The Struggle for Thailand. Counterinsurgency 1965-1985

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THE STRUGGLE FOR THAILAND Counter-insurgency 1965-1985

General Saiyud Kerdphol

S. Research Center Co., Ltd. Bangkok, 1986

S. Research Center Co., Ltd. Room 1 12 Erawan Hotel, Rajdamri Road, BKK 10500, Thailand 001 10 86 First Published 1986 Cover designed by Kanha (Jrasyanandana Printed by Al.LIEb PRINTERS Division of The Post publishing Co., Ltd. 3rd Roor, U-Chufiang Foundation Bldg. 968 Rama I V Rd., Bangkok 10500 Tel. 233’0488, 233-8030, 233-8040 ExL.198

Dedicated to all those civil servants, police, military and private citizens whose efforts made the Civilian Police Military (CPM) concept work during very trying times.

CONTENTS

FOREWORD ............................................................... EDITOR’S FOREWORD...............................................

1 9

PREFACE ....................................................................

13

CHAPTER I

: “The First Round” .........................

23

CHAPTER II

: “The Counter-Insurgency Thrust” ........ .................................

41

CHAPTER III CHAPTER IV CHAPTER V

: “Revolt in the North” ..................... : “Village Security” .......................... : "Rural Development” ....................

53 69 89

CHAPTER VI

: “The Minority Question” ...............

97

CHAPTER VII : “Reappraisal”....'............................ CHAPTER VIII : “The Urban Factor” .......................

113 139

: “Security, Democracy and Reform” ................................. : “Thailand’s Present Internal

151

Security System”........... ..............

165

CHAPTER IX CHAPTER X

APPENDIX

Communist Insurgency in Thailand: A Chronology of Key Events.......................................

179

Thailand’s Regional Characteristics (Extracted from the Rural Security Manual).................................

189

Who Has Failed -ISOC or the Reds? ..........................

195

A Blueprint for Reform Parti : An Overview......................................... Part II : Political and Administrative Reorganization ....................................

215

Partlll : Internal Security................................... Part IV : Rural Development..............................

225 237

Part V . : Blueprint................................................

247

205

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Supreme Commander Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol.

FOREWORD by Dr. George K. Tanham For General Saiyud Kerdphol, a retired four star general and former Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, success did not come easily. He was reared and received his boyhood schooling in the northern province of Sukhothal; however, he aspired to higher education, competing and winning admission to Bangkok’s Wang Somdejbhurapha School for his final years of secondary schooling. There, pitted against well advanced city students, he learned important lessons in survival and the rewards of hard work as he completed the last two years in one year. Upon graduation in 1938, encouraged by friends but unsure of himself, h e took and passed the examinations for Chulachomklao Royal Military Cadet School. There he finished first in his class. These early years of struggle and hard work honed his acute mind and native ability; they also taught him the wisdom of the motto, “Where there is a will, there is a way," a philosophy which has guided him throughout his fife. General Saiyud’s military career may be usefully divided into two main periods: the first began when he completed cadet school in 1 940 and was commissioned a second lieutenant, and lasted until 1965. This time of regular army duties included excellent assignments and wide practical experience that groomed him for further responsibility and suggested that he was destined for a highly successful career as an army officer. The second period of his military career started in 1965-66 when he became interested in counterinsurgency. During this period, he became the inspirational 1

leader of Thailand’s counter-insurgency programmes and it was he who first suggested the Civil-Police-Military (CPM) concept, which became the basis for the Thai insurgency effort for the next decade. His first military assignment was with the 29th Infantry Battalion and in the next two years/ Lt. Saiyud became involved in military operations against the French, the Japanese, and the British — quite an experience for a 2nd Lieutenant. In January and February of 1940, Thailand sought to regain some of the territory that the French had taken from them in Cambodia. Lt. Saiyud’s battalion, along with other units, attacked certain French positions along the border with some success. This period of success, however, was halted by the ceasefire agreement signed 11th March 1940 between France and Thailand, with’ Japan acting as the mediator. By this agreement, Thailand got back some of the territory that she felt the French had wrongly taken in the late 1 9th century. There was even a victory parade in Bangkok, but Lt. Saiyud missed that, staying with his battalion along the Cambodian border. There was not a great deal of actual combat, but Lt. Saiyud got his first taste of military operations. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 and their swift invasion of the whole Southeast Asian area, Thailand signed a military co-operation agreement with Japan, and the Thais, after initially resisting the Japanese, began co-operation with the Japanese military forces against the British. The 29th was deployed to Mae Sot, next to the Burmese border. As the end of the war approached, Lt. Saiyud’s battalion was ordered to join other Thai units establishing a capital defence force in Bangkok. During his battalion's movement to Bangkok an incident occurred which reveals much about Saiyud’s character. He was given money to pay for the rail transportatin of hrs unit but didn’t spend it all. Much against the urgings of his friends, he returned the money to the government saying, “honesty is honour”. Some of Saiyud’s cogent observations about the 2

Japanese are of interest, as is his acute insight into the habits of the Mae Sot Thais. H e learned that a few Japanese had settled down, married Thais, and become engaged in business in this area of Thailand next to Burma. Saiyud found that local Japanese businessmen had obviously been involved in intelligence and reconnaissance operations for the Japanese prior to the invasion. The Japanese businessmen had obtained the pine oil concession for the area — and so had become very familiar with the local terrain and routes into the area. The march of the Japanese into Mae Sot traversed a route which could have been familiar only to local experts. But was this chance or careful and long-term Japanese planning? Saiyud wondered. Saiyud noted that the Japanese had very large horses and that the troops were extremely well-disciplined. Any offenders against the Thai were said to be “Koreans.” White serving in the Thai border town of Mae Sot, Saiyud was surprised to team that most of the people spoke Burmese and used Burmese currency. Most of their food also came from Malamang instead of Tak because of the better communications with Burma. After the Japanese began their invasion of Burma, Saiyud’s battalion was ordered to join the main Thai forces in the North providing flank security to the Japanese Army. During this period Saiyud’s battalion fought several engagements against the Chinese in the Shan States of Burma. At the end of the war, Saiyud co-operated with members of the British Force 136 and helped disarm the Japanese. Immediately after the war, Saiyud was assigned as Commander of Headquarters Company of the Infantry School Troops. The army had assumed a very low profile. Military activity had become non-existant. Saiyud chose this quiet period to pay homage to his parents and the Buddhist faith by entering the monkhood for three months, according to the Thai tradition. He served in a tempie in Si Satchanalai; the village where he was born. This time of reflection seems to have revived his spirits. Soon Saiyud, who had already made captain was 3

promoted to major. He was sent to the Infantry School, graduating again first in his class. He then attended the army command and general staff college, which he completed in 1952 and then served in the Directorate of Intelligence of the Army. The Korean War had broken out in June 1951 and Major Saiyud served as the S-2 of the Thai battalion there in 1952. Just before departing for Korea, he married Miss Uraiwan Chandrapa. After the Korean War, based upon his performance at the Infantry School, he won the single Thai scholarship to attend the U.S. Army Infantry Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. Upon his return he was appointed instructor at the Thai Infantry School and later became chief of staff of the Infantry Centre. In 1957, he was transferred to the Directorate of Operations and later commanded its training division. While in operations, he became interested in studying abroad, particularly in Australia, which he thought would be especially important to the Southeast Asian region in the future. H e worked out an arrangement on his own and was sent to Australia as the first Thai army officer to study there. He completed his study by the end of 1 958 and joined a party of Thai officers who were visiting the United States. Again being independent, he went on to Europe, anxious to learn even more, while the rest returned to Thailand. Upon his return he was appointed deputy director of operations, and during the same period was able to complete the Army War College course. In 1960, Pathet Lao forces were threatening the governed of Laos, headed by General Phoumi Norsovan. In co-operation with the United States, Saiyud, by now a special colonel, visited Laos and then organized a clandestine U.S. backed operation to support General Phoumi. Later that year, Saiyud was appointed a member of the Thai delegation, led by then foreign minister, Thanat Khoman, to the Geneva peace talks. There General Saiyud met a number of high level people, including Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Governor Averill Harriman, and Krisna Menon. He remained in Geneva and

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was the last member of the delegation remaining until the end of 1961. He made a very perceptive remark about his experience in Geneva. He said that it seemed to him that small countries — about which such conferences were called — always seemed to suffer as a result of this international help. Saiyud clearly saw, in spite of all the talk, that the interests of the great powers were of foremost concern, not those of the subject country. In 1 962 he received his promotion to Major-General from His Majesty the King and was appointed Director of Operations for the Royal Thai Army. During this tenure, he helped in the reorganization of the Army, and the drafting of a national defence plan. In 21 years he had risen from Lieutenant to Major-General and held one of the most important jobs in the entire army. The second period in General Saiyud’s military career began in 1965-66. Early in 1966 he participated in the establishment of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC). For several years, the communist insurgency had been brewing in the Northeast, and on the 7th of August 1965, the communists announced the launching of the revolutionary struggle against the Thai government. Saiyud immediately turned his attention to this internal threat and actively sought io become totally involved in the work of CSOC and the entire counter-insurgency effort. The CPM concept, using civilians, police and military in a co-ordinated approach, suggests that General Saiyud had probably very recently studied British counter-insurgency operations in Malaya. His concept, with the Coordinating Command, the Communist Operations Suppression Command (CSOC) in Bangkok and the CPM committees at the provincial level, very much reflected the British coordinating structure in Malaya. General Saiyud rightly saw that countering insurgency was not just a military problem, but involved a coordinated effort of the army, police, and many civilian agencies of the government. While it was necessary to suppress the communist guerrillas by means of force, it was also important to

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assure good government and to improve the social and economic conditions of the people in rural areas. General Saiyud’s broad view of country-insurgency and his emphasis on the GPM concept brought him into conflict with the more conventional views of many senior officers in the Royal Thai Army. At this point, General Saiyud had to decide whether to give up ideas which he knew were right and pursue a successful army career, or stick with his ideas and probably sacrifice — or at least damage — his army career. He persisted with the theme that Thailand must deal with its social and economic problems before it could solve the insurgency. He saw insurgency as a symptom of a deeper, but must less obvious malady. The Army, unfortunately, did not always accept General Saiyud’s views — but over the years his concepts were gradually accepted. Despite resistance by the Army, General Saiyud continued to do his best as Director of Operations of GSOC and worked with private groups to help the people in the rural areas. He developed counter-insurgency plans for the Northeast and later, the North. He tried to develop a psyops capability to insure that the government’s position was clearly stated and to weaken the morale of the communist terrorists. On weekends he continued his work, particularly working with a private organization called “Mitrapap” (the Thai word for friendship), which raised funds for the construction of elementary schools by conducting sky diving demonstrations in remote areas of Thailand. He also developed and led a Rotary Club of Bangkok effort to help the tribes in northern Thailand by providing schools, medical assistance, and help wiith the marketing of their produce. General Saiyud’s work and thoughts on counter-insurgency were not always appreciated by the Army hierarchy, which favoured head-on, military confrontation with the insurgents. His perceptive concepts with regard to counter-insurgency, however, constitute perhaps his greatest contribution as an army officer. The respect that General Saiyud had developed outside the Army became critically important towards the end of 1973 6

as students and others demonstrated against the government. In those difficult times, General Saiyud was asked to set up a student coordination centre, thus showing the regard with which he was held by the students. Some of his personnel in Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC, formerly CSOC) worked with students to fill the vacuum left by a near paralysis in the police force. A year later in 1974, General Saiyud became Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, General Kris Sivara, as well as Chief of Staff of ISOC, but held no post in the Army, which was the real source of power. In October 1978, he became Chief of Staff to the Royal Thai Armed Forces and in 1981 was promoted to Supreme Commander, a position he relinquished in October 1 983 upon his retirement from the Army. In a few brief months, General Saiyud succeeded in transforming this somewhat ceremonial post into an active command and policy-making organization. He had the chiefs of the three services made deputy supreme commanders and began to work out a joint approach to service problems. General Saiyud initiated a number of multi-service programmes, which focused upon a coordinated approach to national defence efforts. Joint Logistics Planning between the three Thai armed services, Supreme Command and the U.S. Department of Defence was conceptualized and implemented by General Saiyud. Despite initial pessimism, this project has become the most important unifying effort in the Thai Armed Forces. Equally important, it has created a rational, coordinated process of modernizing the Thai defence establishment — and a means to coordinate its defensive needs with the U.S. in times of crisis. General Saiyud also visualized and introduced a war reserve concept — a programme which is just now beginning to evolve through Thai-American coordinated efforts initiated by General Saiyud himself. Despite his successes in modernization and coordination of the Thai Armed Forces, General Saiyud always maintained as his primary focus the leadership of Thailand’s

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counter-insurgency efforts. General Saiyud’s conviction that his was the right approach and mental toughness prevailed. His ideas have, over the past ten years, shaped Thailand’s very successful counter-insurgency efforts. In retirement, General Saiyud has lost none of his zest for life, his proclivity for hard work, his desire to serve hjs country, and his dedication to the people of Thailand. Today he attends international conferences, speaks widely both in Thailand and abroad, and eagerly participates in activities with students and academics, as well as other groups in Thai society. He is widely respected abroad and in Thailand, and can look back with satisfaction on his dominant role in solving Thailand’s insurgency problems.

EDITOR’S FOREWORD Since the mid-1960s, the author has been widely recognized as one of the leading architects of Thailand’s strategy for rural counter-insurgency. But less well known beyond Thailand has been the prominence and popularity he has achieved as the Thai official who, perhaps more than any other, has worked to explain to English-speaking audiences as well as his own countrymen the dynamics of the conflict in the Thai countryside and the methods developed by the Thai military to counter the communist compaign. In addition to writing several books on the subject in Thai, he has over the years been an informative and invariably entertaining speaker at functions attended by Bangkok's diplomatic and press corps as well as at gatherings of academics and concerned professionals. General Saiyud’s voice has never been that of the government spokesman reciting the official line, however. A basic element in the continued survival of the Communist Party of Thailand has been the exploitation of the real ills afflicting the nation’s economic, political and social structure. As these speeches underscore, the author has spoken and continues to speak not simply as a military tactician but also as an incisive critic of official failings and vested interests, and as a determined advocate of reform. Selecting the contents of this book from scores of speeches, articles and pamphlets written over the years has been no easy task. What this collection has attempted, however, is to focus on the author’s reflections on some of the more salient aspects of insurgency

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and counter-insurgency in Thailand within a broad chronological context. Equally, it seeks to provide some insight into the range of factors, domestic and international, political and military, economic and psychological, that have all impinged on the development of Thailand’s strategy for counterinsurgency. The result, necessarily, has been something of a ‘potpourri’. Certainly, the writings in this book, produced over a period of nearly two decades, make no claim to the consistency of viewpoint or interpretation that a history can retrospectively impose on events. Inevitably, these are reflections made in the context of an unfolding political and military situation with all the imprecision that implies. But it is arguably one of the values of such a presentation that it does permit on appreciation of the way in which the perspectives of an individual closely involved will change in their focus. Certainly, such shifts are discernable in these pages. There is, in the early speeches of 1969 and 1970, an attention to the external aspects of the insurgency and the support reaching it from China and North Vietnam. Given these foreign underpinnings and an apparent lack of political roots in the countryside, there is a sense of optimism and confidence that insurgency can be contained and reduced. But by the mid-1970s against a backdrop of widening political polarization, those early assumptions are increasingly clouded by a concern over the inadequacies of an illcoordinated and jealous bureaucracy, a perennial failure fully to grasp the socio-political dimension of the conflict. Against that background comes the need for far reaching reform articulated most forcefully in the ‘Blueprint for Reform’, which is included as one of the appendices in this book. Finally, it is perhaps a measure of the author’s understanding of this enemy that the final chapters of this collection reflect little sense of euphoria over what has been, widely hailed as the collapse of the CPT. While giving due credit to the real successes achieved in rural areas in terms of both development and security, the author harbours no illusions that the communists in Thailand have been defeated. Indeed, 10

the overriding importance of external factors rather than domestic factors in prompting the CPT’s eclipse remains basic to his critique. That the communists have found it expedient to adopt new strategems and adapt their policies to the wider dictates of the regional situation, does not, he contends, mean they have been defeated. It means they are merely less visible.

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Army cadets before Suan Kularb Palace (Dec. 2, 1940)

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PREFACE By General

Saiyud Kerdpol

One morning in December 1965, a phone call from General Prapass Charusathiara, then Deputy Prime Minister, Interior Minister and Army Commander-in-Chief, summoned me to his office to discuss an increase in armed subversion by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). What the communists came to call Gun-Firing Day — the outbreak of armed attacks on government units, launched with an assault on a security force at Na Bua village in Nakhon Phanom’s That Phanom District — had occurred on the previous 7th August. . In South Vietnam, communist penetration, countered by that year’s massive build-up in that country of U.S. forces, was well and truly under way. By December, the Thai government had become alarmed at the security situation developing within the kingdom. A recent Cabinet meeting had called for a stern response to a sharp rise in CPT attacks on officials and government buildings, especially in the Na Kae District in the Northeast. At the time, I was a major-general, the Army Operations Director, so General Prapass called on me to put together a better-organized system for dealing with the insurgency. “If we divert enough resources to this effort," I recall General Prapass saying, “we’ll crush the communists in six months!” In that, he was, as we now know, overly confident. But something else he said that day proved to be correct. “It's not a job for the army alone," he told me. “There have to be other components — police and civilians.” 13

He wanted a tactical operations headquarters within 24 hours. I set one up — the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) — in a building in the Suan Kularb (Rose Garden) Palace compound, which had been erected, 1 understand, for King Mongkut’s Crown Prince. (It is an historic area, indeed. After the 1932 revolution, the army had been given the use of some of the buildings. During his time as Prime Minister, Field Marshal Pibulsonggram made his home there. And for some time thereafter, many prime ministers had resided in the building CSOC first occupied.) Our organization was called CSOC because its creation was authorized under the Anti-Communist Activities Acts of B.E. 2495 (1952) and B.E. 2512 (1969). In time we came to realize that reference in the name to “communist suppression" had its disadvantages. First, there was a negative quality to the phrase, while what we were doing was highly positive. Essentially, our task was nation-building, so that communism and its share-the-wealth deceptions would have less appeal to the people. The name CSOC had an exclusively police-military ring to it and we wanted to stress economic and social problems and the civilian contribution to any counter-insurgency effort. Second, the name bothered some of our Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) allies, who felt that their SEATO obligations were confined to an external threat. Help to CSOC could be seen as involvement in Thailand’s Internal affairs and thus beyond their SEATO brief. We tried hard, very hard, to change the name. Until the events of 14th October 1973, however, we had no success. Then suddenly, largely because of successful communist propaganda, no one seemed to want to associate themselves with CSOC. Everything bad in the country was being blamed on CSOC. CSOC was criticized in Parliament, even by government ministers. So, at one point, I said, “If nobody likes CSOC as a name, why don’t we change it?” When M.R. Kukrit Pramoj became Prime Minister, we finally found someone willing to listen to our side of the story.

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One of my colonels had been assigned as his aide, so 1 worked on him to convince M.R. Kukrit that what we were doing in CSOC was not what the communists were saying. M.R. Kukrit agreed to address a CSOC orientation programme, the first prime minister to do so. As Prime Minister, he was very busy and it was difficult to get to see him. So we prepared an order for him to sign — all word-perfect legally and promulgating the name change. As he arrived at CSOC and was going up in the lift, I broached the question. By the time he left our headquarters, we had a new name. Since 1974, therefore, what was once CSOC has been known as the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). In CSOC's first days, something had to be done for Na Kae District — and quickly. The communists had burned down the district and police headquarters buildings and Bangkok had been notified that the local authorities could not handle the matter. We had a Regimental Combat Team at Udon Thani. However, all we could give them was very general intelligence. We knew that the communists had concentrated in the Lup Ee Lert valley in the Na Kae mountains. It was not very much to go on, but we had to respond, whether our actions were successful or not. We went into Lup Ee Lert and we could not find any communists, but from that first operation we learned a lot. Our intelligence discovered from local villagers that the insurgents were not really living in the valley’s jungle but in villages. They would use peaceful-seeming villages as their base areas and then fight far away, returning home at night. In that operation, we also learned something about the people's attitude towards the communists. They knew that the government did not approve of the terrorists and their teachings, but they were not convinced that Bangkok was serious about countering them. In some areas, the communists had even managed to convince the people that they, the 15

insurgents, were carrying out Bangkok’s wishes. “The local authorities are brutal and corrupt,” they would tell the villagers. “The central government has sent us to help you deal with them.” Occasionally, during those early years, Thai officialdom made mistakes. Some people were impatient with CSOC. Our programmes depended on winning people over to our point of view and this often meant maintaining patience, sometimes with great difficulty. Especially when the communists were using extreme terrorist methods, there were military people who wondered why we should take so long. “Why not go in there, simply and quickly,” they asked, “and use military force to crush the insurgents?” In those days, area commands were in the hands of older soldiers who often did not understand what we wanted to do. I respect this older generation; they are my brothers. But the military alone could not do the job, and occasionally extreme punitive action only made matters worse. In one well-documented action at Ban Phon Ngam in the Northeast in 1966, for example, women were raped, two men (one later found not to be a communist) were tortured, and an unknown number of villagers summarily executed. Younger officers were later to study this incident as an example of what not to do. Despite the problems, however, CSOC had some lucky breaks in those early years. There was, for example, a certain Colonel Thienchai Sirisamphan, then working in the G-2 (intelligence) section in a building next to CSOC.* He had been Chief of Staff of the Special Forces Centre at Lopburi under me and we both figured that he would soon be reassigned there. At Suan Kularb, we came to know each other quite well. I explained that 1 would like to turn the Special Forces into an in-country counter-insurgency force.

• General Tienchai Sirisamphan retired as Deputy Army Commander in September 1985.

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He agreed with me that this would make them more useful. When he returned to Lopburi, we were able to work together to bring this about. Working through him, CSOC was able to set up teams trained to help people in areas targeted both by the communists and us. This was one of the many ways in which CSOC implemented successful Civil-Police-Military (CPM) programmes in CPT-threatened areas of the countryside. CSOC was fortunate, too, in being able to demonstrate that our CPM policies were workable. In the Lerng Nok Tha District of Ubon Rachathani Province, the villagers were notoriously unfriendly towards the army. When the army first went there in 1966, the people ignored all soldiers. They would not even give bananas to the troops. If a soldier went to a latrine in the jungle at night, he was in danger of being shot. We took a district officer called Saisuk, who understood CSOC's CPM programmes, and we sent him to Lerng Nok Tha to implement them. After a while, we learned that a National Staff College student group — mainly senior officers of the civil service and armed forces — had scheduled a visit to the Northeast. So w e invited them to Lerng Nok Tha. Some people were worried that the trip would be unsafe, but we were confident enough regarding our programmes and Saisuk’s work to insist. The group went. So well had our man done his job that the villagers spontaneously put on a banquet and ramwong tor the visitors. The communists had gone; everything was fine. We knew we were on the right track. in the Northeast, we were also helped by the quality of officers serving with the 2nd army — men such as Colonel Harn Leelanond and Colonel Lert Khanitkanaka. Colonel Lert died later in a helicopter crash, but Colonel Harn went on to command successfully the 4th Army in the South during some of the worst communist terror actions. Both Colonel Harn and Colonel Lert understood CSOC's plans and we worked through them with good effect in the Northeast, teaching the 17

villagers about “Religion, security and so on.

Nation, and King," changing village

The communists were quick to spot what we were doing in the 2nd Army Region. Their response was to start operating elsewhere — tn Nan, and Phetchabun, for example. Their intention, of course, was to force us to spread our efforts more thinly. We were doing too well against them in the Northeast. But we considered their diversionary tactics something of a compliment and their new fronts, in the end, did not help them at all. Their activities only meant that the lessons we had learned in the Northeast soon began to be implemented in the North and South — indeed, everywhere in the kingdom. This book is a record of some of the important aspects of Thailand’s eventually successful counter-insurgency. As a people, we are not particularly good at keeping a written record. Moreover, most works on Thailand’s problems with communist subversion seem to approach the topic from the communists' point of view. I hope that the reader will understand if I seem to be prominent in this record. Although my career for many years was intimately connected with the kingdom's counterinsurgency efforts, the book's purpose is not to draw attention to myself. Rather, the book is intended to make as widely known as possible the point that successful counterinsurgency does not depend on the actions of any one soldier or the success of any single campaign. Success depends upon many agencies and their many people, upon the understanding and material assistance of our allies, and, ultimately, upon every loyal subject of His Majesty the King. I see this book as a tribute to every person and agency who played a part in working for the security of our country in some very difficult and dangerous years. It is a tribute, also, to allies who supported us when we most needed them — citizens, many of them anonymous, of the United Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand, Australia, to name some. Thailand owes a special debt to one of these foreign colleagues, my 18

English friend Gerry Waller,* whose loyalty and inspiration helped so much in dark years. The book is a record of events and developments spanning approximately two decades. Communists have been politically active in Thailand since at least the 1920s, when for a time Ho Chi Minh is believed to have lived in the kingdom seeking support from Thailand's Vietnamese communities in his struggle against Indochina’s French colonizers. In the 1940s and 1950s, communists were very busy within Thailand’s Chinese community, gaining widespread influence over the Chinese-language press and Chinese schools. It was not until the CPT's Third Congress in 1961, however, that the party formally resolved to resort to “revolutionary armed struggle." Even before Gun-Firing Day, Thai authorities had been active in monitoring and at times suppressing revolutionary agitation. But only after CSOC was founded were our efforts properly organized and coordinated. Only after CSOC/ISOC replaced fragmentary military and police operations with a comprehensive CivilPolice-Military plan did Thailand begin to make steady progress against the subversion threat. Apart from documenting much of this planning and its results, this book is intended to warn Thais of the need for vigilance against the continuing Marxist-Leninist threat. Above all, I hope to stress the importance of remembering always that what General Prapass spoke of 20 years ago — that the army cannot do the job alone —• is just as true today.

* A personal friend of General Saiyud’s for many years, Gerry Waller served in (he Indian Army in (he pre-World War Two period and subsequently joined the Malayan Police Force where he gained considerable experience in countering communist insurgency during the Emergency of 1948-1960. He first came to Thailand in 1966 as a consultant for the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) programme based in Bangkok. In 1970 he met Gen Saiyud — then Director of ISOC Operations — while working on the border security project. He was to make Thailand his home and remained in the kingdom until shortly before his death from cancer at the age of 56, in May 1983. (ed.)

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More than ever before, the kingdom needs to build up the civilian contribution to CPM. To put it another way, there is an urgent need for development of the kingdom’s democratic base. In many areas, the army can provide leadership. Of that there is no doubt. Because it is an organized class, it has an important contribution to make to nation-building. But just as in 1965, it cannot now do the job alone. It should not stand in the way of civilians — and especially of civilian politicians, who, as the people's elected representatives, should be closer to, more familiar with and better able to fulfill the people’s needs. In many smoothly-running countries, the military is seen as an organization of last resort. Too often in Thailand there is a tendency on the part of the military — and indeed many civilians — to turn to troop movements as the instant solution of this or that crisis, to see the military as an organization of first resort. It would be better for the kingdom if this were not so. Since my retirement, I have been asked to participate in many seminars. I tell the organizers that my theme will be military-civilian co-operation. For the rest of my working life, I would like this to be central to my contribution to the nation. — General Saiyud Kerdpol (retired) Bangkok, October 1985

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The riddled remains of a truck (above) which was ambushed in November 1971 on the yet-to-be completed Mae Sot-Umphang Highway at Kilometre 47, killing Pol. Lt. Prachum Siripala and six other persons.

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Huilawag bridge was burnt by CT.

The bridge on Thadpanom-Mukdaharn Road was burnt by CT.

CT ambushed government’s armoured person carrier by RPG B-40 rocket, government’s officer dead on fire.

Government officers protect the road construction team.

ARD tractors was burnt by C T while their constructing

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road.

Chapter I “The First Round” In this critical chapter, the author outlines in detail his original personal philosophy on effectively countering the spreading communist menace in Thailand. Over fifteen years before the now famous Prime Minister’s Order 66/23 in 1980, the author had helped establish the Communist.Suppression Operations Command (CSOC), which was built around the basic concept that the use of persuasion by government forces (and force when required) to help win the people over to the government side in contested areas would works. *******

1 . A speech to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand, 29th February 1968. ‘My subject matter tonight is The Communist Threat to Thailand and the Royal Thai Government’s Suppression Programme. My observations are based largely on my own experience over the past two years as Director of the Operations and Coordination Centre in the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC). Although the communists may not formally have declared open war on this country, they most certainly have begun an undeclared war here as has been the pattern in Laos, Vietnam and elsewhere. In January 1965, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Marshal Chen Yi, announced that armed struggle would soon start in Thailand and that this country would be the next arena for a “war of national liberation.” indeed, in November 1964 and January 1965, 23

Radio Peking first announced the formation of so-called “front organizations in Thailand” and stated that Peking was happy to support them*. The theme was further expanded when Radio Hanoi and the Pathet Lao Radio aired similar announcements. In the light of these warnings, the Royal Thai Government began to examine its counter-subversion capabilities. Only at that point did we realize the full implications of a war of subversion and infiltration, and discover that workng out effective methods to counter and destroy the threat is very difficult. In communist political parlance, the war now being waged against Thailand is referred to as “revolutionary warfare", “war of liberation" or “people’s war". In fact, such terms bear little relation to the real conflict, which might be better described as a war of some people against others of the same nation. For it is an essential element of communist strategy to create, by whatever means necessary, domestic dissension and attempt to destroy the traditional ties between a people and their government. Illegal and aggressive acts are thus cloaked under the name of revolution and liberation. Since the Chinese have already declared such a state of war in Thailand, there is no doubt they will explore and exploit any social rifts existing in this country. If necessary they will even manufacture grievances to create a situation in which Thais will fight Thais. Neither morality nor respect for national or international law pose any limit o n their actions. Operationally, it is now fairly obvious that the communists work in two main phases. The initial phase is aimed at creating disorder and confusion within the government’s own camp. If, at this stage, the use of force is necessary, only a small number of well-trained units are deployed to disperse and weaken the security forces. In this phase the communists

* These were the Thai Independence Movement (TIM) and the Thai Patriotic Front p’PF). In November 1965 they merged to form the Thai United Patriotic Front, (ed.)

