The Siege of Amida (359 CE) 8370518877, 9788370518875

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Institute of History and International Relations Faculty of Humanities Siedlce University

The Siege of Amida (359 CE)

Kaveh Farrokh Katarzyna Maksymiuk Javier Sánchez Gracia

Siedlce 2018

Authors: Kaveh Farrokh (Langara College, Vancouver, Canada), Katarzyna Maksymiuk (Siedlce University, Poland), Javier Sánchez Gracia (HRM ediciones, Zaragoza, Spain)

Reviewer: Assist Prof. Dr. Ercüment Yildirim (Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam University, Turkey) The results of the research carried out under the research theme No. 452/16/S (Army of ancient Iran in comparative background) were financed from the science grant granted by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education The Book is dedicated to ‘EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES’ Editorial Committee: Andrzej Barczak, Andrzej Borkowski, Mikołaj Bieluga, Grażyna Ciepiela, Janina Florczykiewicz (przewodnicząca), Robert Gałązkowski, Jerzy Georgica, Arkadiusz Indraszczyk, Beata Jakubik, Jarosław Kardas, Wojciech Kolanowski, Agnieszka Prusińska, Zofia Rzymowska, Sławomir Sobieraj, Stanisław Socha, Maria Starnawska, Grzegorz Wierzbicki, Waldemar Wysocki

© Copyright by Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities, Siedlce 2018 © Copyright by Katarzyna Maksymiuk (Institute of History and International Relations), Siedlce 2018

ISBN 978-83-7051-887-5 Scientific Publishing House of Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities (www.wydawnictwo.uph.edu.pl) Typesetting and text makeup: Anita Smyk, Ed. I Recreations of the Savārān by Ardashir Radpour (Courtesy: Ardashir Radpour & Holly Martin) Cover design: Adam Lech Kubik Print: ELPIL Siedlce

Acknowledgements The book The Siege of Amida (359 CE) is the result of several years of collaboration between the authors who undertake daily research on the history of pre-Islamic Iran. The present work is primarily addressed to students of history who acquire their first experiences in exploring the history of the Near East. We hope that it will help readers with a fascinating topic and will encourage them to continue their studies on ancient military. We would like to express our gratitude to everyone whose work helped to bring this volume to press, above all our sincere thank to Allan LANGDALE (University of California at Santa Cruz, USA), Patryk SKUPNIEWICZ (Siedlce University, Poland), Ercüment YILDIRIM (Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam University, Turkey) and Museum With No Frontiers / Discover Islamic Art (Vienna, Austria).

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TABLE OF CONTENS

Introduction

9

Political situation in the 3rd-first half of 4th century CE The basis of the conflict

11

Prelude to the War-religious aspects

21

The wars (337-350)

27

The Sasanian Army in 4th century CE

30

Overview of Sasanian Siege Warfare

49

The Roman Army in 4th century CE

62

Overview of Roman Siege Warfare

85

The siege of Amida

102

Consequences of fall

115

Appendix: Select passages from sources

121

Bibliography

145

Figures

173

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Introduction

Amida (modern Diyarbakır) was a town situated on the west bank of the upper Tigris1. In the 4th century CE was included into the system of the Roman defensive strategy in Northern Mesopotamia. Together with Bezabde on Western Tigris, Singara on the Southern slope of Jebel Sinjar mountaine and Nisibis in center, Amida constituted the points of military importance. Amida was the city which was to protect for Greater Sophene2. Circa 337, the city was rebuilt and heavily fortified by Constatius II, which was, most likely, inspired by capturing of the city two years earlier by Narseh. In 359, Šāpur II (r. 309-379) led his army against Rome. This campaign became the break-even point in the power balance of the border lands. After seventy-three days he succeeded to break the defenses and sack the city. Within the fortifications of Amida, there were some 20 thousand people including the refugees who searched for shelter. Its primary garrison was the legio V Parthica, additional six legions together with auxiliary troops, city inhabitants and the crowd of the refugees from the neighboring villages. After the fall of the city most of the Roman leaders were executed, residential area was destroyed and the prisoners were deported to Xuzestān3.

1

PARLA 2005; YILDIRIM 2012a: 455-456. Jacob the Recluse, 7. 3 Thaˁālibī, 530. 2

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The fall of Amida not only humiliated the Romans, but also had wider consequences for the strategic position of Rome in the border area. The destruction of the city gave to Iran a strategic advantage in future conflicts. The basic narrative source for study of the battle of Amida is Ammianus Marcellinus’ Res Gestae. Out of his work, originally consisting of 39 books, the description of events of years 353-378. Ammianus did participate in the Roman campaign in Mesopotamia and in operations at Amida in 359. Ammianus accompanied the Emperor Julian (r. 361-363) on his disastrous expedition in 363. As an eyewitness and close collaborator of Ursicinus (magister equitum per Orientem)4, he was in good position to obtain first-hand information, either through direct contact with fellow-military officers or through the access to the official documents (like the letter from Šāpur II to Constantine)5. He described in detail Sasanian tactics, siege vehicles and armament. The question of diligence and creditibility of Ammianus Marcellinus, which is crucial for the analyze of the events, was thoroughly studied and despite some doubts the work is found of extraordinary importance for historical studies6.

4

BRODKA 2010: 15. Ammianus Marcellinus, XVII 5. 3-9. 6 ROWELL 1964; CRUMP 1975; SABBAH 1978; BLOCKLEY 1988; LENSKI 2007. 5

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Political situation in the 3rd-first half of 4th century CE The basis of the conflict Utilizing the weakening of the Arsacids a coalition headed by Ardašīr, son of Pābag, arose against the Parthian (Pahlav) dynasty in 221 CE7. After defeating of the armies of Ardavān IV (r. 216-224) at the plain of Hormzdagān, on 30 Mehr/28 April 224 CE, Ardašīr I (r. 224-242) declareed himself the Šāhānšāh (King of Kings) of Iran8. The change of the dynasty was perceived in the Empire as a potential threat for the position of Rome in the Near East9. Based on Cassius Dio “He [Ardašīr] accordingly became a source of fear to us; for he was encamped with a large army so as to threaten not only Mesopotamia but also Syria, and he boasted that he would win back everything that the ancient Persians had once held, as far as the Grecian Sea, claiming that all this was his rightful inheritance from his forefathers”10 and Herodian “The entire continent opposite Europe, separated from it by the Aegean Sea and the Propontic Gulf, and the region called Asia he wished to recover for the Persian empire. Believing these regions to be his by inheritance, he declared that all the countries in that area, including Ionia and Caria, had been ruled by Persian governors, beginning with Cyrus, who first made the Median empire Persian, and ending with Darius, 7

Dio Cassius, LXXX 3. 1-2; Herodian, VI 2. 1; Agathias, II 27; II 64; MAKSYMIUK 2000: 135-157. 8 Ṭabarī, 819; WIDENGREN 1971: 711; FELIX 1985: 26. 9 SCHIPPMANN 1990: 10-79; WIESEHÖFER 2001: 151-221. 10 Dio Cassius, LXXX 4. 1: Page | 11

the last of the Persian monarchs, whose kingdom was seized by Alexander the Great. He asserted that it was therefore proper for him to recover for the Persians the kingdom which they had formerly possessed”11, it might, therefore seem that the intention of the Sasanians was the restoration of the “Achaemenid Great Persia”. However based on the inscription of Šāpur I (r. 242-272) on the Ka’be-ye Zartošt at Naqš-e Rostam, which employs the title of “MLKʾn MLKʾ ʾyrʾn W ʾnyrʾn/šāhān šāh ērān ud anērān” (King of Kings of the Iranians and non-Iranians) it must be assumed that the Sasanians did not consider the border lands being truly Iranian territories12. The Sasanian military operations of the 3rd century cannot be found the attempts of retribution of the Achaemenid lands13. The main goal of the monarchs from the new dynasty was weakening the position of the Rome in the region and not moving the border towards the Mediterranean Sea14. The analyse of the military actions carried by the first Šāhānšāhs in the West reveals that the foundation of their expansive measures was, in fact, continuation of the policy of the last Arsacids15. Until the second half of the second century CE the border between Rome and Iran was marked by the Euphrates, with Mesopotamia regarded as an integral part of the Parthian state. The importance of this region 11

Herodian, VI 2. 2. ŠKZ 1-2/2/2-3; GIGNOUX 1971: 83-93; ALRAM, BLETLEMARQUAND, SKJÆRVØ 2007: 11-40. 13 KETTENHOFEN 1984: 188; CANEPA 2010: 563-596. 14 KETTENHOFEN 1984: 180; KETTENHOFEN 2002a: 49-75. 15 YARSHATER 1971: 531. 12

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resulted from its strategic location and and the trading routes leading through16. The shifting of the border took place due to the actions of Septimius Severus (r. 193-211), who established the provinces of Mesopotamia and Osrhoene. The main city in the region, such as Zeugma, Edessa, Carrhae, Singara, Rhesaina and Nisibis fell under the Roman rule17. Since 214, when the local dynasty of Ḥaṭrā was ousted, Rome exercised control over kingdom of Adiabene18. Removing of the Parthian dynasty in Iran resulted with rapprochement of Ḥaṭrā to Rome. It seems that the first attempts to capture the city by Ardašīr were caused by the associations of the local aristocracy with the Parthian royal family19. Šāhānšāh’s decision could also be inspired by the trade competition between Ḥaṭrā and Ḥira20 and striving to control of trade routes with the Far East. The reasons of the first Romano-Sasanian war are obscure. It seems obvious that the main goal of both sides was gaining control over border-zone cities. However the fact that only Ḥaṭrā, associated with the Arsacids was supported by Rome. The strongest bastion of the opposition to the “new rule” proved to be Armenia. Sources agree that the sons of Ardavān found sanctuary in Armenia where they could prepare to further struggle with Sasanian usurper21. 16

RASCHKE 1978: 630; DREXHAGE 1982: 17; YOUNG 2001: 188-190. 17 BIRLEY 1971: 183; ANGELI BERTINELLI 1979: 39. 18 MARCIAK 2017: 255-418. 19 POTTER 1987: 154. 20 MAKSYMIUK 2017. 21 Dio Cassius, LXXX 3. 3; Zonaras, XII 15. Page | 13

Armenia took up military actions against Ardašīr, motivated by the defense of the local Parthian royal lineage22 (According to Iranian concept of royal power the legality of his claim to power over Ērānšahr was assured only by the divine royal glory, farr(ah)/xᵛarənah which was transferred through blood ties and included all family members). The alliance of Armenia with Rome was specifically confirmed by the actions taken by Severus Alexander (r. 222-235) in course of his Persian expedition23, which allows different interpretation of the Romano-Iranian conflict. The activity of Balaš (VI)24, the resistance of the Arab tribes25 and first of all remaining the power of the Arsacids in Armenia26 were potential dangers for the new Persian king. Based on this fact, it is justified to conclude that the conflicts were waged not only over the control over border lands. It could ba assumed that the goal of war waged Severus Alexander could be re-establishing of the the Arsacids on the throne of Iran. It seems, Roman “Parthian” policy which played decessive role in Western direction of the Operations of the first Sasanian king27.

22

Agathangelos, I 19. Herodian, VI 5. 1; Movsēs Khorenats'i, II 71-72; HA, Sev. Alex. LXI 8. 24 The coins in Seleucia were struck until 227/228; MCDOWEL 1935: 200; SELLWOOD 1971: 290. 25 Ṭabarī, 821. 26 Agathangelos, II 12; Movsēs Khorenats'i, II 71; MAKSYMIUK 2018c. 27 MAKSYMIUK 2000: 135-157; MAKSYMIUK 2005: 41-42. 23

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The conflict started Iranian armies invading northern Mesopotamia in 230 and besieging Nisibis28. The intrusion of Roman troops onto the Iranian territory forced Ardašīr to abandon the siege of Nisibis and to march in the direction of Ctesiphon. In winter of 232 &(, both armies stood under Iranian capital but, most likely, no direct clash occurred. The Iranian campaign terminated with Severus Alexander’s decision to retreat to Antioch29. In years 238-240 Ardašīr conquered Carrhae, Nisibis30 and Ḥaṭrā31. Rome reacted rapidly. Although Emperor Gordian III (r. 238-244) managed to regain Carrhae and Nisibis32, nevertheless he was defeated by Šāpur’s I army in the battle of Pērōz Šāpur in 24433. The peace treaty concluded by Philip the Arab  (r. 244-249) with the Iranian ruler did not introduce any territorial changes in Mesopotamia. Assuming control of Armenia reigned by the Arsacids became of the utmost priority for Šāpur, which explains why Iran made no territorial claims while the Emperor pledged not to intervene in Armenia’s affairs34.

28

Dio Cassius, LXXX 3. 4; Herodian, VI 2. 5-6; Zonaras, XII 15. Herodian, VI 6; Orosius, VII 18; FELIX 1985: 36-38; WINTER 1988: 53; MAKSYMIUK 2005: 43. 30 Zonaras, XII 18; KETTENHOFEN 1982: 21-22; KETTENHOFEN 1995: 159-177. 31 WIESEHÖFER 1982: 437-447; MAKSYMIUK 2017. 32 Syncellus, p. 443; Zonaras, XII 18; KETTENHOFEN 1983, 151-171; EDWELL 2008: 169-172. 33 ŠKZ 5/4/9; Eutropius, IX 2; DODGEON, LIEU 1992: 36-45. 34 Movsēs Khorenats'i, II 72; Zosimos, III 32; According to Zonaras (XII 19) Philip renounced Mesopotamie however ŠKZ is 29

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It must be pointed out that in first half of the third century Armenia was much more than an independent buffer state with no wider cultural context, just placed between two superpowers of the era. The idea of the Iranian character of Arsacid’s Armenia should be accepted without further doubts35. In the inscription of ŠKZ, Armenia was mentioned within the boundries of Ērānšahr36. Armenia was conquered by the Sasanian forces only in 252/25337, and what is especially vague Šāpur gave his son Hormozd-Ardašir the title of Wuzurg Šāh Arminān “Great King of the Armenians”38. In order to prevent any Roman intervention aiming at backing the Arsacids, Šāpur attacked Syria and Cappadocia in 253-25639. In the course of campaign Iranian forces captured Antioch, the main city in Syria40. In the final phase of his military campaign Šāpur destroyed Dura Europos41. During his third war of Šāpur with Rome, Valerian’s (r. 253-260) attempt to hold off the Iranian army ended in his failure in the battle of Edessa, in the course of which silent on that matter; WINTER 1988: 97-107; MOSIGWALBURG 2009: 64. 35 GARSOÏAN 1976; RUSSELL 1987; GOLIYSKI 2013; RAPP 2014; KHURSHUDIAN 2015. 36 ŠKZ 1-2/2/2-3 37 MAKSYMIUK 2007a: 348. 38 ŠKZ 23/18/40-41; KETTENHOFEN 1995: 43-45. 39 MAKSYMIUK 2005: 57-71. 40 ŠKZ 9/7/15; Ṭabarī, 827; Zosimos, I 27; MAKSYMIUK 2007b: 145-153. 41 ŠKZ 10/8/17; KETTENHOFEN 1982: 79-83; MCDONALD 1986: 45-68. Page | 16

the Roman Emperor was captured42. Having plundered Syria and the southern coast of Asia Minor, Iranian troops retreated to Iran43. After the proclamation of Macrianus Major and his two sons as Emperors of Rome in 260, Odenathus, the ruler of Palmyra, backed Gallienus (r. 253268). Taking the advantage of the departure of the usurper’s main forces for Europe, Odenathus seized Emesa. Then leading the Roman troops, he entered Mesopotamia, capturing Nisibis (the city itself backed Šāpur)44 and probably Carrhae45, and encroached on the abandoned territory and, facing no resistence, reached Ctesiphon46. The weakness of the Roman Empire, which came to light during Šāpur’s campaign, enabled Palmyra under the reign of Zenobia to gain control in the Roman east47. The takeover of power by Aurelian (r. 270-275) was followed by the conquest of Palmyra and, in the following year, the destruction of the city48. The demise of Palmyra coincided with the death of Šāpur which was the most probable cause of Iranian army’s passivity. Probably at that time Rome regained temporary control over Northern Mesopotamia (Rome has used its political ties and military 42

ŠKZ 12/9/19; 12/9/20; 14/11/24; Eutropius, IX 7; Festus, XXIII; Lactantius, VII 13; STOLTE 1971: 157-162; CARSON 1982: 461465. 43 KETTENHOFEN 1982, 97-126; LUTHER 2006, 203-219. 44 Zosimos, I 39. 45 KETTENHOFEN 1982: 100. 46 Oracula Sibyllina, XIII 155-171; MAKSYMIUK 1998: 143154; HARTMANN 2001: 162-230. 47 SOUTHERN 2008: 57-82. 48 HARTMANN 2001. Page | 17

strength in the region)49. The resumption of military activities took place in 283, when Carus (r. 282-283)50 captured Ctesiphon51. However, this success was not fully taken advantage of by Rome, because the Emperor died and his son and successor Numerianus (r. 283-284) was soon defeated by Bahrām II (r. 276-293) near Carrhae in the northern Mesopotamia. Carrhae was also conquered by the Iranians52. The reign of Diocletian (r. 284-305) turned out to be decisive for the distribution of power in Mesopotamia. The Emperor modernized the defence system by creating limes named Strata Diocletiana53. “This place [Circesium], which was formerly small and exposed to danger, Diocletian, alarmed by a recent experience, encircled with walls and lofty towers, at the time when he was arranging the inner lines of defence on the very frontiers of the barbarians, in order to prevent the Persians from overrunning Syria, as had happened a few years before with great damage to the provinces”54. At the beginning of Diocletian’s Reign, the Roman garrisons stationed in Mesopotamia in Singara, Nisibis, Sura and Circesium. 49

Zosimos, I 60. 1: Aurelius Marcelinus as praefectus Mesopotamiae; KETTENHOFEN 1986: 144; WINTER 1988: 128. 50 Anon. p. Dionem, 198; Eutropius, IX 18; Festus, XXIV; Movsēs Khorenats'i, II 79; WINTER 1988: 130-137. 51 DIGNAS, WINTER 2007: 26. 52 MAKSYMIUK 2015: 46. 53 EADIE 1996: 72-82; LEWIN 2002: 91-101; MOSIGWALBURG 2009: 98-99. 54 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXIII 5. 2. Page | 18

In 290 Diocletian was to introduce Trdat (Tiridates; r. 298?-330?) of the Arsacid dynasty to the Armenian throne55. These actions could result from the agreement made between Diocletian and Bahrām II in 28856. This situation would lead to weakening of the position of Narseh (r. 272-293) the youngest son of Šāpur I, who ruled Persarmenia (Armenia Maior) after his father’s death57. Although Agathangelos testified that the Sasanians were forced out of Armenia58, however, following the inscription from Pāikūlī describing the events of 29359 it must be assumed that Narseh retained the power in Persarmenia60. After the death of Bahrām II a serious crisis of the Iranian empire took place. The coronation of Bahrām III (r. 293)61, which, against established rules of succession62 resulted in the mutiny of the aristocracy in course of which the power in Iran took over Narseh (r. 293-305) who until that time held the office of šāh Arminān63. In 296, taking advantage of Diocletian’s engagement in Egypt64, Narseh

55

Movsēs Khorenats'i, II 82; Agathangelos, III 18; CHAUMONT 1969, 95-96; TOUMANOFF 1969: 233-281; KETTENHOFEN 1995: 48-55. 56 FELIX 1985: 105; WINTER 1988: 141-142. 57 WEBER 2012. 58 Agathangelos, III 21. 59 HUMBACH, SKJÆRVØ 1980. 60 KETTENHOFEN 2008: 484-490. 61 WEBER 2010: 353-394. 62 Agathias, IV 24. 6-8. 63 WEBER, WIESEHÖFER 2010: 103-105. 64 MAKSYMIUK 2010: 393-400. Page | 19

attacked Roman Armenia and Syria65. The army dispatched against him, commanded by Galerius, was crushed by the Iranian forces between Carrhae and Callinicum66. After Diocletian’s arrival in Antioch, a new campaign began. A part of the army under the command of Diocletian marched into Mesopotamia, while Galerius’s main forces, aided by Danubian legions, struck from Armenia, triumphing over Narseh’s army in the battle of Satala in 298. After the battle Galerius moved south and reached Asorestan. However, because of Diocletian’s orders, he did not make an attempt of capturing Ctesiphon67. The peace treaty concluded in 298, due to which Narseh withdrew from Armenia and renounced his claim to the Trans-Tigritania and established Roman protectorate in Iberia68. Apart from the territorial changes, a decision concerning Nisibis, which turned out to be of paramount importance for the later Roman-Iranian relations, was made. Namely Diocletian made this city the only place for trade exchange between the two countries, putting Rome in

65

Ammianus Marcellinus, XXIII 5. 11; Movsēs Khorenats'i, II 7982; Zonaras, XII 31. 66 Orosius, VII 25. 9; Eutropius, IX 24; MAKSYMIUK 2005: 99100. 67 Festus, XXV; Eutropius, IX 25; MOSIG-WALBURG 2009, 91121; MAKSYMIUK 2015: 48-49. 68 Petrus Patricius, frag. 13-14; Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 7. 9; CHAUMONT 1969: 126; WINTER 1988, 152-215; WINTER 1989: 555-571; DIGNAS, WINTER 2007: 122-130; MOSIGWALBURG 2009: 122-157; WEBER, 2012: 231-248. Page | 20

the privileged position in relation to Iran69. The significance of this decision lied in the fact that after the destruction of Ḥaṭrā, Dura Europos and Palmyra the trade routes moved from the Euphrates to the Tigris70. Prelude to the War-religious aspects It would seem, that religious activities of Constantine I (r. 306-337) ushered in a new phase in the Roman-Iranian relations, juxtaposing Christian Rome against Mazdean Iran71. It is not unequivocal. In Late Sasanian propaganda the state and religion were depicted as two inseparable elements: “Religion and state were born of one womb, joined together and never to be sundered”72. It must be pointed out that at the break of 3rd and 4th centuries, Iran was not only multi-cultural state but excercised also religious diversity. The idea that in 3rd century the orthodox model of Mazdaism was already fully developed finds no foundations. Naturally the important function of the the Zoroastrian priests on the courts of the early Sasanians cannot be challenged73, and, what is more, all the monarchs of the Sasanian dynasty

69

Petrus Patricius, frag. 14; BLOCKLEY 1984: 33; WINTER 1988: 192-199; The Iranian merchants were forced to pay 25% as opposed to the traditional 12.5% duty of the selling price (POLLARD 2000: 213-218). 70 DIGNAS, WINTER 2007: 196. 71 BARNES 1985a: 126-136; FRENDO 2001: 57-69; POGGI 2003: 61-95; MOSIG-WALBURG 2009: 267-282. 72 Nāma-ye Tansar, 33-34; WIESEHÖFER 2001: 170. 73 WIESEHÖFER 1993: 367-368. Page | 21

declared worshipping Oḥrmazd74, however even Iranian sources mention that the works on unification of the doctrine were being only carried (Tansar, Kartēr)75. Perhaps influenced by the change of the attitude of the Empire towards Christianity, Šāpur II commissioned Ādurbād and Mahrspandān the final codification of the Avesta76. First rise of Christian communities on the territory of Iran took place in the Parthian period77. In the middle of 3rd century CE as a result of population deportation from Roman Syria to Iran the number of Christians in the country considerably increased78. It seems that during this period Christians were tolerated minority. Admittedly the Mazdean Priest Kartēr inscription saying about struggles with other religions endured however out of separate acts of martyrdom in the Bahrām II court there is no evidence on general persecution of Christians79. There is an interesting opinion of Eusebius of Caesarea relating to Iranian rulers activities. He wrote that due to deportations Christians avoided persecutions from the Roman Emperors side “Why, the barbarians themselves may boast now of the contrast their conduct presents to these 74

ŠKZ; ALRAM 1999: 67-76. HOFFMANN 1975: 316-325; SHAKI 1981: 117-119; ZAEHNER 2002: 186; CAREY 2008: 32-40. 76 Dēnkard, IV 20; POURSHARIATI 2008: 334; DARYAEE 2009: 84-86. 77 JULLIEN, JULLIEN 2003. 78 Chronicle of Se'ert, 220-221; KETTENHOFEN 1996: 297-308; MOSIG-WALBURG 2010: 117-156. 79 MAKSYMIUK 2012: 397-405. 75

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creel deeds; for they received and kept in gentlest captivity those who then fled from amongst us, and secured to them not merely safety from danger, but also the free exercise of their holy religion”80. What is more Hormozd II (r. 302-309) sented troops into Syria under the pretext of Christians defence persecuted by Diocletian and Galerius (r. 305311)81. At the beginning of the 4th century the number of Christian communities, both in Iran and in border area was substantial82. Large groups of the confessors were active in Edessa, Nisibis or Ctesiphon83. Just like in case of the idea of Iran being purely “Mazean” country, one must bear in mind that Christianity was not doctrinal or organizational monolith. In terms of organization, Christian communities were subdued to Antiochean patriarchate, however the langauage differences (Christianity in the Eastern part of Empire used mainly Syriac language being the dialect of Western Aramaic) made the unity of the church impossible. Bishop Papa (310-329) of Seleucia-Ctesiphon, was found katholikos in 315 &( which made him equal to the patriarch of Antioch but at the same time it placed him in opposition to vast part of the clergy of Eastern part of Empire84.

