The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957 (Volume 1) 9781487599591

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THE SHAPING OF PEACE When Mackenzie King went to the San Francisco Conference he told the Commons that Canada had played its part in winning the war and it was now its duty to play a part in 'the shaping of peace.' This is a history and analysis of Canadian participation in the peace settlement and in the establishment of the United Nations and other international institutions, written by a man who was in the Department of External Affairs at the time. Although the book records the principal events, its emphasis is on the ideas and basic philosophies which Canada applied to the world scene in these years. The first of two volumes deals with postwar planning in Ottawa, the institutions which were created before the war ended, and Canada's part in settling the war, both in relief and reconstruction and in the peace treaties. It describes the shifting relations with Britain and the United States, including new defence and economic relationships, the working of the 'atomic triad,' and the postwar Commonwealth. It concludes with an extended discussion of Canada's part in the preparations for San Francisco and in the conference itself, with reference both to political and security issues and the economic and social functions involved. A second volume will describe Canada's attitudes as the cold war developed, the shifts in NATO, the experiences of the Korean War, and the evolution of middle-power diplomacy in the 1950s. John Holmes' well-informed account of 'the shaping of peace' is the first to provide a comprehensive overview of what has been regarded as Canada's most creative initiative in international affairs. JOHN w. HOLMES, o.c., who was in the Department of External Affairs from 1943 to 1960, is Professor of International Relations at Glendon College in York University and Research Director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. He is author of The Better Part of Valour and Canada: a middle-aged power.

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J O H N W. H O L M E S

The Shapin g o f Peace : Canada and th e search fo r worl d orde r

1943-1957

Volume 1

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London

© University of Toronto Press 1979 Toronto Buffalo London

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Holmes, John Wendell, 1910The shaping of peace Includes index. ISBN 0-8020-5461-7 (v. 1) 1. Canada - Foreign relations - 1945I. Title. FC602.H64 F1034.2.H64

327.71

C79-094558-4

TO R . G . ' G E R R Y ' RIDDELL 1908-1951 Canadian permanent representative to the United Nations 'His memor y and hi s spirit will help us for the days ahead , as we work for the things to which he devoted hi s talents, his energy and hi s life.' L.B. PEARSO N

Our contributions to the fashionin g of victory have bee n far greate r than could have been imagine d six years ago. Our par t in the shapin g of peace may be no less urgent and no less effective . MACKENZIE KIN G

on the Resolution t o approve the invitation to San Francisco, Hous e o f Commons, 20 March 194 5

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Contents

Preface / ix Abbreviations / xvi i PARTI: PRELUD E

1 Tria l and Error, 1914-45/ 3 2 Th e Wartime Experience / 22 PART II: ENDIN G THE WAR

3 Relief , Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction / 77 4 Peacemakin g / 105 PART III: THE TRIANGLE REORDERED

5 Th e Commonwealth, 1944- 7 / 141 6 Nort h America/15 9 7 Th e Atomic Triad / 196

PART IV: ESTABLISHMEN T OF THE UNITED NATIONS

8 Draftin g the Charter / 229 9 Economi c and Social Functions / 269 Conclusion / 296 Notes / 309 Index / 337

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Preface

'The searc h fo r worl d order, ' i t ha s bee n aptl y said , 'i s nothin g bu t a n attempt t o conquer turbulence. " N o times could have bee n mor e turbulen t than th e latte r years of war and the early years of peace whe n the ne w order took shape. The contours of that order were to a considerable exten t planned but then had to be rapidly adjusted to new and unexpected circumstances . A t first the designers, civi l servants fo r the most part, had to contend wit h those who discourage d contemplatio n o f th e peac e whil e there wa s a war to b e won. When i n 1943 they went to work on blueprints, the war began to end in stages. Attentio n ha d to b e diverted to international régimes fo r conquere d and starvin g peoples , refugees , an d disbandin g armies . Swif t compromise s were necessary, furthermore , i f firm foundations wer e to be laid before th e wartime alliance suffered th e tes t o f peace. Th e United Nations , establishe d in 194 2 as an association o f wartime allies with a common ai m to defeat th e enemy, was seen as a peacetime extension o f that alliance; agreement amon g the Americans, British , and Russian s thu s becam e th e inescapable priority. We are not dealing here wit h a philosopher's dream . The Canadia n par t mus t b e seen i n perspectiv e agains t thi s world panorama. It was a part of some consequence , bu t it s quality, such as it was, is to be foun d no t i n th e proposin g o f gran d design s bu t i n th e responses , i n constructive amendment s an d imaginativ e formulas , i n th e exploitin g o f occasions, an d in the insistence , usuall y in company, o n certain basi c principles. Canadia n design s wer e spu n a t th e outset , bu t mor e a s a mean s o f concentrating the mind , a n aid to consistency, o r a point of reference. Fro m this exercise, i n continuous review, emerged no t a blueprint of world organization bu t a way of looking at i t and a way of fitting Canada int o it, a func tionalist approach that ha s endured i n Canadian foreig n policy . Much of th e effort o f th e Canadia n planner s wen t into finding a place in the scheme s o f

x Prefac e things. It was more tha n just a sordid concentratio n on Canadia n interest , however, because i t was highly pertinent to the central theme - th e ways and means o f agglomerating states o f various sizes into a world authority. The Canadia n designer s wer e genuinely interested i n creating a workable framework fo r peace , whic h they regarded a s the firs t priority in the Cana dian nationa l interest . I n so far as their calculations were universal in scop e they wer e listene d to . The y clung , mor e o r less, t o th e libera l concept, a s E.H. Carr described it, that 'every state, b y pursuing the greatest goo d of the whole world , i s pursuin g th e greates t goo d o f it s ow n citizens , an d vic e versa.'2 Tha t assumption , o f course , save d a lo t o f effort . I t late r prove d inadequate fo r th e expande d world community, bu t thi s limite d principle was perhaps all that could b e coped wit h as a start to the Unite d Nation s in peace. I t was not a communist principle, but, given the balanc e of power at the time , th e Sovie t Unio n als o wante d a Unite d Nation s o f restricte d authority. Canadians' hope s an d expectation s were constantly frustrated by the compromise s th e grea t power s exacted o f each othe r an d o f them, bu t they trie d not t o forget that great-power agreement wa s the sine qua non of any order in which Canada coul d flourish . This then canno t be an account o f ideas as adumbrated i n memoranda o f officials an d speeches o f politicians; it must deal to some extent wit h events. The primar y concern, however , i s wit h th e ideas ; i t i s no t intende d a s a comprehensive histor y of Canada's foreign policy. The period in which these events happene d an d th e idea s wer e fashioned wa s roughly from 194 3 t o 1957, but the account spills over at both ends. The first volume is concerned with th e windin g up o f the wa r and th e prospec t o f a new kin d of peace a s perceived whe n th e fighting subsided. Th e secon d volum e deal s with what might be called the revised version , th e reconsiderations after about 194 7 in the ligh t o f th e realitie s tha t wer e protruding , suc h a s th e breakdow n o f consensus amon g the grea t powers and th e reveale d inadequac y of the eco nomic calculation s o f 1945 . Th e treatmen t o f themes , however , ha s bee n determined mor e b y subject matter tha n by chronology, and the divisio n i s often arbitrary. International institutions , th e Unite d Nations , th e Commonwealth , NATO, organizations that were thought about, ar e the majo r subjects of concern, bu t othe r aspect s o f polic y are include d i f the y illustrat e Canadians ' views of the system s aroun d them . T o grasp the significanc e of institutions one mus t conside r als o th e significanc e of non-institutiona l relations . N o book o n Canadia n foreig n polic y ca n ignor e th e Unite d States , an d th e United State s a s a large international presenc e plays a leading role i n every chapter. Ou r strictl y bilateral relation s wit h the US , however, woul d occupy

xi Prefac e little space i n a book concerne d wit h formal intergovernmental institution s because w e are linked by only a few. It had been Canadia n policy, in fact, i n its relations wit h both its closest associates, Britai n and the United States, to minimize structures. Wh y that is so requires attention. Canada matured i n a triangle, it s economi c an d securit y requirement s largel y satisfie d i n th e Anglo-American entente . I t was for Canadian s the mos t concret e reality of their internationa l relations , bu t i t wa s n o mor e tha n a concept , deepl y though ambiguousl y felt, an d devoi d o f chartere d structure . The shap e o f the triangl e shifte d notabl y durin g th e wa r an d altere d thereb y Canadia n perceptions of the world order tha t could accommodate thei r needs. The stud y i s primarily about officia l polic y and officia l perspectives , par ticularly those of th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs . I t i s intended a s on e contribution t o the expandin g literature on Canada's postwar policies. What government leader s and thei r civil and military servants actually wanted and strove for is an important par t of the picture . As one who was a civil servant involved i n man y o f th e project s herein described , I have endeavoure d t o explain official view s as I think they were and as they look in retrospect. This volume is not an apologia; to explain is not necessarily to justify, eve n when the intentio n ma y be to counter misinterpretation . One o f its purposes is to reveal somethin g o f th e debat e withi n th e bureaucracy . My aim i s description an d analysis, not judgment, althoug h th e boo k i s not withou t personal reflections o n the wisdom of certain attitude s an d actions - occasionall y inspired by contemplation in tranquillity and by dismay at memoranda bearing my own initials. Canada's foreign policy towards international institutions is not somethin g to b e se t fort h b y it s leader s briefly , categorically , an d precisely , and i t is unwise of historians to package it too neatly. It is imprudent of any country, large or small, to summarize it s policy in a speech o r a white paper, an d i t is particularly so of a country that must reac t t o circumstances and policies of countries ove r whic h it has little or no control. Certain guidin g principles, a way of looking at issues, an d a sense, based o n experience, o f what is likely to work are required. Consistency is not necessaril y a virtue. Before the war there wa s little effort, excep t i n clichés, t o define Canadian foreig n policy in global terms . I t wa s almos t inevitable , however , tha t wit h th e ne w self consciousness after th e wa r an effor t woul d be mad e t o d o so. The closes t thing was Louis S t Laurent's Gra y Lectur e i n Januar y 1947 , bu t i t prove d more retrospectiv e tha n prospective . Neithe r th e Unite d State s no r th e Soviet Unio n received muc h attention and i n referring to relations wit h th e former h e sai d typicall y tha t it was a matter of settling questions da y to day 'without dignifying the process b y the word "policy." '3 That shrewd bureau-

xii Prefac e crat, Hume Wrong, when asked at a press conference on 26 September 194 6 whether a statement would be produced o n Canada' s foreign policy similar to on e Australi a ha d just issued , replied , 'w e coul d issu e a statemen t o f principles, I suppose, bu t I doubt i f it would be of much value. We follow a fairly consistent patter n at the various conferences we attend, but I don't see what is to be gained by attempting to reduce the matter to a simple code.' To grasp the code of Canada's policies in the shaping of peace one has to look at a spectrum of ideas. Although I have sought t o be as objective as possible and to reappraise in the light of history, I would not preten d to have shed entirely the biases of a Canadian foreig n service office r o f my generation. I assume tha t any reader equipped with appropriate scepticism will adjust fo r that lens. Except for th e personal reflections contained i n this preface an d the conclusion , thi s i s not a first-perso n account . M y part was not consequentia l enoug h t o justify s o narrow a focus. My perspectives, however, may be regarded a s raw material for historian s and political scientists - traditionalists, revisionists , Marxists , or Whigs - whos e job it is to quantify o r pass judgment. The stud y is not confine d to subjects in which I was personally involved, but I hav e concentrate d o n them . Fo r that reaso n ther e i s more abou t th e diplomacy of political and security questions than about economics. M y concern i s with institution s rather than policy . I had the grea t benefit of advice and collaboration from Wynn e Plumptre, one of the most constructive architects of our postwa r economic policies , who not onl y read drafts and helped me pla n the projec t but relieved me of responsibility by preparing himself a study o f foreig n economi c policies , Three Decades o f Decision: Canada an d the World Monetary System, 1944-1975, which , wit h characteristic dedica tion, he completed shortly before hi s death i n June 1977 . My ow n recollection s have , o f course , playe d an importan t par t i n th e writing o f this account. I have to the bes t o f my ability checked th e record . The written record is enormous and swallows up those who try to cope with it all. The Departmen t o f External Affairs, i n accordance with official regulations, ha s allowe d m e t o consul t th e file s wit h whic h I wa s familiar a s a member o f the department , a wise provision designed t o prevent the alumni from writin g historical accounts off the tops of their heads. Needless to say, I found th e record s i n man y case s di d no t confir m th e versio n whic h ha d become fixed in m y mind . I hav e graciousl y left t o scholars a considerabl e range o f record s unexamined . Thi s stud y wa s written whil e I wa s holding positions at two universities and an institute, without benefit of sabbatical. It has seemed best to make my account available now rather than to aim for the definitive stud y in 1984 . Footnotes are included in the interest s of credibil-

xiii Prefac e ity, bu t the y ar e intende d fo r th e genera l reader . Admittedly , the y d o no t pamper scholar s bu t the y should assis t the m i n trackin g document s t o th e files in which they are now held. To assist the reader in detecting prejudice - or even special competence - I shall herewith indicate the specific connection I had with the subject matter. My role, especiall y at the beginning , was junior, bu t I had the good fortun e to work for the men o f quite extraordinary ability who play the leading roles: Norman Robertson , Hum e Wrong , Arnol d Heeney , Escot t Reid , A.G.L . McNaughton, Paul Martin, L.B. Pearson, and others, al l of them friend s as well a s mentors , an d on e prejudic e against whic h th e reade r shoul d b e warned i s m y difficult y i n recognizin g that an y o f the m coul d hav e bee n mistaken. Fortunatel y for this book, at any rate, they were often in disagreement amon g themselves. To begi n wit h I was secretary i n 1943- 4 o f th e Workin g Committee o n Post-Hostilities Problem s an d engage d unde r Hum e Wrong' s directio n i n following th e plan s for the peac e settlement s an d the Unite d Nations being put forwar d b y th e grea t powers , an d i n draftin g positio n paper s o n th e emerging structures. I served a s a general factotu m at the prim e ministers ' meeting in London i n May 1944 and on the staf f o f Canada House, London , during th e las t perio d o f th e wa r and unti l lat e 1947 . I n Londo n I was involved i n liaiso n wit h th e Britis h Post-Hostilities Planners , i n th e pre-Sa n Francisco meeting o f Commonwealth leaders and later Commonwealth ses sions, contac t wit h th e Dominion s an d Foreig n Office s on , amon g othe r things, the peac e settlements, the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the case of Igo r Gouzenko . Th e staf f o f Canad a Hous e wa s small an d m y rang e of subjects during that interesting period broad. I was attached to the delegation to th e Preparator y Commission an d the first session o f the Unite d Nation s General Assembl y i n London. Amon g othe r thing s I made a trip in 194 7 to refugee camp s i n German y wit h C.D . How e which inspired admiratio n for the humanit y of that remarkable man an d some view s and emotions whic h show through my account o f that subject . Later in 194 7 I was sent t o Mos cow as chargé d'affaires , an d a good dea l o f the materia l i n the chapte r o n the Col d Wa r in volume I I reflects my experience there , whic h extended t o the time of the Berli n Blockade. I the n returne d t o Unite d Nation s affairs , wit h whic h I wa s associate d during the res t o f my career i n External Affairs. Afte r working with General McNaughton, ou r Permanent Representativ e t o the United Nations, during the Securit y Council and Assembl y sessions in Paris in 1948, I becam e hea d of th e Unite d Nations Division i n Ottawa when I returned i n 1949 . Durin g 1950-1I also served twice for lengthy periods as acting head o f the Canadia n

xiv Prefac e mission t o th e Unite d Nations in New York, and was on the ho t sea t whe n the Korea n Wa r started . (Reader s shoul d watc h fo r th e Unite d Nation s rather than the Ottawa bias on Korea.) After tw o years on the Directing Staff of th e Nationa l Defence College , 1951-3 , durin g which I acquired a bette r understanding of defence and strategic questions an d saw a lot of the world , from Yellowknif e to Bahrein, I returned to Ottawa as an assistant undersec retary, wit h responsibilitie s for th e nex t year s in Unite d Nations, Fa r East ern, an d Commonwealt h affairs . I attende d th e Genev a Conferenc e o n Korea i n 195 4 and bot h the n an d thereafte r wa s involve d i n th e Genev a Agreements on Indochina and the Canadian role in the International Control Commissions. A goo d dea l o f tim e was spent i n Ne w Yor k a t Assembly , Economic and Social Council, or other meetings , includin g notably the ses sions of 1955 , when the new members issue arose, and 1956 , over Suez and Hungary. M y supervisor y responsibilitie s require d a n acquaintanc e wit h issues fro m disarmamen t o r Palestin e refugee s t o the relatio n o f Canada t o the Pa n America n Sanitar y Organization, an expertis e notabl e mor e fo r it s breadth than its depth. Association with the United Nations from it s prenatal stage into late adolescence ought to have induced pessimism . Nothin g in my career, however , wa s a s exhilaratin g as Unite d Nation s diplomac y i n th e Hammarskjöld years , an d a n inextinguishabl e confidence in th e capacit y of international institutions to grow and adapt is the most obviou s bias in these volumes. Although mos t o f thi s study is base d o n researc h o r recollectio n a t firs t hand I hav e mad e great us e o f bot h publishe d an d unpublishe d wor k by others. Ther e i s no need , fo r example , t o describ e i n dept h Canadia n de fence polic y whe n thi s ha s bee n superbl y covere d b y Jame s Eayr s an d Charles Stacey, upon whose work I have heavily depended. The subject matter o f mos t o f thi s study was so ably and reliabl y recorded b y F.H. Sowar d and Rober t Spencer in their volumes for 1944- 6 and 1946-9 , respectively, in the Canada an d World Affairs series , by F.H. Sowar d and Edga r Mclnnis i n Canada and the United Nations, and b y R.A. MacKay's annotated Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-54 that I frequentl y wondere d whethe r more wa s necessary. Usin g their framework, however, I have sough t t o expand an d ad d detail s a s wel l as documentar y evidenc e no t availabl e whe n they wrote . I hav e als o take n advantag e o f muc h usefu l wor k available i n unpublished theses , whic h are dul y acknowledged i n the footnotes . I hav e been especiall y dependen t o n Dougla s Anglin' s 'Canadia n Polic y toward s International Institutions , 1939-1950, ' a doctora l thesi s writte n i n 195 6 which ought t o have been publishe d lon g ago. Paul Ambrose , Joh n Kirton , Michael Little , Danfor d Middlemiss , Ki m Nossal , Steve n Ruvinsky , an d

xv Prefac e Michael Tucke r no t onl y mad e thei r researc h availabl e but als o helpe d b y reading manuscript and offerin g counsel . My wor k was from th e beginnin g enormousl y facilitate d by access t o ' A Survey of Canadian External Policy ' compiled fo r the Departmen t o f External Affair s i n th e earl y fiftie s fro m departmenta l file s b y Professo r F.H . Soward of the Universit y of British Columbia. This comprehensive survey of policy in seven chapter s assembled, with Professor Soward's remarkable historical judgment, a great deal of the sourc e materia l required. In addition to all this , Professo r Sowar d provided critica l comment o n a great dea l o f m y draft manuscript , increasing thereby the grea t debt I owe him fo r information an d insigh t sinc e w e worke d togethe r i n th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs when all this was going on. The Canadia n Institut e o f International Affairs , o f which I was director at the time , requeste d m e a few years ago to write a book o n Canadian foreig n policy. I was able to get down to work when the Canad a Council provided a Killam Senio r Researc h Scholarship . Th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s encouraged m e t o undertak e a n historica l study o f postwa r foreign policy, and Arthu r Blanchette, former directo r of the Historica l Division, provide d encouragement an d advic e an d arrange d fo r assistanc e wit h m y research , greatly facilitate d by the goo d office s o f Pete r Dobel l o f th e Parliamentar y Centre fo r Foreign Polic y and Foreign Trade . With the hel p of the Historical Division th e manuscrip t i n draft stage s wa s submitted to former colleagues whose suggestions and criticisms were of great value. I was fortunate to have a good dea l o f help from the R t Hon . Lester Pearso n befor e his death and , through hi s editors, Ale x Inglis and John Munro , h e passe d t o me valuable documentation prepare d for his memoirs. M y former colleague and mentor , George deT. Glazebrook, generously made available a very useful collectio n of notes he had prepared on wartime institutions. The list of those who read parts of the manuscrip t is long and I am thankful t o my readers for saving me from error . I should particularly like to thank Louis Rasminsky , Dougla s LePan , an d David Mund y for the carefu l atten tion the y gave to economi c section s and to W.H. Barton , Pau l Bridle, H.H . Carter, Ralp h Collins, Marshall Crowe, Evan Gill, George Ignatieff , D.H.W . Kirkwood, C.E. McGaughey, R.A. MacKay, Escott Reid, and Max Wershof, among others , wh o rea d chapters . Rober t Bothwell , Charle s Stacey , an d Norman Hillme r gav e th e historians ' perspectives ; an d Rut h Russell , th e dean o f UN historians, very kindly checked th e Sa n Francisco material . Th e Hon. Pau l Martin ha s been, as always, very helpful. Non e o f these friends , however, ha s read th e whole manuscript an d no blame should b e attributed to any of them fo r error o r offense.

xvi Prefac e Lois Beatti e made a n indispensabl e contributio n t o the projec t by searching files in Ottawa with remarkable insight , as did Mar y Harrison an d Mary Taylor fo r particula r subjects. Doroth y Stepler , Rober t Willmot , an d Ken t Weaver provide d researc h assistanc e a t hom e base , and Jane Barrett , librarian, an d othe r member s o f th e CH A staff were , a s always , indefatigable trackers dow n o f elusive information. I was fortunate t o have the incomparabl e guidanc e of R.I.K. Davidson i n shaping these volumes an d th e editoria l wisdom o f Rosemary Shipton , als o of th e Universit y o f Toront o Press . Withou t th e collaboratio n o f Gayl e Fraser of the CII A as editor, archivist , transcriber , indexer , and very 'helpfu l fixer,' th e stud y would not have reache d print for man y years. This boo k ha s bee n publishe d wit h th e hel p o f grant s fro m th e Socia l Science Federatio n o f Canada, usin g fund s provide d b y the Socia l Science s and Humanitie s Researc h Counci l o f Canada , an d fro m th e Publication s Fund o f the Universit y of Toronto Press .

Abbreviations

AECB Atomi c Energy Control Board CAOF Canadia n Army Occupation Force CCF Co-operativ e Commonwealth Federatio n CCSC Combine d Chiefs of Staff Committe e CDT Combine d Developmen t Trus t CHA Canadia n Institute of International Affair s CIPO Canadia n Institute of Public Opinion CPC Combine d Polic y Committee CRMB Combine d Ra w Materials Board DEA Departmen t o f External Affair s DP Displace d perso n ECA Economi c Cooperation Administration ECAFE Economi c Commissio n fo r Asi a and th e Fa r East ECE Economi c Commission for Europ e ECLA Economi c Commissio n fo r Lati n Americ a ECOSOC Economi c and Socia l Counci l ERP Europea n Recover y Programm e FAO Foo d and Agricultur e Organizatio n FEAC Fa r Eastern Advisor y Commissio n FEC Fa r Eastern Commission FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States GATT Genera l Agreemen t o n Tariffs an d Trad e IARA Inter-Allie d Reparations Agency IBRD Internationa l Bank for Reconstructio n an d Developmen t ICAO Internationa l Civil Aviatio n Organization ICEM Intergovernmenta l Committee fo r European Migration IJC Internationa l Joint Commissio n

xviii Abbreviation s

ILO Internationa l Labour Organizatio n IMF Internationa l Monetary Fun d IRQ Internationa l Refugee Organization ITO Internationa l Trade Organization ITU Internationa l Telecommunications Unio n JCAE Join t Committe e o n Atomi c Energ y NATO Nort h Atlantic Treaty Organization PASO Pa n America n Sanitary Organization PHP Post-Hostilitie s Problem s (Canada ) Post-Hostilities Plannin g (UK) PJBD Permanen t Join t Boar d on Defenc e POWs Prisoner s o f war RCAF Roya l Canadian Ai r Forc e SCAP Suprem e commander o f the allie d power s SSEA Secretar y o f state fo r external affair s UNAEC Unite d Nations Atomi c Energ y Commission UNCE Unite d Nation s Commissio n fo r Europ e UNESCO Unite d Nations Educational, Scientific , and Cultura l Organization UNICEF Unite d Nation s Internationa l Children' s Emergency Fun d UNRRA Unite d Nations Relief and Rehabilitatio n Administratio n UPU Universa l Postal Unio n USSEA Undersecretar y of state for external affair s WFTU Worl d Federation of Trade Unions WHO Worl d Health Organization WPB Wa r Productio n Board

P A R T I : PRELUD E

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1 Trial an d Error , 1914-45 So here I am, i n the middl e way, having had twent y years Twenty years largely wasted, the years of l'entre deux guerres.

T.S. ELIOT, East Coker

Of the wast e o f years the historia n takes a callous view. It was lives, millions of them, tha t wer e wasted b y th e failur e o f al l efforts betwee n th e war s to prevent anothe r slaughter . For th e survivor s the los s di d not hav e t o b e in vain. The y pondere d deepl y wha t had gon e wron g and i n 194 5 tried again. Perhaps the y concentrate d to o simpl y on doin g wha t ha d no t bee n don e before. Jus t a s general s ar e accuse d o f plannin g to wi n th e previou s war, diplomats ca n b e accuse d o f plannin g to avoi d it . The y di d not , however , reject the experimen t i n international regulation which had been th e League of Nations; the y reconstructed i t with a different name , adjuste d rules, and, most importan t of all, a wider membership . The Unite d Nation s syste m (mor e a galax y tha n a government ) whic h evolved i n the fortie s has been notabl e for its endurance and adaptability. Its reputation has suffered fro m the misrepresentation o f those who dramatized its birt h a t Sa n Francisc o to o apostolically , who proclaime d i t a s th e fina l rejection o f th e failur e an d betraya l tha t ha d precede d it . Tha t versio n re flects partly th e Sovie t an d America n wis h t o exorciz e a League o f Nations that ha d largely been ru n b y others. W e suffer a comparable distortion from those who se e i n th e subsequen t histor y of the Unite d Nation s a fall fro m grace, a noble drea m o f nation s unite d an d agai n betrayed b y selfis h men . These are romantic view s for escapists. I t was after al l largely the sam e me n who bot h create d th e Unite d Nation s an d late r revise d it . Th e purpos e of international institution s i s t o accommodat e th e legitimat e bu t conflictin g interests of nations, whic h it is the dut y of national statesmen an d diplomats to defend. Th e grea t endeavou r i s to devise and use the institution s for that purpose, an d i t is never-ending. I t is wiser to regard 1945 as a resumption of the centuries-old experimentatio n wit h international structures - i f in fact it had eve r ceased , becaus e th e fighting alliance provided some o f the sinew s

4 Th e Shapin g of Peace for postwa r institutions. The makin g and remakin g of these structure s is an organic process ; thei r succes s o r failur e i s alway s relative ; an d fina l judgments ar e difficult becaus e the way ahead remains unclear. Progress i s not to be calculated as if the fixed goal was 'The Parliament of Man, the Federatio n of the World. ' Th e unendin g struggle of mankind to discipline itself move s in mysteriou s ways . I t i s essentiall y a process o f adaptatio n and improvisa tion. A t least, tha t is the wa y Canadian policy-makers have tended t o see it. The 'revolution ' i n Canadian polic y towards international institutions can also be over-dramatized. I t was a change more o f wil l than o f policy, an en forced adaptatio n to chang e in international circumstance. There wa s much that was traditionally Canadian i n the response , and , a s Raymond Aron has noted, 'Ther e is nothing more "traditional, " more molded b y the heritage of the past , than the diplomacy of a state, it s perception of the world of international relations, and its conception of its role in that world." Canadians were not unprepared by their own history for the shaping of peace in 1945. Since the seventeenth centur y they had bee n calculatin g how to deal with neighbours and how to survive in a world often at war. Canada's more enthusiastic participation i n th e detail s of internationa l life durin g and afte r th e Secon d Worl d War marked a notable change of direction, but it was conditioned by what had been learned an d fel t before . The shoc k of a second wa r and the recognition that Canad a coul d no t escap e commitment s wa s basi c t o th e ne w mood . Nevertheless, th e lon g experienc e o f empir e an d commonwealth , o f th e North Atlantic triangle in which Canada ha d sought shelter , and th e effort s to come to grips with the League were embedded i n the subconsciousness o f Canadians as they arrived at 'the middle way' of their life as a member o f the international communit y a t a time whe n tha t communit y was reshaping itself. Canada was not a young country, even i f it was short o f ambassadors . In the years between the wars Canadians had gained a more direct experience tha n ever befor e of international institution-building. There wa s much to be learned i n the testin g of traditional assumptions agains t bitter realities , and man y o f th e particula r ideas abou t worl d orde r wer e evolvin g befor e 1939. To set the stage it is not necessary to provide a survey of foreign policy in th e interwa r years, as this has been wel l done by a number o f historians. 2 It is proposed her e onl y to note certai n attitudes t o the Commonwealt h and the Leagu e o f Nations which help explain postwar perspectives . EMPIRE INT O COMMONWEALT H

Although i n hindsigh t i t ca n b e see n tha t th e Canadia n governmen t wa s reconstituting the Commonwealt h fo r a greater future, that was not the gen-

5 Tria l and Error eral impression between the wars. Some fond and foolish notions did have to be cleared away, but Canadians sounded prett y negative whenever the architecture of the organizatio n was under consideration. A t the en d o f the Firs t World Wa r ther e wa s general satisfactio n among governmen t leader s with the Imperia l War Cabinet, and it was expected that an imperial conference of sorts would be held as soon a s possible to establish a permanent framework. There was a good dea l o f talk, but nothin g concrete cam e o f it. The British were preoccupie d wit h postwa r settlements an d ha d littl e time to spen d o n getting consensus. Thei r experienc e of a commonwealth wa s as yet limited. It too k a long while for the m t o realize that, even fo r suc h loyal subjects as the Australians , an imperial foreign policy was a good deal more complicated than simply the acquisition of agreement fro m Ottawa, Canberra, or Pretoria to policies which would naturally be devised in Whitehall because Whitehal l would kno w best . Th e utte r impracticalit y of the ide a o f a common policy , particularly afte r th e dominion s ha d assume d thei r separat e seat s i n th e League of Nations, ought to have been evident already, but the idea haunted the Commonwealt h fo r anothe r twenty-fiv e years. It did so not just becaus e of British persistence, bu t becaus e o f the continuin g demands o f the Pacifi c dominions fo r a voice in grand strateg y and th e reluctanc e of all concerned, including Canadians, t o abandon a n identity of some kin d for the empire . Mackenzie Kin g was a family ma n - i n his fashion. He argued for a commonwealth principl e of consultation , fo r a continuing effor t t o see k agree ment, bu t the ultimate right of each government to go its own way. However, he surrounded this sensible argument with circumlocutions to bemuse critics both i n Britai n and i n Canad a s o tha t th e long-rang e ai m wa s not clearl y evident, i f indeed h e had one. H e did not want to sever th e British link, but discussion o f th e Commonwealt h unde r hi s régim e seeme d mor e con cerned wit h an ol d relationship Canada was growing out o f than a new relationship it was growing into. In opposition the Conservatives sounde d mor e imperial, bu t i n powe r the y di d no t ac t ver y differently . Durin g th e Firs t World Wa r Canad a ha d participate d in the Imperia l War Cabine t because it wanted a say in the way in which Canadians were going to be killed. After the war, as Canada relaxe d i n its fire-proof house, havin g a voice in an imperial policy looke d to o muc h lik e getting committed b y an imperia l government with far-flun g obligations . O n issues , however , tha t touche d th e Canadia n national interest o r seemed to, or on which the Canadian prim e minister fel t strongly, advantage was taken of the Commonwealth to establish a position notably ove r th e renewa l of the Anglo-Japanes e Treaty which the Canadia n government opposed , an d th e appeasemen t o f Naz i German y whic h i t favoured. Whe n Bennett' s governmen t wante d t o fight the hig h American

6 Th e Shapin g of Peac e tariff wit h a system o f commonwealth preferences , h e made vigorou s use of the empir e as a framework. The Canadia n righ t t o pres s it s case s ca n hardl y be questioned , bu t th e results, see n i n retrospect, rais e doub t abou t any assumption tha t Canada's getting its own way would necessarily ensure th e triump h of right ideas ove r wrong. It can be argued that the Britis h rejection of the Japanese allianc e set Japan o n th e wa y to Pearl Harbor, that King's last-ditc h support of appease ment b y Chamberlain encourage d th e Naz i appetite, an d tha t th e imperial preference syste m onl y compounde d th e economi c autark y tha t precede d the blood y war. To d o so, however , might be to indulge in a typically Cana dian exaggeratio n o f th e impac t o f Canad a o n th e worl d scene i f onl y i t would do the righ t thing. The issue s wer e no t simple . Si r Rober t Borden' s experienc e i n power , particularly durin g th e Firs t Worl d War , ha d mad e hi m wel l awar e o f th e persistent parado x a t the hear t of the imperia l relationship,3 and subsequent prime ministers wrestled, each in his own way, with the puzzle . A belief tha t the strengt h of the empire as a whole was in the national interest o f the part s meant tha t Canad a shoul d b e willin g t o commi t it s military support t o th e defence o f the empire. Suc h a commitment, however , meant no t only a right but a n obligatio n t o shar e i n th e makin g o f policie s tha t coul d lea d th e empire i n or ou t o f danger . Ther e could no t b e a blank cheque. Bu t a principle of shared decision-makin g was a trap because Britain' s role in the world and it s authorit y over a larg e par t o f th e empir e preclude d equality . There were inescapabl e contradiction s involve d i n actuall y securin g agreemen t among Britain and the dominions, an d the proces s woul d have been intolerably cumbersome . This dilemm a o f decision-making i s inherent i n an y alliance relationship, particularly a relationship with greater powers , a s Canada wa s to find in subsequent association s i n NATO and with the Unite d States . The issue, which in one for m o r anothe r ha s bee n a n obsessio n o f Canadian foreig n policy , is confused b y the tendenc y o f politicians and editor s t o make a contradiction that i s in the natur e o f things look lik e a struggle betwee n righ t and wrong , between th e wea k an d th e powerful . Blamin g the grea t power s indiscrimi nately for the postponemen t o f heaven o n earth remain s a persistent them e in the sam e vein . Mackenzie King , who did a great deal to straighten out th e status issu e i n th e Commonwealt h an d mak e possibl e a sublimate d Com monwealth base d o n principles of consultation, wa s guilty of obfuscating th e issue b y shrewd political manipulation. In an anti-colonialist age, the tempta tion t o se e Canada' s cautious an d reluctan t acceptanc e o f responsibility for its foreig n relation s a s a 'struggle ' fo r independenc e wa s irresistible. Wha t

7 Tria l and Erro r King did resist, however , was independence i n practice from the Britis h diplomatic establishmen t whic h woul d hav e force d Canad a int o th e kin d o f expensive and presumptuous foreign service of its own which he deplored. It cannot b e sai d tha t Canadian s emerge d fro m th e wa r a s master s o f th e dilemma, bu t th e lon g experienc e o f empir e an d commonwealt h ha d ren dered the m sensitiv e whe n it appeared i n new settings and endowed official s with a mor e sophisticate d comprehensio n o f th e equation s involved . Tha t was some advantage i n dealing with the ne w imperial power, for the Ameri cans had to suffer frustratio n for many years before realizing that there was a dilemma a t all. The issu e o f an independent foreig n polic y was confused i n the thirtie s by the fac t that British policy on the basi c question o f security was not on e tha t the Canadia n governmen t wante d t o oppose. At the Imperial Conference of 1937 Kin g worked har d fo r Commonwealt h agreemen t o n a n issu e dea r t o his heart: so strong was his belief in appeasement an d his anxiety to support Chamberlain agains t Churchill and the other 'warmongers ' that he forgot his reluctance t o giv e th e Britis h advice o n foreig n policy . Typically, however, he di d thi s personall y and confidentially , and, althoug h h e wa s effusiv e i n public tributes , th e ful l exten t o f hi s suppor t o f Chamberlai n wa s no t revealed unti l private papers became availabl e after the war. 4 Once the war started, King' s polic y on commitments wa s widely reviled as 'pussyfooting,' bu t i t ha s bee n justified-an d denounced-a s a calculate d strategy fo r bringin g Canad a a s unite d a s possibl e int o a wa r tha t seeme d inevitable. The judgment o f two of the leadin g historians of this period i s as follows: In many of his opinions on foreig n policy, King revealed himself to be unreasonably optimistic, prejudice d and unrealistic . But i n hi s basi c perception that foreign policy can be no more effectiv e tha n one's internal strength will support, he was profoundly right. King's backin g and filling, his evasions and hesitations , do not mak e inspiring reading. But his actions, particularly between 193 7 and 1939 , indicat e his sure grasp of th e publi c mood an d hi s recognitio n tha t publi c opinio n canno t b e wishe d int o existence simpl y because one course of action or another is 'right.' When Kin g took a united Canada int o the Secon d Worl d War, he gave Canadians a policy that not only was right to him, but on e that seemed righ t to them. 5

King's basi c philosoph y o f th e Commonwealt h wa s reaffirmed a s soun d during and after the war, but he was not the man to move i t into another an d more positive phas e afte r h e ha d set i t on th e righ t path. In the meantime , however, th e legen d wa s established tha t Canada was drawn into a war by its

8 Th e Shapin g of Peace attachment t o Britai n without havin g ha d an y influenc e on Britis h policy. The Canadia n complain t has been specificall y ove r th e Britis h commitmen t to Poland without consulting Canada, bu t given King's disposition, wel l understood i n London, t o regard consultation as an invitation to commitment , the Britis h action wa s not withou t justification. Som e deduce d tha t th e ti e with Britai n should b e broken or clarified. Other s concluded tha t as Canada would be inevitably drawn into Europe's war s it should get involved before the fightin g started . Th e imperia l tie confused th e issue . Wherea s Canad a would probably not hav e gone t o war two years ahead o f the American s for the secon d tim e i f it ha d no t bee n linke d t o Britain , neither would it have done s o i f Canadia n leader s ha d no t believe d tha t th e internationa l system which guarantee d Canadia n securit y wa s threatened. Wha t wa s needed, a s some clear-heade d official s recognized , wa s a ne w har d loo k a t Canadia n strategic concept s an d prioritie s set i n a wider framework than th e relation ship wit h Britai n o r France , th e Commonwealth , o r th e Nort h Atlanti c triangle. On that basis they began t o think about a new international syste m in which Canada woul d not onl y claim its rights but also accept its responsi bilities. THE L E A G U E O F NATION S

From th e beginnin g o f th e Leagu e o f Nation s Canadia n governments Conservative and Liberal - mad e clear their opposition to two interpretations of it s function . The y oppose d th e concep t o f universa l collectiv e security, involving automati c commitments , an d an y pretension s o f th e Leagu e t o exercise supranationa l authority . Thei r position s wer e neve r state d mor e firmly than b y the Conservativ e statesme n wh o attended th e conferenc e i n Paris and the early sessions of the League - althoug h Borden when the treaty was signed defende d i t as a whole. They well reflected a Canadian consensus. Unlike the belie f afte r th e Secon d Worl d Wa r that onl y by commitment i n advance could aggression again be forestalled, the Canadia n mood afte r 191 9 was on e o f determination no t t o b e dragge d again , o r at leas t o n a regular basis, int o Europea n war s and t o tak e advantag e of the peculia r sanctuary provided i n North America not onl y by geography but by the mor e civilized international habits of North Americans . There wer e articulat e 'internationalists ' an d 'imperialists ' i n bot h majo r parties, bu t thei r view s di d no t prevail . Lat e i n hi s ter m o f offic e R.B . Bennett looke d mor e lik e a League supporter . H e even too k advantag e o f the supranationa l pretension s o f th e Leagu e syste m whe n h e use d Inter national Labour Organization resolutions to justify federa l legislation in what

9 Tria l and Erro r the Judicia l Committe e o f th e Priv y Counci l late r rule d t o b e matter s o f provincial jurisdiction. Partly because o f hi s natura l antipath y to th e isola tionism o f the undersecretar y of state for external affairs , O.D . Skelton, and a characteristi c belie f i n standin g u p t o b e counted , h e gave , i n th e Italo Ethiopian case, clearer support of League sanctions than was characteristic of other Canadian governments. 6 This apparent disposition to act positively was cut short by the accession t o power of Mackenzie King. Bennett's attitude on sanctions, however , wa s largely emotional an d accidental . Hi s governmen t had certainly not bee n zealous for sanctions in the Manchuria n crisis. In any case, hi s dispositio n t o follo w th e Britis h lead becaus e h e believe d i n their superior wisdom would more likel y have led a Conservative government t o support Chamberlain a s King did, rather than to a strong stand fo r collective security. There were other Canadian reservations about the League. It was not universal i n membership . Th e basi s o f the Canadia n concept o f a sound world order wa s the Anglo-America n entente. Canad a woul d undoubtedl y hav e accepted mor e willingl y a leagu e tha t ha d a s it s cor e th e empir e an d th e United States, bu t when the American s decided not t o join, Canada wa s left on a limb. It coul d no t an d di d no t wis h to giv e up the sea t i n the Leagu e which gave it international status, but Canadian s could not see the practicality of military or even economi c sanction s without the American s involved. Ironically, i t wa s Wilson a t Pari s who dislike d most strongl y the Canadia n view o n Articl e 10 , th e articl e o f the Charte r whic h affirmed th e commit ment t o collective security, a view that ha d been pu t forwar d eve n whe n it was expected th e Unite d State s would be a member. Perhap s the Canadian s more accurately reflected North American opinion than did the presiden t of the Unite d States . I n th e Canadia n vie w an d tha t o f man y American s th e League wa s Eurocentric. I t was a device t o ge t all countries t o guarantee a settlement i n Europ e tha t ha d no t bee n determine d o n ground s o f justice and wa s not likel y t o las t forever . The commitmen t require d wa s unequal because Canad a di d no t nee d simila r guarantee s b y Europea n o r othe r powers. When Canad a wen t to wa r in 193 9 it was not becaus e of a commitment to the League or collective security but because o f its calculation of the importance of Britain and France t o the security of North America. The oppositio n t o supranationalis m took othe r form s tha t Canadian s ar e less won t t o recall . Canada wa s ver y suspicious o f proposal s tha t migh t i n any wa y determine Canadia n immigratio n regulations an d bluntl y rejected efforts b y Japa n t o enlis t th e Leagu e i n fightin g racia l discriminatio n i n employment. Sensitivit y about provincia l rights was then, a s always, a serious consideratio n fo r Canadia n delegations , bu t a t a tim e whe n ther e was

10 Th e Shapin g of Peac e trouble i n th e Canadia n labou r forc e an d a strong curren t o f oppositio n t o aliens, particularl y 'orientals, ' ther e wer e mor e tha n simpl y constitutional reasons fo r the Canadia n position. An Italia n proposal that th e Leagu e consider the mor e equitabl e distribution of raw materials was also opposed.7 The idea of the Leagu e as a supranational manager was unacceptable. Some regulation wa s desirable, a s for instanc e o f drugs and epidemics , bu t onl y when there was a demonstrated nee d for it. Canada rejected the suggestion tha t the League d o something t o regulate international air traffic. Becaus e ther e was little ai r traffi c acros s bodies o f wate r in thos e day s Canadians though t thi s was a matter for Canada i n association wit h th e Unite d State s alon e t o consider. This position , whic h had some logi c to it, is in contrast wit h the vigorous effort s o f Canadia n official s a t th e en d o f th e Secon d Worl d Wa r t o create a n internationa l civi l aviatio n organizatio n wit h wha t looke d lik e supranational powers . The troublesom e proposition s raised b y the Japanes e and Italian s hav e becom e eventuall y th e dominan t issue s o f th e Unite d Nations, bu t proposal s fo r a Ne w Internationa l Economi c Orde r wer e no t foreseen eve n i n 1945 . Canada's strong effor t t o delet e an d the n t o amend Articl e 1 0 to mak e it harmless o r inapplicabl e as fa r a s Canad a wa s concerned create d enemies . European an d othe r countrie s tha t regarde d themselve s a s much mor e ex posed tha n Canada considered Articl e 10 the sine qua non of the Leagu e an d resented th e Canadia n campaig n fro m a secur e hinterlan d t o den y the m security. Th e Conservativ e governmen t i n Ottaw a wante d t o ge t ri d o f i t entirely. Th e Liberals , whe n the y cam e t o powe r i n 1921 , di d no t lik e th e article an y bette r but , realizin g there wa s no hop e o f expungin g it, sough t amendment. Amon g th e countries whic h bitterly disliked the Canadian position wer e Persi a an d Estonia , and , perhap s no t surprisingly , the y wer e among the few countries that supported an appeal by the Six Nations Indians from Canad a t o hav e th e Leagu e conside r thei r cas e agains t th e Canadia n government - a n appeal which was frustrated with the powerful assistance of the British Foreign Office. 8 Canadian s also created enemie s when, under th e strong influenc e of Senato r Raou l Dandurand , the y argue d fo r mor e effec tive machinery to consider the appea l of minorities. What the y had in mind, of course , wa s th e dreadfu l stat e o f Europea n minorities , bu t th e Polis h government hinte d tha t suc h regulation s coul d appl y t o Canad a a s well . I t was th e beginnin g o f the slo w education o f Canadian s i n the basi c fac t tha t international politic s and particularl y the politic s of internationa l organiza tions are a two-way street - a lesson which they will probably grasp fully onl y after Canad a ha s itself been put in the dock at the Unite d Nations .

11 Tria l and Erro r In spite of its reservations about the League , Canad a did become a mem ber of the League Council in 1927. Whenever i t comes to asserting the Cana dian righ t t o a seat, Canadia n government s the n a s no w ten d t o suspen d their worrie s ove r commitment . Mackenzi e King , needless to say , was not enthusiastic, but h e was pressed b y Dandurand and somewhat mor e surprisingly b y Ernes t Lapointe , hi s Quebe c lieutenant . Th e Canadia n recor d a t Geneva was, in fact, no t a s discreditable as legend has it, but the legend was a facto r i n creatin g a ne w climat e o f opinion . Fo r a smal l power , Canad a played an active role, without however the favourable reputation acquired in the earl y days o f the Unite d Nations . Th e compulsio n o f successive Cana dian delegates t o lectur e naught y Europeans o n the highe r morality of Canada-United State s relations , an d eve n t o sugges t th e Internationa l Join t Commission a s a mode l fo r Japa n an d China, 9 exasperate d th e Assembl y and embarrasse d Canadia n officials . Canadia n objections to collective security as a practical proposition for the Leagu e as it existed and the emphasi s on the mediator y functio n loo k mor e sensible , however , sinc e th e Unite d Nations i n practice arrived at similar conclusions. For Canad a t o hav e take n a mor e activ e par t i n proclaimin g sanctions against Japa n and Ital y would have bee n not onl y futile bu t also pretentious. Canada ha d neithe r soldier s no r trad e o f sufficien t proportion s t o offe r a meaningful sacrific e and such 'leadership ' would have been dismissed by the powers that had to carry the burden a s no more than a gesture. When Walter Riddell, th e Canadia n permanen t representativ e a t Geneva i n 1935 , pro posed oi l sanctions agains t Italy during a transition fro m a Bennett to a King government, h e stretched considerably his authority as a civil servant, but he was als o th e victi m o f clums y handlin g fro m Ottawa . King favoured eco nomic sanctions t o restrain aggressors, bu t he had, in this situation, come t o fear tha t the y would provoke war. Nevertheless hi s government di d pass an order-in-council implementing the sanctions already approved by the League. He publicly repudiated Riddell , who was later replaced i n Geneva. There wa s war m discussio n i n Canada , a s th e inciden t dramatize d th e question o f Canada' s internationa l commitments . I n th e interwa r perio d dedicated supporters of the League were articulate and eloquent - and somewhat confused-bu t the y remaine d a minority . Th e oppositio n an d man y other spokesme n strongl y criticized the governmen t fo r backin g away from its stand agains t aggression, bu t n o politica l leaders wante d to face the possi bility tha t economi c sanctions woul d involv e Canad a i n militar y action . When wa r did break out in 193 9 and Canada was almost immediatel y caught up i n an effor t a t collective action agains t aggression, th e 'Riddel l incident'

12 Th e Shapin g of Peac e came t o b e regarde d widel y as Canada's 'grea t betrayal. ' Whethe r oi l sanctions woul d hav e don e th e tric k i n Ethiopi a i s doubtful , especiall y a s th e French an d Britis h foreign minister s were engaged i n a 'compromise settle ment' behin d th e scenes . Nevertheless , th e cas e o f oi l sanctions becam e a symbol for much o f Canada's 'culpability' in the 'failur e o f the League. ' ON TH E EV E O F WA R

Enthusiasm i n Canad a fo r th e Munic h agreement wa s widespread. Almos t anything that woul d stave of f a war was acceptable. The 'internationalists ' in the country were victims of conflicting strains of liberal idealism. There wer e strong believer s i n the Leagu e an d collective securit y like J.W. Dafoe o f th e Winnipeg Free Press wh o accepte d th e obligation s o f collectiv e action . Th e liberal Left , thoug h professedl y favourin g brotherhoo d an d international ism, wa s obsessed b y th e wil l t o detac h Canad a fro m Britis h 'imperialism' and sounde d mor e nationalist . Som e nationalist s o f th e thirties , althoug h normally disposed toward s international good deeds, were consistent enoug h to oppose Canadia n commitments eithe r to the League o r the empire. Many people, however , especially those who were young and vocal, denounced the failure o f 'th e powers ' t o suppor t sanctions agains t Japan an d Ital y and th e policy o f 'non-intervention ' i n Spain ; the y called fo r th e overthro w o f fascism an d vigorousl y criticized British policie s of appeasement. A t th e sam e time, however , they opposed militar y expenditures an d argued that Canada , a Nort h America n country , shoul d mak e n o commitment s t o fight againstaggressors outsid e America . I n thei r outloo k wa s a stron g strai n o f anti militarism an d th e rejectio n o f war as a conspiracy o f Old World aristocrat s and munitions manufacturers. Th e apparen t belief tha t it is for Canadians t o denounce si n and for larger and less pacific powers to use force against it has reappeared i n many contexts sinc e th e war. The public debate in Canada befor e 193 9 on issues of international organization doe s no t loo k ver y good i n retrospect, bu t i t was no mor e confuse d than tha t i n Britain , France , o r th e Unite d States . Pacifism , neutralism , appeasement, o r universa l collectiv e security ma y seem naiv e t o a genera tion tha t ha s ha d a more diverse experienc e o f international effort s t o kee p the peace , bu t the League was the first modern effor t t o grapple on an organized scal e wit h deeply-roote d conflict . Th e charg e o f naïvet é ignore s th e conviction o f a generation tha t ha d live d throug h Paschendael e tha t ther e could b e nothing wors e than moder n war . 'I just can' t find the answers t o a lot of questions,' Lester Pearson wrot e in 1939. 10 It is not easy to identify any group that was right. As th e Vancouver Sun sai d i n 1942 : 'The simple fact i s

13 Tria l and Erro r that w e wer e wrong , nearl y all o f us , befor e th e war.' " Professo r Fran k Underbill, wh o aske d man y o f th e righ t question s withou t admitting th e contradictions, confessed i n the sixties that he had been 'slightl y more innocent an d considerabl y mor e irresponsibl e tha n wa s our Prim e Minister." 2 The men o f the thirties did not readil y come t o terms with contradictions. If anything distinguishe d th e Canadia n 'creators ' o f th e postwa r world i t i s a greater dispositio n t o recogniz e tha t there i s no eas y substitute for the end less proces s o f reconcilin g national an d internationa l interests an d tha t a n international organization must hav e the flexibility to embrace paradox. THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS In the year s before th e wa r there was no doubt who determined th e foreign policy of Canada. It was the government i n general and the prime minister in particular, whether that was Bennett or King. Still, the Departmen t of External Affair s playe d a significant role. Th e prim e minister set th e mai n lines , but h e had not the time to look at the details. External Affairs wa s small but forceful, staffe d wit h som e me n o f remarkabl e intellectua l qualit y and a broad comprehension o f international issues. It was by no means monolithic in it s views on th e Canadia n rol e in the internationa l community, but what came ou t a t th e to p wa s dominate d b y th e vigorou s view s o f th e under secretary, O.D . Skelton , an d i n th e latte r year s hi s 'counsellor, ' Lorin g Christie. Thes e me n wer e convinced o f the foll y o f further involvement i n the quarrel s of the Europeans . A s civil servants i t was, of course, thei r duty to operate within a framework laid down by the government. Thei r approach was generally in line with the resonan t conviction of Canadian government s since 1918 , although less so by the end of the thirties . Mackenzie King often sounded lik e Skelton and Christie , and he agree d wit h muc h of their philosophy, but he was playing his game of bringing a united country into a war he saw as almost inevitable . However har d h e trie d t o avoi d tha t war, h e ha d convictions abou t th e ultimat e justice o f th e caus e le d b y Britain. Christie could spea k sarcasticall y o f 'a n English-Speakin g Missio n t o overse e th e universe."3 Kin g believed i n tha t missio n eve n thoug h h e wa s reluctant to see it established b y force. Skelton an d Christi e impose d thei r ow n policie s o n departmenta l corre spondence, slappin g down Vincen t Masse y i n Londo n o r Hum e Wron g i n Geneva when the y got ideas about positive things Canada migh t be doing or saying. Thes e exchanges , ofte n penetratin g an d sophisticate d observation s on th e way s o f a wicke d world , ha d a lif e o f thei r own , bu t i t wa s to o academic t o b e th e stuf f o f Canadia n foreig n policy . It coul d b e sai d tha t

14 Th e Shapin g of Peac e Skelton and Christie had no policy except to shake their heads - eithe r to say no o r t o bewai l the follie s of others , especiall y th e Frenc h an d th e British . The governmen t wa s strong o n denia l also, whethe r i t was an invitatio n to consultation o n policy, economic sanctions against Japan or anybody else, an initiative at the League, or the preposterous suggestio n from the French tha t big empty Canada migh t help with the flood of Spanish refugees. Didn' t th e French kno w about unemploymen t in Canada? 14 In Skelton's an d Christie' s contrariness may be perceived, nevertheless, som e persistent truths. Christie warned Canadian activist s not to let their diplomac y outrun thei r resources . He wa s cogen t o n th e foll y o f sanction s withou t overwhelming force. 15 H e argued perceptively that the way to avoid being a 'protectorate' of the United States o r the Unite d Kingdo m was to pursu e a foreign policy based o n self defence plu s a diplomacy which sought allies with common interest s - a concept developed late r into that of 'alliance potential."6 If only he had not bee n so shril l an d obsessed , an d i f h e ha d live d longer , h e migh t hav e bee n a useful criti c of postwar planning. There were seeds of rebellion agains t the prevailin g orthodoxy of the Eas t Block, however . The y ar e wort h notin g becaus e the y cam e fro m th e me n who woul d soo n b e i n charg e o f th e department . Fro m Canad a Hous e i n London th e prioritie s in 193 8 and 193 9 seemed a little different fro m thos e of Skelton , who coul d writ e on 25 August 1939 , 'Th e first casualt y in thi s war has been Canada' s clai m to independent contro l of her own destinies.'17 Pearson i n London cam e t o see th e inadequacie s o f the Canadia n position . He wrote to Skelton early in 1938 that he now realized the Nazi threat had to be resiste d collectively. 18 A t hom e Norma n Robertson' s powerfu l intellec t and conscience wer e at work. He had displayed a very different attitud e from Skelton's whe n i n 193 3 th e missio n i n Geneva asked Bennet t i f they could take u p membership i n the Committe e o f Seventeen, designed t o see what might b e don e t o brin g pressur e o n Japan . Skelto n wa s ou t o f town , an d Bennett listene d t o Robertson's argument tha t a refusal would seem like an evasion o f responsibility. 19 Robertson wa s as always conscious o f the limit s on what could be done, but he saw these as something t o be regretted rathe r than a s valid excuses t o avoi d commitment . Hi s inventive min d constantl y reached fo r way s of doing something i f possible, i f only to help the victims . When a conference wa s hel d i n lat e 193 8 a t Evia n t o tr y t o cop e wit h th e refugees fro m th e Nazis , Kin g told th e Canadia n delegate : 'I t i s axiomati c that n o state shoul d b e allowed t o throw upon othe r countrie s the responsi bility o f solvin g it s interna l difficulties. ' Ther e wa s legitimate fea r tha t a n open doo r fo r refugee s i n Wester n countrie s woul d simpl y encourage no t only the Nazis but the Poles and others to drive out all their Jews. Neverthe -

15 Tria l and Erro r less, King's perceptio n of the issu e i s blood-chilling. Robertson, i n contrast, proposed tha t th e Nazi s be charged wit h committing 'an internationa l nuisance' an d suggeste d a surta x o n al l imports fro m German y t o pa y fo r re settlement schemes. 20 A preposterous suggestion , perhaps , but i t was better than just finding good reason s fo r doing nothing. Hume Wron g was incisive from Geneva , where he had been poste d i n 1937 as advisory officer and the n permanent delegat e t o th e League . Hi s views of the tim e are worthy of particular examination becaus e o f hi s central influence o n Canadia n policie s in shaping the peace . On e can see already in his Geneva calculation s the architect of postwar responses. The y were the more realistic because they evolved during th e year s when h e wa s intensely preoccupie d with th e diplomac y of winning a war and establishing the basi s of an appropriate role for Canada . This concentratio n o n th e implication s for policy rather than serene judgments Wron g shared wit h Pearson and Robertson, th e other members o f the triumvirate most responsibl e fo r th e shapin g of peace, Canadian-style , afte r 1945. The y wer e a new generation o f Canadian 'nationalists,' mor e assure d and less hag-ridde n by fear o f the British - o r later the Americans. They had all learned a t Oxford to regar d the Britis h as equals. Canada was their country, their base o f operation, an d thei r job wa s to contrive a world best suite d to Canadia n interest s an d th e way s and mean s b y which a country of Can ada's proportions , situation , history , virtue s an d idiosyncracies , strength s and weaknesse s coul d pla y its due part in the creation and permanen t struc tures o f a peac e fo r tha t world . That du e part , i t was recognized , include d responsibilities as well as rights. It was a subject for rational calculation rather than just emotional ferment. There was no longer need t o agonize over Canada's right t o an independen t foreig n policy. That cours e ha d bee n set , an d the arguments abou t commitments an d independence withi n the Common wealth or the Leagu e wer e no longer central. These men wer e not, i n fact, as far from Mackenzie King in theory as his popular reputatio n suggests . A s Blai r Neatb y ha s written : 'Autonom y fo r Mackenzie King ... did not mean independence. H e defined autonomy as selfgovernment bu t saw no inconsistency in a completely self-governing Dominion which none th e less had inescapable obligations to Great Britain . Indeed , for Kin g these obligations would become more acceptable and so more secur e as self-government becam e mor e complete.' 21 Wrong, Pearson, an d Robertson woul d agre e wit h that. Th e differenc e wa s rather i n that th e olde r ma n wanted autonomy to keep Canada out of things and the younger men wanted it so that Canada could do things. They knew they still had to struggle for provisions t o guarantee Canada' s plac e in the firmamen t an d against old assumptions an d prejudice s a t hom e an d abroad. Establishin g the formula s fo r this

16 Th e Shapin g of Peac e purpose, however, was a matter of intellectual agility and stubborn insistence , not a simple-minded campaig n against bullies . These ar e th e me n wh o replaced Skelton and Christie, both of whom died early in the war. R E - E X A M I N I N G TH E L E A G U E

The year s 1938- 9 wer e the wors t of times, just befor e th e catastrophe , bu t the bes t o f time s fo r cutting through illusions . There wa s a somewhat per functory self-examinatio n by the Leagu e tha t wa s on th e whole remarkably clear-headed. I t was realized b y the Genev a communit y that th e Leagu e as an agency of collective security could now play little part in the drastic events in Europe, that what hope there was at that stage was in the organizatio n of a European coalition by traditional methods, an d that the Leagu e as an agency for conciliatio n coul d hop e t o functio n onl y afte r a relaxatio n o f tension . That chanc e cam e onl y after a war had ended th e particula r set o f tension s that existe d i n 1939 . I t shoul d b e noted , however , tha t Wester n member s reached th e sam e conclusion withi n three year s of the establishmen t o f th e United Nations. Then , however , the y had the wil l and th e collaboratio n o f the Unite d States , so the y could set up suc h a coalition and in accordanc e with provisions they had put into the Charter. Canada's role a s i t developed i n the postwa r creation was adumbrated by Wrong's reflection s from Geneva . I t wa s first necessary, h e said , t o take a hard look at the questio n o f Canada's participatio n and its responsibilities for protecting it s ow n interests. Her e h e move d fro m th e fashionabl e abstrac tions abou t right s and wrong s to the polic y decisions tha t actually faced th e government. I n a memorandum 22 o f 7 December 193 8 o n 'Th e Canadia n Position i n the Light of the Septembe r [Munich ] Crisis,' he wrote: 'We must start fro m Canadian opinio n as it was revealed i n September, an d no t as we might lik e it to be.' Tha t wa s always Wrong's approac h and i t set a pattern. Policy-makers mus t star t fro m th e predicamen t a s it has t o b e face d rather than rejecting it because it is unpopular or because the circumstances are not of Canada' s making. He bega n wit h th e assumptio n tha t th e stat e of Canadian opinio n wa s such tha t 'no Canadian government i s likely to be able t o keep Canada out of a great war in which the United Kingdom is engaged.' He cut through th e argument of many nationalists by pointing out that although bellicose Britis h adventure s tha t woul d alienat e Canadia n opinio n wer e a possibility, 'it is apparent that th e Unite d Kingdo m wil l in fact ente r no war on the continent o f Europe except o n a paramount issue. ' Nevertheless, Wron g argued , i t wa s clearly unsatisfactory tha t th e mos t vital decision i n the lif e o f a nation woul d not b e taken i n fac t a s well as in

17 Tria l and Erro r form b y the leader s of the Canadia n people. He had doubts about the logic of the Canadia n solutio n pursue d sinc e 1918-t o limi t politica l commitments and 't o receive information but declin e to offe r advice. ' Ho w could Canada escape from the dilemma that the avoidance of formal commitments had lef t it still deeply committed t o th e Unite d Kingdom? Little could b e done i n a hurry, but a revision of the ends and means of Canadian foreign policy could begin a t onc e t o ensur e tha t al l vita l decision s shoul d b e take n i n Ottawa. However, i t wa s essential t o recogniz e that a home-mad e Canadia n polic y could 'pursue a separate road' or 'stand shoulder to shoulder with the United Kingdom.' Wron g sa w clearly that th e evolutio n o f independen t decision making had t o be separated fro m th e decisio n for isolation or participation. As for th e League , Wron g looke d sceptically at th e comfortable assumption tha t had allowed Canadians to avoid the critical issue - tha t the League had abolished war or, in any case, as any war would be a League war involving Commonwealth members, th e decision to participate would be loyalty to the Covenant rathe r than the empire. The Commonwealth, h e pointed out, had proved hardie r tha n th e collectiv e system . Nevertheless , 'Genev a offered , and still offers t o a limited degree, a means fo r the development and expression of a positive Canadian foreign policy.' He was critical of Canada's policy at the League which he described as seeking 'the most modest interpretation of political obligations under th e Covenant. ' While fully recognizin g a good deal o f unrealit y i n th e ide a o f Leagu e sanction s agains t th e threatene d aggression, i t seeme d wis e for Canad a t o accep t sanction s a s optiona l and provide for the possibility of sanctions under the Covenant, givin g Canada 'a legal mean s whereb y Canada ca n enter unde r he r ow n steam, a s it were, a war i n which she woul d in any cas e b e involve d as a member o f the Com monwealth.' I t wa s an approac h which, as he expected , woul d not wor k in 1939, but it was central to the predominant view of the Unite d Nations as an instrument o f Canadia n foreig n polic y whic h flourishe d a t th e en d o f th e war. In 1950 Wrong, as ambassador i n Washington, Pearson a s minister, and Robertson a s hig h commissione r i n Londo n woul d b e makin g clea r tha t Canada's participatio n in th e Unite d Nations operatio n i n Kore a was from loyalty to the United Nations rather than constraint by the United States, th e country whic h ha d b y then take n over fro m Britai n the rol e o f menac e t o Canadian independence . Wrong did not argue for the simplistic conception of universal and mandatory collectiv e securit y whic h an articulat e minorit y i n Canad a advocate d because h e kne w tha t n o natio n woul d accep t suc h open-ende d commit ments. H e saw that i n a happier time o f eased tension th e Leagu e could be useful a s conciliator, bu t h e kne w also that , a s th e presen t situation illus -

18 Th e Shapin g of Peac e trated, there wer e times whe n collectiv e forc e had to be assembled t o dete r those wh o defied th e internationa l community. In 193 8 that force could no t be organize d b y the discredite d League , although it would be bette r i f such operations coul d b e unde r th e aegi s of a world organization. He kne w that what could be done b y force had to be related to circumstances. H e was wary of dogmas an d universa l theories, an d though t in terms o f function. This functional approach to the Leagu e led Wrong to argue also for mor e attention t o economic an d social activities . 'More frequen t initiativ e by the Canadian representatives o n questions of economic, social and humanitarian importance would contribute toward s preserving the practic e and techniqu e of internationa l collaboration, now endangered b y the extensio n int o nearly every field of the habit of sabre rattling.' The League, h e knew, was doomed, but i t could b e revived 'unde r som e othe r nam e i n some othe r cit y unde r some othe r instrument.' As a historian he saw that the essential thing was 'to preserve th e habi t an d techniqu e o f internationa l collaboratio n i n a world sadly in need of it' - a cause much older than the League of Nations. For that reason, th e 'other functions' of the League should not be discouraged. Ther e was even a n argumen t fo r over-emphasizin g them. Th e attitude s o f Canadian governments becam e mor e favourabl e to the idea of the League having economic an d socia l functions . Kin g sa w i n hi s ow n book , Industry an d Humanity, 'prett y muc h th e whol e programm e tha t no w is being suggeste d for post-wa r purposes.'23 Of course, some o f this emphasis o n the economi c function coul d hav e bee n inspire d b y a n anxiet y to downpla y the military function. On th e ev e o f th e wa r ther e was , i n connectio n wit h th e Internationa l Labour Organization , evidence o f the mor e constructiv e pragmatis m which differentiates postwa r attitudes t o internationa l organizatio n fro m thos e of the interwa r years . Whe n Wron g wen t t o Genev a i n 193 7 h e turne d hi s attention t o the problem s of what could be done bot h to serve the Canadia n interest an d it s imag e and t o strengthe n th e internationa l fabric . Sinc e th e Judicial Committe e o f th e Priv y Counci l ha d i n 193 7 declare d invali d th e Canadian government's ratificatio n o f three IL O conventions a s ultra vires of the federa l power, Canadian polic y had been in a state o f paralysis. The con stitutional stalemat e wa s bot h a caus e an d a n excuse . A s Wron g pointe d out,24 '... every informed perso n woul d agree that the Canadian contribution to th e Internationa l Labou r Organisatio n ha s been smal l an d that th e mos t important reaso n fo r tha t ha s bee n th e limitation s o f ou r federa l system. ' Although a s a good civi l servant h e acknowledged that the questio n whethe r a mor e positiv e attitud e coul d b e take n i n prevailin g circumstance s wa s a political decision, h e pointed out : 'Since the adhesion o f the Unite d States t o

19 Tria l and Erro r the Organisation , however , ou r ofte n repeate d explanatio n o f ou r limite d activity i s not a s convincing a s it was, sinc e th e Unite d State s Governmen t has assumed a leading part although hampere d b y the sam e sor t o f constitutional restrictions a s Canada.' Largel y as a result of his prodding, the parallel interests o f the tw o countries i n some provision fo r the problem s o f federal states were acknowledged. Consultations took place between American s and Canadians o f a kind which foreshadowed a new relationship after the wa r in international organization as sharers of certain coincidental interests . Wrong's memorandu m fo r th e ministe r o f labour , date d Geneva , 3 0 November 1938 , an d entitled 'Som e Proposal s Concernin g Canad a an d th e International Labou r Organisation, ' i s a masterly analysi s o f th e successe s and failures of the ILO , notable for the absence o f denunciation and a shrewd assessment o f ho w t o buil d o n th e successe s an d writ e of f the failures . It would b e best, h e thought, to move away from the idea of the International Labour Conferenc e a s an 'internationa l legislature' adoptin g statutes i n th e form o f draf t convention s t o b e ratifie d b y al l countries. Th e ratification s were simpl y not happening . 'I t i s better t o hav e a recommendation experi mentally applie d i n a numbe r o f States , tha n t o hav e a conventio n whic h only tw o o r thre e Government s wil l ratify. ' Th e function s o f th e ILO , as distinct fro m th e conference , wer e les s spectacula r bu t o f rea l importanc e and efficientl y discharged . Th e emphasis, h e thought, was beginning to shif t to th e conceptio n o f th e IL O 'a s an internationa l centr e of enquir y and re search, achievin g its results in individual countries more b y the influenc e of its work on individual governments tha n by securing widespread acceptanc e of unifor m minimu m standard s se t ou t i n conventions.' Thi s wa s the lapidary approach , th e concentratio n o n buildin g from wha t i s possibl e rathe r than startin g with the grand design . Skelton waited three month s t o acknowledge Wrong's memorandu m o f 8 December 1938. 25 Such positive thinking was not congenial to the masters of the Eas t Block . Skelton had a clear view of the wa y things were moving, th e fragility o f Munich, and the inevitabilit y of Canada's going to war at Britain's side. H e retreate d int o a n academi c disengagemen t fro m event s t o lamen t the follie s o f hom o sapiens , especiall y the Europea n species . Christi e wen t even further . Hi s denunciatio n o f th e follie s o f Britai n an d France , th e League, an d th e whol e nonsense of 'collectiv e security' was often devastat ing. Th e proble m wa s that, unlik e Wrong, ther e wa s no recognitio n o f re sponsibility for a Canadian policy , and hi s condemnation wa s from n o fixed point of conviction. Views o f th e Leagu e fro m th e Eas t Bloc k wer e largel y negative . Fo r Christie th e objectiv e wa s 'the elimination , a s soon a s possible, o f th e las t

20 Th e Shapin g of Peac e vestige of our forma l commitment, eithe r direc t or indirect, to the coercive , alliance features o f the League.' 26 J.S. Macdonald, in a departmental examination o f the question , recognize d some valu e of the Leagu e bu t doubted i f it woul d b e possibl e an y longe r 't o justif y th e paymen t o f $400,00 0 pe r annum, whic h the Leagu e a t present take s from th e Canadia n Treasury, t o maintain a top-heavy institution at Geneva.' 27 Whe n th e Canadia n govern ment considere d it s view s on th e revisio n of th e Leagu e Covenant o n th e basis o f the repor t t o th e Assembl y i n 193 8 o f the 'Committe e o f TwentyEight' i t wa s no t prepare d t o g o eve n a s fa r a s th e British , who offere d a cool-headed assessmen t of what was and was not possibl e now but regarde d the syste m fo r peacefu l settlemen t o f dispute s a s 'a n immensel y valuabl e piece o f machinery.' 28 Ottaw a feare d an y effor t t o revis e th e Covenan t o r produce a n interpretativ e resolution les t 'an y grou p of Europea n member s would be put in a position to seek t o revive the sanctions provisions in a case and a t a time that i t suits their interest s t o do so, i n spite o f having ignored them wit h respec t t o war s o f aggressio n i n Americ a an d Asia.' 29 Finall y should be noted th e persistent conviction in Ottawa that the Covenant ough t to be detached fro m the unfai r Treat y of Versailles, a sound enough vie w for consideration in 191 9 and reconsideration i n 194 5 but fatuous in the tim e of the Fiihrer. What ha d Skelto n and compan y believed i n as a function of the League ? They did believe, as Mackenzie King did, in 'economic appeasement.' They shared wit h many of the libera l internationalists and th e 'revisionists ' of the interwar year s a conviction that th e Versaille s settlement wa s punitive, tha t Germany ha d legitimate grievances, that France was interested no t in collective security but revanche, and tha t Italy and Japan ha d become aggressiv e as a resul t of economi c discriminatio n against them . It was the rol e of the League not to assemble force to use against force but to tackle the economic , social, and politica l causes of war and tension. I t is hard to quarrel with these beliefs, especiall y a s the y hav e becom e th e doctrin e o f Canad a an d mos t other democratic countries about the function s of the Unite d Nations. Mackenzie King's defenc e i n the Common s i n 1936 30 of the Leagu e as 'machinery fo r conferenc e an d conciliation ' tha t i s always available is in term s tha t could wel l have bee n use d abou t th e Unite d Nation s by any prime ministe r after abou t 1952 . One legitimat e question, however , abou t Canada' s espousa l o f th e doc trine of 'economic appeasement' for the League was that its government wa s slow t o recogniz e an y Canadia n responsibility , as a rich country , to contribute. I n th e Canadia n vie w economic appeasemen t mean t free r trade . A n External Affair s memorandu m o f 193 6 complained tha t th e Leagu e wa s a

21 Tria l and Error failure because : 'I n th e economi c fiel d nothin g ha s bee n don e t o preven t tariffs fro m rising to hithert o undreamed o f heights, or t o prevent the mos t favoured natio n claus e fro m bein g vitiate d b y impor t quota s an d simila r restrictions.'31 B y the lat e thirties , furthermore, there wa s something ver y unreal about the insistenc e of some officers i n the department and the mor e extreme academic s tha t fascism could b e cured, o r at least could have bee n cured, b y fair treatmen t fo r German, Italian, and Japanese exports. The de partmental memoranda for the Imperial Conference of 1937 concluded with the injunctio n t o 'figh t wa r hysteri a through returning economic prosper ity.'32 The argumen t wa s ten year s late and it ignored the existence of malignancy in politics. But it was also ten year s early. To give these advocate s credit, they had been arguin g the case, along with other goo d case s about Canadia n autonomy and Canadia n influence , since the earl y twenties. The temptatio n o f a lesser powe r that has not got its way, especially a lesser powe r that can with some credibility regard itself as a fireproof house , t o contrac t ou t o f a mess on th e groun d tha t i t was not o f it s making still paralyzes Canadians from tim e to time. It was not th e attitude of the postwa r leaders i n External Affairs, wh o recognized that although it was their job t o mak e th e worl d a s much a s possible lik e thei r ideal, the y were going to have to go on dealing with a world only partly designed according to Canadian specification s and wit h crise s whic h they could d o littl e to avoid but perhaps something - eve n if modest - to help settle. The prime minister, although h e like d t o cas t blam e an d wrin g his hand s ove r pas t follies , did recognize that the worl d as it existed ha d to be coped with, that he could not, like Lorin g Christie , bac k out . H e wa s still dispose d t o se e Canad a a s th e innocent victi m of crises it never mad e and muc h less ready to see a Canadian role in sorting out the messes into which the incorrigibles had got themselves. However , h e di d desperatel y tr y t o sto p th e drif t t o war , which, according t o hi s lights , mean t vehementl y supportin g Chamberlai n an d appeasement. Whe n tha t failed, h e accepted the obligatio n to fight.