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can also afford to spend unlimited time for their operations using minimal investments of manpower and equipment. The primary focus is on coordinated subversion directed at all levels of the national fabric — political, economic and social. Once society has been weakened, the communists’ best trained regular forces, conserved during the initial phase, can be deployed for decisive attacks on the security forces. The aim is victory in the shortest possible time, and in this, the second phase, the communists commit all their resources. They attempt to demolish popular confidence in the government, weaken the administration and generate a climate of pessimism and vacillation. It would appear that the war in South Vietnam has now entered this phase. Communism in Thailand is, by contrast, still in the initial phase. At present, the communists are spending more time and effort expanding political influence in various parts of the country than in overt armed struggle. They have also made some attempts towards coordinating their activities on a country-wide basis. Some of you may recall that the insurgency in Thailand began as such in November 1965 when a group of police officers from Amnart Charoen District in Ubon Ratchathani Province were ambushed and killed on the road from Mukdaham District in neighbouring Nakhon Phanom Province*. After that, incidents occurred at several points across the Northeast. The most disturbing of these attacks began with cold-blooded assassinations of village leaders. Clashes between government forces and communist terrorists (CT) as well as communist armed propaganda meetings also emerged as part of the overall insurgent plan of attack. The level of conflict rose significantly in 1966 and today, more than two years after the beginning of the insurgency, we estimate that there are approximately 1 ,700 — 2,000 armed

‘This appears to have been the first major incident of the insurgency. The Communist Party of Thailand has generally dated the out-break of hostilities from an August 1965 incident in Na Kae District, Nakhon Phanom Province.

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communist terrorists operating in about 80 groups across the Northeast. The most dangerous concentrations are in Na Kae District, Nakhon Phanom Province, and in Sawang Daengdin District, Sakon Nakhon Province. In addition to this main force, there are estimated to be some 10,0000 village sympathizers, supporters, food suppliers and part-time terrorists. Why, you may ask, is the emphasis on the Northeast? A look at the map provides the answer readily enough. The Northeast is vulnerably situated adjacent to the Mekong River, opposite Pathet Lao-held territory in Laos. At one point it is barely 70 miles from North Vietnam. The region is home to aboutl 1 ,3 12,000 people or over one third of the total national population*. The majority of these people have close ethnic affinity to the Lao, and while they may consider themselves Thai nationals, they retain their own distinctive northeastern dialect, customs and tradition. The Northeast is also a region which has long suffered from infertile soil, both droughts and floods, inadequate irrigation and poor communications. The region is significantly poorer than the rest of Thailand. Educational facilities and medical care have been deficient and there has been a widespread sentiment of having been neglected by the central government. Given all this, it was inevitable that the communists would exploit the situation. Later, once the insurgency had been launched in the Northeast, the communists expanded their activities to the mid-southern provinces of Trang, Phattalung, Nakhon Si Thammarat and Surat Thani. We estimate that there are now some 250 communist terrorists in 17 bands in this region. In the central provinces of Kanchanaburi, Ratchaburi, Phetchburi, and Prachuab Khiri Khan approximately 200 more terrorists are active in some 18 groups.

* The national population has increased substantially since then. In mid1986, it stood at a little over 51 million, (ed.)

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As for the northern region, in Nan and Chiang Rai Provinces, communist operations have only recently beenforced into the open. There are estimated to be around 150 insurgents organised into six or more groups in the area. We believe that most of them are hill tribesmen, trained in China, Laos or Vietnam and reinfiltrated into Thailand. During 1966 and 1 967, however, it was in the Northeast that most violent incidents took place with only a few reported from other regions. A break-down of types of communist activity over these two years reads as follows: 1. Assassinations of government officials: In 1966 there were 44 such killings (or 3.7 per month). This dropped to 39 (or 3.2 per month) in 1967. in the same category,! should also mention assassinations of village headmen and other villagers, which totalled 87 (or 7.2 per month) in 1966, and 78 (or 6.5 per month) in 1967. Thus overall, there were 131 assassinations in 1966 (or 10.9 per month) and 117 (or 9.7 per month) in 1967. 2. Armed propaganda meetings: These totalled 118 (or 9.8 per month) in 1966, rising slightly to 131 (or 10.9 per month) in 1 967. 3. Armed clashes: Terrorist-initiated incidents totalled 78 (or 6.5 per month) during 1966, rising to 137 (or 11.4 per month) in 1967. Government-initiated contacts, on the other hand, stood at 139 (or 11.6 per month) in 1966, and in 1967 rose sharply to 237 (or 19.7 per month). Overall, the total number of clashes in 1966 was 217 (or 17.3 per month), increasing to 370 (or 31 .1 per month) in 1967. This sharp rise was due largely to stepped-up government operations under the Communist Suppression Operation Command’s Village Security Programme. Known also as the 09/10 Plan, the programme was initiated in January 1 967*. Following the launching of the plan, a decline in communist terrorist activities became evident, while village

* The plan’s designation -was derived from the years of Thailand’s Buddhist era — 2509 (1 966) and 251 0 (1967). (ed).

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reporting of CT movements improved and defections from jungle-based communist units increased. This appears to have been a direct result of 09/10 policies aimed at (I) providing village-recruited and trained security forces for critical areas; (ii) improving communications between villagers and government authorities; (iii) increasing civic action programmes; and (iv) developing an information and psychological operations programme for the benefit of the rural population. Direct military operations against the communist terrorists were, by contrast, only a secondary priority. As the 09/10 Plan indicates, CSOC’s information and psychological operations effort is of basic importance. It is designed to inform the rural population and explain government programmes and policies to them. In other words, it seeks to narrow the gap in understanding between the people and the various military, civil and police authorities. In doing this we are using the media as fully as possible. There are now 82 hours of radio programming each week from 27 stations across the country devoted to these aims. We are producing numerous leaflets, posters and pamphlets printed by the Royal Thai Army Propaganda Platoon's light mobile teams, at present attached to CSOC. We are also deploying in the field 1 3 fully trained and equipped military Mobile Audio- Visual Units or MAVU teams. Nine more civilian mobile information teams will be added later this year when medical equipment and vehicles being provided under SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organisation) support for the government’s counter-insurgency programme arrive. But let me turn to CSOC itself. Why was it necessary for the government to establish the Communist Suppression Operations Command? The answer is, quite simply, that Thailand is now faced with a new type of war — a war in which the communists are trying to mislead the Thai people and incite them to revolt against their own government. External forces are infiltrating agents into this country and attempting to subvert our people into supporting foreigntrained terrorists, who attack dur government officials and institutions. 28

K

In particular, the communists are exploiting the vulnerabilities of an administrative system in which the maintenance of law and order is the responsibility of civil authorities during peace time but of military authorities during war. Prior to the establishment of CSOC, they were able to take advantage of the blurred demarcation between war and peace in this particular situation. Civil authorities simply were not trained to cope with this type of conflict without special assistance. To overcome these limitations, civilian, police and military authorities responsible for carrying out suppression operations have been combined under the coordinating authority and special support structure of CSOC. Legislation was passed in late 1965 establishing the organisation, with General Prapass Charusathiara, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army, appointed to head it. CSOC was formally inaugurated by Directive no. 219/08 of the Office of the Prime Minister on 14th December 1965, and in the first CSOC order of 17th December, General Prapass established the organisation’s headquarters at Wang Suan Kularp, the Rose Garden Palace. CSOC is thus organised as a combined civilian, police and military entity and maintains this multi-agency combined staffing at all levels. Broadly, it is responsible for providing guidance, policy and support for all Civil-Police-Military (CPM) programmes particularly in the field of civil action, psychological operations and security. Its nerve-centre is the Operations and Coordination Centre (OCC), which handles the business of day-to-day operations, while various committees — the Civil Committee, the Psychological Operations Committee, the Intelligence Committee, etc, — serve to coordinate the activities of their respective independent civil, police and military units, and present advice on their areas of responsibility to the CSOC commander. Subordinate elements include five Joint Security Centres (JSCs) at regional level, seven provincial CPMs, 19 29

provincial Communist Suppression Committees (CSC) (Class A), 45 provincial CSCs (Class B)* and certain units assigned from the Royal Thai Army, Navy and Air Force.and the Police Department. In January 1966, not long after CSOC’s establishment, its Bangkok headquarters was called upon to support CPM Nakhon Phanom with a regimental combat team to help mop up communist terrorists in the Lup Ee Lert area of Na Kae District. It was also asked to provide an infantry battalion to support suppression operations by CPM Sakon Nakhon. Owing to the tendency of the terrorists to slip back into nearby villages, neither of these operations succeeded in hitting home at guerrilla concentrations. But they did teach us two things: first, that commi nist activity could not be controlled through armed force alone; and second; that CT operations were at that time still in an organizational phase, with the insurgents lacking secure bases necessary for expanded activity. Their tactics were to operate with small groups in jungle and mountain areas, but to remain close enough to villages to permit the acquisition of food, intelligence and recruits. Given a realization that village support remained the communist terrorists’ greatest concern, we developed in late 1966 the 09/10 Plan I referred to earlier. The main thrust of this plan was determining “target areas” or known areas of CT operations. Village Security Teams (VSTs) were then assigned to each village surrounding the “target areas", while

* Provincial CPMs, headed by provincial governors, were standing organisations. Provincial CSCs, by contrast, were composed entirely of provincelevel personnel and were not standing bodies. They were, however, empowered to establish various sub-committees. CSCs Class A had priority for financial support from CSOC HQ over CSCs Ciass B. (ed.)

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platoon-sized Border Patrol Police (BPP) strike forces were stationed nearby to support the VSTs*. District level headquarters with adequate personnel and communications equipment were also set up. Initially, 11 target areas were pinpointed and 173 VSTs deployed. As a result of-the successes of the 09/10 Plan in 1967, a further 11 target areas have been identified for the expansion of the programme — three in the Northeast, one in the Central Region, four in the South and three in the North. In other words, nearly 140 more villages will be provided with VSTs. But while we have been satisfied with the results of the 09/10 Plan, it is also apparent that a permanent programme for village security is essential. This new programme, which we have called the Village Security Force or VSF Programme, rests on the basic premise that village security should be the responsibility of the villagers themselves. The government, however, must always be prepared to provide external assistance and reinforcements as required. At present, recruiting of instructors for the VSF Programme has just begun. Eventually, when permanent and enduring security exists within each village, it is intended that this broad programme should absorb the 09/10 Plan. Finally, I wish to emphasize the facf that the insurgency we are faced with today is one that has been foisted on us by external powers. The seeds of the conflict go back to 1 958 and 1959, when the rifts between China and the Soviet Union first became apparent and the situation in Southeast Asia began to change rapidly. China adopted a hard line and Vietnam, encouraged by Peking to support the new policy,

* Typically, a Village Security Team (also known as a Village Protection Unit or VPU) would consists of two or three police NCOs and a 1 0-20 man force drawn from the Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC), a paramilitary homeguard type organization established in 1954. Ideally, the armed and trained VDC men would be from the same village in which they served with the VST. But as the VDC was district-based, this was not always the case, (ed.)

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increased its efforts to draw Laos into a state of open revolutionary war through a programme of stepped-up guerrilla activities. It was during this period that Thailand, too, became a target of communist aggression. The following points will serve to illustrate the key importance of external support for the Thai insurgency: 1. Prior to 1960, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) received very little support from Peking. But that year saw the beginning of across-the-board aid that included arms, equipment and personnel. With the build-up for armed struggle In Thailand came an increase in propaganda attacks on this country from communist radio stations. 2. China further extended support for the CPT by arranging for political and weapons training courses for Thai recruits in Laos and Vietnam, as well as providing training on her own soil. Once trained, communist terrorists were sent back to their native areas to develop insurgent capabilities. Their tasks included anti-government propaganda work in the villages and conducting weapons training courses for terrorists in the jungle. We have also reason to believe that a significant number of Thai-born Chinese who completed their studies in China after the communist take-over of 1949, were trained as agents and infiltrated back into this country through Laos, Cambodia and Hong Kong. According to our intelligence, Chinese financial support for CT activities in Thailand in 1965 amounted to approximately US$ 1 million. 3. During 1960 and 1961, North Vietnam became Peking’s principal agent in supporting CT activities. In 1 962, a cadre training school was opened at Long Mu, near the town of Hoa Binh.in North Vietnam. A number of North Vietnamese agents were also infiltrated into northeastern Thailand to gain the support of the 30,000-40,000 Vietnamese refugees who fled to this country at the end of the first Indochina war in 1954. Laotian communists also assisted CT operations in Thailand by facilitating the transit of Thai recruits through Laos to Vietnam for training, and transporting arms and equipment. 32

4. Since March 1962, a clandestine radio station, the Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT), located in Yunnan Province, southwestern China, has been broadcasting Thailanguage propaganda into this country. Chinese communist influence is marked: VOPT broadcasts unfailingly follow the Peking party line and are obviously coordinated with those of Radio Peking. 5. In November 1964 and January 1965, Radio Peking announced the formation of front organisations in Thailand, and, as I noted initially, in January 1965 Marshal Chen Yi proclaimed that this country would be the battleground for the next “war of national liberation”. All this was before a single shot had been fired in Thailand. In conclusion, I do not believe it will be easy to defeat the communists in this country. Even though there are indications to suggest we can successfully contain the insurgency, the government cannot afford to become complacent. It may well be that the communists are deliberately avoiding contact with government forces while continuing to gather arms and increasing their efforts to gain a foothold in the villages. But it is also my belief that Thailand will never become another Vietnam. There are several reasons for this, not least the leadership of Their Majesties the King and Queen and the faith our people have in national independence. But important, too, is the progress the country is making politically and economically. As the Thai people realize, this progress is something the communist terrorists seek only to destroy. Significantly, the government has recognized the existence and direction of communist activities from the outset, and its decisive efforts to deal with the threat over the last two years have been apparent to the public. It is not beyond our own capability to solve this problem by ourselves. We Thais have cpnfrontedsimilar problems before in our history. I am confident we will overcome this one.’

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2. A speech to the United States Operations Mission (USOM), 22nd April 1968. ‘All of you have an interest in counter-insurgency methods and have been in Thailand long enough to understand the situation here. However, I would like to present to you my personal views on some of the most salient characteristics of the insurgency here, its trends, and the kind of action being taken by the Royal Thai Government to counter it. First, the conflict in Thailand does not stem from any real domestic political pressures aimed at achieving a genuinely popular goal. Lacking any popular issues through which they can appeal to the people, the communists in this country have had to resortto armed insurgency first, and only subsequently have they attempted to build up front organizations as a popular political wing of their movement. Given that these front organizations are essentially controlled by China, it is hardly surprising that they have elicited less political appeal here in Thailand than in other countries where similar models have been used. The Thai insurgency thus tends to focus on military rather than political activities. Consider for example the term the communists use to refer to their armed forces — 'taharn pa' or ‘jungle soldiers’. The term is essentially military rather than political in the manner of, say, the ‘Viet Minh’, the ‘Vietnamese League’. Similarly, communist units in northeast Thailand are identified by the world ‘tap’, which in northeastern dialect is the word for a small hut or temporary shelter in the forest used by villagers when cutting wood or engaged in some illegal activity. Northerners use a similar word, ’pang’, equivalent to the English term ‘hide-out’. It is also significant that thus far the insurgents in Thailand have no permanent, overall military organization*. * The People’s Liberation Army of Thailand (PLAT) was not formally established until early 1969. (ed.)

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The more organized bands appear to be those referred to as ‘tap’; otherwise a group usually adopts the name of its leader. To date, the various bands are still at the recruiting stage with coordination and co-operation among them depending largely on the personal relationships established between their leaders. Terminology used by the insurgents in this country is, for the most part, a reflection of that used by the Chinese Communist Party. The relevance of terms such as ‘war of national liberation’, ‘patriotic monks', ‘patriotic women' and so forth to the situation in Thailand is another matter altogether. Nevertheless, it remains important that the government should convince the people that, despite this patriotic jargon, the communists are interested primarily In the destruction of our national institutions and most cherished traditions. We can see then that the insurgency in this country remains in its initial phase with command and control exercised from abroad — that is to say from China, in cooperation with North Vietnam and Laos. The more the government exploits its opportunities and promotes a genuine appreciation of this state of affairs among the people, the greater will be the difficulties faced by the communists in fomenting civil war here. Certainly’ at present there is no evidence that communist blandishments are capable of inciting a popular uprising against the government. It is also worth noting that in other countries, communists have seldom pursued serious military operations against a government until their forces have achieved a significant level of organization. In Thailand, on the other hand, the insurgents have begun widespread armed operations despite their low level of organizational development. One might almost assume that they have made a basically flawed assessment of the situation. Personally, however, 1 believe that the communist terrorists understand the situation all too well. Social and political conditions in this country are such that communism has no real appeal. Control over the insurgency, moreover, 35

comes from abroad, creating a natural suspicion among ordinary Thais. The communists have, therefore, made a calculated decision to begin armed operations as a means of creating the conditions for widespread insurgency. They do not expect victories over government forces; but they do expect to score propaganda points by provoking the security forces into massive suppression compaigns. We must recognize that they could well succeed in this endeavour unless the government is able to identify and eliminate all the insurgents at an early date, which we can agree is highly unlikely. Thus the more propaganda capital the communists make, the more their subversive activities can b e expanded. And as the insurgency expands and its foreign direction tends to recede into the background, it may come to b e viewed by ordinary people as a truly Thai phenomenon. At that point the risks begin to multiply alarmingly. In 1966, the government’s military reaction to the insurgency in the Phu Phan mountain range in the Northeast provided the communists with exactly this kind of propaganda opportunity. The communist terrorists were able to demonstrate convincingly the ineffectiveness of attempts to deal with the problem through head-on confrontation*. Later the same year, the communist terrorists began using armed propaganda meetings to demonstrate that they could surround any village in the area at will. Communist tactics are thus partly designed to impress upon people that the Thai communist movement is already well organised and powerful. Rumours that support has been brought into border areas by helicopter and that insurgent units are fielding modern, high calibre weaponry have been spread to create the impression that strong, functioning insurgent forces already exist. In such situations, the government must sort out the real facts from the propaganda to * See Chapter 1, page 30.

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-avoid counter-insurgency propaganda objectives.

operations

actually assisting CT

What then is the real scope of the insurgency? Intelligence gained from interrogation of arrested and surrendered communist terrorists reveals that a significant number have completed political and military training in China, North Vietnam and Laos. We estimate that between 400 and 500 have been trained in North Vietnam alone. These individuals constitute the movement’s hard-core, which recruits, organizes and trains new members from the villages. Most recruitment is taking place around the “target areas” pinpointed by CSOC — 14 in the Northeast, one in the Central Region, three in the South and three in the North. We estimate the total number of full-time terrorists to be about 2,500. If we include sympathizers, the number might reach 25,000. These figures do not, however, include the communist infrastructure, the political organisation which lives unobtrusively in Bangkok and other population centres. Nor do they include the criminal elements operating in remote forest and mountainous areas where insurgency occurs. Many of these criminals are hired to support communist activities and complement the actual number of communist terrorists, adding both an element of confusion and a greater visibility to the basic insurgent threat. What causes ordinary people to support the terrorist? Our investigations have revealed a number of reasons. Most communist adherents seek a higher income and improved living conditions; some are forced into communist ranks; others fear arrest because they have supported the communists or have been falsely accused of having done so. Only a few have professed a faith in communism as an ideology, and this, I would suggest, is one reason that the terrorists tend to surrender as soon as the “going gets tough” or the security forces launch major suppression operations. The movement lacks ideological backbone. Jungle-based communist terrorists rely on their sympathizers in the villages for support, in particular, for food. 37

Villagers who assist them do so generally because of family or friendship ties or out of fear of retribution. More substantial financial and material support is normally obtained from urban sympathizers who operate under cover of legitimate business activities. And this latter area is one in which the government must gain more accurate intelligence. We do know, however, that the terrorists in the forest are, at present, so short of supplies that a decision has been made not to increase the number of jungle-based insurgents. Only those who cannot risk remaining in their villages are now accepted into jungle camps. Other are instructed to remain in the villages to provide food and other support for the jungle-based forces. The seriousness of insurgent support problems is reflected in the fact that higher party echelons are now granting approval for the forceful requisitioning of food from villagers. The assassination of village headmen who refuse to co-operate is also sanctioned. In general, I believe that our efforts towards containing the insurgent threat are proving effective. Local people in remote regions are also developing more friendly attitudes towards the government and it is now becoming difficult for the communist terrorists to recruit from some areas they once regarded as secure. The result has been a tendency to move to new areas where government counter-measures have yet to begin. Terrorists in Pla Baak District of Nakhon Phanom Province have, for example, abandoned a formerly secure area and shifted south to the remote mountains of Na Kae District. In the former high-threat area of Lerng Nok Tha District, Ubon Ratchathani Province, terrorists have also been forced to move out. This is at least partly due to the effectiveness of government counter-insurgency measures, in particular the 09/10 Plan, a scheme to provide security for villages through the provision of a permanent government armed presence to back local defence forces. The other side of the coin is the work of agencies such as the Office for Accelerated Rural Development (ARD), planning and executing a variety of 38

short and medium term development projects. At the same time, police and military counter-guerrilla operations serve to maintain continuous pressure on armed CT bands. We cannot say with certainty that our policy of security and development is necessarily the right answer. Some authorities argue that attempts to suppress guerrillas by regular police or military forces is the wrong approach; others contend that organizing villagers for self-defence is illadvised. And there are people who have worked in the counter-insurgency field in other countries for long periods who are convinced that development programmes are of very little value. We are well aware of all these criticisms. We believe, nonetheless, that our approach — the CSOC or CPM approach — is the best solution for Thailand. If, as we believe, the insurgency has no real roots in this country and is essentially an artificial and external creation, then it seems to us that the use of military force to destroy guerrilla bands on the basis of sound intelligence is both appropriate and legitimate. We believe that Thai villagers are basically loyal and that they are capable — given proper support and motivation — of organizing themselves against communist subversion and terror. Finally, we believe that even without the insurgency, the government owes it to the people to provide those services that will contribute to national strength and prosperity, and provide people with opportunities to improve their individual lives. This, then, is how we Thais view our counter-insurgency programme. Remember also that it is we Thais who are going to have to implement it, and sometimes Thai methods may seem strange or inappropriate. This does not mean that we do not want or welcome USOM's support. We do. We need and welcome your advice at all levels. It has proved valuable In the past and I look forward to a continuing healthy relationship in the future.’

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UiUI If

Lt. Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol receives some emergency relief supplies for disaster stricken people.

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Chapter II “The Counter-Insurgent Thrust” This chapter emanated from one of the author’s speeches to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand in 1971. It traces the initial development and transformation of the Royal Thai Government’s approach to countering the CPT insurgency. Significant in this chapter is the author’s assessment that the second round of the insurgent struggle was just beginning (1 970). The new round was characterized as an attempt by the CPT to change their strategy from one based upon military operations to one predicated upon terrorism and intimidation. Using statistics to prove his point, the author explains the approach orchestrated by CSOC.

******* 1 . A speech to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand, 8th October 1969 ‘My theme tonight is the development of counterinsurgency in Thailand. In my last speech to you, besides noting some statistics concerning incidents and the number of armed communist insurgents, I also discussed the specific characteristics of the insurgency in this country, which, despite certain similarities with the conflicts in Laos and Vietnam, tends to lean more towards military than political activity. Its external support mechanisms are also far more pronounced than those of other insurgencies in the region. These two points represent the communists’ principal weaknesses. And with their limited armed strength they are 41

striving hard to overcomethem. Specifically, they have turned to assassinations of villagers and local officials in order to provoke military retaliation by the government. They are wagering that the authorities will find no alternative to deploying armed forces to stamp out the small bands of terrorists hiding -in the jungle and mountains. Then, as the tempo of conflict quickens, a climate of polarization will be created in which the rural population will become increasingly alienated from the government and more involved with the communists. The CPT’s political organization will, meanwhile, be working to lay the political ground work for the “people’s war” that is the party’s road to state power. Once the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) was established as our combined civil-policemilitary headquarters, I believe that the realization of the dream of a “people’s war” in Thailand became impossible. CSOC came to understand very quickly the dangers inherent in attempting to rely on force alone in suppressing the communist terrorists. We also realised that our goal should be not only to eliminate the insurgents but also to win over the people to the government. Winning the people, in fact, is the key to success. As a result of our early appraisals we adopted the civil-police-military or CPM method in preference to the “direct" military approach. In this indirect approach, it is the people themselves who become the focus of operations or the “target". As a guideline for those responsible for the implementation of this counter-insurgency strategy we have divided the population into five broad categories: • First, the population of "external critical areas” which the communists are trying to dominate as their initial base of operations; • Second, the population of “internal critical r areas" where the communists will establish their next base areas; • Third, the population along the border corridors where infiltration is taking place; 42

• Fourth, the hilltribe population; • Fifth, other minority groups which we anticipate could become targets of communist subversion. On the basis of this categorization, we have developed corresponding operational guidelines for dealing with the insurgency in its various forms, all of’which necessarily call for the participation of various civil, police and military agencies. Let us examine them one by one. For the population of “external critical areas”, CSOC initially formulated the 09/10- Plan*, which is being implemented by local authorities to provide security and development for villages around designated target areas. It is. worthwhile emphasizing that the 09/10 Plan can only be a complete success when civil authorities have played their part in encouraging village volunteers to defend themselves, while the police fulfill their role in supporting the Village Security Teams. The army, too, must be ready to act as a reaction force and conduct operations as requested by the civil authorities. At present, in the context of the plan there are 57 target areas — 30 in the Northeast, 1 3-in the North, 7 in the Central Region, and 7 in the mid-South. A total, of 628 villages are, meanwhile, under the protection of Village Security Teams — 410 in the Northeast, 100 in the North, 46 in the Central Region, and 72 in the mid-South. As a result of our experience with the 09/10 Plan, CSOC initiated Operational Policy 110, otherwise known as the Village Security and Development Plan**. Under this scheme VST members will b e selected and trained for 11 week courses in political affairs, security and basic development. They will then be deployed in their villages supported by local Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC) forces (at district level), tambon (hamlet) level police, village police and army reaction forces. The Department of Local Administration (LAD) of the Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for the programme, is * See Chapter 1, page 27. ** CSOC memorandum no. 1786 of 7th September 1967.

43

currently conducting experimental training. The first group of about 400 VST trainees from Prachuab Khiri Khan and Udon Thani provinces are being put through a course at the LAD training centre in Prachuab Khiri Khan. Next, we believe the communists will move into the “external critical areas" as their next operational base areas. To deal with these zones, CSOC established In 1968 a policy of approaching remote villages before contact was made by the *communists*. This became known as Operational Policy 1 12. As result, potential target villages for CT infiltration have been identified io ensure that local authorities improve intelligence and security as well as promote development activities and psychological operations. This plan is aimed purely at encouraging local authorities to take whatever steps they feel necessary as swiftly as possible, with CSOC’s support if required. We thus hope it will be possible to avoid the errors of omission committed in “outer critical areas” after 1961 when communist subversion began in earnest**. Policy 112 is also designed to dispel ill-feeling among local authorities, who, during the earliest days of communist subversion, sometimes felt that their own initiatives were not supported by the central government. Within the framework of the policy a number of villages have already been approached in Prachuab Khiri Khan, Surin and Kanchanaburi provinces. The concept governing operations in the border areas is contained in Operational Policy 111***. This plan calls for the participation of local people in border security with the supervision, coordination and support of the police and military. The emphasis is very much on local involvement, which takes advantage of local familiarity with the terrain

* CSOC memorandum no. 1218 of 18th May 1968. * In 1961 the CRT held its Third National Congress, a pivotal gathering during which the decision was made to set the party on a course of armed struggle based on rural areas. ' CSOC memorandum no. 1070 of 25th May 1968.

44

Chiang Rai

Nan

Uttaradlt

toel

@ ®@

® Tak

©I © ® ®

Phltsanulok Phetchabun

•Nakhon

Ratchaslma

Infiltration routes along mountain ranges Prevention of Infiltration along border according to plan ill

Under planning

(T)

Target In plan 0910

Under training

Accomplished

Target In plan 0910A (Hllttrlbe People)

45

while denying such support to the communists. Five provinces are currently involved in this programme — Uttaradit, Loei, Nong Khai, Nakhon Phanom and Ubon Ratchathani. Next, let me make a few points concerning the fourth category, the hilltribes. Operational Policy 113* specifies the priority of hilltribe target areas and demarcates the areas of responsibility for security, development and psychological operations. This- calls for some elaboration. In designating hilltribe target areas we have also found it necessary to include some of the lowland villages on the outskirts' of disaffected mountain areas. While dealing with hilltribe security, it is also crucial that we improve lowland security with a view towards establishing a “loyal ring” around the uplands that will serve to discourage communist penetration of the hills. Establishing this “loyal ring” also goes to demonstrate to the tribal people that the army, police and government authorities can provide them with real assistance. In this respect, we are planning to set up hilltribe reception centres in the intermediate zones between the hills and the lowlands. The environment is similar to that which the tribal, people are used to, while at the same time the area is not too remote for the authorities to reach easily. We are hoping that the tribespeople will visit these centres, where schools, markets and medical facilities will be available. In fact, ideally, they will choose to settle around them thus enlarging our “loyal ring" until eventually a whole area can b e secured. At present, our priority target areas are Thoeng and Chiang Khong Districts of Chiang Rai Province. The Border Patrol Police are currently training 300 hilltribe security team members in Mae Taeng District, Chiang Mai, while local civil

* CSOC memorandum no. 134 of 20th December 1968.

