them would be a prelude to a new world war. The second day of the conference continued with the Greek representative, General Dovas, who presented a series of assumptions about the enemy’s possible attack and his position on a possible interaction. According to his assumptions, the enemy’s attack would be carried out with powerful forces in all directions in order to keep operations on the opponent’s territory. One of the enemy’s objectives would be separating Yugoslavia from the rest of Europe as well as from Greece, which would prevent its supply through Thessalonica. The second goal would be a merger with Albania. At the same time, the attack in the direction of Greek Macedonia and Thrace would be carried out with the ultimate goal of creating strong bastions on the Aegean coast and capturing the Straits. He particularly pointed out the importance of the Straits and the common borders of southern Yugoslavia and northern Greece, and the need for a firm stand that would be the basis for offensive action when Western allied aid started to pour in. Eventual common action would

234

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

be achieved with a decisive defense of the Straits, while the Yugoslav and Greek forces would conduct offensive actions from Thrace and Macedonia against the flank of enemy forces. Depth, which was small in this area, should be gained in favor of the Bulgarian territory. Turkish General Tahan then made his presentation. He underlined the importance of the Straits not only for the Balkan allies but also for the whole Mediterranean. This caused the Turks to deploy half of their army in the area of the Straits. He stressed the importance of previous joint work in order to organize an active defense better and more quickly. Among other things, he pointed out that future work on defense depended on the outcome of current talks. General Vučković asked Tahan what kind of military or political agreements he thought of. General Tahan answered that he thought of the military with a focus on the Greeks and Turks transmitting the Yugoslav needs to NATO and then provide them. General Vučković then asked what he meant by the term need. General Tahan answered that he actually thought of the frameworks in which Greeks and Turks could cooperate with the FPRY. That part of the negotiations caused General Vučković to reiterate the reasons for Yugoslav resistance in joining NATO. In particular, he stressed that Yugoslavia as a Socialist country could have a strong political influence on the satellite countries. He repeated the view that the Yugoslav forces were assuming all obligations and that they would fight against the common enemy. In relation to war plans, General Vučković agreed with the importance of the battlefields of Macedonia, Thrace, and the Straits, but pointed out that for Yugoslavia, equal importance had two other directions—Central and North, as the Caucasus direction was important for Turkey. However, they noted that their defense had been provided with a sufficient number of units but with an alarming situation in heavy weapons and aviation. He agreed with the previously presented positions and introduced everyone present with the fact that Yugoslavs had finished fortification works on one of the Bulgarian directions. However, Vučković insisted that a joint offensive action plan against Bulgaria still required prior preparation and additional work at future meetings. As a first step, he promised that he would propose four divisions to the YPA general staff to be transferred from Belgrade’s direction to the southern direction. As a sort of general conclusion, Vučković expressed the need for three allied armies to develop and better arm themselves in the near future and that the fact that Greece and Turkey were NATO members had not been an obstacle for their cooperation. General Dovas summarized previous presentations that expressed areas of common interest—the Allies should keep military power strong enough but according to the possibilities of each ally with an obligation that these forces should provide effective defense and offense. Finally, Turkish Defense



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 235

Minister Kurtbek proposed that further steps should be analyzed based on information previously presented and development of deployment plans, joint operations, command, and cooperation with NATO. Defining further steps would be more precisely the task of governments and general staffs.195 The results of these talks were supposed to be formulated by the memorandum that would consist of those points on which an agreement had been reached. The next day, on February 20, they drafted the memorandum.196 Simultaneously with these discussions, on February 18, intelligence officers met. The subject of their talks was the Soviet Union and satellite land forces. In addition to the usual exchange of data concerning the number, composition, and formation of potential enemy forces, special attention was paid to their quality. According to assessments imposed, the Bulgaria army had the best combat readiness, followed by the Hungarian army, while Romanian and Albanian readiness was significantly worse. Yugoslav representatives emphasized the existence of traditional territorial aspirations and nationalistic propaganda as a powerful mobilizing factor. A special meeting was held in the intelligence department of the Turkish navy, where the present parties exchanged information on Soviet and satellite naval forces in the Black Sea. It had been concluded that the forces of the opponent in the Black Sea were far stronger than those of the Allies. In particular, a question appeared of constructing a Soviet submarine base on the island Sasseno in Albania, information that none of the countries at the time could confirm. The Second Tripartite Conference in Athens, June 3–12, 1953 The first meeting of military representatives after the signing of the Ankara Treaty was held in Athens from June 3 to June 12, 1953. During the period in between the first and second conferences, the agreement had been ratified and preparations were made for the second meeting. Generals Theodosis Papathanassiou, Ioanis Palitakos, and Constantine Panagiotopoulos represented the host. General Sun Selim was the head of the Turkish delegation, while Generals Ljubo Vučković and Pero Kosorić led the Yugoslav delegation. Talks were conducted based on previous approval of the Greek general staff’s proposal. At the opening of the conference, the Greek minister of defense, Kanellopoulos, greeted the participants. On behalf of the host, General Papathanassiou pointed out that the conference would be held according to the previously agreed program and that the basis for discussions and the regulation of military arrangements would be taken under the principle that an attack on one member would be considered as an attack on all three countries.197 Separate meetings of several commissions were held.

236

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

The general committee analyzed the Balkan theater and its importance for the defense of the Allies, Europe, and the Middle East. A detailed analysis of the Macedonian, Thracian, and battlefield around the Straits was done with planned lines of defense, planned forces, and modes of operation. In the following days, conclusions of the subcommittees were included in the general work of the commission. An intelligence subcommittee performed an assessment of the opposing forces, as well as an analysis of possible enemy war plans and its variants, of which as priority were pointed out the occupation of northern Italy and northern Yugoslavia and the occupation of Turkey and the Middle East. In this analysis, ground, air, and naval forces were presented as well as their eventual deployment.198 A subcommittee for examining allied forces engaged in the following questions: • • • • • •

What forces each country had in peace and war. The terms of service, mobilization, and training of the recruits. The composition of infantry divisions. The support that army corps and divisions offered in terms of transport. The system of mobilization and recruitment. The forces on the common fronts—what time they would need to become fully operational.

A subcommittee for the air force dealt with an analysis of the enemy and the allies’ air forces, potential targets, and coordination of three allied air forces. It particularly highlighted the issue of the opponents’ possibilities of being transported by air and strategic targets for enemy aviation. A signal subcommittee got the task to determine the condition, quality, potential, resources, and organization of signals in the civil and military sector, and to propose an agreement on issues of frequencies, calls, and encryption systems work, which was of priority importance for future cooperation, equally in peace and war. A subcommittee for supply received a difficult task. It included measures for supplies, the supply base for the Yugoslav and Greek forces operating in a joint operational area, communication (current state and traffic control), the needs of Yugoslav forces in the port facilities, the flow of supplies, and organizing cooperation in the Greek ports. In addition, they had to work with estimates of the daily needs of units engaged on the common front in order to organize their supplies. Special attention had been devoted to supply routes of the Yugoslav forces from the Thessalonica port and Yugoslav Free Zone therein and alternative routes if



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 237

Thessalonica was threatened or taken. In addition, the Yugoslav Adriatic ports had been taken into account, while the Greek representative proposed supplying through the Albanian ports of Durres and Valona as an alternative solution, because it was considered that Albania would soon be thrown out from the war operations and defeated. A special subcommittee for drafting the memorandum was formed.199 As a result of these tripartite discussions, a memorandum with annexes was developed: • Annex A: Conclusions of the committee for estimations of friendly forces analyzed the actual strength of the allied armies, the degree of preparation for war operations, and preparations of the forces in general and on the common front. • Annex B: Liaisons between the two countries. • Annex C: Conclusions of the supply subcommittee. The subcommittee agreed that the most appropriate bases and communications for the joint Greek-Yugoslav battlefield were located on the territory of Greece and said that the most appropriate ports for these purposes were Thessalonica, Volos, St. Marina, and Piraeus. The lack of vehicles in both countries was noted and the need for the construction of a new railway communication and the expansion of the existing infrastructure. It also concluded that seriously wounded Yugoslavs should be evacuated under the same conditions as Greeks in the evacuation centers of army bases Volos–Larissa–Lamia. Their further treatment would be conducted in military hospitals around Athens. • Annex D: General conclusions of the air force subcommittee assessed that the Soviet satellite forces that could be used against Yugoslavia, Western Turkey, and Greece totaled 3,500 aircraft, of which 1,000 were jets. Half of these forces consisted of fighter planes and diving bombers, and the second half of the other types—bombers, reconnaissance, etc. With the maximum strain on the first day, Soviet satellite air forces could perform 4,000 flights of fighter-bombers and fighters and 3,000 flights of bombers. Soviets and satellites had the opportunity to use 2,000 transport aircraft for airborne operations and had 7 to 8 airborne divisions at their disposal. The fact that the Balkan allies were outnumbered 4 to 1 and had a total of 920 aircraft of which only 200 were jets (Greece 200 aircraft, of which 100 were jets; Turkey 220, of which 100 were jets; and 500 Yugoslav aircraft) was stated in the conclusion during the first day that land forces could expect no or minimal support. • Annex E: Coordination of operations in which they discussed various means of action on the Greek and Yugoslav forces to confront the invasion

238

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

coming from Bulgaria. It had been agreed that the two armies should try to keep the enemy on the main defense line outlined near the YugoslavBulgarian border and the Strumica River. They should get the opportunity to improve their defense by coordinating defensive-offensive methods, retreating as necessary to the next line. In the case of an enemy breakthrough on any important point from north to south, the vulnerable area should be ensured with the defense from all directions. It was concluded that a coordinated plan for the Greek army and command of the Yugoslav forces in southern Yugoslavia was needed (13 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, and 1 armored brigade of the Yugoslav forces and 9 Greek divisions). A more detailed and coordinated plan between Yugoslav and neighboring Greek units was especially needed. The schemes with supposed allied and enemy forces were made, as well as a short joint communiqué.200 Western Allies had attributed great significance to these talks. Undoubtedly, there had been a significant step forward in regulating inter-allied relations and obligations. Namely, Admiral Robert Carney, chief of naval operations US navy, simultaneously visited Athens.201 The importance and the degree of confidentiality of negotiations, as well as the leanness of press releases led to numerous speculations, both in the press and in diplomatic circles.202 The reduction of the likelihood of Soviet Union and satellite aggression, as well as the timing of the tripartite military conference, did not influence the seriousness and depth of the analytical assessment and development of joint defense plans. The talks of the military delegation reflected the systematic approach toward the development of the military segment and to the continuation of cooperation in the spirit of the Ankara Treaty. The Third Tripartite Conference in Belgrade, November 10–20, 1953 During the preparations for a new meeting of Balkan allies, in order to design effective defense plans, the Greek national defense general staff, headed by General Kitrilakis, drafted a plan that represented working materials for the next meeting of representatives of the three general staffs. This draft had been sent to Yugoslav and Turkish general staffs before the actual meeting. The plan was prepared in case of an armed conflict imposed on Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. The conflict would be caused by an attack of Bulgarian forces alone or together with Soviet and other satellite forces. According to a unanimous assessment of the Balkan allies, military conflict of this type could not be limited and would probably expand into World War III. The plan



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 239

was titled Plan of Emergency Protective Actions in Case of Necessity, code name GYT (Greece–Yugoslavia–Turkey) and it dealt with coordinating the defense of the Balkan allies. Defense of other regions would be organized by each national general staff and would be coordinated with the defense anticipated in this document. The plan had been based on information from 1953, and it would be used in the early stages of the war that may start unexpectedly in the near future. The plan would be operative after ratification. The draft consisted of three parts: • Basic tripartite plan of action in case of emergency • Tripartite plan for the air forces • Coordination of operational plans of neighboring commands It had been envisaged to continue with conversations over the other issues after the representatives of the three general staffs became acquainted with the materials.203 Greek and Turkish representatives expressed a strong desire to establish an official form of informing NATO.204 Despite the previous agreement that the meeting would take place in Athens, a meeting was held in Belgrade from November 10 to November 20.205 Heads of the delegations were Generals Papathanassiadis, Coşkun, and Božović. On the first day, General Ljubo Vučković welcomed delegations. He thanked the representatives of the Greek general staff on their efforts of the writing the defense draft. General Vučković also introduced the Greek and Turkish representatives with the results of meetings held in Washington with representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France. Before moving on with the agenda, the head of the Greek delegation briefed the others with the results of the meetings with the US representatives regarding the opening of US military bases in Greece. The Greeks were governed, as they themselves said, with the existing fair and correct inter-ally relations, as well as with the fact that the aforementioned bases can be used not only by NATO but also by other members of the Balkan Alliance.206 The proposal of the Greek plan was discussed point by point. After the analysis of all contentious issues, a final version would be determined. An emphasis had been placed on a common part of the battlefield. The Greek version of the plan had a defensive-offensive character, because it predicted that after defending against the initial enemy attack, counteroffensive actions would occur. Yugoslav forces would advance toward Sofia, Greece, and Turkey toward Nevrokop and Plovdiv. Yugoslav representatives were suspicious of their ability to implement this option, because they believed that the forces of the Balkan allies could not support such an ambitious plan.207 In parallel with the work of the general committee, several subcommittees had their meetings:

240

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

• A subcommittee for the development of the defense plan and the coordination plan. • An intelligence subcommittee, which dealt with the analysis of enemy forces, their possible use in case of war, and the changes that occurred meanwhile. Special attention was put on Bulgaria, its forces and overall military capacity, because only from its territory a simultaneous and most efficient attack on all three allies was possible. The conclusion that intelligence must be exchanged with a greater intensity than usual was adopted as well. • A subcommittee for drafting Attachment B (allied land power). • An air force subcommittee. The meeting of representatives of the national general staffs resulted in the production of the tripartite defense plan, with attachments, including: • • • • • •

Tripartite emergency defense plan (code GYT) Appendix A—Enemy forces Appendix B—Allied land forces Appendix C—Allied air forces (air force plan with add ons I, II, III, IV) Appendix F—Coordination of operational plans of neighboring land forces An official statement for NATO, which represented a report from the Turkish and Greek general commands to NATO about the conclusions from the meeting • Communiqué It was presupposed that the hostilities would start the initiative of the Soviet Union and its satellites, whether against one of the three allies separately or against all three at once. In any case, it would quickly spread into a world war. The enemy would have the initiative to attack, the advantage in the preparation, and supremacy in the land forces, especially in aviation and in the initial period of operations. The enemy may perform the attack with the Bulgarian forces in the first echelon and then introduce other Soviet and satellite forces or all of them at once. Therefore, the mobilization day (M) and the day of attack (D) could be considered very close or practically coincide. The possibility that the enemy would use nuclear weapons was also included. The joint task of the three armies was to prevent the enemies from taking control of vital areas of mutual relevance through coordinated active defense and counteroffensive operations as soon as favorable conditions occur. Fortification of several lines of defensive belts in the Yugoslav and Greek sectors should prevent the enemy from interrupting the connection between the two armies, to threaten vital communications in the area of Thessalonica and

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 241



Skoplje and to come in contact with Albania. With a decisive defense in the areas of Çatalca and Demir kapi, Turkish forces should prevent the enemy from breaching the region of the Straits. Within the plan, there was an interesting point concerning the necessary measures “that should be taken in three connected geographic areas so that civilian population does not interfere with the operations.” Namely, in the border regions of all three countries lived representatives of national minorities, whose members could play a role of fifth column. Thus, with the general form, the different interpretations and disagreements had been avoided. In relation to Attachment A—enemy forces—estimations did not differ dramatically from previous meetings. During war, satellites (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Albania) would have 81 to 89 divisions, together with 55 Soviet divisions (majority in the region of the Caucasus—27). Satellite Forces Table A.1. No.

Country

Divisions/peacetime

Divisions/wartime

1 2 3 4

Albania Bulgaria Romania Hungary Total

4–5 16–17 20–22 16–18 56–62

5–6 22–25 28–30 26–28 81–89

Soviet Forces Table A.2. No.

Country

 5  6  7  8  9 10 11

Austria Hungary Romania Odessa region Crimea region Caucasus region Kiev region Total

Divisions/peacetime  2  3  4  9  3 27  7 55

Divisions/wartime

242

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

A plan of action of enemy forces on a certain direction had been made, as well as forces and dynamics of their engagement. For the forces of the Balkan allies (Appendix B—Allied land forces), up to 30 days for full mobilization and concentration had been predicted, but the majority of these forces would be ready in 15 days. Forces assigned for a common front were supposed to take the following deployment. Yugoslav Forces The first line of defense with five infantry divisions and two mountain brigades consisting of: • • • •

A mountain brigade in the region of Belasica–Strumica–Džami Tepe A mountain brigade in the region of Berovo–Carevo selo–Istibanja One infantry division in the region of Kratovo–Kriva Palanka–Stracin One infantry division in the region of Besna Kobila–Studeno–Vlasotince– Vladičin Han • One infantry division in the region of Knjaževac–S. Leskovac–Soko Banja • One infantry division in the region of Zaječar–Negotin–Bor Forces for the Defense • All of the above-mentioned forces • One infantry division, one mountain brigade, and one armored brigade in the region of Štip–Ovče polje–St. Nikola • One infantry division in the region of Niš Reserves • Two infantry divisions, two mountain brigades, and one tank division in the region of Skoplje–Priština–Kosovska Mitrovica • Two infantry divisions in the region of Kruševac–Ražanj–Paraćin Greek Forces • The first line of defense with four infantry divisions and four light infantry regiments consisting of: • One infantry division in the region of Belasica–Dojran–Eastern part Krusa Pl • One infantry division in the region of Pontokerassia–Flamur Mt.–Polidendri • One infantry division in the region of Polikastron–Kherson–Ginekokastron • One infantry division in the region of Kavala–Drama • Four light infantry regiments in Thrace and Eastern Macedonia

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 243



Forces for the Defense • • • •

All of the above-mentioned forces One infantry division in the region of Veria–Gida–Gianitsa A light infantry regiment in the region of Mt. Paikon Armored forces in the strength of a tank division in the region north of Thessalonica

Reserves • • • •

One infantry division in the region of Katerini One infantry division in the region of Kozani One infantry division in the region of Servia One infantry division in the region of Kalabaka-Murgani

Turkish Forces • • • •

The first line of defense was composed of: One infantry division One armored brigade One border regiment in the region of Lileburgaz–Corlu–Kirklareli

Defense Forces • • • • •

Three infantry divisions One infantry brigade (raised to a division) One armored brigade in the region of Çatalca–Istanbul One infantry brigade (raised to a division) in the region of Çanakkale One infantry division and one armored brigade in the region of Uskudar– Omer–Kartel • One infantry division in the region of Izmit • One cavalry division in the region of Hendek–Adapazari Reserves • One infantry division in the region of Brusa • One infantry brigade in the region of Bolu In relation to Attachment C, which had been related to air forces, it concluded that allied air forces should adopt a special way of action. Due to the enemy’s superiority, it would enable them to avoid annihilation during the first days of action and at the same time enable them to provide the greatest possible support to the overall defensive effort of the three countries. The main task of the air force of the three countries should be reducing the

244

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

enemy’s numerical superiority. The results of this would favorably affect the reduction of pressure of the enemy air force. Reducing this kind of pressure from the enemy’s air force would provide the land forces with the possibility to perform a successful defense. With ultimate effort, the Balkan allies should preserve their own air force, and later, in case of a favorable balance of power in the air achieved by the actions of the Western air forces, become able to continue the fight in better conditions. To achieve this, they should use a large number of reconnaissance flights to provide the appropriate information on the movements of enemy forces, concentrations, etc., and not undertake the tasks of support to land forces if the situation should remain unchanged. Fighter planes would mainly be used for combat with enemy aircraft with piston engines. The air battle with enemy jet fighters would be undertaken under favorable conditions or when imposed by the enemy and thus became inevitable. Estimation of Enemy Forces Satellite air force • Hungarian air force: 330 aircraft, of which 100 were jet fighters • Romanian air force: 350 aircraft, of which 100 were jet fighters • Bulgarian air force: 450 aircraft, of which 100 were jet fighters TOTAL: 1,130 aircraft of which 300 were jet fighters Soviet air force: • In Romania, 100 jet fighters • In Hungary, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, 320 aircraft, of which 100 were jet fighters that could be used in the Balkan battlefields • In the region of Kiev, Odessa, Crimea, and the Caucasus: 2,000 aircraft, of which 500 were jet fighters TOTAL: 2,420 aircraft of which 700 were jet fighters The enemy’s air force had 3,500 aircraft, of which 1,000 were jet fighters. Of these 3,500 aircraft, about 3,000 were combat planes, and of these 3,000, 1,500 were fighter planes. Others were divers and bombers and reconnaissance and transport aircraft. Out of 1,500 fighter planes, approximately 1,000 were jets, and the rest were piston engine. It had been estimated that the total power of the enemy’s air transport provided the possibility of transporting 30,000 troops per day and increased the total number in another five days to more than 40,000 troops. The enemy had the ability to block the main supply base for three countries, using aircraft and submarines. In addition, the enemy



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 245

was able to conduct reconnaissance operations on the whole territory of the three countries. The Balkan allies had the following: Turkey 6 squadrons of F-84 fighter-bombers 2 squadrons of Mosquito light bombers 1 squadron of B-26 light bombers 2 Spit XIX planes for strategic reconnaissance 3 squadrons of F-84 fighter-bombers 2 squadrons of Spitfire IX fighters 4 squadrons of C-47 transport aircraft TOTAL

Number of aircraft 150  32  16   2  75  50   48 373

Greece 6 squadrons of F-84 fighter-bombers 2 transport squadrons of C-47 transport aircraft 1 reconnaissance squad of Spitfire XVIs 1 internal security squad of Helldivers TOTAL

Number of aircraft 150  32    8  12 202

Yugoslavia Number of aircraft   80 3 wings of S-49 piston-engine fighter planes  50 2 wings of F-84 jet engine fighters-bombers 120 5 wings of F-47 piston-engine fighter-bombers 120 4 wings of piston-engine Il-2 fighter-bombers  60 2 wings of piston-engine Mosquito light bombers  50 2 wings of piston-engine Mosquito reconnaissance airplanes 1 wing of transport aircraft  20 TOTAL 500 Number of aircraft in the area of common interest: • Turkey, 200 aircraft, of which 150 had jet engines • Greece, 202 aircraft, of which 150 had jet engines • Yugoslavia, 180 piston-engine aircraft TOTAL: 582 aircraft of which 300 had jet engines In Appendix F—Coordination of Operational Plans of Neighboring Land Forces—more attention had been devoted to concrete issues of cooperation. The principle that each country had maintained its sovereignty and was pri-

246

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

marily responsible for defending its own territory had been agreed. Coordination would be performed principally on a tripartite basis, but according to some specific issues, like connected geographic areas, in direct bilateral coordination as well, with the third country informed. Boundaries between adjacent commanding posts were determined by existing state borders, but could be changed according to tactical and operational needs. General staffs would coordinate activities of the neighboring units. It had been agreed that the national general staffs, if necessary, preferably before the beginning of war operations, should make the exchange of one group of liaison officers, whose task would be to perform the exchange of communication operations and to work on coordinating joint operations. It was also agreed that the neighboring commands of army groups, corps, and divisions should make reciprocal visits during peacetime. If necessary, by the approval of the general staffs, adjacent army commands may solve some specific issues of coordination, such as the selection and organization of the defense position, adjustment of plans for engineering, deployment of neighboring units, maintaining connections, etc. During the war, upon approval of the general staff, they would exchange groups of liaison officers. Commands of adjacent corps, divisions, and brigades and, if needed, regiments and battalions, would exchange liaison officers as well. Their task would be an instant notification concerning the operations in order to coordinate joint operations. The tasks for neighboring armies, the First Greek Army and Yugoslav Third Army and the First Greek and First Turkish armies were especially determined. It had been envisaged that the defense in the Strumica direction should be entirely left to the Greek forces, because this direction was leaning on the Greek defensive positions on the Strumica River. In addition, it had been envisaged that the Greek forces in Thrace would withdraw from Turkish territory, from where they would be evacuated by sea or would continue to fight under Turkish command.208 With this, the plan to define and specify the military component of the Balkan Pact was fulfilled. Among other things, the decision was made to organize the next meeting in Ankara. The subject of the meeting would be making annexes on naval forces, counterattacks, coordination, intelligence services, logistics, and signal services.209 The Fourth Tripartite Conference in Ankara, March 24–April 1, 195 One year after the first conference of the three representatives of the general staffs, the fourth conference was held in the Turkish capital. The main task of the conference was to develop a supplement to the plans adopted at the Belgrade meeting. The heads of the delegation were Generals Tunaboylu, Vučković, and Papathanassiadis. Already adopted principles were retained,



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 247

according to which the Greek general staff was developing plans that were then processed at the session of the general committee. For individual plans, special subcommittees have been formed.210 The agenda included the following: • • • • •

Appendix D: Actions of the navy Appendix E: Plan for counterstrikes Appendix G: Coordination of intelligence services Appendix J: Logistics Appendix K: Signals

The working methodology from the previous meetings proved to be effective; however, the fact that there were not enough interpreters influenced the dynamics so that not all the subcommittees could operate simultaneously. Finally, the following documents were produced in this meeting: • A memorandum and the documents from the meeting of military representatives in which they presented the future plans, among which the intention of organizing cooperation between the Greek and Yugoslav units on a possible joint battlefield especially had been emphasized (First Greek and the Third Yugoslav armies). • Appendix D: Plan of Action of Naval Forces with two appendices (Appendix I—Friendly Forces and Appendix II—Enemy Forces). To support joint defense efforts, it had been agreed that the naval forces of each of the three countries would perform the following tasks: protect naval routes and perform offensive actions against the enemy routes, support neighboring allied commands of naval forces, and exercise. countersubmarine and submarine operations such as minelaying and minesweeping • Appendix E: Plan for the Use of Reserves and Counteroffensive Actions provided the optimal use of reserves to neutralize any enemy pressure. A simple principle was adopted that each unit disengaged from the enemy, within the limits of possibility, would perform offensive actions to diminish the hostile pressure on neighboring allied units. • Appendix G: Plan of Coordination of Intelligence Services with two appendices (Appendix I—List of Main Intelligence Objects and Appendix II—Elements That Suggest Aggression). The potential objects were classified into three categories: 1.  Political: Foreign and domestic policy of the USSR and its satellites and the changes in their policy, the political attacks directed against the Balkan allies, and actions that state public opinion in the USSR and its satellite countries.