2

The Wartime Experience

Canadian attitudes to a new international organization were inevitably conditioned by the experienc e of war. The United Nations grew out of the alliance against aggression . Canad a accepte d th e concep t o f a continuing alliance as the cor e o f a new security institution and th e specia l obligation o f the grea t powers. However , i t was the Canadia n vie w that ther e ha d no t bee n i n th e alliance a prope r relationshi p betwee n th e siz e o f th e contributio n and th e voice in decision-making. At any rate, wha t had been accepted t o win a war would not be acceptable in a peacetime institution that must enjoy the willing participation of countries larg e and small . THE WA R AN D FOREIG N POLIC Y

The militar y experience o f th e Secon d Worl d Wa r wa s for Canadian s les s bloody an d frustratin g tha n th e First . There was a greater sens e of purpos e and mission; ther e wa s more Canadia n contro l and leadership. A t the begin ning it was to a considerable exten t a n imperial effort, bu t b y the en d of th e war ther e emerge d a world-wid e partnershi p alread y calle d th e Unite d Nations. Nevertheless , Canadia n participatio n was, a s i n th e 1914-1 8 war , largely confined t o the Europea n front . Canadians agai n fought for the mos t part with the Britis h and ha d little operational contact with the American s or the Russians. The reaso n Canad a did not pla y a larger part in the Pacifi c war was practical and logistic . B y the tim e Japa n entere d th e wa r Canad a wa s deploying it s forces in Britain and preparing to send furthe r troops t o the Europea n front . Although Canad a promptl y declared wa r o n Japan , splittin g the Canadia n forces i n tw o a t tha t critica l poin t merel y t o mak e a toke n demonstratio n would hav e bee n ba d strategy. The token contributio n - mad e befor e Pear l

23 Th e Wartime Experience Harbor - o f untraine d Canadia n force s i n Hon g Kon g wa s bloodily eliminated i n the earl y stages of the war . Unlike the Australians , who felt a need to protec t thei r homeland , Canadians , i n spit e o f som e pani c on th e wes t coast afte r Pear l Harbor , continue d t o see Europ e as the majo r threat . Th e RCAF playe d a par t i n Ceylon , an d ther e wa s a joint Canadian-America n expedition agains t th e Japanes e i n th e Aleutian s designed largel y as a gesture. B y the en d o f the wa r in Europe Canadian s were reluctantly preparing to send forces against Japan. They would be volunteers. Canadian s ha d been fighting several year s longer tha n th e Americans , an d ha d tha t excus e fo r withdrawing. I t wa s accepted , however , tha t somethin g wa s owe d t o th e American allies in the Pacific . Furthermore, i t would be unwise for a country seeking new status i n the worl d and uncertai n of its economic futur e to risk strong American disapproval provoked by a Canadian refusal to fight in what the American s wer e incline d t o conside r thei r war . The wa r i n th e Pacifi c ended, however, before more than token Canadian forces had been engaged . This non-involvemen t i n the Pacifi c wa r encouraged a Canadian disposition to leav e the Pacifi c and the Fa r East to the Americans , a situation which for some tim e afte r th e wa r notably differentiate d Canadian attitude s toward s Asia from Canadian attitudes toward s Europe. The Pacifi c war , nevertheless , le d Canadian s t o a ne w loo k at thei r own geography and their own vulnerability. It not only made them mor e aware of the Pacifi c a s a frontier; i t also le d the m t o loo k upo n th e Nort h wit h new eyes. Th e focu s o n Alask a an d Icelan d an d th e ne w threat s fro m th e ai r raised serious questions abou t the pola r regions as an unbreachable fortifica tion. It was natural enough, therefore, to shift afte r th e war from thinking of the Japanes e o r Germa n threa t i n th e northeas t o r northwes t t o worrying about a n antagonis t stretche d acros s the fa r side o f the Arcti c Ocean. Map s with polar projections began to replace the traditional perspectives o f Mercator. Collectiv e securit y took o n a new meaning if Canada itself wa s open t o direct attack. Drastic revisions i n Canadian thinking took place in the alarming summer of 1940 . In spite of brave talk, serious thought had to be given in Ottawa to a situation i n which Britain might be overrun and the Royal Navy largely taken out o f action. I n extremis Canadian s wer e prepared even t o take a new look at Pan-America n arrangement s the y ha d alway s rejected. Fortunatel y fo r Canada th e presiden t o f the Unite d State s wa s only too willin g to conside r measures o f joint defenc e despit e America n neutralit y and Canadia n belli gerency. Th e wa y had bee n cleare d b y th e implie d commitment s t o eac h other's security exchanged i n 193 8 betwee n Roosevel t an d King. 1 It was in that critica l summe r o f 194 0 tha t th e Ogdensbur g Agreemen t too k place ,

24 Th e Shapin g of Peac e largely at Roosevelt's initiative , and the Permanen t Joint Board on Defenc e was established. At the same time, however, Canadians had to face the assertion o f American prerogativ e an d priorit y i n determinin g th e defenc e o f th e wester n hemisphere. After Denmark , Holland , and France were overrun, Canadians were concerned abou t the fate o f Greenland, S t Pierre, and to a lesser extent the Netherland s an d Frenc h Wes t Indies . Canadia n troop s wer e sen t t o Jamaica, Bermuda , the Bahamas , and British Guiana. Canada sent a consul to Greenland, bu t the American s made clea r that the Monro e Doctrine extended t o Greenlan d an d i t was they rather tha n th e Canadian s who would maintain protectio n over tha t area. Canadians did not muc h lik e this asser tion, bu t ther e wer e practica l advantage s i n gettin g th e non-belligeren t Americans committe d i n thi s wa y whe n Canadia n troop s wer e urgentl y needed elsewhere . S t Pierr e wa s a differen t matter . Man y Canadian s ha d been fearfu l o f thi s island wher e th e Vich y authorities commanded a clear view o f convoy s ou t o f th e S t Lawrenc e and wer e delighte d whe n a Fre e French expeditio n liberated S t Pierre, but th e Americans , wh o had a deeprooted dislik e of General d e Gaull e and suspicio n o f Frenc h 'imperialism, ' were infuriate d and accused th e Canadians o f collusion - a charge tha t was regrettably untrue . The American s were eventually persuaded no t t o intervene i n St Pierre, but Canadian s wer e uncomfortably reminded o f the pretensions o f th e Monro e Docrin e whe n i t extende d eve n t o island s mor e closely associate d wit h Canad a o r Newfoundlan d tha n wit h th e Unite d States. In thes e various ways Canada ha d a broadening experience o f diplomatic complications in which it was by its own plight involved. The defenc e of such Canadian interests could not be left t o the British. The Canadian struggl e for a voice i n the directio n of the wa r and th e protectio n of the Canadia n stak e was more complex than in the Firs t World War. In the latte r part of the war when th e grea t strategi c an d logisti c decisions wer e faced , th e proble m o f policy-sharing was not just with the British. Canada opened direct diplomatic links with both th e Sovie t Unio n and China, but ther e was never an y question o f the participatio n of Canada o r of any other o f the lesse r allie s in th e great-power discussions a t Cairo, Yalta, or Potsdam. Tw o of the majo r western strategi c conference s wer e hel d i n Quebec , an d th e prim e ministe r of Canada wa s in town for them . Churchil l wanted to includ e King and Cana dian officer s i n the discussion s bu t ha d t o giv e i n to Roosevelt's objection s when h e threatene d t o mov e th e conferenc e t o Bermuda. 2 Th e decision s taken, however, even o n atomic energy in which Canada was involved, were bilateral Anglo-America n decisions . Canadian s fough t hard , nevertheless ,

25 Th e Wartim e Experience for th e contro l o f their own forces and to get some recognitio n o f the Cana dian contributio n a s an independen t nation . Whe n i t came t o question s o f supply Canada wa s a much more important factor, and Canadians won places in severa l combine d boards , largel y based i n Washington . Thes e wartime exertions t o get a hearing conditioned Canadians so that at the end of the war they wer e accustome d t o stubbor n insistenc e o n thei r rights , accordin g t o function, i n postwar international organizations. Canada was much bette r prepare d in 194 5 than in 191 8 to take a constructive part in the peac e settlements becaus e i t had the professional backing of a well-staffed Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs . Wherea s i n 193 9 ther e wa s a small bu t effectiv e departmen t wit h mission s abroa d i n London , Paris , Washington, Geneva , Tokyo , an d Brussels-Th e Hague , b y the en d o f th e war the staf f i n Ottawa had greatly increased and there were missions i n most Commonwealth countries , i n Lati n America , t o th e allie d government s i n London, a s well as in Moscow an d Chungking . A Post-Hostilitie s Problem s Committee ha d bee n se t u p i n Ottaw a to conside r th e shap e o f peac e an d Canada's plac e i n th e postwa r world. 3 Althoug h Canad a di d no t tak e par t directly i n high polic y planning during the wa r and i n the Dumbarto n Oak s meetings preliminar y to the establishment o f the United Nations, neverthe less i t was kept well-informed b y the Britis h o f their discussion s an d Cana dians wer e abl e t o pu t forwar d view s o n man y subject s i n Londo n an d Washington an d t o keep in touch with their other wartim e allies. The ne w wartim e leaders i n Externa l ha d grow n restless ove r th e stiflin g negativism o f prewar policy. They sough t fo r things Canada migh t do rathe r than thing s Canad a migh t avoi d doing . Hum e Wron g lef t Genev a i n 194 0 and, afte r a stint in London, cam e to Ottawa where he soon turned his attention t o the kin d o f postwar order for which Canada shoul d aim . When Skel ton die d i n 1941 , Norma n Robertson , age d thirty-nine , took hi s plac e a s undersecretary. Leste r Pearso n wen t fro m Londo n t o Ottaw a and the n t o Washington wher e hi s inventiv e min d wa s engaged i n the Unite d Nation s from th e momen t o f its creation i n January 1942 . With him there was Escott Reid, a skille d an d dedicate d architec t o f internationa l structures . Charle s Ritchie, who was himself th e autho r o f a number o f penetrating analyses o f the postwar world at the time, described i n his diary 'the two most influentia l senior officials. ' O f Wrong h e wrote: 'He inspires alarm on first encounteran alarm which could be justified as he is totally intolerant of muddle, inanity or sheer brute stupidity. He has style in everything from the way he wears his coat t o the pros e o f his memoranda. H e is a realist who understands politica l forces better , unfortunately , tha n h e doe s politician s themselves. ' Abou t Robertson h e added : 'Norma n understand s the m ver y wel l an d ha s influ -

26 Th e Shapin g of Peace ence with the Prim e Minister , bu t wha t does not Norma n understand ? Hi s mind is as capacious as his great sloping frame. He has displacement, a s they say of ocean liners , displacement physical and intellectua l and h e is wonderful compan y wit h hi s ironi c asides , hi s shaft s o f wisdo m an d hi s sigh s o f resignation.'4 Mackenzie Kin g wa s stil l ver y muc h i n charg e o f Externa l Affairs , bu t long-term plannin g had neve r muc h intereste d hi m an d postwa r planning was no t a subjec t t o whic h a wartim e prim e ministe r coul d giv e stead y attention. Th e ne w team wa s inspired b y a very different perspective on th e Canadian rol e or perhap s o n the phas e of its history in which Canada stood. They n o longe r sa w Canada a s a countr y developin g agains t odd s an d i n need o f protection but a s a well-sinewed actor on the worl d scene, its status assured, it s practices stil l to b e worked out. I f their sense of Canada's place in the syste m seem s less parochial than that o f their predecessors , i t should be recognize d tha t a devastatin g wa r help s greatl y t o clarif y priorities . A s Hume Wron g said , whe n h e addresse d th e fina l sessio n o f th e Leagu e Assembly in 1946 : 'Those who have live d through th e terror s and glories of two great war s are boun d t o b e disillusioned . Disillusionment , i n it s literal sense th e absenc e o f illusions , i s a good thing . It shoul d mea n tha t w e see more clearly , no t tha t w e hav e los t hope.' 5 Hum e Wron g di d no t loo k o r sound lik e an 'idealist, ' bu t h e wa s in fact an idealis t of the mor e endurin g kind - unillusioned . H e worke d toward s a n idea l whic h woul d fi t a n unkempt glob e rathe r than seeking t o impose a straitjacket on the worl d for its own good . H e wa s not daunted , lik e the les s humble idealists , b y reverses . After Munic h he conceive d a better League . Durin g the Blit z in London h e wrote: I hav e fo r years thought , and I still think, that war is the wors t of avoidable evils. I wonder i f that is the righ t frame of mind . Might it not b e better t o accept recurren t war as an inevitable feature of life - inevitabl e not in a strictly logical sense (fo r war is the mos t absur d of human activities), but i n the practical sense that we can't avoid it because o f imperfections of our civilizatio n and ha d bette r therefore try to fit it into our schem e o f lif e rathe r tha n regar d i t a s th e negatio n o f ou r ordinar y aims an d purposes? I don't lik e this idea, but w e might make a better peace if we accepted it as true... I can bring myself to hope that war will end i n an immense fluidity, submerging old loyalties, blurrin g national and clas s distinctions . If so, ther e woul d be greater hop e of salvation , no t a t onc e bu t eventually . We may hav e to endure chao s i n order t o struggle through to order. I f we can keep a sense of human decency, of toleration, a respectable orde r might emerge fro m the chao s in time ... 6

27 Th e Wartim e Experienc e By the en d o f an appalling war there was a chance to move ahead. Wrong was ready fo r that , an d h e wa s ready also for the readjustmen t a few years later when the hope s o f security through th e Unite d Nations faltered. His particular kin d o f pragmatic , experimenta l idealism , base d o n a n acceptanc e o f rather than a denial of original sin, strongly influenced those around him . The fac t tha t wha t happene d i n 193 9 seeme d t o b e happenin g fo r th e second tim e strengthened th e inclination to set up institutions to prevent th e same kind of wars. The firm determination t o avoid the economi c a s well as the politica l situations whic h had le d t o wa r dominated th e thinkin g of th e wartime leaders-an d thei r electorate s - wh o created th e Unite d Nations . Their faul t wa s not i n bein g militaris t or vengeful. They wer e not. Bu t th e double experienc e ha d restricted thei r grasp of the variou s causes of war and the require d condition s fo r peace . Les t thi s be regarded a s an argumen t fo r the constitutio n o f internationa l organization s i n tranquillity , i t shoul d b e noted tha t withou t the wartim e unity nothing could hav e bee n don e a t all. Later advance s i n United Nation s practice , furthermore - peacekeepin g for example - hav e bee n forge d in times of crisis. The ne w perspective s unleashe d a n unprecedente d burs t o f zea l an d invention i n Ottawa, an enthusiastic participation in the raisin g of new structures, th e adaptatio n o f ol d ones , an d then , soo n after , thei r remodelling . The mid-fortie s hav e been describe d a s 'a relatively Golden Ag e of international political inventiveness an d institution-building.' 7 One of the American architects, Dea n Acheson , compare d i t wit h 'th e Creation ' o f th e world , quoting Alfons o th e Wise , Kin g o f Castille : 'Ha d I bee n presen t a t th e creation I would have given some usefu l hints for the bette r orderin g of the universe.'8 The American s loome d largest , o f course, throughou t thi s creation, bu t th e Canadian s wer e present , an d i t i s thei r 'usefu l hint s fo r th e better orderin g o f the universe ' with which this study is largely concerned . PUBLIC OPINIO N

The officials , however , coul d no t wor k i n a vacuum . The y le d an d eve n helped moul d publi c opinion, bu t the y ha d t o adjus t thei r calculation s t o public tolerance . Th e uncertai n conviction s o f Canadians ar e wel l reflected in a n interestin g debat e i n th e Common s afte r th e prim e ministe r o n 2 7 January 1943 announced th e Casablanca Conference o f Churchill and Roosevelt. If it revealed som e confusion, tha t was understandable, fo r the wa y was not clear. Conservative spokesmen presse d to know whether Canada had been informed, invite d t o b e a party to th e decisions , whethe r i t had concurred , and, i n particular , whethe r th e governmen t ha d advocate d t o th e Unite d

28 Th e Shapin g of Peac e Nations the settin g up of a Supreme War Council on which all allied nations would be represented. Howar d Green of the Conservatives proteste d against the growth of a 'small power' complex in Canada, a feeling it must run along behind Britain and the United States. Canada was at a parting of the ways, he said.9 It could be influential beyond its numbers if it wished, but unless ther e was a change in attitude Canada would have little to say at the peac e conference. That coul d mean tragedy , as the larg e nations might decide on a peace which prevented th e world Canadians wanted from takin g shape. I n defence of the government' s positio n over Casablanca, Kin g spoke o f the necessar y improvisations i n creatin g a War Council. He acknowledge d the leadershi p of Churchil l an d Roosevel t b y sayin g there wa s ope n recognitio n tha t al l could rall y i n suppor t o f policie s on whic h thes e tw o men woul d have th e final word. He admitted anomalie s i n the evolvin g organization that should be correcte d befor e a total war effor t coul d be achieved an d a n instrumen t for maintainin g th e peac e constructed . Nevertheless , althoug h h e hope d a wider organizatio n would develop, i t was necessary no t t o prejudic e in th e slightest degre e th e concentratio n o f responsibilit y for strategi c decisions . Although he did not say so, i t was one wa y of avoiding commitments. It becam e increasingl y difficul t t o maintai n tha t positio n i n fac e o f th e pressure fro m all sides i n the Hous e a s well a s from his officials, bu t King' s heart wa s never i n th e Creatio n o f a ne w world organization. He mad e th e appropriate speeches abou t the United Nations because he had to, but, as he confessed late r to a Liberal party caucus, he 'greatly feared the new organization migh t i n som e circumstance s b e a s much o f a blin d a s th e Leagu e of Nations.'10 Churchill , th e great-powe r man, stoutl y defende d th e Leagu e when Kin g said to him after th e Quebe c Conferenc e tha t there woul d have been n o wa r i f th e Leagu e ha d no t existed. 11 A t jus t abou t thi s time , i n November 1943 , a Gallu p Pol l indicate d tha t 7 5 pe r cen t o f Canadian s favoured a n active part in maintaining world peace even i f it meant sendin g Canadian force s to keep the peac e in other parts of the world. 12 An External Affairs interna l memorandum o f March 194 3 noted that whereas in the first years of the wa r 'there had been a widespread tendency t o look upon representation i n imperial or international councils as entanglements whic h might involve Canada i n commitments i n someone else's interest, sinc e the Casablanca Conferenc e ther e wa s mor e concer n i n Parliamen t abou t postwa r issues and a realization tha t unles s Canad a too k part , th e interest s o f othe r countries woul d predominate.' Whenever ther e wa s talk of an international organization, Canadian s wer e determine d t o ge t thei r rightfu l plac e i n it . Their conceptio n o f their rightfu l plac e grew consistently i n the latte r years of the war , aggravated, a s always, by the failur e of other countries t o recog-

29 Th e Wartime Experience nize it. Not all Canadians felt thi s way - ther e were still some who preferred the quie t life . Th e Hon . P.J.A . Cardi n said h e wa s not humiliate d because Canada wa s not invite d to Casablanca. 'We had no reason t o be there .. . we are no t on e o f th e mai n power s conducting the wa r ... and w e must accept the decisio n o f th e power s mainl y responsibl e fo r carryin g this wa r t o a successful conclusio n .. . Let u s adjus t ourselve s t o ou r role , t o ou r posi tion.'13 The insistence by the Conservatives and the CCF on a louder Canadian voice was only partly attributable to their ignorance of the difficultie s th e govern ment wa s encountering i n pressing the case . There was a strong nationalist strain in both parties . The zea l of the CC F was stimulated by their dislike of many allie d policies , a s for exampl e th e suppor t of dubious Frenchmen i n North Afric a o r th e wron g kind s o f Yugoslavs. 14 The y wante d Canad a t o exert pressure on the Left. They tended t o favour a council of all the 'united nations.' They were even mor e sceptica l than King about a Commonwealt h front. Th e Conservative s wer e les s sure wha t they wanted . The y expecte d more recognitio n for Canada, bu t the y were always suspicious of King's re luctance t o stan d u p wit h the empire . They sounde d a s if they favoure d a united empire fron t withi n the Unite d Nations, bu t on th e whol e they kept empire an d Unite d Nation s argument s i n separate compartments . Rhetori cally at least they seemed to like the idea of the Commonwealth as one of the great power s in the postwa r organization, but tha t idea did not surviv e long enough t o become a serious cause. In general, Conservatives wer e less cautious tha n Kin g about commitment s an d demande d a voic e i n imperia l or allied councils regardless of the consequences . ALLIED ORGANIZATIO N

The allied war effort wa s organized through many ad hoc functional committees and commission s operatin g effectively bu t withou t any clearly defined structure. Th e syste m wa s disorderly bu t i t produce d a victory . It wa s not based rigidl y on the equality of states. The ultimat e authority was always the two or sometimes three great powers and Canadians were reluctant to admit that the y ha d muc h satisfaction . However, the y learned a good dea l about how to work the system, ho w to get their feet in doors, and above all how to go for the arrangement which meant influence rather than mere status . On genera l militar y strategy there wa s no stron g anxiet y among th e to p level in Canada to play a decisive role. The government reste d largel y on th e position tha t i t mus t b e kep t informe d o f al l important development s an d consulted befor e an y decision directly affecting it s interest wa s taken. It did

30 Th e Shapin g of Peac e claim, however, that wheneve r representative institutions were established, Canada woul d hav e equitabl e treatment. I n practic e the Canadia n interes t was best met flexibly, by constant consultation, visits with the principals, and even b y participation on th e fringe s o f the Quebe c Conferences . Whe n th e Combined Chief s of Staff Committe e was set u p in January 1942, the Britis h and American s sai d n o othe r countr y could hav e membership . Roosevel t feared tha t concessions t o Canada would create demands fro m Brazil, Mexico, an d Chin a an d h e di d not wan t the committe e t o b e ' a debatin g society.'15 He had a point. Canadian representatives could attend meetings when the agend a concerne d Canad a and there were, of course, many bilateral discussions wit h bot h Britis h an d America n chiefs . Ther e wa s goo d liaiso n through th e Canadia n militar y headquarter s i n Londo n an d th e Join t Staf f Mission i n Washington. Canadians, although they could not accept such provisions a s adequate , tacitl y recognize d a functiona l argumen t i n th e enor mously larger forces of the tw o major power s and, of course, the nee d to win the war. As to be expected, it was on the economic and supply side that Canada was most importunate and more successful. The Combined Raw Materials Board, the Combine d Shippin g Adjustment Board , and th e Combine d Munition s Assignment Boar d were set u p early i n 1942 , but Canada' s clai m for mem bership o n th e first and thir d was rejected. Later in 1942 , however, Canad a was admitted t o two further boards that had been established, th e Combined Production Resource s Boar d and the Combined Food Board. It also got seats on a numbe r o f committee s th e functiona l justificatio n for whic h was less obvious - as, for example, the Medical Supplies Committee, Combine d Tex tiles Committee, an d a Combined Tire s and Tubes Committee . C.D . How e and those involved with him were less concerned wit h status and more wit h the protectio n o f Canadia n interests . On e proble m fo r Canadian s wa s that both the British and Americans preferred to have Britain represent the Com monwealth o n th e boards 16 and, t o win the war , certain arrangements were tolerated. I t wa s clear, however, tha t whe n peacetim e institution s were set up, Canada mus t act on its own. Among the reasons Brooke Claxton cited in 1944 fo r Canada' s supportin g internationa l organizatio n wa s tha t 'I n th e absence o f internationa l agreement , economi c o r politica l difference s be tween Grea t Britai n an d th e Unite d State s ma y forc e Canad a int o close r integration with one country at the expense of our relations with the other.' 17 Ever sinc e the Leagu e ha d been established , Canadian s looke d t o multilateral institutions to rescue them fro m the dilemmas of excessive bilateralism. Canada also learned ther e were other lesser power s to be considered. Th e American insistenc e that , regardles s o f th e ver y differen t proportion s o f

31 Th e Wartim e Experience their war efforts, Canada could not b e treated differently fro m Brazil spurred Canadian official s int o a functionalist rationalization. They woul d not insis t on representation on all allied bodies but only on those where they were major contributors. The y wer e even willin g t o apply the principl e negatively. They did not claim membership o n the Combined Shippin g Adjustment Board, recognizing tha t Norwa y an d Greece , fo r example , ha d bette r claims . T o keep things under control th e major powers were cautious about letting Canada set precedents - particularl y in the case of the Combined Ra w Materials Board. It wa s the principl e rather tha n th e practic e that was the majo r caus e of concern. Canad a foun d tha t th e wa y it was linked with the CRM B through a Materials Coordinatin g Committe e wa s effective a s a working arrangement. There was towards the en d o f the wa r some differenc e of opinion or emphasis between th e practica l men lik e Howe or H.J. Symington, chairman of the Canadian sectio n o f th e committee , an d thos e wh o ha d t o kee p i n min d precedents fo r the postwa r organizations already taking shape. Canadian offi cials on all levels ha d established workin g relationships with their America n counterparts an d Howe seemed to feel that formal participation in the tripartite board might interfer e with his own very effective persona l relations with the Americans , no t t o mentio n hi s position vis-à-vi s other department s i n Ottawa. Symingto n though t tha t i f Canad a wer e a membe r o f th e CRM B i t would always be out-voted, tha t it would be stripped of its raw materials as a powerful bargainin g counter . O n atomi c question s How e though t i t mor e important t o acquire a Canadian position in the Combined Polic y Committee or th e Combine d Developmen t Trus t tha t lef t hi m a s fre e a s possibl e t o promote and protect the Canadian interest than to insist on a status of equality i n policy-making b y tripartie bodies.18 One lesso n learne d wa s that th e righ t to a voice implie s commitment. I t would also requir e compromise . Man y Canadians, wit h little experience o f the give-and-tak e o f international organization, seemed t o assume tha t th e Canadian case , bein g naturall y just, woul d prevai l if i t coul d onl y b e pre sented. It did not ofte n work out that way, and Canadians did not like being bound b y decisions which wen t contrar y to their wishes. B y remaining out side th e boards , i t wa s easie r t o maintai n autonomy . Canada , therefore , sought mor e vigorousl y membershi p i n agencie s tha t allocate d supplie s it needed than those that allocated products it exported, especially surplus food and raw materials. I t was cannily realized, furthermore, tha t participation on the highes t leve l o f allie d militar y strategy wa s no t onl y unattainabl e bu t undesirable. I t wa s boun d t o b e token , excep t tha t i t woul d surrende r t o others the final control o f Canadia n forces . Ther e wa s perhaps mor e t o b e

32 Th e Shapin g of Peace gained i n exploitin g a good grievance. 19 A comparabl e fea r o f bein g com mitted wa s th e dominan t consideratio n i n Canada' s no t acceptin g Lend Lease assistance. 20 Granted the basi c value of the wartim e experience an d th e habi t of allied collaboration, nevertheles s th e precedent s wer e i n som e wa y misleading. The wa r machinery was administrative. It allocated . It wa s directing a large war effor t wit h a strong sens e o f common purpose . Som e o f the Canadia n planners during the wartime period may well have been thinking of analogies for postwa r international 'government. ' Th e prevalen t assumptio n that th e enforcement o f collectiv e securit y woul d b e carrie d o n b y th e peacetim e United Nation s mad e mor e natura l the assumptio n o f enforcement i n matters o f healt h o r aviatio n or wireless . Tha t wa s not t o be . Wartime board s were based on a recognition of conflicting interests , an d temporary compromises wer e considere d acceptabl e t o remov e a devastatin g threa t t o th e greater interests o f all. Peacetime agencies must accept, however, the permanence of conflicting interests a s the natural order of things and find means of regulating them. Th e principl e of sharing defence production between Can ada and the Unite d States, for example, folded when there was no commo n enemy21 an d reappeare d onl y whe n a ne w antagonis t wa s perceived . I n a workable Unite d Nation s syste m ever y membe r i s the prospectiv e partne r and antagonist o f every other. The system has been mos t gravely threatened when temporary majorities - th e Western power s in the fifties and the Third World i n the seventies - wer e tempted t o use it as an instrument agains t a common 'enemy. ' Th e self-disciplin e o f th e economi c an d socia l agencie s would have to be based o n a sense of common interes t o r common purpos e but not a common enemy . One Canadia n weaknes s wa s the tendenc y t o judge functiona l claims in terms of the producer rathe r than the consumer. Canadian s saw the position on various board s a s a means by which to insist on their fair supply of scarce materials. The y wer e somewha t to o preoccupied , however , wit h thei r own role a s provider t o realiz e tha t th e stak e o f thos e needin g provision s was even greater . The Canadian ide a of 'responsible government' applied internationally reflected the traditiona l prejudice in favour o f control by the ma n who paid the taxes . They did not recognize, fo r example , the right s of their flattened allie s in Europe as comparable to theirs in determining the policies of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration o r the International Refuge e Organization. 22 Whe n a t Sa n Francisco Canad a presse d a functional qualificatio n for th e Economi c an d Socia l Council, du e recogni tion tha t th e eightee n member s shoul d includ e state s o f majo r economi c importance, i t ran into general opposition on the grounds that small and poor

33 Th e Wartime Experienc e countries ha d thei r ow n perspective s t o contribut e an d tha t th e Counci l would deal with social and cultural as well as economic matters . Th e delega tion backe d awa y gracefully, with the argumen t that as the functions of th e Council had indeed bee n broadened ther e was not the same reason to press the point . Gordo n Graydon , wh o mad e th e statement , wa s greeted wit h applause.23 If Canad a wa s at time s presumptuou s i n it s estimate o f it s own statu s i n postwar organization , th e reaso n wa s partl y i n th e specia l positio n i t ha d acquired during the war. A.F.W. Plumptre, who was in the Canadian embassy in Washingto n i n th e wa r years , ha s writte n o f th e creatio n o f th e Inter national Bank and Monetary Fund : It was in large measure a n American , British, and Canadia n affair, bu t s o were a lot of other thing s in Washington until the en d o f hostilities, until the French and other European government s becam e mor e than exile governments. Washington , indeed, was a surprisingly ABC affai r durin g the war . The Chief s of Staf f wer e the combine d chiefs o f staf f o f th e u s an d th e UK , but th e Canadian s ha d a large and influentia l mission attache d t o them. Th e Combine d Productio n and Resource s Boar d was an ABC board; the Combine d Foo d Board was an AB C board; the Combine d Ra w Materials Board was only an A B board, simpl y because c , Canada , would not go in (C.D . Howe felt we would have more leverag e from the outside than by being voted down on th e inside) . S o th e internationa l agencies, particularl y thos e tha t wer e forme d before th e en d o f hostilities , naturally had this sort of cast... I think that one o f our concerns, i n looking at the Fun d and Bank , is to realize that they still contain certain overtones of tha t original ABC cast. I certainly feel that , had Bretto n Wood s com e a little later, th e Europea n countrie s would have been mor e integrally involve d in the formation o f the Fun d an d th e subsequen t activitie s than, fro m tim e to time, they have been. 24

It should be added tha t this is not the impression gathered from the memoir s of Britis h and America n actor s o n th e scene . Reference s t o Canadian s ar e generous bu t scarce . Memoirists , however , d o lik e to emphasiz e th e big time company they kept. UNRRA

It seemed fortunate that the first battle for a voice in United Nation s bodie s could b e fought ove r th e Unite d Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency in which Canada ha d a strong clai m becaus e o f its expected rol e as a majo r provider. I t was especially important a t that time becaus e the distinction was

34 Th e Shapin g of Peac e not bein g clearl y mad e betwee n relie f an d reconstructio n an d al l th e 'economic proposals ' wer e bein g lumpe d together , includin g those fo r a n international ban k an d a 'clearin g union. ' Relief wa s linked , especiall y i n Washington, to visions of a new world order in which there would be prompt solutions no t onl y for the devastatio n of war but also for the dislocations that had precede d th e war . Th e Europea n allie s wer e mor e anxiou s tha t thei r immediate need s b e recognized a s well. The distinctio n betwee n short - and long-term action became cleare r as the war progressed, an d the name Unite d Nations Relie f an d Rehabilitation Administration was carefully chosen . Thi s organization wa s no t th e bod y t o dea l wit h th e ne w worl d order , bu t th e connection wa s acknowledged betwee n th e wa y in which a country was or was not restore d an d it s long-term prospects . I n Jun e 194 3 draft proposals , already approved by the fou r powers , were made t o the Unite d Nations as a whole. Th e interconnectio n betwee n relie f an d reconstructio n wa s recog nized, especiall y as the same men were often involved i n each, but they were now t o b e th e concer n o f separat e agencies . Ther e wa s obviously a distinc tion betwee n bodie s fo r th e actua l administration o f relief an d thos e which were t o recommen d t o government s plan s fo r a ne w worl d order . I n th e latter categor y wer e th e conference s bein g planne d o n agriculture , money , and civil aviation. UNRRA wa s designe d t o tak e ove r afte r Militar y Relief . Th e Canadia n contribution t o UNRR A wa s only about twic e that t o Militar y Relief, bu t th e nature o f Canadia n participatio n became a majo r politica l issue. Canada' s fortunate positio n as a producer i n the latte r years of the wa r meant tha t its contribution t o relief wa s essential an d large . A refusal t o contribute, give n the dire circumstances, woul d hardly have been credible, but other countrie s had t o recogniz e tha t th e contributio n coul d b e affecte d b y th e exten t o f participation in policy-making. When i n Septembe r 194 1 th e Inter-Allie d Committe e o n Postwa r Re quirements ha d been se t u p in London, Canad a di d not becom e a membe r although i t was represented a t mos t meetings . Afte r th e Unite d State s an d the Sovie t Unio n became involve d i n the war , plans were discussed fo r a UN relief agency . Although th e Canadia n governmen t approve d th e idea , it was disturbed by the America n draf t which provided for an executive committe e of th e fou r powers . O n th e ground s o f it s expecte d contribution , Canad a vigorously demande d membershi p o n th e executiv e committe e o r at leas t the curtailment o f the power s of this committee i n favour of a more broadl y representative council . Th e Americans , an d particularl y Presiden t Roose velt, ha d not as yet learned ho w importunate th e lesser power s were going to be. They wer e more concerned wit h conciliating the Russians, an d the Rus -

35 Th e Wartim e Experience sians did not want lesser powers represented. Th e latter feared that if Canada had a privilege d positio n thi s migh t als o b e accorde d t o Poland , fo r ex ample - an d an amenable Polish governmen t ha d not yet been secured . The Americans, a s usual , worrie d ove r th e claim s o f Brazil . The Britis h were more use d to this kind of pressure fro m Canad a and Australia, and they were getting i t als o fro m th e Europea n governments-in-exil e i n London . B y December 194 2 the y ha d accepte d th e ide a i n principl e o f including lesser powers in executive bodie s o f at leas t internationa l economic organizations. In the battl e over UNRR A which took place in the sprin g of 1943 the Cana dian interpretatio n o f functionalis m was formulated, state d publicl y i n th e Commons b y th e prim e ministe r o n 9 July 1943 , communicate d t o othe r governments, and , indeed , a n effor t wa s made t o commit th e grea t powers to th e principle. 25 Th e gis t o f th e theor y was stated i n the followin g terms : '... authority in international affairs mus t no t b e concentrated exclusivel y in the larges t powers . O n the othe r hand , authorit y cannot b e divided equally among al l th e thirt y o r mor e sovereig n state s tha t compris e th e unite d nations, o r all effective authorit y will disappear... In the vie w of the govern ment, effectiv e representation s .. . should neither b e restricted t o the larges t states nor necessarily extended t o all states. Representation shoul d be determined o n a functional basis which will admit to full membership thos e countries, larg e o r small , whic h hav e th e greates t contributio n t o mak e t o th e particular objec t in question.' I t was not simpl y an argument pu t forward by diplomatic planners. The prim e minister an d the War Committee o f cabinet were engage d i n ful l cry . In statement s and memorand a a t al l levels i t was postulated tha t the succes s of Canada's claim in UNRR A was crucial because it would establish the patter n fo r postwa r organization. Hume Wrong set out the position in a memorandum t o the undersecretar y of 1 9 March 1943 : We are, o f course, deepl y concerned wit h bot h the for m and the substanc e of international postwar planning. As to the substance , a good deal of preliminary study has been give n her e t o som e o f th e economi c questions.. . As t o th e form , w e hav e hitherto advanced , i n our approache s ove r th e Relie f Administratio n and t o som e extent i n connection wit h the Combined Boards , the principl e that representation on international bodies shoul d b e determined o n a functional basi s so as to permit the participation of those countries which have the greatest stake in the particular subject under examination . We have use d thi s principle both t o combat the argumen t tha t the fou r larges t powers shoul d hav e a special responsibility in all the field s o f planning and organizatio n and to avoid the other extreme whic h would allow each member of the Unite d Nations to be represented o n the basis of nominal equality. I think

36 Th e Shapin g of Peac e that w e shoul d stic k t o thi s functional principle . I f we ca n secur e it s general accep tance, i t would permit the representatio n of Canada o n mos t o f the bodie s i n which we are deepl y interested .

Hitherto, Wron g noted , th e mai n concern ha d bee n t o secure prope r influ ence for Canad a i n certain o f the bodie s se t u p fo r directio n o f the wa r and also i n th e so-calle d Relie f Administratio n whic h wa s the onl y subject o n which postwar planning had reached a n advanced stag e of international negotiation. They ha d approached the question singly and improvised as success ful method s a s they could manage, suc h as liaison with the Combined Chief s of Staff throug h th e Canadia n Joint Staf f in Washington, membershi p o f th e Production an d Resource s Board , an d o f th e Pacifi c Council , an d contact s with the Food Board which had not gone a s far as they wished. However, th e United State s governmen t ha d no w indicate d it s readines s t o participat e in the serie s o f postwa r discussion s o n a broad economi c fron t - relief , foo d consumption an d distributio n apar t fro m relief , internationa l monetar y arrangements, an d other economi c questions . The y were proposing the convocation o n 2 7 Apri l i n th e Unite d State s o f a conferenc e o f th e Unite d Nations - the belligerent allie s who had been assemble d an d declared them selves th e Unite d Nation s i n Washingto n i n Januar y 1942-o n foo d con sumption an d production . I n th e monetar y fiel d ther e wer e Britis h an d American plans which the Canadians feare d would become rivals . The Canadians , lik e th e British , favoure d a full-dress conferenc e o f th e United Nations . The American s incline d t o a series o f ad hoc conferences, partly because the y were nervous o f Congressional reaction s to postwar commitments an d wante d t o avoi d publicity . The Canadian s wer e hopin g th e United Nations a s a whole might give the mandate fo r a programme of international collaboratio n rathe r tha n hav e i t instigate d solel y b y th e grea t powers. I n thi s way general principle s for th e participatio n o f lesser power s would b e authorized. Fro m th e beginnin g th e argumen t wa s seen, particu larly o n th e officia l level , no t simpl y as a means o f frustrating great-powe r control bu t als o a s a formul a whic h ough t t o appea l t o th e great power s because i t avoided the chaos of a system base d o n equal representatio n fo r all in everything . The argumen t ove r UNRR A bega n i n close associatio n wit h th e argumen t over a Canadian plac e on the Combined Foo d Board. The British proposed i n August 194 2 a compromis e o n th e Foo d Boar d b y which ther e woul d b e Canadian participatio n i n meeting s whe n matter s concernin g Canad a wer e under discussion , Canadia n membershi p o n al l committees dependen t o n the board, and a Canadian-United State s Committe e o n Food Policy, but the

37 Th e Wartime Experience War Committee i n Ottawa rejected it. At the sam e tim e the British were told that th e Canadia n governmen t too k stron g exceptio n t o th e exclusio n o f Canada from the propose d Polic y Committee o f the inter-allied organization to dea l wit h Europea n relief . Th e hig h commissione r i n Londo n wa s in structed t o emphasiz e t o th e Britis h that th e Canadia n desir e fo r effectiv e representation wa s no t cause d b y considerations o f prestig e o r status . 'W e have limite d ou r request s t o bodie s i n the wor k of which we are inevitably called upo n t o pla y a large part. The Governmen t ha s felt tha t we should b e partners in these bodies and should not merely be afforded mean s of protecting ou r direc t interest s whe n the y com e unde r consideration . A feelin g is growing up, no t onl y in Canada, tha t the directio n of the wa r (except so far as Russia i s concerned) i s too muc h o f an Anglo-America n monopoly. The problem is to find a means whereby sound and speedy decisions can be taken (involving concentratio n i n a fe w hands) , whil e at th e sam e tim e sharin g responsibility for these decision s among the Governments whic h are mainly concerned i n them.' 26 The Britis h argued fo r th e enlargemen t o f th e Polic y Committee fro m four t o seve n member s t o includ e Canada , a Lati n America n ally , an d a European ally. 27 They were concerned abou t their European allies, who were being importunate bu t no t likely to agree easily on one country to represen t them. Litvino v of the USS R argued against the enlargemen t o f the committe e precisely o n th e ground s fo r whic h Canada wante d i t - tha t thi s woul d be taken a s a precedent. Cordel l Hull was affected by the Britis h arguments and Acheson suggeste d severa l way s aroun d th e problem . On e o f these wa s for shared membershi p betwee n Canad a an d th e Unite d Kingdom , an d th e other wa s for establishin g a committe e o f supplyin g countries . Ottaw a did not, o f course, lik e the forme r suggestio n whic h looked to o muc h lik e th e old idea of a Commonwealth seat . The Britis h also rejected it on the ground s that Canada' s was a functional claim o f its own. A t a later stage th e British even offere d t o ste p dow n from th e Polic y Committee i n favour of Canada but, althoug h th e Canadian s appreciate d the gesture , the y thought i t would have the same unfortunate implications. What was more, they supported th e presence of the Britis h on the Polic y Committe e for functiona l reasons . Roosevelt's idea of a compromise wa s that if the Britis h were going to pres s for membership o f seven, the British government coul d decide whether they wanted thei r membershi p t o com e fro m th e Unite d Kingdo m o r Canada. 28 Pearson knew how unacceptable this would be to the prime minister, bu t the Canadian ministe r in Washington, Leighto n McCarthy, was rather impresse d with the suggestion - unti l he tried it out on Mackenzie Kin g who, as Pearson reports , 'gav e hi m a lecture o n the structur e o f the Commonwealth.' 29

38 Th e Shapin g of Peace Eden accepte d 'th e conclusion tha t th e Fou r Powe r basis wil l no t normally be appropriat e fo r internationa l organization s dealin g wit h economi c pro blems, whil e agreeing that it is important that the four great powers "should retain ultimat e control over post-wa r military and political arrangements." ' At this stage, however, the Canadians were not disposed t o look at any compromises o r t o restric t thei r objectio n t o internationa l economic organiza tions.30 The Wa r Committee wa s adamant. Mackenzi e Kin g instructed McCarthy to se e Hul l an d leav e wit h hi m a memorandum . Th e committe e di d no t think th e Externa l Affair s draf t pu t th e cas e strongl y enough , an d i t wa s toughened. I n thi s memorandu m th e governmen t spok e frankl y abou t it s own political problems: There is already a good deal of public questioning over the plac e accorded to Canada in the variou s inter-allied bodies which have been set up for the direction of the war. During wartime, problem s o f this natur e ar e t o som e exten t disguised, because of public concentration o n th e attainmen t o f victory and becaus e of th e secrec y whic h must surround many aspects of war direction. After the fighting ends, the issues will be seen nakedly . The ful l activitie s of the Relie f Administratio n wil l not begi n unti l the wa r i s over ; an d i t wil l b e ver y difficult , o r eve n impossible , t o persuad e th e Parliament and people of Canada to accept the financial burdens and other sacrifices, such perhaps as the continuation o f rationing and other restrictions on th e domestic supply o f consumers ' goods , whic h wil l b e necessar y fo r th e provisio n o f relie f through the Administratio n on the expected scale, unless they are satisfied that their representatives exercised their due par t in its direction. The practica l difficultie s i n creatin g representativ e internationa l agencie s were recognized , bu t 'thes e difficultie s ar e a challeng e t o statesmanship ; they must be faced and on their solution depend s i n large measure the possi bility of an enduring peace.' 31 In late February the four powers met in Washington. The Russians budged a little towards an informal intimation to Canada that they would all support its chairmanship of a suppliers committee bu t they would not abandon th e fourpower principle. The frank Canadian admission o f long-term aims in opening up th e polic y proces s ha d bee n counter-productive . Th e Britis h embass y reported to Pearson tha t it was the intention o f the fou r power s 'to consider the draf t i n the light of any observations which may have been received from the other Unite d Nations and in the hope that at the subsequent conferenc e of the United Nations to consider the whole matter, th e Four Powers may be able to act as a unit in recommending th e draf t t o the othe r nations.' 32

39 Th e Wartim e Experienc e The Wa r Committee unanimousl y rejected th e compromise . The y would settle fo r nothin g less tha n direct representatio n o n the Centra l Committe e (formerly th e Polic y Committee). Th e Canadia n ministe r wa s told: 'I f w e cannot g o into the Centra l Committee b y the fron t w e are unwilling to use a side o r bac k entrance. ' H e wa s given a quotatio n fro m a lette r b y Cliffor d Clark, the deputy minister of finance: 'We are still trying to run a democracy and there i s some historica l evidence t o support the thesis tha t democracie s cannot b e taxed withou t representation.'33 Although th e diplomats had been wary about saying bluntly that unless Canada got its way it would withhold its relief or act on its own, the politicians were less sensitive. The War Committee told the Canadian ministe r 'tha t it should now be intimated t o the United States, Unite d Kingdom , Sovie t an d Chinese Government s tha t unles s Canada is give n in som e manne r a positio n in the directio n of the Relie f Administration commensurat e wit h the expecte d contributio n o f Canada to international relie f th e Canadia n governmen t wil l find it impossible t o participate in the wor k of the Administration.' 34 King told McCarthy to procee d on the assumptio n that , unles s ther e was some great chang e in conditions , the Canadian governmen t woul d refuse to participate in the Relief Administration if its constitution was not altere d to meet thei r views. He was to tell Dean Acheso n i n th e Stat e Departmen t tha t th e governmen t coul d no t accept his argument that this was an isolated problem. If Acheson wante d to come t o Ottawa as he had proposed, h e would be welcome, no t becaus e any arguments h e coul d us e woul d affec t th e situatio n bu t becaus e i t would be well for hi m t o receive a t first hand th e view s of the Canadia n government . King's insistenc e tha t th e proble m mus t b e faced , no t evaded , an d tha t i t could not b e solved b y expedients reveals a lack of awareness o f the fact s of international life . 'Th e durability of the post-wa r settlement depend s o n its solution. Th e Sovie t Governmen t mus t b e brough t t o se e thi s an d i t i s greatly i n the interes t o f the othe r Unite d Nations that thi s should b e don e soon. No bette r opportunit y seems likely t o arise tha n thi s of impressing o n the larger powers the importance of sharing control of international organizations with the smaller countries.'35 That was a point the Russians fully under stood. At this juncture the British became worried . They could not jeopardize the establishment o f UNRR A ove r thi s issue , howeve r important . Ede n wa s i n Ottawa in April where he talked to the War Committee about the desirability of acceptin g a compromise. H e suggested t o Canadian official s a n exchang e of letter s betwee n Canad a an d th e Unite d State s speakin g o n behal f o f th e big four, confirming the Canadia n understandin g tha t any arrangements fo r the Centra l an d Supplie s Committee s o f the Relie f Organizatio n would not

40 Th e Shapin g of Peace be a preceden t fixin g th e Canadia n relationshi p to othe r postwa r agencies . Norman Robertson , th e undersecretary , wa s sceptical and argue d tha t th e outcome o f som e month s o f prett y stubborn an d contentiou s negotiation s would b e a d e fact o preceden t whic h woul d b e invoke d regardles s o f an y formal reservation s o f th e positio n whic h Canad a an d th e othe r countrie s might have agreed to. Robertson als o told Eden the roo t of the presen t diffi culties lay in the way the Combined Boards had been shaped as agencies of the United Kingdom and the Unite d States rather than of the Unite d Nations. 36 Pearson realized the Russian s were becoming suspicious that the proposa l to expand the committee woul d lead to domination by the Anglo-Saxons for political purposes. External Affairs wa s getting worried. It prepared a memorandum fo r th e Cabine t Wa r Committe e o n 6 Apri l setting ou t th e argu ments for and against accepting the compromise of the four powers, but this time the argument s were loaded i n favou r o f acceptance. They said bluntly that there ha d bee n a possibility of abandonment o f the whole plan because of Russia n opposition but the Russian s had now made a concession t o meet the British-Canadia n position. 'The Canadian objection remains, therefore , the onl y outstandin g problem . It s solutio n shoul d mak e possibl e a n early United Nation s Relie f Conference; failur e t o fin d a solution ma y preven t such a conference. We should, therefore, b e certain tha t this failure canno t fairly be attributable to Canada.' The argument showed some shift of ground, emphasizing the importanc e of the Committee on Supplies which might well become the dominatin g body with a Canadian as chairman. If that were so, the preceden t woul d represent a valid recognition of the functional principle. They note d als o tha t th e Australian s had entere d th e pictur e b y making a plea similar to that of Canada. It was not a plea Canada could easily reject but it wa s perhaps necessar y t o gra b this specia l favour for Canad a befor e th e Australians ha d carrie d the Canadia n argument t o a too logica l conclusion. To assure th e Wa r Committee tha t there ha d been no backin g down, it was argued that the presen t offe r wa s in accord with the representations mad e to the Stat e Department o n 1 0 February in which they had insisted o n 'the ful l participation of Canada' in the directio n of the administration. 37 The Wa r Committe e agree d t o accept th e mai n constitutiona l provision s of th e Relie f Administratio n draf t a s revised, an d th e ambassado r wa s told that 'th e government's agreement ha s in large part been determined by the desire tha t internationa l organizatio n i n thi s fiel d should ge t unde r wa y as soon as possible.' In informing the representatives o f the powers the ambas sador wa s instructed to make it clear that Canadian concurrenc e wa s on th e understanding the y would use their best endeavours to secure the election of a Canadian as chairman of the Committe e o n Supplies and at the same time

41 Th e Wartim e Experienc e 'it shoul d b e understoo d tha t ou r acceptanc e o f th e arrangement s i n th e particular case of the Relie f Administration does not indicate any withdrawal from th e positio n w e have taken tha t the fou r powe r pattern is not in principle a n acceptabl e for m o f international organization, that representation o n international bodie s would , wheneve r possible , b e determine d o n a func tional basis , an d tha t th e propose d for m o f th e Centra l Committee wil l no t be regarded as a precedent i n other connections.' 38 The Canadia n governmen t ha d hope d th e Unite d State s governmen t would assur e the m i n th e nam e o f th e fou r power s that thei r mai n point s were accepted . Wha t the y go t seeme d bette r tha n nothing , bu t i t wa s of dubious value . I t wa s contained i n a letter from Dea n Acheso n t o Pearso n dated 1 2 June, replying to Pearson's letter of 1 3 April. After expressin g th e hope tha t th e informatio n containe d woul d mee t full y th e concer n o f th e Canadian government , h e reporte d tha t h e ha d rea d t o a meetin g o f th e representatives o f the fou r power s Pearson's letter of 8 April: All of those present expressed thei r gratification a t th e willingnes s of the Canadia n Government t o co-operat e wit h th e pla n se t fort h i n th e draf t agreement . A t th e same tim e the y too k cognizance o f th e statemen t tha t Canadia n acceptanc e o f th e proposed plan is based on the followin g points of understanding: a) that the prospective members of the Central Committee will use their best endeavours to secure the selection o f a Canadian a s Chairma n o f the Committe e on Supplies ; b) tha t i n th e view o f th e Canadia n Governmen t th e Four-Powe r patter n i s no t i n principl e a n acceptable for m o f internationa l organization ; c ) tha t i n it s view representatio n o n international bodie s should wheneve r possible b e determined o n a functional basis ; and d ) tha t th e Canadia n Governmen t doe s not regar d th e propose d for m o f th e Central Committee as a precedent in other connections. With regard to the crucial point, d), Acheson stated : 'I believe I can say that there has been nothing in the discussions of the representatives o f the Four Powers t o indicat e tha t an y of these Power s tak e [sic ] the positio n tha t th e form o f organizatio n propose d i n th e draf t agreemen t fo r a Relief an d Re habilitation Administratio n would in any sense set a precedent fo r the form of any other internationa l organization.' 39 The bold attempt to have the func tional principle endorsed ha d been take n cognizanc e of. It might hav e bee n considered risk y t o cour t thu s th e possibl e rejectio n o f th e formula . The procedure followe d presumably did no harm and might have had some effec t on th e Britis h and Americans . Subsequen t polic y of the Russian s i n particular and perhaps also of the American s might, however, justify the conclusion that they took cognizanc e of the principl e in order to be wary of it. 40

42 Th e Shapin g of Peac e The UNRR A case wa s an early example of a technique t o b e used ofte n by Canada, an d especiall y Pearson, i n dealing with th e superpowe r neighbour. You present th e Canadian argument with great vigour, but when you realize that th e America n wil l is going to prevail regardless, the n yo u go for a compromise. Th e compromis e doe s not giv e you everythin g you want and you know yo u wil l b e boun d t o accep t i t becaus e yo u hav e bee n involve d i n formulating it. Still, it is presumably an improvement o n the origina l and the only alternativ e is feckless opposition . As in this case, you do your best to see that the compromis e i s not t o be regarded as a precedent, bu t this exercise i s intended largel y to pu t yo u i n positio n fo r oppositio n agai n the nex t time. Yo u dare no t b e too exasperating. In defending the agreemen t i n the House o f Common s Brook e Claxto n mad e th e oft-quote d statement : 'W e can apply the functional principle too far. We cannot be on every board there is in the world.' 41 The four-powe r draft agreemen t o n th e Relie f Administratio n wa s circulated to all members of the United Nations and, in the light of their criticism, modified t o emphasiz e th e authorit y of th e counci l i n whic h all member s were equally represented. Th e Canadian s wer e encouraged b y the indication that thei r view was shared b y other countries , especiall y those o f intermediate ran k lik e th e Netherland s an d Belgium . There was , however , alway s a slight ambivalence i n the Canadia n championshi p o f the caus e o f the lesse r powers, a s it was a category into which they were not certain they wanted to be absorbed. Th e Dutch and others expressed stron g resentment agains t the unrepresentative characte r o f th e Centra l Committee . Thei r attentio n wa s concentrated, however , o n reducing its powers, as the question o f member ship had been clearly settled. Canad a coul d hardly oppose thes e views of its friends, bu t i t wa s awkward to tak e a public stand agains t a n arrangemen t which Canada had privately secured with the grea t powers. In fact, Canada strengthened th e functional principle more solidly by making a notable contributio n t o the success of the institution as a whole instead of simply using its hard-won voice to defend the Canadian interest. The large contribution i n mone y an d good s wa s a justification of Canada' s righ t t o representation. Alon g with the other lesse r power s Canada found opportuni ties for expression o n the committees, includin g the Committe e o n Europe . Pearson becam e chairma n o f the Committe e o n Supplies and thereafter on e of the mai n architect s of UNRRA . Th e thir d meeting o f the counci l was held in Montreal , and , althoug h h e wa s still a civi l servant, h e wa s chosen t o preside ove r it. UNRRA, whe n established , consiste d o f a Council , t o mee t ever y si x months, on which each member sat , and the Central Committee mad e up of

43 Th e Wartime Experience the fou r great powers exclusively. In theory at least the Centra l Committee, which controlle d polic y betwee n sessions , ha d t o hav e it s decision s con firmed b y the Council . UNRRA, however, had to act fast. There was a Committee o n Supplie s of twelve countries including , besides th e great powers, countries tha t woul d properl y be chose n o n functiona l grounds : Australia, Belgium, Brazil, India, Holland, and New Zealand, wit h Canada in the chair. There were regional committees for both th e Fa r East an d Europ e presided over b y representative s o f Chin a an d Britain , respectively. Th e director general, needles s t o say , wa s American - first Herbert Lehma n an d then Fiorello LaGuardia. Each member stat e which had not been invade d agree d to pay 1 per cent o f its national income, a t least 1 0 per cent of which should be convertible. The Canadia n government ha d little difficulty gettin g approval in April 1944 for its contribution of $77 million. Canada paid up punctually t o a tota l amoun t o f $15 4 million , third i n siz e t o tha t o f th e Unite d States an d th e Unite d Kingdom . I t should b e noted, however , tha t UNRR A spent $25 4 million in Canada for agricultural and industrial supplies. There wa s some pric e paid for th e waterin g down of the authorit y of th e major powers . While the wa r was on the Britis h and Americans stressed th e authority of the wartim e machinery of the Combine d Board s rather than of the UNRR A Committee o n Supplies. Not lon g after th e en d o f the war , however, the y moved towards the dissolutio n o f UNRRA and the continuation of relief on a bilateral basis. As far as the American s were concerned, i t was the difficulty o f sharin g authority with th e Sovie t Unio n rather tha n th e lesse r powers which by this time mattered most. Nevertheless, the y were not at all used t o multilateral control of their funds. In appropriating its second contribution t o UNRRA , Congres s specifie d tha t th e Centra l Committe e rathe r than th e Counci l shoul d b e responsibl e fo r approvin g the financial allocations to specifi c countries . For thi s and othe r reason s the Committe e on Supplies did not achieve th e authority Canadians hoped for at the tim e of the compromise. A s chairma n o f thi s committe e Pearso n attende d onl y some seven o f the sixtee n meeting s o f the Centra l Committee. Nevertheless , h e was, b y sheer ability , a decisive forc e in UNRRA . The fac t tha t influence was more closely related t o persona l ability than formal statu s was being proved also by other Canadian s i n these formative years of UN bodies. I t permitted a somewhat more flexible stance on the functiona l principle. After th e Sa n Francisc o Conferenc e an d th e acceptanc e o f Franc e a s a great power , i t wa s agree d tha t Franc e woul d hav e t o b e o n th e Centra l Committee. I t was tactfully decide d t o use th e occasio n t o admit Canada a s well - i n August 1945 . The Russians had seconded the United States resolu tion to admit Franc e an d Canada, bu t they opposed a n Australian resolution

44 Th e Shapin g of Peac e that woul d hav e admitte d thre e furthe r countries , Australia , Brazil , an d Yugoslavia. Canada expressed sympath y with the Australian proposal but did not go so far as to resign as chairman of the Committe e o n Supplies to make way for a n Australian. There was during the creatio n o f internationa l institutions a curious allyrival relationshi p between Canad a an d Australia . Canadians recognize d th e Australians as valuable allies in the struggl e for th e right s of middle powers , especially a s th e Australia n style wa s less inhibited . O n th e Canadia n sid e there was great respect for the tough Aussies and a close personal association with an extremely able group of Australian diplomats and negotiators. There developed a collaboratio n i n internationa l organization s s o habitua l it wa s taken for granted b y the 1950s . Th e Austalian s were less subtle an d perhaps less far-sighted than th e Canadian s i n thei r searc h fo r independenc e an d a role, but they were also less preoccupied with status as an end in itself. Having a voice in the grand strategy of the war was a luxury that Canadians could forgo, provide d the y had a decent opportunit y to protec t th e specifi c inter ests o f Canadia n force s an d Canadia n supplies . Fo r th e Australians , how ever, it was a life-and-death matte r to see that adequate forces were allocated to their exposed an d lonely front. The y needed a say in the directio n o f the war, and they demanded i t without having time t o worry about th e commitments involve d i n theor y to a common empir e polic y o r a United Nation s security scheme controlled b y the great powers. At San Francisco an d at th e Paris Peac e Conferenc e th e redoubtabl e Herber t Evat t hollere d hi s way to some considerabl e influenc e on th e decision s o f th e tim e whil e Canadians were gaining their reputation for moderation and mediation. There was more difference i n temperamen t tha n i n policy , a situation which often mad e fo r good team work. When i t cam e t o refugees , Canada' s zea l fo r statu s wa s considerabl y tempered b y the government's hesitatio n to stick its neck out. Although the International Refuge e Organization was not set up until after th e war, it was, like UNRRA , linke d t o th e wa r an d transitional . Th e politica l issue s mad e collaboration betwee n Eas t an d Wes t eve n mor e difficult . Canad a wa s less enthusiastic abou t a place of honour because its policy on accepting refugees was hardly straightforward. Nevertheless, Canadia n officials di d play a useful role an d Canad a wa s o n th e Executiv e Committe e o f Nin e becaus e i t was wanted there and could not decently escape th e responsibility. 42 THE UNITE D STATE S AN D TH E UNITE D NATION S

Plans wer e bein g lai d als o durin g the wa r for permanen t internationa l eco nomic an d socia l institution s t o cop e wit h th e problem s o f peacetime .

45 Th e Wartime Experienc e Although i t wa s hope d t o exploi t the sens e o f wartim e unity t o ge t the m launched, the gulf between communist and non-communist assumptions on economic an d socia l policie s was too great . The agencie s evolve d largel y as instrumentalities of the non-communist world - not just the Western world. Without th e intimidatin g requirement o f great-power unity, and wit h Canada's considerabl e resources , Canadia n delegation s di d quit e well i n these enterprises. The rol e o f the Unite d State s in the Unite d Nations was a problem. Th e enormous militar y and economic power of the United States and its remoteness fro m th e fron t mad e a dominant position inescapable. American sponsorship wa s welcome d b y thos e wh o feare d America n isolationis m mor e than America n 'imperialism, ' bu t th e proprietar y stance, accompanie d b y assumptions o f mora l superiority , rouse d som e fea r an d resentmen t i n Europe an d also in Canada. To othe r countrie s th e Unite d State s attitud e to the internationa l bodie s being set u p a s th e Unite d Nation s often looke d officious , bu t American s tended t o se e thei r willingnes s to ac t throug h internationa l bodies , rathe r than entirely on thei r own, as a concession t o internationalism, a gesture of good intentions . Thi s wa s particularly tru e o f both the Ho t Springs Conference o n Food and UNRRA , i n which American resources wer e predominant. Roosevelt ha d been itchin g to take ove r the runnin g of the gran d coalition. In the administratio n of UNRR A and late r IR Q Americans largely did run the show, with American methods, an d little doubt in Washington that that was right an d natural . Th e Britis h an d othe r allie s were s o preoccupie d b y and exhausted wit h survival tha t ther e wa s some compensatio n i n havin g th e powerful American s mov e i n and assume burdens . Canadians resented th e American positions becaus e they thought their per capita contribution was at least as high as that of the Unite d States. O n the othe r hand they had strong reasons fo r satisfaction in seeing the Americans entwined in world organization - no t sufficiently, however , to let the Americans get away with assumptions abou t thei r uniqu e mission a s God's temporal power on earth . Whe n Roosevelt tol d Kin g i n privat e ho w h e ha d though t u p th e ter m 'Unite d Nations' i n discussion wit h Churchill, King reported i n his dairy: 'The President mentione d i t wa s lik e adoptin g th e ide a o f Seeley' s Expansio n o f England. This was the expansion o f the United States. The United States had grown int o th e Unite d Nations , etc. ' Kin g commented tha t 'Th e prid e of authorship is one o f the stronges t of temptations of most men ...' 43 The firs t Unite d Nation s conference , tha t at Ho t Spring s in 1943 , ha d as chairman a Texas Democrat wh o tried, as Lester Pearson noted , 't o combine the Congres s o f Vienn a wit h a Rotar y meeting.' 'W e opene d wit h a silen t prayer an d ende d b y singing, no t "Hai l t o th e Unite d Nations, " bu t th e

46 Th e Shapin g of Peace "Star Spangled Banner."544 As for UNRRA , Congress scrutinized its activities possessively. Congressme n calle d it s personnel offic e seekin g jobs fo r con stituents an d treate d i t a s a n America n agency. 45 Fo r Ho t Springs , UNRRA , and i n the origina l establishment o f the Unite d Nations th e American s gra ciously consulted th e othe r great powers, includin g China, a great power by American decree , an d the n eve n mor e graciousl y let the other s know what was to be done. By 1945, however, thanks to the resistance of Canadians and Australians as much as any, they had a somewhat better perspectiv e o f th e star-spangled role than the y had held at the dawn' s earl y light. Unshakable , however, wa s that messiani c convictio n tha t th e sacre d principle s o f 177 6 were the way, the truth , and the ligh t and destined, on e day, to be carried to all mankind . Thos e recalcitran t Northern peopl e whos e histor y had bee n a superhuman effor t t o contain that manifest destiny were quick to resent the message. A t the same time, if one could swallow the moral arrogance, ther e was a goo d dea l t o b e sai d fo r democrac y American-style . It wa s certainly preferable t o what the German s an d Russian s wer e peddling . Th e messag e about freein g th e channel s o f trade , whic h th e American s regarde d a s essential t o God' s pla n an d ha d installe d a s Articl e vu o f al l Lend-Leas e agreements, wa s a n aspec t o f th e Gospe l wit h whic h Canadians generall y agreed - eve n i f they regarded the Americans as late converts. 46 At this stage there were some differences between th e Britis h and Americans o n the approac h to shaping a postwar world order to which all the allies were no w firml y committe d i n principle , and whic h their sufferin g citizen s were determine d t o hav e i n plac e o f wa r and depression . Th e Britis h preferred a n orderl y timetabl e an d a unifor m pla n wherea s th e American s seemed t o wan t a d ho c meeting s an d conferences . Th e effor t t o ge t allied agreement on postwar arrangements was plagued by the sensitivity of American official s t o Congressional prejudices. Congress wa s assumed, with justification, t o b e i-;eptica l o f scheme s tha t woul d lea d th e Unite d State s int o interminable obligation s t o sustai n European s an d th e world a t large . Between Unite d State s official s an d thos e i n othe r countrie s ther e wer e n o major disagreements , althoug h the former did not wish to risk everything by frightening Congress . Canadian , British , and othe r official s recognize d thi s as a genuin e risk . I n thei r ow n long-rang e interes t the y were , therefore , susceptible t o th e America n argument , althoug h i t weakened thei r positio n in the dialogue . The American preferenc e for ad hoc conferences, a s Ottawa saw it, wa s based no t o n theory bu t o n the anxiet y to avoid publicit y which could set of f adverse Congressional reactions. The administratio n was trying to lea d th e Unite d State s int o internationalis m withou t Congres s realizin g quite wha t wa s happening , an d i n thi s ai m the y ha d th e collaboratio n o f friends i n London an d Ottawa.

47 Th e Wartime Experience In Ottaw a ther e wa s a somewhat simila r fear o f provokin g the ol d isolationism i n the cabinet, and official s wer e shrewdly sensitive t o King's preju dices. Mackenzi e King was in full charge, however. He might not fully gras p the long-rang e implication s o f th e proposal s bein g pu t forwar d b y the offi cials, bu t the y wer e careful t o seek hi s approval. It was he, of course , wh o preferred not to confuse parliamen t or the publi c by provoking public debate on foreig n policy. The nee d fo r broa d publi c acceptance o f internationalis m was more ofte n mentione d i n External Affair s memoranda . Th e functional ist crusade, however , serve d domesti c purposes . Cabine t wa s led into firm internationalist commitment s becaus e o f its determinatio n t o assure Cana dian status, without always pausing to calculate whether it really wanted to be deeply involve d a t all . I n thi s formativ e yea r o f 194 3 th e minister s wer e insistent that Canada mus t get justice, a seat at the table. Kin g and the cabinet regarde d External Affair s as too flexible over the UNRR A issue. A change was taking place in the Canadian claim as seen by staunch nationalists - fro m the right not to be committed b y the great powers to the right to sit with the powers. Althoug h American an d Canadian parliamentarians shared som e of the sam e hesitation s abou t committin g themselve s t o a quarrelsom e an d poverty-stricken world , the y wer e a t cros s purposes . America n official s sought t o assure Congress tha t in the postwa r institutions th e Unite d State s could ru n th e sho w o r at least no t hav e t o submi t t o th e wil l o f foreigners. That was the kind of institution Canadian politician s and officials wer e determined t o resist . An d ye t everyon e i n Ottaw a believe d that , withou t th e willing participatio n of Congres s thi s time , ther e wa s going t o b e no brav e new world . Canad a certainl y wa s no t goin g t o pa y for i t withou t a Unite d States contribution . Robertson , Wrong , Pearson , an d King , fro m hi s per spective, di d not lik e or defend thi s American ambivalence bu t the y recognized it as a fact o f life t o b e lived with. HOT SPRING S

In the sprin g of 194 3 Canadians wer e more incline d to the orderl y approach favoured b y the British. They had an additional reason. The y wanted the new structures t o arise from th e authority of the Unite d Nations as a whole, no t to be products o f Anglo-American wartime arrangements o r four-power prescriptions. They recognized, however , in the interest o f orderly progress, th e desirability of the fou r powers doing a certain amount of steering and initiating, a s wel l a s explorin g th e limit s o f East-Wes t collaboration . Th e great powers were going to do this anyway, of course. Th e Canadian approac h on the eve of the Hot Springs gathering was set out in a memorandum o f Hume Wrong's o f 1 9 March 194 3 which reflected also the view s of Robertson an d

48 Th e Shapin g of Peac e W.A. Mackintos h o f th e Departmen t o f Finance , an d wa s show n t o th e prime minister : I think that the tidies t way of dealing wit h th e presen t situatio n would be to hold as soon a s possible a full-dress conference of the Unite d Nations with an agenda mainly restricted to the establishment of methods of postwar planning. There shoul d first be a measure of preliminary agreement betwee n the chief participants on what ought to result. The conference might set up a series of bodies of experts to prepare draft plans in particula r fields, applying the functiona l principle to their composition. The occa sion migh t also b e use d fo r th e forma l adoption o f som e genera l declaration s o f purpose, perhaps embodying the economic principle s in Article 7 of the Lend-Leas e Agreement whic h wer e reflecte d i n ou r ow n exchang e o f note s wit h th e Unite d States las t November . I n thi s way a mandate could b e given b y the Unite d Nation s for a programme of international collaboration of a flexible character, and w e should avoid what I feel would otherwise be the case - a series of disputes lik e that over the Relief Administration about what countries are to be represented o n each body.