46

authorities are training 420 lowland VST members in Chiang Rai Province itself. As to our final category — other minority groups that represent potential targets for communist subversion — CSOC is still at a consultative stage. A comprehensive national policy is expected to be drawn up in the near future. In general, I would maintain that government countermeasures have had a significant impact on communist activities in Thailand over the past three to four years. But in all frankness, I must also admit that the communists have made gains too, particularly in terms of “on the job” training which has served to improve their organization. They have also succeeded in laying the ground-work for future activities by increasing liaison and co-operation between elements across the country rather than relying solely on external support and direction. A good example of this can be seen in the establishment of the Supreme Command of the People’s Liberation Army of Thailand on 1st January 1969. At the same time, armed units are now referred to as People’s Liberation Army units rather than simply “jungle soldiers" as in the past. Subsequently, in an effort to make propaganda capital, the Supreme Command issued a tenpoint directive setting out a course of action for communist elements throughout the country. We can see then a concerted attempt to reinforce the communist* organisational infrastructure. Doubtless, these initiatives are intended to some extent to score propaganda points and alarm the government. Announcing the establishment of a “Supreme Command” and printing documents is not a particularly difficult task; effectively implementing the programmes set out is altogether another question. Even so, however hollow their pronouncements may appear, we cannot afford to dismiss them out of hand. They constitute a real warning to the government that the CPT is dedicated to continuing its strategy of protracted struggle.’

47

2. A speech to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand, 30th June 1971. ‘Some of you may recall that, in my first address to you on the insurgency situation, I discussed its origins. In my second speech of October 1969, I pointed out that despite the Communist Party of Thailand’s attempts to follow the blueprint for insurgency laid down in Vietnam and Laos, they were hampered by two crucial weaknesses: a tendency to rely more on military than political tactics, and the embarrassing source and visibility of their external support. I also explained at some length the counter-insurgency strategy adopted by the Communist Suppression Operations Command, the so-called CPM approach that aims to coordinate civil, police and military elements and to combine the twin counter-measures of security and development at the village level. Target areas were pin-pointed and the main CPT thrust in the Northeast contained. Up until the end of 1969, incidents of armed clashes were declining to come extent. Let me now examine some of the results. I can say with confidence that after five years of fighting, the CPT's organizational infrastructure has suffered a great deal. A number of their Central Committee members have been rounded up* and insurgent activities in target areas are no longer ignored by the government. A considerable number of communist cadres and supporters in villages in or near those areas have been eliminated or neutralized. Nevertheless, despite our efforts, the communists did succeed in establishing the People’s Liberation Army of Thailand (PLAT) in 1969. And the number of armed insurgents which in 1967 stood at some 2,000 has today risen to

* tn 1967, 20 ranking CPT cadres were arrested Bangkok area. Among the Central Committee Eeowchai, Prasert Sapsunthorn, Pin Bua-orn and was subsequently to return to join the CPT in

48

in major sweeps in the members were Prasert Thong Chaenisri. Thong the jungle, (ed.)

5,000. We know, moreover, that the PLAT command is trying to consolidate its organization by issuing regulations to standardize uniforms, discipline and a variety of functions. On the other hand, the communists have suffered a loss of some 1,500 weapons of various kinds, while 540 terrorists have been killed and another 3,000 have surrendered. Many CPT jungle base camps have also been overrun by security forces. As of 1970, however, I believe that the second round of the struggle in Thailand began. This round of fighting is still probably in its initial phase and may last four or five years. During this period, the CPT is naturally anxious to avoid government harassment and win time to repair damage suffered to date, while consolidating its organization. To gain this time, the CPT appears to have switched from a strategy based mainly on military operations to one that tends more towards terrorism and intimidation. Consider the statistics: Incidents involving face-to-face propaganda have risen from an average of 6.4 per month between 1966 and 1969 to 16.4 per month in 1970; assassination of villagers unwilling to co-operate with the insurgents increased from an average of 5.6 per month between 1 966-1 969 to 1 1 .6 per month in 1 970; over the same periods the assassination of government officials rose from an average of 3.6 per month to 10 per month. These statistics indicate clearly enough that the communist terrorists are attempting to find a way of defeating the government’s village security programme in order to reassert control over the population of target areas. Recent communist directives to local insurgents have instructed them to set up village committees and provide Village Military Units (VMUs) to ensure the security of their elements in the villages. This activity, clearly aimed at extending the party’s popular base, has been complemented by the re-establishment of new and more secure links with operatives in urban areas. As a result, we can expect attempts at quiet infiltration of student and worker organizations and other susceptible groups.

49

On the military side, the PLAT’S “permanent” bases, which have remained undisturbed in the jungle for several years, are now vulnerable to attack and can no longer be considered permanent. The CPT may well not attempt to establish similar bases again but rather rely on small mobile bases operating in the areas in which they have a relatively high degree of influence. They will thus remain fairly close to their village support base. PLAT units have, meanwhile, three broad missions: to support the expansion of the popular base in the villages; to attack carefully selected government units to obtain arms and ammunition; and to undermine popular confidence in the government. The communists are likely to intensify current efforts to train and indoctrinate armed units in training camps hidden in deep jungle and secured by roving guerrilla bands. Sources of equipment and supplies to complement what can be obtained locally will doubtless also be sought and supplies secretly cached, while the CPT awaits the second round of the conflict to begin in earnest. This will occur only when the communist leadership deems the political situation favourable and their own forces well prepared. From the government’s point of view, I can derive some satisfaction from being able to report an improvement in the performance of all our agencies involved in the counterinsurgency effort, in particular the police and army. Capitalizing on lessons learnt during the first round of fighting, they have developed new training techniques and have adapted their organizational structures to suit the demands of counterinsurgency. Meanwhile, the task of aligning, as closely as possible, development activity to security is progressing. Road construction in the North and irrigation projects in the Northeast have both made considerable headway. We are also now working closely with the Accelerated Rural Development Office to combine the independent efforts of civil, police and military agencies In pushing through development projects in key areas. 50

It is my hope, moreover, that CSOC’s guidelines for the various categories of population target area* will be more widely accepted and effectively implemented. If we can achieve this, I believe we will be in a better position to keep pace with CPT activities and obstruct them. This in turn will secure us more time to apply resources towards long-term development and security. Finally, this briefing would not be complete if I did not touch on the question that has arisen of late of a possible dialogue with Peking. First, let me say that I am not aware whose initiative this was. But if it was Peking’s, it would appear to fit into what I have described to you as the preparatory phase of the second round of the conflict. Certainly, there are no solid grounds for believing that China has deviated from its objective of overthrowing the government of Thailand by means of insurgency. If anything, 1 would argue that the communists are merely seeking to win a period of grace which they will exploit to their own advantage. Alternatively, they may be seeking to score propaganda points by attempting to show that the government is not interested in peace. Let m e state emphatically: the government of this country does want peace. But we cannot but note that propaganda broadcasts from Radio Peking do not reflect any change in Chinese attitudes. Nor, for that matter, do those of the Voice of the People of Thailand. Propaganda attacks from these stations are, in fact, increasing. We are unable, therefore, to discern any real change in Peking’s stance towards the conflict in this country.’

* See Chapter 2, page 43.

51

O ,-4 f

4

Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol visits hilltribes at Baan Paklang in Nan Province.

52

Chapter III “Revolt

in the North”

This chapter was adapted from the text of a CSOC publication in 1969 entitled “A Solution For The North.” In this chapter the author enunciates one phase of the Royal Thai Government’s approach to countering the CRT insurgency, this one in northern Thailand where the primary targets were the vulnerable hilltribes. These efforts were focused on village development which included programmes for instituting schools for tribal peoples, training indigenous development specialists in their own villages, constructing roads into tribal areas and establishing markets for local produce.

******* 1. Excerpts from “A Solution for the North”, a pamphlet written and published in 1969. a) Introduction. The history of communist activity in Northeast, Central and Southern Thailand indicates that the insurgents are focusing their efforts on remote villages, hoping to incite anti-government revolt and ultimately ignite what they term a “war of national liberation.” Thus far, government countermeasures have effectively contained these initiatives and in some areas brought about a gradual improvement. Our efforts have been directed at improving village security, reducing the number of armed insurgents and promoting a better climate of understanding between the rural population and the government. The means of achieving these goals 53

have been the integration of civil, police and military operations under guidelines set out by the Communist Suppression Operations Command. In the North, however, a different situation has evolved. Dating from 1967, a series of incidents involving hilltribes erupted, first in Thung Chang District of Nan Province, and later in Thoeng and Chiang Kham Districts of Chiang Rai, and Mae Sot District of Tak. Most recently, this tribal unrest has expanded to the tri-border area of Phetchabun, Loei and Phitsanulok Provinces. A careful study of the situation in the North confirms that the communists have used many of the same basic techniques employed elsewhere in Thailand. Yet it is obvious that the hilltribes, even if won over by the communists, would be unable to expand the insurgency into the lowlands and high population density areas of the country. What then are the objectives of communist activities in these areas? A study of methods employed in China, Cuba and elsewhere leads to the conclusion that the communists have selected the jungles and mountains of the North and the indigenous peoples of the region to provide logistic support for operations in more politically crucial areas. Historical parallels are readily available: Mao Tse-tung’s choice of Yen-an and the Shensi base area in northwest China in the late 1930s; H o Chi Minh's retreat to the mountains of the Viet Bac base area in 1946; Castro’s use of the Sierra Maestra range during the Cuban revolution; and even today, Chin Peng and the Communist Party of Malaya's refuge in the densely jungled Thai-Malaysian border area. The technique is, then, a tried and proven one that has permitted communist insurgents to pursue a strategy of "protracted war.” The pattern of insurgency in Thailand leaves no doubt that the CPT is embarked on a similar course. Insurgent operations which began in 1965 have, despite government suppression operations, assumed a protracted character, and it is quite apparent that the CPT is prepared to sustain its campaign for years to come. The remote, jungle-clad hill tracts of the North and the support of 54

the tribal peoples living there will be crucial in under-pinning it.

b) The Origins of Communist Activity among the Hilltribes. During the period 1965-1967 when national and international attention was focused on the strife-torn Northeast, some of Thailand's more perceptive leaders were looking with apprehension towards the North. Here the jungled mountains and lack of communications offered an environment similar to those exploited in Malaya, Cuba, Vietnam and the Philippines. Jungled mountains mean comparatively safe ground for the guerrilla. Every ravine and crag offers innumerable sites for secret camps and rendezvous areas. Denied observation by the jungled canopy and vehicular mobility by the nature of the terrain, the advantage usually enjoyed by a modern, mobile army is largely neutralized. Here the guerrillas can meet the army on their own terms, ambushing columns moving single-file along jungle tracks or suddenly emerging from the jungle to terrorize a remote village or attack a police station. The tribal people indigenous to these wild, remote regions are ideally suited to the form of warfare waged by the communists. The Yao and, in particular, the proud Meo (or Hmong in their own language) have long harboured grievances against the government stemming from restrictions on their traditional slash-and-burn agriculture — which wreaks havoc on watershed forest — and their opium production. Ridiculed and often cheated in lowland market towns, many of these tribal people sense little or no identification with the government. The communists began sending small propaganda teams into the North in 1963. These groups were composed of hilltribe people who had been trained in Laos and Vietnam. And they came offering a cheap commodity never before extended — status. Speaking in tribal languages and sharing tribal dress and culture, these propaganda and recruitment teams had little difficulty in winning acceptance.

55

Their appeals, moreover, were couched in terms easily understood by the hill people. Meo legend has long prophesied the coming of a Meo king who will establish a kingdom for his people. This king, said the organizers, now lived across the mountains to the northeast and had called Meo warriors to confer with him. As a consequence, many young Meos followed the recruiting teams back across the border. Some returned disillusioned after they had seen through the communist ploy; others, however, enjoyed their new-found status and went on to Hao Binh in North Vietnam, where they were indoctrinated in the communist ideology and trained in guerrilla warefare. By 1965, a number of these indoctrinated recruits, had returned to their villages and begun the slow, painstaking process of building up the communist infrastructure. During the summer of 1967, a series of scattered administrative injustices offered communist leaders the opportunity for which they had been waiting. Quarrels over land rights and taxation erupted across Chiang Rai and Nan. Then the communists, who reckoned — correctly, as it turned out — that the government would seek a “quick” solution to these problems through the use of force, informed the hillpeople that the whole tribal population would be the target of government counter-measures. Nor was this difficult to prove. By deliberately provoking incidents in or around hilltribe villages, the desired reaction could be triggered. And the military, inexperienced in their new counter-insurgency role, responded with the full weight of conventional strength. Villages which had harboured communist cadres were wiped out, in some cases with the use of napalm. This left the villagers with the clear-cut choice of either evacuating to a hilltribe refugee settlement or joining the communists in the jungles. Many, embittered by the destruction of their homes and unwilling to face the difficulties of adapting to the lowland environment, chose the latter course. And as the number of tribal dissidents grew, the 56

government military force expanded proportionately to cope with the threat. Subsequent military sweeps in late 1967 and 1968 were generally unsuccessful. The hilltribe rebels, well-suited to operating over familiar terrain, were able to choose their own battleground. Communist cadres, meanwhile, urged them on and wasted no opportunity to exploit the propaganda value afforded by the military’s frequent blunders in recourse to brute force. c) The Current Situation. The situation which developed in the 1967-1968 period produced a cycle that can perhaps best be illustrated by the annotated diagram (see diagram on page 58). This experience has tended to repeat itself wherever a communist threat developed and force was used to suppress it — in Thoeng and Chiang Kham Districts of Chiang Rai, Lomsak District in Phetchabun, or Mae Sot District in Tak. The first stage in the cycle is that of development, during which the government pursued a wide range' of economic, educational and health programmes in order to establish a measure of identification with the hilltribes. These activities were conducted primarily by personnel of the Department of Public Welfare’s Hilltribe Division and by the Border Patrol Police (BPP). In the villages this development thrust has taken the form of instituting schools for tribal peoples, training some of them as development specialists in their own villages, construction of roads into tribal areas and establishing markets for local crops. These multi-faceted efforts have resulted in a full range of government-to-people relations; and, as elsewhere, some have been good, while others have been, frankly, bad. Misunderstandings between officials and hilitribe leaders have, o n occasion, led to gunfire. This hostility is normally sparked by some real or imagined government perpetrated inequity. And, it should be said, uneducated tribal people offer a convenient target to communist propagandists and are easily pursuaded by their deceptions and blandishments. 57

58

Medium Average of

Legend

Rehabilitation

HJtltrlbe People

x

r

(3

Results of Faulty Suppression

Line of Transition

No Suppression

\

Suppression

Level of Situation Threatening to Development

Results of Sustained Development

Development

In accessible areas, under normal circumstances, higher authorities are quickly called in to solve a crisis before it reaches an explosive stage. But hilltribe villages, located in areas denying this accessibility, stand little chance of outside assistance in time to curb the deterioration of relations. The most appropriate solution to dissidence in this first stage is to continue to press ahead with development programmes until they achieve some success — an approach that requires both stamina and perceptivity if it is to have results. All too often, however, the problem festers too long before it is identified; or there is simply a failure of good judgement and patience in the government’s approach. Frequently, too, the threat is misrepresented with suggestions that overwhelming numbers of insurgents are terrorizing an area. Higher echelons consequently respond with massively disproportionate force. These heavy fisted deployments achieve little since for the most part we are unable to determine who these terrorists are, where they are hiding, or even how many of them we face. Stage 2 w e can describe as that of suppression. It consists of armed units undertaking security operations in order to provide protection to villagers and government officials and eliminate communist insurgents in the area. It is also of key importance that the order and security necessary for the continued execution of development programmes be maintained. The problem is invariably that tribal people, unfamiliar with military concepts of security and hampered by a language barrier, often fail io comprehend the mission of troops deployed to protect them. Experience has shown, in fact, that as soon as the military establish a position close to a tribal village, the villagers will usually simply disappear into the jungle. They complain that as soon as the military move into their area, they begin to make elaborate defensive preparations — an indication, as far as the villagers are concerned, that a battleground is being prepared. Fearful for the safety of’ their families, they then move elsewhere. At 59

times they shift to the homes of relatives in neighbouring villages. Often, however, they disappear into jungled areas controlled by the communists. Instead of isolating the communists from the people, our military deployments are thus merely serving to drive villagers into the insurgents’ arms. Stage 2 becomes a reality only when stage 1has failed to progress properly or is halted by the need to take measures to ensure security. The purpose of stage 2 is to bring about the necessary conditions for stage 3, which I have referred to as rehabilitation, and ultimately a return to stage I. Units participating in stage 2 operations must realize that their missions are not purely military in.nature but should be better described as those special tasks necessary to achieve conditions conducive to the stage of rehabilitation. They are clearly operations that will require the joint efforts of military, civil and police personnel. A headquarters must be a joint headquarters that will work out and implement programmes to influence tribal people to stay in their villages as well as win back those who have fled to the jungle. If suppression activities are conducted with the proper degree of perceptivity and precision at all levels, the situation will progressively improve to the point at which stage 3 conditions are achieved. This is exactly what happened in Mae Sot District, Tak, where the situation was successfully guided from stage 2 back to stage 3 and so back to stage 1 again. There is a tendency, however, for commanders to seek military solutions and endeavour to move from stage I prematurely in order to rush into stage 2, the suppression stage. The temptation to reclassify a given situation as stage 2 is one that must be resisted. In Chiang Kham District of Chiang Rai, our analysis is that the situation is moving from the suppression stage into stage 3, rehabilitation. This is also true of Thung Chang District in Nan. We must ensure, therefore, that the suppression forces are adequately informed so that they will be able to recognize stage 3 conditions promptly. Phetchabun, on .the other hand, is still in 60

stage 2. Whether or not this state of affairs will progress to stage 3 depends on the proper execution of stage 2 tasks by the Joint Headquarters. How then do we know when conditions are really conducive to rehabilitation? The primary yardstick is when most of these hilltribe people who fled into the jungle begin to return to their villages or other neighbouring villages, to evacuation camps or to government centres. When tribal attitudes towards the government become friendly and co-operative, we can conclude that the situation is conducive to a transition to stage 3, in order further to build for the return to stage I, development. During the rehabilitation stage government officials must seek to establish a genuine rapport with the people by correcting those conditions that contributed to the slide into stage 2. Officials must thus be prepared to overlook minor infractions committed by poorly-informed indigenous people and render prompt assistance in the provision of housing, clothing, food, tools and equipment necessary for the general welfare and health of the community. Operations during stage 3 are particularly sensitive given that mistrust and suspicions generated during the period of suppression inevitably linger. It is mandatory, therefore, that only those officials who seriously appreciate the nuances of this problem be selected. If the tasks set out for stage 3 are properly executed, the situation should slowly revert to stage 1.

2. A speech to the U.S. Regional Quarterly Counterinsurgency Conference o n Northern Thailand, 8th April 1969. ‘In a speech to the Rotary Club in February (1969), His Majesty the King referred to the fact that much has been said about the hilltribe problem and many plans drafted to deal with it; but that many of those plans contradict each other. I hope my briefing will go some way to alleviate His Majesty's concern over this question, for I believe it is through mutual understanding that our plans can be focused on a common 61

goal. Clearly, the best way to bring about such understanding among those involved with the hilltribe problem is through discussion and exchange of ideas. This, then, is an excellent opportunity to outline what the Communist Suppression Operations Command has drafted as a tentative solution for the North. I should make it clear that this plan is not mine alone. It represents the work of CSOC as a whole and has been approved by the organization’s commanding officer. The plan, moreover, has been based on the lessons that we have learned in the execution of the 09/10 plan for village security in the Northeast as well as from suppression operations carried out in the North over the past two years. We have also taken into consideration the ideas and recommendations of various experts in related fields. Our task has been essentially to combine security and development operations in order to achieve the most effective balance. The lessons learned in the Northeast suggest that in order to achieve close coordination down to the lowest authorities and to produce the best results from available resources, we need to identify the problem area and outline detailed procedures to be followed. In other words before solving any problem, we have to establish beyond any doubt where exactly that problem lies and what constitutes its salient characteristics. CSOC has thus designated five problem areas in the North as priority targets for operations. These are: (i) The mountainous area of Thoeng and Chiang Khong Districts in Chiang Rai — a range which adjoins Doi Pha Mon on the Thai-Lao border; (ii) the mountainous area at Phu Lang Kha in Chiang Kham and Pong Districts of Phayao; (Hi) the area of Doi Pha Ji between Pong District of Phayao and Muang District of Nan; (iv) the Doi Museu area of Tak; 62

(v) and the Phu Lorn Lo area in the PhetchabunPhitsanulok-Loei tri-province zone*. The first three of these target areas are located in the Chiang Rai-Phayao region of the North and have certain common characteristics. They are (a) all mountainous zones on provincial or district borders; (b) there are hilltribe villages scattered throughout these areas; and (c) close by these settlements are valleys or points at which the lower slopes abut the plains and where remote lowland villages are thus vulnerable to CT infiltration. To circumvent the vulnerability of these mountainous areas straddling provincial or district borders, new operational zones have been established and placed under a combined headquarters. This step draws on our successes in the 09/10 target areas in the Northeast where close coordination between provincial and district authorities proved vital. In addition, hilltribe operational zones include both the mountainous areas and the lowlands surrounding them. Thus in each target area there are both lowland and hilltribe villages. Within this overall framework, we have divided our efforts between the establishment of security, development, and suppression and psychological operations. Our initial development efforts were based on what one might term the “direct approach” — marching up to the top of a hill in a tribal area establishing a presence. This was less than successful. Hilltribe people suspected that attempts to construct offices and other facilities were not for development purposes but rather represented a control mechanism through which the government would derive some profit.

* In terms of putting the government at an administrative disadvantage, the CPTs Phu Lorn Lo base area could hardly have been bettered. The area marked the dividing line between the Second Army in the Northeast and the Third Army in the North; between the Fourth and Sixth police regions; and between the three provinces of Loei, Phetchabun and Phitsanuiok. (ed.)

63

Naturally such suspicions were readily exploitable by communist propaganda and subversion. In addition, the terrorists were able to destroy within a matter of weeks all the permanent structures the government had taken years to build. Incidents of this type took place in Chiang Rai, Nan and the tri-province zone. To avoid a repetition of such a situation we have adopted an “indirect approach”, selecting suitable areas on the buffer zone between the lowlands and the mountains which have an environment reasonably similar to those the tribal people are accustomed to and yet are not too far from lowland villages*. In one of these selected areas, a hilltribe reception centre is set up as a refuge for both hilltribe villagers threatened by the communists and those who have fled the fighting into the jungle. At the centre, medicine, food and clothing are provided as well as schools, dispensaries and a market. The rationale of the "indirect approach” is therefore that the government meets the hilltribes half-way. At the centres it is easier for the authorities to approach the tribal people and provide security, while the familiar environment also serves to attract the tribal villagers down from remote settlements, (see diagram on page 66). Differences in language and customs are also problems which inevitably lead to misunderstandings that a "direct approach” to those on the mountains will only exacerbate. It is also likely to create concern among lowland villagers that government assistance to tribal people demonstrates partiality and ignores their own difficulties. By contrast, the “indirect approach”, which embraces both hilltribe and plains people, serves to promote better cross-cultural understanding. At the same time, building up a lowland “loyalty ring” around hilltribe areas makes communist infiltration from mountain bases more difficult. ’ A notable success was the hilltribe reception centre in Pua District of Nan, which arranged for legal landholdings for tribal people, had a good school and boasted a thriving handicraft industry, (ed.)

64

In security and suppression work we must bear in mind the lessons learned during the Royal Thai Army’s earlier operations. First, the hilitribes do not like having military and police forces stationed in their areas and will flee into the jungle whenever security forces move in. Second, the key to military success is complete familiarization with the terrain on which operations are to be conducted. Given an appreciation of all this, we have then to consider how best to deploy military and police forces. Their role is essentially to assist plains villagers in providing security for their villages through the use of Village Security Teams, reaction platoons and control teams. As far as hilltribe villagers are concerned, the establishment of reception centres will encourage them to provide their own security. As this progresses, military or police personnel will provide the training for hilltribe security teams and reaction platoons to back up the security teams. In addition, the cutting edge will be provided by Combined Special Force Teams composed of military and police personnel along with selected and thoroughly trained hilltribesmen. These Combined Teams will need to be highly motivated and intensively trained in terrain familiarization, jungle warfare and small-unit tactics. They must be assigned to carry out counter-guerrilla special operations within target areas on the basis of reliable intelligence on CT movements. The stationing of well prepared military and police units at the Control Headquarters will meanwhile provide general support for deterrent operations.'

65

HQ

HQ 50

Target Area

HI lit riba Evacuation

HllltrJbe Village

Joint H Q

Main Village or Hilltribe Development Centre

so

Development Team

[bpp I

Village Protection Team (hilltribe)

Hilltribe

|

Centre

Special Operations

B.p.p.

Team

HQ

Inf Co and Hllttrlbe Platoon

Recon Platoon

Signal Commo

Control HQ for Lowland Villages according to Plan 0910 that Surrounds Target Areas of Plan 091 OS

66

■'’"X *!*

Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol inspects troops of the first hilltribe company at Baan Paklang in Nan Province, Sept. 1968

67

Aranyaprathet — National Defence volunteer training at Thai Kampuchean border.

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Chapter IV “Village Security” In this chapter the author offers a glimpse at the most critical social and political institution in rural Thailand and explains its importance in the government’s efforts to defeat the communists. . Since rural life in virtually all regions of the kingdom revolves around the village, its state of well being and attitudes were then — and are — still critical. The question of the security and development of the village, therefore, is at the heart of any government campaign to defeat the insurgency. General Salyud provides a historical outline of the problem and offers a solution.

******* 1. A speech to the United States Operations Mission (USOM) Quarterly Conference, 18th March 1969.' ‘The question of village security is the foremost problem confronting us today in Thailand and it is my belief that basic to this question is the mental attitude of villagers towards their future. This means that in addition to actual physical security, villagers’ other concerns — will they reap a good harvest? will their children be able to attend school? what will be done for the new-born and aged? — are also of considerable importance. If we can provide answers to these most immediate concerns, we will have made a good start towards establishing village security in its fullest sense. 69

Let us consider briefly the history of village security in the Thai context. Historical records indicate that from the time the Thai people lived in Nan Chao, (in southwestern China of today) through the period of their occupation of the Sibsong Panna and Sibsong Chu Thai (today’s Phongsali Province of Laos) until the Sukhothai period, the Thai administrative system was based on key towns. It was from such administrative centres that personnel were sent to outlying districts to assist the local population. The famous Inscription Stone of the Sukhothai era refers to this administrative system as "thang baan thang muang", which roughly translated means an association of villages and towns. During the early Rattanakosin period when war was waged for years across the Northeast, the populace faced so much confusion and upheaval that many simply abandoned the towns and fled to the jungle. To check this social fragmentation, King Rama IV utilized the thang baan thang muang technique. He directed the chiefs of villages, tambons (hamlets) and muang (towns) to send out representatives to various localities to contact the floating population and reorganize them into villages or townships as appropriate. Based on this method, his attempts to resettle the rural population were largely successful. My reason for this historical diversion is to give some idea of the relationship between the administration and the populace in the past. It was a broad relationship which included security and relied heavily on the abilities 'of the local chiefs. More recently, during the past 30 to 40 years, village security has depended largely on the capabilities of five key individuals — the village headman, the religious layman, the teacher, the family doctor and the midwife. If we include the local abbot, this group could be extended to six. In addition, each individual usually has a certain number of followers or supporters. I believe it is useful to examine some of the essential characteristics of each of these five. To take the village headman (or phuyai baan) first: he will usually be the most 70

popular .and respected person in the village and is elected by popular vote. This position is often filled by descendants from one family with the approval of the majority, and compared to the average villagers, the phuyai baan will generally be a person of relative wealth. His main functions are to arbitrate in village disputes and to provide security for the villagers. Secondly, there is the religious layman (or makkh-thayok.) His role is broadly speaking to maintain liaison between the clergy in the local monastry and the villagers. He is relied on to arrange religious ceremonies such as the ordination of monks and other basic rites that are central to the religious life of the village. Next is the morprajam baan, a kind of village doctor who is the individual best versed in traditional methods of medical treatment in the community. His knowledge will have been handed down by his forebears or through such spiritual means as dreams, ghosts or devils. His methods of treatment may include modern drugs in addition to traditional herbs, holy water and even magic. Governed by a strict fate and predestination, the villagers do not rely totally on this treatment. But, the mor prajam-baan can relieve individuals' concerns in much the same way as the well-trained doctor in today’s big cities. Finally, there are the midwife (or mor tam-yae) and the village teacher (or khru.) The former serves most obviously to assist in the safe delivery of the new-born, and like the family doctor, her skills may be derived from a mixture of traditional and modern sources. The latter will usually be the most knowledgeable person in the village. In addition to his mission of teaching the village children — a role from which he derives considerable respect in the community — he will also advise on more general problems and in particular those involving modern technical knowledge. In most Thai villages, be they on the areas or in the jungle, these five individuals leaders in their respective fields. But how Simply, they are selected and appointed 71

plains, in upland will be found as are they found? by the villagers

themselves in a process of popular consensus. Given the requirements of the community, the person with the widest knowledge in these various fields will, willingly or reluctantly, be appointed by the villagers. And as people automatically begin treating them with greater respect and consulting them with greater frequency, they come, to accept their positions. The point that I wish to emphasize is that these five individuals receive no official appointment, and, while in certain respects they may be recognized by the government, they ther work as government officials nor receive payment from the government. Their work is for the villagers — who pay them as they can afford — and they can take pride in their contribution to the community’s welfare. Thus they serve the community rather than the government. Village security in the broadest sense, therefore, relates significantly to the attitude and performance of these five leaders. If they possess the required knowledge and perform their duties effectively, the overall level of security will be enhanced. If on the other hand, they are poorly motivated or weak, the community’s security inevitably suffers. From a governmental point of view, it follows that we should do our utmost to improve the qualifications and status of these community leaders. in my estimation, much of the difficulty surrounding the question of village security today stems from the current transition of Thai society from the traditional to the modern. This has created unavoidable friction between traditional village leaders and modern specialists working for the government. The net result has been a decline in the standing of traditionally respected figures who in many cases have been faulted for their ignorance of modern methods and techniques. But at the same time, the government is unable to supply a sufficient number of modern specialists to replace the traditional leaders whose status has been undermined. This only goes to compound the problem. One of the most important bases on which to enhance village security should, therefore, be to bolster the effective72

ness of traditional community leaders. This means that our various technical departments must organize training courses in modern techniques for them. The only other alternative is training new individuals to replace them. In addition, in areas where communist activity is apparent, the key personnel in a village must receive arms training, and sufficient weapons should be supplied to these people to defend themselves and their communities. In other words, a Village Security Team or VST should be formed. The VST will generally consist of a team chief, a deputy team chief and team members. Ideally, the team chief should be the phuyai baan, who has completed Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC) training. In addition to his military role, he would thus enjoy a certain authority in civil matters. Similarly, the deputy team chief should, if possible, be the assistant phuyai baan. Team members can be drawn from among the phuyai baan’s other assistants or from ordinary villagers with VDC training. It might also be necessary to assign a police or military non-commissioned officer as team chief in villages seriously threatened by communist penetration. Support for the VST should come from the tambon (hamiet) and district support teams made up of police and volunteer units. When the situation proves beyond the capabilities of units at those levels, the VST will be reinforced by police and military units in adjacent areas. Obviously, these various elements must establish a precise and well coordinated chain of command and support. In summary then, we are aiming at improving the skills and status of our traditional village leaders through technical training with a view to fostering respect for them and encouraging them to serve the community while co-operating with the government. Secondly, village leaders must be trained to organize the defence of their own communities. But at the same time we must assure them that armed support is available when needed. Finally, supporting units must be organized, equipped with communications facilities and trained to respond rapidly 73

when called upon by VSTs to provide reinforcements. These observations are made on the basis of both my own rural background and upbringing and my experiences since working with the Communist Suppression Operations Command. I have visited many villages and had the chance to talk with many villagers. I am confident that those villagers are ready to look after themselves. What they need from the government is merely support and encouragement — not very big items, it would seem. But both are absolutely essential to the success of efforts to improve security in rural areas.’

