The Third City (Routledge Revivals): Philosophy at War with Positivism [1 ed.] 0415749697, 9780415749695

Citation preview

Routledge Revivals

The Third City

The Third City, first published in 1982, offers an innovative response to the troubled relationship betw een W estern philosophy, as it has been conducted since the Renaissance, and the everyday lives of the com m unities in w hich we live. Bebek contends th a t the model of philosophical reflection is to be found in P lato’s dialogues, w hich, rather than sim ply describing utopia through a series of abstract ‘concepts’, were instead designed to im pel the learner towards a recognition of the true nature of reality — as m uch a ‘self-recogni­ tio n ’ as an understanding of the w orld ‘out there’. T hus, in order to revive the spirit of true philosophy, it is necessary to avoid both the false extremes of idealism and m aterialism , and to allow ethics once more to m erge w ith epistem ology. This title presents an exposition of this ethically based philosophy, allowing the very hum an insights of Plato to illum ine the diverse problem s of today.

Page Intentionally Left Blank

The Third City Philosophy at W ar with Positivism

Borna Bebek

First published in 1982 by R outledge & K egan Paul Ltd T his edition first published in 2014 by R outledge 2 Park Square, M ilton Park, A bingdon, Oxon, O X 14 4 R N and by R outledge 711 T h ird A venue, N ew Y ork, N Y 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 1982 Borna Bebek T he rig h t o f Borna Bebek to be identified as author of this w ork has been asserted by him in accordance w ith sections 77 and 78 of the C opyright, D esigns and P atents A ct 1988. A ll rights reserved. N o p art of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic , mechanical, or other means, now know n or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any inform ation storage or retrieval system, w ith o u t perm ission in w riting from the publishers. P u b lis h e r’s N o te T he p ublisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint b u t points out th a t some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. D isc la im e r T he p ublisher has m ade every effort to trace copyright holders correspondence from those they have been unable to contact. A Library of Congress record exists under LC control num ber: 82012227

ISBN 13: 9 7 8 -0 -4 1 5 -7 4 9 6 9 -5 (hbk) ISBN 13: 9 7 8 -1 -3 1 5 -7 9 5 9 2 -8 (ebk)

and

welcomes

I

5 n

I I I 1

THE THIRD CITY Philosophy at war with positivism BORNA BEBEK

Routledge & Kegan Paul London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley

T o A thene, who protects the city

First published in 1982 by Routledge & Kegan Paul L td 3 9 Store Street, London W C 1E 7DD, 9 Park Street, Boston, M ass. 02108, USA, 2 9 6 Beaconsfield Parade, M iddle Park, Melbourne, 3206, Australia, and Broadway House, Newtown Road, Henley-on-Thames, Oxon R G 9 1 E N Set in 1 Opt Baskerville and printed in Great Britain by The Thetford Press L td Thetford, Norfolk © Borna Bebek 1982 No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fo r the quotation of brief passages in criticism Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Bebek, Borna, 1 9 5 1 The third city. Bibliography: p. 1. Philosophy. 2. Logical positivism— Controversial literature. I. Title. B 7 2 .B 4 1982 100 8 2 -1 2 2 2 7 IS B N 0 -7 1 0 0 - 9 0 4 2 - 0

JjT

isSjtSSj

1^1jj^l 1^1j^ |

j^TI 111

% $

CONTENTS

IIT

si

if t I

iI=i!=iS=|!=lI=l=7l-=7l=¥l-=7l=7l=¥l-=7l=7j^1 S \

HI

1

Three

10

JI tj] THE C R I T I Q U E | ii OF C O N C E P T S I 11 I IlJ[E[I=TETIE[!=T!=TETEi!=T!=j!=T!EfE Ut T h e foregoing suggests some am biguities as between specific injunctions, such as those of religious and secular law, and ethical dem ands determ ined by the sentim ent. It will become obvious th at my intention is not to diffuse these tensions, nor to be critical of them, but to switch sides, arguing or seeming to argue form alistically, only to reverse this position elsewhere. T he purpose is to create the so-called Tenos, a corybantic p aradox. T h e use of paradox is not specific to pre-sophist Greek philosophy or to Plato; indeed all the Philosophia Perennis schools eventually lead to a confrontation betw een two conceptually irreducible statem ents. In Zen this is called a K oan, and takes expression not only as a clash between two conceptually irreconcilable doctrines, but also in various actions, m usical p attern s, unexpected visual disharm onies and so on. A pious m aster m ay end a wise tale w ith a piercing^sfcream, or he may unexpectedly violently strike his favourite disciple on an occasion which requires praise and com m endation. T his is the m ethod of the Rinzai school to precipitate satori - the higher-level reconciliation of contradictory opposites. T he regular p a tte rn of a Zen garden is suddenly interrupted and the observer sees an apparen tly random collection of lines and paths, until suddenly he discovers a new organizing p attern and the garden paths ap pear again to be harm onious, yet this time the p attern is not objectively apparent. In H induism , m an is required to renounce all his desires; yet the highest realization lies in the reconciliation of the paradox created by the obligation not to strive, work or wish for renunciation in any way. O ne m ust renounce the renunciation in order to renounce. T h e corybantic paradox in Islam is the dem and to w orship the tran scen d en t (negative) God, yet by subm itting to a positive law and 48

THE CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTS

ritual. As against this, C hrist - or Paul - points to the absurdity of calling things clean and unclean. Paul stresses th at it is wrong to assum e th at the way to God lies in observing or not observing the S abbath, or eating or not eating pork. T hese Pauline anti-form ality argum ents appear particularly sensible and intellectually attractive as opposed to M uslim ideas of salvation through regular prayer and abstinence from pork. T o C h rist­ ians, such rituals m ay ap p ear idolatrous; yet the paradox in C hristianity, as M uslim s will readily point out, is the conceptually nonsensical claim th a t C hrist is both God and m an. Islam and C hristianity have both produced ‘philosophers’ who would resolve the paradoxes and make the religion conceptually (dianoically) attractive. It is claim ed by m ore than one Islam ic author th at the consum ption of pork was forbidden only because there was no adequate refrigeration in the tim e of M oham m ed - today, however, there is no need for such rules, and the law may be abandoned; and likewise for R am adan (the fast), etc. Such scholarship is applauded in the W est, ju s t as some M uslim s w ould no d o u b t applaud the repeated ‘philosophical’ claims that C h rist was not really God. T h e h ard core of any religion rejects such conceptual reconciliation. W hile religious claims m ay be m yths, the whole point of these m yths is to create the corybantic paradox, the tension which projects m an into noetic ra th e r th an conceptual reconciliation. Even the ‘G odless’ philosophyreligion of B uddhism relies on the renunciation-of-renunciation paradox. As for a contem porary ideological Weltanschauung such as M arxism , this also employs the paradoxical notion of a completely non-alienated society - the perfect state of com m unism - projected into the future so as to exact specific forms of behaviour in the real-actual world of today. W hile a com petent ‘philosopher5 could perfetly well argue for the necessity of corybantic paradox, in practice we m ay observe th at his verbosity will not help him to accept it himself. T he final requirem ent for a philosopher is th a t he should hum ble him self in favour of those who do und erstan d . It is for this reason th at Plato, having persistently ridiculed and exposed the m yths of religion and of seers and mystics as unreasonable and im m oral, nevertheless finishes his dialogues by beating a sudden retreat, and bowing his head to ‘the men of old who were better and wiser th an u s’. Hegel, on the other hand, takes the ‘philosopher king’ idea literally, and im agines him self to be a superior being, com petent to create reality and to pass judgm ents on the ‘true n atu re ’ of the Absolute. H egel’s idealism as a consequence has no practical relevance, for it is not based on the reality of the cosmic m yth but simply on the conceptualization of such a m yth. M yths can take different forms and be given different nam es, b u t essentially they m ust be based on eternal 49

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

fixities such as the Fall, the Cross, the curse of realization through toil and so on. O ne m ay reject the concept of the Fall and call the basic hum an condition ‘alienation’. O ne may deny th at m an realizes him self by daily picking up his cross and consecrating his toil to C hristhood, and w rite instead th a t m an realizes his essence him self in non-alienated labour - or indeed th a t m an becomes truly m an by defining him self through labour. F u rth er, one m ay reject the Second Com ing and replace it with non-alienated com m unism . Such a world view ‘w orks’ in so far as it is based on the cosmic truths; when it strays away from them , it ceases to work.

I It has been suggested by some scholars th at concepts and conceptual thinking are a relatively recent phenom enon. T hus we m ay note H eidegger (1968, p. 213) claiming th at both ‘concept and system alike are alien to G reek thinking’, and this applies even more to H indu and T aoist thought. O f course Greek texts and the T ao T e C hing may be read conceptually; and as a result one can derive interpretations of H induism in which ‘all is illusion’. Likewise, a m arket interpretation of Taoism would be a call for the unlim ited gratification of desire. T he mistake is typically m odern, but it is n o t tru e th a t the an c ie n ts n ev er m a d e it them selves. Before turning to these issues, some prelim inary investigation of the term ‘concept’ itself seems due. T he Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines it as ‘the result rendered p erm anent by language of a previous process of com parison’ (W. H am ilton). T he key phrase here is ‘rendered perm a­ n e n t’; th a t is, a concept is fixity as opposed to a tendential m ovem ent. It is to this characteristic th at H eidegger makes his objection. F u rth er, as pointed out by the phenom enologists and H eidegger, the concept-form ing m ind operates w ith a specific notion of time. Concepts are seen as being m ade from different stuff and in a different m anner from ideas. I shall refrain here from looking at the stuff of which ideas are m ade, an d attem p t to see w hat process lies behind concept form ation. C onceptual thought, as well as the conceptual notion of time, sees both the process of thinking and the flow of time in term s of a string of points located on a continuous line. T houghts as well as m atter are created from tiny building blocks. O pposed to this stands K ierkegaard’s account of actuality as a non-concretized flow of non-existent entities, which if arrested are rendered vacuous. As an exam ple he uses a group of soldiers 50

THE CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTS

com m unicating a passw ord. T he soldiers are standing in line and w hispering the passw ord from one to another. Each soldier forgets the passw ord as soon as he has com m unicated it to the next one. T hus the passw ord exists, if at all, as a m ovem ent - an activity - rath er than a nything th a t can be pinpointed and arrested. Likewise, noetic activity is the activity behind the aspectual principle: as such it does not create concepts - instead it tears down the arbitrary walls which concepts create. In addition, the correct perform ance of noetic activity is dependent not on a p articu lar conclusion b ut on the thinker’s ability to make categorial divisions along the n atu ral and contextually appropriate lines (Findlay, I 974>P - 156). T t seems probable to me th at God in the beginning formed m atter in solid m assy h ard im penetrable movable particles, of such sizes and figures and w ith such other properties and in such proportion to space as m ost conduced to the end for which he formed them; and th a t these prim itive particles being solids are incom parably harder than any porous bodies com pounded of them; even so hard as never to wear or break in pieces (N ew ton in C rosland, 1971, p. 76). T his study is em phasizing the interconnection of m an, cosmos, m atter and thought. W hether a culture appreciates food by tasting it with the u p p er frontal taste buds or the Katie tastebuds (the ones at the back of the throat) - sipping wine or gulping beer - determ ines w hether a m an u nderstands or swallows m eaning. T he K oran, the Laws of M anu and P lato point to the fact th a t m an ’s understanding and vision is determ ined by such ‘details’ as w hether he wears a h at or works at night. It is not for tra d itio n ’s sake th at M uslim s cover their heads. How we view m atter or the world influences how we form our thoughts. A m an who thinks in the conceptual m anner, in term s of building blocks, forms a specific world view. A ccording to Galileo, the centre of the universe was ‘there’ in the centre o f the sun, not here on earth. F urther, Galileo was of the opinion th a t prior to the invention of the telescope, these m atters could not have been properly studied. K a n t em braced these views enthusiastically and called his own revolution in thought Copernican, extending it to all fields of knowledge. N othing could be known prior to the sensual encounter and to understan d in g in term s of categories (K ant, 1881, p. 115). W e, on the other hand, can deduce from the analysis of prim itive art th a t the notional unities em bracing certain phenom ena are not necessarily form ed sim ultaneously w ith m an ’s sensual encounter with them . T he ab stract a rt of seventh-century A thens portrays this preconceptual state of m ind. T his is not to argue th at a m an whose thought is not conceptual has no knowledge or opinion concerning things he has not form ulated in term s 5i

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

o f objective images (concepts). It is only when the m ind attem pts to treat opinions as facts of externally objective knowledge th at it is forced to lend reality to the previously undifferentiated building blocks on which these opinions were based. O r, simply, although D em ocritus created the atom ic theory and Protagoras saw the m ind and not the soul as the final cognitive faculty, the Greeks did not treat these postulations as final truths. A bstract postulations, then, if treated merely as abstractions do not give rise to concepts. T hey are simply m eaningful or not, depending on factors external to their genesis. In treating such abstractions as objective knowledge, however, the m ind is stirred into reflective, causally oriented reckoning. In order to justify its behaviour by retrospective reference to rational rules, a person or his m ind is forced to lend reality to elem ents th a t previously had no m ental existence. Concepts are thus always retrospective; conceptual thought is likewise retrospective. P rior to the concepts, we noted, there were notions. These notions m ay still be valid while based on undifferentiated entities. T hey become concepts when the m ind attem pts to re create them in term s of first elem ents, i.e. as legitim ate autonom ous sub-unities. Concepts, however, are not valid unities and should not be differentiated as such. In granting unity to concepts the m ind is simply arresting the flow of thought, building illegitim ate walls and creating grounds for various kinds of falsity. T his applies to the creation of all things. T he idea th at thought is m ade of building blocks gives rise to the corresponding idea th at m atter is m ade of tiny building blocks — elements. Yet as pointed out by Socrates, in either case this ‘id ea’ is false: ‘Do you rem em ber, then, my dear T heaetetus . . . th at no account could be given of the prim ary things of which other things are com posed, because each of them taken ju s t by itself was incom posite and th a t it was not correct to attrib u te even existence to it, to call it “ th is” or “ th a t” ?’ ( Theaetetus, 205°.) O r, in the words of a contem porary physicist: ‘Subatom ic particles do not exist w ith certainty at definite places but rath er show tendencies to exist, an d atom ic events do not occur w ith certainty at definite times b u t rath er show tendencies to occur’ (C apra, 1975, p. 137). As for Socrates, he does not deny th a t the m ind does lend existence to the building blocks of conceptual thought or of m atter: the point of the argum ent is not to deny th a t perception, belief and ju d g m en t - or physical things - are thus constituted; the process is illegitim ate only if treated as knowledge. T he m an n er of thought th a t treats building blocks as real entities creates the possibility of a conceptual m ism atch, putting the concept of the T heaetetu s who really is together w ith a T heaetetus who is flying, who 52

THE CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTS

really is not. In this way we can account for the fact th at one may claim th a t 7 + 5 = 13; for only in attem pting to see the unity 13 as composed of 7 + 5 units does the possibility of m ism atch arise. T h e process of conceptualization therefore directly relates to the view th a t a conceptualist thinker has of time. Since this problem of time and m a tte r will be dealt w ith at some length later, all th at should be pointed out here is th a t the view of the existence of elem entary particles necessitates the view of tim e as a series of points and of m atter as extended building blocks. T his conceptualist view is not adequate. C ontem porary science is handicap p ed by conceptual thought, and by the ‘logical’ language of the positivists, as is contem porary philosophy. T hough physics has broken through this barrier, the tight lid held by the logical positivists on philosophical thought has so far stifled the inevitable breakthrough. C oncerning this m atter, H eisenberg (1963, p. 177) observes in relation to physics: the m ost difficult problem concerning the use of language arises in q u a n tu m theory. H ere we have at first no simple guide for correlating the m athem atical symbols with the concepts of ordinary language; and the only thing we know from the start is the fact th at our common concepts cannot be applied to the structure of atoms. ‘N on-logical’, non-conceptual thinking, far from being unscientific, is in fact in tune w ith the realities of our time. C ap ra (1975, p. 71) states: Q u a n tu m theory thus reveals a basic oneness of the universe. It shows th a t we cannot decom pose the world into independently existing sm allest units. As we penetrate into m atter, nature does not show us any isolated basic building blocks, but rath er appears as a com plicated web of relations betw een the various parts of the whole. These relationships always include the observer in an essential way. T he h u m an observer constitutes the final link in the chain of the observational process, and the properties of any atom ic object can only be understood in term s of the object’s interaction with the observer.

II N oetic principles are as relevant to art as to physics: elaborate technology confers no great advantage in approaching them . But the relation of the artist to Aritmos is of a p articular nature. According to Plato, he is an inverted m irror-im age of the noetic thinker. Each operates under a kind of spell (Mania). T hese spells however are of three kinds: the noetic and the two ‘lower m an ias’. W hile the ‘lower m an ia’ divides into two - positive 53

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

and negative - noetic m ania, as Theia Moira, is always single and positive. T he cognitive agency of the soul, Logisticon, is such th at it is entirely tru th o rientated, and as such it can only fail in so far as it ceases to operate: it cannot m alfunction. A rtistic inspiration, on the other hand, stems from the h eart and the stom ach; and unless these two are controlled by the noetic faculty, they inevitably do m alfunction. W hile the norm al individual ought to keep in balance the three cognitive faculties - those of the soul, m ind and body -- the artist, in those m om ents in which he operates as an artist, stuns his other faculties so as to be receptive to the passionate aspect of the soul. In this sense the artist is different from other people, for in order to be productive, he tends to m aim the balance of his own soul. T he artist in the m om ents w hen he acts as an artist m ay resem ble an irresponsible child, and m ust not be left to his own devices. It m ay be disturbing to the contem porary m ind, yet history em pirically testifies to the fact th at ‘g reat’ art was produced in service of the com m unity. T he great artists were subject to control and censorship. Such control was not necessarily exercised by a hum an agency - the environm ent at large and the m aterials used could be the controlling factors. In other words, for a rt to be effective it needs to m eet resistance and opposition. T h e traditional H indu artist is bothered and inconvenienced by the poor quality of his p ain t com pared to the non-drip paint of the m odern painter. T he flute player in Pakistan is inconvenienced by the restrictions of his instrum ent. Even so, by m aking the execution of art easier in the m aterial sense - by constructing electronic organs and ‘perfect’ p ain t — the art is not im proved. A rt is in fact the art of overcom ing the restrain t of the given situation, w hether considered in term s of m aterials or of other, social constraints. A rt can be defined as a sym bolic, publicly observable and graceful way of overcoming the friction of Anangke. Ballet dancers could leap higher if they were to be given little je t propulsors, yet the beauty of a ballet leap lies precisely in th at the restrictions of gravity are defied. A dvancem ent in technology does not in any way whatsoever lead to advance in art. T he same principle may be applied to a lim ited extent to formal restrictions of other kinds. W hile B eethoven and M ichelangelo found it distressing th at they were subject to censorship by the Pope and the State, it was in fact in the controlled clim ate of the V atican, the H apsburg court and the Florence of the M edici th a t ‘g re a t’ a rt flourished. T oo m uch control stifles the black, passionate horse of the soul; hence there is less a rt in times of excessive repression. O n the other hand, to allow the lower m ania a free rein leads to the disappearance o f ‘good’ art. 54

THE CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTS

Such a view m ay be unusual to the contem porary m ind, yet it can be objectively verified. A look at any period of repression of a rt or of its unlim ited expansion will show a reduction in the am ount of ‘good’ art. T hese m atters will be taken up elsewhere, and are to be understood in term s of Pleonexia - the psychological desire for unlim ited expansion w hich also m anifests as a phenom enon known to physics as ‘negative interference’: light waves if not in harm ony will cancel themselves out. Before turning to these issues, let us establish how a rt relates to the form ation o f concepts. In every period, the conceptual thinkers create time-specific philo­ sophies to w hich later generations cannot relate. W hile Socrates, Lao Tzu or R am an u ja were not the ‘established’ or ‘fam ous’ thinkers of their age, we do not know who these established or famous thinkers were, since their thought is not of interest to us. T ho u g h texts such as the T ao T e C hing or the M a h ab h ara ta are constructed in accordance with ‘foreign’, non-conceptual rules, m em bers of o ther cultures and epochs m ay - if willing to relax and to concentrate find them interesting and meaningful. T he reason, of course, is th at these texts relate to fixed, deeper needs: they are constructed in accordance with the ethical or religious sentim ent, and this is why we can understand them . I f no am ount o f concentration can help a non-specialized citizen to u n d erstan d a contem porary work of philosophy, the indication is th at such philosophy no longer relates to reality. T h e sam e objection applies to non-conceptual disciplines such as contem porary m usic and art. T he reasons why a non-specialized individual cannot always relate to these are of an ethical nature, and are given in relation to m usic by J.S . Bach. Bach expresses him self by using a notion - th a t of ‘G od’ - which is meaningful to him, yet his observation is valid even for those who do not accept his terminology. T hus he writes th a t all m usic which is not w ritten in the spirit of God is false, and is not m usic b u t an im itation of it. H e points out th at when the ethical sentim ent - w hich he calls ‘G od’ - is abandoned, the arts can freewheel for a while, b u t only for a while. U nlike the social sciences, contem porary art is not always conceptual: yet there is no m erit in abandoning conceptual rules unless one reintroduces the ethical elem ent as the organizing principle. In all cases ‘tru e ’ a rt as well as ‘tru e ’ philosophy will be found in the dialectical relationship betw een the two elements. Linear art freewheels; linear, non-creative m usic replays the patterns already created by the conceptual m ind. It is for this reason th at Parm enides and H eraclitus - despite their 55

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

differences - both w arn against the habit-conform ing m ind, and it is in the light o f this w arning th at one is to understand w hat it is th at Plato is hinting at w ith his continuous references th at one is not to forget O ceanus’ and T h e ty s’ axioms th at all things are perpetually flowing ( Theaetetus, i5 2 e, i8 o d; Timaeus, 40e; Cratylus, 402b). O ne may also understand how it is th a t Plato is said to have com bined both H eraclitian and Parm enidean traditions. I f thought is arrested by the nature of conceptual activity, then reality indeed becomes flux - the rivers of O ceanus and T hetys pass m an by. In recognizing this fact, m an unbalances the conceptual arrest and learns to flow w ith the rivers: viewed in this sense, reality can be observed as unchanging. F or exam ple, the dialogue between Socrates and the sophists can be seen as the struggle between thought and the arrest of thought. W ords and language can be used either as triggers to notional flow, or as sources of autonom ous m eaning arrested in these very verbal form ulations. T his issue o f flow versus the arrest of flow is the subject of the dialogue Cratylus. Episteme - knowledge - can be interpreted as Epetai - the m ovem ent of things (412a): this is the ‘tender’ use of language. Episteme can also be taken as Stenai - stopping or standing still (437a). T ru e m eanings cannot be arrested in words or definitions. Language is only a tool to help us recollect. T reating a word or definition as a source of reality lends a unity and perm anence to conceptual thought which it does not possess. T his principle also applies to things as m entally put together. As Findlay (1979, p. 218) notes, C ratylus ‘rejects the basic prem ise of the W ittgensteinian theory of language: th at there is no understanding or percipient grasp of ideal natures prior to the use of linguistic expressions’. T h u s neither language nor the rules of logic or reason determ ine reality, despite various claims to the contrary voiced by philosophers from K a n t through Hegel to W ittgenstein. T h e difference between the sophist and the philosopher can be seen as the difference between a m an who uses language to persuade and a m an who uses speech to discover. In creating a concept, the m ind had already m ade a statem ent and chosen a m iniature philosophy, and it seeks to persuade others. As pointed out in the Gorgias (520s, 52i e), the sophist enters a courtroom arm ed with a set of definitions; he ‘know s’ prior to the facts and context w hat justice, wisdom and knowledge are. A gainst him stands Socrates, the stingray, stinging the lazy horse back into activity, not allowing thought to stand still, and insisting on treating each instance as new (Meno, 8oa_c).

56

THE CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTS

II I Noetic thought does not lay stress on arrested definitions, w hether arrested in a single-word sentence or in a philosophical doctrine. E xtended to the field of ethics, concepts m aterialize as laws - so noetic thought attem p ts to m inim ize reliance on the law in the courts as well as on definitions in philosophical discourse. These principles extend further into the region of m a n ’s ideological and religious beliefs. Noetic thought m inim izes beliefs th at are based on images, words, doctrines and Eikones. A ccording to Lao T zu, ‘Good men do not argue’ (Tao T e C hing, L X X X I); the true teaching is the ‘teaching w ithout w ords’ (X L III). W h at he m eans is th a t a m an cannot be persuaded to a true belief. By persuading a m an to accept a p articular creed, one has only captured a non-essential aspect of the m an. T he profession of faith in a creed, if a m a tte r of persuasion, is likewise of little value. T his is borne out by J e su s’ parable of the two sons. A m an had two sons and asked them to work in the vineyard. O ne rejected the words of his father; yet for reasons w hich are not analysed, it was in fact this son who w ent and cultivated the vineyard. T he other son accepted - i.e. conceptually accepted - his father’s words, but did not cultivate the vineyard: ‘he answ ered, ‘I go, sir,’ but did not go. ‘W hich one of the tw o’ asks Jesu s - ‘did w hat his father w anted?’ (M atthew , X X I, 28-31). Elsewhere, Jesu s says th at he himself, the Son of M an, may be rejected, b u t not so the sentim ent th at he represents - the Holy Ghost: ‘whoever says a w ord against the Son of m an will be forgiven; but w hoever speaks against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven’ (M atthew , X II, 31). T hough M oham m ed calls upon all to be M uslim s and to accept ‘the Book’, one should not be too quick to understand this ‘book’ literally. T h u s in surah IV , 153, he writes of the people who look for God in scripture: ‘the People of the Book ask you to bring down for them a book from heaven. O f Moses they dem anded a hard er thing than that. They said to him: “ show us Allah distinctly.” And for their wickedness a th u n d erb o lt sm ote th em .’ M oham m ed does not m ean by this th at the K o ran is dispensable. However, elsewhere he writes th at Allah has sent m essengers to all nations to tell them his word in their own language; thus C hristians, Sabaeans, Jew s, etc. should all do well: ‘As for those th at believe in A llah and His apostles and discrim inate against none of them , they shall be rew arded by A llah’ (IV , 152). T h ere is of course a paradox here, for one cannot be both a C hristian and a M uslim , yet both insist on exclusivity. M oham m ed him self accepts - and preaches - this paradox, for above the paradox, which is conceptual, there stands the Logos: it is in fact the ‘Islam ’ - subm ission to 57

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

the will of A llah - th at is decisive. Pickthall writes (n.d., p. 33), ‘All through the [second] surah runs the note of w arning, which sounds indeed th roughout the whole K oran, that it is not the mere profession of a creed, b u t righteous conduct, which is true religion.’ T his point is carried to an extrem e by the Sufi m ystic who, when tortu red to d eath by C hristian crusaders, spoke thus to his torturers: T f you believe th at you strike for Allah, then strike h arder so th at we shall m eet in heaven.’ T h e point is also illustrated by K ierkegaard (developing an idea also found in the M a h a b h a ra ta ). A knight is a knight by virtue of his noble conduct in battle. A knight when fighting in the fog m ay in fact be fighting on the opposite side to the one he thinks, yet - notes K ierkegaard (1962, p. 2 0 )- this is not the point: when the fight is a noble one any side is the right side. T h e contem porary ideal of an all-em bracing resolution with the absence of all paradox and conflict sounds (conceptually) pious, yet is not of Z,0g0j-based thought. K rish n a speaks to A rjuna before the battle - ‘Slay and be slain’: the K sh atrias on both sides are equally dear to God. Likewise, M oham m ed writes: ‘H ad your Lord pleased, all the people of the earth would have believed in H im . W ould you then force faith upon m en?’ (K oran, X , 95.) St Paul cannot be assum ed to be w riting of historical ‘Je w s’ and historical ‘G entiles’. Jew s are those who have accepted the formally true religion —i.e. th a t o f the one God —and Gentiles are those who have not. F or he is not a real Jew who is one outw ardly, nor is true circum cision som ething external and physical. H e is a Jew who is one inw ardly, and real circum cision is a m atter of the heart, spiritual and not literal (R om ans, II, 28-9). M y argum ent, however, is not against formality. U nlike C alifornian gurus and pop singers, I do not urge people to rise above environm entally d eterm ined givens or parties, religions, creeds, etc. In saying th at all men are brothers, neither B uddha nor Confucius was advocating th at men should aban d o n the particularity of belief, custom, philosophy or religion necessitated by the historical m om ent. ‘Faithful in abstracto’ pop stars and professionalized hum an itarians may be successful in draw ing universal approval by preaching ‘peace and love’ platitudes in such a way as to reduce them to simplified images bearing no relation to reality; b u t the ways of Logos are not susceptible to conceptual simplifications. Behind the ‘le t’s do aw ay w ith divisions’ slogans lies the hard m ateriality of the bourgeois m achinery. T he divisions these entertainers would really like to do aw ay w ith are those halting the spread of the m arket: few pop stars or C alifornian gurus have seriously proposed to elim inate economic divi­ 58

THE CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTS

sions, or given aw ay the m oney they earned by preaching anti-form alism . T h e com plexity of real life situations is given in the M ah ab h arata. T he general rule of conduct is abstention from injury by act, thought and word in respect o f all creatures, yet a few lines later in the text we read th at ‘no person in the world can support life w ithout injuring other creatures. T he very ascetic in the depths of the forest is no exception.’ W hile noetic thought stresses th at a particular m anifestation is not the tru th , it does not pretend th a t it can do w ithout such m anifestations. An icon is not a god b u t a picture of God. Likewise, m an is not God b u t m ade in the im age of God; yet for m an there is no God except as m anifest in m an. Positivists would have us believe th at we can know w hat m an is by studying an existing, p articular m an or group of men. Yet no m an can exhaust m anhood. T his does not m ean th at for every actual m an there is a real m an in the world of ideas. Even though the tangible is not the u ltim ate tru th , there is nothing but the tangible. A lthough the actual m an is not the m an himself, there is no m an but the actual m an. Behind T aoism or altruistic socialism there does not exist a transcendent, ‘tru e’ philosophy of Logos, even though we may be forced to make the conceptual assertion th at there is such a ‘thing’. T here is nothing b u t the actual: in taking away the actual m anifestation of a particularized religion or philosophy w ithout replacing it by a new one, one takes away everything there is. T h u s m an will never be able to do away with nations, ideologies and so forth: even though one m ight do away with nations based on territory, language or race, people would form groups and associations on a different basis. T he same principle applies to thoughts, w ords, actions, houses - all of these need to take expression by resorting to some actual form. T h e noetic thinker is obliged to differentiate between the symbol (which is fixed) and the m eaning (which is loose). A nything becomes w hat it is through the m arriage of the fixed and the loose, the lim it and the unlim it. T h e noetic thinker does not deny the ability to connect things through the unifying activity of the sentim ent, which transcends the various m ani­ festations w hich take place in time and space. B ut if K a n t and Stenzel were wrong to equate the ideas of true things w ith concepts, and if concepts are illegitim ate entities anyway, then where are valid forms to be found? Similarly, if atom s - or any tiny building blocks - are not the real constituents of things, w hat are things m ade of? N oetic thought claims th at thoughts and things, bodies and souls, are all m ade from the sam e m aterial and range into one another. Before we identify this m aterial, let us exam ine the form ation of thoughts and concepts in m ore detail. 59

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

IV C ontem porary thought in the W est appears unwilling to give up the view of ideas as concepts, though it is quite prepared to replace ‘concepts’ with a different word. Sir D avid Ross prefers ‘universals’. H e writes: ‘the senses present us w ith a world of p articular events, but in Reason we have a faculty by which we transcend the flux and synthesise universals’ (Ross, 1966, pp. 225-6). Ross bases his understanding of universals on the A ristotelian paradigm or m aster instance which, to him , becomes the idealized concept. C rudely understood, this m eans th at through seeing m any horses, we eventually form a picture of the universal horse. H e considers th a t ‘the best exam ple we have of this power is to be found in m ath em atics.’ Ideas, in this interpretation, become ab stract and theore­ tical, like the rules and objects of m athem atics. T his is not the view of noetic thinkers. In the Republic (511a— e), for exam ple, Plato claims th at m athem atics is entirely lim ited by the lower epistem ic activity, which is expressed as an hypothesis derived from sense d ata. T his is different from the idea-oriented activity called Noesis, which is entirely independent of the calculative reason of the m athem atical (i.e. theoretical) sciences. In view o f E gyptian, Babylonian and Pythagorean thought, we could ask w hether it m ight be numbers th at are the currency of noetic thought. In associating num bers and m athem atics with universals, G aiser, Ross and those like m inded seem to base their views on certain Pythagorean strains in P lato ’s thought. W hile such views are currently being exploited at length by all kinds of unexpected authorities, it m ust be rem em bered th at A ristotle (Metaphysics, 987*29-988*1 7) writes th at the num bers Plato and P ythagoras are talking about are not the objects of m athem atics. T he num bers th a t are constitutive of reality have little to do w ith m ath em at­ ical universals. For the Egyptians or for the B rotherhood at C roton, ‘m athem atical thinking’ is not the correct currency for apprehending reality. N um bers, according to Plato, are forms - or like them - and as such quite above thought: even the purest thought cannot be equated w ith the universal. T h e realization th at ideas transcend ordinary thought is not easily m ade, and m ay have been hotly disputed in the A cadem y itself. T his is possibly why in the dialogue Parmenides the old philosopher finds it necessary to point out this peculiarity to Socrates, who is described as ‘young and inexperienced’ in observing th at ideas are thoughts. ‘But P arm en id es,’ asks Socrates, ‘may it not be th at each of these ideas is a thought which cannot exist anyw here but in the m ind?’ Parm enides refutes this, for it would imply th at there have to be thinkers everywhere 60

THE CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTS

present, otherw ise the universe would consist of thoughts being thought by nobody. W hile attem p tin g to diagnose the false way of thinking, I have so far been less explicit concerning the nature of correct thought. (It is of course a p a rt of Logoj-based philosophy th at positive conclusions should be im plied ra th e r th an form ulated.) I have called the correct m anner of thought ‘asp ectu al’, and described it as a ‘flow’ of entities. I have em phasized th a t these entities are not concepts. Even though it is not etymologically correct, .H am ilton’s equation of Ratio w ith concept and Nous with notion seems philosophically apt. T he w ord ‘n otion’ as a cou n terpart to ‘concept’ serves to suggest both the ‘NoeirC-form ing process and its product. T he sage’s m ind ‘flows like w ater’ (Lao T zu) or ‘like sm ooth oil’ (Socrates in the Theaetetus), but C huang T zu speaks of fools recognizing things by referral to a string of pictures, and Confucius advises the rectification of these pictures when they are arrested in w ords, according to the rhythm s of Li. If concepts are defined as universalized w ords or pictures derived through the senses and im printed as m odels on our m inds, then we do not have far to look for them in P lato’s dialogues: ‘It appears to me th at the conjunction of m em ory with sensation together w ith the feeling consequent upon m em ory and sensation m ay be said to write words in our souls’ (Philebus, 39a). This passage seems to be a description of the process of concept form ation. H ow ever, if we are to follow H am ilton’s definition, for a concept to be a concept it m ust be rendered perm anent: ‘T hen please give your approval to the presence of a second artist in our souls . . . a painter who comes after the w riter and paints in the soul the pictures of these assertions that we m ake’ (Philebus, 39b) . C oncept form ation is also sim ilar to the process outlined by Socrates in the Theaetetus: sense im pressions are im printed on a ‘block of w ax’, to be used as a fixed sym bol or universal by m eans of which one can recognize other instances (Theaetetus, 191°). Socrates likens the possession of ‘concepts’ to the possession of token birds held captive in the aviary of our m inds. W hen sensually encountering an unrecognized ‘b ird ’, the m ind turns to the token collection and seeks to grab hold of an identifying representative ( Theaetetus, 197°). However, the use of such knowledge is of lim ited value to Socrates: all these attem pts to account for such knowledge lead to eventual bankruptcy, since they allow for the possibility of false ju d g m en t. I f som ething is known, argues Socrates, it can never be m atched against an unknow n and different thing and judged to be the sam e. T he very fact th at conceptual m ism atching occurs proves th at conceptual ‘know ledge’ is not knowledge but conjecture (Theaetetus, 200b). O pposed to this there is the aspectual flow. ‘To know like a river’ is a 61

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

stan d ard form of im agery m uch used in Vedic, T aoist and Platonic thought. ‘N otion’ is defined by the Shorter Oxford Dictionary as an inclination, a tendency, a flow: and it is the word ‘flow’ th at we here distinguish as characteristic. In the Symposium (207b-2 0 8 a), Plato gives us a detailed account of knowledge as a flow of births: ‘E verything including m an is continually changing, and this is true not only o f the body b u t of the soul, [yet] w hat happens with pieces of knowledge is even m ore rem arkable. . . . Each individual piece of knowledge is subject to the same process as ourselves. W hen we use the w ord “ recollection” we imply by using it th at knowledge departs from us; forgetting is the d ep arture of knowledge, and recollection, by im planting a new im pression in the place of that which is lost, preserves it and gives it a spurious appearance of uninterpreted identity. It is in this way th a t everything m ortal is preserved: not by rem aining for ever the sam e . . . b u t by undergoing a process in which the losses caused by age are repaired by new acquisitions of a sim ilar kind.’ N otions cannot be defined positively - th at is, statically - for they only trace th a t from which they separate, and which is forever being born anew. Aritmos is the organizing principle of noetic thought. Its general m eaning ap art, it also has a num ber of specific m eanings: this plurality of m eaning is perfectly legitim ate if in each case it is determ ined by context. Faced w ith the words arithm etic, reason, Logisticon, Techne, science, astronom y, the contem porary m ind autom atically reduces a preconceptual term inology to conceptual units: but a knowledge of Aritmos, it is repeatedly argued by Plato, is necessary in the ordering of one’s affairs, of o ne’s own soul and of the affairs of State (Laws, 737d~738b; Epinomis, 979a_b). H e placed a sign over the entrance to the Academy, stating th at ‘those not schooled in Aritmos need not en ter’. In contem porary term s, he was saying th at practical science m ay increase the standard of living, and th a t excellence in theoretical science may win social recognition, but the study of n um ber is th at w hich ‘facilitates the conversion of the soul’ to true values, which are ethical (Republic, 525°). (For those who are of the opinion th at contem porary science has surpassed the thinking of the Greeks, it m ay be w orth pointing out th at D alton obtained his atom ic theory from D em ocritus. T he debate over the wave and particle theories of m a tte r was ju s t as active in the A cadem y as it is today. Plato rejected the particle theory on the same grounds as those recently used by Bohr and R utherford. T he p opular belief th at Galileo discovered th at the earth is round and th at it was he who posited heliocentric theory is ju s t a myth: all this was well established in Greece. Plato rejected the heliocentric 62

THE CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTS

theory of A ristarchus on ethical grounds, while being fully aw are of the em pirical evidence in favour of it.) Findlay (1974, p. 345) draw s attention to the word D iarithm esis, and writes concerning it: ‘O u r sense of the ju st and noble always depends on a subtle num bering th at we use to persuade ourselves and others.’ H e adds, ‘W ith o u t this we should only have correct opinions and could convince no o ne.’ D iarithm etic vibration is in fact the test of truth. W ithout this sentim ent, we can persuade people only on the basis of concepts and opinions: we appeal only to the m ind and ignore the logic of the body and th a t of the soul. T h e difference between persuasion and the creation of sentim ent is the difference between the sophist and the philosopher. T he sophist does not speak to a m an as an integrated body, soul and mind; he structures his w ords, beliefs and institutions around images and concepts. T h e philosopher, on the other hand, verifies the validity of a particular construction —w hether a sentence or a legal constitution - by com paring it to the underlying reality which manifests itself in a certain Aritmos, the ratio defining a unity of body and soul (Epinomis, 978a-b). It m ay be difficult to calculate the num bers involved in these ratios, but several ancient systems of philosophy were structured around them , and so are the notions of contem porary physics, since they reflect and are consonant w ith the forces ruling the universe. Sentim ents correspond to the aspectual notional m ovem ent, and follow the changing flux while m aintaining an inner fixity and objectivity which is not touched by outer change. Sentim ent, therefore, is th at objective quality which legitim ates the fluid aspectuality of noetic thought, and rescues it from the ethical subjectivity of the positivists. In short, then, there are three different uses of the word Aritmos: (1) in the ordinary sense of num ber as in counting; (2) in the quasi-eidetic sense, as an object of theoretical m athem atics or defined ratio; and (3) in the com pletely non-em pirical sense, where it functions as the subjectively felt cognitive elem ent, or divine sentim ent, whereby one understands the rhythm ic su b strata o f the ethical cosmos. In this tradition, the universe is constituted, apprehended and governed by rhythm . ‘N ot only for plants th at grow from the earth but also for the anim als th a t live upon it there is a cycle’ (Republic, 550*). T his m ust be true for m en as well; the qualities of the rhythm ic divisions ruling any group in a city - and the city itself - ensure ‘the common sentim ent’ (Laws, 745e). T hese qualities of m easure and proportion are w hat constitutes beauty and excellence (Philebus, 64e). Indeed it is rhythm , ratio, proportion, as apprehended by a correct motion of the soul, th at constitutes all noetic differentiation. In this light, one can understand better how it is the n atu re of our sentim ents th at determ ines the way we 63

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

co nstruct not only our own persons and identities b u t all other entities, inner and outer. W ith Solmsen (1942, p. 169) we can see P lato’s laws as reflective of ‘basic spiritual and m oral forces in fact deriving their strength, appeal and pow er of persuasion from intim ate contact with the deeper layers of h um an existence.’

V T o sum m arize the whole discussion so far, we have seen two principles aro u n d w hich an autonom ous, conscious entity constitutes knowledge. In the first case, the constitutive activity was expressed in the creation of entities differentiated by their extension in time and space, and organized into unities called things. T he force bringing these unities together was p arekbasitic Epithumia, Kama, desire. As an indirect product of this activity, the ‘discerning ag ent’ was generated, i.e. the person who becomes conscious of him self as a unit through his reflective awareness of the above process. T hro u g h such activity, m an separates his m ind from his body an d his body from his soul. T he individual is equated w ith his m ind, and as such separates him self from the environm ent at large - the cosmos and his im m ediate environm ent, his body. O pposed to this m entally constituted individual there is the aspectually perceiving psyche posited by Z,0g0j-orientated thought. T he differences between these two are rooted in a difference over the n ature of the organizing principles of thought. For K an t, whose thought was taken as an archetype counterposed to noetic thought, the principle behind all reasoning is the categories of the m ind. In choosing this principle, K a n t (as also Protagoras) chose to accept a p articu lar set of scientific beliefs which were predom inant in his tim e. In K a n t’s case, the views concerned were of m atter as consisting of m aterial particles, and the centre of the universe as being external to m an - i.e. not the earth. T he sophists accept D em ocritus’ view of all m atter as composed of indestructible little elements - atom s - and of thoughts being composed of sum m arized, fixed images or Eikones. Further, they accept the heliocentric theory o f A ristarchus. All this is rejected by the noetic thinkers - Socrates, the Pythagoreans and in p articular Plato - who, while fam iliar with the argum ents of the astronom ers, reject these views on ethical grounds and propose an alternative way of seeing the universe. T he assum ptions of heliocentric theory are now held as provisionally true. In the local sense, the views of N ew tonian m echanics hold: the object with the larger mass will be central to rotation. However, as far as observational evidence goes precisely the sam e observations will be m ade w hether the sun is orbiting 64

THE CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTS

around the earth or vice versa: in fact the observations will conform to the locality of the observer. Protagoras, like K an t, never denies the existence of the ‘alm ighty m over’; both thinkers, however, make the origin of m ovem ent external to m an. In order to define m an, Protagoras externalizes the divine. K an t follows the sam e procedure, except th at he claims his intention is to be b etter able to define God and religion. They both turn the m an-cosm os or m an-G od relation upside down: by externalizing God in m an, K an t also externalizes m an. T h e essence of m an is seen as external to the actual m an, and is given by the categories of apprehension. Protagoras sum m arizes all these views in his famous dictum th at m an is the m easure of all things. For ‘m a n ’ read ‘m an ’s m ind as given by external criteria’ ('Theaetetus, 154b—17 1b); hence for the paradigm atic sophist, external p a tte rn is the m easure of all things ( Theaetetus, i6od). A gainst this view stands Socrates, for whom it is the internal pattern G od - w hich is the m easure of all things; God is conceived of as ‘divine m in d ’ or ‘the true divine reason’, Logos, which is differentTrom m ental, Dianoia-based reason (Philebus, 22c). T his divine reason can be pro­ visionally equated with the set of internal criteria I have labelled sentim ent. T h u s the criteria for God, which in positivist thought are external to m an, are in fact internal or hum anistic; and the conceptually ‘in te rn a l’ criteria become external. T h e K an tian , so-called hum anistic, m an-oriented conception inevitably leads to the ‘dehum anizing’ conclusion th at m an is preceded by abstract entities called categories. T he noetic notion starts and ends with m an, or ra th e r an aspect of m an, the Auto Kath-Auto (Timaeus, 57e-5 8 ), the infinitely flexible self-determ inant or self-mover, which precedes any constitutive entities. T h e divine aspect of m an here chooses the organizing principles by its own changing inclinations. T he organizing activity itself is ‘teleologically aspectual’. I have chosen the word ‘aspectual’ since such activity transgresses the aspects or dimensions delim ited by time and space, and does not compose unities according to sensually perceived units of shape and tem poral succession, nor according to N ew tonian m echanical causality; rather, unities are determ ined by a particular inclination or affection of the soul, and are governed by a specific Aritmos or ratio. I have used the word ‘teleological’, since both the m anner in w hich som ething is discerned by the soul and the nature of the soul’s eventual conclusion is determ ined by the nature of its interest. T h e constitutive blocks of the ‘things’ discerned by ‘categorial’ thought were labelled concepts, and atom s or elements. Against these were posited notions and Aritmoi, being the flux of sentim ent-structured thought and of things. T his distinction between the two sets of organizing criteria has led 65

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

to a fu rther distinction, between things as functions of time and space and things as functions of n um ber or sentim ent. W hile introductory definitions such as ‘by m an we shall m ean so-and-so’ are the currency of the conceptualist, a definition may be em ployed by a noetic thinker in order to sum m arize a set of movements. H aving gone through such a set of m ovem ents, the reader m ay com pare how his own positive grasp relates to th at of the author: the true definition lies in the dialectic betw een these two. T h u s we m ay generalize, and claim th at a hum an individual is never this or that, b u t is always a flow of decisions. In other words, there are m any possible I ’s, and the true I is created in the relationship between the chooser and the environm ent w ithin which he chooses. Logically the chooser precedes the chosen I, but the precedence is only logical, not tem poral. In the course of his life a m an is constantly redefining himself. W hile the choices are infinite, conjecturally we may reduce them to a choice between two kinds of I. In every thought, in every action, in every desire, one chooses betw een these two selves. O ne of them is integrated and noetic, and defined in a positive sym biotic relation between the larger cosmos the universe - and the im m ediate environm ent of one’s family, city and own body. Such an I instantly resolves the clash of any interests, w hether of body-m ind or soul, and fuses them all into a single entity. As against this there is the individualizing I, which is the desire th at makes us smoke even though this m ay be bad for our body: it creates body-m ind conflict. F u rth er, the individualizing I sees its own interests as independent of the im m ediate environm ent and of the cosmos at large.

VI T he m ind-know ing faculty, if not operating in conjunction with the body-know ing faculty, and if separate from the knowing faculty of the soul, necessarily creates false thinking. T he objection to m ental thinking is not an objection to a p articular doctrine or a content - the objection is to the activity itself. T he m ind is ultim ately a conjectural abstraction: there is no m ind, b u t simply the brain which feels pleasures and pains. T he m ind is a m echanical, passive instrum ent, which when divorced from noetic control seeks to avoid pain and m aximize pleasure in the most im m ediate ways. T h e m ind is capable of perceiving th at certain pleasures taken today m ay bring pain tom orrow , since these relationships follow the cause-andeffect laws of m echanics, which are also the laws w ithin which the m ind 66

THE CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTS

itself operates. T h e m ind, however, is not able to grasp how dam age done to the environm ent, i.e. to entities other than the self conceived by the m ind, will also bring pain to the self and to all other selves - since the interrelation betw een the self and the cosmos does not follow the principles of m ental thought, tem poral succession in causality, the categories of tim e and space and so forth. T h e m ind therefore is incapable of being good. A m entally rational m an can only be expected to be good to his fellow m an if he can be shown th at if he behaves in this way to others, others will be good to him. T hus parents are expected to love and care for their children only in the expectation th a t they will be cared for by the children in their old age. If such ‘m ark et’ relationships can be institutionalized, e.g. through social security and old people’s homes, then love becomes unnecessary. T hus the m arket replaces love. N oetic thought m aintains th at love is its own rew ard. For a parent to love and care for a child is rew arding in itself, for in loving a parent becomes w hat he is. So too for a citizen and his duties tow ards his city. In a com plicated way such individuals are rew arded, although the m anner and the n atu re of the rew ard cannot be grasped by the m ind: it is grasped by the soul and by the body - by the heart. T he individual who is rew arded by acts undertaken in the sentim ent of love is not the sam e individual as the one synthesized by the categories of tim e, space and causality. K ant, realizing this, calls on m en to do not w hat they would like b u t w hat is their duty. T his is the inevitable result of conceptual thinking: action either becomes self-gratifying or selfsacrificing. W e dislike serving king and country but it is our duty; and so also for duties tow ards children, parents and God. E ventually one becomes tired of all these duties. It is unreasonable to expect people to act in a certain way because they are daily persuaded th a t they ought to, even though they d o n ’t like it. And it is unreasonable to accept th at they can be forced to behave in a socially acceptable way m erely through the creation of an efficient police force and law courts. In the long run, a conceptually organized society - m arket, law, police - is unbearable. R ath er th an the ‘stick and carro t’ techniques of the m arket and the law courts, noetic thought uses sounds, rhythm s and ideas to educate the individual to perceive him self differently. T hus activities which are seen as painful by the conceptual I appear enjoyable to the noetic I. Views such as this are also advocated by conceptual thinkers, but w ithout realizing th at m ental philosophy is not enough. For the object of noetic w riting is not to draw conclusions such as the above, which are them selves conceptual: the object is to create the sentim ent. 67

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

W ere one to draw philosophic distinctions according to the nature of the m ental activity behind a philosophy, one could fruitfully posit a dichotom y betw een idealists and noetic thinkers. T he idealists, ‘the friends of ideas’, m ay take the ‘religious’ view as their intellectual starting point, b u t their view is itself rooted in an idea of the m ind - i.e. it is a thought. Idealists like Hegel are forced to deny objective reality to the external em pirical world, and to see it as a product of the m ind. T hough a p p aren tly at odds, the idealist and em pirical positions are identical with respect to the m ental process through which the world view of each is derived. T h eir conclusions are, of course, different: the idealists assert the prim acy of m ind over m atter and the em piricists assert the reverse. Noetic thou g h t rejects both positions as based on object-subject, inner-outer divisions which are incom patible with its own world view. Such divisions do not occur in aspectual thought. For the aspectual thinker, the world is the body of the deity: and the deity is w ithin and w ithout, in m atter and outside it. T hales writes th at all things are full of God. T here are in the S a an th an a tradition no discussions of the type on which post-C artesian philosophy is based: noetic thinkers do not ask questions such as ‘Do I exist?’ or ‘W ho am I?’ H aving never asked such questions, noetic thought never provided answers to them. As against noetic thought, conceptual thought is parekbasitic - it turns things upside down. W hen he wrote th at Hegel ought to be turned right side up, M arx was not being clever with words or coy. T he conceptualist inversion of reality is an ever-recurring phenom enon. As Plato argues in the Parmenides, w herever the conceptualist uses an ‘is’, the philosopher should su b stitute an ‘is n o t’. T h e sophist is in fact a m irror image of the philosopher, for he is exactly the sam e, except th a t w hat is on the left for the one is on the right for the other. Indeed the notions ‘left’ and ‘rig h t’ in contem porary political ja rg o n are based on yin-yang, heaven-earth, male-female divisions and are correspondingly inverted. Inversion or Anatrope will be explored furth er below; let us for now take a last look at how it relates to the p arad ig m atic bourgeois thinkers, K an t and Descartes. T hese two, while formally claim ing to be religious, in fact present a sentim ent and a m anner of apprehending the world which is in the long ru n fundam entally irreligious. They present an externalized entity and call it God. T his ‘theoretical’ God however is not a living God; it was only a m a tte r of tim e before it was negated by Nietzsche and others. K a n t w ould have us believe th at in destroying God as w ithin m an, and externalizing it into the transcendent world of ‘things as such’, he has m ade true religion possible. A rgum ents apart, history has shown the result of K a n t’s activity (in the words of Jesus, ‘by their fruits you shall 68

THE CRITIQUE OF CONCEPTS

know th em ’). K a n t is afraid to verbalize w hat Nietzsche, in a sudden bout o f courage, scream s from the cliff of Engadin - ‘God is dead and we have m urdered him !5 A form al disbeliever, Nietzsche proves more ethical and religious th an the form ally pious, clerical K a n t - proving once again th at form al notions or the profession of faith in God are not decisive. N obody can believe in a conceptual God, and nobody does. A conceptual, external God is a projection of fears, prejudices, fantasies and wishful thinking. T his is w hat the God of the nineteenth century had become: opium for the masses and the intellectuals. W hile God as an intellectual concept seems to be different from the God of the supersti­ tious, icon-w orshipping, ignorant idolater, both notions are in fact the same: both are externalized, fixed icons or pictures, and, as such, subject to all the criticism s of Freud, Nietzsche and the others. All these criticism s apply only to God as conceptualized. In denying this external G od, the m ental-intellectual idol, Nietzsche, Freud and other conceptually atheistic philosophers make room for the re-emergence of the ‘new ’, the internal God. W hether this internal God will be called God again will depend on how soon the negative, conceptual connotations of the w ord can be rem oved from the E uropean consciousness; until this happens, it is possibly better to call God by other names. As I shall argue, any progress, in art, music or science, necessitates the radical b anishm ent of conceptual thought. C ontem porary physics has already m oved in this direction. Given th at activity and motion are the essential properties of m atter, the concept of ‘d ea d 5 physical atom s and external forces w hich push them around can no longer be m aintained. Let us look now a t the substance of the new and living cosmos th at will replace it.

