The Theological-Political Origins of the Modern State: The Controversy between James I of England and Cardinal Bellarmine 0813217911, 9780813217918

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The Theological-Political Origins of the Modern State

The

Theological-Political Origins of the

Modern State The Controversy between

James I of England & Cardinal Bellarmine

> Bernard Bourdin Translated by Susan Pickford

The Catholic University of America Press Washington, D. C.

Originally published as La Genèse théologicopolitique de l’Etat moderne by Les Presses Universitaires de France, © 2004. This translation is published with permission and with support from the Centre nationale du livre. Copyright © 2010 The Catholic University of America Press All rights reserved The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standards for Information Science— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. ∞ Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bourdin, Bernard. [Genèse théologico-politique de l’Etat moderne. English] The theological-political origins of the modern state : the controversy between James I of England and Cardinal Bellarmine / Bernard Bourdin ; translated by Susan Pickford. p. cm. “Originally published as La genèse théologico-politique de l’Etat moderne by Les Presses Universitaires de France, 2004”—T.p. verso. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8132-1791-8 (cloth : alk. paper)  1. Political theology—History.  2. Monarchy—England— History.  3. Church and state—England—History.  I. Pickford, Susan.  II. Title. BT83.59.B6813 2010 261.70941'09032—dc22   2010013566

Contents Acknowledgments  vii

Introduction  1 one The Ecclesiastical and Political Implications of Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  16 two James I’s Interpretation of Royal Sovereignty in Conflict with the Presbyterian Church  70 three King James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and the Theologico-Political Concept of Tolerance  95 four Bellarmine’s Theory of the Indirect Temporal Power of the Papacy: A Political Ecclesiology  132

vi  Contents five James VI of Scotland’s Trew Law of Free Monarchies: A Theologico-Political Hermeneutics of Scripture  157 six The Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance in the Context of James I’s Ecclesiological Beliefs and the Controversy with Cardinal Bellarmine’s Papal Theory  201 Conclusion  236 Appendix  251 Selected Bibliography  259 Index  277

Acknowledgments The first edition of this book was published in France. My warmest thanks to the translator, Susan Pickford, for the quality of her work and her constant readiness to participate in every stage of the publication process. I also wish to thank Father Romanus Cessario, who opened the way to this translation when I was researching at the University of Oxford. My sincere thanks also to David McGonagle and his panel of readers, without whom the book would not have been published in the United States. I owe a debt of gratitude to W. B. Patterson, a leading scholar of James I, whose work has been a considerable source of inspiration. I also wish to express my thanks to Theresa Walker and Beth Benevides at the Catholic University of America Press and to the copy editor, Carol Kennedy, for their tireless work on this edition. Finally, I would like to thank Father Guy Bedouelle and Gladys Sweeney and Craig Titus of the Institute for the Psychological Sciences, without whose assistance I would not have been able to carry out my research at the Bodleian Library.

vii

The Theological-Political Origins of the Modern State

Introduction

T

he controversy that pitted James I of England against Cardinal Bellarmine in the years 1606–10 on the issue of the loyalty that Catholic subjects owe to their monarch sheds considerable light both on the nature of theologicopolitical debate in this period and on our contemporary exploration of the theologico-political sources of modernity. The opposing theses espoused by twentieth-century jurists and philosophers, in particular Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg, are of particular interest with regard to this second aspect, which is of capital importance. At the heart of the debate is the key concept of secularization, a notion that raises many questions. Before giving what must of necessity be a succinct statement of our own position, we must first address the nature of this issue in its historical context. James VI of Scotland, I of England, author of The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, Basilikon Doron, and the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance, was a stout defender of the doctrine of the direct divine right of kings and of the two kingdoms. These two doctrines required a legitimist and hereditary understanding of royal power. They thus represented a direct challenge both to the clerical interpretation of the two kingdoms espoused by the Scottish Presbyterians and to the Roman Catholic belief in papal mediation as a regulatory channel that legitimizes secular power. However, the concept of divine right raises a prob-

1

2  Introduction lem of interpretation in the analysis of its historical development and, correlatively, its theologico-political meaning. The opposing arguments put forward by John Neville Figgis and John William Allen are key in this context. Their opposition was based on the conflation of the concepts of divine right and absolutism. In his book The Divine Right of Kings,1 Figgis put forward the argument that the theory of divine right arose from defending the monarch’s rights against the political ambitions of the papacy in the medieval period. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the same theory was put forward once more to undermine Presbyterian political thought. While this historical analysis is relevant as far as it goes, it does not account for the conceptual delimitation of divine right. At the heart of this problem of interpretation lies the concept of sovereignty, held to be synonymous with absolutism: “Monarchy is pure, the sovereignty being entirely vested in the king, whose power is incapable of legal limitation. All law is a mere concession of his will [. . . .] A mixed or limited monarchy is a contradiction in terms.”2 It is thus apparent that Figgis’s conflation of the three concepts of divine right, sovereignty, and absolutism leads to the thesis that the sovereignty of divine right implies that there are no limits to the monarch’s power. It is a bold position, contested by Allen, Francis Oakley, and other English historians.3 In other words, there is no denying that the concept of royal 1. John N. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914). See also John W. Allen, English Political Thought, 1603–1660 (London: Methuen, 1938), in particular 97 and 101, where Allen disagrees with the existence of a theory of royal absolutism by divine right. 2. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 5–6. 3. Francis Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant, and Order: An Excursion in the History of Ideas from Abelard to Leibniz (Icatha, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), ch. 4, esp. 111–14. For Allen, the fact that Jacobean and Caroline theologians had a belief in divine right does not mean that they acknowledged that the king had unlimited or discretionary power.

Introduction  3 sovereignty is bound up with the concept of divine right, in particular in King James’s political thought; however, it remains the case that this power is not without limits. The concept of absolutism should in fact be replaced by that of obligation. The “rights of a free monarchy,” to rephrase the title of The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, are in fact the sovereign’s obligation to govern his subjects to the best of his abilities; in return, his subjects are obliged to obey him. The Jacobean doctrine of the two kingdoms should be read in the light of this theory of a twofold obligation in which the political reign has partially, and conditionally, taken the place of God’s reign. The imposition of an oath of allegiance following the failure of the Gunpowder Plot in 1605 is certainly based on this theory. The English, and later European, controversy that opposed James VI and Cardinal Bellarmine likewise had its roots in the dilemma opposing the divine right of kings and the divine right of the papacy. This controversy is of major significance inasmuch as it indicates the extent to which James brought about the theologicopolitical conditions enabling the promotion of a concept of sovereignty that was not simply an exact replica of absolutism or arbitrary government, as Figgis suggested.4 However, at the same time, these theologico-political conditions required a major overhaul of the relationship between the Church and civil power. James’s theory of the legitimacy of sovereign power implied a subordinate position for the Church, while conversely accrediting the increasing autonomy of civil power with respect to ecclesiastical power. This raises the issue of the relationship between theological and political concepts, leading to a definition of the autonomy of the state that, 4. It should be noted that the concept of absolutism raises a historiographical problem. In France, the word—first used in 1797—arose in a revolutionary context, giving it a negative connotation. The same is true for England, where the term was first used in 1830. For the British monarchy, the events of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 were a key factor in the pre-understanding of the concept of absolutism in Whig historiography.

4  Introduction paradoxically, is theological and political in nature. We will return to this point briefly later, as in the broader sense it involves an understanding of secular modernity in the early modern period and beyond. Consequently, the thesis that modernity is linked to the secularization of European society is undermined. Hans Blumenberg’s book The Legitimacy of the Modern Age is particularly stimulating for his criticism of the anachronism of the notion of secularization. Modernity cannot be reduced to a process of secularization by which theological concepts are transformed into political ones. This transformation is based on a conflation of concepts and their metaphorical extensions. It would thus be inaccurate to describe this process in terms of the transfer of attributes from God to State. This is the weakness of the notion of secularization as a process that discounts historical schisms. Rather than the notion of transfer, Blumenberg prefers the expressions “reoccupation” and “reality underlying the appearance of secularization”;5 the modern age has its own history, set against the backdrop of a schism, particularly as a result of the nominalist crisis in the fourteenth century. This renders obsolete the possibility of thinking of modern—and particularly political— man as a “little God,” as the modest comparison of the theological age had it. But in our opinion, it also reduces modernity to its fullest moment of autonomy. Schmitt also criticizes the notion of secularization, although for opposite reasons. Yet however appealing his position positing a homology of structure between theology and politics, it should nonetheless be challenged. Schmitt reduces Christian revelation to the tragic dimension of the human condition: “Every political idea in one way or another takes a position on the ‘nature’ of man and presupposes that he is either ‘by nature good’ or ‘by nature evil.’ ”6 This 5. Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), 89. 6. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 56.

Introduction  5 circular argument is based on the influence of original sin, which results in a political distinction fundamental in Schmitt’s thought— the distinction between “friends” and “enemies.” This anthropological pessimism leads Schmitt not only to highlight the importance of the doctrine of Incarnation in the remission of Adamic sin, but also to make a clear distinction between Jewish and Christian Revelation.7 As a backdrop to the development of this thesis, the influence of the traditionalist thinking of Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald, and Juan Donoso Cortés on Schmitt’s thought should not be underestimated. However, Schmitt acknowledged that the expression “political theology” is fundamentally polysemic: “Political theology is indeed a polymorphous phenomenon, and, moreover, there are two different sides to it, a theological and a political one. Each is directed to its specific concepts. This is already given in the compositum of the phrase. There are many political theologies because there are, on the one hand, many different religions, and, on the other, many different kinds and methods of doing politics.”8 The polysemy of the expression “political theology” is clear from even a cursory examination of texts such as Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan and Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus,9 to quote two seventeenth-century examples, not to mention numerous other less well known writings on controversies, including those of James I. As a result, the debate surrounding the division created by liberal political philosophy and the highly complex relationship between modernity and theologicopolitical conceptuality is thrown wider open. Continuity and division are thus coexistent. Our contribution to this contemporary debate is limited here for reasons of space, 7. See Tristan Storme, Carl Schmitt et le marcionisme. L’impossibilité théologicopolitique d’un œcuménisme judéo-chrétien? Coll. “Humanités” (Paris: Cerf, 2008). 8. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology II: The Myth of the Closure of Any Political Theology, trans. M. Hoelzl and G. Ward (London: Polity, 2008), 66. 9. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. G. A. J. Rogers and Karl Schuhmann (Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2003); Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, ed. J. Israel, trans. J. Israel and M. Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

6  Introduction but we have indicated its terms with reference to a specific historical context and two aspects in particular. The first, as we have already noted, is the question of sovereignty associated with the divine right of kings; the second is the issue of the tolerance of religious opinions. In other words, the issue at stake in the controversy between James I and Bellarmine is the political norm determined by theological transcendence, which could permit or refuse the relative tolerance of public expressions of faith prior to the advent of political liberalism. The conflict that pitted James I first against the Scottish Presbyterians, then later the Jesuits, and above all Cardinal Bellarmine, is at the heart of this issue. We shall thus focus on reconstructing the doctrines to try to determine the importance of the theologicopolitical paradigm and paradox at this period. However, to produce a satisfactory analysis, we must also take into consideration the specific religious characteristics of biblical monotheism and the various theologico-political models that led to changes in Christianity in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Let us begin by focusing on James I. The Stuart king represents a decisive step in the origins of modern politics because he used a theologico-political theory to oppose the power of the State to that of the Holy See. The originality of James I’s contribution was to turn theology into a powerful weapon to reduce papal sovereignty to the level of other powers, with its own aims. This conflict between a long-extant authority and a new one seeking to affirm itself will be an essential aspect of our study. The controversy between James I and Cardinal Bellarmine provides ample demonstration of this. It is not without similarity to the numerous quarrels between Church and empire in the early centuries of the second Christian millennium. However, by the 1600s, times had changed, and Europe was in the grip of religious divisions. James I and Cardinal Bellarmine maintained an apologetic attitude toward medieval ecclesiastical history in terms

Introduction  7 of both religious and political doctrine, with the fundamental aim of proving the superiority of their respective powers. This is why the controversy between the two protagonists is a more important paradigm than the schism that led to the creation of the Church of England. King James can be seen as representing the culmination of a crisis dating back several decades in England, in both religious and political terms. This twofold opposition to the Holy See certainly relativizes the notion that the modern autonomous State is connatural with the Protestant reforms.10 Although in theological terms James I is clearly within the sphere of influence of the Reform, he is nonetheless atypical from this point of view. We must first of all look at him as a king of his time, concerned with the loyalty of his subjects. This was the message he addressed to the Catholic community in England by imposing an oath of allegiance. In taking this decision, he reformed the oath’s medieval role by making the State the supreme power, thereby overthrowing the concept of the duality of powers developed by theorists in favor of papal theocracy.11 James I did not see his royal function as being in the service of an ecclesiastical and institutional order united round the figure of the pope.12 In fact, the opposite was true: the king was the sole political and spiritual sovereign to whom his subjects owed loyalty. The Acts of Supremacy of Henry VIII, Edward VI, and Elizabeth I are of some significance 10. The example of France since the Concordat of 1516 is highly significant in this context: the redefinition of the relationship between the Church and the monarchy of the Most Christian King established other limits to the respective sovereignty of the two institutions. See Francis Rapp, “De la pragmatique sanction au concordat de Bologne: le roi et l’Église gallicane,” in De la Réforme à la Réformation (1450–1530), vol. 7 of Histoire du christianisme: des origines à nos jours, ed. J.-M. Mayeur, et al. (Paris: Desclée, 1994), part 2, ch. 2, 345–51. 11. See Paolo Prodi, Christianisme et monde moderne, Cinquante ans de recherches, trans. Antonella Romano (Paris: Gallimard, 2006), esp. 240–43. 12. Marcel David, La Souveraineté et les limites du pouvoir monarchique du IXème au ème XV siècle (Paris: Dalloz, 1954). See also Marcel David, “Le serment du sacre du IXème siècle au XVème siècle,” Revue du Moyen Âge Latin (1956): 2–367.

8  Introduction here. The major issue now became uniting the kingdom through royal sovereignty and religious uniformity. The theory espoused by Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, the king’s earliest and leading opponent on this issue, opposed these notions and defended the idea that the pope gave legitimacy to the power of princes and that the king ruled only indirectly by divine right. The consequence of this theory was that the sovereign pontiff held indirect power over temporal matters when they risked compromising the eternal salvation of the faithful. This belief, inspired by Aristotelo-Thomist philosophy, implied that there are two types of subordination. The first of these is philosophico-theological, with the king ruling by divine right through the mediation of natural law, which confers the right of election on the political body. Natural law is the rational framework within which the political body accomplishes its own moral finality. Moreover, the common weal that political authority seeks to promote anticipates the spiritual weal that the Church alone has a mission to accomplish. The second type of subordination is ecclesiastico-political. It represents a concrete application of the first type of subordination by means of an oath creating a legal, moral, and spiritual bond between the monarch and the Church; it follows that the king must be a faithful servant of the Catholic faith. In this context, the Gregorian Reform of the eleventh century and the key development of the papal monarchy in the thirteenth century were of such importance, and thus acquired paradigmatic status in the controversy between James I and the papacy, thanks to both their originality and their intellectual heritage. Gregory VII’s twenty-seven Dictatus papae13 neatly encapsulate the nature of the argument between the two powers: the divine right of the pope is superior to that of kings and emperors, and therefore the pope has the power of excommunication, 13. See Marcel Pacaut, La Théocratie. L’Église et le pouvoir au Moyen Âge (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1957), 236–37, and H. X. Arquillière, Saint Grégoire VII. Essai sur sa conception du pouvoir pontifical (Paris: Vrin, 1934).

Introduction  9 deposition, and releasing subjects from their oath of allegiance by virtue of their ruler’s disobedience of the Catholic faith. This is the point of view espoused by Bellarmine. In order to determine the stakes of this conflict, a number of key concepts must be identified. These include divine right, legitimacy, supremacy, State, loyalism, the oath, the right or duty of resistance, temporal or spiritual power, theocracy, the plenitude of papal power, religious faithfulness, excommunication, deposition, and law. These notions likewise underline the unavoidable overlap between theologico-ecclesiological, political, and juridico-canonical doctrines. This is why these three intellectual fields require a historical approach to grasp the meaning of these notions, both in their earlier historical context and in the new usage that gave them fresh theoretical significance. Moreover, drawing on a political and religious anthropology of European civilization, at least in a Western context, proves particularly enlightening in this case. Since the end of Roman antiquity, it has been a particular characteristic of European history to be marked by religious history, shaped over the centuries by an unprecedented theological doctrine: one God in three persons, the second of whom, Christ, is both God and Man, and is thus the mediation for the salvation of mankind. Following Christ, the Church is the institution charged with this task of mediation. The historical convergence between the official inclusion of the Church in the Eastern Roman Empire, the break-up of the Western Roman Empire, and the theology of the incarnation encouraged the development of a new socio-political bond. Prior to the rise of secular states, the ecclesiastical institution saw its vocation of the mediation of salvation only in close relation to rulers who held secular power. This mediation implies a specifically ecclesiastical and soteriological aspect involving the Church’s mission in the strict sense. Yet it also involves a political dimension. These two instances of ecclesiastical mediation bring judicial, political, and theological issues into play.

10  Introduction The impossibility of separating these three orders of reasons makes it necessary to clarify the notion of the State and of temporal and spiritual power.14 Temporal power corresponded more precisely to the term “political power,” whose role was to ensure justice on earth and to protect the Church. The term “temporal” is relevant here, because its finality as a power is not to lead to salvation as such, but rather to lead indirectly to its possibility. The exclusively earthly nature of this power is thus limited in time, as well as use and legitimacy. Coronations owe their legitimacy to spiritual power. Yet the same ambiguity exists with regard to the term “spiritual,” as long as its meaning has not been clarified. As might be expected, it refers to ecclesiastical power. However, the term “spiritual” is problematic insofar as it is difficult to imagine a form of human power that is exclusively spiritual. The Church can carry out its mission of salvation only on the condition that it has access to adequate resources—sacraments, liturgy, law, and so on. Yet these resources, by their very essence, are as much part of temporality as the law and the sword are for temporal power. The distinction between the temporal and the spiritual is thus relevant only if we abandon the idea of juxtaposing the two notions. The distinction between the temporal and the spiritual in fact means the gap between man’s historical, temporal condition and his definitive accomplishment of redemption in the second coming of Christ. Consequently, it is far more relevant to distinguish between the notions of temporality and eschatology, which can then be juxtaposed. However, given that the latter has by definition no chance of being materialized in terms of power, the term “spiritual” is inevitably used to refer to power that is not political in nature. As we shall see, this is the topical meaning used by the authors we shall examine. It nonetheless remains the case that the problem posed 14. Differentiating between two types of power—one managing temporal affairs, the other spiritual life—sheds light on a key aspect of the anthropological rift introduced by Christianity in the status of religion and the earthly order.

Introduction  11 by the distinction between temporal and spiritual powers has the great advantage of raising the problem of theological epistemology, posed by Christian revelation as far as the institution of human reality is concerned. As we shall see in the answers proposed by Presbyterian, Anglican, and Roman Catholic theses, each theological epistemology corresponds to a particular understanding of the relationship between the temporal and the spiritual.15 In other words, whatever the theological epistemology, the task of Christianity is to sanctify human reality through the institution of temporal and spiritual powers. This affirmation aims to promote the idea that Christianity moves beyond a straightforward alternative between the sacralization of political powers on the one hand and their secularization or laicization on the other in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. From this point of view, the controversy surrounding the oath of allegiance is particularly important, because beyond the conflict between the temporal and spiritual powers, the theological originality of Christian revelation is in question. In both the Old and New Testaments, Scripture gives us the key to this originality, which can be summed up in the word “duality.” This term should be understood in the context of the rise of the religions of the Word—in this context, Judaism and Christianity. The particular characteristic of biblical and Christian revelation is that it allows the earthly order to be questioned in the name of another reality, by whose yardstick it is judged. This is the essential difference between the political theologies of pagan antiquity and those developed in a Jewish, then Christian, context: the religious order can act against the power that it legitimizes. In the Old Testament, the notion of alliance best expresses the impossibility of moving beyond the duality of God and man, Creator and creature. This duality takes form in three types of me15. Which in historical terms proves Carl Schmitt right when he states that the political and theological are inevitably ubiquitous. Schmitt, Political Theology II, 84.

12  Introduction diation: royal, prophetic, and sacerdotal. These three forms of mediation are all means of assessing the faith, or lack of faith, of the children of Israel in their alliance with God. The representatives of each form of mediation cannot interfere in the other two, because this would lead to disorder in the alliance between the children of Israel and their God. This is particularly true should a king attempt to take over the role of the priest,16 and should he fail to heed the prophet’s reminders to respect the law. In other words, the royal function has meaning only within the limits of obedience of the one true king, who is the sole God of Israel. Thus the religious legitimization of royal power can be used against its holder. This inescapable duality through the alliance and the three forms of mediation—royal, prophetic, and sacerdotal—is radicalized by Christianity. The religion of God made flesh, which unites the three forms of mediation, makes it impossible to sacralize political and religious powers. This fact was demonstrated when Christianity became the religion of the empire under Constantine in 313 and was confirmed by Theodosius in an edict in 391. The political powers and the Christian Church had to adapt to each other in a variety of ways.17 In Byzantium, Church and empire strove to create a “symphony” between the temporal and spiritual powers. The bishops were responsible for performing pastoral duties and enforcing the respect of Christian doctrine, while emperors had the role of an external bishop, which granted them the right to call councils. This “symphonic” model was adopted by Charlemagne, but it proved short-lived. The Western solution to the problem of mediation between the Church and temporal power took a decisive turn down another path—that of a genuine form of dualism, although this was never 16. See 1 Sm 15. 17. See Gilbert Dagron, Empereur et prêtre. Etude sur le “césaropapisme” byzantin (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), and also Paul Veyne, Quand notre monde est devenu chrétien (Paris: Albin Michel, 2007).

Introduction  13 fully realized. This theory was rooted in the Augustinian theory of the two cities.18 It was taken up by several popes, most notably Gelasius I (492–96) and Gregory I (Gregory the Great, 590–604). It gave shape to a group of doctrines that the twentieth-century historian H.-X. Arquillière referred to as political Augustinism. This doctrine, which took a multitude of forms, aimed to give spiritual and political meaning to building the city of God in the earthly realm. It was only from the eleventh century on, with the Gregorian Reform named after Gregory VII (1073–85), that there arose a form of political Augustinism that placed the papacy above the state. The bishop of Rome then gradually began to govern the Church in a monarchical style that the pope Innocent III (1198– 1216) theorized in the doctrine of plenitudo potestatis.19 The pope, who from then on bore the title Vicar of Christ, was the Church’s universal judge and could himself be judged by no one but God. This doctrine of the papal monarchy was not without political consequences, because it led to a more energetic leadership of Christianity as a whole. The secular powers reacted against this understanding of the government of the Church and the unity of Christianity. The Holy Roman Empire and the English and French monarchies wished to wield their temporal supremacy over the Church at the cost of the Holy See in Rome. This was what lay at the root of investiture contests over appointing bishops and financial issues. Two theorists mark particular milestones in the history of these quarrels: the political philosopher Marsilius of Padua20 and the Franciscan theologian William of Ockham,21 who both pleaded in favor of the 18. See the classic work by H. X. Arquillière, L’Augustinisme politique (Paris: Vrin, 1955). 19. See Pacaut, La Théocratie, 255–56. 20. Marsilius of Padua, Defender of the Peace, ed. and trans. Annabel Brett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 21. William of Ockham, A Short Discourse on Tyrannical Government, ed. A. S. McGrade, trans. John Kilcullen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

14  Introduction empire in the early fourteenth century. They were to have considerable influence in the sixteenth century. Martin Luther’s reform, in particular, was influenced by William of Ockham’s nominalist theses. If the Church consisted essentially of believers made just in the eyes of God, this meant there had to be a thorough rethinking of its role in the mediation of salvation. The true Church was no longer a hierarchical institution, but rather consisted of the elect justified by Christ as a mediator between God and Man. The Church Invisible was made visible by the sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist and by preaching the Word of God. Moreover, the Church Visible, the outward grouping of the faithful who now all played a part in the priesthood, passed into the power of the temporal prince. The cura religionis was thus in the hands of a layman.22 The Lutheran thesis of the Church Invisible and the Church Visible led to a doctrine of two reigns. The external reign of the law and works, including the reign over bodies belongs to the prince, who, in this capacity, contributes “externally” to the coming of the kingdom of Christ. The internal reign of grace and faith, including the salvation of souls, belongs to Christ through the mediation of His disciples and of the Church Invisible and Visible, in order to bring about His own kingdom. The ultimate consequence of the prince’s external supremacy over believers is the subordination23 of the Church and of believers to temporal power. This theory thus favors the superiority of political power over the ecclesiastical institution. This is the first complete change of perspective from the monarchical understanding of the papacy, as espoused by the Roman Church. However, the dualism between temporal and spiritual continued in the Germanic territories. The influence of Mar22. On all these issues, see Joseph Lecler, Histoire de la tolérance au siècle de la Réforme (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1955), 2:167–72, and Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), ch. 3. 23. Not having a more adequate term at my disposal, I have chosen to use the word “subordination,” although it is somewhat inopportune, as it refers to a specifically Catholic context: the subordination of the temporal end to the spiritual end.

Introduction  15 silius of Padua must also be taken into account, representing as it does another challenge to the power of the papacy. The “Anglican” schism lies much more within this second current by requiring a renewal of the “symphonic” relationship between temporal and spiritual powers, as testified by the establishment of royal supremacy in England in 1534. This new theologico-political situation was to have major consequences, reaching as far as Thomas Hobbes’s philosophical understanding of the relationship between the Church and the sovereign.24 This understanding involved transferring the Church’s mediation of salvation to the State. The “mediating” State was thus legitimized in its normalization of Christian doctrine.25 Such radical political and religious monism, although steadfastly refused by Anglican theologians, was—unbeknownst to them—the object of theological conditions, as indicated by Richard Hooker’s thinking. James refused this monism. The Stuart king, heir to the Presbyterian theology of the doctrine of the two kingdoms, defended a politico-religious dualism that he had to reconcile with royal supremacy in England, restored by Queen Elizabeth I. Would it not be less problematic to intervene in religious doctrine, and thus more in line with a policy of religious tolerance? An examination of the theologico-political consequences of the Anglican schism will enable us to site the differences between the political theses of the Jesuits and the Presbyterians and those of James I himself. 24. Hobbes, Leviathan, in particular ch. 42. For an examination of all these questions, see Bernard Bourdin, “Le droit divin et les sources théologico-politiques de la modernité,” in Revue d’éthique et de théologie morale 227 (2004): 121–42. 25. On the question of mediation, see Bernard Bourdin, La médiation chrétienne en question, Les jeux de Léviathan (Paris: Cerf, 2009).

chapter one

> The Ecclesiastical and Political Implications of Royal Supremacy over the Church of England

I

n the Middle Ages, conflicts between secular princes and the authority of the pope were frequent, but they never challenged the nature of the relations between the spiritual and the temporal in the general context of the Christian republic. This was still the prevailing climate in England when in 1521 King Henry VIII vigorously combated Luther’s theological ideas and received the title “Defender of the Faith”1 from Pope Leo X. At that time, it would have been unthinkable that, just a few years later, the same sovereign was to cause a schism between the Holy See in Rome and the Church of England, leading his son Edward VI to open the country in turn to the theological principles of the continental reforms, and that his daughter Elizabeth I would set up the Church of England once and for all under the auspices of her supreme government and the Act of Uniformity. Yet we must not forget that Henry VIII, the second Tudor to reign over England 1. In 1521, Henry VIII published a treatise entitled Defence of the Seven Sacraments, which contained a dedication to Leo X. See King Henry the Eighth’s Defence of the Seven Sacraments (Dublin: J. Griffen, 1800).

16

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  17 since the end of the War of the Roses, was increasingly preoccupied by the question of his own succession. He needed a male heir. The dashing of his hopes to see a boy born from his marriage to Catherine of Aragon, daughter of the powerful Ferdinand V, led him to seek a “divorce.”2 Pope Clement VII thwarted Henry’s wishes by refusing to grant his request. Henry seriously considered breaking with Rome by obtaining the title “supreme head of the Church of England” from Parliament and the convocations of Canterbury and York. At the same time, he decided to marry Anne Boleyn, who was then pregnant with the future Elizabeth I. Henry enjoyed the support of Thomas Cranmer, who was appointed archbishop of Canterbury in February 1533 with the approval of Clement VII. Thomas Audley succeeded Thomas More as chancellor, and Henry appointed Thomas Cromwell vicar general in matters spiritual in 1535. With the support of these three men, Henry was able to put his intentions into practice, creating a schism with Rome that Elizabeth I was to renew in 1559. Several decades prior to James I’s accession to the throne of England, the ecclesiastical and political implications of royal supremacy were already of paramount importance. On the Anglican side, several theologians of the generation from Henry VIII to Elizabeth I, most notably Gardiner and Hooker, provided a solid theologico-political basis for royal sovereignty. On the Roman Catholic side, the problem of the politico-religious future of English Catholicism gave rise to various strategies—on the one hand those of the secular priests, and on the other those of the Jesuits, who hoped to reconquer the kingdom. It fell to James I to try to resolve the dilemma of political unity and religious plurality. A shift took place between the reigns of the second Tudor monarch and the first of the English Stuarts: a move away from the antique and medieval tradition and into the modernity of the classical age. 2. See Guy Bedouelle and Patrick Le Gal, Le “divorce” du roi Henri VIII (Geneva: Droz, 1987).

18  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England

The Monarch’s Supremacy over the Church of England: An Antique and Medieval Issue Returns to Center Stage >

We should begin by noting that the axiom “the king is emperor in his kingdom” was well established some three centuries prior to the creation of royal supremacy in 1534.3 This axiom, well known in the kingdoms of France and England, enabled Henry VIII to revisit the antique Roman public law on which Emperor Constantine had based his establishment of Christianity as the religion of the empire (religio licita). This public law enabled the emperor to call the Council of Arles in 314, the first ecumenical Council of Nicaea in 325, and the other ecumenical councils. The emperor had no say in questions of dogma or doctrine, speaking only on questions of the Church’s outward forum—hence the title “external bishop,” later adopted in the West by Charlemagne. Henry VIII used this distinction, which appears in the revised coronation formula, stating that the king shall “mayntene the lawfull right and libertees of old tyme graunted by the righteous cristen kinges of Englond to the holy chirche of inglond nott preiudyciall to hys jurysdiccion and dignite ryall.”4 According to the terms of Roman public law, the king was emperor in his kingdom. The Act in Restraint of Appeals (1533), preventing appeals to Rome, and the Act of Supremacy5 (1534) were drawn up in precisely this spirit. The king is the head of the “political body,” analogous to the role of the Roman emperors: 3. See Walter Ullmann, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 217. 4. J. R. Dasent, ed., Acts of the Privy Council, A.D. 1547–1550, vol. 2 (London: Stationery Office, 1890), 30. 5. G. R Elton, The Tudor Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 364–65. See also the Act of Supremacy in the appendix.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  19 Albeit the King’s Majesty justly and rightfully is and oweth to be the supreme head of the Church of England, and so is recognised by the clergy of this realm in their Convocations; yet nevertheless for corroboration and confirmation thereof, and for increase of virtue in Christ’s religion within this realm of England, and to repress and extirp all errors, heresies and other enormities and abuses heretofore used in the same, be it enacted by authority of this present Parliament that the King our sovereign lord, his heirs and successors kings of this realm, shall be taken, accepted and reputed the only supreme head in earth of the Church of England called Anglicana Ecclesia, and shall have and enjoy annexed and united to the imperial crown, of this realm as well the title and style thereof, as all honours, dignities, preeminences, jurisdictions, privileges, authorities, immunities, profits and commodities, to the said dignity of supreme head of the same Church belonging and appertaining.6

The dukes of Suffolk and Norfolk had anticipated this official declaration in declaring four years earlier “that the king was absolute both as emperor and pope in his own kingdom.”7 However, the Act in Restraint of Appeals to Rome and the Act of Supremacy must be read in terms of the notions of sovereignty and territory. Sovereignty meant the rejection of all appeals by subjects to a court of the kingdom, and territory meant rejection of all appeals to foreign powers—in this case, papal jurisdiction. The king was able to point to a papal decretal by Clement V dating from 1313.8 The German emperor Heinrich VII had condemned King Robert the Wise of Sicily on a charge of high treason following a conspiracy in northern Italy. Robert the Wise appealed to Clement V, who granted his appeal. The emperor’s claim to universal jurisdiction was thus condemned—further evidence of the eternal struggle for universal jurisdiction between the pope and the emperor. To jus6. Elton, The Tudor Constitution, 364–65. 7. See Calendar State Papers: Spanish, IV. 734, no. 445. 8. This was the papal decretal Pastoralis cura. For further details of this quarrel, see Walter Ullmann, “This Realm of England Is an Empire,” in Journal of Ecclesiastical History 30, no.2, (1979): 175–203.

20  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England tify his decision, Clement V based his argument on principles of Roman law, axioms of canon law, and ecclesiastical practice. Following these principles, the king was put on an equal footing with a bishop, who held jurisdiction in terms of diocesan law. The king thus acquired a judicial personality such that no jurisdiction could be held by any extraterritorial body. The king was thus sovereign in his kingdom. These principles corresponded to those in antique Roman law governing territory.9 Henry VIII was aware of this precedent—or at least his advisers were. It was an unexpected reversal of the situation when Henry used this judicial and canonical argument in 1534 against the pope’s power. Henry also added that the king had no superior overseas! The combination of the principles of territory and sovereignty, especially the principle that the king is emperor in his kingdom, promoted the king’s jurisdiction over the outward government of the Church, in the Constantinian sense of the term. This was the judicial basis that underpinned Henry VIII’s opposition to papal jurisdiction, except for cases of heresy, which were strictly religious in nature. Furthermore, Henry VIII’s claim to the right to call assemblies was also based on Roman practice, which no ecclesiastical practice had ever challenged. France also followed this principle. It is important to bear in mind here that the terms “temporal” and “spiritual” came to take on different meanings through the use of these historical precedents: “the whole external ordering of the Church belonged to the prince’s charge.”10 Thus in 1533, the king of England referred to the Code of Justinian to insist on his duty to defend the faith and to stigmatize the misuse of the term “spiritual.”11 Yet this duty, resulting from 9. Ibid., 186. 10. See J. J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 365. 11. See Edward Foxe, Opus eximium de differentia (London: In oedibus Th. Bertheleti, 1534), fo. 58 r–59 r.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  21 the royal function’s title of “supreme head,” could still not strictly be compared to the magistracy of Byzantine and Frankish emperors and medieval English kings. As we have seen, the change lay in the principle of personal and territorial sovereignty. The linking of sovereignty over a territory with the concept of “the king as emperor in his kingdom” is doubtless the best way to express the spirit of the Act in Restraint of Appeals and the Act of Supremacy. Furthermore, wielding royal jurisdiction over the outward government of the Church means the “plenitude of power” is transferred from the pope to the king. In other words, Henry VIII took up the late Roman practice of the principle of the corporation: Where by divers sundry old authentic histories and chronicles it is manifestly declared and expressed that this realm of England is an empire, and so hath been accepted in the world, governed by one supreme head and king having the dignity and royal estate of the imperial crown of the same, unto whom a body politic, compact of all sorts and degrees of people divided in terms and by names of spiritualty and temporalty, be bounden and owe to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience.12

This statement in the Act in Restraint of Appeals makes the ecclesiastical body a constitutive part of the kingdom, and thus subordinate to the sovereign. The text justifies the old Roman distinction between matters internal and external. In concrete terms, external matters covered institutions, offices, customs, administrations, properties, discipline, and ecclesiastical organization. However, there is a major difference between this corporative approach to external Church life and medieval precedents: Henry VIII rejected the notion “spiritual,” which by then had become too broad, encompassing as it did both ecclesiastical causes and persons. In other words, Henry reappropriated the Constantinian model of Roman government as regards the external matters of Church life, adapting it to the new sixteenth-century political issue of State sov12. Elton, The Tudor Constitution, 353–58.

22  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England ereignty over its territory. Elizabeth I did likewise when she adopted the less provocative title “supreme governor of the church” in 1559. Elizabeth denied herself the right to wield power to regulate doctrine or to fulfill a purely spiritual function. Her power in the Church was described as equivalent to that held by her father and her brother: “The Act renewed ten of Henry VIII’s Acts and one of Edward VI’s.”13 Consequently, she could not claim power over the administration of divine worship beyond that held by Henry and Edward. But in reality, secular power was the supreme judge of doctrine and ritual and the source of ecclesiastical discipline through the intermediary of the High Commission and the Royal Visitors, whose task it was to ensure that the Act of Supremacy and the Act of Uniformity were applied.14 How could it be any different? Henry VIII and Elizabeth I were not Luther, and they were certainly not Calvin. Henry VIII’s political will to break with Rome did not mean he turned to the theological theses espoused by Reformers on the continent. He therefore had to use royal supremacy to limit the risk of doctrinal abuses. Henry remained a Catholic until his death—in spite of the schism! Elizabeth was hostile to Rome, but this did not mean she wished to embrace Protestantism, at least not in its most radical form. She upheld the progress made by the Reformers during the reign of her half-brother Edward VI, while interpreting doctrine in a manner more favorable to Catholics. The 1559 Book of Common Prayer provided liturgical proof of this, to the great disappointment of English Reformers, who dreamed of a church inspired by the Genevan model. The royal will thus imposed the via media. The policies of the Tudor monarchs and their ecclesiastical supporters were inspired by monism—in other words, a coextensive and unitary relationship between the kingdom and the Church. Henry VIII was not alone in 13. H. A. Moreton, La Réforme anglicane au XVIème siècle (Paris: Les Œuvres Représentatives, 1930), 241, 314. Except where indicated, all translations are by the translator. 14. Ibid., 314.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  23 being fascinated by the Constantinian model, as well as that of the Israelite monarchs and the Epistle from Saint Paul to the Romans 13:1–8. In 1535, his closest ecclesiastical supporter, Stephen Gardiner, published a particularly important treatise on Henry’s, and later the wider Anglican, understanding of the relationship between the Church and the Crown: Wherin surely I see no cause why any man shoulde be offended that the kinge is called the headde of churche of Englande rather than the headde of the realme of Englande [. . .] the churche of Englande consisteth of the same sortes of people at this daye that are comprised in this worde realme of whom the kinge his called the headde: shall he not beinge called the headde of the realme of Englande be also the headde of the same men whan they are named the churche of Englande? [. . .] What a folye were it than for a man to confesse that al one man [. . .] dwelling in Englande is in subieccion to the kinge as vnto the headde: and if ye call him a christian of the same sorte to saye that he is not a subiecte?15

The same spirit is apparent in the opening remarks of the 1533 law forbidding appeals to Rome. However, it was not until the 1590s, toward the end of Elizabeth’s reign, that a political theology of royal supremacy was systematically formulated by Richard Hooker, in opposition to the Puritan Presbyterians.

Richard Hooker (1554?–1600) and the Doctrine of Royal Supremacy: From Monism to the Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms >

As this title suggests, Richard Hooker’s theory of royal supremacy, developed in Elizabethan England in the 1590s, is based on an interpretation of the doctrine of the two reigns. Hooker expounds 15. Stephen Gardiner, Obedience in Church and State. Three Political Tracts, ed. and trans. Pierre Janelle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), 93–95.

24  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England his thinking on an issue that stimulated debate among Anglican theologians at that time in the eighth and final book of his Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. Richard Hooker put forward the doctrine of royal supremacy to challenge the theses espoused by the Puritan Thomas Cartwright and the Disciplinarians, who held that royal supremacy was against the teachings of Scripture. However, this incompatibility did not lead Cartwright to contest the theological validity of the doctrine of the two reigns. In other words, the interlinking of the two issues of royal supremacy and the doctrine of the two reigns gave rise to a controversy that was both theological and political in nature. This conflict thus brings us to a key aspect of the changes in the theological and political spheres in late sixteenth-century England. This change had a number of consequences in terms of the relationship between political power and the Church. In the longer term, it implied two models of the increasing autonomization of the political sphere, which can respectively be described as separatist and inclusive. In this context, the controversy between Cartwright and Whitgift and, later, Hooker, sheds a great deal of light on these two modes of increasing autonomy in the political sphere.

The Treatise Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity at the Service of the Church of England Richard Hooker is thought to have been born in 1554, during the reign of Mary Tudor. He died toward the end of Elizabeth’s reign, in 1600. He was a pupil of John Jewel, bishop of Salisbury, whose patronage enabled him to study at Corpus Christi, Oxford. In his early years, he showed some signs of sympathy for the Puritans when his protector John Jewel and his uncle John Hooker were in exile together. He was later appointed master of the Temple in 1585, possibly thanks to the support of the bishop of York, the father of his friend and fellow student at Corpus Christi, Edwin Sandys.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  25 Hooker took over the post from Richard Alvey, who died in August 1584, and had to combat the Puritan ideas of Walter Travers (1548–1643).16 Having discharged this duty, he devoted his time to writing his master work Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity,17 which reflected the extremely heated debate between Puritans and Anglicans at the Temple. Of the eight books, four were published in 1593, the fifth—by far the longest—in 1597.18 Hooker wrote the final three books shortly before his death, but the first complete edition of the work was not published until 1662.19 This major work, which set out to establish the orthodoxy of the Elizabethan reform, made Richard Hooker England’s foremost theorist of the period. The starting point for his work is not the question of salva16. On the controversies between the Elizabethan establishment and the Puritans during this period, see Olivier Loyer, L’Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1979). Travers was due the position following Alvey’s death, but Whitgift, then archbishop of Canterbury, blocked the appointment. He was also against Hooker’s appointment, doubtless because he thought him unsuited to polemics (ibid., 5–6). 17. See the most recent edition, Richard Hooker, The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, ed. G. Edelen and W. Speed Hill, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, vols. 1 and 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). As this was unavailable when the original French edition of the present work was written, the following notes refer to R. W. Church’s 1888 Clarendon Press edition in three volumes. Many studies have been written on Hooker, including Alessandro Passerin d’Entrèves, Riccardo Hooker: contributo alla teoria e alla storia del Diritto naturale (Turin: Presso l’Istituto Giuridico della R. Università, 1932); Gottfried Michaelis, Richard Hooker als politischer Denker (Berlin: E. Ebering, 1933); F. J. Shirley, Richard Hooker and Contemporary Political Ideas (London: SPCK, 1949); Peter Munz, The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1952); W. Speed Hill, Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary of His Works (Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1972); Loyer, L’Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker; and Paulette Carrive, La Pensée politique anglaise de Hooker à Hume (Paris: PUF, 1994). 18. See the Folger edition, which differs on this point from Arthur Stephen McGrade’s 1989 edition of the preface and books 1 and 8 for Cambridge University Press. See also the next note. 19. It should be noted that the authenticity of books 6, 7, and 8 was long disputed, but has now been clearly demonstrated. See P. G. Stanwood’s introduction to volume 3 (books 6, 7, and 8 of Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity) in the Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker.

26  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England tion, as was the case for the Arminian theologians, but rather the institution of the Church Visible as criticized by the Puritans. Although Hooker agreed with the Puritans that Scripture had the last word in establishing sound doctrine, he refused to recognize it as the exclusive arbiter of civil and Christian life. Under the influence of Aristotelo-Thomist philosophy, he set out to be a defender of reason:20 God is eternal reason, and reason makes man capable of hearing the Word of God and thereby changing his behavior. He applied this principle to his understanding of the Church, its relationship to the social order, the origins of society and the State, and the supremacy of the monarch over the Church as a political body. His use of the word “polity” merits a brief study. “Polity” should be understood in the sense of Aristotle’s politeia, or the fact of living together in society.21 In this sense, Hooker is an heir to Greek political philosophy, and more directly to theorists of political Aristotelianism in the late medieval period. He preferred to use the term “polity” rather than “government,” as he felt the latter was too restrictive. Hooker thus intended the expression “ecclesiastical polity” to refer to the visible order of the Church. But behind the term is a theology of salvation covering the entire human order,22 which accounts for the rejection of any move toward a separation of the Church from temporal society, let alone from the State. 20. A powerful Calvinist strand can also be seen in Hooker, particularly in his sermons on the theories of justification and the inadmissibility of grace. Six of Hooker’s sermons were published by his followers in around 1612–14, with Izaak Walton publishing a seventh in 1678. The diversity of Hooker’s theological sources makes his thinking extremely complex and apparently contradictory; his authority was invoked by the Reformed Church, Erastians, Anglo-Catholics, contractualist theologians, and those in favor of absolute monarchy. See Loyer, L’Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker, 691, and Carrive, La Pensée politique anglaise, 7–8 n. 1. 21. Hooker uses the word “regiment” as a synonym for “polity” fairly frequently. Neither is an exact equivalent for “government.” 22. Alan Richardson, “Une interprétation anglicane de l’Eglise,” in La Sainte Eglise universelle. Confrontation œcuménique (Neuchâtel, Switzerland: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1948), 133–74, esp. 169–71.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  27 That was the fundamental divergence between Hooker and Cartwright, echoing the earlier divergence between Cartwright and Whitgift during the Admonition Controversy. Royal supremacy could not be reduced to a purely political issue. The controversy raised the issues of the two reigns and of soteriology.

The Admonition Controversy, or the Doctrine of Royal Supremacy and Its Relationship with the Reformed Magisterium and Trinitarian and Christological Doctrine Following the Elizabethan Settlement of 1559, there arose a conflict between Puritans and Anglicans that lasted from 1570 to 1590. The point at dispute was basically the episcopacy and royal supremacy. Two influential figures of the period represent the two sides of the conflict: Thomas Cartwright, leader of the Puritan Disciplinarians, and John Whitgift, archbishop of Canterbury from 1583 to 1604. Cartwright argued that royal supremacy was an attribute that should be reserved solely for Christ: “the cyuill magistrate is head of the comonwealthe / and not of the church.”23 To corroborate this view, he contested the notion that civil sovereignty over the Church could be based on Trinitarian and Christological doctrine, as defined by the first four ecumenical councils, in particular the Council of Chalcedon in 451. The theory of royal supremacy was also contrary to the principles of reformed ecclesiology, especially Luther’s doctrine of the two reigns and Calvin’s doctrine of the two kingdoms: For to overthrowe this doctrine that Christe alone is head of his church / this distinction is browghte / that according to the inward influence off grace / Christe onely is head: but according to the owtward governement/ the being of head is commen with him to others. For answer wherunto I referre my self in parte to that I have written before / off the 23. Thomas Cartwright, The Second Replie against Master Whitgiftes Second Avnswer (1575), 2:411.

28  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England absurde distinction betwene the governement off the churche by the mynisterie off men/ instituted off our Sav [iour] Christ / and his spirituall governmente. For that if there be no head but Christe / in respecte of the spirituall governermente: there is no head but he in respecte of the worde / sacramentes / and discipline administred by those whom he hath appoincted / forasmuch as that is also his spirituall governmente . . . yt followeth that even in the owtward societie / and meetinges off the church / no symple man can be called the head of it. Seeing that our Saviour Christe doing the whole office off the head him selfe alone: leaveth nothing to men / by doing wheroff they maie obtaine that tytle.24

Unquestionably, by refusing all distinctions in the ecclesial order on the grounds of both Christological and ecclesiological doctrine, Cartwright took the debate straight to the heart of the theological controversy. However, it was precisely these grounds that drew the most outspoken criticism from Whitgift and later from Hooker. Whitgift also drew on the doctrine of the two reigns and the two kingdoms to demonstrate that Christ is head of the Church only within its mystical government. Thus, in the Defense of the Avnswere to Cartwright, he writes: Christ is the head of the church, and spiritually governeth the same in the conscience; but because it hath an outward and visible form, therefore it requireth an outward and visible government, which Christ doth execute as well by the civil magistrate, as he does by the ecclesiastical minister; and therefore the government of the church, in respect of the external and visible form of it, is not only spiritual. Christ governeth by himself spiritually only, and by his ministers both spiritually and externally.25

The controversy over royal supremacy thus gave rise to three categories of question—ecclesiological, Trinitarian, and Christological—which influenced each side’s interpretation of the doctrine of the two reigns. First of all, it should be noted that the two op24. Ibid. 2:414. 25. John Whitgift, The Defense of the avnswere to the Admonition, against the Replie of T. C., in Works (Cambridge: John Ayre, 1852), 3:419.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  29 ponents agreed on the strictly ecclesiological issue of establishing a correlation between the visible head and the episcopal authority. However, for Cartwright, only Christ could be arch-shepherd.26 Indeed, the Church can have no other head: The D[octor’s] answer unto the second proposition by distinction . . . is full of disorder / and hath nothing sound. First yt faulteth in that yt rendeth a sunder thinges which can not be separated / and that two waies: one in separating the governement of the church by pastors / doctors / etc. from the spirituall. For when the ecclesiasticall ministrie hath respecte to the sowle / and conscience: when yt is called the mynisterie off the spirite/ spirituall: when they which execute yt/ are called mynisters in the kingdom off heaven: when the owtward preaching / excommunication/ and other discipline which they use / be spirituall: this seperation off the owtward government off the church from the spirituall, and making off them opposite members / doth not distinguishe but destroie the governement off Christe.27

In other words, at no point does the New Testament invoke the superiority of the ministry. In Whitgift’s view, this meant rejecting the distinction between the outward and spiritual reigns proper to reformed ecclesiology: “[Christ] is only ‘Archbishop’ and Bishop in respect of his spiritual government, which he keepeth only unto himself, and in the respect that all other be under him, and have their authority from him. But this name may also aptly be given unto those that have the oversight of other bishops in the external government of the church.”28 This thesis was taken up by Richard Hooker. In line with the Anglican distinction between the Church as a spiritual (mystical) and political (outward) body, Whitgift argued for the principle of episcopal jurisdiction, which—contrary to Cartwright’s belief—did not represent a challenge to Christ’s unique mediatorial office. 26. Cartwright, The Second Replie, 1:61. 27. Ibid., 2:409–10. 28. Whitgift, The Defense of the avnswere, in Works, 2:85.

30  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England As a consequence of this difference of interpretation over the doctrines of the Church and the doctrine of the two reigns or the two kingdoms, Cartwright and Whitgift were also at loggerheads over royal supremacy. For Cartwright, there was a close link between the affirmation that Christ was the shepherd of His Church and his justification for rejecting royal supremacy: And, if any man will reply and say that it is not said that our Saviour Christ is only archbishop, I answer that he is not only said the head, and yet nothwithstanding there is no more heads of the church but he. And, if it be further said that these archbishops are but under and as it were subordinate archbishops, I say that a man may as well say that men may be also under-heads of the church; which is the same which is alleged for the pope.29

Whitgift did not argue against this reasoning as such, but rather against his opponent’s interpretation of it: Christ is “the only Head of the Church”: if by the head you understand that which giveth the body life, sense, and motion; for Christ only by his Spirit doth give life and nutriment to his body: he only doth pour spiritual blessings into it, and doth inwardly direct and govern it. Likewise, he is only the Head of the whole church; for that title cannot agree to any other. But, if by “the head” you understand an external ruler and governor of any particular nation or church (in which signification head is usually taken), then I do not perceive why the magistrate may not as well be called the head of the church, that is, the chief governor of it in the external policy, as he is called the head of the people, and of the commonwealth.30

This argument shows Whitgift to be in agreement with the Calvinian distinction between the forum conscientiae and the forum externum.31 Cartwright categorically rejected this distinction by drawing 29. Cartwright, The Second Replie, 1:61. 30. Whitgift, The Defense of the avnswere, in Works, 2:85. 31. See Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 1979), 3.15.19.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  31 on Trinitarian and Christological doctrine to justify Christ’s unique role as mediator: The other faulte of this distinction is / that yt confoundeth and shuffleth together the autoritie of our Saviour Christ / as he is the sonne off God onely before all worldes / coequall with his father: with that which he hath gyven off his father and which he exerciseth in respecte he is mediator betwene God and us. For in the governement off the church / and superiorytie over the officers off it / our Saviour Christ himselfe hath a superior / which is his father: but in the governement off kingdomes / and other commonwealthes / and in the superiority which he hath over kinges / and judges / he hath no superior / but immediate authoritie with his father. Therfore the mouldinge upp off the two estates / and governementes together / is to lay the foundations of many errors.32

According to Cartwright, the separation of the civil and ecclesiastical spheres is rooted in the Christological doctrine of Christ’s two natures, human and divine. Cartwright thus justifies his theory of the head, and, consequently, the relationship between the Church and political power, by his interpretation of the Chalcedonian doctrine of the two natures of Christ. The ultimate source of the Church’s authority is Christ the Son of Man and Christ the Mediator, subordinate to the Father. Conversely, the source of power in political society lies in Christ, the Son of God, equal to the Father. This was the distinction that Hooker refused to accept.

From the Church to Royal Supremacy: Hooker’s Interpretation of the Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms The Church Visible and Invisible according to Hooker  Hooker develops the main points of his ecclesiology in book 3 of his Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, in which he contests the doctrinal stance tak32. Cartwright, The Second Replie, 2:411.

32  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England en by Thomas Cartwright and the Disciplinarians. The book is all the more important since it puts the system of laws that began the work (book 1) in its full ecclesiological context. We shall briefly revisit the main aspects of Hooker’s understanding of the Church. The Church is bound to divine law on the one hand, and to natural and positive law on the other, because of its nature as a political society: The Church being a supernatural society doth differ from natural societies in this, that the persons unto whom we associate ourselves, in the one are men simply considered as men, but they to whom we be joined in the other, are God, Angels, and holy men. Again the Church being both a society and a society supernatural, although as it is a society it have the selfsame original grounds which other politic societies have, namely, the natural inclination which all men have unto sociable life, and consent to some certain bond of association, which bond is the law that appointeth what kind of order they shall be associated in: yet unto the Church as it is a society supernatural this is peculiar, that part of the bond of their association which belong to the Church of God must be a law supernatural, which God himself hath revealed concerning that kind of worship which his people shall do unto him.33

The two aspects of the Church are divine insofar as the revealed law deals with salvation, and insofar as natural law and positive law, which derive from it, are unified by eternal law.34 The doctrine of the Church as a political and supernatural society is developed in the context of this twofold divine government. This demonstrates that Hooker used his borrowings from Aristotelo-Thomist philosophy to serve a reformed ecclesiology first and foremost. As we have seen, this ecclesiology calls for a clear distinction between that which belongs outwardly to the Church of Christ and that which is invisible. On the one hand, Hooker defines the Church as an invisible reality and a mystical body: 33. Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, I, 15, 2. 34. Ibid., I, 2, 1–6; I, 3, 1.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  33 That Church of Christ, which we properly term his body mystical, can be but one; neither can that one be sensibly discerned by any man, inasmuch as the parts thereof are some in heaven already with Christ, and the rest that are on earth (albeit their natural persons be visible) we do not discern under this property, whereby they are truly and infallibly of that body. Only our minds by intellectual conceit are able to apprehend, that such a real body there is, a body collective, because it containeth a huge multitude; a body mystical, because the mystery of their conjunction is removed altogether from sense.35

This definition of the Church corresponds to Luther’s spiritual reign (geistliches Reich) and Calvin’s forum conscientiae.36 The unity of the Church Visible rests entirely on Christ, its head.37 The Church is “a sensible known compagnie.”38 In other words, the outward face of the Church is part of the Luther’s earthly reign or Calvin’s forum externum. But, as Hooker immediately adds, the Church is united by the outward profession of faith of its members: The unity of which visible body and Church of Christ consisteth in that uniformity which all several persons thereunto belonging have, by reason of that one Lord whose servants they all profess themselves, that one Faith which they all acknowledge, that one Baptism wherewith they are all initiated. The visible Church of Jesus Christ is therefore one, in outward profession of those things, which supernaturally appertain to the very essence of Christianity, and are necessarily required in every particular Christian man.39

However, this distinction between the Church Visible and Invisible can be fully understood only in the light of soteriology, associ35. Ibid., III, 1, 1. See Calvin, Institutes, 4.1.7. 36. See Calvin, Institutes, 3.15.19, and Martin Luther, Against the Roman Papacy, an Institution of the Devil, trans. Eric Gritsch, ed. J. Pelikan and H. Lehmann, in Works, vol. 41 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), 259–376. 37. Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, V, 56, 7. 38. Ibid., III, 1, 3. 39. Ibid., III, 1, 3, 4.

34  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England ated with the existence of the two reigns. Just as Christians live both in Heaven, as justified by Christ’s justice, and on earth, in accordance with sanctification, so the Church lives spiritually in Christ and visibly on earth. Hooker shared Luther and Calvin’s belief in a close link between soteriology and ecclesiology. Echoing Calvin’s “Nulla salus extra ecclesiam,” he wrote that “Our being in Christ by eternal foreknowledge saveth us not without our actual and real adoption into the fellowship of his saints in this present world.”40 Hooker’s theological demonstration that Christians and the Church belong both to Christ and to the world requires consideration of the Christological paradigm, which, as we have seen, was an essential element of the controversy between Cartwright and Whitgift. For Hooker, the dual status of the Church is determined by the two natures of Christ, in correlation with the system of laws. Because Christ is both God and man, with no confusion of the two, the Church is consequently both a mystical and a political body, again with no confusion of the two. Christ thus wields authority over both the mystical and political bodies at the same time.41 This fundamental issue of Christic unity in duality was at the heart of Whitgift’s, and thus Hooker’s, opposition to Cartwright, who held that royal supremacy was contrary to Scripture, the Trinitarian and Christological dogma of the two natures, ecclesiological principles, and the doctrine of the two reigns as professed by the Reformed magisterium.

40. Ibid., V, 56, 7. Compare this with Calvin, Institutes, 4.1–4. 41. Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, V, 53, 3. The issue of the Church and its relationship to the two reigns cannot be separated from Christological dogma. In this context, there can be no doubt that Hooker was clearly in the camp of the Council of Chalcedon and thus condemned Christological heresies denying the doctrine of the two natures of Christ. Hooker’s theology was fundamentally incarnational.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  35 Royal Supremacy and the Interpretation of the Doctrine of the Two Reigns  Hooker’s belief was that fundamentally, the granting of royal supremacy on two occasions (the titles Head and later Supreme Governor of the Church) changed nothing. The nature and extent of royal supremacy were identical during both schisms, in 1534 and 1559. Hooker indicated this very clearly in a chapter with the unequivocal title Vindication of the Title Supreme Head of the Church within His Own Dominions. He used the words “head” and “governor” synonymously to express “the chiefty of dominion”— nothing more, nothing less.42 The dispute over these two words in fact hid another problem entirely: the refusal to grant a lay person supreme spiritual jurisdiction. In line with his theory of the union of the Church and society, Hooker argued that there was only one head, and thus only one leader. His affirmation of this unifying principle revealed him to be as faithful to his ecclesiological, philosophical, and anthropological principles as to the spirit of the preamble to the 1533 Act in Restraint of Appeals and Stephen Gardiner’s 1535 De Vera Obedientia.43 The Disciplinarian Puritan theologians objected to this on theological grounds.44 They did not allow the title “head,” which belonged to Christ alone. As we have seen in Cartwright’s arguments, the objection was not entirely without foundation, but it did overlook three distinctions vital to Hooker’s doctrine: the order, measure, and kind of power. In terms of order, Christ was head of the Church by virtue of His divine nature. The sovereign was head of the human order, which was by definition finite: 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid., VIII, I, 3. 44. Ibid., VIII, IV, 8: “But I see that hitherto they which condemn utterly the name so applied, do it because they mislike that any such power should be given unto civil governors.” Hooker here quotes Catholic authors (Thomas More) as well as Protestants (the Centuriators, who were the authors of the Historia Ecclesiae Christi published in Basel in 1559–74, and Calvin himself).

