The Theology of the Epinomis 0367683210, 9780367683214

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The Theology of the Epinomis

This is the first monograph devoted to the theology of the Epinomis. It argues that the work offers a revised Platonic conception of the divine better suited to the political-religious imperatives of the post-Classical age. The Epinomis is the ‘appendix’ to Plato’s Laws likely written by Plato’s student and disciple, Philip of Opus, who is believed to have taken care of the arrangement and posthumous editing of the Laws into twelve books. Through a comprehensive analysis of the Epinomis’ lexicon, and comparisons with the Corpus Platonicum, Vera Calchi offers readers an insight into the Epinomis’ philosophical and historical context, purpose, and legacy. Calchi argues that Philip effectively reshapes Plato’s metaphysical language into a theology premised on the immanence of God in the heavens. The resulting account of God’s providential activity in the cosmos, which offers a new way of thinking about morality and political order, can be regarded as a major step towards the cosmic theology of the Hellenistic period. The Theology of the Epinomis is suitable for students and scholars of ancient philosophy, particularly those working on the Epinomis and Platonic philosophy. It will also be of interest to those studying the history of religion and theology in antiquity. Vera Calchi is currently a postdoctoral researcher at Politecnico di Milano, Italy. She earned her PhD in ancient philosophy in 2019 and was a visiting DS at various (non-) European universities. She is the author of Under the Auspices of Plato: Did Aristotle Read the Epinomis?

Issues in Ancient Philosophy Series editor: George Boys-Stones, University of Toronto, Canada

Routledge’s Issues in Ancient Philosophy exists to bring fresh light to the central themes of ancient philosophy through original studies which focus especially on texts and authors which lie outside the central ‘canon’. Contributions to the series are characterised by rigorous scholarship presented in an accessible manner; they are designed to be essential and invigorating reading for all advanced students in the field of ancient philosophy. Taurus of Beirut The Other Side of Middle Platonism Federico M. Petrucci Ancient Logic, Language, and Metaphysics Selected Essays by Mario Mignucci Edited by Andrea Falcon and Pierdaniele Giaretta The Stoic Doctrine of Providence A Study of Its Development and of Some of Its Major Issues Bernard Collette Investigating the Relationship Between Aristotle’s Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics Giulio Di Basilio Thales the Measurer Livio Rossetti Gorgias’s Thought An Epistemological Reading Erminia Di Basilio The Theology of the Epinomis Vera Calchi For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Issuesin-Ancient-Philosophy/book-series/ANCIENTPHIL

The Theology of the Epinomis Vera Calchi

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 Vera Calchi The right of Vera Calchi to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-0-367-68321-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-68323-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-13691-0 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003136910 Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of tables Acknowledgements Preface 1

Introduction: the Epinomis, a mirror of its times: the transition from Plato to the Hellenistic age The philosophical context of the Epinomis 2 Author, style, and themes  2 Rival theologies within the Early Academy  4 A confusingly worded ontological doctrine  6 The hidden ontology of a manifest deity  6 Different nouns: the Epinomis’ fluctuating divine ontology  7 Divine providence and the decay of dialectic  9 From Plato to Hellenism  11 Conclusions 13 Appendix 14

viii ix x

1

SECTION ONE

The Epinomis and its background: re-shaping Plato’s theological language 2 The Phaedo and the Epinomis: the de-transcendentalised forms What does the Epinomis accept from the Phaedo and what does it reject?  25 Borrowings  27 ἀνώλεθρον-ἀθάνατον (88b6; 981e7)  27 καθαρόν* [καθαριότης] (79d1; 984a6)  29 λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή (83d2; 985a5)  30

23 25

vi  Contents ἀσώματον (981b5)  32 ἀχρώματον (981b5–6)  33 Adaptations 34 μονοειδές > ἔχει μορφὴν μίαν (80b2;981b5)  34 ἀιδές > ἀόρατον (79a3;981c2)  36 Different ways to define the λογισμός  38 Conclusions 41 3 The Timaeus and the Epinomis: God’s non-imitative activity Preliminary remarks  50 The life-giving function  53 The attributes of divinity and priority  53 The noetic aspect  54 The ordering function  56 The steering function  60 The productive function – poiesis 63 Conclusions 65 4 The Cratylus and the Epinomis: Homoiosis theo(i) and astral worship Topic 1: the shared experience between Greeks and barbarians  76 Topic 2: the Greeks’ indebtedness to the barbarians  78 Topic 3: knowledge and virtues  80 Topic 4: Homeric and natural gods  83 Topic 5: daemons  86 Conclusions  87 5 The Laws and the Epinomis: the astral psychic immanent God The φύσις of the Epinomis: the psychic God is close to humans  93 The ἔμψυχον of the Epinomis: lawfully transcending the Olympian religion  95 The δύναμις of the Epinomis: the astral dynamic forces  98 The God of the Epinomis: a binding force  102 The God of the Epinomis: the oneness  104 Conclusions  107

49

72

93

Contents  vii SECTION TWO

The Epinomis and its advance: the Olympians’ departure

115

6

The greatest God The emergence of doubts about the gods’ existence  118 The deconstruction of the old religion  119 Eastern influences  121 The regulated innovation: responses to the changing times  122 Plato’s response  124 Laws, VII 821ab  128 Apollo-Sun Lord: the greatest God  130 The Sun-Soul God: the cosmos as a whole  130 The same religion  132 The Laws’ two levels and the Epinomis 134 Conclusions 136

117

7

Philip of Opus’ contributions to the Early Academy: The theology of the Epinomis The Early Academy and the originality of Philip of Opus’ proposal 146 The Epinomis’ retracing of the political vocation of the Platonic project: tradition and innovation  149 ἄτοπον  150 A feasible political project  152 Religion for politics, astronomy for ethics, philosophy for living  157 Immanentisation as an impulse to virtuous living  160 The Epinomis’ function as a bridge  161 Hellenistic themes and style  164 Conclusions  167

8 The Epinomis, a vivid example of transition Who is the God of the Epinomis?  176 References Index

146

176

184 197

Tables

1.1 List of descriptive attributes of both the Epinomis’ God and Plato’s divine subjects 3.1 Passages of the Timaeus and Epinomis that echo on themselves 4.1 The contents which connect the Cratylus’ etymological section to the Epinomis’ text and how they are arranged 5.1 Passages of the Laws and Epinomis that echo on themselves

14 50 75 95

Acknowledgements

This book reflects years of research spent working with many Professors in Pavia, Madrid, Rome, Leuven, Sydney, Munich, Turin, and elsewhere. They all made invaluable suggestions, generously discussing with me and commenting on my research. Above all, they allowed me the priceless blessing to put myself in the shoes of a student again: Professor F. L. Lisi Bereterbide, Professor F. Trabattoni, Professor F. Ferrari, Professor G. Van Riel, Professor R. Benitez, and Professor F.M. Petrucci. I am also grateful to Professor G. Boys-Stones and Routledge for giving me this opportunity. I would also like to thank my senior at Politecnico of Milan, Professor N. Di Blas, who not only read the entire manuscript but has also been an advisor and mentor to me. A very special thanks goes to two women of great integrity, personality, and elegance in reasoning: Professor J. Kindt, as having met her has been an important learning experience in many respects, and crucial for carrying out this study; and Professor F. Calabi, as without her I  would have never begun to study the Epinomis. I thank all of them for having listened to me with patience. They are all masters of researching and questioning. I would also like to warmly thank my friends for their support throughout the whole process of the drawing up and writing of the manuscript. I dedicate this book to my aunt Elena, my spiritual guide in never losing the enthusiasm for life and the opportunities that it offers.

Preface

The divine principle of the Epinomis Through a comprehensive and unprecedented analysis of the Epinomis’ lexicon and a close comparison between the text and some of the Platonic dialogues, the present book will investigate the theology and the divine principle of the appendix to the Laws, also shedding light on further related issues. It will show that the Epinomis acts as a bridge between previous theologies and subsequent ones, by bringing Platonic transcendence down to earth, so to speak, and paving the way for the Stoic notion of the immanence of the divine. A careful study of some main topics about the Epinomis, such as an ­investigation of the presence (or absence) of the Forms1 – also from a theological ­perspective – or of the controversial issue of this work’s authorship and reception, has already been extensively pursued; by contrast, the nature of the Epinomis’ divine principle remains an under-researched aspect of the dialogue. For this reason, this book focuses on the very nature of the Epinomis’ God, constituting the first monograph devoted to its divine principle and a contribution to understanding how the conception of God changed from Plato to the Hellenistic age. The inquiry of this volume analyses the dialogue in relation to various areas – ranging from cosmology to politics – and offers a philosophical perspective that contextualises the appendix to the Laws by assigning to it a clearly defined place in time.

The Epinomis as a collection of various topics and the snapshot of a specific historical period In the first place, the appendix to the Laws is worth analysing because, despite its brevity (hardly twenty Stephanus pages), it is rich in ontological, epistemological, theological, and ethic-political topics.2 This surprising multiplicity of issues allows the theology which the author proposes to emerge as the mixture of various disciplines: the answer to the main question of the dialogue (977ab: what does a man need to know in order to be wise and joyful during his mortal life?) is mainly developed through a theological argument (the author discusses the astral visible gods), which in its turn is conveyed by means of an epistemological solution (astronomy as the first science) and explicitly connected to a political aim (the reformulation of polis life in accordance with sophrosyne).

Preface  xi Secondly, the religious dimension of the Epinomis is surely noteworthy – indeed, noted by many scholars.3 Particularly remarkable, in this respect, is the role played by the dialogue in its own time, when – as a programme for religious reform – it represented, for Greece, the heralding of new Eastern perspectives. Significantly, the Epinomis has been defined as the ‘gospel’ (in its etymological sense of ‘good news’) of astral religion, since it proclaims the advent of happiness for men by identifying a God who is somehow new; closer and more accessible to human beings thanks to the observation of the motion of the stars (astronomical deities). These interesting aspects have been highlighted by a rich – proportionately to the length of the dialogue – literature on the appendix to the Laws, yet there are no extensive studies specifically focusing on the nature of the Epinomis’ divine principle. Thus, confirming the fresh attention and the new value that the appendix to the Laws has received in recent scholarship,4 this book discusses the Epinomis’ re-shaping of the Platonic divine by stepping into the field left open for research by previous studies and offering an inquiry on what the author of the dialogue left in the shadows: this essay will devote an in-depth analysis to the nature of the divine principle of the Epinomis, further expounding the purpose and origin of this work.5

The benchmark: a terminological comparison with the Corpus Platonicum While this book addresses a variety of questions, as the Epinomis’ theology touches upon heterogeneous fields, it maintains a theological focus, particularly through a comparative examination of the late Plato’s conception of God and religious doctrine. Without, however, aiming to specifically enter the debate on Plato’s understanding of God, which is a much discussed issue,6 this study necessarily refers to this philosopher, not only because the Epinomis is the last dialogue of the Corpus Platonicum, but also because whenever one approaches the study of theology in relation to the history of philosophy after Plato, one must consider the person who first coined the term – and hence the concept of – theologia, i.e., the first systematic theologian.7 The key method of this book, thus, establishes the Corpus Platonicum as the main counterpart: by concentrating on the theology of the Epinomis, it approaches the question of God in Plato as nothing more than a useful tool for better delineating the Epinomis’ divine principle. In this sense, the book only aims to shed light on the Epinomis’ conception of God by comparing it with what Plato considers to be divine. Indeed, examining the relationship between the appendix to the Laws and other works of the Corpus by specifically highlighting the connection between them brings out the particularities of the Epinomis, enabling us to overcome the idea that this text constitutes a mere complement to the main dialogue, and thus freeing it from its status of appendix – although it is clear that its precise reference to Plato’s last work cannot be ignored. In such a way, the Epinomis will emerge as a well-rounded and fully independent dialogue, despite the title it bears.8

xii  Preface An adequate evaluation of the relationship between the Epinomis and those dialogues safely attributed to Plato, examining both the novel elements and the Platonic borrowings compared to the Corpus, will require us to determine whether and to what extent the Epinomis’ theology constitutes a break with Plato’s theories. The Epinomis indeed seems to reflect the kind of theological discussions that became popular in the Hellenistic period, when religious and metaphysical ­questions – and answers – were established by partly challenging and partly maintaining the divine principles envisaged by earlier philosophers.9 A comparison not only with the Laws but the whole Corpus shows that even though the divine principle of the Epinomis can reasonably be considered to have been borrowed directly from Plato’s last work, it had already been present throughout his other dialogues and had then undergone further developments after his death. As we will see, in the Corpus there are traces of the evolution of Plato’s thought about the divine as the cause of things: while God has no place in Plato’s early philosophical system and the theory of Forms, as principles used to explain the world and knowledge cannot be found until after the Socratic dialogues, an increased interest in the World Soul and the Intellect, understood as the cause of movement, led the later Plato to develop a new theory that opened up the concept of the divine to the sphere of change proper to the perceptible10; what came next was the de-transcendentalising of Platonic ontology and the transition towards a single, psychic, and providential divine principle in the Epinomis. These aspects are made particularly explicit by the author of the dialogue, who, while remaining close to Plato’s works in semantic and syntactical terms, also modified Platonic theological terminology to suit his own purposes. Therefore, the starting point to propose an interpretation of the Epinomis that enhances its theoretical autonomy consists in an analysis of the text’s vocabulary and argumentative structures; by observing the Epinomis’ language and drawing parallels with Plato’s works, I  will provide an account of the Epinomis’ philosophical system, thereby contributing to its re-evaluation.

Book sections In providing a coherent account of the theological theory proposed by the Epinomis, the chapters of this book, while self-contained, are also closely interconnected, insofar as they address separate yet intrinsically related questions. Throughout all chapters, I will propose a reflection that mainly consists of two parts, corresponding to the analysis of the Epinomis’ background and legacy, respectively. After an introduction (Chapter  1) that offers a brief overview of the Epinomis’ philosophical and historical framework, the first section of the book (Chapter  2 to 5) begins. Through a comparative study of the Epinomis and Plato’s works, it will try to show the philosophical orientation of the Epinomis’ recovery of Plato’s dialogues, by revealing in what way the former shapes a new conception of God: each chapter from 2 to 5 (included) is concerned with a textual comparison between the Epinomis and a dialogue of certain Platonic authorship – not only those texts traditionally considered to be sources for the

Preface  xiii Epinomis, but all those dialogues in which extensive syntactical-lexical correspondences can be traced. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate metaphysical elements in the Phaedo and Timaeus that seem to be echoed in the Epinomis. Chapter 4 illustrates how the Epinomis’ roots are not exclusively to be found within the late Plato: a theory about the presence of Reason in the world is even identified in the Cratylus. Chapter 5 offers what might seem like an obvious parallel with the main work, the Laws; however, a comparison of this sort is extremely helpful to define two of the main features of the Epinomis’ God, namely, the oneness and immanence. This chapter links the two sections of the book by completing the first and, at the same time, touching upon the subject matter of the second part (which begins with Chapter 6): again based on a lexical inquiry, Chapter 5 already seeks to define the theology of the Epinomis in itself, quite apart from Plato’s dialogues. The second section (Chapter 6 to 8) is devoted to specifically examining and defining the Epinomis’ theology – in as comprehensive a way as possible – also by highlighting those hints that establish a connection between the appendix to the Laws and the later cultural context. This part is therefore mainly devoted to the innovativeness of the dialogue and improves our knowledge on the shift from Plato’s philosophy to Stoicism: firstly, Chapter  6 takes the chronology and the context of the Epinomis into account by pointing out that its philosophical theology undoubtedly presents certain links with the astral theology developed by the late Plato; then Chapter 7 considers the author’s position within the group of the Early Platonists. Finally, Chapter 8 offers a brief conclusion that revisits the major points made in the previous chapters of the book by placing them within a more general framework; by considering possible future research trajectories, it also raises the question of the legacy of the Epinomis’ theology.

Lexical aspects To make the reading unequivocal, in what follows I will point out some specific lexical aspects of the manuscript, which mostly concern the choice of some proper nouns, the use of capital letters for some key concepts, the use of synonyms, and the transliteration of the Greek. Firstly, I  should note that I  have decided to designate the main character of the dialogue by the name of ‘Athenian Visitor’. The Epinomis begins with three elderly men tracing Minos’ steps on the path from Cnossos to the sacred cave and sanctuary located on Mount Ida in Crete, in the hope of receiving Zeus’ guidance and discovering what the best political system and laws are. The conversation left open in the Laws is continued by the same characters: the Athenian – the main speaker – and his interlocutors (Megillus the Spartan and Clinias the Cretan). While the last two are called by name, the Athenian is identified only by the polis from which he comes from; acting almost like a judge between the other two, the Athenian summarises and extrapolates concepts from the opinions of the two Dorians, who defend views that are stereotypical of their home institutions. There is some (ancient and contemporary) speculation as to who this unnamed Athenian

xiv  Preface of the Laws might be, and according to tradition he speaks for Plato. Setting this issue aside, since there is no uncontroversial answer to the question, it must be noted here that, although the Athenian represents the intellectual pursuits of Ionian culture against the less philosophical interests of the Dorians; although he is culturally different from the other two speakers, it is unhelpful to refer to him by the name of ‘Stranger’ – as critics have sometimes used. Doing so would add an excessively exotic touch, when, in creating a constitution for Magnesia, the new Cretan colony, the Spartan, the Cretan, and the Athenian men come together: they are all Greeks who are not pursuing foreign principles and aims, but behaving in ways that are typical and characteristic of their culture – which in the Epinomis is indeed set in opposition to barbarian customs. A similar observation applies to the author of the dialogue. While the issue of the authorship of the Epinomis has been extensively investigated, an overview of scholarly analyses does not reveal any consensus on the matter, which appears to be a rather unsolvable problem.11 Given this, I will not go into much detail on the issue or dwell on it, but I accept the very reasonable attribution of the Epinomis to a milieu close to Plato; the author of the Epinomis is thus called Philip of Opus (fourth century BC) throughout the whole book, avoiding other formulas, such as ‘Plato’s secretary’ or ‘the editor of the Laws’. Moreover, I  would like to clarify the meaning attributed to certain concepts within the argumentation of the present book and the related use of capital or lowercase letters. The Sun and the Universe are understood either as gods or as a celestial body and the physical cosmos, depending on the context, so the initial letter is changed accordingly (by using the upper and the lower case, respectively). Similarly, the Soul has a capital letter when it is specifically understood as Epinomis’ God and a lowercase one when it is generically mentioned as the most divine part of living beings or referring to the individual human soul; likewise, ‘Providence’ and ‘Nous’ only have a capital letter when they are understood as divine principles. I should also provide some clarification as to the term ‘astronomy’ in this book, which is used in accordance with its understanding within the Epinomis. Firstly, it must be said that the Epinomis does not refer to astronomy stricto sensu: the importance of astronomy lies not only in scientific knowledge, but in a rational theology that grounds the new cult of the stars, leading to the attainment of true wisdom. It should be noted that the interest in astronomy in the Epinomis stems from a view of the discipline that evolved throughout the whole Corpus Platonicum, resulting – in the appendix to Plato’s last dialogue – in a close link with the ethical value of planetary motions, i.e., the orderly and harmonious orbital movements that are the visible image of fair behaviour. Plato’s understanding of astronomy underwent various developments: it is always associated with the eidetic sphere, until the severing of this link with the Laws.12 The famous anecdote of the Theaetetus (173e–174a) about Thales’ fall into a well reflects the poor consideration that many people had of the philosopher figure who spent his time looking up at the sky: absorbed in his own thoughts and contemplations, he was seen as distant from earthly things and judged unfit for everyday life; but Socrates