69

f7 1

I l £= 7 l ^ i

®

ill i

% I II I

\ \z z \ £]

I Four

ANEW M A T E R IA L I S M

in 1 111 I

C?!=TET!ETETETETET!=TJ=fJ=T!=iI=l!ii

M atter, it is claim ed by Bohr, de Broglie and the qu an tu m theorists, moves itself —it has its own forces and laws. P lato’s definition of ‘real’ is th a t w hich can move and be moved, which can affect and be affected. For the G reeks, for H in d u and Chinese thinkers, the whole cosmos was alive. T h e new m icrobiology likewise abandons the organic-inorganic divi­ sion, and so does the new chem istry. W hile the social sciences are continuing their m arch tow ard further and further specialization, and while sociologists can no longer m eaningfully com m unicate w ith psycho­ logists and lingual philosophers, these principles of specialization are in fact already b ankrupt. H istory creates strange alliances, and it is not surprising to see physics m erging w ith philosophy and biology w ith political science. O n a large scale, the new alliances will fuse tax m erchants and ‘sinners’, atheists and priests. New affinities and new com m on interests will be found in surprising q uarters. Sentim ent cuts across ideological, racial and profess­ ional divisions. D ram atic exam ples of this can be found. W hile the m ainstream of philosophy today is either logical positivism or anarcho-existentialism , there is appearing a sm all group of thinkers from various schools who suddenly grasp a com m on affinity and realize that, although they are classified as philosophers by the various university departm ents, they share neither the language nor the interests of their so-called peers - the positive philosophers and social scientists. Instead, they socialize and converse w ith physicists, biologists and m em bers of the ‘other cam p’. Sim ilarly, there is a split between the m ain body of applied science (the technologist and the m arket scientist) and an avant-garde group of physicists, biologists and chemists. Industrial chemists can m eaningfully 70

A NEW MATERIALISM

talk to industrial sociologists and to logical-positivist philosophers, while the sam e individuals cannot grasp the ideas of contem porary m athem atics or physics. T h e new, noetic biologists converse freely with the new chem ists, and the one science ranges freely into the other. M en like Bohr or Einstein were not p articularly im pressive as students of conceptual m athem atics, and the la tte r found considerable difficulty in stunning his m ind sufficiently to follow its fixed rules. Park finds th at he can never rem em ber the form ulae necessary to solve quadratic equations, and creates a new form ula every tim e this algebraic problem presents itself. M ore than one scientist has observed th at the theory of relativity is more likely to make sense to a philosopher than to a professional (i.e. industrial) m athem ati­ cian. T his theory cannot become a law precisely because it cannot be objectively verified - if by ‘objectively’ we m ean by the m echanical application of preform ulated rules, such as those followed in conceptual m athem atics. It is as a result of this th at m any leading physicists have turn ed to E astern and ancient philosophy for inspiration, exchanging their ideas w ith philosophers, biologists and chemists of the noetic variety, and turning the established division of labour upside down. Before long questions will be raised about the naturalness of dividing biology from chem istry and physics. Leaving these issues aside, let us turn to a related topic: the division between idealism and m aterialism .

I W hile the w ord ‘m aterialism ’ is widely and popularly used, its validity and m eaning m ay be doubted, w hether it is scientifically or philosophical­ ly considered. ‘M a tte r’ m ay be saved if it is modified to include m otion as intern al to it. I prefer, however, to use a new word. T he ‘m atter’ which reabsorbs the externalized idea of m otion no longer exists: in the sense of Esse it is no longer the m atter of Descartes. T he new word is Chora, and its m an n er o f ‘existing’ is actuality. M atter exists, but Chora is actual. So the new m aterialism is better called actualism . O f course, to call it ‘new ’ is m isleading. It is not new; it was essential to Greek, T aoist and B uddhist thought. As a result of post-C artesian views on substance and post-A ristotelian views of m atter, K a n t and subsequent scholarship m isread the Greek view of the form ative m edium of ‘things’ and their ideal models. This m isapprehension involves the assum ption th at the ideal - the entity called the Eidos - is the perfect instance behind the imperfect m anifestation of a thing: seeing m any different horses, a m an develops a view of a perfect 71

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

horse. T his ‘A ristotelian’ rendering is alm ost diam etrically opposed to w hat noetic thinkers have in m ind w hen positing notions such as Eidos. It im plies th a t he who w ants to know horses ought to see as m any horses as possible, study them , com pare them and thus form an idea of the true horse. I f we were to caricature noetic thought, we could by inversion say th at, for the O rp h ic Greeks, a m an who w ants to know w hat a horse is should ra th e r close his eyes every time he sees one. For w ithin such thought, instances are not true entities. In saying th at perceived objects are shadow-copies of true objects, R am an u ja or Plato is not em phasizing the fact th at they are copies and hence im perfect im itations of the real thing; only th at they are other than real, they are not true. An instance can, and indeed ought to, serve to trigger a recollection of a true unity, but it is not the em pirical dim ension th a t activates such recollection. In other words, the em pirical horse bears no em pirical resem blance to the true horse. T he knowledge of a horse comes through the noetic activity and psychic rhythm involved in using and experiencing a horse as a m eans of satisfying certain of one’s essential h u m an needs. T h ere is a ‘horse’ aspect to each m an, and it needs to be fulfilled in a certain way for a m an to be a m an. In short, it is not the horse in time and space which rem inds one of the true horse; b u t this does not m ean th at an actual horse cannot be used to gain knowledge of a true horse, for actual or visible things have a dim ension which is out of time. In fact, as soon as one perceives the flux as flux, i.e. as soon as one recognizes actuality for w hat it is, one is no longer deceived, and can no longer be said to be perceiving things in time even though one is perceiving sensible reality. I t is only in conceptual thought th at things are seen as isolated entities (‘a stone is a stone, a river is a river’). Noetic thought, being out of time, sees a stone in a thousand years from now, when it will be earth, sees a river as rain or cloud. Indeed, noetic thought insists th at there really are no such things as stones or rivers. W here does the Indian O cean become the Pacific, w here does the Pacific become the A tlantic, and w here do all these become different from rain? It is the m ind th a t isolates them . K a n t was correct when he pointed out th at the m ind does not exist before its encounter with the sensible environm ent. Prior to m ental perception, there are no things or individual persons, and there are no objects. T h ere are, of course, noetic objects as constituted by Aritmos, but these are not the same. H eisenberg has described the world as divided not into objects b u t into ‘groups of connections’ determ ining ‘the texture of the w hole’. T he m ind is simply a set of m otions which has the ability to constitute m ental images - objects - and in turn to constitute itself: ‘the universe really is m otion and nothing else. And there are two kinds 72

A NEW MATERIALISM

o f m otion. O f each kind there are any num ber of instances, but they differ in th a t the one kind has the power of acting and the other of being acted upon. From the intercourse and friction of these with one another arise offspring, endless in num ber b u t in pairs of twins. O ne of each pair is som ething perceived and the other a perception, whose birth always coincides w ith th a t of the thing perceived’(Theaete tus, 156a,b) . T his is, of course, the correct version of K a n t’s argum ent, and it does not claim th a t the individual is composed thus: the soul faculty, Logisticon, has its own rules and m ovem ent. Plato makes clear th a t there is no other than conjectural distinction betw een perception and w hat is perceived. M atter or the thing-in-itself does not ‘cause’ sensations, w hich the m ind unifies to create perceived objects. T h e sensation and the thing - w hat we see as the chair and the chair - are coequal, a p air of twins springing to life in the intercourse of the two motions. L ater in the sam e dialogue, Plato continues this argum ent and states: ‘N othing has any being as one thing ju s t by itself, no more has the agent or patien t, b u t as a consequence of their intercourse w ith each o th er’ ( Theaetetus, i82a). T his statem ent, caricatured, is taken to m ean th at a tree in the forest cannot fall unless some conscious entity is there to perceive it: or sim ply th a t there is no tree prior to somebody perceiving it as such. H ow ever, since ‘the offspring’ (actuality) always come in pairs, ju st as there are no trees, chairs, tables, bodies or m atter prior to being perceived as such by someone, there is likewise no ‘som eone’ prior to perceiving som ething: ‘For there is no such thing as an agent until it meets with a p atien t nor any patient until it meets with an agent’ ( Theaetetus, 157a) . It is in term s of these two motions th at we can understand Plato’s O ne and the indefinite dyad, or the Pythagorean male-female principle. All things are a creation of the intercourse between them , yet the O ne and the dyad are not in themselves actuality - they spring into existence and can be understood only through the offspring of their intercourse. As shown in the Parmenides, the unqualified unity, the non-predicated O ne, while alone is perfectly real: as such it is completely beyond thought, it is out of time and place and can only be conceived of negatively: indeed it cannot be conceived, b u t one posits it in order to account for things th a t can be conceived. Everything th a t can be touched, seen or even thought of is the progeny of the encounter between th at O ne and the dyad, To Peras and Aperion. T h e progeny is Chora and is in Chora - it is all things.

73

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

II C ontem porary thought abounds with conceptualized ‘E astern m ystics’. C om m on to all of them is the externalization of the verifying criterion. T his externalization m ay take m any forms. For exam ple, contem porary research into the physical aspect of m arital love gauges the superiority of a p articu lar kind of relationship according to criteria devised in the laboratory; yoga is a useful discipline since it helps one keep a desirable figure and m editation is valid since it produces certain effects on an oscilloscope. T h e philosophy of a logical positivist is ‘tru e ’ if it adheres to a specific logical m atrix. In the so-called totalitarian states, a p articular in terp retatio n of an ideology or of a particular philosophy is ‘tru e’ if it adheres to the m atrix laid down by the ruling party. Logos-oriented thought radically avoids verification by any such criterion. T o use a few m ore exam ples, the popular cliche th a t m editation brings peace of m ind is no more than a cliche if one is referring to the em pirical m ind, Manas. T his is pointed out by Jesus, w ith the words, ‘Do you think th a t I have come to give peace on earth? No, I tell you, but ra th e r division; for henceforth in one house there will be five divided, three against two and two against three . . . father against son and son against fath er’(Luke, X II, 51-53). M any saints were torn by psychological conflicts and suffered correspondingly. T he popular notions of sm iling gurus an d self-satisfied practitioners of H indu m editations living in blissful indifference have little basis in fact. T he experiences of the a sp ira n t after enlightenm ent are more likely to be those of the hero of the B hagavad G ita, A rjuna, who, w hen faced with the realities of the real b attle - i.e. real yoga - ‘is overcome by grief and despair’; he is, in fact, p articip atin g in the cosmic experience described elsewhere as the hour of Jesu s in the garden of G ethsem ane. It is for this reason th at the hero of the yoga of resignation says, ‘In the dark night of my soul I feel desolation. In my self-pity I see not the way of righteousness’ (Bhagavad G ita, 11, 7). N ot th a t the yoga of the B hagavad G ita does not bring peace - but ‘M y peace is not such as the world gives’: the fruit of the resignation to the sentim ent of K rish n a is not any peace, health or indeed anything th at can be registered on a electroencephalograph. A p art from the reigning positivist orthodoxy, the late tw entieth century has also seen the grow th of a ‘spiritually oriented’ dissident group which a ttem p ts to blend the spiritual with the scientific. T he activities of such people range from the deeply philosophical and scientific to funfair charlatanism ; w hat they all share, however, is the assum ption th at since one cannot differentiate between the body and the soul, the soul itself o ught to be an em pirically verifiable entity. W hile one may sym pathize 74

A NEW MATERIALISM

w ith their broad intentions, S aanthana-oriented thought cannot possibly endorse their approach. All attem pts to com m unicate physically w ith the soul - to p h otograph it, to induce it to speak, to register its presence on a geiger counter or any such device - are essentially foreign to this kind of thought. W hile S aan th an a philosophers do assert th at the body and soul are one, they do not claim th at the soul is physical in any way whatsoever. In other w ords, the soul, absolute Being, B rahm an and A tm an, reality, are wholly negative entities. T he essential I is not an entity composed of extrem ely fine particles. God is not a field of electrical force. T he way of Logos thought is the Via Negativa: there is no soul and there is no God, so long as ‘is5 - Esse - is used in the tim e-space sense as it is in norm al speech. ‘T h e kingdom of God is not coming with signs to be observed; nor will they say “ Lo, here it is!” or “ T here!” for behold, the kingdom of God is in the m idst of you’ (Luke, X V II, 20-21). N either the soul nor God nor the kingdom of God can ever be photographed. In saying th at there is no soul, Logos thought uses ‘is’ in a very specific way. T he notions ‘is’ and ‘is n o t’ will be dealt w ith in some detail elsewhere: suffice it to establish for now th at a noetic being is never to be confused with one existing in time and space. Perhaps it is now safe to begin a discussion of space and m atter. It should be clear th a t the fact th at the view of space, time and m ateriality in the contem porary n atu ral sciences is essentially th at held by B uddhist and Z oroastrian thought, the fact th at Bohr and R utherford derive this view from Logoj-based thought and their theories can help to send men to the m oon and create laser beam s, is no proof of its validity. T h a t validity is know n in a different fashion.

Ill M ore th an one scientist has expressed am azem ent at how it was possible that, w ithout the scientific tools of the astrophysical observatory, the E astern thinkers could form sophisticated theories about the creation of m atter and the life-cycle of the universe. Park, in his lectures on q u antum theory and tim e and space in Plato, observes that there m ust be some universal constants inspiring such thought. Less qualified b u t more fantasy-orientated authors have assum ed th at there m ust in the past have been ex tra-terrestrial visitors passing out sheets of inform ation on the creation of m atter, space and time, for only in th at way can we account for this uniform ity of views. T hese apart, a serious answ er can be given. It lies in the fact th a t Logoj-orientated thinkers do not differentiate between space and them selves - between the far and the near. T he notion th at the 75

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

galaxy a million light-years away is fa r stands up only for the conceptual thinker. A gainst this, contem porary astronom ers observe th at in astrophysics the notions of far and near are not m eaningful, they are sim ply conjectural; i.e. conceptual views of the universe do not correspond to reality. W h at is near determ ines the behaviour of w hat is far, and w hat is far directly conditions w hat is near. W hat is true here is only true in so far as there is a specific ‘there’: in this sense, there is here. Fred Hoyle (1970, p. 304) observes: Present day developm ents in cosmology are coming to suggest rath er insistently th at everyday conditions could not persist b u t for the d istant parts o f the universe, th at all our ideas of space and geom etry would becom e entirely invalid if the d istan t parts of the universe were taken aw ay. O u r everyday experience even down to the sm allest detail seems to be so closely integrated to the grand scale features of the universe th a t it is well nigh im possible to contem plate the two being separated. C om pare the H in d u view of the world, where each unit contains as a m icrocosm or a m acrocosm all other units. V yasa’s or the D elphic dictum ‘K now yourself (Knothi Seuton ) implies th at in knowing yourself you know everything th at is, for ‘T a t tw am asi’ (‘T h a t art thou’). T his is, of course, P lato ’s view, and his m ethod is based on it. He taught th at in order to learn ab o u t anything one m ust learn astronom y; yet he never failed to point out th a t astronom y is studied by exam ining oneself. ‘In te rn a l’ and ‘ex tern al’ are for S aanthana-based thought conjectural, and so is lim itation in time and space. T he form ation of the C rab N ebula can be studied here and now by exam ining the microcosmic ‘C rab N ebula’ contained w ithin each m an. It can be studied as it was millions of years ago or as it will be in millions of years’ time. These notions are as startling to the a u th o r as they m ust be to anybody brought up in the conceptualist tradition: they are, however, the views not only of Plato b u t also of any thinker of the H in d u or V edantic tradition. Indeed the notions of the inseparability o f observed and observer, of m atter as non-extended in tim e and space, of the elem entary unit as both a wave and a particle, are all beyond conceptualization. From all this the scientifically orientated m ind m ay gain further insight into w hat it is th a t the S aanthana tradition means when it affirms th a t in o rder to know we m ust first decide w hat it is we ought to know. How we decide to know will determ ine w hat it is to know. T here is no such thing as an objective concept or an objective atom or electron or neutron for science - only the logical positivist and the party idealogue use the external auth o rity of science to discipline dissenting opinion. T here is no objective, positively determ ined T for sociology: in pretending to be objective, by turning to a set of criteria such as polls and laboratory 76

A NEW MATERIALISM

observation, the positivist scientists have merely decided in advance on the n atu re of the person they are investigating. J.A . W heeler (in M ehra, 1973, p. 244) is led to observe: N othing is m ore im p o rtant about the quantum principle than this: th at it destroys the concept of the world as sitting out there with the observer safely separated from it by a 20 centim etre slab of plate glass. Even to observe so miniscule an object as an electron, he m ust sh atter the glass. H e m ust reach in. H e m ust install his chosen m easuring equipm ent. It is up to him to decide w hether he shall m easure position or m om entum . T o install the equipm ent to m easure the one prevents and excludes his installing the equipm ent to m easure the other. M oreover the m easurem ent changes the state of the electron. T he universe will never afterw ards be the same. T o describe w hat has happened one has to cross out th a t old word ‘observer5and put in its place the new word ‘p a rtic ip a to r’. In some strange sense the universe is a participatory universe. T his is, of course, the famous H eisenberg principle which has revolutio­ nized contem porary physics. T he noetic thinker agrees, and points out th a t twenty-five centuries ago Plato (Sophist, 248e) wrote: ‘I f knowing is to be acting upon som ething it follows th at w hat is known m ust be acted upon by it; and so on this showing, reality when it is being known by the act of knowledge m ust insofar as it is known be changed owing to being acted u pon.’ W hile Plato and H eisenberg speak the same language w hen w riting of the universe as consisting of nothing but a set of motions, and when describing the properties of m atter, Plato goes further by introducing a yet higher dim ension. H ere he is closer to Bohr, who understands both T aoism and physics as subject to rules which can only be described as ethical. De Broglie, Bohr and indeed the whole team th at form ulated the qu a n tu m theory unanim ously point out th at the observer/observed relationship cannot be externalized: th at its rules are internal, derived w ithin an integrated system and valid for th at system. T h e principle of the externalization of evaluative criteria is one which distorts not only scientific theory b u t also society at large. By externalizing criteria and calling them ‘the high standard of living’, ‘the satisfaction of m aterial needs’ and so on, positivists are sundering m an and universe. T his separation is unethical: indeed ‘unethical’ m eans th at which differentiates the individual from the social interest. T h e ideas of contem porary sociologists, psychologists or physicists may ap p ear to be new, b u t the idea of linear time and hence of ‘historical progress’ is itself time-specific, and when analysed breaks down to the interests of corporate m ultinational capitalism . This study does not deny 77

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

progress, yet the n atu re of progress for S aanthana-based thought is altogether different from the ‘progress’ posited by bourgeois sociologists. All notions - w hether of time and space, or of progress - are not true or false in themselves: it is the m anner in which they are understood and the n atu re of m a n ’s relation to them which makes them true or false. At a specific m om ent in history, the separation of m an and cosmos m ay have been legitim ate for the thought specific to th at period. T hus in order for H eisenberg to be able to observe th a t the observed and the observer are one, it was necessary for N ewton and Galileo to have held otherwise: hence ‘progress’. Logos-based thought, however, operates differently: P lato ’s views of the form ation of galaxies do not differ from those of L am a G ovinda or of contem porary astrophysics. For noetic thought there has been no progress: in other words, while the noetic thinker applauds the scientist for concluding th at the external and the internal are one, he did not need a scientist to tell him this. T h e B uddhist does not believe in an independent or separately existing external world, into whose dynam ic forces he could insert himself. T he external world and his inner world are for him only two sides of the sam e fabric, in which the threads of all forces and of all events, of all forms of consciousness and of their objects, are woven into an inseparable net of endless m utually conditioned relations (Govinda, I 973>P- 93)T o be in harm ony w ithin oneself one m ust be in harm ony with the external world. T h e bourgeois assum ption of ‘me and my needs’ as opposed to ‘you and your needs’ is thus fundam entally false and unethical. For Logos thought, ‘tru e’ and ‘ethical’ are the same. Preconceptual Greek language was better equipped to serve these purposes th an English, b ut the relevant Greek words have atrophied. In tu rn in g to Plato we cannot speak o f ‘m a tte r’; we m ust somehow a ttem p t to grasp the notion of a ‘form ative m edium ’. It will not do, however, to equate this form ative m edium with th a t of q u antum physics. C ontem por­ ary physics has only touched on the edges of Noesis. Logo^-based notions of the form ative m edium are elaborate and more complex, for they include biological, m icrobiological, ethical, political, religious and scientific aspects. Science proceeds from hypotheses which change from age to age. Every epoch is characterized by its own New ton and Galileo, founding fathers who set up the basic framework, which in its early stages is both noetically an d em pirically derived. T o break away from the sophists, the Greeks seem to have turned to the Zoroastrians for inspiration. In the M iddle Ages, philosophy, algebra and geom etry all entered Europe prim arily via the A rabs in Africa and Spain. In attem pting to break through the 78

A NEW MATERIALISM

rigidifying conceptual cloud which was stifling creative thought in E urope, Bohr, H eisenberg, Chew and others have reached still further E ast. B ut eventually the noetic elem ent is always discarded: it is only in times of change th a t such faculties can be used to the full. We can expect th at o ur physics, too, will eventually be ‘rebourgeoised’ and reconceptualized, its revolutionary theories adapted to the satisfaction of epithum ic needs. W hile the process m ay take several centuries, if history is Magister Vitas then this developm ent is inevitable. However, unlike scientific and ideological Weltanschauung, Logoj-oriented thought itself is not a conceptual fram ew ork, and therefore not subject to these fluctuations. It is rooted in needs w hich are constant, and the ideas of physicists are quoted here only because they m ay be found suggestive.

IV Let us tu rn to the question o f ‘m atter’. As a noetic thinker, Plato does not posit a fundam ental underlying entity enduring in time and taking on various predications. For him there is no A ristotelian ‘ideal essence’ such as ‘oakness’ m aintaining its ‘oakhood’ while taking on its m any cloaks from the acorn to the m ighty tree. It is only conceptualists who operate w ith ab stract essences. T hough Y. Bonnitz has argued th at it was A ristotle who created the idea of a nonchanging essence as som ething a p a rt from w hat is perceived, calling it Hyle, other scholars have suggested th a t this was above all a hypothetical exercise in order to solve a logical problem . O nly subsequently was it concretized into a theoretical dogm a th a t has, over the span of centuries, acquired the solidity associated with m aterial reality itself. Before approaching P lato’s notion of the formative m edium of reality, one ought to dismiss all such notions as ‘m atter’ or ‘substance’, w hether a b stract or concrete, visible or invisible. For Plato there is only one form ative elem ent, and all visions, thoughts, souls, ideas, feelings and things are m ade from, or rath er in, th at m edium . And although Plato only introduces this notion in his later dialogues, one cannot thereby simply assum e th a t he reached this conclusion late in his life; rather, such was the n atu re of this form ative m edium th at a great deal of negative m ental refutation was necessary before the notion of it could be introduced. T h e m ain assum ption which had to be underm ined was the idea th at there is a difference betw een being m ade ‘from ’ and being m ade ‘in ’. T he container or crucible in which all things are m ade is called Chora, and this is also the stuff of which they are m ade ( Timaeus, 52b). W hile Chora in some 79

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

ways functions as m atter, it is not the sam e as ‘m atte r5 considered as substance extended in tim e and space: the notion is m uch broader, since not only m aterial b u t also abstract things such as concepts, notions and im ages are m ade in and of Chora, and so are moods and sensations (Timaeus, 48e~52b). C ornford (1937, p. 181) writes: ‘there is no justification for calling the receptacle ‘m atte r5- a term not used by Plato5. H owever, if by ‘m a tte r5 we u n d erstan d only the perm eable stuff of which ‘things5 are m ade, then Plato quite distinctly does treat Chora as m atter. In Timaeus (5ob-c) he explains: ‘Suppose a m an had m oulded figures of all sorts out of gold, and were unceasingly to rem ould each into all the rest; then if you should point to one o f them and ask w hat it was, m uch the safest answ er in respect of tru th w ould be to say ‘gold5, and never to speak of a triangle or any of the o ther figures th at were coming to be in it as things th at have being, since they are changing even while one is asserting their existence. . . . Now the sam e thing m ust be said of th at nature [Chora] - it appears to have qualities, it receives all qualities, but it itself is always the same, never changing.5 So Chora is not m atter, or at least not m atter in time; thus it cannot be the stuff o f w hich conceptually constructed things are m ade. But it is the stuff o f w hich all real things are m ade, and it is called ‘m a tte r5 by A ristotle (Physics, 207* 29-32) and Callicles, and identified as such m ore recently by C rom bie (1971, p. 223). Cornford, denying th at Chora is m atter, equates it w ith space. H ow ever, while the word m ay be thus translated, this ‘space5 is o f a p articu lar kind. A lthough everywhere, Chora-space has shape: it is curved. C ornford ( 1937? P- *88) observes th at ‘according to Plato, space has a shape of its own, being co-extensive with the spherical universe5. C onceptually, Plato, like E instein, found it difficult to account for the fact th at space is everyw here and yet is curved. Plato's answ er was th at Chora-space exists in pockets. Particles large or small, galaxies or grains of salt, are all form ed by the condensation of Chora. This condensation creates solidity and visibility - mass and light - and, when intense, forms a solid body perceived as a particle. T h e em pirical view of body and shape is given by Socrates as ‘shape is the lim it of a body5; yet the correct view does not reduce bodies to dense concentrations of weight. T hus from Proclus5 com m entary on the Timaeus we g ath er th a t the space-m atter which solidifies as a star does not end w ith the first degree of condensation: any solid particle is in fact a collection of concentric spheres of condensation. T h e centre of a star contains a super-dense kernel, ‘where weight and light are densely crow ded together5. A round this kernel, space solidifies in the form of 80

A NEW MATERIALISM

‘e a rth 5- a less dense crow ding of Chora. Beyond the lim it of the perceived shape there is another layer, called ‘eth er5 (not to be equated with w hat we call the atm osphere - air), where the crowding of Chora is still less dense. Beyond this there is another envelope of very rarified space, and then the void: nothing. Therefore space exists only around bodies. Since each little body resem bles each large body, each has its own ethereal envelope. T his is the case with atom s, where the kernel is a densely packed nucleus of protons and neutrons, surrounded by less densely packed electrons. Likewise the universe at large curves its own space, and has its own aura. T h u s Chora is everywhere, and yet it is curved and has a shape. Beyond Chora is nowhere. Einstein (1969) working w ithin an entirely different tradition, concludes: W e m ay therefore regard m atter as being constituted by the regions of space in which the field is extremely intense. T here is no place in this new kind o f physics both for the field and m atter, for the field is the only reality. U nlike the m odern physicist, Plato applies this same principle to sp iritual entities, so th at each soul also creates its space, i.e. curves its field of extension: this is how a true individual is constituted. In Proclus5 com m entaries, the true individual (like the true body) is brou g h t together by the gravitational pull of the sentim ent. W herever there is Logisticon, there will be a series of outer layers constituting the various aspects of the individual. T he perceived body is simply a less dense aspect of the kernel-soul or Logisticon; and beyond the perceived body as lim ited by extension there are further, even less dense aspects of the individual. T his does not refer to a physical aura, as it has been simplified by gnostic interpreters: the less dense aspects of the individual m ay be scattered in other people, in other times and so on. T he layers of the individual are not next to each other in a ‘time and space5sense; only if considered noetically is the body - Chora - of an individual concentrated and curved aro u n d the kernel Logisticon. (This is, of course, why the true individual cannot be photographed - for such an individual exists only in the noetic sense. It is also where the present work parts ways with the contem porary p o p u lar body of literature th at works from the same sources - Pythagoras, the V edas, Proclus - but draw s different conclusions.) J u s t as the body is only aspectually different from the soul, so space is only aspectually different from time or from m atter. W hile Einstein does not extend the m icro-m acro analysis beyond th at which he can m athem atically support, he also comes to the conclusion th at space is curved, and th a t m atter and space cannot be separated: In general relativity these two concepts can no longer be separated. 81

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

W herever there is a massive body, there will be a gravitational field, and this field will m anifest itself as the curvature of the space surrounding th at body. We m ust not think, however, th at the field fills the space and ‘curves’ it. T he two cannot be distinguished; the field is the curved space! (C apra, 1975,p. 218.) I t is this fact of the curvature of space th at invalidates both N ew tonian m echanics and E uclidean geometry. A triangle draw n on a sphere is no longer a 180° triangle. T he shortest distance between two points is no longer a straig h t line. T im e is sim ilarly affected, and stretches and bends in accordance w ith the pull of gravity. P lato ’s Chora is the container of creation and the m atter of it: ‘it creates a hom e for all created things’ (Timaeus, 52b) and it ‘assum es a form like th a t of any of the things which enter into it’ ( Timaeus, 50b_c). Chora is a ‘nurse and m o th er’ of all creation ( Timaeus, 49e), not only of concrete visible things b u t of anything th at can be thought of. T hings are organized into unities following the rules of Aritmos or sentim ent. An activity is a flow of instances; it is not a collection of sections of tim e synthesized into blocks. Reality is not conceptually perceived, b u t grasped in an in stant which is itself free of tem poral considerations. T aylor (1928,p. 332) is led to observe th at while the world as a function of Chora m ay be perceived as phenom enal, Chora itself is non-phenom enal. In trying to explain w hat Chora is, Plato uses the examples of fire and w ater occurring in space to make it clear th at such nouns as ‘fire’, ‘w ater’, etc. should not be m istaken for anything substantial or perm anent. O ne m ust be careful, however, not to assum e th at there is som ething else which is p erm anent, and thus bring back the idea of substance or essence enduring in time. T he conceptualist’s mistake has to do with the un d erstan d in g of ‘p e rm an en t’ as opposed to ‘tran sien t’. ‘P erm an en t’ in conceptual thought m eans ‘th at which endures in tim e’. Plato, however, points out in the Parmenides (i5 5 e—i56e) th at the m eaning o f ‘p erm an en t’ is closer to th a t o f ‘in sta n t’: both are out of time altogether. Fire as seen is true fire; it is not an illusion. T he illusion sets in only in the infinitesim ally short period (not an instant, which has no duration at all) of interpretive interjection. T he visible world is real; w hat is false is the assum ption th a t behind the visible there is a ‘real’ hidden entity, a perfect instance enduring in time, of which the visible is a false image. These im ages are not false: ‘the forms [i.e. the images of the visible world] which enter into and go out of her [Chora\ are the likeness of eternal realities m odelled after their patterns in a wonderful and mysterious m a n n er’ ( Timaeus, 54°). It is thus m isleading to translate Chora as space, if this is confused w ith 82

A NEW MATERIALISM

a K a n tia n category. For Plato, space is also m atter. Chora is ‘th at in which all elem ents grow up and appear and decay. [Chora] alone is to be called by the nam e “ this and th a t” ’ ( Timaeus, 50d); everything th at is seen or thought of is both in and from Chora. O bviously the notion is m uch w ider th an th a t of q u an tu m physics: we ought to look for further parallels and different words. C an it be m aintained th at the tw entieth century m ind has no word to m atch this notion? I think not. W hile it is possible for certain notions to be w ithout ready words, Chora is too basic to hum an experience ever to lack a word: it includes anything of which any entity or thing is m ade. T he word th at comes to m ind is ‘actuality’. W hile actuality has been defined in m any ways, and H usserl’s notion of it as ‘th at which quite literally is, w ithout the aid of interm ediate interpretation by the organizing m in d ’, seems adequate, we need not feel restricted by such definitions. W hile w ords change in m eaning and so do concepts, there is a hidden su b stratu m of notions which does not change; actuality, despite its over-use, appears to me far closer to P lato’s Chora than any other contem porary word.

V In the Timaeus3 for fire to be fire it m ust endure in time; however, this ‘tim e’ is not a string of points. It is a fusion of instances, no longer distinguishable as separate from each other. In other words, in Chora, time and space are fused. T his sam e view was proposed by Minkowski in 1908 (his theory was at the tim e regarded as ‘surprisingly’ sim ilar to th at of Plato but has now been generally accepted): T he views o f space and time which I wish to lay before you have sprung from the soil of experim ental physics, and therein lies their strength. T hey are radical. H enceforth, space by itself and time by itself are doom ed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality (in Einstein, 1969^. 53). M inkowski, according to my view, is unduly optim istic. It is only in transitional periods (such as the tw entieth century) th at science becomes noetically based; inevitably it slips back into Dianoia, and the technicians take over and reconceptualize its assum ptions. It is only Saanthana-based philosophy which does not change its views from epoch to epoch, but persistently repeats one message. But how does this em pty space-Chora create objects? Let us again turn to Einstein for his view. A ccording to W heeler (in Stevens, 1974, p. 6): 83

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

E instein, above his work and w riting, held a long-term vision th at there is nothing in the world except curved em pty space. G eom etry bent one way here describes gravitation; rippled another way som ewhere else it m anifests all the qualities of an electrom agnetic wave. Excited at still an o th er place the m agic m aterial th at is space shows itself as a particle. . . . m atter, charge, electrom agnetism and other fields are only m anifestations of the bending of space. T h is is as far as science can go. But Chora, although it is all th at is, is for Plato beyond all th a t is. T his is w hat T aylor implies: all m anifestations of Chora are phenom enal, b ut Chora itself is non-phenom enal. T he world taking place in Chora is only a duplication of the noetic, non-phenom enal w orld (Cosmos Noetus — the cosmos wKich ‘is’ not). W hy and how Chora solidifies - w hat stim ulates, guides and creates the electron - is not the subject of physics. M odern physics is still not Aixos, the science where inner and outer, psychological and em pirical observa­ tion is m erged, as it was for the Greeks. W hile the indications are th at science is about to break the wall by which it has unnecessarily been divided from the inner science of m an, this breakthrough has not yet been perform ed. T h e organizing principle of Chora is, of course, Aritmos - which is the very object o f science as Aixos. W hile Aritmos has an objective dim ension, this is not all. C oncerning the ‘public’ aspect of Aritmos, Findlay (1970, p. 256) rem arks: being w ater or earth or air, wood or gold or purple or angry or intelligent or a m an or a dw arf star or an electron are all basically a m a tte r of specific proportions or quantitative m easures. A nd a contem porary physicist affirms: ‘rath er than a concrete particle, an electron is sim ply a field in space. . . . there is no such thing as one and the sam e substance of w hich the electron consists at all tim es’ (Wreyl, 1949, p. 171). W hether this electron creates atom s of hydrogen or carbon is all a m a tte r o f the organizing principle, num ber. T h e Plato scholar, W .K .C . G uthrie (1950, p. 337), writes: T h ere can be no essential difference between a tankful of w ater and the delicate organism of a racehorse or a hum an being. Since both are form ed of some ultim ate m atter [Chora], the cause of their difference lies elsewhere, and it is there, said Plato, in the principle of organization by w hich the m atter has been differentiated, th at the true philosopher will look for explanation. Sri A urobindo, (1957, p. 337) puts it like this: T h e m aterial object becomes . . . som ething different from w hat we now see, not a separate object on the background or in the environm ent

84

A NEW MATERIALISM

of the rest of n atu re b u t an indivisible p art and even in a subtle way an expression o f all th a t we see. A nd H eisenberg (1963, p. 96): ‘T he world thus appears as a com plicated tissue of events, in w hich connections of different kinds alternate or overlap or com bine and thereby determ ine the texture of the w hole.5 W hile the friends of B uddhism m ight be more convinced were we to rely m ore on B uddhist texts, and the scientific reader m ight prefer more from B ohr or de Broglie, the intention in using such quotes is not to rely on outside authorities. In the final analysis, all theories will change, and can be differently verbalized. But introducing them in a p articular way may create a m eaning in this context which does not depend on w hat the original a u th o r said or did not say.

VI T h e noetic thinker does not intend to convey a particular picture of the world. Seen cyclically, the noetic im pulse occurs at the end of an epoch, to give an im petus to theories which will only later take forms specific to the historical givens o f the m om ent. Theories, rules and models are a function of specialists. T he noetic thinker's intention is to see things, or to make m en see. G iven a healthy society, healthy food and a healthy life, seeing actuality is sim ple. A healthy shepherd sees nothing but actuality, and needs no noetic thinker to point it out to him; most likely such a person sees actuality even m ore clearly than did the people who wrote down the sayings of men like Socrates (who was, according to X enophon, practically illiterate). Yet, for the citizen of a sick city it is not so easy, for the m ind interjects and perverts the vision. A ctuality is not a sum of m entally interpreted images. These difficulties came to the fore in the last century, w here philosophers - foreseeing the end of an epoch - attem pted to present a b etter world by painting beautiful conceptual models and abstractin g the needs of the body. T his was, of course, the failure of the idealists. T h e nineteenth century had great difficulties in defining m atter. Some thinkers called their world view m aterialist, yet they did not define m atter in term s of irreducible tiny particles. W hy should anybody assum ing m atter to be ‘non -m aterial5 call him self a m aterialist? Given the reigning orthodoxy o f the century - such as Hegel's idealism - a ‘m aterialist5 label for the counterposition becomes understandable. Idealists see the world as a creation of the m ind: to Hegel, in particular, ‘real5 m eans ‘ratio n al5. M atter, however, is a reality existing outside or rath er beyond the m ind

85

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

(th at is, beyond m ind as Manas). In positing a reality external to the m ind, a Logos-based thinker m eans external to the ‘m ind’ of Hegel. N oetic thought sees reality in some ways as being internal to m an, but not ‘in te rn a l’ in the sense of being created by the hum an m ind. M an A tm an - is not m ind. T he m aterial world is internal in so far as m an needs the m aterial in order to fulfil his needs. T hus the external is internalized. A ctuality - an d /o r the m ateriality of essences - can also be defined in term s o f the forces of m aterial production and social intercourse, w ithin w hich societies and individuals satisfy and realize themselves. O f course, the notion o f ‘m aterial production’ is too readily abused. It should m ean m ore th an ju st the production of so m any kilowatts of electrical energy, or so m any tons of grain. For Plato, m ateriality includes social intercourse, thou g h t and actions: m aterial needs are also social and cultural. Indeed, given the nineteenth-century connotations of the word ‘m atte r’, ‘actuality’ seems far m ore useful. A ctuality is thus m ateriality, where ‘m atte r’ is not com posed of concrete particles, and it takes form in time, where ‘tim e’ is not com posed of a string of points. T h e world of sense is thus twofold. T here is actuality, which is perceived in an in stant, and there is the world of becoming, which is perceived in time. T he difference is inner: it is a psychological difference. T h e world of in stantiation is described in the Parmenides (i5 6 d): ‘T h ere is no transition from the state of rest so long as a thing is still at rest, nor from m otion so long as it is still in motion, but this queer thing the in stan t is situated between the motion and the rest; it occupies no tim e at all, and the transition of the moving thing to a state of rest or of the stationary thing to a state of being in motion takes place to and from the in sta n t.’ T his realm of in stantiation is separate from that of becoming, and hence from the interpretive activity of conceptual thought — which always necessitates an extension in time. A nd it is this realm of instance which corresponds to Chora. A ctuality is th a t ever-present reality which is grasped w ithout recourse to interm ediate interpretation by the mind. It is defined by Plato as th at which is ‘apprehended when all sense is absent by a kind of spurious reaso n ’ (Jow ett’s translation, Timaeus, 52b). Taylor translates the kind of reason by which we apprehend Chora as ‘bastard reason’. T he word ‘b a s ta rd ’, though possibly a negative emotive characterization, seems a telling one, and better than Jo w e tt’s ‘spurious’. T he word ‘b a sta rd ’ does not im ply an inferior product; the bastard offspring may be of excellent quality - it is ju s t th at its generation is unconventional. T his interp reta­ tion is also given by Crom bie. W hy is such reasoning ‘b a sta rd ’, he asks? ‘N ot, I think, because the inference is illegitim ate, but because the m ind 86

A NEW MATERIALISM

cannot grasp and u n derstand the entity which it has to postulate’ (C rom bie, 1971, p. 217). T h e w ord for apprehending C hora is Apsastai, ‘grasping’; the activity itself is reflective of the m ental process I have called Diarithmesis. Findlay (1974, p. 345) connects Diarithmesis with grasping, and Cornford (1967, pp. 76-7) equates grasping with the cognitive activity that involves the im m ediate apprehension of actuality by a ‘leap of m ind’. A lthough in some way derivative of reality, actuality is not far removed from it. A ctuality, rath er than the realm of becoming, is m ade in the im age of true being. Concepts, as we have tried to show, are the stuff of thought. Chora is grasped by a process parallel, though not identical, to Diarithmesis, which I have equated with sentim ent. Sentim ent is the ‘stuff of actuality: ‘Chora is the im m ediate reflection of reality,’ w rites C rom bie (1971, p. 218) com m enting on the Timaeus, 50d, and Robin (1908, p. 475) argues th a t Chora is the stuff of which num ber (Aritmos) is m ade. Sentim ent and num ber, in this light, are the two sides of the same coin, On or Ens. Perceived through the ‘reason’ or intellect, Ens is num ber. Perceived through the im m ediate emotive consciousness of the third p art of the soul, the thorax soul (through a process to be described later), num b er is sentim ent. In betw een sentim ent and num ber there lies the whole interm ediate w orld of interpreted perception, called variously the flux, the becoming, Samsara, Maya, etc. N either actuality nor reality, but only their interm edi­ ate interpreted counterpart, becom ing or Samsara, is illusory. Since the conceptualists have failed to differentiate between the two worlds of body-sense and conceptualized sense (m ental sense), Samsara has been tran slated as the w orld o f sense. Since then, a body of W estern-educated In d ian s have been convincing the world th at in Indian thought the world of sense is not an illusion. O w ing to the fact th at the world of sense and the conjectural w orld have been one for the W est, there has been a whole series of such cross-purposed East-W est dialogues. As a result we have W estern B uddhism , which like the nineteenth-century God is a concep­ tualized idea w ith no root in the body-m ind, nor in the inner eye of the soul: ju s t an o th er move in a gam e of conceptual chess. T h e above discussion has been restricted m ainly to the lower two (becom ing and actuality) of the three ontological realm s. Let us now move on to the n atu re of the first realm , th a t of being.

87

■ 7 il = it= il= il= ;> = ii= i> = T is ;l= ti= il= :l= T i

I

1!I| I

ill

b

Five

P L A T O ’S PARMENIDES

1

|

11 6

111

In the dialogue Parmenides, Plato has attem pted a ‘one time only’ discussion of the true natu re of being. Such is the nature of this being th at it is unchanging and eternal. P lato’s intention is to show th at such a reality cannot be philosophized about or constructed by hum an reason. H ere he differs from idealist philosophy: the idealists consider the u nchanging as an object of thought, and hence as an object of reflection and philosophy (Sophist, 248*). For Plato, however, th at which truly is cannot be predicated, th at is, it cannot be given verbal predicates and spoken abo u t positively (Phaedrus, 247°). I f the existence of real entities cannot be proved philosophically, then it m ight seem th a t all the authors of the U panishads and the O rphic philosophers of G reece could hardly justify the time they have devoted to their tasks. T h e solution is th at being or reality can be insinuated through philosophy. It is in order to use words in this insinuating m anner and thus to account for the ‘Beingly Being’ ( Usia Ontos Usa, or B rahm an) th at Plato creates the curious m ental exercise referred to today as the Parmenides dialogue.

I T h e object of the Parmenides is to drive aw ay all positivist representations of true being. Its au th o r will outperform the atheists and the sophists, and destroy the last conceptual residue of this true being, which he refers to as the O ne. H is intention is to construct a dialogue th at will force the m ind to grasp the unsaid. In driving away positive representations, the au th o r m akes the reader p articipate in the authorship by forcing the identifica88

p l a t o ’s p a r m e n i d e s

tion betw een a u th o r and reader in a common movement. T hus he makes the m ind receptive to a conclusion which is not stated, but generates itself. T h e m ental exercise is so constructed th at the m ind consciously realizes th a t absolute, real things - here called ‘form s’ and translated as ‘ideas’ cannot possibly be thought about, and th at the infinite cannot possibly be conceived: yet we do think of both. Inevitably the m ind is forced to ask, from w here do we derive these ‘ideas’? T his principle, applied in connection with the absolute unity of being, gives rise to the only correct version of the ontological argum ent. It is the perfect version of this argum ent precisely because of its negativity; St A nselm ’s and the C artesian versions have, by their explicit verbalization of the im plied, m ade the argum ent subject to all the objections raised by K an t. C onventional Greek thought alternatively relies on three basic types of exposition: 1 So-called indirect or negative description - speaking of things in a ro u n d ab o u t way so as to allow the reader to come to his own conclusion. N egative description is used by H eraclitus, and is also related to the Socratic m ethod: in H induism it is the neti neti approach ‘not this, not th a t’. 2 M ore conventional philosophical discourse em ploying discursive reason (Logos) treats knowledge as the object of definition (see, for exam ple, the discussion of justice in the Republic, or the philosophy of A ristotle). 3 M yths and scientific allegories (Aixos) can be literally im agined, painted or in some way im itated. Exam ples are stories of heroes, references to the sun as the good and soul as a chariot or the ‘scientific’ accounts o f the world as an anim al in P lato’s Timaeus. T h e use of these three m ethods is not arbitrary. In treating their subject m atter as (i) things negatively predicated, (2) objects of definition and (3) pictures or im itative models, the Greeks are referring to the three different realm s o f being, becom ing and actuality. Each one of these m ethods useful as it m ay have been at times - is shown in the Parmenides to be inad eq u ate if the purpose of the exposition is to convey a meaningful account of real entities such as the living ideas themselves. Even such sophisticated devices as the negative description cannot convey knowl­ edge o f true entities if used in isolation from other methods. T hings as they really are can be grasped by sim ultaneous referral to three different realm s. T hings as spoken about, however, are reduced to only one aspect of their n ature, or to several aspects perceived w ithin a single realm . No philosopher can present all three sides of reality at the sam e time; ra th e r he presents them alternatively. V arious horizontal

89

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

(‘m onodim ensional’) sections are stringed in a sequence th at should lead the read er to grasp them ‘vertically’, all at the same time. Any philosophical argum ent calls for creative synthesis on the p a rt of the audience. I f a philosopher wishes to be absolutely coherent in the linear, verbal, logical sense, he can achieve this coherence only by elim inating an essential dim ension of the issue under discussion. A noetic thinker does not wish to elim inate th at dim ension; it is for this reason th at he uses several - in fact, three - systems of exposition, as will be described below. T h e creative activity exercised by the reader is th at of seeing the issues u n d er discussion in term s of ‘extended references’. H e synthesizes the positive, m ythological picture with the Logos and with the negative definition, seeing all three as a unity otherwise scattered by the noetic philosopher throughout his work. These extended references are dis­ covered as the reader restructures the argum ent in his own m ind, u nbalancing the subject-predicate relationship he had previously estab­ lished. W h at is and w hat is not becomes dictated by the contextual rhythm and flow of the exposition, connecting with an inner psychological rhythm w hich is both objective and universal. It is only tow ards the end of the exercise th at the reader realizes th at the author m eant som ething o ther th an w hat had to be postulated to elevate the discourse on to a h igher plane. N otions are form ed in terms of grasped units. These units filter into conscious thought and unravel the concepts of linear philosophy. ‘N o rm al’ philosophical discourse - th at relied on by linear thought pretends th at it can effect sharp definitional distinctions and deal with things in a single realm only. However, the m ind carries the ‘transdim ensional residue’ from one realm into another and from one argum ent to another, raising corresponding contradictions. R ather than try to control for this by using stricter qualifications, the noetic thinker relaxes the contextual rules and allows things to m anifest themselves in all three realm s according to a presupposed inner logic.