80

Eusebius, Vita Constantini, II 53. Lactantius, XV 4; KELLER 2004: 22-27; AUBREVILLE 2009: 415-429. 82 Eusebius, Vita Constantini, IV 8; HAGE 1973: 174-187. 83 BUNDY 2008: 122-124. 84 ASMUSSEN 1983: 931; CHAUMONT 1988: 137-147; WIGRAM 2004: 44-56; WALKER 2006: 92. 81

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Adoption of Christianity in Armenia by Trdat during the early years of Šāpur II’s resulted in closure of the kingdom with Rome85. Trdat’s decision initially placed Armenia in opposition to Rome and even resulted with punitive expedition of Maximinus Daia (309-313)86, however within couple of years the situation of Christianity in Roman Empire changed radically. Despite some uncertainties regarding the chronology of the event87, one might state that after announcement of the Edict of Milan88, the two countries’ relations became closer not only on the religious grounds89 but also politically90 because Constantine warranted the succession of Trdat’s son91. Trdat’s agreement with Constantine was most probably a result of the ruler’s problems with the Armenian opposition strongly associated to the Iranian tradition92. Internal conflicts in Armenia increased especially after the marriage of prince Wahan Mamikonean with Hormozd-

85

Sozomen, II 8. 1; DE DECKER 1979: 99-116; THOMSON 2002: 159-169; KETTENHOFEN 2002b: 45-104; SEIBT 2002: 125-133; MAKSYMIUK 2011: 48-56; DMITRIEV 2012; STOPKA 2016: 25-35. 86 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica, IX 8. 2-4; CASTRITIUS 1968/9: 94. 87 SEIBT 2002: 125-133; DIGNAS, WINTER 2007: 180. 88 Lactantius, XXXIV 1-XXXV 1; XLVIII 1-12. 89 On presence of the representative of Armenian Church on the Council of Nicaea in 325: Aristakes BUNDY 2008: 137. 90 HEWSEN 1986: 22-23; THOMSON 1997: 277-289. 91 Movsēs Khorenats'i, III 5; ASDOURIAN 1911: 140-141; CHAUMONT 1996: 55-66. 92 DIGNAS, WINTER 2007: 180; BUNDY 2008: 137. Page | 24

duxtak93, daughter of Hormozd II. It must be borne in mind that Armenian aristocratic houses preserved the cult of the Zoroastrian god Mithra (Mid. Pers. Mihr), confirmed still at the end of the 5th century94. Adoption of Christianity by Trdat did not cause mass abandonment of traditional religion by all the subjects. Religious policy of Constantine influenced the status of Christianity in Iran95. The Emperor in his letter directed to Šāpur II appeared as guardianship of Christians as well as of Iranian ones: “Having heard, too, that there were many churches of God in Persia, and that large numbers there were gathered into the fold of Christ, full of joy at this intelligence, he resolved to extend his anxiety for the general welfare to that country also, as one whose aim it was to care for all alike in every nation” 96. After the death of Trdat a group of Armenian Naxarars, in communication with ecclesiastical hierarchy strove to tighten the teis with Rome. Bishop Vrt’anes in his letter addressed to Constantius II (r. 337-361) requested military assistance of the Roman armies in Armenia recalling common cree: “Archbishop Vrt’anes and the bishops under him and all the princes of Greater

93

P'awstos Buzandac'i' IV 50. POURSHARIATI 2008: 392. 95 Lactantius, XLVIII 2-12; DECRET 1979: 91-152; JULLIEN 2009: 119-131. 96 Eusebius, Vita Constantini, IV 8; BARNES 1985a: 131-132; VIVIAN 1987; FRENDO 2001: 57-69. 94

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Armenia, to our lord the emperor Caesar Constantius…do not give this country over to the godless Persians”97. In the year of Constantine death Iranian army invaded north Mesopotamia and Armenia98. Christians were accused of Rome supportment during the war99. It should be emphasized that the actions undertaken against the Christians by Šāpur II were motivated by political and not religious factors. “The pagans (in Persia) slandered the Christians to Shapur, their king, (accusing them) of sending an embassy to the Roman Emperor. Shapur became angry and began to oppress the Christians and destroy their churches”100. Iranian religious policy towards the Christians changed after failed attempt to capture Nisibis in 337, in which important role was played by bishop Jacob101. The same time Šāpur made decision stroke on Christians in Iran. One of those decisions was doubling of taxes102. After 338, during the great Persecution lasting almost 40 years around 35 thousand people died103. It is not certain whether

97

Movsēs Khorenats'i, III 5. MOSIG-WALBURG 2002: 329-347. 99 BROCK 1982; CHAUMONT 1988; MOSIG-WALBURG 2007: 171-186; MAKSYMIUK 2014. 100 Mika’el Rabo, VII 3; BLUM 1980: 11-32. 101 Theodoret, Historia ecclesiastica, II 30. 1-14; JACKSON BONNER 2017: 97. 102 Mar Simon, 2. 135-136. 103 Acta sanctorum martyrum orientalium et occidentalium, 1. 95; Ṭabarī, 819; Chronicle of Arbela, 12; DEVOS 1966: 213-242. 98

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the conversion from Mazdaism to Christianity was punished with death104. The wars (337-350) Šāpur’s II army entered Osrhoene and conqured Constantina (Maximianoupolis) in 312, most likely in order to force the Romans, under the command of Maximinus Daia, to retreat from Armenia105. About 324 Šāpur’s older brother, Hormozd (Hormisdas) fled to the Romans106. Constantine moved to the East, entrusting the command over cavalry to Hormozd however the Roman army was defeated107. The diplomatic negotiations were installed108. Before Iranian attack on Mesopotamia probably c. 336 Šāpur intervened in Armenia. He succeeded in capturing Armenian King Tiran (r. 330?-338)109. However, Iranian prince Narseh’s capture Amida110 and the subsequent loss in the battle of Narasara111 in 336 with the Romans turned out to be a true prelude to the real longlasting conflict112. Constantine then resolved to campaign against Persia 104

Mār Kardag was to be stoned in 358 (WALKER 2006: 66-67), but perhaps the decission of Šāpūr was inspired by the fact that Mār Kardag was a marzbān of Nisibis in the border zone in the period of wars waged with Rome. 105 Malalas, XII, p. 312-313: Ṭabarī, 840. 106 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVI 10. 16; Zosimos, II 27. 1-4. 107 Zonaras, XIII 5. 33; contra Malalas XIII, p. 317-318. 108 Eusebius, Vita Constantini, IV 8-13. 109 P'awstos Buzandac'i' III 20. 110 Theophanes, A.M. 5815. 111 Festus, XXVII. 112 Caesar Constantius was sent to take command of the Eastern frontier; Julian, Orationes, I 9. Page | 27

himself, but the Emperor became sick and death (22 May, 337)113. In this year Šāpur invaded Roman territory. Despite numerous individual victories of the Iranian army in Mesopotamia, Rome was successful in sustaining Nisibis, the main aim of Šāpur’s attacks: “Shapur, king of the Persians, besieged Nisibis for two months after laying waste to Mesopotamia”114. At the break of 337 and 338 Constantius II arrived to Mesopotamia, already abandoned by the Iranian armies115. In 338, however, Šāpur agreed to the release of the royal family of Armenia and to the enthronement of Aršak II (r. 350-367)116. The Roman at that time launched limited, singular raids aimed in devastation of the territories on the left bank of Tigris117. Probably c. 343 Nineveh was captured by Constantius and he transported the captives to Thrace118. The first phase of it, was not particularly fruitful for the Iranians operating in Mesopotamia. Even though they defeated the Roman army in the vicinity of Singara (344, 113

Eusebius, Vita Constantini, IV 56; Eutropius, X 8. 2; Orosius, VII 28. 31; FOWDEN 1994: 146-148. 114 Hieronymus, a. 338, p. 234, 17-18; Theodoret, Historia religiosa, I 11-12; Mika’el Rabo, VII 3; BURGESS 1999: 7-17; MOSIG-WALBURG 2009: 215; MAKSYMIUK 2015: 50-54. 115 Libanius, Orationes, LIX 76; WARMINGTON 1977. 116 Tiran lost his life to Šāpūr. 117 Julian, Orationes, I 17. 118 Libanius, Orationes, LIX 83; DODGEON, LIEU 1992: 329, n. 18. Page | 28

348) twice119, despite several attempts Šāpur was not able to achieve the main goal of his expedition, namely Nisibis (346, 350)120, which still remained under the Roman control121. The encroachment of the nomadic invaders from Central Asia forced Šāpur to turn his attention to the East122. In 350, Magnentius had rebelled and killed the Emperor Constans, claiming the purple. Constantius prepared to move against the usurper, and because of that Gallus (r. 351-354) was made Caesar of the Roman Empire and placed in charge of the defense of the East. For few coming years the military Operations in Mesopotamia were stuck in stelmate123. Šāpur pacified the threat from the East by setting an Alliance with king of the Chionitae, Grumbates124. In the winter of 357/358, Constantius received embassy from the Šāhānšāh who demanded that Rome 119

Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 5. 7; XVIII 9. 3; Libanius, Orationes, LIX 99-120; Festus, XXVII; MOSIG-WALBURG 1999: 330-384; DMITRIEV 2015. 120 Hieronymus, s. a. 346, p. 236, 19; Theophanes, A.M. 5837; A.M. 5841; Zosimos, III 8. 2; Chronichon Paschale, p. 536-539; MAROTH 1979: 239-243; LIGHTFOOT 1988: 105-125. 121 About 345/6.-350 Constantius carried intensive construction works in Mesopotamia, strengthening the defenses of the main Roman fortresses (Jacob of Edessa, 21). 122 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIV 3. 1; XVI 9. 3; HOWARDJOHNSTON 2010; JACKSON BONNER 2017: 98-99. 123 There was only a failed attempt of capturing the town of Batnae, in 353 (Ammianus Marcellinus, XIV 3. 1-4). Errorously Ammianus gives Nohodares as the name of teh commander instead of the title. In reality it was the title of a high rank official (M. Pers. *naxvadār). 124 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVII 5. 1; FELIX 1991. Page | 29

restore the lands surrendered by Narseh. Despite the attempts to instigate negotiations by the diplomats of Constantius it was clear that demanding the conditions impossible for the Emperor to fulfill was in fact renewal of the war by Šāpur125. Warfare was resumed in the spring of the year 359. The Sasanian Army in 4th century CE One of the greatest challenges faced by the Sasanian army (Mid. Pers. Spāh)126 was the vast landmass of the Sasanian Empire with limited military resources127. This necessitated the formation of a well-trained force capable of rapid deployment across the empire to confront military challenges posed along the empire’s western (Roman), northern (Caucasus), southern and Central Asian frontiers128. The Nāma-ye Tansar129 and the Dēnkard130 describe two major groups of warriors in the Sasanian military, the cavalry and the infantry. In practice, the Sasanian army’s primary battlefield asset was the armored cavalry lancers, often supported by other combat arms such as infantry, including close combat troops as well as foot archers, slingers, battle elephants, camel cavalry and auxiliary light 125

Ammianus Marcellinus, XVII 5. 7; Zonaras, XII 9. 25-27; WARMINGTON 1977: 515; DIGNAS, WINTER 2007: 233. 126 SHAHBAZI 1986: 489-499; TAFAZZOLI 2000: 4. 127 JALALI 1383/2004: 48. 128 DODGEON, LIEU 1992; GREATREX, LIEU 2002; POURSHARIATI 2008; DARYAEE 2009; MAKSYMIUK 2015. 129 Nāma-ye Tansar, 12. 130 Dēnkard, IV. Page | 30

cavalry forces131. The deployment of multiple combat arms also facilitated Sasanian siege warfare capabilities, a task in which they equaled the Romans in skill. Estimates of the numerical strength of the professional core (versus total number of fighters that can be mobilized such as levies, etc.) of the Spāh vary with respect to primary sources consulted. Severus Alexander for example claimed to have destroyed “One hundred and twenty thousand of their [Sasanian] cavalry”132. While this would suggest that the early Sasanians were able to field very large numbers of professional cavalry, the credibility of these claims as recorded in the Historia Augusta are now questioned by Western scholarship133. Olbrycht’s detailed analysis of the troop complements of the Parthian and Sasanian military provide totals approximating 120,000150,000 when factoring all possible recruits from provinces, levies and auxiliaries in combination with the professional core134. The Aswārān or Savārān cavalry were to the Spāh’s primary strike arm with Bivar noting “The whole issue of the battle, once an opening appeared, depended on the single overwhelming cavalry charge”135. The function of the armored lance-bearing cavalry was to launch the primary battlefield strike, often preceded by the arrow barrages of 131

FARROKH, KARAMIAN, MAKSYMIUK 2018. HA Sev. Alex. LVI 5. 133 CHARLES 2007: 305-308. 134 OLBRYCHT 2016: 292-296. 135 BIVAR 1972: 289. 132

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foot archers136. The cavalry was placed at the front of Sasanian armies before the battle commenced137, however other types of formations were possible such as an allcavalry doctrine (somewhat similar to the former Parthians), as well as cavalry acting in concert with elephants and infantry. The two-handed “bayonet” type wielding of the Nēzak (lance) appears consistently in reliefs of the early Sasanian era138. The mural painting from Dura-Europos displays a fully armored cavalryman (man and horse) of the Iranian type wielding a lance with his sword hilt projecting from his left side. Dating of the Dura Europos painting is debated among scholars, Mielczarek139 suggesting the 3rd century CE with current scholarship setting this to 232/233-256 or the early Sasanian era140. This early phase of cavalry141 development appears to span to Sasanian defeats in Armenia (298) by Galerius 136

JALALI 1383/2004: 48. INOSTRANCEV 1348/1969: 42. 138 The Nēzak was based on its 12-foot long Parthian lance (Kontos) predecessor that had a sword-like blade of iron socketed onto the lance shaft. National Museum of Tehran, Catalogue: 295299; KHORASANI 2006: 246; SKUPNIEWICZ 2006; SKUPNIEWICZ 2014; FARROKH, KARAMIAN, MAKSYMIUK 2018: 30. 139 MIELCZAREK 1993: 36. 140 NIKONOROV 2005, Note 12; WÓJCIKOWSKI 2013, 233234. 141 In Mesopotamia, horses that were a war tool from the Assyrian period were also used by the Persians. The Persian cavalry have improved their horse war strategies over centuries, learned from communities from Central Asia. These warfare strategies continued to be used by Sasanids. 137

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after which a number of changes to the cavalry’s weaponry, armour and helmets142 were apparently introduced during the reign of Šāpur II. A possible doctrinal shift towards a more heavily armed and armored cavalry lancer, Heliodorus describes Sasanian cavalryman of the 350s CE as having been selected for “chosen for his bodily strength… lifted up by others [onto his saddle] because of his weight”143. Libanius describes the array of weaponry of these cavalrymen as having included “darts, sabres (scimitars?), spears, swords and every warlike implement … carried a lance which needed both hands”144. Heliodorus describes these “bronze men” and their horses as having been covered entirely in “unbreakable” armor that was “proof against any missiles, and is a sure defense against all wounds”145. Describing Sasanian cavalry at the time of Julian’s invasion of Iran in 363, Ammianus Marcellinus describes them as having been “all the companies were clad in iron, and all parts of their bodies were covered with thick plates, so fitted that the stiff joints conformed with those of their limbs; and the forms of human faces were so skilfully fitted to their heads, that, since their entire bodies were plated with metal, arrows that fell upon them could lodge only where they could see a little through tiny openings fitted to the circle of the eye, or where through the tips of their noses they were able to get a little breath. Of these some, who were armed with pikes, stood so motionless that 142

KUBIK 2017. Heliodorus, IX 15. 1; IX 15. 5. 144 Libanius, Orationes, LIX 70. 145 Heliodorus, IX 15. 3. 143

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you would think them held fast by clamps of bronze.”146. Interestingly, Tafazzoli cites a Pahlavi quote Zēnagēn Ištēd pad čafār handām (he is with armour on his four limbs)147, but it is not possible to reference this specifically to the 4th century CE or other Sasanian eras. One of the assault tactics deployed during the Sasanian era is the three-wave attack implemented at the Battle of Nisibis in 350 CE148. Julian reports the first wave as having been lance-bearing armored cavalry followed by archers who would be (the third wave) of another contingent of armored cavalry lancers149. The “archers” were presumably mounted to keep pace with the armored cavalry. The primary advantage of this tactic was that it forced defending infantry to rapidly “switch” their tactics in order to adapt to each type of (lance or missile) assault. Cavalry forces were also deployed in siege operations, notably at Amida in 359150. In this operation, Albanian cavalry was stationed to the north of Amida, the Sakas of Sakastān/Sistān to the city’s West, and the Chionites to the east. Šāpur II and his “royal escort” of elite cavalry situated to the south of the city are reported as having made several assaults towards Amida’s gates151. Šāpur II’s “royal escort” may have been prestige unit known 146

Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 1. 12-13. TAFAZZOLI 1993: 193. 148 MAROTH 1979; LIGHTFOOT 1988. 149 Julian, Orationes, III 11-13. 150 LIGHTFOOT 1989; YILDIRIM 2012a; WÓJCIKOWSKI 2015: 221-226. 151 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 1. 147

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as the Puštigbān (Pahlavi: life guardians) led by PuštigbānSardār152 and who was considered as one of the honored intimates of the Šāhānšāh’s entourage153. Foss proposesthat officers of this unit were identified as Puštigbān-Sālār154. The commander of this unit may have also been known as the Hazārbed (commander of one thousand) cited previously and possibly escorted the king during battles155. It is possible that Ammianus Marcellinus’ report of the “Royal Escort” escorting Šāpur II during his attacks towards the gates of Amida in 359 may have been the Puštigbān. While it is not clear however when exactly this unit had been formed, one possibility may be traced to Šāpur II’s campaign which expelled nomads invading southern Iran to the Arabian Peninsula156. In reference to that campaign Ṭabarī describes Šāpur II as having “he selected one thousand cavalrymen from among the stoutest and most heroic of the troops”157. The Parthian predecessors of the Sasanians did not rely in infantry as a primary battlefield support for their cavalry158. In contrast to the Parthian Ispāδ (army), the Sasanian Spāh maintained a professional infantry force. The Paygān-Sālār would be the commander of the Sasanian 152

FARZIN 1387/2008: 104. TAFAZZOLI 2000: 12. 154 FOSS 2002: 170. 155 MATUFI 1378/1999: 203. 156 DARYAEE 2009: 16-17. 157 Ṭabarī, 838. 158 MIELCZAREK 1993: 55. 153

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infantry unit159, with Kolesnikoff highlighting the importance of such units for the Spāh160. The PaygānSālār (commander of the infantry) is commonly identified as having been ranked second in status by the Spāh in comparison to the Framādār Savārān (commander of Savārān cavalry)161. Inducing from primary sources, Jalali categorizes Sasanian infantry forces into three general classifications:162 (1) the heavily armed and armored Paygān, with a subdivision of Nēzak-Dārān (spearmen) (2) lightly armed infantry or peasant levies and (3) foot archers. The classical sources such as Procopius163 have often provided negative assessments of Sasanian infantry combat performance. These assessments have been challenged by Howard-Johnston164 who cautions against overreliance on primary sources such as Ammianus Marcellinus’ dismissal of the 4th century CE Sasanian infantryman as a poorly equipped serf165. However, as discussed below there are also descriptions of hoplite and even “gladiator” type infantry. While Roman infantry forces were often able to prevail against their Sasanian counterparts166. Ward notes that Sasanian infantry were nevertheless a professional and well159