The best position to assume, Wrong recommended, wa s that 'the concept of the Unite d Nation s shoul d b e embodied i n some institutiona l form, repre sentation o n agencie s shoul d b e extended fro m th e fou r power s t o includ e those which have th e chie f contributio n to make. ' A n early agreement wa s desirable to avoid dispute s about the for m o f international co-operation an d this might best be obtained b y holding a UN conference charged wit h setting up exper t bodies . 'I f thi s method , however , i s not acceptabl e t o th e large r powers, it would not b e in our interes t t o press fo r its adoption.' Wrong was not inclined to waste strength an d credit butting against ston e walls. 47 The orderly approach was not to be. Although the Britis h and Americans , and t o a privileged extent Canadians , ha d been engrosse d fo r some time in talks on the expert level about the new bodies to be set up, particularly in the area o f relief, food, money , an d commerce, th e Unite d States State Depart ment wa s favourin g a genera l internationa l economi c conference . Befor e such planning had gone very far Roosevelt, withou t even consultin g his own secretary of state le t alone th e British , Russians, an d Chinese, announced in February 194 3 tha t a United Nation s conferenc e woul d be hel d i n April to consider long-ter m foo d problems . H e had sensed that it was time t o mak e clear to the world that the Unite d Nations wa s moving from word s to action. The purpos e wa s mor e declarator y tha n definitiv e - a gal a performanc e rather tha n a committe e meeting . H e wa s not wron g i n this , bu t h e wa s operating o n a differen t wav e length fro m th e bureaucrac y wh o wanted t o get some clearl y defined plans in motion. H e and his wife had become inter -

49 Th e Wartime Experienc e ested i n a proposa l fo r a 'Unite d Nation s Programm e fo r Freedo m fro m Want o f Food ' draw n u p b y Fran k McDougall , a n Australian , wit h Cana dian, British , and America n collaborators . H e kne w that th e increase d pro duction o f foo d wa s a them e whic h woul d rous e th e leas t controversia l support for United Nations action. The British and Russians were not happy, and the American experts had to improvise quickly. The meeting was put off until 1 8 May to allow for preparation , but n o country wanted to oppose it. It was an America n production . O n hi s own , Roosevel t invite d the non-belligerent America n republics , thereb y setting a precedent. Agains t the wis h of the Europeans bu t out of concern for Congressional reaction he insisted tha t the agend a b e the long-rang e issues and not includ e the plans for relief now under vigorou s discussio n amon g th e allies . There was considerable uncer tainty i n advance , a s Pearson commented : 'W e kne w onl y that it was to b e organized and run by the United States, who would choose the chairman and the secretariat an d draw up the agenda.' 48 This kind of conference di d not raise for Canada the acute questions posed by th e plan s for a Relief Agency . Everyone wa s welcome at th e party . Offi cials ha d bee n doin g thei r preparator y work i n Ottaw a o n foo d a s wel l a s financial issues , an d postwa r foo d suppl y was a subject o f enormou s com mercial concer n t o Canada . A stron g Canadian delegatio n wa s sent t o Ho t Springs and membership was secured o n the steering committee. Of greatest consequence fo r Canada wa s probably the fac t that Lester Pearson , who was at tha t tim e a caree r civi l servan t wit h the no t particularl y exalte d ran k of minister-counsellor i n th e Canadia n embassy i n Washington , wa s o n th e delegation an d ver y helpfu l i n th e steering . Alway s aware o f th e nee d fo r inspiration i n internationa l politics, he personall y proposed t o some friends that th e conferenc e shoul d issu e ' a short , non-technica l bu t inspirationa l declaration o n th e determinatio n o f th e Unite d Nation s t o dea l wit h th e problems o f hunger and malnutrition once the war was over; something that would be valuable not only now in the politica l warfare that was being waged against the Nazi s and their allies, but might help also to convince opinio n in all countries that, this time, internationa l co-operation and action would not fail afte r victor y was won.'49 In th e en d h e was asked t o draft th e statement. The conferenc e conclude d wit h a ringing declaration that the wa r against hunger could b e won, an d in the spiri t of the time s linked this struggle with the defea t o f aggression an d maintenanc e o f international security regarded as essential condition s fo r th e tremendou s expansio n o f productio n envis aged. There was no fear of over-production, an d the North Americans got in their stron g word s abou t removin g barrier s t o trade . 'I n n o mor e succinc t way coul d th e popula r phrase-"i f w e ca n d o i t i n wa r w e ca n d o i t i n

50 Th e Shapin g of Peac e peace"-find expression,' 50 wa s th e commen t o f th e Winnipeg Free Press correspondent, Gran t Dexter , wh o wel l reflecte d influentia l Canadia n atti tudes. No great significance would have been attache d t o the findings if the delegates ha d been 'theoretica l folk, soft-heade d and big-hearted, lackin g ... in knowledg e o f th e busines s o f producing , distributing , and sellin g food stuffs,' h e said , bu t the y happened t o represent government s an d include d experts from every phase of the food industry . Unlike previous international agricultural conference s thi s wa s not concerne d onl y wit h th e producers ' interest. 'Th e Ho t Spring s conferenc e approache d th e foo d proble m fro m the standpoin t o f wha t i s require d t o fee d th e peopl e o f thi s world. Th e approach wa s wholl y th e approac h o f th e consumer. ' Tha t ma y no t hav e been quit e th e assumptio n o f Jimmy Gardiner, th e ministe r o f agriculture. Dexter wa s a large-hearted internationalist, as well as a voice from the wheat country. His was the prevailing mood. Of great importance to the administrators was the setting up at Hot Springs of an Interi m Commissio n t o pla n th e permanen t internationa l food body . Pearson became th e chairma n o f this commission . I n spite of his junior sta tus, hi s extraordinary capacity for reconciling contrary views in apt formulas, his geniality under stress, his tactical skill, and his inoffensive idealis m were being recognized . H e wa s exactly the kin d o f person needed , an d h e cam e from th e country best designed no t only to propose compromises bu t to be a compromise. Shortl y afterwards he wa s chosen fo r a critical role i n UNRR A and hi s nam e croppe d u p wheneve r candidate s fo r U N office wer e bein g considered. Hi s personal contribution to the acquisitio n of status b y Canada in the Unite d Nation s wa s that he was more concerned wit h the job in han d than th e statu s o f th e Canadia n representatives , thereb y doin g far more t o raise th e latte r tha n thos e mor e intereste d i n form tha n substance. H e was not appointed to jobs just because the great powers wearily concluded i t was best t o appoint one of the Canadians to shut the m up . Pearson ha d expecte d tha t th e prim e ministe r woul d resis t hi s appointment, bu t such was the zeal in Ottawa for a foot in the door that King agreed. In spit e o f hi s heav y diplomati c loa d a s N o 2 ma n i n th e Washingto n embassy and , afte r Januar y 1945 , a s ambassador himself , Pearso n worke d diligently and effectivel y wit h the commission an d it s Executive Committe e to prepar e th e require d plans . I n Augus t 194 4 a constitution wa s propose d which mad e clea r that th e agenc y would be advisory an d fact-finding rathe r than 'administrative, ' dependin g o n th e co-operatio n o f membe r govern ments served b y national committees. I t was not unti l 16 October 194 5 that the Interi m Commissio n coul d b e dissolved an d the new Food an d Agriculture Organization set up at a meeting i n Quebec City , with Pearson a s chair-

51 Th e Wartim e Experienc e man, a n unusual appointment for a mere diplomat. He had also been presse d to b e th e firs t director-genera l o f th e FA O bu t h e di d no t wan t to leav e th e Canadian service an d though t the pos t should go to Sir John Boyd-Orr , who was a scientis t an d ha d don e mor e tha n anyon e els e t o rous e publi c and official interes t i n practical means o f coping with hunger.51 In spite of this satisfactory Canadian role, parliamentary approval of membership ran into some political difficulty. The problem was not that the Conservatives or CCF opposed Canadia n participatio n in international organization, but the y wer e concerne d ove r th e exten t t o whic h the implementatio n of FAO recommendation s woul d b e lef t i n th e hand s o f officials . Th e govern ment me t th e criticis m with some redrafting. It was inevitably the responsi bility o f official s i n al l countrie s t o la y th e foundation s o f th e ne w worl d order i n wartime , an d the y di d s o wit h zea l an d imagination . They wer e tempted t o circumven t i f possible th e lumberin g politica l process. Expert s had a tendency t o favour the rol e of experts i n international bodies, knowl edgeable peopl e who would know their business and not pla y politics. There was pressure withi n the FA O secretaria t t o strengthen it s authority, but th e politicians were reasserting themselve s afte r the special demands o f wartime. They had , b y and large , accepte d th e ide a o f international institutions, bu t they di d no t wan t a n internationa l bureaucrac y working through nationa l bureaucracies t o pre-emp t thei r authority . The FA O debat e i n Ottawa , just before th e organization' s Quebe c Conferenc e an d two months after th e end of hostilities , illustrate d clearl y the difficultie s i n stor e i f any o f th e mor e orderly scheme s fo r 'internationa l government ' tha t ha d looke d goo d i n 1943 had been implemented - eve n i n a body like FAO in which the Russians did not take part. Canadians could not complain, however , that they had not been give n due recognition in FAO. The meetin g in Quebec wa s a calculated gesture, an d not only Pearson bu t th e Canadia n specialists , in particular Dr G.H. Barton, deputy minister o f agriculture, had bee n dul y influential. A seat wa s obtaine d on the Executive Committee, t o which the government sent a broadly-based delegation, heade d b y J.G. Gardiner , wh o was politically if not intellectually powerful, and included experts from the Departments of Agriculture, Fisheries, Mine s and Resources , Nationa l Healt h and Welfare , Trad e and Com merce, Externa l Affairs , an d also , a s associates o r advisers, representative s of suc h bodie s a s th e Canadia n Federatio n o f Agriculture , th e Fisherie s Council o f Canada, an d o f the pulp , paper, and lumbe r industries . Th e siz e and qualit y of the delegatio n wer e an earnes t o f the government' s commit ment t o the cause of an international agricultura l agency in particular and to that o f specialize d agencie s i n principle . This kin d of internationa l exercis e

52 Th e Shapin g of Peac e was not t o b e lef t t o diplomats , although they had their function as negotiators, but would involve specialists inside and outside government and , it was hoped, create a community of those wh o would pursue goals beyond sover eignty an d ac t non-politically . A t th e sam e time , o f course, th e delegatio n reflected th e expectation that , as Canada's staple s were involved, there were commercial interests t o be advanced o r protected. BRETTON WOOD S

There wer e six legs to the world monetary stool, according to Clifford Clark; 'All si x legs ar e necessary i f the stoo l i s to stand up. ' These were collective security t o en d fear , multilatera l trade, stabilit y o f exchang e rates , willing ness o f credito r countrie s t o accep t import s i n paymen t o r inves t abroad , freedom fro m wid e fluctuation s i n the pric e of raw materials, and policies of full employmen t i n each country. 52 That view is constantly repeated i n Canadian memoranda an d statements, a view shared by many international financial experts . Perhap s th e mos t professiona l plannin g being don e i n Ottawa was o n postwa r financia l arrangements , bu t th e ministe r o f financ e con stantly reiterated that thes e arrangements coul d not succeed b y themselves . Canadian official s share d wit h counterparts i n other allie d counries th e con viction that 'ful l employment, ' which was everyone's state d goal , depende d on both the establishment of international mechanisms to assure the stability of currencies and avoid the autarkical habits which had stagnated economie s in the thirtie s and on some kin d of lending provisions to tide countries ove r the difficul t period s whe n they were tempted t o put up the barriers . Because o f the widel y recognized dependenc e o f Canada o n internationa l commerce, Canadia n official s ha d less difficult y wit h the prejudice s of their legislatures than ha d those in Washington an d London. Wherea s th e United States Congres s wa s wary o f effort s b y the Britis h and other s t o drai n gol d and credit from them , i n London ther e wer e fears that, in the debtor's position they faced at the end of the war, they would be hamstrung by an institution designe d b y the chief creditor. Fortunatel y the leadin g politica l figures, preoccupied wit h gran d strategy , agree d i n principl e tha t economi c multi lateralism wa s the essential counterpar t of a multilateral security system, an d they blessed the effort s o f an extraordinarily wise and able group of financial experts. Thes e expert s thrashe d ou t plan s fo r th e Internationa l Monetar y Fund an d th e Internationa l Ban k fo r Reconstructio n an d Developmen t which may well have bee n the mos t revolutionar y aspects o f the ne w shape of peace. With much talk several decades late r of 'the collapse of the Bretto n Woods scheme ' an d th e inadequacie s o f th e ban k an d fund , i t i s har d t o

53 Th e Wartime Experience realize ho w revolutionar y it was . I t wasn' t th e mechanism s themselves ; i t was the acceptance of international collaboration - no w taken for granted to such a n extent tha t its novelty in the fortie s is no longer apparent. Looking back some twenty-five years later, one of the principa l Canadian architects of the bank and fund, Loui s Rasminsky, commented : One o f th e result s o f the establishmen t o f th e Fun d tha t ha s no t receive d enoug h emphasis i s the grea t increas e i n internationa l consultation and collaboration . Thi s seems so obvious that it may seem jejune even to mention it, but to those of us who saw what international co-operation i n these matter s was before the wa r the differ ence i s dramatic ... Before th e war , there wa s great diffidence abou t discussing anybody's domestic economic policies or the impac t of those policies on other countries' positions, and discussio n tended to be focuse d exclusivel y on 'external ' economi c policy such a s tariff barrier s ... If one contrast s tha t with th e frequenc y an d intimac y of th e discussion s whic h no w tak e plac e on th e boar d o f th e Fun d an d i n othe r forums on e becomes awar e of a very major achievement. 53

One should mention also the bouleversement implied in what may also seem obvious a generatio n later , th e acceptanc e b y credito r countrie s o f joint responsibility wit h debto r countrie s t o correc t a disequilibriu m o f payments - a reversal of traditional assumptions comparabl e with the acceptance a decade o r so later of the strategic argument that it is in the interest of a nuclea r powe r that it s antagonis t shoul d fee l secur e o f it s capacit y for a second strike . 'The Internationa l Monetar y Fun d an d th e Internationa l Ban k were th e product o f English and America n brains, with valuable assistance fro m th e Canadians.' Tha t wa s the judgment o f Si r Roy Harrod, a British economist close to the scene at the time. 54 'The Canadians,' he said, 'were keen that the British an d American s shoul d thin k alike on post-wa r topics; i n these talks and throughou t th e subsequen t negotiation s th e Canadian s continue d t o make valuable contributions. They were represented on successive occasion s by abl e men , includin g Messrs. Rasminsky , Towers , Macintos h [sic ] an d Pearson. Almos t alone , outsid e th e rank s o f Britis h and Americans , th e Canadians seeme d capable of understanding the international monetary problem as a whole. Their suggestions were intelligent and constructive, and the British and American s were always anxious t o have them.' 55 With that kind of input the struggl e for a voice did not hav e to be loud and formal . It wa s no t jus t th e old-fashione d nationalist s i n Britai n an d th e Unite d States abou t who m Canada ha d to be concerned. Ther e wer e those in both countries wh o sa w the futur e i n bilateral terms. In the Unite d State s ther e

54 Th e Shapin g of Peac e were supporter s o f th e 'ke y currency ' approac h whic h envisaged n o mor e than a special relationship between the dollar and sterling, with the countries of the worl d grouped roun d on e o r the other . Th e Britis h were attracted t o this partnership , partl y becaus e i t woul d b e mor e efficien t an d partly , n o doubt, because the y were desperately clinging to the status which came from association wit h th e ne w giant . Keynes' s origina l draft propose d 'tha t th e Currency Unio n shoul d b e founde d b y th e Unite d State s an d th e Unite d Kingdom, whic h woul d b e designate d Founde r State s an d give n a specia l position.' However , th e American s too k th e positio n tha t th e arrangemen t must be fully internationa l with no special status for Britain. 56 It need not be assumed tha t the American s thereby displayed an enthusiasm fo r multilateralism a s the alternativ e of bilateralism. Their preferenc e migh t unkindly be described a s unilateralism - o r rathe r multilateralis m managed b y a singl e rather tha n a twin leadership . The ke y currency idea was described b y Rasminsky as 'the monetary counterpart of the Grea t Powe r doctrine o f international organization generally.' 57 Although the extent to which the American and British officials worked to a common ai m was remarkable, there were stormy sessions. American offi cials were conscious o f the insistenc e o f Congress tha t the Unite d State s b e in th e driver' s seat . The y were New Dealers an d the y had their ow n itch to run th e sho w in everybody' s interest , a s well a s tha t endemi c suspicio n of the Britis h empir e a s someho w a n obstacl e t o thei r on e worl d theme 'theological convictions' abou t empire preferences, W.A. Mackintosh called them. Th e Britis h knew how dependent the y were, and they were seriousl y concerned les t th e grea t credito r fai l t o realiz e the specia l needs o f debto r countries before the ne w world was functioning. It was a situation mad e fo r the middl e man . Th e Canadia n positio n a s a large exporter eager fo r unre stricted trad e t o star t wa s closer t o tha t o f the Unite d States . Bu t Canada' s economic relation s with Britain, through trade and investment , wer e closer than thos e o f the Unite d State s and i t had, perhaps , a livelier awareness of the tim e an d effor t tha t would be required t o get the Britis h economy bac k on its feet. Personally the Canadia n economists ha d close and good relation s with bot h th e Britis h and America n officials , whic h meant tha t ther e wa s a good dea l of informal exchange o f views in London an d Washingto n befor e formal talk s were initiated with 'th e allies.' One servic e the y could perfor m was to translate fo r the Cambridg e graduates the econo-bureaucrati c jargo n now infestin g Washingto n lik e th e po x - a ling o whic h Keynes , th e old Bloomsburian, called 'Cherokee. ' To begi n wit h ther e wer e tw o plans , a 'Clearin g Union ' wit h a n inter national currency, designed b y J.M. Keynes and his British associates, and an

55 Th e Wartim e Experience international fund , propose d b y Harr y White of the Unite d States Treasury and hi s associates , t o whic h members woul d subscrib e gol d an d thei r own currencies. Keynes' s proposa l was shown to Canadians i n the sprin g of 1942. Then, shortl y after th e Britis h an d America n officials ha d started lookin g at each other's plans, Keynes's idea s were discussed i n London wit h dominions representatives i n October 1942 . It was in connection with this meeting that Harrod particularl y praise d th e Canadia n contribution, and Rasminsk y later recalled i t a s 'th e hig h spo t intellectuall y in th e discussion s tha t precede d Bretton Woods.' 58 Canadians ha d been anxiou s about the wa y Britain would move afte r th e wa r an d the y wer e elate d b y Keynes' s sponsorshi p o f th e multilateral approach because of his prestige at home and abroad. They were greatly imprese d b y the desig n o f the Clearin g Unio n bu t concerne d a t th e way th e Unite d State s Congres s woul d view it, largel y becaus e o f the appa rently unlimited liabilit y o f creditor countries, of which Canada was likely to be one o f two. They also saw the White plan, which White gave to Plumptre of the Canadia n embassy o n a personal basis in November 1942 . It originally went much further i n providing for supranational controls, allowing the fund not onl y t o fi x th e initia l exchang e rate s bu t even t o requir e countries t o change their exchange rates . Congres s woul d never hav e accepted that with its eyes open, an d in the end the fun d an d particularly the bank turned out to be much les s supranationa l than the America n planners had at first fancied. Paradoxically it was the American s throughout wh o favoured institutions with managerial powers and the Britis h and Canadians wh o thought of them as frameworks of agreed rule s within which countries would act. As Harrod commented: 'Th e American s ar e i n th e habi t o f praisin g private initiative and inveighin g agains t paternalisti c socialism... Yet, whe n th e American s turn thei r eye s awa y from thei r ow n rights under th e Constitutio n toward s the internationa l sphere, i t is they who have recently tended t o be the chief advocates o f paternalism.' 59 Th e Americans , o f course , fel t the y ha d th e power an d competenc e t o manag e th e worl d for it s own goo d becaus e th e American interes t coincide d wit h tha t o f mankind . Canadian s woul d pro bably have conceded tha t in this the American s were about half right. The Canadian s produce d and publishe d their own plan, which would probably hav e bee n labelle d a compromise eve n i f it had no t been. 60 It wa s an effort t o find ways and mean s o f reconciling Keynes and Whit e and pushing both i n certain directions . Th e Britis h were disappointed that the Canadians did not come out for the Clearin g Union. Canada proposed a fund o f a larger original amoun t tha n Whit e ha d envisage d an d wit h powe r t o increas e it s resources by borrowing from it s members - a provision tha t foreshadowe d the adoption by the fun d o f the General Arrangement s t o Borrow in 1958. It

56 Th e Shapin g of Peace also challenge d th e extensiv e vet o powe r th e American s wer e claiming . It was close r t o th e Britis h view on th e siz e o f th e fun d whil e avoidin g th e virtually unlimited commitment o f creditor countries inheren t in the Clear ing Union proposal. I t allowed for immediat e withdrawal from th e fun d i f a country wished to do so, thereby covering the fear o f those who argued that membership involve d a complete surrende r o f national sovereignty. Harry Whit e tol d Cliffor d Clar k it was all to th e goo d tha t th e Canadia n proposal had been made public. 'It will unquestionably be widely read in this country an d i t wil l contribut e t o th e interes t o f ou r peopl e i n th e variou s proposals fo r internationa l monetar y cooperation.' 61 Expert s fro m som e of the allied countries were also producing their own views, and i n April 1944 , after a series of meetings culminating in a gathering of delegates from thirty countries at Atlantic City, there was published a 'Joint Statement b y Experts on the Establishmen t o f an International Monetary Fund' which formed the basic workin g document o f th e Bretto n Wood s Conference . Althoug h th e subject wa s abstruse an d th e expert s naturall y dominated th e discussion , there was less secrecy about the debat e than there was for most international projects of these times. There wa s so much revision and negotiation and honest intellectua l groping in this process tha t it would be hard and also foolish to say just what was Canadian tha t cam e ou t i n th e end . Th e vie w expressed i n th e Ne w York Times tha t the final agreement mos t closely resembled th e Canadian plan is understandably the opinion cited in Canadian versions. Rasminsky , who contributed as much as anyone, ha s commented modestly : 'Havin g in mind the real distributio n o f economi c powe r a t th e time , m y overal l impressio n i s that the American s move d a very great distance , tha t the y did not exploi t that powe r in determining the final version at Bretton Woods. The y went a very great distance towards meeting the British view. I would naturally like to think tha t Canadian s playe d som e par t i n that . I d o no t honestl y kno w whether w e di d o r not.' 62 W.A . Mackintosh' s judgmen t was : 'Ther e wer e many points in the International Monetar y Agreement a t which the Canadians, particularl y Mr Rasminsky , mad e importan t an d clarifyin g contribu tions. I n successiv e preliminar y discussions w e probabl y ha d considerabl e effect i n converting the Britis h to a multilateral approach ... On the view s of United State s official s concerning th e Britis h preferenc e w e ha d at leas t a n eroding effect , s o tha t preferentia l tariffs becam e subject s fo r negotiatio n and not illega l weapons to be given up at the door.' 63 Rasminsky playe d an important part in preparing the ground by publishing in the Jul y 1944 issue o f the influentia l quarterly, Foreign Affairs, 64 a n article in which he demolished wit h the utmos t reasonableness the case against th e

57 Th e Wartim e Experience international approach - an d also the bilateral 'key currency' scheme favoured by man y Wal l Stree t reader s o f Foreign Affairs. H e pointe d ou t t o sceptical Americans that a simple return to the gold standard o f prewar days was not a feasible alternative , tha t i f they wante d t o remov e th e barrier s t o trad e i n accordance with Article vu of Lend-Lease t o which they had committed their allies they had to concern themselve s with their customers' capacity to pay. The fun d was no miracl e cure , of course : 'Divergencie s betwee n nationa l policies wil l develo p eve n so ; ther e wil l be stresses and strains . This wil l b e true unde r an y conceivabl e arrangement : bu t I hav e fait h tha t generall y acceptable solution s ar e mor e likel y t o be found throug h th e machiner y of consultation, warning and advice provided by an international agency such as the Fun d tha n a s a result o f the uncoordinate d unilatera l action o f individual countries.' It is a clear early statement o f an argument tha t has had to be repeated constantly : internationa l institution s d o no t necessaril y produc e wise policies, bu t the y do provide machiner y through whic h it is possible t o achieve wiser policies. Rasminsky als o mad e severa l basi c argument s fo r Canadians . First , h e stressed the valu e of the multilatera l approach in the ambiguou s continental relationship: 'True , th e Unite d State s i s such a colossus i n the worl d eco nomic system that , linke d or unlinked, foreign countries cannot hel p being greatly influenced, for better o r for worse, by the tren d o f affairs there. But it is on e thin g for a countr y t o accep t thi s predominan t America n influenc e when tha t countr y i s in a positio n t o expres s som e view s on th e cours e o f events or is free to cope with it with such ingenuity as it can muster, i f things do not g o well; it is quite another fo r on e countr y to tie its fortunes inexor ably t o policie s pursue d b y another , n o matte r ho w farsighte d an d well chosen thos e policie s migh t be. ' Fo r Canadians , a s wel l a s Americans , another poin t ha d t o b e made : th e nee d fo r a perio d o f transitio n t o th e Utopian world of unfettered exchange , whic h was provided for in the 'escape clause' o n whic h Britain and othe r postwa r debtor s insisted : 'Fo r Canada , multilateral clearing is the chie f merit of any form of international monetary organization, an d hop e fo r this is now deferred. Nevertheless, I still think it worthwhile t o procee d wit h th e creatio n o f th e Fun d .. . if w e ar e eve r t o achieve internationa l monetar y cooperatio n w e mus t reac h agreemen t while the atmosphere i s relatively favorable. Countries hav e become used to working togethe r closel y durin g th e war . I t wil l requir e les s psychologica l adjustment t o exten d thes e close wartim e relationship s fo r peacetim e pur poses now than would be required five or ten years after th e war has ended.' The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire , 1 July 1944 , wa s a very differen t affai r fro m tha t a t Ho t

58 Th e Shapin g of Peac e Springs, mor e concret e an d more thoroughl y prepared. The Canadia n dele gation included , i n additio n t o th e official s involve d i n the preliminar y discussions, th e ministe r o f finance, J.L. Ilsley, and Louis St Laurent, ministe r of justice and the senio r Quebecke r i n the cabinet. Rasminsky was chairman of th e committe e t o draf t th e Article s of Agreement an d th e rapporteu r t o the Plenar y Conference o n matters relating to the fund. Mackintos h took the chair i n th e importan t committe e whic h dealt wit h th e operation s o f th e fund. Th e Internationa l Monetar y Fund agree d upo n a t Bretton Woods was to consist o f a mixed bag of gold and national currencies, wit h each country' s contribution (quota ) base d on estimate s of wealth , trade , and productio n adapted to mee t specia l circumstances . Canada' s contributio n ranke d sev enth. The fund was to be a permanent international institution for collaboration on monetary questions. There was to be a Board of Governors with on e representative fro m eac h membe r stat e an d a boar d o f twelv e executiv e directors on which the five largest contributors would have permanent seats . It wa s specified tha t there woul d be tw o Latin America n representatives , a provision Canadian s ha d grea t difficult y swallowing . There wer e to b e only five other seats . Canad a ingeniously argued that this would probably mean a board consistin g of eleven debtor s an d on e creditor , an d gaine d acceptanc e of a provision that the second larges t creditor (n o doubt assumed t o be Canada) shoul d always b e o n th e board . I t wa s probably the neates t victor y for the pur e functional theory, involving a legitimate principle of general validity calculated t o further a Canadian claim. The Bretto n Wood s meetin g als o se t u p a twi n institution , th e Inter national Ban k for Reconstructio n an d Development . Althoug h th e 'Worl d Bank' ha s attracted increasing attention, muc h greate r emphasi s wa s placed on th e fun d a t the time . The fund, of course, wa s concerned wit h problems of behaviou r (exchang e rates, exchang e restrictions, discrimination ) which are inherentl y more interestin g than money . Th e ban k a s i t emerge d ha d been drasticall y reduce d i n scop e an d resource s fro m th e kin d o f inter national central bank that American planners had first envisaged. It s importance ha s grown as the theme of developing the les s developed ha s becom e paramount, bu t tha t i s not wha t preoccupie d Canadian s an d other s i n th e mid-forties. Th e ban k wa s to hav e a capital of onl y $10 billio n to provid e members wit h long-term capita l for reconstruction an d development . Can ada's subscription was sixth in amount. Eac h member pai d up 1 5 per cent of its capital which could, however , b e len t b y the ban k onl y with its consent . The remainin g 8 5 pe r cen t wa s a guarante e fun d whic h stood behin d th e obligations (bonds ) whic h the ban k sold in the money markets of the world. This provide d a 'saf e bridge ' whic h enabled privat e investor s t o pu t thei r

59 Th e Wartim e Experience money into risky places, via the bank . The bank was regarded as an agent for speeding reconstruction, the wor d development i n its title being regarded as something fo r a bette r day . However , reconstructio n wa s largel y accomplished b y the Unite d State s an d Canadia n postwa r loans and th e Marshall Plan. The voice of the developing countries was raised sooner than expected, and the bank turned its attention to a function which, although contemplated by its founders, wa s not i n the forefron t o f their thinking. At the inaugura l meeting of the Boards of Governors of both the bank and the fun d i n March 194 6 Canada secure d electio n t o the board s of executive directors of both institutions. Unlike other specialized agencies, voting in the fund a s well as the ban k was weighted by the size of each country's quota (or contribution), a form of 'functionalism.' By the origina l formula Canada had slightly over 3 per cent of the voting power in the fun d t o 33 per cent for th e United State s and 1 6 per cent for the Unite d Kingdom . In Decembe r 194 5 Canadian participatio n in both the ban k and the fun d was approve d o n thir d readin g i n th e Common s b y a vot e o f 16 9 t o 9 . Neither the ministe r o f finance nor members of the Libera l or Conservative parties who spoke in favour regarded either of these institutions as the magic solution t o thei r problems . Thei r preoccupatio n wit h trad e wa s evident . Nevertheless, mos t member s seeme d to agree with the financial critic of the Progressive Conservatives , J.M . Macdonnell: 'I f we can begin by some kind of financia l cooperation , i t wil l b e a help. I t i s only a beginning; an under standing i n trad e i s necessary. Bu t we can begin wit h thi s ac t of faith , nex t summer w e ma y hav e anothe r ac t o f faith . Whe n trad e arrangement s ar e made they will be an act of faith fo r the momen t too.' 65 The debat e wa s noisier tha n i t would have bee n a s a reflectio n o f broa d popular opinio n becaus e o f th e oppositio n o f th e Socia l Credi t party . Th e speeches did at least reveal a hard-core resistance to any abnegation of sovereignty t o a n internationa l body . The y denounce d Bretto n Wood s as a club with whic h Canad a woul d hel p th e Unite d State s 'bea t th e Motherlan d t o death.' They talked o f perpetual bondage t o international bankers and Canada losin g contro l o f it s ow n economy , theme s fro m th e fa r Righ t which sound curiousl y like the interpretation s of postwar policies by the 'revision ists' o n th e Lef t a generation later . In the Commons debat e a t the time th e CCF were somewhat reserved, bu t they took a constructive part in the discussions i n the Bankin g and Commerc e Committee . Howeve r uneas y some o f the member s wer e about certai n aspect s o f such a financial agreement, th e commitment t o internationalis t solutions , particularl y on th e par t o f thei r leader, M.J . Coldwell, was such that they would not oppose th e grand effort . The onl y amendment t o th e bil l afte r discussio n i n committee wa s a provi-

60 Th e Shapin g of Peac e sion for annual reports on the operation s under th e act to be made to parliament b y the ministe r of finance, reflecting the same concern o f legislators as in th e cas e o f the FA Q lest thei r authorit y be ignore d i n thi s vastl y fortifie d level of international government . The government' s vie w of all these measure s a s a package was illustrated by Ilsley's announcemen t o n the same da y as he introduced th e ac t that th e United States had agreed to a loan to Britain and that the Britis h and Americans wer e takin g the initiativ e in summoning a world conference o n trad e and employment . 'Th e proposal s o n commercial policy, ' h e said , '.. . hav e resulted fro m discussion s amon g official s tha t hav e extende d ove r tw o o r three years , i n som e o f whic h ou r official s hav e participated.' 66 The y cer tainly had . Th e almos t continuou s negotiatio n amon g Americans , British , and Canadian s ove r wa r and postwa r payments (discusse d in chapter 3 ) had been closel y relate d t o th e tal k about th e fun d an d th e bank. 67 The Unite d States loan to Britain would presumably help shorten th e transitional period. It would also lead shortly to Canada's makin g a considerably more generou s loan for the sam e long-rang e purpose . The Bretto n Woods syste m wa s a beginning, but i t reflected the restricte d vision of the time. Joh n Deutsc h wh o was on the Canadian delegation com mented severa l decades later : '... ther e was one very important aspect which, as I look bac k now, w e did not understan d ver y well at th e tim e o f Bretton Woods. Tha t wa s the positio n o f the under-develope d countries ... At Bretton Woods we were looking for and we thought we were building a universal system .. . it has in fact made possibl e a fantastic growth in trade and production in the industrialized west. But this is in very strong contrast with the rest of th e world . The under-develope d worl d really is not par t of this system a t all. I t i s still fa r from clea r ho w this syste m ca n b e mad e int o th e universa l system of trade and exchange fo r the benefi t of the whole world. This is one of th e grea t unfinishe d task s ahea d o f us.' 68 It wa s unlikely, however, tha t after Bretto n Wood s ther e coul d b e a n abandonmen t o f th e internationa l approach, eve n i f it wa s on th e basi s of understanding s amon g regiona l or functional groups. The zea l for universalism was somewhat fanatical in 1944, but Canadian and other planners had not fully grasped the distinction between the Wester n worl d and th e universe . The y woul d ge t th e messag e i n par t from th e very institutions they were creating. CHICAGO

Of al l the issue s o f postwa r internationa l co-operation , non e wa s closer t o the Canadia n hear t tha n civi l aviation. I t capture d th e popula r imagination and i t involved C.D . How e i n an importan t aspect o f the ne w internationa l

61 Th e Wartime Experience structure. How e had bee n ministe r of transpor t befor e the war and was responsible, therefore, fo r th e developmen t o f Trans-Canada Ai r Lines. H e retained control of civil aviation during the wa r as minister of munitions and supply. H e wa s also th e guidin g genius of the Commonwealt h Air Training Plan which gave Canada a special place in the imaginatio n of its citizens and others a s well . I n th e interwa r perio d th e fledglin g RCA F ha d bee n main tained throug h the auster e year s becaus e o f its role i n developing air transport, especially in the north . Technological developments i n aviation during the war had a profound effect o n Canadian thinking - no t only the advances made b y themselves an d thei r allie s bu t als o b y the countrie s which might threaten them . Aircraf t ha d remove d th e Arcti c barrier i n whic h the y had reposed thei r confidence. I t had altered th e kin d of map the y thought by . It brought a n unfamilia r feeling of insecurity along with an exhilaratin g sense of opportunity . 'Aviation ha s mad e u s a buffe r state, ' said Gran t Dexter in 1944. 'In the air world we are the cock-pit of North America.' 69 Transport ha d always bee n a t th e cor e o f the Canadia n national problem and the Canadian nationa l dream. Aviatio n offered t o a small population the possibility o f coping with enormou s territor y and enormou s resources , lik e the buildin g of canals an d the n railway s i n th e nineteent h century . In Canada, unlik e the Unite d States, the developmen t o f aviation, as well as other forms o f transportation, wa s seen as a national enterprise. On e reaso n i t had to be national was, of course, t o protect the Canadia n interest fro m th e fre e enterprise of a powerful neighbour. The other reason wa s the relationship of aviation t o security , uppermos t i n th e mind s o f everyon e i n th e forties . It was not just a matter o f th e defenc e o f Canadian soil . The strategi c signifi cance o f Canada i n world security was dramatized by the Northwes t Staging Route reachin g up from Edmonto n throug h Alask a to Asi a and b y the pro jected Crimson Rout e in the northeast. When Canadians came to think institutionally abou t internationa l aviation, they placed heav y emphasi s o n th e implications for security, insisting on a close link with the propose d Security Council. Even i f it was a matter of civil aviation there was the vivi d recollection of how the Nazis had used (an d planned to use further) civil aviation for infiltration abroa d and as a screen behind which to develop the Luftwaff e i n defiance o f th e Treat y o f Versailles . Th e Britis h ha d a n eve n mor e vivi d regard for th e airplan e as a menace and they , like the Canadians , wante d it controlled. Th e American s though t mor e o f the liberatio n o f aviation from control an d restriction . Tha t appeale d als o t o th e Canadians , anxiou s t o spread abroad their newl y found air power. So it was not a n internationa l theoretician of the Departmen t o f External Affairs bu t Howe who said of an international air agreement: 'a n enlightened

62 Th e Shapin g of Peac e settlement... can constitut e a mode l fo r th e settlemen t o f othe r difficul t international problems, and create an atmosphere in which the settlement of these other problems will become easier. Failure to devise a working system of co-operation and collaboration .. . will prejudice the establishment o f an effec tive worl d security organization.' 70 H e wa s prepared t o se t a n example tha t went pretty far for a man supposedly attached to liberal capitalist principles. In Ottawa, as in Washington, London , an d in other capitals , there was a strong desire t o clea r away the nationa l barrier s t o ai r transport tha t ha d impede d development befor e the war and would be utterly inappropriate now that transoceanic flights had become an accepted feature of travel. There was little hope of aviation serving the needs of mankind so long as each country could bargain bilaterally for transit of its air space and whole regions could be shut off from competition. Something like 'freedom o f the air' to match the 'freedom of the seas' was required, althoug h the difficultie s wer e more complex. 71 In 194 2 studies were authorized in Ottawa and an interdepartmental committee se t up so that in April 1943 the prime minister was able to adumbrate a position . 'Th e Canadia n governmen t strongl y favours a polic y o f inter national collaboratio n an d co-operatio n i n ai r transpor t an d i s prepare d t o support i n internationa l negotiation s whateve r internationa l ai r transpor t policy ca n b e demonstrate d a s bein g bes t calculate d t o serv e no t onl y th e immediate nationa l interests of Canada but also our overriding interest in the establishment o f a n internationa l order whic h will preven t th e outbrea k of another world war.' 72 The lin k perceived wit h security and th e othe r leg s of the ne w internationa l orde r wa s clear. What was also clear in other part s of this statemen t wa s the determinatio n t o tak e advantag e of Canada' s enor mously increase d significanc e i n internationa l aviation , no t onl y as a n ai r power bu t a s a larg e space an d a crossroads. T o thi s en d th e governmen t wanted al l existing agreements t o lapse so they would be 'unfettered b y any commitments whe n i t come s t o dea l wit h post-wa r ai r problems. ' Trans Canada Ai r Line s woul d b e th e government' s instrumen t fo r internationa l services s o that it s freedom o f action would not b e 'limited by the existenc e of privat e interest s i n internationa l ai r transpor t services. ' Thi s marke d a significant differenc e fro m prevailin g American views. On the government's mind als o was the necessity of taking over fro m th e Americans th e wartim e transport lines they had opened u p in Canada . A particular problem aros e vis-à-vis the British. A British perspective was bluntly state d i n th e Common s o n 1 June 194 3 b y Sir Archibald Sinclair , secretary o f state for air: 'After th e wa r we shall either b e in a world domi nated b y th e Unite d State s o r th e Sovie t Unio n o r th e centr e o f a grea t Empire boun d togethe r by air routes.' Whe n Canad a had fel t les s strong in

63 Th e Wartime Experience the field , i t ha d agree d t o sponso r a transatlanti c air service alon g with the United Kingdom , Newfoundland , an d Ireland . Thi s schem e ha d no t bee n fully implemented . B y 1942 the governmen t ha d establishe d Trans-Canad a Air Lines , capabl e o f a transatlanti c servic e o f it s own . It s confidenc e i n Canadian capacit y was vastl y increased, an d i t preferre d t o terminat e th e joint arrangemen t wit h th e Britis h and Irish . Ottaw a wa s not enthusiastic , needless to say, about proposals for a grand Commonwealth operatin g company bein g pressed b y Lord Beaverbroo k an d th e imperially-minde d members o f the Britis h government. Whe n th e Britis h proposed Commonwealt h talks o n internationa l civi l aviatio n th e Canadian s wer e nervous . O n thi s subject, abov e al l others , thei r relation s wit h th e Unite d State s wer e sui generis and th e ide a of negotiations with the Unite d States a s part of a Commonwealth front was unacceptable. It was not that Canadians saw their interests and those of the United State s as identica l o r necessaril y parallel . I n thei r oppositio n t o America n 'fre e enterprise' they had more in common wit h the other Commonwealth countries. It was just that the Canada-United States relationship had, for territorial reasons, a dimensio n o f it s own. Canadian s perceive d als o tha t th e British might naturall y like t o negotiat e wit h th e American s a s a Commonwealt h unit because Canadia n rea l estate would have considerable bargainin g power with th e Americans . I t was the possessio n o f essential base s whic h Canada regarded a s i t chie f counte r i n an y internationa l negotiations . Curiousl y enough ther e wer e als o som e American s wh o wante d t o bargai n wit h th e British a s a whole Commonwealt h a s a means o f gettin g concessions fro m the Canadians. 73 Ottaw a wa s worrie d over th e powe r o f th e America n ai r lobby an d anxiou s no t t o giv e th e American s ground fo r complainin g tha t the Britis h countries wer e ganging up on them. They did not seek t o drive a wedge between th e Britis h and Americans becaus e they were determined t o get a tough an d tigh t international aviation authority and British-America n collaboration was fundamental to this object. There wa s much skirmishin g between London an d Ottawa over th e hold ing of a Commonwealth conference on aviation, with the Canadians insisting on America n participation . During the Quebe c Conferenc e of August 194 3 the Canadian s foun d a n all y i n Churchill, who, in spite o f his weakness fo r imperial solidarity, gave a higher priority to British-American understanding. Eventually, Commonwealt h conversation s too k plac e i n Octobe r 194 3 i n London, wit h the Americans duly warned of their informal nature. The British did not press an unacceptable imperial scheme, and the Canadians found the talks satisfactory. There was unanimous agreement 'tha t closed discrimi natory system s coul d onl y promote disharmony , and endanger th e chance s

64 Th e Shapin g of Peac e of reachin g that broa d agreemen t whic h i s necessary.'74 To mak e their pure internationalism obviou s th e Canadia n governmen t announce d discussion s with th e Unite d State s an d th e Sovie t Unio n a s wel l a s the Chinese . Onl y those wit h the American s took place. On 1 7 March 194 4 Howe tabled a draft Internationa l Air Transport Con vention. Thi s propose d a n internationa l authorit y whic h would encourag e and pla n international ai r services. I t would be subordinate t o the propose d international securit y organization . I t woul d hav e powe r t o licens e inter national airlines , fi x rates , assig n quotas , an d determin e th e frequenc y of service o n approved air routes. What proved to be the most importan t Canadian contribution was the definitio n of certain freedoms : 1 freedo m o f transit over the airway s of member states ; 2 freedo m o f landing for refueling, repairs, or emergencies; 3 freedo m o f carrying passengers, mail, and freigh t t o the hom e state fro m any other membe r state , o r 4 t o any member stat e from the home state. Although thi s pla n envisage d unprecedente d powe r fo r a n internationa l body, i t rejected th e proposa l fo r internationa l ownershi p and managemen t of international air services, a n idea strongly advocated i n those heady time s by many people, fro m Henr y Wallace in the Unite d States to the Australia n and New Zealand Labour governments. Clar e Boot h Luce called it 'globaloney.' Althoug h man y Canadian s wer e attracte d b y it, th e Ottaw a planner s knew that it would in no circumstances b e accepted b y the United States and it wa s wiser to devise somethin g the y might b e persuaded t o go along with. The Canadia n plan was circulated for study, as were also British and Ameri can plans. In November 194 4 an international conferenc e wa s held in Chicago o n the invitation of the United States. Th e Soviet Unio n di d not attend, but a large number o f neutral an d belligerent countrie s did . A basic documen t wa s the Canadian draf t convention , revise d t o take into consideration America n an d British view s and prejudices . The righ t to fix rates wa s transferred fro m th e international authority to the operators , an d there wa s provision for a transitional postwa r perio d i n whic h bilatera l agreement s coul d b e made . Th e United State s pla n provide d fo r a n internationa l authorit y wit h power s limited t o technical and consultative functions . The British plan called for an authority similar to the Canadian. Whe n the conference bega n o n 1 November th e Australian-Ne w Zealan d pla n wa s quickly eliminated. The n i t was realized that there was not going to be agreement o n any of the three remaining plans. Open meeting s wer e suspended, and from 1 2 to 20 November th e United Kingdom , Unite d States , an d Canadia n delegation s wer e i n almos t

65 Th e Wartime Experience continuous close d conference , afte r whic h the y place d befor e th e confer ence, withou t committin g themselves , draf t proposals . Th e Britis h an d Canadian preferenc e for allocatin g route s and fixing frequencie s had los t out. A s far as the 'economi c functions' wer e concerned, th e proposed body would be purely advisory and consultative. In the end rates and routes were left fo r bilateral negotiation. Most o f th e subsequen t controvers y wa s over th e 'fiv e freedoms. ' Th e United State s ha d added , a s a fifth , th e freedo m t o pic k u p and discharg e traffic a t intermediate points . That wa s critical. The American s sa w the liberation o f th e airway s a s a blessing fo r al l peoples, bu t i f plane s could no t pick up an d deposit passenger s alon g the way , there could not b e profitabl e long distance run s and needy countries woul d be missed. Tru e enough, but, of course , thi s provision would also enable th e well-endowe d Americans to capture routes betwee n countrie s tha t wanted, as soon a s they were able, to get into international flying themselves. A s the Frenc h representativ e put it: 'the overwhelmin g superiority o f a competitor, eve n i f he i s an absolutel y fair partner , might provoke protective reflexe s i n smaller nations , the aerial sovereignty o f which is unquestioned.' 75 Agreemen t o n th e fiv e freedom s could no t b e reached, an d it was decided t o open fo r signature a Two Freedoms agreemen t an d a Five Freedoms agreement. Man y more states signe d the forme r tha n th e latter , whic h was abandoned a few years later. Canada signed only the Two Freedoms agreement which did cover the essential free dom o f transit . Th e sovereignt y o f a countr y wa s neve r questioned , o f course. Wha t was provided was a reciprocal, multilatera l guaranty of rights. Canada refused t o concede th e right s involved in the third, fourth, and fifth freedoms, excep t a s par t o f a worldwid e multilateral system whic h woul d promote th e kin d o f orderl y development o f air transpor t the y ha d sought from th e beginning . I n fac t the y kept fighting for multilateralis m for som e time afterwards . The Chicag o Conference produce d als o a Convention o n International Civi l Aviatio n tha t modernized the law of the air , a standar d form o f bilateral agreement fo r the exchange of air routes tha t brought some measure o f consistency, a n impressive serie s o f technical annexes tha t provided the basis for technical and operational uniformity, and an International Civil Aviation Organization to supervise an d develop further what had been agreed at Chicago. The Chicago Conference wa s in a sense not a United Nations conference . The American s planne d an d ra n it . Th e staf f wer e American , an d the pre scribed languag e wa s English . Th e chairman , Adol f Berle , wa s fa r fro m impartial. Th e Frenc h an d Chines e vice-chairme n wer e no t abl e t o thro w much weight . The results , however , wer e not wha t the American s wanted ,

66 Th e Shapin g of Peac e although littl e got throug h tha t the y di d not want . Canada ha d a powerfu l delegation heade d b y C.D. Howe , wit h H.J. Symington, president of Trans Canada Ai r Lines , J.A . Wilson, directo r of Air Services, an d a n unbeatabl e collection of technical advisers from Transport , National Defence, an d othe r departments. The Canadia n draf t wa s used no t just because o f its intermediate positio n bu t becaus e o f th e thoroughnes s an d detai l wit h whic h it ha d been prepare d - a product largely of the master han d o f Escott Reid . Adolf Berle sai d i n hi s closin g remarks : 'le t m e als o pa y tribut e wit h particular affection t o th e Delegatio n o f Canada, whic h tirelessly worked to reconcil e the differen t point s o f view . Indeed , t o th e Canadia n though t an d th e Canadian draf t w e ow e th e languag e w e ar e using. ' Th e British , h e said , approached the proble m primaril y from th e poin t of view of order in the air. 'We o n ou r sid e approache d i t fro m th e poin t o f vie w of freedo m o f th e air.'76 There wa s something o f both approache s in the Canadia n attitude , so that the rol e of middleman cam e naturally. It is a generalization which might have been mad e about the positions of the three powers towards the postwar economic structur e i n general. The Chicag o final act provide d fo r a n interi m bod y fo r thre e years . Th e Canadian draft ha d envisaged an International Air Transport Board to consist of representatives o f the eigh t states o f chief importanc e i n international air transport plus the national s of four states elected b y an assembly. I n arguing for thi s position the Canadian s foun d themselves close r t o the great powers than to the smaller powers, displaying thereby their bias in the application of the functionalist principle. The political strength o f the smaller powers, especially the Lati n Americans , wa s such that a compromise wa s necessary. Th e eventual agreement wa s on an annual assembly and a council of twenty-one elected fo r a period of three years , to be in continuous session. The council, composed b y a more flexibl e interpretatio n o f the functiona l principle than Canadians usuall y advocated, wa s to include states of three categories: thos e of chief importance in air transport, those which made the greatest contribu tion t o th e provisio n o f facilities , an d thos e whic h represente d th e mai n geographical areas o f the world. Canada wa s elected i n the second category, which was functionalist enough . The experienc e o f this electio n earl y in th e proces s o f establishing inter national institution s ha d a considerable effec t o n Canadia n thinkin g about the functional principle and also about its so-called 'neighbours ' in the west ern hemisphere . Sinc e th e Lati n American s an d the Arab s combined coul d command nearl y half the vote s of the Chicag o Conference, the y were abl e almost t o dictate the slate of candidates elected to the interim council . What particularly disturbed Canadians wa s that they simply ignored the criteria for

67 Th e Wartime Experienc e membership tha t had bee n carefull y adopted . Mexic o was elected a s a world air operator and Canada, although it was the fourth military air power among the Unite d Nations , wa s not . Seve n Lati n America n an d tw o Ara b state s were among th e twent y elected t o th e council, and thes e include d El Salvador. Ther e wer e onl y fiv e European s an d fou r Asians . Indi a wa s omitte d altogether, bu t Cub a finally withdrew in its favour. Egypt was the onl y Afri can member. Th e majorit y o f these states had approved th e functiona l prin ciple incorporate d i n th e Ai r Conventio n withou t intendin g t o abid e b y it. Nothing coul d b e done. A n electio n coul d no t b e contested o n th e groun d that th e stat e electe d lacke d th e requisit e qualifications . What happene d i n Chicago stiffene d th e Canadia n resolv e t o mak e provisions fo r membershi p according to function on the Securit y Council. It might better hav e provided a warning that th e functiona l principle could not b e successfully prescribed. The firs t sessio n o f th e Counci l o f th e Provisiona l Internationa l Civi l Aviation Organization was held in Montreal i n June 194 5 with an American as presiden t an d a Frenchma n a s secretar y general . I n Ma y 194 6 th e firs t meeting o f th e interi m assembl y wa s held , als o i n Montreal , an d a t tha t session it was decided t o mak e Montrea l th e permanen t sit e o f ICAO , which came int o existenc e i n Apri l 194 7 afte r thirty-fiv e state s ha d ratifie d th e convention. No t surprisingly , Canada becam e a member o f the Permanen t Council o f twenty-one . I t continue d vigorousl y but unsuccessfull y to pres s the case fo r a multilateral system, arguin g that a network of similar bilaterals was not multilateralism. In the meantime, however , it proceeded t o negotiate what wer e i n fact reasonabl y consistent bilateral s with the Unite d Kingdom , Ireland, Newfoundland , th e Unite d States, an d Australia. When Newfound land entere d confederatio n i n 1949 , Canad a wa s saddled wit h commitment s previously made, an d fo r the first time exchange d fift h freedo m right s with the United State s an d the Unite d Kingdom . The civi l aviation negotiation s pose d squarely for Canada th e challenge of American Ne w Dea l internationalism , that ambivalen t mixtur e of idealis m and imperialism personified in Adolf A. Berle, the assistant secretary of state in charg e of , amon g othe r issues , internationa l civi l aviation . I t i s a phe nomenon o f th e mid-fortie s perhap s bette r understoo d a generatio n late r when one can see in it the sourc e o f the flourishing famil y o f United Nations agencies tha t coul d no t hav e bee n launche d withou t America n leadershi p and resources , an d als o th e sourc e o f the appallin g miscalculation i n Viet nam. To regard Berle as the typica l American planner of that era would be an error. H e was held i n check b y other America n traditions , less arrogant and more conservative, bu t is illustrative as caricature. As a political appointee, a New Dealer amon g th e Stat e Departmen t pros , wit h links to Roosevelt an d

68 Th e Shapin g of Peace Hull, however, h e was a part of the act . His brand of moral imperialism was to b e foun d i n dose s o f varyin g proportio n throughou t Washingto n an d coast-to-coast. Ther e wa s much o f it in th e presiden t himself , although his humanitarianism was less xenophobic. Berle was an anti-imperialist imperialist, genus Americanas, not t o be confused wit h the nationalist s whose single dedication t o th e assertio n o f Unite d State s militar y and economi c interes t was easier t o cop e with . In th e Firs t War , as h e sa w it, th e Unite d State s 'came so int o the Englis h camp that... we got not on e thin g that we really desired i n the ensuin g peace. ' Thi s tim e it should b e the othe r way round. 'We hav e th e ultimat e strength. W e also hav e th e ultimat e consistency of principle; we are the inevitabl e economic cente r of the regim e which wil l emerge - unless , of course, we all go under.'77 In his diary for 2 2 February 194 4 Berle jotted: 'The last few days, working on two separate jobs, although they sound th e same : th e developmen t o f a postwar civil aviation policy; and th e collectio n of a string of bases designed to take care of United States security after th e end o f the war.' 78 He took for granted tha t th e Unite d State s mus t hav e assured acces s t o air base s i n all strategic part s o f the globe , fo r reason s o f strategy and commerc e an d th e stability o f th e grea t glob e itself . H e ha d bee n passionatel y arouse d ove r Canadian, British , or French 'plots ' to take protective custody of Greenland or St Pierre during the war , yet he could note in his diary: 'The bases i n the Japanese mandated island s ... we will not negotiat e for; I hope we shall simply go out and take them. We shall have some negotiations to do with a few British islands.. . Just a s soo n a s w e ge t reasonabl y starte d i n Brazi l an d Mexico, I propose to go to work in Canada.'79 Berle saw a sinister dispostio n of the Europeans to carve out their empires in th e air , bega t o f cartelization an d socialis m i n th e fac e o f th e America n doctrine o f the liberatio n of trade . I t ha d bee n thi s America n attitud e tha t provoked these countrie s t o insist at Bretton Woods o n a transitional period of financial and commercial protection until they could get on their feet. Berle accepted the nee d for a transition period in aviation, but he did not want to dismantle the world-girdling network of military transport the Americans had set up, especially as he believed that the British were planning to exploit their wartime system. That the remova l o f barriers to the fligh t o f planes all over the world must wor k to the particula r interest o f the United States he could not admit. In any case, the Unite d States would operate in the interests of all. Freedom was, after all, a holy cause. As the chie f of the Aviatio n Division in the Stat e Departmen t expresse d it : 'It need not stop at the water' s edge , or hesitate a t mountai n barriers . T o d o s o i s t o den y it s God-give n righ t of universal entry.'80

69 Th e Wartime Experience The American s woul d no t concede , however , tha t i f th e Britis h mad e available bases i n their maritim e empire, th e Unite d State s shoul d ope n u p its great land empire - Chicag o for Singapore. An American interest in opening up Canad a wa s a major caus e o f anxiety in Ottawa. That i s why Canada resisted th e Fift h Freedom agreemen t which , unless it was part of a broader scheme, could have permitted Pan American to pick up passengers at Montreal or Edmonton e n route abroad. The realization that the Americans could easily dominat e ai r transpor t i n Canad a i f they got a foothold wa s clear t o Howe. Because he was the zealot most likely to draw the United States, in spite of the howl s of isolationists and private interests, into an international aviation structure whic h Canadian s staunchl y believe d t o b e th e bes t guaranto r of their interests , Berl e ha d t o b e supported . Bu t h e an d hi s kin d ha d t o b e treated warily . He represented, afte r all, not only internationalism but a messianic continentalism. His anti-British prejudices prevented hi m from under standing th e ambiguous phenomenon tha t Canada was . His comprehensio n is illustrated by his gleefully noting , at the outbrea k of war, that Mackenzie King ha d take n a mor e neutra l position than ha d Lor d Tweedsmui r i n hi s speech fro m th e throne. 81 Canada did not fit his simple view of the righteous republic and the wicked empire - except, of course, as a people straining for freedom i n the America n way. Although the Canadian plan at Chicago, with its extensive internationa l control, wa s contrary to the basi c American concept, Berl e wa s les s hars h o n Canadian s tha n o n rea l foreigners . Berl e believed i n th e wester n hemispher e a s hi s community . H e wa s no crud e annexationist. H e did want to see th e hemisphere politicall y completed, bu t he sa w i t mor e a s a communit y o f nations . Afte r a tal k i n Ottaw a o n 1 8 March 194 1 wit h Hugh Keenleysid e o f Externa l Affair s abou t what was to become the Hyd e Park agreement for mutual exchanges i n defence production, Berl e noted : 'Keenleysid e realize s tha t thi s is now one continent and one economy; that we shall have to be integrated a s to finance, trade routes, and pretty much everythin g else; and in this I so thoroughly agree with him that i t i s refreshin g ... This a t leas t i s a new orde r whic h can exis t without hatred an d ca n be created withou t bloodshed, an d ough t to lead to production without slavery.'82 Canadians wer e more incline d to envisage a postwar Utopia dominated by the Commonwealt h an d th e Unite d States, bu t their assumption abou t th e moral superiority of 'the English-speaking world' had something in common with Berle's assumptions abou t America. Some Canadians could be accused of wantin g multilateralism unde r neithe r unilatera l (us ) no r bilatera l (USUK) bu t rathe r trilatera l leadership. Tha t is perhaps wha t the Chicag o Con -

70 Th e Shapin g of Peac e ference was . Discussion wa s directed t o the thre e plans . There wa s also th e Australian-New Zealand plan. No meeting could b e smoothly trilateral if the Aussies wer e there , bu t the y mad e themselve s ineffectua l b y divorcin g themselves fro m th e mai n stream. A s th e officia l repor t o f the proceeding s makes clear, the American-British-Canadia n conference withi n a conferenc e was the centr e o f the action . The Russian s had refused t o attend at the las t minute, an d thei r absence removed th e compulsio n t o preserv e th e great power front . Th e Frenc h wer e attendin g thei r firs t conferenc e a s a Paris based governmen t an d wer e not read y to assum e a leading role i n a highly technical negotiation. In spite o f this sterling performance by Canada - a stature an d status pro bably neve r agai n reache d i n a broa d internationa l conferenc e - did th e Americans triumph regardless? They successfully resisted th e Canadian and British hop e fo r a n internationa l body with stricter regulator y authority and got instea d a bod y tha t woul d b e advisor y o r consultative . However , th e Americans may have had the better argument. Howe insisted that what Canada wanted was no more than what the American s had at home i n their Civil Aeronautics Board . Th e American s pointe d ou t th e ver y grea t differenc e between a board of individuals appointed by the electe d presiden t of a state, with a set o f guiding principles, and an international board composed o f th e representatives o f states wh o would inevitably be advocates.83 In their enthusiasm fo r international institutions 'wit h teeth' an d i n their trust i n the rol e of 'internationa l men 1 Canadian s wer e hopin g ther e coul d b e international 'government' b y wise an d exper t me n detache d fro m a politica l constitu ency. But the responsibilitie s of any international authority would inevitably be political . It was a lesson Canadia n imperia l experience ha d taugh t them, but the y were tempted t o thin k the Unite d Nation s woul d b e different . I n 1944 th e Canadia n conceptio n o f a Unite d Nation s structur e wa s mor e authoritarian than what proved possible. The origina l Canadian pla n for civil aviation envisaged , fo r example , tha t th e Securit y Council coul d cal l upon the Air Authority to 'take the measures concernin g technical services, oper ating facilitie s and base s whic h th e internationa l securit y organizatio n ha s directed shoul d b e taken ' o r eve n 't o operat e ai r service s o n route s o r i n regions designated fro m tim e to time b y the internationa l securit y organisation.'84 Experience proved , however , tha t state s woul d wor k togethe r withou t enforcement provision s when the y had good selfis h reasons for doing so - a fact th e Universa l Posta l Unio n ha d bee n provin g fo r three-quarter s o f a century. What was produced a t Chicago was a basic agreement o n the essential freedom s an d a n organization to overse e and furthe r develop th e rule s

71 Th e Wartime Experienc e and regulation s to which nations no w conform, no t becaus e the y are called 'compulsory' but because i t is in their own national interest to do so. It seemed like a waterin g down o f th e vision , bu t it s importance, lik e that o f Bretto n Woods, wa s th e commitmen t t o th e internationa l consultativ e approach . There would still be bilateral deals and cut-throat competition, but the world was not goin g to be cut up into closed zones . Freedo m o f the air had, as was so often said , i n one jump reached th e status whic h had taken several centu ries t o achiev e fo r th e seas . Th e Chicag o Conferenc e i s of grea t historical importance becaus e i t set a pattern fo r wha t has becom e th e essentia l func tion o f the Unite d Nation s - providin g a framewor k for multilateral diplomacy so that sovereign member s ca n bargai n with each othe r i n accordanc e with universa l principles . I t foreshadowe d th e accomplishment s withi n th e General Agreemen t o n Tariff s an d Trad e an d th e Unite d Nation s Confer ences o n the La w of the Sea , the boldest effor t yet to solidify an international community. The succes s o f th e delegatio n ough t no t t o b e judge d i n term s o f th e number o f point s score d fo r Canadia n aviation . Canada coul d hav e single mindedly hel d it s broa d territor y fo r bargainin g but sai d instea d tha t 'i t would b e willin g t o foreg o a bargainin g positio n i n orde r t o contribut e t o increased freedo m o f th e ai r tha t woul d promote internationa l harmony.' 85 At Chicago the Canadia n governmen t notabl y achieved an importan t aspect of it s functionalis t philosophy . 'Th e Governmen t ha s felt, ' Hum e Wron g wrote t o Vincen t Masse y i n 1942 , 'tha t w e shoul d b e partner s i n thes e bodies an d shoul d no t merel y b e afforde d mean s o f protectin g ou r direc t interests whe n the y come unde r consideration.' 86 It was their critica l role in bringing abou t a general agreemen t tha t bes t serve d th e Canadia n interest . It i s a rol e tha t require s a certai n detachmen t fro m narrowl y national ad vantage. I n fact , ther e wa s no seriou s sacrific e of advantage. Canad a would have t o negotiat e directl y with th e Unite d State s fo r reciproca l rights , bu t the American s coul d clai m n o concede d 'freedom ' t o fl y beyon d borde r points i n Canada. Whe n h e first presented hi s plan to the Commons, How e said: 'I f any suc h framewor k for international cooperatio n i n th e fiel d o f air transport shoul d b e developed.. . it would seem tha t cross-borde r services , such a s those between Canad a an d the Unite d States , should b e considere d in a special category, an d dealt with specially by the two countries concerned , since service s originatin g in the one country and terminating in the other are primarily trans-frontie r extension s o f domesti c ai r services.' 87 I n spit e o f a diffuse feelin g tha t globa l internationa l organizatio n was a counterweigh t against th e continenta l pressures , Canada preserve d i n practice a n assump tion that continental internationa l relations wer e a thing apart.

72 Th e Shapin g of Peac e FUNCTIONALISM

In th e creatio n o f these internationa l institutions in wartime, the Canadian philosophy (i f one ca n us e such a grandiose term ) o f a United Nation s was being shaped befor e the position papers were drafted for the Charter conference i n San Francisco. Th e theor y which emerged i n King's statement s o n functionalism o f 9 July 194 3 during the discussion s ove r UNRRA , an d the n again o n 4 August 1944 , ha d bee n largel y a conception o f Hum e Wrong , formulated i n constant colloqu y with hi s colleagues. Whethe r Kin g meant what hi s official s ha d i n mind ma y be doubted, becaus e their s was an argument no t just for Canadia n right s but b y implication for wider responsibilities, bu t whe n aske d i f h e agree d wit h th e argumen t se t ou t i n detai l i n a memorandum o f guidance for an UNRRA Council meeting, he wrote, 'entirely so.'88 In the context of relief he was probably seeing this as the principle of no taxation withou t representation. H e ha d bee n predispose d i n favour of th e general 'functionalist ' approac h to internationa l organization becaus e o f its apparent emphasis o n economic an d social rather than on military activities. There wer e tw o meanings o f the ter m 'functiona l internationa l organization,' as Wrong pointed out to the prime minister. The special Ottawa meaning had been that effective internationa l authority in a given matter ought to be concentrate d i n bodie s i n whic h th e countrie s mainl y concerned wer e represented. H e added , however , that , 'ther e i s another meanin g give n t o the term , use d especiall y by Professor Mitran y in a study recently issued by Chatham House. 89 He argues tha t the world should b e bound togethe r b y a large numbe r o f differen t internationa l institution s organize d t o dea l sepa rately with the many functions requiring international co-operation. The two meanings overla p and are not essentially inconsistent bu t the variation in the use o f th e ter m shoul d b e born e i n mind. ' Ther e wa s no doub t a general acceptance o f Mitrany' s assumption s i n Canadia n policy , an d wha t Kin g and hi s official s mean t b y 'functionalism ' wa s b y no mean s incompatible . Nevertheless, 'a n analytica l distinctio n mus t b e made,' a s A.J . Mille r has aptly pu t it , 'betwee n the theor y o f functional representation an d what, for lack of a better term, shall be called functionalist internationalism.' He adds, 'The essenc e o f functionalis t internationalism , a s distinc t fro m functional representation, i s a belief i n international economic an d social co-operatio n as a means o f reducing the likelihoo d o f conflict i n the buildin g of huma n accord, ultimatel y to the poin t of world government.'90 The concrete step s toward s 'functionalist internationalism ' take n at Bretton Wood s an d Chicag o mad e th e principl e of 'functiona l representation ' more important to Canadians. The statements o f 1943 had not been approved

73 Th e Wartime Experienc e in advanc e b y cabinet, a s the significanc e they were t o have a s basic docu ments of Canadian foreig n policy was not foreseen . Althoug h the y di d no t cause a loud public stir, the speeches were noted with interest by the diplomats of other lesse r powers , and support came quickly from th e representatives o f Belgium, Brazil , th e Netherlands , an d Ne w Zealand , a s wel l as fro m th e redoubtable Evatt , wh o visite d Ottaw a a fe w day s later . Canadia n editor s recognized th e significanc e of the functiona l principle , which got favourable mention eve n fro m usual critics in the Gazette and the Globe and Mail. Thus encouraged, governmen t spokesme n gav e th e principl e full treatmen t an d King develope d a ne w regar d fo r th e advic e h e wa s getting from External Affairs. A s Dougla s Angli n ha s said : 'Mos t importan t o f all , functionalism was readily adaptable to the exigencies and uncertainties of the war and post war years. Indeed, th e functiona l approach wa s so natural that i t was never formally adopted ; i t simpl y emerged.' 91 T o som e exten t i t was a matter of making necessit y int o a virtue - a n attitude characteristic of much o f Canada's emerging foreign policy.

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PART II : ENDING TH E WAR

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3

Relief, Rehabilitation , and Reconstruction

The new worl d orde r was not conceive d in tranquillity , and to thi s fac t is attributable some weaknes s but also much strength. Because it was forged in conflict, th e inevitabilit y o f conflic t woul d no t b e ignore d i n brotherhoo d phrases. The structure would undoubtedly have been better-lookin g if there had bee n harmon y a t the time, bu t there wasn' t - the n o r later - an d harmony could no t hav e bee n impose d b y a more platoni c Charter. Canadian s worried particularly about a too close lin k between th e ne w United Nations and the peace settlement an d about the imperfections that would be perpetuated i f the institution s wer e determine d durin g the turbulenc e inevitable at the en d o f a destructive war . They preferre d t o thin k i n term s o f a transitional perio d and an interim Unite d Nations . Nevertheless , the windin g up of th e wa r permanentl y affecte d th e shap e o f thing s t o come . Ther e wa s some immediat e advantage to Canada in that its status an d functions in the new world were to an important extent determined b y its considerable role in relief an d reconstruction - althoug h the question mus t b e asked whethe r it did not als o distor t th e Canadia n situation. For purposes o f calculation, the times were not at all normal. THE C A N A D I A N PERSPECTIV E

One o f the basi c problem s o f Canadian foreig n polic y i n the postwa r years has been the adjustment of Canadians t o being rich. The immediate postwar period when Canadians could hardly deny that they were relatively, if in their minds onl y temporarily, better of f than other s wa s a useful trainin g experience for mor e acut e trial s in the las t thir d of the century . In his preface to Canada's Immigration Policy i n 195 7 Davi d Corbett quote d Roussea u fro m The Social Contract: 'How can a man o r a people seize an immense territory

78 Th e Shapin g of Peac e and kee p i t fro m th e res t o f th e worl d except b y a punishable usurpation , since al l others ar e bein g robbe d b y such a n act, o f the place s of habitation and the mean s o f subsistence whic h nature gave them i n common?" It was not until the acute realization in the seventies o f the world's under supply of resources an d ove r supply of people that Canadians began to be aware of the full implication s of their enviable situation. By that time, although they had not abandoned th e habi t of lamenting their lot, it was hard to deny, even t o themselves, tha t absolutel y o r relativel y they were rich . I n th e immediat e postwar period, while acknowledging their relative good fortune , they clung to th e imag e o f themselves a s a thrifty, hard-working , pioneer peopl e who would do their Christian duty to their fellows but could not afford th e generosity o f the élit e powers. The differenc e betwee n th e Canadia n and Ameri can incom e wa s such tha t thi s attitud e was fro m on e perspectiv e justified. Unlike th e Unite d States , furthermore , Canad a wa s heavily in deb t t o th e rest o f th e worl d an d runnin g a deficit , mos t o f th e time , i n it s curren t account balanc e o f payments. Vis-à-vis the British , however, th e ne w situation was harder to grasp. In spite of Britain's straitened circumstances , Cana dian politicians, Kin g and especiall y St Laurent, could not shak e of f the ol d expectations o f the opulen t imperial power. Judged b y their own perspectives, Canadian s wer e generous i n their policies o f mutual aid during the war , and in relief and rehabilitatio n assistanc e at the en d of the war. Comparisons ar e not onl y odious bu t har d to compile. Just wha t d o yo u includ e a s aid? I n 194 8 Walter Lippmann sai d tha t wit h one-twelfth th e America n populatio n an d one-eighteent h th e America n national income , Canada' s contributio n t o recover y wa s one-fift h o f th e American. Canadian s wer e no t dispose d t o disput e these figures and Lippmann's comment, justifyin g th e us e of Marshall Plan funds for purchases in Canada, was often quoted: 'Th e truth is that man for man, family for family, taxpayer for taxpayer the Canadians hav e borne a heavier part of the burde n of Europea n reconstructio n tha n w e have.' 2 Books, speeches, and editorials of the tim e ar e self-congratulatory about Canadian philanthrop y and willingness to sacrifice. The attitude, however, betrays the persistence o f the voluntarist approach. It was a good record fo r a country which could have escape d war entirel y i f i t ha d wante d an d whos e contributio n eve n a t it s bes t wa s bound to be supplementary rather tha n decisive . In the early months of the war Mackenzie King had told the British delegation proposin g a Commonwealth ai r training plan that although Canad a ha d 'lost no tim e i n ranging herself o n the side o f Great Britain and Franc e .. . it was no t Canada' s wa r i n th e sam e sens e a s i t wa s Great Britain's , an d i t would d o more har m tha n goo d i f they were pressed t o do mor e tha n they

79 Relief , Rehabilitation, and Reconstructio n felt the y wer e abl e t o do.' 3 Tha t attitud e wa s considerably altere d b y th e course o f the wa r in which half th e worl d was ranged o n th e allie d side and the Nort h America n stak e becam e mor e obvious . Nevertheless , ther e per sisted th e taci t assumption that Canada, no t havin g been responsibl e for the war nor it s intended victim , should no t b e expected t o interpret literally the principle o f equa l sacrifice , o r a t leas t tha t it s contribution s shoul d b e regarded a s somewhat beyon d th e cal l of duty. Caution wa s required in th e case of relief and reconstruction. I t could be argued logically that Canada and Britain should suffer equall y in a common cause , and this assumption lurked in th e Britis h attitude s durin g th e lon g hagglin g over postwa r loans. Th e fortunes o f wa r ha d weakene d th e Britis h an d strengthene d th e Canadia n economies, bu t ther e wer e long-rang e historica l trends involve d a s well . Where should the line be honourably drawn between rehabilitating Britain or Western Europ e an d being saddled wit h the continuing burden of sustaining economies ove r whic h Canada ha d no control? The American s were faced with th e sam e dilemma , bu t the y coul d aspir e t o mor e influenc e ove r th e recipients. The proble m o f ho w to behav e toward s the less fortunate in other countries trouble d Canadian s i n their officia l an d privat e capacities throug h various phases . Durin g the wa r there wa s the inescapabl e necessity t o keep th e British and other allies solvent s o that the common struggl e for victory could be carried on . Then followe d the perio d o f emergency supplies , to keep not only allie s bu t enemie s alive an d ge t the m workin g again. Relief, however, was one thing ; reconstructio n wa s another. Vas t sums o f money were the n needed t o ge t the Europea n economie s movin g s o that relie f could b e suspended. Canadian motive s wer e frankly acknowledge d as a compatible mixture o f charitabl e instinc t an d th e calculatio n o f advantag e fo r a tradin g nation dependen t o n health y markets. B y the earl y fifties, when th e Euro pean countries wer e stumbling to their feet, attention switched to the othe r continents wher e drastic changes were taking place and ne w threats to stability perceived . Althoug h fe w peopl e faile d t o acknowledg e th e differenc e between th e reconstructio n o f a matur e Europea n econom y an d th e con struction o f rudimentary economies i n Asia and Africa , nevertheless , muc h of th e simpl e optimis m o f th e successfu l reconstructio n programm e i n Europe, culminatin g in the Marshall Plan, stimulated the ventures in foreign aid and development i n the fifties. Because o f its earlier involvement i n the war and in particular in the survival o f Britain , Canad a provide d hel p whe n i t wa s mos t neede d an d leas t noticed - tha t is, during and immediately after th e war. While the American administration cope d wit h more refractor y public attitudes an d th e division

80 Th e Shapin g of Peace of powers, the Canadian government was able to provide financial support to stave of f a British collapse in 194 6 and 194 7 while Congress pondered . By the tim e the Marshal l Plan was approved in 1948 , Canad a had, i n so doing, virtually bankrupted itself. There wa s in 194 7 a very serious exchange crisis. Canada wa s an indirec t beneficiary of the Marshal l Plan because th e Euro peans wer e thereby enable d t o pa y for th e supplie s Canad a had previously been providin g them o n highl y uncertai n credit . Th e Marshal l Plan i s re membered by Europeans with gratitude, and properly so, while the Canadian assistance i s recalled, if at all, only by elderly ex-officials . WARTIME AI D

Well before the approva l of Lend-Lease by the United States Congress Canada was financing British purchases i n Canada and enablin g Britain thereby to assist other Commonwealth and foreign countries. I n the beginning transactions were on a normal commercial basis, bu t as war supplies were more desperately neede d th e Britis h wer e unabl e t o pay . The flow of arm s fro m Canada could not be stopped in mid-war, and the Canadian government was forced t o improvise variou s ways and means to provid e the cash. In March 1942 a billion dollars were put at the disposa l o f Britain for the purchas e of vital wa r materials . Thi s wa s an outrigh t gift, bu t i t wa s usuall y described officially i n othe r term s t o appease a critical attitude in Quebec. Ther e was also an interest-free loan of 700 million dollars. However, it was regarded as natural to require some repatriation of Canadian securities hel d by residents of Britain and to ensure tha t the proceed s o f the sal e of any non-repatriated securities be used to finance British purchases i n Canada. It seemed to some cabinet minister s a good chance to do what their successors have wanted to do with America n investments - bring them home . Control by London was the bogey . This insistence o n a hard-pressed all y divesting itself of its assets may have reflected a persistently colonial attitude to the imperial economy and a failure to foresee the Canadian interest as perceived years after the war, when Ottawa was concerned bot h with the inability of the British to earn Canadian dollars and the unhealthy preponderance of American investment i n Canada. At the time, however, it looked more like one of the desperate expedients to which recourse must be had. Unlike the United States, Canada did not repatriate direct investment, and the British remained in a creditor position vis-à-vis Canada after the war. Long-term investmen t i n Canada owned in the Unite d Kingdom was $2476 millions in 193 9 and $1670 million s in 1945 . Directing military aid to Britain made sense in the earl y years of the war, but by 1943 it was recognized as more appropriate to have a 'United Nation s

81 Relief , Rehabilitation, and Reconstructio n Mutual Aid Act' which empowered the government to spend money on war supplies fo r any of the Unite d Nation s considere d 'essentia l to the defenc e and securit y of Canada an d th e caus e o f world freedom.' Mutua l aid agreements were negotiated no t only with th e Unite d Kingdo m but also with th e Soviet Union, China, Australia, New Zealand, and the French Committee of National Liberation . Becaus e o f an anxiet y not t o ge t involved agai n in th e terrible problem s o f th e repaymen t o f wa r debts an d recognizin g that i n a common effor t Canad a should b e giving and not lending , mutual aid agreements did not provid e for repayment or redelivery of war supplies although there were certain reasonably flexible provisions about handling materials in the pipelin e at the tim e o f the terminatio n of hostilities. Altogethe r Canada provided economi c ai d to its allies of over five billion dollars which, in view of the fac t tha t i t exceeded the nationa l income o f 1939 , was a considerable feat. It was fortunate, for political reasons, that it was broadly based on a vast expansion o f the economy acros s th e nation. In return for mutual aid the beneficiaries were obliged in each case to sign the pledge . The y promise d t o follo w afte r th e wa r economi c policie s tha t would lead to the 'adoptio n o f measures designe d t o promote employment , the production and consumption o f consumers' goods, and the expansion of commerce throug h appropriat e internationa l agreement s o n commercia l policy.'4 Canadian politician s an d officials , lik e th e Americans , wer e deter mined t o create a postwar system i n which the barrier s to trade, whic h they both believe d ha d bee n majo r cause s o f depressio n an d war , woul d b e removed. Canadians , no t being under the same strident politica l pressure as the American s felt fro m thei r Senate, di d not engage in the sordid pressures that distinguished th e negotiations ove r Articl e vil of the Lend-Leas e agree ments which pledged the recipient to expansionist economic policie s and the elimination o f 'discriminator y treatmen t i n internationa l commerce. ' Still , Canadian politician s wanted thei r government t o get terms not significantl y different fro m wha t Washington wa s demanding. Canadians, lik e Americans , woul d regar d thi s a s 'ai d withou t strings ' although that phrase had yet to be coined. A commitment t o virtuous behaviour i n th e motherhoo d term s o f th e da y wa s no t regarde d a s a string , although the signatories thought it was. Certainly the Canadians, n o less than the Americans , wer e convinced tha t their aims for a free-trading world were as much in the interest s of the othe r parties as they were of Canada and th e United States. They were prepared to open u p their own markets. They had, by gifts and interest-free loans , showed their concern tha t the erstwhile trading partners would not be unduly handicapped. The British and others knew, however, an d postwa r experienc e wa s to prov e the m right , tha t durin g an

82 Th e Shapin g of Peac e extended perio d of recovery they would have to protect their economies and the free-trade gospel of the North Americans was better suited to the American and Canadia n economie s whic h at the en d o f the wa r would be bulging with increase d capacit y in industria l and natura l resources . Th e Canadia n taxpayer di d hav e t o b e promised som e reward , however, and i n particular some reaso n fo r th e eas y terms . Th e oversea s marke t wa s so stubbornl y regarded as the essential condition of Canadian prosperity that fewer questions would b e aske d i f aid were related t o it . Althoug h the Hous e o f Common s gave overwhelmin g endorsemen t t o the variou s mutual aid appropriations, there wa s significan t oppositio n fro m a smal l grou p o f member s fro m Quebec.5 M I L I T A R Y RELIE F

Mutual ai d cease d a t th e en d o f hostilities , an d i t was explained tha t relief funds wer e bein g provide d throug h othe r sources . On e o f thes e wa s what was know n a s Militar y Relief. A s Canadia n forces wer e liberating areas i n Europe an d ha d thei r quot a o f Civi l Affair s officers , the y wer e inevitably involved i n programme s t o hel p th e civilia n populatio n surviv e unti l civil régimes could b e established. No t onl y food bu t medical supplie s and othe r commodities wer e required, if only to enable th e fighting forces to maintain security i n their rear. In Ital y this was a lengthy process, bu t Militar y Relief was les s protracte d i n othe r countries . Allocation s wer e i n th e hand s o f a Combined Civi l Affairs Committe e (Militar y Relief) financed by the Unite d States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Each government had undertake n to pa y for th e supplie s i t provided, bu t thi s meant a n undu e share fo r Can ada. A ne w formul a wa s worke d ou t tha t allowe d fo r Canada' s payin g roughly i n proportio n t o it s part in the invasio n o f Europe. The tota l Canadian contribution to Military Relief was in the neighbourhood of $95 million. Inevitably, in view of the dominant role played by the British and American s in militar y policies, Canad a ha d littl e shar e i n th e majo r decision s o f thi s programme. A s this was a winding up of the wa r rather tha n th e shapin g of the postwa r era, precedent s wer e relevant t o the past rather than the future . The Unite d Nation s Relie f an d Rehabilitatio n Administratio n wa s de signed t o co-ordinate relie f efforts a s territories were liberated. As describe d in chapter 2 , it s establishment wa s of critical importance in the evolutio n o f Canadian position s o n U N structures. UNRR A was not onl y a cause o n which officials worke d out their new theories, i t was one that roused th e suppor t of the Canadian public . The government ha d little trouble getting the approval of parliament ; question s fro m th e oppositio n tende d rathe r t o strengthe n

83 Relief , Rehabilitation, and Reconstructio n than t o weaken the positio n th e governmen t wa s taking. The fac t tha t Canada wa s relativel y fortunate wa s questioned b y onl y a few . A t th e secon d reading o f th e bil l callin g fo r Canadia n participatio n in UNRR A ther e wa s some suggestio n tha t i t was too limite d i n scope , tha t i t shoul d g o beyon d relief an d rehabilitatio n to involv e recover y lest i t merely lead t o indefinite relief. Tha t wa s a note struc k frequently , an d i t was accompanied b y a ful l recognition tha t th e economi c interest s o f Canadian s were involved i n th e recovery of Europe. The fear expressed i n the United States by Senator Vandenberg tha t UNRR A woul d pledge 'ou r tota l resource s t o whateve r illimitable schemes fo r relief and rehabilitation all around the world our New Deal crystal-gazers migh t desir e t o pursue ' wa s reflecte d i n Canada , bu t les s bluntly. Gordo n Graydon , fo r th e Conservatives , wante d 'som e limiting clause wit h respect to the lengt h to which these nations bande d togethe r are going to go in matters further than relief and rehabilitation provisions.'6 Like others, h e feare d a domesti c foo d shortage . Th e cessatio n o f Mutua l Aid immediately afte r th e en d o f hostilitie s befor e movin g o n t o th e recover y phase was evidence o f this cautious approach. Public opinion may have only vaguely comprehended the new functional ism, bu t the fine-spun theories of the specialists di d reflect a national mood. It was a mixture of a reinforced nationalis m along with a new conviction that internationalism wa s th e onl y wa y to assur e peace . Thi s firs t o f th e ne w United Nation s famil y t o get unde r wa y provided a challenging opportunity for Canadia n diplomat s becaus e the y wer e les s dispensabl e tha n usual . By the internationalizatio n of the relie f programme the publi c vaguely sensed a practical means of diffusin g th e awfu l responsibilit y of feeding th e destitut e indefinitely. Canadian s wer e neithe r stron g no r self-confiden t enoug h t o face alon e suc h complex issues as supplying the inscrutabl e Russians, decid ing whether or not to let the Germans starve, not to mention the horrendou s political implication s o f assistanc e t o th e fragil e an d distracte d coalition s struggling fo r powe r i n th e Europea n capitals . Politica l troubl e over ai d t o dubious régime s i n Easter n Europ e coul d b e averted . I t wa s ironica l tha t although i t wa s anxiet y t o fee d th e starvin g people s o f Europ e tha t ha d inspired th e government s o f th e U N to se t u p a relie f agency , i n th e en d UNRRA did not operat e in the liberate d West Europea n countrie s because of the principle that it would aid only those countries unable to pay. The Dutch , Belgians, an d other s wer e regarde d an d regarde d themselve s a s capable of financing their own relief supplies. At the Atlantic City meeting o f the Council in 194 6 Pearson urge d that foo d should no t b e a weapon of internationa l politics, an d whe n post-UNRR A relief wa s discussed i n th e U N Assembly i n 1946 Canada took the lead in getting the supplying countries to provide relief