II T h ro u g h o u t this study I have attem pted to interpret central philosophical notions prim arily in term s of the W estern tradition, b u t the n ature of the dialogue Parmenides is such as to lend itself readily to cross-cultural com parison. (O f course, the technique of extended reference m ay well have been as comm on in pre-Parm enidean Greece as it was in In d o -Ira n ia n thought. W hether Plato learned the Sat-Asat (being90

PLATO S PARMENIDES

nonbeing) m ethod from Eudoxus, was following an indigenous tradition or independently discovered it, it is not possible to establish.) In order to avoid m isrepresentation through a literal rendering of the ancient wisdom, In d o -Ira n ia n tradition has forbidden th at it should be w ritten down. (Plato also makes reference to this idea, e.g. Phaedrus, 275s; Letter VII, 334c.) T h e wisdom was to be interpreted by recourse to three referential systems, called in the V edas three ways of using language. Issues u n d er discussion were to be exam ined either (1) by a single reference, literal narrative; (2) by a cross-reference; or (3) by a com bination of the two. T he latter was difficult and its exercise allowed only to the initiated keepers of the scripture. W riting on this topic in The Myth o f Invariance, M cC lain (1978, p. 21) calls these different m ethods ‘systems of logic’: ‘T he Rig Veda has been w ritten in keeping w ith four different systems o f logic, or rath er four different ways of using language’. O f these four, we are interested only in three (the fourth is only the reference to the o ther three). Each of these ways is concerned with an ‘is’, an ‘is n o t’ and their com binations: (1) Sat, the language of existence (of ‘is’); (2) Asat, the language of nonexistence (of ‘is n o t’); and (3) their com bination in the third by cross-sectional reference, where the predica­ tion by ‘is’ or ‘is n o t’ is relative to each and every p art of the exposition. As today, in ancient Greece there were already conceptual thinkers equating ideas w ith concepts, while others were seeing them as existing things. P arm enides’ objection to all these is th at ‘form s’ cannot simply be treated as existents, conceptuals or non-predicables. T hey cannot be treated as existing things, ‘for if like things, then other things cannot partake of them as parts nor as wholes, for as p arts they would by participation suffer dim inution, and if as wholes w hen they would become separate from them selves’ (.Parmenides, 131e) . N or can they be conceptual models which other things im itate, for in order to account for a relation between a thing and a model, a further m odel w ould have to be posited and so on ad infinitum (the T h ird M an argum ent, Parmenides, 133a: this is also K a n t’s problem with his m ental sense of ‘I ’). N or can the forms be treated as abstract negative universals in a separate, non-predicated world of their own, for then they would cease to have significance for us (the separate God-for-himself-in-heaven, or M aster-Slave argum ent, Parmenides, 133e—134a) • P arm enides makes it clear th at in spite of all this he does not insist th at ideas do not in some sense exist or participate in each of the three realm s, or th a t they are not such as the refuted assertions held them to be. P arm enides’ explicit statem ent is th at the forms cannot be treated separately if their treatm ent is restricted as in ordinary discourse. 9i

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

H ow ever, ‘a m an of exceptional gifts will be able to see th at a form or essence ju s t by itself does exist in each case’ ( 135a) H aving refuted Socrates’ m ethod rath er than his position, Parm enides is to show Socrates the new kind of discourse. Before the exercise was begun we were told of three ways in which ideas could exist - i.e. as actual, conceptual and negative entities. Consequently, the argum ent th at follows has three distinct stages: (i) of things as if they are ( 136a); (2) of things as if they are not (136*); and (3) ‘Let us take the argum ent yet a third tim e’ - as things which appear to exist (156e—157e) . T he dialogue term inates as follows: ‘T o this we m ay add the conclusion. It seems th at w hether there is or is not a one, both th a t one and the others alike [1] are, [2] and are not, [3] and ap p ear and do not appear, to be all m anner of things in all m anner o f ways w ith respect to themselves and one another’ (Parmenides, i6 6 b). W h at this m eans is th at real things can be seen in three ways: as being eternally; as being in time; and as being in an instant. T h e dialogue uses the Sat-Asat technique, and - H eraclitian fragm ents a p a rt - it is the only w ritten account of this technique in the W estern tradition. T he exercise treats the three realms cross-referentially: w hen­ ever an ‘is’ is evoked, it can refer to either becoming, being or actuality. In oth er w ords ‘is’ can m ean ‘is n o t’, and vice versa. All predication is in reference to the whole: the dialogue m ust be ‘raced th rough’ (Parm enides is like a racehorse in Ibycus - Parmenides, 137a) 3 or read in a single attem p t, and cannot be broken down into sections. T reated as a linear piece of w riting it becomes w hat W ilam owitz called it: a lark, silly p edantry, Schulfuchserei. M isinterpretation occurs when, like T aylor, one both assum es it to be a serious piece of w riting (which it is) and treats it as a norm al piece of philosophy (which it is not). Parm enides clearly w arns, first, th a t it is not for a large audience, and second, th at ‘is’ and ‘is n o t’ are interchangeable: ‘You m ust make a supposition th at such and such a thing is and consider the consequences; you m ust also m ake the supposition th at the sam e thing is n o t’ (Parmenides, 136**). From the account in I42b- i 5 5 d, we can gather th at w hatever is in time is becom ing, and w hatever is becom ing is changing. T he change takes place not in spurts but continually: becom ing is an uninterrupted change. N othing extended ever properly exists, as we also learn from the Timaeus (38-39). T h e fact th at Parm enides, as m ust anybody, uses ‘is’ to refer to things th a t are becom ing is an unavoidable characteristic of speech. Ideas have an eidetic content which is beyond any participation, b u t even those who ‘know ’ cannot help using these words in referring to som ething. As we learn in the Sophist (252°), even forms differentiated w ithin speech cannot be referred to w ithout recourse to predication by existence. 92

p l a t o ’s p a r m e n i d e s

In contrast w ith the Socratic negative argum ent used in the Theaetetus, the argum ent of the Parmenides is doubly negative, since it denies the denial by adding a third qualifying element: ‘seems both to be and not to b e’. T hings are not denied but seem to be denied, and things are not but seem to be, yet they both are and are not. Q ualification is based on the following referential im plications of is: (i) ‘is’ for things which truly are (i.e. out o f tim e); (2) ‘is n o t’ for things which are in time; (3) ‘is and is n o t’ for actuality (seeming both to be and not to be). (It would be fascinating to learn from where the Greeks derive this technique. Plato attrib u tes it to Parm enides, which m ay indicate Z oroastrian origins; quite definitely it is not Socratic, since Plato explicitly says so. Both Plato and Parm enides would have been fam iliar with Egyptian techniques, since both had studied these in Greece and one presum es in Egypt too, for it is hardly likely th at Plato went to Egypt for the sole purpose of sightseeing. I am inclined to think th at the technique is th a t of the historical Parm enides. Plato never used it in any other dialogue, and had he falsely attributed it one assumes somebody would have recorded an objection. As it was, antiquity has not corrected Plato nor claim ed th a t he was distorting the historical Parm enides - a m an w hom Plato held in the highest respect.) ‘Is ’ is differently understood when using reason (Logos ) and when using the thinking m ind. T he m ind inverts the correct subject-predicate relationships. I f one is thinking with Logos, then ‘is’ refers to things which are unchanging, i.e. to things which are out of time; ‘is’ refers to th at w hich is real, and not th at which is becoming. T he m ind, however, operates in term s of concepts, things which are functions of time. H ence to the m ind, ‘is’ refers to th at which is not, which is becoming. T h a t which is, cannot be apprehended by the m ind, for it cannot be verbally qualified. It can only be apprehended by reason, Logisticon, in an im m ediate, non-conceptual way, for it has no properties (such as colour or smell); it is not in tim e and space; and it alone is the object of all true knowledge (.Phaedrus, 247c-d). A gainst the true being of the forms, there is the realm of actuality. As stated, actuality is the m irror of reality, i.e. in some ways it also is: it is not changing, it is not becom ing, therefore it is. However, the duration of actuality is infinitely short - instantaneous - so it is not out of time in sense of persisting for ever. A ctuality both is, since it does not become or change, and is not, since it has no durability. In so far as it ‘is and is n o t’, Plato refers to it in Parmenides (i6 6 b) as th at which appears to be. A lthough becom ing (Samsara) has no noetic validity, it is not free of all rules. Becom ing has its own rules, those according to which the m ind constructs its illusion. In the realm of becoming there can be false as well 93

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

as true judgm ents: T heaetetus cannot fly (Sophist, 263d) nor can 7 + 5 = 1 3 . Parm enides therefore accomplishes the following: he establishes the three realm s of being, becoming and actuality; he accounts for false judgm ents, i.e. the m atching of th at which is with th a t which is not; and he accounts for nothingness, which has no existence whatsoever. Ill In the dialogue, Parm enides is in fact asking three questions concerning the n atu re of unity. Beforehand, he has not bothered to define w hat is m eant by unity, nor has he asserted th at there is such a thing. In speaking of it, he relies on the existence of an underlying notion which he shares w ith his audience. T his notion is no longer part of contem porary W estern secular thought, yet it is readily m et with in the East: ‘All things have their life in this Life’ (Bhagavad G ita, V II, 6). W hether or not Plato believed in this notion of unity, Zeno certainly expressed it, echoing the historical Parm enides. In the dialogue, Parm enides’ three questions regarding this unity are: 1 I f there is a unity, w hat if anything can be known about it, if it is not in any way conceptualized, i.e. predicated by pictures, things verbal or m ental? T his relates to the realm of being. 2 I f we insist on conceptualizing this unity, (i) how is it changed by being described in term s of words and things, and (ii) having granted this conceptualized unity to perceived phenom ena, in w hat way, if any, have we affected the phenom ena th at we call things? T his relates to the realm of becoming. 3 Is it possible th at the unity may somehow be used to give im m ediate identity to actual things w ithout conceptually predicating these things by the unity? T his relates to the realm of actuality. In asking the second of these questions, Parm enides m ay be seen as exam ining the m ental effects of the principle contem porarily known in science as H eisenberg’s: how is the observed changed by the fact th at it is observed? In P lato’s equation there are three participants: the unity, which is sum and substance of all reality; the perceiving individual; and the things perceived. I f there is no interaction at all, nothing can be known. F or the m ind, either all is change, or there is no change a t all: these two are the positions of the idealists and the empiricists, both rooted in the m ind. Parm enides will have both change and rest, so he posits the realm o f the instant. N othing considered in time could ever make the transition from rest to 94

p l a t o ’s p a r m e n i d e s

m otion unless it itself passed out of time: ‘But there is no time during w hich a thing can be at once neither in m otion nor a t rest’ (Parmenides, 156°). P arm enides’ conclusion is not th at things are therefore either only and always in m otion or only and always at rest, but rath er th at all things considered beyond all change or else in time are conjectural: the actual state of n atu re is th at things are sim ultaneously in motion and at rest, and this is the realm of instantiation - it cannot be thought of, but it is grasped by every conscious m an or anim al, as actuality. N othing can change w ithout m aking the transition from rest to m otion and vice versa; yet for Plato, unlike Parm enides, change is real: ‘O n the other h and it does not change w ithout m aking a transition.’ ‘W hen does it m ake the transition, then?’ ‘N ot while it is at rest or while it is in m otion, or while it is occupying time. C onsequently, the time at w hich it will be w hen it makes the transition m ust be th at queer thing, the in sta n t’ (Parmenides, 156c— d) . A ctuality relates to the flow of births and deaths; it is continuously born anew and it passes away (Symposium, 207a-e). T hought, or rath er grasping to apprehend, m ust likewise follow this process of continually passing from m otion to rest. T his is the very nature of aspectual thought. Yet this transition is not taking place in time, for only conceptual m otion is in tim e, w hereas the grasping thought and actuality are for ever in-betw een, passing from m otion into rest. Plato writes: ‘T he w ord “ in sta n t” appears to m ean som ething such th at from it a thing passes to one or other of the two conditions. T here is no transition from a state of rest so long as the thing is still at rest, nor from m otion so long as it is still in m otion, but this queer thing, the instant, is situated betw een the m otion and the rest; it occupies no time at all; and the transition of the moving thing to the state of rest, or of the stationary thing to being in m otion, takes place to and from the in sta n t’ (Parmenides, i 56e)H e is arguing th at true things are not sections of the perceptual flux-in-tim e, synthesized by the m ind into units. T he elements of thought and of m atter can only be considered as concrete particles instantaneous­ ly. Y et the in stan t is not a very, very short duration in time - it is out of time. O n the other hand, if we consider thoughts or m atter as a flowing continuity, then thinking is not fragm ented and Chora is not m ade of particles: it can be grasped only as an undifferentiated flow. W riting of the location of atom ic particles during m om ents of change, O p penheim er (1954, pp. 42-3) observes th at at the m om ent of transition the particle is neither in m otion nor a t rest; yet it is only at this time th at it is a m aterial particle, i.e. th a t it can be observed as such: If we ask for instance w hether the position of the electron rem ains the 95

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

sam e, we m ust say ‘no’, if we ask w hether the electron is at rest, we m ust say ‘no’; if we ask w hether it is in motion, we m ust say ‘no’. O p eratin g w ithin an entirely different tradition, Bergson reaches com patible conclusions, pointing to the inadequacy of treating time as a series of m om ents. H e criticizes Zeno’s argum ent th at the arrow does not really move, since it at each instant occupies a single point in space and is therefore at rest in each. Bergson, of course, m isunderstands Zeno, who m akes his argum ent tongue in cheek: in fact, Zeno acts like a Zen m aster who creates a paradox precisely in order to stim ulate the disciple to posit his own solution. Bergson, like M arx, has in refuting Zeno reached precisely the conclusion Zeno intended. Zeno’s intention is suggested by Plato, who - alm ost unobserved by scholarship - reports a conversation betw een Zeno and Socrates in which Socrates suddenly realizes th a t Zeno is, in a negative way, arguing precisely the same point as Parm enides: ‘You seem to be opposed, yet your argum ents really come to very m uch the sam e thing - this is why your exposition and his seem over the heads of outsiders’ (Parmenides, I 2 8 a - b ) . Greek thought is full of such paradoxes. O ne m ay well w onder how often in refuting H eraclitus one is in fact reaching the conclusion H eraclitus intended; these philosophers did not wish to win argum ents b u t to convert souls.

IV T h ere are three kinds of time: cosmic time, as defined by the m ovem ent of the stars and the ‘su n ’s m ovem ent around the e a rth ’ (this is P lato’s position); biological time, or the cycle which regulates the grow th, feeding an d reproduction of living beings; and finally m ental, conjectural, psychological time, or time as m entally experienced. T his latter kind is only felt as a resistance or friction w hen the m ind is at odds w ith biological and cosmic time. In the sick city this is a perm anent condition: hence perceived things are not true, they are in flux. For the m ind flowing in rh y th m w ith biological and cosmic time, the flux is no longer flux: hence actu al entities are perceived. T h is notion is not easy to grasp. Being in tune w ith cosmic time does not m ean being in tune with the calendar: the calendar is certainly based on stellar m ovem ents, but these m ovem ents are em pirically observed: a picture of a picture. T his kind of ‘cosmic tim e’ can easily be conceptual (m entally false). It is not the object of thought th at determ ines the m anner o f thought, b u t the latter that determ ines the nature of the former. T hinking about God does not make one pious; thinking about m an, or anything, in a godly way is to think of God. 96

p l a t o ’s p a r m e n i d e s

It is when the three kinds of time and the three kinds o f ‘is’ coincide that actual things are perceived. In this coincidence time is in fact abstracted, since one moves w ith it. T he actual entities are constituted out of time and space (i.e. in Chora3 which is both). P arm enides points out ( 155e) : ‘if there is a O ne such as we have described . . . it follows th at since it is one, it has existence at some time; and again since it is not one, at some tim e it has not existence. And since it cannot both have and not have existence at the sam e tim e . . . ’ T his is the K oan or corybantic paradox, and it is precisely the question faced by Bohr and H eisenberg, who - having broken away from the concept of atom s - tried to account for the existence of real constituents of m atter which both were and were not particles. Like Plato, Bohr and H eisenberg concluded th at these things in fact have ‘existence’ out of time. So w hat, then, of space and time, and things constituted in space and time? P arm enides’ answ er is th at these are simply the product of lim itations of language and conceptual thought, which operates in terms of lingual symbols. T hey appear to take an ‘is’, yet they should be referred to as ‘is n o t’. It is not the things taking shape out of time and space th at are unreal, but tim e and space itself. This is expressed by the physicist M endel Sachs (1969, p. 53) - ‘relativity theory implies th at space and time coordinates are only elem ents of the language th at is used by an observer to describe his environm ent’ - and in an ancient B uddhist text: ‘O M onks . . . the past, the future, physical space . . . and individuals [m eaning individuals as in tim e and space] are nothing but nam es, forms of thought, words of com m on usage’ (M urti, 1955, p. 198). A ctuality is a string of instants - but not in the conceptual sense. All real things take form in the realm of instants or Chora; individuals take existence and can be seen only when the tim e-space division is abstracted. ‘A though we speak of an individual being the same . . . every bit of him is different and every day he is becoming a new m an, while the old m an is ceasing to exist. . . . A nd the application of this principle to hum ap knowledge is even m ore rem arkable. . . . when we say we are studying we really m ean th at our knowledge is ebbing away . . . and we have to study to replace w hat we are losing so th at the state of our knowledge m ay seem at any rate to be the same as before. . . . This, my dear Socrates, is how the body and all else partakes of the eternal - there is no other w ay’ (Simploke, 8). D iotim a (a H etera, or highly cultured courtesan - possibly a m istress of Pericles) adds th at this principle applies to all kinds of knowing, thinking and seeing: a m an m ust see instantaneously all the time. C onceptual 97

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

interjection, even though extremely short in duration, nevertheless takes th a t fraction of a fraction of a second - long enough to feed the m ind w ith a flow of illusions. Concepts are always retrospective, for they refer to previously held models. A ctual things are seen forever anew.

IV It has been suggested th at the technique used by Parm enides is doubly negative. In positing the realm of instance, the ‘is and is n o t’ realm , Plato denies validity to conceptualized perceptions; he is also negating the existence of ab stract universals. As such, the dialogue becomes a refutation o f ‘a b stra c t’ idealism (the two-world theory). For there are not two distinct worlds - th at of ideas and th at of m aterial things - rather, there is one world, or simply all there is - the O ne, B rahm an - w hich we can conceive in three separate ways. So far in this study I have been p rim arily concerned with differentiating between the realm s of actuality and o f becom ing, since it is these two th at are least well distinguished in contem porary philosophy. T he m ain objective in the Parmenides, however, is to elaborate on the nature of the O ne. T he realm of the O ne is th a t of reality. T o u n derstand its deeper m eaning, an inclination in sentim ent is required: ‘for those whose tem peram ent finds the procedure of this sort of thought congenial’ (Sophist, 265e) it is a m atter of deeply-felt certainty th a t th a t which is finally and ultim ately real is God, and it is for this reason th a t the neo-Platonists and Anselm equate the O ne of Parm enides w ith God. It m ay very well have been P lato’s assum ption, also, th a t anybody who could conceive of the O ne would not fail to identify it with G od (‘I am the one th at is’): but, unlike Plotinus or Anselm, Plato did not feel th a t such an identification should be ‘provided’ for the reader. As a m atter of principle, Plato will not positively identify the Good itself (Letter VII, 241°); w hether it m eant God for him or not cannot objectively be d eterm ined from the dialogues. (For hints as to his private views on this m atter, see Letter X III, 36313; II, 312s; VII, 340°; VIII, 365e.) W hile Plato sees fit to argue for the im m ortality of the soul (e.g. Phaedo, 85; Laws, 959; Meno ), he does not argue in the same way th at there is a O ne; indeed in the Parmenides he explains why. He eloquently shows th at there is nothing in the m ental sphere, Dianoia, to lead one to infer either its existence or its non-existence. However, if there is anybody in the audience who still m aintains (as does Zeno) th at there is a O ne, Parm enides will show him not w hat th at O ne is, but w hat it is not. It is this negative description of the O ne which will be considered below. T h e non-predicated O ne ‘has no beginning nor end; it has no lim its’ 9S

p l a t o ’s p a r m e n i d e s

(.Parmenides, 137d) ; ‘it has no shape, it is not round or straig h t’ ( 137e) . F u rth er, such a being, by being everywhere, is in no particular place —it is out of space, not extended ( 138a) . It cannot have an age, for th at would im ply being older or younger (i4 0 e- i 4 i ) ; hence it is out of time: ‘we may infer th a t the O ne, if it is such as we have described, cannot even occupy tim e at all’ ( i 4 i a). T h e concluding p arag rap h serves not only to delineate w hat being is not, b u t also w hat becom ing is - since becoming is everything th at being is not. Becoming is in time, it has properties, it is in space and so on. C onsequently, if the O ne has nothing to do with time, ‘it never has becom e or was becom ing . . . or will be becom ing’ (Parmenides, 14 1e) : it is not in time and place (141); we cannot speak of it (142s); it has no properties. C onclusion is by grasp; it cannot be thought of. Parm enides has a specific purpose. T he O ne which has no existence in tim e and space also has no existence for thought. Therefore if the non-predicated unity is w hat truly is, then w hat truly is is literally beyond thinking (Dianoia). T his conclusion is the object of the dialogue.

99

I M HI tj| £ ]l HI

a Six

THE BODY OF T R U T H I

b\!=T^ETI^!ET!ET!=TETI=TSn=TI=TiiI

T aoism , Plato and the U panishads are not simply expounding com patible doctrines. M uch m ore than this, their imagery, their choice of words and their rhythm ic construction is essentially identical. This is not because of borrow ing or copying: any highly disciplined and concentrated m ind faced w ith sets of conceptual paradoxes will resolve them in a sim ilar way. W h at is im p o rtan t is not the em pirical content or the m ethod, narrow ly understood. O ne m ay concentrate on the symbol of the lotus or gaze at the infinite expanse of a m oonlit sky; one may feel music deeply or lose oneself in the love of m ankind: the decisive factor is the level of this concentration. It m ust be intense enough to absorb egoistic, conceptual im pulses, and allow the noetic m ind to flow freely. Conclusions thus reached will be verbalized in a certain way. T o make them accessible to others who do not think noetically, they are further translated into time-specific imagery. T hese reductions do not render the original vision m eaningless. W hile it m ay be useful to underm ine these second-order verbalizations w hen they grow sterile, it is m istaken to assum e th at all form alization is bad. Like the idealists and m aterialists, the antiform alists and ultraform alists are equally m isguided, and not surprisingly of the sam e psychological m ake-up. T h e extrem e antiform alist Bible fundam entalist will argue th at there is no m ediator betw een God and m an save for Jesus C hrist, and th at there is no need for priests, vicars, churches, etc. If it is pointed out to him th at there is no Jesu s C h rist or New T estam ent save for M atthew , M ark, Luke and Jo h n , he will inevitably answer, ‘Yes, but when we read Luke we do not h ear or see Luke - we see beyond Luke; we listen, in fact, to Jesu s C h rist.5 In this he m ay be right; yet Luke was also an actual person, who according to his own account received the teachings of Jesus second-hand, io o

THE BODY OF TRUTH

and was as such no different from a contem porary priest. W hile Luke may be sim ply a channel to Jesus C hrist, so likewise is a H indu B rahm in or even an icon: there are no teachings other than m ediated teachings. T his is not intended as a form ulation of anti-anti-form alism . ‘T here is no m ediator betw een God and m an but X , Y or Z ’ m ay well lead m any m en to good thoughts, feelings and acts, so let it be. Yet as an idea it is ju st as reasonable - or unreasonable - as the idea th at the holy w ater of the G anges cleanses all sins, or th at no pork-eater may reach heaven. As K ierkegaard said, any belief of m an formalized into a doctrine becomes false. Y et if a doctrine serves only as a trigger for grasp by love, then th at doctrine (even though formally false) is a useful stepping stone. T he same principle applies to anti-doctrine doctrines and to this study. Let us look critically at the philosophically attractive and conceptually plausible statem ents of m en like Heidegger, Russell and indeed Einstein, who believe in God, b u t not in Jesus or K rishna or the T alm ud. T heir attitu d e m ay be philosophically sophisticated, yet Plato and, in a different way, Z oroaster both show th at such statem ents can become m eaningless. T o believe in an ab stract God, in God as nothingness only, is to believe in nothing - it is not to believe. According to C hrist, ‘no one comes to the F ather, b u t by m e’ (John, X IV ,6); and K rishna makes sim ilar statem ents in the B hagavad G ita. T he contem porary W estern notion of a transcendent God of Islam versus an im m anent G od of H induism is also false: both are transcendent and im m anent. T o be a M uslim it is not enough to believe in an abstract Allah: one m ust accept his prophet M oham m ed. To be a M uslim means to accept M oham m ed and ‘his’ Book. I am not arguing here th a t there cannot be a belief in God w ithout organized religion, b u t simply th a t there cannot be a belief in nothingness, neither can there be ethics, an idea or an ideology, w ithout it taking some positive expression - although such positive expression is not itself truth, b u t a trigger or vehicle to an inner grasp in term s of sentim ent. Even M arxism - as practised in E astern Europe or C hina, not the ‘transcenden­ ta l’ M arxism of W estern intellectuals - necessarily resorts to icons, ‘saints’ and ideals sim ilar to the garden of Eden or the Second Coming: the notion of a land ‘beyond’, to come in the future. This is not sarcasm: woe to any com m unist or M uslim or any nation th at dismisses these organizing ‘m y th s’ - its inevitable fate is anarchy, im m orality, ram p an t egoism and finally collapse. T he cynic will observe th at I am recom m ending the invention of m yths and beliefs in order to create social cohesion. Q uite the contrary: I am asserting th a t all m yths are true in so far as they have a common basis, i.e. th a t of the essential brotherhood of all men, the unity of the cosmos and its IOI

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

essential harm ony. T hese facts are not relative but absolute truths. T he fact th a t societies and individuals who subm it themselves to such rules prosper is due to the fact th at they behave in accordance w ith the real n atu re of the cosmos: since this is good, goodness is their rew ard. A p articularly successful exponent of anti-form ality writes best sellers on the them e th at all governm ent and all other organized social units such as the city and the family should be done away with. T his view would be correct were it not presented as a positive doctrine, as a literal truth. As it stands it is a sim plistic view, com parable to the zeal of fanatical M uslim s who attack the H indus for w orshipping cows, failing to realize th at the cow is sim ply a symbol, as is turning to face Mecca; or like the H indus who attack M uslim s for ‘reducing religion to ritualism ’. T he quasi­ intellectual attack on external aspects of a foreign creed are always a self-defensive fight to preserve some dom estic brand of orthodoxy. In some sense this m ay be necessary; yet the self-righteous would-be doer aw ay w ith the form alities of creed ought first to take the log out of his own eye. . . . T h e sam e applies to sophisticated anti-form ality argum ents such as those of H um e. N ot th at in criticizing ‘religiosity’ H um e is w ithout merit; however, he does take his own argum ent too seriously. His objections, valid as they are on the conceptual level, do not touch noetic faith. J u s t as I have advocated replacing the notion of ‘m atte r’ w ith Chora and ‘a ctu ality ’, so I am tem pted to use new words for ‘faith’ and ‘belief, ‘gods’ and ‘G o d ’; instead, I shall follow Plato, who advises philosophers to leave these m atters alone, and retain the word ‘faith’, although I cannot em phasize too strongly the difference between faith as a concept of Dianoia and faith as noetic belief based on the corybantic paradox. B ohr and R utherford testify that it was the absolute and unbridgeable conceptual paradox betw een light as particles and light as waves th at required the leap of ‘faith’ (the faith of Noesis) into qu an tu m theory. Q u a n tu m theory itself is transconceptual: it cannot be conceptualized, yet it can be believed. It is this kind of faith which is Noesis. T h e conceptual notion of faith is of a blind acceptance of testimony: one m ay accept on the basis of factual statem ents th at the population of a certain city is a certain num ber, w ithout having counted its inhabitants oneself. F aith in this sense m eans the acceptance of the probable, w ithout having to verify the facts. It is this kind of faith in God which is criticized by H um e, and quite correctly so. Indeed H um e may have been a deeply religious m an w ithout knowing it (conceptually). Noesis, or the faith proposed by K ierkegaard, is the m ental leap beyond two conceptual paradoxes, an active and logically coherent act of reconciliation betw een two conceptual opposites leading to a resolution on a higher plane. 102

THE BODY OF TRUTH

In this light we m ay look at the way in which the Greeks solved conceptual paradoxes. T he older, pre-sophistic Greeks had no problem in grasping th at ‘sp irit’ and ‘m atter’ were one, th at the mover and the moved were inseparably bound yet not identical. Thales writes th at ‘all things are full of gods’ - or in other words, th at ‘m a tter’ is spiritual. Plato pointed o ut th a t the perceived thing and its essential ‘spiritual’ quality are not the sam e. (T he w ord ‘sp iritu al’ of course is as misleading in this context as ‘m a tte r’; as usual we are condem ned to use other people’s words.) This conceptual am biguity is overcome by noetic grasp: hence we read in the B rihadaranyaka U pan ish ad (III, 15) o f ‘H e who dwells in all beings, yet is other th an all beings, whom all beings do not know, whose body is all beings. . . . ’ T o argue th at the m oving principle is eternal, or th at ideas are reabsorbed into the things which they are the ideas of, is not to say th at perceived things are the same as the ideas of them. T he am biguity cannot be presented conceptually, and m ust be grasped by an ethical leap. F aith does not m ean blindly accepting im plausible statem ents such as th at there is a G od in a place called heaven. R ather, it m eans the ability to stun the conceptual m ind and grasp the deeper logic - the deeper kind of thought, Noesis — which moves on ethical grounds. Even a first-class dianoic brain such as th at of A ristotle was incapable of such a leap. H e could not grasp how it was th at Plato insisted th at ideas were in things and yet were other th an things: for him , this necessarily m eant th at ideas were ap a rt from or external to things, and it is in this way th at Plato has been interpreted by alm ost everyone who pays their attention to com m entaries on Plato rather th an the text itself.

I T h e purpose of P lato ’s dialogue Parmenides is to induce in the reader or h earer a noetic grasp of the relationship between the O ne and the m any. I observed in the last chapter th at Parm enides shared his notion of the O ne w ith the East, though this observation was not adequately supported at the time. T his final Being is seen by Plato ( Timaeus, 51,52) as: ‘th a t one kind o f being the form of which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from w ithout, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and im perceptible by any sense, and of which the contem plation is granted to [noetic] intelligence only.’ A nd in the Phaedrus (247°) it is described as ‘w ithout colour or shape, th at 103

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

cannot be touched; intellect alone, the soul’s pilot, can behold it, and all true knowledge is knowledge thereof.’ T his, to Plato, is Usia Ontos U sa - the Beingly Being, the Indivisible O ne w hich the U panishads call B rahm an and which is described in the Svetasvatara U pan ish ad ( V I ,u - i 2 ) as ‘the O ne God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the [Self] existent w ithin every being, the surveyor o f all actions, dwelling in all creatures, the witness, the spirit, the unique, free from a ttrib u te s.’ Before we too hastily draw a linear-style deduction, and conclude as did the historical Parm enides th at all is one, we turn back to Plato’s Parmenides and observe w ith him th a t although if it were not for the O ne there could not be anything at all, yet in order for it to be a O ne for us it m ust of necessity have some kind of extension, w hether this be simply a verbal predication or m erely a notional one. T he O ne to be a O ne needs some kind of a body, concrete or abstract. T h e com plications involved in conceiving of the O ne, i.e. B rahm an, are fu rth er elaborated in the Svetasvatara U panishad (V I, 12): he is the O ne, C ontroller of a passive m u ltitude’, th a t is, he ‘makes his one seed m anifold’; and in the Parmenides: ‘T hus he is both one and he is m any, or ra th e r he is one th at seems and seems not to be m any.’ T he problem of the m any being one lies in the separation between the observer and the observed. H eraclitus rem arks th at when you are awake, you cease to be one, you are em braced by the m any and em brace the m any in yourself, so th a t there is nothing w ithout and nothing within. J u s t as a m an em braced by his beloved wife does not know w hat is outside an d w hat is inside, likewise the person, when he is em braced by the conscious [Self], does not know w hat is outside and w hat is inside. . . . Being ju s t B rahm an, he goes to B rahm an (B rihadaranyaka U p an ish ad IV ,3 ,2 i; IV ,4,6). Likewise, to know oneself becomes to know the one being, ‘for all knowledge is the knowledge th ereof (Phaedrus, 247) and ‘the knowledge of all is th a t which you are - Tat Tvam Asi. ’ W e find echoes of this in T illich’s (1951, v o l.i, pp. 72f) form ulation of ‘ontological reason’ —reason which perceives the ideal p attern of the being itself and its repetition in the structure of hum an intelligence. W e find Lord K rish n a instructing A rjuna th at knowledge is the perception of the one in the m any. H e says: W hen one sees E ternity in things th a t pass away and Infinity in finite things, then one has pure knowledge. But if one merely sees the diversity of things, with their divisions and lim itations, then one has im pure knowledge. A nd if one selfishly sees a thing as if it were

104

THE BODY OF TRUTH

everything, independent of the o n e and the m any, then one is in the darkness of ignorance (Bhagavad G ita, X V III, 20-22). Ignorance is not ju s t a perceptive deficiency: it has an ethical dim ension, for it is the sam e as egoism and selfishness opposed to knowledge. T h u s religious, philosophical, scientific and even m undane practical knowledge m anifests itself through the activity of gathering the m any into one, and vice versa. O r in the words of St J o h n ’s gospel (X V II, 11-23): H oly F ather, keep them in thy nam e, which thou hast given me, th at they m ay be one, even as we are one . . . th at they m ay all be one; even as thou, F ather, a ft in me, and I in thee, th at they also m ay be in us. . . . T h e glory w hich thou hast given me I have given to them , th at they m ay be one even as we are one, I in them and thou in me. T his relationship pervades all noetic thought, and is based on the assum ption th at one is indeed m any - but not ju st any kind of m any, or infinite kinds o f m any, b u t a specific, ordered kind: the m any become one only in so far as they are ordered according to a specific pattern. T o be, therefore, m eans to be in a specific place and to execute specific actions: to be is to be in order. In religious philosophy, this principle extends from the form ation of individual w ords themselves (as in the Cratylus, 389), to sentences, to philosophies and to cities, leading to m an ’s integration into the body of B rahm a, Je su s or the Shariah. T his is conveyed in I Peter ( 11, 5 ): ‘like living stones be yourselves built into a spiritual house’. St Paul taught th at the church is the body of C hrist. W e become w hat we are m eant to become, or w hat we ‘really are ’, when we function ‘as we should’, harm oniously with respect to both planes: ‘T h y will be done on earth as in heaven.’ T hrough ‘knowledge’, the nature o f this functioning is m ade m anifest on both planes. St Paul (Ephesians, IV , 9-16) writes: (‘H e ascended’, w hat does it m ean but th at he had also descended into the lower parts o f the earth? H e who descended is he who also ascended far above all the heavens, th at he m ight fill all things.) A nd his gifts were th a t some should be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers . . . for building up the body of C hrist, until we all atta in to the unity of the faith. . . . we are to grow up in every way into him who is the head, into C hrist, from whom the whole body, joined and knit together by every jo in t w ith which it is supplied, when each part is working properly, makes bodily grow th and upbuilds itself in love. (M y em phasis.) T his perennial order, this universal tru th and p attern which St A ugustine writes always has been and always will be, is characterized by

105

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

the V edic Rta —m eaning the world order, the law and p attern to which all the cosmos m ust conform. Confucius calls it T ao Tien w hich Noss (1974 , p. 243) defines as ‘the pre-established pattern into which all things ought to fall if they are to be in their proper place and do their proper w ork’. T h e Z oroastrian Asha is described by Boyce as a ‘n atu ral law which ensured th a t the sun would thus m aintain its regular m ovem ent and th at the seasons would change’. She adds th at ‘the concept of Asha had ethical im plications also in th a t it was thought th at it should likewise govern h u m an conduct. V irtue belonged to that n atural order and vice was its betrayal. Asha is a difficult word to tran slate.’ A nd she writes of ‘order w here the concept refers to the physical world, tru th and righteousness in connection w ith the m oral one. T he principle of falsehood . . . which was opposed to Asha the A vestan people called drug - Sanskrit Druh} (Boyce, ! 979>PP- 7,8 )T his sam e concept - i.e. the lie - is called in the K oran Druj, and opposed to the holy order, the law, called Ashariah or simply Shariah. T he way o f the gods or T ao Tien is, in C onfucius’s words (cited by Sm ith, 1973, p. 65), ‘the way a m an ought to travel, because it is ordained by H eaven th a t he should walk in it. It is fundam entally the way of H eaven, and only becom es a way of m an because all wise and good men follow it.’ All these models see the individual as walking on two paths: one as an individual integrated into the Asha, Rta, Body of C hrist, world order; and one as an individual separate from it. In betw een order and the false self there is always a door - there is necessarily a positive interm ediate vehicle or model. I shall later call this m odel the p aradigm atic city (the New Jerusalem , the City of Ayodha, the cosmic A thens). It m ay also take local form as a person - ‘I am the way, the door, the tru th ,’ etc. - or as law. T he ‘City of G od’ concept is an im p o rtan t prerequisite of noetic thought, being on its lower level a social representation of the eternal Rta-Asha. T he model is triple in nature, for its function is to represent the way in which the fixed ratios and relationships of the unchanging order particularize down into the sphere of social existence, taking concrete form w ithin the context of a p articu lar culture. T h e city of G od never is; for it to m aterialize, all men would have to accept the law o f Rta and behave accordingly. None the less, it has a function.

II T his study began with an attem p t to distinguish between two different m odes o f apprehension, Noesis and Dianoia. C orresponding to these we 106

THE BODY OF TRUTH

posited two cognitive faculties, one the m ind and the other Logisticon or Buddhi (‘g reater th an the m ind is B uddhi5 - Bhagavad G ita, II I , 42). Associated w ith these two cognitive faculties were two realm s of being. T h e body perceives a world of sense, yet it is not this world th at is m ediated by the conceptual m ind. As we have shown, the conceptualist differentiates betw een things and sensations. T o the conceptualist, an orange is a synthesis of roundness, redness and sweetness - all the m anifold qualities th at the m ind synthesizes as an orange. Likewise, a horse is a synthesis of blackness, four-leggedness and so on. Sometimes the horse is regarded as som ething behind all these sensations, and it is never taken in im m ediately. I f we could peep into the m ind of a H sia dynasty peasant (as indeed we can, through the a rt of th at tim e), a horse appears as a pulsating bundle of energy, virility, w arm ness and various other impressions th at cannot be conceptually deduced. Rivers are the blood vessels of dragons, hills can be m ale or female and caverns are the orifices of a cosmic anim al. T o the G reek preconceptual m ind waterfalls are im prisoned lions th at roar; the sound of a gong is for Pythagoreans the sound of an im prisoned giant. T he presophist Greek calls white and quick by the same nam e (Leukos); P latn au er argues (tongue in cheek) in Classical Quarterly th at the lack of correspondence betw een words and colours would indicate th at the ancient ‘Greeks were insane or colourblind5. His point is th at the pre-seventh century BC Greek world is non-m ental: it is grasped by a cognitive faculty other th an the m ind. Proclus, too, distinguishes between reality which is grasped and reality which is seen m entally. T he equation of the m entally in terpreted with the grasped universe is false. T he two can coincide b u t need not. Both, of course, are rooted in perception. W e have already considered a third realm which is altogether independent of sensual perception. It m ust, however, be im m ediately stressed th a t the realities of this third realm are not different from the realities of the grasped world. By positing an intuitive w orld, we are not creating a dualistic position. T he ontological distinction of the world of sense and the world of intuition is a necessary conceptualization, but it is conjectural. W orld A is not different from world B, the inner from the outer, though they may be differently perceived. T h e realm of Eidos or Logos and the realm of grasp and actuality, though in some ways separate, are essentially one: subject and object are only aspectually independent. For Plato, w hat is and w hat is not external or m aterial is a highly complex question. T he problem is grasped by several more recent thinkers: H ere externality is not to be understood as sensuousness th at 107

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

externalizes itself and discloses itself to sensuous m an. T his externality is m eant here as an alienation, a fault, a weakness th at should not exist (M arx, Mega, 1,3, pp. 17if). T his ‘o therness’ appears in existentialist philosophy and psychology as the principle of falsehood and inauthenticity. Psychological-existential authenticity becomes ‘w holeness’: the return to the unity from which one originally stems. T he same principle of alienation from unity and the retu rn to it likewise crops up in microbiology: in the creation of new organism s, D N A form ation controls the evolutionary developm ent of D ictyodora - the spiralling m ovem ent of shells, horns and galaxies (see T hom pson, 1942). It also surfaces in contem porary cosmology, in the Big B ang theory, w here the O ne explodes into the m any, and history is a g rad u al retu rn to the O ne.

Ill

T h e earlier chapters have used the words ‘horizontally’ and ‘vertically’ in a connotative m anner which can now be explicitly elaborated. It was suggested above th at the ‘Left’ and ‘R ight’ division in popular political term inology stems not from the seating divisions in Parliam ent b u t reaches far back into history, and is as present in Plato’s A thens as in the thought of Confucius. ‘Left’ signifies soft, liberal, yielding, earthy, feminine: its negative connotations are dark, crooked, devious, u n tru st­ w orthy. ‘R ig h t’ - being associated with maleness, catharsis, purity, rigidity - stands for the opposite qualities. As we gather from Lao T zu (T ao T e C hing, X X X IV ), the eternal T ao does not differentiate but ra th e r incorporates left and right. Plato, likewise, was at great pains to reconcile and avoid these divisions; for it was as a victim of these factions th a t Socrates was condem ned to death. T h e them e of the left and right and their reconciliation is of p aram ount im portance to Logos thought. It is symbolized by the T ai Chi symbol chosen for his coat of arm s by Niels Bohr, who him self accounts for things in term s of the creation of yin and yang, or positive and negative charges in the life of subnuclear particles. T he two can be viewed as the two ways o f perceiving the world - sensually and intuitively. (The intuition of Bergson, o f poets or of the nineteenth-century Rom antic m ovem ent, while a valid form o f apprehension, should not be equated with noetic thought. As there is Eros and A gape - love of the lower and higher A phrodite - and as there are two kinds of divine m adness, so there are also two different types of intuition, to be treated elsewhere.) 108

THE BODY OF TRUTH

T o divide the world poetically, empirically, scientifically and erotically presupposes a (unified) conceptualist vision characteristic of the age of specialization. Such an age does not m anifest itself only in the actual division of labour; the principle spills into all areas of life. So at the height of a conceptual era, m en specialize in the ways they perceive the world; further, they specialize into ‘serious’ and ‘unserious’, employed and unem ployed, workers and non-workers. Poets are paid to poetize, scientists to scientize, singers to sing. W hen the scientist w ants to particip ate in m usic or art he does so via the m ediation of the m arket: in other words he buys a record. Singers similarly buy the products of the scientist. M an is therefore conditioned to consum e things in packages. T his principle of pre-packing applied to thinking results in piecemeal apprehension. In view of this, I can declare w hat I m ean by the notion ‘horizontal’ in a single sentence. W henever the being of anything is presented through an exposition of separate aspects, th at presentation is horizontal. T he ‘left and rig h t’, ‘being and becom ing’ divisions presented above are all horizontal in this sense. A spectual thought, on the other hand, operates in vertical units, th at is, it sim ultaneously grasps the three aspects of entities which have been identified as the realm s of being, becoming and actuality. These vertical units do have a horizontal dimension: a form can be spoken about, a God can be painted. T he tension between vertical and horizontal lies behind the w ord play o f the V edas, and accounts for the ap parent rivalry of Lao T zu and Confucius. Broadly generalizing, noetic philosophy can be seen in term s of an intersecting set of trichotom ies, which come into being in the course of interaction of the vertical and horizontal duality called by Pythagoreans the lim it and unlim it, or To Peras and Aperion (the O ne and the indefinite), and by H om er O ceanus and Thetys. T hus ‘all things . . . consist of one and m any and have in their nature a conjunction of lim it and unlim it’ (Philebus, i6 d). T h e horizontal elem ent of anything is th at which can be seen, touched or thought about; it is th at aspect of being which adm its to more or less, heavy or light (Philebus, 24e-2 5 a; see also A ristotle’s Metaphysics, 998a8 and Physics, 207a8 and Sim plicius’ Comments on Physics, 2 0 7 ^ 9 -3 2 ). In a way, we can follow Speussipus and Aristotle in claiming th at it corresponds to the process w hereby the concept - the content of the m ind - becomes also a kind of body: ‘T h e being which is distributed or parcelled out by the lim iting factor of unity is the indefinite dy ad ’ (Aristotle, Physics, 20915; see also Sim plicius On Physics, 1 8 7 ^2 ), the horizontal elem ent of being. In thus equating the indefinite with m atter, we need not subscribe to the 109

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

absolute A ristotelian division between m atter and separate ideal essences (.Metaphysics, 987*—988): it m ust be em phasized that even God and Form have a horizontal elem ent, for they too can be painted, spoken about and thought of. A lthough it is the horizontal elem ent th at can be sensually perceived, in itself it is held in existence by the vertically defined limit; thus even the action of conceptualization (as any action) is derivative of both the lim ited and unlim ited principles. T h e vertical elem ent is the hierarchical aspect of a thing, its ontological structure. T he indefinite elem ent progresses horizontally and is d istri­ buted am ong bodies ( Timaeus, 359). T he conceptual ‘body’ is its verbal predication. T o give body a conceptual unity is to give it a predication, a word: and this unity of predicated conceptualization is other than itself: ‘I f the O ne is, it cannot be and yet not have a being. So there will also be the being w hich the O ne has, and this is not the sam e thing as the O ne: otherw ise th a t being would not be its being’ (Parmenides, 142°). T his sim ply m eans th a t in conceptualizing anything we m ust give it a tangible aspect, even if this be the concept or the word itself. T his elem ent is ‘the being d istributed am ong the bodies’ ( Timaeus, 35s) which A ristotle identifies w ith the indefinite, and which we have called considering things horizontally. H orizontally seen, being is known, becom ing is understood conceptually and actuality is grasped. V ertically seen, any single thing exhibits the three aspects of being, becom ing and actuality. N othing could be seen or thought of were it not held in place or contained by the horizontal element; in order to be known, the O ne has first to em anate, alienate or in some way separate or contradict itself; but then the contradiction m ust be resolved into a unity. Hegel turns this principle upside down and creates the idealistic dialectic; M arx turns Hegel upside dow n and creates dialectical m aterialism ; yet the m echanics stay the same: the non-alienated, the O ne, the thesis, followed by the historical process of alienation, Enifremdung, the em anation away from the norm al, the dyad. T his alienated, externalized principle is referred to in T aoism and the U p an ish ad s as the ‘illusion’, as the m aterial or perceptual veil, Maya, the cause of all suffering and all evil. In Zoroastrianism it is called ‘the O th e r’: it can be variously portrayed either as a psychological principle (Angro Manyush, A hrim an), or as a conjectural principle opposed to the true and real (V ohu M anu). It can also be regarded as nothingness: the devil is frequently portrayed as an absence of reality by pseudo-Dionysius, St A ugustine and St T hom as A quinas. For pseudo-Dionysius, existence is the fusion of being with nothingness. ‘N othingness’ can also sometimes stand for true being (non-conceptually considered): thus conceptual or em pirical being can be called an em anation from nothingness returning to 110

THE BODY OF TRUTH

nothingness. T he A dvaita school of V edanta take the view th at nothingness is being, while perceived (atomic) m atter is conjectural. A nd Lao T zu writes: T h e T ao begot O ne. O ne begot two. [These two are yin and yang, the m ale and female principles which create the third, their offspring.] Two begot three. A nd three begot the ten thousand things. T he ten thousand things carry yin and em brace yang. T hey achieve harm ony by com bining these forces (Tao T e C hing, X L II). T riu n ity is, of course, the essential characteristic of C hristian theology. T h e O ne - the F ath er — creates the world through his word, the Logos (‘through him all things were m ade’), and reconciles duality into unity by m eans of the all-com prehensive sentim ent of the Holy Ghost. H ere we shall tend to concentrate on the schem atic outlines of the philosophical aspect of this process. M ythologically, the H indu God is a unity - the O ne, alone - ‘with whom was the w ord’. T he creative word - A U M - em anates from the O ne, and by its various vibrations creates the extended universe. A T ib etan L am a cited by A lexandra David-Neel (1936, pp. 186-7) sees things as: aggregations of [tiny entities, atoms] th at by their movements produce sounds. W hen the rhythm of the dance changes, the sound it produces also changes. . . . Each atom perpetually sings its song, and the sound at every m om ent creates dance and subtle forms. A contem porary ‘field theory’ of m atter sees it as originally existing as a non-differentiated frequency (‘nothingness’ in the sense, not of a void, but of not being other th an itself), which becomes differentiated by the concentration of energy. All atom s, elements and so on are simply more or less dense rhythm ic vibrations of this prim al substance. M aterial particles are created by the sym m etrical interaction of two kinds of m ovem ent, th at of positive and negative charge or m atter and antim atter, during which energy and m om entum are conserved. Such models are daily re­ exam ined; they vary from laboratory to laboratory, from age to age and from culture to culture. Yet w henever we look for the dual triunity we may be sure it will be there.

IV W e have so far considered the ontological realm s and their corresponding epistemologies. V ertically considered, being, becoming and actuality correspond to knowing, thinking and grasping. Hence the two philo­ sophical divisions, the epistemological and the ontological. T here is, 111

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

however, a third broad division, which concerns souls, and is a psychological division. Psychologically and vertically considered, the soul can be seen as a trip artite hierarchy of Logisticon, Thumos and Epithumia (Republic, 435-442, 58od), or Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (Bhagavad G ita, X IV , 5). It m ust be em phasized th a t w hereas a m an dominated by the ‘highest’ soul quality, Logisticon-Sattva (B hagavad G ita, X IV , 18), can be considered to be superior to a m an dom inated by Epithumia-Tamas (Bhagavad G ita, X IV , 17), such superiority does not ascribe a hierarchy of w orth to the three qualities themselves w hen taken out of their instantial context. Thumos-Rajas, w hen correctly functioning, is no more th an a psychological quality, and as such as good as any other. Considered vertically, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are coequal; indeed to claim anything else would be like claim ing th at a piece of p aper with a painting of a gold coin on it was by virtue o f its subject w orth m ore than a painting of a silver coin. These qualities are, then, precisely like paper money: coequal in their objective w orth (i.e. as pieces of paper), yet acting as tokens for the sym bolization an d perception of objective value-relations between goods other than them selves. T h u s, considered as a psychological quality, Logisticon-Sattva can be seen as th a t p a rt of the soul concerned w ith thought and reflection in the epistem ological dim ension called knowing (.Noesis)\ ontologically it corresponds to the realm of being. Thumos-Rajas is th at executive elem ent o f the soul concerned with activity, and hence with the realm of time and extension; it corresponds to becoming. T he third elem ent, EpithumiaTamas has no negative connotations: it is defined by Proclus (1820, X I) as a ‘tendency or appetite to be filled with som ething present, to be disposed according to some sensitive energy’, hence it corresponds to the psychological dim ension of grasping. T he grasping soul apprehends im m ediately: it is filled with im pressions w ithout the interm ediate function o f opinion or thought. It is m ade clear by Proclus, through reference to the Pythagoreans, th at a negative ju d g m en t about any of these psychological qualities can be m ade only as a result of their m u tatio n or ab erration, they are no longer functioning w ithin their assigned places. T h e A rab philosopher Averroes (1956^. 162) also opposes the two ‘active’ qualities of Logisticon and Epithumia w ith the Rihd, w hich is like Thumos in a sense passive or lacking independent im pulse; and he assigns no qualitative predication to these three parts of the soul. T h e In d ia n caste corresponding to Rajas (i.e.Thumos) is th at of the w arriors: their d uty is to fight, yet not to originate the causes of wars, nor to dwell on issues - not to reason why. Kshatriyas who fight well reach heaven regardless of the side on w hich they fight or the issue. 112

THE BODY OF TRUTH

W e are now in a position to clarify further the functioning of the horizontal dim ension. T he epithum ic soul has a cognitive function which we have called grasping and whose object is actuality. G raphically, this relation can be portrayed as follows: Grasping

Actuality -

-Epithumia

(horizontal or indefinite)

All things consist of both the O ne and the unlim ited, i.e. vertical and horizontal elem ents; therefore actuality itself can be considered vertically. P ortrayed graphically, this vertical elem ent of actuality is the triunal being, as below: Being

r.