FOSS 2002: 170. KOLESNIKOFF 1357/1978: 122. 161 NAFISI 1331/1952: 277. 162 JALALI 1382/2003: 15. 163 Proc. Bell. II 14. 164 HOWARD-JOHNSTON 1995: 75. 165 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXXIII 6. 8. 166 SIDNELL 2006: 73. 160

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trained force167. The term Payg (foot-soldier; Arm. Payik)168 has been challenging to discern as this fails to definitively ascertain if this is specifically describing the poorly trained and lightly armed peasant levies recruited at wartime in contrast to the heavily armed, armored and professionally trained combat infantry troops. This may explain the divergences in interpretation among researcher with respect to the Paygān. Penrose169 for example avers that Roman sources often confused professional Sasanian infantry and the poorly armed and trained peasant levies as one single force, when in practice they were separate services. Iranian historians also diverge with respect to the role (battlefield combat vs. support levies) and equipment (weapons, armor) of the Paygān. Sasanologist Daryaee describes the Paygān as being lightly armed with spear only and (for battlefield protection) having a shield but no armor170. Diverging from Daryaee’s analysis, Sasanian military historians Jalali171 and Sami172 define the Paygān as having been the Spāh’s standard professional heavy infantry until the recruitment of the Deylamites in the later Sasanian era173. An indication of the Paygān’s professional status is provided by their registration on the state’s rolls allowing 167

WARD 2009: 31. TAFAZZOLLI 2000: 13. 169 PENROSE 2008: 258. 170 DARYAEE 2009: 46. 171 JALALI 1382/2003: 15. 172 SAMI 1342/1964: 62. 173 FARROKH, KARAMIAN, MAKSYMIUK 2018: 47-48. 168

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them to be paid (like the Aswārān cavalry) for their military services to the empire174. The Paygān’s tasks on the battlefield were to support the cavalry and elephants corps as well as protecting the lightly armored and armed foot archers and light infantry (often peasant levies)175. Heavy professional infantry of this type was evidently in the Spāh’s service from the earliest times of the empire, especially during Šāpur I’s campaigns against Roman East176. The Paygān’s typical close quarters combat gear, are described by Zoka177 and Hekmat178 as sword, dagger and mace (Mid. Pers. warz179). Ziapour has also proposed that the Paygān wore leg armor of the metal (or hardened) lamellar type that would have been worn over leather trousers180. The Romans held the overall advantage over the Sasanians in infantry warfare, however as noted by Lee the Spāh was often able to counterbalance this by deploying their highly effective Savārān cavalry lancers as well as their proficiency in siege warfare181. By the time of Šāpur II, notably by the years prior and during Emperor Julian’s invasion of the Sasanian Empire in 363, the Spāh was reportedly fielding a new type 174

HOWARD-JOHNSTON 1995: 219. JALALI 1383/2004: 37. 176 KETTENHOFEN 1982. 177 ZOKA, IMAM-SHUSHTARI, GHAEM-MAGHAMI 1349/ 1970: 140. 178 HEKMAT 1342/1964: 1089. 179 DOOSTKHAH 2002. 180 ZIAPOUR 1349/1970: 286. 181 LEE 2009: 4. 175

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of infantry described as “hoplites” notably at the siege of Nisibis in 350182. Ammianus reports of a similar reference to Sasanian infantry during Julian’s invasion being: “armed like Murmillos [a type of Roman armored gladiator]”183. No other details are however provided with respect to these “Sasanian gladiators” in terms of their armor, shields or weaponry. One possibility is that these were a contemporary version of the earlier Dura Europos type infantry, but this assumption requires corroboration by the excavation of archaeological data. Another possible and related hypothesis is that the Sasanians may have been developing a “heavier” version of infantry in tandem with the heavier cavalry forces, notably with respect to the requirement that the trooper have exceptional physical strength. This would be consistent with the murmillos or “hoplite” concept that the warrior needing to have powerful arms, shoulders, torso and legs enabling to wield a heavy shield and powerful sword. Ammianus however does not provide specific details on the Sasanian murmillo, which leads to the question of whether the armaments and armor of the Sasanian murmillos were Roman or Sasanian? The Roman murmillo had his right arm protected with manica of tied linen with his left leg protected by a short grave184. This type of partial protection would have left the Sasanian murmillo highly vulnerable to the Roman infantryman (most likely aware of gladiatorial combat techniques)185 who could exploit the (unprotected) 182

Julian, Orationes, III 11. Ammianus Marcellinus, XXIII 6. 83. 184 WIEDEMANN 1992: 41. 185 COULSTON 1998. 183

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left arm and right leg of his opponent. It would appear more likely that the Spāh would have equipped their infantry murmillos with armor, conceivably a mixture of mail worn over lamellar for protection of the torso, with the arms and hands possibly shielded with ring armor or gauntlet respectively. The legs in turn may have also been possibly shielded by ring armor or greaves. For shielding the Roman murmillo was equipped with the standard Scutum shield, however it is improbable that the Sasanian murmillo would have used this given its heavy weight (approximately 10 kilograms)186 in comparison to the lighter but stout wickerwork shield of the Dura Europos type also adopted by Europe’s Germanic tribes187. It is also more likely that the Sasanian murmillos would have been using the standard Sasanian scabbard slide swords of the 4th century CE that were on average 1-1.11 cm in length in comparison to the Roman trooper’s Spatha featuring an average length of 64-81 cm.188. The Paygān were often positioned to the rear of the Aswārān cavalry189, with available sources reporting on two types of combined infantry-cavalry battlefield tactics. One of these is the account of the Battle of Singara (348?) by the Chronicon Anonymum:190 (1) the Aswārān would charge towards enemy lines followed closely behind by the infantry (or murmillos, hoplites?), however (2) as 186

WHEELER, STRAUSS: 2007: 196. BOSS 1993: 25, 56, 66, Fig. 14-18; BOSS 1994: 20-25. 188 Vegetius, II 15. 189 SAMI 1342/1964: 62. 190 Chronicon Anonymum, XXXVI. 187

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the Aswārān approached closer to the enemy appearing as if they were about to engage they would instead part in two groups, one moving to the left and the other to the right in order to (3) allow the infantry following from behind to now approach and engage the enemy front lines. The intention of this technique was to confuse the enemy as to the types of countermeasures to use as just as they braced themselves for the anticipated armored mounted lancers they would be forced to confront an infantry assault instead. The skill of Parthian and Sasanian archery191 has been acknowledged by a number of Classical sources, such as Herodian192 or Ammianus Marcellinus193. Sasanian archery served four functions for the Spāh: (1) support of Savārān lance thrusts (2) repelling enemy infantry and/or cavalry assaults (3) support of siege operations against enemy fortresses and cities and (4) support of counter-siege operations against enemy besiegers attempting capture Sasanian (and/or Sasanian-held) cities and fortresses. The Tirbad (arrow commander) was the leader of a contingent of archers, with the term also signifying a regional command term as Tirbad units often acted as government security forces in the empire’s villages. Foot archer units were integral to Sasanian battle doctrine, often bombarding enemy formations from a static position194 with

191

DMITRIEV 2016: 18. Herodian, VI 5. 1-6. 193 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 1. 13. 194 HEKMAT 1342/1964: 1088. 192

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massive missile salvoes in set-piece battles195. Expert archers could form elite units and were evidently accorded a high status in the Spāh. In set-piece battles, foot archers would deliver missile barrages into the enemy ranks to weaken them prior to the attacks of armored cavalry lancers. Foot archers were also entrusted with the suppression of enemy archery as well as defending the main army against enemy cavalry and infantry attacks. Depending on the commander’s tactical choices, foot archers could also advance forward to bombard the enemy with massive missile volleys196. For shielding against enemy counter-archery, foot archers often placed large palisades to their front. Siege operations often relied heavily on foot archers with Ammianus noting of a “shower of missiles from the archers” during the siege of Amida197. Expert archers could also be used for the infiltration of besieged fortresses and cities. This occurred also at Amida when seventy royal archers infiltrated one of the city’s towers198. The archers then directed their arrows into the city with accurate fire into the city’s interior in coordination with Šāpur II’s general assaults outside of Amida. The besieged Roman forces however eliminated the small infiltration force once their arrow supplies were exhausted.

195

ZAKERI 1995: 51. ZAKERI 1995: 51. 197 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 5. 1; XXIII 6. 83; XXIV 6. 18. 198 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 5. 5. 196

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The foot archer suspended a buckler from his shoulder for the protection of his head and neck199. Nevertheless foot archers were very vulnerable if caught at close quarters after exhausting their supplies of arrows, as they lacked the countermeasures necessary to repel enemy infantry attacking their positions. For this reason, combat infantry would often be placed to the rear of the archers at the onset of the battle200. The (arrow-less) archers would relocate to the rear of the combat infantry, who having moved to the front, would now be engaging the attacking enemy troops201. The (foot and horse) archer’s equipment consisted of the bow and bowcase (Mid. Pers. kamām)202, a wide variety of arrows, quiver and finger guards (to reduce pressure on the fingers when drawing the heavy compound bow). The composite bow’s ability to efficiently convert potential (stored) energy to kinetic (propulsion) energy facilitated the Spāh’s doctrine of firing missiles towards the enemy from a safe distance. The power of the compound bow was the result of its construction with different combinations of wood (i.e. cornus, mulberry, etc. at the bow’s core), various types of horn, sinew and glue203. Bows were conventionally held by the left hand with the right used to fire the arrows.

199

INOSTRANCEV 1926: 25, note 3. HEKMAT 1342/1964: 1088. 201 PENROSE 2008: 258. 202 TAFAZZOLI 1993: 189. 203 PATERSON 1966: 70. 200

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In addition to the traditional (compound) bow and arrow, the Spāh also deployed a number of other missile systems such as Libanius’ reference to dart-type weapons204 used by infantry. The Savārān cavalry used the nawak for launching darts (10-40 cm length), which as noted by Nicolle, was an “arrow-guide held against the bow to form a temporary crossbow”205. Advantages afforded by the nawak-dart were greater range than regular arrows, difficultly to detect by the enemy when nawak-propelled dart was in flight, more effective penetration and the enemy’s inability to fire back the dart with regular archery. There was also a device described by the Āʾīnnāmeh as being capable of firing five arrows simultaneously206, however its’ exact characteristics are challenging to decipher. The term for this weapon in AraboMuslim sources such as Ṭabarī207, Jāḥiẓ208, and Maqdisī209 is derived from the Persian word panjagān. Tafazzolli’s analysis of Middle Persian military terminology leads him to conclude that the Panjagān was “a kind of arbalist”210 for firing five arrows, raising the possibility that this may have been a cross-bow type weapon as opposed to Boss’

204

Libanius, Orationes, LIX 69. NICOLLE 1996: 24. 206 INOSTRANCEV 1926: 51. 207 Ṭabarī, 955. 208 Jāḥiẓ, III 18. 209 Maqdisī, III, 193. 210 TAFAZZOLI 1993: 191. 205

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suggestion that this was an archery technique for rapidly firing five arrows in succession211. Like the preceding Parthian dynasty, horse archery was one of the Spāh’s vital military assets from the outset of the Sasanian dynasty. Herodian for example attributes the destruction of Emperor Alexander Severus’ invasion forces at the Battle of Ctesiphon (233 CE) to the effective horse archery forces of Ardašīr I212. The pivotal role of horse archery in the Spāh may partly explain why a large proportion of excavated Sasanian metalworks to date frequently exhibit this martial form. The classification of Sasanian horse archery falls into four broad categories: forward shot, Parthian shot, horse archery with stirrups, and shooting arrows while riding backwards. Battle elephants were utilized in set-piece battles, siege operations, and for logistic purposes (e.g. transport supplies)213. In battlefield arenas, elephants were generally placed to the rear of front line troops, although this was not always the case214. In practice it would appear that a variety of tactical infantry-elephant formations did exist. Battle elephants’ elevated platform allowed archers to more effectively fire arrows against enemy cavalry, infantry and

211

BOSS 1993: 56. Herodian, VI 5. 5-10. 213 NAFISI 1331/1952: 22; ZOKA 1350/1971: 144; JALALI 1382/2003: 17; DMITRIEV 2014a; DMITRIEV 2014b; DARYAEE 2016. 214 contra RANCE 2003. 212

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troops in besieged fortresses215. In the latter case, elephants could also be used as a form of “living mobile tower” for firing arrows in conjunction with siege engines. In addition, elephants provided psychological support for the infantry with these also used to psychologically intimidate enemy troops inexperienced in elephant warfare216. The battle elephant also had two major liabilities. First, the battle elephant could rampage within Sasanian lines if stricken with panic, which led to the howdah being equipped with a dagger to sever the vertebrae of the beast with a knife in case it went out of control. Second, the eyes of the elephant could be targeted by enemy spearmen. Battle elephants were certainly in operation in the armies of Šāpur II217. Julian also describes “hoplites” being deployed in tandem with Sasanian battle elephants following the defeat of the Savārān’s attacks during during Šāpur II’s siege of Nisibis in 350218. Sasanian infantry are reported as having been placed between the Savārān (at the front line) and the elephants (situated to the rear); this type of tactical formation failed to repel the advance of Julian during his initial stages of the (ultimately unsuccessful) invasion of the Sasanian empire219. Šāpur II’s elephants are described as having had iron towers manned with archers220. Possibly armored in reference to Ammianus’ description of 215

ZOKA 1350/1971: 144. NAFISI 1331/1952: 22; JALALI 1382/2003: 17, 39. 217 Theodoret, Historia religiosa, I 11. 218 Julian, Orationes, III 11-13. 219 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXIV 6. 12. 220 Julian, Orationes, III 12. 216

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“gleaming elephants”221 during Julian’s invasion of Persia, Sasanian elephants reportedly operated in concert with the Savārān’s cavalry raids against Roman forces222. Like the Roman, the Spāh deployed various types of auxiliary and allied forces recruited from within the Sasanian provinces and outside the frontiers. Auxiliaries provided three benefits for the Spāh. The first was that these provided critical battlefield support in domains where the Spāh lacked sufficient personnel (light cavalry for skirmishing, slingers, etc.). Second, warriors who could otherwise join enemy armies (especially Roman) would instead be encouraged to enter Sasanian service223. The third benefit of auxiliaries was in the arrival of new recruits, who by introducing new tactics and equipment could potentially enhance the Spāh’s overall military performance. Central Asian auxiliary recruits included the Iranic Kušans, and Hsiang-Nou, Turkic, Chionite, Hephthalite, etc., all of whom fielded high quality light cavalry224. The armies of Šāpur II had contingents of Chionites at Amida in 359225. Armenian armored cavalry exhibited a significant Iranian influence with respect to equipment and fighting methods226 and like their Sasanian counterparts, Armenian Sparapets (Mid. Pers. Spāhbed) maintained a consistent martial 221

Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 1. 14. Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 3. 2. 223 JALALI 1383/2004: 58-59. 224 JALALI 1383/2004: 36, 62. 225 SAMI 1342/1964: 60. 226 COSENTINO 2004: 253; MEKHAMADIEV 2014. 222

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tradition of warfare227. Elite Armenian cavalry from the Naxarar nobility228 and their retinues that joined the Spāh were the most esteemed allied units of the Spāh. The cavalry of the Naxarars were equally formidable as infantrymen or mountain warfare229. In addition to Armenian Naxarar cavalry, other regions of the Caucasus, notably Albania provided high quality cavalry auxiliaries (armored cavalry and light cavalry) for the Spāh. Part of the recruitment was made possible by the presence of a number of local Caucasian princes loyal to the Sasanians230. Albanian cavalry were present in the armies of Šāpur II at Amida231. The Spāh often sought to recruit nomadic tribes and mountain warriors from Iran’s north, west, interior and southeast into regular military service232. The important region in the southeast was Sakastān. Especially esteemed by the Spāh for their martial prowess as cavalrymen, the Sakas of Sakastān are cited by Ammianus Marcellinus as having been “the fiercest warriors of all”233 during Šāpur II’s siege of Amida. The Sasanians are believed to have recruited their slingers primarily from the Median highlands of western Iran234. Sasanian slingers were utilized against Roman forces, notably at the battle

227

AYVAZYAN 2012: 79-80. GARSOÏAN 2005. 229 PASDERMAJIAN 1369/1990: 159. 230 ADONTZ 1970: 8-24, 165-182. 231 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 6. 21. 232 JALALI 1383/2004: 67. 233 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 2. 3. 234 BAMBAN 1998: 117. 228

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of Singara (343 or 344)235. The slinger-archer combination is reported at the siege of Amida for example whose combined barrages reportedly “never ceased for a moment”236. Arabs auxiliary forces also provided two critical assets of military importance237. First, was their expert knowledge of the deserts. This made them valuable assets as guides and trackers for Sasanian armies during campaigns along or across the empire’s southwestern regions. The second military asset of Arab auxiliaries was their proficiency as light cavalry, notably in launching rapid raids and pull back just as rapidly before the enemy was able to organize effective counterstrikes238. The Arabs would often engage in securing plunder before making good their escape239, an important asset when fighting on behalf of the Sasanians against Roman forces, but at the root of this success is the presence of a politically strong dynasty. Overview of Sasanian Siege Warfare The battles of the Spāh against the Roman Empire were not exclusively of the setpiece type fought on the battlefield, as military operations often involved siege warfare during attacks into Roman-held territories. In this endeavor the Sasanians are known for having been highly adept (in comparison to their Parthian predecessors) at siege warfare matching the Romans in skill. The battles of 235

Libanius, Orationes, LIX 103. Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 5. 1. 237 JALALI 1383/2004: 64-65. 238 PIGULEVSKAYA 1372/1994: 253. 239 JALALI 1383/2004: 65. 236

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Šāpur II against the Roman Empire in 337 or 338 to 360 for example were notable in the Sasanian display of military skill in siege operations. Like their Roman counterparts, Sasanian capabilities in siege warfare were enabled and sustained by a highly efficient logistics system240. An efficient supply-logistics system was of course critical to the Spāh’s ability to maintain sieges over long periods of time. Interestingly, early Sasanian siege warfare technology and tactics were most likely influenced by the Romans, however the Sasanians soon began to indigenously manufacture their own array of siege equipment241. Oates note that Sasanian siege technologies had so progressed by the late 3rd and early 4th centuries CE that the Romans were compelled to construct “more elaborate systems of fortification [Roman] fortress cities began to play a more dominant role in frontier strategy”242. In the Classical sources have provided detailed information on Sasanian siege weaponry. Ammianus’ information is vivid and detailed, as he had witnessed Iranian siege engines in person.

240

FARROKH, KARAMIAN 2015: 25-26; FARROKH, KARAMIAN 2016: 332-339. 241 DIAKONOV 1346/1967: 424. It is possible that Sassanian engineers would examine captured Roman engines in order to facilitate the indigenous construction of this technology. Another possible route of technological transfer may have been from China, a hypothesis requiring further research. 242 OATES, OATES 1959: 208. Page | 50

The Sasanians had demonstrated their adeptness in siege warfare as early as the time of Šāpur II. The Sasanians also used captured Roman siege engines against their former owners. This occurred for example during the siege of Amida, where the Sasanians deployed siege engines taken from the Romans in Singara ten years before243. The Sasanians would be prepared to engage in the standard set-piece battle in which enemy forces would be battled outside of the fortified city244. If this scenario were to occur, the objective would be to comprehensively defeat the enemy army and prevent its surviving elements from escaping back into the safety of their fortress. If the enemy was inclined to fight the Sasanians outside of the fortifications and lost the battle, they could then be forced to yield the city as a condition of their surrender. In practice however, enemy forces would often conserve their military strength by ensconcing in the safety of their powerful fortified surroundings. This was often the favored scenario instead of risking their situation by way of a deadly clash with besieging Sasanian forces. Roman forces in particular often preferred to force Sasanian forces into a costly siege in which they could suffer high casualties. The besieging of Roman fortifications was in practice a formidable task for the Spāh, as the Romans were excellent in their conduct of counter-siege operations.

243 244

Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 2. 8. PAZOKI 1374/1995: 42-55. Page | 51

Sasanian siege tactics unfolded in two general stages245. The first stage was the actual encirclement of the enemy fortress or city. The Spāh’s efforts at building a rapid and effective encirclement bore two critical objectives: (1) closing off all means of escape for the defenders and (2) prevention of the arrival of relief forces and supplies for the besieged. At this stage, non-combative methods for taking over the enemy fortress could include subterfuge, intrigue, negotiated settlements and offers of compromise as well as proposals of friendship to the city (or fortress) about to be besieged246. In the majority of cases however the Sasanians would be forced to engage in siege warfare in the endeavor to capture the enemy’s fortress and/or city. This would lead to the second stage of Sasanian siege operations that was the implementation of the siege itself to force the enemy’s submission. The prosecution of the siege was conducted by the deployment of siege equipment, foot archers as well as Paygān armored infantry and Savārān cavalry entrusted with assault operations. With the siege underway, operations would be observed and supervised by the Šāhānšāh and his military staff from a secure and (preferably) elevated position. However at the onset of the siege, the king could approach the walls to the enemy, an action that could be interpreted as an official operation by the leader of the besiegers or an example of the prestige and courage of the Šāhānšāh (as commander in chief) over his warriors, 245 246

LUKONIN 1372/1993: 94. PAZOKI 1374/1995: 43.