Preface  xv defends the philosopher, who, knowing how to look at sidereal bodies, is able to easily turn his soul from the world of becoming to the sphere of being; from the astral vault to the celestial ‘hyper-ouranos’, where the transcendent Forms reside. In Euthydemus 290c, astronomers (like cooks, surveyors, and accountants) defer to the superior knowledge of dialecticians, who know the supreme science of Forms, the height of – and precondition for – any kind of knowledge. In various works of Plato’s, then, astronomy is defined as a form of mathematical knowledge13; the case of Resp. 527e–531a is interesting: although astronomy is assigned a place in the sequence of studies that make up the typical cursus studiorum of the Nocturnal Council’s members14 even in the Laws and in the Epinomis, unlike in these two dialogues, in the Republic it is said to be detached from the divine world precisely because it grasps its objects through the physical faculty of sight, not by discerning eidetic patterns.15 Therefore, insofar as it represents merely an empirical mode of observation unrelated to thought, astronomy in the Republic only perceives physical copies, which, while being the most beautiful of earthly realities, remain material bodies vastly inferior to the truly perfect being. Astronomy is finally claimed to be an extraordinary science in the Laws (VII, 821a), and in the Epinomis it is the discipline that allows one to recognise divine Providence, i.e., the God-Heavens that takes care of human beings by showing them the path to acquire sophrosyne through the celestial movements. In this regard, it is necessary to underline that, although in the Epinomis God is associated with the earthly world, the author never raises the question of planets’ influence on human life or that of the acquisition of information on terrestrial events based on the study of the movements of celestial objects; in other words, while acknowledging the effects of the heavens on the human world – for applying sophrosyne is the only way to lead a peaceful life – the Epinomis offers no trace of the doctrine of astral configurations and divination practices, the main components and impulses of the kind of astrology that will take root in later times. Therefore, within the Epinomis, we do not find what we would call ‘astrology’ today, but we should bear in mind that this techne might be even said to constitute a single whole with astronomy in Classical Greece.16 Having clarified the meaning of ‘astronomy’, let me also spell out that in the use of legal terms, while seeking to maintain the general juridical meaning of certain words (not least by taking account of the differences between the ancient legal system and the modern one), I will not pursue to find the most exact possible expressions – the ancient law not being the focus of the study. Let me also press the fact that, likewise, I will not focus in-depth on the issue of the ‘founded’ (or not) nature of religion, i.e., on the polis’ interference in religious life instituted by the state, only accepting that Philip of Opus’ lawgiver organises and warrants religious facts. I should also like to point out that in this book I use synonyms of various words, preferring one over the other depending on the context. This is the case with (1) the divine principle: ‘God’, ‘the (universal/cosmic) Soul’, or ‘the psychic/divine principle/Logos’ – see the question of ontological fluidity dealt with in Chapter 1. Even when the masculine pronoun is used, the intention is never to give a personal

xvi  Preface character to God; (2) the group of the astral bodies: ‘cosmic entities’, ‘celestial realities’, ‘sidereal bodies’, ‘stars’ and ‘planets’; (3) the dialogue itself: ‘Epinomis’ or ‘the appendix to the Laws’ – the formula ‘pseudo-Platonic text’ has been avoided since, differently from ‘the appendix to the Laws’, which is considered a universally coherent label, it risks engendering confusion by shifting the focus to the question of authorship, which is not an issue the book intends to cover. A final note on the spelling conventions and transliteration criteria: throughout this book, Greek nouns are not transliterated when the reference is to their occurrences within the Corpus Platonicum or they express key concepts in the Epinomis’ argumentation, to which part of the volume’s terminological research has been devoted (e.g., ἀριθμός, δυνάμεις, etc.). The Latinised form (without accent marks) is instead used whenever the nouns in question express broad ideas (e.g., sophia), not specific to the Epinomis – or specifically discussed in relation to this dialogue. In such cases, the use of the original Greek forms would be misleading since it would draw attention to the lemma rather than the broad concept. In general, I  have adopted the following rules for transliteration: the improper diphthongs ᾳ, ῃ, and ῳ are transliterated as a(i), e(i), and o(i), respectively; the diaeresis and the smooth breathing are omitted, the rough one is rendered as h. Translations from the Greek are from the Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon, unless otherwise noted.

Greek editions This book is not intended to provide an ultimate and all-encompassing theoretical study that fully explains and links together all the unsolved aspects of the Epinomis’ theology; indeed, not all the questions and problems that emerge from its analysis of the onto-epistemological research on God – and, more generally, religion – in the appendix to the Laws, for systemic reasons, can be answered. Nor is this work intended to replace current interpretative comments. Instead, while still relying on such sources and alongside these models, it is designed to shed light on those aspects of the Epinomis’ conception of theology that have not yet been treated. This book will refer to the following editions, translations, and commentaries of the Greek text: • • • • •

Tulli M. (2013), Epinomis, introduzione, traduzione e commento di F. Aronadio, note critiche di F. Petrucci, M. Tulli (ed.), Bibliopolis, Napoli Tarán L. (1975), Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus and the Pseudo-platonic Epinomis, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia Adorno F. (1971), Platone. Opere complete, traduzione italiana di F. Adorno, Laterza, Bari Specchia O. (1967), Platone. Epinomis, Introduzione, testo critico e commento, Le Monnier, Firenze Novotný F. (1960), Platonis Epinomis. Commentariis illustrata, Academae Bohemosloveniae, Praha

Preface  xvii • • • •

Des Places E. (1956), Platon, Oeuvres comlpètes, Tome XII, 2e partie: Les Lois. Livres XI e XII, text établi et traduit par A. Diès; Epinomis, text établi et traduit par E. Des Places, Les Belles Lettres, Paris Taylor A.E. (1956), Plato. Philebus and Epinomis, translation and introduction by A.E. Taylor with the cooperation of R. Klibansky – Calogero G. – A.C. Lloyd (eds.), Nelson & Sons, London Taylor A.E. (1929), Plato and the Authorship of the Epinomis, British Academy, London Burnet J. (1907), Platonis opera, John Burnet (ed.), vol. IV, Oxford Classical Text, Scriptorum Classicorum Biblioteca Oxoniense, Oxford University Press, Oxford

Notes 1 The presence of the Forms within the Epinomis has been one of the major themes of debate. Suffice it here to mention that the discussion on this issue (a problematic one, insofar as it also brings up the matter of the authorship of the text) has led to the emergence of two main interpretative approaches: on the one hand, an immanent interpretation of the Epinomis’ ontology; on the other, an opposite interpretation, which claims that the absence of explicit references to the Forms is not a sign of the rejection of transcendence (just as the similar absence of the Forms in the Laws does not automatically imply that Plato changed his metaphysical view in the last period of his life by denying the ontology of the eidetic sphere). See Des Places 1952, pp. 376–83, 1981; Tarán 1975; Gaiser 1986. 2 Cf. especially Des Places 1937, who clearly claims that, within the Corpus Platonicum, not only does the Epinomis contain the most important mathematical passages, but it is also of great interest for the history of astronomy, and its religious significance has not escaped the notice of early Christian apologists and Neoplatonists. 3 Among the others, see Festugière 1949, p. 204; Cumont 2019 (3), p. 51; Vegetti 1992, pp. 295–318; Simeoni in Alesse – Ferrari 2012. 4 Recent publications on the Epinomis include Alesse – Ferrari 2012; Aronadio – Petrucci – Tulli 2013. 5 This book will not focus on what has already been investigated by literature; the approach adopted here is indeed unique in certain respects: this book offers a detailed lexical evaluation that compares the  Epinomis  and various Platonic dialogues, by drawing attention to the cultural and religious context and concentrating on the specific issue of theology. Indeed, even though critics have looked at the historical period of the Epinomis by dealing with its theology, no suggestions have been developed by means of an investigation that in this sense systematically compares the dialogue with more than one Platonic work or shows in detail how the Epinomis’ terminology is particularly revealing of a change in spirit. Not even Frede – Laks 2002, which collects articles that take into account historical developments in the Epinomis’ time and coeval authors, claims to cover the entire field – indeed, it does not discuss the appendix to the Laws at all. Then, the contributions by Theiler (1931) and Aronadio – Petrucci – Tulli (2013) offer observations on the  Epinomis’ time and the milieu in which the dialogue was composed by providing not only commentaries but also philosophical analyses; however, these studies do not focus on the nature of God. Finally, Taylor (1956) draws a comparison between the Epinomis and Plato, but this does not extend beyond the Philebus. 6 See Dodds 2015 (BUR 6) (1951), p.  285 nt. 67. Rheins 2010 reminds us that over the last century the debates on Plato’s theology have primarily revolved around two

xviii  Preface approaches that seem to overlap yet are seldom combined: the cosmological approach and the metaphysical one, which focus on interpreting and incorporating into a coherent system, respectively, the three key figures that play prominent theological and cosmological roles in Plato’s late dialogues (the World Soul, the Nous, and the Demiurge) and the One of the ‘unwritten doctrines’. 7 I am not referring here to the conception of theology in the archaic period, which was not a systematic discipline nor even part of religious life (which was nourished by various mythological traditions and cults that did not refer to any theological authority, sacred text, or established doctrine); nor am I referring to the technical usage of the term made by Aristotle or the advanced conceptions of God, such as the one introduced by Philo of Alexandria in terms of unknowability and indescribability. Rather, the reference is here to the theoretical reflection on the divine developed from the fifth century BC onwards, when religious beliefs and philosophical doctrines ceased to coexist in harmony and parted ways. In this respect, cf. Resp. II, 379a, where theologia is mentioned for the first time and said to have sprung from the conflict between the mythical tradition – which in Plato’s opinion consist of morally harmful stories – and rational opinions on the issue of God (insofar as theologia means approaching God(s) by means of logos). 8 See Tarán 1975, p. 49, who nevertheless argues that the Epinomis cannot be regarded as a self-standing work, on account of certain elements suggesting that the author assumed his readership to know that they were dealing with a continuation of the Laws, as well as on account of the opening, which creates a connection with the main work through a dramatic sequence presenting the same characters. Cf. Chapter 1. 9 Do gods exist? Do they care about the world and human beings? If so, how? Questions such as these, already raised by Plato and Aristotle, gained importance and were systematically addressed in later periods, in increasingly refined ways. Cf. see Frede – Laks 2002, p. IX. 10 This evolution of the concept of God also involves certain impasses, the greatest of which comes from the conflict between two key passages: at Resp. II, 380–2 the divine is defined as that which never changes and which thus belongs to the intelligible sphere; at Laws X 891a–899b, the divine cause of all realities is the Soul, which, as a vital principle, is by nature connected to movement and belongs to the world of becoming (see also Tim. 34c). Cf. Bordt 2006, pp. 21–2, 43–54; Bovet 1902, pp. 155, 177–9. 11 See Chapter 1. 12 Plato’s view of astronomy has been a matter of considerable controversy and is still debated. See, in particular, Kalligas 2016. 13 Cf. Gorg. 451c, Hipp. m. 367e–368a, Protag. 318e, Theaet. 145d, 169a, and Phaedr. 274c–275b. 14 See Chapter 6. 15 It is possible to trace a meticulous recovery of the Republic by the author of the Epinomis with regard to the whole cursus studiorum: arithmetic, Resp. 525d7-Epin. 990c6; geometry, Resp. 527a6-Epin. 990d2; stereometry, Resp. 528b1-Epin. 990d5; harmony, Resp. 531a6-Epin. 991b1; and, finally, astronomy and dialectic, respectively, Resp. 527b8-Epin. 991b5 and Resp. 534d9-Epin. 991c3 – although these last two disciplines are conceived of in different ways (see Chapter 1). These parallels echo the scheme proposed by Brisson in Alesse – Ferrari 2012, although the lines I  have quoted are different. Notwithstanding the drastically divergent ways in which this passage of the Republic has been read, it is clear that it strongly reveals Plato’s anti-empirical strain, which is to say his condemnation of the use of numbers for purely practical purposes (such as commerce). What is interesting for our purposes is the fact that the hyperbolic results of this ban on sense-perception – e.g., the positing of a ‘blind astronomy’ or a ‘deaf music theory’ – implies that, according to Plato, mathematics, even when ‘reformed’ (i.e., exercised in accordance with the pure knowledge of numbers), is

Preface  xix always inferior to dialectic. The latter indeed remains more virtuous for three main reasons: it makes use only of logos (without having recourse to sensitive instruments or replacing speculation with observation); it provides a synoptic vision; and it enables dialogic discourse. See Vegetti 2010, pp. 187–9. 16 The distinction between astronomy and astrology is largely a modern one. Indeed, in the ancient Greek world, the word ‘astronomy’ had a far wider range of meanings than today and included both astrological and astronomical aspects, i.e., both sidereal movements and the changes that they produce in things. Concerning the ancient use of the term ‘astronomy’, see Hübner 1989; Noegel – Walker – Wheeler 2003, p. 220; Repellini in Alesse – Ferrari 2012; Lisi 1991. Cf. also Cumont 2019 (3) (pp. 65–6) and Boyancé 1952 (p. 312), who, in slightly different ways, interpret the issue by indicating that it is necessary to distinguish astral religion from astrology proper: the latter is a form of divination based on a particular system of the universe, according to which the whole course of events is inflexibly determined by celestial alignments; the Greeks, though acquainted with cosmic fatalism, dismissed such a system by distinguishing the scientific data collected by the Babylonians from the erroneous theories they derived from it.

1 Introduction The Epinomis, a mirror of its times: the transition from Plato to the Hellenistic age

Who is the God of the Epinomis? Can this God be called both Platonic and nonPlatonic? Through questions such as these, this book aims to provide a complete definition of the theology of the appendix to the Laws, by exploring how its religion reflects the sociopolitical structures of the Greek polis at a very peculiar time. The Epinomis’ theology is here understood as the nature of its divine principle and, more broadly, religious beliefs; the investigation of this God will be conducted in both ontological and epistemological terms (i.e., in relation to the cognitive role of God), by examining the relationship between the cult dedicated to him and the laws in force at the time in which the work was composed, in order to reveal the orientation and philosophical ideas of the dialogue. Though the hazy nature of the speech delivered by the main character, the Visitor from Athens, the following pages will attempt to identify the ontological status of the Epinomis’ God. The presumed inauthenticity of the appendix to the Laws should not prevent us from identifying connections with dialogues of undisputed Platonic authorship. It is indeed undeniable that many Epinomis’ passages are thematically based on Plato’s dialogues: as we will see, this connection not only involves late works – ones similar to the Epinomis in terms of subject or chronology, such as the Timaeus or the Laws – but also extends to other dialogues from Plato’s early and mature period.1 An analysis of this clear relationship with the rest of the Corpus Platonicum allows us to trace an outline of the Epinomis and to determine the characteristics of its God; and, in particular, we can achieve an understanding of the topic by running two stages of analysis of the Epinomis’ theories in relation to Plato’s thought: the first stage is to assess the Epinomis’ recovery of the Platonic tradition, i.e., the similarity between its arguments and Plato’s; the second stage is to detect possible novelties, i.e., any theories which are absent from the rest of the Corpus and might therefore indicate an overcoming of it. Comparative in method and outlook, the present book will seek to define the degree of autonomy of the Epinomis’ philosophy vis-à-vis Plato’s, by touching upon various interrelated topics that the Epinomis discusses: religious beliefs, ethics, politics, and legislation. The premise and framework of the investigation is the particular historical moment in which new divine characteristics, such as God’s providential nature, became increasingly prominent in religious and philosophical reflection. DOI: 10.4324/9781003136910-1

2  Introduction

The philosophical context of the Epinomis Author, style, and themes As is well known, the question of the authorship of the Epinomis is far from clear: it could be even said to represent the most controversial aspect in the critical literature about this dialogue, with scholars being divided between supporters of Plato’s authorship and champions of the inauthenticity thesis.2 The latter make the incompleteness and rhetorical inconsistency of the dialogue the strong points of their argument and attribute the clunkiness of the text to the limited competence of its author, who was unable to faithfully reproduce his teacher’s style. On the contrary, when forced to acknowledge this opacity of the Epinomis’ phrases and, at least in relation to certain passages, its dissimilarity with respect to the style of the rest of the Corpus, those scholars who defend Plato’s authorship argue that this defective modus scribendi recalls that of the elderly philosopher, who never completed the dialogue, leaving us only an unrevised draft of it. Anyhow, discussing whether the Epinomis was written by Plato himself or by one of his disciples seems to constitute an unattainable objective and, besides, it does not lead to any particular advantage of the topic to which this book is addressed; then suffice it here to recall the Suda entry ‘Philosophos’, which credits an anonymous person (i.e., not Plato) with both the arrangement and posthumous editing of Plato’s Laws into twelve books and the addition of the Epinomis to them; and the Lives of Eminent Philosophers (III, 37),3 where Diogenes Laertius establishes the identity of this author by establishing that the dialogue was written by Plato’s secretary and disciple, a member of the Academy by the name of Philip of Opus – as the Epinomis’ author will be called in this essay.4 The present book will thus conduct its analysis based on the assumption that the Epinomis is most unlikely to be the work of Plato himself; so the main question becomes: what does the Epinomis’ author, who is not Plato, show us and why? Like the issue of authorship, so too is somehow blurred the argument of the Epinomis, which, though similar to the Laws’, undeniably unfolds more discontinuously: at a fast pace, the Athenian makes pregnant concepts suddenly emerge and then momentarily abandons these points, only to take them for granted a few pages later, sometimes even making them the basis of his presentation of central doctrines. The suggestions offered by the Athenian are like swift brushstrokes: through a dry and sharp language, they initially seem to convey illicit proposals, later to turn out as endorsements of the traditional concept of homoiosis theo(i). In a complex tangle of ideas seamlessly following one another, an indication of the right morality emerges when the Athenian – vehement about leaving no other possibility for action except the study of astronomy – ceases altogether to exchange views with his interlocutors: these characters, who already in the Laws played a merely supporting role by approving the Athenian’s words, so as to confirm faithfulness of them, are now completely deprived of any chance to put forward significant opinions; by revealing to the spectator truths that are inscribed in the heavens and taking part in what he is preaching, Philip of Opus urges citizens to make an immediate change of attitude.