Becoming Actuality

In order th at these two creative forces, the O ne and the unlim ited (vertical and horizontal) can create a progeny, they m ust be brought together graphically. T his m arriage is shown in Fig. i . Being (The dimension of instants)

T O 0

'E 0) >

Becoming

Actuality-

■Grasping-

-Epithumia

Horizontal (The dimension of time and space)

Figure / R eality, we said, is constituted by an intersecting set of ontological trichotom ies (psychological, ontological and epistemological), brought together through the interaction of a vertical and horizontal duality (To Peras and the indefinite Aperion, or the two rivers O ceanus and T hetys). B ringing the intersecting trichotom ies together, the m atrix of Fig. 2 results. T h e horizontal aspect im parts corporeality and tangibility, w hether m ental or physical, for it can only operate by creating extension in tim e or space. T h e vertical aspect confers instantaneous unity through a noetic grasping or ‘intellecting’ of three aspects in one. In actuality or reality, the O ne and the indefinite dyad, when correctly I!3

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

Ontological

Epistemological

Psychological

Being

(Absolute) Knowing

Sattva Logisticon RuJing-soul element

Understanding

Rajas Thumos Executivemental element

Grasping

Tamas Epithumia Desire and need-body element

To Peras Becoming The limit

Actuality

The indefinite

Figure 2

apprehended, always converge in a point. This is where the diagram is deceptive. In grasping or in knowing, the Logisticon and Epithumeticon elim inate the autonom ous m ind’s activity, Dianoia: hence the m iddle region in the diagram is conjectural. T h u s this diagram rests on a borrow ed prem ise which assum es an ‘is’ for the m iddle section (considered horizontally). Between being and Logisticon there is no interm ediate knowing: Logisticon is axiological and com prehends itself; knowing is being (Ens). Likewise, considered vertical­ ly, there is no becom ing between being and actuality (see Fig.3). T he aspects of the m ediative ‘cross’, from the perspective of reality, become m ere conjectural creations. T h e diagram in Fig. 2 can be seen as portraying the three different m odes of apprehension. W hen attem pting to apprehend the notion ‘grasp in g ’, the m ind should abstract the m iddle cross, and connect the opposites in one m ovem ent. Looking at the diagram : between the square representing being and the square representing actuality there stands a square representing becoming; the same relationship is true of knowing, und erstan d in g and grasping (see Fig. 4). K now ing is only aspectually different from understanding. K nowing, if considered m ediatively (e.g. betw een being and Logisticon ), becomes conjectural. Logisticon com pre114

THE BODY OF TRUTH

Figure j hends (is) being. K now ing, in this horizontal sense, ceases to be knowing. T he grasping m ind, when moving between knowing and grasping, abstracts the square in between - the process of understanding. T his is precisely w hat ‘grasping’ m eans in our context: the ability to abstract the

Figure 4

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

interm ediate distortions of the independently operating m ind. T his relationship holds true all across the board: it is w hat was m eant in positing the m iddle ‘cross’ as conjectural, for considered in this m ediative, m iddle-cross sense, knowing, understanding, grasping and Thumos are all of the realm of becoming. W e m ay note th a t Logisticon can, by this same process of abstraction of interm ediate knowing, be identified with being; knowing does not d isappear, b u t is in a sense absorbed. T h a t is w hat is m eant by saying th at the know er and the known are one. Ideally the diagram should itself be com prehended through the sim ultaneous apprehension of all its parts. Behind every entity hide all these relationships, linked together and flowing into one another. T h e Dianoia-h&std, conceptual m ind - as opposed to the intellect - does not grasp or ‘leap ’: it works mediatively, as in the diagram . Between being and actuality it posits becoming, and cannot conceive of either of the two w hich are w ithout positing the third, which is not. This extra creation is grafted on by the m ind in order to make notions conceptually intelligible. T h e m ediative activity is therefore th at of the indefinite horizontal elem ent. W e can define Noesis as the sim ultaneous grasp of the three ontological aspects of being — not in the sense of stringing them one alongside the other, b u t by ab stracting any such division. Noesis is ‘vertical thinking’. Dianoia, on the o ther hand, uses as its currency symbols and images, and can consider its objects only by seeing them as w ithin one of the three realm s. T h e d iagram m atic model itself and the division into trip artite reality is, of course, rooted in Dianoia: for vertical thought it does not exist.

V Clock tim e (which is simply a convention) apart, corresponding to the three realm s of the conceptual-m ental, the body-soul or actual and being there are also three realm s of time. T im e experienced in the psychological and conjectural sense is a m ental projection - this is the time of Samsara. G rasping or actuality implies the direct, bodily grasp of time, and this body-tim e or actuality-tim e we can roughly equate w ith th at of the so-called ‘biological clock’. Finally, there is cosmic time, o f which m an can be intuitively or noetically aware. All individual suffering m ay be interpreted as stem m ing from subjective discrepancies betw een the experiences of these three kinds of time. These discrepancies arise as the m ind is influenced by m ovem ents and rhythm s which contradict th at of the cosmos. 1 16

THE BODY OF TRUTH

T h e m ind is in a sense drugged to such m ism atches. False music, false philosophy, false eating all drug the m ind. O ne of the sym ptom s of intoxication is a distorted sense of time, and to understand this phenom enon, we m ust look at the origin of this sense. Noesis involves the constant overcoming of inertia, and this friction gives rise to the psychological experience of time. T he experience is intensified in m om ents of acute suffering. Pain can be overcome by abandonm ent to the cosmic rhythm ; b u t it can also be avoided through drugs. False music creates a false feeling th at life is friction-free. A potent drug such as heroin tem porarily blocks the friction of Anangke or the Cross (notions to be developed later) by distorting the sense of time. T he use of heroin may be felt as p leasant to the conceptual m ind, yet the body’s biological system is being destroyed: inevitably the pain of destruction is felt after a period of some days. It is the fact th at body-tim e and m ental time diverge that causes the suffering. T h e sam e applies to evil sentim ents such as sadism. T he torturing of anim als or of hu m an beings - even if by m utual consent in sado­ m asochism - inevitably causes psychological and m ental dam age to the practising individuals, and to the society at large, even if the practices be discrete or unknow n. T his is why the bourgeois idea th at all is perm itted given consent falls flat, for this ‘consent’ is given on the conceptual plane by the conceptual m ind. T ru e consent involves a sim ultaneous agreem ent in all three realm s. Any arousal of evil sentim ent causes dam age on the bodily or m ental plane. T he evil th at men do is only possible because of the delay in inevitable punishm ent. T he punishing agent has often been externalized into a vengeful God: a m ore appropriate conceptualization is to see the punishing agent as some inner entity. To say th at the individual punishes him self m ay be m isleading, for there are two ‘individuals’ concerned: the true individual punishes the false one. ‘P unishm ent’ is again an incorrect w ord, for it im plies vengeance. T here is no vengeance. Pain stems from the restoration of im balance, and all pain is self inflicted. A m an actually cuts into his own flesh when he steps out of body or cosmic time, for in doing so he no longer feels w hat is painful, and hence ‘unw ittingly’ com m its evil acts on others - and on himself, since he is in others. (M oham m ed: ‘W hosoever com m itteth a sin com m itteth it against him self.’ Socrates: ‘O ne can only com m it injustice against him self.’) I f a m an were to perceive the three realm s of time sim ultaneously, he w ould be perfect. In the m om ents when he does, a m an is perfect: biological and m ental time are reconciled in cosmic time, and therefore disappear. Perfect tim e - cosmic time - is in a sense no time; m an is projected on to a higher plane, where he is out of time. 117

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

Likewise for all real entities: contem porary physics bears out th at the conceptual constituents of so-called ‘real5 things - things in time - are in fact abstractions. T hese abtractions - atom s and other prim ary elem ents are not adequate, for they can no longer account for the universe as em pirically given. T h e ‘particles’ in conceptual time and space are not true: true particles take form out of time and place. W e read this in the C handogya U pan ish ad (V I, 12,1): ‘Bring me a fruit of the fig tree!’ ‘H ere it is, sir.’ ‘Break it open!’ ‘T here it is, sir!’ ‘W h at do you see?’ ‘T hese fine seeds, like tiny particles.’ ‘Break one open!’ ‘T here it is, sir.’ ‘W h at do you see?’ ‘N othing at all, sir!’ T hese invisible particles are not nothing - they are invisible because they are out o f time. T he ‘out o f time seeds’, as the sage goes on to observe, are in fact the constituents of all that really is: ‘T his finest elem ent, which you cannot perceive [in tim e and space] - out of this finest elem ent, my dear, comes this big fig tree! T h a t which is this finest element, the whole world has for itself (C handogya U panishad, V I, 12,2-3). As pointed out earlier, in order to be ‘th a t’, it needs to take a body. In fact, ‘th a t’ is the synthesis of the body and ‘th a t’ - prior to this synthesis, there is neither ‘th a t’ nor the body. A ccording to Socrates, all is nothing b u t pairs of m ovem ents —yet even these movem ents are not until there is a synthesis: ‘there is no agent before it meets a patient, and no patient before it m eets the ag en t.’ T he m ind operates by the same rules. In view o f the foregoing we can understand the complexity of the relationship betw een Noesis and Dianoia. T his can only imperfectly be graphically portrayed in our m atrix; the two merge into one another by m eans o f the interm ediate area. T he interm ediate area of becoming, i.e. conceptual understanding, can be apprehended in several different ways. I f it is understood for w hat it is, it is in a sense abstracted; it is absorbed into knowledge. As we have argued of actuality-Chora, the container and the contained, the receptacle, space and the stuff of which the universe is m ade, m erge into each other - there is no more container and contained. C onceptually, Chora itself can be considered as an object (and so can Noesis, for a process is also a thing), which is discerned as such either by w ord or by thought, once it has been differentiated as an entity by g ran tin g it a unity. T he intelligible Noesis itself takes on tangibility, i.e. 118

THE BODY OF TRUTH

conceptual unity: ‘the one in order to be thought of as one m ust take a being which is other than itself. In other words, Noesis is divided into Noesis and its body (Dharmakaya ). All things are constituted by the O ne and the indefinite dyad (Philebus, i6 d), by on the one h an d the eidetic content, the being of the being, and on the other the kind of being distributed am ong bodies, apprehended by opinion join tly w ith sense ( Timaeus, 52a). Noesis, considered as a process — a thing - therefore has both a vertical and a horizontal com ponent: horizontal as a concept or a word, for words and concepts have a being (Cratylus, 386e); considered vertically, a notion. T he vertical aspect is knowledge considered as its own object, the realm of form, and as such it is called Noesis. T h e horizontal com ponent represents knowledge ap p rehended as an opinion of itself, and is represented by the ‘one section of it which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating things as im ages’ (Republic, 5 io b): this dim ension of Noesis is called Dianoia. Let us consider two sections of Fig.2, understanding and knowing. C onsidered aspectually, each of these likewise has a com ponent which could in tu rn be called knowledge or understanding - ju st as a god, a m an and a piece of d irt each have a form and extension (Parmenides, 130). In order to avoid the infinite internal regression to which the ontological m atrix is subject conceptually, we add the third dim ension - grasping. T h e object of the subdivision is not to create a new and independent class of knowledge, b u t rath er to illustrate the relations of the two basic entities (conceptuals and know ables). We are not dealing with three classes of knowledge, b u t w ith knowledge viewed aspectually, ‘know ledge’ viewed conceptually, and knowledge as grasped. Dianoia is thus not a ‘second-best’ kind of knowledge: it is not knowledge at all, b u t a picture of knowledge. T he distinction at hand is betw een objects and pictures of these objects. Pictures can be considered both as pictures of objects and as objects - as they indeed are, considered for themselves.

VI T he intention here is not merely to distinguish between an object ‘know ledge’ and its Eikon ‘opinion’; this distinction is readily acknow­ ledged. T h e m ore im p o rtant distinction relates to the conjectural thinking characteristic of those people commonly considered as ‘thinkers’: m athe­ m aticians, positivist philosophers, scientists. I aim to diagnose the nature of the m ental activity th at would today be called positivist thought, and to show it to be different from the m ental activity of the dialectical thinkers. ll9

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

N oetic activity escapes positive elaboration, since it starts from principles th a t cannot be positively derived, and it uses no pictures to m ake progress. In the Republic (511°), G laucon states: ‘[I u n d erstan d th at you m ean to distinguish reality and dialectic from] the so-called sciences and arts whose assum ptions are arb itrary points. A nd, though it is true th at those who contem plate them are compelled to use their u n derstanding and not their senses . . . you do not think they possess true intelligence about them , although the things them selves are intelligibles. . . . A nd I think you call the m ental h ab it of geom eters and their like, m ind or understanding and not reason. . . . 5 ‘Y our interp retatio n is quite sufficient,’ I said. T h u s, sim ply, Noesis is an act of apprehension independent of concepts or images. Dianoia is ab stract or discursive thinking, dependent on images w hich are conjectural. T his is also observed by K. O e h le r - to whom I am indebted - and by Cornford (1967, pp. 76-7): Noesis, as opposed to Dianoia, is the intuitive act of apprehending by an u pw ard leap . . . for this Apsastai, Katidein, Feastai etc. are usually substitutes [grasping, direct vision]; [whereas] Dianoia m eans generally a b stract thinking. . . . as opposed to Noesis, Dianoia is the dow nw ard m ovem ent of u nderstanding . . . the uncertain state of m ind of one whose so-called knowledge consists of isolated chains of reasoning. T h e distinction between Noesis (O ehler’s term for which is Empfangen ) and Dianoia is not the distinction between thinking about ‘higher’ entities (such as forms, gods, m orals, ideas) and thinking about ‘lower’ entities. It is betw een a valid and the invalid m anner of apprehending the sam e things. C onceptual thinking is invalid; Noesis is valid, and it is not thinking. It is a com mon but m istaken assum ption to see the NoesisDianoia distinction as derivative of a distinction between objects of thought; this was K a n t’s mistake. Cornford (1967, p. 76) notes: ‘Noesis is not the realm of apprehension to do with m oral ideas, as for K an t, and Dianoia is not the realm of m a th e m a tic a l.’ It is the m anner and not the object of thought which distinguishes the two activities. T h e im plications of this statem ent may be obvious, yet they are far-reaching. Noesis, it will now be clear, is essentially an ethical way of knowing: to know noetically is to know ‘Sattvically’, i.e. diarithm etically through the vibration of the soul which is controlled by the heart. For K an t, the sense o f ‘I ’ is present and conditions all categorical perception; for noetic thought, it is the sentim ent which conditions all apprehension. T h e point is well developed in the U panishads. F aith in the O ne is not to believe in this or that, for the O ne is never this or that. However, he who thinks noetically, through the sentim ent of the O ne which is Love - is always in the O ne. A nd K rishna says in the Bhagavad G ita (X I, 53—54): 120

THE BODY OF TRUTH

‘N ot by the V edas [i.e. formal religion] . . . or ritual offerings can I be seen as thou h ast seen me. O nly by love can m en see me, and know me, and come unto m e’. Noesis is know ing through faith. T he knower voluntarily surrenders the m ental T , and in so doing creates and perceives a different world and a different self. A m an who is apprehending correctly makes lim ited use of the conceptual m ind, and relies instead on the vibrations of the soul. For the sim ple, healthy shepherd, this process is n atural and comes as a result of p roper upbringing and inner m oral goodness (Laws, 679c; Republic, 372b; Phaedrus, 275b_c). For the citizen of a fevered city, the same process m ay be realized only after the limits of thought have been understood and exhausted, or by Theia Moira (Meno, ioob; Republic, 519b) . H aving attain ed this realization, a noetic thinker does not cease to talk or to think. R ather, he develops techniques of using words, thoughts, and discourse not in order to create further concepts, but to create a philosophy w hich serves to agitate the soul. T he soul has its own m ovem ent, and it is eager for the words which will stir it into activity. W ords and speech become charm s; this is expressed by Socrates in the Charmides (157s) and com m ented upon by C ushm an (1958, p. 22): W ords of the right sort are charm s w hich heal the soul . . . and if words o f the right kind induce wisdom in the soul, Socrates is not averse to being an enchanter. . . . H e is prepared to excite a kind o f ravishm ent, nam ely a m oral sensibility, Alidius - sham e or reverence for goodness. I f we cannot see Socrates as a teacher of specific thoughts or concepts, we can see him as a creator of sentim ents. This idea is conveyed by X en o p h o n ’s (1923, vol.3, lines 25-31) observation: ‘for I never heard Socrates say th a t he tau g h t philosophy, neither did I know any who ever did h ear h im ’. In the Symposium (209°) a m an seeks a com panion so th at each of them should educate the other not by persuasion, but by the m u tu al creation of ‘noble sentim ents’, by giving birth to correct m ovem ents of the soul. Also in the Symposium (175°), A gathon requests Socrates: ‘Com e and sit here beside me, Socrates, and let me by contact w ith you enjoy the discovery which you m ade in the p orch.’ T h a t Socrates’ m ethod was not th at of any of the concept-em ploying philosophers is fu rther borne out by Alcibiades (Symposium, 2 i7 e- 2 i 8 a): ‘T h ere never was anybody like Socrates, unless you com pare him to saty rs.’ ‘Socrates’ philosophy stirs the soul’; ‘it is like a bite in the h e a rt’. It ‘clings like an ad d er to any young or gifted m ind’ (Symposium, 2 i8 a~b). T he extrem e exam ple of knowing through absence of thought is given by the ‘wise’ dogs of the Republic (375s), who know instantly by recognition their friends and foes (w hatever is known instantly, by 121

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

recognition or ‘rem em bering’, is true, and to know thus is to know the tru th ): ‘An exquisite trait, and one which shows [dogs’] true love of w isdom ’. ‘H ow I ask you can the love of learning be denied to a creature whose criterion of the friendly and the alien is intelligence and ignorance?’ (Republic, 376b). T h e tacitu rn S partans are called ‘the most talented am ong philo­ sophers’, b u t their philosophic activity is hidden and secret: they use no m edium of thoughts and words (Protagoras, 342a). In the Protagoras (343b), Plato states th a t the S partan, non-elaborated wisdom was for the ancients ‘a characteristic expression of philosophy’. T he activity of the philosopher thus seen is prim arily to silence the m ind, in order to make it reflective of the sentim ent. H aving m ade him self a m edium of the perception of sentim ent, the philosopher can then assist others. T he philosopher does not teach a philosophy th at needs to be thought of. Q uite the opposite: he conveys sentim ents and arrests thought. St A ugustine (1952, IX ,p. 25) expresses the same view: C ould one silence the clam orous appetites; silence his perceptions of the earth, the w ater and the air; could he silence the sky, and could his very soul be silent unto itself and by ceasing to think of itself transcend self consciousness . . . could he entirely silence all language and all symbols . . . so th at we m ight hear His word [Logos] not through hum an language nor through the voice of an angel nor through any utterance out of a cloud nor through any m isleading appearance, but m ight instead hear w ithout these things the very Being himself. . . . In The Silence o f St Thomas, Pieper describes the developm ent of A qu in as’ thought as leading to final silence. T his was m anifested in a literal sense: T hom as indeed ceased to speak or write of his final experiences, and in the last p art of his life simply affected his fellow monks by his behaviour, his com posure and presence. P lutarch describes the m ind of Socrates as perfectly still and free of thoughts. Philosophers, unlike thinkers, become like people whose m inds are asleep - for ‘Sleepers see and hear although there are no sounds or p ictu res’; and the m ethod of Socrates is to induce this absence of thought: T h ere is no voice heard, but fancies and notions as to p articu lar words reach the sleepers . . . only sleepers receive such conceptions in a real d ream because of the tranquillity and calm of the body in sleep, w hereas in waking m om ents the soul can hardly attend to greater powers, being so choked by thronging emotions and distracting needs th a t it is unable to listen and give its attention to clear revelations. But the m ind of Socrates, pure and passionless and interm ingling itself b u t little w ith the body for necessary purposes, was fine and light of touch and quickly changed u nder any impression. . . . the words of spirits 122

THE BODY OF TRUTH

pass through all nature, but only sound for those who possess the soul in untroubled calm (Ferguson, 1979, pp. 224-5). In the light o f this view of the philosopher, perhaps we can understand why in the Potidean cam paign Socrates stood fixed in place w ithout word or m ovem ent for tw enty-four hours, from daw n to daw n, a ‘story which, if tru e 5, writes G uthrie (1971, p. 34), ‘is hard to explain w ithout some elem ent of tran ce’. Before com m encing his discourse in the Symposium, Socrates likewise retreats to a neighbouring porch, and stands fixed and silent th roughout the first p art of the banquet. T h a t these are not isolated instances is shown in the Symposium, 17513: ‘A nd there he stood, said the m an [informing A gathon th at Socrates will not move or speak]. T his is very odd, said A gathon, you m ust speak to him again. . . . B ut here I broke in: I should not do that, I said. Y ou’d m uch better leave him to himself. It is quite a habit of his you know; off he goes and there he stands, no m atter where it is.’ In the final passage o f the Republic (618C), Plato concludes not by recom m ending th at one study philosophy as such (i.e. thinking, doctrines, etc.) b u t rath er ‘it should be our m ain concern th at each of us, neglecting all other studies, should seek . . . if in any way he may be able to learn of and discover the m an who will give him the ability and the knowledge to distinguish the life which is good from th at which is b ad .’ C h u an g T z u ’s p aradigm atic teacher teaches by silence; he m irrors the Tao: ‘T h e still m ind of the sage is the m irror of heaven and earth, the glass of all things’ (Legge, 1971, ch. 13). From the counsellor we receive no specific form ula, b u t w ith him we create the sentim ent: we distinguish the good from the bad by the nature of this m ovem ent which it produces in our soul (Laws, 864*). T he point of the association of lovers is th at together they m ay beget noble sentim ents, so th at they may know (1Symposium, 209c). S entim ent is the legitim ate mode of apprehension of all th at is true and noble.

V II Let us now a ttem p t to sum m arize the above observations regarding sentim ent and thought. All things consist of two elements, vertical and horizontal, m eeting in a third. T h e indefinite, horizontal elem ent has been equated with extension, Dharmakaya, Chora, m atter, outer, body. T he O ne, or the limit, the vertical tendency, appertains to or insinuates the inner element, the non-extended, 123

ASPECT AND CONCEPT

the intelligible, the mover, the hidden, the organizing principle, the unity. T h e vertical, we noted, was the origin of all m ovem ent - Auto Kath-Auto. T h e vertical characterization of th at m ovem ent can be seen as a sentim ent; the tangible, horizontal characterization is num ber. Yet n u m b er can also be taken in a vertical sense, as the organizing principle relative to which the horizontal is the m aterial; w hat is yin or yang, left or right is aspectual because it depends on the context. T h e tangible, being a thing, also has two elements, horizontal and vertical. S entim ent in and for itself is vertical; if considered in conjunction w ith its horizontal com ponent it creates a progeny, the notion. N otion considered horizontally, i.e. as its ‘visible’ image, can be equated with thought: the m ind, in o rder to account for the image and its model, creates a never-ending flow of new images - an activity called thinking. Sentim ent is the m ovem ent of the soul; thinking is the m ovem ent of the body. Yet w hat (and when) counts as body or soul is again aspectual. T h e m ind, although not extended as a substance enduring in time (as is C artesian ‘substance’) is here regarded as ‘body’ or ‘m atte r’ in the sense of Chora. M ind as Chora functions as a m irror by m eans of which we perceive reality ( Timaeus, 50e) . However, for the m irror to be effective, the surface m ust be ‘as even and sm ooth as possible’ ( Timaeus, 51s; also the ‘sm ooth lake’ referred to by the Rig V eda and R am ak rish n a). T he legitim ate function of the m ind is to reflect the m otions of the soul, or sentim ents. T h o u g h t is an activity of the body, or rath er an ab erran t activity of the p a rt of the body-aspect of the soul called Thumos. Thumos, when in its place, is an integrated p a rt of a unity which sustains activity, but which ought not to act independently. T he disturbed Thumos (overwhelmed by the desiring, epithum ic aspect of the soul) becomes self-interested and egoistic, and g rants itself unity and autonom y by usurpation. Speculative thought is the usurpation of the m ind by the unlawful activity of thum etikoid desire. Thumos has no legitimacy as an independent entity, so thought is forced to create interpretative conjectures. However, thought ascribes reality to itself by this agitation of the mind; the agitated m ind ceases to be sm ooth and still, and is a m irror no more. T h e sentim ent-oriented ‘m ind’ is ethically interested and m aterially disinterested. T he thought-oriented ‘m ind’ is ethically disinterested, and directed at the m aterial realm ; it comes into existence as a response to some desire of the body. D istortions of the proper relationship between the soul and the m ind can be o f two kinds. T he hierarchical aberration is the im balance of the vertical aspect, i.e. the psyche, and is called Ammetria. T h e horizontal ab erratio n , o f the body, is called Stasis (Sophist, 228d-e). But both body and 124

THE BODY OF TRUTH

psyche have horizontal and vertical elements, hence both are subject to Ammetria and Statis. T h e unity of perceived entities has no counterpart in ‘reality5 (B rahm an, Usia), not because w hat is perceived lacks reality, but because the perceived entities are spuriously conglom erated fragm ents of the real unity. R eal entities, including things, actions and persons, are instantiated in fragm ented blocks. (Love is the synthesizing force by m eans of which the fragm ented parts of bodies wish to reunite into the original whole: Symposium, 192. A ristophanes has simplified the case here by speaking of two fragm ents; in the Symposium, 191d, however, he also says the process of fragm entation is indefinite; if fragm ents misbehave, Zeus will q u arter them , and so on ad infinitum.) T he conjunction of these fragm ents is subject partially to the w andering causes of Moira and Anangke (K arm a) - chance and necessity; entities are dispersed into fragm ents independent of connection by time, place or perceivable causality, as the outcom e of chance and choice (Republic 617d— e); the timing, location and generation of particles is unpredictable (cf. H eisenberg's U ncertainty Principle). These real entities are akin to qualities norm ally labelled as abstract such as goodness, redness, badness; gram m atically less w ell-elaborated but no less real are further qualities such as m anness, Socratesness, horseness. R ath er th an seeing these qualities as the flowing predicates of extended things, the extended things should lose their fixity and be seen as flows of qualities. T he flows alone can be said to be real - as well as those non-changing forms which truly are. Both change - when recognized for w hat it is - and non-change are real, but things in time are not. All extended things properly function only as predicates of true entities; these true entities exist as real unities in the non-extended realm whose unifying characteristic is num ber, and in the extended realm whose constitutive substance is Chora and whose organizing principle is the sentim ent. They exist as dispersed wholes, unperceived as unities by the conceptual m ind, yet ap prehended as real by the Logisticon-Buddhi.

!25

Page Intentionally Left Blank

5 i! 3 t = 5 i3 ! = i! i5 i5 i5 ! - l I

1 1 I 1

I I I

I I I 1

Part Two

TH E T H I R D CITY

Page Intentionally Left Blank

= =:terI— u 5 11

fi I i I Li] I

Se v e n

LAW OF THE HEART

i I I il l!f

LFii=riim!=Mi^i!^igTETI=TS=Ti=1— 1

tl— t 1— 1t—"1^ 11— I I'l

n

II

i>l

Twelve

CURING THE CITY

I I

il | I 111 ®

T h e Sick A ristocrat, the m an infected with Pleonexia, is a m asochist. H e enjoys the destruction of w hat he holds m ost dear. However, for Pfonos to be experienced as pleasure the m ind m ust undergo a prior period of conditioning. T his process has its parallel in the history of philosophy, for p articu lar m ovem ents in thought m irror those in society.

I T he basic goal of m erchant thought is to find w hat is true for me, good for me. T h e self has been separated from the world, the knowing faculty inverted, by the insertion between me and my knowledge of the world of an interm ediary agent: false self, m edia, television, academ e. Between me and the satisfaction of my needs stands the m arket. To know the world one needs to consum e the services of television and press. To know history one needs to consum e the services of historians. D irect access to inform ation is m ade difficult through the inventions of specialized languages and jarg o n . Noetic thought m aintains th at all men already know everything - w ithin him self each carries the com plete history of m ankind. T o realize this knowledge all we need to do is concentrate: good books sim ply act as triggers to rem ind us of this knowledge. T his is diam etrically opposed to the m arket idea of knowledge, where each individual possesses only one fragm ent, and purchases the next through a State- or class-controlled m edium of exchange. T h e com m ercialization of hum an needs is alienation or the Flood. T he assum ption behind the division of labour is th at for a duration of hours a 208

CURING THE CITY

person labours at his jo b so th at he can purchase the products of other people. T h e failings of this idea from the economic view point have been exposed by others. M y own criticism of it would be th at the purchase of culture or of entertain m en t implies toil-free consum ption. This is ju st not realistic. L earning to sing or to dance requires the overcoming of pain, self-discipline - perhaps dieting and special exercises. T he hunger of restlessness, Pleonexia, m ust be overcome if we are to learn to sing, run or dance, and this involves a kind of concentration which destroys the egoistic self. Even to appreciate a good wine, let alone com plicated work of m usic, takes some degree of m astery over Pleonexia. T he true connoisseur is neither glutton nor tyrant, for to enjoy anything one needs to overcome epithum ic desire. E njoym ent is the feeling that accom panies the fulfilment o f the true as against the false self. A m erchant State is characterized by Pleonexia and dom inated by the m arket. C om m ercialization and professionalization result in an increase in quality only in the very first phase of the disintegrating process. T he com m ercialized and functionally specialized individual loses his capacity for self-m oderation, and is consequently unable to enjoy good food, music or wine. T h e m erchant S tate is not luxurious, and no true m aterial needs are satisfied. T h e m erchant does not chew properly, but gulps his food; he cannot sip wine, and therefore develops pungent, acid-sharp, bitter-sw eet drinks and ju n k food. C ulture itself is gulped. T he m erchant State cultivates desire, forgetting that all enjoym ent is based on overcom ing desire. As soon as the m erchants take over a society desire and its satisfaction becomes the organizing force. Desires, however, cannot be gratified infinitely, owing to obvious physical lim itations. O nly so m uch food can be consum ed. In order to elim inate this constraint the m erchant State introduces further refinements. T he Rom ans employed special m asseurs to induce vom iting during large meals. R om an houses h ad special aqueducts for this purpose in their banquet rooms. Sim ilar techniques were developed to induce m iscarriages. M ore recently, the bourgeois State has invented the calorie-free soft drink, the contraceptive pill, etc. All these developm ents are inevitably labelled as progress in the stan d ard of living, yet inevitably they lead to the breakdow n of the nation, the economy and even the w eather. T he cosmos is such a finely balanced system th a t no being m ay artificially increase its capacity for consum ption w ithout causing disequilibrium and harm to itself. As Pleonexia spreads through the man-city, there arises the need for some kind of m ental reconciliation. Such excess causes a physical pain, w hich on the m ental level takes the form of feelings of shame. As the m erchant State creates the professional vom it-inducers, so likewise it creates the specialists for rem oving sham e and placating alienated 209

MYTHOS

consciousness. For the Rom ans to be able to enjoy spectacles of sodomy, to rtu re and m an-eating, m uch groundw ork had first to be done by trained sophists. Sophistry is as prevalent today as in fifth-century A thens. T h e sophist is the desiring or the m erchant elem ent of the man-Po/w; he does away w ith the ethically based injunctions th a t restrict commerce and stand in the way o f m aterial enrichm ent or pleasure. T h o u g h t, divorced from the noetic or ethical vision, turns into sophistry, as T .S .E liot (in Pieper, 1952, pp. 14-15) realized: T h e root cause of the vagaries of m odern philosophy - and perhaps, though I was unconscious of it, the reason for my dissatisfaction with philosophy as a profession —I now believe to lie in the divorce of philosophy from theology. Like ‘Platonic love’ and ‘idea’, the term ‘sophist5 has acquired m eanings little related to any notion th at may be m eaningful for an u n d erstan d in g of ancient Greek thought. T he distinction between the sophist and the philosopher does not depend upon the la tte r5s more rigid adherence to the rules of formal logic, nor with his intellectual superiority, and certainly not w ith his w inning or losing argum ents. If formal logicality is not the criterion by which philosophy is to be distinguished from sophistry, one m ay perhaps agree with G auss (1937, Introduction) th a t sincerity and the desire for tru th are the decisive factors: ‘For, to put it bluntly, . . . philosophy is essentially nothing but a sincere love of tru th .5 B ut even the notions ‘tru th 5 and ‘sincerity5 require elaboration. T he tru th th a t G auss refers to, like Plato’s ‘logic’, is an inner, deeper, m oral truth. T h e distinction betw een the sophist and the philosopher will not be in the form of a positive, form ulaic, perform ed superiority; it will be an inner, ethical one. T h e sophist is a creator of false images, a liar of a p articular kind: he is an inner liar, practising the art of self-deception. T he sophist, a professional deceiver who will deceive for a fee, needs first to deceive himself. Even in his professional capacity as a deceiver of others, the others are willing victims: they pay the sophist to facilitate the self-deception for which they long. W hether in his private or professional capacity, the activity of the sophist can be shown to stem from the specific sentim ents of greed, arrogance and fear, all tied up in the love of the false self. ‘T h e attach m en t to self is the constant source of all m anner of misdeeds in every one of us. T h e eye of love is blind where the beloved is concerned, and so a m an proves a bad judge of right good honour, in the conceit th at m ore regard is due to his personality . . . w hereas the

210

CURING THE CITY

m an who m eans to be a great m an m ust care neither for self nor for its belongings’ (Laws, 732). Sophistry, then, is the deceiving tendency present in every m an, the m ercenary aspect o f the m ind ready to cater as the rationalizing agent to the excesses of Thumos. T he sophist is the persuader: he assumes he can know, hence he starts w ith a definite proposition, a fixed system or a set of values, created for an internal aspect of the tyrant, such as love of self, or an external ty ran t on whose com m and the sophist creates an ideology. O pposed to persuasion stands Noesis: the philosopher cannot simply persuade, since he knows th at he him self does not know. Real knowledge flows: it is forever being born anew, and the philosopher m ust perpetually, from m om ent to m om ent, from situation to situation, seek to discover the tru th . T his is the so-called m aieutic dim ension of philosophy, the art in w hich each of the particip ants learns for him self (Versenyi, 1963). F or the sophist, though, self-gratification is the m easure and criterion for all things. In the Theaetetus, Socrates sarcastically observes th at were the sophist to confine his judgem ent to the taste of food, he m ight be able to m ake a case for his usefulness; but since he is a sick m an, his success even in th at field is unlikely. T he sophist is the pastry cook, delighting the children and himself, caring nothing for nourishm ent ( Gorgias, 505**). It is the sophist who dem ands th at self-gratification be taken as the criterion in ju d g in g art, poetry and philosophy. W hen this criterion is indeed accepted, either through com m ercialization or tyranny, the city’s dow n­ w ard-m oving Dianoia overtakes the noetic faculty: pleasure becomes the u ltim ate criterion for all judgem ents, even the m athem atical, ethical and scientific, and people like M ithaecus and Apollodorus and Saram bus, p o p u lar entertainers (G orgias, 518b), become the final authorities on im p o rtan t questions in life. Democracies have a tendency to ask soccer players and film stars for guidance, simply because they represent the m arket. W hether any p articu lar philosophy is sophistry or not has to do not only w ith the au th o r b u t w ith the reader. Read and believed for its content it is false. Like an icon, true philosophy should conduct the m ind away from its own form. T he M uslim theologian, W ahabi, describes four sources of idolatry (Shirk). T he first is epistemological (L ’ilm): the source o f wisdom is identified w ith the picture of God rath er than with God. T he second involves giving to people things and ideas qualities th at ought to be ascribed to God (L ’ibdah). Both of these were fam iliar to Plato. T he o ther two sources are L ’adah, superstition, and Tasawurj\ the assum ption th a t anybody can influence the ways of God. For exam ple, the sophist w itch-doctor of today assumes th at technology can influence cosmic law,

211

MYTHOS

changing the basic equations to allow men to break traditional taboos. P lato ’s attack on sophism is far from mild. T he sophist assumes his philosophy is the source of knowledge, w hereas noetic thinkers have no philosophy th at gives knowledge. Sophists teach th at through their philosophy one m ay gain favours in this life, and then bribe the gods to ensure one’s well-being in the next (this is the philosophy of T rasym achus in the second book of the Republic). And flattery is also characteristic of sophism as shown in the concluding sentence of the Sophist, (286d) where Socrates defines this ‘a r t’ as: ‘conceited mim icry, im age-m aking . . . distinguished as a portion, not divine, b u t of h um an production, th at presents a shadow -play of words; such are the blood and lineage which can with perfect tru th be assigned to the au thentic sophist.’ T h e sophist is the Eikon-maker, the idolator. It is only in this way th at we can u n d erstan d Plato ’s w rath in attacking him. It is unreasonable to assum e th at such vehem ence could be directed at somebody simply holding a different philosophical view; the sophist m ust be th at elem ent or factor which sabotages philosophy by treating it as if it were an objective tru th . Even the developm ent of m athem atics is affected (see Klein, 1968). T h e pleasant feeling th at all is perm itted and all is relative filters into m athem atical and scientific thinking, and sophists are readily found to create corresponding m athem atical theories: this is w hat leads the A thenian to m ake the otherwise absurd observation th at pleasure cannot be m ade the criterion for geom etrical proportionality (Laws, 667). It is on the grounds of pleasure th at an A ristarchus creates a heliocentric theory, for to the A thenians this would imply th at all is relative, all perm itted. Plato rejects the heliocentric theory for precisely this self-serving relativism , and not on the basis of em pirical evidence, which is conjectural in any case. C onceptual thought follows the sentim ent of pleasure, and constructs concepts, cities, philosophies and speech to m aximize pleasure and m inim ize self-control. Noetic thought is not against pleasure; the sophists, however, have an incorrect view of w hat it m eans to be a city or a person, for they do not perceive the interconnection between m an and m an, and m an and city, and city and nature. In following individual pleasure as the criterion, a true individual ju st brings more suffering to him self and to the city, for he creates thoughts, actions and institutions th at lead the various p arts o f the organism into w ar against each other. T he sentim ent of love ignores individual pleasure or pain, but in doing so, it indirectly m inim izes the pain both to the true individual and to the true city. T he pleasure and pain in the realm of becom ing are centripetal sentim ents for the false self, opposing the opposite pull of the divine entity 212

CURING THE CITY

situated in the realm of being. T he purifying cathartic activity of correct thinking involves the birth of the true self; this can be m entally painful for it requires the dissolution of the perceived self. A certain am ount of pain due to Anangke cannot be avoided, despite encouragem ent by the like-m inded m en, whose thought stretches across centuries and reaches those who would listen. T he searcher continues on his own.

II ‘A wall is, in the first place, far from conducive to the health of town life, and, w hat is more, com m only breeds a certain softness of soul in the tow nsm en; it invites h ab itants to seek shelter w ithin it and leave the enem y unrepulsed, tem pts them to neglect effecting their deliverance by unrelaxing nightly and daily w atching, and to fancy they will find a way to real safety by locking themselves in, and going to sleep behind ram p arts and bars, as though they had been born to shirk toil, and did not know th at the true ease m ust come from it . . . whereas dishonourable ease and sloth will bring forth toil and trouble’ (Laws, 778-779)B .B osanquet has seen Plato as p art of an intellectual m ovem ent of resistance against em pire. T here was a body of opinion in A thens at the tim e th at saw the fall of the city as due to its desire to exploit cities other th an itself, to shirk its ju s t share of toil through colonial expansion. T rade and suchlike were felt to be p a rt of a rebellion against the older order acceptance of Anangke. Indeed, in the Gorgias Plato identifies as an all-binding law th at as soon as a city sets up a wall (which can take m any shapes: a treaty, a financial hedge, protection of comfort by the exploitation of natu ral resources), it is doom ed to fail. Before setting up M agnesia, the A thenian makes sure it is not too well wooded or too near the sea, lest the citizens live off unearned n a tu ra l gifts ra th e r than by overcoming difficulties (Laws, Book IV ). Following the universal Fall, m an is condem ned to give birth in pain, to create through toil: any attem pt to circum vent the fact that this is a basic h u m an condition leads to the internal m oral collapse of the individual Polis, family or m an. J.B .M o rrall (1977, p. 77) observes A ristotle also accounting for the m oral degeneration of Athens in term s of its economic and trad e expansion, and attacking the tendency to obtain security by artificial m eans such as commerce. T h a t the wall in Greek philosophical texts often functions as a symbolic notion can be seen from an announcem ent by the O racle of Delphi, referring to the N avy as ‘the wooden w all’: a rem ark which Plato exploits 213

MYTHOS

in the Laws (707a_e), attacking the N avy precisely because it does function as a wall. States th at base their security on navies lay their fate in the hands of m en practising the ignoble activity of archery, from the relative safety o f the ship. T he skills and sentim ents of a naval engagem ent favour the helm sm an, the pilot the strategist and the archer, all of whom engage in less noble activities than those of the foot soldier. For a Hoplite to excel, he needs physical and m ental excellence, courage and determ ination. T he land engagem ent is decided by, and creative of, the superior m oral sentim ent, w hereas naval encounters are based on the lesser sentim ents and on professionalized skills and techniques: ‘M en should never be trained to evil ways; th at the practice in question [he m eans the use o f the great w arships] is ignoble m ight have been learned from H om er. . . . T hus you see H om er was also well aw are w hat a bad thing it is for infantry to be supported by a line of men of w ar. . . . States which owe their power to a navy also bestow the rew ard for their security on an inferior elem ent of their forces, as they owe their security to the arts of the sea captain, the helm sm an and the oarsm an . . . and to a miscellaneous and not overreputable crow d5 (Laws, yo6c~e, yoya~b). A further point m ade is the objection against specific actions, such as trap p in g ships into bottlenecks, and bom bardm ent by fireballs from relative safety; hooking fish, m en or ships is of evil sentim ent. Plato is not a pacifist; in condem ning naval victories, particularly such as the one at Salam is, he is condem ning the burning of the Persians alive and the trap p in g of their ships in the hook of Raes; he is condem ning the treacherous skills of strategy and clever tricks to avoid honest com bat by engaging in the activities conducive to evil sentim ent. W hile Plato was opposing the wooden wall, the Navy, as a m atter of m oral principle, this does not invalidate the practical aspects of his objection. Any em pirical evidence aside, he could confidently argue th at despite initial success, the reliance on the wooden wall would inevitably destroy the security of A thens. In principle he was correct. H aving built a pow erful navy, A thenians found it acceptable to abandon m ore strenuous forms o f defence th a t required m oral and physical exertion of the populace. T h e significance of m ilitary defence is universal and cosmic. A ccording to the Laws and the Republic, by subm itting themselves to the hardship of learning to defend themselves, not with technology and m ercenaries, but by m arching and sw ord-play (if not w ith their bare hands), citizens steel their bodies, appease the gods of w ar and create an inner solidarity, ensuring th a t it is not necessary to go to war. T hus G laucon, who finds the city state consisting of 5,000 citizens too small to guarantee its survival, is told by Socrates th a t such a State is the least likely even to go to w ar : it 214

CURING THE CITY

will not attack or be attacked. A State which keeps busy and only satisfies its legitim ate needs has no excess fat: with so m any idle, fat cows around no enem y will attack a lean anim al th at keeps fit. T he sm aller and leaner the State, the less booty for the enemy. Yet the fitter it is, the more capable to resist agression. H ence it is not likely to be attacked, and, being satisfied w ith w hat it has, it will not attack others. T he often misused quotation, ‘I f you w ant peace, prepare for w ar,’ stems from S aanthana thought; b u t though the Logos wages an unceasing battle to m aintain itself against the forces of disorder, this does not m ean th at one should stockpile arm s and build ships, subm arines and tanks, it m eans precisely the opposite. By building powerful navies, armies and alliances, A thens will inevitably be led into wars. He who takes up the sword perishes by the sword. Plato would prefer to tear down walls and sink the Navy. T he same principle was expressed by G andhi, who said that In d ia should not build fortifications of any kind (physical or cultural). In th at way each Indian will learn how to w ithstand the winds. Armies and alliances allow the citizens to relax and grow into ‘fat cows’. W alls and barns lead to the accum ulation of false treasures. O f course, if the Navy is sunk, and the city’s security is taken out of the hands of the specialist, every m an, w om an and child will have to be prepared for w ar in a physical and psychological sense. T h a t w ar will never come as long as these precepts are m aintained, according to cosmic law. In practice, of course, no State is perfect, and w ars do come - but the good State is not likely to lose a war, for it has on its side both cosmic forces and psychological fixities.

Ill C riticism of wall- and barn-building is of param ount im portance in Logos-based thought. It relates to national security, b u t is also applicable to oth er aspects of physical existence, and prim arily to the creation of concepts. In B uddhism , original ignorance is attrib u ted to a wall, inside w hich G au tam a lived as a prince. In the R am ayana, R avana piles his loot behind a wall on the assum ption th at walls cannot be scaled. T o pile treasures in barns and behind walls is to create false riches: as the Gospels teach, treasures th a t are capable of storage are nothing of the sort. T he ‘noble tru th s’ of B uddhism testify that suffering in this life arises w henever one resists the basic flow of life and tries to cling to fixed concepts, ideas, events, people, situations and things. A ttachm ent is not im m oral because it offends a transcendental deity - it is im m oral because it is false. O ne cannot retain youth, wealth, physical beauty and power. 215

MYTHOS

M an brings suffering to him self and distorts the world by trying to hold on to them . It is only through giving everything up th at he can enjoy the m om ent, the flow, actuality. All conceptual, tangible entities are Avidya, falsehood; only in the noetic, the level of deeper consciousness, can one legitim ately look for fixities. T h e building of walls against necessity or fate is a rebellion against the will of G od, and another expression of the activity which brings about the ongoing Fall. In epistem ological term s, the Fall is caused by autonom ous thought. C oncept-building is the building of a m ental wall: the psychology and the internal dynam ics are the same as those involved in building stone ones. In search of a false sense of security, the internal sophist builds a wall by creating a concept. In doing this he arrests the genesis, the rebirth of knowledge. In this connection, Socrates, claim ing to be inspired by a superhum an pow er (396e), states in the dialogue Cratylus (41 i d_e):‘here is Noesis, the very w ord ju s t now m entioned, which is neou-esis, im plying th a t the w orld is always in the process of creation; the giver of the nam e w anted to express the longing of the soul for the new .’ W ith Noesis, Socrates contrasts Aishron, ‘ugly’, and defines it as the obstacle to flow (Cratylus, 416a), while Pseudos, ‘falsehood’, is the opposite of motion. It is w rong to build obstacles to arrest the n atural m ovem ent, argues Socrates, citing H om er (in Theaetetus, 153c— d) : ‘M otion is a good thing for both soul and body, and im m obility is bad. N eed I speak further of such things as stagnation in air and water, w here stillness causes corruption and decay? . . . So long as the heavens and the sun continue to move around, all things in heaven and earth are kept going; w hereas if they are bound down and brought to a standstill all things would be destroyed.’ T h e duties of any noetic thinker are those of a midwife, assisting at the constant reb irth of knowledge, which is a continuous process of creation in pain (Symposium, 207d). T h e sophist attem pts to arrest thought by offering ready-m ade formulae: Socrates is the destroyer of these walls. A city can be com pared to a well-bred horse which, even though carefully put together by a pedigree, nevertheless exhibits a constant tendency to inactivity, and seeks the security and seclusion of the stable: this is the picture painted by Socrates in the Apology.. Athens is the splendid-looking yet inactivity-seeking horse, and the true philosopher a stinging fly, forcing it into m ovem ent: ‘And if you finish me with a single slap, then you will go on sleeping till the end of your days, unless God in his care for you sends som eone to take my place.’ (Apology, 30e). T he noetic thinker inevitably annoys both others and him self (for the tendency to stagnation is present in us all), yet m an needs to be 216

CURING THE CITY

p erm anently restung, not to assum e today that he still knows w hat he knew yesterday. A definition or a form ula is only m om entarily true; in ord er to be relevant it needs to be taken up again, shaken about, turned upside dow n, requestioned and examined.

IV S aan th an a thought suggests th at external and internal reflect each other. E ach individual contains a token of each p art of the universe. A p art of each individual is also represented in all other individuals and entities, living and dead. T his principle is not unrelated to the idea of am bassadorial representations from one State to another. O ne precinct of a capital city contains fragm ents of all other countries, ju s t as the host country itself is represented in those other countries. A perfect em bassy would, w ithin its grounds, represent the dom inant features of the country it belonged to. T he m odel would be scaled down, for its objective would not be to be functionally operative. This parallels Proclus’ notions of intersubjectivity: the enlightened soul sees the other souls represented in it, and is represented in them , yet through individual integrity the pain or happiness experienced by each representative microcosm is felt by the whole entity. For Plato, each individual consists largely of a collection of such representative parts. T he representative precinct is, in a quantitative sense, the largest section of the ‘city’ - whereas the home, the ruling faculty, is situated in the citadel called the Logisticon. This Logisticon does not exhaust the integrity of a person, because a true person is the sum of all the ‘am bassadorial stafF scattered through the other entities, all held together by the unifying sentim ent. T he fact th at m ost of the constituents of a person are on a kind of perm anent post abroad in other entities does not dim inish the integrity of an individual person. For the H indus, each individual is represented not only in each other individual, b u t in each o ther anim al, plant, star and galaxy. Every unit in the cosmos is represented, b u t not contained or exhausted, by every other unit. This representation is sim ultaneous - though it is not so conceptualized. T he reassem bly of all the fragm ents of a person around the focal point, the ruling spark, Logisticon or Atman, is suggested by notions of resurrection, or of the end of the diaspora. T his sym biotic unity of the cosmos is, of course, ju s t another conceptualization, whose acceptability will vary with period and indi­ vidual inclination. Sim ilar notions have been differently conceptualized. In the ‘p rim itive’ religions of Africa, a witch doctor constructs micro217

MYTHOS

cosmic models - anim als and dolls representing the individual m em bers of the com m unity. M em bers of the com m unity may be punished by sticking needles into parts of the doll. A needle stuck into the liver or the leg of the doll is supposed to bring pain or cure, as the case m ay be, to the actual person. W hile a witch doctor will actually possess the doll effigies of all the m em bers of his ‘p arish 5, speaking generally each m an m ay be viewed as possessing w ithin him self the m iniature model of all living beings ever born or to be born. Each m an is a partnership of the living and the dead w ith those who will be born. By self-abuse one m ay inflict pain on everyone (though in a deeper sense yet one can only h u rt himself). It is for this reason th at Confucians and T aoists claim th at a m entally disturbed society will create clim atic disturbances, individual excess triggering floods, earthquakes, w ars, etc. For Plato, the inner organs are models of astronom ical and geographic bodies. T he milky way is the spine of the cosmos, and it portrays the flow of cosmic energy called variously K und alin i, C hi and Pneuma. T h e ‘seven5 celestial bodies represent the seven nerve centres of the spine, the H in d u Chakras. Since in the Epinomis Plato writes th at all his knowledge was achieved by internally observing these seven celestial bodies, we m ay infer he had m editated on the seven Chakras as the H indus and B uddhists do. T he sam e bodies are referred to in the Revelation to J o h n as the seven churches, the seven flames of seven candles and so on. A nd the m icrocosmic idea is also behind the theory of one m an dying for the sins o f the w orld, for all men are contained in the one. By conquering all the negative tendencies w ithin his own body, this ‘suffering serv an t5 m ay defeat such tendencies in everyone. But at the sam e time, as Proclus points out, each m an is also autonom ous and can reject w hat is in fact the case. In Z oroastrian thought, too, the w ord of V ohu M anu, Ahuna Varya, accounts for all true individuals and em braces them . Yet each living individual is free at any m om ent to choose between V ohu M anu and the desiring self of A hrim an. C oncerning this notion of the paradigm atic city taking form as a hum an being, it is curious to observe a prophecy m ade by Plato (or Socrates) in the Republic (3 6 ic~362c). Plato's brother G laucon tells the story of the perfect m an. M ost m en, he claims, are partly good, partly bad, so they prosper or do not prosper depending on circum stances. However, if there ever occurs such an event as the birth of perfectly good or sinless m an, his fate will necessarily be tragic. Such a perfectly good m an will make no attem p t to convince or conceptually persuade m an th at he is in fact good. Being perfectly good he will only do and be good - if accused of being evil he would not argue or dispute, or make any attem pt to safeguard his existence or reputation. Such a person is so far outside the experience of 218

CURING THE CITY

m ankind th a t he will necessarily offend and infuriate the ‘authorities’. Inevitably, he will be accused of being everything th at he is not. H e will be tried, w hereupon he will not plead or argue for mercy and will in the end be beaten, tortu red and sentenced to death. For reasons incom prehensible to scholarship, since crucifixion was not the m anner of death for crim inals in Greece, it is claim ed th at the perfect m an will be crucified, if he should ever m anifest in time. A m yth, if true, rem ains relevant to m an ’s destiny even if it is forgotten or expressed in some other way. In H indu mythology it is K ali who slays the devil, for Z oroastrians it is V ohu M anu - for Plato it is the m ythical cosmic city (of which each good m an is a citizen in m om ents when he is good) w hich defeats the evil city (of which each m an is a citizen when he is bad). T h e fact th a t such an im portant event is ‘forgotten’ by us does not contradict its cosmic and eternal relevance. T he m yth is based on a deeper fundam ental reality, and will find an expression in words one way or another. T h e relativity of m ythology does not imply relativity of hum an conduct. In each age K rishna m ust be served anew, and ‘Even those who in faith w orship other gods, because of their love they w orship me, although not in the right w ay’ (Bhagavad G ita, IX , 23). K rishna, M oham m ed and C hristianity all insist th at their particular religion is the best one. T his subjectivity w ithin objectivity appears paradoxical - yet the p aradox is entirely conceptual. W ithin any particular culture only one set o f symbols can be m eaningful. A lthough in the conceptually ‘objective’ sense these m ust therefore em body relative truths, in noetic thought the relative tru th becomes absolute. For the absolute has no existence except in the relative: as Jesu s claimed, nobody can see God except through him.

