The Tet Offensive: A Concise History 0-231-12840-1
The Tet Offensive: A Concise History КНИГИ ;ВОЕННАЯ ИСТОРИЯ Издательство: Columbia University PressАвтор(ы): James H. Wi
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TheTetOffensive
TheTetOffensive: AConciseHistory
JamesH.Willbanks
co lumb i a un i ve r si ty p re ss n e w yo r k
ColumbiaUniversityPress PublishersSince1893 NewYork,Chichester,WestSussex Copyright©2007ColumbiaUniversityPress AllrightsReserved LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Willbanks,JamesH.,1947– TheTetOffensive:aconcisehistory/JamesH.Willbanks. p.cm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN0-231-12840-1(cloth:alk.paper) 1.TetOffensive,1968. I.Title. DS557.8.T4W54 2006 959.704'342 dc222006012721
ColumbiaUniversityPressbooksareprintedonpermanent anddurableacid-freepaper PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica c10987654321
ReferencestoInternetWebSites(URLs)wereaccurateatthetimeofwriting. NeithertheauthornorColumbiaUniversityPressisresponsiblefor Websitesthatmayhaveexpiredorchangedsincethebookwasprepared.
Thisbookisdedicatedto themembersofourarmedforces, thenandnow,whoputitonthelineforournation.
co n t en t s
Acknowledgments xiii Introduction xv Maps xix Abbreviations xxv
parti HistoricalOverview 1 Chapter1.Prelude 3 AmericanPublicOpinion 5 PublicRelationsandWestmoreland’sOptimism 6 TroopDisposition 7 TheCommunistDecisiontoConducttheOffensive 8 ThePlan 10 PreparingfortheOffensive 13
Chapter2.BorderBattles,HillFights,andKheSanh 15 KheSanh 17 TheHillFights 19 OperationNiagara 22 TheSiegeofKheSanhBegins 23
viii Contents
Chapter3.TheTetOffensive 26 TheOffensiveBegins 30 TheBattleforSaigon 31 TheBattleattheU.S.Embassy 34 AttacksAroundtheCity 37 TheBattleofCholon 39 TetCountrywide 39
Chapter4.TheBattleforHue 43 TheBattleBegins 46 TheMarinesRespond 48 FightingintheNewCity 50 TheFightfortheCitadel 52
Chapter5.TheSiegeofKheSanh 56 TheFallofLangVei 59 ResupplyingtheMarines 61 TacticalAirSupport 61 ANewAttack 62 LiftingtheSiege 63
Chapter6.TheImpactoftheTetOffensive 66 PoliticalFallout 68 TheRequestforAdditionalTroops 70 TheNewHampshirePrimary 74 ThePresidentialElectionof1968 77
Chapter7.AssessingtheTetOffensive 79
partii IssuesandInterpretations 87 Chapter8.MotivationsandObjectivesoftheTetOffensive 89 Chapter9.MilitaryIntelligenceandSurpriseatTet 93
Contents ix
Chapter10.WhatHappenedatHue? 99 Chapter11.WhyKheSanh? 104 Chapter12.TetandtheMedia 110 Chapter13.TetandAmericanMilitaryStrategy 118
Notes 123
partiii Chronology,1967–68 139 partiv TheTetOffensiveAtoZ 161 partv Documents 189 PresidentJohnson’s“SanAntonioFormula”Speechof September29,1967 191 DirectiveonForthcomingOffensiveandUprisings,ProvincialParty StandingCommittee,1November1967 193 CapabilitiesoftheVietnameseCommunistsforFightingin SouthVietnam,November13,1967(Extract) 196 AddressbyCommanderofU.S.ForcesinVietnam,General WilliamC.Westmoreland,November21,1967(Extract) 197 “SaigonUnderFire,”CBSNewsSpecialReport,January31,1968 199 MemorandumfromChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffGeneral EarleG.WheelerforthePresident,February12,1968(Extract) 203
x Contents
WalterCronkite’s“WeAreMiredinStalemate”CBSNewsBroadcast, February27,1968 205 ReportoftheChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffGeneralEarleG. WheelerontheSituationinVietnamandMACVForceRequirements, February27,1968(Extract) 206 SummaryofNotesfromMarch26,1968,MeetingBetween PresidentLyndonJohnsonandtheWiseMen 211 PresidentJohnson’sAddresstotheNationAnnouncingHisDecision NottoSeekReelection,March31,1968 213
partvi Resources 223 GeneralWorks 225 Encyclopedias,Bibliographies,Dictionaries,Guides,andAtlases 225 GeneralHistories,Anthologies 227 Biographies 232 Memoirs 233 VietnamesePerspectives 234 OralHistories 236 DocumentCollections 237
LyndonJohnsonandtheWar 238 TheTetOffensive 239 TheBattleofHue 241 TheSiegeofKheSanh 243 TheHillFightsandBorderBattles 245 PresidentLyndonB.JohnsonandtheMedia 246 MilitaryIntelligenceandTet 248
Contents xi
U.S.StrategyinVietnam 250 CombatAfter-actionReportsandCommandHistories 250 Microfilm/Microfiche 251 DocumentaryFilms 251 ElectronicResources 252 WebSites 252 CD-ROMs 253
ArchivesandLibraries 253
Index 255
a ck n owl ed g m en t s
Iwouldliketothankanumberofpeopleandagenciesfortheirassistancein preparingthisvolume.Firstofall,IwouldliketothankJamesWarren,former executive editor of Columbia University Press, and Marc Jason Gilbert ofNorthGeorgiaCollegefortheirsageadviceandwillingassistance,which wasinvaluable.. ThanksalsogototheU.S.ArmyCenterofMilitaryHistoryatFortMcNair in Washington, D.C., the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,Kansas. AspecialthankyougoestothestaffofTheVietnamCenteratTexasTech University, and in particular James Reckner and Steve Maxner, not only for theassistancetheyhavegivenmebutalsofortheimportantworkthattheyare doingindocumentingthenation’slongestwar. IamalsoindebtedtomycolleaguesintheDepartmentofMilitaryHistory, U.S.ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,fortheirsupportandadvice duringthepreparationofthisvolume. Last,myheartfeltgratitudegoestomywifeDiana,whosupportsandsustains meineverythingthatIdo.
i n t r o d u ct i o n
The Tet Offensive of 1968 was the pivotal event of the long Vietnam War. Itsoutcomeandmeaninghavebeenthesubjectsofadebatethathasraged for more than thirty years. As historian Marc Jason Gilbert suggests, “To mostformeralliedmilitaryofficers,somescholarsofAmericanhistory,and much of the American public, the Tet Offensive was a ‘last gasp,’ a failed all-or-nothing bid to win the war on the ground, which, though stymied in the field, succeeded, largely by accident, in persuading American to throw awaythefruitsofamajoralliedvictoryandstartdowntheroadtodefeatand humiliation.”1 Other historians and Vietnam-era American policy analysts givemorecredittoHanoiandtheNationalLiberationFrontforthedesign, outcome,andeffectsoftheoffensive,seeingitasacalculatedstrategicmove thatachieveditsultimateobjectives—breakingAmerican will and bringing theUnitedStatestothenegotiatingtable.Regardlessoftheirdifferinginterpretationsonmotivationsandoutcomes,allagreethattheTetOffensivewas adecisivemomentthatforeverchangedthenatureoftheU.S.commitment tothewar.However,asRichardFalkpointsout,theTetOffensive“remainsa mirrorforrestatingopposedpreconceptionsandvalidatingcontendingideological biases.”2 This guide seeks to examine the Tet Offensive and explore thevariousissuesandinterpretationsofthiscontroversialeventthatchanged not only the conduct of the war itself, but that also continues to have an
xvi Introduction
impactonthelong-standingdebateaboutthewaranditsmeaningforboth theUnitedStatesandVietnam. On January 21, 1968, twenty thousand Communist troops surrounded the MarinebaseatKheSanhandlaysiegetoitforthenextseventy-sevendays.Ten daysaftertheinitialattackatKheSanh,intheearlymorninghoursofJanuary 31,VietCongandNorthVietnameseforceslaunchedamassivecountrywide attackonthecitiesandtownsofSouthVietnam.3Morethaneightythousand Communist troops mounted simultaneous assaults on thirty-six of forty-four provincialcapitals,fiveofsixmajorcities,includingSaigonandHue,sixty-four of242districtcapitals,andmorethanfiftyhamlets. TheferocityandscopeoftheoffensivestunnedboththeAmericanpublic andPresidentLyndonB.Johnson.TheTetOffensivewoulddestroyanylingering confidence the American public might have had that Johnson’s policies wereleadingtoanyprogressinVietnam.OnMarch31,thepresidentspoketo theAmericanpeopleaboutthecourseofthewarinVietnamandannounced thathewasrestrictingbombingofNorthVietnamtotheareajustnorthofthe demilitarized zone (DMZ). Additionally, he committed the United States to negotiations,namingtheveterandiplomatW.AverellHarrimanashispersonal representativetoanysuchtalks.Finally,attheendofhisspeech,thepresident shockedthenationbyannouncingthathewouldnotrunforreelection. The Tet Offensive had effectively driven the president from office. It had providedstrengthtothewarprotestorsandledotherDemocratstochallenge Johnson’s leadership within his own party. Tet convinced the president that military victory in Vietnam was not attainable and forced a reevaluation of Americanstrategy.TheTetOffensiveanditsaftermathmarkedthebeginning of a protracted American retreat from Vietnam that would not end until five yearslater. ThejournalistDonOberdorferhaswritten,“theTetOffensiveof1968was the turning point of the U.S. war in Vietnam, and thus a historic event of lasting importance.”4 Although Oberdorfer was addressing the impact of the offensiveonthewarinSoutheastAsia,theTetOffensiveanditsoutcomehave amuchbroadermeaning.TheeventsoftheTetOffensivedemonstrateavital aspectofcontemporarywars:militaryoperationsarenormallybutoneaspect ofthestruggleandmaynot,ascanbeseeninthecaseoftheeventsof1968in Vietnam,bethemostimportantfactorindeterminingthewar’soutcome.This studyoftheTetOffensiveinformscontemporarydiscussionsaboutthenature ofwaranditsmilitaryandpoliticalaspects. TheconflictinVietnamalwayshadastrongpoliticalcomponentinaddition tothemilitaryengagementsthatragedonthebattlefield.Thewarinthesouth wasaboutwhocontrolledthepopulation.Recognizingthisfact,therewasgreat unityofpurposebetweentheNationalLiberationFrontinthesouthandthe
Introduction xvii
CentralCommitteeoftheVietnamWorkersPartyinHanoi.Ontheotherhand, therewasadistinctivelackofunityofeffortbetweentheUnitedStatesandits allyinSaigon.ThelegitimacyoftheSouthVietnamesegovernmentwasalways subjecttoquestion,andmanyhistoriansseethetroubledrelationshipbetween WashingtonandSaigonandtheAmericanmilitary’sfailuretowinheartsand mindsoftheSouthVietnamesepeopleascriticalfactorsthatledtothefallof Saigon.Inthatsense,theTetOffensive,althoughusuallyseenwithinamilitary context,hadseriouspoliticalimplications,and,inthefinalanalysis,itwasin thepoliticalarenathattheoffensivehaditsgreatestimpact. Thisguideismeanttoprovideinformationandresourcesforfurtherstudy ofthe1968TetOffensive.Itisnotmeanttobeanexhaustivediscussionofthe entire war and associated resources for its study; for that, readers should see The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War by David L. Anderson (Columbia UniversityPress,2002).ThisguidefocusesontheeventsleadinguptotheTet Offensive, the conduct of the offensive itself, and its aftermath. It also seeks todiscussthevarioustactical,operational,andstrategicinterpretationsofthe offensiveandtheeventsthattookplaceinitsaftermath. The guide is divided into six major parts. It begins by providing a list of abbreviations and a set of maps as ready references for the reader to use in the rest of the guide. Part I is a historical overview of the Tet Offensive that addressesthepreludetotheoffensive,theoffensiveitself(includingthebattles ofSaigonandHue),thesiegeofKheSanh,andanassessmentoftheoutcomes oftheoffensive.PartIIexaminesanumberofissuesandinterpretationsofthe main themes and questions that arose from the Tet Offensive; the objective ofthispartoftheguideistopresentthemajorhistoriographicalthreadswith regardtothemorecontentiousaspectsoftheoffensiveanditsaftermath.Part IIIprovidesachronologyofactionleadinguptotheoffensive,thekeyevents of the offensive itself, and the events that followed in the wake of the offensive.PartIVisashortencyclopediaofkeypeople,places,andevents.PartV presents a collection of excerpts from historical documents pertaining to the TetOffensive.PartVIisanannotatedlistingofresourcesforstudyingtheTet Offensive,arrangedtopically. Ihopethatthisvolumewillprovideausefuloverviewandaguideforfurther studytoprovideeducators,students,andanyotherreadersareadyreferenceto aidintheunderstandingofthiscrucialeventinAmericanhistory.
1.RepublicofVietnamCorpsTacticalZones
2.KheSanh
3.TheTetOffensive,1968
4.TheAssaultonSaigon
5.TheAttackonBienHoa-LongBinh
6.TheAttackonHue
a b b r ev i a t i o n s
xxvi Abbreviations
AAA AAR AFB AID AO APC ARVN CAP CBU CG CIA CICV CIDG CINCPAC CJCS COMUSMACV nam CORDS COSVN CP CTZ DCG DIA DMZ DOD DRV FFV FSB GVN HES JCS JGS KSCB KIA LAW LZ MACV MAF MIA MP NLF
antiaircraftartillery afteractionreport U.S.AirForcebase AgencyforInternationalDevelopment areaofoperation armoredpersonnelcarrier ArmyoftheRepublicofVietnam CombinedActionProgram clusterbombunit CommandingGeneral CentralIntelligenceAgency CombinedIntelligenceCenterVietnam CivilianIrregularDefenseGroup Commander-in-Chief,Pacific Chairman,JointChiefsofStaff Commander,U.S.MilitaryAssistanceCommand,VietCivilOperationsandRevolutionaryDevelopmentSupport CentralOfficeforSouthVietnam commandpost CorpsTacticalZone DeputyCommandingGeneral DefenseIntelligenceAgency DemilitarizedZone DepartmentofDefense DemocraticRepublicof(North)Vietnam FieldForceVietnam firesupportbase Governmentof(South)Vietnam HamletEvaluationSystem U.S.JointChiefsofStaff SouthVietnameseJointGeneralStaff KheSanhCombatBase killedinaction lightantitankweapon landingzone MilitaryAssistanceCommand,Vietnam MarineAmphibiousForce missinginaction militarypolice NationalLiberationFront
Abbreviations xxvii
NSC NVA OB OPLAN PAVN PF PLAF POW PRG PSA PSDF RD RF/PF ROK RPG RVN RVNAF SAC SAM SEATO TOC USAID USARV VC VCI VNAF VNMC VNN WIA
NationalSecurityCouncil NorthVietnameseArmy OrderofBattle operationsplan People’sArmyof(North)Vietnam PopularForces People’sLiberationArmedForces prisonerofwar ProvisionalRevolutionaryGovernment ProvinceSeniorAdviser People’sSelf-DefenseForce RevolutionaryDevelopment RegionalForces/PopularForces RepublicofKorea rocket-propelledgrenade Republicof(South)Vietnam RepublicofVietnamArmedForces StrategicAirCommand surface-to-airmissile SoutheastAsiaTreatyOrganization tacticaloperationscenter U.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment U.S.Army,Vietnam VietCong VietCongInfrastructure RepublicofVietnamAirForce RepublicofVietnamMarineCorps RepublicofVietnamNavy woundedinaction
TheTetOffensive
parti HistoricalOverview
Chapter1
p r el u d e
On March 8, 1965, elements of the U.S. 9th Marine Expeditionary Force cameashoreinVietnamatDaNang,initiallytoprovidesecurityfortheU.S. air base there. A month later, President Lyndon Johnson authorized the use of U.S. ground troops for offensive combat operations in Vietnam. These events marked a significant change in U.S. involvement in the ongoing war between the South Vietnamese government in Saigon and the Viet Cong (VC).1TheAmericangoalinSoutheastAsiawastoinsureafree,independent, and prosperous South Vietnam. However, the Saigon government was losing thebattletotheVietCong,andthingsworsenedwhenHanoibegantosend NorthVietnamesesoldiersdowntheHoChiMinhTrailintoSouthVietnam. Heretofore,U.S.forceshadbeensupportingtheSaigongovernmentwithadvisersandairsupport,butthatapproachhadprovedinadequateinattemptingto halttheCommunists.WiththearrivaloftheMarines,amassiveU.S.buildup ensued;bytheendoftheyear,184,300AmericantroopswereinVietnam.This numberwouldrapidlyincreaseuntilthereweremorethan485,000incountry bytheendof1967. ThedifficultyinachievingU.S.goalsinVietnamwasthatitwasapolitical problemaswellasamilitaryone.ThekeytomakingsurethatSouthVietnam wonthewaragainsttheCommunistinsurgentswastowintheheartsandminds of the South Vietnamese people. To do this, the people had to believe that
4 h i sto r i ca l o ve r vi e w
thegovernmentinSaigonwasresponsivetotheirneeds.Thisproveddifficult owingtotheinstabilityofthatgovernment.Withthearrivaloflargenumber ofAmericancombattroopsinSouthVietnam,theU.S.effortshiftedinfocus frominsuringaviablegovernmentinSaigontoconductingmilitaryoperations todestroytheCommunistsonthebattlefield,essentiallyamilitaryanswertoa politicalproblem. Eventually, U.S. ground troops were deployed in all four corps tactical zones(seeMap1)andactivelyconductedcombatoperationsagainsttheViet CongandtheirNorthVietnamesecounterparts,thePeople’sArmyofVietnam (PAVN).2OneofthefirstmajorbattlesbetweenU.S.forcesandPAVNtroops occurredinNovember1965intheBattleoftheIaDrangValleyintheCentral Highlands. Over the next two years, U.S. forces under General William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV),conductedmanylarge-scaleoperationsdesignedtofindanddestroy VCandPAVNforcesinawarofattritionmeanttoweardowntheenemyby killingordisablingsomanyofitssoldiersthatitswilltoresistwouldbebroken. As Westmoreland prosecuted the war of attrition, Hanoi ordered more PAVNsoldiersdowntheHoChiMinhTrailtojointheforcesoftheNational LiberationFront(NLF)intheirfightagainsttheSouthVietnamesetroopsand their American allies. The United States hoped that the continued bombing ofNorthVietnamandthetrailmighteventuallypersuadetheCommuniststo calloffthewar.However,bylate1967,thebombingseemedtobehavinglittle effect,andheavyfightingcontinuedtorageinthesouth. TheCommunistsadoptedastrategyofprotractedwardesignedtoexhaust America’s determination to continue its commitment to South Vietnam. GeneralVoNguyenGiap,theNorthVietnamesedefenseminister,wasconfidentthatCommunistpersistencewouldeventuallyoutlastAmericanpatience and willingness to sacrifice, much as the Viet Minh had done against the FrenchintheFirstIndochinaWar. InSouthVietnam,AmericantroopsworkedwiththeArmyoftheRepublic of Vietnam (ARVN) to secure the countryside and drive out the Viet Cong andPAVN.InJanuary1967,AmericanandARVNforcesattackedintoanarea knownastheIronTrianglenorthofSaigon,aregionthathadlongbeenconsideredakeyCommunistsanctuary.Initially,thisoperation,calledCedarFalls, was successful, and the Viet Cong withdrew from previously safe base areas closetoSaigon.FromFebruarytoMay1967,thealliesconductedOperation Junction City, the largest combat operation to that point in the war. During thecourseofthisoperation,whichwasconductedinWarZoneCnorthwest ofSaigon,U.S.forcesshatteredthebetterpartofthreeVCregiments,butthe restoftheVCandPAVNforcesintheareawithdrewtothesanctuaryoftheir basesinCambodia.
Prelude 5
Althoughlarge-scalealliedsearchanddestroyoperationsconductedthroughoutthe1966–67dryseasonsuchasCedarFallsandJunctionCitydidnotresult in the total destruction of PAVN and VC units, they severely disrupted the Communist logistics system and forced the enemy to move its installations andsupplieswestintosanctuariesinCambodia.Thecombinationofdisrupted logisticsandincreasingcasualtiescausedmanyVCandPAVNsoldierstofeel thattheendofthewarwasnotyetinsight,andthisresultedinadeclinein the morale and combat capability of some Communist units.3 Nevertheless, Communistforcescontinuedtoconducteffectivecombatoperationsfromtheir Cambodiansanctuariesandeventuallyreoccupiedtheareasthattheyhadfled inthefaceoftheearlieralliedsweeps. Although some headway was being made militarily, the problem was not purely military in nature. Concurrent with the fighting, there was a significant allied effort to pacify the countryside and spread the control and influence of theSaigongovernment.Bytheendof1967,officialU.S.estimatesindicatedthat 67 percent of the South Vietnamese population was living under government control.4However,thisnumberwassubjecttoseriousquestion;a1967Hamlet EvaluationSystem(HES)reportfoundinthePentagonPapersadmitted“thatto alargeextent,theVCnowcontrolthecountryside.”5 Bythemiddleof1967,thewarinVietnamhaddegeneratedintoabloody stalemate.U.S.andSouthVietnameseoperationshadinflictedheavycasualties anddisruptedCommunistoperations,butHanoicontinuedtoinfiltratetroops intoSouthVietnam,andtheVietCongstillcontrolledthecountrysideinmany areasinthesouth.BoththeAmericansandtheNorthVietnamesehadvastly increasedtheircommitmenttothebattlefield,butneithersidecoulddefeatthe other.AstheUnitedStatespouredmoretroopsandfirepowerintothestruggle, theCommunistleadershipinHanoibegantodebatehowtoregaintheinitiativeinSouthVietnam.AccordingtohistorianWilliamJ.Duiker,thepartyleadersacknowledgedthattotalmilitaryvictoryoverthecombinedU.S.andARVN forceswasimprobable,buttheywereconvincedthatifseverereversescouldbe inflictedontheenemy’smilitaryforces,theUnitedStateswouldbecompelled towithdrawfromSouthVietnam.6
AMERICANPUBLICOPINION In the United States, the slow progress in the war and numerous revelations about the government’s lack of candor about the conflict combined to erode public support for the Johnson administration’s handling of the war and to bolsteragrowingantiwarmovement.Newspapers,magazines,andthenightly televisionnewsbroughtthewarhometoAmerica.Thetollofthefightingin
6 h i sto r i ca l o ve r vi e w
Vietnamwasmounting;thetotalcasualties—dead,wounded,andmissingin action—had grown from 2,500 in 1965 and would top 80,000 by the end of 1967.Scenesofthebloodshedanddevastationresultingfromthebitterfighting convinced increasing numbers of Americans that the price of U.S. commitmentinVietnamwastoohigh.Thewarwasalsoaggravatingsocialdiscontent at home. One leading critic, Martin Luther King Jr., criticized the Johnson administrationforthecostofthewarandtheeffectitwashavingontheability andwillingnessofthegovernmenttoredresssocialillssuchasinequalityand povertyathomeintheUnitedStates. The American people began to mistrust the White House, which, many believed, was not telling them the truth about the real situation in Vietnam. Whilethereporterscoveringthewarwerewritingthatithadreachedastalemate,PresidentJohnsonandhisadviserswerestillpubliclysayingthatthewar couldbewon. Polls were showing that Americans, who at first had supported the president, were now beginning to turn against him. By June 1967, fully two-thirds ofAmericanssaidtheyhadlostfaithinPresidentJohnson’sabilitytoleadthe country.ApublicopinionpollinSeptember1967showedforthefirsttimethat moreAmericansopposedthewarthansupportedit.7Atthesametime,Johnson’s popularityhaddroppedtobelow40percent,anewlowforhisterminoffice. Antiwarprotestshadgrowninsizeandviolenceandgarneredconsiderable mediacoverage.InOctober1967,anestimated100,000demonstratorsmarched on the Pentagon. The American public was becoming increasingly polarized overthewar.Eventhosewhosupportedthewareffortwerebecomingdissatisfied with Johnson’s handling of the war and his inability to craft a winning strategy.Thepresident,sensingthathispublicsupporthadbeenshakenbythe clamoroftheantiwarfactionandfacingreelectionin1968,couldillignorethe growingrestlessnessoftheelectorate.
PUBLICRELATIONS AND WESTMORELAND’SOPTIMISM Concernedaboutpublicopinionandwantingtoshowthatprogresswasbeing madeinthewar,JohnsonorderedamediablitztoreassuretheAmericanpeople andbolstersupportforhiswarpolicies.Inwhatbecameknownasthe“Success Campaign,” administration officials took every opportunity to try to repudiate the perception that there was a stalemate on the battlefield in Vietnam and repeatedlystressedthatprogresswasbeingmade. InNovember1967,thepresidentcalledWestmorelandhomefromVietnam to make the administration’s case to the American public. Stepping off the
Prelude 7
plane in Washington, an optimistic Westmoreland told reporters, “I have neverbeenmoreencouragedinthefouryearsthatIhavebeeninVietnam. Wearemakingrealprogress.”8ThenextdayhetoldreportersthattheSouth Vietnamese Army would be able to assume increasing responsibility for the fighting,andthatthe“phaseout”ofU.S.involvementinVietnamcouldbegin within two years. On November 21, in a speech before the National Press Club, Westmoreland asserted, “We have reached an important point when theendbecomestocomeintoview.Iamabsolutelycertainthat,whereasin 1965theenemywaswinning,todayheiscertainlylosing.Theenemy’shopes arebankrupt.”HeassuredthereportersandtheAmericanpublicthatvictory “lieswithinourgrasp.”9Forthetimebeing,Westmoreland’scommentshelped calmarestiveAmericanpublic.Hisoptimisticpredictionswouldsooncome backtohaunthim.
TROOPDISPOSITION By the end of 1967, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) numberedabout350,000regularsintheArmy,Navy,AirForce,andMarineCorps. The South Vietnamese ground forces included eleven army divisions and threemarinebrigades.About12,000Americanadviserswhoservedasliaison, operations,andlogisticsspecialistsaccompaniedtheseforces.The151,000-man RegionalForcesandthe149,000-manPopularForces,whichweretheequivalentofprovincialandlocalmilitia,augmentedtheregulargroundforces. Thealliedforcesalsoincludedabout42,000menwhoformedtheCivilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). These troops, mostly Montagnard tribesmen,weretrainedandledbyAmericanandVietnameseSpecialForces.They normally manned the outposts along the borders with Laos and Cambodia. ThisputthemsquarelyinthewayofCommunisttroopsinfiltratingacrossthe borderfromsanctuariesandbasecampsinthosecountries. Therewasalsoa70,000-mannationalpoliceforcethatwouldbeforcedto playacombatroleoncethebattleforthecitiesstartedin1968.Thiswasnota roleforwhichthepolicemenhadbeentrained,andtheywereillpreparedfor thesituationthatwouldconfrontthemwhentheTetOffensivebegan. U.S.forcesatthebeginningof1968includedninedivisions,onearmored cavalryregiment,andtwoindependentlightinfantrybrigades.Thisforcehad one hundred infantry and mechanized battalions numbering 331,000 Army soldiers and 78,000 Marines. The total American military strength reached 486,000bytheendof1967. Takentogether,theU.S.andSouthVietnameseforcesincluded278maneuverbattalions,28tacticalfightersquadrons,and3,000helicopters.10Inaddition,
8 h i sto r i ca l o ve r vi e w
thealliedforcesweresupportedby1,200monthlyB-52sortiesandavastarray ofartilleryandlogisticalsupportunits. JoiningtheU.S.andSouthVietnameseforceswerealsotroopsfromseveral other countries, who were providing military support to Saigon. These were collectivelyknownastheFreeWorldMilitaryForcesandincludedtroopsfrom Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, who foughtalongsideU.S.andSouthVietnamesesoldiers. Facing the Americans, South Vietnamese, and their allies was a formidable combination of PAVN and Viet Cong troops. There were two types of forces withintheVietCong:mainforceunitsthatbyearly1968numberedaboutsixty thousand soldiers organized into regular combat units, and the paramilitary or guerrillaforces.Mainforceunitsengagedinfull-scalecombatandwereusually madeupofhighlymotivated,skilledfighterswhowereadeptatambushes,theuse ofmortarsandrockets,andcoordinatedattacksonallieddefensivepositions. The paramilitary forces of the Viet Cong included regional, or territorial, guerrillas and local guerrillas. They provided logistical support, scouts, and guidesandengagedinlocalhit-and-runtacticssuchasstagingambushesand layingmines.MACVestimatedinOctober1967thattherewerenearly250,000 VietCongmainforceandparamilitaryforcesoperatinginSouthVietnam.11 Whenthewarbegan,theVietCongguerrillasdidmostofthefightingand receivedonlylimitedsupportfromtheNorthVietnameseregulars.However,as thewarintensified,increasingnumbersofPAVNtroopstraveleddowntheHo ChiMinhTrailtojointhefightinginthesouth,servingasfillersinVCunits. ThefirstPAVNunitshadcomedownthetrailin1964.Byearly1968,American intelligenceanalystshadidentifiedsevenNorthVietnamesedivisions,totaling aboutfifty-fivethousandsoldiers,inthesouth.Americanintelligenceestimated thatatthetimeoftheoffensive,abouthalfofthe197main-forceenemybattalionsinthesouthwerePAVNregulars.12 ThePAVNwasaformidableforceorganizedintodivisions,regiments,battalions,andcompanies.ThesewerearmedwithmodernSovietandChineseweapons.Theyweresupportedbymortars,artillery,rocketlaunchers,and,by1968, tanks.ThePAVNsoldiers,manyofwhomsportedtattoosthatproclaimed,“Born intheNorth,todieintheSouth,”werewelltrainedandhighlymotivated.
THECOMMUNISTDECISION TO CONDUCTTHEOFFENSIVE AsPresidentJohnsonandhisadviserswrestledwithhowtoproceedwiththe war, the Communists were having discussions of their own. According to WilliamJ.Duiker,theCommunistshadearlierdecidedona“decisivevictory
Prelude 9
in a relatively short period of time,” which was confirmed by the Thirteenth Plenuminlate1966.13Thisledtoanaggressivebattlefieldstrategythatachieved onlylimitedresults.Bymid-1967,thepartyleadersinHanoidecidedthatsomethinghadtobedonetobreakthebloodystalemateinthesouth.However,there followedacontentiousdebateinthePolitburoabouthowbesttodothis.Bythis time,LeDuan,aonetimeorganizeroftheresistanceinthesouthandby1967 secretary-generaloftheLaoDongParty,hadbecomecriticaloftheprotracted war strategy. The war was not going as well as the Communists had hoped, chiefly because the commitment of American troops had inhibited PAVN infiltrationandimposedheavycasualties.ToLeDuan,theaggressiveAmerican tacticsduringtheearlypartof1967didnotbodewellforthesuccessfulcontinuationofaprotractedapproachtowardprosecutingthewar.However,two areasofpotentialalliedweaknesshademerged.TheARVNstillhadsignificant problems, and U.S. public opinion had begun to waiver in its support of the Americanwareffort.Forthesereasons,LeDuanadvocatedamoreaggressive strategy to conclude the war by destroying U.S. confidence and spreading Communistcontrolandinfluenceinthecountryside. Le Duan was not alone. Chief among those who agreed with him was General Nguyen Chi Thanh, head of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), which had been initially established in 1951 as the Communist militaryheadquartersinSouthVietnam.Thanhalsowantedtopursueamore aggressive strategy. He called for a massive attack against the cities of South Vietnamusinglocalguerrillas,mainforceVC,andPAVNregulars.Thiswould betheadventofthethird,andfinal,stageoftherevolutionarystruggle—what CommunistdoctrinetermedtheGeneralOffensive,GeneralUprising. Le Duan and Thanh found other supporters in the Politburo, who were also unhappy with the stalemate in the south. One Communist general later describedthesituation,saying,“Inthespringof1967Westmorelandbeganhis secondcampaign.Itwasveryfierce.Certainofourpeoplewereverydiscouraged.Therewasmuchdiscussionofthewar—shouldwecontinuemain-force efforts,orshouldwepullbackintoamorelocalstrategy.Butbythemiddleof 1967weconcludedthatyou[theAmericansandSouthVietnamese]hadnot reversedthebalanceofforcesonthebattlefield.Sowedecidedtocarryoutone decisivebattletoforceLBJtode-escalatethewar.”14 NoteveryoneagreedwithLeDuanandThanh.Somehistoriansandother observers, one of whom described the offensive as “Giap’s Dream,” ascribe thegenesisoftheplantoHanoi’sdefenseminister.15However,Giapactually opposedtheproposedescalation,becausehethoughtthatamajoroffensivein 1968wouldbeprematureandlikelytofailagainstanenemywithvastlysuperiormobilityandfirepower.16Longthechiefproponentofprotractedguerrilla operations against allied communication and supply lines in the south, Giap
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fearedthatiftheoffensivefailed,therevolutionwouldbesetbackyears.Giap andThanhhadbeenlongtimerivalsforcontroloftheCommunists’military strategy in the south. Thanh charged Giap with being old-fashioned, with “a methodofviewingthingsthatisdetachedfromreality,”insistingthatGiapand hisfollowerslookedforanswers“inbooks,and[by]mechanicallycopyingone’s pastexperiencesortheexperiencesofforeigncountries...inaccordancewith adogmatictendency.”17 In the end, Le Duan and Nguyen Chi Thanh won the argument. After lengthy deliberation, the 13th Plenum of April 1967 passed Resolution 13, whichcalledfora“spontaneousuprisinginordertowinadecisivevictoryin theshortestpossibletime.”18ThiswasablowforGiapandhistheoryofprotractedwar.However,onJuly6,1967,Thanhdiedsuddenly.Thecauseofdeath remainsunknown;accordingtoGiap’sbiographer,CecilCurrey,Thanhfellill frompneumonia,waswoundedbybombfragments,orsufferedaheartattack while on duty in his COSVN tactical operations center.19 Despite Thanh’s death,theCentralCommitteedirectedthatplanningforthegeneraloffensive continue. The responsibility for planning and directing the campaign fell to Giap.Althoughhestillthoughttheoffensivewasilladvised,Giapswallowed hisobjectionsandreluctantlybegantoputtheplantogether,warningagainst expectingquickvictory.20 It was decided that the offensive would be launched in early 1968 during Vietnam’s Tet holiday, which marks the start of the lunar new year. Tet is a timenotonlyofrevelrycelebratedwithfeastsandfireworks,butalsoofworship atthefamilyaltarforreveredancestors.Forseveraldaystheentirecountryside isonthemoveaspeoplevisittheirancestralhomes,andallbusiness,eventhe businessofwar,comestoahalt.Before1968,bothsidesinthewarhadobserved Tetcease-firesovertheholiday.Therefore,theNorthVietnamesereasonedthat halftheSouthVietnamesearmyandnationalpolicewouldbeonleavewhen TetbeganandSaigonwouldbeunpreparedforacountrywideattack.
THEPLAN TheplanfortheTetMauThan(NewYearoftheMonkey)1968offensivewas finalizedinlatesummerof1967.NorthVietnamesediplomatsfromaroundthe world were called to Hanoi for consultation in July to discuss the upcoming offensive.Thisshouldhavebeenthefirstindicationtoalliedintelligencethat something significant was in the offing, but most allied analysts believed the meeting’spurposewastoconsiderapeacebid. The Tet campaign was designed to break the stalemate and achieve three objectives:provokeageneraluprisingamongthepeopleinthesouth,shatter
Prelude 11
the South Vietnamese armed forces, and convince the Americans that the war was unwinnable. According to William J. Duiker, “Hanoi was counting on the combined offensive and uprising to weaken the political and military foundationsoftheSaigonregimeandtotriggerashiftinpolicyintheUnited States.”21 To accomplish this, the offensive would target South Vietnamese urbancenters. Dubbed Tong Cong Kich–Tong Khoi Nghia (General Offensive–General UprisingorTCK-TKN),theplan,usingsecrecyandsurprise,calledforaseries ofsimultaneousattacksagainstAmericanbasesandSouthVietnamesecities.22 GiapspecificallytargetedpreviouslyuntouchedurbancenterssuchasSaigon inthesouth,NhaTrangandQuiNhonincentralSouthVietnam,aswellas QuangNgaiandHueinthenorthernpartofthecountry. Ultimately,Giap’splanwaspredicatedonfourassumptions.First,theARVN wouldnotfightwhenstruckahardblow.Second,theSaigongovernmenthad no support among the South Vietnamese people, who would rise up against PresidentThieuifgiventheopportunity.Third,boththepeopleandthearmed forces of South Vietnam despised the Americans and would turn on them if giventhechance.Fourth,thetacticalsituationatKheSanhin1967paralleled thatofDienBienPhuin1954. With these assumptions in mind, Giap devised a three-pronged military offensive.However,inthemindofGiap,thisoffensivewasanotherstepinthe long process of dau tranh, “the struggle.”23 He later explained his campaign inaninterviewwithjournalistStanleyKarnow:“Forus,youknow,thereisno suchthingasasinglestrategy.Oursisalwaysasynthesis,simultaneouslymilitary, political, and diplomatic—which is why, quite clearly, the Tet offensive hadmultipleobjectives.”24ForGiap,warwaspoliticalaswellasmilitary,and herecognizedthatthelatteronlyservedtopromotetheformer. According to General Tran Van Tra, commander of Communist forces in thesouthfrom1963to1975,theobjectivesofTCK-TKNwere“tobreakdown anddestroythebulkofthepuppet[SouthVietnamese]troops,topplethepuppet administration at all levels, and take power into the hands of the people; todestroythemajorpartoftheU.S.forcesandtheirwarmateriel,andrender them unable to fulfill their political and military duties in Vietnam; and to breaktheU.S.willofaggression,forceittoacceptdefeatintheSouthandput anendtoallactsofwaragainsttheNorth.”25Aspartofthedesiretobreakthe American will, the Communists hoped to convince the United States to end thebombingofthenorthandbeginnegotiationstoendthewar.26Itisagainst theseobjectives,notjustthegenerallyacceptedmilitaryaims,thattheoffensive mustbeanalyzed. Giap’s plan called for a preparatory phase that would be conducted from SeptembertoDecember1967.Duringthisperiod,PAVNforceswouldlaunch
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attacks in the remote outlying regions along South Vietnam’s borders with CambodiaandLaos.Thepurposeoftheseoperations,whichwereessentiallya grandfeint,wouldbetodrawU.S.forcesawayfromthepopulatedareas.This wouldleavethecitiesandtownsuncovered.Thisphasewouldhavetwoother objectives.ThefirstwastoprovideopportunitiesforGiap’stroopstohonetheir fighting skills, and the other was to increase American casualties. As part of thispreparatoryphase,mainforcedivisionswouldbegintomoveintoposition aroundKheSanh,anoutpostalongtheLaotianbordermannedbyonlyasingle U.S.Marineregiment. AlthoughthereissomedisagreementamongAmericanscholarsaboutthe phasingoftheactualoffensive,TranVanTraassertedsomeyearsafterthewar thattheplanfortheoffensivecalledforthreedistinctphases.27PhaseI,which wasscheduledtobeginonJanuary31,1968,wasacountrywideassaultonSouth Vietnamesecities,ARVNunits,Americanheadquarters,communicationcenters, and air bases to be carried out primarily by VC main-force units. It was hopedthatthesoutherninsurgentswouldbeabletoinfiltratetheirforcesinto theattackpositionsandtargetareasbeforetheoffensivestarted. Concurrent with this phase would be a massive propaganda campaign aimed at coaxing the southern troops to rally to the Communist side. The objectiveofthiscampaignwastoachievewholesaledefectionsfromtheARVN ranks. At the same time, the North Vietnamese would launch their political offensive, aimed at causing the South Vietnamese people to revolt against the Saigon government. Successful accomplishment of this objective would leave“theAmericanforcesandbasesisolatedislandsinaseaofhostileSouth Vietnamesepeople.”28 Ifthegeneraluprisingdidnotoccurorfailedtoachievetheoverthrowof theSaigongovernment,follow-onoperationswouldbelaunchedinsucceeding monthstoweardowntheenemyandleadeithertovictoryortoanegotiated settlement.29AccordingtoTra,PhaseIIoftheoffensivebeganonMay5,and PhaseIIIbeganonAugust17andendedonSeptember23,1968.30Itisclearthat toHanoiandtheNLF,theTetOffensive,whichisusuallyseentocoveramuch shorter period by many American historians, was a more prolonged offensive thatlastedbeyondtheactionimmediatelyfollowingtheTetholiday. All of this was unknown to Westmoreland and his intelligence officers at MACV, who thought the sequel to the Tet attacks would be a big set-piece battledesignedtodefeatAmericanforcesdecisively,inmuchthesamewaythat theFrenchhadbeendefeatedatDienBienPhu,whichhadprecipitatedtheir withdrawalfromVietnam.Thisperceptionwouldprovecriticalasintelligence reportsinlater1967andearly1968indicatedthattheCommunistswereplanning something big. As these reports increased in frequency, Westmoreland would becomeconvincedthattheultimatetargetoftheoffensivewasKheSanh.
Prelude 13
PREPARINGFORTHEOFFENSIVE Preparations for the attack began immediately after the decision to launch theoffensivewasmade.Giapmasterfullydirectedanintensivelogisticaleffort focused on a massive buildup of troops and equipment in the south. Men and arms began pouring into South Vietnam from staging areas in Laos and Cambodia. New Russian-made AK-47 assault rifles, B-40 and 122mm rockets, andlargeamountsofotherwarmaterielweremovedsouthalongtheHoChi MinhTrailbybicycle,oxcart,andtruck. As the PAVN troops infiltrated into the south, VC units were alerted and began preparing for the coming offensive. Guerrilla forces were reorganized into the configuration that would later be employed in attacking the cities and towns. Replacements arrived to round out understrength units. The new weaponsandequipmentthathadjustarrivedwereissuedtothetroops.Food, medicine, ammunition, and other critical supplies were stockpiled. In areas closeenoughtothecitiestopermitrapiddeploymentbutfarenoughawayto preclude detection, VC units conducted intense training for the upcoming combatoperations.Sometraininginstreetfightingwasconductedforspecial sapperunits,butthiswaslimitedinordertomaintainsecrecy.Reconnaissance was conducted of routes to objective areas and targets. Meanwhile, political officers conducted chin huan, or reorientation, sessions where they indoctrinated the troops, proclaiming that the final goal was within their grasp and exhorting them to prepare themselves for the decisive battle to achieve total victoryagainstSaigonanditsAmericanallies. Toachievetacticalsurprise,whichGiapconsideredessentialforsuccess,the NorthVietnameseinstitutedatwo-partplanofdeceptiontocoverpreparations fortheoffensive.Thefirstrevolvedaroundpassivemeasures,whichprimarily reliedonsecrecytoconcealpreparationsfortheoffensive.Operationalplans fortheoffensivewerekeptstrictlyconfidentialanddisseminatedtoeachsubordinatelevelonlyasrequirementsdictated.Althoughtheexecutivemembers ofCOSVNknewoftheplansometimeinmid-1967,itwasnotuntilthefall that the complete plan was disseminated to high-ranking enemy officials of the Saigon–Cholon–Gia Dinh Special Zone, one of the main target areas of the offensive.31 Although this secrecy was necessary for operational security, it would add to the customary fog and friction of war once the offensive was launched and have a significant effect on the outcome of the fighting at the tacticallevel. TheotherpartofHanoi’sdeceptionplanemployeddiplomaticmaneuvers toobscuretheongoingpreparationsfortheoffensive.OnDecember31,1967, North Vietnam’s minister of foreign affairs declared that if the United States unconditionally ceased its bombings, North Vietnam would be prepared to
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enterintonegotiations.Thisofferhadseveralobjectives.First,it“putasmokescreen”onHanoi’spreparationsforthegeneraloffensivetomisdirecttheattentionofAmericanauthorities.32Second,itwasmeanttodriveawedgebetween theAmericansandtheSouthVietnamese,whodidnotwantpeacetalksofany kind. Last, if the U.S. government agreed to a cessation of bombing, Hanoi could speed up infiltration movements into South Vietnam during the dry seasonintimefortheoffensive. Communistagentsalsoapproachedprominentrepresentativesofthepolitical opposition in the south in an attempt to sow political dissent against the Saigongovernment.Atthesametime,theNationalLiberationFrontinitiateda newpropagandaeffortthrough“LiberationRadio”towinmoreconvertstothe revolution.TheCommunisthopedtheseactionswoulddampensupportforthe Saigongovernmentandsparkapopularuprising,orkhoinghia.33 TheTetOffensivethusreallybeganin1967withthepreparatoryphasethat includedthediversionaryattacksontheoutlyingareasinSouthVietnam.The bitterfightingthatresultedwouldsetthestagefortheTetOffensivethatbegan inJanuary1968andlastedintothefallofthatyear.
Chapter2
bo rd er ba t t l es , h i l l f i g ht s , a n d k he s a n h
During the fall of 1967, the PAVN began to attack allied positions in the northernpartofSouthVietnam,alongtheCambodianborder,andjustsouth oftheDMZ.Theseoperationsservedthreepurposes.Theyweredesignedto drawtheAmericantroopsawayfromthepopulatedareas.1Theyprovidedan opportunitytorehearsecoordinatedoperationsbetweentroopsofthePeople’s ArmyofVietnam(PAVN)andVietCong(VC)guerrillas.Andtheyservedto screentheinfiltrationoftroopsandequipmentintoSouthVietnamfromLaos andCambodiabeforeTet. Interpreting these moves as an effort to gain control of the northern provinces, General William Westmoreland retaliated with massive bombing raids targetedagainstsuspectedPAVNtroopconcentrations.HealsosentreinforcementstothenorthernandborderareastohelpdrivebackPAVNattacksatCon Thien,LocNinh,SongBe,andDakTo.TheattackonDakTointheIICorps areainNovember1967wasthelastofaseriesof“borderbattles”thatbegantwo monthsearlierwiththesiegeofConThienintheICorpsareaandcontinued inOctoberwithattacksonSongBeandLocNinhintheIIICorpsarea.2 Con Thien was a barren Marine outpost situated ten miles northwest of DongHaonthetopofHill158,overlookingthedemilitarizedzone(DMZ).It wastheeasternmostanchorofalineofoutpoststhatextendedwesttoCamp Carroll and Khe Sanh, which were meant to provide a shield to protect the
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two northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien.3 The outpost at Con Thien,occupiedbyabattalionofMarines,cameundergroundattackinJuly 1967byPAVNforcesoperatingoutofthesupposedlyneutralDMZ.Thebase wasalsothetargetofconstantandintenseartillerypoundingfromanestimated 130 PAVN artillery pieces emplaced in well-fortified firing positions north of theBenHaiRiver,whichbisectedthefive-mile-widebufferzone.TheMarine defendersconductedanumberofspoilingattacksinJulyandAugust,turning backseveralPAVNattemptstotakethebase. In September, elements of a PAVN division made a concerted effort to captureConThien,butonceagaintheMarinesprevailed.Failingtotakethe basebygroundattack,theCommunistsincreasedtheirartillerybombardment ofthebase.TheshellingreacheditspeakduringtheweekofSeptember19–27, whenmorethanthreethousandmortar,artillery,androcketroundsstruckthe Marine outpost. In response, Marine and army artillery, naval gunfire, and massiveairstrikes,including790B-52sorties,inflictedheavycasualtiesonthe PAVN attackers. By October 31, the Marines had held, and the siege of Con Thienwasover. The Communists followed the attack on Con Thien with new attacks alongtheborderswithLaosandCambodia.OnOctober27,aPAVNregiment attacked the command post of a South Vietnamese battalion at Song Be in PhuocLongprovinceneartheCambodianborderintheIIICorpsarea.With theaidofairsupport,theARVNsoldiersrepulsedseveralPAVNattacks. Twodayslater,aVCregimentattackedanotherSouthVietnameseoutpost atLocNinh,asmallrubberplantationtownontheCambodianborderinBinh Longprovince.TheVietCongpenetratedthedistrictheadquartersperimeter and gained control of about half the compound, but ARVN reinforcements helpeddrivebacktheVietCongafterbitterfighting.Afterthefirstattackwas repelled,anotherVCregimentjoinedthebattle,followedbyelementsoftwo otherPAVNregiments.Thefightingspreadintotheadjacentplantationareas, andabrigadefromtheU.S.1stInfantryDivisionwasinsertedintothebattle. Thecombatwasintenseasbothsidesfoughtdesperatelytoovercometheother inheavyfightingthatragedfromOctober29toNovember2.TheCommunists troopslaunchedrepeatedhumanwaveattacksagainstthealliedpositions,but thedefendersinflictedheavylossesontheattackers.4 TheattackonLocNinhrepresentedthefirsttimethattheCentralOfficefor SouthVietnam(COSVN),theseniorCommunistheadquartersinthesouthern halfofSouthVietnam,hadstagedcoordinatedattacksbylargeunitsfromdifferentdivisions.Itwaslaterdiscoveredthatthisactionwasessentiallyarehearsal intendedtoprovideVCandPAVNforceswithanopportunitytoexperiment with street fighting techniques, as well as to test South Vietnamese reactions anduseoffirepowertorelieveembattledcitiesandpopulationcenters.5
BorderBattles,HillFights,andKheSanh 17
The final “border battle” occurred near a U.S. Special Forces camp near DakTonorthwestofKontuminthemountainousareaalongtheLaotianand Cambodian borders in the Central Highlands. In late October, intelligence indicatedthatfourPAVNmain-forceregimentsweremovingintotheDakTo region. At the time, there was only one American battalion in the area, but Westmoreland quickly sent in reinforcements. By mid-November as PAVN attackindicatorsincreased,therewereatotalofnineU.S.andsixARVNinfantrybattalionsinthearea.Thefirstengagementbetweenthealliedforcesand PAVNtroopseruptedonNovember17,anditwasfollowedbyaseriesofpitched battlesthatrangedoveranareaof190squaremilesandlastedfortwenty-two days.Duringthebitterfighting,threePAVNregimentswereseverelycrippled, suffering an estimated 1,400 soldiers killed, but allied losses were heavy, too. The ARVN lost 73 men, and 289 Americans were killed during the battles aroundDakTo;morethan900Americansoldierswerewounded. TheattacksonConThien,SongBe,LocNinh,andDakTowerepartof the preparatory phase for Giap’s general offensive plan designed to lure U.S. forcesawayfromthecitiesandintoSouthVietnam’speriphery.Inpurelytactical terms, these operations were costly failures, and, although exact numbers arenotknown,theCommunistsnodoubtlostsomeoftheirbesttroops.Not onlydidthealliedforcesexactahightollinenemycasualties,buttheattacks alsofailedtocauseapermanentrelocationofalliedforcestotheborderareas. ThestrategicmobilityoftheAmericanforcespermittedthemtomovetothe borders, turn back the Communist attacks, and redeploy back to the interior in a mobile reserve posture. North Vietnamese Colonel Tran Van Doc later described these border battles as “useless and bloody.”6 Nevertheless, at the operationallevel,theattacksachievedatleastpartofGiap’sintentbydiverting Westmoreland’sattentiontotheoutlyingareasawayfromthebuilduparound theurbantargetareaswhilealsogivingtheNorthVietnameseanopportunity toperfectthetacticsthattheywoulduseintheTetattacks.7
KHESANH U.S. intelligence analysts were puzzled by the Communist moves, which seemedtoinvitemassiveAmericanretaliationfornoapparentpurpose.Asthe fighting intensified in 1967, Westmoreland received reports that PAVN forces weremassingforcestoattacktheMarinebaseatKheSanhinthenorthernI Corpsarea(seeMap2).AmericanSpecialForceshadoriginallysetupthebase in1962,formingCivilianIrregularDefenseGroup(CIDG)companiesamong the Bru Montagnard tribes there to monitor and block activity along the Ho ChiMinhTrail.In1964,theSpecialForcesbuiltanewbase,whichcovered
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anareaofabouttwosquaremiles.Builtaroundanoldmilitarybaseknownas theFrenchFort,itwaslocatedonaplateautwomilesnorthofKheSanhvillage.Northofthefort,anairstriphadbeencarvedfromapieceoflevelground among the hills. Special Forces soldiers built strong cement bunkers for the commandcenteranddefensivepositions. By 1965, the Special Forces had installed mortars and other weapons to defendthebaseagainstthePAVNandVietCongwhowereoperatinginthe area. Nevertheless, the base sustained a major enemy attack on the evening of January 3, 1966, and suffered sixty to seventy casualties among the Special Forces advisers and their Montagnard troops. To strengthen the base, Navy Seabeesimprovedtheairstrip,buildinga1,500-footrunwayofsteelplankingin thesummerof1966. ThefirstMarinesintheareahadcomeinApril1964whenacommunication intelligenceunitarrivedtomonitorVCandNorthVietnameseradiocommunication.WestmorelandvisitedKheSanhforthefirsttimeduringtheperiodof theseearlyintelligence-gatheringoperations. Asthewarexpanded,KheSanhgraduallygrewinimportancefortheU.S. highcommand.Inmid-1966,thePAVNbegantodeploylargenumbersofforces withintheDMZ,inLaos,andinthesouthernpanhandleofNorthVietnam. Giapwantedtoshortenhissupplylinesandmakeinfiltrationfromthenorth harder for the Americans to detect.8 With the increased infiltration of PAVN troops from the north, Westmoreland saw Khe Sanh as the key to preventing theNorthVietnamesefromcarryingthefightintothepopulatedcoastalregions ofnorthernSouthVietnam.Consequently,heorderedabattalionofMarines totheKheSanhareainApril1966.InJanuary1967,theSpecialForcestroops weredisplacedfromtheircampbyelementsofaMarineregiment,whichwas orderedtoassumeoperationalresponsibilityfortheareainApril.TheGreen BeretsmovedtheircampwestwardtotheMontagnardvillageofLangVei. Surroundedbyaseriesofmist-enshrouded,jungle-coveredhills,KheSanh wasoneofaseriesofoutpostsestablishednearthedemilitarizedzoneseparating North and South Vietnam. Located just north of Khe Sanh village some sevenmilesfromtheborderwithLaosandaboutfourteenmilessouthofthe DMZ,KheSanhCombatBase(KSCB)wasakeyelementinthedefenseof ICorpsinSouthVietnam.KheSanheffectivelycontrolledavalleyareathat wasthecrossroadsofenemyinfiltrationroutesfromNorthVietnamandlower Laos,whichprovidednaturalinvasionavenuesofapproachintothetwonorthernprovincesofSouthVietnam.ToWestmoreland,KheSanhwasthenatural blocking position to block this infiltration in order to protect Quang Tri and ThuaThienprovinces.9Thebasealsoservedasatop-secretlaunchsiteforvital SpecialForcesreconnaissancemissionsintoLaosandasanairfieldforreconnaissanceflightsovertheHoChiMinhTrail.Inaddition,Westmorelandhoped
BorderBattles,HillFights,andKheSanh 19
thathemightconvincetheWhiteHouseinthenearfuturetoapprovecombat operationsintoLaostodestroytheNorthVietnamesesupplyroutesandsanctuaries.10Inthatcase,KheSanhwouldserveasanidealbasefortheinvasion. Bytheendofthesummerof1967,KheSanhCombatBasehadbecomethe westernanchorofachainofstrongpointsstretchingfromtheborderwithLaos tothecityofHueintheeastthatweredesignedtothwartanyPAVNinvasion acrosstheDMZ.InadditiontotheMarinesatKSCBandtheSpecialForcesat LangVei,therewasasmallMarineCombinedActionProgramcompanyand aRegionalForcescompanyinthevillageofKheSanh.11 Supported by 175mm guns from two firebases seventeen miles to the east, CampCarrollandtheRockpile,theMarinesbegansendingoutpatrols,which soondiscoveredPAVNbunkers,tunnels,andsupplydepots.Inthemeantime, theMarineengineersworkedonRoute9,repairingbridgesandimprovingthe roadsosuppliescouldbebroughtintothebaseoverland.ThePAVNcontinued tothreatenKheSanh,andafiercebattlebrokeoutonthenightofMarch15, 1967,inwhichthePAVNinflictedheavycasualtiesonaMarinecompany.
THEHILLFIGHTS Thisbattle,alongwiththeothersthatfollowedin1967andinto1968,becamea titanicstrugglebetweenU.S.forcesandtheCommunistforcontrolofthehigh groundintheKheSanharea.Thebaseitselfwassurroundedbyseveralhills that were strategically important to its defense. The most important of these wereHills881North,881South,and861(theirnamesdenotetheirheightin meters),withinsightoftheplateauandoverlookingtheRaoQuanRiver.These hills formed a near-perfect triangle, with Hill 881 North at the apex and the othertwohillsatthebaseofthetriangle.Hill861wasabout5,000meters(3.1 miles)northwestoftheairstrip;Hill881Southwasapproximately3,000meters (1.85miles)westof861and2,000meters(1.25miles)southof881North.Ifthe PAVNoccupiedthesehills,theywouldbeideallyplacedtobombardKheSanh CombatBase,thusmakingaerialreinforcementandresupplyvirtuallyimpossible.BetweenApril28andMay11,1967,inaseriesofhard-foughtengagements known as the “Hill Fights,” two Marine battalions from the Third Marine RegimentwrestedcontrolofallthreekeyterrainfeaturesfromthePAVN,who gaveasgoodastheygotintheheavyfighting. InAugust,theMarinesincreasedtheirpatrollingactivityandextraoutposts wereestablishedonHills558and861A,totheeastandnorthwestof861,respectively,toblocktheRaoQuanvalley.InviewoftheincreasingPAVNactivity in the area, the Marines began an effort to improve the defenses of the base and the hilltop outposts. They began to work on building new fortifications
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andimprovingexistingfightingpositions.Atthesametime,theKheSanhairfieldwasshutdownsotheSeabeescouldmakemuch-neededimprovements, includinglengtheningandstrengtheningtherunway,usingcrushedrockfrom anearbyquarryandothermaterialsprovidedbyparachuteorbyaspeciallowaltitudeextractionsystem.12Whiletheairfieldwasbeingimproved,helicopters andC-7Caribouaircraftthatcouldlandonshortopensegmentsoftherunway suppliedthebase.TheimprovedairfieldwouldreopeninOctobertoC-123and C-130aircraft.Thisairfieldwouldprovecrucialinthecomingsiege. InSeptember,AmericanintelligencereportedthattwobattalionsofPAVN troops, approximately 1,600 men, had moved into the Khe Sanh area. In November,thePAVNbeganmassingforwhatappearedtobeamajorassault. UnderthecommandofthecorpslevelRoute9Front,morethan20,000PAVN regularsbeganconvergingontheKheSanharea. In late November, U.S. intelligence began to receive reports that several PAVN divisions normally located in North Vietnam were beginning to move south.BylateDecemberitwasapparenttoU.S.intelligenceagenciesthattwo ofthesedivisionswereheadedfortheKheSanharea.Oneofthesedivisions,the 304th,wasanelitehome-guarddivisionfromHanoithathadledthestruggle againsttheFrenchduringthe1950sandparticipatedinthedecisiveVietMinh victoryatDienBienPhuin1954.Inadditiontothesetwodivisions,intelligence reportsindicatedthatanotherdivisionandonemoreregimentweremovingto withineasysupportingdistanceofthePAVNtroopsconvergingonKheSanh. ThePAVNbuildupatKheSanhwasnotunwelcomenewstoWestmoreland. For several years, the American commander had hoped to engage the PAVN andVietConginatraditionalset-piecebattleongroundofhischoosinginstead of having to deal with the usual hit-and-run guerrilla campaign where the Communistshadtheinitiative.WestmorelandsawKheSanhasanopportunity tousehisadvantagesagainstGiap’sweaknesses.TheCommunistswouldhave tomasstheirforcestotakeKheSanh,andthatwouldmakethemvulnerable totheoverwhelmingfirepoweratWestmoreland’sdisposal.TheAmericangeneralwasconvincedthatinsuchaconfrontation,superiorU.S.firepowerwould destroytheenemyandperhapswinadecisivebattlethatmightturnthetide ofthewar.13 Already,Westmorelandandhisseniorcommandersbelievedthatthewarwas movingintheirfavor.Theyseemedtobeinflictingheaviercasualtiesonthe VietCong,anditwasalmostimpossibletobelievethatsuperiorAmericantechnologycouldnoteventuallywinavictoryinVietnam.Asaresult,Westmoreland andhisadviserswerenotpreparedforsimultaneousattacksagainstAmerican bases and South Vietnamese cities. They did not believe that the Viet Cong and PAVN had such a powerful military capability, given the casualties that theyhadincurredin1966–67.Ultimately,alliedintelligencehadfailedinits
BorderBattles,HillFights,andKheSanh 21
assessmentofCommuniststrengthsandweaknesses,andWestmorelandandhis staffersbelievedtheirownreportsofprogress,whichwouldonlyaddvelocityto theimpactoftheTetOffensivewhenitfinallycame. OnJanuary1,1968,RadioHanoibroadcastapoemwrittenbyHoChiMinh tomarkthearrivaloftheYearoftheMonkey,whichread: ThisSpringfaroutshinesthepreviousSprings, Oftriumphsthroughoutthelandcomehappytidings. LetNorthandSouthemulateeachotherinfightingtheU.S.aggressors! Forward! Totalvictorywillbeours.14 Thiswasthesignalthatthegeneraloffensivewasabouttobegin.Already, VietCongtroopshadoccupiedattackpositionsand infiltrated the major cities,carryingweaponsthattheywoulduseduringtheoffensive.However,the PAVN and VC forces had not been able to conceal all of their maneuvers fromtheAmericans.JustbeforethebattleatDakTo,acapturedenemydocumentrevealedthattheattackwastobeapreludetoamajorPAVNoffensive inKontumprovince.Otherinterceptedenemyordersanddocumentstoldof impendingattacksonPleikuandBanMeThuot. Although Westmoreland believed the Communists were preparing for a majoroffensive,heremainedconvincedthatthemainbattlewouldbewaged atKheSanh.Healsothoughtthatitwouldbeginsometimebeforeorjustafter theTetlunarnewyear,becausehedidnotbelievethattheCommunistswould violate the holiday itself. Apparently, the American commander and his staff didnotpaymuchattentiontohistory.In1789,theVietnamesehadlaunched anattackduringtheTetholidayagainsttheChinesetroopsoccupyingHanoi, achievingtotalsurpriseandwinningagreatvictorybylaunchingamajorattack whenitwasleastexpected. Even though MACV had some indication of an impending offensive, Westmoreland risked uncovering the populated areas in an effort to take the wartotheenemy,assertingthathehad“nointentionsofsittingbacktowaitthe enemy’smove.”15Inhismind,thebestopportunitytotakeontheCommunists anddefeatthemwasatKheSanh,whereallindicationspointedtowardamajor buildupofenemyforces. AlthoughintelligencereportsindicatedtheCommunistswereplanningan offensiveoperationofsomeundeterminedpurposeforlate1968,Westmoreland concludedthattheVCeffortwasprobablyintendedasadiversiontodistract allied attention from the main attack by PAVN forces that he was convinced wouldcomeatKheSanh.HethoughtthatGiaphopedtoannihilateamajor U.S.forceatKheSanhjustastheVietMinhhaddestroyedtheFrenchgarrison
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atDienBienPhuin1954.TherewereseveralotherreasonswhyWestmoreland focusedonKheSanh.HewasconvincedthatthePAVNattackerswouldstayas closeaspossibletotheirownterritorytoreducetheneedforlongsupplylines. HealsothoughtthatGiapmighttrytocapturetheentirenorthernpartofSouth Vietnamandincorporateitintohisowncountry.
OPERATIONNIAGARA InJanuary1968,thepossibilityofattackloomedlarger.OnthenightofJanuary 2,aMarineadvanceoutposttothewestoftheairfieldatKheSanhspottedsix menwalkingnearthem.WhentheMarinestoldthementostop,theydidnot respond.TheMarinesopenedfire,killingfiveofthemenandwoundingthe sixth.ThispartyturnedouttobeaPAVNregimentalcommanderandhisstaff, whowereapparentlyconductingareconnaissanceoftheMarinepositions.For theseofficerstobeintheareacouldonlymeanthatthePAVNwereplanning amajorassault. TherewereadditionalsignsthattherewasamajorPAVNbuilduparound KheSanhandthesurroundingarea.Marinepatrols discovered fighting positions, widened trails, and even new roads. Additionally, the Special Forces at LangVeireportedthattheywerepickingupsignsofenemymovementeastward duringtheirlong-rangepatrolsacrosstheborderinLaos. For Westmoreland, this was all the proof necessary to confirm his belief that Khe Sanh would be the major battle of the coming Vietnam offensive. TheMACVcommanderhopedthatthePAVNwouldmakeaheavycommitmenttotheassaultthere,afterwhichhewouldhitthemwithoverwhelming U.S. firepower. When the buildup in the Khe Sanh area became apparent, Westmoreland ordered his staff to prepare several contingency plans to deal withthesituation.ThefirstwasknownasOperationCheckers,acontingency planthatcalledfortransferringuptohalfoftheonehundredorsoU.S.combat battalionsinSouthVietnamtothenorthernprovincesifneeded.16Thesecond plancalledforamassiveaerialbombardmenttocountertheincreasingthreat. This plan, called Operation Niagara “to evoke an image of cascading bombs and shells,” was a two-phased operation.17 Phase I was designed to find the PAVNforces.PhaseII,themostconcentratedapplicationofaerialfirepowerin thehistoryofwarfare,woulddestroythem. PhaseIofOperationNiagarabeganinearlyJanuarywithanintensiveintelligenceefforttopinpointPAVNpositionsaroundKheSanh.U.S.AirForce,Navy, andMarineplanestookaerialphotographsoftheKheSanharea,whileelectronicwarfareaircraftlistenedforPAVNradiotraffic.Helicoptersalsobeganto dropsophisticatedsensordevicesontothegroundtodetecttroopmovements.
BorderBattles,HillFights,andKheSanh 23
Thisincludedacousticsensorstopickupvoicesandseismicdevicestorecord vibrationsfrommarchingsoldiersandpassingtrucksandtanks. ForPhaseIIofOperationNiagara,whichwouldbeginoncethePAVN openedtheirattackonKheSanh,Westmorelandassembledanimpressive armadaofmorethantwothousandstrategicand tactical aircraft, ranging from the B-52 Stratofortresses to the propeller-driven South Vietnamese A-1ESkyraiders. AstheMarinesofthe26thRegimentunderthecommandofColonelDavid E.Lowndsmadepreparationsforthecomingbattle,sodidthePAVN,whowere rushingadditionalreinforcementstotheareaaroundKheSanh.18Intelligence reportsindicatedthataPAVNdivisionwastakinguppositionsnorthwestofthe base,whileanotherwasoperatingtothesouthwest.Intotal,Communistforces surroundingKheSanhnumberedabouttwentythousandtroopswhowouldbe opposedbyonlyaboutathirdofthatnumberofMarines.Otherintelligence reportsindicatedthataPAVNregimentwaslocatedinsidetheDMZonlyten tofifteenmilesnorthofKheSanhwhileanotherPAVNdivisionwasbelieved tobenorthoftheRockpile,puttinganadditionaltwelvethousandtofourteen thousandenemysoldierswithineasyreinforcingdistanceoftheenemyunitsin theKheSanharea. As the PAVN forces converged on Khe Sanh, the Marines continued to prepareforthecomingbattle.WhiletheMarinesinsideKheSanhcontinued to dig additional trenches, build new bunkers, and reinforce the perimeter, additionalMarineforceswerepositionedtocontrolthekeyterrainsurrounding thebase.
THESIEGEOFKHESANH BEGINS On17January,aMarinepatrolwasambushedsouthwestof881North.When anotherpatrolwassenttothesameareatwodayslater,itwasalsoambushed. ThePAVN,usingthecoverofmonsoonrainandmist,hadquietlyretaken881 North, giving them a position on the high ground that posed an immediate threattoMarinepositionselsewhere. DuringtheafternoonofJanuary20,aPAVNsoldierappearedunderaflag oftruceatKheSanhandsurrendered.HeturnedouttobeSeniorLieutenant La Thanh Tonc, commander of the 14th Antiaircraft Company of the 325-C Division.ToncrevealedtotheMarinesthattwoPAVNdivisions—hisandthe 304th—werepreparingforanattackonKheSanhthatwouldbeginthatnight withtheinitialassaultagainstHills861and881South.Oncethesehillswere taken, two PAVN regiments would attack Khe Sanh itself from the northeast andsouth.AccordingtoTonc,thepurposeofthecampaignwastogainbargain-
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ingleverageatthenegotiatingtablebyoverrunningtheU.S.basesalongthe DMZandthensubsequentlyliberatingQuangTriProvince.Healsoclaimed thatGiapwasintheareaanddirectingthecampaignpersonally.19 TheMarineswerenotsurewhethertobelieveTonc,buttheywentonalert anyway. Tonc’s predictions were soon borne out when just after midnight on January 21, following a mortar, rocket, and rocket-propelled-grenade barrage, three hundred PAVN soldiers spearheaded by sappers using satchel charges, bangalore torpedoes, and bamboo ladders breached the perimeter wire and attackedHill861.Theyadvancedupthehill,yellingandthrowinggrenades, andquicklypenetratedtheMarinedefensesandcapturedthehelicopterlandingpadinfiercefighting.Withsupportingfirefromadjacenthills,theMarines retookthehillinbrutalhand-to-handcombat. TheattackonHill881SouththatTonchadpredictednevermaterialized; perhapsacombinationofthecasualtiesinflictedbytheMarinesandtheeffect oftheheavyartillerypoundingchangedthePAVNplans. AstheattackonHill861wounddown,thePAVNbeganshellingKheSanh Combat Base with hundreds of rockets, mortars, and artillery shells. One of thefirsttargetstobehitwastheexposedammunitiondumpattheeasternend of the runway, setting off an explosion in a Marine bunker containing 1,500 tons of stored ammunition, including bombs, artillery shells, grenades, and small-armsammunition.Theblastdestroyedahelicopterandsweptawaytents, small buildings, and even the landing lights and radio antennae around the airstrip.Anothershellhitacacheofteargas,releasingcloudsofchokingvapor that soon enveloped the entire base. Secondary explosions from ammunition “cookingoff”intheragingfirecontinuedforforty-eighthours.Thiseventwas covered by several reporters and cameramen and it rapidly became headline newsallovertheUnitedStates;thesituationatKheSanhwassoonthefocus oftheeveningtelevisionnewscasts,evenaftertheCommunistslaunchedthe full-scaleTetOffensive. Thousands of shells were lost in the explosion of the ammo dump, more than90percentofMarines’ammunition.Thishadtobequicklyreplacedifthe MarinesinKheSanhweretocontinuetodefendthearea.Accordingly,U.S.Air ForceC-123andC-130cargoaircraftbeganaerialresupplyflightstoreplenish thedestroyedammunition. As the ammo dump at Khe Sanh base exploded, hundreds of PAVN troopsoverranKheSanhvillagealongRoute9,forcingtheMarinesfromthe CombinedActionCompanyandtheSouthVietnameseRegionalForcescompanytheretoevacuatetoKSCB. Afteradayofintensefightingandenemyshelling,theMarineshadsuffered nine killed and seventy-five wounded (thirty-eight of whom were returned to duty).ThePAVNhadblownuptheammodumpandforcedtheevacuationof
BorderBattles,HillFights,andKheSanh 25
KheSanhvillage,buttheMarinesstillheldKheSanhCombatBaseandthe surroundinghills. Overthenextfewdays,helicoptersbroughtinabattalionofthe9thMarines and the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, the last reinforcements to reach the MarinebaseuntilthesiegewasformallyliftedonApril8.TheMarinesnow had about six thousand troops to defend against the twenty thousand to forty thousand PAVN regulars who surrounded Khe Sanh. About half the Marine infantry would be deployed outside the base on the surrounding hills; the recentlyarrived1stBattalionofthe9thMarinesoccupiedadefensiveposition neararockquarrytoguardthewesternapproachtoKSCB. Thus, ten days before the Tet Offensive had formally begun, the Marines at Khe Sanh found themselves virtually surrounded by PAVN troops. When it became apparent that Khe Sanh was in danger of an imminent attack, Westmoreland initiated Operation Niagara II and ordered allied aircraft to begin pounding the PAVN forces surrounding the Marine base. Between January22andMarch31,atotalof24,000tacticalairstrikeswouldbeflownby USAFandMarinefighter-bombers.Thesestrikesweresupplementedby2,700 missionsflownbyB-52StratofortressesaspartofOperationArcLight. For seventy-seven days, a desperate battle raged between the besieged MarinesandthePAVNforcesthatsurroundedthem.Americanprintjournalists and television reporters covered the intense combat. Despite the obvious differencesbetweenDienBienPhuandKheSanh,thejournalistscouldnot resistthecomparison.“Theparallelsarethereforalltosee,”WalterCronkite informed a CBS radio audience in early February.20 Perhaps because of that intensecoverage,PresidentJohnsonremainedfixatedonthebattle.Hehada modelofthebaseconstructedintheWhiteHouseandwouldporeoveritfor hours,discussingthedetailswithhismilitaryadvisers.“Idon’twantanydamn Dinbinphoo,” he reportedly told the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making them sign adocumentonJanuary29promisingthatthebasecouldbeheld.21However, astheMarinesbattledforsurvivalatKheSanh,Johnsonwaspresentedwitha stunningnewcrisiswhentheCommunistslaunchedtheTetOffensive.
Chapter3
t h e t et o f f en s i v e
As the fighting mounted at Khe Sanh in the first part of January 1968, the CommunistsweremakingfinalpreparationsforlaunchingtheTetOffensive. SinceTettypicallybroughtamutualcease-fire,HanoiassumedthattheSouth Vietnamesewouldberelaxedandunpreparedforanassault.Takingadvantage of the situation, the Communists smuggled men and equipment into and around South Vietnam’s cities and provincial capitals. Weapons arrived in trucks loaded with flowers, vegetables, and fruit destined for the holiday celebrations.“Mourners”carriedcoffinsfilledwithweaponsandammunitionand buriedthematpagodasandchurcheswheretheycouldeasilybeduguplater. Explosiveswereconcealedinbasketsoftomatoesandrice.VietCong(VC)soldiersincivilianclothes,someevendressedinSouthVietnameseArmy(ARVN) uniforms,mingledwithcrowdsofSouthVietnameseciviliansreturningtothe citiesfortheTetcelebrations. ThecommanderoftheVCdivisionchargedwithconductingtheattackon Tan Son Nhut Air Base outside Saigon personally conducted the reconnaissanceforhisunit’sattack.Oneofhisregimentalcommandersalsogotalook attheobjectivewhenhevisitedhisfamily’sgravesiteatamilitarycemeteryjust outsidethebase. U.S.militaryintelligenceanalystsknewthattheCommunistswereplanningsomekindofspectacularattackbutdidnotbelieveitwouldcomedur-
TheTetOffensive 27
ingTetorthatitwouldbenationwide.Oneofthefirstindicationsofachange in strategy occurred at Loc Ninh in October 1967. As previously described, the Communists had attacked the district capital and, contrary to normal practice,triedtoholdit,sufferingterriblywhenalliedairsupportandartillerydrovethemout.Intelligenceofficerswerepuzzledwhytheenemyhad stoodandfought,riskingcertainheavylossesforameaninglessobjective.It would later become known that the Viet Cong had been practicing urban assaulttactics. Therewereothersignsthatsomethingunusualwasafoot.Therehadbeen aflurryofattacksinDinhTuongprovince,wheretraditionallytheVietCong testednewtactics.Additionally,intelligenceindicatedthatCommunistdesertionratesweredown,apparentlybecausetheenemytroopshadbeentoldthat victorywasnearandthattheentirecountrywouldsoonbeliberated. In late November, the CIA station in Saigon compiled all the various intelligence indicators and published a report called “the Big Gamble.” This was not really a formal intelligence estimate or even a prediction, but rather “a collection of scraps” that concluded that the Communists were changing theirstrategy.1Atfirst,intelligenceanalystsatMilitary Assistance Command, Vietnam(MACV)disagreedwiththeCIA’sassessment,becauseatthetimethe commandwasreducingitsestimateofenemycapabilitiesaspartoftheeffort toshowprogressinthewar.2 As more intelligence poured in, MACV commander General William Westmorelandandhisstaffalsocametotheconclusionthatamajorcountrywideeffortwasprobable.Allthesignspointedtoanewmajoroffensive.Still, Westmoreland did not anticipate heavy attacks on cities and towns. On the contrary,hehadrepositionedforcesawayfromthepopulatedareastoconduct operations along the border with Laos and Cambodia, where he thought the mainenemythreatlay. On December 18, General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff,warnedtheAmericanpublicthat“theremaybeaCommunistthrust similar to the desperate effort of the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge.”3 President Johnson himself indicated that he was aware that the Communists were planning something unusual when he told the Australian cabinet at Canberra,wherehehadtraveledforthefuneralofPrimeMinisterHaroldHolt, that“kamikaze”attackswereexpectedinVietnam.4 Despite concerns about a potential Communist offensive, the Johnson administrationchosenottotakeanyextrameasurestopreparetheAmerican peopleforthecomingblow.Havingspentthepreviousmonthstryingtoconvincethepublicthatprogresswasbeingmadeinthewar,Johnsonwaslessthan enthusiasticaboutalarmingthepeople.Hisadministrationinsistedincontinuingtopaintarosypicture—andthisplayedrightintoGiap’shands.