Introduction  3 Thus, even though the title ‘Epi-nomis’ – as is widely known and as the name implies – designates the work as the appendix to Plato’s Nomoi, making it a dialogue formally belonging to the Corpus Platonicum, very little of Plato’s earlier dialogic spirit survives. Conversely, it is certain that Philip of Opus took up Plato’s doctrines in the belief that he was developing them in accordance with his teacher’s latest theories, particularly by giving his own view on two topics of crucial importance for Plato’s thought: the nature of the highest principle and the supreme object of research for philosophy. While the former topic is only hinted at and not clarified – which is why it constitutes a focus of enquiry for the present book – the text openly states that the object of study is astronomy (and no longer dialectic), understood as astronomy-based piety. Like the Laws, the Epinomis opens with a question, which is the very question that the Dorians had posed at the end of the main work, after witnessing the collapse of their theological-political views: what should mortal man learn in order to be wise? The answer to this, which is the raison d’être of the Epinomis, is set out by the Cretan Clinias at the beginning of the dialogue, giving Philip of Opus the opportunity to make manifest what was still partly hidden in the Laws, namely: the invitation to embark on an astronomical investigation, which also entails the legalisation of astral theology, as the only path to knowledge and happiness; this means that an intellectually aware form of piety has the power to raise human beings above their destiny. Through a heartfelt talk (see esp. the language at 973b), the Athenian claims that, even though only a few individuals can be truly blessed in this life – only the philosopher is makarios (supremely happy), since there is no difference in him between the happiness proper to the gods and the ‘earthly’ happiness of human beings – attaining wisdom is essential for everyone, and even achievable: all humans share the faculty of sight, which enables each person, according to his or her own capabilities, to deal with numbers. In fact, eyesight permits to investigate the measured movement of the divine stars and, by imitating it, to adjust our soul to God’s rationality, thereby making happiness attainable. The universe provides an inescapable point of reference: it is the most admirable model of moral behaviour, a concrete paradigm that offers an ethical paradigm for humans, allowing them to make their deeds consistent with their thoughts.5 In this sense, the Epinomis represents a means to develop the Platonic roots of cosmology as an indispensable background for ethics, in accordance with the later Hellenistic notion of humans as citizens of the universe; the meaning of human life cannot be adequately determined unless one sets it within a broader picture: even if we are not living in ideal political conditions, it is still possible for us to conquer bliss by studying the universe and knowing the orderly cosmos that surrounds us (as opposed to the Platonic contemplation of Forms). The theoretical issue of astronomy thus has practical consequences: without entirely stripping religious worship of its civic traits, Philip of Opus strives to purify official theology by pushing to the extreme the attempt to bring together civic religion and the astral (cosmic) one – whose divorce Plato had already emphasised. He aims to combine the new form of astral worship with the old, Olympian one; to link the tradition of the people and philosophers’ piety. And, while bridging the gap between philosophical theology and civic religion by

4  Introduction suggesting certain reforms, Philip of Opus displays a spirit of understanding and acceptance, adapting his speech to his interlocutors’ limitations and opting for general and simple terms to persuade his audience. Therefore, in addition to representing the culmination and the natural outgrowth of the mature Plato’s theological arguments, the Epinomis’ theology foreshadows the (Hellenistic) idea of cosmic religion by overcoming the traditional limits of city cults. In bearing witness to the Greek spirit’s urge to leave the polis behind and move beyond the narrow confines of the Greek world, Philip of Opus contributes to shaping the astral religion by pursuing his theological aim to convince his readers of God’s providence, along with the political one of establishing astral worship by law; while newly formulating certain ideas that the reader may have missed in Plato’s text, and seeking to give the reader far clearer indications than those found in the Laws, he also fills the gap in the main dialogue’s argument by claiming that the city can be preserved only if wisdom resides in it. Rival theologies within the Early Academy6 Like the other members of the Academy, Philip of Opus viewed his philosophical commitment strictly in relation to the Platonic legacy. Despite the wide range of interests and lack of doctrinal uniformity within the Academy, the debates among its members after Plato’s death mostly focused on the same key Platonic topics, most notably: the nature and activity of the first principles (with regard to which Plato had left a rather confusing inheritance) and the World Soul – two focal points that were to gain even greater prominence in the immediately subsequent period.7 Especially in relation to the reflection on the eidetic sphere, the interest in the sensible world increased and the thinking about the re-inclusion8 of the divine in the material world certainly had a prominent place within the philosophical discussions among the members of the Academy after Plato’s death. Indeed, it derives from a revision of the doctrine of Forms, understood as the primary founding realities; more specifically, this first immanentisation of the transcendent realm is envisaged as a reaction against the limits of the ontological separateness of the eidetic sphere – limits that are regarded as aporetic outcomes due not to the lack of conceptual tools but to the difficulties intrinsic to the theory itself. The latter was indeed considered by early scholars of Plato to have reached an impasse and to have become stranded in inherent complications, solvable only through considerable corrections and expansions. In this sense, the evolution that Plato’s doctrine underwent – and which in most cases seems to follow a purely mathematical path and to recover theories already developed within the immediately preceding Pythagorean tradition – mainly reflects the Academics’ attempt to eliminate the two major problems to which the eidetic principles gave rise: the confusion between the ethical and the ontological sphere, and the risk of the regressus in infinitum.9 In general, Plato’s doctrine of Forms was variously reformulated, without being entirely rejected. And this also led to a further reflection on the nature of the divine: while some scholars, including Philip of Opus, held that the supreme

Introduction  5 principle is immanent in the cosmos, others plainly did not share this view.10 The former group includes figures like the astronomer Eudoxus, who tended to physicalise the Forms by reformulating the theory in terms of a mixture between them and things (understood as replacing the relation of methexis), and believed in a causal link that could only be justified through an immanentist conception. An echo of Philip’s take on Plato’s first principle is also discernible in the thought of Polemon, the last head of the Old Academy: he declared that the supreme principle is an Intellect immanent in the cosmos, i.e., that the cosmos is God – a view very close also to the Stoic one.11 The latter group instead includes philosophers who would not appear to have abandoned the notion of a transcendent first divine principle in favour of an intra-cosmic ordering power; while positing a World Soul with intellective functions, they did not envisage it as the ultimate principle of reality, which for them indeed remained distinct and separate from the sensible cosmos. These philosophers constructed their worlds by operating with two principles: the One and something opposed to it, referred to under different names; in their view, God consists of a Nous, i.e., it is a divine mind that transcends everything and an ontological source that orders the cosmos.12 Speusippus, for his part, postulated the plethos (‘plurality’) or Indefinite Dyad, a principle of indefinite multiplicity, and the One, a perfectly simple and entirely transcendent principle that represents the cause of goodness, the supreme divine Unity, and the first principle of all things, occupying the first level of the metaphysical hierarchy. Indeed, while rejecting formal numbers and the entire theory of Forms along with them, he did not theorise the soul as the highest principle. For Xenocrates too God is outside the heavens, even though he seems to have emphasised the cosmic character of God – conceiving of cosmology as a key issue – and indeed to have regarded the heavens themselves as God (cf. fr. 15 Heinze). Nor is Xenocrates an exception to the general trend to posit two first principles, the Monad and the Dyad (‘the unequal’ seems to be the expressions associated with this philosopher): he established a transcendent theology based on the former, which he identified as the first principle, marked by divine, numerical, intellectual, and cosmic attributes. This active principle, encompassing the Forms-Numbers, remains transcendent: Xenocrates did not abandon the theory of eidetic models, but he replaced them with mathematical ones, assigning them a privileged place within his hierarchy of being (the first example of a graded ontology) as the truest and most authentic type of intelligible, independent real existence.13 Allegedly, it was these major figures who mostly contributed to developing the doctrine of Forms that characterises the Early Academy. In this regard, I will show in this book that one of the philosophers who innovated Plato’s thought was the author of the Epinomis himself. He strongly contributed to the reflection on these issues, although his strategy for the appropriation of Plato’s theories – differently from other thinkers’ – did not consider metaphysical reflection per se, but focused on the smooth running of the polis, in keeping with the concerns of his time. He did take a stance on metaphysical matters (by totally expunging his philosophy of any eidetic terms, as we will see), but he did so by joining metaphysics and ethics through a focus on political aims. He followed Plato’s path by suggesting a

6  Introduction unique scenario, not envisaged by any other known member of the Academy: for the major part, Academic philosophers systematised Platonic doctrine by trying to resolve the issue of transcendence and dividing the theoretical area of speculation into subfields. For his part, Philip of Opus reframed Platonic theology within the Old Academy by propounding original views, which also notably contributed to the transition to the themes of Middle Platonism. Being concerned with the challenges posed by atheism, which he regarded as profoundly undermining good governance, Philip is engaged in showing the true nature of God, whose existence and providential care for mankind he aims to highlight. By finalising the enhancement of the status of the soul begun by Plato, Philip of Opus advanced a doctrine based on the concept of a rational World Soul with demiurgic functions, a deity that does not transcend the physical world, yet presides over the celestial realm by guiding the other gods, who are revealed to be celestial deities subordinated to this Soul: the old god Ouranos is pressed into service in a quite new role, as the immanent guiding principle of the universe. It is this psychic God that teaches us the wonders of the astronomical numbers, the virtues of being well balanced, temperate, moderate, and decorously self-controlled (sophrosyne) – a virtue that, in turn, endows us with wisdom (phronesis). The study of astronomy therefore becomes synonymous with the contemplation of the structure and workings of God’s mind.

A confusingly worded ontological doctrine The hidden ontology of a manifest deity In the Epinomis, theological speculation, understood as the explanation of God’s nature, remains subsidiary to other focuses of interest, not seeming to be one of Philip of Opus’ primary concerns. The notion of divinity, philosophically understood, is neither defined nor clearly expounded, and speculation on the topic is left largely implicit. Philip of Opus does not provide any precise description of God’s traits (unambiguous indications are only given concerning some of God’s functions, i.e., his capacity for kinetic and demiurgic causation, guiding role, and psychic and noetic attributes); the few indications about divine reality we find in the text are, indeed, given in a rather cursory manner. Anyhow, this conceptual opacity regarding the nature of God does not mean that the Epinomis is unfamiliar with the philosophical ontology underlying the astral theology discussed in Plato’s last works, but only that Philip of Opus can afford to maintain an attitude of apparent theoretical uncertainty with regard to the divine principle since the Athenian Visitor’s argument in support of his scientific and religious theses does not depend on it; nor does this theoretical indefiniteness have an impact on the Epinomis’ religious requirements or affects Epinomis’ theology per se. However, the Epinomis’ reflection must not be regarded as a simple endorsement of religious practices or as a scientific theory hastily formulated through an exchange between dialectic and astronomy within the hierarchy of sciences (see later on): this dialogue indeed played a significant role in shaping a new conception of God. Notwithstanding the fact that a theological theory cannot be easily

Introduction  7 drawn from the Athenian’s words, it is undeniable that such a theory underlies the whole text: the religious practices proposed in the text actually seem to rest on a hard core of ontological metaphysics. In other words, the appendix to the Laws bases its ethics on a very specific – albeit unspecified – theology.14 Different nouns: the Epinomis’ fluctuating divine ontology For the aforementioned reasons, offering a complete and precise definition of the Epinomis’ God is a complex and subtle task. It is made even more challenging by the shifting use of nouns made by the Athenian, who, in order to indicate the divine principle, employs various terms, which sometimes seem to be synonyms while at other times seem to refer to different and autonomous entities. Mentioned for the first time at the very beginning of the dialogue (976e3), the divine principle immediately presents many facets, being ontologically intertwined with the notion of soul, along with those of a general divine reality and astral bodies. The expressions used in the Epinomis to refer to divine beings – ὁ θεός, ἡ ψυχή, τὸ θεῖον, and τὰ ἄστρα – too are elevated to the same divine dignity. The shadowy areas of the dialogue do not offer any certainty as to the fact that the fluctuating use of particular terms in the Athenian’s speech is due to a deliberate choice on the author’s part. However, the apparent indecision in the use of certain expressions cannot be attributed to mere impreciseness, or – more uncharitably still – be thought of as reflecting terminological-conceptual difficulties, i.e., ‘doctrinal errors’. On the contrary, this variation is to be regarded as not by chance; so it is worth considering each of the four different nouns which the Athenian employs to refer to God by examining what features and actions are attributed to which of these different divine agents – and why – and by assessing the choice to use one noun rather than another on a case-by-case basis. Plato, for his part, had already made flexible use of the terms god (θεός), divine (θεῖον), and gods (θεοί). Besides, the large number of statements about divine being(s) in the Corpus makes it impossible to identify in which dialogues and by means of which characters the philosopher actually intended to expound his theological conception; within the Platonic universe there are many realities that are labelled as ‘divine’, without Plato ever giving a clear and precise definition of this concept.15 In this sense, considering the subjects that Plato from time to time enumerates among the gods, in an effort to grasp which of them best fits the description of the μέγιστoς θεός of Laws VII 821a2, to which the Epinomis’ God seems to draw on, is not of great help as a way to identify whom or what Philip of Opus is referring to when he speaks of God. By contrast, recording all the features that qualify God in the Epinomis and verifying to which Platonic divine subject they are attributed within the rest of the Corpus might help us to understand which of these divine beings lies at the basis of the Epinomis’ God. As already noted – and as we will see in greater detail – in the appendix to the Laws, the divine principle, while embodying the characteristics proper to all three of Plato’s transcendent powers, is especially defined as a development of the World Soul: a broad connection between the notions of Soul and God runs throughout the Epinomis, firmly

8

Introduction

establishing the psychic nature of God. This conception rests on explicit formulations found in the text (Epin. 981a–982b; 983ab), and not merely on the concept of ‘anteriority of the soul’, traditionally viewed by critics as proof of the identity between the two realities in question; it indeed fulfills a very useful function for Philip of Opus, insofar as it makes it possible for him to acknowledge the celestial bodies as gods on account of their psychic component.16 Therefore, given the fact that the identity between the Soul and God is evident, even upon a cursory analysis, Philip of Opus’ choice to distinguish between these two subjects (and also between the divine and the stars) acquires salience and must be investigated. By taking into account the development of philosophical language at the time of Philip of Opus,17 I will embark on a terminological investigation focusing on the use of those expressions that qualify God in the Epinomis. I will list all these descriptive features in a table, structured in such a way as to present four sections (see the Appendix to this chapter).18 The main one, which guides the analysis, lists the attributes of the Epinomis’ God; the sections on either side, pertaining to Plato (left) and Philip of Opus (right), are in turn subdivided into columns, each devoted to a divine subject (those listed to follow for the Epinomis and the various divine subjects that can be found within Plato’s dialogues). The last section (the column to the far left) shows in which chapter(s) of this book each feature is discussed. The table thus shows the correspondences between Plato’s conception of the divine and Epinomis’, while also specifying to which subject(s) such terms are applied and indicating which works by Plato make use of the features in question. This terminological research allows us to consider the concept of God on the basis of how it is expressed, in view of finding a definition of it. As can be seen, the total number of semantic attributes that Philip of Opus uses to describe the divine is 26, of which: •

•

15, the majority, refer to ἡ ψυχή (6 of them also describe ὁ θεός; 1 οἱ θεοὶ φανεροί / τὰ ἄστρα). In the Epinomis, God is most often described as a cosmic Soul (and less frequently as a generic deity or as the stars), which mostly presents the features of Plato’s World Soul (and, to a lesser degree, of the Forms). This is unsurprising, since the topic Philip of Opus is dealing with is astral worship, which rests on the belief that the stars are gods on account of their psychic component; 9 refer to ὁ θεός (in the masculine singular form, used to express the subject or agent – i.e., in the nominative or in the accusative with a preposition – consistently with common usage in the Greek language; 6 of them also describe ἡ ψυχή). Although these terms occur throughout most of the dialogue (lines 975 to 991), they are concentrated in 976a–978d, which is the most philosophically dense passage and the incipit of the ‘pars construens’19; here the Athenian states that the subject of his speech is indeed a deity, the superior providential God who provides mankind with the crucial epistemic content, namely numbers. The most important hiatus is instead at 986a–988e, where, describing the structure of the heavens and the Greeks’ astronomical

Introduction 9

•

•

knowledge, Philip of Opus presumably prefers to use other terms to emphasise the sidereal nature of the divine principle; 2 refer to τὸ θεῖον (while also being applied to ὁ θεός and ἡ ψυχή). This nominalised adjective has a different value than ὁ θεός, that is, it expresses a more conceptual idea of God; Philip of Opus indeed does not seem to use the two expressions interchangeably but, through the alternation between masculine ὁ θεός (‘the god’) and neuter τὸ θεῖον (‘the divine’), he sharply distinguishes between a more personal and more abstract concept of the divine, respectively, by employing the former to refer to a specific god belonging to a particular religion, that of the Epinomis, and reserving the latter for stressing God’s non-human characteristics, i.e., to refer to the general concept of divinity in opposition to that of humanity. Here he must certainly be following the tendency in the Greek language to mark the transition from simple and concrete terms to more complex abstract periphrases by involving a change in using grammatical gender classes, i.e., a variation from masculine to neuter (of the singular adjective jointed with the article), which, especially in the philosophical scope, was the shape of how theoretical abstraction made its way in Greece;20 8 refer to οἱ θεοὶ φανεροί / τὰ ἄστρα (7 of which also describes ἡ ψυχή and 1 ὁ θεός). The stars are described as divine physical bodies in terms of their intrinsic, natural characteristics (cf. Tim. 34–38), i.e., the typical properties of sidereal bodies as physical manifestations of the invisible cosmic Soul that informs and moves them.

Philip of Opus’ vocabulary mostly refers to the material sphere and lacks any reference to the concept of ‘perseity’; in this sense, out of the various features described: •

•

God’s physic nature (τις φύσις) is absent in Plato’s dialogues, where God’s providential nature is far less emphasised than in the Epinomis. The terminology used within the rest of the Corpus to refer to the divine indeed does not belong to the material sphere because the primary characteristic of divinity is transcendence; on the contrary, in the Epinomis God is strongly associated with the worldly dimension. Connected to this is the key feature of Philip of Opus’ God, a characteristic that was greatly stressed in his age, namely God’s identification with Providence; the absence of αὐτὸ καθ᾽αὑτό and αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι stands out within the Epinomis’ text. The absence of perseity must be regarded as a terminological indicator that substantiates an immanentistic interpretation of the Epinomis’ theology, which indeed does not seem to envisage any transcendent dimension.

Divine providence and the decay of dialectic Even before Plato, Greek thinkers proved the divinity of the stars by pointing to the visibly ordered character of their motions, to their eternity and universality,

10  Introduction their limitlessness in time and space. In particular, considering the order of nature as proof of God’s existence, they attributed unlimited power to celestial harmony. In the heavens – they argued – there are no disturbances or errors because nothing moves without design: Providence directs the incessant regulated celestial movements, which are inconceivable without a divine Intelligence.21 Therefore, the active principles that move the celestial bodies were deified. For his part, Philip of Opus makes the same argument in a way that is both very Platonic, as he is primarily interested in establishing the existence of Providence, and non-Platonic, since he downplays the eidetic model and leaves room for the sensible paradigm that guides the acquisition of sophia. Within the Epinomis, it is astral theology that responds to man’s need to come into contact with God by offering a perceivable deity whose power to guide human beings towards virtue is tangible, whose providence is perceptible, and whose example is applicable to human life. A means to understand and implement homoiosis theo(i) is thus found in physical sight, which allows man to contemplate the empirical-sensible dimension. This notion is very far removed from the ideal level considered by Plato, and replaces the idea of noetic-intellectual view. The Athenian overturns the axiology of sight by operating a significant change in relation to cognitive action: the visibility and observability of an object ensure the possibility of becoming fully acquainted with it. In this sense, the Epinomis’ God, which is the precondition for knowledge, establishes the physical realm of the heavens as the impassable limit by which knowledge is made possible. By placing the object of knowledge in the material rather than noetic sphere – in the visible sidereal vault, thereby denying the possibility of a transition to a further ontological dimension – the argumentation of the  Epinomis  completely disregards the kind of conversion of the gaze (from the empirical to the ideal) that Plato had invoked. This leads to a change at the top of the ladder of knowledge: within his speech, the Athenian discards dialectic in favour of the mathematical sciences, especially astronomy.22 Dialectic now seems to be conceived of as a preliminary discipline, a kind of heuristics of error valid only to verify and guarantee the results gradually achieved and helpful to attain contemplation of the unity of the whole. The understanding and actualisation of the universal order still remains to be achieved, as in Plato,23 but this time the possibility of comprehending the harmony of the cosmos – in which the multiple cognitive data find unity – is unequivocally and entirely provided by astronomical studies in themselves (which do not play second best to the direct grasping of Forms). Astronomy serves this function through a factor which enables man to interpret reality, that is, the numbers shown by sidereal motions. By transferring the categories proper to the metaphysical sphere to the sensible world and switching from dialectic to astronomy, Philip of Opus proposes a concrete universal ethical model that is essential for living in a society that functions with a satisfactory degree of concord. In this sense, he is interested in the kind of study and worship that, while respecting the cognitive and intellectual limits of most people – for the most, beautiful and divine thing to be contemplated is inferior to the invisible, and thus accessible – shows the path to fruitful coexistence between human beings.

Introduction  11 Philip of Opus’ emphasis on physical visibility reflects a trend that was quite common in the Academy, especially during Plato’s final years, namely the tendency to combine elements of cosmology, theology, and demonology with mathematised metaphysical theories. Indeed, within the framework of the aforementioned effort to systematise Plato’s works, metaphysics were gradually abandoned in favour of mathematics. Although the exact nature of the Academy’s activities remains largely mysterious, there is evidence of its connection, both during and after Plato’s lifetime, with the most renowned Greek mathematicians and astronomers, and of a decline in this kind of interest only during the age of Polemon, the third scholarch after Plato.24 In the Epinomis all of this takes the shape of a change of context, which marks the transition from transcendent causes to an immanent divine principle. The Platonic Forms lose the precondition for their presence – if not even for their very existence – and the resulting definition of the divine falls within a purely ­naturalistic horizon: the first principle is not outside the material world but permeates it, manifesting itself through the sidereal movements. The removal of the Forms entails the re-thinking of both the related terminology – Philip of Opus de-­transcendentalises Plato’s vocabulary through a process of ‘physicalisation’25 – and the ethical perspective; while in the Republic the Forms were the ultimate model to be followed in order to be virtuous, their paradigmatic function is now encompassed within a model that the physical heavens offer to the whole of humankind.26 So regardless of whether or not Philip of Opus continued to posit the existence of Forms, he no longer had any need to mention them and was not interested in talking about the otherworldly dimension.