V Stripped of its m etre, rhythm and pattern, inspired philosophy becomes nothing b u t persuasive speech. For in fact the core of philosophy consists in this very rhythm and sentim ent, and not in the external layer of words w hich are usually m istaken for its content. All the traditions we have looked at m ake it the task of the philosopher and the sage to determ ine the correct rh y th m (Li) and its correlation, first to the inner, and then to the outer m anifestations of public life. T his rhythm lies behind all good craftsm anship, including architecture and the m anufacture of household furnishings, and also in the n atural m ovem ent of plants and anim als. It is crucially related to governing th at dim ension of the city which m ay be called psychological, as well as to the design of the buildings, streets and fences. In India, B abylon and Greece, cities were built after an established 219

MYTHOS

blueprint. Even to spatial and seasonal relations, such as the distances from a shrine to the m arket place, the size of the Agora with respect to that of the tem ple, the directions of the streets, the frequency of festivals and processions. U pon these fixed patterns various cultures imposed differ­ ences: tem ples were dedicated to the gods appropriate for the given circum stances. But though the physical reality, the architecture, does vary in keeping w ith local conditions, such as the availability of building m aterials and the n atu re of the terrain, this variation exists only to preserve a deeper pattern. Correspondingly, in constructing a book, argum ent or sentence, one should be in keeping with the general rules of construction th at apply to craftsm en, cooks or architects. Things are to be constructed to cater to the m ind and the body, yet also to serve the third, the elem ent beyond element. In discourse, this third, hidden principle is the unknow n m oral elem ent. ‘U nknow n’, indeed, m ay have been the G reek nam e for it: It is even possible th at the word ‘U nknow ing’ was (with this positive m eaning) a technical term . . . and th at this is the real explanation and in terp retatio n of the inscription on the A thenian altar: ‘To the U nknow n G od’ (Rolt in Dionysius, 1940, p. 33). T h e three basic psychological and cosmic principles have been suggested earlier. T he Fall may be seen as a state of w ar between them , a w ar w hich on a social level is sometimes called the class war. Noetic thought attrib u tes class divisions to psychological constants. A m an is not a m em ber of the ruling class once and for all: he is a doctor or father, or anything else only w hen he is correctly functioning as such. T he ruling class therefore exists on the one hand as an abstract function, and, on the other as the group of people who have the power in any one m om ent. But this group of people cannot properly be called a ruling class if they are m isruling. It is another of the assum ptions of S aanthana thought th at in some deep sense one can in the final analysis only harm , exploit or oppress oneself. Punishm ent, and com pensation, are only delayed. In crucifying Jesu s, or killing the hero or the m artyr, the executioners h u rt themselves m ore th an they have h u rt their victim. W hile the m arty r’s life has been shortened, in dying for a cause he is in a sense fulfilled: not so his executioners. T he ruling class is m isruling as soon as it begins to ‘exploit’ the ruled: at th a t point it ceases to rule. O n the individual level, the noetic, m ental and appetitive forces each contain the other two, and so ad infinitum. A city will at various times be governed by deities, a single king or a group of aristocrats, depending on w hich aspect prevails. It is not the form of governm ent which is decisive b u t the m anner of governing. In applying this to a family, we m ay observe th a t it is ruled by the children, by the father and by the m other. It is ruled 220

CURING THE CITY

by the children, for everything is done for their sake. T raditionally, the family is ruled by the father: yet when he is sick or sleeping or away, by the m other, or ano th er senior m em ber. T he effective power is from m om ent to m om ent, and depending on your viewpoint, held by different entities. Plato speaks of three educators in the family (Laws, 627): one of these uses brute strength (it applies to the working elem ent), the second is the clever m em ber of the family and the third represents noetic reason. T h e first rules by force, the second by persuasion - yet both are false. T he correct rule is by reconciliation. In the Symposium (1 g 1d), Love is the physician who ‘restores us to our ancient state by attem pting to weld two beings into one and to heal the w ounds which h um anity suffered.’ T h e m edical analogy is subtle yet of decisive im portance. Persuasion is com pared by Plato to the treatm ent of disease with pain-subduing potions. In contem porary term s these would be drugs. Ruling by persuasion is getting m en drunk and feasting them to achieve their agreem ent. But drunken men eventually sober up, and return to renew their claims. In all noetic thought reconciliation replaces persuasion. K an t, of course, was a m aster persuader. In order to achieve his aim m aking all m en ethical - K an t form ulates a form ula - the principle of universalizability: Do only th at of which you would approve even if your act were to become a universal code of behaviour. He may have persuaded a few or m any of his readers, yet one may be sceptical w hether Europe becam e m ore m oral as a result. M en follow conceptual m orality only in times of plenty; as soon as there is hardship, conceptual rules are abandoned. M en can only be moved to meaningful activity through knowledge w hich incorporates knowing by the body (grasp) and the soul. O pinions, however, are mere persuasions. This is w hat Socrates objects to w hen he says opinions are of no use unless tied down, for ‘opinions run aw ay’ (Meno, 97d). T o have an opinion is to be ruled by the m ind - the m ind persuades others to the same opinions, but persuasions are skin deep. N oetic agreem ent is not an agreem ent of conceptual images. A good T ao ist does not conceptually share the vision of the world of a devout B uddhist or of Socrates - yet Socrates will get along considerably better w ith a sincere B uddhist or Taoist than with a Professor of Socratic M ethod who does not share his sentim ent. It is of no use to believe th at one ought not to smoke: w hat is necessary is for the body to be educated not to w ant things th at are contradicted by the intellect. Thus: ‘th a t type of ignorance m ay be called the greatest of a m an who hates, not loves, w hat his ju d g em en t presum es to be noble and good’ (Laws, 68gb). To know only w ith one’s m ind is not to know. This is illustrated in the Laws 221

MYTHOS

w hich describes the bringing together of three men representing the three psychological principles —Noesisy Dianoia and Epithumia. T o assum e th at the m ind is superior to the body is false and m eaningless - the body has a reason of its own and the m ind has a body, with appetites such as greed. In m edicine, politics and philosophy the three hum an aspects of m an need to be brought together. In the Timaeus, Socrates claims th at it is useless to move the m ind unless one moves the body, and in the Laws one learns th at instruction in philosophy cannot be divorced from music and gym nastics. T o m ake a m an faithful to one wife involves teaching him gym nastics, m usic and the noetic feeling. O nly in th at way can one create the correct sentim ent for m arriage. A nything achieved by persuasion is com parable to the superficial results achieved by threats. O ne should not persuade but convert. T h e function of rhythm in a philosophical discourse is to exercise the m ind physically. T h e citizens of M agnesia are divided into three choruses and ch an t every day. T h e m ajor world religions may also be seen as structured around these three psychological principles. Islam is rhythm ically and physically oriented; it stresses rhythm , ritual and movem ent. T his is also true of T aoism , w ith its T ai Chi. H induism in general aims tow ards noetic grasp, while C h ristianity gravitates tow ards the heart. Yet ‘T here is no wisdom for a m an w ithout harm ony, and w ithout harm ony there is no co ntem plation’ (B hagavad G ita, II, 66). Yoga is harm ony: A harm ony in eating and resting, in sleeping and keeping awake. A nd all religions and philosophies necessarily rely on the m ind, the heart, and the noetic faculty: th a t is, on the harm ony between the three. VI T o a conclusion like the one which characterizes the last section, th at harm ony is the key to hum an well-being, Plato is led to rem ark cynically th a t a m arvellous philosophical solution, ‘which m ight have worked w onders if only someone had known the proper w ay’, dies as soon as it is w ritten down. Plato is criticizing both him self and all the philosophers who have reasoned thus. W e m ust not assum e too readily th at by giving a p articu lar interp retatio n or application of some dialogue th at we have cap tu red anything b u t one aspect of the true solution. In observing th at Z,0£0.y-based thought tries to effect a harm ony between the three parts of the soul, or the three psychological constants of any society, one needs to exercise the greatest caution. A noetic grasp of harm ony is not to be derived from a single conceptual model. I f the model of any city as conceptualized in the various visions of S aanthana thinkers could encom pass the totality of the reality of a city, then we could treat harm ony 222

CURING THE CITY

sim ply as the absence of outer conflict between the citizens. Since noetic thought is not to do w ith the creation of conceptual utopias, we cannot assum e th a t the inner psychological dim ension will be subject to such sim ple notions of harm ony. For a citizen of an actual State to be in harm ony w ith th a t State he will have to subjugate his own soul to a more complex set of rules th an simply the existing legal code and his own notion o f harm ony. T h e conceptual model of perfection portrays a single (the outer) dim ension of the triunal dim ensionality of any actual city, ju st as the concept o f harm ony as an absence of conflict is only one single dim ension of the notion of harm ony. It is a m istake to treat the Greek notion of harm ony as equivalent to some kind o f instantaneous concord. Even in the context of music, harm ony in this contem porary sense entered Greek culture with the sophists. H eidegger (1968, p. 213) was wrong to assum e th at conceptual thought was absent in Greece; at about the time of Pericles it flooded the culture, and can readily be observed in the art, poetry and the language of th a t time. In the hands of the sophists, Harmonia became nothing more th an Symphonia. ‘Harmonia, however,’ Cornford (1967, p. 19) explains, ‘is the orderly adjustm ent o f various parts with respect to the unfolding w hole.’ It is a developm ent leading to a com prehensive unity. A dissonant sound followed by a non-dissonant sound, com prehended in the totality of the given flow of m usic, becomes retrospectively harm onious. Its ap p aren t, m om entary dissonance is resolved with respect to the whole. T h e noetic notion of harm ony involves an abstract affiliation of a m utually sym pathetic range of sentim ents over and above the perceived connections or interests determ ined by chance and circum stance. T he harm ony o f the G reek song is not instantaneously com prehensible, but requires unfolding in time; and a fully noetic harm ony is to be perceived by m ore com plex criteria yet. T his harm ony includes a curious blend of the all-em bracing P arm enidean resolution of conflict by denial of deviation and change, w ith the H eraclitian flux. T his complex notion of harm ony as a set of converging inclinations, resolving perceived contradictions by reference to a common sentim ent, is expressed by the fam ous Greek physician Eryxym achus solely in term s of music; yet its principle covers a m uch greater range. W ith reference to H eraclitu s’ F ragm ent 45, Eryxym achus observes th a t rule by m utual love ‘holds good of m usic - w hich is perhaps w hat H eraclitus m eant us to u n d erstan d by th at ra th e r cryptic pronouncem ent: T he one in conflict w ith itself is held together like the harm ony of the bow and the lyre’ (iSymposium, i8 7 a). H e is not unaw are of the contradictions th a t such noetic notions present on the dianoic level. But unlike H eraclitus, he is not averse to reducing the poetically derived to the rationally com prehensible: 223

MYTHOS

he does a ttem p t a verbal solution to the extent this is possible: ‘O f course, it is absurd to speak of harm ony as being in conflict, or as arising out of elem ents which are still conflicting, but perhaps he [H eraclitus] m eant th a t the a rt of music was to create harm ony by resolving the discord between the treble and the base. T here can certainly be no harm ony of treble and base while they are still in conflict, for harm ony is concord, and concord is a kind of sym pathy, and sym pathy between things which are in conflict is im possible so long as th a t conflict lasts’ (Symposium, 18ya— b) . T his does not im ply th at one should passively accept conflict and not seek to resolve it. R ather, there are two kinds of conflict, elsewhere called Stasis and Ammetria (Sophist, 228d), one of which, the latter, can be resolved by a relatively sim ple reordering of the constituents. In the Symposium passage, the intention is to distinguish a m ore complex conflict from one which is unnecessarily perceived as such but which, if subjected to specific criteria, m ay be resolved into harm ony: ‘T here is, on the other hand, a kind of discord which it is not impossible to resolve, and here we m ay effect a harm ony - as for instance we produce rhythm by resolving the difference betw een fast and slow’ (Symposium, 187°). E ryxym achus is a physician, and his tru th will not readily apply to the ruling of the noetic p art of m an, yet aspectually, i.e. in reference to the body, he is as m uch a representative of true philosophy as is H eraclitus or Parm enides. T h e bodily aspect of any city is to be treated as such through m usic and gym nastics. ‘A nd ju s t as we saw that the concord of the body was brought ab o u t by the art of medicine, so this other harm ony is due to the a rt of music, as the creator of m utual love and sym pathy’ (Symposium, 187°). So w hat, then, is music? N othing but ‘the science of love, or of desire, in this case in relation to harm ony and rhythm ’ (Symposium, 187°). T his is far from being the contem porary view of harm ony. M usic was held by the Greeks to be the force constitutive of personality, and Plato looks backw ard to D am on to resurrect this unusual notion. For Plato, citizens are disarranged bits and pieces which are put together by music along w ith gym nastics and philosophy. (Cf. an expression from Illtyd T rethow an: ‘W e are all bits and pieces until C hrist puts us together.’). ‘M usic’, of course, is not music in the m odern sense; it is the collective em bodim ent of universal rhythm s and constants conveyed by inspired ritu al poetry, dance and mime, all in some sense participating in the underlying principle of love, all serving a psychotherapeutic role. In Islam and the Perennial Philosophy, Frithjof Schuon writes th at in Islam ic tradition the soul o f A dam would not enter his body until lured there by music. H arm ony, therefore, cannot be reduced to som ething which is perceived by the body, w hether in sensation or concept. T o understand 224

CURING THE CITY

harm ony one needs to take a broader view. In the noetic perspective kings, ty rants and other power-holders are not m uch different from terrorists. T h e terrorist, holding a ship or a family to ransom , appears to have power, yet this appearance is only due to his lim ited perception. In the Gorgias (469^, Socrates observes that anybody can set a dockyard on fire or walk abo u t with a hidden dagger and grab citizens for ransom . Such power, says Socrates, lasts merely a few m inutes or days; nevertheless it is no different from th at of a king, for even a decade-long rule is a fleeting second com pared to the longevity of the soul. T rue harm ony can be discerned only outside time, or in time as a whole. T h e reason why the simple sophist’s concept of harm ony —the absence of pain and conflict in his perceived realm - is victorious over th at of the philosopher does not lie in any deficiency on the p art of the philosopher’s logic. T h e sophist’s concept appears more logical and is m ore fam iliar to the m ind, which, in order to make the harm ony between false units convincing, creates rules of com prehension on the basis of desire, Epithumia. T h e m ind is an unreliable ally of the philosopher, and at best a n eu tral agent, by virtue of this inclination. But the philosopher has a more powerful weapon than the m ind, and he readily uses it. T his weapon is rhythm . By self-purification through rhythm , philosophy, gym nastics and music, a real philosopher apprehends the organizing principles of deeper harm ony and is able to tran slate them into words, institutions, architecture and philosophy. This is why Socrates was able to move his listeners to action (Symposium, 215d) . T his is the only way to defeat the sophist, and the only cure for the city. T h e Greek tem ple or ancient city harm onizes three elements, three different conceptions of harm ony. T he first is of ‘harm ony’ as the contem porary m ind would understand it, harm ony th at is a K antian victory over the self, and hence absence of conflict. T he victory here is by persuasion, the harm ony merely conceptual; the persuaded m an ‘thinks' he is at peace. T h e second notion of harm ony is th at of the body, and the third, though it m ay im ply local conflict in the perceived realm , is conducive of an eventual resolution if perceived macrocosmically. T he ideal harm ony is one where the concept and the body are in tune w ith the noetic faculty. T his comes about as the three different kinds of time psychological tim e, body time, and cosmic time - are fused in actuality. T his harm ony implies th at other beings also accept and perceive the noetic harm ony, since all men are interconnected. For this reason the philosopher em ancipates him self by em ancipating others. O f course, he is only relatively successful in an objective sense. Subjectively, however, the harm ony available is the one of projection into the out-of-tim e realm called the other world. If successful, he no longer feels pain as pain. 225

it; i=> t= it = T i ~ t= T » = ;(= ; i = i i= T i= i> = ii— (q

11] 1 Thirteen U | THE CITY 1 AS THE TEMPLE ]l IT

il ii I if

T h e G reek notion of harm ony makes it possible to understand the non-legislated for, i.e. the larger, aspect of life in M agnesia. N oetic h arm ony necessarily includes th at between body and soul. T he whole issue is complex, for the division betw een m ind and body is not one th a t can be conceptualized. T he m ind both is and has a body. Therefore, for Plato any state of harm ony, w hether spiritual, m ental or physical, cannot be achieved w ithout physical activity or exercise. T his allows us to app ro ach th a t otherw ise incom prehensible aspect of Greek life and philosophy, usually referred to as Choreia. ‘and he who is careful to fashion the body should in turn im p art to the soul its p roper m otions and should cultivate the arts and philosophy. . . . A nd the separate parts should be treated in the same m an n er in im itation of the pattern of the universe. . . . B ut if anyone, in im itation of th a t which we call the foster m other and nurse of the universe, will not allow the body ever to be inactive, but is always producing m otions and agitations through its whole extent, which form the n a tu ra l defence against their m otions, both internal and external, and by m oderate exercise reduces to order, according to their affinities, the particles and affections which are w andering about the body, as we have already said when speaking of the universe, he will not allow enem y, placed by the side of enemy, to stir up wars and disorders in the body, b u t he will place friend by the side of friend. . . . Now, of all m otions th at is the best which is produced in a thing by itself, for it is m ost akin to the m otion of thought and of the universe’ ( Timaeus, 89- 9° d).

226

THE CITY AS THE TEMPLE

I In approaching the corybantic aspect of O rphic philosophy, we enter the single least know n area o f Greek experience, yet one which deserves m uch attention. T h e Greeks took p a rt in regular collective rhythm ic exercises of the kind one m eets today in com m unist C hina - where hundreds of thousands o f children create patterns spelling the nam e of a party leader or an idea. For the Greeks, such activity perm eated all walks of life. M y interest in the m atter lies in the possibility of differentiating the feelings I have referred to as sentim ents and the sim ilar, b u t ontologically divergent, set of feelings th at may be called passions or affections of the lower soul. A lthough the Greeks did not use the words ‘poetry’ and ‘m usic’ consistently to indicate the differences between corybantic and ecstatic purification, Plato and A ristotle do exhibit a certain consistency in using them to refer to two different sets of arts and their corresponding em otions. O ne m ay observe th at the corybantic aspect in m usic contains the positive elem ent in the arts, and vice versa for the passion-orientated activities th a t I shall here som ew hat arbitrarily equate with poetry and dram a. Any m eaningful analysis of the corybantic aspect of Choreia can only be carried out by reference to oriental parallels, as the notion is strange, even if the experience is not completely foreign to the Greeks and to the W estern trad itio n in general. A ristides Q uantilianus is one of the few authors to have com m ented on the subject at all. H e sees corybantic exercises and m usic as prim arily a m im etic vehicle: Q u an tilianus’ view appears to have a degree of validity, b u t does not diagnose the fact th at two different m ovem ents are involved in the mimesis. T ru e corybantic m ovem ent is concerned w ith th a t p a rt of the lower soul which produces sentim ents w hich are the co u n terp art to Noesis; their perverted im age consists of the passions, and these are the currency of the undesirable poet and d ram atist. W ilhelm W u n d t (1905, pp. 396-405) writes of the difference betw een w hat he calls ecstatic and m im etic dance. From W u n d t’s account one m ay infer th a t the form er serves to arrest the m ovem ent of the conscious soul, allow ing the deity to enter a m ind which has in some sense em ptied. T he affected person is extinguished, and becomes a passive recipient. As opposed to this stands m im etic dance, where the particip an t retains consciousness, yet ceases to differentiate him self as a single p articular entity. Consciousness is not extinguished but enlarged, by becom ing p arasitic on the m ovem ent of the im itated entity, be it anim al or deity. W u n d t finds the m im etic superior. 227

MYTHOS

C oncerning the n atu re of ecstatic rituals, M ircea Eliade (1979, p. 368) comes closer to w hat I have in m ind. H e writes: A t the centre of the Dionysic ritual we always find, in one form or another, an ecstatic experience of a more or less violent frenzy or m ania: this m adness was in a way the proof th at the initiate was entheos - ‘filled w ith G o d .’ . . . com m union with God shattered the hum an condition for a tim e but it did not succeed in transm uting it. T here is no reference to im m ortality in the Bachae . . . it is characteristic of all such activities th a t they bring only a tem porary relief. It is im p o rtan t to note the difference between two kinds of art: art designed to develop and educate the soul, and art designed to bring tem porary relief. T hese distinctions are universal. Parallels can be draw n with m odern psychology, which when divorced from the ethical-religious dim ension becom es a science designed to alleviate m ental pain, rath er than to cure the soul in a deeper, p erm anent way. T he d ram a and Bacchic rites of fourth-century A thens, in contrast to O rphic Choreia, were also designed p rim arily to effect relief. But, as far as I am aw are, Ivan Linforth (1946) is the only scholar since Q u an tilian u s to have w ritten on the corybantic rites of Choreia, rites in dependent of those associated w ith w orship and ceremony: ‘T he rites belonged to th at class of religious ceremonies which were called Teletae. . . . A telete of this kind was a form of ritual whose chief function was not the w orship of gods but the direct benefit of the p a rtic ip a n t.’ T he Choreia he describes is clearly neither an activity designed to tem porarily relieve pain, nor an entertainm ent. It can best be understood com pared w ith the activity called yoga. T he m eaning of this word stems from the root yu j — to yoke or to jo in - and its objective is to educate hum an soul (Jivatman) to perceive itself as p a rt of the universal soul em bracing all living beings: anim als, the fishes in the sea and the birds of the air. W hile the w ord yoga brings to the W estern m ind the postures (Asanas) of H ath a yoga, this does not exhaust the m eaning of the word. D ancing and mime are ju s t as legitim ate a p a rt of it, as indeed is any activity which teaches m an to integrate him self in the m ovem ent of the universal soul. It is the bodily mimesis of all the forms of life in which m an participates. T he theory of yoga is the theory behind the m yth of the Statesman: in order to learn our p a rt in the m ovem ent of the universe, we ought not to differentiate ourselves from any other living being, for in the age of C ronus we were all in a sense one. W hile philosophy educates the intellectual p art of the soul, the body has its own m an n er of thought and its own reason, extended in the liver ( Timaeus, 71). T h e Greeks and H indus in general saw disorders of the soul 228

THE CITY AS THE TEMPLE

as stem m ing from disorders in the body, and vice versa. T he fall of m an was a tw o-sided affair. As we learn from Pindar, the most ancient sin was hubris (m an desiring to be more than m an); but, again, there is a hubris of the m ind and a hubris of the body. In Biblical term s, it was not ju st A d am ’s m ind th a t w anted to be like God. The rebellion lay in the m in d ’s desire to be like God and to know the difference between good and evil, yet for this knowledge to be absorbed it was necessary for A dam to a p p ro p riate it also by the body. So the perversion did not ju s t lim it itself to m ental desire; it was physically consum m ated through the apple. T he m ovem ent of the body is as corrupted as the m ovem ent of the m ind. M an is doubly ignorant, since the one kind of ignorance causes and ranges into the other. T h ro u g h yoga, m an m im etically integrates him self into the forms of being from which he is separated by the nature of his sin, and in thus purifying him self he overcomes the fear of seeing him self as he is. In H in d u accounts, as in Plato, m an is afraid of his true identity. Like the prisoners in the cave, he prefers the ‘im agined’ comfort of his chains to the painful Periagoge. H e is asham ed of his nakedness: by covering his true body, he has placated his sham e - but this false protection also caters to his fear. T ru e reunion involves the overcoming of fear; perceiving oneself naked yet purified, and hence free of shame. Fear, sham e, happiness, courage, justice - indeed all sentim ents, good or bad - are m ovem ents of the soul outw ardly manifested as psychic sensations. T his m echanistic view of the nature of the affections of the soul and corresponding states of m ind differs considerably from the ‘m eta­ physical’ views attrib u ted to the Greeks by m odern thinkers, and eloquently dem olished by those same people. Evil is prim arily a wrong kind of m otion; a symbolic m otion, but quite literally a tangible, m echanical m otion th at can be m echanically counteracted. Ethics merges w ith gym nastics, w ithout losing its integrity. T he body itself has its reason and intelligence, its courage and ethical virtue. To overcome bodily pain is as virtuous as to overcome a m ental obstacle: both involve the sentim ent of love tow ards the n atu ral state, an element of courage to resist the pain th a t hinders the reversal of m ovem ent from bad to good. But the intelligence of the body cannot be treated as separate from the intelligence of the m ind; one is reflective of the other, and they each participate in a unity. T h e liver also has its rational-cognitive element, as does every cell in the body. So, for noetic thinkers, intelligence is not located in the brain alone, m anifested as thought. T he Nous pervades the whole cosmos, and it m anifests itself in app ro p riate forms through a characteristic m ovem ent. ‘T h o u g h t’ is a m isleading translation of Noesis, for it restricts itself to the 229

MYTHOS

m ind. Noesis does m ean ‘m ovem ent’ - the soul has different m ovem ents and it acts, cognates and feels in term s of them: ‘I have often rem arked th at there are three kinds of soul located w ithin us, having each of them motions. . . . Now there is only one way of taking care of things, and th at is to give to each the food and the m otion w hich is n atu ral to it. A nd the m otions which are naturally akin to the divine principle w ithin us are the thoughts and the revolutions of the universe. T hese each m an should follow, and by learning the harm onies and the revolutions of the universe should correct the courses of the head which were corrupted at our b irth ’ ( Timaeus, 8ge-9 0 d). D isease in the body is not m uch different from evil and im m oral thought. O ften, m an is responsible for his own disease, for the body a ttracts it by following the evil m ovem ents of indecent dances and d ram a, enjoying bad foods, tastes, smells and sights. O f course, disease may also come to the best of m en through the independent activity of Anangke. T ho u g h physically he m ay be m ost uncom fortable, through accepting the p ain of an undeserved disease a m an may restore the order of his soul. F ear entered the world with pain and disease, and in some ways is senior in evil to the latter, being higher in the hierarchy of m ovem ents by its capacity to engender those on a lower level (Laws, 893). Socrates rem arked th a t the law would not have come into being for the sake of good m en; St Paul th at it ‘is not laid down for the ju st but for the . . . ungodly and sinners’ (I T im othy, I, 9). T he cause of punishm ent and of all fear, in the G reek and C h ristian tradition, is sin, or those desires th at are elim inated by a training in true philosophy. A ugustine wrote, in Serm on 145: D escend into thyself. T hou wilt see another law in thy m em bers, fighting against the law of thy m ind and captivating thee in the law of sin th a t is in thy m em bers [see Rom ans, V II, 23]. . . . W hy is this but th a t on receiving the com m andm ent thou didst fear, not love? T hou didst fear punishm ent, thou didst not love justice. It is, o f course, the purpose of true philosophy - and not of logical positivism - to resolve this conflict between ‘m ind’ and ‘m em bers’. T h e fear we are concerned with here is th at which we m ight today call ‘existential fear’ —the lack of confidence to abrogate internal m otions by assum ing the external m otion of the universe. In the Laws (790), this fear is seen as ‘an internal m otion of the soul [which] can be influenced by external m otion’. It is for this reason th at Plato recom m ends th at it should be overcom e a t the earliest stages, starting in the womb. U nlike K an t, who saw only the individual as capable of perfecting his own m oral virtue, noetic thinkers, in view o f a fundam ental cosmic unity, regard parents as to some extent able to bestow virtue on their children; though to do this is 230

THE CITY AS THE TEMPLE

m ore difficult than bestowing anything as concrete as advice, gifts or positive instructions. O ne can best educate the soul by m ovem ent, and particularly so w hen the child is still in the womb. H ence in the Laws, 790b, Plato follows D am on, and legislates th at pregnant women should go for walks, ‘m oulding the child like w ax’. These ancient instructions are very strict w ith respect to the sentim ents experienced by pregnant m others: they should abstain from violent pleasures, and concentrate on divine thoughts, love and prayer. T his attitude is still prevalent in H induism today, where the pregnant m other is instructed to be continuously thinking w ith love o f her child. W hile eating, sleeping and resting, she should be im agining th at she is acting for the sake of the child. Sexual intercourse for p regnant women is only perm itted in the first stages of pregnancy if the m other-to-be abstains from lust and keeps her pleasures rooted in love. Plato also takes m inute care in legislation concerning children, and dem ands th at p regnant women be entertained, kept happy and visited and advised by family and by the officials of the State. T he sw addling and the w rapping up o f babies is given m oral significance. Babies should be carried abo u t and rocked: ideally, Plato would have them spend all their tim e on the sea, assim ilating the cosmic m ovem ent m anifested by the roll o f the waves (Laws, 790°). C ertainly, young children should be taken for all kinds of rides on sea and land —since children are close to God they will inevitably enjoy all these movem ents. T he assum ption behind all this is th a t universal rhythm s are m anifested in the seasonal cycles, the roll of the surf, the sway o f the trees in the wind: m an is estranged from this n atural cosmic rhythm and should continuously strive to im itate it in his m ovem ent, in his thought and in all his activity. II A fu rther insight into Choreia m ay be gained by reference to Confucius: M en ’s behaviour is governed by a m ind in large m easure m otivated by love an d hate, joy and depression, fear, jealousy, anger, tenderness and com passion. T w o things are necessary: the first to bring about an inner harm ony of the m ind so th at each emotion as it arises is given a fitting outlet. No em otion m ust be allowed unbridled expression, b u t one m ust seek to cultivate a balanced harm ony within the m ind itself. In this p u rsu it the melodies, harm onies and rhythm s of m usic are of great value, and in the process of character training there are few things th at can m atch the disciplined co-ordination of an orchestra or the rhythm ic and balanced m ovem ents of a form al ritual dance (Sm ith, 1973, p. 72). F or Confucius, m usic (by music he, like Plato, m eans a com bination of 231

MYTHOS

m ovem ent, dance, poetry and music) was instrum ental in teaching virtue: indeed he saw it as a more powerful m edium than philosophy itself. Choreia - referred to in Chinese as Li - was even m ore im portant in C onfucian teaching than in P lato’s, and Confucius claim ed th a t no philosophy was possible w ithout it. Socrates and Confucius point to dangers in the professionalization of dancing and singing. A gentlem an is not a gentlem an unless he is thus schooled - and a wife who cannot sing for her husb an d and family but relies on the services of slaves is not a pro p er lady. Li was also im portant as a force for social cohesion: ‘R itual and m usic were the essential m anifestation of culture. M usic, w hich included m im ing and dancing, was a powerful stim ulus to the com m unity spirit, w hether in solemn seasonal and family festivals or in the rhythm ic ch an tin g ’ (Sm ith, 1973, p. 63). W hile processions, Bacchic dances and festivals were also a p a rt of G reek life, one cannot too readily equate these with the corybantic Choreia as it was understood by noetic tradition. T here are m any reasons for believing th a t the corybantic synthesis described by Plato had already atrophied in the city of A thens, th at it was som ething characteristic of the Socratic m ethod b u t foreign to later Greek experience. Linforth argues th at the o rdinary corybantic ritual was an unusual and rare phenom enon associated w ith O rphism , and in spite of its outw ard resem blance to the cult dances and so forth was an essentially different activity. Indeed, the charge against Socrates th at he was corrupting youth through strange practices and the introduction of foreign gods may have had som ething to do w ith this. Some pointers m ay be found in Proclus and particularly Psellus: though, since some of this evidence m ay be spurious, I will not attach m uch w eight to it, m entioning it only in so far as it has parallels elsewhere. Psellus w rites in the Pletho of the ‘second o rd er’ of Platonic philosophy, corresponding to the Z oroastrian order of Synoches and T eletarchs given by D am ascius. T hro u g h m editating on such cosmic m ovem ents m an loses his fear. T he practice of curing existential fear by m ovem ents and dance is still com m on in Iran , and has been incorporated into Islam . In ‘B astani’, w hich is both rhythm ic and gym nastic, the participants w hirl weights and execute dancelike m ovem ents to the chanting of poetry. Its Zoroastrian origins are the cause of hostility in some circles. T here is also evidence for S ocrates’ use of dance and mime to perfect the soul in the Lives of Diogenes L aertus, and in Ferguson (1970, p. 229), quoting A theneas. It can certainly be inferred from the reactions of his co-citizens th a t Socrates’ activities were not of a kind considered norm al and usual by the A thenians. T hey were foreign to Hellas. His trances, his dancing or standing still ‘from daw n to dusk’ perplexed the indifferent, gave cause for 232

THE CITY AS THE TEMPLE

com plaint to his enemies, and were startling even to his friends. I have already referred earlier to the Parmenides as being a corybantic dialogue, based on oriental techniques th at force the m ind to enter into a specific m ovem ent, transcending the particular m eaning conventionally conveyed by w ords. T his was an th er m anifestation of the same m ethod. In the Charmides ( 156e—157), Socrates tells the young m an of a technique he has learned from a wise foreigner (Zalmoxis, who is also said to be able to point the way to im m ortality). T he technique is to cure the soul by the use of verbal charm s: ‘A nd the cure of the soul, my dear youth, has to be effected by the use of certain charm s, and these charm s are fair words, and by them tem perance is im planted in the soul.’ T h a t the Socratic dialogue itself is corybantic is enunciated specifically by Alcibiades: ‘W hen I listen to him my state is like th a t of the corybantic devotees’ (Symposium, 215). References m ay also be found in the Crito, 54d, the Euthyphro, 227^ e and the Phaedrus, 228b. Sensitivity to inner logic, even today, is one of the criteria by which potential students are assessed at the M uslim U niversity in Cairo, and it forms p a rt of the post-graduate curricula in the fields of theology and Islam ic thought in general. O ne is tested for rhythm by recital. W hether one has understood the text is judged not only by the verbal elaboration, b u t also by the rhythm ic pronunciations. [The] h ab it of recital in strict sequence fixed the juxtaposition of Q u ran ic incidents and endowed them with a sort of second logic. Adjacence becam e significant of m eaning, and sense was linked strongly w ith proxim ity (Cragg, 1973, p. 26). Plato, too, frequently recom m ends th at the Laws should be chanted, repeated over and over again, m em orized and recited as poetry, for this in itself will m ake one a better m an ’ (Laws, 81 i c, 858% 957°). It is not enough m erely to express a thought; it m ust be done rhythm ically and aesthetically, and there is an objective aesthetics to guide all one’s actions. E thical notions themselves have a dim ension which is aesthetically pleasing. T he fact th at this is ‘lost to contem porary m a n ’, writes T aylor ( I 934? P* 34)5 is due to a ‘certain aesthetic im perceptiveness on our p a rt.’ I f the ethical dim ension has, in some sense, a visible, or aesthetically perceivable dim ension or body, we m ay infer th at the converse is true: for a perceptive m an the extended aspect of the aesthetical will have an ethical dim ension. It is this which characterizes the structure of the P latonic dialogues. Differences between the contradictory elements are resolved by rhythm . N or m ust we ever forget the close connection between Choreia and politics: for ‘C hange in music is always accom panied by a change in the sta te ’ (Republic, 424°). 233

MYTHOS

III W hile Choreia m ay be the single least discussed issue in Greek history and philosophy, th a t o f n um ber m ay well turn out to be the one least understood. T h e interpretation I have followed above sees num ber as the inner, the fixed d eterm in ant which manifests outw ardly as the sentim ent. T h ere are, however, difficulties w ith this interpretation, whose exposition m ay in a way enhance rath er than obscure my position. In the earlier discussion of Aritmos, my objection to recent interpretation was based on the S aan th an a position th at knowledge cannot be frozen into objectified form ulae, be they m athem atical or astrological, since epistem ology is not independent of ethics. T his having been stated, we cannot but notice th at for Plato there does a p p ear to be a certain ‘publicly objective’ dim ension to num bers and to their m anifestations. O ne of E ngland’s foremost Greek scholars, J . A dam , devoted three years to working out ju st one of the m any m athem atical problem s posed by Plato. His painstaking calculation of the N uptial N u m b er as 12,960,000 was, from my point of view, m isguided, if A dam believed th a t it was going to help men to better their souls or to father their children in season (although the activity m ay well have been beneficial for A dam in less obvious ways). But: why does Plato, like St J o h n and Z oroaster, enter into such detail as to im bue their texts with precise form ulae? Even a relatively superficial study reveals th at the num erical relations expressed and im plied are not arb itrary - they are not ju s t figurative exam ples o f n atu ral rhythm . They app ear to be literal and objective, b u t fragm entary, presentations of a coherent universal system. O u r inability to account for this system o f ‘ethical m athem atics’, thanks to four centuries o f conceptual conditioning, does not create such an in terp retatio n al gap th at we can bridge it only by a leap of faith. Even if we do not know w hat kind of m athem atics it was th at was practised by the disciples of Jesu s or at the A cadem y, it has already been established th at the m ental process involved in its study is not to be equated with the one by which the contem porary m ind acquires m athem atical knowledge. P lato ’s advice th a t the study of m athem atics is conducive to philosophical knowledge has no validity if applied to contem porary dianoic m athem a­ tics, ‘the science o f m easuring and com paring and predicting sequences’ (Republic, 5 i6 d), which Plato says is for auxiliaries, not philosophers. O f course, one should not take this too far. W hatever Plato m eant by stan d ard izin g the size o f cups and saucers (Laws, 747a_d) in a ratio to the circum ference of the earth, the orbit of the moon and so on, he could not have m eant th at drinking out of such cups and saucers was in itself enough to m ake one d ear to the gods. But th at num ber is m ore objective

234

THE CITY AS THE TEMPLE

th an most o f the dialogues would suggest is evidenced in the Philebus (66a) . H aving argued for the superiority of a life based on reason as against a life based on the blind following of pleasure, Socrates comes to an unexpected conclusion. Failing to introduce his term s or in any way prepare the reader, he concludes by asserting th at there are in life five m ost im portant possessions: the first being m easure (To Metron); second, proportion and only in the third place reason, followed by Techne and pleasure. (‘A nd if you accept w hat I divine, and p u t reason and intelligence third, you will not be very wide of tru th .’) T he other dialogues m ight have led one to believe th at reason (in the divine sense) would top P lato’s hierarchy, or at least come second after the direct vision (Periagoge). O ne can perhaps understand To Metron to signify Diarithmesis, the correct rhythm ic m ovem ent of the soul by which one differentiates the good from the bad. It would then equate with the ethical Golden M ean, as well as w ith the categorical injunction in the Laws and Epinomis (989k) to the effect th a t there is ‘No greater possession or virtue than Piety’. But perhaps the m athem atical To Metron does not coincide w ith the ethical To Metron. Plato dem ands nothing short of the m ost literal standardization of practically every physical object, building or utensil. T h a t the calendar should be standardized has, of course, im m ediate religious significance; b u t it is less obvious why toys, clothes and roads should all conform to objectively fixed num bers. B rum baugh (1962, p. 81) sees the system as duodecim al, yet A dam and M cC lain posit a m ultiplicity of systems. O ne m ay ask w hat the A th en ian’s intentions are in the following: ‘T hese facts of num ber, then, m ust be thoroughly m astered at leisure by those whose business the law will make it to understand them; they will find them exactly as I stated them , and they m ust be m entioned by the founder of a city, for the reason I shall now give.’ T h e reasons given are ethical injunctions from prophets, visionaries and the m oral traditions: ‘since no m an of sense will presum e to disturb convictions inspired from Delphi, D odona, the oracle of A m m on, or by old traditions o f any kind of divine appearances or reported divine revela­ tions’ (Laws, Perhaps we m ay infer th a t P lato’s num bers are not all newly derived in the Academ y: he m ay be simply following established practice. His idea th a t m en and wom en should eat together, and th a t drinking be allowed in Systitia, are m et w ith expressions of am azem ent; whereas his geom etric city planning seems to call for no explanation. It has already been m entioned th a t cities and temples used to be constructed on traditional principles (and see Friedlander, 1969, I, pp. 318-20). If P lato’s num bers were p a rt of a universal system, studying them would not m ean calculation and the derivation of form ulae by Dianoia at all; it m ight be 235

MYTHOS

com pared again to the use of G regorian chants, rhythm ic poetry and other sim ilar corybantic exercises. T he Revelation to St Jo h n also gives an objective form ula for the construction of the New Jerusalem , but the C h ristian C hurch has not found it necessary to im plem ent these instructions literally. If these form ulae were draw n from an existing tradition, their context m ay have given them a m eaning beyond the one th a t we im m ediately discern in our literalistic fashion. V arious keys are available to us if we wish to recover some of this lost m athem atical tradition. Scholars like A .E.B errim an, E rnest G .M cC lain and J o h n M ichell - and before them Newton and N apier - have d em onstrated the interrelation of standard m easures and common specifications for city or tem ple with astronom ical constants such as the d iam eter of the moon. Each side of St J o h n ’s New Jeru salem m easures 12,000 furlongs, and the total perim eter 48,000 furlongs or 31,680,000 feet. T his last n um ber has connections with various temples around the world: for exam ple, the m ean perim eter of the sarsen circle at Stonehenge is 316.8 feet, and the area of sacred land recorded as belonging to the Abbey of G lastonbury by the Dom esday Book has a perim eter of 31,680 feet. T he com bined radii of the earth and the moon am ount to 5,040 miles (Plato’s m ystical num ber, the population of M agnesia), and if you draw a circle w ith this diam eter its circum ference is 31,680 miles - which is the same as the periphery of a square draw n around the earth alone. In the Laws (745d), the A thenian dem ands th at the land occupied by the circular city be divided betw een its citizens. T he city’s radius becomes 5,040 units, and its circum ference therefore, like th a t of New Jerusalem , 31,680. Such calculations could be prolonged indefinitely - but it is not my contention th at the A cadem y spent its time doing so.

IV T he State, writes G uthrie in The Greeks and their Gods, was for the Greeks in some sense their C hurch. T he essence of any city has this underlying dim ension. So does the hum an body. ‘Destroy this tem ple, and in three days I will raise it u p ’ (John, III , 19). According to the ‘enlightened’ in terp retatio n of this text, Jesus was referring to his own body - of course, this one conceptualization of his m eaning should not be overextended to exclude the others. T he extension in stone, brick and m o rtar is one dim ension of the body of C hrist, and is also involved in the process of restoration, even if the three days would then have a less straightforw ard significance referring perhaps to Kalpas, Yugas or ontological realm s. T he

236

THE CITY AS THE TEMPLE

body of the Logos is all the creation subject to history: it includes words, thoughts, churches, physical bodies and all cities. Solmsen (1942, p. 6) writes: ‘the deity th at represents and personifies the city actually is the city’. It is clear from the context th at he is referring not to the totality of the perceived city, but rath er to its purified dim ension, which I have described as the true city. N or is the ‘tem ple’ to be restricted to a perceived house of w orship and its official keepers, for they particip ate in the city ju s t as Babylon participates in New Jerusalem or A thens in M enexenus. Identification with the city, Solmsen (1942, p. 155), points out, serves to facilitate an identification with the cosmic whole. In order for the actual to coincide with the ideal, the inner with the outer, the earthly city m ust im itate the cosmic pattern. P lato ’s ‘cosm ic’ view of an Athens-in-the-sky need not be accepted solely on the authority of scholars. In the Timaeus, (21-25), Plato writes of this eternally recurring A thens th at has existed since the daw n of time; and in 2 i e he equates the goddess A thena w ith the Egyptian deity Neith, giving credence to the claims of F riedlander and others th at both gods and their tem ples have an oriental origin. Plato, as we have seen, develops his dialogues along anatom ical lines, and the city of M agnesia is specifically equated w ith the headless body: (since the workings of the head aspect are described in a separate dialogue, the Republic). ‘W hy, m anifestly the city at large is the trunk of the body’(Laz£Ay, 964^. In The City and the Image o f Man, T .C . Stewart, relying on a collection of sources, city plans and a H indu temple, analyses the anatom ical aspects of the city to show th at it does indeed express basic psychological constants. From these and sim ilar accounts (see Patai, 1947) one is led to conclude th a t the so-called Platonic im peratives - class divisions, standardization of objects and m easures - need not be provided for or im plem ented by legislation, since they are taking form all the time. T he objective is to recognize these realities and to adjust to them in the best possible way. Even V oltaire recognized this, in his Lettres sur VAtlantide (in Bailly, 1879). T o the w ealth of evidence th at P lato’s instructions concerning the outw ard dim ension of M agnesia form a p art of a universal num erical system, scholarship has responded in two ways. T he nineteenth century sim ply ignored this dim ension, while contem porary scholarship has turned to the other extrem e, and interprets P lato’s philosophy in term s of objective m athem atics. As these facts enter popular consciousness all kinds of fantastic speculations will no doubt be m ade. M y own position is th a t the objective aspect simply points to the fact th at M agnesia is an ethical, num erical skeleton: th at this is so can be inferred both from the text and from parallels in other religions. It will be a sad day when the

237

MYTHOS

research on this and sim ilar problem s is used to sell books on alchem y and m agical num bers. O ne can understand the hesitancy of m en who have devoted hundreds or thousands of hours to painstaking research in this field, only to have the fruit of their labour exploited by charlatans and sensationalists. O ne the other hand, the fundam ental unicity of the teaching of the ancient cultures - be it th at of Z oroastrians, T aoists or the A cadem y - has already reached into our reality. T he kind of philosphy tau g h t in the last century has nothing to do w ith the ideas of contem porary m athem atics or physics. C ontem porary m an will soon have to revise his views and relation tow ards past, present and future.