2. A speech to the Fifth Annual Seminar on Village Development and Defence, South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) headquarters, Bangkok, 18th November 1974. 'My topic today is one I like to refer to as the 'mathematics of insurgency'. I myself am a relative newcomer to the field of counter-insurgency. But my limited experience and a study of similar problems abroad have taught me that once a country in the Southeast Asian region is confronted with insurgency, it is very difficult — in fact almost impossible — to eliminate it. Insurgency, moreover, is like a cancer — difficult to detect and hardly felt in its initial stages. Yet, as we all know, an insurgency can thoroughly debilitate a nation economically, politically and militarily. With an active domestic insurgency, a country’s chances of successfully defending itself against overt external aggression are drastically reduced. If we allow the cancer to spread, we will have surrendered all hope for survival. Yet for developing countries, which most of this region are, preventing an insurgency from ever beginning is virtually impossible. If a political party or faction is seeking to exploit economic or social difficulties, if it is prepared to resort to infiltration and armed struggle to further its ends, and particularly if a communist party in a neighbouring country 74

can be relied on to lend support, then the basic conditions for fomenting insurgency exist. These are exactly the conditions we face today in Southeast Asia. As a result, almost every country in the region confronts an insurgency at some level, with Thailand being the last country to slide into the morass. We have, then, no option but to fight. I have been searching for a simple, uncluttered formula that will effectively convey to people generally and government leaders in particular the essence of our dilemma. I hope that what I have termed the 'mathematics of insurgency' will answer this need. Let us assume for the purposes of an algebraic equation that ‘G’ stands for government, *P’ for people (or target villages), *0’ means communist insurgent and V means victory. In the first stage of our counter-insurgency effort, the relationship between government programmes, the insurgents, the people and the desired goal could be represented as follows: G - (C+P) = -V In other words, governments — including the Thai government — invariably seek at the outset to destroy the insurgents. The number of guerrillas is of course small and government intelligence services are usually able to identify many of them. But at this stage, insurgent activities have been focused mostly on assisting the people or assessing what improvements the people would most like to see. The insurgents’ goal at this stage is to win popular support, and this they hope to do by offering assistance. When the government arrests a villager and accuses him of being a communist terrorist, even though the accusation may be justified, other villagers are unlikely to approve. They see, after all, only a man who has offered to set right certain injustices within the community. The accused thus becomes a victim of official harassment and this only increases the distrust between government and villagers. The terrorists, meanwhile gain more sympathy, more support and more adherents. So the insurgency expands with the govern75

ment, algebraically speaking, actively contributing to the ' - V ’ . This is a pattern of events with which most governments are painfully familiar. Indeed, there is a general consensus that fighting an insurgency successfully means winning the people. Why then, aren’t the necessary steps taken? Why aren’t efforts directed at extending assistance to the people? The answer is probably that in most Southeast Asian countries, including this one, the physical destruction of insurgent cadres is perceived as the easiest and quickest way of suppressing the insurgency. There is also a tendency in an insurgency situation to assume initially that the government has no problems with equipment or manpower, that it has everything. Usually there is a problem, however, and it is associated with the distribution of these resources. In the absence of a realistic table of priorities, which takes the insurgency into consideration, resources often continue to be allocated as if no conflict existed. The result is that effectiveness in the field declines drastically. A related problem is the tendency to put the emphasis on equipment rather than qualified personnel. Rather than improving the skills of the personnel we already have, we attribute our shortcomings to inadequate equipment. This is merely an excuse and a dangerous one because fancy new equipment may be an asset but it still requires qualified personnel to maintain and operate it. So in the long run we wind up merely aggravating the basic problem of insufficient trained personnel. An insurgency is a complicated phenomenon involving a wide range of political, economic, social and psychological factors. It is far from being the simple military problem it is often presumed to be. Any real solution thus depends on qualified people competent in a range of these fields. By extension, it depends on what we in Thailand have called the “combined” or GPM approach. Adopting such a strategy is one thing, translating it into action is something altogether more difficult, however. It 76

requires dedicated and qualified men and women — and a lot of them. Training this corps of specialists depends, in turn, on the government, i.e. top-level decision-makers. But making people, even at this level, understand the problem is not easy. It takes time and effort on their part, neither of which are readily available given the plethora of other matters these senior officials must attend to. At this stage, the government tends not to believe that the communists can recruit sufficient numbers to pose a real threat: there are, after all, only a small number of communist terrorists. Targets of communist approaches, such as farmers and workers, are seen as poor, uneducated and essentially harmless. But things today have changed. The communists have proved clearly enough that these farmers and labourers can be indoctrinated and do have the potential to- obstruct or fight a government. Much of the situation in Thailand prior to 1965 fits this pattern well. We subsequently discovered that many remote villages had never really been contacted by the government. This provided the insurgents with an excellent opportunity to make the first approach, build a popular base for their armed forces and later arm the villagers themselves. Later, when the government belatedly attempted to Intervene, a visible insurgency was sparked off. The government had thus surrendered the initiative to the insurgents. Once an armed struggle erupts, the authorities wake up with a jolt. At this point they realize all too well that farmers and labourers can, indeed, be recruited, indoctrinated and organised to overthrow the government. The realisation also dawns that the loyalties of the villagers, rather than the destruction of the insurgents, should be the main objective. Then comes the second act of the struggle. The government, perceiving the importance of the villager, attempts to intervene and contest his loyalty with the communists. It starts to devote attention to remote areas. At this point, the government has no choice but to arm the villagers for the simple reason that if it does not, the 77

communists will. Then, too, the government begins to appreciate the importance of having irregular or para-military forces to help the counter-insurgency effort, an idea never paid serious attention in the past. At this stage, our equation changes to become: G±P-C=±V What this indicates is that while the government aims to give arms to the villager so he will help fight the communists, it is not seriously assisting him with problems of vocational development or village administration. This stands in contrast to the behaviour of the communists, who entered the village first to help the villagers help themselves and convince them they should not depend on the government — and only' then arm them. The government approach will thus only win over some villagers who are willing to be armed and who claim they are willing to exchange fire with the communists. There is a real danger, however, that if these armed villagers are not closely supervised and controlled, they will use their newly acquired weaponry for their own ends. This will inevitably create friction among the community, and government armed individuals will become resented by those the government has not armed. While the authorities gain some allies, they lose others. Hence the “ ± P” in our equation. Two points here are basic. First, arming villagers without control measures and logistics support will b e of limited effectiveness at best and could be downright dangerous. When one includes weapons supplied by the communists, one is talking about thousands or tens of thousands of arms in the hands of simple villagers, a potentially highly volatile situation. There should be one basic principle applied rigorously to the distribution of weapons by the authorities: war weaponry must be limited to personnel in uniform, subject to military discipline and at the end of a clearly defined chain of command and logistic support. Other villagers wishing to possess arms to protect persona! property should only be permitted civilian-type weapons, to which with a licence they are in any case legally entitled.78

Secondly, I wish to stress the importance of irregular forces and their relationship with regular forces. Normally, a government’s first instinct is to conduct counter-insurgency operations with regular units. The communists, by contrast, generally start first with a build-up of irregular forces such as village militia and local force units from which their regular forces are subsequently drawn. Firm ties between the two types of units thus exist from the outset. And once hostilities have broken out, a tight, mutually supportive relationship persists. Laos provides a clear example of this type of interaction. The communists fielded some 40,000 - 50,000 regulars — in fact North Vietnamese — plus several thousand irregular Pathet Lao troops. In attacking a strong government position, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) made the assault and the Pathet Lao provided the occupying force. During operations aimed at mass political work in any locality, the force would be mixed, the NVA providing the muscle and the protection, while the Pathet Lao undertook the "meet-the-people" mission. This sort of relationship between regulars and irregulars was significantly more efficient than anything the National Lao Army attempted. Initially, the Vientiane government attached no importance at all to irregular forces. Later, the United States and the Thais built one for them composed of Hmong hiiltribe guerrillas under Gen Vang Pao and the Thai Volunteer Unit. Numbering several tens of thousands, these forces were capable of stiffening the government's war effort for a while. But if attacked by communist regular (i.e. the NVA) they were soon in trouble. Why? Because they had no close bonds to the National Lao Army and tended to receive no support when the going got tough. The moral of this little story is as follows: in fighting the communist terrorists regular forces are not enough. We must have irregulars, too. Secondly, irregular units can only prove their mettle if they have a close relationship with the regulars. They must, moreover, operate in their own localities where 79

their knowledge of the terrain offers them a distinct advantage. In the light of all this, let us turn to the situation in Thailand today. Our counter-insurgency programme is, I believe, at the second stage of the equation: G ± P — C = ± V. It seems to me there is now an appreciation of the necessity of irregular forces. Indeed, we already have some — the Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC), the Village Volunteers or “Than Baan Asa", the People’s Resistance Against Communism (PRAC) group and others. Their capabilities vary widely, however. It is my impression that only those trained and closely supported by the regular army — the PRACs in the South and the Village Volunteers in parts of the Northeast — are of much value. Other groups such as the Anti-communist Villagers group at Bung Kan in Nong Khai Province do not have a close relationship with the Royal Thai Army and have been unable to defend their areas successfully. In Thailand, however, we are fortunate in having an increasing number of villagers who seem willing to take up arms against the communists even though there is no assurance that they will receive support from regular forces. This is an opportunity we should seize. Certainly, if we do not come up with some new ideas, if we merely plod along in our current rut, we cannot hope to defeat the insurgents or even contain them. Meanwhile, the number of weapons in villagers’ hands will steadily increase with all the dangerous consequences we have seen in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Given that we must take action and take it now, how can Thailand avoid the fate of Indochina? Let me go back to the equation: G ± P— C = ± V. If we are to prevail, that must be changed to P G - C = V. How? On paper, one could get rid of “ G ” and subtract "C” from "P”. But can “ P " really fight “C” by itself? I think that is highly unlikely. “P”, the people, need the power of “G”, the government. To arrive at our desired solution we must apply two key principles. 80

1. In villages which have not yet been infiltrated by the communists, or which are only being surveyed by the communists as ground for further organizational expansion, the government must assist the villagers in developing their own administration. They must provide their own qualified leaders or headmen and village committees for vocational development, education, public health and self-defence. Such a programme will serve to maintain law and order and develop the village, while at the same time immunizing the community against the insurgents by convincing the villager he has more to gain by staying in his village under the government umbrella than going to join the communists in the jungle. 2. In villages already infiltrated by the communists to the point where communist village committees, militia and hardcore cadre are active, the government will also usually have some of its representatives — personnel from the police, the VDC, Village Development Units and anti-communist groups, if the villagers are to take care of their own community as envisaged, then the government must withdraw these representatives. But given the CT presence, the withdrawal must be gradual and in proportion to the progress in self-help made by the community as it finds its own leaders and sets up its committees. Clearly, any precipitous withdrawal of government personnel would amount to surrendering the village to communist influence. Furthermore, if the village is to be strengthened to resist communist encroachment in the future, government representatives cannot be completely or permanently withdrawn. To keep the “ P ” squared by the “ G ” , uniformed government personnel must be on hand, ready to provide help as necessary. The programme that will bring about the equation PG C = V is what we have called the Development and Self-Defence Volunteer Programme (in Thai, “Asa-samak Phattana lae Pongkan ton-eng” — or Aw Paw Paw for short). This programme was developed from the contributions of innumerable civilian, police and military personnel, both 81

within the Royal Thai Government and amongst our allies. Their studies and resultant proposals covered a period of over one year and resulted in what is now called the Rural Security Manual. We plan to use this new manual to help implement the Aw Paw 'Paw programme.’

3. Excerpts from the Manual for the Development and Self-Defence Volunteer Programme. (Aw Paw Paw). Since 1950, the Royal Thai Government has developed a series of plans, programmes, projects and organizations all focused in some way or other on village security and development. A rough estimate shows there have been some 120 development projects, 12 security projects and at least 20 different types of para-military forces organized. Some of these programmes have been effective; others have made little impact. Because of the autono mous and independent nature of the various ministries involved, the results have been inconsistent and resources have been haphazardly distributed. At the same time, there has been a conspicuous lack of coordination between responsible agencies. The insurgents, of course, have capitalized on the government’s errors and apparent disunity, resulting in a slow but steady growth in the insurgency. An overview of the current situation might be- summarized as follows: (i) The communists continue to use the same tactics to coerce the villagers into providing support and bearing arms against the government. The government’s resort to force to suppress the insurgents has led to civilian casualties, which have exacerbated the problem and driven more people into communist arms. (ii) Even though at present the communists are capable of conducting only limited warfare, on the basis of current trends we estimate that they will be in a 82

(iii)

(iv)

(v)

(vi)

position to form larger units and begin major operations within the next three years. The importance of the government undertaking the Aw Paw Paw programme now is, therefore, critical. The communists are still unable to win over the majority of the rural population. Villagers, for the most part, see themselves as neutral. But there are others who support the communists either because they lack the means to resist or because they have friends or relatives in the jungle. In the past, military suppression policies have generally resulted' in loss of life and massive financial expenditure. This money might have been far better used for development or welfare purposes. Government agencies that have worked with the Internal Security Operations Command (1SOC)* on different counter-insurgency programmes have failed to understand the importance of these projects, preferring to concentrate instead on programmes originating within their own ranks. The result has been a government effort which has been fragmented and lacking in unity. Government agencies have also failed to brief their personnel on the importance of combining development and security. Thus projects in these two closely related -fields have been formulated without coordination. In many cases, programmes have overlapped or — more disturbing still — have been incompatible. All this, moreover, was taking place in a village environment totally lacking in selfgovernment. On the other hand, over the past two years villagers in some areas, notably Phattalung and Nakhon Si

* The Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) changed its name to the internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) in June 1 974.

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Thammarat Provinces, have fought the communists with impressive results. Similarly in the northeastern provinces of Udon Thani and Nakhon Phanom, villagers have joined together to defend their communities from CT pressure. Although to be fully successful, this effort must have both political and military support, these examples are indicative of a new trend: the people themselves are standing up to communist pressure and want to eradicate communists from their villages. In view of this, ISOC has found it necessary to make a thorough revision of its defensive strategy in order to achieve the following goals: (1) Rallying the rural population and persuading people to become involved with the development and security of their own villages. This must be done before the communists succeed in massing larger forces. (2) Organizing the administration of the village to assume responsibility for its own development and security. A village administrative committee will effectively act as an organ of local government to implement various projects approved by the central government. (3) Reorganizing the present Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC) at district and provincial level so that in the event of a communist attack it is capable of supporting village-level Village Security Teams (VSTs). It is hoped that this programme will result in a marked improvement of rural standards of living. This, in itself, would act as a bulwark against communist subversion. Regular army units can gradually be withdrawn, turning over local security to irregular forces trained to provide support to the villages. It seems safe to predict that the communists will try to prevent villagers from providing support to the government 84

and will resort to attacks on villages and assassinations of village headmen. Once their influence in the villages has declined, however, the task of military suppression should become easier. The objective of the Aw Paw Paw programme is thus broadly twofold: to train and advise villagers in sensitive areas so that they can better themselves socially, politically and economically; second, to ensure that villagers receive the training and the capability to defend their own communities. Personnel for the programme will be drawn from the Royal Thai Army, the Ministry of the Interior and its subordinate departments, and the Ministries of Agriculture, Health, Education and Industry. Non-Thai bodies such as SEATO and JUSMAG (Joint United States Military Advisory Group) will extend aid when appropriate. The nerve-centre of the programme will be the National APP Centre, which will be composed of two working groups — the Policy, Plans and Operations Group and the Field Training Group. The first of these groups consists of two divisions, the Administration and Support Division and the Policy and Planning Division. The second group, the Field Training Group, will b e split into three divisions: the Development and Service Training Division, the Security Training Division, and the Field Supervision and Inspection Division. Because APP requires considerable coordination between different government agencies, each division will have one or two liaison staff to ensure smooth coordination and an effective information flow to supporting agencies. Almost all personnel involved in the programme will be seconded to the APP Centre from their parent agencies for between three and four years. At village level, the APP Committee will consist of a Central Committee chaired by the village headman with his two deputies as deputy chairmen. Between three and five other members will oversee the functioning of subcommittees for (i) village development, (ii) village government, (iii) village defence, (iv) finance, (v) health, and (vi) 85

education and culture. Chairmen for these sub-committees will be elected by the villagers themselves. Villagers elected to the various sub-committees will require training in the functions of their specific commitees so that they can lead and advise the community. Officials at district level will also be available to act in an advisory capacity, particularly on those subjects requiring technical expertise. Once the village committee structure has been established, the APP Centre will send out mobile teams to train villagers on Village Security Teams. The implementation of the APP Programme will be gradual. In the first year, a pilot project will be launched in two provinces of each region. Within these two provinces 20 villages will be selected from each district, of which only 15 will receive security team training on the basis of 50-100 volunteers from each village. In the programme’s second year, it is aimed to set up APP Villages in all provinces which have been declared sensitive (25 In all) — a projected total of some 4,000 villages.*

• The APP Programme was never to become the all-encompassing national programme its authors had envisaged. As a result of the political upheavals and discontinuity of administration during the three years of open parliamentary democracy between 1973 and 1976, the project got off to a slow start. It did not receive a governmental stamp of approval until January 1975 when Prime Minister Sanya Dharmasakdi finally approved it shortly before handing over power to the elected government of M.R. Kukrit Pramoj. As General Saiyud was to note subsequently: “The government had no time to implement the project and the government that followed (that of M.R. Seni Pramoj) did not give its full support.*'

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Nevertheless, despite the bureaucratic and political obstacles the APP Programme was to face, it did make a notable Impact on the. Thai countryside during its first decade of implementation. Between 1975 and 1985, a total of 6,960 villages across the country were set up along the lines of the APP Programme. During the first period of implementation between 1975-1981 a total of 3,754 villages were established in 38 ■provinces, while during the second period from 1982 to the present the programme was expanded to cover 52 of Thailand’s 73 provinces. A survey conducted in early 1985 revealed that generally the programme's greatest impact had been in the field of security with a marked reduction in crime. On the administrative side, the picture appears to be less impressive. The survey's authors noted that “there are still many APP villages which are not as progressive as they should be, the main reason being that village central committees do not quite understand how to manage their own villages." In villages where the central committees are deemed ineffective, the APP Centre is currently planning for refresher _training. In terms of social and economic work, the results of the programme were described in the survey as “reasonable", suggesting that here too progress had not measured up fully to expectations. In conclusion, the survey noted significantly that the failure to achieve the results hoped for was due, among other factors, to “the fact that the APP Programme is not fully accepted as the (all-encompassing) national project it was intended to be.” (ed.)

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General Saiyud presents scholarships during a Mitrapap school dedication.

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Chapter V “Rural Development” In this chapter the author describes early attempts to convince the Royal Thai Government that it must respond against the growing communist menace. For General Saiyud, the anti-insurgent struggle was really waged on two fronts. The first against the CPT and the latter, to convince the public that the communist threat was real in terms of Thailand’s ultimate survival.

******* 1. A speech to the Rotary Club of Bangkok, 9th May 1974. ‘Let me draw your attention to what are perhaps the two most widely cherished hopes of our citizens: that there should be no strife among the Thai people that could lead to a break-down in our fundamental loyalties to the nation, our religion and our monarchy; and that this country should never become a battleground. Yet these are- precisely the conditions that communist elements in Thailand are striving to bring about. In the furtherance of their own political ends, they bandy about such terms as “revolutionary war” and “war of national liberation.” But let us be quite clear on this: what they really mean is civil war. The communists have long since begun their armed attacks and propaganda campaign to foment such a war. Fortunately, their strategy was recognized early and CPT activities have been contained at a manageable level. Nevertheless, there are still many people who fail to 89

appreciate the seriousness of the communist threat. The only effective way to meet and overcome this threat is for all citizens, private individuals as well as government officials, to join in supporting the government's counter-insurgency programme. Support from the general public is indeed important and I am particularly glad to address as my topic today the role of the private citizen in strengthening national security. Clearly the first step in avoiding armed struggle is to promote understanding between the government and the people, in particular those living in remote villages. How can we achieve such understanding? The answer is that we must convince people that government officials come to their villages as friends not enemies, and that they come offering genuine assistance. Of course, talking of providing assistance to the rural population is easy enough. In practice, if that assistance is to be of real benefit, the matter is somewhat more complex. One problem, perhaps the most basic, is to instil in villagers a sense of confidence in government officials. Bear in mind that people in remote areas are not readily given to accepting, let alone confiding in, strangers. But once a local official can inspire confidence, once he can really communicate with people, he Is in a position to provide the assistance they need and want. This is the crucial point — knowing what the villagers themselves want. In my own experience, many well-intentioned rural aid projects have failed because they were too sophisticated and exceeded local requirements. In one very remote village, for example, the government provided a hand-operated water pump for people who for centuries had been happy enough lowering a bucket tied to a piece of rope down their well. Since the villagers saw no particular need for the pump they simply ignored it and before long it had rusted and was unusable. Valuable resources were thus wasted. In other cases, local people have actually been embarrassed by development projects because they felt these 90

projects implied their present way of life was somehow inferior. They felt change was being forced upon them. Officials, therefore, have to learn that change can only be introduced effectively in the village environment when the villagers themselves seek change. Usually they begin to want it only when they have seen it with their own eyes somewhere else first. The lesson to be learned is that if one wants to assist the common people in rural areas, one must first win their confidence. Presuming that there are no urban prejudices towards these upcountry people, there are three ways this ' can be accomplished. First, the development worker must convince the villagers that government-sponsored projects will be of direct benefit to them. Second,"he must encourage the villagers to participate in the project, perhaps by contributing labour. Third, he must impress upon the villagers that progress depends, in the final analysis, on their own determination and efforts. Government assistance can only supplement what the people are prepared to do themselves. Once people have become involved with a project with support from the government, they begin to develop self-confidence as well as confidence in the officials. But all this takes time. Sometimes government assistance may be slow in reaching some of the people. Thisis a problem that can certainly be alleviated by organizations such as Rotary.Indeed, the Rotary Club has been doing just this and-organized a trip recently to provide material support to Karen tribal people in Chiang Mai Province. Similarly, the Thai-U.S. Mitrapab Educational Foundation is arranging sky-diving exhibitions in all provinces to collect funds for school construction in remote, needy areas. The Foundation is also trying to provide scholarships for students from deprived homes. Another group of public-spirited individuals has established an Association for the Relief of Communist Victims or ARCV. This organization is drawing on cooperation from large stores and private companies to provide aid to hilltribe people in Nan and Chiang Rai who have been 91

threatened by the insurgents. In doing so, the ARCV has significantly lightened the burden shouldered by the government in those areas. Funds are being used mainly for school supplies. It is felt that education is important to develop an understanding among hilltribe youths of the government and Thai society in general. In addition, the ARCV hopes to work with the authorities to persuade hilltribe people to remain in their home villages. This is critical because tribal people who do remain in their own areas can provide a counter-force to communism. If, on the other hand, they leave and become refugees, the government is confronted with the burden of providing food and security. At present we are conducting a careful, study to determine the best means of assisting these tribal peoples. But in the final analysis, the success of any assistance that we give will depend o n the attitude of the people themselves. We believe that there are a certain number of tribesmen still loyal to the government and willing to resist the communists. If our aid to these individuals succeeds, we believe that tribes people in other areas will be willing to co-operate as well. But material assistance to the hilltribes alone is not enough. We must develop a clear understanding of the situation and ensure that it is appreciated by the country as a whole. The communists, on the other hand, will do their best to distort the picture with propaganda. They are, for example, well aware of the fact that their movement is not rooted in domestic political grievances but originated and has been orchestrated from abroad, and this represents for them a basic liability. Hence the continual emphasis in radio broadcasts and written propaganda on the theme that the CPT was organized in Thailand by Thais with no help from foreign communists. There is a concerted attempt to try and mislead people into believing the movement is composed of ordinary Thais who are resisting the government out of genuine political convictions. 92

Bearing this in mind, we must exercise care in ensuring that our counter-measures do not give the insurgents the propaganda advantage they sorely need. We must make it clear that this counter-insurgency effort is being directed and fought by Thais and not by our allies whose role must be an Indirect, supporting one. In so doing, we will be giving a clear answer to the question of whether or not Thailand can defend itself from communist insurgents without the help of our allies, particularly if the United States were to withdraw its forces from Vietnam. The message here is simple: the best countermeasures to terrorism, are those undertaken by Thais themselves, drawing on our own resources before we draw on those of others. Our foreign friends cannot help much in promoting the sort of understanding amongst the Thai people I have referred to, nor in correcting the deficiencies in our society. These are tasks we must shoulder ourselves.’

2. Part of a speech to the Bangkok Chapter of the Society for international Development, 20th January 1972. ‘It is a privilege to address so distinguished a gathering of foreign and Thai specialists on the subject of economic growth, social injustice and insurgency. At a speech I made in May last year to the Economists’ Luncheon, I mentioned that evidence gathered from the interrogation of surrendered and arrested communist terrorists indicated that economic conditions were not the main factor prompting people in remote areas to give support and co-operation to the Communist Party of Thailand. This fact in itself is not particularly surprising. One has only to go back to the writings of Mao Tse-tung to appreciate that Mao himself never saw absolute economic standards as a motivating force behind a mass movement. What he did say was that economic injustice or relative economic deprivation was a powerful propellant behind the success of his movement and the expansion of the Chinese Communist Party. Given the 93

Maoist orientation of the Thai communist movement, we can assume this perspective is one shared by the CPT. I am thus convinced that despite the prodigious sums of money being allocated for economic development, political stability is only likely to come about when people are assured that social injustices are being corrected. If following a major drive to develop an area the result is popular dissatisfaction, an increase in crime and a net drop in security, we can safely assume that it is inequity in the distribution of benefits or economic injustice that is the basic cause. From the point of view of the “target population” in the rural area, the impact was negative probably because it was not them but another group of individuals who profited from governmental largesse. The resultant dissatisfaction provides fertile ground for communist propaganda that, in turn, prompts more villagers to move into' the CPT camp. The same logic also applies to those foreign aid programmes that seek to win popular confidence in a local government. Let me stress that I am not suggesting that we do not need foreign aid — far from it. But what is critical is the manner in which local government officials manage the funds and projects for which they are responsible. If we perform competently and honestly, there is every reason to believe that the rural population appreciates the efforts the government is making to solve the problem. The point I would emphasize, however, is that while economic injustice persists, a flourishing insurgency can exist even during a period of economic growth, particularly if it is stimulated by foreign aid. All the evidence we have gleaned from our interrogation of former communists underlines the fact that most communist supporters joined the insurgency because of real or perceived social or economic injustices. In particular, the abuse of power by some government officials has been the single most important factor in alienating people and breeding recruits for communist terrorism in Thailand. Conversely, my own experience suggests that only a very

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small minority of CT supporters have any real faith in the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Those who join the communists seek a better standard of living, more money, greater educational opportunities and improved status. In the final analysis, it is these social and economic injustices that are the root causes for the continuing communist insurgency in this country.’