From Plato to Hellenism Only through adequate historical contextualisation is it possible to answer the question of who the Epinomis’ God is, whose worship Philip of Opus aims to promote. Indeed, while it would not be misleading to argue that this representation of God reflects the development of the late Plato’s religious reflection, this would mean telling only part of the story. The real answer to the question of what shaped this picture provided by the Epinomis’ theology is to be found by taking into consideration not only where Philip of Opus’ philosophy comes from, but also towards which direction it is pointing – in other words, by also considering Greek religious life in the historical period in which the Epinomis was drawn up. For this reason, this book’s analysis will be extended – though not limited – to considerations on religion in fifth-to-fourth-century BC Athens. In this sense, only by examining the changes that took place in Greece at the turn of the fourth century BC, against a historical backdrop of great unrest and profound upheaval, can we find a good starting point for analysing the religious doctrine of the Epinomis. It must be noted that throughout Greek history, decisions on religious matters (i.e., about ‘the gods’ or ‘divine affairs’) were taken by the same institutions that deliberated on ‘secular’ matters. Full evidence of this intersection can clearly be found in the Laws, where the connection between politics and

12  Introduction religion is evident since the former serves as the framework for the sacred sphere and the latter as a foundation and guarantee for the law: political and religious life synergistically guarantee the gods’ due place in the city, ensuring and regulating morality.27 For its part, the Epinomis does not deny this traditional combination; at the same time, however, it paves the way for a new religious sensibility. In light of all this, we should now attempt to define the place of the appendix to the Laws with respect both to other Academic reinterpretations of Plato’s thought and to Hellenistic theological models; the theology of the Epinomis derives from Plato’s, while moving beyond it in two respects: (a) it weakens the theoretical framework of the Timaeus, which defended an ontologically existing transcendence, (b) while concurrently extending Plato’s polemic against materialistic doctrines, which had already been discussed at length in Laws X. The Epinomis’ outline of a natural philosophy is also linked to ethics and politics, though here the purpose is no longer to establish the existence of a good telos in nature – for the Platonic dialogues has already done so – but only to confirm its presence. In this sense, while the Laws provides meticulous rules to regulate every situation and moment in the polites’ life, the Epinomis – a brief dialogue that could not have offered such specific arguments based on case studies or indications from which to derive a legislative code – does not present an elaborate and circumstantial indication of how the good citizen is called to fulfil his civic duties through the practice of worship. While keeping within the limits of Plato’s advice and promoting individual participation in political life, the Epinomis provides a kind of universal lesson on happiness and how it can only be pursued through religious virtue. In doing so it seems to foreshadow later themes, such as the Stoic question of how to achieve eudaimonia. So, although it is grounded in Plato’s thought, the Epinomis makes significant changes by inserting itself in a different, wider framework than the other texts in the Corpus Platonicum; the appendix to the Laws must be regarded as part of post-Academic literature: by presenting many features that are characteristic of fourth-century Academic thought (e.g., the protreptic nature of the dialogue, its complex demonology, the primacy it assigns to the science of numbers, the idea of a providential divine reason, the reflections on the wisdom-happiness relationship, and the identification of the Olympians with the stars), the Epinomis marks a continuity between Plato, the post-Platonic Academy, and the Hellenistic schools. Indeed, the close interpenetration of the themes addressed, along with the markedly Hellenistic tone of certain passages, and Philip of Opus’ religious outlook suggest that the Epinomis’ view appears to have been truly influential in later times. This dialogue no longer belongs to the Classical age but emerges as an integral stage along the path leading to the philosophical-religious culture of the early Imperial age. Therefore, although Philip of Opus is unable (or unwilling) to set himself free from the Platonic legacy, he – perhaps unconsciously – offers proof not only of this dependence, but also of an attempt to establish an autonomous philosophical identity and to achieve full autonomy. The appendix to the Laws falls at the crossroads between two eras and connects rather different moments by ensuring a degree of continuity between them; it offers a snapshot of the historical time

Introduction  13 in which it was written, capturing elements of a time of transition: a moment in which what will be has not yet been fully developed and exploited, and what was has not entirely vanished. Within the Epinomis, the influence of the past has not yet faded, but the gradual abandoning of the Classical religion and the shift to Hellenistic theology has certainly begun. Despite its brevity, the Epinomis is a good hinge between Plato and Hellenism, especially accompanying the sliding of Platonism towards Stoic themes. Indeed, upholding the World Soul as the supreme principle, Philip of Opus’ dialogue served as a necessary bridge between Plato’s theology and cosmology and those of the Stoics, influencing their development28: it constitutes the outcome of the theoretical frameworks established by previous philosophical reflection, as well as the precondition for later theological thought. The Epinomis stands in a complex relationship with Plato’s thought and that of contemporary members of the Academy, preserving and transmitting Platonic concepts, in a reworked form, to later philosophies.

Conclusions What shaped this picture of the Epinomis’ God? Two axes orient the development of the Platonic notion of the divine in the Epinomis: the processes of ‘psychisation’ and ‘immanentisation’. Firstly, within the appendix to the Laws, there emerges a metaphysical structure that certainly takes its cue from the centrality assigned to the soul in Laws X, whose argument the Epinomis completes. Secondly, God’s property of being visible makes it evident that the union between materiality and divine nature – coexistence that is variously clarified (on the terminological and conceptual level) – no longer represents a hurdle. In this sense, by refashioning Plato’s metaphysics, as well as modifying conventional Greek religion, Philip of Opus develops a theology which is more rational (i.e., open to philosophy) and cosmopolitan, hence better suited to the new historical period. The Epinomis prepares the ground for the great spread of this theology in times to come. In the following chapters, still relying on but moving beyond what other scholars have already said about the Epinomis, I will explore Philip of Opus’ God by providing a more straightforward account of his theology, in order to make it more accessible than it is now. I will endeavour to do so by basing my analysis on an acknowledgement of the fact that the dialogue’s conceptual argument reflects a particular historical time.

14

Appendix

Introduction

Table 1.1 List of descriptive attributes of both the Epinomis’ God and Plato’s divine subjects Chapter presenting the topic Forms

Soul

II

Demiurge Phaed. 88b6, 95c1, 106d1, 106e2, 107a1

II

Phaed. Phaed. 80b2 78c6–d2, 79a9, 79d5; Tim. 48e6

II

Phaed. 79d2, 80b1, 81a5, 86b1, 106e1

II II

Feature

Plato’s Dialogues

Phaed. 73a2, 95c1, 100b9, 105e6, 106b2, 106c10, 106d3, 107d8, 114d4; Phrd. 245c5, 246a1, b5, c6, d1; Tim. 36e4

God

Intellect

Olympians

Astral deities

Heavens

Epinomis

ἡ ψυχή ἀνώλεθρος, ον

ὁ θεός / the Heavens

τό θεῖον

οἱ θεοί φανεροί / τὰ ἄστρα 981e7

ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ  ὡσαύτως ἔχει

ἀθάνατος, ον

981e7

ἄπαυστος ἀεί εἶναι

984b3

Phaed. 78d5  

 

 

 

 

 

 

ὂν αὐτὸ καθ᾽αὑτό

 

 

 

 

II

Phdr. 247c6  

 

 

 

 

 

 

οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα

 

 

 

 

II

Phaed. 86b1, 80b2 Phaed. 79d1

Tim. 36e4

 

 

 

 

 

θεῖος

982a1

 

 

982a1

Phaed. 80d6, e2

 

 

 

Phaed. 109b7 καθαρός, ά, όν (οὐρανός)

 

 

 

984a6* (καθαριότητι)

II

Phaed. 83d3–5

 

Tim. 37a1

 

 

Lg. 778c6   (temples dedicated to)    

 

985a6

 

 

II

Phaed. 78d5, 80b2, 83e2

Resp. 612a4

 

 

Resp.   381c8–9

 

981b5

 

 

 

II II

Phaed. 78c6   Phaed. 80b2  

   

   

   

   

   

ἔξω τούτων, λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, εἶναι ἔχει μορφὴν μίαν/μένει ἀεὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ μορφῇ/ μονοειδής, ές ἀσύνθετος ἀδιάλυτος

   

   

   

   

II

 

 

 

 

 

ἀόρατος, ον

981c2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ἀιδής, ές (τῷ τῆς   διανοίας λογισμῷ ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι) ἀσχημάτιστος, ον  

 

II; III

Phaed. Tim. 36e6, 52a3; 46d6 Resp. 529b5 Phaed. Phaed. 80d5, 79a4, 7, 81a4 9, 81b7, 83b4 Phdr. 247c6  

 

 

 

II; III

 

 

 

 

 

 

νοῦς

 

 

 

 

II; III

Phaed.   80b1, 81b7, 83b4; Tim. 39e1, 48e6, 51b5, c5, 92c7

Tim. 47e3, 48a5 Tim. 37a1

 

 

 

 

 

νοητός, ή, όν

981c3

 

 

 

II

II

 

 

 

Introduction  15

II

(Continued)

Chapter presenting the topic

Feature

Plato’s Dialogues

 

Forms

Soul

Demiurge

God

Intellect

Olympians

Astral deities

Heavens

Epinomis

 

ἡ ψυχή

ὁ θεός / the Heavens

τό θεῖον

οἱ θεοί φανεροί / τὰ ἄστρα

ἔννους, ουν

 

 

 

 

Lg. 967b4  

Tim. 30b8 (κόσμος)    

νοῦν κτᾶσθαι ἀσώματος, ον

982b5 981b5

   

   

   

II; III

 

 

 

 

 

 

II; III II

  Soph. 246b7, 247d1; Polit. 286a5; Phil. 64b7 Phdr. 247c7 Phdr. 247c6

Tim. 46d7–8  

   

   

   

III; V III; V III; V

     

III; V

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ἀναφής, ές

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

981b6–7

 

 

 

    Lg. 898e10

 

     

     

     

     

     

ἀχρώματον (χρῶμα οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς οὐδέποτ᾽ ἔχον) φέρειν κινεῖν περιφέρειν

983b6    

     

     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  988d3 983a7, 988d3 988d6

 

 

 

III

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

980e3, 988c4*, 991d2

 

 

 

II

 

Tim. 34c2, 4; Lg. 892b1, c6, 896c6, 7, 966e1 Phaed. 86c6, 91c8; Lg. 726a3, 728b1, 966e1

 

 

 

 

 

 

981b7, 986c5, 991d2

 

 

 

II II

τῆς φορᾶς πάσης καὶ κινήσεως αἰτία πρεσβύτερος, α, ον (understood as πρεσβύτατος, η, ον) θειότερος, α, ον (understood as θειότατος, η, ον)

16  Introduction

Table 1.1  (Continued)

Tim. 36e6–37a1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tim. 30a5*

 

 

 

 

 

λογισμοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν/ λογισμοῦ μετέχειν καὶ ἁρμονίας ἐν ἀταξίᾳ κινεῖν

Phaed. 80a2, 4

 

 

 

 

 

ἅρχειν

      Tim. 46e4

Tim. 34c5, 36e4, 48e3; Lg. 892a6   Lg. 631d5–6      

       

       

      Tim. 69c4

       

       

III

 

 

 

 

Tim. 42d6

 

 

III

 

 

 

 

 

 

V V

   

   

Tim. 28c4,   34a4, 41a7        

   

  Lg. 899a4

  Tim. 41d8–e1

V III; VI

   

Lg. 899a3 Lg. 891e5, 896d8

  Tim. 29e4–5

III; VI

 

Lg. 896d6

    Phaed.   97c1–4; Phil. 26e3, 30e1; Tim. 76d7    

VI

 

VI

 

Phaed. 98a2; Lg. 899b6, 967c5  

Tim. 29a5–6

 

III; VI

 

 

 

 

II; III

 

III III III III III III

   

981c3–4

 

 

 

982a7, b1

 

 

 

 

 

  980c4, 989d4    

       

       

 

 

 

978d6

 

 

τίς φύσις ἔμψυχος, ον

974c1  

983a8  

   

  983a1, b2

Tim. 38d4  

  Tim. 30b8 (κόσμος)    

δύναμις αἰτία (ἁ)πάντων

   

 

   

986a8*  

 

 

αἰτία ἀγαθῶν

 

 

 

 

 

αἰτία ἄστρων

 

977a6, 978a4   (ἀριθμός)  

Phil. 28c6–   8, 30c5    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

αἰτία κόσμου/ οὐρανοῦ αἰτία ὅλου

988d5

 

 

Resp. 379c5    

Introduction  17

 

980e2, 982b6, 983d6     (ὑφ)ηγεῖσθαι 991d2 νομοθετεῖν 982b7 δημιουργεῖν 981b8, 984c4 πλάττειν 981b8, 984b7, 984c3 ποιεῖν τὴν σελήνην  

 

(Continued)

Chapter presenting the topic

Feature

Plato’s Dialogues

 

Forms

Soul

Demiurge

God

Intellect

Olympians

Astral deities

VI

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

VII

 

 

 

 

 

 

Heavens  

VII

 

Tim. 34b3–4

 

 

 

 

Euthyphr. 3b1   (daemons); Apol. (astronomical studies); Resp. 530b1 (astral motions) Lg. 899b9  

III; VII

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

III; VII

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

III; VII

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

III; VII

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

III; VII II; VII

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

III; VII

 

Tim. 36e4

 

Phaed.   80d4

 

 

 

Epinomis

  αἰτία φορᾶς καὶ κινήσεως ἄτοπος, ον

ἡ ψυχή

ὁ θεός / the Heavens

988 e1

 

 

976 e5

τό θεῖον  

οἱ θεοί φανεροί / τὰ ἄστρα    

 

θεῶν εἶναι πάντα πλέα διδόναι [. . .] ἀριθμὸν/ διδάσκειν [. . .] ἡμᾶς [. . .] ἀριθμεῖν/ παρὰ δ᾽ἡμῖν τοῦτ᾽αὐτὸ πρῶτον ἐνοικίζειν (= ἀριθμεῖν)/ παραδιδόναι φύσιν [. . .] τοῦ [. . .] μανθάνειν (= ἀριθμεῖν)/ διδόναι κατιδεῖν οὔτε ἀγνοεῖν [που τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν]/ ἔμφρων/

 

 

 

977a7

   

    988b3–4

978c4–5

991d4      

   

978e4–5

   

    983d5

991b8

  988a8, b5; 982d7  

     

18  Introduction

Table 1.1  (Continued)

III; V; VII  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

III; VII III; V; VI

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

III; V; VI

 

 

 

 

 

Phrd. 247a5  

 

III; V; VI

 

VII

 

Lg. 898e– 899b  

Tim. 29e1–2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

τοῦ δὲ φρονεῖν [. . .] κατὰ πάντα μεταλαμβάνει/ οὔτε ἄφρων φθόνος γάρ ἔξω θείου χρονοῦ ἵσταται/ ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος/ συγχαίρει ἄνευ φθόνου μηδέποτε λήθῃ μηδὲ ἀμελείᾳ παρολιγωρεῖν

 

 

985a7

 

   

   

988a8, b5      

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

   

  991d4–5

Introduction  19

20  Introduction

Notes 1 I am following the division of the dialogues established by G.R. Ledger (1989). 2 Supporters of the inauthenticity of the dialogue: Müller 1927, pp. 11–14; Ritter 1888, pp. 93 ff., 1929, pp. 522–4; Post 1928, pp. 368–74; Lamb 1964, p. 424; Shorey 1965, pp. 360–3. It is surely appropriate to mention also Tarán 1975, pp. 14–19; Einarson 1936, pp.  261–85. On the other side of the dispute: Taylor 1929; Des Places 1981, pp.  105–11; Specchia 1967, pp.  16–17; Harward 1928. Some critics even date the dialogue to a period later than the years of Plato’s death (cf. Brisson – Solnico 2003; Stallbaum 1960). 3 ‘Some say that Philip of Opus copied out the Laws, which were left upon waxen tablets, and it is said that he was the author of the Epinomis’ (Hicks 1972). 4 See the Preface. Cf. also Brisson 2005; Tarán 1975, pp. 115–39. 5 This is what Carone 2005 (pp.  76–8) describes as ‘logical and performative consistency’. 6 I will return to this topic in Chapter 7. 7 The reference here is especially to the focus on the World Soul, which basically came to be conceived of in the same terms as in the Timaeus, but with the addition of a rather more august figure, responsible for all creation (see Philo and Plutarch). See Dillon 1977, pp. 45–51, and Chapter 6. 8 Philosophical claims that the divine is closely blended with the material world (in this case, that it actually belongs to nature, being a material substance) can be traced back to the very beginnings of Greek philosophical thought; indeed, as the idea of transcendent theology was unknown to the ancient world, Presocratic philosophies are regarded as natural theologies. The problem of the origin of all things occupied a prominent place in the speculations of the early natural thinkers and went far beyond traditional beliefs: as there was no real distinction between theology and philosophy, this problem also involved the knowledge of nature in terms of the knowledge of Being – in other words, it concerned the divine principle itself. See Jaeger 1936. 9 Concerning these issues, see Trabattoni 2016, pp. 143–63; Isnardi Parente 1977; Cattanei in Alesse – Ferrari 2012. 10 Here I will not consider Aristotle’s interpretation of the issue, which, by criticizing the concept of separation while retaining that of eidos, envisages the relationship between God and the world as reflecting the duplicity that is present in the very notion of being: it thus denotes an immanent transcendence that is too complex and articulate to be discussed here. Concerning the possible sharing of the same view by all these authors through the overlapping of the World Soul and the Monad, which indeed seem to have the same function in the universe, being the ultimate cause of motion in the cosmos – a function that, according to the Platonic perspective, is the province of Soul, see Dillon 2012. See also Forcignanò 2015; Fine 1993. 11 The doxographic report on Polemon’s position is provided by Aetius, as preserved by Stobaeus in his Anthologia. See Dillon 2021. 12 God does not transcend the Nous – as it instead does according to Middle Platonism – but is rather identical to it. See Drozdek 2007 (pp. 190–2), also on the correspondence between God and the One. 13 Cf. Baltes 1988. 14 Aronadio – Petrucci – Tulli 2013 (p. 94), argues that, precisely because the Athenian does not feel compelled to take an unequivocal stance on key theoretical problems, it is tempting to consider the issue of God’s ontology superficial and gloss over it. Cf. also Aronadio 2010. 15 Plato is loath to talk about gods as – he says – it is difficult to do so (especially with the masses Tim. 28c) since we know nothing about them (Cra. 400d); Plato offers what is probably his most complete and elaborate definition of the divine in the Phaedrus (an immortal being which has soul within it, 246cd). On this issue see Hackforth 1936. It

Introduction  21 16 17

18

19

20 21

22

23 24

25

was widely believed at the time that it should not please the gods if men attempted to grasp too much about them: see Xenophon (1921, Memor. IV, 7, 6–7). See Chapter 5, which explains this issue in detail. Considering that language is an expression of the human spirit that unfolds in philosophical thought, it is important to note that the close connection between the verbal formulation of certain concepts and the intellectual understanding of them underwent rather profound developments during the fifth century BC. See Snell 2002, pp. 313–34. This table is not intended to be a strict ‘table of correspondences’, but rather a work tool that offers some coordinates to identify possible connections between the Platonic lexicon and the text of the Epinomis. This can help us understand to what extent, as far as theology is concerned, this work can be seen to reflect the Platonic heritage. Some methodological clarifications are in order: the comparative analysis between Plato’s dialogues and the Epinomis takes into account the fact that the Platonic passages examined cannot be considered exhaustive descriptions of the divine by Plato (since, as already noted, within his dialogues there are no complete definitions of it); rather, I have sought to provide a list of those passages in which the essential divine features are best expounded. I should also mention what I have done in order to standardize the terms reported in the table: nouns are always given in the nominative singular form; terms reported in italics are either verbs that have been put in the simple present (to avoid tense and mood discordances) or single words that I am using to paraphrase certain concepts expressed in the dialogue by periphrases. The various features are listed by respecting the order in which they appear in the Epinomis. Cf. Aronadio – Petrucci – Tulli 2013, p. 26. The Athenian’s speech teaches us what wisdom is only after inquiring what it is not. It can be divided into two parts: a negative process that has the purpose of freeing the mind of prejudice and error, allowing it to see true knowledge only in those arts which are subservient to life’s needs; and a positive process that, leaving the banausic arts aside, reveals what wisdom is, starting from an identification of its first principle, namely number, which conveys an understanding of both the mathematical and the moral order. Cf. Lanza 1972; Ellis 2015, pp. 127–72. The theme of the contemplation of the world as a way to perceive the divine at work is a well-known expression of the ancient Hellenic tradition, which moreover always connected the conception of a power superior to humans to the idea of time. In later ages, eternity came to be separated from the stars and the heavens, and it starts to be worshiped as a deity in itself, with the infinity of time being elevated to the status of Supreme Cause. See Cumont 2019 (3), pp. 95–115. The issue of how astronomy came to replace dialectic as the highest science has been extensively discussed by critics by referring to the conceptually central lines Epin. 990c and 991e–992a. There is no consensus on the issue, which seems open to different interpretations. In antiquity, the Epinomis was usually interpreted in light of the Republic, that is by assigning mathematics a propaedeutic role: it is to dialectic that one must turn, since – as the point of arrival of the cognitive path – it consists in true wisdom (see Giardina in Alesse – Ferrari 2012). I share the view of those scholars who state that rather than deny a change at the top of the ladder of knowledge, we need to consider that everything is still oriented towards the telos of unity; see, Tarán 1975, pp. 32, 345–6; Pesce 1992, p. 6. On this topic, see Chapter 5. The most important and frequently mentioned account of the Academy’s crucial role in the development of mathematics is a passage from Philodemus. Cf. El Murr in Perilli – Taormina 2018; Vegetti 2003, who reports ancient sources documenting the prevailing Academic tendency to mathematize philosophy. See also Waterfield 1988, p. 27. On this subject, see especially Chapter 2, where each examined lemma reveals a fascinating redefinition and precise adjustment of Plato’s legacy.