248

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

2.  Economics: Resources and supplies of raw materials and industrial capacity, industrial production, agricultural facilities, the scale in which the needs of the army in peace and war can be satisfied, trade, economic capacity, statistical data from a variety of areas, and other issues. 3.  Military: The organization, composition, and deployment of the armed forces; equipment; means of transport, supplies, probable operational plans; plans for military buildup; mobilization plans; human and material resources; fortified areas; fortification system and strength of fortifications; war potential; morale; the training system of the armed forces; military leaders and their biographies; communications and their capacity; technical studies and research organizations of civil defense; air fields and naval bases and their capacities; parachute and airborne units; possibilities of amphibious operations; and data on naval and air forces. Also, the elements that would suggest incoming aggression were listed, such as mobilization—public or secret—the formation of a larger number of new units; mobilization, concentration, and transportation toward the border; approach of the larger units; mobilization of material resources for war; reorientation of industry to wartime production and increased production of war materials; dissolution of a number of military schools and the dispatching of their personnel in operational units; increased political propaganda in the army and among the population against the three countries; militarization of the railroad system; and road, water, postal, and telephone-telegraph traffic. The following security measures were also included: the evacuation of commercial enterprises and factories that were located in exposed areas; stocking large quantities of war materiel near the strategic routes; and severe security measures, especially in the border territory; limited population movements within the country and abroad; the evacuation of populations from the border zone; banning of all leaves to military personnel and personnel working in military enterprises; the evacuation of civil-administrative services and their relocation; increased air-defense measures; the prohibition of trading with certain commodities; enhanced work of enemy spies and saboteurs and the sudden execution of sabotages; closing of borders; the arrests of politically suspected entities and deportations; the appearance of Soviet and other satellite units on Bulgarian soil; replacing male workers in the economy with women and youth who are not subject to military duty; the introduction of Soviet personnel to high positions in the satellite units; reactivation of general, specialists, and staff officers who were demobilized due to political reasons or lack of commissions; concentration of war and merchant ships in the ports, whose numbers in normal conditions would be much smaller; deployment of the enemy air force units at the civil airports and frequent vio-



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 249

lations of neighbors’ airspace; arming of merchant ships and ports; relocation of the large headquarters outside of garrisons; the appearance of new radio networks in the border zones; the militarization of civilian hospitals; frequent appearances of enemy submarines; intense mining activity; concentration of amphibious ships in ports; reinforcement of coastal defense; and retention of foreign merchant ships and other vehicles. • Appendix J—Plan of logistics. The need for creating inventories was pointed out with this plan, especially in the joint battlefields (the purpose of securing a better supply until the shipments start to come from Western allies). The importance of the Greek ports and roads and railroads heading to Yugoslavia is also stated. • Appendix K—Project of signals with one attachment. It was agreed that the common signal language would be English. • Statement for NATO, which in form was almost identical to a report from the previous meeting. • The official communiqué, which did not depart from the usual general form.211 It had been decided that the host of the next conference would be Athens, with the following agenda: • Joint assessment of the situation (enemy land, navy, and air forces) • Review and approval of the plan of action and coordination of the First Greek and Third Yugoslav armies • Review and approval of a detailed plan that would be produced by a special commission for logistics • Review and approval of a detailed plan from the signal commission The above-mentioned projects would be provided by the Greek general staff, except the project on signals, which was supposed to be provided by the Turkish general staff.212 The First Conference of the Chiefs of the General Staffs, Athens, September 20–29, 1954 The preparation for this conference took place during the summer of 1954.213 The agenda of the conference was discussed during the meeting of military experts in Bled during the signing of the Balkan Pact, August 7 to August 8. However, they did not reach an agreement smoothly since the Turkish representative, General Goşkun, insisted on a provision that would bring

250

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

the Balkan Pact in close terms with NATO. In addition, he raised the issue of joint command. The Yugoslavs were very sensitive concerning both issues. The question of closer connections with NATO was left aside with the statement that the Yugoslavs appreciated the Greek and Turkish obligations toward the Western military alliance and that Yugoslavia would resolve any issue in direct contact with NATO. In relation to the issue of joint command, the Yugoslav representative, General Vučković, said that the defense plans should be prepared in time of peace and that in case of war, Yugoslav forces would be commanded by the Yugoslav general staff. The problem existed only in coordination, not in command. Finally, for the first meeting of the chiefs of staff, the following agenda had been agreed: • A short analysis and conclusion from previous meetings of representatives of the general staffs • Discussion about the military clauses of the Treaty of Alliance in order to reach a unified view for determining and providing general instructions and the general principle of the future joint work of the general staffs214 The conference would be held in Athens for a period of 10 days. The program included meetings of chiefs of general staffs, subcommittee meetings, receptions, visits to units and installations of the Greek army and other protocol duties. Within the preserved working materials, the Yugoslav delegation had the following: • Questions that were discussed in the conference in Bled and that would probably be set by the Greeks and Turks at the meeting of chiefs of general Staffs—one of the questions dealt with aggression, that is, whom to consider as an aggressor. Yugoslavia’s position on this issue was that only governments, not chiefs of staff, should discuss this issue. • Questions for Comrade Marshal (i.e., Josip Broz Tito)—several questions had been asked, but one of the most important was the question of the connection of the Balkan Pact to NATO. Yugoslavia’s attitude was unequivocal—there were no obstacles for cooperation with NATO on issues that would be harmonized in advance within the Balkan Pact (a conference with the United States, Great Britain, and France from the previous year had been mentioned as evidence for the above mentioned). For Yugoslavia, the best form of cooperation with NATO was direct contact. The question of Albania had been resolved by quotations from the talks that Josip Broz Tito and Winston Churchill had the last year: “In the war, the enemy should not be kept behind the back because of strategic needs” and “In the case



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 251

of aggression everyone should take measures for preventive reasons. Since we have an agreement with the Turks and Greeks it will not be difficult to solve the strategic problem.” In matters in which a decisive action or offensive deterrent was required, a certain discomfort was felt and a desire for the other side to conclude the obvious, as if it were inconceivable that Yugoslavia would become the aggressor, despite the clear reasons for such developments. In relation to the issue of the acceptance of Italy into the Balkan Pact, it was said that this question would be solved at the level of government; previously it was necessary for Italy to demonstrate goodwill for cooperation in all fields. Italy and Yugoslavia previously needed to solve all questions and then to raise the question of acceptance of Italy into the Balkan Pact. • A brief analysis and conclusion on previous work that was characterized as successful, that all delegations demonstrated goodwill and that a spirit of trust had prevailed. Issues that remained unresolved in the framework of cooperation: • Among the unresolved issues, which in the future had to be addressed, was the question of “psychological warfare.” • The protection of operations and the population in the area of common interest. • Security of maritime traffic routes. • The coordination of action to confront enemy air force (primarily Bulgarian). • The manner and scope of data exchange gathered from air reconnaissance. • Connecting of services for monitoring, informing, and controlling. • Organization of signals between land, naval, and air forces. • The execution of submarine and countersubmarine operations. • Minelaying and minesweeping, support of land forces from the sea, safety of coastal zones, etc.215 During the meeting in Athens, discussions had been very open and some differences occurred among allies. From the report of the head of the Yugoslav delegation, General Peko Dapčević, it was visible that those were primarily the adjustment of the Balkan Pact war plans with the plans of NATO and the issue of joint command, which specifically and consistently was insisted on by the Turks. However, the fact that Yugoslavs refused to discuss this subject and that the Greek delegation at all times had a conciliatory attitude that in many aspects coincided with Yugoslavia, meant that there was no discussion over these issues. In addition, the attitudes of the three allies

252

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

differed on the issue of defense plans. Namely, the Greeks and Turks were in favor of a joint defense plan, while the Yugoslavs were in favor of coordination of national war plans, which was finally accepted.216 Despite the declarative consensus, it had been proven that without adequate political context, it was not possible to carry out a planned alliance. Clearly, this conference represented a manifestation of disunity and the hint of the end of their military cooperation.217 The Fifth Tripartite Conference in Athens, November 4–12, 1954 As a continuation of the previously initiated agreements, in November 1954, the fifth tripartite conference was held in Athens. The Yugoslavs were led by General Vučković, the Turks by General Ilter, and the Greeks by General Kitrilakis. Besides the main conference, subcommittees for operational work, aviation, logistics, signals, and exchange of maps held their meetings. Topics that were addressed in subcommittees actually represented the agenda of the conference, which had been slightly different from what was previously established in the fourth conference in Ankara. Discussions over the enemy forces and the general aviation plan were left for the next meeting, and Plan 31 of the First Greek and Yugoslav Third armies was processed in the meeting of the general commission. The air force subcommittee considered the question of air support to the Greek and Yugoslav forces in joint battlefields, as well as similarities and differences in the organization of air forces. During the conference, the following conclusions were reached: • Memorandum. • Appendix A: Operational issues. In this attachment, mostly related to the cooperation of the Greek and Yugoslav armies on joint battlefields, a series of amendments were carried out, and the meetings of the neighboring Greek and Turkish commanders were initiated in order to prepare a similar plan of action on common battlefields. • Appendix B: Air force issues: In a separate subcommittee, three delegations exchanged views regarding the organization of the air force of each of the allies. The categories of war operations—air forces, tactical (i.e., air superiority, reconnaissance, isolation of the battlefield, direct support, air transport), air defense, and technical operations services (i.e., meteorology, search-and-rescue services)—were formulated. Certain questions for the following conferences were agreed on: assessment of enemy capabilities, reconnaissance operations, meteorological plan and ways of collecting data on weather in the territories of the opponent, early warning of enemy airborne actions, and control systems of all three armies.



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 253

• Appendix C: Logistics issues. Within these issues were the calculation of materiel needs of neighboring armies, provision of assistance in transportation, the organization of communication and financial compensation, etc. • Appendix D: Signal issues. Issues of time zones, codes, a signal network of general staffs, armies, corps, connections between the neighboring Greek and Yugoslav and Greek and Turkish army units, tables for identification, and code systems. There were also issues of cartographic code, telephone and telegraph signals, radio signals, radio-surveillance services, modes, frequencies, aviation network, dial characters, and the signals of the navy. • Appendix E: Exchange of maps. • Report of the Greek and Turkish general staffs to NATO. • Communiqué.218 The draft agenda of the next conference in Belgrade was also determined. It had been envisaged to consider: • Joint assessment of enemy forces and the probable enemy plans of action against the Balkan allies • A tripartite coordinated plan based on national defense plans, which considers the most difficult hypothesis—the simultaneous attack of all neighboring countries against Balkan allies • Aviation issues • Logistic issues • Signal issues • Adoption of the Yugoslav proposal for the exchange of visits between the heads of geographic institutes • Adoption of three proposals of the delegation regarding items A, B, and E The Sixth Tripartite Conference in Belgrade, April 5–14, 1955 According to the previously achieved agreements, military cooperation of the Balkan allies continued during 1955. The beginning of the year was marked by the preparation for the Belgrade meeting. The conference was held from April 5 to April 14. Heads of the delegations were Generals Ilter for Turkey, Barjaktarević for Yugoslavia, and Pipiliangopoulos for Greece. Talks were conducted through the work of: • • • •

General Intelligence Air force Logistics subcommittee219

254

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

According to the already agreed agenda, the following plans were adopted: • The Basic Plan of Tripartite Cooperation, code 111. • Appendix A: Assessment of intelligence data of the Basic Plan of Tripartite Cooperation because in the meantime certain changes had been amended. This plan presented the opponent’s goal to occupy Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey in order to use all types of their resources, to expand air defense of the Soviet Union, to occupy military bases to control communications in the Mediterranean, and to continue its actions toward North Africa. Other goals were to take the Straits, reach the Mediterranean, and extend the attack on the Asian part of Turkey, take the Ljubljana gates, to continue the attack in the direction of northern Italy and secure the left flank of the forces operating in the direction of Western Europe. Concerning the impact of enemy operations, it had been said that the enemy attack on central Yugoslavia would create the possibility of a split of the overall Yugoslav defense, separating the Northwest from the South front and the continuation of operations toward southern Yugoslavia and Greece. A successful enemy offensive at a joint Greek-Yugoslav area would open up the invasion routes in the direction of central Yugoslavia and central Greece, and cut the Yugoslav supply lines from the south. Also, it would merge with Albania in order to help it. Onward, Albanian territory would be used for continuation of other operations: to the south, against Greece; to the west, to close the Otranto; to the north, against Yugoslavia. In addition, the successful actions against Greece and the islands in the Aegean Sea would have resulted in endangering Turkey from the west. Occupation of Western Turkey would result in endangering Greece and its islands from the east as well as capturing the Straits and strengthening of the enemy position in the Black and Aegean Seas. It was said that enemy countries had been constantly improving the quality of their work. Most of them had already passed through the process of unification. The command staff had almost all gone through staff schools, making their armies capable of offensive operations. Only the quality of the Romanian army was slightly lower, but these forces also, along with Russian forces, could effectively be used for offensive action. At that moment, Albanian forces lacked arms and equipment and were not able to perform offensive operations. It was believed that the defense capabilities of the Albanian army were significant due to the mountainous terrain. Enemy attack would be aimed at neutralizing the possibility of mobilizing and concentrating forces of the Balkan allies. A possibility



