The Thirty Years War, 1618 - 1648: The First Global War and the end of Habsburg Supremacy 1526775751, 9781526775757

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The Thirty Years War, 1618–1648

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The Thirty Years War, 1618–1648 The First Global War and the end of Habsburg Supremacy John Pike

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First published in Great Britain in 2022 by Pen & Sword Military An imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd Yorkshire – Philadelphia Copyright © John Pike 2022 ISBN 978 1 52677 575 7 The right of John Pike to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Maps by Amy Wilkinson ([email protected]) Typeset by Mac Style Printed in the UK by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY.

Pen & Sword Books Limited incorporates the imprints of Atlas, Archaeology, Aviation, Discovery, Family History, Fiction, History, Maritime, Military, Military Classics, Politics, Select, Transport, True Crime, Air World, Frontline Publishing, Leo Cooper, Remember When, Seaforth Publishing, The Praetorian Press, Wharncliffe Local History, Wharncliffe Transport, Wharncliffe True Crime and White Owl. For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles please contact PEN & SWORD BOOKS LIMITED 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.pen-and-sword.co.uk Or PEN AND SWORD BOOKS 1950 Lawrence Rd, Havertown, PA 19083, USA E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.penandswordbooks.com

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Contents

Introduction1    Madrid and Vienna, two coup d’etat1    The Defenestration of Prague 18 May 1618 7    Background to the Holy Roman Empire 8 Chapter I: The Naval and Economic Challenge to the Habsburg Imperium15    The Ottoman challenges 19    Challenges within and without the Empire before 1600 20   New intellectual and religious challenge to Universal Christendom’s   political order 22    Nationalism and identity politics 24    The ‘perceived’ Habsburg threat 32   Civil war and the dynamics of intervention; fear, the security   dilemma, and balance of power 37 Chapter II: Habsburg Domains, Ferdinand and the Defenestration of Prague46    Internal development of Spanish politics, 1600–1621 46   Olivares 47   Olivares’s policy 51    Spain; financing, social and economic problems 52    Spanish politics and foreign policy, 1619–21  53    Defenestration of Prague 54   Ferdinand II 56    The Dutch economy 1600–1648: military-industrial complex 59 Chapter III: The Thirty Years War: Military developments in the Thirty Years War 1618–163466    From Vienna to the White Mountain and the wars of the interveners 66   Wallenstein 73    Wallenstein and war finance 77    The grudging acceptance of the offer, 17 April 1626 78

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vi  The Thirty Years War, 1618–1648 Chapter IV: Gustavus: the War in the Baltic86   Gustavus Adolphus 86   Baltic War 93 Chapter V: The Emergence of France, the Edict, Wallenstein and the Mantuan War104    Richelieu’s policies and political developments, 1620–27 104    The Edict of Restitution 1629 111   Louis XIII 114    Cardinal Richelieu: Machiavelli’s disciple 117    Duchesse de Chevreuse 121   The concept of frontiers and contrasting world views of ‘devot’ and  Gallicans 122    The Mantuan War and the dismissal of Wallenstein 123   France, Italy, and the Huguenots and the development of French   foreign policy 127   ‘Day of the Dupes’: Three in a room - Turning point in the fight   against Habsburg supremacy 128 Chapter VI: The Dutch Front and Naval War133    The Dutch front 133   Naval War 136 Chapter VII: Gustavus Invades Germany139    Enter Gustavus: Germany 1628–32 139   Swedish economy, military-industrial complex – sinews of war,  1600–1648 141    The Swedish army 144    Battle of Breitenfeld 1631 145    Gustavus’s march to the Rhine 150    Richelieu’s vexation with his maverick ally  152   Gustavus rampant 153 Chapter VIII: Wallenstein Returns and the Battle of Lutzen155    The return of Wallenstein: Gustavus falls off the critical path 155   Götterdämmerung 157 Chapter IX: Wallenstein’s fall, Oxenstierna and the Peace of Prague163    Oxenstierna takes power and the fall of Wallenstein 163    Spanish reaction to the Swedish occupation of the Rhine valley 165    Journey to Nordlingen May 1634–Sept 1634 168    Another Spanish army crosses the Alps, 1634 169    Wheel of fortune; The battle of Nordlingen, 6 September 1634 171

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Contents vii    Dutch campaigns 1633–4 and reactions to the Battle of Nordlingen    Dutch war financing    The war of Smolensk and the Swedish loss of Prussian tolls,  1632–1635   Oxenstierna’s odyssey, and the end of the Heilbronn League,   September 1634–May 1635    The Peace of Prague, 30 May 1635    Spanish policy and the progress of the Imperial armies 1634–5

178 179 179 180 183 185

Chapter X: France Declares War and the Dutch Alliance186    Richelieu sends a herald to Brussels, 5 April 1635 186    Pre-emptive onslaught, Battle of Avin May 1635 187    Fault lines: Franco–Dutch campaign, summer 1635 189   The Rhineland 191    Rohan’s Swiss campaign, the Valtellina, 1635 191 Chapter XI: Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar Defects and the Swedish Army Mutiny193    Recruiting Saxe-Weimar, 1635 193   The ‘Gunpowder Convention’ and the French alliance, August   1635–February 1636  195    Saxon disillusion and decline, 1635–6 197   The Hessian ‘long march’ 1636 and relations with the Dutch and  French 198    Imperial-Bavarian financing of war 1618–1648 200 Chapter XII: French Economic and Military Mobilisation202    The French economy and war finance, 1618–1648 202   Social stress 207    War on the home front 209    French army and military efficiency 1635 209   France: Recruitment and officers and the changing role of Europe’s  nobility 211    State development and ‘absolutism’ 212   French nobility, constitutional crisis, role in warfare, and modern   military state 1629–1632 212    Richelieu’s regime of terror 213    Invasion of France: the year of ‘Corbie’, 1636 215    Rohan’s Swiss campaign and the Valtellina: 1636 218 Chapter XIII: Swedish Recovery and the Emergence of Hesse220    The Dutch Front and the English Channel, 1636  220    Baner’s masterpiece: Swedish recovery  220