22  Introduction 26 In this sense, as it will be seen, Philip of Opus is innovative but not completely unorthodox: the Epinomis’ God does not lose the sense of existence that qualifies Plato’s Forms, which display complete predicative stability – to wit, Philip of Opus is consistent with the Classical Greek perspective, where ‘being’ is always dependent upon some given context (nature, quality, or essence). To be clear, we are not dealing yet with the biblical concept of God as an absolute being (ʾehyeh ʾašer ʾehyeh). Cf. Kenney 2010, pp. 5–8. 27 Traditional religion is placed at the basis of the polis. On the one hand, the legislator divides people into twelve tribes, each consecrated to – and named after – one of the members of the Olympians (Laws V, 745d). On the other hand, religious festivals, traditionally dedicated to the Olympians, are considered ‘civic’ moments, insofar as they promote unity among citizens, fostering feelings of loyalty and devotion to the homeland through the incessant repetition of songs, a way of conveying ethical messages. 28 Alesse in Alesse – Ferrari 2012, pp. 206 ff. offers a very comprehensive status quaestionis, summarizing the most relevant studies that have made it possible to regard the Epinomis as a source of inspiration for Stoic thought. I  will return to this topic in Chapter 7. Anyway, I should point out here that this book is intended to provide a comprehensive account of the theology of the Epinomis by defining its God, who represents a reshaping of Plato’s concept of the divine; and, thus, in accordance with this aim, I have chosen to focus on a comparison between the appendix to the Laws and the Corpus Platonicum, without specifically referring to Stoic philosophy, i.e., without focusing on ‘the other side of this bridge’.

Section one

The Epinomis and its background Re-shaping Plato’s theological language In this section, which starts with Chapter 2 and takes us up to Chapter 5, I will discuss the relationship between the Epinomis and the vocabulary and syntax of four of Plato’s dialogues. In particular, my analysis will consider the  Phaedo, the Timaeus, the Cratylus and the Laws, and will focus on the following aspects: the process of de-transcendentalisation of Forms, the demiurgic and life-giving functions of the Epinomis’ God, the existence of a universal Reason in the Epinomis (as well as in Plato’s dialogues), and its strong interconnection with the corporeal sphere (which, conversely, is typical only of the appendix to the Laws).

DOI: 10.4324/9781003136910-2

2 The Phaedo and the Epinomis The de-transcendentalised forms

What does the Epinomis accept from the Phaedo and what does it reject? Although Philip of Opus does not really provide a description of the highest God,1 evidence can be found to suggest that, in order to talk about the psychic deity, he relied on the description of Forms reported by Plato’s Phaedo. Here, the Forms are almost omnipresent and play a much bigger part than in any other previous work, being described in far greater depth and detail. They can be grasped by the use not of any of the senses, but of pure thought (65d4–66c8) and, as a consequence of this intelligibility, they are incorporeal (80d5–6) and unchangeable (78c6). By treating the Forms as the things responsible for all reality but existing separately from perceptible materials, Plato presents the notions of αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι and αὐτὸ καθ ̓αὑτό by referring to ‘things in themselves’ (75d2) and to their ‘separate existence’ (78d6), respectively; he also emphasises the Forms’ role as standards and limits which individual things only approximate (74d9, 75b1–7). Furthermore, for the first time, in the Phaedo the relationship between the Forms themselves are explored and that between the sensible things and the Forms is conceived as an imitation rather than as a kind of sharing. Demonstrating the necessity of the existence of transcendent essences, the Phaedo contains what is probably Plato’s first overall statement of his theory of Forms, which can be regarded as a key source for Platonic metaphysics and as a crucial point of reference for every author who, after Plato, has aspired to develop his own aetiological doctrine.2 This also holds true for the author of the Epinomis, who, in attempting to describe the divine principle, which is the beginning and the end of everything, could not help but engage with those Platonic passages sketching a description of the causes of reality. In view of all this, this chapter aims to suggest a comparison between Epin. 981b3–982a1 (and also 984e6; 985a6), a passage describing the divine principle in opposition to material bodies where the whole range of Forms’ properties seems to be adopted (and adapted), and Phaed. 78c6–80b4 (and also 83d1–7 and 88b), where Plato, arguably for the first time, sets forth his theory of Forms. [78c] [. . .] Οὐκοῦν ἅπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀσύνθετα, [. . .] [79a] [. . .] τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν DOI: 10.4324/9781003136910-3

26 The Epinomis and its background ὅτῳ ποτ᾽ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ, ἀλλ᾽ἔστιν ἀιδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά; [. . .] [79d] ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ᾽αὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ᾽ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται [. . .] [80b] [. . .] τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχή. [. . .] [83d] Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεῖται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος; – πῶς δή; – ὅτι ἑκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἧλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ. [. . .] [88b] [. . .] ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον. [981β] [. . .] Στερεὰ δὲ σώματα λέγεσθαι χρὴ κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον πέντε, ἐξ ὧν κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστά τις ἂν πλάττοι, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο γένος ἅπαν ἔχει μορφὴν μίαν: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀσώματον ὅτι τ᾽ἄλλο γίγνοιτ᾽ἂν καὶ χρῶμα οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς οὐδέποτ᾽ἔχον, πλὴν τὸ θειότατον ὄντως ψυχῆς γένος. [. . .] [981ξ] [. . .] τῷ δέ, λέγωμεν πάλιν, οὐ γὰρ ἅπαξ ῥητέον, ἀοράτῳ τε εἶναι καὶ γιγνώσκοντι νοητῷ τε, μνήμης μεταλαβόντι λογισμοῦ τε ἐν περιτταῖς τε καὶ ἀρτίαις ἅμα μεταβολαῖς (προσήκει). [. . .] [981ε] [. . .] ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον [982α] ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ θεῖον τὸ παράπαν ἐξ ἁπάσης ἀνάγκης. [. . .] [984α] οὐ γὰρ μήποτε φανῇ καλλίω καὶ κοινότερα συμπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀγάλματα, οὐδ᾽ ἐν διαφέρουσιν τόποις ἱδρυμένα, καθαριότητι καὶ σεμνότητι καὶ συμπάσῃ [984β] ζωῇ διαφέροντα ἢ ταύτῃ ὡς πάντῃ ταύτῃ γεγένηται. [985α] [. . .] θεὸν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν τέλος ἔχοντα τῆς θείας μοίρας ἔξω τούτων εἶναι, λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, τοῦ δὲ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ γιγνώσκειν κατὰ πάντα μετειληφέναι. [78c] [. . .] and only that which is non composite, if anything, is not likely to be split up? [. . .] [79a] [. . .] those that always remain the same can be grasped only by the reasoning power of the mind? They are not seen but are invisible? [. . .] But when the soul [79d] investigates by itself it passes into the realm of what is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging, and being akin to this, it always stays with it whenever [. . .] [80b] [. . .] the soul is most like the divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself [. . .] [83d] And doesn’t such an experience tie the soul to the soul to the body most completely? – How so? – Because every pleasure and pain provide, as it were, another nail to rivet the soul to the body and to welm them together. It makes the soul corporeal, so that it believes the truth is what the body says it is. [. . .] [88b] [. . .] the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. [981b] [. . .] On the most likely account there are to be reckoned five solid bodies, from which one might fashion things fairest and best; but all the rest of creation has a single shape, for there is nothing that could come to be without a body and never possessing any color at all, except only that really most divine creature, the soul. [. . .] [981c] [. . .] But the other – let us repeat it, for not once only be it said – has to be invisible even to the inquiring, and merely thought, if he has got a share of memory and reckoning by both odd

The Phaedo and the Epinomis  27 and even variations. [. . .] for each of them is either imperishable [982a] and immortal, and by all necessity wholly divine [. . .] [984α] for never will fairer or more generally-known images be found among all mankind, none established in more various places, more pre-eminent in purity, majesty, and [984b] life altogether, than in the way in which their existence is altogether fashioned. [985a] [. . .] [For we know that God, who has the privilege of the divine portion, is remote from these affections of pain and pleasure, but has a share of intelligence and knowledge in every sphere.3 From these extracts it is possible to highlight the fact that the description of the Forms provided by the Phaedo is not merely reused in the Epinomis; rather, Philip of Opus sketches a portrayal of God which, compared to the Plato’s description of Forms, presents both borrowings (in bold and underlined in the text) and changes (in italics and bold), which suggest an approach to Plato’s text driven by a specific philosophical agenda. Even in the light of the fact that the Early Academy is marked by a terminological, as well as theoretical, effort to semantically characterise in the most pertinent way the generative cause of reality, I would like to consider how Philip of Opus made use of Platonic terminology; I start by focusing on what can be called the adoptions.

Borrowings ἀνώλεθρον-ἀθάνατον (88b6; 981e7) The ἀνώλεθρον-ἀθάνατον iunctura, which is typical of the Phaedo for describing the psyche more than the Forms – four out of six occurrences of the semantic pair (88b6, 95c1, 106e1–2, 107a1) concern the soul, whereas only the remaining refer to the Forms – and it is employed by Plato even in other works, always pertaining to the psychic sphere more than the eidetic one. Based on this, as we will see, the fact that the Athenian Visitor characterises the psychic God of the Epinomis through the adjectives in question could be considered, with good reason, a citation from Plato. Anywhere within the whole Plato’s work, even when the two terms are taken separately, they preferably indicate the soul and not the Forms. Indeed, where Plato needs to distinguish between the Forms and the soul in terms of immortality, he prefers to qualify the eidetic sphere through the adjective ἀδιάφθορον, and the soul by ἀνώλεθρον: Plato defines the soul as akin – yet not identical – to the Forms by stating that the latter are not affected by decay (ἀδιάφθορον), and the soul is equally incorruptible (ἀνώλεθρον).4 Thus, it can be said that, whereas the attribute ἀδιάφθορον has to do with the concept of purity to a greater extent, the adjective ἀνώλεθρον, being related to the soul more than the Forms, carries a less transcendent tone. Even etymologically, by expressing the absence of ruin (ὄλεθρον) and so inserting into a material frame of reference, ἀν-ώλεθρον tends to evoke physical destruction or the dissolution of material bodies in sensible

28 The Epinomis and its background realities (e.g., a defeated army in Aeschylus or destroyed cities and vessels in Homer [LSJ s.v.]). Almost the same goes for the word ἀθάνατον. Although in Plato’s works this lexeme is applied both to the anthropic and the transcendent sphere, in general qualifying both the divine (including the Olympics) and human beings,5 when, throughout most of the Corpus Platonicum, ἀθάνατον concerns the incorporeal sphere, it indicates the soul and not the Forms. One could therefore posit it would seem as though Philip of Opus is quoting Plato when he makes use of the ἀνώλεθρον-ἀθάνατον iunctura for referring to the divine sphere, meant both as Soul and stars.6 The mutual entailment between these two adjectives is indeed closely linked to a third one, θεῖον (982a1): in keeping with Plato’s teaching, the stars deserve being labelled divine (981e4), and hence indestructible and undying.7 In this sense, contrary to what some have claimed, I would like to highlight that the everlasting nature of the celestial bodies, previously only theorised (981e7–982a3), is established strongly and unequivocally at 984b3.8 Critics have commented on this moment in the Athenian Visitor’s speech, claiming that this section is not very coherent or straightforward but ambiguous, since the author of the Epinomis could be suggesting alternatives (regarding whether the stars are divine in themselves or not) without taking sides but leaving important issues open. While I share this view, I feel that certain reservations are in order; indeed, it is rather undeniable the Athenian Visitor expresses the eternal nature of the stars quite explicitly, and with it, their divinity. It is certainly essential to emphasise that Philip of Opus does not aim to provide a theory of ­immortality – an issue that had been previously addressed by Plato and already accepted by the Athenian Visitor – but it is equally important to state that he intends to avoid doubts on the divine nature of the eternal celestial bodies (given the bond between ἀθάνατον and θεῖον).9 Indeed, the previously explained indecision shown at 981e6–982a3 notwithstanding (the stars can be conceived of in two ways: either each of them is imperishable and by necessity wholly divine, or they have a certain longevity such that nothing could ever outlive them), pages 981–982 consist in an introduction to the issue of ἔμψυχον: the celestial bodies are construed as everlasting thanks to their eternal psychic essence, not to their physical bodies.10 Thus, it can be said that it is this relationship between the Soul and the sidereal bodies in the Epinomis that opens up the possibility to apply the ἀνώλεθρον-ἀθάνατον pair, which is chiefly attributed to the soul by Plato, as well as to the sidereal bodies. Based on the considerations advanced so far, it is clear that the Athenian Visitor in assigning eternity to the stars establishes God on an altogether physical level: the heavenly bodies, qualified as non-perishable, immortal, and divine beings, emerge as deities whose worship must be authorised by the city law. Anyway, we will now proceed by focusing on an important detail, that is, as has been said at the beginning of the paragraph, the Phaedo’s ἀνώλεθρον-ἀθάνατον iunctura also referring to the Forms. And since it cannot be a priori ruled out in the Epinomis a relationship between the stars and the Forms, bearing in mind that the lack of mention of the latter does not guarantee their absence, for they could

The Phaedo and the Epinomis  29 still exist even though they are not named, in this sense, there is something more to consider. Firstly, the two specific syntactical devices par excellence designed to express eidetic kinds of entities in Plato’s dialogues, αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι and αὐτὸ καθ᾽αὑτό (meaning what is in itself by itself, the essence, the very thing which a thing is in itself) are not found in the Epinomis’ text; the lack of these specific Platonic constructs enhances its exegetical value, seeming to strengthen the absence of Forms in the appendix to the Laws. And moreover, divine perfection, altogether immortal and imperishable, seems to be no longer conveyed by the traditional Platonic expression, namely ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει,11 which was the periphrasis usually tied to the transcendent sphere indicating things that are always the same and unchanging and uncompounded, yet now indeed described by the ἀνώλεθρον-ἀθάνατον iunctura. From these erosions along with reformulation, it can be, thus, inferred that within the Epinomis’ belief system, in comparison to the Platonic one, a shift of the ontological baseline occurs: the adhesion to the transcendent scope is decreasing, and the only model inherent in the polis’ code of ethics is now based on coordinated planetary motion, which does not require any intellectual understanding but can be grasped through the sense of sight. The adjustment of the Platonic lexicon in the Epinomis, where God is not defined by the expression which characterises Forms in the strongest sense but is rather designated by way of the terms whose usage Plato favoured in referring to the soul, might be considered a sign of Philip of Opus focusing solely on the divine psychic principle and on the visible cosmos in which it is present, and leaving aside the highest realities. He dismisses the reference to those divine beings which cannot belong to the material cosmos, in order to set only one horizon of meaning; he complies with the Platonic lexicon intentionally to preserve the divine nature of the heavenly bodies and, at the same time, to exclude anything that could undermine or even invalidate it. Consequently, the demise of the transcendent Forms and their world could be reasonably assumed. καθαρόν* [καθαριότης] (79d1; 984a6) The second term I would like to analyse in greater detail is the noun καθαριότης. It occurs only once within the Corpus Platonicum, specifically in the Epinomis, where it pertains to the sky; however, all in all, the term can certainly be considered very Platonic, since somehow (namely, in its variant καθαρότης) it is present in the dialogues undoubtedly written by Plato.12 In the Platonic lexicon, καθαρότης applies both to the physical sphere and to the moral field [LSJ s.v.], indicating purity. The καθαρά are unadulterated things (Phil. 53a7), and the καθαρόν is the realm where they are collected together (Phaed. 79d1); the Theaet. 177a (as Phaed. 67ab) fully shows how the term καθαριότης pertains to the divine region. In Resp. IX, 585b11 we read that correct opinion, knowledge, and reason, meaning all the most excellent things, have the greatest share in pure essence. We also find the word καθαρόν throughout the Phaedrus,13 where the upper surface of the earth rests on ether and cannot be

30 The Epinomis and its background reached by imperfect and defective entities, namely humankind, who dwell in a hollow of the earth. In Laws V, 736ab, purity is described by a simile which illustrates the formation of the new Magnesian colony by citizens who are from all of the Peloponnese by comparing it to the water purification system; just as when there are streams from many sources flowing into a single reservoir, it is necessary to take wary precautions to ensure that the water may be of the utmost purity, similarly, those who attempt to enter the State must be carefully tested thoroughly before being admitted, in order to exclude the unfit and morally defective and to allow the καθαρόν, which coincides with the correct and polite behaviour, i.e., the ultimate display of morality, to be ensured. Pushed further, it even designates the sacred entities and the seat of the purest transcendence; at VI, 778cd, the land use plan reserves higher ground for the purest places: both temples and lawcourts, being the holiest places, must be erected on the highest spots all around the whole city, where religious ministers and political officials will perform their holy functions. Moreover, it is interesting to noted that the line in the Laws employs the verb ἱδρύω in its sense of ‘dedicate temples, statues’ [LSJ s.v.], as in Epin. 984a5–6: the law-courts of the Laws are the seats of holy gods (θεῶν ἱδρύματα), just as the celestial bodies are images situated in excellent places which are preeminent in purity, majesty, and life altogether (ἐν διαφέρουσιν τόποις ἱδρυμένα). Turning our gaze to Epin. 984a5–6, καθαριότητι καὶ σεμνότητι καὶ συμπάσῃ ζωῇ διαφέροντα, we see that σεμνότης, i.e., the seriousness or the dignity which makes men worthy of honour – and which can be of a religious kind, too (the noun derives from the verb σέβω which, above all, means ‘to worship and be religious’ [LSJ s.v.]) – along with the σύμπασα ζωή14 of the stars, is connected to καθαριότης. The dative with a limiting function describes the properties of the stars, which are the purest images created by the gods or even living gods themselves; as already observed in the previous paragraph, this line offers a solution to the indecision at 981e6–982a3, by identifying the empsychoi celestial bodies with deities. This seems closer to what Plato means in the Republic; the passage quoted must indeed be interpreted in the light of Resp. X, 614e, where, after judgement, only the pure souls come down from heavens (ἑτέρας ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καθαράς), while souls full of squalor and dust come up from the earth. As can clearly be seen, then, it stands to reason that the usage of καθαριότης by the author of Epinomis is a borrowing from Plato, adapted to the new non-eidetic context. The idea of καθαριότης reaffirms the divinity of the psychic heavenly bodies: as in Plato’s dialogues, starting from the Phaedo, where it described a blessed place, free from all evil things, which will receive the righteous and the wise after death and where everything is unambiguous and uncorrupted since it is not physical, καθαριότης now serves as an intrinsic property of celestial bodies, the visible deities. λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή (83d2; 985a5) Even with regard to the theme of divine beings lacking pain and pleasure, which resonated strongly in ancient times – from Euripides to Aristotle and all those who