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Just before Christmas 1967, intelligence reports indicated a 200 percent increaseintrucktrafficontheHoChiMinhTrailinLaos.Thereportswere determined to be credible and, together with the other mounting evidence, convincedWestmorelandandhisstaffthatsomethingunusualwasafoot.They apparently had no idea that the Communists had the capability to launch such a widespread attack. While predicting that the enemy was planning a majorefforttowinaspectacularsuccessonthebattlefield,Westmoreland,like Johnson,madenodeliberateefforttoalertthepressandtheAmericanpublic for what might be coming. Failing to do so only increased the shock of the enemyoffensiveonceitbegan. The indications that the enemy was planning something big continued to pileup.OnJanuary4,1968,U.S.troopsintheCentralHighlandscaptureda documententitledOperationOrderNo.1,whichcalledforanattackagainst PleikupriortoTet.Afewdayslater,ARVNsoldierscapturedasimilarorderfor anassaultonBanMeThuot,althoughnodatewasspecified. Westmoreland became sufficiently alarmed by the situation developing at Khe Sanh and the new intelligence indicators to request that the South VietnamesecancelthecomingTetcease-firecountrywide.OnJanuary8,the chief of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS), General Cao Van Vien, told Westmoreland that he would try to limit the truce to twenty-four hours.SouthVietnamesePresidentNguyenVanThieuarguedthattocancel theforty-eight-hourtrucewouldadverselyaffectthemoraleofhistroopsand the South Vietnamese people. However, he agreed to limit the cease-fire to thirty-sixhours,beginningontheeveningofJanuary29. Inmid-January,the101stAirborneDivisioncapturedplansforanattackon the city of Phu Cuong. Because the Communists compartmentalized their plans, there was no mention in the captured documents about a nationwide offensive,andcountermeasureswerelefttolocalU.S.commanders.Still,there werenowmanyindicationsthatanoffensiveofunusualproportionswasinthe offing.Therewouldsoonbemore. OnJanuary28,SouthVietnameseMilitarySecurityServiceagentsarrested eleven VC cadres in Qui Nhon. The Viet Cong had in their possession two audiotapescontaininganappealtothelocalpopulationtotakeuparmsagainst the Saigon government and an announcement that Saigon, Hue, and other SouthVietnamesecitieshadalreadybeenliberated. Toward the end of January, the government of North Vietnam made a strange announcement. Citing an auspicious conjunction of the moon, the earth,andthesun,thegovernmentdecreedthattheTetholidaywouldbegin notonJanuary30,asindicatedbythelunarcalendar,butonJanuary29instead. Hanoi, the allies later learned, wanted its people to be able to celebrate Tet beforethegeneraloffensivewaslaunched.
TheTetOffensive 29
In the South, the change in the North Vietnamese holiday schedule went unnoticed. By this time in late January, both Westmoreland and the White House were preoccupied with the developing situation at Khe Sanh. Westmoreland remained convinced that the PAVN buildup in the area presagedaCommunistattempttotakethenorthernmostprovinces.Accordingly, WestmorelandorderedtheU.S.1stCavalryDivisionfromtheCentralHighlands to Phu Bai just south of Hue. Additionally, he sent one brigade of the 101st AirborneDivisiontoICorpstostrengthenthedefenseofthetwonorthernmost provinces.BytheendofJanuary,morethanhalfofallU.S.combatmaneuver battalionswerelocatedintheICorpsarea,readytomeetanynewthreat. Not everyone in the U.S. military high command was focused on Khe Sanh. Lieutenant General Frederick C. Weyand commanded the American field forces in III Corps Tactical Zone and was charged with defending the approachestoSaigon.Hehadfifty-threecombatmaneuverbattalions,mostof whichhadbeenoperatingagainstenemybasesalongtheCambodianborder inthelattermonthsof1967.5WhencontactwiththeVietCongintheseareas droppedoffinDecember,WeyandbecamealarmedattheseeminglyincoherentpatternofenemyactivityandtelephonedWestmorelandonJanuary10to explainhisconcernandrecommendthatforcesreturnfromtheborder.The MACV commander agreed, and fifteen combat battalions were ordered to repositionnearertoSaigon. When the Communists struck, the number of American battalions within the urban zone had risen to twenty-seven. Their presence made a tremendousdifferenceinthefightingtofollowandmayhavesavedthecapitalcity. Although Westmoreland had approved strengthening Saigon’s defenses, his attentionremainedonnorthernSouthVietnam,andnotmuchelsewasdone tostrengthenothercitiesandtowns. The intelligence picture was further clouded on January 30 between midnight and 3:00 a.m., when VC forces apparently launched the offensive prematurelywhentheyattackedeighttownsandcitiesalongthecoastandin the Central Highlands. A ground attack in battalion strength hit the port of NhaTrang;anotherstruckHoiAn,adistrictcapitalnearthecoast.Mortarand rocket fire preceded a ground attack by two thousand enemy soldiers on the Highlands town of Ban Me Thuot. Farther north, the Viet Cong launched a sapperattackagainsttheheadquartersofARVNICorpsinDaNang.Additional attacksweremadeonKontum,Pleiku,andQuiNhon. AccordingtoGeneralTranVanTra,Giaphadcalledfortheoffensivetostart on“thefirstdayoftheLunarNewYear.”Apparentlythereweretwodifferent calendarsinuse:anolderversionbeingusedinthesouthandaneweronein thenorthernareas.Usingtheoldercalendar,thelunarnewyearfellonJanuary 31,butonthenewercalendar,itfellonJanuary30.This“threwoffthetiming
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oftheopeningattacks.”6Apparently,thefogandfrictionofwarappliedtothe Communistsideaswellastothealliedforces. The premature attacks were not coordinated well, and by daylight all Communist forces had been driven from their objectives. No other towns or citiesinSouthVietnamwereattackedthatnight.AfterdaylightonJanuary30, President Thieu, at the urging of General William Westmoreland, canceled thecease-firethroughoutthecountryandalerted all South Vietnamese military units. However, it was too late to call back those ARVN soldiers already onleave,andwordofthecancellationofthetrucefailedtoreachmanySouth Vietnameseunitsuntilitwastoolate. Althoughtheprematureattacksprovidedawarningoftheimpendingoffensiveandtroopswereputonalert,fewpeopleexpectedthewidespreadassaults thatfollowedthenextday.However,BrigadierGeneralPhilipDavidson,chief ofMACVintelligence,lookedatthereportsandwarnedWestmoreland,“This isgoingtohappenintherestofthecountrytonightortomorrowmorning.”7 TheAmericancommanderimmediatelyputhisforcesonalert,buthedidnot orderanychangetotroopdispositions.Sincetheyhadbeenonalertmanytimes before,mostAmericantroopswerenotpreparedforthestormabouttobreak uponthem.ForWestmoreland,theattacksonJanuary30onlyservedtoconfirm inhismindthatthemainenemyeffortwasfocusedonKheSanh.Hewould soonbeprovedwrong. Thus,theprematureattacks,thechangeinalertstatusandcancellationofthe trucehadonlymixedresults.SomeARVNcommandersrespondedwithappropriateprecautionarymeasures,butothersrespondedhardlyatall.MostAmerican andSouthVietnamesecommandersthoughtitwassimplyoutofthequestion thattheCommunistswouldtrytocapturethecitiesandtowns.Consequently, whentheoffensivewasfinallylaunched,thesurprisewasalmosttotal.
THEOFFENSIVEBEGINS The Tet Offensive began in full force shortly before 3:00 a.m. on January 31. More than eighty thousand Communist troops—a mixture of PAVN regulars andVCmain-forceguerrillas—beganacoordinatedattackthroughoutSouth Vietnam.8 The PAVN and Viet Cong targeted more than three-quarters of theprovincialcapitalsandmostofthemajorcities(seeMap3).Inthenorth, Communist forces struck Quang Tri, Tam Ky, and Hue, as well as the U.S. militarybasesatPhuBaiandChuLai.Inthecenterofthecountry,theyfollowed up the previous evening’s attacks and launched new ones at Tuy Hoa, PhanThiet,andtheAmericaninstallationsatBongSongandAnKhe.InIII CorpsTacticalZone,theprimaryCommunistthrustwasatSaigonitself,but
TheTetOffensive 31
therewereotherattacksagainsttheARVNcorpsheadquartersatBienHoaand theU.S.IIFieldForceheadquartersatLongBinh.IntheMekongDelta,the VietCongstruckVinhLong,MyTho,CanTho,DinhTuong,KienTuong, GoCong,andBenTre,aswellasvirtuallyeveryotherprovincialcapitalinthe region.TheCommunistforcesmortaredorrocketedeverymajoralliedairfield andattackedsixty-fourdistrictcapitalsandscoresoflessertowns. Although the attacks varied in size and scope, they generally followed the same pattern. They began with a barrage of mortar and rocket fire, followed closelythereafterbyagroundassaultspearheadedbysappers,whopenetrated thedefensiveperimeter.Onceinsidethecities,thecommandoslinkedupwith troops who had previously infiltrated and with local sympathizers, who often actedasguides.Mainforceunits,whichquicklyseizedpredeterminedtargets, followed. They were usually accompanied by propaganda teams that tried to convince the local populace to rise up against the Saigon government. The attackers were both skillful and determined and had rehearsed their attacks beforehand. The scope of the Tet Offensive was stunning; everywhere there was confusion, shock, dismay, and disbelief on the part of the allies. The carefully coordinatedattacks,asjournalistStanleyKarnowwrites,“explodedaroundthe country like a string of firecrackers.”9 U.S. intelligence had already gathered someinformationofinfiltrationintosouthernpopulationcentersandcaptured documents that outlined the general plan. However, Westmoreland and his intelligencestaffweresoconvincedthatKheSanhwastherealtargetandthat theenemywasincapableofconductinganoffensiveonsuchamassivescale that they viewed the captured documents as a diversionary tactic. “Even had I known exactly what was to take place,” Westmoreland’s intelligence officer laterconceded,“itwassopreposterousthatIprobablywouldhavebeenunable tosellittoanybody.”10Westmoreland,himself,lateradmittedthathehadnot anticipatedthe“truenatureorthescope”oftheattacks.11Consequently,the U.S.highcommandhadseriouslyunderestimatedtheenemy’spotentialfora majornationwideoffensive,andtheallieswerealmostoverwhelmedinitiallyby theaudacity,scale,andintensityoftheattacks.
THEBATTLEFORSAIGON SomeofthebitterestfightingoftheTetOffensivetookplaceinSaigon,which had not seen much combat during the war before 1968. It was the site of a largeAmericanairbaseatTanSonNhut,andthereweremorethan130U.S. installationsinthegreaterSaigonarea.However,becauseofSouthVietnamese sensitivities toward a large American presence in Saigon, the overall defense
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ofthecityitselfhadbeenturnedovertotheARVN,andtheinstallationswere guarded only by a thousand-man U.S. military police battalion. Despite the changeinalertstatus,onlyaboutone-thirdoftheMPswereattheirpostswhen theVietCongstruck.ThecitywasprotectedbyalargecontingentofARVN soldersandaboutseventeenthousandSouthVietnamesepolicewhopatrolled thecitystreets. Saigon,ateemingcityofmorethantwomillionpeople,hadbecomeasafe haven for Vietnamese refugees fleeing the war in the countryside. As more andmorepeoplecametothecity,itspopulationswelledtonearlythreemillion. Although there was not enough work for all the refugees, at least they hadescapedthedestructivewarthathadlaidwastetosomuchofthecountry. However,theTetOffensivewouldsoondemonstratetoallSouthVietnamese thatnoareaoftheircountrywassafefromtheCommunists. TheplanfortheattackonSaigoncalledforthirty-fivebattalionstohitsix primarytargetsinthecapitalcity(seeMap4).Theseobjectivesincludedthe headquarters of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff; Independence Palace,whichservedasPresidentThieu’soffice;theAmericanembassy;Tan SonNhutAirBase;theVietnameseNavyheadquarters;andthenationalbroadcastingstation. DuringtheearlymorninghoursofJanuary31,theattackonSaigonbegan fromseveraldifferentdirections,withelevenbattalionscomprisingmorethan four thousand troops focusing on the city’s urban center. Prepared by battlehardened PAVN General Tran Do, the battle plan called for the main force guerrillastolinkupwithlocalforcetroopswhohadalreadyinfiltratedthecity inthedaysjustbeforeTet.Togethertheyweretoattackkeypositionsinthecity centerwhileotherforcesfromelementsofthreeVCdivisionslaunchedsimultaneous assaults on the American bases just outside the city to prevent U.S. reinforcementsfromenteringthecity.Guidedbyabout250menandwomen fromtheC-10SaigonSapperBattalion,whonormallyoperatedinandaround Saigon,theinitialwaveofCommunisttroopsweretoseizeandholdtheirobjectivesforforty-eighthoursuntiladditionalforcesarrivedtoreinforcethem.12 Shortlybefore3:00a.m.,asmallconvoyofjeepsandsedansarrivedatthe government radio station. A group of about twenty armed men dressed in South Vietnamese riot police uniforms dismounted the vehicles, while their leaderexplainedtotheguardthatreinforcementshadarrived.Whentheguard protestedthatheknewnothingaboutreinforcements,theyshothimandbroke into the station under covering fire from a nearby apartment building. The Communistshadpreparedaseriesofaudiotapestobebroadcastovertheradio throughoutSouthVietnam,announcingthatSaigonhadfallenandurgingthat thepeopleriseupandthrowoutthegovernment.Bycontrollingtheradiosta-
TheTetOffensive 33
tion,theVietConghopedtoseizethepropagandainitiativeandmotivatethe SouthVietnamesepeopletorallytotheirside. However,theVCplanswerequicklyfoiled.TheARVNlieutenantcolonel inchargeofthestationhadmadepreparationstotakethestationofftheairif itwaseverattacked.AstheVietCongbegantheirassault,atechnicianatthe stationradioedtoatransmittingtowerseveralmilesawaythatallcommunicationswiresshouldbecutwithSaigon.13Withoutanyconnectiontothetower, radio broadcasts were impossible. Upon realizing what had happened, the sappersdestroyedtheradioequipmentandpreparedtodefendthebuildingas theywaitedforreinforcementsthatweresupposedtojointhem.Acompanyof ARVNparatroopersarrived,andapitchedbattleensued.TheVietCongheld outforsixhoursbeforetheywereallkilled;thereliefforcenevershowedup. As the battle for the radio station raged, another contingent of thirtyfour sappers from the VC C-10 Battalion wearing ARVN uniforms attacked IndependencePalaceonNguyenDuStreet.Arrivingat1:30a.m.,theyblasted the gates with B-40 rockets, but as the Viet Cong tried to rush through the breach, they were immediately struck with a hail of fire from the defenders inside the palace grounds. The palace security force, comprising the palace guard, national and military police, and two tanks, were too strong for the attackers,whoretreatedtoanearbyapartmentbuilding.Duringthenexttwo days, they tried to hold off ARVN soldiers and American MPs in a desperate last-ditchstandwhileAmericanTVcamerasrecordedtheaction.Intheend,all theVietCongwerekilledorcaptured. AttheVietnameseNavyheadquarters,theCommunistplanwastocapture boththeheadquartersandnearbydockedships.Theshipswouldthenbeused totransportpeoplefromruralareasintheMekongDeltaandalongthecoast to Saigon to participate in the general uprising. The plan rapidly went awry. TwelveVCsappersblewaholeinthesecuritywallbutmetstiffresistancefrom theSouthVietnamesedefenders.Withinfiveminutes,tenofthesapperswere dead.Asintheotherattacks,theattackershadbeentoldtoseizeandholdtheir objectivewhilewaitingforreinforcements;but,asinmostcases,therewereno reinforcementsandtheseattacksbecamesuicidemissions. The Viet Cong ran into similar trouble at the compound housing the Armored Command and Artillery Command headquarters on the northern edgeofthecity.TheCommunistsplannedtocapturetheARVNtanksandartilleryandusethemduringtheremainderoftheoffensive.However,theysoon foundoutthatthetankshadbeenmovedtoanotherbaseandthatthebreech lockshadbeenremovedfromtheartillerypieces,renderingthemuseless. TheattackagainsttheJGScompoundbeganat2:00a.m.,whenVCsappers attackedtheARVNguardsononeofthemaingates.AdditionalAmericanMPs
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arrived on the scene, and the initial VC assault collapsed. The original plan had called for a local force unit to attack one of the other compound gates at the same time, but this unit was delayed en route to their attack position. Nevertheless, when they arrived, they were able to penetrate the weak and disorganized ARVN defenses at that location and get inside the compound. Rather than overrun the entire nerve center of the South Vietnamese armed forces,theyduginandwaitedforreinforcements.Eventually,ARVNairborne andmarineunitsrootedtheVietCongoutofthecompound.
THEBATTLEATTHEU.S. EMBASSY ThemostspectacularattackinSaigonwaslaunchedagainsttheU.S.embassy in Saigon, located on Thong Nhat Boulevard only a few blocks from the Presidential Palace and the downtown hotels where American reporters and television cameramen were quartered. The embassy, a $2.6 million, six-floor building just opened in September 1967, was the symbol of American power and presence in Vietnam. It was at the center of a fortified compound that coveredoverfouracresandwasenclosedbyaneight-foot-highwall. At 2:45 a.m. on January 31, a squad of nineteen VC sappers attacked the embassy. The commandoes had secretly moved weapons and explosives into thecityfromtheirbaseneararubberplantationthirtymilestothenorth,concealingtheshipmentsintruckloadsofriceandvegetables. The sappers used a satchel charge to blow a three-foot hole in the compound’souterwalls,andthentheirlieutenantledthewaythroughthebreach. TheMPguardsopenedupontheVietCongastheycamethroughtheholein thewall,killingtheplatoonleaderandseveralofhissoldiersbeforetheythemselveswerekilledinahailofreturnfirefromthesurvivingVCsoldiers. Onceinsidethecompound,theleaderlessVietCongfailedtoexploittheir initial success. Without orders, they milled around in apparent confusion before taking cover behind some oversized flower tubs. They missed their primechance,becausetheembassybuildingitselfwasvirtuallytheirsforthe taking. The Viet Cong were soon embroiled in a six-hour-long standoff with theguardsandmilitarypolicemenwhorushedtotheembassy.Withthearrival ofadditionalreinforcementsfromthe101stAirborneDivision,wholandedby helicopter on the roof of the chancery, the Viet Cong were all killed or captured,andthesecurityoftheembassywasreestablished.Duringthefighting, fiveAmericanswerekilled. TheVietCongnevermadeitinsidethemainembassybuilding,butitwas leftpockmarkedbyrocketandmachinegunfire.TheGreatSealoftheUnited States,whichhadhungoverthefrontdoor,wasblastedbyenemyfireandfell
TheTetOffensive 35
totheground.Althoughtheyhadonlycausedminordamagetotheembassy andallofthemhadbeenwipedoutby3:00a.m.,thissmallsquadofVCsappershadprovenindramaticfashionthattherewasnoplaceinVietnamthat wassecurefromattack. TheU.S.mediafocusedonthedramaticassaultontheembassy.Reporters and cameramen rushed to the scene immediately, drawn by the pitched gun battlebetweentheU.S.guardsandtheVCsappers.Confusedbythegunfire anddarkness,thereportersconcludedthattheVietConghadpenetratedthe chancery.AnAPreportersentabulletinsayingthattheembassybuildingitself hadbeentakenbytheenemytroops.Thiserroneousreportwentswiftlyover thewiretotheUnitedStates,whereitarrivedjustbeforethefirst-editiondeadlinesformanyinfluentialmorningnewspapersontheEastCoast.Theglaring headlinesspreadtheshockingmessagethattheCommunistshadcapturedthe symbolofAmericanprestigeinSaigon.Thefront-pagephotographontheNew YorkTimesFebruary1editionshowedthreemilitarypolicemen,riflesinhand, seekingprotectionbehindawalloutsidetheconsularsectionoftheembassy while the bodies of two American soldiers slain by the guerrillas lay nearby. WalterCronkite,deanofAmericannewsbroadcasters,isreportedtohavesaid, “Whatthehellisgoingon?Ithoughtwewerewinningthiswar!”14 Soon thereafter, photos and film of the fighting on the embassy grounds appearedontheAmericantelevisioneveningnewsprograms.Thevividimages ofdeadbodiesamidtherubbleanddazedAmericansoldiersandciviliansdashingbackandforthastheytriedtoflushoutthesapperssentshockwavesacross theUnitedStates.ThespectacleofU.S.troopsstormingtheirownembassyto ousttheguerrillafightersstunnedAmericansonthehomefront. InSaigon,reportersswarmedthegroundsoftheembassyasmilitaryspokesmen tried to explain what had happened. The key question was whether the VietConghadactuallyenteredthechancery.Althoughtheyclearlyhadnot, APstoodbyitsclaim.Overtheyears,aconfrontationalrelationshiphaddevelopedbetweenthemilitaryandthepresswhenofficialpronouncementswere oftenfoundtobemisleadingortotallyfalse.Thissituationcametoaheadover theissueoftheembassyattack. At9:20a.m.,Westmorelandarrivedatthejust-securedembassycompound and held an impromptu press conference. Dressed in starched fatigues, he toured the building with reporters and assured them that no Viet Cong had entered the chancery, exuding an air of extreme confidence. He confidently proclaimed that “the enemy’s well-laid plans went afoul.”15 The reporters were stunned. A Washington Post writer recalls, “The reporters could hardly believe their ears. Westmoreland was standing in the ruins and saying everything was great.”16 Meanwhile, news was cascading in of VC attacks all over South Vietnam. This situation widened the “credibility gap” almost to the
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breaking point. Several reporters continued to quote “other sources” denying Westmoreland’s assertion that the embassy chancery had not been breached. When the American public read the morning newspapers and watched the evening news, it received two impressions: the Viet Cong had seized the embassyitself,andWestmorelandwaslyingwhenhesaidtheyhadnot.While Westmorelandtriedtoassurethemthatthingsweregoingwellfortheallies,the Americanpeoplecouldseeforthemselvesthecarnagewroughtbythefighting inSaigonandelsewherearoundthecountry.Theseverepsychologicaldamage donebythesejuxtaposedimagestotheAmericanwareffortwouldnotbecome apparentuntillater. Thecoverageoftheembassyattack,coupledwiththatoftheas-yet-unresolved siegeofKheSanh,gavethefalseimpressionthatSaigonhadbeencompletely overrunandthatthewholealliedpositioninSouthVietnamwasfallingapart. Thoughtheattackontheembassyhadfailed,Communistforceshadpenetrated totheveryheartofAmericanpowerinSouthVietnam,indicatingthatthewar therewasmuchmoreseriousthanexpectedandthatU.S.boastsofimminent victoryweremisguidedatbestandcalculatedliesatworst.IftheUnitedStates couldnotevenprotectitsownembassy,howcouldthewarhavereachedapoint, asWestmorelandhadclaimed,“whentheendbeginstocomeintoview”?17 Elsewhere,chaosreignedasfightingbrokeoutalloverthecity.SmallVC squadsfannedoutandattackednumerousofficers’andenlistedmen’sbillets, thehomesofARVNofficers,anddistrictpolicestations.Othergroups,carrying“blacklists”bearingthenamesofARVNofficers,civilservants,andothers connected with the Saigon government, conducted house-to-house searches through residential quarters of the city. One civilian witness recalled, “They guarded the street, checked houses and ID cards, and forbade us to leave. Soldiers on leave were arrested and shot on the spot.... Ordinary people weren’tarrested,butweren’tallowedtoleavethearea.”18 TheVietCongconductedritualburningsoftheSouthVietnameseflagand held“people’scourts”todecidethefateofsuspected“traitors.”Someofthose who were rounded up were shot. By dawn, the Viet Cong had made major penetrations into western and southern Saigon and controlled large areas in thesuburbofCholon. Brutalitybegatbrutality.OnFebruary1,earlyinthefightforSaigon,South VietnamesepolicecapturedaVietCongsoldierincivilianclothesanddragged himbeforeGeneralNguyenNgocLoan,chiefofthenationalpoliceforce.19The generalputarevolvertotheman’sheadandfired.Loanturnedtothereporters standingafewfeetbehindhim.“TheykilledmanyAmericansandmanyofmy men,”hesaidquietlyinEnglish.“Buddhawillunderstand.Doyou?”20 Theentireepisode,includingthemanfallingtothestreetwithbloodspurtingfromhishead,wascapturedbyEddieAdams,anAPphotographer,andVo
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Suu,anNBCtelevisioncameraman.Thenextmorningthephotographofthe executiondominatedthefrontpageofAmericannewspapers;thateveningthe video tape footage was broadcast on NBC television news. Many Americans were horrified. Former Ambassador to the United States Bui Diem described thesituationbestinhismemoirswhenhesaidthatimageslikethis“crystallized thewar’sbrutalitywithoutprovidingacontextwithinwhichtounderstandthe eventstheydepicted.”21Whilethatisnodoubttrue,theimpactofthisphotoand filmfootagealongwiththerestofthecoverageoftheoffensivewasexplosive. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was furious after watching the NBC news broadcast.“Whosesideareyouon?”hedemandedofthenewsmenafewdays later,adding,“Idon’tknowwhypeoplehavetobeprobingforthethingsthat onecanbitchabout,whentherearetwothousandstoriesonthesamedayabout thingsthataremoreconstructive.”22
ATTACKSAROUNDTHE CITY Althoughthefightinginthecapitalcitywasspectacular,Saigonwasneverin dangeroffalling.The“saviorofSaigon,”LieutenantGeneralFredC.Weyand, commanderofIIFieldForceVietnam,thecorps-levelheadquartersatnearby LongBinh,wasresponsibleforthedefenseoftheareasurroundingSaigonand reactedquicklyoncetheCommunistlaunchedtheirattackonthecity. Aspreviouslydescribed,WeyandhadsensedinearlyJanuarythatsomething was afoot. Accordingly, he asked for and got permission to pull his combat forcesbackfromtheborderareastowithinatwenty-eight-milezonesurroundingthecity.AthisdisposalinIIFieldForce,Weyandhadfifty-threemaneuver battalions(infantry,armor,andarmoredcavalry)fromfourU.S.divisionsand two separate brigade-size units. Against his forces were arrayed thirty-five VC and PAVN battalions in the initial assault. As eleven VC battalions attacked Saigondirectly,aVCdivisionattackedthesupplydepots,ammunitiondumps, andmilitaryheadquartersatLongBinhandthenearbyU.S.airbaseatBien Hoa.APAVNdivisionblockedtheroadstothenorthandnorthwestofthecity, whilethreeVCbattalionsattackedtheairfieldatTanSonNhut. At his headquarters, which was under rocket and ground attack, Weyand tried to make sense of the situation. The map showing the reported attacks around Saigon reminded him of “a pinball machine, one light after another going on as it was hit.”23 Between 3:00 and 5:00 a.m., he shifted some five thousand mechanized and airborne troops to defend the various installations underattack. TheassaultonTanSonNhutAirBase,justnorthofthecity,wasoneofthe largestactionsintheSaigonarea.SiteoftheheadquartersofbothU.S.Military
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Assistance Command Vietnam and the U.S. 7th Air Force, Tan Son Nhut was especiallycriticaltotheVietCongplansbecausenotonlywasitthenervecenter oftheU.S.command,buthigh-rankingSouthVietnameseofficialsalsolivedin thearea.Around3:00a.m.aheavybarrageofrocketandmortarfirehittheair base. Following the barrage, three VC battalions simultaneously assaulted the perimeterfromthewest,north,andeast.TheyquicklyoverrananARVNguard postandpenetratedthebase.TheAmericancommandhadbeencaughtoffguard, andmostoftheAmericansoldiers,includingseniorstaff,werenotevenarmed.An ARVNairbornebattalion,whichhadbeenwaitingintheterminalfortransporttoI Corps,tookupthefightagainsttheCommunists.Whenthefiringbrokeout,they reactedquicklytoblockfurtherpenetrationoftheperimeterinthatsector. Americanofficersalsojoinedinthefighting,andthestrugglewasdesperate as the battle raged across the airfield. Meanwhile, an armored relief column rushed from its base at nearby Cu Chi. Arriving at 6:00 a.m., the tanks and armored personnel carriers tanks attacked the Viet Cong from the rear, forcingthemtoretreattoatextilemillontheoutskirtsofthebase.Alliedjetsand helicopter gunships pounded the mill, but the Viet Cong stood and fought tenaciously,holdingouttothelastman. FifteenmilesnorthofSaigonwastheLongBinhlogisticalandcommand complex.Thissprawlingbase,whichextendedtotheenormousBienHoaAir Base,wascriticaltotheAmericanwareffortandthusprovidedalucrativetarget fortheCommunistplanners.At3:00a.m.,anintenserocketandmortarbarrage poundedtheareaassoldiersfromaVCdivisionpreparedtolaunchtheattack. When the signal was given, the veteran VC fighters assaulted the northern perimeter of Long Binh while a local VC battalion launched a diversionary attackagainsttheeasternbunkerline.Meanwhile,VCsappersinfiltratedthe hugeammunitiondumpjustnorthofLongBinhwhileanotherVCregiment attackedtheairbaseandIIICorpsheadquartersatBienHoa. ElsewhereinIIICorpsTacticalZone,elementsofaPAVNdivisionhitLai Khe,theheadquartersofboththeU.S.1stInfantryDivisionandtheARVN5th Division.Meanwhile,troopsfromaVCdivisionstrucktheheadquartersofthe U.S.25thDivisionatCuChi.Theseforcesweretointerdictalliedlinesofcommunication and block potential allied reinforcements from the outlying U.S. divisionsfromreachingSaigon. Weyand responded to the threat in the Bien Hoa–Long Binh complex by ordering U.S. reinforcements by helicopter and land to relieve the defenders there(seeMap5).Thegroundreliefcolumnhadtofightitswaythroughthe VCroadblocks.TheAmericanstookheavylossesbutwereultimatelysuccessfulinbreakingthroughtheroadblocksandrepellingtheVCattackersinBien Hoa.Inthisaction,theAmericansweresurprisedthattheVietCongstoodand fought,ratherthanwithdrawastheyhadusuallydoneinthepast.
TheTetOffensive 39
THEBATTLEOFCHOLON Meanwhile,thefightinginsidethecapitalcitycontinuedtorage.Bythistime, theCommunisthighcommandhadintroducedas many as fifteen battalions intotheSaigonarea.ApitchedbattledevelopedinthePhuThoracetrackarea inCholon,thesouthwesternsuburbofSaigon.AVCbattalionhadseizedthe racetrackduringtheopeninghoursoftheoffensive.Theracetrackwasastrategiclocationthatsatatthehubofseveralmajorroadsandprovidedaneasily recognizablerallyingplaceforruralVCtroopsunfamiliarwithSaigon.Control oftheracetrackitselfalsodeniedthealliesapotentiallandingzoneforhelicoptersbringinginadditionaltroopsandsupplies.WeyandorderedU.S.reinforcementsintothearea,andbitterfightingensuedforcontrolofthearea. In the fighting in Saigon and the surrounding areas, the Viet Cong used the element of surprise to make initial gains, but they were unable to hold theirobjectivesowingtothequickreactionofpowerfulU.S.andARVNforces. Within a few days, allied troops had defeated most of the Communist forces in the Saigon area, but heavy fighting continued for several more days in Cholon.Itwasabitterfightthatincludedseverallarge-scaleVCcounterattacks. Eventually,everyVCunitthatparticipatedintheSaigonoffensivecontributed manpowertothebattlefortheracetrack. FromtheroofoftheCaravelleHotelincentralSaigon,warcorrespondents watchedthedramaticbattleforCholonunfold.Everynightafterdinner,the scenewasilluminatedbythefiresburninginCholonandtracerbulletsfiredby Americangunshipshoveringoverenemypositions.OnFebruary4,residentsof Cholonwereaskedtoleavetheirhomes,andtheareawasdeclaredafreefire zone.U.S.jetssubsequentlypoundedVCpositionsinandaroundtheracetrack area.AlargepartofCholonwasdevastatedbytheairstrikes,buttheVietCong, bythistimelargelyleaderlessandlackinginstructions,stillheldtenaciouslyto theirpositions.Finally,onFebruary10,troopsfromanAmericanlightinfantry brigadedestroyedtheremainingVietCongholdouts.Sporadicfightingcontinued,butbyMarch7,thebattleforSaigonwouldbeover.
TETCOUNTRYWIDE Saigon was only one objective in the overall Communist plan. As fighting eruptedandincreasedinintensityinandaroundthecapitalcity,itseemedas iftherestofSouthVietnamwasalsoindangeroffallingtotheCommunists. ItsoonbecameclearthattheCommunistshadlaunchedamajorcountrywide offensive involving eighty thousand men, mainly Viet Cong, except in the northern provinces, where PAVN regulars predominated. Communist troops
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captured Hue and intense battles raged for Quang Tri in the north; Dalat, Kontum,Pleiku,andBanMeThuotintheCentralHighlands;andCanTho, MyTho,SocTrang,andBenTreintheDelta.TheCommunistsevenrocketed thehugeAmericanbaseatCamRanhBay.Theyalsoseizedcontrolofscoresof districtcapitals,disruptingtheSaigonregime’spacificationprogram. In Da Nang, South Vietnam’s second-largest city, the Communist attack resembled the initial moves in the battle for Saigon. The first assault wave utilized local VC units, sappers, and in-place agents, targeting headquarters andtrainingandlogisticsbases.AsinSaigon,theCommunistsachievedtotal surprise,eventhoughapoliceagentwhohadinfiltratedthelocalVCorganizationwarnedofthecomingattack.Areinforcedcompanybrieflypenetratedthe headquartersoftheSouthVietnameseICorpsontheoutskirtsofthecity,but eventuallytheSouthVietnamesesoldiersprevailedandtheattackonDaNang failed. FiercefightingalsotookplaceinthetwelveprovincesinIICorpsTactical Zone. Major ground attacks struck seven provincial capitals and three other objectives. Nha Trang was the first city to be attacked in the II Corps area. JustaftermidnightonJanuary31,elementsoffivesappercompaniessupported by mortar and recoilless rifle teams attacked the Naval Training Center and several targets within the city itself. ARVN Rangers and U.S. Special Forces detachments located in the area reacted quickly and regained control of the citywithintwelvehours. AtQuiNhon,acoastalcityinIICorpsarea,theARVNdefendersdiscovered theCommunistplanbeforetheattackbeganwhentheycapturedelevenVC agents.However,thesituationwassomuddledthattheARVNfailedtomake any special preparations and the Communist sappers attacked exactly as the capturedplanhadrevealedandstillseizedtheirobjectives. InBanMeThuotintheCentralHighlands,theARVNdivisionheadquarters therealsohadadvancewarningwhentheycapturedaplanforanattackonthe cityonJanuary20.Thedivisionalcommanderaccordinglycancelledhistroops’ leave and put them on alert. When the PAVN regiment attacked, the South Vietnamesesoldierswereready.Thebitterfightinglastedforninehours,with thecitycenterchanginghandsfourtimesbeforetheARVNregainedcontrol. AtDalat,amountainresortinIIARVNCorpsareaandalsothesiteofthe VietnameseNationalMilitaryAcademy,VCtroopscrashedpastweakoutposts tooccupythesouthwesternsectorofthetown.Thedeputyprovincechief,leadingtworegionalforcesecuritycompaniesandacompanyoffreshmancadets fromthemilitaryacademy,heldoutagainsttheoriginalVCbattalionandone thatcametoreinforcetheircomrades. IntheMekongDeltaregion,wheretheVietCongattackedthirteenofsixteenprovincialcities,theARVNleadershipwaslessthaneffective.Whenthe
TheTetOffensive 41
attackstruckthere,themajorgeneralcommandingIVCorpsdidnotemerge fromhisfortifiedcommandpostfordays,leavingtheconductofthedefenseto hisAmericanadvisers.Similarly,theARVNcolonelcommandingatVinhLong crackedunderthestressofthesituation.Anotherprovincialadviserfoundhis provincechiefwearingcivilianclothesunderhismilitaryuniform—justincase hehadtomakeaquickescape. MuchofthefightingintheDeltafelltotheAmericans.TheMobileRiverine Force (MRF) was a special American brigade-sized organization equipped to operateintheuniquecombatenvironmentthatprevailedintheMekongDelta, whichwascharacterizedbyavastnetworkofrivers,canals,andricepaddies. The MRF was a joint Army/Navy force consisting of improvised vessels and weaponstailoredforthenatureoftheoperationalarea.Builtaroundabrigade ofthe9thInfantryDivisionandtheNavy’sRiverAssaultFlotilla1,theMRFwas equippedwithspeciallydesignedwatercraft,includingarmoredtroopcarriers, barracksships,gunboats,andsixty-foot-long“monitors”armedwitharevolving armoredturrethousinga40mmcannonintendedforclosefiresupport. ThefirstattackinthedeltacameatMyTho,southofSaigon.ThreeVC battalions and a sapper company had entered the city while one battalion remainedontheoutskirts.TwoMRFbattalionsrushedtothecitytoreinforce theunitsoftheembattled7thARVNDivision.Ittookthreedaystorecapture MyTho.Thebattlefeaturedbitterhouse-to-housefighting,atypeofcombat far different from the MRF’s normal mission and one unsuited to its special weaponry.Nevertheless,theMRFhelpedsecurethecityandthenrushedoffto otherthreatenedpositions. Thefightinginthedeltawasintenseandresultedinseveredamagetothe citiesandtownswhereitoccurred.Aperfectexampleofthiscanbeseeninthe resultsoftheattackonBenTre,aMekongDeltarivercity.AreinforcedVC regimentnumberingabout2,500menattackedandgainedafootholdwithin the city. To evict the Communists, the Allies had to employ artillery and air strikes, causing extensive damage to the city and producing one of the more unfortunate, but memorable, quotes of the war. While explaining what had takenplace,itwasreportedthatanAmericanmajorsaid,“Itbecamenecessary to destroy the town to save it.”24 In Reporting Vietnam, William Hammond observes,“TheNewYorkTimesseizedupontheremarkassoonasitappeared. SodidTime.Fromthereitpassedintotheloreofthewartobecomeoneofthe mostserviceableiconsoftheantiwarmovement.”25Tomany,thequoteepitomizedtheseemingfutilityofthewarandthedevastationthatitwrought.Along withWestmoreland’s“lightattheendofthetunnel,”itturnedouttobeoneof thewar’sbest-rememberedphrases. Dayafterdayandweekafterweek,theTetOffensivecontinuedtodominate theheadlines.TheU.S.andSouthVietnameseforceshadtofightcitybycity
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to dislodge the Communist troops. Although the Communists had taken the Americans and North Vietnamese by surprise, their attacks were not as well coordinated as they might have been. Overcoming their initial surprise, the alliedforcesreactedreasonablyquicklyinmostcases,permittinglittletimefor theattackingforcestoestablishsoliddefensivepositions.ARVNfoughtmore effectively than most Americans had expected. Generally, the Communists wereunsuccessfulinmaintainingtheirpositionsinthecitiesforverylong,and South Vietnamese and U.S. troops inflicted heavy casualties and took many prisoners. Nevertheless, the resolute VC and PAVN troops fought hard and madeitdifficultforthealliedforces. Despiteheavyfightingatsomeplaces,ingeneral,theCommunistoffensive seemedtorunoutofsteambytheendofthefirstweekinFebruary.Inmost cases, allied control was regained in less than a week and Communist forces were driven out of most of the cities with a few days, with the exceptions being Cholon in Saigon and Hue, the current and ancient capitals of South Vietnam. SomeofthefiercestfightingoftheTetOffensive,andthewar,tookplacein thebattletorecapturetheoldimperialcityofHue,whichuntil1968wasarguablythemostbeautifulcityinSouthVietnam.TwoPAVNregimentsinfiltrated thecitybeforeTet;withsupportfromotherPAVNtroopsstationedoutside,they seizedcontrolonJanuary31.BythesecondweekinFebruary,withthefighting beginningtowinddownelsewhere,U.S.attentionturnedtothenorth,where U.S.MarinesfoundthemselvesconfrontedwithretakingHuewhileatthesame timeholdingoffthePAVNatKheSanh.
Chapter4
t h e b a t t l e f o r hu e
ThelongestandbloodiestbattleoftheTetOffensiveoccurredinHue,themost veneratedplaceinVietnam.Thecity,sixmiles(10km)westoftheSouthChina Seacoastandsixtymiles(100km)southofthedemilitarizedzone(DMZ),was thecapitalofThuaThienProvinceandSouthVietnam’sthird-largestcity,with awartimepopulationof140,000.Huewastheoldimperialcapitalandservedas theculturalandintellectualcenterofVietnam.Ithadbeentreatedalmostasan opencitybybothsidesandthushadremainedremarkablyfreeofwar.Although therehadbeensporadicmortarandrocketattacksinthearea,Hueitselfhad beenrelativelypeacefulandsecurebefore1968. HuewasoneofthekeystothenorthernprovincesofSouthVietnam.The city sits astride Highway 1, which in 1968 was one of the main land supply routesforthealliedtroopsoccupyingpositionsalongtheDMZtothenorth; thecityalsoservedasamajorunloadingpointforwaterbornesuppliesthatwere broughtinlandviatheriverfromthecoast. Hue was really two cities divided by the Song Huong, or Perfume River, whichflowedthroughthecityfromthesouthwesttothenortheastonitsway to the sea. Two-thirds of the city’s population lived north of the river within thewallsoftheOldCity,orCitadel,apicturesqueplaceofgardens,pagodas, moats,andintricatestonebuildings.JustoutsidethewallsoftheCitadeltothe eastwasthedenselypopulatedresidentialdistrictofGiaHoi.
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OncetheresidenceoftheAnnameseemperorswhohadruledthecentral portion of present-day Vietnam, the Citadel covered three square miles and wasprotectedbyanouterwallthirtyfeethighanduptofortyfeetthick,which formed a square about 2,700 yards on each side. Three sides were straight, whilethefourthwasroundedslightlytofollowthecurveoftheriver.Thethree wallsnotborderingtheriverwereencircledbyazigzagmoatthatwasninety feet wide at many points and up to twelve feet deep. Many areas of the wall werehoneycombedwithbunkersandtunnelsthathadbeenconstructedbythe JapanesewhentheyoccupiedthecityduringWorldWarII. The Citadel included block after block of row houses, parks, villas, and shops, along with various other buildings and an airstrip. Within the Citadel wasanotherenclave,theImperialPalacecompound,wheretheemperorshad heldcourtuntil1883,whentheFrenchtookcontrolofVietnam.Locatedatthe southendoftheCitadel,thepalacehadtwenty-foothighwallsthatmeasured 765yardsperside.TheCitadelandtheImperialPalacewere,asoneobserver putit,a“camera-totingtourist’sdream,”butwouldprovetobe“arifle-toting infantryman’snightmare.”1 SouthoftheriverandlinkedtotheCitadelbythesix-spanNguyenHoang Bridge,overwhichRoute1passed,laythemodernpartofthecity,whichwas abouthalfthesizeoftheCitadelandinwhichresidedaboutathirdofthecity’s population. The southern half of Hue contained the hospital, the provincial prison,thecathedral,andmanyofthecity’smodernstructures,includinggovernmentadministrativebuildings,theU.S.Consulate,HueUniversity,thecity’s highschool,andthenewerresidentialdistricts. The South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) 1st Infantry Division was headquarteredinHue.Thedivisionheadquarterswaslocatedatthenorthwestcornerof theCitadelinafortifiedcompound,butmostofitscombatunitswereoutside thecity,spreadoutalongHighway1northofHuetowardtheDMZ.Theonly combatelementinthecitywasthedivision’sHacBaoCompany,knownasthe “BlackPanthers,”aneliteall-volunteerunitthatservedasthedivisionreconnaissanceandrapidreactionforce.Securitywithinthecityitselfwasprimarily theresponsibilityoftheNationalPolice. The only U.S. military presence in Hue when the battle began was the MilitaryAssistanceCommand,Vietnam(MACV)advisorycompound,which housedtwohundredAmericansoldiersandahandfulofAustralianswhoserved asadviserstothe1stARVNDivision.Thislightlyfortifiedcompoundlayonthe easternedgeofthemodernpartofthecityaboutablockandahalfsouthof theNguyenHoangBridge.ThenearestU.S.combatbasewasPhuBai,eight miles south along Route 1, which was a major Marine Corps command post andsupportfacilitythatwasthehomeofTask Force X-Ray, which had been established as a forward headquarters of the 1st Marine Division. The task
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force, commanded by Brigadier General Foster C. “Frosty” LaHue, assistant commanderofthe1stMarineDivision,wasmadeupoftwoMarineregimental headquarters and three battalions. Most of these troops had only recently arrived in the Phu Bai area, having been displaced from Da Nang, and they werestillgettingacquaintedwiththeareaofoperationswhentheCommunists launchedtheirattackonHue. Opposing the allied forces in the Hue region were eight thousand Communist troops, a total of ten battalions, including two People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) regiments and six Viet Cong (VC) main-force battalions.2 During the course of the battle for Hue, the total Communist force in and aroundthecitywouldgrowtotwentybattalionswhenthreeadditionalinfantry regimentsweredispatchedtotheHueareafromtheKheSanhbattlefield. Before the Tet Offensive began, the Communists had prepared extensive plansfortheattackonHue,whichcalledforadivision-sizeassaultonthecity, whileotherforcescutoffaccesstoHuetoprecludealliedreinforcements.The senior PAVN commanders believed that once the city’s population realized the superiority of the Communist troops, the people would immediately rise uptojoinforceswiththeVCandPAVNagainsttheAmericansandtheSouth Vietnamese,drivingthemoutofHue.Possessingverydetailedinformationon civilandmilitaryinstallationswithinthecity,theCommunistmilitaryplanners had divided the city into four tactical areas and prepared a list of 196 targets withinthecity.Theyplannedtousemorethanfivethousandsoldierstotake thecityinoneswiftblow. DocumentscapturedduringandaftertheTetoffensiveindicatethatVCand PAVNtroopsreceivedintensivetraininginthetechniqueofcitystreetfighting beforetheoffensivebegan.3Adeptatfightinginthejunglesandricepaddies, thePAVNandVCsoldiersrequiredadditionaltrainingtoprepareforthespecialrequirementsoffightinginurbanareas. While the assault troops trained for the battle to come, VC intelligence officers prepared a list of “cruel tyrants and reactionary elements” to be roundedupduringtheearlyhoursoftheattack.4ThislistincludedmostSouth Vietnamese officials, military officers, politicians, American civilians, and otherforeigners.Aftercapture,theseindividualsweretobeevacuatedtothe jungleoutsidethecity,wheretheywouldbepunishedfortheircrimesagainst theVietnamesepeople. The PAVN commanders had carefully selected the time for the attack. BecauseoftheTetholiday,theARVNdefenderswouldbeatreducedstrength. In addition, bad weather that traditionally accompanied the northeast monsoon season would hamper aerial resupply operations and impede close air support,whichwouldotherwisehavegiventhealliedforcesinHueaconsiderableadvantage.
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The city’s defense hinged in large part on the leadership of Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong, commander of the 1st ARVN Division, who wasregardedbymanyU.S.advisersasoneofthebestseniorcommandersin the South Vietnamese armed forces.5 A 1954 graduate of the Dalat Military Academy,hehadwonhispositionthroughabilityandcombatleadershipand notbecauseofpoliticalinfluenceorbribery,aswasthecasewithmanyother SouthVietnamesegenerals. On the morning of January 30, the beginning of the Tet holiday, Truong received reports of VC attacks on Da Nang, Nha Trang, and other South Vietnamese installations during the previous night. Sensing that something wasamiss,hegatheredhisdivisionstaffattheheadquarterscompoundandput themandhisremainingtroopsonfullalert.Unfortunately,overhalfofhisdivisionwasonholidayleaveandoutofthecity.BelievingthattheCommunists wouldnotattackthe“open”citydirectly,Truongpositionedhisavailableforces aroundthecitytodefendoutsidetheurbanarea;heassignedtheonlyregular ARVN troops in the city, the Hac Bao “Black Panther” reconnaissance company,todefendtheairstripatthenortheasterncorneroftheCitadel.
THEBATTLEBEGINS UnbeknowntoTruongashemadehispreparationsforwhateverwastocome, therewereclearindicationsthattherewouldbeadirectattackonhiscity.On thesamedaythattheSouthVietnamesecommanderputhisstaffonalert,a U.S.ArmyradiointerceptunitatPhuBaioverheardCommunistorderscalling foranimminentassaultonHue.Followingstandardprocedure,theintercept unitforwardedthemessagethroughnormalchannels.Windingitswaythrough severalcommandlayers,theinterceptandassociatedintelligenceanalysisdid notmakeittotheHuedefendersuntilthecitywasalreadyunderattack.6 Evenastheintelligencereportmadeitswayslowlythroughchannels,the VietConghadalreadyinfiltratedthecity.Asinothertargetcities,Communist troopswearingciviliangarbhadmingledwiththethrongsofpeoplewhohad come to Hue for the Tet holiday. They had easily transported their weapons andammunitionintothecityinwagons,truckbeds,andotherhidingplaces. IntheearlymorninghoursofJanuary31,thesesoldierstookupinitialpositions inHueandpreparedtolinkupwiththePAVNandVCassaulttroops.At3:40 a.m.,theCommunistslaunchedarocketandmortarbarragefromthemountainstothewestonboththeoldandthenewsectorsofthecity.Followingthis barrage,theassaulttroopsbegantheirattack.TheVCinfiltratorshaddonned theiruniforms,mettheircomradesatthegates,andledthemintheattackon keyinstallationsinthecity.
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TwoPAVNbattalionsofinfantryandaVCsapperbattalionlaunchedthe mainattackfromthesouthwestandmovedquicklyacrossthePerfumeRiver into the Citadel toward the ARVN division headquarters in the northeastern corner (see Map 6). The PAVN troops rapidly overran most of the Citadel, butTruongandhisstaffheldtheattackersoffatthedivisioncompound,while theHacBaoCompanymanagedtoholditspositionattheeasternendofthe airfield.BydaylightonJanuary31,thePAVNcontrolledtherestoftheCitadel, includingtheImperialPalace. ThesituationwasnotmuchbetterfortheAmericansandAustralianssouth of the river in the new city. A PAVN battalion twice assaulted the MACV compound, but the attackers were repelled each time by rapidly assembled defenders armed with individual weapons. Failing to take the compound, PAVNtriedtoreduceitwithmortarandautomatic-weaponsfirefromoverlookingbuildings.Thedefendersheldtheirgroundandwaitedforreinforcements. Meanwhile,twoVCbattalionstookovertheThuaThienprovinceheadquarters,thepolicestation,andothergovernmentbuildingssouthoftheriver.At thesametime,otherPAVNforcesoccupiedblockingpositionsonthesouthern edgeofthecitytopreventreinforcementfromthatdirection. Thusinveryshortorder,theCommunistshadseizedcontrolofvirtuallyall ofHue.WhenthesuncameuponthemorningofJanuary31,nearlyeveryone inthecitycouldseethegold-starred,blue-and-redNationalLiberationFront flagflyinghighovertheCitadel.ItwasclearthattheVCandPAVNtroopswere nowinchargeinHue. Having captured most of the city, the VC cadre instituted a new political regime and established Revolutionary Committees to control the various neighborhoods.WhiletheNVAandVCassaulttroopsroamedthestreetsfreely and consolidated their gains, political officers began rounding up the South Vietnamese and foreigners on the special lists. They marched through the Citadel, reading out the names on the lists through loudspeakers and telling themtoreporttoalocalschool.Thosewhodidnotreportwerehunteddown.7 Mostofthedetaineeswereneverseenaliveagain. AsthebattleeruptedatHue,fightingragedelsewhereincitiesandtowns fromtheDMZtotheCaMauPeninsulainthesouth,andalliedforceshad theirhandsfullalloverthecountry.Thenorthernprovinceswerenoexception, and it would prove difficult to assemble sufficient uncommitted combat power to oust the Communists from Hue. Additionally, U.S. and South Vietnamese forces had been moved to the west to support the action in and aroundKheSanh,thusreducingthenumberoftroopsavailableintheentire northernregion. General Truong, who by this time had only a tenuous hold on his own headquarters compound, ordered one of his regiments, reinforced with two
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airborne battalions and an armored cavalry troop, to make its way into the Citadel from their positions northwest of the city. En route, these forces encounteredintensesmallarmsandautomaticweaponsfireastheynearedthe Citadel.TheyfoughttheirwaythroughtheresistanceandreachedTruong’s headquarterslateintheafternoon. As Truong tried to consolidate his forces, another call for reinforcements went out from the surrounded advisors at the MACV compound. This plea for assistance was almost lost in all the confusion caused by the simultaneous attacks going on all over the I Corps Tactical Zone. Lieutenant General HoangXuanLam,commanderoftheSouthVietnameseforcesinICorps,and Lieutenant General Robert Cushman, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) commander, were not sure what exactly was happening inside the city. The strengthandthescopeoftheCommunistattackwaslessthanclearduringthe early hours of the battle, but the allied commanders realized that additional forces would be needed to eject the Communists from Hue. Accordingly, CushmanorderedTFX-Raytosendreinforcementsintothecitytorelievethe besiegedMACVcompound. While both ARVN and U.S. commanders tried to assess the situation and preparedtomovemoretroopstoHue,PAVNforcesquicklyestablishedadditional blocking positions to prevent those reinforcements from reaching the beleaguereddefenders.
THEMARINESRESPOND General LaHue, commander of Task Force X-Ray, dispatched a company of MarinestomoveupRoute1fromPhuBaibytrucktorelievethesurrounded U.S.advisers.LaHue,havingreceivednoreliableintelligencetothecontrary, believedthatonlyasmallenemyforcehadpenetratedHueaspartofalocal diversionary attack; little did he know that almost a full enemy division had seizedthecity.Hethereforesentonlyonecompanytodealwiththesituation. LaHue later admitted, “Initial deployment of force was made with limited information.”8 Notknowingexactlywhattoexpectwhentheyreachedthecity,theMarine companyheadednorthasordered,joiningupwithfourMarinetanksenroute. Astheyapproachedthecity,theyencounteredstiffresistancefromthePAVN defendersandbecamepinneddownbetweentheriverandthePhuCamcanal, justshortoftheMACVcompoundtheyhadbeensenttorelieve. Withthefirstcompanyunabletocontinuetheattack,areactionforcewas hastilyorganizedandbegantomoveupthehighway,reinforcedwithtwoselfpropelledtwin-40mmguns.Theforcemetlittleresistancealongthewayand
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linkedupwiththeoriginalreliefforce.Withtheaidoffourtanksandtheselfpropelledguns,thecombinedforcefoughtitswaytotheMACVcompound, reachingthebeleaguereddefendersatabout3:15p.m.Thecost,however,was high:tenMarineswerekilledandthirtywerewounded. HavinglinkedupwiththedefendersoftheMACVcompound,theMarines were ordered to cross the Perfume River and break through to the ARVN divisionheadquartersintheCitadel.Leavingthetanksonthesouthernbank to support by fire, the Marines attempted to cross the Nguyen Hoang Bridge leadingintotheCitadel.Astheinfantrystartedacross,theymetahailoffire fromamachinegunpositionatthenorthendofthebridge.Accordingtoone Marine,thePAVNwerewelldug-inand“firingfromvirtuallyeverybuildingin Huecity”northoftheriver.9Aftertwohoursofintensefighting,theMarines wereforcedtopullback.TheattemptbytheMarinestoforcetheirwayacross the bridge had been costly; the Marine company lost one-third of the unit killedorwounded“goingacrossthatonebridgeandthengettingbackacross thebridge.”10 AtPhuBai,despitedetailedreportsfromhistroopsinthecity,LaHueand hisintelligenceofficersstilldidnothaveagoodappreciationofwhatwashappeninginHue.Helaterexplained,“EarlyintelligencedidnotrevealthequantityofenemyinvolvedthatwesubsequentlyfoundwerecommittedtoHue.”11 TheintelligencepictureofwhatwashappeninginHuewasjustasconfused at MACV headquarters in Saigon; General William Westmoreland cabled GeneralEarleWheeler,chairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,thatthe“enemy hasapproximatelythreecompaniesintheHueCitadelandMarineshavesent abattalionintotheareatoclearthemout.”12ThisrepeatedgrossunderestimationofenemystrengthinHueresultedininsufficientforcesbeingallocatedfor retakingthecityintheearlydaysofthebattle. WiththeSouthVietnameseforcesfullyoccupiedintheCitadelnorthofthe river,LieutenantGeneralLam,ICorpscommander,andGeneralCushman decided to divide responsibility for the battle. They agreed that ARVN forces wouldberesponsibleforclearingtheCitadelandtherestofHuenorthofthe river,whiletheMarineswouldclearoutthesouthernpartofthecity.Thissituationresultedinwhatwouldbe,ineffect,twoseparateanddistinctbattlesthat wouldrageinHue,onesouthoftheriverandonenorthoftheriver. TheancientcapitalwasalmostsacredtotheVietnamesepeople,particularly sototheBuddhists.ThedestructionofthecitywouldresultinpoliticalrepercussionsthatneithertheUnitedStatesnorthegovernmentofSouthVietnam could afford. Cushman later recalled, “I wasn’t about to open up on the old palace and all the historical buildings there.”13 As a result, limitations were imposed on the use of artillery and close air support to minimize collateral damage.Eventuallytheserestrictionswereliftedwhenitwasrealizedthatboth
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artilleryandcloseairsupportwouldbenecessarytodislodgetheenemyfrom thecity.However,theinitialrulesofengagementplayedakeyroleinthedifficultiesincurredbythealliesintheearlydaysofthebitterfighting. Having divided up the city, Cushman, with Westmoreland’s concurrence, began to send reinforcements into the Hue area in an attempt to seal off the enemyinsidethecityfromoutsidesupport.BeginningonFebruary2,elements of the U.S. Army 1st Cavalry Division entered the battle with the mission of blocking the enemy approaches into the city from the north and west. While these U.S. Army units saw plenty of heavy action in these outlying areas and contributedgreatlytotheeventualalliedvictoryatHue,thefightinginsidethe citywastoremaininthehandsofSouthVietnamesetroopsandU.S.Marines.
FIGHTINGINTHENEW CITY As the ARVN and Marines made preparations for counterattacks in their assignedareas,theweathertookaturnfortheworsewhenthetemperaturefell into the fifties and the low clouds opened up with a cold drenching rain. As therainfell,theMarineslaunchedanattacktoseizetheThuaThienProvince headquartersbuildingandprison,adistanceofsixblockswestoftheMACV compound.Thefightingwasimmediatelyjoined.OneMarinelaterrecalled, “We didn’t get a block away [from the MACV compound] when we started gettingsniperfire.Wegotatank...wentablock,turnedrightandreceived 57mmrecoillesswhichputoutourtank.”Theattackwas“stoppedcold”and thebattalionfellbacktoitsoriginalpositionneartheMACVcompound.14 Bythistime,LaHuehadfinallyrealizedthatheandhisintelligenceofficers hadvastlyunderestimatedthestrengthoftheCommunistssouthoftheriver. Accordingly,hecalledinColonelStanleyS.Hughes,newcommanderofthe 1stMarineRegiment,andgavehimoveralltacticalcontrolofU.S.forcesinthe southernpartofthecity.Assumingcommandofthebattle,Hughesordereda newattack.Bytheafternoonofthenextday,theMarineshadreachedtheHue Universitycampus,butonlyafterintensefighting. OntheafternoonofFebruary2,ColonelHughesmovedhiscommandgroup intoHue,wherehecouldmoredirectlycontrolthebattle.Onceinthecity,he wastednotimeintakingchargeofthesituation.Heorderedoneofhisunits, the1stBattalion,1stMarines,tokeepthemainsupplyrouteintothecityopen anddirectedhisotherbattalion,2ndofthe5thMarines,toattacksouthfromthe universitytowardtheprovincialheadquarters,tellingthebattalioncommander, LieutenantColonelErnestC.Cheatham,to“cleantheNVAout.”15 FromtheMACVcompoundtotheconfluenceofthePerfumeRiverandthe PhuCamCanalwasalmostelevenblocks,eachofwhichhadbeentransformed
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bythePAVNtroopsintoafortressthatwouldhavetobeclearedbuildingby building.TheMarinesbegantheirattacktowardthetreasurybuildingandpost office,buttheymadeveryslowprogress,nothavingyetdevisedworkabletacticstodealwiththedemandsoftheurbanterrain.AstheMarines,supported bytanks,triedtoadvance,thePAVNtroopshitthemwithawitheringarrayof mortar, rocket, machine gun, and small arms fire from prepared positions in thebuildings. TheMarinesjustdidnothaveenoughmentodealwiththePAVNsoldiers entrenchedinthebuildings.BytheeveningofFebruary3,theyhadmadelittle progress and were taking increasing casualties as they fought back and forth overthesamegroundagainstafiercelydeterminedfoe. EarlyinthemorningofFebruary4,theMarinesrenewedtheirattack.Ittook twenty-fourhoursofbitterfightingjusttoreachthetreasurybuilding.Attacking therearofthebuildingafterblastingholesthroughadjacentcourtyardwallswith 106mm recoilless rifle fire, the Marines finally took the facility, but only after ithadbeenplasteredwith90mmtankrounds,106mmrecoillessrifles,81mm mortars,andfinallyteargas.ThePAVNforcesfoughtwell,makingtheMarines paydearlyfortheiradvance,buttheMarinesresolutelypressedtheattack. Inrapidlydeterioratingweather,theMarinesfoundthemselvesinaroomby-room, building-by-building struggle to clear an eleven-by-nine-block area just south of the river. Fighting in such close quarters against an entrenched enemy was decidedly different from what the Marines had been trained to do. Accustomed to fighting in the sparsely populated countryside of I Corps TacticalZone,nothingintheirtraininghadpreparedthemforthetypeofwarfaredemandedbythisurbansetting. Itwassavagework—house-to-housefightingthroughcitystreets—ofatype largely unseen by Americans since World War II. Fighting in the winding, narrowconfinesofHue’sstreetsnegatedthealliededgesinmobilityandfirepower.Groundgainedinthefightingwastobemeasuredininches,andeach cityblockcostdearly,aseveryalley,streetcorner,window,andgardenhadto be paid for in blood. Correspondents who moved forward with the Marines reportedthefightingasthemostintensetheyhadeverseeninthewar. Thecombatwasrelentless.SmallgroupsofMarinesmoveddoggedlyfrom housetohouse,assaultingenemypositionswithwhateversupportingfirewas available,blowingholesinwallswithrocketlaunchersorrecoillessrifles,then sendingfireteamsandsquadsintothebreach.UsingM-16riflesandgrenades, theMarineshadtocleareachstructureroombyroom.Makingskillfuluseof Hue’s numerous courtyards and walled estates, the PAVN fought back every stepoftheway. ProgressfortheMarineswasslow,methodical,andcostly.OnFebruary5, there was a particularly bloody battle when one Marine company captured
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theThuaThienprovinceheadquartersbuilding.Usingtwotanksand106mm recoillessriflesmountedon“mechanicalmules”(aflat-bedded,self-propelled carrier about the size of a jeep), the Marines advanced against intense automaticweaponsfire,rockets,andmortars.Respondingwiththeirownmortars andteargas,theyfinallyoverwhelmedthePAVNdefendersinmid-afternoon. The fighting continued, but it was not until February 11 that the Marines captured the province headquarters and reached the confluence of the river and the canal. Two days later, they crossed into the western suburbs of Hue, aimingtolinkupwithtroopersofthe1stCavalryDivision,whoweremoving in toward the city. By February 14, most of the city south of the river was in Americanhands,butmoppingupoperationswouldtakeanothertwelvedays as rockets and mortar rounds continued to fall and isolated snipers harassed Marine patrols. The Marines had recaptured the new city, but they had sustained38deadand320woundedindoingso.Ithadbeenevenmorecostlyfor thePAVN,whohadfoughtdesperatelyastheygavegroundtotheMarines;the bodiesofmorethanathousandVCandPAVNsoldierswerestrewnaboutthe citysouthoftheriver.
THEFIGHTFORTHE CITADEL WhiletheMarineshadfoughtforthesouthernpartofthecity,thebattlenorth of the river had continued to rage. By February 4, the ARVN advance had effectivelystalledamongthehouses,alleys,andnarrowstreetsadjacenttothe Citadelwalltothenorthwestandsouthwest,leavingthePAVNstillinpossessionoftheImperialPalaceandmostofthesurroundingarea. On the night of February 6–7, the PAVN counterattacked and forced the ARVNtroopstopullbacktotheTayLocairfield.Atthesametime,theNorth Vietnameserushedadditionalreinforcementsintothecity.Truongresponded by sending reinforcements of his own into the battle. However, the ARVN troopsstillfailedtomakeanyheadwayagainstthedug-inPAVN,whohadburroweddeeplyintothewallsandtightlypackedbuildings. Withhistroopsstalled,anembarrassedandfrustratedTruongappealedto the Marines for help. On February 10, LaHue ordered one of his battalions intotheoldcitytohelprecapturetheCitadel.Atthesametime,twobattalions of Vietnamese Marines moved into the southwest corner of the Citadel with orderstosweepwest.ThisbuildupofalliedforcesinsidetheCitadelputintense pressureonthePAVNforces,buttheystoodtheirgroundandredoubledefforts toholdtheirpositions.
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Once in the old city, the Marines from Major Robert H. Thompson’s 1st Battalion,5thMarineslaunchedtheattackdowntheeastwalloftheCitadel towardtheriver.Underheavyenemyfire,theadvancedidnotgetveryfar,with theMarineslosingfifteenkilledandfortywounded.Afreshcompanyreplaced theleadunit,butonceagain,heavysmallarms,machinegun,androcketfire thatseemedtocomefromeverydirectionrakedtheMarines.Nevertheless,they managedtoinchforward,usingairstrikes,navalgunfire,andartillerysupport. Thefightingprovedevenmoresavagethanthebattleforthenewcityonthe southbank. The next day another Marine company was inserted into the battle by boat. After making preparations, the new company launched their attack the following morning to take a key tower on the east wall. For the next twentyfourhours,thebattleseesawedbackandforthwhilemuchoftheCitadelwas poundedtorubblebycloseairsupport,artillery,andheavyweaponsfire.The bitterhand-to-handfightingwentonrelentlessly.TheMarineswereattackinga defender’sparadise—rowafterrowofsinglestory,thick-walledmasonryhouses jammed close together up against a solid wall riddled with spider-holes and other fighting positions. The Marines discovered that the PAVN units in the Citadelemployed“bettercity-fightingtactics,improvedthealreadyformidable defenses, dug trenches, built roadblocks and conducted counterattacks to regainredoubtswhichwereimportantto...[their]defensivescheme.”16Itwas abattlefoughtinchbyinch;eachPAVNstrongpointhadtobereducedwith close-quarterfighting.NosoonerhadonepositionbeentakenthanthePAVN troopsopenedupfromanother,exactingadeadlytollontheMarinesasthey inchedtheirforward. By February 17, the Marines attacking the Citadel had suffered 47 killed and240woundedinjustfivedaysoffighting.OnFebruary18,withwhatwas leftofhisbattalioncompletelyexhaustedandnearlyoutofammunition,Major Thompsonchosetoresthistroopsinpreparationforarenewaloftheattack. Thefollowingmorning,theMarinesresumedtheattacktowardtheImperial Palace.Aftertwenty-fourmorehoursofbitterfighting,theysecuredthewall, buthadvirtuallyspentthemselvesindoingsoagainstthedug-inPAVNdefenderswhofoughtdesperatelytoholdtheirpositions.Meanwhile,troopsfromthe U.S.1stCavalryDivisionhadtakenuppositionswestoftheCitadeltosealoff thecityfromNorthVietnamesereplacementsandsupplies. ForthefinalassaultontheImperialPalaceitself,afreshunit,CompanyLof the3rdBattalion,5thMarines,wasbroughtin.ByFebruary22,thePAVNheld onlythesouthwesterncorneroftheCitadel.TheMarinesbreachedtheouter perimeterofthepalace,butonceinside,theywerefacedbyintensefirefrom theentrenchedPAVNdefenders.
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AstheMarinesgirdedthemselvesforthenextassaultontheImperialPalace, MACVdecidedthatitwaspoliticallyexpedienttohavethepalaceliberatedby theSouthVietnamese.17OnthenightofFebruary23–24,anARVNbattalion launchedasurpriseattackwestwardalongthewallinthesoutheasternsection oftheCitadel.Asavagebattleensued,buttheSouthVietnamesepressedthe attack.ThePAVN,sufferingfromalackofammunitionandsupplies,fellback. Allied forces overran some of the last positions; VC and PAVN troops abandonedtheothersastheywithdrewwestwardtosanctuariesinLaos. On March 2, 1968, the battle for Hue was declared officially over. “The twenty-fivedaystruggleforHuewasthelongestandbloodiestgroundactionof theTetoffensive,”saidtheWashingtonPost’sDonOberdorfer,whowitnessed itfirsthand,“and,quitepossibly,thelongestandbloodiestsingleactionofthe Second Indochina War.”18 It had been a bitter ordeal, and the casualties on both sides had been high. In the twenty-six days of combat, the ARVN lost 384killedandmorethan1,800wounded,plus30missinginaction.TheU.S. Marinessuffered147deadand857wounded.TheU.S.Armysustained74dead and507woundedinthebattlesthatragedintheareasurroundingthecity.The alliesclaimedover5,000Communistskilledinthecityandanestimated3,000 killedinthefightinginthesurroundingarea.ActualfiguresofVCandPAVN casualtiesarenotknown,butitisclearthattheCommunistsforceshadpaid dearlyinthebitterfighting. Intheend,theU.S.andARVNforceshadretakenthecity,butthecostly battle had demonstrated that the Communists could occupy an important city,thoughttobesafefromthewarandunderthecontroloftheallies.The Americanhighcommandhadbeencompletelysurprisedbytheaudacityofthe enemyattacks.Americanintelligencehadfailedtopickupthedangersignsof impendingCommunistassaultuntilitwastoolate.Accordingtoalliedintelligence before the battle, PAVN units that fought in the Hue were not even supposedtohavebeeninthearea;theyhadverystealthilysurroundedthecity, eludingalliedintelligenceefforts.Onceinthecity,theyfoughtskillfullyand tenaciously to hold it, inflicting heavy casualties on the Marines and South Vietnamesesoldiers. The cost of the battle for the people of Hue was catastrophic. During the twenty-fivedaysofintensefightingtoretakethecity,Huewasreducedtorubble, blockbyblock.AlthoughtheU.S.commandhadtriedtolimitdamagetothe citybyrelyingonextremelyaccurate8-inchhowitzersandnavalgunfire,much oftheoncebeautifulcitylayinrubble.Estimatestalliedtenthousandhouses eithertotallydestroyedordamaged,roughly40percentofthecity,and116,000 civilians were made homeless (out of a pre-Tet population of 140,000). One observerdescribedthedestructionafterthefighting,“Thebeautifulcity...was ashattered,stinkinghulk,itsstreetschokedwithrubbleandrottingbodies.”19
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Asidefromthisbattledamage,thecivilianpopulationsufferedterriblelosses from the fighting: some 5,800 were reported killed or missing. Many of the deadandwoundedweretrappedintherubbleoftheirhomesandcourtyards. Theexactextentofthebattle’stollontheciviliansinHuewouldnotbecome clear for some time. In late February, soldiers moving through the Gia Hoi schoolyard came across freshly turned earth; upon investigation, the soldiers discovered the hastily buried bodies of a number of civilians, most of whom hadbeenboundandshot.Thisprovedonlythefirstinstanceofsuchgraves, andmorebodieswouldbefoundoverthecourseofthenextseveralmonths.In total, South Vietnamese authorities uncovered nearly three thousand corpses inmassgravesintheHuearea.Mosthadbeenshot,bludgeonedtodeath,or buriedalive,almostallwiththeirhandstiedbehindtheirbacks.Thevictims included soldiers, civil servants, merchants, clergymen, schoolteachers, intellectuals,andforeigners.SouthVietnameseinvestigatorschargedthatVCcadreshadroundedupthevictimsandexecutedthemaftertheCommunistshad seized the city in early February. Others were apparently killed as the PAVN withdrewfromtheCitadel.
Chapter5
t h e s i eg e o f k he s a n h
On the morning of January 31, 1968, when the Tet Offensive was launched, General William Westmoreland remained convinced that the enemy’s real goalwastheconquestoftheU.S.MarinebaseatKheSanh,eventhoughthe enemy’srealintentionswereunclear.TheattacksonSaigonandothercities, he declared, were designed to create “maximum consternation” in Vietnam andwere“diversionary”tothemaineffortstilltocomeatKheSanhandthe northernpartofthecountry.1 TheMarineswerelessconvincedthatholdingKheSanhwasagoodidea. Senior commanders thought that Khe Sanh was too isolated and too hard to support.Theassistantcommanderofthe3rdMarineDivisionsummedupthis sentiment by saying, “When you’re at Khe Sanh, you’re not really anywhere. Youcouldloseit,andyoureallyhaven’tlostadamnthing.”2ButWestmoreland didnotseeitthatway.KheSanhwasalinchpininhisfutureplansforoperationsinLaos,andanyCommunistbuilduptherethreatenedhisstrategy. Westmorelandhadgoodcausetobeconcernedwiththeworseningsituation atKheSanh.TheMarineshadbeenunderheavyshellingandlivinginastate ofsiegesinceJanuary21,tendaysbeforethestartoftheTetOffensive.Forthe nextseventy-sevendays,theMarineswouldendureadailybombardmentwhile enemyassaultunitsprobedforasoftspotinthedefenses.