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viii  The Thirty Years War, 1618–1648                     

Battle of Wittstock 4 October 1636  Death of Ferdinand II February, 1637 Ferdinand III  Baner’s campaigns 1636–1641 Campaigns in Europe 1637 Amelia of Hesse Landgravine Amelia of Hesse holds out, 1637–1639

223 226 226 227 228 230 231

Chapter XIV: Saxe-Weimar Breaks Out and the Battle for the ‘Spanish Road’234    Campaigns in Europe 1638 234    Dutch debacle at Kallo 22 June 1637 236    Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar 237    Battle of Rheinfelden, February 1638 239   Consequences of Rheinfelden and the serendipity of war, March   1638–April 1638 242    The Breisach campaign and siege, April–December 1638 243    The battle of Poligny 18 June 1638 and war in Franche-Comté 244    The battle of Wittenwier, 9 August 1638 245    Battles for the siegeworks October 1638 246    The surrender of Breisach, 17 December 1638 246    Cutting the Spanish Road: Consequences 247    Death of Saxe-Weimar, 1638–1639 248    England’s last eccentric intervention February 1637–October 1638 248 Chapter XV: Global War250    Dutch and English attacks on Spain’s Empire 250    The Portuguese Empire and trading riches 256    The Habsburg Asian Empire 262    War in the Atlantic, South America and Caribbean 1618–1640  281    Fortresses on the Spanish Main  281    War in the Caribbean 1620–1641 284    Sugar and slaves 286   Bahia 1624–1625 289    The battles for El Mina and the Gold Coast 1600–1625 290    Luanda and ‘The Heart of Darkness’ 291    Mozambique and Mombasa 292    End of Imperium 293 Chapter XVI: Stalemate on Land; Dutch Supremacy at Sea and Prelude to Revolution294    The Pyrenees front 1637–1640 and siege of Salces 294    Military stalemate, Flanders and Germany, 1639 296

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Contents ix                           

Spain’s fleet 1630–1640 The Battle of the Downs, 18 September to 21 October, 1639 Dunkirkers: Spanish maritime raiders 1621–1646 Campaign in Germany 1640 and Amelia returns home The Artois–Luxembourg front, the siege of Arras, 1640 Dutch campaign 1640 Regensburg Diet, Campaigns in 1641 and Baner’s last hurrah Soissons rebellion, Battle of La Marfee, 9 July 1641 The Dutch-French land campaign, 1641

299 302 305 306 306 308 309 310 312

Chapter XVII: Iberian Revolutions and the Fall of Olivares313    The revolutionary road: Catalan revolt May 1640 313    Revolution in Catalonia 1640–1642 314    The secession of Portugal, December 1640 316    Spain’s economic problems 1640s 318    The fall of Olivares, January 1643 319 Chapter XVIII: Origins of Peace320    Origins of the Peace of Westphalia, 1640–1643 320    Sweden’s negotiating issues, pressures for peace, 1636–1642  322    Dutch moves towards peace, 1640–1646 323    Spain sues for peace, 1640 324    Bavaria’s need for peace, 1636–1640 324    The Emperor considers peace 324    France: Peace talks and revolt 1636–1639  325    Hesse and German supplicants at Westphalia 325    Other interests at Westphalia 326 Chapter XIX: Enter Torstensson and Mazarin, Italy and Habsburg Exhaustion327    Mazarin, the gambler 327    Mazarin’s progress to power 1634–1639 332   Savoy: a small state’s struggle for survival, 1635–1640 and the war   in Italy 333    Savvy Christina of Savoy and the war in Italy 1638–1641 334    De Campion’s transition into high politics and misdemeanours 336   The Cinq Mars affair, usual suspects, and the Death of Richelieu,  1642 337    French military and political triumph in Savoy 1641–1643 341   Interregnum, death of Louis XIII, Mazarin and Anne of Austria   consolidate power 341    Anne of Austria 342    Power struggle at court 344

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x  The Thirty Years War, 1618–1648    Massacre of the Tercios: Battle of Rocroi, 19 May 1643   Consequences    Dutch campaign 1643   The battle of Tuttlingen, military masterclass by Franz von Mercy,   November 1643    The Bavarian army and postscript to Tuttlingen    Torstensson identity: Enter the ‘artilleryist’, 1641–1645    The German campaign in balance 1641; Brandenburg makes peace    Torstensson’s invasion of the Hereditary lands, 1642     The invasion of Moravia and capture of Olomouc, June 1642    Torstensson’s retreat to Silesia and Saxony, July–November 1642   Torstensson supremacy: Second Battle of Breitenfeld, 2 November  1642    The strategic outcome of the battle of Second Breitenfeld    Torstensson’s campaign in 1643