V ‘N ot only for plants th a t grow in the earth, but for anim als th at live on it, there are the seasons of fertility and infertility of both m ind and body, seasons which come when their periodic motions come full circle5 (Republic, 546d). T h e cause o f all decay, Socrates goes on to say, is a falling out of that seasonal rhythm . Asked how to ensure th at no subversive m ovem ent of the soul creeps into the life o f M agnesia, the A thenian answers th at the evil sentim ents (such as lust, pleasure, anger) will be kept out of everyday life by draw ing up a correct calendar, ensuring an orderly exchange between activity and rest, work and festival, and also involving the sanctification of dance and music: ‘T h e first jo b will be to settle the festivals by draw ing up the year’s program m e, which should show the dates of the various holidays and the individual gods, children of gods or spirits in whose honour they should be tak en ’ (Laws, 799). T his seasonal notion of life persists even today. A ccording to Jo se f Pieper (1954, p. 80), echoing a pronouncem ent of Pope Pius X , to be a C h ristian m eans to p articipate in the C hristian rhythm . A part from the form al atten d an ce of m ass, one shares in the religious life through ‘living the C h u rch y ear’: T h e liturgical year is m ade up of two different but com plem entary elem ents w hich dovetail. O ne is the week, the other is the series of feasts o f C hrist. T h e ann u al cycle of the feasts of our Lord puts into tangible term s o f space and time the recital of the second p a rt of the Creed. Professor E .O .Jam es shows how close the relationship is between this C h ristian rhythm and th at of the pagan cults - in fact betw een each event in the C hristian calendar and an ancient counterpart. In the Laws, each 238

THE CITY AS THE TEMPLE

p a rt o f the year, and even each p art of the m onth, is to be characterized by a p articu lar spirit, and secular activities, w hether work or music, m ust be in harm ony w ith th at spirit. In the C hristian liturgical year each spirit is represented by a saint. Professor Jam es interprets the P rotestant rejection of the saints as a rejection of the liturgical year, and an attem pt to replace a holiday-w ork p a tte rn th at is in keeping w ith the spiritual rhythm by an idolatrous gnostic or com m ercial one. C olours are also significant, and are prescribed by Plato in his city plans. T he linking of green, white, orange and red to the seasons appears to be alm ost universal, and they are, for example, worn by C atholic priests at the ap p ro p riate times. Professor Jam es finds W hitsun symbolized by the colour red and also by the sound of trum pets, signifying the sacred w ind, the b reath of life, linked with spring and rebirth. Red is also the first of the seven colours o f the rainbow which links the earth to the sky and w hich represents a covenant between God and m an. T he division of the rainbow into seven colours connects it to the seven sacram ents of the C hurch. Such m atters are com m only ignored, but Plato rem arks, ‘Those whose business is to u n d erstan d them - they will find them exactly as I have stated th em ’ (Laws, 738b). Evidently such m atters have been and are of great im portance. Pope V ictor in AD 190 alm ost precipitated the subsequent split of the C hurches by threatening to excom m unicate the E ast for calendar m odifications. A nd Plato seems even more papist than the Pope. In the Laws (809°) he observes th at the city can only be kept alive ‘if the sacrifices and feasts may fit into the true and n atural order, and receive their several proper celebrations’. In 8o9d he goes on to say th at in doing this ‘m en are advancing in intelligence’. K now ing through doing is of course stan d ard for Plato; understanding is a result of building in accordance w ith the given pattern (Laws, 738a~e). M cC lain (1978, p. 15) traces the seven day week through the Greek, Z oroastrian, E gyptian and H indu calendars. T he seven days are the seven steeds o f the su n ’s chariot. T he year is divided into 360 parts, w ith a five-day New Y ear holiday. T his corresponds to the division of the circle into 360 parts; hence for H indus 360 years is a year of gods, and 36002 (12,960,000) is a cycle o f P rajapati. It is also the num ber of citizens of A tlantis, the circum ference of the earth in stadia, etc. In the Gorgias, 504°, Socrates equates regularity with health and order, and goes on to repeat the opinions voiced in the Republic th a t the cause of social and individual disease is a falling out of the n atural rhythm . G aiser (1963) sees the philosopher as the one who ensures th a t the rhythm of the Polis should follow the cosmos: a difficult task in times of decay. For Eliade, ‘the year is the totality of cosmic tim e’, which may be w hat Plato 239

MYTHOS

m eant in the Timaeus (37d) by ‘Tim e is the m oving image of eternity’ - by observing the seasonal interchange taking place w ithin each year we p articip ate in the entire cosmic story. Eliade (1979, P-332) sees the last ten days of the year as ‘an eschatological d ra m a ’, linking it w ith the general resurrection. All these clues convey the im pression that, for Philosophia Perennis, distinctions betw een the physical and psychological cycles of life are hard to m ake, for there is an all-em bracing cosmic unity involving both. VI T h e contem porary concept conveyed by the word leisure relates im perfect­ ly to the notion shared by Confucius, A quinas and, to an extent, Aristotle. For the latter, leisure was ‘thought of not merely as free time, b u t as the o pp o rtu n ity for creatively constructive activity, which is sum m ed up in the life o f the Polis’ (M orrall, 1977, p. 89). In a way, the differences and sim ilarities betw een the C onfucian and A ristotelian notions of leisure illustrate both the basic philosphical affinity and the spiritual gap which separates C hina from Hellas. F or Confucius, disinterested activity was to act as a vehice for the rectification of the hearts of men. For Plato, leisure m eant absorption in the divine, to the exclusion of concern for with outcom es in the secular sphere. T h e scholastics agreed, as did Ficino, th at the divine being, w ithin ourselves and everywhere, can be com prehended only in ‘stillness, leisure and peace’. It is other, lesser things th at are in particular places, and m ust be sought by m ovem ent and effort. T he eye of the m ind perceives the divine light as soon as it ceases to be distracted by worldly affairs, for, in a phrase o f Ficino’s, ‘to be turned tow ard the divine m eans sim ply not to be tu rn ed aw ay from it’ (cf. ‘he th at is not against you is for you’, Luke, IX , 50). T h e com pulsion to work and struggle is foreign to m an and enters reality through fear: accepting th a t G od will provide for clothes and shelter, one ceases to work for the sake of this goal. By adopting this a ttitu d e toil ceases to be toil and becomes the joyous fulfilment of a service. W ork is ritualized when it becomes service, be it to C aesar or to the Law. T h e Islam ic Shariah appears to be secular, but has been sanctified. T h e ideal of the religious m an is, of course, that everything should be done ritually. O n th a t account every act is liable to become a religious act, ju s t as every n atu ral object is liable to become a hierophany. In o ther words, any m om ent may be inserted into the G reater T im e, and thus project m an into eternity (Eliade, 1958, p. 460). 240

THE CITY AS THE TEMPLE

In the Age of C ronus, all work was done by gods, and even rules and laws were living spirits. T he Age of C ronus, as suggested above, is actuality: not the perceived actuality but rath er the one defined as Chora, ‘T h a t in w hich all elements severally grow up and appear and decay is alone to be called this or th a t.’ And ritual is a celebration or assum ption of actuality. It is not the case th a t the religious law is necessarily superior to the secular: by his inner acceptance of the secular law as religious m an em ancipates him self and his obedience, and then ‘H um an existence takes place sim ultaneously upon two parallel planes, th at of the tem poral, of change and illusion, and th at of reality5 (Eliade, 1958, p. 460). It is the perceived which is the illusion. Existence in the perfect city is th at aspect of the physical which has been projected into the higher sphere. M an actualizes his life in so far as he consecrates his activity. T he tem ple, argues Pieper (1952), is a piece of ground which is no longer private property, no longer used for any practical activity, but consecrated to God. Likewise for a holiday or a festival: it is a piece of time not to be used for any profitable activity. It is in this light th at we can u n d erstan d the p aram o u nt im portance th at the Greeks attach to the Festival and Jew s to the S abbath day. T he Festival was m an's gift to the gods (Laws, 653); it was restorative of the Age of Cronus. In joining in the Choreia, the procession or the dance, the n atural order was re-established (Laws, 738) and the correct m ovem ent tem porarily restored. In the opening passage of Book V III of the Laws, Clinias observes it will be not D elphi b u t the M agnesians who decide the num ber of festivals per year. T he A thenian endorses this, for, as we learn in the next sentence, ‘there should be no less than three hundred and sixty-five5 (Laws, 878b). Plato here makes a decision independently from Delphi, to ensure an unbroken chain of festivals, sanctifying every single day. W h at is the intention behind this? C onsecrating work does not in any way dim inish the objective am ount of toil; the Anangke is portioned out equally, so th a t no m atter w hat life, city, body, circum stance or period the soul chooses, the am ount of overcoming will be fixed, even though it varies in form. In accepting toil as a necessity and consecrating it, one is freed from anxiety, and the pain becomes tolerable. H e is liberated from interior, psychological pain, once he stops working from fear of hunger and cold. Look at the birds of the air: they neither sow nor reap nor gather in barns, and yet your heavenly F ather feeds them. . . . Therefore do not be anxious, saying, ‘W h at shall we eat?5or ‘W hat shall we d rin k 5or ‘W h at shall we w ear?5 For the G entiles seek all these things; and your heavenly F ath er knows th at you need them all. But seek first his 241

MYTHOS

kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well. Therefore do not be anxious about tom orrow , for tom orrow will be anxious for itself. Let the day ’s own trouble be sufficient for the day (M atthew , V I, 26-34). In M agnesia, every day is a holy-day; every activity is undertaken not to procure livelihood but as a cerem onial act. ‘How w ondrous this, how m ysterious, I carry fuel, I draw w ater’ (Suzuki, 1959, p. 16). In this study we have looked at the m yth of the Fall, cross-referring from the G reek tradition to the C hristian, the M iddle and F ar East. We m ight also have looked at the legends of Africa and the Pacific, for this experience is one th at is shared by all living beings. All cultures are founded on the sam e rhythm ic pattern. By perm itting oneself to be subjugated to the basic forces in the universe, by following the rhythm of n atu re and the cosmos, one enters a higher region. T his m erging into the fu ndam ental reality m ay be conceptualized as the consecration of one’s activity to the gods or to God. All the great traditions point to a non-self oriented, or indirect, gratification of desire. A frightened m an works for his food, a m an im m ersed in the noetic rhythm procreates, works and plays for the greater self. But the laws of the cosmos are such th at in doing this, he is inevitably rew arded, the curse is lifted. In words of the T ao T e C hing (V II): ‘T h e sage stays behind, thus he is ahead. H e is detached, thus a t one w ith all. T hrough selfless action, he attains fulfillm ent.’

242

Jl

IT

i Fourteen

p

I % I RECONCILIATION l\ I I II l5 T l= |l= |l= |l= li= 1 1 = l'l= ll= ll= |i= lI= ii= i!ij N oetic philosophy is oriented tow ards a general reconciliation of all conflicts. T his reconciliation is epistemological, ontological and ethical. It can be seen as triu n al or as dual. Considered as the former, it is effected by a Diaresis or separation of things according to their ontological status and psychological affinity. T hings are assigned to the realm s of being, becom ing or actuality. Living things are characterized according to the basic psychological characteristics of Thumos, Epithumia and Logisticon. T hese characteristics pervade all creation in num erous and complex relations; their reconciliation is a result of assigning each thing, and each o f the various constituents of a thing, to its corresponding realm or dim ension in the one cosmos. T his diaretic reconciliation is the one which closely approxim ates the behaviour of m en and societies in times of transition. Falsely conglom er­ ated societies and concepts are dissolved, and each thing becomes w hat it is. E qually im p o rtan t is dual reconciliation by reduction to a com prehen­ sive sentim ent, or a ratio. W hen the two are reduced to one, previously existing entities ap p ear to have been abolished or negated. Reconciliation by synthesis m ay therefore seem opposed to reconciliation by Diaresis in w hich entities are reaffirmed, not absorbed. T he two types of reconcilia­ tion correspond to the two ways of looking at falsity: as Parekbasis (aberration) or as Anatrope (inversion). All things are brought into existence by these two processes, Diaresis and Sinkresis. A nd from another p oint of view, even this duality disappears. T he two processes are one, ju st as the evening star is the m orning star. E ach thing is triunal - it splits into three principles. T his sam e rule

243

MYTHOS

holds for Diaresis, Sinkresis and the two negative principles, Parekbasis and Anatrope. T h u s, on the positive side the dialectical process involves six m ovem ents, and the sam e is true for the negative. T he six positive m ovem ents are com prehended in the seventh, all-com prehensive move­ m ent of the Good, which Plato, the Z oroastrians, H eraclitus and the noetic tradition in general call the organizational principle of the universe, or Logos, the W ord or h um an aspect of God. (The eighth m ovem ent, Auto Kath-Auto, is the invisible O ne, which itself is triunal. T he totality of m ovem ents is therefore ten: seven belonging to the W ord on earth, and three to God in heaven.) All lines of distinction m ust m eet somewhere, though one may purposely refrain from m aking them do so. Confucius and Lao Tzu, H eraclitus and Parm enides relied on the second type of exposition, creating dualistic distinctions apparently w ithout synthesis. But epistem ological schism was not created by noetic thinkers, although they accepted it, Z oroaster speaking of two world souls, Plato of the Gods of left and right, Lao T zu of yin and yang. M an imagines th at he is living in a dual world; noetic thought is not responsible for this condition. T h e noetic philosophy is not simply a theory or a system aim ing at conceptual coherence; it is a set of potentially contradictory theories aim ed at contextual coherence, th at is, coherence with respect to a p articu lar intention, necessarily related to practical considerations. W ere there such a thing as a m aster synthesis of noetic thought, it would, if verbalized, m ost certainly deny the co-reality of the evil and the good. Yet it w ould be w rong to look for this idea in any p articular scriptural passage. In so far as the form ula exists, it does so through the sentim ent. T his kind of thought is concerned with ‘aspectual’ knowledge. W here and w hen it appears necessary to use a dualistic argum ent it does so. In attem p tin g to reduce this duality to singularity to achieve philosophical coherence, one makes such a philosophy less coherent in a deeper sense. F inal tru th really is of such a nature th at it can more truly be represented by sets of dichotom ies. Perceived reality is dual when objectivized in speech: the task of the philosopher and the statesm an is to reconcile its contradictory aspects. T h e world is good as it is; however, men do not see it as it is. T he philosopher can only provide them with counter-im ages in order to do aw ay w ith images. It is always two aspects of good which are erroneously perceived as good and bad by w arring factions, as J.B .M o rrall (1977, p. 22) observes w ith reference to Aeschylus: the real tragedy in cosmos, Polis and personality is the conflict between differing aspects of good, whose discrepancy can only be resolved by 244

RECONCILIATION

their voluntary and com plem entary m erging in a more adequately com prehensive synthesis. T his com prehensive synthesis is not som ething artificial or invented; yet it w ould be dangerous and irresponsible to force people to a pretended ideal of unity before it is perceived as reality. Conflicts between public and private goods, the conflict between A ntigone and the city cult, all these are potentially resolvable; yet before the catharsis their duality is ‘real’ and has to be accounted for. T h e achievem ent of reconciliation has a historical dim ension in the perp etu al m eeting of the old and new world deities. Plato provided the rational and philosophical background for a m ovem ent from anthropo­ m orphic gods, in terpreted as real existents, to the notion of such entities as representing psychological forces, contained by the pervasive unifying cosmic sentim ent. T his ‘new ’ notion, th at of the underlying p attern, seems to have been sprouting independently throughout the (M iddle) E ast at the tim e it was form ulated into intellectual principles by the Greeks. T he idea th a t the E ast is m ore conducive to discernm ent of deity, whereas H ellas is better at u n derstanding deity and applying it to the creation of laws, cities and philosophy, is voiced in the Laws (747d) and Epinomis (9^ 7d)‘Greeks enjoy a geographical situation which is exceptionally favourable to the a ttain m en t of excellence. . . . [It is, however, not so excellent a location for the discernm ent of spiritual forces, hence] it is o ur deficiency in respect of sum m er, by com parison with the peoples of o ther [E astern] regions, which, as we said, has m ade us later than they in discerning these gods [the new, true gods]. W hile the Greeks were a local event, they may also stand for W estern civilization. T h e sceptical European of today may well ask him self w hether there is a lesson for him in the A thenian’s attribution of ‘all his achievem ents . . . to the discovery of new, non-G reek gods’; and in the passage: ‘T h ere is every ground for the splendid hope that, though the news of these gods and their w orship has come to us from non-Greeks, the Greeks will learn to w orship them all in a truly nobler and more righteous fashion’ (Epinomis, 987d). I f the Jew s gave birth to m onotheism through the synthesizing instrum entality of the tem ple, as P atai (1947, pp. 54-105) suggests, Plato synthesized O lym pic and Chthonic deities by m eans of philosophy, and reduced the dichotom ous deities to singularity by m eans of a com prehen­ sive sentim ent. (‘P lato ’ understood in the broadest sense stands for the noetic thinker, of course, and his exercise of reconciliation can be nothing o ther th an an ongoing event.) Greek religion was centred on this dualism 245

MYTHOS

betw een the Chthonic and O lym pian gods: ‘T he contrast between C h th o n ian and O lym pian, then, is the contrast between earthly and heavenly’ (G uthrie, 1950, p. 207). T he pu rp o rt of noetic philosophy is, in contem porary term s, the rem oval of utopian idealism and vulgar positivism ; for the ancients it was this search for the m eeting point of the two rivers, upw ard and dow nw ard, heavenly and earthly, inner and outer. By accepting the gods both of the right and of the left, both heavenly and earthly, ‘P lato ’ is accepting Anangke (K arm a) as a p art of destiny. In this w ay he accounts for evil as necessity, and elim inates all real need for dual deities, good and bad. Less sophisticated thinkers, symbolized by the historic A ristotle, always see the indefinite p a rt of the dyad as m aterial and earthly, and as the source of evil: they do not undergo the non-m ental, supraconceptual process of synthesizing the two elem ents of the dyad, the vertical and horizontal. Plato, although a proud Greek, was not asham ed to learn from foreign cultures. T he first line of the Republic (327s) reads: ‘Down I w ent to . . . the festival of Bendis the new foreign goddess, being presented by foreigners, an d observing th at, while the G reek procession was fine, the foreign contingent was equally as good’ (my em phasis). T he yang, the m asculine elem ent, accounts for the economic and m ilitary m ight of A thens, b u t this is not enough. In the Laws, (e.g. 793d) Plato hints at the Chthonic deities by m eans of allusions to the left hand: ‘there will be men responsible th at all our boys and girls m ay grow up am bicrural and am bidextrous’. In the Phaedrus, 266a, the speech is supposed to cover the left-hand side o f the body as well as the right. In the sam e dialogue we learn that, although by itself the ‘left’ type of love becomes perverse, we are not to destroy it, but to control it. T h e black horse of the soul-chariot is not to be discarded, but properly integrated to fit with the white. ‘I say the m ark of godliness will be truly hit if the gods of the lower world are held in honour next to [i.e. together with] the O lym pians . . . the left hand being consecrated to them ’ (Phaedrus, 717b) . H aving accepted suffering as Anangke, necessity, one is able to claim th a t everything sent by gods is good. We can deny the gods’ duality: the two sets of twelve Chthonic and twelve O lym pian deities are reduced to six du al tendencies, which are the basic psychological forces, or six m ovem ents o f the soul th at I have referred to as sentim ents. T he six of the left are reconciled in the m ovem ent of the female or of the earth (which constitutes a seventh) and the m ovem ents of heaven are synthesized in the m asculine. R ath er th an m aintain two sets of deities (good and bad, heavenly and earthly), one posits a single set, each containing a counter-m ovem ent. T h u s both the soul and the gods ultim ately reflect the sam e entity, the O ne, or the Logos. ‘T hy will be done on earth as it is in 246

RECONCILIATION

h eaven.’ P lato ’s victory was to rejuvenate the two sets of deities and to ‘sn atch ’ the seven of the left up and away from the various cults th a t were flourishing in fifth-century A thens, while at the same time taking the wind out of the clever arm y of sophists th at were proliferating and controlling the cultural life o f Hellas. T h e fifth century was not a century like any other - it was the century w hen the greatest U p anishads and the Bhagavad G ita were w ritten, and w hen T aoism , C onfucianism , Z oroastrianism and B uddhism becam e form al religions. It was a century of change, in A thens, in H astin ap u ra and in the Y angtse valley. T he yang, the all-too clever intellectual elem ent guided by the reigning com m ercial forces, had alm ost done away with the sentim ents of the hum ane tradition. It had rationalized the organizing principle of society and reduced the m eaning of life to m entally deducible form ulae. T he response to this universal tendency tow ards conceptualiza­ tion was a wave of occultism , the flood of the dow nw ard river, the revolt of the female. A nd it is in such times th at noetic thought arises to reconcile the m ind to the body, h eart to reason. W hen righteousness is weak and faints and unrighteousness exults in pride, then my Spirit arises on earth. For the salvation of those who are good, for the destruction of evil in men, for the fulfilment of the kingdom of righteousness, I come to this world in the ages th at pass (Bhagavad G ita, IV , 7-8). For those historically m inded, the Bhagavad G ita, P lato’s dialogues and C onfucius’ analects m ay be a local historical event. For others, they sym bolize a never-ending process, as relevant today as yesterday.

247

In this study I have argued th at the S aanthana tradition uses rhythm to affect readers and listeners so th a t they will act and think, and even build their political and social world, in accord with a certain p attern . T his p a tte rn is one w hich any properly functioning entity should necessarily reflect, and this reflection takes place in the form ative m edium Plato called Chora, the third ontological realm which I have called actuality. O pposed to this stands the perceived world of becoming, characterized by Pleonexia, the w ar of all against all. T his second, perceived world is only a ph an tasm , yet its illusions are continually being re-created by the conjectural m ind. W hen correctly apprehended, the three parts of the soul and the entity m an-polis-cosm os are held together by a unifying rhythm and ratio, Aritmos. O nly in d eparting from this rhythm do things become subject to the contrary pull o f desire in which Pleonexia takes place. This m isapprehension involves conflict in the soul, but one cannot end the conflict sim ply by desiring peace or well-being. O nce subject to the inversion, m an no longer perceives him self as w hat he is. Thereafter, w henever he w ants to m aximize his own well-being, it is the well-being of som ething w hich he is not th at he pursues, and in this way he aggravates both his own condition and th at of the true units and individuals around him . F or this reason, when noetic thinkers describe social utopias or ideal constitutions, they do not m ean them for literal im plem entation. U topias are m odels of an idealized goal, which requires hum an well-being to be ju d g e d according to false criteria, the criteria which apply to the perceived ra th e r th an to the true dim ensions of m an. Goals such as individual peace

248

CONCLUSION

of m ind, w ealth and health, are all im perfect for noetic entities, since the identity they presuppose is inadequate. In short, then, m an cannot by any autonom ous activity remove the cause of Anatrope, the epistemological inversion. In fact, it is precisely the hubris, the proud assum ption of perceptual self-sufficiency, th at brings the false self into birth. T his argum ent has been presented in four stages. First, in P art O ne I tried to show th a t the process of apprehension functions correctly only w hen based on notional principles th at are organized by the sentim ents. T his type of apprehension is labelled Noesis in Greek thought and it derives from the ethical light of the Good itself. Noesis is opposed to Dianoia, autonom ous thought based in the world of becoming, which is m erely a conjectural interpretation superim posed on true apprehension and valid only when used in conjunction with noetically derived principles. In P art Tw o, the city model was exam ined to see how the ruling philosophic elem ent of the soul m ight free itself of the desire to be w hat it is not. H ow could the Logisticon, the higher m ind, be separated from the body - w hich in this context is not the corporeal, extended aspect of m an b u t a conglom eration of desires around a false notion of self? In P art T hree, an analysis of mythological images, I looked at the origin of Anatrope, the Fall. T his was identified w ith the desire to think and act independently of the m ovem ent of the universe. I looked too at the bodily aspect of noetic thought, or learning through the body. T he physical, extended city is the city th at is concerned with the outw ard dim ension of the self, in household and social interaction. It plays an im p o rtan t p a rt in reconciling the various aspects of the self with the regulative principles of the soul. T hroughout all the traditions m entioned, an interest in social and personal exem plars is sparked by the need for a deeper harm ony, based on the noetic apprehension of a universal pattern. T h a t p a tte rn is im plicit in every tradition, but never explicitly described by philosophers. It m ay be objectively experienced, however, and we may infer th a t it reflects th a t one being beyond all being, the m aker and creator of the universe, of whom we find we cannot speak ( Timaeus, 28°). An aspect of this being is the Good itself, which cannot be known directly yet w hich is m ade known to us by its light. This light both constitutes the true unities and renders them visible. It is this light which may be called the organizing principle of the universe, it has been given the nam e of sentiment.

249

Page Intentionally Left Blank

I

I I 1

EPILOGUE

is 1

i ii

1 E H = l!= j!= i!= i!= i!= i£ = i!3

Page Intentionally Left Blank

gJ3>3i3>a>=j>=j>=i>3l3l=i>=iJ=jj£l

m I / Ifl tj] THE BAREFOOT % P HI L OS OP HE R

H ) 111 Li

m s (f|j | I

II

I

3m bsif a BIETETETI=T1=11=1lm b

T h e study contained in the foregoing book completes a particular m ovem ent, even if it lacks a satisfactory justification for some of its assum ptions or an adequate conclusion. In adding this Epilogue I am im itating the structure of the U panishads and th at of Greek philosophical discourses th at seem to end in an anticlim ax. T he U panishads themselves are a series of postscripts to the Vedas. An epilogue m ay attem pt to sum m arize; yet often it elaborates an aspect which need not ap p ear particularly im portant to a given reader and w ith w hich he need not agree. It m ust be taken as a personal flourish by the au th o r - ra th e r like the Greek villagers who, when leaving the cafe, do not find it ad equate to say ‘G oodbye’ two or three times, ‘Good d ay ’ and ‘Be seeing you’, b u t ju st before leaving suddenly repeat a sentence th a t was used by someone in the course of the conversation, and having said this, step out and are gone. T o the following, in which my personal prejudices may be even more a p p a re n t th an elsewhere, I shall add a further appendix yet - one which deals w ith the notion Logos - and which itself will term inate with a single q uotation, which in some ways throws the whole discussion open again.

PR O G R ESS T h a t the new is better than the old is an im portant notion for the consum er-oriented society. Like all ideas, this one has its justification and is based on a fundam ental truth; however, the sophist w ithin us turns this tru th upside down.

253

EPILOGUE

C onceptual thinking employs old images or Eikones. ‘Progress’ is the replacem ent of one social or philosophical theory, one Eikon by a new one. T h e flow o f Eikones, however, is not really conducive to the birth of a new kind of thinking: in order to m aintain the illusion, the process of replacem ent has to become an accelerating one, and the sam e applies to all appetitive activity. T h e m arket calls for new products, new ways of opening a can, new forms of m arriage, new forms of burial: it w ants a new philosophy and a new language every year. This study has tried to show th a t the search for the new definition, the new language, the new Eikon is an attem p t to resist real birth, to prevent m ovem ent rath er than to prom ote it. T o create involves pain, perm anent inner restructuring. T he person unw illing to create, unwilling to suffer pain, will hide the fact by m aintaining an outw ard sem blance of activity. T he uncreative artist will ad o p t eccentric dress, and become ever more ‘outrageous’. F urtherm ore, he will dem and ever m ore perfect tools. It has been rem arked th at contem porary philosophy consists of the sharpening of pens in p re p a ra ­ tion for the w riting of philosophy. In the same way, the contem porary artist or m usician dem ands ever better m aterials and instrum ents. H e is given an electronic organ which supplies beat and harm ony; he can play a tune by m echanically pressing a single precoded key. Yet the In d ian sitar player, using an instrum ent centuries old, is more of an artist, and produces m ore m eaningful music. T he technological ‘a rtist’ is standing still, by run n in g faster and faster. For the noetic worker, the only progress there is m ust be achieved in sweat, concentration and the sentim ent of love. T he idea th at the new is b etter th an the old m ay be correct, but only if ‘new ’ is given a different m eaning from ‘chronologically later’. T he truly new is th at which is born or reborn (like the phoenix). T he ideas of contem porary pop singers, psychologists, football players and other heroes of the desiring city are ‘new ’ only in a chronological sense. O n the other hand, N ew ton’s chronologically older grasp of differential calculus was and is in a deeper sense new er th an anything the average student of physics or m athem atics m ay have learn t through graduating from a university. It m ight take a tw o-m onth refresher course for Isaac N ew ton to be able to teach physics at a contem porary university; and it would not take m uch longer to equip Pythagoras to teach tod ay ’s m athem atics. T h e d om inant, m arket-based institutions of the contem porary era find ju stification for their continuing existence in a view of history as progressive. T he ‘ignorance’ of ages gone by is being replaced by the ‘know ledge’ of today. Increasing consum ption becomes the m eaning of history. T o present these views for them , the institutions co-opt 254

THE BAREFOOT PHILOSOPHER

likem inded academ ics: grants are given, theses are w ritten, all to show how our ‘good life5 is the best and the cleverest. T his process has been going on since the R enaissance, but it has accelerated in the last two centuries, culm inating in a series of absurd theories, and a distortion of curricula and education, which makes all of us its victims, and from which it is h ard for any single individual to become em ancipated. In order to show the culture, science and medicine of com peting cultures and traditions to be inferior, the sophist in m an has often resorted (through greed rath er than design) to factual and interpretational inaccuracies. T im e-honoured and proven systems of logic, medicine and n u tritio n from other cultures were denigrated; false evidence was m anufactured, and the practitioners of these foreign arts were called witch doctors, superstitious prim itives and other nasty nam es. T he same form ula was applied to our own tradition, except th at kinder words were used. Greek science was seen not as sorcery but simply as prim itive and wrong. G eocentric theories were ridiculed for being based on imperfect m easuring instrum ents or superstitious reverence for the past. W e were tau g h t th at the heliocentric theory was a discovery of C opernicus’, when in fact it existed long before. Even so, as the yin-yang symbol suggests, every dogm a contains w ithin itself the seed o f its own destruction. T he ‘conceptual m arket city5 th at ruled E urope for the last four centuries has finally produced a nonconceptual science. M eaningless production has produced an a p ath e­ tic generation th at will no longer work, and this apathy spreads into art and philosophy. T he fact th at Lao T zu is ‘new er’ than Pepsi Cola is hard for a m ind grown inactive through the consum ption of prepacked effort-saving gadgets, opinions and philosophies to grasp. Yet the potentially noetic m ind will always find the strength to make the necessary leap. All birth, all creation, all th at is good, all th at is real takes place out of time. T he ‘good age’, the truth, is neither in the past, nor in the future, nor is it now - the good age is now, yesterday and tom orrow — it is out of time. T his view is neither m ystical nor subjective, neither new nor old - the only difficulty in adopting it lies in visualizing a world where time is not. B ut such a view is also th a t of contem porary science. D uring this century, the debate ab o u t w hether atom s should be seen in term s of concrete particles or as waves was resolved by the decision th at both were true - or rath er, our ju d g m en t as to which applies in a given case depends on the context, it is ‘aspectual’. Some two m illennia ago, Sextus Em piricus in Against the Mathematicians wrote a conclusion to the discussions then taking place in P lato ’s A cadem y, and H ellas in general: For those who m ake atom s or hom oeom eriae or massive points (Oykoi) 255

EPILOGUE

or rationally conceived Bodies be the Principles of things, were right in one respect b u t w rong in another. T hey were right in m aking their principles u n ap p aren t, b u t w rong in m aking them corporeal. . . . W e m ust therefore hold th at rationally conceived Bodies have incorporeal constituents, as E picurus also recognized, saying th at Body was d ream t up through the crow ding together of Shape, Size, Resistance and W eight. It is clear from w hat has been said th at the Principles of rationally conceived bodies m ust be incorporeal. . . .F o r consider how the Ideas, which Plato deems incorporeal, preside over Bodies, and how all th a t comes into being follows their p attern (in Findlay, 1974, p p . 426-7). W h at Plato and the m odern scientists are saying is th a t the concrete (bodies com posed by the crowding of ‘resistance and w eight5 w ithin ‘shape and size5) m ust in some sense be non-concrete. T he non-concrete aspect of anything is its noetic pattern. T his p attern is not, of course, in any separate world of ideas, for in order for anything to be anything it m ust have a body in this world. For Plato, mass or body was nothing b u t a condensation o f space- Chora. T he T aoists taught the same: W hen the C hi [space-void] condenses, its visibility becomes ap p aren t so th a t there are then the shapes [of objects]. W hen it disperses, its visibility is no longer ap p aren t and there are no shapes. . . . T he great void [space] cannot b u t condense to form all things, and these things cannot b u t become dispersed so as to form the great void (Fung Yu Ian, 1958, pp. 279, 280). It was E instein's conclusion th at m atter is constituted by regions of space in w hich the gravitational field is extrem ely intense. M eanw hile, C ap ra ( ! 975>P- 21 3) contends: T h e discovery th a t mass is nothing but a form of energy has forced us to modify our concept of a particle in an essential way. In m odern physics m ass is no longer associated with m aterial substance, and hence particles are not seen as consisting of any basic stuff b u t as bundles of energy . . . subatom ic particles are dynam ic patterns which have a space aspect and a time aspect. T h e noetic grasp of any individual involves economic, erotic, corporeal and physical dim ensions, and it is w ithin all these disciplines th at the noetic individual will be studied by the new science which is beginning to take shape.

T H E T R U E IN D IV ID U A L T h e fact th a t the true individual cannot be conceptualized does not m ake it any less real. As has been pointed out, it is only in the recent epoch th at 256

THE BAREFOOT PHILOSOPHER

thinking has been reduced to m iddle-soul or ‘m ental’ thinking, and as a result the cognitive faculties of the body and soul have not atrophied so far th a t they cannot be reactivated. Like m oving one’s ears, it seems im possible at first, yet the right muscles are there, the nerve currents and the m otor m echanism are all available. Likewise, the new kind of thought is w ithin everyone’s reach. T he view o f reality w hich has developed since the R enaissance is based on the stru ctu re of language: according to this view, how we view reality and how we think is determ ined by the rules of gram m ar. Yet this view of reality is incorrect on an ethical basis - ‘in one’s h e a rt’ one knows this. It also contradicts scientific and even economic reality. Logic which cannot m eaningfully coordinate its symbols with the entities and environm ent from w hich these symbols are derived is not true logic. T he only reason logical positivists and industrial scientists rem ain in power in universities a nd industry is th a t they are held there by the forces of the old m arket. M eanw hile, the new m arket theorists are beginning to break away from these static views. In this study I have m ade the words ‘m arket’ and ‘m erch an t’ into sym bols, and have used them in their negative sense. T he m iddle soul, however, is a necessary and legitim ate aspect of an integrated city/ individual. T h e correctly functioning m arket is a system of exchange th at facilitates com m unication between excesses of production and deficiencies in consum ption w ithin an integrated system. It has been described quite well recently by Philip K otler, in his work on the m anagem ent of m arketing. J u s t as the noetic individual is not defined by the limits of his perceived body, so the noetic firm, factory or producing unit is not lim ited by a conceptually defined product, or by the single interest of a conceptually defined group of m anagers-ow ners. G illette is not to be seen as a razorblade factory owned by this and this trust and located in this and th a t locality: rath er, G illette is a solution of the need for the rem oval of beards. An industrial unit, like a city of an individual, should be defined in term s of needs. T h e success of a productive unit defined in this way can no longer be seen in term s of growth, power, dom inance in the m arket, m onopoly, etc. Success is m easured in term s of the definition: a successful firm, like a successful individual, is one which fulfils the need in response to w hich it was condensed in the first place. K otler does not elim inate profit; yet profit in the new kind of m arket is not m easured on a balance-sheet. T he m an who produces a m eaningful p ro d u ct is rew arded by the nature of the productive activity itself. By cosmic law, all m eaningful productivity - i.e. th at which fulfils genuine needs of m an - is pleasant and rew arding, and the satisfaction of false 257

EPILOGUE

needs is the opposite. ‘Profit’, in the new systems view of business, therefore includes the w orker’s psychological well-being, the attractiv e­ ness of the work environm ent and the rew ards of the process of production itself. N aturally, the m arketing m echanism itself m ust be efficient enough to generate sufficient returns to the producer to ensure continued investm ent. T he new systems view would require restructuring on all levels of business from economic theory to accounting. W hile K o tler’s theories are attractive in some ways, he seems not to have fundam entally revised his view of the individual. His theory of business therefore rem ains self-contradictory, for it attem pts to graft a system s firm on to an atom istic individual. As Plato observed, from age to age m en come up w ith clever ideas th at m ight have worked ‘if only’ this or that. (Plato was also criticizing himself.) Q uite simply, the systems view of the universe will always fail if it does not include a restructuring of the individual: realistic philosophy m ust take into account the fact th a t the process of disintegration of the egoistic self is painful. A lthough he who succeeds in overcom ing this egoism is inevitably rew arded, as pointed out earlier, m en cannot be persuaded or forced to give up egoistic notions. T h e reason for this is simple: the rew ard is not given directly to the original individual. All dem ands for m en to behave in m oral ways reduce to asking individual A to behave in such and such a way, so th a t he will be rew arded as individual B. But at the time of the dem and, individual A is A, and as such he w ants to participate in systems th at will rew ard individual A. A nd it is not m entally believable th at all such systems will bring suffering both to the system and to individual A. So we can u n d erstan d why all clever ideas and all social reforms based either on persuasion or on physical force will inevitably fail. Force affects the body-soul and persuasion the m ental-soul; yet an individual is an integrated unit, including three soul faculties - th at of the m ind, heart and body. T h e leap from individual A, the desire-constructed individual, to individual B can only be taken noetically: the leap is a leap into the unknow n. M an reduced to his m ental faculties may understand this - yet m ental u n derstanding is not enough, for behaviour is not determ ined by this alone. For the leap to be effective, a m an m ust surrender to the noetic sentim ent. Filled w ith the rhythm of cosmic truth, the noetic faculty swells w ith a wave of energy, and individual A dies to be born anew. T his, of course, is w hat Socrates m eant by saying th at philosophy is like dying. In o rder for noetic thought to operate, one m ust continually be born anew. O ne gives up a concept one has held on to: there is a pang of m ental pain yet im m ediately the new knowledge ebbs in and the pain is forgotten, ju st as a m other in the joy of birth forgets the pain of labour. 258

THE BAREFOOT PHILOSOPHER

As argued earlier, pain is the ‘curse’ of the fall. W om an is condem ned by her sin to give birth in pain, as m an is condem ned to toil by the sweat of his brow: yet in em bracing the curse, in picking up the Cross and su bm itting to it, the ancient sin is washed away, the pain lifts and toil becomes a joy. W ith all this said, one needs to be perpetually aw are th at no concept, no idea, no philosophy can give the im petus to ‘Islam ’, to the surrender of false self. Philosophers can argue till the cows come home, and they will convince neither others nor themselves by the content of their doctrine; only to the extent th a t sentim ent is present in an argum ent will they convince anyone and be filled with energy to continue the uphill struggle against the false self. For in all men there is the decaying, egoistic pull of desire subverting noetic m ovem ent. T he last words of the dying G autam a B uddha were: ‘D ecay is inherent in all com pounded things [including thoughts and ideas]. . . . Strive on with diligence.’

LA N G U A G E W hen the w eather turns foul, says Confucius, when sum m er behaves like w inter, w hen m en im itate women and women im itate men, w hen yin is no longer yin and yang is no. longer yang — then is the time for the rectification of nam es. T his rectification is necessary for us to understand the world and to rule it properly. It does not im ply the creation of ‘new speak’, or even of new words: it m eans sim ply th at the old words are to be differently understood. Like moving its ears, the new epoch will have to think by exerting a different p a rt of the brain, using nerve channels and m otor m echanism s which are presently full of debris. It will have to revise its relationship to language. By following the experience of others who have taken the first step, all can learn to walk, even though society at large has been bedridden for the last few decades, if not centuries. It is the sciences th at have taken the step into a non-conceptual reality. Before transcending the lingual reality of time and space, both Bohr and H eisenberg had to endure the painful m om ent of ‘dying’ to the language. T h u s H eisenberg (1963, p. 43) writes: I rem em ber discussions with Bohr which w ent through m any hours till very late at night and ended alm ost in despair; and when at the end of the discussion I w ent alone for a walk in the neighbouring park I repeated to m yself again and again the question: C an nature possibly be as absurd as it seemed to us in these atom ic experiments? T h e answ er was, of course, th at it is not nature th at is absurd but rath er conceptual language. 259

EPILOGUE

H eisenberg’s statem ent is also interesting from a psychological point of view. A rjuna, when faced with the yoga of resignation, the yoga which requires him to accept th at a living individual cannot be slain, is likewise overcom e w ith despair. T his experience of despair in the face of paradox is w h at leads to the creation of knowledge. T his observation is im portant. I am not pointing to B ohr’s or H eisenberg’s view of m atter as the finally correct one, neither am I pointing to A rju n a’s view of reincarnation as the correct way of conceptualizing im m ortality. Both views will change: no theory is finally true or binding. It is the process of creation of knowledge th at is universal and unchanging. K now ledge stems from the resolution of conceptually painful paradoxes. It involves paradox and the clash between yin and yang. Its resolution is not perm anent: it is achieved by periodic a b an d o n m en t to non-m ental forces and organizing principles. T his triad - consisting of the O ne, the em anation from the O ne and the resolution - relates to the form ation not only of thought but of all things, including the cosmos itself. T here is no relativity in these underlying rules: they are universally and eternally valid.

T H E T W O SELVES I have tended to express the cosmic dram a in term s of the choice between two selves or the citizenship of two cities. M y m edium has been ink, paper and w ords, yet the rules or forces th at I am dealing with can be com prehended in any activity, given sufficient concentration. A m an like Tchaikovsky m ight not display an interest in anything w ritten here, b u t in m om ents o f intense concentration the nerve currents of his brain nevertheless externalize into two sets of harm onies. T he world is seen as a variation of a violin tune presented in 4:4 rhythm and in A m inor; the sam e w orld is seen again, in A m ajor. T hus for the hero of Swan Lake, life becom es a choice betw een two kinds of princess: one - O dile, the w hite sw an - is the true one; the black one - O dette - is the false. T he tragedy or comedy, however, is th at both are in fact the same wom an. T here is an O d ette an d an O dile in each wom an, and as Eryxym achus suggests, there are two kinds of love involved in any hunger. T he false self is subject to love as desire — hence the inevitable fall. Good though he m ay be, nevertheless in m om ents of choice Siegfried - the personality in time inevitably chooses the wrong, the black swan: this is the Fall of m an, and it is inevitable. Tchaikovsky m ight not agree with this interpretation, for he is an artist, and as Plato says, artists do not ‘u n d erstan d ’ w hat they create, even 260

THE BAREFOOT PHILOSOPHER

though, if they are sufficiently concentrated, it may be the truth. Likewise, a sensuous ballerina m ay not care for philosophy, yet she understands through her body w hether she is dancing O dette or O dile, and w hat each o f them m eans. (T he role is traditionally danced by the same ballerina w earing a different costume.) In order to choose the true I or the true princess, one m ust die to the false I, to false desire. Siegfried, who m ust die, dies freely, for love, so that he is rejoined w ith his princess in the ‘other w orld5. This ‘other w orld5 is, of course, the world out of time and space, the world of instants; and the dying is not literal. At any m om ent in time, m an is choosing between O d ette and O dile, and it is only by dying to desire th at he can choose correctly. H e is both divine and fallen - but in actuality, in truth, he is divine. T h e ‘other w orld5 is this world, and this world is the true world. T h e rules apply not only to hum ans, anim als and the form ation of thought b u t also to the form ation of the cosmos. Every star, in a sense, faces two kinds of destiny: like a m an, it m ust inevitably die, but it can die egoistically or altruistically. T he altruistic ‘system s5 death of a star involves it overcom ing the gravitational pull which holds it together, so th a t it is fractured and explodes into a supernova. As such, it gives light and w arm th, and is eventually reconstituted as other stars. It has become im m ortal. W ith some stars, the case is entirely different. T he egoistic, sythesizing gravitational pull is so intense th at the star will eventually collapse into itself. T his fall in the case of a massive star is so intense that, once initiated, it leads to som ething which one m ight com pare to absolute death in hell. Desire gives rise to new desire which gives rise to yet stronger desire: the increase is a geom etric progression. Similarly, the person who gives in to lust and greed cannot be satiated: the excesses of N ero and C aligula, Sodom and G om orrah, can only be halted in death. T h e sam e is true of stars. E ach star is held in its orbit of the galaxy and in balance by its interactions in the cosmic system: it is where it is, when it is and as big as it is because it is defined thus by all the other bodies in the universe of space and time. In the words of Socrates, justice or world order is that state w here each pays his due to everyone else. For the earth to be where it is, it m ust respond to dem ands - am ong them the pull of the sun and th at of the other planets. T he egoistic star refuses to be cosmically, i.e. socially, defined: its gravitational pull becomes so great th at it ignores and exceeds the dem ands of all other entities. T he result is its own collapse. T he punishm ent for a bad m an, says Socrates, is th at his wishes are fulfilled he becomes w hat he w anted. T hus the egoistic star draw s itself in and furth er in, and it cannot stop - its wish is granted, it has itself and nothing else. T his quasi-m ythological account is based on the phenom enon of the 261

EPILOGUE

black hole. At a certain point in its collapse, the sta r’s gravitational pull becom es so intense th a t not even light can escape: the star becomes invisible and eventually a ‘singularity’, infinitely small and dense. If death exists in the cosmos, then it takes the form of a black hole. Sm all as it is, the black hole is not obliterated - it is eternally punished for its sins. Inside the nucleus, particles are so densely packed th at they are in a perm an en t state of painful collision. Pleonexia here is total: each particle is in a p erm anent state of conflict with every other particle. W hile the cosmos m ay be subject to a cyclical series of rebirths, the well of the black hole is subjectively eternal. W hen nothing can move, time has stopped; a point is infinitely condensed, a m om ent infinitely prolonged. So the p unishm ent for egoism is eternal death; to be dead and to be in hell is to be defined by oneself alone.

R E L A T IV IT Y O L D AND N EW I do not wish to overstress the relationship of m odern science to T aoist or Platonic form ulae. For Plato, the scientist and the artist are very sim ilar, since they base their work on the lower type of m ental activity. Poets and m athem aticians are unpredictable: poets are like schoolchildren in the absence of their teacher, the philosopher. These children ‘rea d ’ the teach er’s notes while turning them upside down. T he objection to scientists is different: scientists are to be criticized only w hen they present am oral formulae: w hen they pretend their science is ethically neutral. Like the Pythagoreans, Plato radically denied the possibility of ethics-free m athem atics or science: in order even to understand an equation, a m em ber of the Pythagorean com m unity had to undergo a period of prayer, fasting and m oral purification. A dissenting m em ber who revealed the existence of irrational num bers, such as the square root of 2, was put to d eath for his treachery. T he reason given was th a t the dissenting m em ber was teaching the masses to assum e th a t if there are irrational num bers, then rationality is relative. For the sam e reason, Plato rejects the heliocentric theory of A ristarchus and the irregular m ovem ents of the stars. He is aware th at objectively i.e. in the publicly observable sense - stars do veer from a circular path; b u t true astronom y is not concerned solely with the publicly observable, it is ethical. T he elaborate epicycles of Ptolemy were constructed as a m eans o f bridging the observed facts of planetary m ovem ent to the idea of circular orbits, w hich was preferred on ethical grounds. For S aanthana thought, the basic evaluative criterion holds: if it is not ethically based, it 262

THE BAREFOOT PHILOSOPHER

is relative. T his applies to qu an tu m theory too. ‘T o calculate the course of the w orld does not m ean to understand it’ (H usserl, 1965, p. 140). It would be incorrect to seek to return to an ethically based world view while relying on the ab stract form ulae of objective scientists, even those of m odern physicists.

T H E SELF AS A P IV O T E astern texts contain objections to reliance upon chariot-based defence, on the grounds th a t it relies on the skills of chariot-m akers and horse-groom s. (T he Laws of M anu generalize this and require the householder to m inim ize reliance on men whose skills and words he cannot u nderstand.) As we have seen, Plato believes th at the security of a city does not have to be based on high-technology m ethods of warfare: by placing our security in the hands of the experts in navigation, sm elting an d the properties of m etals, in the hands of tacticians, strategists and cockswains, we place it further and further from the centre. T he more a city goes along this route, argues Plato, the more am oral become the men whose service it depends on. C h a p te r 12 suggested th at the best security is th at which can be achieved by any m an or wom an who practises gym nastics, ‘clean living’ and ‘clean thinking’. Sim ple w eapons are best for they maxim ize the h u m an elem ent, and the skills needed to operate with them encourage the physical and m ental fitness which leads to and results from m oral excellence. By depending on ab stract form ulae and specialists using expensive technology we alienate ourselves from the world - for expensive technology is always controlled by others. ‘R uling the country is like cooking a small fish’ (Tao Te Ching, L X ). Fluidity is a characteristic of S aanthana thought: thus a principle which applies to cooking a dish (e.g. in the Laws of M anu, a wife should lose herself in p rayer while cooking so as to fill the food with Sattva, the energy of love) applies also to the conduct of warfare, to ruling oneself and to creating thoughts. T o base one’s world view or m orality on the opinions of m en whose currency and tools are microscopes and equations is ju s t as foolish as basing national security on m erchants, with their ability to purchase sophisticated w eaponry and soldiers. M orality ap art, the abstraction of knowledge and defence into the realm o f the professional expert is also self-defeating on grounds which m ay be called M achiavellian. In fact M achiavelli in The Prince makes this very point; a city should never place its security in the hands of specialists, for they are m ercenaries. 263

EPILOGUE

T h e conceptual apologist would im balance this study by arguing th at such issues are no longer relevant, but Lo^oj-based thought m aintains th at they are perm anently relevant. M arx him self (no friend of fixed philosophies) said th a t the basic laws and rules of n ature are fixed and im m utable - w hat can change is only their m anifestation. T he noetic thinker is concerned w ith the basic forces: he is forced to use the im agery of his epoch, b u t he uses it in such a way as to maxim ize the im plied —so th a t a congenial noetic thinker of an epoch to come can relate to his work by rem oving some of the conceptual debris th at inevitably clouds his message.

LOVE D espite sim ilarities betw een contem porary science and the views of the wise m en of old, I earlier called for caution: the missing elem ent in contem porary science is the constitutive principle, the sentim ent of love. Such rem arks m ay for some bring back memories of boring Sunday school teachers, the Salvation A rm y and old ladies rattling charity boxes; nevertheless, the cliches are not thus invalidated. Cliches are usually true - although it takes effort to make them alive and m eaningful. It is w orth looking at the new science again, and seeing where it in fact lags behind the ‘o ld ’ science. D uring a few hun d red years in W estern Europe it had been held th at m a tte r was indestructible. T he revolutionary nature of E instein’s theory was th a t it established th at m atter can create and be created by energy one flows into the other. Energy equals mass times the speed of light squared. T he H indu scriptures also see the created universe as composed of visibility and resistance - light and mass. It is m aintained by the cosmic energy called Kundalini: visibility is referred to as fire, and m ass as weight, solidity or earth, depending on the tradition. Needless to say, Plato’s views are sim ilar. H e expresses them in term s of the notion erroneously tran slated as the four elem ents (also found in the Bhagavad G ita) - earth, air, fire and w ater. T he ‘elem ents’ - in so far as the word has any m eaning for noetic thought - are triunal units, referred to as triangles. As for earth, fire, air and w ater, these are not elements but principles from which the elem ents are composed. T his study has m aintained th at all things are created from two forces being resolved into unity by a third: four principles reduce to two. From the Timaeus, 31, it is clear th at earth and w ater are the two modes of the principle of solidity, while fire and air represent the m edium or m ode of visibility. H ence, ‘God in the beginning of creation m ade the body of the 264

THE BAREFOOT PHILOSOPHER

universe to consist o f fire and earth [i.e. visibility and solidity]. But two things cannot be rightly p u t together w ithout a third - there m ust be some kind o f bond or a unio n ’ ( Timaeus, 3 i b). Fire, air, earth and w ater a rt principles, from which the elements —in the form of the ‘trian g le’ - are created. However, this im personal triunity is not the end of creation, and this is where the noetic thinkers p a rt ways w ith the scientists. Energy is related to mass and light, and the three define each other, yet aspectually the third - the constitutive elem ent of the cosmic energy, the fire of love - is differently defined. In the Bible it is Pneuma, the breath of God. Proclus in his com m entary on Timaeus (155) identifies it as nothing b u t love: not a form ula, but the fiery bond of love th a t holds both the principle behind creation (i.e. behind m ass and light) and the creation itself together. T his love is the father o f all, and the self of all creation: ‘For the paternal self-begotten m ind, understan d in g his works, sowed in all the fiery bonds of love, th at all things m ight continue loving for infinite tim e’ (Proclus, 1820).

T H E S E L F -R E G E N E R A T IN G C O SM O S To Peras and Aperion, B rahm a and Siva are unceasingly at work, represented by light and mass: all things are perpetually reborn through these two. W h at the left, Siva, the dissolving principle, takes away or pulls ap art, the right instantly and sim ultaneously re-creates. Yet creation and dissolution are jo in ed and resolved into an unchanging unity by the sustaining force o f love, through God the preserver, V ishnu. T h e noetic grasp of im m ortality is related to Proclus’ observation th at in the central m ind, the Nous, all processes are symm etrical: for each m ovem ent there is a counter-m ovem ent, and therefore all events seen by the m ind of G od are stationary. In the same way, we can understand w hat Plato m eant when he em braced both the Parm enidean dictum th at there is no m ovem ent at all (in the cosmos) and the H eraclitian dictum th at all is m ovem ent. In the Nous one grows young and old at the sam e time; therefore one grows neither young nor old. M ythologically, Plato (in the Statesman) represents the universe as having two m ovem ents - backw ards and forwards. We perceive the first of these w hen we see children grow into old men. T here is, however, a second m ovem ent in w hich everything is reversed, where old m en grow young and retreat into the womb, and where the m ighty oaks reduce to acorns. W hen these two m ovem ents are brought together in a reconciled th ird m ovem ent, then there is no m ovem ent at all. E instein w rites th a t the theory of relativity was born when he was 265

EPILOGUE

sixteen and fantasizing on w hat it would be like to follow light waves at their own speed as they fled away from the earth. H e realized th at for such an observer everything, including the light itself, would app ear stationary. T im e slows dow n as the speed of light is approached. T h e perceiving m an ‘read s’ his life by isolating the events he rem em bers and conceptually stringing them into a sequence, which he experiences as resistance and interprets as time. But de Broglie (in C apra, 1975, p. 195), the co-form ulator of q u an tu m theory, writes that: In space-tim e, everything which for each of us constitutes the past, the present, and the future is given en bloc. . . . Each observer, as his time passes, discovers, so to speak, new slices of space-tim e which ap pear to him as successive aspects of the m aterial world, though in reality the ensem ble of events constituting space-tim e exist prior to his knowledge of them . In other w ords, everything has already happened - and is being discovered by the conceptual m ind. C ap ra (1975, pp. 193, 196) adds: T h e relativistic theory of particle interactions shows thus a com plete sym m etry w ith regard to the direction of time. All space-tim e diagram s m ay be read in either direction. For every process, there is an equivalent process with the direction of time reversed and particles replaced w ith antiparticles. . . . W hen they are taken as four-dim ensional p atterns w ithout any definite direction of time attach ed to them , there is no ‘before’ and no ‘after’, and thus no causation. A gainst the scientists, noetic thought insists th at there is causation: and we learn this from Lao T zu and Plato, men who form ulated their theories w ithout any reliance on State funds or team s of technicians. T h e scientific prem ise th a t o f two adequate theories the sim pler and m ore elegant one is true, applied to Plato and m odern physics, favours both the conclusions and the m ethods of the former. For Plato, true causation is not m echanical —w hich is why it is not perceived by the scientists —but ethical. T h e arrested cosmos (or society) in which nothing seems to change is not devoid of action: it is continually re-creating itself. W e have to keep up w ith the counter m ovem ent. As a B uddhist text has it, ‘T he stillness in stillness is not real stillness. O nly when there is a stillness in m ovem ent can the sp iritual rhythm appear which pervades heaven and e a rth ’. Scientists are the allies o f the noetic thinker in so far as they im balance the doctrines of progress in time and of m echanical causality. However, science, still being am oral, is incapable of penetrating as far as ethical causality. T h is is out o f tim e - the bad will be punished and have been p unished, the good will be and have been rew arded - and it is not

266

THE BAREFOOT PHILOSOPHER

norm ally perceived because the wrongly perceiving individual sees him self as w ithin time.