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 255

existed that the enemy could use nuclear weapons on the facilities of vital importance. To accomplish that, the enemy would limit its preparations before the D day to those that could be hidden or concealed in any way. It was concluded that the work of intelligence agencies should intensify, with the continuous coordination of defense plans of the three countries in order to confront the enemy’s intentions. • Supplements of the Attachment E (plan for coordination between air forces): within were plans for air reconnaissance and meteorology. • The signal issue: Appendix K of plan GTY • The logistics issue: attachment J of plan GTY Afterward, a memorandum was formulated that traditionally consisted of the conclusions and suggestions for future work and communiqués for NATO and to the general public. It had been agreed that the next meeting would be used for further work on drafting the Basic Plan of Tripartite Cooperation; approval of the decision from the conferences of the First Greek and Third Yugoslav armies and regulation of identical cooperation between them; and resolution of issues of liaison officers and other issues. Agreed plans for military cooperation from this conference were later ratified.220 CONFERENCES OF GREEK FIRST ARMY AND YUGOSLAV THIRD ARMY COS To realize mutual successful interactions of the units during the war period, regular meetings of the First Greek Army and Third Yugoslav Army teams were held. In the area of responsibility of the two armies was the joint GreekYugoslav battlefield. Within a period of two years, four conferences were organized. Controversial issues were resolved in the subcommittee and then adopted at the plenary meetings. At the first conference, held from June 9 to June 15, 1954, in Strumica, the following issues were discussed: • Specifying the delineation of the border between the Greek First and Yugoslav Third armies • The initial deployment of the Yugoslav and Greek forces • Organizing the defense position in Strumica’s direction • Communications in Strumica’s direction • Airports for transport and signal aviation221

256

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

At the second conference, held July 27 through August 1, 1954, in Thessalonica, cooperation went further, resulting in detailed considerations of open issues. It included: • Determination of the goal, general situation, and assessment of enemy forces and data of allied forces • Joint task of the two armies and the borders between them • Execution, the idea of maneuver, common defense positions, deployment, distribution of tasks, and securing the junction between the armies • Logistics • Signals • Immediate replacement of Yugoslav forces in the Strumica Valley with Greek forces • Regulation of the terrain, fortification, obstacles, and communications At this meeting, the Plan of Coordination of Operations of the First Greek and the Third Yugoslav Army in a Joint Greek-Yugoslav Tactical Zone, known in military circles as Plan 31, was adopted.222 The third conference, held in Skopje from February 8 through February 16, 1955, was more detailed: • A plan of fortification in the mountains of Belasica and Karaula • A plan for replacement of the 44th Yugoslav brigade with the Second Greek Division • Consideration of objections from the fifth tripartite conference • Adoption of the initial basis for the use of reserves and counteroffensives • Development of the signal plan for Greek-Yugoslav forces • Development of the logistics plan for Greek-Yugoslav forces223 The fourth and last conference was held in Thessalonica from October 17 through October 24, 1955. The conference mainly verified already reached agreements and generally considered: • • • •

Use of reserves Defense plans on position L-3 The issues of logistics, signals, and communication Amendment of Plan 31 (enemy forces, logistics, signals, replacement of the 44th Brigade)224

Defense preparations were not harmonized only at conferences but also at the special committees, as well as with the exchange of written materials.



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 257

From a military-geographic aspect, defense of the Strumica Valley was particularly interesting, because the aggressor had favorable conditions for the use of armored mechanized forces. To achieve an effective defense, Greek forces should replace Yugoslav forces. Specificity of mutual separation of responsibilities in the joint zone was visible in the fact that the Greek forces (Second Division) were responsible for defending not only the Greek national territory but also part of the Yugoslav territory in the Strumica Valley. Such a division of responsibility was logical and militarily justified, given that the positions and lines of defense included the territory of both countries and that the importance of the Strumica Valley was particularly significant for the Greek side. Namely, in April 1941, the defensive front in northern Greece did not collapse until the German troops, coming across the Yugoslav territory, passed behind the Greek defensive positions. In this way, the Strumica Valley represented the direction of primal importance for the defense of Greece. In this manor, the defense was planned in two defensive positions, with each position in two lines. Both participants estimated enemy forces jointly with the fact that the information brought by the Yugoslav side was far more detailed. The main way of collecting the data was through the interrogation of persons who fled to Yugoslavia, seized Bulgarian agents, reconnaissance, and their own agents. While during the second conference only general information was presented on the expected opponent forces, in the third and fourth conferences, within the consideration of the use of reserves and counterattacks, a detailed analysis of the possible enemy forces had been conducted in five variants. In all five variants, the main goal was separating the Greek-Yugoslav forces that would be located east of the Vardar River. The general strategic assessments had been based on less favorable assumptions, that Bulgaria would deploy all its forces, which had been assessed at twentytwo to twenty-five infantry and one to two armored divisions to the west and southwest. The first echelon would consist of six infantry and one armored division and two armored brigades (peacetime formation), while the second echelon had twelve infantry divisions and the third echelon five to nine infantry divisions (up to fifteen days from mobilization). The situation would be favorable if Bulgarians would engage part of their forces against Turkey, but also far more complex if Bulgarians were fighting alongside Soviet troops. The defense of the southeast part of Yugoslavia was the responsibility of the Third Military District (in the war, the Third Army District and the Third Army), with headquarters in Skoplje:225 • 13th Corps (HQ in Niš), with the 45th, 2nd, 75th, 10th, and 35th infantry divisions

258

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

• 5th Corps (HQ in Skoplje), with the 8th operational group in wartime • 19th Corps (HQ in Kumanovo), with the 24th and 42nd infantry and 50th mountain divisions • 26th tank division in Skoplje Strategic development predicted that in the southeastern direction, the Greek and Yugoslav forces would engage: 1.  Yugoslav forces: three corps, eleven infantry divisions, one armored division, five infantry brigades, one armored brigade, and five battalions. 2.  Greek forces: three corps, eleven infantry divisions, one armored division, and eight light regiments. 3.  In the joint tactical area close to Strumica, Greeks would deploy the 2nd infantry division while Yugoslavs would use the 44th mountain brigade. NOTES  1.  Yugoslav transcript of the conference may be found in the Military Archives in Belgrade: VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8. As for the US version of the minutes of the conference, the file was withdrawn because it contains security-classified information: NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Miscellaneous Lot Files, Lot File No. 59 D 383 (Box 4 of 5), Box 38, Miscellaneous Office Files Relating to Yugoslav Affairs 1948–1956, Yugo Mil Talks, Handy Report, Dec. 1952. See more in I. Laković 69–97.   2.  VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8, p. 1.   3.  DAMSPRS, 1952, str. pov, f XIV, 2802, 2–119, pp. 662–663.  4.  VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8, p. 12.  5.  VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8, pp. 13–15.  6.  Ibid., pp. 16–17.   7.  Ibid., p. 18.   8.  VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8, p. 21.   9.  Ibid., p. 21. 10.  Ibid., p. 22. 11.  German expression meaning an area where troops planned for attack are deployed and trained. 12.  Ibid., p. 23. 13.  Soviet railway tracks are wider than European. 14.  VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8, p. 26. 15.  Ibid., pp. 27–28. 16.  Ibid., p. 31. 17.  Ibid., p. 33. 18.  Ibid., p. 34.



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 259

19.  Ibid., p. 38. 20.  Ibid., pp. 41–44. 21.  Ibid., pp. 44–45. 22.  Ibid., p. 47. 23.  Ibid., p. 61. 24.  Ibid., p. 63. 25.  Ibid., p. 64. 26.  Ibid., pp. 65–67. 27.  Ibid., p. 67. 28.  Ibid., p. 68. 29.  Ibid., pp. 69–71. 30.  Ibid., pp. 71–73. 31.  Ibid., p. 74. 32.  Ibid., pp. 75–77. 33.  Ibid., p. 77. 34.  Ibid., p. 78. 35.  D. Bekić, p. 441. 36.  I. Laković, p. 80. 37.  VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8, pp. 79–81. 38.  Ibid., p. 81. 39.  Ibid., pp. 82–83. 40.  Ibid., pp. 85–90. 41.  Ibid., p. 87. 42.  www.aeronautics.ru/nws002/migs_in_local_conflicts_part i.htm, November 2005. 43.  VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8, p. 92. 44.  Ibid., p. 93. 45.  Ibid., pp. 96–98. 46.  Ibid., pp. 98–100. 47.  Ibid., p. 99. 48.  Ibid., p. 100. 49.  I. Laković, pp. 83–84. 50.  VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8, p. 106–108. 51.  VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8, p. 108. 52.  Ibid., p. 112. 53.  Ibid., pp. 112–114. 54.  Ibid., p. 126. 55.  Ibid., pp. 115–116. 56.  Ibid., p. 118. 57.  Ibid., pp. 124–126. 58.  Ibid., p. 129. 59.  Ibid., p. 130. 60.  Ibid., pp. 131–132. 61.  Ibid., p. 133. Railroad Belgrade-Bar was eventually constructed by the end of the 1970s.

260

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

62.  Ibid., p. 134. 63.  I. Laković, pp. 89. 64.  VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8, p. 141: D. Bekić, p. 442. 65.  Ibid., p. 143. 66.  Ibid., pp. 145–147. 67.  I. Laković, pp. 90–91. 68.  Ibid., p. 147. 69.  Ibid., p. 155. 70.  D. Bekić, p. 442. 71.  VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8, p. 161. 72.  Ibid., pp. 161–162. 73.  Ibid., pp. 162–163. 74.  Ibid., p. 164. 75.  Ibid., p. 165. 76.  Ibid., pp. 161–162. 77.  Ibid., pp. 171–172. 78.  Ibid., p. 172. 79.  Ibid., pp. 172–175. 80.  Ibid., p. 176. 81.  Ibid., p. 178. 82.  Ibid., p. 181. 83.  Ibid., pp. 184–185. 84.  Ibid., pp. 186–188. 85.  I. Laković, p. 96. 86.  VA, II section, S-8, f IV, 1387, 8, pp. 197–198. 87.  Ibid., p. 204. 88.  Ibid., p. 205. 89.  Ibid., pp. 208–209. 90.  Ibid., pp. 209–211. 91.  Ibid., p. 212. 92.  For the reconstruction of the conference, an English version of the minutes was used, which is kept in section II of the Military Archive in Belgrade: VA, S-8, f III, 14. The Yugoslav version in the Serbian language is published in the collection of documents “Balkanski pakt 1953/1954,” Document no. 35, pp. 354–493, Belgrade, 2005, and this document contains excerpts from the talks on certain technical questions that happened immediately after the conference. As for the US version of the minutes of the conference, the files have been withdrawn because they contain security-classified information: NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Miscellaneous Lot Files, Lot File No. 59 D 383 (Box 5 of 5), Box 39, Miscellaneous Office Files Relating to Yugoslav Affairs 1948–1956, Yugo Military Discussions-Tripartite, Washington, August 1953, Folder 1 of 2 (Rpt), as well as Folder 2 of 2 (Minutes). See more in I. Laković, pp. 101–147. 93.  General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer (1899–1988) was one of the youngest generals who during World War II held positions in the strategic-planning circles of the American army. He participated in planning invasions in North Africa and Sicily and



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 261

negotiated with the Italian representatives on surrender and capitulation in 1943 and in the same mission two years later during the capitulation of the German forces. Upon the termination of the operations, he performed administrative duties, and in 1950, as a fifty-year-old man, he finished parachute training and became commander of the 111th Airborne Division. In November 1951, he took command of the 7th Infantry Division, and with it he went to Korea. In March 1955, he was appointed as commander of the 8th Army, as well as all American forces on the Far East. In July 1957, he became Chief of Army Staff, and in July 1960 chairman of the Joint General Staff. He became commander of the American forces in Europe in 1962 and the next year, Supreme commander of NATO forces. He retired in 1969. www.en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Lyman_Lemnitzer, September 2005.  94.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, p. 1.  95.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, ap. A, p. 1.   96.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, ap. B, pp. 1–5.   97.  Ibid., pp. 8–10.   98.  Ibid., pp. 10–12.   99.  Ibid., pp. 12–13. 100.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, ap. B, pp. 14–15. 101.  Ibid., pp. 16–17. 102.  Ibid., p. 18. 103. Ibid. 104.  Ibid., pp. 18–20. 105.  Ibid., p. 20. 106.  Ibid., pp. 20–22. 107.  Ibid., pp. 23–25. 108.  Ibid., p. 25. 109.  Ibid., pp. 25–26. 110.  Ibid., pp. 26–27. 111.  Ibid., p. 28. 112.  Ibid., pp. 30–34. 113.  Ibid., pp. 35–36. 114.  Ibid., pp. 36–37. 115.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, ap. C, pp. 1–3. 116.  Ibid., pp. 3–4. 117.  Ibid., pp. 4–5. 118.  Ibid., pp. 5–7. 119.  Ibid., pp. 8–10. 120.  Ibid., pp. 10–11. 121.  Ibid., pp. 12–17. 122.  Ibid., pp. 17–19. 123.  Ibid., pp. 20–25. 124.  Ibid., pp. 26–27. 125.  Ibid., pp. 29–32. 126.  Ibid., pp. 32–33. 127.  Ibid., pp. 34–35.