352 356 357 357 358 359 362 363 368 369 372 374 375

Chapter XX: Torstensson’s War and the Invasion of Denmark376   Torstensson’s ultimatum: The Swedish-Danish war, 1643–1645:  causes 376    ‘Torstensson’s War’: Swedish war aims 1636–1642 378   The invasion of Denmark and the War at Sea, 1643–44: Opening  Gambits 379    Disquiet amongst the anti-Imperialist alliance, 1644 380    Baltic Naval strategy 381    Gallas; ‘the army wrecker’ and last hope for the Danes, 1644 382    Transylvania stirs again 383   The Baltic naval war and Torstensson at bay July 1644: Middle  Game 384    Military manoeuvres in Jutland and Holstein 386    Naval battle of Ferman, 23 October 1644 386    Gallas’s long retreat autumn-winter 1644: Endgame 387    The Peace of Bremsebro, 1644: Checkmate 389   The accession of Queen Christina of Sweden, her character and   policy, 1644 390 Chapter XXI: War and Peace: Mazarin and France Ascendant394   Turenne 394    The ‘Great’ Condé, duc d’Enghien 398    The five-day battle of Freiburg, August 1644 401    The siege of Philippsburg, August 1644 407   The French and Dutch attack on Gravelines and Sas-van-Ghent,  1644 409    The Battle of Jankov, Bohemia, 7 March 1645  410

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Contents xi    Advance to Vienna, March 1645    Diplomatic tremors after Jankov, June to August 1645    Imperialist popular mobilisation, Spring 1645    The battle of Mergentheim (Herbsthausen), May 1645   After Jankov: Joining Rákóczy and the siege of Brno, April–   August 1645    Battle of Allerheim, 3 August 1645    In Flanders field 1645    Diplomatic consequences for the Peace of Imperial defeats in 1645 

421 422 423 423 427 430 437 438

Chapter XXII: Setting up the Conference 1643–1645440   The delegations 440    Main issues at the conferences 1645 443 Chapter XXIII: Peace and the End of Habsburg Supremacy in Europe444   Germany 1646–1648 444    The Dutch triumph 444    Peace at last, October 1648 446   Bohemia betrayed 449   Last fighting 450    End of the Habsburg Imperium 451 Chapter XXIV: Postscript: The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe and European Identity454    Europe and hegemony; the struggle to master Europe 454 Notes469 Index496

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Town/Village

Map Key Infantry

Lagoons/Lakes

Cavalry

River/Canals

Tercio

Road Coastline Land Gradient Sea Bridge

Killing Zone Battle Musket Cannon Fire

Houses

Cheveaux de Frise

Windmill

Ditch

Wat/Pagoda

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Evergreen Trees

Palm Tree

Chains Explosion Wind Direction

English Ship Swedish/Danish Warship Spanish Galleon Dutch Warship/ Merchant Ship Portuguese Galleon/Nao

Cannon

Redoubts/Fieldwork /Siege Lines

Wagon Train

Deciduous Trees

Attack

Church

Camp

Mountain

Mixed Forest French Warship Banyan Tree

Chinese Junk

Marshland

Dutch Herring Fleet

Elephant

Oared Galley/Galiotte (Lateen rigged)

Horse Grazing

Dutch & Spanish Barges

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Introduction

Habsburg Imperium and the Challenges Madrid and Vienna, two coup d’etat

A

t the Spanish court, Count Olivares was gaining influence behind the scenes as the confidant of Philip III’s son (to become Philip IV). Olivares with his uncle Zuniga organised a progressive coup d’etat to replace chief Councillor Duke of Lerma; contriving firstly to insinuate his uncle Zuniga onto the Royal Council they then instigated a new assertive foreign policy on behalf of Philip III and his Jesuit confessor. Lerma received his coup de grace in October 1618, but power had already shifted from the moment that ambassador Zuniga at Vienna was recalled to join the Royal council in July 1617. Through 1617-18 power slipped away from Lerma who was forced into a more pro-active policy. With Philip III’s support a reluctant Lerma was forced to offer money to the Emperor in the form of a 200,000 ducat subsidy in July 1618, to help Ferdinand in the Bohemian crisis, ‘since if the Empire should be lost to the House of Austria through the lack of it (money),’ advised Lerma, ‘nothing in Italy will be safe’. [Lerma to Salazar 26 Aug 1618]. He was replaced by his own son Ucueda who had backed the reformist faction. Completion of the coup had to wait until Philip III’s death in 1621, at which point Philip IV’s favourite, Olivares, would boast ‘now everything is mine’. New ambassador Onate in Vienna actively aided the launching of a coup against Emperor Matthias by grooming Counter-Reformation hawk Ferdinand of Styria as the future emperor. The Habsburg alliance was renewed and set on a stable course by the clearing of potential disputes. Spain dropped its dynastic claims which were compensated by transfer of Franche-Comte to Spain, the territory that covered the region between Switzerland and Burgundy. It heralded a major policy shift to an assertive foreign policy with the aim of winning the war against the Dutch Republic when the truce ended in 1621. Motivation was expressed by Zuniga: ‘In my view if a monarchy has lost its reputation, even if it has lost no territory, it is a sky without light, a sun without rays, a body without soul.’ Recovery would involve increased military spending and a second coup d’etat in Vienna. The Habsburg dynastic alliance between Vienna and Madrid was therefore committed to a multi-faceted revanchist policy across Europe in parallel with the Counter-Reformation; an adventurist policy which would disturb the balance of power in Germany and in Europe, and test the strength, stability and supremacy of the Habsburg alliance.