36  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England It is not simply the title of Head, which lifteth our Saviour above all powers, but the title of Head in such sort understood, as the apostle himself meant it: so that the same being imparted in another sense unto others, doth not any way make those others therein his equals; inasmuch as diversity of things is usual to be understood, even when of words there is no diversity; and it is only the adding of one and the selfsame thing unto diverse persons, which doth argue equality in them. If I term Christ and Caesar lords, yet this is no equalling of Caesar with Christ, because it is not thereby intended. “To term the emperor Lord,” saith Tertullian, “I for mine own part will not refuse, so that I be not required to term him Lord in the same sense that God is so termed.”45

Nor are the measure of power of Christ and that of the monarch of the same nature. While Christ’s authority extends to all places, people, and things,46 the monarch’s power is limited to one territory: “Christ is said to be universally head, the king no further than within his own dominions.”47 According to Hooker, the most important distinction is the “very nature and kind” of power. Christ wields His power invisibly and spiritually, while the magistrate’s power is visible and outward: “The headship which we give unto kings is altogether visibly exercised, and ordereth only the external frame of the Church’s affairs here amongst us; so that it plainly differeth from Christ’s, even in very nature and kind.”48 Hooker’s doctrine of the two reigns is founded on this distinction first and foremost. One ambiguous point still remains. Is royal supremacy a purely civil power, or is it granted the power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction?49 Hooker’s thinking appears to follow the distinction between the two forms of power: “The second and third [books] are concerning the power of jurisdiction [. . .] And because besides the power of order [. . .] and the power of jurisdiction [. . .] there is a third power, 45. Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, VIII, IV, 3. 46. Ibid., VIII, IV, 7. 47. Ibid., VIII, IV, 7. 48. Ibid., VIII, IV, 5. 49. Loyer, L’Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker, vol. 2, 648.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  37 a power of Ecclesiastical Dominion [. . .] the eighth book we have allotted unto this question.”50 Hooker uses specific vocabulary to refer to the three powers in the final three books of his Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. “Jurisdiction” refers to general ministerial jurisdiction, “dignity” to the episcopacy, and “dominion” to royal supremacy.51 However, the first sentence of book 8 somewhat undermines such subtle distinctions: “We come now to the last thing whereof there is controversy moved, namely the power of supreme jurisdiction, which for distinction’s sake we call the power of ecclesiastical dominion.”52 This introduction is later corroborated in the commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews (6:1) regarding the power of high priests: “ ‘Every high priest,’ saith the Apostle, ‘is taken from among men, and is ordained for men in things pertaining to God.’ ” As Hooker observes, “the Apostle doth there mention the power of offering gifts and sacrifices for sins; which kind of power was not only given of God unto priests, but restrained unto priests only. The power of jurisdiction and ruling authority, this also God gave them, but not them alone. For it is held, as all men know, that others of the laity were herein joined by the law with them.”53 This commentary alone suffices to demonstrate the importance for Anglican theologians of the politico-religious model of the Israelites. For Hooker, then, dominion is just one aspect of jurisdiction—the outward spiritual power of Christ.54 50. Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, preface, VII, 6. 51. Ibid., VI, I, 1. 52. Ibid., VIII, I, 1. 53. Ibid., VIII, VIII, 6. 54. Ibid., VIII, IV, 10. Here, Hooker clearly associates the spiritual power of the prince with that of the clergy, without, however, conflating the two. Both are part of what he calls “Christ’s outward spiritual regiment.” He presents the following classification: 1. Christ’s inward spiritual regiment, invisibly exercised by Christ himself; 2. Christ’s outward spiritual regiment exercised through a) t he ministry = the power of order, i.e., the power of administering the word, sacraments, or discipline; b) the king = the power of dominion.

38  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England The terms “invisible,” “visible,” “inward,” and “outward” indicate Hooker’s desire for balance in his thinking. The king should not trespass on the authority of the clergy. However, the royal role unites the spiritual and temporal jurisdictions, but without conflating them, as the three differences of order, measure, and kind of power indicate. These differences are founded in Trinitarian and Christological dogma and the ecclesiological principles of the Reform.55 Let us now turn to the interpretation of Trinitarian dogma. As one might expect, Hooker contested Cartwright’s thesis that Christ’s authority is divided into two. Christ cannot be “unequal to himself.” “All power both in heaven and in earth,” including civil power, is held by Christ, God’s consubstantial Word made man.56 Because Christ’s divine nature as God’s Son gives Him universal authority, He cannot be refused authority as king: “The Father by the Son both did create, and doth guide all; wherefore Christ hath supreme dominion over the whole universal world.”57 According to Hooker, Cartwright’s error lay in his conflation of Christ’s royal and priestly powers: “in truth, government doth belong to his kingly office, mediatorship, to his priestly.”58 In other words, in Hooker’s opinion, Christ’s royalty encompassed both ecclesiastical and political powers. This echoes chapter 51 of book 5, in which he insists on the doctrine of “consubstantial equality” with the Father, in conformity with the thirty-nine articles of religion (see article 1 of the Trinitarian dogma).59 55. Ibid., VIII, III, 2: “A gross error it is, to think that regal power ought to serve for the good of the body, and not of the soul; for men’s temporal peace, and not for their eternal safety: and if God had ordained kings for no other end and purpose but only to fat up men like hogs, and to see that thay have their mast?” 56. Ibid., VIII, 8, 4, 6. 57. Ibid., VIII, 8, 4, 6. 58. Ibid., VIII, 8, 4, 6. 59. Ibid., V, 5, 56, 2; V, 42, 1–13; V, 51, 1, 2. See Report of the Archbishops’ Commission on Christian Doctrine: Subscription and Assent to the 39 Articles (London: SPCK, 1968), 46.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  39 This brings us to Hooker’s Christological doctrine, doubtless the most convincing of his arguments in favor of royal supremacy. The Christological issue is all the more important for having been the object of major theological controversies among Reformists.60 Calvin drew on the doctrine of the two natures established at the Council of Chalcedon, applying it in particular in his theology as a means of differentiating himself from Luther and Zwingli. Hooker was following Calvin’s example when he refuted Cartwright’s doctrine of the division of Christ’s sovereignty and criticized his allegiance to Nestorianism.61 As we have seen, for Hooker, the unity of Christ’s person implied the dependence of civil power on God through Christ. Civil power thus belonged as much to Christ’s human authority as it did to His divine authority. Likewise, by virtue of the equality of Christ and His Father, ecclesiastical jurisdiction depended on both His human and divine natures.62 In other words, Hooker believed that the unity of Christ’s two natures logically implied the universality of His power. The unity of the two natures and the universality of Christ’s power were the conditions governing his understanding of the ecclesiological paradigm and the doctrine of the two kingdoms.63 According to Hooker, the universal presence of Christ and His Church is possible only in a spiritual and mystical sense. This affirmation gives rise to two difficulties, at least in appearance: the visible and universal presence of Christ as the head of the Church 60. Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, V, 42, 13. See also Calvin, Institutes, 2.14.5–8. 61. Nestorianism divided Christ into two persons. The Council of Ephesus defined the unity of the two natures of Christ as a reaction against Nestorian doctrine in 431. 62. Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, VIII, 8, 4, 6. 63. In keeping with Calvin’s principles in the Institutes, Hooker insists equally forcefully on the unity of the two natures of Christ’s Person in wielding his royal office. Compare Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, V, 55, 8, and Calvin, Institutes, 2.14.5–8.

40  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England Visible on the one hand, and the nature of ecclesiastical authority on the other.64 This twofold difficulty was resolved by the famous—and typically Anglican—distinction between matters necessary for salvation and accessory or indifferent matters relative to the ecclesial order. Both types of matter shed light on the nature of the bond and the distinction between the Church as the mystical body of Christ and the Church as visible and temporal body. Hooker thus joined the Reformist theologians arguing in favor of the Church Visible and Invisible. This theology enabled him to justify the existence of two heads of the Church: Christ as head of the Church Invisible and the sovereign as head or supreme governor of the Church Visible. The fact of having two heads had the vital consequence that the Church Spiritual was indivisible, while the Church Visible was divided into two. It manifested its presence in multiple territories and nations and was thus under the jurisdiction of several governors. However, the plurality of governors or sovereignties in different territories or nations was in no way a challenge to the unity and universality of Christ as mystical ruler, as his kingdom was of a completely different nature: Besides, howsoever Christ be spiritually always united unto every part of his body, which is the Church; nevertheless we do all know, and they themselves who allege this will, I doubt not, confess also, that from every church here visible, Christ, touching visible and corporal presence, is removed as far as heaven from earth is distant. Visible government is a thing necessary for the Church; and it doth not appear how the exercise of visible government over such multitudes every where dispersed throughout the world should consist without sundry visible governors; whose power being the greatest in that kind so far as it reacheth, they are in consideration thereof termed so far heads. Wherefore, notwithstanding that perpetual conjunction, by virtue whereof our Saviour remaineth always spiritually united unto the parts of his mystical body; 64. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, VIII, 4, 7.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  41 Heads endued with supreme power, extending unto a certain compass, are for the exercise of visible regiment not unnecessary.65

Note Hooker’s use of the doctrine of extra calvinisticum,66 which lends support to his argument in favor of the Church’s dual nature, Visible and Invisible. By calling on Reformist Christological orthodoxy, he clearly indicates that he intends to maintain a distance between Christ’s universal presence, inherent in His divine nature, and the sovereign’s visible, finite supremacy over his territories. Hooker also maintains this distance by making a distinction between the two kingdoms, visible and invisible, which give full validity to the three fundamental differences between the titles of “head” as held by Christ and the sovereign: the order, measure, and kind of power. Hooker sees the last of the three as the most important, writing in book 8 that “the last and the weightiest difference between [Christ] and [kings], is in the very kind of their power.”67 This brings us to the heart of the controversy between Cartwright and his fellow Disciplinarians, on the one hand, and the representatives of the Elizabethan establishment, on the other, over their conflicting views of the doctrine of the two reigns and the doctrine of salvation: “Christ is head as being the fountain of life and ghostly nutriment, the well-spring of spiritual blessings poured into the body of the Church; the heads, as being his principal instruments for the Church’s outward government.”68 The distinction between the spiritual blessings and the outward gov65. Ibid., VIII, 4, 7. 66. This expression originated in the interconfessional polemics between Lutherans and Calvinists in the latter half of the sixteenth century and debates in the seventeenth century. The term first appeared in the 1620s. The debate was on issues of the Sacrament. From a Christological point of view, it addressed the distinction between the Word Incarnate (the Word made flesh) and the Word (unincarnate). The points at issue here are the ecclesiological consequences of the doctrine of extra calvinisticum. See Pierre Gisel, Le Christ de Calvin (Paris: Desclée, 1990). 67. Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, VIII, 4, 7. 68. Ibid., VIII, 4, 8.

42  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England ernment of the churches is in fact a reference to the “two kinds of power (dominion).” Furthermore, it is highly significant that Hooker includes the administration of “the word, sacraments, and discipline”69 in the Church’s outward form, contrary to Disciplinarian ecclesiology. Hooker does not deny the spiritual nature of the word, sacraments, and discipline, but does not interpret them as being unequivocally so. Because the Church is at once Visible and Invisible, mystical and political, its power is consequently twofold. One form of its power is outward and human, while the other is inward and divine. The former flows from the latter, but the two are not conflated. The magistrate holds his ecclesiastical power from Christ’s power, while remaining subordinate, limited in measure, and, above all, distinct in kind. Hooker saw Cartwright’s theological error as lying in the conflation of Christ’s immediate spiritual authority and His authority mediated by outward means, which justify the distinction between the powers of order, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and dominion (or supreme jurisdiction). It is clear that the difference in approach to the doctrine of the two reigns that opposed Cartwright to Whitgift and later to Hooker in the Admonition Controversy was the condition determining whether or not royal supremacy was theologically valid. The three differences of order, measure, and the two kinds of power gave decisive confirmation. In order to justify their respective positions, the two sides in the controversy had to draw on interpretations of Trinitarian and Christological doctrine, Church doctrine, and the two reigns of the reformed Luthero-Calvinian magisterium. In focusing on these two divergences in interpretation, we have tried to shed light on the theological source of the conflict, which also establishes two models of increasing autonomy in the political sphere. In the longer term, Cartwright’s model tended to encourage a stricter separation of Church and State. 69. Ibid., VIII, 4, 10.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  43 Yet this separation implied a misunderstanding of the orthodoxy of the doctrinal theses of the Reformists and their approach to conciliary dogma, at least in the context of the controversy. The increasing autonomy of the political sphere thus followed a twofold path: on the one hand, a delimitation proper to the political commonwealth (the sovereign holds his authority from Christ God), and on the other, a delimitation of the Church’s sphere of competence (ecclesiastical authority comes from Christ the Man). Cartwright’s theology was fundamentally dualist and separatist and thus implied a more clerical vision of the Church in relation to civil magistrates. Hooker’s theological and political doctrine, on the other hand, followed on from and represented a systematic development of Whitgift’s theses, at the opposite end of the spectrum from Cartwright’s Disciplinarian approach. His insistent defense of the unity of Christ’s human and divine person and the universality of His power shaped his inclusive vision of the religious sphere within the political sphere, with the Church Visible being subordinate to the magistrate’s power. He thus defended the autonomization of sovereign power by means of a unity distinguishing between the order, the measure, and the two kinds of power. Richard Hooker died three years before James I succeeded to the throne of England. He was thus essentially an Elizabethan theologian. He still believed in the possibility of creating a synthesis between the medieval theory of political power and the increasing dominance of state sovereignty over matters of religion in the sixteenth century. While James’s theological theories proved very close to Hooker’s Anglicanism, he did not entirely share Hooker’s understanding of the legitimacy of royal sovereignty, as amply demonstrated by his conflict with the papacy and the theologians of the second Scholastic period. Nonetheless, Richard Hooker provided a sound basis for the doctrine of royal supremacy.70 70. Thinking on royal sovereignty during the reigns of James I and Charles I is further evidence of this. See John Buckeridge, A Sermon Preached at Hampton Court (London: Robert Barker, 1606), sig. Ela, to quote just one example.

44  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England Yet it was this correlative doctrine of the question of peace and unity that proved problematic, both for the Church of England and for the Holy See in Rome, because of the consequences it implied for the kingdom’s political coherence. This was the case with the policy of the Jesuits, whose positions exclusively in favor of Rome caused unease within the English Catholic community. The secular clergy in particular wished to remain faithful to the Crown. In the 1590s, a rift appeared between Catholics who were politically loyal to the queen and whose religious practices were not suspected of involvement in religious conspiracies and the group led by the Jesuits. This rift grew especially plain among the Catholics imprisoned in Wisbech, where a violent controversy arose in 1594 between the Jesuit party and the secular clergy known as the Appellants. The controversy between the two groups reflects a much broader opposition between the “English party” and the “Spanish party.” We must now shed some light on the political theories of the Jesuits, limiting our enquiry to the political thought of Francisco Suarez and his fellow Jesuit, the Englishman Robert Parsons.

Some Aspects of Francisco Suarez’s Political thought in his De Legibus and Defensio Fidei >

In 1613, Pope Paul V commissioned the Spanish Jesuit and theologian Francisco Suarez (1548–1617) to write a work confuting James I’s ecclesiological and political theses. Suarez used the work as a further opportunity to air the judicial theory he developed in De Legibus.71 Suarez thus played a key, albeit late, role in the contro71. Francisco de Suarez, Defensio fidei Catholicae et apostolicae adversus anglicanae sectae errores, cum responsione ad Apologiam pro iuramento fidelitatis & Praefationem monitoriam serenissimi Iacobi Angliae Regis; ad serenissimos totius Christiani orbis Catholicos reges ac principes, vol. 24 of Opera omnia (Paris: L. Vivès, 1869); De legibus, vols. 5

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  45 versy over the oath of allegiance. Unlike Cardinal Bellarmine, Suarez was not a churchman with responsibility for the government of the Church in addition to his university duties. He was first and foremost a speculative thinker, as shown by his complete works, dominated by the development of a metaphysical system. Suarez— heir to the tradition of scholastic thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham—invented what can justifiably be called Suarezian thought. In political terms, Suarez proved to be relatively faithful to the Aristotelo-Thomist premise that politics is connatural with the human condition. From this premise, he deduced the existence of an authority that can rightly be held by the multitude as a whole. It belongs only to the people considered as a whole; no single individual can exert authority. Consequently, whenever an individual holds public power, he does so only because the people as a whole freely conferred the right to wield it upon him. In other words, the principle that attributes the immediate origin of authority to God is meaningful only by virtue of natural law.72 It is by means of this law that authority is willed by God, by means of all the social institutions that are necessary for God to achieve His ends. However, this key question requires a number of further explanations. The political commonwealth exists as a perfect society only when wills have come together freely as a means of seeking the common good.73 and 6 of Opera omnia. See also Martine Pecharman’s article on Suarez’s notion of the people: “Les fondements de la notion d’unité du peuple selon Suarez,” in Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la philosophie politique moderne, ed. Yves-Charles Zarka, 103–26 (Paris: PUF, 1999). 72. Suarez, De legibus, III, 3, n. 1–5; 4, n. 8; Defensio fidei, III, 2, n. 2–3, 5–6, 13–14; 3, n. 9 and 12. De legibus, III, 2, n. 2; 4, n. 2, 5–6; Defensio fidei, III, 2, n. 5, 10, 13, 17. Suarez’s thought varied somewhat. De legibus, III, 4, n. 2 concedes that Saul and David received their power directly from God; Defensio fidei, III, 3, n. 5–10 fully discusses the question and attempts to justify Bellarmine’s assertion, contested by James I. 73. Defensio fidei, III, 2, n. 4; 3, n. 1, 2, 6; 4, n. 1. On imperfect political societies, see De legibus, III, 9, n. 18 and 19.

46  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England Once this society has formed, God confers upon it the political authority without which it cannot subsist. A key aspect of Suarez’s thinking should be underlined here: the relationship between authority and society is not automatically equivalent to the relationship between form and matter. Society is constituted prior to authority, which is understood simply as a property necessary for society to function: “Natural reason would suggest recognizing power as absolutely necessary to the conservation and equity of the republic of men. In such a community, its sign is thus to be like a property arising from nature or creation and its natural institution.”74 As a result, the choice of regime determines the form of authority. As a general rule, society can wield power itself only in exceptional circumstances: “Power is rarely or never held by the whole community in such a way that power is wielded by it with no intermediary.”75 In fact, it transfers power to governors. This is another fundamental aspect of Suarezian political theory. Power is not delegated by the people, but rather transferred or translated,76 according to the three traditional modes of government—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—or by a combination of the three regimes: “According to common moral philosophy, there can be three political regimes: the monarchy of a sole supreme prince, who is a single person; the aristocracy of a supreme council or a court consisting of several dignitaries; and democratic power constituted by the suffrages of all the people.”77 The transfer or trans74. Ibid., III, 2, n. 4; 3, n. 5–6; 4, n. 1 and Defensio, III, 2, n. 5; ibid., n. 6: “Power is a property arising from human nature insofar as it is united in one single political body.” In the absence of an English translation of Suarez’s works, all quotations from his works are translated from the French. 75. De legibus, III, 3, n. 8. 76. On the opposition between the straightforward designation and the translation or alienation of power, see ibid., III, 3, n. 8; 35, n. 10, and Defensio, 2, n. 15–19; 3, n. 5–6, 9–13. Power designated or delegated by the people is temporary, while in the case of transfer and translation, the people cannot take back the power they have given away. 77. Defensio, III, 2, n. 4.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  47 lation of authority begins with an explicit or tacit pact between society and the individual or assembly upon which power is conferred. At the same time, this pact, which is the necessary precondition for the legitimacy of power, establishes the limits of power and the manner in which it is to be used. The commonwealth, acting in the plenitude of its sovereign authority, determines the conditions in which power is to be wielded. It transmits power wholly or partially, sharing it between one individual and one or several assemblies: “From what we have just said, it follows that each time we find civil power in one single man or prince, legitimately and according to ordinary law, it comes from the people and the community, either closely or distantly, else it could not be held justly. This is the common opinion of theologians (Thomas, Cajetan, Vitoria).”78 The commonwealth even reserves the exercise of power for itself in certain cases, depending on its constitution, written or established by tradition and precedent. Furthermore, it makes little difference whether the necessary pact is subject to explicit or unspoken agreement: “It follows secondly that power lies in the supreme principle of the manner and conditions in which it is given and transferred . . . that is like a convention between the community and the prince and thus the power received does not exceed in its modality the donation or the convention. Whatever the mode, if there is no written document, it must be established above all by custom.”79 The obligations are strict on both sides. The subject owes absolute obedience, but the representative of power can act legitimately only within the limits of the constitution and does not have the right to transform the authority entrusted to him by the commonwealth into tyranny. Whether the power is transmitted on hereditary principles or merely held for life, or even if the leader is 78. Ibid., III, c. 2, n. 4, 6, 9, 14, 17, 19; c. 3, n. 7–8, 10, 12–13. 79. De legibus, III, 9, n. 4, t. V, 202.

48  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England elected for a fixed period, in all cases he holds authority by virtue of the initial pact. But the commonwealth cannot take back what it has freely transferred: “This is why it is not absolutely true that the king depends for his power on the people even if he received it from them, because he could have depended on them, as we say, then no longer depend on them to keep it if he received it entirely and absolutely.”80 Only in exceptional circumstances where the supreme salvation of the country is at stake can the people take back this power.81 We now turn to the ecclesiastico-political dimension of Suarez’s thought, which sets another limit to the theory of the transfer of authority. In his Defensio Fidei, Suarez explains that the political commonwealth, a society perfect in its order, does not exclude the Church founded by Christ as a perfect society with its own end. Nor do the specific differences between these two societies diminish the superiority of the Church. This superiority is permanent in the face of changeable human power, and its spiritual finality is universal, unlike the civil powers held by individuals.82 Furthermore, the specificity of the Church as regards temporal power is the fact that it is directly instituted by God, especially the papacy—as stated by Gregory VII in his Dictatus papae—contrary to the origin of temporal governments in natural and human law:83 “The end of ecclesiastical power is supernatural; civil power is contained 80. Defensio, III, 2, n. 12, 18; 3, n. 3–4. 81. Suarez differentiates between two cases: (1) interventions permitted in the constitution, and (2) the supreme salvation of the country. Explicit allowance is made for the first, while the second is inalienable under natural law. See Defensio, III, 3, n 1–4: “These cases must be understood either according to the conditions laid out in the prior contract, or according to the demands of natural justice; just pacts and conventions must be respected. And this is why, if the people have transferred power to the king, reserving it for themselves in a few extremely serious cases, in such cases the people can wield power legitimately while maintaining their right.” 82. Ibid., I, III, chap. V, 11. 83. Ibid., I, III, chap. V, 17.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  49 entirely within the plan of nature; the former is spiritual, the latter material; the former is eternal, the latter temporal.” Suarez also notes that if one form of power can be directly dependent on another, it can equally be so indirectly. This is precisely the relationship of dependence of temporal power with regard to the Church because of its supernatural end, which is in this respect superior to the natural end of the political order. The Church’s indirect power grants it the right to intervene in the sphere of temporal power if the latter’s laws risk endangering the salvation of souls and the smooth running of ecclesiastical institutions. According to Suarez, indirect power is both directive and coercive because it involves canonical sanctions, including excommunication and deposition.84 These were the issues at the heart of the controversy that pitted James I against both Suarez and Bellarmine in the debate over the oath of allegiance. It should be noted that Suarez went further than Bellarmine in his opposition to regalian power, invoking the right to tyrannicide. Furthermore, he developed a critical analysis of James I’s oath that was far more subtle than that of Bellarmine.85 Suarez developed his theory of the legitimacy of tyrannicide against the backdrop of the conflict between James I and the Holy See. He adopted the traditional distinction between the usurping tyrant and the tyrant by practice, putting forward several hypotheses.86 Suarez states that no private individual can kill a tyrant without a public mandate, with the exception of the usurping tyrant, in which case the notion of the mandate is implicit. The idea of overthrowing a tyrant by practice is quite a different matter, involving as it does a legitimate sovereign. In this case, tyrannicide requires either the tyrant to be first constitutionally deposed with 84. Ibid., I, VI, chap. IV, 16. See the appendix for a text of the Defensio fidei regarding the pope’s indirect temporal power. 85. See Defensio, book 6, prologue and chap. 1, for Suarez’s typology of oaths. 86. Ibid., I, VI, chap. IV, n. 7.

50  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England the pope’s approval, or the pope to excommunicate and depose the tyrant as a heretic.87 It is clear that the Suarezian theory of the divine origin of temporal power through the mediation of natural law is hardly compatible with the theory of the direct divine right of kings, since in James I’s theory there is no notion equivalent to natural law. Furthermore, while both theories impose absolute allegiance of subjects to their princes, the doctrine of tyrannicide contradicts the prohibition of the right to resistance in James’s theory. In the final analysis, in terms of the relationship between the temporal and spiritual spheres, the doctrine of the indirect power of the papacy and James I’s theory of the two kingdoms are mutually exclusive. Following this brief analysis of Suarezian political doctrine, we are now in a position to take a closer look at the categorical opposition between the Tridentine Church and the English crown during the reigns of the Tudors and the first Stuart king after he came to the throne in 1603. Anglican political theory, shaped by the theory of royal supremacy, could scarcely be compatible with the theses espoused by the Jesuits.

87. On July 6, 1610, following the assassination of Henri IV and the scandal caused by Mariana’s book De rege et regis insitutione. To my knowledge, there were three contemporary editions: Joannis Marianae, De rege et regis institutione libri III (Toleti [Toledo]: Apud Petrum Rodericum typo, Regium, 1599); De rege et regis institutione libri III (Moguntiae [Mainz]: Typis Balthasaris Lippii, Impensis Heredum Andrea Wechelii, 1605); and De rege et regis institutione libri III (Moguntiae [Mainz]: Typis Wechelianis, 1611). The general of the Jesuits Acquaviva tried to calm public opinion in France (or rather Parliament and the Sorbonne) by publishing a decree that “by virtue of the holy obedience, penalty of excommunication, ineligibility for all offices, suspension and other penalties subject to our discretion, no member of our Society henceforth shall dare to assert, publicly or privately, during lectures or in counsel, and much less in books, that it is allowed for anyone whatsoever, under any pretext of tyranny whatsoever, to kill kings or princes or to plan their murder.” See G. Lewy, Constitutionalism and Statecraft during the Golden Age of Spain: A Study of the Political Philosophy of Juan de Mariana, S.J. (Geneva: Droz, 1960), 167.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  51

The Elizabethan Controversy between the Secular Priests and the Jesuits: Two Approaches to Fidelity, One Conflict >

The Controversy of the Appellants The conflict between secular priests and Jesuits is vital in understanding the situation of the English Catholic community when James I succeeded to the throne.88 The controversy of the Appellant priests and their quarrel with the Jesuits was undeniably the final legacy of Elizabeth’s religious policy. The irreconcilable opposition of the two ecclesiastical strategies was to prove a determining factor in James’s stance toward his Catholic studies. It was to lead him to impose the oath of allegiance. Let us begin by examining the events of the years 1590 to 1600. In the final years of Elizabeth’s reign, a certain number of English churchmen wished to promote a national Church, while remaining faithful to the sovereign pontiff, with no thought of schism or rebellion. They adhered to the Gallican movement in France, developing theories clearly laid out in a long document sent to Pope Clement VIII (1592–1605) in the name of the English secular clergy.89 The document also contained a series of accusations against the Jesuits. In 1596, several of the churchmen formed a group that sent a petition to the pope in the hope of seeing a bishop appointed in England. The Jesuit Robert Parsons reacted immediately by ask88. On this question that arose repeatedly throughout Elizabeth I’s long reign, see John Bossy, The English Catholic Community 1570–1850 (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1979), and his article “Henry IV, the Appellants and the Jesuits,” Recusant History 8 (1965): 80–122. 89. Following the death of Cardinal Allen in 1594, the pope no longer appointed bishops to govern the English Catholic Church, but only priests with the title of archpriest, helped by a council of twelve assistants. This system lasted until the appointment of England’s first vicar apostolic, William Bishop, in 1623. See W. Maziere Brady, Annals of the Catholic Hierarchy in England, A.D. 1585–1876 (London: John Mozley Stark, 1883), 57.

52  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England ing Rome not to comply with the request. He thereby obtained in 1598 the nomination of one of his own partisans, George Blackwell, as head of the secular clergy, with the title “archpriest”: There was but one restriction on these powers, which was that the archpriest could not use them without first having taken the opinion and advice of the English province of Jesuits. The wishes of the Fathers were granted. Their one remaining concern was to choose with discernment the person who was to be entrusted with the new dignity. It had to be a friend and more than that, an instrument. George Blackwell offered all the guarantees they could wish for.90

The secular clergy appealed against this nomination, but it was confirmed by a papal decision on April 6, 1599. The secular clergy had no choice but to bow to the pope’s authority. However, Blackwell was very soon accusing his “congregation” of schism, and after a series of intrigues, thirty priests from Wisbech took their appeal to Rome, upping tensions considerably: “Several priests first spoke out against the imperial orders that came from their new archpriest [. . .]. But soon the quarrel grew more venomous and the Jesuits joined the stage: both sides put out lampoons and pamphlets, while the archpriest stripped the recalcitrant priests of their powers and even declared them schismatic.”91 Clement VIII was mistrustful of their position, but Béthune, the king of France’s ambassador to the Holy See, influenced his stance: “Without openly contradicting the pope’s words, Béthune insinuated that these priests were perhaps guilty, but that they might also be calumnied. Their accusers had been heard, why should their defense not also be heard? Clement VIII acknowledged the wisdom of this reasoning and declared that he would gladly receive them.”92 90. Abbé R. Couzard, Une ambassade à Rome sous Henri IV (septembre 1601–juin 1605) (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1900), 81. 91. Ibid., 82. 92. Ibid., 84 and 86, n. 2. In the Sully archives, a special document in Béthune’s papers, separate from official letters from Henri IV and Villeroi, indicates the correct

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  53 Concomitantly, the government tended to encourage Catholic loyalists in the final decade of Elizabeth’s reign by suspending any prosecutions and punishments pending for dissidence. This position, although never official, led to an increase in dissentions between the two groups of Catholics and encouraged the secular clergy in their vain hope for relative religious tolerance—that Catholics who were devoted purely to spiritual ends and who fully acknowledged the supremacy and legitimacy of the Crown would be able to enjoy a certain degree of religious freedom. Several secular priests spoke out in favor of tolerance, such as Father Mush, who spoke of his astonishment that the government could be so blind as to be incapable of coming up with a form of tolerance that would free Catholics from this oppression.93 In 1601, another priest, William Watson, published a long pamphlet accusing the Jesuits of disloyalty to the queen and calling for pitiless sanctions against them. He did not hesitate to denounce his fellow believers to the attorney general,94 thereby placing them stance to adopt in this situation: “To induce the pope to agree to receive the said priests well, demonstrate to him that if he supports and encourages them, he will obtain better advantage for the propagation of the Catholic faith, than by the violent means used by the Jesuits and Spanish, through which they have earned nothing but having given the queen of England occasion to treat her Catholic subjects with great rigor where the latter, humiliating themselves, have already been granted advantage and enjoyed benefits by petitioning her. Thus if it comes to the attention of the queen that these priests are supported by his Holiness against the Jesuits, she will have some occasion to be persuaded that to be Catholic does not mean to be her enemy, nor to try to use hostility against her; or even that his Holiness will not try to move and incite some other secular prince to make an attempt on her state. Thus being removed from these suspicions, she will doubtless afford gentler treatment to the priests and other Catholics of her kingdom that she has done hitherto. So that they, finding themselves in this manner somewhat at liberty, can be of more advantage to the Catholic faith than weapons would be.” 93. Thomas Graves Law, A Historical Sketch of the Conflicts between Jesuits and Seculars in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, with a reprint of Christopher Bagshaw’s True Relation of the Faction Begun at Wisbech and Illustrative Documents (London: David Nutt, 1889), 147–48. 94. Thomas Graves Law, Watson to the Attorney General 1599 in The Archpriest

54  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England at risk of the most brutal punishments. He enjoyed the brief support of William Cecil and Richard Bancroft, the Anglican bishop of London. Around him formed the group known as the Appellants—Catholic priests who demanded the expulsion of the Jesuits and the establishment of a sort of modus vivendi between the government, the monarch, and a minority of “papists” who renounced all subversive political activity. The priest Thomas Bluette came into close contact with Richard Bancroft after being released from prison. Through his intermediary, he contacted a number of influential members of the House of Commons who were anxious to lower tensions. Thomas Bluette then obtained permission to travel to Rome to meet Pope Clement VIII to discuss the situation of Catholics in England.95 The Jesuits, although greatly destabilized by the government’s clever policy, found it hard to believe that the latter would truly allow English Catholics genuine religious freedom. They defended their position in two important texts.96 Any concession made by Controversy, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, 1898), 222: “The epistle to her maty syr Robert Cecil saw in my L. of Essex hand and disliked only or rather doubted (as was told me) of this word tolleration yt her maty wold not grant it. It was sent backe to alter it, I did soe & returned it againe (the very day that I was taken on), my L. of Essex vsing these honorable speaches that he coulde wishe wth all his hearte yt we mighte have liberty of conscience.” 95. Couzard, Une ambassade à Rome sous Henri IV, 95–96: “However, the English ministers wished to know what the priests arrived from Rome had negotiated with Clement VIII. One of them, Thomas Bluette, was ordered to come to London by the leader of the Council Lord Cecil. Campnews and Mirlews also traveled there in secret [. . .]. The English priests were asked to sign an oath drawn up by the bishop of London. They refused and were authorized to draw up a new one, in which they acknowledged that Elizabeth held the same civil authority as her predecessors and undertook to reveal all plots and planned invasions, even those whose avowed aim was to re-establish the Catholic faith. The bishop of London was satisfied by these declarations, but the ministers showed themselves to be inflexible. The negotiations continued and were not to be completed during the queen’s lifetime.” 96. Memorial Setting Forth on the part of the Jesuits the Injustice of the Conditions Under which it was Proposed that Queen Elizabeth should grant Liberty of Conscience to Catholics and Discorso sopra la proposa che si hà dà fare per quanto si dice, à S. Sant. da alumi Sa-

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  55 the English government would come at a high cost to the pope and the Church.97 The secular clergy’s policy would lead straight to the exclusion of papal authority over England. They held that only when penal laws were abolished would Catholics be granted true freedom. Even if the government wished to take this radical step, it would be prevented by opposition from the Anglican clergy and the Puritans.98 In these two texts, the idea is constantly present that the queen encouraged the secular clergy, only to take advantage of their efforts. The queen would never allow any form of papal authority over England, and she well knew that “by granting freedom of conscience to Catholics, she could never attach them sufficiently to herself to make them agree to separate from their supreme Guardian.”99 These two texts openly acknowledged that the Holy See was hostile to the English state, claiming that “the queen would never place the Catholics in a situation where they would no longer have to fear or submit to persecution.”100 On the contrary, she “will continue to divide and disunite the Catholics and [. . .] persecute them under cover of political necessity.”101 She was accused of having supported the Appeal to Rome with the sole aim of sowing discord in the Church and stirring up animosity toward the Jesuits. Her intention was simply to “foment discord between Catholics with a view to controlling them all.”102 Influenced by the Jesuits’ arguments, Clement VIII forbade the publication of texts likely to stoke the enmity between Jesuits and Appellants. Many of the latter wanted to lead a merciless combat cerdoti Inglesi à nome della Regina d’Ingliterra, circa il dare libertà di conscienza à Catholici di quel Regno (Discourse on the propositions that certain English priests are to submit to his Holiness in the name of the queen of England with a view to the granting of freedom of conscience to English Catholics). Neither document is signed or dated. 97. Discorso sopra la proposa, II, 78. 98. Ibid., II, 78. 99. Ibid., II, 82. 100. Ibid., II, 82. 101. Ibid., II, 82–83. 102. Ibid., II, 82–83.

56  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England against the Jesuits, particularly as they enjoyed tacit yet effective government support. Writings hostile to the Jesuits were distributed freely throughout the kingdom, and negotiations were held with Elizabeth’s ministers to further an atmosphere of mutual understanding. Rome prohibited and condemned these negotiations. In the end, Thomas Bluette and a few other Appellants failed in their mission to the Holy See. In October 1602, Clement VIII, probably worried by the negotiations between the Appellants and the government, sent a brief to George Blackwell prohibiting him from consulting the Jesuits and ordering him to select three Appellants as auxiliaries.103 At the same time, Clement renewed the ban on publishing tendentious writings on the Jesuits and the Appellants. He likewise expressly forbade the continuation of talks with representatives of the royal government that would have resulted in an attack on the integrity of Catholic faith and doctrine. Elizabeth was equally intransigent. After a detailed examination of the Appellants’ case, she finally rejected their argument: “She [added] that veritably she praised and approved of the good intentions of the said priests [. . .] that her people were not capable of tolerating the exercise of two religions, that she would do nothing to affect the peace of her kingdom by this confusion.”104 Her position was that one could not be loyal to the established Church and 103. Couzard, Une ambassade à Rome sous Henri IV, 90: “The cardinals added that it was necessary to remove secular priests and lay people who had not been brought up in seminaries from the jurisdiction of this archpriest, and to enjoin him, contrary to the prescriptions of Cardinal Gaetani, no longer to take the advice of the English provincial of Jesuits or anyone from the Society, whether resident in Rome or elsewhere, for the matters in his charge; he should address himself directly to the cardinalprotector in charge of English matters [. . .] For their part, the Appellant priests were to disown the insults contained in books written by them against the Jesuits, and the books themselves. Both parties were forbidden, on pain of excommunication, to publish anything without prior approval from the cardinal-protector or to write anything, either in public or in private, about this controversy, which absolutely had to be silenced.” 104. Jean-Baptiste-Théodore-Alexandre Teulet, Relations politiques de la France et de l’Espagne avec l’Écosse au XVIème siècle, vol. 4: Correspondances Françaises 1585–1603 (Paris: Veuve Jules Renouard, 1862), 265.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  57 the throne and at the same time to a foreign sovereign. The time of “peaceful coexistence” had not yet arrived and the age of persecutions had not yet come to an end. In November 1602, prompted by a desire to test the goodwill of the Appellants and dissociate them from their adversaries, Elizabeth made a proclamation: An edict, even more severe than those preceding, was pronounced against Catholics. Monks and priests were condemned to be banished, if they had not sworn the unacceptable oath they were required to, the former and their followers within thirty days, and the latter within three months [by January 29, 1603]. A plot discovered at that moment against the king of Scotland, which the Spanish were suspected of instigating, was even greater justification, in the eyes of the queen, for this violent measure.105

The edict ordered the Jesuits to leave England on pain of being accused of high treason, while the Appellants were merely invited to reject the authority of the pope, “the country’s most mortal enemy,” and to swear an oath to follow the laws of the country. On January 29, 1603, thirteen Catholic Appellant priests responded to the queen’s offer. They wanted to separate questions of pure dogma from political issues. They thus envisaged absolute submission to the pope in matters of faith, while refusing to accept external interventions in established matters not directly linked to their religion. Their wish was to approve the laws against all Catholics accused of plotting and undermining state security and to expel all missionaries back to the continent if their activity appeared to harm the prestige and independence of the realm. Furthermore, the Appellants spoke out vigorously against the “violent enterprises” of the Jesuits and undertook to “defend her majesty’s person, estate, realms, and dominions from all [. . .] forcible and violent assaults and injuries.”106 The Appellants were un105. Couzard, Une ambassade à Rome sous Henri IV, 95. 106. Quoted in Michael Carrafiello, Robert Parsons and English Catholicism, 1580– 1610 (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1998), 92.

58  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England doubtedly sincere in their wish to separate ecclesiastical and political issues in order to make being a member of the Catholic Church compatible with being a subject of the kingdom. Their political doctrines likewise reflect this fact. In keeping with their “protestations of allegiance,” they followed the legitimist criterion of unconditional obedience and thus placed themselves in opposition to the political theories of resistance espoused by Protestant and Catholic monarchomachs.107 The result was a political plea in favor of the State’s “divine” nature, which could not be challenged on any religious grounds whatsoever. They also acknowledged the pope’s power in its exclusively spiritual plenitude—a thesis as close to James and William Barclay’s ecclesiastico-political theories as it was diametrically opposed to those of the Jesuits Bellarmine and Suarez, both ardent defenders of the pope’s indirect temporal power. One of the Appellant leaders, Watson, in fact made a significant connection between the political ideas of the Jesuits and the Puritans, referring to the former as “Puritan Jesuits”108—an ironic label taken up in almost identical terms by James I in his Apologie against Cardinal Bellarmine.109 However, the connection was not entirely disinterested: once again, the aim was to prove to the English government that the Appellants were loyal Catholic subjects and thus good Englishmen.110 But the central point of convergence between the political theories of the Appellants and the Anglicans lay more precisely in the extent of the sovereign’s power by divine right, with both ac107. Protestant and Catholic monarchomachs also refused resistance from within the Church. Ibid., 95. 108. Ibid., 96. 109. James I of England, An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance: First Set Forth without a Name, and Now Acknowledged by the Author, the Right High and Mightie Prince, Iames by the Grace of God, King of Great Britaine, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc.; Together with a Premonition of his Maiesties to All Most Mightie Monarches, Kings, Free Princes, and States of Christendome (London: Robert Barker, 1609) [henceforth Apologie and Premonition], 44: “since Iesuits are nothing but Puritane-Papists.” 110. An identical issue arose in France under the Valois dynasty. See Pierre du Belloy, De l’Authorité du Roy et Crimes de lèze Majesté (n.p.: 1587), 43–44, 57–58.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  59 knowledging his right in “the making, giving, and promulgating of laws”111—one of the attributes of sovereignty already noted. Furthermore, the method used by the Appellants to argue their case is common to all royalist and regalian theses: they quoted numerous examples from Antiquity and the Middle Ages in order to illustrate the eminent power of emperors and kings, corroborated by the inevitable references to Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Romans 13:1–8, and to Tertullian and Saint Augustine.112 In other words, in comparison with the situation in France—but in a proportionately inverse power relationship—the Appellants were defending theologico-political theses similar to political Gallicanism. Since the Council of Trent, Catholicism as such could not be identified with a seditious form of Christianity: rather, it was a divided spiritual community, part of which intended to remain loyal to its sovereign in England, the keystone of their loyalty being the defense of the Crown and the doctrine of royal divine right, which alone was in a position to transcend and forestall religious conflict. Yet this ecclesiastical strategy and conception of the devolution and exercise of secular power did not bear the desired fruit, as Queen Elizabeth refused to allow the two religions to coexist. It is difficult to reach objective judgments about the role of the Appellant priests.113 They were concerned to bring about a rapprochement between the Crown, Parliament, and the papists. They tried to remain perfectly loyal to Elizabeth and to bring painful conflicts to an end. Yet they can be blamed for causing greater coercion against all those who refused to submit to the govern111. Carrafiello, Robert Parsons and English Catholicism, 98. 112. Ibid, 98. Pierre du Belloy uses the same sources in De l’Authorité du Roy et crimes de lèze Majesté, 40, as does Richard Mocket, God and the King: Or, A Dialogue Shewing That Our Soveraigne Lord King James, Being Immediate under God within His Dominions Doth Rightfully Claime Whatsoever Is Required by the Oath of Allegiance (London: n.p., 1615), 55. 113. For further information on the Appellants’ strategies, see Bossy, The English Catholic Community.

60  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England ment. They were the mortal enemies of the Jesuits, whom they accused of blindness and fanaticism, and hoped to reconcile obedience to the pope and loyalty to the Crown. All these events, during which the fate of the Catholic community in England at the end of Elizabeth’s reign hung in the balance, indicate that the government seriously considered adopting a policy of tolerance toward loyalists. However, its stance was essentially informed by political considerations that consisted in widening the gulf between the secular clergy and the Jesuits. The government considered the possibility of a total rift, which would allow it to take on the role of adjudicator. These maneuvers came to an end when the queen announced that the government could not acknowledge the principle of total religious freedom. Furthermore, the antagonisms in the Catholic community were such that the State had nothing further to fear from them, at least for the time being. Yet this is to overlook the fact that the influence of the Jesuits on English Catholicism remained strong, particularly thanks to the most influential English Jesuit of the group, Robert Parsons.

Robert Parsons: Temporal Authority in the Service of Catholic Truth A fundamental postulate of Robert Parsons’s thought was based on the medieval notion that “the highest and chiefest end of euery common wealth, is Cultus Dei, the service of God, and religion, and consequently that the principal care & charge of a prince and magestrate euen by nature it selfe, is, to looke thereunto.”114 This 114. Robert Parsons, A Conference about the Next Succession to the Crowne of Ingland (Douay, France: H.C.L., B.M., 1594), I, 207. The book, printed under the pseudonym Robert Doleman, was probably published only in 1595. Dr. Gifford described the book as “the most pestilent ever made.” See Franck Lessay, “Robert Parsons, S.J.: de la reconquête à la recréation du royaume d’Angleterre,” in Innovation et tradition de la Renaissance aux Lumières, ed. F. Lessay and F. Laroque (Paris: Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2002), 107–31. The manuscript had an astonishing impact in the seventeenth century, being taken up by revolutionary republicans and then Whigs under the restora-

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  61 statement in effect means that religion is the key criterion to take into account in choosing a sovereign: [I]t followeth that what-soeuer prince or magestrate doth not attend vvith care to assist and helpe his subiects to this ende, omitteth the first and principal part of his charge, and committeth high treason against his lord and master, in whose place he is, and consequently is not fitt for that charge and dignity, though he should performe the other two partes, neuer so vvel, of temporal iustice and valor in his person.115

In other words, religion represents a guarantee of political legitimacy. Here he was in agreement with his Anglican adversaries, but arguing from opposing ecclesiastico-political principles. In so doing, he denounced Elizabeth’s attempts to subordinate the spiritual sphere to the temporal sphere, as Bellarmine was later to do during the debate over the oath of allegiance. In accordance with this principle, Parsons declared that “there is but one only religion that can be true among Christians.”116 In this, Parsons remained faithful to the spirit to the majority of his contemporaries, who reasoned essentially in terms of uniformity: Christian truth is whole and indivisible and thus cannot be open to differing interpretations—let alone antinomic ones. Robert Parsons’s thoughts and deeds were thus guided by two principles—on the one hand, the normative superiority of religion tion. For the revolutionaries’ reading of Parson’s work, see J. B. Williams, “Puritan Piracies of Father Parsons’ Conference,” The Month 117, no. 561 (March 1911): 270–78. According to Williams, Oliver Cromwell played a role in the piracy of Parsons’s book. Parsons also had his detractors. The ideas he put forward in A Conference were condemned by a writer using the same pseudonym, Robert Doleman, in 1683, while the University of Oxford declared them pernicious and an attack against the sacred person of princes. The University of Oxford condemned the theories of Buchanan and Bellarmine in the same context. See Franck Lessay, Le Débat Locke/Filmer (Paris: PUF, 1999), 39. Finally, it is interesting to note that Parsons was favorable to James VI’s succession to Elizabeth, as he believed in the 1590s that the Stuart king might convert to Catholicism. See Carrafiello, Robert Parsons and English Catholicism, 33–35. 115. Parsons, A Conference, I, 212. 116. Ibid., I, 214.

62  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England over politics, and on the other, the uniformity of truth, which of course he saw as residing in the Roman Catholic Church. It therefore followed quite naturally that the Church was the religious institution that legitimized the choice of such or such prince and thus called for the reconquest of territories lost to the Reform. Parsons did not believe that tolerance or even moderation were possible as a policy: “for let the bargaines and agreements be vvhat they wil, and fayre promises & vayne hopes neuer so great, yet seing the prince once made and setled, must needes proceede according to the principles of his owne religion.”117 This is far from untrue if we take seriously the inevitable clash between religious principles and the political principles defended as much by Anglicans as by Puritans and Catholics. However, it is on precisely this key point of theological epistemology that the rift between the adverse parties became apparent to all. Since the two groups did not share the same understanding of Christianity, the understanding of the political institution and the normative decisions it implied in terms of religion could not be the same. Consequently, there was a profound misunderstanding over the nature of tolerance. In other words, the understanding of tolerance was strongly determined by each side’s concept of Christian truth and the ecclesiastical institution that was meant to represent it on earth. In his earliest works, Parsons certainly expressed an inclination for the respect of freedom of conscience, starting from the observation that there are four great religions in England, including the Roman Church. The Roman Church being the oldest, it deserves the most tolerance.118 It must “receaue more fauour then the rest, 117. Ibid., I, 217. 118. Parsons’s religious tolerance is particularly relativized in his work The Jesuit’s Memorial for the Intended Reformation of England, published in 1596. The title was not chosen by Parsons. When the manuscript was published in 1690, it was preceded by a very hostile foreword by Dr. Edward Gee that recalls the original title: A Memo-

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  63 or at least wyse, equall tolleration with other religions disalowed by the State.”119 He also insisted heavily on the respect of freedom of conscience, arguing that Catholics could not be forced to believe in doctrines that were foreign to them, and also emphasizing their loyalty: The onlie cause of their molestation, is their conscience in religion, whiche beinge setled uppon invincible grounds, as it semethe to them, is not in their power to alter at their pleasure, neither is any persecution in [the world?] able to change the same, but rather confirmeth it more and more, bringing alwaies an argument withe it, of lack of truthe in the persecutor, whiche seeketh to supply by externall terror the thynge he is not able to proue by argument.120

He thus rejected all forms of state persecution, which would lead to a conformity that was purely external in nature: “except he wil mislike with his owne doctrine, which condemneth me of hipocrise, dissimulation, and renouncinge of Christ, and his Gospel, if I present my only bodye, to the Churches of them, whos religion I am not persuaded to be trew.”121 Parsons’s plea in favor of tolerance led him to distinguish between civil obedience and religious fidelity in his work Certayne Reasons. However, these texts are a double-edged sword because they invoke the truth both as an objective norm and as a personal rial of the Reformation of England: Containing Certain Notes, and Advertisements, which seem might be proposed in the First Parliament, and National Council of our Country, after God, of his mercy, shall restore it to the Catholick Faith, for the better Establishment and Preservation of the said Religion. For further details, see Lessay, “Robert Parsons, S.J.” 119. Robert Parsons, A brief discours contayning certayne Reasons why Catholiques Refuse to goe to Church. Written by a learned and vertuous man, to a friend of his in England, and dedicated by I.H. to the Queenes most excellent Maiestie (Douay, France: Iohn Lyon, 1580), Dedic., IV. 120. Robert Parsons, An epistle of the Persecution of Catholickes in England. Translated ovvt of frenche into Englishe and conferred vvith the Latyne copie by G.T. To whiche is added an epistle of the translator to the right honorable Lordes of her Maiesties preeuie councell touchynge the same matter (Douay, France: H.C.L., B.M., 1582), 8. 121. Parsons, A brief discours contayning certayne Reasons, 53.

64  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England belief: “And if euerye man which hath anye religion, and is resolved therein, must needes presuppose this only truth, to be in his own religion: then it followeth necessarily, that he must like wyse perswade him selfe, that all other religions besides his owne, are false and erroneous, and consequently al assemblies, conuenticles, and publike actes of the same.”122 This forthright statement by Parsons somewhat undermines his belief in tolerance! Another text allows us to make a clearer distinction between obedience to the laws of the state and religious practice: If by the rackinges, stretchinges, wrestinges, and dreadfull tortures used so often and to so many of our innocent afflicted brethren . . . there hath bene any one thinge wrounge out from them, of treason, conspiracie, or practises against the state, wherewith our aduersaries, without conscience, do use daily to accuse us; let the partis guyltie be punished openly, with infamie also to our cause. Albeit in this later we offer more than reason. But if after all this fierce halinge, and pitifull pullinge of men in pieces, nothinge hath bene founde at all, no one act, no worde, no cogitation of suche matters, but onlye innocencie and zeale of religion in the tormented: then is our case much more hard at home, in our owne countrye, under our owne Soueraigne, than it could be any where els under the extremest aduersaries of our religion in the worlde.123

Yet here again, the distinction is a fine one in an age where religion and politics were inextricably bound. The Tudor and Stuart monarchies also acknowledged this distinction, but the problem was identifying the limits of Robert Parsons’s “zeale of religion”! The government held that there came a point where the Jesuit missions stopped being purely religious in nature and slipped over into seditious and political activity. The Catholics based their case on an earlier argument and held that granting freedom of conscience is hollow if it is not followed by the freedom to hold religious rites and services. In this sense, they opposed the English government’s Erastian theory, 122. Ibid., 53. 123. Parsons, An epistle of the Persecution, 36.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  65 which undermined the universality of the Church. If, as Anglican theologians claimed, the secular sovereign was head of the “universal” Church in his kingdom, Christianity was nothing more than a juxtaposition of completely independent churches. If the pope’s spiritual authority over the Church was denied, the identity of the Catholic faith was threatened. The logical consequence of the doctrine of royal supremacy was to fill the world with as many churches as there were princes. Strictly speaking, it was not up to the civil power to decide on matters of religion and doctrine, because such a principle would make the spiritual life of the subjects dependent on the will of the sovereign. So the Catholics “in iustice . . . crave pardon of your honours, for not conforminge our opinions to yours in this matter; We can not doe it without dissimulation and most greeuouse remorse of an accusinge conscience.”124 In other words, Parsons and his fellow Jesuits rejected the notion that the government can intervene in matters of doctrine and the form of worship and impose conformity. This understanding of the relationship between the spiritual and the temporal negates the true nature of religion. According to Parsons, mankind is naturally sociable, in keeping with the Aristotelian postulate, and thereby assures its perennity. Consequently, the notion of political authority does not come directly from God, but from a natural principle whereby the political commonwealth organizes itself according to various modes of power: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.125 Parsons favored the first of the three, although he rejected the direct divine right of kings: “the power and anthority [sic] vvhich the Prince hath from the common wealth is in very truth, not absolute, but potestas vicaria or deligata [. . .] that is to say, a power delegate, or power by commissiõ from the commõ wealth.”126 In other words, sovereign au124. Ibid., 31. 125. Robert Parsons, Conference about the Next Succession to the Crowne of Ingland, inprinted at N. with Licence, 1594, ch. 1, 4–7, 9–15. 126. Ibid., ch. IV, 73.

66  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England thority is held by the people, who choose to entrust it to the prince under certain conditions. The sovereign’s power must be hedged with “conditions, statutes and limitations”;127 the people are invested with an authority giving them the capacity to restrict civil power as a way of forcing it to be just. In concrete terms, the sovereign receives his legitimacy at his coronation.128 A contract is thus established between the new sovereign and his people whereby he undertakes to protect the Commonwealth. If the contract is not followed, the people have the legitimacy to depose the king.129 The law is at the heart of this contractual agreement, because, unlike the sovereign, who is fallible, it is not swayed by emotions. Three consequences arise: firstly, the sovereign owes his “divine” character solely to the law; royal sacrality therefore comes not from “divine” heredity, but from following the law.130 Secondly, the “divine” character is attributed to the authority upheld by this juridico-political principle rather than to the person who holds the authority. Thirdly, the sovereign can be crowned only by the pope’s ecclesiastical representatives.131 In other words, the contract is spiritually sealed and approved by the Church, whose hierarchical mediation confers transcendent legitimacy on royal authority. Consequently, the human, contractual legitimacy of civil power is insufficient. It requires divine legitimacy, but in a form opposite in every way to that espoused by the Appellants and, more generally, political, royalist, regalian theories. Parsons thus believes that the latter misinterpret Paul’s Epistle to the Romans 13:1–8, which states that “there is no power but of God.” He affirms on the contrary that resisting the king does not mean opposing God: “[authority power or iurisdiction] [. . .] may be resisted in diuers cases.”132 Par127. Ibid., ch. IV, 72. 128. Ibid., ch. IV, 73. 129. Ibid., ch. IV, 75–76. 130. Ibid., ch. IV, 65–67. The interpretation of 1 Samuel 8:9–20, which differs from that of legitimist theories, is highly significant in terms of the respect for the law. 131. Ibid., ch. IV, 83–84. 132. Ibid., ch. I, 8–9.

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  67 son’s interpretation of the pericope of Paul confirms that civil power, rather than the person who represents it, is divine in nature. It is thus logical to depose a king who rules unjustly, for he demonstrates his unfaithfulness to God by oppressing his subjects. It is thus hardly surprising that the opposition between the Appellants’ and Parsons’s own theologico-political theses sheds light not only on two understandings of the legitimacy of sovereignty and the sacrality of power, but also on two diametrically opposed ecclesiopolitical theories. The conflict was thus twofold, with two correlating aspects; its epicenter—beyond the issue of the legitimacy of power—lay in the status of ecclesial mediation as a criterion of the transmission of Christian truth. On the one hand, the Appellant clergy drew on the principles of territorial and national ecclesiology, while remaining united to the Holy See. The issue was to reconcile the dual demand for allegiance, spiritual and temporal; in this case, religious tolerance was a possibility. On the other hand, Parsons and the Jesuits espoused Tridentine ecclesiology, whose central premise was the defense of “Catholic universality,” guaranteed by the unity of the Roman Pontificate. This principle dictated that allegiance to the temporal did not give grounds to disobey the rule of Catholicity, which was a fundamental criterion of the devolution of the Crown in addition to the contractual origins of civil power.133 From this perspective, it is clearly impossible to admit tolerance because of the mutually “intolerable” nature of the two ecclesiological policies. The conflict on ecclesial mediation is at the very heart of the crisis of legitimacy of civil power—a crisis arising from the sacrality of this power due to the competitive relationship between two ecclesiological modes of wielding a power that originated in God. This was a fundamental point of divergence between Anglicans and Roman Catholics. Behind the problem of royal jurisdic133. See Robert Parsons, A Discussion of the Answere of M. William Barlow (Saint Omer: English College Press, 1612), 80.

68  Royal Supremacy over the Church of England tion and questions of Christian doctrine, the very idea of religion was challenged. While the two groups agreed in acknowledging that Christianity was involved in all areas of society, they disagreed as to its doctrinal interpretation and its institutions.134 As we have already seen, in his Conference about the Next Succession, Parsons rejected the possibility of another faith being accepted by the dominant religion. The desperate situation of English Catholics forced him to plead in favor of tolerance and to denounce persecution. The same can be said for the English government, which was obliged to adopt a policy of limited tolerance, choosing a lesser evil in the hope of avoiding a greater. The key elements of Parsons’s thought are these: the finality of the political order is spiritual life and thus respect for religion; Christian truth is wholly contained within the Catholic faith; it is morally unacceptable for a State to impose a religion on its subjects if they do not believe in it; if the truth professed by one religious group is incompatible with the truth of another, one or the other must be false; the Catholic duty of civil obedience to their sovereign is beyond doubt, but it must be distinguished from their spiritual fidelity (he thus distinguishes between loyalism and religious truth, but with the proviso that his reasoning applies only to Catholics when they are in a minority); and the nature of religion means it cannot be subordinated to a State. The result of these principles as a whole was a close relationship between politics and religion that made it difficult to differentiate between religious zeal for truth and civil obedience. This further highlighted the incompatibility between the Anglican principles of religious unity subject to the state and the Catholic 134. The disagreement also encompasses the understanding of public power. Anglican theses such as those of Bodin in France attribute total supremacy to the State, while Parsons and his fellow Jesuits put forward the theory of the supremacy of papal power. Parsons’s ideas are also different from Protestant monarchomachic theses, which do not postulate the same type of ecclesiastical power. See Lessay, “Robert Parsons, S.J.”

Royal Supremacy over the Church of England  69 principles according to which religious unity, based on Christian truth, implied the subordination of the State to spiritual ends. The upshot was a conflict not about the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual as such, but about the institutional status of visibility—the State for the Anglicans, the Church for the Jesuit theologian and his fellow believers. It was in the light of this conflict that tolerance became an ecclesiastico-political issue. We will encounter the same issue in the writings of the Presbyterians. However, neither their theologians nor, for the most part, those of the Catholic Church were ready to embrace the notion of tolerance. Both wished to impose the orthodoxy of their own faith, through the ministry of preaching or through the power of the papacy. The plea for religious freedom by the two groups in fact led to mutual intolerance. But the Anglican thesis of an established church was scarcely more tolerant, as Elizabeth’s ambivalent stance toward the Appellants indicates. Does this mean that the ecclesiastico-political events of the early years of James I’s reign in England undermined or otherwise affected the Crown’s relationship with the Puritan and Catholic minorities? To answer this question, we must turn to the political and religious situation in Scotland following the start of the Presbyterian Reform in 1560. This reform, which received a boost in its early years when James VI acceded to the throne in 1567, led to conflict between pastors and the monarch over the interpretation of the doctrine of the two kingdoms. James’s relationship with the Scottish Catholics was not entirely unconnected to this conflict.

chapter Two

> James I’s Interpretation of Royal Sovereignty in Conflict with the Presbyterian Church

S

hortly after Elizabeth’s death on March 24, 1603, a council of the great officers of the Crown and a handful of lords decided to call James VI of Scotland to the throne of England. Like other English dignitaries, Robert Cecil had already been in contact with James over the preceding years1—a clever way of smoothing the path to ensure that no obstacles would hinder his succession after Elizabeth’s death. James, son of Mary Stuart, could be considered Elizabeth’s closest heir, but the situation was not so straightforward. James was the oldest descendant of Henry VII of England. The elder of Henry VII’s two daughters, Margaret Tudor, first married James IV of Scotland.

1. James VI of Scotland, I of England, The Secret Correspondence of Sir Robert Cecil with James VI, King of Scotland (Edinburgh: A. Millar, 1767); Letters of Queen Elizabeth and King James VI, of Scotland, ed. John Bruce (London: Camden Society, 1849); Original Letters Relating to the Ecclesiastical Affairs of Scotland, Chiefly Written by or Addressed to His Majesty King James the Sixth, after His Accession to the English Throne, ed. D. Laing (Edinburgh: J. Hughes, 1851); Correspondence of King James VI of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and Others in England, during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, with an Appendix Containing Papers Illustrative of Transactions between King James and Robert, Earl of Essex, ed. John Bruce (London: Camden Society, 1861).

70

Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church  71 James VI was a direct descendant of this marriage. From a strictly hereditary point of view, James thus had a claim to the throne of England at the death of the last Tudor monarch. However, Henry VIII had made his will known that foreigners were to be excluded from the succession on principle. James, born in Scotland, was a foreigner. In this respect, his cousin Arabella Stuart, niece of Henry Stuart Darnley, was a much better match for the conditions of accession, as there was no doubt that she was English. Furthermore, she could lay claim to the throne as a descendant of Margaret Tudor’s second marriage, to another Scot. Unfortunately, her attitude to religion did not match that of the Elizabethan establishment, to the point that it was rumored that she had enjoyed the pope’s intimate favors. James’s accession thus offered a twofold advantage. He would finally unite the two kingdoms of Great Britain under one jurisdiction, thereby providing a solution, at least temporarily, for the long unresolved Scottish question. A mature man of thirtyseven who had reigned over his country since 1567, he also had considerable personal experience of royal government since reaching the age of majority in 1578. He had dealt with two major problems, the unruliness of the Scots and the spread of Calvinism, both likely to create politico-religious factions. The threat that these divisions posed to the unity of his kingdom meant that James brought three strong beliefs with him to his new kingdom—a hostility to Presbyterianism and a powerful wish to maintain a strict episcopal hierarchy, a stubborn desire to defend the royal prerogative, and a deep hatred of war. James thus came to the throne of England as a man of unity and peace.