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Some American political leaders had begun to fear that Khe Sanh might turnintoanotherDienBienPhu.ThePeople’sArmyofVietnam(PAVN)had successfullyclosedRoute9,isolatingKheSanhandprecludinggroundresupplyoftheMarinesdefendingthebase.Onseverallevels,thesituationwasreminiscentofthe1954battlethathadendedinFrenchdefeat.However,intruth, conditionsatKheSanhweredecidedlydifferentfromthoseatDienBienPhu. TheFrenchpositionhadbeeninavalley,andtheNorthVietnamesehadcontrolledthesurroundinghills.AtKheSanh,theMarineshadamuchstronger position;theycontrolledthecriticalhighgroundthatsurroundedthebase.In addition,AmericanforcespossessedamuchstrongerairforcethantheFrench had at Dien Bien Phu. With those air assets, Westmoreland was convinced thathecouldpoundtheenemyfromtheairandatthesametimecontinueto supporttheMarinebasecompletelybyaerialresupplyevenifitremainedsurroundedbythePAVNontheground. It must also be pointed out that Khe Sanh, while surrounded by enemy forces,didnotmeetthestrictestdefinitionof“siege”inthehistoricalsense.The Marinesconductedconstantpatrolsfromthebase,oftenasfarasathirdofa milefromtheirownlines.3TheintentwastokeepthePAVNoffbalanceandto gatherintelligence.Thus,giventheabilitytoconductpatrolsoutsidethewire andthefactthathelicoptersandfixedwingaircraftcouldgetintoandoutof KheSanh,itwasnottrulybesiegedinthetraditionalsense,asDienBienPhu mostdefinitelyhadbeen. DespitethedifferencesbetweenKheSanhandDienBienPhu,theMarines knewthattheCommunistsmighttrytoreplicatetheirearliervictoryandthey wereclearlyawareofhowcriticaltheirmissionwas.TheMarinecommander told his men that they were “going to be remembered in American history books.”4 He told them that their mission had been ordered by the highest authorityandthattheyweretoholdKheSanh“atallcosts.”TheMarineswere awarethatWestmorelandwantedtoturntheareaaroundKheSanhintoakillinggroundwheretheoftentoo-illusiveenemycouldbedrawnintoaset-piece battleanddestroyedbyAmericanfirepower.OneoftheMarineartilleryofficers atKheSanhdescribedthesituationbestwhenhesaid,“Ourentirephilosophy [is]toallowtheenemytosurroundusclosely,tomassaboutus,torevealhis troop and logistic routes, to establish his dumps and assembly areas, and to preparehissiegeworksasenergeticallyashedesires.Theresults[willbe]an enormousquantityoftargets...idealforheavybombers.”5OneMarinewho survivedthesiegeputitinmorepersonalterms,saying,“themarinesatKhe Sanh were bait; chum liberally spread around the Khe Sanh tactical area to enticelargemilitaryforcesofNorthVietnamfromthedepthsoftheirsanctuariestotheexposedshallowsofAmerica’shigh-technologykillingmachine.”6
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OneofthosemostconcernedwiththeworseningsituationatKheSanhwas Lyndon Johnson. On February 2, at a press conference in the White House, the president had announced that the Tet offensive was a “complete failure.” However,afterpointingoutthattheCommunistshadalreadysufferedstaggering lossesestimatedatmorethantenthousandkilled,hesoundedanoteofcaution, saying that the third phase of the Communist campaign—a “massive attack” across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in the area of Khe Sanh—was “imminent.”7Thus,despitethefactthatthefightingcontinuedinHue,theattentionof boththeWhiteHouseandWestmorelandremainedfixedonKheSanh. Before the Tet offensive began, there had been some discussion in the White House about the advisability of continuing to defend Khe Sanh, but withtheCommunistattackontheMarinebaseonJanuary21,thedebateabout whether to hold Khe Sanh came to an abrupt halt. General Maxwell Taylor laterrecalled,“Itwasapparentthatthediewascastandwewouldhavetofight itoutonthisline...weourselveshaddoneagreatdealtobuilduptheimportanceofKheSanhinthemindsofthepublic,anditwasgoingtobedifficult toexplaintoourpeopleoranyoneelsethatKheSanhwasaminoroutpostand theoutcomeofthebattleunimportant.”8 With the decision to hold Khe Sanh, both the White House and the PentagonfocusedonthesixthousandMarinesthereandthetwentythousand PAVN soldiers who surrounded them. Concerned about the ability of the Marines to hold, General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,cabledWestmorelandtoraisethepossibilityof“whethertacticalnuclear weaponsshouldbeusedifthesituationinKheSanhshouldbecomethatdesperate.”Acknowledgingthattheirusewasunlikely,heneverthelessrequested alistoftargetsinthearea“whichlendthemselvestonuclearstrikes,whether somecontingencynuclearplanningwouldbeinorder,andwhatyouwould considertobesomeofthemoresignificantprosandconsofusingtac[tactical]nukesinsuchacontingency.”9Westmorelandrepliedthathedidnotthink thesituationwouldrequiretheuseofnuclearweapons,butthattheyshould not be ruled out if the North Vietnamese launched a major invasion south across the DMZ, and therefore contingency planning was ongoing. Johnson latervehementlydeniedthatnuclearweaponshadeverbeenconsidered(and Westmoreland was quietly told to discontinue planning for their use). This episodeindicatesthemind-setintheWhiteHouseandPentagonasthesituationatKheSanhworsened.Politically,aswellasmilitarily,KheSanhhadto beheldatallcosts. Events would soon increase that concern. On the night of February 3, the American sensors that had been dropped during Operation Niagara detectedheavyenemytroopmovement.Twodayslater,intheearlymorning hoursofFebruary5,Hill861Awasattacked.ToMACV,itappearedthatthe
TheSiegeofKheSanh 59
Communists,takingadvantageofthefactthatthenationwideTetOffensive had diverted attention away from Khe Sanh, were renewing their efforts to capturethecombatbaseandthesurroundingarea.At3:05a.m.,heavyshellingbeganonKheSanhCombatBaseandseveraloftheoutlyingpositions. Atthesametime,waveafterwaveofPAVNriflemenfromthe325CDivision strucktheMarinesonHill861A.Theskillfulanddeterminedattackquickly gainedafootholdonthenorthernedgeoftheAmericanperimeter,butthere wasabrieflullinthefightingasthePAVNsoldiers“stoppedtosiftthroughthe Marinepositionsforsouvenirs.”10Takingadvantageofthelull,theMarines rallied and launched a counterattack. The fight degenerated into hand-tohandcombatastheMarinesforcedthePAVNtroopsback.Shortlyafterdawn, the PAVN made another concerted assault to take the Marine position, but the Marines, supported by mortars from the surrounding hills, prevailed in thebitterfighting.
THEFALLOFLANG VEI AsPAVNforcescompletedtheirencirclementoftheMarinesatKheSanh,they made preparations for a major assault on the nearby Special Forces camp at LangVei.Twenty-fourmembersoftheAmericanSpecialForcesteamandtheir Montagnardtroops,aswellassomeLaotiansoldierswhohadfledtheirhomes justacrosstheborderduringaCommunistattacksomedaysearlier,manned thebase.Thetotalalliedforcenumberedaboutfourhundredtroops. TheshellingofLangVeibeganintheearlymorninghoursofFebruary7. Then, at first light, the PAVN struck in force spearheading their attack with elevenSoviet-madePT-76amphibiouslighttanks,markingthefirsttimethat tanks had been used by the Communists in South Vietnam. Although the defenders received artillery support from Khe Sanh, Camp Carroll, and the Rockpile, they were soon overrun. Calling down artillery and air strikes on topoftheirownposition,thecommanderofthecamp,thirteenofhisGreen Berets,andsomesixtyMontagnardsmanagedtobreakouttotheeast.Marine helicopterspickedthemuplaterthatafternoon,buthalftheoriginalgarrison was unaccounted for, and ten of the twenty-four Americans at Lang Vei had beenkilled. The appearance of tanks at Lang Vei rightfully concerned many of the Marines at Khe Sanh. With tanks, they reasoned, the PAVN could take Khe Sanh anytime it wanted. Still the Communists made no direct move on the combat base. However, they continued to apply pressure on the base while groundandartilleryandmortarattackscontinuedagainsttheMarinepositions inthesurroundinghills.
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It appeared to the Marine defenders that the enemy was preparing for anothermajorattackonKheSanh.Basedonthepreviousenemyactivityinthe area,theythoughtthatthePAVNwouldattacktheMarineoutpoststothenorth ofthebaseandthenmakeadirectattackonthemainbasefromthatdirection. TheyalsobelievedthatanotherPAVNdivisionwouldattackalongtheaxisof LangVei–KheSanhvillageandthenmakeitsfinalassaultonthebasefromthe southandeast. WhiletheMarinedefenderswaitedforthenextattack,theywereunaware thattheCommunistshadencounteredseriousproblemselsewherethatwould haveanimpactonthesituationatKheSanh.AsthefightinginHueincreased inintensity,GiapbegantowithdrawPAVNunitsfromtheKheSanhareatoreinforcehisbeleagueredtroops,whoweretryingdesperatelytoholdontotheold imperialcapital.AroundFebruary10,fivePAVNbattalionsbeganmovingfrom the Khe Sanh area to join their comrades in Hue.11 Although the PAVN had thinnedtheirforcesinthearea,theystillhadsufficienttroopstokeepKheSanh encircledandcontinuouslybombarditwithrockets,mortars,andartillery. Such tactics had proved successful against the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. However, as noted, there were some crucial differences between the situationatDienBienPhuandtheoneatKheSanhin1968,nottheleastof whichwasthatKheSanhwasnevertrulybesiegedintheclassicsenseofthe term.WhereastheVietMinhhadbeenabletosevervirtuallyalloutsidesupportfromtheFrenchdefendersatDienBienPhu,theMarinesatKheSanh werenevercutoff,andU.S.forcesneverlosttheabilitytoreinforceandresupplythebase.Inaddition,theMarinesheldthevitalhillpositionstothenorth andwestofKheSanhandactivelyconductedpatrolsintheareassurrounding thecombatbase. Consequently, the PAVN appeared content for most of the seventy-seven daystoholdtheirpositionsandbombardthedefenderswith122mmrocketsand 82mmand120mmmortarsfrompositionsinanarcabouttwothousandtothree thousandyardsnorthandwestofthebase,whilelong-range130mmand152mm guns fired on the Marines from concealed positions on Co Roc Mountain acrosstheborderinLaos.Thedefendersreceivedanaverageof2,500roundsa weekinanarealittlemorethan1,750yardslongand875yardswide. In the United States, the U.S. media continued to report on the situation atKheSanh,implyingthatitwasinimminentdangerofbeingoverrunbythe Communists.OnFebruary27,WalterCronkiteintonedthat“KheSanhcould wellfall,withterriblelossinAmericanlives,prestige,andmorale.”12Nodoubt influenced by such gloomy reports, some of Johnson’s advisers had begun to questionthewisdomofcontinuingtoholdKheSanhinthefaceofthecontinuedsiege,butWestmorelandremainedconvincedthattheMarinebasewas criticalandwassteadfastinhisinsistencethatKheSanhbeheld.
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RESUPPLYINGTHEMARINES ThekeytothesurvivalofKheSanhcombatbasewastheairfield.IfthePAVN couldcloseitandcutoffsuppliestothebase,theywouldwinanenormousvictory.TheMarinecommanderestimatedheneeded160tonsofsuppliesaday tosustainhisMarinesastheydefendedagainstthePAVN.WithRoute9cut bytheCommunists,theairfieldandaerialresupplybecamethelifelineforthe defenders.AlthoughCommunistmortar,rocket,andartilleryfirehitthefield repeatedly,theMarinedefenderswereabletorepairiteachtime. ThePAVNtriedtoisolatetheMarinebasefromoutsideaerialsupportbyan intensiveumbrellaofairdefenseartillery,butU.S.AirForceandMarinepilots andcrewsbravedheavyfiretokeeptheMarinesonthegroundresuppliedwith ammunition,food,water,andothercombatnecessities.Despiteintenseenemy groundfireanddeplorableweatherconditions,theseairliftsinsuredthatsupply levels never became dangerously low and precluded Khe Sanh from becomingarepeatofDienBienPhu.AsMarinehistorianCaptainMoyersS.Shore observed, “the Marine and U.S. Air Force transport pilots, helicopter crews, loadmasters,andgroundpersonnelkeptopenthegiantumbilicalcordwhich meantlifeforthecombatbase.”13Thiseffortwasnotwithoutcost;seventeen helicoptersandfourfixed-wingaircraftwerelosttoenemygunners.
TACTICALAIRSUPPORT Whilethehelicopterandcargoaircraftcrewsexerteduncommoneffortstokeep theMarinesresupplied,U.S.AirForce,Navy,andMarineCorpspilots,aswell asairborneandgroundcontrollers,providedcloseairsupporttokeepthePAVN atbay.MarineandAirForcecontrollerscoordinatedtheairstrikes,actingas thelinkbetweenthefighter-bombersandtheMarinesontheground.Tactical aircraft—F-4Phantoms,A-4Skyhawks,andA-6Intruders—flewapproximately threehundredsortiesperdayoverKheSanh.Constantairstrikespoundedthe PAVN.EvenmoredevastatingweretheB-52sflyingfromtheirbasesinGuam, Thailand,andOkinawa.Thebigbomberseachcarrieda27-tonpayloadof108 mixed500-and750-poundbombs,whichwasdevastatingonenemytroopconcentrations,supplydepots,andbunkersites.During the siege, it is estimated thatB-52sdroppedatleast50,000tonsofordnanceontheNVAforcessurroundingKheSanh.Theseairstrikeswerecriticalinthedefenseofthecombatbase andsurroundingMarinepositions. Inadditiontothemassiveairpowerbroughttobear,thedefenders’ownartilleryatKheSanhwassupplementedfromfirebasesatCampCarrollandthe Rockpile.FiresupportcoordinatorsatKheSanhhadatremendousamountof
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firepowerattheirdisposal.Severalinnovativemethodswereusedtomaximize this firepower. One was known as the “Mini Arc Light.” This strike involved plottinga550-by-1,100-yardblockaroundareportedPAVNposition.Then,two A-6Intruders,eachcarryingtwenty-eight500-poundbombs,wouldbecalled in;thirtysecondsbeforetheyarrived,the175mmgunsfromCampCarrollor the Rockpile would hit one half of the block, firing about sixty rounds. The A-6swouldthengoforthemiddleoftheblock,while155mmand105mmhowitzers,plus4.2-inchmortarsfromKheSanh,wouldsaturatetheotherhalf.All theroundswouldbetimedtostrikesimultaneously.Theeffectontheenemy wasdevastating.14
ANEWATTACK During the early evening hours of February 29, acoustic and seismic sensors along Route 9 indicated a major troop movement toward the combat base from the east. Colonel Lownds, the Marine commander, thought this might be the big attack everyone had been anticipating and immediately called for maximumfireagainsttheareaindicatedbythesensors.Inresponse,artillery, fighter-bombers,andB-52sstruckthearea.Thisdevastatingfirepowerbrokeup theattack,destroyingthebetterpartoftwobattalions.Undeterred,at9:30p.m. thePAVNlaunchedalarge-scaleattackagainsttheARVNrangerpositionson thesoutheastcornerofKheSanhbase.Withtheaidofmortars,artillery,and tacticalairsupport,theSouthVietnameseRangersbeatbackthePAVNattack, buttheCommunistsmadeanotherattemptat11:30p.m.This,too,wasstopped coldbeforetheymadeittothedefensivewire.Athirdwavecameat3:15a.m., buttheresultwasthesame.Thesefailedattacksseemedtomarkaturningpoint in the battle for Tet; the PAVN never again mounted a sizable attack against thebase. AttheendofFebruary,aMarinepatroldiscoveredthatthePAVNweredigging trenches. Later patrols revealed that these trenches were moving closer andclosertotheperimeterofthemainbaseatKheSanhandthatthePAVN weresometimescompletingasmuchasninety-fiveyardsanight.Fromthese advancedpositions,theymightbeabletolaunchapowerfulassaultthatcould overrunthebasebeforetheMarineshadtimetomountasuccessfuldefense,as hadhappenedatDienBienPhu.TheMarinesknewthattheanniversaryofthe firstattacksontheFrenchstrongholdwasonlytwoweeksaway,andtheywere concernedthatthetrenchdiggingindicatedthattheenemymightbepreparing foranewattacktocommemoratethathistoricday. Sincethesituationlookedlikeitwasenteringanewandpotentiallymore dangerousphase,Westmorelandturnedagaintoairpower,includingB-52raids
TheSiegeofKheSanh 63
onsuspectedCommunisttroopconcentrationsnear the base perimeter. This wasariskymove,becauseupuntilthistime,theAmericanforceshadusually triedtoavoidB-52bombingofenemypositionsiftheywereincloseproximity toU.S.troops.TherewasjusttoomuchchancethatAmericansmightbekilled by“friendlyfire”fromthebombsdroppedfromanaltitudeofthirtythousand feet. However, Westmoreland decided that using the big bombers so close to thebasewastheonlywaytodrivetheenemyfromtheKheSanharea.Adding additionalmotivationweremoreintelligencereportsthattheCommunistswere againbuildinguptheirtroopstrengthforonemorebigpush.Beginningatthe endofFebruaryandcontinuingintoearlyMarch,B-52srepeatedlyhammered thePAVNpositionsaroundKheSanh. UnbeknowntotheMarinedefenders,thePAVNhadactuallybegunwithdrawingtheirforcesfromthearea,andonMarch10theCommunistsstopped repairingtheirtrenches.15OnMarch13,theanniversaryofthestartofthebattle at Dien Bien Phu passed without incident. The sporadic shelling continued, butMarinepatrolssoondiscoveredthatsomeofthePAVNtrencheshadbeen abandoned. OnMarch30,acompanyofMarinesfoughtathree-hourbattlewithNorth VietnamesetroopsnearwheretwopatrolshadbeendecimatedonFebruary25. ThistimetheMarinesprevailed,counting115enemydeadonthebattlefield.It wasthelastbigbattleintheKheSanharea.Smallfirefightswiththeenemyin thesurroundinghillscontinued,andtheMarineswerestillharassedbyenemy rocketandartilleryfire,butthebaseatKheSanhhadheld.
LIFTINGTHESIEGE On April 1, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division reinforced with an ARVN airbornebattalionbeganOperationPegasus,thereliefofKheSanh.Landing zoneswereestablishedalongRoute9.Asthehelicoptersof1stSquadron,9th Cavalryreconnoiteredthewayahead,the1stCavalrytrooperslandedalongthe roadandpushedwestwarduntiltheheadofthereliefcolumn,2ndBattalion, 7thCavalry,linkedupwiththeMarinesatKheSanhonApril8,officiallybringingthesiegetoanend.OnApril18,theMarineswhohadenduredthesiege wereairliftedoutofthearea.Theyhadsuffered199killedinactionand830 wounded,whilethePegasusreliefforcehadlost92killedand629wounded. ARVNforceshadlost34killedand184wounded. ThePAVNandVietConghadlostanestimated10,000to15,000killedduringthedesperatefightingforKheSanh,manytotheMarineandArmyartillery (over150,000rounds)andthe100,000tonsofbombsdroppedduringOperation Niagara.TwoPAVNdivisionshadsufferedbadly,andtheMarinesclaimeda
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resoundingvictorywiththeendofthesiege.LocalMontagnardtribesmenlater told of finding large numbers of PAVN dead in the jungle surrounding Khe Sanh; many were found in groups of two hundred to five hundred at a time alongthevariousavenuesofapproachtotheKheSanhbase,apparentlykilled byB-52sandcloseairsupport.16 Alookattherespectivecasualtyfiguresperhapspointsoutthedifferencein resultsbetweenDienBienPhuandtheoutcomeatKheSanh.Approximately eightthousandVietMinhandtwothousandFrenchsoldiersdiedatDienBien Phu.However,atthebattleatKheSanh,theCommunistslostmorethanten thousandsoldiersatacostoffewerthantwohundredU.S.Marineskilledin action.AccordingtoStanleyKarnow,aCommunistveteranofthebattlelater admittedthatPAVNandVCunitssufferedasmuchas90percentlossesinthe relentlessdownpourofAmericanbombs,napalm,andartilleryshells.17 OnApril11,fourdaysbeforePegasuscametoanend,Westmorelandflewto Washingtontoconferwiththepresident.StandingontheWhiteHouselawn, he announced that Route 9 was open again and that the battle of Khe Sanh wasover.Helavishedpraiseoneveryoneinvolvedwiththesuccessfuldefense of the combat base: the Marines for their “heroic defense,” the combat engineersfortheir“herculean”effortsinreopeningthemainroadtothebase,and thesupplyunitsforhavingperformed“thepremierlogisticalfeatofthewar.” He saved his highest accolades for those who had contributed to “one of the heaviestandmostconcentrateddisplaysoffirepowerinthehistoryofwarfare.” ArmyandMarineartilleryunitsfired158,891roundduringthesiege.TheAir Forceflew9,691bombingsortiesoverKheSanh,theMarines7,078,andthe Navy5,337.Yetthe“keytosuccess,thebiggun,theheavyweightoffirepower, wastheB-52strikes.”18AsWestmorelandlatertoldB-52crewmenstationedon Guam,“Withoutquestion,theamountoffirepowerputonthatpieceofreal estateexceededanythingthathadeverbeenseenbeforeinhistorybyanyfoe, andtheenemywashurt,hisbackwasbroken,byairpower...basicallythefire oftheB-52s.”19 Despiteallthedoomsdayprophetsinthemedia,thegreatlyoutnumbered MarinessupportedbymassiveAmericanfirepowerhadsurvivedseventy-seven days of intense fighting and shelling. Perhaps an editorial in the Washington PostbestsumsuptheepicbattleatKheSanh:“Tobesure,KheSanhwillbea subjectofcontroversyforalongtime,butthismuchaboutitisindisputable:It haswonalargeplaceinthehistoryoftheVietnamwarasaninspiringexample ofAmericanandAlliedvalor.”20 FromtheVietnameseperspective,thePAVNcouldalsopointtotheirown valor;theyhadmorethanheldtheirowninthedesperatefighting.Whatever theirintentions,whichwillbediscussedlater,theirsoldiershadstoodfastunder a devastating bombardment for two and a half months. Although their losses
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werehuge,they,asKheSanhveteranPeterBrushpointsout,“werewillingto absorblossesofthismagnitudeinordertocontinue,andwin,theirstruggle.”21 IndescribingthefightingcapabilityanddedicationofthePAVN,perhapsthe wordsofaMarineatKheSanhprovidethebestappreciation:“You’llneverhear MarinessaytheNorthVietnamesearen’ttough.They’reprobablythetoughestfightersintheworldasfarasIamconcerned.Theyknewwhattheywere fightingfor.Theyunderstoodwhytheywerethereandtheywerethereforthe duration.”22ThesamecanbesaidoftheMarines.
Chapter6
t he i m pa ct o f t he t et o f f en s i v e
In most American accounts of war, the Tet Offensive lasts only a few weeks, andtheenddateisusuallyplacedsomewherearoundtheendofMarchwhen the siege is lifted at Khe Sanh. However, the fighting continued into the fall as Hanoi and the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) pressed the attack.AccordingtoGeneralTranVanTra,writingafterthewar,thefighting fromMaytotheendofSeptemberwasacontinuationoftheoriginalGeneral Offensive–General Uprising. He acknowledged that the initial phase of the offensivehadnotgoneaswellmilitarilyasplannedandthatthePeople’sArmy ofVietnam(PAVN)andVietCong(VC)“werenotabletodestroyasignificant numberoftheenemyforces,”buthemaintainedthattheir“attackssentshudders through the enemy’s vital points, and destabilized its military, political, andeconomicfoundationsthroughoutSouthVietnam.”1Hefurtheracknowledgedthatthe“enemy”hadrespondedstrongly,butinsodoinghadbetrayed many“weaknesses.”Accordingly,thesituationprovidedtheCommunistswith “anopportunity...tocontinuestrongassaultsandcompensatefor...earlier shortcomingsinordertowinevenbiggervictories.”2 Toreplacetheheavylossesincurredintheearlierfighting,Hanoisenteighty thousandtoninetythousandreplacementsdowntheHoChiMinhTrailbythe endofApril.InthefirstweekofMay,theylaunchedanewroundofattacks,
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which the South Vietnamese and Americans referred to as a “Mini-Tet.” AccordingtomostCommunisthistories,however,thisactionwasacontinuationoftheoverall1968GeneralOffensive.3 Intherenewedoffensive,theystruck119citiesandbases,includingSaigon. Unlikeduringtheearlierphaseoftheoffensive,whenVCunitsborethebrunt ofalargepartoftheheaviestfighting,thePAVNconductedalmostalloftheMay attacks.Otherwise,thenewattacksresembledthoseoftheinitialTetOffensive. Unfortunately, however, for the Communists troops, this time they failed to achievesurprise.AlliedintelligencehadclearindicationsthatthePAVNwould launchanewroundofattacksandalliedforceswereready.Theattacksplanned forHueandelsewhereintheICorpsareainMay,aswellasthoseintheCentral Highlands,werepreemptedbyalliedattacksonthegatheringforces. ThenewassaultonSaigonbeganintheearlymorninghoursofMay5,when abarrageofrocketsandmortarsslammedintotheheartofthecity.HeavyfightingragedinpartsofSaigon,includingthevitalTanSonNhutarea,butU.S. groundandaircavalryunitsrepelledthePAVNforces.Itlookedasifthebattle wasover,buttwodayslater,theCommunistsrenewedtheirattack,andintense fightingonceagainbrokeoutinCholonandaroundthePhuThoracetrack. ByMay13,theCommunistsweredefeatedonceagain,butthefightinginsome placeshadbeenasbitterasthatinthefirstdaysoftheTetOffensive. Twoweekslater,theCommunistslaunchedyetanotherassaultonSaigon. This time two PAVN regiments captured the densely populated northern suburbswhilealocal-forcebattalionreoccupiedtheCholonarea,wherethey raised a National Liberation Front (NLF) flag over the central post office. It tookuntilthefirstweekinJuneforSouthVietnameseArmy(ARVN)brigades torootoutthePAVNsoldiers,usingteargasandhelicoptergunships. Still that did not mean a respite for Saigon, because the Communists initiated a daily barrage of 122mm rockets on the city. Twenty-five times in thirty-eightdays,rocketspoundedthecapital,killinghundredsofciviliansand woundingnearlyathousandmore.Inaddition,thenewroundoffightingproduced180,000newrefugeeswhosehomeshadbeendestroyed. InSaigonandmostoftheotherareasattacked,theCommunistforceswere destroyed or driven into the countryside. However, television coverage reinforcedtheimpressionthattheenemywasonceagainknockingatthegatesof themostheavilydefendedcitiesinSouthVietnam.4 ThefightingduringthesubsequentphasesofTetwasintense.TheUnited Stateslost562deadintheweekendingMay11,thehighestweeklytotalofthe war;withthelossofnearly2,000deadduringthatmonth,May1968becamethe bloodiestmonthofthewarforU.S.troops.TheCommunistforceshadclearly demonstratedthattheyhadnotbeendestroyedduringtheearlierTetfighting.
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The fighting continued for several more months, entering yet another phaseoftheoffensive.TheVietCongattackedanumberofARVNpositions in the Mekong Delta in August, and the PAVN launched a major attack on U.S.forcesfortymilesnorthwestofSaigoninSeptember.PAVNcolonelBui Tinh acknowledged that these attacks were very costly.5 Accordingly, in late September,COSVNorderedPAVNandVCmain-forceunitstowithdrawto theirsanctuariesacrosstheborderwithCambodia.
POLITICALFALLOUT WhilethefightingcontinuedinSouthVietnam,Johnsonwrestledwithwhat to do with the deteriorating political situation at home. Though General WilliamC.Westmoreland,thecommanderofU.S.forcesinVietnam,characterizedTetasagreatvictoryfortheallies,thenatureofsuchavictorywas difficultformanyAmericanstounderstand.Theonlysignofsuccesswasthe high“bodycount,”butitseemedthattheCommunistshadalimitlesssupply ofmanpower.TetprovedtomanyAmericans,stunnedbythescopeandferocity of the offensive, that their government had been misleading them about alliedprogressinthewar.Partoftheimpactoftheoffensiveonpublicopinion canbetracedbacktoWestmoreland’soptimisticpredictionsinthefallof1967. Richard Falk writes, “The public relations urge to build confidence on the homefrontbyexaggeratingbattlefieldprospectssubsequentlyhelpedcreatea vulnerabilitytoabruptdisillusionmentwiththewareffort....Thedynamics of hopes raised in such circumstances can quickly shift to the dynamics of hopescrushed.”6 WalterCronkite,theCBSEveningNewsanchormanandperhapsthemost trustedjournalistinthenation,hadflowntoSouthVietnaminmid-February and visited Hue while the battle still raged. He interviewed Marines during thefightingandconcludedthatvictorywasnotpossible.Inaspecialhalf-hour reportbroadcastafterhisreturntotheUnitedStatesinlateFebruary,Cronkite, asthecamerapannedoverthebattledamageinSaigon,saidthattheruins“in thisburnedandblastedandwearyland...meansuccessorsetback,victoryor defeat,dependingonwhoyoutalkto.”Hewentontosay: WehavebeentoooftendisappointedbytheoptimismoftheAmerican leaders....Tosaythatweareclosertovictorytodayistobelieve,inthe factofevidence,theoptimistswhohavebeenwronginthepast....To saythatwearemiredinstalemateseemstheonlyrealistic,yetunsatisfactoryconclusion....Itseemsnowmorecertainthaneverthatthebloody experienceofVietnamistoendinastalemate....Itisincreasinglyclear
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tothisreporterthattheonlyrationalwayoutthenwillbetonegotiate, notasvictors,butasanhonorablepeoplewholiveduptotheirpledgeto defenddemocracy,anddidthebesttheycould.7 Cronkite’s report had a significant impact on the president. Watching the program,Johnsonreportedlyremarkedtohispresssecretary,GeorgeChristian, “IfI’velostCronkite,I’velostmiddleAmerica.”8Thissentimentwasprettyclose tothetruth,becausethemediahadasignificantimpactontheperspectivesof mainstreamAmericansandCronkite’scommentsreflectedthewidespreaddissatisfactionwiththeadministration’spoliciesthatmanyintheAmericanmedia felt. Previously, Cronkite and many of his colleagues had generally accepted theoptimisticreportsofgovernmentauthorities,butlikemostotherAmericans, theywerestunnedbythelevelofcombatandtheabilityoftheCommuniststo launchsuchawidespreadoffensive. ThecorrespondentsinVietnamonlyhadtolookaroundtoseetheimpactof theoffensive.“Coveringthewarwaseasy,”observedRonSteinman,headofthe NBCNewsbureauinSaigon.“Itwaslikespringtimewithbudsoffirepopping outwhereveryouchancedtoturnyourhead.”9Abletoseethefightingandits effectsfirsthand,thereportersfoundthemilitary’sclaimsofvictorylessandless credible.InthewakeofTet,themediatookanincreasinglyunfavorableview ofU.S.policy,andthereportingonthesituationinSouthVietnamduringand afterTethadasignificantimpactonpublicopinion. Whentheoffensivefirstbegan,however,Americansralliedbehindtheflag inapredictabledisplayofpatrioticfervor;journalistDonOberdorferreported thattherewasa“suddenjumpinpublichawkishness”inthewakeoftheearly television reports of the offensive.10 In fact, a public opinion survey in early February revealed that 55 percent of those polled favored a stronger military response to the situation in Vietnam. However, as journalist Stanley Karnow points out, the American people’s “mood of despair quickly returned as the fightingdraggedon,andtheirendorsementoftheconflictresumeditsdownwardspiral.”11Giventheextensivemediacoverage,theAmericanpublicwas abletoseeforitselfthewidespreadbloodshedanddevastationwroughtbythe heavy fighting. These images contradicted all of the optimistic claims of the previousfall.ItwasclearthatAmerica’sfoeremainedmuchstrongerthanthe politiciansandgeneralshadledthemtobelieve. Westmoreland claimed that the failed Communist efforts during Tet representedthe“lastgasp”ofalosingcause,butfewAmericansbelievedhim.In November 1967, Westmoreland had reported that American forces were winningthewarinVietnam,butthesurpriseandferocityoftheTetattacksstrained his credibility to the breaking point. Many Americans could not reconcile Westmoreland’snewclaimswithwhattheyhadseenontheirTVscreens.After
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Tet,itwasimpossibleformostAmericanstobelieveWestmoreland’srenewed promisethatvictorywasjustaroundthecorner.
THEREQUESTFORADDITIONAL TROOPS Johnson’s deteriorating public support would soon get worse over one of the most controversial issues to develop in the aftermath of the offensive. This issue,whichbegantoplayitselfoutinthedaysrightaftertheoffensivebegan, involvedarequestforanincreaseinU.S.troopsinSouthVietnam.Although Westmorelandisgenerallycreditedformakingtheadditionaltrooprequest,the situationwasactuallymuchmorecomplexthanthat.OnFebruary3,General EarleWheeler,chairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,expressingthepresident’s continuingconcernaboutKheSanh,sentamessagetoWestmorelandasking ifheneededadditionalreinforcements.Westmorelandrepliedthatthedefense ofKheSanhwassolidandthathedidnotneedanythingexceptafewmore supplyaircraftandtheadditionaltroopshehadalreadybeenpromised,about tenthousand.Thefollowingday,Wheelersentanothercablesayingthatthe presidentwasconsideringdiversionaryattacksnorthofthedemilitarizedzone (DMZ) or in eastern Laos to relieve the pressure on Khe Sanh. The next day,WestmorelandreceivedamessagefromAdmiralU.S.GrantSharp,commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, reiterating the same message andaddingthattheremightbesomeinclinationinWashingtontowardrelaxing theceilingonU.S.troopsinVietnam. Westmorelandwasnotsurewhatwasgoingon.Hehadrepeatedlyreported that he had the situation at Khe Sanh in hand and he was not sure why Washington was so concerned.12 Still, Westmoreland had been urging the presidentforseveralyearstoremovetheconstraintsontheconductofthewar, advocatingoperationsnotonlyineasternLaos,butalsoagainstNorthVietnam itself.Accordingly,henotifiedWheelerthatanadditionalU.S.divisionwould beneededifandwhenoperationsinLaoswereauthorized.Wheelerresponded, somewhattestily,thatWestmorelandshouldfocusonhis“immediaterequirementsstemmingfromthepresentsituationinVietnam,”nothis“longerrange” needs.13AfollowingmessagefromWheelertoWestmorelandurgedtheMACV commandertoaskformoretroopsifheneededthem. Fear of a defeat at Khe Sanh was not the real factor motivating Wheeler. The issue of an additional troop request for Vietnam was intertwined with a much larger issue. Wheeler was concerned that American forces around the worldwerestretchedtoothin.TherewerealsoproblemselsewherethatconcernedWheelerandhisfellowchiefsofstaff.NorthKoreahadrecentlyseized the U.S. communications ship Pueblo; trouble in Berlin or the Middle East
TheImpactoftheTetOffensive 71
mightflareupagainatanymoment.TheArmy’sstrategicreserveconsistedof onedivision,the82ndAirborneatFortBragg,NorthCarolina.Inthewakeof theTetoffensive,WheelersawanopportunitytousethesituationinVietnam togetPresidentJohnsontocallupthereservesinordertoreplenishthestrategicreserve. Aspartofthisplan,WheelercoaxedWestmorelandtosubmitanewassessmentofthesituationinVietnam.Westmorelandrespondedwithamessagethat wasintotaloppositiontohisearlierconfidentclaims.Althoughhecontinued toclaimvictoryintheTetOffensive,hetoldtheJointChiefsofStaffthathe neededreinforcementsnotonlytoreplacehislossesduringTetbutalsotodeal withthegrowingpowerofthePAVNthroughoutSouthVietnam.Intelligence reportsindicatedthatHanoiwassendinginmoresoldierstofilltheranksthat hadbeenreducedduringTet.TheMACVcommandersaidthatthesituation wasoneofgreatopportunity,butalsoonefraughtwithdanger.Thiswascompletelyoppositeintonefromthemessagetrafficthathadbeencomingoutof hisofficeforWashington. AsomewhatperplexedpresidentdispatchedWheeleronafact-findingmissiontoSouthVietnamtoconferwithWestmorelandonfutureneeds.Uponhis returntoWashington,Wheeler’sreporttoPresidentJohnsonwasfilledwithbad news.OnFebruary27,hetoldthepresident,“Thereisnodoubtthattheenemy launchedamajor,powerfulnationwideassault.Thisoffensivehasbynomeans run its course.” In fact, the battle for Khe Sanh was still underway. Wheeler wentontosaythattheARVNhadsufferedhugelosses,andtheCommunists werelargelyincontrolofthecountryside.HeaddedthatTet“wasaverynear thing.... We suffered a loss, there can be no doubt about it.” Wheeler predictedarenewedCommunistoffensiveandcontendedthatmoretroopswere necessaryunlesstheUnitedStateswas“preparedtoacceptsomereverses.”14 AccordingtohistorianGeorgeHerring,Wheeler’spessimismmayhavebeen sincere,butitappeared“thatbypresentingagloomyassessmenthehopedto stampede the administration into providing the troops needed to rebuild a depletedstrategicreserveandmeetanycontingencyinVietnam.”15 Accordingly, Wheeler brought a request from Westmoreland for 206,000 moretroopsforSouthVietnam.Thetroopincreasewouldbeinthreeincrements.Thefirstwouldtotal108,000troopsthatwould deploy to Vietnam by May 1. The second and third increments totaled 42,000 and 55,000 troops, respectively.ThesetroopswouldnotdeploytoVietnamunlesstheCommunists hadmadesubstantialgainsonthegroundortheWhiteHouseapprovedamore aggressive ground strategy. Otherwise, these forces would be earmarked for rebuildingthestrategicreserve. AlthoughWheelermaneuveredWestmorelandintoaskingformoretroops, Westmorelanddidnotneedmuchurging;hethoughthehadtheCommunists
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ontherunandcouldusetheadditionaltroopstopursuethemintotheirhiding places and sanctuaries. He wanted to drive the Communists from their bordersanctuariesinCambodiaandtocuttheHoChiMinhTrailbyathrust intoLaos.HethoughtthatcallingupthereserveswouldconvincetheNorth Vietnamese that the United States was serious about pursuing victory in the war.However,Wheeler’sreportdidnotreflectanyoftheseconsiderationsand did not mention the idea that part of the additional forces would be used to augmentthestrategicreserve.InhismemoirASoldierReports,Westmoreland implies that Wheeler deliberately concealed why he wanted the additional troopsinordertoforcetheissueofthestrategicreserve.16 Wheeler’sploydidnotwork.Infact,asRichardFalkwrites,thetrooprequest “significantly hardened the impression among the hesitant in Washington andthemediathatTetwasanenormous,unacknowledgedAmericandefeat, andthatthewar,ifseriouslyresumed,wouldbeanevengreaterdrainthatit alreadywas,andthistheUnitedStatescouldnotlongaffordeitherpolitically oreconomically.”17 Forhispart,JohnsonwastakenabackbyWestmoreland’srequestforsuch anenormousincreaseintroopstrength.Heknewthatsuchaproposedtroop deployment would necessitate calling up the reserves, requiring a national call to war. Johnson realized that such a move would threaten the American economyandthefutureofhisGreatSocietyprograms,inadditiontoenergizingtheantiwarmovement. Charging him to “give me the lesser of evils,” the president asked Clark Clifford to form a task force within the Defense Department to evaluate the situation in South Vietnam and come back with a recommendation on Westmoreland’s request for more troops in Vietnam.18 Clifford had replaced SecretaryofDefenseRobertS.McNamara,whohadprivatelyturnedagainst the war and left the administration in January 1968. Clifford had directed Johnson’s election campaign in 1964 and was for several years a leading supporterofthewareffort,buthehadbeguntodevelopdoubtsverysimilartothose thathadledMcNamaratoresign.19 Clifford’staskforceassessedU.S.strategyinVietnamandreviewedtheproposalforadditionaltroops.Thegroupexaminedtheimplicationsofanynew escalationandconcludedthattheexistingpolicywasfailing.Additionaltroops offerednoguaranteethatthewarcouldbeturnedaround;increasingtheforces inVietnampromised“noearlyendtotheconflict,noranysuccessinattriting theenemyorerodingHanoi’swilltofight.”20Whilethetaskforcereportdidnot openlychallengecontinuedU.S.involvementinVietnam,itdidwarnagainst committingadditionaltroopstothewarandsuggestedamorecautiousmilitary strategyinVietnamthanthesearch-and-destroyoperationsthatWestmoreland favored. Clifford’s group advised the president to send approximately 22,000
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additionaltroopsandapproveacall-upof245,000reservists,buttolinkanyfurtherincreasesintroopstrengthtotheperformanceoftheSaigongovernment anditsarmedforces.Privately,Cliffordtoldthepresident,“Themajorconcern ofthepeopleisthattheydonotseevictoryahead.Themilitaryhasnotcome upwithaplanforvictory.Thepeoplewerediscouragedasmoremengoinand arechewedupinabottomlesspit.”21 WhileJohnsonandhisadvisersdebatedaboutwhattodoinVietnam,his poll numbers plummeted. By late February, surveys showed that only 32 percent of the American people endorsed Johnson’s handling of the war, down from51percentinNovember1967.GallupPolldatasuggestthatbetweenearly February and the middle of March 1968, nearly one person in five switched from“hawk”to“dove”onthewar.22 The president’s policies were also under attack in Congress, where the responsetoTetwasimmediateandintense.SenatorRobertKennedyclaimed that Tet had “finally shattered the mask of optical illusion with which we have concealed our true circumstances, even from ourselves.” For Senator Mike Mansfield, long an opponent of the war, Tet was the disaster that he had been anticipating. “From the outset,” he said, it “was not an American responsibility, and it is not now an American responsibility, to win a victory for any particular Vietnamese group, or to defeat any particular Vietnamese group.”SenatorGeorgeAikenofVermontsummedupthesituationformany Americanswhenhesaid,“Ifthisisafailure,IhopetheVietCongneverhave amajorsuccess.”23 AddingtoJohnson’spoliticalwoeswasthedeterioratingAmericaneconomy. Inflation had been growing rapidly since 1966, and the costs of runningthewarinVietnamwhilealsofinancingtheprogramsofthepresident’s Great Society were more than the United States could afford. To remedy thesituation,thepresidenthadproposeda10percentsurtaxonincome,but Congresshadrefusedtopassituntilthetaxhikewasaccompaniedbycuts indomesticspending. ThesituationfortheadministrationworsenedconsiderablywhentheNew YorkTimesranastoryonMarch10revealingthatWestmorelandhadrequested thatanadditional206,000troopsbesenttoVietnam.Theothermediaquickly picked up the story. NBC News reporter Frank McGee told the nation that 206,000 more troops would only result in more destruction, not peace and victory. Echoing the earlier story from Ben Tre, he said, “We must decide whetheritisfutiletodestroyVietnaminanefforttosaveit.”24TheTimesstory andthesubsequentreportswereincompleteandmisleadingbecausetheydid notsaythatWheelerwantedhalfoftheforcetoshoreupAmerica’sstrategic reserve. Nevertheless, they added to the fears of Americans that the war was going nowhere—if the Tet battles had been a defeat for the Communists, as
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Westmorelandandtheadministrationinsisted,whythendidtheyneed200,000 moretroopsinVietnam? WiththisnewblowtoWestmoreland’scredibility,thepresident’sownpopularity increased its downward spiral. By late March, a new poll revealed that 78percentofAmericanssurveyedfeltthattheUnitedStateswasnotmaking anyprogressinthewar,andonly26percentoftheAmericanpublicapproved Johnson’shandlingofthewar.25DuringthetwomonthsfollowingTet,onein everyfiveAmericansswitchedfromsupportingthewartoopposingit.Formuch oftheAmericanpublic,theTetOffensivehadbeenarudeawakeningtothe realitiesofthewarthatpromptedareevaluationofthenation’scommitment. Havingbeenrepeatedlytoldbyleadingadministrationspokesmenandmilitary leadersthattheCommunistswerefadingandthattherewaslightattheendof thetunnel,thepublicwasshockedtofindthemstillcapableofsuchaneffort. Vivid coverage of close-quarter fighting appeared on their television screens andinnewspapersandmagazines,remindingthemonceagainoftheescalating human costs of the war. Presidential advisor Walt Rostow said that the additionaltrooprequeststory“churnedupthewholeeasternestablishmentand createdafalseissue.Itcausedanunnecessarycrisisanddistortedthings.Itoverrodethehopefulnewsandhadquitesubstantialeffectsonpublicopinion.”26
THENEWHAMPSHIRE PRIMARY Two days after the news of the 206,000 additional troops issue broke, the Democratic primary election was held in New Hampshire. Senator Eugene McCarthyofMinnesota,whohadannouncedhisdecisionthepreviousfallto challengethepresidentinthe1968primaries,chargedthattheTetOffensive demonstratedthat“theAdministration’sreportsofprogress[inVietnam]arethe productsoftheirownself-deception.”27McCarthy,relativelyunknownoutside hisstateandrunningonanantiwarplatformasthe“PeaceCandidate,”astonishedthenationbycomingwithinafewhundredvotesofdefeatingJohnson in the primary. Most in the media attributed the president’s poor showing in the primary to an antiwar protest by voters. Not all who voted for McCarthy didsobecausetheyopposedthewar;somewantedtoregisteraprotestagainst Johnson’sapparentfailuretotakeafirmerstandfollowingtheTetoffensive.28 Nevertheless,thevoterevealedJohnson’spoliticalvulnerabilityandthegrowinglackofconfidenceinthepresident’shandlingofthewar.Itwasclearthat theincumbentpresident,whofouryearsearlierhadbeenelectedbythewidest margininAmericanhistory,wasindesperatepoliticaltrouble. Four days after the New Hampshire primary, a potentially much stronger Democratic candidate, Robert Kennedy, convinced to run by the administra-
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tion’shandlingoftheTetOffensive,thepresident’slowratingsinthepolls,and theresultsoftheprimary,announcedhisdecisiontoentertherace.Kennedy, likeMcCarthy,madeoppositiontothewarthecentralissueofhiscampaign. In trouble on the campaign trail, the president soon found himself under increased pressure from Congress. Senator J. William Fulbright, a DemocratfromArkansas,openednewhearingsintheSenateForeignRelations Committeeontheadministration’sconductofthewar.IntheHouse,139memberssignedapetitionaskingJohnsonforacompletereviewofVietnampolicy. TheseresponsesreinforcedtheJohnsonadministration’sbeliefthatadditional escalationwouldproveincreasinglydivisive. OnMarch25–26,abeleagueredJohnsoncalledforameetingofagroupof fourteen unofficial senior advisers he referred to as the “Wise Men”—former cabinetofficers,presidentialaides,ambassadors,generals,andotherswhohad advisedhimonotheroccasions.TheWiseMenincludedformersecretaryof stateDeanAcheson,formerambassadorHenryCabotLodge,formernational securityadviserMcGeorgeBundy,andretiredgeneralsOmarBradley,Matthew Ridgway,andMaxwellTaylor. Johnson had gone to the Wise Men for counsel before, and as late as November1967,theyhadrecommendedthatthepresidentstaythecoursein Vietnamandpressaheadwithhiscurrentprogram,rejectingde-escalationof the war. Now, in the wake of the Tet Offensive, Johnson turned again to the groupforadvice. TheWiseMenmetonMarch25,withtwomembersofJohnson’scabinet, Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clifford, in attendance. Military and CIA officials briefed the group, saying that even with reinforcements it might take the United States another five to ten years to defeat the CommunistsinVietnam.Attheendoftwodaysofmeetings,theWiseMen metwiththepresidentanddeliveredtheirverdict:thewarwasunwinnablewith presentpolicies,anditwastimefortheUnitedStatestobeginreducingitsrole inSouthVietnam.Thoughtherewassomedisagreement,theconsensusofthe Wise Men was that no additional troops should be sent to Vietnam, that the bombingofNorthVietnamshouldbehalted,andthattheUnitedStatesshould movetowardanegotiatedsettlementanddisengagement. Johnsonwasshockedbythisshiftinopinionamongthesesolidlyanticommunistelderstatesmenandmilitaryleaders,someofwhomhadhelpedshape thepoliciesthathadgottentheUnitedStatesinvolvedinVietnaminthefirst place.AlthoughtheantiwarmovementhadnotbeenabletochangeLyndon Johnson’spoliciesdirectly,ithadaneffectontheWiseMen,andtheyinturn pushedJohnsoninanewdirection.AsJohnsonnotedinhismemoirs,theWise Men“expresseddeepconcernaboutthedivisionsinourcountry.Someofthem feltthatthosedivisionsweregrowingrapidlyandmightsoonforcewithdrawal
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fromVietnam.”29Althoughthepresidentdidnotwholeheartedlysubscribeto the advice of the Wise Men—“The establishment bastards have bailed out,” he bitterly noted—their recommendations, clearly a repudiation of his war policies, greatly influenced Johnson as he prepared to make a major speech on the war to the nation.30 He later wrote in his memoirs that he had asked himselfatthetime,“Ifthey[theWiseMen]hadbeensodeeplyinfluencedby thereportsoftheTetoffensive,whatmusttheaveragecitizeninthecountry bethinking?”31 On Sunday, March 31, 1968, the beleaguered president spoke to the Americanpeopleinanationallytelevisedbroadcast.Thatnightheannounced thattheTetOffensivehadbeenafailurefortheCommunists,buthedidnot offeranyoptimisticpredictions.Instead,heannouncedahalttothebombing raidsinNorthVietnamexceptfortheareajustnorthoftheDMZandcalled uponNorthVietnameseleaderstojointheUnitedStatesinpeacetalks.Andat theendofthespeechhepausedandsaid,“WithAmerica’ssonsinthefieldsfar away,withAmerica’sfutureunderchallengerighthereathome,withourhopes andtheworld’shopesforpeaceinthebalanceeveryday,IdonotbelievethatI shoulddevoteanhouroradayofmytimetoanypersonalpartisancausesorto anydutiesotherthantheawesomedutiesofthisoffice—thePresidencyofyour country.”Thenhestunnedhislistenersbydeclaring,“Ishallnotseek,andIwill notaccept,thenominationofmypartyforanothertermasyourpresident.”32 TheVietnamWarhadfinallydestroyedJohnson’spresidency. Three days after Johnson’s speech, North Vietnamese leaders announced their willingness to accept his invitation to take part in peace negotiations. AmericanandNorthVietnamesediplomatsbegan meeting a few weeks later inParistodiscusshowthetalkswouldbearranged.Itturnedouttobealong discussion,sincetheUnitedStatesinitiallyobjectedtotheparticipationofthe VietConginthepeacetalks,andtheCommunistsobjectedtotheparticipation oftheSaigongovernment. ThefirstformalmeetingofthenegotiationsbeganonMay13attheMajestic HotelinParis.Ambassador-at-largeW.AverellHarriman,representingtheU.S. side,metwithHanoi’srepresentative,XuanThuy,secretaryoftheLaoDong Party.Thesenegotiationswereextremelycontentiousfromtheverybeginning andwouldlastforthenextfiveyears. Havingessentiallyforcedapresidentoutofoffice,theTetOffensiveclaimed anothermajorvictiminJune1968whenWestmoreland,whohadcommanded theMilitaryAssistanceCommand,Vietnam(MACV)forfourandahalfyears, was replaced and promoted to fill the position of U.S. Army Chief of Staff. Johnson had actually made the decision to replace Westmoreland with his deputy,GeneralCreightonAbrams,inmid-JanuarybeforetheTetoffensivewas launched, but the delayed announcement enabled Westmoreland’s critics to
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maintainthatthepresidenthadbecomedisenchantedwiththegeneralbecause oftheTetoffensiveandhad“kickedhimupstairs.” On June 17, the Marines began to take down the base at Khe Sanh and evacuatethearea.TheAmericanpresscriticizedthedecision,especiallyafter thenumberofcasualtiesthathadbeensustainedthere.Towalkawayfroma sitethatsorecentlyhadbeenproclaimedavitalpositionfurtherstrainedthe president’scredibilitywiththepublicandemphasizedthewar’sirrationality. OnNovember1,JohnsonhaltedallbombingofNorthVietnam(U.S.planes hadcontinuedsinceMarchtopoundtargetsupto225milesnorthoftheDMZ). PresidentNguyenVanThieuofSouthVietnamstillobjectedtopeacenegotiations,apparentlytryingtodelayanytalksuntilafterwhathehopedwouldbe theelectionofRichardNixontothepresidency.Allthewhile,theyear’sdeath tollinVietnamcontinuedtomount.Americanlossesinthewarbytheendof 1968stoodat30,610killed.Ofthese,14,589,nearlyhalfthetotalnumber,had beenkilledinthepastyear.
THEPRESIDENTIALELECTION OF 1968 WhileAmericantroopsweretryingtostabilizethesituationinSouthVietnam, a bitter election campaign was being waged in the United States. Former vice president Richard Nixon received the Republican nomination for the presidency, implying that he had a “secret plan” to end the war in Vietnam if elected. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party splintered over the war issue. Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy won most of the primaries in the spring,butKennedywasassassinatedinearlyJuneafterwinningtheCalifornia primary.VicePresidentHubertHumphreyenteredtheraceforthepresidency inAprilwithPresidentJohnson’ssupport.InAugust,hewontheDemocratic Party’snominationatitsnationalconventioninChicago,whichwasmarredby bloodystreetbattlesbetweenantiwarprotestersandChicagopolice.Humphrey was too closely identified with Lyndon Johnson’s failed policies in Vietnam tounitehispartyintheremainingweeksbeforethe November election. On November5,1968,RichardNixonwaselectedpresidentoftheUnitedStates, andonJanuary20,1969,hewasinaugurated.ItwasnowNixon’swar. Following his inauguration in January 1969, Nixon began to implement a new policy in South Vietnam. Called Vietnamization, it included improved training and a vast modernization effort for the South Vietnamese armed forces.Concurrently,NixonbegantowithdrawAmericantroops,aprocessthat continueduntilalmostallU.S.groundsoldiershadleft.In1972,U.S.advisers and massive American airpower helped the South Vietnamese beat back a NorthVietnameseinvasion.AftermonthsofsecretnegotiationswiththeNorth
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Vietnameseandastepped-upbombingcampaign,theParisPeaceAccordswere signedinJanuary1973,andacease-firewasinitiatedsoonthereafter.ByMarch of that year, all American military forces had been withdrawn from South Vietnam. The cease-fire proved to be only a momentary lull in the fighting, whichcontinuedfortwomoreyearsuntilafinalCommunistoffensiveoverran theSouthVietnameseforcesinfifty-fivedays.OnApril30,1975,PAVNtanks crashedthroughthegatesatthepresidentialpalaceinSaigon,andthewarwas over.AllofVietnamfellunderHanoi’scontrol,andSaigonwasrenamedHo ChiMinhCity.
Chapter7
a ss es s i n g t h e t et o f f en s i v e
Any assessment of the Tet Offensive must begin with the critical question of “Whowon?”Forsome,suchashistorianDavidF.Schmitz,theTetOffensive clearly“representedadefeatfortheUnitedStatesanditspolicyinVietnam.”1 However,thequestionisverycomplex.AnassessmentoftheTetOffensivemust beconsideredonanumberoflevels;ashistorianWilliamJ.Duikersuggests,it mustbeviewedin“highlyqualifiedtermsandnotsimplyasavictoryordefeat foreitherside.”2Militarily,TetwaslargelyafailureforHanoiandtheNational Liberation Front (NLF). By attacking the major cities, the Communists had hoped to win a huge symbolic victory. They wanted to prove to the South VietnamesepeoplethattheycouldnotdependontheSaigongovernmentor theAmericanarmy,evenwithitshugefirepoweradvantage,toprotectthem. TheCommunistsalsohopedthatthepeopleofSouthVietnam,especiallythe BuddhistactivistswhowereopposedtotheregimeinSaigon,mightriseupand beginarevolt.CombinedwithpressurefromtheVietCong(VC)andPeople’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) troops, a popular uprising might have toppled the SouthVietnamesegovernmentandledtoanimmediateAmericanwithdrawal. When this uprising did not materialize, the government in Saigon and the Americancommandclaimedagreatvictory. Militarily, there is clear justification for such claims. Tactically, the Tet OffensivewasacatastrophefortheVietCongandPAVN.GeneralVoNguyen
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Giap’splanfailedtoachievethehoped-fordecisivevictoryonthebattlefieldfor anumberofreasons. First,heunderestimatedthetacticalandstrategicmobilityoftheAmerican forces in South Vietnam. His opposite, General William Westmoreland, was able to take advantage of this mobility and could react to the enemy thrusts acrossSouthVietnam’sbordersandstillpullhisforcesquicklybackwhenthe Communistslaunchedtheirassaultonthecitiesandtowns.Thus,Giap’spreparatoryattacksalongthebordersfailedtodrawtheU.S.forcestothoseareas permanently.ThemobileAmericantroopsfoughttheborderbattlesbutwere stillavailabletoreactrapidlytotheoffensiveonceitwaslaunched. Second,Giap’splanwastoocomplicatedanddifficulttocoordinate.Thestrict secrecyrequiredtoinsuresurprisepreventedcoordinationbetweenunitsthathad neverworkedtogether.Eachunitknewonlyitssmallpieceoftheplanandhad no feel for the overall campaign objectives. Thus, while achieving numerous isolatedinitialsuccesses,onceinpositiontheCommunisttroopshadtofendfor themselvesandoftenappearednottohaveanyrealideaofwhattodonext. Additionally,thesecrecyandcoordinationproblemscontributedtotheconfusionthatmayhaveledtotheprematureattacksonJanuary30,1968.Thus, theoffensivewaslaunchedpiecemealovertwodaysratherthaninonesimultaneousdecisiveblow.AsDaveRichardPalmersuggests,“Hadallthebattles commenced as planned that first night, the outcome might well have been different.Asitturnedout,mostAlliedforcesweregrantedfromafewhoursto afewdaystobraceforthestorm.”3 Third,Giap’splanviolatedtheprincipleofmass.ThePAVNandVietCong hadtriedtohittoomanyplacesatonce.Byattackingvirtuallyeverywhere,they werestrongnowhere,spreadingtheirforcestoothinly;thus,theydidnothave enoughtroopstodomuchmorethanmakesomespectacularattacksthatwere soondefeatedbyalliedforces.OnlyinHueandSaigondidGiaphaveenough forcestomakeasignificantimpact. Ultimately,theplancalledfortheCommuniststoattackthestrengthofthe AmericanandSouthVietnamese(ARVN)forces.Turningawayfromtheirpreviouslyverysuccessfulhit-and-runtactics,theCommunistsattackedheadlong into vastly superior firepower. Even when the attacks were successful, there werenoplansforwhattodonextanduponattainingtheirinitialobjectives,the Communistsbecameimmobilizedorwereforcedtoretreatforlackoffollow-up ordersorreinforcements. ThegreatestfailingofGiap’splanatthetacticallevelliesintheassumptions uponwhichitwasbased,allofwhichprovedtobeabsolutelywrongintheend. TheCommunistshadexpectedtheARVNtocrumbleundertheirattacks,but theSouthVietnamesearmydidnotcollapse,nordidtheARVNsoldiersdesert in large numbers to join the Viet Cong as the Communists had predicted.
AssessingtheTetOffensive 81
Despiteinstancesofpoorleadership,troopindiscipline,andexcessivereliance on American firepower, the South Vietnamese responded fairly well to the demandsofthesituation. As for the anticipated general uprising, there had been no spontaneous revolt by the South Vietnamese people against the Saigon government. On the contrary, the devastation resulting from the fighting caused many South VietnamesetorallybehindSaigon. ThepriceofGiap’smiscalculationsandflawedassumptionswashigh.The Tet Offensive resulted in huge casualty figures for the Communist forces. Estimatesrangefromatotalof40,000deadoutof80,000Communistsengaged toashighasmorethan72,000Communistsdead,accordingtoU.S.military records.4Whilethesenumbersarecertainlysubjecttodebate,itisclearthat theCommunistsfailedtoholdontoanyofthemajorobjectivesthattheyhad attackedandsufferedhorrendouscasualtiesintheprocess;thissituationunderminedtheVietCong’s“reputationofinvincibility.”5 MosthistoriansagreethattheNationalLiberationFrontnevercompletely recoveredfromTet.TheVietCongwasbadlycrippledasafightingforce,and the NLF political organization was seriously damaged.6 In 1981, Dr. Duong QuynhHoa,aprominentCommunist,toldjournalistStanleyKarnowthatthe VietConghadbornethebruntoftheheavyfightinginthecitiesandtowns; sheadmittedmournfully,“Welostourbestpeople.”7Militarily,theVietCong wereneveragainabletofieldfullmain-forcebattalions(withsomeexceptions, suchasintheMekongDelta).Fromthispointoninthewar,thewarbecame moreconventionalandwasfoughtmainlybyPAVNforcescontrolleddirectly fromHanoi.JournalistDonOberdorferremarks,“TheVietConglostthebest ofagenerationofresistancefighters,andafterTetincreasingnumbersofNorth Vietnamesehadtobesentsouthtofilltheranks.Thewarbecameincreasingly aconventionalbattleandlessaninsurgency.Becausethepeopleofthecities did not rise up against the foreigners and puppets at Tet—indeed they gave littlesupporttotheattackforce—theCommunistclaimtomoralandpolitical authorityinSouthVietnamsufferedaseriousblow.”8 PAVNGeneralTranVanTrawrites,“Wedidnotcorrectlyevaluatethespecificbalanceofforcesbetweenourselvesandtheenemy,didnotfullyrealize thattheenemystillhadconsiderablecapabilitiesandthatourcapabilitieswere limited, and set requirements that were beyond our actual strength.... We sufferedlargesacrificesandlosseswithregardtomanpowerandmaterial,especiallycadresatthevariousechelons,whichclearlyweakenedus.Afterwards,we werenotonlyunabletoretainthegainswehadmadebuthadtoovercomea myriadofdifficultiesin1969and1970sothattherevolutionarycouldstandfirm inthestorm.”9AccordingtoDuongQuynhHoa,“Hanoiwasguiltyofgrievous miscalculation,whichsquanderedthestrengthoftheSouthernforces.”10
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U.S. and South Vietnamese forces had indeed defeated VC and PAVN forces on the tactical level, recovering quickly from the surprise and fighting courageously;fifteenAmericanswereawardedtheMedalofHonorforbravery duringtheTetbattles.However,thealliedvictoryhadbeenverycostly.More than 1,100 Americans were killed and wounded in the first two weeks of Tet, alongwithseveralthousandSouthVietnamesesoldiers.BytheendofMarch, the casualties had risen to 1,001 American dead and 2,082 ARVN and other alliedforceskilled.11 Ontheupsidefortheallies,theSouthVietnamesetroopshaddisplayedbetter fighting capability than most observers expected, and government control wasreestablishedinmostareasfollowingtheheavyfightinginthelatespring andearlysummer.RecruitingbytheSaigongovernmentflourished,andARVN morale was much higher than before Tet. The government was soon able to armthousandsofvolunteersforanationwideself-defenseforce. Still,theTetOffensivehaddamagedalliedpacificationeffortsintherural areas. The offensive weakened the government’s standing in the countryside. HistorianRichardA.Huntremarks,“Nearlyfivehundredofthefivethousand RF/PF[RegionalForces/PopularForces]outpostswereabandonedoroverrun, andthegovernmentmovedRF/PFunitsoutofruralvillagesandintobesieged towns and cities to provide additional defensive forces.”12 The withdrawal of government soldiers and police contributed to a drop in security, and many villagesrevertedtorevolutionarycontrolwhenthealliedtroopswhonormally operatedinthoseareaswerewithdrawntohandlethefightinginthepopulation centers.However,Huntpointsoutthatthesetbacktothepacificationprogram was not as drastic as depicted in the American press and that allied forces recoveredveryquickly.However,Westmoreland’srequestforadditionaltroops seemedtoconfirmthegloomyreportsintheAmericanmedia.13 In the cities, there was much ambivalence on the part of the citizenry. A studyconductedinSaigoninlate1968revealedthatmanySouthVietnamese inthecityremainedpassiveandmightbeledtoaccommodatetotheVietCong movement.14 The South Vietnamese and American troops had turned back theCommunistonslaughtin1968,buttherewasmuchconcernamongSouth Vietnamese,particularlytheeliteinSaigon,thattheARVNwouldnotbeable tostanduptofutureattacksiftheAmericansleft.15Suchattitudeswouldhavea greatimpactonthesuccessoftheVietnamizationeffortafterNixontookoffice. Thus,Tet,accordingtoastudybyLeslieGelbandRichardBetts,“exposedthe extremevulnerabilityoftheGVN[GovernmentofVietnam]thatlaybeneath theveneerofmilitaryprogress.”16 TheTetOffensivewasneverapurelymilitarycampaign,andanyanalysis of the operation must include an assessment of the outcome of its strategic politicalobjectives.AlthoughtheallieswonmostoftheTetbattlesandinflicted
AssessingtheTetOffensive 83
horrendouscasualtiesontheCommunistforces,theTetOffensive“brokelike aclapofthunderonanastonishedworld”andresultedinastunningstrategic victoryfortheCommunists.17InthewordsofaformerVCcolonel,BuiTin, “theMauThanOffensivecausedadisastrousturnaboutinU.S.policythatgave Hanoi breathing room at just the moment when we were hardest-pressed in SouthVietnam!So,onthepolitical,strategic,andpsychologicalfronts,wehad wonamajorandspectacularvictory!”18 However,StanleyKarnowandothersmaintainthattheoutcomeoftheTet Offensive may not have been as clear-cut to the Communist planners as Bui Tinandhiscomradeswouldhaveit.KarnowquotesatopNorthVietnamese general, Tran Do, who commented after the war, “In all honesty, we didn’t achieveourmainobjective,whichwastospuruprisingsthroughoutthesouth. Still,weinflictedheavycasualtiesontheAmericansandtheirpuppets,andthis wasabiggainforus.AsformakinganimpactintheUnitedStates,ithadnot beenourintention—butitturnedouttobeafortunateresult.”19 Suchstatementshavecontributedtowardtheclaimbymanythatadecisive tactical defeat was turned into a psychological victory at the strategic level, almost by happenstance. A perfect example of this line of thought can be seeninmostdiscussionsoftheresultsoftheVCattackontheU.S.embassy. Historian James R. Arnold spoke for many when he wrote of the embassy attack,“Herewastheparadoxofthewar:asmall,ill-conceived,tacticallyflawed attackagainstaninsignificantmilitaryobjective,designedtoimpresstheSouth Vietnamese,provedthedecisiveactionofthewarbecauseofitsimpactonthe Americanpublic.”20 SomeAmericanhistoriansofthewar,mostoftheseniorleaderswhoparticipatedinthewar,andmuchoftheAmericanpublicmaintainthatthereaction totheTetOffensiveintheUnitedStateswasafortunatecoincidenceforHanoi andtheNLF—thattheimpactofthisattackandtherestoftheTetOffensive was a result of “a meddling new media” and “weak-willed leaders” and not becauseofanydesignbytheCommunists.21Theimplicationisthatthewarwas lostinWashingtonandnotinVietnam. GeneralTranVanTrafindsthisassessmentoftheoutcomeoftheOffensive to be “an example of blind xeno [xenophobia].”22 To Tra, the Tet Offensive wasastrategicvictory“wonbyblood”thatachievedtheobjectivesthatitwas designedtoaccomplish.Hewrote: The Tet Offensive was still a great victory, creating the most important strategicturningpointofthewar,eventuallyleadingustototalvictory. Tet,TetMauThaninfact,shooktheenemy’saggressivewilltoitsfoundationandputanendtotheU.S.dreamofachieving“victory”byescalating thewar;itawakenedtheUnitedStatestothefactthatmight,resources,
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andmoneyhavetheirlimits;andithighlightedtheconclusionthatthe United States was not strong enough to force another nation—even a smaller and weaker one—to kneel down and surrender if that nation’s desireforindependenceandfreedomwasstrong.23 For Giap, the Tet Offensive had vindicated North Vietnam’s war strategy. SpeakingoftheAmericans,heclaimed,“UntilTettheyhadthoughttheycould winthewar,butnowtheyknewthattheycouldnot.”24Therewasalotoftruth inwhatGiapsaid.PartoftheimpactoftheTetOffensivelayinitstiming.It occurred just before the first presidential primaries and thus, in the words of DonOberdorfer,“caughttheAmericanpoliticalsystematitsmomentofgreatest irresolution and potential for change.”25 According to Townsend Hoopes, one of President Johnson’s advisors, the Tet attacks left the White House in a state of “troubled confusion and uncertainty.”26 This situation would prove fatal for the Johnson administration and represented the turning point in the warfortheUnitedStates.PoliticalscientistBernardBrodiemaintainsthatthe TetOffensive“doesnotsimplymarkbutactuallycausedthebeginningofthe endofAmericanparticipationintheVietnamWar,withallthestrategicand politicalconsequencesthatflowedfromthatwithdrawal.”27 Ononelevel,theTetOffensivewasanill-advisedandcomprehensivemilitarydefeatatthetacticallevelfortheCommunists.But,asBrodiesuggests,Tet, whetherbydesignornot,was“uniqueinthatthesidethatlostcompletelyina tacticalsensecameawaywithanoverwhelmingpsychologicalandhencepoliticalvictory.”28AccordingtohistorianDavidSchmitz,theTetOffensivewasdecisivebecauseofitsimpactonseniorofficialsintheJohnsonadministration,who thenhelpedbringaboutJohnson’sdramaticdecisiontochangepolicy.29The offensivehadshakenthewillofboththepresidentandtheAmericanpublic, convincedJohnsontoinstituteaunilateralbombinghalt,resultedintheopeningofnegotiationsinParis,andultimatelyledtothepresident’sleavingoffice. TheVietCongandPAVNhadpaidahighprice,but,asTranVanTrawrites, theywerepreparedtomakesuchsacrificessincetheTetOffensivewasmeant tobethe“decisivephase”oftherevolutionary“roadtovictory.”30 TheTetOffensiveplayedakeyroleinthesubsequenteventsthatledtothe long, protracted U.S. withdrawal under Richard Nixon. It marked the beginningoftheendofU.S.involvementinSoutheastAsia.Inthefinalanalysis,as Oberdorfer writes, “The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong lost a battle. The United States Government lost something even more important—the confidence of its people at home.”31 It is correct that the Vietnamese foe lost the bloodybattlesoftheTetOffensiveandthat,asmanyhistorianspointout,the allied forces made progress in the aftermath of the offensive, but in the long run,thetacticalsuccessesandtheadvancesinpacificationachievedduringthe
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yearsfollowingtheoffensiveeventuallyprovedirrelevant.Atthestrategiclevel, theoffensivewasnota“desperategamble,”butratheracalculatedcampaign that won a great political victory that turned the tide of the war. It proved to theUnitedStatesthatthewarwasunwinnable,effectivelytoppledapresident, convincedthenewpresidentto“Vietnamize”thewar,andpavedthewayfor theultimatetriumphoftheCommunistforcesin1975.
partii IssuesandInterpretations
Chapter8
m o t i va t i o n s a n d o b j ect i v es o f t h e t et o f f en s i v e
ScholarsdisagreeaboutwhatmotivatedtheTetOffensive.AshistorianEdwin Moisehaspointedout,“Itisnotentirelycleartowhatextentthisextraordinarygamblewasbasedonhopesitcouldachieveitsmaximumgoals—causingarealcollapseoftheRepublicofVietnam,anddrawingthepopulation of the cities into a general uprising—and to what extent it was based on a reasonableassuranceofachievingmoremodestdisruptionsoftheU.S.and ARVN war effort, and of U.S. public support for the war.”1 The question remains a source of debate among historians of the war. Some argue that theNorthVietnameseCommunistgovernmentandtheNationalLiberation Front(NLF)wereworriedaboutmountinglossesandpursuedaconventional assaultasadesperatemeasuretostayinthewar.Most,however,believethat theleadersinHanoi,despitethedifficultiesincurredinthesouth,remained optimistic about their ultimate success and their ability to improve the militarysituationorevenachieveaknockoutblowontheSouthVietnamese armedforces.Otherobserversmaintainthattheoffensivewasanattemptto improvethepositionoftheNorthVietnameseinfuturenegotiationsbyplacing the two northernmost South Vietnamese provinces under Communist control.StillothersclaimthattheattitudesoftheAmericanpublicandmembersoftheJohnsonadministrationweretheultimatetargetsoftheoffensive. Alloftheseperspectivesaresubjecttodebate.TheCommunistshavebeen
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less than forthcoming with explanations of their motives for the offensive, whichremainobscuredbypropagandaandthedifficultyingainingaccessto NorthVietnameserecords. The Communists clearly hoped to stimulate a popular uprising and the formationofacoalitiongovernment.Somemighthavelookedforthecollapse of Nguyen Van Thieu’s regime and perhaps even an American withdrawal. AccordingtohistorianGeorgeHerring,amajoritymorelikelyexpectedaless decisivechange,suchasahalttothebombingoraweakenedgovernmentin Saigon, and viewed the offensive as part of a long-term strategy of “fighting whilenegotiating.”2 HistoriansJamesOwensandRandyRobertsmaintainthatNorthVietnamese strategistNguyenChiThanh,headoftheCentralOfficeforSouthVietnam andoneoftheprimaryadvocatesforlaunchingthegeneraloffensive,believed that the offensive could alter the entire outcome of the war. The success of a widespread offensive could undermine the Thieu regime, force the South VietnameseArmy(ARVN)tosurrender,secureamilitaryfootholdinthemajor citiesandprovincialcapitals,andinflictheavycasualtiesonAmericanswhile bringingthewarhometotheSouthVietnamtodemonstratethatVietCong (VC)powerwaseverywhere.3 Other sources make it clear that some Communist leaders in Hanoi were notsureofthelikelyoutcome;one,LeDuan,isreportedtohavesaidthatthey “mustfightandthensee.”4HistorianNgoVinhLong,havingdoneextensive research in Vietnam, has written that the most important objective of the TetOffensivewastoforcetheUnitedStates“tode-escalatethewarinNorth Vietnamandtobeginnegotiations.”5Similarly,historianMarilynYoungmaintainsthattheleadersinHanoihopedforacollapseoftheSouthVietnamese government, followed by popular demands for a coalition government that wouldincludetheNationalLiberationFront,andtheconsequentwithdrawal oftheUnitedStates.6 The picture became somewhat clearer in 2002 when an English translation of The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975 was published.IndiscussingtheplanningfortheTetOffensive,theofficialhistory quotesthePartyCentralCommitteeresolutionthatcalledforthegeneraloffensiveandgeneraluprising,enumeratingthefollowingobjectives: • Tobreakdownanddestroythebulkofthepuppettroops,topplethe puppetadministrationatalllevels,andtake power into the hands of thepeople. • To destroy the major part of the U.S. forces and their war materiel andrenderthemunabletofulfilltheirpoliticalandmilitarydutiesin Vietnam.
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• On this basis, to break the U.S. will of aggression, force it to accept defeat in the South, and put an end to all acts of war against the North. With this, we will achieve the immediate objectives of our revolution—independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality for the South—andwecanproceedtonationalreunification.7 Historianswritingbeforethepublicationoftheofficialhistorywereaware ofthisresolution,but,asonecansee,thegenerallanguageofthedocument is indirect and does not spell out the specific objectives of the offensive. Extrapolatingfromtheresolutionandcomparingitwithwhathappenedonce the fighting started, some historians have asserted that Hanoi’s aim was to underminetheconfidenceoftheSouthVietnamesecivilianslivinginthecities aswellasthepeasantswhohadfledtherefromthecountryside.Byattacking thecities,theNorthVietnamesehopedtoprovetothepeoplethattherewas nosafetyanywhereinSouthVietnam,withtheresultthattheywouldloseall confidence in their government, which would eventually be toppled by the Communists.Inaddition,accordingtothehistorianswhoholdthisview,Hanoi believed that the American people, whom the Johnson administration had assuredthattheirtroopswerewinningthewar,wouldbeshakenintheirsupportofthewareffort.ThepeaceprotestsinAmericawouldgrow,andpressure wouldthereforebuildontheU.S.governmenttorethinkthewarandbeginto disengagefromSouthVietnam.TheNorthVietnameseweredoubtlesshopefulthattheoffensivewouldlessenAmericansupportforthewar.Still,Pham VanDong,NorthVietnam’sprimeminister,toldtheAmericanreporterDavid Schoenbrunin1967thattheNorthVietnamesewere“gratefulforthehelpof theAmericanpeacedemonstrators,but,inthefinalanalysisweknowthatwe mustcountmainlyonourselves.”8 AnadditionalobjectivefortheoffensivecanbegleanedfromanexaminationofaseriesofarticlesbyGiapentitled“TheBigVictory,theGreatTask,” broadcast by Radio Hanoi on September 17–20, 1967. The Communists were awarethatanewoffensivemighthaveanexplosiveimpactduringanAmerican electionyear.InGiap’swords,theoffensivewouldbecomeapartisanissuethat “willmaketheAmericanpeoplemoreawareoftheerrorsandsetbacksofthe JohnsonadministrationintheaggressivewarinVietnam.”9 ItappearsthattheCommunistleadersbelievedthatacatastrophicmilitary defeat of allied forces in an American election year, an immense increase in American and South Vietnamese casualties, and a demonstration that the South Vietnamese were incapable of shouldering the burden of the war togethermightprovetheequivalentofaDienBienPhu.TheU.S.government mightthendecidethattherewasnowaytovictoryexceptatacostthatmost Americanswereunwillingtopay.10
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WilliamJ.Duiker,authorofTheCommunistRoadtoVictoryinVietnam, maintains that while the North Vietnamese were quite confident before the offensive,theyhedgedtheirbetswithacontingencyplan“incasetheuprising didnotsucceedinachievingthetotaloverthrowofenemypower,itwouldbe followed by a series of military offensives during succeeding months to wear downtheenemyandleadeithertovictoryoftoanegotiatedsettlement.”11That explainsthefollow-onphasesinthesummerandearlyautumnof1968,afterthe earlierfightinghadfailedtoachievealloftheirgoals. Another interpretation ascribes a wholly different goal for the North Vietnamesein1968.NormanPodhoretz,authorofWhyWeWereinVietnam, andHarrySummers,authorofOnStrategy,assertthatoneobjectiveoftheTet OffensivewastheeliminationoftheVietConginordertoinsurethatSouth VietnamwouldbecontrolledbyNorthVietnamafterthewarwasover.12This is highly debatable, and other historians argue that it is unlikely that North Vietnam,lockedinalife-or-deathstrugglewiththeUnitedStates,wouldhave willinglysquanderedthatmanymilitaryforcesintheinterestofpostwarinternalpolitics. SomehaveattributedgreatmilitarygeniustoGiap,assertingthatheknowinglysetouttoachievethegreatpsychologicalvictoryagainsttheUnitedStates. OtherhistorianssuggestthatthereislittleevidencetoindicatethatGiaphad any idea how great the impact of the offensive would be on both the White House and the American public. Tran Do, a top North Vietnamese general, acknowledgedthattheCommunistshadfailedtospurthegeneraluprisingin thesouthbutstillmanagedtoinflictheavycasualtiesonboththeAmericans andtheSouthVietnamese.Asforachievingadecisivepsychologicalvictoryin theUnitedStates,Doadmitsthat“ithadnotbeenourintention—butitturned outtobeafortunateresult.”13 Given the stated and implied objectives of the Tet Offensive, perhaps the bestassessmentofhowtheCommunistsdidinachievingthemcanbefound ina1988articleinaVietnamesemilitaryjournalwrittenbyGeneralTranVan Tra,whowascommanderoftheCommunistB-2Frontinthesouthforamajor partofthewaragainsttheUnitedStates.Herevealsthatheandhiscomrades failedtoachievethegoalsenumeratedintheCentralPartyCommitteeresolutionbecausethey“surpassedouractualcapabilitiesbymanytimes.”14Thatmay betrue,butintheend,theoffensivehadsuchanimpactontheWhiteHouse, media,andtheAmericanpeoplethattheCommunists’failuretoachievetheir originalgoalsatthetacticalandoperationallevelsprovedirrelevant.Intheend, theywonagreatpoliticalvictoryatthestrategiclevel.