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General Saiyud acting as Master of Ceremonies at a Special Program for the Benefit of Hilltribes organized by the Rotary Club.

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Chapter VI “The Minority

Question”

In this chapter General Saiyud focuses on the problem of assimilating national minorities. He explains that this problem is riot a unique Thai problem but one resulting from centuries of migration which affects all Asian peninsula countries. General Saiyud describes the approach of other Asian countries to this problem and offers his recommendation on what Thailand should do. ******* 1. A speech to The National Geographic Seminar at Chiang Mai University, 23rd December 1975. ‘Here in Chiang Mai we are at the centre of a geographical formation through which one of the most fascinating movements of population in history has taken place — the continuous southward drift of peoples, of many racial and linguistic groups, out of China and the Tibetan plateau, and down through a series of upland valleys into mainland Southeast Asia. Thus was much of the Indochinese peninsula settled; and thus more than 1,000 years ago was the foundation laid for conflicts on the peninsula whose resolution still remains uncertain. The southward movement of peoples continues up to this very day for the same reasons it always has — war and demographic pressure. The phenomenon involves timeless factors of geography and ecology; more recent factors of population distribuiton and social structure; and, not least, the 97

political demands of the moment. The question of refugees and what we should do with them is one of the latter. The “Thai” whom you see in Chiang Mai often do not much resemble the “Thai” of our great Central Plains in complexion, facial features or build. Such differences are true of other regions of the kingdom, too. Thus when we speak of “Thais" we are really speaking of a great racial mix. We still do not know who the original Thai were, what they looked like or how they organized their society. This continues to be a focus of academic research and debate. What we do know, however, is that we are here today only after an odyssey stretching back thousands of miles and thousands of years, during which there has been much cultural borrowing and racial mixing. Thais first appear in the history of the peninsula in a Cham inscription about the year 1050 A.D. in what is now Central Vietnam. We next appear a century later as first among a great procession of warriors depicted in the southern gallery of Angkor Wat There we are identified as “Syam” or “Siamese” as it has been anglicized. Although our Khmer neighbours sometimes called us savages because of our strange dress, I can assure you that we were then already a highly cultivated people. Having lived in the orbit of Chinese civilization we had an advanced material culture and contacts with Indian Buddhism via routes stretching through Assam and Yunnan. Even then, we were remarkable assimilators of whatever we found of benefit in neighbouring cultures. But this is only half the story. As we moved down the river valleys under pressure from the Mongols to the north, we mixed with indigenous peoples — Burmese, Mons, Khmers and Laos. Later, war brought about even greater intermixture. As dynasties declined they would invade neighbouring territory in search of prisoners to fill the underpopulated peninsula. These people were assimilated and their descendants often shifted back as a particular dynasty declined and an ascendant enemy, in turn, invaded its territory. Later, as the peninsula turned from wars of conquest and plunder to relatively more peaceful tasks of development, 98

it became our national policy to invite large numbers of another major ethnic group, the Chinese, to leave poverty behind and link their fate with ours. Economically, this policy has certainly succeeded, even beyond the expectations of its initiators. In terms of human co-operation, 1 also believe this great voluntary migration has been a remarkable success. There have inevitably been periods of stress and isolated incidents of unpleasantness. But in general the integration of Chinese immigrants into Thai society has been more successful here than probably anywhere else where such an influx of Chinese has occurred. As a result of these interchanges, we have been enormously strengthened materially, culturally and in the determination and wisdom which we bring to the conduct of public affairs. As some scholars have argued, it has been this willingness to reach out, to share, to enter into two-way exchange with foreign peoples and cultures, which has permitted us to surmount the challenges encountered during an odyssey of a thousand years or more. For those more fragile or more rigid, who could not so reach out, the result has been catastrophe or consignment to some backwater of the Southeast Asian landmass. This openness is readily visible. Throughout our society from the lowest to the most exalted of the realm, you will find Chinese blood coursing in the veins of “Thais”. We also have ties of blood to peoples of the West. Indeed, some of our most distinguished families trace their origins from minority stock; the Goj'aseni of Mon descent and the Bunnag of Arab stock are examples. The same preparedness to reach out is apparent also in the communications we maintain with all corners of the world. It is plain in arts, culture, music, books and newspapers. If the lowest of foreign culture in the form of bars and massage parlours has found its way to Bangkok, that is the price we must pay in return for access to the better parts of this culture. 99

These points are not of merely historical interest. 1 believe that they have significance today also. In the currents of international change, we are apt to lose our perspective on the factors which have helped us to survive as long and as effectively as we have. Not least of these has been a spirit of openness, accommodation and compromise. To this perspective on Thai history we must bring a clear understanding of our present options when addressing the question of minority peoples who, for one reason or another, find themselves within our borders. -Formerly, state authority tended to decrease in effectiveness in proportion to the distance away from the rule of the capital. Some scholars have described this as the “radio station state," a reference to the ever diminishing intensity of the signal as one moves further from a transmitting station. Over the last century, however, this model has been gradually abandoned in exchange for a western bureaucratic model of nation-building, which hypothesizes an everconstant intensity of state authority as far as a line on the ground where the intensity suddenly drops to zero and another state begins. The latter model was adopted only because of the threat from the West that we faced in the middle of the last century. Assuming as it does an integrated population and a high administrative capability, it derives from an entirely different social and political context. But faced with the Western threat we adopted it defensively, as we have borrowed in the past, and it has served us passably well. Nevertheless, we should not blind ourselves to the side-effects of its central premise, which is the penetration of a highly centralized bureaucracy to the remotest reaches of the national territory. It has led to high levels of domestic tension, to political disruption and protest, to regional revolts , and ultimately, in our own time, to the weakening of the very state it was Intended to support. When applied to non-Thai areas such as those occupied by hilltribes in the North, the policy has triggered a disastrous tribal revolt. In the past when upland communications were 100

quarters. Most notably, there have been proposals for a decentralization of decision-making authority to locally elected bodies. These ideas are commendable as far as they go. But what 1 wish to emphasize here is that we need to be very clear about the need for serious domestic restructuring, and to carry this beyond ethnic Thai to the minority groups who share our national territory. I am talking of a new period of domestic reform and reorganization to meet the challenges of a new period In our history. The Indochinese peninsula is undergoing a major shift in the character of its international relations and in the kind of problems it faces.- We Thai of this generation must have the vision and courage that our forebears had almost a century ago to institute changes as sweeping as those they made. The stakes are high and the price of failing to rise to the challenge could be the loss of the independence we have managed to maintain to date. I am confident that we have that vision and courage. But I am also aware that the path of reform is a difficult one, obstructed by those who prefer comfortable routine and are prepared to acquiesce before vested interests. Certainly, reform was not easy even for King Chulalongkorn; and he was an absolute monarch. How much more difficult it will be for us, who must consult and accommodate on a far broader scale, than was ever necessary for King Chulalongkorn. While ethnic Thai in many rural areas have been at a disadvantage under the bureaucratic, centralized model of development, others have been struck harder. First, there are those who are refugees from war and population pressure to the North, and second our Muslim compatriots in the South who, through the vagaries of international politics, find themselves irrevocably in a Thai state. In both cases the result has been interminable revolt for which there appears to be little chance of a solution. As humane people we have no wish to see these revolts continue. And as responsible observers of politics, we realize that in today's climate we cannot afford to let them continue. The inescapable conclu101

sion is that the Thai state must change its approach to minorities. The history of this region suggests that there is only one successful way to bring national unity out of ethnic heterogeneity. The way is not forced assimilation, which only increases tensions. Nor is it isolation and exclusion from the body politic, which thus far has been our attitude towards the peoples on the periphery of our nation. The only method which has worked is a genuine sharing of power and responsibility. If the majority and minorities intermingle everywhere, as in Malaysia, then that sharing may take place in a political party structure. If, on the other hand, they are territorially separated, some form of autonomy may be necessary. In both cases, there are sufficient economic and political incentives for minority leaders not to be attracted by troublemaking outsiders offering a “better deal” and undermining national unity as has already occurred in Thailand. A close look at the recent history of the region reveals some important lessons about how to achieve smooth and mutually rewarding majority-minority relations. Broadly, upland minorities have experienced three kinds of situation in their relations with dominant lowland cultures. In one case, exemplified by the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, they have-been welcomed — admittedly for expedient reasons — with open arms by those dominating the lowland political system. In both these countries the minorities enjoy legal rights, are represented in the highest councils of government and have autonomous or semi-autonomous regions. Political integration has proved highly successful and development programmes have proceeded fairly well. A second kind of situation has occurred in those countries that were colonized. The colonialists, French or British, generally protected the upland peoples against the inroads of the majority lowland culture. They invariably provided higher education to the tribal peoples and often

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poor and our attention was focused principally on the threat from Europe, we could afford to ignore this problem. Now, with the withdrawal of the Western powers from the region and the swing back to essentially regional power struggles, our focus must shift. In this new environment we can no longer afford to ignore discontent among minority groups on our periphery who share kinship ties across the border and whose discontent can be exploited to our disadvantage. Given today’s emerging pressures for democratization and our own highest ideals, what we have to do is clear. It consists, simply, in recognizing the rights and prerogatives of local people and local communities, giving them sufficient autonomy within their own spheres of competence and sufficient recognition to their own leaders. In so doing we can assure their adherence to and contentment within the larger national community. This may be unpalatable to many in the government whose whole consciousness is shaped by the bureaucratic, centralist, "internal colonialist” model. But the “internal colonialist” method of rule from Bangkok is now becoming a liability; henceforth it can only be maintained at higher and higher levels of political stress and ultimately by violence. As events over the last two decades on the Indochinese peninsula have sadly shown, internal disunity is an attractive nuisance that almost inevitably leads to international conflict. The lesson is clear and the only alternative is a serious rethinking of our internal policy towards the rural areas — the sooner the better. Since the events of October 1973,* in our country, ideas along these lines have been tentatively suggested from many

* In October 1973, the arrest of activists agitating for a new constitution sparked student riots and clashes with security forces that eventually toppled the military government of the day and led to the temporary exile of Prime Minister TTianom Kittikachorn. The October 1973 "revolution” marked the beginning of three years of civilian rule terminated by the military coup of October 1976. (ed.)

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recognized local leaders, their legal systems, and offered a degree of autonomy. Such countries, notably Burma, Laos and South Vietnam, have sometimes had difficulties in the post-colonial period, as the colonialists produced highly educated tribal leaders whose claims on behalf of their own peoples were not accepted by the lowlanders. The result has often been revolt. In Burma this began virtually as soon as the country gained independence in 1948. In South Vietnam uprisings took place in the late 1950s and again in 1964. Thailand falls into a third category, arguably worse in many ways for the hilltribes. The Thais have never had an open-arms policy towards the upland peoples. Neither was Thailand colonized. So the tribes have had no powerful foreign protectors. As a result, they enjoyed none of the legal rights and privileges of their counterparts in British-ruled Burma or French-ruled Vietnam, the rescinding of which by independent governments led to revolts. But this has hardly eliminated the so-called “hilltribe problem” in Thailand. It has simply postponed it and meant that it now appears in a somewhat different form. It has made the solution more difficult too, for we have no precedent of legal rights and privileges to which to revert. While the Saigon government was unwilling to restore most of their preindependence rights to South Vietnam’s highland peoples, it at least knew that this was what needed to be done to end the 1964 revolt. Our government, however, is pursuing the phantom of a “technical solution” to the problems of the North in the belief that some yet-to-be-discovered agricultural innovation will end both the opium culture and the revolt in the hills. Thai officials are mostly oblivious to both the political questions involved and to the alternatives. The answer does not involve merely citizenship with a few tribal votes sprinkled in among an enormous number of lowlanders. What is crucial is participation in the bureaucracy and real power to act as a coherent group in politics. Our failure thus far to recognize these dimensions of the problem is leading ineluctably to a crisis in the hills. 104

Compounding the complexity of the problem is the lack of education among the hilltribes. This condemns them to economic backwardness and to a Jack of leaders who might represent their interests in the councils of government. Regrettably — and the fault is unquestionably ours — there are practically no people of tribal origin in Thailand with higher education. There are some 20-30 graduates of teacher training institutes and a grand total of one college graduate. Recently, there has been some broadening of opportunity for tribal education under official auspices, but we are moving too slowly in this respect. It is, of all places, Laos which provides the most impressive example of what can and must be done, it was no accident that so many tribesmen in Laos were willing to fight against the communists — a willingness notably absent in Thailand. The reason is clear: Lao recognition of minority legal, political and customary rights. A single example is indicative. .While in Thailand it would be highly unusual for a tribesman to b e even a private in the military, in Laos there was a Meo three-star general, Vang Pao. Other citizens of minority origin held similarly high positions in the civilian administration and the political system. From an educational standpoint, there may be 50 or more college graduates among the tribal peoples in Laos compared to our one, while far larger numbers have lesser certificates of higher education. In short, there is a startling difference in the degree of legal, administrative and political opportunity for hilltribe minorities in Laos and Thailand. It showed in the extent to which the hill people fought to protect the Kingdom of Laos. The implication for us requires no elaboration. Because we Thai avoided colonization, we escaped some harsh but salutary lessons about how to deal with minorities. We can no longer afford to overlook these, however, and the time has come for a change in government policy. The racial minorities and refugees living in Thailand can be divided broadly into two groups, old and new. This 105

includes only the rural population. Minorities such as the Chinese, Muslims and Indians living in .Bangkok are well assimilated, are mostly Thai citizens, and do not constitute a problem for the government. Of the old group who are now really minorities, there are three sub-groupings distinct ethnically and geographically: (i) 300,000 - 500,000 hilltribe people in the North; (ii) 800,000 — one million Thai Muslims of ethnic Malay stocks; (iii) 50,000 - 60,000 North Vietnamese, living mainly in the Northeast. The new groups are refugees composed entirely of those who have fled from their' homes in various parts of Indochina as a result of communist successes. Estimates of their numbers vary between 60,000 and 70,000 and their breakdown is roughly as follows: (i) Laos (mainly Meo) — 52,000 located in Nan, Chiang Rai, Nong Khai and Khon Kaen; (ii) Cambodian — 10,000 located in Prachin Buri, Trat, Surin, Buriram and Si S a Ket. Most are in government-controlled refugee camps and the remainder are scattered around in smaller groups. All told, there are up to one and a half million refugees and stateless people of various racial minorities in the kingdom and a specific government policy to deal with them is long overdue. Many, particularly the Vietnamese in the Northeast, might well like to return to their homelands now that there is peace, and they should be allowed to go. This applies equally to many of those who fled in terror from Laos, should they wish to return. In fact for anyone who is not threatened with political persecution, there should b e a government policy to send them home. But we must also remember that the Thais are a tolerant people and those who are absolutely unwilling to return should be permitted to stay. If we are just and fair to them, the kingdom will benefit in the long run from their presence, just as it has in the past from the presence of other foreign influences. 106

But — and this is the crux of the matter — the people who remain must b e treated with responsibility, and not isolated or harassed by Thai officialdom. They should be allowed to live together, as they wish, have their own leaders and follow their own religious observances and customs. Above all, they must be given a chance to identify with Thailand and offered a stake in the nation’s political and economic future. If we can enunciate and pursue such a policy, we will have gone a long way to winning the loyalties of these displaced persons. We should also recognize that the time has come for a coordinated government approach to the problems of minorities and refugees. The tendency in the past has been for various departments and agencies to squabble among themselves over their prerogatives and areas of responsibility. Indeed, the problems of the northern hilltribes have continually been beset by a lack of agreement between the eleven or so agencies and national committees Involved in tribal administration. Perhaps the best answer would be the establishment of a new Bureau of Minorities with overall responsibility for all aspects of minority and refugee affairs. This has proved effective in other countries with similar problems and would serve to dispel the confusion and neglect that have often marred attempts to deal with these problems in the past. More specifically, I would suggest the following proposals which go some way towards a realistic response to the new situation we face: 1. A special study group should b e appointed as soon as possible. It should be headed by a respected figure, preferably a scholar with training in such fields as government, anthropology or economics, rather than a government official. The group should have a capable staff of its own and funds to hire expert consultants. Its task will be to study the majority-minority relations of other countries in the region in the light of Thailand’s own special circumstances. It should then make recommendations to the government on viable 107

policies pertaining to our hilltribe and minority affairs, preferably within a reasonably short period of, say, three to six months. 2. In dealing with the problem of refugees, particularly those who have recently arrived from Indochina, it is necessary to separate those who would like to return to their countries of origin from those who wish to stay in Thailand. In regard to the first category, detailed negotiations will have to be held with the countries of origin and joint repatriation plans prepared. 3. For nomadic minorities, the modalities for -a definitive determination of citizenship must be decided immediately. This matter has been in limbo for decades and needs to be resolved promptly. We can hardly ask the nomadic minorities to b e loyal to Thailand if we ourselves are unable to make up our own minds whether they are citizens or not. In practice, present procedures are fraught with bureaucratic red tape calculated to alienate precisely those people we are trying to win over. Whatever procedure is adopted must be simple, free and capable of rapid implementation. 4. A concerted programme of education must be undertaken for the hilltribe minorities. For any of the other measures proposed to succeed, the hilltribes must be brought nearer the educational standards of the rest of the kingdom. The distinguished efforts of the Royal Family and the Border Patrol Police have demonstrated clearly that there is both a need and a desire for education. The problem has been only our unwillingness to supply it. For that negligence, we are now paying, as aspiring tribal leaders are going enthusiastically to Laos, Vietnam and China to take advantage of opportunities offered there. 5. A Bureau of Minority Affairs must be established. Such a measure has proved valuable in other countries with similar problems and its adoption is long overdue here. As far as possible, a bureau of this type should assume the functions of other administrative units dealing with minority administration and should be staffed by members of the 108

minorities themselves. Ideally, as educational levels among minority communities rise, staffing would increasingly be drawn from minority ranks. The exact specific responsibilities and functions of this organization should be major topics for the special study group to examine. 6. There is a need for a basic restructuring of the government’s approach in areas overwhelmingly populated by minorities, i.e. the tribal North and the Muslim South. Details of what is possible or desirable in specific areas should be scrutinized by the special study group. But there are two essential points that require emphasis. First, insofar as educational levels permit, minorities themselves should gradually come to staff the administration in their own areas. In other words, at district and provincial level, officials in Muslim areas should be Muslims, and in hilltribe areas, tribal people. Sending Thai officials with little grasp of local language or culture to administer these areas is a form of internal colonialism we should be trying to avoid. Second, within well-defined limits, these areas should be permitted to operate under their own laws and regulations. Education, for example, is a contentious issue in the South, as is land use in the North. The excessive regulation of the details of rural life from Bangkok only serves to exacerbate tensions and create opportunities for local graft and corruption. If adopted, such measures would amount to semiautonomy for certain regions. There are those hesitant to go this far. But the choice is not between semi-autonomy and a peaceful, contented kingdom; it is between a judicious and mutually agreed form of semi-autonomy and endless revolt that ultimately threatens the whole body politic. The situation is clear: if we do not grant what is only reasonable and just, it will be taken by force of arms. 7. We must establish organizations that will permit minorities, in particular upland tribal people, to become responsible members of the military and police and be absorped into local security forces. It remains absurd to apply 109

formalistic bureaucratic criteria involving certificates, degrees and educational attainments in situations where they have no meaning. If our present organizations will not permit these people to participate in the security forces, we must create new organizations. The best argument for this approach is the success these people have achieved in military operations against our existing military and police forces. 8. The civil revolt of October 1 973 demonstrated clearly that the Thai people had decided that "administration” was not enough. Administration without accountability to freely elected representative bodies leads to despotism. If we believe that this is true for ourselves, then consistency demands we apply the same criteria to other major groups sharing our territory. The details of greater legislative representation is an appropriate subject for a special study group. In some countries simple per capita representation is the favoured method; in others, a fixed number of seats is set aside for minority groups to fill through separate elections. In closing, I would emphasize that the hour is already late. If we begin measures such as these tomorrow, it will not be a moment too soon. The results of past neglect of these problems are already evident: in the North, a still expanding rebel movement among the hilltribes; in the South, generations of ill-feeling culminating in such lamentable incidents as that which occurred recently in Pattani.* In past centuries we have surmounted great difficulties by virtue of a willingness to learn from others and adopt new ideas. There are those who argue that success has spoiled us, that our remarkable skills of the past have now atrophied

* In December 1975 mass demonstrations took place in the town of Pattani. The week-long protests which brought together Muslims from across the majority- Muslim southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun, were triggered by the murder of some Muslims and by a grenade throwing incident at an early protest demonstration. Narathiwat-based Marines were implicated in both incidents.

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and that we will prove unequal to the current challenge. I do not believe that this is so. But we will know soon enough, for the test is a simple one. Will we as a people and government adopt concrete reforms — as far-reaching as those of King Chulalongkorn in the last century? We must if we are to offer necessary educational, administrative and political opportunities to members of our minority and refugee groups.’

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J Village leaders in Southern Thailand visit Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol at Communist Suppression Operation Command (CSOC)

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Chapter VII “Reappraisal” In this chapter developed from an address given by the author in 1977, General Saiyud looks back over twelve years (1 965-77) of the government’s efforts against the Communist Party of Thailand. By region, the author gives a chronological assessment of the successes and failures of the government’s efforts, together with an update of the CPT’s personnel strengths. The chapter includes a frank appraisal of the performances of key army regional commanders engaged in the anti-insurgent effort. He concludes with a note of. cautious optimism concerning the government's chances for ultimate success against the Communist Party of Thailand. *******

1. Counter-Insurgency: Grounds for Cautious Optimism — a speech to the Ninth Special Forces Seminar, Bangkok, 26th February 1977. ‘ Since 1965 Thailand has been the most recent target of communist aggression in Southeast Asia. But the decision to launch an armed struggle was reached by the Communist Party of Thailand some years before, in 1961, and I believe this generated considerable friction within the party between 'hard-line and moderate factions. The basic -reason for these differences was that the moderates saw in Thailand a completely different situation from that found in the former colonies of Southeast Asia. There, communist exploitation and manipulation of nationalism was relatively easy, and 113

although they did not immediately achieve their aims, we must admit that communist victories in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were impressive. They have, in fact, fundamentally changed the security situation in this~region. By contrast, in Thailand, with its long history of independence and strong institutions, it has been difficult for the communists to find a plausible, compelling cause. They have, however, managed to build a well-knit, durable organization. It, therefore, follows that a counter-insurgency campaign must concentrate both on weakening the enemy’s organization and upon ensuring that there is no legitimate, popular cause for the communists to exploit. It remains axiomatic that in this kind of warfare we must concentrate on the people as the crucial element. However, we cannot win over the people and prevent them from joining the communists unless we can significantly improve the government’s currently uncoordinated efforts and also reduce corruption in government agencies. These two problems must be recognized and no efforts spared to correct them if we are to reduce, let alone eliminate, the existing insurgency. In Thailand our strategy has been based upon the CPM concept, which emphasizes the importance of civil, police and military co-operation. In the context of this strategy, laid down in 1966, we have established three broad objectives: 1. To stimulate popular understanding of the government by pursuing sound and honest policies and programmes; 2. To stimulate popular willingness to counter communist activities and promote national unity. 3. To suppress firmly all communist terrorist forces. Our fortunes with this strategy have fluctuated considerably over the past eleven years. This has been due to internal friction and pressures. For the sake of clarity, let m e divide these eleven years into the following five periods 1965-1967; 1968-1970; 1970-October 1973; October 1973 to the military coup of October 1976; and finally, from October 1976 to the present day. 114

The first period, from mid-1965 to the end of 1967, was in many ways the most significant period of the counterinsurgency campaign in Thailand. There were many lessons to be learned, lessons which, in many cases, were ignored. But on the positive side, the insurgency was immediately recognized as the nation’s most serious single problem. As a manifestation of top-level concern, the then all-powerful deputy prime minister, General Prapass Charusathiara, personally assumed responsibility for the problem. A combined GPM headquarters was established under his control to implement a single strategy for counter-insurgency. First called the Communist Suppression Operations Command (and subsequently, the Internal Security Operations Command), this headquarters was authorized to direct and coordinate the activities of all civil and military organizations concerned. Clear objectives were formulated from the outset and the CPM concept was firmly established. A number of specific plans to provide security and development tor remote villages threatened by insurgents were also drawn up and implemented. These programmes varied according to the different types of population target areas. Meanwhile, on the basis of a comprehensive village security programme, the armed forces rendered military assistance in the villages and also struck hard at communist jungle bases. As a result, in the Northeast (which was then the sole area of insurgency) the number of insurgents was reduced from 2,000 to 1 ,000. In addition, a number of key CPT officials were either killed, arrested or forced to surrender, while in Bangkok and provincial capitals, over 100 cadremen, including some Central Committee members, were rounded up. Had this kind of effort been sustained, I feel sure we could have won an early victory. But things turned out differently, and this brings me to the next period of the campaign. The second period lasted from 1968 to 1970. After the government’s successes in the Northeast in 1967, the Communist Party of Thailand had no choice but to unleash its 115

small reserves on a terrorist campaign in other areas, in an effort to divert government attention. The communists also appear to have hoped that the government would switch from its successful village security and development programmes to aggressive sweep operations. Such sweeps, as they knew, would have a negative impact on the population. It turned out that their hopes were well founded. At the end of 1967, the Royal Thai Army was suddenly and unexpectedly ordered to take over operational responsibility for counter-insurgency from CSOC. Since then, CSOC has become ah administrative and planning agency with very limited influence on operations. At the same time, the Second Army (in the Northeast) was ordered to take over CSOC's CPM Advanced Headquarters for the Northeast at Sakon Nakhon. From that moment, the emphasis shifted towards military operations of the Vietnam type. As a result, the whole village security programme in eleven target areas in seven provinces, covering about 200 villages, was neglected. The opportunity was also given to the communists to evade the military sweeps in the jungle and take refuge in the villages. Here, they found not only safety but the opportunity to neutralize CSOC's successes of the two previous years. This blunder was finally recognized by the army three years later in 1971 , when the number of communists in the Northeast had increased to over 2,000. In the North, meanwhile, the Third Army was ordered to launch military suppression operations, which included indiscriminate use of bombs and napalm, against a group of some 300 hilltribesmen, mainly Meos, led by lowland Thais. This action was pursued in disregard of CSOC’s advice spelt out in a booklet entitled “A Solution for the North” (see chapter 3), which was based on lessons learned in the Northeast. As a result, a few hilltribe insurgents were killed but the operations produced a large number of tribal refugees as well as a high casualty toll of innocent tribal people in areas of Nan, Chiang Rai, the Phetchabun-Loei-Phitsanuiok tri-province border region and Tak. The tribal refugees produced by these

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operations remain a most serious problem, with the situation further complicated by the influx of refugees fleeing the war in Laos. The net result was that the number of communist terrorists in the North grew from some 300 in 1967 to nearly 2,000 by the end of the second period in 1970. In the central southern provinces of Surat Thani, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Trang, Phattalung, Songkhla and Satun there were some 400 communists in 1968. The insurgents in this region commenced operations some time after their comrades in the Northeast. But due to the inability of the Southern Region Army commander* to understand the nature of the problem, very little effort was made to deal with local communist activities, and by the end of 1 970 the number of terrorists had risen to some 1,100. This alarming increase in insurgent numbers permitted CSOC to get into the picture by volunteering a general** from a less significant post in Bangkok to replace the Southern Region commander. This general, who agreed with CSOC’s CPM concept, introduced a village security programme of the 09/10 Plan type for communist-infested areas. Later he succeeded in convincing villagers to form volunteer anti-communist groups within their own communities as a popular base for the government. These were supported by Village Security Teams and army strike forces. Fortunately, in the third period, from 1971 to the uprising of 14th October 1973, the army finally learned, after three years’ experience, the negative lessons of a purely military approach to the problem. Throughout the second period, military sweep operations contributed only to the statistics of clashes, killed and wounded. After this, the army had little choice but to fall back on CSOC’s CPM approach. This enabled CSOC to introduce, albeit belatedly, the CPM 14/15

• This was Maj-Gen Cherm Preutsayachiwa (ed.) •* Maj-Gen San Chitpatima, who was subsequently to become the figurehead leader of the abortive “April Fool's Day" coup of 1981 (ed.)