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Habsburg Imperium and the Challenges  7

The Defenestration of Prague 23 May 1618

On the morning of 23 May 1618, rebellious nobles, their retainers, and a mob of citizens surged across the Charles Bridge then swept up the steep cobblestone path to the Hradčany Castle perched high in Prague’s Old Quarter. Pouring through the main gate conveniently left open, they stormed into the building, forcing an entry into the council chamber, a small wood panelled room with a large German-style tiled fireplace. There they confronted the four terrified Imperial councillors, including Slawata and Martinitz. There followed angry questioning as to the origins and authorship of the orders in respect of the Braunau incidents, where Protestant churches and congregations had been suppressed. According to Count Martinitz the Protestant delegation replied to the Imperial letter which had already been addressed to them; the reply went like this: ‘his Majesty declared all our lives forfeit, thereby greatly frightening all three protestant estates.  … it is clear that such a letter came through the advice of some of our religious enemies. …’1 The Imperial councillors prevaricated amid the rising anger of their noblemen accusers who demanded, according to Martinitz’s testimony, ‘No no … we want to have a clear answer now from the four of your graces who are now present.’2 Pistols were produced from under a cloak by Litwin von Rican: after further heated declarations and an assault by Thurn on Martinitz who was thrown to the floor, Rican, Kinsky, and Smirizcky declared: ‘It is clear that the Imperial letter goes against our letter of majesty.  … You are enemies of us and our religion, have desired to deprive us of our letter of Majesty, (1609 guarantee of rights) have horribly plagued your protestant subjects … and have tried to force them to adopt your religion against their wills or have them expelled for this reason. …3 (Martinitz). Most notably the Government ‘had pulled down, razed to the ground, and levelled’ the newly built church at Klostergrab. This and other breaches… had legitimised the revolt. In the Hussite tradition, the angry mob of noblemen eventually rushed at the two councillors deemed the guiltiest intending to defenestrate them. Martinitz recounted that the rebels pinned him down then took him to the open window whilst they shouted, ‘Now we will take our just revenge on our religious enemies’; he feared that his end was nigh.4 When Martinitz realised the nature of his impending death he claimed in his embellished account to have called out loudly, ‘Since this concerns the will of God, the Catholic religion, and the will of the Emperor we will gladly submit…’ He was then thrown head first out of the window. Martinitz plunged down screaming ‘Jesus Maria Help!’ accompanied by the laconic comments of the rebels, ‘We will send a villainous Jesuit to follow you.’5 Slawata, scratching at the windowsill and crying in anticipation of death, ‘God have mercy on me a sinner,’6 followed soon after, having had a dagger jabbed at his fingertips to release his grip on the sill. As the rebels later remarked, and by way of a legitimising excuse, ‘we threw both of them out of the window in accordance with the old custom. …’7

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8  The Thirty Years War, 1618–1648 Secretary Fabricius was also ejected for good measure. Later ennobled, he was given the title von Hohenfall (of the highfall). Cushioned by accumulated rubbish, they all survived with minor injuries. Seemingly a miracle of survival, Catholic propagandists published cartoons of the Imperial officials being held aloft by a flock of angels! The shocked Imperial councillors scampered quickly away as they heard cries from the window above, ‘Shoot them and finish them off.’8 Crack of pistol shots rang out as they fled and hurried them on their way. In the following days a revolutionary directorate was established to rule Bohemia and so began a jostling for power with leading aristocrats combining to prevent Count Thurn becoming the leader although he would secure generalship of the army. Having provoked the crisis, Emperor Matthias’s Imperial policy directed by Cardinal Klels now sought to calm matters and reach a compromise settlement. But the the emperor in waiting, Ferdinand of Styria, and the Spanish had another plan. Exploiting the crisis they would seek to crush the revolt as part of a general objective of strengthening the Emperor’s political power in the Holy Roman Empire and at the same time support the Counter-Reformation in Germany. A coup d’etat backed by the Spanish ambassador Onate saw Cardinal Klesl arrested and Emperor Matthias removed from power. For Spain the aim was geo-political positioning prior to the ending of the 1609 truce with the Dutch republic and consequent resumption of war in 1621. Spain’s vital interests included securing its lines of communication and reinforcement along the Spanish Road to Spanish Flanders which ran the length of the Rhine before debouching over the Alps to Spanish-controlled Milan and Genoa.

Background to the Holy Roman Empire and Habsburg supremacy

After his election as Emperor in 1519, a youthful Charles V was told by his chancellor, Gattinara, ‘God has set you on a path towards a world monarchy.’9 There was nothing subtle or nuanced about the meaning of Imperial election to the Holy Roman Empire; its ambit extended well beyond Europe. Even before being elected emperor he styled himself, ‘Roman King, future Emperor, semper augustus, King of Spain, Sicily, Jerusalem, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, the Indies and the mainland on the far shore of the Atlantic, Archduke of Austria, Duke of Burgundy, Brabant, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Luxembourg, Limburg, Athens, and Patras, Count of Habsburg, Flanders and Tyrol, Count Palatine of Burgundy, Hainault, Pfirt, Roussillon, Landgrave of Alsace, Count of Swabia, Lord of Asia and Africa’. Charles had inherited vast territories and wealth from the New World, underpinned by the silver of the Cerro Rico mine that, since its founding at Potosi in the Andean highlands of Bolivia in 1645, continued to be scooped out in huge quantities, accounting for 60 per cent of world silver production.10 He had just become crowned head of the largest empire or polity that the world has ever experienced, before or since. It encompassed the globe: most of Europe and the Americas, and the Philippines. Within a generation the Habsburgs, through Charles’ son, Philip II of Spain,