Chapter9
m i l i ta r y i n t el l i g en ce a n d s u r p r i s e a t t et
One of the lingering debates about the Tet Offensive centers on how the Communistswereabletoachievethelevelofsurprisethattheydidwhenthey launched the offensive. As historian John Prados has written, “Whether the attack at Tet represented a surprise—and intelligence failure—has ever after remainedafervidquestion,oftenlurkinginthewingsofVietnamdiscussions, provokingnumerousarguments.”1 TheVietCong(VC)andPeople’sArmyofVietnam(PAVN)skillfullyused bothactiveandpassivedeceptiontofoolthealliedintelligenceapparatus.By usingpassivemeasuressuchasoperationssecuritytoachievesecrecy,theywere effectivelyabletomaskpreparationsfortheoffensive.Byusingactivedeception measuressuchastheoffensiveoperationsintheborderareas,theysuccessfully drewtheallies’attentionawayfromtheurbantargetareas. Nevertheless, there were numerous signs that the Communists were up tosomething.VoNguyenGiaphadwrittenaseriesofarticlesbroadcastover HanoiRadio,whichalsoappearedinpartinPAVNnewspapersinSeptember 1967andwerelaterpublishedcollectivelyasBigVictory,GreatTask.Inoneof thebroadcasts,GiapacknowledgedtheU.S.troopbuildupinSouthVietnam whilenotingthatanopportunitypresenteditselftoconfrontWashingtonwitha dilemmabecause“thepresentmobilizationlevelhasfarexceededinitialU.S.
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forecastandisatsharpvariancewithU.S.globalstrategy.”2ThenGiapoutlined howtheCommunistsplannedtotakeadvantageofthatopportunity. Inretrospect,thesearticlesprovidedaprettygoodblueprintforwhatHanoi wasplanning,butthebeliefsmanyU.S.commandersandanalystsembraced divergedfromGiap’sdescriptionofthesituation,andthustheydismissedhis claims and recommendations as unrealistic.3 Such dismissals of new intelligencewouldcontinueevenasindicatorsofanimpendingoffensivebeganto mount. OnOctober16,1967,SouthVietnameseArmy(ARVN)unitsintheMekong Delta found a three-page memorandum from the regional party committee, dated September 2, that used the phrase “winter-spring campaign” and discussedpreparationsforit.OnOctober25,animportantenemydocumentfell into allied hands in Tay Ninh Province. Dated September 1, 1967, the documentcontainedinstructionalmaterialonhow“tohelpbetterunderstandthe newsituationandournewtask.”4Itfurtherdefinedathree-prongedoffensive designedtodefeattheSouthVietnameseforces,destroyU.S.politicalandmilitaryinstitutions,andinstigateacountrywideinsurrectionofthepopularmasses. Accordingtothecaptureddocument,thisprojectedoffensiveboretheabbreviated designation TCK-TKN for Tong Cong Kich–Tong Khoi Nghia (General Offensive–GeneralUprising).Ataboutthesametime,ARVNtroopscaptured anotherdocumentthatdiscussedsappertrainingandpreparationsforVCand PAVNpersonneltouseagainstARVNmechanizedequipment. Over the next two months, several other captured documents indicated thatanewoffensivewasintheoffing.PerhapsthebestknownofthesedocumentswasamilitarydirectiveissuedbyCOSVNB-3FrontCommand,which controlledCommunistoperationsinthecentralpartofSouthVietnam.This document fell into allied hands in mid-November 1967. It called for “many large scale, well-coordinated combat operations” to “destroy or disintegrate a largepartofthePuppet[ARVN]army.”Ofparticularnoteweredirectionsto “annihilateamajorU.S.elementinordertoforcetheenemytodeployasmany additionaltroopstotheWesternhighlandsaspossible.”5 OnNovember19,thepicturebecameclearerwhenU.S.troopersfromthe 2ndBattalion,327thAirborne,operatinginQuangTinProvince,capturedathirteen-pagenotebookcontainingadocumententitled“HoChiMinh’sOrderfor ImplementationofGeneralCounteroffensiveandGeneralUprisingduring1967 Winterand1968SpringandSummer.”ThisdocumentwastranslatedanddisseminatedtobothU.S.andSouthVietnameseintelligenceagenciesintheform of a detailed memorandum from the Defense Intelligence Agency. The U.S. embassyinSaigonevenputoutapressreleasecontaininganumberofdetails from the notebook and document. Still, the dissemination of this intelligence appearsnottohavehadamajorimpactonalliedthinkingorpreparations.
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OnNovember25,1967,alliedforcesinTayNinhprovincecapturedatenpagedocument.DatedSeptember1,1967,itwasessentiallyatrainingmanual entitled“ClearlyUnderstandtheNewSituationandMission:TakeAdvantage of Victories to Surge Forward and Complete Defeat the U.S. and Puppet Enemy.”Itcontainedageneraloutlineofthestrategyandobjectivesofanew offensive. Captureddocumentswerenottheonlyindicationsthatanewoffensivewas impending.Althoughenemytroop-infiltrationlevelsdidnotappeartobeout oftheordinaryinlate1967,reportsofmorethantwentythousandenemytroops movingsouthinJanuaryrepresentedadrasticincreaseandindicatedthatsome sortofincreasedenemyactionwasprobable.Additionally,trucktrafficdetected on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in late 1967 far exceeded earlier periods, further indicatingthatamajorpushwascoming. Thus,therewasagooddealoffairlyexplicitintelligenceavailabletoU.S. and South Vietnamese decision makers in the last few months leading up to the offensive, intelligence that gave indications of significant action pending by the Communists. According to John Prados, “The indicators were numerous....Thestreamofthembeganrelativelyearlyinthecycleofpreparation fortheoffensiveandthatmanyofthereportswerecomplementaryandbuilt uponeachother.”6 So,then,thequestionis,whythesurprise?TheTetOffensiverepresented,in thewordsofNationalSecurityCouncilstaffmemberWilliamJorden,writing inaFebruary1968cabletopresidentialadvisorWaltRostow,“theworstintelligencefailureofthewar.”7Nevertheless,afterthewar,someofthoseofficers who held posts as commanders and intelligence officers in Vietnam at the timeoftheTetOffensiveassertedthatMilitaryAssistanceCommand,Vietnam (MACV)headquarterswasfullyawarethattherehadbeenachangeinNorth Vietnamese strategy, but was surprised only by the actual scale and level of coordinationoftheTetattacks.8 ManyhistoriansandotherobserversdiscountsuchclaimsandhaveendeavoredtounderstandhowtheCommunistswereabletoachievesuchastunning level of surprise. There are a number of possible explanations. First, allied estimatesofenemystrengthsandintentionswereflawed.Partoftheproblem was that MACV, in an effort to show progress in the war, had purposefully downgradedtheintelligenceestimatesaboutVC/PAVNstrength.CIAanalyst SamAdamschargesthatMACVactuallyfalsifiedintelligencereportstoshow progressinthewar.9Whetherthisaccusationistrueissubjecttodebate,but itisafactthatMACVchangedthewayitcountedtheenemy,revisingenemy strengthdownwardfromalmost300,000to235,000inDecember1967.10U.S. intelligenceanalystsapparentlybelievedtheirownrevisedestimatesandlargely disregardedthemountingevidencethattheCommunistsnotonlyretaineda
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significantcombatcapabilitybutalsoplannedtousethatcapabilityinadramaticfashion. Former South Vietnamese Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, in a postwar monograph written for the U.S. Army about the 1968 offensive, observes that “intelligencetheorytaughtusthatinestimatingtheenemy’sprobablycourse of action we should be primarily concerned with his capabilities and not his intentions.”11Havingsaidthat,heassertsthatSouthVietnamese intelligence analystsdismissedmanyofthecaptureddocumentsassomuchwishfulthinking on the part of the Communists—that the documents represented merely anexpressionoftheintentionoftheCommunists,ratherthansomethingthey clearly had the capabilities to accomplish—at least as those capabilities were knownandassessedbyalliedcommandersandintelligenceanalysts. Thus,thealliesgreatlyunderestimatedthecapabilitiesoftheirenemyand dismissednewintelligenceindicatorsbecausetheytoogreatlycontradictedprevailingassumptionsabouttheenemy’sstrengthandcapabilities.Itwasthought that enemy capabilities were insufficient to support a nationwide campaign. AsMarilynYoung,authorofTheVietnamWars,writes,“Tohavetakenother signsofthecomingoffensiveseriously—captureddocument,rumors,warnings given American civilians by Vietnamese friends—would have meant revising theviewofthewartowhichAmericans,civilianaswellasmilitary,werefirmly wedded.”12Therefore,theinfluenceofentrenchedbeliefsabouttheenemyand thenatureofthewarcoloredtheperceptionsofalliedcommandersandintelligence officers when they were presented with intelligence that varied with theirpreconceivednotions. Inthesamevein,documentsandotherevidencewerediscountedbecause theanalystsdidnotthinkthattheCommunistswouldwanttoincurinevitable heavy losses for such questionable objectives. Even if the Communists could occupy any cities, did they have the strength to hold them against the strong reaction of the allied forces? Thus, the reports did not pass the logic test for alliedintelligenceanalysts.Suchanevaluationdepends,ofcourse,onwhois definingwhatislogical. Some of the South Vietnamese analysts even believed that the enemy was actuallyrevertingtothefirstordefensivephaseofhisrevolutionarywarstrategy. TheythoughtthatU.S.search-and-destroyoperationsconductedin1967inWar ZonesCandDandtheIronTriangle,thecriticalareasbetweenSaigonandthe Cambodianborder,hadforcedtheCommuniststoreturntoamoredefensive postureandthattheenemydidnothavethecapabilitytogofromtheretoageneraloffensive.13Evenwhentheanalystsagreedthattherewasageneraloffensive beingplanned,theythoughtitwouldcomeinthedistantfuture,becauseGiap hadalwaystalkedaboutthewarlastingforaprotractedperiod.Theseperceptions overshadowedinformationsuggestingindicationsofanimpendingescalation.
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AnotherproblemthathadanimpactontheintelligencefailuresinTetdeals withwhatisknowntodayas“fusion.”Thedatacollectedwasneverassembled intoacompleteandcohesivepictureofwhattheCommunistsweredoing.The analystsoftenfailedtointegratecumulativeinformation,eventhoughtheywere chargedwiththeproductionofestimatesthatshouldhavefacilitatedthecombinationofdifferentindicatorsintoanoverallanalysis.Partofthisproblemcanbe tracedtothelackofcoordinationbetweenalliedintelligenceagencies.Mostof theseorganizationsoperatedindependentlyandrarelysharedtheirinformation witheachother.Thatwastrueevenwithinthemilitaryintelligencestructure. Ronnie Ford, author of Tet 1968: Understanding the Surprise, argues that bureaucratic infighting over order-of-battle issues among the American intelligence agencies led to the lack of coordination and information sharing, impedingboththesynthesisofalltheintelligencethatwasavailableandthe abilitytopredictwhenandwheretheoffensivemightcome.Fordwrites,“The substantive disagreements and bureaucratic infighting that were to follow in WashingtonandinSaigonoverenemystrengthwouldprecludethefusionof intelligencenecessarytopreventthesurpriseofthe1968TetOffensive.”14 Evenifthealliedintelligenceapparatushadbeenbetteratfusion,itwould still have had to deal with widely conflicting reports that clouded the issue. Whiletheaforementionedintelligenceindicatedthatageneraloffensivewas intheoffing,therewereanumberofotherintelligencereportsindicatingthat theenemywasfacingextremedifficultiesinthefieldandthathismoralehad declinedmarkedly.Itwasdifficulttodifferentiateamongthewidelydiffering reports. Additionally, some indicators that should have caused alarm among intelligence analysts got lost in the noise of developments related to more obvious and more widely expected adversary threats. Faced with evidence of increasingenemyactivitynearurbanareasandalongthebordersofthecountry,theallieswereforcedtodecidewhere,when,andhowthemainblowwould fall.Theyfailedinthiseffort. AsJamesJ.Wirtz,authorofTheTetOffensive:IntelligenceFailureinWar, pointsout,therewasanever-increasingamountofinformationindicatingthat the Communists were preparing to attack urban areas. On the other hand, Communist diversionary efforts intended to fix the majority of U.S. units in their normal operating areas increased in intensity. When indications that PAVN units were massing near Khe Sanh were confirmed by ground attacks against the firebase on January 21, reinforcements and the attention of U.S. commandersweredirectedtowardtheborderarea.15 NowheredidGeneralWilliamC.Westmoreland,theMACVcommander, predictacountrywideoffensive.Hethoughttherewouldbeperhapsa“show of force,” but otherwise the enemy’s main effort would be directed at Khe Sanh and the northern provinces. His intelligence officer expected a threat
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intheKheSanh–ThuaThienarea,butnotmuchintheSaigonarea(which conformedtothepatternofrecentenemyactivityinthebattlesof1967).This fitwellwiththeanalysts’beliefsaboutenemystrategyandcapabilities.Wirtz describes this situation very well when he observes that “individuals tend to makeadecisionwhentheypossessinformationthatconfirmstheirpreexisting beliefs,eventhoughthisinformationmayfailtodescribedadequatelythepresentsituation.”Wirtzcallsthisthetheoryof“unmotivatedbias.”16 Whenintelligenceindicatorscoincidewithpreferences,predisposition,and preexisting beliefs, the real message behind the gathering intelligence may belost.Inthiscase,asLarryCablewrites,theresultwas“anunwillingnessto acceptintelligencethatrunscountertopersonalpredilections,prejudices,and beliefssuchastoconstituteavariantofthecommonpsychologicaloccurrence calledcognitivedissonance.”17Thus,Westmorelandandmostofhisstaffevaluatedtheintelligenceinlightofwhattheyalreadybelieved,discountingmost ofitbecauseitdidnotconformtotheirpreconceivednotionsabouttheenemy situationandintentions. The Communists skillfully contributed to the erroneous perceptions held at MACV headquarters. As John Prados writes, “adversary actions created a deception—an alternative interpretation of some plausibility. American commanderschosetobelieveinthatotherinterpretation.”18Thenatureandscope of the intelligence failure is debatable, but it is clear that there was a failure in“strategicconceptualization,whichinturnwastheproductofthepolluted policyprocess.”19 The impact of surprise in Tet Offensive cannot be overstated. As Wirtz writes, “the Tet offensive represents an extraordinarily successful instance of surpriseattack.Surpriseitselfalteredthebalanceofpoliticalwillbetweenthe combatants.”20ThescopeandferocityoftheattacksstunnedtheAmericanpeople,andalthoughtheoffensivewasanoverwhelmingdefeatoftheCommunist forcesatthetacticallevel,thesheerfactthattheenemyhadpulledoffsuchan offensiveandcaughtthealliesbysurpriseultimatelycontributedtothestrategic Communistvictoryandtheturningpointofthewar.
Chapter10
wh a t h a p p en ed a t hu e?
On October 31, 1969, Time reported that 2,300 bodies of South Vietnamese men,women,andchildrenhadbeenunearthedinseveralmassgravesaround Hue.ThemagazinearticlesaidthatCommunistcadreshadexecutedthevictimsduringthebattleforthecityinFebruary1968.Whatactuallyhappenedat Hueremainsatopicofintensedebatetothisday. One of the first in-depth assessments of the civilian deaths at Hue was by Douglas Pike, of the U.S. Information Agency. In The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror,publishedbytheU.S.MissioninSaigonin1970,Pikeassertsthatthe VietCong(VC)executedmanyofthe5,800civilianswhoweremissingafter thebattleendedonFebruary24. Pikereportsthat1,200bodieswerediscoveredineighteenhastilyconcealed shallowgravesinthemonthsfollowingtheendofthebattle.Thesecondmajor groupofgraveswasfoundinthefirstsevenmonthsof1969.Athirdgroupwas discovered in September 1969, when three Communist defectors told intelligenceofficersofthe101stAirborneDivisionthattheyhadwitnessedthekilling ofseveralhundredpeopleatDaMaiCreek,abouttenmilessouthofHuein February1968.Asubsequentsearchrevealedtheremainsofaboutthreehundredpeopleinthecreekbed.ThefourthdiscoveryofbodieswasmadeinPhu ThuSaltFlatsinNovember1969,nearthefishingvillageofLuongViensome tenmileseastofHue.
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Alltotal,Pikereportsthatnearlytwothousandbodieswererecoveredfrom thesemassgraves.Pikemaintainsthatatleasthalfofthebodiesrevealedclear evidenceof“atrocitykillings:toincludehandswiredbehindbacks,ragsstuffed inmouths,bodiescontortedbutwithoutwounds(indicatingburialalive).”1 Pikechargesthatthekillingsweredeliberatelydoneandwerenottheresult ofrage,frustration,orpanicduringtheCommunistwithdrawal,asothershad suggested at the time of the discovery of the bodies. He says that the executionsweredonebylocalVCcadresandweretheresultof“adecisionrational andjustifiableintheCommunistmind.Infact, most killings were, from the Communist calculation, imperative.”2 Pike points out that the Communist lineontheHuekillingslaterattheParistalkswasthatitwasnottheworkof Communistsbutof“dissidentlocalpoliticalparties.”3 JournalistDonOberdorfer,authorofTet!,firstpublishedin1971,writesthat whileNorthVietnamesetroopsatHuewerelockedincombatwiththeMarines and South Vietnamese soldiers, VC cadres took over control of the city and begantoroundupgovernmentworkers,foreigners,andother“reactionaries.”4 Oberdorfercitesanumberofexamplesofwhathappenedaftertheroundup. StephenMiller,atwenty-eight-year-oldAmericanForeignServiceOfficer,was inthehomeofVietnamesefriendswhenVCtroopscapturedhim.Theyled himawaytoafieldbehindaCatholicseminary,boundhisarms,andthenexecutedhim.PhysiciansRaimundDischer,AloisAltekoester,andHorstGunther Krainick thought they would be safe as foreign aid workers, but they were wrong. The Viet Cong came and took them and Krainick’s wife away. Their bodieswerelaterfounddumpedinashallowgraveinanearbyfield.Similarly, two French priests, Father Urbain and Father Guy, were led away. Father Urbain’sbodywaslaterfound,boundhandandfoot,wherehehadbeenburied alive.FatherGuy’sbodywasfoundinthesamegravewithUrbainandeighteen othervictims;Guyhadbeenshotinthebackofthehead.AVietnamesepriest metasimilarfate.FatherBuuDong,whohadtriedtoministertobothsidesand evenhadaphotographofHoChiMinhinhisroom,wastakenaway.Hisbody wasfoundtwenty-twomonthslaterinashallowgravealongwiththeremainsof threehundredothervictims. PhamVanTuongwasonthelistof“reactionaries”becausehewasaparttimejanitoratthegovernmentinformationoffice.WhenVCtroopsvisitedhis home,theyfoundhimhidingwithhisfamily.Heemergedwithhisthree-yearolddaughter,five-year-oldson,andtwonephews.TheVietCongimmediately gunneddownallfive,leavingthebodiesinthestreetfortherestofthefamily toseewhentheyemergedmomentslater. Mrs. Nguyen Thi Lao, a forty-eight-year-old widow who sold cigarettes fromastreetstand,wasledawaywithoutanyexplanation.Shewasfoundina commongraveatthelocalhighschool,havingbeenburiedalive,armsbound
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behindher.Shemayhavebeenmistakenforhersister,whowasaclerkinone ofthelocalgovernmentoffices. Onthefifthdayoftheoccupation,VCtroopscametoPhuCamCathedral, wheretheyhadgatheredsomefourhundredmenandboys.Somehadbeen ontheenemieslist,somewereofmilitaryage,andsomejustlookedprosperous.VCcadresledthemawaytothesouth.Itwasapparentlythisgroupwhose remainswerelaterfoundinthebedofDaMaiCreek. DonOberdorferbelievesthattheVietCongexecuted2,800peopleinHue, buthealsoacknowledgesreportsthatinthelaststagesoftheNLFoccupation, Saigon government assassination teams operating in Hue began to systematicallyroundupsomeofthosebelievedtohaveaidedtheCommunists.Mostof theseindividualswereneverseenagain,andthereisnorecordofwhatactually happenedtothem.However,thegeneralbeliefisthattheywereexecuted.5 Whilethatmaybetrue,thereisoverwhelmingevidencetosuggestthatthe preponderanceofthevictimsweredeliberatelykilledbytheCommunistsduring the battle. Both Gunther Lewy, author of America in Vietnam, and Peter Macdonald,authorofGiap,citeacapturedenemydocumentthatstatedthat, duringtheoccupationofthecity,theCommunists“eliminated1,892administrativepersonnel,38policemen,790tyrants.”6 In A House in Hue, Omar Eby describes the experience of a group of MennoniteaidworkerswhoweretrappedintheirhousewhentheCommunists tookoverthecity.HereportsthattheMennonitesinthehouseobservedseveral Americans, one an agriculturist from the U.S. Agency for International Development,beingledawaybyVCcadreswiththeirarmstiedbehindtheir backs.Theywerelaterfoundexecuted.EbyreportsthatoneoftheMennonites said,“DuringthefirstdaystheNorthVietnamesehadeverythingundercontrol. ItwasonlylaterthattheVCbegankidnappingandmurdering.”7 TruongNhuTang,authorofAVietcongMemoir,tellsofaconversationwith one of his VC colleagues about the situation at Hue that acknowledges that atrocities occurred at Hue, but his account differs in terms of describing the motivationforthekillings.Hesaysthataclosefriendtoldhimthat“disciplinein Huehadbeenseriouslyinadequate....Fanaticyoungsoldiershadindiscriminatelyshotpeople,andangrylocalcitizenswhosupportedtherevolutionhadon variousoccasionstakenjusticeintotheirownhands....Ithadsimplybeenone ofthoseterriblespontaneoustragediesthatinevitablyaccompanywar.”8 Not everyone agrees that a massacre occurred at Hue, or at least one as describedbyPike,Oberdorfer,andtheothers.InanarticleintheJune24,1974, issueofIndochinaChronicle(reprintedintheCongressionalRecordonFebruary 19,1975),politicalscientistD.GarethPortermaintainsthatthemassacreisone ofthe“enduringmythsoftheSecondIndochinaWar.”9Hethenchargesthat DouglasPike,whohecallsa“mediamanipulatorparexcellence,”wasincollu-
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sionwiththeARVN10thPoliticalWarfareBattaliontomanufacturethestoryof themassacreatthedirectionofAmbassadorEllsworthBunker.Whileacknowledgingthatsomeexecutionsoccurred,Porterassertsthatthekillingswerenot part of any overall plan. Additionally, he charges that Pike overestimated the numberofthosekilledbytheVCcadresandthat“thousands”ofcivilianskilled inHue“wereinfactvictimsofAmericanairpowerandofthegroundfighting thatragedinthehamlets,ratherthanNLFexecution.”10Moreover,heagrees withOberdorferthatteamsofSaigongovernmentassassinsfannedoutthrough thecitywiththeirownlistoftargets,eliminatingNLFsympathizers,butona muchgreaterscalethanOberdorfersuggests.Porterconcludesthat“theofficial storyofanindiscriminateslaughterofthosewhowereconsideredtobeunsympathetictotheNLFisacompletefabrication.”11 Thepassageoftimehasnotquelledthecontroversyoverwhathappenedin Hue.Writingin1991,historianMarilynB.Young,authorofTheVietnamWars, disputesthe“official”figuresofexecutionsatHue.Whileacknowledgingthat therewereexecutions,shecitesfreelancejournalistLenAckland,whowaspresentandestimatedthefiguretobesomewherebetweenthreehundredandfour hundred.12Youngattempts“tounderstand”what happened at Hue. She says thatthetaskoftheNLFinHuewastodestroythegovernmentadministrationof thecityandtoestablish,initsplace,a“revolutionaryadministration.”Howthat justifiestheexecutionofanycivilians,regardlessofthenumber,isunclear. ThetopicofwhathappenedatHuewasrevivedin2002.BuiTin,aformer colonel in the North Vietnamese Army, shares his insights into the Vietnam WaranditsaftermathinhisbookFromEnemytoFriend.Onceapresidential palaceguardforHoChiMinhandaparticipantinthedecisivebattleofthe French-Indochina War at Dien Bien Phu, Tin served as a frontline commander.OnApril30,1975,herodeatankontothepresidentialpalacegrounds inSaigontoaccepttheSouthVietnamesesurrenderfromGeneralDuongVan “Big”Minh.Inhisbook,Tindealswithanumberofissuesonthewarfromthe Communistperspective. With regard to the massacres in Hue, Bui Tin acknowledges that some executions of civilians did occur. However, he explains that the discipline of the troops broke down under the intensity of the American bombardment. AccordingtoTin,the“unitsfromthenorth”hadbeen“toldthatHuewasthe strongholdoffeudalism,abedofreactionaries,thebreedinggroundofCanLao PartyloyalistswhoremainedtruetothememoryofformerSouthVietnamese presidentNgoDinhDiemandofNguyenVanThieu’sDemocracyParty.”13He saysthatmorethantenthousandprisonersweretakenandthemostimportant sentnorth.WhentheMarineslaunchedtheircounterattacktoretakethecity, theCommunisttroopswereinstructedtohangontotheprisonersandtomove them with the retreating troops. However, according to Tin, in the “panic of
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retreat,”someofthecompanyandbattalioncommandersshottheirprisoners “toensurethesafetyoftheretreat.”Hecitedthisbreakdownindisciplineasthe reasonforthemassacres. PerhapsoneofthemostcogentassessmentsoftheaftermathofwhathappenedatHueisbestexpressedbyDonOberdorfer,whowrites,“Hardlyanyone took the trouble to investigate the full details of what happened; after Tet, Americaandmostoftheworldwasinterestedinproofsandprophesies,notin history.ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesandotherscitedthekillingsinHue asanobjectlessoninCommunistimmoralityandaforetasteofthebloodbath aheadshouldtheCommuniststriumphinSouthVietnam.Opponentsofthe President’spoliciestreatedthekillingsasanaberrationofwarordeniedthatany purposefullarge-scaleslaughterhadtakenplace.”14 Richard Falk effectively agrees with Oberdorfer: “The subsequent history of Vietnam makes one wonder whether the shadow cast by Tet did not add significantlytothefearandhostilityofSouthernerstowardstheNorth,tothe massexodusafterliberation,andtothephenomenonoftheboatpeople,which undercut the basic claim of national liberation and reunification.”15 We may neverknowwhatreallyhappenedatHue,butitisclearthatmassexecutions didoccurandthatreportsofamassacretherehadasignificantimpactonSouth VietnameseandAmericanattitudesformanyyearsaftertheTetOffensiveand wouldultimatelycontributetothepanicthatseizedSouthVietnamwhenthe NorthVietnameselaunchedtheirfinaloffensivein1975.
Chapter11
wh y k he s a n h?
Ever since 1968, historians, military leaders, and other observers have argued about what General Vo Nguyen Giap was attempting to accomplish at Khe Sanh.ThequestionhasbestbeenphrasedbyPeterBrush:“WasKheSanha territorialimperativeorabaitandswitch?”1BothsidesclaimedvictoryatKhe Sanh,fuelingalong-runningdebate. The U.S. commander in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, was clearlyconvincedthatKheSanhwasthefocalpointoftheCommunistplansin 1968.HebelievedthattheattacksbytheVietCong(VC)andPeople’sArmyof Vietnam(PAVN)elsewhereinVietnamduringtheTetOffensiveweremeant asadiversion“whileconcentratingoncreatingsomethinglikeDienBienPhu at Khe Sanh and seizing the two northern provinces [of South Vietnam].”2 This may have been wishful thinking on Westmoreland’s part, since he had always wanted to get the Communists to stand and fight on ground of his choosinginaset-piecebattle.KheSanhappearedtoprovidetheopportunity hehadbeenseeking. ThosewhomaintainthatoverrunningKheSanhwasGiap’smainfocusand notmerelyadiversionciteconsiderableevidencetomaketheirargument.On January2,1968,theMarineskilledfivePAVNsoldiersjustoutsidethedefensive perimeter of Khe Sanh; they were apparently reconnoitering the base. It appeared that this reconnaissance was in preparation for an attack—because
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why,arguethosewhobelieveKheSanhwasnotadiversion,wouldtheyhave hadtogetsoclosetotheMarinebaseforadiversionaryattack? Stronger support is provided by the intelligence gleaned from the interrogationofSeniorLieutenantLThanhToncafterhissurrenderatKheSanh onJanuary21.ThePAVNofficersaidthatheandhiscomradeshadbeentold thatthefallofKheSanhwouldbethedecisivebattleofthewar.Afteritfell, accordingtothelieutenant,PAVNforceswouldadvanceeastwardtocapture allofRoute9andcutoffthenorthernprovincesofSouthVietnam.Thosewho assertthatKheSanhwasadiversionmaintainthattheintelligencefromTonc’s interrogationisnotconclusiveevidencebecauseToncmayonlyhavebeenfed propagandabyhissuperiors. Nevertheless, the sheer number of forces in the Khe Sanh area when the firstattackbeganonJanuary21suggestsstronglythattheCommunistswanted to take the base. The PAVN force included three infantry divisions, a fourth infantry division nearby in a support role, tanks, and two artillery regiments withantiaircraftsupport.Thiswasanextremelylargeforcejusttotiedownsix thousand Marines and create a diversion to attract Westmoreland’s attention. ThosewhobelievethatKheSanhwasnotadiversionmaintainthatGiapkept thislargeforceatKheSanhwhentheycouldhaveperhapsbeenbetterused elsewhereduringtheTetOffensive;therefore,hehopedtoachievemuchmore thanamerediversionthere.3 In fact, Giap’s forces launched five battalion-size or larger attacks against KheSanhandthesurroundingoutposts.Intheinterim,theyweresubjectedto continuousshellingandaerialbombardment.Why,askthosewhobelieveGiap plannedtotakeKheSanh,wouldhelaunchtheseattacksandleavehisforces inthearea,wheretheycouldbeeasilytargetedbyartilleryandtacticalairsupport,ifhedidnotintendtomakeanall-outpushtotakethebase? Several commentators draw exactly the opposite conclusion about Giap’s intentions at Khe Sanh. Neil Sheehan, the author of A Bright Shining Lie, agrees with those who assert that Khe Sanh was a diversion: “Khe Sanh was thebiggestlureofthewar.TheVietnameseCommunistshadnointentionof attemptingtostageasecondDienBienPhuthere.Theobjectiveofthesiege wasWilliamWestmoreland,nottheMarinegarrison.Thesiegewasaruseto distractWestmorelandwhiletherealblow[theTetOffensive]wasprepared.”4 William S. Turley, author of The Second Indochina War: A Short Political andMilitaryHistory,1954–1975,citesapostwarinterviewwithPAVNColonel NghiemTuc,thedeputyeditorofQuanDoiNhanDan(People’sArmy)newspaper,whoclaimedthatKheSanhwasneverintendedtobeanotherDienBien Phu.In1968,hesaid,theCommunistsknewthattheUnitedStateswasatthe peakofitsmilitarypower.ToachieveanotherDienBienPhuatthattimewas “impossible.”5Turleyconcludesthatinadditiontoprovidingastrategicdiver-
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sion,theKheSanhbattlewasatestoftheU.S.reactiontothePAVNuseofthe demilitarized zone (DMZ). According to Turley, Giap wanted to determine howtheUnitedStateswouldrespondifhestagedattacksfromtheDMZ—specifically,whethertheUnitedStateswouldsendtroopsintotheNorth.6 Cecil Currey, Giap’s biographer, who interviewed the general extensively, maintains that Giap’s primary intention was indeed to stage a diversion and thatanynotionsofoverrunningthebaseweresecondary.Moreover,heasserts that“Giap’stargetwaslargerthanjustKheSanh;itwasalloftheRepublicof Vietnam.”7 With the eyes of the world focused on Khe Sanh, he was free to positionhissoldiersandtheVietCongtolaunchtheTetOffensive. General Philip Davidson, Westmoreland’s wartime intelligence chief and authorofVietnamatWar,callsthenotionthatGiapintendedKheSanhtobea strategicdiversiontodivertAmericanattentionawayfromthecitiesa“myth... withnofactualbasis.”8Hepointsoutthatadiversioncouldhavebeenachieved with far fewer troops and that Giap clearly meant to “overwhelm Khe Sanh with two, three, or four NVA divisions, ending the war with a stunning militaryvictory.”9HecallsanysuggestionthatKheSanhwasadiversion“obvious nonsense,” noting that “Giap’s alleged diversion consisted of some 32,000 to 40,000 NVA troops (and good ones at that) tying down 6,000 Marines and ARVNRangers.IfKheSanhwasanNVAdiversion,militaryhistoryprovides fewexamplesofonemoreexpensive.”10Davidsonmakesaverygoodpoint;itis unlikelythatageneralwouldusetwoorthreereinforceddivisionstodivertfour Marine battalions, certainly when those forces were badly needed in Quang Tri City and Hue during the Tet offensive. Moreover, Giap paid too costly a butcher’s bill around Khe Sanh not to have had some important purpose in mindforputtingthoseforcesthereinthefirstplace.Otherwise,whywouldhe havecontinuedtheattacklongafterthediversionhadbeenaccomplishedand theTetOffensivelaunched? Davidson believes that Giap himself was in the Khe Sanh area, proving that the siege was meant to be a major effort by the North Vietnamese. He cites several intelligence reports that indicated that Giap was indeed there. Additionally,radiointerceptsrevealedthattherewasaveryseniorPAVNheadquarters in a cave in the Khe Sanh area. Davidson also notes that Giap was notseeninHanoibetweenSeptember2,1967,andFebruary5,1968,andadds, “ThebestguessisthatGiapwasinthecaveandthatheplannedaPhaseIII battleatKheSanh.”11 PeterMcDonald,authorofGiap,disagrees,citinglackofNorthVietnamese helicoptersorothertransportationcapableofgettingGiaptothecombatzone fromHanoiinatimelyfashion.Macdonaldbelieves that it was unlikely that theNorthVietnamesegeneralwouldhaveleftthecenterofmilitarycontrolin Hanoiduringamajornationwideoffensiveinthesouth.12
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RobertJ.O’Neill,authorofGeneralGiap,alsothinksithighlyimprobable that Giap was in the Khe Sanh area. Like Macdonald, he asserts that Giap wouldnothaveabsentedhimselffromtheonlyheadquartersfromwhichallthe activitiesoftheentireNorthVietnamesemilitaryoffensivecouldbecontrolled. Moreover,hethinksitunlikelythatGiapwouldhaveplacedhimselfinposition tosufferapersonaldefeatatthehandsoftheAmericansatKheSanh.13 ThePAVNcommittedalargenumberoftroopsatKheSanh.Itisnotclear whytheydecidedtocalloffthestruggleafterhavingdoneso.Perhapsithad neverhadthesignificancethatWestmorelandattachedtoit.Still,therearea numberofpuzzlingaspectsabouttheNorthVietnameseactionatKheSanh. For one, after the ammunition dump at Khe Sanh had been blown up, the NorthVietnamesemadenoattempttofollowuptheiradvantageandlaunch afull-scaleattackagainstthebase.Iftheirprimaryintenthadbeentocapture KheSanh,thiswouldhavebeentheopportunitytodoso. Inaddition,theNorthVietnamesemadenoefforttocutoffthewatersupplytoKheSanh.Soldiersatthebasereceivedtheirwaterfromastreamthat ranabout1,500feetoutsidetheinstallation.Cuttingoffthewatersourcewould have made the American soldiers even more heavily dependent on supplies fromtheair,possiblytoodependentfortheirneedstobemetandperhapseven causingthemtoabandonthebase. During February, while the siege was still under way, the Communists pulledthreeregimentsawayfromKheSanhandsentthemtothebattleraging in and around Hue. Apparently, the capture of Hue seemed more important tothemthanKheSanh.SomehistorianshavetheorizedthatbyearlyMarch, Giap had realized that his forces could never overrun the base; thus, it was senseless to stay and take the pounding from allied artillery and air support. AnotheranalysisinsiststhattheabandonmentofKheSanhwasrelatedtothe failure of the North Vietnamese to hold Hue and gain control of Quang Tri andThuaThienprovinces.StillanothertheoryisthattheCommunistsnever intendedtocaptureKheSanhandwithdrewbecausetheyhadachievedtheir objectiveofdivertingalliedforcesawayfromthetownsandcities. MarineLieutenantGeneralVictorKrulaksuggeststhatGiap’sactionatKhe SanhconformedtoWestmoreland’shopesofcreatingakillingground.Once GiapsawthestrengththeAmericanswouldcommit,heleftenoughmenatthe combatbasetofreezeU.S.forcesthereandshiftedhistroopstosupportother phasesofTet.“Intheend,”Krulakasserts,“Giap,havingmilkedasmuchoutof theKheSanhoperationashecould,simplycausedhisforcestomeltaway.... Theironlyinvestmentwasblood,towhichtheyassignedalowimportance.”14 YetanotherexplanationisrelatedbyWilliamS.Turley,whointerviewedthe deputyeditorofQuanDoiNhanDaninHanoiin1984.Theeditorsaidthat KheSanhwasnevermeanttobeanotherDienBienPhu,butthebattle,aside
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from “providing a strategic diversion,” was “a test of the U.S. reaction to the PAVN’suseofthedemilitarizedzone.”ThePAVNcommandwantedtoknow whattheU.S.governmentwoulddoifthePAVNstagedattacksfromthatarea, specificallywhetheritwouldsendgroundtroopsintoNorthVietnam.When thatdidnothappen,HanoiwentaheadwiththeTetOffensive.15 Giap himself does not help to clear up the mystery. During an interview with Peter Macdonald many years after the war, he said, “Khe Sanh was not importanttous.OritwasonlytotheextentthatitwastotheAmericans.Itwas thefocusofattentionintheUnitedStatesbecausetheirprestigewasatstake, buttousitwaspartofthegreaterbattlethatwouldbeginafterTet.Itwasonly adiversion,butonetobeexploitedifwecouldcausemanycasualtiesandwin abigvictory.”16 Hanoi’sofficialhistoryofthewarclearlystatesthattheRoute9–QuangTri FrontresponsibleforthebattleatKheSanh“wasacombatbattlefieldforour mainforceunitsthatwasassignedthemissionsofannihilatingtheenemyforces andofdrawinginandtyingdown[emphasisadded]asignificantportionofthe mobilereserveforcesoftheU.S.andpuppetarmies,therecreatingfavorable conditionsforthefocalpointsofourattacksanduprisings,andespeciallyfor Tri-ThienandHue.”17 Such comments, like many statements by Giap and other Communist militaryleadersduringandafterthewar,havetobetakenwithagrainofsalt, sincetheyappeartobesomewhatself-congratulatoryafterthefact.Theymay ormaynotrepresenttheactualstrategicthinkingin1968thatledtotheaction atKheSanh. Someobservershavetakenanothertackwiththeissue,lookingattheend result of what happened at Khe Sanh. Ronnie E. Ford, author of Tet 1968: Understanding the Surprise, maintains that Westmoreland destroyed a large partofthePAVNregularsassemblednearKheSanh,preventingthatforcefrom playingoutwhatFordbelievedwasitstruerole—actingasthe“secondwave”of theoverallplanfortheoffensiveandachievingitsultimateobjectiveofseizing HueandDaNang,thuspavingthewayforNorthVietnameseregularunitsto streamintoSouthVietnam.18HarrySummersoftheU.S.ArmyWarCollege, authorofHistoricalAtlasoftheVietnamWar,agreeswithFord.Citingpostwar documentsfromHanoithatrevealthatmuchmorewasatstakethanmerelya diversion,SummersassertsthatKheSanhwastobeatestofwhethertoproceed with Phase II of the General Offensive–General Uprising, which began with the“borderwars”thepreviousSeptember.19 Ford, Summers, and other observers may or may not be correct in their conclusionsabouttheroleofKheSanhintheoverallTetOffensivecampaign. What is known is that Giap surrounded Khe Sanh with more than twenty thousandsoldiersbutnevermadeaconcertedefforttotaketheposition.The
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mysteryremainswhythePAVNfailedtodosowhileleavingtheirtroopsatthe mercyofthemassedfirepowerofartilleryandairstrikes.Perhaps,asPeterBrush suggests,KheSanhachievedGiap’sdiversion,andhethoughthehadnothing tolosebycontinuingthefight.Butintheend,he“stayedtoolong,foughttoo hard,andsustainedtoomanycasualties.”20 KheSanhprovedtobeacostlybattleforbothsides.TheMarineswereable toholdthebase,butU.S.forcesabandoneditinJune1968.Themeaningof thefuriousfightingthatragedatandaroundKheSanhforseventy-sevendays in1968remainsunknown.
Chapter12
t et a n d t he m ed i a
TheroleofthemediaduringtheVietnamWarremainscontroversial,andthere hasbeenalong-standingargumentthatthecoverageofthewarandparticularly theTetOffensiveultimatelyledtotheAmericandefeatinVietnam.Itistrue thatasthewarprogressed,televisedcoverageofthefightinginVietnambecame moreandmoreimportanttochangingpublicopinion.Vietnamwasthefirst warcoveredextensivelyonU.S.television,andbythetimeofthecommitment of American combat troops in 1965 more than half of the American people reliedonTVastheirprincipalsourceofnews.1 ThemediacoverageoftheTetOffensivehadagreatinfluenceontheeventual outcome of the fighting and its aftermath. The reporters did not believe the official statements that came out of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam(MACV)duringandafterthebloodyfightingoftheoffensive,andthe mediacoveragegenerallyreflectedthisdisbelief. The journalists were not wholly to blame for this attitude. MACV, the Pentagon, and the president himself all helped to create the credibility gap that ruined press-military relations long before 1968. Army and Marine press officers had reported every in-country operation, regardless of outcome, as a major step forward. Fear of public vilification of its actions forced both the WhiteHouseandMACVtowhitewashoratleastplaydownanyreportsthat wouldadverselyaffectsupportofthewarathome.Thissituation,accordingto
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ClarenceWyatt,authorofPaperSoldiers:TheAmericanPressandtheVietnam War,resultedin“asteadilyincreasingsuspicionandtensionbetweenthepress andthegovernment.”2 President Johnson attempted to repair this situation in late 1967 when he ordered a public-relations campaign designed “to present sound evidence of progress in Vietnam.”3 He admonished his top advisers “to sell our product” and“togetabetterstorytotheAmericanpeople.”4The“SuccessCampaign,” asitlaterbecameknown,didindeedachievesomebrief,momentarysuccesses, but the Tet Offensive exploded like a bombshell in South Vietnam, leaving manyAmericansfeelingthatthepresidenthadliedtothemaboutprogressin thewar. Images of the bloody Tet fighting, especially in Saigon and Hue, flooded American airwaves. Coverage of the sapper attack on the U.S. Embassy and theinfamousphotoofSouthVietnameseGeneralNguyenNgocLoan’ssummaryexecutionofaVietCong(VC)prisonerwerepowerfulintheirimpact.As KathleenTurner,authorofLyndonJohnson’sDualWar,writes,“WithTet... the fighting was suddenly, inescapably, terrifyingly close to the Saigon-based news teams. The proximity of the battle guaranteed extensive coverage by mediainstitutions:itwasdramatic,itwaseasilyaccessible,anditwasformany thefirstextendedviewoftheenemy.”5 To viewers back in the United States, Saigon appeared to be a city besieged. According to historian Chester Pach, the correspondents and cameramen “emphasized the unprecedented, astonishing, and frightening sights of Saigon—tanks in the streets, fighter aircraft hitting targets in residential neighborhoods, refugees who had come to the city to escape the war fleeing onceagain.”Thetelevisionimagesandnewsphotographsdemonstratedonly tooclearlythatnormalroutinesofthecityhadcometoahalt.“Onlythecoffin makerswereopenforbusiness,”ABCreported.6 SuchcoveragenodoubthadanimpactontheAmericanswhowatchedit everynightontheeveningnews.AccordingtocorrespondentDonOberdorfer, theAmericanpeoplewere“experiencingtheworst of the bloodshed through the new technology of television. The [government’s] summaries were not believed.Theprojectedexperiencewas.”7 AgoodexampleofthisdynamicatworkcanbeseeninMACVcommander William Westmoreland’s impromptu press conference on the grounds of the U.S.EmbassyonFebruary1,1968.Accompaniedbythesoundofexplosionsin thebackground,thegeneralclaimedthatMACVhadforeseentheattacksand thattheenemyhadlost5,800killedinthefirstdaysoftheoffensive.Heasserted thattheCommunistshadsufferedagreatdefeatandthattheattackswereonly diversionsfromtheenemy’smaineffort,whichwouldcomeacrossthedemilitarizedzone(DMZ)andaroundKheSanh.AccordingtoWilliamHammond,
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“Tomanyreporters,Westmorelandseemedtobemouthingplatitudeswhilethe wolfwasatthegate.”8 Walter Cronkite, among many others in the media, felt that he had been duped by government assurances that the war in Vietnam was being won. Nine million people viewed his famous February 27 Tet broadcast, in which he declared that the U.S. was “mired in a stalemate” and called for negotiations to end the fighting. This marked the point at which a large segment of middleAmericacametoquestionthevalueofcontinuingthewarinVietnam. JournalistDavidHalberstamsaidthatwhenCronkitemadehiscommentaryon theTetOffensive,“Itwasthefirsttimeinhistoryawarhadbeendeclaredover byananchorman.”9 The lingering question, then, is whether the American media turned the tacticaldefeatofCommunistforcesinTetintoapsychologicalvictoryforthem. Thereisalotofdisagreementabouttheanswertothequestiononthepartof commentators and historians. One side of the argument is best represented by the comments of Robert Elegant, who covered Vietnam for several years. Writing some years after the war, he berated his colleagues for distorting Tet and the war, remarking, “Never before Vietnam had the collective policy of themedia...soughtbygraphicandunremittingdistortion—thevictoryofthe enemiesofthecorrespondents’ownside.”Elegantchargedthatthereporting duringTetwas“superficialandbiased.”Hefurtherclaimedthattheultimate impactofsuch“skewedreporting”wasthat“forthefirsttimeinmodernhistory, theoutcomeofawarwasdeterminednotonthebattlefieldbutontheprinted pageand,aboveall,onthetelevisionscreen.”10 Elegant was not alone in this sentiment. Howard K. Smith of ABC News resignedhisposition,chargingthatthepresswas“contributingtotheconfusion and frustration now damaging the American spirit.” He said that press coverage of General Loan’s execution of the VC suspect was an example of what he meant. He pointed out that no one had made “even a perfunctory acknowledgment... of the fact that such executions, en masse, are the Viet Congwayofwar.”11 Keyes Beech, who served for many years as a journalist in Vietnam, also condemns his colleagues in the press. Echoing Elegant’s sentiments, Beech chargesthat“themediahelpedlosethewar”andthatintheend,“thewarwas lostintheU.S.,notinVietnam.”12 On the other side of the issue are those who adamantly refuse to accept thatthemediawasatfaultfortheimpactoftheTetOffensive.CharlesMohr, anotherwarcorrespondent,contendsthattheAmericanpeoplewereshocked intoanewlevelofawarenessabouttheactualsituationinVietnamwhenthey were confronted with the discrepancy between Westmoreland’s optimistic reportsandthedramaticrealityoftheenemy’sactualmilitarycapability.13Thus,
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accordingtoMohr,thereporterswerenotmakingthenews,butjustreporting whattheysawandlettingviewersandreadersdrawtheirownconclusions.The enduringimagesfromthatreportingwerenotthoseofvictory,butratherthose ofthesapperraidontheembassy,Loan’sexecutionoftheVCsuspect,andthe bitteranddestructivestruggleinHue.Theseimagesweretestamentstomany Americansofawargonewrong.AsPaulElliottsuggests,“thedesperatestreet fighting,thesickeningimagesofciviliansufferinganddeathandthenever-endingstoryofKheSanhseemedtoprovidethegovernmentandthepeoplewith anopportunitytoreassesstheircommitmenttothewar.”14 Perhapsthemostin-depthexaminationoftheroleofthemediaintheTet Offensive is Peter Braestrup’s acclaimed two-volume study Big Story: How theAmericanPressandTelevisionReportedandInterpretedtheCrisisofTetin Vietnam and Washington.15 Braestrup, a war correspondent and head of the WashingtonPostSaigonbureaufrom1968to1973,providesanexhaustiveexaminationoftheroleofthemediaduringtheTetOffensiveanditsaftermath.He arguesthatunfairandbiasedreportingduringtheoffensiveturnedthemajority of Americans against the war in Vietnam. He cites the adversarial theme in much of the reporting during Tet, saying, that “the collective emanations of themajormediawereproducingakindofcontinuousblackfogoftheirown,a vagueconventional‘disaster’image.”16 BraestrupcitesthefightingattheU.S.Embassyasaprimeexampleofbiased reporting.ReportersandcameramenweresurethatVCsappershadpenetrated the chancery building and seized the embassy. Erroneous reports from the militarypolicewerepartlytoblame.Uncorrectedstoriestothiseffectwerefiled with news agencies in the United States, resulting in sensationalist headlines gracingthefrontpagesofAmericannewspapers. Braestrup asserts that even after “the fog of war began to lift” and allied success became apparent, TV executives would not listen. He cites one case inwhichanNBCproducerrejectedaproposedlate-1968seriesdepictingTet as a major American victory because, as the producer said, “Tet was already establishedinthepublic’smindasadefeat,andthereforeitwasanAmerican defeat.”17BraestrupconcludesthatatTet,“thepress shouted that the patient wasdying,thenweekslaterbegantowhisperthathesomehowseemedtobe recovering—whispersapparentlynotheardamidtheclamorousdomesticreactionstotheinitialshouts.”18 ThenetworknewscastsdevotedmoreattentiontoKheSanhthananyother battleduringtheTetOffensive.AfterthebitterfightingatHuewasover,this leftthebattleontheLaotianbordertheonlyremainingcombatstoryinSouth Vietnam for the reporters to cover. The story was compelling, particularly because of the emphasis the president and other U.S. officials placed on the fightthere.BraestrupwritesthatKheSanhwasbothasymbolofthefrustration
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oftheVietnamWarandapotentialdisasterinthemoldofDienBienPhu—“a historicalghost”evokedinelevenofthirty-onefilmreportsonthesiege.19 ReportingatKheSanhwasveryselective,featuringthedamagedonetothe MarinesbytheNorthVietnameseartillerybutneglectingtheheavycasualties inflictedbyAmericanartilleryandB-52s.Thereportersandcommentatorskept predictingtheattackthatnevercame.Theyalsoexaggeratedaircraftlossesat thebase.Duringthecourseofthefighting,severalC-123andC-130aircrafthad beenshotdownordamagedbyincomingrounds.Althoughtheselosseswere expectedforanoperationthissize,thereportersrepeatedlyusedthelossofthe sameaircraftintheirstories,givinganimpressionthatplaneswerefallingout oftheskyeveryday.AccordingtoBraestrup,thefocusonKheSanh,aftermost oftherestofthefightingwasover,gavetheimpressionthattheoutcomeofthe offensivewasstillindoubtintoMarch,longafterthefightinghadtaperedoffin mostoftherestofthecountryandtheNorthVietnamesehadbegunthinning theirforcesatKheSanh. Braestrup does not credit the negative reporting as solely the result of bias onthepartofreporters.Anumberofotherfactorshadanimpactonthetone andnatureofthereporting.Braestrupassertsthatmanyofthelessexperienced, more naive reporters were influenced by the panic they themselves felt, and this colored their reporting of the events as they occurred. He maintains that thefocusonSaigon,Hue,andKheSanhdrainedthelimitedresourcesofthe Americanpressawayfromthesmaller,lessdramatic,lessaccessibleactionthat, nonetheless,involvedthebulkofAmericantroopsandcasualties.Accordingto Braestrup,theseeventswerelefttothedailywarsummariesprovidedbyMACV briefersandcommuniquéwriters,whichwere“scanty”and“fragmentary,supplyinglittlecontextthatwouldhaveaidedalargerunderstandingofthewar.”20 Braestrup charges that the Johnson administration played a major role in thenatureofthereportinganditsimpact.AlthoughthepresidenttriedtoreassuretheAmericanpublic,BraestrupbelievesthatJohnsonandhisadvisorsdid nottakeasufficientlyaggressiveroleintryingtoexplaintheoffensiveandits outcomeonthebattlefield;thisfailure“magnifiedthedamageandprolonged theimageofagreatdisaster.”21Braestrupconcludes,“Rarelyhascontemporary crisis-journalismturnedout,inretrospect,tohaveveeredsowidelyfromreality.Essentially,thedominantthemesofthewords,andfilmfromVietnam... addeduptoaportraitofdefeatfortheallies.Historians,onthecontrary,have concludedthattheTetOffensiveresultedinaseveremilitary-politicalsetback forHanoiintheSouth.Tohaveportrayedsuchasetbackforonesideasadefeat for the other—in a major crisis abroad—cannot be counted as a triumph for Americanjournalism.”22 Kathleen Turner agrees with some of Braestrup’s conclusions about flaws in the reporting during the Tet Offensive. She asserts that as the offensive
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continued,thelackoffamiliaritywiththeVietnameselanguage,culture,and countryside,compoundedbylackofmobility,hamperedboththeabilityand theinclinationofmanyreporterstoseethewidercontextoftheTetoffensive.23 Shedoesnotbelieve,however,thatbiasedreportingturnedTetfromavictory intoadefeat;rather,shemaintainsthatJohnson’slong-standinginabilitytodeal withthepressexacerbatedthesituationin1968andworsenedtheimpactofthe surpriseattackanditsaftermath. Others have taken strong exception to Braestrup’s charges about the role of the media in the offensive and its aftermath. Paul Elliott disagrees with Braestrup’s thesis that Tet reporting increased antiwar sentiment, noting that a poll published within Braestrup’s book indicates that there was little relationbetweenthetwo.Heassertsthatpublicresolvedidnotfalterorcrumble, as Braestrup insists, but actually strengthened as a strong mood of retaliation against the VC swept through America.24 Elliott is only partially correct, because after the initial wave, public opinion on Johnson and the war effort fellquickly. DanielC.Hallin,authorofThe“UncensoredWar”:TheMediaandVietnam, assertsthatpublicopinionturnedagainstJohnson’shandlingofthewarduring 1965–67,whentelevisionreportingwasmostfavorabletoadministrationpolicies in Vietnam. He argues that before Tet, editorial comments by television journalistsrannearlyfourtooneinfavorofadministrationpolicy;afterTet,it rantwotooneagainst.25HeconcludesthatJohnsonexaggeratedtheeffectsof TVnewsinshapingpublicattitudestowardthewar.26 Hallin,however,acknowledgesthatTetcausedamajorshiftintelevision’s imageofthewar.Nevertheless,Tet“waslessaturningpointthanacrossover point,amomentwhentrendsthathadbeeninmotionforsometimereached balanceandbegantotiptheotherway.”27Hemaintainsthat“journalistsseem tohaveinterpretedTet,withoutconsciouslymakingthedistinction,forwhatit saidratherthanwhatitdid—asproof,regardlessofwhowonorlostit,thatthe warwasnotundercontrol.”28 Paul Elliott, author of Conflict and Controversy, asserts that the American mediadidnotinducemasspessimisminWashington;rather,themediatended toreflectthemoodofthegovernment,whichwasreactingtothelackofprogress in Vietnam and mirroring the concerns and worries that the American peoplealreadyhadaboutthewar.Hedisagreeswiththosewhomaintainthat themediareportedTetasanAmericandefeat,citingmorethanafewexamples ofwherethemediacorrectlyreportedthatTetwasalossfortheCommunists. For example, Elliott points out that Walter Cronkite reported on February 14 that“firstandsimplest,theVietCongsufferedamilitarydefeat.”29 Clarence Wyatt, author of Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the VietnamWar,challengesBraestrup’sassertionabouttelevision’simpactonthe
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AmericanpublicanditsperceptionoftheTetOffensive.Inastudythatcoverstheperiodfrom1962to1975,Wyattassertsthat,contrarytothechargesof Braestrupandothersthatthepressexertedsubstantiveinfluenceinanegative way on home-front opinion, the news coverage of the war reflected, virtually unchallenged, official government information, statements, and views. “The press,”heconcludes,“wasmoreapapersoldierthananantiwar,anti-governmentcrusader.”30 In addition, Wyatt maintains that relatively few people even watched the television news in the 1960s. He cites a survey conducted by the Simmons MarketResearchBureauin1969,whichfoundthatonly24percentoftheadult population in America watched a television news show. Moreover, according toa1967HarrisPollcitedbyWyatt,forthosewhodidwatchtelevisionnews, theexperiencedidnotnecessarilymeanthatthecoveragewouldmakethem more likely to oppose the war; only 31 percent who responded said it that it did.31Mostlikely,accordingtoWyatt,thetelevisioncoverageprobablytended toreinforcewhattheviewersalreadybelieved. Wyatt acknowledges that skepticism began to influence reporting, particularlyduringandaftertheTetOffensive,butonlyafterofficialsources“clammed up,lied,orwereovertakenbyevents,”suchasintheearlydaysoftheoffensive. Wyatt maintains that the Tet reporting was “the product of characteristics of American journalism and government information policies that had been developingforyears.”32AccordingtoWyatt,attemptsbytheadministrationand the military to confront the press or deny information threatened the press’s abilitytodoitsjobandinspireditsangerandsuspicion. With his book Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War, William Hammond provides a comprehensive study that traces the military’s controversialrelationswiththenewsmediaduringtheVietnamWarfromKennedy throughJohnsonandNixon.Hammond,aseniorhistorianwiththeU.S.Army’s CenterofMilitaryHistory,revealsthatanimositybetweenthemilitaryandthe presshadnotalwaysbeentherule.Basedonrecentlydeclassifiedgovernment documents and other exhaustive research, Hammond demonstrates that the relationsbetweenthemilitaryandthemediaatfirstsharedacommonvisionof AmericaninvolvementinVietnam.However,asthewardraggedon,thereportersbegantochallengetheconsistentlyupbeatreportsfromthemilitary. Hammond discusses at length the impact of the photo of General Loan’s shootingoftheVCsuspectinSaigon.Contrarytomostconventionalwisdom, HammondassertsthatthisvividimageprobablyhadlittleeffectonAmerican public opinion, noting that twenty million people watched the HuntleyBrinkleynewsprogramonthenightthefilmfirstplayed,yetNBCreceivedonly ninetylettersonthesubject,andonlyfifty-sixofthoseaccusedthenetworkof badtaste(therestcomplainedthatthefilmappearedatatimewhenchildren
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could watch).33 Interestingly, Hammond concludes that gloomy and sensationalreportinghadlittleeffectonAmericanpublicopinion,but“itnonethelessreinforceddoubtalreadycirculatingwithintheJohnsonadministration.”34 Intheend,partoftheblamefortheultimateoutcomeoftheTetOffensive maylieinbiasedanderroneousreporting,buttheearlierburstsofoptimism from the highest levels of government that told Americans that the United StateswaswinninginVietnamdidnotsquarewellwiththestunningsurprise oftheCommunistsattacks.Allthereports,newsphotos,andfilmfootage,good orbad,onlyservedtoaddvelocitytoasituationmadebadbythecredibilitygap thathadbeguntodevelopwellbeforetheCommunistslaunchedtheiroffensive in1968.HavinggainedavictoryincounteringtheTetOffensive,therewasno needtojugglethenumbersthistime,butthecredibility gap had opened up toofar.JournalistsinSaigonlookedforsignsofdefeateverywhere,andwhen they looked hard enough they seemed to find them. As the New York Times observed,“Thesearenotthedeedsofanenemywhosefightingefficiencyhas ‘progressivelydeclined’andwhosemoraleis‘sinkingfast,’asUnitedStatesmilitaryofficialsputitinNovember.”35Thiswasthesameimpressionthatmany Americans had of the bitter fighting that they saw on their televisions during theTetOffensive.
Chapter13
t et a n d a m er i ca n m i l i ta r y s t r a t eg y
TheTetOffensiveclearlydemonstratedtomanyobserversthatAmericanstrategyinVietnamtothatpointhadbeenseriouslyflawed.TheU.S.hadcommitted tremendousamountsofbothmanpower(closeto540,000troopsbymid-1968) and money (by mid-1967, government spending for the war was running at a rateof$20billionannually)tothewar,whichhadasignificantimpactonthe countryathome.1YettheTetOffensiveprovedthatthisexpenditureprovided noguaranteeofvictory,andthisledmanyAmericansinandoutofgovernment toquestionthecontinuedutilityofthestrategythatwasbeingpursued. During the early days of U.S. commitment in Vietnam, the American answertothesituationwascounterinsurgency,usingSpecialForcesandother advisorsinanattempttodealwiththeVietCong.However,withthedecision by North Vietnam to send military forces down the Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Vietnam in 1964, the conflict escalated drastically. Soon the war outstrippedthecapabilitiesoftheadvisorsandtheSouthVietnameseforces,and PresidentLyndonJohnsonturnedtothecommitmentofU.S.combattroops. With the arrival of these regular forces, the focus of U.S. strategy shifted to conventionaloperationstodefeattheCommunists;theseoperationswerecharacterizedby“search-and-destroy”tacticsthatreliedheavilyonfirepower.The strategyquicklybecomeoneofattrition,inwhichthegoalwastokillsomanyof theenemytroopsthateventuallytheywouldbenolongerabletofieldcombat-
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readymilitaryunitsandwouldthereforebewillingtonegotiateasettlementof theconflictonU.S.terms. Ultimately, attrition became a numbers game in which American leaders, both civilian and military, became obsessed with body counts. The overall objective of the attrition strategy was to wear down the enemy and find his breakingpoint—tofindthatpointwheretheleadershipinHanoidecidedthat thepriceofcontinuingthewarinthesouthwastoohigh. Bytheendof1967,GeneralWilliamWestmoreland,commanderofMilitary AssistanceCommand,Vietnam(MACV),hadnearly485,000troopsathisdisposal,allfocusedonprosecutingtheattritionstrategy.In1966and1967,U.S. forces conducted large-scale search-and-destroy operations throughout South Vietnamthatweremarkedbylavishand,somewouldsay,indiscriminateuse offirepower.Bylate1967,Westmorelanddeclaredthatthecrossoverpointwas beingapproachedinwhichU.S.forceswereinflictingmorelossesontheViet CongandNorthVietnamesethantheenemycouldreplace. TheTetOffensivein1968gaveWestmorelandtheopportunityhehadbeen seeking.Afterrecoveringfromtheinitialsurpriseoftheattack,hisforceshad thechancetodestroylargenumbersofenemytroopsinpitchedbattleswhere U.S. firepower could be brought to bear; this would be attrition at its best. Althoughlargenumbersoftheenemytroopswerekilled,thesituationdidnot turnoutthewayWestmorelandexpected.AndrewF.Krepinevich,authorofThe ArmyandVietnam,maintainsthat,fortheAmericanpeopleandtheJohnson administration,theTetOffensive“providedtheshockthatledtotheirlossof faithintheArmy’sstrategy.”2Krepinevichisextremelycriticalofthatstrategy andassertsthatU.S.forcesshouldhavefocusedoncounterinsurgency,rather thanlarge-unitoperationsinsearch-and-destroymissions.Hechargesthatthe Armyslavishlyadheredtowhathecalledthe“Concept,”whichwasmarkedby conventionaltacticsthathadbeenperfectedduringWorldWarIIandsubsequentlyrefinedtocountertheSovietsinEurope.AccordingtoKrepinevich,the Armyfailedwhenittriedtotransplantthe“Concept”tothedifferentsituation thatconfrontedU.S.forcesinVietnam—aCommunistinsurgency. KrepinevichmaintainsthatthestrengthandscopeoftheTetOffensivedemonstratedthefutilityofthe“Concept”anditsrelianceonattritiontotheneglect ofthesocialandpoliticalfactorssocrucialtowinningthewar.Thestunning nature of the offensive, coupled with Westmoreland’s request for additional troops,provedthatattritionwasnotworkingand“ledtoafull-blownreviewof U.S.strategyinVietnam,endingintheexplicitrejectionoftheArmystrategy bythecivilianleadership.”3ToKrepinevich,therequest for additional troops clearly“reflectedthebankruptcyoftheArmy’sstrategy.”4 Unfortunately, according to Krepinevich, the Tet Offensive “brought no reevaluationoftheConceptwithintheArmyitself.TheArmyhadconvinced
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itselfthatithadwontheTetOffensive;therefore,nosoul-searchingwasnecessary.”5Thus,hewrites,“Themilitary’sresponsetotheimplicationsoftheTet Offensivewasthesameasithadbeenthroughoutthewar:applytheConcept, butatahigherlevelofintensity.”6Accordingly,Westmorelandaskedformore meninordertoescalatethewarhorizontallyintoLaosandCambodia. The counter to Krepinevich’s argument is provided by Colonel Harry Summers, author of On Strategy, who concludes that U.S. strategy failed in Vietnambecausemilitaryandcivilianleadersfailedtoapplythetimelessprinciplesofwarcorrectly.UsingaframeworkdrawnfromCarlvonClausewitz’s military classic On War, Summers implies that the North Vietnamese would nothavebeenabletolaunchalarge-scaleoffensivelikethatin1968hadthe UnitedStatestakenthewardirectlytowardtheCommunistcenterofgravity, which was, to Summers, clearly Hanoi and North Vietnam. When the U.S. leadership failed to target that center of gravity, the North Vietnamese were able to launch the Tet Offensive. Summers asserts that the offensive was a “resoundingtacticalfailure,”butacknowledgesthattheoffensive“struckwhat wastoproveafatalblowagainstourcenterofgravity—thealliancebetweenthe UnitedStatesandSouthVietnam.”7 HistorianHerbertY.Schandlertakesexceptionwiththosewhoagreewith Summers’sconclusions.HeassertsthattheAmericanfailureinVietnamupto the time of Tet 1968 was not a failure caused by the limitations placed upon militaryaction.Neitherwasitcausedbythepressordissentonthehomefront. On the contrary, according to Schandler, overwhelming American military power had finally been brought to bear; clearly, the United States enjoyed completecontroloftheseaandairandhada“strikingsuperiority”inmobilityandmaterielonland.However,thisdidnotresultinanAmericanvictory. Schandlerwrites,“TheAmericanfailurewascausedbythelackofrealization inWashingtonthatmilitarypoweralonecouldnotsolvealong-rangepolitical problem,thatofthecompetenceandpoliticalstabilityoftheSouthVietnamese government.”8 TheTetOffensivecausedPresidentJohnsontotakeanotherlookathowthe warwasbeingconducted.StunnedbythescopeandferocityoftheCommunist attacks,hewastakenabackbyWestmoreland’srequestforadditionaltroopsin theaftermathofthefighting.WhenhetaskedDefenseSecretaryClarkClifford tomakearecommendationontheadditionaltrooprequest,theyrespondedby proposing an alternative strategy for MACV, one that focused on traditional counterinsurgencyoperationsandabandonedthestrategyofatttrition.9 InthecourseofpreparingClifford’sconsiderationoftheadditionaltroop request, a heated debate developed between General Earle Wheeler, chairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,andciviliansintheDefenseDepartmentover strategyinVietnam.Wheelermaintainedthattherewasnothingwrongwith
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the current strategy that a more forceful application (and additional troops) would not cure. Clifford asked Wheeler if he could predict when the war mightbebroughttoaconclusion,asking,“Whatisourplanformilitaryvictory in Vietnam?”10 He was not happy with the answer he got when it appeared that the military planned to continue with the same strategy of attrition. In theend,Clifford,asanewcomer,toneddownhisreportanddidnotdirectly challenge the Army’s ground strategy. However, he did insert the following passageinthereport: There can be no assurance that this very substantial additional deploymentwouldleaveusayearfromtodayinanyfavorablemilitaryposition. Allthatcanbesaidisthattheadditionaltroopswouldenableustokill moreoftheenemyandwouldprovidemoresecurityiftheenemydoes not offset them by lesser [sic] reinforcements of his own. There is no indicationthattheywouldbringaboutaquicksolutioninVietnamand, in the absence of better performance by the GVN and the ARVN, the increased destruction and increased Americanization of the war could, infact,becounterproductive.11 Intheend,PresidentJohnsondeployedamuchsmallerpackageinresponse toWestmoreland’srequestforadditionaltroops.Reelingfromthenearlossin the New Hampshire presidential primary, the president convened a meeting of the “Wise Men” to advise him on future strategy and policy in Vietnam. They gave him their verdict: believing that continued escalation of the war andincreasedtroopstrengthinSouthVietnamwouldbefruitless,theyrecommendedaconcentrationonimprovingtheSouthVietnamesearmedforceand phasingoutU.S.forceswhileseekinganegotiatedsettlement.12 Twelvedayslater,Johnsonmadehisnowfamousspeech,announcingthat he would not run for reelection. Within the Defense Department, Clifford began to implement his work group’s recommendations, among them the modernization of the South Vietnamese armed forces. General Creighton AbramsreplacedWestmorelandonJuly1,1968.HeattemptedtochangeArmy operationsawayfromtheirconventionalorientationandinstituteda“onewar” planinwhichthepacificationandpopulationsecuritygotequalbillingwith the “big war.” When Richard Nixon took office in January 1969, he ordered that the process started by Clifford, which the new president described as Vietnamization,beaccelerated.Concurrently,hebegantowithdrawAmerican troopsfromSouthVietnam. Even with all these factors, the nature of American military strategy did not change overnight. There was still an emphasis on body count and attrition. For example, the bloody battle of Hamburger Hill was fought in May
122
i ssue s a n d i n te r p r e ta ti o n s
1969.Eventually,however,asmoreAmericanforceswerepulledoutofSouth Vietnam,thefocusofU.S.strategyshiftedtopreparingtheSouthVietnamese toassumetheburdenforfightingthewaralone. WhiletheTetOffensivehadnotdirectlyaffectedthenatureofU.S.military strategyonthegroundinSouthVietnam,itledtoacompletereevaluationof U.S. strategic policy in Southeast Asia. As Michael Lind, author of Vietnam: The Necessary War, concludes, the United States may have won tactically in the Tet Offensive, but “the excessive costs of winning badly by means of an ill-conceivedattritionstrategyinSouthVietnammadeaU.S.withdrawalasa resultofdomesticpressureinevitable.”13
n o t es
in t ro d u c t io n 1.MarcJasonGilbertandWilliamHead,eds.,TheTetOffensive(Westport,CT: Praeger,1996),2. 2.RichardFalk,AppropriatingTet(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityCenterof InternationalStudies,1988),11. 3. Although the main attack commenced during the early morning hours of January31,severalPAVNandVCunitslaunchedprematureattacksonJanuary30,as willbediscussedlaterinthebook. 4.DonOberdorfer,Tet!TheTurningPointintheVietnamWar(Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2001),xi.
1. prel u d e 1. The government of the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon called the insurgents “Viet Cong,” an abbreviation of Viet Nam Cong Sam, meaning Vietnamese Communist.TheNationalLiberationFront,establishedin1960astheleaderofthe insurgentmovementinSouthVietnam,deniedthatitwasCommunist,buttheorganization,whichincludednoncommunistnationalists,wasdominatedandcontrolled bytheCommunists. 2.ThePeople’sArmyofVietnamwasmorepopularlyknownduringthewarasthe NorthVietnameseArmy(NVA),butthemorecorrecttermisPAVN,whichwillbe usedinthisbook. 3. William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview,1981),262.
124 1.Prelude 4.HoangNgocLung,IndochinaMonographs:TheGeneralOffensivesof1968–69 (Washington,DC:U.S.ArmyCenterofMilitaryHistory,1981),7. 5. The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam—The Senator Gravel Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971),2:507. 6.Duiker,CommunistRoadtoPower,263. 7. George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin: UniversityofTexasPress,1994),141. 8. Quoted in Don Oberdorfer, Tet! The Turning Point in the Vietnam War (Baltimore,MD:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2001),104. 9.QuotedinSpencerTucker,Vietnam(London:UCLPress,1999),136. 10.RichardA.Hunt,Pacification:TheAmericanStruggleforVietnam’sHeartsand Minds(Boulder,CO:Westview,1995),133. 11.ThomasC.Thayer,WarWithoutFronts:TheAmericanExperienceinVietnam (Boulder,CO:Westview,1985),31. 12.Ibid.,31–33.Theseintelligenceestimateswouldbethesubjectofahugecontroversy,whichisexplainedinmoredetailinchapter13ofthisbook. 13.Duiker,CommunistRoadtoPower,263. 14. Quoted in James R. Arnold, Tet Offensive 1968: Turning Point in Vietnam (London:Osprey,1990),9. 15.TimothyJ.Lomperis,“Giap’sDream,Westmoreland’sNightmare,”Parameters 18 (June 1988), 18. Lomperis, a political scientist, defined Giap’s “dream” as the achievementofaDienBienPhu–likevictoryovertheAmericans. 16. On September 14, 1967, Giap published in Hanoi his now-famous “The Big Victory,theGreatTask,”whichwasapleaforreturntotheprotractedwarofguerrillatypeactions.Hiseffortstoresistthegeneraloffensivefailed,andhebecameitschief architect.PatrickJ.McGarvey,ed.,VisionsofVictory:SelectedVietnameseCommunist MilitaryWritings,1964–1968(Stanford,CA:HooverInstitution,1969),223. 17.QuotedinCecilCurrey,VictoryatAnyCost:TheGeniusofVietNam’sGen. VoNguyenGiap(Dulles,VA:Brassey’s,1999),262–263. 18. Cecil Currey, “Giap and Tet Mau Than 1968: The Year of the Monkey,” in MarcJasonGilbertandWilliamHead,eds.,TheTetOffensive(Westport,CT:Praeger, 1996),82. 19.Currey,VictoryatAnyCost,264. 20.WilliamS.Turley,TheSecondIndochinaWar:AShortPoliticalandMilitary History,1954–1975(NewYork:Westview,1986),100;Currey,“GiapandTetMauThan 1968,”73. 21.Duiker,TheCommunistRoadtoPowerinVietnam,265. 22.AccordingtoNgoVinhLong,theCentralCommitteeissuedthefinalorderfor theoffensiveintheformofResolution14onOctober25,1967.NgoVinhLong,“The TetOffensiveandItsAftermath,”inGilbertandHead,TheTetOffensive,99. 23. Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988), 396–397. Dautranh,theVietnamesecommunistmilitaryandpoliticalstrategyadoptedinthe 1930s,combinedMarxist,Leninist,Maoist,andVietnamesedoctrines.Accordingto
2.BorderBattles,HillFights,andKheSanh 125 thisstrategy,allpoliticalandmilitaryactionsagainsttheenemywereintertwinedand were ultimately focused on exhausting the enemy’s will to continue the war. For a detaileddiscussionofdautranh,seeDouglasPike,VietCong:TheOrganizationand TechniquesoftheNationalLiberationFrontofSouthVietnam(Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1966),85–92. 24.StanleyKarnow,Vietnam:AHistory,2ded.(NewYork:PenguinBooks,1997), 548. 25. Tran Van Tra, “Tet: The 1968 General Offensive and General Uprising,” in Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and AmericanPerspectives(Armonk,NY:M.E.Sharpe,1993),40. 26.NgoVinhLong,“TheTetOffensiveandItsAftermath,”89.Foramoredetailed discussionofCommunistmotivationsandobjectivesoftheTetOffensive,seePartII. 27.TranVanTra,“Tet,”45–51. 28.Davidson,VietnamatWar,398. 29.Duiker,CommunistRoadtoPower,264. 30.TranVanTra,“Tet,”48–51. 31.HoangNgocLung,TheGeneralOffensivesof1968–69,30. 32.Ibid.,27. 33. “Directive from Province Party Standing Committee to District and Local Organs on Forthcoming Offensive and Uprisings, 1 November 1967,” Vietnam DocumentsandResearchNotes,April1968,reprintedinStevenCohen,ed.,Vietnam: AnthologyandGuidetoaTelevisionHistory(NewYork:Knopf,1983),201–203.
2. bo rd er bat t l es, h il l f ig h t s, an d k h e san h 1.JohnCarland,“AnNVAGeneralLooksBack,”Vietnam(December2002),35. 2. For military purposes, South Vietnam was divided into four Corps Tactical Zones(CTZ).TheICorpsTacticalZoneincludedthenorthernportionofthecountryjustsouthoftheDemilitarizedZone(DMZ).IICorpsTacticalZoneincludedthe CentralHighlandsandtheadjacentcoastalplain.IIICorpsTacticalZoneincluded the eleven provinces that surrounded Saigon and abutted the Cambodian border. IVCorpsTacticalZoneincludedtheMekongDelta.Thesedesignationswerelater changedto“militaryregions.” 3. Con Thien was also the western anchor of the so-called McNamara Line of electronicsensorsunderconstructionatthetime. 4.OfficialreportsputVCandPAVNlossesatsomeninehundredkilledinaction. Such numbers were often estimates and were thus subject to question. The allied forcessustainedaboutsixtydeadduringthebattleforLocNinh. 5.HoangNgocLung,IndochinaMonographs:TheGeneralOffensivesof1968–69 (Washington,DC:U.S.ArmyCenterofMilitaryHistory,1981),28. 6. Quote cited in Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988),469.