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by demonstrating that he also runs the same risks as his soldiers. The Spāh’s inventory of siege weaponry in 4 century CE fell into general categories: ballistae, battering rams and mobile towers. Ballistae247 was used for launching “missile” or “arrow type” projectiles248 against besieged enemy walls, towers, and troops249. Ammianus Marcellinus provides a glimpse of Sasanian ballistic weapons during Šāpur II’s siege of Amida: “They shot out heavy wooden javelins with great rapidity, sometimes transfixing two of our men at one blow, so that many of them fell to the ground severely wounded, and some jumped down in haste from fear of the creaking engines, and being terribly lacerated by the fall, died”250. th

Like their Roman counterparts the Spāh was adept at using battering rams during their sieges against enemy fortresses and cities251. Ammianus Marcellinus describes Šāpur II’s siege of Bezabde in 360, during which Sasanian commanders bought forward their primary battering ram: “One battering-ram was higher than the rest, and was covered with bull's hides wetted, and being therefore safer from any accident of fire, or from lighted javelins, it led the way in the attacks on the wall with mighty blows, and 247

TAFAZZOLI (1971: 199) lists a Pahlavi word for ballista, kaskanjir; FEUGÈRE 2002: 53-55; YILDIRIM 2012a: 458-461. 248 JALALI 1383/2004: 51, 85. 249 MATUFI 1378/1999: 221. 250 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 5. 6. 251 YILDIRIM 2012a: 462. Page | 53

with its terrible point it dug into the joints of the stones till it overthrew the tower. The tower fell with a mighty crash, and those in it were thrown down with a sudden jerk, and breaking their limbs, or being buried beneath the ruins, perished by various and unexpected kinds of death; then, a safer entrance having been thus found, the multitude of the enemy poured in with their arms”252. Ammianus’ description provides two perspectives. The first pertains to the Spāh’s deployment of battering rams of varying sizes and momentum. Apparently during this siege the Spāh’s forces had initially attempted to deploy what may have been a more “standard” ram to hammer against the enemy’s walls, with these efforts beaten back by: “by the vast weight of millstones, and all kinds of fiery missiles hurled against them”253. With the failure of their “standard” battering rams, the Spāh then deployed a larger and more powerful battering ram that was also better protected against incendiary arrows. Certainly, in this occasion the ram could arrive to the wall due to two circumstances. First, this was moved at night and in the dark, minimizing the defenders’ ability to monitor its progress towards the city. Second, the ram was used to attack an area defended only by a single wall, as opposed to other parts of the city which were protected by a double-wall system. Some of the rams were brought to the siege, while others were built during the siege.

252 253

Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 7. 13. Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 7. 12.

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The second perspective provided by Ammianus is the physical characteristics of that particular battering ram’s “terrible point” against Bezabde’s tower. However, while the robust characteristics of the ram’s head are clearly expostulated, what remains less clear are its actual metallurgy and shape. Ammianus describes an older Iranian battering ram left behind by the Sasanians at Antioch but later used by the Romans against their former owners254. While the exact age of the weapon during the siege of Bezabde is unclear, Ammianus characterizes it as “old”255. The head of that Iranian battering ram (wheeled ramp) is described as having had a “projecting iron head, which in shape was like that of a ram”256. While this singular description does not imply that all Sasanian battering rams featured the ram’s head per se, it may be surmised that the heads of Sasanian battering rams were most likely of a resilient metallic manufacture, making them durable upon impact. In the case of Šāpur II’s siege of Bezabde, the battering ram’s momentum and force breached the enemy’s walls and caused one of its towers to collapse. Sasanian warriors quickly exploited that breach to storm inside Bezabde and force its submission. Sasanian military engineers were adept at the construction of mobile towers for siege operations257. 254

The battering ram had been left at Antioch after having used it there in an earlier Sasanian siege of the city. 255 Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 11. 12. 256 Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 11. 15. 257 JALALI 1383/2004: 84; IMAM-SHUSHTARI 1350/1971: 87; YILDIRIM 2012a: 461-462. Page | 55

Much like artificial hills, mobile towers enabled archers to fire their missiles against their opponents at higher platforms and closer ranges. According to Theodoret, Sasanian forces at the siege of Singara had placed their archers in towers for these to fire into the defenders’ walls, just as Sasanian engineers were working to undermine the same walls from beneath258. Ammianus reports Sasanian mobile towers as being constructed of metal or coated with metal259, however it is unclear whether (a) the entire chassis was of metal construction or (b) if the metal was applied as armor upon a wooden chassis. However Ammianus’ description of the destruction of a mobile tower in Amida would suggest that the chassis itself was made of wood. There are also rams covered with very sturdy animal breeds. In addition to regular mobile towers, there were also two types of “combination” mobiles towers. The first of these was the combination of the mobile tower and ballistae. Ammianus’ reports of such a weapon utilized by Šāpur II’s besieging forces at Amida:“ballistæ of the enemy [the Spāh], placed on their iron towers, and pouring down missiles with great power from their high ground on those in a lower position, spread a great deal of slaughter in our ranks”260. The impact of the mechanically propelled ballistae mounted on the elevated platform of mobile towers shooting 258

Theodoret, Historia religiosa, I 11-12. Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 7. 2; XX 5. 1. 260 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 7. 5. 259

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at a depressed angle (or simply downwards) could prove devastating. This is because besieged defenders would now have to cope with powerful projectiles fired at them from a higher position. While the tower-ballistae could be characterized as the Classical era’s equivalent of mobile mechanical warfare, these weapon systems (like mobile towers in general) were themselves vulnerable to (Roman) counter siege measures. At Amida for example, besieged Roman forces deployed (heavy) stone hurling catapults against Sasanian mobile towers, shattering their structures261. In this scenario the mobile tower was destroyed before reaching the walls and at least in one spectacular case, the stricken tower collapsed, tumbling down with troops still inside of it. The Sasanian Spāh utilized a number of siege engineering systems, notably trenches (and ditches), sandbags, mounds (or artificial hills), tunneling (and mining), pyro-techniques, and hydro-engineering (utilization of water as a siege weapon)262. The Spāh was especially competent in its use of trenches and ditches during siege operations. The Sasanians had four types of trenches. The first was the standard ditch dug around a targeted fortress in order to isolate it. The second type of surround-ditch was filled with water. Another type of Sasanian ditch was laid with deadly iron

261 262

Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 7. 7. YILDIRIM 2012a: 462-463. Page | 57

traps263, a powerful dissuader against surprise attacks or sallies by the besieged enemy outside of his fortress. Interestingly the lack of such iron traps in trenches may have been a factor that emboldened the raid of Gaul cavalry in Amida against Šāpur II’s forces besieging that city264. A third type of surrounding trench was one filled with wood, which was then sprayed over with flammable substances265. Upon command, the wood would be set ablaze, encircling the enemy city or fortress with flames. Flaming trenches afforded the besieging Spāh army with four options. The first advantage of these was their overall enhancement of the siege process. Once a breach had been made against an enemy wall or defensive structure, Sasanian engineers could then put out those fires leading to that breach. Then, the Savārān and combat infantry could be sent through that breach to storm into the enemy fortress. The second advantage of flaming trenches was in their ability to dissuade attempts by the garrison to launch counterattacks or to attempt escape. Third, surrounding fires helped mask the digging of tunnels under the enemy’s walls, opening an ingress into the interior of the enemy’s stronghold. Fourth, weakens the people of the city psychologically. Sandbags and buckets served three distinct objectives for Sasanian siege activities. The first was to use these as building blocks for the erection of temporary shielding or defensive walls for protecting Sasanian troops, 263

INOSTRANCEV 1926: 50. Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 6. 4-5; 7-9; 11. 265 SAKET, YAHAQHI 1389/2010: 26. 264

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engineers and laborers. Temporary defensive walls per se were often built by using sand-filled buckets and sandbags266. Second, these same temporary defensive walls could be used for the partial masking of impending siege actions such as tunneling beneath the enemy’s walls. The third application of sandbags and sand buckets was their utility in filling in sections of water-laden moats surrounding the enemy fortress267. This action was fraught with great risk as it exposed siege personnel to severe countermeasures such as enemy archery fired from enemy towers and walls. In these cases, the Paygān could of course provide escort and/or partial protection with their large shields. One key siege tactic was the construction of mounds (or artificial hills) in close proximity to the enemy’s walls. This strategy provided two distinct advantages during a siege. First, archers on the mound would be able to fire at closer ranges into the enemy embedded in the defensive walls, towers, etc. This advantage would of course be amplified in proportion to the elevation of the mound. An ideal situation in this scenario would be the erection of a mound higher than the defending walls of the enemy. The second advantage of artificial hills was that they could be used as platforms for landing troops inside the enemy’s defense walls, forcing their adversaries into close quarters combat. Despite these advantages the construction of

266 267

IMAM-SHUSHTARI 1350/1971: 87. IMAM-SHUSHTARI 1350/1971: 87. Page | 59

mounds against fortifications was fraught with risk given the high Roman skill in counter-siege operations268. Tunneling and mining strategies for digging under enemy fortified foundations were often utilized during Sasanian siege operations269. The primary objective was to burrow an ingress pathway into the enemy’s interior fortifications. Spāh combat personnel would then surprise the enemy defenders by emerging inside their compounds270. The defenders, already engaged in trying to stave off Sasanian besiegers outside of their fortress, would be forced to divert forces to fight off Sasanian troops now inside their compounds. An effective strategy would be to dig multiple routes of ingress into the enemy fortress or city interior. If this could be successfully implemented then combat personnel could surprise and overwhelm the enemy by emerging at multiple points in the fortification’s interior areas. The Romans however, themselves adept at sieges, were often able to counter such Sasanian siege tactics by implementing countermeasures such as rushing troops to confront Sasanian forces emerging from the tunnels or even collapsing the tunnels altogether. Iranian military hydro-engineering precedes the Sasanians as far back as the Achaemenids who factored the waters as a weapon of war271. A notable example of the weaponization of rivers by the Sasanians occurred during 268

YILDIRIM 2012a: 458. INOSTRANCEV 1926: 16. 270 JALALI 1383/2004: 83. 271 PAZOKI 1374/1995: 44. 269

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Šāpur’s first siege of Nisibis (337 or 338). The Spāh’s strategy in this operation was to first utilize the potential energy of the Mygdonius River by the construction of dykes. With enough water collected, Sasanian engineers opened the dykes to propel the water as a “hydro battering ram” against the robust walls of Nisibis272. Theodoret has provided a concise overview of Šāpur’s hydro-warfare at Nisibis: “Shapur stopped up the course of the river which flowed past the city and when as vast an amount as possible of the accumulating water had piled up behind the dam he released it all at once against the walls, using it like a tremendously powerful battering-ram. The wall could not withstand the force of the water, and indeed, badly shaken by the flood, the whole stretch of that side of the city collapsed”273. Another siege of Nisibis in 350 by Šāpur’s forces again involved the weaponization of the Mygdonius River. The hydro-warfare tactics of this operation were different from the earlier siege of the city. In the 350 siege, Sasanian forces first dug a ditch around the city and then filled this with water that had been routed into it from the Mygdonius. Surrounding Nisibis was an effective tactic as it effectively barred the besieged garrison from dispatching sallies against Sasanian forces. However, the primary objective of the water-ditch was offensive. As noted by Julian:“…he [Šāpur] besieged it [Nisibis] by

272 273

PAZOKI 1374/1995: 44-47. Theodoret, Historia religiosa, I 11-12. Page | 61

bringing up ships with engines on board. This was not the work of a day, but I believe of almost four months”274. The Roman Army in 4th century CE By the 4th century CE, the victorious army of Emperor Trajan (r. 98-117) that had invaded the Parthian Empire275 was no longer in existence. As the Parthian armies passed their successful military legacy to the Sasanians, the Rome of Trajan, especially her military, had changed with the Severians. This was followed by the anarchy of the 3rd century CE, but the Roman army was to “evolve” with the tenure of Emperor Constantine. Thus as the enemies of Rome changed militarily, so too, did the Roman adjust their policy changes, and with this the military modus vivendi also changed: the Roman military machine continued to learn, adapt and improve in response to the threats it continually faced along its vast frontiers. The older and more traditional Roman army, composed of legionaries from the provinces and commanded by militarily inexperienced senators seeking to promote their political fortunes, had by now virtually disappeared. As before, the Roman army of the 4th century CE featured highly capable officers and soldiers, however a notable proportion of these were of non-Roman or “barbarian” origins276. One example is the “barbarian”-born Ursicinus, the Roman magister equitum per Orientem in the East in 274

Julian, Orationes, III 11-13.30. BIRLEY 1997: 66-76; SHELDON 2010: 133 YILDIRIM 2013. 276 BILETA 2014. 275

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359. Additional examples include Silvanus, the Gaul general who had made a coup d’État in 355277, as well as many others. Furthermore, the creation of “border troops” (Limitanei) and a mobile reserve army (Comitatenses) quartered in the rear, ready to march where crises erupted, clearly demonstrates how the Roman army had transformed in less than two hundred years278. The battlefields of the third century had severely tested the mettle of the Roman army. First was the everpresent danger of “barbarians: threatening the empire, an present state (and/or potential) of civil war. In the latter scenario the Roman solider would have to face one his greatest and most dreaded enemies: Roman soldiers from another faction. In these situations the Roman army would be at war with itself. This of course was not unique to the Roman Empire: the former Parthians were often involved in internal power struggles, one of the factors that facilitated Trajan’s successful invasion in 116. The greatest military challenges were to delivered by Rome’s external foes. Emperor Decius (r. 249-251) died in 251 while in battle against a Scythian federation led by the Gothic king Kniva279. Emperor Valerian (r. 253-260) invaded the Sasanian empire with an army of - troops, but after initial success witnessed his forces defeated at Edessa in c. 260280. Festus reports of Valerian, the praetorian prefect and a large 277

DEN BOER 1960. LEWIN 2004. 279 Aurelius Victor, 29; SCARRE 1995: 170. 280 FARROKH 2017: 155-157. 278

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body of troops and support personnel having been captured by Šāpur I281. Lactantius282 asserts that Valerian died in captivity, and following his passing was skinned (and dyed red) which was then hung as a trophy in a temple: “Indeed, when his life ended in this dishonour, he was skinned and his skin, without its viscera, was dyed red, so that it would be placed in a temple of the gods of the barbarians as a reminder of this remarkable triumph”. Although a “classic” testimony about the “evil of the Persians”, in practice Valerian’s fate is described differently by Firdawsī of the Šhāh-nāma. The latter citing the Emperor as “Baranush” describes the Emperor as a man of positive character who following his capture by Šāpur I was treated well for remainder his life spent in captivity283. Western historiography is now tending toward the scenario that Valerian was not tortured and lived the remainder of his life in captivity in a palace, possibly in Bišāpur, where he died of natural causes and was not skinned284. As noted by Meijer285 eighteen Emperors (or usurpers) had been killed in 238 to 283, after the end of the Severan dynasty. The arrival of the Tetrarchy bestowed a measure of peace to the empire for twenty years.

281

Festus, XXIII. Lactantius, V 6. 283 Firdawsī, 530-575; FARROKH 2007: 189. 284 SÁNCHEZ GRACIA, SÁNCHEZ SANZ 2017: 341. 285 MEIJER 2004: 83-108. 282

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Diocletian may be considered a “great” Emperor, at the same level as Augustus, Trajan, Aurelian or Constantine, as he created a new method of imperial government management. He not only created a collegial government (the Tetrarchy) to put an end to almost a century of anarchy, usurpations and civil wars, but also laid the foundations for the reorganization of a new Roman army. Diocletian increased the number of troops in the army: according to Treadgold, the army had 390.000 soldiers in the year 285, and was augmented to 581.000 during the Tetrarchy. Along the Iranian frontier, the number of troops were increased from 253.000 men to 311.000. Naval personnel were also increased from about 46.000 seamen to about 64.000, with perhaps half of that number assigned towards Rome Eastern theatres. Thus, according to the estimates provided by Treadgold, the Roman army at the beginning of the 4th century CE had a total of 645.000 soldiers286. During this time, Diocletian imposed two forms of recruitment. First, being a soldier of the army became a hereditary office, a measure intended to assure a continual supply of troops. Second, each community assumed the obligation of providing a certain number of soldiers for the state. If not, the option would then be to pay a tax to assist the empire to finance the purchase of mercenary barbarians of the limes. This appears to have been part of the overall strategy of Rome’s defence-in-depth system.

286

TREADGOLD 1997: 19. Page | 65

In addition, Diocletian created the Limitanei (troops located along the limes) and Comitatenses (a mobile reserve army located in the four capitals of the empire to assist conflicts that could arise in the vicinity). Thus, the old disposition of the army, structured on the basis of legions, was replaced by a defence of the frontiers, with troops living (and working) in the limes and by a mobile army situated in the rear. The latter professionalism was enhanced, featuring more cavalry units, making these forces potentially of great utility in case the frontier regions were menaced by danger287. A precedent of the Comitatenses is found in the military reforms of Gallienus, a period in which an increase in the number of cavalry units and their greater importance is witnessed288. Roman contact with Iranian peoples bearing a long tradition of combat on horseback (Sarmatians, Parthians, Sasanians...) proved beneficial for Rome as it allowed for the creation of Roman units of horse archers and armoured cavalry289. So with Gallienus the germination of the Roman mobile cavalry army led to an increase of troops on horseback within the legion, which increased from 120 to 528 soldiers organized into 16 turmae290.

287

SOUTHERN, DIXON 1996: 36-37 . DE BLOIS 1976: 27-30. 289 COSENTINO 2004: 253. 290 If equites promoti are disconnected from the legion it was one unit, it probably consisted of about 700 horseman ROCCO 2012: 203-204. 288

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The increase of the army and the civil service led, logically, to an increase in public spending that had to be financed by taxation. Since the maintenance of the army absorbed a large proportion of the imperial budget, any reforms in this domain was especially costly. The proportion of the adult male population devoted to military service in the army increased approximately from 1 in 25 to 1 in every 15 men, a proportion that remained about consistent into the 5th century CE. By the end of the 4th century CE, even after the disaster of Adrianople for example, the Roman army stationed in the East remained especially formidable with some 303.000 troops, while these same regions had been considerably less at approximately 198.000 before Diocletian291. Wages however remained low, with large groups of soldiers often resorting to extortion or the reconciliation of their work in the army with other civilian work. Some troops even received payments in kind instead of their own wages. In view of the formidable challenges posed for maintaining the increased size of the army, and in order to avoid civil strife, Diocletian needed to create a new tax system. The relative tranquil state of affairs lasted until Diocletian’s abdication because most of the claimants to the imperial office between 309 and 313 had died or had been killed in various civil wars: Constantine forced Maximian's suicide in 310; Galerius died of natural causes 291

TREADGOLD 1997: 112-113. Page | 67

in 311292; Maxentius was defeated by Constantine at the battle of the Milvian Bridge in 312293, and subsequently killed. Maximinus committed suicide in 313, after being defeated in battle by Licinius. Following these tumultuous events, there were only two Emperors remaining with the Tetrarchy system having virtually disappeared. In 324, Constantine, after defeating Licinius, became Rome’s sole Emperor294. While Constantine’s reign , was not a haven of peace, it did provide a measure of stability to the empire as there were hardly any military campaigns: one campaign of note occurred in late winter of 332, when Constantine campaigned with the Sarmatians against the Goths295. The weather and lack of food took a heavy toll of the Goths: reportedly, nearly one hundred thousand died before their submission to Rome. After Sarmatian commoners had overthrown their leaders in 334, Constantine led a campaign against their confederation. As noted by Barnes296 Constantine emerged victorious in the ensuing war, allowing him to extend his control over the Sarmatian region, as evidenced by the archaeological remains of camps and fortifications in the region. The Emperor resettled some Sarmatian exiles as farmers in Illyrian and Roman districts, and conscripted the rest into the Roman army.

292

Lactantius, V 9; CORCORAN 1996: 187. Zosimos, II 16. 2-4. 294 Zosimos, II 22. 3-7; SYVÄNNE 2015: 270. 295 LE BOHEC 2008: 52. 296 BARNES 1981: 250. 293

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In the final years of his life following the Sarmatian campaign, Constantine drafted plans for a campaign against Iran, but died without having completed his military preparations. Although the end of the Tetrarchy was not a fullfledged war period per se, the potential for violence never disappeared. Emperor Constantine himself ordered the killing of his eldest son, Crispus, because he believed that he had consorted with his new wife, Fausta. When Constantius discovered that the allegation was a false and an invention of his wife, he allegedly drowned her in the bathtub. In a bloodier version of these events, Zosimos claims that Fausta had been thrown into a bathtub with boiling water297. While the true reasons for these events will of course remain debated by historians. Guthrie298 for example affirms that the testimony of Zosimos provides a “moralistic interpretation” with the true reason for these events being attributed to Crispus’ status as an illegitimate son, thus not qualified to inherit the throne. Hence, Cripus may have been conspiring to occupy this position by force. We do not know the truth; therefore, although “moralistic” the can be an option. Despite these family intrigues, Constantine became the founder of a “new” Rome, along with Constantinople and the promotion of the Christian faith in the empire. In military faairs, Constantine continued with the reforms of 297 298

Zosimos, II 29. GUTHRIE 1966: 327. Page | 69

his predecessors, despite having inherited an army worn down by civil wars and a number of units of doubtful loyalty. After defeating Maxentius in 312, Constantine I dissolved the Praetorian Guard, putting an end to a military corps whose existence had been maintained for more than 300 years, although the immediate reason for the Praetorian Guard’s disbandment had been its support of Maxentius299. Certainly, the utility of a force like that of the Praetorian Guard, based in Rome, had become obsolete, especially as the Emperors now rarely even resided in the capital. The work of imperial escort of the cavalry of the Guard, the Equites Singulares Augusti, was now carried out by the Scholae300. Elite Roman cavalry regiments, already in existence at the time of Constantine, may have already been founded by Diocletian. Constantine expanded his Comitatenses into a major and permanent force. This was now placed under the command of two new officers, a magister peditum to command the infantry and magister equitum for cavalry301. The size of Constantine’s Comitatenses is uncertain, however if he had mobilized 98,000 troops for his war against Maxentius, this would have represented approximately a quarter of the total regular forces, with Constantine’s army having numbered at approximately 299

BINGHAM 2013: 50. JONES 1964: 100. 301 Zosimos, II 33. 3. 300

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400,000 troops. With Constantine the division in military tasks became consolidated: a) Limitanei on the frontiers: these were almost entirely infantry troops who had resided in these locales with their military quality considerably lower. However troops stationed in zones prone to combat, such as those along the dangerous Sasanian Iranian frontiers were of a higher military quality and experience302. b) Comitatenses as the strategic reserve: these could be deployed against major barbarian invasions that had succeeded in penetrating deep into the empire or as the core of large expeditionary forces sent across the borders. This view of the comitatenses however has been questioned in recent scholarship. Goldsworthy303 for example has explained the primary function of the Comitatenses as protection against potential usurpers. Constantine also completed the separation of Roman military commands from the administrative structure304. The Vicarii and Praefecti Praetorio lost control over the armies and became purely administrative officers. Nevertheless, they maintained a crucial role in military matters, insofar as they remained responsible for the recruitment, payment and, above all, supply of the army. 302

ELTON 1996: 204-209; ISAAC 1988; NICASIE 1998: 16-18. GOLDSWORTHY 2000: 170. 304 JONES 1964: 607; contra under the reign of Gallienus - DE BLOIS 1976: 49-50; under the reign of Diocletian- SOUTHERN, DIXON 1996: 249-250; . 303

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Finally, there was the Protectores Domestici (where Ammianus was employed). This was a mixed unit that was partly an academy for future officers, and partly a guard regiment with staff functions. At the court, with the Emperor, were an army Praesentalis, formed for soldiers of the Comitatenses and members of the Scholae. Harrel indicates that in 363, after the disaster of Amida, Julian’s Praesentalis army in his failed Iranian campaign had 95.000 soldiers305. With Constantine the command of this army was straightforward: the Emperor was in command, but delegated to his “number two”, the magister peditum (“general chief of the infantry) and, subordinated to him, the magister equitum (“general chief of cavalry”). The Limitanei troops in the provinces were commanded by the dux (pl. duces or “generals”). When Constantine died, the Roman army was divided among his three sons, each one with his own magister peditum and magister equitum and approximately 40.000 soldiers. As the empire often faced dangers in critical zones such as the Iranian frontier, and as the magisteres literally could not be in two points at the same time, Constantius created a new kind of officer, the Comes Rei Militaris (“count of military affairs”), who commanded small units of the regional Comitatus field army. The Comites were generals in their own right and commanded regions during 305

HARREL 2016: 31.