The Phaedo and the Epinomis  31 were in contact with the Academy15 – Philip of Opus draws upon the Phaedo. In the vein of his master, who evoked the issue in particular by refining the view of the realm to which pleasure itself belongs, he does not distance himself from tradition and adapted the Platonic theories to its framework specifically by defining the kind of relationship with passions and, in this sense, separating from each other human and divine nature (Epin. 985a6). A dissertation that involves such a complex subject will have to account first for Plato’s treatment of pleasure in general. Thus, before we expound any further, we need to tackle and briefly discuss Plato’s statement that pleasure is linked with illusion, and then the psychological and metaphysical implications of this theory. Plato associates pleasure with perception (Phaed. 65c,  Theaet. 156b, and Tim. 69cd), arguing that pleasure is ontologically inferior to the good (Phaed. 60bc, Grg. 495e ff. and Phil. 53c ff.) since it is a form of becoming and not of being (as is, instead, the good); this would seem to put pleasure in the lower half of Republic Vl’s dividing line, implying that the pleasure is impure and unstable, unlike the good and hence Forms, and, contrary to the latter, belonging to the realm of appearance. The consequences of all this are to be recosgnised: (a) Forms are not involved in the shifting passions and free in themselves; consequently, (b) λύπη and ἡδονή can only be envisaged within a physical context. All this leads to an understanding of Phaed. 83d3–5, where λύπη and ἡδονή shape the distinction between the realm of Forms and all other realities, including the soul. Since the soul falls between the eidetic sphere and perceptibles, it can be easily nailed to the body by pleasure and pain, and when this happens, the soul has no part in common with the divine and absolute; since it has the same beliefs and pleasures as the body, it fancies that the things are true which the body says are true and, contaminated with the body in this way, the soul can never depart in purity to the other world: pleasures impede the soul’s progress towards truth. The pleasure-illusion connection is developed into a psychological theory in the Republic, holding that the appetitive part of the soul is not only prone to illusions but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasures appear good, and this part of the soul desires them since it ignores reasoning about what the good really is: most things people desire as pleasures are, in fact, only apparent pleasures, things that are not really pleasant at all.16 Anyhow, it should be considered that passions are essential components of human nature, so any effort to free oneself from them is in vain: whosoever wants to be godlike must pursue the middle state of the soul; the right life neither pursues pleasures nor shuns pains entirely, but embraces the condition of God himself to the greatest possible extent. The wise man emerges as he who is well balanced thanks to adopting temperate conduct in his public and private behaviour, and not contravening the instructions of the lawgiver.17 Since not all desires are rational, virtue depends on giving voice to the rational part of the soul, which means bringing one’s non-rational desires under the control of reason and tending to true pleasures, the only ones that are ontologically robust and worth enjoying. Therefore, starting from the Phaedo and coherently with the other Platonic dialogues, only the deity (Forms) is free from λύπη and ἡδονή, to which instead all

32 The Epinomis and its background the other realities, including the soul, are subject, then the most divine life is the life of the mind, feeling no pleasure or pain (Phil. 33b) – which trick us with their illusion, making us content with what merely seems good and real. In the same way, and reproposing the two levels of realities indicated by Plato, the Epinomis’ perfection described by not being dominated by passions, pertains only to the greatest God, whereas being liable to pain and pleasure qualifies human beings and daemons (who are weakened by this typical terrestrial laxity). Given all this, it is tempting to say that the Epinomis replaces the Forms with this divine principle, who, likewise to the eidetic realities but not the soul, though being a psychic God, is not bound by appetites. It, therefore, can be said that, even about the property of not being mastered by λύπη and ἡδονή, of the Epinomis’ God draws on the Platonic idea of Forms. ἀσώματον (981b5) It has been evident so far that Philip of Opus is likely to be bearing in mind (and to be referring to) Plato’s lexicon, especially that of the Phaedo. Such also regards the character of being ἀσώματον, through which the Soul – as one of the two kinds of existent things (the other being the corporeal realm) – is defined in the Epinomis. Nevertheless, in order to analyse the usage of this lexeme, we will take into account not only the  Phaedo, where neither the Forms nor the soul, though clearly defined as incorporeal realities, are called through the term in question, but rather the rest of the Corpus Platonicum. No doubt, referring to the eidetic sphere by the adjective ἀσώματον is typically Platonic, and indeed this word defines the Forms intrinsically. For example, in the dispute between corporealists and idealists (Soph. 246b–247d), by rejecting both positions, the Eleatic Stranger affirms the existence of an incorporeal ousia: it is unreasonable to state that the only things which exist are those which can be touched and handled, and that nothing exists except atoms and the void, as well that real existence does not consist just of certain Forms that are only conceived by the mind and have no bodies. Moreover, in Statesman 286a5 an incorporeal order is assigned to reality, an order which nobly rules living bodies (as we read in Phil. 64b7). The references here given illustrate that intangibility is far from being a minor feature of the Forms. In the same way, the syntax of Epin. 981b5 does not laconically declare but explicitly states and highlights that the property of being ἀσώματον characterises the psychic God; the hyperbaton, as is usually the case in Ancient Greek, lays stress on the first term of the sentence, emphasising the word in question18: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀσώματον ὅτι τ᾽ἄλλο γίγνοιτ᾽ἂν καὶ χρῶμα οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς οὐδέποτ᾽ἔχον, πλὴν τὸ θειότατον ὄντως ψυχῆς γένος. Let us instead construct the phrase continuously: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο ὅ τι ἀσώματον τε γίγνοιτ᾽ἂν καὶ χρῶμα οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς οὐδέποτ᾽ἔχον, πλὴν τὸ θειότατον ὄντως ψυχῆς γένος.

The Phaedo and the Epinomis  33 Some critics claim that this syntactical structure must be taken into consideration as an indication of the authorship of the appendix to the Laws, which in their opinion would not be attributable to Plato: Philip of Opus would have chosen such a significant rhetorical figure to underline that the property of being ἀσώματον belongs to the soul and thus to jettison the Platonic Forms.19 Regardless of the debate on the authorship of the Epinomis, what matters here is that, in this case too, the psychic God presents the very features formerly attributed to the eidetic sphere. ἀχρώματον (981b5–6)20 The God of the Epinomis has characteristics which are different from those of visible deities, the planets: the latter are all most likely of a red colour (the most intensely hued is Jupiter, the ἐρυθρώτατον, 987c7), whereas God is completely achromatic. As regards this property of being colourless, as in the case of ἀσώματον, we will not highlight the connection with the Phaedo, though the Epinomis is in general reminiscent, as we saw, of the description of Forms offered within this dialogue. Commentators have often recognised in the Epinomis’ passage in question a possible recovery of Resp. X, 617a21; nevertheless, this parallel does not seem so consistent, on account of the fact that, on the one hand, the syntax is completely different from the Epinomis’ and, on the other, the Epinomis’ description of the shades of sidereal bodies is not as fine-grained as that of the Republic. On the contrary, I align with those who had suggested that the closest Platonic lines to the appendix to the Laws in this sense are Phdr. 247c6–8. The connection with these lines is extremely relevant, drawing attention to the truly existing essence, a formless (ἀσχημάτιστος), intangible (ἀναφής) and also colourless (ἀχρώματον) reality,22 visible only to the mind since it eludes sense perception: ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ, περὶ ἣν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης γένος, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον Critics are sharply divided over the interpretation of lines 981b5–6: (a) some argue that Philip was referring to Plato; (b) others suggested that he applied the inherent features of the ousia to the psyche on the basis of a misunderstanding: not comprehending the meaning of Phdr. 247c6–8, and neither believing that Plato had established the identity between the essence and the soul.23 At this stage, let us take a look at the characteristic of being ἀχρώματον within the whole Corpus Platonicum, where it is specific to the non-perceivable divine reality; it can be inferred from the usage of the noun χρῶμα, which is instead closely linked to perceptibles, both because it denotes something typically sensitive and because what makes it possible to perceive them is a purely physical phenomenon. The greatest number of occurrences of the word χρῶμα primarily indicates, as was common, the ‘skin, especially of the human body’, ‘epidermis’

34 The Epinomis and its background [LSJ s.v.], someone’s complexion – and, by extension, every nuance that colours tangible realities – that can only be seen in the daylight [LSJ s.v.].24 Also the adjective χρώματον conveys a characteristically anthropic feature (Soph. 251a7– 10): ‘We speak of man, you know, and give him many additional designations; we attribute to him colours and forms and sizes and vices and virtues’.25 Taking into consideration all of this and the aforementioned dispute but without going into the merits of it – since this is not the issue at stake – a twofold consideration can be made: first of all, it must be affirmed that the achromatic nature of the Epinomis’ God is certainly taken from Plato; secondly, independently of what the actual Platonic reference might be (whether to the Forms or to the Soul – see points (a) and (b) of the aforementioned dispute), it must be noted that in the Epinomis even the allusion to the chromatic context through of the noun χρῶμα, while denied by means of the alpha privative, might show that here we are essentially dealing with a worldly context.

Adaptations Epinomis’ departure from the transcendent Platonic lexicon is not only shown by the use of identical terms embedded in a different context and related to different realities, but also involves actual adjustments. In the appendix to the Laws, the author’s immanentisation effort clearly emerges in the dropping of the words μονοειδές and ἀιδές, which are respectively replaced with the periphrasis ἔχει μορφὴν μίαν and the adjective ἀόρατον. μονοειδές > ἔχει μορφὴν μίαν (80b2;981b5) To understand the significance of the shift from μονο-ειδές to ἔχει μορφὴν μίαν, it is necessary to analyse the two terms in question, εἶδος and μορφή, separately. This will enable us to determine whether, and to what extent, their Platonic meanings are accepted in the Epinomis too. Looking at the use of μορφή within Plato’s works, we find that, as it often happens, Plato applies the current connotation to the word: as some critics have pointed out, it is possible to ascertain that in the Corpus the word implies visible appearance. In the Gorgias, it is said to be the boyish – and immature – form under which philosophy conceals the soul; in the Phaedo μορφή is the outward presence of things and, in the Phaedrus, it is the physical manifestation of a living body. In Phil. 34d1 μορφή is used to signify the various ways pleasure may appear, and in the Republic it is the feature distinguishable through eyesight; lastly, in the Timaeus, it is the shape which the chora takes from time to time through the bodies which it receives and which move and mark its formless substance.26 Nevertheless, an extremist view, claiming that the typical Platonic usage of μορφή restricts its meanings to ‘visible form’, should be rejected. Indeed, even the use of the word within an incorporeal context can be considered Platonic to some extent27: in particular, in Phaed. 104d2 odd and even numbers are referred to as the two different μορφαί. That said, it is also true that Plato does not use the

The Phaedo and the Epinomis  35 word in question to indicate the divine transcendent sphere specifically, which in the Corpus is called μονοειδές, a compound of εἶδος. Briefly analysing this last term, it can be noted that the meaning ‘formal cause, essence’ was only established via Plato’s vocabulary,28 which made the term more befitting to philosophical reflection by implying a reference to the invisible and incorporeal sphere: in Theaet. 205d1, εἶδος is the primary non-material element of which other things are composed; in Symp. 211b2, e4 it is divine beauty itself, in its unique form; and within the enchanting and striking maritime metaphor at Resp. X, 612a4 it refers to that soul that is uncorrupted by the world. In the language employed before Plato, the word εἶδος (and ἰδέα) involves physical entities by indicating outward appearance and the visible figure. This traditional meaning is not, anyway, ruled out in Plato’s works, where εἶδος – and the compound adjective μονοειδές – is sometimes treated as signifying material objects as well (Phaed. 92b5–6; 110d1–3; Tim. 59b2). Thus, it follows that in Plato’s lexicon μονοειδές and μορφή indicate and are related to the transcendent and the physical sphere respectively, yet do not strictly refer to just one of the two contexts: the former may also be considered compatible with materiality, while the latter can be taken to indicate more than just the worldly reality. At this point, it is clear that Philip of Opus, who is willing to regard the psychic God not as visible but as immanent to the physical cosmos – thereby retaining its relevance for the sensible world – would have had the chance to remain faithful to Plato’s lexicon, without major disruptions, i.e., without any shift from εἶδος to μορφή, by making use of the former, and not necessarily needing the latter, to designate God who is manifest through the sidereal bodies. So why, then, does he opt to change the noun? If we broaden our view, we can further examine the context in which εἶδος and μορφή appear in the Phaedo and in the Epinomis; that is to say by analysing the terms to which they are related. From the passages reported in the introduction (Phaed. 80b and Epin. 981b), it is ­evident that: •

•

the single-shape (μορφὴ μία) entity is marked by the adjectives ἀ-σώματον and ἀ-χρώματον,29 which seem to emphasise the immanent nature of God by denying some typically corporeal features: the θεῖον is not a transcendent but a non-corporeal deity, which is defined as divine through the negation of the typical traits of what it is not; as previously reported, the word μονοειδές, although it can also indicate wordly things, is specifically used to qualify what always remains the same and unchanged, marked by indissolubility (ἀδιάλυτον), which is a peculiar quality of the ἀσύνθετον (uncompounded),30 i.e., the Forms.

In order to better grasp the whole issue, there is another inference that one can draw by cross-examining the texts, either verifying whether there is any occurrence of the noun-adjective pair μορφὴ μία or ascertaining that the word εἶδος is used within the text of the Epinomis. We thus find that naming God through the formula μορφὴ μία is certainly a prerogative of the author of the Epinomis, who

36 The Epinomis and its background most likely is interested in defending the uniqueness of God, who is the only reality to be psychic.31 Moreover, it can be considered the occurrence of the term εἶδος in the text of the appendix to the Laws, where it appears only on two occasions (990e4, 991c4), and never with reference to the ontological causes. Rather, the species is always indicated as a basic unit of classification: in its first occurrence, the term is adopted to express those items that the highest officials of the Nocturnal Council envisage and reflect on; in its second occurrence, it concerns how cognitive contents are formulated (i.e., by referring each particular thing to its generic form). At any rate, it does not present the technical value assigned in Plato’s lexicon.32 All things considered, Philip of Opus seems to make use of the expression μορφὴ μία to highlight the immanent nature of God, who is now very close to terrestrial objects; and there are evident traces of the fact that the μορφὴ μία of the Epinomis fulfils, in a different framework, the same role as the Forms do in Plato’s works.33 Indeed, the Athenian Visitor, without mentioning transcendence, appears to state that the double function of providing an ontological and epistemological foundation pertains to God; he interprets the μορφή by retaining the specificity of the Platonic εἶδος as the highest degree of being and the formal cause, upon which the various multiplicities are ontologically dependent (cf. also Phaed. 99b), and announces a new paradigm of knowledge, making this non-transcendent God the ultimate object of knowledge and that which makes knowledge possible.34 ἀιδές > ἀόρατον (79a3;981c2) If we turn to consider the occurrences of ἀιδές in the Corpus Platonicum, we find that, out of a total of fifteen, as many as twelve are in Phaed. 69a–83d and concern the invisible sphere; the remaining specifically refer to the netherworld, hinting at the god Hades. In Plato’s lexicon the peculiarity of the term is evident. Reflecting what happens in the Phaedo, the most frequent use of ἀιδές is to distinguish the immaterial sphere from the visible world, thereby establishing a split between two types of reality (79a6)35: an ontological division that was to influence all following metaphysics. This categorical separation seems to be the result of the philosopher’s need to distance himself from anything that could undermine the possibility of acquiring stable knowledge; neither Heraclitus’ nor the Eleatics’ ontology is right: ever-present change is not the fundamental essence of the universe, but only affects sensible realities; likewise, all the properties which the Eleatics attribute to Being (uniqueness, perpetuity, indivisibility, etc.) only pertain to the intelligible Forms. The lexeme ἀιδές, as it is defined in Plato’s works, seems to undergo a semantic shift to ἀόρατον in the Epinomis, where the same property of being invisible of God is now defined through the latter – no longer the former – term. This occurs in relation to the attempt to define the divine principle by pointing to a change both in its nature and location: in Plato the principles are transcendent and inhabit the perfect realm of Hyperuranion, but in the Epinomis God is psychic and immanent to the physical universe. Let us start by considering the exchange at the Phaedo

The Phaedo and the Epinomis  37 (79b14), where it is clear that Socrates rejects the use of the adjective τὸ ἀόρατον to qualify the psyche, thus to define the invisible dimension: τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι;   οὐχ ὁρατόν.   ἀιδὲς ἄρα;   ναί. Then what do we say about the soul? Is it visible or invisible?   Not visible.   So it is invisible?   Yes. The thorniness of the subject should be evident from the fact that, although the adjectives ἀιδές and ἀόρατον can both be translated as ‘unseen’, Plato and Philip of Opus make a choice between the two.36 In order to appreciate the significance of these terminological selections, it is necessary to somehow distinguish the two attributes. The inversive prefix in ἀ-όρατον negates the sense of the perceptual verb ὁράω, and the Greek adjective means exactly what we understand by ­‘invisible’ – and nothing more. Hence, it is evident that ἀόρατον, which then simply denies the feature of being visible to the eye, is truly insufficient to provide any real insight into how Plato conceives of the invisible quality of the intelligibles; this property is indeed better shown by the root *-ἶδ, which gives οἶδα (‘I have seen’), the perfect tense of the verb ὁράω, which ultimately carries the epistemological meaning of ‘to know’, and the cognate adjective ἀιδές. After all, the property of being intelligible (‘knowable only by the intellect’) is necessarily implicated and linked to the feature of not being visible by eyesight.37 Consistent with this, supreme knowledge coincides with dialectic, which accounts for everything in relation to the Forms and inquires into the relationships between them without resorting to any sensible patterns. An epistemologically clear reformulation of the passage in question, thus, might be: Then what do we say about the soul? Is it visible or invisible?   It is not visible by eyesight.   It is knowable only by the intellect, then?   Yes. Line 79a4 is quite clear in drawing specific distinctions between two different ontological spheres: there are only two kinds of beings (δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀιδές) and what is immaterial, and hence invisible to the eye, exists differently in a super-sensible existence, able to be grasped only by means beyond eyesight. The implication between the ontological element and the epistemological one is clear. Given all this, the Phaedo passage emphasises the need to establish a clear barrier between the physic sphere and the super-sensible one, whose strict separation

38 The Epinomis and its background is strongly advocated by Plato through the use of such terminology; through the lexeme ἀιδές it gives fuller expression to the idea of a conceptual departure from physicality and affirms a complete denial of the corporeal form.38 Plato rejects the complete identity between ἀιδές and ἀόρατον, since it is not enough to treat the ἀιδές simply as the opposite of the ὁρατόν: what is ἀιδές is also – yet not ­exclusively – defined as being invisible to the eye, yet primarily it is knowable only by the Intellect. Taking said considerations into account, the absence of the term ἀιδές from the Epinomis is also worthy of attention. This adaptation of the Platonic vocabulary reflects the fact that for Philip of Opus there are not several ontological spheres and the only reference system is the sensible cosmos. Once again, the whole purpose here seems to be under the auspices of the epistemology: since true knowledge is only found within the material world, in the Epinomis the word ἀιδές, with its specific transcendent meaning, seems to be useless.