84 Th e Shapin g of Peac e without regar d t o 'race , creed , o r politica l belief.' 7 A Canadia n brigadier , C.M. 'Bud ' Drury , wa s head o f th e UNRR A missio n i n Poland . Th e grea t advantage of an international organization for this problem and for the many problems looming in the futur e wa s that they removed th e necessit y o f unilateral or bilateral decisions. Isolation from th e world's problems, i t was fully realized, wa s no longe r a possibility. Internationalized responsibility was the other wa y out. For al l these reason s an d becaus e UNRR A ha d clearl y pu t Canad a o n th e map - and one Canadian, Lester Pearson , in particular -Canadians wer e reluctant to see it dissolved. The reasons the United States Congress wanted to deal with relief bilaterally were the reasons why Canadians did not want to do so. Whe n th e UNRR A Council met i n Geneva i n Augus t 194 6 Canada too k the lea d i n the adoption of a measure asking the Genera l Assembl y t o consider th e proble m o f post-UNRR A relief. The British , somewhat reluctantly , supported the Americans . So did the Dutch . In the 194 6 autumn session o f the General Assembly the Canadian delegation, led by Paul Martin, strongly favoured an approach to the proble m 'whic h will rest on concerted actio n by the Unite d Nations.' 8 Althoug h Canadian s wante d actio n throug h th e UN, they wer e no t entirel y happy t o pas s beyon d th e UNRR A phase . I t ha d be come a vast affair . 'Admirin g its success a s we do, we cannot help but shudder a t it s presen t complexity.' 9 Man y recipient government s wer e no w o n their feet and able to make trade agreements. However, 'one of the purpose s for whic h the internationa l organizatio n o f UNRR A wa s establishe d i s still present: namel y tha t ther e mus t b e som e internationa l machiner y fo r th e screening o f requirement s an d th e balancin g of competin g claims.' 10 It was made clear also that Canada, th e thir d largest contributor to UNRRA , bot h in sharing costs an d supplyin g goods, now wanted a broader base of contributing countries . There wa s a candid not e o f grievanc e in th e Canadia n position . Contri buting and receivin g countries wer e admonished fo r no t livin g up t o thei r commitments an d buryin g political differences . The Canadia n spokesma n mentioned tha t Canada's ability to contribute ha d depended o n special con ditions, notabl y a wheat surplus. Now reserves had been reduced belo w normal. 'I n thi s connection, I migh t mentio n tha t w e are still rationing butter and mea t i n addition to sugar." 1 The Canadia n positio n was close to that of Denmark, Brazil , an d othe r lesse r power s and o f Fiorell o LaGuardia , th e American director-genera l o f UNRRA , wh o denounce d hi s ow n country' s position. A majority, which included th e Eas t Europea n countries , fearin g they woul d be cut off relief, oppose d the Britis h and Americans , but the latter woul d no t giv e in . S o the Canadian s realize d agai n tha t the y would

85 Relief , Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction have to bow to the inevitable and make the best of it. In the General Assem bly a Canadian compromis e resolutio n was passed unanimously. It called for a 'special technical committee of experts ... [to ] be established by the Assem bly to study the minimum import requirements for the basic essentials of life of countries whic h might be in need o f relief, t o survey the mean s available to eac h t o financ e such imports , an d t o repor t o n th e amoun t o f financial assistance require d b y each o f thes e countries." 2 The Canadian s expresse d 'understanding' of the Unite d States position . Their private view, however, was better expresse d b y a well-placed Canadian journalist, Max Freedman , who commented tha t 'it is a pity, however, that she [th e us] lost her way and abandoned th e shinin g vision before the task was done."3 POST-UNRRA RELIE F

UNRRA'S activitie s were dul y woun d u p i n 194 7 and , i n spit e o f th e goo d intentions o f Canadians an d the others, not much in the way of international co-ordination throug h th e U N was provide d fo r post-UNRR A relief . Th e Assembly designated te n governments , includin g Canada, t o appoint an expert eac h t o the committee. Thi s body , convened b y the secretary-general , said tha t Europea n countrie s would need additiona l assistance o f $58 3 million fo r 1947 . Th e principl e instrument fo r continuing relief wa s to b e th e United Nations Internationa l Children's Emergenc y Fund which had a budget o f $45 0 millio n for 1947 . B y this time, however , Canada was beginning to fee l th e pressur e o f the drai n on its dollar reserves and its generosity was considerably less than it had been. I n these days Canada was still adjusting t o the revolutionar y programme o f social welfare and famil y allowance s introduced b y the King government during the war - an d beginning to realize its cost. Ther e wer e postwa r taxatio n trouble s a s well. Caution wa s observed , therefore, abou t commitment s t o programmes , howeve r worthy , which implied a continuing international obligation to social welfare in the worl d at large. Whereas Canad a presse d for obligator y support by all members of temporary relief agencie s lik e UNRR A o r th e Internationa l Refuge e Organization, when i t cam e t o th e Unite d Nation s Internationa l Children' s Emergenc y Fund, which might carry on indefinitely, they wanted to make contributions voluntary. In fact, Canada was not enthusiastic about UNICEF as a permanent institution and in 1950 actually voted against the resolution to continue it for another thre e years becaus e i t was impossible to give relief t o hundred s of millions o f children an d i t was better t o ac t i n emergencies. Nevertheless , UNICEF ha d th e stron g support o f a number o f Canadian official s an d als o of

86 Th e Shapin g of Peace Canadian privat e agencies. 14 I n th e critica l 1947-8 perio d th e governmen t contributed onl y 1. 1 per cen t o f UNICEF' S budget. The country' s reputation was partially saved b y the million s of dollars ($1 8 million between January 1947 an d Apri l 1948 , for example) raised for relief by private organizations in Canada. Government support , needless t o say, was heavily directed to the purchase of Canadian produce. Parliament in 194 7 appropriated $20 millions for post-UNRR A relief. Fiv e million dollar s of this went to UNICE F and th e res t t o Austria , Greece, and Italy. None o f this relief went to the East European 'satellites, ' a s they were now being called. Soviet hegemony was becoming clearer, and the charge was being made that relief funds woul d be used fo r Communist part y purposes. Communist representatives i n the U N attacked the aid policy of the Wester n countries on the grounds that it was granted for political reasons rather than on the basis of need. Although the Canadian government had not renounced its view that aid should be non-political, it could probably not have got parliamentary support for sending relief to the régimes now being installed in East European countries. It was Europe, of course, to which Canadian attention was still directed, not only because of the historic fixation and the conviction about the economic an d securit y priority o f that continent , bu t also because the chal lenge of relief to the suffering millions of Asia was better not thought about. If Europe might prove insatiable, Asia was certainly the bottomless pit. In a very few years, however, it would be membership in the United Nations, as well as the Commonwealth, tha t would force Canadians to think about the unthinkable. That was a consequence o f the passion for participation in international institutions no t clearly recognized a t the time - althoug h it may have bee n foreseen all too clearl y by Mackenzie King. It shoul d b e adde d tha t a s Canada's financial position improve d in later years and i t was obvious that the UN , with its present balanc e of power, was not going to rush headlong into global welfare, th e government accepte d th e existence of such bodies as UNICEF and supported them, if not t o the limit of its resources, at least well enough t o compare reasonably with others. When it came to specific - and presumably emergency - relief programmes such as the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agenc y and the United Nation s Relief an d Work s Agenc y for Palestin e Refugees , th e Canadia n contribu tions were among the worthiest. 15 F I N A N C I A L AI D T O EUROPE 1 6

Canadian motive s fo r contributin g to relief , rehabilitation , and reconstruc tion were mixed and full y acknowledge d to be so. Even without the convie -

87 Relief , Rehabilitation, and Reconstructio n tion that a restored Europ e would be good business, i t is hard to believe tha t Canada coul d hav e stoo d idl y by . Th e programme s o f Militar y Ai d an d UNRRA wer e obligatory , les s relate d t o calculation s about th e need s o f th e Canadian economy. B y the tim e the y were exhausted, however , th e econo mies of Western Europe , including especially Britain, were still desperate, fa r from bein g thos e o f profitable trading partners. There ha d bee n a n invest ment that needed much mor e mone y befor e it could pay off. It could not be written off, partly because a restored Britis h and European marke t remained central in Canadian calculations, but also because, howeve r exasperating the effort t o establish term s with the bankrupt , no Canadian government coul d be ruthles s enoug h t o turn it s back - especiall y when th e Americans were not doin g so . The situatio n di d no t diffe r greatl y from tha t which obtained during th e wa r when the movemen t o f goods an d service s le d th e wa y and then som e respectabl e financial cover ha d t o be found. 17 Afte r th e fighting had ceased, however , practice s accepted i n wartime would come int o question. That Mutua l Ai d would not g o on afte r th e fighting stopped should pro bably hav e bee n take n fo r granted . It s abrup t endin g i n Septembe r 194 5 was harsh-an d woul d hav e seeme d harshe r i f th e European s ha d no t already suffere d severa l week s earlie r th e shoc k o f Washington's cessatio n of Lend-Lease . Canad a obviousl y could no t affor d t o b e th e on e sourc e o f free assistanc e whe n th e American s ha d shu t of f th e flow . I n makin g hi s announcement th e ministe r o f finance, J.L. Ilsley , pointe d ou t tha t Mutual Aid was a wartime measure t o end when victory came. 'The government ha s always endeavoured t o make this clear to parliament and the Canadian public, a s well as t o th e allie d nations receiving Mutua l Aid.' 18 However, thi s would not end or delay the flow of essential civilian supplies to the allies. The government woul d continue t o bu y such supplie s for allied governments i f they requeste d the m an d undertoo k t o reimburs e Canad a fo r th e cost s s o incurred. Ilsle y recognize d tha t mos t countrie s woul d require credits , an d negotiations wer e proceedin g wit h a view to th e provisio n of credits unde r the Export Credits Insuranc e Act . Britain, he acknowledged, was a very special problem. Even in 1945 the illusio n persisted tha t the Britis h could get back on their feet soon , an d ther e followe d a series o f desperate measure s t o prop up th e British econom y an d permi t the Britis h to continu e buyin g food an d othe r products tha t wer e stil l pouring out o f the enormousl y expande d Canadia n economy. It became a long sad story and a classic illustration of how indebtedness affects ol d friendships. The Britis h were strapped, with little room for manoeuvre, bu t whe n the y ha d t o bargai n stiffl y ove r th e term s b y which

88 Th e Shapin g of Peac e they woul d accept Canadia n assistance , th e Canadian s wer e understandably irked. There was persistent and wide-spread sympathy for the British in their tribulations, a feeling that geography and British courage had forced them t o pay an undu e pric e for victory. Cold winters and shortage s o f food an d fue l in 194 6 and 194 7 stirred compassion among comfortable Canadians. A t bottom wa s a simple realization that the y could not le t a people t o which they were so deeply, if ambiguously, attached sin k into a slump. King was of two minds. In his diary he records his irritation with the British over the loan. His views swung from thos e o f St Laurent, who was for tougher terms, t o those of Ilsle y an d th e financia l expert s wh o though t i t bes t tha t a loa n no t b e saddled wit h interest a t all. That h e was, nevertheless, Britain' s best friend, King never doubted . 'I t did not seem to me i t was fair t o future generations to mortgag e th e futur e in that wa y though I was prepared to agree that had Britain becom e a debto r natio n i n th e war , and w e had becom e a credito r nation, tha t w e mus t recogniz e a n obligatio n t o hel p t o restor e Britain' s future. Thi s di d not mea n ou r goin g the lengt h o f risking the defea t of th e Government itself.. . I said i t was my first duty to see that the Governmen t was sustained. I t would be little help to Britain or anybody else if we were out of office.' 19 H e wa s probabl y right . A Conservativ e governmen t wit h it s imperialist reputatio n coul d les s easil y have marshalle d suppor t acros s th e country for a loan of this proportion to Britain. In hi s speech o f 1 1 April 194 6 announcing a loan to the Unite d Kingdom of $1,250,000,000 , Ilsle y stressed th e crucia l importance for Canad a o f th e rehabilitation o f Britain . The triangula r trade o n whic h Canada ha d flour ished wa s at stake. The irresistibl e pressure o f consumers flus h with money and shor t o f good s ha d enormousl y increase d import s fro m th e Unite d States. The needs of Britain and Europe were such that exports were pouring in tha t direction , bu t the y coul d b e pai d fo r onl y b y credits. H e expecte d Britain woul d be goin g through abou t five years o f transition . Ther e was a broader principl e a t stake , however , tha n simpl y balancin g th e Canadia n budget. 'Becaus e o f thi s larg e an d centra l plac e whic h Britain occupies i n world trade , Britis h policie s in regar d t o trad e ar e o f critica l importance t o exporting countrie s an d particularl y to Canada . I n addition , Britis h policies will influenc e an d largel y determine th e policie s o f man y othe r countries , including particularly the countrie s no w in the sterling area and probably the countries o f Western Europe. ' Th e Britis h were seen a s facing two alternatives, on e libera l and one restrictive, and it was of the utmos t importanc e to Canada that Britain give the lea d in the directio n o f liberal trade.20 A determining facto r i n arranging the loa n to Britain was the fac t tha t th e British were at the same tim e negotiatin g with the Americans. Canada could

89 Relief , Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction not affor d t o be as generous - or so Canadians thought - as the rich United States, bu t where Britain was concerned they would be expected t o be. They would not want to compare unfavourably with a country outside the family . The Unite d State s Congres s expecte d the m t o b e mor e generou s an d th e assistance offere d b y Canad a wa s regarde d a s importan t b y thos e i n th e Washington administration trying to get legislative approval for aid to Britain on th e bes t possibl e terms . Canadia n legislators , o n th e othe r hand , espe cially thos e les s wel l dispose d t o th e 'Mothe r Country, ' ha d an eye on th e terms th e Yankee s wer e getting . Wha t Canad a offere d wa s in proportion very much larger, $1.25 billion as compared with $3.75 billion for the United States. The interest was the same, 2 per cent, although the cost of borrowing was higher in Canada. In addition, after muc h argument, the Britis h debt of $425 million on th e Commonwealt h Ai r Training Plan durin g the wa r was cancelled. The $70 0 million loan of 1942 was extended to 1951 , still interestfree. Ironically , th e groun d wa s cut fro m unde r th e fee t o f th e Canadia n officials whe n th e Britis h i n thei r loa n negotiation s wit h th e American s agreed to the insertion of a clause by which they undertook not to accept any loan fro m a Commonwealt h countr y o n term s mor e onerou s tha n thos e incorporated i n the loa n agreement wit h the Unite d States . This , o f course, made i t impossibl e fo r Canad a t o giv e them bette r terms. 21 Althoug h th e Canadian agreement , lik e th e American , calle d for non-discriminatio n an d the convertibilit y of sterling , th e term s wer e les s hars h an d specific . Th e Americans mad e n o secre t o f thei r desire t o en d th e imperia l preference arrangements a s th e majo r barrie r to th e brav e ne w worl d of free r trade . Even Canadian s wh o would have bee n happ y to exchange imperia l preference for something wider and better preferred that it not be abandoned without being used as a bargaining counter wit h the Americans, whose professed devotion t o removin g barrier s had ye t t o b e teste d i n th e practic e o f Con gress. The Anglo-Canadia n wheat agreement o f 1946 should be seen in this context. I t wa s not strictl y speaking an aid-to-Britai n scheme, bu t ther e wa s a tendency t o see i t in that light as it followed soon after th e loan . The British desperately neede d whea t an d the y ha d t o ge t i t economically . Canadians wanted the m t o ge t i t a s cheaply as possibl e an d remai n th e stabl e custo mers. A bilatera l dea l o f thi s kin d ra n counte r t o th e Canadia n argumen t for multilatera l arrangements, bu t it could be excused a s a temporary necessity. Politica l pressure s fro m Wester n Canad a mad e a wheat deal wit h Britain obligator y for an y government. Britai n was the histori c destination fo r Canadian grain . Sendin g foodstuff s t o Britai n had bee n a habi t during th e war. In the depressio n befor e th e wa r the prairies had suffered bitterl y from

90 Th e Shapin g of Peace low far m prices . Th e Britis h coul d no t affor d t o pa y much fo r whea t now when it was a scarce commodity, an d Canadians wer e prepared to concede a low price provided they could get some commitment s fro m the British to go on buyin g at a fai r pric e late r whe n supplie s wer e expecte d to be mor e plentiful - an d prices wer e expecte d t o decline . Som e far-sighte d officials , such as the high commissioner i n London, Norman Robertson , realize d that such a n arrangemen t would be storin g up trouble, tha t the Britis h recovery would b e slow, and i n such circumstance s i t might b e very difficult t o insis t that the y go on buying wheat at a price that could be well above the marke t price. The inevitabl e happened . Accordin g to the agreement Britai n would take more whea t tha n i t would normally require, a t least 16 0 million bushels i n each of the first two years and 14 0 million in each of the next two years. The price stipulated , $1.5 5 i n th e firs t tw o years , was considerabl y lowe r tha n world prices. It was to go down to not less than $1.25 and then $1.00, respectively, in the third and fourth years, but the prices negotiated for the last two years were to 'hav e regar d to any difference between price s paid under thi s Agreement... and worl d prices' fo r deliverie s i n th e firs t tw o years. Wheat prices did not fal l an d the pric e agreed upon for the las t two years was $2.00. However, th e ne w internationa l Whea t Agreemen t i n 194 8 set a ceiling of $1.80, an d the n whe n th e Marshal l Pla n got into operatio n i n 1949 , Nort h American wheat was available to the British free. The British thought that, as they ha d pai d a pric e well above th e specifie d minimu m fo r th e las t tw o years, the y ha d pai d of f their obligation . Canadia n whea t farmer s though t they ha d go t a ra w dea l an d presse d th e governmen t t o ge t a n additiona l payment from the British . After much sou r haggling , the Canadia n govern ment pai d the additiona l sum, $6 5 million, itself. Robertson ha d been righ t in hi s fears . Lik e al l o f th e British-Canadia n financia l negotiation s i n thi s period, the perspective s on what was right or wrong, fair o r unfair, could no t be brough t int o focus . Too fe w people i n Londo n o r Ottawa could see i t as Pearson note d i n a memorandum fo r cabine t of 9 December 194 7 at a time of nea r deadloc k wit h th e British : 'We agree d tha t bot h side s wer e facin g facts which were difficult t o reconcile, and that the facts of the situatio n an d not an y lac k o f goodwill on eithe r side was responsible for ou r presen t diffi culties.' That kin d of perception wa s the essence of his diplomacy. Britain was crucial, but the other Europea n countries - an d potential markets - wer e not forgotten. It was as 'a measure to facilitate and develop trad e between Canad a an d other countries' tha t the Export Credits Insurance Act had been introduce d o n 2 8 July 1944. Althoug h i t was a boon t o the recipients, it ought no t to be classified as aid. It provided for insurance o f ordinary

91 Relief , Rehabilitation, and Reconstructio n short-term commercia l credit s tha t could b e use d onl y fo r Canadian good s and services . On 3 Decembe r 194 5 Ilsle y secure d approva l both fo r th e provisio n o f $750 millio n for credit s to France , th e Netherland s Indies , an d Norway and also t o enabl e th e governmen t t o conclud e negotiation s wit h Belgium , China, an d th e USSR . I n thi s speec h h e agai n stresse d th e importanc e o f 'reviving and developing our export trad e during the reconstruction period.' He sa w als o a securit y angle , fo r 'I f Europ e an d Asi a ar e economicall y healthy, wars are less likely to break out.' He recognized ther e was a risk, but Canada was prepared t o accept the ris k rather than pass it on to the receiver. Recipients wer e aske d t o purchas e par t o f th e requirement s i n Canad a fo r cash, normall y one-fifth o r one-sixth, but the requiremen t was waived in the case o f Czechoslovakia whic h could no t pa y cash. 22 Afte r th e hug e British loan i n Apri l 1946 , th e drai n o n reserve s mad e official s mor e cautiou s about Canada' s leadin g role in reconstruction. In 194 6 the governmen t dis couraged application s fo r furthe r assistanc e fro m France , Czechoslovakia , Greece, Denmark , Finland , Hungary , and Turkey. The Pole s di d not mak e known thei r interes t i n thi s kin d o f assistanc e unti l the appropriation s had been almos t exhausted , bu t th e trouble d relation s wit h Polan d ove r th e admission b y Canada o f Polish soldiers a s refugees and the Polish state treas ures stil l hel d i n Canada 23 were o f some relevance . Thi s programm e ha d a very successfu l recor d a s far a s repayment s wer e concerned . Althoug h th e Export Credi t procedur e wa s designed fo r a postwa r situation, i t continue d and developed int o the Export Developmen t Corporation . As the wa r ended, the continenta l positio n wa s for Canada quit e satisfactory, thanks t o th e favourabl e balance resultin g from th e Hyd e Park Agree ment. B y the middl e o f 194 6 Canadia n reserve s ha d reache d a substantia l figure beyon d tha t o f prewa r years , an d th e governmen t fel t confiden t enough t o retur n th e Canadia n dolla r t o parity- a measur e primaril y in tended t o insulat e Canada fro m importin g inflation fro m th e Unite d States . In 1947 , however , th e reckonin g came . Th e Britis h wer e drawin g mor e rapidly than expecte d o n the loan - a result in part of the delay of Congres s in ratifying th e American loa n -and th e reserves of gold and dollars deterio rated seriously . Th e governmen t wa s stil l reluctan t t o chang e it s poli cies, and post-UNRR A aid was extended durin g that year. However , b y Feb ruary the governo r o f the Ban k of Canada wa s warning that 'Canad a canno t continue indefinitel y t o sell on credit i n overseas market s whil e she is incurring a substantia l cas h defici t i n he r balanc e o f payment s wit h th e Unite d States.'24 I n thei r postwa r nee d fo r material s Canadian s wer e importin g heavily from the United States, but unlike the prewar years they were not able

92 Th e Shapin g of Peac e to compensate by payment from exports to the United Kingdom. The Americans were concerned wit h the recovery of Western Europ e and not dispose d to take Canada's difficulties seriously . In June 194 7 General Marshall made his famous speech, bu t the promised massive American assistance fo r European reconstructio n wa s a long time coming . I n th e absenc e o f America n help, th e Britis h continue d t o dra w so rapidl y o n th e Canadia n loa n tha t Canada wa s facing a crisis . Th e Britis h were pressing Canadian s fo r mor e generous term s an d warning that they would have to discriminate more severely against Canadian imports . Canadian official s sa w th e collaps e o f thei r drea m o f a transitio n fro m temporary difficultie s t o th e er a o f world-wid e trad e expansion , an d the y went off to Washington t o put pressur e o n the American s to do something . They i n tur n ha d t o threate n th e American s wit h discriminatio n agains t American import s an d th e effec t tha t woul d hav e o n thei r versio n o f th e dream. Official s i n Washingto n wer e understanding enough, bu t the y were clearly concerne d ove r Congress . Britis h demand s fo r Canadia n hel p go t more shrill , an d Canadians , bese t b y their own difficulties, go t less sympathetic. The America n official s wer e unable to find a solution, although they did hel p Canada ge t a line of credit o f $300 million from th e Export-Impor t Bank i n Novembe r 1947 . I n spite o f the anxiet y in Ottawa to seek broade r international solutions, the y were caught in the old triangle. The world market wa s slow in opening up . I t was clear that Canada would have t o restrict dollar imports, and this was especially unfortunate as it had to be done just as the Genera l Agreemen t o n Tariff s an d Trad e was signed i n Geneva o n 30 October. Th e American s were equally concerned ove r th e impac t on GATT , and th e Canadia n announcemen t o f the restriction s wa s stage-managed i n collusion. It stated the government's intentio n to administer the controls in a manner consisten t wit h GAT T an d remov e the m 'a t th e earlies t possibl e moment tha t circumstance s permit. ' Th e Stat e Departmen t issue d a pres s release tha t concluded : 'I n term s o f he r continue d contributio n t o world reconstruction Canada' s action shoul d be considered a s a short ter m meas ure whic h does no t mea n abandonmen t o f the lon g term objective s share d by the Unite d States.' 25 The perio d betwee n th e en d o f th e wa r an d th e middl e o f 194 8 wa s a curious lul l betwee n th e ho t wa r and the col d war . During this tim e everybody seemed to be desperately trying to get back to the prewa r world, eve n though they proclaimed their will to something better . It was a cantankerous and frustratin g period , an d th e spiri t of wartim e communit y wa s draining rapidly. From this corrosion the Atlantic economies, including the Canadian , may hav e bee n save d b y th e blunderin g Russians. 26 Th e Pragu e cou p i n

93 Relief , Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction March 194 8 moved th e Unite d States Congres s t o pas s the Foreig n Assist ance Act in April. The argument in Ottawa, as well as in Washington, on th e loans to Britain had been largel y economic. Now political and security calculations becam e important . Just afte r th e cou p in Prague the Canadia n high commissioner i n Londo n pointe d ou t tha t th e altered politica l situation, a s well as the resulting probability of more rapid action by Congress, were arguments fo r a somewha t mor e generou s Canadia n attitud e o n credi t t o th e British. In this way, he thought it would be possible for Canada 'to share in this additional but comparatively modest way in the risks involved in attempting to safeguard Western Europe from further encroachments and infiltrations.'27 In Washington Wrong , wh o ha d bee n appointe d ambassado r i n Septembe r 1946, wa s finding the American s critical of Canada's unwillingnes s to help the British further. The political circumstances were only going to make Canada loo k worse . O n 2 5 Marc h th e Canadia n governmen t agree d tha t th e United Kingdo m migh t dra w on th e Canadia n credi t a t a n increase d rate , with the additional concession that the offe r wa s to hold good whether or not the Europea n Recover y Programme in Washington cam e into effect befor e that date . Loui s St Laurent wa s now assuming control as secretary o f stat e for externa l affair s and , although he had been les s disposed t o concession to the British , he wa s more susceptibl e tha n Mackenzi e King to th e politicalsecurity argument. In September 194 8 he suggested in a joint meeting of the cabinet Externa l Trad e Committe e an d th e Interdepartmenta l Committe e that the Unite d Kingdo m and Western Europ e should now be regarded no t so much as a market but as a buffer betwee n th e Iron Curtain countries and the western hemisphere whic h should be helped to self-sufficiency. 28 I t was a time, o f course, whe n S t Laurent an d hi s advisers wer e contemplating the moves that shortly produced the North Atlantic Treaty. Statistics for th e Canadia n contributio n t o relief and recover y wer e produced i n Februar y 194 8 b y th e ne w ministe r o f finance , D.C . Abbott . I n addition t o th e mone y provided Britain , Canada ha d under th e Mutua l Aid Act provide d good s an d service s t o it s allie s t o a valu e o f approximately $2,200,000,000. This he regarded as part of the war effort. I t was in addition to furthe r wartim e aid amounting t o $1. 3 billion , postwa r relief direc t an d through Unite d Nation s agencie s o f ove r $275,000 , and postwa r credits of about $1,857,000,000 . This wa s on the ev e o f the Marshal l Plan and Canadians were justified i n pointing out that on a per capita basis they had made a very muc h large r contributio n t o Europea n recover y tha n ha d the Ameri cans. There was, however, anothe r aspec t o f postwar relief that required deci sions muc h mor e difficul t an d much closer t o political sensitivities tha n th e

94 Th e Shapin g of Peac e mere provision o f money. Wha t was to be done with the million s o f people displaced durin g the war , many o f whom wer e unwillin g to retur n t o their homes? REFUGEES 2 9

Although there was much talk from Ottaw a in the later years about the nee d to surrende r sovereignt y t o the ne w world organization, ther e wer e certai n reservations abou t sensitive areas on which the Canadian government wa s as unyielding as it had been whe n confronted with the League. 30 'If there is one idea held more tenaciously than another on our side of the Atlantic , it is that we must retain control of our ow n internal affairs,' declare d Newton Rowell to the Firs t Assembly of the League. The abstractions of the post-World War II leader s wer e different . I n hi s addres s t o th e firs t sessio n o f th e Unite d Nations General Assembl y St Laurent did not stress national sovereignty bu t said rather that 'Sovereignty must not mean libert y to defeat the purpose s of international peace and security.' He went on to say that 'If this be the way to world government , the n th e Canadia n delegatio n wholeheartedl y support s world government.' 31 Thi s coul d b e misleading . Fro m th e privat e memo randa o f th e tim e i t i s clea r tha t internationa l contro l o f th e immigratio n policies of member state s wa s so far from th e mind s o f Canadian politicians that the y wer e no t eve n preoccupie d wit h i t as a threat. Whe n the y talke d about the subordinatio n o f national sovereignty they were thinking of collective securit y i n conventiona l term s or , a s S t Lauren t mad e clea r i n thi s speech, th e nee d o f desperate measure s t o control atomic energy . Whe n i t came t o internationa l security Canada wa s a consumer, bu t i n matter s eco nomic Canada was a producer. They were strongly emphasizing the role and the authorit y of th e Unite d Nation s Economi c an d Socia l Council , bu t it s function wa s to b e co-ordination. It was, o f course, a liberal's, no t a socialist's, view of 'world government.' Within th e civi l servic e th e fact s o f life , includin g the conservatis m o f cabinet o n populatio n policies , wer e recognize d a s settin g limit s t o polic y proposals, even thoug h Externa l Affair s official s i n particular were aware of the handica p placed o n their vision o f the countr y b y Canada's insensitivity to the pligh t of refugees, it s archaic immigration regulations, an d the racism clearly evident i n practice. External Affair s battere d vigorousl y against what they regarde d a s th e defensiv e mentalit y entrenche d i n th e Immigratio n Branch, sough t to war n the cabine t of the desperat e realitie s the y saw in Europe, an d t o encourage an imaginative approach to a population policy for Canada.32 To avoid the exposur e o f hypocrisy, External Affair s though t that

95 Relief , Rehabilitation, and Reconstructio n the les s said in international bodies the better . A t San Francisco the Australians an d Ne w Zealander s threatene d t o g o ou t o n a limb over a propose d limitation on the domestic jurisdiction article of the Charter (2:7) which they thought migh t threaten ratificatio n b y their legislatures , fearfu l o f implications fo r immigratio n laws. Robertson an d Wron g sa w that th e Australian s and New Zealanders could not change the great-power draft and would serve only to dra w loud attention t o a possible consequenc e tha t would be as unhappy for the Canadia n parliamen t as for theirs. The fuss would do no good. They got the prim e minister's approva l for a policy of lying low and supporting 'any text which could be agreed betwee n th e United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countrie s an d th e Unite d States.' 33 This wa s not a topic on which to b e pu t o n th e spot . I t was rarely difficult , o f course, t o get King' s approval for a policy of lying low. The ide a of a world body actually assigning the world' s population on th e basis o f available space an d resource s ha s always been more a bogey than a threat.34 As an abstraction it can be supported o r opposed o n moral grounds , but i n practic e th e close r on e approache s i t th e les s rea l i t becomes . A s a cause it had and still has, nevertheless , a significance which rallies the righteous an d make s th e guilt y tremble. I n thei r defianc e o f immigratio n pres sures, parliamentarian s betraye d onl y occasional sensitivit y on th e subject . The imaginar y threat of being forced t o accept horde s o f people of someone else's choic e undoubtedl y inhibite d th e mor e humanitaria n feeling s tha t might have been expecte d fo r the victim s of that tyranny younger Canadians were fighting to destroy. Some one millio n refugees wer e i n th e car e o f UNRR A a t th e en d o f th e hostilities in Europe . The y include d refugees o f lon g standing and th e mil lions o f persons displace d b y the war , crowded int o camps in Germany an d uncertain abou t returnin g to Eastern Europe . Canadian official s wer e active in th e creatio n o f international structures t o cop e with refugees, specificall y an Internationa l Refuge e Organizatio n that woul d b e functionally effectiv e and provide for a n equitable sharin g of the financial burdens. The respons e of th e governmen t wa s muted. Sharin g the finances was one thing ; sharing the refugee s wa s another. I t touche d upo n a n unresolve d dilemm a o f th e Canadian econom y o f this period. Th e governmen t wa s dominated b y me n who ha d onl y recentl y survive d th e depressio n o f th e thirtie s and i t could not, i n these uncertai n times , shak e loos e from th e inhibitio n about immigration writte n indelibl y into part y policies durin g th e perio d o f desperat e unemployment. Wherea s th e expectatio n o f postwa r unemploymen t afte r the dismantling of the war machine encouraged generosity in the reconstruc tion o f th e Europea n market , i t discourage d a polic y o f welcomin g new -

96 Th e Shapin g of Peace comers. The ol d caution wa s countered b y the expansionis t nationalis m of young politician s an d a larg e par t o f th e senio r bureaucracy , wh o too k a Keynesian vie w o f population. 35 Thei r convictio n tha t a mor e populou s country woul d b e a wealthie r countr y wa s widel y expresse d a s Canad a entered the postwar period, but it did not sway government policy until a few years later when it looked as though, contrary to widespread speculation, th e transition fro m wa r to peac e econom y woul d not entai l sever e unemploy ment. By that time, however, the period of desperate emergency in the refu gee camps had passed. REFUGEES: WARTIME MEASURE S

The nervou s attitud e toward s refugee s i n 194 5 resemble d incredibl y that displayed before the war. While the number of desperate people fleeing fro m Germany, Italy , or Spai n had mounted i n Europe durin g the thirties , Can ada's immigratio n regulations admitted onl y British and America n citizen s and agriculturalist s who coul d b e self-sufficient . Hitler' s treatmen t o f th e Jews was deplored, bu t a boatload o f Jews escaping from German y was denied admission t o Canada, a s well as to the Unite d States and Cuba , in th e summer of 1939. 36 A scheme to bring Sudeten refugees to Canada for which the Britis h would have pai d was so hesitantly embraced tha t the Nazi s overran Czechoslovaki a befor e thei r victim s coul d escape. 37 A t th e en d o f th e depression official s di d not want to add more names to the welfare rolls, and there wa s a widesprea d feelin g that relie f fund s should b e spen t o n Cana dians. Ther e wa s als o a nativisti c fear o f increasin g th e percentag e o f an y racial group excep t th e Britis h and the French . A memorandum t o cabinet from th e Immigration Branch, 29 November 1938 , said : 'We do not want to take too many Jews, but in the present circumstances, w e do not want to say so. We d o no t wan t to legitimiz e the Arya n mythology by introducing any formal distinctio n fo r immigratio n purpose s betwee n Jew s an d non-Jews . The practical distinction, however, has to be made and should be drawn with discretion and sympathy by the competent department , without the need t o lay down a formal minute o f policy.' When Roosevel t calle d a conference a t Evia n i n 193 8 to establis h som e international actio n o n refugee s fro m th e Nazis , Canad a wa s invited. Th e Canadian delegates were instructed to see that no country would be expected to tak e mor e immigrant s tha n wer e permitte d b y existin g legislatio n an d reminded tha t few refugees were of the agricultural class, that they had usually been deprive d o f their citizenship and thei r capital, both o f which were required for immigrants to Canada so they would not be a charge on welfar e

97 Relief , Rehabilitation , and Reconstructio n and coul d b e sen t hom e i f necessary. 38 In th e decad e 1933-42 , when hun dreds o f thousand s o f people wer e desperatel y tryin g to escap e fro m Nazidominated territories, some 9000 people were admitted to Canada by special orders-in-council - mostl y refugees. Th e total number o f immigrants in that period was 39,000. Even durin g th e wa r the attitud e t o refugee s remaine d exceedingl y cautious - althoug h problem s o f transportation reduce d th e pressure . Canad a took ove r som e interne d enem y alien s fro m Britain , but a distinctio n was made betwee n wartim e sanctuary and permanen t settlement . Canad a wa s not represente d a t a conference i n Bermuda i n 194 3 to dea l wit h refugees , but aske d t o b e kep t informed . I t wa s a British-America n affai r t o which, King said, Canad a had not been invited. King did say Canada would receive a number o f additional refugees until peace is restored and 'individua l applications fo r permission t o remain i n this country after th e war will be given ful l and sympatheti c consideration.' 39 Willingness to pla y a ful l bu t unspecifie d part was a favourite formula of King's when dealing with issues on which he believed tha t th e less sai d th e better - a category tha t include d mos t ques tions o f externa l affairs . Member s o f parliamen t raise d question s bu t th e prime minister an d J.A . Glen, wh o as minister of mines and resource s was timidly i n charg e o f immigration , too k evasiv e action-on e formul a o f King's being to deplore the raisin g of such a question when there was a war to b e won. He said Canada woul d be glad to play its full par t as soon as the proposals wer e presented t o the United Nation s - anothe r piou s excuse fre quently invoke d t o justify procrastinatio n o n ticklis h issues. H e promise d participation i n th e revise d an d strengthene d 'Intergovernmenta l Commit tee' although this gallant body, seeking to operate fro m Londo n durin g the war, had received littl e help from Canada. King was reflecting hesitation among the general public to throw open th e doors. Quebe c member s o f parliamen t sai d bluntl y that the y did no t want hoards o f refugees, eithe r becaus e the y would distort the balanc e within the country or because the y were people who would not be easily assimilable in Quebec. That usually meant Jews, a sentiment also expressed b y some Social Creditors and more politely by some others. Canadian s were horrified by the treatment o f Jews in Germany bu t the y did not necessarily want to increas e 'disproportionately' th e Jewis h populatio n o f Canada . Poll s take n i n 194 6 show a resistanc e t o th e admissio n i n particula r o f Japanes e an d Jews. 40 There was the traditiona l xenophobia o f a conservative societ y tha t had , in the first quarter of the century, absorbed a n enormous number o f stranger s and achieve d precariou s equipoise , fearfu l no w that the ruine d civilizations of Europ e woul d spe w forth thei r desperat e million s t o threate n Canada' s

98 Th e Shapin g of Peac e bucolic and abstemious way of life. Fear of displaced persons wa s not merely anti-semitic. There was legitimate concern tha t some ha d been collaborators with the Germans. Ther e was fear i n labour unions that Canadian employers might exploi t thei r desperatio n b y importin g displace d person s a s chea p labour, a fear encouraged by a storm over the importatio n of Polish girls by a Quebec industrialis t to wor k in his textile mills under contract s reminiscen t of the ag e of indentured labour. THE I N T E R N A T I O N A L REFUGE E ORGANIZATIO N

A fe w hundre d refugees wer e reaching Canada a t th e en d o f the war . The government wa s co-operatin g i n it s fashio n wit h th e Intergovernmenta l Committee o n Refugees . Throug h it s contribution s t o an d it s wor k i n UNRRA Canad a was , o f course , offerin g som e assistanc e i n th e immediat e problems o f th e refugees . I t i s notable , however , tha t i n al l th e extensiv e debate ove r Canada' s rol e i n UNRR A ther e wa s little acknowledgement o f responsibility t o provid e refuge for th e homeles s victims o f th e war . In all the justifications, publi c and confidential, of Canada's right to a major voice in UNRRA , i t i s Canada's rol e a s a produce r o f foreign exchange assistanc e and supplie s whic h i s stressed . Ther e wa s les s awarenes s o f a con comitant obligation to share with the Europea n countrie s the burde n o f the refugees. Canad a di d agree tha t the Intergovernmenta l Committee wa s inadequate t o deal with the enormou s refuge e proble m and that the questio n should b e referre d t o th e Unite d Nations . I n Februar y 194 6 th e Genera l Assembly establishe d a committe e o n refugees . Th e Economi c an d Social Council too k u p the questio n an d bega n preparing an internationa l refugee organization. On matter s o f genera l U N policy Canadians were , a s usual , zealou s an d mediatory. Th e importan t committe e dealin g wit h budgetar y and financial aspects o f the refuge e question ha d as its chairman Senator J.G . Turgeo n of Canada an d met i n London i n 1946 . The Canadia n attitude was still to hop e that politics could be kept out of the refugee question, but it became a forum for on e of the mos t vehement clashe s between East and West. The Russian s insisted tha t th e organizatio n should assis t onl y in the repatriatio n o f refugees, wit h the Wester n countrie s arguin g tha t repatriatio n mus t b e volun tary. Canadian delegates i n the committee and later in the General Assembl y made desperat e bu t futil e effort s t o put forward compromise solutions , bu t no matte r ho w understanding they tried to be of legitimate Russian feelings after suc h a war - o r aware of the practical advantages for Canada of the repatriation of the troublesome 'displaced persons' - the y could not agree to the

99 Relief , Rehabilitation, and Reconstructio n forced repatriation of Ukrainians, among others. Canadians were denounced for thei r pains by Vyshinsky, and the Polis h representatives expresse d shar p criticism of Canada's taking Polish soldiers from General Anders ' army. When th e Genera l Assembl y vote d o n th e creatio n o f the Internationa l Refugee Organizatio n the motio n wa s passed b y only 30 votes t o 5 with 18 abstentions. Canad a supporte d th e resolution , bu t wit h typica l caution proposed that i t not come int o force until it had received th e suppor t of fifteen states contributing 75 per cent o f the organization' s budget . While Canada favoured voluntar y contributions t o UNICEF , i t was insistent o n th e obliga tory principl e when i t looked a s if the larg e financial burden of the refugees might fal l undul y on thos e able and willin g to pay. The ne w organization, it was said, would not b e able to carry passengers. Th e proposa l was accepted, but contributions to the expensive project s for long-range settlement wer e to be voluntary. Canada favoured the IR Q going as far as possible to meet Sovie t objections. Th e IRQ , i t wa s agreed, woul d not forc e repatriatio n but woul d provide tha t refugee s b e full y informe d concerning existin g condition s i n their countries an d produce valid objections 'suc h as a rational fear of persecution, compelling family reasons , or reasons o f health.' The IR Q would not help 'war criminals, quislings, and other person s guilty of collaboration with the enemy , or , o f participatio n in organization s hostil e t o member s o f th e United Nations. ' It woul d also not hel p 'person s of German ethni c origin.' This wa s no t goo d enoug h fo r th e communis t states , however , an d the y would not participate. In Jul y 1947 th e IR Q took ove r responsibilit y from UNRR A and th e Inter governmental Committee . Ther e wer e only eighteen members . Canad a was a membe r o f the Executiv e Committee o f nine. It s contribution was set at 3.2 pe r cen t o f the administrativ e budget an d 3. 5 per cent o f the operatin g budget, whic h migh t b e compare d wit h Britain' s contribution o f 11.4 8 pe r cent an d 14.7 5 pe r cent , respectively . In Jul y 194 7 th e governmen t estab lished a quot a o f 500 0 DP S to b e admitte d t o Canad a provide d the y were capable of filling positions in Canadian industrie s experiencing labour shortages. This was raised t o 20,000 b y the end o f 194 7 and by 1949 to 40,000. By the en d o f 194 7 734 5 DP S had bee n admitte d t o Canada . Althoug h th e number Canad a coul d or wa s prepared t o tak e was relatively limited, som e effort wa s mad e t o hel p maintai n th e others . I n Jun e 194 8 a gran t o f $5,415,000 wa s mad e t o th e IR Q t o maintai n DP S in camp s an d fo r othe r costs. Altogether, during the lif e of the IR Q until 1951, Canad a accepted 123,47 9 refugees. Sixt y per cent o f these were workers and their dependent s an d 40 per cen t wer e nominate d cases . Thi s tota l numbe r compare s reasonabl y

100 Th e Shapin g of Peac e favourably wit h tha t fo r th e Unite d States , 329,851 , bu t Australi a too k 182,851. When on e considers , however , tha t this was the crea m o f the DPS skimmed i n UNRR A camp s wher e in 194 6 they numbered 1. 4 million, i t is not impressiv e as a contribution to 'relief. ' I n any case the motives b y 1951 were b y no mean s strictl y humanitarian - althoug h the y were enlightened . By that time Canada was looking for good immigrants to build up its population. On e might assume tha t man y of the immigrant s who came to Canad a from German y and other countries at a later stage were originally inhabitants of the D P camps. Altogether it was an investment which the sceptic s of 1945 hardly deserve d - an injectio n int o th e bloo d strea m o f an extraordinarily qualified grou p of people whose contribution to th e economic , intellectual , and cultura l lif e o f th e countr y has neve r bee n equalled . I t i s no t eas y t o determine wh o exactly is or is not a refugee, bu t th e roug h official Canadia n figure of the numbe r of refugees admitted during the whol e postwar period from al l areas i s over 300,000. The Unite d State s give s a figure of over on e million and Australia claims to have admitted some 354,000 refugees. 41 Contemporary accounts dealin g with Canada's role i n accepting sufferin g refugees spea k wit h th e restraine d satisfactio n about th e Canadia n performance tha t wa s becomin g typical . I t wa s generou s i f on e accepte d th e approach that what Canada did to help the Europeans was beyond the call of duty. In the light of the oratory accompanying the victory over Nazi bestiality and th e revelation s from Belsen , Canadia n policy seems incredibly calculating. There were formidable practical problems in the way of rescuing victims of the war who could not be repatriated. The lack of shipping was serious and the insistenc e o n giving a priority to the return of Canadian forces and their families acquired in Europe was inevitable. To these legitimate excuses government spokesme n alway s pai d the greates t attention . Th e realizatio n that Canada wa s better place d than any other country in the world to take a risk on thes e wretche d peopl e wa s onl y diml y perceived . However , th e mor e Canadian spokesme n opposed , wit h emotiona l publi c support, th e force d repatriation o f anti-communists, th e mor e difficul t i t became t o do nothing about thos e left . Publi c opinion - at least amon g th e articulate - may have run ahea d o f th e governmen t i n changin g it s attitud e t o refugees . A t th e extended hearing s o f 194 6 i n th e Senat e Standin g Committee o n Immigration an d Labou r representative s no t onl y o f religiou s organization s bu t o f labour an d o f managemen t displaye d some recognition o f Christian obliga tion an d o f nationa l advantag e i n an open-doo r policy . By August 194 7 5 1 per cent said i n a CIPO poll that Canada needed immigrants, wit h supporters of the CC F considerably less enthusiastic than Liberals or Conservatives .

101 Relief , Rehabilitation , and Reconstructio n The presiden t o f th e Unite d State s mad e hi s 'statemen t o n admission t o the U.S . o f DP S an d refugees ' i n Decembe r 1945 , bu t n o Canadia n offe r o f refuge wa s mad e unti l 7 Novembe r 1946 . No t onl y th e well-populate d United State s bu t als o th e over-populate d and distresse d Unite d Kingdo m were recognizing the urgency of the problem. The Australians, similarly situated to Canada but less bountiful i n their prospects, inaugurate d a very active policy o f bringin g refugees fro m Europe . Th e Australians , o f course , ha d had a shock an d the realizatio n of the nee d fo r more peopl e in their isolate d continent wa s a powerfu l spur . I n spit e o f an increasin g awareness o f their greater vulnerabilit y to attack s b y air, the Canadian s ha d stil l that comfortable feeling of security in the Anglo-America n bosom. The y were only dimly beginning t o recogniz e th e vulnerabilit y in a n over-populate d worl d o f a n under-populated country. David Crol l was one o f the fe w MPS to make refugees a cause . I n a stron g an d well-documente d speec h i n Marc h 194 7 h e pleaded fo r accepting DPs not as an immigration policy but as a limited shortterm humanitaria n act arising out of obligation. 'Since the end o f the war we have shippe d ou r ol d clothes an d surplu s food , bu t tha t i s not enough.' 42 Curiously enough , th e mos t timi d o f leader s i n thi s respect , Mackenzi e King, acknowledged when he presente d hi s immigration polic y in 194 7 that it was dangerous for a small population to attempt to hold 'so great a heritage as ours' - a gesture whic h is probably attributable to the civil servants who drafted th e speech . Bu t it would take another quarte r of a century before th e full significanc e of that remark was to become apparent . The few refugees who came durin g the critical period were admitted partly for humanitaria n reason s an d partl y because som e gestures wer e unavoid able, bu t a n economi c justificatio n ha d t o b e found . Muc h wa s mad e i n Canadian statement s o f th e admissio n o f abou t 300 0 veteran s o f Genera l Anders' Second Polis h Army , the only substantial group of immigrants from Europe t o arrive i n 1946 , bu t thes e were selecte d b y representatives o f th e Department o f Labou r fro m amon g 450 0 wh o di d no t wan t t o retur n t o Poland bu t di d want to com e t o Canada . The y wer e all sent of f to wor k on farms wher e the y were needed . A s i t was assumed, however , tha t Canad a was doing the Britis h a favour by taking these sturd y allie s off their hands , the Unite d Kingdo m provide d th e shippin g and paid the cos t o f transporta tion. An y DP S who woul d be permitte d t o come , i t was assumed, woul d be selected lik e good bee f cattl e wit h a preference fo r stron g young men wh o could d o manua l labou r an d woul d no t b e encumbere d b y aging relatives . The latter presumably could sit in camps in Germany unti l the strong young son made hi s fortune and sent for them .

102 Th e Shapin g of Peac e By 1947 , however , attitude s toward s immigratio n ha d change d an d ship ping wa s becoming available . External Affairs , particularl y member s i n th e field, had been insisting for some time that shipping could be found and that its scarcit y was bein g exaggerate d b y immigratio n official s fo r purpose s o f stalling. Th e voice s o f Canadians whos e blood-brother s wer e i n th e camp s were beginnin g t o b e heard . Th e inhumanit y o f separatin g familie s wa s increasingly recognize d whe n some o f th e singl e me n arrived . Regulation s concerning familie s becam e mor e lenient . However , th e mos t desperat e problem as the IR Q came t o an end wa s the fat e o f the so-called 'har d core,' those no countr y would take becaus e the y were ill or elderl y and require d welfare, or those professional people, such as doctors, who were not accepted by th e professional establishment s i n receivin g countries . Whil e Canad a selected th e best, the Europeans in their distressed state had to look after th e vast majority o f the refugee s until they had reached saturatio n point. In a few years, however , th e DP S wer e becomin g reconcile d t o abandonin g Europ e and any hope of returning home and Canadians were having revised thoughts about their value to a young nation. AFTER IR Q

The attentio n o f the IR Q was devoted ver y largely to Europea n refugees . I t did hav e a han d i n repatriatin g a few Chinese, bu t th e vas t dislocation s o f population i n Asi a wer e to o overwhelmin g t o b e faced . I f Canadian s fel t daunted b y the thousand s o f European s wh o needed ne w homes, they did not dar e turn their eyes towards Asia . In officia l circle s at least there wa s an unspoken realizatio n that the IR Q as a United Nation s bod y was discriminatory i n it s attentions t o a world-wide problem. Th e practica l argument wa s that whe n somethin g a t least coul d b e done abou t th e wretche d in Europe , the whol e operatio n ough t no t t o b e swampe d b y taking on a burde n wit h which no administration o f the tim e could cope and which was a problem of the age s rathe r tha n just o f postwa r emergency. I t wa s quite clea r t o thos e determining polic y i n Ottaw a tha t th e Canadia n public , whic h ha d som e reservations abou t admittin g Europea n DP S i n larg e numbers , wa s no t ye t prepared to alter drastically its firmly entrenche d polic y of discouraging 'ori entals.' It was best, therefore, no t to think or say much o n the subject. However, a s the non-European countries became mor e vocal and influential in the Unite d Nations , th e IR Q could not continu e a s it had done. It had been intende d a s an emergency body, and rather than expan d it s mandate i t was wound up wit h two successor institution s taking over som e of its work. The offic e o f the Unite d Nation s Hig h Commissioner fo r Refugee s wa s set

103 Relief , Rehabilitation, and Reconstructio n up by the General Assembl y in 1950 and although in the early stages its work was directed largel y towards the remainin g refugees o f the Europea n war , in later years it became mor e an d mor e involved wit h refugees in Africa, Asia , and th e continent s wher e th e war s wer e the n takin g place . A s fo r thos e countries intereste d mainl y in European immigration , including Canada, th e solution was to set up, as they did in 195 1 outside th e United Nations framework, th e Intergovernmenta l Committe e fo r European Migration . ICE M was not devoted strictl y to refugees but sought to provide international assistanc e to any people who wanted to emigrate from Europe. By this time Canada was taking a more favourabl e view of European immigration and as ICE M suited its purposes i t was for the first decade a n active supporter o f the committee . In 196 2 Canad a withdre w from ICE M o n th e ground s tha t it s functio n ha d become o f marginal use to the country. CONCLUSIONS

The experienc e o f relie f wa s educational an d sobering. I t ha d element s o f nobility, bu t i t often looke d a little sordid i n contrast t o th e hig h resolve o f postwar rhetoric, especially as most of the quarrelin g and jostling was among friends an d allies . Th e financial crisis resulting from th e loa n to Britai n and the consequent nee d for American hel p graphically illustrated the limitations on th e Canadia n role . Althoug h the issue s wer e not basicall y between Eas t and West , Canadians , i n UNRR A and th e IRO , wer e faced directl y with th e frustrations o f negotiation s wit h th e Sovie t Unio n an d understoo d bette r than previously attitudes of the Britis h and Americans that had looked somewhat rigid. Certain ambiguitie s abou t internationa l institution s wer e alread y bein g revealed. O n th e questio n o f responsibility fo r IRO , for example , th e Cana dians pressed their more idealisti c principles. It should b e directly under th e control o f th e Economi c an d Socia l Council, the y argued, thereb y makin g every United Nations membe r responsibl e for it and subject to annual assessment. I n theor y i t wa s a goo d idea , a desirabl e preceden t fo r th e Unite d Nations i n general, bu t it revealed an early illusion about the extent to which strong member state s would ever agree to participate in causes t o which they objected. The view that prevailed, however, saw the IR O as an ad hoc specialized agency which could be operated independentl y by those wh o supported it an d remove d fro m broa d Unite d Nation s policies . This prevailin g view, which wa s applied b y th e Unite d States , was , i n fact , muc h close r t o th e 'functionalist' approac h that Canadians later came to advocate, ofte n against the more absolutis t Americans .

104 Th e Shapin g of Peac e The doubl e edg e o f international institutions , a s instruments t o b e use d and commitments t o be accepted, was becoming more apparent . For a country a s vulnerable as Canada t o demands fo r help, worried, with some justification, about endless philanthropy and unassimilable immigration, the value was evident of a United Nations framework to spread the burden and alleviate the anguish of unilateral policy decisions. At the same time, involvemen t in UNRR A and th e IRQ , which status and self-respect required , increased th e moral pressur e fo r appropriate contributions. Without fo r a moment recognizing the righ t of any internationa l organizatio n to determin e Canada' s immigration policy, a new and powerfu l elemen t ha d entered int o the Canadian decision-makin g process . Whe n Mackenzi e Kin g finally announced a more liberal policy for immigrants in general in February 194 7 he cautiously recognized th e ne w factor: 'Canada is not obliged, as a result of membershi p in th e unite d nation s o r under th e constitutio n o f the internationa l refugee organization, to accept any specific number of refugees or displaced persons . We have, nevertheless , a moral obligation to assist in meeting the problem , and thi s obligatio n w e ar e prepare d t o recognize.' 43 I n tim e thes e clu b memberships woul d play their part in leading the countr y to alter drastically its rules abou t immigrants . Members o f the Unite d Nation s an d th e Com monwealth are free t o legislate as they wish, but it is much harde r fo r the m to practis e racia l discrimination . Kin g was probabl y correct whe n h e said : 'There will, I am sure, be general agreement wit h the view that the people of Canada do not wish, as a result of mass immigration, to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population.' 44 It would be some years before the Diefenbake r government woul d begin to dismantle the racial priorities in immigration. To join an international organization is, in some ways, to light a time bomb .

4

Peacemaking

Along with th e fact s of life learne d over relief and reconstructio n came th e bitter lessons o f the peacemaking . The functionalis t principle was refined in the fire . I t survived , bu t wit h th e functiona l expectation s considerabl y altered. THE RIGH T TO A VOIC E

After th e Secon d Worl d War Canada's internationa l status ha d bee n mor e firmly clarified tha n at th e en d o f the Grea t War . It was a country of larger consequence i n world politics as well as in the wa r effort, an d it had a professional establishment much better prepared on the details at issue in the peace settlement. An d yet Canada ha d a less satisfactory role in the peacemakin g than in 1918-19 . I t may be that the part played in 191 9 has been exaggerated because i t wa s th e establishmen t o f Canadia n statu s hithert o unacknowledged, wherea s wha t happene d i n 1945- 6 seeme d lik e a checkmat e t o a country o n th e rise . Wha t ha d happene d i n 191 9 was , i n th e opinio n of Loring Christie, wh o later became th e suprem e sceptic , highly satisfactory. The dominions , h e said, wer e muc h better place d tha n other smal l powers. They '.. . were prominently represented o n th e variou s Commission s o f the Peace Conference , an d at times th e Prime Minister attended th e Council of Ten, whil e in additio n th e Prim e Ministe r o f Canada o n a number of occa sions too k par t in the wor k of the Counci l o f Four an d the Counci l of Five . More tha n that , ever y Commission Report , ever y aspect, ever y sectio n o f the Condition s o f Peace wa s first considered i n meetings of the Britis h Empire Delegation (whos e personnel wa s the sam e a s that of the Imperia l War Cabinet) befor e the assent of the British Empire was given. The Dominions ' participation in the makin g of peace has been substantial indeed.' 1 King was

106 Th e Shapin g of Peac e less anxious than Borden to involve himself in grand strategy. His intent was to defen d specifi c Canadia n militar y or economi c interests . H e wa s mor e hesitant than his own professional advisers to take stands on the settlement s in Europe o r Asia, although he defended Canada' s right to do so. The essentia l differenc e i n 1945 , however , wa s not tha t Canadian leader s failed t o press their case. It did not matter greatly that Canada had changed in status an d power . Circumstances i n the worl d at large were different. Ther e was no great single peace conference as in 1918 and no conference at all on a settlement wit h the majo r enemy , Germany . I n 191 8 th e grea t powers had been divided , bu t i n 194 5 the y wer e threatene d wit h eve n mor e seriou s division. It was the desperat e necessit y to avoid a split of devastating consequence tha t prevente d the m fro m openin g thei r negotiation s t o lesse r powers. Why di d Canadians , bot h officia l an d private , insis t s o strongl y o n th e Canadian right to a voice in the peac e settlement an d why did they express dismay at the treatmen t received ? Smaller European countries o r Australia, for example , ha d convictions about specific nationa l interests tha t would be overlooked i f th e nationa l voice wa s not listene d to . Canadian s ha d view s about th e kin d o f world they wanted , i n which the German s woul d not b e able t o d o thi s again, an d ther e wa s some disposition t o retribution . Ther e was, however , n o particularl y Canadian territoria l or economi c interes t a t stake. Canadian s wer e more concerned wit h genera l questions o f collective security. One does not sense an urgent need t o put across a unique national message a s a principal motive fo r wanting a proper voice. The them e o n whic h Canadia n spokesme n kep t harping was that o f justice. Th e war , as fa r a s mos t Canadian s wer e concerned, ha d prove d on e thing conclusively . Whethe r the y wer e involve d i n Europea n affair s o r not - or even Fa r Eastern whe n the y thought about the m - the y were going to be involved in foreign wars. Their participation in the war, they constantly reminded thei r allies (on e hesitates t o call them their listeners), was without stint. 'N o questio n o f partia l participation arose,' sai d th e Canadia n state ment t o the Counci l o f Foreign Ministers . I t was undeniable i n simple justice, therefore, tha t they had dearly bought the right to a position o f equality in th e settlement . Kin g tol d th e Pari s Conference o n 2 August 1946 : 'We also wante d Canada's contributio n to be of an orde r which would entitle u s to shar e effectivel y i n the makin g of peace ...' 2 It was offensive i n that hou r to be treated as second-class pleaders. It was not a simple emphasis on status; it was a cry for fai r treatment. If one was to judge by speeches and editorials , the Canadia n publi c backed th e governmen t i n its claims and protests. Th e Progressive Conservativ e leader , John Bracken, spoke of an insult and indig-

107 Peacemakin g nity if Canada was excluded,3 and the Montreal Star warned the great powers that a peac e whic h did no t carr y the judgment o f th e Canadia n people was bound t o affec t Canada' s foreig n policy in the future. 4 Becaus e there was no specific Canadia n conten t i n the Canadia n demand, however , publi c resentment wa s not long sustained. Th e fat e of Germany or of Japan did not touch them directly . They were more intereste d i n demobilization of the Canadian armed force s and the restoratio n o f the Canadia n tradin g position. Officials i n th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s an d th e defenc e minis tries, however , were concerned. The y had had some modest involvement in early planning. The interdepartmental Post-Hostilities Problems Committee , set u p i n 1943 , ha d bee n receivin g information regularly from th e Britis h about th e discussion s a t Yalta, Potsdam , Quebec , an d othe r exoti c places concerning postwa r plannin g fo r th e defeate d states. 5 View s o n substanc e and o n th e mechanic s ha d bee n consistentl y pu t forwar d to the Britis h and shared ofte n wit h the American s an d th e allie d governments-in-exile. Fo r the mos t part , thi s was merely a question o f commenting o n drafts . Hum e Wrong, who had a sensible vie w of what was possible, wrote to Wilgress on 13 May 1944: 'it would be wasted effort fo r us to contribute any comprehen sive plan s o f ou r own , for Canada, as a secondary power , would not hav e a great enough influence to make our views prevail. We should, however , be in a position a t leas t t o decide wha t is not acceptabl e t o us, an d to advocat e changes i n accor d wit h ou r interests , throug h appropriate channels, i n th e plans of the Great Powers.' It would be impossible to calculate the amount of Canadian 'input, ' bu t th e clos e relation s with British, American, an d othe r colleagues provide d som e par t i n th e continuin g exploration s o f polic y options. O f this incalculable influence there ma y have been as much Canadian as that o f any other lesse r powers . The for m mattered, however , when what wa s at issu e wa s a claim for justice. Canad a di d no t onl y hav e t o b e influential, i t had to seem to be influential . However gallin g t o som e Canadia n nationalist s t o obtai n informatio n from th e Britis h Foreig n Office , i t wa s of considerabl e advantag e to d o so . Canadian official s receive d throug h these regular sources no t onl y copies of British paper s o n th e subjec t o f th e settlemen t bu t als o a regula r flow of telegrams an d despatche s fro m Britis h embassies i n sensitiv e place s which gave official s i n Ottaw a a sophisticated understandin g o f the force s as they existed. Th e rudimentar y natur e o f th e Canadia n externa l servic e a t tha t time mad e thi s kin d o f detai l fro m anothe r sourc e essential . An d t o b e really useful , i t ha d t o com e fro m a grea t power . Th e danger , a s som e might se e it , o f bein g brainwashed , wa s minimal . Canadia n officer s wer e well able t o assess what came ou t o f a Foreign Offic e wit h which they were

108 Th e Shapin g of Peace very familiar. Few national foreign service s hav e a point of view. The Brit ish voices to which Canada was able to tune in were varied. At any rate there was a goo d opportunit y t o compar e wha t the y wer e sayin g wit h wha t th e Americans, th e Free French, an d others were also whispering or shouting in their officia l ears . Whethe r the y liked it or not , an d the y didn't much , th e major issue s of the peac e settlemen t wer e being decided b y the fou r o r five great powers , and the Commonwealt h communication s syste m enable d Canadians t o know much more tha n they would have known otherwise. It was useful becaus e i t was a system on which Canadians could count. The Ameri cans were prepared informally to tell them a good deal when they wanted to. Officially, however , the Stat e Departmen t had to be careful abou t treatin g Canada mor e favourably tha n the Latin Americans . Of th e fiv e grea t powers , th e onl y countr y tha t care d muc h abou t th e position o f the secondar y power s was Britain. The Russian s considered th e peace settlemen t a closed affai r fo r th e grea t powers . The Fre e Frenc h ha d been desperatel y anxiou s t o have an equal seat at the tabl e and were generally supporte d i n thi s clai m b y their wartim e friends, th e Canadians . How ever, onc e th e Frenc h ha d bee n accepte d a s a great power, it was clear tha t their previou s interes t ha d bee n i n th e positio n o f France , no t o f lesse r powers. The concer n o f the Britis h Foreign Offic e fo r lesser power s was not entirely inspire d b y a magnanimou s an d democrati c vie w of internationa l politics. Th e mos t clamorou s lesse r power s were th e Canadians , Ne w Zealanders, an d Australian s an d the y coul d mak e lou d noise s i n London' s political circles. The Britis h also would have liked Canadian support in their occupation role in Germany . In th e earl y stage s post-hostilitie s plannin g tended t o encompas s every thing. The Canadia n concer n ove r it s position i n the peacemakin g mus t b e seen i n the contex t o f its concern wit h the ne w world order. A s Mackenzie King told the Hous e o f Commons, the y must no t acquiesc e i n the wartim e practices by which the grea t power s arrived at 'privat e settlements.' 'Ever y possible precautio n should , therefore , b e taken to see that in this particular the war-tim e pattern i s not perpetuate d i n the framin g o f the peac e settle ment an d in the United Nations organization.' 6 Canada wante d peace settlements in the nam e of the Unite d Nations. The British proposal on which the post-hostilities planner s i n Ottaw a firs t wen t t o wor k calle d fo r a Unite d Nations Commission fo r Europe and the Canadians wished to be part of that not jus t becaus e the y wante d a voic e i n th e peac e settlement s bu t als o because the y sa w it a s a n importan t ar m o f th e emergin g Unite d Nation s structure.