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(1971-1972) Plan for the communist area in Na Kae District, Nakhon Phanom. This programme was followed up by the 16/17 Plan for the communist stronghold in the tri-province zone of Phetchabun, Loei and Phitsanulok, and the 17/18 Plan for the terrorist base in the mountainous area between Udon Thani and Loei Provinces. The long-range programme of producing the combined Rural Security Manual was also completed to give birth in turn to the Aw Paw Paw (Volunteer Development and Selfdefence) Programme. The APP Programme was designed as a response to intelligence estimates that the Thai insurgency would reach a critical stage in 1977 or 1978. That is why the programme was planned on a five-year basis to win over communist-influenced villages — of which there were altogether 4,000-5,000 — beginning in 1 974 at a rate of about 1 ,000 villages per year. But the unexpected events of October 1973 delayed the whole programme. Statistics indicate, however, that by comparison with the second period, the insurgency during the third period was under far better control. By the end of this period, there were some 6,500 communists operating — 2,400 in the Northeast, 2,100 in the North, 400 in the Central Region, and 1 ,600 in the mid-South. The fourth period of the campaign lasted from October 1973 to October 1976. After the student rising of October 1 973 succeeded in bringing down the government of the day, five governments came and went over the next three years, two appointed and three elected administrations. But without stable government counter-insurgency programmes „could not be effectively implemented. That said, it is worth adding that, in the long term at least, a democratically elected government stands a far better chance in the political struggle with communist insurgents than any other type of regime. For its part, CSOC had to endure strong and continued attacks from the student and labour Left, the Communist Party of Thailand and its front organizations, and some misled Rightists, including members of Parliament and some cabinet

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ministers. In order to adapt to the prevailing mood, the name CSOC was changed to ISOC, the Internal Security Operations Command, in June 1974. It is my own belief that communist strategy at this time was concentrated on eliminating ISOC at all costs. The hope was that, with ISOC removed, the government’s counterinsurgency campaign would founder. Indeed, I consider the survival of ISOC over this period to have been critical and would refer you to a newspaper article which appeared in the Bangkok Post in October 1976 entitled “Who Has Failed — ISOC or the Reds?” (see appendix). Even without ISOC’s demise, the situation in the capital and other urban areas did offer an excellent opportunity for the Communist Party of Thailand to expand its underground political activities with very little disruption from the government. By the end of the fourth period, communist infrastructure and front activities had grown enormously in all urban areas. This reached such a critical level that the Right was prompted to react violently, leading to the collapse of the elected government and the take-over by the Military Reform Council on 6th October 1976. As for the armed insurgents in rural areas, their fortunes depended largely on the quality of leadership in the various army regions. While the First (Central Region), Second (Northeastern Region), and Third (Northern Region) Armies pursued their programmes largely successfully, the Fourth Army (Southern Region) withdrew from the field for no good reason* and permitted the communists to rebuild their

* The reason appears to have been primarily the result of friction between the Third Army commander, Maj-Gen San Chitpatima and the elected government of the day in Bangkok. As a result of alleged military abuses, Maj-Gen San was also requested by the then governor of Phattalung Province, Chamlong Pholdet, to withdraw all army units from the province. Chamlong evidently hoped that the insurgency in the area — along with Surat Than!, a hotbed of CPT activity — could be contained by local Volunteer Defence Corps and police units alone. In this he was clearly mistaken, (ed.)

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organization and strength. As a consequence, today poses the most active and formidable problem we face.

the South insurgency

Statistics reveal that at the end of the fourth period, overall communist strength had risen to around 9,000 from a total of some 6,500 in 1973. Of these, 4,000 were estimated to be in the Northeast, 2,800 in the North, 1,800 in the Mid-South and some 400 in the Central Region. We come finally to the fifth period from October 1976 to the present day. After the military take-over following the bloody events at Thammasat University, we have seen a strongly anti-communist and relatively stable government running the country. In counter-insurgency, there has been a firm policy of continued military operations, particularly in the South, where "search and destroy” has been the order of the day. Although such operations are undeniably necessary from time to time to facilitate and complement "soft” measures of village security and development, we all know they are only part of the answer. Our target must always be the insurgents’ mass support base in the villages, without which both the communists’ political organization and guerrilla units would wither and die. So when I see operation orders specifying “kill communists” as the only objective, I feel sad that some of our field commanders still have so much to learn. Against this, however, we do have commanders — particularly the present Second Army Region commander* — who with his competent and able staff fully understands the social, economic and political dynamics of insurgency. Such commanders are achieving real success by involving villagers in their own security and development, using military forces in close support only when needed.

* Gen Pram Tinsulanonda, later to become Army Commander-in-Chief and Prime Minister of Thailand, (ed.)

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In addition, the Ministry of the Interior is at last moving rapidly ahead with the Aw Paw Paw Programme. This programme was produced over three years ago in CSOC, but got off to a bad start. This was not just because of political upheaval, but because of a lack of top-level political support and encouragement. Various government agencies also refused to become seriously involved. Given the present mood of the rural population, shuddering at the brutalities and privations of Cambodia and Laos, the Aw Paw Paw Programme now has every chance of success. It will, however, still need support from the top and I trust that the government will appreciate the limitations of using force alone. Indeed, it is already becoming clear that various groups both inside and outside the government are beginning to realize the need to arm villagers who have shown they are prepared to defend themselves against the communists. If only those now in authority could be convinced of an even greater need — to rationalize and integrate the many different and sometimes conflicting rural security programmes into one system under one management — then we would have gone a long way towards a final victory. In sum, there are now good grounds for cautious optimism in our counter-insurgency campaign. This would be very much more the case if only we could get everyone thinking in terms of a common approach. Let us hope this will prove to b e the case.’

2. Thailand: The Challenge Ahead. — a speech to the Inter-American Defence College, Washington D.C., December 1978. ‘ Thailand is a land of some 45 million people* mostly of the Buddhist religion. It covers an area about the size of

* By July 1986, Thailand’s

population

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had risen to 51.7 million (ed.)

France and lies entirely within the northern tropical zone in the centre of the Southeast Asian peninsula. With a basically agricultural economy, and one of the few consistent foodexporting nations in the world, its major land-mass is surrounded by mountain chains that protect the country from the savage, typhoons that occasionally cause havoc in other parts of the region. The fertility of the country’s soil means a capability to support a large population at a standard of living well above that of other countries in the region. Historically, the Thais can trace their lineage back over some 13 centuries and are very aware of their long history as an independent people. Indeed, the word "Thai”, itself, means “free”, and our people are intensejy proud of having maintained their independence through an era dominated by competing colonial powers. Under a much revered constitutional monarch, and, at present, ruled by an interim government which is preparing for a return to parliamentary democracy over the next five months, the Thais have also prided themselves on their three traditional "pillars” — the King, the Nation and Religion (Buddhism). It is to these pillars that they invariably revert when their easy-going ways are threatened by alien and hostile influences, as has been the case over the past dozen or so years. Its strategic geographical location has given Thailand its current important position in international politics. Not only is the country a focal point in regional communications, but Thailand also constitutes the front-line of the Association of South-East Asian Nations* against the encroaching communist tide in the region. As a result, we are subject to a variety of external and internal pressures, and even our internal problems have tended to stem largely from

* In 1978 ASEAN grouped Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. Brunei joined the association in 1984.

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external causes. I would, therefore, like to look at the external picture first. Following the take-over of Laos by the Pathet Lao in December 1975, shortly after the North Vietnamese triumph in South Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge victory in Cambodia, we were subjected to a most searching inquiry — externally and domestically — as to whether Thailand was to become another domino in a relentless communist drive down through the Thai-Malay peninsula. With Ho Chi Minh’s dream of a fully communist Indochina realized, the initial threat was from North Vietnam. Having just won perhaps the greatest military victory of communist revolutionary warfare (in which they had bested a super-power and forced it to abandon a longstanding policy of containment) the North Vietnamese were supremely confident and aggressive. They alsd had a huge and experienced army, part of which was in Laos, bounteously equipped with war booty and quite capable of an offensive campaign against their historic Thai enemy. Indeed, it was Thailand, which had not only supplied its troops to fight in South Vietnam, but had also provided air bases from which the majority of American air strikes against North Vietnam were carried out It transpired subsequently that the Vietnamese were really in no position for such a campaign, even had that been their intention, because their own domestic situation proved far more chaotic than earlier supposed. They were — and still are — in need of urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction — requiring massive financial and technological assistance from Japan and the West. Had Vietnam embarked on fresh foreign adventures, such assistance would clearly not have been forthcoming.*

* Vietnam’s first real "foreign adventure" came within days of the delivery of this speech, when, on 24th December 1 978, Vietnamese forces rolled into Cambodia to oust the Khmer Rouge regime from Phnom Penh and install their own supporters, (ed.)

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South Vietnam, too, was proving a hard nut to crack in the enforcement of large-scale re-education and resettlement programmes. At the same time, there were signs of impending problems with China and the new Republic of Democratic Kampuchea. The Chinese were making it very plain to Hanoi’s ambitious Lao Dong Party that it should be satisfied with the considerable gains already achieved in the Vietnam War. For the time being, the Vietnamese settled down to other priorities. But they continued their support of the communist insurgency in Thailand through provision of supplies and training courses. These courses had begun in the early 1960s with the establishment of a combined North Vietnamese Army/Pathet Lao command operating along the borders of northern and northeastern Thailand. With some 40,000 or more of their troops in Laos, the Vietnamese were in a position to render much more positive support to the Communist Party of Thailand than in the past. And in Laos, incidents immediately began along the Mekong River. But since the great majority of external supplies reaching land-locked Laos still have to pass through Thailand, it took only a few salutary border closures by the Thais to pursuade Vientiane to alter its tactics. With a population of only around 3 million, Laos is hardly a military threat to Thailand. Faced with massive economic and communications problems, as well as a need to pacify hostile hilltribes, the country presents a problem only as a conduit through which elements hostile to Thailand can pass. More recently, the Vietnamese Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, publicly announced that Hanoi would henceforth cease its support, direct or indirect, to the Thai insurgents. We are now watching closely to see if this promise is, in fact, being kept. We are well aware that instead of the direct logistics and training support of the past, the Vietnamese can rely on their friends in Laos to assume responsibility for assistance to Thai communists. Nevertheless, we will of course be delighted if Mr Pham Van Dong keeps to his word, 124

as our intention is to establish and maintain an open and sincere relationship with all countries, irrespective of their political systems and ideological beliefs. Nowhere is this more important than in our relations with our immediate neighbours. Cambodia is another of these neighbours and with a population of 7 million or less is, like Laos, no real military threat. It is also more than pre-occupied with the domestic problems brought about by war and the subsequent brutal de-urbanization and communization of the country. The assumption of power by the Khmer Rouge led quickly to the revival of long-term Cambodian grievances over border demarcations with both Vietnam and Thailand. From early 1977 onwards this developed into a series of bloody incursions across the Thai border in which several hundred Thai villagers were killed and wounded, often in the most bestial manner. In addition, the Phnom Penh regime was not slow to begin cross-border support for Thai communist guerrillas, notably in the southern border provinces of the Northeast Region. Despite quite severe dissension at home, the Thai government saw fit not to retaliate militarily, persisting instead with diplomatic approaches. These have apparently paid off over the past several months during which no aggressive Khmer Rouge incursions have been recorded. It remains unclear, however, to what extent this has been the result of a new spirit of accommodation in Phnom Penh and to what extent it reflects a Cambodian need to concentrate on the eastern border with Vietnam, where a protracted and bitter border conflict has been taking place for the past 18 months. Compounding these schisms within Asian communism are the escalating hostilities between Peking and Hanoi on their mutual border. Ostensibly this has stemmed from the persecution of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. But underlying everything is clearly the pervasive Sino-Soviet conflict that sees the Russians siding with the Vietnamese and the 125

Chinese actively supporting the Cambodians. Neither side has so far seen fit to make any accommodation with the other and quite intense diplomatic rivalry is now developing between them for technology and foreign investment from the West. The corollary of this for Thailand is that we now have the irony of the much vilified Bangkok of a year ago transformed into the much-wooed political maiden of today, as delegations from Peking, Hanoi and Phnom Penh regularly visit our capital. The past year has also seen a surprising series of policy reversals towards ASEAN, with all communist countries in the region now professing warm regard for a formerly much abused organization. In the midst of all this change and confusion, the present Thai government is quietly developing an independent foreign policy. As a relatively small and weak nation, Thailand has traditionally sought the umbrella of a major power In her foreign relations. Originally, it was to China that Thailand looked when in need of succour, paying tribute to Peking for many years up to 1840. But the outcome of the Opium War convinced King Mongkut that Great Britain was henceforth to be the major power in the region, and this policy was actively pursued by his son, King Chulalongkorn. Apart from Britain, France was also bent on imperialist expansion during this period, and it was only by the most dexterous of policies, including enlisting moral support from the Russians, that the Thai kings were able to prevent the colonization of the kingdom. In the process, Thailand had to cede large tracts of outlying territories, including Sayabouri, Champasak and Sithandone in today's Laos, Siem Reap in Cambodia, and the four southern states of Kedah, Perlis, Trengganu and Kelantan to the British in Malaya. After the First World War, Thailand began to further develop its already friendly relations with the United States, which was then emerging as a future world power. This process was arrested during World War II, when Japanese power was paramount in the region. But after the war, Thailand resumed its close relations with the U.S., which not 126

only protected Thailand from British demands for reparations and sponsored Thailand’s admission to the United Nations, but also provided large-scale and long-term investment and development programmes. The hand writing on the wall for Thailand came in 1961 with the Geneva Conference on Laos, where, for the first time, American determination to defend Thailand and other parts of Southeast Asia was called into serious question. Subsequently, Thailand grudgingly accepted a neutralist regime in Laos, although this was clearly recognized as the thin end of a communist wedge. Despite the U.S.’s massive intervention in South Vietnam, certain military and diplomatic thinkers in Bangkok thought that Thailand, too, might one day be in the same position as abandoned Laos. And so it has proved. After the collapse in Indochina, the American exit from Thailand became a clear political necessity, although one might have wished that Thailand had not made it quite so easy by inviting U.S. forces to leave. Bangkok might, for instance, have sought a specific treaty of American assistance against aggression as a condition for U.S. withdrawal, rather than rely on the very loose Manila Pact of 1954 and the Thanat-Rusk Agreement of 1962. Other countries in the region have such foreign assistance pacts, notably Malaysia and Singapore. Even the Vietnamese now have a protective treaty with the Soviet Union. All Thailand can hope for in a crisis is that the American Congress will prove compassionate. That is not at all satisfactory. Since 1 975, successive Thai governments have moved into a closer relationship with ASEAN, which has now become Thailand’s foremost foreign policy priority. The government’s attitude toward our communist neighbours was not, in fact, resolved until the present government came into power in late 1977. Since then, a. positive, clear-cut policy of friendly and correct relations with all countries, irrespective of ideology, was formulated. Ties with western countries have, 127

perhaps, been somewhat loosened in pursuance of this broader foreign policy, but not at the price of sacrificing friendships or forgoing mutually beneficial trade and development programmes. Overall then, at the end of 1978, Thailand’s relationship with its neighbours and former allies has changed greatly. Increasing emphasis on self-reliance has led to major investment in the modernization of the armed forces and the forging of an effective self-defence capability. Generally speaking, therefore, external factors have developed in Thailand’s favour over the past few years and the present situation promises to produce balance in our diplomacy with no serious threat in the foreseeable future/ The internal situation is quite different and far less satisfactory. Thailand’s widespread insurgency derives from and feeds on a range of political, social and economic problems. The root causes are similar to those in other developing countries that have experienced the same phenomenon and include limited access by the rural population to substantive political participation; restricted social mobility; a gap between popular expectations and government performance in improving conditions; economic disparities and inequality of opportunity; corruption in both governmental and commercial sectors of the economy; arrogant treatment of villagers by some government officials; and anomalies relating to ethnic minorities' and citizenship. The particular causes for popular participation in the communist insurgency do, of course, vary in emphasis and this is clearly apparent in Thailand. In the Northeast, relatively poor economic and social conditions are the root cause, while in the North tribal disaffection is rampant. In the South, on the other hand, corruption and frustrated political ambition tend to

* This perspective was to be changed dramatically, of course, by the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the arrival of the Vietnamese Army in strength along Thailand’s eastern border, (ed.)

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underlie the insurgency. On the southern border with Malaysia, Thailand also shares the presence of the Communist Party of Malaya. But this is essentially a Malaysianoriented organization and does not constitute an indigenous Thai problem. The attitude of the people in rural areas towards the insurgency is initially, at least, one of indifference. Engaged in subsistence agriculture and traditionally independent, they prefer to be left alone. They may co-operate with the insurgents out of fear or out of gratitude, but very rarely do so because of their respect for the ideology. For the most part, the rural population has been fairly content until agitation and propaganda — assisted by the ubiquitous transistor radio — opened their eyes to better living conditions in more affluent urban areas. Improved communications have also enabled many rural people the chance to see for themselves the inequities in the distribution of wealth and income. Given the indifference or hostility of the wealthy and powerful, it is hardly surprising that some villagers fell prey to insurgent enticements and, once having run foul of the law, they then had no recourse but to fight the government. After a certain period marked by a conventional military efforts to suppress insurgency, the government has come to realize that the causes of insurgency are deeply rooted in depressed social and economic conditions. Programmes have, therefore, been created to combine security with rural development, or, to use Ramon Magsaysay’s phrase, all-out friendship, on the one hand, with all-out force on the other. .

Specifically, problems have been categorized as poverty, disease, ignorance and public apathy. To overcome these problems, governments have launched socio-economic development programmes, featuring increased income (through improved agricultural production and light industries), better health and sanitation facilities, wider educational opportunities and public information programmes. There has also been much talk about integration of governmental efforts, bringing 129

government to the people through popular participation and so forth. In the initial stages the novelty of these programmes has had some effect on villagers. But unless carefully implemented, such efforts tend to be superficial and, as their effects wear off, the same problems re-emerge. The insurgents, of course, are quick to exploit such government failures. The main problem is usually lack of cohesion in the government’s efforts. As has become apparent in Thailand, without significant institutional change and reorganization, government agencies will naturally cling to the prestige and power that are associated with independently administered programmes. This presents to the people and the insurgents an image of weakness and at the same time actively undermines the effectiveness of the counter-insurgency campaign. Uncoordinated and fragmented government programmes, even if backed by far greater resources than at the disposal of the insurgents, cannot prevail against the smaller but well organized communist efforts. A related problem has been the way in which the needs in the villages exert tremendous pressure on government resources. The response has been to expand the capacity of existing organizations, while also creating new organizations. Instead of improving the counter-insurgency effort, these measures have, of course, tended to compound the web of interagency jealousies, as both new and old agencies compete for control over resources. It must be said, too, that for many officials, increased resources become an added opportunity for lining their own pockets. Thus, where there is some apparent increase of assistance to villages, there is also an increase of the flow into personal coffers. Such corruption, again, weakens the government’s efforts. The attitude of many officials towards a villager, moreover, tends to be superior and patronizing — something which derives very much from our traditions of government. No matter how benevolent they may be, officials make it appear 130

that they are doing the people a favour rather than performing the public service for which they are paid. The much vaunted partnership between the government and the people, therefore, remains an empty ideal: the gap still exists. In fact, placing a government man in a village and getting him accepted by the villagers can prove more difficult than putting a man on the moon, because it depends not so much on sheer technology as on overcoming a centuries-old mental block. In counter-insurgency, the most critical level of administration is the one directly in touch with the people. It is at this level that the whole government effort will be judged. The district official and the local policeman will inevitably b e compared with the local insurgent and the results of the comparison will influence people’s decisions if and when they have to take sides. Placing the government’s own house in order is, then, a key priority in the counter-insurgency campaign. The basic requirements.are far-reaching institutional changes along the following lines: • Restructuring the organization of government so as to orient its functions towards counter-insurgency objectives. This should be undertaken within the framework of a comprehensive national plan and a single operational programme. • Placing the best qualified personnel in key positions to improve administrative leadership. • Undertaking intensive re-education of government personnel to correct administrative shortcomings and reinject moral values. • Ensuring prompt administrative action or criminal prosecution for wayward government personnel. • Instituting a system of incentives and rewards for efficiency and good performance to attract people of higher calibre to the public service.* The points I have made here are all applicable to Thailand and resolving these problems constitutes, in large 131

measure, the challenge we face. If you are wondering how Thailand has managed to survive as long as it has in the face of so many weaknesses, the answer lies largely in the character and tactics of the Communist Party of Thailand. The CPT has its own interned weaknesses, which have been compounded by the difficulties the communists are encountering in applying theories of rural revolutionary warfare in Thailand and elsewhere. The Communist Party of Thailand first embarked on its armed struggle in August 1 965, and for the first eleven years of the war the insurgents proved unable to expand their operations and influence more than a marginal distance from their jungle redoubts. However, the infusion of several thousand students and activists following the military coup of 1976 has gone far to fulfil a longstanding need for a radical, politically conscious intellectual stratum to fill key organizational posts. The immediate effect of this strengthening of communist infrastructure has been the beginning of political infiltration and subversion in several new areas. This poses a serious threat to the government. But in the last analysis, the CPT’s basic inability to recruit an adequate body of rural cadres from among the ethnic Thai remains. This relates directly to the generally apolitical cast of rural Thai society. The CPT’s second most important handicap has resulted from the party’s revolutionary strategy and tactical line. Attempts to wage violent struggle against “feudalism", “monopoly capitalism” and “imperialism” in order to install a “people’s democracy” are goals that have borne little relevance to the actual political situation in Thailand. Conversely, Thai Buddhism serves to bind the society together and works against violence-oriented, uncompromising political dictums. In addition, the profound loyalty of the vast majority of Thais to the monarchy, and particularly to the present King, deprives the communists of a national rallying point. * A third and easily exploitable weakness lies in the CPT’s ties with the Chinese and Vietnamese communist parties. 132

These external links belie the party’s claim that it represents Thai nationalism and that its interests and policies coincide with those of the nation. A related handicap from the ethnic viewpoint is the makeup of the CPT leadership itself, which remains largely Chinese or Sino-Thai. Nor has the Communist Party of Thailand managed to produce any leaders of national standing. Significantly, there has been no Thai equivalent of Ho Chi Minh, who might have won the sympathy and support of non-communist Thais. But ironically, perhaps the most telling blow to the CPT’s fortunes over the past three years has been the impact of the communist victory in Indochina on the Thai rural population. Initial reports of harsh control measures imposed by the new regimes in Laos and Cambodia were quickly followed by floods of refugees, an exodus which has continued to the present day. Thai villagers in border areas — often the ones most affected by CPT operations — soon came to realize through contact with the refugees what living under a communist regime really meant. Increasingly, they have come to reject as alien the way of life described by the refugees and by numerous defectors from the CPT’s jungle forces. In very short order, these stories spread inland to people living in insurgent-affected areas in the central and southern regions. From the ideological point of view, the Communist Party of Thailand has always relied for guidance on the Maoist model for revolution. Mao Tse-tung’s prescriptions for “people’s war” were decided on by the CPT leadership during the pre-insurgency strategic planning phase and have been adhered to ever since. But tied to a dogmatic Maoism, the Communist Party of Thailand has failed to appreciate that the basic nature of insurgency is dynamic and that it has undergone considerable change over the past 20 years. In fact, as Douglas Hyde, a noted authority on the subject, recently put it; “Guerrilla war is now likely to be one in which neither side can win, and each side would b e wise to recognize this before becoming inextricably entangled.” After 133

an exposition of the advantages enjoyed by colonial governments 20 years ago, when it was always possible to undercut communist appeal by offering national independence, Hyde went on to point out: “If, however, governments are now faced with the need for new thinking on what is the best way to deal with insurgency, it may be of some comfort for them to know that the problems they face are certainly no greater than those of today’s guerrilla fighters.” Foremost among those problems from the CPT’s perspective is that Mao Tse-tung’s basic theories of rural revolution may now be unworkable. There are also grounds to challenge whether his classic three-phase prescription for revolutionary warfare have worked even in China itself. There, the first two phases and part of the third phase were based essentially on a nationalist reaction to Japanese encroachment and invasion. It was only after the antiJapanese war, with their liberated areas already well established and their forces expanded ten-fold, that the communists were able to take on and defeat the Nationalists. Moreover, despite repeated attempts, from the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960, through to the various communist victories in Indochina in 1975, we have yet to see a revolution in the classic Maoist pattern. The Domino Theory is also in disarray. It did not work in Latin America after Castro’s victory of 1959 in Cuba, and there has been no indication after the past three years that it will prove itself in Southeast Asia. Now that the communist parties of Indochina have fallen to fighting and squabbling among themselves, aided and abetted by their Soviet and Chinese mentors, the threat has receded even further. In short, with the wrong strategy, the wrong sort of leaders, a poor public image and the real schisms that have developed among its fraternal parties in the region, the Communist Party of Thailand is in deep trouble. Furthermore, now that the Americans have left, it lacks any popular rallying cry and lacks of the racial or religious differences that other communist parties have been able to exploit. Significantly, it 134

has been unable to hold a National Congress years.

for over 17

A final major obstacle to communist success in Thailand lies in the current efforts of the country’s leaders to lay the foundations of a democratic, parliamentary system of government that will provide an enduring and more attractive alternative to the communist blueprint for violent revolution. The Communist Party of Thailand fully realizes this is evident from the fact that the communists have long opposed the development of a meaningful system of representative government. This would undermine their major propaganda themes and serve to enlist those disaffected but noncommunist elements with whom the party might otherwise hope to build up a revolutionary united front. The government, however, has much to do to put its house in order. After a series of crashing failures over the past few years, there is the need to achieve a system of participatory government that can both establish a democratic consensus and provide efficient management for the development of the country. In this process, decentralization of a traditionally monolithic administrative structure is clearly required. Important too are greatly improved patterns of social mobility and a more equitable channeling of the country’s not inconsiderable wealth back into rural areas. There is also a basic need for a single national plan for dealing with the insurgency and an integration of the government's organizations and assets to implement this plan. If all this proves too difficult and the present confused situation is permitted to continue, no sudden reverses in the security picture need be expected. Instead, a process of slow, steady erosion may continue with the communists gaining ground until extremism from the Right may again be provoked. At that point the armed forces tend to become increasingly suppressive and action, reaction and polarization eventually bring about a civil war. Thailand is no Vietnam, and never will be unless outside forces intervene. But if one is to find an analogy, it might be Spain prior to the Civil War. 135

In tackling its problems, Thailand does possess many inherent strengths. What the kingdom now needs is the proper leadership to bring about unity. The military-technocrat government which has been in power since October 1 977 has made great strides on both the external and internal fronts. Not least, it has succeeded in alleviating the once serious threats from hostile neighbours and has achieved a degree of accommodation that was virtually undreamed of a year ago. Internally, the government’s performance has been marked by consolidation and stability carried out with a style that is important to winning Thai loyalties. Thailand has seen none of the riots and strikes that were a regular feature of previous administrations. Immediate and successful action has been taken to remedy the effects of a severe drought and flooding. A reasonable minimum wage structure has been established; and active planning is being undertaken to deal with insurgency, land reform, corruption and a host of other problems. Perhaps the greatest handicap in achieving these reforms is the present gap between the military — who regard themselves as the guardians of the nation — and the intellectuals and technocrats whose participation in the political and administrative processes is vital to success. Allied to this is the problem of inducing a spirit of true nationalism, whereby all concerned, in particular the small body of professional politicians, will be prepared to forsake personal aggrandizement in the interests of the nation’s welfare as a whole. in summary, Thailand has her problems — many of them — in regard to both external and internal security. But except perhaps for a total Cambodian collapse, we are capable of dealing with them. We are now a front-line state against militant communism. Thailand will always welcome support, moral, diplomatic and otherwise, from friendly countries who wish to share a stake in the continued security and political stability of Southeast Asia.' 136

Riots after dark in Plabplachai

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District, Bangkok, 1974

* * ■’? The Metropolitan Police Bureau Headquarters were burnt by rioters, October 14th, 1973

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Chapter VIII “The Urban Factor” This chapter consists of two speeches given by the author in 1983. In the first presentation General Saiyud identifies the urban guerrilla threat and describes the character of its operations. In the second, the author explains how the threat can be overcome.