126 2.BorderBattles,HillFights,andKheSanh 7.CecilB.Currey,VictoryatAnyCost:TheGeniusofVietNam’sGen.VoNguyen Giap(Dulles,VA:Brassey’s,1997),267. 8. Giap’s remarks stating new strategy appeared in North Vietnam’s armed forces newspaper, Quang Doi Nhan Dan, quoted in Edwin H. Simmons, “MarineCorpsOperationsinVietnam,1967,”TheMarinesinVietnam,1954–1973 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,1985),97. 9. The senior Marine commander, Lieutenant General Robert Cushman, disagreed that holding Khe Sanh was critical. He, like his predecessor, thought that hisMarinesshouldbeconductingcombatoperationstoactasabarrierclosertothe coastlinetoprotecttheCombinedActionCompanies,whichwasaprogramtowin theheartsandmindsoftheSouthVietnamesepeopleinthehamletsandvillagesin thepopulatedareasofICorps. 10.WilliamC.Westmoreland,ASoldierReports(GardenCity,NY:Doubleday, 1976),272.Therewasanactualplanforthisoperation,calledElPaso. 11.TheCombinedActionProgram(CAP)wasaMarineinitiativethatfocusedon counterinsurgency.ItassignedMarinesquadsandplatoonstoliveandworkwiththe Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces. The theory was that the presence of the MarinesinthevillageswouldbefarmoreeffectiveinexcludingCommunistforces fromthecountrysidethanperiodicsweepsbylargeunits.Marinegeneralssupported theapproach,butWestmorelandthoughtthattheMarineswouldbemoreeffectiveas partoflarge-unitoperations. 12.Thelow-altitudeparachuteextractionsystem(LAPES)isusedtodeliverheavier cargowhenthecombatsituationdoesnotpermitaircrafttoland.Whentheaircraft makesanextremelylow-levelpassjustovertherunway,therearcargorampislowered and a parachute attached to the cargo is released that extracts the vehicle or other heavy cargo, strapped to a pallet, from the rear of the aircraft. As the aircraft gains altitude,thepalletslidesdowntherunwayuntilitstops. 13. Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History, 1946–1975 (Novato, CA: Presidio,1988),496. 14. Quoted in Clark Dougan and Stephen Weiss, The Vietnam Experience: NineteenSixty-Eight(Boston:BostonPublishing,1983),10. 15.Westmoreland,ASoldierReports,314. 16.Thiscontingencyplanwasneverexecuted,butthereweresomeadjustments madetoMarinedeploymentsintheQuangTriareajustsouthoftheDemilitarized Zone. 17.Westmoreland,ASoldierReports,339. 18.The26thMarineRegimentwasreinforcedby1stBattalion,9thMarines,the 37thARVNRangerBattalion,andthe1stBattalion,13thMarineArtillery. 19.RobertPisor,TheEndoftheLine:TheSiegeofKheSanh(NewYork:Norton, 1982),108–112. 20.QuotedinDouganandWeiss,NineteenSixty-Eight,42. 21.FrankE.Vandiver,ShadowsofVietnam(CollegeStation:TexasA&MUniversity Press,1997),271;Westmoreland,ASoldierReports,316–317.
3.TheTetOffensive 127
3. t h e t et o f f en siv e 1.DonOberdorfer,Tet!TheTurningPointintheVietnamWar(Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2001),120. 2. Sam Adams, a CIA analyst, later charged that MACV had falsified enemy strengthfiguresinordertoshowprogressinthewar.ThesechargesledtoaCBSNews TVdocumentaryentitled“TheUncountedEnemy:AVietnamDeception.”General Westmoreland subsequently sued the television network for $120 million for defaminghishonor,namingAdamsasoneoftheco-defendants.Westmorelandwithdrew hissuitbeforeitwenttotrial.SeeAdams,WarofNumbers:AnIntelligenceMemoir (SouthRoyalton,VT:Steerforth,1994)andDonKowet,AMatterofHonor(NewYork: Macmillan,1984). 3.QuotedinJamesR.Arnold,TetOffensive1968(London:Osprey,1990),35. 4.Oberdorfer,Tet!,121. 5.Maneuverbattalionsincludeunitsthatcanbemaneuveredagainsttheenemy in combat operations, such as infantry, mechanized infantry, armor, and armored cavalry.ThenumberofmaneuverbattalionswasameasureofU.S.combatcapability intheVietnamWar. 6. Tran Van Tra, “Tet: The 1968 General Offensive and General Uprising,” in Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and AmericanPerspectives(Armonk,NY:M.E.Sharpe,1993),45. 7.QuotedinClarkDouganandStephenWeiss,TheVietnamExperience:Nineteen Sixty-Eight(Boston:BostonPublishing,1983),12. 8. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981), 267. Estimates of Communist troops involved in the offensive vary, but most authoritiesacceptthefigureofapproximatelyeightythousand. 9.StanleyKarnow,Vietnam:AHistory,2ded.(NewYork:PenguinBooks,1997), 536. 10. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976),421. 11.Karnow,Vietnam,556. 12.Thesapperswerepromisedinstantpromotionaftertheobjectivesweresecured; thismotivationwasnecessary,nodoubt,becauseofthesuicidalnatureoftheirmissions. 13.Thechiefofthetransmitterstationusedastandbystudioequippedwithtape recorders; thus, he was able to broadcast without interruption, using primarily prerecordedprograms.Nobodyeverdetectedanythingabnormalovertheair. 14. Quoted in Clarence R. Wyatt, Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the VietnamWar(NewYork:Norton,1993),168. 15.QuotedinOberdorfer,Tet!,34. 16.QuotedinArnold,TetOffensive1968,57. 17.OriginalquotefoundinSpencerTucker,Vietnam(London:UCLPress,1999), 136.
128 3.TheTetOffensive 18.DouganandWeiss,VietnamExperience,19. 19.LoanhadbeenresponsibleforcrushingthedissidentBuddhistmovementin Huetwoyearsearlier. 20.Oberdorfer,Tet!,161–171. 21.BuiDiem,IntheJawsofHistory(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1999), 220. 22.QuotedinKarnow,Vietnam,561. 23.QuotedinArnold,TetOffensive1968,50. 24. Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported andInterpretedtheCrisisofTetinVietnamandWashington(Boulder,CO:Westview, 1977),1:254.PeterArnettreportedthemajor’scomment.B.G.Burkett,StolenValor: HowtheVietnamGenerationWasRobbedofItsHeroesandItsHistory(Dallas,TX: VerityPress,1998),120–121,saysthatherandownthe“unidentified”majorwhowas theseniorU.S.advisorinBenTreandthatthemajortoldhimthathehadtoldArnett thatindefendingthetownitwasashamethatsomeofitwasdestroyed.Thus,Arnett misquoted the American officer. Nevertheless, the quote became one of the most memorableofthewar. 25. William H. Hammond, Reporting Vietnam: Media & Military at War (Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,1998),115.
4. t h e bat t l e f o r h u e 1.EdwardF.Murphy,SemperFiVietnam:FromDaNangtotheDMZ,Marine CorpsCampaigns,1965–1975(Novato,CA:Presidio,1997),189. 2.OtherestimatesofthenumberofNVAtroopsinvolvedinthecaptureofHue range as high as twelve thousand. See William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to PowerinVietnam(Boulder,CO:Westview,1981),267. 3. Pham Van Son, Tet—1968 (Salisbury, NC: Documentary Publications, 1980), 2:459. 4.DonOberdorfer,Tet!TheTurningPointintheVietnamWar(Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2001),225. 5.GeorgeW.Smith,TheSiegeatHue(NewYork:BallantineBooks,2000),225. 6. James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversityPress,1991),98. 7.PhamVanSon,TheViet-CongTetOffensive1968(Saigon:RVNAFPrintingand PublicationsCenter,1969),272–276. 8.QuotedinJackShulimsonetal.,U.S.MarinesinVietnam:TheDefiningYear 1968 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps,1997),171. 9.Ibid.,174. 10.Ibid. 11.Ibid.
5.TheSiegeofKheSanh 129 12.WestmorelandmessagetoWheeler,dated31January68,WestmorelandPapers, Center of Military History, quoted in Shulimson et al., U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 176. 13.Ibid. 14.Ibid. 15.Ibid.,179–180. 16.Ibid.,204–205. 17.Ibid.,211. 18. Quoted in Harry Summers, Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War (New York: HoughtonMifflin,1995),134. 19. Quoted in George Donelson Moss, A Vietnam Reader: Sources and Essays (EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall,1991),279.
5. t h e sieg e o f kh e san h 1.SamuelZaffiri,Westmoreland(NewYork:WilliamMorrow,1994),283. 2.QuotedinPeterBrush,“TheBattleofKheSanh,1968,”inMarcJasonGilbert andWilliamHead,eds.,TheTetOffensive(Westport,CT:Praeger,1996),196. 3. Moyers S. Shore, The Battle of Khe Sanh (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1969), 63. Shore reports that one battalion that held the rock quarry 1,500 meters southwest of the airfield conducted patrols from its perimeter out to a distance of nine-tenths of a mile (1,500 meters). 4. Clark Dougan and Stephen Weiss, The Vietnam Experience: Nineteen SixtyEight(Boston:BostonPublishing,1983),40. 5.RobertPisor,TheEndoftheLine:TheSiegeofKheSanh(NewYork:Norton, 1983),86. 6.QuotedinBrush,“TheBattleofKheSanh,1968,”196. 7. Lyndon Baines Johnson, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970),155–163;seealsoLyndonBainesJohnson,TheVantagePoint:Perspectivesofthe Presidency,1963–1969(NewYork:Holt,Rinehart,andWinston,1971),383. 8.QuotedinDouganandWeiss,VietnamExperience,45. 9. Quoted in Larry Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam(NewYork:Norton,1989),149. 10.Shore,TheBattleofKheSanh,64. 11. Lt. Gen. Willard Pearson, The War in the Northern Province, 1966–1968 (Washington,DC:DepartmentoftheArmy,1975),72. 12.TextofCronkitereportfoundinPeterBraestrup,BigStory:HowtheAmerican Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet in Vietnam and Washington(Boulder,CO:Westview,1977),2:180–189. 13.Shore,TheBattleofKheSanh,92.
130 TheSiegeofKheSanh 14.Brush,“TheBattleofKheSanh,1968,”209. 15.Pisor,TheEndoftheLine,235. 16.MarkW.Woodruff,UnheraldedVictory:TheDefeatoftheVietCongandthe NorthVietnameseArmy,1961–1973(Arlington,VA:VandemerePress,1999),115. 17.Karnow,Vietnam,553. 18.QuotedinDouganandWeiss,VietnamExperience,51. 19.Ibid. 20.QuotedinShore,TheBattleofKheSanh,151. 21.Brush,“TheBattleofKheSanh,1968,”209. 22.QuotedinRonaldH.Spector,AfterTet:TheBloodiestYearinVietnam(New York:FreePress,1993),71.
6. t h e im pac t o f t h e t et o f f en siv e 1.TranVanTra,“Tet:The1968GeneralOffensiveandGeneralUprising,”inJayne S.WernerandLuuDoanHuynh,eds.,TheVietnamWar:VietnameseandAmerican Perspectives(Armonk,NY:M.E.Sharpe,1993),48. 2.Ibid. 3. Edwin E. Moise, Historical Dictionary of the Vietnam War (Lanham, MD: ScarecrowPress,2001),392. 4. Larry H. Addington, America’s War in Vietnam: A Short Narrative History (Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2000),124. 5. Bui Tinh, From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War (Annapolis,MD:NavalInstitutePress,2002),64. 6.RichardFalk,AppropriatingTet(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityCenterof InternationalStudies,1988),7. 7.TextbyWalterCronkitefoundinPeterBraestrup,BigStory:HowtheAmerican Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet in Vietnam and Washington(Boulder,CO:Westview,1977)2:180–189. 8. Quoted in Robert Buzzanco, “The Myth of Tet,” in Marc Jason Gilbert and William Head, eds., The Tet Offensive (Westport, CT.: Greenwood, 1996), 231 and PhillipB.Davidson,VietnamatWar:TheHistory,1946-1975(Novato,CA:Presidio, 1988),436. 9. Quoted in Don Oberdorfer, Tet! The Turning Point in the Vietnam War (Baltimore,MD:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2001)160. 10.Ibid.,176. 11.StanleyKarnow,Vietnam:AHistory,2ded.(NewYork:PenguinBooks,1997), 558. 12. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976),350–359. 13. Quoted in Clark Dougan and Stephen Weiss, The Vietnam Experience: NineteenSixty-Eight(Boston:BostonPublishing,1983),70.
7.AssessingtheTetOffensive 131 14.WheelerReport,27February1968,declassifieddocumentreprintedinRobert J. McMahon, ed., Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War (New York: HoughtonMifflin,2003),321–324. 15. George Herring, America’s Longest War, The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975,4thed.(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,2002),235. 16.Westmoreland,ASoldierReports,356–357. 17.Falk,AppropriatingTet,19. 18. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969(NewYork:Holt,Rinehart,andWinston,1971),392. 19. Clark M. Clifford, Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random House,1991),475. 20.QuotedinJamesS.OlsonandRandyRoberts,WheretheDominoFell:America andVietnam,1945to1990(NewYork:St.Martin’s,1991),189. 21.Clifford,CounseltothePresident,493–494. 22.Oberdorfer,Tet!,241. 23.AllquotesfoundinOlsonandRoberts,WheretheDominoFell,186. 24.Ibid.,191. 25.Herring,America’sLongestWar,243. 26.QuotedinHerbertY.Schandler,TheUnmakingofaPresident:LyndonJohnson andVietnam(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1972),202. 27.QuotedinOberdorfer,Tet!,174. 28.Karnow,Vietnam,572. 29.Johnson,TheVantagePoint,418. 30.QuotedinHerring,America’sLongestWar,251. 31.Johnson,TheVantagePoint,418. 32.LyndonB.Johnson,PublicPapersofthePresidentsoftheUnitedStates:Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 1:469–476.
7 . assessin g t h e t et o f f en siv e 1.DavidF.Schmitz,TheTetOffensive:Politics,War,andPublicOpinion(Lanham, MD:Rowman&Littlefield,2005),xiv–xv. 2. William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview,1981),270–271. 3.DavePalmer,SummonsoftheTrumpet(SanRafael,CA:Presidio,1978),186. 4.WilliamC.Westmoreland,ASoldierReports(GardenCity,NY:Doubleday, 1976), 404; George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam,1950–1975(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,2002),232;GuntherLewy,America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 127, 134, 146–147; Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington, DC: U.S.ArmyCenterofMilitaryHistory,1988),327–328.NgoVinhLong,“TheTet
132 7.AssessingtheTetOffensive OffensiveandItsAftermath,”inMarcJasonGilbertandWilliamHead,eds.,The Tet Offensive (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 105, disputes these figures, maintaining that they were greatly inflated. Cecil Currey, “Giap and Tet Mau Than 1968:TheYearoftheMonkey,”inMarcJasonGilbertandWilliamHead,eds., TheTetOffensive(Westport,CT:Praeger,1996),84,statesthat40,000battlefield deaths for the VC and PAVN was probably closer to the truth than the official U.S.estimates. 5.RichardA.Hunt,Pacification:TheAmericanStruggleforVietnameseHeartsand Minds(Boulder,CO:Westview,1995),139. 6. Ibid., 143. Not all historians agree that the Viet Cong was severely crippled during the 1968 Tet Offensive. See Ngo Vinh Long, “The Tet Offensive and Its Aftermath,” in Gilbert and Head, The Tet Offensive, 89–123. Long argues that the Viet Cong recovered from its losses and played an important role in the eventual Communistvictory. 7. Quoted in Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, 2d ed. (New York: Penguin Books,1997),547. 8.DonOberdorfer,Tet!TheTurningPointintheVietnamWar(Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2001),329–330. 9.TranVanTra,Vietnam:HistoryoftheBulwarkB2Theater,Volume5:Concluding the30-YearsWar,SoutheastAsiaReportNo.1247(Washington,DC:ForeignBroadcast InformationService,February2,1983),35. 10.QuotedinPeterMacdonald,Giap:TheVictorinVietnam(NewYork:Norton, 1993), 268. Not everyone agrees that the National Liberation Front was seriously crippledbytheoutcomeoftheTetOffensive.NgoVinhLong,“TheTetOffensive and Its Aftermath,” in Jayne Werner and David Hunt, eds., The American War in Vietnam(Ithaca,NY:SoutheastAsiaProgram,CornellUniversity,1993),23–45,writes, “becauseofitspopularsupport,theNLFwasnotdestroyedbutmanagedtorebuild itself...anditwasonlywiththisrecoverythatmilitarysuccessesin1971and1972were possibleandforcesfromtheNorthcouldbegintooperateintheSouthagainwithout sufferingprohibitivelosses.” 11.CasualtyfiguresfortheTetOffensivevarydrasticallydependingontheexact timeframecovered,butthesefigures,whichcoverJanuary–March1968,comefrom Harry G. Summers Jr., Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War (New York: Houghton Mifflin,1995),130. 12.Hunt,Pacification,137. 13.Ibid.,141. 14.VirginiaPohle,TheVietConginSaigon:TacticsandObjectivesDuringtheTet Offensive(SantaMonica,CA:RandCorporation,1969),viii. 15.Duiker,CommunistRoadtoPower,270. 16. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitution,1979),171. 17.Ibid.,269. 18. Bui Tin, From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War (Annapolis,MD:NavalInstitutePress,2002),64. 19.QuotedinKarnow,Vietnam,536.
8.MotivationsandObjectivesoftheTetOffensive 133 20. James R. Arnold, Tet Offensive 1968: Turning Point in Vietnam (London: Osprey,1990),87. 21. Gilbert and Head, The Tet Offensive, 1. In their book, the editors provide a collection of excellent essays that attempt to address what they describe as “wishful thinking, analytical dogmas, and political agendas” that they believe influence any considerationoftheTetOffensive. 22. Tran Van Tra, “Tet: The 1968 General Offensive and General Uprising,” in Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and AmericanPerspectives(Armonk,NY:M.E.Sharpe,1993),57–58. 23.Ibid.,60. 24.QuotedinMacdonald,Giap,269. 25.Oberdorfer,Tet!,20. 26. Townsend Hoopes,The Limits of Intervention: AnInsideAccountofHowthe JohnsonPolicyofEscalationinVietnamWasReversed(NewYork:McKay,1969),145. 27. Bernard Brodie, “Tet Offensive,” in Noble Frankland and Christopher Dowling, eds., Decisive Battles of the Twentieth Century: Land-Sea-Air (New York: DavidMcKay,1976),321. 28.Ibid. 29.Schmitz,TheTetOffensive,xv. 30.TranVanTra,“Tet:The1968GeneralOffensiveandGeneralUprising,”61. 31.Oberdorfer,Tet!,329.
8 . m o t ivat io n s an d o bjec t iv es o f t h e t et o f f en siv e 1. Edwin E. Moise, Historical Dictionary of the Vietnam War (Lanham, MD: ScarecrowPress,2001),391. 2.GeorgeC.Herring,America’sLongestWarAmerica’sLongestWar:TheUnited StatesandVietnam,1950–1975(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,2002),227. 3. James S. Olson and Randy Roberts, Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam,1945to1990(NewYork:St.Martin’s,1991),182. 4.QuotedinMarcJasonGilbert,ed.,WhytheNorthWontheVietnamWar(New York:Palgrave,2002),67. 5.NgoVinhLong,“TheTetOffensiveandItsAftermath,”inMarcJasonGilbert andWilliamHead,eds.,TheTetOffensive(Westport,CT:Praeger,1996),119. 6. Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945–1990 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991),216. 7.MilitaryHistoryInstituteofVietnam,VictoryinVietnam:TheOfficialHistory of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, trans. Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: UniversityPressofKansas,2002),214–215. 8.JonM.VanDyke,NorthVietnam’sStrategyforSurvival(PaloAlto,CA:Pacific Books,1972),32. 9. Patrick J. McGarvey, ed., Visions of Victory: Selected Vietnamese Communist MilitaryWritings,1964–1968(Stanford,CA:HooverInstitution,1969),222.
134 8.MotivationsandObjectivesoftheTetOffensive 10. For similar interpretations of the objectives of the Tet Offensive, see Hoang NgocLung,TheGeneralOffensivesof1968–69(Washington,DC:U.S.ArmyCenter of Military History, 1981), 26; Dave Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet (San Rafael, CA:Presidio,1978),176;andU.S.GrantSharp,StrategyforDefeat(SanRafael,CA: Presidio,1978),214. 11.WilliamJ.Duiker,TheCommunistRoadtoPowerinVietnam(Boulder,CO: Westview,1981),264. 12.NormanPodhoretz,WhyWeWereinVietnam(NewYork:Simon&Schuster, 1982), 175; Harry Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato,CA:Presidio,1982),96. 13. Quoted in James R. Arnold, Tet Offensive 1968: Turning Point in Vietnam (London:Osprey,1990),86. 14.ThetranslationofTranVanTra’sarticleisreprintedinJayneS.Wernerand Luu Doan Huynh, eds., The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives (Armonk,NY:M.E.Sharpe,1993),52–53.
9. m il itary in t el l ig en c e an d su r pr ise at t et 1. John Prados, “The Warning That Left Something to Chance: Intelligence at Tet,”inMarcJasonGilbertandWilliamHead,eds.,TheTetOffensive(Westport,CT: Praeger,1996),143. 2.VoNguyenGiap,BigVictory,GreatTask(NewYork:Praeger,1968),90. 3.HoangNgocLung,TheGeneralOffensivesof1968–1969,19–20;DavePalmer, SummonsoftheTrumpet(SanRafael,CA:Presidio,1978),169. 4.HoangNgocLung,TheGeneralOffensivesof1968–69(Washington,DC:U.S. ArmyCenterofMilitaryHistory,1981),33. 5.QuotedinPrados,“TheWarningThatLeftSomethingtoChance,”146–147. 6.Ibid.,153. 7. Quoted in David F. Schmitz, The Tet Offensive: Politics, War, and Public Opinion(Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield,2005),84. 8.PhillipB.Davidson,VietnamatWar(Novato,CA:Presidio,1988),429–430. 9.SamAdams,“VietnamCover-up:PlayingWarwithNumbers,”Harper’s,May1975; SamAdams,WarofNumbers:AnIntelligenceMemoir(SouthRoyalton,VT:Steerforth, 1994).Adams,aCIAanalyst,chargedthatMACVdeliberatelydownplayedthenumber ofguerrillasinSouthVietnamandthatthisdeceptionplayedamajorroleinthesurpriseoftheTetOffensive.AdamsbecamethesourceforaCBStelevisiondocumentary aboutAmericanintelligencefailuresinVietnam,“TheUncountedEnemy:AVietnam Deception,”thatwasthesubjectofalawsuitbroughtbyWilliamWestmoreland,former MACVcommanderagainstCBS.Ultimately,thelawsuitwassettledoutofcourt. 10.ThomasC.Thayer,WarWithoutFronts:TheAmericanExperienceinVietnam (Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1985),27-33. 11.HoangNgocLung,TheGeneralOffensivesof1968–69,38.
10.WhatHappenedatHue? 135 12. Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991),221. 13. Hoang Ngoc Lung, The General Offensives of 1968–69, 39. U.S. and ARVN forces conducted Operation Cedar Falls in January 1967 in the “Iron Triangle,” an areanorthwestofSaigon.Itwasalarge-scalesearchanddestroyoperation.CedarFalls was followed by Operation Junction City (February–March 1967), the largest U.S. militaryoperationofthewar,whichwasconductedinWarZoneC,theareaadjacent totheCambodianborderwestofSaigon. 14. Ronnie E. Ford, Tet 1968: Understanding the Surprise (London: Frank Cass, 1995),167. 15. James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversityPress,1994),180. 16.Ibid.,10. 17.LarryCable,“Don’tBotherMewiththeFacts;I’veMadeUpMyMind:The TetOffensiveintheContextofIntelligenceandU.S.Strategy,”inGilbertandHead, TheTetOffensive,167. 18.Prados,“TheWarningThatLeftSomethingtoChance,”162. 19.Ibid,179. 20.Wirtz,TheTetOffensive,275.
10. w h at h appen ed at h u e? 1.DouglasPike,TheVietCongStrategyofTerror(Saigon:U.S.Mission,1970),25. 2.Ibid.,27. 3.Ibid.,29. 4.DonOberdorfer,Tet!TheTurningPointintheVietnamWar(Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2001),225. 5.Ibid.,232–233. 6. Gunther Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980),274;PeterMacdonald,Giap:TheVictorinVietnam(NewYork:Norton,1993), 267. 7.OmarEby,AHouseinHue(Scottsdale,PA:HeraldPress,1968),103. 8.TruongNhuTang,AVietcongMemoir(NewYork:HarcourtBraceJovanovich, 1985),154. 9. D. Gareth Porter, “U.S. Political Warfare in Vietnam—The 1968 ‘Hue Massacre,’”IndochinaChronicle33(June24,1974):1. 10.Ibid.,4. 11.Ibid.,5. 12. Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945–1990 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991),217. 13. Bui Tin, From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 67. The Can Lao Party (Personalist
136 10.WhatHappenedatHue? Labor Revolutionary Party) had been established by former South Vietnamese PresidentNgoDinhDiemandhisbrotherNoDinhNhu.Itwasasecretorganization basedonacombinationofreformideasandrespectforpersonality.Ithadmembers allthroughDiem’sadministrationandthearmedforces. 14.Oberdorfer,Tet!,202. 15.RichardFalk,AppropriatingTet(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityCenterof InternationalStudies,1988),30.
11. w h y kh e san h ? 1.PeterBrush,“TheBattleofKheSanh,1968,”inMarcJasonGilbertandWilliam Head,eds.,TheTetOffensive(Westport,CT:Praeger,1996),191. 2. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976),316. 3.Brush,“TheBattleofKheSanh,1968,”198. 4.NeilSheehan,ABrightShiningLie(NewYork:RandomHouse,1988),710. 5.InterviewinWilliamS.Turley,TheSecondIndochinaWar:AShortPoliticaland MilitaryHistory,1954–1975(NewYork:Westview,1986),108. 6.Ibid.,105. 7.CecilB.Currey,VictoryatAnyCost:TheGeniusofVietNam’sGen.VoNguyen Giap(Dulles,VA:Brassey’s,1997),266. 8.PhillipB.Davidson,VietnamatWar(Novato,CA:Presidio,1988),495. 9.Ibid.,497. 10.Ibid.,495. 11.Ibid,505. 12. Peter Macdonald, Giap: The Victor in Vietnam (New York: Norton, 1993), 285. 13.RobertJ.O’Neill,GeneralGiap(NorthMelbourne,Australia:Cassell,1969), 195–196. 14. Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis,MD:NavalInstitutePress,1984),217–219. 15.WilliamS.Turley,TheSecondIndochinaWar:AShortPoliticalandMilitary History,1954–1975(Boulder,CO:Westview,1986),105. 16.Macdonald,Giap,269. 17.MilitaryHistoryInstituteofVietnam,VictoryinVietnam:TheOfficialHistory of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002),216. 18. Ronnie E. Ford, Tet 1968: Understanding the Surprise (London: Frank Cass, 1995),111;Macdonald,Giap,291. 19. Harry G. Summers Jr., Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War (New York: HoughtonMifflin,1995),138. 20.Brush,“TheBattleofKheSanh,1968,”208.
12.TetandTheMedia 137
12. t et an d t h e m ed ia 1.ChesterJ.PachJr.,“TheWaronTelevision:TVNews,theJohnsonAdministration, andVietnam,”inMarilynB.YoungandRobertBuzzanco,eds.,ACompaniontothe VietnamWar(Malden,MA:Blackwell,2002),451. 2.ClarenceWyatt,PaperSoldiers:TheAmericanPressandtheVietnamWar(New York:Norton,1993),168. 3.LarryBerman,LyndonJohnson’sWar:TheRoadtoStalemateinVietnam(New York:Norton,1989),84–85. 4.Pach,“TheWaronTelevision,”458. 5.KathleenJ.Turner,LyndonJohnson’sDualWar:VietnamandthePress(Chicago: UniversityofChicagoPress,1985),217–218. 6.Pach,“TheWaronTelevision,”461. 7.DonOberdorfer,Tet!TheTurningPointintheVietnamWar(Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2001),159. 8.WilliamHammond,ReportingVietnam:MediaandMilitaryatWar(Lawrence: UniversityPressofKansas,1998),111. 9.DavidHalberstam,ThePowersThatBe(NewYork:Knopf,1979),514. 10.RobertElegant,“HowtoLoseaWar:ReflectionsofaForeignCorrespondent,” Encounter57(August1981),73–77. 11.QuotedinHammond,ReportingVietnam,121. 12.KeyesBeech,“HowtoLoseaWar:AResponsefroman‘OldAsiaHand,’”in HarrisonSalisbury,ed.,VietnamReconsidered:LessonsFromaWar(NewYork:Harper &Row,1984),152. 13. Charles Mohr, “Once Again—Did the Press Lose Vietnam?” in Grace Sevy, ed., The American Experience in Vietnam (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989),145–147. 14.PaulElliott,Vietnam:Conflict&Controversy(London:Arms&Armour,1996), 146. 15. Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet in Vietnam and Washington, 2 vols. (Boulder, CO: Westview,1977).BigStorywasrepublishedbyAnchorBooksasaone-volumepaperback in 1978, by Yale University Press in 1983, and in an unabridged and updated versionbyPresidioin1994. 16. Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported andInterpretedtheCrisisofTetinVietnamandWashington,abridgededition(New Haven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,1983),509. 17.Ibid. 18.Ibid.,517. 19.Ibid.,303–306. 20.Ibid.,219. 21.InterviewwithPeterBraestrupinKimWillenson,TheBadWar:AnOralHistory of the Vietnam War (New York: New American Library, 1987), 190; Braestrup, Big Story,468–461.
138 12.TetandtheMedia 22.Braestrup,BigStory,508. 23. Kathleen J. Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War: Vietnam and the Press (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1985),218. 24.Elliott,Vietnam:Conflict&Controversy,140. 25.DanielC.Hallin,The“UncensoredWar”:TheMediaandVietnam(Berkeley: UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1989),161. 26.Ibid.,211–215. 27.Ibid.,168. 28.Ibid.,173. 29.Elliott,Vietnam:Conflict&Controversy,141. 30.Wyatt,PaperSoldiers,218. 31.Ibid.,148. 32.Ibid.,188. 33.Hammond,ReportingVietnam,115. 34.Ibid.,122. 35.QuotedinHammond,ReportingVietnam,112.
13. t et an d am eric an m il itar y st r at eg y 1.DonOberdorfer,Tet!TheTurningPointintheVietnamWar(Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2001),81. 2. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns HopkinsUniversityPress,1986),237. 3.Ibid.,240. 4.Ibid.,241. 5.Ibid.,250. 6.Ibid. 7. Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato,CA:Presidio,1982),120–121. 8. Herbert Y. Schandler, “America and Vietnam: The Failure of Strategy, 1964– 1967,”inPeterBraestrup,ed.,VietnamasHistory(Washington,DC:WoodrowWilson InternationalCenterforScholars,1984),32. 9. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 243; The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam—The Senator GravelEdition(Boston:BeaconPress,1971),4:564–565. 10. Clark Clifford, “A Vietnam Reappraisal,” Foreign Affairs 47 (July 1969): 601–623. 11.PentagonPapers,4:580. 12. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: Norton, 1972), 386– 388. 13. Michael Lind, Vietnam, the Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s MostDisastrousMilitaryConflict(NewYork:FreePress,1999),78.
partiii Chronology,1967–68
8–26January1967
OperationCedarFallsconductedinareanearSaigonknownastheIronTriangle. 22February–14May1967
OperationJunctionCity,thelargestU.S.operationtodatewithmorethan twenty-twoalliedbattalionsparticipating,takesplaceinWarZoneCnear theCambodianborder 10March1967
TheRepublicofVietnamCouncilofMinistersapprovesanewconstitution forSouthVietnam 20March1967
PresidentJohnsonmeetswithNguyenCaoKyandNguyenVanThieuin Guam April1967
TheCentralCommitteeoftheLaoDong(Workers’)PartypassesResolution13 atitsThirteenthPlenuminHanoi,callingfora“spontaneousuprising[in theSouth]inordertowinadecisivevictoryintheshortestpossibletime”
142 Chronology,1967–68 April–October1967
U.S.MarineunitsfightaseriesofsharpbattlesforcontrolofthehillssurroundingKheSanhbaseintheICorpsarea 4April1967
MartinLutherKingJr.delivershisantiwarspeech“ATimetoBreakSilence” inNewYorkCity 15April1967
LargeantiwardemonstrationsoccuracrosstheUnitedStates,includingan estimated300,000protestorsatapeacerallyinNewYorkCity 10May1967
TheJohnsonadministrationestablishestheCivilianOperationsandRevolutionaryDevelopmentSupport(CORDS)organizationtocoordinatethe pacificationeffortinSouthVietnam 7July1967
TheCentralCommitteeoftheLaoDong(Workers’)PartyinHanoidecides togoaheadwiththeGeneralOffensive–GeneralUprisinginSouthVietnam;funeralheldinHanoiforGeneralNguyenChiThanh 7–11July1967
SecretaryofDefenseRobertMcNamara,accompaniedbyGeneralEarle Wheeler,chairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,travelstoVietnamfora firsthandassessmentofthesituation 9July
PresidentialassistantWaltW.Rostow,onMeetthePress,statesthatNorth Vietnam’sstrategyhas“shiftedfromapostureoftryingtowinthewarto keepingthewargoing” 13July1967
PresidentJohnsondeclaresinapressconferencethat“weareverysurewe areontherighttrack”militarilyinVietnambutacknowledgesthatmore troopswillbeneeded 19July1967
AHanoidelegationledbyDeputyPremierLeThanhNghileavesforBeijing, China,onthefirstlegofatriptosecureadditionalweaponsandotheraid fromCommunistcountries;inWashington,SecretaryofStateDeanRusk
Chronology,1967–68 143
tellsanewsconferencethattheenemyis“hurtingbadly,”butseesa“still tough,longjobahead” LateJuly1967
VietCongcommandersmeetinCambodiatobeginplanningfortheGeneral Offensive–GeneralUprising 3August1967
PresidentJohnsonannouncesthathewillraiseU.S.troopceilingto525,000 andcallsfor10percentsurtaxonindividualandcorporateincome;Viet Conginternaldocumentdescribes“newsituationandmission”thatwill leadtotheclimaxofthewarthatwill“splittheskyandshaketheearth” 5August1967
ThePeople’sRepublicofChinasignsanewaidpactwithNorthVietnamin aceremonyinPeking;JohnsonadvisorClarkCliffordandretiredGeneral MaxwellTaylorreturnfromtriptocapitalsofAmerica’sAsianallies;CliffordreportsthatalliesunanimouslyagreethatbombingofNorthVietnam shouldbecontinuedatpresentorevenhigherlevels 7August1967
ArmyChiefofStaffGeneralHaroldK.Johnsonreportsthe“smellofsuccess” intheAlliedwareffort,markingthebeginningofthepresident’s“success” mediacampaign 8August1967
HouseRepublicanLeaderGeraldFordattacksJohnsonadministrationfor “pullingpunches”inbombingofNorthVietnamwhilesendingmore Americanstodieinthegroundwar 11August1967
NorthKoreasignsmilitarypactwithNorthVietnaminceremonyin Pyongyang 15August1967
AnarticlebyRobertPisoroftheDetroitNewsreportsconcerninSaigon about“amassive,countrywidemilitarystrike”byCommuniststoimprove positionpriortocommencementofpeacetalks 20August1967
AnAssociatedPresssurveyreportsthatU.S.Senatesupportforpresident’swar
144 Chronology,1967–68
policyhasdrasticallyeroded;ofsenatorsreplyingtosurvey,forty-fourgenerallysupportwarpolitics,butfortydisapprove 22August1967
RichardM.Nixon,inaninterviewwiththeChristianScienceMonitor,calls for“massivepressure”shortofnuclearweaponstoshortenthewar 25August1967
SecretaryofDefenseRobertS.McNamara,testifyingbeforeSenate PreparednessSubcommittee,saysthatthewarcannotbewonbybombing,themostpessimisticappraisalofthebombingcampaigntodate; severalsenatorsreplythattheUnitedStatesmayaswell“getout”if McNamaraiscorrect 1September1967
PresidentJohnson,atanewsconference,saysthereisno“deepdivision” inhisadministration’sleadershipconcerningthebombingofNorth Vietnam 3September1967
NguyenVanThieuiselectedpresidentandNguyenCaoKyelectedvice |presidentoftheRepublicofVietnamwith27percentofthetotal vote;peacecandidateTruongDinhDzuwinssecond-highestpresidentialvote 4September1967
GovernorGeorgeRomney,inaDetroittelevisioninterview,says“brainwashing”inSaigonbyU.S.generalsanddiplomatsbroughtabouthisprevious supportofthewar 11September–31Oct1967
PAVNforcesbesiegeU.S.MarinesatConThien,twomilessouthofthe DMZ;thefightingexactsanextremelyheavytollonbothsides 14–16September1967
DefenseMinisterVoNguyenGiap,inseveralHanoiradiobroadcasts, endorsesastrategyofprotractedwarbutdeclaresthat“ourfightwillbe moreviolentinthedaysahead” 21September1967
U.S.AmbassadortotheUnitedNationsArthurGoldbergasksinamajor speechwhattheHanoiregimewoulddoifthebombingstopped
Chronology,1967–68 145 23September1967
TheSovietUnionsignsanewaidagreementwithNorthVietnaminaMoscowceremony 26September1967
TheChristianScienceMonitorreportsthatsupportfortheJohnsonadministration’sVietnampolicywaserodingintheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives;of205Housemembersresponding,43saidtheyhadrecentlyshifted positionsfromsupportfortheadministrationpoliciesonthewartomore emphasisonfindingawayout 28September1967
VietCongMilitaryRegion4directivesecretlyordersintensificationofpoliticalandmilitaryactionintheSaigonarea 29September1967
PresidentJohnsondeclaresinaTexasspeechthattheUnitedStateswillstop thebombingofNorthVietnamifHanoiwillagreetostartnegotiations, whichbecomesknownasthe“SanAntonioFormula”;inSaigon,anew UnitedStatesEmbassychanceryisdedicated LateSeptember
HueCityCommitteeofNationalLiberationFrontordersdevelopmentof grassrootsorganizationandplansforoccupationofthecity 8October1967
ANewYorkTimessurveyreportsthatU.S.politicalandcongressionalsupport forVietnamWariswaning 12October1967
SecretaryofStateDeanRuskcallstheVietnamWaratestinggroundfor Asia’sabilitytowithstandthethreatof“abillionChinese...armedwith nuclearweapons” 16–21October1967
AntiwaractivistsholddemonstrationsagainstthedraftthroughouttheUnited States;thelargestoccursoutsidetheArmyInductionCenterinOakland, California 20October1967
Lifemagazine,inaneditorialshift,callsforapauseinthebombingofNorth Vietnamanddeclaresthat“homefrontsupportforthewariseroding”
146 Chronology,1967–68 21–23October1967
ThreeArmybattalionsbackedbyteargasrepulseastone-andbottle-throwing assaultbysomeantiwarprotestersatthePentagon;inLondon,antiwarprotesterstrytostormtheU.S.Embassy 25October1967
Resolution14ispassedbytheLaoDong(Workers’)PartyCentralCommitteeinHanoi,orderinga“generaloffensive–generaluprising”(tongcong kich–tongkhoinghia). 27October1967
PAVNforcesattacktheSouthVietnamesebaseatSongBeinPhuocLong Province,neartheCambodianborder 29October–3Nov1967
PAVNtroopsattempttotakeandholdanARVNoutpostatLochNinh,adistrictcapitalinBinhLongProvince 30October1967
TheNationalAssemblystandingcommitteeoftheDemocraticRepublicof Vietnam(NorthVietnam)approvesadecreeonpunishmentforcounterrevolutionaryactivity 31October1967
NguyenVanThieuisinauguratedaspresidentofRepublicofVietnam 1November1967
DefenseSecretaryMcNamarasecretlyrecommendsterminationofUnited StatesbombingofNorthVietnamandlimitationofgroundinvolvementin SouthVietnam 2November1967
Seniorunofficialadvisers,knownasthe“WiseMen,”givebroadapprovalof JohnsonadministrationwarpoliciesinaWashingtonmeeting 3November–1December1967
PAVNregimentsmassintheDakToarea,resultinginaseriesofbloodybattleswithelementsoftheU.S.4thInfantryDivisionandthe173rdAirborne Brigadethatlaststwenty-twodays
Chronology,1967–68 147 6November1967
AdocumentcapturedbyU.S.forcesnearDakTosaysthatbattlesinthatarea weremeanttodivertU.S.forcestothemountainousareaswhileimproving techniquesofcoordinatedattacks 10November1967
PresidentHoChiMinhsignsdecreeoncounterrevolutionarycrimes 11November1967
PresidentJohnsonbeginsaVeteransDaytourofeightmilitaryinstallationsto shoreupsupportforthewar 13November1967
EllsworthBunker,U.S.AmbassadortoSouthVietnam,onatriptoWashington,reports“steadyprogress”inthewarzone 16November1967
MACVcommanderGeneralWilliamC.WestmorelandtellstheHouse ArmedServicesCommitteeinWashingtonthatU.S.militarywithdrawal fromVietnamcanbeginwithintwoyearsifprogresscontinues 17November1967
TheNationalLiberationFront,thepoliticalwingoftheVietCong,proclaims athree-daycease-fireforbothChristmasandNewYear’sandaseven-day cease-firefortheupcomingTet(VietnameseNewYear)holiday 19November1967
U.S.forcesinQuangTinProvincecaptureaCommunistPartydocument orderingtheGeneralOffensiveandGeneralUprising 21November1967
AtaspeechattheNationalPressClub,Westmorelandreportsthatprogressis beingmadeinthewarandthatthewarhasenteredthefinalphase“when theendbeginstocomeintoview”;hepredictsthatU.S.troopwithdrawals canbeginintwoyears 24November1967
MACVofficiallyreducesitsestimateofCommuniststrengthinSouthVietnamfrom294,000to223,000–248,000troops
148 Chronology,1967–68 26November1967
SenatorRobertF.KennedysaysPresidentJohnsonhasshiftedwaraimsset outbyPresidentJohnKennedyandseriouslyunderminedthemoralpositionoftheUnitedStates 29November1967
PresidentJohnsonannouncesthatRobertMcNamarawillstepdownassecretaryofdefensetobecomepresidentoftheWorldBank 30November1967
AntiwarDemocratEugeneMcCarthyannouncesthathewillenterprimaries tochallengePresidentLyndonJohnsonfortheDemocraticpresidential nominationin1968 4December1967
FourdaysofantiwarprotestsbegininNewYork;amongthe585protesters arrestedisrenownedpediatricianDr.BenjaminSpock;inSaigon,General WestmorelandandGeneralCaoVanVien(chiefoftheRepublicofVietnamJointGeneralStaff)begindiscussionofChristmas,NewYear’s,and Tetcease-fires 5December1967
RepublicanleadersSenatorEverettDirksenandRepresentativeGeraldFord saythattheJohnsonadministrationhasnotdoneallitcouldtonegotiate settlementofthewar 15December1967
MACVturnsoverresponsibilityforSaigon’sdefensetoSouthVietnamese armedforces 18December1967
GeneralEarleWheeler,chairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,tellstheDetroit EconomicClub“wearewinningthewar,”butwarnsthattheCommunists maytryalastdesperateeffortsimilartotheBattleoftheBulgeinWorld WarII;PresidentJohnsonrejectsMcNamara’splantohaltSouthVietnam bombingandlimitU.S.participationinthewar 19December1967
Inatelevisioninterview,PresidentJohnsonsaystalksbetweenSaigongovernmentandmembersoftheNationalLiberationFront“couldbringgood results”
Chronology,1967–68 149 20December1967
GeneralWestmorelandcablesWashingtonthatCommunistshavedecidedon anintensifiedcountrywideefforttowinthewar 21December1967
PresidentJohnson,inCanberraforthestatefuneralforPrimeMinisterHaroldHolt,tellstheAustralianCabinetthat“kamikaze”attacksarecomingin SouthVietnam 23December1967
NorthVietnamPresidentHoChiMinhaddressesanationalrallyinHanoi, callingforgreaterfeatsofbattleinbothNorthandSouthVietnamtowin thewar;inRome,PresidentJohnsonmeetswithPopePaulandagreestoa twelve-hourextensionoftheNewYear’scease-fireinVietnam 25December1967
VietCongcommandersreconnoiterassignedobjectivesinSaigonduring Christmascease-fire 30December1967
MessengersdeliverHoChiMinh’sTetpoemtoofficialsanddiplomatsin Hanoi;ForeignMinisterNguyenDuyTrinhannouncesthatNorthVietnamwouldbeginnegotiationswiththeUnitedStatesifbombingandother actsofwaragainsttheNorthwerestopped 31December1967
U.S.trooplevelsreach485,600,with16,021Americancombatdeathstodate 1January1968
PresidentJohnsonimposesmandatorycurbsonmostdirectU.S.investment abroad,asksforrestrictionsonoverseastravelofU.S.citizensandother movestocutsharplygrowingbalanceofpaymentsdeficitandgolddrain 3January1968
SenatorEugeneMcCarthyenterstheNewHampshireprimaryinhisquest fortheDemocraticpresidentialnomination 5January1968
OperationNiagarabeginswithanintensiveintelligenceandsurveillance effortintheareaaroundKheSanh;U.S.pressreleaseinSaigonreports Communistorderthattroopsshouldfloodlowlands,attackSaigon,and
150 Chronology,1967–68
launchtheGeneralOffensiveandGeneralUprising;intheUnitedStates, Dr.BenjaminSpockandthreeothersareindictedforcounselingdraft resistance 9January1968
BrigadierGeneralWilliamR.Desobry,retiringasseniorU.S.advisorinthe MekongDelta,saysthattheVietConginregionare“poorlymotivatedand poorlytrained”andthat“ARVNnowhastheupperhandcompletely” 10January1968
GeneralWestmoreland,afterconsultationwithLt.Gen.FrederickWeyand ofIIFieldForce,ordersredeploymentofU.S.forcesfromborderareasto positionsclosertoSaigon 15January1968
GeneralWestmorelandwarnsofCommunistattacksbeforeorafterTetata U.S.MissionCouncilmeetinginSaigon 15-17January1968
TheNationalLiberationFrontpresidiummeets,hearsreportsonimpending militaryaction 18January1968
SingerEarthaKitt,ataWhiteHouseluncheon,blamescrimeandraceriots ontheVietnamWar 19January1968
PresidentJohnsonnamesClarkCliffordtosucceedRobertMcNamaraassecretaryofdefense,effective1March1968 20January1968
AMarinebattalionandPAVNforcesfightabattleonthehillsnorthwestof KheSanh 21January1968
PAVNforcesoverrunthevillageofKheSanhandbegintoshellKheSanh CombatBase,initiatingaseventy-seven-daysiege;inSeoul,SouthKorea, NorthKoreaninfiltratorsunsuccessfullyattemptaraidonthepresidential mansioninthemostdramaticmilitaryactionsincetheKoreanWar 23January1968
NorthKoreansseizetheU.S.intelligenceshipPueblo
Chronology,1967–68 151 24January1968
AmbassadorBunkerandGeneralWestmorelandcableWashingtonthatCommunistsmaybreaktheTettruceandurgeSouthVietnamesegovernment tocancelthetruceinICorpsTacticalZone 25January1968
GeneralWestmorelandreportsthatthesituationatKheSanhiscriticaland mayrepresenttheturningpointoftheVietnamWar;inWashington,PresidentJohnsoncalls14,787reserviststoactivedutyintheKoreacrisisand ordersthenuclearcarrierEnterprisetowardKorea 26January1968
VietCongunitsmovetovillagesontheoutskirtsofCanThoandVinhLong intheMekongDelta 27January1968
TheCommunistseven-daycease-fireforTetbegins;troopsarerestrictedto theirpostsandallleavesarecanceledunderlast-minuteorders 29January1968
TheTetLunarNewYearcelebrationbeginsinNorthVietnam;theTetceasefireforalliesiscanceledinICorpsTacticalZone,butcease-firetakes effectintherestofSouthVietnamat6:00p.m. 30January1968
CommunistslaunchsurpriseattacksonNhaTrang,followedbyattackontwo citiesinICorpsandfivecitiesinIICorps;alliedcommanderscancelTet cease-firethroughoutallofSouthVietnam,andMACVordersallU.S. unitson“maximumalert”;inWashington,theSenateconfirmsClarkCliffordtobesecretaryofstate 31January1968
Communistslaunchsimultaneousattacksonmajorcities,towns,andmilitary basesthroughoutSouthVietnam,includinganassaultontheU.S.Embassy inSaigon;PresidentThieudeclaresmartiallaw;intheUnitedStates,the Americannewsmediaaredominatedbyaccountsoftheheaviestfightingof theVietnamWar—CBSandNBCpresentthirty-minutespecialreportson theTetOffensive;inHanoi,childrenandoldpeopleareevacuatedtothe countrysideinpreparationfortheanticipatedU.S.bombingattacks 1February1968
RichardNixonformallyannounceshiscandidacyforthepresidency
152 Chronology,1967–68 2February1968
HeavyfightingcontinuesinSouthVietnam,althoughthenumberandintensityofattacksbegintoebb;PresidentJohnson,inaWhiteHousepress conference,saysthattheTetOffensiveisa“completefailure”;MACV reports12,704CommunisttroopskilledinactionsincetheTetOffensive began—U.S.battledeathsarelistedas318andthoseoftheSouthVietnameseforcesas661inthesameperiod 3February1968
HeavyfightingcontinuesinSaigon,Hue,Kontum,Pleiku,Dalat,PhanThiet, andothercities;MACVlistsenemylossesat15,595killedinactionwith415 U.S.and905ARVNkilledinthefightingsincetheoffensivestarted;the CentralCommitteeoftheNationalLiberationFrontcallsfortheVietCong andthepeopletostrike“evenharder,deeper,andonawiderfront”;inthe UnitedStates,SenatorEugeneMcCarthyaccusestheJohnsonadministrationofdeceivingitselfandtheAmericanpeopleabouttheprogressofthewar 4February1968
Administrationofficialsappearontelevisioninterviewprogramstodefend warpolicy 5February1968
NhanDan,theofficialnewspaperofLaoDongPartyinHanoi,declares, “Theonce-in-a-thousandyearopportunityhascome.Thebuglehas soundedvictory” 6February1968
MACVreportsthatfightinghasdiminishedthroughoutSouthVietnam,but heavyfightingcontinuesinCholonandHue;aU.S.spokesmaninSaigon reports21,330enemytroopskilledsinceTetbegan;theCommunistParty CurrentAffairsCommitteeinCanThoProvinceintheMekongDelta declaresthattheGeneralOffensiveisalong-termprojectthatmaylast threeorfourmonths,notjustafewdays;inWashington,MartinLuther KingJr.leadstwothousandmarchersthroughArlingtonNationalCemeterytoprotestthe“cruelandsenseless”war 7February1968
LangVeiSpecialForcescampnearKheSanhfallstoPAVNtroopsusingRussian-madetanks;WestmorelandfliestoDaNangandordersmilitaryredeploymentsandstudyoftroopneedsbeyondthe525,000-manceiling
Chronology,1967–68 153 8February1968
JointChiefsofStaffChairmanWheeleroffersWestmorelandadditionalmen from82ndAirborneDivisionandaU.S.Marinedivision;Westmoreland asksplansbemadeforredeploymentoftheunitstoVietnam;Senator RobertF.Kennedy,speakinginChicago,saysTetOffensivehasshattered officialillusionsaboutVietnam 9February1968
U.S.forcesfromthe199thLightInfantryBrigadelandbyhelicoptertoclear CommunisttroopsintheareaaroundtheSaigonracetrack;President ThieuannouncespartialmobilizationofSouthVietnam;Secretary ofStateDeanRusk,inabackgroundbriefing,demandsofjournalists, “Whosesideareyouon?” 10February1968
U.S.planesraidtheHaiphongareaforthefirsttimeinamonth;aCommunistPartycommitteeinBienHoaProvincenearSaigonsaysinasecret reportthat“thepeople’sspiritforuprisingisstillveryweak” 11February1968
TheSaigongovernmentannouncesthecall-upof65,000moremen 12February1968
PresidentJohnsonapprovesdispatchof10,500additionaltroopsfromthe82nd AirborneDivisionand27thMarineRegimentalLandingTeam;inHue, U.S.MarinesmovenorthofthePerfumeRivertotakecontrolofthefight fortheCitadel;aLouisHarrispollreportsthatU.S.publicsupportforthe warincreasesinthewakeoftheTetattacks 13February1968
AGallupPollreportsthat50percentofAmericansdisapproveofPresident Johnson’shandlingofthewar 14February1968
SenatorStuartSymingtonreportsthatthecostofVietnamWarforthefiscal yearis$32billion 15February1968
AU.S.AirForceF-4PhantomshotdownoverHanoibecomestheeighthundredthU.S.aircraftlostinthethree-yearairwaroverNorthVietnam
154 Chronology,1967–68 16February1968
PresidentJohnson,inasurprisepressconference,saysthatrumorsthat GeneralWestmorelandmayberelievedofcommandarefalseandmay haveoriginatedabroad;healsoannouncesthatadditionaltroopswillbe approvedforVietnamasneeded 17February1968
ArecordweeklytotalofU.S.casualtiesissetduringtheprecedingseven days,with543killedand2,547wounded;PresidentJohnsonfliestoFort Bragg,NorthCarolina,tovisitreinforcementsdepartingforVietnam, andthenfliestotheUSSConstellationatseainthePacifictovisitwith thecrew 18February1968
Communistgunnersshellforty-fivecitiesandbases,includingTanSonNhut airbaseandSaigon;groundattacksarelaunchedagainstfourcities 20February1968
TheSenateForeignRelationsCommitteebeginshearingsonthe1964Gulfof Tonkinincident 21February1968
COSVNordersapullbackandreturntoharassingtactics;freshMarinereinforcementsaresenttoHue;GeneralWheelerleavesforSaigontohold consultationswithGeneralWestmoreland 23February1968
TheDepartmentofDefenseannouncesaSelectiveServicecallfor48,000 men—thesecond-highestnumberoftheVietnamWar;atKheSanh, Marinesarebombardedby1,307incomingartilleryrounds 24February1968
SouthVietnamesetroopsstormtheformerImperialPalaceintheCitadelof Hue,tearingdowntheNationalLiberationFrontflagandreplacingitwith theRepublicofVietnamflag 25February1968
GeneralWheelerdepartsSaigonforWashingtonaftermappingoutarequest for206,000additionalU.S.troops;GeneralWestmorelandtellstheAssociatedPressthatadditionalU.S.forceswillprobablybeneeded
Chronology,1967–68 155 27February1968
CBSNewsanchormanWalterCronkite,whohasjustreturnedfromSaigon andHue,tellsAmericansduringhiseveningbroadcastthatheiscertain “thebloodyexperienceofVietnamistoendinastalemate” 28February1968
InaWhiteHousemeeting,GeneralWheeler,onbehalfofGeneralWestmoreland,asksPresidentJohnsonforanadditional206,000soldiersand mobilizationofreserveunitsintheUnitedStates;PresidentJohnsonorders ClarkCliffordtoformataskforcetostudythetrooprequest 29February1968
PAVNforceslaunchthreeattacksagainstthe37thARVNRangerBattalionat KheSanhbutareturnedbackeachtime 1March1968
ClarkCliffordissworninasthenewsecretaryofdefense 2March1968
ThelastenemytroopsaredrivenfromHuebythreeU.S.Marinebattalions andSouthVietnamesetroopsafteramonthoftheheaviestfightingofthe entireTetOffensive;theCliffordtaskforcebeginsitstroop-requeststudy 4March1968
TheCliffordtaskforcerecommendstheimmediatedispatchof22,000more U.S.troopstoVietnam,areservecall-upof250,000men,increaseddraft calls,andfurtherstudyofthedevelopingsituation 7March1968
ChairmanJ.W.FulbrightoftheSenateForeignRelationsCommitteeand othersenatorspubliclyaskJohnsonadministrationtoconsultCongress beforeanynewtroopbuildupinVietnam. 9March1968
AGalluppollreportsanewwaveofpessimismamongAmericansaboutthe warinVietnam 10March1968
TheNewYorkTimesbreaksthenewsofGeneralWestmoreland’srequestfor 206,000troops,sayingthatithasstirredcontroversywithinadministrationranks
156 Chronology,1967–68 12March1968
PresidentJohnsonnarrowlydefeatsantiwarDemocratEugeneMcCarthy bythreehundredvotesintheNewHampshireDemocraticprimary,but McCarthywins42percentofthevote 14March1968
SenatorRobertKennedyandTheodoreSorensonmeetSecretaryofDefense CliffordtodiscusspossibleaU.S.commissiontoreversethegovernment’s Vietnampolicy,butJohnsonrejectsplan 15March1968
FormerSecretaryofStateDeanAcheson,inaprivatereporttoPresident Johnson,saysthatU.S.victoryinVietnamisnotfeasiblewithinthelimits ofpublictolerance 16March1968
SenatorRobertF.Kennedyannounceshiscandidacyforthepresidency;polls indicatethatKennedyisnowmorepopularthanPresidentJohnson 16March1968
MorethanthreehundredVietnameseciviliansaremassacredinMyLaihamletbymembersofCharlieCompany,1stBattalion,20thInfantry,while participatinginanassaultagainstsuspectedVietCongencampmentsin QuangNgaiProvince;themassacrewillnotcometolightuntilearly1969; thenumberoftotalU.S.combatdeathssinceJanuary1961reaches20,096 20March1968
PressureonKheSanhlessens;BrutribesmenreportthatPAVNartilleryhas withdrawnintoLaos;the304thNorthVietnameseDivisionisrelievedofits tunnelingmissionnearKheSanhbaseandorderedtowithdrawtotheeast 22March1968
PresidentJohnsonannouncesthatGeneralWestmorelandwillbecome ArmyChiefofStaffinmid-1968andthatGeneralCreightonAbramswill becomecommanderofMilitaryAssistanceCommand,Vietnam;Khe SanhCombatBasereceives1,100roundsofrocketandmortarfire 23March1968
WheelerfliessecretlytomeetwithWestmorelandatClarkFieldinthe PhilippinesandtellshimthatPresidentJohnsonwillapproveonly13,500 additionalsoldiersoutoftheoriginal206,000requested;Wheeleralso
Chronology,1967–68 157
instructsWestmorelandtourgetheSouthVietnamesetoexpandtheir ownwareffort 25March1968
AHarrispollreportsthat60percentofapublicopinionsamplebelievesthat theTetOffensivewasastandoffordefeatfortheU.S.causeinVietnam 25–26March1968
PresidentJohnsonconvenesthe“WiseMen,”whoadviseagainstadditional troopincreasesandrecommendanegotiatedpeaceinVietnam 30March1968
U.S.MarinesandPAVNtroopsengageinathree-hourbattlenearKheSanh, thelastmajorgroundbattleoftheseventy-seven-daysiege;aGalluppoll reportsthat63percentofthosepolleddisapproveofPresidentJohnson’s handlingofthewar,anall-timelowinpublicapprovalofhisperformance 31March1968
PresidentJohnsonannouncesinanationallytelevisedspeechthathewill orderaunilateralhalttoallU.S.bombingnorthofthe20thparalleland seeknegotiationswithHanoi;healsoannounceshisdecisionnottoseek reelection 1April1968
TheU.S.1stCavalryDivision(Airmobile)beginsOperationPegasustoreopen Route9totheMarinebaseatKheSanh;PresidentThieudeclaresthatthe TetOffensivehas“completelyfailed” 4April1968
MartinLutherKingJr.isassassinatedinMemphis 23–30April1968
StudentprotestorsoccupyseveralbuildingsatColumbiaUniversityuntilforciblyremovedbypolice 26April1968
200,000demonstrateagainstthewarinNewYorkCity 3May1968
JohnsonannouncesthatformalpeacetalkswilltakeplaceinParis
158 Chronology,1967–68 12May1968
PeacenegotiationsbeginbetweentheUnitedStatesandNorthVietnamin Paris May1968
InwhatbecomesknownasMini-Tet,CommunistforcesattackSouthVietnamatvariousplacesbutareturnedbackbyU.S.andARVNforces 4June1968
RobertF.KennedywinstheDemocraticpresidentialprimaryinCalifornia andisassassinatedinLosAngelesthatevening 17June1968
AmericanforcesabandonKheSanh 1July1968
GeneralAbramsformallysucceedsGeneralWestmorelandasMACVcommander 3July1968
WestmorelandreplacesGeneralHaroldK.JohnsonasArmyChiefofStaff; MACVreleasesfiguresshowingthatmoreAmericanswerekilledduring thefirstsixmonthsof1968thaninallof1967 4July1968
U.S.infantrymenrepulseacombinedPAVN–VCattackontheirbaseatDau Tieng,fortymilesnorthwestofSaigon 12–13August1968
HeavyfightingeruptsagainintheMekongDeltabetweenVCandallied troops 18August1968
Intheheaviestfightinginthreemonths,PAVNandVCforcesconductnineteenseparateattacksonalliedpositionsthroughoutSouthVietnam 22–23August1968
VCforcesconductnumerousrocketandmortarattacksonSaigonand numerousothercities
Chronology,1967–68 159 26–29August1968
TheDemocraticNationalConventioninChicagonominatesVicePresident HubertHumphreyforpresident;riotsoccurbetweenChicagopoliceand antiwardemonstrators 11–16September1968
About1,500VCandPAVNtroopslaunchamajorattackonTayNinhinIII CorpsTacticalZone 31October1968
PresidentJohnsonannouncesacompletehalttobombingoverNorthVietnam,endingOperationRollingThunder 5November1968
RichardNixonnarrowlydefeatsHubertHumphreyinthe1968presidential election 31December1968
U.S.militarypersonnelinVietnamnumber536,000;todate,30,610U.S. smilitarypersonnelhavebeenkilledinaction
partiv TheTetOffensiveAtoZ
ICorps.DesignationfortheseniorSouthVietnameseArmy(ARVN)headquartersinnorthernSouthVietnam,locatedatDaNang.Thecorpsheadquarters controlled the ARVN 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions. The counterpart U.S. command to I Corps was the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), also locatedatDaNang. ICorpsTacticalZone(ICTZ).Termusedtodesignatethetacticalareaof responsibilityoftheSouthVietnameseArmy’s(ARVN)ICorps.Itencompassed thefivenorthernmostprovincesinSouthVietnam. II Corps. Designation for the senior ARVN headquarters in the Central Highlands,whichwaslocatedatPleiku.Thecorpsheadquarterscontrolledthe ARVN22ndand23rdDivisions.ThecounterpartU.S.headquarterswasIField ForceVietnam(IFFV)locatedatNhaTrang. II Corps Tactical Zone (II CTZ). Term used to designate the tactical area of responsibility for the South Vietnamese Army’s (ARVN) II Corps. It encompassedtwelveprovincestheCentralHighlandsandtheadjoiningcoastal lowlands.
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IIICorps.DesignationfortheseniorSouthVietnamese(ARVN)headquartersincentralSouthVietnam.IIICorpsheadquarterswaslocatedinBienHoa, northeast of Saigon, and controlled the ARVN 5th, 18th, and 25th Divisions. TheU.S.counterpartheadquarterstoIIICorpswasIIFieldForceVietnam(II FFV)locatedatLongBinh. IIICorpsTacticalZone(IIICTZ).Termusedtodesignatethetacticalarea ofresponsibilityfortheSouthVietnameseArmy’s(ARVN)IIICorps.ItencompassedtheelevenprovincesthatsurroundedSaigonandincludedanareathat ran from the northern Mekong Delta to southern Central Highlands, which contained 38 percent of the country’s population and about 90 percent of its industry.ItalsocontainedanumberofCommunistbaseareas,suchastheIron Triangle,HoBoWoods,andWarZonesCandD. IV Corps. Designation for the senior South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) headquartersintheMekongDelta,locatedatCanTho.ThecorpsheadquarterscontrolledtheARVN7th,9th,and21stDivisions.Asenioradvisertothe SouthVietnamesecorpscommanderrepresentedtheU.S.command. IV Corps Tactical Zone (IV CTZ). Term used to designate the tactical areaofresponsibilityfortheSouthVietnameseArmy(ARVN)IVCorpsinthe MekongDelta.TherewasnocorrespondingU.S.corps-levelheadquarters. Abrams,CreightonW.Jr.(1914–74).CommanderofU.S.MilitaryAssistance Command,Vietnam(MACV)(1968–72)andU.S.Armychiefofstaff(1972–74). In 1967, General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of MACV, gave Abrams the responsibility for improving and modernizing the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and, along with Robert W. Komer, for managing pacification programs in South Vietnam. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, Westmoreland sent Abrams to I Corps Tactical Zone to take direct control of thefightinginthenorthernmosttwoprovincesjustsouthoftheDMZ.InJuly 1968,hesucceededWestmorelandasMACVcommander.Hisassignmentwas tooverseetheVietnamizationofthewarand,beginningin1969,todrawdown thenumberofU.S.troopsinSouthVietnam.In1972,AbramsleftVietnamto assumethedutiesasU.S.Armychiefofstaff.Hisprimarytaskwastorevitalizethe U.S.ArmyintheaftermathoftheVietnamWar.Duringhistenure,thedraftwas endedandthearmybecameanall-volunteerforce.Heldinthehighestregardby hisofficersandmen,Abramsdiedoflungcancerin1974whilechiefofstaff. Adams,Eddie(1933–2004).AssociatedPressphotographerwho,onFebruary 1,1968,attheheightoftheTetOffensive,tookwhatisperhapsthemostinfamous
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photographoftheVietnamWar.Withhiscamera,hecapturedtheinstantthat GeneralNguyenNgocLoan,chiefoftheSouthVietnamesenationalpolice, shotacringingVietCongsuspectintheheadoutsidetheAuQuangPagodain Saigon.Thephotograph,whichwonAdamsthePulitzerPrize,demonstrated tomanyAmericansthebrutalityoftheVietnamWar. ArcLight,Operation.Codenamefortheuseofhigh-altitudeB-52bombing missionsinsupportofU.S.andArmyofRepublicofVietnam(ARVN)ground operationsinSouthVietnam,Cambodia,andLaos.DeployedtoAndersenAir Force Base in Guam and later to bases in Okinawa and U-Tapao, Thailand, thefirstArcLightstrikeoccurredonJune18,1965,markingthedebutofthe bigbombersinVietnam;thelastmissionwasflownonAugust19,1973.These strikes were particularly effective in breaking up enemy concentrations surroundingKheSanhduringtheseventy-seven-daysiegein1968. ArmyoftheRepublicofVietnam(ARVN).Theland-forcescomponentof theRepublicofVietnamArmedForces(RVNAF).Createdin1955,theARVN wasorganizedalongthelinesofU.S.Armyforces,emphasizingconventional methodsofwarfarethatincludedlarge-scaleinfantryformationssupportedby tanksandartillery.In1968,intermsofsheernumbers,theARVNappearedto beastrongmilitaryforce,butinrealityitsufferedseriousdeficienciesincommandandcontrol,tactics,andtheuseofresources.Theheavyfightingduring theTetOffensivesorelytestedtheARVN.ThefocusoftheVietnamizationprogramimplementedin1969wastoincreasethecombatcapabilityoftheARVN andotherserviceswithintheRVNAF.Someprogresswasmade,butultimately theSouthVietnameseforcesweredefeatedin1975afterU.S.militaryaidand assistancewaswithdrawn. Arnett, Peter (1934– ). New Zealander who was a war correspondent in VietnamfortheAssociatedPressfrom1962to1975.DuringtheTetOffensive, hereportedthatamajoratBenTreintheMekongDeltasaid,“Itbecamenecessarytodestroythetowntosaveit.”IthasbeenchargedthatArnettmisquoted themajor,butthestatementbecameoneofthemostrememberedofthewar. attrition strategy. The primary U.S. military strategy that guided the AmericanwareffortinVietnamfromstarttofinish.Theobjectiveofthisstrategywastokilltheenemy’ssoldiersanddestroytheirequipmentfasterthanthe People’sArmyofVietnam(PAVN)andVietCong(VC)couldreplacethem. Theassumptionwasthateventuallylosseswouldgrowtoanunacceptablelevel andHanoiwouldwithdrawsupportfortheinsurgencyinSouthVietnamand abandonitsquesttoreunifyVietnam.ThisstrategywasbuiltaroundAmerica’s
166 TheTetOffensiveAtoZ
materiel and technological strengths and focused on the use of massive firepower.Ultimately,thestrategyfailedbecausetheVCandPAVNcontrolledthe paceandintensityofbattle.TheycouldseeksanctuaryacrossSouthVietnam’s borders, which allied forces were prohibited from crossing. More important, theCommunistswerewillingtopayahighpriceforeventualvictory,andno matter how many casualties the allies inflicted on them, they continued to fighton. Australia.InApril1965,AustraliadeployeditsfirstcombattroopstoVietnam. By1968,therewereaboutseventhousandAustraliantroopsincountry,fightingaspartoftheFirstAustralianTaskForce.Australianforcesoccupiedabase campinPhuocTuyprovinceandconductedcombatoperationsthroughoutthe provinceandadjoiningareas.AsmallcontingentofsoldiersfromNewZealand foughtwiththeAustralians.TheANZACtroopswerepartoftheFreeWorld MilitaryForces,whichalsoincludedtroopsfromSouthKorea,Thailand,and thePhilippines.Inadditiontogroundforces,Australiaalsoprovidedaguided missiledestroyerandasquadronofB-57Canberrabombers.ThelastAustralian troopsdepartedVietnaminJanuary1973. B-52. Large, eight-engine, high-altitude bomber, originally designed to deliver nuclear weapons against targets in the Soviet Union. In Vietnam, B-52s were used in the conventional role, bombing in support of U.S. and South Vietnamese ground operations in South Vietnam, along the Ho Chi MinhTrailinCambodiaandLaos,andinthe1972“Christmasbombing”of NorthVietnam.FirstusedinSouthVietnamonJune18,1965,thebombers couldcarryanenormousloadof500-,750-,and1,000-poundhigh-explosive, general-purposebombsandoperatedataltitudesofwellover30,000feet.The B-52splayedamajorroleinthesupportofbesiegedU.S.MarinesatKheSanh in1968. BanMeThuot.CapitalofDarlacprovinceintheCentralHighlandsand headquartersfortheSouthVietnamese23rdDivision.BanMeThuotwasone oftheplacesattackedbeforedawnonJanuary30,1968,twenty-fourhoursahead ofscheduleintheTetOffensive.ItwastobecometheinitialtargetofthePAVN finaloffensiveinMarch1975. Ben Tre. A town in the eastern part of the Mekong Delta, southwest of Saigon. It was the capital of Kien Hoa province and became famous when AssociatedPressreporterPeterArnettreported that an unnamed U.S. adviser hadsaidofitduringtheTetOffensive,“Itbecamenecessarytodestroythetown tosaveit.”
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Bien Hoa. The capital of Bien Hoa province, twenty miles northeast of Saigon,BienHoawasthesiteofaU.S.-SouthVietnameseairbasethatwasthe largestinVietnamandoneofthebusiestairfieldsintheworld.Itwasalsothe siteoftheheadquartersfortheSouthVietnameseArmyIIICorps.Therewas significantfightinginBienHoaduringthe1968TetOffensive. bodycount.MeasureemployedbytheU.S.militarytoassessprogressinthe warofattritionagainsttheCommunistsinVietnambykeepingtrackofenemy casualties.Bodycountswereregularlyannouncedtothemediatoindicatehow theconflictwasprogressing.SomearguethatthefocusonbodycountdesensitizedU.S.troopsandofficersandcontributedtotensionsbetweenVietnamese civilians and the U.S. military. As the war continued, pressure from both military and civilian officials, who wanted to show the American public that thewarwasbeingwon,ledtoroutineinflationofbodycountsandawidening credibility gap between the military and the American public. Ironically, the reportedbodycountprovedmoreaccuratethanatfirstbelieved.Inaninterview in1969,GeneralVoNguyenGiapadmittedthatthePeople’sArmyofVietnam hadlostmorethan500,000soldierskilledonthebattlefield,whichwasroughly thenumberthattotalbodycountshadindicated. Bunker, Ellsworth (1894–1984). U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam(1967–73).BunkerbecameastrongproponentoftheAmericanwar effort and of General William C. Westmoreland’s methods of fighting it. He alsoadvocatedextendingmilitaryoperationsintoLaosandCambodiaandsupportedtheCambodianincursionbyU.S.andSouthVietnamesetroopsin1970. GrahamMartinreplacedhimasambassadorinMarch1973. Calley,William(1943–).CommanderofaplatoonfromCCompany,1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, Americal Division, that murdered several hundred South Vietnamese villagers on March 16, 1968, in what became known as the My Lai massacre. After an initial cover-up by the Army, thirteen officers andenlistedmenwerechargedwithwarcrimes.OnlyLieutenantCalleywas foundguilty,specificallyforthemurderoftwenty-twounarmedcivilians,and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court of Military Appeals upheld the conviction,buttheSecretaryoftheArmyeventuallyreducedCalley’ssentence totenyears.OnMarch19,1974,PresidentRichardNixonparoledhim. CedarFalls,Operation.Aseventeen-daysearch-and-destroyoperationconducted in January 1967 by some thirty thousand U.S. and South Vietnamese troops,whichwasaimedatdestroyingtheVietCong(VC)tunnelsinthesixtysquare-mileIronTriangle,thirtymilesfromSaigoninBinhDuongprovince.