Different ways to define the λογισμός The word ἀιδές giving way to the more physical ἀόρατον provides the best evidence of the fact that true knowledge consists no longer of an intellectual vision. Nevertheless, although the Epinomis would not entrust the epistemological function to the eidetic paradigms, the knowledge framework of the appendix to the Laws is still primarily linked to the act of seeing, which this time is enabled by a sense organ. In particular, the periphrasis of the Phaedo, which further informs us about the adjective ἀιδές through the dative of manner (τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ), is replaced in the  Epinomis  by two more attributions accompanying ἀόρατον (γιγνῶσκον and νοητόν): the triad of adjectives at 981c1–2, shows that the things that could be grasped only by reason in Phaed. 79a3–4 turn into something that is defined as knowing and noetic specifically thanks to its memory capacity (μνήμη) and reckoning power (λογισμός). In order to grasp the significance of the replacement of the periphrasis of the Phaedo with the previously listed attributes in the Epinomis, which will also involve a shift in meaning of λογισμός, it might be enough necessary to focus on only one element from the ἀόρατον – γιγνῶσκον – νοητόν list, namely νοητόν. Indeed, the term νοητόν does not exclusively mean ‘intelligible’, but can be used either (a) as a verbal adjective (first form) or (b) as a simple adjective equivalent to νοητικός [LSJ s.v.]: (a) νοητόν, ‘knowable by the intellect’. In this case, the term expresses the passivity of the subject, presenting the act of knowing as a possibility rather than as a necessary event. In Plato, as is well known, there is talk of Forms39: probably following the most common use of the term, that is ‘what is opposite to όρατον’ [LSJ s.v.], Plato suggests the antithesis ὁρατόν-νοητόν,40 where the latter attribute in most occurrences within the Corpus does not represent the World Soul or the Demiurge, but qualifies the subject which belongs to the supersensible invisible sphere par excellence. It is only with the

The Phaedo and the Epinomis  39 Plato’s Laws (X, 898d6–7, e2) that the eternal and perfect Forms no longer come into play and the subject qualified by νοητόν becomes the Soul – a possible shift towards the use of the term made by Philip of Opus within the appendix to this work. In this sense, it is fairly clear that in the ascription of the noetic character, which is one of the most divine features, the gradual shift from the Forms to the Soul does not coincide with a loss of intelligibility in the former and its increase in the latter; rather, this shift just means that the Soul, without any explicit detriment to the Forms, is assigned an ever-increasing divine power, which reaches its culmination in the Epinomis.41 (b) νοητικός, ‘intellectual’ [LSJ s.v.]. Although critics have frequently concluded that there is practically no difference between the meaning assigned to νοητόν by Plato and that assigned to it by Philip of Opus, I believe it is beneficial to verify the consistency of the use of the word in an active sense, i.e., as νοητικός – as opposed to the passive sense illustrated by (a).42 This possible interpretation is suggested by Tim. 46d5–7, where the Soul is the only existing thing which has the property of acquiring thought: Epin. 981b3–c3 follows the Platonic passage, keeping both the combination ἀόρατον – νοῦς and the syntax of the independent clause. As said, by contrast to the predominant use made of νοητόν in the Corpus Platonicum, in Tim. 46d5–7 the term is used to describe the invisible Soul, which, of all entities, is the only one that has to do with rational planning and for which it is appropriate to possess nous; in the same way, the Cosmic Soul of the Epinomis possesses the ability to know (γιγνῶσκον) and reason (νοητόν) to the highest degree, as is befitting for a god. Tim. 46d5–7: τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ᾧ νοῦν μόνῳ κτᾶσθαι προσήκει, λεκτέον ψυχήν – τοῦτο δὲ ἀόρατον, πῦρ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ καὶ ἀὴρ σώματα πάντα ὁρατὰ γέγονεν. Epin. 981b3–C5: στερεὰ δὲ σώματα λέγεσθαι χρὴ κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον πέντε [. . .]: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀσώματον ὅτι τ᾽ἄλλο γίγνοιτ᾽ἂν καὶ χρῶμα οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς οὐδέποτ᾽ἔχον, πλὴν τὸ θειότατον ὄντως ψυχῆς γένος. τοῦτο δ᾽ἐστὶ σχεδὸν ᾧ μόνῳ πλάττειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν προσήκει [. . .]: τῷ δέ [. . .] ἀοράτῳ τε εἶναι καὶ γιγνώσκοντι νοητῷ τε. The properties exposed within the list of the adjectives of the Phaedo and Epinomis  are nailed to λογισμόι of a different kind. Perhaps being influenced by the Platonic works, the lines of the Epinomis in question show attributes that follow one another and complement each other. Indeed, this is what occurs in  Phaed. 79a–80b, which reveals an interdependence between the divine nature, immortality, uniformity, indissolubility, ontological stability, and the feature of being knowable only by the intellect, and in Epin. 981c2–4, which, on its part, includes consistency among the adjectives and participles present on its list, where each depends on the previous term. In this sense, if (b) is accepted, then in the Epinomis νοητόν specifies the participle γιγνῶσκον and defines the way in which the

40 The Epinomis and its background Soul knows, namely the means by which its act of learning occurs43: the understanding actualised by the psyche involves the intellect; this latter, in turn, is specifically completed by reckoning power (λογισμός). Although, therefore, the dissertation once again falls within the epistemological context, this latter now sees the divine logos expressing itself differently from how it was attributed within Plato’s works. Here, the term λογισμός is commonly used to denote both a generic reasoning power without any reference to the number and purely mathematical reckoning.44 Conversely, in the Epinomis the term is conferred by a new, and distinctly only mathematical value, either through the ability to reveal the sphere of numbers or by playing an active role in the process of acquisition of correct astronomical knowledge (and, consequently, right moral prescriptions), which gives human beings the ability to grasp the universal rhythm. The Athenian Visitor expunges the passive aspect from his description of God’s intellectuality, which is to say that he discusses intelligence and not intelligibility – the capacity to understand and not the capability of being ­understood – in order to define λογισμός. Thus, by means of the genitive τῆς διανοίας Plato relegates λογισμός to the intelligible sphere, assigning it a rather different meaning from the Epinomis; here, λογισμός is no longer discursive thought but numerical calculation. Moreover, while it is true that διάνοια is a term used explicitly by Plato for mathematical and technical thinking, we should bear in mind that the word embodies one of the two degrees of the intelligible realm (Resp. VI, 511d, where, as known, Plato accurately represents the different levels of reality and the corresponding degrees of the capacity of the human soul in terms of knowledge); διάνοια is the intellectual perception to which the sensory experience is subordinate, the only kind of understanding which is not limited to the external dimension but grasps things in themselves, independently of space-time conditions. Under these circumstances, it appears that the author aspired to reveal even the noetic nature of God without abandoning – even in this case – the Platonic lexicon. However, if all the aforementioned reconstruction is acceptable, the mutual specification between the descriptive terms would prove a replacement in meaning that attests to: (1) a redefinition of the balance between the various sciences, with mathematical doctrines gradually gaining importance to the detriment of dialectic; (2) the desire of Philip of Opus to emphasise the providential character of the God he intends to legitimise. In the Epinomis, the precise mathematical character of the motions of the heavenly bodies reveals the orderliness of the heavens thanks to the physical faculty of sight, which allows us to realise the ratio bestowed by the divine Soul, in which the celestial movements have their source and origin. In this respect, it can be hinted that the Athenian Visitor’s aim is largely to educate people by recalling the contact that God establishes with humankind, that is, how men who follow moral rules – which are now tangible – can feel close to God who has established them; whereas in the Phaedo the concept was only mentioned through a passing reference (62d).

The Phaedo and the Epinomis  41

Conclusions To sum up, the  Phaedo  appears to have served as a major source of inspiration for the  Epinomis  in the modeling of its psychic God. This is evident, first and foremost, from the author’s terminology: the text clearly presents, on the one hand, expressions drawn from Plato and, on the other, divergences from the Phaedo (and Corpus Platonicum)’s vocabulary. The latter consist in adjustments made to the Platonic lexicon, which may be deemed ontological – to wit, motivated by the need to frame the whole discourse within certain boundaries, whereas the borrowings reflect the author’s desire to rely on Plato’s authoritativeness in order to defend the idea of the divine nature of the Soul. In this respect, the chapter has considered a major thematic point of the usage of eidetic terminology to define the psychic God of the Epinomis despite the apparent absence of the eidetic sphere from the appendix to the Laws.45 In the Phaedo Socrates describes the soul as akin to the Forms (and not to sensible things) with respect to their unchangeability (79d1–4, 80b1–4). Indeed, when Plato affirms the pre-existence both of the Forms and of the soul by offering four pieces of evidence in support of their immortality, one is the ‘Affinity Argument’ (80d), which explains that the soul is most like what is divine, immortal, intellectual, uniform, indissoluble and ever-unchanging, which makes it possible to use the same terminology to characterise both the Forms and the soul. Drawing upon this description, Philip of Opus goes even further and suggests that the soul should be considered the only divine reality (soul and body, in their respective spheres, encompass and account for all existent things of whatever kind, from the astral to the inanimate: Epin. 983d). The chapter has shown just how functional this reuse is, especially as a means to establish the non-existence of a purported third thing, a view which offers a conceptual structure that is dismissive of the idea of transcendent entities: non-psychic metaphysical realities are clearly excluded at 981b, where we can detect an anti-Platonic stance with regard to the non-duality of the immaterial (which is therefore only psychic and not eidetic).46 Given that in the Epinomis the ontological and epistemological framework was different from the Platonic one, the vocabulary too needed to change: the author engaged in a process of de-transcendentalisation of the Platonic lexicon and his choice of words is perfectly consistent with this. He is unable to accept the Platonic vocabulary sic et simpliciter, since the removal of the Forms entails the re-thinking of the related terminology, which is altered through a process of ‘physicalisation’ that makes it very clear that the Forms no longer play any role. To expound the divine kind as different from the corporeal one, the Athenian Visitor maintains the Platonic descriptive structure of eternal and unchangeable patterns. However, as the divine principle changes its seat and becomes embedded in the sensitive universe – which now includes the whole of reality, even the divine sphere – it is necessary for the author of the Epinomis to change the Phaedo’s lexicon by making the divine more connected to the physical sphere, thereby associating God to the visible dimension.

42 The Epinomis and its background The direct outcome of the alteration performed by rejecting Plato’s transcendent vocabulary is the immanentisation of the divine principle. The point of reference for the description of the Soul is a material ontology, which is brought into play by being denied: it builds on prefixes which denote privation and express absence, or on litotic formulations which emphasise certain features by affirming yet at the same time rejecting bodily qualities. This terminology does not exclude the empirical sphere in describing the divine, but – on the contrary – falls within a system of reference which is worldly and tangible. So, for example, the Athenian Visitor does not delineate a Soul which can be understood only by the intellect but rather one which is devoid of any external shape discernible by human eyesight. In order to demonstrate the rules governing this process of immanentisation, a comparative analysis of Epin. 981b3–982a1 (984e6; 985a6) and Phaed. 78c–80b (83d1–7) has been carried out. In particular, from the borrowing and changes introduced by Philip of Opus, it has been observed that: •

• • •

in the Epinomis the ἀνώλεθρον-ἀθάνατον iunctura, as in Plato’s dialogues, not only describes the soul (through the stars), but also constitutes a reformulation of αὐτὸ καθ᾽αὑτό, which is regarded as sufficient to describe the psychic God (αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι, strictly intended, is no longer necessary and, in fact, disappears); this means that, in order to describe God, the specific properties of the Forms are unnecessary, as those qualifying the soul are enough; as in Plato’s works, in the Epinomis the lexeme καθαρόν indicates purity and divinity (the visible gods); this is also the case with λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή; the property of not being mastered by pleasure and pain is a characteristic that qualifies both the Platonic Forms and the psychic God of the Epinomis modelled after them; the use of ἀσώματον to describe the divine principle must have been borrowed from Plato, though not from the Phaedo, and being ἀχρώματον is a specific characteristic of the non-perceivable divine reality in the Corpus Platonicum as well.

As far as the terminological shifts are concerned, it is reasonably certain that in the Epinomis there are actual variations, which involve the discarding of specifically Platonic words like μονοειδές and ἀιδές and which are functional to the process of immanentisation: •

•

The change from εἶδος to μορφή is justified by the emergence of a new paradigm of knowledge, which makes the eidetic sphere unnecessary: without being part of a transcendent system, the God of the Epinomis is the ontological and epistemological foundation of everything, meaning that – exactly like the Forms – he embodies the highest degree of being and the formal cause on which the whole multitude of entities are ontologically dependent. On the basis of the meaning of ἀιδές in the Platonic lexicon, the usage of ἀόρατον to indicate invisible reality in the Epinomis must reflect the author’s intention to avoid referring to the invisible understood as intelligible, which

The Phaedo and the Epinomis  43 in turn reveals how important it is for Philip of Opus not to exceed the material scope, either in terms of physical visibility or in term of knowledge. It is generally agreed that the lack of Forms in the Epinomis is self-evident. In this sense, what I have claimed in this chapter is that in the appendix to the Laws transcendence does not simply go unmentioned but is actually rejected: if we consider the shifts in the vocabulary, by which a material horizon of meaning is inferred, we cannot fail to notice that they are accompanied by the absence of some distinctly Platonic syntactic elements. Also in light of the results reached in the debate between A.E. Taylor and Friedrich Müller,47 which focused on the syntactic constructions and vocabulary that are peculiar to the Epinomis, though not to dialogues that were undoubtedly written by Plato, the fact that the text of the Epinomis does not present distinctly Platonic features seems like the most promising avenue to explore. In this sense, we see that in his response to Müller, Taylor has argued that the new elements in terms of grammar and structure to be found in the Epinomis do not necessarily support the inauthenticity of the text – given the presence, for example, of hapax legomena in dialogues that were undoubtedly written by Plato. But then, what about the absence in the dialogue of expressions such as αὐτὸ καθ ̓αὑτό, μονοειδές or ἀιδές? Without treating the issue of the authorship, but rather focusing on the possible absence in the Epinomis of the divine Forms, this chapter has proposed an argument similar to Taylor’s but opposite in content: if Taylor and Müller’s analysis on those non-characteristic elements of Plato within the Epinomis can be considered reasonable, the same has to be held from the perspective of the typical Platonic components, that is to say, an enquiry on the absence of the aforementioned expressions that are the cornerstones of Plato’s language proved to be fruitful. In the light of this analysis, therefore, it may be argued that most doubts about the absence of explicit references to the Forms have been cleared: it is evident that Philip deliberately changed the Platonic vocabulary in order to deny the ontology of the eidetic sphere. As we have seen in this chapter, any amendment is attributable to a change of context, which marks the transition from transcendent causes to an immanent divine principle. The Platonic Forms lose the precondition for their presence – if not even for their very existence – and the resulting definition of the divine falls within a purely material horizon: the principle makes itself manifest through the world and, insofar as God permeates the material world, he is not seen as being outside it. On this route, what is also discernible is a significant change of setting on the epistemological level, in relation to the cognitive action of seeing, which now covers the anthropic sphere and no longer the noetic one (as in Phaed., 65e6–66a6): Then he will do this most perfectly who approaches the object with thought alone, without associating any sight with his thought, or dragging in [66a] any sense perception with his reasoning, but who, using pure thought alone, tries to track down each reality pure and by itself, feeing himself as far as possible from eyes and ears, and, in a word, from the whole body, because the body

44 The Epinomis and its background confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom whenever it is associate with it. Will not that man reach reality, Simmias, if anyone does? In the Epinomis the philosopher’s gaze is turned towards the physical sky and no longer towards the Hyperuranium, since it is now eyesight (not intellectual vision) that makes the acquisition of sophia possible (Epin. 978c1–d1): Creatures are not endowed by nature even to the actual point of being able to learn from their father to count; whereas in us, in the first place, God implanted this very conception, so that we might be equal to comprehending it when shown to us, and in the second place, he showed it and shows it. Among such things, what one more singularly beautiful can a man behold than the world of day? Then he comes to the province of night, and views it; and there quite another sight [978d] lies before him. Given all this, it is entirely possible to affirm that the removal of the supra-­sensory sphere is deliberate. The Athenian Visitor’s words are uttered in a context that does not change the value which should be assigned to the divine. Indeed, God still enjoys particular prominence as both the cause of everything that exists and the ultimate cause of knowledge, as well as an object of truth. The Phaedo’s terminology is modified in order to bring it into agreement with the absence of Forms, and words describing physical realities replace terms which apply to the transcendent sphere. Although the qualities of the Forms and the features of the divine described in the Epinomis can be translated using the same English adjectives, they convey widely diverging contents. The Phaedo’s background and that of the Epinomis are conceptually different: in the appendix to the Laws no dimension distinct from materiality is introduced under any circumstances; therefore, as noted, in depicting God, the author highlights the divine state by denying all physical properties and not by positing a realm outside the physical one. No mention of the Hyperuranium can be found in the Athenian Visitor’s speech, since there is only one space-time, encompassing both perceptibles and the divine principle.

Notes 1 See Chapter 1. 2 As I cannot delve into the details of this issue, I will refer to: D.T.J. Bailey, ‘Platonic causes revised’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 52 (2014): 15–32; N.F. Alican – H. Thesleff, ‘Rethinking Plato’s forms’, Arctos: Acta Philologica Fennica, Vol. 47 (2013): 11–47; N. Gulley, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge, Routledge, London, 2013 (1962); H. Thesleff, Platonic Patterns: A Collection of Studies, Parmenides Publishing, Las Vegas, 2009; M. Cohen, Theory of Forms, University of Washington, Seattle, 2006; R.M. Dancy, Plato’s Introduction of Forms, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007; P. Dimas, ‘Recollecting forms in the Phaedo’, Phronesis, Vol. 48, No. 3 (2003); G. Fine, Plato on Knowledge and Forms, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; W.A. Welton, Plato’s Forms: Varieties of Interpretation, Rowman  & Littlefield, Lanham, 2002; F. Fronterotta, Methexis. La teoria platonica delle idee e la

The Phaedo and the Epinomis  45

3 4

5 6

7 8 9

partecipazione delle cose empiriche. Dai dialoghi giovanili al Parmenide, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, 2001; D. Sedley, ‘Platonic causes’, Phronesis, Vol. 43 (1998): 114–32; G. Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993; G. Vlastos, ‘Reasons and causes in the Phaedo’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 78, No. 3 (1969): 291–325, Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review; F. Ademollo, ‘Plato’s conception of the forms: Some remarks’, in R. Chiaradonna – G. Galluzzo (eds.), Universal in Ancient Philosophy, Edizioni della Normale, Pisa, 2013; N.F. Alican, ‘Rethought forms: How do they work?’, Arctos: Acta Philologica Fennica, Vol. 48 (2014): 25–55; Pesic 2007; Rogers 1936; Ross 1951; Rodziewicz 2012; Fine 2003; Kennedy 2010. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are drawn from Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes, English translation by W.R.M. Lamb, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1914. The use of the word ἀνώλεθρον cannot be totally excluded in Plato for describing the Forms, see e.g., the presentation of the theory of Forms at Tim. 52a. However, especially this dialogue and the Laws distinguish between Forms and the World Soul in terms of immortality; roughly speaking, the Demiurge crafts the Soul (Tim. 34c), which is therefore eternal in a different way from the Forms: the Soul is everlasting (36e) – time being the eternal image of that Eternity which abides in unity (37d) – whereas the Forms are placed outside time. Moreover, in Tim. 36e the Soul is ­generated and fabricated within the Corporeal (and the Demiurge makes the two fit together, uniting them center to center) and in Laws X, 904a, the Soul is presented alongside the Corporeal and envisaged as indestructible but not eternal. Nevertheless, it must be said that this topic raises deep-rooted issues that would require specific treatment; suffice here to make one last reference, that is, to Phaed. 105d–106a, where Socrates says that the Soul brings life to anything which it takes possession of and it never admits the opposite of that which it brings with it, meaning that it never admits of death. In other words, the Soul is immortal because, in contrast to things like snow, which melts when it approaches fire (its contrary), it is imperishable. This is an issue Lefka (Motte – ­Rutten – Somville 2003) insists on. The use of the term ‘immortal’ for the human race refers to very specific expressions such as ἀ. ἀνήρ, the ‘bodyguard’ and οἱ ἀ., a body of Persian troops in which vacancies were filled up by successors already appointed [LSJ s.v.]. An extensive discussion of the problem of the ways in which the Cosmic Soul correlates with the celestial bodies (namely whether the stars are divine in themselves or by extension, i.e., whether something else directs their motion by making them otherdirected or whether they have an inner soul which intrinsically leads their movement), which constitutes an intensely debated point, is held in Chapter 5. Without going into the matter in depth, it is enough, for now, to point out that in the Epinomis the controversial relationship between the Soul and the stars is never disclosed. See also 982a1, 984b2, and 984d5. See Aronadio – Petrucci – Tulli 2013, pp. 91–8, 360. It has to be reasonably recognised that Philip of Opus was not interested in discussing deeply philosophical aspects (see Chapter  5), as long as any theoretical uncertainties were not detrimental to his ultimate goal, namely, to endorse astral worship. On the reasons why the Epinomis is intended to justify astral theology, especially from a legal standpoint, see Chapter 7. Furthermore, it should be noted that the expression ἐξ ἁπάσης ἀνάγκης (Epin. 982a1) forcefully states that incorruptibility, immortality, and divine nature need to be considered inseparable. In doing so, Philip avoids the problem of the coexistence of physical matter and the divine nature within the stars. The latter are visible gods mostly made up of a physical substance (fire) which is nevertheless the noblest and the purest element: certainly, the perceptible conformation of the heavenly bodies would not prevent them from being everlasting.