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Habsburg Imperium and the Challenges  9 would have added most of coastal Africa, the Persian Gulf, India, Ceylon and the most important trading regions of South east Asia and China, not to mention a monopoly on trade with Japan. All of this included monopolistic control of the international spice and bullion trades, including Japan’s. The Emperor was also the temporal leader and protector of Christianity who, theoretically at least, discharged this function in tandem with the Pope’s spiritual leadership. The Habsburg Imperium in Europe and its associated ideas of ‘Universal Christendom’ or universal monarchy was based on a troika of concepts: power, tradition, and religion. It was an idea supported and built up through the late medieval period by vested interests within the papacy and the Habsburg family who held the title of Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Much earlier, Charlemagne, as King of the Franks and recent conqueror of Lombardy, attracted the interest of Pope Leo III because he was the most powerful political force in Europe. Pope Leo, who notified Charlemagne of his nomination as Holy Roman Emperor and sent him the keys of St Peter, needed Frank protection against his enemies; so began the close association and the idea of recreating the Roman Empire as a single unit detached from any claims of the rival at Byzantium (Constantinople) which was then ruled by Empress Irene in tandem with her son Constantine. They had the prime claim on legitimacy, but a Greek-speaking woman in distant Constantinople was not politically desirable in Rome, nor could Constantinople offer the sort of ‘temporal’ protection that Charlemagne could provide. Led by the papacy, theological and political momentum developed into a coalition of interest from the Carolingian house as well. The idea and propaganda was cultivated by Alcuin of York who acted as a theologian to the Carolingian court. Alcuin saw a need for ‘a chief in whose shadow the Christian people repose in peace and who on all sides strikes terror into the pagan nations, a chief whose devotion never ceases to fortify the Catholic faith with evangelical firmness against the followers of heresy’.11 This sense of legitimacy, always highly prized by kings and political leaders, was enhanced still further in 800 ad when Charlemagne was designated protector of the Holy Sepulchre by the Patriarch of Jerusalem. From the start, the Roman Imperator title signified the papacy and the Emperor working in a mutually reinforcing temporal-spiritual tandem. Charlemagne built a suitably grand palace at Aachen, placing himself in a Germanic orbit, a tradition that continued to modern times. By myth and tradition, the Empire traced itself back to the crowning of Charlemagne as Emperor in 800 on Christmas day; the reality was that Otto I may have been the real progenitor of the Holy Roman Empire, but the legend had already been recreated and established. The name was officially changed in 1512 by decision of the Diet of Cologne to the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nations, although the title tended to be abbreviated to exclude the reference to Germany. By the mid-sixteenth century the Empire had a greater meaning than that, not least because the Habsburg Emperor’s personal

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10  The Thirty Years War, 1618–1648 hereditary patrimony extended well beyond it. As the Habsburg dynasty spread, the narrow German definition became increasingly irrelevant and, in any case, it lacked the universal lustre that was sought after. It is important to consider that this vague, legalistic and traditional idea of Empire was an evolving one that became appropriated and adapted by the demands of realpolitik, as a front for the ambitions of the Habsburgs and the papacy. We should note that the latest reincarnation and adaptation is the European Union, whose founders’ appropriation of the concept and legitimacy derived from Charlemagne’s Europe and the idea of ‘European Christendom’ were eagerly adopted by European Christian Democratic parties after the Second World War. It is no coincidence that the highest honours award of the European Union is the Charlemagne Prize, awarded to one individual annually in Aachen for work done for promotion of European unification. The notion of Holy Roman Emperor came to fit neatly into the idea of an ordered feudal and hierarchical world. Ideas elaborated on this theme underpinned a Catholic world view as well as the temporal interests of the Habsburgs. How did this idea come about and flourish? Firstly, the concept was underpinned by the idea that temporal legitimacy of the Imperium had been legally transferred or inherited from the Roman Empire. It was an antique idea but it had a natural hold on the medieval mind. By way of example, Charles V, ever keen to associate the Empire with the Roman tradition, adorned Emperor Trajan’s monumental Roman bridge and triumphal arch over the Tagus, at Alcantara in Spain, with his shield and insignia. The second factor in Habsburg success, by luck and calculation, was in building up a vast dynastic patrimony, a patchwork of territories, titles, constitutional entitlement and elective monarchical licences, not just in Germany but across Europe and extending to Spain, much of Italy, Burgundy (Flanders) and the Netherlands. The critical period of dynastic expansion occurred in the reign of Maximilian I (1459–1519). It was the successor dynasty to the Hohenstaufen. It more resembled a diversified property holding company than a state as such. By 1600 the Habsburg Imperium encompassed both directly and indirectly the following territories: Germany, Austria, Bohemia (including Silesia), Lusatia, Moravia, Alsace, Hungary, Croatia, Switzerland and much of Northern Italy. There were no natural frontiers to this construct. From the Habsburgs in Madrid, control ran to Spain, Portugal (incorporated in 1568), the kingdom of Naples, Flanders and the Dutch provinces, Luxembourg, Franche-Comte and Roussillon (later Franche-Comte adjacent to Switzerland and Spain respectively), and Sicily. Additionally, there was the entirety of South America, the Caribbean and Mexico, as well as the Philippines and Formosa (Taiwan); the Portuguese element, which was mainly a fortress-based trading empire, ran from a myriad of coastal forts from Brazil to West and Southwest Africa, to East Africa up to the Red Sea. In the Indian Ocean and the Malay Archipelago fifty fortresses