******* 1 . A Concept of Urban Security — a speech given to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 16th March 1983. ‘Before attempting any prescription for dealing with the complex and much misunderstood problem of urban security, let me attempt a brief analysis of the revolutionary factors prevalent in society today which constitute the prime ingredients of the threat. By revolution we mean a change in the structure of government occurring outside the established mechanism for change. In other words, a ruling group is ousted and a new group takes its place with the intention of restructuring society in line with its own prescription for social and economic development. Revolution involves violence or the threat of violence, and usually necessitates the active participation of the populace in order to overcome the forces of the established government. Revolution is intrinsically a political act; but the ends of revolution imply social, economic and even psychological change. 139

All societies are liable to revolutionary change and all cases of successful revolutions in the past three centuries have included one or more of the following components: • A need for economic improvements. • Marked inequities ' i n distribution of the national income. • Class antagonisms and a lack of social mobility. • Desertion of the intellectuals from the ruling elite. • A loss of confidence among the old ruling class. • Inefficient and corrupt governmental machinery. • Extreme polarization between forces of the Right and Left. Revolutionaries have consistently sought to take advantage of the factors outlined above in order to seize state power, in the post-World War II era, their efforts have been considerably facilitated by the process of rapid urbanization in the developing countries. There are many complex factors which have caused this urbanization of revolution and insurgency, but I intend to discuss only three. First, revolutionaries have come to recognize that as more people are now living in the cities, they can no longer afford to concentrate solely on a rural segment of the population, which is growing proportionately smaller. The second factor is the failure, or lack of progress of rural-based revolts, in particular, the “people’s wars” of Maoist inspiration. There has also been a realization that a large city can offer more protection than a mountain stronghold. Indeed, in Thailand, even if the communist build-up were to continue at the optimum growth rate it has achieved s o far, it would be well into the next century before the Communist Party of Thailand gained control of much more than a 20-km wide strip along the nation’s borders. The last factor is the way in which the urbanization process tends to break down the traditional buffers against discontent that have existed within the social, economic and cultural context of rural life. Farmers go to the cities with high expectations, but the net result is usually poverty, bewilder140

ment and frustration. This is only aggravated by the fact that in the cities they can see around them the good things of life that they would like to have but are never likely to attain. Together with the existing urban poor and other frustrated elements in society, such people become potential targets for any group suggesting a way out of an otherwise impossible situation. Furthermore, feeling themselves discriminated against, they may well be receptive to the idea that violence is necessary to improve their lot. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that revolutionaries throughout the world are turning their attention to urban areas. It is essentia] and, in fact basic common sense that in all large cities there should be a comprehensive and wellorganized crisis management system with which the government cap tackle civil disorders. These might include (i) riots, sabotage, demonstrations and strikes as well as (ii) disasters such as floods, power or water shortages, fires, earthquakes and chemical or nuclear emergencies. In both types of incidents the result is likely to be a serious breakdown of law and order. To these problems must be added over the past decade or so the phenomena of (iii) the urban terrorist, and (iv) the ubiquitous hijackers, which have become constant threats to state security. To cope with these potential situations, therefore, a crisis management system must bring all appropriate government departments into an effective working relationship with the civil urban administration, assisted where necessary by the armed forces. While it takes a comparatively long time for rural insurgents to take over the countryside, it may take only a few days for well-placed urban insurgents to seize control of key points or otherwise threaten the government. A dozen small groups of agitators and saboteurs can cause widespread and continuous disorder and civil commotion that can paralyse communications and neutralize government control. A metropolitan area like Bangkok, with its narrow, clogged streets and centralized administrative system would be highly vulnerable 141

to such attacks. In Thailand today the armed forces constitute an effective barrier against any attempted urban take-over by anti-government elements, even though in an extreme situation suppression operations might prove extremely bloody. But an effective crisis management centre in Bangkok is still badly needed in order to guarantee public safety. Without such a system, the government will have no immediate and effective recourse against terrorist incidents. Failure in this area could lead to a lack of public confidence, which could in turn result in a loss of foreign investor confidence and economic dislocation. Remember that a successful campaign against rural insurgents requires a permanently secure government base area. The time may well come when either the .Communist Party of Thailand or a pro-Soviet splinter faction realizes that rural insurgency along Maoist lines is not going to succeed in overthrowing the government in Bangkok. When this happens, it is reasonable to suppose that a serious effort may be made to experiment with an urgan strategy for revolution. It is for this sort of eventuality that the government must be constantly prepared. The seeds of urban insurgency have in fact been growing steadily over the past decade with the emergence of civil demonstrations, riots, and the organization of revolutionary groups. Although these organizations have operated underground over recent years, they still exist and represent a potential force. However, the extent of the threat to Bangkok’s security has not been fully appreciated given that so far there has never been the kind of disorder that might test government organization and response to the full. The riots of October 1973, Plabplachai in 1975,* and the Thammasat * Between July 5 and 7, 1974, extensive riots broke out in the Plabplachai area of Bangkok’s Chinatown. Triggered initially by the arrest of a taxi driver by local police, the disorder snowballed into a siege of the Plabplachai police station and serious clashes between crowds of local youths and police during which shots were fired. (ed.J

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violence of 1976 were all undoubtedly serious, but they were essentially localized and of relatively short duration. But riots on the Plabplachai scale perpetrated in a dozen or more key areas represent the kind of threat that an urban security organization should be prepared to meet. To achieve this level of readiness, it is necessary to establish an agreed doctrine and a well-tested organizational plan. Standing operational procedures must b e developed for the coordination of civil, police and military agencies responsible for the preservation of public security and order. The police, planning jointly with the civil authorities (i.e. the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration in the capital) and the armed forces, must b e fully prepared with both preventive and counter-measures. This means a capability to deal with riots, sabotage and arson, as well as to ensure the availability of essential services and utilities such as hospitals, transportation, water, electricity, post and telephones. Equally, we must be prepared to accommodate and feed displaced persons or refugees. Finally, while intended primarily for Bangkok, an urban security system should be organized sufficiently flexibly to deal with outbreaks of disorder in other cities in Thailand as well. Such a system can only b e viable if it is based on sound joint planning and organization between the armed forces, police and civil administration and includes comprehensive written standing procedures and contingency plans. Such plans will then need to be tested and, if necessary, revised in periodic individual and joint’ exercises. During the eighteen months i have been Supreme Commander, the establishment of a national crisis management centre has been one of my top priorities and will continue to be so for the rest of my tenure.* It has frankly not * The Internal Peace-keeping Command (Gong Amnuaigam Rakhsa Khwamsagnop Riap-roi Phainai Prathet), tasked among other duties with urban security, was established in early 1982 during General Saiyud's two-year tenure as Supreme Commander: Subsequently, the Capital Peace-keeping Command (Gongbanchagam Rakhsa Phranakhon) was charged specifically with security in the Bangkok metropolitan areas, (ed.)

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been easy; the problems of trying to reconcile the suspicions, jealousies and conflicting prerogatives of the many organizations and personalities involved has been daunting. I believe, however, that the basic concept of joint responsibility, coordination and planning are now recognized and accepted. Much remains to be done before a comprehensive organization can be fully established and tested. But it is my hope that my successor and leaders of the principal organizations involved will continue to press for an effective urban security system in this country.’

2. The Urban Guerrilla — a speech to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand, 14th April 1983. ‘Today I will discuss the phenomenon of the urban guerrilla, focusing mainly on his objectives, motivation and methods of operation as well as government resources to deal with the threat. The tactics of revolutionary movements such as the CPT and the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO)* in Thailand stem largely from the circumstances in which these movements are conceived. As new causes of unrest arise with the tide of aspiration for change, so too are revolutionary methods developed and tailored to meet the needs of the moment. A revolutionary thrust does not follow any set pattern, nor does it lend itself to precise definition. There are, however, certain basic principles and common characteristics which are recurring, and these deserve study. * Formed in 1967 and the largest of several Muslim guerrilla factions operating in the predominantly Muslim southern provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Songkhla, PULO is committed to wresting a separate ‘Islamic* state of Pattani from the border provinces. Never particularly effective either politically or militarily, despite considerable financial support from radical Arab states, its significance has declined markedly since the begining of the decade, (ed.)

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First, the aim of revolution is the overthrow and replacement of a government or regime by violent means. The size and nature of the operations undertaken to achieve this will vary widely according to circumstances. But in most cases during the pre-revolutionary period, subversive organizations will have assigned priority to establishing a foothold in appropriate trade unions and political parties. They will also have sought to infiltrate agents into government departments, and local security and police forces. All these activities, violent and non-violent, revolutionary and pre-revolutionary, constitute subversion. In the rural context, the communist prescription for revolution was enunciated in its classic form by Mao Tse-tung, who envisaged a revolutionary process aimed first at isolating the cities and then reducing them. The *foco' theory of revolutions also focused initially on rural areas, but after foundering in the jungles of Latin America, it went on to achieve something of a renaissance in the cities of that continent* It has contributed much to the rise of the urban guerrilla. The art of creating a revolutionary situation, on the other hand, finds its classic exposition in the thoughts and writings of Lenin. The Bolshevik leader had a real appreciation of the importance of first destroying a government’s credibility as well as its will and ability to govern. This creates what has * The ‘toco’ theory of rural guerrilla warfare finds its most articulate exposition in the book by the French left-wing intellectual Regis Debray, 'Revolution in the Revolution’. Broadly, it advocates small bands of Marxist revolutionaries by-passing ‘official’, bourgeoisified communist parties and implanting themselves among the deprived peasantry. In the rural setting, initial victories by the guerrillas over the security forces were, supposedly, to trigger a groundswell of popular resistance to the government. The theory found its most celebrated failure in the attempt by the Argentinian revolutionary Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara to ignite a revolutionary war amid the poverty-stricken villages of the Bolivian mountains. Guevara was captured and shot by government Rangers in 1967. The urban version of the ‘foco* theory was subsequently articulated by the Brazilian Marxist Carlos Marighela in his ‘Handbook of Urban Guerrilla Warfare’, (ed.)

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aptly been described as a ‘climate of collapse’, in which people confronted by the threat of a breakdown of urban life and livelihood will rally to whatever organization seems best able to restore order from the chaos. The urban guerrilla has adopted precisely these tactics designed to erode the morale of politicians, administrators, the judiciary, and eventually the police and army. The aim is to induce a climate of collapse. At this stage, the revolutionary anticipates that the government will either begin to capitulate, of, far more likely, will be provoked into adopting repressive measures. Against the background of such repression and a population increasingly alienated from the security forces, the urban guerrilla purposes to appear as a knight in shining armour, a protector of ‘the people’. The guerrilla’s chief weapon is indiscriminate - terror by means of which he hopes to induce this situation of general insecurity, apprehension and fear. He enjoys the advantage of surprise which he exploits by concentrating on isolated attacks such as assassinations, ambushes, kidnappings, sabotage and bank raids. He has been depicted as “familiar with the avenues, streets and alleys, the ins and outs of the urban centre; its paths and short-cuts, empty lots, underground passages, pipes and sewers. The urban guerrilla crosses through irregular and difficult terrain unfamiliar to the police and where they can be ambushed or trapped at any moment."* Unlike his rural counterpart, the urban guerrilla cannot establish bases and recruit armies. He is essentially an individual or member of a relatively small group, relying on the teeming crowds of the city for cover and on terror to avoid betrayal. But above all, as the Latin American urban guerrillas of the 1960s appreciated all too well, he relies on publicity to make his cause known and elicit a favourable public

’ Extracted from the "Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla", drawn up by the Internal Peace-keeping Command in November 1981.

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response.* Hardly less important are efforts to promote adverse publicity against the government and the security forces. The opportunities for media coverage have not only advertized and contributed to the growth of this type of revolutionary violence, but have also given it an international colouring. This is evident not only in the way in which new terrorist techniques become widely adopted in a short space of time, but also in the advent of the peripatetic revolutionary. Usually well-educated and economically well-heeled, these individuals may appear in any country and setting where circumstances are ripe for exploitation. The archetype is the Venezuelan terrorist, llich Ramirez Sanchez, better known simply as ‘Carlos’. Looking back to the mid-1 960s, our ability in Thailand to react effectively to rural insurgency and develop our own unique Thai-style counter-insurgency doctrine was made possible through the establishment of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (or CSOC). This organization went far to define and execute a successful strategy. More recently, under the direction of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond we have come a long way towards eliminating communist insurgency from the countryside. Now that it appears we have almost achieved victory in rural areas, however, we must begin to look at the future and examine what new internal threats may develop. Perhaps as a military man I am overly cautious, but I believe that we can ill afford to lower our guard. In addition to the obvious external threat that looms along our border with Cambodia, we must also consider domestic dangers that may surface afresh. Foremost among these is the threat of an urban communist

* Perhaps the most effective instance of urban guerrillas' use of publicity in winning genuine popular sympathy and embarrassing a government was the campaign by the Tupamaros in Uraguay in the mid and late 1960s. (ed.)

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campaign. The possibility of such a threat developing in Bangkok and our larger provincial capitals is not to be lightly dismissed and it is with such a potential danger that I am primarily concerned. My interest is focused mainly on two areas: the government’s ability to react in terms of the present legal framework, and secondly, our organizational readiness. In the first instance, we need to ask ourselves whether existing laws should be updated or new legislation passed that is more appropriate to the potential threat. It may well be that we need to replace the old Anti-Communist Act with new legislation. On organization, it took us several years to iron out the problems in CSOC’s structure. In order to counter a new urban terrorist threat, we probably will not have that sort of time in which to make adjustments. It is thus all the more important that we lay the groundwork now for a new, all-encompassing urban security organization. It should b e set up along CPM lines with participation from all concerned government agencies — the Police Department, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Communications and others — in addition to the armed forces. Its primary purpose, however, must b e to support the elected civilian government and to that extent it should report directly to the prime minister. I would like to emphasize the ideological nature of the threat facing us. While we welcome the thousands of communist defectors now returning from the jungle, we should not be led to the conclusion that the Communist Party of Thailand has abandoned its basic goals. They have tried their best to implement a Maoist strategy and manifestly they have failed. We must now continue to be vigilant for a turn to an urban or joint urban-rural strategy that could well be the communists’ next ploy.’

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General Saiyud during visit to Thai Marine Firebase in Trat Province near The Cambodian border.

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Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol inspects some military equipment seized from the Vietnamese-led forces in Ta Phraya.

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Chapter IX “Security, Democracy and Reform” The external threat posed by Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea in 1978 coupled to a growing armed insurgency points to a serious need for strong remedies to counter the growing crisis. Instead, a profusion of purportedly beneficial solutions have combined to confuse and compound the problem. The author advocates “revolutionary" reform at grass roots level through decentralization of power to the rural areas.

******* 1. A speech to the Rotary Club of Bangkok 15th February 1980. ‘With shock waves still spreading out from Cambodia, Southeast Asia is taking stock of new geopolitical realities and nowhere are the lessons of recent years being more urgently studied than in the Kingdom of Thailand.*

* Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia in December 1978, routed the Khmer Rouge and by February 1979 had consolidated their hold on the main centres of population and arteries of communication. By October 1979, the massive social and economic dislocation caused by the invasion and collapse of Khmer Rouge power was resulting in a refugee exodus towards the Thai border of unprecedented proportions, (ed.)

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The “consolidation” of Indochina should not have come as any surprise. The Vietnamese have never attempted to conceal what they evidently consider their undisputed right of overlordship on the peninsula, and the bloodily incompetent regime of Pol Pot merely accelerated this process through suicidal and futile attacks across the border. Although the United States’ sudden disengagement from the region caused radical changes in strategic priorities and popular attitudes here, the Thais have never harboured, any illusions over their latent confrontation with Vietnam. Long beset by low-key but spreading insurgencies in all regions of the country and unsuccessful in the democratic experiment of 1973-1976, Thailand has proved unable to exploit the anti-communist sentiment that has swept the country since the communist victories of 1975. The opportunity for achieving the internal solidarity so necessary to face the immediate external threat has thus been lost. The reasons for this are complex. But bearing a large measure of the responsibility are cultural egocentrism — the attitude which defines the individual and his family as the first consideration; a vertically oriented bureaucracy — where lateral coordination between departments is still in its infancy; and simple political immaturity. The question is now whether Thailand can mobilize its instincts for survival to cope with this fast growing crisis. Despite its external trappings of modernity, Thailand is still administered along broadly feudal lines. Its 73 provinces are administered by centrally appointed governors and district officers, operating very much as colonial governors of the past. An enviable state of rustic harmony was maintained as iate as the 1 950s. A docile and politically apathetic peasantry was the backbone of Thailand’s agricultural economy. Society as a whole was governed by the strong cultural traditions of master-client relationships and the tolerant Buddhist ethic which ascribes social status to one’s karma. Then, under the influence of rapid regional change, communist propaganda, and the ubiquitous transistor radio, 152

rural people slowly awoke to the realities of their relatively deprived existence and the fact that by comparison with affluent urban dwellers they were economically disadvantaged. The result was a rebellion under externally supported communism that has continued without respite to the present day. The slow but steady spread of subversion now covers the majority of the kingdom’s provinces. The government’s response to armed insurgency, which first broke out in 1965, has been an American-supported doctrine of resource allocation to rural areas coupled with integrated civil, police and military operations. But the results have not been entirely successful. Resources have often been misapplied and there has been an inability on the part of vertically oriented government agencies to coordinate the counter-insurgency effort. Indeed it is arguable that improvements that have been made in infrastructure (communications and agricultural training) have produced little substantive change —• but have served to whet the peasants’ appetite for more. For their part, the communists have been able to claim, with some justification, that It was they who were responsible for focusing the government’s efforts in the first place. The root of the problem clearly lies in the superficiality of the government approach. Instead of tackling the basic reforms required for more locally controlled and locally accountable political and economic administration, leaders in Bangkok have contented themselves with periodic handouts as gestures of official magnanimity. The fact remains that rural areas even now receive back less than half the revenue that their agricultural output contributes to the national income. Curiously, the continuing lack of rural appreciation appears to bewilder Bangkok. The typical bureaucratic response is to attribute these failures to specific flaws in the organization of various pacification programmes. The next step is then to introduce yet another rural security cum153

development programme. But the new programme, based on some purported “new” approach, seldom if ever replaces the previous one. The net result is that the countryside is now a hodge podge of overlapping and redundant programmes which serve not only to confuse villagers and local administrators but also to waste collosal amounts of money and manpower. The ultimate purpose seems to be the aggrandizement of these programmes’ bureaucratic sponsors in their search for power, prestige and personal enrichment. We already have a comprehensive and, apparently, sound programme called Development and Self-defence Volunteers (Aw Paw Paw), which was intended, when introduced four years ago, to replace all other programmes. The programme promised success by virtue of its being based on popular participation by villagers themselves. Despite that, however, the last six months have seen the establishment of yet two more national programmes. The first is called the Thai National Volunteers and Is supposedly another programme to replace all others. In fact it amounts essentially to a duplication of the security aspects of Aw Paw Paw, while making no attempt to address the all-important political and economic aspects of rural security. It appears that the programme’s sponsors, the Ministry of Interior — responsible for the administration of the country through governors — were apprehensive lest their power base be eroded by any viable system of village government such as that set out in the Aw Paw Paw scheme. They therefore found it necessary to establish a competitor to kill off the threat. To compound this tragedy of errors, some bright young men in the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), perhaps despairing that regular government agencies would ever get it right, came up with their own new national pacification programme. This is based on development with security overtones but excludes any political elements. Financed by a $100-million Japanese loan, this latest plan reads like some nightmare account -of the Vietnamese pacification programmes, of the mid-1960s. It

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purports to be different from all other programmes, but conceptually and in terms of its channels of implementation it hardly differs from the rest. This then are our problems — poor management, an almost total lack of lateral co-operation, an abysmal ignorance of the lessons of similar counter-insurgency programmes, and all compounded by the extraordinary egocentrism that is such a marked feature of our bureaucracy. After two and a half years of military rule, our next experiment in democratic politics is due in April.* But one can already see signs of the political pork-barrelling associated with our parliamentary arena and the resultant loss of respect for Thai politicians. All too often these men turn to bribery and manipulation to persuade the public to elect them and then use their positions to favour the special interests of a wealthy few. But the politicians themselves can hardly be blamed for their greed. There have been so few opportunities over the past 4 0 years or so for them to develop stability and a code of ethics in their profession. But the tragedy is that the continuation of this democratic experiment may only serve further to degrade the parliamentary process in Thailand and so open the way once again to willing popular acceptance of a military-bureaucratic dominated oligarchy. Whatever the outcome in April, the position of Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanand over the next few years seems to be assured. If anything, the recent events- in Cambodia have merely served to reinforce the need for the continued stable government and leadership for which he has demonstrated his capacity. His military background has also been a crucial factor in these times when national security

* This was the generat erection of 22 nd April 1979. Nationally, voter turn-out ran at a low 35%-40% , while in Bangkok it was even lower — around 1 9% . The resultant coalition government was headed by Gen Kriangsak Chomanand. (ed.)

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must be our foremost consideration. An able leader and statesman in his own right, he has yet to demonstrate any taste for parliamentary politics himself and has managed to resist the many advances made to him by parties and interest groups seeking to attach themselvesjo his success. Moreover, with his own tailor-made constitution he need not pursue the electoral route to continue on as prime minister. With or without a public mandate, General Kriangsak sorely needs a radical shake-up in his Cabinet, however. The caretaker regime he has headed since the end of 1977 has been very much a one-man show. Despite his own considerable achievements in bringing stability to the country, the present Cabinet does not contain men possessing the talent and drive to undertake the far-reaching reforms necessary to steer a safe course for the future. Foremost among these reforms is the decentralization of .political and economic responsibility with an accompanying restructuring and clean-up of the civil service. This is a massive and radical undertaking bound to encounter considerable resistance in the military and bureaucracy. There are also some perceived dangers inherent in such a modernization process. These include the possible fueling of separatist and irredentist tendencies in some regions and. the inevitable disruption of traditional rural attitudes of subservience — something which constitutes a hazard in most official minds. Another problem to be considered is the much higher national income that is now needed to pay for burgeoning military expenditures and various development programmes. The financial reserves so carefully husbanded by the Thanom-Prapass regime are now fast running out. External borrowing, particularly from the World Bank, has assumed such proportions that debt-servicing will become a real problem some three years from now unless export earnings can be at least doubled — and that does not seem likely. Faced with a guns versus butter dilemma, General Kriangsak seems to be trying to satisfy everyone. Perhaps this attitude 156

will change after the election, assuming, as everyone does, that he will continue on as prime minister. At that time perhaps greater efforts will be made to check the country's current slide towards bankruptcy. In the meantime, the military is busily building up its conventional forces in order to deter a Vietnamese attack — despite the fact that the recent conventional invasion of Cambodia has, once again, demonstrated that Southeast Asia is really guerrilla territory. The alternative to large and expensive conventional forces is a small, mobile and well equipped army, supported by large numbers of inexpensive guerrilla forces. But within military circles there is a preference for sophisticated and hugely expensive guns, tanks and aircraft, that are the status symbols of the international power game. Why should our military planners bother about the ultimate cost? Does not “national security” always come first? Then, too, there is the problem of more equitable income distribution — a catch-phrase of successive governments. There has, however, been equitable distribution other than periodic and patronizing hand-outs. It will be necessary to establish a realistic rice price at the expense of the city dweller. Also needed is a comprehensive new tax system that will narrow the gap between rich and poor. Although none of these reforms would be considered unreasonable in advanced countries, they would be tantamount to revolution in Thailand. The reason for this is the short-sightedness and greed typical of monied classes throughout history who are never willing to surrender anything unless they are placed under duress. The entrenched rich in Bangkok are among the most lightly taxed people in the world. They do not know and do not want to know of the problems of poverty and internal subversion that could disturb their comfortable life-styles. They are also well placed to check any measures that might adversely affect their accumulation of wealth. They constitute that stratum of society from which government leaders are drawn and are in a

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position to influence such leaders. Finally, in any real crisis, we can be sure that the rich will have their bank accounts and commercial interests already carefully salted away in the United States and Europe. So without the emergence of a political maverick with the vision and determination to pull Thailand into the twentieth century — something for which General Kriangsak may have the potential but possibly not the inclination — what are the prospects? In all probability, the status quo will be maintained as long as possible with the cracks papered over as they appear. We Thais will continue to function in our own way in the belief that the problems we face will somehow disappear of their own accord. In short, the Thai people are not really worried about the future. We have a strong sense of history, an enviable confidence in ourselves and an unshakable faith in the benevolence of our ultimate fate. One can only hope we will be proved right.’

2. A speech to the British Chamber of Commerce, 23rd March 1982. ‘Three years ago, I painted a very bleak picture of the political, social and economic turmoil taking place throughout Indochina. At that time I anticipated that this would probably increase our refugee burden dramatically — to an extent, in fact, that would seriously jeopardize our national security. At that time we had approximately 160,000 refugees, mainly from Laos and Kampuchea settled in 17 camps around the country. I forecast then that because of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia this figure could go as high as one million within a few months. As events turned out, by October 1979, some 200,000 more refugees arrived in our camps, mainly from Cambodia, while another 600,000 to 800,000 displaced Khmers moved west and north to settle in 158

pockets along the Thai border. All of these people had to be fed through Thailand. So my gloomy prediction of a figure of one million which few believed at the time did come to pass. In late 1979, international and private relief organizations did more to share the burden of administering and feeding these refugees, however. They were also of great assistance in establishing a "land bridge" into Kampuchea for the feeding of displaced and starving refugees on and around the border with Thailand. These same organizations have also played an important part in a resettlement programme, which has succeeded in finding homes in third countries for nearly 400,000 Indochinese refugees over the past six and a half years since the communist take-over. The countries involved in this humanitarian programme are the United States, which has accepted 68 per cent of these refugees, France ’Which has taken 1 5 per cent, Canada with six per cent and Australia with four per cent. Other countries have accounted for the remaining seven per cent. At the same time we have much appreciated international assistance in resettling and rehabilitating the 200,000 Thai villagers who have been displaced along the Cambodian border over the past three years. Most of those Indochinese who desire permanent resettlement and are able to leave have probably by now already left. This fact, coupled with the new internationally agreed humane deterrence programme, should guarantee that the massive exodus of 1979-1980 is not repeated. The fundamentals of this programme are continuing detention in austere camps, provision of only essential health and social services and denial of access to third country resettlement processing. On the last point, however, there will probably have to be occasional exceptions, but, broadly, every effort is made to ensure that future refugees are genuine ones, not simply people seeking economic betterment. The exception, of course, is in the case of the Vietnamese “boat people” whose terrible odyssey continues despite some slowing down caused by a shortage of boats, 159

the imposition of departure controls and fear of piracy. In regard to the latter problem, efforts are underway to involve several concerned governments in an international programm e to combat the depredations of pirates in and around the Gulf of Thailand. In the meantime, we are doing the best we can with limited resources to control what has been a perennial problem along our southern shores. In making an overall assessment of the refugee situation, one might then argue that the past three years have seen very considerable improvements. But much clearly remains to b e done before this threat to our security and stability can be said to have been reduced to a tolerable level. As to the question of security more generally, I have discussed the topic on numerous occasions in recent years, so will be brief today. The immediate external threat from Vietnam is not one of all-out invasion but rather of harassment, and support for domestic insurgents. Militarily, Hanoi is fully preoccupied by the difficulties of maintaining its client regime in Phnom Penh in the face of continued guerrilla resistance. Any wider military operations would unquestionably mean increased Soviet support. But the Soviet Union has its own internal economic problems to resolve, and shoulders, as well, a heavy burden in sustaining the Eastern Bloc and the embattled regime in Afghanistan. Domestically, the security situation is mixed. We saw a sharp rise in insurgent strength following the Thammasat University violence of October 1976 and then a steady and continuing decline. We have also witnessed the crushing defeat inflicted upon the major communist base of Khao Khor last year. This operation relied essentially on the same tactics proven in the Huai Bang Sai area of Nakhon Phanom in the early 1970s. More recently a similar operation against the virulent insurgent organization in the Banthat Mountain range in central-southern Thailand has been highly successful. Despite these successes, however, follow-through and consolidation have still to be implemented effectively. In addition, there has been a very real split in the communist 160

leadership since 1975, with urban-oriented pro-Soviet and pro-Vietnamese factions aligned against the Sino-Thai hierarchy. The division has been further underlined by the recent intrusion of new insurgent bands from Laos into several parts of Nakhon Phanom and Nong Khai. The competing gangs of CPT and Pak Mai (‘New Party’) insurgents are now reliably reported as having established restricted areas where their rivals are not permitted to operate. Against this, however, it must be recognized that of the overall total of 8,000 terrorists operating in 1975, 7,000 were still in the field at the beginning of this year. The reasons underlying current insurgent strength are many and include the support provided by relatives, continued coercion of unwilling recruits into communist ranks, and inadequate government protection. Even so, a large number of ordinary village people sitll appear to be supporting local insurgent groups because of dissatisfaction with the central government and its policies — a considerable disappointment in view of the efforts made on behalf of the rural population. Still, a figure of 7,000 terrorists with a support base of, say, 100,000 villagers in a rural population of 40 million is not very .significant, particularly in a world in which dissension is in vogue. The problem is containable so long as we continue to pursue our efforts to narrow the gap between rural and urban incomes and services. In the last analysis, we must face the fact that whatever we are able to achieve, there will always be the disaffected amongst us. The last issue I wish to touch on is that of political stability, a question which is naturally close to the hearts of businessmen operating in this country. It is perhaps important first to understand the cultural attitudes of Thai society, in which people regard the entire universe as a hierarchy of human beings ranked according to the merit they have acquired through actions in previous lives. The resultant autocratic tradition and the decisiveness of personality has often manifested itself in modern Thai politics. There is, for example, the coup d’etat rather than the electoral process as 161

a major instrument of leadership change. Then there is the frequent modification and occasional suspension of parliamentary and electoral processes. Thirdly, there is widespread public indifference to politics. Finally, one must add the absence of any effective source of policy discussion and initiative except among the bureaucratic elite. Since 1932 and the end of the absolute monarchy, political competition has, in fact, been largely a function of factional or clique rivalry among those in positions of power or influence. The base of political power has been highly personalized and subject to informal political manipulation and the pressure of existing loyalties. Thus the operation of the political system has been generally determined by the attitudes, personalities and interaction of the small ruling group concentrated in Bangkok. In such a system, a coup is obviously a convenient and economical method for governmental change — but one not generally found in other countries of the region who tend more to follow the political traditions and training derived from the colonial inheritance. But the very word “coup” leads to much misunderstanding, particularly in the Western world where reports of short-lived Thai coups are invariably accompanied by pictures of tanks and troops in the streets. The fact remains, however, that intentional bloodshed is extremely rare. In this system of politics by personality, the bureaucracy continues virtually undisturbed. Senior members acceptable to the regime are often co-opted into the government usually resuming their previous position when the regime changes. We therefore have continuity and stability in our system of government. I am not, of course, suggesting that things should remain as they are. The problem is how to correct them. Politicians, in particular, complain about the system and most governments on assuming power do have bureaucratic reform as a target. But little or nothing has been achieved so 162

far and this is because there has been no realistic and detailed prescription for tackling the problem. My personal answer to the problem of bureaucratic strangulation has always been through grass roots level constitutional reform to establish responsible, elected regional and local councils accountable to the people, both politically and administratively. Only by so doing, can we break the massive over-centralization and vertical orientation of our present bureaucratic system. It is a tough proposition, I know; but until such time as someone proposes a wellreasoned and detailed concept for change, further talk of reforming the bureaucracy is merely whistling in the wind. Nevertheless, I strongly believe that Thailand must persist in its quest for democracy however often the political system may break down before we achieve a working model. The military establishment will gain respect by remaining on the sidelines. Military officers must learn not to try and think for the people but let the people think for themselves and gain political experience through trial and error. As we approach the count-down for next year’s elections, let us put aside uncertainties and fears about the outcome. It seems unlikely that any single party can capture a majority of the votes and, thus, another coalition government looks probable. So be it. If the people want democracy, they should have it. If the next government proves unequal to the task the people will see it. And so we shall try again. And that, after all, is what democracy is all about.’

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Chapter X “Thailand’s

Present Internal Security System”

In this chapter, General Saiyud warns that although the CPT has lost its support from China, Thailand can ill afford to reduce its vigilence. The chapter describes the CPT’s new modus operendi — one based upon the infiltration of economic, professional and cultural groups as a means to build its united front organization. General Saiyud points to recent events, such as the abortive coup of 9th September 1985, as particularly attractive opportunities for exploitation by the CPT. In the final analysis, concludes General Saiyud, the fight against the CPT will be won through the elimination of the social and economic causes for dissatisfaction.