262

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

128.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, ap. D, pp. 1–3. 129.  Ibid., pp. 3–5. 130.  Ibid., pp. 6–7. 131.  Ibid., pp. 6–8. 132.  Ibid., pp. 8–10. 133.  Ibid., pp. 11–13. 134.  Ibid., pp. 13–14. 135.  Ibid., p. 15. 136.  Ibid., pp. 17–19. 137.  Ibid., p. 20. 138.  Ibid., pp. 20–23. 139.  Ibid., pp. 23–26. 140.  Ibid., pp. 26–27. 141.  Ibid., p. 27. 142.  Ibid., pp. 28–29. 143.  Ibid., p. 29. 144.  Ibid., pp. 29–30. 145.  Ibid., pp. 30–31. 146.  I. Laković, pp. 128–129. 147.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, ap. E, p. 1. 148.  Although Dasović did not mentioned it, it should be said that Soviet military equipment in the arsenal of the YPA completely represented material used in the last war; therefore its operational resources were at the end at the same level as they were with the German and Italian weapons. 149.  Ibid., pp. 2–3. 150.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, ap. E, pp. 4–8. 151.  Ibid., pp. 8–9. 152.  Dasović illustrated this with data that if the capacities of the division of an old type would be marked by an index 100, in relation to it, the new division regarding its firepower had index 141, communication 110, engineering 330, and transportation 446. These figures clearly illustrated the difference in the overall combat readiness of new and old Yugoslav formations. Ibid., p. 9. 153.  Ibid., pp. 10–11. 154.  The rest of the list consisted of 492 howitzers of 155 mm, 324 guns of 155 mm, 221 anti-tank guns of 57 mm, 598 anti-aircraft guns of 90 mm, 532 scout cars M3A1, 22,856 trucks of 2 tons (t), 4,277 trucks of 750 kg, 1,355 tractors M-5, 459 bulldozers, 8,958 trailers M-28 of 1.5t, 8,517 jeeps, 634 trucks—fuel tanks of 2.5t, 169 trucks—water tanks of 2.5t, 4,355 radio devices AN/GRC-9, 3,079 radio devices AN/GRC-3, 3,046 radio devices AN/VRC-9, 3,814 radio devices AN/PRC-9, 7,118 radio devices AN/PRC-10, etc. Ibid., p. 11; total requests in the list submitted after the conference. VA, II section, 2951, 14, ap. H, pp. 1–6. 155.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, ap. E, p.12. 156.  Ibid., pp. 14–15. 157.  Ibid., pp. 16–17. 158.  Ibid., pp. 17–18.



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 263

159.  Bubanj also mentioned that satellite countries, according to information available to Yugoslavia, already had around 400 MIG-15 jet fighters, while for the number of JAK-23 he did not have information; ibid., p. 22. 160.  Ibid., pp. 18–19. 161.  Ibid., pp. 18–21. 162.  Ibid., p. 21. 163.  Bubanj also expressed the request for shipment of 4,280 different motor vehicles, around 700 radio sets, and equipment for 4 air-engineering battalions and 6 companies; ibid., p. 21. 164.  Ibid., pp. 22–28. 165.  Ibid., pp. 29–32. 166.  I. Laković, p. 135. 167.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, ap. E., pp. 33–35. 168.  Ibid., pp. 35–36. 169.  Ibid., p. 37. 170.  Ibid., pp. 36–38. 171.  Ibid., pp. 38–39. 172.  Ibid., pp. 39–40. 173.  Ibid., pp. 40–41. 174.  Ibid., p. 42. 175.  Ibid., p. 43. 176.  Ibid., pp. 43–44. 177.  I. Laković, pp. 138–139. 178.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, ap. E, p. 45. 179.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, ap. F, pp. 1–2. 180.  Ibid., pp. 2–4. 181.  Ibid., pp. 4–5. 182.  Ibid., pp. 6–7. 183.  Ibid., pp. 7–8. 184.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 27, pp. 1–15. 185.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 27, p. 10. 186.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, ap. G, pp. 1–7. 187.  VA, II section, S-8, f III, 14, ap. H, pp. 1–6. 188.  Project 913 contained aircraft, motors, and meteorological equipment; Project 932, radio, radar, and telephone and telegraphic equipment, as well as different spare parts; 933, motor vehicles for transport and pull and sighting devices; 934, air and AA armaments; 935, aviation equipment and photo and engineering equipment; 936, munitions, rockets, bombs, and licenses for production of rockets HVAR and MIGHTY MOUSE, as well as napalm bombs of 110 kg; 951, oils and lubricants; and 974, training and field equipment, as well as equipment for airborne units. VA, II section, S-8, f III, 2951, 14, ap. I, pp. 1–12. 189.  VA, II section, 2591, f III, 14, ap. J, p. 1. 190.  VA, II section, 2591, f III, 14, ap. K, pp. 1–3. 191.  Balkan pact 1953/1954, Collection of documents, Belgrade 2005, pp. 453– 467 (hereinafter: Balkanski pakt 2005).

264

Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

192.  D. Bekić, p. 497. 193.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 11, p. 255. 194.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 15, p. 259. Detailed report of the talks of Greek, Turkish, and Yugoslav military delegations, Ankara, February 17–20, 1953. 195.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 15, p. 259. 196.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 12, p. 256. Memorandum of the talks of military delegations of Turkey, Greece, and Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia in Ankara, February 17–20, 1953. 197.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 29, p. 325. Minutes of the tripartite military talks of Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece in Athens, June 3–12, 1953. 198.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 51 199.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 52. 200.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 29, p. 325. 201.  D. Bekić, p. 509. 202.  D. Bekić, p. 510. 203.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 36, p. 494. Letter of the Chief of the General Staff of National Defense of Greece General Kitrilakis to the Chief of the Yugoslav People’s Army General Staff General Dapčević and to the Chief of the Turkish Army General Staff General Yamut, containing the Draft of the Tripartite Emergency Operation Plan—Code GYT, September 11, 1953. 204.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 37, p. 522. 205.  VA, GŠ-2, k. 15, f. 2, reg. br. 1. 206.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 64. 207.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 64. 208.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 40, p. 525. Tripartite defense plan with enclosures from the talks of military representatives held in Belgrade, November 10–20, 1953. 209.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 65. 210.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 72. 211.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 57, p. 578. Memorandum and documents of the talks of military representatives in Ankara, March 24–April 1, 1954. 212.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 73. 213.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document nos. 77, 78, 102, 105, 104, 107. 214.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 94, p. 709. Minutes of the talks of military experts, Bled, August 7–8, 1954. 215.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 110, p. 747. Yugoslav documents from Bled conference (the meeting of military delegations) and material for the Conference of the Chiefs of General Staffs, September 1954. 216.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 112, p. 768. Report of the Chief of the Yugoslav People’s Army General Staff on proceedings of the First Conference of the Chiefs of General Staffs of the Tripartite Alliance, October 11, 1954. (This report is the only testimony on the conference and its results since the minutes of the conference have not been preserved.) 217.  D. Bogetić, pp. 153–154.



Annex: Conferences of Military Experts 265

218.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 115, p. 777. Minutes, memorandum, and documents of tripartite military talks of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY), Turkey, and Greece in Athens, November 4–12, 1954. 219.  Balkanski pakt 2005, p. 110.

220.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 125, p. 820. Memorandum of the tripartite military talks of FPRY, Turkey, and Greece in Belgrade, April 5–14, 1955. 221.  VA GŠ-2, k-17, F-1, 2/1. 222.  Balkanski pakt 2005, Document no. 88, p. 682. Plan of coordination of operations of the First Greek and third Yugoslav Armies in the joint GreekYugoslav tactical zone, July–August, 1954. 223.  VA, GŠ-2, k. 18, f. 1. reg. br. 1/1, Minutes of the Third Conference of the commanding officers of First Greek and Third Yugoslav armies, Skopje, May 8–17, 1955. 224.  VA, GŠ-2, k-18, F-3. 225.  Razvoj OS SFRJ, KoV JNA, 1; Beograd, 1988, 70.

Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES Archival Sources Serbia Vojni Arhiv, Belgrade [Military archive, Belgrade]

Arhiv JNA [Archive of the Yugoslav People’s Army] Fond GŠ—1 (Kabinet Načelnika Generalštaba JNA: 1945–1961, međunarodna vojna saradnja). [General Staff—1 (Office of the YPA Chief of Staff, 1945–1961, international military cooperation)] Fond GŠ—2 (Оperativna uprava Generalštaba JNA: ratni planovi). [General Staff—2 (Operations, war plans)] Fond GŠ—10 (Druga uprava Generalštaba JNA: 1945–1961, izvještaji vojnih izaslanika iz Moskve, Londona, Pariza i Vašingtona) [General Staff—10 (Intelligence, reports of the military attachés from Moscow, London, Paris, and Washington)]

 iplomatski Arhiv Ministarstva Spoljnih Poslova Republike Srbije, D Belgrade [Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade]

Fond Politička arhiva (1945–1961. godinа): SSSR, SAD, Velika Britanija, Francuska, Italija, Grčka, Turska. [Political archive 1945–1961: USSR, USA, UK, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey] Fond Politička arhiva—strogo povjerljivo (1945–1961. godinа): SSSR, SAD, Velika Britanija, Francuska, Italija, Grčka, Turska [Political archive—classified (1945– 1961): USSR, USA, UK, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey]

267

268

Bibliography

Arhiv Jugoslavije, Belgrade [Archive of Yugoslavia, Belgrade]

Fond 9 (Мinistarstvo spoljne trgovine FNRJ: 1945–1953, sjednice, radna tijela, međunarodni odnosi) [Collection 9 (Ministry of foreign trade of Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia, 1945–1953, sessions, working bodies, international relations)] Fond 15 (Prezidijum Narodne Skupštine FNRJ: 1945–1956) [Collection 15 (Presidency of the Federal parliament 1945–1956)] Fond 50 (Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ: 1946–1953, sjednice i odluke) [Collection 50 (Presidency of Federal government 1946–1953, sessions and decisions)] Fond 112 (ТАNJUG), 1945–1961 (dnevni bilteni, vijesti stranih agencija) [Collection 112 TANJUG (Telegraph agency of new Yugoslavia, 1945–1961, daily bulletins, foreign agencies news)] Fond 130 (Savezno Izvršno Vijeće, 1953–1961, sjednice, radna tijela, međunarodni odnosi) [Collection 130 (Federal Executive Board, 1953–1961, sessions, working bodies, international relations)] Fond 160 (Savezna Narodna Skupština, 1945–1961, sjednice, оdluke, međunarodni odnosi, аnketni odbori i komisije, radna tijela) [Collection 160 (Federal parliament, 1945–1961, sessions, decisions, international relations, commisions, working bodies)] Fond 507/II (Depeše Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Jugoslavije) [Collection 507/II (Dispatches of the Central committee of the Communist party of Yugoslavia)] Fond 507/III (Polibiro Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Jugoslavije) [Collection 507/III (Politburo of the Central committee of the Communist party of Yugoslavia)] Fond 512 (Lični fond Moše Pijade, 1945–1956) [Collection 512 (Personal collection of Moša Pijade, 1945–1956)] Fond 513 (Lični fond Veljka Vlahovića, 1945–1961) [Collection 513 (Personal collection of Veljko Vlahović, 1945–1961)] Fond 703 (Kabinet Potpredsjednika Republike, 1945–1961 (posjete, prijemi, informacije) [Collection 703 (Office of the vice president, 1945–1961, visits, receptions, information)] Fond 836 (Kabinet Maršala Jugoslavije—KMJ (1945–1953): SSSR, SAD, Velika Britanija, Francuska, Grčka, Turska (posjete, prijemi, lične poruke, bilateralni odnosi) [Collection of the Office of Marshal of Yugoslavia (1945–1953): USSR, USA, UK, France, Greece, Turkey (visits, receptions, personal messages, bilateral relations)] Fond 837 (Fond Kabineta Predsjednika Republike—KPR (1953–1961): SSSR, SAD, Velika Britanija, Francuska, Grčka, Turska (posjete, prijemi, lične poruke, bilateralni odnosi) [Collection of the Office of the President of the republic (1953–1961): USSR, USA, UK, France, Greece, Turkey (visits, receptions, personal messages, bilateral relations)]

Arhiv Srbije, Belgrade [Archive of Serbia]

Lični fond Veljka Mićunovića [Personal collection of Veljko Mićunović]

Bibliography 269



United States National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

Record Group 59, State Department records Record Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, 1788–1964 Record Group 218, Joint Chiefs of Staff records Record Group 273, Records of National Security Council Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff, 1903–2006 Record Group 330, Secretary of Defense records Record Group 334, Army records Record Group 338, Records of US Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations (World War II and thereafter), 1917–1993

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Papers of Clare Booth Luce Papers of Averell Harriman Papers of Paul H. Nitze

National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.