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Habsburg Imperium and the Challenges  11 and unofficial colonies of the Estado da Indias spanned the Persian Gulf, India, the Bay of Bengal, Ceylon, Malacca, Java, Flores, the Moluccan ‘spice islands’, China (Macau) and Japan. The Habsburg Imperium was a colossus. Emperor Charles V needed to travel for almost half of his reign to oversee just his European domains. The vast acquisition of ‘New World’ territory in the Americas and in Asia emerged in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries through remarkable swashbuckling adventurers such as Columbus, Cortez and Pissarro in the west and the Portuguese Alfonso de Albuquerque’s crusader conquests in the east against the Asian sultanates, respectively drawn by the allure of bullion and spices. South American silver, especially from the huge mine, the Cerro Rico Mountain at Potosi, located in a 3,000-metres-high-altitude desert, underpinned the entire Habsburg Imperium. Output was collateralised and leveraged to the hilt, which became a problem early on as yields reduced and production became more costly after the first halcyon years of 1545–1565 when the ore was scooped off the cone as if it were ice cream. Rivers of money flowed in this newly created high Andean city, the third biggest city in the world and by far the richest. It was a licentious, hedonistic Mecca of ‘36 casinos, a theatre, fourteen dance halls and eighty churches … . Fountains spouting wine …’.12 Laundry was sent back to Spain. Hard to reach even today, Potosi is located in a desolate mountain region of Bolivia. Speculation that millions of Incas were consumed inside this hell may well be exaggerated; modern scholarship explains that only a minority of workers were coerced ecomenderos under the mita system. However, even today the many artisanal mines on the mountain exploit child labour whose life expectancy is very low due to the appalling working conditions. In the early years, the cone and upper parts of the mountain yielded silver purity of 90–100 per cent,13 but in the latter part of the century expensive mercury was needed to refine the ore. The nearest source was 500 kilometres distant. Of the mountain Philip II would boast, ‘For the powerful Emperor, for the wise King, this lofty mountain could conquer the whole world.’14 He seems to have believed his own propaganda. The sheer size of the Imperium furthered Habsburg claims to universal monarchy and monopoly of power in the entire known world, not merely the European one. These global pretentions fused into one when the Spanish king inherited the Portuguese realm and empire in 1570. The concept had already been legitimised by Pope Alexander VI’s ruling on the division of the world between Spain and Portugal by the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1493, and then confirmed by the Treaty of Zaragoza of 1529. The mineral riches of the New World and the trading riches of the East underpinned the extraordinary agglomeration. Armed with this ‘legal right’ the Habsburgs would be intent on maintaining and expanding their interests. In Germany, the myths and legal legacies of the Golden Bull of 1356 underpinned the legitimacy of the Imperial constitution, which was substantially

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12  The Thirty Years War, 1618–1648 reformed in 1500 into the structures that remained more or less constant until the Empire’s demise in 1806. By 1600 the matter of elections for Emperor was becoming increasingly irrelevant. The Habsburgs, by degrees and the passage of time, were seeming to occupy some of the constituent kingships, such as Bohemia and Hungary, and the elective Imperial title itself, by right of longevity and continuous occupation, although the right to Bohemia was possibly ceded in 1529. A radical challenge was made to the Habsburg succession in 1519 when Francis I of France put himself up as candidate for the Imperial Crown with the backing of the pro-French Pope and, at the outset, four out of seven Electors. That Charles should defend his candidacy with all his financial might was deemed essential by his advisers, notably Chancellor Gattinara, for the coherence of the Habsburg territory and dynastic prestige, ‘to maintain his hereditary lands’. 500,000 ducats had to be paid over to rival Francis I’s bribes. As the election approached the result was secured; brimming with confidence as to the outcome, and having offered very substantial bribes, Charles proclaimed ‘We will be able to accomplish many good deeds and great things, not only conserve and guard the possessions which God has given us, but increase them greatly…, upholding and strengthening our holy Catholic faith which is our principal foundation.’15 The words echoed those of Charlemagne’s theologian Alcuin in 796. It was a manifesto which described exactly the role and ideology of the Habsburgs in the Imperial structure. Charles chose the title ‘Imperator Romanorum’. The emphasis again on the role as protector of all Christians and the keeper of religious purity is highly significant, especially in the light of emerging Lutheran heresy. Charles V’s failure to deal with that ‘heresy’ problem, culminating in the recognition of Lutheranism at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, would cast a long shadow over the Habsburg Imperium well into the first half of the seventeenth century. Charles abdicated in 1554–6 and retired to a monastery to reflect on the spiritual life, having divided the Empire between his son Philip II16 and his brother Emperor Ferdinand I. Philip became King of Spain and inherited the Spanish Empire based in Madrid, while Ferdinand became the Holy Roman Emperor with his seat in Vienna. Charles died in 1558. Another binding duty, a mantle which Charles V felt as Advocatus Ecclesiae [Defender of the Faith], was resistance to the Ottomans: ‘The enemy [the Turks] has expanded so much that neither the repose of Christendom, nor the dignity of Spain, nor finally the welfare of my Kingdom are able to withstand such a threat. … unless I link Spain with Germany and add the title of Emperor to the king of Spain.’17 The Habsburg Imperium was not exclusively a temporal and material construct; its strength was reinforced and tempered by ideas of religion and social order which were thoroughly imbued in the medieval mind and ‘weltanshauung’. The feudal system did not separate politics from religion; the two were completely