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the years or in special situations. Examples include the Comes commanded by Lucillianus at Nisibis when it was besieged by Šāpur II in 350306, and the Comes commanded by Aelianus in Amida when it was also besieged by the armies of Šāpur II. After the fall of Amida, the Šāhānšāh ordered Aelianus’ crucifixion, most likely due to latter’s infliction of losses on the Sasanians during the siege. Envy was visible in the roman army, with any mistake quickly taken advantage of by rival officers eager to sieze power. For this reason two generals were often placed in command of large operations. While in theory the lines of command were clear, in practice, personal rivalries would surface, resulting in military failure. One such example occurred in 357, when a pincer movement coordinated by Julian and Barbatio (in command of 25.000 and 13.000 troops respectively) failed due to the mutual animosity of the officers. In this battle, Barbatio attacked the Alamani but had to fall back and when Julian arrived, the Roman soldiers were already fleeing as they were being pursued by the barbarians. Acting out of spite, Barbatio, ordered the burning of vital supplies, just so to prevent Julian from accessing these307. The 4th century CE legions were inferior in numbers. A Comitatensis legion at this time for example had 1.000 soldiers and commanded by a tribune. As Harrel308 has theorized, such legions had their origins as Vexillationes 306

Zosimos, II 45. 2; III 8. 2. Ammianus Marcellinus, XVI 11. 3-6. 308 HARREL 2016: 33. 307

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from much older legions. The dates for the creation of such units remain uncertain. It’s possible that these originated during the time of Diocletian in Egypt, where the legio III Diocletiana had been divided in two: the legio III Diocletiana, commanded by the Dux Thaebaeorun and the legio III Diocletiana Thaeorum under the command of the Magister Militum for Thrace. The organization of the 4th century CE army had also evolved from the traditional Roman organization, which is generally better known. In theory, the legion was based on groups of eight soldiers (Contubernium). A “century” of infantry had eighty soldiers (commanded by a Centenarius, the 4th century CE Centurio and helped by an Optio and a platoon of cavalry (Turma), was formed by twenty two men. In reality, these units were often under strength and only at the beginning of a campaign were they fully staffed with new recruits. This is seen for example, in a report by Ammianus stating that at peacetime two cavalry regiments had 700 troops, or 350 in each regiment309. However during Julian’s campaign in 363, each of these regiments now had 750 troops. Thus in practice, the units often had fewer troops than they would have had on paper. But even when they were fully staffed, they did not maintain those numbers for a prolonged period: this was due to losses as a result of combat as well as diseases. A legion of Comitatenses had two cohorts, each one with 480 troops and 21 staff officers, as well as musicians, 309

Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 8. 2.

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standard-bearers and instructors (Campidoctores), numbering approximately 1.023 men. On the other hand, the Limitanei varied in size depending on the number of fortresses and cities they garrisoned. While precise statistics cannot be ascertained with absolute certainty, Harrel has proposed that the limitanei legions fielded around 2000 to 4000 troops in three cohorts310. The Auxilia of the 4th century CE were viewed as elite corps. Their origins can be traced to 306, when Constantius raised a regiment from a band of Germans that had supported him in his uprising. With their arms and equipment having been standardized, these troops fought alongside the legionaries. Like the Germanic tribal warriors, the Auxilia were excellent warriors but lacked the exemplary level of discipline seen in Roman legionnaires. Nevertheless, these proved loyal to the their Roman comrades-in-arms, fighting alongside them against fellow Germanic peoples. The tasks of the Auxilia were less sophisticated than those of the Roman legionaries, and were correspondingly more lightly equipped. Many of the new recruits (Tirones) from Rome’s western provinces often preferred to enlist in these units. With respect to cavalry, the more traditional legions had 768 mounted troops organized in an Ala Milliaria, but by the 4th century CE its’ troop levels had been lowered, with an official contemporary strength ranging between 500

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to 600 men. Its minimal organizational structure was the Turma with thirty-two men commanded by a Decurio. As Harrel has averred, the roman army of the 4 century CE required between 15.000 to 30.000 new recruits yearly and had a total strength of 300.000 or 600.000 troops311. th

Conscripted in his twenties, the recruit (Tiro) was typically hailed from the rural region (because they were more accustomed to hard labour), with the minimal height requirement at 155 cm. The Tiro was frequently the son of a veteran or hailing from humble family origins, these frequently being (non-Christian) pagans. The veteran's sons however did not necessarily serve in the same unit where their fathers had served. The men conscripted into Limitanei units might have remained in their home province (although serving in those units was considered somewhat analogous to that of a second class category. Barbarians could also serve in the roman army from ways of ingress: To join as individual volunteers. To be conscripted as part of a treaty. To be recruited from prisoners of war. On many occasions these “barbarians” were to be assimilated into the Roman way of life, learning Latin and forming a “family” with their Roman comrades. 311

HARREL 2016: 36.

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The Roman method of war was structured on three basic principles (which bore Roman martial morals as well): a hard type of discipline, daily training and corporate work. Before enrolment, the recruit would be trained and tested by the Campidoctores, who decided whether or not the conscript was fit for service. They were rigorously and thoroughly trained to fight with swords, javelins, bows, arrows, slings and darts. Requiring the utmost physical fitness, these recruits had to swim adeptly and to be capable of marching twenty roman miles (30 km) per day while carrying full martial equipment (weighing in at sixty pounds or 27 kg) in just five hours. Finally, during the reign of Gratian all infantry were equipped with helmets, mail or scale body armour regardless of their combat speciality within the legion. If a recruit enlisted with a horse, he could be enrolled in the cavalry. However the Campidoctor could decline his request for recruitment recruitment, as having a horse was synonymous with having some economic solvency. After four months of training the recruit was graduated into the ranks of the professional combat personnel, having taken the oath and having this inscribed with a tattoo. The new soldier joined a veteran Contubernium of eight men and incorporated the into new Miles, who in turn introduced him into military life and prepared him for real warfare. Finally after two years of training a new unit was battle-ready with chances of surviving in combat, especially against the formidable Sasanian troops in the east. The Auxilia were paid by Rome, but formed and trained by the tribal chieftains. Page | 77

The body of officers and staff was formed by members of the nobility or by veterans. Flavius Abinnaeus for example, spent thirty-three years serving in a cavalry regiment of the Limitanei before being promoted to staff service. As a result, experienced troops who had survived years of dangerous combat could certainly be promoted to staff or regiment command312. Future officers, who had not ascended from the troops, were trained in “military schools” (Scholae), where they studied for four years. After completing their training, these became part of an elite unit known as the Protectores Domestici. Many of these officers were placed in command of small units (specially engineering or artillery detachments) or to the staff offices of some generals. This was for example the case of Ammianus, who had served in the staff of Ursicinus, not only in the East, but also in his “commando” mission to kill the Gaul rebel Silvanus313. Excepting the officers, the Roman soldier was not well paid: these received some money, donations on special occasions (i.e. emperor's birthday; celebration of victories or campaigns, uprisings, etc.). The Roman soldier however was allowed to keep booties obtained in their looting against the enemy. In practice the primary income of a Roman soldier was his rations (Annona) and fodder (Capitus) for his horse. These rations consisted of bread, meat, wine and oil.

312 313

BARNES 1985b: 368-374. HUNT 1999: 46-56.

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Biscuits (Bucellatum) were baked for the army by local bakers and transported to the campaigning army. The roman Limes were more than 6000 km, from the North Sea to the Red Sea, through the Rhine, Danube and Tigris rivers. As a result, due to Rome’s vast territorial expansion, there could not have been a grand strategy, as there were simply too many enemies with their unique military tactics and weapons placed on multiple fronts. The mobile army was too small to combat all of these forces singlehandedly with the frontiers troops having had a more defensive rather than offensive mind-set. In the eastern Limes facing the Sasanian Empire, there was a development of fortified zones, where the army was reorganized and expended in order to defend the Roman Empire. These fortified garrisons (especially Quadriburgia, a square fortress with four corner towers) where placed alongside all the eastern frontiers. This can be seen for example with Castra Maurorum, near Nisibis or Qasr Bashir, whose ruins can be seen today in the Jordanian desert. Another locale of note in Rome’s eastern front was the Strata Diocletiana in the Limes Arabicus, a fortified road along the desert border, built under Emperor Diocletian. This was lined with Quadriburgia, with each of these situated at one day's march (over 30 km) from one another. Each of these Quadriburgia had a garrison of 70 to 160 soldiers, depending on their size. This system was designed to place just enough troops to protect the border and counter bandits, but often proved ineffective against an enemy invasion, especially those of the Sasanians. Page | 79

Certainly, no Emperor who followed Diocletian (except for Julian, with his reckless, if not insane, expedition) made any attempt to expand the empire into Iran. This military system, created by Diocletian, was success in the overall sense and survived almost intact even after the 363 peace treaty with Šāpur II, until the time of Emperor Justinian (r. 527-565), when it began weaken and become more porous, thus losing its originally intended military effectiveness. As noted by Harrel314 the Limitanei had three functions on the border: policing, intelligence gathering and deterring raids. The policing function had other duties assigned with it, such as certain responsibilities for recruitment (protecting the officers in levy charges), tax collection and the administration of justice in communities surrounding the forts. They were also entrusted with the prevention of desertions and blocking the entry of enemy spies into the Roman Empire, especially those from the Sasanian intelligence network. While not much information is known of minor battles, there were constant and frequent “razzias” that took place along the border, between the Roman garrisons and the Sasanians, as well as Arab raiders and various bandits. In certain regions such as Isauria, banditry was an endemic source of trouble with the mountain-based Isaurians periodically ransacking neighbouring provinces. These even had the audacity to attack military Roman patrols. Roman 314

HARREL 2016: 53.

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soldiers could prevail if they caught their Isaurian attackers in the open plains, however these often took refuge in the mountains and proved difficult to subdue by the Romans. Although few details are available to us, the work of Ammianus has provided the context for this type of combat faced by Roman forces and the social realities that propelled such raids. Arab raids in particular targeted isolated travellers and commercial routes. This forced Roman or Roman-affiliated cavalry to patrol huge tracts of land just to chase away small groups of enemies back into the deserts of Arabia. Another development in the 4th century CE were the pilgrimages to the Holy Land, a tradition initiated by Helen (mother of Constantine). These pilgrimages became the object of thieves and criminals, forcing the Roman army to deploy forces to protect pilgrims as they arrived and department from the region. The Roman army in the east was primarily quartered in the provinces of Syria, Mesopotamia, Euphrates, Phoenicia, Cilicia, and Isauria. The Roman army in these provinces were not just stationed on guard against possible invasions by the Sasanian Empire but were also tasked with fulfilling the functions of "citizen security", protecting civilians and merchants from attacks by bandits. Roman forces were also stationed in Palestine and Arabia. From Circesium to the south, the border was essentially protected by the sands of the desert: the Strata Diocletiana, which connected Damascus to Palmyra and the legionary fortress at Oresa and Sura, became the border. Further to the North, closer to the Euphrates, the risk of Sasanian invasions was greater and, for this reason, Roman cavalry in these regions Page | 81

were often stationed as part of a defensive screen connecting the fortress cities. Each legion was quartered in a fortified town with small contingents scattered in small forts to counter enemy invasions. The Equites Promoti cavalry regiments also provided critical support and were essentially deployed as a rapid reaction force. The following 31 units (or detachments of units) of Equites Promoti are cited in the Notitia Dignitatum in the eastern half of the Roman Empire315. The primary region defended by the bulk of the Roman army (especially the cavalry) in the east to contain the Sasanians, was the city of Edessa. This was because if the bridge of Zeugma on the Euphrates316 fell to Sasanian control, this would allow the latter to cross the river. The Sasanian Spāh would then break into a very extensive Roman territory that was difficult to defend. This would then endanger Antioch and its port, Seleucia Pieria. For this strategic reason, the bulk of the Roman cavalry was stationed on the steppes of Mesopotamia or the valleys situated between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. By the year 395 there were nineteen legions, two Auxilia regiments and eleven cavalry regiments in the East, as reported in the Notitia Dignitatum. Assuming that these regiments were at full strength, a typical eastern Roman field 315

Or. XXXII- XXXVIII; The part concerning the East is dated on 395, KULIKOWSKI 2000: 360. 316 YILDIRIM 2012b. Page | 82

army would be comprised by 21.000 infantry and 5.500317. Despite the military disasters and ensuing casualties that had befallen the Roman army a number of years before (the failed invasion of Julian and the comprehensive defeat at Adrianopolis), the numbers of troops stationed in the East remained impressive. This is indicative, at least in part, of Roman concerns with the potential military threats posed by the Sasanian Spāh, By this time Roman military power was gradually recovering although the barbarization experienced by the army with Theodosius (r. 379-395) continued to be felt in the East. However, of the five Trans-tigritani regiments, three were lost and it seems that they were not recruited again. Under Theodosius the mobile campaign army was smaller and prioritized such that the troops were now concentrated in the defence of strong locales. This resulted in smaller numbers of troops available, but just enough to defend Roman territory, but apparently inadequate for a new campaign against Sasanian Iran. The Romans were often concerned with fending off the attacks of the Arabs, which were a constant menace in the Roman East, as their raids were often more common than Sasanian Iran invasions. In this endeavour, the Limitanei army was deployed in three sectors: a) Along the Strata Diocletiana (patrolling over the border and following the Roman roads); b) In the hilly terrain near Danaba – in the north of the road – which was the headquarters of the legio III Gallica; c) In the oases of the Syrian Desert,

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located in the southeast of the Strata in order to prevent Arab raiders from accessing key watering points. In conflict zones, Rome often recruited from native citizenry in order to form local troops. These types of troops were more likely to be motivated fight against invasions of their homelands, notably from the Sasanian Spāh in the East. This was especially notable as imported auxiliary type units from Western Europe for example were not always necessarily reliable, with the Gallic cavalry being one example (although their courage at Šāpur II’s siege of Amida was commendable). Another factor motivating native recruits to fight was the prospect of being taken prisoner and deported to the Sasanian Empire. A good example of this type of vigorous defence against the Sasanian Spāh is seen at Bezabde where the native troops (Zabdiceni) resisted the Persian attack with extraordinary courage. Ammianus provides a grim testimony with respect to the fall of the city: “Then, while the terrified ears of the vanquished were thundered everywhere by the violence of the Persian cries, the close combat broke out within the walls, fighting each other groups of enemies and ours, wounding bodies here and there with the sword unsheathed, nobody was spared from those who were. In the end, the besieged, who for a long time had barely resisted the destruction, dispersed on all sides before the thrust of so many people. After this, the swords of the angry enemies fell on anyone they could find … And this people … loaded with all manner of spoils and driving Page | 84

a huge number of prisoners, returned exultantly to their camp”318. While wars continued to erupt between Rome and Sasanian Iran well into the 7th century CE, the Limes Arabicus never fell. The Limes Mesopotamicus however was to experience constant Sasanian pressure, especially after the peace treaty signed between Šāpur II and Jovian following the death of Julian in 363. Nevertheless the Romans remained vigilant and continued their policy of constant repair and maintenance the forts. The military personnel manning these were relatively well equipped and prepared throughout Roman rule. Furthermore, Diocletian and Constantine established new forts east of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea along the via Nova Traiana. The official strength of the armies in the Limes Arabicus widely varied in the range of 8,000 to 20,000, while the defence of the province of Mesopotamia required some 20,000 soldiers ensconced in fortified positions with another 4.000 cavalry troops continually patrolling the Limes. Overview of Roman Siege Warfare Siege warfare was a primary characteristic of the Greek and succeeding Roman martial traditions. In this respect the Romans (and their Greek predecessors) were clearly different from the other European peoples of their time, such as the Gauls and Germanic peoples. In the ancient West, siege warfare as a military instrument had already 318

Ammianus Marcellinus, XXI 7. 14-15. Page | 85

been highly developed by the Greeks at the dawn of classical civilization. By classical times, Hellenic siege warfare was already well advanced, as evidenced by the numerous military manuals written by Greek authors on this subject (Aeneas the Tactician; Asclepiodotus; Onasander). The Alexanderian armies followed by those of Rome, were already prosecuting siege warfare with a high degree of effectiveness319. Our current understanding of siege warfare in the 4th century CE derives from the work of Ammianus Marcellinus. Ammianus’ life and career are of vital importance, given that he was not only a historian but especially his detailed excursus with respect to the siege weapons of his time320 which are of relevance for this textbook. Much of our knowledge of siege warfare in the 4th century CE is based, mainly, on the information that Ammianus has provided us. By late Antiquity the Romans had become possibly the world’s specialists in siege warfare. For this reason, the Romans held a distinct military edge in this type of warfare against their respective “barbarian” and nomadic enemies. The prosecution of sieges necessitated the preparation of large (infantry-heavy) armies, supported by extensive baggage trains required for the transportation of the necessary supplies and siege engines.

319 320

LEVITHAN 2013. Ammianus Marcellinus, XXIII 4.

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Once the siege had been initiated, the Roman infantry would approach the city protected by their shields or mantletes. There were often two objectives with this manoeuvre: (1) to inspect the condition of the walls, especially to assess the feasibility of creating a breach (2) calibrating check the reach of their archers and siege engines. While infantry advanced, their rear would be protected by their own archers. Accompanying the infantry were personnel carrying debris in order to construct a siege ramp (Agger). If the frontal assault failed, other methods were implemented: a) Bombardment of the walls with artillery or deploying a battering ram to force a breach. b) Digging of mines, either to break a curtain wall. Often in this case the mine was filled with flammable substances that were set on fire in order to destroy the wall. Another option was to dig into the interior of the enemy city and to attack them from within. c) Construction of a siege ramp higher than the enemy’s walls so that, once surpassed (in height), the infantry could then use for ingress. Generally, the use of these three methods was often combined with (1) direct infantry assaults on the enemy’s walls using ladders and (2) the use of siege towers and/or battering rams. If the siege became prolonged, “dirty war” methods could then be used:

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d) Deployment of incendiary arrows and the hurling enflamed stones into the enemy city or fortress to produce fires that would wreak destruction and to sap the morale of the defenders. e) “Sound warfare”: the creation of constant noise in order to deprive the besieged party from any sort of rest and to increase their psychological distress. f) Psychological warfare: the torturing and killing of the wounded or even captured civilians before the eyes of the defenders. Roman sieges against the Sasanians were not always successful, as with sasanian sieges against the Romans. Both however we highly adept in the military domain of siegecraft. Sometimes the arrival of the winter season or a support army was sufficient to force the termination of a siege. Roman officers were often permissive of their soldiers in their killing and pillaging of the vanquished in the aftermath of a successful siege. In general the Romans would imprison younger males in good physical condition to then sell them as slaves. If the siege were to prove costly for the Romans and resulted in significant casualties, orders could be issued for the victorious troops to slay their captives. This type of policy was essentially a form of psychological warfare. This was meant to dissuade potential enemies from offering stiff resistance for fear of Roman reprisals. There could also be economic benefits for the Romans if the besieged were “persuaded” to surrender quickly and without much resistance. This type of (quick Page | 88

surrender-little resistance) scenario would be especially beneficial if the enemy city was a commercial hub or military headquarters321. This would translate to much potential (economic) booty and/or captured military equipment for Roman appropriation. Roman siege warfare had achieved a very high level of combat effectiveness by the 4th century CE. This had been comprehensively proven (before the 4th century CE) during Rome’s wars against the Sasanians (and their Parthian predecessors) as well as in countless civil conflicts. The Romans in general began their sieges with the dispatch of an embassy. The dispatch of ambassadors also bought more time, both for the besiegers and the besieged. If the Romans were the besieged party and held suspicions of the arriving ambassadors, they would consider barring their entry into the city by shooting arrows at them. In the case of Bezabde however this Roman tactic was futile. This was because the arriving Sasanian embassy had placed Roman prisoners to their front to act as human shields322. Thus while the ambassadorial embassy was known to both the Romans and the Sasanians, both being the great military powers of their day, this “protocol” was yet another tool of war in the arsenal of both empires. This can be seen for example in the case of Constantius who dispatched an embassy as was usual in such scenarios, even as he was not optimistic of its chances of success; as noted 321 322

SYVÄNNE 2015: 32. Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 7. 4. Page | 89

by Ammianus: “And not to omit anything that was necessary before the heat of combat, sent very cautious men with an alternative proposal”323. A siege was often a costly affair for both sides. Both the Romans and Sasanians built strong and sophisticated fortifications maintained these in good condition. Plans and accompanying provisions were often made for prolonged resistance against sieges. As a result, Roman fortifications were often stocked with large stores of food with access to several fountains and cisterns for the collection of water from the rain and/or other sources of water without the need to depart beyond the protection of the fortress walls. In military terms, preparations would often be in place with respect to supplies of archery and combat gear, and (especially with large and important cities) counter-siege equipment. Engineers would also be prepared to effect repairs in case of breaches made by enemy battering rams and various types of artillery. The Romans were highly adept at preventing their enemies from exploiting breaches due to their ability to rapidly repair damaged defence works. If damages to walls, gates, etc. became critical during prolonged sieges, Roman engineers could resort to cannibalize or demolish private homes and public buildings in order to accumulate vital construction materials. In such scenarios weaker sections of defence walls could be buttressed as well as new walls erected behind the primary walls in order to contain breaches made by the enemy. There were also considerable quantities of oil, tar and other 323

Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 11. 7.