CIA estimate publication NSA documents on Yugoslavia

PUBLISHED ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS Bela knjiga o agresivnim postupcima vlada SSSR, Poljske, Čehoslovačke, Mađarske, Rumunije, Bugarske i Albanije prema Jugoslaviji. Belgrade: MIP FNRJ, 1951. Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici SFRJ—1950. Edited by D. Bogetić and Đ. Tripković. Belgrade, 1993. Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije 1941– 1950. Belgrade: Jugoslovenski pregled, 1988–1993. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, vol. VI, 1947 vol. IV, 1948 vol. IV, 1949 vol. V, 1950 vol. IV, 1951 vol. IV, 1952–1954 vol. VIII, Washington, D.C., 1988. Londonski razgovori Tito-Churchill, 1 6–21. III 1953. Edited by Đ. Borozan, Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis, 1–2, Belgrade, 2001: 183–204. Balkanski ugovorni odnosi. Dvostrani i višestrani međunarodni ugovori i drugi diplomatski akti o državnoj granici, političkoj i vojnoj saradnji, verskim i etničkim manjinama, III tom (1946–1996), Belgrade, 1999. Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Zbornik dokumenata, Vojnoistorijski institut. Edited by Milan Terzić. Belgrade, 2005. Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 1945–1956. Belgrade: MSP Republika Srbije i MIP Ruske federacije, 2010. Odnosi Jugoslavije i Rusije (SSSR), Dokumenti i materijali. Belgrade: Savezno Ministarstvo za insostrane poslove, 1996.

Bibliography

270

Sovetskii faktor v vostochnoi Evrope 1944–1953. Vol. 1, 1944–1948. Moscow: Rosspen, 1999. Tito, J. B., Govori i članci. Volumes V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI (1956–1957). Zagreb, 1959. Vostochna Evropa v dokumentah rossiiskih arhivov (1944–1949), Vol. II (1949– 1953). Moscow and Novosibirsk, 1997, 1998. Yugoslavia: From National Communism to National Collapse. US Intelligence Community Estimative Products on Yugoslavia, 1948–1990. Edited by C. Thomas Finger. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2006. Yugoslavia: Political Diaries 1918–1965, vol. IV. Edited by Robert L. Jarman, Slough, UK: Archive Editions, 1997. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. A Documentary Survey. Edited by Stephen Clissold. Oxford, 1975. Zapisnici sa sednica Politbiroa Centralnog komiteta KPJ (11. jun 1945–7. jul 1948). Belgrade, 1995.

PUBLISHED COLLECTIONS OF PAPERS Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Zbornik radova. Belgrade: Institut za strategijska istraživanja, 2008. Balkan posle Drugog svetskog rata. Belgrade, 1995. Jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob 1948. Belgrade, 1998. Velike sile i male države u Hladnom ratu, 1945–1955. Belgrade, 2003. Jugoslavija v Hladni vojni, Institut za novejšo zgodovino. Ljubljana, 2004. Jugoslavija 1918–1998. Belgrade, 1999. Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1950–1961. Belgrade: INIS, 2008. Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2010.

NEWSPAPERS Politika (Belgrade): 1945–1953. Borba (Belgrade): 1945–1953.

SECONDARY LITERATURE Books Аникеев, А. С. Как Тито от Сталина ушел: Югославия, СССР и США и началъны период холодной войны (1945–1957). Москва, 2002. Anikeev, A. S. and Iu. S. Novopashin. Kak Tito ot Stalina ushel: Iugoslaviia, SSSR i SSHA v nachal’nyi period «Kholodnoi voiny» (1945–1957). Moscow: In-t slavianovedeniia RAN, 2002.



Bibliography 271

Baev, Iordan. Voennopoliticheskite konflikti sled Vtorata svetovna voina i Bulgariia. Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1995. Bekić, Darko. Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu. Odnosi sa velikim silama, 1949–1955, Zagreb: Globus, 1988. Bjelajac, Mile. Jugoslovensko iskustvo sa multietničkom armijom, 1918–1991. Belgrade: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju, 1999. Bogetić Dragan. Koreni jugoslovenskog opredeljenja za nesvrstanost. Belgrade, 1990. ———. Jugoslavija i Zapad, 1952–1955. Jugoslovensko približavanje NATO—u. Belgrade: Službeni list, 2000. ———. Nova strategija spoljne politike Jugoslavije, 1956–1961. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006. Borhi, Laszlo. Hungary in the Cold War 1945–1956. Between the United States and the Soviet Union. Budapest and New York: Central European University, 2004. Borozan, Djordje. Velika Albanija: Poreklo, ideje, praksa. Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1995. Clogg, Richard. History of Modern Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Crampton, Richard J. The Balkans since the Second World War. Harlow: Longman, 2002. Dedijer, Vladimir. The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948–1953. New York: Viking Press, 1971. Dedijer, Vladimir. Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita. Belgrade, 1977. Dimitrijević, Bojan. Jugoslavija i NATO (1951–1957). Belgrade: NIC Vojska, 2003. ———. Jugoslovenska armija 1945–1954: Nova ideologija, vojnik i oružje. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006. ———. Jugoslovensko ratno vazduhoplovstvo 1942–1992. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006. ———. Od Staljina do Atlantskog pakta: Armija u spoljnoj politici Titove Jugoslavije 1945–1958. Belgrade: Službeni list SCG, 2005. Edemskii, A. B. Ot konflikta k normalizatsii: Sovetsko-iugoslavskie otnosheniia v 1953–1956. Moscow: Nauka, 2002. Frankel, Jоseph. British Foreign Policy, 1945–1973. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Gavranov, Velibor and Momir Stojković. Međunarodni odnosi i spoljna politika Jugoslavija. Belgrade: Savremena administracija, 1972. Gromyko, A. A. and B. N. Ponomarev. History of Soviet Foreign Policy. Moscow: Progress, 1969–1973. Громыко, А. А., Пономарев, Б. Н, История внешней политики СССР, I–II, Москва 1986. Jovanović, Jadranka. Jugoslavija u Organizaciji ujedinjenih nacija (1945–1953). Belgrade, Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1985.

272

Bibliography

———. Jugoslavija i Savet bezbednosti ujedinjenih nacija, 1945–1985. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1990. Kalinova, Evgeniia and Iskra Baeva. Sledvoennoto desetiletie na bŭlgarskata vŭnsna politika. Sofia: Izd-vo Polis, 2003. Kennan, George F., Realities of American Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954. Laković, Ivan. Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951–1958. Podgorica: Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 2006. Lees, Lorraine M. Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War. College Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Luburić, Radojica. Pomirenje Jugoslavije i SSSR 1953–1955: Tematska zbirka dokumenata. Podgorica: Istorijski institut, 1999. Marković, Predrag. Beograd izmedju Istoka i Zapada, 1948–1965. Belgrade: Sluzbeni list SRJ, 1996. Мates, Leo. Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije. Belgrade: Nolit, 1976. May, Alex. Britain and Europe since 1945. New York and London: Longman, 1999. Mitrokhin Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin. The Mitrokhin Archive, II: The KGB and the World. London and New York: Allen Lane, 2005. Opremanje naoružanjem. In edition: Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, vol. 17. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1989. Petković, Ranko. Balkan: Ni “bure baruta” ni “zona mira.” Zagreb: Globus, 1978. ———. Nesvrstana Jugoslavija i savremeni svet: Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1945– 1985. Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1985. ———. Subjektivna istorija jugoslovenske diplomatije, 1943–1991. Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1995. Petranović, Branko. Balkanska federacija 1943–1948. Belgrade: Zasion, 1991. Petranović, Branko and Vinka Dragović. Istorija Jugoslavije, Vol. 3. Belgrade: Nolit, 1988. Petranović, Branko. Istoriografske kontroverze. Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1998. Petranović, Branko and Ivan Lakić. Jugoslavija na razmeđu (1945–1950). Podgorica: Crnogorska akademija nauka i umjenosti, 1998. Petranović, Branko and Momčilo Zečević. Agonija dve Jugoslavije. Belgrade: Zasion, 1991. Primakov, E. M. Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki. Vol. 5: 1945–1965. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2003. Rabel, Roberto G. Between East and West: Trieste, the United States and the Cold War 1941–1954. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988. Radonjić, Radovan. Sukob KPJ sa Kominformom i društveni razvoj Jugoslavije 1948–1950. Zagreb: Narodno sveučiliste grada Zagreba, 1975. Stamatović, Aleksandar. Vojna privreda druge Jugoslavije. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 2001. Stavrianos, Leften Stavros. The Balkans since 1453. New York: Rinehart, 1958. Štrbac, Čedomir. Jugoslavija i odnosi među socijalističkim zemljama: Sukob KPJ i Informbiroa. Belgrade: Prosveta, 1984.



Bibliography 273

———. Svedočanstva o 1948: Fragmenti za istoriju. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 1989. Tripković, Đoko. Prilike u Jugoslaviji i Velika Britanija 1945–1948. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1990. Volokitina, T. V., G. P. Murashko, A. F. Noskova, and T. A. Pokivailova. Moskva i vostochnaia Evropa: Stanovlenie politicheskikh rezhimov sovetskogo tipa, 1949– 1943. Ocherki istorii. Moscow: Rosspen, 2002. Vučinić, Mihajlo, Ilija Nikežić, and Boško Todorović. Koncepcija doktrina i sistem opštenarodne odbrane. In series: Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ 1945–1985, vol. 1. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački centar, 1989. Zubok, Vladislav Martinovich and Konstantin Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.

Memoirs Duhaček, Anton. Ispovest obaveštajca. Uspon i pad jugoslovenske obaveštajne službe. Belgrade, 1992. Djilas, Milovan. Tito: The Story from Inside. London: Phoenix, 1981/Đilas, Milovan, Druženje sa Titom, Belgrade, 1990. Djilas, Milovan. Conversations with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962. Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich. Memoirs. New York: Doubleday, 1989 [British edition: Memories. London: Hutchinson, 1989]. Kennan, George F. Memoirs, 1925–1950. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. Kennan, George F. Memoirs, 1950–1963. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972. Milatović, Arso. Pet diplomatskih misija. Ljubljana and Zagreb: Cankarjeva zal., 1985–1986.

Articles Baev, Jordan. “Bulgaria and the Balkan Pact 1953–1954,” Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Zbornik radova, Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Belgrade 2008: 251–281. Bogetić, Dragan. “Jugoslovenska politika ekvidistance i problem dalje vojne saradnje sa Zapadom tokom 1955.” Vojnoistorijski glasnik XLVI, 2–3/1997: 11–132. Bogetić, Dragan S. “Jugoslovensko približavanje zapadu u vreme sukoba sa Kominformom.” Istorija 20. veka 16, no. 1 (1998): 61–67. Bogetić, Dragan. “Saradnja Jugoslavije sa zapadnim zemljama 1953. i 1954.” Istorija 20. veka 13, 2 (1995): 115–125. Bogetić, Dragan. “Podsticaji i ograničenja na putu normalizacije jugoslovensko— sovjetskih odnosa tokom 1956. godine,” Tokovi istorije, nos. 3–4 (2005): 160–181. Bogetić, Dragan. “Podsticajni i faktori ograničavanja na putu savezništva Jugoslavije, Grčke i Turske 1951–1954. godine.” Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Zbornik radova, Belgrade 2008: 64–83.

274

Bibliography

Bogetić, Dragan, “Vojna saradnja Jugoslavije i SAD.” Istorija 20. veka, 11, 1–2 (1993): 117–121. Bogetić, Dragan. “Ekonomska i vojna pomoć Zapada Jugoslaviji.” Jugoslovenskosovjetski sukob 1948, Zbornik radova, Belgrade, 1999: 43–47. Borozan, Đorđe. “Jugoslovensko-britanski razgovori u Beogradu 1952. i Londonu 1953. godine.” Istorija 20. veka 15, 2 (1997): 113–127. Borozan, Đorđe. “Posrednik mira između gvozdenih zavesa (Razgovori Tito-Hruščov u Moskvi 1956).” Vojnoistorijski glasnik, XLVI 1/1997: 93–114. Borozan, Đorđe. “Posrednik mira između gvozdenih zavesa (Razgovori Tito-Hruščov u Moskvi 1956.—II deo), Vojnoistorijski glasnik, XLVI 2–3/1997: 133–153. Dimitrijević, Bojan. “Jugoslovenska narodna armija u Tršćanskoj krizi 1953. godine.” Istorija 20. veka 16, 1 (1998): 69–82. Dimitrijević, Bojan, “Jugoslovensko ratno vazduhoplovstvo 1945–1951.” Let, časopis za istoriju vazduhoplovstva, Muzej jugoslovenskog vazduhoplovstva, 1/1998: 194–220. Dimitrijević, Bojan. “Jugoslovensko-sovjetski vojni odnosi, 1945–1948.” Istorija 20. Veka 15, 1 (1997): 87–96. Dimitrijević, Bojan. “Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji, 1951–1958.” Istorija 20. Veka 14, 1 (1996): 101–112. Dimitrijević, Bojan. “Jedinice jugoslovenske vojske na Kosovu i Metohiji, 1945– 1999.” Istorija 20. veka 25, 2 (2007): 101–118. Gavrilov, A. V. “The Balkans in the Context of the Soviet-Yugoslav Relation in the late 1940s–early 1950s.” Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Zbornik radova, Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Belgrade 2008: 219–225. Gibianskii, Leonid. “Sovjetsko-jugoslovenski sukob 1948: Istoriografske verzije i novi arhivski izvori.” Jugoslavija v Hladni vojni, Institut za novejšo zgodovino, Ljubljana 2004: 27–47. Guštin, Damjan and Vladimir Prebilič. The Intervention That Never Happened: Yugoslavia Under the Threat of Soviet Intervention 1948–1953, Exiting War. Post Conflict Military Operations, 6th International Conference Military History Working Group, Bratislava—Chateau de Vincennes 2007: 290–305. Hrabak, Bogumil. “Medjunardni položaj Albanije, 1945–1947, i Jugoslavija.” Istraživanja 13, 1999: 249–312. Kiraly, Bela. “The Aborted Soviet Military Plans against Tito’s Yugoslavia.” In Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in Historic Perspective, New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982: 273–288. Laković, Ivan. “Operativna problematika rada na zapadnoj vojnoj pomoći 1951– 1958.” Istorijski zapisi, 1–4/2005: 109–142. Laković, Ivan. “Vojna pomoć SAD Jugoslaviji u naoružanju artiljerijskih i oklopno– mehanizovanih jedinica 1951–1958.” Vojnoistorijski glasnik LVI, 1–2/2005: 98–116. Mastny, Vojtech. “NATO in Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949–1956.” Cold War International History Project Bulletin—Working Papers 35. Washington, D.C., 2002.