James VI’s Politico-Religious Education and His Experience of Royal Government >

James was born to Mary Stuart and Darnley in Edinburgh on June 19, 1566. He came to the throne of Scotland when his mother

72  Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church was forced to abdicate thirteen months later. His accession to the throne at such a young age was key to the success of the Presbyterian Church and theories restricting royal power. These ideas were adopted by Scottish Reformers during the long years of conflict with the monarchy. The principal representative of the Church, John Knox, was an ardent defender of the right to oppose a prince who condemned divine law and persecuted God’s children. Mary Stuart’s forced abdication in 1567 was the logical corollary of this theory, and it naturally fell to John Knox to preach the infant king’s coronation sermon.2 From that moment on, the Crown of Scotland came under the influence of the Presbyterian Church and the nobility. From 1567 to 1578, a series of regents governed Scotland in James’s name. At the same time, a group of tutors, led by the wellknown poet and political theorist George Buchanan, was appointed to educate the young king and prepare him for his royal duties. George Buchanan considered that an essential part of his duty was to give the king not just a humanist and religious education, but also and above all a solid, healthy grounding in political doctrine. James was trained to become an ideal prince in the purest Protestant tradition.3 The hopes the Scottish Presbyterians had of seeing the results of the 1560 revolution come to fruition rested on his shoulders. Buchanan—one of the most radical Protestant intellectuals of his day—did everything in his power to shape his young pupil in accordance with his own beliefs. James’s library indicates the sort of books he was given to prepare him for his royal duties, including Agapetus’s De Officio Regis, Budé’s L’Institution du Prince, Guevara’s 2. Caroline Bingham, The Making of a King. The Early Years of James VI and I (London: Collins, 1968), 17–142. After John Knox’s sermon, the Earl of Morton swore the king’s oath: “to reule in ye faith, fear, and love of God, and maintain ye religion then professed in Scotland” (35). It should be noted that John Knox was not in favor of James’s coronation. 3. On the development of the notion of the “pious prince,” see K. M. Brown, “The Search of the Godly Magistrate in Reformation Scotland,” in Journal of Ecclesiastical History 40, no. 4 (October 1989): 553–81.

Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church  73 The Dial of Princes, Elyot’s Governor, and Morzillus’s De Regni Regisque Institutione. Buchanan described his notion of the ideal king to the English ambassador Sir Thomas Randolph: You often urge me to paint for you what manner of King I should wish, were God to grant me one according to my prayer. Here, then, is the portrait you want. In chief, I would have him a lover of true piety, deeming himself the veritable image of highest God. He must love peace, yet be ever ready for war. To the vanquished he must be merciful; and when he lays down his arms he must lay aside his hate. I should wish him to be neither a niggard nor a spendthrift, for each, I must think, works equal harm to his people. He must believe that as King he exists for his subjects and not for himself, and that he is, in truth, the common father of the State. When expediency demands that he shall punish with a stern hand, let it appear that he has no pleasure in his own severity. He will be ever lenient if it is consistent with the welfare of his people. His life must be the pattern for every citizen, his countenance the terror of evil doers, the delight of those that do well. His mind he must cultivate with sedulous care, his body as reason demands. Good sense and good taste must keep in check luxurious excess.4

In certain key areas, Buchanan’s description of the ideal king is not dissimilar to certain aspects of James’s personality and politics, especially his faith, his indulgence, and his love of peace. The three works in which Buchanan sets forth his understanding of a just and authentic relationship between a prince and his subjects, the Baptistes, the De Iure Regni apud Scotos, and the Rerum Scoticarum Historia,5 all include prefaces filled with advice to James. 4. P. Hume-Brown, George Buchanan, Humanist and Reformer (Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1890), 254. 5. George W. Buchanan, De Iure Regni apud Scotos . . . dialogus (Edinburgh: John Ross for Henry Charteris, 1579); Rerum Scoticarum Historia (Edinburgh: Apud Alexandrum Arbuthnetum, 1582); Opera Omnia, 2 vols. (Leyden: Langerak, 1725). See also The Tyrannous Reign of Mary Stewart: George Buchanan’s Account, ed. and trans. W. A. Gatherer (Edinburgh: University Press, 1958), and The Art and Science of Government among the Scots, ed. and trans. D. H. MacNeill (Glasgow: W. McLellan, 1964).

74  Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church Buchanan’s theory of monarchy is one of duty and responsibility, with very little consideration for the king’s rights. James was to refute these notions in his Trew Law of Free Monarchies. But only his personal experience of royal government enabled him to develop his own political theories. He began to do so in 1578, when Morton’s official regency came to an end. James began to govern by himself, at the tender age of twelve! This new situation did not, however, immediately free him from his tutor’s influence. Until his death in 1582 Buchanan continued overseeing James’s moral and intellectual education. Furthermore, the Presbyterian Church showed no sign of wishing to give up any of the power it had won so dearly in the 1560s. Knox died in 1572, but his theories were taken up by his successor as head of the Church, Andrew Melville (1543–1622). In 1581, following the publication of the Second Book of Discipline,6 the Reformed Church of Scotland took on a more formal administrative structure. The Episcopal Church was rejected once and for all—at least, so the leaders of the Reformed Church thought—and a Presbyterian leadership was firmly established. The development of its ecclesiastical claims followed that of its administration, encouraged by an obvious mistrust of James’s intentions. There was no clearer proof of the king’s enthusiasm for matters political than his persistence in the long struggle against the Presbyterian Church! The roots of the conflict lay back in 1560, the year when the Church was constituted and Mary Stuart came to the throne. We shall now turn to two key aspects of this conflict. The first deals with the status of the prince approved in the Confession of Faith, while the second deals with the establishment of the Church as such in December 1560. The text dealing with the civil magistrate appears to have been rigorously analyzed and probably corrected before the Confession 6. J. Kirk, ed., The Second Book of Discipline: with an Introduction and Commentary (Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1980).

Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church  75 was approved. It was passed to one of the less radical ministers, John Winram, for a second reading. One of his colleagues, Randolph, later wrote to the English minister Cecil that although they coulde not reprove the doctrine, yet dyd thei mytigate the austeritie of maynie wordes and sentences [. . .] The autor of thys worke had also put in thys treatie a tytle or chapter of the obediens or dysobediens that subjectes owe unto their magistrates: yt contayned lytle les mater in fewe wordes than hath byne otherwyse wrytten more at large. The surveyors of this worke thought yt to be an unfeet matter to be entreated at thys tyme, and so gave their advise to leave yt owte.7

According to Laing, this advice was not taken, because the Confession included the text.8 Nevertheless, it may well be the case that the initial project was amended. For example, it states that the duty of submission to “Kingis, Princes, Reullaris, and Magistratis” is strictly enjoined. They are the “lieutennentis of God,” and those who “resist the Supreme power (doing that thing which apperteanis to his charge) do resist Goddis ordinance, and thairfoir can not be gyltless.”9 Such a clear-cut statement of the doctrine of Christian obedience could not fail to be approved by the queen of England and her advisers. But this does not mean that the politicoreligious situations in the two countries were identical. The status of civil magistrate was not without difficulty for anyone who espoused the theory of royal supremacy in Scotland. The Confession of Faith explicitly answers the issue of which domains fall under the sovereign’s jurisdiction: “Moreover, to Kingis, Prince, Reullaris, and Magistratis, we affirme that cheiflie and maist principallie the [conservatioun] and purgatioun of the Religioun apperteanes; so that not onlie thei are appointed for civile policey, but also for mantenance of the trew Religioun, and for suppressing of idolatrie and 7. Cal. Scot. Pap, i, no. 902, 477–78. 8. D. Laing, ed., The Works of John Knox (Edinburgh: Woodrow Society, 1846–64), vol. 6, 121 n. 1. 9. Ibid., 2:169.

76  Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church superstitioun whatsomever.”10 Some months later, the Presbyterian ministers founded their church’s general assembly, including representatives from the nobility, the towns, and the clergy. The assembly set about organizing the Church. Three dioceses were governed by bishops who had played a part in the revolt against Mary. The Crown appointed five superintendents to keep a close watch over ecclesiastical matters in the regions, and the assembly likewise appointed several commissioners with similar responsibilities. However, the controversial question of whether the institution of bishops should be kept or not remained unresolved. This question arose once more in late summer 1571, when the government appointed ministers to act as the archbishops of Glasgow, Saint Andrews, and Dunkeld. The general assembly reluctantly acquiesced but insisted that the committee of ministers must approve the bishops appointed by the government. We shall return to this arrangement, which proved far from satisfactory, in greater detail. It was challenged by Andrew Melville, a respected man of letters, who returned from Geneva in 1574 and became an important figure at the University of Glasgow. Melville espoused a very strict version of Presbyterianism. The Church should be governed neither by bishops nor by superintendents, but by committees of ministers—hence the term “Presbyterian.” There was to be no hierarchy of ministers, and this principle was not to be broken by the tyranny of the institution of bishops. Furthermore, the Presbyterian Church held its authority from God and was thus superior to the authority of the civil magistrate. Supreme authority in the Church was held by the general assembly, which, under Melville’s influence, was reformed to represent not the three states, but rather the ministers and church elders. As a member of the Presbyterian Church, James had to follow the advice of pastors on all issues relating to both his public and 10. Ibid., 2:170.

Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church  77 private life. However, although Melville’s beliefs posed a threat to royal authority, his influence was more imagined than real. Many Reformers did not fully share his views on ecclesiastical matters and were in fact willing to accept the episcopate desired by the Crown. The second generation of Protestant noblemen were less fervent in their beliefs than their elders, and many lay people rejected the ministers’ demands. Furthermore, James appeared to be the ideal Protestant king. Compromise thus won out over intransigence. An oath was adopted that described the ruler as “supreme Governour of this realme, as well in things temperall as in the conservatioun and purgatioun of religioun.”11 This echoes the 1560 Confession of Faith. However, the presence of the title “supreme Governor” and the responsibility for the “conservatioun and purgatioun of religioun”— a thinly veiled reference to Church discipline and policy—make it hard to believe that there was unanimous agreement over this compromise, drawn up under the Earl of Morton’s enthusiastic regency. It was in this context that work began on the Second Book of Discipline of 1581, with the participation of Andrew Melville. The text included a section entitled “Of the Office of the Christian Magistrate in the Church.” The issue of temporal and spiritual powers is addressed from the outset: “This power and policie ecclesiasticall is different and distinct in the awin nature fra that power and policie quhilk is callit the civille power and appertenit to the civile governament of the commoun welth, albeit thay be bayth of God and tend to ane end gif thay be richtlie usit, to wit, to advance the glorie of God and to have godlie and guid subjectis.”12 Spiritual power “flowis immediatlie frome God and the Mediatour Chryst Jesus”; it has “[no] temporall heid in eirth bot onlie Chryst, the onlie spirituall king and governour of his kirk.” Members of 11. Kirk, The Second Book of Discipline, 40. 12. Ibid., 166.

78  Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church the “ecclesiasticall estait” are subjects of the “magistrat civilie,” but equally, “the persone of the magistrat” must be “subject to the kirk spirituallie and in ecclesiasticall government.” The two powers— “the civill sword” and “the spirituall keyis”—cannot ordinarily be held by one single individual.13 Yet however separate and distinct the two forms of power, both serve the same ultimate aim, each in its own sphere, and each has a positive and negative power of control over the other: The civile power sould command the spirituall to exercise and do thair office according to the word of God; the spirituall rewlaris sould require the Christiane magistrat to minister justice and punische vyce and to mantene the libertie and quyetnes of the kirk within thair boundis. [. . .] The magistrat aucht to assist, mantene and fortifie the jurisdictioun of the kirk; the ministeris sould assist thair princes in all thingis aggreable to the word.14

These points are addressed once more in the section of the text devoted to the office of the Christian magistrate. In this section, the duty “to advance the kingdome of Jesus Chryst” is incumbent upon “Christiane princes, kingis and uther magistrates.” In particular, they must “sie that the publick estait and ministrie” of the Church “be mantenit and sustenit.”15 With regard to Church discipline, rulers must “punische thame civilie that will not obey the censur of the [kirk]” while taking care not to conflate the two jurisdictions. Moreover, the sovereign’s duty as legislator means he must “mak lawis and constitutionis aggreable to Goddis word, for the advancement of the kirk and policie thairof without usurping ony thing that pertenis not to the civill sword.” The dignity of the ecclesiastical state is also clearly stated: “the ministrie of the kirk is anis lauchfullie institut, and thay that ar placed do thair office faythfullie, all godlie princes and magistratis aucht to heir and obey 13. Ibid., 166, 169–70. 15. Ibid., 213.

14. Ibid., 170–72.

Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church  79 thair voice, and reverence the majestie of the sone of God speiking be thame.”16 The doctrine of the two kingdoms developed in the Second Book of Discipline thus paved the theoretical way for the conflicts that were to arise in the following years, particularly due to Catholic resistance. This represented a danger, both within the country and from elsewhere, and it was therefore in James’s interest to avoid disagreements with the Presbyterian Church. In a kingdom where rebellion was rife, the government was threatened by two extremist groups: conservative lairds in the north, led by the Earl of Huntly, and the “ultra-Protestants” led by Francis Stewart Hepburn, Earl of Bothwell. The lairds, attached to their traditional religion and hostile to the Presbyterians, formed a group of Catholics. Huntly refused to acknowledge Spain’s defeat when the Armada was destroyed, and he wrote to Philip II to try to organize a second invasion. Such seditious actions led to his being frequently imprisoned. The fact that he was then nearly always pardoned meant that the king’s tolerance was often seen as the result of favoritism. But it must be acknowledged that it would have been very difficult for James to do otherwise, given that he lacked the material resources to take repressive measures. Not having a large army at his disposal, he succeeded in imposing his authority by managing to stabilize the various factions and using discreet force when possible. He needed Huntly—probably his closest friend at that time—as an ally against Bothwell. By refusing to persecute Catholics, James minimized the risk of assassination by fanatics, while guaranteeing his future should England be defeated by Spain. However, the ultra-Protestants were not especially appreciative of James’s refusal to crush the northern counties. The year 1582 saw a new quarrel between the king and the Presbyterians. Mary Stuart informed her son of her intention to 16. Ibid., 213–16.

80  Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church reconquer her throne, offering to share the Crown with him. Unfortunately, Mary’s lack of discretion meant that her plans were leaked. The Calvinist aristocracy were deeply concerned. Fearing an attempt to overthrow their power with Spanish support, they decided to conspire to have the young king imprisoned during a hunting party at Ruthven Castle. The plan worked for a time. The king was released on the condition that he accept the expulsion of his influential adviser Esmé Stuart, seigneur d’Aubigny, from Scotland. James was forced to obey, but the episode left him with a deep dislike for the Presbyterians. He then opened negotiations with his mother, Queen Elizabeth, France, Spain, and Pope Gregory XIII. Two years after his kidnap, James made Parliament adopt a series of laws known as the Black Acts,17 which confirmed the king as supreme head of the Church with power of jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters; no assembly could meet without his permission, and he alone could appoint bishops. This decision met with immediate disapproval from the Presbyterian clergy. It was not until 1592 that a general assembly of ministers re-established the Presbyterian system of the “Golden Acts,”18 held to be “the Presbyterian Magna Carta.” Four years later, the situation was reversed once more in James’s favor, and for the last time. The cause was once again the tactics of his relationship with Scotland’s Catholics. James authorized 17. W. C. Dickinson, G. Donaldson, I. A. Milne, eds., A Source Book of Scottish History, vol. 3 (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1961), 39–43. 18. See James Melville, The Diary of Mr. James Melvil [sic], 1556–1601, ed. G. R. Kinloch (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1829), 159–61 and 199–201. See also Maurice Lee Jr., “James VI and the Revival of Episcopacy in Scotland: 1596–1600,” Church History 43, no. 1 (March 1974): 50–64; and J. H. Burns, The True Law of Kingship. Concepts of Monarchy in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 224–25, esp. 224 n. 8: “One factor in the decline of episcopacy at this period was the 1587 Act of Annexation, whereby all the temporalities of the pre-Reformation church were transferred to the crown. Neither the bishops nor the Presbyterians stood to gain by this appropriation.”

Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church  81 Huntly to return to Scotland;19 the decision met with a violent response from the minister Andrew Melville. As James declared himself to be God’s lieutenant on earth, Melville vehemently repeated the Presbyterian doctrine of the two kingdoms: “There is two Kings and two Kingdoms in Scotland. There is Christ Jesus the King, and his kingdom the Kirk; whose subject King James the Sixth is, and of whose kingdom not a King, nor a lord, nor a head, but a member!”20 David Black, minister of Saint Andrews, declared from his pulpit that all monarchs were children of the devil. He accused Elizabeth of atheism and claimed that James intended to apply the full rigors of the Episcopal Church in Scotland. When called before the council, he refused to acknowledge its authority. In November, the ministers demanded that the king and the council be called to give account of their indifference in hearing and applying the Word of God. Toward the end of the year, the king ordered the Presbyterian Church commissioners to leave the capital, prohibited antigovernment speeches, and insisted that the ministers be accused of sedition and brought before the council. When the ministers spoke of their fear of the Papists, James indicated his disapproval by leaving for Linlithgow with his family and the whole court. Edinburgh was discouraged by the king’s anger, and the city’s dignitaries agreed not to admit any ministers without James’s authorization. Both sides had to make concessions. A commission met in Dundee in May 1597 to appoint the Church commissioners. The commissioners then requested that the Church be represented in Parliament. James granted this request, on the condition that the representatives were bishops.21 The Church was thus subordinated to the Crown, and James finally achieved his goal. Once the power 19. Ibid., 224–25. 20. David Calderwood, The History of the Kirk of Scotland, ed. Thomas Thomson, vol. 5 (Edinburgh: Woodrow Society, 1845), 378, 440. See also Melville, Diary, 245–46. 21. Lee, “James VI and the Revival of Episcopacy in Scotland: 1596–1600,” 61.

82  Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church of the extremists had been checked, James decided to strengthen the Episcopal Church, doing away with the doctrine of the parity of ministers. There were no protests when he appointed new bishops for the archbishoprics of Aberdeen, Ross, and Caithness. The status and powers of bishops gradually increased into the early years of the seventeenth century, to the point that they were transformed into symbols of royal influence, both in matters pertaining to the Church and in questions of state. James’s Episcopalianism was one of the principal threads of his ecclesiastical and political thought, together with continental theories of royal sovereignty. Over the course of this period, James was in a position to define both his understanding of the basis and exercise of royal power and his ecclesiological preferences. The theological culture he was taught as a child, and doubtless also his challenging experience of dealing with politico-religious factions, had a considerable influence on his opinions, but we should not underestimate the importance of the intellectual climate of the day, which favored both doctrines of the absoluteness22 of monarchical power and doctrines of the right of resistance. James developed a theory of royalty based on principles that were very different from those that Buchanan had laid out for him. He was not interested in limited monarchy, and his tutor’s political preferences hindered him from affirming his own ideas. When James’s cousin Esmé Stuart, seigneur d’Aubigny, was sent to Scotland by the French court in 1579, his influence on the young king proved such that James steadily moved further away from Buchanan’s teachings. The “absolutist” theories that were then in favor at the court of Henri III appealed much more to James than the “republicanism” preached by the Scottish Calvin22. I prefer to use this term rather than “absolutism,” which is too open to erroneous interpretations. For further details on this notion, see François Busnel, Frédéric Tellier, Frédéric Grolleau, and Jean-Pierre Zarade, Les mots du pouvoir, Précis de vocabulaire (Paris: De Vinci, 1995), 16–20.

Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church  83 ists. However, it is far from simple to establish the precise origin of James’s personal beliefs.23 Before we explore Buchanan’s theories, a brief examination of the political doctrines of state sovereignty in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries will enable us to place James’s political thought in its wider European context.

The Influence of Continental Theories of State Sovereignty >

Of the various sources to have inspired James, his favorites by far were the writings of the apologists for the French monarchy. In 1576, Jean Bodin (1530–96) had recently published his doctrine of sovereignty in the Six livres de la République.24 Among his theories was the notion of entrusting the monarchy with the task of re-establishing peace and unity after many years of political and religious chaos in France. Bodin, a well-known jurist, was the first to develop the theory of political sovereignty. His theory has two distinctive characteristics: perpetuity, by which the holder wields authority for life in his own name rather than by delegation or being commissioned by a third party, and absoluteness, meaning the indivisible character of sovereignty: For the nobilitie which should haue the power to make the lawes for all: (which is as much as to say to commaund and forbid what them pleased, without power to appeale from them, or for a man to oppose himselfe against their commaunds) would by their lawes at their pleasure forbid others to make peace or warre, or to leuie taxes, or to yeeld fealtie and homage without their leaue: and he againe to whom fealtie and homage is due, would bind the nobilitie and people not to yeeld their obedience 23. We do know that James’s library contained Jean Bodin’s Six livres de la République. See G. F. Warner, “The Library of James VI, in the Hand of Peter Young, his Tutor, 1573–1583,” in Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, ix–lxxv (Edinburgh, 1893). 24. Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la République (Paris: J. Du Puys, 1576).

84  Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church vnto any other, but vnto himselfe. [. . .] Whereby it commeth to passe, that where the rights of soueraigntie are diuided betwixt the prince and his subiects: in that confusion of the state, there is still endlesse sturres and quarrels, for the superioritie, vntill that some one, some few, or all together haue got the soueraigntie.25

James could not fail to be struck by such high-flown claims for the nature of sovereignty. However, we should not overstate the similarities between Bodin’s and James’s doctrines of sovereignty. Bodin was a Catholic jurist, James a Calvinist political theologian, and their views could never totally coincide. If Bodin—who died in 1596, shortly before the publication of The True Law of Free Monarchies and Basilikon Doron—had known of James’s views, he would doubtless have reproached him for favoring seigneurial monarchy as much as hereditary royalty, which was the only form of sovereignty to meet with Bodin’s approval.26 It nonetheless remains the case that the characteristics of absoluteness and perpetuity permit a striking parallel to be drawn between divine right as the source of sovereignty and the hereditary nature of the crown as the criterion of the transmission of legitimacy. Furthermore, their shared preoccupation with resolving religious divisions in Christian society through the mediation of political sovereignty should not be overlooked. Other contemporary writers similarly shared traits with James’s theologico-political thought. In 1581, Adam Blackwood, a devout Catholic Scot who became French, dedicated his book Apologia pro Regibus to Mary Stuart and her young son.27 This treatise was spe25. Jean Bodin, The Six Bookes of a Commonweale, trans. Richard Knolles and ed. K. D. McRae (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962) [facsimile reprint of the 1606 English translation], 194. 26. R. Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572–1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 26–27, 260–61. 27. Adam Blackwood, Apologia, in Opera Omnia (Paris: Cramoisy, 1644). In the absence of an English edition of this work, all quotations from this source have been translated from the French.

Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church  85 cifically intended to counteract Buchanan’s teachings and presented a theory of monarchy that seemed to take up many of Bodin’s ideas. Blackwood uses legal arguments to prove that a true monarch is endowed with an imperium merum ac solutum that no elected magistrate holds. Such a king has been divinely anointed in a quasisacramental manner. But royal power is exclusively hereditary, even though “kings do not inherit from their predecessors, but from the kingdom itself,”28 which in fact implies that the kingdom has an existence independent of that of the king. This thesis does not stop Blackwood from holding that a king can abrogate or revoke any law that he has created and that he is in no way bound by any decision taken by his predecessors.29 It should also be added that Blackwood’s theory is founded on a vision of human society in which all authority is rooted in strength.30 Another Scottish Catholic who also became French, William Barclay (1541–1606), supported James in his opposition to the doctrines of the Counter-Reform, just as Blackwood had done in his opposition to Scottish Calvinism. However, he wrote his De Regno et regali potestate with the intention of opposing Buchanan’s theses.31 For Barclay, utilitas was a key concept defining harmony between human societies and nature. The laws of nature must be taken into account if one wishes to further the common good. However, attention must be paid to the variety of human situations, which require the development of laws adapted to the specific needs of each society. It is therefore up to the sovereign to wield his authority with this in mind. According to Barclay, the sovereign is legibus solutus—free from all constraints with regard to human laws pro28. Ibid., 113. 29. Ibid., 114. 30. Ibid., 61–63. 31. William Barclay, De regno et regali potestate adversus Buchananum, Brutum, Boucherium, et reliquos monarchomachos, libri sex (Paris: Apud G. Chaudière, 1600). In the absence of an English edition of this work, all quotations from this source have been translated from the French. A French translation and a critical edition of this work by Bernard Bourdin are forthcoming.

86  Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church ceeding from his authority32 (although naturally not from natural or divine law). If the prince takes advice in his exercise of authority, it is only in the interest of “prudence.” According to this logic, the councils, assemblies, and states who assist the monarch all proceed from his authority and his will. In the final instance, he is the authority who makes the law. It is thus clear why Barclay devotes so much of his interest to royalty. His thinking is guided by a fundamental principle: kings govern in accordance with divine right. However, this fact does not at all exclude the possibility of the people playing a certain role. Turning to biblical experience, he notes that God’s intervention in the authority exercised by kings did not stop the commonwealth from contributing to the exercise of power. The Israelites’ “election” of Saul and David, although they had already been anointed by Samuel the judge, is clear proof of this. Yet God alone, in the strictest sense, confers power upon kings invested with authority by the commonwealth. The biblical model, as Barclay understands it, has a normative value for all kings. Starting from this principle, royal power—divine in essence—is superior to any form of power that the commonwealth could confer. As a result, the people do not have the right to depose kings or to take any other form of coercive measure against them.33 The same principles hold true for hereditary monarchies, which Barclay naturally favors. Royal succession is exactly the kind of situation which requires positive regulation through human laws, given differences in circumstance.34 Furthermore, all monarchs, even those who accede to the throne under normal circumstances, are responsible for their acts only before God, from whom alone they hold authority. In correlation with this theory of the monarch being responsible solely before God, Barclay put forward another argument in his 32. Ibid., 193–94. 33. Ibid., 112–13, 269–70. 34. Ibid., 119–20. See also 66, 68, 195.

Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church  87 De potestate Papae defending the independence of monarchs with regard to the power of the pope.35 This thesis was based on the principle of a twofold hierarchy—spiritual (the Church) and temporal (secular powers). Barclay begins by putting forward a first postulate that all authority is received and granted in the same way as patrimonial rights, for which the holder must show his title of acquisition. According to Barclay, the doctrine of Bellarmine and other theologians “ouerturnes the naturall course of things, which willeth, that no man vse any power or authoritie ouer others, which is [not] by name granted to him.”36 This argument presupposes a private law mandate. Barclay secondly postulated that public and private came together in the person of the king. He wrote that Christ had no temporal royal power because He was poor. “The Foxes (saith he) have holes, and the birds of heauen nests, but the Sonne of man hath no where to lay his head.”37 In concrete terms, if the pope had the right to depose kings by virtue of his spiritual authority, he could easily combine the cause of the public interest of Christianity with the private interests of his sovereign power.38 Thirdly, Barclay postulated that temporal power is a hierarchy in the strict sense of the term. All power comes from the prince, and no one can give orders if their authority does not come from the king, who is the source of all temporal power.39 According to 35. De potestate Papae: an et quatenus in reges et seculares jus et imperium habeat. Anno MDCIX. Barclay’s work is a long refutation of Bellarmine’s De Potestate Pontificis temporalis. It was put on the Index by a decree of the Sacred Congregation on October 28, 1609. Bellarmine answered Barclay in his Tractatus de Potestate Summi Pontificis in rebus temporalibus adversus Guilielmum Barclaium, Romae, 1610. This work was condemned by the Parliament in Paris on April 16, 1613. The quotations are taken from the English edition Of the Authoritie of the Pope: Whether, and How Farre Forth, He Hath Power and Authoritie ouer Temporall Kings and Princes (London: Arnold Hatfield for William Aspley, 1611). 36. Barclay, Of the Authoritie of the Pope, 4. 38. Ibid., 64. 37. Ibid., 5. 39. Ibid., 153–54.

88  Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church Barclay, political society was not alone in being hierarchical. He believed that all societies are—and can only be—hierarchical. “The same is true in the orders of the heauenly warfare, and of the ecclesiasticall Hierarchie.”40 The sovereign pontiff holds all the spiritual power for the ecclesiastical hierarchy and can wield it over princes and subjects alike. He can excommunicate Christian monarchs. However, he has no temporal power over princes or subjects, clergy or laymen. He cannot therefore depose kings, grant their kingdom to another ruler, or intervene in the temporal administration of the state,41 even if the king has sinned against God or man. Temporal rulers, at the summit of the temporal hierarchy, each wield their own temporal authority and can exercise their authority over laymen and the clergy. Even the pope would not be beyond the reach of their power if he were not himself the temporal king of the Church States.42 Barclay believed that the pope and sovereigns were judges of their own causes and were entitled to use the means of enforcement at their disposal. Thus the pope could use excommunication and other forms of censure and monarchs could use fines and imprisonment;43 God alone set the pope and monarchs apart, as well as monarchs from each other. Because Barclay justified the separation of the spiritual and the temporal by considerations relating to the origin and aims of the two types of power, he concluded that temporal power predates spiritual power and cannot therefore originate in it: For Christ came not to dissolue the law, but to fulfill it: Nor to destroy the lawes of nature and nations, or to exclude any person out of the temporall gouernment of his estate. Therefore as before his comming Kings ruled their subiects by a ciuill power, so also after that he was come, and gone againe from vs into heauen, they retained still the selfe same 40. Ibid., 155. 42. Ibid., 75–76.

41. Ibid., 11. 43. Ibid., 74.

Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church  89 power, confirmed also, neither then any whit diminished by the doctrine of the Apostles.44

Barclay also demonstrates that baptizing princes in no way adds to or diminishes their temporal rights as men.45 But he does point out that the consideration of the ends in no way alters his conclusions: I doe constantly deny, that there is any such ordination or subordination of the endes of their powers, so farre as their powers are such. For the end of Politike or Ciuill power, so far as it is politike absolutely containeth no more, then a temporall felicity, the Common-good, and a well ordered tranquillity for the quiet conduct of life, as Bellarmine himselfe confesseth in another place [. . .] Neither doth this Ciuill power preceed further, and is referred to none other end, as it is such. For in that it aspireth to eternall happinesse it hath not that of hir selfe: not so I so farre, as it is Politike doth shee direct hir indeuours thither, as to hir last scope: but in respect that shee is spirituall, or else is furthered by the societie and Counsels of the Ecclesiastike power.46

As these two texts indicate, the temporal and spiritual origin of powers and their respective ends neither presuppose nor imply the subordination of one to the other, either directly or indirectly. Barclay is far too attached to the principle of a dual hierarchy with two mutually exclusive fields of intervention—the temporal and the spiritual. But is such a strict division of powers possible? Probably not, if we compare his ideas to those of James, which were more nuanced as regards the overlapping of the ecclesiastical and political spheres. However, it remains the case that James did come under the influence of the continental theories of monarchy briefly outlined here. Clearly, the Presbyterians’ ecclesiastical demands were incompatible with the new understanding of sovereign monarchy. The doctrine of the two kingdoms as interpreted by the Scottish Cal44. Ibid., 13–14. 46. Ibid., 70–71.

45. Ibid., 17.

90  Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church vinists, Andrew Melville in particular, posed the greatest threat to the Crown and the king’s security, but Buchanan’s thinking did little to promote the affirmation of the absoluteness of monarchical power either.

George Buchanan’s Theory of Limited Sovereignty > “When William Barclay, a Scottish jurist who sought refuge in France and taught law at Pont-à-Mousson, coined the term ‘monarchomachs’ in his De Regno et Regali Potestae in 1600, Buchanan’s name was the first target on his list.”47 Barclay did not intend the term “monarchomach,” which he also applied to the French priest and leader of the Ligue, Jean Boucher, as a compliment! Buchanan can hardly be described as an apologist for royal sovereignty. In 1579, he published his De Iure Regni apud Scotos,48 written some twelve years previously, in opposition to Mary Stuart. The livre de circonstance takes the form of a dialog between Buchanan himself and Thomas Maetellanus, who was probably the brother of William Maitland of Lethington. It is a basic principle of the De Iure to assert that society is built on the basis of nature, both human and divine. This belief is not shared by Buchanan’s interlocutor, who holds that utility is political society’s raison d’être. Buchanan states that nature is “a light divinely shed upon our minds [. . .] by which [we can] distinguish base from noble things.”49 Buchanan refers to John of Salisbury, 47. See Paulette Carrive, “Il re, il tiranno, il papa, il popolo in George Buchanan,” Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 50 (1995): 471–98. 48. The author consulted the Latin edition published in Edinburgh in 1579. The following quotations are from the translation by Roger A. Mason and Martin S. Smith, A Dialogue on the Law of Kingship among the Scots (Darlington, Eng.: Ashgate, 2004). 49. G. Buchanan, De Iure Regni apud Scotos . . . dialogus (Edinburgh: John Ross for Henry Charteris, 1579), XI, 7; XX, 15.

Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church  91 then generally considered to be authoritative, to confirm this postulate by stating that the voices of God and nature are identical.50 This law, inscribed in the heart of men, enjoins them to form a society. By virtue of this principle, the king’s vocation is to serve his people, although monarchy is not the sole indispensable form of government. To wield their authority justly, princes must act in accordance with divine law. In the words of a traditional expression already cited by Bracton, “law makes the king.”51 Buchanan adopts Cicero’s well-known dictum “Rex lex loquens, lex rex mutus.”52 Buchanan also accepts the traditional notion that the king is God’s living representative. The king’s person is sacred because of his similarity to the All-Powerful.53 However, he does not use this divine title in the same way as his student, because of the central character of the positive law and that which gives it shape in his political doctrine. The positive laws lend substance to political legitimacy because they come from the people through the mediation of a council drawn from the commonwealth.54 This alone justifies the claim that the law is first and foremost the voice of the king. This is also the reason why the sovereign is obliged to seek the consent of the people. If he does not, all contracts, pacts, and conventions are invalid.55 This is a major point, on which James’s 50. Ibid., LX, 38. 51. William Holdsworth, Some Makers of English Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938). 52. Buchanan, De Iure, XIX, 12. 53. Ibid., “Deo Simillinum,” XII, 8; “qui veri Dei vices in terris gerit”; LXII, 42. 54. Ibid., XXVII, 19. The term “community” requires further explanation. It could be replaced by the term “society.” Buchanan uses the Latin term “ordines,” which the 1680 English text translates as “estates.” 55. The term “consent” features at least five times in the De Iure. There are at least a further nine occurrences of the notion of the contract or convention. See LII, 37, conventum and pactions and agreements, 80. On breaking contracts, pacts, and conventions that have been imposed, see LIII, 37. For the concept of a “mutual pact” or mutua pactio between the king and the people, see LXXXVI, 58. The expression mutuall paction is used for the same reasons but in support of an opposite theory in James’s Trew Law of Free Monarchies.

92  Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church response is totally opposite to that of Buchanan. Buchanan’s understanding of serving the people presupposes the mutual consent of the governor and the governed, formalized by the royal promise during the coronation ceremony.56 Later in the same text, Buchanan adds that kings promise to govern in justice and equity before the subjects swear the oath of allegiance.57 The same idea features in his History of Scotland: Those ceremonies which are used in the Inauguration of our Kings, have an express Representation of this Law, by which it easily appears, that Kingly Government is nothing else but a mutual Stipulation between King and People; and the same most clearly may be collected from the inoffensive Tenor of the old Law, which hath been observed ever since there was a King in Scotland, even unto this present Time, no man having ever attempted to abrogate, abate, or diminish this Law in the least.58

Should the king fail to keep his promise, the people are entitled to take back their rights, especially since the people are sovereign in creating kings and matters of succession. In other words, the people are superior to the king and have the right to judge him. Finally, Buchanan states that the people must limit the violence of tyrants. This assertion brings us to one final point that was then of capital importance: the question of tyrannicide. Buchanan is clearly in favor of such a serious step, to the point of suggesting that those who carry out the deed should be rewarded.59 It is clear that Buchanan’s theory aims to limit the monarchy by placing both natural and divine law and civil law and the people at the heart of his political ideology. Thus the sovereign is bound by contract and runs the risk of being deposed or even executed by his subjects. 56. Buchanan, De Iure, LVII, 39. 57. Ibid., LXXXV, 58. 58. G. Buchanan, History of Scotland, vol. 2 (London: D. Midwinter and A. Ward, 1733), 423. 59. Ibid., LXXX, VII, 59.

Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church  93 Such a theory could clearly never find favor with James. Instead, barely twenty years later, he drew on all his experience and his personal thinking to develop his own political theory. This new theory enabled him to prepare himself to accede to the throne of England. He had to find a way to combine Scottish divine right and Tudor royal supremacy! The Act of Supremacy, promulgated by the Tudors in 1534 and 1559, transformed the relationship of the Church and political power. What the Middle Ages called spiritual and temporal power changed into a relationship between Church and State, with the latter replacing the former in wielding supremacy over the strictly defined geographical area of England. The monist theory won out in the end, although the doctrine of the two kingdoms is not entirely absent from the works of Anglican theologians and theorists. Book 8 of Richard Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity is the most systematic proof of this. Yet it remains the case that the separation of the Anglican Church from the Holy See under the auspices of the English sovereign led to closer links between the spiritual and the temporal. The Crown proved to have an interventionist approach to religious doctrine, albeit indirectly under Elizabeth, who left such questions to the High Commission. Furthermore, in the context of the established Church, the question of the episcopate proved to be the dividing line between Anglican orthodoxy and the Puritans, whose church followed the Scottish and Genevan Presbyterian model. James was fundamentally in agreement with this understanding of the catholicity of a church attached to a political territory under the aegis of the sovereign. He certainly felt no more at ease with the Jesuits’ politico-religious doctrines than did the Tudor monarchs, and he, too, had to deal with the English Puritans over a number of litigious issues. The continental theories in favor of the absoluteness of royal power—which do share some similarities with his doctrine of divine right—only lent additional credit to this head-on opposition. However, unlike Hen-

94  Royal Sovereignty and the Presbyterian Church ry VIII or Elizabeth, James was a religious and political theorist. He enjoyed such intellectual pursuits, and the religious situation that he had had to deal with since his earliest childhood strengthened his interest. He inherited doctrines that his predecessors had partially disavowed; he took the best of them and laid special emphasis on the dualism inherent in the doctrine of the two kingdoms. He argued in favor of the unity of the sovereign’s power with the same fervor, while more openly integrating religious minorities. Would his Catholic adversaries understand his thinking? It appears unlikely, given the slim margins of maneuver he had to work with. He defended the political sovereignty of the Crown with equal vigor as it moved from Anglican monism to Jacobean dualism, albeit not on exactly the same principles.

chapter Three

> King James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and the Theologico-Political Concept of Tolerance

W

hen King James acceded to the throne of England in 1603, he intended to continue the policy of peace he had managed to establish between the religious factions and the nobility in Scotland. It was with this in mind that he wanted the House of Commons to draw up a treaty of union between England and Scotland. The same was true of the policy of reconciliation that he launched to smooth over the politico-religious divergences blighting his new kingdom and continental Europe. First of all, he strove to split off the moderate Puritans from the radicals by incorporating them into the established Church.1 He adopted a similar policy toward Catholics by distinguishing the recusants from the loyalists, then by suggesting that the pope call a general council to bring an end to Christian disunity.2 In his dealings with both Puritans and Catholics, 1. On this question, which is not central to our argument, see Peter Lake, Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 243–92. 2. On James’s proposal to call an ecumenical council to reunite Christianity, see W. B. Patterson, “King James I’s Call for an Ecumenicall

95

96  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance James’s main objective was to strengthen the unity of the kingdom by bringing their doctrines closer to the theses espoused by the Church of England. Religious tolerance was possible only if it was politically acceptable.

James I and the Puritans: the Hampton Court Conference > The Hampton Court Conference, held in January 1604, aimed to find a response to the protests of nonconformist Puritans in the Millenary Petition in the early years of James’s reign. Several points needed answering, among them the making the sign of the cross during baptism, the giving of a ring to symbolize marriage, the importance of diligent preaching, prevention of clergy holding more than one benefice with cure, and the use of excommunication by lay people.3 In the Proclamation concerning such as seditiously seeke reformation in Church matters of October 24, 1603, James stated his belief that the Church of England’s “constitution and doctrine” were “agreeable to Gods word, and neere to the condition of the Primitive Church,”4 although experience had shown that certain forms of corruption had been allowed to gain a foothold in the Church Militant. In order to purify the Church of England of all the elements that impaired its authenticity, the king “appointed a meeting to be Council,” in Studies in Church History, vol. 7, ed. G. J. Cumming and D. Baker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 267–75. See also Patterson’s more recent study, King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 3. For the text of the Millenary Petition, see J. P. Kenyon, ed., The Stuart Constitution 1603–1688: Documents and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 117–19. See also Patrick Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967), 452–54. 4. James F. Larkin and Paul L. Hughes, eds., Stuart Royal Proclamations, vol. 1, Royal Proclamations of King James I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 61.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  97 had before our Selfe and our Counsell, of divers of the Bishops and other learned men” to examine the state of the Church and weed out errors and obvious abuses.5 The date of the meeting was settled after Christmas. As a Calvinist, accustomed to the plain austerity of the Scottish Presbyterian Church, James welcomed a delegation of ministers with assurances of his regard: as he wrote in Basilikon Doron, “I am so farre from being contentious in these things (which for my owne part I euer esteemed as indifferent) as I doe equally loue and honour the learned and graue men of either of these opinions.”6 His conciliatory tone did not reassure Bancroft, bishop of London, who was of the opinion that there was no reason to meddle in a church that had been running smoothly for some forty years. On the first day of the conference, in response to such worries, the king told his audience “that in 42 yeares corruptions might creep in.”7 This led to a long discussion with the bishops, “to his good satisfaction in all such objections as he propounded,”8 as Tobias Matthew, bishop of Durham, reported. James ignored Bancroft’s doubts and met with representatives of the moderate Puritans at Hampton Court on the second day of the conference. He discussed their requests and agreed to some changes—mostly minor—in the liturgy and church practices. In particular, the clergy had to be capable of educating the people, and their morals had to be beyond reproach. James came to an agreement with John Reynolds, one of the leading Puritan representatives, on a number of key aspects for reform: one single form of catechism throughout the Church, a satis5. Ibid., 62. 6. The Political Works of James I, ed. C. H. McIlwain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1918), 8. 7. R. G. Usher, The Reconstruction of the English Church (New York: D. Appleton, 1910), 2:338. See also Edward Cardwell, A History of Conferences and Other Proceedings Connected with the Revision of the Book of Common Prayer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1849), 213. 8. Cardwell, A History of Conferences, 163.

98  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance factory definition of baptism and the Last Supper, and a new translation of the Bible, to be written “consonant to the originall Greeke and Hebrew” and “set forth without note.”9 However, when the issue of ecclesiastical discipline was broached, James reacted vehemently. During the discussion, Reynolds informed him of his preference for a conciliatory form of church government, with a system of local pastors and provincial and national synods, which would meet annually under the leadership of the bishops. As such a system was an exact copy of the Scottish Presbyterian Church, James—as William Barlow reports—responded that in his opinion, the system of councils suggested by Reynolds was a rough draft for a Presbyterian system just like the one in Scotland, which “as wel agreeth with a Monarchy, as God, and the Deuill.”10 However, James reassured the Puritans, promising them that the Church would be governed by bishops who would have the power of excommunication, albeit “being assisted with the deanes and grauest preachers.”11 On the third and final day of the conference, James informed the bishops, deans, and privy councilors of the outcome of the discussions. He also informed the civil lawyers about ecclesiastical court procedure. Finally, in the presence of Puritan representatives, he “exhort[ed] the ministers to carrie themselues duetifull towards their Bishops; and the Bishops to deale fauorable with them, and more gently then euer they had don before.”12 At the outcome of the conference, some Puritan requests had been rejected, while others agreed to by the king were never im9. Usher, The Reconstruction of the English Church, 2:345. 10. William Barlow, The Summe and Substance of the Conference. Which It Pleased His Excellent Maiestie to Have with the Lords, Bishops, and Other of His Clergie (at Which the Most of the Lordes of the Councell Were Present) in His Maiesties Priuy-Chamber, at Hampton Court, Ianuary 14, 1603; Whereunto Are Added, Some Copies, (Scattered Abroad,) Vnsauory, and Vntrue (London: Mathew Law, 1604), 79. 11. Usher, The Reconstruction of the English Church, 1:352. 12. Ibid., 1:353.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  99 plemented.13 The new translation of the Bible authorized by James was begun by a group of theologians that included Lancelot Andrewes, John Overall, William Barlow, Laurence Chaderton, and Reynolds.14 As the seventeenth-century church historian Thomas Fuller wrote, “Wheresoever the Bible shall be preached or read in the whole world, there shall also this that they have done be told in memorial of them.”15 Historians have often debated whether the Episcopalians or the Puritans gained the upper hand at the outcome of the conference. Following the principles and methods that had served him well in the past, James managed to avoid giving preeminence to one side over the other. As the Basilikon Doron shows, he was as mistrustful of giving too much power to the bishops as he was of Puritan extremists. It is a fact that in the years that followed, Puritan extremists attempted to push through religious reforms from within the established Church.16 Could they have done otherwise? In April 1604, the Convocation prepared new canons defining the laws and beliefs of the Church. The new canons stipulated excommunication for anyone 13. Cardwell, A History of Conferences, 214–16. 14. See Thomas Fuller, The Church History of Britain, from the Birth of Jesus-Christ until the Year New, 1655, ed. J. S. Brewer, book 10 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1845), 44–47; Alfred W. Pollard, ed., Records of the English Bible: The Documents Relating to the Translation and Publication of the Bible in English, 1525–1611 (London: Oxford University Press, 1911), 331–77; John Bois, Translating for King James: Being a True Copy of the Only Notes Made by a Translator of King James’s Bible, the Authorized Version, as the Final Committee of Review Revised the Translation of Romans through Revelation at Stationers’ Hall in London in 1610–1611 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969), vii–x, 3–34; Ward Allen and Edward C. Jacobs, eds., The Coming of the King James Gospels: A Collation of the Translators’ Work-in-Progress (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1995), 3–57; David Daiches, The King James Version of the English Bible: An Account of the Development and Sources of the English Bible of 1611 with Special Reference to the Hebrew Tradition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1941). 15. Fuller, The Church History of Britain, 59. 16. Lake, Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church, 243–92, and Patrick McGrath, Papists and Puritans under Elizabeth I (London: Blandford, 1967), 339–63.

100  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance who challenged Church hierarchy, articles, rites, or ceremonies. Furthermore, members of the clergy had to accept three articles. The first, affirming royal supremacy, and the third, bearing on acceptance of the thirty-nine articles, did not cause any difficulty. The second, on the other hand, stated that Puritans were obliged to acknowledge that “the Book of Common Prayer [. . .] containeth in it nothing contrary to the Word of God.”17 As the Puritans had been vehement in speaking out against “Papist” elements in the Book of Common Prayer, particularly with reference to ceremonies, subscribing to the second article was a test of their sincerity in wishing to remain part of the established Church—or not. Now that the inward stability of the kingdom was assured thanks to peace and religious unity, James had to try to obtain the same result in his ecclesiastical policies regarding the Holy See and the English Catholics.

James I and the English Catholic Community: Loyalty to the King or Allegiance to the Pope? >

The years prior to James’s accession to the English throne are vital in understanding his policy toward Catholics. He gave them the hope of a better future in order to guarantee his own succession. Catholic advisers encouraged him to obtain Pope Clement VIII’s support by promising tolerance toward followers of Rome. Moreover, the king of France’s absolution could only strengthen James’s decision to begin negotiations with the pope. In late 1600, he sent Edward Drummond, a Scottish Catholic, to secure support from Catholic states in Italy and from the pope himself. Drummond took with him a letter from James in which he addressed the pope 17. Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution 1603–1688, 123.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  101 as “Beatissime Pater.” Similarly, the letter ends with an expression of respect unusual from a Protestant ruler: “Beatitudinis vestrae obsequentissimus filius, J-R.”18 James’s wife, Queen Anne, also informed Clement VIII of her conversion to Catholicism in a manner that seemed to involve James in her decision.19 The pope responded in the course of the summer of 1602 through the intermediary of Sir James Lindsay, another Scottish Catholic. Clement VIII promised to support James’s claim to the English throne on the condition that his heir, Prince Henry, became a Catholic. As Lindsay’s state of health prevented him from continuing as intermediary, James sent his answer to the pope through his ambassador in Paris, Sir Thomas Parry. In the letter, he refused Henry’s conversion categorically, proposing instead to call a council to resolve the controversies dividing his kingdom and Christianity: And would that (which has always been in our prayers) this course be entered upon, and care be taken, by means of a General Council, justly and legitimately declared and assembled, by which all contentions and controversies could be settled and composed: whence it would be clear in the case of each doctrine what would be agreeable to antiquity, and to the first and purer times of the Christian Church, [and] what was born from and sprang from the inventions of men not long ago.

Further, he added: We think nothing is to be more earnestly wished for, and we should approve nothing more willingly, than divine worship which is common and uniform in all things, not thoroughly defiled by the corruptions of men, nor repugnant to the divine laws; from which the Church may receive the most joyful fruits of peace and tranquillity, and may acquire 18. On James’s letter to Clement VIII and Drummond’s role as envoy, see Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary Queen of Scots, A.D. 1597–1603, vol. 3, part 2. 19. On Anne’s conversion to Catholicism, see Albert J. Loomie, “King James I’s Catholic Consort,” Huntington Library Quarterly 34 (1971): 303–16.

102  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance strength to repulse and carry the war to the finish against the common and most dangerous enemy of God and of all Christians.20

The pope was not convinced by these proposals, and the negotiations stalled. This first attempt to find some common ground with the papacy merely served to accentuate the divisions among Catholics. The Jesuits denounced James’s dangerous declarations, while the secular clergy pronounced themselves ready to obey him in exchange for concessions on religious issues. In late 1602, James wrote to the Earl of Northumberland, who was in close contact with several other Catholic leaders: “I will neither persecute any that will be quiet and give but an outward obedience to the law, neither will I spare to advance any of them that will by good service worthily deserve it.”21 This could legitimately be understood as a promise of tolerance, particularly as—with a few exceptions such as the Jesuit Robert Parsons—most Catholics were not keen to see a Spanish king on the throne. They were rather in favor of dealing with a Protestant prince, as long as he was British, tolerant, and hostile to radical Calvinism. However, in raising the hopes of both loyalist and recusant Catholics prematurely, James underestimated the difficulties he was to face. He thereby set up the conditions for later disappointments that were to have particularly dramatic politico-religious consequences. His policies remained ambiguous when he came to the throne of England in 1603. The Catholics were in an extremely unstable position and hoped that he would abrogate antiCatholic legislation as soon as he was on the throne. There were indeed promising signs that suggested they would obtain satisfaction: nobles were granted greater freedom to protect their fellow believers. Sermons took place in chapels in Catholic embassies, 20. Charles Dodd, Church History of England from the Commencement of the Sixteenth Century to the Revolution in 1688, vol. 4 (London: C. Dolman, 1841), lxx–lxxi. 21. S. R. Gardiner, A Student’s History of England, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, 1896), 100.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  103 and the queen, who had converted to Catholicism, did not attend services in the established Church. Many Catholics in exile returned to England, reassured by the prospect of greater religious tolerance. In the immediate wake of these events, several petitions pleaded for greater tolerance, while promising Catholic loyalty to the Crown. They were received by the King’s Council, but those known since the end of Elizabeth’s reign as Appellants were disappointed. Contrary to his earlier promises, James adopted a prudent approach, fearing hostile reactions from his new subjects. His wavering caused ever greater disappointment for the Catholic community and led to two conspiracies before the terrible plot that was to spark a politico-religious conflict across Europe. The first of the two conspiracies, known as the Bye Plot, was planned during the summer of 1603 by a group of secular clergy led by Watson, who had grown disillusioned when James failed to keep the promises he had made in Edinburgh. James had promised to stop the imprisonment of recusants. Watson, who felt James had betrayed him, planned to kidnap him in order to force a change of policy. The plot was discovered by the Jesuits, who did not wish to be mixed up in it. James was relatively lenient with the plotters and informed the French ambassador to the Holy See, Béthune, in June 1603 that he intended to make recusants pay fines again. A few months later, he received a delegation of Catholic leaders, reassuring them that he would follow a more moderate policy. Following the Bye Plot, the pope informed the king through his nuncio in Paris that he would denounce any sedition by Catholic believers. However, these attempts at conciliation by both sides did little to change the situation. A second, much more ambitious conspiracy, known as the Main Plot, was planned. Lord Cobham and the Count of Aremberg, ambassador of the Spanish Netherlands, plotted a Spanish invasion to overthrow James and replace him with his cousin Arabella Stuart. This conspiracy was also discovered, and it seems that Arabella herself was unaware of it. When James called Parliament on March 19,

104  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance 1604, he gave a measured speech on the problem posed by the Catholic minority. He distanced himself from the strengthening of penal laws against Catholics. While the government could not tolerate the clergy’s political ambitions, this was not the case for certain laymen who, it was hoped, would agree with Parliament’s decisions.22 However, Parliament by no means intended to take such a conciliatory stance. On the contrary, urgent calls for public tolerance of Catholicism encouraged the Protestants of the established Church to put pressure on the king and Parliament to take tougher measures. James could not take a hard stand against Puritans on the one hand, while reaching out to Catholics on the other. Priests entering the kingdom further weakened his policy of moderation. In May 1604, James let the members of Parliament vote a law on the status of Catholics. They confirmed all the laws then on the statute books and even strengthened some. The Catholic peer Lord Montague denounced the new measures that were so prejudicial to England’s oldest faith. It made no difference. The king accepted the law, and several priests and laymen were executed.23 None of these decisions stopped James from launching his policy of expelling priests and granting greater tolerance to lay Catholics. Thus in September 1604, a commission was appointed to carry out the royal proclamation calling for all priests to be banished, but just a few days later, the council accepted the suspension of laws against lay Catholics, as James wished. Moreover, the same proclamation called for a general council as the only way to put an end to the religious and political rifts afflicting Christianity: Yet when wee consider and observe the course and claime of that Sea [of Rome], Wee have no reason to imagine, that Princes of our Religion 22. See “Speech to Parliament of 19 March 1604,” in King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. J. Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 132–46, esp. 139–40. 23. See Larkin and Hughes, Stuart Royal Proclamations, vol. 1, Royal Proclamations of King James I, 72–73.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  105 and Profession, can expect any assurance long to continue, unlesse it might be assented by mediation of other Princes Christian, that some good course might be taken (by a generall Councell free and lawfully called) to plucke up those roots of dangers and jealousies which arise for cause of Religion as well as betweene Princes and Princes, as betweene them and their Subjects, and to make it manifest that no State or Potentate either hath or can challenge power to dispose of earthly Kingdomes or Monarchies, or to dispense with Subjects obedience to their naturall Soveraignes: In which charitable Action, there is no Prince living, that will be readier then Wee shall be to concurre even to the uttermost of our power, not only out of particular disposition to live peaceably with all States and Princes of Christendome, but because such a setled amitie might (by an union in Religion) be established among Christian Princes, as might enable us all to resist the common Enemie.24

Yet James’s wavering on policy did not stop there. That same year, he sent a message to the pope via Sir James Lindsay in which he called the sovereign pontiff first among bishops. He acknowledged that the Church in Rome was the Mother Church and proposed calling a council to discuss the ideas of the Reform and those specific to Catholicism.25 This led Clement VIII, doubtless with Henri IV’s recent conversion in mind, to conclude that James wished to convert to Catholicism. As a result, he appointed a commission of twelve cardinals to study the possibility and held public prayers for England.26 When the rumor spread throughout England that James was intending to lead his subjects back into the Catholic fold, he was forced to make a declaration of his hatred for Papism and to disavow the letter he had sent to Clement VIII. He also ordered the immediate application of the laws against all Catholics who refused to acknowledge royal supremacy.27 James’s renewed failure here sheds light on his tendency to be24. Ibid., 73. 25. Public Record Office State Papers (hereafter PRO SP) 78/52, fol. 31 verso. 26. Ibid., 215. 27. Ibid.

106  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance lieve himself gifted with a talent for theology such that the pope would naturally agree with his point of view. This episode also clearly demonstrates the narrow margins within which James was trying to draw up his ecclesiastico-political project of Catholic obedience to the Crown and the reconciliation of Christian factions. There can be no doubting James’s desire to “reunite” Catholics and Protestants in an Anglican ecclesiological model, which dated back to the time before the Church was divided. His arguments in the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance show this to be the case. But neither the papacy nor the more Calvinist wing of the Church of England could accept this irenist stance. Any decision that went against the political and religious divisions that had dominated England and the rest of Europe since the Reform was greeted with suspicion. James did, however, enjoy the precious support of his minister Cecil in furthering his ecclesiastical policy. In his correspondence with the Venetian ambassador Molin, Cecil emphasized the reasons that justified the government’s attitude of coercion toward Catholics: “There are laws and they must be observed, and there is no doubt but that the object of these laws is to extinguish the Catholic religion in this kingdom; for we hold it undesirable in a well-governed monarchy to allow the increase of persons who profess obedience to the will of a foreign sovereign as the Catholics do.”28 Cecil’s correspondence clearly indicates James’s two approaches in trying to solve religious dissentions and division in the kingdom. In his letter to the pope and his speech of 1604, James acknowledges that the Roman Church is the Mother Church and that the bishop of Rome is first among bishops, but at the same time he denies the pope the authority to intervene in matters of royal sovereignty. In other words, the government’s objective was clear: it aimed to ensure the political subordination of the pope’s followers in England. For this to succeed, laymen and secular clergy had 28. Molin to Doge and Senate, March 1605, Venetian series, X, 230.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  107 to be separated off from the regular clergy, particularly the Jesuits. From this point of view, James simply continued Elizabeth’s policy, but with one difference (which should not be underestimated): James’s strategy did not simply rely on playing on divisions within the Catholic community. James was certainly much more inclined to respect England’s Catholics insofar as the more moderate among them gave concrete proof of their loyalty. However, the more intransigent members of the Catholic community were disappointed to see their hopes crushed and could not accept a compromise. James found it equally difficult to find a middle solution in his foreign policy. Only Spain responded positively to James’s proposal to organize a general council, and even then it was fraught with diplomatic difficulties, as indicated by a Spanish document dated summer 1605 entitled Discourse on the desire which the king of England is said to have to conform to the Catholic Church by means of a Council.29 The text, drawn up by the Austrian Jesuit Richard Haller, reports the opinions of English representatives at the Spanish court of James’s ideas on religion and his call for a general council. The document probably mirrors the peace negotiations held in the same context between Catholic Spain and England. Haller remains cautious about James’s peace plans and considers that it “has always been customary for heretics to cover up their obstinacy with the demand for a council.”30 He is all the more cautious since a council had already been held to resolve all existing theological disputes, particularly since the Protestant schisms. However, it was impossible to overlook the diplomatic context: peace between Spain and England in the United Provinces was at stake.31 A council would al29. Vat. Arch., Fondo Borghese, ser. III, vol. 68, fols. 182–185. 30. Ibid., fol. 182. 31. On James’s policy toward Spain, see W. B. Patterson, Political Works of James I, vol. 1 of Spain and the Jacobean Catholics, ed. A. J. Loomie (London: Catholic Record Society, 1973), 149–50.

108  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance low a rapprochement between the two enemy powers. The king’s informers wrote: Yf the King [of England] hath a will, ther will at his Desyre be graunted a generall Counsayle, and that in the most free, and irrestrayned manner. Therein all things now doubted of, being with greate libertie called in Question, and every Man suffered in publique to deliver his Opinion, much hope they say there is, that by the goodnesse of god some perfect concord may be had in all thinges, or at lest such reformation in most, as may give to men charitable, and trulie relligiouse some good Contentment.32

Sir Charles Cornwallis, England’s ambassador in Spain, sent a letter to Cecil in July 1605 expressing his doubts about the possibility of reuniting the two Christian churches. He questioned how the council was to be organized. Who would preside at the meetings? How would the votes be held? Who would be authorized to take part in the council, given that Reformist churches did not all have bishops? And would Pope Paul V be in favor of the principle of such a council?33 All these questions were to remain unanswered; the Spanish representatives saw only the political side of the question—the chance to end a costly war in the Netherlands to the satisfaction of both sides and to maintain Spanish supremacy, while granting England control over certain territories. Plans were also drawn up for Prince Henry to marry the Infanta.34 Of course, none of these projects came to fruition, particularly the plan for a general council. The English Catholics were chafing more and more at their oppression and had nothing further to expect from political and ecclesiastical diplomacy. It was in this context that Cornwallis sent his secretary to London, where he learned of a plot against James.35 The details of the plot to assassinate James and the members of Parliament on November 5, 1605, are too well known to 32. PRO SP 94/11, fol. 196 verso. 34. Ibid.