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incendiary materials available. Such substances were vital in setting fire to the siege engines of the Sasanians in particular. In these actions the Romans often witnessed their enemies having already coated their engines with alum or even wet rags in order to minimize the impact of the fires. Another tactic used by the besieged Romans against the enemy’s siege engine was the launching of surprise sorties. These could be carried out at night, timed when the besiegers were often exhausted. The common tactic was to have a small party egress the city to slay unsuspecting enemy sentries, followed by the opening of the gates to allow for a larger party to assault the siege engines by setting them alight with torches. In the siege of Amida however, all Roman attempts at surprise attacks against Sasanian engines ended in failure. Ammianus however reports of another type of Roman surprise raid attempting to assassinate Šāpur II. This too failed however Ammianus reports of the raiders having slayed a number of Sasanian nobles located in tents close to Šāpur’s. In practice, the real weapon allowing a city to survive a siege was perseverance, especially after having suffered high casualties. Perseverance itself however was vulnerable hunger, disease and betrayal. In the majority of cases, it was the siege artillery and engines that were the true protagonists during sieges. According to a military manual written by Vegetius (a veterinarian in the army) in the 4th century CE, there were two types of sieges:

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a) The blockade: This system is based on the fact that the city is condemned to starvation and surrendered. As we read in Vegetius:“There are many types of defence and attack, which we will explain at the right time. For now it should be known that there are two ways to pose a siege; one when the enemy, after having placed garrisons in the right places, leaves the besieged without water or waits for their capitulation due to hunger, preventing the entry of provisions. Through this system, the besieger wears the enemy without effort or risk”324. b) Deployment of siege machines and constant attacks: this was essentially the use of military assaults to force the enemy city’s surrender. Integral to this tactic was the heavy use of siege artillery and engines. In practice, the two tactics were not mutually exclusive and were often combined together against the enemy. The Romans developed a highly developed system of catapults325: (a) heavier catapults for siege warfare and (b) lighter catapults for use against enemy troops (infantry and cavalry). The power derived in the Roman catapults derived from twisted sinews and the mechanical flexibility of the “arms”. The armament production of artillery pieces in the 4 century CE had been centralized in two imperial th

324 325

Vegetius, IV 7. YILDIRIM 2012a: 458.

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factories: one in Autun and another in Treves. The assembly of Roman artillery machines during campaigns was by no means an easy task. This required a high level of engineering skills, both in assembly and use of the technology in battle. Every Centuria had, at least in theory, its own carriage with Ballista and eleven specialized soldiers to arm it, prepare the projectiles and then fire them. A full legion would have had have 55 Carroballistae and 10 Scorpiones. All of the artillery, especially the personnel responsible for their maintenance as well as building new components for replacing damaged ones was under the supervision of the Praefectus Fabrum, although from these weapons were part of the legion from earlier times. By the 4th century CE they had created their own artillery units, complete with their own officers, competent and trained in their use. SouthernDixon326 and Marsden327 have stated that the Comitatenses (the mobile reserve army) had two Carroballistae, with the commanders of border garrisons probably having had assigned artillery units. Roman artillery of the 4th century CE can be divided into two large groups: torsion and non-torsion machines. In the former, the force of shot was produced by the twisting of rope springs, constructed of hair or animal fibres (knitted plant lifts and animal bristle). Non-torsion machine had their energy produced from the bending of a wooden pole. The remainder of this chapter provides a synopsis of these siege machines. 326 327

SOUTHERN, DIXON 1996: 247. MARSDEN 1969: 196. Page | 93

Ballista was a two-arm twisting machine, in which the impulse for the firing was obtained from two rope springs under tension. Two wooden arms were inserted in the springs and a wooden slide in the centre. This was fired by tightening that slide backwards by means of a lathe located at the end of its carriage. In this way, the springs acquired more tension such that when released, hurled the projectile. Its operation was essence similar to that of a bow. A larger version of this weapon was built created in the 2nd century. This was mounted on a two-wheeled cart pulled by mules (carroballistae). Its purpose was to be a mobile ballista, which could be used in the open field (not in a fixed position against a static target) in order to shoot arrows against large enemy infantry attacks. Sometimes this weapon could be deployed to the rear of the army, alongside Roman crossbowmen (Manuballistarii) and slingers (Funditores). These ballistae launched darts between 6 and 8 cm, with wooden fins (or feathers). Sometimes these could also be incendiary. In these cases, the tip had three iron bars joined at both ends and arched towards the exterior, capable of introducing flammable material into the hole. Some ballistae of the same mechanism but larger in size (about 2.40 meters long) were used to throw stones that were almost 4 kg in weight. The Arcuballista (non torsion ballistae) was a wooden bow attached to one end of the carriage that supported the arrow. The rope, fixed to each end of the bow, was held by a trigger, which, when released, propelled the arrow with great force. While this was not an appropriate weapon for Page | 94

open field combat (since the process of recharging it was very slow), it did have greater reach and penetration capacity, making it a deadly weapon in sieges. Scorpio was in later times known as Onager328. It would appear that this technology was developed in the third century, with archaeological data dating back to the year 220 CE (the late Parthian era, a few years before the ascendancy of the Sasanians). This weapon was limited to siege as its large size precluded its use in the open battlefield. Ammianus Marcellinus has provided a detailed description of this machine329. Aries (battering ram): The Roman covered ram was a machine originally developed in the ancient Middle East. The Roman ram was protected by a type of “cab” or cover reinforced with panels in order to increase its thickness. The “cab” was also intended to provide protection against the spread of flammable liquids. Once the ram succeeded in reaching the enemy’s walls it was a very dangerous weapon. The ram however was a very slow machine due to its weight. This made it especially vulnerable to the martial attentions of enemy archers. Vegetius has described the various ways in which the Roman ram could be neutralized. “Against the battering rams there are those who drop centones and mattresses tied with ropes and place them in the points where the battering ram strikes, so that the impact of the machine does not 328 329

YILDIRIM 2012a: 459-460 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXIII 4. 4-6. Page | 95

destroy the wall when being cushioned with a very soft material. Others, trapping the battering rams with bows, pull them on the wall from the wall with the help of many men and make them overturn with their own cover330 […] Sometimes, marble columns and their pedestals are thrown from the wall, pushing them with great force and thus destroying the battering rams”331. Despite having the same name, the Helepolis alluded to in this discussion is not the same as the large siege machine that had been used by Alexander. The Roman Helepolis was a siege tower built of wood and covered with steel with various ballistae distributed at different heights332. The Turris (siege tower)was a square base tower composed of several floors joined together by an internal staircase. The engine was often constructed to be two or three meters higher than the walls to be overcome. There was a drawbridge at the top for reaching to the enemy battlements where the opposing troops were located. As the bridge was being lowered, the tower’s archers would shoot at the defenders to suppress their countermeasures. For its mobility, the tower had four large wheels. It was initially propelled by oxen or horses, but as it approached its objective the animal traction was replaced by the thrust of numerous men at its rear. This measured 330

This was the stratagem employed by the Sasanian against the Romans in the siege of Bezabde in 361. 331 Vegetius, IV 23. 332 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXIII 4. 11-13. Page | 96

at 43 m in height and 22 inside at its base. This was built with wheels that were 4.6 m in diameter. The tower also featured catapults that had been and on its nine floors. The construction of this machine required a considerable time and resources, and were thus deployed only when all other means for overcoming the enemy’s walls (e.g. battering rams) had failed. The engine was sometimes assembled on the siege site by prefabricated pieces, in view of the fortress or besieged city. The very act of its assembly would have had an appreciable psychological impact on the besieged enemy. Vineae (Mantlets) these were wooden sheds that served to protect the soldiers who participated in the work of the engineers. The Plutei in particular was a wicker structure with a vault shape covered with goatskin and leather mats. This had three wheels (two at the ends and one in the centre) and was pushed to the enemy’s wall, from where they could provide covering fire for those who were scaling the walls(s). Triboli (Caltrops) were iron contraptions formed by four pointed spikes joined at the base such that, when thrown to the ground, a point is always oriented upwards. Therefore the soldier (or beast) stepping on them was incapacitated for combat (or killed if the wound became infected). Funda (Sling) was possibly one of humankind’s most ancient the weapons, this basically consists of two ropes or straps on the ends of which a flexible receptacle is held from which a projectile is fired. Grasping the contraption by Page | 97

the other two opposite ends, it turns so that the projectile acquires speed and then one of the ropes is released to discharge it, making it reach great distance and power of impact. The materials used in its construction are very diverse, traditionally leather, textile fibres, tendons, horsehair, etc. Fustibalus was a hand weapon used by several peoples of antiquity. This essentially was a more complex sling allowing for the hurling of stones of greater weight at greater speed. The one used by Roman light infantry consisted of a pole of 1.5 m length, from which ropes were hung at the end. At that juncture a piece of leather was placed for the stone or lead that was to be hurled at the enemy. The Fustibularios, often in the deploy of crossbowmen and slingers, was located in the fifth row of the legion, in front of the Triarios. This was used during the tenure of the Roman Empire and came to be widely used in sieges as well as naval clashes during the Middle Ages. The weapon consisted of a sling allowing for the launch of large stones. There was a shaft or handle of different dimensions, with the larger size versions being held with both hands. Its operation took advantage of the energy accumulated by twisting vegetable fibres, and in addition to balls of stone or other objects, allowing for hurling masses of burning bitumen.

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As noted by Richardot333 the engineering required for the building of siege ramps are immense in scope and required a three-pronged approach: a) Filling of ditches b) Construction and elevation of the ramps. This would often occur under the heavy fire of enemy artillery and the targeting of personnel by enemy archers. c) Digging mine routes The function of the siege ramp was essentially simple: building an elevated structure that surpassed the height of the enemy’s walls in order to carry out an infantry attack. The outer frame of the ramp was often constructed with tree trunks, making these the frequent targets of the enemy expeditions that sought to set them on fire. The Sasanian military fortifications were especially robust and often defended with a very well prepared army and a professional infantry. As a result, when Julian invaded the Sasanian Empire he was forced to capture many cities with assault. This was especially evident in his conquest of Bezabde and Maiozamalcha during which Julian ordered the building of siege ramps in his operations against both cities334.

333 334

RICHARDOT 2001: 229. Ammianus Marcellinus, XXIV 4. 6; LEVITHAN 2013:201. Page | 99

Mines were especially effective since, especially of their construction could be hidden from the eyes of the besieged. In such cases mining operation would afford the besiegers the advantage of the surprise. This could for example if a mine succeeded in penetrating into the interior of the enemy fortifications, such as below a wall. This would then allow the deadly Roman infantry to break into the fortifications to engage the surprised defenders in close quarters combat and force their submission. If a mine succeeded in burrowing beneath a gate, Roman soldiers could then proceed to open this and allow for their main army to pour into in the enemy fortress. The ruins of Dura Europos’ archaeological remains have discovered a Persian mine as well as a Roman counter-mine with several corpses inside. Thjs would indicate that the Sassanian Spah (army) was a sophisticated military machine, adept at siege warfare and a dangerous rival. In addition to all the types of machinery and operations discussed in this chapter, mention must be made of "sappers". These were infantrymen, commanded by the Protectores Domestici or engineers. Their mission was to approach the walls directly (not through mines) to detect construction weaknesses in the masonry. The sappers could also be tasked to assess the impact of the damage inflicted on the enemy’s walls by Roman siege engines. Having identified the enemy walls’ weak points, the sappers would then endeavour to tear these down in order to create a breach.

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Roman sappers were armed with sapping material, especially with Ligones (mattock), Dolabrae (pickaxe) and Vectes (strong pole; lever). As the sappers’ tasks were at the foot of the enemy’s walls, they made easy targets for the defenders. The besieged had a variety of countermeasures against Roman sappers such as throwing large stones from the battlements and the pouring of boiling oil (or tar, sand, etc.). This meant that Roman sappers often suffered high casualties. Their physical protection, was limited to overlapping shields formed by their companions. They did not often have the protection of mantletes with their safety essentially depending on the aim of their own Roman archers. This resulted in Roman sappers often being hindered from their tasks, especially during siege operations against Sasanian fortifications. Roman siege warfare was based on three key elements: intelligence, artillery and flexibility of tactics. Hunger and disease (i.e. plagues due to overcrowding, lack of hygiene and stagnant water) were often the primary reasons for the besieged enemy’s capitulation. Another way of capturing a city or fortress was by way of betrayal by proRoman fifth column elements within the locale. Nevertheless if the city or fortress succeeded in avoiding fifth-column sabotage, which was often the case, the siege would then almost always be costly for the besiegers themselves. All the stratagems described in this chapter were used either singly or in combination together. Besieging troops often suffered high casualties which would then usually Page | 101

result in harsh “revenge” measures against the fallen city; this was often characteristic of both the Romans and the Sasanians. If the besieged forces managed to launch a raid to set fire to the Roman siege engines, this could both undermine the Roman military effort as well as morale. Another factor in the siege was the acumen of the besieged military commander. If the commanding officer of the besieged city was resourceful (both Romans and Iranians had very well-trained officers), he would then be quick in responding with effective countermeasures. Sieges involving the Romans and the Sasanians often witnessed archery duels, inrense combats between artillery pieces, mines and countermines (e.g. Dura Europos), siege ramps and counter-ramps (e.g. Amida). Often the side that made the first tactical error was the one most likely to suffer defeat. An example of this was the failed expedition of the Gallic soldiers to kill King Šāpur II during the siege of Amida. The Sasanian troops protecting their monarch forced back the attacking forces, inflicting heavy casualties on them (including the two officers who led it). After this failure, the besieged Romans at Amida simply could not recover from their heavy losses. The siege of Amida In 336, Constantius captured Amida and initiated a major refortification of the city, enhancing the city's circuit stout walls and constructing strong towers. He also built a new stronghold in the hinterland nearby, naming it

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Antinopolis335. According to Jacob of Edessa the city was rebuilt in 348: “This year Constantius built the city of Amida between the rivers; and the same year the Romans fought a battle with the Persians by night”336. Two key points on the perimeter of the Tur Abdin hills to the south were also fortified, Cepha and Rhabdium. Tella (Constantina) was probably being prepared to make it a secure reserve base337. In 359, Constantius realizing the threat, made decisions about the personel changes at the staff. He moved some experienced commanders to the East with intention to lead operations against the army of Šāpur. To Euphratensis and Mesopotamia was sent Domitius Modestus338. Ursicinus (magister peditum) replace Barbatio, as second-in-command under Sabinianus (magister equitum per Orientem)339. Ursicinus with the army marched out of Thrace and directed to Nisibis, where intensive construction works were carried in preparation to expected siege340. The plans of invasion routes of Šāpur against Rome were consulted with the traitor Antoninus: “And after long debate to and fro it was decided, on the advice of Antoninus, that since Ursicinus was far away and the new commander was lightly regarded, they should give up the dangerous

335

Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 9. 1; YILDIRIM 2012a: 457. Jacob of Edessa, 21. 337 HOWARD-JOHNSTON 2013: 870-871. 338 Libanius, Epistulae, 46, 367, 383 and 388. 339 LENSSEN 1999; OLSZANIEC 2013: 191, 284, 333. 340 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 6. 5; 5. 8-9. 336

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sieges of cities, pass the barrier of the Euphrates”341. The Iranian army crossed the Greater Zab and next the Tigris north of Singara342. The Romans expected the attack directed against Zeugma (the trespass on Euphrates) and abandoned weakly fortified city of Carrhae. Cassianus, the dux of Mesopotamia employed scorched earth tactics343: “and fortified the nearer bank of the Euphrates with towers, sharp stakes, and every kind of defence, planting hurling-engines in suitable places, where the river was not full of eddies”344. Sabinianus was getting ready for defending Edessa345. Then the Iranian army conducted false attack head straight for the Euphrates, bypassing Nisibis 346. After twelve days of march, reached Bebase (about 50 km west of Nisibis)347. Next Ursicinus established his command at Amida348. According to Ammianus Marcellinus crossing the Euphrates was impossible because of the flood, which resulted with changing the direction of the thrust towards the North349. However in context of proficiency of Iranian engineers in dealing the hydrodynamic matters 350 it is 341

Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 6. 3; The defection of Antoninus to Šāpur in 357/358: LIEU 1986: 494-495; SEAGER 2010: 158162. 342 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 6. 19. 343 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 7. 3-5. 344 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 7. 6. 345 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 7. 7; BLOCKLEY 1988: 255. 346 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 7. 8; LEE 1993: 108. 347 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 7. 9. 348 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII, 6. 17. 349 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 7. 8-11 and Zonaras, XIII 9. 3031; WARMINGTON 1977: 515. 350 DODGEON, LIEU 1992: 332, n. 16. Page | 104

possible to assume that North Mesopotamia and Amida, and not Syria, were the initial target of Šāpur351. Ammianus Marcellinus forwarded detailed information regarding Roman army stationing in Amida “Of this town the regular garrison was formed by the Fifth Legion, Parthica... But at that time six additional legions ... These were the soldiers of Magnentius and Decentius, whom, after finishing the campaigns of the civil wars, the emperor had forced, ... to come to the Orient, ... also the soldiers of the Thirtieth, and the Tenth, also called Fortenses, and the Superventores and Praeventores ... There were also in the town the greater part of the comites sagittarii (household archers), that is to say, a squadron of horsemen so̻named”352. The Legio V Parthica, the Gallic legions Magnentius, Decentius353 and Vexillationes of Legio XXX Ulpia Victrix, Decumani of Legio X Fortensis (Decimani Fretensis?), Praeventores, Superventores354, Equites Illyrian regiments with a combined strength of 700355, the comites sagittarii cavalry regiment together with refugee farmers from the neighboring countryside was about 20,000 (7-10,000 of soldiers and 10-13,000 civilians356).

351

JACKSON BONNER 2017: 100; MAKSYMIUK 2018a. Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 9. 3-4. 353 The legions of the usurpers Magnentius and Decentius 354 light-armed horsemen; POLLARD 2000: 138. 355 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 8. 2. 356 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVII 2. 13; XIX 2. 14; LENSKI 2007: 224-226. 352

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The Sasanian army numbered about 100,000 soldiers357. Among them were allied armies: “Close by him [Šāpur] on the left went Grumbates, king of the Chionitae, a man of moderate strength, it is true, and with shrivelled limbs, but of a certain greatness of mind and distinguished by the glory of many victories. On the right was the king of the Albani, of equal rank, high in honour”358. Busa and Rema were captured en-route by Sasanian forces as they advanced towards Amida359. When the Spāh arrived at Amida, Šāpur ordered his forces to surround the city’s gates to its east, west, south and north. At the eastern gates stood the Chionites of Central Asia with the Saka cavalry of Iran’s Sakastān placed towards the western gates. The northern gates of Amida were confronted by the cavalry of Albania with Šāpur and the elite Savārān corps deploying to the south of the city360. Ammianus also noted of the slow march of “lines of elephants…loaded with armed men” facing Amida’s western gates361. This is of interest as the elephants were being deployed from the same position as the Saka contingent.