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Duringtheoperation,theVC-controlledvillageofBenSucwasdestroyedand itssixthousandinhabitantsrelocated.Althoughmanytunnelsweredestroyed, VCtroopsreturnedtotheareasixmonthslater. Central Highlands. Located in II Corps Tactical Zone, the Central HighlandswerethesouthernendoftheTruongSonMountainsinwest-central South Vietnam. An area of approximately 5,400 square miles, it was sparsely populated, primarily by Montagnard tribesman. The principal towns in the regionareKontum,Pleiku,BanMeThuot,andDalat.Therewereseverallarge attacks in the Central Highlands during the Tet Offensive. North Vietnam’s final offensive in 1975 began at Ban Me Thuot. South Vietnamese forces crumbledrapidlyaftertheywithdrewfromtheCentralHighlands. Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). Formed in 1961 when the southern and central branches of the Lao Dong Party (Vietnam Workers) merged. The original purpose of COSVN was to direct the Viet Cong (VC) guerrillasintheSouth.NguyenChiThanh,anortherner,assumedcommand ofCOSVNin1964,andeventuallyitcontrolledbothVCandPeople’sArmyof Vietnam(PAVN)forcesinSouthVietnam.Theheadquarterswasthetargetof anumberofalliedoperationsbecauseU.S.strategists,whobelievedCOSVN waslocatedinLaosandlaterinCambodia,thoughtthatlocatinganddestroying theheadquarterswouldcrippletheCommunistwareffort.Unliketheelaborate fixed U.S. and South Vietnamese headquarters, COSVN was more what the U.S.militarywouldtermaforwardcommandpost,consistingofafewsenior commanders and key staff officers. The allies never succeeded in locating or destroyingit. Chairman,JointChiefsofStaff.Bylaw,theseniorofficeroftheU.S.armed services, who presides over the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Army General Earle G. WheelerwasthechairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffformostoftheVietnam War(1964–70). Cholon.AnethnicallyChinesearea,Cholonwasasectionofmetropolitan Saigononthesouthwestsideofthecity.Itwasthesceneofbitterfightingduringthe1968TetOffensive. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). Agencyestablishedin1967toexercisecontrolovertheAmericanpacification efforts, military and civilian, in South Vietnam. It was later renamed Civil OperationsandRuralDevelopmentSupport.TheCORDSprogramdeployed unifiedcivil-militaryadvisoryteamsinallofSouthVietnam’s250districtsand
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44provinces.Theprovincesenioradvisercontrolledthepacificationactivities ineachprovince;abouthalftheprovincesenioradvisersweremilitarypersonnel, and half civilians. With the heavy casualties sustained by the Viet Cong during the 1968 Tet Offensive, the CORDS program achieved some success from1969to1971inspreadingtheinfluenceandcontroloftheSaigongovernmentoverthecountryside. CivilianIrregularDefenseGroup(CIDG).ACIA/SpecialForcesprogram thatinvolvedtrainingindigenousmountaintribestoprovideintelligenceand interdict Communist infiltration into South Vietnam from Cambodia and Laos. The tribesmen received salaries, medical care, and development aid in exchange for fighting for the Saigon government. A CIDG camp at Lang VeiwasoverrunbyNorthVietnamesetroopsduringthefightingatKheSanh in February 1968. In 1970, CIDG units were converted to South Vietnamese Rangerunits. Clifford,ClarkM.(1906–98).AlongtimeadvisertoLyndonJohnson,Clark Cliffordbecamesecretaryofdefensein1968afterthedepartureofRobertS. McNamara. When the military requested 206,000 additional troops after the Tet Offensive in 1968, Clifford, who had initially supported the war effort, advisedthepresidenttorefusetherequest,haltthebombingofNorthVietnam, andde-escalateAmericanparticipationinthewar.AfterJohnsonannouncedin Marchthathewouldnotseekasecondterm,Cliffordspentthelastmonthsof thepresident’stermlayingthegroundworkforU.S.withdrawalandwhatwould becomeknownasVietnamizationduringtheNixonadministration. Combined Action Program (CAP). A program of the U.S. Marines in VietnamwherebysmallMarineunitswerelocatedinvillagestohelppromote the security and pacification of the surrounding area. The Marines assigned to a village would live in the village and make it their base of operations for extended periods. The objective was for the Marine unit to provide security while getting to know the villagers, helping in civic and health projects, and teachingthevillagerstoprotectthemselvesandtheirhomes.Whenthebattle forKheSanhbeganin1968,aMarinecombinedactioncompanylocatedin KheSanhvillagebecameoneoftheearlytargetsofthePAVNinthebattle. ConThien.AvillageinQuangTriprovince,justsouthofthedemilitarized zone(DMZ),andthesiteofaU.S.MarineoutpostthatwasattackedbyPeople’s ArmyofVietnam(PAVN)forcesinSeptember1967.Inthisbattle,whichlasted almostamonth,thePAVNbombardedtheMarinesnearlycontinuously,but theMarines,withtheaidofU.S.air,naval,andartillerysupport,successfully
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defendedthebase.ThisbattlewaspartofthePAVNstrategytodivertattention awayfromtheSouthVietnamesetownsandcitiesastheCommunistsprepared tolaunchtheTetOffensive. CorpsTacticalZone(CTZ).SouthVietnamwasdividedformilitarycommand purposes into four tactical zones numbered from north to south. An ARVNcorpscommanderwasresponsibleforSouthVietnameseoperationsin eachcorpstacticalzone. Cronkite, Walter L., Jr. (1916– ). A widely respected CBS Evening News anchor (1954–81), Cronkite was cautiously optimistic about the Vietnam War until the 1968 Tet Offensive, when, shocked by the discrepancy between the shockandintensityoftheTetOffensiveandtheU.S.military’sclaimsduring the preceding months that the Communist forces were weakening, he traveled to Vietnam to see for himself what was happening. Upon his return to theUnitedStates,hereportedthatthewarwasa“bloodystalemate”inwhich therewaslittlelikelihoodthattherewouldbeaclearwinner.Hedidnot,ashas sometimesbeenclaimed,describetheTetOffensiveasaCommunistmilitary victory,butheleftnodoubtthathethoughttheadministration’swarpolicies werenotworking.SensingthatCronkiteaccuratelyreflectedpublicopinion, PresidentLyndonJohnsonreportedlyremarked,“IfIhavelostWalterCronkite, IhavelostmiddleAmerica.” DakTo.AtownlocatedinthewesternCentralHighlandsneartheLaotian andCambodianborders.TheareaaroundDakTowasthesceneofaseriesof bitterbattlesfromOctobertoNovember1967,whenNorthVietnameseforces attackedelementsoftheU.S.4thInfantryDivisionand173rdAirborneBrigade. Thisactionwaspartofthepre-TetdeceptionplanmeanttodrawAmericanattentionandresourcesawayfromSouthVietnamesecitiesinthecoastallowlands. Dalat.ThecapitalofTuyenDucprovinceintheCentralHighlands,Dalat wasthehomeoftheSouthVietnameseMilitaryAcademy,thePoliticalWarfare College, and a university. Dalat was the site of a battle during the 1968 Tet Offensive. Da Nang. South Vietnam’s second-largest city, located in Quang Nam ProvinceinnorthernICorpsTacticalZone,DaNangincludedamajorport and jet-capable airfield and was the headquarters for the South Vietnamese Army’sICorpsandits3rdDivision.Thecitywasalsothesiteofseveralmajor U.S. installations, including, in 1968, the headquarters of the III Marine AmphibiousForce.
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dau tranh. Literally translated as “the struggle,” Dau tranh was the overarchingVietnameseCommunistmilitaryandpoliticalstrategy.Adoptedinthe 1930s, it combined Marxist, Leninist, Maoist, and Vietnamese ideologies and doctrines.Thisstrategyincludednotonlypoliticalbutalsomilitarymeasures workingtogethertowardthefinalgoal,whichwasreunificationofNorthand SouthVietnam. DemilitarizedZone(DMZ).A6.25-mile(10km)-widebufferzonecreated by the 1954 Geneva Conference that became the de facto border between NorthVietnamandSouthVietnam.TheDMZranfivekilometersoneither sideoftheBenHaiRiver,generallyalongthe17thparallel.Althoughbothsides agreed to withhold military forces from the zone, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN)andVietCongunitsoftentookrefugeinsideitfromU.S.planesand artillery.Inresponse,theUnitedStatesconstructedaseriesoffiresupportbases alongRoute9justsouthoftheDMZin1966–67.ThePAVNattackedacross theDMZduringthe1972EasterOffensive. DienBienPhu.SiteofadecisivebattlebetweentheVietMinhandFrench forcesduringtheFirstIndochinaWar.LocatedneartheLaotianborder,Dien Bien Phu was a French outpost manned by fifteen thousand troops. The French commanders hoped to draw the Viet Minh into a set-piece battle in whichitwassupposedthatsuperiorFrenchfirepowerwoulddestroythem.The Frenchgrosslyunderestimatedtheirenemy.VietMinhGeneralNguyenGiap entrenchedartilleryinthesurroundinghillsandmassedfivedivisionstotaling aboutsixtythousandtroopsaroundtheFrenchpositions.TheVietMinhbegan shellingtheFrenchandultimatelyoverrantheFrenchgarrisononMay7,1954, afteratwo-monthsiege.TheVietMinhvictoryendedtheeight-yearIndochina WarandbroughtaboutFrance’swithdrawalfromIndochinainJuly1954.Both theJohnsonadministrationofficialsandtheAmericannewsmediadrewstrong parallelsbetweenDienBienPhuandthesiegeofKheSanhin1968. dust off. The evacuation of wounded soldiers by helicopter; also called “Medevac.”Helicopterswouldpickupthewoundedtroopsonthebattlefield and fly them to the nearest field hospital. Getting the injured to hospitals quicklymeantthatmanymensurvivedwoundsthatwouldhavebeenfatalin previouswars. FireSupportBase(FSB).Aself-containedbasethatwasestablishedtoprovideartilleryfiresupporttopatrollingunitsoperatingwithintherangeofthe gunsonthebase.Hundredsoffiresupportbaseswereestablishedthroughout SouthVietnamduringthewar.
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Free World Military Forces (FWMF). The designation of allied units deployedtoVietnamtosupporttheSouthVietnamese.Theseforcesincluded troopsfromSouthKorea,Thailand,Australia,NewZealand,andthePhilippines, whotookpartincombatoperationsinSouthVietnam. friendlyfire.Termusedtodescribecombatdeathsorwoundscausedbythe guns,bombs,orartilleryofone’sownsideinawar. Grunt.PopularnicknameforU.S.ArmyandMarineCorpsgroundcombat forcesinSouthVietnam. Hanoi.TheadministrativecapitaloftheDemocraticRepublicofVietnam (NorthVietnam).LocatedintheRedRiverDelta,Hanoiexperiencedperiodic bombing during the war with the United States. President Lyndon Johnson announced a halt to the bombing in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, but RichardNixonresumedthebombingafterheassumedofficeaspresident. Harriman,W.Averell(1891–1986).Diplomatwhoservedasoneofthe“Wise Men”in1968andadvisedPresidentLyndonB.Johnsontode-escalatethewar in Vietnam. The president subsequently named Harriman to head the U.S. delegation at the Paris peace talks when they began in May 1968. He urged compromisewiththeNorthVietnamese,butJohnsonrejectedhisproposaland replacedhiminJanuary1969withHenryCabotLodge. HoChiMinh(1890–1969).FounderoftheVietnameseCommunistParty (1930)andthefirstpresidentoftheDemocraticRepublicofVietnam(1945–69). BornNguyenTatThanh,hewasthefatheroftheVietnameserevolutionand the most influential figure in modern Vietnam. After the 1954 defeat of the French, he played a key role in the formulation of policy in the DRV. He remained a major voice on diplomacy and strategy in the struggle for South Vietnamuntilthemid-1960s,whenhisroleindecisionmakingbecamelargely ceremonialduetofailinghealth.HediedinSeptember1969. HoChiMinhTrail.ThePeople’sArmyofVietnam(PAVN)infiltrationand supplyrouteintoSouthVietnambylandthoughLaosandCambodia.Anetworkoftrailsratherthanasinglepath,theHoChiMinhTrailranthroughthe TruongSonmountainrangealongtheborderbetweenVietnamandLaos.By 1967,anestimatedtwentythousandPAVNtroopsmovedintoSouthVietnam viathetraileachmonth.Thealliestriedmanytimestostopthemovementof soldiersandsuppliesdownthetrail,butwereunabletodoso.ThePAVNtroops whoplayedakeyroleinthefightingduringthe1968TetOffensivecamedown thetrailfromthenorth.
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Hue.SouthVietnam’sthirdlargestcity,forty-fivemilessouthofthedemilitarizedzone(DMZ)onthePerfumeRiverinThuaThienprovince.Anoldimperial capital, considered Vietnam’s most beautiful city, Hue was the scene of widespreadprotestsagainstPresidentDieminMay1963andagainstPresident Ky in March 1966. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, the People’s Army of VietnamandtheVietCongcapturedthecityandhelditfortwenty-fivedays.In thefightbyU.S.MarinesandSouthVietnamesetroopstoretakeHue,muchof thecitywasdestroyed.Afterthebattle,bodieswerefoundinseveralmassgraves; itwasreportedthattheCommunistshadmassacredthemduringtheoccupationofthecity.Bylate1969,nearlythreethousandbodieshadbeenexhumed, althoughthereisaclaimthatsomeofthesewerekilledbySouthVietnamese teamsseekingtoeliminatesuspectedCommunistsandtheirsympathizers. Humphrey,HubertH.(1911–78).U.S.senator(1948–65)andvicepresident (1965–69).HewasastrongadvocateoftheVietnamWarandPresidentLyndon B.Johnson’spolicies.WhenJohnsonannouncedinMarch1968thathewould notrunforreelection,HumphreywontheDemocraticnomination.Thenominating convention in Chicago proved a disaster for him when conflict broke outbothinsideandoutsidetheconventionhall.Humphreyrepudiatedsome ofJohnson’swarpoliciesduringtheelectioncampaign,butRichardNixonnarrowlydefeatedhimallthesame.HumphreywaselectedtotheSenateagainin 1970andserveduntilhisdeathin1978. Iron Triangle. The nickname for a Communist base area lying mostly in BinhDuongprovince,lessthantwentymilesnorthwestofSaigon.Itsborders wereapproximatelydefinedonthesouthwestbytheSaigonRiver,ontheeast bytheThiTinhRiver,andonthenorthbyalinerunningfromBenSuceastto BenCat.Heavilyforestedandsparselypopulated,the125-square-mileareawas lacedwithtunnelsandfortifications.OperationCedarFallswaslaunchedby U.S.andSouthVietnameseforcesinJanuary1968todestroyVietCongforces andfacilitiesinandaroundtheIronTriangle,buttheoperationwasonlypartiallysuccessful,andCommunisttroopseventuallyreoccupiedthearea. Johnson,LyndonBaines(1908–73).PresidentoftheUnitedStates(1963– 69). Formerly a U.S. Representative (1937–48) and U.S. Senator (1949–61), Johnson became vice president and succeeded President John F. Kennedy when Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963. Believing he was following Kennedy’s intentions, the new president pledged notto“lose”SouthVietnam.InAugust1964,armedwiththeGulfofTonkin Resolution,Johnsonbegananescalationofthewarthatresultedinthearrival of more than 400,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam by the end of 1967. He cameunderincreasingcriticismathomeforhishandlingofthewar.Stunned
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by the scope and violence of the Tet Offensive, he announced on March 31, 1968, that he would reduce the bombing of North Vietnam, that the United Stateswasreadyforpeacetalks,andthathewouldnotrunagainforpresident. AfterdefeatingVicePresidentHubertH.Humphrey in the 1968 presidential election,RepublicanRichardM.NixonsucceededJohnson,whodiedin1973 athishomeinTexas. JointChiefsofStaff(JCS).ThehighestmilitarybodyintheUnitedStates. ItconsistsoftheArmychiefofstaff,theAirForcechiefofstaff,thecommandant of the Marine Corps, and the chief of naval operations, along with the chairman.DuringtheVietnamWar,theJCSadvisedthepresidentonthewar, strongly endorsing the domino theory (which held that if one nation fell to Communists,adjacentnationswouldsoonfall)andurgingJohnsontoescalate the war. Additionally, the chiefs were responsible for strategic planning and logisticalandadministrativemattersfortheirrespectiveservices.Theyhadno directoperationalcontrolovertroops,butreporteddirectlytothesecretaryof defenseandissuedordersinhisname. Joint General Staff (JGS). South Vietnam’s counterpart to the U.S. Joint ChiefsofStaff,whichincludedthecomponentcommandersoftheRepublic ofVietnamArmedForces:theArmyoftheRepublicofVietnam(ARVN),the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF), and the Vietnamese Navy (VNN), whichincludedtheVietnameseMarineCorps(VNMC).UnliketheJCS,the JGShaddirectoperationalcontroloverSouthVietnam’smilitaryforces. Junction City, Operation. A large joint U.S.-South Vietnamese operation in the Iron Triangle area of Tay Ninh province February to May 1967. The purposeoftheoperation,whichinvolvedtwenty-two battalions, about 25,000 allied troops, was to find and destroy the Viet Cong (VC) Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). Although the operation achieved tactical success bydestroyingVCforcesandcapturinglargeamountsofwarmateriel,itfailed toachieveanylong-termstrategicadvantage.Theoperation,however,didconvincetheCommuniststhattheiroperatingandsupplybaseswerevulnerableto alliedattackandtheysubsequentlyrelocatedmanyofthesefacilitiesacrossthe borderintoCambodia. Kennedy, Robert F. (1925–68). U.S. attorney general (1961–64) and U.S. senator(1964–68).AftertheTetOffensiveof1968,Kennedyenteredtheracefor thedemocraticnominationforpresidentandmadethewarthecentralissueof hiscampaign,advocatinganegotiatedsolution.HewasassassinatedonJune5, 1968,inLosAngelesafterwinningtheCaliforniaprimary.
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KheSanh.AMarineCorpsbaseinnorthwesternSouthVietnam,aboutsix milesfromtheLaotianborderandaboutfourteenmilessouthofthedemilitarizedzone(DMZ).TheareawasfirstoccupiedbyU.S.SpecialForcestroops in1962.Inthesummerof1966,GeneralWestmorelandorderedtheMarinesto setupabasetocounterinfiltrationbythePeople’sArmyofVietnam(PAVN) into South Vietnam from Laos. The garrison was reinforced to regimental strengthinthespringof1967andfoughtaseriesofbattlesforcontrolofthe strategic hills surrounding the base. By the end of 1967, U.S. intelligence indicatedthatelementsofthreePAVNdivisionswereintheKheSanharea. In January 1968, the garrison was further reinforced, raising the number of defenderstomorethansixthousandMarinesandARVNRangers.ThePAVN launchedanattackonJanuary21,layingsiegetotheMarinebaseforthenext seventy-sevendays.ThebattlereceivedmuchattentionbecauseoftheparallelsbetweenthesituationandthatatDienBienPhuin1954.OnApril15,in OperationPegasus,areliefforceunderthe1stCavalryDivisionbrokethrough andliftedthesiege.OnJuly5,theMarinesabandonedthebase.KheSanhwas reoccupiedinJanuary1971andservedasthebasefortheSouthVietnamese incursionintoLaos. Kontum.ThecapitalofKontumProvince,locatedinthenorthernportion of the Central Highlands in II Corps Tactical Zone, Kontum was one of the townsattackedprematurelybytheCommunistforcesonJanuary30,1968,to launchtheTetOffensive. Korea,Republicof.SouthKoreafirstsentsoldierstoVietnamin1965.By theendofthewar,theRepublicofKoreahadsentlargenumbersofcombat troops,alevelsecondonlytothatoftheUnitedStates.Koreantroopdeployment reached a high of fifty thousand in 1968. These troops were part of the Free World Military Forces, which also included forces from Thailand, Australia,NewZealand,andthePhilippines.ThelastKoreantroopsdeparted Vietnamin1973. LaHue,FosterC.(1917–66).MarinegeneralwhocommandedTaskForce X-Ray,responsibleforcontrolofU.S.MarinesinthebattleforHueduringthe TetOffensivein1968. Lang Vei. Site of a U.S. Special Forces camp near the border of South VietnamandLaos,aboutninemilessouthwestofKheSanhbase.OnFebruary 7,1968,aNorthVietnamesedivisionequippedwithSoviet-madetanksoverran thecamp,whichwasdefendedbysomefourhundredMontagnardtribesmen andtwenty-fourU.S.advisers.AlmostthreehundredoftheLangVeigarrison
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were killed, wounded, or missing, including ten U.S. Special Forces soldiers killedandthirteenwounded. Lao Dong Party. The Vietnamese Workers’ Party created in February 1951,whichbecametheleadingpoliticalpartyintheDemocraticRepublicof Vietnam(NorthVietnam)andtheguidingforceinthestruggleforreunification ofNorthandSouthVietnam.AseparateCommunistPartyforSouthVietnam was established in 1962, but this was a propaganda ploy; the Lao Dong Party remainedinrealitytheCommunistpartyforallVietnam,NorthandSouth. Le Duan (1908–86). Founding member of the Indochinese Communist PartyandgeneralsecretaryoftheLaoDongParty(1957–86).In1968,LeDuan wasinstrumentalinHanoi’sdecisiontolaunchthegeneraloffensive.Afterthe deathofHoChiMinhin1969,LeDuanemergedasoneoftheleadingmembersofthegovernmentofNorthVietnam. Le Duc Tho (1911–90). Influential member of the Lao Dong Party who becameprincipalnegotiatorfortheDemocraticRepublicofVietnamatParis when the peace talks opened on May 13, 1968. Ultimately, he would meet secretlywithHenryKissingerinclandestinenegotiationsthatwouldresultin thesigningoftheParisPeaceAccordsin1973. LocNinh.SouthVietnamesedistricttowninBinhLongprovince,seventy milesnorthofSaigonalongtheCambodianborder.Inoneoftheborderbattles precedingtheTetOffensive,VietCongforcesattackedtheU.S.outpostatLoc NinhonOctober29,1967,andhelditforasortperiodoftime.Duringintense fighting,U.S.forcesrecapturedthetown,inflictingheavycasualtiesontheViet Conganddrivingthemback. LongBinh.LargeU.S.militarylogisticalandheadquarterscomplexlocated just outside the city of Bien Hoa, about twenty miles north of Saigon. The base,housingmorethanfortythousandU.S.personnelatonepoint,contained severalseniorU.S.headquarters,hospitals,logisticalunits,severallargeammunitiondumps,andtheinfamousLongBinhJail,themilitary’slargestconfinementfacilityinSouthVietnam.LongBinhwasthetargetofamajorVietCong attackduringthe1968TetOffensive. McCarthy,EugeneJ.(1916–2005).U.S.SenatorfromMinnesota(1959–71), McCarthyranfortheDemocraticnominationforpresidentin1968onapeace platform, winning 42 percent of the vote in the New Hampshire primary, thus clearly demonstrating the political vulnerability of President Johnson, whosubsequentlyannouncedthathewouldnotseekanotherterm.However,
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McCarthy lost the nomination to Hubert H. Humphrey at the tumultuous Democratic National Convention. Humphrey was subsequently defeated the followingNovemberbyRichardM.Nixon. McNamara, Robert S. (1916– ). U.S. secretary of defense (1961–68). McNamara headed the Defense Department under presidents Kennedy and Johnson.Hepresidedovertheescalationofthewaruntil1967whenheproposed limiting the bombing of the North, capping U.S. troop deployments, loweringpoliticalobjectives,andshiftingwar-fightingresponsibilitybacktothe SouthVietnamese.PresidentJohnsonwasnotpleasedwiththeserecommendationsandbegantoloseconfidenceinhissecretaryofdefense.Increasingly at odds with the president, McNamara tendered his resignation and left the Pentagonin1968tobecomeheadoftheWorldBank.ClarkCliffordreplaced McNamaraassecretaryofdefense. McNamaraLine.AproposedinterdictionzonealongtheDMZcoveredby air-laidmineandbombingattackspinpointedbyair-laidacousticsensors.The objective of the line was to interdict the flow of personnel and supplies into SouthVietnamfromthenorth.ConstructionofthelinebeganinApril1967, buttheeffortwasabandonedin1968whentheconceptprovedunpracticalin termsofbothresourcesrequiredandpotentialeffectiveness. MekongDelta.Thelowland,marshygeographicalareaofsouthernSouth VietnamformedbytheMekongRiveranditstributaries.Afertileregionlaced with canals and irrigation ditches, the Delta was the scene of much fighting duringthe1968TetOffensive.TheCommunistshadexpectedthepeopleofthe DeltatoriseupagainsttheSaigongovernmentwhentheoffensivebegan,but becausetheguerrilla-initiatedfightingcausedfurtherdisruptionandsuffering forthepeople,theydidnotrallytotheCommunists,andtheirsupportforthe SouthVietnamesegovernmentincreased. MilitaryAssistanceCommand,Vietnam(MACV).TheseniorU.S.military commandforSouthVietnam,establishedonFebruary8,1962,withGeneralPaul Harkinsasitsfirstcommander.HarkinswassucceededbyGeneralWilliamC. Westmoreland,whocommandedMACVfromJune1964toJuly1968.TheheadquarterswashousedinseveralbuildingsinthecityofSaigonuntilthesummer of1967,whenitwasmovedtoalargefacilityatTanSonNhutAirBase,onthe northwestedgeofthecity,whereitwasattackedduringthe1968TetOffensive. MobileRiverineForce(MRF).AU.S.Army-Navytaskforceinvolvingthe 2ndBrigadeofthe9thInfantryDivisionandtheNavy’sTaskForce117,which operatedintheMekongDelta.TheNavyprovidedawidevarietyofspecialized
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vesselssuchasgunboats,armoredtroopcarriers,andbarracksships.Combining these vessels with the brigade of Army troops and its associated artillery and othersupportunitsresultedintheformationofafloatingtaskforcethathadthe capabilitytomoveafloatforupto150milesintwenty-fourhoursandlaunch combat operations within thirty minutes of anchoring. The MRF played a significantroleinturningbacktheCommunistattacksintheDeltaduringthe TetOffensiveandwaslaterawardedaPresidentialUnitCitationforitsperformanceduringthatfighting. Montagnard. Name meaning “mountain people” given by the French to thirty-threetribes,estimatedat800,000to1,000,000people,livingprimarilyin theCentralHighlands.Duringthe1960s,theMontagnardsmadeupmuchof theCivilianIrregularDefenseGroups(CIDG),organizedbytheCIAandthe U.S.SpecialForcestointerdictCommunistinfiltrationintoSouthVietnam.On February7,1968,NorthVietnamesetroopsoverranfourhundredMontagnard tribesmenandtheirSpecialForcesadvisersatLangVei,nearKheSanh. My Lai Incident. A massacre of South Vietnamese civilians by a rifle company from the Americal Division on March 16, 1968. A platoon led by LieutenantWilliamL.CalleyJr.roundedupciviliansinthehamletofMyLai in Son My village, Quang Ngai province, in I Corps. The American soldiers then gunned down approximately three hundred and fifty women, children, andoldmen,whomtheyhadherdedintoaditch.Throughouttheday,Calley’s platoonandothermembersofCCompany,1stBattalion,20thInfantry,under the command of Captain Ernest L. Medina, committed murder, rape, and other atrocities. The chain of command at the time did not investigate these atrocities, but the Army ordered an inquiry after the crimes were brought to light by former infantryman Ron Ridenhour on March 29, 1969. A formal board of inquiry was convened, headed by Lieutenant General William R. Peers. Eventually, court-martial charges were prepared against twelve officers forderelictionofduty.Thirteenofficersandenlistedmenwerechargedwith warcrimes.OnlyLieutenantCalleywasfoundguilty,specificallyforthemurder of twenty-two unarmed civilians, and sentenced to life imprisonment. A crywentupthatCalleyhadbeenrailroadedandthathewasascapegoat.The CourtofMilitaryAppealsupheldtheconviction,buttheSecretaryoftheArmy eventuallyreducedCalley’ssentencetotenyears.OnMarch19,1974,President RichardNixonparoledhim. National Liberation Front (NLF). The political organization of the Communist-dominated insurgent movement in South Vietnam, created on December31,1960.Itwasoriginallyformedasabroadnationalfrontorgani-
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zationtooverthrowthegovernmentofNgoDinhDiem.TheNLForiginally claimedthatitwasapopularfrontaimedatliberatingSouthVietnamandnot dominatedbytheCommunists.ThemilitaryarmoftheNLFwasthePeople’s Liberation Armed Forces, popularly known as the Viet Cong to its enemies. TheNationalLiberationFrontwassupersededbytheProvisionalRevolutionary Governmentin1969.Afterthewar,theNorthVietnamesefreelyadmittedthat theNLFwastheirowncreation,totallycontrolledanddirectedfromHanoi. New Zealand. In 1965, New Zealand, which the year before had sent a small contingent of medical personnel and engineers to Vietnam, replaced the original contingent with combat troops, who worked with the Australian TaskForceinPhuocTuyprovince.ThesetroopswerepartoftheFreeWorld MilitaryForces,whichalsoincludedtroopsfromSouthKorea,Thailand,and thePhilippines.NewZealandbegantowithdrawitstroopsin1970,andmostof itscombattroopshaddepartedVietnamby1971. NgoQuangTruong(1929–).SouthVietnamesegeneralwhocommanded theSouthVietnameseArmy’s(ARVN)1stDivisioninHueduringthe1968Tet Offensive.Widelyregardedasoneofthemostcompetentcommandersinthe ARVN,TruongledhistroopsinthebitterfightingtoretaketheCitadel.InMay 1972,hewassenttoreplaceGeneralHoangXuanLamascommanderofARVN ICorps.Underhisleadership,theSouthVietnameseretookQuangTri,which NorthVietnameseforceshadcapturedduringtheEastertideOffensive. NguyenCaoKy(1930–).Primeminister(1965–67)andvicepresident(1967– 71)oftheRepublicofVietnam.RelationsbetweenKyandPresidentNguyen VanThieudeterioratedafterthe1968TetOffensive,andheretiredfrompolitics in1971,decliningtorunasanoppositioncandidateagainstThieu. NguyenChiThanh(1914–67).People’sArmyofVietnam(PAVN)general; commanderofoperationsinSouthVietnam(1965–67).In1967,headvocateda quickvictoryusingconventionaltacticsandplayedamajorroleinthedecision tolaunchtheTetOffensivein1968.HediedinJuly1967asthecampaignwas beingplanned,buttheoffensivewaslaunchedanywayunderthedirectionof GeneralVoNguyenGiap. NguyenNgocLoan(1932–98).ArmyoftheRepublicofVietnam(ARVN) general and chief of South Vietnam’s national police. During the 1968 Tet Offensive,hesummarilyexecutedaVietCong(VC)suspectonthestreetsof Saigon.EddieAdamsoftheAssociatedPressphotographedtheact;hisphoto-
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graphwaswidelycirculatedintheUnitedStatesandbecameasymbolofthe violenceandbrutalityofthewar. Nguyen Van Thieu (1923–2001). President of the Republic of Vietnam (1967–75). After the Tet Offensive of 1968, he took steps to increase the size andcapabilityofSouthVietnam’sarmedforces.WiththeelectionofRichard Nixonaspresident,ThieubecameincreasinglyconcernedasU.S.forceswere graduallywithdrawnfromVietnam.Hisforces,withtheaidofU.S.airpower, defeated the 1972 North Vietnamese Easter Offensive, but he was coerced by Nixon to accede to the Paris Peace Accords. The fighting continued after the cease-fire and with Nixon’s resignation, the U.S. Congress drastically cut militaryaidtoSouthVietnam.Whenthecommunistslaunchedanewgeneral offensivein1975,Thieu’sforcescollapsedinfifty-fivedays. Niagara,Operation.Codenameforthe18January–31March1968bombing ofPeople’sArmyofVietnam(PAVN)forcesbesiegingtheU.S.Marinebaseat KheSanh.Afterthefirstphase,whichincludedreconnaissanceflightstopinpointenemyforces,some24,000tacticalfighter-bombersortiesandsome2,700 B-52strategicbombersortieswereflown,averagingmorethanthreehundred strikesperday.ThePAVNdivisionsweredecimatedbymorethan110,000tons of bombs dropped from Navy, Marine, and Air Force aircraft. This airpower playedamajorroleinthesuccessfuldefenseofKheSanh. Nixon, Richard M. (1913–94). President of the United States (1969–74). NixondefeatedHubertH.Humphreyinthe1968presidentialelection,partly by promising to achieve “peace with honor” in Vietnam. After his inauguration,NixonorderedthegradualreductionofU.S.groundtroopsandpressed forwardwithVietnamization,apolicyinitiatedbytheJohnsonadministration tobeginturningthewarovertotheSouthVietnamese.Atthesametime,he steppeduptheairwarandorderedU.S.troopsintoCambodiain1970.When theNorthVietnameselaunchedafull-scaleoffensiveonGoodFridayin1972, he responded with massive airpower, including intensive bombing of North Vietnam.ByOctober1972,theoffensivehadbeenblunted,andsecretnegotiations in Paris had produced a settlement to end the war. President Thieu of SouthVietnambalkedattheterms,andtheNorthVietnamesewalkedoutof thenegotiations.NixonrespondedbybombingNorthVietnamwithB-52sand otheraircraftfortwelvedays.TheNorthVietnamesereturnedtothenegotiations;theSouthVietnamese,atNixon’surging,droppedtheirobjections;and the Paris Peace Accords were signed on January 27, 1973. While all this took place,WhiteHouseofficialscreatedaspecialunittoplugleaksofgovernment documents. This unit played an important role in the subsequent Watergate
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scandal,whichledtoNixon’sresignationinAugust1974.WithNixon,whohad promisedcontinuedsupporttotheSouthVietnamese,outofoffice,Congress slashedmilitaryaidtoSaigon.Thefightingcontinuedfortwomoreyearsuntil the South Vietnamese, abandoned by its American allies, succumbed to the NorthVietnameseonApril30,1975. NorthVietnameseArmy(NVA).SeePeople’sArmyofVietnam. Ontos.Alightlyarmoredtrackedvehiclearmedwithsix106mmrecoilless rifles, originally designed as a tank killer. The Marines used the Ontos very effectively in Hue in 1968 to support their infantry troops in house-to-house fighting. pacification. Unofficial term given to various programs of the South Vietnamese and U.S. governments designed to spread the influence of the Saigongovernment,destroyenemyinfluenceinthevillages,andestablishor reestablishlocalgovernmentresponsivetotheneedsofthepeople.Thepacificationeffortwasdamagedbytheheavyfightingduringthe1968TetOffensive. TheferocityoftheoffensiveconvincedtheSouthVietnamesegovernmentthat pacificationneededtobemadeatoppriority.Theincreasedresources,coupled withtheweaknessoftheVietCongmilitaryforcesfollowingtheheavyfighting of1968,ledtosomesuccessbetween1969and1971,duringwhichthegovernmentspreaditsinfluenceandcontroloverthecountryside. Pegasus, Operation. Code name for the operation of April 1–15, 1968, in whichacombinedU.S.Army-MarineandSouthVietnamesetaskforce,under the1stCavalryDivision,brokethroughPAVNlinesandliftedthesiegeofKhe Sanh. PentagonPapers.A7,000-pagesetofdocumentschroniclingU.S.actionsin Vietnamfrom1945to1968writtenbetween1967and1969attheinstructionof SecretaryofDefenseRobertMcNamara.Thedocumentsweresecretlycopied atthePentagonbyDanielEllsberg,aformerMarineofficerandresearcherat the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies whohadbeenworkingontheproject.InFebruary1971,heturnedthemoverto theNewYorkTimes,whichbegantopublishtheminJune1971.Thelastsection ofthepapersdealswiththeTetOffensive. People’sArmyofVietnam(PAVN).Morepopularlyknownduringthewar astheNorthVietnameseArmy(NVA),thePAVNwasmadeupofamainforce ofregulartroops,aregionalforceoffull-timetroopsresponsibleforterritorial
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security and support of the main force, and a self-defense force of part-time militiainthevillages.In1964,PAVNregular-forceunitsbegantomovedown the Ho Chi Minh Trail to enter the fighting in South Vietnam. The PAVN playedamajorroleinthe1968TetOffensivebydrawingU.S.forcesoutofthe lowlandsandpopulatedareaswithdiversionaryattacksatKheSanhandother points along the borders with Laos and Cambodia. The PAVN also played thekeyroleinthecaptureofHueduringtheoffensive.AftertheheavyViet ConglossesintheTetOffensive,thewarintheSouthwasfoughtprimarily byPAVNregulars. People’sLiberationArmedForces(PLAF).SeeVietCong. Philippines,Republicofthe.ThePhilippinessenttwothousandengineer troops to South Vietnam in 1966. These troops were part of the Free World Military Forces, which also included soldiers from South Korea, Thailand, Australia,andNewZealand. Pleiku.TheprovincialcapitalofPleikuProvinceintheCentralHighlands, Pleiku was the site of the South Vietnamese Army’s II Corps headquarters. DuringtheTetOffensive,theSouthVietnameseandAmericanforcesinPleiku were forewarned when troops from the U.S. 4th Infantry Division captured “UrgentCombatOrderNumberOne,”whichsetforththeenemy’splansfor theattackontheprovincecapital.Alertedbythisdocument,thealliedforces inPleikuwerepreparedwhentheattackcameonJanuary30,1968. RepublicofVietnamArmedForces(RVNAF).ThearmedforcesofSouth Vietnam, comprising the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF), and the Vietnamese Navy (VNN), whichincludedtheVietnameseMarineCorps(VNMC). Resolution13.Thisresolution,passedbytheCentralCommitteeoftheLao DongParty’sThirteenthPlenuminHanoiinApril1967,calledfora“spontaneousuprising[intheSouth]inordertowinadecisivevictoryintheshortest possibletime.”Thisresolutioneffectivelychangedtheprotractedwarapproach andledeventuallytothedecisiontolaunchtheTetOffensivein1968. Resolution14.ThisresolutionpassedbytheNorthVietnameseLaoDong Party’sCentralCommitteeonOctober25,1967,orderinga“generaloffensive– general uprising” (Tong Cong Kich–Tong Khoi Nghia). This order launched preparationsforthe1968TetOffensive.
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Rolling Thunder. Code name for President Lyndon Johnson’s bombing campaign against North Vietnam from March 2, 1965, to October 31, 1968 (interrupted by occasional bombing halts). The campaign was designed to induceNorthVietnamtocometothenegotiatingtablewhilealsoattempting to interdict Communist supply lines to their troops in South Vietnam. The campaignwaslargelyineffectiveandresultedinthelossof922aircrafttoenemy action.Johnsonhalteditin1969intheaftermathoftheTetOffensive. Rusk,Dean(1909–94).U.S.secretaryofstate(1961–69).Asaleadingforeign policy adviser to presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Rusk fully supported and helpedimplementKennedy’sandthenJohnson’sdecisionstoescalatetheU.S. commitmentinVietnam. Saigon. The capital city of South Vietnam, Saigon had a wartime population of over two million. Saigon and adjoining urban areas were in what was called the Capital Military Region, Gia Dinh Province. It was the seat of the South Vietnamese government and the headquarters of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Saigon was the scene of extensive fighting duringthe1968TetOffensive.AfteritfelltotheCommunistsonApril30,1975, SaigonwasrenamedHoChiMinhCity. San Antonio Formula. An August 1967 U.S. offer to stop bombing North VietnamifHanoi agreedtoenterproductivepeace negotiations immediately andnottakeadvantageofthecessation.PresidentLyndonB.Johnsonpublicly announcedtheofferinSanAntonio,Texas,onSeptember29,buttheNorth Vietnameserejecteditastheysecretlymadepreparations to launch the 1968 TetOffensive. sappers.VietCongandNorthVietnamesecommandoswhowereadeptat penetratingallieddefenses.SappersusuallyledCommunistattacksbybreachingdefenseswithsatchelchargesandotherweapons. Sharp, U.S. Grant (1906–2001). Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command(1964–68).AsCINCPAC,AdmiralSharpoversawtheU.S.buildup in Vietnam and was in command of all Pacific forces during the 1968 Tet Offensive. SongBe.ThecapitalofPhuocLongprovince,SongBeliesaboutfiftymiles north of Saigon, near the Cambodian border. On October 27, 1967, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops attacked a South Vietnamese outpost in
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SongBeaspartofthediversionaryefforttodrawalliedforcesawayfromSouth VietnamesecitiesbeforetheCommunistslaunchedthe1968TetOffensive. SpecialForces(SF).PopularlyknownastheGreenBerets,theU.S.Special Forces were organized in 1952 to wage guerrilla war and organize resistance behind enemy lines. Beginning in 1963, they took over a CIA operation that organizedCivilianIrregularDefenseGroups(CIDGs)amongtheMontagnard tribesmenoftheCentralHighlandstoconductinterdictionmissionsandlongrangereconnaissanceagainsttheCommunistsinLaos.AnSFCIDGcampat LangVeiwasoverrunbyNorthVietnamesetroopsonFebruary7,1968,during theintensefightingaroundKheSanh. TanSonNhut.LargeairportontheoutskirtsofSaigon.ItservedasheadquartersforMACVandincludedahugealliedairbase.TanSonNhutwasthe sceneofintensefightingduringthe1968TetOffensive. Tet. The Vietnamese New Year, the most important holiday of the year. Tet is celebrated in Vietnam during the first week of the first month of the lunar calendar, falling between January 19 and February 20. The holiday is marked by feasting, setting off fireworks, decorating homes, spending time with family, and paying reverence to ancestors. During the Vietnam War, therewasnormallyacease-fireatTet,butin1968,theCommunistsviolated thetruceandlaunchedamassiveoffensiveagainstSouthVietnamesecities andtowns.ThescopeoftheoffensivestunnedboththeWhiteHouseandthe American public and played a major role in the president’s decision not to runforreelection. Thailand.ThailandwasthefirstAsiancountrytosendtroopstoVietnamin 1964.By1967,therewere11,000ThaicombattroopsinVietnamandatthepeak ofThaiparticipationthenumberreached16,500.ThaitroopsconductedcombatoperationsfromabasenearLongThanhinIIICorpsTacticalZone.The ThaisoldierswerepartoftheFreeWorldMilitaryForces,whichalsoincluded forcesfromSouthKorea,Australia,NewZealand,andthePhilippines. Tran Van Tra (1918–96). Military leader of the National Liberation Front and general in the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). As chairman of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), he coordinated the war in the south,includingtheattackduringthe1968TetOffensive.Healsoplayedacriticalroleinthe1972PAVNinvasionandthefinaloffensivein1975thatresulted inthefallofSouthVietnam.
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Truong Chinh (1907–88). President of the National Assembly of the DemocraticRepublicofVietnam(1960–76)whocounseledagainstlaunching theTetOffensive.HewantedHanoitofocusonthesocialistreconstructionof theNorth,whileLeDuanandhisfactionadvocatednewmeasurestowinthe warintheSouth.LeDuanwontheargument,andtheoffensivewaslaunched inJanuary1968. VietCong(VC).SouthVietnameseslang(acontractionofVietNamCong San,meaning“VietnameseCommunist”)fortheguerrillamovementinSouth VietnamsupportedbyNorthVietnam;knownofficiallyasthePeople’sLiberation Armed Forces (PLAF). Formerly established in early 1961, the PLAF was the military arm of the National Liberation Front and consisted of regular forces, full-time guerrillas, and self-defense militia. The PLAF assumed the primary roleinthe1968TetOffensiveandsufferedmorethan40,000casualties;itsubsequentlydeclinedasamajorfactoronthebattlefieldfortheremainderofthewar, althoughitremainedstronginseveralareas,includingtheMekongDelta. VietMinh.ContractionofVietNamDocLapDongMinhHoi(Leaguefor theIndependenceofVietnam)foundedbyHoChiMinhin1941;itprovided the leadership and troops in the struggle against Japanese and French rule in Vietnam. Viet Minh forces under General Vo Nguyen Giap defeated the French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, which led to the French departure fromIndochina. Vietnamization.TermcoinedtodescribetheefforttobuilduptheSouth VietnamesearmedforcesandgraduallyturnoverthewarasU.S.forceswere withdrawn. Although Vietnamization became the focus of U.S. efforts in VietnamunderPresidentRichardNixon,theinitialstepsintheprocesswere takeninthelastmonthsoftheJohnsonadministrationintheaftermathofthe 1968TetOffensive. Vo Nguyen Giap (1911– ). General and commander of People’s Army of Vietnam(1946–72);NorthVietnameseministerofdefense(1946–80).Giapwas thearchitectoftheVietMinhvictoryovertheFrenchatDienBienPhu.As a major land war erupted in the 1960s, Giap advocated guerrilla warfare and theadvancementofaCommunistpoliticalbaseintheSouth.In1967,though disagreeingwiththetimingofageneraloffensive,hedesignedanddirectedthe TetOffensivein1968.AlthoughtheCommunistssustainedatacticaldefeatand sufferedhorrendouscasualties,intheendtheyachievedagreatpsychological victorythatledtoaprotractedU.S.withdrawal.Giapplannedthe1972Easter
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Offensive,whichfailed,andhewaseasedfrompowerin1973infavorofhis protégé, PAVN Chief of Staff Senior General Van Tien Dung, who planned andcommandedthefinalPAVNoffensivethatconqueredSouthVietnamin 1975.In1980,DungformallyreplacedGiapasMinisterofDefense. WarZonesCandD.CommunistbaseareaslocatedtothenorthofSaigon inIIICorpsTacticalZone.WarZoneCwasborderedonthewestbyCambodia andincludedthenorthernhalfofTayNinhProvince,thewesternhalfofBinh LongProvince,andthenorthwesternQuarterofBinhDuongProvince.War ZoneDwaslocatedtotheeastofWarZoneCandincludedthenorthwestern portionofBinhDuongProvince,anortheasternportionofBienHoaProvince, andthenorthernportionofLongKhanhProvince.WarZoneCwasthesite of one of the largest allied search-and-destroy missions of the war, Operation JunctionCity,in1967. Westmoreland,WilliamC.(1914–2005).CommanderofU.S.MilitaryAssistance Command,Vietnam(1964–68).From1965to1967,WestmorelandwasinstrumentalinraisingthelevelofU.S.forcesinSouthVietnamanddevelopingthestrategy of attrition for the ground war. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, Westmoreland’s forces, though initially taken by surprise by the scope of the offensive, reacted quicklyanddecisivelydefeatedtheattackers.Aftertheoffensivewascontained, he requested an additional 206,000 troops, which was rejected by President Johnson.WestmorelandwassubsequentlyrecalledandmadeArmychiefofstaff untilheretiredin1972.HediedathishomeinSouthCarolinainJuly2005. Weyand,FrederickC.(1916–).U.S.Armygeneralwhoplayedakeyrolein turningbacktheCommunistsattackersinthefightinginandaroundSaigon duringthe1968TetOffensive.Beforetheoffensive,Weyand,thencommander of II Field Force, suspecting that the Communists were preparing to launch a major attack on Saigon, repositioned his forces closer to the capital city. WhentheVietCongattacked,hisforceswereabletoreactquicklyandsaved Saigon.HereplacedGeneralCreightonAbramsascommanderoftheMilitary AssistanceCommand,Vietnam(MACV)in1972andsupervisedthefinalwithdrawalofU.S.forces. Wheeler,EarleG.(1908–75).U.S.Armychiefofstaff(1962–64)andchairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff(1964–70).Asakeyadvisortobothpresidents KennedyandJohnson,WheelerpresidedovertheescalationoftheU.S.troop commitment in Vietnam. He advocated the full use of U.S. power against North Vietnam. After the Tet Offensive, Wheeler advised Johnson to call up thereservesandsend206,000additionaltroopstoVietnam.Johnsondeclined
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therecommendationandbegande-escalatingtheU.S.effort.Wheelerretired in1970anddiedfiveyearslater. “WiseMen.”Nicknamegiventoagroupofelderstatesmenwhometperiodicallyfrom1965to1968toadvisePresidentLyndonJohnson.Theyfirstmet inJuly1965andendorsedSecretaryofDefenseRobertMcNamara’sproposal forescalatingthewar.InameetinginNovember1967,mostofthemcontinued tobackJohnson’sVietnampolicies.However,inameetingheldinMarch1968 aftertheTetOffensive,theWiseMen,stunnedbythescopeoftheoffensive, advisedthepresidenttobegindisengagingfromVietnam.ThischangeofopinionhadaprofoundeffectonJohnsonandinfluencedhisdecisionnottorun forreelection.
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PRESIDENTJOHNSON’S“SANANTONIO FORMULA” SPEECHOFSEPTEMBER 29, 1967 ThiseveningIcameheretospeaktoyouaboutVietnam.... DoubtanddebateareenlargedbecausetheproblemsofVietnamarequite complex.Theyareamixtureofpoliticalturmoil—ofpoverty—ofreligiousand factionalstrife—ofancientservitudeandmodernlongingforfreedom.Vietnam isallofthosethings. Vietnam is also the scene of a powerful aggression that is spurred by an appetiteforconquest.... IwanttoturnnowtothestruggleinVietnamitself. There are questions about this difficult war that must trouble every really thoughtfulperson.... First, are the Vietnamese—with our help, and that of their other allies— really making any progress? Is there a forward movement? The reports I see makeitclearthatthereis.Certainlythereisapositivemovementtowardconstitutionalgovernment.ThusfartheVietnamesehavemetthepoliticalschedule thattheylaiddowninJanuary1966. The people wanted an elected, responsive government. They wanted it stronglyenoughtobraveaviciouscampaignofCommunistterrorandassassina-
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tiontovoteforit.Ithasbeensaidthattheykilledmoreciviliansinfourweeks tryingtokeepthemfromvotingbeforetheelectionthanourAmericanbombers havekilledinthebigcitiesofNorthVietnaminbombingmilitarytargets. On November 1, subject to the action, of course, of the Constituent Assembly, an elected government will be inaugurated and an elected Senate andLegislaturewillbeinstalled.... Thereisprogressinthewaritself,steadyprogressconsideringthewarthat we are fighting; rather dramatic progress considering the situation that actually prevailed when we sent our troops there in 1965; when we intervened to prevent the dismemberment of the country by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. Thecampaignsofthelastyeardrovetheenemyfrommanyoftheirmajor interiorbases.ThemilitaryvictoryalmostwithinHanoi’sgraspin1965hasnow beendeniedthem.ThegripoftheVietcongonthepeopleisbroken. SinceourcommitmentofmajorforcesinJuly1965,theproportionofthe population living under Communist control has been reduced to well under 20 percent. Tonight the secure proportion of the population has grown from about45percentto65percent—andinthecontestedareas,thetidecontinues torunwithus. But the struggle remains hard. The South Vietnamese have suffered severely,ashavewe—particularlyintheFirstCorpsareainthenorth,where theenemyhasmountedhisheaviestattacks,andwherehislinesofcommunicationtoNorthVietnamareshortest.Ourcasualtiesinthewarhavereached about 13,500 killed in action, and about 85,000 wounded. Of those 85,000 wounded,wethankGodthat79,000ofthe85,000havebeenreturned,orwill returntodutyshortly.ThankstoourgreatAmericanmedicalscienceandthe helicopter.... AswehavetoldHanoitimeandtimeandtimeagain,theheartofthematter isreallythis:TheUniteStatesiswillingtostopallaerialandnavalbombardmentofNorthVietnamwhenthiswillleadpromptlytoproductivediscussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would nottakeadvantageofthebombingcessationorlimitation. ButHanoihasnotacceptedanyoftheseproposals.... Why,inthefaceofmilitaryandpoliticalprogressintheSouth,andtheburdenofourbombingintheNorth,dotheyinsistandpersistwiththewar? Frommanysourcestheansweristhesame.Theystillhopethatthepeople oftheUnitedStateswillnotseethisstrugglethroughtotheveryend.Asone Westerndiplomatreportedtomeonlythisweek—hehadjustbeeninHanoi— “Theybelievetheirstayingpowerisgreaterthanoutsandthattheycan’tlose.” AvisitorfromaCommunistcapitalhadthistosay:“Theyexpectthewartobe long, and that the Americans in the end will be defeated by a breakdown in
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morale,fatigue,andpsychologicalfactors.”ThePremierofNorthVietnamsaid asfarbackas1962.“Americansdonotlikelong,inconclusivewar....Thuswe aresuretowinintheend.” AretheNorthVietnameserightaboutus? Ithinknot.No.Ithinktheyarewrong.... source:PublicPapersofthePresidentsoftheUnitedStates:LyndonB.Johnson,1967 (Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,1970),876–881.
DIRECTIVEONFORTHCOMING OFFENSIVE ANDUPRISINGS ProvincialPartyStandingCommittee,1November1967 Localcommunistcadresreceivedthisdirectiveexplainingthegoalsandstrategy for the offensive, the plan for the beginning of the general uprising, and the strategyforsuccess.Theseinstructionsweresenttothelocalcadres. 1.Followingisinformationonthenewsituation.Outtroopsarecontinuously attacking the enemy everywhere, especially in the district seats and province capitals.Wehavestartedapartialuprisinginthecity.Severalprovincecapitals anddistrictseatshavechangedhandsthreeorfourtimes.Theenemytroopsin severaldistrictsandprovinceshavebeenconfusedanddisorganized. Intherural,deltaandmountainareas,anuprisingmovementtogainfull control of the rural areas has started. The rural people, together with town people,arerisinguptofighttheU.S.,overthrowthepuppetgovernment,and seizepower.Inthefaceofthissituation,theenemyhasshiftedtothedefensive and has been thrown into utmost confusion. A new era, a real revolutionary period,anoffensiveanduprisingperiodhasbegun.Thevictoriousdayofthe peopleandthetryinghoursarecoming.Thisistheencouragingfactorofthe situation.Thisiswhattheentireparty,entirearmy,andentirepopulationhave beenexpecting.Thepeopleoftensay:“Itiswisetocarrythroughtotheend,no matterwhatthecostinlivesandmoneymaybe.”Nowitistimetoapplythis mottotocompleteourworkassoonaspossiblewithoutdelay.... Uponreceiptofthisletter,youarerequiredtoformulateaplantoprepare themindsoftheParty,Group,agencies,andthepeoplebyconveningaParty Branchmeeting(onenight)to: Reportthenewsituationintownsandruralareas.Thetimeisnowmore favorable [for an offensive] than ever before. This is to notify you that an offensive and uprising will take place in the very near future and we will
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mount stronger attacks on towns and cities, in coordination with the widespreadmovementintheruralareas.Theenemywillbethrownintoutmost confusion. No matter how violently the enemy may react, he cannot avoid collapse.Thisisnotonlyagoldenopportunitytoliberatehamletsandvillages butalsoanopportunitytoliberatedistrictseats,provincecapitals,andSouth Viet-Namasawhole. Ourvictoryiscloseathand.Theconditionsareripe.OurPartyhascarefullyjudgedthesituation.Wemustactandactfast.Thisisanopportunityto fulfill the aspirations of the entire people, of cadre, of each comrade and of ourfamilies.Wehavelongsufferedhardships,death,andpain.Wearelookingforanopportunitytoavengeevildoneourfamilies,topayourdebttothe Fatherland,todisplayourloyaltytothecountry,affectionforthepeopleand loveforourfamilies.Wecannotaffordtomissthisrareopportunity.AllParty membersandcadremustbewillingtosacrificetheirlivesforthesurvivalof theFatherland. The opportunity is like an attack on an enemy post in which we have reachedthelastfenceandtheenemyputsupafierceresistance.Weonlyneed tomakeaswiftassaulttosecurethetargetandgaintotalvictory. Ifwearehesitantandfearfulofhardshipsandmisery,wewillsufferheavy losses,failtoaccomplishthemissionandfeelguiltyforfailingournation,our people,ourfamilies,andourcomradeswhohavealreadysacrificedthemselves. Itistimeforustotaketheinitiativeinpenetratingintoenemybasesinprovinces,districts,andvillages,attackinghimfiveortentimesmoreviolentlyto scorebrilliantachievements. Make all comrades realize that the purpose of the revolutionary activities conductedformanyyearsismainlytosupportthisphase,inthisdecisivehour. Eventhoughwemakesacrifices,wewillgaingloriousvictory,notonlyforthe people,butalsoforourFatherlandandfamilies.Ifweadoptahesitantattitude, wewillnotonlybelittlethevalueofhumanbeingsbutalsolowertheprestigeof revolutionarypartymembers.Thismeanswewillloseself-respectandwewill notbeworthyofenjoyingtherightsofman. AsPartymembers,weshouldnotthinkandactinaninferiormanner.For this reason all comrades must get together and speak their minds in order to become better acquainted and to transform the whole Party Branch into a determined-to-die unit. All comrades must write a heart-felt letter expressing theirdecisiontotheCentralPartyCommittee,toChairmanHoaswellasto theProvincePartyCommittee.... 3.Howwilltheuprisingbeconducted? Therearetwofundamentalsteps: First, annihilate the enemy’s political power. It is fundamental that we capturealltyrantsfromthevillageandhamletadministrativemachineryand
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anumberofspies.Ifwearenotsuccessfulinthisareatheuprisingwillnotbe abletotakeplace. Second, organize our political power, specifically our district, village, and hamletadministrativemachinery. Toconductanuprising,youmusthavearosterofallthetyrantsandspies andbefamiliarwiththewaytheyliveandwheretheylive.Thenusesuicide cells to annihilate them by any means. The following tasks should also be achievedonthesamenight: Conductmeetingsandgiveinformationofthecurrentsituation(about10 to15minutes).Makeuseofthepopulaceimmediatelyinsabotageandsupport activitiesandinraidoperationsagainstthespies.Themassesshouldbeencouragedtogoonstrike.Digtrenchesandmakespikesallnightlong,andcontributetothetransformationoftheterrain.Allpeopleineachfamily,regardlessof theirages,shouldbeencouragedtotakepart.Thisisthebestwayofmotivating thepopulaceandofelevatingtheirpride.Wemustaltertheterrainfeaturesat nighttosecurepositionstooppressandstriketheenemyinthemorning.The cadre, together with the population, will be required to swear that they will stayclosetotheirricefields,defendtheirvillages,anddotheirutmosttowrest backcontroloftheentirearea,includingdistrictseatsandtowns.Anumberof oldmen,womenandchildrenshouldbemadeavailablethefollowingmorningandorderedtoreporttoenemydistrictseatsorposttoinformthem[GVN officials]thattheir[thedemonstrators’]villagehasbeenoccupiedbytherevolutionaryarmyandthatthepersonnelofthe[village]administrativecommitteeas wellastheir[own]husbandsandchildrenhavebeencaptured.Thisdemonstrationwillbeaimedatpreventingtheenemyfrombatteringtheirvillage.Young menandhealthyfarmerswillberetainedforuseindefenseworkconstruction, alteringterrain,guardduty,andcombat.Thisisdonetorestrictescapeesand limit our casualties. Place emphasis on encouraging enemy soldiers’ dependentstostruggleforthereturnoftheirhusbandsandchildren.Makeappealsto enemypersonnelfromthePopular,Regional,andSpecialforcestosurrender. Oncethetaskisachieved,makeuseofanumberofagentsunderlegalcoverto organizeinsurrectioncommitteesinwhite[GVN-controlled]hamletsandvillages.Atthesametime,transferthedetermined-to-diecellstothenexthamlet orvillagetopushtherevolutionarymovementforwardquickly,observingthe sameprinciplesappliedrecentlyinTuyPhuocandotherareasoftheprovince. Womenandchildrenmustberecruitedimmediatelytoserveintheself-defense corpsandguerrillaforce. A number of loyal farmers, youths, and women will be selected for indoctrination.Uponterminationofthecourse,andafterthestudentshave been acquainted with the regulations, an official selection of members for organization and recruitment of personnel for hamlets will take place. This
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willfacilitatetheorganizationofpeople’scells,suchasthosefortheyouths, farmers,andwomen. Instructions on carrying out such policies as that for land will be disseminatedinthefuture.IfallPartyBranches,hamlets,andvillagesdisplayastrong determination and unanimously carry out the aforementioned tasks, we will surely create various levels of supremacy and will continue to brighten our supremacy.... source: “Directive from Province Party Standing Committee to District and Local PartyOrgansonForthcomingOffensiveandUprisings,1November1967,”Vietnam Archive(LarryBermanCollection),TexasTechUniversity,Lubbock,Texas
CAPABILITIESOFTHEVIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS FORFIGHTINGINSOUTH VIETNAM, NOVEMBER13,1967(EXTRACT) Conclusions A.Duringthepastyear,Hanoi’sdirectcontrolandshareoftheburdenofthe warinSouthVietnamhasgrownsubstantially.Thistrendwillcontinue. B.Manpower is a major problem confronting the Communists. Losses have beenincreasingandrecruitmentinSouthVietnamisbecomingmoredifficult. Despite heavy infiltration from North Vietnam, the strength of the Communist military forces and political organizations in South Vietnam declinedinthelastyear. C.Themajorportionofthisdeclinehasprobablybeenfeltatthelowerlevels, reflectingadeliberatepolicyofsacrificingtheselevelstomaintainthestructure of political cadres and the strength of the Regular military forces. In particulartheguerrillas,nowestimatedtototalsome70,000—90,000,have sufferedasubstantialreductionsincetheestimatedpeakofaboutearly1966. Regular force strength, no estimated at 118,000, has declined slightly, but VietCong(VC)unitsareincreasinglydependentuponNorthVietnamese replacements. D.GivencurrentCommuniststrategy,andlevelsofoperations,amajoreffort will be necessary if the Regular forces and the guerrillas are to be maintainedatornearpresentlevels.Todosowillrequirebothalevelofinfiltrationmuchhigherthanthatobservedin1967andintensiveVCrecruitment aswell.Consideringalltherelevantfactors,however,webelievethereisa fairlygoodchancethattheoverallstrengthandeffectivenessofthemilitary forcesandthepoliticalinfrastructurewillcontinuetodecline.
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E.The Communist leadership is already having problems in maintaining moraleandquality.Theseproblemshavenotyetimpairedoverallmilitary effectiveness,buttheyarelikelytobecomemoredifficult. F.Difficulties in internal distribution will continue to cause local shortages andinterferewithCommunistoperationsfromtimetotime.Butwebelieve thattheCommunistswillbeabletocontinuetomeetatleasttheiressential supplyrequirementsforthelevelofforcesandactivitiesinSouthVietnam describedinthisestimate. G.Communiststrategyistosustainaprotractedwarofattritionandtopersuade theUSthatitmustpulloutorsettleonHanoi’sterms.Ourjudgmentisthat theCommunistsstillretainadequatecapabilitiestosupportthisstrategyfor atleastanotheryear.WhetherornotHanoidoesinfactpersistwiththisstrategydependsnotonlyonitscapabilitiestodoso,butonanumberofpolitical andinternationalconsiderationsnottreatedinthisestimate. source: Document declassified by the CIA, December 1, 1975; Vietnam Archive (DouglasPikeCollection),TexasTechUniversity,Lubbock,Texas
ADDRESSBYCOMMANDEROF U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM,GENERALWILLIAMC. WESTMORELAND, NOVEMBER21,1967(EXTRACT) ImprovingVietnameseEffectiveness With1968,anewphaseisnowstarting.Wehavereachedanimportantpointwhen theendbeginstocomeintoview.Whatisthisthirdphaseweareabouttoenter? InPhaseIII,in1968,weintendtodothefollowing: HelptheVietnameseArmedForcestocontinueimprovingtheireffectiveness. DecreaseouradvisersintrainingcentersandotherplaceswheretheprofessionalcompetenceofVietnameseofficersmakesthispossible. Increase our advisory effort with the younger brothers of the Vietnamese Army:theRegionalForcesandPopularForces. UseU.S.andfree-worldforcestodestroyNorthVietnameseforayswhilewe assisttheVietnamesetoreorganizeforterritorialsecurity. ProvidethenewmilitaryequipmenttorevitalizetheVietnameseArmyand prepareittotakeonanever-increasingshareofthewar. ContinuepressureonNorthtopreventrebuildingandtomakeinfiltration morecostly. TurnamajorshareoffrontlineDMZdefenseovertotheVietnameseArmy. IncreaseU.S.supportintherichandpopulateddelta.
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HelptheGovernmentofViet-NamsingleoutanddestroytheCommunist shadowgovernment. Continuetoisolatetheguerrillafromthepeople. HelpthenewVietnamesegovernmenttorespondtopopularaspirationsand toreduceandeliminatecorruption. HelptheVietnamesestrengthentheirpolicyforcestoenhancelawandorder. Openmoreroadsandcanals. ContinuetoimprovetheVietnameseeconomyandstandardofliving.
THEFINALPHASE NowforPhaseIV—thefinalphase.Thatperiodwillseetheconclusionofour plantoweakentheenemyandstrengthenourfriendsuntilwebecomeprogressivelysuperfluous.Theobjectwillbetoshowtheworldthatguerrillawarfare andinvasiondonotpayasanewmeansofCommunistaggression. IseephaseIVhappeningasfollows: Infiltrationwillslow. TheCommunistinfrastructurewillbecutupandnearcollapse. The Vietnamese Government will prove its stability, and the Vietnamese ArmywillshowthatitcanhandletheVietCong. TheRegionalForcesandPopularForceswillreachahigherlevelofprofessionalperformance. U.S.unitscanbegintophasedownastheVietnameseArmyismodernized anddevelopsitscapacitytothefullest. The military physical assets, bases and ports, will be progressively turned overtotheVietnamese. TheVietnamesewilltakechargeofthefinalmoppingupoftheVietCong (whichwillprobablylastseveralyears).TheU.S.,atthesametime,willcontinuethedevelopmenthelpenvisagedbythePresidentforthecommunityof SoutheastAsia. YoumayaskhowlongphaseIIIwilltake,beforewereachthefinalphase. WehavealreadyenteredpartofphaseIII.LookingbackonphasesIandII,we canconcludethatwehavecomealongway. IseeprogressasItravelalloverVietNam. IseeitintheattitudesoftheVietnamese. Iseeitintheopenroadsandcanals. Iseeitinthenewcropsandthenewpurchasingpowerofthefarmer. IseeitintheincreasingwillingnessoftheVietnameseArmytofightNorth Vietnameseunitsandinthevictoriestheywarewinning. Parenthetically,ImightsaythattheU.S.presstendstoreportU.S.actions,so youmaynotbeasawareasIamofthevictorieswonbySouthVietnameseforces.
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Theenemyhasmanyproblems. Heislosingcontrolofthescatteredpopulationunderhisinfluence. Heislosingcredibilitywiththepopulationhestillcontrols. Heisalienatingthepeoplebyhisincreaseddemandsandtaxes,wherehe canimposethem. Heseesthestrengthofhisforcessteadilydeclining. HecannolongerrecruitintheSouthtoanymeaningful extent; he must plugthegapwithNorthVietnamese. Hismonsoonoffensiveshavebeenfailures. Hewasdealtamortalblowbytheinstallationofafreelyelectedrepresentativegovernment. Andhefailedinhisdesperateefforttotaketheworld’sheadlinesfromthe inaugurationbyamilitaryvictory. Lastly, the Vietnamese Army is on the road to becoming a competent force.KoreantroopsinVietNamprovideagoodexamplefortheVietnamese. Fifteen years ago the Koreans themselves had problems now ascribed to the Vietnamese.TheKoreanssurmountedtheseproblems,andsocanandwillthe Vietnamese. Wearemakingprogress.Weknowyouwantanhonorableandearlytransition tothefourthandlastphase.SodoyoursonsandsodoI. Itlieswithinourgrasp—theenemy’shopesarebankrupt.Withyoursupport wewillgiveyouasuccessthatwillimpactnotonlyonSouthVietNambuton everyemergingnationintheworld. source:DepartmentofStateBulletin,December11,1967,785–788,VietnamArchive (LarryBermanCollection),TexasTechUniversity,Lubbock,Texas
“SAIGONUNDERFIRE” CBSNewsSpecialReport,January31,1968 This is a transcript of the fifteen-minute CBS News Special Report “Saigon UnderFire,”hostedbyMikeWallace.Itwastelecastfrom11:15to11:30p.m., following“TheJonathanWintersShow.” wallace:Goodevening.I’mMikeWallace. WithaboldseriesofraidsduringthelastthreedaystheenemyinVietnam hasdemolishedthemyththatAlliedmilitarystrengthcontrolsthatcountry.The Communists hit the very heart of Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, and atleasttencitieswhichcorrespondtostatecapitalshereintheUnitedStates.
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And then, as if to demonstrate that no place in that war-torn nation is secure theystruckatleastnineAmericanstrongholdsandunnumberedfieldpositions. TonightthemagnitudeofthoseraidsbecameapparentintheU.S.Command’s reportoncasualties.TheCommunistspaidaheavytollfortheirstrikes,almost 5,000 dead, including 660 in Saigon alone, and almost 2,000 captured. But Alliedcasualtiesalsoarehigh:232Americanskilled,929wounded;300South Vietnamesekilled,747wounded,andthattollisexpectedtoclimb. Theenemy’swell-coordinatedattacksoccurredthroughoutSouthVietnam, butthemostdramaticdemonstrationoftheboldnessandcapabilitycameatthe everysymbolofAmerica’spresenceinVietnam,thebrandnewU.S.Embassy buildingthere.CBSNewsCorrespondentRobertSchaknereports: schakne: The American Embassy is under siege; only the besiegers are Americans.Inside,inpartofthebuilding,aretheVietcongterrorsquadsthat chargedinduringthenight.MilitaryPolicegotbackintothecompoundofthe $2.5millionEmbassycomplexatdawn.BeforethataplatoonofVietcongwere incontrol.TheCommunistraidersnevergotintothemainchancerybuilding; ahandfulofMarineshaditblockedandkeptthemout.Buttheraiderswere everywhere else. By daylight (voice drowned out by gunfire) No one, unless identified, was allowed in the street. An Australian military policeman was standingguard,firingwarningshotstokeepthestreetclear. Outsidethebuildingknotsofmilitarypolicemenheldpositions.Therewere burstsofwildshootinginthestreets,perhapssnipersinotherbuildingandthere had been casualties. The bodies of two military policemen who died as they triedtoassaultthecompoundlayneartheirjeepacrosstheboulevard.Buteven afterthemilitarypolicefoughttheirwaybackinside,therewasmorefighting. The raiders were still about the compound. They may have been a suicide cadre.Intheendnoneofthemweretosurrender. ThisiswheretheVietcongraidersbrokein.Theysneakedupandblasteda holeinthereinforcedconcretefencesurroundingthecompound.Theywere insidebeforeanyoneknewit.TheyhadthebigEmbassywalltoprotectthem. Butnoneoftheraiderslivedtotelloftheirexploit.By8:00o’clock,fivehours after they first broke in, almost all of them were dead. Nineteen bodies were counted.Allincivilianclothes,theyhadbeenarmedwithAmerican—sixteen riflesandalsorocket-launchersandrockets.Theyhadexplosives,theirpurpose apparentlytodestroytheEmbassy.Inthatpurposetheydidnotsucceed. ThefightingwentonforatotalofsixhoursbeforethelastknownVietcong raiderwaskilled.Theywererootedoutofbushes,fromoutlyingbuildings,and thenthelastone,the19th,fromthesmallresidenceoftheEmbassy’sMission Coordinator,GeorgeJacobson,whohadbeenhidingallalone,allmorning. What could you see from the window? Were the—were the VC in the buildings?
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jacobson:No,IdidnotseeanyVCinthebuildingexceptthatIknewthat therewasatleastoneVCinmyhouse.Iknewthathewasonthebottomfloor ofmyhouse. schakne:Youhadquiteanescapeattheveryend.Howdidthathappen? jacobson:Well,they[U.S.troops]putriotgasintothebottomfloorsof my house, which of course would drive whoever was down below up top where I was. They had thrown me a pistol about ten minutes before this occurred,andwithalloftheluckthatI’vehadallofmylife,Igothimbefore hegotme. schakne:Withthepistol.Andhehadwhat? jacobson:AnM-16. schakne:Andyougothim. ThenthejobofsweepingthroughtheEmbassybuildingandcompound,tryingtomakesurenoVietcongwerestillhiding.Thejoboffindingunexploded rockets,grenades,andsatchelcharges.Andthecasualties.ThetwoAmerican military policemen at one gate, a handful of Marines inside. There wasn’t anyonetostoptheVietcongwhentheycame.GeneralWestmorelandcameby soonafter.HisversionwasthatthisrepresentedaVietcongdefeat. westmoreland:Insomeway,theenemy’swell-laidplanswentafoul.Some superficialdamagewasdonetothebuilding.Alloftheenemythatenteredthe compound as far as I can determine were killed. Nineteen bodies have been found on the premises—enemy bodies. Nineteen enemy bodies have been foundonthepremises. schakne:General,howwouldyouassessyesterday’sactivitiesandtoday’s? Whatistheenemydoing?Arethesemajorattacks? (soundofexplosions) westmoreland: The enemy very deceitfully has take advantage of the Tet truce in order to create maximum consternation within South Vietnam, particularly in the populated areas. In my opinion this is diversionary to his maineffort,whichhehadplannedtotakeplaceinQuangTriProvince,from Laos,towardKhesanhandacrosstheDemilitarizedZone.Thisattackhasnot yetmaterialized;hisschedulehasprobablybeenthrownoffbalancebecauseof ourveryeffectiveairstrikes. Nowyesterdaytheenemyexposedhimselfbyvirtueofthisstrategyandhe suffered great casualties. When I left my office late yesterday, approximately 8:00 o’clock, we—we had accounted for almost seven hundred enemy killed inaction.Nowwehadsufferedsomecasualtiesourselves,buttheyweresmall by comparison. My guess is, based on my conversations with my field commanders,thattherewereprobably—therewereprobablyfarmorethanseven hundredthatwerekilled.Nowbyvirtueofthisaudaciousactionbytheenemy, hehasexposedhimself,hehasbecomemorevulnerable.AssoonasPresident
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Thieu,withouragreement,calledoffthetruce,U.S.andAmericantroopswent ontheoffensiveandpursuedtheenemyaggressively. schakne: When they built this Embassy it was first to be a secure building.ThisEmbassywasdesignedasabomb-proof,attack-proofbuilding,butit turnedout,whentheVChitus,itwasn’tattack-proofenough.RobertSchakne, CBSNews,Saigon. wallace:Washingtonregardstheenemyraidsasthefirststepinastrategy aimedatstrengtheningtheirhandforanypeacetalkswhichmaydevelop,and capturedCommunistdocumentslendweighttothistheory. CBSNewsWhiteHouseCorrespondentDanRatherreports. rather: We knew this was coming—a well-coordinated series of enemy raids against South Vietnamese cities. Our intelligence even pinpointed the exactdayitwouldhappen.Whatwedidnotknowwaswhere.Thisistheofficial story,asgivenoutbyWhiteHousenewssecretaryGeorgeChristian,whowent ontosaytherewasnowaytocompletelyinsulateyourselfagainstthiskindof thingiftheenemyiswillingtosacrificelargenumbersofmen. Butifweknewitwascoming,eventotheexactday,Christianwasasked, whywasn’textraprotectionplacedaroundsuchanobviousplaceastheSaigon Embassy?TheWhiteHousespokesmanpaused,thensaid,“Ijustdon’tknow.” AtthePentagonahigh-rankingsourcesaid,“Theresimplyweremoreofthem andtheywerebetterthanweexpected.” Washington is startled but not panicked by the latest series of events. President Johnson privately is warning Congressmen that intelligence reports indicate the whole month of February will be rough in Southeast Asia. Mr. Johnson is emphasizing that the enemy’s winter offensive is only beginning. DanRather,CBSNews,Washington. wallace:ThedramaofthebattleforSaigoncapturedmostattention,but the South Vietnamese capital was only one of the Communist targets. In a momentwe’llreturnwithbattlefilmfromanothercity. (announcement) wallace: The U.S. Command’s battle communiqué indicates that the Alliedrepulsedmostoftheenemy’sattacks,butthissuccesswasnotuniversal. InanassaulttodaytheCommunistcapturedhalfoftheCentralHighlandscity ofKontumandtheVietcongflagfliesinthecenterofthenortherncityofHue. TheenemyclaimsalsotocontrolQuangTricity,alsoinICorpsinthenorth, aclaimasyetunconfirmedbytheAllies. But one place where American and South Vietnamese troops turned back theenemywasatNhatrang,acoastalcityabout190milesnortheastofSaigon. In peacetime a pleasant resort city, now Nhatrang is the headquarters for the FifthSpecialForces,theGreenBerets;andtheGreenBeretswereinthethick ofthefighting.TheCommunistattacktherehadbegunaroundmidnight,andit
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developedintoastreetfightwhich,asyouseehere,carriedoverintothedaylight hours.Theenemy’sapparentgoalinthisfight,downthestreet,wasaprovincial prisonwheremanyimportantVietcongwerebeingheld.Duringthisbattlemany innocentcivilians,friendlytotheAllies,weretrappedintheirhomesbetweenthe linesoffirebetweenVCandtheGreenBerets.Itwasonlyaftertwelvehoursof battlethattheareawassecureenoughtocallthoseciviliansouttosafety. TheCommunistraidshadastunningimpact,allofthem,aroundtheworld, andthequestionis,whatisitthattheenemyisafterintheseattacks.Certainly hedoesnotbelievethatthesesuicideassaultsbyterroristsquadsaregoingto radicallychangethecourseofthewarinVietnam;buttherecanbenodoubt that these attacks are calculated to impress indelibly on public opinion in NorthandSouthVietnamandintheUnitedStatestheresourcefulnessandthe determinationoftheVietcongandhisabilitytostrikealmostatwillanyplace inSouthVietnamifheiswillingtopaytheprice. Thestoryofthepastthreedays,withheavyemphasis,ofcourse,onAmerican andSouthVietnamesecasualtieswillbetrumpetedthroughoutVietnamand aroundtheworldbyHanoi.Whetherallofthisisapreludetoanexpressionthat Hanoiiswillingnowtogotothenegotiationtableremainstobeseen,butthere islittledoubtthattherewillbemoresuchstoriesfromKhesanhandelsewhere inSouthVietnaminthebittermonthofFebruarythatliesahead. MikeWallace,CBSNews,NewYork. announcer: This had been a CBS News Special Report: “Saigon Under Fire.” source: “Saigon Under Fire,” originally broadcast January 3, 1968, over the CBS TelevisionNetwork;reprintedwithpermissionofCBSNewsArchive
MEMORANDUMFROMCHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFSOFSTAFFGENERALEARLE G. WHEELER FORTHEPRESIDENT,FEBRUARY 12, 1968 (EXTRACT) 2.GeneralWestmorelandrepeatedoverthetelephonetomeat0815hoursthe gistofhisearliermessages;namely,hebelievestheVCstruckoutinPhases1 and2oftheiroffensive.Heconsidershehasopportunitiesavailabletoexploit the enemy’s failures. He needs soonest one brigade of the 82d Airborne DivisionandaMarineCorpsRegiment.Heconsidersthathecanholdoffon adecisiontorequesttheremainderofthe82dAirborneDivisionandtheother threebattalionsofMarinesuntillater.Hecanabsorblogisticallythetroopshe asksfornow.Itisconceivablethatthetroopsheasksforwillbeneededonlyfor
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sixmonths;hewillnotbindhimselfthathewillnotneedmoretroopsatalater time.Hepointedoutthattheforcesheisrequestingarewithinthe525,000ceilingtowhichheagreed.Parenthetically,hecommentedthathedoesn’tknow howsacrosanctthatfigureis.Inresponsetothequestionsposedinmymessage tohim,attachedhereto,hemadethefollowingcomments: a.He does not anticipate “defeat,” but he desperately needs the troop elementsrequestedinordertocapitalizeonopportunitiesopentohim.The enemyhasbeenrepulsedinII,IIIandIVCorpsareas,butICorpsmust bereinforced.Ifrequestedtroopsarenotmadeavailable,hewouldhaveto undertakeanunacceptablyriskycourseofdrawingadditionalforcesfrom elsewhereinSouthVietnam. b.OnbalancetheARVNhasdoneagoodjob.Hedoesnotknowthestatus ofRegionalForceandPopularForcetroopelements.Hebelievesitwill be1AprilbeforethestatusofARVNisknown. c.He can support logistically the forces he requested; however, it is mandatorythatheopenandkeepopenHighways1and9andthiswillcost troops. d.Additionalforceswillgivehimincreasedcapabilitytoregaintheinitiative andgoontheoffensiveatanappropriatetime. 3.Astoparagraph2ofmycableregardingstrategy,GeneralWestmorelandsays theyaregoodquestionswhichhewillrespondtomorefullyinamessagenow beingdrafted.Hisbriefresponsestothethoughtsexpressedinparagraph2of mymessageareasfollows: a.HisPriorityOneobjectiveistoclearthecities. b.HeagreeswiththeexpressedPriorityTwoofgivingawaynoterritoryof valuebuthepointsoutthatsometimeshemustfightinunfavorableterrainandweatherinordernottogiveupimportantground. c.As to holding Khe Sanh, he has prepared on a close hold basis contingencyplanstoexecuteatacticalwithdrawalifthisbecomesdesirableand necessary.However,hebelievesstronglythatretentionofKheSanhwill afford him in future opportunities to exploit the enemy’s commitment oftroopsinandaroundKheSanhanddealhimasevereandperhapsa knockoutblow. d.AstotheDelta,hedoeshavecontingencyplanstomoveforcesformthere asrequired.Hepointsoutthatthebattalionscommitted(US)intheDelta havestiffenedtheARVNandhavehelpedhimtorepulsetheenemywith heavylosses.HisRiverineForceisnowbeingusedinthevicinityofCan Thowithgoodeffect. 5.AseniorVCpoliticalcadrewascapturedyesterdayatDanang.Thismanhad onhimalongdocument,nowbeingtranslated,whichapparentlyrepresents theresultsofahighlevelconferenceofVCofficials.Thefirstquickexami-
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nationofthedocumentindicatesthattheVCmadeamistakeinlaunching theirTetoffensiveatthetimeandinthemannertheydid.Specifically,the country was not ready for a mass uprising and US/ARVN military strength wasseriouslyunderestimatedbyVC/NVAforces. source: Memorandum for the President from General Wheeler, Subject: Reinforcements for South Vietnam, February 12, 1968, declassified by Joint Chiefs ofStaff,October10,19789;VietnamArchive(LarryBermanCollection),TexasTech University,Lubbock,Texas.