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Habsburg Imperium and the Challenges  13 fused. Any attack on the Habsburg system would therefore be an attack on the entire intellectual and belief system of Christian Europe. The idea of a United Christendom had a lasting appeal well into the Thirty Years War and beyond. The religious-political construct as an aspect of the war influenced Ruben’s painting; writing of his female figure in Allegory of Peace and War he wrote on 12 March 1638, ‘It’s about the tragedy of Europe after so many years of rape, outrages, unspeakable miseries. She holds up a globe supported by an angel surmounted by a cross, … .’18 (emphasis added) As for most Catholics in the Counter Reformation, Rubens was holding on to the mantra of Unified Christendom. When Charles V ascended the Imperial throne in 1519, becoming ruler of most of Europe and vast swathes of the known world, he inherited an ideology that was steeped in religious symbolism and iconography; the Emperor as God’s vicar (Vicarius Dei) ‘who received his authority direct from “God” [and thus] endowed Kingship with celestial greatness’.19 Prime duties included protection of the faith and the administration of justice, which, apart from the aura of the title, was the Emperor’s prime source of power under the constitution. The authority of the Imperial courts, Reichskammergericht, and the Aulic council, Rechofracht, became a major issue in the run-up to the Thirty Years War. However, in the mid-sixteenth century, there was some shift in realpolitik power from the Habsburgs of Prague and Vienna to the Habsburgs of Spain after the split in the Empire following Charles V’s death, even though prime titular prestige remained in Vienna or Prague. With unified Spain emerging as a superpower underpinned by New World conquests and bullion, the Spanish King, Philip II, tended to appropriate some of the ‘universal’ and ‘imperial’ mantle. Jealous of the title of Emperor belonging to his uncle, he had medals minted in Spain which ‘commemorated Philip’s Universal monarchy’. Some went so far as to state that ‘the world is not enough’ for the Spanish monarchy: ‘non suffit orbid’. 20 Courtiers suggested that Philip should take the title ‘Emperor of the Indies’; ‘the Roman Empire became a model and reference point for sixteenth century Castilians who looked upon themselves as heirs and successors of the Romans conquering an even more extended empire.’21 Spain would be the dominant partner in the Habsburg Imperium; for Spanish Kings the Austrian court was not merely a dynastic ‘junior’ brother-in-arms, but a key strategic interest needing protection and care, because the Emperor stood guard to Spanish Burgundian possessions and to Spain’s vital land communication links to them. The ‘Spanish Road’ which passed through Genoa and Milan was the most common route and strategically the most secure, because it crossed through regions controlled under the aegis of the Vienna Habsburgs; it traversed the Valtellina, climbed over the Simplon pass, crossed the Inn, ran east-west past Lake Konstanz, before running the length of the upper and lower Rhine. To solidify the Imperium, the Onate Treaty was signed in 1617 between its two halves; Spain took possessions along the Spanish Road, from Liguria to Milan,

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14  The Thirty Years War, 1618–1648 to Breisach and Philippsburg and Franche-Comte; Spain also offered Alsace but this clause was never enacted. In return Spanish claims to the succession in Hungary and Bohemia were renounced. The Road was a crucial strategic connection as Spain battled against Dutch rebellion after 1568. It is worth reflecting momentarily on the extraordinary strength of the dynastic, ideological, religious and familial bond which underpinned the Habsburg Imperium and the idea of United Christendom. When Ferdinand III, with his back to the wall after a string of military disasters, compounded by economic exhaustion, finally decided that he must take the peace talks in earnest, he issued his last and deeply significant fifteenth point of instruction concerning ‘the Spaniards’ to his Westphalian plenipotentiary. His closest adviser and confidant, von Trauttmansdorff, was informed: ‘It is known that all our enemies’ plans and intentions, effort and work is directed to separate the Germans from the Spanish et secundum illud, divide et vinces [and thus divide and rule] … therefore Count von Trauttmansdorff will above all ensure that it will not come to such a separation, and will rather let all go to rack and ruin than this to happen’. [Emphasis added].

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Chapter 1

The Naval and Economic Challenge to the Habsburg Imperium

S

pain was proud of its global empire which it claimed as a monopoly by law, such that any state seeking to trade in it would be subject to attack and arrest; its subjects could be imprisoned and executed, which they were. However, England, and later the Dutch had no intention of subjecting themselves to any such restrictions. War, opportunities for piracy under letters of marque, and the chance for lucrative trade merged seamlessly into an onslaught on Spain’s global pretentions. The fight would encompass not just a global war, the first in history, but an existential struggle for naval supremacy in the Atlantic, Caribbean, Indian Ocean, South China Sea, the Baltic, English Channel, the North Sea and the Mediterranean. France would also challenge Spain’s naval dominance along the Bay of Biscay and in the Mediterranean and Caribbean. It was a French corsair attack on Havana in 1555 which led to the vast outlay on the fortresses of Fuerza, finished in 1577, and El Morro, started in 1589 and completed in 1630. Francis Drake’s epic voyage in the Golden Hind did more than circumnavigate the world. The Elizabethan government sanctioned attacks on Spanish assets and treasure shipments, and their ‘illegal’ trading in Spanish-controlled ports and colonies showed the way for the Dutch. In capturing Spanish treasure shipments in Panama at Nombre de Dios, and by seizing treasure ships navigating along the Pacific coast of South America, Drake set an example that would be emulated tenfold by the Dutch. The English mounted 235 privateering expeditions against Spanish possessions in 1589–91. When Drake sailed around the world and put into the Moluccan spice island of Ternate, he revealed boundless possibilities for the spice trade which became the main focus of future Dutch trading expeditions. From the 1690s, multiple Dutch expeditions were setting sail for Asia. English aid on land and sea was essential to the sustenance of the Dutch rebellion. It took a heavy toll on Habsburg resources, not least in the destruction of the Spanish Armada and the assault on Cadiz; raiding by ‘el Draque’, (Drake) and others along the Spanish Pacific coast and the Caribbean had an immense strategic impact in raising the costs of Habsburg colonial defence. The Dutch would adopt this strategy to even greater effect. The significance of the attacks by the northern Protestant states lay in the fact that their growing naval power