357

LENSKI 2007: 222. Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 6. 22. 359 Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 10. 360 Šāpur II is described by Ammianus Marcellinus (XIX 1. 3) as “…wearing in place of a diadem a golden image of a ram's head set with precious stones, distinguished too by a great retinue of men of the highest rank and of various nations…”; About other possibilities of identifying of the king: REZAKHANI 2017. contra MAKSYMIUK 2018b. 361 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 2. 3. 358

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Siege engines were quickly operationalized allowing powerful projectiles to be hurled into Amida. These inflicted heavy casualties among combatants and civilians alike. Šāpur then followed up with messages of peace that were rejected by Aelianus, the general in command of Amida. Sasanian siege batteries then resumed their deadly barrages against Amida. Šāpur then led the elite Savārān in major assaults against Amida’s gates that had most likely been damaged as a result of Sasanian siege batteries. According to Ammianus, Šāpur: “rode up to the gates attended by his royal escort, and while with too great assurance he came so near that even his features could clearly be recognized”362. Nevertheless each of Šāpur’s assaults was beaten back by the Amida’s defenders who unleashed powerful salvos of missiles and lances against Šāpur’s Savārān. This is notable as the armour of Šāpur’s Savārān is described by Heliodorus as having been “proof against any missiles”363. Evidently the Amidan defenders were able to successfully concentrate dense barrages of missiles into the compact formations of the heavily armored Savārān approaching the gates. As a result, the barrages were so concentrated and dense that these overcame the powerful armor of the Savārān. It is possible that to maximize the kinetic energy and density of their missile delivery, the Amidans would wait until the Savārān reached close to the city gates (perhaps 100 meters or less) before discharging their barrages. Amida’s defenders were also in possession 362 363

Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 1. 5. Heliodorus, IX 15. 3. Page | 107

of powerful ballistae. The son of the Chionite king was killed by just such a weapon as he and the Chionite contingents launched an assault against the eastern gates of Amida: “but a skilful observer caught sight of him as soon as he chanced to come within range of his weapon, and discharging a ballista, pierced both cuirass and breast of Grumbates' son”364. The Romans also found ways of countering Šāpur’s “troops of elephants” by hurling flames against the beasts’ skins, making Sasanian elephant drivers “unable to control them”365. On the third day of the siege, the Spāh reorganized its forces for a fresh round of assaults. As before, the eastern gates were faced by the Chionites, the western gates by the Sakas, the northern gates by the Albanians and the south with the Gelai (modern-day Gilan in northern Iran). “The Persians beset the whole circuit of the walls. The part which faced the east fell to the lot of the Chionitae... The Gelani were assigned to the southern side, the Albani guarded the quarter to the north, and to the western gate were opposed the Segestani... With them, making a lofty show, slowly marched the lines of elephants, frightful with their wrinkled bodies and loaded with armed men”366. The presence of the Gelai, who were excellent infantry fighters, indicated that the Spāh expected to break into Amida to engage its desperate defenders in close-quarter combat. A “wall of infantry” five rows deep now surrounded 364

Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 1. 7. Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 7. 6-7. 366 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 2. 3. 365

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Amida367. Šāpur ordered fresh assaults of infantry and cavalry supported by the furious archery barrages of Sasanian foot archers. Despite the ferocity of the assaults, the Amidans again successfully repelled these by relying on a combination of archers, ballistic weapons, lances and scorpions368. While the Spāh had certainly suffered heavy losses, Sasanian siege engines continued to inflict a heavy toll against Amida’s defiant defenders. The Spāh was also deploying ex-Roman siege batteries captured in earlier campaigns, “the artillery which the Persians had acquired from the plunder of Singara”369. Amida’s inhabitants had suffered terribly from Šāpur’s siege with the Roman legions defending the city running out of land to bury their dead. “for within the limits of a city that was none too large there were shut seven legions, a promiscuous throng of strangers and citizens of both sexes, and a few other soldiers, to the number of 120,000 in all”370. Šāpur and the Spāh leadership now resorted to maximize the use of their siege weaponry. Catapults371 were installed around the city along with towers constructed with metal sheets at their front. Ballistae were mounted onto the towers. “But meanwhile 367

See discussion of these these infantry tactics by MATUFI 1378/1999: 170-171. 368 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 2. 7. 369 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 2. 8. 370 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 2. 14; Amida’s circumstances deteriorated to such an extent that a plague broke out in the city, which was however washed away by subsequent rains. Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 4. 1; MATUFI 1378/1999: 171. 371 YILDIRIM 2012a: 458. Page | 109

the restless Persian was surrounding the city with sheds and mantlets, and mounds began to be raised and towers were constructed; these last were lofty, with ironclad fronts, and on the top of each a ballista was placed, for the purpose of driving the defenders from the ramparts; yet not even for a moment did the skirmishing by the slingers and archers slacken”372. The elevation afforded by the towers allowed the Spāh to maximize the effectiveness of these ballistic weapons. These could now menace Amida’s archers and ballistic units. If these “ballistic towers” could (at the very least) partially suppress Amida’s archers and ballistae, Šāpur could finally launch his Savārān, combat infantry and elephants towards the city’s gates without suffering the level of losses incurred in previous assaults. Sasanian engineers also constructed a large mound that was to prove its effectiveness in finally turning the tide in Šāpur’s favor. Another stratagem was the successful infiltration of seventy elite archers into Amida’s southern walls373 with the assistance of a Roman deserter. These then fired their arrows against Roman troops in the city but when their quivers emptied, they were all cut down by Roman troops 372

Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 5. 1. Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 5. 4: “In a remote part of the walls on the southern side, which looks down on the river Tigris, there was a tower rising to a lofty height, beneath which yawned rocks so precipitous that one could not look down without shuddering dizziness. From these rocks subterranean arches had been hollowed out, and skilfully made steps led through the roots of the mountain as far as the plateau on which the city stood, in order WKDW ZDWHU PLJKWEHEURXJKWVHFUHWO\IURPWKHFKDQQHORIWKHULYHU´ 373

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and their ballistae374. Next the Iranian army captured fortress of Ziata. “But at the arrival of the following dawn we saw from the citadel a countless throng which after the capture of the fortress of Ziata was being taken to the enemy's camp… and from them many thousands of men had been dragged, and were following into slavery, among them many feeble old men, and women already advanced in years”375. The Romans also launched a sortie of their own by sending their Gallic troops on a raid against the Sasanian camps “Meanwhile the Gauls, ... armed with axes and swords rushed out through an opened postern gate, taking advantage of a gloomy, moonless night ...And holding their very breath when they had come near the enemy, they rushed violently upon them in close order, and having slain some of the outposts, they butchered the outer guards of the camp in their sleep”376. After the assault the warfare was suspended for following three days “And as because of this event a truce of three days was granted by common consent”377. The armies were getting ready to the decessive assult. First of all, new engineering works were carried “various kinds of siege-works were brought up, along with ironclad towers, on the high tops of which ballistae were placed, and drove off the defenders who were busy lower down”378.

374

Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 5. 5-7. Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 6. 1-2. 376 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 6. 3-7. 377 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 6. 13. 378 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 7. 2. 375

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Sasanian and allied forces resumed their attacks “And day was now dawning, when mail-clad soldiers underspread the entire heaven, and the dense forces moved forward...protected too by pent-houses and holding before them wicker hurdles”379 but these (and the battle elephants380) were all repelled by the devastating fire of Amida’s archers, ballistae, slingers and scorpions “But when their approach brought them within bowshot, though holding their shields before them the Persian infantry found it hard to avoid the arrows shot from the walls by the artillery, and took open order, and almost no kind of dart failed to find its mark; even the mail-clad horsemen were checked and gave ground”381. Sasanian ballistic-towers however were now placing the Amidan defenders at great risk “the enemy's ballistae, mounted as they were upon iron-clad towers, were effective from their higher place against those lower down, on account of their different position they had a different result and caused terrible carnage on our side”382. This prompted the Romans to launch heavy “round stones” which accurately struck at the joints of the towers, causing these to collapse “round stones hurled at intervals from the battlements by the iron arms of our scorpions shattered the joints of the towers, and threw down the ballistae and those who worked them in such headlong fashion, that some perished without injury from wounds, others were crushed to

379

Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 7. 3. Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 7. 6. 381 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 7. 4. 382 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 7. 5. 380

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death by the great weight of debris”383. Šāpur responded by launching yet more attacks lasting into the night and even participated in these dangerous assaults in person “For even the king of the Persians himself, who is never compelled to take part in battles...rushed into the thick of the fight like a common soldier”384. Šāpur participated in hand to hand combat with sword and dagger385. The Spāh’s mound already erected as high as Amida’s towers now proved decisive. Sasanian engineers placed makeshift “bridges” connecting their mound to Amida’s walls. This allowed Sasanian infantry, dismounted Savārān and allied forces to pour into the city to subdue its defenders “when that mound of ours, the result of long toil, fell forward as if shattered by an earthquake. Thus the gulf which yawned between the wall and the heap built outside was made a level plain, as if by a causeway or a bridge built across it, and opened to the enemy a passage blocked by no obstacles”386. The fighting was very bloody with the dead of both sides piling into the trenches387. With Amida now clearly doomed, the survivors sued for peace, allowing Šāpur to officially enter the city as its conqueror. The Šāhānšāh ordered the execution of captured 383

Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 7. 7. Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 7. 8. These attacks were fraught with danger as the Amidans were able to target Šāpur with their missiles. Many of the elite Savārān of the royal guards were killed in the endeavor to protect their king during these assaults. 385 MATUFI 1378/1999: 172. 386 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 8. 2. 387 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 8. 4. 384

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Roman commanders at Amida388. The city of Amida was pillaged and its population deported to Xuzestān389. The siege lasted seventy-three days (from July 22 to October 4) and, although it was a clear Sasanian triumph the high number of casualties (and the late season of the year) obliged Šāpur to return to Iran390. In fact the siege was a serious loss to both the Romans and Iranians. Rome had suffered at least 20,000 casualties during the siege, with the Sasanians having lost 30,000 troops “when he had invested Amida for seventy-three days with a great force of armed men, he lost 30,000 warriors”391. This was 30% of the original force that had invaded Mesopotamia392. In the following year of hostilities however, Sasanian casualties were less. Šāpur’s renewed invasion of 360 resulted in Sasanian victories in the sieges of Singara393 and Bezabde394 (both lasted less than Amida). Thus, while the strategic game of imperial chess remained in place, Rome had now discovered that the Sasanians were a formidable enemy, stronger than their Parthian predecessors.

388

Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 9. 2. KETTENHOFEN 1996: 299. 390 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 9. 1. 391 Ammianus Marcellinus, XIX 9. 9; WHITBY 2013: 436. 392 LENSKI 2007: 222. 393 Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 6. 1-9. 394 Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 7. 1-15. 389

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Consequences of fall At first glance it might seem that stopping of the invasion of the Iranian armies at Amida disabled the execution of great Western campaign of Šāpur. The Iranian armies did not attack any other border cities in 359. The above conclusion was made based on the testimony of Ammianus Marcellinus, who was personally involved in heroic defense of the city. Naturally if Šāpur II had planned plundering Cappadocia than leaving Amida aside would leave Iranian army in strategically disadvantegous situation as this would allow Roman attacks from behind on the units operating on enemy territory. It should be considered however if in reality the pillage of the rich, Roman borderland was not the only goal of Šāpur. From political point of view and in the context of later military actions, expedition aiming further into Roman territory seemed unlikely. Amida was from one hand a gateway to Roman Armenia, on the other, it secured the province Mesopotamia from the attack from the North. Šāpur underestood well the significance of the city. It should be borne in mind that already at the beginning of the war in 336, Iranian prince Narseh captured Amida. Destruction of Amida allowed control over the route leading to Armenia. The political program of Šāpur was cancellation or reversal of the treaty of 298. This was impossible without capturing Nisibis. Despite numerous individual victories of the Iranian army in Mesopotamia, Rome was successful in sustaining Nisibis, the main aim of Šāpur’s attacks. Destruction of Amida, Page | 115

aquisition of Singara and Bezabde in 360 isolated the region of Eastern Trans-Tigritania, and what is more important, made the direct assault on Nisibis possible. In elaborated plan of capturing Nisibis, this was the key point. Reinforcement of the walls and leaving Iranian garrison in Bezabde proves that the final goal of Šāpur reached beyond the pillage of the Roman cities and the true aim was assuring the control over North-Eastern Mesopotamia by capturing Nisibis. Realizing the threat, Constantius, together with his army, reached Edessa by the route through Melitene and Samosata395. After the autumnal equinox, he directed to Amida. Next, the Roman army took failed attempt to recapture Bezabde396. The fall of Amida not only humiliated the Romans but had wider consequences for the Roman situation in the East. Enormous financial burden of keeping the garrisons in Northern Mesopotamia did not bring the expected effect. “Behold with what courage the cities are defended by our soldiers, for whose abundance of pay the wealth of the empire is already becoming insufficient”397. The loyalty of Armenia was upset “Constantius sent for Arsaces, king of Armenia, and after entertaining him with the greatest generosity forewarned and urged him to continue to be faithful and friendly to us”398, and Iberia “envoys were sent to the kings and satraps beyond the Tigris with generous 395

Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 11. 4. Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 11. 6-32. 397 Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 11. 5. 398 Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 11. 1. 396

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gifts, to admonish and exhort them all to be loyal to us and attempt no deceit or fraud. But above all Arsaces and Meribanes, kings of Armenia and of Hiberia, were bribed with splendidly adorned garments and gifts of many kinds, since they would be likely to cause damage to Roman interests”399. Roman administrative-military machine had been thrown into confusion. Vast number of Roman civilian and military leaders was captured and deported or executed. Ursicinus, the commander of the Roman army in the East was blamed for the fall of Amida and released from duty “Constantius…ordered the victim of the calumnies to give up his command in the army and go into retirement”400. The trials and condemnations for treason were carried on the imperial court401. The campaign of Šāpur remained not completed. He did not capture Nisibis and did not manage to cancel the treaty of 298. The goals of the Šāhānšāh were reached three years later. Julian’s military expedition proved to be rich in consequences for the entire balance of power in the borderland. Although the Emperor reached Ctesiphon402, after his death Jovian (r. 363-364) was forced to abandon Diocletian’s acquisitions. According to the subsequent peace treaty the Emperor renounced his rights to the Trans399

Ammianus Marcellinus, XXI, 6. 7-8. Ammianus Marcellinus, XX 2. 5. 401 JACKSON BONNER 2017: 101. 402 WIRTH 1978: 455-507; KAEGI 1981: 209-213; MOSIGWALBURG 2009: 283-304; SZELĄG 2012: 168-185. 400

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Tigritania, Singara, Castra Maurorum, Nisibis and fifteen other fortresses403. It is surprising that Šāpur did not require transfer of Sophene. Amida was captured by the Iranian armies however it was the Roman fortress and there was no need to regulate its status in the articles of the treatise. Although Iran took Nisibis, its residents were allowed to leave the city (Emperor Jovian commanded the evacuation of the population of Nisibis for which only three days were granted.)404. The inhabitants of Nisibis were relocated to Amida405. The treatise which allowed safe withdrawal of the Roman army was perceived in the Empire as disgraceful406. It was more important from the military infrastructure point of view. The transfer of the fortresses in Singara and Nisibis damaged Roman defensive system in North-Eastern Mesopotamia407. Iran controlled from then on the main routes to Euphrates and Syria. Having lost Nisibis to Šāpur, Amida acquired additional strategic importance408.

403

Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 7. 9-14; MAKSYMIUK 2016. Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 7. 10; XXV 9. 1-12; TEIXIDOR 1995: 499-510; BLOCKLEY 1984: 28-49; CHRYSOS 1993: 165202; MOSIG-WALBURG 2009, 305-324; LAWRENCE, WILKINSON 2017: 106. 405 It is likely, that the purpose of this provision written into the treaty was to save the numerous Christian community from possible persecutions. Zosimos, III 34. 1; The curtains walls of the city were rebuilt in the early 370s by Valens (r. 364-378): LENSKI 2002: 378; LENSKI 2007: 220. 406 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 7. 13; Eutropius, X 17; Festus, XXIX; Agathias, IV 26. 7; BLOCKLEY 1984: 34-37. 407 BLOCKLEY 1984: 35. 408 SARANTIS 2013: 344. 404

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The sack of Amida and new peace agreements set important ramifications for the position in the Caucasian region. The treaty demanded the withdrawal of Rome’s backing for Armenian rulers409. Acquisition of four fifths of South subcaucasian region to Iranian zone, including regional capitals of Armenia and Iberia, gave Iran clear strategical advantage410. The Romans did not intend to obey by the treaty. Rome’s reluctant attitude to compliance with the treaty’s regulations was further strengthened by the king’s actions in Iberia aiming at the dethronisation of Sauromaces (r. 361-363/370-378)411, which eventually shattered the balance of power in the Caucasian region. Shortly after the death of Jovian, counting on Rome’s neutrality in the matter, Šāpur II led his army to Armenia. The Armenian aristocracy’s request for help in overthrowing king Aršak II served as a convenient pretext for the Iranian ruler412. King Aršak was murdered and his son Pap (r. 370374) sought the Emperor’s help413. In 371 the Roman troops intervened in Armenia, but in the course of military operations previous alliances were reversed, which resulted in the murder of Pap414. Varazdat (r. 374-378) introduced to the Armenian throne by Valens was soon overthrown by 409

Festus, XXIX; Agathias, IV 26. 6-7; Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 7. 12; SEAGER 1996: 275-276. 410 HOWARD-JOHNSTON 2013: 872. 411 HAAS 2008: 101-126. 412 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXVI 12. 1; Zosimos, IV 4; P'awstos Buzandac'i' IV 58; GUTMANN 1991: 162-191. 413 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXVII 12. 5-10; P'awstos Buzandac'i' V 1; 414 MAZZA 2003: 405-440. Page | 119

the local aristocracy. Ultimately, Armenia was taken over by Šāpur’s II ally, Manuēl Mamikonean (r. 378-385). The death of Šāpur II and the threat of the Gothic raids on Rome enabled Manuēl Mamikonean to remain in power415. Another internal war in Armenia, which broke out after his death, led to the partitioning of the country under the ensuing agreement between Theodosius I (r. 378-395) and Šāpur III (r. 383-388)416. In 394, Bahrām Šāpur (r. 394414), the Iranian king’s brother, came to the throne of Persarmenia417. In 428, Bahrām V (r. 420-439) changed the status of Armenia by introducing the system of military government, though the position of marzbān could also be held by a member of the local aristocracy418, which also had positive effects.

415

P'awstos Buzandac'i' V 37; GREATREX 2000: 40. BLOCKLEY 1987: 222-234; GREATREX 2000: 35-48. 417 La Narratio de rebus Armeniae, 10-12; DARYAEE 2009: 43. 418 La Narratio de rebus Armeniae, 16; Movsēs Khorenats'i, III 64; GARSOÏAN 1997: 95-115. 416

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Appendix: Select passages from sources The peace treaty of 298 Peter the Patrician, frg. 13-14 (Translation of Beate Dignas, Engelbert Winter): As Apharbān, who was a very close friend of the Persian king Narsē, had been sent as ambassador, he approached Galerius in supplication. When he had the opportunity to speak he said, ‘It is obvious for all mankind that the Roman and the Persian Empires are just like two lamps; and it is necessary that, like eyes, the one is brightened by the light of the other and that they do not angrily strive for each other’s destruction. For this is not held as a virtue but rather levity or weakness. As they believe that later generations will not be able to help them they make an effort to destroy their opponents.’ He continued by saying that it was not necessary to think that Narsē was weaker than the other kings but rather to see Galerius as that much superior to the other kings so thatNarsē himself was inferior to him alone, and rightly so, without, however, proving to be lower in dignity than his ancestors. Apharbān added that Narsē had given him instructions to entrust, as they were fair, the right of his empire to the kindness of the Romans; that this was why he was not bringing the oaths by which the peace had to be concluded but was handing everything over to the judgement of the Emperor, asking only that his children and wives were returned to him, and he claimed that for their return he would owe the Emperor more for his benefactions than if spared by his arms. He was not able to thank him Page | 121

appropriately for the fact that those in captivity had not experienced any cruelty but had been treated as if soon to be returned to their own high status at home. In this context he also reminded the Emperor of the changeable character of human affairs. But Galerius seemed to be angry about this remark and, with his body beginning to shake, responded that it was not quite appropriate for the Persians to remind others of the changes in human affairs because they themselves did not cease to use every opportunity to add to human misfortune. ‘For you guarded the rule of victory well in Valerian’s case, when you deceived him with tricks, took him captive and did not release him until old age and his shameful death, when you, after his death, conserved his skin with some disgusting method and thereby afflicted the mortal body with immortal offence.’ The Emperor went through all this and added that his mind was not changed by what the Persian embassy tried to convey, namely that he should respect human fate (because one should rather be enraged by this if one considered what the Persians had done), but that he would follow the footsteps of his own ancestors, whose custom it had been to spare their subjects but to fight the ones who opposed them; he told the ambassador to inform his king of the generosity of the Romans, whose kindness he had challenged, and to hope that soon they [the captives] would return to him by judgement of the Emperor. When Galerius and Diocletian had come together in Nisibis, they took counsel there and agreed to send an ambassador to Persia, Sicorius Probus, an archivist. Narsē received him in Page | 122

a friendly way expecting to hear what had been reported to him. But Narsē also made use of delaying tactics. For as if he wanted the ambassadors who had come with Sicorius to recover (since they were exhausted), he took Sicorius, who knew well what was going on, as far as the Asproudis, a river in Media, until the units who had been scattered here and there because of the war had gathered. And then, in the inner room of the palace, having sent away all others and allowing only the presence of Apharbān and of the archapetēs Barsaborsos, the one of whom was the praetorian prefect and the other held the rule over Syme, he asked Probus to deliver his message. The main points of the ambassador’s message were the following: that in the eastern region the Romans should receive Ingilēnē together with Sōphēnē, Arzanēnē together with Karduēnē and Zabdikēnē and that the river Tigris should be the boundary line between the two states, that the fortress of Zintha, which was located on the border of Media, should mark the border of Armenia, that the king of Ibēria should owe his royal status to the Romans, and that the city of Nisibis, which lies on the Tigris, should be the place of trade. Narsē listened to these points and – as his present situation did not allow him to refuse any of this – agreed to all of them; with the exception, so that he would not seem to be forced to comply with everything, that he rejected the condition that Nisibis should be the only place for exchange. Sicorius, however, responded, ‘This point is a requirement because the embassy does not have full power and no instructions for this have been given by the emperors.’ When these matters had thus been settled, Narsē was given back his wives and Page | 123

children, whose pure reputation had been respected thanks to the emperors’ love of honour.

Letter of Constantine to Šāpur II (after 324?) Eusebius, vita Constantini IV 9-13 (Translation of Ernest Cushing Richardson): Letter of the Emperor to Shapur, king of the Persians, concerning his care over the people of God. ‘By protecting the Divine faith, I am made a partaker of the light of truth: guided by the light of truth, I advance in the knowledge of the Divine faith. Hence it is that, as my actions themselves evince, I profess the most holy religion; and this worship I declare to be that which teaches me deeper acquaintance with the most holy God; allied to whose Divine power, beginning from the very borders of the ocean, I have aroused the whole empire in succession to a wellgrounded hope of security; so that all those who, groaning in servitude to the most cruel tyrants, and yielding to the pressure of their daily sufferings, and almost extinct, have shared in the general amnesty and regained new life as if through a healing process. This God I confess I hold in unceasing honour and his symbol is borne on the shoulders by my god-fearing army which is guided wheresoever the word of the righteous one urges, and from them I immediately receive his favour through magnificent victories. This God I confess to honour with undying regard

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and him I discern clearly with a pure and innocent mind to be clearly in the highest. This God I invoke with bended knees, and recoil with horror from the blood of sacrifices, from their foul and detestable odours, and from every earthly lamp, for the profane and impious superstitions which are defiled by these rites have cast down the whole race of the Gentiles and consigned it to the lowest regions. For the God of all cannot endure that those gifts which, in his own loving-kindness and consideration of the needs of men, he has revealed for the use of all, should be perverted by the lusts of individuals. His only demand from man is purity of mind and an unblemished soul: and by this standard he weighs their deeds of virtue and piety. For he takes pleasure in works of moderation and gentleness: he loves the meek, and hates those who excite contentions; delighting in faith, he chastises unbelief: by him all presumptuous power is broken down, and he punishes overweening pride. While the arrogant and haughty are utterly overthrown, he requites the humble and forgiving with deserved rewards: even so does he highly honour and strengthen with his special help a kingdom justly governed, and preserves the royal counsel in the tranquillity of peace. ‘I cannot, then, my brother, believe that I err in acknowledging this one God, the ruler and father of all things; whom many of my predecessors in power, led astray by insane madness, have ventured to deny, but who were all visited by such a visible vengeance, that all succeeding generations have held up their calamities as the most Page | 125

effectual warning to any who desire to follow in their steps. Of the number of these I believe him16 to have been, whom the lightning-stroke of Divine anger drove forth from hence, and banished to your dominions, and leaves among you a notorious legacy of the disgrace that fell upon him power is great, I commend these persons to your protection; because your piety is eminent, I commit them to your care. Cherish them with your customary humanity and kindness; for by this proof of faith you will secure an immeasurable benefit both to yourself and us.’