33. Ibid. 35. PRO SP 94/12, fol. 128.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  109 need recounting here. Instead, we shall analyze the political and ecclesiastical consequences of the Gunpowder Plot.

The Political and Ecclesiastical Consequences of the Failure of the Gunpowder Plot >

Just four days after the Gunpowder Plot failed, James made a speech to Parliament that was remarkably restrained for a man who had nearly fallen victim to a terrorist conspiracy: I wish you to consider, That I would be sorie that any being innocent of this practise, either domesticall or forraine, should receiue blame or harme for the same. For although it cannot be denied, That it was the onely blind superstition of their errors in Religion, that led them to this desperate deuice; yet doth it not follow, That all professing that Romish religion were guiltie of the same. [. . .] And therefore doe we iustly confesse, that many Papists, especially our forefathers, laying their onely trust vpon Christ and his Merits at their last breath, may be, and often times are saued; detesting in that point, and thinking the crueltie of Puritanes worthy of fire, that will admit no saluation to any Papist. I therefore thus doe conclude this point, That as vpon the one part many honest men, seduced with some errors of Popery, may yet remaine good and faithfull Subiects: So vpon the other part, none of those that trewly know and beleeue the whole grounds, and Schoole conclusions of their doctrine, can euer proue either good Christians, or faithfull Subiects.36

However, the situation was too serious for the two houses of Parliament to react as James had done,37 and they decided to broaden the Penal Code by adding six new laws known as the Act for the Better Discovering and Repressing of Popish Recusants.38 Among 36. “Speech to Parliament of 19 March 1604,” 152. 37. On the Gunpowder Plot, see Alan Haynes, The Gunpowder Plot: Faith in Rebellion (Stroud, Eng.: Sutton, 1994). 38. See “Act for the Better Discovering and Repressing of Popish Recusants,” in

110  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance the measures voted into law, recusants who worshipped as part of the established Church were required to receive the blessed Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper at least once a year. Failure to do so was punishable by fines rising from year to year—twenty pounds the first year, forty the second, and sixty the third. Those who refused to attend all services were obliged to pay forty pounds a month or to renounce two-thirds of their possessions, by decision of the king. Moreover, any Catholic subject who attempted to re-convert a former believer to the pope or See of Rome would be accused of high treason.39 Recusants were also banned from traveling to the king’s place of residence unless they were invited to do so.40 Recusants were prohibited from working in the medical and legal professions, commanding troops or ships in the service of the king, and owning gunpowder. People were authorized to inform on recusants, whether laymen or priests, who held Roman Catholic services, and the informer was rewarded with a third of the fine.41 Such excessive measures were in fact applied unevenly, to the point where Parliament was obliged to call for them to be followed more rigorously. This much more repressive legal context was the backdrop for the act introducing the obligatory oath of allegiance for recusants, “for the better trial how his Majesty’s subjects stand affected in point of their loyalty and due obedience.”42 Once the plan to call a general council had failed, James’s decision to impose an oath was in fact the logical conclusion of his ecclesiastical policy. According to the American historian C. H. McJ. R. Tanner, ed., Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), 86, and Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution 1603–1688, 165–71. 39. Tanner, Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I, 92. 40. Ibid., “Act to Prevent and Avoid Dangers which May Grow by Popish Recusants,” 95. 41. Ibid., 94. 42. Larkin and Hughes, Stuart Royal Proclamations, vol. 1, Royal Proclamations of King James I, 249.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  111 Ilwain, the oath was a response to the challenge posed by Bellarmine’s theory of the pope’s indirect temporal power.43 Consequently, it marks a major turning point in the history of modern political thought because of the clearer demarcation of secular and ecclesiastical powers and the controversy that ensued across Europe, so numerous were the contributors to this intellectual debate. The oath’s major architect was the new archbishop of Canterbury, Richard Bancroft, who had already put it forward as a possibility during the last years of Elizabeth’s reign, with the government’s approval.44 However, the government was not convinced by his proposal and thought that only a minority of Appellants would accept it, and then only in part. Elizabeth’s death and James’s accession had put a temporary stop to the project. But Bancroft did not give up on the idea of drawing up an oath that would distinguish the civil and ecclesiastical spheres to avoid challenging the pope’s spiritual supremacy. In 1605 the priests were consulted on the project for the oath, and the following year, Bancroft agreed to revise the initial formulation.45 The oath appeared to be fair to all parties and reassured the Crown and loyalist Catholics, who were not required to give up their loyalty to the pope. It contained seven affirmations: King James “is lawful and rightful king of this Realm”; the Pope had no “power or authority to depose the King, or to dispose any of his Majesty’s kingdoms or dominions, or to authorise any foreign prince to invade or annoy him or his countries, or to discharge any of his subjects of their allegiance and obedience to his Majesty”; regardless of “any declaration or sentence of excommunication or deprivation [. . .] by the pope or his successors [. . .] or any absolution of the said subjects from their obedience,” the swearer would bear faith and true allegiance to his Majesty; he would endeavor 43. McIlwain, The Political Works of James I, XLIX. 44. Usher, The Reconstruction of the English Church, 1:160–88, 2:101–9, 310–20. 45. Ibid., 2:320.

112  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance to disclose “all treasons and traitorous conspiracies, which I shall know or hear of.” He swore that he did “from my heart abhor, detest and abjure, as impious and heretical, this damnable doctrine and position, that princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the Pope, may be deposed or murdered by their subjects, or any whatsoever” and that he was resolved that “neither the Pope nor any person whatsoever hath power to absolve me of this oath.” Finally, he swore that the oath was “lawfully ministered unto me” and that he swore “without any Equivocation, or mental evasion, or secret reservation whatsoever.” The fifth affirmation met with serious objections and put recusants and well as laymen and the secular clergy in an awkward position. The issue was the pope’s authority to excommunicate and depose princes, described as a heresy despite the fact that for part of the Catholic community, at least, it was part of their doctrine of faith. Recusants and the clergy who represented their ideas—friars in particular—could not swear the oath as it stood. James’s government had gone too far in their demands, and this did nothing to resolve the conflict, as indicated by the ecclesiastico-political controversy that followed the imposition of the oath. In fact, there was a very fine line between a scrupulous respect for canonical doctrine on the one hand and the equally pressing respect for loyalty to the king on the other. The Jesuits, who fervently defended the ecclesiastical right to resistance, were the most hostile toward any new coercive measure against the Church.46 On May 18, 1606, England’s leading Jesuit, Robert Parsons, sent a document to Cardinal Bellarmine expressing his wish for a condemnation of the Appellant priests’ Gallican theories, on which he believed the royal and parliamen46. Joseph Creswell, A Proclamation Published under the Name of Iames, King of Great Britanny; With a Briefe et Moderate Answere Thereunto; Whereto Are Added the Penall Statutes Made in the Same Kingdome against Catholikes (St. Omer: English College Press, 1611), 81–82.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  113 tary decisions were based. Parsons’s thinking was not wholly erroneous. The archpriest George Blackwell, leader of the Catholic community, was horrified to learn of the plot and considered it contrary to both a decree promulgated at the Council of Constance and the judgment of the “best catholic writers of our age.”47 He called on his fellow priests to inform their followers that “private violent attempts cannot be thought of, much less may be aided and maintained by Catholics.”48 In June 1606, Blackwell and his three assistants, Bishop, Mush, and Broughton, met with the Benedictine superior Father Preston and the Jesuit superior Father Holtby. At the end of the meeting, Preston, Holtby, and Mush voted against the oath, while Blackwell, Bishop, and Broughton voted for. Since they were unable to come to a joint decision, they turned to the newly elected pope, Paul V.49 Paul V took advice from Henri IV’s counselors and reacted cautiously, sending an envoy to try to bring James round to a point of view more favorable to Catholics. However, this cautious approach failed. The division of the Cath47. Dodd, Church History of England, vol. 4, CXI–CXII. Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reigns of Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, and James I, 12 vols. (London: HMSO, 1856–72), 8:243. The controversy between Jean Petit and Jean Gerson arose in the context of the struggle between the Burgundians and Armagnacs and the promotion of Conciliarist views, which maintained that the authority of ecumenical councils took precedence over that of popes. Jean Petit defended tyrannicide, while Jean Gerson argued against it. The fifteenth session of the Council of Constance, held on July 6, 1415, refused to pronounce a blanket condemnation of Jean Petit’s arguments, fearing the reaction of his backer, John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy. However, the Parliament of Paris did forbid teaching the doctrine of tyrannicide on September 16, 1416. For further details on the question of tyrannicide at the Council of Constance, see Mario Turchetti, Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l’antiquité à nos jours (Paris: PUF, 2001). 48. Dodd, Church History of England, vol. 4, CXII. Calendar of State Papers, Domestic series, 8:243. 49. Camillo Borghese, 1550–1621, pope from 1605 to 1621. Paul V was a specialist in canon law and vigorously defended papal authority. On April 17, 1606, he excommunicated the doge and senate of Venice for infringing the rights of the clergy and placed the city under an interdict for a time. For further details on Paul V, see Philippe Levillain, Dictionnaire historique de la Papauté (Paris: Fayard, 1994).

114  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance olic community and the failure of the pope’s diplomatic mission led Paul V to send a brief to English Catholics that condemned the oath as a whole.50 Blackwell learned about the brief from the Jesuit Holtby, but, fearing that the government would prosecute him, did not publish it. His discretion was wasted because James managed to obtain a copy of the brief. He immediately ordered Blackwell to be arrested. The arrest took place in the night of June 24, 1607.51 Blackwell was interrogated the next day, and Bancroft forced him to swear the oath again. Blackwell stated that he had approved the oath of allegiance as soon as it was voted into law the previous summer. He told them of his opinion and his directive to legitimize the oath at his meeting with members of the Catholic clergy. On July 7, 1607, he sent a letter to the clergy declaring that the excommunication of the king was illegitimate and that his subjects “would still be bound in the same way as now to maintain their loyalty.”52 He also pressured his fellow Catholics to swear the oath: “So shall we shake off the false and grievous imputation of Treason.”53 The form of Blackwell’s opinion on allegiance suggests that it was far from free and spontaneous. However, it was not fundamentally at odds with his personal opinion, so difficult did he find it to 50. James I of England, Triplici nodo, triplex cuneus: or an Apologie for the oath of allegiance, ag. the two breves of Pope Paulus Quintus a. the late letter of Cardinal Bellarmine to G. Blackwel the Arch-priest (London: R. Barker, 1607), 9–16 (henceforth Apologie), and Cardinal Bellarmine’s Apologie de l’illustrissime Robert Bellarmin, . . . pour la response dudit sieur au livre du serenissime roy de la Grand-Bretaigne . . . avec la responce cy-devant publiée, sous le nom de Matthieu Torty. Responce du cardinal Bellarmin au livre intitulé “A triple coing, triple noeud” ou autrement “Apologie pour le serment de fidélité contre deux brefs du Pape Paul V et les dernières lettres du cardinal Bellarmin, escrites à Georges Blackwell, archiprêtre d’Angleterre” (N.p.: 1610), 46–49 (henceforth Responce). See the appendix for the text of the brief Magno animi maerore. 51. George Blackwell, His Answeres upon Sundry His Examinations; Together with His Approbation and Taking of the Oath of Allegeance; And His Letter Written to His Assistants and Brethren, Mooving Them Not Onely to Take the Said Oath but to Advise All Romish Catholikes So to Doe (London: Robert Barker, 1607), 9 and 14. 52. Ibid., 23–24. 53. Ibid., 39.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  115 bear the recent humiliation of all Catholics by the Gunpowder Plot and the trial of the conspirators. Moreover, the compromise that Blackwell accepted with the king was also in the pope’s interest. Paul V feared that the Catholic community would be swallowed up by the Anglican Church. However, the majority of Catholics went against the wishes of the letter and declined to swear the oath. But because a minority did choose loyalty to the Crown, Paul V was still not satisfied. On August 23, 1607, he sent a second brief, which was no more successful than the first.54 The two letters from the sovereign pontiff marked the end of any hopes of conciliation between James’s ecclesiastical policy and the papacy. At the same time, Cecil’s order to expel all the Jesuits and seminarians from the kingdom only aggravated the situation. This step, which resulted from James’s desire to separate the two understandings of Catholicism then prevalent in England, merely served to strengthen Paul V’s determination. On September 28, 1607, the pope thus asked Bellarmine to send Blackwell a letter.55 Bellarmine accused Blackwell of weakness over the oath, which, in his opinion, “tends to this end, that the authoritie of the head of the Church in England, may bee transferred from the successour of S. Peter, to the successour of K. Henry the eight.”56 The oath, designed to swear civil allegiance to the king, in fact meant to “denie the Primacie of the Apostolike Sea.”57 Blackwell was authorized by the government to respond, which he did on November 13, 1607. He based his argument on Catholic authors in favor of oaths, writing that these theologians never allowed that “the most holy successor of S. Peter” had “an Imperiall and Ciuill power” to depose the king.58 54. James I of England, Apologie, 31–33, and Bellarmine, Responce, 168. The brief ’s title was Renunciatum est nobis. 55. James I of England, Apologie, 36–44 and Bellarmine, Responce, 170–74. 56. James I of England, Apologie, 38 and Bellarmine, Responce, 171. 57. James I of England, Apologie, 39 and Bellarmine, Responce, 171. 58. George Blackwell, A Large Examination Taken at Lambeth According to His

116  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance On January 20, 1608, he wrote a letter to the Catholic community, calling their attention to the pope’s two briefs and Bellarmine’s letter to him. He did not contest the fact that the pope was “head of the Catholicke Church” and that princes were “subiect in some cases vnto his spirituall censures.” However, it was unthinkable that the pope should be allowed to depose a ruler by divine right, directly or indirectly. The king of England’s subjects owed him allegiance as the earliest Christians did to their emperors.59 Blackwell was deposed for this statement on January 22, 1608. He was replaced by George Birckhead,60 whose immediate duty was to dissuade Catholics from swearing the oath and taking part in Anglican services. The Jesuits had defeated the secular clergy, and the matter soon became an international controversy. Each side prepared to do battle. The two leading protagonists were James I of England and Cardinal Bellarmine.

The Start of the Controversy between King James and Cardinal Bellarmine over the Oath of Allegiance >

James could not stand idle in the face of the offensive by Paul V and Bellarmine. He was convinced that Rome simply did not understand the true intentions of his ecclesiastical policy and asked Thomas Bilson, bishop of Winchester, to write a reply to Bellarmine.61 The first draft was entitled For penne and inck. A few days later, Maiesties Direction, Point by Point, of M. George Blakwell, Made Archpriest of England by Pope Clement 8, upon Occasion of a Certaine Answere of His, without the Priuitie of the State, to a Letter Lately Sent unto Him for Cardinall Bellarmine Blaming Him for Taking the Oath of Allegeance (London: Robert Barker, 1607). 59. Ibid., 158 and 166. 60. Calendar of State Papers, Domestic series, 8:397. 61. Thomas Bilson gave James I’s coronation sermon, A Sermon Preached at Westminster before the King and Queenes Maiesties, at Their Coronations on Saint James His

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  117 James wrote his own work, which Bancroft and Lancelot Andrewes preferred. James gave it the title Triplici nodo, triplex cuneus—a threefold wedge against a threefold knot—in reference to the pope’s two briefs and Bellarmine’s letter to Blackwell. However, the title that truly reflected James’s intentions was the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance, dated 1607 and published anonymously for the first time on February 14, 1608, by Robert Barker. Only the royal coat of arms revealed the author’s identity. Copies were sent to the ambassadors in London to pass on to their respective sovereigns. Although James Montague, Bancroft, and Andrewes inspired the Apologie in part, James was doubtless the principal author. It was translated into Latin and French in 1607 and 1608.62 A long introduction sets out the reasons why James decided to impose an oath on his subjects. He then shared the first brief, including the oath and Bellarmine’s letter to Blackwell, with his readers. He thus lifted the veil on the lack of understanding between the king, the English Catholics, and the papacy. James first of all considered that the oath was the only way to tell loyal and disloyal subjects apart.63 He expressed his surprise at the pope’s claim to be entitled to intervene in political life in England without previously expressing any objection. Yet James appeared ready to reconcile English Catholics with his government. He added that Paul V’s two briefs did not succeed in demonstrating that the oath contradicted the Catholic faith. Bellarmine’s letter to Blackwell likewise conflated the pope’s spiritual jurisdiction, Day, being the 28 of July 1603. By the Reverend Father in God, the Lord Bishop of Winchester (London: V.S. for Clement Knight, 1603). 62. James I, Triplici nodo, triplex cuneus: sive Apologia pro iuramento fidelitatis, adversus duo brevia P. Pauli Quinti et epistolam Cardinalis Bellarmini ad G. Blackvellum Archipresbyterum nuper scriptam (London: R. Barker, 1607); Triplici nodo, triplex cuneus: ou Apologie pour le serment de fidélité, que de Roy de la Grand Bretagne veut estre faict par tous ses sujets, contre les deux brefs du Pape Paul cinquième et l’epistre, ou lettre, nagueres envoyee par le Cardinal Bellarmin à G. Blackwel Archiprestre (Leyden: J. Le Fevre, 1608). 63. James I of England, Apologie, 2–3.

118  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance rejected by Elizabeth’s oath of supremacy, and his own oath of allegiance, which was purely civil in nature: “For in all this Letter of his, neuer one word is vsed to prooue, that by any part of this Oath the primacie of Saint Peter is any way medled with, except Master Bellarmine his bare alledging.”64 James then cited a number of historical accounts demonstrating that the pope’s claims were excessive. He contradicted Bellarmine’s affirmation that no pope had ever ordered the assassination of a prince, even heretics and tyrants,65 pointing out that he had overlooked cases of deposition, degradation, agitation, and rebellion.66 He cited the numerous attacks against Elizabeth and Pope Sixtus V’s praise for the assassin of Henri III of France as examples.67 He further noted that the Scriptures and the writings of the Church Fathers nowhere authorized the pope’s claim to the power of deposition. On the contrary, they lent indubitable support to the ancient councils in favor of the temporal supremacy of kings.68 James was suspected of penning the Apologie after the work was translated into Latin and French in 1607 and 1608. Once again, Henri IV, hoping to protect the Catholic community, sent word through his ambassador in Rome to the pope, advising him not to respond. Paul V ignored this advice and asked Bellarmine, directly impugned in the Apologie, to prepare an answer rebutting all James’s arguments in favor of the oath. This is how Bellarmine came to write Matthaei Torti, presbyteri et theologi papiensis, responsio ad librum inscriptum, Triplici nodo, triplex cuneus, sive apologia pro iuramento fidelitatis under the pen name Mathieu Torti, borrowed from his chaplain.69 Like James, Bellarmine hid his true identity. He began his Responce by focusing on the object at the heart of the con64. Ibid., 61–62. 65. Ibid., 65. 66. Ibid., 65–66. 67. Ibid., 66. 68. Ibid., 24–26. 69. “Torti” means tortured or twisted. Bellarmine, Matthaei Torti, presbyteri et theologi papiensis, responsio ad librum inscriptum, Triplici nodo, triplex cuneus, sive apologia pro iuramento fidelitatis (St. Omer: English College Press, 1608); Apologia Roberti

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  119 troversy between England and the papacy, arguing that the oath of allegiance was a disguised version of the oath of supremacy70 and was intended to interfere in the pope’s spiritual jurisdiction over Catholics. To establish the accuracy of this interpretation, we shall return to the two previous oaths. The first main point to keep in mind is that the Tudors rejected the pope’s spiritual jurisdiction over the Catholic faithful. Henry VIII’s oath stipulates that those swearing must reject the authority, power, and jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome.71 Elizabeth’s oath states that “no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, preeminence or authority ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realm, and therefore I do utterly renounce and forsake all foreign jurisdictions, powers, superiorities and authorities.”72 The second key idea is consequently that those swearing the oath acknowledge the sovereign’s superiority as “supreme head of the Church of England.”73 This was Henry VIII’s formula. Elizabeth’s oath states in a more balanced manner that “the Queen’s Highness is the only supreme governor of this realm [. . .], as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal.”74 We shall not further discuss the ambiguities of royal sovereignty in the context of the Tudor monarchs’ greater or lesser interference in doctrinal issues. The important point to note here is the close correlation in the two oaths between the rejection of the bishop of S.R.E. Cardinalis Bellarmini pro responsione sua ad librum Iacobi Magnae Britanniae Regis cuius titulus est Triplici nodo triplex cuneus: in qua apologia refellitur Praefatio monitoria regis eiusdem: accessit eadem ipsa responsio iam tertio recusa qua sub nomine Matthaei Torti anno superiore prodierat (Rome: Bartholomew Zannetti, 1609; second ed., St. Omer: English College Press, 1610). 70. James I of England, Apologie, 38, and Bellarmine, Responce, 145. 71. Elton, The Tudor Constitution, 365–66. 72. Ibid., 375. 73. Ibid. See the appendix for the full text of Henry VIII’s Act of Supremacy. 74. Ibid., 364–65. See the appendix for the full text of Elizabeth’s Oath of Supremacy.

120  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance Rome’s spiritual jurisdiction and the exercise of royal supremacy. This was the issue that the new oath had to deal with in a new way75—contesting the pope’s universal jurisdiction over Catholics did not give the king the right to intervene in matters of faith in the strict sense. Bellarmine’s response to James was based on the belief that the king’s new oath was intended to strengthen the Crown’s grip on the spiritual and ecclesiastical life of England’s Catholics. Two key demands led the Apostolic See, Cardinal Bellarmine, and the recusants to believe that James did intend to intervene in Catholic doctrine. The first of these was the statement that “notwithstanding any declaration or sentence of excommunication or deposition made or granted, or to be made or granted by the Pope or his successors, or by any authority derived, or pretended to be derived from him [. . .] I will bear faith and true allegiance to his Majesty, his heirs and successors.”76 In Bellarmine’s opinion, a subject’s duty of allegiance to the king and his successors by no means justified denying the papal power to excommunicate and depose monarchs: Now do we not see that through this sort of oath, the power to excommunicate heretical kings is taken away from the pope? And how can a good and true Catholic swear in conscience not to obey the pope if he excommunicates a heretical king, if he believes that the pope has the power to excommunicate him? But does the power to excommunicate not belong to, and is it not inseparable from, the Holy See, because our Lord said to Saint Peter, the first spiritual primate, Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: And since it was given to Saint Peter to be the shepherd for the whole Christian flock, and consequently also to his successors, it must be admitted, either that the king of Great Britain is not part of the Lord’s flock, or that he is a subject of Saint Peter and his successors in matters spiritual, and that by the same means, he can be bound and loosed by them. Now, what more just cause could 75. James I of England, Apologie, 48–50. 76. Ibid., 10–13.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  121 the successors of Saint Peter have than to excommunicate on grounds of heresy, which takes away the basis of the Catholic faith, and with all justice?77

The rejection of these two canonico-ecclesiological principles was the first point of contention at the heart of the controversy. Second was the impossibility for the pope of absolving English Catholics: “I [. . .] declare in my conscience before God and the world, [. . .] that the Pope neither of himselfe, nor by any authoritie of the Church or Sea of Rome, or by any other meanes with any other, hath any power or authoritie to [. . .] discharge any of his Subiects of their Allegiance, and obedience to his Maiestie.”78 Bellarmine interpreted this prohibition as preventing the pope from exercising his power to loose, which was conferred on the Apostle Peter and his successors: He who previously denied the pope’s power to bind now denies his power to loose. For the words of our Lord, Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven: Catholics are under the authority of the pope, which extends not only to the absolution of sins, but also to punishments, censures, laws, vows, and oaths when they are to the glory of God and the salvation of souls. Furthermore, when one declares an oath to be full and complete, and legally administered, one thereby declares that the king of England, to whom it is sworn, has sovereign power over matters spiritual, and as such has the power to command one to crush all declarations and excommunications pronounced by the pope under foot.79

Bellarmine’s response to James clearly used the pope’s power to bind and loose as a means of highlighting the doctrinal divergence between the king and the pope regarding their respective spheres of jurisdiction. James’s desire not to see his sovereignty diminished 77. Bellarmine, Responce, 144. In the absence of an English translation of Bellarmine’s works, all quotations from his writings have been translated from the French. 78. James I of England, Apologie, 10–11. 79. Bellarmine, Responce, 145.

122  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance led him to pursue and even intensify Henry VIII’s policy regarding the requirement of loyalty to the Crown, and in terms of ecclesiological consequences, made it all the more urgent to reconsider the notion of the Church. The papacy, on the other hand, was keen to defend the Roman Catholic tradition, based on the primacy of the pope’s jurisdiction and indirect temporal power. To highlight the king of England’s interference in the lives of English Catholics, Bellarmine evoked the creation of harsher penal laws related to the oath, which betrayed a discriminatory, intolerant attitude.80 A mention of a letter in which James asked Clement VIII to appoint a Scottish cardinal led Bellarmine to ban sales of the Apologie. In October 1608, following a report that accused his former secretary of state for Scotland, James Elphinstone (by then Lord Balmerino), James demanded a complete explanation of this compromising letter. Balmerino was forced to admit that he had used the royal signature on a letter of which James had no knowledge. Balmerino was then forced to repeat his confession in front of a private council, as James had charged the king’s council with an enquiry into the letter. A year later, Balmerino was condemned to death. The sentence was later commuted to a lifetime’s house arrest.81 This enabled James to save face without having to return to the question in the second edition of his Apologie. Yet despite Bellarmine’s insinuation, the letter in question made no allusion either to the king’s intention to convert or to his projects for his Catholic subjects. At this stage, other authors, including Robert Parsons and his adversary William Barlow, bishop of Lincoln and one of the king’s chaplains, joined the war of words.82 On the Anglican side, James called on the best-known and unquestionably the best-read of the 80. Ibid., 157–58. 81. On Balmerino, see J. Brodrick, The Life and Work of Blessed Robert Francis Bellarmine (1542–1621) (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1928), vol. 2, 212 n. 3. 82. William Barlow, An Answer to a Catholike English-Man (So by Him-selfe Entituled) Who, without a Name, Passed His Censure upon the Apology, Made by the Right High

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  123 pamphleteers, Lancelot Andrewes, to pen a refutation of Bellarmine’s work. In 1609, Andrewes published in Latin Tortura Torti, in which he evokes the Balmerino affair.83 James was not content merely to leave his best theologians to counter the attacks by his adversaries. He decided to acknowledge his authorship of the Apologie, a political work considered to be the most important since he began his career as a theorist. For James, calling on all the other European rulers was a way of alerting them to the danger that the papacy posed to their thrones. It therefore had to be known across Europe that he was the author of the Apologie, which argued for the supremacy of temporal powers. He thereby hoped to obtain the agreement and support of other European rulers. This also explains why James remained anonymous in the first edition: I thought it not comely for one of my place, to put my name to bookes concerning scholasticke Disputations, whose calling is to set forth Decrees in the Imperatiue moode [. . .] I was neuer that man, I confesse, that could thinke a Cardinall a meete match for a King; especially hauing many hundreth thousands of my subiects of as good birth as he. As for his Church dignitie, his Cardinalship I meane, I know not how to ranke or value it, either by the warrant of God his word, or by the ordinance of Emperours or Kings; it being indeede onely a new Papall erection, tollerated by the sleeping conniuence of our Predecessors (I meane still by the plurall of Kings).84

It is interesting to note the care with which James maintains the status of his authority. Including his name in the second edition was thus in fact something of a concession. He condescended to beand Mightie Prince Iames by the Grace of God King of Great Brittaine, France, and Ireland, etc. for the Oath of Allegeance (London: Mathew Law, 1609), 163. 83. L. Andrewes, Tortura Torti: sive, ad Matthaei Torti librum Responsio, qui nuper editus contra Apologiam serenissimi potentissimique principis, lacobi, Dei gratia, Magna Britanniae, Franciae, & Hiberniae Regis, pro ivramento fidelitatis (London: Robert Barker, 1609), 181–89 (Balmerino’s “Declaration and Confession,” 191–94). 84. James I of England, Apologie and Premonition, 4–5.

124  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance come involved in a controversy although his royal function raised him above all discussion. The concession was all the greater since it involved exchanging arguments with a churchman whose title was invented by the papacy. The preface is a warning: To you, most Sacred and Invincible Emperour; Right High and Mightie Kings; Right Excellent Free Princes and States, My Loving Brethren and Cosins, To you, I say, as of right belongeth, do I consecrate and direct this Warning of mine, or rather Preamble to my reprinted Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance. For the cause is generall, and concerneth the Authoritie and priuiledge of Kings in generall, and all supereminent Temporall powers.85

It is true that there was good reason for this appeal for support, given that in the period before and after James’s accession to the throne of England, he was involved in a peace process with the continental monarchies. In the 1590s, his ecclesiastical policy with regard to Rome was above all designed to guarantee him as Elizabeth’s successor. To this end, he had sent envoys to France, Spain, Venice, and the United Provinces. His marriage to Anne of Denmark in 1589 helped him forge closer links with Lutheran Denmark and the northern German principalities linked to his wife’s family. James also planned to marry his eldest son, Prince Henry, to Grand Duke Ferdinand of Tuscany’s daughter, who was indisputably related to the House of Scotland through James’s grandmother Mary of Guise. James had also developed a political friendship with Flanders, then still under Spanish control, and continued to do so after 1603.86 During his first year on the English throne, he signed an alliance with France.87 He also established peace between Spain and 85. Ibid., 1. 86. PRO SP 77/7, fol. 273 (Salisbury to Edmondes, Nov. 14, 1605), fols. 285–86 (Edmondes to Salisbury, Nov. 19, 1605), fol. 295 verso (Edmondes to Salisbury, Nov. 25, 1605), fols. 312–15 (Edmondes to Salisbury, Dec. 20, 1605); 77/8, fol. 15 (Edmondes to Salisbury, Jan. 23, 1606), fol. 40 (Edmondes to Salisbury, Feb. 19, 1606). 87. SP 78/49, fols. 111–111 verso (James I to Henri IV, Dec. 24, 1604), fols. 112–13

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  125 Flanders by means of a treaty.88 He supported the doge during the conflict between the Venetian Republic and the papacy in 1606.89 Since 1603, France and England had shared a common desire to bring a definitive end to the war between Spain, Flanders, and the United Provinces. Several years of complicated negotiations finally led to twelve years of peace.90 The second edition of the Apologie, including a preface appealing to Europe’s rulers for solidarity, was dated April 8, 1608, and published in 1609. The French and Latin editions were published in London. A Dutch edition was printed in Leyden and a second Latin edition in Amsterdam. Lancelot Andrewes played a key role in writing the second version of the Apologie.91 In the preface, James reminds his readers that the oath of allegiance was part of the penal measures taken by Parliament following the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot: “This Treason, I say, being not onely intended against me, and my Posteritie, but euen against the whole house of Parliament, plotted onely by Papists, and they onely led thereto by a preposterous zeale, for the aduancement of their Religion; some of them continuing so obstinate, that euen at their death, they would not acknowledge their fault.”92 He added that his chal(James I to Henri IV, Feb. 15, 1605), fols. 113–13 verso (James I to Henri IV, Apr. 13, 1605); SP 78/51, fols. 4 verso–6 (Parry to Cecil, Jan. 5, 1604); SP 78/54, fol. 125 (Carew to Salisbury, Jul. 6, 1608), fols. 160–61 (Carew to Salisbury, Sep 15, 1608), fols. 221–22 (Carew to Salisbury, Dec. 7, 1608). 88. Roy Strong, Henry, Prince of Wales, and England’s Lost Renaissance (London: Thames and Hudson, 1986), 77–78. 89. Wotton to James I, May 26, May 16, English style, 1606, PRO SP, Venice, SP 99/3, fols. 82 verso–83. PRO SP 99/3, fols. 111–111 verso (Salisbury to Wotton, Jun. 16, 1606). 90. PRO SP, Miscellaneous, France and Holland, SP 104, p 163. PRO SP 104, 174, 176 (Council to Commissioners, Nov. 9, 1607, Dec. 15, 1607). See Pieter Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1555–1609 (London: Ernest Benn, 1962), 250–59, and Geoffrey Parker, Spain and the Netherlands, 1559–1659: Ten Studies (London: Fontana, 1979), 73–74. 91. See Paul A. Welsby, Lancelot Andrewes, 1555–1626 (London: SPCK, 1958), 144–45. 92. James I of England, Apologie and Premonition, 6.

126  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance lenge to the pope’s power of excommunication was based solely on his fear of Catholic plots against him. In so doing, he made it clear that he did not oppose excommunication in principle, but only the power to depose kings. He also added that even when tensions between the papacy and the Crown were at their height, he never planned to abandon his policy of moderation: “And yet so farre hath both my heart and gouernment bene from any bitternes, as almost neuer one of those sharpe additions to the former Lawes, haue euer yet bene put in execution.”93 Furthermore, the Gunpowder Plot controversy had ramifications beyond the English context, as it broached the question of the status of the temporal power of European princes directly. Bellarmine was at the heart of the controversy, as he considered it legitimate for the pope to excommunicate sovereigns, in direct contrast to “the rule of all Scriptures, ancient Councels, and Fathers.”94 This issue alone was enough to threaten Europe’s secular powers, particularly the Roman Catholics among them: So doeth he upon that ground of Pasce oues meas, giue the Pope so ample a power ouer Kings, to throne or dethrone them at his pleasure (and yet onely subiecting Christian Kings to that slauery) as I doubt not, but in your owne Honors, ye will resent you of such indignities; the rather since it concernes so many of you as professe the Romish religion, farre more then me.95

James reminded his readers that Bellarmine had already espoused the same theses in his book De Clericis: I tell with admiration, that he freeth all Church men from any subiection to Kings, euen those that are their borne Subiects; hee is angry with this phrase, and saith, it is an addition for breeding enuy unto him, and raising of hatred against him. For, saith he, although Bellarmine affirmed generally, that Church-men were not subiect to earthly Kings; yet did 93. Ibid., 8. 95. Ibid., 18–19.

94. Ibid., 17.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  127 he not insert that particular clause (though they were borne, & dwelling in their dominions).96

Such a claim was a cause of real worry for Catholic princes, a third of whose subjects were members of the clergy. Rulers who owed allegiance to Rome should “consider and weigh, what a feather he pulls out of your wings, when he denudeth you of so many Subiects, and their possessions, in the Popes fauour: nay, what bryars and thornes are left within the heart of your Dominions.”97 James took the opportunity to remind his readers that the Middle Ages had shown numerous examples of the dangers of the papacy. Bellarmine had even based his statement that the temporal authority of the papacy is “one of the chiefe Articles of the Catholicke faith”98 on such examples. But James was even more outraged by Bellarmine’s theological arguments. He began by refusing to be called an apostate and heretic.99 He presented the theological arguments why he was beyond all doubt a Catholic.100 He argued against a number of practices that Papist theologians considered Catholic, such as private Masses, communion under one kind alone, transubstantiation, adoration of the saints, the cult of the Virgin, supererogatory works, the veneration of images, and purgatory.101 Finally, James readily acknowledged the existence of the episcopate and its apostolic origin.102 He also acknowledged the Roman primacy and the fact that the patriarchs played a role in the construction of the Church from the beginning of Christianity, but added that this was a source of conflict.103 The historical nature of the Holy See by no means justified the pope’s status as monarch or his power to bind and loose (as he had already stated in his 1604 96. Ibid., 20. 97. Ibid., 21. 98. Ibid., 22. 99. Ibid., 34–35. 100. Ibid., 35. James refers to the Symbols of the Apostles, Nicaea and Athanasius, and the first four ecumenical councils. 101. Ibid., 37–42. 102. Ibid., 43–44. 103. Ibid., 45–46.

128  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance speech).104 James’s distinction between Roman primacy and papal power led him to devote a long section to the papacy as the personification of the Antichrist. We shall return to this point later, as it highlights the rivalry between temporal and spiritual powers. Let us simply note at this point a passage from a conversation between James and the French ambassador to England, Antoine Le Fèvre de la Boderie, which the latter reported to Brûlart de Puysieulx, secretary of state at the French court, in July 1609: “James does not wish to say that the pope is the Antichrist except in so far as he [the pope] maintains that he has the power to depose princes; that if he [the pope] wishes to give up this pretension, he [James] is willing to accept him as the first among bishops.”105 James was convinced that only a general council could rebuild the Church and reunite Christianity: Whereas, if euer there were a possibilitie to bee expected of reducing all Christians to an uniformity of Religion, it must come by the meanes of a generall Councell; the place of their meeting being chosen so indifferent, as all Christian Princes, either in their own Persons, or their Deputie Commissioners; and all Churchmen of Christian profession, that beleeue and professe all the ancient grounds of the true, ancient, Catholike, and Apostolike Faith, might have tutum accessum thereunto; All the incendiaries, and Nouelist fire-brands on either side being debarred from the same, as well Iesuites as Puritaines.106

This declaration is hardly surprising in the light of the proposition James sent to Clement VIII and repeated in his speech of 1604. James’s Apologie aroused numerous reactions on the continent, quite apart from the controversy with Bellarmine. This was particularly the case in the Holy See, as the diplomatic correspondence 104. Ibid., 46–47. 105. A. Le Fèvre de la Boderie, Ambassades de Monsieur de La Boderie en Angleterre, sous le règne d’Henri IV et la minorité de Louis XIII depuis les années 1606 jusqu’en 1611 (Paris: P. D. Burtin, 1750), 4:387. 106. James I of England, Apologie and Premonition, 110–11.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  129 in the Vatican archives shows. The numerous publications on “the king of England’s book” reflect Rome’s worry at the spread of politico-religious beliefs of varying degrees of heterodoxy—Gallicanism, the Venetian episode, German Lutheranism and Calvinism, and of course, the difficult situation of England’s Catholics.107 The pope’s representatives worked hard to persuade European courts not to accept the Apologie. To give just a few examples, in Flanders, the pope’s secretary of state Cardinal Scipione Borghese urged Arch-Duchess Isabella to refuse James’s book.108 He was happy to learn that the Spanish ambassador in London had refused “the king of England’s pernicious book.”109 Cardinal Borghese tried to stop the Apologie from reaching Italy by asking the nuncio in Naples to contact the viceroys. They were sent a letter detailing the Apologie’s heresies. A copy of the letter was also sent to the Venetian ambassador in Rome. The secretary of state was pleased to discover that the city’s senate had prohibited the publication and sale of the book.110 However, not all Rome’s efforts met with equal success. In France, the Apologie was read at court. James himself wrote to Henri IV on May 15, 1609, to thank him for efforts by the French ambassador in Rome to resolve the controversy between the Holy See and the English Crown. James drew Henri’s attention to the issue of the “State and the liberty of all Christian princes”; this could not fail to touch a chord in a country keen to preserve “the liberty of the Gallican Church.”111 Sir George Carew presented Henri with a copy of the book in early June, making a speech in which he 107. See Robert Peters, “Some Catholic Opinions of King James VI and I,” Recusant History 10 (1969–70): 293–303. 108. Rome, Vat. Arch., Fondo Nunziatura Fiandra 136 A, fols. 238 verso–239. 109. Vat. Arch., Fondo Borghese, ser. I, 914, fol. 12. 110. Ibid., 898, fol. 15; 901, fol. 7 verso; fols. 170 verso–171; 897, fols. 111–111 verso, 135, 139 verso. 111. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, MS. Français, Ancien Fonds, vol. 15984, fol. 341 verso.

130  James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance recalled that the pope had acted “most precipitously and peremptorily” in forbidding Catholics to swear the oath although the French ambassador to the Vatican had advised him against it.112 One month later, on July 13, Henri IV told George Carew that he had found much that was good in James’s book.113 A few days previously, Henri had sent it to four of France’s leading theologians, who concluded that although the Apologie contained a few errors, it also made a number of affirmations “that today all heretics deny.”114 Cardinal Davy du Perron, spokesman for Henri IV’s advisers on theological matters, considered that James’s ideas on ancient councils, the teachings of the Church Fathers, the role of the Holy See in the primitive Church, and his loyalist demands meant that his thinking was likely to develop in the right direction. He believed that in order to encourage this, James should not be provoked by the publication of pamphlets that would give him to believe that Rome approved of the recent plot against him, either directly or indirectly.115 However, this is precisely what Pope Paul V did, shortly after the second edition of Bellarmine’s Apologie was published. The ongoing doctrinal controversy between James I and Cardinal Bellarmine reflects the extent of the mutual misunderstanding between Roman Catholics and Anglicans on the question of tolerance and the conception of the unity of Christianity. On the English side, the Elizabethan heritage certainly complicated James’s task. Moreover, while the government benefited from divisions among the Catholic community, the arrival of missionaries in England added to the anxiety of members of parliament and Reformers in the Anglican Church. There was no chance of finding common ground between the king’s loyalist requirements and Catholic demands to be allowed to worship freely. Once the plots and the call 112. PRO SP 78/55, fols. 105–105 verso (Carew to Salisbury, June 15, 1609). 113. Ibid., fol. 132 verso (Carew to Salisbury, Jul. 21, 1609). 114. Vat. Arch., Fondo Borghese, ser. I, 915, fol. 227 verso. 115. Ibid., 915, fols. 228–228 verso.

James’s Ecclesiastical Policy and Tolerance  131 for a general council had failed, the next step was a war of words. Battle was declared by James and Bellarmine, followed by polemicists on both sides.116 116. According to the modern Jesuit historian James Brodrick, the controversy surrounding the oath of allegiance turned into a battle of books such as the world had never seen. Another major event that took place on May 4, 1610—the assassination of Henri IV of France—further encouraged Catholic and Protestant authors to do battle over ecclesiological and political doctrine. The English parliament took Henri’s assassination as an excuse to apply the oath of allegiance to everyone over the age of eighteen. Henri’s assassination hastened the spread of the open conflict between Rome and London across Europe. On Henri’s assassination, see Roland Mousnier, L’Assassinat de Henri IV. Le problème du tyrannicide et l’affermissement de la monarchie absolue (Paris: Gallimard, 1964). The large number of works published on both sides of the debate gives an idea of the importance of this conflict in Europe in the years after 1610.

chapter Four

> Bellarmine’s Theory of the Indirect Temporal Power of the Papacy A Political Ecclesiology

L

ike Suarez, Bellarmine, about whom Bayle wrote that “there is no author who better supported the cause of the Church in general and that of the pope in particular,”1 was a man of remarkable qualities. His powerful memory, admirable talent for assimilating new information, and clarity of thought and method enabled him to grasp the essentials of an argument and respond clearly. He took an active part in all the great controversies of his day. His only intellectual weakness was that the erudition he brought to anti-Protestant controversies was hardly groundbreaking in theological terms. He was a typical representative of the Counter-Reform, whose stance in favor of the Christian faith meant defending the Roman Catholic Church, and above all the primacy of the papacy. Bellarmine stoutly defended the theories taught by medieval scholastic theologians on the origin of civil power, the indirect authority of the popes over the temporal power of princes, and the

1. P. Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique (Amsterdam: Brunel, 1730), 1:503, or (Rotterdam: Reinier Leers, 1697), 1:532.

132

Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy  133 people’s right of resistance against tyranny. He also addressed all the points of dogma or morality attacked by the Protestants in his famous Controversies.2 He was thoroughly familiar with the writings of Luther, Philip Melanchthon, Calvin, Théodore de Bèze, and the Socinians and produced a clear critique of their controversial aspects, resolving them thanks to his far-reaching patristic erudition. He has thus been described as one of the fathers of positive theology.3 His brilliance was noticed during his studies, and he was appointed professor of theology at the Jesuit college in Louvain (1569– 76), where he also preached on controversial theology. It was there that he wrote his first commentaries on the Summa theologica from 1570 to 1576. The theologians and bishops who made their mark in these debates published commentaries on the decrees they wrote. The Catechism of the Council made the results of these works available for all priests to read. At the height of his career, Bellarmine went to Rome to begin the teaching on controversies that was to prove his crowning achievement (1576–88). The moment had come for him to sort through sixty years of polemical writings, often of unequal worth. He had to do away with all those that had failed to withstand attacks by heterodox scholars and retain those that had stood the test of time. These included the writings of the professor of the Gregorian University, which had led Elizabeth to found chairs to refute controversies at Oxford and Cambridge. Followers of the regalian doctrine considered Bellarmine their most fearsome adversary and banned and condemned his writings in all the countries where they were predominant. 2. On the history of the term “controversy” and its new usage in the sixteenth century, see Yves Congar, ed., Catholicisme, vol. 3 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1948–99), 154–56. 3. Except for the Responce à l’Apologie de Jacques Ier, published in French in 1610, Bellarmine’s works are quoted from the following edition: Opera omnia (Naples: Apud Joseph Giuliano, 1856–62).

134  Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy When in 1576 he accepted the chair of controversy recently created at the Roman College with the approval of Pope Gregory XIII, Bellarmine became responsible for preparing the pupils of the English and German colleges for their apostolate. He taught his famous course for twelve years (1576–88), reading widely and gathering material for his books. His heavy teaching duties did not stop him from writing several polemical works against various opponents of the papacy. These included a report dating from 1579 on the Baius affair in Louvain,4 the De Transitu Romani Imperii a Graecis ad Francos (1584), intended as a refutation of Flacius Illyricus’s De Transatione Imperii (1566),5 and a judgment of the Lutheran work De Concordia (1585).6 He also worked on other scholarly projects such as the SixtoClementine edition of the Vulgate,7 as a reward for which he was promoted to the rank of cardinal in 1599. From 1586 on, he began publishing his Controversies, the first volume of which contained the treatises on the sovereign pontiff and the Church. Bellarmine’s numerous works also include political controversies. He responded to Pierre du Belloy’s Apologie, published in 1585 in Paris, which defended Henri de Navarre’s claim to the French throne.8 Pope Sixtus V then sent him to France to serve Cardinal Gaetani as theologian to protect Catholic interests in the Valois kingdom, racked by wars of religion. He learned of a plan for a national council to create an independent patriarchate and had to write a letter to warn the French prelates. He also opposed 4. See Laderchi and Raynaldi, Annales parisis ecclesiastici Baronii (Rome: 1728), 22:366 and 24:183. 5. Bellarmine, Opera omnia, vol. 4. 6. Ibid. 7. Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet, Bellarmin et la Bible Sixto-Clémentine: Études et documents inédits, Études de Théologie Historique 3 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1911). 8. Pierre du Belloy, Apologie catholique contre les libelles, déclarations, advis et consultations faictes, escrites et publiées par les liguez perturbateurs du repos du royaume de France, qui se sont eslevez depuis le décès de feu Monseigneur, frère unique du Roy, par E.D.L.I.C. (N.p.:1585).

Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy  135 the future Henri IV, reminding him that any acts of allegiance to him would be punishable by excommunication.9 Following these events, he published a treatise on the exemption of the clergy from ecclesiastical immunity, then the De Romano Pontifice in 1599.10 He later played a part in Galileo’s first trial in 1616, although he was more involved in three other politico-religious controversies. The first of these was the interdict against Venice. A quarrel broke out in 1605 between Rome and Venice over several laws contrary to ecclesiastical immunity. Paul V proclaimed an interdict against the Venetian republic. At the same time, a group of theologians, led by Paolo Sarpi, republished Gerson’s writings on the validity of excommunication, along with several short treatises against papal censures. In response, Bellarmine wrote several texts over the course of 1606, resuming the doctrines laid out in the controversies over the power of the papacy and ecclesiastical immunities and applying them to the situation in Venice. In 1610, following the publication in London and Pont-à-Mousson of a treatise by William Barclay entitled De potestate Papae, arguing against the power of the papacy in matters temporal,11 Paul V called on Bellarmine to pen a response, which he did under the title De Potestate Summi Pontificis in rebus temporalibus.12 This was published in Rome in 1610 and prohibited by the parliament in Paris the same year. In addition to the interdict against Venice and the debate with William Barclay, Bellarmine was also at loggerheads with England’s 9. René Follet, “Saint Robert Bellarmin en France comme conseiller du Cardinal Gaëtani, légat de Sixte-Quint (1589–1590),” Lettres de Fourvière 4 (1931): 8–21. 10. R. C. Bellarmine, Tertia Controversia generalis. De Summo Pontifice, quinque libris explicata ou De Romano Pontifice, Napoli, Liber Quintus, De Potestate Pontificis temporali, in Opera omnia, vol. 4 (1859). 11. William Barclay, De potestate Papae an et quatenus in reges et principes seculares jus et imperium habeat; Of the Authoritie of the Pope: Whether and How Farre Forth He Hath Power and Authoritie over Temporall Kings and Princes (London: William Aspley, 1611). 12. Tractatus de Potestate Summi Pontificis in rebus temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, auctore Roberti S.R.E. card. Bellarmini, in Opera omnia, vol. 4 (1859).

136  Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy first Stuart king. His first opportunity to cross swords with James came the year before the Gunpowder Plot, in 1604. That year, he published the Hieratikon Doron,13 or Sacerdotal Gift, and sent it to the new king of England as a response to his Basilikon Doron. The king’s text, which he had intended to remain private, in fact quickly found its way into publication. In 1604, a Latin version entitled Jacobi primi, Angliae, Scotiae, Franciae et Hiberniae, Fidei Defensoris [. . .], sive regia institutio ad Henricum principem, primogentum filium suum et haeredem proximum14 arrived in London. The papal nuncio in Paris managed to get hold of a copy and sent it to Rome on March 8 that same year.15 Bellarmine was then in Capua and read the book. He was interested to see how James’s thinking on the Church had developed and noted that he revealed his hostility to the Catholic Church. Yet he remained positive about James’s beliefs, bearing in mind Henri de Navarre’s conversion. Bellarmine decided to send James a friendly admonishment. Three copies of this work survive, two of them identical, alluding at the end to the Gunpowder Plot.16 A year later, Bellarmine was to begin a correspondence with James once again, but the tone this time was much less amicable.

The General Principles of Bellarmine’s Conception of the Indirect Temporal Power of the Papacy >

Bellarmine owed his central role in the debate over the oath of allegiance above all to his talent as a controversialist. In keeping with 13. Its full title is Hieratikon Doron, sive modesta et fidelis Adminitio Roberti Bellarmini, S.R.E. Cardinalis, Ad Jacobum Magnae Britaniae Serenissimum ac Potentissimum Regem, in Auctarium Bellarminianum, supplément aux œuvres du cardinal Bellarmin, ed. Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet (Paris: Beauchesne, 1913), 209–56. 14. Brodrick, The Life and Work of Blessed Robert Bellarmine, 155. 15. Ibid. 16. Le Bachelet, Auctarium Bellarminianum.

Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy  137 his status as a Jesuit, his highest loyalty was to the pope. This implies a desire to shun all extremist theses, whether with regard to the pope’s direct power in temporal matters or to the direct power of princes over spiritual matters, both in terms of political doctrines and the relationship between the Church and secular powers. Bellarmine thus defended a middle way, which he defined as “[a] middle opinion shared by Catholic theologians; they teach that the pope’s position does not give him direct and immediate power in matters temporal, but only in matters spiritual, but his spiritual power does, however, in some cases, give him indirect supreme power in matters temporal.”17 Taking this argument as his starting point, he developed an entire theory of the indirect temporal power of the papacy. We shall draw on Bellarmine’s philosophical, scriptural, and ecclesiasticopolitical principles to present a concept that in Bellarmine’s opinion did not constitute indirect power. We shall also examine how he defines the relationship of temporal power to the Church’s spiritual power, as well as the origin of the former and what differentiates it from the latter. Finally, we shall look at the allegory and the rational postulates of the theologians on whom he bases five arguments and twelve examples in favor of indirect power. Once we have examined all the criteria justifying the doctrine of the indirect temporal power of the papacy, we will be in a better position to understand how Bellarmine used them in the controversy over the oath of allegiance.18 17. R. C. Bellarmine, De Romano Pontifice, V, 1, 524–25, in Opera omnia, vol. 4. See the appendix for the text in Latin. 18. For a clear definition of Cardinal Bellarmine’s thinking among the numerous Catholic theories of the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual and the temporal power of popes in terms of deposition and excommunication, see J. P. Sommerville’s Ph.D. thesis, “Jacobean Political Thought and the Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance,” Cambridge, 1981. The theories are explained in chapter 6, “The Deposing Power,” 248–328. Sommerville has drawn up a very full bibliography of both Catholic and Anglican authors of the period.

138  Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy The Kingdom of Christ Does Not Justify the Direct Power of the Papacy Most errors in this field were due to the fact that properties were incorrectly attributed to “indirect power.” Theologians who defended papal theocracy referred to the authority that the pope was believed to have over kings as “direct power,” because monarchs held their power indirectly from God and directly from the pope.19 Bellarmine explicitly denied that the pope held such power, and the internal logic of his thought did not allow for such a concession in the pope’s favor. He wrote that the pope was not a temporal ruler. The argument seemed clear to him: as Christ’s vicar on earth, the pope could not be more powerful than Christ himself. Christ himself was never a temporal ruler: “Christ, as a man and a mortal, did not possess a temporal kingdom. And neither does the pontiff, as Christ’s vicar, possess such a kingdom.”20 The pope was ruler of the Church States, but the Church States were not divinely instituted. They were necessary to protect the Apostolic See. Furthermore, the Papal States were one temporal kingdom among many. Since no one can grant what he does not possess, the pope, who does not hold temporal power, cannot transmit it to monarchs. Bellarmine also noted that the same conclusion was reached by starting from the point of view of the ruler instead of the pope. Pagan kings did not receive power from the papacy. The pope would never have granted temporal power to Nero, who persecuted Christians. Yet the pagan kings were true rulers.21 19. Bellarmine, De Romano Pontifice, V, 1, 526–27. See J. de la Servière, La Théologie de Bellarmin (Paris: Beauchesne, 1909), 130: “Certain canonists who enjoyed Sixtus V’s favor simply reproduced the doctrines of certain medieval predecessors, such as V.G. Augustinus Triumphus in his Summa de Potestate Eccles., q. 1, art. 1, 2–3, Rome, 1582: ‘Potestas juridictionis spiritualium et temporalium immediata est in solo papa, derivata in omnibus episcopis et praciatis; potestas autem in ministerium data in omnibus saccularibus et principibus ponenda est.’ ” 20. Bellarmine, De Romano Pontifice, V, 4, 526–27. See the appendix for the text in Latin. 21. Ibid., V, 7, 533. See the appendix for the text in Latin.

Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy  139 Indirect Power Is Not a Right to Command Bellarmine explicitly denied that the Church had a right to command temporal powers. While the sovereign pontiff holds the plenitude of spiritual power by divine right, this does not mean that he also holds the plenitude of temporal power by divine right. If by chance he did have such power, it would be either incomplete or indirect: “The sovereign pontiff does not possess the plenitude of power over the whole world by divine right, either in ecclesiastical or political matters.”22 Furthermore, the pope cannot wield his authority over all Christian peoples, as Scripture and Tradition do not mention this point: “Scripture only teaches us that Peter and his successors received the keys to the kingdom of heaven; there is no mention of the keys to earthly kingdoms, and the apostolic tradition is also silent in this respect.”23 Finally, indirect power is always justified in terms of its ends, not its causes. It is thus not a power to command, given that this power justifies itself by referring to causes. This means of justifying indirect power by ends is all the more significant as Bellarmine does not hesitate to refer to causality in cases not of indirect power, but of a ruler’s power over his kingdom. He also notes that indirect power no longer exists if it is illegitimate: it requires not only a just and reasonable cause, but also a threat to the salvation of souls or the Church. Indirect power therefore exists only in cases necessary for salvation. The right to command does not require such conditions to be valid. Bellarmine’s terminology is interesting in this respect. He generally uses the terms dominus and dominium, used by medieval authors, to refer to the temporal power of kings and the direct power that he believes the pope does not hold. He uses the word dominium to refer to sovereignty and property. His argument to demonstrate that the pope is not the dominus of the whole world is as follows:24 22. Ibid., V, 2, 525. See the appendix for the text in Latin. 23. Ibid., V, 3, 525. See the appendix for the text in Latin. 24. Ibid., V, 2, 3, 525. See the appendix for the text in Latin.

140  Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy “Infidel princes are true princes, supreme in their kingdoms, for dominium is founded not on grace or faith, but on free will and reason.” Likewise, he demonstrates that the pope is not the dominus of the Christian world: “Christ did not and does not take away kingdoms from those who possessed them, for Christ did not come to destroy what existed, but rather to perfect it. Thus when a king becomes Christian, he does not lose the earthly kingdom he acquired through just means, but rather he acquires a new right to the eternal kingdom; otherwise Christ’s benevolence would oppose kings and grace would destroy nature.”25 As a result, the dominium is the exclusive preserve of temporal power. Moreover, Bellarmine uses the expressions “purely temporal jurisdiction” and “purely temporal dominium” interchangeably.26 He never uses these expressions to refer to indirect power. Rather, he normally uses the term potestas.27 He usually refers to the pope’s temporal power over the Church States by the terms principatus and principium. This distinction between terms reveals a distinction between concepts. Indirect power is not a power to command that the pope holds over the power to command held by rulers. Direct theocratic power was of this type, but indirect power is and has always been merely a ministerium.

Indirect Power Is Not an Ordinary Form of Power Bellarmine specifically noted this point: “The pope cannot ordinarily depose temporal princes, even for a just cause, as he can depose bishops, as their ordinary judge; nevertheless, he can deplace royal power and take it from one to confer it on another because he is the supreme spiritual prince, if it is necessary for the salvation of souls.”28 Other extracts back up this argument: “The pope cannot 25. Ibid., V, 6, 525–26. See the appendix for the text in Latin. 26. Ibid., V, 4, 526 ff. 27. Ibid., V, 6, 531: “Papam habere summam temporalem potestatem indirecte.” 28. Ibid., V, 6, 532. See the appendix for the text in Latin.

Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy  141 ordinarily decree or confirm civil laws [. . .]. But he can do all these things if a civil law is necessary for the salvation of souls and if monarchs do not wish to decree it.”29 He also notes the same argument with regard to judicial competence: “The pope cannot ordinarily judge temporal affairs [. . .]. But in cases where the salvation of souls makes it necessary, the pontiff can hand down temporal judgements when there is no-one else to act as judge.”30

The Basis of the Relationship between Temporal and Spiritual Powers in a Legal Analogy This approach to the indirect power of the papacy over princes implies a theological theory of the finality of temporal and spiritual societies. The former aims to promote the political common weal and the latter the spiritual weal. In other words, the common weal is a preparation for eternal weal. Human laws drawn up by the political community become part of the universal norm of natural law, which exists only with regard to God’s law, which in turn resides in the Church through the mediation of papal power. In this regard, Bellarmine considers the Church to be a perfect society: “The ecclesiastical community must be perfect and self-sufficient in relation to its own end.”31 The theory of the analogy of the law, which demarcates the respective ends and fields of application of papal sovereignty and political authority, is based on the medieval theory of the duality of powers. The Church is located within the supernatural order, political authority within the natural order. The actual particularity of the Church is that its order and power are based on unmediated divine right. Political authority, on the other hand, is based on divine right, but through the mediation of natural law. In the natural order, subjects are subordinated to their ruler, and in the supernatural order, they must obey the ec29. Ibid., V, 6, 532. See the appendix for the text in Latin. 30. Ibid., V, 6, 532. See the appendix for the text in Latin. 31. Ibid., V, 7, 533.

142  Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy clesiastical authorities.32 Despite the overlapping of the temporal and spiritual orders, and despite the fact that they share the same subjects in the same Christian civil order, their subjects owe allegiance to their political authorities as members of civil society and not as Christians. On the other hand, they owe allegiance to the pope independently of their duty of obedience to political authority. Bellarmine took up this distinction between the natural and supernatural orders, already defined by Saint Thomas Aquinas in his Treatise on Law,33 in opposition to the Reformers’ thesis that human nature is totally fallen because of original sin. This thesis was intended to destroy the basis for the scholastic philosophy of natural law and its analogy with eternal law. In keeping with their metaphysical anthropology, sixteenthcentury Catholic theologians, including Bellarmine, insisted on man’s free will, while stating the supremacy of God’s law. Spiritual superiority can be summed up by the following propositions: man has a supreme end to which everything must be subordinated, and that end is eternal beatitude; the beatitude of which man is capable can be achieved only through the supernatural blessing of religion; as agents of the supreme end, ministers have superior authority over human actions; this authority exists in relation to not only the individual, but also the political community, because that which holds true for the former also holds true for the latter; this authority exists through religion and extends as far as the limits of religious interests, but no further; wherever there is a religious interest, spiritual authority has the right to command, but wherever this interest does not exist, it has no right to intervene.34 32. Bellarmine, De Laicis, III, 6, 317. 33. See Saint Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Law, trans. R. Regan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), Ia, IIae, Qu. 91, and Summa theologica (New York: Cosimo, 2007). 34. Sixteenth-century Catholic theologians often limit the sphere of action of spiritual power. F. de Vitoria defends a very different thesis in his De Potestate ecclesiae prior (Madrid: Urbanez, 1960), qu. IV, a-11.

Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy  143

The Origin of Temporal Power and What Distinguishes It from Spiritual Power >

The Origin of Temporal Power: General Principles According to Bellarmine, political authority in the medieval and scholastic tradition came from God; when a ruler commanded, it was in the name of the King of kings whose vicar he was. He backed up his argument with texts from the Old and New Testaments.35 He also insisted that simply observing human nature proved the postulate that “political authority is so necessary to human nature that to destroy it means destroying human nature itself.”36 In accordance with this principle, he stated that man is a naturally sociable being and is incapable of meeting his needs without the support of his fellow men. Bellarmine added that on his own, man is incapable of achieving the learning without which his most noble faculties are useless, and he is too weak to protect himself alone against his enemies. Finally, unlike animals, man has the gift of speech, which is an absolute prerequisite for life in society with his fellow men. However, he immediately qualifies this by saying: While human nature demands to live in society, it likewise demands at the same time a government and a leader; a multitude of men cannot form a body for a long time without a superior to keep them united and to look after the common weal, just as the human body soon falls into decomposition once the soul is no longer there to organize its strength and keep it united.37

However, the allegory of body and soul, which determines the subordination of subjects to the king, does not explain the origin 35. “Per me reges regnant” (Prv 8:15). “Reddite quae sunt Caesaris Caesari” (Mt 22:21). “Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit; non enim est potestas nisi a Deo” (Rom 13:1). See Bellarmine, De Laicis, III, 3, 314. 36. Bellarmine, De Laicis, III, 5, 316. 37. Ibid., III, 5, 316–17.

144  Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy of civil authority. In Bellarmine’s day, there were two answers to this question. The first put forward the notion that the people relinquished its initial power to transmit it to one or several individuals. This was Suarez’s theory. The second suggested that on the contrary, authority was received directly from God. This was the theory espoused by the jurists to Heinrich IV of Germany, Friedrich II, Ludwig of Bavaria, and Philip the Fair, not to mention James I himself.38 Bellarmine, who shared Suarez’s political ideas and was an admirer of Saint Thomas Aquinas, borrowed an adage from the latter to define the origin of political power; authority came to the king from God via the people.39 In other words, the immediate source of power is the people. Bellarmine used a classic argument to defend this postulate: “As we proved earlier, civil power is by divine right. However, divine right does not confer this power on one man in particular; it is thus conferred on the people as a whole; if one does not take positive right into account, there is no reason why any one given individual rather than another should dominate those who were hitherto his equals.”40 However, because the people could not exercise power themselves, they necessarily delegated it to one or more representatives: “In this sense, one can say that the authority 38. R. W. Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, vol. 4, The Theories of the Relation of the Empire and the Papacy from the Tenth Century to the Twelfth Century, part 2, chs. 3 and 4, part 4, chs. 1 and 3; vol. 5, The Political Theory of the Thirteenth Century, part 1, ch. 10, part 2, ch. 4 (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1921, 1928). 39. The postulate according to which all authority comes from God is taken from Paul’s Epistle to the Romans 13:1. This verse has been interpreted in widely differing, even contradictory, ways. Bellarmine interprets the postulate in keeping with the teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas, in complete opposition to James I’s theory of the direct divine right of kings. Aquinas’s political theory is explored in numerous treatises. See in particular the Summa theologica Ia, IIae, question 105, article 1. On the possibility of knowing whether infidels can have authority over Christians, see IIa, IIae, question 10, article 10. See also Bourdin, “La théologie politique chez Saint Thomas” in Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la philosophie politique moderne, 25–43. 40. Bellarmine, De Laicis, III, 6, 317.

Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy  145 of one or several individuals, considered from a general point of view, is by natural or divine right; for even if the entire human race agreed to do so, it could not decree the suppression of all princes or leaders.” Considered in particular instances, authority “comes from God, but through the intermediary of men’s reasoned choice, like everything that constitutes human law. Human law is like a conclusion drawn by human reason from natural law.” The conclusion must therefore be that “the various forms of government do not exist through natural law, but through human law.”41 Kings, consuls, and all other forms of government are constituted with the consent of the people. This was Bellarmine’s theory of the origin of power in society. We shall now turn to its religious function.

The Religious Function of Temporal Power The two questions that especially interest Bellarmine—“Is it the magistrate’s duty to protect religion? Or can he allow everyone to believe what they like?”42—are particularly important with respect to the central issue of this book. There can be no doubt that for Bellarmine, kings should not tolerate freedom of belief. On the contrary, their duty was to “conserve the faith taught by Catholic bishops and above all the sovereign pontiff.”43 He backs this affirmation with two proofs: Scripture and, first and foremost, the Old Testament.44 The “accounts given by the popes” also support his argument.45 Furthermore, Bellarmine’s thesis of religious intolerance is corroborated by rational arguments. We shall not discuss the first, touching on the relationship between the body and the soul, since 41. Ibid., III, 6, 317. 42. Abbé Ducruet, ed., Démonstration victorieuse de la foi catholique (Paris: L. Vivès, 1855), vol. 3: De l’office du pouvoir politique dans la cause de l’Église, ch. 23, 488. 43. Ibid., 488. 44. Ibid., 488–89. See the text in the appendix. 45. Ibid., 488–89. See the text in the appendix.

146  Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy it deals with indirect power. The Old Testament argument, on the other hand, is interesting because Anglican theologians likewise drew on it to justify the conflation of political unity and religion. The difference is that Bellarmine discusses this unity in terms of the superiority of the priesthood over royalty.46 The same holds true for allegiance to the king and to God, the former implying the latter, enabling Bellarmine to turn round James I’s “Protestant” proposition: Freedom of belief is pernicious even to temporal weal and public order. Where faith and obedience to God are maintained, one does not fail to obey kings: it is a duty demanded by faith itself. While divergence of beliefs gives rise to the division of minds and hearts, and any kingdom divided within itself will be desolated. It is perfectly useless to prove a fact of which we currently have a sad example right before us.47

This affirmation also justifies the superiority of ecclesiastical power over that of rulers. The other arguments, based on examples from ancient Rome to the Council of Trent, which “ordered an Index of all heretical books to be drawn up,”48 all aim to demonstrate that unity of faith leads to civil unity. Although it is never explicitly stated, the Church is unquestionably presented as the institution that can unite political society through its doctrine. We shall now turn to the difference between the origins of civil authority and spiritual power.

The Criteria Differentiating the Origins of Temporal and Spiritual Power Bellarmine lays out the criteria in his De Clericis, explaining that it is not up to the people to choose their bishops: He said, the king is doubtless pastor of his people; and yet the people elect their king. But the condition of earthly societies is different from 46. Ibid., 490. See the text in the appendix. 47. Ibid., 490–91. 48. Ibid., 492.

Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy  147 the heavenly society that is the Church. In an earthly society, all men are free by nature; and, consequently, the immediate subject of political power is the people as a whole, until it transmits this power to a sovereign. This is not the case for ecclesiastical society. It had a king, a pastor, from the moment of its birth: at the very moment when Christ founded the Church, he made Peter its leader.49

Similarly, in his De Laicis, he states: There are two differences between royal and papal authority. The former is taken from the subject in whom authority resides, political power being vested without mediation in the community, and ecclesiastical power being vested without mediation in an individual. The latter, taken from the efficient cause of authority, is of divine right; considered in the individuals who hold it, it is of human right. Whichever side we examine it from, ecclesiastical power is by divine right and comes from God without mediation.50

It is apparent from these two texts that Bellarmine’s thinking is coherent with his theory of the superposition of the two powers. Having shown that this power is not indirect, whatever the reasons given to justify a secular authority’s dependence on the Church and the origin of their respective forms of power, we can turn to the general principles of the indirect power of the papacy and the criteria behind the exercise of this power.

Ecclesiological Principles and Concrete Applications of the “Body and Soul” Allegory >

Bellarmine borrows the traditional allegory of body and soul from the Church Fathers to establish the actual conditions of the exercise of indirect power. 49. Bellarmine, De Clericis, I, 7, 157. 50. Bellarmine, De Laicis, III, 6, 317.

148  Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy General Principles Ecclesiastical power is like the soul, while political power is like the body. For Bellarmine, this allegory was indisputable; ecclesiastical power could be only spiritual and political power could be only temporal.51 The Republic—a perfectly ordered society— could commit more or less serious infringements of divine law in exercising its power. It was the pope’s duty to call attention to such infringements and, where necessary, to inform the subjects that they could not in all conscience follow their ruler on such a dangerous path. The prince could seriously damage the Church’s interests by his government. It was thus up to the head of the Church, invested by God with all the powers needed to meet the Church’s ends, to protect these interests by admonishing the prince, handing down spiritual censures, and if this was not enough, deposing him. The pope was the sole moral judge of the prince’s acts, and he alone could judge the harm they could do the Church. Indirectly, he achieved all the act’s temporal effects. Indirect power above all applied to mixed issues that both powers had a stake in resolving, such as clauses governing marriage, education, and ecclesiastical property. In Bellarmine’s day, this power was frequently called on because of the regalian tendencies at Catholic courts and attempts by princes to drag their subjects into apostasy. We shall now turn to the arguments on which Bellarmine based his theory of indirect power.

The Criteria by Which Bellarmine Applied His Doctrine Bellarmine always begins with the supposition that secular authority poses a real threat to the Church, or, even more seriously, to the salvation of souls, and that it refuses to change its attitude. As there is no authority on earth higher than the Church or secular 51. Bellarmine, De Romano Pontifice, V, 6, 531–32. See the Latin text in the appendix.

Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy  149 authority to which the Church could appeal or before which the ruler would agree to appear—or in other words, because Church and civil order are two “perfect societies”—a dilemma is inevitable. Either the Church accepts the harm, even persecution, or it carries out justice for itself, using all the licit and efficient means at its disposal, insofar as there is no prior agreement between the Church and the secular authority. Bellarmine’s unequivocal answer was that the Church had this right, which he referred to as the Church’s indirect temporal power. When a secular authority causes serious harm to the Church or to Christians, the Church is in principle entitled to depose kings—whether Christian or not— and put another ruler on the throne. It can also modify the administration of the civil power at fault. In principle, the Church can call on all these censures, and others still, by virtue of natural law. In modern terms, we could say that indirect power is a kind of right to self-defense. Whatever the circumstances, however, several conditions had to be met before it could be exercised. Bellarmine lays out these conditions through five rational arguments and twelve historical and biblical examples. By Christ’s constitution: Civil power is subordinate to spiritual power when both belong to the same Christian republic. In this case, the spiritual prince can order the temporal prince and organize temporal matters with a view to the spiritual weal: all superiors can order their inferiors.52

Bellarmine of course added that the pope could also have deposed Nero, Diocletian, and other emperors, even though they were not rulers of a Christian empire in which the temporal and spiritual powers were rooted in the same Christian society. The only reason why the Church did not depose them was because it did not then have the capacity to do so. If the pope had had the right to depose Nero, a pagan ruler, he had all the more right to depose a Christian 52. Ibid., V, 7, 532. See the Latin text in the appendix.

150  Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy king such as Louis the Pious. This indicates that for Bellarmine, temporal ends are simply means insofar as they are subordinated to the Church, whose highest end tends to become not only a necessary point of reference, but also a principle by which the spiritual overtakes the temporal. As a result, the legitimate autonomy of the temporal is considerably reduced, not only as a means, but also as an intermediary end valid by virtue of its own right. The following two arguments are particularly enlightening in this context. By virtue of the defense of its spiritual interests: All perfect societies—because they are perfect—can give orders to a society that is not subordinate to them, oblige it to modify its administration, and depose its prince and replace him with another, when there is no other way of defending its spiritual weal.53

Of all Bellarmine’s rational arguments, the second is doubtless the most complex, as it could justify the Church’s claim to the right of the sword. The question is whether this power belongs to the Church by virtue of it being a perfect society or whether it is a gift from Christ. In line with the preceding arguments, Bellarmine defends the former thesis. The power of commanding the “temporal sword” is nothing short of a necessity for Christian society. It is the single body to which Bellarmine constantly refers, which unites spiritual and temporal powers in a shared objective in which each power plays a clearly defined role. This theory of the unity of the Christian order also applies to pagan princes. Christians are not permitted to tolerate an infidel or heretical king if he strives to involve his subjects in his heresy or infidelity. But judging 53. Ibid., V, 7, 533. See the Latin text in the appendix. W. Barclay argues vehemently against this in Of the authoritie of the Pope, 92: “From the time that certaine Popes went about to annex . . . a soveraigne temporall government to that spirituall soveraigntie which they had . . . the Church decaied every day.” This position was shared by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill; see especially p. 435 on the “consolidation of the Right Politique, and Ecclesiastique in Christian Soveraigns.”

Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy  151 whether the king is so doing or not is the task of the sovereign pontiff, who is entrusted with the care of religion. Thus it falls to the pontiff to say if the king must be deposed or not.54

Indirect power can thus be used in the case of a pagan or heretical ruler. If a Christian, heretical, or pagan king commits an act harmful to the Church, he is challenged by the Church’s indirect power, which can, in principle, depose or replace him or modify his laws. Of course, the decision falls to the sovereign pontiff, although Bellarmine never wrote that the pope had the monopoly of this power in the Church. When kings and princes petition the Church to become Christian, they are received on the express or tacit condition that they will submit their scepter to Christ and promise to save and defend the faith of Christ, even at the cost of losing their kingdom. Thus they become heretics.55

This argument is so decisive in justifying the deposition of rulers that Bellarmine immediately moves on to the next point, which is the most important. As Peter was told, “Feed my sheep” (John, last chapter), so the pastor was given every power necessary to watch over his flock. The sovereign pontiff requires a threefold power: first over wolves, to stop them by all possible means; secondly, over rams, so that when they hurt the flock with their horns, he can lock them away and prevent them from leading their flock again; thirdly, over all the ewes, so that he can give them all the pasturage that best suits them. The sovereign pontiff has this threefold power.

Three arguments are based on this passage: First: the wolves devastating the Church of God are heretics, as written in Matthew 7: “Beware of false prophets.” Thus if a prince, though 54. Bellarmine, De Romano Pontifice, V, 7, 533. See the Latin text in the appendix. See also Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, IIa, IIae, 10, 10 and 12, 2. 55. Bellarmine, De Romano Pontifice, V, 7, 534. See the Latin text in the appendix.

152  Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy formerly a ewe or a ram, becomes a wolf—that is to say, if a Christian becomes a heretic—the pastor of the Church can excommunicate him to defend his flock and conjointly order his people to turn away from him and thus prove to them his power over his subjects. Secondly: when maddened rams destroy the flock, the pastor can isolate them and lock them away. The prince is a maddened ram destroying the flock when he is Catholic by faith but so bad that he does great harm to religion and the Church: for example if he sells bishoprics, strips churches of their riches, etc. Thirdly: the pastor can and must bring all his ewes to the pasturage that best suits them. Thus the pontiff can and must order and oblige all Christians to serve God the best they can according to their state. Kings must serve God by defending the Church and punishing heretics and schismatics [. . .] . Thus the pastor can and must order kings to do so, and if they do not, he can even oblige them by excommunication and other appropriate means.56

This last argument is paramount, as it sums up everything at stake in the controversy between James I and the papacy. Indirect power can lead not only to princes being deposed, but also to excommunication and loosing subjects from their oath of allegiance—in other words, exactly the powers rejected by James, who asked his Catholic subjects to consider them heretical. In Bellarmine’s opinion, the use of Scripture and ecclesiastical history was necessary to guarantee the legitimacy of the three measures of excommunication, deposition, and loosing the subjects from their oath of allegiance. Following the same reasoning, Bellarmine refused to acknowledge James’s right to impose an oath of allegiance. In terms of indirect power, there are two preconditions, to which Bellarmine adds two restrictions: the Church must have suffered some harm, and no censure can be meted out if no offense has been committed. While Augustinus Triumphus justified the church’s involvement in the administration of civil affairs in the name of “ordinary” papal power and set illicitness57—in other 56. Ibid., 534. See the Latin text in the appendix. 57. On the plenitude of papal power and temporal authority in the hierocratic

Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy  153 words, misuse of this power by the pope—as its only limit, Bellarmine was much more restrictive. The Church can intervene in temporal affairs only in cases of harm caused by the secular authority. If the Church fails to respect this precondition, any steps it takes are both illicit and invalid. Furthermore, all peaceful means to resolve the dispute must have been tried. The civil authority must have been warned in some way or another to stop whatever it was that was endangering souls, and must have refused or been unable to put a stop to it. It is thus clear that while the Church could intervene in temporal affairs in principle, there were limits to its right of intervention. A third aspect underlines the moderation of Bellarmine’s theory of the indirect power of the papacy: he utterly condemns tyrannicide, espoused by his two fellow believers and theorists, Mariana and Suarez. His position on this matter is clear in his response to James: “When I say that no pope since the beginning of the Church has ever ordered the assassination of a prince, even a heretic or persecutor, or approved the assassination of a prince by a third party, I do not mean the death of a prince in battle, but an assassination committed by traitors or sicarians.”58 Similarly, he agrees with the Church canons when he writes: “since monks and clerks must not spill blood, all the greater reason for them not to betray and murder a prince.” His opinion on this issue differs from that of Mariana, who approved of Henri III’s assassination by the Dominican Jacques Clément. Bellarmine places one final restriction on the theory of indirect power. Since the pope must limit himself to his role as the leader of Christianity, once he has handed down a sentence of deposition against a recalcitrant ruler, he must leave it up to others to carry out the sentence: “Sovtheories of the late Middle Ages, see William D. McCready, “Papalist and Antipapalist: Aspects of the Church / State Controversy in the Later Middle Ages,” Viator, Medieval, and Renaissance Studies (1975): 241–73. 58. Bellarmine, Responce, 181.

154  Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy ereign pontiffs customarily give a paternal rebuke to the guilty prince, then censure them and deprive them of Church sacraments; finally, if circumstances allow, they loose his subjects from their oath of allegiance and deprive the prince himself of his royal dignity and authority. It falls to others to carry out the sentence.”59 In addition to these five rational arguments, Bellarmine also cited twelve historical examples to justify the indirect temporal power of the papacy.

Bellarmine’s Use of Biblical and Ecclesiastical History to Justify Indirect Power: The Limits of Apologetics >

Although Bellarmine’s fifth argument explicitly alluded to the Apostle Peter’s power to bind and loose, and although he drew on the Old Testament to justify religious intolerance and the superiority of ecclesiastical power over kings, it nonetheless remains the case, as Bellarmine acknowledged, that Scripture does not provide an explicit basis for the indirect temporal power of the papacy. Bellarmine’s references to the Bible in fact reveal that his readings were conditioned by his theological background. Bellarmine did the same with respect to the ecclesiastical practice and theories of the patristic and medieval Church: high priests of the Old Testament, apostles, bishops, and popes all sanctioned the secular use of indirect temporal power. This was exactly the method that Bellarmine used in his letter to George Blackwell and that led him naturally to criticize the transfer of papal sovereignty to Henry VIII. A second example in the same letter backs up this 59. Bellarmine, De Potestate, 282: “Pontificum mos est, primum paterne corripere deinde per censuram ecclesiasticam sacramentorum communione privare, denique subditos principum a juramento fidelitatis absolvere, eosque dignitate, atque auctoritate regia, si res ita postulet, privare. Executio ad alios pertinet.” This sentence was quoted in the Paris Parliament’s decision to burn De Potestate on November 26, 1610.

Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy  155 same point of view—the condition of Christians under the Roman emperor Julian the Apostate, which Bellarmine freely compared to that of Catholics under James I.60 Through this comparison, he forced English Catholics to choose between their allegiance to the king and allegiance to the pope, without which the Catholic faith was in danger. In this instance, Bellarmine’s letter is similar to Paul V’s brief. Failing the excommunication of the king, it was always possible to call Catholics’ attention to the danger he represented by making an analogy between past and present. History, in the modern sense of the word, had no place here. It was apologetic and in fact contrary to free choice. James’s Catholic subjects, who were also followers of the pope, were caught between the two opposing powers, political and ecclesiastical. It is clear that these two texts shed light on the difficulty facing Catholics, who had to choose between loyalty to their monarch and obedience to their pope. These are the “reasons” for the apologetic discourse. Calling on the Old and New Testaments and the ecclesiastico-political history of the pre-Tridentine Church legitimized the actions of contemporary popes in conflict with rebellious secular authorities who were harming the unity of the Catholic faith. Revisiting Christian history also enabled Bellarmine to turn old arguments into new ones. Beginning with the long-standing tradition of Christian duality—or to be more precise, medieval Christianity structured by political Augustinism and its multiple doctrines of the two powers— Bellarmine developed a new relationship between Christianity and the political institution. In other words, the contraction of history, generated by apologetics, paradoxically promoted the rise of another theologico-political instance. But this intermediary stage of the controversy over the oath of allegiance put Catholic subjects on the horns of a dilemma, as we saw when we analyzed the 60. James I of England, Apologie, Letter from Cardinal Bellarmine to Blackwell I, 36–44, and Bellarmine, Reponce, 173.

156  Bellarmine on the Power of the Papacy oath.61 Their situation was an exact reflection of Western Christianity since the Reform: the unity of Christian truth torn apart, the political institution divided, and Catholic subjects caught between their duties of allegiance to both secular and ecclesiastical powers. It was in this context that Bellarmine drew up his doctrine of the indirect temporal power of the papacy. By claiming to root his theory in the doctrine of the two powers since Pope Gelasius, Bellarmine aimed to respond to the challenge laid down by modern states, marked as much by denominational differences as by their aspirations to politico-religious unity. Yet in its desire to face up to the disintegration of Christianity’s former theologico-political unity, Bellarmine’s response—however moderate he intended it to be—stumbled by blurring the distinction between the Church’s unity of jurisdiction and the indivisible sovereignty of states. He tried to maintain the former duality of powers, while taking new political aspirations into consideration.62 Like the controversy over the oath of allegiance, Bellarmine’s initial attitude to the Protestant prince Henri de Navarre, his involvement in the interdict against Venice, and his opposition to William Barclay’s theses all indicate a defensive attitude and a willingness to fight for Catholicism and the papacy under threat. The new concept of state sovereignty that arose from old medieval ecclesiastico-political conflicts in fact proved advantageous to other doctrines—such as that laid forth in James I’s Trew Law of Free Monarchies and Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance. 61. This is not to state that the conflict between political loyalty and faithfulness to the Church was unprecedented: the early Christians had faced a similar dilemma. 62. On the defensive attitude of sixteenth-century Catholic theology with regard to the rise of theories of divine right, see the concluding remarks in M.-F. RenouxZagamé’s article “Théologie sacerdotale contre théologie séculière: la question du droit divin des rois,” in Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la philosophie politique moderne, 151–52.

chapter Five

> James VI of Scotland’s Trew Law of Free Monarchies A Theologico-Political Hermeneutics of Scripture

J

ames owed his reputation as a theorist of royal abso lutism to his authorship of the True Law of Free Monarchies; or the Reciprock and mutuall duetie betwixt a free King and his natural subjects and Basilikon Doron, published in 1598 and 1599, respectively.1 These two works are of major significance, not just because they take the exact opposite view to the Presbyterians’ monarchomachic theories, but also because they underline James’s concern with preparing to succeed Elizabeth on the throne of England.2 Yet 1. The True Law of Free Monarchies: or, the reciprock and mutuall dutie betwixt a free King, and his natural Subiectes (Edinburgh: Robert Waldegraue, 1598), and Basilikon Doron (Edinburgh: R. Walde-grave, 1599). “True” was spelled “Trew” in the second edition of 1616 (in The Workes of the Most High and Mightie Prince, Iames by the Grace of God, King of Great Britaine, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc., published by Iames, Bishop of Winton, and Deane of his Maiesties Chappel Royall [London: Robert Barker and Iohn Bill, 1616]); for the sake of consistency, the latter is used throughout, unless the text specifies the first edition. 2. See Parsons, A Conference about the Next Succession to the Crowne of Ingland.

157

158  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies the two works, published toward the end of his reign in Scotland, are not identical in nature. Basilikon Doron addresses only members of the court and was made available to the wider public without James’s authorization. The praise for royal authority in Basilikon Doron aroused such hostility that James added a explanatory foreword to the 1603 edition.3 Once the work had been published in London, it was translated into Latin, French, German, Dutch, and Danish. It remained a success throughout the seventeenth century. Unlike the Trew Law of Free Monarchies, Basilikon Doron was not a polemic; it aimed to instruct Prince Henry in the art of governing as a Christian. The text is in three parts. The first reminds the young prince of his “Christian duetie towards God,”4 the second his “duetie in his office.”5 The less important third part is devoted to “the king’s behaviour in indifferent things.”6 The Trew Law of Free Monarchies is a pamphlet in which the king addresses the people as subjects and as Christians. His aim is to discredit both his tutor George Buchanan’s doctrine of resistance and tyrannicide and the political theories of the Ligue in France. He also expresses his firm intention to assert his authority over the Scottish aristocracy. We shall now analyze this treatise, in which James explicitly espouses the cause of direct divine right,7 and cor3. In the “Epistle to the reader” in the 1603 English edition, James pointed out that only seven copies were printed in 1599. 4. James I, Basilikon Doron, 148. 5. Ibid., 155. 6. Ibid., 180. For a more detailed presentation of Basilikon Doron, see my article “La pensée ecclésio-politique de Jacques VI, I, Stuart. Continuité et rupture avec la Suprématie royale anglaise,” in L’Identité anglicane aux XVIème–XXème siècle (Arras, France: Artois Presses Université, 2004). 7. It was not acknowledged as a genuine work by King James until James Montague’s 1616 edition. The style is typical of such pamphlets, although less contentious than Basilikon Doron, and aroused much less public debate. This is what James hoped, as his aim was to lay out the principal characteristics of true monarchy. On the conflict between James’s theologico-political doctrine and the English Parliament,

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  159 relatively, the doctrine of the two kingdoms. His two theses are based on 1 Samuel 8:9–20. These two theses gave him the theoretical tools to oppose the doctrine of the indirect temporal power of the papacy, defended by Suarez and above all by Bellarmine, James’s first and most vigorous adversary. James began another intellectual dispute a few years later with his Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance. This was a controversial work aimed at the Holy See, in which the religious question was given equal importance to that of the monarch’s sovereignty because of the problem raised by his Catholic subjects’ loyalty to the pope. Although the Basilikon Doron challenges Puritans and Trew Law of Free Monarchies challenges Catholics, both works defend the political legitimacy of a king by divine right over denominational duties. The ten years from 1598 to 1608 (in addition to his long reign in Scotland) saw James develop his theory of the theologico-political origins of secular power and his ecclesiological beliefs. One point remains constant in James’s thought throughout this period: he always based the autonomy and sovereignty of the political institution on considerations other than Christian theology. Although James does not use the term “paradox,” it sums up his theory of the basis of power. While it could be applied to Christian doctrine as a whole, James had an original approach in an age of reform: although theological language contributes to the constitution of a political order, and although the political order absorbs such language, this does not mean that either is sacrificed to the other. James thereby leaves behind the issue of temporal involvement in matters spiritual and vice versa, which dominated the medieval period and which his English predecessors and the theologians of the Reform had espoused. We shall now turn to the particular nature see Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution. An Introduction to English Political Thought 1603–1642 (London: Macmillan, 1992), especially 115–38.

160  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies of the Jacobean paradox, explained first in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies and then in the Apologie. We shall begin by describing the conditions that provided the theological basis for the political order, before examining how and why the creation of the monarchy led to the inclusion of the biblical postulate of the origin of power in law. To conclude, we shall examine the status of the religious condition in the political sphere. Our task with regard to the first two points will be to demonstrate that divine right was the central plank of James VI of Scotland’s political thought. The four basic postulates that legitimize the civil institution—Scripture, the king’s coronation oath, natural law, and historical and legal arguments—were determined by the Old Testament model of monarchy. On the final point, our task is to shed light on the convergence between James’s political principles and his ecclesiological ideas— in other words, between the divine right of kings and the doctrine of the two kingdoms. The latter, suggested in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies through a close correlation between civil obedience and subjects’ theologico-spiritual freedom, is clearly developed in the Apologie. James’s understanding of tolerance can be measured on the basis of the divine right of kings and the doctrine of the two kingdoms. We must examine the theologico-political status of Scripture in James’s thought to explore these three points. We must resolve two essential issues—the structure of the composition and argument in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies and the question of sources with regard to James’s use of Calvinist political thought and the relevance of political theology in the light of Scripture. The exploration of these two points will provide the basis for our analysis of the treatise’s intellectual structure, beginning with the commentary on 1 Samuel (8:9–20) dealing with the creation of the monarchy.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  161

The Structure of the Composition and Argument in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies >

It must be said that James’s thought is hard to decipher on first reading, due both to the composition of the Trew Law of Free Monarchies and to the lack of clear hermeneutic rules enabling the reader to grasp his biblical exegesis. The structure of the treatise’s composition and argument make it a particularly complex matter to follow the thread of James’s thought, which is not formally laid out in chapters, parts, or paragraphs. By dismantling the work to lay bare the different points that structure his thought, we have identified five parts. The first is preceded by a brief note to the reader explaining the king’s intention to instruct his subjects in the true basis of political institutions, while the fifth is followed by a conclusion that details the author’s theologico-political project. The first part begins by taking up the overall title, Trew Law of Free Monarchies; or the Reciprock and mutuall duetie betwixt a free King and his natural subjects, in which James announces the first postulate of his political thought: As there is not a thing so necessarie to be knowne by the people of any land, next the knowledge of their God, as the right knowledge of their alleageance, according to the forme of gouernement established among them, especially in a Monarchie (which forme of gouernement, as resembling the Diuinitie, approcheth nearest to perfection, as all the learned and wisee men from the beginning haue agreed vpon; Vnitie being the perfection of all things).8

Taking this postulate as a starting point, three notions are to be borne in mind: God, Unity, and Perfection, without which no political order can have a true basis. The second part is introduced with the same postulate, but goes on to develop two others: 8. Trew Law of Free Monarchies, 193.

162  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies First then, I will set downe the trew grounds, whereupon I am to build, out of the Scriptures, since Monarchie is the trew paterne of Diuinitie, as I haue already said: next, from the fundamental Lawes of our owne Kingdome, which nearest must concerne vs: thirdly, from the law of Nature, by diuers similitudes drawne out of the same: and will conclude syne by answering the most waighty and appearing incommodities that can be objected.9

James draws on these three postulates (Scripture, fundamental law, and natural law) to describe a king’s duty to his subjects—in other words, the moral ideal of an authentic royal government. The third part is marked by a break that determines the project and later structure of the treatise.10 Up to this point, James has justified and described the basis and aims of good government. From this point on, he aims to analyze the theologico-political origins of the divine right of kings and the resulting obedience of their subjects. This break initially gives the impression of a contradiction: the just king whose duty is to serve his subjects gives way to a prince with absolute power. The fourth part does not resolve this contradiction, because James justifies the absoluteness of monarchical power by Scottish history and law:11 civil law strengthens the theological basis for the divine right of kings. Finally, in the fifth part, the thesis of the absoluteness of power is definitively confirmed by his response to his opponents’ objections as regards the prohibition of the right12—or duty—of resistance by his subjects. Only in the conclusion does James indicate that he has not forgotten his high opinion of the royal function:13 the king’s vocation is to serve his subjects, and they in turn must support him, because his happiness is theirs and vice versa. As the programmatic full title of the Trew Law of Free Monarchies suggests, the king and the people have reciprocal and mutual duties. Yet the end of the treatise, however positive, cannot 9. Ibid., 194. 11. Ibid., 201–5. 13. Ibid., 209–10.

10. Ibid., 195–201. 12. Ibid., 205–9.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  163 help us immediately to understand the shift from an ideal vision of the monarchy to the much more equivocal vision in the third part. The second difficulty, which arises from the use of a Calvinist source and Scripture, will help us understand this shift.

The Influence on James I’s Thought of Three Axioms of Calvinist Theology and the Process of Analogy >

Fundamental principles are an essential part of understanding the hermeneutic rules governing James VI’s theologico-political exegesis. As we have seen, James was influenced by his Calvinist education, while rejecting Presbyterian ecclesiastico-political theories. This is why, when he wrote his treatise in 1598, his political perspective brought about a reform within the Reform. This is also true of the shift he imposed on the Anglican theory of the relationship between Church and society, which we have seen in particular in Hooker’s writings on royal supremacy. These two transformations are in fact not unrelated, both arising from the doctrine of divine right and the hereditary legitimacy of the Crown. It can also be seen in the doctrine of the two kingdoms, which is corroborated by James’s oath of allegiance as compared with those of the Tudor monarchs. Let us begin by examining the Calvinist source from which James borrowed three fundamental axioms: Scripture as the sole source of the transmission of Christian truth; the lasting theological value of the Old Testament within the economy of the New Testament; and the theocentric understanding of divine providence, which translates as the focalization on the theme of God’s power, which James evokes in terms such as “command” and “law.”14 Through these three axioms, James gives Scripture a specifically 14. On Calvin’s theology, see Gisel, Le Christ de Calvin, especially chs. 1 and 2.

164  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies theologico-political interpretative status, particularly highlighting a single Old Testament text: the account of the creation of monarchy in 1 Samuel (8:9–20). He draws on this account to develop his biblical interpretation of monarchy, helped by two theological determinations that embody a judicial, ethical, and political principle: the absoluteness of monarchical power by divine accord, sealed by a contract inspired by the first royal model in the biblical alliance. These two determinations are due to the people who challenged God’s yoke, which harks back to the hidden side of the treatise, the moment when the people accepted God as their sole ruler. These determinations also call for a dialectics of obedience and liberty; then, in correlation to the first theological determination, the transfer of the reign of God to the king’s right implies a doctrine of two kingdoms. Furthermore, the dialectic of obedience and liberty and the doctrine of the two kingdoms can be found by a process of analogy. James draws on this process and on the three Calvinist axioms to attribute a theologico-political status to Scripture, resulting in a politico-theological status for the civil institution of the monarchy. To begin with, let us note that James chose wisely in selecting 1 Samuel as his biblical reference. It was indeed in this text that the Hebrews opted for a monarchy, which proved to be a fault. However, by selecting one single text relative to the Hebrews’ political epic, James inevitably gives the creation of the monarchy a onesided meaning, corroborated by the theory of divine right that the biblical authors were not familiar with. This is where James’s theological assumptions become clear. He sets out to demonstrate that the political institution is the result both of faults15 and of God’s ordinance.16 On this negative basis, he draws a parallel between the Hebrews’ wish to be gov15. The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, 197. 16. Ibid., 197.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  165 erned by a king and the politico-religious context in Scotland in the late sixteenth century. This is the first aspect of the analogy that enables us to grasp the meaning James attributes to the two theological determinations, “fault” and “God’s yoke.”17 In other words, the analogy is the means by which James affirms the legitimacy of the divine right of kings and justifies the passive obedience of his subjects. The process is the same in the part devoted to historical argument. James draws an analogy between past and present that legitimizes a free monarchy. The analogy would not be complete, however, without the second step, in which James converts a juridico-political meaning into theologico-biblical language. This process is clear in the fourth and fifth parts of the treatise. The use of analogy requires a clarification of the concept’s definition to understand the general tenor of James’s thought. The first aspect of the analogy avoids the solution of historical continuity, while in the second, it is clearly explained by the switch from theologico-biblical to legal language. The Israelite monarchy is not in question, but rather that of James and the legitimacy of his divine right. Indeed, the expression “divine right” (although the expression “divine right” never appears in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies!) nicely sums up this analogy. The “divine” nature of monarchy implies a political theology mediated by law. This is the heart of what the analogy, and thus the theologico-political status of Scripture, means for James. This fraught concept of history, familiar to medieval scholastic theologians, no longer has the metaphysical status here that it once did. However, it is far from being the case that all metaphysical reference has been removed, as we 17. On this issue, see André Lichnerowicz, François Perroux, and Gilbert Gadoffre, eds., Recherches interdisciplinaires. Analogie et connaissance, vol. 1, Aspects historiques (Paris: Maloine, 1980), particularly ch. 4: “Les hommes de la Renaissance et l’analogie,” 47–53; ch. 9: “L’analogie dans la pensée de Calvin,” 113–23; and ch. 11: “L’analogie corps humain-corps social dans la pensée politique du XVIe siècle,” 139–47.

166  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies have seen that the first postulate in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies affirms that royalty is the most perfect type of government because of the underlying principle of unity, which mirrors the unity of God. Other authors in the Anglican tradition, particularly preachers, were to defend this belief later in the seventeenth century. The expression that best sums up this thinking is “the great chain of being” that hierarchizes the human order in imitation of God the Creator.18 However, in the perspective put forward by James and the Anglican thinkers, the metaphysical basis now aims to place royalty at the center of the world. Consequently, it implies a redistribution of earthly powers in favor of the superiority of the political over the spiritual power of the ecclesiastical institution. James’s use of Scripture, particularly a text of biblical history, meant realizing the new analogico-metaphysical basis: he defines the political institution as the cornerstone of earthly society in relation to God and the cornerstone of the world order. This is why we should not misunderstand the term “metaphysical”: James’s language is in fact a sign between divine and human reality and a theory that enables him to draw up a theologico-political epistemology of the institution of human reality.19 Drawing on the analogy’s new status, James can tell apart good and bad governments, kings and tyrants, just as his scholastic predecessors could. In the passage from 18. Conrad Russell, “Arguments for Religious Unity in England, 1530–1650”, in Journal of Ecclesiastical History 18, no. 2 (October 1967): 201–26. See also Margaret Atwood Judson, The Crisis of the Constitution: An Essay in Constitutional and Political Thought in England 1603–1645 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988). 19. It was not until the advent of modern political philosophy that the origins of the political institution were examined in the light of a much more elaborate rationality. The task fell to Thomas Hobbes in England and later to Baruch Spinoza, both of whom placed political theology at the heart of their philosophical systems. Drawing up a new, autonomous, individualist natural law in relation to Christian revelation was to prove the cornerstone of modern politics. It nonetheless remains the case that the political theologies of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, like that of James himself, paved the way for these new perspectives. Religious controversies certainly played an important role!

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  167 the spiritual power of God to the political power of man, the only place left for the arbitrary is scholastic metaphysics and the resulting status of the analogy. The Calvinist inspiration behind James’s thought is here confirmed by Calvin’s theology of divine providence, the role he attributes to Scripture and to temporal power as a sign of God’s power. Although the same cannot be said for the relationship between the civil authority and the Church, in that the theory and above all the practice of Calvin and his followers are more complex from this point of view,20 the same scheme of thought applies to the ecclesiastical institution: it is the sign of God and Christ’s presence on earth,21 and as such, its visibility cannot compete with that of the political institution. We shall of course return to this absolutely essential point, which is at the heart of the incompatibility of Bellarmine’s and James’s theories. Finally, the analogico-metaphysical basis, in James’s thinking, had the key consequence of maintaining a link with history, albeit one far removed from our critical and scientific history. However, the necessity of verifying the metaphysical postulate of the monarchy through Scripture meant that ancient, and especially religious, history was the obvious choice of process in legitimizing the political institution. While the theologico-biblical language harks back to the constitution of a juridico-political order, it looks forward to a metaphysics of foundations, which in return cannot do without Scripture and secular attestation. Biblical history thus becomes the theological site from which James promotes his apology for monarchy, as a truth that is as much metaphysico-political as it is theologico-political. He used the same apologetic vision of history in the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance, but, paradoxically, this use of history could not fail to arouse critical doubt in the longer term regarding his use of both 20. I am thinking here particularly of the Presbyterian Reform in Scotland and the doctrine of the two reigns espoused by the pastors. 21. See Gisel, Le Christ de Calvin, 184–90.

168  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies religious and secular texts, as the controversy with Bellarmine was amply to prove. This was both the new richness of James’s use of analogy and its theoretical weakness: analogy proved to be much more a method of illustration, “proving right” royalty by divine right, than a true rational basis—hence the reciprocal relationship between the theologico-biblical and juridico-political languages.

James I ’ s Justification of Divine Right >

James’s Hermeneutics Having noted the Calvinist sources and the Jacobean definition of the analogy, we can now continue our analysis of the shift from theologico-biblical to juridico-political language. The shift is characterized by the fact that it takes place as a sign and not a cause. Thus the people’s wish to have a king is a fault insofar as it is not presented in the treatise as having been prompted by a particular event. As a result, the term “fault” is a sign in two ways: it looks back to what we have described as the hidden face of the treatise and looks forward to the political foundation of the monarchy. The same is true for the terms “God,” “king,” “obedience,” and “law,” which stand at the center of the mutual relationship between theologico-biblical and juridico-political language. The analogy with Scripture would be irrelevant if James did not back it up with two criteria, hermeneutic and theological, in the second paragraph of the third part of the treatise. They are introduced by this long statement of principle: Now then, since the erection of this Kingdome and Monarchie among the Iewes, and the law thereof may, and ought to bee a paterne to all Christian and well founded Monarchies, as beeing founded by God himselfe, who by his Oracle, and out of his owne mouth gaue the law thereof: what liberty can broiling spirits, and rebellious minds claime iustly to against any Christian Monarchie; since they can claime to no

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  169 greater libertie on their part, nor the people of God might haue done, and no greater tyranny was euer executed by any Prince or tyrant, whom they can obiect, nor was here fore-warned to the people of God, (and yet all rebellion countermanded vnto them) if tyrannizing ouer mens persons, sonnes, daugthers and seruants; redacting noble houses, and men, and women of noble blood, to slauish and seruile offices; and extortion, and spoile of their lands and goods to the princes owne priuate vse and commoditie, and of his courteours, and seruants, may be called a tyrannie?22 

We shall begin by examining the hermeneutic criterion. Underlining the ongoing relevance of the Old Testament in the New is of key importance because paradigmatic value is attributed to the Old Testament model of monarchy: it is the universal model of all “well founded” government in Christian society. Furthermore, the ongoing relevance of the Old Testament is a precondition for the analogical relationship to Scripture and the language that gives the Bible theologico-political status. Without the ongoing relevance of the Old Testament in the New, James could not have turned to the Book of Samuel to provide a biblical basis for the divine right of kings or transformed theologico-biblical into judicial language. The result would have been the impossibility of establishing a legal link between the monarch’s power and the obedience of his subjects. Only the historical argument (concerning Scottish and English history) would allow him to ground his legitimacy by invoking the ancestral right of ownership over his realm. Of course, this source should not be underestimated in James’s political thought, but by itself it is rather insubstantial, particularly due to the somewhat mythical aspect of this history, at least in the earliest times. In fact, it is difficult to picture how James could imagine a limit to his power, and, similarly, how he could manage to overcome the considerable gap between the moral ideal of the royal function and the right over people and property. 22. The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, 199.

170  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies However, the hermeneutical criterion is not enough in itself to validate James’s analysis of the theologico-political origin of the monarchy. It is necessary to examine a second theological, or rather theocentric, criterion. In the text just quoted, James states that “Monarchie among the Iewes, and the law thereof may, and ought to bee a paterne to all Christian and well founded Monarchies, as beeing founded by God himselfe, who by his Oracle, and out of his owne mouth gaue the law thereof.”23 In other words, for the ongoing relevance of the Old Testament in the New to be thinkable requires the presupposition that the Word of God, as it appears in the Book of Samuel, is in no way affected by the new mode of revelation intrinsic in the Christian doctrine of the incarnation; hence the theocentric aspect of this theological criterion, shown by the royal title “God’s lieutenant in [sic] earth.”24 We shall see later the extent to which this second criterion succeeded in limiting the king’s power and respecting the moral end of his function. At this point it is important to note an absolutely essential fact—the close correlation between the hermeneutic and the theological criteria. The latter lends value to the former (hence the universal relevance of the Old Testament model of monarchy), while as a result, the former lends validity to the process of analogy, and consequently to the meaning of key terms in the doctrine of divine right. These two criteria enable us once again to see the importance of Calvinist sources in James’s thought, but recast in the light of establishing the institution of monarchy. The analogy enables James to give Scripture a specific hermeneutic status: theological questions are themselves predetermined by a political intention. This is why biblical language never has a strictly theological status: it is theologico-political in its aims and juridico-ethical in its meaning effect. Consequently, the two sides of the analogy—looking back to the universally normative status of the Old Testament model of monarchy, and forward through 23. Ibid., 199. 24. Ibid., 200.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  171 the mediation of the New Testament (and with the Scottish Christian model of monarchy)—lie at the heart of the theologico-political paradox of the institution of monarchy by divine right. James’s theologico-political project is undeniably innovative in transforming biblical vocabulary into legal concepts. In the historical and legal parts of his treatise (parts 4 and 5), he also links divine right to the fundamental laws of the kingdom, the right to property and birthright. The result is a hereditary legitimist theory of royalty and a doctrine of the two kingdoms linked to a dialectic relationship between obedience and liberty. Both were powerful arguments that James used against his Catholic opponents in the dispute over the oath of allegiance. We shall now examine the relevance of the process of analogy and the hermeneutic and theocentric criteria that structure James’s political thought in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies.

From Theologico-biblical to Juridico-ethical and Political Language: The Scriptural Basis for the Divine Right of Kings, 1 Samuel 8:9–20  To begin with, let us quote the brief introduction that precedes the account of the creation of the Israelite monarchy: As to the other branch of this mutuall and reciprock band, is the duety and alleageance that the Lieges owe to their King: the ground whereof, I take out of the words of Samuel, dited by Gods Spirit, when God had giuen him commandement to heare the peoples voice in choosing and annointing them a King. And because that place of Scripture being well vnderstood, is so pertinent for our purpose, I haue insert herein the very words of the Text.25

The break we have noted in the treatise’s composition and argument is explicitly stated here: while the king has a duty to his subjects, the subjects also have duties, as the text from the Book of Samuel clearly indicates. The break is signified by a reversal of the 25. Ibid., 195.

172  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies ethical ideal of royal government. In other words, having affirmed the basic principles of monarchy, James goes on to give a historicobiblical explanation: 9. Now therefore hearken to their voice: howbeit yet testifie unto them, and shew them the maner of the King, that shall raigne ouer them. 10. So Samuel tolde all the wordes of the Lord unto the people that asked a King of him. 11. And he said, This shall be the maner of the King that shall raigne ouer you; he will take your sonnes, and appoint them to his Charets, and to be his horsemen, and some shall runne before his Charet. 12. Also, hee will make them his captaines ouer thousands, and captaines ouer fifties and to eare his ground, and to reape his haruest, and to make instruments of warre and the things that serue for his charets: 13. Hee will also take your daughters, and make them Apothicaries, and Cookes, and Bakers. 14. And hee will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your best Oliue trees, and giue them to his seruants. 15. And he will take the tenth of your seed, and of your Vineyards, and giue it to his Eunuches, and to his seruants. 16. And he will take your men-seruants, and maid-seruants, and the chiefe of your yong men, and your asses, and put them to his worke. 17. He wil take the tenth of your sheepe: and ye shall be his seruants. 18. And ye shall cry out at that day, because of your King, whom ye haue chosen you: and the Lord God will not heare you at that day. 19. But the people would not heare the voice of Samuel, but did say: Nay, but there shalbe a King ouer vs. 20. And we also will be like all other Nations, and our King shall iudge vs, and goe out before vs, and fight our battles.26

In order to highlight the linguistic structure of the account and its meaning, we shall note the principal verbs used: “take” (5 uses, verses 13 through 17); “reign” (2 uses, verses 9 and 11); “make” (1 use, verse 12); “cry out” (1 use, verse 18); “judge” (1 use, verse 20); and “hearken” and “hear” (respectively 1 and 2 uses, verses 9, 18, and 19). 26. Ibid., 196.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  173 All these verbs, conjugated in the future tense, point to the characteristics of the ethico-political condition the people are entering into. It covers both people (the verbs “be,” “reign,” “make,” “judge,” and “take”) and property (the verb “take”), as well as God, who, through Samuel, dictates the conditions governing the agreement (the verbs “hear” and “hearken”). Note that these two verbs, “hear” and “hearken,” are used first to highlight an act of communication by God (verse 9), then to add in conclusion that he will not go back on his word (verse 18). The third and final occurrence underlines the people’s refusal to listen to the negative consequences of their desire to have a king (verse 19). The sole occurrence of the verb “judge,” in the last verse, confirms this: it is the only instance where the people speak for themselves and give the passage its overall meaning: the people want a king (verse 19) to be judged like other nations (verse 20). This verb should be borne in mind, as it is one of the most important keys to James’s justification of the monarchy and its institutional guarantee. James then returns to this account to comment on it, verse by verse. He explains the consequences of the “break” in the “ethical” and “justice” relationships defined in the fundamental principles of royal government. For the moment, let us return to our linguistic analysis. We shall return later to James’s general conclusion. Let us simply note that the transformation in the relationship between the king and his subjects (in comparison with the second part of the treatise) foreshadows the historical argument by which James justifies the right over people and property and the king’s superiority over the law. For now, we shall consider the first consequence of this break: But by the contrary it is plaine, and euident, that this speech of Samuel to the people, was to prepare their hearts before the hand to the due obedience of that King, which God was to giue vnto them; and therefore opened vp vnto them, what might be the intollerable qualities that might fall in some of their kings, thereby preparing them to patience,

174  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies not to resist to Gods ordinance: but as he would haue said; Since God hath granted your importunate suit in giuing you a king, as yee haue else committed an errour in shaking off Gods yoke, and ouer-hastie seeking of a King; so beware yee fall not into the next, in casting off also rashly that yoke, which God at your earnest suite hath laid vpon you, how hard that euer it seeme to be: For as ye could not haue obtained one without the permission and ordinance of God, so may yee no more, fro hee be once set ouer you, shake him off without the same warrant. And therefore in time arme your selues with patience and humilitie, since he that hath the only power to make him, hath the onely power to vnmake him; and ye onely to obey, bearing with these straits that I now foreshew you, as with the finger of God, which lieth not in you to take off.27

This text is of major significance in that it both sums up and completes in six points the process that we analyzed in the account from the Book of Samuel, by which the people are required to obey the king and put their trust in God: The people committed a fault in rejecting the yoke of God. Samuel warned them of their fault. The people refused to listen to him. God granted the people a king. If the people wanted to change their king, they had to request permission from God. They thus had a duty of obedience, patience, and humility, and were therefore prohibited from any right or duty of resistance. It is clear that this text gives the two theological determinations for the people’s fault and the yoke of God. As a series of signs, rather than in the order of composition, they represent the first of the consequences that were to lead to the definitive creation of the monarchy, with God and passive obedience as its cornerstone. The fault is at the origin of the analogical relationship between 27. Ibid., 197.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  175 the theological and political languages (although not yet legal in this context)—analogical in that the question is one of a fault that disqualifies the yoke (or reign) of God. In this, James’s commentary on the text from Samuel makes use of a religious language specifically located in Christian doctrine, although he does not use the word “sin.” At the same time, because of the agreement with God, the word takes on an analogical meaning that acts as a sign in terms of the political foundation. In other words, the two sides of the fault look to the transgression of an ideal moment in God’s relationship with his people and to the development of a new order of theologico-political reality. Consequently, the fault and the divine guarantee are the two central criteria that determine the other concepts in James’s political thought, such as the terms “obedience,” “patience,” “non-resistance,” and “the yoke of God.” These terms reappear when James defines the relationship between the king and his subjects in the fourth and last parts of his treatise. Now let us turn to the text that best explains the fundamental problem raised by the break in the relationship of ethics and justice created by the people’s fault: The best and noblest of your blood shall be compelled in slauish and seruile offices to serue him: And not content of his owne patrimonie, will make vp a rent to his owne vse out of your best lands, vineyards, orchards, and store of cattell: So as inuerting the Law of nature, and office of a King, your persons and the persons of your posteritie, together with your lands, and all that ye possesse shal serue his priuate vse, and inordinate appetite.28

This statement that the law of nature is reversed corroborates the break in the order of the ethics of power and justice as regards the description of an ideal royal function. It thus becomes necessary to consider the meaning of the royal function in terms of the criteria of fault and divine guarantee. However, “break” does not mean 28. Ibid., 198.

176  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies “contradiction.” We must start from these two theological determinations to verify whether the king’s duties are maintained, and if so, by what criteria. Let us now briefly turn to another text that lays forth the legal consequences of overturning natural law: As he would say; When ye shall finde these things in proofe that now I fore-warne you of, although you shall grudge and murmure, yet it shal not be lawful to you to cast it off, in respect it is not only the ordinance of God, but also your selues haue chosen him vnto you, thereby renouncing for euer all priuiledges, by your willing consent out of your hands, whereby in any time hereafter ye would claime, and call backe vnto your selues againe that power, which God shall not permit you to doe. And for further taking away of all excuse, and retraction of this their contract, after their consent to vnder-lie this yoke with all the burthens that hee hath declared vnto them, he craues their answere, and consent to his proposition: which appeareth by their answere, as it is expressed in these words: 19. Nay, but there shall be a King ouer vs. 20. And we also will be like all other nations: and our king shall iudge vs, and goe out before vs and fight our battles.29

Three notions represent the central plank of James’s political thought from a legal point of view: the definitive renunciation of all privileges, voluntary consent, and the contract made with God through Samuel. The analogical relationship with biblical language is confirmed. We have seen how to begin with, the biblical language of fault looked back to a (supposedly) unknown anteriority and forward to a political ethics of obedience through the people’s patience and humility. It then secondly, and lastly, looked back implicitly to the first biblical model of royal alliance and forward explicitly to a theologico-judicial doctrine of obedience. As a result, although Scripture has a political status due to the analogical structure of biblical language, this status can never entirely 29. Ibid.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  177 leave behind its origin in theology. Three parties are required for the contract of subjection: a population that already constitutes a people, divine revelation (a God who speaks to men), and a prophet, through whom the two parties to the contract reach an agreement. This results in a paradox: the divine yoke is rejected, but on the condition that God approves the king’s nomination—a precondition to the validity of the contract. God is thus the sole guarantor of the relationship between the sovereign and the people, which essentially means that the personification of the juridico-political order in the figure of the king is possible only with regard to God’s legal power. The role of the prophet has been replaced in political terms by the king and in theological terms by God, the sovereign’s only true judge, because He is the third party who guarantees the terms of the contract of subjection: Shortly then to take vp in two or three sentences, grounded vpon all these arguments, out of the lawe of God, the duetie, and alleageance of the people to their lawfull king, their obedience, I say, ought to be to him, as to Gods Lieutenants in earth, obeying his commands in all things, except directly against God, as the commands of Gods Minister, acknowledging him a Iudge set by God ouer them, hauing power to iudge them, but to be iudged onely by God, whom to onely hee must giue count of his iudgement.30

This statement of principle in the second paragraph of the third part of the treatise confirms the nature of the contract in terms of the king’s power. In this context, the reference to Scripture is no longer necessary; duty and allegiance are now no more than a reminder to justify what comes next—royal legitimacy (this is where the term “legitimacy” first appears) due to the king’s function of “God’s lieutenant in earth” (also used here for the first time). It is in this capacity—and this is the crux of the text—that he is the people’s judge, whose powers are limited by the judgment of 30. Ibid., 200.

178  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies God, to whom he must give account of his government and against whom he cannot make any laws. The four times “judgment” is mentioned—twice as a verb, twice as a noun—are attributed twice to the king and twice to God. They indicate the political end of the royal contract by pointing back to God, who authorized the contract, and forward to the king, who implements it. They also represent a legal and political translation of the people’s utterance at the end of the account in the Book of Samuel. Let us now turn to the meaning effects in the historical and legal arguments, which James addresses in the following two parts of the treatise.

The Historical Justification of the Divine Right of Kings  The theory of the contract of subjection that can be summed up in three key concepts—the obedience of the people who renounce all their privileges by virtue of their will to consent, the king’s judicial power, and God’s judicial power—is corroborated in the historical argument in the fourth part of the treatise. It represents a second, empirical basis for the contract. Monarchy by divine right has been legitimized since the beginnings of English and Scottish history; the first kings naturally owned what they conquered31 and thus wrote the law: “And so it followes of necessitie, that the kings were the authors and makers of the Lawes, and not the Lawes of the kings.”32 The fact that the kings wrote the laws resulted in another principle: “yet, it lies in the power of no Parliament, to make any kinde of Lawe or Statute, without his Scepter be to it, for giuing it the force of a Law.”33 The king’s superiority over the law is thus clearly stated within the Jacobean contract of subjection. The power of life or death over his subjects was another argument supporting the principle that all power came from the sovereign: “And as ye see it manifest, that 31. Ibid., 201. 33. Ibid., 202.

32. Ibid.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  179 the King is ouer-Lord of the whole land: so is he Master ouer euery person that inhabiteth the same, hauing power ouer the life and death of euery one of them.”34 This statement echoes the notion whereby the advent of the monarchy according to the wishes of the people led to the overturning of the natural law: people and property thus depend on the royal will. But as we have seen in the second paragraph of the treatise’s third part, God alone can judge the king. James stresses this theological principle in the limits of royal power: Not that I deny the old definition of a King, and of a law; which makes the king to bee a speaking law, and the Law a dumbe king: for certainely a king that gouernes not by his lawe, can neither be countable to God for his administration, nor haue a happy and established raigne.35

He then adds a second principle—the voluntary restriction of his will by the good example he must set for his subjects: As likewise, although I haue said, a good king will frame all his actions to be according to the Law; yet is hee not bound thereto but of his good will, and for good example-giuing to his subiects.36

James’s theory of the contract, as developed from Scripture, is confirmed even more clearly in the fifth and final part of the treatise, in which he responds to his opponents’ objections concerning the right or duty of resistance or rebellion.

The Illegitimacy of Resistance  James gives four responses. The first contradicts the so-called passions of subjects to liberate their country from the oppression of “bad and tyrannical kings,” based on the following postulate: Whereunto I giue two answeres: First, it is a sure Axiome in Theologie, that euill should not be done, that good may come of it: The wicked34. Ibid., 203. 36. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

180  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies nesse therefore of the King can neuer make them that are ordained to be iudged by him, to become his Iudges. And if it be not lawfull to a priuate man to reuenge his priuate iniury vpon his priuate aduersary (since God hath onely giuen the sword to the Magistrate) how much lesse is it lawfull to the people, or any part of them (who all are but priuate men, the authoritie being alwayes with the Magistrate, as I haue already proued) to take vpon them the vse of the sword, whom to it belongs not, against the publicke Magistrate, whom to onely it belongeth. Next, in the place of relieuing the common-wealth out of distresse (which is their onely excuse and colour) they shall heape double distresse and desolation vpon it; and so their rebellion shall procure the contrary effects that they pretend it for: For a king cannot be imagined to be so vnruly and tyrannous, but the common-wealth will be kept in better order, notwithstanding thereof, by him, then it can be by his waytaking. For first, all sudden mutations are perillous in common-wealths, hope being thereby giuen to all bare men to set vp themselues, and flie with other mens feathers, the reines being loosed to all the insolencies that disordered people can commit by hope of impunitie, because of the loosenesse of all things. And next, it is certaine that a king can neuer be so monstrously vicious, but hee will generally fauour iustice, and maintaine some order, except in the particulars, wherein his inordinate lustes and passions cary him away; where by the contrary, no King being, nothing is vnlawfull to none: And so the olde opinion of the Philosophers prooues trew, That better it is to liue in a Common-wealth, where nothing is lawfull, then where all things are lawfull to all men; the Common-wealth at that time resembling an vndanted young horse that hath casten his rider: For as the diuine Poet Dv Bartas sayth, Better it were to suffer some disorder in the estate, and some spots in the Common wealth, then in pretending to reforme, vtterly to ouerthrow the Republicke.37

James’s answer contains five arguments that we have already encountered in part: the principle that “evil should not be done, that good may come of it” means denying the people the legiti37. Ibid., 206.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  181 macy of commandeering the judicial function, either individually or collectively, to bring about a change in their condition. Espousing this principle implies challenging the unity of power, which the magistrate alone holds. Rebellions always have effects opposite to those initially intended and give rise to an disorderly appetite for power. With a few rare exceptions, the king’s moral fallibility is never great enough to make him a tyrant over his subjects. Consequently, it is preferable for the people to be obedient, even if the kingdom is in disorder, rather than living in a semblance of political order where because nothing is legitimate, everything is legitimate. James’s second response to his opponents deals with the problem of the curse that afflicts the kingdom, and correlatively the problem of the correct interpretation of God’s will to restore the common weal. James answers his opponents in their own terms by drawing on a theological axiom: Whereunto for answere, I grant indeed, that a wicked king is sent by God for a curse to his people, and a plague for their sinnes.38

The text once again dismisses all thoughts of the rejection of royal power because of its divine origin. The use of the word “sin” (for the first time!) underlines the religious significance of the curse and strengthens the theological case for prohibiting the right or duty of rebellion. To back up his argument, James quotes several examples from the Old and New Testament that exhort the people not only to obey, but also to pray. As a spiritual theme, prayer crops up repeatedly in James’s political thought—as we shall see, it appears in other texts. The most important part of James’s response deserves to be quoted. It repeats in full the consequences of the contract for subjects, not only in ethical and spiritual terms—“patience” and “prayer”—but also legal, reminding them that agreement implies the definitive loss of their privileges: 38. Ibid.