WALTERCRONKITE’S“WEARE MIRED IN STALEMATE”CBSNEWSBROADCAST, FEBRUARY27,1968 Tonight,backinmorefamiliarsurroundingsinNewYork,we’dliketosumup ourfindingsinVietnam,ananalysisthatmustbespeculative,personal,subjective.WhowonandwholostinthegreatTetoffensiveagainstthecities?I’mnot sure.TheVietcongdidnotwinbyaknockout,butneitherdidwe.Thereferees ofhistorymaymakeitadraw.Anotherstandoffmaybecominginthebigbattles expectedsouthoftheDemilitarizedZone.Khesanhcouldwellfall,withaterrible loss in American lives, prestige and morale, and this is a tragedy of our stubbornnessthere;butthebastionnolongerisakeytotherestofthenorthern regions,anditisdoubtfulthattheAmericanforcescanbedefeatedacrossthe breadthoftheDMZwithanysubstantiallossofground.Anotherstandoff.On thepoliticalfront,pastperformancegivesnoconfidencethattheVietnamese governmentcancopewithitsproblems,nowcompoundedbytheattackonthe cities.Itmaynotfall,itmayholdon,butitprobablywon’tshowthedynamic qualitiesdemandedofthisyoungnation.Anotherstandoff. We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders,bothinVietnamandWashington,tohavefaithanylongerinthesilver liningstheyfindinthedarkestclouds.Theymayberight,thatHanoi’swinterspringoffensivehasbeenforcedbytheCommunistrealizationthattheycould not win the longer war of attrition, and that the Communists hope that any successintheoffensivewillimprovetheirpositionforeventualnegotiations.It wouldimprovetheirposition,anditwouldalsorequireourrealization,thatwe shouldhavehadallalong,thatanynegotiationsmustbethat—negotiations,not thedictationofpeaceterms.Foritseemsnowmorecertainthaneverthatthe bloodyexperienceofVietnamistoendinastalemate.Thissummer’salmost certain standoff will either end in real give-and-take negotiations or terrible escalation;andforeverymeanswehavetoescalate,theenemycanmatchus,
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andthatappliestoinvasionoftheNorth,theuseofnuclearweapons,orthe merecommitmentofonehundred,ortwohundred,orthreehundredthousand moreAmericantroopstothebattle.Andwitheachescalation,theworldcomes closertothebrinkofcosmicdisaster. Tosaythatweareclosertovictorytodayistobelieve,inthefaceoftheevidence,theoptimistswhohavebeenwronginthepast.Tosuggestweareonthe edgeofdefeatistoyieldtounreasonablepessimism.Tosaythatwearemired instalemateseemstheonlyrealistic,yetunsatisfactory,conclusion.Ontheoff chancethatmilitaryandpoliticalanalystsareright,inthenextfewmonthswe musttesttheenemy’sintentions,incasethisisindeedhislastbiggaspbefore negotiations.Butitisincreasinglycleartothisreporterthattheonlyrational wayoutthenwillbetonegotiate,notasvictors,butasanhonorablepeoplewho liveduptotheirpledgetodefenddemocracy,anddidthebesttheycould. ThisisWalterCronkite.Goodnight. source: CBS News Special: “Who? What? When? Where? Why? A Report from Vietnam by Walter Cronkite, originally broadcast February 27, 1968, over the CBS TelevisionNetwork;reprintedwithpermissionofCBSNewsArchive
REPORTOFTHECHAIRMANOF THE JOINT CHIEFS OFSTAFFGENERALEARLEG. WHEELER ON THESITUATIONINVIETNAMAND MACV FORCE REQUIREMENTS,FEBRUARY27, 1968 (EXTRACT) 1.TheChairman,JCSandpartyvisitedSVNon23,24,and25February.This reportsummarizestheimpressionsandfactsdevelopedthroughconversations andbriefingsatMACVandwithseniorcommandersthroughoutthecountry. 2.Summary —The current situation in Vietnam is still developing and fraught with opportunitiesaswellasdangers. —ThereisnoquestioninthemindofMACVthattheenemywentallout forageneraloffensiveandgeneraluprisingandapparentlybelievedthat hewouldsucceedinbringingthewartoanearlysuccessfulconclusion. —The enemy failed to achieve his initial objective but is continuing his effort.Althoughmanyofhisunitswerebadlyhurt,thejudgmentisthat hehasthewillandthecapabilitytocontinue. —Enemylosseshavebeenheavy;hehasfailedtoachievehisprimeobjectivesofmassuprisingsandcaptureofalargernumberofthecapitalcities and towns. Morale in enemy units which were badly mauled or where themenwereoversoldtheideaofadecisivevictoryatTetprobablyhas
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sufferedseverely.However,withreplacements,hisindoctrinationsystem wouldseemcapableofmaintainingmoraleatagenerallyadequatelevel. Hisdeterminationappearstobeunshaken. —Theenemyisoperatingwithrelativefreedominthecountryside,probably recruitingheavilyandnodoubtinfiltratingNVAunitsandpersonnel.His recoveryislikelytoberapid;hissuppliesareadequate;andheistryingto maintainthemomentumofhiswinter-springoffensive. —ThestructureoftheGVNheldupbutitseffectivenesshassuffered. —TheRVNAFheldupagainsttheinitialassaultwithgratifying,andina way,surprisingstrengthandfortitude.However,ARVNisnowinadefensiveposturearoundtownsandcitiesandthereisconcernabouthowwell theywillbearupundersustainedpressure. —Theinitialattacknearlysucceededinadozenplaces,anddefeatinthose places was only averted by the timely reaction of US forces. In short, it wasaverynearthing. —ThereisnotdoubtthattheRDProgramhassufferedaseveresetback. —RVNAFwasnotbadlyhurtphysically—theyshouldrecoverstrengthand equipment rather quickly (equipment in 2–3 months—strength in 3–6 months).Theirproblemsaremorepsychologicalthanphysical. —USforceshavelostnoneoftheirpre-Tetcapability. —MACV has three principal problems. First, logistic support north of Danang is marginal owing to weather, enemy interdiction and harassmentandthemassivedeploymentofUSforceintotheDMZ/Huearea. OpeningRoute1willalleviatethisproblembuttakesasubstantialtroop commitment. Second, the defensive posture of ARVN is permitting the VC to make rapid inroads in the formerly pacified countryside. ARVN, in its own words, is in a dilemma as it cannot afford another enemy thrustintothecitiesandtownsandyetifitremainsinadefensiveposture againstthiscontingency,thecountrysidegoesbydefault.MACVisforced todevotemuchofitstroopstrengthtothisproblem.Third,MACVhas beenforcedtodeploy509cofallUSmaneuverbattalionsintoICorps,to meetthethreatthere,whilestrippingtherestofthecountryofadequate reserves. If the enemy synchronizes an attack against Khe Sanh/HueQuangTriwithanoffensiveintheHighlandsandaroundSaigonwhile keepingthepressureonthroughouttheremainderofthecountry,MACV willbehardpressedtomeetadequatelyallthreats.Underthesecircumstances,wemustbepreparedtoacceptsomereverses. —Forthesereasons,GeneralWestmorelandhasaskedfora3division-15tacticalfightersquadronforce.Thisforcewouldprovidehimwithatheater reserveandanoffensivecapabilitywhichhedoesnotnowhave. 3.Thesituationasitstandstoday:
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a.Enemycapabilities (1)Theenemyhasbeenhurtbadlyinthepopulatedlowlands,butispracticallyintactelsewhere.Hecommittedover67,000combatmaneuver forcesplusperhaps25%or17,000moreimpressedmenandboys,fora totalofabout84,000.Helost40,000killed,atleast3,000captured,and perhaps5,000disabledordiedofwounds.Hehadpeakedhisforcetotal toabout240,000justbeforeTET,byhardrecruiting,infiltration,civilian impressment, and drawdowns on service and guerrilla personnel. Sohehaslostaboutonefifthofhistotalstrength.Abouttwo-thirdof histrained,organizedunitstrengthcancontinueoffensiveaction.He isprobablyinfiltratingandrecruitingheavilyinthecountrysidewhile alliedforcesaresecuringtheurbanareas.(Discussionsofstrengthsand recruiting are in paragraphs 1. 2 and 3 of Enclosure (1)). The enemy has adequate munitions, stockpiled in-country and available through theDMZ,Laos,andCambodia,tosupportmajorattacksandcountrywidepressure;foodprocurementmaybeaproblem.(Discussionisin paragraph6Enclosure(1)).Besidesstrengthlosses,theenemynowhas moraleandtrainingproblemswhichcurrentlylimitcombateffectivenessofVCguerrilla,mainandlocalforces.(Discussionsofforcesare inparagraphs2,5,Enclosure(1)). (a)I Corps Tactical Zone: Strong enemy forces in the northern two provincesthreatenQuangTriandHuecities,andUSpositionsat theDMZ.TwoNVAdivisionsthreatenKheSanh.EightenemybattalionequivalentsareintheDanang–HoiAnarea.Enemylossesin ICTZhavebeenheavy,withabout13,000killed;someNVAaswell asVCuniteshavebeenhurtbadly.However,NVAreplacementsin theDMZareacanoffsettheselossesfairlyquickly.Theenemyhas anincreasedartillerycapabilityattheDMZ,plussometanksand possiblyevenalimitedairthreatinICTZ. (b)II Corps Tactical Zone: The 1st NVA Division went virtually unscathedduringTEToffensive,andrepresentsastrongthreatin thewesternhighlands.Sevencombatbattalionequivalentsthreaten DakTo.Elsewhereinthehighlands,NVAunitshavebeenhurtand VCunitschoppedupbadly.Onthecoast,the3rdNVADivision hadalreadytakenheavylossesjustpriortotheoffensive.The5th NVA Division, also located on the coast, is not in good shape. Local force strength in coastal It CTZ had dwindled long before theoffensive.Theenemy’sstrengthinIICTZisinthehighlands whereenemytroopsarefreshandsupplylinesshort. (c)IIICTZ:Mostoftheenemy’sunitswereusedintheTETeffort,and suffered substantial losses. Probably the only major unit to escape
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heavy losses was the 7th NVA Division. However, present dispositions give the enemy the continuing capability of attacking the Saigonareawith10to11combateffectivebattalionequivalents.His increasedmovementsouthwardofsupportingarmsandinfiltration ofsupplieshasfurtherdevelopedhiscapacityforattacksbyfire. (d)IV Corps Tactical Zone: All enemy forces were committed in IV Corps,butlossespertotalstrengthwerethelightestinthecountry. Theenemycontinuestobecapableofinvestingorattackingcities throughoutthearea. (2)Newweaponsortactics: Wemayseeheavierrocketsandtubeartillery,additionalarmor,and theuseofaircraft,particularlyintheICTZ.Theonlynewtacticin viewisinfiltrationandinvestmentofcitiestocreatechaos,todemoralizethepeople,todiscreditthegovernment,andtotiealliedforcesto urbansecurity. 4.Whatdoesthefuturehold? a.Probable enemy strategy. (Reference paragraph 7b, Enclosure (1)). We see the enemy pursuing a reinforced offensive to enlarge his control throughoutthecountryandkeeppressuresonthegovernmentandallies. WeexpecthimtomaintainstrongthreatsintheDMZarea,atKheSanh, in the highlands, and at Saigon, and to attack in force when conditions seemfavorable.Heislikelytotrytogaincontrolofthecountry’snorthern provinces.Hewillcontinueeffortstoencirclecitiesandprovincecapitals toisolateanddisruptnormalactivities,andinfiltratethemtocreatechaos. HewillseekmaximumattritionofRVNAFelements.AgainstUSforces,he willemphasizeattacksbyfireonairfieldsandinstallations,usingassaults andambushesselectively.HiscentralobjectivecontinuestobethedestructionoftheGovernmentofSVNanditsarmedforces.Asaminimumhe hopestoseizesufficientterritoryandgaincontrolofenoughpeopletosupportestablishmentofthegroupsandcommitteesheproposesforparticipationinanNLFdominatedgovernment. b.MACVStrategy: (1)MACVbelievesthatthecentralthrustofourstrategynowmustbeto defeattheenemyoffensiveandthatifthisisdonewell,thesituation overallwillbegreatlyimprovedoverthepre-TETcondition. (2)MACV accepts the fact that its first priority must be the security of Government of Vietnam in Saigon and provincial capitals. MACV describesitsobjectivesas: —First, to counter the enemy offensive and to destroy or eject the NVAinvasionforceinthenorth. —Second,torestoresecurityinthecitiesandtowns.
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—Third,torestoresecurityintheheavilypopulatedareasofthecountryside. —Fourth,toregaintheinitiativethroughoffensiveoperations. c.Tasks: (1)SecurityofCitiesandGovernment.MACVrecognizesthatUSforces willberequiredtoreinforceandsupportRVNAFinthesecurityofcities,townsandgovernmentstructure.Atthistime,10USbattalionsare operatingintheenvironsofSaigon.Itisclearthatthistaskwillabsorb asubstantialportionofUSforces. (2)SecurityintheCountryside.ToalargeextenttheVCnowcontrolthe countryside.Mostofthe54battalionsformerlyprovidingsecurityfor pacificationarenowdefendingdistrictorprovincetowns.MACVestimatesthatUSforceswillberequiredinanumberofplacestoassist andencouragetheVietnameseArmytoleavethecitiesandtownsand reenterthecountry.ThisisespeciallytrueintheDelta. (3)Defense of the borders, the DMZ and the northern provinces. MACV considersthatitmustmeettheenemythreatinICorpsTacticalZone and has already deployed there slightly over 50% of all US maneuver battalions.USforceshavebeenthinnedoutinthehighlands,notwithstandinganexpectedenemyoffensiveintheearlyfuture. (4)OffensiveOperations.Couplingtheincreasedrequirementforthecities andsubsequentreentryintotheruralareas,andtheheavyrequirement fordefenseoftheICorpsZone,MACVdoesnothaveadequateforces atthistimetoresumetheoffensiveintheremainderofthecountry,nor doesithaveadequatereservesagainstthecontingencyofsimultaneous large-scaleenemyoffensiveactionthroughoutthecountry. 5.ForceRequirements: a.ForcescurrentlyassignedtoMACV,plustheresidualProgramFiveforces yettobedelivered,areinadequateinnumbersandbalancetocarryout the strategy and to accomplish the tasks described above in the proper priority. To contend with, and defeat, the new enemy threat, MACV has stated requirements for forces over the 525,000 ceiling imposed by ProgramFive.Theadd-onrequestedtotals206,756spacesforanewproposedceilingof731,756,withallforcesbeingdeployedintocountrybythe endofCY68.Principalforcesincludedintheadd-onarethreedivision equivalents, 15 tactical fighter squadrons and augmentation for current Navy programs. MACV desires that these additional forces be delivered inthreepackagesasfollows: (1)ImmediateIncrement,PriorityOne:Tobedeployedby1May68.Major elementsincludeonebrigadeofthe5thMechanizedDivisionwitha mixofoneinfantry,onearmoredandonemechanizedbattalion;the
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Fifth Marine Division (less RLT-26); one armored cavalry regiment; eighttacticalfightersquadrons;andagroupmentofNavyunitstoaugmenton-goingprograms. (2)Immediate Increment, Priority Two: To be deployed as soon as possible butpriorto1Sep68.Majorelementsincludetheremainderofthe5th MechanizedDivision,andfourtacticalfightersquadrons.Itisdesirable thattheROKLightDivisionbedeployedwithinthistimeframe. (3)Follow-OnIncrement:TobedeployedbytheendofCY68.Majorelements include one infantry division, three tactical fighter squadrons, andunitstofurtheraugmentNavyPrograms. source: Memorandum of February 27, 1968, from Wheeler to Johnson, declassified by Department of Defense, no date given; Vietnam Archive (Douglas Pike Collection),TexasTechUniversity,Lubbock,Texas.
SUMMARYOFNOTESFROMMARCH 26, 1968, MEETINGBETWEENPRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSONANDTHEWISE MEN SummaryofNotes mcgeorgebundy:Thereisaverysignificantshiftinourposition.Whenwe lastmetwesawreasonsforhope. We hoped then there would be a slow but steady progress. Last night and todaythepictureisnotsohopefulparticularlyinthecountryside. DeanAchesonsummedupthemajorityfeelingwhenhesaidthatwecanno longerdothejobwesetouttodointhetimewehaveleftandwemustbegin totakestepstodisengage. Thatviewwassharedby: GeorgeBall CyVance DouglasDillon andmyself(McGeorgeBundy) Wedo think weshoulddo everythingpossible to strengthen in a real and visiblewaytheperformanceoftheGovernmentofSouthVietnam. Therewerethreeofuswhotookadifferentposition: GeneralBradley GeneralTaylor BobMurphy
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Theyallfeelthatweshouldnotacttoweakenourpositionandweshould dowhatourmilitarycommanderssuggest. GeneralRidgwayhasaspecialpointofview.Hewantedtosostrengthenthe ArmyofSouthVietnamthatwecouldcompletethejobintwoyears. Onnegotiations,Ball,GoldbergandVancestronglyurgedacessationofthe bombingnow.OtherswantedahaltatsomepointbutnotnowwhilethesituationisstillunresolvedintheICorpsarea. On troop reinforcements the dominant sentiment was that the burden of proofrestswiththosewhoareurgingtheincrease.Mostofusthinkthereshould beasubstantialescalation.Weallfeltthereshouldnotbeanextensionofthe conflict.Thiswouldbeagainstoutnationalinterest. Theuseofatomicweaponsisunthinkable.
Summary ridgway:IagreewiththesummaryaspresentedbyMcGeorgeBundy. [arthur]dean:Iagree.Allofusgottheimpressionthatthereisnomilitary conclusioninsight.Wefelttimeisrunningout. deanacheson:AgreewithBundy’spresentation.Neithertheeffortofthe GovernmentofVietnamortheeffortoftheU.S.governmentcansucceedin thetimewehaveleft.Timeislimitedbyreactionsinthiscountry.Wecannot buildanindependentSouthVietnam;therefore,weshoulddosomethingbyno laterthanlatesummertoestablishsomethingdifferent. henrycabotlodge:Weshouldshiftfromsearch-and-destroystrategytoa strategyofusingourmilitarypowerasashieldtopermittheSouthVietnamese society to develop as well as North Vietnamese society has been able to do. WeneedtoorganizeSouthVietnamonablock-by-block,precinct-by-precinct basis. douglasdillon:Weshouldchangetheemphasis.IagreewithAcheson. Thebriefinglastnightledmetoconcludewecannotachieveamilitaryvictory. IwouldagreewithLodgethatweshouldceasesearch-and-destroytacticsand headtowardaneventualdisengagement.Iwouldsendonlythetroopsnecessary tosupportthosetherenow. georgeball:IshareAcheson’sview.Ihavefeltthatwaysince1961—that ourobjectivesarenotattainable.IntheU.S.thereisasharpdivisionofopinion. In the world, we look very badly because of the bombing. That is the central defect in our position. The disadvantages of bombing outweigh the advantages.Weneedtostopthebombinginthenextsixweekstotestthewill oftheNorthVietnamese.Aslongaswecontinuetobomb,wealienateourselvesfromthecivilizedworld.IwouldhavethePopeorUThant[Secretary-
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GeneraloftheUnitedNations]suggestthebombinghalt.Itcannotcomefrom thePresident. Abombinghaltwouldquieten[sic]thesituationhereathome. cyvance:McGeorgeBundystatesmyviews.IagreewithGeorgeBall. Unlesswedosomethingquick,themoodinthiscountrymayleadustowithdrawalontroops,weshouldsendnomorethanthe13,000supporttroops.... generaltaylor:Iamdismayed.ThepictureIgetisaverydifferentonefrom thatyouhave.Let’snotconcedethehomefront;let’sdosomethingaboutit. fortas: The U.S. has never had in mind winning a military victory out there;wealwayshavewantedtoreachanagreementorsettleforthestatusquo betweenNorthVietnamandSouthVietnam.IagreewithGeneralTaylor.... Thisisnotthetimeforanovertureonourpart.Idonotthinkacessationof thebombingwoulddoanygoodatthistime.Idonotbelieveindramaforthe sakeofdrama. acheson:TheissueisnotthatstatedbyFortas.Theissueiscanwedowhat wearetryingtodoinVietnam.Idonotthinkwecan.Fortassaidwearenot tryingtowinamilitaryvictory.Theissueiscanwebymilitarymeanskeepthe NorthVietnameseofftheSouthVietnamese.Idonotthinkwecan.Theycan sliparoundandend-runthemandcrackthemup. source: “Meeting with Special Advisory Group,” March 26, 1968, Meeting Notes File,Box2,LyndonB.JohnsonLibrary,Austin,Texas.
PRESIDENTJOHNSON’SADDRESS TO THE NATION ANNOUNCINGHISDECISION NOT TO SEEK REELECTION,MARCH 31, 1968 President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Address to the Nation Announcing Steps To LimittheWarinVietnamandReportingHisDecisionNotToSeekReelection. March31,1968.ThePresidentspokeat9P.M.ESTfromtheovalofficeinthe WhiteHouse.Theaddresswasbroadcastednationally. Goodevening,myfellowAmericans: TonightIwanttospeaktoyouofpeaceinVietnamandSoutheastAsia. No other question so preoccupies our people. No other dream so absorbs the250millionhumanbeingswholiveinthatpartoftheworld.Noothergoal motivatesAmericanpolicyinSoutheastAsia. Foryears,representativesofourGovernmentandothershavetraveledthe world—seekingtofindabasisforpeacetalks. SincelastSeptember,theyhavecarriedtheofferthatImadepublicatSan Antonio.
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Thatofferwasthis: ThattheUnitedStateswouldstopitsbombardmentofNorthVietnamwhen thatwouldleadpromptlytoproductivediscussions—andthatwewouldassume thatNorthVietnamwouldnottakemilitaryadvantageofourrestraint. Hanoi denounced this offer, both privately and publicly. Even while the search for peace was going on, North Vietnam rushed their preparations for a savage assault on the people, the government, and the allies of South Vietnam. Their attack—during the Tet holidays—failed to achieve its principal objectives. ItdidnotcollapsetheelectedgovernmentofSouthVietnamorshatterits army—astheCommunistshadhoped. It did not produce a “general uprising” among the people of the cities as theyhadpredicted. TheCommunistswereunabletomaintaincontrolofanyofthemorethan thirtycitiesthattheyattacked.Andtheytookveryheavycasualties. ButtheydidcompeltheSouthVietnameseandtheiralliestomovecertain forcesfromthecountrysideintothecities. They caused widespread disruption and suffering. Their attacks, and the battlesthatfollowed,maderefugeesofhalfamillionhumanbeings. TheCommunistsmayrenewtheirattackanyday. They are, it appears, trying to make 1968 the year of decision in South Vietnam—theyearthatbrings,ifnotfinalvictoryordefeat,atleastaturning pointinthestruggle. Thismuchisclear: Iftheydomountanotherroundofheavyattacks,theywillnotsucceedin destroyingthefightingpowerofSouthVietnamanditsallies. But tragically, this is also clear: Many men—on both sides of the struggle—willbelost.Anationthathasalreadysufferedtwentyyearsofwarfarewill sufferonceagain.Armiesonbothsideswilltakenewcasualties.Andthewar willgoon. Thereisnoneedforthistobeso. Thereisnoneedtodelaythetalksthatcouldbringanendtothislongand thisbloodywar. Tonight,IrenewtheofferImadelastAugust—tostopthebombardmentof NorthVietnam.Weaskthattalksbeginpromptly,thattheybeserioustalkson thesubstanceofpeace.WeassumethatduringthosetalksHanoiwillnottake advantageofourrestraint. Wearepreparedtomoveimmediatelytowardpeacethroughnegotiations. So,tonight,inthehopethatthisactionwillleadtoearlytalks,Iamtaking thefirststeptodeescalatetheconflict.Wearereducing—substantiallyreducing—thepresentlevelofhostilities.
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Andwearedoingsounilaterally,andatonce. Tonight,Ihaveorderedouraircraftandournavalvesselstomakenoattacks onNorthVietnam,exceptintheareanorthofthedemilitarizedzonewherethe continuingenemybuildupdirectlythreatensalliedforwardpositionsandwhere themovementsoftheirtroopsandsuppliesareclearlyrelatedtothatthreat. Theareainwhichwearestoppingourattacksincludesalmost90percent ofNorthVietnam’spopulation,andmostofitsterritory.Thustherewillbeno attacksaroundtheprincipalpopulatedareas,orinthefood-producingareasof NorthVietnam. EventhisverylimitedbombingoftheNorthcouldcometoanearlyend—if ourrestraintismatchedbyrestraintinHanoi.ButIcannotingoodconscience stopallbombingsolongastodosowouldimmediatelyanddirectlyendanger thelivesofourmenandourallies.Whetheracompletebombinghaltbecomes possibleinthefuturewillbedeterminedbyevents. Ourpurposeinthisactionistobringaboutareductioninthelevelofviolencethatnowexists. Itistosavethelivesofbravemen—andtosavethelivesofinnocentwomen andchildren.Itistopermitthecontendingforcestomoveclosertoapolitical settlement. And tonight, I call upon the United Kingdom and I call upon the Soviet Union—ascochairmenoftheGenevaConferences,andaspermanentmembersoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil—todoalltheycantomovefrom the unilateral act of deescalation that I have just announced toward genuine peaceinSoutheastAsia. Now,asinthepast,theUnitedStatesisreadytosenditsrepresentativesto anyforum,atanytime,todiscussthemeansofbringingthisuglywartoanend. IamdesignatingoneofourmostdistinguishedAmericans,AmbassadorAverell Harriman,asmypersonalrepresentativeforsuchtalks. Inaddition,IhaveaskedAmbassadorLlewellynThompson,whoreturnedfrom Moscowforconsultation,tobeavailabletojoinAmbassadorHarrimanatGeneva oranyothersuitableplace—justassoonasHanoiagreestoaconference. IcalluponPresidentHoChiMinhtorespondpositively,andfavorably,to thisnewsteptowardpeace.Butifpeacedoesnotcomenowthroughnegotiations,itwillcomewhenHanoiunderstandsthatourcommonresolveisunshakable,andourcommonstrengthisinvincible. Tonight, we and the other allied nations are contributing 600,000 fighting men to assist 700,000 South Vietnamese troops in defending their little country.Ourpresencetherehasalwaysrestedonthisbasicbelief:Themain burdenofpreservingtheirfreedommustbecarriedoutbythem—bytheSouth Vietnamesethemselves. Weandouralliescanonlyhelptoprovideashieldbehindwhichthepeople ofSouthVietnamcansurviveandcangrowanddevelop.Ontheirefforts—on
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theirdeterminationandresourcefulness—theoutcomewillultimatelydepend. Thatsmall,beleaguerednationhassufferedterriblepunishmentformorethan twentyyears. Ipaytributeonceagaintonighttothegreatcourageandenduranceofits people.SouthVietnamsupportsarmedforcestonightofalmost700,000men— andIcallyourattentiontothefactthatthisistheequivalentofmorethanten millioninourownpopulation.Itspeoplemaintaintheirfirmdeterminationto befreeofdominationbytheNorth. Therehasbeensubstantialprogress,Ithink,inbuildingadurablegovernment duringtheselastthreeyears.TheSouthVietnamof1965couldnothavesurvived the enemy’s Tet offensive of 1968. The elected government of South Vietnam survivedthatattack—andisrapidlyrepairingthedevastationthatitwrought. TheSouthVietnameseknowthatfurthereffortsaregoingtoberequired: —toexpandtheirownarmedforces, —tomovebackintothecountrysideasquicklyaspossible, —toincreasetheirtaxes, —toselecttheverybestmenthattheyhaveforcivilandmilitaryresponsibility, —toachieveanewunitywithintheirconstitutionalgovernment,and —to include in the national effort all those groups who wish to preserve SouthVietnam’scontroloveritsowndestiny. Last week President Thieu ordered the mobilization of 135,000 additional South Vietnamese. He plans to reach—as soon as possible—a total military strengthofmorethan800,000men.Toachievethis,theGovernmentofSouth Vietnamstartedthedraftingofnineteen-year-oldsonMarch1st.OnMay1st, the Government will begin the drafting of eighteen-year-olds. Last month, 10,000menvolunteeredformilitaryservice—thatwastwoandahalftimesthe number of volunteers during the same month last year. Since the middle of January,morethan48,000SouthVietnamesehavejoinedthearmedforces— andnearlyhalfofthemvolunteeredtodoso.AllmenintheSouthVietnamese armedforceshavehadtheirtoursofdutyextendedforthedurationofthewar, and reserves are now being called up for immediate active duty. President Thieutoldhispeoplelastweek:“Wemustmakegreatereffortsandacceptmore sacrificesbecause,asIhavesaidmanytimes,thisisourcountry.Theexistence of our nation is at stake, and this is mainly a Vietnamese responsibility.” He warnedhispeoplethatamajornationaleffortisrequiredtorootoutcorruption andincompetenceatalllevelsofgovernment. WeapplaudthisevidenceofdeterminationonthepartofSouthVietnam. Ourfirstprioritywillbetosupporttheireffort.WeshallacceleratethereequipmentofSouthVietnam’sarmedforces—inordertomeettheenemy’sincreased firepower. This will enable them progressively to undertake a larger share of combatoperationsagainsttheCommunistinvaders.
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On many occasions I have told the American people that we would send toVietnamthoseforcesthatarerequiredtoaccomplishourmissionthere.So, withthatasourguide,wehavepreviouslyauthorizedaforcelevelofapproximately525,000. Some weeks ago—to help meet the enemy’s new offensive—we sent to Vietnam about 11,000 additional Marine and airborne troops. They were deployedbyairinforty-eighthours,onanemergencybasis.Buttheartillery, tank,aircraft,medical,andotherunitsthatwereneededtoworkwithandto supporttheseinfantrytroopsincombatcouldnotthenaccompanythembyair onthatshortnotice. In order that these forces may reach maximum combat effectiveness, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to me that we should prepare to send—during the next five months—support troops totaling approximately 13,500men. Aportionofthesemenwillbemadeavailablefromouractiveforces.The balance will come from reserve component units which will be called up forservice. Theactionsthatwehavetakensincethebeginningoftheyear: —toreequiptheSouthVietnameseforces, —to meet our responsibilities in Korea, as well as our responsibilities in Vietnam, —tomeetpriceincreasesandthecostofactivatinganddeployingreserve forces, —toreplacehelicoptersandprovidetheothermilitarysuppliesweneed,all oftheseactionsaregoingtorequireadditionalexpenditures. Thetentativeestimateofthoseadditionalexpendituresis$2.5billioninthis fiscalyear,and$2.6billioninthenextfiscalyear. Theseprojectedincreasesinexpendituresforournationalsecuritywillbring intosharperfocustheNation’sneedforimmediateaction:actiontoprotectthe prosperityoftheAmericanpeopleandtoprotectthestrengthandthestability ofourAmericandollar. OnmanyoccasionsIhavepointedoutthat,withoutataxbillordecreased expenditures,nextyear’sdeficitwouldagainbearound$20billion.Ihaveemphasizedtheneedtosetstrictprioritiesinourspending.Ihavestressedthatfailureto actandtoactpromptlyanddecisivelywouldraiseverystrongdoubtsthroughout theworldaboutAmerica’swillingnesstokeepitsfinancialhouseinorder. YetCongresshasnotacted.Andtonightwefacethesharpestfinancialthreat inthepostwarera—athreattothedollar’sroleasthekeystoneofinternational tradeandfinanceintheworld. Lastweek,atthemonetaryconferenceinStockholm,themajorindustrial countriesdecidedtotakeabigsteptowardcreatinganewinternationalmon-
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etary asset that will strengthen the international monetary system. I am very proudoftheveryableworkdonebySecretaryFowlerandChairmanMartinof theFederalReserveBoard. ButtomakethissystemworktheUnitedStatesjustmustbringitsbalanceof paymentsto—orverycloseto—equilibrium.Wemusthavearesponsiblefiscal policyinthiscountry.Thepassageofataxbillnow,togetherwithexpenditure control that the Congress may desire and dictate, is absolutely necessary to protectthisNation’ssecurity,tocontinueourprosperity,andtomeettheneeds ofourpeople. What is at stake is seven years of unparalleled prosperity. In those seven years,therealincomeoftheaverageAmerican,aftertaxes,rosebyalmost30 percent—againaslargeasthatoftheentireprecedingnineteenyears. Sothestepsthatwemusttaketoconvincetheworldareexactlythestepswe musttaketosustainourowneconomicstrengthhereathome.Inthepasteight months,pricesandinterestrateshaverisenbecauseofourinaction. We must, therefore, now do everything we can to move from debate to action—from talking to voting. There is, I believe—I hope there is—in both Houses of the Congress—a growing sense of urgency that this situation just mustbeacteduponandmustbecorrected. My budget in January was, we thought, a tight one. It fully reflected our evaluationofmostofthedemandingneedsofthisNation. But in these budgetary matters, the President does not decide alone. The Congresshasthepowerandthedutytodetermineappropriationsandtaxes. The Congress is now considering our proposals and they are considering reductionsinthebudgetthatwesubmitted. Aspartofaprogramoffiscalrestraintthatincludesthetaxsurcharge,Ishall approveappropriatereductionsintheJanuarybudgetwhenandifCongressso decidesthatthatshouldbedone. Onethingisunmistakablyclear,however:Ourdeficitjustmustbereduced. Failure to act could bring on conditions that would strike hardest at those peoplethatallofusaretryingsohardtohelp. Thesetimescallforprudenceinthislandofplenty.Ibelievethatwehave thecharactertoprovideit,andtonightIpleadwiththeCongressandwiththe people to act promptly to serve the national interest, and thereby serve all of ourpeople. Nowletmegiveyoumyestimateofthechancesforpeace: —thepeacethatwillonedaystopthebloodshedinSouthVietnam, —that will permit all the Vietnamese people to rebuild and develop theirland, —thatwillpermitustoturnmorefullytoourowntaskshereathome.
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I cannot promise that the initiative that I have announced tonight will be completelysuccessfulinachievingpeaceanymorethanthethirtyothersthat wehaveundertakenandagreedtoinrecentyears. But it is our fervent hope that North Vietnam, after years of fighting that have left the issue unresolved, will now cease its efforts to achieve a military victoryandwilljoinwithusinmovingtowardthepeacetable. AndtheremaycomeatimewhenSouthVietnamese—onbothsides—are abletoworkoutawaytosettletheirowndifferences by free political choice ratherthanbywar. AsHanoiconsidersitscourse,itshouldbeinnodoubtofourintentions.It mustnotmiscalculatethepressureswithinourdemocracyinthiselectionyear. Wehavenointentionofwideningthiswar.ButtheUnitedStateswillnever acceptafakesolutiontothislongandarduousstruggleandcallitpeace. Noonecanforetelltheprecisetermsofaneventualsettlement.Ourobjective in South Vietnam has never been the annihilation of the enemy. It has beentobringaboutarecognitioninHanoithatitsobjective—takingoverthe Southbyforce—couldnotbeachieved. We think that peace can be based on the Geneva Accords of 1954— under political conditions that permit the South Vietnamese—all the South Vietnamese—tocharttheircoursefreeofanyoutsidedominationorinterference,fromusorfromanyoneelse. SotonightIreaffirmthepledgethatwemadeatManila—thatwearepreparedtowithdrawourforcesfromSouthVietnamastheothersidewithdraws itsforcestothenorth,stopstheinfiltration,andthelevelofviolencethussubsides. Ourgoalofpeaceandself-determinationinVietnam is directly related to thefutureofallofSoutheastAsia—wheremuchhashappenedtoinspireconfidenceduringthepasttenyears.Wehavedoneallthatweknewhowtodoto contributeandtohelpbuildthatconfidence. A number of its nations have shown what can be accomplished under conditionsofsecurity.Since1966,Indonesia,thefifth-largestnationinallthe world,withapopulationofmorethan100millionpeople,hashadagovernment that is dedicated to peace with its neighbors and improved conditions for its own people. Political and economic cooperation between nations has grownrapidly. I think every American can take a great deal of pride in the role that we haveplayedinbringingthisaboutinSoutheastAsia.Wecanrightlyjudge—as responsible Southeast Asians themselves do—that the progress of the past three years would have been far less likely—if not completely impossible—if America’ssonsandothershadnotmadetheirstandinVietnam.
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At Johns Hopkins University, about three years ago, I announced that the UnitedStateswouldtakepartinthegreatworkofdevelopingSoutheastAsia, includingtheMekongValley,forallthepeopleofthatregion.Ourdetermination to help build a better land—a better land for men on both sides of the presentconflict—hasnotdiminishedintheleast.Indeed,theravagesofwar,I think,havemadeitmoreurgentthanever. So,IrepeatonbehalfoftheUnitedStatesagaintonightwhatIsaidatJohns Hopkins—thatNorthVietnamcouldtakeitsplaceinthiscommoneffortjust assoonaspeacecomes. Over time, a wider framework of peace and security in Southeast Asia may become possible. The new cooperation of the nations of the area could be a foundation-stone. Certainly friendship with the nations of such a SoutheastAsiaiswhattheUnitedStatesseeks—andthatisallthattheUnited Statesseeks. Oneday,myfellowcitizens,therewillbepeaceinSoutheastAsia. It will come because the people of Southeast Asia want it—those whose armies are at war tonight, and those who, though threatened, have thus far beenspared. PeacewillcomebecauseAsianswerewillingtoworkforit—andtosacrifice forit—andtodiebythethousandsforit. Butletitneverbeforgotten:PeacewillcomealsobecauseAmericasenther sonstohelpsecureit. Ithasnotbeeneasy—farfromit.Duringthepastfourandahalfyears,ithas beenmyfateandmyresponsibilitytobeCommanderinChief.Ihavelived— dailyandnightly—withthecostofthiswar.Iknowthepainthatithasinflicted. Iknow,perhapsbetterthananyone,themisgivingsthatithasaroused. Throughoutthisentire,longperiod,Ihavebeensustainedbyasingleprinciple:thatwhatwearedoingnow,inVietnam,isvitalnotonlytothesecurity ofSoutheastAsia,butitisvitaltothesecurityofeveryAmerican. Surely we have treaties which we must respect. Surely we have commitmentsthatwearegoingtokeep.ResolutionsoftheCongresstestifytotheneed toresistaggressionintheworldandinSoutheastAsia. ButtheheartofourinvolvementinSouthVietnam—underthreedifferent presidents, three separate administrations—has always been America’s ownsecurity. And the larger purpose of our involvement has always been to help the nations of Southeast Asia become independent and stand alone, self-sustaining,asmembersofagreatworldcommunity—atpeacewiththemselves,and atpeacewithallothers. With such an Asia, our country—and the world—will be far more secure thanitistonight.
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IbelievethatapeacefulAsiaisfarnearertorealitybecauseofwhatAmerica hasdoneinVietnam.Ibelievethatthemenwhoendurethedangersofbattle—fightingthereforustonight—arehelpingtheentireworldavoidfargreater conflicts,farwiderwars,farmoredestruction,thanthisone. Thepeacethatwillbringthemhomesomedaywillcome.TonightIhave offeredthefirstinwhatIhopewillbeaseriesofmutualmovestowardpeace. IpraythatitwillnotberejectedbytheleadersofNorthVietnam.Ipraythat theywillacceptitasameansbywhichthesacrificesoftheirownpeoplemaybe ended.AndIaskyourhelpandyoursupport,myfellowcitizens,forthiseffort toreachacrossthebattlefieldtowardanearlypeace. Finally,myfellowAmericans,letmesaythis: Ofthosetowhommuchisgiven,muchisasked.Icannotsayandnoman couldsaythatnomorewillbeaskedofus. Yet,Ibelievethatnow,nolessthanwhenthedecadebegan,thisgenerationof Americansiswillingto“payanyprice,bearanyburden,meetanyhardship,supportanyfriend,opposeanyfoetoassurethesurvivalandthesuccessofliberty.” SincethosewordswerespokenbyJohnF.Kennedy,thepeopleofAmerica havekeptthatcompactwithmankind’snoblestcause. Andweshallcontinuetokeepit. Yet,Ibelievethatwemustalwaysbemindfulofthisonething,whateverthe trialsandthetestsahead.Theultimatestrengthofourcountryandourcause willlienotinpowerfulweaponsorinfiniteresourcesorboundlesswealth,but willlieintheunityofourpeople. ThisIbelieveverydeeply. ThroughoutmyentirepubliccareerIhavefollowedthepersonalphilosophy thatIamafreeman,anAmerican,apublicservant,andamemberofmyparty, inthatorderalwaysandonly. Forthirty-sevenyearsintheserviceofourNation,firstasaCongressman, asaSenator,andasVicePresident,andnowasyourPresident,Ihaveputthe unityofthepeoplefirst.Ihaveputitaheadofanydivisivepartisanship. Andinthesetimesasintimesbefore,itistruethatahousedividedagainst itselfbythespiritoffaction,ofparty,ofregion,ofreligion,ofrace,isahouse thatcannotstand. ThereisdivisionintheAmericanhousenow.Thereisdivisivenessamongus alltonight.Andholdingthetrustthatismine,asPresidentofallthepeople,I cannotdisregardtheperiltotheprogressoftheAmericanpeopleandthehope andtheprospectofpeaceforallpeoples. So,IwouldaskallAmericans,whatevertheirpersonalinterestsorconcern, toguardagainstdivisivenessandallitsuglyconsequences. Fifty-twomonthsandtendaysago,inamomentoftragedyandtrauma,the duties of this office fell upon me. I asked then for your help and God’s, that
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wemightcontinueAmericaonitscourse,bindingupourwounds,healingour history,movingforwardinnewunity,tocleartheAmericanagendaandtokeep theAmericancommitmentforallofourpeople. Unitedwehavekeptthatcommitment.Unitedwehaveenlargedthatcommitment. Throughalltimetocome,IthinkAmericawillbeastrongernation,amore justsociety,andalandofgreateropportunityandfulfillmentbecauseofwhat wehavealldonetogetherintheseyearsofunparalleledachievement. Ourrewardwillcomeinthelifeoffreedom,peace,andhopethatourchildrenwillenjoythroughagesahead. Whatwewonwhenallofourpeopleunited just must not now be lost in suspicion,distrust,selfishness,andpoliticsamonganyofourpeople. Believing this as I do, I have concluded that I should not permit the Presidencytobecomeinvolvedinthepartisandivisionsthataredevelopingin thispoliticalyear. WithAmerica’ssonsinthefieldsfaraway,withAmerica’sfutureunderchallengerighthereathome,withourhopesandtheworld’shopesforpeaceinthe balanceeveryday,IdonotbelievethatIshoulddevoteanhouroradayofmy timetoanypersonalpartisancausesortoanydutiesotherthantheawesome dutiesofthisoffice—thePresidencyofyourcountry. Accordingly,Ishallnotseek,andIwillnotaccept,thenominationofmy partyforanothertermasyourPresident. But let men everywhere know, however, that a strong, a confident, and a vigilantAmericastandsreadytonighttoseekanhonorablepeace—andstands ready tonight to defend an honored cause—whatever the price, whatever the burden,whateverthesacrificethatdutymayrequire. Thankyouforlistening.GoodnightandGodblessallofyou. source:PublicPapersofthePresidentsoftheUnitedStates:LyndonB.Johnson,196869(Washington,DC:GovernmentPrintingOffice,1970),1:468–476.
partvi Resources
Theobjectiveofthissectionistoprovideaguidetoreferencesandresources having to do with the Tet Offensive and Khe Sanh and the impact of those events.Itisnotmeanttobeanexhaustiveandall-inclusivelistofeveryresource ontheVietnamWar,butratherfocuseson1968.Assuch,thissectionbegins withalistofgeneralhistoriesofthewarthatputtheseminaleventsofthatyear inproperhistoricalperspective.Theotherlistingsfocusonvariousaspectsof theTetOffensiveandincludebooks,articles,films,Internetsources,libraries, archives,andotherresources.
g en eral w o rks Encyclopedias,Bibliographies,Dictionaries,Guides,andAtlases Anderson,DavidL.TheColumbiaGuidetotheVietnamWar.NewYork:Columbia UniversityPress,2002.Theauthorprovidesacomprehensiveguidetothestudyof theVietnamWar.Theguideisdividedintothreeparts.ThefirstisahistoricalnarrativeofthewarfromFrenchoccupationthroughNorthVietnam’svictoryin1975, organizedaroundkeycontroversialissues.Thesecondpartisamini-encyclopedia
226 Resources ofthewarthatincludeskeypeople,places,andevents.Thethirdpartisanextensivelistofresourcesanddocuments,plusadetailedchronologythatrunsfrom207 B.C.throughPresidentClinton’srecognitionofVietnamin1995. Bowman,JohnS.,ed.TheVietnamWar:AnAlmanac.NewYork:PharosBooks,1985. Thisreferencebookcoversthemilitary,diplomatic,anddomesticeventsofthewar arrangedinchronologicalorder.Italsoincludesanumberoftopicalessays,aswell asbiographicalsketchesandabibliography. ———,ed.TheVietnamWar:DaybyDay.NewYork:BromptonBooks,1989.Thisisa detailedday-by-daychronologyofthewarthataddressesthekeymilitary,political, anddiplomaticeventsfrom1857to1984. Burns,RichardDean,andMiltonLeitenberg.TheWarsinVietnam,Cambodia,and Laos,1945–1982:ABibliographicGuide.SantaBarbara,CA:ABC-CLIO,1984.An excellent bibliography containing more than 6,200 entries organized by key topics,thisbookaddressessomeoftheolderworksbutisobviouslydated,giventhe numerousbooksthathavecomeoutsinceitwaspublished. Kutler, Stanley I., ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War. New York: Macmillan LibraryReference,1996.Containingsome560articles,thisencyclopediaaddresses virtuallyeveryaspectoftheVietnamWar:individuals,places,andevents.Italso includesteninterpretiveessaysonkeyissuesofthewar. Moïse,EdwinE.HistoricalDictionaryoftheVietnamWar.Lanham,MD:Scarecrow Press,2001.MoisefocusesontheessentialelementsoftheVietnamWar,including significantpersons,battles,weapons,places,andevents.Thebookalsoincludesa detailedchronologyandacomprehensivebibliography. Olson,JamesS.,ed.DictionaryoftheVietnamWar.Westport,CT:Greenwood,1988. Thisbookprovidesagoodreferencethatcoverskeyconcepts,people,locations, and events of the Vietnam War; it is particularly good on military topics and Vietnam-eraterminology. ———. The Vietnam War: Handbook on the Literature and Research. Westport, CT: Greenwood,1993.Thisbookcontainstwenty-threeessaysoncriticaltopicsabout thewar;eachessayisaccompaniedbyafocusedbibliography. Stanton, Shelby L. Vietnam Order of Battle. New York: Galahad Books, 1986. This excellent reference volume addresses U.S. and allied order-of-battle information forallunitsthatparticipatedinthewar.Itincludesunitheraldry,datesofservice, geographicalareasofoperation,and,inmanycases,listingsofcommanders.Italso hasanextensivesetofmapsandphotographs. Summers, Harry G., Jr. Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War. New York: Houghton Mifflin,1995.Thisatlascomprisesmorethan120excellentmapsaccompaniedby brief but well-written historical explanations discussing the events that occurred ontherespectivemaps;itincludesmapsandnarrativesontheHillFights,Con Thien, Dak To, and Tet 1968, including the battles of Saigon and Hue and the siegeofKheSanh. ———.VietnamWarAlmanac.NewYork:FactsonFile,1985.Dividedintothreeparts, thisalmanacfirstaddressesthebackgroundonVietnamandthewar.Thesecond part is a detailed chronology of the war. The third part is a collection of more
Resources 227 thanthreehundredarticlesondifferentaspectsofthewar,includingbiographical entries,militaryterms,andgeographicallocations. Tucker, Spencer C., ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and MilitaryHistory.3vols.SantaBarbara,CA:ABC-CLIO,1998.Thisisoneofthe mostcomprehensivereferenceworksontheVietnamWar.Thefirsttwovolumes contain more than nine hundred signed entries ranging in length from several paragraphstoseveralpages;thethirdvolumeprovidesarepresentativeselectionof documentspertainingtothewar.
GeneralHistories,Anthologies Addington,LarryH.America’sWarinVietnam:AShortNarrativeHistory.Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. This is a brief narrative history of the war in SoutheastAsia.Itisagoodoverview,butitdoesnotprovidemuchdetail. Anderson, David L., ed. Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945–1975. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. This collection of essaysfocusesonthepresidentswhomadeandexecutedU.S.policyinSoutheast AsiafromTrumanthroughFord,providingusefulinsightsintotheconflictandits impactonthepresidency.ItcontainstwoverygoodessaysonLyndonJohnsonand hishandlingofthewar. Arnold,JamesR.PresidentsUnderFire:CommandersinChiefinVictoryandDefeat. NewYork:OrionBooks,1994.Arnoldexploresfourcasestudiesofpresidentsand how their administrations handled war. One of those studies addresses Lyndon Johnson,whomArnoldcriticizesforfailingtodealsuccessfullywiththesituation inVietnam. Bergerud,EricM.TheDynamicsofDefeat:TheVietnamWarinHauNghiaProvince. Boulder,CO:Westview,1991.Theauthoranalyzestheentirecourseofthewarby examiningasinglekeyprovince,HauNghia,northwestofSaigon.Hefocuseson theoperationallevel,wherepoliticalpolicywastranslatedintomilitaryaction.The bookcontainsaverygoodchapterontheTetOffensiveinHauNghia,representativeoftheactionseeninmanyotherprovincesduringtheearlymonthsof1968. ———.RedThunder,TropicLightning:TheWorldofaCombatDivisioninVietnam. Boulder,CO:Westview,1993.Theauthorprovidesanaccountoftheoperations ofaU.S.infantrydivision.Itisagoodrepresentationoflifeinacombatunitthat addressesorganization,tactics,andtheconductofoperations. Braestrup, Peter, ed. Vietnam as History. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1984. This is a record of the proceedings of a conferenceofleadinghistoriansandanalystsoftheU.S.experienceintheVietnam Warheldinearly1983.Itiseffectivelyapostmortemonthewar,coveringarange oftopicsfrommilitarystrategytolessonslearned. Buzzanco,Robert.MastersofWar:MilitaryDissentandPoliticsintheVietnamEra. NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996.Buzzancoexaminestheroleofsenior
228 Resources militaryleadersandtheirrelationshipwiththeciviliandecisionmakersintheplanningandconductofthewarinVietnam.Thebookcontainsachapterdedicated totheTetOffensiveanditsaftermath. Clarke,JeffreyJ.AdviceandSupport:TheFinalYears,1965–1973.Washington,DC: U.S.ArmyCenterofMilitaryHistory,1988.PartoftheofficialhistoryoftheU.S. ArmyinVietnam,thisbookprovidesanexcellentappreciationofGeneralWilliam Westmoreland’s strategy and how that strategy changed under his successor, GeneralCreightonAbrams. Cohen,Steven,ed.Vietnam:AnthologyandGuidetoaTelevisionHistory.NewYork: Knopf, 1983. A companion to the PBS series, Vietnam: A Television History, this book includes a number of topical essays and associated documents arranged in chronologicalorder.ItincludesalengthychapterontheTetOffensive. Davidson,PhillipB.VietnamatWar.Novato,CA:Presidio,1988.Theauthor,who was senior military intelligence officer under General Westmoreland, provides a comprehensive military history of the war. He maintains that the Tet Offensive wasagreatvictoryfortheAmericanmilitarybutwasstolenbythepress,whotransformeditintoapsychologicalvictoryfortheCommunists. Dawson, Joseph G., ed. Commanders in Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars.Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,1993.Inthisbook,prominenthistorians examine various presidents and how they fulfilled their constitutional and politicalrolesduringwartime.ThisbookincludesanexcellentessayonJohnson’s wartimeleadershipbyProfessorFrankVandiver. Dougan, Clark, and Stephen Weiss. The Vietnam Experience: Nineteen Sixty-Eight. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1983. This is one in a multivolume series on the VietnamWar.Thisvolumefocusesonthedramaticeventsof1968inVietnamand intheUnitedStates,providingverythoroughcoverageoftheTetOffensiveand thesiegeofKheSanh. Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981. This is a general history of the Vietnamese Communist Party’s revolutionarystrategywithwhichtheyprosecutedthewaragainstfirsttheFrench andthentheAmericans. Elliott,Paul.Vietnam:Conflict&Controversy.London:ArmsandArmour,1996.The authorexaminestheforceswithintheU.S.militarythatcontributedtoitsdefeatin theVietnamWar.Whileputtingthewarinpoliticalcontext,theemphasisofthe bookisonhowthemilitaryfoughtthewar. Errington,ElizabethJane,andB.J.C.McKercher,eds.TheVietnamWarasHistory. Westport,CT:Praeger,1990.Composedofninetopicalessaysonvariousaspectsof theVietnamWar,thisbookcontainstwoessaysontheTetOffensive—oneaddressing how the Communist forces achieved such a stunning surprise and another aboutJohnsonandthemedia. FitzGerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and Americans in Vietnam. NewYork:VintageBooks,1973.Theauthorprovidesaverybiasedhistoryofthe warfromtheliberalviewpointandisverycriticaloftheAmericangovernmentfor failingtounderstandthenatureoftherevolutioninVietnam.
Resources 229 Gilbert,MarcJason,ed.WhytheNorthWontheVietnamWar.NewYork:Palgrave, 2002. In this book, nine noted Vietnam scholars discuss how a nominally Third Worldstatedefeatedasuperpower.Itaddressesforeignanddomesticpolicyissues, militarytacticsandstrategy,andculturalquestionssurroundingthefallofSouth VietnamtotheCommunistNorth. Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950– 1975. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002. A very balanced general history of thewar,thisbookisrecognizedasamajorcontributiontothestudyofAmerican involvementinVietnam.Herringanalyzestheultimatefailureinthewarandits impactonU.S.foreignpolicy.Theauthorplacesthewarinthehistoricalcontext oftheColdWarandU.S.containmentpolicy. Hess, Gary R. Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War. Rev. ed. Boston: Twayne, 1998. Author places U.S. polices in the context of Vietnamese, Laotian,andCambodianhistory.ItprovidesadiscussionofhowtheUnitedStates becameinvolvedinSoutheastAsia. Hunt, Richard A. Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds. Boulder,CO:Westview,1995.Huntaddressesthe“otherwar”andprovidesoneofthe bestaccountsofthepacificationprogram.Withinthelargercontextoftheevolutionof thepacificationeffort,HuntdescribestheimpactoftheTetoffensiveonthecampaign towintheheartsandmindsoftheSouthVietnamesepeople.Theauthorconcludesthat thepacificationprogramfailedtosolveSouthVietnam’spoliticalandsocialproblems. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. 2d ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1997. This comprehensive study of the war looks at the conflict from both sides. Very well documented,thisbookcontainsmaterialfromextensiveinterviewswiththeparticipants.ItincludesathoroughdiscussionoftheTetOffensiveanditsaftermath. Kinnard,Douglas.TheWarManagers.NewYork:DaCapo,1991(reprinted.).The author,himselfageneralofficer,surveyed173generalswhomanagedthewarin Vietnam.ThisbookisananalysisofthesurveyresponsesonawiderangeoftopicsfromthequalityofbothAmericanandVietnamesetroopstoU.S.strategy.It includesaveryusefulchapterontheTetOffensive. Lanning, Michael Lee, and Dan Cragg. Inside the VC and the NVA. New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1992. The authors provide a comprehensive portrait of America’senemyintheVietnamWar,includingadiscussionoforganization,tactics,recruitingandtrainingprocedures,leadership,andfightingability. Lewy,Gunther.AmericainVietnam.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1980.The authorprovidesoneofthestandarddefensesoftheAmericaneffortinVietnam, whichincludesadiscussionofthepost-TetreassessmentofAmericanstrategy. Lind, Michael. Vietnam, the Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most DisastrousMilitaryConflict.NewYork:FreePress,1999.Lindattemptstodefend American intervention in Vietnam, but his discussion of the background of the conflictissubjecttodebate. Matthews,LloydJ.,andDaleE.Brown,eds.AssessingtheVietnamWar.Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1987. This is a postmortem on U.S. involvement in Vietnam,whichcontainsseveralessaysonstrategyandthenatureofthewar.
230 Resources McMahon, Robert J., ed. Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War. New York:HoughtonMifflin,2003.Thistextbook,designedtoencouragecriticalthinking about the Vietnam War, consists of a number of recently declassified documentsandanalyticalessaysonimportanttopicsinthehistoryofthewar,including achapterontheTetOffensive. Moss,GeorgeDonelson.Vietnam:AnAmericanOrdeal.3rded.UpperSaddleRiver, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998. This is a comprehensive narrative account of America’s involvementinSoutheastAsiathataddressesthepolitical,diplomatic,andmilitary aspectsofthewarfromthe1940sto1975.ItincludesalengthychapterontheTet Offensiveanditsaftermath. Neu, Charles E. America’s Lost War: Vietnam, 1945–1975. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson,2005.Neu,anotedhistorian,offersaconcise,balanced,andwell-written narrativehistoryofthewar. Olson,JamesS.,andRandyRoberts.WheretheDominoFell:AmericaandVietnam, 1945to1990.NewYork:St.Martin’s,1991.AconcisehistoryoftheAmericanexperienceinVietnam,thisincludesachapteronthepsychologicalimpactofthewaron theUnitedStatesanditspoliticallegacy. Palmer,Bruce.The25-YearWar.Lexington:UniversityPressofKentucky,1984.The author, a retired general, argues that the civilian leaders prevented the military fromwinningthewar. Palmer, Dave. Summons of the Trumpet. San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1978. An Army colonelwhenhewrotethisbook,Palmerprovidesagoodmilitaryhistoryofthe war, but complains that there was too much interference by civilian leaders in determininghowthewarwasfought. Pike,Douglas.PAVN:People’sArmyofVietnam.Novato,CA:Presidio,1986.Anoted expertonboththeVietCongandtheNorthVietnamese,Pikedescribesthecreation of the People’s Army of Vietnam and how it grew to be one of the largest andmosteffectivearmiesincontemporarytimes.Hedetailsthemilitaristicnature ofVietnamesesociety,describestheorganizationandfunctioningofthemilitary forces,andplacesthoseforcesinapoliticalcontext. ———.VietCong:TheOrganizationandTechniquesoftheNationalLiberationFrontof SouthVietnam.Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1966.Pikeprovidesacomprehensive discussion of the military army of the National Liberation Front. He describes organization,recruitment,training,andconductofmilitaryoperations. Pimlott,John.Vietnam,TheDecisiveBattles.NewYork:Macmillan,1990.Thisbookis anillustratedanthologyofseventeendecisivebattlesintheVietnamWar,including thesiegeofKheSanhandtheTetOffensive.Graphicsincludephotos,computergeneratedmaps,andspeciallycommissionedpaintingsthatdepictcriticalmoments. ———,ed.Vietnam:TheHistoryandtheTactics.NewYork:CrescentBooks,1982.An overview of the conflict focusing on how the United States fought the war, this bookaddressesgroundoperations,theairwar,andtheroleofU.S.SpecialForces. Itcontainstwohundredillustrations. Podhoretz,Norman.WhyWeWereinVietnam.NewYork:Simon&Schuster,1982. TheauthorseesAmerica’sVietnameffortasanoblecause,butassertsthatJohnson
Resources 231 failedbecausehetriedtofightthewarwhilekeepinghisGreatSocietydomestic programsgoing. Schulzinger,RobertD.ATimeforWar:TheUnitedStatesandVietnam,1941–1975.New York:OxfordUniversityPress,1997.Theauthorprovidesacomprehensiveoverviewof thewar,includingadiscussionofTetandhowitchangedU.S.strategyinthewar. Sevy, Grace, ed. The American Experience in Vietnam. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989. This book is a collection of essays and articles about the VietnamWar.Itcontainsaverygoodsectionontheroleofthepressinthewar. Sorley,Lewis.ABetterWar:TheUnexaminedVictoriesandFinalTragedyofAmerica’s LastYearsinVietnam.NewYork:HarcourtBrace,1999.Theauthorexaminesthe eventsthattranspiredinVietnamafterCreightonAbramsassumedcommandof MACVfromWilliamWestmoreland.Heprovidesacomprehensiveexamination oftheproblemsthattheAmericanarmyfacedintheaftermathoftheTetOffensive asU.S.troopsweresteadilywithdrawnandtheresponsibilityforthewarwasslowly transferredtotheSouthVietnameseforces. Stanton,ShelbyL.AnatomyofaDivision:1stCavinVietnam.Novato,CA:Presidio, 1987.Thisisacomprehensivehistoryofthe1stCavalryDivisioninVietnamfrom its arrival in 1965 until its departure in 1972. It includes a discussion of division operationsduringtheTetOffensive,amongthemthebattleofHueandtherelief ofKheSanh. ———. The Rise and Fall of An American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1973. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Author discusses the deterioration of the AmericanArmyinVietnamthatgathersmomentumaftertheTetOffensive. Thies, Wallace J. When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1968. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. AuthoraddressestheconflictbetweentheJohnsonadministrationandtheNorth VietnameseCommunistsoverSouthVietnam.Heprovidesausefulexamination ofNorthVietnamesedecisionmaking. Tucker,SpencerC.Vietnam.London:UCLPress,1999.Thisisaconcise,well-documentedanalyticalsurveyofVietnamesemilitaryhistorythatconcentratesonthe FrenchandAmericantwentieth-centurywars.UnlikemanyVietnamwarhistories, thisonebeginswithabriefaccountoftheearliestrecordeddaysoftheVietnamese people. The author is critical of the way the American military dealt with the Communiststrategyofprotractedwar. Turley,WilliamS.TheSecondIndochinaWar:AShortPoliticalandMilitaryHistory, 1954–1975.NewYork:Westview,1986.Thisbookisaverygoodsurveyofthewar that encompasses not only Vietnam, but also Laos and Cambodia. It provides a particularlyusefuldiscussionofCommunistpolicydecisionsinaddressinghowthe warbegan,whyitsscaleoutstrippedU.S.expectations,andwhytheCommunists prevailedintheend. VanDyke,JonM.NorthVietnam’sStrategyforSurvival.PaloAlto,CA:PacificBooks, 1972.ThisisacomprehensiveanalysisofNorthVietnam’sstrategy,particularlywith regard to their response to the intensive American bombing campaign of 1965 to late1968.
232 Resources Warner, Denis. Certain Victory: How Hanoi Won the War. Kansas City, KS: Sheed AndrewsandMcMeel,1977.BasedonastudyofGeneralVanTienDung’smemoirs, Warner, a war correspondent, argues that the North Vietnamese were the aggressors,butthattheUnitedStatesneverunderstoodthenatureofthewarand thuswereultimatelydefeated. Werner,JayneS.,andDavidHunt,eds.TheAmericanWarinVietnam.Cornell,NY: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993. This is a collection of seven papers presented at a conference held in Hanoi in 1988, during which scholars fromVietnamandtheUnitedStatesmetforthefirsttimesince1975todiscussthe war.ItcontainsaparticularlyusefulpaperbyNgoVinhLongoftheUniversityof MaineontheTetOffensiveanditsaftermath. Werner, Jayne S., and Luu Doan Huynh, eds. The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993. This is a collection of nineteenpaperspresentedataconferenceofprominentAmericanandVietnamese authorities who met at Columbia University in 1990. It is organized into four sections that address the Vietnamese political/military strategy, the war from the American side, the war in Cambodia, and postwar legacies. It contains an extremelyvaluablepaperbyGeneralTranVanTrathatshedslightonCommunists objectivesandassessmentsoftheTetOffensive. Woodruff,MarkW.UnheraldedVictory:TheDefeatoftheVietCongandtheNorth VietnameseArmy,1961–1973.Arlington,VA:VandemerePress,1999.Theauthor,a formerMarine,seekstoprovideamilitaryhistoryofthewarandtodemonstratein hisopinionthatthewarwaswonmilitarilybeforetheU.S.unilaterallywithdrew fromtheconflict.TheauthordoesnotsufficientlyaddresswhytheUnitedStates becameinvolvedinSoutheastAsiainthefirstplace. Young, Marilyn B. The Vietnam Wars: 1945–1990. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. TheauthoranalyzesthewarinVietnamandtheeffectthatithadonthehome front in the United States. She discusses how the Americans took over after the FrenchdefeatatDienBienPhu,but,intheend,didnobetterindealingwiththe Vietnameserevolution. Young,MarilynB.,andRobertBuzzanco.ACompaniontotheVietnamWar.Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002. This collection of twenty-four historiographical and narrative essaysbyleadinghistoriansexaminesthewarinitsmostimportantcontexts.Itincludes anextremelygoodessayonLyndonJohnsonandthemediabyChesterPach.
Biographies Currey, Cecil B. Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam’s Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap. Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1999. Drawing on extensive interviews and material providedbyGiap,theauthorhasproducedareadableandcomprehensiveportrait oftheVietnamesemilitaryleaderandatthesametime,ahistoryoftheVietnam War.CurreydoesnotshyawayfromcriticizingGiapforhiswillingnesstosustain
Resources 233 appallingcasualtiesinpursuitofhisobjectives,butheconcludesthatfewinhistory matchGiap’smilitaryaccomplishments. Dallek,Robert.FlawedGiant:LyndonJohnsonandHisTimes,1961–1973.NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress,1998.Inthisdefinitivebiography,Dallekfocusesonthe WhiteHouseyearsandexaminesJohnson’sdecisionsonVietnam.Hearguesthat Johnson’shandlingofthewarhasobscuredmanyofthegoodthingsthathedidin Congressandaspresident. Duiker,WilliamJ.HoChiMinh.NewYork:Hyperion,2000.Theauthor,whoserved intheU.S.embassyinSaigonduringtheVietnamWar,hasproducedthedefinitivebiographyoftheNorthVietnameseleader.DuikerdepictsHoasanationalist first,butalsoaconvincedMarxistwhobelievedsocialismwouldhelphiscountry modernizeandcorrectlong-standingsocialinequities. Macdonald,Peter.Giap:TheVictorinVietnam.NewYork:Norton,1993.Writtenby aBritishbrigadier,thisbookwasoneofthefirstbiographiesofVoNguyenGiap. MacdonaldextolsGiap’smilitarygeniusbutisuncriticalofhisshortcomings.The booksuffersbecauseofitsexclusiverelianceonWesternsources. Sheehan,Neil.ABrightShiningLie.NewYork:RandomHouse,1988.SheehanprovidesahistoryofthewarinVietnamusingasavehiclethelifeofJohnPaulVann, the legendary American military advisor who became a civilian official and was killedinahelicoptercrashduringthe1972NorthVietnameseEasterOffensive. Zaffiri,Samuel.Westmoreland.NewYork:WilliamMorrow,1994.Thisisabiography of the commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Within the contextofhisentireprofessionallife,thebookprovidesanappreciationoftheTet OffensiveasseenfromMACVheadquarters.
Memoirs Clifford,ClarkM.CounseltothePresident:AMemoir.NewYork:RandomHouse, 1991.AuthorservedassecretaryofdefenseforPresidentJohnsonintheaftermath of the Tet Offensive. He advised the president to de-escalate the war in South Vietnamandplayedamajorroleintheadministration’spost-Tetdebatefollowing GeneralWestmoreland’srequestforadditionaltroops. Hoopes,Townsend.TheLimitsofIntervention:AnInsideAccountofHowtheJohnson PolicyofEscalationinVietnamWasReversed.NewYork:D.McKay,1969.Hoopes, who served as undersecretary of the Air Force in the Johnson administration, provides an insider account of the reexamination of U.S. strategy in the period followingtheTetOffensive. Johnson,LyndonBaines.TheVantagePoint:PerspectivesofthePresidency,1963–1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971. Johnson explains his thoughts andactionsaspresident,assertingthatwhathedidandwhathewastryingtodo were often misunderstood. This book is useful in understanding and evaluating Johnson’sVietnampolicy.
234 Resources McNamara,RobertS.InRetrospect.NewYork:TimesBooks,1995.Inthismemoir, which was very controversial when it was first published, former Secretary of DefenseMcNamaradiscusseshisroleinAmericaninvolvementinVietnamduring the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Admitting part of the blame, he arguesthattheUnitedStatesshouldhavewithdrawnfromVietnameitherinlate 1963,afterPresidentDiem’sassassination,orinlate1964orearly1965. Rusk,Dean.AsISawIt.EditedbyDanielS.Papp.NewYork:Norton,1990.Inthis book, transcribed from tapes he made for his son, the former secretary of state under President Johnson reminisces about his family, his World War II military experience, and his various government posts. He provides an insider’s view of the Johnson White House and defends the correctness of U.S. intervention in SoutheastAsia. Westmoreland,WilliamC.ASoldierReports.GardenCity,NY:Doubleday,1976.In thismemoir,thecommanderofAmericanmilitaryforcesinVietnamarguesthat TetwasadefeatfortheCommunists,butthatthewarwaslostbecausethecivilian leadershipdidnotprovidesufficientresourcestowinit.
VietnamesePerspectives BuiDiem.IntheJawsofHistory.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1999.AformerhighofficialintheSaigongovernmentwhoalsoservedasSouthVietnamese ambassadortotheUnitedStates,theauthorgiveshisperspectiveontheVietnam War and relations between his government and the U.S. He is critical of how the American forces took over the war, exhibiting a blatant disregard of South Vietnameseinterestsandsensitivities. Bui Tin. Following Ho Chi Minh. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995. The author,aformercolonelintheNorthVietnameseArmy,describeshisroleinthe war against the Americans. Interestingly, he eventually leaves Vietnam after the wartobecomeanexpatriateinParis.HeprovidesuniqueinsightintotheinnermostworkingsoftheCommunistdecision-makingapparatusduringthewar. ———.FromEnemytoFriend:ANorthVietnamesePerspectiveontheWar.Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002. The author shares additional insights into the Vietnam War. He is relatively evenhanded in his views about the policies and operationsoftheVietnameseandU.S.governmentsduringthewar. Carland, John. “An NVA General Looks Back.” Vietnam (December 2002), 30–36. This is a transcription of an interview with former North Vietnamese General TranVanTra,whoplayedakeyroleintheTetOffensiveof1968,theNguyenHue Campaignof1972,andthefinaloffensivein1975.Thegeneral’scommentsduring theinterviewprovideextremelyvaluableinsightintohowtheCommunistsfought thewar. Chanoff,David,andDoanVanToai.PortraitoftheEnemy.NewYork:RandomHouse, 1986.Thisisacollectionoffirst-personaccountsoflifeontheothersideduringthe
Resources 235 Vietnam War. It includes the voices of guerrilla fighters, militant monks, propagandachiefs,villagepartyofficials,andmanyothers,providingawidevarietyofperspectivesfromthosewhofoughtagainstU.S.troopsandtheSaigongovernment. Guan, Ang Chen. “Decision-Making Leading to the Tet Offensive (1968)—The VietnamesePerspective.”JournalofContemporaryHistory33(July1998):341–353. Theauthorprovidesaverygoodaccountofthedecisionsthatledtothelaunching oftheTetOffensive. HoangNgocLung.TheGeneralOffensivesof1968–69.Washington,DC:U.S.Army Center of Military History, 1981. Written by a formerARVNcolonel,thisisone inaseriesofmonographswrittenafterthewarthatprovidetheSouthVietnamese militaryperspective.AuthoraddressestheTetOffensiveandthe“Mini-Tet”offensivethatfollowed. Lam Quang Thi. The Twenty-Five Year Century: A South Vietnamese General RememberstheIndochinaWartotheFallofSaigon.Denton:UniversityofNorth Texas Press, 2001. A former general in the South Vietnamese army, the author describeshislifeandparticipationintheVietnamWar.Hisnarrativeincludesa vividdescriptionofhisexperiencesduringtheTetOffensive. McGarvey,PatrickJ.,ed.VisionsofVictory:SelectedVietnameseCommunistMilitary Writings, 1964–1968. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1969. This collection includestranslationsofarticlesandbroadcastsfrom1966to1968thatcoversuch topicsastheeffectivenessofAmericantacticsandthesuccessesandfailuresofthe TetOffensive. MilitaryHistoryInstituteofVietnam.VictoryinVietnam:TheOfficialHistoryofthe People’sArmyofVietnam,1954–1975.TranslatedbyMerleL.Pribbenow.Lawrence: UniversityPressofKansas,2002.ThisisanEnglishtranslationofthe1994official history of the North Vietnamese Army. Pribbenow, a former CIA officer who served five years in Vietnam, has performed an invaluable service by translating thishistory,whichanswersmanylingeringquestionsfromthewar. NgoVinhLong.TheTetOffensiveandItsAftermath.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversity Press,1991.Theauthorseekstoexaminetheaftermathoftheoffensiveandhow it changed the conduct of the war. It is particularly notable for its reliance on Vietnamese language sources and interviews. He maintains that the National Liberation Front recovered from the losses it incurred during the Tet Offensive and,contrarytowhatmostWesternhistorianshavewritten,playedanimportant roleinthemilitarysuccessesof1972and1975. ———. “The Tet Offensive and Its Aftermath.” In March Jason Gilbert and William Head, eds., The Tet Offensive, 89–123. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996. Long asserts that the Tet Offensive, though it did not overthrow the Saigon government, was successfulinaccomplishingitsmainobjectiveofforcingtheUnitedStatestodeescalatethewarandtobeginnegotiations. NguyenCaoKy.Buddha’sChild:MyFighttoSaveVietnam.NewYork:St.Martin’s,2002. TheformerprimeministerofSouthVietnamrecountshisriseandfallfrompowerand theerrorsgreatandsmallthatledtohisnation’sdefeat.ThisautobiographyoffersvaluableinsightintothehistoryofthewarasseenfromtheSouthVietnameseside.
236 Resources Page, Tim. Another Vietnam: Pictures of the War from the Other Side. Washington, DC:NationalGeographic,2002.Thisbookisaremarkablepictorialrecordofthe warinVietnamseenfromtheotherside.TakenbyNorthVietnamesecombatphotographers, the images provide a comprehensive portrait of America’s heretofore largelyfacelessenemy. PhamVanSon.Tet—1968:TheCommunistOffensiveThatMarkedtheBeginningof America’s Defeat in Vietnam. 2 vols. Salisbury, NC: Documentary Publications, 1980. This is an English edition of an earlier official history written by a South Vietnamese lieutenant colonel in the Military History Division of the Joint General Staff of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. It describes the action fromtheSouthVietnameseperspective. TranVanTra.Vietnam:HistoryoftheBulwarkB2Theater,Volume5:Concludingthe 30-YearsWar,SoutheastAsiaReportNo.1247.Washington,DC:ForeignBroadcast InformationService,February2,1983.ThisbookwaswrittenbyaPAVNgeneral who commanded the forces that attacked Saigon from the north during the Tet Offensive. Truong Nhu Tang. A Vietcong Memoir. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985. WrittenbyafoundingmemberoftheVietCong,thisbookprovidesauniqueperspectiveonthewarfromtheothersidethatisgenerallyfreeofthestridentsocialistdogma thatnormallyaccompaniesmanyVietnameseCommunistaccountsofthewar. VoNguyenGiap.BigVictory,GreatTask.NewYork:Praeger,1968.ThisbookprovidesGiap’sassessmentofthesituationofthewarinSouthVietnam.Itincludesa seriesofarticlesbroadcastoverHanoiRadioin1967thatprovidedinsightintothe thinkingthatledtothedecisiontolaunchtheTetOffensive. ———. The Military Art of People’s War. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970. A collectionofspeechesandessays,thisbookgivesanappreciationforthetactical doctrine of insurgency operations and the political guidelines for enlisting the peopleintheinsurgency.