T H E SAGES O ne could go furth er than this in criticizing the contem porary sciences. T h eir vaunted objectivity m ight be reduced by an unkind critic to the acceptance of a special language and the subjugation of one’s brain to a certain n u m b er o f years of university conditioning; and to the good-will of the controlling agent, the State m arket, which allocates radio-telescopes and other h ardw are to the m ost select group of initiates. T he laboratory of the noetic thinker is his body: his geiger counter is his heart, and his telescope the noetic vision, whose only lim itation is m oral imperfection. W ithin each of us there is a noetic thinker, and this should never be intim idated by the m ight of the C aesar who will perpetually seek to externalize the tru th , and the m eans to truth, so as to be able to exercise control over both. A m ong the philosophers, of course, there is a great difference between a K a n t and an A rjuna. A ristotle was a court philosopher to A lexander the G reat, b u t Socrates, Lao T zu and Zoroaster were independent agents. T h e latter group, whose teachings will from age to age be reduced to conceptualized theories, stand ap art from the ‘historical’ philosophers who prom ote these theories. They share not only ideas, but also traits of personality, life styles and even m anners of dress. Plato cannot be counted as one of them , nor does he make the claim - he is an encyclopaedist, who comes at the end of an epoch to w rite down the thoughts and ideas of the p arad ig m atic thinkers of his culture. H e speaks for Socrates, Parm enides, H eraclitus and Pythagoras. In contrast to H eraclitus or Socrates, who stood aloof from any external au thority, dressed simply and disdained all honour, we m ay look at A ristotle. In o rder to form ulate his own view of the universe, this m an relied on hundreds of slaves and the arm ies of A lexander to bring him specim ens o f anim als, plants and men from all over the world: yet he calls Socrates an elitist. Philosophers like Socrates do not have letters after their nam es, or com puter p rintouts in their back pocket. Yet they bear witness to real hum anity, and rally each and every soul to autonom ous exertion. T h e ir view of the world is hectic, perhaps outrageous: it m ay offend com m on sense; it is also one th at they were themselves generally reluctant to disclose. B ut its validity can be tested by anyone. I cannot pretend to u n d erstan d all their insinuations and ways - why they walk barefoot, why

267

EPILOGUE

they either shave their heads or do not cut their hair at all, why they w ear loose clothes. W hy do the V edas, the K oran and the Pythagoreans recom m end th at one rests by placing the right foot over the left? W hy do the apostles tell us how m any fish they caught? W hy is it im portant to inform us th at Jesu s fed exactly 5,000 people, and th at there were twelve or seven baskets left over? W hy does Plato dem and th at the city should be a n a tu ra l unit consisting of 5,040 people? Are all these things symbolic: if so, sym bolic of what? T h e only guideline I can supply is the simple message of this book. C en tral to the organization of any valid thought is its good sentim ent: any in terp retatio n of philosophy or m yth which arouses fear, hate, lust, jealousy, self-righteousness or greed for power is false. It is also false if it externalizes the tru th , projecting the source of our civilization on to an o th er planet, m aking this world unreal by inventing another, or separating the rules of logic from the hum an heart.

268

§ S

a

pi I

ill

m I MMO R T A L I T Y

i

% I

I

As the read er will have gathered by now, this study involves a progressive relaxation o f form ality. As it develops, becomes less formally struc­ tured, its rhythm looser and its insinuations and assertions wider and deeper. Its function m ay be com pared with th at of a tug plane th a t launches a glider. T he glider is pulled by the m echanical power of the conventional aeroplane - but once a certain height is reached, the cord snaps and the glider is on its own. C orrespondingly, as this study is deconceptualized and deform alized, the reader is expected to become the co-author. In w hat follows I will throw out all kinds of notions from all kinds o f traditions. T he subject - im m ortality and life after death necessitates this approach. C onceptualizations will be used, but concep­ tual coherence is not the aim.

T H E BO D Y O F G O D T he S aan th an a tradition calls the visible, created universe (composed of visibility and solidity) the body of a cosmic Being. T his Being is eternal an d indestructible, even though it is daily dissolved. A lthough m ortal capable of dissolution - the universe is free from old age and disease. It provides its own food: it regenerates itself and is perfectly efficient, using the totality of its w aste as sustenance. Following the notion, ‘M agnus hom o, brevis m u n d i’, each hum an being is created after this model: thus we are each also in a sense im m ortal, perfectly efficient in satisfying our needs, w asting aw ay at one end while being proportionately regenerated a t the oth er end. T his universal im agery is paradoxical. How can anything th at is 269

EPILOGUE

created be eternal? H ow can anything th at is born be im m ortal? V arious traditions have given various answers, all of which in some way relate to the others. In all these traditions, the universe is the body of God; taken in its totality it is a single creature. M an is m ade in the im age of God: hence the tangible aspects o f m an are m ade after the cosmic model. I f m an has a spine, then the cosmos has a spine - the Milky W ay. If m an breathes, then the cosmos breathes. W e can understand the workings of the cosmos by exam ining the workings of m an. But the process works two ways: we are studying m an when we study the cosmos. O f course, the cosmos does not resem ble m an literally: it resem bles the true m an. U nlike the perceived hum an individual, the cosmic entity is not fragm ented b u t complete. Being also self-sufficient, in some sense it has no need for limbs, organs of sense or digestion. Yet this is only aspectually true: in a different sense it does have all these, b u t since all things are functionally defined, its limbs and organs take a different form from our own. In ord er to project the m eaning of this in a positive sense, it is necessary first to conceptualize it in a negative sense. Let us tem porarily pretend th a t the cosmic Being has no limbs at all, since it has no need of anything. H aving no need for locom otion or com m unication, and being perfect, it is round, silent and ageless - yet not devoid of m ovem ent, w hich is circular. T h e cosmic Being symbolizes perfection, or is perfect. A perfect m an therefore ought to resem ble or approxim ate this perfection. A ccording to Schopenhauer, living beings and their organs, limbs and actions are expressions o f the will to be and to possess som ething th at is needed. T he stom ach, m outh and teeth are expressions of the desire to eat: teeth also of the desire to soften food. Legs are the expression of the desire to be elsewhere. In contrast to m an, the perfect Being already is w here it w ants to be, so it has no legs. All p arts of the body cater to some need. T he heart is given to pum p passion into the body, to p repare it for its daily wars. Lungs are given as a counter-tendency to the heart, to cool it lest it become too violent. T he m ind is an expression o f the desire to know. T he perfect cosmic Being has no m ind, no eyes, ears or m outh, for it does not w ant to see, hear, talk or think (conjecturally): it is perfect and non-desiring. T his does not at all m ean th a t the cosmic Being, or the God beyond gods of whom the cosmos is an im age, is w ithout intelligence and awareness. Its intelligence needs no pictures (concepts) as its currency of apprehension, so it does not need sense im pressions. It is perfectly aw are of everything all the time, for it is perfectly aw are of itself and there is nothing outside. T h e body - w hether m ental or external - is inevitably linked to some need, and all activity is m ovem ent tow ards the satisfaction of this need, a 270

IMMORTALITY

becom ing of w hat one potentially is. Assum ing there is a possibility of satisfaction and the cessation of striving and desire, one m ay well ask w hat happens to the body then. W hat does one do with one’s legs w hen one has arrived; w hat happens to the questing m ind and eyes when all has been seen and known? T here are at least two possible answers. T he first, more obvious one is th a t the after-life, an entity has no need w hatsoever for such things as m outh, teeth, stom ach or legs, so it loses them and sheds the body - it dies. T h e second answ er is more complex, but it is hinted at by the p arad ig m atic city model. Life in the p aradigm atic city is not oriented tow ards personal survival. All the actions concerned w ith the body, w ith feeding, procreating, defence and education, are detached from the satisfaction of individual desire. T he city is for the citizens, and life a ritual. T he city eats, procreates and exists to allow each individual to m erge into the totality of city and cosmos: ‘T hus they have eyes and ears, legs and arm s in com m on’ (Laws 739a) Every city is two cities - it is A tlantis, characterized by individual desire (the stone of H eraclea), and then again it is not, it is the A thens of M enexenus, the Holy Jeru salem or Politea. Likewise, the body and every organ in it has a dual function. Considered in the realm of perception (becom ing), the liver has to do w ith clearing and exterm inating toxic bodies and noxious juices; considered vertically, it is the extension of Apollo, and serves a religious purpose. Seen vertically, the liver is a mind: it produces im ages of divine sentim ents and translates them into sweet juices, in every way opposite to the bitter, destructive juices th a t purify an d petrify. J u s t as Apollo is the terrible purifier and also radiant, so with the liver. Sim ilar considerations apply to every other organ. W e think th a t we have to work in order to eat, th a t we m ust eat in order to live - b u t why do we have to live a t all? T he mythological answ er is th at each and every activity, properly executed in the land of Ekei, is a ritual: life is a gam e, a festival, a celebration. T he m outh is not given to eat, but to praise G od and sing the eternal harm ony. Legs are not given to get us from w orkplace to hom e, for work and walking is a dance. Every organ and lim b has a double function, the one hum anly perceived in term s of satisfaction, and the other unperceived, which is to take p a rt in the cosmic chorus, the harm ony of the spheres, the dance of Siva. T his is possibly why Choreia was necessary to philosophy. It lies behind the B astani ritual and the w hirling of dervishes. In Jew ish, C h ristian, O rp h ic or In d ian m yths there occur the same images of a cosmic chorus, of 144,000 creatures singing, harp-playing or dancing in heaven. From Plato we learn th at we participate in this dance on our 271

EPILOGUE

earth. T h e citizens of M agnesia, he writes, may outw ardly seem to be w orking, toiling and procreating: innerly their life is a never-ending festival. T his cosmic festival is nothing but im m ersion into the rhythm of the universe. W e dance as we work, toil and draw w ater - every activity is consecrated and used to project m an on to the higher plane. In the laser, light waves brought into resonance serve to reinforce each other, and together create a powerful beam . M ythologically, each m an can, through m u n d an e activity, enter into this resonance with the cosmos and thus be projected into im m ortality. B ut the notion o f im m ortality is a difficult one, and we can approach it from yet anoth er angle.

T H E IM M O R T A L PER SO N AN D T H E T H R E E K IN D S O F T IM E Persons assum e their true identity only in instants w hen they are functioning correctly, in harm ony with correct sentim ent. T he word ‘in sta n t’ m ust be stressed, for an instant is out of time. As suggested earlier, for every action there is a Logos, an ideal pattern , a possibility of perfect enaction. W hen perform ing his profession in a near-ideal way, the doctor enters into this pattern. A w arrior m ay cast a lance in this perfection, ju st as the ecstatic dancer may execute a leap w hich projects him or her into w hat Urwick has called the ‘higher dim ension’. All such actors are subject to the division of labour; they have ‘specialized’, in so far as their actions are singly m otivated and perfect at the ‘tim e’ of perform ance. T h e inner m ental experience of perform ing such actions projects us out of time. W e experience time only to the extent th at we ‘toil’ in a way divergent from the perfect pattern. Defined in term s of m ental aw areness, tim e could be seen as the experience of resistance to activity, ju s t as the extended body is defined in the Timaeus as the experience of resistance to touch. Both tim e and m atter as extension in space stem from the arrest of a n a tu ra l flow, divergence from the Logos. T u rn in g to P lato’s Republic, we see the citizens are ‘dissolved’ persons: they have no ‘possessive’, ‘m anifested-in-tim e’ personality in the sense of being husbands, sons, owners, etc. They constitute a ‘com m unity’ of eyes and ears - having dissolved the capacity to feel individual pain or pleasure, or indeed to see or hear individually. In calling for such a com m unity, the noetic thinker is speaking m etaphorically of a psycholo­ gical experience, not of a ‘n o rm al’ physical event. T he sam e point is m ade 272

IMMORTALITY

by Jesus: the Son o f m an is propertyless, parentless, homeless; foxes have holes, b u t the Son o f m an has nowhere to lay his head. In short, the p aradigm atic individual has throw n away the attachm ents th a t qualify anybody as a p articu lar person (son of A riston, living in such-and-such a place). T h e loss of self in this sense can only take place in an instant: it projects us from ‘local to a greater T im e’ (Eliade), to the T im e beyond time. O u t of time, it is out of the realm of becoming; it is in the third realm , th at of actuality. A lthough ideally we could forever be grasping actuality as we did in the Age of C ronus, in practice this is not the case. O nly very rarely do we perceive it. A m other giving birth; an all-engulfing act of love; the charge o f a m ilitary unit; in all these instances actuality is perceived when the self is given up. W hile ‘living’, only a few perceive actuality. T he ‘d e a d ’ personality is the dissolved self (dissolved in the sense described above), and the ‘d e a d ’ find it easier to perceive the real earth because they have no desires. As H eraclitus would say, to be dead is to be alive. T his sym bolic death aside, one m ay well ask w hat happens to a person after so-called physical death. Let us (tongue-in-cheek) separate the body from the soul, ju s t to see w hat happens to the body. L ater it m ay be observed th at the sam e holds for the soul. U nlike later thinkers, who interpret im m ortality in term s of the persistence of the soul, T im aeus - a wise m an of Locri - is at pains to argue for the im m ortality of the body, though his account is oblique. In 4 i b, T im aeus points out th at all created beings are soluble in principle, yet G od, being good and loving, will only dissolve th a t which is corrupt. T he perfect body, the body of the universe, can only be m ade corrupt by God: and God, being eternal and eternally good, will never a ttem p t to corrupt the good. H ence, although vulnerable to death the cosmic body will never die, for it will be held together as long as it is loved by God —which is forever, since G od does not change his nature and it is in his natu re to love the good. T h e m ortal is im m ortal. N othing p u t together by God can ever be dissolved, for God would never join elements th at cannot m atch together perfectly ( 4 ib_c). In this passage, T im aeus acounts for the fact th at perceived unities are not real and enduring in time. Individual m en as they perceive themselves are conglom erations of units p u t together by entities other than God, i.e. by the lesser gods (4 id). T hey are not true entities, for the great God would never p u t any false unity together. T he hum an being is somehow falsely constituted o f building blocks which themselves are fragm ents of indestructible true units which are correctly created. T hus the essential m an is created by God and is indestructible ( 4 ib): the body of m an is likewise m ade from fragm ents of the indestructible body of the universe. 273

EPILOGUE

T h e process o f dying is reflected in the yin-yang symbol in T aoism , or in the m eander of Greek tradition, both of which consist of two interlocked shapes, one the negative of the other, the placem ent of the observer’s atten tio n determ ining which is the positive side. Seeing the body grow old is sim ply a result o f biased vision: growing old, m an is shedding the bonds o f desire and progressing tow ards his true self. To grow old is therefore the deepest desire of every true individual: it is only the fear of growing old th a t blinds us to the parallel spiritual and physical developm ent th a t takes place w ithin our m ind and body. T hus it is characteristic of philosophers, even of the lesser kind, th at they grow more and more lucid as they advance in age. Senility tends to be absent in the great artist: G oethe can w rite his greatest work, Faust, at the age of eighty, and a top pianist or violinist perform s into his nineties, even though the perform ance requires physical and m ental exertion. A ballet dan cer’s love of dance will arrest m any of the processes of ageing until well into m iddle age. T his is conveyed by Plato in the Politea, through Sophocles, who sees grow ing old as the liberation of true vision. As a m an grows older he becomes freer, and thus in a sense younger. Indeed, from V alm iki we learn th a t the wise are the children and the aged. As we grow tow ards m iddle age, we see progressively less well: according to Plato it is around the age of fifty th a t the reverse process begins, and we see better and better. No one ought to teach philosophy before the age of fifty. In the Laws of M anu, the aged householder is encouraged to m erge w ith nature, w hich like a child he can understand again. T h e ballet d ancer is a low-key exam ple of this principle. T he sage is m ore extrem e. A yogi can often m aintain the complexion and texture of a young m a n ’s skin until death; A urobindo arrested the decay of his body for m any days after his death. But in actuality it is not only yogis who do not age: according to the S aanthana m yth, nobody does. It is a m atter of perception: the perceived body only reflects the degree to which actuality is perceived. A urobindo’s body has not aged - nor has th at of the village d ru n k ard - for our perceived body is not the true one: the arrest of aging in the perceived body of a philosopher is only a hint, a pointer tow ards the correct perception. T h e synthesis, grow th and dissolution of the unity which m an perceives as his body is conjectural. T he universal body contains the bodies of all the living beings th a t have and ever will come into existence. W hat is true of the cosmic Being as a m acrocosm is also true of the m icrocosms or true unities it contains. For any p art of the true body which is perceived as being in the process of dissolution, there exists a m aster p attern in which its integrity is recorded, and according to which, som ewhere in the universe, a parallel reconstitution of the same particle is taking place. I f 274

IMMORTALITY

we could perceive the totality of the universe, we would see each of our constituent p arts sim ultaneously w asted and created: in other words, we w ould agree w ith Parm enides, th at nothing ever changes, and with Ecclesiastes, th a t ‘there is nothing new under the su n ’. Seen locally, on the other hand, all is in flux: the Logisticon, by flowing counter to this, arrests the change.

R E IN C A R N A T IO N ? C ontem porary difficulties in understanding the notion of reincarnation seem to arise from a false superim position of a concept of literal, tem poral reincarnation on to a non-literal model. W e are told th at the H indus believe in a cycle of rebirth, in which a single soul reappears under the guise o f several different persons or anim als. T his is not P lato ’s view of incarnation. For Plato, all things are h appening sim ultaneously, out of time: rather than being born again, one is perpetually ‘growing young5 or ‘growing backw ards5. N or can the so-called H in d u idea of reincarnation as a succession of births in creatures oth er th an oneself be found in the U panishads: there, too, all living is seen as taking place sim ultaneously. In the B hagavad G ita (II, 20), K rishna tells A rjuna explicitly th a t it is only the lesser m ind th a t invents reincarnation, for the true person ‘is never born, and he never dies. H e is in Eternity: he is for everm ore . . . beyond times gone or to com e.5 W hen Jesu s was asked about the resurrection of the dead he answered th a t there is no resurrection, in the sense being disputed by Sadducees and Pharisees, for in reality the living never die. T he resurrection idea is as conjectural as is the idea of death, since for God, in reality, nobody dies: ‘have you not read w hat was said to you by God, “ I am the God of A braham , and the G od of Isaac, and the God of J a c o b 55? H e is not the G od o f the dead, but o f the living5 (M atthew , X X II, 31-32). A braham is still alive and so is Ja c o b - although now they are differently perceived. Jesu s is still alive, still preaching, still being crucified; Pilate is daily w ashing his hands, and the cosmic d ram a is being replayed in its m any variations. T h e conceptual m ind perceives the situations and people of the New T estam en t and the living Jesus as other than itself. Likewise, the philosophy of Protagoras is seen as other than th at of K a n t or of some contem porary positivist. T his is not how the world is presented in Plato's M yth of Er: if we are to accept this, then the sam e people are continually alive w ithout realizing it. 275

EPILOGUE

St Paul believed th at the Second Com ing was ju st around the corner. W e m ay in terp ret this in a symbolic sense, but the Apostles took it m ore seriously — ‘sym bolic’ and ‘literal’ lose all significance in their thinking. W ere they wrong? Is Peter the Rock really dead? W ho is the real Peter? Is it m ere sym bolism to identify the Pharisees with false priests everywhere; Jew s w ith all those C hristians, M uslim s, or H indus who em brace the ritu al b u t not the sentim ent of religion; Gentiles with those who have not form ally accepted Islam or any other religious creed; Peter with every m an or aspect of m an in whom the Holy Spirit can identify incarnate God? T he twelve tribes of Israel stand for all hum anity. P lato’s dialogue the Laws describes a walk from Crossus in Crete to a cave w ith seven stops betw een. T he cave is G olgotha and the death cave of Zeus. T he third stop occurs at noon by the cave T ora, and it is here th at these lines are being w ritten. W h at is true in symbolism m ust be sought by the individual, alone. I f the S aan th an a account of actuality as taking place in an instant out of tim e is correct, then tem poral developm ent is false. If actuality is out of tim e and becom ing is unreal, we are led to conclude th a t all actual living is taking place sim ultaneously, and th at perceived dead people live through perceived living people, people in time, as the latter enter the realm of instants. N eedless to say, the complexity of all these relationships is such th a t I am continually simplifying the picture. Nevertheless all prophets, sinners, saints, ideologies and cities reduce to a finite num ber of eternal forces. P eter the Rock will betray Jesus the W ord: the extended, the solid, will b etray visibility before the cock crows three times. C onceptually speaking, the cock crowed in AD 28 or 29. Cosmically speaking, it is yet to crow for the last time. O r rather, the cock is continually crowing, and Peter - the C h u rch - is continually betraying his mission. Yet in a higher sense the Rock is still the Rock, for Peter is never a traitor: when a traitor, he is not P eter b u t J u d a s. T h ere is a Ju d a s w ithin each Peter, and vice versa. B oth Peter and Ju d a s are apostles chosen by C hrist, and chosen not for three years b u t for eternity. T he difference between them is not th at one stays eternally true and the other eternally evil: both fail, and both regret their failure. Even after the betrayal, Jesus welcomes Ju d a s: Ju d a s, however, will not accept it. Failure is not ju st to fail, for m an has already failed: failure lies in not forgiving oneself, or in not accepting external p ard o n (depending upon w hether one sees God internally or externally). R esting after a victory over a Jew ish tribe, the historical prophet M oham m ed was poisoned by an enemy wom an, and dies. M ercy, however, is not a C hristian m onopoly. H aving caught the assassin, the M uslim s bring the w om an to the prophet. ‘W hy did you do it?’ he asks. 276

IMMORTALITY

She tells him th a t she did it for her people and for her religion, and the p ro p h et gives her m oney for the journey and lets her go free. Kshatriyas (w arriors) on all sides are dear to K rishna. T he division between right and left is present at G olgotha. Both have failed: hum anity is nailed to the C ross on both sides. N oetically, Jesus is crucified daily, and so is hum anity, in the shape of thieves on his left and on his right, Ju d a s/P ete r. B abylon is at work in each and every city. T he thief on the right of Jesus, however, accepts the Cross; Peter is forgiven; and the fact th at the Jew ess poisons the Prophet is not decisive - having com m itted her act in good sentim ent she ceases to be an assassin and joins the com m unity of the faithful. W ith all his excesses, Peter is still the Rock, even though he will go on betraying the W ord until the end of time. T h e above insinuations do not link together particularly well, since they are sim ply conglom erated together. Jesus refrains from com m enting on the n atu re of the ‘oth er w orld’ ap art from pointing out th at (i) it is w ithin you; (2) its G od is the G od of the living; and (3) the end of the age will come before people now living have died. From K rishna we learn that nobody is ever born and nobody dies, th at the idea of rebirth is for those who do not u n derstand. From the Z oroastrians we learn th at V ohu M anu has already defeated A hrim an, Plato argues th at the cosmic A thens is now and forever, and T im aeus attributes growing old to a false vision of the self. From such hints anyone may draw conclusions th at he or she find suitable. T o add some coherence, I will spell out one possible conclusion am ong a h u n d red and one others. ET E R N A L L IF E Like any conceptualization, the following is not ‘tru e’: yet it m ay be em otionally less offensive, or in some other sense more acceptable than some other conceptualizations. It is objectively, quite definitely false; however, as a stream of words and pictures it m ight ‘trigger’ the reader to create his own true grasp - one not m ade of pictures and symbols as is public speech. T o be alive, to be a person, m eans to be conscious of one’s past and of o ne’s identity. T h e idea th at after death one will be born as somebody else contradicts this and is not im m ortality - death is not to rem em ber who one is. I f I insist on seeing m yself as an individual being defined by my body in tim e and place I will die, for one becomes w hat one follows. M ind, personality, ‘personhood’, body - all this will be dissolved, for both m ind and body are m ortal. N onconceptually, however, I am other than a son of so-and-so and citizen of so-and-so. T o experience this I m ust suspend conjectural 277

EPILOGUE

thought, and ab andon m yself to noetic thought (K ierkegaard calls it the leap of love). It seems at first th at beyond the m ind-held personality there will be nothing, yet this is not true. God asks A braham to sacrifice his son, and A b rah am does so in his h eart - yet God, being God, requires only this. Inw ardly giving up his son, A braham instead recovers him. By giving up individual identification one does not disintegrate into cosmic nothingness. N irvana is not the loss of self-identity. T he death of the perceived personality, synthesized by desire, creates the true individual, synthesized by the sentim ent of love. It is this notion which stands behind the words used in the C atholic M ass: ‘Dying, you destroyed our d e a th .’ A person who relies on noetic thought perceives him self out of time and space: he rem em bers through love his past and future selves. T he divine chariot driver tells A rjuna in the Bhagavad G ita (IV , 5) th at the difference betw een them is th at T rem em ber my past lives, and thou hast forgotten th in e’. H e goes on to add th at past and future lives are not unfolding, they are now - yet only he can perceive this (T am unborn . . . I am b o rn ’). T o know - in Pythagorean thought, for the Z oroastrians and for Plato is to rem em ber (Anamnesis). T o live is to rem em ber, and not to rem em ber is to be dead. W hen I ‘forget’ th at I am also a p art of the A ndrom eda galaxy and particip ate in all other living beings, I am only partly alive. I live wholly only in m om ents of rem em bering (‘Do this in m em ory of m e’): ‘So we, though m any, are one body in C hrist, and individually m em bers one o f an o th e r’ (Rom ans, X II, 5). T o be im m ortal is to be conscious of one’s identity in others. O ne cannot be m entally, i.e. conceptually, conscious of this; b u t then conceptual tru th is not final. I am conscious of my true identity in my love of my fellow m an and of the cosmos. Religion however, goes a stage further th an this, and Plato and the U p an ish ad s insist th a t the m an who becomes conscious of his true identity does not love this consciousness after the physical dissolution of his body. I f such is the case, where does such ‘living’ take place? T h e true person, we have argued, is not a flow in time. The true person is the locus drawn through all the high points o f a certain type o f excellence, instantiated by all those people and animals containing, in theirfalse perceived bodies, fractions o f true persons. J u s t as all m en and anim als participate in each other and in the cosmos ( Timaeus, 30 sq), by functioning correctly each living thing helps every oth er to realize its true identity. Protagorean epistem ological subjectivity is elim inated in this. The realized soul - the soul o f a good man - lives on earth 278

IMMORTALITY

perceiving itself in each o f the excellent actions executed by its various members, whether whales, flat-footed animals or birds. To the perceiving m ind it may ap p ear th a t the soul has to w ait for each of its constitutive parts to instantiate: this is not so. T he in-tim e existence is only falsely perceived as occurring in time; the real or actual is physical, visible, b u t is not perceived in time. In reality and in actuality, all is happening sim ultaneously. T he realized O rpheus perceived him self as a swan, as a singer and as a tw entieth-century scientist all at the same time. The Logisticon synthesizes simultaneously all its dispersed constituent parts, whether o f the body or o f the mind (which itself is a bodily part). As some of these parts are ‘egoistically5 retained by their tem porary keepers, who perceive them as their own, a full bodily reconstitution is ‘not yet’ possible. It is for this reason, I assum e, th at Plato, the Zoroastrians and C hristianity posit a kind of in-betw een existence described variously as ‘p u rgatory5 or ‘the passage through heaven5. Presum ably Je su s5 three days in H ades coincide w ith this. Full bodily reconstitution is to take place only after all false unities have been dissolved, and all the constituent blocks have thus been freed from their im prisonm ent in w hat is not, to be merged with w hat is. W hile Z oroastrians and C hristians project this age into the future, Plato projects it into the past. As the perceived universe is created, so it will clearly have an end: to m ake an issue out of w hether the Age of Cronus is coming or going seems m eaningless in a noetic context. U nlike perceived existence, actuality and actual things are created by God: thus, although created, actuality is eternal, held eternally by the loving God. In eternity, the real and the actual coincide. W h at ab o u t hell? T h e evil, claims Socrates, are punished by coming to resem ble w hatever they follow. J u s t as the good in heaven are only capable o f experiencing m om ents of excellence, so the evil in hell are only capable of experiencing the m om ents of pain and misery. T h u s both heaven, hell and purgatory take place sim ultaneously on earth. T h e souls in heaven experience only the good aspects of their lives, the persons in hell the bad, and purgatory is in between: it is norm al, everyday existence. (We should, however, recall the words of Socrates: ‘O f course these things are not exactly like that, but if talking about them helps us rem em ber true things, then we will have become better m en5.) All the ‘d e a d 5 are alive in living people. T he ‘realized5 dead, the ones who have given up desire while in the perceived body, as the ones who are aw are of them selves as true individuals. Socrates comes to be every time a dolphin in w hich there is a p a rt of Socrates makes a perfect ju m p , or every tim e som ebody completes a thought or a sentence in a perfect way. As all these actions have already been perform ed, Socrates does not have to wait 279

EPILOGUE

for others to behave perfectly. T hus Socrates is conscious and living. T o be ‘reb o rn ’ into someone and not to be aw are of it is, of course, to be dead. T h e dead are also w ithin us, and they exist as potentialities. In oth er words, if a m an brings to light some stored experience, a ‘dead ’ p a rt of him m ight aw aken. T his is why Plato calls learning Anamnesis. T he dead w ithin us have known how to swim, but they and we have forgotten it: in learning how to swim, we reactivate a fraction of this shared experience. T h e ‘d e a d ’ w ithin us are becom ing alive. A living, acting m an is, in one sense, not a person at all but a sum of dead persons w ithin him coming alive. As they are dead, they are not conscious of themselves, nor is the perceiving person really conscious of who he is: he is only a stim ulusresponse m echanism . T h e ‘living’ and ‘d e a d ’ in us are not somebody or som ething, b u t a process o f becom ing som ebody or something. By rejecting the m yth of reincarnation, C hristianity has rejected the idea th a t Peter can be born as Paul. Socrates and the V edas do the same. T h e p o p u lar view m aintains th a t one is m any people - Peter is Paul, George, etc. But C hristianity and Socrates view m an as One; Socrates only has parts of him dispersed in others. Peter cannot become aw are of him self as Paul, for he never was Paul. R ather, there is a p art of Paul in him , and by behaving properly - using his body, m ind and soul in a perfect way - Peter realizes these parts of Paul and they ‘leave’ him: in doing this he opens him self up and can receive his own self. C om plete realization, therefore, does not m ean to strip myself bare to the soul. Q uite the opposite: it m eans to open m yself up, to throw out everything th at never was me in order to be em pty, to receive all the scattered parts th at belong to me. C om plete realization requires th at all a person’s parts come together around the original owner. As Plato says, we have been scattered as the S partans scattered the A rcadians. T he coming together of Israel - the end o f the d iaspora —is the coming together of every true and n atu ral nation, city and m an. ‘O f all the m ultitude of things every one returns to its root’ (C huang T zu in W altham , 1971, p. 136). W e m ay close this account by observing th a t as there are three realm s of reality - being, becom ing and actuality - so there are three aspects to each city. In the sam e way, each individual is a com bination of the dead, those who are com ing to birth and those who truly live. T he whole of hum anity is dead, becom ing alive and really alive, in hell, purgatory and heaven, all the time. As Chora, w hen properly functioning, m irrors the realm of being, so the dead who have died properly m irror, and are, the truly living. In betw een these two are those who think th at they are living, but in fact are only becoming. 280

IMMORTALITY

O f course there never are really three worlds or two worlds: all the realm s o f tim e are one, though they are not perceived as such. To bring ab o u t this tem poral and cognitional reconciliation of three in one is, of course, the aim of noetic philosophy.

281

fi) s

IM T

///

S E N T I ME N T

Ft m

11 I ff

I i

T h e subject of this study has been the role of ‘sentim ent’ as the unifying force, the organizing principle behind the creation of all true units, w hether these be m ovem ents in Chora, the construction of cities or the correct organization o f speech and writing. T h e sentim ent was presented as a flux, a tendency, a stream . It was com pared to a m oving locus of points, the ‘em otional’ pull of the stone of H eraclea. Some exam ples were given creating, as it were, a series of in stantiations of the sentim ent, w ithout draw ing the full locus of points. F or the m ost p art, stress was laid on the negative function of this study. Indeed, P art O ne presented Philosophia Perennis as prim arily concerned w ith the dissolution of all positive conceptualizations restricting the flow of the sentim ents. T he intention was to make the reader understand th at all true unities are to be constructed in the realm of actuality, w here the form ative m edium is notional m ovem ent rather than concepts, and where the principle is sentim ent rath e r than proxim ity in space and time as perceived by the desiring mind. Every S aan th an a thinker has refrained from form ulating a single, general, prescriptive conclusion. But I would like to close this study by exploring the universality of this p attern or sentim ent, w hether we call it Pathos} Pneuma, T ao, Logos} Eros, Aritmos or Diarithmesis.

TH E W ORD ‘T h e universal, the true religion is of the w ord’, proclaim s the B hagavad G ita. ‘N ot by the V edas, or an austere life, or gifts to the poor, or ritual offerings can I be seen as thou hast seen me. O nly by love can m en see me, 282

SENTIMENT

and know me, and come unto m e5 (Bhagavad G ita, X I, 53-54). T h e idea o f the creation of the world by the God beyond gods, through recourse to an unchanging p attern, lies behind P lato’s cosmology and is verbalized in the opening paragraphs of the account in the Timaeus (286—29d): ‘W as the w orld, I say, always in existence and w ithout beginning, or created and h ad it beginning? C reated, I reply. . . . Now th at which is created m ust, as we affirm of necessity, be created by a cause. But the father and the m aker of all of this universe is past finding out, and even if we found him , to tell o f him to all men would be impossible. [This is n ot agnosticism .] T his question, however, we m ust ask about the world: w hich of the pattern s had the artificer in view when he m ade it - the p a tte rn of the unchangeable or th at which is created? . . . Everyone will see th a t he m ust have looked to the eternal [pattern], for the world is the fairest of creations and H e is the best of causes. A nd having been created in this way, the world has been fram ed in the likeness of th at w hich is apprehended by reason and m ind [Noesis] and is unchangeable, and m ust therefore necessarily be a copy of som ething.’ W e cannot know the m aker of the universe, nor can we know (in the conceptual sense) the eternal pattern. However, we can and do infer th at tru th , goodness and beauty share a common origin. T h e idea o f G od the C reator m aking the world in this way is com m on to the w orld’s m ajor religions. T he sim ilarity of language and im agery implies either a certain universal, prim ordial psychological experience, or (for those so inclined) a direct revelation of these m atters at various times to different peoples. Be th a t as it may, the W ord rem ains the unifying factor of th a t universal religion heralded in the V edas and proclaim ed by St A ugustine. H eraclitus ap art, the m ost precise verbalization of the Logos concept seems to be th a t of Philo the Jew , for whom it is the im age and Son of G od, the instrum ent by which the world was m ade and the connecting pow er by w hich all things are united. G oing m uch further East, Lao T z u ’s ‘T a o ’ is also the ‘W ord’ - both the way to the p a tte rn and the p attern itself. But it is the H indu thinkers who have m ost fully recognized the m ore than philosophical significance of calling the p a tte rn a ‘W o rd’, m aking it central to both their cosmology and their daily liturgy. It is venerated in the fo rm 3 jo - being pronounced O M or A U M and savoured for its sound. Note the presence of the num ber three in the w ritten form: the W ord illustrates a dual trinity, a trinity m ade of two syllables (O and M) pronounced as three (A, U , M ). T he two are ‘divided into three sounds b u t the three roll into one’ (M ascaro in B hagavad G ita, p. 14). I have em phasized the separateness of divine Nous and individual 283

EPILOGUE

Logisticon (B rahm an and A tm an). It is the W ord th at forms the bridge betw een the two: ‘T h e T ru th of the universe is b r a h m a n : our own inner T ru th is a t m a n . T he sacred om is a nam e for b o th ’ (M ascaro in B hagavad G ita, p. 14).

IN C A R N A T IO N W hile for the H indus this W ord has never incarnated in a single, com pletely h u m an being - though it has incarnated in other ways, and as the excellencies of m any m en - this possibility is not formally excluded. It m ay be significant th a t both the sunset Puja and the C atholic Benediction are dedicated to the W ord, celebrated in a sim ilar rhythm and m anner, at the sam e times and for the same duration, and end w ith sim ilar words: ‘W h at was, w hat is, and w hat shall be - all this is O M . W hatever else is beyond the bounds of threefold tim e - th at also is only O M ’ (M andukya U pan ish ad ); ‘In the beginning was the W ord . . . As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world w ithout end. A M E N .’ C om pare, too ‘In the beginning was B rahm an, with whom was the W ord, and the W ord was truly the suprem e B rah m an ’ (P atanjali in Isherw ood, 1969, p. 39) w ith the opening lines of the gospel according to St Jo h n : In the beginning was the W ord, and the W ord was with God, and the W ord was God. H e was in the beginning with God; all things were m ade through H im , and w ithout H im was not anything m ade th at was m ade. T h e W ord which gives substance to goodness is called by the Z oroastrians Ahuna Varya. It was uttered by A hura M azda ‘before the sky and before the w ater’ and ‘contains the seed of righteousness’. Ahuna Varya ‘is coequal w ith A hura M azda and alm ost on the same level w ith him. H e is A h u ra M a z d a ’s own bountiful spirit. Like A hura M azda he is wholly good; nothing o f evil adheres in him ’ (K anga, 1933, pp. 64-5). H e is used by G od ‘as a m eans of bringing about the defeat of the evil principle’, and ‘com prised the substance of the whole religion of G od’ (B harucha, 1979, pp. 102-3). Islam , too, is the religion of the W ord: its ‘doctrine is indeed alm ost exactly parallel to the C hristian doctrine of the in carnation,’ writes Z aehner (1964, p. 115), ‘except th at in Islam God is m ade not m an but book’. T h e P rophet has a function analogous, not to C hrist, but to M ary, the M other of the W ord. T h e function of the W ord is universal: w hether m anifested as a counsellor or a book of rules, it will serve as a m eans of reconciliation 284

SENTIMENT

betw een inner and outer, positive and negative, the said and the unsaid. All such divisions are false, and are elim inated and consum ed by the Logos. T he K o ran —rath er like P lato’s dialogues, and particularly the Laws - certainly functions in this triunal sense. A gainst the w ritten law, the Shariah, there stands the opposing aspect of the W ord, in this case conveyed by rhythm and m etre - which is the W ord apprehended through the heart, the Tariquah. Reconciling these two is the tru th itself, Haqiqah, like the centre of a circle whose radius is the inner W ay and whose circum ference is the outer law. Even though Islam rejects the doctrine of T rinity, the W ord of God itself is to be grasped on these three axes. W hile the C atholic C hurch claims th at Jesus is the only way to God, this dogm a does not preclude him having functioned in this capacity at o ther times and places in a restricted sense, taking on some appropriate identity. N inian Sm art rem arks th at religious visions are culturally conditioned: H indus do not have visions of the M adonna, nor do Scottish m ystics tend to catch glimpses of the celestial B uddha. Yet Allah says ‘We have sent messages to all nations’, and St Jo h n records the prom ise th at the F ath er will send a Counsellor to each disciple: and we may assum e th a t he has sent culturally acceptable m anifestations of this Counsellor to various disciples throughout the ages, a Counsellor who ‘will teach you all thin g s’ (John, X IV , 25). T his Counsellor who teaches all things surfaces in all the m ajor expositions of Philosophia Perennis. It is also m et with in Plato, and is not only in the form of Socrates’ D aim on. Prior to recom m ending it to G laucon, Socrates differentiates this Counsellor from the Daim on: the la tte r instructs negatively, ‘and has happened to few or none before m e’ (Republic, 496°), b u t the form er is recom m ended to others, and for positive guidance. T he Counsellor —at times called the Preceptor - conducts the ascent from the cave (Republic, 515e) and across the river Lethe (671°), and it is also he who comes to the conceited, intelligent young m an and w hispers gently ‘th a t he has no sense and sorely needs it, and th a t the only way to get it is to work like a slave to win it’ (494^. In the Symposium (2 io a—212), the Counsellor slips in unannounced and hardly appears at all, yet he is there in the philosopher’s ascent from the visible to beauty itself. W ithout the Counsellor, we learn from St Paul, we cannot understand Scripture. Plato is even m ore specific in the Republic, where it is stated th at only through positive guidance from the Counsellor can one see the light of the Good. T he ideas, according to Republic, 5 0 7 - n , cannot m ean anything w ithout this illum ination. For things to be visible there have to be three elem ents present: the object to be seen, light and the vision in w hich the two meet, which is neither the light nor the object but which 285

EPILOGUE

contains them both. In other words, for true things to be visible, earthly things m ust be reconciled w ith heavenly - and this reconciliation is achieved through the Logos: ‘no one comes to the Father, b u t by m e5 (John, X IV , 6). T h e O ne is alone, w ithout predication, with no nam e, existing only for itself. Before it is nam ed, for m an ‘it has not become, it never was, nor can you say it has become now or is becom ing or is’ (Parmenides, 141). It is only w hen the O ne is nam ed by the W ord, the eternal A U M , th at B rahm an becomes the ‘O ne th at is’ of the B rihadaranyaka U panishad. H ence Dionysius the A eropagite (1940, Ch. 4) writes of Je su s’ prayer, the ‘O u r F a th e r’, th a t the nam e of the O ne com prehends all the nam es for justice, beauty, righteousness: every noble nam e, evoking every noble thought ever conceived, is the nam e of the One. Jesu s personifies the N am e in the flesh, in so far as he makes the F ather visible; he does this not by teaching a doctrine, since doctrines are strictly of the earth, b u t ra th e r by creating a p attern of sentim ents. T he Logos, w hether it m anifests as a philosophy, a song, a tem ple, an activity or a thought, always reduces to an entity which acts as a reconciling catalyst. H eaven and earth are at odds, and as a result m an suffers. T he conflict betw een yin and yang - the left and the right - is, of course, im aginary: yet subjectively both forces are real. Aristotle, Simplicius and Proclus identify the dyad as m atter (the earth, the body), the cause of evil. O n the left there is the so-called lower consciousness, the earthly appetites, desires and cravings, the spiritual-biological forces Nietzsche referred to as the D ionysian principle. In contrast to these stands Apollo, to whom even P lato refers to as Apollo of the R ight - the purifier. W hether in politics or procreation, food or children, in thoughts and ideas everywhere one meets with this duality, the two opposing principles either locked in deadly com bat or alternatively subjugating one another. M ore th an one philosopher has interpreted all of history in term s of such a com bat. Yet the n atu re of the universe is such th at there exist ‘charm s’, m ovem ents or thoughts which, in some incom prehensible way, tend to elim inate the conflict - not by subjugation or elim ination of either of the tendencies, b u t by the infusion of some common rhythm with which both can identify. All political activity and philosophy is a search for the lost form ula of the G olden Age. W hen this agent of reconciliation, this vehicle of synthesis, is understood by a positivist it becomes the blueprint for a uto p ian city. In our age this takes the form of the political dogm a th at m ankind will be liberated from pain and toil by technology. For one set of Utopians this will result in the classless, propertyless society; for another set it will be a world of unlim ited consum ption. 286

SENTIMENT

A gainst this there stands Philosophia Perennis. All hum an goals - all concepts, walls, em pires - are variations of the G olden C alf m yth, w hether they be political utopias, clever philosophies or the philosopher’s stone. T hey all attem p t to remove, destroy, negate, ignore or otherwise deny the true distinction betw een the desirable and the undesirable, by identifying the desirable w ith worldly goods. T he Logos - paradoxical and nebulous as it m ay be - is the only thing able to com prehend and reconcile all elements in the struggle into a sim ultaneous unity. T his unity is not any p articular model, any p articu lar system or city. T his is the ap p a re n t contradiction of all noetic philosophy. Plato warns against w riting, yet he writes: Confucius, Viyasa, Socrates, Lao T zu are all against utopias, yet they describe them. Jesus came to transcend the law, yet he him self laid it down.

FU L L S T O P All around us paradox, inadequacy, contradiction - images and symbols, w ords and pictures calling for more words. Are there no answers? Is there no place where the O ne can be seen simply as O ne, and not as a duality resolving into a triunity, while being neither a duality nor a triunity? Is there anything which is not seen in fragm ents, flashes and spurts, synthesized by the conjectural mind? W as there ever a time when men were not falsely conglom erated, bits and pieces painfully held together? Is there a region w here things are not both w hat is and w hat is not - a region w here one need not spend hours in painful positions or praying on one’s knees to escape the ugliness of perceived reality, and to catch a glimpse of beauty? Is there a place where Socrates is not condem ned to death, where Jesu s is not crucified and where B uddha is not torn ap a rt by the hungry tiger? Is there such a yoga in which A rjuna is not crushed by sorrow, w here m an is spared the hour of G ethsem ane, where the F ather takes the b itter cup away? Are there answers to such questions, or are there only questions? W here do we look for the answers - in science, each m an for his own self? O r shall we look some three or four m illennia back at the V edas again: and w hat do they say - do they answ er or do they ask? T h ere was not then w hat is nor w hat is not. . . . W hat power was there? W here? . . . T h e o n e was breathing by its own power, in deep peace. O nly the o n e was: there was nothing beyond. D arkness was hidden in darkness. T h e all was fluid and formless. T herein, in the void, by the fire o f fervour arose the o n e . And in the o n e arose love. Love the first seed of soul. T h e tru th o f this the sages found in their hearts: seeking in their hearts w ith wisdom, the sages found th a t bond of union between 287

EPILOGUE

being and non being. [Yet] W ho knows in truth? W ho can tell us w hence and how arose this universe? . . . O nly th at God who sees in highest heaven: he only knows whence comes this universe, and w hether it was m ade or uncreated. H e only knows, or perhaps he knows not (Rig V eda, X , 129).

288

I lil HI I BI BLI OGRAPHY | 1 U

I i I i LH I S

Bible: (1973) The Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version, Ecumenical Edition, London: Collins. Bhagavad Gita: Ju a n Mascaro (tr.) (1962), The Bhagavad Gita , Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Koran: N.J.Dawood (tr.) (1974), The Koran, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Tao Te Ching: Gia-Fu Feng and Jan e English (tr.) (1973), Tao Te Ching, London: Wildwood House. U panishads and Vedas: Raimundo Panikkar (tr.) (1977), The Vedic Experience: Mantramanjari, London: Darton, Longman & Todd.

PLATO (1491), Opera , tr. Marsiglio Ficino, Bernardina de Choris and Simone de Leuco Venetiis. (1562) (doubtful attribution), Theages (ou de la Sapience), tr. P.Tredehan, Lyons: C. Pesnot. (1699), Les Oeuvres de Platon , tr. A.Dacier, Paris: J.Anisson. (1742), Opere di Platone , tr. D.Bembo, Venezia: G.Bittinelli. (1769), Loix de Platon , tr. J.N .G rou, Amsterdam (1780) (doubtful attribution), The Rivals, tr. F. Sydenham, London. (1894), Phaidros, tr. F.Petracic, Zagreb: V atica Hrvatska. (1912-22), Platons Dialoge, tr. O.Apelt, Leipzig. (1936-44), Oeuvres Completes, tr. E. Chambry, Paris. (1960), Prawa, tr. M. Mayakowska, Warsaw: Biblioteka Klass. Filozofi. (1961), Zakony , tr. F. Novotny: Ceskoslovenska Akademia. (1964), The Dialogues o f Plato, tr. B.Jow ett, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (1970), The Laws, tr. T.J.Saunders, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

289

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1974), Platon's Werke, tr. F. Schleiermacher, Darmstadt: Eigler. (1978), The Collected Dialogues o f Plato , ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns: Princeton University Press.

O T H E R SOURCES AND FU R T H E R READING Alfarabius (1943), de Platonis Philosophia - Plato Arabus, ed. F. Rosenthal and R. Walzer, London: W arburg Institute. Allen, R. E. (ed.) (1965), Studies in Plato's Metaphysics: Indiana University Press. Aquinas, St Thomas (1921-32), Summa Theologica, tr. Fathers of the British Dominican Province, London: Burns & Oates. Aquinas, St Thomas (1954), Nature and Grace: Selections from the Summa, ed. A.M .Fairweather, London: SCM .

Aristotle (1921), The Works o f Aristotle, ed. Sir W.D. Rose and H.A. Smith: Oxford University Press. Aristotle (1929), Physics, tr. P.H. Wickstead and F.M. Cornford, London: William Heinemann. Aristotle (1946), Politics, tr. E. Barker: Oxford University Press. Aristotle (1965), Metaphysics, tr. T.S.Dorsch, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Augustine, St (1651), The Profit o f Believing and D e Cura pro Mortuus, tr.unknown, London: R. Daniel. Augustine, St (1888a), Sermon on the Mount, tr. W. Findlay, New York. Augustine, St (1888b), Harmony o f the Gospels, tr. S.D.F. Salmond, New York: Christian Lit. Co. Augustine, St (1904), Soliloquies, tr. H. L. Hargrove, New York. Augustine, St (1952), Confessions, tr. E. Bouverie, Chicago: Enc. Britt. Aurobindo, Sri (1957), A Synthesis o f Yoga, Pondicherry. Averroes (1956), Commentary on Plato's Republic , tr. E.I.J. Rosenthal: Cambridge University Press. Bailly, A.M. (1879), Lettres sur I'Atlantide de Platon , Paris: Freres Debure. Bambrough, R. (ed.) (1967), Plato, Popper and Politics: Some Contributions to a Modem Controversy: Cambridge University Press. Barker, E. (1906), The Political Thought o f Plato and Aristotle , London: Methuen. Barker, E. (1918), Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors, London: Methuen. Berriman, A.E. (1953), Historical Metrology, London: J.M .Dent & Sons. Bharucha, E.S.D. (1979), Zoroastrian Religion and Customs, Bombay: D .B.Taraporevala Sons & Co.

Bidez, J . and Cumont, F. (1938), Les Mages Hellenises Zoroastre Ostanes et Hystape d'apres la Tradition Grecque, Paris: Soc. d ’Editions des Belles Lettres. Bigger, C.P. (1968), Participation , Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press. Bohr, N. (1958), Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, New York: J . Wiley & Sons. Bonitz, H. (1886), Platonische Studien, Berlin: F. Vahlen Verlag. Bosanquet, B. (1906), Companion to Plato's Republic , London. Bosanquet, B. (1932), The Education o f the Young in the Republic o f Plato : Cambridge University Press.