Bibliography 275

Pelikan, Jan. “Jugoslavija i Sovjetski savez polovinom 1954. godine. Od normalizacije diplomatskih odnosa do političke saradnje.” Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis 30, 2/1997: 133–156. Ristović, Milan. “‘Mali rat’ na jugoslovensko-grčkoj granici (1945–1950).” Vojnoistorijski glasnik, XLIX 1–3/1999: 89–109. Ritter, Laszlo. “War on Tito’s Yugoslavia? The Hungarian Army in Early Cold War Soviet Strategies.” Balkanski pakt 1953/54, Zbornik radova, Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Belgrade, 2008: 251–281. Tasić, Dmitar. “Preoboroževanje enot zagrebško-ljubljanske armadne oblasti s tehniko iz programa zahodne vojaške pomoči v pedesetih letih 20. stoletja (“Rearmament of the Zagreb-Ljubljana Army Authority with Technical Assets from Western Military Assistance Programme in the 1950s”). Vojaška zgodovina, 1(14), letnik 9/2008, Ljubljana 2008: 59–77. Tasić, Dmitar. “Slovenija v obrambenih načrtih Zahoda, Jugoslavije in Balkanskega pakta.” Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino, XLVII, 2/2007: 97–110. Tasić, Dmitar. “Otkrivanje Afrike, jugoslovensko-etiopski odnosi i počeci jugoslovenske afričke politike 1954–1955.” Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1950–1961, INIS, Belgrade, 2008: 513–525. Tripković, Đoko. “Normalizacija jugoslovensko-sovjetskih diplomatskih odnosa 1953. godine.” Istorija 20. veka 12, 1 (1994): 111–122. Tripković, Đoko. “Uspon i pad jugoslovensko-sovjetskih odnosa 1956. godine.” Istorija 20. veka 16, 2 (1998): 129–141. Tripković, Đoko. “Vruće leto 1949. godine.” Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis 47, 1–2 (2000): 189–207. Tripković, Đoko. “XX kongres Komunističke partije Sovjetskog Saveza i jugoslovensko/sovjetski odnosi.” Arhiv, 2 (2001): 200–214.

Index

Acheson, Dean 4–5, 11, 119 Adapazari 243 Adenauer, Konrad 80, 105 Adriatic Sea 26, 187, 190–3, 200, 203, 208, 212, 219, 224–6, 237 Aegean Sea 191, 203, 213, 217, 233, 254 Africa 68, 179, 254, 260 Akçakoca, Mithat 63, 231 Akšamlija, Adem 231 Albania 26, 53–4, 60–1, 64–6, 90, 118, 182, 186, 190. 192, 201, 208, 213, 229, 231–3, 235, 241, 250, 254 Allen, George 4–5, 8, 21, 27, 34–5, 41, 43 Alsop, Joseph 6 Alsop, Stewart 6 AMAS. See American Military Assistance Staff American Joint Chiefs of Staff 5 American Military Assistance Staff (AMAS) 123–134, 146–8, 150, 152, 174, 176, 213 Amindeon 225 Ankara 56, 60, 62, 64–5, 69–78, 80–4, 86–8, 92, 101–2, 107, 179, 231, 235, 238, 246, 252 Ankara Treaty 70–2, 74, 77–8, 80–3, 102, 231, 235, 238

Aranđelovac 216 Ardahan 53, 74 Asia 179 Athens 42, 46, 59–61, 63–4, 66, 68–70, 72–6, 82–3, 85–7, 90, 92, 108, 231, 235, 237–9, 249–52 Attlee, Clement 9 Austria 37, 40, 42, 119, 185–187, 190, 192, 195–7, 199–200, 202–203, 205, 212–4, 216–7, 228, 241, 244 Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos 109 Axel, Aga 72–3, 78 Baja 115, 117 Bakar 191, 225 Balkan Alliance. See Balkan Pact Balkan Entente. See Balkan Pact Balkan Pact 46, 48, 53, 59, 62, 66–9, 71–2, 73, 75–6, 78–80, 81–92, 101–5, 107–9, 121–2, 150, 178–80, 239, 246, 249–51 Balodimos, Andreas 64–5 Banja Luka 114, 216 Bar 193 Baranja 203 Barjaktarević, Branislav 253 Baudete, Philippe 5 Bayar, Celal 55, 61, 70, 81, 90, 108–9 Bebler, Aleš 74 277

278

Index

Bekić, Darko 4–7, 11, 14, 39, 42, 64, 110, 136–7, 178, 187 Belasica 242, 256 Belgrade 4–8, 22–3, 27–9, 34, 38–40, 43, 46, 48, 58, 60, 62–4, 67, 69, 72, 77–8, 83, 88, 90–1, 102–4, 107, 113, 119, 122, 145, 148–9, 151, 154, 159–60, 179, 181, 186, 193, 195, 199, 203, 205 Belogradchik 117 Berovo 242 Besna Kobila 242 Biggart, Homer 57 Bihać 226 Bird, G. R. G. 181, 194 Birgi, Nuri 70, 81, 89 Bisenić, Dragan 6, 22 Bitolj 216–7, 225 Black Sea 53, 190, 232, 235, 254 Black, Eugene 5 Bled 21–2, 34, 54, 71, 87, 89–90, 92, 102, 179, 249–250 Bollen, Charles 6 Bolu 243 Bonn 71, 105 Bor 137, 242 Bosanski Novi 216 Bosnia and Herzegovina 115, 203 Bosnić, Bude 181 Bosporus. See Straits Božović, Božo 239 Bradley, Omar 8, 11 Brenner 205, 215 Brioni Isles 67, 69, 90, 145, 158 Brosio, Manlio 78 Brovet, Stane 198 Brown, US brigadier general 181, 188–9, 193, 196–7, 205, 214 Brusa 243 Bubanj, Zdenko 139, 198, 202, 206–7, 209, 221–3, 226–7 Bucharest 71 Budapest 182, 200 Bulganin, Nicolay 120

Bulgaria 23, 53–4, 56, 62, 64, 90, 92, 106, 117–9, 182, 186–7, 190–1, 200–2, 229, 231–5, 238, 240–1, 244, 257 Burma 101, 179 Čačak 224–5 Calbon, general 46 Çanakkale 243 Carević, Miloš 109 Carevo selo 242 Carney, Robert B. 37, 42, 58, 60–1, 72, 238 Casey, UK Commodore 198 Castiglione, Italian general 57, 60 Çatalca 241, 243 Caucasus 231–2, 234, 241, 244 Cavour, Sadi 104 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 4, 6, 22, 23, 113, 115, 119, 121 Černi, Josip 181, 191–2 Chiang Kai-shek 121 Churchill, Winston 72, 250 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency Clay, Lucius D. 37 CMEA see East European Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Cold War 14, 29–30, 40, 150, 178 Collins, Joseph Lawton 10–11, 22, 25–28 Cominform 2, 71, 79, 90, 117–8, 155, 178–9, 231, 233 Cominform Resolution 2, 71, 113, 122, 188 Communist Party of Yugoslavia 6, 15 Cooper, admiral 46 Corfu 108 Corlu 243 Coşkun, Salih 89, 239 Coulet, François 149 Crete 232 Crimea 241, 244 Croatia 115 Cyprus 56, 58, 80, 83, 90, 103–6, 108–9



Index 279

Czechoslovakia 71, 180, 231, 244 Czepel 182 Danube 114, 203, 213, 215–6 Dapčević, Peko 22, 27, 63–4, 181–5, 188–9, 191–2, 194, 196–7, 251 Dardanelles. See Straits Dasović, Martin 198, 219–20 Davis, Ernest 55 Davis, William V. 46 De Gasperi, Alcide 57, 61–2, 65–6, 68–9,76 Dedijer, Vladimir 9 Demir kapi 241 Đilas, Milovan 9, 79, 159 Dimitrijević, Bojan 132 Dimitrovgrad 116 Dinaric Alps 69 Dobbiaco 205 Dodecanese Islands 53 Dojran 242 Dovas, Constantinos 87, 89, 231, 233 Drama 242 Drava 216 Dravograd 216 Drina 203 Dubrovnik 191, 224 Đukanović, Drago 181, 193 Dulles, John Foster 45, 68–9, 73, 77, 85, 106–7, 146, 158 Dupnica 116 Durres 237 Džami Tepe 242 East European Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 120 ECSC. See European Coal and Steel Community EDC. See European Defense Community Eddleman, Clyde D. 11, 22, 34, 39, 43, 46–8, 198, 205, 208–11, 213–14, 217–18, 220, 223–4, 226–8 Eden, Anthony 60, 66, 71

Eisenhower, Dwight D. 11–4, 22, 37, 56–7, 85, 158 Ely, P. 46, 198 Ethiopia 88–9, 218 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 87 European Defense Community (EDC) 44, 81–3, 84, 90, 101 Fechteler, William Morrow 227 Flamur 242 France 4–5, 13, 35, 39, 40, 60–1, 67, 70–1, 79–80, 103, 135–6, 152, 172, 181, 198, 212, 239, 250 Genoa 195, 210, 224, 226 Gevgelija 225 Gianitsa 243 Gibraltar 36 Gida 243 Giffin, Sidney F. 181 Ginekokastron 242 Good, Roscoe F. 181 Gorniya Dzhumaya 117 Gošnjak, Ivan 6, Great Britain. See United Kingdom Greece 23, 25, 27, 40, 44, 53–77, 79–80, 82–5, 87–92, 103–10, 117, 121, 179, 182, 186–7, 189, 190–1, 198, 200, 202–5, 210–1, 216–7, 225, 228, 231–4, 237–9, 245, 253–4, 257 Gruenther, Alfred 105, 228 Guzina, Vojin 6 Hamović, Rade 79 Handy, Thomas Troy 37–45, 48, 181–182, 184–185, 187, 189, 192–3, 195–7, 199, 201, 226 Hariman, Averell 6, 10, 21 Harmony, John W. 28, 67, 125–6, 128, 134, 146, 198, 222–3 Heins, Peter Conover 126, 134, 146, 175 Hendek 243

280

Index

Hungary 115–9, 180, 182, 186–7, 190, 192, 199, 200–3, 213, 218, 229, 231, 241, 244 Huntington, Ellery C. 6–7, 14 Ibar 216 Ilter, Sefik 252–3 India 101, 109, 179 Iran 21, 115, 232 Iraq 232 Iskilipligil, Canip 231 Istanbul 55, 105, 243 Istibanja 242 Italy 13, 25–8, 34, 40–1, 53, 57, 60–2, 65–9, 73, 76–7, 81–2, 84–5, 87–91, 101, 104, 107–8, 172, 179, 184, 190, 195, 198–99, 203, 205, 211–4, 218, 228, 236, 251, 254 Izmit 243 Jakšić, Pavle 60 Joint Chiefs of Staff 5, 8, 37, 102, 107 Jovanović, Radoš 58, 61, 68, 70, 74, 91 Joyce, Robert 6, 19 Julian Alps 69, 214 Kačanik 225 Kalabaka-Murgani 243 Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis 62, 68–70, 73, 91, 102, 106, 235 Kapetanides, Spyros 59, 67, 82, 90 Kaposvar 117 Karamanlis, Constantine 108–9 Karaula 256 Kardelj, Edvard 6, 15, 21, 41, 105–6, 188 Kardeljevo 191, 193, 226 Karlovac 151, 216 Kars 53, 74 Kartel 243 Katerini 243 Kavala 242 Köprülü, Fuat 55–7, 59–60, 62, 65, 67–70, 81, 87, 102 Kherson 242

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyvitch 86, 104, 109, 122, 154, 158 Kidrič, Boris 5, 21 Kiev 241, 244 Kilibarda, Milo 14, 22 Király, Béla 115–6 Kirklareli 243 Kitrilakis, Stylianos 238, 252 Knin 226 Knjaževac 242 Kofler, Frano 198 Korea 56, 71, 116, 119, 121, 189 Korean War 4, 21, 120, 202 Kosorić, Pero 232 Kosovska Mitrovica 224, 226, 242 Kovin 114 Kožani 225, 243 Kratovo 242 Kriva Palanka 242 Krusa 242 Kufstein 215 Kula 117 Kumanovo 258 Kurtbek, Seyfi 231, 235 Kutz, E. 22–3 Kyustendil 117, 199, 204 Lamia 237 Larisa 225 Lees, Lorraine 4, 6–7, 11, 22, 28 Lekić, Danilo 46, 198, 211, 213–4, 218, 220, 223 Lemnitzer, Lyman 198–9, 201–5, 211–2 Lend and Lease Agreement 113 Leskovac 242 Lileburgaz 243 Lindsay, Franklin 6 Lisbon 56–8 Ljubljana 23, 28, 42, 90, 114, 130, 189, 192–3, 195, 199, 203, 206, 211, 214, 216, 219, 224, 233, 254 Ljubljana Gap 13, 21, 25, 27, 33, 38, 40, 147, 179, 181, 187, 213, 220 London 11, 44, 59, 68, 71, 78, 80, 84, 137