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16  The Thirty Years War, 1618–1648 was defying the Habsburg ability to trade and communicate with its empire. The emphatic shift in naval dominance was highlighted by two events; in 1588, the huge Spanish Armada was defeated by the English and in 1607 a large Spanish fleet of twenty-one galleons and other vessels was destroyed in the Bay of Gibraltar by Admiral Jacob van Heemskerk. Naval power had shifted and, in tandem with it, so had economic muscle which was moving to the coastal maritime nations and away from those countries whose capitals rested on the great landmasses. In 1600 a Royal Charter was established to form the East India Company (EIC) in London; investors included both the aristocracy and merchants. EIC Article 22 provided for ‘Six good Ships and Six good Pinnaces, well furnished with Ordnance, and other Munition for their Defence, and Five Hundred Mariners, English Men, to guide and sail in the same’. Military equipment outfitting was essential for the EIC fleet because the government and crown knew that they would be putting themselves in harm’s way by conducting trading in territories claimed exclusively by the Spanish king (wearing his Spanish and Portuguese crowns). Attacks on enemy shipping and colonies were fully anticipated, but not in writing. Contrary to the Dutch, the bellicose intentions of the English were never overt, even though England was still engaged in a war with Spain which would flare up again in 1602, following the seaborn invasion and the capture of Kinsale by 6,000 Spanish troops in support of O’Neill’s Irish rebellion. The global challenge to the great Imperium was unlooked for, but Spanish determination to continue the war against the Dutch Republic made it inevitable; the Dutch response was a logical one and it offered financial reward. Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, the Grand Pensioner of Holland, mooted the idea of amalgamation of the six Dutch companies which had started to operate in Asia as early as 1598; by 1602 it was a reality. In the words of the Stadtholder, Maurice of Orange, the purpose was for ‘damaging the enemy Spain and Portugal and for the security of the fatherland’.1 Initially the mantra put forward by the authorities was one of commerce, not war. After all, why antagonize further the might of Spain, especially as there were hopes of negotiating a peace. The moderate approach was represented in Article 37 of the Verenigde Oost Insiche Compagnie (VOC) charter which authorized defensive military action only ‘if the ships of the Spaniards or other countries should attack the company’s ships’. The aggressive intentions and strategic priorities of the Dutch Estates General were made clear from the inception of the VOC in 1602 as a national trading/military project by the award of its charter and Asian ‘monopoly’. The charter embraced all the maritime chambers of commerce in the corporation and identified Spain and Portugal as enemies; reporting procedures were defined in contract, ‘So as ships return from the journey, the generals and commanders of the fleet, ship or ships shall be obliged to deliver a report to us about the success of the voyage … in the required format’. (VOC Charter, The Hague, 20 March

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The Naval and Economic Challenge to the Habsburg Imperium   17 1602). For the Dutch, trade and war ran in tandem for the fulfilment of national destiny, identity, wealth and independence. However, Article 37 paints only a thin veneer over the real intention. If there were any doubts as to the actual objectives of the company’s charter, the November 1603 resolution of the Estates General was categorical that ‘to damage the enemy and inflict harm on his persons, ships, and goods by all means possible … was the principal reason why the States General have undertaken the Union of the companies …’.2 The intention was an aggressive military strategy aimed at crippling Portugal’s trade and then stealing it. Though mainly aimed at Portuguese interests, it was also a blow aimed at the Spanish king; Spanish Manila, a major trading hub, would also be within its remit. As the truce’s end approached, preparations were afoot for a similarly formed company to exploit the advantages of trade and conquest in the western hemisphere. The Dutch West Indies Company (WIC) was being conceived even as the Dutch and Spanish negotiated to try to find a peaceful solution to their differences. In what was truly a national commercial enterprise, but with delegated plenipotentiary diplomatic, civil and military powers, the aforesaid Company may, in our name and authority, within the limits herein before prescribed, make contracts, engagements and alliances with the limits herein before prescribed, make contracts, engagements and alliances with the princes and natives of the countries comprehended therein, and also build any forts and fortifications there, to appoint and discharge Governors, people for war, and officers of justice, … for the promoting of trade’ (WIC Charter clause II 1621) Board representation was shared amongst the maritime provinces pro rata to their commercial muscle. A monopoly of twenty-one years was granted to their operations. In return the VOC and WIC as sovereign entities were expected to contribute to the maritime defence of the nation when called upon: and vice versa. The Republic was financially stretched in 1609 as a result of the Spanish economic embargo which cut off the lucrative Mediterranean trade. Global expansion was needed to replace this lost business as well as provide investment opportunities from the cash flowing into what was now a maturing Dutch economy, so pressure mounted for the formation of the West Indies Company, which would target Portugal’s Western Empire in Brazil and Spain’s American and Caribbean possessions in the same way as the VOC had done in the East. Under clause XL of the WIC charter granted by the Estates General in 1621: And if by a violent and continued interruption of the aforesaid navigation and traffic, the business… shall be brought to an open war, we will … give them [the Dutch Estates] for their assistance sixteen ships of war; which shall be properly mounted and provided in all respects, both with brass

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