OralHistories Denenberg, Barry. Voices from Vietnam. New York: Scholastic, 1995. This is a collection of accounts of the Vietnam War told in the voices of the participants. Arranged chronologically, it includes a variety of perspectives, including governmentofficials,politicalleaders,diplomats,soldiers,warprotestors,reporters,and Vietnamesecitizensandsoldiersonbothsides. Kellen,Konrad.ConversationswithEnemySoldiersinLate1968/Early1969:AStudy ofMotivationandMorale.SantaMonica,CA:RandCorporation,1970.Thisbook collectsinterviewsRandCorporationanalystsconductedwithCommunistsoldiers intheperiodfollowingtheTetOffensive. Maurer,Henry.StrangeGround:AmericansinVietnam,1945–1975.NewYork:Henry Holt, 1989. This oral history traces the evolution of American involvement from
Resources 237 thelastdaysofWorldWarIItothefallofSaigonthreedecadeslater.Itincludesa numberofaccountsofthefightingduringtheTetOffensive. Steinman, Ron. The Soldier’s Story: Vietnam in Their Own Words. New York: TV Books, 1999. This oral history contains the vivid recollections of seventy-seven veteranswhorecalltheirwartimeexperiences.Itcontainssectionsonthosewho participatedinthefightingduringtheTetOffensiveandthesiegeofKheSanh. Verrone, Richard Burks, and Laura M. Calkins. Voices from Vietnam: Eye-witness accounts of the War, 1954–1975. Newton Abbot, UK: David and Charles, 2005. Thisbookincludesfirst-personaccountsoftheVietnamWardrawnfromtheOral HistoryProjectattheVietnamArchive,TexasTechUniversity,Lubbock,Texas.It containstwenty-eightpagesofaccountsbyparticipantsintheTetOffensive. Willenson,Kim.TheBadWar:AnOralHistoryoftheVietnamWar.NewYork:New American Library, 1987. This is a collection of oral histories of those with many differentviewsandperspectivesonthewar.ThereareseveralentriesontheTet Offensiveasviewedbyjournalists,politicians,andsoldiers.
DocumentCollections Barrett,DavidM.,ed.LyndonB.Johnson’sVietnamPapers:ADocumentaryCollection. CollegeStation:TexasA&MUniversityPress,1997.Thiscollectionofdocuments focusesonJohnson’sVietnampolicyandprovidesprovideanexcellentinsightinto whatPresidentJohnson’sadviserstoldhimabouttheVietNamfromNovember 22,1963,toJanuary20,1969. Gettleman,MarvinE.,JaneFranklin,MarilynB.Young,andH.BruceFranklin,eds. Vietnam and America: A Documented History. Rev. ed. New York: Grove Press, 1995.Ahistoryofthewartoldinessaysbyleadingexpertsonthewaraccompanied byoriginalsourcematerial,thisbookincludesdocumentssuchasspeeches,messages,andofficialrecordsfrombothsidesoftheconflict. Goodwin,DorisKearns.TheJohnsonPresidentialPressConferences,2vols.NewYork: E. M. Coleman Enterprises, 1978. This is a collection of the transcripts of the president’s press conferences. It includes those conducted prior to, during, and aftertheTetOffensive. Katsiaficas,George,ed.VietnamDocuments:AmericanandVietnameseViewsofthe War.NewYork:M.E.Sharpe,1992.Thiscollectioncontainsfifty-twodocuments thatpresentacompletepictureofthewarfrom1954to1975andincludesseven entriesontheTetOffensive. Moss, George Donelson, ed. A Vietnam Reader: Sources and Essays. Englewood Cliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall,1991.Thisbookincludesacollectionoffiveessaysand morethansixtyprimarysourcedocuments. ThePentagonPapers:TheDefenseDepartmentHistoryofUnitedStatesDecisionmaking on Vietnam—The Senator Gravel Edition. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972. Senator MikeGravelofAlaskareadthisversionofthePentagonPapersintothecongres-
238 Resources sionalrecord.Itcontainsfourvolumesoftext,includingtwothousandpagesofnarrative,sevenhundredpagesofdocuments,andtwohundredpagesofstatementsby governmentofficials.Anadditionalvolumecontainsnotesandcommentary. Porter,Gareth,ed.Vietnam:AHistoryinDocuments.NewYork:EarlM.Coleman, 1979. This collection includes key documents on the Vietnam War from 1941 to1975. PublicPapersofthePresidents:LyndonBainesJohnson,1968–69.2vols.Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970. This is the official compilation of President Johnson’s public writings, addresses, and remarks. These volumes contain all of Johnson’s speeches and remarks about Vietnam in the 1968–69 period,includinghiscommentsaboutthesituationjustbeforetheTetOffensive and, of course, the famous address when he announced that he would not run forreelection. Sheehan,Neil,HedrickSmith,E.W.Kenworthy,andFoxButterfield.ThePentagon Papers—as published by The New York Times. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971. This versionofthePentagonPapersincludes134documents. Williams, William Appleman, Thomas McCormick, Lloyd Gardner, and Walter LaFeber, eds. America in Vietnam: A Documentary History. New York: Norton, 1975.Theeditorscompiledacollectionofdocuments,includingsomefromthe 1950sthatemphasizetheoriginsofthewarandU.S.commitmentoftroops.
l yn d o n jo h n so n an d t h e war Barrett, David M. Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisors. Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas,1994.BarrettexaminesPresidentJohnson’s relationshipwithhisadvisorsandhowthisrelationshipresultedinaflawedstrategy inVietnam. Berman,Larry.LyndonJohnson’sWar:TheRoadtoStalemateinVietnam.NewYork: Norton, 1989. Berman examines Johnson’s management of the war, focusing on whathedescribesastheflaweddecisionmakingthatresultedinabloodystalemate inVietnam.Healsofaultsseniormilitaryofficersandpresidentialadvisorswho,in Berman’sopinion,didnotservethepresidentwell. Brands,H.W.TheWagesofGlobalism:LyndonJohnsonandtheLimitsofAmerican Power.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1995.BrandsplacesJohnson’swartime policiesinthecontextofthemanyinternationalcriseshefaced,notjustVietnam, andthepolicyofglobalcontainmentofCommunismthatheinheritedfromhis predecessors. Clifford, Clark. “A Vietnam Reappraisal.” Foreign Affairs 47 (July 1969): 601–623. FormerSecretaryofDefenseClarkCliffordprovidesablueprintforchangingstrategyinVietnampublishedonlyafewmonthsafterPresidentJohnsonleftoffice. Gardner,LloydC.PayAnyPrice:LyndonJohnsonandtheWarsforVietnam.Chicago: IvanR.Dee,1995.AnexaminationofJohnson’sjugglingofmilitarystrategy,inter-
Resources 239 nationaldiplomacy,anddomesticpoliticsduringtheVietnamWar.Authorasserts thatVietnamwasnotsolelyLyndonJohnson’swar,butratheraseriesofinevitable conflictsrootedinNewDealliberalismandColdWardiplomacy. Herring, George C. LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994. Herring maintains that Johnson’s leadership style adversely affectedtheVietnamWar’soutcome.HeassertsthatJohnsondiscouragedtheopen exchangeofideasindiscussionswithadvisersandfailedtoencouragecooperation amongthosedirectingthewareffort.Intheend,hisflawedmanagementfailedto meetthechallengesencountered. LaFeber, Walter. The Deadly Bet: LBJ, Vietnam, and the 1968 Election. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005. The author examines the political ramificationsofJohnson’sdecisioninthewakeoftheTetOffensivenottorunfor reelection.Theresultwastheturmoilofthe1968presidentialelection,acrisisfor theUnitedStatesthat,LaFeberargues,wasmoreseverethananysincetheCivil War. Schandler, Herbert Y. Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam: The Unmaking of a President. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977. This book examines the events thatleduptothedaywhenLyndonJohnsonmadethedramaticannouncement thathewouldnotbeacandidateforreelection.ItfocusesontheTetOffensiveand itspoliticalramifications. Vandiver, Frank E. Shadows of Vietnam: Lyndon Johnson’s Wars. College Station: TexasA&MUniversityPress,1997.Vandiverprovidesanempatheticportraitofa besiegedcommander-in-chiefwhohadtodealwithVietnam,theGreatSociety, theSix-DayWar,theDominicanRepublicandothercrises.Thisrevisionistlook atJohnsonlayssomeoftheblameforthepresident’sdifficultiesonthelegacyof JohnF.Kennedy,fearsofcommunismandnuclearconfrontation,theimpactof themedia,andthemotivesandmethodsofJohnson’sadvisors.
t h e t et o f f en siv e Arnold, James R. Tet Offensive 1968: Turning Point in Vietnam. London: Osprey, 1990.OneoftheOspreyCampaignSeries,thisbookprovidesabrief,butdetailed depictionofthefightingduringtheTetOffensive.Itincludesverygoodmapsand photographsofthecombataction. Bradford, Zeb B. “With Creighton Abrams During Tet.” Vietnam (February 1998), 43–49,66.Theauthorwasaide-de-camptothedeputycommanderofMACVduringtheTetOffensive. Brodie,Bernard.“TetOffensive.”InNobleFranklandandChristopherDowling,eds., DecisiveBattlesoftheTwentiethCentury:Land-Sea-Air,320–334.NewYork:David McKay,1976.Theauthor,arenownedpoliticalscientist,discusseshisthesisthat theTetOffensivechangedthecourseofthewar,analyzingthedecisivenessofthe offensiveanditsshort-termandlong-termeffects.
240 Resources Coan,JamesP.“TetAttackatCamLo.”Vietnam(February2004),34–40.Aformer MarinerecountstheCommunistattackonCamLo,adistrictcapitalnearQuang Tri,duringtheTetOffensive. Daugherty,LeoJ.III.“PostOneatWar:MarineSecurityGuardsandtheVietnam War, 1963–1975.” Vietnam (February 2006), 43–47. Within the larger story of MarinesecurityguardsattheAmericanEmbassyinSaigon,theauthorrelatesthe events of the early morning hours of January 31, 1968, when Viet Cong sappers breachedtheembassygrounds. Falk, Richard. Appropriating Tet. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Center of InternationalStudies,1988.Authordiscusseshowhistoriansandcommentatorson bothsideshaveappropriatedTettodescribetheiroverallinterpretationsofthewar anditsmeaning. Gilbert,MarcJason,andWilliamHead,eds.TheTetOffensive.Westport,CT:Praeger, 1996.Anexcellentcollectionofessaysandcommentary,thisbookprovidesunique andvaluableperspectivesofnotedVietnamWarscholarsonthevariousaspectsof theTetOffensiveanditsaftermath. Goldsmith,WynnA.“RiverRatstotheRescueatBenTre.”Vietnam(February1998), 26–32.Thisisanaccountoftheroleofthe“BrownWaterNavy”inthebattleof BenTreduringtheTetOffensive. Gross, John E. “The Tet Battles of Bien Hoa and Long Binh.” Vietnam (February 2006),18–26.Theauthor,whoservedasacompanycommanderinthe9thInfantry Division,providesafirsthandaccountofthebattlesofBienHoaandLongBinh duringtheopeninghoursoftheTetOffensive. Hanson,VictorDavis.CarnageandCulture:LandmarkBattlesintheRisetoWestern Power.NewYork:AnchorBooks,2002.TheauthorexaminesninebattlestodeterminewhyWesternculturehasspreadsosuccessfullyacrosstheworld.Hemaintainsthatmilitarypowerwastheprimaryreason.Amongthebattlesheexploresis theTetOffensive. Kerwin, Walter T. “Desperate Hours During Tet: Inside MACV Headquarters.” Vietnam(February2001),27–32.ThisisanaccountoftheTetOffensiveastoldby GeneralWestmoreland’schiefofstaff. Kneipp, Nancy V. The Tet Offensive and the Principles of War. Newport, RI: DepartmentofJointMilitaryOperations,NavalWarCollege,1996.Theauthor, aprofessorattheNavalWarCollege,seekstodiscussthesuccessesandfailuresof theTetOffensiveintermsoftheprincipalsofwar. Lomperis, Timothy J. “Giap’s Dream, Westmoreland’s Nightmare.” Parameters 18 (June 1988), 18–32. Lomperis address Giap’s plan for the General Offensive– General Uprising of 1968. The author, a political scientist, analyzes U.S. and Communist strategies. He maintains that Tet ended Giap’s dream of winning a Dien Bien Phu–like victory against the Americans, but that ultimately Hanoi “achievedsuccessinfailure.” McManus, John C. “Battleground Saigon.” Vietnam (February 2004), 26–33. This article recounts the battle fought by a battalion of the U.S. 7th Infantry Regiment, 199th Infantry Brigade, to retake part of Saigon during the Tet Offensive.
Resources 241 Nolan,KeithW.TheBattleforSaigon:Tet1968.NewYork:PocketBooks,1996.This historyofthebattlechroniclessucheventsastheassaultontheAmericanEmbassy andthegroundattacksonBienHoaandTanSonNhutairbases. North,Don.“VCAssaultontheU.S.Embassy.”Vietnam(February2000),38–47,72. Theauthor,areporter,witnessedtheattackontheU.S.EmbassyinSaigon. Oberdorfer,Don.Tet!TheTurningPointintheVietnamWar.Baltimore,MD:Johns HopkinsUniversityPress,2001.Theauthor,ajournalistwhocoveredtheVietnam War,providesoneofthemorecomprehensiveaccountsoftheTetOffensive,coveringthedecisionsandeventsthatleduptotheoffensive,thebitterfightingduring theoffensive,anditsdramaticaftermath. ———.“Tet:WhoWon?”Smithsonian(November2004),117–123.Theauthoraddresses thevariousinterpretationsofwhowontheTetOffensive.Thisisaverybalanced andobjectiveessay. Pohle, Victoria. The Viet Cong in Saigon: Tactics and Objectives During the Tet Offensive.RM-1799-ISA/ARPA.SantaMonica,CA:RandCorporation,1969.This RandstudyprovidesgreatinsightintohowandwhytheVietCongattackedSaigon duringtheTetOffensive. Schmitz,DavidF.TheTetOffensive:Politics,War,andPublicOpinion.Lanham,MD: Rowman&Littlefield,2005.ThisbookseekstoreexaminetheTetOffensiveinthe contextofAmericanforeignpolicy,thestateofthewarupto1968,andtheimpact ofthemediaonpublicopinion.Itisextremelywelldocumentedandmakesextensiveuseofprimarysourcematerial.Itconcludeswithaveryusefulbibliographic essayontheoffensiveanditsaftermath. Shiels, Frederick L. Preventable Disasters: Why Governments Fail. Savage, MD: Rowman&Littlefield,1991.Theauthor,apoliticalscientist,looksatthreecasestudiesofgovernmentalfailure,oneofwhichistheTetOffensiveanditsaftermath. Spector,RonaldH.AfterTet:TheBloodiestYearinVietnam.NewYork:FreePress, 1993. The author, who served as a Marine historian in Vietnam, addresses the year after Tet, maintaining that the offensive was only the beginning of what he describesasthebloodiestofthewarforAmericanforces. Tonsetic, Robert. Warriors: An Infantryman’s Memoir of Vietnam. New York: Ballantine,2004.TheauthorservedinVietnamasacompanycommanderinthe 199thInfantryBrigadeduringtheTetOffensiveandprovidesadetailedaccountof hisunitduringthefightingin1968. Worth, Richard. Tet Offensive. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publications, 2002. A verybriefoverviewoftheoffensiveanditsaftermath,thisbookdoesnotinclude detailedanalysisaboutCommunistplanningandobjectives.
t h e bat t l e o f h u e Annenberg, Robert. “Intelligence Team Under Siege.” Vietnam (February 2001), 34–42.ThisisafirsthandaccountoftheexperiencesofanArmyintelligenceofficer inHueduringtheTetOffensive.
242 Resources Brown,RichardL.PalaceGate:UnderSiegeinHueCity,Tet,January1968.London: Schiffer, 1997. An Air Force officer who served as an adviser to the South VietnamesedivisioncommanderinHueduringtheTetOffensive,theauthorwas presentforthefirstseventeendaysofthebitterfightingwithintheancientCitadel ofHue. Bullington,James.“AndHere,SeeHue!”ForeignServiceJournal(November1968), 18–49. The author was a foreign service officer who successfully hid during the CommunistoccupationofHueduringtheTetOffensive. ———. “Trapped Behind Enemy Lines.” Vietnam (February 1999), 18–24. This is an account of the author’s experiences as a diplomat trapped in Hue after the CommunistscapturedthecityinFebruary1968. Clifford,JamesO.Sr.“ForgottenMassacreatHue.”Vietnam(February2002),26–32, 63.Theauthor,ajournalist,assertsthattheU.S.newsmediadidnotthoroughly reportthedeathsofciviliansinHueatthehandsoftheCommunists. Dix, Drew. The Rescue of River City. Fairbanks, AK: Drew Dix Publishing, 2000. A SpecialForcesstaffsergeantwhowontheMedalofHonorforhisactionsinthe defenseofChauPhuduringtheTetOffensivewritesthisaccount. Eby, Omar. A House in Hue. Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1968. The author is a Mennonite who was in Hue during the North Vietnamese occupation. He describeswhathappenedwhentheVietCongtookcontrolofthecity. Flores,JohnW.“Marine’sSacrificeattheBattleofHue.”Vietnam(February1999), 26–32. This article provides an account of Marine Sergeant Alfredo Gonzales, recipientoftheMedalofHonor,whogavehislifeduringthebattleforHue. Hammel,Eric.FireintheStreets:TheBattleforHue,Tet1968.Chicago:Contemporary Books,1991.InadefinitivecombatnarrativeofthebloodybattleforHuein1968, Hammelgivesavividandup-closeaccountofthehouse-by-house,block-by-block fighting. Krohn, Charles A. The Lost Battalion: Controversy and Casualties in the Battle of Hue. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Written by the unit’s intelligence officer, this isthestoryofabattalionfromthe1stCavalryDivisionanditsattackonaNorth VietnameseforceontheoutskirtsofHuein1968. Laurence, John. The Cat from Hue: A Vietnam War Story. New York: Public Affairs, 2002.AuthorwasawarcorrespondentinHueduringtheTetOffensive.Heprovides avividdescriptionofthebattleaswellasinsightintothelifeofareporterinwar. Maslowski, Peter, and Don Winslow. Looking for a Hero: Staff Sergeant Joe Ronnie HooperandtheVietnamWar.Lincoln:UniversityofNebraskaPress,2005.Sergeant HooperwasawardedtheMedalofHonorforactionnearHueonFebruary21,1968. ThebookdescribestheactionwithinthelargercontextofHooper’slifebeforeand afterhereceivedthemedal. Nolan,KeithW.BattleforHue:Tet1968.Novato,CA:Presidio,1983.NewYork:Dell, 1985.ThisisacomprehensiveanddetailedaccountofthefightforcontrolofHue duringtheTetOffensive. Pike,Douglas.TheVietCongStrategyofTerror.Saigon:U.S.Mission,1970.Within thelargercontextofVietCongstrategyanditsimplications,Pikeassertsthatthe
Resources 243 Communistsmassacredmorethantwothousandciviliansduringtheoccupation ofHueduringtheTetOffensive. Porter,D.Gareth.“The1968‘HueMassacre.’”IndochinaChronicle33(June24,1974). Challenging Douglas Pike’s assertion about the nature of the civilian deaths in Huein1968,theauthormaintainsthattherewasnosystematizedmassacrebythe Communists. Porter, D. Gareth, and Len E. Ackland. “Vietnam: The Bloodbath Argument.” The ChristianCentury,November5,1969.Theauthorschallengetheclaimthatthe CommunistsmassacredciviliansduringtheBattleofHue.Theyalsosaythatthe argumentthattheCommunistswoulddothesamethingonagranderscaleifthey tookovertheentirecountryaddedtothepanicoftheSouthVietnamesepopulace inthenorthernprovincesduringtheNorthVietnameseoffensivein1975thatled tothecollapseoftheSaigongovernmentanditsforces. Smith,GeorgeW.TheSiegeatHue.Boulder:LynneRienner,1999.Theauthorwas an Army captain and intelligence adviser to the 1st ARVN Division during the battleforHue.HeprovidesadetailedaccountoftheSouthVietnameseparticipationinthebloodyfightingtoretakecontroloftheCitadel,astorynotcoveredin mostaccountsofthebattle. Warr,Nicholas.PhaseLineGreen:TheBattleforHue,1968.Annapolis,MD:Naval InstitutePress,1997.Theauthorwasaplatooncommanderinthe1stBattalion,5th Marines,duringthebattleforHue.Hedescribeswhatitwasliketodealwiththe savagehouse-to-housefighting.
t h e sieg e o f kh e san h Archer, Michael. A Patch of Ground: Khe Sanh Remembered. Central Point, OR: Hellgate Press, 2005. The author, a Marine radioman during the siege, provides hisperspectiveonthefightingatKheSanh. Boyne,WalterJ.“AirpoweratKheSanh.”AirForceMagazine81,no.8(August1998), 82–88.Boynedescribesthevariousaspectsofairpowerthathadsuchasignificant impactontheoutcomeofthefightingatKheSanhin1968. Brush,Peter.“AerialLifelinetoKheSanh.”Vietnam(December1999),30–37.Brush discussestheairliftthatkeptKheSanhsuppliedduringthesiege. ———.“Perspectives:KheSanhCouldHaveBeenAnotherDienBienPhuiftheNVA Had Cut Off the Marines’ Water Supply.” Vietnam (August 1997), 58–60. Brush questionswhytheNorthVietnamesefailedtoattacktheMarinewatersupplyat KheSanh. Corbett, John. West Dickens Avenue: A Marine at Khe Sanh. New York: Ballantine Books, 2003. The author was Marine gunner in the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh duringthesiege.Hedescribeshisdaysthereindispassionate,butdetailedprose, providingavividaccountofwhatlifewaslikefortheMarinesduringthedesperate battlethere.
244 Resources Drez,RonaldJ.,andDouglasBrinkley.VoicesofCourage:TheBattleforKheSanh, Vietnam.NewYork:BulfinchPress,2005.Thisaccountisanarrativeofthebitter fightingatKheSanhthatdrawsonthefirsthandexperiencesoftheMarinewho foughtthere.Twoaudiodiscsthatincludesomeoftheinterviewsusedtocompile thenarrativeaccompanythebook. Ewing,Michael.TheIllustratedHistoryofKheSanh.NewYork:BantamBooks,1987. This book provides a brief narrative and an extensive collection of photos and maps. Hammel,Eric.SiegeintheClouds:AnOralHistory.SanFrancisco:PacificaPress, 2000. This book is a collection of first hand accounts of the seventy-seven-day siege. Nalty,BernardC.AirPowerandtheFightforKheSanh.Washington,DC:Officeof AirForceHistory,UnitedStatesAirForce,1973.Thisbookistheofficialhistory ofU.S.AirForcesupporttotheMarinesduringOperationNiagaraandthesiege ofKheSanh. Phillips,WilliamR.NightoftheSilverStars:TheBattleofLangVei.Annapolis,MD: NavalInstitutePress,1997.ThisisthestoryoftheNorthVietnameseattackonthe SpecialForcescampatLangVei,inwhichtheCommunistsusedtanksforthefirst timeinthewar. Pisor,Robert.TheEndoftheLine:TheSiegeofKheSanh.NewYork:Norton,1982. AwarcorrespondentfortheDetroitNews,Pisordiscussesthehistory,politics,and strategiesofthebattleofKheSanh,butalsogivesanappreciationofthenature of the desperate fighting there. He is very critical of General Westmoreland for underreportingtheAmericancasualtiesandoverestimatingtheNorthVietnamese deadafterthebattle. Prados,John,andRayW.Stubbe.ValleyofDecision:TheSiegeofKheSanh.Boston: HoughtonMifflin,1991.Basedoninterviews,documentaryresearch,andthepersonalexperiencesofoneoftheauthors,thisisacomprehensivehistoryofthebattle forKheSanhin1968.Theauthorsalsoaddressthelargerpoliticalcontextthatled tothedecisiontostandandfightthere. Rottman,GordonS.KheSanh1967–68.London:Osprey,2005.Thisexcellentvolume intheOspreyseriesaddressesthesiegeofKheSanhandthebattlesthatpreceded it.Itprovidesadetailednarrative,excellentmaps,andanumberofphotographs. Shore,MoyersS. TheBattleofKheSanh.Washington,DC:HistoryandMuseums Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1969. The official Marine Corps history of the battle, this is based on extensive interviews of the survivors of the seventy-seven-daysiege. Shulimson, Jack, Leonard A. Blasiol, Charles R. Smith, and David A. Dawson. U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year 1968. Washington, DC: History and MuseumsDivision,HeadquartersU.S.MarineCorps,1997.Avolumeintheofficial historyoftheMarineCorpsinVietnam,theauthorsaddressMarineoperationsinI Corps,amongthemtheearlierbattleforthehillsaroundKheSanh,thesiegeand thebitterfightingatHue,andthesiegeofKheSanh.Thisisanextremelydetailed andthoroughlydocumentedaccountbasedoninterviewsandofficialrecords.
Resources 245 Simmons, Edwin H., et al. The Marines in Vietnam 1954–1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974.AnanthologyofarticlesabouttheMarinesinVietnamthatincludesoneon thebattleforKheSanh. Spencer, Ernest. Welcome to Vietnam, Macho Man: Reflections of a Khe Sanh Vet. Alamo,CA:CorpsPress,1987.Acompanycommanderinthe26thMarines,Spencer tellswhatitwasliketoendurethefightforKheSanhatthegroundlevel.Extremely wellwritten,thisbookisanononsenseaccountoflifeinthe“mudandblood.” Stockwell,DavidB.TanksintheWire:TheFirstUseofEnemyArmorinVietnam.New York:JovePublications,1990.WrittenbyanArmyarmorofficer,thisisanarrative oftheattackontheSpecialForcescampatLangVeiinwhichtheCommunists usedtanks.
t h e h il l f ig h t s an d bo rd er b at t l es Coan, James P. Con Thien: The Hill of Angels. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004. The author, a decorated Marine, describes his experiences while assignedasatankplatoonleaderstationedatConThienforeightmonthsduring theperiod1967–68. Hammel,Eric.AmbushValley:ICorps,Vietnam,1967,theStoryofaMarineInfantry Battalion’s Battle for Survival. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990. Hammel describes the vicious fighting by the 3rd Battalion of the 26th Marines near the DMZ in September in the words of the survivors of the bitter fighting that preceded the siegeofKheSanh. Hemingway, Al. “Hell on the Hill of Angels.” Military Heritage 7, no. 4 (February 2006):40–45,74.TheauthoraddressesthesiegeofConThien. Murphy, Edward F. Dak To: The 173d Airborne Brigade in South Vietnam’s Central Highlands, June-November 1967. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993. The author tells the story of the U.S. paratroopers in the desperate fight for Hill 875 in the Central Highlands.ThisbattlewasaresultofGeneralGiap’sstrategytopullU.S.unitsaway fromthepopulatedareasastheCommunistforcespreparedfortheTetOffensive. ———.SemperFi:FromDaNangtotheDMZ,MarineCorpsCampaigns,1965–1975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1997. Murphy seeks to provide a history of Marine Corps operations in Vietnam, but may have thrown his net too wide for a book of this length. He does address the Hill Fights of 1967, the siege of Khe Sanh, and the BattleofHue. ———.TheHillFights:TheFirstBattleofKheSanh.Novato,CA:Presidio,2003.This bookaddressesthefirefights,ambushes,andotherbattlefieldactionofthevicious actionsthattookplaceinthehillsaroundKheSanhforseveralmonthsbeforethe siegeoftheMarinebasethatbeganonJanuary21,1968. Pearson, Willard. The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–1968. Washington, DC: DepartmentoftheArmy,1975.AnofficialU.S.Armyhistory,thisbookaddresses
246 Resources operations in the area just south of the DMZ in the years prior to the 1968 Tet Offensive,includingthe“borderfights”of1967. Simmons,EdwinH.“MarineCorpsOperationsinVietnam,1967.”InTheMarines in Vietnam, 1954–1973. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1985. Simmons describes the Marine Corps operationsatConThienandinthehillssurroundingKheSanhin1967. Telfer, Gary F., Lane Rogers, and Victor K. Fleming. U.S. Marines in Vietnam, Fighting the North Vietnamese Army, 1967. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1984. An official Marine Corpshistory,thisbookexaminesthefightingin1967whentheMarinesfirsttook onthePeople’sArmyofVietnam.
presid en t l yn d o n b. jo h n so n an d t h e m ed ia Adams,Eddie.“ThePicturesThatBurninmyMemory.”ParadeMagazine(15May 1983), 4–6. The photographer who took the famed photograph of General Loan shootingaVietCongsuspectreflectsontheeffectofthephotograph. Arlen,MichaelJ.Living-RoomWar.NewYork:PenguinBooks,1982.Arlenexamines televisionreportingonthewar,1966–1968. Arnett, Peter. Live from the Battlefield: From Vietnam to Baghdad, 35 Years in the World’s War Zones. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. About half of this book coversArnett’scareerandcontroversialcoverageasanAssociatedPressreporterin Vietnamfrom1962to1975.HewaspresentinVietnamduringtheTetOffensive and attributed the infamous quote about “destroying Bet Het to save it” to an unnamedAmericanmajor. ———. “Tet Coverage: A Debate Renewed.” Columbia Journalism Review (January/ February 1978), 44–47. A review of Peter Braestrup’s Big Story that challenges Braestrup’sconclusions. Braestrup, Peter. Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet in Vietnam and Washington. 2 vols. Boulder, CO: Westview,1977;one-volumeabridgment,NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress, 1983.Providingaverydetailedstudywithvoluminousdocumentation,Braestrup is very critical of the performance of the press during the Tet Offensive. He concludesthatmediareportinghelpedtransformatacticaldisasterinastrategic psychologicalvictoryfortheCommunists. Elegant, Robert. “How to Lose a War: Reflections of a Foreign Correspondent.” Encounter 57 (August 1981), 73–90. Elegant argues that a hostile media seized defeatfromthejawsofvictorybyturningpublicopinionagainstthewarandlimitingthegovernment’sfreedomofaction. Halberstam,David.ThePowersThatBe.NewYork:Knopf,1979.HalberstamexaminestheAmericannewsmedia,focusingonTimemagazine,CBS,theWashington
Resources 247 Post,andtheLosAngelesTimes.Heincludesadiscussionofthecoverageofthe VietnamWar. Hallin, Daniel C. The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam. Berkeley: UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1989.Theauthorprovidesabalancedanalysisofthe NewYorkTimesandnetworkcoverageofthewarfrom1961to1973.Heconcludes thatthemediagenerallyacceptedofficialexplanationsofthewarupuntiltheTet Offensive,butthenbegantoreflectratherthandrivegrowingpublicdisaffection withthewar. Hammond, William H. Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. A senior historian at the U.S. Army’s Center of Military History, Hammond examines the tense relationship between the armed servicesandthemediaduringtheVietnamWar.AnabridgementofHammond’s earliertwo-volumework,thisbookchallengestheassertionsofmanymilitaryleadersthatthemedialostthewarbyswayingpublicopinion. Mohr,Charles.“OnceAgain—DidthePressLoseVietnam?”InGraceSevy,ed.,The AmericanExperienceinVietnam,143–152.Norman:UniversityofOklahomaPress, 1989.Mohrarguesthatthemedia,andinparticulartelevisionreporters,didnot slantthenewsbutratheronlyreportedwhattheysaw. Pach,ChesterJ.,Jr.“TheWaronTelevision:TVNews,theJohnsonAdministration, andVietnam.”InMarilynB.YoungandRobertBuzzanco,eds.,ACompanionto theVietnamWar,450–469.Malden,MA:Blackwell,2002.Theauthorprovidesa balancedaccountoftheimpactofthetelevisionmediaonJohnsonandhisconductofthewar.Pachconcludesthatthepresidentthoughtthathisproblemwas thathehadfailedtowinthewarontelevisionwhentherealproblemwasthewar thattelevisionshowed. Reporting Vietnam. 2 vols. New York: Library of America, 1998. This two-volume anthology is a collection of newspaper and magazine reports and book excerpts from more than eighty reporters and writers that cover the entire period of American involvement in Vietnam. Volume 1 contains a number of articles and reportsontheTetOffensiveandKheSanh. Salisbury,Harrison,ed.VietnamReconsidered:LessonsFromaWar.NewYork:Harper &Row,1984.ThiscompilationofessayscontainstwoessaysbyPeterBraestrupand KeyesBeechrespectivelythattakethemedia,andparticularlytelevision,totaskfor havinganegativeimpactonAmericanperceptionsofthefightingandoutcomeof theTetOffensive. Turner, Kathleen J. Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War: Vietnam and the Press. Chicago: UniversityofChicagoPress,1985.AuthorarguesthatJohnsondidnotdoagoodjob ofexplainingU.S.actionstothepressandincreasinglylostpresssupport. Wyatt, Clarence R. Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War. New York: Norton, 1993. The author seeks to counter the widespread belief that the American press was a major factor in the U.S. failure in Vietnam. He reveals thattherecordshowsinsteadafluctuatingmixofcooperationandconfrontation betweenjournalistsandthegovernmentandmilitary.
248 Resources
m il itary in t el l ig en c e an d t et Adams, Sam. “Vietnam Cover-up: Playing War with Numbers.” Harper’s, May 1975. AdamswasananalystfortheCentralIntelligenceAgencyanalystduringtheVietnam War.HechargedthatMACVheadquartersinSaigondeliberatelydownplayedthe numberofguerrillasinSouthVietnamandthatthisdeceptionplayedamajorrole inthesurpriseoftheTetOffensive.AdamshelpedproduceaCBStelevisiondocumentaryaboutAmericanintelligencefailuresinVietnamthatwasthesubjectofa lawsuitbroughtbyWilliamWestmoreland,formerMACVcommander. ———. War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir. South Royalton, VT: Steerforth, 1994.ThisisSamAdams’sunfinishedmemoir,inwhichheexpandsonthecharge originallymadeinthearticleabovethatMACVheadquartersdeliberatelyaltered enemyorderofbattlefigures.HiswifepublisheditafterAdamsdied. Adler,Renata.RecklessDisregard:Westmorelandv.CBSetal;Sharonv.Time.New York:VintageBooks,1988.Theauthor,alawyer,analyzestheWestmorelandtrial and a similar suit brought by Israeli General Ariel Sharon against Time magazine.TheWestmorelandtrialevolvedfromtheCBStelevisiondocumentarythat chargedMACVhadalteredtheorderofbattleaccountinginordertoshowprogressinthewar.AdlerisverycriticalofbothCBSandTime. Allen,GeorgeW.NoneSoBlind.Chicago:IvanR.Dee,2001.Theauthor,aformer career officer in the Central Intelligence Agency who served in Vietnam for a number of years. He criticizes American leaders, who he asserts were unwilling to confront reality when presented with bad news from intelligence sources and insistedinmakingtheirownstrategicandtacticaldecisions.Itincludesalengthy chapterontheTetOffensive. Blood,Jake.TheTetEffect:IntelligenceandthePublicPerceptionofWar.London: Routledge, 2005. Blood, a retired military intelligence officer, examines what hecalls“theTetEffect,”whichhedescribesasthelossofcredibilitythatresults withthepublicisgiven“skewed,”or“justplainbad,”intelligence.AfterdiscussingtheimpactofintelligencefailuresduringtheTetOffensive,heassertsthat the“TetEffect”wasalsooperablewhentheUnitedStateswenttowarinIraq in2003. Brewin,Bob,andSydneyShaw.FairPlay:CBS,GeneralWestmoreland,andHowa TelevisionDocumentaryWentWrong.NewYork:Atheneum,1987.Thisbook,by twojournalists,providesagenerallyimpartialandthoroughaccountofthelandmarklegalcase.Thebookexaminesthemakingofthedocumentary,thehistoryof thewar,andfinallythetrialitself. Davidson, Phillip B. Secrets of the Vietnam War. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990. This bookaddressestheexperiencesoftheauthorwhoservedasthechiefUnitedStates militaryintelligenceofficeinVietnam(MACVJ-2)fromMay1967untilMay1969. Amongawidearrayofissues,theauthoraddressestheenemytroop-strengthcontroversyinthemonthsleadinguptotheTetOffensive.Notsurprisingly,Davidson assumesaverypro-Westmorelandstance.
Resources 249 Ford, Harold P. CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962–1968. Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central IntelligenceAgency,1998.AhistorianfortheCIA,theauthorexaminesthreeepisodesbetween1962and1968,oneofwhichistheTetOffensive,todeterminethe informationandjudgmentstheCIAprovidedseniordecisionmakers.Theauthor assessestheimpacttheseinputshadordidnothaveonpolicydecisions. Ford,RonnieE.Tet1968:UnderstandingtheSurprise.London:FrankCass,1995.The author,anArmycaptain,examinestheroleplayedbyU.S.intelligenceintheTet OffensiveanddemonstrateshowtheCommunistswereabletoachievesuchastunninglevelofsurprisewhentheylaunchedtheoffensive. Handel,MichaelI.,ed.LeadersandIntelligence.London:FrankCass,1989.Thisis abookofessaysonleadershipandstrategicintelligence.Itincludesanessayon WestmorelandandintelligencebyT.L.Cubbage. Jones,Bruce.WarWithoutWindows.NewYork:Vanguard,1987.Joneswasajunior officerwhoworkedinmilitaryintelligenceinSaigonduring1967–68.Heasserts thatheparticipatedinthefalsificationofenemyorderofbattlefigures. Kowet,Don.AMatterofHonor.NewYork:Macmillan,1984.Thisbookpurportsto be the inside story of the CBS documentary about the “uncounted enemy” in Vietnamanditsrepercussions. President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. “Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam.” Issued on April 11, 1968, and declassified and releasedtotheU.S.HouseofRepresentativesPikeCommitteein1975,thisisthe reportofthepresident’sselectadvisoryboardonthefailureofU.S.intelligenceto anticipatethescopeandmagnitudeoftheTetOffensive. Wirtz, James J. “Deception and the Tet Offensive.” Journal of Strategic Studies 13 (June 1990): 82–98. Wirtz discusses the role of deception in the ability of the Communiststoachievethestunningsurprisetheyachievedwiththelaunchingof theTetOffensive. ———.“IntelligencetoPlease?—TheOrderofBattleControversyDuringtheVietnam War.”PoliticalScienceQuarterly106(Summer1991):239–263.Wirtzaddressesthe order-of-battle controversy that erupted when CIA analyst Sam Adams charged thatMACVwasdeliberatelyunderestimatingthenumberofVietCongandPAVN forcesinthefieldbeforeandduringtheTetOffensive. ———. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1994.WirtzexaminestheCommunistdeceptionplanthatprecededtheTet OffensiveandaddresseswhyAmericanandSouthVietnameseintelligencefailed toseewhatwashappening.
u.s. st rat eg y in v iet n am Krepinevich,AndrewF.,Jr.TheArmyandVietnam.Baltimore,MD:JohnsHopkins UniversityPress,1986.InthiscriticalanalysisofU.S.militarystrategyinVietnam
250 Resources from1954to1973,theauthorchargesthattheArmymistakenlyappliedthedoctrinethathadbeendevelopedforaconventionalwarinEuropetotheuniquesituationinVietnam,whileignoringthedemandsoffightingacounterinsurgency. Sharp,U.S.Grant.StrategyforDefeat.SanRafael,CA:Presidio,1978.Theformer commander-in-chiefinthePacific(CinCPac)maintainsthattheUnitedStateswas notdoomedtofailureinVietnam,butlostbecausetheWhiteHouseprosecuted afatallyflawedstrategy. Summers,HarryC.,Jr.OnStrategy:ACriticalAnalysisoftheVietnamWar.Novato, CA:Presidio,1982.TheauthorarguesthattheVietnamwarwaswinnable,butthat amisunderstandingofclassicalmilitarytheoryanditsconnectiontopolicyledtoa fatallyflawedstrategyandsubsequentdefeatfortheUnitedStatesinVietnam. Thayer, Thomas C. War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985. The author provides a quantitative analysis of the critical dimensions of the war. He concludes that the war was so different from anything that the United States had previously fought that the public and that thisdifferencemadeitdifficultforWashingtonandthemilitarytocomprehend. AccordingtoThayer,theflawsinstrategystemmingfromthislackofcomprehensionmadeU.S.failureinVietnaminevitable.
c o m bat af t er-ac t io n repo r t s an d c o m m an d h ist o r ies 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, Combat After Action Report, 3–28 February 1968, dated 13April1968. 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, Combat After Action Report, 30 January—12 February 1968,undated. 1stBrigade,101stAirborneDivision,CombatAfterActionReport,February22–March 2,1968. 1st Cavalry Division, 14th Military History Detachment, Combat After Action Report—OpHue,Period2–26February1968,dated16August1968. 1st Marine Division, 1st Mar Div Commander’s AAR, Tet Offensive, 29 January–14 February1968,dated25May68. 1stMarineDivision,TFX-Ray,AAR,OperationHueCity,withenclosures,dated14 April1968. 1st Marines (Rein), 1st Marine Division (Rein), Combat Operations After Action Report(OperationHUECITY),dated20March1968. 4thBattalion,12thInfantry,199thInfantryBrigade(Sep)(Light),CombatAfterAction Report,14January–17February1968. 199thInfantryBrigade(Separate)(Light),AfterActionReport,LongBinh/Saigon,Tet Campaign,12January–19February1968. IIFieldForceVietnam,AfterActionReport—TetOffensive,31January–18February 1968.
Resources 251 II Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report—Lessons Learned, Period Ending 30 April1968. U.S.MilitaryAssistanceCommand,Vietnam.CommandHistory,1967. U.S.MilitaryAssistanceCommand,Vietnam.CommandHistory,1968.
m ic ro f il m /m ic ro f ic h e Lester,RobertE.,ed.RecordsoftheMilitaryAssistanceCommandVietnam.3parts.90 microfilmreels.Bethesda,MD:UniversityPublicationsofAmerica,1988. ———. Records of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Vietnam War. 3 parts. 78 microfilm reels.Bethesda,MD:UniversityPublicationsofAmerica,1990. ———. U.S. Army Build-up and Activities in South Vietnam, 1965–1972. 3 parts. 29 microfilmreels.Bethesda,MD:UniversityPublicationsofAmerica,1989. ———.TheWarinVietnam:ThePapersofWilliamC.Westmoreland.PartI:History, Statements, and Clippings Files. 25 microfilm reels. Bethesda, MD: University PublicationsofAmerica,1993. The Lyndon B. Johnson National Security Files, 1963–69: Agency File. 34 microfilm reels.Bethesda,MD:UniversityPublicationsofAmerica,1977. TheLyndonB.JohnsonNationalSecurityFiles,1963–69:Vietnam:FirstSupplement. 18microfilmreels.Bethesda,MD:UniversityPublicationsofAmerica,1996. Pike,Douglas,ed.TheHistoryoftheVietnamWar.10units.Microfiche.AnnArbor, MI:UMIResearchCollections,1988. Stubbe,RayW.,ed.KheSanh:ACollectionofResearchDocumentation.10microfilm reels.
d o c u m en tary f il m s AirPoweratKheSanh.VHS,30minutes.BrentwoodCommunications,1990. BattlefieldVietnam,Episode1:CountdowntoTet.VHS,58minutes.TimeLifeVideo, 1998. BattlefieldVietnam,Episode2:TheTetOffensive.VHS,58minutes.TimeLifeVideo, 1998. Battlefield Vietnam, Episode 6: Siege at Khe Sanh. VHS, 58 minutes. Time Life Video,1998. BloodySiegesofKheSanh&ConThien:MiscalculationinVietnam.VHS,44minutes.A&ETelevisionNetworks,1996. History Alive: Unsung Heroes—The Battle of Khe Sanh. VHS, 50 minutes. A&E TelevisionNetworks,2002. To Hell and Beyond: Air Power at Khe Sanh. VHS, 30 minutes. Brentwood Home Video,1989.
252 Resources TheVietnamWarwithWalterCronkite.DVD,11hours.CBSVideoLibrary,2003. The Vietnam War with Walter Cronkite: The Tet Offensive. VHS, 55 minutes. CBS VideoLibrary,1985. 20th Century with Mike Wallace: Vietnam Dilemma: Tet Offensive and the Anti-War Movement. VHS, 55 minutes. The History Channel, A&E Television Networks, 2000. Vietnam,Episode8:TheTetOffensive.VHS,61minutes.CBSVideo,1987. Vietnam: A Television History, Episode 7: Tet 1968. DVD/VHS, 60 minutes. PBS, 2004. Vietnam:BattleofKheSanh.VHS,60minutes.MPIHomeVideo,1989. Vietnam:OntheFrontlines,Volume2:TetinSaigonandHue.VHS,50minutes.The HistoryChannel,A&ETelevisionNetworks,2000. Vietnam:TheTenThousandDayWar,Episode7:Siege.VHS,49minutes.Embassy HomeEntertainment,1980. WarStories:TheSiegeatKheSanh.VHS,50minutes.FoxNews,2001. WarStories:TheTetOffensive.VHS,50minutes.FoxNews,2002. WhyVietnam&WhyKheSanh?VHS,55minutes.UnitedAmericanVideo,1998.
el ec t ro n ic reso u r c es WebSites The American Experience—Vietnam. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/index. html.AcompaniontothePBSseriesVietnam:ATelevisionHistory,thissiteincludes maps,primarysources,bibliography,andtranscriptsofthetelevisionprograms. DocumentsRelatingtotheVietnamWar.http://mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam. htm.Thissitecontainsmanyprimary-andsecondary-sourcedocuments,withlinks todocumentsonothersites. EdwinMoïseBibliographyoftheVietnamWar.http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/ FacultyPages/EdMoise/bibliography.htmlPreparedandmaintainedbyanationally recognizedVietnamscholar,thissiteprovidesanextensive,annotatedbibliographyarrangedtopically.ItincludeslinkstootherVietnamsites. Khe Sanh Declassified Documents. http://members.easyspace.com/airdrop/index. html. This site includes a number of declassified documents having to do with KheSanh. TexasTechUniversityVietnamCenter,VirtualArchive.http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/ virtualarchive. This site offers an extensive collection of primary sources online andincludesaccesstodocuments,photos,oralhistoryinterviews(bothaudiofiles andtranscripts),andawiderangeofmediaformats. Vietnam:EchoesfromtheWall.http://www.teachvietnam.org.Thissite,maintained bytheVietnamVeteransMemorialFund,providesaneducationalcurriculumand associatedlinksforteachingabouttheVietnamWar.
Resources 253 Vietnam War Internet Project. http://www.vwip.org/vwiphome.html. Maintained by theLyndonBainesJohnsonPresidentialLibrary,thissiteoffersanextensivearray oflinkstodocuments,memoirs,photos,bibliographies,andothersources. The Wars for Vietnam: 1945–1975. http://students.vassar.edu/~vietnam/. This site provides links to a wide selection of primary source documents, bibliographies, andothersites.
CD-ROMs American Journey: The Vietnam Era (1999). Edited by George Herring, Clarence Wyatt,andRobertK.Brigham.PublishedbyPrimarySourceMedia(Woodbridge, CT)forMacandWindows,itprovidesprimarysourcematerialorganizedaround thematic essays. It also includes links, timelines, maps, pictures, and full-text searchcapability. USA Wars: Vietnam (1994). Published by Quanta Press (Minneapolis) for Mac and Windows.DistributedbyWAE(Clarkson,WA).ThisCDhasalargeamountof textfromprimarysourcedocumentsandsecondarydocumentsplusimages,tables, maps,andasectionontheVietnamWarMemorial. War in Vietnam: A Multimedia Chronicle (1995). Published by Macmillan Digital (New York) for Mac and Windows. CD provides more than a thousand articles fromtheNewYorkTimes,anhouroffilmfootagefromCBSNews,35maps,800 photographs,andtheVietnamWarMemorialdatabase. Wings:KoreatoVietnam(1995).PublishedbyDiscoveryMultimedia(Bethesda,MD) for Mac and Windows. CD includes information on five hundred aircraft of all typesflownduringthewarsinKoreaandVietnam.Italsoincludesinteractivebase tours,warreportswithvideo,andmanyotherfeatures.
arc h iv es an d l ibrar ies U.S.ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,CombinedArmsResearchLibrary, EisenhowerHall,250Gibbon,FtLeavenworth,KS66027;tel.1(913)758–5053 LyndonBainesJohnsonPresidentialLibrary,2313RedRiverStreet,Austin,TX78705; tel.1(512)482–5137 Marine Corps Historical Center, 1254 Charles Morris Street SE, Washington Navy Yard,D.C.20374,tel.1(202)433–0731 U.S.ArmyMilitaryHistoryInstitute,22AshburnDrive,Carlisle,PA17013,tel.1(717) 245–3711(facsimileinquiriesonly) Vietnam Archive, The Vietnam Center, Texas Tech University, Special Collection Library,Room108,Lubbock,TX79409,tel.1(806)742–9010
i n d ex
ABC(AmericanBroadcastingCompany),111,112 Abrams,CreightonW.,76,121,156,158, 164 Acheson,Dean,75,156 Ackland,Len,102 Adams,Eddie,36–37,164 Adams,Sam,95,127n2,134n9,180 advisers,U.S.,7 aerialresupply,ofKheSanh,24 Aiken,George,73 Aircraft, A-1E,23 A-4,61 A-6,61 B-52,8,16,23,25,61,62–63,64,114, 166 C-7,20 C-123,20,24,114 C-130,20,24,114 F-4,61,153 AirForce,UnitedStates.SeeU.S.Air Force Altekoester,Alois,100 AmericanBroadcastingCompany (ABC).SeeABC(AmericanBroadcastingCompany)
AmericalDivision(23rdInfantryDivision),167,178 AmericanEmbassy.SeeU.S.Embassy, Saigon Anderson,DavidL.,xvii AnKhe,30 antiwarprotests.Seeprotests,antiwar ArcLight.SeeOperation,ArcLight. Army,UnitedStates.SeeU.S.Army ArmyoftheRepublicofVietnam (ARVN),4,165;airbornetroops,38; ArmoredCommand,33;Artillery Command,33;performanceof,81, 82 —unitsof, HacBao“BlackPanther”company, 44,46 10thPoliticalWarfareBattalion, 101–102 1stDivision,44,163,179 2ndDivision,163 3rdDivision,163 5thDivision,38,164 7thDivision,164 9thDivision,164 18thDivision,164 21stDivision,164
256 Index —unitsof(continued) 22ndDivision,163 23rdDivision,163 25thDivision,164 37thRangerBattalion,25,62,126n18, 155 ICorps,163 IICorps,163 IIICorps,164 IVCorps,164 Arnett,Peter,128n24,165,166 Arnold,JamesR.,83 ARVN,SeeArmyoftheRepublicof Vientam(ARVN) AssociatedPress(AP),38,144 attritionstrategy,165 Australia,8,166 BanMeThuot,21,28,29,40,166 Beech,Keyes,112 BenHaiRiver,16 BenTre,31,40,41,73,128n24,166 Betts,Richard,82 BienHoa,31,37,153,167;attackonair base,38–39 “BigGamble”report,27 BinhLongProvince,16 bodycount,167 BongSon,30 “BorderBattles,”15–17 Bradley,Omar,75 Braestrup,Peter,onroleofmediainTet, 113–116 Brodie,Bernard,84 Brush,Peter,104,109 BuiDiem,37 BuiTinh,83,102–103 Bundy,McGeorge,75 Bunker,Ellsworth,102,147,151,167 BuuDong,Father,100 Cable,Larry,98 Calley,WilliamL.,Jr.,167,178 CamRanhBay,40
Cambodia,Communistsanctuariesin, 4,5,7 CampCarroll,15,19,59,61,62 CanLaoParty,102,135n13 CanTho,31,40,151,152 CaoVanVien,28,148 capabilitiesoftheVietnameseCommunists,196–197 CaravelleHotel,39 casualties,6,132n11;allied,duringTet Offensive,82;atKheSanh,63–64; duringmonthofMay1968,67;MarinecasualtiesinfightfortheCitadel atHue,53;totalAmericannumber for1968,77;VietCongandPAVN, 81,131–132n4 CBS(ColumbiaBroadcastingSystem), 68,151;CronkiteBroadcast,February 27,1968,205–206;Report:“Saigon UnderFire,”199–203 cease-fire,Tet.SeeTetholiday,truce for CedarFalls,Operation.SeeOperation, CedarFalls CentralCommittee.SeeLaoDong (Workers’)Party CentralHighlands,4,17,29,40,168 CentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA),27 CentralOfficeforSouthVietnam (COSVN),9,13,16,90,94,154,168, 184 Cheatham,ErnestC.,50 Checkers,Operation.SeeOperation, Checkers China,People’sRepublicof.See People’sRepublicofChina chinhhuan,13 Cholon,13,168;battleof,39,42,152; secondbattleof,67 Christian,George,69 ChristianScienceMonitor,144,145 ChuLai,30 Citadel,Hue,43–44;fightfor,52–54 CivilOperationsandRuralDevelop-
Index 257 mentSupport(CORDS),142, 168–169 CivilianIrregularDefenseGroups (CIDG),7,17,169 Clifford,ClarkM.,143,151,156,169; replacesMcNamaraasSecretaryof Defense,72,150,155;formstaskforce tostudysituationinVietnam,72–73, 120–121;meetswith“WiseMen,”75; submitsreporttoJohnson,121 ColumbiaBroadcastingSystem(CBS). SeeCBS(ColumbiaBroadcasting System) CORDS.SeeCivilOperationsandRuralDevelopmentSupport(CORDS) CombinedActionCompany,24 CombinedActionProgram,19,126n11, 169 CommunistPartyofNorthVietnam.See LaoDong(Workers’)Party ConThien,125n3,144;battleof,15–16, 17,169–170 CongressionalRecord,101 CoRocMountain,60 CorpsTacticalZones,4,125n2,170 I,29,48,51,151,163,170 II,40,151,163 III,29,30,38,159,164 IV,41,164 COSVN,SeeCentralOfficeforSouth Vietnam. “credibilitygap,”35–36,110–111 Cronkite,Walter,25,35,170;onKhe Sanh,60;onTetOffensive,68–69, 112,155;textofFebruary27,1968, report,205–206;triptoVietnam, 68 CuChi,38 Currey,Cecil,10,106 Cushman,RobertE.,Jr.,48,49–50,126 n9 DakTo,battleof,17,21,146,147,152,170 Dalat,40,170
DaMaiCreek,99,101 DaNang,3,29,40,45,46,170 DauTieng,158 dautranh,11,124–125n23,171 Davidson,PhillipB.,30,31,106 DemilitarizedZone(DMZ),xvi,15–16, 70,171 DemocraticNationalConvention,77, 159 DemocraticParty,77 DemocraticRepublicofVietnam (DRV),146 DepartmentofDefense(DOD).See U.S.DepartmentofDefense(DOD) Desobry,William,150 DetroitEconomicClub,148 DetroitNews,143 Diem,Bui.SeeBuiDiem DienBienPhu,Battleof,11,12,20, 21–22,25,57,60,62,63,91,171 DinhTuong,31 DinhTuongProvince,27 DirectiveonForthcomingOffensiveand Uprisings,193–196 Dirksen,Everett,148 Discher,Raimund,100 DMZ.SeeDemilitarizedZone(DMZ) Doc,TranVan.SeeTranVanDoc Do,Tran.SeeTranDo DongHa,15 DRV.SeeDemocraticRepublicof Vietnam Duiker,WilliamJ.,5,8,11,79,92 Dung,VanTien.SeeVanTienDung DuongQuynhHoa,81 DuongVanMinh,102 DustOff,171 Eby,Omar,101 Elegant,Robert,112 Elliott,Paul,113,115 ElPaso,Operation.SeeOperation,El Paso Embassy,U.S.SeeU.S.Embassy,Saigon
258 Index Falk,Richard,xv,68,72,103 FirstIndochinaWar,4 Ford,GeraldR.,143,148 Ford,RonnieE.,97,108 FreeWorldMilitaryForces(FWMF), 8,172 Friendlyfire,172 Fulbright,J.William,75,155 GallupPoll,73,153,155,157 Gelb,Leslie,82 GeneralOffensive,GeneralUprising, 9,11 GiaHoi,43 Giap,Gen.VoNguyen.SeeVoNguyen Giap Gilbert,MarcJason,xv, GoCong,31 Goldberg,Arthur,144–145 GovernmentofVietnam(GVN/South Vietnam),82 GreatSociety,72,73 Guy,Father,100 HacBao“BlackPanther”reconnaissancecompany,44,46 Halberstam,David,112 Hallin,DanielC.,115 HamburgerHill,battleof,121–122 HamletEvaluationSystem(HES),5 Hammond,WilliamH.,41,112,116–117 Hanoi,172;Tetcelebrationin,28 Harriman,W.Averell,xvi,76,172 HarrisPoll,116,153,157 Herring,GeorgeC.,71,90 Highway1,43 Hill158,15 HillFights,19–22,142 Hill558,19 Hill861,19,23,24 Hill861A,58–59 Hill881North,19 Hill881South,19 HoangNgocLung,96
HoangXuanLam,48,49,179 HoiAn,29 HoChiMinh,21,100,102,147,149,172 HoChiMinhCity,78 HoChiMinhTrail,3,4,8,13,17,28,66, 72,95,118,172 Hoopes,Townsend,84 Hue,173 —battleof,xvi,30,42,43–55,152,173; casualties,53–54;civiliancasualties, 54–55;destruction,54;fightforthe Citadel,52–54;fightinginNewCity, 50–52;liberationofImperialPalace byARVN,54,154 —descriptionof,43–45 —massacrein,55,99–103 Hughes,StanleyS.,50 Humphrey,HubertH.,77,159,173 Hunt,RichardA.,82 Huntley-Brinkleynewsprogram,116–117 IaDrangValley,Battleof,4 ImperialPalace,44,52 IndependencePalace,32,33 intelligence:beforeOffensive,21,26–27, 28;“BigGamble”Report,27;during TetOffensive,93–98;failuresduring Tet,127n2,134n9,93–98;reports priortoattackonHue,21,46,147 IronTriangle,4,96,173 JCS.SeeJointChiefsofStaff(JCS) Johnson,HaroldK.,143,158 Johnson,LyndonBaines,142,144,147, 148,149,150,151,154,173–174;almost defeatedatNewHampshireprimary, 74,156;announcesthathewillnot runforre-election,76,157,213–222; announcesthatClarkCliffordwill succeedMcNamara,150;announces thatpeacetalkswillbegininParis, 157;announcesthatRobertMcNamarawillstepdown,148;announces thatGeneralWestmorelandwillbe
Index 259 replacedbyGeneralAbrams,156; authorizestheuseofU.S.ground troops,3;callsfor10percentsurtax, 143;concernedaboutKheSanh, 58;convenesthe“WiseMen,”157; decliningpublicsupportafterTet, 70,73,74,157;directsCliffordto formtaskforce,155;haltsbombingof NorthVietnam,77;meetswithPresidentThieu,141;onKheSanhand DienBienPhu,25,58;orders“SuccessCampaign,”6–7,27,111;predicts Communistoffensive,27;remarks aboutfailureofTetOffensive,58,152; replacesWilliamWestmoreland,76; respondstoreportby“WiseMen,” 75–76;responsetoadditionaltroop request,120–121;responsetoTetOffensive,xvi;“SanAntonioFormula,” 145,191–193 JointChiefsofStaff(JCS),174 JointGeneralStaff,32,174 JointGeneralStaffheadquarters,attack on,33–34 Jorden,William,95 JunctionCity,Operation.SeeOperation,JunctionCity Karnow,Stanley,11,31,83 Kennedy,RobertF.,73,74–75,77,148, 153,156,158,174 KheSanh,xvi,12,15,17–19,150,175; abandonedbyMarines,77,109,158; aerialresupplyof,61;Cronkitepredictionabout,60;comparedtoDien BienPhu,21–22,25,57,60,62,64, 105,107–108,113–114,129n3;Communistbuild-upat,23;Communist objectivesat,104–109;firesupport,19; coordinationat,61–62;Hill558;Hill 861,14,23,24;Hill861A,58–59;Hill 881South,19,23,24;Hill881N,19; impactoffightingatHue,60;media coverageof,36,113–114;purposeof
siege,104–109;siegeof,23–25,56–65; siegelifted,63–64;tacticalairsupport,61–62,64;watersupplyat,107 khoinghia,14 KienTuong,31 King,MartinLuther,Jr.,6,142,152,157 Kitt,Eartha,150 Kontum,175 attackson,29,40 intelligenceabout,21 Korea,Republicof,8,175 Korea,South.SeeKorea,Republicof Krainick,HorstGunther,100 Krepinevich,AndrewF.,Jr.,119–120 Krulak,Victor,107 Ky,NguyenCao.SeeNguyenCaoKy LaHue,FosterC.,45,48,49,52,175 LaiKhe,38 Lam,HoangXuan.SeeHoangXuan Lam LangVeiSpecialForcesCamp,18,22; fallof,59–60,152,175–176 LaoDong(Workers’)Party,xvii,9,76, 141,152,176;decidestolaunchTet Offensive,142;resolutioncallingfor TetOffensive,90–91;Resolution13, 10,182;Resolution14,146,182;ThirteenthPlenum,9,10,141,182 Laos,7 LeDuan,9,90,176 LeDucTho,176 LeThanhTonc,23–24,105 LeThanhNghi,142 Lewy,Gunther,101 “LiberationRadio,”14 Life,145 Lind,Michael,122 Loan,NguyenNgoc.SeeNguyenNgoc Loan LocNinh,battleof,16,17,27,146,176 Lodge,HenryCabot,75 LongBinh,attackon,37,38–39,176 Long,NgoVinh.SeeNgoVinhLong.
260 Index LowAltitudeParachuteExtraction System(LAPES),126n12 Lownds,DavidE.,23,62 LunarNewYear.SeeTetholiday Lung,HoangNgoc.SeeHoangNgoc Lung LuongVien,99 MacDonald,Peter,101,106,108 MACV.SeeMilitaryAssistanceCommandVietnam(MACV) MACVCompound,Hue,44,49–51 Mansfield,Mike,73 MarineCorps,UnitedStates.SeeU.S. MarineCorps McCarthy,Eugene,74,75,77,148,149, 152,156,176–177 McGee,Frank,73 McNamara,RobertS.,72,142,144,146, 148,177 MedalofHonor,82 Media(news),roleofinTetOffensive, 83,110–117 Medina,ErnestL.,178 MekongDelta,31,94,152,158,177; attacksinduringTetOffensive,40–41 MilitaryAssistanceCommand,Vietnam (MACV),177;asseenbymedia, 110–111;attackonheadquarters, 37–38;estimateofVCstrength,8;indicationsofimpendingoffensive,21; intelligenceanalysisby,20–21,27,95 Miller,Stephen,100 Minh,DuongVan.SeeDuongVan Minh “MiniArcLight,”62 Mini-Tetoffensive(1968),67,158 MobileRiverineForce(MRF),41, 177–178 Mohr,Charles,112–113 Montagnards,7,17,18,59,178 Moïse,EdwinE.,89 MyLai,massacreat,156,178 MyTho,31,40,41
NationalBroadcastingCompany(NBC). SeeNBC(NationalBroadcasting System) NationalLiberationFront(NLF),xvi, 4,14,47,79,81,89,147,150,178–179; CentralCommitteeof,152;HueCity Committee,145 NationalMilitaryAcademy,South Vietnamese,40 NationalPolice,SouthVietnamese,7 NationalPressClub,7,147 NationalSecurityCouncil(NSC),95 NBC(NationalBroadcastingCompany), 69,73,113,116–117,151 NewHampshireprimary,74,156 NewYorkTimes,35,41,73,117,145, 155–156 NewZealand,8,179 Nghi,LeThanh.SeeLeThanh Nghi NghiemTuc,105 NgoDinhDiem,102 NgoQuangTruong,46–48,179 NgoVinhLong,90 NguyenCaoKy,141,144,179 NguyenChiThanh,9,10,90,179 NguyenDuyTrinh,149 NguyenHoangBridge,44 NguyenNgocLoan,36–37,111,112, 116–117,179–180 NguyenThiLao,100–101 NguyenVanThieu,28,77,90,102,141, 144,146,151,153,157,179,180 NhaTrang,11,29,40,46,151 Niagara,Operation.SeeOperation, Niagara Nixon,RichardM.,77,121,144,151–152, 159,178,180–181 NLF.SeeNationalLiberationFront (NLF) NorthKorea,143,150 NorthVietnam:bombingof,4,14 —CentralMilitaryPartyCommitteeof. SeeLaoDong(Workers’)Party
Index 261 NorthVietnameseArmy(NVA).See People’sArmyofVietnam(PAVN) Oberdorfer,Don:;onoutcomeofthe TetOffensive,81;onpublicreaction toTetOffensive,69;onTetandthe “credibilitygap,”111;onthebattle ofHue,54;onthemassacreinHue, 100,101,103;ontheimpactoftheTet Offensive,83,84;onthesignificance oftheTetOffensive,xvi O’Neill,RobertJ.,107 Ontos,181 OperationOrderNo.1,28 Operations: ArcLight,25,165 CedarFalls,4,5,135n13,141,167–168 Checkers,22 ElPaso,126n10 JunctionCity,4,5,135n13,141,174 Niagara,22–23,25,58,63,149,180 Pegasus,63,64,157,181 RollingThunder,159,183 Owens,James,90 Pach,Chester,111 pacificationprogram,5,82,181 Palmer,DaveRichard,80 ParisPeaceAccords,78,100 ParisPeaceTalks.SeePeaceTalks(Paris) PeaceTalks(Paris),157,158 Peers,WilliamR.,178 Pegasus,Operation.SeeOperation, Pegasus PentagonPapers,181 People’sArmyofVietnam(PAVN),xvi, 4,123n2,181–182;build-upatKhe Sanh,20;estimatedstrengthin1967, 8;orderedtomovedowntheHoChi MinhTrail,4,8;preparationsforTet Offensive,13–14 —unitsof, B-2Front,92 325CDivision,23,59
304thDivision,20,23,156 Route9-QuangTriFront,20,108 People’sLiberationArmedForces (PLAF).SeeVietCong People’sRepublicofChina(PRC), 143 PerfumeRiver,43,50 PhamVanDong,91 PhamVanTuong,100 PhanTiet,30,152 Philippines,8,182 PhuBai,30,44,48,49 PhuCamCanal,48 PhuCamCathedral,101 PhuCuong,28 PhuocLongProvince,183 PhuThoracetrack,39 PhuThuSaltFlats,99 Pike,Douglas,onmassacreinHue,99, 100 Pisor,Robert,143 Pleiku,21,28,152,182 Podhoretz,Norman,92 PopularForces(PF),7 Porter,D.Gareth,101–102 Prados,John,93,95,98 Presidentialcampaignof1968,77 protests,anti-war,6 PT-76tanks,59 publicopinion,5–6,70,73,74,157 Pueblo,seizureof,70,150 QuanDoiNhanDan(People’sArmy Daily),105,107–108,152 QuangNgai,11,156 QuangTinProvince,16,18,94,147 QuangTri,30,40 QuangTriProvince,24 QuiNhon,11,28,29,40 RadioHanoi,21,91 RaoQuanRiver,19 RegionalForces(RF),7,19,24 RepublicofKorea,150
262 Index RepublicofVietnamArmedForces (RVNAF),182;strengthinlate1967,7 Resolution13,10,182 Resolution14,124n22,182 Ridenhour,Ron,178 Ridgway,Matthew,75 Roberts,Randy,90 Rockpile,19,59,61,62 RollingThunder.SeeOperation,RollingThunder Romney,George,144 Rostow,WaltW.,95,142 Route9,19,57,62,63,64,105 Route9Front,20 Rusk,Dean,37,75,142–143,145,153,183 Saigon,183;battlefor,31–39,152;renewedattacksinMay1968on,67 Saigon-Cholon-GiaDinhSpecialZone, 13 “SanAntonioFormula,”145,183,191–193 Sappers,32,33,34,35,183 Schandler,HerbertY.,120 Schmitz,DavidF.,79,84 Schoenbrun,David,91 Seabees,20 SelectiveService,154 Senate,UnitedStates.SeeU.S.Senate Sharp,U.S.Grant,70,183 Sheehan,Neil,105 SimmonsMarketResearchBureau,116 Smith,HowardK.,112 SocTrang,40 SongBe,battleof,16,17,146,183–184 Sorenson,Theodore,156 SouthKorea.SeeRepublicofKorea. SouthVietnam,ArmedForces.See RepublicofVietnamArmedForces SovietUnion.SeeUnionofSoviet SocialistRepublics SpecialForces,SouthVietnamese,7 SpecialForces,U.S.,7,17,22,184 Spock,Benjamin,148,150 Steinman,Ron,69
Strategy,U.S.,118–122,165–166 “SuccessCampaign,”6–7,111 Summers,HarryG.,Jr.,92,108,120 Symington,Stuart,153 tacticalnuclearweapons,58 TamKy,30 Tang,TruongNhu.SeeTruongNhu Tang tanks,PAVNuseatLangVei,59 TanSonNhutAirBase,26,31,32,184; attackon,37–38;shellingof,154 TaskForceX-Ray,44–45,48–49 Taylor,MaxwellD.,58,75,143 TayNinhProvince,94,95,159 Tetholiday,10,21,28,45,184;inHanoi, 27;trucefor,28,30,147,148,151 TetMauThan1968,10 TetOffensive(generaloffensive/general uprising—tongcongkich/tongkhoi nghiaTCK/TKN,1968),30–31,127n 8,184;assessmentof,79–85,132n6, 132n10,133n21;battleofCholon, 39;battleofHue,43–55;battle forSaigon,31–39;battleforU.S. Embassy,34–37;battlescountrywide, 39–42;casualtiesduring,67,81, 131–132n4;durationof,66,67–68; impactof,66–78,82–85;impacton pacificationprogram,82;military intelligenceduring,26–27,28,30,31, 93–98,127n2,134n9,147;“MiniTet,”66–67;NorthVietnameseplan, 9–12,26;NorthVietnameseand VietCongpoliticalpreparationsfor, 13–14;objectivesof,10–11,89–92,134 n10;phasesof,12;planfor,11–12; prematureattacksbefore,29,30,123 n3;preparationsfor,13–14,26;role ofmediain,110–117;scopeof,31; surpriseof,31;U.S.domesticpolitical reactionto,68–70;U.S.publicreactionto,68–70 Thailand,8,184
Index 263 Thanh,NguyenChi.SeeNguyenChi Thanh Thieu,NguyenVan.SeeNguyenVan Thieu Tho,LeDuc.SeeLeDucTho Thompson,RobertH.,53 ThuaThinhProvince,16,18,43,50,52 Thuy,Xuan.SeeXuanThuy Time,99 Tonc,LeThanh.SeeLeThanhTonc TongCongKich-TongKhoiNghia (TCK-TKN),11 Tra,TranVan.SeeTranVanTra, TranDo,32,83,92 TranVanDoc,17 TranVanTra,11,84,184;onassessmentsoftheTetOffensive,83–84;on phasesoftheTetOffensive,12,66;on outcomeofTetOffensive,81,92;on prematureattacks,29–30 troopdisposition,late1967,7–8 troops,additionalrequestfor,70–74 TruongChinh,185 TruongDinhDzu,144 Truong,NgoQuang.SeeNgoQuang Truong TruongNhuTang,101 Tuc,Nghiem.SeeNghiemTuc Turner,KathleenJ.,111,114–115 Turley,WilliamS.,105,107 TuyHoa,30 UnionofSovietSocialistRepublics (U.S.S.R.),145 UnitedStates,forcesinVietnamatthe endof1967,7 U.S.AirForce,7thAirForce,38 U.S.Army,strengthofinVietnamin 1967,7 —unitsof CCompany,1stBattalion,20thInfantry,156 2ndBattalion,7thCavalry,63 2ndBattalion,327thAirborne,94
1stCavalryDivision,29,50,52,53,63, 157 1stInfantryDivision,16,38 4thInfantryDivision,146 9thInfantryDivision,41 11thArmoredCavalryRegiment, 23rdInfantryDivision,167,178 25thInfantryDivision,38 82ndAirborneDivision,71,153 101stAirborneDivision,28,29,34, 99 173rdAirborneBrigade,146 199thInfantryBrigade,153 IFieldForce,Vietnam,163 IIFieldForce,Vietnam,31,37,163 U.S.Congress,responsetoTetOffensive,73 U.S.DepartmentofDefense(DOD), 154 U.S.Embassy,Saigon,32;battlefor, 34–37,151 U.S.HouseofRepresentatives,erosion ofsupportforwarin,145 U.S.MarineCorps, strengthofinVietnamin1967,7 —unitsof: CompanyL,3rdBattalion,5thMarines,53 1stBattalion,5thMarines,50,53 2ndBattalion,5thMarines,50 3rdBattalion,5thMarines,53 1stBattalion,9thMarines,25,126n18 1stBattalion,13thMarineArtillery,126 n18 3rdMarineRegiment,19 9thMarineExpeditionaryForce,3 26thMarineRegiment,23,126n18 27thMarineRegimentalLanding Team,153 1stMarineDivision,44–45 3rdMarineDivision,56 TaskForceX-Ray,44–45,48–49 IIIMarineAmphibiousForce(MAF), 48
264 Index U.S.MilitaryAssistanceCommand, Vietnam.SeeMilitaryAssistance Command,Vietnam(MACV) U.S.Navy,RiverAssaultFlotilla1,41; Seabees,18,20 U.S.Senate,ForeignRelationsCommittee,75,154 Urbain,Father,100 USSPueblo.SeePueblo VanTienDung,185 Vien,CaoVan.SeeCaoVanVien VietCong(VC),xvi,3,123n1,185;attackonU.S.Embassy,34–37;attacks duringTetOffensive,30–43;battle ofHue,43–55;crippledduringTet Offensive,81,132n10;estimated strength,1967,8;preparationsforTet Offensive,13;typesofforces,8 —unitsof, B-3Front,94 C-10SapperBattalion,32 VietMinh,20,21,185 VietnamWorkers’Party.SeeLaoDong (Workers’)Party VietnameseArmy.SeeArmyofthe RepublicofVietnam VietnameseCommunistParty.SeeLao Dong(Workers’)Party VietnameseNationalMilitaryAcademy, 40 Vietnamization,77,85,185 VinhLong,31,41 VoNguyenGiap,17,21,185–186;advocatesprotractedwar,124n16,144;assessmentofTetOffensive,84;failures ofTetOffensive,79–81;planforthe TetOffensive,9–12,80–81;presence inKheSanharea,24,106;radio broadcastonoffensive,91,93–94;role inplanningforTetOffensive,9–11; strategyof,4,27,126n8 VoSuu,36–37 VuVanUoc,276
WarZoneC,4,96,186 WarZoneD,96,186 WashingtonPost,35,54,64 Watergate,180 Westmoreland,WilliamC.,4,80,119, 148,149,150,151,152,186;address, November21,1967,197–199;becomes ArmyChiefofStaff,158;cancelsTet truce,30;claimsgreatvictoryduring TetOffensive,68,69;conductspress conference,111–112;convincedthat KheSanhisthemainenemyobjective,12,21–22,28,29,30,56,104;early assessmentofactioninHue,49;early visittoKheSanh,18;intentatKhe Sanh,20,104–110;interpretspre-offensiveintelligence,27,28,31,97–98; makesstatementsaboutprogressin war,6–7,147;ordersKheSanhtobe held,60;reactsto“BorderBattles,” 15;receivesreportsthatPAVNforces aremassingatKheSanh,17,20; replacedasMACVCommander,76, 121,156;requestsadditionaltroops, 70–74;rolein“SuccessCampaign,” 6–7;sendsreinforcementstoDak To,17 Weyand,FrederickC.,29,37,150,186 Wheeler,EarleG.,27,58,142,148, 154,186–187;memorandumforthe president,February12,1968,203–205; memorandumforthepresident, February27,1968,206–211;roleinadditionaltrooprequest,70–74,120–121, 153,155,156–157 Wirtz,JamesJ.,97 “WiseMen,”75–76,146,187;summary ofmeetingbetweenPresidentJohnsonand,211–213 Wyatt,ClarenceR.,111,115–116 XuanThuy,76 Young,Marilyn,90,96,102