******* Following the communist victories of 1975 in Indochina, there was a sense of real concern among friends of Thailand abroad over the kingdom’s security and, by extension, the security of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a whole. In Thailand itself, however, there was generally a greater confidence. This was due both to the nation’s past success in safeguarding its own independence as well as to a spirit of co-operation prompted by an awareness of a new threat on our borders. In military and government circles, and particularly in the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) there was also a growing emphasis on the principle of putting political measures before military operations in tackling internal security problems. This trend was facilitated by the close relationship between the upper echelons of the military and the government. Indeed, General Prem Tinsulanond served for a period as Director of 165

1S0C, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army and Prime Minister. At the same time, there were also the negative lessons of communist victories in Indochina. These were most graphically illustrated by the flood of refugees into Thailand, in particular Khmers fleeing the murderous regime of Pol Pot. These refugees recounted the brutalities of life under communist regimes to Thais living in rural areas of the East and Northeast, and in the case of certain Lao refugees — former left-wing activists, student leaders and monks — ISOC organized orientation courses for Thai civil servants and businessmen at which they spoke of their experiences. As a result, Thais generally became more determined than ever to resist communism. Then in December 1978 socialist Vietnam invaded Cambodia, captured Phnom Penh the following month and replaced the Pol Pot government with a regime favourable to its wishes led by Heng Samrin. This development reflected as nothing else to that date had done the extent of the rift between Vietnam and China. But of more immediate significance, from Bangkok’s point of view, it also produced a split within the Communist Party of Thailand. One faction, in fact the mainstream of the leadership, supported the People’s Republic of China and the overthrown Pol Pot regime; another dissident group sided with Vietnam and the Soviet Union. As a direct result of the split and the crisis of loyalties it entailed, pro-Chinese elements of the CPT were expelled from their long-time sanctuaries and bases in Laos and Cambodia. The loss of these key staging areas along the borders of the North and Northeast was, not surprisingly, to have serious repercussions on the insurgents’ operational capability inside Thailand. Hardly less important was the fact that the Cambodian situation made Peking suddenly more dependent on Thai goodwill in order to pursue its goals in the region. Most specifically, this shift saw the need to channel munitions and 166

logistics support to pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge guerrillas along the Thai border in order to provide continued resistance to Vietnamese occupation forces. Bangkok found itself in a position to appeal to Peking to end its support for the CPT, which Thai authorities at that time still regarded as the foremost threat to national security. Significantly, in July 1979, the Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT), the CPT's clandestine radio, which had been broadcasting from southwestern China since 1962, abruptly went off the air. In this overall context, Thailand's domestic efforts to suppress communist insurgency began to make notable advances. If one were to pinpoint the key factors behind these successes, it would only be fair to say that events external to Thailand played a more significant role. For it remains apparent that the conditions for, or root causes of communism in this country, while to some extent reduced, still exist. They can, in brief, be summed up as dissatisfaction over lack of social justice — especially in dealings with government officials — and material deprivation arising from economic problems. The persistence of these problems, along with the government's erroneous belief that the insurgency has been beaten once and for all, have combined to permit the CPT to survive. At present, the communists are concentrating their efforts on implementing a new strategy laid down at the CPT’s Fourth National Congress, which held its final meetings in early 1982.* In essence, the new line dictates a policy of continued armed struggle using the countryside as a base, in

* Owing to security concerns, the CPT’s Fourth National Congress — the first after a break of over 20 years following the Third Congress in 1961 — was held in a series of staggered, regional meetings between June and November 1981. These took place in Tak Province (Northern region), Nakhon Phanom (Northeast), Nakhon Si Thammarat (South), Surat Thanl (Central assembly), and Kunming, Southwestern China, (China-based members). A final meeting at which various resolutions were adopted was held in March and April 1982 in the Chong Chang base area (Work zone 508) in Surat Than! Province, (ed.)

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coordination with political, economic and other forms of agitation in both rural and urban areas. In other words, the CPT is still committed to armed struggle based In rural areas which include specific “operational zones" (khet ngam) in the jungles and plains. Urban areas mean primarily Bangkok and here too there is a recognition that armed struggle may be necessary. From the military standpoint, the new strategy thus implies a major adjustment in the CPT’s approach to warfare that requires a movement of its armed cadres from the jungles and hills down to the plains, towns and cities as quickly and inexpensively as possible. This shift has been considerably facilitated by the government’s “open arms” policy towards communists. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that the major so-called 'surrenders’ have taken place largely at the initiative of the CPT as a means of implementing its changed strategy. At the same time, government policy has served to inflict damage on the party and limit is operations to a degree which the party leadership had probably not foreseen. But the CPT is attempting to remedy this situation. In the light of its changed strategy, the party leadership has defined three types of operational zones for propaganda and organizational activities. These are known as 'red', ‘pink’ and ‘white’ zones and it is worth considering each in turn. ‘Red’ zones are those in which the CPT considers it has a strong and proven support base of strategic importance. The party is striving both to maintain a hold over these zones and to lay the basis for future operations by preserving its organizational structure. It is noteworthy that in these ‘red’ zones the CPT has tended to stage large-scale surrenders with maximum publicity. Afterward they have made agreements with the government allowing surrenderees to remain in the areas concerned. These 'quid pro quo’ arrangements are aimed at preserving the party’s civil and military organization, while retaining a hold over the areas and their populations. The mechanisms of liaison with other communist zones are also carefully maintained.

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In certain of these zones the CPT has frankly had considerable success. Notable are operational zones No. 444 in northern Ubon Ratchathani Province and No. Ill in Mukdaharn and Kalasin Provinces. In these areas the party’s aim is not propaganda or subversion but simply a preservation of the ‘status quo’ in a situation where its influence is already pervasive and well-accepted by the masses. ‘Pink’ zones are those in which the party has operated before but where it does not enjoy the degree of influence it exerts in ‘red’ zones. In these areas it employs two types of operatives for propaganda and subversion. The first type consists of cadres of proven ability who are generally recognized as communists but who operate in the capacity of what the party has termed ‘phu-ruam phattana chart Thai' or ‘partners in national development'. These are government recognized community leaders who are well placed to move around and maintain contact with party supporters. Such activities are, of course, suitably disguised to appear innocuous and necessitate the cadres concerned projecting an image of being simply justice-loving citizens. In this way, the party attempts to establish as abroad a united front as possible, although quality in propaganda and organization work rather than quantity is emphasized. The second type of operatives in ‘pink’ zones are those who are not generally known as communists and who, thus, work in an altogether clandestine context. But their goals remain essentially similar — long-term infiltration and subversion. Caution, however, remains the watch-word and, again, quality rather than quantity of work is the target. Finally, ‘white’ zones are those in which the CPT has not operated before. Here the party uses only reliable cadres and ones which are not recognized as having had any communist sympathies or affiliations in the past. Under cover of normal employment, these individuals form cells for future work and conduct activities aimed at fostering a political atmosphere conducive to communist operations.

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In all three types of zone the point to be emphasized is that the CPT does not promote propaganda, subversion or organization in depth as a priority, but rather focuses on building up a broad ‘united front’. In this context, communist activities, are carefully adapted to the prevailing situation and popular mood in any given area at any given time. Among other things, this kind of broad ‘united front’ work involves setting up mass organizations in the form of economic, professional or cultural groups. An example might be the organization set up ostensibly to purchase forest products and other commodities at Samyaek Village in Loengnoktha District of Yasothon Province. The individual mairily responsible is one “Comrade Singh”, an operative of Zone 444, but not recognized as having any communist affiliations. The organization is widely accepted by local villagers. Another example might be the ‘mo-lam* northeastern-style band at Nong Khaen village in Dongyen District of Mukdaharn, which has proved particularly effective as a pro-communist propaganda organ. The CPT is also focusing its attention on subversion of the government's volunteer rural security organizations such as the Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC), the National Defence Volunteers (Thai Asa Pongkan Chart) and Santi Nimit Teams." It is striving to infiltrate its own cadres into these organizations primarily with a view to maintaining a military capability. Moreover, in addition to being useful for united front and intelligence work, this area of activity also offers the possibility of coordination in the future between the CPT’s

* First appearing in 1980, the Santi Nimit or ‘Peace Teams' were a relatively late arrival on the field of Thai counter-insurgency. Based on the communist concept of armed propaganda as well as the Royal Thai Army's own earlier experience with psychological operations or 'pysops' teams, ‘Santi Nimit’ units are composed of around 12 to 15 personnel of whom three or four are seconded from regular RTA special forces units and the rest, including women, are paid volunteers. The main thrust of the Santi Nimit teams in the villages is propaganda through entertainment with song and music routines playing a prominent role, (ed.)

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own standing armed units and armed communists within the government’s security apparatus. For this type of infiltration the party employs reliable cadres without known communist affiliations, or, alternatively, members of its mass organizations who have joined the Volunteer Defence Corps or other government organizations. In addition, the party also calls on operatives of conscription age to enroll in the regular military and in this way aims at gaining military training and slowly infiltrating its cadres into the military reserve structure. An examination of these facts, together with evidence of CPT activity that surfaces from time to time, leads to the conclusion that the party has indeed survived. More specifically, its three main components — the party structure itself, the party's armed units and its united front organization — are all still functioning in skeletal form, even though they may not have developed quantitatively. The available evidence suggests, moreover, that the CPT has learned lessons from the past and is using its experience to adapt its operations to new conditions, as laid down by the Fourth Congress. Examining the CPT’s component sections, first, in terms of power within the party itself, it Is believed that Virat Angkhathaworn still retains dominant influence. Virat has always been regarded as pro-Chinese and is strongly supported in the current politburo by Sin Termlin from the South, where CPT operations are still more effective than in other regions. Nevertheless, Virat appears to be trying to create the impression that he is essentially independent and not subject to Chinese pressure. To this extent, he has recently been advocating a more balanced foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Vietnam. This was apparent in an interview given to a news magazine by Central Committee member Pirun Chatravanitgun prior to his arrest in July 1 984.*

* The interview with Pirun Chatravanitgun was published in the Thaitanguage weekly Arthit Khledlap of 1 2-1 Sth May 1984. Pirun, his wife and several other ranking CPT officials were rounded up in a series of.sweeps in the Greater Bangkok area during the first two weeks of July 1984. (ed j

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Virat’s efforts to polish up his image were in fact already evident at the time of the Fourth Congress, but do not appear to have been entirety successful. It is safe to say that conflicts within the politburo still exist. Government intelligence officials understand that the CPT intends to hold its Fifth Congress by 1 987 with a view to resolving these differences. Although the party has been somewhat shaken, it can still operate and is attempting to stabilize its position. Its operational headquarters is believed to be'currently situated in the Trang-Phattalung provincial border area, in a secure zone guarded by armed units . It is maintaining an effective communications network linking it to other parts of the country. Politburo members are not normally present in the same place at the same time. For practical as well as security reasons, they are scattered in the areas of their own individual responsibility, including Bangkok. How is the CPT faring economically today? While the People’s Republic of China is generally understood to have discontinued its direct aid to the Thai communists, party to party links between the CCP and the CPT still exist. Furthermore, it is believed that the CPT is still receiving funds from united front networks that take the form of Sino-Thai trade associations. Nevertheless, the CPT does now appear to be emphasizing a policy of selfrreliance and encourages its members to support themselves as far as possible. It is known, for example, that the Northeastern Branch of the party has bought some agricultural land in Chumpae District of Khon Kaen Province to provide its supporters with an opportunity to earn a living. In addition, the branch committee has invested in a number of companies trading in agricultural goods and medical supplies. In the South, the party has been known to condone illegal acts so long as they do not hurt the interests of the poor or the majority of the people. This may take the form of co-operating with influential local interests to blackmail or extort money from 'capitalists’. Certainly, the pros172

pects for financial gain in the South and the often thin line between insurgency and banditry have gone far to make the southern branch the most financially independent. With regard to the CPT’s armed forces, the Party's Fourth Congress decreed that armed struggle should continue and be extended to towns and cities in coordination with other strategic zones, i.e. the jungle areas and the plains. Consequently, since 1982, the party has been making preparations in the capital, setting up armed units and bringing together cadres keen to operate in the city. Modifications to the new system occurred in 1 983 as some communist operatives were arrested and others moved out of Bangkok. In 1984, as a result of improved standards of political and military training among student adherents, students were added to the CPT’s armed elements in Bangkok for the first time. The system of coordination between communist cells was also improved to provide greater flexibility and efficiency and, at the same time, tighten security. Cell-type units are now widespread but lateral linkage between them is strictly prohibited. Organization is thus hierarchical with operatives reporting directly to zonal commands in the provinces or to the representatives of zonal commands in the capital. For security reasons, there appears to be no overall CPT command centre for Bangkok. It is important to emphasize that while many CPT operatives officially surrendered to the government, many others moved down from hill and jungle zones onto the plains and into urban areas without reporting to the authorities. They continue to operate clandestinely. Thus in the northern part of the Northeast there are believed to be armed insurgents or ‘jungle fighters’ responsible for protecting operatives on the plains and providing sanctuary for cadres whose work has been disrupted by government measures. In all CPT zones, the total number of these fighters is estimated to be around 2,000 — or about the same number of armed effectives as at the beginning of the insurgency in 1965. There is also a number of former CPT guerrillas who 173

have moved quietly onto the plains and who, for the most part, are today employed in agriculture like other rural people. The party's command and control link with this group remains fairly loose, but contact and coordination can be maintained by means of normal commercial arid private transportation. in geographic terms, communist organization has been established along the following lines: In the South, there are two operational zones, numbered 104 and 105, with overall command exercised from the Palien area of Trang Province. In Zone 104 the senior coordination cadre is a ‘Comrade Thawat', while his counterpart in Zone 105 is a ‘Comrade Hem*. Operatives in each zone are divided into different units responsible for intelligence, military coordination, economic affairs, external coordination and medical services. Most of the operatives in Zone 104 are former students from a Bangkok university, who originally came from the South. In Zone 105, operatives are primarily communists who have “returned from the jungle” (khon pa khao meuang) from various zones in the South. Again, many are former students. The Northeastern Region has now been divided by the CPT into northern and southern areas. The northern area is in turn divided into two zones known as Zone Petch — including Nakhon Phanom, Sakon Nakhon, Kalasin and Mukdaharn Provinces — and Zone Buadaeng, that covers Nong Khai, Udon Thani and Khon Kaen. The former area has as its senior coordinator one ‘Comrade Amata’ and is divided into an armed unit, an external coordination unit, an economic affairs unit and a m e d i c a l section. Armed effectives are equipped with M-1 6 assault rifles, grenades and explosives. ‘Buadaeng’ is similarly organized under the overall coordination of a 'Comrade Kong’ and is mainly composed of former guerrillas from the northern part of the Northeast. In the south of the Northeast, the CPT has now only one operational zone, Zone 207, which includes the border provinces of Buriram', Surin, Si Sa Ket and parts of southern

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Ubon Ratchathani. The zone comes under the coordinating authority of ‘Comrade Detch’, and here again the area is divided into sections dealing with intelligence, economic affairs, external coordination and armed elements. It is understood that no medical section is as yet operating, but in case of need, Zone 207 would be supported by other zones. In the North, communist armed elements appear to have been already organized though the picture in detail remains unclear. What is known, however, is that northern zone operatives are primarily ‘returnees’ (khon pa khao meuang) from the tri-province border zone of Loei-Phitsanulok-Phetchabun. As in most other areas, they are armed with a mix of communistbloc AK-47 rifles and U.S.-designed M-16s. And finally, let us consider the Bangkok area: Among communist influenced labour in the industrial areas of Samrong (Samut Prakan Province), Omnoi (Samut Songkhram) and Rangsit (Pathum Thani), individuals designated as “armed elements” are also operating. Secure communications with CPT operatives in other areas have been established and it is understood that a private clinic is available to provide medical facilities and support on provision of a code-word. As of early 1 985, intelligence estimates are that there are some 250 workers in addition to around 200 students designated as armed elements, although many may not have immediate access to weapons. Thus, in Greater Bangkok, there is a total of some 450 communist operatives intended to take part in armed subversion should a suitable occasion arise. It is worth noting that in 1984, there were only 300. Nevertheless, economic difficulties act as a significant constraint on communist operatives in labour organizations.. Many factories have had to cut back on their work forces, while others have closed, resulting In a growing number of unemployed. In these circumstances, some armed elements have been obliged to sell their weapons and others have moved back to the provinces in search of work. The impact of the economic downturn on the CPT’s student following has, 175

by contrast, been less marked, as almost all of them are financially supported by their parents. Thus both in qualitative and quantitative terms, the students tend to represent a firmer support base. Lastly, it is important to consider the CPT’s front organization, the third leg of the communist tripod. In this context, the party has now turned its attention specifically to the Bangkok metropolitan area where it is striving to expand its influence among intellectuals, students, political parties and the mass media. Party cadres are primarily composed of ‘returnees’ with past experience of mass organization work. But party din 'ctives are nevertheless strict in enjoining cadres engaged in propaganda work to maintain a middle of the road political line, and project a liberal image of supporting democracy, social justice and popular rights. They are also instructed to adapt their work to the prevailing political mood and avoid all reference to the CPT itself. The thrust is thus directed towards expanding the front on as broad a basis as possible. Communist operatives will, for example, be vocal supporters of popular movements such as the campaign against buying Japanese products and the ‘Buy Thai’ campaign. At the same time, the party has secretly organised and assigned its cadres to monitor and lead such movements, particularly those involving students. But perhaps the most significant role of the communist front organization in urban areas is employing those of its cadres who are not known to have any communist affiliations — individuals referred to as ‘white outside, red inside’ (nork khao, nai daeng) — to infiltrate political parties. This process takes place at two levels. First, at the party executive level, the CPT is believed to have made some progress in inserting individuals who can influence ideas and report back to the CPT on activities within the target party. Better known communists cannot, of course, join political parties in this manner because of their backgrounds. But even in these cases, there have been instances of suspected communists gaining access to certain politicians on a personal basis. 176

Secondly, infiltration takes place at the rank and file level. Many of the CRT’s own younger activists — a significant number of these joined the communists after the Thammasat violence of October 1976 — are known to be engaged in infiltration of mainstream political parties from the bottom. In conclusion, the CPT with its three main components — the centre, the armed wing and the front organization — is still operating. There can be no doubt that the CPT has survived. The party is now at a stage of developing a new strategy and adjusting its methods of struggle to a situation in which armed activity has been almost entirely suspended. The government’s claim that the communists have been beaten is, moreover, one that the CPT itself regards as having been made purely on military grounds — in total disregard of all-important political and economic factors. In fact, the primary factors contributing to government success since 1980 have been external ones. The political, social and economic causes underlying communist activity in Thailand remain. Some attempt has admittedly been made by the government to remedy these ills. But in the crucial areas of establishing a durable democratic process and correcting social injustices, little has been really achieved.

Future Trends In line with resolutions adopted by its Fourth National Congress, the CPT has succeeded in maintaining its three key organizational components at the level of the beginning of the insurgency in 1965. In addition, the underlying causes of popular dissatisfaction remain largely unchanged. To this extent, the CPT is likely to continue to survive. At the same time, most Thais are staunchly anticommunist and are well aware of the course of events in the neighbouring communist-ruled countries of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The Thai people, as a whole, are under no illusions that communism can solve the problems faced by this nation.

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This fact is well recognized by the CPT which has, as a result, altered its approach and now emphasizes in its united front activities the importance of a national democratic revolution. Communism perse is not mentioned. Meanwhile, on the international front, the party awaits a shift in the relationship between China and Vietnam, or between China and the USSR. Should such changes evolve, the CPT will undoubtedly seek to exploit some advantage. Domestically, communist efforts are likely to be focused on maintaining tight coordination among its scattered units and central committee members. Communists will also be doing their best to monitor the situation in urban, rural and border areas, and where possible, manipulate events to its advantage. We can safely assume that the CPT will be seeking opportunities to exploit and escalate incidents and crises to a point where the government may be hard-pushed to control them. In such an eventuality, communist cadres would then attempt to step in and manipulate the direction of events. The abortive coup of 9th September 1985 in Bangkok provides graphic illustration of the sort of explosive political and military instability the CPT is in a position to exploit. Had the crisis not been swiftly defused that day and had protracted fighting broken out in Bangkok, there is every reason to believe that communist cadres would have stepped in and made their presence felt. Admittedly an upheaval of that nature represents a worst case scenario. But should the government fail to maintain its vigilance on the assumption that the communists have now been definitively beaten, the dangers will certainly multiply. In the last analysis, it remains up to the government to determine to what extent it will monitor and react to the communist threat.

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APPENDIX Communist Insurgency in Thailand: A Chronology of Key Events. 1933: Thailand passes its first anti-communist legislation. 1942: The Communist Party of Thailand holds its First National Congress. 1946: Thailand abolishes its anti-communist laws as the price of Soviet agreement to its entry into the United Nations Organization. 1947: The coup of Field Marshal Phibulsonggram ends the period of relative freedom enjoyed by the CPT. 1948: Arrests of communist activities are widespread. 1952: The CPT holds its Second National Congress. The Thai government passes an Anti-communist Act outlawing the party and a crackdown on suspected communists follows. The late 1950s: The first CPT cadres receive political and military training in China, Laos and Vietnam. 1961 : The CPT holds its Third National Congress charting a Maoist strategy of rural-based armed struggle. 1962: In line with its Third National Congress resolutions, the CPT establishes a northeastern jungle headquarters to direct future military operations, and a Farmers’ Liberation Association to mobilize potential support. The clandestine Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT) begins broadcasting from southwestern China as of March. 1964: The Thai Independence Movement (TIM) is established as a communist united front organization in November.

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1965: The Thai Patriotic Front joins TIM as a CPT front organization. In November the two merge to form the Thai United Patriotic Front. Chinese Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi announces January that a war of national liberation is soon to begin in Thailand.' August 7: Commmunist guerrillas launch their first attack on security forces in N a Kae District of Nakhon Phanom Province. December: The Communist Suppression Operations Command is established in Bangkok. 1966: January: Counter-insurgency sweeps in Nakhon Phanom and Sakon Nakhon Provinces fail to achieve real success against local insurgents. Early in the year, CPT insurgents begin conducting armed propaganda meetings in the Northeast. 1967: The 09/10 Plan for village security is launched in January. Ranking communist leaders are rounded up in Bangkok and other areas in February and August. In the Northeast, an upsurge of incidents occurs in February and March, but subsequently the level of conflict declines to a level only slightly above that of 1966. A February clash in Nan Province marks the beginning of the insurgency in the North. At the end of the year the Royal Thai Army takes over responsibility for counter-insurgency operations from CSOC. 1968: Fighting spreads to the Loei-Phitsanulok-Phetchabun tri-province border area. CPT bases are established in Nan and Chiang Rai. 1969: The CPT establishes the Supreme Command of the People’s Liberation Army of Thailand as its military command and coordinating body in January. The insurgency spreads to the Tak and the Burmese border area with attacks on road construction teams 180

between Mae Sot and Umphang. 1969-1970: The insurgency spreads south from the Nakhon Si Thammarat-Surat Thani and Trang-Phattalung provincial border areas in lowland Phattalung and further south Into Song kh la and Satun. 1 972: The RTA’s First Division is moved from Bangkok to the tri-province area in the North for counter-insurgency operations, but withdrawn in April after suffering heavy losses. In the Central South, the RTA's Fourth Army under General San Chitpatima begins more aggressive suppression operations. 1973: The arrest of activists agitating for a new constitution sparks major riots and clashes between students and security forces in Bangkok (October). The triumvirate of Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn, Deputy Prime Minister Prapass Charusathiara and Thanom’s son, Colonel Narong Kittikachorn, leaves the country for a period of exile. A three-year experiment in open politics begins. A statement released by the CPT to mark the anniversary of its December 1942 founding emphasizes the party’s commitment to a Maoist strategy of rural-based armed struggle, but urges expansion of both rural and urban united front work. 1974: In June the Communist Suppression Operations Command changes its name to the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). 1976: A military coup and the formation of the National Administrative Reform Council mark the end of open democracy. Following violence at Thammasat University, some 3,000 students are arrested in a countrywide crackdown. The anti- leftist wave and the vigorously anticommunist regime of Thanin Kraivixien spurs an exodus of an estimated 2,000 left-wing activists and intellectuals to CPT-controlled rural areas and goes far 181

to strengthen the party’s base. In the year following the October coup, CPT jungle forces are estimated to •expand from 8,000-9,000 to around 12,000. 1977: An October meeting in a CPT base area' establishes a ‘Coordinating Committee for Patriotic and Democracy-loving Forces’, chaired by a CPT Central Committee member and including representatives of the Socialist Party, the National Student Centre of Thailand, and labour and farmers’ leaders. 1977 and 1978: In accordance with Central Committee directives, CPT forces step up military operations across the country. Statistics of incidents indicate a rise in communist military activity of the order of 20 per cent. The security forces also increase their operations. 1979: Vietnamese forces oust the Chinese-backed Pol Pot regime from Phnom Penh in January and drive west to overrun the whole of Cambodia. The invasion triggers a rift within the CPT between the dominant proChinese faction and dissidents supporting the Vietnamese. In May, Laotian authorities begin expelling proChinese CPT elements from Laotian soil. In July, the China-based Voice of the people of Thailand goes off the air, underscoring Chinese interest in improving relations with the Thai government. The CPT defection rate triples over the course of the year while security force casualties drop by nearly 20 per cent. 1980: April: Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond issues Directive No. 66/2523 stressing the need for political measures to be given priority over military operations in combatting communism. October; Seksan Prasertgul, a former student leader who joined the insurgency in the aftermath of the Thammasat violence of 1976, surrenders to government officials with his wife, Jiranan.

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Therdpoom Chaidee, a former Bangkok labour leader, surrenders to the government in Nong Khai, accusing the CPT of being completely dominated by China. 1 981 : January: Khaiseng Suksai, former deputy leader of the Socialist Party, surrenders io the government. February: Thirayuth Boonmee, another noted former student leader and leading figure in the CPTsponsored Coordinating Committee for patriotic and Democratic Forces (CCPDF), surrenders to government officials after leaving the Phuphan mountains in the Northeast. April: Damri Ruengsutham, one of the CPT’s sevenman politburo, is arrested at a road-block in Ban Chong chang, in Surat Thani’s Na San district. He later claims to have been on a mission to negotiate with the government. January-April: Operation Phamuang Padetsuek, one of the largest counter-insurgency drives ever launched by the Royal Thai Army, pushes CPT forces out of their Khao Khor stronghold in Phetchabun, a key position in the tri-province base area. June: The CPT attempts to initiate cease-fire talks with the government in order to join forces against what it calls“acommon Vietnamese enemy!' The government rejects the offer, insisting CPT guerrillas surrender. June-November: The CPT’s Fourth National Congress is held in a series of staggered meetings in different regions and China. It reaches a compromise resolution substantially adjusting military strategy while adhering to a course of armed struggle. 1982: March: CPT Camp 508, a major base complex in the Chong Chang area of Surat Thani’s Na San district, falls to government assaults after protracted clashes. A series of satellite camps are also seized. March: In the North, Operation Suriyapong targets and captures the communist stronghold of Doi Pha Chi in Ban Luang district of Nan. 183

May: Some 1,500 CPT guerrillas and sympathizers of Hmong tribal stock surrender to government forces in Loei. In Operation Kriangkrai troops overrun the CRT’s northern nerve centre in Phu Khad — Phu Niang mountains of the Loei-Phitsanulok provincial border. May: The government confirms reports that CPT Secretary General, Mit Samanan (or Charoen Wangnarm) has died and that, according to Maj-Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, RTA Director of Operations, all major CPT strongholds have been smashed. August: Some 7,400 Hmong tribal people, CPT supporters, surrender to the government in the Hin Rong Ka area of Phitsanulok’s Nakhon Thai District, part of the CPT’s tri-border base area. September: Udom Srisuwan, a CPT politburo member and former secretary of the CPT-sponsored CCPDF surrenders to the government. December: 216 CPT guerrillas surrender from CPT work-zone 444 in Yasothon’s Loeng Nok Tha District. This marks the first mass defection of CPT forces proper since the party’s Fourth Congress. 1983: January: Mass defections continue in the Northeast with 83 surrendering from CPT work-zone III in Nakhon Phanom’s Khamchayee District; 263 from Na Kae District, also in Work Zone III; and 76 from Work Zone 333 in Udon Thani. September: ISOC drops 12 provinces from its Type I “very active" (insurgency) classification. Of the original 16, the remaining four are: Nan, Mukdahan, Surat Thani and Nakhon Si Thammarat. October: In an ISOC report, the government announces it has scored “total victory" over the CPT and destroyed all the party’s major strongholds. November: 33 CPT guerrillas surrender in the CPT’s southern Nan Work Zone, the first of a series of surrenders in Nan. November: 164 insurgents surrender at an officially

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sponsored ceremony in the RTA’s Sirinthorn Camp, Pattani. November: 500 Karen and Hmong tribal guerrillas and their dependents surrender at a ceremony in Sangkha District of Kanchanaburi. November: Large government forces .continue a massive 'psyops* offensive, Operation Bloodless in Nan. Surrenders continue. December: Some 5,000 CRT guerrillas and dependents — mostly of hilltribe stock — who have surrendered since the beginning of 1983 in the- North — stage a mass surrender ceremony in Nan. 1984: March: ISOC Assistant Chief of Staff, Lt-Gen Juthai Saengthaweep, announces CPT forces nation-wide have been reduced to some 1,000-1,200 armed effectives. July: 22 CPT suspects are rounded up in a series of raids in Bangkok, including alleged Central Committee members, Pirun Chatvanitgul, Manot Methongkul and Prasong Arunsantirot. 1985: November: RTA Chief-of-Staff, Gen. Chavalit Yongchaiyudh claims CPT elements were involved in the abortive September 9 coup attempt and states that “the war with the Communist Party of Thailand is not over yet.”

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