Letter of Šāpur II to Constantius II (357/8) Ammianus Marcellinus, XVII 5. 3-8 (Translation of John C. Rolfe): I Sapor, King of Kings, partner with the Stars, brother of the Sun and Moon, to my brother Constantius Caesar offer most ample greeting. I rejoice and at last take pleasure that you have returned to the best course and acknowledged the inviolable sanction of justice, having learned from actual experience what havoc has been caused at various times by obstinate covetousness of what belongs to others. Since therefore the consideration of truth ought to be free and untrammelled, and it befits those in high station to speak as they feel, I shall state my proposal in brief terms, recalling that what I am about to say I have often repeated. That my forefathers' empire reached as far as the river Strymon and the boundaries of Macedonia Page | 126

even your own ancient records bear witness; these lands it is fitting that I should demand, since (and may what I say not seem arrogant) I surpass the kings of old in magnificence and array of conspicuous virtues. But at all times right reason is dear to me, and trained in it from my earliest youth, I have never allowed myself to do anything for which I had cause to repent. And therefore it is my duty to recover Armenia with Mesopotamia, which double-dealing wrested from my grandfather. That principle shall never be brought to acceptance among us which you exultantly maintain, that without any distinction between virtue and deceit all successful events of war should be approved. Finally, if you wish to follow my sound advice, disregard this small tract, always a source of woe and bloodshed, so that you may rule the rest in security, wisely recalling that even expert physicians sometimes cauterize, lance, and even cut away some parts of the body, in order to save the rest sound for use; and that even wild beasts do this: for when they observe for what possession they are being relentlessly hunted, they give that up of their own accord, so as afterwards to live free from fear. This assuredly I declare, that if this embassy of mine returns unsuccessful, after the time of the winter rest is past I shall gird myself with all my strength and with fortune and the justice of my terms upholding my hope of a successful issue, I shall hasten to come on, so far as reason permits.

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Letter of Constantius II to Šāpur II (358) Ammianus Marcellinus, XVII 5. 10-14 (Translation of John C. Rolfe): I, Constantius, victor by land and sea, perpetual Augustus, to my brother King Sapor, offer most ample greeting. I rejoice in your health, and if you will, I shall be your friend hereafter; but this covetousness of yours, always unbending and more widely encroaching, I vehemently reprobate. You demand Mesopotamia as your own and likewise Armenia, and you recommend lopping off some members of a sound body, so that its health may afterwards be put upon a firm footing - advice which is rather to be refuted than to be confirmed by any agreement. Therefore listen to the truth, not obscured by any juggling, but transparent and not to be intimidated by any empty threats. My praetorian prefect, thinking to undertake an enterprise conducing to the public weal, entered into conversations with a general of yours, through the agency of some individuals of little worth and without consulting me, on the subject of peace. This we neither reject nor refuse, if only it take place with dignity and honour, without at all prejudicing our self-respect or our majesty. For at this time, when the sequence of events (may envy's breezes be placated!) has beamed in manifold form upon us, when with the overthrow of the usurpers the whole Roman world is subject to us, it is absurd and silly to surrender what we long preserved unmolested when we were still confined within the bounds of the Orient. Furthermore, pray make an end of those intimidations which (as usual) are Page | 128

directed against us, since there can be no doubt that it was not through slackness, but through self-restraint that we have sometimes accepted battle rather than offered it, and that when we are set upon, we defend our territories with the most valiant spirit of a good conscience; for we know both by experience and by reading that while in some battles, though rarely, the Roman cause has stumbled, yet in the main issue of our wars it has never succumbed to defeat.

The peace treaty of 363 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 7. 9-14 (Translation of John C. Rolfe): But Shapur obstinately demanded (to use his own language) the restoration of those territories which had been taken from him a short while ago by Maximian; but as was seen in the process of the negotiation, he in reality required, as the price of our redemption, five provinces on the other side of the Tigris – Arzanene, Moxoene, Zabdicene, as well as Rehimene and Corduene, with fifteen fortresses and Nisibis and Singara, and Castra Maurorum, an extremely well placed fort. And though it would have been better to fight ten battles than to give up any of them, still a set of flatterers harassed our timid emperor with harping on the dreaded name of Procopius, and affirmed that if he [Procopius] returned with the fresh troops under his command when he heard of the death of Julian, he would easily bring about a revolution which no one would resist. Jovian, excessively inflamed by the pernicious reiteration of these evil counsels, Page | 129

without further delay gave up everything that was demanded, (with this proviso), which he obtained with difficulty, that Nisibis and Singara should go over to Persian control without their inhabitants, and that the Roman garrisons in the forts to be surrendered should be permitted to retire to fortresses of our own. To this another deadly and unfair condition was added, that after this treaty was concluded aid was not to be brought to Arsaces against the Persians, if he implored our aid, though he had always been our friend and trusty ally. And this was insisted on by Shapur for two reasons, in order that the man might be punished who had laid waste Chiliocomum at the emperor’s command, and also that the opportunity might henceforth be given for invading Armenia without a check. In consequence of this it fell out subsequently that Arsaces was captured alive, and that amid different dissensions and disturbances, the Parthians laid violent hands on the greater portion of Armenia, where it borders on Media, and on the town of Artaxata. Once this ignoble treaty had been made, in order that nothing might be done during the armistice, in contravention of its terms, some men of rank were given as hostages on each side: on ours, Nemota, Victor and Bellovaedius, tribunes of distinguished legions: and on that of the enemy, one of their chief nobles named Bineses, and three other satraps of note. So peace was made for thirty years, and ratified by solemn oaths;

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Formation of a mobile field army by Constantine (before 325) Zosimos II 34. 1-2 (Translation of Samuel N.C. Lieu): Constantine also adopted another measure which allowed the barbarians to penetrate the territories under Roman domination without encountering any resistance. For, thanks to the forethought of Diocletian, as I have already described, the Roman Empire was protected on all its frontiers by cities, fortresses and signalling towers, in which the entire army was stationed. It was consequently impossible for the barbarians to cross the frontier as there was always sufficient force everywhere to counter and repulse them. Constantine, however, abandoned this security by transferring the greater part of the soldiers from the frontier garrisons and installed them in cities that had no need of defenders, thus depriving those who were exposed to the barbarians of every form of defence, and oppressing the tranquil cities with so great a multitude of soldiers that many of them were totally abandoned by their inhabitants. He likewise lowered the morale of the soldiers through regular shows and comfortable living. In plain terms, he was the original sower of the seeds of decline which afflict us all at present.

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Roman cavalry equipment strengthened by Constantius Julian, Orationes, I 30: (Translation of Wilmer Cave Wright): Your [Constantius II] cavalry was almost unlimited in numbers and they all sat on their horses like statues, while their limbs were fitted with armour that followed closely the outline of the human form. It covers the arms from wrist to elbow and thence to the shoulder, while a coat of mail protects the shoulders, back and breast. The head and face are covered by a metal mask which makes its wearer look like a glittering statue, for not even the thighs and legs and the very ends of the feet lack this armour. It is attached to the cuirass by fine chain-armour like a web, so that no part of the body is visible and uncovered, for this woven covering protects the hands as well, and is so flexible that the wearers can bend even their fingers.

Description of Scorpio Ammianus Marcellinus, XXIII 4. 4-6 (Translation of John C. Rolfe): The scorpion, which is now-a-days called the wild ass, has the following form. Two posts of oak or holm-oak are hewn out and slightly bent, so that they seem to stand forth like humps. These are fastened together like a sawing-machine and bored through on both sides with fairly large holes.

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Between them, through the holes, strong ropes are bound, holding the machine together, so that it may not fly apart. From the middle of these ropes a wooden arm rises obliquely, pointed upward like the pole of a chariot, and is twined around with cords in such a way that it can be raised higher or depressed. To the top of this arm, iron hooks are fastened, from which hangs a sling of hemp or iron. In front of the arm is placed a great cushion of hair-cloth stuffed with fine chaff, bound on with strong cords, and placed on a heap of turf or a pile of sundried bricks; for a heavy machine of this kind, if placed upon a stone wall, shatters everything beneath it by its violent concussion, rather than by its weight. Then, when there is a battle, a round stone is placed in the sling and four young men on each side turn back the bar with which the ropes are connected and bend the pole almost flat. Then finally the gunner, standing above, strikes out the pole-bolt, which holds the fastenings of the whole work, with a strong hammer, thereupon the pole is set free, and flying forward with a swift stroke, and meeting the soft haircloth, hurls the stone, which will crush whatever it hits.

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Description of Helepolis Ammianus Marcellinus, XXIII 4. 11-13 (Translation of John C. Rolfe): It is built in the following manner: a huge mantlet is constructed of strong planks of great length fastened together with iron nails, and covered with ox-hides and hurdles of green twigs; and over these is spread mud, in order to protect it from fire and falling missiles. On its front side are set very sharp, three-pronged spear points, of the form which our painters and sculptors give to thunderbolts, made heavy with iron weights, so that whatever it attacks it shatters with the projecting points. This powerful mass is guided by numerous soldiers within by means of wheels and ropes, and by their united efforts is brought up to the weaker part of the walls; and unless the strength of the defenders above is too great, it shatters the walls and opens great breaches.

The first siege of Nisibis (337 or 338) Theodoret, Historia religiosa I, 11 (Translation of Michael H. Dodgeon): [in 337] At this moment the king of the Persians, whose name was Shapur and who despised the sons of Constantine as being less capable than their father, marched against Nisibis at the head of a vast army comprising both cavalry and infantry, and also as many elephants as he could muster. Page | 134

He divided his army as for a siege and completely surrounded the city, setting up machines of war, commissioning towers, erecting palisades, the areas between strewn with branches placed crosswise, then he ordered his troops to raise embankments and build towers against the city towers. Then, while dispatching his archers to ascend the towers and direct their arrows at those defending the walls, at the same time he charged others with undermining the walls from below. Yet all these plans came to nothing, rendered useless by the prayers of Jacob, that inspired man, until finally, by prodigious effort, Shapur stopped up the course of the river which flowed past the city and when as vast an amount as possible of the accumulating water had piled up behind the dam, he released it all at once against the walls, using it like a tremendously powerful battering-ram. The wall could not withstand the force of the water, and indeed, badly shaken by the flood, the whole stretch of that side of the city collapsed. Then there arose a great shout, as though the city were now ready for the taking; for they had overlooked the great wall formed by the city’s inhabitants. However, the Persians postponed their assault, since they could see that the water flooding into the city made access impossible. Retreating, then, some distance, as though relaxing their efforts, they rested themselves and tended their horses. The citizens, on the other hand, redoubled their prayers, with the noble Jacob as their intercessor. All those old enough to be of use set to in earnest to rebuild their defences, without regard to appearance or neatness of construction: indeed they threw everything together, pell-mell, stones and bricks, whatever Page | 135

they could carry, and in one night the work progressed and attained a sufficient height to prevent either a cavalry charge or an assault by troops with scaling-ladders.

The battle of Singara (343 or 344) Libanius, or. LIX 103-110 (Translation of Michael H. Dodgeon, revised by Samuel N.C. Lieu): When these apparent concessions had been made and no one from our side opposed them, they bridged the river at three points and crossed over in closed ranks everywhere. At first, running day into night, they continually poured across the river. Afterwards, when the necessity arose to fortify their position, they raised a circuit wall on the same day more quickly than the Greeks at Troy. Already the entire position was full of those who had crossed over the river bank, the breadth of the plain and the mountain peaks. But there was no type of military equipment which did not complement their army, archers, mounted archers, slingers, heavy infantry, cavalry and armed men from every part. While they were still deliberating as to where they should muster, their king made his appearance in truly Homeric image; outstanding in brilliance and fitly armed, he supervised the whole operation. Then the Persians developed a strategy somewhat along the following lines. They drew up their archers and javelin men on the peaks and on the wall, and they pushed forward their heavily armoured troops in front of the wall. Page | 136

The remainder took up arms and advanced against their enemies to rouse them to action. When they saw the Romans go into action, they immediately broke off the engagement and fled and led them to within missile range so that they might be shot at from above. And so the pursuit continued for some time and indeed for the greater part of the day, until those who had fled had retreated within the wall. Thereafter the archers and those before the wall who had not been engaged were called up to take advantage of the situation. Then the emperor won a victory…What is the nature of this? He alone discovered the intention behind what was happening, and not only was he not deceived by the battle array but he alone shouted out and ordered our troops not to pursue nor to be forced into obvious danger…For between the camps there was an interval of one hundred and fifty stades, and they began the pursuit in the forenoon and were already drawing near the wall by late afternoon…It is appropriate to examine the merits of those who fought and make obvious to all from what small beginnings they started out to fulfil such a role. First of all, when they clashed with the cavalry (cataphracts) before the wall, they discovered a tactic superior to their armour. For the infantry soldier stepped aside from the charging horseman and rendered the attack useless, while he himself struck the rider on the temple with his club as he passed by and knocked him off, and the rest of the business was finished off quite easily. Whereupon, since those who arrived at the wall did not restrain their hands, everything from the battlements was pulled down to the lowest foundation and there was no one to stop them. Page | 137

Description of Amida Ammianus Marcellinus, XVIII 9. 1-2 (Translation of John C. Rolfe): This city was once very small, but Constantius, when he was still a Caesar, in order that the neighbours might have a secure place of refuge, at the same time that he built another city called Antoninupolis, surrounded Amida with strong walls and towers; and by establishing there an armoury of mural artillery, he made it a terror to the enemy and wished it to be called after his own name. Now, on the south side it is washed by the winding course of the Tigris, which rises near-by; where it faces the blasts of Eurus it looks down on Mesopotamia's plains; where it is exposed to the north wind it is close to the river Nymphaeus and lies under the shadow of the peaks of Taurus, which separate the peoples beyond the Tigris from Armenia; opposite the breath of Zephyrus it borders on Gumathena, a region rich alike in fertility and in tillage, in which is the village called Abarne, famed for its warm baths of healing waters. Moreover, in the very heart of Amida, at the foot of the citadel, a bountiful spring gushes forth, drinkable indeed, but sometimes malodorous from hot vapours.

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Description of Iranian army (363) Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV 1. 12-18 (Translation of John C. Rolfe): Moreover, all the companies were clad in iron, and all parts of their bodies were covered with thick plates, so fitted that the stiff joints conformed with those of their limbs; and the forms of human faces were so skilfully fitted to their heads, that, since their entire bodies were plated with metal, arrows that fell upon them could lodge only where they could see a little through tiny openings fitted to the circle of the eye, or where through the tips of their noses they were able to get a little breath. Of these some, who were armed with pikes, stood so motionless that you would think them held fast by clamps of bronze. Hard by, the archers (for that nation has especially trusted in this art from the very cradle) were bending their flexible bows with such wide-stretched arms that the strings touched their right breasts, while the arrow-points were close to their left hands; and by a highly skilful stroke of the fingers the arrows flew hissing forth and brought with them deadly wounds. Behind them the gleaming elephants, with their awful figures and savage, gaping mouths could scarcely be endured by the fainthearted; and their trumpeting, their odour, and their strange aspect alarmed the horses still more. Seated upon these, their drivers carried knives with handles bound to their right hands, remembering the disaster suffered at Nisibis; and if the strength of the driver proved no match for the excited brute, that he might not turn upon his own people (as happened then) and crush masses of them to the ground, Page | 139

he would with a mighty stroke cut through the vertebra which separates the head from the neck. For long ago Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal, discovered that in that way brutes of this kind could quickly be killed. Although these sights caused no little fear, the emperor, guarded by troops of armed men and with his trustworthy generals, full of confidence, as the great and dangerous power of the enemy demanded, drew up his soldiers in the form of a crescent with curving wings to meet the enemy. And in order that the onset of the bowmen might not throw our ranks into confusion, he advanced at a swift page, and so ruined the effectiveness of the arrows. Then the usual signal for battle was given, and the Roman infantry in close order with mighty effort drove the serried ranks of the enemy before them. And in the heat of the combat that followed, the clash of shields, the shouts of the men, and the doleful sound of the whirring arrows continued without intermission. The plains were covered with blood and dead bodies, but the Persian losses were greater; for they often lacked endurance in battle and could with difficulty maintain a close contest man to man, since they were accustomed to fight bravely at long range, but if they perceived that their forces were giving way, as they retreated they would shoot their arrows back like a shower of rain and keep the enemy from a bold pursuit. So by the weight of great strength the Parthians were driven back, and when the signal for retreat was given in the usual manner, our soldiers, long wearied by the fiery course of the sun, returned to their tents, encouraged to dare greater deeds of valour in the future.

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Description of the Iranian cataphracts Heliodorus, Aethiopica, of Walter Lamb)

IX

14.3-15.18

(Translation

For in fact it is this brigade of Persians (i.e. the cataphracts) which is always the most formidable in action; placed in the front line of battle, it serves as an unbreakable bulwark. Their fighting equipment is furnished in this way: a picked man, chosen for his bodily strength, is capped with a helmet which has been compacted and forged in one piece and skilfully fashioned like a mask into the exact shape of a man’s face; this protects him entirely from the top of the head to the neck, except where eye-holes allow him to see through it. His right hand is armed with a pike of greater length than the spear, while his left is at liberty to hold the reins. He has a sabre slung at his side, and his corselet extends, not merely over his breast, but also over the rest of his body. This corselet is constructed thus: plates of bronze and of iron are forged into a square shape measuring a span each way, and are fitted one to another at the edges on each side, so that the plate above overlaps the next one to it, all forming a continuous surface; and they are held together by means of hooks and loops under the flaps. Thus is produced a kind of scaly tunic which sits close to the body without causing discomfort, and clings all round each limb with its individual casing and allows unhindered movement to each by its contraction and extension. It has sleeves, and descends from neck to knee, with an opening only for the thighs so far as is required for mounting a horse’s back. Such a corselet is proof against any missiles, and is a sure Page | 141

defence against all wounds. The greaves reach from above the flat of the foot to the knee, and are joined on to the corselet. The horse is protected by a similar equipment: round his feet greaves are fastened, and his head is tightly bound all about with frontlets. From his back to his belly hangs on either side a housing of plaited strips of iron, serving as armour, but at the same time so pliable as not to impede his more rapid paces. The horse being thus equipped and, as it were, encased, the rider bestrides him, not vaulting of himself into the saddle, but lifted up by others because of his weight. When the moment comes to engage in battle, he gives his horse the rein, applies his spurs, and in full career charges the enemy, to all appearance some man made of iron, or a mobile statue wrought with the hammer. His pike projects with its point thrust far ahead: it is supported by a loop attached to the horse’s neck, and has its butt-end suspended by a strap alongside the horse’s haunches; so that it does not recede in the clashes of conflict, but lightens the task of the rider’s hand, which only directs the blow. He braces himself and, firmly set so as to increase the gravity of the wound, by his mere impetus transfixes anyone who comes in his way, and may often impale two persons at a single stroke.

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The units formation in Mesopotamia the Notitia Dignitatum, Or. DODGEON, LIEU 1992: 293):

XXXVI,

18-36

(after

(18) Under the command of the vir spectabilis, the dux Mesopotamiae: (19) Equites scutarii Illyriciani, at Amida (Diyarbakir) (20) Equites promoti Illyriciani, at Rhesaina-Theodosiopolis (Ras al ‘Ain) (21) Equites ducatores Illyriciani, at Amida (22) Equites felices Honoriani Illyriciani, at Constantina (Viransehir) (23) Equites promoti indigenae, at Constantina (24) Equites promoti indigenae, at Apadna (25) Equites sagittarii indigenae Arabanenses, at MefanaCartha (26) Equites scutarii indigenae Pafenses, at Assara (27) Equites sagittarii indigenae Thibithenses, at Thilbisme (28) Equites sagittarii indigenae, at Thannuri. (29) Prefect of the Legio I Parthica Nisibena, at Constantina (30) Prefect of the Legio II Parthica, at Cefa. (31) And these which are assigned from the lesser register: (32) Ala secunda nova Aegyptiorum, at Cartha (33) Ala octava Flavia Francorum, at Ripaltha (34) Ala quintadecima Flavia Carduenorum at Caini (35) Cohors quinquagenaria Arabum, at Bethallaha (36) Cohors quartadecima Valeria Zabdenorum, at Maiocariri

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Figures

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Fig. 1. Position of Amida, (source of image: Google Maps).

Fig. 2. Diyarbakır's city walls, (source of image: Google Earth).

Fig. 3. The view south from the walls of ancient city of Diyarbakir, (Photo by Allan Langdale).

Fig. 4. The southern sectios of the walls, (Photo by Allan Langdale).

Fig. 5. Diyarbakır's city walls, (Photo by Allan Langdale).

Fig. 6. Diyarbakır's city walls, (© photograph courtesy of the Museum With No Frontiers / Discover Islamic Art; Photo by Mehmet Koştumoğlu).

Fig. 7. Diyarbakır's city walls, (© photograph courtesy of the Museum With No Frontiers / Discover Islamic Art; Photo by Mehmet Koştumoğlu).

Fig. 8. Diyarbakır's city walls, (© photograph courtesy of the Museum With No Frontiers / Discover Islamic Art; Photo by Mehmet Koştumoğlu).

Fig. 9. Military operations in 359-360, (drawing by Katarzyna Maksymiuk).

Fig. 10. The army around the city of Amida (drawing by Katarzyna Maksymiuk).

Fig. 11. Territorial changes due to the treaty of 298 CE, (drawing by Katarzyna Maksymiuk).

Fig. 12. Territorial changes due to the treaty of 363 CE, (drawing by Katarzyna Maksymiuk).