109 Peacemakin g OCCUPATION FORCE S I N EUROP E

The connectio n betwee n th e provisio n o f occupation force s an d a voice in the Europea n peac e settlement wa s apparent to planners i n the Departmen t of Externa l Affair s i n 194 3 when a n enquir y was received fro m th e Britis h government a s to whether Canada woul d want to contribute forces to police Germany. Th e departmental planner s were interested i n playing a justly allocated par t in the European settlement, but Hume Wrong could see that not only woul d militar y participatio n b e require d fo r membershi p i n th e UN Commission fo r Europe bu t th e maintenanc e o f that positio n could requir e the indefinit e retentio n o f forces in Germany o r elsewhere.7 Although in the Department o f Externa l Affair s the y wer e dispose d t o pa y tha t price , i t would b e unwis e t o ge t trappe d i n commitment s fo r whic h thei r politica l masters wer e no t reall y prepared. 8 Wit h thi s cautiou s positio n th e militar y planners wer e impatient. They were already worried about the dismantling of the armed forces , a s had happened after th e Firs t Worl d War, and an exten sive and honourable commitment t o postwar obligations in Europe might be some guarantee agains t instan t demobilization. 9 External Affair s wa s aware that a blun t refusa l t o tak e par t at thi s stag e woul d seriousl y threate n th e Canadian campaign to be involved in post-hostilities planning and might also encourage a retur n t o th e isolationis t moo d tha t ha d kep t Canad a ou t o f international activit y between th e wars . The governmen t di d agree t o sen d something les s than a negative reply, noting that Canada would be contributing substantiall y t o th e pacificatio n o f Europ e bu t pointin g out tha t it s expected large-scal e participatio n i n relie f an d othe r civi l activities should b e taken int o consideratio n a s well . 'Th e natur e an d exten t o f th e Canadia n contribution t o th e "policin g o f Europe " woul d depen d o n th e circum stances of the tim e and on the definition o f that phrase.' 10 The politica l considerations fo r cautio n wer e not easil y dismissed. Man y Canadian unit s ha d bee n awa y fro m home longe r tha n thos e o f any othe r country and the y and their families wanted a speedy return . There was also worry about th e contributio n Canad a migh t have t o make t o the wa r in the Far Eas t whe n German y ha d bee n deal t with . Th e governmen t remaine d cautious unti l i t was realized that there wa s no possibility in any case o f th e Canadian force s returnin g instantl y becaus e o f th e acut e pressur e o n ship ping. The y woul d have t o remai n i n Europe fo r quit e a long time an d thi s factor migh t b e exploite d t o ge t som e credit fo r occupation . I n Decembe r 1944 th e Cabine t Wa r Committe e approve d a programm e fo r occupatio n forces i n Germany , includin g eleven squadron s o f th e RCA F an d a n arm y

110 Th e Shapin g of Peac e group of about 25,000. These would be allocated to the British zone o f occupation and committe d for what was known as Stage n, a term coverin g only the perio d of adjustment and disarmament immediately following the opera tional occupatio n o f Germany. 11 Th e British , who wer e countin g o n thi s assistance i n occupatio n becaus e the y ha d som e o f th e sam e politica l problems, wer e told at the beginnin g of 1945 of this intention but warned not t o count o n occupatio n force s indefinitel y a s th e matte r woul d b e reviewe d again in 1946 . During 194 5 th e politica l argument s fo r withdrawa l became stronger. Canadian forces wer e no t require d i n th e Fa r Eas t becaus e Japa n sur rendered. Transportatio n becam e a subject of constant debat e and there was concern over th e restlessnes s o f the troop s i n Europe . One reaso n occupa tion dutie s ha d been accepte d wa s that it was considered bette r t o have th e troops doing something while they waited for ships. The astutenes s o f a few Canadians in such activities as trading cigarettes for art masterpieces worrie d the authorities lest they endanger relations with friendly countries, especially Holland. I n Decembe r 194 5 th e Britis h governmen t wa s informed tha t th e Canadian Arm y Occupatio n Forc e woul d b e withdraw n durin g 1946 . Th e British were upset. Prim e Minister Attlee made several stron g pleas to Mackenzie King , a t leas t fo r a postponemen t int o 1947 . I n th e cours e o f hi s argument Attlee unwisely suggested tha t Canadian forces in Germany would help free British troops which had world-wide obligations. Although Louis St Laurent was no Anglophobe, he was a Quebecker and this plea for assistance in the maintenanc e o f the Britis h imperial role made him uncharacteristically angry.12 I n an y case, ther e wa s no possibilit y of Mackenzi e King relenting. He wa s in a snit ove r heav y taxation and th e wa y in which Canadians were bankrupting themselves fo r the relie f and reconstruction o f Europe. King woul d probabl y have ha d politica l difficulties i f h e had , a t Britis h request, change d th e dat e for repatriation . In a CIP O poll of 8 May 1946 , 4 6 per cen t approve d withdrawa l to 3 7 per cent opposed , bu t outsid e Quebe c only 4 0 pe r cen t approve d an d 4 3 per cent opposed . Th e governmen t ha d explained to the Britis h that one of the difficulties was that of administration. There was no doub t tha t maintainin g an administrative tail for thes e forces was considerable, an d ther e wa s also concer n abou t havin g thei r force s o n duty i n a zone wher e they i n no wa y shared polic y responsibilities wit h the British. Th e oppositio n wa s sceptical o f th e administrativ e argument . The y also sa w a connection betwee n th e exclusio n fro m a voice in the peac e an d the precipitat e withdrawal of Canadia n forces . In a debate o n the subjec t of Canada's par t or lack of it in the Germa n peac e settlement in March 194 7 St Laurent mad e hi s memorable commen t tha t th e Canadia n force s ha d been

I l l Peacemakin g 'kicked out.' This wa s reported as 'kicked out,' but h e was too gentlemanly to lik e that languag e o n reflectio n an d h e ha d i t altered i n Hansar d t o 'lef t out.'13 His apparent argument was that Canada had refused to maintain occupation forces in Germany becaus e they had not been allocate d a fair share in policy-making or in the control machinery. It was not an argument that could be made cogentl y and it bothered the official s who recognized its weakness. The government di d produce a statement an d even publishe d the despatche s to London o f 9 January and 8 December 1945 , which proved merely that the British ha d receive d fai r warnin g no t t o coun t o n Canadia n occupatio n forces. St Laurent's outburs t should not be take n literally. He was still irritated over Attlee' s suggestion an d he had been goaded . A more convincin g point wa s mad e i n th e sam e debat e b y th e ministe r o f nationa l defence , Brooke Claxton , tha t ther e wa s n o proo f 'tha t th e presenc e o f an y forc e Canada migh t hav e i n Europe would change our positio n b y so much a s an ounce o f more powe r or weight." 4 Although th e great-powe r planner s wh o wer e bus y concoctin g scheme s for th e contro l of Germany an d th e maintenanc e o f peace i n Europe would from tim e t o tim e includ e the possibilit y of Canadian an d othe r Common wealth force s i n thei r calculation s for postwa r policing, at no tim e di d they ever seriousl y conside r allowin g any countr y except th e wartim e big thre e and Franc e i n th e contro l machinery. 15 Canad a migh t hav e pu t u p a better case if it had, before the wa r ended, tied a specific promise of so many troops to th e allocatio n o f a seat o n som e body , bu t i t is har d t o believ e tha t th e Russians would have agreed and it is almost certain that the provision for the voice o f th e lesse r power s woul d hav e bee n withou t grea t substance . Un doubtedly irritatio n with th e wa y in whic h the majo r power s were ignoring Canada's righ t t o a voice o n German y playe d some par t in th e decisio n o f December 194 5 but th e rea l cause o f anger on this score di d not come until 1946. Th e decisio n o f Decembe r 194 5 would probably have bee n take n i n any case, but the position of the Canadian government i n defending it might have been mor e difficul t i f a shiny seat polished i n accordance wit h the bes t functionalist principle s ha d bee n awaitin g it i n som e well-balance d contro l council for Germany or for Europe as a whole. Mackenzie King was still prime minister and he knew that involvement in European politic s was unwise fo r Canadians , howeve r muc h the y though t they had a right to it. There is a canny Canadian political instinct to recognize that although the arrogan t claim of the grea t powers for special responsibili ties is quite unacceptable, there is , nevertheless, somethin g t o be said for it. From th e perspectiv e o f a late r generatio n i t i s hard t o se e why Canadian s would hav e profite d at all from involvemen t i n the long , trouble d questio n

112 Th e Shapin g of Peace of occupation - o r contributed much. The yearning for an activist European policy was a legacy of the postwa r logic that because th e securit y of Europ e unquestionably affecte d th e securit y o f Canada , Canadian s mus t see k a national involvement i n matters pertainin g to the securit y of Europe. Ther e may b e n o escapin g the consequence s t o Canada o f a disturbance o f European security, but i t is hard also to escape th e conclusion that the security of Europe will be determined b y the Europeans and the Americans an d there is little Canadians ca n do or need d o about it - othe r than provide forces when needed. PARIS PEAC E CONFERENCE 1 6

There wa s a peace conference o f sorts in Paris in 1946 , but thi s was to deal only wit h th e treatie s wit h Ital y and th e mino r enemies . Th e peac e confer ence with Germany has never bee n hel d and that for Japan came some years later. A t most peac e conference s o f recent centurie s th e grea t power s have dominated th e proceedings , bu t th e rol e o f the lesse r power s was rarely so formally limited as it was at this meeting in Paris in the summer o f 1946. The main line s o f th e settlement s ha d alread y bee n worke d ou t b y th e grea t powers, an d th e recommendation s o f th e conference , whic h include d al l those who had been a t war with one or all of the enemy states under consid eration, wer e merely recommendations t o the Counci l of Foreign Minister s of the grea t power s which the latte r did not have to accept. Canada took th e conference seriously . Th e brie f fo r th e delegatio n ha d bee n i n preparatio n for ove r a year. It was an impressive delegation but there was no great expectation of a dramatic role. The commentary for the Canadian delegation note d that: 'The procedure fo r the preliminar y drafting o f the Peace Treaties, as it was worked ou t a t Moscow, an d th e convokin g o f th e Conferenc e accord s closely with what might b e expected a t any large Peace Conference . I n fact , the concentratio n o f authority and responsibilit y for preparatio n of preliminary drafts i n the representatives o f the Great Powers had a precedent i n the practice adopted at Paris in 1919.' There ha d then bee n a Council of Foreign Ministers as well as a Council o f Prime Minister s an d a Conference o f Ambassadors (o f the grea t powers ) se t u p to supervise th e carryin g out o f th e terms o f the Treat y of Versailles. 17 Under th e term s o f th e Mosco w communiqué , th e fiv e treatie s (Italy , Romania, Bulgaria, 18 Hungary , Finland ) woul d i n th e firs t instanc e b e drafted b y the signatories o f the relevan t surrender terms . Canada wa s not a signatory o f an y o f the armistic e agreements , whic h the Canadia n govern ment regarde d as military instruments impose d on states by the commander s

113 Peacemakin g of the allied forces. A t the time the government ha d reserved it s position in relation to the negotiatio n and signatur e of the final peace treaties. Th e in struments o f surrende r provide d fo r a for m o f associatio n fo r th e Unite d Nations a t war with th e respectiv e enem y state s othe r tha n the signatories . The way in which the great powers assumed thes e rights, never delegated t o them b y the allied powers acting as United Nations, had been another source of irritation in Ottawa. When Mackenzi e King announced t o the Hous e of Commons o n 1 2 July 1946 the name s o f the delegatio n he made i t clear that the Canadian delegation woul d take a n interes t onl y in the genera l natur e of the peac e treatie s and no t i n the specifi c issues such a s boundaries, populatio n transfers, war damage an d indemnitie s whic h wer e o f direc t concer n t o th e Europea n states. Canada's role, he suggested, woul d 'lie in helping the countries more directly concerne d t o wor k ou t agree d solutions whic h ar e fai r an d wil l b e likely to endure.' 19 Needless t o say, he informed th e plenary session in Paris that Canada' s rol e i n th e conferenc e woul d be ' a modes t bu t constructiv e one.' H e was resuming somewhat th e traditiona l Canadian role of observer of th e Europea n scene , willin g to b e helpfu l and , o f course, morall y above the battle as Canada had no special interests or claims for territories or reparations. In spit e o f al l this modest y a smal l bu t talente d delegatio n wa s sent t o Paris. The prim e minister himsel f was there at the beginnin g and, when h e departed, h e lef t th e ministe r o f national health an d welfare , Brook e Claxton, i n charge. Th e alternate s wer e Robertson, Wilgress , Genera l Mauric e Pope, and th e advisers include d some o f the bes t brain s in the department . Most of the European delegations were much larger. There were never more than te n Canadian s availabl e at a time , rathe r fe w for al l the commission s and subcommission s durin g a ten-weeks ' conference . N o member s o f th e opposition were present a s they had been i n 194 5 at San Francisco. Mackenzie King raised th e questio n a t a cabinet meeting and S t Laurent advocated having th e oppositio n represented . Kin g oppose d this , however , 'o n th e score that Canada's interests in the Conference itsel f would not justify that.' On thi s poin t h e 'foun d al l the othe r Member s o f the Cabine t wit h me.' 20 The qualit y o f th e delegatio n an d it s relative objectivit y was in fac t recog nized i n som e smal l ways . Claxton wa s made chairma n o f th e importan t Legal and Draftin g Commission. A particular recognition o f Canada's disin terested positio n wa s the appointmen t o f Genera l Pop e t o chai r a specia l meeting to discuss the frontier betwee n Hungar y and Czechoslovakia . The mos t importan t Canadia n contributio n t o th e conferenc e wa s probably a procedura l on e mad e b y th e prim e ministe r himsel f i n th e initia l

114 Th e Shapin g of Peac e plenary session. A fact which daunted the conference was that it could do no more tha n make recommendation s whic h would then b e considered b y the Council o f Foreign Ministers . Kin g made th e suggestion , whic h he himself credited to Claxton, that the Council of Foreign Ministers should endeavour to sav e tim e i n completin g th e treatie s b y meeting a t interval s in Pari s t o review and discuss proposals developed durin g the conference. This suggestion, which was ultimately adopted, di d help to lift th e conference above th e level o f th e slangin g matc h i t ha d bee n a t th e start . Accordin g to Harol d Nicolson: 'It was Mr. Mackenzie King, who, before he returned t o Canada, advised Mr . Bevin that things could not possibly continue as they were. Mr. Bevin acted promptly on that advice. He persuaded hi s three colleagues that only failure would result unless they met togethe r i n secret, reaffirme d thei r solidarity, examine d ho w the machiner y could b e speeded up , an d mad e it clear to the small Powers, who were ganging up behind them , that the agreement reached betwee n the four Foreig n Ministers must be maintained at the Conference o f 21.' 21 Accordin g to a Dutch pres s repor t King' s proposa l received th e bigges t ovation at the conference becaus e h e had appealed to the conscience o f the worl d with the authorit y of an experienced statesman. 22 It was a trying conference, nevertheless , fo r a statesman wh o saw himself a s Solomon. Whe n th e Belgia n and Yugosla v delegate s wer e nominate d fo r chairman of the Committe e o n Procedures , Kin g voted for a Czech motio n that th e tw o hol d offic e alternately , commentin g i n hi s diar y tha t h e wa s 'glad t o hav e a chanc e a t th e outse t t o cas t a firs t vot e whic h showed n o antagonism towar d anyone. ' Thi s nobl e motio n wa s lost 12-8 . Kin g then voted fo r the Belgians, saying in his diary that everything seemed to be done in the wron g way with no guiding spirit or direction. 23 This excellen t delegatio n certainl y di d not thro w its weight about. Clax ton reporte d i n a broadcast t o Canada o n 1 6 October tha t member s o f th e Canadian delegatio n mad e onl y eleve n speeches , thre e i n plenar y sessio n and eigh t o n majo r issue s discusse d i n commissions , an d non e exceede d fifteen minute s i n length . Som e o f th e credi t wo n b y th e Canadian s ma y have bee n inspire d b y contrast wit h th e extraordinar y performanc e o f th e Australian Externa l Affair s minister , Herber t Evatt , wh o mad e himsel f ridiculous b y introducin g a n enormou s numbe r o f Australia n amend ments, practicall y all of whic h wer e defeated . King' s inclinatio n t o tak e a moderate lin e wa s reinforced , an d th e Canadian s kep t ou t o f th e proce dural debate s whic h starte d th e peac e conferenc e of f on a ba d note . Can ada wa s discoverin g method s whic h late r distinguishe d it s middle-powe r diplomacy, suc h a s keepin g clea r a t a n earl y stag e o f partisa n commit ments s o tha t it s credit was more acceptabl e a t th e bargainin g stage. Clax -

115 Peacemakin g ton reporte d tha t Czechoslovakia , Poland , an d Yugoslavi a had invite d th e whole delegatio n t o ceremonia l lunches . 'Thi s ma y b e a coincidenc e o r result fro m th e fac t tha t w e ar e les s committe d t o position s tha n mos t delegations her e ,..' 24 As the Canadian s wer e there, however , even thoug h the subject s unde r discussion wer e European they could hardl y kee p out o f the m altogether. 25 They gave some support to Austria in stating its case on the frontie r dispute with Ital y (Sout h Tyrol-Alt o Adige ) an d the y secured unanimou s approval of a motion fo r a joint session o f the Hungaria n and Romania n representatives. The y trie d t o persuade the Yugoslavs to take more 'reasonable ' positions i n thei r frontie r dispute s wit h Ital y an d th e Czech s i n dealin g wit h Hungary over the Bratislav a bridgehead and the transfer of Magyars. Canada supported modificatio n i n th e politica l clauses o f the treatie s o f th e Balkan countries and Finland , th e mos t importan t of which was an amendment fo r the guarantee of minority rights designed t o protect the Jews . A concern for the protectio n o f al l religiou s and racia l minoritie s was displayed . On th e subject o f the Fre e Territory of Trieste the Canadia n delegation showed a n interest tha t wa s to reappea r on subsequen t occasions , i n connectio n wit h Jerusalem or Berlin, for example, in the experiment of independent municipal entities unde r th e authority of the United Nations - a precedent create d by th e Leagu e fo r Danzig . When thi s failed , however , Canad a decide d t o support the thre e wester n powers in their proposal to return Trieste to Italy. The Canadia n delegation was hardly satisfied with the results, especially as they ha d hope d thi s migh t b e a n occasio n t o narro w th e breac h wit h th e Soviet Union . Claxto n summe d u p th e treatie s as 'generally just an d workable if there is the spiri t to make them work ... in any event they are the bes t that could be obtained.' He saw the Paris Conference 'a s a proving ground to show numerous mistakes to be avoided in making the much more important peace treat y wit h Germany.' 26 I t ha d bee n a chastening experienc e fo r th e delegation an d whe n the y returned t o Ottaw a they recorded som e o f their impressions. The y ha d bee n struc k forcefull y wit h Sovie t determinatio n t o maintain the monolithi c solidarity of its bloc and were pessimistic about th e prospects o f an earl y East-West rapprochement . The y were also very much concerned about the continuing weakness of France and the other European allies an d conclude d tha t Europea n economi c recover y wa s goin g t o b e harder an d tak e longe r tha n expected . Thi s raise d th e question : i f Europ e needed hel p wha t would o r shoul d Canada' s attitud e be ? I n th e economi c sphere, ther e woul d b e n o financial help available after Ma y 194 6 wit h th e exhaustion o f the last export credits. They were pondering the answers in the political an d strategi c spher e a s well . What woul d b e th e implication s for

116 Th e Shapin g of Peac e Canadian polic y of greate r America n involvemen t i n Europ e and als o th e British quest t o establish understandings across the Channel? 27 ITALIAN COLONIE S

As dispositio n o f th e Italia n colonie s coul d no t b e settle d i n Paris , i t was referred t o the Unite d Nations. I n the Genera l Assembl y Canadian s found themselves severa l year s later taking part i n a forum wher e the distinction between grea t powers and medium powers was less evident. It was still diffi cult, nevertheless, t o have a strong Canadian position on matters concerning Northeast Africa . I n such a setting th e Canadian anxiety to achieve a settlement, no t regardless o f cost bu t somewha t impatient of the cost fo r others , encouraged a disposition o f Eritrea more expedient than just. The Canadian interest ha s alway s been i n the reductio n o f tension, th e settlemen t o f disputes, a good intention which encourages at times a belief in the virtue, as an end i n itself, o f getting troublesome matter s off the Unite d Nations agenda. In such situations people like Eritreans are expected not to be tiresome about their fate. There ma y be nothing particularly Canadian about this attitude in international politics, but it is a temptation to a country whose vested interes t in international tranquillity supersedes other national interests. The questio n of Eritrea is worth noting,28 because it raised moral issues too little perceived at the time . It typified a n issue which has perturbed the United Nations ever since. At Paris a guilty feeling of obligation to Ethiopia was evident. As the head of th e Canadia n delegatio n noted : 'Ethiopi a wa s one o f the first nations t o suffer th e ful l forc e of aggression i n consequence o f the failur e o f collective action, whic h had bee n establishe d precisel y to prevent such an occurrenc e and, consequently , Ethiopi a shoul d b e on e o f the firs t t o receiv e redress. ' The commentar y fo r the delegation , moreover , ha d described Eritre a as an 'artificial creatio n o f Italian imperialism,' part s of which ha d bee n detache d from Ethiopi a and the Sudan. Nevertheless, after the deputies of the Council of Foreign Minister s decide d t o send a four-man commission t o investigate conditions i n th e forme r Italia n colonies, th e Canadia n attitud e changed a little. The secretar y o f state fo r externa l affair s sen t a cautious telegra m t o London sayin g that th e Canadia n governmen t wa s 'inclined t o support th e union with Ethiopia of that portion of the highland s of Eritrea in which the majority o f th e peopl e wis h t o b e include d i n th e Ethiopia n Empire . Th e remainder o f the territor y would be placed under trusteeship.. . Where Ital ian settlers are welcomed b y the nativ e inhabitants , facilities should be provided fo r th e settlemen t o f former residents of Afric a no w living in Italy.' 29

117 Peacemakin g The U N General Assembl y sen t a commission o f its own to Eritre a to find out mor e abou t th e stat e o f loca l opinio n an d aske d th e so-calle d Interi m Committee o f the Assembl y t o study the commission' s recommendations . These, received in 1950, took the form of three different proposals . The on e which th e Interi m Committe e though t migh t b e th e basi s fo r a n agree d settlement provide d tha t Eritre a shoul d b e se t u p a s an autonomou s uni t federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown, enjoying a constitution, a government o f its own, a separate legislature and judiciary, and equal representation wit h Ethiopia in an imperial federal council. Canada joined i n sponsoring the resultant resolution, which the Assembly adopted. I t represente d a ver y Canadian approac h t o th e issu e o f historic rights. Ther e wer e still nagging doubts i n Canadia n minds , however , a s t o whether o r not Eritrean separatists could be brought to co-operate o r Ethiopia induce d t o trea t Eritre a a s an equa l partne r i n th e federation . Anothe r worry assaile d th e Canadia n representative i n the Interi m Committee. Th e four power s had promised t o put th e Assembl y resolution, whateve r it was, into effect. Thi s meant that in its recommendation o n the disposal of former Italian colonies the Genera l Assembl y was coming about as close to international legislation as it had ever com e and there were doubts abou t its authority under the Charter to do so. A proposal before the Assembly prescribed a bill of rights for residents o f Eritrea which recommended constitutiona l features not only for Eritrea but for Ethiopia as a whole. The analogy seen in the department was a situation in which the opponents o f confederation in Newfoundland might appeal to the United Nations and the General Assembly, in order t o achiev e a n amicabl e settlement , woul d prescribe a union o f Newfoundland wit h Canad a whic h obliged th e Canadia n governmen t t o recog nize certain fundamenta l rights in the provinc e of Newfoundland and set up a particula r kin d o f federa l council. 30 Ther e wa s littl e doub t tha t Canad a would have protested tha t this was intervention in domestic affairs, contrary to Article 2(7) of the Charter . The Canadia n representativ e i n th e Interi m Committe e raise d wit h th e British and American representatives th e question of the extent to which the General Assembl y woul d be oblige d to enforce it s system i n perpetuity on Ethiopia. The British and Americans were, however, so intent on getting an immediate agreemen t tha t the y could no t spar e tim e fo r speculating about the long-rang e implications of what they were doing. It seemed to the Cana dian representative tha t th e Assembl y was either moving well in advance of the intention s o f th e founder s o r els e bein g hypocritical . In th e corridor s other representative s agree d tha t th e Assembl y coul d no t interfer e wit h a member's desire t o alter its own legislation, but this meant of course that the

118 Th e Shapin g of Peac e federal solution in no way guaranteed the rights of Eritrean minorities. It was not the sort of subject, however, on which a remote Nort h America n middle power woul d stick it s neck out -and certainl y not i n 195 0 wit h the Korea n war raging. That it might have been justified i n so doing, however, has bee n proved b y the disregar d b y Ethiopi a o f Eritrea n autonom y an d th e arme d resistance o f the Eritrean s a quarter of a century later. G E R M A N Y A N D AUSTRI A

Canadians i n general were not muc h intereste d i n the settlement s wit h th e minor enemies . Fo r the m th e wa r ha d bee n almos t entirel y agains t Ger many - eve n whe n they fought i n Italy. It was in this context they felt mos t keenly thei r righ t to a major position . The Britis h ide a o f a United Nation s Commission fo r Europ e suited Canada as it provided for bodies dealing with armistices, occupation , an d relie f responsible t o the UNCE . The commissio n would have a Steering Committee of the great powers but it would be open to any Europea n all y o r dominio n prepare d t o contribut e t o th e policin g of Europe.31 Suc h an admirable arrangement di d not surviv e the exigencie s of the final militar y phase. Canad a di d not pres s for membership i n the Advisory Counci l fo r Ital y o r th e Europea n Advisor y Commissio n i n Londo n established b y th e grea t power s a t th e Mosco w Conference . I t sough t a n appropriate role in a UN body. By late 194 4 Canada was expressing uneasi ness over th e appearanc e o f a tripartit e Hig h Commissio n fo r Germany. 32 And s o i t went . Disappointmen t wa s perhap s keene r amon g th e officials . When th e Wa r Committee considere d a memorandum abou t th e Canadia n part in UNC E it was cautious. The vie w was expressed tha t it was important to avoid commitment s whic h would involve extensiv e us e o f Canadian force s after th e en d o f hostilitie s and heavie r burden s tha n th e Canadia n peopl e would be inclined to accept after th e long strain o f war. 33 On 1 3 October 194 4 Pearso n ha d predicte d accuratel y from Washingto n that 'whatever may have been the U K Government's own views on the subject, the y hav e ha d t o yiel d t o th e view s o f th e U.s . and, abov e all , o f th e USSR, tha t the armistice terms and the German settlemen t are to be matter s for discussio n an d decision b y the Three Powers alone. A n occasiona l bon e of participation will be thrown to the European allies and the Dominions, bu t it will b e done withou t enthusiasm an d there wil l b e little mention o f it.' In spite o f thi s discouraging forecas t th e interdepartmenta l Post-Hostilitie s Problems Committe e gav e the subject of Germany major attention. The consideration wa s detailed an d exhaustive, touchin g on all aspects o f the futur e of Germany. I t was a good academic exercise, althoug h it was largely wasted.

119 Peacemakin g Some o f th e Canadia n ideas , fo r a n internationa l Ruh r Authorit y for ex ample, di d attract interest from the majo r powers . In retrospect, i t is hard to understand th e concentration o n a subject which, however important for the peace of the world , was not one on which Canada had any reasonable expec tation o f bein g decisive . Th e explanatio n wa s partiall y shee r intellectua l exuberance, th e inabilit y to kee p one' s hands of f a subject of admitted im portance. An d then ther e was the nee d t o do what had to be done to prove a right. What Canad a wanted , particularl y after th e experienc e o f the Pari s Peac e Conference, wa s i n th e firs t plac e a n opportunit y to discus s th e Germa n settlement befor e i t ha d congeale d i n four-powe r agreement . An d i n th e second place , t o hav e a rea l give-and-tak e discussion . Wha t the y go t was even les s satisfactor y tha n th e Pari s arrangement . A t Potsda m th e fou r powers ha d indicate d a willingnes s to discus s th e Germa n settlemen t wit h the lesser powers . Their greater rigidit y on the subject, when they got round to this phase early in 1947, was the consequence o f the even greater difficul ties the y were having in reaching agreement amon g themselves . I t was not that they were callously unaware of the claims of Canada and the other countries. If they could reach any kind of agreement with the Russians, they were not going to forfeit i t by exposure t o the Australians . Canada di d argue , wit h som e justification, a specia l cas e a s th e fourt h power arrayed against Germany, bu t there was no way in which an exception could b e mad e fo r Canad a alone . In on e respec t Canad a di d get a deserve d rebuke. Its claim that it had a greater righ t even than the occupie d countries on th e ground s o f it s greate r wa r effort wa s grossly lacking in imagination. Such a claim reflected that bias in favour of the produce r a s opposed t o th e consumer tha t was notable throughou t the Canadia n interpretatio n of func tionalism. A s the secretary of state for the dominions pointe d out to Ottawa, the occupie d countries ma y hav e been unabl e to produc e a war effort com parable t o tha t of an unoccupie d Canada, bu t certainly their stake i n a Ger man settlemen t wa s greater. 34 However , th e Sovie t position , whic h mad e some minor provision fo r committee discussions wit h representatives o f 'interested states,' defined those wit h direct interests a s countries whos e terri tory had been occupie d during the war. The Canadian reaction was to regard this as preposterous . In lat e 194 6 th e Counci l o f Foreig n Minister s (us , USSR , UK , France) began to consider a German peace treat y and appointed deputies t o hear the views of the othe r allies. The Canadian government wa s duly invited to submit its views in writing to the deputies and given one week's notic e to do so. The writte n submission s coul d b e supplemente d b y ora l presentations . A

120 Th e Shapin g of Peac e Canadian note was sent requesting a larger part along with the other allies in considering matters of procedure and substance. Such was the interest of the opposition an d o f editor s acros s th e countr y tha t S t Lauren t gav e a ful l account t o th e Hous e o f th e negotiations , togethe r wit h th e tex t o f th e communications, emphasizin g tha t Canad a ha d trie d t o b e 'moderat e an d constructive' an d make 'practicabl e suggestions fo r alternative measures.' 35 The deputie s were unable to agree o n a reply, but th e Canadia n high commissioner i n London wa s invited to present th e view s of the Canadia n government t o th e deputie s o n 2 5 January. This place d th e governmen t i n a difficult position . The y di d no t wan t t o acquiesc e i n thi s unsatisfactor y procedure, bu t i f thi s invitatio n wer e rejecte d th e possibilit y of pressin g further claim s when th e foreig n ministers me t woul d be jeopardized. Firs t the governmen t trie d t o ge t assuranc e tha t th e submissio n o f preliminary views at thi s poin t would not prejudic e the chanc e o f discussing th e settle ment highe r u p a t a late r stage . Th e deputies , however , sai d the y ha d n o authority t o giv e thi s assurance. S o a writte n submission wa s made which was calle d preliminar y and th e Canadia n insistenc e o n havin g a furthe r opportunity wa s spelle d out. 36 I n th e submissio n th e Canadia n claim s o n questions o f procedure wer e firmly put along with views on substance . As reflecte d in editoria l opinion th e moo d o f th e countr y was resentful. The tendenc y wa s t o blam e th e governmen t fo r no t havin g more loudly proclaimed an d insisted . I n fact , th e charg e that the governmen t ha d been slow to make its views known in appropriate quarters is hard to sustain. Th e British an d American s wer e made wel l awar e of th e Canadia n vie w by th e Canadian representatives i n London an d Washington an d by the loud state ments in Ottawa. The Canadian ambassador in Moscow had been making the case wit h Molotov. Th e governmen t di d stic k to wha t St Laurent calle d a 'moderate and constructive' tone throughout . It was a posture mor e congenial to the minister , but i t was also calculated to persuade the foreig n ministers that Canada had no intention o f being a nuisance like Evatt. As might have been expected th e deputies were unable to agree on procedure and they simply sent a report to the Counci l in which the view s of the various allie s were included. The foreig n minister s then me t i n Moscow in March and again there was deadlock. Bevin and Marshall did try to find a way to satisf y th e lesse r powers , but Moloto v go t some support fro m Bidaul t in his view that the allie s might merely submit their view s on a subcommitte e level before the peace conference. Wha t happened then was that the occupying power s bega n t o mak e arrangement s fo r thei r ow n zones, whic h quite clearly mean t tha t th e futur e o f German y wa s going to b e determine d b y their ad hoc practices.

121 Peacemakin g The Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s sa w th e chanc e t o pla y a rol e i n a peace conference slipping out of its hands and continued to remind the great powers o f 'th e necessit y o f makin g adequate provisio n i n th e nea r future , before the genera l lines of the peac e settlement wit h Germany hav e becom e fixed, fo r th e activ e participatio n in th e proces s o f peac e makin g o f thos e countries, lik e Canada, whic h contributed effectivel y t o th e prosecutio n o f the war.' 37 The perpetuation of this argument about a right based on wartime effort wa s becoming not s o much tiresome a s irrelevant. Attitudes to peac e and t o th e postwa r positio n o f German y shifte d drasticall y during 194 7 because o f th e realizatio n tha t th e grea t power s wer e no t going t o agree . Robertson, fro m London , advise d against reviving the old issue o f appropriate participatio n and pointe d ou t tha t th e 1939-4 5 line s o f neutralit y an d belligerency had been completely cut across by the movements fo r 'Western Union' an d th e Marshal l Plan. H e though t th e Wester n occupyin g powers would nee d al l the elbo w roo m the y coul d ge t t o cop e wit h th e Russians . Premature pressur e fo r a peac e settlemen t woul d confir m the divisio n o f Germany and end th e faint possibilit y of an agreement wit h the Russians. 38 Because Canadia n perception s o f Soviet policie s wer e similar t o those of the Wester n European s an d Americans , the y were susceptible t o the argument tha t th e Wester n grea t power s shoul d no t b e inhibite d i n th e quic k and desperat e measure s the y migh t hav e t o tak e t o cop e wit h wha t was generally see n a s a calculate d Sovie t effor t t o engineer, i n on e wa y o r another, a communist Wester n Europe . Som e Canadia n official s were , furthermore, attracte d t o the concept o f Western Europea n Union , not only as a means o f restoring the Europea n econom y but also as a framework within which German y migh t safely b e revived . On 5 May 1948 , i n th e Hous e o f Commons, S t Lauren t summe d u p th e revise d Canadia n positio n wit h a sensible distinction : '...w e hav e no t wishe d t o appea r to b e attemptin g t o put forwar d technical claim s which might requir e the occupyin g powers, in order t o giv e offenc e t o n o one , t o invit e al l those wh o ha d declare d war against Germany ; thi s i n ou r opinio n would hav e ha d a delaying effect o n the measure s th e occupyin g powers are tryin g to tak e t o brin g about som e semi-permanent solutio n o f th e problem . Bu t w e ar e stil l insistin g tha t when i t comes to th e makin g o f the fina l peac e wit h Germany th e power s who too k a substantial par t i n th e winnin g of th e wa r shall b e given a role proportionate to their importance in the conflict.' 39 Ottawa did not cease, however, to bombard the power s with memoranda . An indication of Canadian zeal had been th e setting up of a Military Mission in Berli n in Januar y 194 6 under th e directio n of one o f the shrewdes t military men, Genera l Pope , wh o continued t o make hi s presence fel t i n Berlin

122 Th e Shapin g of Peac e and Ottawa . The last-gas p Canadian effor t wa s directed t o Berlin . When i t was learned in early 194 8 that the thre e Western militar y governors in Berlin would continue secret studie s of the futur e o f Germany, th e heads o f Commonwealth militar y mission s i n Berli n were tol d b y th e Britis h the y could present thei r view s then . Nothin g daunted , th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs se t u p a series of interdepartmental panels and came u p with exten sive prescriptions for the political and economic life of Germany. The papers were respectable contributions but considerably beyond the call of duty. As it happened the secret Workin g Party in Berlin completed it s report so quickly that th e Canadia n positio n could b e slippe d i n onl y a s a n addendum . A n extensive paper on the establishment o f an International Ruhr Authority did attract som e attentio n i n London , Paris , an d Washington . Th e American s incorporated some Canadian sentences in their draft proposa l but did not like Canada's cann y suggestion that provision be made for the accession o f other powers to th e Authority , lest thi s tempt the Russian s to claim membership in a bod y concerne d solel y wit h th e Wester n zones . A t an y rat e th e ne w Authority was established lat e in 194 8 and in Ottawa it was thought it agreed in all major point s with their own commentary. 40 Futile as all this work may have been, the paper s do provide an indication of Canadia n views , at leas t o n th e officia l level , o n German y an d Europ e during that strange interlud e before NAT O took over. 41 The approac h to th e future o f German y was , as might hav e bee n expected , on e whic h avoided extremes. Th e concep t o f a deindustrialized Germany advocate d b y Henry Morgenthau, Jr , th e forme r Unite d State s secretar y o f th e treasury , wa s rejected. The best hope was seen in 'a moderate and democratic governmen t in a united and relativel y prosperous Germany.' 42 By the tim e forma l views were presente d i n 194 7 this emphasi s ha d bee n strengthene d b y the grad ual - althoug h reluctant - transitio n to the concept of Western German y as a bulwark. Towards th e Germans themselves th e attitud e remained hard , but in the politica l and economic confusion of Europe at this time the belief was strong tha t German y ough t no t t o b e i n s o depresse d a conditio n tha t i t would serve as a centre o f infection . Canadian planner s were afraid o f th e spread of communism, of course, bu t their liberal view was that communis m was mor e likel y to b e th e produc t o f miser y tha n o f Sovie t machinations . General Pope , fro m th e devastate d city of Berlin, feared 'a German state so politically and economicall y oppresse d tha t sh e wil l b e a constant threa t t o the peace and economic stability of the world.' 43 The Canadian submission t o the Council of Foreign Ministers argued that the primary consideration in a treaty should be the welfare of Europe and the world and not merely 'the position of Germany o r her relation to any one of

123 Peacemakin g her neighbours.' The prescription was for a nice democratic government an d a mildly but not too prosperous economy, federalized so that it would not be too strong (a n interesting Ottawa perspective o n federalism circa 1946), with a constitutio n tha t coul d no t b e amende d fo r a numbe r o f year s without consent o f the Unite d Nations. It outlined suitable forms of democratic government fo r peopl e wit h a pervers e dispositio n to naught y behaviour, an d was even s o nationally doctrinaire as to point out th e superiority of a system of 'responsibl e government. ' Ther e wer e al l the correc t view s of the tim e about breakin g u p cartel s an d th e emergenc e o f wha t becam e a dogmati c belief i n Wester n Europea n Union . I n 194 7 th e Canadia n governmen t favoured th e complet e demilitarizatio n of Germany, wit h only police forces left. In th e ligh t of the politica l realities of the time , muc h of this prescription for Germa n goo d behaviou r sound s pedantic . Mor e t o th e poin t wa s th e contribution of Norman Robertso n whos e inventive mind produced the idea of a n internationa l statute a s an alternativ e t o a peace treaty which was unachievable. Thi s woul d serv e a numbe r o f purposes . I n th e absenc e o f a German government , i t woul d provid e a constitutiona l basi s fo r th e ne w state. Having in mind the recent German attitud e to the Weimar Republic as the work of traitors, Robertson though t there was some advantage in having a constitution provide d fo r the ne w political leaders. Th e ne w German government migh t itself later adhere t o the statute. I t was a means als o of making peac e b y instalments , startin g with th e bar e minimu m o n whic h there was a consensus and then movin g on as agreement coul d be reached.44 From the Canadia n point of view this procedure ha d the advantag e also of permitting the lesse r states to be associated by membership in various functional committees. I t wa s consistent als o wit h th e Canadia n ide a o f buildin g th e European peac e settlemen t int o th e internationa l framework of the Unite d Nations. Those who drew up the treaty should regard themselves a s trustee s for th e worl d community. I t was only within the Unite d Nation s syste m o f collective securit y that there could be any real protection against German or any othe r aggression . Th e proposa l i s interestin g a s a n illustratio n o f th e lapidary approac h t o institutio n buildin g whic h increasingl y characterize d Canadian thinking as it moved awa y from the blueprin t stage . The ide a o f a statute wa s overtaken b y events . I t probabl y never ha d a chance becaus e th e ga p between th e grea t power s was already so wide that there woul d not hav e bee n eve n th e minimu m consensu s necessary t o get started. The concept o f the all-embracin g United Nations looks, from a later perspective, illusory. Nevertheless, i t was a serious effor t t o grapple with real politics. I t wa s original and imaginativ e an d serve d t o justify th e Canadia n

124 Th e Shapin g of Peac e insistence o n a voice. Within a year, however, the sam e official s wer e contemplating a different kin d of immediate procedure , a North Atlantic security pact , althoug h eve n thi s the y were anxious t o fit into the concep t o f a universal security system under the United Nations. A settlement with Austri a was also a responsibility of the Counci l of Foreign Minister s an d thei r deputies . A s th e grea t power s ha d regarde d th e Anschluss as null and void, Canada, like the other allies, did not regard itself as having been at war with Austria. The issues there seemed somewhat more remote, bu t the government regarded it essential to submit views in order to maintain th e right s of th e lesse r allies . Ther e wa s no questio n o f a peac e treaty o r a peace conference and th e Counci l instructed it s deputies to prepare the terms without any provision for consultation. The Canadian submission, made to the deputies in February 1947, was called a statement 'o n th e proposed treat y for th e re-establishmen t o f an independent an d democrati c Austria.' Th e earlie r par t o f th e submissio n wa s devoted t o restatin g th e Canadian case on procedure. This was followed by some very general principles calling for a free, democratic, and independent Austria, withdrawal of all occupation forces, and prohibitio n of union with Germany. One interestin g and typicall y Canadia n section wa s the following : 'Canad a doe s not , how ever, conside r tha t the signatories to a treaty should be asked to secure the future integrit y of Austria , but rathe r that any threa t t o Austria n independence shoul d b e deal t wit h b y th e unite d nations . I f th e fou r occupyin g powers, however, wish to go beyond this and themselves mak e such a guarantee i t i s a matter which would not concer n th e Canadia n government.' 45 Canada proceede d t o establis h norma l diplomati c relation s wit h Vienna , although a 'state treaty' between the four powers and Austria was not agreed to until 1955. Canada acceded t o the treat y in 1959 . JAPAN The government's attitud e towards the peace settlement wit h Japan differe d in many ways from it s attitude towards the settlement wit h Germany. Ther e was a similar desire t o avoid sending force s for occupation, rendere d easie r by a dissimila r reluctanc e t o pla y an activ e role i n control, supervisory , or even just advisory bodies. Although Canada had trade and other interests in the Far East, it had never had to determine a coherent policy in that area and had judged events in Asia more in terms of their effect o n relations betwee n the United Kingdom and the United States or on the League of Nations. The war i n th e Pacifi c Canadian s ha d lef t t o th e American s fo r goo d tactica l reasons. I t wa s recognized tha t a failure o f Canadian troop s t o go to Japa n

125 Peacemakin g after th e victor y in Europe woul d cause a seriou s rif t wit h th e Americans , but Kin g was determined tha t thi s be a volunteer effort . J.W . Pickersgill' s comment i n volume I of the Mackenzie King Record was that 'the war against Japan ha d neve r reall y caught th e imaginatio n of Canadians, an d any plans for participatio n in the fighting in the Pacific had no politica l pressure behin d them.'46 Littl e attentio n wa s given t o th e Fa r Eas t b y th e post-hostilitie s planners i n Ottawa. Although the Dominion s Offic e referre d copie s o f British-American exchange s concernin g postwa r policie s toward s Japan , th e prime minister neve r approve d the sending o f Canadian comment. Externa l Affairs assumed that this meant h e did not want to intervene i n that sphere . The Britis h showe d insensitivit y t o Canadia n prejudic e i n Augus t 194 5 which can be attributed, perhaps, to the confusion of changing governments at Westminster. A request cam e t o th e prim e minister o f Canada fo r assis tance i n many task s resultin g from th e Japanes e surrende r whic h included the statement , 'indeed, we regard your assistance a s indispensable.'47 Before this ther e had been proposal s for a Commonwealth occupatio n forc e to reoccupy ke y area s an d tak e par t i n th e occupatio n o f Japan . A misguide d effort t o be sensitive ha d even le d to the suggestio n tha t since Canad a ha d shared i n the defenc e o f Hong Kong a Canadian ship might like to take part in th e surrende r o f tha t colony , th e shi p o f cours e t o sai l wit h th e com mander-in-chief of the Britis h Pacific Fleet . All have the earmark s of proposals designe d b y th e Britis h military . Attlee woul d neve r hav e authorize d them afte r h e had experienced Mackenzi e King. Canada replie d o n 1 5 August 48 tha t HMC S Prince Rupert woul d join th e fleet to repatriate POW S from Hon g Kong and carry relief supplies. The Canadian militar y attaché at Chungking would accompany United States Genera l Wedemeyer's land forc e fro m Chin a t o Hon g Kong . No brigad e would be supplied fo r occupatio n o r othe r specia l dutie s i n th e Pacifi c theatre . 'W e now hav e considerable occupatio n force s in Europe and we are not read y to undertake an y furthe r commitment s o f thi s natur e involvin g our Arm y or Airforce units.' King went further: 'I regret to have to say that I consider that any mention t o the Unite d States Chiefs of Staff of the possibl e participation of Canadian troop s i n such a force should have been deferred until you had been informe d o f our views ...' Under instructions the Canadian ambassado r in Washington passe d on thi s exchange t o the State Departmen t on 1 8 August, bu t h e added tha t i t was uncertain ho w long the occupatio n force s i n Germany woul d b e kep t ther e sinc e th e fir m commitmen t wa s to provid e only an occupation grou p of some 25,000 during the fiscal year. The Americans wer e no t t o ge t th e notio n tha t althoug h Canad a use d it s occupatio n duties i n Europ e a s th e reaso n fo r no t sendin g the m t o Japan, an y troop s released from Europe would be available in the Fa r East.

126 Th e Shapin g of Peac e Nevertheless, Canad a woul d b e jeopardizing it s claims t o a voice i n th e postwar world if it were to reject a seat at a council table. The wa r was, afte r all, on e wa r and Canad a ha d bee n holdin g its assigned front . Canad a wa s a Pacific country, as the British Columbians kept insisting, and there ha d been some contribution t o fighting the Japanese . Lat e i n Augus t Canada was informed tha t it was included, along with Australia, New Zealand, the Nether lands, an d th e Philippines , wit h the grea t power s in membershi p o f a Fa r Eastern Advisor y Commission. Ther e was no suggestion of a United Nations Commission a s ha d a t firs t bee n contemplate d fo r Europe . Th e FEA C ha d been a proposa l o f th e grea t power s i n th e Mosco w Declaration , bu t thi s membership lis t was proposed b y Washington. The FEA C was to b e respon sible fo r formulatin g policies for Japa n t o fulfi l it s surrender term s and th e steps necessar y i n th e machiner y t o assur e complianc e b y Japan . Hum e Wrong recognized tha t although a United State s initiativ e to include smaller countries was welcome an d th e offe r woul d be difficul t t o refuse, neverthe less it was desirable to be cautious because th e United States suggestion 'ma y have been in part prompted by a desire to enlist the direct responsibility of as many countrie s a s woul d hav e anythin g t o contribute , whil e retainin g fo r themselves th e actual execution o f policy in Japan through th e supremacy of the American Commande r there.' 49 The department suspecte d als o that the Unite d State s wante d the FEA C to forestall Sovie t pressur e fo r a four-powe r contro l counci l i n Japa n an d thereby avoi d anothe r Berli n situation o r a stalemate b y veto. Tha t wa s an American wis h Ottaw a ha d n o interes t i n frustrating. They recognize d th e realities o f America n powe r an d th e inevitability , therefore, o f America n responsibility. The Canadia n representativ e o n the FEA C was told tha t what was most desirable was retention o f a single United States military command and an allied body to lay down general lines of policy. The principle of according to the Unite d States a position of primary military responsibility avoids the practical difficulties inherent in setting up separate zones of occupation or in other forms of four-power administration. Moreover, there is an advantage in havin g the Unite d States , a s a power with both th e mean s a t her disposa l an d a reasonable degre e o f willingness to cooperate wit h smaller nations, mad e responsible for th e execution of Allied policy. At the same tim e the exclusion of other countries, particularly the Sovie t Union, from an y real share i n the contro l of Japan is difficul t to justify . Indeed , i t migh t wel l encourag e th e formatio n o f sphere s o f influence which it is in the general interest t o avoid as far as possible. 50

The FEA C di d no t g o far becaus e th e Sovie t Unio n refuse d t o participate so long a s i t ha d a purel y advisor y role . Th e Unite d State s wa s exceedingl y

127 Peacemakin g reluctant t o hav e a n allie d council established wit h vet o power s that would shackle th e wor k o f th e Suprem e Commande r fo r th e Allie d Powers . Nevertheless, the y were anxious to ge t th e Sovie t Unio n involved . A t th e Moscow Conferenc e o f foreign ministers in Decembe r i t was agreed t o re place the FEA C with a Far Eastern Commission, which was to be no longer an advisory body but wa s charged primarily with the tas k of formulating policy for th e fulfilmen t o f th e surrende r term s fo r Japan. However, ther e was an Allied Counci l fo r Japa n i n Toky o to advis e S CAP on polic y formulation by the FE C and there the vet o applied. In connection with the Allied Council Canada ran again into the problem of participation as part of the 'Britis h Commonwealth.' This time it was not th e British who made th e proposa l but th e Unite d State s secretar y o f state, th e Americans no doubt thinking this would all be neater. The argument the Canadians used against this proposal in talking to the British was that the Soviet government might use it as a precedent for resisting separate Canadian representation i n situations of considerably greater importance to Canada. Therefore, Canad a considere d i t important that th e Unite d State s b e discouraged from makin g such proposals in future. 51 There wa s a British Commonwealth seat in the Allied Council but Canada did not participate in the arrangements. If Canada wanted to escape involvement it would have been wiser to reject membership. Membershi p involve d takin g positions . Canad a wa s repre sented, even i n the FEC , by ambassadors lik e Pearson an d Wrong as well as deputies wh o wer e specialist s in Fa r Easter n affair s an d i f they had t o tak e part at all they could not resist taking part intelligently. Seldom, however, did work o f the FE C receiv e consideratio n a t a high leve l i n Ottawa. The Cana dian contributio n in Japa n wa s considerably greater than intende d becaus e the Canadia n o n th e spo t happene d t o b e a remarkable person, E.H . Nor man. Herber t Norma n ha d grow n u p i n Japa n an d bee n educate d a t th e renowned Canadia n Academy a t Kobe. He ha d studied als o at Toronto an d Cambridge, published works in both Englis h and Japanese, and although he was still i n hi s thirtie s h e wa s recognized i n Japa n an d abroa d a s a unique scholar.52 He had bee n involved durin g the wa r in special work dealing with Japan i n th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s an d shortl y afte r th e en d o f hostilities in the Far East he was sent to Manila to head the Canadian group arranging fo r civilia n repatriation fro m th e Orient . Fro m ther e h e wen t t o Japan wher e the Unite d State s army was anxious that he remai n s o that hi s extensive an d specia l knowledg e o f Japanes e politica l condition s coul d b e made available to General MacArthur's staff. H e was allowed to remain and played a leading part in counter-intelligence work. 53 When th e FE C moved t o Japa n a t th e en d o f 194 5 th e prim e ministe r agreed tha t Norma n shoul d represen t Canad a eve n thoug h h e woul d b e

128 Th e Shapin g of Peac e junior to the representatives of other countries. As an adviser on SCAP' S staff his freedom of action had been restricted, but as the Canadian representative he gained the confidenc e of MacArthur himself and o f other leader s in th e United State s headquarter s to a remarkable degree. Canada ha d had a legation i n Japa n fo r some year s before th e war , in on e o f the larges t an d bes t equipped buildings in Tokyo which had miraculously survived. The government wa s anxious to set up a civilian mission and put Norman in charge of it, but th e American s were unwillin g to receiv e an y civilian s wh o wer e no t attached t o SCAP' S staff . Ther e wa s a typicall y exasperatin g hassl e whe n MacArthur grudgingl y agree d tha t the Canadia n representative migh t go to Tokyo with the provis o that he could not be accommodated i n the Canadian legation as the buildin g was required for othe r purposes . After strong complaints to the Stat e Department, th e situation was worked out. The missio n was wante d t o loo k afte r relie f o f Canadia n national s i n Japa n an d othe r consular an d commercia l duties a s wel l as politica l liaison wit h SCAP . Th e mission i n Tokyo, unlike that in Berlin, was civilian. The FE C had tw o principa l functions: 'To formulate th e policies , principles, an d standard s in conformity with whic h the fulfilmen t b y Japan o f its obligations under the term s o f surrender ma y be accomplished' and 'To review, o n th e reques t o f an y member, an y directive issue d t o th e Suprem e Commander fo r th e Allie d Power s o r an y actio n take n b y th e Suprem e Commander involvin g policy decisions withi n the jurisdiction of the Com mission.'54 Th e suprem e commande r wa s of cours e MacArthur , th e sol e executive authorit y fo r th e allie d powers , wh o wa s abl e permanentl y t o circumvent Sovie t objection s b y havin g recourse t o interi m directives . I n the commissio n ther e wa s theoretically at least a chance for the lesse r allie s to stat e thei r piece s an d exer t thei r will . However , i n spit e o f it s wid e authority wit h respec t t o th e post-surrende r policy , the commission' s freedom wa s considerably handicapped b y the fac t tha t th e mai n outline s ha d already bee n draw n u p b y th e American s befor e th e FE C got int o action . The commissio n coul d revie w o r modif y thes e policies , bu t th e practica l opportunities wer e distinctl y limited b y th e chaoti c situatio n o f Japa n an d by the fac t tha t all authority was in the hand s of the Americans . Canada played its part in drawing up the basic post-surrender policy , which was somewhat miraculously agreed upon. It was in general a declaration for all th e accepte d virtue s an d ther e wa s no particula r Canadian angl e t o b e noted. Difference s howeve r di d begi n t o develo p ove r th e refor m o f th e Japanese constitutio n an d relate d issues . Australian s an d Ne w Zealander s played a more active role, which Canadians were happy to concede to them. However, ther e wa s a tendenc y fo r a n informa l Commonwealt h fron t t o

129 Peacemakin g emerge i n th e pursui t of what might be described a s more libera l positions. Australia, New Zealand, an d Canada, wit h more reluctan t support from th e United Kingdom , expresse d som e oppositio n to th e earl y date se t fo r th e elections i n th e belie f tha t i t di d no t allo w tim e fo r th e mor e democrati c forces to organize themselves. Canad a joined in a stubborn opposition mov e behind a Ne w Zealan d resolutio n o n thi s subject , bu t SCA P convince d a majority o f the commissio n tha t such questionin g of his position would undermine hi s authorit y dangerously. Tha t wa s th e onl y tim e Canad a went along with a resolution that could be regarded as critical of SCAP. This kind of argument b y the American s was at first resented i n the commission, bu t th e Canadians an d thei r Commonwealth colleague s wer e more incline d to submit to it as the y becam e mor e concerne d ove r Sovie t policie s elsewhere . Hereafter th e oppositio n continue d t o question America n policies but to do so privately, to seek amendments withou t public differences in the commis sion tha t migh t undermin e SCAP . Th e commissio n wa s fa r fro m bein g a docile bod y an d th e Canadian s wer e activ e an d conscientious , constantl y seeking to strengthen all the democratic elements a s they saw them in constitution-making. In th e end , however , the y submitted t o America n domina tion no t becaus e i t was imposed o r because the y always agreed but because , when it came to the final assessment, they did believe in the ultimate priority of maintainin g SCAP' S positio n i n perilou s times . The y recognize d also , o f course, tha t th e American s wer e providin g all the forc e and th e economi c assistance, the Canadia n contributio n to both was virtually nil, and the government woul d not want to change tha t happy situation. In their attitudes toward s the reconstructio n o f Japan and towards reparations, th e Canadian s tende d t o agre e wit h th e Unite d States . Canad a ha d little interest itsel f in reparations and could be more impartial than those who had suffere d directl y from Japanes e aggression . Consisten t als o wit h thei r position on Germany wa s the belief that the bes t guarantee against commu nism i n both case s wa s a reasonably prosperous country. In Japan there was less inclinatio n tha n i n German y t o se e a new marke t fo r Canadia n good s because th e tradition s of Canadian trad e with Japan were more ambiguous . A typical contretemps too k plac e in th e autum n o f 194 8 concernin g th e policy o f th e Japanes e governmen t prohibitin g strikes. A t issu e wa s a FEC directive o f 194 6 i n whic h the righ t o f Japanes e worker s t o join union s o f their ow n choice , bargai n collectively , an d strik e wa s affirmed. Th e livel y Australian membe r of the commissio n too k a strong stand i n opposition t o what had been done and he certainly had the sympathy of the Canadians and the somewha t reluctan t suppor t of the British . Open criticism of such policy in th e commission , however , woul d hav e bee n regarde d a s a n attac k o n

130 Th e Shapin g of Peac e SCAP, wh o ha d allowed the Japanes e t o act thus. The Sovie t delegation was anxious t o discredi t SCA P o n ever y possibl e occasio n an d woul d welcom e such a n opportunit y of support. The America n argument was that SCAP had been confronted wit h th e threa t o f a strike that would have endangered th e safety of the occupation - a n argument that may have been a clever debating point o r may hav e ha d substance. Non e o f the friendl y government s wa s in the en d prepare d t o challenge th e Unite d States o n the matte r i n the com mission. Becaus e th e sam e consideration s continue d t o appl y t o almos t all issues before th e commission th e bod y declined i n importance. In Jul y 194 7 the Unite d States propose d a conference of the eleve n state s who were members o f the FE C to draft a peace treaty for Japan, decision s t o be adopted b y a two-thirds majority. Al l agreed excep t Chin a and the Sovie t Union, who wanted to preserve the veto in a treaty drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers . In Augus t and Septembe r 194 7 representatives o f Commonwealth government s me t i n Canberra i n th e firs t meetin g outsid e th e United Kingdom , th e first to include representatives of India, Pakistan, and Burma, an d th e first major effor t t o have a genuine consultation o n foreign policy withou t th e assume d necessit y t o establis h a commo n policy . Al though the communiqu é wa s careful t o note a similarity of views with those of the Unite d States, there was a difference of emphasis whic h was to characterize a Commonwealt h approac h on Asia n matter s durin g the fifties . Th e members were agreed on pressing for a peace settlement a s soon as possible. Canada urged the desirability of a peace treaty and of getting Japan set in the ways o f self-government a t th e earlies t possibl e moment, bu t th e Russian s continued t o insist on the priorit y of the Counci l of Foreign Ministers . On 1 6 November 194 9 Pearson sai d the absenc e of a treaty with Japan was one o f the causes of uncertainty in the Fa r East. 'Muc h as the Unite d State s occupation of Japan has done fo r that country, I myself am inclined to think that militar y occupation s a s a rul e quickl y reac h a poin t o f diminishin g returns ,..' 55 Between 194 7 an d 1950 , althoug h Canada continued t o believ e that a peace treat y was not onl y desirabl e bu t necessary , i t deferred t o th e delaying tactic s o f the Unite d States , attributable to the conflictin g views of the Stat e Department an d the Unite d State s army.56 The Canadian vie w was clearly expressed b y the secretar y of state for external affairs i n the Hous e of Commons a fe w day s later : '...i t i s clea r tha t th e Japanes e hav e fulfille d pretty well the requirements that have been imposed upon them b y the occupation, an d i t seem s t o m e tha t fro m her e o n w e mus t giv e the m som e incentive t o maintain an d strengthen th e democrati c way of life, and to wish to maintai n clos e an d friendl y relation s wit h the wester n world.' 57 H e went on t o speak o f the danger s o f punitive peace treaties i n general terms which

131 Peacemakin g indicated that Canadians were still influenced by the vie w that the reviva l of militarism i n Germany coul d b e trace d t o th e hars h term s of th e Treat y of Versailles. The Korea n Wa r confirmed the vie w that something must be done about Japan. Japa n ha d assume d enormou s importanc e as a security base fo r th e United Nation s operation , an d th e Korea n Wa r ha d assiste d greatl y in th e revival o f Japan as an economic powe r which was becoming o f considerabl e interest to Canada, among others. The action taken against North Korea also encouraged th e non-communis t power s to act on their own when faced with indefinite resistance fro m Mosco w and Peking . Early in 195 1 President Truman sent Joh n Foste r Dulle s to Tokyo and other countries to prepare for the negotiation o f a treaty with Japan. I n Marc h Canada wa s invited to expres s views on a n American draft . A n invitatio n was issued i n July to all countries that ha d bee n a t wa r wit h Japan . Th e peac e conferenc e wa s hel d i n Sa n Francisco i n September , an d th e treat y wa s signed o n 8 September 1951 . Fifty-four nation s ha d been invited . For various reason s India , Burma , and Yugoslavia did not accept . Neither Chinese governmen t wa s invited. Of the fifty-one countries tha t were present, forty-eigh t signed. Th e Sovie t Union , Poland, an d Czechoslovakia participate d but refused t o sign. The procedur e was no t muc h mor e conduciv e t o lesser-powe r participatio n than wa s th e Paris Peace Conferenc e o f 1946 , bu t the arrangements wer e less offensive. It was a non-punitive peace treat y along the line s Canada preferred , and ther e was no strong sense of frustration in Ottawa. In variou s speeche s i n the Hous e o f Commons an d elsewher e th e prim e minister and th e secretar y o f state strongl y defended th e treaty . In stressin g the desirabilit y of Japan's bein g allowed to take its place in world commerc e they recognized lingerin g Canadian doubts abou t Japanese trade practices. In a speech t o the Hous e o n 2 2 October 195 1 Pearso n outline d Canada' s attitude to the treaty and incidentally took some credit for Canada in seeing to it that althoug h they had not manage d t o have a fisheries agreement included in th e treaty , Japa n wa s obliged t o begi n discussion s wit h Canada an d th e United State s fo r a fisherie s arrangement. 58 S t Lauren t tol d th e Women' s Canadian Clu b in Victoria on 5 September 1952 59 that Canada must lear n t o buy fro m Japa n i n order t o raise th e livin g standards o f the people s in Asia. He sai d th e Japanes e would be prepare d t o agre e b y treaty not t o tak e sal mon, halibut , and herring in the Nort h Pacifi c Ocea n an d added tha t as long as good s wer e no t dumpe d Canad a shoul d b e prepare d t o bu y it s shar e of goods mad e by those with lower living standards. O n 11 February 195 3 Pearson tol d th e Hous e tha t Japa n wa s already Canada's fourt h best customer , that Japa n brough t fro m Canad a onl y one-eight h o f wha t Canad a sol d t o

132 Th e Shapin g of Peac e Japan, an d th e balanc e wa s pai d i n Unite d State s dollars , a n exceedingly valuable commodity at that time.60 Canada was well on the way to a new and special relationshi p with it s North Pacifi c neighbour . The missio n in Tokyo became th e Canadia n embassy in November 195 2 and in June of that year a Japanese ambassado r reopene d a s a n embass y th e legatio n i n Ottaw a that had been closed th e da y of Pearl Harbor. R E P A R A T I O N S AN D WA R CRIME S

At th e Pari s Peac e Conferenc e Canada , alon g wit h othe r Wester n allies , waived al l reparation claims against minor belligerents . Durin g the discus sions i n th e Economi c Commissio n o n Ital y th e Canadia n representativ e pointed ou t tha t Canad a wa s no t onl y askin g nothin g fo r itsel f bu t ha d already contributed substantially to the recover y of Italy through its support of UNRR A an d it s grant of over $28 million in military relief. The Canadia n government ha d als o bee n th e firs t t o allo w its peopl e o f Italia n origi n t o send relie f supplies to their relatives. In November 194 5 the governments of France, Britain, and the Unite d States invited representatives of fifteen governments tha t ha d fough t against Germany t o study plans fo r allocatio n of reparations from Germany. General Pop e represented Canada. The meeting established the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency to ensure equitable distribution. The Canadia n ambassador i n Brussels represente d Canada , and Canadians continue d fo r som e tim e t o tak e par t in th e wor k of subcommittee s which interested them . The Canadia n representative s sough t t o protect Canadia n interests, bu t it was not a matter of great importance to Canada and the participation was not vigorous. I t reflecte d als o th e increasin g Canadia n interes t i n securit y through a modest reviva l of the Germa n economy . The IAR A allocated Canada 1. 3 per cen t o f categor y B assets (capita l goods an d merchan t vessels ) and 3. 5 per cent of category A assets (all other forms of reparations). Canada later agree d t o a reduction o f th e numbe r o f ships it received an d the n re nounced right s to industrial capital equipment. The government di d not feel it ha d muc h clai m o n surplu s industrial equipmen t an d Canadia n industry was not muc h interested. I t was a policy consistent with the genera l view on the subjec t expressed in the Canadian submission to the Counci l of Foreig n Ministers: 'O n th e questio n o f Germa n reparations , i t i s th e vie w of th e Canadian governmen t tha t existing agreement s wil l hav e t o be reviewed in the ligh t of the leve l of economy and standar d o f living which is to b e permitted t o Germany i n order t o prevent German y continuin g to constitute a centre of European economic depression. Reparatio n deliveries agreed upo n

133 Peacemakin g should the n b e implemente d a s expeditiously as possibl e i n orde r tha t th e Germans may know what industrial capacity i s to be left t o them. The Ger mans shoul d the n b e mad e t o realiz e that withi n th e framewor k o f allied control it will be possible for them to reestablish favourable living conditions only through their own efforts.' 61 In Japan Canada was more interested in the restitution of property belonging to Canadian firms. Brooke Claxton stated in 194 7 that Canada held Japanese external assets of about $5 million and claims filed against these assets were o f abou t th e sam e amount . H e pointe d ou t tha t Canadian s ha d th e biggest lif e insuranc e busines s o f an y foreig n country in Japa n befor e th e war.62 These were a subject of concern to Canadian s i n the treaty , although they never dispute d th e claim s of those who had suffered mor e directly. In his statemen t i n th e Hous e o n th e treaty , Pearson said : 'The allied power s recognize in the treat y that Japan should in principle pay reparations for th e devastation an d sufferin g sh e cause d durin g th e war . They recognize d in addition, however, that Japa n lacks the physica l capacity to recompense he r former victim s if at the sam e tim e sh e i s to achiev e a viable economy an d contribute t o th e economi c healt h o f th e Pacifi c area. ' H e note d als o that Japan ha d agree d t o mak e available its assets to indemnify prisoners of war who ha d suffere d undu e hardship , a matter o f concer n t o th e Hon g Kong survivors i n Canada. 63 Some modest and specifi c compensatio n o f this kind seemed wort h pursuing, but th e Canadia n attitude to reparations in general was t o count o n the m ver y little for financial help and t o regard them a s an aspect of political policy towards the former enemies. It was a duly functional approach. To those who suffered mos t shoul d go the most reparation. In the prosecution of war criminals Canada was not very active. There was a good deal of interest in seeing that those who had maltreated Canadian soldiers an d prisoner s wer e brough t to justice, an d Canad a joined th e Unite d Nations War Crime s Commissio n se t u p i n October 1943 . However, i t did not adhere to the Charter set up by the International Conference on Military Trials i n 194 5 consistin g o f th e fou r majo r powers . Altogethe r ninetee n states i n additio n t o th e drafter s signed, bu t Canad a wa s prepared to leave this matter to the countries that had had the Germans on their soil. The high commissioner i n London participate d in the work of the Unite d Nations War Crimes Commission, bu t Canada took no part in the Nuremberg trials. On 13 September 194 5 th e prim e ministe r state d tha t Canadia n militar y court s would deal with offences against Canadian armed forces, the courts would be established i n accordance wit h military law and the principle s of justice, with safeguards t o assur e fai r trial. 64 Seven case s came befor e Canadia n military courts i n Aurich, Germany. Ther e were no militar y courts in Japan as Can-

134 Th e Shapin g of Peace ada ha d n o force s statione d there . Japanes e wh o wer e accused o f atrocities against Canadians were tried by British and America n military courts, bu t in each case a Canadian judge sat; Canadians assisted i n gathering the evidenc e and i n th e prosecution . Wherea s ther e wa s no Canadia n a t Nuremberg , a Canadian judge, M r Justic e E.S. McDougall, was a member o f the Interna tional Militar y Tribuna l i n Tokyo. Thi s apparentl y greater interes t i n Japanese tha n Germa n crime s wa s les s a matte r o f deliberat e polic y tha n a reflection o f th e Canadia n sensitivit y about it s unequal par t in the Germa n settlement.65 THE LESSON S

Before th e fightin g wa s over , plannin g fo r peac e wa s inevitabl y abstract , based o n assumption s abou t th e caus e an d cur e o f war. The conceptio n of the Canadia n rol e wa s als o base d o n postulation s abou t participatio n an d justice. I f thes e plan s seem naive , th e naïvet é wa s not peculia r t o Canada . The great-power planner s were equally abstract - the Americans incredibl y Utopian - althoug h thei r expectation s wer e constantl y adjuste d b y the exigencies o f negotiation s amon g themselves . I f Canadia n official s adjuste d also, i t was not fro m a failur e o f idealism but fro m a need t o cope wit h th e onrush o f event s i n a worl d which , afte r wha t i t ha d bee n through , wa s chaotic. Canadian attitudes o f 194 4 and 194 5 reveal an identificatio n on th e one han d wit h a group o f allie s facing common enemie s an d o n th e othe r with a laye r of lesser power s demandin g right s from a consortium o f great powers. A s the East-Wes t spli t cam e swiftly , ther e ha d to be a reconsidera tion o f priorities . The earl y Canadian memorand a mak e clea r tha t Canad a was not countin g with assurance o n postwa r unity among th e grea t powers . However, the y thought i t important to mak e all efforts t o maintain unity in spite of the odd s against it . The insistenc e o n lesser-power right s continued , but the priorit y was conceded t o the perceived need to maintain the strength and unity of the Western powers . It was not a shift made unde r pressure, an d it wa s based o n eclecti c assessment s - an obviou s enoug h comment , re quired, however , b y th e persisten t legen d tha t Canad a an d it s Europea n allies wer e hypnotize d int o a Col d Wa r mentalit y b y the Americans. 66 Ele mental problem s o f security and economic s too k precedence . Th e postwa r world took shap e i n the emergenc y measure s require d afte r a holocaust . The 194 5 Canadian memorand a spok e o f the wa y in which the German s might b e allowe d eventuall y t o gro w u p withi n a democrati c strait-jacke t imposed b y the occupiers. In 194 7 Canada wa s recognizing the German government se t u p i n th e Wester n zones . Th e mai n reaso n fo r thi s chang e i s

135 Peacemakin g obvious, th e reluctan t recognitio n tha t ther e coul d b e n o mor e tha n rudimentary co-operatio n wit h th e Russians . Fea r o f anothe r wa r exaggerated the similaritie s between th e ne w challenge and tha t whic h ha d just been s o bloodily repulsed . Feelin g th e nee d o f allies with a considerable population and even some capacity to fight, the Canadian view of both the Germans an d the Japanese changed rapidly. A second reason fo r the chang e was that the assumption s of the constitution monger s o f 194 5 dissolved unde r the pressure s of cold and hunge r and fear. Give n th e attitude s o f 1945 , th e German s migh t hav e bee n lef t t o starve i n their ruins. However, when their vanquishers assumed responsibility for government the y became involved in keeping the Germans alive and making i t possibl e fo r the m t o ear n thei r ow n living . Canadian s wer e no t occupiers bu t the y share d thi s concern. Th e futur e o f Germany la y in th e hands o f the administrators. Whatever vantage-point Canad a ma y have had in 194 5 t o clai m a voice in th e dispositio n o f Germany ha d disappeare d by 1947 -only t o reappea r in a differen t for m i n 194 9 as a membe r o f NATO . Another forme r enemy , Italy , wa s also an all y shortl y afte r th e en d o f th e war. There was no alliance to embrace Japan, but Canad a and Japan evolved a specia l relationship, based o n mutua l economic an d politica l interests , a tacit alliance. There was little doubt felt of the desirability for Canada and th e world a t larg e of unrestricte d internationa l trade and th e strengthenin g for that purpos e of the liberal-capitalis t system, whereve r it could flourish . Re tribution seeme d pointles s i f the Canadia n interes t was best serve d b y selfreliant, free enterpris e German , Italian , and Japanese economies. Over peacemakin g Canada ha d it s early lessons i n th e ne w diplomacy of participation. Claxton regarded the Paris Conference a s 'a proving ground to show numerou s mistake s t o b e avoided.' 67 That could b e sai d of the whole experience o f settling with the lat e enemies. Viewed in the ligh t of Ottawa's expectations an d demands i t was not a success. The expectations , however, were wishful. Canada' s plac e during the wa r had been abnormally large, and the proces s of influencing postwar policy was infinitely more complex than it had been whe n Canada's world was triangular. There was the old problem of relating influenc e to right s and t o participation . Now ne w way s and mean s had to be worked out: how to combine wit h others, when to be stubborn and when to be complaisant, how to use a committee, at what point to speak out. Canadians profite d from th e experienc e an d earned a reasonable reputatio n for seriou s and practica l contributions and, abov e all, a sense of responsibility for the long-rang e issues rather than just the nationa l angle. The ad hoc mechanisms o f peacemaking , however , wer e les s satisfactor y for Canad a than the fixed but flexible framework being provided in the United Nations.

136 Th e Shapin g of Peace In peacemakin g on e ha d t o plead for a chance to speak, argu e for a general conference, forestal l great-power fiats, waste time and energy on mechanic s rather tha n substance . Unite d Nation s bodie s wer e mor e comfortabl e fo r lesser powers . A seat and a chance to speak were provided; the challenge was to us e th e opportunitie s effectively . I t i s n o wonde r tha t Canad a presse d whenever possible fo r a UN role in the peacemaking . A practica l lesson o f th e experienc e wa s not onl y that a country's diplomacy shoul d no t outru n it s resources bu t also tha t it should no t outru n its personnel. Th e multiplicatio n o f obligation s t o participat e i n al l kind s o f bodies connecte d wit h th e settlemen t o f th e wa r an d th e establishmen t o f new internationa l structure s cam e o n to p o f the nee d t o provid e staff fo r a considerable number o f missions whic h had been agree d t o in principle during the wa r and serve d unti l then b y a single mission i n London. Ther e ha d been no recruitin g of permanent officer s durin g the war, and it took time for the postwa r crop of veterans t o be recruited and trained. Betwee n 31 Decem ber 194 4 and 3 1 December 194 6 diplomatic staff increase d fro m 7 2 to 138 , but i n 194 6 12 8 officers attende d variou s internationa l conferences abroad . Concern wa s being expressed i n the departmen t an d elsewhere i n the gov ernment structur e about th e proliferatio n of agencies an d meeting s an d th e heavy strai n o n government departments . Thi s helpe d t o induc e a mood o f scepticism abou t som e o f the ne w agencie s an d institution s an d als o abou t putting too much effort int o bodies like the FE C where there was a minimum chance o f having influence. A neat mora l would be how Canada learne d from th e peacemaking that to get a voice i n policy-making a country had t o pa y its way. But the argumen t that Canad a ha d alread y pai d it s wa y b y it s wartim e effor t wa s neve r re jected - no t even b y the Russians. Ther e wer e other reasons fo r great-power dominance, an d being deserving wa s irrelevant. Did Canada forfei t it s influ ence by refusing to take part in occupation duties ? Som e good wil l from th e great powers was perhaps lost, but would Canada hav e enjoyed a better audience if it had responde d affirmatively ? Ho w would one tel l anyway? There was no specia l Canadian content fo r th e settlements b y which to judge success. Influenc e is hard t o measure . I n diplomacy it is rarely to be judged by formal provisions . A countr y ha s a s muc h influenc e as i t ca n expec t i f it involves itsel f no t onl y physicall y bu t intellectually , constructively , an d assiduously i n the variegate d channel s o f policy formation. I t is less a question o f bein g i n ther e fightin g a s being i n ther e thinking . Some ver y able External Affair s me n were so involved, contributing in a thousand conversa tions t o weaving the we b of ideas and policies , making their presence felt a t the creation.

PART III : TH E TRIANGLE REORDERE D

MANIFEST DESTIN Y REVISE D Canada gre w u p i n a triangl e - isosceles , o f course . Som e o f it s neuroti c quirks ma y b e attributabl e t o havin g bee n th e produc t o f a ménag e à trois - wha t with two mother countrie s and an over-weening uncle . In 1945 the nee d t o understand Canadia n history as a continuing triangular relationship ha d just bee n persuasivel y stated b y J.B. Brebner i n hi s North Atlantic Triangle: th e Interplay o f Canada, th e United States and Great Britain. In th e eyes o f som e Canadians , Canad a ha d bee n crushe d betwee n tw o riva l powers. Other s woul d argue that Canada survive d an d prospere d b y skilfu l exploitation o f thi s rivalry . I n eithe r perspectiv e Canada' s internationa l predicament wa s seen a s three-sided. Whethe r Canad a shoul d lea n toward s Britain o r th e Unite d State s o r pursu e it s ow n pat h wa s a contentious , i f somewhat unreal , issu e durin g the war and postwa r decade. Wha t was not a subject of much contention was that Anglo-American goodwill and co-operation wer e th e bes t guarante e o f Canad a an d o f peac e i n general . I t wa s a conviction tha t ha d ripened over a century. The Britis h had been more con vinced o f it s wisdo m a t firs t tha n th e Canadians , becaus e Canadians , a s in the Washington Treat y of 1871 or the Alask a Boundary award, thought they were being asked t o make sacrifices to appease the American s an d perpetu ate the entente . B y the Secon d Worl d War, however, th e virtue of the triangle was accepted wisdo m in Canada and a primary theme o f Mackenzie King. He saw the Ogdensburg Agreement no t as a simple continental arrangemen t but a s 'part o f a new world order base d o n friendshi p and goo d will. ' In an interesting twis t o f a n America n formul a h e state d i n th e Hous e o f Com mons o n 1 2 November 1940 : 'I n th e furtheranc e o f this ne w world orde r Canada in liaison between th e Britis h Commonwealth an d the United State s is fulfilling a manifest destiny.' The altere d position s o f Britain and the Unite d State s o n the worl d scene were a n historica l development whic h profoundl y affected Canadia n polic y and the Canadia n predicament . Th e shif t i n power to the Unite d State s was not somethin g Canad a willed . It was a fact t o which Canada ha d to adjust. A shift wa s not entirel y t o Canada' s liking , and muc h o f Canadia n polic y in economics an d securit y wa s intende d t o shor e u p th e ol d happ y balance . Canada ha d for a century been in a sense an Anglo-American 'protectorate. ' After th e wa r on e coul d argu e tha t bot h Britai n and Canad a ha d becom e American protectorate s - or that in the age of nuclear deterrence Canada was in realit y a Soviet-America n protectorate . Term s lik e protectorate , depen dency, o r satellit e ar e bes t avoided . Suc h over-simplification s o f comple x relationships hav e don e mor e t o obscur e an d prejudic e than t o clarify . Th e

139 Manifes t Destin y Revise d standard pronouncemen t abou t Canada' s havin g switched from bein g a British t o an American dependency misrepresent s th e pas t and the presen t an d Canada's association wit h eac h o f the powers . The purpos e o f Part Three is to clarify th e triangula r relationship by complicating it. A paradox is that although this study is primarily concerned with the institutional framework which Canada sough t zealously to construct for international relations , th e Canadia n attitud e toward s it s relation s wit h th e tw o major partner s was anti-institutional. Canada resisted effort s t o establish formal structures fo r th e Commonwealth . Asid e fro m the Join t Boar d on De fence whic h was intended t o be 'Permanent,' wartime Canada-United State s bodies were dismantled an d no concerte d effor t wa s made a t the en d o f th e war t o institutionaliz e the relationship . There was, furthermore, little interest i n bringin g th e continenta l relationshi p withi n th e jurisdictio n o f th e United Nations . A polic y o f non-institutionalizatio n wa s no t a polic y of neglect o r antipathy. Nor wa s it unstructured. Canad a ha d a good idea of the kind of Commonwealth i t was shaping. The avoidanc e o f institutions, in th e case of North America , wa s perhaps more instinctiv e than calculated, but it was no t withou t design . Th e transformatio n o f th e triangl e wa s itsel f a n alteration of structure, eve n though th e triangl e was a concept without institutions. There were during the war certain so-called AB C (American, British, Canadian) bodies , bu t the y wer e a d hoc , functional , an d temporary . Th e subject of this section is the relationship rather than the relations, with attention directed t o aspects whic h illustrate the complexities .

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5

The Commonwealth , 1944-7

IMPACT O F TH E WA R

Whether on e think s th e Commonwealt h wa s weakened o r strengthened b y the Secon d Worl d War depends upo n th e perspective fro m which its history is viewed. Certainl y it could neve r b e th e sam e again . It matters , however , whether w e think we have witnessed th e declin e and fall o f the Britis h em pire or th e sublimatio n o f an organism , gloriou s or ingloriou s but anachronous, int o a new kind of Commonwealth, fitted to pla y a valuable part in an age of transition. The wa r weakened th e trun k an d strengthene d th e branches . Militaril y and industrially, Canada, Australia , and even Indi a took great leaps forward. To begin with the organism had its finest hour when the dominions rallied of their free will to a common cause . Th e Britis h Commonwealth Ai r Training Plan, successfull y ru n i n Canada , wa s a majo r sourc e o f inspiration . The prestige of this kind of Commonwealth wa s high during the perio d when its members stood almost alone against the acknowledged enemy of all Western civilization. (Th e Englis h ha d a habi t o f spoilin g the effec t b y speaking of how Britai n - or even Englan d - stood alone . Mackenzi e King reprimanded Churchill severa l time s fo r doin g this , bu t h e kep t on. 1) Whe n tha t stan d became i n 194 2 th e commo n caus e of the 'Unite d Nations ' th e Common wealth a s a politica l ideal wa s justified, bu t its incapacity as a strategic - or economic - institutio n t o stan d o n it s own was evident. I n particular , the essentiality o f Unite d State s powe r t o th e surviva l o f it s part s wa s mad e clear - althoug h this was not so much a new as a previously concealed factor . The shif t o f balanc e withi n th e Commonwealt h an d i n relatio n t o othe r powers mean t tha t it s days as a power o n it s own in the worl d were clearly numbered - i f it ever ha d been in that position. The fact tha t it had acted so

142 Th e Shapin g of Peace splendidly as an entity in a crisis unfortunately obscured for some, especially in Britain, the reality. Although ther e wa s emergin g anothe r an d a valuabl e functio n fo r th e Commonwealth a s a power for good withi n broader internationa l structures, the wartime experience stimulated the hope that the empire could be revived as a Commonwealth o f Nations united befor e the world . This was not to be the ol d empire run fro m London . I t was in many ways a splendid vision of equality, bu t th e premise s wer e fals e an d i t could hav e ru n th e Common wealth int o a dea d end . Th e alternat e future , fo r whic h Canada wa s t o a considerable extent responsible, wa s not seen clearly enough even b y Canadians. The y foun d i t difficul t t o shak e fre e o f antiquate d attitude s t o th e empire an d t o Britain, whether thes e wer e filial or rebellious, an d to recog nize sooner th e opportunities provided by the shift of power from the centre. Canadian nationalist s wer e stil l obsesse d wit h statu s vis-à-vi s th e Britis h and tende d t o emphasiz e Canada' s Nort h Americannes s a s a corrective, a proclivity whic h later nationalist s mistakenl y interpre t a s calculated 'conti nentalism.' Fo r the most par t they did see the Commonwealth dimensio n a s a par t of the Canadia n identity , provide d it coul d be kep t in prope r bal ance-and i t looke d mor e usefu l t o the m a s th e America n dimensio n loomed larger as a challenge. Issues o f Commonwealth relation s were in many ways similar in the Sec ond Worl d War to those i n the first, especially in the earl y years. The majo r Commonwealth countrie s had, however , no w established themselve s a s internationally recognized entities . Canad a ha d the statu s an d resources t o act more independentl y an d a keener awarenes s o f a distinct nationa l interest . There was, nevertheless, continuin g anxiety on al l sides t o maintain a common bond , th e mysteriousnes s o f which was a favourite theme. In spit e of the change s sinc e 191 8 and the fac t tha t Canada, by ostentatiously declaring war on its own, had demonstrated tha t it was not automatically committed t o take part in British wars, the same basic problem emerged: How to manage a common enterpris e - wit h participatio n of the dominion s no t onl y i n the fighting but i n the policy-making ? It was increasingly evident i n the Worl d War u setting that the members had a common interes t but also quite differ ent regiona l priorities . Ther e was the fac t als o that they were not equal . Britain was the mos t populous , militarily the strongest; it had a prestigious role and mor e experienc e i n international diplomacy. The war may have under mined it s position a s a world power, but the international community did not fully absor b this fact unti l about a decade afte r th e wa r was over. There were, a s always, paradoxes whic h could no t b e explaine d awa y by abstract talk about arrogance at the centre and the democratic right s of lesser

143 Th e Commonwealt h powers. Tha t th e dilemm a o f policy-sharin g in an associatio n i s inescapable and not peculia r to an empire was made clear to Canadians in the cours e of the wa r when what had been largely a Commonwealth enterprise became an allied coalition . By the tim e th e wa r ended argument s which for Canadian s had bee n imperia l in context ha d been transforme d into issues tha t were to persist i n thei r relation s wit h foreig n allie d power s and , particularly , th e United States . However blin d and unimaginativ e Westminster ha d seemed to b e a t time s o n th e questio n o f th e Canadia n voice, th e Commonwealth had been a good training ground for all concerned. The British had had much experience o f clamorous associates. 2 The American s tended t o assume tha t although Canad a an d other lesse r power s would have such problems with a real imperial power like Britain, they would be bound to understand that the United States was the vica r of all democracies. The Australia n prim e minister , Rober t Menzies , approache d Mackenzie King directly in July 1941 , expressin g hi s concern abou t th e lac k of dominion participatio n in th e directio n o f th e wa r an d suggestin g somethin g b e done - 'no t som e practica l impossibilit y like a n Imperia l War Cabinet but effective Dominions ' representatio n i n a Britis h Wa r Cabinet.' 3 H e als o wanted a meetin g o f dominio n prim e ministers . King' s way , as always , of rejecting suc h proposal s was to prais e existing means o f consultation as well as to point out the 'grav e political and constitutional objections' to including in a cabine t responsibl e t o Westminste r minister s responsibl e t o othe r governments.4 Smut s tol d Churchil l h e supporte d King' s 'outspoke n con demnation o f agitation for a n Imperial Cabinet.'5 The matte r was settled by Churchill's agreein g i n January 194 2 to the Australian s accrediting a minister o f thei r governmen t t o atten d meeting s o f th e Wa r Cabinet . H e tol d Canada the y could hav e th e sam e arrangemen t i f they wanted . I n fact , a s King pointed ou t to the Hous e o f Commons,6 any dominion prim e minister could atten d th e Wa r Cabine t whe n h e wa s i n London . H e di d sa y tha t although existin g means of consultation were working well, Canada might if necessary hav e its views presented b y an accredited representative . In th e Secon d Worl d Wa r Canad a maintaine d stron g enoug h establish ments i n London , bot h politica l and military , so that , wit h muc h bette r means o f communication , th e Canadia n idea l o f a permanen t Common wealth 'cabinet,' with the capitals in constant touc h with each other, could be better justifie d tha n i n th e Grea t War . I f th e Canadia n voice , however , seemed t o hav e bee n mor e resonant i n the Firs t World War this may have been because i n the second Canadians were less perturbed about the military direction o f th e wa r tha n the y ha d bee n i n th e first . I n 191 6 Borde n ha d complained: 'I t can hardly be expected tha t we shall put 400,00 0 or 500,000

144 Th e Shapin g of Peac e men i n th e fiel d an d willingl y accep t th e positio n o f having no mor e voic e and receivin g n o mor e consideratio n tha n i f we were toy automata.' 7 King did not tal k like that. There were persistent and unavoidable problems about the wa y in which Canadian forces could be fitted in with the British and allied forces. Accordin g to a goo d judge, Genera l Mauric e Pope , 's o fa r a s th e army, and th e arm y only, is concerned th e Britis h in providing a place for a Canadian army have been a s magnanimous as they have been farseein g and wise.'8 The experienc e o f the othe r service s wa s perhaps les s happy , but in spite of friction th e wa r was won. The entry into the war of the United States and the Soviet Union raised new questions. Canad a ha d t o resis t suggestion s comin g fro m variou s quarter s that ther e b e a Commonwealt h entit y i n internationa l institutions , bot h those fo r runnin g the wa r and thos e bein g designed fo r the postwa r world. These were the produc t not just of a British interest in magnifying its power but also of an American preference for a tidy arrangement that would avoid a lot o f problems, alon g with their innocence o f the natur e of the Common wealth. For practical reasons the American military insisted on working bilaterally wit h th e British . No othe r countr y coul d hav e membershi p o n th e Combined Chief s of Staf f Committe e se t up in 1942 . Canada did not i n fac t accept th e righ t of the Britis h to act for them i n the ccsc and arrange d fo r their own representative to be heard when necessary. The objection s in principle were pressed les s vigorousl y because th e results , a s far as Canada was concerned, wer e reasonably satisfactory . The sam e ca n be said o f the ad hoc means o f handling issues of supply. 9 Canadian official s wer e sensitiv e abou t suggestion s tha t th e Common wealth act as a unit and were slow to recognize the advantages of the practice of consultation, th e virtues of which they emphasized, however, when it was convenient t o d o so . When th e Britis h pressed fo r Commonwealth discus sions o n economi c an d othe r postwa r matters , Ottaw a sa w difficulties . I n October 1942 , for example, a group of Commonwealth expert s met i n London for a preliminary discussion o f postwar international economic relation s in general and specifically o n some proposals that John Maynar d Keynes had for a n internationa l clearing union. 10 On internationa l economi c questions , where Canadian relation s wit h th e Unite d State s wer e close an d important , there wa s resistance t o an y suggestio n o f a common Commonwealt h posi tion. The Canadians were reluctant not only because they disliked the idea of a common voic e bu t als o becaus e the y were afraid o f upsetting the Ameri cans, wh o wer e suspicious of a Commonwealth fron t o n trad e preference s and might draw the wrong conclusions whe n it came to matters o f representation of Commonwealth countrie s in the postwa r structures.