Index

Lovett, Robert A. 8 Lucas, Scott 7 Lucioli, Mario 82 Macedonia 23, 54, 58, 80, 233–4, 242 MacGee, George Crews 56 MacLachlan, Donald 68 Maclean, Fitzroy 119 Maljen 216 Mallet, Ivo 41, 83, 88 Malta 42, 227 Manola, Srećko 22, 27, 121 Maribor 216 Marshall Plan 7, 54 Marshall, George C. 37 Mates, Leo 27, 110, 158 Matthews, Freeman H. 8 McAuliffe, Anthony 46 McCarthy, Joseph 211 MDAP see Mutual Defense Aid Program Mediterranean 45, 56, 61, 64, 68, 72, 178, 191, 195, 210, 212, 214, 227–8, 232, 234, 254 Medvednik 216 Menderes, Adnan 54, 59, 85, 101–3, Middle East 54, 56, 102, 106, 157, 236 Mljet 208 Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich 121 Montenegro 115, 186 Montgomery, Bernard 59 Montreaux 53 Morava 27, 40, 203, 195, 216 Moscow 54, 59, 69, 71, 75–6, 78, 85, 103–5, 115–6, 120 Mostar 114, 209 Mountbatten, Louis 61, 68, 227 Možirje 216 Mura 216 Murphy, Robert 126, 146, 151–152 Mutual Defense Aid Program (MDAP) 5, 7, 11, 34, 124, 127, 139, 157, 159, 174, 176, 202, 208–9, 219–20, 222–3, 227

281

Nagykanizsa 117, 216 Naples 37, 42, 58, 227 Naser, Gamal Abdel 179 Nash, Frank 34, 39, 43 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Negotin 242 Nehru, Jawaharlal 104, 180 Netherlands 79 Nevrokop 239 Niš 186, 193, 199, 203–4, 233, 242, 257 NKVD. See People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 2, 5, 7, 12, 23, 28–9, 34–49, 56–63, 65–92, 101–3, 105–10, 115, 119, 121–4, 127, 131, 134–6, 139, 145, 148–51, 156–7, 159, 168–70, 173, 179, 181, 185, 189–99, 202, 205, 209–11, 213–4, 217, 221, 223, 227–9, 234–5, 239, 240, 249, 250–1, 253, 255 NSC. See US National Security Council O’Shaughnessy, Elim 159 Odessa 231, 241, 244 Office for Eastern Issues 6 Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 6 Ogulin 224, 226 Okan, Zakai 231 Olmstead, George 6–7, 14, 34, 39, 43 Omer 243 Oršava 117 OSS. See Office of Strategic Services Otranto 191, 226 Ovče polje 242 Ozak, Ahmet Zeki 231 Pace, Frank 36, 39, 43 Paikon 243 Palitakos, Ioannis 232 Panagiotopoulos, Constantinos 232 Pančevo 114 Papagos, Alexander 61, 66, 73–4, 76, 78–9, 83–5, 87

282

Index

Papathanasiadis, Theodosis 239, 246 Papathanassiou, Theodosis 231–3, 235 Paraćin 242 Paris 61–2, 65–6, 72, 75, 121, 148 Paris Peace Treaty 121 Partridge, F. 22, 27, 46 Paul I, King of Greece 55 Pavićević, Mišo 108 Pearson, Dixon 68 Pecotić, Bogdan 198, 207–9, 212–220, 223 Pella, Giuseppe 76–8 Pentagon 5–6, 9, 37, 124, 127 People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) 121, 184 Petrić, Jakša 68 Philon 104–5 Pijade, Moša 60 Pipiliangopoulos, Dimitrios 253 Piraeus 237 Plastiras, Nicolaos 54 Plocken 205 Plovdiv 239 Poglajen, Franc 198, 205–6, 215, 223 Poland 180, 231 Poliden 242 Polikastron 242 Politburo of the Central Committee of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia (CC LCY) 43 Pontokerassia 242 Popović, Koča 6, 9–15, 22, 26–7, 67, 69–70, 72, 74, 77, 81–2, 102–3, 105, 137, 146, 148, 158 Popović, Vladimir 6–7, 9–10, 28, 34, 57 Potsdam 53 PPS. See State Department’s Policy Planning Staff Prica, Srđa 62, 149–150 Primorac, Rudolf 114 Priština 225, 242 Pula 114, 191, 209, 225 Radford, Arthur W. 91 Radovanović, Ljubomir 56, 65, 69

Ranković, Aleksandar 6, 21 Ražanj 242 Red Army 1, 3 Reinhardt, Frederick 6 Riddleberger, James W. 91, 126, 146, 148–152, 158–9 Ridgeway, Matthew B. 37, 71 Rijeka 23, 90, 187, 191, 203, 216, 224–6 Ritter, László 116 Roberts, Frank 149 Romania 53, 115, 119, 182, 184, 186–7, 190. 200–3, 208, 229, 231–2, 241, 244 Rome 62, 65–6, 68, 76 SACEUR. See Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe Salzburg 42 Šar planina 216 Sarajevo 90, 193, 224, 226 Sarajevo 90, 193, 224, 226 Sasano 208 Sava 23, 114, 195, 199, 203, 216 Schelba, Mario 78 Schlater, David M. 227 Schlatter, David M. 58 Selassie, Haile 88 Selim, Sun 232 Serbia 115 Servia 243 SHAPE. See Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe, known as the headquarters of NATO Šibenik 191 Skopje 23, 28, 101, 186, 193, 200, 203–4, 209, 225, 233, 241–2, 256–8 Slavonia 115 Slivnica 116 Sofia 186, 199, 200, 239 Soko Banja 242 Sombor 114 Soviet satellites 10–1,22–3, 33, 38, 40, 63–5, 77, 79, 104, 113, 115, 118–23, 172, 175, 179, 181–2, 184–90,



Index

192–5, 198–202, 204–5, 212, 219, 221, 229, 231–2, 234–5, 237–8, 240–1, 244, 247 Soviet Union 1–3, 6, 14, 39, 44, 53, 55, 59, 63, 70, 73, 75, 87, 86, 109, 111, 114–5, 118, 121–2, 138–40, 148, 151, 154–5, 156–7, 171, 173–4, 178– 80, 183, 188–9, 192, 200, 208–9, 231–2, 235, 238, 240, 254, 247 Spain 36 Split 191, 225 Spreča 216 St. Marina 237 St. Nikola 242 Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich 3, 43–4, 48, 71–2, 84–5, 113, 116, 120–1, 153, 173, 178 State Department’s Policy Planning Staff (PPS) 6 Stehlin, Paul 198, 209 Stephanopoulos, Stephan 62, 68–70, 73, 91, 102, 106 Stewart, G. C. 46, 230 Štip 116, 242 Stracin 242 Straits 53, 232–4, 236, 241, 254 Stratton, E. H. 46, 48, 198, 204, 208–9, 214, 217, 226, 229 Strumica 88, 238, 242, 246, 255–8 Studeno 242 Sudopatlov, Pavel 121 Šumonja, Miloš 14, 22, 64–5, 181–3, 185–190, 194–7, 231–2 Sunay, Cevdet 231 Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe (SACEUR) 11, 105 Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe, known as the headquarters of NATO (SHAPE) 78 Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (SHNLAY) 6 Syria 232 Szeged 115, 117

283

Tahan, Necati 231–4 Tarchiani, Alberto 83 Tarvisio 205, 215, 218 Taylor, Maxwell D. 36, 43 Thessalonica 23, 26–7, 62, 80, 88, 106, 190, 192–3, 217, 224–5, 233, 236–7, 240, 243, 256 Third Reich 121 Thrace 59, 75, 232–4, 242, 246 Timisoara 115, 199 Tito, Josip Broz 1, 3–10, 12–5, 21–2, 27–8, 34–5, 38–9,41, 43–4, 54, 57, 59–61, 64, 66–72, 76–88, 90–1, 101–2, 104–9, 113–4, 119–20, 122, 146, 148–9, 151, 158–9, 178–80, 250 Todorović, Mijalko 114 Todorović, Voja 137 Trieste 26, 36–7, 42, 44, 48, 57, 60, 62, 64–8, 76–84, 86–8, 91, 102, 107, 126, 130, 177, 179, 187, 190–1, 193, 195–7, 199, 203, 206, 210, 212–3, 216, 224–4, 229 Truman, Harry S. 6, 8, 28, 34, 54 Tunaboylu, Ismail Hakki 63–6 Turkey 23, 44, 53–66, 68–77, 79–85, 87–9, 91–2, 101, 103–6, 108–10, 117, 121, 179, 182, 186–7, 189, 191, 198, 202, 205, 210–1,228, 231–2, 234, 236–9, 245, 253–4, 257 Turkish-Iraqi pact 102 Turkish-Pakistani Pact 81 Turn Severin 117 Uçaner, Asim 231 UK. See United Kingdom Ulepič, Zdenko 139 United Kingdom 7, 13, 26, 35, 39–40, 42, 54, 55, 59–60, 67–8, 70–2, 77, 80, 84, 88, 91, 103, 105, 119, 136–8, 181, 198, 239, 250 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 113 United States 2, 4–12, 14, 21–3, 26, 28–9, 33–6, 39–40, 42, 44–8, 54, 60, 67–71, 76–8, 80, 82–5, 87–8, 91–2,

284

Index

102–3, 106, 113, 115, 119, 122, 124, 129, 131, 134–6, 138, 145, 147–8, 150–2, 156–160, 169–170, 172–4, 176, 178, 198, 211, 220, 229, 233, 239, 250 UNRRA. See United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration US Congress 5, 7–8, 27–8,135, 148, 159 US Defense Department 7, 15 US National Security Council (NSC) 4–5, 34, 120 Uskudar 243 USSR. See Soviet Union Užice 15, 225–6 Valona 208, 237 Valykov, Vasiliy 86–7 Vardar 27, 38, 40, 190, 203, 216–7, 257 Velebit, mountain 69 Velebit, Vladimir 6–9, 78 Venizelos, Sophocles 54, 56–7, 61 Veria 243 Vidin 116–7 Vilfan, Joža 21 Villach 203 Vinkovci 226 Vladičin Han 242 Vlaisavljević, Dušan 181, 189, 192 Vlasotince 242 Vojvodić, Radovan 69, 87, 231 Vojvodina 26, 115 Volos 225, 237 Vrbas 28

Vučković, Ljubo 22–3, 25, 46–8, 89–90, 198–9, 201–5, 208, 211–3, 215, 218, 220, 223–4, 226, 228, 231, 233–5, 239, 246, 250, 252 Vukmanović, Svetozar Tempo 114 Walter, Mercer Christie 146 Warsaw Pact 104, 121–2 Washington, D. C. 5–6, 9–11, 14–5, 21–2, 26, 45–8, 57, 71, 77, 80, 82, 127, 135, 137, 147–9, 181, 198, 229, 239 Waters, John Knigth 126, 134, 146 West Germany 37, 87 Wisner, Frank 6 World Bank 5–6 Yalta 53, 102, 145, 158 Yugoslav General Staff 6, 22, 26, 35, 45, 63, 181, 231–255 Yugoslav Military Archive 14, 22 Yugoslav Navy 2, 14, 132–3, 207, 209, 214, 220 Zachariades, Nicholas 53 Zadar 191, 208–9, 225–6 Zagreb 23, 90, 114, 130–1, 133, 186, 188, 193, 195, 199, 209, 211, 216, 233 Zaječar 242 Zelenika 191, 224 Zenica 90 Zidani Most 216 Zorlu, Fatin 105 Žumberak 216

About the Authors

Ivan Laković is a research associate at the Historical Institute of the University of Montenegro in Podgorica, Montenegro. His main fields of interest are military and diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Western countries, particularly the Untied States, in the second half of the twentieth century. His other professional engagements include research on Yugoslav military policy between the two world wars, the role and impact of OSCE in Montenegro at the turn of the century and the cultural-historical heritage of mountain areas. He has published a book on Western military aid to Yugoslavia, 1951–1958 (2006), and many articles on similar topics. Dmitar Tasić is an Irish Research Council Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for War Studies, University College Dublin. His main field of interest concerns the position of the armed forces of Yugoslav states and their developments, influences, and dependence on internal and foreign policies as well as ideology and everyday life. Equally important is his research on manifestations and legacies of paramilitarism and paramilitary violence in the Balkans in the 20th century. He has written extensively on these topics. His publications include numerous peer-reviewed articles, conference presentations, a book on Yugoslav armed forces from 1918–1920 (2008 and 2012), two coedited collections of documents, and one bibliography. During 2013 and 2014, he acted as editor in chief of the Serbian Military History Journal (Vojnoistorijski glasnik).

285