182  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies It is certaine then (as I haue already by the Law of God sufficiently proued) that patience, earnest prayers to God, and amendment of their liues, are the onely lawful meanes to moue God to relieue them of that heauie curse. As for vindicating to themselues their owne libertie, what lawfull power haue they to reuoke to themselues againe those priuiledges, which by their owne consent before were so fully put out of their hands? for if a Prince cannot iustly bring backe againe to himself the priuiledges once bestowed by him or his predecessors vpon any state or ranke of his subiects; how much lesse may the subiects reaue out of the princes hand that superioritie, which he and his Predecessors haue so long brooked ouer them?39

James’s third response also deals with a problem of interpreting God’s will in Scripture. James considered that his opponents believed that rebellions were legitimate because their success was willed by God. He contradicts this belief, saying that it is misguided to judge the cause by the consequence. This argument is based on God’s freedom to support wrongdoers to defend his own cause. This freedom is part of God’s judiciary role over the king: And therefore God will make oft times them that haue the wrong side reuenge iustly his quarrell; and when he hath done, cast his scourge in the fire; as he oft times did to his owne people, stirring vp and strengthening their enemies, while they were humbled in his sight, and then deliuered them in their hands. So God, as the great Iudge may iustly punish his Deputie, and for his rebellion against him, stir vp his rebels to meet him with the like: And when it is done, the part of the instrument is no better then the diuels part is in tempting and torturing such as God committeth to him as his hangman to doe: Therefore, as I said in the beginning, it is oft times a very deceiueable argument, to iudge of the cause by the euent.40

In other words, in certain circumstances, the people can be the tool of God’s will against the sovereign, as certain biblical accounts 39. Ibid., 207. 40. Ibid.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  183 indicate. James believes that God acts as He sees fit and denies the biblical basis for rebellion, considering the act as devoid of all theological and moral, and thus legal, legitimacy. James demonstrates this in his fourth and final riposte. This is the most decisive of all, as it recapitulates the preceding arguments and lays bare two opposing conceptions of the mutual engagement between the king and the people. It enables us to shed light on the meaning of the shift noted earlier from a description of the ethical ideal of the royal function to its theologico-political origin. To begin, let us study the contractual theory espoused by James’s opponents: And the last obiection is grounded vpon the mutuall paction and adstipulation (as they call it) betwixt the King and his people, at the time of his coronation: For there, say they, there is a mutuall paction, and contract bound vp, and sworne betwixt the king, and the people: Whereupon it followeth, that if the one part of the contract or the Indent bee broken vpon the Kings side, the people are no longer bound to keepe their part of it, but are thereby freed of their oath: For (say they) a contract betwixt two parties, of all Law frees the one partie, if the other breake vnto him.41

James’s opponents believed that the contract between the people and the king was associated with a “mutual pact” that placed the two parties on an equal footing. Consequently, if the king broke the mutually sworn pact, the contract was invalid and the people were freed from their oath. These are the theories espoused by George Buchanan and John Knox. Clearly, this theory is diametrically opposed to that defended by James in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies, which identifies the fundamental law with the rights of the Crown by virtue of the royal acquisition of the land in his realm and the superiority of the king over the law.42 We have also seen that the subjects’ volun41. Ibid. 42. See C. McIlwain, The Political Works of James I, XXXVIII.

184  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies tary renunciation of their privileges prohibits them from retracting their consent. Following a method already used in his earlier responses, James partly acknowledges the value of his opponents’ arguments. He concedes that the king promises at his coronation to honor his duties. However, these duties are entrusted to him by God, and were the king to fail in his promise, the role of judge should not fall to one of the contracting parties—the people—unless one accepts that a party can be judge in his own case. Because the origin of the royal function is divine, only God can judge the monarch, in keeping with the principle already stated in the second paragraph of the third part of the treatise: Now in this contract (I say) betwixt the king and his people, God is doubtles the only Iudge, both because to him onely the king must make count of his administration (as is oft said before) as likewise by the oath in the coronation, God is made iudge and reuenger of the breakers: For in his presence, as only iudge of oaths, all oaths ought to be made. Then since God is the onely Iudge betwixt the two parties contractors, the cognition and reuenge must onely appertaine to him: It followes therefore of necessitie, that God must first giue sentence vpon the King that breaketh, before the people can thinke themselues freed of their oath.43

In other words, in keeping with his interpretation of the Old Testament account of the creation of the monarchy, James cannot accept the lack of a third party in the contract of subjection. The illegitimacy of the right or duty of rebellion or resistance is based entirely on this theologico-political basis and its juridico-ethical application. This is what he means by the four ripostes to his opponents’ arguments. The analogical relationship between theologico-biblical and juridico-political language that we noted in the third part of the treatise here reaches its logical conclusion. The meaning of the 43. The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, 208. This text’s refusal of the contractualist theory in the strict sense of the term was to be radicalized by royalist pamphleteers in the early 1640s. See Henry Ferne, The Resolving of Conscience (Cambridge: E. Freeman and T. Dunster, 1642), 14–15.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  185 word “contract” in James’s thought demonstrates this amply. While the biblical language as such has gone, the word “God” is still meaningful. It is fully integrated into the sphere of law to the point of representing the contract’s major cornerstone, on which the two others—the king and the passive obedience of the people—are based. We shall return later to the juridical use of the word “God” in the context of the vexed issue of the liberty of subjects. For the time being, we shall take a closer look at why James felt the presence of God as a third party was necessary. It is clear that this necessity is itself based on the origin of royalty, in other words on the link between the notions “fault” and “divine guarantee.” However, this does not explain its finality. Irrationality is recurrent in the earlier responses, albeit couched in specific terms, such as torment, desolation, curse, an evil king sent by God because of the sins of the people,44 violence, and passions that cause the subjects to rebel and take over the role of judge.45 The aim of the treatise is precisely to check the disorder caused by the rebellions afflicting states across Europe, torn by politicoreligious wars. This theme justifies James’s project by contrast: he expects obedience from his subjects not as an aim in itself, but with a view to creating a new rational, unitary political order that combines theology and law. The king is thus obliged to keep his promise to govern with rectitude. In return, the people must not pass judgment or try to overthrow a monarch who fails to honor his oath, at the risk of opening the way to passions and the collapse of the civil institution. Both parties can honor the contract by respecting this moral rule: Nay, to speake trewly of that case, as it stands betwixt the king and his people, none of them ought to iudge of the others breake: For considering rightly the two parties at the time of their mutuall promise, the king 44. The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, 206. 45. Ibid., 209.

186  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies is the one party, and the whole people in one body are the other party. And therefore since it is certaine, that a king, in case so it should fal out, that his people in one body had rebelled against him, hee should not in that case, as thinking himselfe free of his promise and oath, become an vtter enemy, and practise the wreake of his whole people and natiue country: although he ought iustly to punish the principall authours and bellowes of that vniuersall rebellion: how much lesse then ought the people (that are alwaies subiect vnto him, and naked of all authoritie on their part) presse to iudge and ouerthrow him? Otherwise the people, as the one partie contracters, shall no sooner challenge the king as breaker, but hee as soone shall iudge them as breakers: so as the victors making the tyners the traitors (as our prouerbe is) the partie shall aye become both iudge and partie in his owne particular, as I haue alreadie said.46

It thus appears that God alone is capable of taking on the role of judge: but by the contrary, by remitting them to God (who is their onely ordinary Iudge) I remit them to the sorest and sharpest schoolemaster that can be deuised for them: for the further a king is preferred by God aboue all other ranks & degrees of men, and the higher that his seat is aboue theirs, the greater is his obligation to his maker.47 

James’s responses to his opponents demonstrate that his theocentric understanding of God’s law, in which the extent and limits of royal power arise, is beyond doubt. Nonetheless, the theocentric aspect of James’s thought does not overshadow one final argument that justifies the people’s duty of obedience—the hereditary nature of monarchy, or the legitimist doctrine. According to James, duty and allegiance are sworn not only to the reigning monarch: And it is here likewise to be noted, that the duty and alleageance, which the people sweareth to their prince, is not only bound to themselues, but 46. Ibid., 208–9. 47. Ibid., 209.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  187 likewise to their lawfull heires and posterity, the lineall succession of crowns being begun among the people of God, and happily continued in diuers christian common-wealths: So as no obiection either of heresie, or whatsoeuer priuate statute or law may free the people from their oathgiuing to their king, and his succession, established by the old fundamentall lawes of the kingdome: For, as hee is their heritable ouer-lord, and so by birth, not by any right in the coronation, commeth to his crowne; it is a like vnlawful (the crowne euer standing full) to displace him that succeedeth thereto, as to eiect the former: For at the very moment of the expiring of the king reigning, the nearest and lawful heire entreth in his place: And so to refuse him, or intrude another, is not to holde out vncomming in, but to expell and put out their righteous King.48

It is interesting to note that James associates the hereditary principle with his biblical basis for divine right. The hereditary transmission of the Crown thus enables him to reject objections that refer to the criterion of heresy (which he associates with private status) as a way of challenging royal legitimacy. These two points are especially important. First of all, it should be noted that the biblical basis for the political institution is a key part of the legitimist doctrine. It is closely linked to the fundamental laws of the kingdom, which are based on birthright. Thanks to the close links between these three aspects, the text perfectly sums up James’s conception of monarchical legitimacy. And although the biblical basis plays a role in the legitimist doctrine, there is no question of conflating it with denominational differences, which fall 48. Ibid. See E. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), especially 381, where the author quotes Francis Bacon: “For no man can shew me in all corporations of England, of what nature soever, whether they consist of one person, or of many, or whether they be temporal or ecclesiastical—not any one takes to him or his heirs, but all to him and his successors. . . . For the king takes to him and his heirs in the manner of a natural body, and the word ‘successor’ is but superfluous: and where it is used, it is ever duly placed after the word ‘heirs’: the king, his heirs and successors.” Hooker makes a similar point: see Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, VIII, II, 8.

188  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies under the heading of private status. In other words, if the creation of the political order is above all based on biblical texts, then consequently this basis in Scripture is the first precondition for society’s ecclesiastico-political unity. Yet the reference to Scripture does not justify the doctrinal and denominational rifts (issues of private status) that represent a strong factor of division and strife. The status of the Church and the public expression of faith within the monarchy by divine right must therefore be examined. James applied these three postulates—the biblical basis, the hereditary transmission of the Crown, and the illegitimacy of rebelling against kings on religious grounds (accusations of heresy)—following the Gunpowder Plot. He added the requirement of swearing the oath of allegiance to the first, which he saw as part of the people’s duty of obedience to the king, seeing it as part of natural law. Thus, the biblical prerequisites of James’s political ecclesiology, outlined in the second paragraph of the third part in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies, give us a clearer idea of what the Church means in James’s thought.49 Before analyzing the status of the Church in James’s thought, we must return to the intellectual structure of the treatise. The introduction and first part give the reasons why James wrote the treatise and the postulates that justify his preference for monarchy as the ideal form of government: God, unity, and perfection. The second part explains the ethical ideal of the royal function, whose basis in Scripture and fundamental and natural laws establishes the king’s duty to his people. The third part recalls the biblical origin of monarchy by divine right, characterized by the fault of the people in their desire to have a king, and God’s agreement. In addition to these two criteria are the people’s renunciation once and for all of all their privileges, their will to consent, and the contract that 49. This is not to overlook, of course, the essential contribution of Basilikon Doron. We shall see later that other writings by James also make major contributions to his ecclesiological thinking.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  189 cannot be withdrawn. Finally, the king—the people’s judge—and God—judge of the king and the contract—draw up the people’s duty of obedience to the king. The fourth part gives historical and legal arguments: the land belonged to kings, who distributed it to their subjects following conquests by James’s ancestors. Kings make the law and are answerable only to God. The fifth part contains theologico-juridico-ethical arguments: the illegitimacy of the right or duty to rebel against the king; God as the sole judge of the contract of subjection; and the legitimist doctrine of the hereditary transmission of the Crown and its origin in the Old Testament. It is interesting to note that of all the key notions in James’s political thought, God is the central criterion that structures the internal dynamics of his theories.50 In the first part, he affirms that the best government is that which draws on God. This criterion remains of major importance throughout the treatise. The reversal of the natural law that creates the figure of a king with tyrannical powers does not in fact obviate the principle that God is the first basis and thus the ethical guarantor of royal government. The fundamental ethical principles of sovereignty are reinterpreted in the light of the biblical origin of the divine right of kings and the duty of obedience of their subjects. The conclusion provides concrete proof of this: But remitting to the iustice and prouidence of God to stirre vp such scourges as pleaseth him, for punishment of wicked kings (who made the very vermine and filthy dust of the earth to bridle the insolencie of proud Pharaoh) my onely purpose and intention in this treatise is to perswade, as farre as lieth in me, by these sure and infallible grounds, all such good Christian readers, as beare not onely the naked name of a Christian, but kith the fruites thereof in their daily forme of life, to keepe their hearts and hands free from such monstrous and vnnaturall rebellions, whensoeuer the wickednesse of a Prince shall procure the same at Gods hands: that, when it shall please God to cast such scourges 50. The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, 193.

190  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies of princes, and instruments of his fury in the fire, ye may stand vp with cleane handes, and vnspotted consciences, hauing prooued your selues in all your actions trew Christians toward God, and dutifull subiects towards your King, hauing remitted the iudgement and punishment of all his wrongs to him, whom to onely of right it appertaineth. But crauing at God, and hoping that God shall continue his blessing with vs, in not sending such fearefull desolation, I heartily wish our kings behauiour so to be, and continue among vs, as our God in earth, and louing Father, endued with such properties as I described a King in the first part of this Treatise.51

As this text indicates, James always had a high opinion of the royal function, but ethical principles were not sufficient. He also had to restate the moral and religious grounds justifying the monarchy— the fault of the people, which resulted both in the people’s duty of obedience and in the king’s duty to do his best for his people. The king’s obligation to serve his subjects to the best of his ability is the highest moral condition required for him to be “as our God in earth.” The conclusion takes us back to the theological postulate stated in the first part of the Trew Law of Free Monarchies. However, James immediately adds: And that ye (my deare countreymen, and charitable readers) may presse by all meanes to procure the prosperitie and welfare of your King; that as hee must on the one part thinke all his earthly felicitie and happinesse grounded vpon your weale, caring more for himselfe for your sake then for his owne, thinking himselfe onely ordained for your weale; such holy and happy emulation may arise betwixt him and you, as his care for your quietnes, and your care for his honour and preseruation, may in all your actions daily striue together, that the Land may thinke themselues blessed with such a King, and the king may thinke himselfe most happy in ruling ouer so louing and obedient subiects.52

This last part of the conclusion in effect demonstrates that the fundamental principles of the ethics of royal government cannot 51. Ibid., 210.

52. Ibid.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  191 be separated from the duty of obedience, any more than this duty can be seen as an apologetics of power as such. The biblical and juridico-ethical basis for monarchy by divine right aims to justify the people’s duty of obedience with a view to ensuring the rational unity of the political order only in the light of the superior aim of promoting the common weal of the king and his people. However, this mutual benefit presupposes first and foremost that the duties of the two parties are mutual and reciprocal, as the title of the Trew Law of Free Monarchies suggests. There can therefore be no doubt that the shift that we noted in the second part of the treatise by no means implies a contradiction. On the contrary, the conclusion indicates that James succeeds in uniting the two poles of the political institution—the king and the people—in one moral aim. Yet this coherence between the theological postulate of monarchy, the ethical ideal of royal government, and its theologico-political origin has been made possible only by an analogical reading of biblical language. This hermeneutic rule enabled the transfer of this language toward an ethical and juridical meaning—the ethics of the people’s duty of obedience and the king’s duty of service to the people; the king’s rights over people and property; God’s juridical power over the king and thus over the contract of subjection. Thus the process of analogy implies not a contradiction, but rather a paradox enabling James to relate the fundamental principles of government to the origins of the civil institution. God is both outside the foundation of the monarchy (as monarchy is modeled on divinity, royal power is derived from God’s power), and involved in the limitation of the king’s right by virtue of his judicial power. Furthermore, it is clear that the analogical structure of biblical language would have no theoretical value if it were not based on the hermeneutic criterion of the dialectic relationship between the two Testaments, which gives the Old Testament an ongoing meaning effect in the religious economy of the New. We have also seen that this criterion required a second, theological cri-

192  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies terion—the theocentric postulate of God’s law unaffected by the Christian mode of revelation. James was able to read Scripture in theologico-political terms because of this process of analogy and the hermeneutic and theocentric criteria determining the status of biblical language. Thus he was able to assert the divine model of monarchy on the one hand, while on the other affirming the relationship between the sovereignty of the king and that of the law. He drew on numerous examples to explain these three principles once again in the second paragraph of the third part of the treatise. These examples gave the necessary prerequisites for linking the legitimist understanding of the monarchy and the “political” understanding of the Church,53 which enabled him to draw up two correlative doctrines: the doctrine of the two kingdoms—political and religious—and the doctrine of civil obedience and theologicospiritual freedom.

The Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms: Civil Obedience and the People’s Spiritual Freedom >

The Status of the Church in Relation to Political Power We shall begin by examining the status conferred on the Church in terms of its relationship to political power. Like that of the monarchy, it can be understood only in the light of the dialectical relationship between the two Testaments. There is perfect continuity between the attitude of the prophets and that of the Apostle Paul. For Christians, it represents the universal model of the obedient subject who acknowledges the legitimacy of princes, even those who are evil and tyrannical. James backs up his argument with 53. This concept was topical at this period. James uses it in Basilikon Doron, and it also appears as an ecclesiological concept in the works of Richard Hooker.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  193 two examples of obedience to pagan princes, first from the Old Testament: To end then the ground of my proposition taken out of the Scripture, let two speciall, and notable examples, one vnder the law, another vnder the Euangel, conclude this part of my alleageance. Vnder the lawe, Ieremie threatneth the people of God with vtter destruction for rebellion to Nabuchadnezar the king of Babel: who although he was an idolatrous persecuter, a forraine King, a Tyrant, and vsurper of their liberties; yet in respect they had once receiued and acknowledged him for their king, he not only commandeth them to obey him, but euen to pray for his prosperitie, adioyning the reason to it; because in his prosperitie stood their peace.54

James then alludes to the New Testament and the pericope of Paul in which the subjects are enjoined to obey a Roman emperor: And vnder the Euangel, that king, whom Paul bids the Romanes obey and serue for conscience sake, was Nero that bloody tyrant, an infamie to his aage, and a monster to the world, being also an idolatrous persecuter, as the King of Babel was.55

These two examples illustrate James’s very lofty understanding of the legitimacy of princes and, in correlation, the loyalty of their subjects. Furthermore, they highlight his equally lofty belief in fidelity to God, which represents the theological counterpoint to the political allegiance of the people: If then Idolatrie and defection from God, tyranny ouer their people, and persecution of the Saints, for their profession sake, hindred not the Spirit of God to command his people vnder all highest paine to giue them all due and heartie obedience for conscience sake, giuing to Caesar that which was Caesars, and to God that which was Gods, as Christ saith; and that this practise throughout the booke of God agreeth with this lawe, which he made in the erection of that Monarchie (as is at length 54. The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, 200. 55. Ibid.

194  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies before deduced) what shamelesse presumption is it to any Christian people now adayes to claime to that vnlawfull libertie, which God refused to his owne peculiar and chosen people?56

This long text concludes with the theoretical justification of the examples exhorting the people to obedience. In keeping with the analogical structure of biblical language, the examples look back to ancient narratives and forward to a normative attitude that was indispensable for James’s subjects. However, the text we have just quoted goes much further in specifying a new, and vital, aspect of James’s thought. It draws a close correlation between religious persecution in the name of fidelity to God and, in the name of the same fidelity, obedience to the sovereign, even if he is a heretic and a tyrant. To state it more simply, obedience to Caesar and fidelity to God are the mutual condition of each other’s existence, but should not be conflated. James does not exclude the possibility of the sovereign being hostile, or at least opposed in part or in full, to the religion of his subjects. This distinction is of capital importance, because it implies that the divine origin of civil power does not necessarily mean that the sovereign’s legitimacy depends on the established religion. In the context of the last two decades of the sixteenth century in Scotland, there can be no doubt that James meant here to challenge the doctrine of the two reigns espoused by the Presbyterian Church.

The Specific Characteristics of James’s Understanding of the Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms In the light of this argument, the meaning of James’s theocentrism in relation to Church and State is now clear. The divine right of kings is not bound up as such with one particular ecclesiastical institution; the sovereign does not owe his power to one religion in particular, nor is he subordinate to common law. James’s theo56. Ibid.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  195 centrism dismisses the medieval vision of the papal theocracy that represented the cornerstone of Christian society by virtue of the divine institution of the papacy;57 similarly, he refuses the Presbyterian understanding of the doctrine of the double regime, which subjects the king to the ecclesiastical power of the pastors, as Andrew Melville sharply reminded him. This twofold rejection is possible only thanks to the “political shift” of Calvinist theocentrism by which James, as a theorist of divine right, affirms royal sovereignty without disavowing the religious dimension of the political condition. This is what we must now explain. According to James, since God agreed to the creation of the monarchy, Christians have no greater legitimacy than Hebrews to enjoy civil liberty. However, for the loyalist attitude of the prophets and the earliest Christians to make sense, the king of Scotland’s subjects had to have an institutional Church where they could profess their faith in God and obedience to the king. This institution represents the ongoing prophetic vocation that legitimizes the historical apologetics of civil obedience and fidelity to God: fearing him as their Iudge, louing him as their father; praying for him as their protectour; for his continuance, if he be good; for his amendement, if he be wicked; following and obeying his lawfull commands, eschewing and flying his fury in his vnlawfull, without resistance, but by sobbes and teares to God, according to that sentence vsed in the primitiue Church in the time of the persecution. Preces et lacrymae sunt arma Ecclesia.58

This text contains the only two mentions of the Church. James’s treatise does not develop a theory of the Church as institution as he was to do in the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance; instead, he sug57. We are alluding here to Pope Gregory VII’s reform, particularly the first Dictatus papae, which affirms that the Roman Church was founded by the Lord alone. 58. The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, 200–201.

196  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies gests such a theory by drawing attention to the theological, moral, and political significance of the Church. It is thus fair to say that the Trew Law of Free Monarchies contains a “political” understanding of the Church, backing up the legitimist theory of monarchy, both drawing on the doctrine of the two reigns and the underlying paradox of the doctrines of obedience and liberty. Thus the Church has a twofold vocation: it looks back to the spiritual freedom of the people accepting God’s yoke (freedom before the fault) and forward to civil obedience. The latter implies both the preservation of spiritual freedom (after the fault), signified by God’s judicial power, against which the king cannot make any law (were he to do so, the people would have the right to disobey). We see here once again, through the doctrine of the two kingdoms, the solution to the rift between the ideal of royal government and the people’s duty of obedience. As we saw in the second paragraph of the third part, the two poles of civil obedience and spiritual freedom are the mutual condition for each other’s existence. We also saw that in the first two responses on the illegitimacy of the right or duty of resistance that this illegitimacy was based on the hope of an improvement in the people’s condition, hence the necessity for them to be patient and to pray. The political and spiritual orders are thus never uncoupled from each other. The former draws its legitimacy from the latter and “authorizes” it to take its rightful place in the civil institution, but in the hope of a better order. By throwing the paradox of obedience and liberty into sharp relief, James echoes the Protestant theology of the serf as judge and Christian freedom, hence the insistence on the eschatological dimension of Christian existence. It should be borne in mind that the king is addressing his readers both as subjects and as Christians. In the light of this argument, we can also see how the Church—the institutional embodiment of the spiritual order—comes to be closely linked to the State. This renewal of the “religious” within the civil institution demon-

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  197 strates that the transformation from theologico-biblical to juridicopolitical language has not diminished the former in favor of the latter; in actual fact, the theologico-biblical language points to the limitation of royal power by virtue of God’s judicial power, while implying the subordination of the ecclesiastical institution to the monarchy by divine right. The theologico-biblical language thus reappears in the civil institution on two levels: on the one hand, in the power of God, and on the other, the passive obedience of subjects as Christians through the mediation of the Church. Here again, there is no contradiction, but rather the consequence of the analogical status of language, expressed in the paradox of Jacobean political theology: the people’s civil obedience is “acceptable” only by handing the exclusive right to judge the king to God. This is why civil obedience is at the same time an act of spiritual freedom. In other words, the doctrine of the two kingdoms can be summed up as follows: the Church has a political status because the monarchy has a theological status by virtue of the normative nature of Scripture. As a result, the political and ecclesiastical orders are founded and united simultaneously, without, however, being conflated. The two institutions have the common objective of obeying God and awaiting God’s reign on earth. We should also note that by virtue of its biblical justification, royal power is not sacred,59 because it is limited by God’s judgment (and is a source of civil and hereditary law). The intervention of secular powers in Church matters was rethought as a result of James’s application of the principles of reformed theology. Although royal supremacy remained fully relevant, it was nonetheless relayed and taken over by the divine right of kings, which determined the political loyalty of all subjects, whatever their religious faith. This was the aim of 59. The word “sacred” can be used in its usual sense here, but not in its strict anthropological sense, which harks back to a pre-biblical religious economy. God’s judgment of the king is a good illustration of the anthropological rift created by biblical monotheism.

198  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies James’s twofold process of theologico-political recentering. From 1600 on, it was applied in the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance. As we have seen, James’s interpretation of the Protestant doctrine of the two kingdoms lent a new tone to the relationship between theology and politics. The king’s famous outburst against the Puritan representatives at the Hampton Court conference in 1603 illustrates this new tone: “No bishops, no king!” simply means a new type of reciprocal relationship between Church and State.60 As the Church was framed solely as a means of ensuring the unity of the realm, interference in questions of a purely doctrinal nature was not an end in itself for James. Loyalty was his watchword, and Christian doctrine was judged solely by this yardstick. The doctrine of two kingdoms resulted in an ecclesiology with two faces—the first political and visible, the second spiritual and invisible, corresponding to Christian freedom. This was the Church as an instrument of salvation. In other words, James reconsidered Christian duality on two levels: the king’s visible power is subordinated to God’s invisible power (God is judge), while reading the Church as the body bringing together the elect implies that its human visibility is a sign of the invisibility of the justifying faith. This understanding of the Church, which correlates to James’s theory of divine right, sheds light on the major theological and political issues at stake in the succession to Elizabeth, following the example of the succession crisis in France. In this historical context, “royalism” meant promoting the apologetics of secular power. The apologetics thus raises the question of how “the confessional state” should be understood. Two models exist: the subordination of the clergy to the secular sovereign (and more broadly of spiritual to temporal power), or the sovereign’s subordination to the Church. These two theological and political models (which encompass several sub-systems) entail two 60. Kenneth C. Fincham, The Early Stuart Church, 1603–1642 (London: Macmillan, 1993), 23–49, esp. 26.

The Trew Law of Free Monarchies  199 types of theories of devolving and wielding power. The Jacobean model was of necessity similar to political Gallicanism, as both dealt with the concerns of a secular sovereign who refused to submit to an ecclesiastical structure. James’s appeal to the European princes—Protestants and Catholics alike—at the end of the Premonition in the Apologie is highly significant in this respect. In fact, the appeal was not solely an attempt to unite Europe’s princes in the defense of their sovereignty, but also to unite the churches with a view to holding a general council to reunite Christianity. The appeal for a council clearly signaled James’s opposition to the clerical and confessional model. This model also called for a rapprochement in terms of concepts, especially the doctrine of resistance to “tyrannical” sovereigns. However, any such rapprochements were much more limited due to the stance of the clergy, who held diametrically opposing ecclesiological beliefs, and to their mutual intolerance. Consequently, the model was unable to come to terms with the principle of confessional coexistence. The two confessional models attest to the difficulty, not to say impossibility, encountered by the doctrinal historian in subordinating the analysis of theological and political conflicts of the period to an ecclesiastical structure.61 The theoretical issue at stake in the succession to Elizabeth, which pitted Parsons’s and James’s doctrines against each other and arose again over the controversy with Bellarmine (1609–10) and Davy du Perron (1615), is valuable in the light it sheds on the problem. The close correlation between “succession” and “religious orthodoxy” favors a different perspective. Of course, there are different confessions of Christianity, but none holds one single answer to the legitimacy of the devolution of power. 61. My aim here is not to challenge the specificity of each confession as such; however, it would be a gross oversimplification to reduce doctrinal conflicts (or theological and political controversies) to a purely confessional level. The theories of the divine right of kings demonstrate the limits of making historiography contingent upon a particular ecclesial culture.

200  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies The problem of the succession to Elizabeth raises the key political issue of legitimacy and the equally key religious issue of the nature of the True Church—in other words, its catholicity and the criterion of unity. James’s answer to his Jesuit opponents and to Davy du Perron on both these issues clearly demonstrates where the real opposition lay. It was not—or at least not at first or not solely—a conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism,62 but rather a divergence of opinions on the relationship between Christianity and the political sphere. The quarrel between ancients and moderns that took place over Christianity in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries invites a reading from this perspective, in that it was delineated by a border between secular political theologies and those held by the clergy of all denominations. James’s particular circumstances placed him at the heart of the debate. Being royal, he was a secular theologian who did not hesitate to cross the confessional Rubicon, as he showed in the years 1590–1600, in order to strengthen the legitimacy of his claim to succeed Elizabeth. He wrote the Trew Law of Free Monarchies and Basilikon Doron in a Scottish context and the Defence of the Right of Kings in an English context, all to defend his crown. The political legitimacy of his succession was meant to be coupled with equally strong religious and ecclesial principles. This is reflected in the ecclesiological concepts that James develops in the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance and other writings, which confirm this dialectic of the visible and invisible in opposition to Bellarmine’s theories. Furthermore, they correspond to his understanding of tolerance. 62. This raises the interesting question of the specificity of Gallicanism within the Roman Church and the even more interesting question of the originality of the Church of England!

chapter six

> The Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance in the Context of James I’s Ecclesiological Beliefs and the Controversy with Cardinal Bellarmine’s Papal Theory

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he Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance puts the theories James expounds in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies into practical application. Although the Trew Law of Free Monarchies is less explicit on the question of the doctrine of the two reigns than the Apologie, the Trew Law nonetheless represents the Apologie’s theoretical basis, particularly on the issue of the dialectic relationship between civil obedience and spiritual freedom. The Trew Law of Free Monarchies and the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance shed light on each other, as we shall see in our examination of the structure of the argument in the 1607–8 Apologie and, more generally, James’s ecclesiological thought as seen in other sources. The controversy between James and Bellarmine will enable us to compare two Christian conceptions of the history of salvation, one proposing the power of the papacy as the key to salvation, the other challenging this stance by figuring the pope as the Antichrist. With the aim of protecting the sovereignty of temporal rulers firmly in mind, James carved out a middle path between these two extremes.

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James’s Approach to Tolerance > James’s legitimist theory was based first and foremost on the theologico-political status of Scripture. In the light of this principle, he confirmed the justification of royal supremacy, while proving himself to be more tolerant than his Tudor predecessors toward the Puritan and Catholic minorities. Doctrinal tolerance was possible insofar as the religious tendencies external to the established Church acknowledged the theologico-political norm imposed upon them. In this context, the king’s jurisdiction over the Church of England remained relevant, but as we have seen, it was subordinated to a higher normative power. This was the ecclesiasticopolitical consequence of James’s theory of the divine right of kings. This is why James challenged accusations of intolerance, arguing that the aim of the oath was to differentiate between the temporal and spiritual realms. On the practical issue of tolerance, we have seen how in the Basilikon Doron, James did not hide the fact that he accepted differences of opinion (within reason) on the nature of Church government. Furthermore, on the issue of the impact of religious tolerance on civil life, he was very clear in his speeches of 1604 and 1605, making a similar point again in a speech to the House of Commons in 1610: I doe not meane by this to mooue you to make stronger Lawes then are already made, but see those Lawes may bee well executed that are in force; otherwise they cannot but fall into contempt and become rustie. I neuer found, that blood and too much seueritie did good in matters of Religion: for, besides that it is a sure rule in Diuinitie, that God neuer loues to plant his Church by violence and bloodshed, naturall reason may euen perswade vs, and dayly experience prooues it trew, That when men are seuerely persecuted for Religion, the gallantnesse of many mens spirits, and the wilfulnes of their humors, rather then the iustnesse of the cause, makes them to take a pride boldy to endure any

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  203 torments, or death it selfe, to gaine thereby the reputation of Martyrdome, though but in a false shadow.1

There is no reason to doubt James’s sincerity here if we bear in mind that while he did reject religious ideas opposite to his own, it was more because of their political connotations than because of the beliefs per se. This was the case of his hostility to Puritans and Jesuits, whom he described as “Puritane-Papists.”2 His repressive measures against Catholics appear harsher than those against Puritans because the former were more equivocal in their loyalty to the Crown. Both groups were equally dubious from the point of view of James’s theologico-political beliefs: whether Separatists, Puritans, Episcopalians, or Roman Catholics, they all had to acknowledge that the monarchy was divine in origin, as demonstrated in Scripture. This principle meant that each group had to conform as closely as possible to an ecclesiastical structure that was territorial or national in nature. The Church of England was thus the normative religious institution to which English Christians should ideally conform. But since Christianity was in fact divided into various denominations, only the unity of subjects/Christians around the monarchy—thereby making it an ecclesiastico-political norm—made the existence of independent religious groups acceptable. This is why the idea that the unity of the kingdom is a theologico-political criterion is not itself a disavowal of a principle previously espoused by the Tudor monarchs and their theologians, such as Gardiner and Hooker. However, James did take this criterion in a new, paradoxical direction. He diminished the Church of England’s normative character by readily accepting doctrinal differences, but in return he demanded much more from subjects who were not strictly Anglican or who found themselves outside the established Church, im1. “Speech to Parliament of 21 March 1610,” in King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. J. P. Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 199–200. 2. James I of England, Apologie and Premonition, 305.

204  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance posing doctrinal and ecclesiastico-political consensus upon them.3 The Puritans were directly affected by this dual tendency toward lenience and strictness at the Hampton Court conference, particularly on the issue of accepting bishops. This ecclesiastical policy also applied to Catholics through the imposition of the oath of allegiance, which forced them to disavow the pope’s power of excommunication and deposition. This was the precondition to James’s recognizing the English Catholics. However, as we have seen, this recognition, at the cost of renouncing what was a priori a purely canonical matter, in fact challenged the pope’s universal jurisdiction over the Church and his temporal power, even if it were indirect, which had been a fundamental principle of Roman ecclesiology since the Gregorian Reform in the eleventh century. Such a concession, whereby Puritans acknowledged the episcopate and Catholics renounced their belief in the temporal dimension of the power of the papacy, suggests that James’s religious tolerance in fact aggravated ecclesiological disputes with the Roman Catholic Church, and above all within the Anglican church itself. The Anglican via media in fact grew closer to Episcopalian theses, a tendency that began in the final years of Elizabeth’s reign.4 Hence James contributed to the decline in the Calvinist tendency in the Church of England.5 The seeds of this development under Charles I and Archbishop Laud are already to be found in the preface to the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance. Two points are particularly important here: faith in the divine right of the episcopacy, of which James was never fully convinced,6 and the subtle distinction he made between rejecting the 3. See Peter White, “The Via Media in the Early Stuart Church,” in Fincham, The Early Stuart Church, 211–30, and The Political Works of James I, 120–68. 4. The theological debates in the 1590s between representatives of Anglican orthodoxy such as Hooker on the one hand, and Puritan Presbyterians on the other, reflect this tendency. 5. Anthony Milton, “The Church of England, Rome and the True Church: The Demise of a Jacobean Consensus,” in Fincham, The Early Stuart Church, 187–210. 6. See Sommerville, “Jacobean Political Thought,” 361–71.

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  205 notion of a papal monarchy, the figure of the Antichrist, and accepting Catholic pre-eminence in the purely spiritual sphere. Jacobean ecclesiology’s irenist tendency was, in the final analysis, in keeping with his theologico-political principles: royal sovereignty by divine right was the cornerstone of the politico-religious community. This point of view meant he was bound to clash with the English legal and parliamentary tradition and, in ecclesiastical terms, with the denominational differences that were already marked in early seventeenth-century Europe. Yet James’s ambition was to promote hereditary legitimacy by divine right and royal supremacy over the established Church in the service of politico-religious unity in England and Western Christianity. As a result, it became necessary to define the Church Visible and Invisible according to criteria that did not conflict with the temporal prerogatives of princes. This was the key argument of James’s apologetics. It is based on the fundamental postulates of the continental Reform, or rather the version of these postulates applied in England by the Tudor monarchs and their theologians, although we must of course bear in mind the subtle differences that we have already discussed in this context. James took this system of theological preunderstanding as his starting point to draw on the Bible, the Church Fathers, the first four ecumenical councils, the provincial councils, and the stance of popes from the first Christian millennium toward secular princes to back up his political ecclesiology, and the attitude of popes from the second millennium to challenge the political ecclesiology of his Catholic, and above all Jesuit, opponents. In this context, the medieval disputes are a paradigmatic justification of the theory of the divine right of kings and royal supremacy, just as for Bellarmine they serve the pope’s cause. The medieval heritage of the Christian duality of powers was claimed on both the royal and papal sides of the argument because the controversy of 1606–9 was both old and new. It was old in that it echoed numer-

206  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance ous quarrels over investiture and jurisdiction between the Holy Empire, territorial monarchies, and the papacy. Yet it was new because the radical tone of the conflict between temporal and ecclesiastical powers was without precedent and decisively blocked the ambition of the papacy to wield temporal power, even indirectly. It was also new because the religious reform of the sixteenth century highlighted the complexity of relations between Christianity and secular powers. Protestantism was just as divided as Catholicism on this issue, both being split into two schools of thought. The first group—Puritan Presbyterians, Gomarists, Catholic members of the Ligue in France, and most of the regular clergy—rejected the pre-eminence of the political over the spiritual, while the second group took up the opposite position. This second group included Episcopalian Anglicans, Lutherans, and Arminians, and, on the Catholic side, Gallicans. In James’s dispute with the papacy, some Catholics, most notably Roger Widdrington and Barclay, sided with James. Other thinkers agreed with James’s interpretation of the supremacy of the divine right of kings in temporal matters, but refused the theological beliefs of the Church of England, the rejection of the papal power of excommunication and deposition, and the imposition of the oath of allegiance on Catholics. This was the case of Cardinal Davy du Perron, for example. In 1615, James and Jacques Davy du Perron became involved in a controversy that was a kind of after-tremor following the key events we have discussed. The Defence of the Right of Kings,7 James’s last political work, was similar to the Trew Law of Free Monarchies, but in the context of a controversy with a Gallican Catholic who had just published a work against the plan to impose an oath of allegiance.8 7. James I of England, Remonstrance of the Most Gratious King Iames I. King of Great Brittaine, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c., for the Right of Kings and the Independance of Their Crownes against an Oration of the Most Illustrious Card. of Perron, Pronounced in the Chamber of the Third Estate. Ian. 15. 1615 (Cambridge: Cantrell Legge, Printer to the University of Cambridge, 1616). 8. Jacques Davy du Perron, Harangue faicte de la part de la chambre ecclésias-

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  207 However, the publication of these two works on the divine right of kings and their relation to the papacy did nothing to change the fundamental rift between the ecclesiastico-political standpoints of the Anglican and Catholic Churches. From the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance to the Defence of the Right of Kings, and from Bellarmine’s Responce to Davy du Perron’s Harangue, the controversialists drew on the medieval doctrines of the two powers and their proand anti-papal developments to justify their well-established theological, ecclesiological, and political theses. How could this interest in doctrinal truth on both sides of the divide fail to give rise to a theologico-political argument on the question of the norm, heterodoxy, and what should be tolerated? However, what sets apart James’s thought—along with all those who promoted political sovereignty—was the subordination of religious orthodoxy to the unity of the civil institution. This was the root cause of the opposition between James and Bellarmine.

The Structure of the Argument in James’s and Bellarmine’s Apologetics: History as Proof of Truth >

It was in the light of his ecclesiastico-political renewal of the long medieval tradition, helped by the achievements of the continental and Anglican Reform, that James questioned the meaning of the terms “unity,” “apostolicity,” “catholicity,” and “sanctity” in the context of the Apostle Peter and his relation to the Church.9 He explains the true nature of the political role of princes and their relationship to their subjects, the Church, and the Holy See in cortique en celle du Tiers-estat sur l’article du serment, par Mgr le cardinal Du Perron (Paris: A. Estienne, 1615). 9. Gustave Thils, Les notes de l’Église dans l’apologétique catholique depuis la Réforme (Gembloux, Belgium: J. Duculot, 1937), 171–73 and 230–33.

208  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance relation with this. Of Scripture, the Church Fathers, the popes of the first Christian millennium, the ecumenical councils of the first four Christian centuries, and the provincial councils, the first was the most important source. James thus showed himself to be a worthy heir of the Reform. However, Bellarmine, his major opponent, drew on the same register of arguments in his Responce. In fact, there is a second reason for the abundance of biblical quotations: Scripture, the source of Christian revelation, is the first battlefield for these two ecclesiastico-political hermeneutic arguments, since their aim is to defend a just understanding of the relationship between ecclesiastical and political powers through the fundamental principles of their faith and the Church. Because the other fundamental principles are of lesser authority, they are less frequently called upon, although they pose exactly the same problem of identifying sources as the link made by James and Bellarmine between the antiquity of the true faith and the theologico-political history of Christianity. In the Trew Law of Free Monarchies, James already took this path in interpreting biblical texts, whose meaning he constantly converted. Taking as a starting point the hermeneutic rule that identifies a commonality between past and present in the Apologie, we can see the premise of a new relationship to history that legitimizes the creation and ongoing existence of an institution, in both political and ecclesiastical terms. This same rule also provides the hierarchy of fundamental principles in justifying the oath of allegiance in the Apologie. According to James, this was perfectly in keeping with the practice of the early Church. In support of his thesis, he quoted the sixthand seventh-century Councils of Toledo and the religious function of the Byzantine and Carolingian emperors and Old Testament kings.10 As arguments, the numerous examples drawn from the political Augustinism of the Latin West and Eastern Caesaropap10. James I of England, Apologie and Premonition, 52–56, 106–7.

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  209 ism all share the general characteristics of religious controversies of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries: history is at stake in the “truth” of arguments about the orthodoxy of Christian faith—in this case, in its ecclesiastico-political consequences.11 By applying the same method to his theory of the indirect temporal power of the papacy, Bellarmine also used the same analogical process to equate past and present. In his Responce, he takes up James’s examples and reads them in favor of the papacy. In other words, the two men use the same system to interpret the history of the relationship between political and ecclesiastical powers, and end up with completely different answers. The central configuration of these two hermeneutics of the ecclesiasticopolitical history of Christianity lies in the issue of oaths. Oaths are the concrete judicial representation of the conflicts within the Christian duality of spiritual and temporal powers. Arguments for royal supremacy over the Church and the divine right of kings draw on Old Testament, English, Capetian, Byzantine, and Carolingian models to oppose the sovereignty of the divine right of the papacy over Christian society as a whole. Similarly, James’s and Bellarmine’s understanding of the oath of allegiance leads them to accept or reject the legitimacy of the ecclesiastical right of resistance, the nature of the royal coronation oath, and, consequently, the subordination of political to ecclesiastical power or vice versa. In the final analysis, the nature of secular and ecclesiastical power is at stake. While the terms “unity,” “apostolicity,” “catholicity,” and “sanctity of the Church” were key to both Reformist and Catholic theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, each side interpreted them in very different ways. 11. Alain Le Boulluec, “La Controverse religieuse et ses formes,” in La Controverse religieuse au XVIIe siècle et la naissance de l’histoire, ed. François Laplanche (Paris: Cerf, 1955), 373–404. The polemical and apologetic relationship to history was apparent throughout the seventeenth century: see Nicolas Piqué, “P. Jurieu et les voies contournées de l’histoire. L’origine, l’écart et la variation,” Revue d’Histoire et de Philosophie religieuse 78, no. 4 (1998): 435–49.

210  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance James is unquestionably in favor of faith in unity, apostolicity, catholicity, and the sanctity of the Church, albeit within the territorial and jurisdictional limits of political sovereignty. That is why the Church, as a visible institution, cannot exercise power over its followers to the detriment of kings. In this case, the oath of allegiance to the king is categorical and thus incompatible with the notion of resistance. The historical arguments thus result in an apologetic choice in favor of the popes and councils of the first Christian millennium that justified loyalty to kings and emperors. Similarly, the ecclesiastico-political disputes of the late Middle Ages hinged on challenging the papacy and its increasingly self-satisfied grip on power. It is hardly surprising, then, that James and Bellarmine—in common with most Reformist and Catholic theologians of the age—both claimed that theirs was the correct definition of the true Church and the true political regime. This explains their desire to resolve the most awkward aspect of the dispute—the power of the papacy, seen as a rival to regalian monarchies—which raised the issue of the oath of allegiance.

Is the Papacy against God, the Church of Christ, and Political Sovereignty? >

Like his fellow believers, Bellarmine demonstrated that in his day, the Church was faithful to its apostolic foundation. In other words, ecclesiastical history legitimized a progressive argument for the justification of Catholic pre-eminence, based in doctrinal terms on infallibility12 and in jurisdictional terms on the plenitude of papal power by divine right.13 The pope cannot therefore be the Anti12. Bellarmine, Tertia controversia generalis, De summo pontifice, ed. Napoli, IV, 1, in Opera omnia. 13. R. C. Bellarmine, Démonstration victorieuse de la foi catholique, extraite des controverses du R. Cardinal Bellarmin, traduite du latin par M. l’abbé Ducruet (Paris: L.

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  211 christ. In order to understand this argument, diametrically opposed to that of James, we must briefly examine Bellarmine’s method of exegesis. For Bellarmine, Scripture has two meanings according to the Apostle Paul and Gregory of Nazianzus. The first is literal, “which is equally called historical,” while the second is spiritual or mystical. “The literal meaning is that immediately offered by the words. The spiritual meaning is that related to objects or ideas other than those immediately revealed by the expressions.” The literal meaning consists of a straightforward meaning and a figurative element. The simplicity of the initial meaning aims to achieve “the content of the terms,” while the figurative nature of the second aims to produce meaning above and beyond the natural understanding of the words.14 The spiritual meaning is divided into three facets— allegorical, topological, and anagogical. However, at the outcome of his demonstration, Bellarmine lends much more credit to the literal meaning than to the spiritual, because the literal meaning definitely leads to the interpretation of Scripture according to the Holy Spirit. Finally, the criterion that allows us to know where the Spirit will manifest itself can only be in the Church: The whole question is resolved in these terms: where is this spirit? For our part, we believe that although this spirit is often communicated to individuals, it nonetheless and beyond all doubt resides in the Church, in other words in the body of bishops which depends on the sovereign pontiff, the pastor of the universal Church: thus it resides in the Supreme Pastor united with the body of bishops, as was formally declared at the Council of Trent.15 Vivès, 1855), vol. 2, ch. 3: “Did Christ set up in his stead the Apostle Saint Peter, leader and prince of all Churches?” ch. 4: “Did Saint Peter visit Rome, and did he die as bishop of the city?” and ch. 5, “The Roman pontiff is successor to Peter in the ecclesiastical monarchy.” All translations from the works of Bellarmine are by the translator of the present volume. 14. Ibid., vol. 1, ch. 3: “De l’interprétation de la parole de Dieu,” 31–33. See the Latin edition in Opera omnia, De Verbo Dei, III, I, De Verbo Dei Interpretatione, 96–98. 15. Bellarmine, Démonstration victorieuse, vol. 1, ch. 3, 34.

212  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance Bellarmine’s arguments, from his emphasis on interpreting Scripture literally to identifying the Church as the site where the Holy Spirit will manifest itself, lead to a justification of the pope’s universal jurisdiction. Bellarmine thus concludes that the papacy is the precise opposite of the Antichrist: “The name ‘Antichrist’ means a person opposite to Christ; opposite not in an indefinite manner, but by fighting Christ for influence and dignity; in other words he is Christ’s rival, or he wishes to be taken for Christ after having brought about the rejection of the genuine Christ.”16 Moreover, the Apostle Peter’s transmission of the keys confirms the validity of papal power. Bellarmine’s exegetic principles lead him to assert: [The Antichrist] will bring about very grave and obvious persecution, such that public acts of worship and sacrifices will have to stop, which is something that we have not yet witnessed. Simply keeping to facts that are clear for all to see, the pope is the Antichrist’s worst enemy, because he devotes all his efforts to maintaining and developing the divine sacrifice of which the Antichrist must be the enemy. Today’s heretics, who desire nothing so much as the abolition of eucharistic sacrifice, are the true precursors of the Antichrist.17

Consequently, the pope cannot be the Antichrist, given that the Antichrist’s reign will last three and a half years, while the papacy has already had authority over the Church for more than 1,500 years. Furthermore, if the Antichrist had already come to earth, the world would no longer be in existence: Let us therefore first listen to Saint Irenaeus: “The Antichrist (he says) will reign for three years and six months, and then our Lord will descend from Heaven.” In his orison on the end of the world, Saint Hippolytus the Martyr wrote, “The Antichrist will reign on earth for three and a half years.” And Saint Cyril wrote, “He will reign for but three 16. Ibid., vol. 2, ch. 6, 192–95, and Bellarmine, Apologie, ch. 9, 79–83. 17. Bellarmine, Apologie, ch. 10, and De summo pontifice, III, 16.

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  213 and a half years, and we have not learned this from the Apocrypha, but from the Prophet Daniel.”18

At stake in this accusation made by Protestants against Catholics was the status of the Church Militant on earth and thus the means used to tell Christ’s true disciples apart from their enemies. The question of knowing who would be saved implied recognizing, and especially belonging to, the institution that represented salvation. From the Catholic point of view, the answer lay in the papacy, which guaranteed the note of unity of ecclesiastical faith: The fifth sign is the succession of bishops in Rome, which has been continuous from the Apostles to the present day. The succession is called apostolic because it has been continuous. The early Fathers always pointed to this succession as the most indisputable proof of the true Church.19 Do we not know that even today, all the Catholics scattered throughout the world have but one feeling with regard to all the dogma of faith; that they cannot feel otherwise on this matter, because their feeling is subordinated to that of one single pastor who sits on the throne of Peter, who, with the assistance of the other bishops, governs the whole Church? Never was such agreement seen in any sect of gentiles and heretics. Everyone knows the divisions that arose on the very first day among the Lutherans, the Confessionists, the Anabaptists, the Sacramentists, and other sects which have split off from each other since Luther and are now counted in their hundreds.20

Bellarmine then deals with the note of apostolic succession: what is true of the transmission of Peter’s pre-eminence to the pope21 also “holds true” at a lower hierarchical level for the trans18. Bellarmine, Apologie, 85–86. Basing his argument on Saint Irenaeus’s theory, Bellarmine states that the Antichrist’s seat will be in Jerusalem (84). 19. Bellarmine, De Notis ecclesiae, IV, 8, 115–16; see also Démonstration victorieuse, vol. 3, ch. 7, “Des marques de l’Église,” 343. 20. Ibid., vol. 3, ch. 7, “Des marques de l’Église,” 348, and De Notis ecclesiae, X, 7. 21. Démonstration victorieuse, vol. 2, ch. 5, 185–92.

214  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance mission of power by all the apostles to bishops.22 The note of apostolicity also covers the question of the identity of faith with that of the Fathers and its unconditional historical continuity, hence the numerous polemics between Reformist and Catholic (and Anglican) theologians. The controversies on the apostolicity of doctrine were of major significance in that they also set the conditions for the note of catholicity.23 For Bellarmine, as for all Roman Catholic theologians, it is impossible to call oneself a Catholic if one is not in communion with Rome, and this is what he holds against James (as indeed did Cardinal Davy du Perron). The following criteria of space and time can also be used in defining catholicity: The third sign is a lasting, uninterrupted length of time. [. . .] It is beyond question that our Church has lasted since the beginning of the world to the present day; to speak only of the New Testament, from Christ to the year 1610, despite all the attacks on it, first of all by the Jews, then the pagans, and lastly the heretics, not only has it lasted, but it has even spread. [. . .] For a Church to be Catholic, it is necessary that it should not exclude any time, any place, or any sort of men; that is what distinguishes it from the synagogue, which was a particular rather than a Catholic church, because it had a limited length of time, that is to say until the advent of Christ.24

Finally, the note of sanctity is also defined in doctrinal terms: “The eighth sign is the holiness of the doctrine. The true Church is not 22. I have used quotation marks for the expression “holds true” because in strictly Bellarminian terms, bishops do not succeed to the apostles in the same way as the pope succeeds to Peter: “Magnum esse discrimen inter successionem Petri et aliorum apostolorum. Nam romanus pontifex proprie succedit Petro, non ut apostolo, sed ut pastori ordinario totius Ecclesiae; et ideo ab eo habet romanus pontifex jurisdictionem a quo habuit Petrus; at episcopi non succedunt proprie apostolis, quoniam apostoli non fuerunt ordinarii, sed extraordinarii, et quasi delegati pastores, quibus non succederetur.” De Romano Pontifice, IV, 24, vol. 2, 141. 23. P. Polman, L’élément historique dans la controverse religieuse du XVIème siècle (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1932), 512–16. 24. Bellarmine, De Notis ecclesiae, IV, 7; Démonstration victorieuse, vol. 3, ch. 7, 339–41.

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  215 only Catholic, apostolic, and indivisible, but also holy, as taught by the symbol of Constantinople. The Church bears the title ‘holy’ because its belief is holy, containing only that which is holy in terms of doctrine, and only that which is just in terms of morals.”25 Further on, Bellarmine adds that one of the criteria of sanctity is the external union “of members with each other and with their leader.” This simple expression demonstrates the complete opposition between Catholic and Protestant ecclesiology. As a general rule, Reformist theologians understood sanctity in terms of a theology of the invisibility of the predestined and the justified, while Catholic thinkers emphasized the visible dimension of the earthly communion of the baptized. The note of sanctity as defended by Bellarmine reveals a further difference of opinion with James’s Protestant beliefs. Following the notes of unity, apostolicity, and catholicity, the note of sanctity corroborates his understanding of the visibility of the Church. For Bellarmine, Scripture fully attests the Church’s visible nature, particularly through Christ’s own words: meaning, mountain, cradle, feast. He also puts forward another key reason—the Church Fathers’ teachings are unanimous: Through the Fathers, and above all through those who teach of one common accord that those who are outside the Church have neither authority nor jurisdiction within the Church. Reason dictates the same thing. How can it be, in truth, that a man who is not even member of the Church can hold authority or jurisdiction within it? Furthermore, it is certain that a secret heretic, even if he were a bishop or even pope, would lose neither jurisdiction, nor dignity, nor the title of leader of the Church, as long as he is not publicly distanced from it or has not made clear his own distance from it.26

So, by virtue of its New Testament origin, how can what Bellarmine believes to be the one true Church of Christ be corrupted, 25. Bellarmine, De Notis ecclesiae, IV, 11; Démonstration victorieuse, vol. 3, ch. 7, 348. 26. Bellarmine, De Notis ecclesiae, IV, 7; Démonstration victorieuse, vol. 3, ch. 5: “Du nom et de la définition de l’Église,” 325.

216  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance and how can its leader be the personification of the Antichrist? The answer lies in the notion of power itself. Following Lutheran and Calvinist theologians, James asserts that the person of the pope and the Holy See (and its duration) have corrupted the true “Catholic Church” because of the jurisdictional and doctrinal power confiscated by the Church over the centuries.27 In short, the Church has become perverted because it has taken over the mediating and monarchical function of the one true Mediator and Creator. The pope and the Holy See became the Antichrist when they granted themselves divine power over souls, whereby the Church confiscated secular powers, at least indirectly. From confiscating God’s sovereignty to the political sovereignty of monarchs was but a short step! In the light of these two apologetic theologies, we can see how the notes of unity, apostolicity, catholicity, and the sanctity of the Church came to play a part in a controversy opposing two interpretations of the ecclesiastico-political history of Christianity. James’s monitory preface in the second edition of the Apologie and Bellarmine’s Apologie both clearly highlight these two antinomic ecclesiologies. Some of the themes touching on issues of faith have no bearing, however indirect, on the central, pressing problems of the oath, the people’s loyalty, the divine right of kings, and royal supremacy. However, they represent a solid base enabling James to challenge the papacy’s unjustified claims to power over princes. These claims were justified with reference to a Church that constantly invented new articles of faith, particularly from the Gregorian Reform to the Council of Trent. On the other hand, the same themes enabled Bellarmine to justify—at least indirectly—the pope’s universal jurisdiction over the Church and his temporal power.28 27. On hostility to the power of the papacy, see Peter Lake, “Antipopery: The Structure of a Prejudice,” in Conflict in Early Stuart England, Studies in Religion and Elites 1603–1642, ed. Richard Cust and Ann Hughes (London: Longman, 1989), 72–106. 28. On the issue of Catholic and reformed theological doctrines, see A. Milton, Catholic and Reformed, The Roman and Protestant Church in English Protestant Thought,

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  217 As a result, if the Church of Rome granted itself the right to interpret, detail, and present new religious doctrines, it also had to intervene in the secular jurisdiction of monarchs in order to maintain Christian unity. Any rebelliousness on the part of the monarchs was then understood as a challenge—direct or indirect, depending on the object of the dispute—to their loyalty to the Catholic faith. In this, the dispute over the oath of allegiance echoes the political dimension of religious controversies opposing Protestant and Anglican reformers and the Holy See. James drew on other criteria to defend the notes of unity, apostolicity, catholicity, and the sanctity of the Church on the basis of this ecclesiastico-political controversy. Like the Anglican theologians, he disqualified the Catholic criteria for a dogmatic interpretation of faith. More fundamentally, the status of true religion was open to question. Didn’t the Catholic Church’s doctrinal errors prohibit it from claiming to be the Church of Christ? This was the belief shared by Protestant theologians on the continent and some Anglican theologians. Anglican theologians who tended to Episcopalianism, most notably Hooker, were less categorical in this respect. Under Andrewes’s influence, James was part of this school. For a better understanding of the central points of James’s theological and ecclesiological thought, we shall now examine it in several of his texts. By examining these various themes, we shall be in a better position to grasp the ecclesiastico-political argument in the Apologie, James’s constancy of thought in his religious and political ideals, the epistemological coherence of his beliefs, and the nature of their incompatibility with Bellarmine’s ideas and Roman Catholic theology. We will then be able to conclude our analysis of James’s political theology regarding the justifications for his thinking on the pope as the Antichrist. 1600–1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); on Protestant views of the errors of the Catholic Church, see especially ch. 4: “The Errors of the Church of Rome,” 173–228.

218  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance

From Christ to the Church: The Church, the Papacy, and James’s Political Theology of the Christian Conception of Time >

King James’s Ecclesiology In keeping with the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone that he discussed in Basilikon Doron, James develops his ecclesiological theories in several of his texts. They likewise correlate to his beliefs on the theology of the Church, the final advent of Christ, and his political thought. To begin with, we shall examine the vocabulary James uses to define the Church.29 He bases the unity of the Church and its identification with Christ on the postulate of the Church’s divine nature. This unity and identification justify in particular the expression “bride of Christ.” The Paraphrase upon the Revelation of the Apostle Saint John contains James’s clearest explanation of the connection between Christ and the Church: “the Church [. . .] is signified here by a woman, (for she is the spouse of Christ, who is her head, her husband, and her glory, obeying him with a reuerent loue, and yet weake and infirme like to a woman).”30 In other texts, most notably the Meditation upon the Lords Prayer, James alluded to Cyprian (rather than Augustine, as he believed), to describe the Church as a mother: “For hee that will haue God to bee his Father, must also haue the true Church to be his Mother, as Saint Augustine saith.”31 Furthermore, in the Declaration against Vorstius (an Arminian theologian), he referred to the Church as the “Church of God.”32 In this context, his intention was first and foremost to com29. All quotes from James’s writings in this paragraph are from James Montague’s edition of his works, The Workes of the Most High and Mightie Prince, Iames by the Grace of God . . . (London: Robert Barker and Iohn Bill, 1616). 30. A Paraphrase upon the Revelation of the Apostle S. John, in ibid., I, 37. 31. A Meditation upon the Lords Prayer, in ibid., II, 577. 32. A Declaration against Vorstius, in ibid., II, 356.

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  219 bat Vorstius’s somewhat diluted version of Calvinism by insisting on God’s sovereignty. When James complained in the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance about those who were dividing the Church, he referred to the Church as a “mystical body”: “for idle Controuersies or indifferent things, teare asunder that Mysticall Body, whereof ye are a part, since the very coat of him whose member wee are was without a seame.”33 The use of the terms “bride,” “mother,” “Church of God,” and “mystical body” point to the key notion of Christ’s glorified humanity. Christ defeated evil, represented in the Apocalypse by a dragon: “By the vertue of Christs renewing of vs, was no more able to accuse the Saints of God, as he did in time of the old Law, since now we are made righteous, which is signified by the battell in heauen, where God [. . .] made Christ, here called Michael [. . .] to fight and ouercome the diuel and his angels, and cast them on the earth.”34 Through this theology of recapitulation (“by the vertue of Christs renewing of vs”), James asserts his faith in the eternal life of the Church, represented by the victory of the Archangel Michael. As a result, the purpose of the Church is divine worship, as James explicitly reminds his readers in the Meditation on the Lords Prayer: The principall ende for which God created man after his Image, was that hee might sanctifie his Name; and this is not onely the Office of the Militant Church heere, and of euery one of them; but it is also the eternall Office of the Church triumphant in Heauen, composed of Angels and men, who without ceasing praise and sanctifie the Name of God for euer. [. . .] euery Christian man as a feeling member of the body of the Church, ought to pray that Gods Name may bee praysed, and sanctified by men and Angels: not onely for the present, but in all times comming, and after that there shall be no more time, for euer and euer eternally. And although wee knowe it must and euer will bee so, yet wee pray and 33. Apologie and Premonition, 337. 34. A Meditation upon the Revelation of the Apostle Saint John, in The Workes of the Most High and Mightie Prince, I, 38.