145 Th e Commonwealt h This was particularly the cas e ove r international civil aviation where Canada's interests were much involved on its own continent. It was not that it had a common interes t wit h the United States but rather that in negotiations with the United States it did not want to be hampered by attachment to a somewhat unreal Commonwealth position. 11 When the Canadians finally did have Commonwealth talks on civil aviation in London, man y of their fears proved un founded an d i n fact i t was a very useful discussion. Th e 'imperia l sky' idea , which was being pressed b y the British Right wing, especially by Lord Beaverbrook, did not win out, and the conference unanimousl y took a stand against discriminatory systems. Som e excessivel y nationalist Canadians too k a perverse pleasure in the foolish imperial schemes perpetrated by peers and potentates and assumed a conspiratorial connection wit h the British government in very much the sam e wa y as a later breed o f nationalists hav e enjoyed selectively citing Southern senators, mid-wester n editors, or over-zealous generals as evidence of the malign designs of the United States government. Th e experience over civil aviation was useful in getting the Canadians over their neurosis. From then on they were inclined to agree to preliminary discussions as, for example, before the Bretto n Woods, Sa n Francisco, an d Paris Peace confer ences. When it had become clear that these were for the clearing of minds and the exchang e o f opinions, thei r value as trial runs was proved. A new era of serious Commonwealt h consultatio n wa s being launched. The conceptua l proble m wit h th e American s is illustrated by Harry Hopkins' accoun t o f ho w he, Roosevelt , an d Welle s oppose d i n Marc h 194 3 a British proposa l fo r separat e representation o f Canada an d Australi a on th e Central Committe e o f UNRRA. 'I said I believed b y this technique w e would be constantly outvoted , an d tha t I thought w e should pu t ou r foo t dow n in the ver y beginning in this Food Conference an d insist on the mai n committee o f four members onl y and let the Britis h decide whethe r they want their membership t o com e fro m Englan d o r Canada." 2 Th e America n draf t ai r convention o f October 194 4 provided that the Executiv e Counci l would be composed o f tw o member s appointe d b y th e governmen t o f th e Unite d States, tw o b y the governmen t o f th e Unio n o f Sovie t Socialis t Republics, two b y th e Britis h Commonwealth , an d on e eac h b y Brazil , China , an d France.13 In bot h case s Canad a successfull y resiste d unti l som e American s began to realize that they had got the wron g idea about the empire . HOW M A N Y VOICES ?

The issu e o f a common voic e wa s raised o n th e highes t leve l i n th e latte r years o f th e wa r an d persiste d fo r a tim e afterward s unti l i t wa s burie d

146 Th e Shapin g of Peac e forever i n th e transformatio n o f th e Commonwealt h b y th e accessio n o f India an d Pakistan . Ther e were various pressure s fo r unity , some o f the m British, some o f them Australian , and some fro m Canadia n Conservatives. 14 Britons perceived alread y during the wa r that they were unlikel y to emerg e from i t an unquestione d grea t power . To kee p thei r plac e among th e grea t they would have to represent somethin g more than an island with diminishing resources. This theme varied from the purely rhetorical to some concrete suggestions fo r institutionalizing the Commonwealt h s o that i t could be th e designated grea t power on th e Unite d Nations Securit y Council. The Cana dian government rejected any such inference from the beginning. They were quite happy to accept the position of the United Kingdom as a great power on the Securit y Council an d wante d onl y t o b e recognize d a s an independen t middle powe r with its own functions . The ide a o f a common foreig n polic y and some kind of institution to formulate it was more enthusiasticall y sponsored b y those remot e fro m th e realitie s of diplomacy. The secretar y of state for dominio n affairs 15 an d th e Foreig n an d Dominion s Office s i n Londo n could see the difficultie s involve d in seeking assent t o the hundred s o f decisions tha t mak e up a foreign policy. They could see the risks , furthermore , for Britai n i n havin g it s polic y in th e ne w Unite d Nation s Counci l deter mined multilaterally . Unfortunately, however, political leaders found mystical adjurations to unity irresistible, and their pronouncement stimulate d and prolonged a scholastic debate ove r a proposal which was a dud.16 The Britis h Foreign Offic e peopl e could, o f course, se e th e advantage s of some mystification of Britain's role and would have been willing to go along with schemes which provided for a special role on the par t of the dominions . That the y could eve n thin k in such tem s i s attributable to their inabilit y t o take the dominions very seriously. They were shielded from the importunat e Commonwealth b y a Dominion s Offic e whic h the y di d no t tak e seriously either. It was unfortunate for both Britain and the dominions that at this time few peopl e i n th e Foreig n Offic e ha d eve r bee n poste d i n th e Common wealth. Foreig n countrie s wer e thei r preoccupation . Som e o f the m wer e unable to understand wh y the 'Doms' bothered t o have their own diplomatic services whe n they were so liberally supplied with the 'gen ' from Whitehall. Others, becaus e o f thei r experienc e o f som e o f th e first-clas s Common wealth diplomat s i n the cours e o f the creation, develope d a regard for thei r contributions to both informatio n and policy formation and, o n the whole, a good relationship was established bot h in London and in the field. The Canadian Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s ha d inherite d muc h o f th e styl e an d analytical approac h o f th e Foreig n Offic e and , i n spite o f differin g perspec tives and sometimes divergent interests , especiall y on economic issues , th e

147 Th e Commonwealt h British and Canadia n professional s ha d muc h i n common i n their view s of the postwar structure. One important conviction they shared was the priorit y to be accorded t o the relationshi p with the Unite d States. 17 The discussio n o f unity in all its mystic forms came to a head at th e Ma y 1944 meeting o f Commonwealth prim e ministers in London. Prim e Minister Curti n o f Australia , desperat e t o protec t Australia n strategic interests , had let it be known that he would propose the establishment of a Commonwealth council with a secretariat. He was not specific in his proposal. What he emphasized wa s a standing consultativ e bod y rather than an executive, bu t such consultation 'must be consistent wit h the sovereign control of its policy by eac h Government. ' Hi s interes t seeme d t o b e mor e i n seein g tha t th e Australian cas e go t a hearing and th e Britis h did not mak e importan t decisions o n their own. He did not stress the 'commo n foreign policy' theme for its own sake, bu t man y of those wh o were interested i n this end supporte d him fo r tha t purpose. 18 Shrew d mind s i n Whitehal l realized tha t although such a council might promote th e ide a of Commonwealth unity , which was in thei r interests , i t ha d littl e chance agains t Canadia n an d Sout h Africa n opposition. Support in Britain was strongest i n the pres s and parliament. Mackenzie Kin g mad e clea r tha t thi s was not th e kin d o f proposa l tha t appealed to him. An ill-advised speech i n Toronto by the Britis h ambassador to Washington, Lor d Halifax , seeme d to link this highly pragmatic Australian proposa l wit h a mov e t o establis h a unite d empir e a s a grea t power , thereby challenging the dearest hel d of King's views.19 The speech stirred up a commotion. On 31 January 1944 King said in the House that he was unable to agre e wit h what was implied in th e argumen t o f Lor d Halifax . We look forward, h e said , 't o clos e collaboratio n i n th e interest s o f peac e no t onl y inside th e Britis h commonwealth, bu t also with all friendly nations , smal l as well a s great. ' Externa l Affair s officer s wer e les s incline d tha n th e prim e minister t o esp y a conspiracy , but the y were no t i n th e moo d t o thin k of restricting themselve s t o diplomati c effor t withi n a Commonwealt h unit . Lester Pearson , commentin g fro m Washingto n in a personal lette r t o Norman Robertso n o n th e Halifa x speech, sai d tha t a s it was clear Canada ha d been involved i n the result s of British policy, 'surely we should seek to influence Britis h policy in som e wa y when i t appear s t o b e goin g in th e wron g direction.' That did not mean adoptin g 'certain ideas being thrown out at this time.' 'I f w e act as a unit, I do no t se e ho w we can also ac t separately and maintain th e nationa l an d internationa l positio n w e hav e gained.. . The Prime Minister was, in my opinion, absolutely right when he deprecated thi s talk o f a Commonwealt h uni t in foreign affairs; talk s based o n view s held, I'm afraid , i n pretty high quarters, i n the Whit e House, in No. 10 . Acting in

148 Th e Shapin g of Peac e unison a s separate States is one thing ; acting as a unit is quite another.'20 Mackenzie Kin g could no t resis t th e opportunit y to postur e a s th e de fender o f Canada against another imperial plot. His emotional approach was exacerbated b y the fac t tha t he wa s regarded by the supporter s of 'unity' as the villain , even the sole obstacle in the way of a great opportunity. This view was perpetuated b y those lik e Geoffrey Crowther , edito r o f th e Economist, who accepte d th e fac t that , give n Canadia n opposition , th e pla n mus t b e dropped. Crowther insisted on regretting the lost opportunity and like others nourished a grudg e i n spit e o f th e effort s o f Canad a Hous e t o pu t hi m straight.21 A legend persisted for years that Canada had spoiled the chance of a glorious future fo r the Commonwealth. 22 Discussion o f the Curtin proposal at the prim e ministers' meetin g was, in the ligh t o f al l th e hullabaloo , anti-climactic. It wa s a usefu l conference , proving the value of consultation. Most of it was devoted to hearing a review of th e wa r situatio n fro m Churchil l and th e chief s o f staf f an d discussin g foreign policies . According to a Canadian report of the sessions, 'th e Prim e Minister o f Canada expresse d war m approval of the foreig n policy pursued by the Unite d Kingdom since the beginnin g of the War and satisfaction with the wa y in which they had been kep t informed.' 23 In the discussio n o f strategy Curti n explaine d very effectively th e sever e suppl y problems Australia faced. 'Man y questions were asked, bu t there was general agreement o n th e main line s o f Allied strategy.' Th e mos t valuabl e discussion concerne d th e new worl d organization . Again ther e wa s agreemen t o n th e approac h of a Foreign Offic e memorandum . Kin g called it 'excellent,' but wa s careful her e as a t al l time s t o establis h hi s principl e b y sayin g tha t h e di d no t wis h t o commit th e Canadia n governmen t t o specifi c proposals withou t consultin g his colleagues in Ottawa. So much agreement o n foreign policy relieved th e pressure fo r new machinery and seemed t o validate the Canadian argumen t that al l was well. 'Our presen t discussions, ' King said, 'hav e confirmed ou r confidence tha t the policie s of our governments wil l be in substantial agreement o n th e majo r issue s o f wa r an d peace.' 24 Th e Foreig n Offic e memo randum spok e o f the desirabilit y of one membe r o f the Commonwealt h i n addition t o th e Unite d Kingdo m havin g a seat o n th e U N Council, clearly implying that they did not see the Commonwealth sittin g as a unit. King, on several occasions , mad e clear his belief that the United Kingdom should si t in its own right. Churchill agreed, although he fudged the issue by saying there 'woul d be obvious advantage s i f she [th e UK] were in a position to spea k o n th e world Council fo r al l the Dominions , o f course, afte r th e closest consultatio n wit h them.' 25 Curti n an d Frase r o f Ne w Zealan d wer e

149 Th e Commonwealt h worried about th e U K speaking for itsel f alone, bu t Curti n did not pres s hi s proposal for a secretariat. He and Fraser, as well as Cranborne, made various proposals fo r improvin g means o f consultation, especially on defenc e mat ters. The prim e ministers expressed general agreement with a suggestion for monthly meeting s o f th e Britis h prim e ministe r wit h th e hig h commis sioners - a practic e o f whic h Kin g ha d bee n ver y sceptical before th e war - an d agreed t o consul t thei r government s o n the other proposal s pu t forward. Curti n ha d revised hi s proposals and th e Britis h minister s ha d deter mined thei r attitude in the ligh t of the negative attitude expected from King. As wa s ofte n th e cas e Kin g wa s less forcefu l o n suc h issue s i n Londo n than i n Ottaw a an d ha d t o b e prodde d b y Norman Robertso n t o stat e hi s position i n the meetings . O n 1 1 May he mad e a statement, prepare d b y his advisers, stressin g th e positive and constructive aspects of the Canadian position o n th e futur e o f th e Commonwealth . I t wa s a succinct outline o f th e approach t o th e Commonwealt h i n a ne w postwa r setting which was being developed i n Ottawa. The aim was to find a valid role for an institution which many Canadians prized and which offered advantage s as well as traps for th e new Canadian diplomacy . This would have to be formed by emphasizing not its exclusivit y bu t it s universality , a n internationa l institutio n o f prove n strength which could play its part in holding together the perilously inchoate world body which the United Nation s were preparing to launch. The draf t prepared fo r King was delivered in the context of a discussion of the new world organization. He stressed th e importance of the United Kingdom's havin g a fir m an d decisiv e voice , whic h it could no t hav e 'i f ever y issue mus t b e decided o n the majorit y vot e o f countries, some o f which are not directl y in touc h wit h th e affair s o f al l part s of th e worl d a t once. 1 Britain's strengt h ha d always been i n its 'alliance potential': This allianc e potentia l sh e i s able t o command whe n he r policy is such tha t he r interests are those of her allies . Her most faithful allie s in the past two wars have been th e other nation s o f th e Commonwealth , an d n o natio n wh o wishe s t o attac k Grea t Britain can dare t o ignore th e lesson s of 191 4 an d 1939 . No r nee d we fear that Great Britain wil l fai l t o giv e du e consideratio n t o th e interest s o f othe r nation s o f th e Commonwealth, for she wil l want our continuing support . Bu t this is true not only of Great Britain. I t is true fo r al l of us. Non e o f us ca n defen d ourselve s b y oursleves, and w e shal l al l seek s o t o coordinat e ou r policie s tha t w e can count on suppor t i n times o f crisis . Ar e w e stronger an d mor e impressiv e i n th e eye s of th e worl d thi s way, or bound together in such a way that ou r differences ma y be magnified and ou r disputes advertised ?

150 Th e Shapin g of Peac e The inflexibilit y o f the common-voic e principl e was presented a s a threat to Commonwealth solidarity . Canada care d abou t th e healt h of the Common wealth: The prestig e o f th e Britis h Commonwealt h was never higher than i t is to-day, an d that is particularly true in the United States, despite friction an d jealousies that sometimes obscure their fundamental friendliness . The prestige is based upon a belief that in the British Commonwealth there has been evolved a unique alliance of a peculiarly tough and endurin g kind whose members ac t together, unlike so many allies bound by explicit treaties, no t because they are compelled to act together, bu t because they have th e wil l t o ac t together . Wha t i s mor e ou r friend s hav e discovere d tha t th e primary object s fo r which the member s o f the Commonwealt h ac t together ar e ob jects which can be shared by other countries of good will . They have realized that the Commonwealth i s not a Power bloc exploiting its own selfish interest s bu t a group of like-minded nation s whos e clos e associatio n ha s i n the pas t an d ma y i n the futur e form th e mos t reliabl e element withi n th e framework of the worl d order.26

There persisted considerabl e discussion abou t a common voice , bu t it was taken mor e seriousl y i n the pres s an d in parliaments tha n i t was by officials , who were increasingly aware of the ga p between ide a and reality. It would, if it were t o work , requir e a n enormou s amoun t o f extra effor t an d th e post ponement o f decison s tha t coul d no t b e postponed . Th e Britis h especiall y were muc h to o bus y windin g up th e wa r to pa y more tha n li p service. Th e Foreign Offic e an d th e Dominion s Office , rechristene d i n 194 7 th e Com monwealth Relations Office, continue d t o keep the dominions as well poste d as possible o n thei r doing s amon g th e grea t power s an d invite d comment . They got a good deal of comment, listene d t o some, but inevitabl y made u p their own minds in the end . The man who did mor e tha n Kin g to kil l the ide a of a unifie d foreig n policy wa s probabl y th e rambunctiou s ministe r o f extena l affair s fo r Aus tralia, Herber t Evatt . H e professe d agreemen t wit h th e Canadia n position, but hi s actions suggeste d tha t if he coul d largely determine Commonwealt h policy in the Pacific , he would concede a priority to the British in Europe, a n argument whic h di d no t preven t hi m fro m raisin g a row about Australia' s right to a voice over Trieste. The idea of regionalizing Commonwealth polic y kept croppin g up . Churchil l ha d fancie d i t and Kin g had ha d t o argu e with him its impracticality. 27 The ide a that Canada woul d have a priority in deter mining policie s o f Britain and Australi a i n North Americ a migh t hav e pro mised ne w powe r an d influenc e bu t neithe r Kin g no r hi s adviser s wer e susceptible t o tha t allurin g trap. Th e experimen t o f havin g th e Australia n

151 Th e Commonwealt h representative spea k for th e Commonwealt h (excep t Canada ) i n the Allied Council for Japan dismaye d the Foreig n Office . Whe n th e Australian representative, a distinguishe d professor , sen t bac k hi s firs t message sayin g h e assumed hi s role was to mediate between th e Russian s and the Americans , the Britis h pointe d ou t tha t thei r collaboratio n wit h th e Unite d State s i n other parts of the worl d was of such outstanding importance tha t the y were not prepared to be committed i n advance to such a policy of mediation. Th e professor wa s told to request instruction s in all cases.28 In th e meantim e extensiv e consultation , exchange s o f views, and some times combine d representation s mean t tha t th e Canadia n concep t o f th e Commonwealth wa s bein g pu t int o practice . Th e dominions , havin g acquired more extensive an d on the whole ably staffed foreig n services of their own, wer e abl e t o mak e a contribution t o the poo l of understanding which British officials cam e to appreciate. 29 The Britis h Labour party, when it came to power at the en d o f the war , did not flatly rule out th e idea of a common voice, bu t i t was less imperially minded tha n it s predecessors. Labour style facilitated a give-and-take relationship. King found Attle e a n easie r ma n t o deal with than Churchill. The departure of the Conservatives removed some of th e suspicio n o f imperial plots which had mad e i t difficult fo r Canadian s previously t o discus s th e subjec t o f Commonwealt h collaboratio n i n a rational way , althoug h Britis h Conservatives , b y constantl y pressin g th e Labour government t o prove its Commonwealth loyalty , forced ministers to use language that affected Canadian sensibilities. King remained cautious, of course, an d suspicious . Whe n th e questio n o f Commonwealth defenc e was raised a t a prime ministers' conferenc e in the autum n of 1946 he acted suitably shocked . H e might well have recognize d tha t th e Australian s and New Zealanders ha d good reason to want to talk about Singapore and all that even if he did not. Instead, h e acted as he often did, like a teetotaller at a party into which alcohol has been introduced. 30 CONSULTATION

There wa s muc h tal k o f conference s i n 1945-6 . Th e oppositio n Conserva tives and muc h o f the pres s i n Britai n badgered th e Labou r governmen t t o have a n imperial conference i n full panopl y to show the world that the em pire was a great power, bu t i t was hard to arrang e suc h a grand affair . Kin g naturally di d no t lik e thi s sor t o f thing , an d h e wa s busy. Hi s professiona l advisers wer e askin g whethe r th e valu e o f th e Commonwealt h associatio n was no t bette r assure d b y the almos t continuou s serie s o f functiona l con ferences whic h accomplishe d th e wor k wit h les s fus s an d bette r timing .

152 Th e Shapin g of Peace Although Clemen t Attlee , th e ne w prime minister, and Lord Addison , th e secretary o f state fo r dominio n affairs , coul d no t entirel y shut thei r ear s to the internal pressures in Britain, their thinking on the whole was sympathetic to the Canadia n conception. When th e Council of Foreign Minister s of th e great powers met i n the autumn of 194 5 to consider the peace settlements 31 the new Labour government sent ou t a discreetly-worded invitation to Commonwealth capitals for those who might want to send ministers o r others to be on han d for discussions with th e Britis h who would be taking part in th e council. Kin g did not wis h to come, bu t h e sent a gracious response. Cana dian participatio n was throug h th e Hig h Commissioner' s office , althoug h Vincent Massey was on home leave in Canada. There was some suspicion in Ottawa tha t this was an effor t b y the ne w government t o pu t Britai n in th e position o f speakin g fo r th e empire . I n fact , i t wa s a n effor t b y Attlee an d Bevin t o organiz e som e kin d o f input from th e importunat e dominions t o the peac e settlemen t wit h Germany i n spite of the arbitrar y attitude of th e other grea t powers . A s on e Dominion s Offic e staf f membe r tol d Canad a House: 'This is not th e Halifa x pla n for a single voice. The members of the new governmen t ar e anxiou s to mee t representative s o f othe r Common wealth Government s an d infor m themselves o f th e genera l tren d o f their views on international policy.'32 External Affair s wa s increasingl y realizing that , whethe r they liked it or not, th e big decisions were being made among the great powers and the best channel o f information as t o wha t was going on at thos e levels, and als o of providing som e outle t fo r Canadia n views , wa s th e Britis h bureaucracy , which shared it s confidences with the Canadian s and Australian s in a much more familial way than was conceivable at that time from Washington . If the bogey o f a single voic e could b e laid, then th e advantage s of the Common wealth association could be exploited. As Canada Hous e sa w the Attle e proposal: 'It could be argued that they are seeking a guarantee o f Canadian and Australian support for their policy in the Balkans and elsewhere, and Canada would naturall y be reticen t abou t signing any blank cheques o f thi s kind. I feel reasonabl y convince d tha t th e Labou r Minister s reall y do wan t something else. Just a s they are always anxious to know the view s of the Frenc h and the American s before they act, they wish to make sure that they do not make irrevocable decisions without being assured tha t their policies are generally acceptable to the other Commonwealt h countries.' 33 That would seem obvious enough , bu t th e obviou s was not always evident t o those in Ottawa whose mind s ha d bee n overstimulate d o n th e subjec t o f Commonwealt h relations.

153 Th e Commonwealt h The stat e o f transitio n wa s reflected i n 'th e meetin g o f Prim e Minister s and other Minister s of the Britis h Commonwealth' which took place in London betwee n 2 3 Apri l an d 2 3 Ma y 1946 . Ther e wer e ninetee n meeting s divided int o thre e series . Differen t set s o f prim e minister s attende d each , depending on the exigencies of their timetables and also on the subjects they were prepare d t o discuss . Th e Canadia n prim e minister , needles s t o say , would not ope n hi s ears t o talk of Commonwealth defence , bu t the Australians and Ne w Zealander s wante d to tal k about i t and wer e given the chanc e trilaterally. It was all very functionalist i n a way designed t o appeal to Canadians. What wa s more, th e agenda concentrated o n world issues, everything from Egyp t an d th e Italia n colonie s t o Palestin e an d th e disposa l o f th e Polish armed forces . This was consultation, no t navel-gazing. Only a short tim e at the final meeting wa s actually devoted to the subject of consultation and co-operation. 'The reason,' according to Canada House's report of the meetings , 'wa s the remarkable degree o f agreement amon g th e representatives o f th e Commonwealth. ' Th e communiqu é mad e clea r tha t members considere d th e flexibl e method s bein g practised preferable to any centralized machinery , whic h migh t eve n hampe r effectiv e co-operation . The repor t added: 'I t should b e emphasized tha t this expression o f opinion did no t represen t simpl y the triump h of the Canadia n poin t of view against opposition. The United Kingdo m and other Commonwealt h representatives made thei r satisfactio n wit h the presen t syste m emphaticall y evident. Fiel d Marshal Smuts expressed th e hope that something migh t be done in order to inform th e publi c as to the efficienc y o f present methods i n order to forestall the agitatio n which is constantly taking place for new machinery. Mr. Attle e and Lor d Addiso n expresse d thei r entire lac k o f sympathy with those wh o were constantl y wishin g to reorganiz e the Commonwealth. ' I t wa s furthe r noted that , in spite of the smal l but voca l group campaigning for centralization, th e Conservativ e part y a s suc h wa s no t goin g t o campaig n fo r ne w machinery. 'Mr . Ede n accepte d Mr . Attlee' s definitio n of th e principle s of consultation. Whateve r som e o f his backbencher s migh t say , h e an d Lor d Cranborne... can b e counte d o n t o preven t thi s matte r fro m becomin g a Party issue.' Among the practitioner s if not among th e editor s the ide a was disappearing tha t Commonwealt h meeting s wer e intende d solel y t o determin e th e nature o f the Commonwealth . I n the discussio n o f so many different topic s the ide a of a united fron t o r a single voice vanished no t so much because o f constitutional arguments agains t it as because i t was irrelevant. It would have died soone r if it had not bee n fo r the editor s o f the Sunday Times and a few

154 Th e Shapin g of Peac e other paper s obsesse d wit h thei r imperia l design . The y wer e al l the mor e difficult t o comba t becaus e the y did not represen t merel y an old-fashione d view o f a British-dominated empire. Man y of the m wer e the contemporar y spokesmen o f the Balfouria n Commonwealth in which unanimity would be spontaneous rathe r tha n imposed . They saw themselves a s advocates of the rights of the dominion s to a voice and the end o f domination from London . Canada House ha d to remind Ottawa that these eminent journals which had been looke d upo n fo r s o lon g as representing semi-officia l opinio n were no longer o n th e inside . Th e onl y voice of Labour , th e Daily Herald, was not interested i n this campaign. 34 I M P E R I A L DEFENCE 3 5

The idea of imperial defence was more persisten t than the idea of a common voice. Th e Australian s an d Ne w Zealander s wante d defenc e co-operatio n and plannin g for reason s o f basic national interest a s they saw it. Canadian governments ha d long rejected the idea of an imperial defence system except in the sense that by tending to the security of their own vast region they were contributing t o th e defenc e o f th e empir e a s a whole . The y repeate d tha t argument now, but they also stressed the importance of the America n factor, not onl y fo r Canadia n defenc e bu t als o becaus e o f th e significanc e o f th e United State s i n any concep t o f th e far-flun g empir e a s défendable. Ottawa was still clinging to the triangle and not anxious to opt solely for a continental defence system . Canadia n official s wer e bus y a t thi s tim e resistin g argu ments fro m th e militar y i n Washington 36 eve n thoug h defenc e o f Nort h America mad e mor e strategi c sens e tha n defenc e o f th e thi n re d empire . They made clear to the British that the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board o n Defenc e wit h th e Unite d State s wa s basic , tha t the y wante d t o make it compatible with the Commonwealth association, but, without saying so to o bluntly , i t wa s the forme r which would hav e t o hav e th e priorit y if necessary. (Late r Ottaw a wa s t o mak e even cleare r tha t i t wa s th e NAT O defence associatio n tha t ha d firs t priorit y and tha t Canad a coul d mak e n o greater contribution to imperial defence than to put its efforts int o the maintenance o f the Nort h Atlanti c life line. ) Abov e all, Canadians insiste d tha t security for th e scattere d Britis h lands woul d depend o n th e succes s of th e plan for collective security within the Unite d Nations. Nevertheless, Labour governments in London, Canberra , an d Wellington were stuc k wit h far-flun g responsibilitie s tha t coul d no t b e immediatel y sloughed off . Attlee' s governmen t ha d th e foresigh t t o se e th e ultimat e answer t o th e impracticalit y of 'imperia l defence ' whe n Indi a and Pakista n

155 Th e Commonwealt h were created a s independent nations , bu t in the meantim e th e garrisons had to b e maintained . Whateve r th e prejudice s i n Ottaw a agains t th e empire , Canadians, an d American s likewise , were concerned no t just over th e dan gers o f communism bu t o f anarchy and fo r the tim e bein g at least a precipitate breakdown of the imperia l structures in Asia was not to be regarded with equanimity. I n th e circumstances , however , th e ide a o f a self-containe d imperial defence structur e wa s absurd. The Britis h chiefs-of-staff pape r prepared fo r th e 194 6 conferenc e di d tr y t o se e th e empir e a s a unit , eve n recommending th e dispersa l o f industrie s an d manpowe r fro m th e Unite d Kingdom to the dominions for this purpose. The latter was not an idea which appealed t o the Labou r government , bu t Attle e pu t the Commonwealt h representatives o n th e spo t b y producin g statistic s illustratin g Britain' s nea r bankruptcy an d th e appallin g burden o f maintaining the minimu m numbe r of force s require d t o maintai n obligation s in Europ e and othe r continents . Attlee foresa w tota l annua l militar y expenditures o f ove r a billio n dollars , compulsory militar y service fo r tw o years, an d a drai n o n th e financ e an d manpower o f the countr y which would seriously affect it s ability to rehabilitate it s economy an d oversea s trade . Tha t wa s an argumen t which affected Canadians. Th e Labou r governmen t wa s too sensitive t o suggest tha t other countries o f th e Commonwealt h shoul d contribut e t o a common pool , bu t expressed th e hop e tha t th e othe r countrie s migh t accep t define d regional obligations whic h would reduc e t o som e exten t thos e o f the Unite d Kingdom.37 Such a formula would be acceptable to Canada onl y if its regional responsibilities were defined o n its own terms and not as part of an imperial strategy. They were not incline d to stretch this even t o include the Wes t Indies , fear ful tha t i t woul d involve the m i n interventio n i n th e interna l affair s o f th e islands fo r which they had not, an d did not want to have, an y responsibility. In every memorandum an d statement o f the time the Canadian governmen t and it s advisers insiste d tha t they regarded th e securit y of the Unite d Kingdom a s vital to the securit y of Canada. However , a combination o f old prejudices and a regard for strategi c realities made the m exceedingl y leery of any commitments t o defen d othe r part s o f th e dependen t empire . Tha t i s why they wer e particularl y cautious abou t involvemen t in any 'Commonwealth ' responsibilities i n th e Fa r Eas t o r th e Middl e East . The Britis h chiefs were not unnaturall y thinking of th e problem s face d earl y in th e wa r when th e Commonwealth ha d ha d t o stan d alon e an d unprepared . Canadian s wer e aware of that dreadful lesson a s well, but they assumed that once the Unite d States had cast off isolation ther e would not b e a situation like that of 1940 in the future . Th e obsessiv e suspicio n i n Ottaw a (i n governmen t rathe r than

156 Th e Shapin g of Peac e military circles and b y the prim e minister more than hi s colleagues) o f anything that looked remotel y like an imperial chiefs-of-staff prevente d Canad a for th e tim e bein g from looking closely at even the kin d of arrangements for liaison officer s i n Londo n whic h the Labou r government wa s putting out, not a s th e nexu s o f a n imperia l bod y bu t a s a so p t o th e head y empire builders i n th e Britis h forces an d i n th e opposition . Ther e wer e proposal s affecting othe r part s of the Commonwealt h discussed in the session s which King did not attend. Canada House pointed out that although they might not be acceptable to the Canadian government as they stood, they were different from thos e made i n the past . 'In the first place they recognised th e fac t that no centralised Imperia l body for th e directio n of Commonwealth defence is practicable, and tha t an y arrangements mus t mak e i t possible fo r member s of th e Commonwealt h t o conclud e thei r ow n arrangement s wit h foreign countries - i n particular with the Unite d States . I t is specifically recognize d that i n any future war the Commonwealt h woul d have to rely on th e activ e assistance of the United States, and that any Commonwealth defence system must therefore include machinery for co-operation with the United States.' 38 Although a sentimenta l attachmen t t o th e imperia l fraternity lingere d in the defenc e force s not onl y of Britain but o f Canada as well, and even Indi a or late r Nigeria , th e Britis h military in a fe w years, whe n NAT O wa s being created an d th e Korea n Wa r fought, move d close r t o the Canadia n ide a of priorities. I t ma y b e symbolic that on e wa y in whic h the commo n militar y traditions o f Commonwealth force s pai d off was in th e collaboratio n which was possible amon g the m a s a Commonwealth Divisio n i n the U N force in Korea an d i n peacekeepin g operation s i n Indochina , th e Congo , an d else where. It was, in a sense, the fulfilment o f the Canadian idea by which Commonwealth defenc e woul d b e sublimate d i n th e Nort h Atlanti c o r UN security systems. I n defending the Canadian contribution to imperial security it was pointed ou t that the North Atlantic shipping lanes were a great deal more crucial than the Sue z Canal. Canada's record o f good advic e on Com monwealth defenc e ha d no t bee n noteworthy , bu t th e Britis h migh t hav e avoided som e o f th e miscalculation s o f th e nex t decad e i f they ha d given some of the Canadia n views of this period more patien t consideration. COMMERCIAL POLIC Y

Discussion of commercial polic y took a surprisingly small amount of time at these Commonwealth meetings . Th e Beaverbroo k pres s and other Tor y organs, whose calculated distortion o f the purposes of the 194 6 conference was a subjec t o f som e vigorous complain t b y Canadian officials , sough t t o give

157 Th e Commonwealt h the impressio n tha t th e Commonwealt h minister s were coming together t o strengthen thei r devotion t o th e principle s of imperial preference. This was another subjec t Canada di d not wis h t o discus s i n this context. Th e Unite d Kingdom governmen t share d th e Canadia n vie w tha t question s o f imperial preference wer e a t tha t poin t prope r subject s o f discussio n onl y amon g experts - a view that wa s not entirel y share d b y the othe r prim e minister s and in particular by Nash of New Zealand. The Canadian experts were doctrinally dedicate d t o freein g the channel s o f world trade. The y di d no t muc h like imperia l preferences , partl y becaus e the y wer e imperia l and partl y be cause the y were obstacles t o purer forms of trade. They knew, furthermore , that th e American s wer e obsessed ove r imperia l preferences an d any combined Commonwealt h effor t t o strengthe n o r defend the m migh t drive th e Americans i n their ow n preferential direction . Nevertheless , i n th e parlou s state o f Canadian oversea s tad e there wa s no disposition t o surrender thos e advantages whic h the preference system di d provide and a canny recognition that thi s wa s at least a bargaining point to b e maintained. Accordin g t o th e reports o f the prim e ministers' meetings sent from the acting high commis sioner in London, 3 June 1946 : 'i t was made clear in the discussions tha t all Commonwealth Government s ar e agree d tha t Imperia l Preference s migh t have to be reduced o r removed i n the interests o f wider international trade, but tha t the y would b e surrendere d onl y in exchang e fo r appropriat e tariff concessions o n th e par t of the Unite d State s an d othe r countries. ' A s th e same repor t noted , 'discussio n o f commercia l polic y occupie d onl y part of the time at the concluding meeting.' Despite King' s insistenc e o n equality , othe r member s o f the Common wealth might well have argued that their agendas were determined t o a large extent b y the wil l and whims of the Canadian prim e minister. I t was perhaps significant, however , tha t whereas th e Britis h Conservatives ha d submitte d to King's wil l out o f deference t o the strengt h o f his voice within the Com monwealth an d hi s powe r o f veto , Attle e an d Addiso n di d s o t o a larg e extent becaus e the y agree d wit h him . Ther e ha d bee n worr y that Canad a would fin d itsel f somethin g o f a n outside r i n view of the ideologica l frater nity o f th e Labou r régime s i n London , Canberra , an d Wellington . I n for eign polic y generall y th e Britis h Labourite s an d th e Canadia n Liberal s seemed t o hav e ha d more i n common. Canad a Hous e though t King' s rea sonable styl e would be appreciated. 'He [Evatt ] is probably going to find that he cannot bull y the ne w Government a s he could bull y the old , i n spite of the ideologica l harmony. H e knew he could abuse th e old Etonians becaus e their code require d the m t o take it, but Bertie might just make one pass too many at Ernie [Bevin] . The Labour men are more apt to look at this thing on

158 Th e Shapin g of Peac e a ma n t o ma n rathe r tha n a mother an d daughte r basis, an d daughte r wil l have to make adjustments as well as mother.'39 If King' s presentation o f the argumen t for a consultative Commonwealth had no t bee n accompanie d b y wha t looke d lik e pett y sensitivitie s Canad a might wel l hav e bee n acclaime d sooner , a s i t deserved t o be , a s a principal begetter o f th e ne w Commonwealth . There woul d certainly have bee n n o Indian and Pakistani applications for membership o n the basi s of a common voice. A vestigia l Commonwealt h o f th e whit e members woul d have los t momentum an d becom e an ineffectual ol d boys association. The multiracial Commonwealth phas e (whic h will b e considere d i n a subsequen t volume ) may hav e bee n a formul a onl y fo r a generation , bu t i t wa s a n ide a tha t averted bloody struggles during a precarious period of transition both for th e empire and Commonwealt h an d fo r Britain . Acclai m for Canad a di d com e later fro m new members of the Commonwealt h and somewhat belatedly by its supporter s i n wha t was unofficiall y know n as the Ol d Commonwealth. 40 The transforme d Commonwealt h di d somewha t unexpectedl y provid e a counterweight, i f no t i n defenc e an d economics , a t leas t i n diplomacy , a sublimation o f th e 'Britis h connection ' int o somethin g mor e relevan t t o a new world and a new Canada.

6 North America

INTRODUCTION

An understandin g o f Canada' s change d and changing relationship with th e United State s a t the en d o f the wa r does not begi n in Ottawa. The essentia l change wa s no t i n Canadia n foreig n polic y but i n th e rol e o f th e Unite d States i n the world at large. The relation s o f Britain, Europe, or China with the Unite d State s were dramaticall y altered as well. The internationa l situation limited choice. There was a certain inevitability, as well as broad consensus, abou t Canadia n polic y towards the gian t neighbour. Relation s were on many levels, betwee n governments , betwee n officials , an d betwee n people, infinitely mor e comple x tha n the y had ever bee n before , bu t there was not here th e deliberat e effor t t o institutionaliz e them tha t provide s th e mai n theme o f this study. There i s no nee d her e t o provide a detailed account of defence an d economi c policie s o n whic h specialist s hav e already published the result s o f considerable research. 1 It is proposed onl y to relate these subjects t o the theme - Canadia n designs fo r the web of a world at peace - and to look for filaments . Because thi s stud y is concerned wit h the shapin g of international institutions, i t mus t pa y som e attentio n t o reason s fo r non-institutionalization . Canada's postwa r planners wer e constructivists b y nature. A t th e dro p of a gavel they would conceive a new international organism. Functionalist rather than Utopia n they may have been, but these organisms were usually seen as deliberative an d administrative bodies with at least some rules of procedure . How doe s one explain , therefore, wh y the planner s ha d no concrete struc tures i n mind fo r th e internationa l association whic h loomed a s th e mos t important of all - tha t with the great continental partner ? The tw o major bilatera l institutions, on e ol d and on e new , would , it was taken fo r granted , remain . Th e Internationa l Join t Commissio n ha d bee n

160 Th e Shapin g of Peac e affected ver y little by the war . It was a consultative body empowered onl y to make recommendations t o two sovereign an d equal governments, althoug h it ha d potentia l quasi-judicia l powers . I t wa s superbl y functiona l bu t ha d none o f th e authorit y to prescribe , i f not impose , collectiv e decision s afte r which th e planner s seemed t o hanke r for the multilatera l bodies the y were proposing. Th e Join t Boar d o n Defence , establishe d b y a pres s releas e a t Ogdensburg in 1940 , ha d been called Permanent an d it would be retained. It had been useful in planning for common purpose s and protecting the inter ests of the mino r partner. Furthermore, a s it was based roughly on the sam e principle as the uc, it did not challenge Canadian sovereignty. Nevertheless , litle attention, i f any, was given at this time t o enlarging the scop e o f these bodies o r setting u p others i n accordance wit h a pattern which , experienc e seemed t o prove , ha d bee n wel l calculate d fo r co-operativ e endeavour s between unequa l power s locked b y geography into functiona l complicit y of one kind or another. That Canadians and Americans were bound to get more mixed up together in their various activities was taken for granted. Why then was mor e though t no t give n t o th e creatio n o f structures t o cop e wit h th e inevitable? A memorandu m o f th e Post-Hostilitie s Problem s Committe e referred t o the PJB D as 'a practical working model o f a regional defence sys tem wher e weigh t o f counsel i s dependent o n functio n rathe r tha n o n ne t power.'2 One would have expected dedicate d an d inventive functionalist s to play with such models . Explanations ar e many . Basicall y ther e wa s th e endemi c nervousnes s about 'constitutional ' links of any kind with a power which, however neighbourly, stil l traile d a n aur a o f manifes t destiny . I t wa s showin g awesom e muscle, an d th e futur e was too unpredictabl e for confiden t planning . Fur thermore, th e Canadia n enthusias m fo r multilatera l creation wa s to some extent a wis h t o mak e continenta l institution s unnecessary . B y entwining North Americ a in multilateral institutions Canada would find greater flexibi lity, breathing-space, an d counterweight. This was rational enough, but ther e was withal an element of nostalgia for the Nort h Atlanti c triangle which had in s o man y way s seeme d idea l fo r Canada . Canada' s almos t ideologica l antipathy in 1945 to regionalism in international institutions reflected worries about th e Nort h America n region int o which it might be cast. 3 In matters of security, for example, Canad a was one of those that insisted o n the ultimat e authority o f th e U N Security Council so tha t regiona l organization s such a s the Pa n American Union could not be managed b y a regional superpower. However, whe n it came to specific practice s Canada showed no interest in having the worl d body 'interfere ' wit h Canadian-American relations . I f th e United State s wer e eve r t o behave outrageously , a n appeal to the Assembl y

161 Nort h Americ a or ECOSOC , th e Internationa l Court , o r th e Inter-Governmenta l Maritim e Consultative Organizatio n coul d presumabl y b e made . A n appea l t o th e Security Council would be a very tricky affair t o be considered a d hoc. In th e meantime i t wa s bes t t o assum e i t woul d neve r b e required . Th e Unite d States ha d a veto, but s o had Britai n an d France. There was no questio n of merging th e u c or the PJB D into universal structures . A century or more of successful co-existenc e ha d apparentl y given Canadian s th e assuranc e tha t they coul d handl e th e Unite d State s bes t o n thei r ow n and perhap s als o a belief tha t ther e wa s a superior Nort h America n wa y of doin g thing s tha t ought not to be upset by the quarrelsome habit s of others. The only outsider that ha d eve r bee n involve d i n thes e continental dispute s wa s Britain, and the Canadia n legen d had it that the othe r part y had always , for reason s of 'power politics, ' favoure d th e majo r Nort h America n power . There wa s a good deal to be said for encasing Unite d States commerce o r civil aviation or even it s military operations in broad international regulations, but i f it came to an appeal to a United Nations bod y in a Canada-United States dispute, th e smaller power might get the sympath y but Santa Claus would get the vote . Circumstances require d tha t Canadian s ge t a ne w perspectiv e o n th e meaning o f North Americ a i n their lives . This mor e powerfu l an d assertiv e continent ha d t o b e fitte d int o a ne w assessmen t o f th e worl d a t large . It would be too muc h t o expect tha t the vie w would be free of contradictions. The situatio n was volatile, and variou s patterns had to be envisaged t o provide for the turns Washington - or Moscow or London - might make. When Canadian polic y must be essentially reactive, it is folly t o pretend otherwise . Neat schemes for the dovetailing of regional and global structures were useful t o perceiv e directions , bu t Canada' s positio n wa s unique. A d ho c deci sions wer e force d b y events . Ther e wa s risk in th e functionalis t approach , but greate r ris k in the rigidit y o f adhering t o broa d schemes . Th e historia n must b e careful no t to iron out the ambiguities. It i s difficul t fo r late r generations , knowin g ho w th e Unite d State s be strode th e world like a Colossus, t o grasp the uncertaintie s about th e State s which preoccupied Canadians and other s as the wa r ended. To some exten t they wer e war y i n vie w o f thei r neighbour' s swolle n power. Perspectives , however, wer e conditione d b y th e Unite d State s o f th e thirties , no t th e sixties, b y th e experienc e o f wa r an d depressio n neithe r o f which , i t wa s thought, woul d have bee n s o ghastl y if the Unite d State s ha d no t isolate d itself. Th e priorit y must go , therefore , t o enmeshin g th e superpowe r tha t was 'o n ou r side ' i n internationa l commitment s fro m whic h i t woul d no t want t o ru n away . Tha t th e Unite d State s woul d self-righteousl y tr y to ru n the sho w woul d no t surpris e thos e wh o had survive d tw o centuries o f th e

162 Th e Shapin g of Peace American mission and a war effort whic h the Unite d States ha d presumptuously take n over whe n i t ha d becom e belatedl y involved . Ther e ha d bee n considerable practical advantages in having the Americans run the war, however galling it had been, an d there were similar practical advantages in letting the onl y power with sufficient resource s assum e 'leadership ' in the postwa r world. Fo r al l thei r hubri s and thei r heresy , the y di d stan d fo r mora l an d political values basically the sam e as those of Canada o r Britain, Belgium or Australia, and even o f the non-Western powers such as India. The Americans were, however, brash and impetuous. The Canadian view of a pax American a was succinctly expressed i n 194 6 by Mackenzie King to the secretar y o f state fo r th e dominion s wh o had enquire d abou t Canadia n attitudes to the Unite d States maintaining it s chains o f bases i n the Atlantic and the Pacific : 'I n short, we regard it as in the interes t of Canada and in the general interest o f the Commonwealth an d the United Nations Organization that the Unite d States should hav e extensive right s and responsibilities out side he r ow n territories. However, w e also are dubious about th e timin g of some o f th e request s whic h they hav e pu t forwar d especially a s the y ma y encourage the Soviet government t o make undesirable demands.' 4 In spit e o f anxietie s abou t th e future , i t wa s a tim e o f nationa l self confidence fo r Canadians . Th e wa r effor t ha d encouraged it . However frus trating th e effor t ha d bee n t o gai n a voic e i n allie d councils , Canadia n officials ha d done no t at all badly in getting the American s t o listen to them . Having somewhat more realistic expectations of influence and independenc e than a later generation, they were less easily depressed. Thos e worried about Canada's image were still more concerne d abou t being regarded as a British colony tha n an America n satellite. That ther e coul d i n the mid-fortie s hav e been sincer e anxiet y about freedo m o f actio n vis-à-vi s Britai n ma y no w seem a s absur d a s i t wa s i n fact . Ther e was , however , enoug h loos e tal k about a single-throated empir e to provid e evidence fo r thos e who enjoyed conjuring up imperial spooks. Even among these old-style nationalists, how ever, ther e wa s a growin g recognition tha t th e triangl e woul d b e har d t o restore an d tha t the economi c an d securit y relations wit h the Unite d State s of on e kin d o r anothe r tha t woul d hav e t o b e cultivate d woul d provid e a more substantive challenge than th e Commonwealth t o Canada's maturity. This chapter is concerned wit h Canadians' visio n of their continent as they emerged fro m the war. The counter-theme o f preparation and adaptation for new challenges begins almost immediately , but that new order will be left for later treatment. I n order t o comprehend wha t the wa r had done to the relationship, a look wil l be taken first at the wartim e association i n defence an d defence production . Economic relation s have been discussed up to a point in

163 Nort h America chapter 3 in the contex t o f postwar reconstruction. To illustrat e the contra dictions with which Canada wa s now faced, this account wil l be extended t o its clima x in th e Marshal l Plan. Finally, a loo k wil l b e take n at th e signifi cance in diplomacy of Canada's having become a n ally of the Unite d States , aligned a s i t ha d neve r bee n before-wit h bot h commo n an d cros s pur poses - i n search o f a congenial world order. C O N T I N E N T A L DEFENCE 5

The concept o f 'continental defence' against an actual assault was developed by Presiden t Roosevel t when , i n the lat e thirties, h e became seriousl y concerned abou t a militar y challeng e fro m Japan ' Canad a ha d bee n tacitl y regarded a s part of the are a to which the Monro e Doctrin e applied , but th e significance of its frozen waste s in the defence of the U nited States was not a matter of serious concern . America n defence planner s ha d been largel y preoccupied with Latin America. Roosevelt's pledg e in 1938 that if Canada were attacked the Unite d States would not stand idl y by was a calculated step in his vision o f continenta l defence , an d Mackenzi e King' s repl y tha t Canad a would no t b e a base fo r a n attack on th e Unite d State s fitte d neatl y into his plan for northern coverage . However calculated it was on the American side , it wa s a clarification of principl e so sensibl e an d s o mutually advantageous that it has remained th e basi c commitment o n both sides ever since . Roose velt was popular in Canada and the menace o f the Nazi s was looming. Canadians by and large saw Roosevelt's tactics as a guarantee of their security, not an 'imperialist ' threat . Cautio n i n an y militar y association wit h the Unite d States wa s deepl y ingrained , bu t th e 193 8 declaratio n calle d fo r none , although some preparatory discussion seemed a logical means to the end. King was shy about talk s before September 1939 , and then the American s ha d to be wary of military discussions wit h a belligerent. It wa s not unti l bot h countries , i n th e summe r o f 1940 , ha d t o fac e th e stark possibilit y of their bein g isolated an d threatene d b y a Nazi-dominated Europe tha t the y were ready to fac e the challeng e o f military collaboration. The presiden t an d th e prim e ministe r cam e togethe r a t Ogdensbur g tha t summer to accept wha t seemed the inescapabl e principl e of co-operation i n defence an d t o se t u p th e Permanen t Join t Boar d o n Defence . Thi s wa s followed in the nex t yea r by an agreement at Hyde Park on defence production. Even befor e Pear l Harbo r th e PJB D went t o wor k grimly on a scenario i n which Nort h Americ a face d th e worl d alone. Th e summe r o f 194 0 wa s a traumatic experience fo r Canadians . The y worrie d ove r th e implication s of

164 Th e Shapin g of Peace this last-ditch strategy while the Battl e of Britain was going on. Nevertheless , there wa s virtually unanimou s support for a defence arrangemen t with th e Americans i n suc h circumstances an d an acceptance of continental defenc e as the ultimate necessity. When Roosevelt suggested American air and naval bases i n Nova Scotia , King said facilitie s woul d be made availabl e on a kind of 'limite d fre e port ' basis. 7 Th e Ogdensbur g initiativ e had bee n almos t entirely Roosevelt's . Ther e i s n o evidenc e o f pressur e fro m th e militar y whose concern was directed towards Latin America. The American military, in fact, did not want to divert their limited resources to the northern regions. Canadians stoutl y resiste d proposal s b y whic h Canadia n force s woul d b e placed under United States command, except in the hypothetical situation of fighting in North America. 8 Although the word integration was loosely used, wartime defence association wa s mainl y a n exercis e i n co-operation , co-ordination , an d trouble shooting. During the middle years of the war, when the threat not only from the Japanes e i n th e Aleutian s but als o from th e German s i n the northeas t preoccupied defenc e planner s i n bot h countries , th e PJB D wa s kep t bus y planning project s lik e th e Northwes t Stagin g Route , th e defenc e o f New foundland, an d organizin g co-operation o n man y levels. I t kep t awa y from issues such as the protection of Greenland and the Free French seizur e of St Pierre an d Miquelo n becaus e thes e wer e sensitive politica l issues betwee n the tw o countries . Th e PJB D wa s organize d i n tw o nationa l sections , eac h with it s ow n chairma n an d independen t administrativ e machinery. 9 Th e board was based on roughly the same principles as the uc (except, of course, that th e PJB D assumes a common caus e an d th e U C assumes perpetua l contention) an d it s rol e wa s to mak e recommendations . I t ha d n o executiv e functions, althoug h i n the pressure s o f wartime the tw o sections wit h their close telephonic communications did act informally and unofficially as quasiexecutive bodies seein g that programmes were carried out. Towards the end of th e war , wit h th e tw o countrie s a s allies , th e boar d wa s les s active , although it retained its status. The broad plans had been laid , and day-to-day collaboration was the responsibility of the chiefs of staff and the man y liaison agencies. The PJB D an d th e whol e Ogdensbur g arrangemen t wer e geographically limited an d di d no t constitut e wha t migh t properl y be calle d a n alliance . There wa s obviously no commitmen t t o b e militar y allies, a s Canad a wa s belligerent and the United States intended to remain neutral. The provisions had t o d o wit h th e defenc e o f the norther n par t of North Americ a bu t no t even all of the Unite d States. I n practice it involved the Unite d States in th e defence o f Canada , bu t i t di d no t involv e Canad a i n th e whol e o f Unite d

165 Nort h Americ a States strategy . While thi s migh t appea r a s a n asymmetr y dictate d b y th e larger power, Canadians had no more desir e to get mixed up in United States commitments i n th e Caribbean , fo r instance , tha n th e American s ha d t o share thei r policies . There wa s no question o f the Unite d State s having any say i n Canada' s militar y operation s i n Europ e excep t late r throug h th e Supreme Allie d Command. A s the wa r against the enemie s wa s carried on further an d further fro m the coasts of North America there was an inevitable lowering of the priorit y for continental projects, and befor e V E Day liquidation of major operations in Canada was already taking place. DEFENCE PRODUCTION 1 0

Whether th e wartim e experience o f 'integrated ' defenc e productio n was a unique and limited experience, th e beginnings of absorption into the American economic empire , o r an interesting stra w in the wind , it is the subject of animated debat e - and for that reaso n require s som e examination . A.F.W . Plumptre, wh o watche d i t from Washington , concluded : 'I t ha s bee n sug gested tha t ther e wa s som e far-reachin g integratio n o f th e whol e Nort h American econom y for wartim e purposes. Thi s was not th e case; bu t ther e was a real and effectiv e coordination of wartime economic planning and wartime controls i n the two countries.'11 In 1940- 1 Canadian s wer e trying to involv e the American s in support of Canada's war and Roosevel t wante d to b e helpful . Unite d State s neutrality legislation forbad e dealing s wit h a belligerent , bu t th e administration , re cognizing the particula r effect o n Canad a becaus e o f its close financia l ties , bent th e rule s t o accommodat e Ottawa . Ther e wa s some ris k entailed , a s Michael Little has pointed out: 'It was to the Canadian national advantage to curry favo r with the America n economi c colossu s i n time o f war. Thus, i n many respects , th e ver y satisfactory hig h level America n imag e o f Canada was to result, i n no small part, from premeditatio n o n the par t of the Cana dian official s concerne d wit h th e Unite d States . However , thi s practice also entailed a certain danger, i n that American satisfaction with an accommodating Canadian Government migh t well reinforce the America n propensity to take for granted their access to and use of Canadian territory and its environs should a strategic threat to North Americ a become palpable.' 12 The Canadia n Britis h payments positio n vis-à-vi s th e Unite d State s got increasingly desperate , an d th e American s wer e preparin g Lend-Lease fo r the British. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau thought it would be neater for Canad a t o accep t thi s formula. 13 Th e Canadia n government , however , did not want to be obligated by an arrangement like Lend-Lease which would

166 Th e Shapin g of Peac e require commitment s o n postwa r commercial polic y and th e liquidatio n of Canadian assets 14 i n th e Unite d States . Canadia n officials , therefore , pre sented t o Adol f Berle , Unite d State s assistan t secretar y o f state, a proposal looking a t th e 'possibilit y o f arrangin g for co-operatio n betwee n th e war expanded industries o f Canada and th e Unite d States or for their co-ordination o r integration.' 15 Berle saw this as the dawn of 'a new order.'16 Others in both countrie s ha d thei r eye s mor e firmly fixed on loadin g the convoy s t o Britain in the sprin g of 1941 . In Apri l Kin g went to Hyd e Par k where the president an d h e mad e a declaration agreeing 'a s a general principl e that in mobilizing resources of this continent each country should provide the other with th e defenc e article s whic h i t i s bes t abl e t o produce , and , abov e all, produce quickly , and tha t productio n program s shoul d b e co-ordinate d t o this end.' 17 It was not s o much a calculated step towards economic integration a s a n arrangemen t t o benefi t th e Canadia n econom y withou t th e entanglements o f Lend-Lease . The Hyd e Park declaration looke d lik e a functional agreement , bu t King placed a significance on i t that was far from routine . What he saw was more international i n implicatio n than Berle' s drea m o f an integrate d continent . He told the Hous e o f Commons tha t the declaration was 'a further convinc ing demonstration tha t Canad a an d th e Unite d State s ar e indee d layin g th e enduring foundations o f a new world order, a n order base d o n international understanding, o n mutua l aid , o n friendshi p an d goo d will.' 18 Roosevelt , concerned abov e al l with sustaining th e allie d cause, understoo d th e signifi cance o f helping the Canadian war effort. Cordel l Hull was dedicated to postwar liberalizatio n of trade, to the convictio n tha t any removal o f barriers to trade was a way of preventing postwa r autarky. King saw the agreemen t in the contex t o f a new world, no t just a new continental order , an d thereb y supported Hull. Whatever th e lurkin g implications fo r Canad a o f this kind of continenta l enterprise, ther e wa s no doub t o f the immediate advantage . Th e Canadia n balance-of-payments defici t wit h the Unite d States , whic h in 194 1 was $162 million, becam e withi n on e yea r after Hyd e Park a surplus of $136 million. In 194 3 the so-calle d Morgenthau-Dsle y agreement sought t o control excessive surpluse s o n eithe r side . I n spit e o f thi s an d subsequen t agreement s according t o which Canada assume d large r responsibilities fo r sharing costs under its own Mutual Aid programme, Canada ende d th e war with a considerable balance in its favour. Neither Hyd e Park no r Ogdensburg wa s a formal treaty. The Ogdensbur g Agreement ha d set u p a continuing institution, th e Permanen t Join t Boar d on Defence, bu t there was no provision for a committee t o implement Hyde

167 Nort h America Park. What wa s accomplished wa s done i n a highly pragmati c way. Barriers such a s the 'Bu y American ' Act , tariffs , an d export controls wer e remove d not b y treaties and legislatio n but b y the extraordinary ingenuity of administrators. Congress and parliament were more docile in wartime. The lack of an institutional structur e migh t sugges t tha t th e defence-productio n sharin g experience was shallow, but functional integration can be more constructiv e or insidiou s (accordin g to valu e judgment) tha n forma l intergovernmenta l institutions whic h usually guarantee sovereignt y an d se t limit s o n integra tion.19 In this case the implementin g committee s o n a high level petered out or faile d t o mee t wherea s subcommittee s flourished . Th e Join t Economi c Committees established were in fact two committees, one American and one Canadian, whic h sometimes me t jointly. The Join t Economi c Committee s gave birth to a Joint Defence (late r War) Production Committee i n September 194 1 which was to report to the presiden t and the prim e minister. Thi s body did little more than draw up a Joint Declaration of Principles a few days after Pear l Harbor. 20 The actio n wa s in the subcommittee s o n tank s and automotive vehicles , artillery, ammunition, and small arms. There developed an old-boy network of effectiv e operator s conspirin g togethe r t o wi n th e wa r b y short-cutting diplomatic procedure s an d existin g legislation . Official s an d businessme n who wor k this wa y are impatien t o f sovereignt y whe n ther e i s a commo n enemy. I n Ottawa in particular there was a determination t o avoid the usua l diplomatic procedures. The testimony of the Canadians involved concerning the ver y satisfactory treatment of Canadian interests because o f the good will shown and th e commo n approac h to problem s i s convincing. Two of them, S.D. Pierc e an d A.F.W . Plumptre , concluded: 'I n short , th e Unite d State s trusted us, liked us, understood us , had no reason to fear us, and shared with us th e commo n objectiv e of defeating the enemy.' 21 That specifi c judgment sparked a sceptical professor of a later day to remark: 'This is close to being a classic formulation of the "goo d neighbourhood" theory of continental relations, but som e of it may be true for all that.'22 The specia l circumstance s do , o f course , hav e t o b e born e i n mind . R . Warren James , who also had the Washington experienc e and gives the same testimony abou t the value s of personal contact, cautions : The virtu e of informa l understanding s can b e exaggerated . Casua l agreements ar e not ver y satisfactor y when a crisis develops an d th e nationa l interest become s in volved. As it was, the path of economic co-operation between th e two countries was smoothed because , i n general, consumptio n was increasing in bot h countries . If it had been necessary to reduce consumption in both countries to austerity levels over a

168 Th e Shapin g of Peace wide rang e o f essentia l commodities , i t i s certai n tha t domesti c politica l pressure s would hav e straine d eve n th e forma l agreement s betwee n th e tw o countries. Thi s would almos t certainly have meant that almost all intercourse between the two governments would have had to be conducted at the highest levels, ie, there would have been muc h heavier reliance on diplomatic negotiations.23

The arrangemen t wit h th e Unite d State s wa s seen i n th e contex t o f th e triangular relationship with the Unite d Kingdom. Canada ha d gained a place on severa l o f th e Unite d States-Unite d Kingdo m boards. 24 However, i n th e field o f defenc e production , a s distinc t from th e actua l fightin g o f th e wa r where Canadians were largely 'integrated ' with th e British , what was evolving wa s no t s o muc h a triangl e as a continental 'team, ' whic h th e Unite d States naturall y dominated, i n a bilateral relationship with th e British . This was somewhat the revers e o f the patter n in atomic questions wher e Canada was part of a British team.25 What C.D. How e was interested i n was not th e proper form but the best way to see that Canadian interests wer e advanced in the allie d directorate . H e wa s prepare d fo r a Canadia n t o si t a s a Britis h representative i n th e Combine d Developmen t Trus t (Atomic ) o r o n a n American bod y for wa r production if that was the bes t wa y to get results. I n the officia l histor y of the Unite d State s War Productio n Boar d it is recalled that Canada decline d t o present it s requirements to the Unite d States Board of Economic Warfare because i t objected to being considered a foreign country. 'I t wa s willing t o becom e a member o f th e Requirement s Committee , but thi s wa s generally objecte d t o b y th e committe e o n th e groun d that , although the Hyd e Park Agreement... made Canada a part of the America n economy [sic] , i t was, i n fact , a foreign country and foreig n representatio n on th e Requirement s Committe e wa s undesirable.' 26 Th e proble m wa s resolved b y utilizing what was called the 'Canadia n and Foreig n Division s of the WPB. ' An importan t implicatio n o f th e principl e of a common effor t wa s common sacrifice . Canadians an d American s woul d hav e t o submi t t o roughl y comparable controls . Th e economie s wer e s o different , however , an d the y started off the Hyd e Par k era at such differen t stage s of involvement in the war that thi s could be done onl y on a basis of parallel or comparable nationa l regulation. It was, o f course, a n importan t aspec t o f the perio d o f decontro l at the en d of the war. Inevitably an agreement fo r war production spread into production fo r civilia n purposes . T o begi n with , Unite d State s official s ha d tended t o thin k th e schem e mean t tha t Canad a woul d simpl y modif y it s defence productio n programm e i n accordance wit h United State s plans and be regulate d b y United State s priorities , exports , an d allocatio n controls . I t

169 Nort h Americ a proved t o b e muc h mor e informa l than that . There wa s simply a generally accepted feelin g that th e Hyd e Par k spiri t should b e maintained, bu t ther e was n o intergovernmenta l polic y directive . Ther e wa s n o legislation . Th e Canadians ofte n acquiesced i n United States proposal s because tha t was the best wa y of gettin g the benefit s o f collaboration , but , a s Danfor d Middlemiss observes, '.. . the long-ru n implications of excessive economi c defenc e co-operation wer e not los t o n Canadia n official s an d th e loft y idea l o f integration was accordingly never full y realized , or, for tha t matter, full y attain able.'27 The programm e o f joint productio n wa s undoubtedl y justified a s a wartime measure. Th e Canadian operators may or may not have been heedlessly weaving a pattern o f permanent continental integration, but th e long-range consequences wer e not th e firs t thin g on thei r minds. The y wer e tryin g t o win a war and see that Canada got the bes t deals. The programme helped lay the foundation s o f a vastly more competitiv e Canadian industrial base, de signed mor e than i t otherwise might have bee n t o fit a continental pattern. The declaratio n wa s intended t o b e more than just a negative agreemen t t o remove barriers to trade . The intentio n was the maximizatio n of the conti nental produc t t o strengthe n th e allie d cause . T o achiev e thi s en d ther e would have to be positive government directio n o f the tw o economies. The wartime situatio n wa s extraordinary i n tha t bot h countrie s ha d controlle d economies an d th e nee d an d capacit y t o co-ordinat e regulation s was much greater tha n i t would be in normal circumstances. I t was not possible , however, t o develo p ' a singl e war productio n programm e fo r Nort h America ' because th e tw o countries' programme s were planne d independently . The y were no t initiate d at the sam e time and Canada's was designed t o meet th e needs of the Unite d Kingdom. Canadian dependence on United States industry was a consequence of the war, no t o f Hyd e Park . Hyd e Par k was a mean s o f organizin g that depen dence in th e Canadia n interest. Th e promotio n of reciprocal trade was a far less demeaning relationshi p than th e acceptanc e o f Lend-Lease or loans. I t was, nevertheless , a new chapter i n the continental relationship , an experience beyond th e earlie r experimen t i n reciprocity . The conclusio n o f John Kirton i s that th e appropriat e metaphor i s 'not on e o f a silent surrende r o f sovereignty bu t a selectiv e suspensio n o f self-relianc e fo r a temporaril y limited period.' He adds: 'This is not to deny the original Canadian ambitions to exten d th e Hyd e Par k "system " int o th e post-wa r period . Ye t a s th e external condition s whic h ha d produce d th e origina l two-stage agreemen t began to erode with the decline of the axis powers, and as the benefits of the cooperative endeavou r bega n t o accru e disproportionatel y t o th e junio r

170 Th e Shapin g of Peac e partner, the corresponding inter-governmental and societal alterations in the relationship were produced without undue difficulty.' Canad a had, as a result of wartime economic co-operation, accumulated the resources t o buy its way out o f th e arrangement s whic h had interfere d wit h it s sovereignty : '... th e 1941-1944 perio d appear s a s a classi c exampl e o f "integrativ e immunization," in which limited amounts of sovereignty are surrendered to attain the capabilities by which it is ultimately to be preserved an d enhanced.'28 Dependence, afte r all , was not one-sided. Canad a got good deals at Ogdensburg and Hyde Park because it had what the Unite d States needed. Having mobilized sooner and wit h les s haste , Canada's econom y was less over-heated . Thes e advantages, alon g wit h King' s conviction an d hi s cleve r diplomacy, got for Canada arrangement s whic h left th e countr y at th e en d o f th e wa r with a surplus. Withou t tha t surplus , th e force s o f continenta l absorptio n would surely have bee n les s easily resistible. STRATEGIC APPRECIATION S

Before th e wa r ended th e strategi c position of Canada in the postwa r world was considered jointly in the PJB D and the Militar y Co-operation Committe e and somewha t mor e candidl y by the PH P Committee. Thi s latter was an allCanadian examinatio n an d it s report entitle d 'Post-Wa r Defenc e Relation ship wit h th e Unite d States ' wa s approved b y the Wa r Committe e o f th e cabinet o n 2 8 February 1945. 29 It was a cool assessment which regarded th e maintenance o f friendl y relation s wit h th e Unite d State s a s bein g i n th e Canadian interest , favoure d clos e co-ordinatio n o f th e defence s o f Canad a with thos e o f the Unite d States , an d th e continuatio n o f the PJB D a s an in strument o f co-ordination - eve n i f it had little to do and was not much mor e than a symbol. At the sam e time , th e repor t foresaw that although Canada United States relations were unlikely to prejudice friendship there was a possibility of the United States being moved to exert undue pressure on Canada because o f differences o f attitude towards events i n other parts of the world. The Canadia n experienc e durin g the wa r confirmed th e vie w of the PHP committee that Canada should take an active part in maintaining defences in Canada a s well as in Newfoundland an d Labrador to forestall an inclination of the Unite d States to proceed o n its own. The war had brought about a new set o f defenc e relationships . Opinio n i n bot h countries , the y thought , ha d gone far towards recognizing that the two oceans di d not provide full protec tion fro m attac k an d furthe r tha t th e ultimat e securit y o f th e continen t depended o n th e maintenanc e o f peace in Europe and Asia . Both countries accepted th e fac t tha t they mus t hav e adequate protectio n agains t airborn e

171 Nort h America attack, especiall y from th e north , northeast , an d northwest . Canad a would continue t o b e vita l t o th e defenc e o f th e Unite d State s and , a s aviation developed, th e norther n route s woul d increasingly become worl d commer cial highways and a t th e sam e tim e potential routes fo r hostile power s with designs agains t the Unite d States . Conceivably , also, the y could be used by the Unite d State s for offensive purposes . Th e United States , th e committe e held, migh t be expected t o take an active interest i n Canadian defence policy and o n occasio n expres s i t 'wit h an absence o f the tac t and restrain t custo marily employe d b y th e Unite d Kingdom. ' I n vie w o f Canada' s positio n astride 'th e overlan d route ' betwee n th e Unite d State s an d th e USSR , an y serious deterioratio n i n thei r relation s woul d b e a n embarrassmen t t o Canada. Canada' s bes t hop e wa s in th e establishmen t o f a worl d security organization, bu t in any event Canad a and th e Unite d State s woul d have t o co-ordinate thei r defences an d such a policy could 'take its place as part of a plan o f universa l security.' Fo r tha t purpos e th e PJB D was a suitable instrument. Canada should not base its defence policy exclusively on collaboration with the Unite d States , bu t shoul d accep t a fair shar e o f responsibility in an international securit y organization . Finally , it was agreed tha t the new vul nerability o f Nort h Americ a mad e i t compulsor y fo r Canad a t o accep t increased defenc e responsibilitie s and maintai n large r arme d force s tha n before the war. As basi c strategi c principle s thes e prove d far-sighte d an d continue d t o guide defence policy for some years, even thoug h the plea to maintain larger armed force s wa s ignored b y politicians in Ottawa - a s well a s in Washington - anxiou s to demobilize. A point t o be noted i s that th e argument for participation i n defenc e o f th e continen t wa s established befor e th e Col d War o n th e ground s tha t Canad a an d th e continent ha d becom e mor e vulnerable to an extracontinental threat. The planners certainly had in mind the danger o f Unite d States-USS R confrontation , bu t thei r calculation s wer e based o n considerations o f more permanen t validit y than anti-communism . Through th e Canada-Unite d State s Militar y Co-operatio n Committe e a n effort wa s made befor e th e wa r ended t o agree o n a new set o f principles to replace the so-called ABC-2 2 which had been designed fo r wartime. Although the cabinet War Committee agreed in February 1944 on certain principles, the pace was relaxed whe n th e wa r ended an d th e American s wer e told no t t o press.30 It was early 1947 before a joint statement o n defence co-operation was reached, bu t that belongs to a later chapter when the prospect had drastically altered. Canadians were getting after 194 0 a new geo-political vision of themselve s which altere d thei r perceptio n o f Nort h America . Map s wer e becomin g

172 Th e Shapin g of Peac e popular whic h showe d th e worl d fro m a pola r projectio n rathe r tha n th e familiar prospec t accordin g t o Mercator . Th e convictio n remaine d deepl y rooted, o f course , tha t Canadians , b y travellin g straigh t east , woul d firs t encounter th e Britis h an d th e Wes t European s an d then , i f the y kep t o n going, the Russians . The idea that Europe was the place where wars hatched and wer e fough t persiste d - and was to b e later reinforce d b y the Europe based strategy of NATO. Nevertheless, i n 194 5 Canadians wer e trying hard to absorb th e ide a that they had an 'Arctic frontier.' Th e building of the Alaska highway, joint concer n ove r th e Japanes e threa t fro m th e northwest , th e prominence o f Edmonto n i n wartim e a s th e take-of f poin t b y ai r fo r th e Soviet Union , th e shoc k fel t i n 194 0 ove r th e possibilit y of Greenland an d Iceland fallin g t o the Nazis - al l had a considerable effec t o n Canadian idea s of their ow n sovereignty. Canadians fel t expose d an d vulnerable a s they had not sinc e the y gav e u p worryin g about a n America n invasion . Th e deduc tions, however , wer e not clear-cut. There wa s an argument for perpetuatin g the closes t link s with th e Unite d State s i n Fortres s America , bu t ther e was also an argument to do everything possible to prevent the Americans and the Russians fro m staging an aerial war over Canada . The Arcti c frontie r pose d squarel y fo r Canadian s th e doubl e edg e o f defence policy . They had t o defend themselve s agains t any hostile outside r and the y also ha d t o defen d themselve s o n anothe r plan e against thei r defenders. Ther e wer e two aspects t o the latte r concern. They had to put up at least a show of defence themselves les t the Americans seek to do it for them . They also ha d t o keep a wary eye on the sovereignty of their own vast territory. The small band of Canadian arcticians who had pleaded the cause of the north without much success ove r the years profited considerably b y the wartime activities in that area and they now had the powerful argument of security. Ther e wa s a considerabl e flurr y o f interes t i n th e nort h marke d b y a number o f articles in journals and scholarly quarterlies. The Canadian public became awar e that thei r sovereignt y ove r th e Arcti c archipelago wa s by no means universally recognized an d that it would have to be assured b y a more active occupation or at least surveillance. It was, as an External Affair s memo randum said , 'unchallenge d bu t no t unchallengeable.' 31 A lot of American s had been i n the Canadia n nort h durin g the wa r and there wa s an increasin g number o f reason s fo r the m t o retur n o r sta y there. Canadia n sovereignt y was becomin g a matte r o f som e politica l consequence. Ther e wa s not th e acute popula r sensitivit y tha t erupte d severa l decade s late r whe n th e re sources o f the Arctic , especially oil, became significant . It was muted b y the fear o f being left alon e and defenceless .