290

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boyce, M. (1979), Zoroastrians: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Brann, E. (1966), The Music o f the Republic, Annapolis, Md. Brumbaugh, R. S. (1954), Plato’s Mathematical Imagination’. Indiana University Publications. Brumbaugh, R. S. (1962), Plato fo r the Modern Age , New York. Buhler, G. (tr.) (1886), The Laws o f Manu , Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. Max Muller, vol. XXV: Oxford University Press. C apra, F. (1975), The Tao o f Physics, London: Wildwood House. Cherniss, H. (1944), Aristotle’s Criticism o f Plato and the Academy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Cherniss, H. (1945), The Riddle o f the Early Academy : California University Press. Cleve, F.M . (1965), The Giants o f Presophistic Greek Philosophy, Hague: M. Nijhoff. Copleston, F. (1975), History o f Western Philosophy, London: Burns & Oates. Cornford, F.M. (1935) P lato’s Theory o f Knowledge, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Cornford, F.M. (1937) P lato’s Cosmology, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Cornford, F.M. (1939), Plato and Parmenides, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Cornford, F.M. (1948), Religion and Philosophy, London: Allen & Unwin. Cornford. F.M. (1967), The Unwritten Philosophy: Cambridge University Press. Cragg, K . (1973), The M ind o f the Quran, London. Crombie, I.M . (1971), An Examination o f Plato’s Doctrines, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Crosland, M.P. (1971), The Science o f Matter, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Cushman, R.E. (1958), Therapeia: P lato’s Conception o f Philosophy: University of N orth Carolina Press. Danielou, J . (1944), Platonisme et Theologie Mystique: Doctrines Spirituelles de St Gregoire de Nysse , Paris: Aubier. David-Neel, Alexandra (1936), Tibetan Journey, London: Bodley Head. Day, C.B. (1962), The Philosophers o f China, London. Dionysius the Areopagite (1940), The Divine Names and The Mystical Theology, tr. C.E. Rolt, London: SPCK. Duchesne-Gueillemin, J . (1953), Ormazd et Ahriman: L ’Aventure Dualiste dans I’Antiquite, Paris. Durich, M.N. (1958), ‘Was Plato a Machiavellian?’, in Archiv fu r Rechts -und Sozialphilosophie , vol. X LIV , pp. 79-93. Durich, M.N. (i960), Platonova Akademia injen Politicki rad, Belgrade: Srpska Akademija Navka. Einstein, A. (1969), The Principle o f Relativity , New York: Dover. Eliade, M. (1958), Patterns in Comparative Religion , London: Sheed & Ward. Eliade, M. (1979), A History o f Religious Ideas, London: Collins. England, E.B. (1921), The Laws: University of M anchester Press. Erigena, J.S. (1870), Ueber die Eintheilung der Natur , tr. L. Noack, Berlin: Philosophische Bibliothek. Ferguson, A.S. (1921-2), ‘Plato’s Simile of Light’, in Classical Quarterly, pp. I 35- 22; PP- I5~28. Ferguson, J . (1970), Socrates: A Source Book, London: Macmillan.

291

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ficino, M. (1944), Commentary on P lato’s Symposium, tr. Sears, Reynolds and Jayne: Columbia University Press. Ficino, M. (1964), Theologie Platonicienne de VImmortalite des Ames, Paris. Ficino, M. (1978), The Letters, London: Shepeard-Walwyn. Findlay, J.N . (1974), Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Findlay, J.N . (1978), Plato and Platonism , New York: Times Books. Findlay, J.N . (1970), Ascent to the Absolute, London: Allen & Unwin. Fox, A. (ed.), Plato and the Christians, London: SCM. Friedlander, Paul (1969), Plato, 3 vols, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Fung Yu Ian (1958), A Short History o f Chinese Philosophy, New York: Macmillan. Gabrieli, F. (n.d.), Alfarabius: Compendium Legum Platonis (Plato Arabus III), London: W arburg Institute. Gadamer, H.G. (1952), ‘Retraktionen zum Lehrgedicht des Parmenides varia variorum ’, in Festschrift fu r Reinhardt, pp. 58—68, Cologne: Munster. G adam er, H.G. (1964), ‘Dialektik und Sophistik im Siebenten Platonischen Brief, in Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Abh. 2, Heidelberg. Gadamer, H.G. (1968), Platos dialektische Ethik, Hamburg: Felix M einer Verlag. G adam er, H.G. (1973), ‘Ueber Idee und Wirklichkeit im Tim aeus’, in Sitzungsbe­ richte der Heidelberger Akademie, 10 Nov. Gaiser, K. (1963), Platons Ungeschriebene Lehre, Stuttgart: E. K lett Verlag. Gauss, H. (1937), Plato's Conception o f Philosophy, London: Macmillan. Gorman, P. (1979), Pythagoras: A Life, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Gosling, J.C .B . (1973), Plato, London. Gould, J. (1955), The Development o f Plato's Ethics: Cambridge University Press. Gouldner, A.W. (1965), Enter Plato, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Govinda, Lama A. (1973), Foundations o f Tibetan Mysticism, London: Rider.

Greene, W.C. (1944), Moira: Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought: H arvard University Press. Gregory of Nyssa, St (1864), Dialog uber Seele und Auferstehung, tr. H. Schmidt, Halle. Gregory of Nyssa, St (1893), Select Writings and Letters, tr. with Prologomena, Notes and Indices, W. Morre and H.A. Wilson, Oxford: Parker & Co. Gregory of Nyssa, St (1927), Ausgewahlte Schriften, tr. K arl Weiss, Miinchen: Bibliothek der Kirchenvater. Guthrie, W .K.C. (1950), The Greeks and their Gods, London: Methuen. Guthrie, W .K.C. (1967), Man and the Microcosm: The Idea in Greek Thought and its Legacy to Europe, The Hague. Guthrie, W .K.C. (1971), Socrates: Cambridge University Press. H aberm as, J . (1972), Knowledge and Human Interest, London: Heinemann. Heisenberg, W. (1963), Physics and Philosophy, London: Allen & Unwin. Hesiod (1973), Theogeny and Works and D ays , tr. D. Wender, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Homer (1950), Iliad, tr. E. V. Rieu, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Homer (1952), The Iliad o f Homer and The Odyssey, tr. S. Butler, Chicago: Enc. Britt. Hoyle, Fred (1970), Frontiers o f Astronomy, London: Heinemann.

292

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Husserl, E. (1965), Phenomenology and the Crisis o f Philosophy, New York: H arper & Row. Husserl, E. (1970), Logical Investigations, tr. J.N . Findlay, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Isherwood and Prabhavananda (1969), How to Know God: Yoga Aphorisms o f Patanjali, New York: Mentor. Jaeger, W. (1947), The Theology o f Early Greek Thinkers, Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Jam es, E. O. (1961), Seasonal Feasts and Festivals, London: Thames & Hudson. Jaspers, K . (1975), History o f Philosophy, New York and London: McGraw-Hill. K anga, S.N. (1933a), The Christ-Concept and o f Logos in Christianity, Bombay: G atha Society. Kanga, S.N. (1933b), Heaven and Hell and their Location in Zoroastrianism and Plato, Bombay: G atha Society. Kanga, S.N. (1933c), A New Interpretation o f the Sperta Manyu, Bombay: G atha Society. K ant, Immanuel (1881), The Critique o f Pure Reason, tr. J.H .Stirling, London: Simpkin & Marshall. Kierkegaard, S. (1940), Stages on L ife’s Way, tr. W. Lowrie: Oxford University Press. Kierkegaard, S. (1962), Philosophical Fragments'. Princeton University Press. Kierkegaard, S. (1966), The Concept o f Irony with Constant References to Socrates, tr. Lee Capel, London: Collins. Kirk, G.S. and Raven, J.E. (1957), The Presocratic Philosophers'. CambridgeUniversity Press.

Klein, J . (1968), Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin o f Algebra, Cambridge, Mass.: M IT Press. Krishnaswami (1901), Popular Hinduism, Madras: Aiyar. Lake, J.W . (1874), Plato, Philo and Paul, or the Pagan Conception o f Logos, London. Legge, Jam es (tr.) (1971), The Texts o f Taoism, 2 vols, Sacred Books of the East, ed. F. M ax Muller, New York: Dover. Lindsay, A.D. (1930), The Historical Socrates and the Platonic Form o f the Good: University of C alcutta Press. Linforth, I.M . (1946), The Corybantic Rites in Plato : University of California Publications in Classical Philology, xiii. M cClain, E.G. (1978), The Myth o f Invariance, Boulder and London: Shambhala. M arx, K arl (1952), Briefe an Kugelman, Berlin. M ehra,J. (ed.) (1973), The Physicist's Conception o f Nature, Dordrecht: Reidel.

M erlan, P. (1947), ‘Form and content in Plato’s Philosophy’, in Journal o f the History o f Ideas, vol. 8. M erlan, P. (1963-4), ‘Religion and Philosophy from Plato’s Phaedo to the Chaldean O racles’, in Journal o f the History o f Philosophy, vol. I, pp. 163-76. Michell, John (1972), City o f Revelation, London: Garnstone Press. M orrall, J.B . (1958), Political Thought in Medieval Times, London: Hutchinson University Library. Morrall, J.B . (1977), Aristotle, London: George Allen & Unwin. Morrow, G.R. (i960), Plato's Cretan City: Princeton University Press.

293

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Muller, F.M ax (1978), The Six Systems o f Indian Philosophy, London. M urdoch, Iris (1978), The Fire and the Sun: Oxford University Press. M urphy, N.R. (1932), ‘The Simile of Light in Plato’s Republic’, in Classical Quarterly, pp. 82-107. M urti, T.R.V . (1955), The Central Philosophy o f Buddhism , London: George Allen & Unwin. Nasr, S.H. (1966), Ideals and Realities o f Islam , London: George Allen & Unwin. N oss,J.B . (1974), Man's Religions, London: Macmillan. Oehler, K. (1962a), Die Lehre von Noetischen und Dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles , M unchen: Zetemata Studien. Oehler, K. (1962b), ‘Subjekt und O bjekt’, in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, vol. V I, pp.448ff. Oehler, K. (1962c), ‘Vernunft und V erstand’, in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, vol. VI. Oehler, K. (1969), Antike Philosophie und Byzantinische Mittelalter, Munchen. Oppenheimer, J.R. (1954), Science and the Common Understanding: Oxford University Press.

Panoussi, E. (1969), ‘L ’Origine de la Notion de Participation chez Zoroastre et chez Platon’, in Beitrage zur alten Geschichte und deren Nachleben, Festschrift fur Franz Altheim, Berlin: de Gruyter. Patai, R. (1947), Man and Temple, London: T.Nelson & Sons. Pauly-Wissowa (1893-1922), ‘Real’, in Encyclopaidie der Classichen Altertums Wissenschaft, 33 Bd., Stuttgart. Peterson, P. (1924), Hymns from the Rig Veda, Poona. Pickthall, M .M . (n.d.), The Meaning o f the Glorious Koran , New York: New American Library (Mentor). Pieper, Josef (1952), Leisure the Basis o f Culture, tr. A. Dru, London: Faber & Faber. Pieper, Josef (1954), What Catholics Believe, London. Pieper, Josef (1957), The Silence o f St Thomas, tr. D. O ’Connor, London. Pieper, Josef (1965), Love and Inspiration, tr. Richard and Clara Winston, London: Faber & Faber. Pindar (1930), The Works o f Pindar, tr. L.R.Farnell, London: Macmillan. Plotinus (1956), The Enneads, tr. S. M acKenna, London: Faber & Faber. Plutarch (i960), The Rise and Fall o f Athens, tr. Ian Scott Kilvert, Harmonds worth: Penguin. Plutarch (1974), Plutarch's Lives, ed. A. Wardman, London: Paul Elek.

Popper, K.R. (1957), The Open Society and its Enemies, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Proclus (1820), Commentaries on the Timaeus, tr. T. Taylor, London. Proclus (1970), Commentaire sur la Republique, tr. A.J.Festugiere, Paris. Proclus (1978), Theologie Platonicienne, tr. H.D. Saffrey and L.G.Westernik, Paris: Soc. d ’Edition des Belles Lettres. Radhakrishnan, S. (1923-7), Indian Philosophy, 2 vols, London: George Allen & Unwin. Radhakrishnan S. (1957), Source Book in Indian Philosophy, London: George Allen & Unwin.

Rankin, H.D. (1964), Plato and the Individual, London: Methuen. Ritter, C. (1933), The Essence o f Plato’s Philosophy, London.

294

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Robin, Leon (1908), La Theorie Platonicienne des Idees et des Nombres, Paris. Rosen, S. (1968), Plato's Symposium : Yale University Press. Ross, D. (1966), Plato's Theory o f Ideas: Oxford University Press. Runciman, W.G. (iq^q), ‘Plato’s Parmenides’, in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, LX IV . Runciman, W.G. (1962), Plato's Later Epistemology: Cambridge University Press. Russell, Bertrand (1961), History o f Western Philosophy, London: Allen & Unwin. Ryle, G. (1966), Plato's Progress: Cambridge University Press. Sachs, Mendel (1969), ‘Space, Time and Elementary Interactions in Relativity’, in Physics Today, vol. 22 February. Sallis, J. (1975), Being and Logos: The Way o f Platonic Dialogue, Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press.

Sastri, P.S. (1963), Aristotle's Theory o f Poetry and Drama, Allahabad: K itabmahal. Seligman, P. (1962), The Apeiron o f Anaximander: The Athlone Press, University of London. Sinaiko, H.L. (1965), Love, Knowledge and Discourse in Plato : Chicago University Press. Smith, D.H. (1973), Confucius, London: Maurice Temple Smith.

Solmsen, F. (1942), ‘Plato’s Theology’, in Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, vol. 27Stapp, H.P. (1971), ‘S-M atrix Interpretation of Q uantum Theory’, in Physical Review, vol. D3, 15 March. Stenzel, J . (1940), Plato's Method o f Dialectic, tr. D.J. Allen: Oxford University Press. Stevens, P.S. (1977), Patterns in Nature, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Stewart, J.A . (i960), The Myths o f Plato, London: Centaur Press. Strabo (n.d.), ‘Zoroastrian Sources’, in Geography, vol. V II, Loeb Classical Library. Strauss, L. (1964), The City and Man: Chicago University Press. Stumpf, S.E. (1966), From Socrates to Sartre, New York: McGraw-Hill. Suzuki, Daisetz T. (1959), Zen and Japanese Culture, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Taylor, A.E. (1926), Plato: The Man and his Work, London. Taylor, A.E. (1928), A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Taylor, A.E. (1934), The Parmenides o f Plato, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Thompson, D ’Arcy (1942), On Growth and Form : Cambridge University Press.

Tillich, Paul (1951)5 Systematic Theology, vol. 1: Chicago University Press. Tong, L .K . (1973), ‘Confucian Zen and Platonic Eros: A Comparative Study’, in Chinese Culture, vol. X IV , pp. 1-8.

Uphold, W .B.Jr (1961), ‘The Fourth Gospel as Platonic Dialectic’, in Personalist, vol. X L II, pp. 38-51. Urwick, E.J. (1920), The Message o f Plato, London: Methuen. V an Houte, M. (1954), La Philosophie Politique de Platon dans les Lois', Louvain.

Versenyi, L. (1963), Socratic Humanism: Yale University Press. Voegelin, E. (1957), ‘Plato and Aristotle’, in Order in Society, vol. I l l , Baton Rouge.

W altham , Clae (1971), Chuang Tzu: Genius o f the Absurd, tr. Jam es Legge, New York: Ace Books. Weil, S. (1951), Imitations o f Christianity Among the Ancient Greeks, London:

295

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Routledge & Kegan Paul. Weyl, H. (1949), Philosophy o f Mathematics and Natural Science: Princeton University Press. Wild, J . (1974), Plato's Theory o f M an , New York: Octagon Books. W undt, W. (1905), Volkerpsychologie, Leipzig. Xenophon (1923), Memorabilia and Oeconomicus, tr. E.C .M archant, New York: Heinemann. Zaehner, R.C. (1953), Foolishness to the Greeks, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Zaehner, R.C. (1961), The Dawn and Twilight o f Zoroastrianism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. Zaehner, R. C. (1964), The Catholic Church and World Religion , London: Burns & Oates. Zaehner, R. C. (1967), Mysticism, Sacred and Profane: Oxford University Press.

296

^7

Icj js jls j

j'H

® INDEX

gfnri^iasM M asiasiisiM Ssi!si!siasiiM aberration logic, 26-7 abstractions, 51-3 activity, see exercise; movement actuality, 83, 85-7, 89, 94-7, 107, 111-16, 137, 183; see also Chora; materialism Adam, J., 234-5 Agathon, 121, 123 ageing, 274 Ahmra, 4 Ahuna Varya, 4, 218, 284 A hura M azda, 30, 284 Aishron, 216 Aixos , 84, 89 Alcibiades, 121, 233 Alidius, 121 alienation, 110, 193-202, 208; see also Flood ambiguity, 175 Ammetria, 124, 224 Anamnesis, 34, 278 Ananda, 11 Anangke, 117, 125, 143, 145, 201,241, 246 Anatrope, 68, 194, 197, 243-4, 249 Anaximander, 195 Angro Manyush, n o Anselm, St, 89, 98, 151 anti-city, see Atlantis; sick city anti-formality, 101-2 Aperion, 22-3, 73, 109, 113-14, 195, 265 Apollo, 277 apprehension, 17-32

Apsastai, 87; see also grasping Apsathnai , 179

Aquinas, St Thomas, 46, 110, 228 Aristarchus, 63-4, 202 Aristophanes, 24, 169 Aristotle, 267, 277, 290; on city, 213; on commerce, 36; on God, 196; Golden Mean, 143-4; on horizontal, 109-10; on ideal, 143; on ideas, 142, 153; on leisure, 240; on male/female principle, 22-3; on mathematics, 60; on two worlds, 141,150 Aritmos, xii, 44-5, 53, 62-3, 65, 84, 87, 234, 248 Arjuna, 74, 104, 132, 184, 260, 270, 275; see also Hinduism art, 53-6, 163, 178, 181, 228, 260-1 Asanas, 228 Asha, 106 Ashariah, 106; see also Shariah aspectuality, 10, 19, 24, 27-32, 244; and flow, 95; and noetic thought, 51, 61, 68; opposition to positivism, 35, 39> 435 and vertical, 109 astronomy, xii, 1-2, 44, 218, 236, 261—2; see also heliocentricity; space Atlantis, 175, 199, 203-4, 271; see also sick city Atman, see self atoms, 4, 7, 43-4, 59, 64, 95-6, 111, 255 Augustine, St, 11, 105-6, n o , 122, >50-i, 175-6,230,274, 290 AUM , 4, 30, 111,274-5, 283, 286

297

INDEX

container of creation, 79, 82-3, 248; and grasping, 87, 137; and ideal, 145; as matter, 79-81, 118, 125; as mind, 124; and reflection, 158; - space, 80-1 Choreia, 226, 231-2 Christianity: dualism in, 131, 177; on evil, 46-7; and future age, 279; and God, 105; and Greeks, 45; and heart, 222; and order, 238—9; paradox in, 49, 57; and reincarnation, 156, 280; and triunity, 111; and truth, 100-1; on virtue, 46-7, 132-3; and Word, 283-4; see also Jesus; John; Paul C huangT zu, 123, 198, 280 citizenship, 135 City of God, 4, 106, 134-5, !45 city: actual and perceived, 199-200; and body, 236-7; curing, 205-25; healthy, 137-9, 166, 204; man as, 145, 218-19; paradigm atic model of, 4-5, 129-40, 271; planned, 235-7; Plato on, xii, 19&-200, 203-5, 213, 217-19, 237, 239; smallest, 165; as temple, 226-42; Third, 129-249; two, 271; vision of, 179-89; see also sick city class, xiii, 165 Cleve, F.M ., 198, 291 Cogito argument, 40-1 cognitive faculties, see knowing colours, 239 communism, 40, 135 concepts, critique of, 48-69 conceptual objectivism, 141-58 conceptualism, see thought, conceptual Confucius: and control of heart, 140; dialectic, 20, 22; on disturbed society, 218; on division of labour, 174; on duality, 108, 178, 244; on harmony, 231-2; on leisure, 240; on rectification, 259; and Taoism, 131, 177; on virtues, 134, 231-2; on work,

Aurobindo, Sri, 84, 274, 290 Auto Kath-Auto, 65, 244

Averroes, 112, 290 Bach, J.S ., 55 Bailly, A.M ., 237, 290 barefoot philosopher, 253-68 becoming, 70-87,89, 93-4, 111-12, 114-15 Being, 104, 207, 269; see also God; One being, 39, 88-99, i°7. 11i~ '2 , 114-15 Bergson, H., 96, 108, 160, 179 Berriman, A.E., 236, 290 betrayal, 276 Bhagavad Gita, 29, 112, 120-1, 134, { 5 l > '97. 275, 282-4 ; see also Hinduism Bhakti, 30, 39 Bharucha, E.S.D., 275, 290 Bible, see Christianity Bigger, C.P., 153, 290 biological time, 96, 116 body: and city, 236-7; disorder, 201-2, 229-30; dying to, 186-7; exercise of, 226-32, 263; function of, 270-1; and harmony, 222, 225-6, 231; immortality of, 273; knowing with, 18, 26-7, 30, 38; rivers of, 201; and society, 167-8; and time, 224 Bohr, Niels, 7, 62, 71, 75, 77, 79, 97, 102, 108, 259-60, 29O Bonnitz, Y., 29 Bosanquet, B., 213, 290 bourgeois, see m erchant thought Boyce, M., 10, 39, 106, 290 Brahm an, 75, 98, 104-5 Brumbaugh, R.S., 235, 291 Buddha, G autam a, 12, 24, 36, 259 Buddhi, 19, 29, 37, 107, 125, 179 Buddhism, 78, 215 calendar, 238-42 C apra, F., 8, 52-3, 82, 256, 266, 291 caste system, 112 categories, 65 Chakras, 30, 142, 218 change, 25, 92, 95, 275 charity, 132 Cherniss,H., 141, 291 Chi, 201, 218, 256 Chora: as actuality, 71, 73, 83, 97, 137, 141, 144, 207, 241, 272-3; as

185

conjunction, see Simploke Copleston, F., 141, 291 Cornford, F.M ., 10, 80, 87, 120, 144, 181,233,291 cosmic chorus, 281 cosmic energy, 218, 264 cosmic time, 96, 116, 224 cosmic unity, 217

298

INDEX

Counsellor, 276 counter-cosmic thought, 194 Cragg, K., 233, 291 Cratylus, 20, 56 creation, 2, 70, 82-3, 248, 274 Crombie, I.M ., 86- 7, 291 Cronus, Age of, 157-8, 197, 241, 273,

279

Crosland, M.P., 51, 291 Cross, the, 201-2, 259 crucifixion, 219-20 curing the city, 208-25 curse, 201-2, 259 Cushman, R.E., 31, 45, 121, 291 Dalton, John, 62 dance, 227, 232, 272 Danielou, J ., 197, 291 David-Neel, Alexandra, 111, 291 de Broglie, L., 77, 266 dead, ‘realized’, 279 death, 185-8; to body, 186-7; to false desires, 261; to language, 259; physical, 273-4; of self, 168; of star, 261 decay, 238, 259 deception, self, 211 Democritus, 52, 62, 64 demystification, 205 Descartes, R., 40-2, 46, 68-9, 89, 197 desires, 26, 28-31, 38, 112-15, 138, 164-6, 203-4, 209 Dharmakaya, 119 dialectic, 17-32, 167 Dialisis, 167 Dianoia , 19, 26, 41, 98—9, 107, 116-20, 180-2, 205, 211, 235, 249 Diaresis, 18, 44 Diarithmesis , 21, 63, 87, 179, 235 dichotomy, see dualism Dionysius the Areopagite, 110, 220, 277, 286, 291 Diotima, 97 discursive reason, 89; see also Logos disease, 229-30, 239 disjunction, see Diaresis distortion, 124 Division of labour, 43, 159-78, 208-9 downward flow, 205-7, 211, 247 Doxa Alethes, 193 dram a, 171, 227-8 drugs, 117

Druh, Druj, 106

dualism, 29, 108, 129-31, 180, 243-4; ° f knowing, 18-23; in religion, 111, 17-8, 246; in self, 44, 169-75;in society, 169-75 duty, 67 dyad, the indefinite: and the One, 73, I J 3? j 9? ^ o , 286; see also dualism dying, see death Eckhart, Meister, 142 education of soul, 228 Eidos, 4, 71-2, 107, i 49- 5> 153? J57—S, *99 Eikones, 24, 27, 64, 119, 212, 254 Einstein, A., 71, 80-1, 83-4, 101, 256, 264-6, 291 Ekei , 23, 271 elements, 265 Elenchos, 27, 39, 133 Eliade, Mircea, 10, 129, 194, 228, 2 3 9-4^ 273, 291 Eliot, T.S., 151, 210 emotions, 27, 45 Empfangen , 120; see also Noesis Empiricus, Sextus, 255 Ens, 87 entheos, 228 Epetai , 56 Episteme, 56 Epithumia, 26, 29-30, 112-15, !38> 164—6 Er, M yth of, 156-7, 275 errors of positivism, 33-47 Eryxymachus, 169, 172, 198, 223, 260 Esse , 75 essences, 143 estrangement, see alienation ethical determination of creation, 151 ethical faculty of thought, 37, 120; see also Noesis

ethical illumination, 182 ethical mathematics, 234-5, 237 ethics and exercise, 229 Eudoxus, 11,91 Eutyphro, 170-1 evil, 47, n o , 117, 133-4, 145, 172-6, 181, 197-8, 229-30, 279, 286; see also Fall; sick city exercise, 226-32, 263 existential fear, 230 existentialism, 147-9

299

INDEX

expectations from well-endowed, 200—1 exposition, 89 extension, 123 externality, 7, 76, 79, 107-8, 217 externalization, 65, 68-9, 74-8, 159 faith, 102-3, 121 Fall myth, 50, 193-207, 213, 216, 220, 242; see also evil; sick city false thinking, 24, 94 falsehood, 106, 216, 261 family, 220-1 fear, 230, 240 female principle, 22, 68, 177, 198, 247 Ferguson, A.S., 232, 291 Ferguson, J ., 123, 291 festivals, 238-43 passim Ficino, M., 150, 176, 240, 292 Findlay, J.N ., 28, 51, 56, 63, 84, 87, 144-5. *50> !56> i6 3, 256, 292 flattery, 212 Flood myth, 205-6; see also alienation flow, 263; aspectual, 61-6; of consciousness, 21; downward, 205-78, 211, 247; of history, 3; and language, 56; resistance to, 215; sentiment as, 282; upward, 207; see also movement fluidity, see flow formalities, dying to, 187 fragmentation, 125, 197 free choice, 39 Freud, S., 71 Freidlander, Paul, 203, 235, 292 Fung Yu Ian, 256, 292

Goethe, J.W . von, 179, 274 Golden Age, 157, 287 Golden Calf, 286 Golden Mean, 143, 235 goodness, see virtue Gosling, J.C .B ., 184, 292 Govinda, Lama A., 78, 292 grasping, 87, 107, in - 1 6 , 120, 137,

179, 183 Gregory, St, ofNyssa, 197, 292 Guthrie, W .,.C., 84, 123, 236, 246, 292 H aberm as, Jurgen, 28, 37, 151, 292 Hamilton, W., 50, 61 harmony, 78, 105, 180, 197, 222-6, 231 Haruvastra, 30 H atha yoga, 228 h e a d ,30 healthy city, 137-9, *66, 204; see also city heart, 30, 129-40 heaven, 29, 68, 143-4; see also City of God Hegel, F. : on absolute, 203; dialectic of, 22-3; on duality, 22, 49; on idealism, 85-6, 143, 147, 149; on knowledge, 37; and Marx, 68, 110 Heidegger, M artin, 33, 50, 101, 131, 147, 177, 199, 223 Heisenberg, W., 53, 77-8, 85, 94, 97,

142, I48, 259—60 heliocentricity, 62, 64, 212, 255, 262; see also astronomy hell, 279 H eraclitus, 20, 55-6, 89, 104, 131, 180,

, , ,

205 223 244 267,273

Gadamer, H.G., 27, 143-4, 292 Gaiser, K., 60, 292 Galileo, 51, 62, 78 G andhi, M., 215 Gauss, H., 210-11, 292 giving up, 135, 170 Glaucon, xii, 120, 181, 214, 218 G nana yoga, 30, 39 God: abstract, 101; City of, 4, 106, 134—5; communion with, 228-9; as creator, 283; externalized, 65, 68-9; faith in, 102-4; Hindu, 104, i n , 132, 286-7; and incarnation, 284-5; as neutral currency, 196; reflection of, 176; see also One gods, 195, 197, 245-7

high-dwellers, 205-7 Hinduism: caste system, 112; on city, 138; on evil, 110, 219; on God, 104, i n , 132, 277-8; on grasp, 222; on identity, 229; on immortality, 275; on incarnation, 284, 286; on knowing, 120-1, 151; on language, 93; on microcosm/macrocosm, 76; on N ature, 29; on non-violence, 134; paradox in, 48; on perfection, 5; psychological divisions, 112; and psychotherapy, 29; on reincarnation, 275; on self, 41; on seven celestial odies, 218; on soul, 28-30; on thought, 22, 26; on turning around, 185; on universe, 264; on virtue, 197;

300

INDEX

on Word, 282-4; on world order, 106; see also Bhagavad Gita; Krishna; Upanishads; Vedas Hobbes, Thomas, 31, 168, 174 Homer, 214, 216, 292 horizontal dimension, 89—90, 108—16, 123-4, 134 Hoyle, Fred, 1, 5, 76, 292 hubris, 2, 195 Hume, David, 102 Husserl, E., 32-3, 41, 83, 148, 263, 292 Hyle, 3, 143, 162 I, the, 40-3, 66, 120, 197, 202; ideal world, 141-58 idealism and materialism, 71-5, 143 ideas, 92, 141-58; see also thought, conceptual identity, see self idolatry, 211-12 ignorance, 105 illiteracy, 12-13, 85 immortality, 98, 155-6, 159, 162, 195, 265, 272-5, 277-81 inactivity, 2 16; see also walls incarnation, 284-7; see also reincarnation indirect description, 89 individual, see I; perfect man; self insight, religious, 132-3 instantiation, 86 instants, 95,97, 113 interests of social man, 31 internal study, 76 intuition, 107, 179, 183 inversion, 68, 193-202, 249

100-1, 132; and dualism, 131-3, 177; fasting, 185; on giving up, 135; on ideal, 144; on loss of self, 273; as Name, 286; parables of, 57, 200; on psychological conflict, 74; on reincarnation, 275—6; on social ties, 188; on work, 242; and writing, 24; see also Christianity; perfect man Jivatm an , 228 John, St, 166, 187, 218, 236, 2 8 4 - 5 ;^ also Christianity Jow ett, B., 86, 293 Judas, 132, 171, 276-7 justice, 132 Kam a , 26, 29

Kanga, S.N., 284, 293 K ant, I., 32, 35, 144, 293; on Copernicus, 51; cyclical view of history, 36-7; on duty, 67; on ethics and morality, 44, 46, 240; on inversion, 68-9; on man, 65; on m atter, 64, 71-3; on perception, 39, 43; on reality, 152; on self, 38-42, 91, 186; on thought, 197; on universalizability, 221 K arm a, 145, 246 K arm a yoga, 30, 39 Kephr, 44 Kierkegaard, S., 39, 50, 58, 101-2, 131, i 47> I49>278, 293 Klein, J., 18 1, 212, 293 Knothi Seuton, 76 knowing/knowledge, 112-14, 114, 119, 179-80, 182; being as object of, 39; with body, 18, 26-7, 30, 38; and experience, 36; as flow, 62; as perception of one in many, 104-5; three kinds of, 17-32, 54, 66-7; without thought, 121-2; see also Noesis ; thought Koan, 48 Koinonia , 45, 154 K oran, 21,24, 47,75, 106, 132; see also Islam Kotler, Philip, 257-8 K rishna, Lord, 29-30, 58, 74, 101, 104, 120, 132, 184, 219, 27% see also H induism Krishnaswami, 29, 293 K rya , 186 K undalini, 218, 264

‘Is’, 93 Isherwood, C., 275, 293 Islam: aspectuality in, 30; duality in, 130; and falsehood, 106; and God, 1o 1; and idolatry, 211; on mercy, 132; on morality, 133; paradox in, 48-9, 57; and spiritual vision, 185; rhythm in, 21, 24, 222, 232-3, 284-5; ritual in, 240; on virtue, 47; on Word, 284-5; see a^so Koran; M ohammad Jaeger, W., 45, 293 Jam es, E.O., 238-9, 293 Haspers, K., 34, 147, 293 Jesus Christ: on adultery, 46; body of, 150; on death, 168, 186-7; disciples,

301

INDEX

labour, see division of labour; work L ’adah, 211 language, 37-8 ,4 2 ,5 6 -7 ,9 1 ,, 121, 152, 219, 233, 244, 257, 259-60; see also words L aoT zu, 12,255, 267; see also Taoism left/right duality, 22-3, 29, 68, 108, 172, i 78» !98>244>246 Legge, Jam es, 123, 293 Leibniz, G., 151 leisure, 240 Leonidas myth, 159-60 Levy, G .R .,45 L i , 20, 232 L ’ibdah, 211 lie, see falsehood L ’ilm, 211 linear philosophy, 11 linear time, 77-8 Linforth, Ivan, 228, 232, 293 liver, 228-9 Locke, John, 32 logic, systems of, 91 logical postivism, see postivism Logisticon , 29, 37-8, 54, 73, 81, 93, 107, 112-16, 125, 164-6 Logoj-oriented thought, 3-4, 64, 144, 247; aspectuality in, 19; on autonomy, 39; avoids verification, 74-5; and being, 93; and conceptualists, 46, 57; and duality, 108; ethical faculty, 37-8; and harmony, 222; and I, 175; objectives of, 182-3, ^ 9 ; ° n space, 75, 78; on walls, 215; love, 171, 264-5; being as object of, 39; and heart, 37; kinds of, 172-3; knowledge through, 180; as own reward, 67; and self, 151; as synthesizing force, 125 lower-body logic, 26-7, 30, 179 lust, 198 McClain, E.G., 91, 203, 235-6, 239, 293 Machiavelli, N., 263 macrocosm/microcosm, 4, 76, 217-18 M ahabharata, 46, 55 maieutic technique, 24 male/female duality, 22, 68, 177, 198 M anas , 19, 26-7, 29-30 M ania , 53-4 m antra, 21-2

market, see m erchant M arx, Karl, 264, 291; on activity, 148; on externality, 108; and Hegel, 68, 110; on labour, 201; on natural laws, 26; on philosopher, 8; on private property, 177; on stages of society, 35 Marxism, 101, 144 materialism, new, 70-87; see also m erchant mathem atics and number, xii; as art, 181; and astronomy, 44; and Chora, 87; and city plans, 235-7; anc^ conceptual thought, 60, 62-3; ethical, 234-5, 237; and evil, 181; and sophism, 212 matter: Chora as, 79-81, 118, 125; constitution of, 256, 264; defined, 85-7; and space, 79-83 M aya , 87, n o mean, 144 measurement, standardized, 234-5 medical analogy, 221 meditation, 8, 74, 142 Menexenus, 200 mental time, 96 merchant thought, xiii, 6, 35-8, 40, 67, 209, 254, 257-8; on division of labour, 162, 174; on God, and I, 40-3, 196; State, 208-9; se a^so materialism M erlan, P., 11, 150, 293 Metanoia , 185 Metastrophe, 185 Michell, John, 236, 293 microcosm/macrocosm, 4, 76, 217-18 mind: and body, 167-8; correctly functioning, 180-1; knowing with, 18, 38 M ohammad, 13, 24,57-8, 101, 1 1 7 ;^ also Islam M oira , 125, 143, 163\ see also Theia Moira Moksha , 185 M orrall, J.B ., 180, 213, 240, 244, 293 Moses, 57 movement, 124, 148, 216, 226-31, 244, 265—6; see also flow; vertical M urti, T.R.V ., 97, 192 Muslims, see Islam; Koran; M oham m ad music, 21, 55, 223-4, 227, 231-2, 272 myths, 49-50, 84, 89, 101-2, 157-8,

-, ,

161 2 177 193-249

302

INDEX

Namas , 44

names, 130; rectification of, 38, 259 Nasr, S.H., 130, 294 nature, 26, 29 needs, sets of, 26-7 negative description, 89 negative, double, 93, 98 negative mania, 54 negative movements, 244 negative sentiments 172-5; see also evil negative soul, 75 newness, 254-5 Newton, Isaac, 78, 236, 254 Nietzsche, F., 68-9, 286 Noesis and noetic thought, 19, 107, 249; and concepts, 57, 59-68; defined, 120; on dualism, 44; on ethics, 31; on falsity of positivism, 32; on ideas, 60; on movement, 207, 230; on reality, 86; on sentiments, 27; on thought, 25; on time, 23, 72, 116-19 non-alienated society, 199 non-conceptual thinking, 51-3 non-violence, 133 norm, 144 Noss, J.B ., 106, 294 nothingness, 110-11, 142 notions, 52, 61-2, 90 Nous, 61, 229, 265 number, see mathematics objectivism, conceptual, 141-58 observation, 149 Oehler, K., 120, 199, 294 O M , see AUM One, 103-4; and dyad, 73, 113, 119, 130, 277; in many, 104-5; nature of, 98-9; power of, 287; and Word, 286—7; see also God; vertical ontological realms: of becoming and actuality, 70-87, 111; of being, 88-99, 111 O ppenheimer, J.R ., 8, 95, 294 opposites, 171-3; see also dualism oppsition and art, 54 order, 105-6, 238-42 organizaing principle, 28 otherness, 108 pain, 212-13, 258-9 paradox, 2, 48-9, 57, 97, 103, 161 Parekbasis, 173, 243-4

parenthood, 230-1 Parmenides : on being, 39, 88-99; on conceptual objectivism, 141-58 passim ; on dualism, 244; on habit-conforming, 55-6; on ideas, 60; on One, 73, 98, 103-4, *80 parrot parable, 176 participation, 8, 152-3, 158 Particular Being, 207 passions, 27, 178, 227 Patai, R., 198, 237, 245, 294 Patanjali, 37, 168, 186, 284 Pathos, 19, 133 paths to God, 30 Paul, St, 47, 49, 58, 105, 142, 173, 187, 230, 276, 285; see also Christianity Pausanias, 172 perceptions, 33, 36 perfect city, 4-5 perfect man, 202, 218-19, 256-9, 270 perfect society, 159 Periagoge, 183-5, 229 permanence, 82 personality, 155, 168, see also self persuasion, 219, 221 Pfonos, 171, 208 Philo the Jew , 274 philosopher-poets, 177-8, 180 physical activity, 226-32, 263 physics, 77; see also atoms; quantum Pieper, J ., 45, 122, 151, 197,210,238, 241, 294 Pindar, 229 Pius X, Pope, 238 plant, man as, 194 Plato and Platonic thought: on ageing, 274; on art, 53; on astronomy, 44, 62-4, 75-6, 78, 162, 218; on being, 39; on children, 231; on Chora, 256; on city, xii, 5, 134-9, i9 9 -200>203“ 5> 213, 217-19, 237, 239; on Counsellor, 285; on Cronus, 279; and dialectic, 18-24; on dualism, 46, 177-8, 244, 247; on elements, 264; as encyclopaedist, 11-12; on faith, 102, 104; on fear, 230; on flow, 56; on gods, 195, 197, 245-7; on identity, 229; on knowing, 62, 121, 151; on law, 130; on leisure, 240; on Logisticon , 37; on mathematics, xii, 60, 143, 181, 234-6, 262; on matter, 79-83, 86, 107-8; on movement, 232,

303

INDEX

265; on navy, 214-15; on needs, 26-7; on observation, 149; on order, 239; and Parmenides, 22—3, 88-99, 103; on perception, 72-3, 103; on perfect man, 218; on reincarnation, 155—6>275-7; on religion, 49; on rivers and flood, 203-6; on ruling, 140, 221; on society, 35, 188; on sophism, 6, 212; on soul, 29-30; on Spartans, 122; on spiritual vision, 183—5; on thought, 62-4, 68; on time, 275; on truth, 45; on two worlds, 141, 144, 150, 152, 174; on walls, 213-15; on work, 241; see also Saanthana thought; Socrates pleasure and pain, 212-13 Pleonexia, 168, 203, 206, 208-9, 248 Plotinus, 11, 98, 150, 152-3, 155, 294 pluralism, 6 Plutarch, 36, 122, 294 Pneuma, 19, 133, 218, 265 poetry, 45, 177-9, 227, 233 Politea, 134-9, *66; see also city politics, 233 positive, 53-5, 244 positivism, xii, 6-8, 53, 59, 119; errors

of, 33-47 Prana , 201

priest/Brahm in soul, 28-9 private property, 177-8; see also walls Proclus, 80-1, 107, 112, 150, 184,218, 232, 265, 286, 294 profit, 257-8; see also merchant progress, 9, 78, 159, 202, 205, 253-6 Protagoras and Protagorean thought, 52, 64-5, 141-58 passim Psellus, 232 Pseudo-Dionysius, see Dionysius Pseudos, 216 Pseudo-Theages, 45 psychological divisions, 112 psychological time, 224 psychotherapy, 29 Ptolemy, 262 punishm ent, 117, 220 purgatory, 279 Pythagoras and Pythagoreans, 60, 64,

, , ,

73 81 109 112,151

Q uantilianus, Aristides, 227

quantum theory, 53, 75, 77, 102, 263, 266 Radhakrishnan, D., 41, 294 Rajas, 28, 112, 114, 164

R am anuja, n , 72, 149, 168 Ratio , 45, 61

rationalists, see thought, conceptual Ravel, M., 21 reading, see writing reality, 33, 89 reconciliation, 243-7 reincarnation, 40, 155, 159, 272, 275-7 relativistic subjectivism, 141-58 relativity, 146, 262-3, 265 religion, 129-32, 177-8 \ see also Buddhism; Christianity; faith; God; Hinduism; Islam; Taoism representative precinct, 217 remembering, 270 rhyme, 19-20 rhythm , 20-4, 63, 219, 222, 224, 248; of calendar, 238—42; and exercise, 227-33; loss of, 239 right/left duality, 22-3, 29, 68, 108, 172, 178, 198, 244, 246 Rihd, 112 rituals, 238-42 passim river myths, 201, 205-7, 285 Rolt, C.E., 220, 291 Ross, Sir David, 60, 295 Rta, 106 ruling, 140, 220-1 Rumi, 142 Russell, Bertrand, 100, 151, 295 Rutherford, Ernest, 62, 75, 102 Saanthana thought, 4-5, 10; on ageing, 274; on change, 25; on cosmic Being, 269-70; on division of labour, 12; on duality, 29; on free choice, 39; on external and internal, 76, 217; on harmony, 222; on ideal, 143-7; on knowledge, 234; on participation, 152-3, 158; on perfect society, 159; on progress, 78; on punishment, 220; on rhythm, 248; on sentiments, 197-8; on soul, 75; on time, 276; on unity, 1 7 1 ;^ also Hinduism; Logos:; Saanthana thought; Taoism; Zoroastrianism

304

INDEX

Sachs, Mendel, 97, 295 sages, 267-8 Samadhi, 5 Samkara, 41 Samsara, 87, 93, 116 Sartre J .- P ., 33-4, 149 Sat-Asat, 90-2 satori, 48 Sattva , 28-9, 112, 114, 263 Schopenhauer, A., 35 Schuon, F., 224 self:-abuse, 218; -assertion, 195; attachm ent to, 210; as blank, 163; concepts of 40—3; -consciousness, 155, 199; -creator, man as, 144; and death, 168, 186-7; deception, 211; denial, 162; duality in, 169-75, 217; gratification, 211; -identity, 277-8; -limitation, 203; loss of, 273; and love, 151; and many, 155-7; paradigmatic, 159; perceived, 159, 167-8; as pivot, 263-4; purification, 224; -regeneration, 265-7; sacrifice, 159; and soul, 28—9; survival of, 277—81; two, 260-2; unity of, 169-71; unselfish, 185; see also I; individual; personality; soul seasons, 239-42 Seligman, P., 195, 295 sentiments, 19, 282-8; and aspectuality, 63; and emotion, 140; and ideas, 141-58; and movement, 229; and number, 87; and passions, 27, 227; six, 246; and spirit, 133; and synthesis, 44-7; and thought, 65, 121,123-4; see also Logos; Pathos; Pneuma\ Tao seven celestial bodies, 218; see also astronomy seven days, 239 seven evils, 181, 198; see also evil seventh movement, 244 shape of space, 80-2 Shariah, 106, 230-1, 240, 284 Shirk, 211 sick aristocrat, 208 sick city, 137-9, 166, 173-5, 210-12,

271; see also Atlantis; city; evil; Fall silence, 122-3, 2^6 Simplicius, 109, 195, 286 Simploke, 18, 44

sin, see evil; Fall; sick city Sinaiko, Herm an, 27, 39, 46, 134, 146, 295 Sinkresis, 167, 243-4 six sentiments, 246 Smart, Ninian, 285 Smith, Adam, 168 Smith, D.H., 231,295 society, duality in, 169-75 Socrates, 267; on art, 232; on astronomy, xii, 64; on belief, 205; on city, i 39> J45> i 99- 20> 214; on Counsellor, 285; on death, 185; on decay, 238; dialectic, 20, 23-4, 27; on emotions, 45; on evil, 117, 271; on God, 65; on ideal, 143-4; illiterate, 12, 85; on immortality, 156-7; on labour, 162; on law, 230; maieutic technique, 24; on mathematics, 181; on m atter, 80; on mind and body, 221-2; on music, 232; on names, 130; on order, 239, 261; on perception, 32, 34; on possessions, 235; on reincarnation, 286; silence of, 123, 266; on social ties, 188; on sophism, 211—12; on thought, 52, 56, 60-1; on tyranny, 225; on walls, 216; on war, 214; on words, 121, 233; on writing, 135; Xenophon on, 121; and Zeno, 96; see also Saanthana thought; Plato Solmsen, F., 64, 237, 295 Soma, 186 ‘something’, 142 sophism, 68, 205, 210-12, 223-4, 255; see also positivism Sophocles, 283 soul, 18, 74-5, 136, 228; aspects of, 28-30; and division of labour, 164-6; and thought, 38, 112; see also self space, 75-9; and matter, 79-83; shape of, 80-2; and time, 83-5, 97; see also astronomy Spartans, 122 specialization, 162 speech, see language; words Speussipus, 109 spiral, 21, 160 Spirit, 133 spiritual vision, 183-5 Stalin, 178 Stapp, H .P., 43, 295

3°5

INDEX

star, death of, 261-2; see also astronomy statesman, ideal, 139, 228 Stasis, 124, 224 Stenai, 56 Stenzel, J ., 59, 167, 295 Stevens, P.S., 26, 83, 295 Stewart, J.A ., 45, 195, 295 Stewart, T.C ., 237 stillness, 122-3, 266 stomach, 30, 179; see also Manas stream of consciousness, 161 Stumpf, S.E., 34, 295 subjectivism, 141-58 Sufism, 133, 185\ see also Islam Suzuki, D .T., 242, 295 symbols, 18 Symphonia, 223 synthesization, 44-7, 125, 167 Syrianus, 150

sentiments, 65, 121, 123-4; and soul, 38, 112; types of, 26-8, 38; as understanding, m - 1 2 , 114-15, 119,

124

three, 274; see also triunity thumetikoid desire, 38 Thumos, 29, 112, 114-16, 124, 164-6, 179,211 Tien , 106 Tillich, Paul, 104, 295 time: and becoming and changing, 92-6; biological, 96, 116; in conceptual thinking, 50; conjectural, 175; continuity in, 162; cosmic, 96, 116, 224; and immortality, 272-5; linear, 77-8; mental, 96; out of, 5, 23, 72, 95, 272, 275, 278-80; seasons, 239-42; and space, 83-6, 97; types of, 96-7, 116-19, 224, 272-5 To Metron , 235 Tai Chi acupuncture, 29 To Perns, 22-3, 73, 109, 113-14, 265 Tamas , 29, 112, 114 transconceptual reality, 142 Tao, as sentiment, 19 Trasym achus, 212 Taoism: and Confucianism, 131, 177; tree symbol, 194 on death, 187; and dialectic, 20-3, Trethow an, I., 224 57; dualism in, 108-9, 1115 177> 244; triunity, 110, 129, 243-4, 260 on Fall, 195; on music, 9; newness of, truth, 100-25, I 3 I > 180-1, 210 255; on non-conceptualization, 53; turning around, 183-5 on nothingness, 142; on order, 106; two cities, 271 as organizational principle, 4; two selves, 260-2; see also dualism rhythm in, 222; on sage, 46; and two-world interpretation, 141, 144, silence, 123; on work, 185; see also 150* J52, 174 Lao Tzu tyrant, 170, 224 Tariquah , 130-1, 285 Tasawurf, 211 ugliness, 216 Taylor, A.E., 82, 84, 86, 92, 233, 295 understanding, see thought Tchaikovsky, P., 260 unity, 2, 4, 94-6, 169-71, 217 Techne, 235 Universal Being, 207 technology, 202 universalizability, 220—1 temple, city as, 226-42 ‘universals’, 60 Terns, 48, 133 U panishads, 22, 30, 104, 110, 185, 286; terrorist, 224 see also Hinduism Thales, 103 upward movement, 207 Theia M oira , 54, 136, 185; see also Moira Urwick, E.J., 129,272,295 therapeutic city, see healthy city Usia Ontos Usa, 104 things, 64, 118 Utopia, 138-40 thinking, see thought third city, the, 129-249 Vedas, 29, 93, 106, 109, 287; see also Thompson, D ’Arcy, 108, 295 Hinduism Thorax , 26, 142 verification, 74-5 thought: conceptual, 37-69, 72, 91, Versenyi, L., 211, 295 142-3, 189; parasitic, 179-80; and

3°6

INDEX

vertical dimension, 89-90, 108-16, 123-4 vice, see evil Victor, Pope, 239 vision, spiritual, 183-5 virtue, 132-3, 175-6, 197-8, 207, 231-2,244 vision of city, 179-89 V ohu M anu, 133,218-19; see also Zoroastrians Voltaire, 237 walls, 188, 213-16 W altham , Clae, 195, 272, 295 Weil, Simone, i q 8 , 20^ Weyl, H., 84, 296 wheel, 21 Wheeler, J.A ., 77, 83 W hitehead, A.N., 150-2 wholeness, 108 Wild, J ., 193, 296 W ittgenstein, L., 32, 42-3, 56, 152 Word, the, 282-6 words: as charms, 121, 233; written, 24, 91, 135, 182; see also language

work, 185, 201; see also division of labour world order, 105-6 writing, see words W undt, Wilhelm, 227, 296 Xenocrates, 24 Xenophon, 12, 85, 121, 296 yin/yang duality, 22-3, 68, 111, 130, 177,244, 247,259,274 Yoga, 5-6, 29-30, 201, 228-9, 260, 274 Zaehner, R.C., 185, 195, 284, 296 Zen, 5, 7,48, 131 Zeno, 94, 96, 98, 160 Zoroastrians, 11-12, 160, 267; on choice, 39; on city, 138; commands, of, 30; and future age, 279; and Greeks, 78; on movement, 232; on natural order, 106; on other, 110; on soul, 29-30; on thought, 26; on two world souls, 244; on virtue, 133, 218-19; on Word, 284

307