46 The Epinomis and its background 10 In this regard, it is worth briefly looking at Tim. 41a, where the Demiurge himself engenders the celestial deities, whose immortality he ensures; the gist of the Athenian Visitor’s theory, which classifies the stars as immortal deities on account of their intelligent souls (981e5–6), can be considered a reference to Plato: in view of the Platonic argument of the decay of matter, on three occasions (981b7, 986c4, 991d2) the Athenian Visitor stresses that the Soul is a supreme incorporeal substance which, alone of all existent things, reaches the highest state and the most sublime level, not governed by necessity. 11 Phaed. 78c6, 79a9, 79d5; Hipp. mi. 366e5 (the numbers); Resp. V, 479e7 e VI, 484b8; Soph. 248a12; Polit. 278c1; Tim. 28a2, 35a2, 38a3, 48e6. 12 Cf. Chantraine 2009; Roberts 2007. 13 The theme of purity runs throughout the whole dialogue, moving from initiation rituals for mystery religions into more properly philosophical fields. 14 See Specchia 1967, who makes an interesting remark which stresses the dissimilarity between the simulacra of the visible gods – deities in the strong sense – and the statues made by wise, yet merely human, hands. 15 See Euripides, Medea vv. 1077 ff., Kovacs 1994 (ed.); Heraclides Ponticus, On Pleasure; Cic. N. D. I, 13, 34; Specchia 1967, p. 103 as regards the references to Aristotle. On Plato’s pleasure theory see also Moss 2006; Fletcher 2014. 16 Cf. Republic IX, 583b–587e where it is clear that when we devote ourselves to pleasure, we accept a counterfeit reality and fail to seek out the true world that lies beyond appearances, and Philebus, 36c–50e which presents the doctrine of false pleasures. 17 Cf. Laws I, 633de; III, 689a; VII, 788b and 792d; X, 902b. The most extreme form of courage is defined as battling against λύπη and ἡδονή since they easily melt men’s hearts like wax; the encouragement towards self-conditioning in following the laws given by the legislator is provided by the community and the device of choral music and dancing are ‘enchantments’ of crucial importance in education for training feelings of order, rhythm, and harmony. See Morrow 1993, p. 309. 18 See Specchia 1967, p. 93. 19 See Tarán 1975, p. 263. 20 The text does not present the adjective ἀχρώματον but a periphrasis which defines a colourless psyche: οὐ γάρ στιν ἀσώματον ὅτι τ᾽ἄλλο γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν καὶ χρῶμα οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς οὐδέποτ᾽ ἔχον. 21 See Aronadio – Petrucci – Tulli 2013; Adorno 1971. 22 All three words are hapax legomena of the Corpus Platonicum. 23 See Aronadio – Petrucci – Tulli 2013, p. 351; Tarán 1975, pp. 263–4. With regard to this matter, see also Cra. 423e: alluding to the difference between the essential nature of something and its qualities (colour, sound, etc.), it is said that the former is invisible whereas the latter are within our senses’ reach. 24 For reference to a ruddy complexion, see Phaed. 117b4 and Lys. 222b2. It is also worth looking at: the Timaeus, where visible material objects are called ‘coloured’ (Tim. 59b3, 67d1, 68a6, 71b7, 74d4, 80e2); the Republic, which refers to pigments used to dye clothes or artists’ paints (Resp. II 373b6; IV 429d6, e4; VI 507e2; X 601a4, 602c12); the Phaedo, where the earth where human beings live is said to reflect each colour of the light spectrum (Phaed. 110b8, c5, d1–2, d7). 25 See also Symp. 211e2, where colour is one of the primary constituents of human beings. 26 This second section will take into consideration various contributions to the book of collected articles entitled Philosophie de la Forme (Motte – Rutten – Somville 2003), which primarily looks at the usage of μορφή in connection to εἶδος, dealing even with the variant μόρφωμα (G. Jeanmatk, in ibid. p. 83). The volume also shows the physicality of μορφή by detecting its association with φύσις (A. Lefka, ibid. p. 95; A. Motte, ibid. p. 115), and addresses matters concerning gods’ immutability and relinquishing their own form (G. Van Riel, ibid. p. 220, who finds references in Phil. 12c7,

The Phaedo and the Epinomis  47 34d1; J. Follon, ibid. p. 155, who refers to Resp. II, 380d3; 381c6; 381c9 to argue that God never alters his shape through many transformations; J. Opsomer and G. Roskam, in ibid., pp. 244–6, who find references in Tim. 50c1–51a7. See also G. Guldentops in ibid. pp. 255–6 along with Bordt 2006). 27 See Taylor 1929, p. 13; Specchia 1967, p. 93. 28 On linguistic infrastructures and formulation as prerequisites for the development of concepts through which philosophy presented its ideas in the ancient Greek world, see Snell 2002, pp. 313–34. 29 See f.n. 19. 30 In particular, see Theaet. 205c7. There is just one exception at Polit. 288e5, where the term describes things like carpentry and joinery, cork, straw, and plaiting products. By contrast, what is ἀδιάλυτον it is not unavoidably ἀσύνθετον (see Tim. 35ab and Resp. 380d1–381c9). 31 See, in particular, Aronadio’s interpretation of 981b and 983d (Aronadio – Petrucci – Tulli 2013, p. 358), which, according to him, eloquently and unequivocally show the rejection of any further ontological dimension by Philip of Opus, hence explaining the absence of any reference to the Platonic εἴδη. See also D. Pesce 1992, p. 5. It ought to be mentioned here that in the Epinomis there is no perfect consistency in the use of the term μορφή (again Aronadio – Petrucci – Tulli 2013, p. 350): it is understood either as the combination of Soul and body (981a9) or just as the former (981b5). 32 Aronadio (Aronadio – Petrucci – Tulli 2013, pp. 398–9) believes that Plato employed the word μορφή in a technical sense, which is instead absent in the Epinomis, where (991c4) it is echoed in Socratic dialectic but without exhausting all its features, which consist in a complex interaction between Forms that are not reducible to a simple ascending motion. 33 Phaed. 78d5, 80b2, 83e2, Symp. 211b1, e4, and Resp. V, 479a3–e9, where, crucially differently, the self-identity of the εἶδος is asserted, should not be considered. 34 The heavens, in order to show number, cause night and day to alternate, the seasons to change, and produce all the courses of the stars, and food for all; accordingly, human beings, after receiving the greatest gift, namely numbers, have acquired understanding. If they were deprived of numbers they could never attain any understanding or virtue (Epin. 977b). This concept will be thoroughly examined within the chapters of this book. 35 The same goes for Phaed. 98a1–2, 100b4–6. 36 All this is also confirmed by the fact that the real reason why Plato introduces the doctrine of recollection in the Phaedo is not to describe a certain method of research but to demonstrate the necessarily metaphysical nature of the soul. See Martinelli Tempesta – Trabattoni 2011. 37 See also Stat., 286a5: ‘immaterial things, which are the noblest and greatest, can be exhibited by reason only’. 38 It must be noted that, within the  Corpus Platonicum, the ἀόρατον also designates Forms (e.g.,  Resp. VII, 529b5;  Soph. 246b7). However, in this sense, many occurrences of the term indicate the divine things in relation to the physical world (while not conveying a specifically material meaning): the ἀόρατον soul is compared to the visible sky and the natural elements (Tim. 36e6, 46d6); Plato, when he adopts the materialists’ manner of speaking, calls the invisible τὸ ἀόρατον (Thaeth. 155e6); the chora is called ἀόρατον as, although remaining immune from generation and corruption, and being self-sufficient, it has to do with the physical world as its constituent element (Tim. 52a3–4). 39 It seems clear that in Plato’s works the νοητά quite frequently represent the ideal models (Resp. VI, 511a3), which are invisible to the eyes but tangible to philosophy (Phaed. 81b7), or their intelligible realm (Resp. VI 508c1, 509d4; VII 517b5–c3, 524c13). Particular attention should be paid to Tim. 37a1–2, which the ancient authors interpreted

48 The Epinomis and its background variously: they either attribute intelligibility to the World Soul or considered the latter a product forged by the Demiurge, which in his shaping of the cosmos turns to the νοητά (48e6; 51b5. See Fronterotta 2011, n. 115, p. 207) – it is indeed true that the latter in the Timaeus are usually regarded as ontological patterns (51c5), whose immobility is reproduced in the sensible cosmos by the regularity of its movement (39e1, 92c7; in the same sense also 30c7, 31a5). 40 The juxtaposition is highlighted in Resp. VI, 509d and VII, 524c. 41 The World Soul was assigned a more prominent role in the last period of Plato’s literary activity, as well as in the Academy after Plato’s death. On this, see Chapter 6 and 7. 42 Tarán 1975, p.  264 (comment on 981b7–c4). Aronadio – Petrucci – Tulli 2013, p. 351 (commenting on 981c2–3) speaks of a link between ἀοράτῳ, γιγνώσκοντι, and νοητῷ: they evoke and enrich one another, which is completely acceptable to Plato but indeed raises certain problems with regard to the knowability of the intelligible, since γιγνώσκοντι and νοητῷ must be distinguished on the grounds that only the latter receives the action of the verb – which is to say that it implies the attribution of passivity to God. 43 For a deeper investigation of the noetic essence of the psychic God, see Chapter 3. 44 All occurrences of the word will be mentioned in Chapter 3. 45 See Chapter 1. 46 See Tarán 1975, p. 263: ‘Since the soul is the only entity that can be asomaton, is it clear that the author tacitly denies the separate existence of the idea’. The same negation of 981b occurs also at 983d2–5. 47 Taylor 1956.

3 The Timaeus and the Epinomis God’s non-imitative activity

We have said that the characteristics possessed by all of the Platonic transcendent realities considerably influence the Epinomis’ conception of the divine principle, being incorporate by this one God. In this sense, this chapter is intended to complete the previous one: it will be devoted to analysing no longer those expressions which Philip of Opus drew from Plato’s description of eidetic features, but rather those functions of the Epinomis’ God that undoubtedly recall the roles that in Plato belonged to the divine artisan and the World Soul. In sketching God’s properties, indeed Philip of Opus also takes cue from the Timaeus, where not only the existence of a craftsman-like God and a World Soul that directly derives from him is asserted, but also detailed functions are assigned to both – possibly considering these impersonal functions as the very essence of them. After some preliminary considerations, which regard the distance that can be highlighted between the onto-epistemological systems of the Timaeus and Epinomis, the present chapter shows how the Epinomis’ God is however originating from Plato’s World Soul and Demiurge; a comparative terminological analysis that examines the nature and functions of them is conducted by offering an investigation of the life-giving function, divinity and priority, noetic character, ordering and steering function, and productive activity of the Epinomis’ God. By focusing on these features, it is indeed possible to discover what kind of hints Philip of Opus offers about the nature of his divine principle, so as to more deeply explore the role and philosophical import of the God of the Epinomis. In order to stress correspondences (while noting possible divergences) between the divine principle of the Epinomis and Plato’s Demiurge and World Soul, there is no need here to address the issue of the potential identity between the Demiurge, the Forms, and the World Soul in the Timaeus; in other words, there is no need to address the question of whether the Forms are to be understood as the Demiurge’s thoughts, as efficient paradigms, or as models that, in order to be transposed into the sensible world, require a subordinate intermediate element between them and the chora – insofar as they coexist with the latter in a state of mutual causal inertia.1 Through keeping the Demiurge and the World Soul separate from each other and from the Forms, this chapter compares the former two divine entities and God stated by Philip of Opus, claiming that in the Epinomis the demise of the imitative nature of God’s activity and the orderly heavens as the manifestation of Providence – and no longer of the Forms – make it quite clear that is unnecessary to bring the eidetic sphere into play. DOI: 10.4324/9781003136910-4

50 The Epinomis and its background

Preliminary remarks There is a guiding thread connecting the Epinomis’ discussion to the Timaeus’ one. The parallels which can be found between the two works are justified not only by the Epinomis’ adoption of the Timaeus’ definition of homoiosis theo(i) (as a reproduction of the perfect regularity of celestial movements) and, consequently, by its adoption of Plato’s ethical theory,2 but also by its use (Epin. 976e2–989c2) of an argumentative structure that is almost identical to that of Tim. 46c7–47e2. By adding some examples more strictly related to the astral religion, the Athenian Visitor recovers the Platonic text fairly accurately. If we compare the two texts (see Table 3.1), an identical set of topics emerges; at the same time, it is precisely this similar lexical structure and phrasing that makes the difference between the two dialogues quite evident. The analogous argumentative structure, which is laid out through the use of an identical lexicon and organised into corresponding logical steps, clearly reveals the non-Platonic peculiarities of the Epinomis, pointing to two conflicting theoretical backgrounds. In the appendix to the Laws, no mention is made of the need to approach the Forms, which, as it is well known in Plato’s view, consists of the most suitable and indeed the only path to knowledge and the best means to attain it. The mimesis of intelligible patterns disappears, for it is now the cosmos that represents the visible and ontologically perfect paradigm by – and the physical limit within – which the acquisition of knowledge becomes possible. The emphasis on the discipline of astronomy, which constitutes the cornerstone of the Athenian Visitor’s speech, counterbalances the absence of any reference to the Platonic Forms. In fact, ontological frameworks that are apparently analogous – if not in terms of their subjects, at least in terms of the functions and characteristics of the ­latter – do not overlap and serve radically different purposes. The doctrine of being that underlies the Epinomis is designed to emphasise the Soul’s supremacy over material realities, rather than founding perceptible bodies on intelligible Forms. Therefore, a comparative analysis between the two dialogues shows that the philosophical core of the Epinomis is mostly derived from the Timaeus, although, at the same time, it cannot be said to simply stem from the Platonic work. Table 3.1  Passages of the Timaeus and Epinomis that echo on themselves   1 46d5–7

Tim. 46d–47b

 

981b7–c1 τῶν γὰρ ὄντων ᾧ νοῦν μόνῳ κτᾶσθαι προσήκει, λεκτέον ψυχήν – τοῦτο δὲ ἀόρατον, πῦρ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ καὶ ἀὴρ σώματα πάντα ὁρατὰ γέγονεν 982b5

Epin. 976e2–989c2 οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀσώματον ὅτι τ’ἄλλο γίγνοιτο [. . .], πλὴν τὸ θειότατον ὄντως ψυχῆς γένος. [. . .] τοῦτο δ᾽ἐστὶ σχεδὸν ᾧ μόνῳ [. . .] προσήκει, σώματι δέ [. . .] ὁρᾶσθαι: [. . .] ἀοράτῳ τε εἶναι καὶ γιγνώσκοντι νοητῷ ἡ ψυχῆς δὲ ἀνάγκη νοῦν κεκτημένης

The Timaeus and the Epinomis  51 Table 3.1  (Continued) 2 46d7–8

τὸν δὲ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐραστὴν [. . .]

3 46d8–e2

[. . .] ἀνάγκη τὰς τῆς 988d4–5 ἔμφρονος φύσεως 983d αἰτίας πρώτας μεταδιώκειν, ὅσαι δὲ ὑπ᾽ἄλλων μὲν κινουμένων, ἕτερα δὲ κατὰ ἀνάγκης κινούντων γίγνονται, δευτέρας. καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν 976e5–977a1 πῶς γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον (θεὸνδημιουργοὶ ψυχήν) ἡμῖν συμπάντων οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολὺ μεγίστου, τῆς φρονήσεως, αἴτιον ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ γεγονέναι; 981b8 τοῦτο (ψυχῆς γένος) δ᾽ἐστὶ σχεδὸν ᾧ μόνῳ πλάττειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν προσήκει 978c6–979a4 ὧν τί κάλλιον ἓν ἑνὸς ἄν τις ὄψις δὴ κατὰ τὸν θεάσαιτο πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐμὸν λόγον αἰτία γένος, εἶτα εἰς τὸ τῆς νυκτὸς τῆς μεγίστης ἔλθοι μέρος ἔχων ὄψιν, ὅθεν ὠφελίας γέγονεν ἕτερον πᾶν αὐτῷ [978δ] ἡμῖν, ὅτι τῶν νῦν φαίνοιτ᾽ἄν; καὶ ἑλίττων δὴ λόγων περὶ τοῦ ταῦτα αὐτὰ ὅταν μὴ παύηται παντὸς λεγομένων πολλὰς μὲν νύκτας, πολλὰς δὲ οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε ἡμέρας ἃς οὐρανός, οὐδέποτε ἐρρήθη μήτε ἄστρα παύεται διδάσκων ἀνθρώπους μήτε ἥλιον μήτε ἕν τε καὶ δύο, πρὶν ἂν καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸν ἰδόντων. δυσμαθέστατος ἱκανῶς μάθῃ νῦν δ᾽ἡμέρα τε καὶ ἀριθμεῖν: ὡς γὰρ καὶ τρία νὺξ ὀφθεῖσαι μῆνές καὶ τέτταρα καὶ πολλά, τε καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐπινοήσειεν ἂν περίοδοι καὶ ὁρῶν ταῦτα. καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἰσημερίαι καὶ τροπαὶ ἓν ἐποίησεν τὴν σελήνην ὁ μεμηχάνηνται μὲν θεὸς ἀπεργασάμενος, ἣ τοτὲ ἀριθμόν [. . .] ἐξ μὲν μείζων φαινομένη, τοτὲ ὧν ἐπορισάμεθα δ᾽ἐλάττων, διεξῆλθεν ἄλλην φιλοσοφίας γένος ἀεὶ φαίνουσα ἡμέραν, μέχρι οὗ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν πεντεκαίδεκα ἡμερῶν καὶ οὔτ᾽ἦλθεν οὔτε ἥξει νυκτῶν: αὕτη δ᾽ἔστιν περίοδος ποτὲ τῷ θνητῷ [. . .] καὶ τούτου δὲ σελήνην, γένει δωρηθὲν ἐκ καθάπερ εἴπομεν, αὐξανομένην θεῶν. καὶ φθίνουσαν ἐμποιήσας, μῆνας πρὸς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν συνεστήσατο 976e2 ἡ (ἐπιστήμη) τὸν ἀριθμὸν δοῦσα παντὶ τῷ θνητῷ γένει

46e4

4 47a1–b1 (cf. 38c– 39e)

989b8–c2

ἐν ταύταις ταῖς φύσεσιν δυναμένη μανθάνειν καὶ μνήμων οὖσα, εὖ μάλα χαίρειν τούτοις αὐτοῖς δύναιτ᾽ἂν φιλομαθὴς ὥστ᾽εἶναι. ψυχῆς οὔσης αἰτίας τοῦ ὅλου ἔμφρον μέν που (ἡ ψυχῆς), τὸ δὲ ἄφρον (τό σῶμα) θήσομεν

52 The Epinomis and its background 1 – The Nous and (in)visibility. Plato’s invitation for us to assimilate our souls to the movements of the World Soul – an invitation also present in the ­Epinomis – begins with a description of ‘existing beings’ that distinguishes the corporeal genus from the psychic one. The former group includes the four mechanical auxiliary – literally ‘contributory’ – causes, which are of visible and non-intelligent nature, whereby the phenomena that occur under their influence are automatic responses not implying any planning but driven by Necessity; these non-primary causes indeed lack the kind of capacity for reasoning, thinking, and evaluating that instead characterises the invisible Soul. In one word, in Plato the distinction between the genera of body and soul is due to the degree of affinity to the first causes (which are described right after the συν-αιτίαι). Of the latter there is no trace in the Epinomis, where the nous is proper only to the psychic divine principle: only two genera exist, the body and the soul, and there is no need to introduce the Forms in addition to them. 2 – The love of ἐπιστήμη. In the Timaeus, full and firm knowledge occurs only when intelligible and essential objects are taken as content; here, not only the nature of the object, i.e., the first cause, is emphasised but also the kind of desire that guides the man who is eager for knowledge: he is the ἐπιστήμης ἐραστής, whose aspect of conducting research is highlighted. Differently, in the Epinomis, we apparently find no trace of this passional desire3: no mention is made of ἔρως; the verb μανθάνω rather emphasises the importance of learning; in this sense, he who loves science is referred to as a φιλομαθής; unlike in the Timaeus, he is receiving a gift freely offered by God,4 which, moreover, is explicitly assigned with a mathematical value. The learner is, then, specifically fond of mathematics, to which great value is ascribed since it consists of the kind of knowledge that makes those who possess it wise (976c–977e). An entire section is centred on the concept of proportion and stresses the key role of numbers, overlaying thinking ability with numerical calculation capacity; even in describing the good citizen, who acts according to justice and measure, the Athenian Visitor uses terms that refer to mathematical order and harmony, such as ἐμμελής (