220  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance wish it; to shewe and expresse our harmonie and holy zeale to prayse God, ioyntly with the rest of the members, both of the Militant and Triumphant Church.35

The understanding of the Church that James defends here also requires the reader to take into account the relative nature of the visibility and personalization of the exercise of authority by and within the Church. James’s ecclesiology can be understood from his conception of salvation in Christ. In terms of the relationship between the Church Visible and Invisible, the difference is an important one, because it determines the status of believers in time and space. We have already seen that the distinction between the visible and invisible features in Basilikon Doron and was at least implied in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies. James gives another very illuminating definition of the difference in his dispute with Cardinal Davy du Perron on the issue of heretics: They frowardly wrangle for the inuisibilitie of the Church in earth: For indeed the matter is nothing so. They freely acknowledge a visible Church: for howsoeuer the assembly of Gods elect, doth make a body not discerneable by mans eye; yet we assuredly beleeue, and gladly professe, there neuer wanted a visible Church in the world; yet onely visible to such as make a part of the same. All that are without, see no more but men, they doe not see the said men to be the trew Church. Wee beleeue moreouer of the vniuersall Church visible, that it is composed of many particular Churches, whereof some are better fined and more cleane from lees and dregs then other: and withall, we denie the purest Churches to be alwayes the greatest and most visible.36

Note the careful tone in which the theologian discusses the visibility of the Church. It is interesting only insofar as it sheds light on the assembly of God’s elect, recognizable only to its members. Furthermore, he adds, the Church Visible “is composed of many par35. A Meditation upon the Lords Prayer, in ibid., II, 578–79. 36. A Remonstrance for the Right of Kings, and the Independance of Their Crownes, against an Oration of the Most Illustrious Card. of Perron, in ibid., II, 455.

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  221 ticular Churches” whose importance in terms of purity should not be exaggerated. This statement—at least the latter part—would have met with approval from Richard Hooker.37 The status of the Church Visible and Invisible also leads to a further distinction, which is just as important from the point of view of the tension between the Church’s temporal condition and its final triumph. James divides the true Church into the Church Militant and the Church Triumphant. In Basilikon Doron, he tells his son Henry that the Church Militant is informed and governed by Scripture. However, in the Paraphrase upon the Revelation of the Apostle Saint John, it is apparent that the distinction between the Church Militant and the Church Triumphant is never far from his mind. For example, the twenty-four elders represent “the whole Church, as well Militant as Triumphant.” They “powre forth, aswel on the Church triumphants part, thankesgiuing, that by the reuealing or opening of the Booke, he armeth the Militant Church to resist all the tentations contained therein, as also on the Church Militants part, to pray him to hasten the end and dissolution, for the hastening whereof all creatures sigh and grone to their Creator.”38 Finally, the Church Militant and the Church Triumphant together comprise the Tabernacle of God, the Sanctum Sanctorum. The Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance continues this contradiction between time and eternity, which both divide and unite the Church Militant and the Church Triumphant. According to James, it was equally important to distinguish between the true and the false Church: “Wee are taught, that the defection or falling away under the Antichrist, was generall, and so no visible Church was there: whereof two things doe follow: One, the Church may be corrupted and erre: another, the Church may lurke, and be unknowen for a certaine space.”39 In the Dec37. R. Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, III, I, 14. 38. A Paraphrase upon the Revelation of the Apostle S. John, in The Workes of the Most High and Mightie Prince, I, 17. 39. James I of England, A Fruitfull Meditation, Containing a Plaine and Easie Exposi-

222  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance laration against Vorstius, he also includes Cathars, Anabaptists, and Precisians among the false churches. This sidelining of Protestant “sects” along with the Roman Church should not surprise us, given James’s ecclesiastical policy and his wish to remain faithful to his understanding of the norms of the true Church. In both the Declaration against Vorstius and the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance, he gives a clear definition of the true Church according to the criteria of the Primitive Church.40 James was not alone in stating these principles, which were common to the continental and Anglican Reform. He is consistent in his theological thinking, affirming in the Paraphrase upon the Revelation of the Apostle Saint John that only those who belong to the one true Church will be saved: For he will saue all them that are of the true Church, for they are the inward parts of the Temple; and the rest by reason of their hypocrisie, shalbe accounted of as Gentiles; and this diuision shalbe made by my successours in doctrine, (of whom I spake already) for they by the measure and triall of the word, signified by the reede, shall separate that holy Sanctum Sanctorum from the rest of the outward Temple of God, to wit, the hypocriticall and Antichristian Church.41

Yet, he adds to back up his thesis, the true Church is not so much the church he defines as a return to the Church as it was before the divisions that arose following the era of Saint Augustine. The era of the Antichrist came into being because of the divisions created by heresies. The criteria of the true Church of Christ are thus the theological site from where we can recognize the elect. Finally, these criteria should draw our attention to the issue of the Church’s authority. In the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance, James wrote in support of a principle defended by Vincent de Lérins: “I will neuer refuse tion, or Laying Open of the VII. VIII. IX and X. Verses of the 20. Chapter of the REVELATION, in Forme and Maner of a Sermon, in ibid., I, 79. 40. A Declaration against Vorstius, in ibid., II, 357. 41. A Paraphrase upon the Revelation of the Apostle S. John, ibid., I, 33.

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  223 to imbrace any opinion in Diuinity necessary to saluation, which the whole Catholike Church with an vnanime consent, haue constantly taught and beleeued euen from the Apostles dayes.”42 James respects the authority of the general councils in the name of the necessity of “vnanime consen.” Again, on this point, his thought is not without similarity to statements by Episcopalian Anglican theologians such as Saravia.43 He did, after all, send a proposal to Pope Clement VIII to hold a council to reconcile the Christian Churches. He also added that national and local councils should be recognized as holding some authority, albeit at a lower level. In the Declaration against Vorstius, he expressed his regret over the loss of these bodies, which, moreover, proved to be a blow against monarchical power: The trew principle and foundation of the error of the Anabaptists, taking away by this meanes, all maner of gouernment from the Church: For hauing first ouerthrowen the Monarchicall power of the Pope, he sweepes away next all manner of power both Aristocraticall and Democraticall from the Church, cleane contrary to the Apostles institution, which ordeineth, that the spirits of the Prophets should bee subiect to the Prophets. For if one particular man may take vpon him such a singularitie as this, how shall he bee subiect to Generall, Nationall, and Synodicall Councels?44

Yet in spite of his understanding of Church authority, which, while conciliatory, was consistent with his idea of the undivided Church in the early centuries of Christianity, James did not reject papal authority per se, as he pointed out in the preface to the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance. This is doubtless further evidence of his theological and ecclesiological pragmatism, but it is also due to the fact 42. Apologie and Premonition, 307–8. 43. See Adrianus Saravia, A Treatise on the Different degrees of the Christian Priesthood, trans. A. W. Street (Oxford: J. H. Parker, 1840), 240. 44. A Declaration against Vorstius, in The Workes of the Most High and Mightie Prince, II, 370.

224  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance that in his opinion, Roman Catholic pre-eminence is not the same as the unwarranted expansion of the power of the papacy. In his 1609 text, he cites numerous popes who proved their loyalty to emperors, including most notably Gregory the Great, who refused the titles “chief ” and “universal bishop.”45 In his understanding of the Petrine ministry, the episcopacy is not instituted by divine right, nor is it a note of apostolicity. However, bishops do have a pastoral duty over which the king has no right. Of all the various themes that we have seen with reference to the structure of James’s ecclesiological thought, the key idea is that the unity of the Church is fundamentally based upon Christ, who is the head and the bridegroom of the Church, from whom man received salvation by virtue of justification, and through whom Christian life is recapitulated. The life of the Church is eternal, but there is a clear distinction between the Church Militant and the Church Triumphant, the vocation of sanctity preparing the former for the advent of the latter. The Church is visible, albeit with the sole aim of giving account of the assembly of God’s elect. The Church is universal (catholic), but present in particular churches. The criteria of the true Church are due to its great age and are rooted in the declaration of faith of the first four councils. The authority of the Church rests on these councils, on the level of both general councils and national and local councils. The identification of Christ with His Church does not mask God’s sovereignty over believers—a notion whose impact on James’s political thought we have seen. The pre-eminence of the papacy is not rejected, on condition that it is understood as a ministry in the service of the Church and that it does not trespass in the sphere of royal sovereignty. Finally, although the episcopal function, like Roman Catholic jurisdiction, is not held to be a note of apostolicity, its pastoral authority is nonetheless acknowledged. 45. James I of England, Apologie and Premonition, 279.

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  225 It is thus clear that among all the specific characteristics of James’s ecclesiological thought, the notes of unity, apostolicity, catholicity, and the sanctity of the Church are fundamentally at odds with Bellarminian and Roman ecclesiology. The point is of course not to suggest that Bellarmine saw no importance in the early Church and thus the normativity of Scripture, any more than he ignored the normativity of the first four councils. However, in line with the decision taken at the Council of Trent, Tradition, as well as Scripture,46 is the source of Revelation. The Reformed Churches did not acknowledge this authority. In addition to this first point of difference, there are three others: James’s rejection of the personalization of Church authority, principally in the person of the pope; the relative nature of the visibility of the Church; and the division of the catholicity of faith into a multitude of particular churches. These points indicate that as a theologian, James was a worthy heir to the Reform. It is important to note here that because faith and election are first and foremost part of the register of interiority, the Church cannot be characterized by a “mediating,” visible authority that imposes itself on Christian consciences, excepting ecumenical councils, of course. This is why, on the religious side, only God is sovereign over believers, only Christ assures the unity of the Church, and only the truth of the doctrine of faith guarantees the apostolic succession, in accordance with Lerinian principles. Starting from these principles, the catholicity of churches is preferable to that of the Church. In keeping with this theological epistemology, it is clear why James 46. We must avoid the misconception that the Sacrosancta decree at the Council of Trent espouses a theology of “two sources.” On this fundamental doctrinal issue, see the collective work by Olivier de La Brosse, Joseph Lecler, Henri Holstein, and Charles Lefebvre under the direction of Gervais Dumeige, Histoire des Conciles œcuméniques (10), Latran V et Trente (Paris: L’Orante, 1975). According to the authors, “The Church’s respect for the twofold transmission of the Gospel of Christ prohibits it from dissociating the two or creating distinctions which would suggest a preference for one over the other, while the Church intends to receive the apostolic legacy whole and undivided,” 255.

226  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance made his emphatic plea in favor of exteriority or visibility as far as the political institution was concerned. Having studied these theological and ecclesiological topics, we are in a better position to understand why James included a long section in the preface to the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance on the pope as Antichrist.

The Papacy as Personification of the Antichrist The theme of the Antichrist takes us straight to the heart of the ecclesiological and political stakes raised by James VI of Scotland and I of England’s theses, because it highlights two correlative aspects that are linked, directly or indirectly, to the question of power: the visibility of political and ecclesiastical institutions and, of particular interest to us, the specificity of Christian time and its manifold interpretations. Before turning to James’s interpretation of the coming of the Antichrist in the preface to the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance, we shall briefly examine the context in Scotland. In echoing the Paraphrase upon the Revelation of the Apostle Saint John and Demonologie, in Forme of a Dialogue,47 published respectively in 1588 and 1597, in the Apologie, James explains the criterion by which he differentiates between temporal political powers and ecclesiastical spiritual powers. The Antichrist is presented as a metaphor for the malevolent power that has become involved in the Church of Christ. It designates not only the person (the pope) and the See (Rome), but also the duration; it is particularly through this troubling and mysterious figure that the question of time in the Christian regime meets that of power. In its religious dimension, the apocalyptic theme of the Antichrist underlines the theological importance of this question, consecrating thinking on millenarianism and eschatology.48 While eschatology deals with the expec47. Demonologie, in Forme of a Dialogue, in The Workes of the Most High and Mightie Prince, I, 91–136. A Paraphrase upon the Revelation of the Apostle S. John, ibid., I, 7–89. 48. See Luc Borot, “James VI and I and Revelation: How to Discourage Millenar-

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  227 tation of final ends, millenarianism holds that the reign of Christ and the saints will last a thousand years, followed by a period of diabolical violence before the second resurrection and the Day of Judgment. The key question is thus whether the millennium has yet begun or is about to begin, or if believers should wait for its unexpected advent. This question also had major political repercussions, especially given that there were numerous precedents, from the medieval period through to the Anabaptist revolt in Münster in 1532–35. Knowing that millenarianism was a major source of political danger, James intended to explain his own vision of things by virtue of his legitimacy by divine right, which granted him a privileged relationship with God. It nonetheless remained the case that his room for maneuver was limited, particularly in England and Scotland, where apocalyptic meditations were exclusive to radical Calvinists. James wrote the Paraphrase upon the Revelation of the Apostle Saint John in the context of a series of particularly harsh disputes with Scottish Presbyterians. James, king by God’s grace and Calvinist by upbringing, had to take a position that did not rile the extremist wing of the Church of Scotland, while strengthening his authority over both the Church and his kingdom. Thinking of his future reign in England, threatened by the Spanish Armada and the Church of Rome, James read chapters 9 and 11 of the Apocalypse as describing the Jesuit Papist danger, represented by the horses and the Babylonian empire.49 Faced with these two dangers, he had to choose a middle way, which he restated in the preface to ian Aspirations,” Anglophonia 3 (1998): “Millénarisme et utopie dans les pays anglosaxons,” 23–36. On the theme of the Antichrist under Elizabeth I, see Peter Lake, “The Significance of the Elizabethan Identification of the Pope as Antichrist,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 31, no. 2 (1980): 161–78, and the major work by Denis Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, la violence au temps des troubles de religion (Seyssel, France: Champ Vallon, 1990), which contains numerous chapters on the themes of eschatology, millenarianism, and the violence that is its fundamental theme. 49. Borot, “James VI and I and Revelation,” 28.

228  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance the second edition of the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance. By 1609, the threat was exclusively Papist; the interpretation of the second Epistle to the Thessalonians 2:3 and of the Apocalypse50 served to demonstrate that the pope and Christian Rome were the person and the seat of the Antichrist, whose reign began when the Church gave up its zeal for conversion “which immediatly followed the Apostles time.”51 In this context, James’s apologetic demonstration consisted in proving that the apostles clearly understood that the Antichrist would appear in Rome—the heart of Christianity—where Christ was crucified in allegory, because, as James wrote, Christ’s trial was a Roman trial, held for Roman reasons. It is clear that the term “Roman” is used here in two ways. Pagan Rome’s behavior foreshadows that of a perverted Christian Rome. James justifies this allegorical interpretation by the second coming of Christ, which has been delayed. Christ will reveal himself in time through the diminution of the Antichrist’s powers. In this analysis, James demonstrates that the coming of the Antichrist could not have taken place in the age of the Apostles, but rather much later. He backs up this claim with three arguments: the Roman Church’s manifold errors, its domination over earthly kings, and the ongoing persecution of saints of the true Church of Christ. These three reasons, which indicate the devastating reign of the Antichrist, themselves prove that it takes a certain time to recognize him and that only Christ has the gift of this length of time, especially since His enemy reveals himself in His Church, God’s temple. According to James, the historical beginning of the Antichrist’s reign coincided with the destruction of Ancient Rome and its restoration by Goths and Vandals. That was the beginning of the conflation of the spiritual reign of the Church, God’s temple, and the 50. On Protestant interpretations of these biblical texts, see Milton, Catholic and Reformed, ch. 2: “The Rejection of Antichrist,” 93–127. 51. James I of England, Apologie and Premonition, 310.

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  229 temporal reign of his political power, which was to continue to the end of the second half of the second spiritual week separating the first coming of Christ from the second.52 The millenarian reign of Christ will begin only after the completion of this time of iniquity. It is clear that for James, as for all Protestants of his day, the end of the Antichrist’s reign corresponds to that of the papacy. This is hardly surprising given James’s interpretation of biblical texts. Through this spiritual and allegorical reading of Christian time, James confronts the reader with the historical norm of the true Church—that of the early centuries when the Church was not yet divided and was not dominated by the power of the papacy. By repeating his meditation on the Antichrist and the second coming of Christ, linked to His last judgment, James clearly lays out his doctrine of the two reigns, presented much more discreetly in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies. Setting out to prove that the Antichrist lies within the pope and the Holy See, he also offers the reader a meditation on the Christian significance of time, through the confrontation of ecclesiastical and political powers. In other words, in the spirit of the Luthero-Calvinist doctrine of the two kingdoms and the double regime, James renews Saint Augustine’s doctrine of the two cities. The spiritual sphere of Christian life cannot be considered a “power” that intervenes in the temporal magistracy of kings. If this is the case—and this is what James holds against the papacy—the Church thus considers itself to be a temporal power, even in respect of the salvation of souls. By granting itself the attributes of power, the Church cannot but be unfaithful to the reign of Christ, whose earthly temple it is, because it aims to impose the city of God using the methods of the city of men. In James’s view, this challenge to papal power is all the more justified since temporal kings must themselves govern with the people’s common weal in mind, according to the judgment of God, who granted them 52. Ibid., 308–11.

230  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance their royalty. It is clear that if we follow James’s theologico-political thought, the duality of powers under Christianity cannot be abolished, save on the condition that he who rules secular life should exercise the plenitude of his temporal rights and that he who announces the end of days in the spiritual reign of Christ should accept his subordination to the former. This is the only way for the Church Militant not to take the place of Christ’s millenarian reign and second coming. In line with his doctrine of the two kingdoms, James’s response on the date of the beginning of the millennium makes him a postmillenarian. Adopting a strictly millenarian viewpoint would have laid him open to an extremist Puritan position, in flagrant contradiction with his legitimist political theory of divine right. As king by divine right and supreme governor of the Church, he had to protect the Church against “dragons,” be they Puritans or the power of the papacy. Here again, James VI of Scotland, author of the Trew Law of Free Monarchies, Basilikon Doron, Demonologie, and the Paraphrase upon the Revelation of the Apostle Saint John, proved to share the beliefs of James I of England, author of the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance, as well as the Defence of the Right of Kings. In both cases, his aim was to strengthen the unity of Church and State under his authority. He thus willingly believed in the prophecies of the Apocalypse. This is why he devoted so much effort to interpreting them, because failure to do so meant giving free rein to dangerous interpretations, which would lend credence to the belief that they would soon come to pass. This would justify all sorts of rebellions in the name of the coming of Christ’s reign, following extremist Puritan separatist theses. But the former danger could be completely neutralized only by facing up to the latter and protecting the kingdom of England against Papism. Thus, the postmillenarian stance James adopts in the preface to the Apologie is aimed against the papacy, but is also at the same time an implicit message to the Puritans: James’s moderate attitude to Catholics did not mean a renunciation that would create doubt over the authenticity of his

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  231 Protestant faith. In fact, it was a strategy that can later be seen in his plan to marry the future Charles I to the Spanish Infanta and in the concession he granted to episcopacy by divine right.53 Furthermore, his avowal—repeated many times in the preface—of Catholic faith, according to the criteria that we have already described in his other writings, also reflects this. For all these reasons, his references to the pope as Antichrist are relatively moderate and reflect James’s will to proclaim the catholicity of his faith and of the Church of England, while identifying himself wholeheartedly as a man of the Reform. It is therefore not unfair to read the Apologie as a text that is sincere, yet driven by a desire for compromise between heterogeneous theological tendencies within the established Church and on its outlying fringes. However, this moderate attitude should not be understood in terms of pragmatism alone. The fact of writing the Apologie was a reflection of James’s theologico-political understanding of civil and ecclesiastical order: the moderate anti-Papism corresponds to a postmillenarian thesis insofar as James does not wish the very idea of power to be discredited by a belief in the imminent advent of the kingdom of Christ. It is clear that James’s challenge to papal power for ecclesiological reasons was now conditioned by his political doctrine of the legitimacy of hereditary divine right. As one divine right must replace another, there could be no question of giving the excesses of millenarianism a free rein. The end of the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance is enlightening in this respect, because it shows James repeating his appeal (already made at the beginning of the text), first of all to continental Protestant rulers, then to Catholic princes, against the Papist threat to their temporal sovereignty. This twofold appeal showed that James set as much store by political solidarity (worth more than purely denominational criteria) as by reli53. Lancelot Andrewes’s influence on James I was certainly significant in explaining this theological doctrine.

232  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance gious solidarity. Finally, his plea in favor of royal supremacy, based on numerous examples of Old Testament royalty, set the tone for his defense of the ecclesiastico-political unity of the human establishment. His duty as governor of the Church and his divine legitimacy granted him the right to interpret the norms of the true Church. Because human power is an institution founded on both fault and divine approval, it represents the exteriority or visibility of the Christian condition, but without quashing its interiority or invisibility. God acts on both dimensions of the human and Christian condition—sovereignty of the prince and the law, and grace—without which the Christian order would lose its stability. Protestant spiritual dissidence subverts this order by its different interpretation of the Bible, while the papacy does so by usurping temporal power. Hence the unavoidable interpretation of the coming of Christ’s millenarian reign.54 This is the key point of James’s message in the controversy over the Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance, because of what he saw as the impossibility of two powers cohabiting. A situation that Cardinal Bellarmine saw as theologically and legally justified had no legitimacy in James’s view. In other words, although Bellarmine saw his theory as moderate, it was nonetheless part of a superimposition of finalities— temporal-natural and spiritual-supernatural—that was bound to come into direct conflict with the theological principles of the Reform. This is confirmed in the way Bellarmine links ecclesiastical and political power, justifying an ecclesiology that grants the Church the power of interpreting the truth of faith through the notes of unity, apostolicity, catholicity, and sanctity. As a result, papal power 54. Anglican theological thought continued to pursue these questions in the following decades, for example in the writings of the Cambridge professor John Davenant, who neatly sums up the moderate Calvinist position. See John Davenant, Determinationes quaestionum quarundam theologicarum (Cambridge: Thomas Buck, 1639), 156 and 216.

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  233 held sway, at least indirectly, over all of temporal Christian society. Protestant (or Jacobean) refusal to acknowledge the power of the keys resulted in another status for the theological interpretation of Christian faith, and thus for ecclesiastical mediation for salvation, the duality of powers, the Christian understanding of time, and its advent. By rejecting Roman Catholic principles, Jacobean political theology itself contains another theological understanding of history and its consummation. The believer saved by Jesus Christ knows that he belongs to two kingdoms, the second of which—spiritual in nature—will lead him to the salvation that has already come. This was the essence of the Reformist theology of which James was part, corresponding to the theory of the two cities held by political Augustinism. But the duality of the two powers in James’s thought, implying the temporal subordination of the visible, institutional Church, should not be understood exclusively in terms of a dual Augustinian and Reformist heritage. In James’s usage, the doctrine of the two kingdoms, which called for a transfer of the institutional visibility of the Church (as affirmed by Bellarmine) toward the visibility of political sovereignty, also contributed to the origins of the modern State. This call is of vital significance: medieval examples, particularly of conflicts between the spiritual and the temporal, led to the sudden convergence of new theological, ecclesiological, and political issues. We have dwelt long enough on the fact that the apologetic genre that stoked the controversy between Bellarmine and James implied an analogical relationship between the politico-religious events of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and biblical, ancient, and medieval history. Both men were so keen to “prove” or “demonstrate” the legitimacy of royal or papal sovereignty through history that they utterly failed to make critical use of the sources. But the apologetic use of history gave the two opposing theses their fundamental interest. They have the merit of raising two key problems regarding the

234  An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance true ecclesiologico-political issue at the heart of the controversy— the incompatibility of the oath of allegiance and the papal power of excommunication and deposition—while the theory of the indirect temporal power of the papacy highlights each side’s notion of Christianity and its theologico-political norm. This incompatibility also demonstrates the impossibility of founding a political order on an undisputed theological truth since the schism in Western Christianity in the sixteenth century. Ecclesiological theories had become the focus of too much discussion and uncertainty for the Church to be the institutional channel for establishing the legitimacy of civil power with any degree of stability. This issue dominated the doctrinal debate on the notes of apostolicity, catholicity, and the sanctity of the Church, and the note of unity regarding the pope’s spiritual pre-eminence, the plenitude of his power by divine right over that of the king, and the judicial, ecclesiological, and political status of the oath of civil obedience. Hence the inflation of the apologetic discourse, which revealed, contrary to its initial intention, the impasse in which the controversialists found themselves when they tried to found a political order on religious orthodoxy. Yet there is a key difference between the political meaning of Bellarmine’s and James’s religious orthodoxy. The former determines the theologico-political status of the secular order by reference to what he believes the norm of the true Church to be. The theory of the indirect temporal power of the papacy is the perfect illustration of this. The latter, on the other hand, determines the norm of the true Church by reference to the legitimacy it offers the political institution. That is the originality of James’s political and ecclesiological thought, despite its awkwardness, the hesitations of his ecclesiastical policy, and the limitations of his theological intellect, which cannot be compared to that of eminent theologians such as Bellarmine or Suarez. In this context of vigorous doctrinal conflicts, along with attempts at control by the Puritan and Jesuit

An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance  235 clergy, James clearly saw the necessity of strengthening his legitimacy by reference not to a theological principle, but to a theologicojuridico-political one. This principle aimed to order the Christian truth, in the sense of the interior spiritual life of his Christian subjects, on the one hand, while on the other ordering the State to his own ends. In this context, James used the oath of allegiance and the Apologie to put into practice the central doctrine of the Trew Law of Free Monarchies—legitimacy founded on divine right and the hereditary transmission of the Crown. James broke with the ecclesiastical policy of his predecessors, at least in part, because of this doctrine: the loyalist legitimist request did not depend solely on the exercise of royal supremacy, and thus did not challenge the principle of Roman Catholic pre-eminence, but rather the Apostolic See’s claim to jurisdiction, which infringed on that of secular states: And next, that we may prouidently looke to the securitie of our owne States, and not suffer this incroaching Babylonian Monarch to winne still ground vpon vs. And if God hath so mercifully dealt with vs, that are his Lieutenants vpon earth, as that he hath ioyned his cause with our interest, the spirituall libertie of the Gospell with our temporall freedome: with what zeale and courage may wee then imbrace this worke.55

The convergence of the “spirituall libertie of the Gospell” and the “temporall freedome” of princes led to the rise of a new and decisive Christian institution of human reality. 55. James I of England, Apologie and Premonition, 337.

Conclusion

T

he eschatological dimension of Christian preaching meant that it was initially nontheological and nonpolitical, despite having the potential to be so, as several New Testament texts indicate. This potential came to fruition when the Christian faith acquired the status of religio.1 However, the fact that the religion of Christ’s disciples was now given official status subverted the idea that the Romans had of the religion. As Christ was the only God, the emperor could not be divine. The advent of a Christian empire under Constantine led to a long history not only of collaboration but also struggle between the spiritual power of the Church and the temporal power of the emperor and other Christian monarchs. These relationships inevitably also gave rise to reciprocal influences between the two spheres. There is no doubt that the Church was strongly affected by the empire, even if only because the empire pre-dated it. The empire’s power and

1. On the term religio and its history in the context of Christianity, see Michel Despland, La Religion en Occident. Evolution des idées et du vécu (Montreal: Fides, 1979). For a more detailed examination of the controversy between Tertullian and the pagan authors of his period on the meaning of the true religio, see Maurice Sachot, L’Invention du Christ, genèse d’une religion (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1998), especially the third part, which deals with the shift of the notion of religio toward Christianity. See also Sachot’s Quand le christianisme a changé le monde, I La subversion chrétienne du monde antique (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2007), especially the section on Christianity as a subversion of Judaism and Hellenism, 161–71.

236

Conclusion  237 structures represented an illustrious model for ecclesiastical organization, while offering the secular support that the Church needed. However, the reverse is also true. The empire needed a new religious legitimacy, which the former Roman religion could no longer offer. However, in the West, Saint Augustine’s doctrine of the two cities led to the Church’s greater independence as regards political influences, even within the process of Romanizing Christianity. While Saint Augustine’s original doctrine was extremely subtle, over the course of the Middle Ages it became a factor in spiritualizing the temporal order, referred to as political Augustinism. Pope Gelasius was its first theorist in the late fifth century, followed by Gregory the Great a century later. This doctrine led to a narrower interpretation of the city of God. The basic idea was the existence of a single order of the universe and a single movement toward its end—God—with two interdependent regulating authorities, the emperor and the pope. Christianity was driven by these two powers. However, after the collapse of Charlemagne’s heritage, the power of the papacy progressively took over the medieval ideal of political and religious unification. Charlemagne’s fleeting revival of the old Roman understanding, combining the functions of priest and king, enabled Gregory VII to take over the notion for himself and to try to create a unitary order with the pope at its head. The Gregorian Reform continued with Innocent III and Boniface VIII’s doctrine of papal monarchy. This unification was to have a profound impact on ecclesiological doctrines. The Church inevitably adopted the characteristics of political power that then became the model for all power. It was no longer a question of the influence of the independent temporal over the spiritual, which acknowledged the former’s dignity, but rather an attempt by the latter to take over the former’s constitutive characteristics. The dawn of the sixteenth century witnessed the opposite phenomenon, which led to a change of theological and political para-

238  Conclusion digm. As states formed, the ancient collaboration between the temporal and the spiritual most often led to a situation of collusion, whereby churches were subordinated to princes. Crises, struggles, and controversies now usually pitted the papacy against states. Yet at the same time, there was a revival of the Constantinian unitary ideal. The prince’s religion, splintered and diversified, became the religion of his subjects. England represents a case in point from 1534 onward, unlike the religious reform in Scotland, where the people imposed their religion on the Crown in the 1560s. In the case of England, this “new” phenomenon had its roots in the medieval period. In certain circumstances, disputes over jurisdiction between ecclesiastical and royal courts cast a shadow over the relationship between the temporal and the spiritual. However, it remains the case that the rejection of the pope’s authority to wield any form of power over the Church of England, and indirectly over the kingdom itself, was quite new, by virtue of Henry VIII’s creation of royal supremacy over the Church. The roots of Henry’s schism, following the Holy See’s refusal to authorize the king’s “remarriage,” lay in the pope’s understanding of his universal jurisdiction over the Church, with all the political consequences that implied. The conflict was repeated in 1559 when Elizabeth deepened the schism by taking the title “supreme governor of the Church.” Pope Pius V then decided to publish a bull against the queen, declaring her a heretic and excommunicating her. He was faithful to the notion of the ecclesiastical right of resistance and also declared that the queen was stripped of her rights to the Crown of England and her subjects were freed from their oath of allegiance to her. Following this last schism, Anglican religious orthodoxy took shape in the 1590s, with Richard Hooker, one of its leading representatives together with Lancelot Andrewes. Hooker’s theses are, for the most part, in line with continental Reformist principles. However, Hooker’s underlying philosophical principles are unquestionably closer to those of medieval Catholic theologians than to the

Conclusion  239 Puritans. His central idea was to demonstrate the coextensive and unitary relationship between Church and society, particularly in his doctrine of royal supremacy. English Catholics, for their part, were split on the position to adopt with regard to royal supremacy, for reasons diametrically opposed to those of the Puritans. In the 1590s, while secular priests and many lay believers wanted to be loyal to the Crown while remaining spiritually faithful to the papacy, a certain number of Jesuits refused any politico-religious compromise, believing that Elizabeth would retain the principle of one single religion for all. The Jesuits held theories hostile both to regalian power and to national churches. They thus contributed to the cause of papal power. The split in the Catholic camp grew wider under James. His clumsy, excessive promises to Catholics as king of Scotland led to a deep misunderstanding. Catholics faithful to the pope, disappointed to see their precarious position undermined yet further by the new king’s ecclesiastical policy shortly after his accession to the English throne in 1603, began planning three plots, including the Gunpowder Plot. These were the circumstances in which the penal laws were made more severe and an oath of allegiance was imposed. A minority of Catholics, represented by the archpriest George Blackwell, espoused the idea of swearing the new oath, as they were convinced that it was merely a promise of civil obedience that subjects were not permitted to withdraw from their legitimate sovereign. This position was not accepted by the Apostolic See, because the oath included several aspects contrary to the Roman Church’s understanding of its relationship to secular powers, in particular the protection of believers. This was Bellarmine’s position. He believed that the oath of fidelity was no different from earlier oaths of supremacy, which always granted the king the right to intervene in doctrinal issues. Bellarmine thus became involved in the controversy, first trying to bring Blackwell back to his initial position, then publishing two editions of his Responce to James’s Apologie. Bellarmine’s thesis, which he had al-

240  Conclusion ready expressed a few years earlier in the De Romano Pontifice, was to reaffirm the indirect temporal power of the papacy. This was wholly incompatible with royal supremacy and the divine right of kings. It is clear that Bellarmine’s theory of the indirect temporal power of the papacy, against the backdrop of the canonical powers of excommunication and deposition, had no choice but to oppose the theory of royal supremacy over the Church. Yet paradoxically, this incompatibility was possible only within the Christian duality of the spiritual and the temporal. This is why the controversy between James and Bellarmine took the shape of a dispute over terminology and shifts of meaning in an ecclesiastico-political context: thus, royal supremacy vied with papal jurisdiction, and Henry VIII’s, Elizabeth’s, and James’s oaths, contrary to the Gregorian understanding, moved toward political sovereignty. Because this dispute over terminology was ecclesiastico-political and anthropological in nature, the controversy of 1606–9 should be read in the light of this rivalry between two powers and two understandings of Christian truth. To begin with, from an ecclesiastico-political point of view, Bellarmine’s central argument that because of its rejection of the pope’s powers of excommunication, deposition, and liberation of believers, the oath of allegiance was in fact a disguised version of the oath of royal supremacy, sufficiently demonstrates that although the immediate stake of the controversy was political, its basis was ecclesiological. This is how James angled the controversy against Pope Paul V in his Apologie and Bellarmine’s Responce. In James’s view, the oath of allegiance, which brooked no “reservations,” by no means challenged Roman Catholic pre-eminence per se. For Bellarmine, this legal step was fundamentally incompatible with apostolic faith, which presupposed unfailing unity around the figure of the pope. Furthermore, papal power originated with the Apostle Peter, and was monarchical in form. This power was characterized in doctrinal terms by infallibility and in legal terms by the “plenitude of power,” defined as such since Innocent III.

Conclusion  241 Bellarmine does not fail to highlight this point with reference to the “power to bind and loose,” justified, in his opinion, by Scripture. The rivalry between power and truth in each institution also led to an even more key dispute over terminology and its basis. The opposition between James and the papacy forbade all forms of compromise because of the legitimacy of their power by divine right. Here again, the reasons for the rivalry between the two powers lie in the dispute’s ecclesiological nature. The dispute became focused on the king of England’s claim to consider himself the sovereign pontiff’s political superior because of the divine origins of his authority. The consequence of this argument was to discredit the superiority of the spiritual jurisdiction and the finality of the Christian order as conceived by the theocratic ideal of the second medieval millennium. The second aspect of the ecclesiastico-political conflict raised by the oath of allegiance cannot be separated from the first, in that the dispute is once again formulated in terms of one authority’s superiority over another. However, James’s claim to legitimacy by divine right shifted the controversy toward a deeper issue: the basis of political and ecclesiastical institutions, and the way the superiority of one over the other should be understood. Questioning the basis, superiority, and finality of the two institutions meant taking into account the definition of the four notes of unity, apostolicity, catholicity, and sanctity of the Church. They were at the heart of both Catholic and Reformist ecclesiological thought during this period and were not without influence on theologians’ understanding of a Christian political order. The path they took to answer the question determined the status they granted the political sphere: either relative autonomy as regards religious finality (Bellarmine’s response—the theory of the indirect temporal power of the papacy over temporal issues), or total autonomy (James’s response—the divine right of kings). In terms of the former theory, the notion that popes enjoy plenitude of power

242  Conclusion over the Church and indirect authority over princes by divine right can be grasped only within an ecclesiological perspective, whereby the catholicity of the Church is considered from the outset in spatial terms of universalist visibility. Catholicity is a whole that informs the particular political characteristics of territories within the Christian order. In the temporal order, it is ordered by the principle of apostolic succession, whose cornerstone is canonical and ecclesiological unity guaranteed by the sovereign pontiff. This first response states there are no grounds for the total autonomy of secular power (royal supremacy over the Church) or territorial churches independent of the papacy. Furthermore, it is incompatible with a mode of expression of royal divine right that interferes with the pope’s divine right to exercise universal jurisdiction. From this point of view, the basis of the ecclesiastical institution and the superiority of the finality of its spiritual mission over all other forms of reality imply an institutional mediation under the guarantee of papal power. The second response given by James’s theory of the divine right of kings can be considered only in the perspective of a Church organized in a politically identifiable territory to which it is subordinated and from whence it can project its catholicity. In the temporal order, the question of apostolic succession gave rise to diverse thoughts according to the theological tendencies of the Church of England. From the end of Elizabeth’s reign, the dominant ecclesiology to which James subscribed inclined toward the episcopal nature of the Church. But there was no question of the principle of apostolic succession becoming the object of the same sacramental qualification that Roman Catholic theologians attributed to it. Finally, while the episcopacy was indeed instituted by divine right, it was nonetheless closely dependent on royal supremacy. This principle basically meant that the source of the Church’s unity was transferred to the political institution. Contrary to the theory of the plenitude of power and the divine right of popes, royal suprem-

Conclusion  243 acy made sense only if the notes of unity, apostolicity, catholicity, and sanctity were linked to the ecclesiology of a national territory. As a result, these two divergent approaches to the superiority of the spiritual finality of Christian existence tended toward the visibility of the Church and the relative subordination of secular power on the Roman Catholic side, and the visibility of the political institution and the relative subordination of the Church on the Anglican side. The key notions we noted in the introduction thus reveal their full relevance, particularly those of the power of excommunication and deposition, the ecclesiastical right of resistance, and the plenitude of papal power, in opposition to the divine right of kings, legitimacy, loyalism, and royal supremacy. The controversy’s anthropological dimension cannot be overlooked. The political sovereignty that emerged in Europe in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was partially built on an underlying conception of the relationship between man and God that implied the rejection of ecclesiastical mediation as a form of structural hierarchy. Since the late medieval period and the Gregorian Reform, of which Bellarmine considered himself a faithful disciple, this understanding of the Christian order had justified a hierarchical duality between temporal and spiritual powers within the Church itself. The analogical relationship between the created order and its creator, between man the sinner and God his savior, was redefined by the Lutheran reforms, which were the first to expose a crisis in ecclesiastical mediation dating back to the fifteenth century, and then redefined once more by Calvinism, which influenced James. The metaphysical ideas espoused by Anglican theologians and preachers also played a role in this redefinition. In keeping with Anglican theology, James placed royalty at the center of the universe in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies. Royalty came closest to divine unity and perfection and thus determined and organized the earthly realm. In this new metaphysical context, Christian truth, and the Church that represented it, worked toward the

244  Conclusion salvation of mankind. The keys to power thus lay in the political sphere and came directly from God. The notion of hierarchy is not abolished as such, but the temporal is pre-eminent. This resulted in the denunciation of papal power as the personification of the Antichrist. From the standpoint of this religious anthropology and political theology, the Church, understood as a form of power, could not work toward the sanctification of mankind, just as extremist Puritanism (let alone millenarianist schools of thought) could not maintain a strict balance between the temporal Christian condition and the definitive advent of the reign of Christ. It is thus impossible to separate the ecclesiastico-political and anthropological dimensions of the conflict that pitted the English monarchy against the papacy. We have tended to focus on the former dimension because of the immediate nature of the stakes that it enables us to observe and analyze. Politico-religious unity no longer existed on the scale of a Respublica Christiana with Rome as its capital. The unity of the new duality of powers was guaranteed by the State and was no longer shaped by Scholastic conceptuality, any more than by medieval political Augustinism. What we have written of Bellarmine’s theses also holds true for Paul V’s briefs in this context. The whole theological construction that structures the first brief, in particular, justifies human authority by divine right, which Catholics must obey: the pope guarantees the unity of the Roman Catholic Church, present in England. As such, the pope must remind Catholics that the unity of the Church is of far greater importance than England’s political and religious unity. The various attempts to bring England back into the control of the Holy See during Elizabeth’s reign, the plots against James, and the precarious situation of English Catholics all show that the conflict could not have a peaceful outcome in this historical context. Yet James and Paul V did agree on one point: because of their wish for unity, neither allowed the slightest right of conscience to their subjects or

Conclusion  245 believers, requiring it only as a means of justifying their respective authority. Their theory involved the entire political and ecclesiastical institution. The absolute nature of authority, whether political or ecclesiastical, did not allow for individual consciences. Of course, the king and the pope did not use the same technique to establish their sovereignty. For Paul V, the necessary unity of the Church focused on the virtue of charity. His apostolic exhortation emphasized the value of the theologal dimension of Christian life at the cost of conscience. Similarly, his theologal ideas are in line with the Church’s eschatological finality, taken in this instance as a polemical view. The theology of charity that aims to unify the Catholic community consequently cancels the autonomy of the political reason. This political reason, which is the criterion of unity in James’s oath of allegiance, is seen as dangerous competition for the full realization of the Church’s mission. Paul V could not accept this conception of the human establishment and argued in favor of unity subordinating the temporal to the spiritual. The fundamental reason why he did not allow individual conscience was his understanding of the Church as heir to the second medieval millennium—an understanding that could not fail to clash with the emerging new socio-political order. Furthermore, allowing individual conscience would also open the way to theological pluralism, which might encourage a possible rapprochement with Church of England ecclesiology. James also required obedience from his subjects, but to ensure they remained faithful they had to swear an oath of allegiance that required them to say I—a required, obedient I, but like all forms of subjectivity, capable of failing to keep or betraying its promise. It was necessarily a much more fragile undertaking to corroborate the legitimacy of sovereignty by divine right through the intermediary of one’s subjects than through ecclesiastical power, but that is why the obedience that James expected from his subjects was modern and promised to create genuine subjects of rights in the longer

246  Conclusion term. He transformed the feudal oath into a practice favorable to the constitution of a State, demanding full sovereignty and uniting all its subjects around the figure of the monarch. The complex relationship between James’s theory of legitimacy and the status of his subjects’ consciences thus contributed in the long term to the equality of all under one single sovereign. As we have seen, the divergence of understanding of theologicopolitical unity between the Roman Catholic Church and the English monarchy implies a divergence of points of view on the relationship to individual conscience. Both institutions demanded obedience, but both also conceived of a certain expression of conscience. Catholic theologians defended, in political terms and under strict conditions, the pope’s power to release believers from their oath of allegiance to the king and even to commit tyrannicide if the salvation of their soul was threatened. The English monarchy tolerated the public expression of religious opinions insofar as they remained in the context of the established Church and did not represent a challenge to royal supremacy and legitimacy. In other words, the affirmation of the State and the individual played a role in the metaphysical, anthropological, and theologico-political transformation of man’s relationship with God his savior. As previously noted, in the context of this transformation, the controversy between the Appellants and the Jesuit Parsons reflects a conflict in man’s relationship with religious and political sacrality. Discrediting Church mediation as a hierarchy opened the way after the Lutheran reform for an understanding of salvation centered on the individual. This led to a new type of theologico-political institution of human reality. The universal priesthood of baptism replaced the hierarchical Church represented by the pope; princes’ power was no longer aimed solely at the weal of the body, but also, in its own outward order, at the weal of the soul. They thus aimed to wield their power without interference from foreign powers, even ecclesiastical ones—hence the polysemic and controversial nature of the doctrine of the two kingdoms, as

Conclusion  247 outlined by Luther, the Scottish Presbyterians, Hooker, and James. The connection Richard Hooker makes in his theory between the “two kingdoms” and the monism of royal supremacy is highly indicative of the polysemic nature of the doctrine. In the context of the Elizabethan establishment, he defended a new relationship between Church and State. The Tudors’ religious policy clearly demonstrates the correlation that can be drawn between the origins of the modern State and the individual following the crisis in ecclesiastical mediation during the late medieval period. The Tudors embodied this new understanding of the politico-religious link by highlighting the notion of the individual by attributing higher value to personal reason than to ecclesiastical law. We are alluding here to Henry VIII’s “second marriage,” which was the decisive step in his schism with the Holy See. The State and the individual were the two constitutive criteria of the new ecclesiastico-political mediation, and thus of the first threshold of modernity. The monarchical principle opposed to the papacy in the first instance, then later to the Puritan community, forged its path from the 1530s to the first English revolution; the concept of State sovereignty arose from these conflicts. Throughout this period of English history, discussion of the State or of absolute monarchy necessarily means discussing the individual who embodied the period of their reign. In the name of the same subjective logic, this can, moreover, overturn the situation of the theologico-political mediation. This was the case for Edward VI and Elizabeth I: the former widened the schism, while the latter made it more moderate. Between these two monarchs, Mary Tudor very briefly restored the Catholic faith. Whether Anglican or Catholic, the monarch’s faith was that of the people. This identification of the State and the people in terms of religion is in addition to the existing identification of the public person and the State. The State continues its existence beyond the reign of individual sovereigns. The Jacobean period of legitimization by hereditary divine right is the perfect illustration of this identification. The State, an abstract juridico-political concept, never

248  Conclusion dies, thanks to its incarnation in the form of hereditary sovereigns. It should be noted that this perennial existence follows a paradox that challenges the idea that the secularization and laicization of the political authority are the fruit of a linear progression.2 The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the religious world turn into a world where religion had less and less influence. This statement is not false as it stands, but it does deserve some discussion. Rather than talking in terms of linear evolution, it would be more relevant to acknowledge the existence of a theologico-political paradox that represents one of the key modes of explanation through which the modern sovereign State by divine right was constituted until the seventeenth century in England and the eighteenth century in France. While there is no denying the diversity of European contexts, one common aspect does, however, characterize the advent of modern politics: judicial distancing from papal authority, or a rift with papal authority in countries where the Protestant reformers won the day. The case of England is highly significant in this context, although it is theologically untypical as compared to other states affected by the Reform. It is thus far more relevant to turn to the notion of autonomy to explain the theologico-political dimension of the events and doctrines that preceded the secularization and laicization of European societies. This paradox must also lead us to be careful in using the thesis of the sacralization of politics in this context of European history. In the Christian regime, human history no longer participates in the pre-biblical dialectic of the profane and the sacred. These notions are reconsidered from within a religion of the Word and of sanctity.3 This is why the duty of polit2. On this approach to the advent of modern politics, see Marcel Gauchet, “L’État au miroir de la raison d’État: la France et la chrétienté,” in Raison et déraison d’État. Théoriciens et théories de la raison d’État aux XVIème et XVIIème siècles, ed. YvesCharles Zarka (Paris: PUF, 1994), 193–244. 3. The sacred, reclassified in the Christian economy of salvation, was fully verified in the religious and political crisis of the Reforms and the early modern period. The crisis had decisive consequences, leading to the advent of the rationalist philoso-

Conclusion  249 ical and ecclesiastical offices is to institute human reality in view of its sanctification.4 We have seen in the controversy between James I and Bellarmine the variability of ecclesiastico-political models in defining the relationship between the temporal and the spiritual. This variability fundamentally questions the relationship to time and its accomplishment; to reach toward its end, the sanctification of the earthly city requires another dialectic—the visible and the invisible. For this key reason, the conflict in interpreting this dialectic, between James’s thesis rooted in Calvinism and the Holy See’s Catholic thesis, is not simply ecclesiastico-political and anthropological in principle: it is also theological. Through the criteria that define it, most notably those of alliance, mediation, and, more radically, incarnation, biblical and Christian monotheism prevents any move beyond the regime of the duality of powers. This is why, by virtue of the principle that sovereignty cannot be divided, the advent of absolutist monarchies and their ambition to reduce the institution of human reality to political unity was to generate further conflicts. The English, American, and French revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were its logical consequence, giving substance as they did to liberal and democratic societies and thus to another political and religious paradigm: John Locke’s liberal thinking is a key development in this context. Twentieth-century reexaminations of the theologico-political problem here become fully relevant, although their relevance gives rise to certain ambiguities, at least in the judicial perspective formulated by Carl Schmitt.5 Yet phy of the Enlightenment, as demonstrated by issues in three areas: the civil tolerance of Churches, Deism, and the contractualist basis of the State. 4. Lancelot Andrewes’s political preaching is very interesting from this point of view. See the final chapter in Nicolas Lossky’s Lancelot Andrewes le prédicateur (1555–1626): aux sources de la théologie mystique de l’Église d’Angleterre (Paris: Cerf, 1986), 285–318. 5. On the controversy between the theologian Erik Peterson and Carl Schmitt, see Erik Peterson, Le monothéisme, un problème politique et autres traités (Paris: Bayard, 2007), with my own preface. As far as I know, no English-language edition of this work currently exists. See also the critical edition of Carl Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form, trans. G. L. Ulmen (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1996).

250  Conclusion the link between the democratic foundations of modern Western societies and the transcendent-secular instance, understood as the redefinition of a political and religious alterity, remains completely open.6 The definition of the concepts of sovereignty and liberty, and their relationship to religion and politics, requires further research. 6. The differences in historical and cultural situations must be highlighted in any response to this complex question. It is particularly interesting to note the American use of the expression “civil religion,” used by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in book 8 of his Social Contract. The first American author to have defined the concept of “civil religion” appears to have been Robert N. Bellah. See his “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus 96 (1967): 1–21.

Appendix An Act Concerning the King’s Highness to be Supreme Head of the Church of England and to Have Authority to Reform and Redress All Errors, Heresies and Abuses in the Same (1534: 26 Henry VIII, c.1) Albeit the King’s Majesty justly and rightfully is and oweth to be the supreme head of the Church of England, and so is recognised by the clergy of this realm in their Convocations; yet nevertheless for corroboration and confirmation thereof, and for increase of virtue in Christ’s religion within this realm of England, and to repress and extirp all errors, heresies and other enormities and abuses heretofore used in the same, be it enacted by authority of this present Parliament that the King our sovereign lord, his heirs and successors kings of this realm, shall be taken, accepted and reputed the only supreme head in earth of the Church of England called Anglicana Ecclesia, and shall have and enjoy annexed and united to the imperial crown, of this realm as well the title and style thereof, as all honours, dignities, preeminences, jurisdictions, privileges, authorities, immunities, profits and commodities, to the said dignity of supreme head of the same Church belonging and appartaining. And that our said sovereign lord, his heirs and successors kings of this realm, shall have full power and authority from time to time to visit, repress, redress, reform, order, correct, restrain and amend all such errors, heresies, abuses, offences, contempts and enormities, whatsoever they be, which by any manner spiritual authority or jurisdiction ought or may lawfully be reformed, repressed, ordered, redressed, corrected, restrained or amended, most to the pleasure of Almighty God the increase of virtue in Christ’s religion, and for

251

252  Appendix the conservation of the peace, unity and tranquillity of this realm: any usage, custom, foreign laws, foreign, authority, prescription or any other thing or things to the contrary hereof notwithstanding.1

An Act Restoring to the Crown the Ancient Jurisdiction over the State Ecclesiastical and Spiritual, and Abolishing All Foreign Power Repugnant to the Same (Act of Supremacy, 1559: I Eliz. 1, c.1) I, A.B., do utterly testify and declare in my conscience that the Queen’s Highness is the only supreme governor of this realm and of all other her Highness’ dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal, and that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state or potentate hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, preeminence or authority ecclesiastical or spiritual within this realm, and therefore I do utterly renounce and forsake all foreign jurisdictions, powers, superiorities and authorities, and do promise that from henceforth I shall bear faith and true allegiance to the Queen’s Highness, her heirs and lawful successors, and to my power shall assist and defend all jurisdictions, preeminences, privileges and authorities granted or belonging to the Queen’s Highness, her heirs and successors, or united or annexed to the imperial crown of this realm: so help me God and by the contents of this Book.2

Francisco Suarez on the Pope’s Indirect Temporal Power Pontifex Summum, ex vi suae postestatis seu iurisdictionis spiritualis, est superior regibus et principibus temporalibus, ut eos in usu potestatis temporalis dirigat in ordine ad spiritualem finem, ratione cuius potest talem usum praecipere vel prohibere, exigere aut impedire, quantum ad spirituale bonum Ecclesiae fuerit conveniens. Per potestatem enim directivam non intelligimus solam potestatem consulendi, monendi aut rogandi, haec enim non sunt propria superioris potestatis, sed intelligimus propriam vim obligandi, et cum morali efficacia movendi, quam aliqui solent coactivam appellare, sed haec vox magis ad poenas pertinet, . . . hic autem de iurisdictione ad obligandum in conscientia loquimur.3  1. Elton, The Tudor Constitution, 364-65. 2. Ibid., 363. 3. Francisco Suarez, in Opera, vol. 24 (Paris: L. Vivès, 1859).

Appendix  253 Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, De Romano Pontifice Tertia sententia media, et catholicorum theologorum communis, pontificem ut pontificem non habere directe et immediate ullam temporalem potestatem, sed solum spiritualem; tamen ratione spiritualis habere saltem indirecte potestatem quamdam, eamque summam, in temporalibus. Ita Hugo de s. Victore lib. 2 de sacram, p. 2. cap. 4. quem sequitur Alexander Halensis 3. par. Sum. q. 40. m. 5. et 4. p. q. 10. in explicat. can. missae, in illlud. Et pro rege N. item s. Bonaventura in lib. de Eccles. Hierarch. par. 2. cap. 1. Durandus in lib. de orig. jurisdict. q. 3. in fine. Petrus ab Alliaco in q. de re sumpta, utrum Petri Ecclesia fide confirmetur. Joannes de Parisio in tract. de potestate regia et papali, cap. 6 et 7. Jacobus Almair in tract. de sup. pol. Eccles. cap. 6. Gabriel Biel explicat. canonis missae, lect. 23. Henricus de Gandavo, quodlib. 6. q. 23. Joan. Driebo lib. 2 de libert. Christ. cap. 2. Joan. de Turrecremata lib. 2. Sum. cap. 113. et seq. Albertus Pighius lib. 5. hierarch. Eccles. Thomas Waldensis lib. 2. doct. Fid. art. 3. cap. 76.77.78. Petrus de Palude in lib. de pot. Eccles. Cajetanus in Apol. cap. 13. ad 8. Franciscus Victoria relect. 1. q. 6. de pot. Eccles. Dominicus a Soto in 4. dist. 25. quaest. 2. art. 1. Nicolaus Sanderus lib. 2. cap. 4. visib. monarch. Navarrus Relect. in cap. Novit, de judic. notab. tertio, Antonius Cordubensis lib. 1 quaest. 57. dub. 3. et alii plurimi. De s. Thoma, quid senserit, non est tam certum. Nam in fine 2. sent. dicit, in papa esse apicem utriusque potestatis. Tamen in cap. 13. ad Rom. dicit, clericos exemptos a tributis privilegio principum saecularium: et 2.2. quaest. 40. art. 2. dicit, praelatos posse disponere de bellis solum quatenus ordinantur ad bonum spirituale, qui est finis potestatis ipsorum. Ex quibus colligitur, eum non dissentire a caeteris theologis.4 > Superest nunc, ut demonstremus, papam directe nullius loci esse dominum temporalem jure divino. Quod expresse docet Joannes de Turrecremata lib. 2. de Eccles. cap. 114. Cajetanus in Apol. pars. 2. cap. 13. ad 8. et Navarrus in cap. Novit, notab. 4. verba Cajetani haec sunt, Potestas papae directe est respectu spiritualium ad supremum simpliciter finem humani generis; ideo suae potestati duo conveniunt, primo quod non est directe respectu temporalium; secundo, quod est respectu temporalium in ordine ad 4. Bellarmine, Opera omnia, v, 524–25.

254  Appendix spiritualia. Id vero hac ratione manifeste probatur. Christus, ut homo, dum in terris vixit, non accepit, nec voluit illius provinciae vel oppidi mere temporale dominium: summus autem pontifex Christi vicarius est, et Christum nobis repraesentat, qualis erat dum hic inter homines viveret; igitur summus pontifex ut Christi vicarius, atque adeo ut summus pontifex est, nullius provinciae vel oppidi habet mere temporale dominium.5 > Quod si Christiani olim non deposuerunt Neronem, et Diocletianum, et Julianum apostatam, ac Valentem arianum et similes, id fuit quia deerant vires temporales Christianis. Nam quod alioqui jure potuissent id facere, patet ex apostolo 1. Corinth. 6. ubi jubet, constitui novos judices a Christianis temporalium caussarum, ne cogerentur Christiani caussam dicere coram judice Christi persequuore: sicut enim novi judices constitui poluerunt: ita et novi principes et reges propter eamdem caussam, si vires adfuissent.6 > At, inquient: papa est monarcha spiritualis in toto orbe terrarum; et tamen numquam potuit exercere hunc principatum in toto orbe terrarum. Respondeo: Papam dici monarcham spiritualem in toto orbe, non quod praesit omnibus hominibus, qui sunt in toto orbe, sed quod praesit omnibus Christianis toto orbe diffusis. Et rursum etiam ex hypothesi, nimirum, quia si totus mundus converteretur ad fidem, toti mundo plane spirituali jurisdictione papa praeesset.7 > Jam vero, quod secundo loco propositum fuit, non esse papam dominum totius orbis christiani, docet Hugo de s. Victore lib. 2. de sacram. par. 2. cap. 4. Terrana, inquit, potestas caput habet regem: spiritualis potestas habet summum pontificem. Et clarius, Joannes Driedo lib. 2. de libert. Christ. cap. 2. Christus, inquit, cum praefecit Petrum universali Ecclesiae pastorem, non simul dedit illi imperium temporale super universam Ecclesiam, neque enim abstulit imperatoribus et regibus sua regna, neque item voluit, ut omnis potestas regalis, proinde ac ecclesiastica debeat derivari, et descendere ex potestate Petri. Eadem est aliorum multorum sententia, et probatur 5. Ibid., 526–27. 7. Ibid., 525.

6. Ibid., 533.

Appendix  255 Primum. Quia si res ita se haberet, et quidem jure divino, ut volunt, deberet id constare ex Scripturis, aut certe ex apostolorum traditione: ex Scripturis nihil habemus, nisi datas pontifici claves regni coelorum; de clavibus regni terrarum nulla mentio fit; traditionem apostolicam nullam adversarii proferunt.8 > Praeterea, Christus non abstulit, neque aufert regna iis quorum erant; nam Christus non venit destruere ea quae bene se habebant, sed perficere; ergo quando rex sit christianus, non perdit regnum terrenum, quod jure obtinebat, sed acquirit novum jus ad regnum aeternum: alioqui obesset regibus Christi beneficium, et gratia naturam destrueret. Et confirmatur ex hymno Sedulii, quem tota Ecclesia publice canit.9 > Quantum ad personas, non potest Papa, vt Papa, ordinariè temporales Principes deponere, etiam iusta de caussa, eo modo quo deponit Episcopos, id est, tanquam ordinarius Iudex: tamen potest mutare regna, & vni auferre, atque; alteri conferre, tanquam summus Princeps spiritualis, si id necessarium sit ad animarum salutem, vt probabimus.10 > Quantum ad leges, non potest Papa, vt Papa, ordinariè condere Legem ciuilem, vel confirmare, aut infirmare Leges Principum, quia non est ipse Princeps Ecclesiae politicus: tamen potest omnia illa facere, si aliqua Lex ciuilis sit necessaria ad salutem animarum, & tamen Reges non velint eam caudere; aut si alia sit noxia animarum saluti, & tamen Reges non velint eam abrogare.11 > Quantum ad iudicia, non potest Papa, vt Papa, ordinariè indicare de rebus temporalibus. Rectè enim Bernardvs Eugenio lib. t. de consider. dicit: Habent haec infirma & terrena Iudices suas Reges & Principes terra. Quid fines alienos inuaditis? Quid falcem vestram in alienam messem extenditis? Item: In criminibus, non in possessionibus potestas vestra. At nihilominus in casu, quo id animarum saluti necessarium est, potest Pontifex assumere etiam temporalia iudicia, quando nimirum non est vllus, qui possit iudicare; vt cum duo Reges supremi contendunt, vel quando qui possunt, & 8. Ibid. 10. Ibid., 532.

9. Ibid., 525–26. 11. Ibid.

256  Appendix debent iudicare, non volunt sententiam ferre. Vnde ibidem Bernardvs: Sed, aliud est, inquit, incidenter excurrere in ista, aliud vero incumbere istis, cumquam dignis tali, & talium intentione rebus. Et Innocentivs aut. III. cap. Pervenerabilem, qui filii sint legitimi, dicit, iurisdictionem temporalem solum casualiter Pontificem exercere.12 > Ut enim se habent in homine spiritus et caro, ita se habent in Ecclesia duae illae potestates: nam caro et spiritus sunt quasi duae respublicae, quae et separatae et conjunctae inveniri possunt. Habet caro sensum et appetitum, quibus respondent actus et objecta proportionata, et quorum omnium finis immediatus est sanitas, et bona constitutio corporis: habet spiritus intellectum et voluntatem, et actus atque objecta proportionata, et pro fine animae sanitatem et perfectionem: invenitur caro sine spiritu in brutis, invenitur spiritus sine carne in angelis. Ex quo apparet, neutrum esse praecise propter alterum. Invenitur etiam caro adjuncta spiritui in homine, ubi quia unam personam faciunt, necessario habent subordinationem et connexionem: caro enim subest, spiritus praeest, et licet spiritus non se misceat actionibus carnis, sed sinat eam exercere omnes suas actiones, ut in brutis exercet; tamen quando eae officiunt fini ipsius spiritus, spiritus carni imperat, eamque castigat, et si opus est, indicit jejunia, aliasque afflictiones, etiam cum detrimento aliquo et debilitatione ipsius corporis, et cogit linguam ne loquatur, oculos ne videant, etc. Pari ratione si ad finem spiritus obtinendum, necessaria sit aliqua carnis operatio, et ipsa etiam mors; spiritus imperare potest carni, ut se ac sua exponat, ut in martyribus videmus. Ita prorsus politica potestas habet suos principes, leges, judicia etc. et similiter ecclesiastica suos episcopos, canones, judicia. Illa habet pro fine, temporalem pacem, ista salutem aeternam. Inveniuntur quandoque separatae, ut olim tempore Apostolorum, quandoque conjunctae, ut nunc: quando autem sunt conjunctae unum corpus efficiunt; ideoque debent esse connexae, et inferior superiori subjecta et subordinata. Itaque spiritualis non se miscet temporalibus negotiis, sed sinit omnia procedere, sicut antequam essent conjunctae, dummodo non obsint fini spirituali, aut non sint necessaria ad eum consequendum. Si autem tale quid accidat, spiritualis potestas potest et debet cöercere temporalem omni ratione ac via, quae ad id necessaria esse videbitur.13 12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., 531–32.