173 Nort h America The policy of a carefully calculated defence partnership with the Americans in th e North , a s eventually adopted, wa s an effor t t o resolve th e contradictions. When after the war the Americans expressed interest in maintaining and developing weather station s i n the Arcti c for bot h militar y and civilian purposes, ther e was uncertaint y in Ottawa . It was recognized tha t the projec t would be in the Canadian interest, and there was much to be said for co-operating wit h th e Unite d States , whic h coul d contribut e mone y an d technica l resources. Al l Canadian departments, including National Defence, were adamant, however , o n th e nee d t o affir m Canadia n sovereignty . Nationa l Defence worrie d abou t Sovie t action s i f Canad a showe d doubt s o f it s own sovereignty vis-à-vi s th e Unite d States , and Externa l Affair s worrie d that if the Unite d State s wa s turned dow n the y might see k thei r end s b y actually challenging Canadia n sovereignty . Eventuall y the official s recommende d a cautious bu t affirmativ e repl y to th e America n request. Cabine t refuse d t o be rushed , arguin g that al l aspects o f Nort h America n defenc e shoul d b e considered together . There was hope i n this predicament tha t the Unite d Nations could be the answer. Nationa l Defenc e wondere d wh y ther e coul d no t b e a regiona l defence agreemen t wit h the Unite d States a s provided in the Charter . Similarly, when the Canadia n section o f the PJB D produced plans for a revision of ABC-22, both Pearso n an d Heeney objecte d that it had not bee n regarded as part o f the U N plans for internationa l security.32 The multilatera l framework had priority and whatever bilateral arrangements might be necessary must be fitted int o it. To begi n with ther e wa s some hop e tha t the existenc e o f a UN system o f security would obviate th e nee d fo r bilatera l defenc e wit h al l its problems. In any case i t provided for a time an excuse fo r procrastination. The question o f territorial waters, which also became a major issu e a generation later , arose a t the en d o f the war. Whereas i n the seventies i t was to be Canada that took the initiativ e in asserting control of waters far out to sea in th e nam e o f conservation , i t wa s th e Unite d State s tha t di d s o i n th e forties. Durin g th e war , i n accordanc e wit h Roosevelt' s wishes , talk s ha d been initiate d wit h th e Canadian s o n measure s t o conserv e th e fisherie s beyond th e territoria l limits. Thes e wer e stil l proceedin g whe n the Unite d States developed a t the en d of the war a parallel interest in asserting its rights over th e continenta l shelf , whic h was beginning t o hav e importanc e a s a source o f oil . Th e Stat e Departmen t argue d agains t unilatera l action until those other countrie s mos t directl y concerned ha d been consulted , an d thi s advice was accepted. Canada an d Mexico were recognized as primarily interested, and it was clear that Canada was given a priority over all others. A s the

174 Th e Shapin g of Peac e Canadian charg é d'affaires, Merchant Mahoney, explained, Canad a wa s in the middl e of an election and a governmental opinio n would be hard to get. When no response was forthcoming, the possibility of postponing action un til afte r th e Canadia n election s wa s actually considered. I t was a classic case of good behaviour by the Americans, making sure that Canadian views were considered befor e takin g action that would obviously affect Canadia n interests, but Canad a muffed it . The Canadia n government di d not in fact object to Unite d States policy because i t saw advantage for Canada in the principle but th e Departmen t o f External Affairs though t that, in light of the commit ment t o drafting ne w international law through the United Nations, it would have bee n bette r t o approac h th e subjec t multilaterally. 33 One advantag e Canada gaine d wa s that whe n th e American s proteste d i n 197 0 against th e Arctic Water s Pollutio n Preventio n Ac t whic h asserted Canadia n contro l over a one-hundred-mil e zone , th e declaratio n b y Presiden t Truma n o f authority ove r th e continenta l shel f i n 194 5 wa s cite d a s a preceden t fo r unilateral action. LIQUIDATION

As th e wa r ende d o n bot h front s Canadian s surveye d thei r experienc e o f continental defence. There was little inclination to abandon th e concept or its instrument, th e PJBD , but th e defenc e production arrangements, whic h had been les s forma l an d designe d fo r a n emergency , wer e woun d up quickly. The experienc e o f co-operation with the Americans , particularl y on the offi cial level, ha d been reasonabl y satisfactory, although the American military, preoccupied wit h their responsibility for winning the war , had often seemed insensitive about sovereignty. In order to remind the visitors of the authority of Ottawa, the government had in 1943 appointed a special commissioner fo r defence project s i n th e northwest , residen t i n Edmonton , an d officiall y a t least the American s ha d welcomed the step for the better liaison it provided. For bot h ol d and ne w reason s Canadian s wer e determined t o liquidate en tirely American military establishments o n Canadian soil and make unneces sary th e presenc e o f any America n troops . Th e scalin g dow n o f America n garrisons i n Canada and Newfoundland began in 1943. In that same year the withdrawal bega n o f th e enginee r troo p constructio n forc e o n th e Alask a highway whic h a t on e tim e ha d exceede d a strengt h o f te n thousand . Nevertheless, a goo d man y America n civilian s remaine d i n Canad a an d there were expressions o f Canadian uneasiness over what was glibly referred to as the 'ocupatio n forces ' base d i n Edmonton. A s early as 1 February 194 3 the prime minister stated: 'It is not contemplated tha t the contribution which

175 Nort h America the United States is thus making to the common defence will give that country any continuing rights in Canada after th e conclusion of the war. Indeed, with regard to most of the projects that have been undertaken in this country by th e Unite d States, agreement s hav e already been made which make the post-war position completely clear.'34 The governmen t wa s careful t o avoid any note of antagonism in declaring its policy, and the American s displayed no strong disposition to resist. The liquidatio n was virtually a. fait accompli befor e the Pentago n began, at the en d o f the war , to loo k at continental defence fro m a new perspective. They had had other things to worry about in 1944. The American politicians were mollifie d b y th e extraordinar y experience o f a n all y offerin g t o pay. According to the American military historian of the period: 'On the U.S. side, no responsibl e official ha d envisage d a positio n o f special privileg e for th e United State s i n Canad a a s a resul t o f th e wartim e operations there , an d therefore the offe r o f unanticipated payment for U.S. expenditures was readily gratefully [sic ] accepted.'35 By late 1944 the Canadia n Department o f Transport was taking over facililties from th e Americans and a year later only a few United State s personnel remained . A ceremony a t White Horse o n 3 April 1946, i n th e presenc e o f the chairme n of the PJBD , wound up the transfer . Airfields i n eastern Canada were released from Augus t 1945 on. The United States wa s reasonabl y satisfie d with its reimbursemen t an d Canadian s fo r their part had acquire d airfields an d othe r facilities at only a fraction o f their original cost . O n 1 Apri l 194 6 th e Canadia n army took ove r th e car e an d maintenance o f the Canadia n section of the Alask a highway. The RCA F assumed charg e o f all facilities o n th e Northwes t Staging Route a s American personnel departed . Althoug h Canada assumed ful l control , continued collaboration with the United States was, of course, not ruled out. One importan t function of th e Hyd e Park arrangement ha d bee n clearly stated fro m th e beginnin g - to assis t th e partie s throug h th e transitio n t o peace. By 1944 Canadian officials wer e concerned over the consequence s of war production . Canadian industr y woul d still need Unite d State s compo nents durin g conversio n an d th e ver y acts o f decontro l woul d have t o b e co-ordinated. Decontro l was , however , no t a joint operatio n bu t paralle l action b y each government base d o n consultation an d co-ordinated timing. In May 1945 there was an exchange of notes 'Providing for the Continuation of th e Principle s o f th e Hyde Par k Declaratio n int o th e Post-Wa r Transitional Perio d wit h Specia l Reference t o th e Problem s o f Reconversio n o f Industry.'36 The United States at this stage was most interested in continuing Canadian co-operation in the war against Japan and in Canada's not restoring the old barriers to trade. Canadian motives were more strictly economic and

176 Th e Shapin g of Peac e immediate. However , th e exchang e o f note s certainl y indicated tha t bot h parties were stil l thinkin g of continuing defence productio n co-operation i n peacetime - whateve r that would mean. When th e wa r actually ended, however , ther e wa s a reaction agains t defence productio n in both countries. Th e convictio n o f a common caus e was suspended, a t least for a few years, and efficienc y n o longer had the absolut e priority over othe r considerations . Th e infrastructur e could no t b e disman tled immediately. There wer e still scarcities, and the controls in each country had t o be balance d s o that continuing sacrifices were commensurate. Cana dians wer e dependen t o n th e suppl y of many America n materials, and , i n particular, o n shipping , and the y ha d their ow n needs for a staged disman tling. A larg e America n wa r effor t i n th e Pacific , furthermore , woul d kee p the Canadian arms industry rolling during a change-over. But that war ended sooner than expected, an d after v j Day there was a rush from a wartime to a peacetime order . Th e Material s Coordinating Committee wa s dissolved i n December 194 5 and th e Join t Wa r Production Committe e i n January 1946 . The wartime officials who had worked so well together went home as soon as they could. The beautiful thoughts which Mackenzie King and others had had about the removal o f continental barrier s a s an exampl e t o th e worl d and th e devel opment o f common resource s fo r the common goo d seem to have dissipated as conflictin g interest s an d fear s emerged . Amon g th e Canadia n politician s anti-militarism wa s more importan t tha n anti-Americanism a s a motive for dismantling, bu t th e actua l experience a t first hand of the America n driving force ha d sobere d somewha t th e earlie r enthusias m fo r integratio n a s a n abstraction. Th e governmen t wa s not going t o b e rushe d int o long-rang e defence commitment s o f any kind. For th e momen t Canad a ha d its surplus from wartim e defenc e productio n exchanges . Withou t a commo n enemy , the raiso n d'êtr e o f 'integration ' vanished. I f there wa s to be an integrate d continental economy i n peacetime, i t would have to be on the basi s of a new philosophy for whic h neither sid e wa s prepared i n 1945 . Th e belie f i n col laboration with the Unite d State s i n defence, includin g defence production , was no t rejected , an d th e nee d t o b e prepare d wa s upheld. Othe r things , however, seemed more important . Mackenzie Kin g ha d fits of suspicion about America n intention s an d in sisted tha t ther e b e n o military agreements wit h the American s wit h which the Britis h could no t b e associate d a s well . He did , o f course , exploi t th e triangle to avoid commitments. Havin g taken a very negative positio n o n all proposals on Commonwealth defence , h e nevertheless pleaded the need for co-operation an d consultatio n wit h th e Britis h to stal l proposal s fro m th e

177 Nort h Americ a PJBD fo r continenta l defence. 37 Muc h of the effor t t o maintai n defence preparedness went into the effor t t o achieve military standardization on a trilateral basis. When the American s proposed to the PJB D in June 1945 a number of join t projects , includin g 'the standardizatio n of equipmen t an d forces, ' General McNaughto n refused t o consider anythin g that would not provide for Britis h participation. What Kin g wanted wa s 'standardizatio n o f equipment i n trainin g and militar y research betwee n u.s . and th e U.K . and Can ada.'38 McNaughton presse d the issue hard. He and his colleagues recognized the inescapabl e necessit y o f bein g able t o wor k with America n defenc e in dustries, but they did not want to cut themselves off from the traditional link with Britis h industry. The lesson s o f 1940- 1 wer e not forgotten , whe n th e circumstances o f a rea l wa r ha d mad e i t impossibl e t o depen d o n Britis h supplies an d therefor e essentia l t o secur e sustenanc e fro m a source vastly better endowed an d closer at hand. Afte r severa l years of tough negotiating, at whic h McNaughton was a master , ther e wa s achieved o n 1 8 November 1948 an accord on an American-British screw thread. By that time, of course, standardization was being regarded in a wider NATO context and Canada was seeking to encase its defence relationshi p in the broade r alliance to ease the pressures. TRANSITION

In 194 5 Canad a an d th e Unite d State s wer e i n a summi t perio d o f thei r alliance relationship, a status attributabl e not s o much t o Ogdensburg a s to their commitments a s 'united nations' rightin g a war. However, the relative simplicities o f tha t allianc e relationship were o n th e poin t o f givin g way to the histori c dilemma s o f tw o unequal power s with many interest s i n common an d man y in collision. During the perio d of transition from ho t to cold war th e specia l arrangements o f wartime were largely abandoned o r fell int o desuetude. Bot h countries , bu t Canad a in particular , reached toward s what was regarded as normal. For Canada this meant demobilizatio n and a drastic reduction i n th e priorit y given t o defenc e considerations . Althoug h th e Ogdensburg an d Hyde Par k agreements wer e reaffirmed, political leaders in Ottawa saw them mor e as a means b y which Canadian right s and interest s could be preserved i n the 'reconversion ' than as a base on which important new peacetim e structure s of economic and defenc e co-operatio n shoul d be built. Canada wanted to reduce the uncomfortable dependence o n North America which had been essential during the war and restore as quickly as possible the ol d balanc e b y which trad e wit h Britain an d Europ e woul d correct th e

178 Th e Shapin g of Peace imbalance o f trad e wit h th e Unite d States . Ther e wa s plent y to expor t t o Britain durin g th e wa r an d after , bu t Canad a ha d t o lend th e mone y fo r repayment. It was not just th e ol d triangle they wanted to recover. Tha t was still basic , bu t th e counterweigh t t o continental pressure s woul d be sought also i n wide r market s opene d u p b y a ne w internationa l tradin g system . Trade discussion s were held with the Americans in Ottawa in the summer of 1945 a t which the Canadian s argue d for a 'multilateral horizontal tariff cut ' or a t leas t ' a serie s o f bilatera l trad e agreement s amon g th e leadin g na tions.'39 Th e wartim e experience ma y wel l hav e encourage d Canadian s t o greater confidence that they had an industr y which was competitive i f there were minima l Unite d State s restriction s an d Canad a woul d use it s special neighbourly statu s t o lesse n thos e restrictions . Som e peopl e a t leas t wer e thinking of bilateral arrangements fo r free r exchange , even i f it was only an alternative to fall bac k on. One facto r whic h drew the United States and Canada together wa s a similarity in their predicaments . Bot h had to help the victim s of war get on their feet, and that meant co-ordination not only in UNRRA but also in bilateral aid programmes. A Unite d States-Canad a Join t War Aid Committee ha d been set up to co-ordinate Canadian Mutual Aid and United States Lend-Lease s o that countries could not play off one against the other. This wartime measure had bee n stimulate d o n th e America n sid e b y th e Chines e makin g direct appeals to Ottawa without Washington knowing what they were up to.40 That sort o f thing could happen again. The commo n predicamen t also produce d similar attitudes towards the reduction of trade barriers and in the exploitation of the greates t ne w resource, atomi c energy. The mutua l perpectives, however, did not abolish friction, for Canada had many specific interests to protect and could not, therefore, simply join forces under the American banner. It was largely a matter of coincidental rather than common interests. I n spite of Canada's relatively healthy financial position, worr y abou t th e dislocatio n o f its markets prevente d Canadian s fro m actin g like an assured economi c power. The surplus in trade with the United States disappeared rapidly, and there was no surplus with the United Kingdo m to counterbalance it. As fo r th e American s durin g tha t period , ther e wa s some specifi c con cern i n the Pentagon . Those who thought about the nort h wante d to maintain an d expan d th e continenta l defenc e syste m worke d out durin g the war and they wanted Canadian co-operation. The economic advisers in Washington though t abou t Canad a mos t ofte n as a country which could shar e som e of th e obligatio n fo r relief . Th e 'creators ' i n th e Stat e Departmen t too k Canada mor e seriously , some of them becaus e Canadian s had proved goo d fellow workmen and others with an eye to attaching Canada to the American

179 Nort h America sphere. Th e Canada-watcher s though t tha t Canadia n fear s fo r thei r Britis h markets woul d drive them t o economic collaboratio n with the United States. In Washington W.L. Batt, vice-chairman of the War Production Board, said: 'I a m authorize d t o tak e th e positio n for the Stat e Department tha t to treat Canada lik e any other foreig n Governmen t woul d be contrary to our policy . It i s thei r vie w tha t th e Canadia n econom y shoul d b e treate d a s nearl y a s possible lik e our own in peacetime, as well as in war, based alway s on mutual reciprocity.'41 In Congress Canad a coul d always count on a few friends an d a few axe-grinders . Th e prevailin g mood wa s friendl y bu t oppose d t o specia l favours for a country which had not bee n damage d b y the war. Attitudes on the highes t level returned t o the banalit y characteristic of the White Hous e befor e Roosevel t ha d turne d hi s shrewder an d mor e knowledgeable ey e on the north. Presiden t Truman' s approac h is illustrated i n his remarks t o members of the National Conference of Business Paper Editors, a conference whic h include d som e o f thos e goo d folk s an d neighbour s fro m that country they just don't think of as foreign. The relationship was benign, President Truman said . It i s one tha t ha s prevaile d fo r mor e tha n a hundre d years , eve r sinc e ol d Danie l Webster and Lor d Ashburto n ha d a meeting .. . to discuss th e situatio n of the boun dary betwee n th e Unite d State s and Canad a fro m Lak e Superior west. An d ol d Lord Ashburton an d ol d Dan cam e to th e conclusio n tha t tha t par t of the countr y wasn' t worth anythin g anywa y - and this was after the y ha d a few good cocktails - an d they took a ruler and ra n i t down from th e middle o f Lake Superior and sai d you take thi s and we will take this. And i t turned ou t t o be a very satisfactory settlement ever since . It i s no t necessar y fo r eithe r on e o f our neighbor s t o b e i n th e leas t bi t nervou s about what we may want to do to them. They ar e most likely to think what can we do for them . And tha t i s the wa y we want them t o feel. 42

When th e presiden t use d words written for hi m b y the wise r boys in th e State Departmen t h e was more interesting . In a letter to the president o f the Senate concernin g th e S t Lawrenc e Seawa y h e said : 'ou r securit y depend s also upon a vigorous and prosperous Canada, a n ally in both world wars.'43 It was fortunate for Canada during this period that it had a few staunch friend s in the Stat e Departmen t wh o fel t considerabl e goo d will , reinforced b y serious calculation . Thes e wer e th e internationalist s i n th e Stat e Departmen t who wante d Canad a a s a n all y i n creatin g internationa l institution s an d i n particular supportin g libera l trade , wh o als o wante d a willin g Canad a a s a partner i n continental defence , an d wh o argued bluntl y in Washington tha t the Unite d State s ha d enough collapse d economies i n Europe to rehabilitate

180 Th e Shapin g of Peac e without having another one to the north. They appreciated the way in which Canada wa s helping to keep the Britis h economy fro m collapse . They could hardly help being attracted by the ide a of a continental economy, whic h one of them said had been 'a n objective of United States foreign policy since th e founding of the Republic.' 44 To call such people covert annexationists would be to make their aims too specific. The y wer e understandably happ y to see Canada moving into their sphere, bu t thei r interes t i n restoring Britain kept them fro m grosse r form s of seduction. They were internationalists to the world at large in that blissful dawn, and their attitude towards Canada was of a piece with their conviction on th e nee d t o lower barriers everywhere, to combat 'narro w nationalism,' and limi t sovereignty . The y wer e battlin g the protectionis m o f thei r ow n government and needed Canada as a good example. It is not surprising some friends i n Washington assumed tha t what Canadians wanted was a continental econom y whic h they coul d penetrate . Thei r ow n disposition t o Canad a being s o benevolent, i t was hard for them - or their presiden t - to understand why Canadians might be 'the least bit nervous' about any arrangement that was reciprocal and presumed therefor e to be fair . Canadians als o opposed protectionis m an d talked the same loft y languag e about taming nationalism and sovereignty . It was their hope, i f less and les s their expectatio n afte r 1945 , tha t freein g the channel s o f trade woul d work miracles. Those who speculated - usuall y off the record - about free trade or other specia l relations wit h th e Unite d State s did not se e them as exclusive and continental. A s Norman Robertson pu t it in December 1943 : 'a comprehensive and thoroughgoing trad e agreement wit h the Unite d State s .. . could be th e firs t majo r instalmen t o f th e multilatera l programme whic h nearly everyone recognize s a s th e desirabl e goal.' 45 I n economics , a s wel l as i n security and diplomacy, multilateralism was seen as a counterweight t o bilateralism. The bilatera l relationship with the Unite d States was inescapable on many levels . I f somethin g ha d t o b e don e abou t it , however , whethe r i n economics o r defence, i t could be regarded either as part of the large r edifice or as a regional step towards a global goal. These hope s an d fear s an d tentativ e design s wer e pu t t o a sever e tes t during th e difficul t day s o f 194 7 an d earl y 1948 , whe n Canada' s financia l position wa s sorel y strained . Canadia n official s presse d th e American s t o consider thei r plight along with that of the European s becaus e Canada' s crisis could be attributed largely to its greater speed i n rushing to the help of the Europeans. America n official s di d not disregard thi s argument, a s they were anxious t o encourag e furthe r Canadia n assistanc e t o Europea n recovery . Congress was being reluctant abou t th e Marshal l Plan and it was essential i t

181 Nort h America be convinced tha t Canadians wer e playing their part. 46 Before the passag e of the so-calle d Europea n Recover y Programme, Canadia n official s wer e desperately tryin g t o get some assurances o f help from America n counterparts in orde r t o justif y carryin g on just a littl e longe r thei r hel p t o th e British . Cripps and Robertson favoure d a joint approach to Washington abou t allowing purchases from Canad a unde r the plan, but Wrong and Pearson advised against it . Fro m th e official s Wron g coul d ge t onl y pessimisti c response s about an offshore provision. Nevertheless, within a month of the passing of the Foreign Assistance Ac t came th e firs t authorizatio n by the American s for paymen t from ER P funds for Unite d Kingdom purchases in Canada. In a short time it was revealed, at least i n the opinio n o f the Canadia n ambassador i n Washington, that provisions fo r Canad a wer e 'a s generous.. . as I thin k w e coul d possibl y hop e for.'47 Th e America n official s ha d proved mos t co-operativ e bu t the y had to keep quiet about their intentions. The Canadia n ambassador advise d Ottawa strongly agains t an y tendenc y t o ope n gloatin g o r undu e satisfactio n i n Ottawa about th e provisions. He hoped that the press might be educated 't o look upo n th e ER P a s something othe r tha n a large pie from whic h we may expect ou r cut.' 48 By 24 June 2 2 per cen t o f the EG A authorization had bee n for Canadia n goods. This was a situation which Canada owed to its friends in Washington - a notable success for quiet diplomacy - but it put the latter in a difficult positio n vis-à-vi s Congress . Thos e Congressiona l leader s wh o ha d been persuade d t o support th e Marshal l Plan in the belie f i t would provide markets fo r thei r ow n produc e woul d no t lik e thes e fund s bein g use d t o purchase foodstuffs fro m thei r Canadian rivals. It looked as if the Canadian s were importunately demanding favours from the Americans . However , the Canadian way of looking at it was different. A s the ministe r of finance put it : 'All we ask and expect, is that Canada b e used as a normal source of supply for European trad e under ERP, where and to th e extent tha t w e ca n suppl y o n competitiv e term s o r better.' 49 Fo r thi s an d other reason s the Canadia n balanc e of payments began t o improv e in 1948 . That ver y improvement, however , undermine d Canada' s stanc e o n Euro pean recovery and le d to embarrassing proposal s fro m Washington . In Feb ruary 194 9 Wron g warned tha t Congress wa s attacking large ECA purchases of wheat . Mid-wester n senator s wer e askin g wh y $5 5 millio n ha d bee n authorized i n January for th e purchas e o f Canadian wheat . On 1 2 February St Laurent i n Washington told Truman tha t if Canada's wheat exports overseas wer e seriousl y threatened , Canada' s whol e foreig n economi c polic y would have to be changed. This would mean a new form of economic rivalr y between Canad a an d th e Unite d State s tha t woul d have wid e ramifications

182 Th e Shapin g of Peac e and seriou s result s in the politica l as well as the economi c field. The presi dent, needless t o say, was quite unaware of Canada's problem. 50 The stor y o f Canada' s associatio n o r non-associatio n wit h th e Marshal l Plan is interesting in that it initiated a new series o f problems arising out o f changed transatlanti c relations. Th e fac t tha t th e European s wer e alik e in their helplessness an d the Nort h Americans were alike in their unique capacity to help forced a functional alignment of the European s on the one hand and th e Nort h American s o n th e othe r i n th e economi c a s in th e defenc e sphere. I n th e fac e o f thi s implie d 'continentalism ' o n bot h side s o f th e Atlantic, Canada would have to be wary. The concept Canad a preferred, that of community , was described b y Douglas LePa n i n a perceptive memoran dum o f 2 5 Septembe r 1947 : 'Canadia n cooperatio n i n th e Marshal l Pla n would ten d t o show that the wester n worl d is not t o be picture d as a single giant towering above a cluster of mendicant clients, each holding out a begging bowl, but rather as a group of freely associated states , differing widely to be sure in their resources an d needs, but also held together b y a great number o f ligament s bot h o f interes t an d o f sentiment.' 51 That wa s very much like James Reston's argument in the New York Times that Canada's presenc e in NAT O turned the whole affair from a n aid to Europe scheme into an Atlantic community. 52 Th e proble m fo r Canadian s wa s threefold . The y di d no t want t o b e draw n int o a junior partner relationship in the Nort h America n responsibility for relief. They were concerned ove r the tendency on the part of th e European s t o for m thei r ow n self-help group. Furthermore , i n th e critical balance-of-payment s positio n o f 1947 , the y looke d mor e lik e th e mendicant client than the generous giant. The challenge from th e Americans came in the form of pressure on Canadians t o associate themselve s formall y wit h th e Marshal l Plan. This wa s an embarrassment becaus e i n th e earlie r stage s Canadian s ha d show n som e anxiety t o b e involve d i n th e planning , fearing that i f they wer e not , the y would lose th e chanc e to have Canadian produce include d an d b e excluded by the American s from gettin g their foot in European markets. The Ameri cans too k a generou s vie w of th e us e o f fund s b y th e European s t o bu y Canadian goods, bu t the y were not prepare d to let Canadians of f the hook . Without being too formally specific , Washington gave the Canadian ambas sador a strong impressio n tha t th e pric e for this concession wa s the kin d of participation in the EC A programme that would tie Canadians to fixed obligations t o Europea n recovery . Wrong reported tha t h e ha d headed of f a draf t letter he had seen which envisaged Canad a joining in a 'permanent concurring partnership ' i n th e ER P which rea d lik e ' a gratuitou s lette r fro m ou r neighbours o n wha t wa s importan t t o Canada. ' Hi s tac k wa s t o argu e fo r

183 Nort h America discussion o f ERP 'problems of mutual concern.' H e described the Canadian dilemma a s 'whethe r w e would get mor e burned b y going in than frozen by staying out.' 53 The objection s were considerably more tha n just a dislike of being forced to give more money . There wa s an instinctive reaction against this kind of continentalism. ERP was not a joint programme, and i t would be dependent fo r it s policies and fo r its very continuance on internal American problems. Canada woul d have to adjus t it s timing to its own balance of payments. Financ e official s wer e alarmed at any further commitment s t o European recover y unti l th e improvement s i n th e Canadia n positio n coul d b e more securely assessed . Sydney Pierce, who had been sent t o Paris to deal with Canadian interest s vis-à-vis th e ERP , was coping wit h a simila r proposal fo r 'join t operation. ' He tol d the hea d o f the America n EC A office tha t h e saw serious difficultie s in a formal partnership, such a s the fac t tha t Congress ha d already dictated the term s o f the programme . To Ottawa he reported another canny consideration: 'We might not want to be considered b y ERP countries as in the sam e kennel with the EC A watchdogs throughout Europe , o r to change th e meta phor, "the hors e coul d do with more ha y but there are enough hand s on the whip." ' H e thought the rest of the world would regard the arrangement not as a partnership, bu t 'a t the ver y least as a subordination of Canadian external interests i n the Unite d States, i f not as a loss of our independent status. ' His preference wa s for a joint committe e alon g the line s o f thos e tha t had been worke d out durin g the wa r for the Mutual Aid and Lend-Leas e opera tions. Suc h a committee woul d be formal enough t o suit the Unite d State s and loos e enoug h t o reassur e Canadians. 54 Ottawa was in entire agreemen t with these views . For American s i t is difficult t o understand wh y Canadians are hesitan t t o take their fair par t in continental institutions or programmes, whereas Canadians recogniz e thes e ar e boun d t o b e America n designe d an d dominated , whatever the good intention s of the American s to consider th e needs of the northern half. The offe r t o share direction with a great power can be alluring. It i s interestin g t o speculat e o n th e consequence s i f such a precedent ha d been establishe d whil e a whol e ne w se t o f transatlanti c relationships was being created. On functional ground s th e arrangemen t coul d have been de scribed a s unique, bu t a pattern se t at a formative stage is hard to abandon . The imag e o f Canad a hel d b y other s woul d have bee n fixed . Indeed , th e whole experiment could well have proved such a disastrous error for Canada as t o discourag e an y for m o f furthe r collaboratio n with the Unite d States . The Americans , however, backe d away from th e proposal for formal association. Instea d ther e wa s constant consultatio n an d constan t argument-al l

184 Th e Shapin g of Peace very healthy and normal - amon g the American and Canadian officials about the amoun t bot h o f Canadia n assistanc e an d o f th e offshor e purchase s i n Canada. I t perhap s becam e obviou s durin g these discussions tha t th e eco nomic an d politica l situation s i n th e tw o countrie s differe d sufficientl y t o make singl e policie s unworkable, although the y did not rul e out co-ordina tion, co-operation, o r jostling. In their attitude towards intra-European co-operation Canadian s displayed the ambivalenc e whic h was to characteriz e their attitude for th e nex t tw o decades. A s goo d internationalist s the y coul d no t i n principl e objec t t o efforts b y countries to co-operate wit h eac h other an d remov e barriers . On the othe r hand, what to participants seems like the removal of barriers looks to outsider s lik e th e creatio n o f a n economic bloc , an d t o tha t Canad a was opposed i n principle. The American s were inconsistent. Wherea s the y took hysterical objectio n t o a vestigia l syste m o f Commonwealt h preferences , they were actively encouraging European co-operation i n the belie f that this was the formul a t o tak e th e loa d of f the ric h uncle. Durin g the gloomies t days of early 1948 Sir Stafford Cripp s told the Canadia n hig h commissione r that he was thinking more and more of 'developing the resources o f Western Europe plu s Afric a o n a hemispheri c basis ' a s a long-term wa y to reduc e dependence o n th e Americans . Robertso n cautione d hi m abou t dryin g up the spring s o f America n generosit y which fed th e Marshal l Pla n an d gav e also a 'gentle warning' that too vigorous a hemispheric policy would probably force Canadians 'int o a parallel hemispheric grouping with the United State s and might destroy the special trading relations which had existed for so long between th e Unite d Kingdo m an d ourselves.' 55 In th e autum n o f 194 7 th e possibility of a European customs union was examined b y states in the Marshall Plan . Robertso n wa s told b y Ottawa: 'We woul d not oppos e an y plan which would result in a closer integration of the economie s o f the Europea n countries an d whic h would assist i n their recovery, ' bu t Canad a coul d no t overlook the Unite d Kingdo m as a valuable market for many Canadian agricultural products and exports would be seriously affected 'i f the participation of that country in a European Custom s Unio n meant that preferential treatment fo r Canadia n product s woul d disappea r o r tha t Europea n product s would receive better treatment.' 56 There were, however , voice s pointin g out tha t basin g the hop e o f a balanced international trade positio n on the recovery of Europe could prove an illusion and that Canada might have no alternative in those circumstances t o looking for prosperit y in a greatly increased continental market . Ther e was reluctance amon g official s t o accep t thi s conclusio n les t i t jeopardize thei r hopes for Canada as a political entity on the world scene. Nevertheless, facts,

185 Nort h America it was thought, had to be faced. During the worst of the balance-of-payment s crisis o f 194 7 som e o f th e mor e suspiciou s official s i n Ottaw a thought th e British wer e seekin g t o lur e Canad a int o a Commonwealt h association . Whereas th e sterlin g bloc was a reality, however troubled , the ide a o f a revived Commonwealt h economi c blo c including Canada could no t b e given serious consideratio n - althoug h i t sometimes appeare d t o Western Cana dian producers and politician s as an answer. Bevin and other British Labour leaders, usuall y sensibl e on Commonwealth affairs, wer e inclined in certain situations to use old-fashione d rhetoric . The y had a habi t of summonin g meetings o f Commonwealt h minister s whe n the y wer e i n trouble , eve n though th e solutio n wa s not t o b e foun d i n Commonwealth action . Cana dians wer e irke d by the casua l way in which the debto r woul d summon th e creditor to meet in London. They were worried also because o f sensitivity in Washington abou t th e Commonwealt h 'ganging up' o n them . Whe n Bevin made on e loos e referenc e i n a speec h t o th e Trade s Unio n Congres s t o a custom s an d defenc e unio n o f th e empire , Pearso n reporte d 'personally ' from Ottaw a that 'all the old skeletons are rattling furiously i n the cupboard.' Cabinet discussed th e matter , an d Canada Hous e wa s informed that : 'If th e United Kingdo m authoritie s thin k ... that ou r financial difficultie s wit h th e United States might make us more receptive to the Commonwealth scheme, they are making a great mistake, and the sooner they can be disabused o f this idea th e better.' 57 Canad a Hous e constantl y sough t t o ge t th e Ottawan s t o take a more relaxed view of these atavistic flights of fancy by the British , but Mackenzie King enjoyed horrifying himsel f wit h the ol d familiar spectre. That Canada shoul d mak e every effor t t o avoid a policy of discrimination directed at the United States was the strong advice in 1947 of Dana Wilgress, Canada's principa l negotiator i n international trad e talks , i n th e contex t o f the negotiation s in Geneva fo r the Internationa l Trade Organization , and of Norman Robertson , th e hig h commissioner i n London. Robertso n di d not want t o se e th e Canadia n econom y pushe d 'int o a n impoverishe d sterlin g area held together by policies of discrimination against United States exports and no t muc h more, ' an d admitte d tha t 'i f h e ha d t o mak e a choice' h e would favour the other 'polar extreme' of closer continental integration with the Unite d States. 58 In September 194 8 the undersecretary , Leste r Pearson , commented o n a mem o o f th e deput y ministe r o f financ e concernin g th e bleak prospects fo r Canadian export s t o the United Kingdom : '...we should consider mor e seriousl y th e possibilit y of som e prett y fa r reachin g agree ment wit h our neighbours t o the south whic h might become no t a matter of choice bu t o f dir e necessity.' 59 H e an d hi s colleagues , however , continue d their efforts t o forestall this 'dire necessity.'

186 Th e Shapin g of Peac e The wonder is that relations among the British, Canadians, and American s did no t suffe r eve n greate r damag e i n th e reconstructio n period . I t wa s humiliating fo r th e British , after thei r great contribution to victory, to hav e to act as importunate beggar to a former colony. They were in no position to be generous as a mother country should be. Canadians had their own serious problems an d a t time s i t was almost a question o f tw o bankrupt s tryin g to make deal s wit h each other . Th e inabilit y o f Britis h officials t o adjus t to a new relationship with the senio r dominio n i s illustrated in an incident when Bryce and Rasminsky went to London, at a time when the British were drawing heavil y o n th e postwa r loan an d Canad a wa s losin g it s Unite d State s dollar reserv e alarmingly . The Canadian s gav e a mild bu t closel y reasoned analysis o f th e reason s why, though the y were ver y sympathetic to Britis h difficulties, the y found it necessary to ask that Britain draw more moderatel y on th e Canadia n credit. The senio r Britis h Treasur y official sai d the y would think over wha t had bee n sai d 'an d see whether there i s some way that we can hel p you out.' To which the courteous Rasminsk y replied, 'I t seems to me that there is a very serious confusion here as to who is helping whom.'60 It was fortunate that Canadian relations were with a Labour government , even thoug h Canadian cabine t ministers , mor e s o than civi l servants, were sceptical abou t socialism . Attle e was sensitiv e abou t Commonwealt h relations, an d althoug h Bevi n occasionall y offende d b y assuming t o b e a spokesman o f the Commonwealth , his gaffes appeared not as calculated misdemeanors bu t th e oversimplification s of a ma n whos e speec h wa s rarely precise. The credit belongs mos t of all, however, to a group of dedicated civil servants i n Londo n an d Ottawa , an d i n particula r to Norma n Robertson , whose capacit y for understanding , interpretation , an d th e spinnin g o f ap t formulas save d th e da y o n man y occasions . H e wa s truste d implicitl y in Ottawa as a defender o f Canadian interests and looked upon by the British as the mos t sympatheti c of friends. The chancello r of the exchequer , Si r Stafford Cripps , althoug h h e ha d t o bargai n hard , understoo d th e Canadia n dilemma. I n a memorandu m t o C.D . How e i n th e sprin g o f 194 9 h e ex pressed th e hop e tha t the Canadian governmen t woul d do all it could '...t o prevent thei r publi c opinion fro m formin g an impressio n tha t wha t i s in reality an inescapabl e choice for the non-dolla r world and th e Unite d King dom i n particular arises only because of doctrinaire attitudes, unwillingnes s to understand th e Canadian point of view, or plain ingratitude for what Canada has done i n the past.' 61 Canada Hous e also understood. Whe n suspicio n was voiced in Ottawa that the United Kingdo m was exaggerating the crisi s to justify it s measures, Canad a Hous e replie d tha t 'a n anima l caugh t i n a trap has ver y little room fo r tactic s or manoeuvre.' 62 The intimacie s o f the war time association an d the commo n caus e wer e paying off.

187 Nort h America The sam e wa s tru e i n relation s betwee n Canadian s an d Americans . I n Washington als o Canad a ha d a super b representative , Hum e Wrong , wh o knew how to make himself listened to even by the busiest of civil servants and could lead Canadian officials to the centres of power. Dana Wilgress, both as a leading architect of GATT in Geneva and Havana and as high commissioner in London afte r Robertson , acquire d wid e international respect fo r hi s tireless efforts t o bring and keep the United States and United Kingdom together. On the America n sid e ther e wer e me n lik e Dea n Acheso n an d Jack Hickerso n whose vision of the postwar world that Americans and Canadians were jointly involved i n creatin g overcam e th e petulance s o f the momen t - and Dea n Acheson coul d b e exceedingl y petulan t abou t Canada , hi s parent s havin g come from Toronto . They showed courag e in getting relief fo r Canada i n its exchange problems by the offshore provisions of the Marshall Plan in the face of Congressional ill-wil l and thereby saved Canad a from desperat e measures . Paul Hoffman , th e hea d o f ECA , wa s especially awar e o f Canada' s desert s because of its earlier contributions to European recovery. The only desperate measures availabl e to Canada a t that time would have been to ask for special favours of Congress, thereb y incurring obligations, either specific or moral. It would surely have been apparent to shrewd men in the State Department tha t they were, in what they did, serving to strengthen Canada' s abilit y to stand on its own feet an d that this made fo r a healthier relationship than encouragin g Canadian dependence. I t was experiences of this kind which encouraged Cana dian official s an d politicians to see the value of 'quiet diplomacy' - and possibly to place too much confidence in it as a plan for all seasons. In thes e particula r issue s th e Canadia n stak e wa s sufficiently significan t and intermediat e t o make th e linchpi n rol e inescapabl e - an d quite unself conscious. Thi s was particularly notabl e durin g tripartite talks in London i n July 1949 . Canad a ha d assiste d i n engineerin g th e meeting , partl y t o stee r the Britis h away from seekin g t o take a Commonwealth stance . It suited th e postwar Canadian personality , furthermore , to kee p thi s kin d of élite com pany. The America n ambassado r tol d th e Canadia n hig h commissione r be fore the meeting he welcomed Canada's participatio n because they could say things t o the Britis h the American s coul d not . Wilgress could agre e t o that, but h e an d hi s team dine d th e evenin g befor e th e meetin g wit h the senio r British officials t o consider 'point s which the Canadians migh t consider mak ing to the United States.' 63 DIPLOMACY In diplomacy , a s i n defence , w e ar e dealin g wit h a n entirel y ne w histori c phase i n Nort h America . Economi c issue s differe d i n scal e fro m anythin g

188 Th e Shapin g of Peac e previous, bu t ther e wa s continuity in the themes . Befor e th e wa r Canadian diplomacy ha d bee n concerne d t o a considerabl e exten t wit h th e Unite d States, bu t th e subjects of preoccupation were rum-runners, tariffs , o r pollution by the Trail Smelter. Exchanges on world issues were minimal, although there wer e a few enquiries over th e stat e o f the worl d and the League , an d some consultatio n o n serious issue s suc h a s the propose d sanction s agains t Japan and Italy. The United States was out of the League and Canada was in, but th e Unite d States, as a giant economic and naval power, was a good deal more involved in world politics, whether it liked it or not, tha n was Canada. Until th e wa r began ther e wa s little sense o f common commitmen t o r th e need t o wor k togethe r o r eve n t o persuad e o r dissuad e eac h other . Suc h attitudes wer e entirely changed lon g before th e wa r ended. Relation s wit h the Unite d State s acquire d a n overwhelmingl y importan t internationa l dimension the y ha d no t ha d before . Relation s becam e warmer , mor e co operative, busier , an d a grea t dea l mor e difficult . I n spit e o f th e prestig e attached to the great international issues, however , far more diplomatic man hours would still be consumed o n fisheries in the Great Lake s or trucking in bond across southern Ontario. The wa r unleashed Canadia n diplomacy. It still had a n establishmen t fa r less tha n that of th e Unite d States , but i t was learning how to exploit func tionally th e limite d strengt h i t had . Fencin g wit h th e Britis h remaine d a diversion in the immediat e postwa r period, but the grea t challeng e was the new an d exhilaratin g game o f one-upmanshi p and team-manshi p wit h th e world's greates t power , wh o wa s also tha t friendl y neighbour , Uncl e Sam . The Canadian tone was accommodating but by no means docile . On 13 February 1945 , fo r example , a ver y abrup t note wa s sen t t o sa y that Canad a would accep t n o furthe r responsibilit y for financin g procurement o f relie f supplies i n th e absenc e o f assurance s tha t Canad a woul d not hav e t o pay more tha n it s agree d figure . Th e Unite d State s gav e in. 64 I t di d not , o f course, always do so. It wa s a tim e whe n diplomacy , fo r goo d o r ill , was highly classifie d an d largely quiet. Bein g privy to th e secret s o f American policy in its formative stage, as Canada often was - and frequently fro m Britis h sources - ther e was no alternative to quiet diplomacy if one was to have any impact at all. Betraying one' s source s drie s the m up . Ther e wer e enoug h successe s durin g a period when Canada, as probably never again, was in the centr e of things to warrant confidenc e in private armtwisting as more effectiv e tha n publi c demanding. As the agend a multiplie d the simpl e appea l of prim e ministe r to president, whic h had worked well up to Hyde Park in 1941 , was inadequate and ha d to b e saved fo r crucial occasions. Th e developmen t o f greater tech -

189 Nort h America nical virtuosity as the expande d Canadia n diplomati c team fanne d ou t even wider at the en d of the war was enormously aided by the process of establishing the Unite d Nations. Canadians took to multilateral diplomacy enthusiastically an d bega n t o discove r th e valu e o f combinations i n coping with th e great power. What o f th e rol e o f linchpin , o f intermediar y between Britai n and th e United State s celebrate d s o ofte n i n th e rhetorica l flourishes after dinner ? Was this vocation strengthene d b y the wartim e experience? Firs t the ques tion ha s t o b e aske d whethe r ther e wa s ever muc h substanc e t o thi s nea t formula? I n it s histor y Canad a ha d probabl y been mor e ofte n a caus e o f dissension tha n a bridg e betwee n th e grea t Anglophon e powers , an d the y had, accordin g t o Canadia n tradition , reache d accor d al l to o frequentl y by sacrificing a Canadia n interest . Washingto n an d Londo n ha d bee n dealin g with each othe r fo r so many years they did not need a youthful interlocutor. At the same time there were no doubt many times when Canadians, because of their understandin g of , an d eve n affectio n fo r bot h parties , ha d assiste d Anglo-American agreemen t o n on e o r othe r o f th e hundred s o f issue s i n which they were all involved. The effor t t o do so had been stimulated by the long-standing conviction that such agreement was a foremost nationa l interest o f Canada . Thi s nee d wa s neve r fel t s o strongl y a s durin g th e perio d between Munic h an d Pear l Harbor, an d Canadian diplomats and statesme n worked har d a t it . Mackenzi e Kin g took advantag e o f hi s associatio n wit h Roosevelt t o this end, although it may have been rather a question of Roosevelt shrewdly using Canada, a belligerent state fo r whose security American voters were more likely to be concerned tha n for that of Britain. The mediatory functio n for Canad a was quit e vali d and stil l is, provide d it is seen as habitual diplomacy rather than as a national vocation. Such a function may have been appropriate when the Britis h and Americans were more nearl y equal. It was not necessaril y promoted b y the ris e to dominance o f the Unite d States. Ther e wa s a clear warning in the exten t t o which Canadia n influenc e in Washingto n declined after Pear l Harbor. Dur ing th e perio d whe n Roosevel t wa s moving hi s countryme n close r t o th e allied cause, h e ha d found Canada useful. With the declaratio n of war, however, there was no longer any need fo r him to be devious. The United State s moved swiftl y t o tak e command o f the operatio n an d asser t it s will directly with both Britain and Canada. The previous American interest in fitting Canada into a hemispheric defenc e syste m becam e secondar y whe n the Unite d States itsel f wa s spillin g out o f th e hemispher e t o wi n a worl d war. In a memorandum fo r the prime minister in December 194 1 Norman Robertso n noted thi s chang e already : 'Canad a naturall y loomed muc h large r i n th e

190 Th e Shapin g of Peace American scheme o f things when the Presiden t an d bot h politica l parties in the Unite d States were thinking primarily in terms o f continental and hemispheric defence. Now that the world war is joined on both oceans, the United States is, not unnaturally, inclined to take Canadian concurrence and support entirely fo r granted. ' H e feare d th e los s 'o f th e preferre d position Canad a had gradually consolidated throug h long years of close and friendl y collaboration with the Presiden t an d the Departmen t o f State.' 65 The American s di d move int o the driver' s sea t i n the conviction , dating back t o th e Foundin g Fathers , tha t th e Unite d State s itsel f wa s not jus t a nation bu t a cause, tha t although it mus t wor k with allie s i t alone ha d th e moral qualitie s t o lea d th e flock . Kin g neve r recovere d th e influenc e in Washington he had had at Hyde Park just befor e Pear l Harbor. Although he could still press with success a particular Canadian case, and Quebec could be an ap t meetin g groun d fo r th e great , h e wa s far fro m th e gran d strategy . Canadian official s an d minister s did , however, manage to maintain a special position with the Stat e Department an d officialdo m i n general becaus e they were abl e t o continu e provin g that the y could produc e goo d ideas , se t ex amples, an d i n many ways hel p the cause . The y could b e stubborn but , on the whole , the y mad e mor e headwa y by being reasonabl e tha n unreason able - a lesso n whic h persisted. A s they wer e wel l aware , th e American s would hope t o use them a s they in turn would use the America n diplomats. Pearson noted , i n discussin g hi s efforts t o persuade th e American s t o support Canadia n representatio n i n UNRRA , 'thei r confidenc e that... when th e decision ha d to b e made w e would be "goo d boys" and hel p them i n their difficulties wit h Moscow and with Latin America.'66 The Americans did get a good deal of help when the Canadians agreed with them, but otherwise only when Canadian s considere d th e issu e s o serious a s to warrant a priority for solidarity. Judgments o n how successful Canada was in influencing the United States during 'the creation' depend o n the judge's view of what was possible. Inso far a s the new international order was the shift i n the balance of power to the United States , tha t wa s an histori c event tha t n o one , no t eve n th e Ameri cans, coul d do much to alter. It behooved ever y country to calculate ho w to cut it s losse s an d increas e it s benefit s fro m thi s ne w situation . Th e ne w order, i t needs to be emphasized, wa s not impose d b y the Americans. I t was encouraged and to a considerable exten t designed b y Europeans and Canadians. The America n wil l could be decisive, o f course. I t could not b e forced, but i t coul d b e bent . I n spit e o f the variation s in power , the designin g was essentially collaborative . On e coul d ad d u p a lis t o f Canadia n successe s in bending th e American s - at Sa n Francisco o r eve n mor e s o at Chicago or

191 Nort h America Bretton Wood s - and compute percentag e result s withou t learnin g much . Multilateral diplomacy cannot b e disentangled an d coded. I t might be wiser simply to acknowledge that United States policies and the positio n occupied by th e Unite d State s i n the ne w world order wer e different fro m wha t they would otherwis e hav e been , an d les s hegemonial , becaus e the y wer e en cased i n internationa l structures. T o achieve thi s end the syste m require d a number o f diplomaticall y lively and effectiv e states , o f whic h Canada wa s certainly one . Confrontin g th e Unite d State s single-handedly , excep t o n a sub-paragraph, was not likel y to be successful. Confrontation, however, was not th e norma l polic y becaus e Canad a an d it s allies did not wan t to oppos e flatly what ha s bee n calle d 'th e ne w America n order.' 67 B y and larg e they liked it. It i s easier t o tal k of Canada's polic y towards the Unite d State s tha n vice versa becaus e ther e is always an element of sleep-walking in American policy vis-à-vis Canada. Certain peopl e and department s i n Washington ha d ideas of what they wanted, but polic y on the highe r level was spasmodic and uncoordinated. Ther e were , o f course , variation s i n attitud e amon g Canadia n cabinet ministers and officials toward s the United States, and one must avoid too categorical definitions of government policy, which was humanly inconsistent. However, there was in Ottawa a good deal more concentration, at the higher and lower levels, on the broader picture, on trends, and on long-range implications o f short-rang e decision s tha n ther e wa s in Washington. I t was often contradictory . Like the prim e minister, the cabinet could shift fro m a consensus tha t th e American s wer e Canada's best friend s (an d customers ) to fierc e resistanc e t o America n 'arrogance. ' Generalization s fro m specifi c occasions o r comment s - spasmodi c outburst s i n King' s diary , fo r exam ple - are hazardous. CONCLUSIONS

Canada is not, a s its frustrated citizens would often like to assume, a philosophers' kingdom. I t i s anchored i n time and place . It is and always has been the northern hal f of North America which the Canadian forefathers, regardless of the doubt s of London an d Washington, wanted to run as an independent America n country, making the best of the circumstances. It is a product of heredit y and environment . Th e centra l theme o f its foreign policy from the beginnin g ha s bee n th e juggling in shifting circumstances o f the advan tages and disadvantage s o f its location. Policy planners at the en d o f the war saw plenty of both , an d polic y was an effor t t o manipulat e the situatio n a s skilfully a s possible - wit h the resources available . It was not a new game, for

192 Th e Shapin g of Peace that i s how Canadians had bee n livin g for two centuries. The issu e was not immaculate independence , but , as it always ha s been, th e bes t mi x o f prosperity and independence obtainable, and as free a hand in policy as a middle power coul d expect . A s Warre n Jame s note d abou t th e issue s whic h ha d arisen between Canada and the United States during the war: 'Ever since the emergence of national states, the existence of large and small nations side by side ha s necessitate d som e definitio n o f the term s o n whic h they shall cooperate, for co-operation in some degree is unavoidable.'68 The American s had becom e mor e powerfu l and assume d the rol e of a world power , bu t thei r pretension s an d extension s als o mad e the m mor e vulnerable, more in need of allies, customers, an d suppliers. They were certainly not dependent on Canadian co-operation, but Canada also had become stronger and better endowed to resist o r to offer co-operation . Assessing th e profit an d los s i s a treacherous endeavour, an d th e conclusion s ar e fals e if they ignore the significanc e o f broadening the common o r mutual interests. It i s hard to say whether Canada, on balance, became more or less independent in the fortie s because the meanin g of independence changed. Independence wa s regarded les s a s an en d i n itself tha n i t came t o b e when, partl y because of the Vietnam War, some Canadians developed ideological reasons for dissociatin g Canada from it s large neighbour. The Second World War had been a forceful reminde r of Canada's dependenc e o n the stat e o f the world at large . Pursuit of th e nationa l interest ha d a priority ove r mer e indepen dence, an d independence , in any case, wa s seen a s the righ t t o sit with th e major power s and asser t th e Canadia n right t o agre e a s well a s to disagre e with them. Although thi s study is primarily about government policy, the action s of government may have been less decisive than is often assumed. The economies of the United States and Canada were certainly intermeshed during the war an d postwa r periods. 'Intermeshed ' i s a deliberatel y crude wa y of de scribing what happened, as 'integrated' is a question-begging term. Government actio n wa s directed mor e t o controllin g than encouragin g th e flow. Encouragement wa s not needed ; th e Canadia n public , coming ou t o f wartime austerit y and, havin g no othe r plac e to turn , rushe d t o the America n supermarket, heedles s o f consequences . Th e governmen t watche d thos e consequences with some disma y as a surplus turned t o an alarmin g deficit . Eventually the y ha d t o threate n stif f expor t controls , althoug h the y were themselves tryin g to lead the world away from suc h bad old ways. They were Liberals with a thin majority and could probably not have survived an effor t to chec k thi s kin d o f 'continentalism ' b y draconia n methods . The y had , moreover, a n electorate conditioned to think in terms of an alliance, to iden-

193 Nort h America tify it s interests wit h those of the Unite d State s an d Britai n and th e leader ship of the Western power s in the new United Nations. The electorat e wer e pliant , reasonabl y nationalis t whe n i t came t o Can ada's rights , bu t unlikel y to endors e a reall y devian t cours e fo r Canada . Standing up to the Yanks on a specific issue was, as always, good politics, but the popula r mood o f the da y was certainly not anti-American. Harold Innis, one of the few Canadians to express concern at that time about the danger of United State s 'imperialism, ' sai d tha t althoug h Canadian s ha d complained often abou t Britis h interference, 'n o question s ar e asked a s to th e implications o f join t defenc e scheme s wit h th e Unite d States.' 69 Inni s dislike d Ottawa so much he was never reall y in touch with what went on there. Con cern wa s loudly expressed i n the debat e i n the Hous e i n June 194 7 on th e legal provision s fo r America n force s i n Canada . Eve n thoug h th e govern ment wo n an easy victory, 70 the debat e did reveal that questions were being asked abou t th e implication s o f joint defenc e an d economi c dependence . They wer e being asked i n the House , i n External Affairs , an d b y the prime minister in his diary. Misgivings, however, did not add up to outright opposition. While Canadians wer e busily helpin g to formalize relations among states, there wa s no inclinatio n to d o th e sam e fo r th e continent . Th e argumen t about th e virtu e o f surrenderin g sovereignt y t o a highe r authority was all right so long as the authority was multilateral. There wa s no escaping, however, the prevalence of the United States. Some committees ha d to be established an d som e understanding s pu t i n writing. These, however , wer e no t necessarily evidenc e o f a desire t o create a continental framework . Usually they indicated the nee d perceive d b y Canadians to check the force of 'conti nentalism' b y establishing rules to control it. They were inspired by a will to co-operate i n th e mutua l interes t bu t a t th e sam e tim e t o stak e ou t an d thereby protec t a Canadian interes t o r assure a Canadian righ t to be heard . The Internationa l Join t Commissio n ha d bee n th e classi c cas e o f suc h a n intention realized . The Permanent Join t Board on Defence, se t up during the war, may have been i n America n eye s a means b y which Canadian co-operatio n coul d b e obtained i n hemispher e defence . Fro m th e Canadia n poin t o f vie w it was based o n a realization that there wer e mutual advantages in the continenta l defence concep t bu t als o pitfall s an d tha t an institution lik e the PJB D could, as it did, provide Canadians wit h a chance to state their concerns where they might best be heard. They could not escape th e consequences o f the Unite d States determination t o defend th e continent, an d it was better t o put continental defenc e o n a rational basis whe n rationa l thought wa s still possible .

194 Th e Shapin g of Peace Such arrangement s di d no t alway s work ou t a s intended, bu t a rejection of co-operation would have impaired Canadian sovereignty by default. Both the Ogdensbur g and Hyde Park agreements had proved, on balance, of grea t advantag e t o Canada . The y secure d t o begi n wit h th e hel p of th e powerful neutra l in Canada's wa r and protected Canada's militar y and espe cially economic interest s i n way s tha t woul d not otherwis e hav e bee n pos sible. I f Roosevel t ha d not see n the m a s being in the America n interes t as well, the y woul d neve r hav e bee n reached . H e and , t o a great extent , hi s associates ma y hav e ha d dream s o f Canada's plac e in a continental, hemi spheric, or global benevolent imperiu m which these arguments migh t serve. Canadians kne w how they could take advantage of a common interes t without sharin g fully th e America n intention. Mackenzie King, who led Roose velt into the Hyd e Park Agreement, coul d talk about it aloud in lofty terms , seeming t o sugges t that it was preliminary to the daw n of a great union, but his diar y note s mak e clear hi s intentio n no t t o b e led along tha t path . His vigilance had been alert since early in the war, particularly in connection wit h the America n operations in the northwest . On 9 May 1946 h e warned cabinet that 'the long range policy of the Americans was to absorb Canada. They would see k t o ge t thi s hemispher e a s completely on e a s possible' 71 - undoubtedly an over-statement o f his real concern . There were certainly short-range advantages in a co-operative stance. The minister of finance told the House o f Commons i n 1948 that 'Export permits and expor t controls hav e neve r bee n enforce d b y the Unite d States against Canada, as they have been against every other country. When hon. member s stop to reflect fo r a moment o n some o f the essentia l raw materials we have to obtain from the United States, such as oil, steel and so on, I think they will agree it is important that the United States should continue to treat us in that way. Tha t i s somethin g w e migh t wel l bea r i n mind.' 72 O n th e othe r han d concern ha s been expresse d i n later years over a tradition of seeking special concessions i n Washington , a habi t sometime s date d fro m Hyd e Park , a policy labelle d 'exemptionalism ' which , as critics see it , serve d t o confirm the ide a o f Canada as part of a continental economy. A n interestin g exception tha t should b e noted wa s atomic energ y where the specia l relationship was denied b y the United States for security reasons73 and Canada stood very successfully o n its own feet. There were some advantages in a little ill will on the American side. The response mad e to the critics is that Canada was not at Hyde Par k or o n late r occasions , as for exampl e whe n i t obtained th e right for Marshal l Plan fund s t o be spent i n Canada, seekin g favours or 'exemp tions' bu t wa s rather proposin g functiona l arrangement s t o cove r feature s particular t o th e Canada-Unite d State s situatio n an d therefor e t o serv e

195 Nort h America United States as well as Canadian interests. In the case of Hyde Park and the Marshall Plan Canada was, like the Unite d States, a provider, not a recipient of economic assistance, an d these were essentially plans to co-ordinate terms for th e benefi t of all concerned.74 The change s i n the relationshi p were more i n texture tha n i n form. Attitudes an d habit s were altered. Mos t importan t of all perhaps was a sense of common purpos e an d responsibilit y in th e worl d a t large . Canadians an d Americans wer e workin g together mor e closely than the y ever ha d before. They ha d don e so , fo r example, i n defenc e production, and althoug h littl e was left o f that but a declaration of intention, the recollectio n of something that ha d worke d an d migh t wor k agai n i f necessar y remained . Canadia n leaders ha d like d t o thin k o f i t a s par t o f th e patter n o f a new free-trading world, bu t it s implications, like that of the aut o pact later, were more mer cantilist tha n libera l internationalist . I t wa s no t a schem e fo r al l seasons, especially not th e postwa r season o f reciprocity , but i t would not b e readily forgotten. Canada wa s no t se t b y choice o n th e pat h o f continenta l integratio n in 1945. World Wa r I I and late r th e Col d Wa r di d give an impetu s t o th e cre ation o f institutions, mostl y for defence , bu t these , accordin g to Professor s Holsti an d Levy , 'contai n fe w integrativ e features , an d decisio n makin g tends to be based o n bargaining between national teams of negotiators or just consultation.'75 Th e importan t functio n wa s the avoidance , prevention , o r resolution o f conflict. Th e Canadia n perception was perhaps best expresse d in the homel y word s of Louis St Laurent i n hi s Gray Lectur e o f 1 3 January 1947 in which he set out the authorized version of postwar foreign policy. He referred t o the Unite d States as 'a state with purposes and ambitions parallel to ours.' As for the relationship: 'Like farmers whose lands have a common concession line, we think of ourselves as settling, from da y to day, questions that arise between us, without dignifying th e process by the word "policy." ' It wa s a quit e differen t philosoph y from tha t alread y bein g proclaime d i n Europe and which took form later in the Treat y of Rome.

7 The Atomic Triad

STATUS

One o f th e shrewdes t observation s o n Canadia n foreig n polic y b y an out sider wa s mad e i n Quebe c i n 195 3 b y the Britis h historia n Deni s Brogan : 'What I am more concerned t o point out is that the basi c Canadian relationship i s not eithe r wit h th e Unite d State s o r wit h th e Unite d Kingdo m bu t with the world of the hydrogen bomb. The ver y fact tha t Canada is now one of th e treasur e house s o f th e worl d make s th e naïv e isolationshi p o f th e inter-war years.. . impossible. A uraniu m producin g countr y canno t b e neutral." The Canadia n experienc e as an 'atomi c power ' durin g and for a decade afte r th e war , unti l th e ter m 'atomi c power ' wa s los t i n th e ne w term 'nuclea r power' with a quite different significance , mature d Canada as a participan t in worl d politics. Canada was willingl y and unwillingl y draw n into th e mos t desperatel y serious aspec t of international politics for reasons that continu e t o b e relevant . I n th e firs t plac e it was because Canad a pos sessed th e essentia l resourc e - i n thi s case , uranium . Secondly , i t was because Canad a ha d enormou s spac e an d provide d sanctuar y fo r experimen t in a worl d a t war . Thirdly , Canad a ha d th e nucleu s o f a n industria l an d technological capacity. As a partner - of sorts - with the United States and the United Kingdom in the achievemen t o f atomic fission Canada was regarded as one o f the thre e 'atomic powers.' The even t which symbolized its initiation into the world of high polic y wa s th e meeting i n Washingto n i n Novembe r 194 5 a t whic h Truman, Attlee, and King produced the communiqué tha t invited all powers to conside r a n internationa l contro l syste m fo r thi s devastatin g ne w force . Although i t was not realize d outside a small circle, a major purpos e o f thi s gathering i n Washingto n wa s t o conside r i n utte r secrec y wha t th e thre e

197 Th e Atomi c Triad countries might do about th e revelation s of a defector from th e Sovie t em bassy i n Ottawa , Igo r Gouzenko , concernin g Sovie t espionag e no t onl y in Canada bu t i n the other tw o countries as well. In more tha n one way Canada was being drawn into the nast y and brutish world from whic h it had recoile d in peacetime . There wa s a price to b e paid for status. Servin g as a linchpin between th e two great power s wa s an attractiv e ide a fo r som e Canadia n statesmen , bu t when the stakes were this high they could get caught. Canada was sometimes forced t o make choices that one o r both of its major partners would not like, or t o si t o n th e fence , whic h the y bot h resented . Fo r Canad a ther e wer e conflicts among it s strictly national interest, it s interest i n the Anglo-American-Canadian entente , an d its zealous interest i n the wider new world of the United Nations. When th e larger powers have not only the most t o gain, but also th e mos t t o lose , an d t o gamble, th e obligatio n on th e lesse r powe r to defer i s compelling, an d it s initiativ e is severely limited. Becaus e th e com mon interes t was in winning a war and maintaining peace, th e argumen t for deference was strong. Nevertheless, fo r lesse r an d greate r powers , th e highe r ai m could not b e divorced fro m th e calculatio n o f economi c an d militar y advantag e i n th e postwar period . Fo r Canad a th e economic , industrial , an d scientifi c gain s were enormous. Th e postwar position acquire d gave the Canadian launching in international diplomac y a powerful shove . Ther e was , however, a certain falseness an d transience abou t it, and the disgruntling suffered whe n Canada retired from these high politics distorted th e national assessment of Canada' s normal rol e i n th e world . 'I f Canad a wer e a great power, ' Charle s Ritchi e commented i n a memorandum a month afte r Hiroshima , 'it s monopoly of the indispensable componen t o f the atomic bomb might put this country in a position t o determine decision s a s to the future use and control of the bomb ; but a s Canada i s not a Great Power , he r possessio n o f uranium i s perhaps more likel y to expos e he r t o embarrassmen t an d difficulties.' 2 Th e sea t a t high table, whil e it lasted, wa s as embarrassing a s it was profitable and it was occupied wit h cunning reticence . WARTIME COLLABORATION 3

Each o f the thre e countrie s ha d starte d independentl y o n atomi c research . Dr George Laurence's work at the National Research Counci l in Ottawa was on a smaller scale , bu t i t meant tha t Canad a di d hav e some competence t o put int o th e po t i n additio n t o ra w material . Th e British , becaus e o f th e wartime pressures an d th e fea r o f the Nazis getting a bomb first, had a brief

198 Th e Shapin g of Peac e headstart. I t was the so-calle d Maud Report in Britain in 194 1 that galvanized scientists bot h i n Britai n and th e Unite d State s int o action . Unfortunately , the Britis h were reluctant to accept American suggestions for co-operation in 1941 when they had a slight lead. By the tim e they realized the grav e limitations on what they could do on a beleaguered islan d the American s wer e at war and throwin g all they had into the effort . Th e American s owe d an enormous deb t t o the Britis h an d Europea n scientist s wh o had contributed cru cially t o th e scientifi c breakthrough , a fac t bette r appreciate d b y scientist s than politicians . The British , realizin g ful l wel l tha t th e atomi c secre t ha d significance for their postwar economy and their military status, nevertheles s offered almos t total collaboration with the Americans and sent man y of their good scientist s there . Whe n th e American s were mobilized, the y perceive d only marginal need of British assistance, a s well as Canadian. Desperat e pressure t o bea t th e enem y t o an atomic bom b persuade d them , an d also gav e them an excuse, t o reduce co-operation t o what they considered essentia l fo r their own purposes . It is true that the British-Canadian operation during the last couple of years of the wa r had no serious prospec t of contributing to the bomb, but the pos sibility was foreseen that it might produce the element, later called plutonium, which was another potentia l explosive for bombs . Thos e engaged i n day-today operatio n foun d collaboratio n difficul t becaus e o f impose d restrictions , although a s goo d scientist s the y manage d o n th e whol e t o subordinat e national grievance s t o a sense o f commo n cause . Man y America n official s were aware of the significanc e of the Britis h decision t o pool their resource s and worke d fo r fai r partnership . I t wa s only, however , a t th e highes t leve l when Roosevel t an d Churchill , an d sometime s als o Mackenzi e King , go t together that the basic interest wa s reaffirmed an d co-operation would have a new spurt . Th e proble m wa s not s o muc h America n arrogance , althoug h there wa s plent y o f that . I t wa s th e disparit y in powe r an d consequence . During th e wa r ther e wa s a lac k o f sensitivity and i n th e postwa r perio d a deplorable lac k of magnanimity to their war-ravaged partner, Britain , but on the Unite d State s rested the responsibilit y of winning the wartime battle for atomic control . Afte r th e wa r crucial decisions coul d b e take n onl y b y th e country that for five years remained th e uniqu e possessor o f the weapon . If the Canadian s recognize d thi s fac t o f lif e somewha t mor e easil y tha n th e British, they had less to lose by doing so. Canada wa s involved i n the first place as a partner or at least collaborato r with th e British . When i t was recognized i n Britain in 194 2 that i t would be impossible t o develo p i n wartime England th e necessar y plant , Canada was looked t o for help and sanctuary. The British first asked to move their teams

199 Th e Atomi c Triad to the United States, bu t the Americans refused. So Canada, which was close to th e centr e o f action, looke d lik e a good alternative . Canada ha d th e uranium. I t ha d a nucleu s o f scientist s an d adequat e industria l capacity with assistance fro m across th e border . Th e ver y few Canadians in on th e secre t responded enthusiasticall y t o a n invitatio n t o shar e wit h a majo r scientific power the developmen t o f this revolutionary force. The pioneer scientists in this field at Cambridg e were regarded wit h awe . Canada pu t a good dea l of effort an d expense int o the establishmen t i n Montreal o f a laboratory where British, Canadian , Fre e French , an d othe r scientist s worke d o n the atomi c process, an d later into the buildin g of a reactor at Chalk River. The grea t problem wa s to get American assistance , t o kee p in touch wit h research i n their laboratories, withou t which progress woul d be limited. The wartime story is a long account o f the ofte n frustratin g effort t o d o so. Th e Americans neve r fel t the British-Canadian effort in Canada to be vital, but as it migh t b e helpfu l the y wer e willin g to provid e some material s an d som e secrets. Som e obligatio n wa s fitfull y recognize d becaus e Britis h scientist s were doin g essentia l wor k i n th e Unite d States . Nothing , however , wa s to interfere wit h what the American s neede d fo r their ow n experiments - including access t o Canadian uranium . Before the Britis h had approached th e Canadians abou t a co-operative enterprise , th e Americans ha d been i n negotiation directly with Eldorado Gold Mines , the Canadian company which was the larges t sourc e o f uranium outsid e the Belgia n Congo, to secure supplie s and had acquired thereb y some claim to a priority. Although i n the en d Britis h and Canadian s ha d reason s t o b e grateful t o each othe r fo r th e contributio n thi s co-operativ e endeavour mad e t o thei r atomic capability after the war, 4 it was dogged with irritations and suspicions . The Britis h were bossy an d th e Canadian s thin-skinned . Bot h had frequent reasons t o be upset by the ruthlessness o f the Americans, bu t the Canadians always insisted tha t a sine qua non of the operatio n on their par t was American co-operation, and they rejected th e occasiona l Britis h suggestion i n extremis that the y and th e Canadians migh t g o it alone. Ther e was the Canadia n instinct for a triangle. There wa s also th e horse-sens e o f Dr C.J. Mackenzi e of the Nationa l Researc h Counci l and o f C.D. Howe , the ministe r of munitions and supply, in recognizing that the Americans were in the driver's seat and ther e wa s a war on. There wa s perhaps also a canny recognition tha t th e national interest lay in keeping on as good term s as possible with the country that was going to set the pace . The Anglo-Canadia n operatio n go t off to a bad start. Th e Canadia n gov ernment ha d agreed wit h the Britis h to see that they got a fair shar e o f uranium bu t th e Britis h were unhapp y over th e amount s tha t Gilber t LaBine ,

200 Th e Shapin g of Peac e the owne r o f Eldorado , ha d committe d t o th e Americans . I t wa s a slip-up under wartim e pressure , bu t th e Britis h were furiou s and, unfortunately, Churchill's intemperat e commen t tha t How e had 'sol d th e Britis h Empire down the river' got back to Howe. Howe was irritated with the British, but he did no t favou r th e Americans ; h e wa s always looking for th e Canadia n ad vantage. Mackenzie took on the role of interpreter by going off to talk to th e Americans himself . The Britis h respected hi m bu t wer e never happ y about the Canadia n reluctance to stand u p in a joint front when this seemed called for. Th e frictio n can , o f course , b e see n ou t o f proportion. Sir John Cock croft, wh o was called in to put the Montrea l laboratory on its feet, and othe r British scientist s wh o worke d wit h th e Canadian s t o develo p Chal k River were highly regarded and liked by the Canadians. These were the British who also got along best with the Americans. It is doubtful if the people in London saw Canada a s a partner in a joint enterprise. Ther e wa s a tendency t o look on it as Commonwealth territory and somewhat, therefore , at their disposal. The ide a o f partnershi p wit h a dominio n wa s not on e t o whic h Sir Joh n Anderson, wh o wa s in charg e of Britis h atomic affairs , coul d easil y adjust. The retreat t o Canada was regarded a s a regrettable wartime necessity rather than a n opportunit y for a great Anglo-Canadia n enterprise . Th e British , as the officia l historia n o f thei r operation , Margare t Gowing , states , wer e always clear on the central point: 'The control of policy... should be retaine d in thi s country.' 5 Much of the controversy , afte r a s well as during the war, was th e inevitabl e consequenc e o f harrie d peopl e wit h reconcilabl e objec tives but irreconcilable perspectives . A typical explosion wa s set off by American anger over the willingnes s of the Britis h to endanger securit y by allowing the Frenc h scientis t who was in charge at Montreal to make a trip to liberated Paris. The Americans tried protesting to the Canadians. The Canadians might well have supported the British position but they had never been consulted i n the first place, even though the man involved, Halban, was associated with a joint Canadian-British enterprise in Canada. Tempers flared, but there were always enough men of good will and dedication in each camp to get the lid back on. The flames were never fanned by the publi c because for this performance there was no public. The Canadia n positio n wa s ambiguous. I t wa s not clea r whether Canad a was one o f a partnership of three or a junior partner on the Britis h team. It is obvious fro m th e numerou s America n account s o f these event s tha t the y linked th e Britis h and Canadian s a s a team t o b e treate d a s such . B y habit they regarded the British as the spokesmen. Fo r the Americans as well as the British, bilateral discussio n wa s simpler, unles s Canada o n special occasions looked to one like a potential ally against the other. The atomic 'partnership,'

201 Th e Atomi c Triad such as it was, had been initiated by British-American discussion an d under standings. Tha t was how the wa r was being run i n general. And i n this case, the Canadians seemed to prefer it that way. Canada ha d membership, o n th e basis of one membe r t o two each fro m th e majo r powers , on the Combine d Policy Committee an d the Combined Development Trust , which guided the operation, but thes e were set up largely as a result of Anglo-American nego tiation. King and Howe seemed happy to accept the 3-2- 1 ratio on the com mittees an d recogniz e i n practic e that these wer e basically Anglo-America n bodies i n which they had the right to speak. They were content t o recogniz e as a bilateral document th e Quebe c Agreemen t of 1943 , which set the term s for continuin g Anglo-America n co-operation , an d di d no t as k t o b e associated with the Declaratio n o f Trust which came out o f it. Why not ? Canadian s wer e quick to resist unfair treatment an d to defen d their position as the countr y with the resources . The y were not goin g to let the other s dispos e o f thos e resources . Wha t the y wante d wa s a chance t o state thei r requirements , no t th e responsibilit y of the gran d decisions . Th e number o f Canadians involved i n polic y was extremely small , an d Externa l Affairs wa s out o f th e picture . King's reluctanc e t o get involve d i n Anglo American disputes was to be expected. Howe' s interes t was in protecting the Canadian sid e of a working operation, no t i n high policy. He wante d to win the war and give Canada a head start in a new industry. That required British and American hel p and a self-confident playing of the strong Canadian han d with both . Keepin g clea r of British-America n disputes woul d b e wise . Th e Americans, o f course, neede d some stubborn resistance , bu t the Canadian s were better able to do that on their own. They had more to bargain with than the British although the Americans needed some lessons on Canadian sover eignty. The United States government, fo r example, negotiated directl y with the Trai l Smelter i n British Columbia t o construct facilitie s fo r heav y water without an y notificatio n t o th e Canadia n authorities . Later , whe n Canad a and Britai n neede d heav y wate r fro m Trai l fo r thei r ow n operation , the y were told by the Unite d State s tha t they would allow no sharing of information, tha t th e Canadia n tea m coul d hav e th e Trai l outpu t fo r a while if in effect the y did fundamental scientific work for Du Pont , and tha t wa s that.6 In th e earl y stages fea r b y Americans tha t th e Canadia n governmen t coul d stop shipment s o f uraniu m an d heav y wate r fro m th e Trai l plan t wa s an argument use d in Washington agains t restrictin g information t o the British and Canadians. 7 The Canadian hand was tied by the constant dange r that any kind o f row would threaten disclosure , simpl y by attracting attention t o th e industries involved . Nevertheless , th e American s wer e le d b y How e an d Mackenzie to a better appreciatio n of Canadian rights.