Appendix  257 > Prima ratio ejusmodi est. Potestas civilis subjecta est potestati spirituali, quando utraque pars est ejusdem reipublicae christianae; ergo potest princeps spiritualis imperare principibus temporalibus, et disponere de temporalibus rebus in ordine ad bonum spirituale: omnis enim superior imperare potest inferiori suo.14 > Secunda ratio. Respublica ecclesiastica debet esse perfecta, et sibi sufficiens in ordine ad suum finem: tales enim sunt omnes respublicae bene institutae; ergo debet habere omnem potestatem necessariam ad suum finem consequendum: sed necessaria est ad finem spiritualem potestas utendi, et disponendi de temporalibus rebus, quia alioqui possent mali principes impune fovere haereticos, et evertere religionem; igitur et hanc potestatem habet.15 > Tertia ratio. Non licet Christianis tolerare regem infidelem, aut haereticum, si ille conetur pertrahere subditos ad suam haeresim, vel infidelitatem, at judicare, an rex pertrahat ad haeresim, necne, pertinet ad pontificem, cui est commissa cura religionis, ergo pontificis est judicare, regem esse deponendum, vel non deponendum.16 > Quarta ratio. Quando reges et principes ad Ecclesiam veniunt ut Christiani fiant, recipiuntur cum pacto expresso, vel tacito, ut sceptra sua subjiciant Christo, et polliceantur se Christi fidem servaturos et defensuros, etiam sub poena regni perdendi; ergo quando fiunt haeretici, aut religioni obsunt, possunt ab Ecclesia judicari, et etiam deponi a principatu, nec ulla eis injuria fiet, si deponantur. Nam non est idoneus sacramento baptismi, qui non est paratus Christo servire, et propter ipsum amittere quidquid habet; ait enim Dominus, Lucae 14. Si quis venit ad me, et non odit patrem, et matrem, et uxorem, et filios, adhuc autem et animam suam, non potest meus esse discipulus. Praeterea Ecclesia nimis graviter erraret, si admitteret aliquem regem, qui vellet impune fovere quamlibet sectam, et defendere haereticos, ac evertere religionem.17

14. Ibid., 532. 16. Ibid., 533.

15. Ibid. 17. Ibid., 534.

258  Appendix > Quinta ratio. Cum Petro dictum est: Pasce oves, Joan. ult. data est illi facultas omnis, quae est pastori necessaria ad gregem tuendum: at pastori necessaria est potestas triplex, nimirum, una circa lupos, ut eos arceat omni ratione qua poterit; altera circa arietes, ut si quando cornibus laedant gregem, possit eos recludere et prohibere, ne gregem ulterius praecedant; tertia circa oves reliquas, ut singulis tribuat convenientia pabula; ergo hanc triplicem potestatem habet summus pontifex. Ergo tria ducuntur argumenta ex hoc loco; primum sit. Lupi qui Ecclesiam Domini vastant, haeretici sunt, ut patet ex illo Matth. 7. Attendite a falsis prophetis etc. si ergo princeps aliquis ex ove, aut ariete fiat lupus, idest, ex christiano fiat haereticus, poterit pastor Ecclesiae eum arcere per excommunicationem, et simul jubere populo, ne eum sequatur; ac proinde privare eum dominio in subditos. Alterum vero sit. Potest pastor arietes furiosos destruentes ovile separare et recludere: Princeps autem est aries furiosus destruens ovile, quando est catholicus fide, sed adeo malus, ut multum obsit religioni et Ecclesiae, ut si episcopatus vendat, Ecclesias diripiat etc. ergo poterit pastor Ecclesiae eum recludere, vel redigere in ordinem ovium. Tertium argumentum est. Potest pastor ac debet omnes oves ita pascere, ut eis convenit; ergo potest ac debet pontifex omnibus Christianis ea jubere, atque ad ea cogere, ad quae quilibet eorum secundum statum suum tenetur, idest, singulos cogere, ut eo modo Deo serviant, quo secundum statum suum debent: debent autem reges Deo servire defendendo Ecclesiam, puniendoque haereticos et schismaticos, ut Augustinus docet in ep. 50. ad Bonif. Leo epist. 75. ad Leonem Augustum, et Gregorius lib. 2. epist. 61. ad Maurit. ergo potest, ac debet regibus jubere, ut hoc faciant, et nisi fecerint, etiam cogere per excommunicationem, aliasque commodas rationes. Vide plura apud Nicolaum Sanderum lib. 2 cap. 4. de visib. monarch. ubi etiam multa ex iis, quae diximus, invenies.18 18. Ibid.

Selected Bibliography P r i m a ry S o u rc e s Manuscripts Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, MSS. Français Anciens Fonds, 15984: Letters (late 16th and early 17th centuries). British Library, Hatfield House, Cecil Papers (microfilm), M. 485/20. Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reigns of Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, and James I. 12 vols. London: HMSO, 1856–72. Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English affairs in the Archives and Collections of Venice, and in other Libraries of Northern Italy, Venetian Series, London, 1864–1927, 7 vols. Public Record Office, London: State Papers, Domestic, 14/109 (1619), 14/216 (Gunpowder Plot Book, 1604–1605). State Papers, Flanders, 77/7–9 (1603–10). State Papers, France, 78/49–74 (1603–25). State Papers, Miscellaneous, 104/164–65 (King’s Letter Book, 1603–11). State Papers, Spain, 94/9–13 (1603–7). State Papers, Venice, 99/2–4 (1599–1607). Vatican Secret Archives, Rome: MS. Fondo Borghese, ser. I, vol. 897: Register of the letters of the papal secretary to the nuncio in Venice (1609–11). MS. Fondo Borghese, ser. I, vol. 898: Register of the letters of the papal secretary to the nuncio in Cologne (1609–10). MS. Fondo Borghese, ser. I, vol. 901: Register of the letters of the papal secretary to the nuncio in Switzerland (1609–13).

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260  Selected Bibliography MS. Fondo Borghese, ser. I, vol. 914: Register of the letters of the papal secretary to the nuncio in Spain (1611–13). MS. Fondo Borghese, ser. I, vol. 915: Register of the letters of the papal secretary to the nuncio in France (1607–10). MS. Fondo Borghese, ser. III, vol. 45C: Papers concerning Germany, Poland, Hungary, Flanders (1607–08). MS. Fondo Nunziatura Fiandra, vol. 136A: Register of the letters of the papal secretary to the nuncio in Flanders (1605–9).

Printed Texts Andrewes, L. Apologiam serenissimi potentissimiqve principis, Iacobi, Dei gratia, Magna Britanniae, Franciae, et Hiberniae Regis, pro ivramento fidelitatis. London: Robert Barker, 1609. ———. Tortura Torti: sive, ad Matthaei Torti librum Responsio, qui nuper editus contra Apologiam serenissimi potentissimique principis, lacobi, Dei gratia, Magna Britanniae, Franciae, & Hiberniae Regis, pro ivramento fidelitatis. London: Robert Barker, 1609. Aquinas, Thomas (St.). Treatise on Law. Translated by R. Regan. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000. ———. Summa theologica. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Cosimo, 2007. Barclay, W. De regno et regali potestate adversus Buchananum, Brutum, Boucherium, et reliquos monarchomachos, libri sex. Paris: Apud G. Chaudière, 1600. ———. De potestate Papae: an et quatenus in reges et principes seculares jus et imperium habeat. Edited by John Barclay. London: Eliot’s Court Press, 1609; Pont-à-Mousson, 1609. ———. I.C. liber posthumus. De potestate Papae: an et quatenus in Reges et seculares jus et imperium habeat. Anno MDCIX; French text, Traité de la Puissance du Pape. Pont-à-Mousson: H. Huldric, 1609. ———. Of the Authoritie of the Pope: Whether, and How Farre Forth, He Hath Power and Authoritie over Temporall Kings and Princes. London: Arnold Hatfield for William Aspley, 1611. Barlow, W. The Summe and Substance of the Conference. Which It Pleased His Excellent Maiestie to Have with the Lords, Bishops, and Other of His Clergie (at Which the Most of the Lordes of the Councell Were Present) in His Maiesties Priuy-Chamber, at Hampton Court, Ianuary 14, 1603; Whereunto Are Added, Some Copies, (Scattered Abroad,) Vnsauory, and Vntrue. London: Mathew Law, 1604.

Selected Bibliography  261 ———. An Answer to a Catholike English-Man (So by Him-selfe Entituled) Who, without a Name, Passed His Censure upon the Apology, Made by the Right High and Mightie Prince Iames by the Grace of God King of Great Brittaine, France, and Ireland, etc. for the Oath of Allegeance. London: Mathew Law, 1609. Bayle, P. Dictionnaire historique et critique. 4th ed. 4 vols. Rotterdam: Reinier Leers, 1697; Amsterdam: Brunel, 1730. Bellarmine, R. C. Matthaei Torti, presbyteri et theologi papiensis, responsio ad librum inscriptum, Triplici nodo, triplex cuneus, sive apologia pro iuramento fidelitatis. St. Omer: English College Press, 1608. ———. Apologia Roberti S.R.E. Cardinalis Bellarmini pro responsione sua ad librum Iacobi Magnae Britanniae Regis cuius titulus est Triplici nodo triplex cuneus: in qua apologia refellitur Praefatio monitoria regis eiusdem: accessit eadem ipsa responsio iam tertio recusa qua sub nomine Matthaei Torti anno superiore prodierat. Rome: Bartholomew Zannetti, 1609; second ed., St. Omer: English College Press, 1610. ———. Apologie de l’illustrissime Robert Bellarmin, . . . pour la response dudit sieur au livre du serenissime roy de la Grand-Bretaigne . . . avec la responce cy-devant publiée, sous le nom de Matthieu Torty. Responce du cardinal Bellarmin au livre intitulé “A triple coing, triple noeud” ou autrement “Apologie pour le serment de fidélité contre deux brefs du Pape Paul V et les dernières lettres du cardinal Bellarmin, escrites à Georges Blackwell, archiprêtre d’Angleterre.” N.p.: 1610. ———. Roberti S.R.E. cardin. Bellarmini Responsio ad librum inscriptum—Triplici nodo triplex cuneus, sive Apologia pro juramento fidelitatis, adversus duo brevia Papae Pauli V et recentes literas cardinalis Bellarmini ad Georgium Blackvellum, Angliae archipresbyterum. Coloniae Agrippinae: Apud J. Kinckes, 1610. ———. Tractatus de Potestate Summi Pontificis in rebus temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaium, auctore Roberto S.R.E. card. Bellarmino. Rome: Ex typographia B. Zannetti, 1610. ———. Démonstration victorieuse de la foi catholique, extraite des controverses du R. Cardinal Bellarmin, traduite du latin par M. l’abbé Ducruet. 3 vols. Paris: L. Vivès, 1855. ———. Opera omnia. 6 vols. Naples: Apud Joseph Giuliano, 1856–62. ———. Auctarium Bellarminianum, supplément aux œuvres du cardinal Bellarmin. Edited by Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet. Paris: Beauchesne, 1913. ———. Responce du cardinal Bellarmin à une lettre sans nom d’autheur touchant le brevet des censures de la S. de Paul V, publiées contre les Seigneurs de Venise. No date or place of publication. Bilson, T. A Sermon Preached at Westminster before the King and Queenes Maies-

262  Selected Bibliography ties, at their Coronations on Saint James His Day, being the 28 of July 1603. By the Reverend Father in God, the Lord Bishop of Winchester. London: V.S. for Clement Knight, 1603. Blackwell, G. His Answeres upon Sundry His Examinations; Together with His Approbation and Taking of the Oath of Allegeance; And His Letter Written to His Assistants and Brethren, Mooving Them Not Onely to Take the Said Oath but to Advise All Romish Catholikes So to Doe. London: Robert Barker, 1607. ———. A Large Examination Taken at Lambeth according to His Maiesties Direction, Point by Point, of M. George Blakwell, Made Archpriest of England by Pope Clement 8, upon Occasion of a Certaine Answere of His, without the Priuitie of the State, to a Letter Lately Sent unto Him for Cardinall Bellarmine Blaming Him for Taking the Oath of Allegeance. London: Robert Barker, 1607. Blackwood, A. Opera Omnia. Paris: Cramoisy, 1644. Bodin, J. Les six livres de la République. Paris: J. Du Puys, 1576. ———. The Six Bookes of a Commonweale. Translated by Richard Knolles; edited by K. D. McRae. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962. ———. Les six livres de la République. Edited by Christiane Frémont, MarieDominique Couzinct, and Henri Rochais. 6 vols. Paris: Fayard, 1986. Breslow, M. A., ed. The Political Writings of John Knox. Washington, D.C.: Folger, 1985. Buchanan, G. W. De Iure Regni apud Scotos . . . dialogus. Edinburgh: John Ross for Henry Charteris, 1579. ———. Rerum Scoticarum Historia. Edinburgh: Apud Alexandrum Arbuthnetum, 1582. ———. Opera Omnia. 2 vols. Leiden: Langerak, 1725. ———. History of Scotland. London: D. Midwinter and A. Ward, 1733. ———. The Tyrannous Reign of Mary Stewart: George Buchanan’s Account. Edited and translated by W. A. Gatherer. Edinburgh: University Press, 1958. ———. The Art and Science of Government among the Scots. Edited and translated by D. H. MacNeill. Glasgow: W. McLellan, 1964. ———. A Dialogue on the Law of Kingship among the Scots. Translated by R. Mason and M. Smith. Darlington, Eng.: Ashgate, 2004. Buckeridge, J. A Sermon Preached at Hampton Court. London: Robert Barker, 1606. Calvin, J. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Translated by Henry Beveridge. Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 1979. Cameron, J. K., ed. The First Book of Discipline: With an Introduction and Commentary. Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1972.

Selected Bibliography  263 Cartwright, T. The Second Replie against Master Whitgiftes Second Avnswer. N.p.: 1575. Creswell, J. A Proclamation Published under the Name of Iames, King of Great Britanny; With a Briefe et Moderate Answere Thereunto; Whereto Are Added the Penall Statutes Made in the Same Kingdome against Catholikes. St. Omer: English College Press, 1611. Dasent, J. R., ed. Acts of the Privy Council, ad 1547–50. Vol. 2. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1890. Davenant, J. Determinationes quaestionum quarundam theologicarum. Cambridge: Thomas Buck, 1639. Davy du Perron, J. Harangue faicte de la part de la chambre ecclésiastique en celle du Tiers-estat sur l’article du serment, par Mgr le cardinal Du Perron. Paris: A. Estienne, 1615. Du Belloy, P. De l’Authorité du Roy et Crimes de lèze Majesté. N.p.: 1587. ———. Apologie catholique contre les libelles, déclarations, advis et consultations faictes, escrites et publiées par les liguez perturbateurs du repos du royaume de France, qui se sont eslevez depuis le décès de feu Monseigneur, frère unique du Roy, par E.D.L.I.C. N.p.:1585. Elton, G. R. The Tudor Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Ferne, H. The Resolving of Conscience. Cambridge: E. Freeman and T. Dunster, 1642. Foxe, E. Opus eximium de differentia. Fo. 58 r–59 r. London: In oedibus Th. Bertheleti, 1534. Gardiner, S. Obedience in Church and State. Three Political Tracts. Edited and translated by Pierre Janelle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930. Henry VIII. King Henry the Eighth’s Defence of the Seven Sacraments. Dublin: J. Griffen, 1800. ———. Défense des sept sacrements. Edited by R.-J. Pottier. Angers, France: Lainé, 1850. Hobbes, T. Leviathan. Edited by G. A. J. Rogers and Karl Schuhmann. Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2003. Hooker, R. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. Edited by R. W. Church. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888. ———. The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker. Edited by G. Edelen and W. Speed Hill. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, vols. 1 and 2. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993. James VI of Scotland, I of England. The True Law of Free Monarchies: or, the

264  Selected Bibliography reciprock and mutuall dutie betwixt a free King, and his natural Subiectes. Edinburgh: Robert Waldegraue, 1598. ———. Basilikon Doron. Edinburgh: R. Walde-grave, 1599. ———. Basilikon Doron ou Présent Royal de Jacques Ier Roy d’Angleterre, Escosse et Irlande; au prince Henry son fils: contenant une instruction de bien régner. Paris: Guillaume Auvray, 1603. ———. Triplici nodo, triplex cuneus: or an Apologie for the oath of allegiance, ag. the two breves of Pope Paulus Quintus a. the late letter of Cardinal Bellarmine to G. Blackwel the Arch-priest. London: R. Barker, 1607. ———. Triplici nodo, triplex cuneus: ou Apologie pour le serment de fidélité, que de Roy de la Grand Bretagne veut estre faict par tous ses sujets, contre les deux brefs du Pape Paul cinquième et l’epistre, ou lettre, nagueres envoyee par le Cardinal Bellarmin à G. Blackwel Archiprestre. Leiden: J. Le Fevre, 1608. ———. Apologia pro iuramento fidelitatis: primum quidem anjnmos nunc vero ab ipso auctore, serenissimo ac potentiss. principe, Iacobo, Dei gratia, Magnae Britanniae, Franciae et Hiberniae Rege, fidei defensore, denuo edita; cui praemissa est praefatio monitoria sacratiss. Caesari Rodolpho II, semper augusto, caeterisque Christiani orbis sereniss. ac potentiss. monarchis ac regibus, celsissimisque liberis principibus, rebus publicis atque ordinibus incripta. London: J. Norton, 1609. ———. An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance: First Set Forth without a Name, and Now Acknowledged by the Author, the Right High and Mightie Prince, Iames by the Grace of God, King of Great Britaine, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc.; Together with a Premonition of His Maiesties to All Most Mightie Monarches, Kings, Free Princes, and States of Christendome. London: Robert Barker, 1609. ———. Apologie pour le serment de fidélité. London: Jean Norton, 1609. ———. Déclaration du sérénissime Roy de la Grande-Bretagne, et Irlande. Défenseur de la foy. Pour le droit des rois et indépendance de leurs couronnes. Contre la Harangue de l’illustrissime Cardinal du Perron, prononcée en la Chambre du Tiers État. London: Jean Norton, 1615. ———. Remonstrance of the Most Gratious King Iames I. King of Great Brittaine, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c., for the Right of Kings and the Independance of Their Crownes against an Oration of the Most Illustrious Card. of Perron, Pronounced in the Chamber of the Third Estate. Ian. 15. 1615. Cambridge: Cantrell Legge, Printer to the University of Cambridge, 1616. ———. The Secret Correspondence of Sir Robert Cecil with James VI, King of Scotland. Edinburgh: A. Millar, 1767. ———. The Workes of the Most High and Mightie Prince, Iames by the Grace of

Selected Bibliography  265 God, King of Great Britaine, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc., published by Iames, Bishop of Winton, and Deane of his Maiesties Chappel Royall. London: Robert Barker and Iohn Bill, 1616. Includes the following: A Declaration against Vorstius; Demonologie, in Forme of a Dialogue; A Fruitfull Meditation, Containing a Plaine and Easie Exposition, or Laying Open of the VII. VIII. IX and X. Verses of the 20. Chapter of the REVELATION, in Forme and Maner of a Sermon; The Trew Law of Free Monarchies; A Paraphrase upon the Revelation of the Apostle S. John; A Meditation upon the Lords Prayer; A Meditation upon the Revelation of the Apostle Saint John; A Remonstrance for the Right of Kings, and the independence of their Crownes, against an Oration of the Most Illustrious Card. of Perron. ———. Letters of Queen Elizabeth and King James VI of Scotland: Some of Them Printed from Originals in the Possession of the Rev. Edward Ryder, and Others from a MS. Which Formerly Belonged to Sir Peter Thompson. Edited by John Bruce. London: Camden Society, 1849. ———. Original Letters Relating to the Ecclesiastical Affairs of Scotland, Chiefly Written by, or Addressed to His Majesty King James the Sixth after His Accession to the English Throne, 1603–25. Edited by D. Laing. Edinburgh: J. Hughes, 1851. ———. Correspondence of King James VI of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and Others in England, during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, with an Appendix Containing Papers Illustrative of Transactions between King James and Robert, Earl of Essex. Edited by John Bruce. London: Camden Society, 1861. ———. The Political Works of James I. Edited by C. H. McIlwain. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1918. ———. The Basilikon Doron of King James VI. Edited by J. Craigie. Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1950. ———. The Minor Prose Works of King James VI and I. Edited by J. Craigie. Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1982. ———. King James VI and I, Political Writings. Edited by J. P. Sommerville. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. ———. La vraie loi des Libres Monarchies. Edited and translated by Bernard Bourdin. Montpellier, France: Presses Universitaires de la Méditerranée, 2004. Kirk, J., ed. The Second Book of Discipline: With an Introduction and Commentary. Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1980. Laing, D., ed. The Works of John Knox. 6 vols. Edinburgh: Woodrow, 1846–64. Larkin, J. F., and P. L. Hughes, eds. Stuart Royal Proclamations. Vol. 1, Royal Proclamations of King James I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.

266  Selected Bibliography Law, T. A Historical Sketch of the Conflicts between Jesuits and Seculars in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth. With a reprint of Christopher Bagshaw’s True Relation of the Faction Begun at Wisbeach and Illustrative Documents. London: David Nutt, 1889. ———. The Archpriest Controversy. 2 vols. London: Longmans, Green, 1898. Le Fèvre de la Boderie, A. Ambassades de Monsieur de La Boderie en Angleterre, sous le règne d’Henri IV et la minorité de Louis XIII depuis les années 1606 jusqu’en 1611. Paris: P. D. Burtin, 1750. Luther, M. Works. 55 vols. Edited by J. Pelikan and H. Lehmann. Translated by Eric Gritsch. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1955–1975. Mariana (de), J. De rege et regis institutione. Toledo: P. Roderius, 1641. Marsilius of Padua. Defender of the Peace. Edited and translated by Annabel Brett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Maziere Brady, W. Annals of the Catholic Hierarchy in England, A.D. 1585–1876. London: John Mozley Stark, 1883. Melville, J. The Diary of Mr. James Melvil [sic], 1556–1601. Edited by G. R. Kinloch. Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1829. Milward, P. Religious Controversies of the Elizabethan Age: A Survey of Printed Sources. London: Scolar Press, 1977. ———. Religious Controversies of the Jacobean Age. A Survey of Printed Sources. London: Scolar Press, 1978. Mocket, R. God and the King: Or, A Dialogue Shewing That Our Soveraigne Lord King James, Being Immediate under God within His Dominions Doth Rightfully Claime Whatsoever Is Required by the Oath of Allegiance. London: n.p., 1615. Notestein, W. The House of Commons, 1604–1610. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971. Parsons, R. A brief discours contayning certayne Reasons why Catholiques Refuse to goe to Church. Written by a learned and vertuous man, to a friend of his in England, and dedicated by I.H. to the Queenes most excellent Maiestie. Douay, France: Iohn Lyon, 1580. ———. An epistle of the Persecution of Catholickes in England. Translated ovvt of frenche into Englishe and conferred vvith the Latyne copie by G.T. To whiche is added an epistle of the translator to the right honorable Lordes of her Maiesties preeuie councell touchynge the same matter. Douay, France: H.C.L., B.M., 1582. ———. A Conference about the Next Succession to the Crowne of Ingland. Douay, France: H.C.L., B.M., 1594. ———. A Discussion of the Answere of M. William Barlow. Saint Omer: English College Press, 1612.

Selected Bibliography  267 ———. A Memorial of the Reformation of England: Containing Certain Notes, and Advertisements, which seem might be proposed in the First Parliament, and National Council of our Country, after God, of his mercy, shall restore it to the Catholick Faith, for the better Establishment and Preservation of the said Religion. London: Richard Chiswel, 1690. Saravia, A. A Treatise on the Different Degrees of the Christian Priesthood. Translated by A. W. Street. Oxford: J. H. Parker, 1840. Spinoza, Benedict de. Theological-Political Treatise. Edited by J. Israel; translated by J. Israel and M. Silverthorne. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Suarez (de), F. Defensio fidei Catholicae et apostolicae adversus anglicanae sectae errores, cum responsione ad Apologiam pro iuramento fidelitatis & Praefationem monitoriam serenissimi Iacobi Angliae Regis; ad serenissimos totius Christiani orbis Catholicos reges ac principes. In Opera, vol. 24. Paris: L. Vivès, 1859. ———. De Legibus. Vols. 5 and 6. Paris: L. Vivès, 1869. ———. De juramento fidelitatis, estudio preliminar: Conciencia y Politica. Madrid: Consejo superior de investigaciones científicas, Escuela española de La Paz, 1979. Tanner, J. R., ed. Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930. Teulet, J. B. Th. A. Relations politiques de la France et de l’Espagne avec l’Écosse au XVIème siècle. Vol. 4: Correspondances Françaises 1585–1603. Paris: Veuve Jules Renouard, 1862. Vitoria, F. (de). De Potestate ecclesiae prior. Madrid: Urbanez, 1960. Warner, G. F., ed. The Library of James VI, 1573–1583, from a Manuscript in the Hands of Peter Young, His Tutor. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1893. Whitgift, J. The Defense of the avnswere to the Admonition, against the Replie of T. C. London: Henry Binneman for Humfrey Toye, 1574. ———. Works. Cambridge: John Ayre, 1852, vol 3. William of Ockham. A Short Discourse on Tyrannical Government. Edited by A. S. McGrade; translated by John Kilcullen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

S e con da ry S o u rc e s Books Allen, J. W. English Political Thought, 1603–1660. London: Methuen, 1938. Allen, W., and E. Jacobs, eds. The Coming of the King James Gospels: A Collation

268  Selected Bibliography of the Translators’ Work-in-Progress. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1995. Arquillière, H. X. Saint Grégoire VII. Essai sur sa conception du pouvoir pontifical. Paris: Vrin, 1934. ———. L’Augustinisme politique. Paris: Vrin, 1955. Bedouelle, G., and P. Le Gal. Le “divorce” du roi Henri VIII. Geneva: Droz, 1987. Bingham, C. The Making of a King: The Early Years of James VI and I. London: Collins, 1968. Blumenberg, H. The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. Translated by Robert M. Wallace. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983. Bois, J. Translating for King James: Being a True Copy of the Only Notes Made by a Translator of King James’s Bible, the Authorized Version, as the Final Committee of Review Revised the Translation of Romans through Revelation at Stationers’ Hall in London in 1610–1611. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969. Bossy, J. The English Catholic Community 1570–1850. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1979. Bourdin, B. La médiation chrétienne en question, Les jeux de Léviathan. Paris: Cerf, 2009. Brodrick, J. The Life and Work of Blessed Robert Francis Bellarmine (1542–1621). 2 vols. London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1928. ———. Robert Bellarmin. L’humaniste et le saint. Translated by J. Boulangé. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1963. Burgess, G. The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Political Thought 1603–1642. London: Macmillan, 1992. ———. Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996. Burns, J. H. The True Law of Kingship: Concepts of Monarchy in Early Modern Scotland. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. ———. Histoire de la pensée politique. Paris: PUF, 1997. Busnel, F., F. Tellier, F. Grolleau, and J-P. Zarade. Les mots du pouvoir, Précis de vocabulaire. Paris: De Vinci, 1995. Calderwood, D. The History of the Kirk of Scotland. Edited by T. Thomson. Vol. 5. Edinburgh: Woodrow Society, 1845. Cardwell, E. A History of Conferences and Other Proceedings Connected with the Revision of the Book of Common Prayer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1849. Carlyle, R. A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West. 6 vols. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1903–36.

Selected Bibliography  269 Carrafiello, M. Robert Parsons and English Catholicism, 1580–1610. Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1998. Carrive, P. La Pensée politique anglaise de Hooker à Hume. Paris: PUF, 1994. Collinson, P. The Elizabethan Puritan Movement. London: Jonathan Cape, 1967. Congar, Y., ed. Catholicisme. 16 vols. Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1948–99. Cottret, B. Henri VIII: Le pouvoir par la force. Paris: Payot, 1999. Couzard, R. Une ambassade à Rome sous Henri IV (septembre 1601–juin 1605). Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1900. Crouzet, D. Les guerriers de Dieu, la violence au temps des troubles de religion. Seyssel, France: Champ Vallon, 1990. Cumming, G., and D. Baker. Studies in Church History. Vol. 7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Dagron, G. Empereur et prêtre. Etude sur le “césaropapisme” byzantin. Paris: Gallimard, 1996. Daiches, D. The King James Version of the English Bible: An Account of the Development and Sources of the English Bible of 1611 with Special Reference to the Hebrew Tradition. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1941. David, M. La Souveraineté et les limites du pouvoir monarchique du IXème au XVème siècle. Paris: Dalloz, 1954. De la Serviere, J. La Théologie de Bellarmin. Paris: Beauchesne, 1909. Despland, M. La Religion en Occident. Evolution des idées et du vécu. Montreal: Fides, 1979. Dickinson, W. C., G. Donaldson, I. A. Milne, eds. A Source Book of Scottish History. 3 vols. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1961. Dodd, C. Church History of England from the Commencement of the Sixteenth Century to the Revolution in 1688. Vol. 4. London: C. Dolman, 1839–43. Duchein, M. Jacques Ier Stuart, le roi de la paix. Paris: Presses de la Renaissance, 1985. Dumeige, G., ed. Histoire des Conciles œcuméniques (10), Latran V et Trente. Paris: L’Orante, 1975. Elton, G. R. Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government, Papers and Reviews 1946–1972. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974. ———. England under the Tudors. London: Methuen, 1975. Figgis, J. N. The Divine Right of Kings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914. Fincham, K. C., ed. The Early Stuart Church, 1603–1642. London: Macmillan, 1993. Fuller, T. The Church History of Britain, from the Birth of Jesus-Christ until the

270  Selected Bibliography Year New, 1655. Edited by J. S. Brewer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1845. Gardiner, S. R. A Student’s History of England. 3 vols. London: Longmans, Green, 1896. Geyl, P. The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1555–1609. London: Ernest Benn, 1962. Gisel, P. Le Christ de Calvin. Paris: Desclée, 1990. Haynes, A. The Gunpowder Plot: Faith in Rebellion. Stroud, England: Sutton, 1994. Holdsworth, W. Some Makers of English Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938. Hume-Brown, P. George Buchanan, Humanist and Reformer. Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1890. Judson, M. A. The Crisis of the Constitution: An Essay in Constitutional and Political Thought in England 1603–1645. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1988. Kantorowicz, E. The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957. Kenyon, J., ed. The Stuart Constitution 1603–1688: Documents and Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Kirby, W. J. T. Richard Hooker’s Doctrine of the Royal Supremacy. Leiden: Brill, 1990. Laderchi, Giacomo, and Odorico Raynaldi. Annales parisis ecclesiastici Baronii. Rome: 1728. Lake, P. Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Laplanche, F. La Controverse religieuse au XVIIe siècle et la naissance de l’histoire. Paris: Cerf, 1955. Lecler, J. Histoire de la tolérance au siècle de la Réforme. 2 vols. Paris: AubierMontaigne, 1955. Lessay, F. Le Débat Locke/Filmer. Paris: PUF, 1999. Levillain, P. Dictionnaire historique de la Papauté. Paris: Fayard, 1994. Lewy, G. Constitutionalism and Statecraft during the Golden Age of Spain: A Study of the Political Philosophy of Juan de Mariana, S.J. Geneva: Droz, 1960. Lichnerowicz, André, François Perroux, and Gilbert Gadoffre, eds. Recherches interdisciplinaires: Analogie et connaissance. Vol. 1: Aspects historiques. Paris: Maloine, 1980. Loomie, A. J., ed. Spain and the Jacobean Catholics. 2 vols. London: Catholic Record Society, 1973–78.

Selected Bibliography  271 Lossky, N. Lancelot Andrewes le prédicateur (1555–1626): aux sources de la théologie mystique de l’Église d’Angleterre. Paris: Cerf, 1986. Loyer, O. L’Anglicanisme de Richard Hooker. 2 vols. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1979. Mayeur, J. M., et al., eds. Histoire du christianisme: des origines à nos jours. Paris: Desclée, 1990–98. McGrath, P. Papists and Puritans under Elizabeth I. London: Blandford, 1967. Mechoulan, H., ed. L’État baroque. Paris: Vrin, 1985. Mesnard, P. L’Essor de la philosophie politique au XVIème siècle. Paris: Vrin, 1969. Michaelis, G. Richard Hooker als politischer Denker. Berlin: E. Ebering, 1933. Milton, A. Catholic and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought, 1600–1640. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Moreton, H. A. La Réforme anglicane au XVIème siècle. Paris: Les Œuvres Représentatives, 1930. Mousnier, R. L’Assassinat de Henri IV. Le problème du tyrannicide et l’affermissement de la monarchie absolue. Paris: Gallimard, 1964. Munz, P. The Place of Hooker in the History of Thought. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1952. Oakley, F. Omnipotence, Covenant, and Order: An Excursion in the History of Ideas from Abelard to Leibniz. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984. Pacaut, M. La Théocratie: L’Église et le pouvoir au Moyen Âge. Paris: AubierMontaigne, 1957. Parker, G. Spain and the Netherlands, 1559–1659: Ten Studies. London: Fontana, 1979. Passerin d’Entrèves, A. Riccardo Hooker: contributo alla teoria e alla storia del Diritto naturale. Turin: Presso l’Istituto Giuridico della R. Università, 1932. Patterson, W. B. Political Works of James I, 149–50. Vol. 1 of Spain and the Jacobean Catholics, edited by A. J. Loomie. London: Catholic Record Society, 1973. ———. King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Peterson, E. Le monothéisme, un problème politique et autres traités. Translated by Anne-Sophie Astrup and Gilles Dorival. Paris: Bayard, 2007. Pollard, A. Records of the English Bible: The Documents Relating to the Translation and Publication of the Bible in English, 1525–1611. London: Oxford University Press, 1911. Polman, P. L’élément historique dans la controverse religieuse du XVIème siècle. Gembloux, Belgium: J. Duculot, 1932.

272  Selected Bibliography Pritchard, A. J. Catholic Loyalism and the Anti-Jesuit Party in Elizabethan Catholicism. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1976. Prodi, P. Christianisme et monde moderne, Cinquante ans de recherches. Translated by Antonella Romano. Paris: Gallimard, 2006. Report of the Archbishops’ Commission on Christian Doctrine: Subscription and Assent to the 39 Articles. London: SPCK, 1968. Sachot, M. L’Invention du Christ, genèse d’une religion. Paris: Odile Jacob, 1997. ———. Quand le christianisme a changé le monde, I La subversion chrétienne du monde antique. Paris: Odile Jacob, 2007. Scarisbrick, J. J. Henry VIII. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. Schatz, K. La Primauté du Pape. Son histoire des origines à nos jours. Paris: Cerf, 1992. Schmitt, C. Théologie politique. Translated by Jean-Louis Schlegel. Paris: Gallimard, 1988. ———. Roman Catholicism and Political Form. Translated by G. L. Ulmen. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1996. ———. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Translated by George Schwab. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. ———. Political Theology II: The Myth of the Closure of Any Political Theology. Translated by M. Hoelzl and G. Ward. London: Polity, 2008. Servière, J. de la. La Théologie de Bellarmin. Paris: Beauchesne, 1909. Shirley, F. Richard Hooker and Contemporary Political Ideas. London: SPCK, 1949. Skinner, Q. The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Smith, A. G. R., ed. The Reign of James VI and I. London: Macmillan, 1973. Sommerville, J. P. “Jacobean Political Thought and the Controversy over the Oath of Allegiance.” Ph.D. thesis. Cambridge, 1981. Speed Hill, W. Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary of His Works. Cleveland: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1972. Storme, T. Carl Schmitt et le marcionisme. L’impossibilité théologico-politique d’un œcuménisme judéo-chrétien? Paris: Cerf, 2008. Strong, R. Henry, Prince of Wales, and England’s Lost Renaissance. London: Thames and Hudson, 1986. Thils, G. Les notes de l’Église dans l’apologétique catholique depuis la Réforme. Gembloux, Belgium: J. Duculot, 1937. Tuck, R. Philosophy and Government 1572–1651. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Turchetti, M. Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l’antiquité à nos jours. Paris: PUF, 2001.

Selected Bibliography  273 Turmel, J. Histoire de la théologie positive, du concile de Trente au concile du Vatican. Paris: Beauchesne, 1906. Ullmann, W. Law and Politics in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. Usher, R. The Reconstruction of the English Church. 2 vols. New York: D. Appleton, 1910. Veyne, P. Quand notre monde est devenu chrétien. Paris: Albin Michel, 2007. Welsby, P. Lancelot Andrewes, 1555–1626. London: SPCK, 1958. Wormald, J. Court, Kirk, and Community: Scotland 1470–1625. London: Edward Arnold, 1981. Zarka Y. C., ed. Raison et déraison d’État. Théoriciens et théories de la raison d’État aux XVIème et XVIIème siècles. Paris: PUF, 1994. ———. Hobbes et la pensée politique moderne. Paris: PUF, 1995. ———, ed. Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la philosophie politique moderne. Paris: PUF, 1999. ———, ed. Penser la souveraineté à l’époque moderne et contemporaine. Paris: J.Vrin, 2002.

Articles Bellah, R. “Civil Religion in America.” Daedalus 96 (1967): 1–21. Borot, L. “James VI and I and Revelation: How to Discourage Millenarian Aspirations.” Anglophonia 3 (1998): 23–36. Bossy, J. “Henry IV, the Appellants and the Jesuits.” Recusant History 8 (1965): 80–122. Bourdin, B. “La théologie politique chez Saint Thomas.” In Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la philosophie politique moderne, edited by Y. C. Zarka, 25–43. Paris: PUF, 1999. ———. “La Révélation chrétienne ou le retournement théologico-politique.” Irenikon 3–4 (2000): 298–315. ———. “La pensée ecclésio-politique de Jacques VI, I, Stuart. Continuité et rupture avec la Suprématie royale anglaise.” In L’Identité anglicane aux XVIème–XXème siècles. Arras, France: Artois Presses Université, 2004. ———. “Le droit divin et les sources théologico-politiques de la modernité.” Revue d’éthique et de théologie morale 227 (2004): 121–42. Brown, K. M. “The Search of the Godly Magistrate in Reformation Scotland.” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 40, no. 4 (1989): 553–81. Carrive, P. “Il Re, il tiranno, il papa, il popolo in George Buchanan.” Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 50 (1995): 471–98.

274  Selected Bibliography Cottret, B. “Le roi, les lords et les communes: monarchie mixte et États du Royaume en Angleterre, XVIème et XVIIème siècles.” Annales 41 (1986): 126–50. David, M. “Le serment du sacre du IXème siècle au XVème siècle.” Revue du Moyen Âge Latin (1956): 2–367. Follet, R. “Saint Robert Bellarmin en France comme conseiller du Cardinal Gaëtani, légat de Sixte-Quint (1589–1590).” Lettres de Fourvière 4 (1931): 8–21. Gauchet, M. “L’État au miroir de la raison d’État: la France et la chrétienté.” In Raison et déraison d’État. Théoriciens et théories de la raison d’État aux XVIème et XVIIème siècles, edited by Y. C. Zarka, 193–244. Paris: PUF, 1994. Lake, P. “Antipopery: The Structure of a Prejudice.” In Conflict in Early Stuart England, Studies in Religion and Elites 1603–1642, edited by R. Cust and A. Hughes, 72–106. London: Longman, 1989. ———. “The Significance of the Elizabethan Identification of the Pope as Antichrist.” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 31, no. 2 (1980): 161–78. Le Bachelet, X.-M. Bellarmin et la Bible Sixto-Clémentine: Études et documents inédits. Études de Théologie Historique 3. Paris: Beauchesne, 1911. Le Boulluec, A. “La Controverse religieuse et ses formes.” In La Controverse religieuse au XVIIe siècle et la naissance de l’histoire, edited by François Laplanche, 373–404. Paris: Cerf, 1955. Lee, M. “James VI and the Revival of Episcopacy in Scotland: 1596–1600.” Church History 43, no. 1 (1974): 50–64. Lessay, F. “Robert Parsons, S.J.: de la reconquête à la recréation du royaume d’Angleterre.” In Innovation et tradition de la Renaissance aux Lumières, edited by F. Lessay and F. Laroque, 107–31. Paris: Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2002. Loomie, A. “King James I’s Catholic Consort.” In Huntington Library Quarterly 34 (1971): 303–16. McCready, W. “Papalist and Antipapalist: Aspects of the Church/State Controversy in the Later Middle Ages.” Viator, Medieval, and Renaissance Studies (1975): 241–73. Milton, Anthony. “The Church of England, Rome and the True Church: The Demise of a Jacobean Consensus.” In The Early Stuart Church, 1603–1642, ed. K. C. Fincham, 187–210. London: Macmillan, 1993. Patterson, W. B. “King James I’s Call for an Ecumenicall Council.” In Studies in Church History, vol. 7, ed. G. J. Cumming and D. Baker, 267–75. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Selected Bibliography  275 Percharman, M. “Les fondements de la notion d’unité du peuple selon Suarez.” In Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la philosophie politique moderne, edited by Y. C. Zarka, 103–26. Paris: PUF, 1999. Peters, R. “Some Catholic Opinions of King James VI and I.” Recusant History 10 (1969–70): 293–303. Pique, N. “P. Jurieu et les voies contournées de l’histoire. L’origine, l’écart et la variation.” Revue d’Histoire et de Philosophie religieuse 78, no. 4 (1998): 435–49. Rapp, Francis. “De la pragmatique sanction au concordat de Bologne: le roi et l’Église gallicane.” In De la Réforme à la Réformation (1450–1530), vol. 7 of Histoire du christianisme: des origines à nos jours, edited by J.-M. Mayeur, et al. Paris: Desclée, 1994. Renoux-Zagamé, M.-F. “Théologie sacerdotale contre théologie séculière: la question du droit divin des rois.” In Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la philosophie politique moderne, edited by Y. C. Zarka, 151–52. Paris: PUF, 1999. Richardson, A. “Une interprétation anglicane de l’Eglise.” In La Sainte Eglise universelle. Confrontation œcuménique, 133–74. Neuchâtel, Switzerland: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1948. Russell, C. “Arguments for Religious Unity in England, 1530–1650.” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 18, no. 2 (1967): 201–26. Ullmann, W. “This Realm of England Is an Empire.” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 30, no. 2 (1979): 175–203. Warner, G. “The Library of James VI, in the Hand of Peter Young, His Tutor, 1573–1583.” In Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, ix–lxxv. Edinburgh: Scottish Historical Society, 1893. White, Peter. “The Via Media in the Early Stuart Church.” In The Early Stuart Church, 1603–1642, ed. K. C. Fincham, 211–30. London: Macmillan, 1993. Williams, J. “Puritan Piracies of Father Parsons’ Conference.” The Month 561 (1911): 270–78.

Index Absolutism, 2, 3, 19, 26n20, 48, 50, 57, 65, 82–84, 90, 93, 157, 162, 164, 245, 247, 249 Acquaviva, Claudio, 50n87 Admonition Controversy, 27, 42 Agapetus, 72; De Officio Regis, 72 Allen, John, 2 Alvey, Richard, 25 Anabaptists, 213, 222–23, 227 Andrewes, Lancelot, 99, 117, 123, 125, 217, 231n53, 238, 249n4; Tortura Torti, 123 Anglicanism, 11, 15, 17, 23–25, 27, 29, 37, 40, 43, 50, 54–55, 58, 61–62, 65, 67–69, 93–94, 106, 115–16, 122, 130, 137n18, 146, 163, 166, 203–4, 206–7, 214, 217, 222–23, 232, 238, 243, 247, 251 Anne of Denmark, 101, 124 Apocalypse, 219, 227–28, 230 Appellants, 44, 51, 54–59, 66–67, 69, 103, 111–12, 246 Aquinas, Thomas, St., 142, 144, 151n54; Summa theologica, 133, 142n33, 144n39; Treatise on Law, 142 Aremberg, Charles, Count, 103 Arles, Council of, 18 Arminians, 26, 206, 218 Audley, Thomas, 17 Augustine, St., 13, 59, 218, 222, 229, 237 Augustinism, 13, 155, 208, 233, 237, 244 Augustinus Triumphus, 138n19, 152 Bacon, Francis, 187n48 Baius affair, 134 Bancroft, Richard, 54, 97, 111, 114, 117

Barclay, James, 58 Barclay, William, 58, 85–90, 135, 150n53, 156, 206; De potestate Papae, 87, 135; De Regno et regali potestate, 85, 90; Of the authoritie of the Pope, 87n35, 135n11, 150n53 Barlow, William, 98–99, 122; An Answer to a Catholike English-Man, 122; The Summe and Substance of the Conference, 98n10 Bayle, Pierre, 132 Bellarmine, Robert, 1, 3, 6, 8–9, 45, 49, 58, 61, 87, 89, 111–23, 126–28, 130–56, 159, 167–68, 199–201, 205, 207–17, 225, 232–34, 239–41, 243–44, 249, 253; Apologie de l’illustrissime Robert Bellarmin (Responce), 114n50, 118, 119n70, 121, 133, 153n58, 155n60, 207–9, 239–40; Controversies, 133–34; De Clericis, 126, 146, 147n49; De Laicis, 136; De Potestate Pontificis temporalis, 87n35, 135, 154; De Romano Pontifice, 135, 137n17, 138, 148n51, 151, 214n22, 240, 253; De Transitu Romani Imperii a Graecis ad Francos, 134; Hieratikon Doron, 136; Matthaei Torti [. . .] responsio ad librum inscriptum, Triplici nodo, triplex cuneus [. . .], 118; Tractatus de Potestate Summi Pontificis, 87n35, 135 Belloy, Pierre du, 58n110, 59n112, 134; Apologie catholique, 134n8; De l’Authorité du Roy, 58n110, 59n112 Béthune, Maximilien de, duc de Sully, 52, 103 Bèze, Théodore de, 133

277

278  Index Bilson, Thomas, 116; A Sermon Preached at Westminster, 116n61; For penne and inck, 116 Birckhead, George, 116 Bishop, William, 51n89, 113 Black, David, 81 Blackwell, George, 52, 56, 113–17, 154, 155n60, 239; A Large Examination Taken at Lambeth, 115n58; His Answeres upon Sundry His Examinations, 114n51 Blackwood, Adam, 84–85; Apologia pro Regibus, 84 Bluette, Thomas, 54, 56 Blumenberg, Hans, 1, 4; The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, 4 Bodin, Jean, 68n134, 83–85; Six livres de la République, 83; The Six Bookes of a Commonweale, 84n25 Boleyn, Anne, 17 Bonald, Louis de, 5 Book of Common Prayer, 22, 100 Borghese, Camillo. See Paul V Borghese, Scipione, 129 Boucher, Jean, 90 Bracton, Henry de, 91 Brandon, Charles, Duke of Suffolk, 19 Brooke, Henry, Lord Cobham, 103 Broughton, Father, 113 Brûlart de Puysieulx, Pierre, 128 Buchanan, George, 61n114, 72–74, 82–83, 85, 90–92; Baptistes, 73; De Iure Regni apud Scotos, 73, 90–92; Rerum Scoticarum Historia (History of Scotland), 73, 92 Buckeridge, John, 43n70; A Sermon Preached at Hampton Court, 43n70 Budé, Guillaume, 72; L’Institution du Prince, 72 Bye Plot, 103 Caesaropapism, 208 Cajetan, Tommaso de Vio, Cardinal, 47, 253 Calvin, Jean, 22, 26–27, 30, 33–34, 35n44, 39, 41–42, 71, 80, 82, 84–85, 97, 102,

106, 129, 133, 160, 163–65, 167–68, 170, 195, 204, 216, 219, 227, 229, 232n54, 243, 249; Institutes of the Christian Religion, 30n31, 33, 34n40, 39 Carew, Sir George, 125n87, 129–30 Cartwright, Thomas, 24, 27–32, 34–35, 38–39, 41–43; Second Replie, 27n23, 29n26, 30n29, 31n32 Catechism of the Council, 133 Cathars, 222 Catherine of Aragon, 17 Cecil, Robert, 54n94, 70, 75, 106, 108, 115, 125n87 Cecil, William, 54 Centuriators, 35n44; Historia Ecclesiae Christi, 35n44 Chaderton, Laurence, 99 Chalcedon, Council of, 27, 31, 34n41, 39 Charlemagne, 12, 18, 237 Charles I, 43n70, 204, 231 Cicero, 91 Clement V, 19–20; Pastoralis cura, 19n8 Clement VII, 17 Clement VIII, 51–52, 54–56, 100–101, 105, 122, 128, 223 Clément, Jacques, 153 Cobham, Lord. See Brooke, Henry, Lord Cobham Code of Justinian, 20 Confession of faith, 74–75, 77 Constance, Council of, 113 Constantine, 12, 18, 236 Cornwallis, Sir Charles, 108 Cranmer, Thomas, 17 Creswell, Joseph, 112n46; A Proclamation Published under the Name of Iames, 112n46 Cromwell, Oliver, 61n114 Cromwell, Thomas, 17 Cyprian, St., 218 Cyril, St., 212 Daniel, 213 Darnley, Henry Stuart, 71 Davenant, John, 232n54; Determinationes

Index  279 quaestionum quarundam theologicarum, 232n54 Davy du Perron, Jacques, Cardinal, 130, 199–200, 206–7, 214, 220; Harangue [. . .] par Mgr le cardinal Du Perron, 206n8, 207 De Concordia, 134 Diocletian, 149, 254 Divine right, 1–3, 6, 8–9, 50, 58–59, 65, 84, 86, 93, 116, 139, 141, 144–45, 147, 156n62, 158–60, 162–65, 168–71, 178, 187–89, 191, 194–95, 197–99, 202, 204–7, 209–10, 216, 224, 227, 230–31, 234–35, 240–45, 247–48 Donoso Cortés, Juan, 5 Drummond, Edward, 100, 101n18 Duns Scotus, John, 45 Edmondes, Thomas, 124n86 Edward VI, 7, 16, 22, 247 Elizabeth I, 7, 15–17, 22–25, 51, 53, 54n95, 56–57, 59–61, 69–70, 80–81, 93–94, 103, 107, 114, 118–19, 124, 133, 157, 198–200, 204, 227n48, 238–40, 242, 244, 247; Act for the Better Discovering and Repressing of Popish Recusants, 109; Act of Annexation, 80n18; Act of Supremacy, 22, 93, 252; Act of Uniformity, 16, 22 Elphinstone, James, Lord Balmerino, 122 Elyot, Thomas, 73; The Governor, 73 Ephesus, Council of, 39n61 Episcopalianism, 74, 81–82, 99, 203–4, 206, 217, 223 Epistle to the Hebrews, 37 Erastianism, 26, 64 Essex, Robert, Earl of, 54n94 Ferdinand V, 17 Ferdinand of Tuscany, 124 Ferne, Henry, 184n43; The Resolving of Conscience, 184n43 Figgis, John, 2–3 Flacius Illyricus, 134; De Transatione Imperii, 134

Foxe, Edward, 20n11; Opus eximium de differentia, 20n11 Friedrich II, 144 Fuller, Thomas, 99 Gaetani, Cardinal, 56n103, 134 Galileo, Galilei 135 Gallicanism, 51, 59, 112, 129, 199–200, 206 Gardiner, Stephen, 17, 23, 35, 102n21, 203; De Vera Obedientia, 35 Gee, Edward, 62n118 Gelasius I, 13, 156, 237 Gerson, Jean, 113n47, 135 Glorious Revolution, 3 Gomarism, 206 Gregorian reform, 8, 13, 204, 216, 237, 243. See also Gregory VII Gregory I (the Great), 13, 224, 237 Gregory VII, 8, 13, 48, 195n57, 237; Dictatus papae, 8, 48, 195 Gregory XIII, 80, 134 Guevara, Antonio de, 72; Dial of Princes, 73 Gunpowder Plot, 109, 115, 125–26, 136, 188, 239 Haller, Richard, 107; Discourse on the desire which the king of England is said to have to conform to the Catholic Church [. . .], 107 Hampton Court Conference, 96–97, 198, 204 Heinrich IV of Germany, 144 Heinrich VII, 19 Henri III of France, 82, 118, 153 Henri IV of France, 50n87, 105, 113, 118, 129–30, 131n116, 134–36, 156 Henri de Navarre. See Henri IV Henry, Prince of Wales, 101, 108, 124, 158, 221 Henry VII, 70 Henry VIII, 7, 16–18, 20–23, 71, 115, 119, 122, 154, 238, 240, 247, 251; Act in Restraint of Appeals, 18–19, 21, 35; Act of Supremacy, 18–19, 21, 93,

280  Index Henry VIII, Act of Supremacy (cont.) 119n73, 251; Defence of the seven sacraments, 16n1 Hepburn, Francis Stewart, Earl of Bothwell, 79 Hippolytus the Martyr, St., 212 Hobbes, Thomas, 5, 15n24, 150, 166n19; Leviathan, 5, 15n24, 150n53 Holtby, Father, 113–19 Hooker, John, 24 Hooker, Richard, 15, 17, 23–29, 31–43, 93, 163, 187n48, 192n53, 203, 204n4, 217, 221, 238, 247; Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, 24–25, 31–34, 36–37, 39–41, 93, 187n48, 221n37 Howard, Thomas, Duke of Norfolk, 19 Huntly, George, Earl of, 79–81 Innocent III, 13, 237, 240 Irenaeus, St., 212, 213n18 Isabella of Flanders, 129 James I of England. See James VI of Scotland James IV of Scotland, 71 James VI of Scotland, 1, 3, 5–8, 15, 17, 43–44, 45n72, 49–51, 58–59, 61, 69, 70–74, 76–77, 79, 81–89, 91, 93–131, 136, 144, 146, 152–53, 155–73, 175–76, 178–211, 214–35, 239–47, 249; Act to Prevent and Avoid Dangers which May Grow by Popish Recusants, 110n40; A Fruitfull Meditation, 221n39; Basilikon Doron, 1, 84, 97, 99, 136, 157–59, 188n49, 192n53, 200, 202, 218, 220–21, 230; Declaration against Vorstius, 218, 222–23; Defence of the Right of Kings, 200, 206–7, 230; Demonologie [. . .], 226, 230; Jacobi primi [. . .], Fidei Defensoris, 136; Meditation upon the Lords Prayer, 218–20; Paraphrase upon the Revelation of [. . .] Saint John, 218, 221–22, 226–27, 230; Proclamation concerning such as seditiously seeke reformation [. . .], 96; speeches to parliament, 104n22, 109n36, 203n1; Trew Law of

Free Monarchies, 1, 3, 74, 84, 91n55, 156, 157–201, 206, 208, 220, 229–30, 235, 243; Triplici nodo, triplex cuneus (Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance), 1, 58, 106, 114, 117–25, 128–30, 155–56, 159–60, 167, 195, 198–235, 239–40 Jesuits, 6, 15, 17, 44, 50–58, 60, 62, 64–65, 67–69, 93, 102–3, 107, 112–16, 131n116, 133, 137, 200, 203, 205, 227, 234, 239, 246 Jewel, John, 24 John of Salisbury, 90 John the Fearless, 113n47 Julian the Apostate, 155, 254 Knox, John, 72, 74, 183; Second Book of Discipline, 74, 77, 79 Laud, William, Archbishop, 204 Le Fèvre de la Boderie, Antoine, 128 Leo X, 16 Lérins, Vincent de, 222 Lindsay, Sir James, 101, 105 Louis the Pious, 150 Ludwig of Bavaria, 144 Luther, Martin, 14, 16, 22, 27, 33–34, 39, 133, 213, 247; Against the Roman Papacy [. . .], 33n36 Lutheranism, 14, 41n66, 124, 129, 134, 206, 213, 216, 243, 246 Maetellanus, Thomas, 90 Main Plot, 103 Maistre, Joseph de, 5 Maitland, William, 90 Margaret Tudor. See Tudor, Margaret Mariana, Juan de, 50n87, 153; De Rege et regis institutione, 50n87 Marsilius of Padua, 13–14 Mary of Guise, 124 Mary Stuart. See Stuart, Mary Mary Tudor. See Tudor, Mary Matthew, Tobias, 97 Melanchthon, Philip, 133 Melville, Andrew, 74, 76–77, 81, 90, 195 Memorial setting forth on the part of the

Index  281 Jesuits the Injustice of the Conditions [. . .], 54n96 Millenary Petition, 96 Mocket, Richard, 59n112; God and the King, 59n112 Montague, James, 117, 158n7, 218n29 Montague, Lord, 104 More, Thomas, 17, 35n44 Morton, Earl of, 72n2, 74, 77 Morzillus, Cornelius, 73; De Regni Regnisque Institutione, 73 Mush, Father, 53, 113 Nazianzus, Gregory of, 211 Nero, 138, 149, 193, 254 Nicaea, Council of, 18, 127n100 Northumberland, Earl of, 102 Oath of allegiance, 3, 7–9, 11, 45, 49, 51, 54n95, 57, 61, 72n2, 77, 92, 110–25, 130, 131n116, 136–37, 152, 154–56, 159, 163, 171, 183–88, 201–35, 238–41, 245–56 Ockham, William of, 13–14, 45 Overall, John, 99 Papacy, 2, 3, 8, 13–15, 43, 48, 50, 69, 102, 106, 115, 117, 119, 122–28, 132, 134–38, 141, 147, 152–54, 156, 159, 195, 201, 204, 206–7, 209–10, 212–13, 216, 218, 224, 226, 229–30, 232, 234, 237–42, 244, 247 Parry, Sir Thomas, 101, 125n87 Parsons, Robert, 44, 51, 60–68, 102, 112–13, 122, 157n2, 199, 246; A brief discours contayning certayne Reasons why Catholiques Refuse to goe to Church, 63; A Conference about the Next Succession to the Crowne of Ingland, 60n114, 68, 125n65, 157n2; A Discussion of the Answere of M. William Barlow, 67n133; The Jesuit’s Memorial for the Intended Reformation of England, 62 Paul, St., 23, 59, 66, 144n39, 192–93, 211; Epistle to the Romans, 23, 59, 66–67, 144n39, 193; Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, 228

Paul V, 44, 108, 113n49, 240, 244–45; Renunciatum est nobis, 115n54 Peter, St., 115, 118, 120–21, 139, 147, 151, 154, 207, 211–13, 214n22, 240 Petit, Jean, 113n47 Philip II of Spain, 79 Philip IV of France (Philip the Fair), 144 Pius V, 238 Precisianism, 222 Presbyterianism, 157, 163, 167n20, 194–95, 204n4, 206, 227, 247 Preston, Father, 113 Puritanism, 35, 55, 58, 62, 69, 93, 95–100, 104, 109, 159, 198, 202–4, 206, 230, 234, 239, 244, 247 Randolph, Sir Thomas, 73, 75 Reynolds, John, 97–99 Robert the Wise, 19 Sandys, Edwin, 24 Saravia, Adrianus, 223; A Treatise on the Different degrees of the Christian Priesthood, 223n43 Sarpi, Paolo, 135 Schmitt, Carl, 1, 4–5, 11n15, 249 Sixtus V, 118, 134, 138n19 Socinianism, 133 Spinoza, Baruch, 5, 166n19; Tractatus theologico-politicus, 5 Stuart, Arabella, 71, 103 Stuart, Esmé, seigneur d’Aubigny, 80, 82 Stuart, Mary, 70–72, 74, 76, 79–80, 84, 90 Suarez, Francisco, 44–46, 48–50, 58, 132, 144, 153, 159, 234, 252; Defensio Fidei, 44, 48; De Legibus, 44 Tertullian, 36, 59, 236n1 Theodosius, 12 Toledo, Council of, 208 Travers, Walter, 25 Trent, Council of, 59, 146, 211, 216, 225 Tudor, Margaret, 70–71 Tudor, Mary, 24, 247

282  Index Villeroi, Nicolas de, 52n92 Vitoria, Francisco de, 47, 147n34; De Potestate ecclesiae prior, 142n34 Vorstius, Conrad, 219 Walton, Izaak, 26n20 Watson, William, 53, 58, 103

Whitgift, John, 24, 25n16, 27–30, 34, 42–43; Defense of the Avnswere to the Admonition, 28 Widdrington, Roger, 206 Winram, John, 75 Zwingli, Ulrich, 39

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The Theological-Political Origins of the Modern State: The Controversy between James I of England & Cardinal Bellarmine was designed and typeset in Dante by Kachergis Book Design of Pittsboro, North Carolina. It was printed on 60-pound Natures Book Natural and bound by Thomson-Shore of Dexter, Michigan.