202 Th e Shapin g of Peac e Not muc h o f th e Canadia n o r th e Canadian-Britis h experiments contri buted t o th e actua l fabricatio n o f th e atomi c bomb . Nevertheless , thos e Canadians involved accepted the fac t tha t the productio n of a bomb was the most importan t immediate result of what they were setting out to do. There is not much evidence, furthermore, that the Canadians involved objected to the ide a tha t a n en d resul t o f thei r wor k might b e th e productio n o f thi s hideous weapo n - although , lik e th e Britis h and American scientists , the y seem t o hav e thought of an atom bom b as a super-explosive, whic h might, in fact , no t com e off , and onl y dimly perceived wha t it would do to a Japanese city. The desperate nee d to produce such a weapon to forestall the Nazis doing the sam e wa s certainly the basi c motive. Ther e wa s no dispositio n t o deny Canadian uranium on moral grounds. It was a time when people were less squeamis h abou t bombin g a 'barbaric ' enemy . Canadian s an d Briton s participated in the annihilatio n of Dresden . Canada wa s not involve d i n the decisio n t o us e th e bomb i n th e wa y in which i t was used. Kin g did have some months' intimation that a bomb was probably going to be produced and was probably going to be used. Howe was present at the meeting of the Combined Polic y Committee o n 4 July 1945 at which Fiel d Marsha l Maitland-Wilson gave what was regarded a s the British assent t o th e us e o f th e bom b agains t Japan . Th e Canadia n governmen t could presumably have dissociated itsel f from the decisio n if it had wanted to do so . How e regarded th e CP C as a bilateral body with a Canadian specialis t looking after particula r Canadian interests . Ottaw a asked n o more question s and gave no advice. The prime minister of South Africa, Jan Smuts, was told slightly i n advanc e and , bein g mor e intereste d i n grand strateg y tha n King and les s modes t abou t it , h e immediatel y raised wit h Churchil l the formid able issue s o f ho w to contro l thi s genie . Th e peopl e i n Ottaw a who would have worried most and who were busy working on the structure of a postwar security organization were in the dark. That they would have recommende d using the bom b les s painfull y i s a reasonable conjecture , bu t i t is doubtful if they would have convinced their prime minister. It would probably not have been difficul t t o persuad e hi m tha t th e bom b shoul d no t b e droppe d o n a crowded cit y but mor e difficul t t o persuad e hi m t o intervene , althoug h h e does seem to have indicated to Roosevelt that it might be a good ide a to give the Russian s som e advance warnin g that a secret weapo n was to be used.8 If the bom b ha d bee n destine d fo r Europ e i t migh t hav e bee n a differen t matter.9 However , i t was to b e use d afte r th e Europea n wa r was over, an d the preferenc e fo r leavin g Pacifi c strateg y t o th e American s ha d bee n strengthened b y the anxiet y not t o increase commitment s i n that area. Th e record then does not provid e solid grounds for arguing Canadian innocenc e

203 Th e Atomi c Triad of 'complicity. ' There i s not a good case either for arguing that Canada coul d have done anything to prevent Hiroshim a o r Nagasaki. Thi s was an instanc e in whic h Canada, o n functionalist grounds, migh t hav e claimed a voice bu t preferred silence . POSTWAR PROSPEC T

During the wa r the triangula r partnership, i n spite of recurring bouts o f suspicion, ha d survive d becaus e o f th e commo n goa l an d th e commo n fear . There were too many divergent interests in a peacetime world , however, for it to last long. The clash was chiefly betwee n th e Britis h and Americans , bu t there wa s a Canadia n perceptio n o f particula r interest tha t limite d enthu siasm fo r too tight a triangle. The wartim e urgency was succeeded by a common concer n fo r internationa l contro l o f th e devastatin g forc e whic h had been unleashed, an anxiety to exploit the industrial potential, an d a recognition of the obligatio n to share thi s potential with the rest of the world. There was still, however, n o equality because the Unite d State s alone ha d decisive control of the atomic weapon. The Britis h and Canadians, althoug h they did not regard this as an ideal situation, were too nervous of uncontrolled atomi c proliferation t o wan t th e monopol y t o sli p out o f the hand s o f the countr y which, i n spite o f differences, remained thei r champion. Fo r Canadians th e problems i n the immediat e postwa r period wer e of three kinds : their part in the maintenanc e o r alteratio n o f a tripartite relationship; their own relation ship t o th e Unite d Kingdo m i n th e continuatio n o f wartime collaboration ; and the questio n o f international control. First o f al l Externa l Affair s ha d t o fin d ou t wha t ha d bee n goin g o n i n atomic research, ho w Canada was involved, and what the consequences were for Canada' s positio n i n th e world . A series o f direc t question s wa s put t o C.J. Mackenzie, 10 presiden t o f the Nationa l Researc h Council , t o which he replied a t som e lengt h o n 2 6 October. Amon g th e point s h e mad e i n hi s letter wer e th e following : the America n projec t was not entirel y dependen t on Canadian ore ; the y ha d stockpile d a great dea l o f Congo material . Can ada's developmen t wor k wa s no t a majo r facto r i n th e productio n o f th e atomic bomb dropped on Japan bu t might have a great effect o n future plans in whic h Canada' s ra w materia l wa s a significan t aspect . Canad a had , o f course, no advantage over the Unite d States or Britain in knowledge of relevant scientific, technical, an d industrial know-how but certainly had over th e rest o f the countrie s o f the world . Its scientifi c knowledge was greater tha n its industria l know-how , bu t thi s woul d chang e withi n th e nex t year . A s owner an d operato r o f th e onl y plan t i n th e Britis h empire Canad a ha d a

204 Th e Shapin g of Peac e strong positio n a s fa r a s everyon e els e excep t th e Unite d State s wa s concerned. 'Whil e I think the Unite d States welcome s the Canadia n contact s I also think they feel, as they do i n the matte r o f militar y defence , tha t they are quit e competent t o loo k afte r themselves. ' Th e questio n o f where and how much raw material there was in the world was not certain, but Mackenzie did not thin k that the control of the raw materials in Canada, th e Unite d Kingdom, and the Unite d States would prevent for any length of time developments in other countries. He cited the 'more experienced engineer industrialists' i n his estimate of a minimum of five, with a probable ten , year s as the tim e it would take countries like Britain, the Sovie t Union, Germany, or Japan to produce the bomb if they were working under prewar conditions. THE WASHINGTO N CONFERENCE , NOVEMBE R 1945

In th e meantim e ther e wer e expectation s tha t th e 'thre e atomi c powers ' would tak e some initiative . Ottawa was being kept well-informed on British thinking, bu t eve n a few weeks before th e Washingto n Conference o f Tru man, Attlee , and Kin g in November 194 5 they were able only to speculat e on American intentions, based on Truman's enigmatic public statements. In Washington their contacts were coping with wide differences among policymakers and reluctanc e to consul t th e Canadian s an d British . Scientists like Vannevar Bus h and Jame s B . Conant urge d Truman t o g o slow o n special tripartite relations les t thes e alienate the Russian s and ris k the possiblit y of United Nations action. King wa s in Londo n a goo d dea l o f thi s tim e i n clos e consultatio n wit h Attlee an d anxiou s fo r a tripartite meeting. Wha t was mostly o n hi s mind , however, wa s the wa y the thre e power s would treat th e Gouzenk o revela tions. Gouzenk o ha d reveale d th e name s o f Canadian s i n a n intelligence network, a s wel l a s a scientist i n London wh o had worked at th e Montrea l laboratory, and suggested America n contacts as well. Those few participants in the kno w recognized th e relationship between th e two issues. The British security people had practical reasons fo r wanting to arrest their man quickly, but the American s wanted to put off revelations until they had tracked down further lead s i n Washington . O n th e politica l level , however , ther e wa s agreement tha t a disclosur e o f Sovie t espionag e befor e a n invitatio n ha d been issue d fo r Sovie t co-operatio n o n th e contro l o f atomic energ y would be widel y regarded a s deliberat e provocatio n intende d t o frustrat e Sovie t participation and justify a Western monopoly . In Ottawa the desperate need for internationa l control in which all the grea t powers would participate overrode i n thes e fearfu l an d anxiou s month s th e alar m an d anger ove r Sovie t

205 Th e Atomi c Triad behaviour i n Canada . I n an y cas e Mackenzi e Kin g wante d th e announce ment abou t espionag e t o b e tripartite , and i t could no t therefor e b e issue d until after h e had had his talks with Truman and Attlee. However bafflin g th e problems , i t was recognized tha t Canada no w had a considerably enhanced - or exposed - position in the international hierarchy. An internal memorandum i n DEA of 6 November11 calculated as follows: 'So far a s the Unite d States i s concerned th e fac t tha t we control an importan t source of potential raw material, combine d wit h our geographica l position, must giv e Canada a new importance fro m th e stand-poin t o f United State s interest. Whil e it has always been tru e that the United States coul d not look with indifferenc e o n any major developmen t o f Canadian foreign polic y this will be much more the case in the future.' Th e position was regarded as even stronger vis-à-vi s th e Unite d Kingdom , fo r wherea s th e Unite d State s was not dependen t o n Canad a fo r th e continue d productio n of atomic weapons or experimentation , th e Unite d Kingdo m wa s dependent. Mos t significan t was Canada's new vulnerability. 'The unique position o f Canada i n relation both t o the Unite d State s and th e Unite d Kingdom wil l certainly not fai l t o attract th e attentio n o f th e Sovie t Unio n an d ma y hav e importan t though unforeseeable effect s o n th e relation s wit h tha t country. ' Thi s feelin g tha t the li d was now of f the Arcti c was one o f th e stronges t publi c reactions in Canada t o th e atomi c bomb. Ther e wa s some dispositio n i n Ottawa and in Washington t o see North Americ a as the continent mor e expose d tha n Europe to the Soviet threat and to complain of European myopia on the subject. Mackenzie Kin g reported tha t Dean Acheso n tol d him i n Washington 'tha t the Unite d State s an d Canad a woul d be more immediatel y affected b y th e consequences o f any action which severed relation s with Russia, tha n eve n the U.K.' 12 Th e Externa l Affair s memorandu m conclude d tha t th e principal interest o f Canad a wa s the avoidanc e o f a situation i n which the nation s of the worl d would be conductin g a desperat e rac e i n th e productio n o f new forms of atomic destruction and, in particular, that the world should not split up into great blocs of power, one headed b y the Unite d States and the othe r by the Sovie t Union . 'Such a development woul d offer particula r danger fo r Canada since , shoul d a final atomic struggl e break ou t betwee n thes e two power blocs, Canad a on account of her geographical situation, her control of the principa l source o f raw material, an d th e locatio n i n this countr y of an important plant, would become a target for attack.' There wa s n o doub t i n Ottaw a that th e answe r ha d t o b e internationa l control. The bom b had swiftly radicalize d the Canadian view of world order. What wa s envisaged t o contro l atomi c energ y wa s a supranational régim e with much greater authority than ha d been considered feasibl e a few months

206 Th e Shapin g of Peace earlier at Sa n Francisco. Externa l Affair s memorand a recognized , however , that it was enough to state such objectives to appreciate the formidable obstacles. Th e Unite d State s woul d almost certainl y be unwillin g in th e interi m period, before a system of control was set up, to share with the Soviet Union information about the manufacture of the bomb. There would be, therefore, a period o f accumulating mutual suspicions tha t woul d certainly not b e laid to rest by signatures affixed t o a pact of renunciation of the atomic bomb. 'It remains to be seen whether in this atmosphere of suspicion it will be possible to achiev e an y progress toward s the solutio n o f the problem s raise d b y the discovery of atomic energy, but at least it is to be hoped that the facts of the situation wil l b e squarel y face d a t th e forthcomin g Washingto n meeting . Even if the Unite d States i s only prepared to move slowly it should move in the righ t directio n - that o f eventual internationa l control - and it is to be hoped tha t th e discussio n wil l no t b e obscure d b y proposals which sidestep the central issue.' 13 The Canadia n memorand a prepare d fo r possibl e presentatio n a t th e Washington Conferenc e wer e somewhat more resolute . It was not the occa sion t o dwel l on doubt s abou t th e practicalit y o f internationa l control. Th e memoranda wer e based firmly on the assumption tha t the atomic bomb was not just a new weapon but something revolutionary and unprecedented, tha t the atomic bomb was only the beginnin g of something far more destructive , that the secre t of the bom b could not be kept for mor e than five years, the manufacture o f the bom b was possible i n any industrial state tha t knew the secret, an d th e projectio n by rockets wit h accuracy over grea t distances was or would shortly be possible. Th e memoranda boldl y countered th e assumption held b y some i n the Unite d States that any government ha d the right to give it s peopl e a feelin g o f security 'whic h ca n onl y be false , b y basing it s policy o n th e opposit e assumption, tha t a national or thre e country monopoly o f development an d productio n is possible.' The memorand a reflecte d the curren t feeling that the bom b wa s particularly dangerous i n the hands of a totalitaria n governmen t becaus e n o parliamentar y democrac y woul d b e capable o f taking the decisio n t o use it . (Th e fac t tha t one democracy , with the passiv e assen t o f two others, ha d just don e precisel y that wa s ignored, presumably becaus e what the y ha d i n mind wa s Pearl Harbor-typ e aggression.) An y constructiv e solutio n t o th e proble m mus t b e international . 'There is , in fact, n o nationa l solution.' I t would be folly, however , for th e three countries concerned t o make a gift o f their atomic knowledge to othe r countries without conditions. ... they should exploi t the temporar y advantage they now possess in order t o bring this weapon under international control, so that it can never be used by anyone. This

207 Th e Atomi c Triad can be attempted b y trading the knowledge o f invention and manufactur e they alon e possess at present , fo r renunciatio n b y all nations of th e righ t of productio n o r use , except, possibly, on order s from th e Unite d Nations . This in its turn mean s interna tional supervisio n an d contro l o f th e developmen t an d us e o f atomi c energy . I f a n honest offer o f this kind , made by the Unite d States, Unite d Kingdom , an d Canada , were refuse d b y any othe r state , tha t refusa l would certainl y disclose whic h nation s were to be trusted and whic h feared.

The outlawin g o f atomi c warfar e wa s considered desirabl e a s on e o f a number o f steps bu t dangerou s a s a single step . Externa l Affair s favoure d destruction o f all existing weapons or their transfer to the Unite d Nations as trustee, the poolin g of all the basi c scientific knowledg e so that secret deve lopment o f ne w weapon s woul d b e impossible , establishmen t unde r th e United Nations of an international commission o f scientists with authority to make periodic investigations of national laboratories and industries. A sceptical view was taken of the 'sacre d trust' approach contained in President Truman's statemen t o f 2 7 October . Tha t wa s n o substitut e fo r internationa l agreement. 'Th e US A simply cannot remov e fear s concerning atomi c warfare, o r preven t th e inevitabl e an d fatefu l competitio n tha t woul d follow , merely by sitting on the bom b a s a self-appointed sacred trustee." 4 As Canada ha d clearl y accepte d th e ide a o f temporar y trusteeshi p b y th e thre e powers unti l th e Unite d Nation s coul d tak e i t over , th e oppositio n i n th e memorandum wa s presumably to those Americans who wanted to be 'trustees' permanently. In fact, there was considerable meeting of minds at the Washington meet ing and n o particula r need fo r the Canadian s t o carry the torc h for international control . Ther e wer e Britis h an d America n draft s an d i n th e earl y stages, confusion . N o Canadia n draf t wa s submitted, bu t Kin g secured sev eral revision s o f th e America n draft . H e argue d tha t th e referenc e t o th e appointment o f a United Nation s commission shoul d be subordinated to the recommendations o f the three signatories as to immediate action. What may look lik e an effor t t o downgrade th e rol e o f th e Unite d Nation s i n fact re flected the Canadia n fea r during this period that the grea t powers, and espe cially the Unite d States , woul d develop a 'leave it to the UN ' attitude, failin g to recognize their responsibility for initiative. Another change King obtained reflected a Canadia n anxiet y t o emphasiz e no t jus t th e negativ e aspec t o f limitation bu t th e positiv e opportunitie s fo r sharing information o n th e in dustrial application of atomic energy. The fina l agreement , o n whic h th e presiden t an d tw o prim e minister s rested thei r ple a t o th e world , wa s the wor k o f a small draftin g committe e consisting o f D r Vanneva r Bush , Si r John Anderson , an d Leste r Pearson .

208 Th e Shapin g of Peac e In thi s declaratio n th e thre e head s o f government expresse d thei r willing ness, a s a first contribution, t o procee d wit h th e exchang e o f fundamenta l scientific informatio n for peacefu l ends with any nation that would fully re ciprocate. They di d not thin k tha t th e spreadin g o f specialized information regarding th e practica l application o f atomi c energ y wa s advisabl e a t tha t point, but the y were prepared to share on a reciprocal basis as soon as effec tive an d forcibl e safeguards coul d be devised. The y advocate d th e creatio n at the earlies t practicabl e date o f a commission unde r th e Unite d Nations to prepare recommendation s fo r submissio n t o th e Unite d Nations . Th e commission shoul d mak e specifi c proposal s fo r extendin g th e exchang e o f scientific informatio n for peacefu l ends, the contro l of atomi c energy , the elimination from nationa l armaments o f atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction , an d effectiv e safeguard s by way of inspection an d other means . I t was recommended tha t the work of the commission procee d by separat e stages , th e successfu l completio n o f eac h on e developin g th e necessary confidenc e before the nex t stage was undertaken.15 The Washingto n Conferenc e ha s bee n regarde d b y some historian s a s a set-back t o th e caus e o f Sovie t collaboratio n an d internationa l contro l be cause i t emphasized th e solidarit y of the Anglo-Saxo n powers. 16 This worr y had bee n i n the mind s o f many Americans i n resisting th e Britis h pressure for a tripartite meeting. The same concer n is not eviden t in Canadian thinking. Th e conferenc e i n fact too k th e directio n propose d i n a Canadian pre liminary memorandum whic h looked upo n the meeting not as an occasion t o consolidate a triumvirate bu t a s one o n which those wh o had launched th e bomb would offer to the Russian s and the worl d at large the opportunit y to control th e ne w force internationally and to share in its blessings. Th e Brit ish, mor e sceptica l o f internationa l control an d muc h mor e anxiou s t o b e reassured o n partnership , ma y have ha d a somewhat differen t perspective . Pearson ha d eve n suggested , i n a memorandu m i n whic h h e sai d 'i t wa s unlikely tha t th e worl d would be reassured b y Truman's promis e t o regard the bom b a s a sacred trust, ' tha t th e ai r channels o f the worl d should b e cleared fo r broadcast statement s by the thre e head s o f government. 17 It was to be a celebration o f internationalism rather than restrictionism. A mont h afte r th e Washingto n Conferenc e th e fou r power s i n Mosco w approved th e settin g u p o f a United Nation s Atomi c Energ y Commission . Canada becam e th e onl y countr y no t a grea t powe r t o hav e permanen t membership - a role t o be taken seriously . Intensiv e preparatio n bega n i n Ottawa, an d participatio n on th e mos t senio r leve l wa s guaranteed b y th e appointment o f Genera l A.G.L . McNaughto n a s Canadian representative , with strong scientific and diplomatic support. The commission go t to work in

209 Th e Atomic Triad mid-1946 on th e basi s o f a far-reaching United States pla n for control by an international authority . Canada gav e genera l support t o thi s proposal , an d McNaughton, wit h th e subtl e professiona l advic e o f George Ignatief f fro m External Affairs , furthe r enhance d Canada' s statu s i n atomic affair s b y his skilful diplomacy , his mastery of the subject , and his willingness to stand u p to the America n representative, th e fearsome Bernard Baruch. However well intentioned - an d however necessary i t was to explore the possiblity of drastic international control - the Russians woul d not accept it, certainly not before the y too kne w how to make a bomb. Whethe r th e othe r majo r powers would have accepted i t in practice is doubtful. A detaile d accoun t o f the wor k of the UNAE C will b e included i n the sec ond volum e wit h a discussio n o f th e genera l effor t a t collectiv e securit y within the Unite d Nations. 18 Attention i n this chapter is directed only to th e tangled histor y o f the AB C relationship , which took o n a different aspec t a s the effor t t o achiev e a broade r internationa l contro l wa s graduall y abandoned - wit h relie f i n some quarters , bu t great reluctanc e i n others. Cana dians ha d les s t o ventur e an d mor e t o gai n an d wer e perhap s th e mos t reluctant o f th e thre e t o abando n th e effort . Internationa l control , amon g other things , might have delivered them fro m th e travails of the triangle. ABC RELATIONS

When th e Britis h minister o f aircraft production , Colone l Moore-Brabazon , had i n 194 1 officiall y passe d o n th e Mau d Reports , h e urge d a long-ter m view. H e aske d i f the atomi c project s did not presen t th e worl d at last with the rea l possiblity of an international polic e force. 'America and Britain, policing and controlling the world , would have an overwhelming superiority of striking powe r withou t needin g t o kee p u p a n overwhelmin g ai r force.' 19 Whether cloake d i n suc h imperia l languag e o r not , Churchill , King , an d Roosevelt al l in their own way saw a strong Anglo-American base as the cor e of a ne w effor t a t internationa l collectiv e security . I t wa s a rhetorica l ide a sincerely enough held but difficult fo r the practitioners to cling to. Economi c considerations o n th e par t o f eac h o f th e thre e countrie s ma y hav e bee n sordid, bu t they were also inescapable. Becaus e th e Unite d State s alone had been abl e to make the investmen t i n production as distinct from the theor y of atomi c energy , the y wer e dispose d t o forge t thei r deb t no t onl y t o th e British but to French an d refugee Europea n scientist s wh o had been largely responsible fo r the theoretical basis. The United States, they were confident, would b e a custodia n fo r mankin d an d se e tha t th e benefit s wer e distri buted.20 The tigh t securit y established b y the Unite d State s during wartim e

210 Th e Shapin g of Peac e was understandable, eve n whe n i t excluded th e Britis h and Canadians fro m sharing thei r productio n secrets , bu t i t wa s also a good wa y to protec t th e economic advantage. Security bedevilled the issue. Both Canadians and British resented American suspicion s o f th e internationa l ban d workin g in Montreal , bu t tw o of them were discovered t o have been passin g secrets to the Soviet Union. The fact tha t the American s to o ha d spie s i n thei r atomic apparatu s was not re vealed unti l later. Non e o f these scientist s wa s passing informatio n to th e wartime enemy. Afte r th e war, however, security had a different orientation . There wa s a panic reaction t o Hiroshima ; some deadl y poison ha d been le t loose an d must not spread. The genie must be put back in the bottle. As this was accompanied b y predictions o f scientist s i n al l three countrie s tha t th e secret coul d no t be kept and the Russian s should b e able to produce a bomb in abou t five years, th e polic y of extreme secrecy looks i n retrospect eithe r irrational or hypocritical. Sharing the secre t wit h th e Russian s wa s seriously considered in Washington. It was debated in Ottawa and London as well, but neither government urge d such a course on the United States. I t was rejected not s o muc h becaus e th e logi c wa s unacceptabl e a s becaus e o f a genera l instinct i n tha t unnervin g situatio n t o pla y safe . Th e dispositio n t o share , strong a t first , diminishe d rapidl y becaus e o f increasing evidenc e o f Sovie t hostility i n 1945- 6 an d Sovie t secretivenes s whic h discourage d eve n th e optimists from thei r faith i n free scientifi c exchange. What to begin with was a blind instinct to keep the secret fro m everyone , including Americans, was directed increasingl y to Soviet 'spies.' That did not mean, however, any relaxation in the opposition of Congress t o sharing with allies. Among th e America n policy-maker s were those who said th e Unite d States should share no secrets because i t had a right to reap industrial advantage from its own scientific and technical genius and those who believed tha t it was essential t o withhold secrets from any other country until a system o f international contro l ha d bee n established . Canad a agree d wit h th e latte r argument. Bot h arguments , however , reinforce d th e cas e for unilateralis m and paranoiac security, the manifestations o f which Canadians di d not like. The basi c principle s for transatlanti c co-operation ha d bee n lai d down in the Quebe c Agreemen t o f 1943 . It was clear that this agreement, whic h was ambiguous abou t it s duration , woul d have t o b e revise d afte r th e wa r was over. Whereas th e British clung to the American commitment t o the sharing of resource s an d secret s agree d upo n a t Quebec, th e American s wer e anxious t o minimiz e it . The actua l agreemen t a t Quebe c remaine d secret , and Congressmen ha d littl e ide a o f th e Britis h and Canadia n par t i n the enter prise o r the commitment s mad e t o them. Wit h considerable pressur e fro m

211 Th e Atomi c Triad London, an d wit h man y reservation s amon g America n scientist s an d sol diers, th e basi c commitmen t t o collaboration , wit h som e reservations, wa s reaffirmed o n th e highes t leve l whe n Truman , Attlee , an d Kin g me t i n Washington i n November 1945 . That agreement gav e Canada clear status as one of three partners on its own. There followe d man y efforts ove r th e nex t fe w years by diplomats of th e three countrie s to work out arrangements b y which the Britis h and Canadi ans might get some at least o f the useful information they thought they were entitled to. The British were more dissatisfied and put on the pressure. In the State Department ther e wa s anxiety to foster Anglo-American co-operatio n in general as the basi s of postwar security, but their efforts t o reach compromise agreement s wit h th e Britis h an d Canadian s wer e smothere d b y th e nationalist attitude s growin g in Congress. 'Th e America n attitude, ' accord ing to Andrew Pierre, 'was a curious mixture of monopolism, insecurity, and idealism.'21 Th e idealis m wa s the convictio n tha t th e continuatio n o f th e tripartite wartime collaboration would or would at least seem t o be in contradiction to the aim of a genuine United Nations direction of atomic policy. So the isolationist Anglophobes an d the on e world internationalists were linked in their aims. One o f th e America n argument s leas t acceptabl e t o th e Britis h was that there should b e neithe r atomi c bomb s no r eve n nuclea r power station s i n Britain becaus e th e countr y wa s too vulnerabl e to communis t occupation . The vie w of Britain and Wester n Europ e a s a glacis of the heartlan d o f th e 'free world ' seeme d logical enough i n the America n mood betwee n victory and NATO . Eve n Genera l Eisenhower , th e staunches ! defender o f British rights in subsequent debates, 22 argued early in 1946 that on grounds of security Britis h piles shoul d b e i n Canada. 23 In th e CP C Pearso n agree d becaus e Howe a t tha t tim e wante d th e pile s i n Canada . S o did Si r John Cockcroft . The chancello r o f th e exchequer , however , feare d th e cos t i n dollars, an d London turne d i t down because, as Attlee told his ambassador i n Washington: 'I f th e pil e is to b e buil t an d pai d for b y the Canadia n Governmen t i t becomes a Canadian enterprise , and even thoug h we might be ready to help by lending staff, th e plan t would necessarily b e owned an d to a large extent controlled by the Canadia n Government.' 24 The disadvantages o f Canada's exposed positio n were apparent to the diplomatists. How e also had reservations. Externa l Affair s wa s having the diffi cult experience o f moving into an exercise o f which they had been ignorant . It was hard for them t o get the fee l o f it, very hard even to find out the facts about Canadian participation . It was not until December 194 5 that they eve n saw King's communications wit h Churchill at the time of the Quebec Agree -

212 Th e Shapin g of Peace ment, and Pearson was embarrassed tha t month at a CPC meeting to consider the Combined Developmen t Trust , as he had never seen the document set ting u p tha t body . The Eldorad o record s wer e a mess and Externa l Affair s could no t ge t any accurate information on what they had bee n o r were producing. Nevertheless, the y had t o plung e into th e ver y difficult discussion s after th e Washingto n agreement o n th e re-establishmen t o f the CP C and th e CDT.25

The Canadia n attitud e o n tripartit e control wa s reveale d i n discussion s between How e and Externa l Affair s o n Canada' s positio n i n the CDT . Can ada wa s no t a s desperatel y anxiou s a s Britai n t o maintai n America n co operation. The y wante d t o share a s many secrets as possible bu t the y were not intereste d i n producin g a bomb . Unlik e the British , they ha d a plant established an d unde r way. Still, Anglo-America n co-operation a s a general principle was an article of faith i n Ottawa. Canadians were able to understand the perspective s o f bot h Londo n an d Washington . Nevertheless, the y had their own as well. Canada was a supplier of uranium whereas the Britis h and Americans were scrounging hard to control all supplies of uranium and thorium, i n th e interes t both o f thei r ow n economies an d o f world security as they saw it. The Congo was still the larges t source of uranium and the British were bus y wit h th e Belgian s tryin g to ti e thi s up . Canad a wa s the secon d largest develope d source , bu t it s importanc e la y i n th e prospec t o f muc h wider discoverie s an d i n it s proximity to th e Unite d States . A t thi s crucial period American s di d no t fee l dependent upo n Canadia n supplie s but the y could no t ignor e Canada . I t wa s not th e kin d o f leverage that alon e would enable Canad a t o coerc e th e American s o n matter s o f policy . The latte r assumed n o doubt that Canadian resources were something they could confidently coun t on ; Canadian s alway s wante d t o sel l things , an d the y would recognize thei r ow n security interes t i n seein g tha t th e American s ha d th e raw material for bombs . So Howe looked at membership in the CP C and CD T with a cool calculation of Canadia n interest . 'Th e Prim e Minister feel s tha t w e should tr y to be as independent a s possible in all these matters,' h e wrote to George Bateman , the Canadia n representative. 26 I f participation in th e CD T meant tha t Cana dian resource s would be dispose d o f by a tripartite body dominated b y two larger powers, then he was against it. At the same time he wanted to develop the uraniu m industr y but ha d t o b e prepare d fo r a drop i n demand . I f th e trust woul d mak e som e kin d o f commitment s t o tak e Canadia n uraniu m regardless, tha t was a different matter . I f pulling out o f the CD T meant als o pulling out o f the Polic y Committee, tha t was all right with him. His notice s

213 Th e Atomi c Triad of meeting s ofte n arrive d lat e an d h e coul d no t attend. 27 H e assume d th e international issue s wer e no w th e responsibilit y of diplomats and preferre d that Pearso n atten d wit h Bateman. H e eve n too k th e positio n tha t Canad a was not a member o f the CDT , that the Canadia n director, George Bateman , was there representin g th e United Kingdom , althoug h Bateman himself sai d he ha d alway s bee n recognize d a s th e Canadia n representative . Pearso n did no t lik e thi s wa y of handling things, althoug h h e ha d doubt s abou t th e advantages o f staying on th e Polic y Committee. 'Frankly, ' he wrote to Norman Robertson , ' I fee l that , a s a junior thir d part y i n thi s Committee, w e may be dragged along in directions where we might not desire to go but ove r which we would have littl e control.'28 He wondered abou t leaving the Policy Committee t o th e tw o government s chiefl y concerne d an d regulatin g th e Canadian associatio n wit h i t o n th e basi s o f bein g calle d int o consultatio n when the y desired , a n associatio n whic h h e compare d wit h tha t wit h th e Combined Chief s of Staff i n Washington. H e foresaw the ol d dilemma: what looked lik e a means o f gainin g a voic e i n policy-makin g could prov e t o b e merely sacrificing the greate r flexibility of independence . In spite o f the temptation t o withdraw, however, Canadians were reluctant to appea r t o b e walkin g out a t thi s particula r time, an d How e cam e t o se e some advantag e i n remaining o n the Polic y Committee i f that would help in the sharin g o f information . Whe n difference s betwee n th e Britis h an d Americans got worse b y the spring of 1946 , the Canadians la y low. Disagree ment betwee n th e Unite d State s an d the Unite d Kingdo m o n the sharing of information an d o f raw materials might b e fraugh t wit h serious embarrass ment fo r Canada , bu t whe n a working group was set u p t o find a solutio n Canada di d no t see k representatio n o n it . According to a memorandum fo r the prim e minister o f 20 April 1946 from Arnol d Heeney : 'Mr . Howe feel s that we should "kee p out" o f this dispute s o far as possible.' It was difficult, however, t o refuse a reply when Attle e asked Kin g to contribute to the dis cussion hi s interpretation o f the meanin g o f 'ful l an d effectiv e co-operation in the field of atomic energy' as contained i n the Washingto n Agreemen t o f 16 November. It was a crucial question an d the British would expect suppor t from th e Canadian s fo r thei r interpretation . Th e Canadia n respons e wa s to avoid th e apparen t takin g of side s b y providing the followin g answer: 'Mr . Mackenzie King' s understandin g o f th e Agreemen t i n thi s respec t i s indicated b y th e fac t tha t w e have , bot h durin g th e Wa r an d i n th e post-Wa r period, provide d Unite d State s authoritie s with full informatio n o n all Canadian activities in this field. In particular, they have had access to full informa tion a s t o development s a t Chal k River . I n fact , a Unite d State s officia l i s

214 Th e Shapin g of Peac e stationed ther e permanently and i s in a position to secure a complete picture of the wor k going forward in the plant.' 29 Acheson expresse d t o Pearso n hi s admiration for the 'ingenuity ' of that reply. 30 One aspec t of the proble m concerne d the Unite d Nations . If wha t was reached betwee n th e Britis h and American s wa s a ne w agreement , then , according t o th e term s o f Articl e 10 2 of th e Charter , i t woul d have t o b e registered wit h the Unite d Nations. When th e Britis h tried to find some way around this, Byrnes regarded it as a legal subterfuge and Pearson, eve r sensi tive about the obligations of the Charter, agreed with him. The disposition of the American s t o minimiz e the AB C relationshi p lest it interfere with genuine Unite d Nation s contro l provide d a dilemma fo r Ottawa . The y di d no t want to provoke the Russian s o r offend th e United Nations community, but at th e sam e tim e the y sa w Anglo-American collaboration a s indispensabl e for th e Unite d Nations. The answer therefore was piously to say: 'We are, of course hopefu l that the Unite d Nations Atomic Energy Commission wil l be able t o mak e progres s towar d eventual internationa l contro l an d w e are at present examinin g the variou s proposals which have bee n advance d i n this connection. I n the meantime , w e feel that continued co-operatio n betwee n our thre e countrie s nee d no t prejudic e the succes s o f the Commissio n an d indeed ma y assist towar d that end.' 31 Matters concernin g tripartit e co-operation remaine d i n limb o for severa l years. Ottawa was not worried on its own account by the stalemate. '... while the presen t situation i s i n som e way s unsatisfactory , i t i s questionabl e whether more precis e definitio n alon g the lines of the new Trust agreemen t would no t creat e mor e problem s tha n i t woul d solve,' Heene y note d i n a memorandum t o Howe . Th e initiativ e lay with the Unite d State s an d the y were no t moving , an d 'Unles s there are any pressing difficulties i n the present Canadia n situatio n a s a supplier o f ra w material , o r otherwis e i n ou r relation t o th e Trust , i t doe s no t see m t o b e i n ou r interes t t o urg e an y immediate conclusion o f the proposed revised agreements.' 32 The McMahon Act of June 1946 , which restricted the sharin g of atomic information by the United States , mad e i t clear tha t co-operation woul d be extremely limited . Because Canad a wa s not a signatory to the Quebe c Agreemen t an d was not developing atomic weapons , Canad a di d not protest , an d Pearso n late r said that th e Unite d State s were , 'perfectl y withi n thei r rights ' i n passin g th e bill.33 The Britis h decided t o g o thei r ow n wa y constructing nuclea r powe r and a bomb . The revelation s i n Marc h fro m Ottaw a about Sovie t espionag e hardene d the America n Congres s an d publi c against an y exchange s wit h Britain and Canada an d th e Washingto n agreement s i n thi s respec t wer e no t imple -

215 Th e Atomi c Triad mented. Th e historian s o f th e Unite d State s Atomi c Energ y Commissio n attribute a decisiv e rol e t o th e new s fro m Ottawa , citin g a repor t tha t th e steady flow of correspondence supportin g more flexible provisions for con trol ceased the day 'the spy story' broke. 'Disillusionment with the Russians , the impuls e to protec t eve n mor e carefull y wha t secrets might remain , an d elemental fea r seeme d i n a moment t o drow n th e sor t o f postwar idealis m that prompted scientist s to advocate the fre e exchang e o f scientific informa tion.'34 I t wa s no t a n interpretatio n o f th e Gouzenk o affai r presse d b y Ottawa. It was a consequence the y had hoped to avoid when they made their inevitable revelation. An indicatio n of a new look in Washington cam e i n September 1947 , in a proposal for a public tripartite declaration o f atomic collaboration, jus t what the American s had resisted a year earlier. The British saw their chance at last for openin g th e exchang e flow. By this time the interes t i n information ha d become a stronger motiv e for the Canadians . In the guidance sent to Wrong with approva l of How e and S t Laurent, i t was stated: 'I n ou r view , the rea l Canadian interes t i n thes e discussion s lie s i n th e possibilit y that the y ma y result i n reall y usefu l informatio n bein g mad e availabl e t o u s an d t o th e United Kingdom . W e appreciat e th e difficul t positio n o f U.S . authorities under U.S . legislation an d i n relation t o Congress but, a s Dr. Mackenzie ha s reported, ther e i s a good deal that the Unite d States can make available to us through cooperatio n i n specific fields. General McNaughto n agrees tha t ou r chief interes t i s in widening to the maximum extent thes e "areas of collaboration" and every opportunity should b e taken to secure U.S . consent t o such arrangements.'35 The Canadian s consistentl y differed wit h the Britis h on th e best wa y to get American information . They were less anxious t o get some new formal arrangement tha t might prove no more valid in practice than that solemly agree d t o i n Washingto n i n Novembe r 1945 . The y ha d ha d more success wit h informal contacts . Furthermore , the y did not lik e this new proposal which , the y thought , woul d probabl y destro y th e Unite d Nation s Atomic Energ y Commission , an d the y wer e no t read y fo r that . Fro m Washington Wron g estimated tha t the Unite d States ha d abandoned al l hope of reachin g agreemen t i n th e Unite d Nation s commission . Althoug h h e shared this view of its prospects, h e thought it rash and unwise to take such a stand i n th e presen t internationa l situation. 36 Th e governmen t sa w i t th e same way . Wrong wa s sent fo r hi s guidance th e tex t o f the instructio n just approved b y St Laurent fo r th e Genera l Assembl y delegation: 'Yo u should endeavour t o avoi d th e prematur e developmen t o f an y issu e t o th e poin t where i t is likely to destro y th e Unite d Nation s o r to drive any of its mem bers to withdraw immediately' and '...at this Assembly the emphasis should

216 Th e Shapin g of Peac e be o n warnin g wha t ma y happe n rathe r than o f forcin g issue s t o th e poin t where things will happen.' 37 By lat e 194 7 th e Unite d State s wa s discoverin g a considerable nee d fo r uranium, inducin g a more companionable attitud e towards Canada an d to wards Britain , whic h ha d som e contro l over Belgia n and Commonwealt h sources. NAT O was being formed and ther e wa s a new spiri t of alliance. Th e internationalist official s i n Washingto n were gaining strength. In Decembe r 1947 th e American s indicate d that they would like a n earl y meeting o f th e CPC to discuss renewe d co-operation . Th e Marshal l Plan was coming u p for Congressional discussio n an d there was a possible tie up, as countries receiving aid might supply uranium as a quid pro quo.3* George Kennan of the Stat e Department tol d the Canadia n ambassador he had succeeded in securing a liberal constructio n o f th e McMaho n Ac t unde r whic h they thought the y could exchange atomic information on the grounds that it was in the national interest. Wrong was surprised by 'the frankness with which the U.S . representatives ha d take n u s int o thei r confidence. ' H e stresse d th e Unite d State s concern over raw materials but wa s himself concerned ove r th e vie w of experts that b y 1951 Canada would drop from bein g a poor second to fourth as a source o f supply behind th e Congo, Sout h Africa, an d th e Unite d States. 39 The Canadia n governmen t playe d i t ver y cool . Wron g wa s tol d tha t Canada's positio n woul d continu e t o b e secondar y t o tha t o f th e majo r powers and tha t woul d condition Canadian participation in th e curren t dis cussions. The y understoo d Unite d State s politica l problem s bu t wer e no t going t o b e rushe d unles s th e connectio n wit h th e Marshal l Plan proved a unique opportunit y t o ge t bette r Unite d State s co-operation . H e wa s re minded o f the vie w of the Canadia n Advisory Panel on Atomi c Energy that 'efforts shoul d continue t o be made t o reach agreement upo n an acceptabl e system o f international control and tha t it was in the Canadia n interes t tha t the Commissio n b e kept viable for this reason.' Canada's limite d part in th e trust wa s affirmed an d Howe' s insistenc e tha t Canadia n productio n shoul d remain unde r th e sol e contro l o f Canada , althoug h the y woul d consider a pledge t o sell excess supplies of uranium onl y t o the Unite d States an d th e United Kingdom and consult them about any other sales. As for the proposal that the Unite d States would agree on freer exchange to the United Kingdo m if the United Kingdom transferred its stockpiles and facilities to less exposed territory, that was up to the two countries t o decide, but , 'It certainly canno t be assume d tha t w e would be prepare d t o accede t o any such proposa l in volving Canada.'40 In Januar y 194 8 th e CP C agreed t o procee d o n th e basi s o f a modu s vivendi, with the trust to continue as the 'Combined Development Agency. '

217 Th e Atomi c Triad After a whil e it becam e clear , however , tha t thi s effor t b y internationalist officials wa s up against th e same ol d obstacles. Thes e move s wer e criticized in the United States by the Congressional Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Th e revelatio n i n Britai n that Klau s Fuchs, wh o ha d ha d acces s t o secrets of the bomb, had been providin g information to Moscow had a disastrous effect. Th e baleful influence of the House Committee on un-American Activities was growing. The Sovie t explosion of an atomic bomb in September 194 9 did not hel p either, as it was assumed tha t lax security of the Cana dians and th e Britis h ha d helpe d thi s along. Tripartite talks continued i n an effort t o replac e th e modu s vivendi , bu t the y wer e eventuall y adjourned. Moscow paper s gloate d ove r Anglo-America n discord . Canad a maintained its attitude o f 'intereste d neutrality, ' a s Heeney describe d i t in a memoran dum o f 1 3 December fo r the minister : 'Our major interest i s to see that the negotiations d o no t brea k down, a s w e stand t o gain a great deal fro m an y sort o f agreement withi n the framewor k of the discussion s whic h have been proceeding.' THE A N G L O - C A N A D I A N R E L A T I O N S H I P

In th e meantim e th e Canadian-Britis h partnershi p ha d bee n considerabl y transformed. Face d wit h th e unco-operativ e attitud e o f the America n ally , the Britis h were disposed t o concentrate thei r resources i n the Unite d Kingdom and push ahead on their own. They had provided one of their best men , Sir John Cockcroft, t o head the Anglo-Canadian development and under his inspired directio n remarkable progress was made a t Chalk River. In a letter of 26 October 194 5 to Hume Wrong , C.J. Mackenzie summarized the situation as follows: As fa r a s th e Unite d Kingdo m i s concerned i t i s m y convictio n tha t w e hol d ver y strong card s at the moment as they hav e n o atomic energy plan t whatsoever i n England, an d i t will take the m some time t o build even an experimenta l pile . So, for th e moment and fo r the nex t year or so they wil l be dependent entirely on our develop ment i n Canada fo r experience i n piles and i t will be from ou r plan t that the y must obtain an y o f th e by-product s whic h loo k s o promisin g i n th e fiel d o f medica l re search. A t th e presen t momen t ther e i s muc h discussio n i n Englan d a s t o futur e plans. On e school apparentl y would like to build large scale plants there and they ar e talking of capital expenditures i n the order of 80 million pounds . Th e othe r school o f thought, whic h in my opinion i s by far the bette r informed, feel s tha t the wise r plan would be to establish a large Commonwealth plan t in Canada, whic h could suppl y the material fo r the other parts o f the Empire , an d t o the research laboratories o f which

218 Th e Shapin g of Peac e teams fro m th e variou s Dominion s and Britai n coul d come fo r research work . Personally I thin k this latte r is b y fa r th e wise r scheme unles s ther e ar e som e highe r policy considerations unknown to me .

A few days after that memorandum How e was informed that United Kingdom personnel, includin g Cockcroft, would be withdrawn. Howe complained of the abruptness of the decision. When th e British, at the CP C meeting on 16 February 1946 , made a statement about their intentions, the Canadian reply was that Canada offere d n o objection to the proposed programm e but since it involved withdrawal from Canad a o f scientists at present directing the Chalk River projec t Canad a considere d tha t th e partnershi p arrangemen t previ ously recorded i n the minute s of the CP C would be ended. There were, however, arrangement s mad e fo r a goo d dea l o f co-operatio n an d exchange . Another able scientist, W.B. Lewis, was obtained fro m Britai n to take Cockcroft's place . He prove d a great succes s an d remaine d i n Canada. Althoug h Howe claime d tha t Cockcroft had been recalle d withou t consultation, Mac kenzie had learned of the possibility during the summer and had argued vigorously both to Malcolm MacDonald and Sir John Anderson tha t the withdrawal of Cockcroft would give Canada no alternative bu t t o go in with the Unite d States.41 It was an idle threat. The Americans were sharing with nobody. Howe continued to nurse his grievance, and when the Americans in 1947 showed an interest i n renewin g co-operation h e wrot e to th e chairma n o f th e Atomi c Energy Advisor y Panel, 42 Arnol d Heeney , tha t th e positio n o f th e Unite d Kingdom wa s that it insisted o n a United Kingdo m programm e with a great deal o f help from 'thi s continent.' To date Canada ha d been furnishin g that help without getting much in return. 'Although Canad a i s now in complet e control, ther e is constantly a large group of U.K . scientists a t Chalk River for the purpos e o f obtainin g information for th e U.K . development. ' H e sug gested tha t th e ambassado r kee p i n min d tha t a bilatera l arrangement be tween Canada and the United States providing for a complete interchange of information woul d b e mor e advantageou s fo r Canad a tha n th e tripartit e arrangement. From th e tim e th e Britis h had first approached the Canadian s during the war, C.J . Mackenzi e ha d envisione d grea t thing s fo r Canad a fro m thi s collaboration. For Canadian scientist s an d engineers t o collaborate with the distinguished Cambridge laboratory would enable Canada t o be on the ground floor of most importan t developments. American s were, of course, regarde d as part of the venture. Now, however, they were rejecting their partners, and there wa s a ne w argumen t fo r Anglo-Canadia n collusion . Cockcrof t an d some o f th e scientist s ma y have see n th e possibilitie s o f a joint enterprise ,

219 Th e Atomi c Triad but no on e in London seeme d t o have grasped that vision. The Britis h made use of Canada when they had to, but when they were jilted by the Americans there wa s little awareness - on the political level at least - of the consideration that might be due t o their erstwhile partner or, what was more tangible, the opportunities . Perhap s the y ha d bee n offende d b y th e failur e o f th e Canadians t o stand u p with them agains t the Americans . Perhap s they were over-confident o f thei r ow n capacit y withou t help from th e colonies . Th e judgment o f Margare t Gowing , th e scrupulousl y fair-minded British histo rian o f th e project , o n th e withdrawa l of Cockcrof t i s that: 'I t wa s a sorry business, badl y handled , bu t eve n no w th e Britis h ha d no t learne d thei r lesson abou t th e nee d fo r the fulles t possibl e consultation with Canada.' 43 There i s a n interestin g contras t i n th e wa y th e Britis h an d Canadian s moved o n th e questio n o f th e bom b afte r thei r wartime partnership. Th e British develope d thei r ow n reacto r fo r peacetim e purpose s bu t the y also went ahea d t o produc e their own nuclear bombs. They seem neve r to have taken a n agonizin g decision t o produc e a bom b becaus e i t wa s take n fo r granted tha t a country of Britain's assumed statur e in the worl d would have one. Th e Canadian situation was the reverse. A t no time was serious consideration give n t o producin g Canada's ow n bomb . I n th e earlie r stages ther e were vagu e idea s tha t th e tripartit e partnership would mean som e kin d of combined trus t for th e bomb , bu t ther e is no evidenc e o f Canadian anxiety to have a finger on the contro l of such a weapon. Canadians were beginning to refe r t o themselve s a s a middl e power , bu t fe w ha d ambition s for th e responsibilities o f great-powe r status. It hardl y seemed necessar y to ge t a n American pledg e to protect Canada from atomi c attack; there wa s President Roosevelt's promise given in Kingston in 193 8 not t o stand idly by if Canada were th e victi m o f oversea s aggression . I t wa s no t t o b e expecte d tha t a Mackenzie Kin g government woul d opt fo r independen t Canadia n posses sion o f a bomb and ther e is no evidenc e tha t the Canadia n militar y pressed for suc h a capability. How e sai d t o th e Common s i n Decembe r 1945 : 'W e have not manufactured atomic bombs, w e have no intention of manufacturing atomic bombs.' 44 It shoul d b e recorde d tha t afte r th e postwa r controversie s settled , th e Canada-United Kingdo m relationshi p on th e technica l sid e improve d not ably. A mont h afte r th e notificatio n to th e CP C that th e partnershi p wa s ended, How e wrot e to th e Unite d Kingdo m high commissioner : 'W e hav e discussed the relative position of atomic energy developments i n the United Kingdom and in Canada, and have had the advice of Dr. C.J. Mackenzie , Sir James Chadwick and Dr. Cockcroft and have, in my opinion, reached a complete understandin g o f th e matter.' 45 S o lon g a s ther e wa s an ambiguou s

220 Th e Shapin g of Peace relationship with an assumption o f ultimate authority in London, ther e was bound to be trouble. When the Commonwealth principle of equal powers in no way subordinate on e to another wa s implemented, partnershi p could become easy and productive. INTERESTED NEUTRALIT Y

Did the Canadian s support the American s in their postwar atomic policy, or the British , o r wa s their' s reall y a n attitud e o f 'intereste d neutrality ' a s Heeney had described it? Margaret Gowing's commen t i s that: 'On both th e main issue s o f the Anglo-American-Canadia n negotiation s - the interna tional aspec t an d the location o f the British plants - th e Canadians sympa thised muc h mor e wit h the American s tha n with the British.' 46 That i s a fair comment a s far as those specifi c issues wer e concerned. Th e Canadians also , as she notes, wer e reluctant t o suppor t stron g Britis h complaints abou t th e release o f information b y the Unite d States . The Canadian s wer e much les s dissatisfied o n this score, but their difference wa s also tactical. They thought the Britis h were unwise to press thi s case a s vigorously and as often a s they did, tha t the y wer e threatenin g th e vita l Anglo-America n fron t i n a vain cause. Th e Britis h accused th e Canadian s als o o f joining th e American s i n opposing atomi c developmen t i n th e Unite d Kingdom . Whe n th e Britis h ambassador i n Washingto n tol d How e tha t Byrne s had sai d thi s t o B e vin, 'Mr. How e said tha t w e had never take n thi s line. ' Canada's objection , h e said, ha d bee n t o th e embarrassmen t o f the Canadia n projec t by the with drawal o f personnel. 47 Although How e and other s di d want Chalk Rive r t o serve a majo r purpos e i n Britis h plans, th e Canadian s wer e carefu l no t t o argue th e cas e agains t Britis h atomic developmen t a t home , t o whic h th e Americans too k suc h stron g objection . Th e British , it was recognized, ha d dominion status . The Canadian belie f was that it was better to work away quietly and ad hoc to get as much informatio n as the scientists coul d extract from thei r Ameri can counterparts tha n confront thei r friends i n Washington wit h formal de clarations Congress woul d never accept . The attitude of Congress wa s a fact of life , no t a point o f view Canadians agreed with. The strateg y worked for the Canadians an d would probably have been wiser for the British, although the America n attitud e t o Canad a wa s a little les s vigorous , partl y because they di d want something fro m Chal k River , the y did not regar d Canad a a s vulnerable, an d perhap s also becaus e the y had not bee n made stubbor n b y the importunin g of Canadians as they had been by the British. Canada coul d

221 Th e Atomi c Triad probably hav e go t mor e informatio n fro m th e American s i f the y ha d cu t themselves of f entirel y fro m th e British , bu t tha t woul d hav e bee n self defeating. Wherea s the y could co-operat e wit h the British , they could only be swallowe d u p b y the Americans . Mr s Gowing' s commen t o n Canada' s happy positio n a t abou t tha t tim e implie s her respec t fo r Canadia n tactics . After th e anxiet y i n Canad a i n 1945 , sh e says , ther e wa s now 'grea t an d justifiable confidenc e i n Canada's ability to run a n independen t projec t successfully.' Th e NR X reactor, i n her opinion , wa s the mos t successfu l experimental pil e i n th e world. 'I n thes e circumstance s Canad a wa s relaxed an d generous, read y to help the British and the Americans without bothering too much whethe r sh e go t back as much as she gave . A n od d twist of wartime fate ha d mad e he r int o a n importan t countr y atomicall y speaking . Sh e wanted full collaboration , but she now valued her independence a s well.'48 It is a comment t o remember . Canadia n foreign polic y may have bee n mos t successful when the national mood wa s 'relaxed and generous.' The essential questio n i s not whether Canadians supported the American s but which Americans the y supported. There was little affection i n Canada for General Groves , th e nationalist , militarist director of the Unite d State s project, no r fo r th e like s of Senators Hickenloope r an d McKellar . Of the latte r Wrong onc e reporte d tha t 'th e Senato r i s unfortunately recovering fro m a recent illness.' 49 Working wit h th e internationalist s lik e Kennan an d Acheson i n the Stat e Department o r David Lilienthal, chairman of the JCAE , was a differen t matter . Pearso n an d Wron g i n Washington , a s wel l a s British ambassadors lik e Roge r Makin s an d Olive r Franks , seeme d a t time s t o b e working i n concer t wit h their America n friend s t o thwar t the wil d men. I f they did not shar e the sam e perspectiv e the y could at least see each other's. Canadians often supported th e State Department not because the y were proAmerican but because they were anti-Hickenlooper. United States policy was not monolithic . I t wa s being constantl y shape d b y the contes t o f powerful forces. Canadian , a s wel l a s British , official s wer e inevitabl y but discreetl y engaged in supporting those in the Unite d State s apparatus whose approach was in their interest . Afte r a CPC meeting i n July 1948, Wron g and th e British ambassador suggeste d t o Lilientha l he migh t mak e a speech explainin g the extent o f United States-United Kingdom-Canadia n co-operation now going on with such benefit 'to avoid the criticism that it was something clandes tine an d therefor e evil. ' Lilientha l got approva l fo r hi s pla n t o visi t Chalk River an d the n mak e tha t kin d o f speec h i n Ottawa . Thi s coul d no t b e worked out and in the en d he made th e speec h o n 21 August at the Waldorf Astoria o n th e occasio n o f th e Ne w York Golden Jubilee . Th e speec h was

222 Th e Shapin g of Peace followed b y a torch-light parade down Lexingto n Avenu e an d a good dea l more pres s coverag e wher e i t mattere d tha n i t woul d have receive d fro m Parliament Hill. 50 Part o f th e gam e was , o f course , no t appearin g to interven e i n Unite d States domesti c affairs . Sometime s publi c support was expressed for Unite d States policies which were merely less offensive tha n the alternatives . Senator Vandenberg, for example, wa s an America n nationalist who could write: 'America must behave lik e the Number One World Power which she is. Ours must b e the world's mora l leadership - or the world won't hav e any!' 51 -a conviction har d for a Canadian to swallow whole. On the othe r han d h e was the stronges t politica l force behin d th e Unite d Nation s i n hi s country, th e best guarantee agains t the traged y of Woodrow Wilson . He was woolly and lop-sided in his conception of international control, but he was a true convert to the belie f that the Unite d States should avoid going it alone. The Canadians coul d no t le t hi m down . Canad a wa s 'supporting ' America n polic y in order to push it in the directions Canada favoured. It is usually, although not always, a more effectiv e wa y of getting at least some o f what a middle power wants tha n t o oppose , confront , an d denounce , althoug h i t ma y not b e a s satisfying t o the nationa l ego. PUBLIC ATTITUDES

The questio n o f public opinion o n atomic issues throughou t this period re quires attention as it casts some light on popular and parliamentary attitudes to Unite d Nation s polic y i n general . Th e decisio n t o tak e part , howeve r vicariously, i n th e productio n o f th e dreadfu l weapo n wa s undertaken , o f course, withou t an y publi c opinio n whatsoever . Th e circumstance s wer e unique. Kin g was always a good baromete r o f public opinion and i t may b e doubted whethe r there would have been much, if any, public objection if the whole thin g ha d bee n debate d i n th e Hous e o f Commons . Kin g assumed that h e knew best what the citizenr y wanted, and th e infuriatin g conclusio n has t o b e tha t th e assumptio n wa s largely justified. The discussion s i n th e House o f Common s an d i n th e pres s afte r th e Canadia n announcement i n August 194 5 of its participation and after the Washingto n declaration later in that year suggest tha t the publi c was bewildered but no t critica l of what had been done. Even afte r th e wa r How e manage d th e subjec t through crow n agencie s that wer e simila r to hi s wartime creations. Tha t i n itself encouraged a continuing wartim e attitud e b y parliamen t an d th e public . A s i n th e Unite d Kingdom the ho t subject was handled by a small group of officials and minis-

223 Th e Atomi c Triad ters. Th e fac t tha t the y were abl e and conscientiou s mad e th e secrec y les s controversial. The heav y emphasis on secrecy over technical aspects and the fact that the tripartit e discussions describe d abov e had to be carried on without eve n disclosin g th e basi s o f thei r existenc e certainl y encourage d an d excused privacy . It wa s no t jus t th e publi c tha t wa s i n th e dark . A s J.E . Hodgetts noted : 'Th e most significant organizationa l gap seems to be at th e top o f the structure , wher e ministerial guidance and collective cabinet consideration o f th e nation' s tota l scientifi c program ar e fa r fro m adequate.' 52 On 3 1 January 194 6 Heeney wrot e to Pearson, à propos of cabinet's consid eration o f th e ne w agreement s o n th e CP C and CDT , that h e wa s worried because 'apar t fro m Mr . How e non e o f the Minister s (includin g the Prim e Minister) ha s any understanding of what is involved.' Parliament accepte d tha t atomic matter s ha d to be left i n the hand s o f the prime minister with little protest - i n great contrast to the rumblings of Congress. Kin g reported to the House on the atomic situation after he had signed the agreemen t i n 194 5 (1 5 November), bu t i t was not unti l 27 March 194 6 that cabine t se t up the 'Advisor y Panel o n Atomi c Energy,' an interdepartmental committee whos e terms of reference were 'to consider and advise the government upo n problem s arisin g out of the developmen t and use s bot h international an d domesti c o f atomi c energy. ' However , n o parliamentar y committee wa s set up. When presse d i n 194 7 for some committee similar to the America n Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Howe doubted th e advisability o f doin g s o an d said : 'Th e worl d i s very sensitive t o atomic energ y matters, an d an y publicit y tha t woul d come fro m th e committe e woul d be disturbing perhaps i n a good man y quarters.' 53 On 1 February 194 9 Howard Green asked agai n about th e possibilit y of setting up a House Committee t o consider atomi c matters . H e compare d th e Canadia n situatio n wit h tha t i n the State s wher e ther e wer e thre e Congressiona l committees . Nearl y fou r years afte r King' s firs t repor t t o th e House , How e finally , o n 2 5 Octobe r 1949, move d th e establishmen t o f a House Committe e o n Atomic Energy, and Gree n wa s on it . Bu t as Professo r Hodgett s commented , 'on e ha s th e impression tha t apar t fro m th e salutar y educationa l servic e rendere d th e members, official s actuall y use th e opportunit y to obtai n a rather uncritica l stamp of approval for the result s o f their stewardship.' 54 There was in Canada, unlik e the United States, almos t n o objection to the principle of government contro l of atomic energy. Government contro l of a great natura l resourc e wa s a mor e norma l phenomeno n i n Canada . Th e Atomic Energ y Contro l Boar d o f Canad a wa s set u p i n Augus t 194 6 with power to acquire 'prescribed substances' or any mines and works for production of or research into atomic energy and to regulate the industry. No oppo-

224 Th e Shapin g of Peac e sition party in the House objected. In presenting the proposal, Howe put it in the contex t o f simila r actio n b y Britai n an d th e Unite d State s t o acquir e national control a s a preliminary to internationa l control. The Canadia n re presentative on the UNAEC , it was provided, would be a member of the AEC B of Canada. Th e Nationa l Research Counci l took ove r th e operatin g and research function s unde r th e supervisio n o f th e board . Wherea s ther e wa s great controversy in Congress an d at Westminster ove r similar legislation, it passed quickl y i n Ottaw a afte r a constructiv e discussio n an d onl y mino r amendment.55 There has rarely been such evidence of the docility of the Canadian public as during that perio d on atomic questions. I t may have been that, a s in th e question of government contro l throug h the AECB , ther e were no plausibl e alternatives. A t the en d o f 194 5 in a poll by the CIP O asking whether Britain and Canad a and th e Unite d State s shoul d tel l th e Russian s tha t the y were ready to join a world government and give that government all the secrets of the ato m bom b or continu e to try to kee p the secret , 58 per cen t replie d 'Keep the secret' and only 32 per cent 'Giv e to world government.' Among other attitude s reveale d b y poll s i n th e yea r after Hiroshim a wer e stron g approval o f the us e o f the bom b against Japan, doub t that Sovie t attitude s were attributable to withholding the atomic secret, and a notable confidenc e in th e benefit s of atomi c energy. 56 Thi s wa s a subjec t on whic h the public seemed t o accep t governmen t leadershi p with little questioning. A poll in July 194 6 showed tha t nearly 60 per cent o f Canadians woul d be willin g t o have Canada turn over control of all its armed forces and munitions, including its atomic bomb materials, t o a world parliament provided leading countries di d th e same . Althoug h tha t wa s certainly not wha t officia l planner s were seriously contemplating a year after th e wa r ended, it was the impres sion th e publi c migh t get fro m th e oratory . Neither th e question s no r th e answers wer e well disciplined, but the y reflect th e simplicit y of public comprehension a t the time . It shoul d no t b e take n fo r grante d tha t the answer s mean t th e forwardlooking internationalis t polic y o f th e governmen t represente d a Canadia n consensus. Perhaps Canadians were so much preoccupied with rehabilitation and domestic economi c question s tha t they had not time to care much what the government did . Indeed, the CIP O poll taken in later 1945 on the greatest single problem facing the government produce d the following results: 40 per cent ful l employment , 2 7 per cent rehabilitation, 8 per cent reconversion, 1 per cen t 'peac e problems, maintainin g world power.' A t any rate there was not th e same evidence o f reaction against participation that was notable after the Firs t Worl d War. There was certainly little will to send the boy s abroad

225 Th e Atomi c Triad again - or to keep the m i n uniform a t all - but not the resentful abstentio n that ha d bee n polic y towards the Leagu e i n it s early stages. Whereas i n th e twenties Canadia n governments , bot h Conservativ e an d Liberal , ha d bee n seeking to emasculate th e collective security provisions of the League, in the late fortie s Canadian s wer e eagerl y assumin g a positio n wel l out i n front , demanding internationa l control of atomic energy of a kind that would have been anathema t o the politica l leaders o f the twenties . Th e reasons fo r this change wer e a lon g an d bitte r experience , th e fac t tha t th e mos t powerfu l and th e mos t involved natio n on earth was right alongside a lengthy border, and th e emergenc e o f a revolutionary new force in international affairs fro m which Canada, a s a producer, could not remain neutral.

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PART IV : ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITE D NATION S

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8

Drafting th e Charte r

The creatio n o f the Unite d Nation s was under wa y long before th e wa r was over. I t wa s spasmodic an d decentralized . Th e grea t a d ho c conferences a t Hot Springs o r Bretto n Wood s whic h created specialize d agencie s wer e a s important i n th e lon g ru n a s th e preparatio n o f th e Charte r b y th e grea t powers a t Dumbarto n Oak s an d b y al l th e allie s a t Sa n Francisco . Thes e events, a s describe d i n chapte r 2 , largel y predate d th e Charte r an d largel y predetermined wha t kind of United Nations ther e would be, even thoug h it was the draftin g o f the Charte r tha t attracted public attention as 'the birth of the United Nations.' At Dumbarton Oaks , Washington , i n August 194 4 the grea t powers came together t o desig n a Unite d Nation s considerabl y mor e restricte d i n it s authority an d i n th e scop e fo r lesse r power s than wha t most Canadia n ha d been loosel y talkin g about. Th e Charte r tha t emerge d a t Sa n Francisc o i n June 194 5 is often regarded a s a descent fro m the idea l to the cynical , but it can also b e regarded a s an advance fro m th e romanti c t o the practical . The great powers , wh o wer e largel y responsible , ar e a n eas y target , bu t thei r citizens were arguing their way through the same contradictions as were Canadians - the relationship between powe r and responsibility, order an d equality. Tradition has encouraged th e legend that 'power polities' denied the little people th e peacefu l world they planned, bu t th e record does not sustai n th e view that , bu t fo r th e rapacit y o f thos e i n th e majo r league , mor e high minded lesse r powers would have created a n international structure in which all would submit t o the wis e collective will. O.D. Skelto n had written of th e pursuit by the great powers of 'their own vital and highly pervasive interests ' so that th e lesse r power s ha d t o protec t 'thei r peoples' les s ubiquitou s and mystical bu t stil l equall y vital concerns." In the proces s o f creating and per petuating th e Unite d Nation s th e right s o f lesse r power s becam e a them e

230 Th e Shapin g of Peac e quite as mystica l as those o f their betters , an d thei r claim to jurisdiction in the affair s o f the univers e almos t a s ubiquitous. From Ottaw a there came a good dea l o f th e rhetori c o f injure d innocence , an d man y o f it s protest s against the great powers were justified. The job of External Affairs, however , was to find ways and means of accommodating the rights and responsibilities of large and small powers rather than simply to rage against those who, while they were ofte n antagonists, ha d to be seen, by the illuminatio n of the war, as partners and protectors as well. Canadian associatio n wit h th e preparatio n of the Unite d Nations Charter was i n summar y a s follows . I n 194 3 th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s began t o sor t ou t proposal s fo r a n internationa l organization . On 9 July of that yea r th e prim e ministe r mad e hi s statemen t o n th e functionalis t approach t o th e Hous e o f Commons , bu t th e effor t t o promot e debat e o n the genera l subjec t wa s frustrate d b y it s coinciding wit h th e invasio n o f Sicily, which diverted the attentio n of press and public. When i n November the fou r majo r power s in their Mosco w Declaratio n agree d t o set up a general internationa l organization , th e mai n issu e wa s settle d an d everyon e could ge t dow n t o details . Th e Thron e Speec h a t th e beginnin g o f 194 4 announced th e government' s intentio n o f seekin g parliamentar y approval of Canadia n participation , an d th e official s starte d planning . A Workin g Committee o n Post-Hostilitie s Problem s wa s set u p an d scrutiny was given to a British PHP paper on 'militar y aspects o f any postwa r security organization.'2 This committee concerne d itsel f more wit h postwar occupation ques tions an d long-rang e strategi c issue s tha n wit h plan s fo r a ne w worl d organization, bu t it s perspective s conditione d th e thinkin g of th e Depart ment o f Externa l Affair s member s wh o wer e a t th e sam e tim e studyin g British and America n plans for a United Nations. In May 1944 Mackenzie King attended th e Commonwealth Prim e Ministers Conference i n London where British views on a postwar order were fully discussed. I n th e ligh t of Commonwealth opinio n thes e view s were revise d and submitte d t o the othe r grea t powers . There was no question o f any but the great power s attending th e meeting s a t Dumbarton Oak s but th e Com monwealth representatives i n Washington were briefed regularly by the British. Clos e contac t wa s also maintaine d b y the Canadia n embass y wit h th e United States State Department an d with other interested lesse r powers, particularly th e Australians , Ne w Zealanders, Dutch , Belgians , an d Brazilians. Consideration wa s even give n to something lik e middle-power blo c tactics. 3 Although the ambassador, Leste r Pearson , an d his staff talke d to their State Department friends, h e reported i n October that the Americans kne w of the Canadian view s largely through th e Britis h and, no w that th e Stat e Depart -

231 Draftin g the Charte r ment ha d presente d the m wit h a draft charter , he though t i t time for direct talks wit h th e Americans . H e kep t Ottaw a closel y informe d o n th e great power bargaining, even noting at one point: 'Tonight the Russians are taking the British to a baseball game. This represents concession s o n both sides.' 4 Canadian views on the Dumbarton Oak s proposals were then consolidate d in a formal memorandum o f 1 2 January 1945 and presente d t o the govern ments o f th e fiv e grea t powers , includin g China an d France. 5 Ther e wa s a preliminary ru n throug h th e Charte r a t a Commonwealth meetin g i n Lon don o n th e ev e o f Sa n Francisco . I n Marc h 194 5 th e Hous e o f Common s discussed an d the n approve d b y a vot e o f 20 2 t o 5 the Dumbarto n Oak s proposals a s a basi s fo r discussion . Canada , th e resolutio n said , should become a member o f the organization , but the Charter should, befor e ratifi cation, b e submitted t o Parliament for approval. An all-party delegation wa s sent t o Sa n Francisco, le d at first by the prim e minister . Afte r th e Charte r had bee n agree d upon , th e Executiv e Committee , o n whic h Canad a sat , began meeting s i n Londo n i n Augus t 1945 , an d th e Canadia n representa tives were active here and in the Preparatory Commission which gathered in November t o make plans for the procedures and agendas of the First Session of the Genera l Assembly . I n Octobe r 194 5 the Hous e o f Commons unani mously approve d th e Charter . I n the meantime , th e first atomic bomb had gone off, four-power unanimity was cracking, and the parliamentarians were more worrie d abou t th e strengt h o f th e internationa l organization to cop e with th e terrifyin g situatio n than i n the particula r Canadian grievances . Th e prime ministe r di d no t g o wit h th e Canadia n delegatio n t o Londo n fo r th e opening sessio n o f th e Genera l Assembly . Th e leade r wa s the ministe r o f justice, Louis St Laurent, who was accompanied b y two other cabinet ministers and a strong grou p of officials. A s at San Francisco an d in the Prepara tory Commission, ther e were representatives of opposition parties. THE OFFICIAL S

Planning fo r th e Unite d Nation s wa s in th e firs t plac e the responsibilit y of officials. The y operated withou t much guidance from cabinet , bu t the y were experienced i n calculating what the traffi c woul d bear. Th e initiativ e rested in External Affairs, bu t the militar y were closely involved in the PHP exercise, as was the secretary of the cabinet, A.D.P. Heeney. In fact, th e whole remarkable mandarinate of the period was a more integral part of the process than the formal record s reveal . Ottaw a wa s a small , closely-kni t capital, and polic y proposals germinated o r were adjusted in the Chateau Laurier cafeteria or on the banks of the Gatineau. Notable among those outside External who made

232 Th e Shapin g of Peac e contributions were General Mauric e Pope o f the Privy Council Office, W . A. Mackintosh and R.B. Bryce of Finance, Graha m Tower s an d Louis Rasminsky o f the Ban k of Canada. Rasminsky was an old Geneva han d and a member o f th e delegatio n a t Sa n Francisco. Contrar y opinions were melded int o something tha t migh t be called a Canadian approach , althoug h no t eve n i n External Affair s wa s the attitud e monolithic. The presidin g officer was Hume Wrong , associat e undersecretar y of stat e for externa l affairs . Mackenzi e King said tha t Wrong 'mor e than an y othe r man i n this country, has from the beginnin g of its consideration t o this hour followed ever y move i n connection wit h the formatio n of this world organization, so far as it has been humanl y possible for anyone to do so.' He adde d that 'Mr . Wrong has been presen t a t meetings o f the cabinet when we have been discussin g these matters . W e have benefited by his expert opinions and suggestions, an d h e has ful l knowledg e of our attitude.' 6 That wa s no exaggeration, althoug h Kin g had hi s reasons a t that moment fo r persuading th e opposition tha t the y shoul d b e satisfie d with Wrong rathe r tha n th e prim e minister himself as custodian of the Canadian interest at the Commonwealt h conference. Kin g respected Wron g but never felt comfortable with his sharp intelligence. Wron g wa s a descendant o f Edwar d Blake . He suffere d politicians less gladl y than did Norman Robertson , bu t hi s genius lay in his capacity t o reconcil e th e idea l wit h th e politicall y and tacticall y possible. H e was impatient of human folly bu t never daunted b y it. He shrewdly reckoned no t only wit h th e limitation s imposed b y Canadian politic s but als o thos e im posed b y the harsh world in which Canadians had to live and hew their place. It was Wrong who early perceived th e nee d t o get a Canadian perspectiv e on the plan s for the en d o f the war , for a postwar order, an d strategic issues of th e future . In addition t o question s directl y related t o security, h e urge d that though t b e give n t o broa d politica l and economi c problems . H e advo cated intellectua l preparednes s rathe r tha n ras h initiative , having a shrewd sense o f ho w Canadia n pressur e coul d mos t effectivel y b e applied. 7 Hi s capacity to foresee ho w situations would develop wa s extraordinary. 'What is agreed upo n befor e th e en d o f the wa r is likely to determin e th e cours e o f history fo r man y year s to come . Th e problem s mentione d i n thi s not e ar e mainly long-rang e problems . Nevertheless , th e answer s t o the m wil l grow out o f wartime decisions, reache d ofte n i n a hurry so as to take advantage o f personal conference s o f leadin g statesme n o r o f a n opportun e momen t t o secure a firm reply from one of the leadin g powers. To pay attention no w to these problem s is , therefore , a necessary complemen t t o meetin g th e pro blems o f the conduc t of the war.' 8 Although they kne w they would have to trim their views to accommodat e the predilection s o f th e all-powerful , most Canadia n official s bega n wit h a

233 Draftin g the Charte r hope that the ne w United Nations could be more boldl y innovative than th e League. External Affair s regarde d the first British PH P paper as too conservative. It had dismissed th e ide a of an international police force on the ground s that tha t implie d the existenc e o f a world state. Th e departmen t was still at the draftin g board . Althoug h th e officials ' Utopia n inclination s wer e re strained b y a recognition tha t ther e wa s no possibilit y of abolishing national armies i n favou r o f a n internationa l forc e wit h ful l responsibilit y fo r th e preservation o f peace, they were interested i n experiments with international forces which might at least guard international bases. That would not require a world state. Wron g saw an encouragin g precedent i n the polyglo t air force then operatin g out o f Britain. Robertson als o stressed Canadia n wartime involvement i n allied forces, typicall y seeing th e nee d t o anchor experimentation i n historica l experience . H e wondere d als o if such a police force might not provid e for the restles s youn g a release comparabl e to that of the RCM P or the Foreig n Legion. 9 Others lik e Lester Pearso n an d Escott Reid , operat ing from the Washington embassy, wer e inclined to go further. Reid forme d the mor e Utopia n win g o f officialdom , Pearso n remaine d strongl y condi tioned b y th e failur e o f collectiv e securit y i n th e thirtie s an d stubbornl y reluctant to bow to the 'wisdom ' of the great powers. Wrong was often impatient o f Reid' s idea s a s bein g 'pushe d to o far. ' Whe n Rei d presse d afte r Dumbarton Oak s for a strong statement o f Canadian position s by the prim e minister, Wron g typicall y warne d agains t gettin g publicl y committe d t o amendments 'th e inclusion of which we may not be able to secure.' 10 Differ ences between Wron g and Reid, whic h became mor e pronounce d late r over the North Atlanti c Treaty, were less ideological than temperamental . I n that their dispute reflecte d the continuing dilemm a o f Canadian foreign policy, it was an extraordinarily creative dialogue which prevented Canadia n position s at this crucial phase fro m becomin g engraved. 11 In 1944- 5 th e divergenc e wa s more of emphasis tha n a cleavage betwee n the Ottaw a and Washingto n offices . Th e Ottawans , however , were , i f not in the driver's seat , a t least sittin g behind the driver. The undersecretary, Nor man Robertson, realize d tha t althoug h Kin g wa s payin g li p servic e t o a strong Unite d Nations, h e was unlikely to approve of one which could order Canadian troop s int o battle. In a sense, Robertson an d Wrong wer e the philosophers o f Canada's U N policy; Pearson wa s the creative operator. Pearso n was th e suprem e strategis t wh o coul d tak e a philosophy eve n i f it wa s no t quite hi s an d mak e a succes s o f it . B y making himsel f indispensabl e t o UNRRA, at Bretton Woods , or at Sa n Francisco h e create d respec t fo r Cana dian positions , bu t hi s par t i n th e formulatio n o f these positions i n 1944- 5 was not decisive . A t San Francisco Robertso n wa s the senior civi l servant i n his positio n a s 'alternate and adviser ' t o the prim e minister i n the Steerin g

234 Th e Shapin g of Peac e Committee an d th e channe l fro m Kin g afte r th e latte r returned t o Ottawa. His uniqu e authorit y was attributable to his own hig h intelligenc e and his proximity t o th e throne . Robertso n wa s the firs t choic e o f Acheso n an d others i n the Stat e Departmen t a s secretary-general of the Unite d Nations . They showed a slight preference for him over Pearson althoug h they recognized that the latter was a superb 'conference man." 2 The plannin g in External Affair s an d i n th e interdepartmenta l PHP Committee wen t on without much reference to the prime minister, except when he ha d t o b e briefe d for speeche s or for meetings abroad . His own conceptions o f a ne w worl d order , a s reveale d i n hi s diar y record s o f talk s with Churchill and Roosevelt, were mostly platitudinous and often determine d by his preoccupation wit h Canadian issues. His views on an international force, for example , wer e thos e o f a ma n involve d wit h a conscriptio n crisi s a t home. On the whole, however, he seemed reasonably content wit h the proposals o f the official s a s filtere d t o hi m b y Robertson. Som e of their earlier ideas about an internationa l force would no doub t have upset him if he had read thei r paper s ver y seriously. By the tim e he becam e involve d i n actual discussions o f th e Unite d Nation s wit h th e Commonwealt h an d othe r leaders, th e Canadia n emphasi s ha d shifted fro m abstractions about collective securit y to th e injustice s fo r a responsibl e middl e powe r o f th e grea t powers' plan s for them . Canadian grievances of that kind were King's stock in trade. Consideratio n o f a security system with teeth ha d to be suspended until th e right s o f the lesse r power s were cleared up . B y the tim e tha t was done at San Francisco, great-powe r divisions were making any Utopian concepts of security irrelevant. Pearson an d Reid continued to regret the failur e o f the great powers to go beyond the Leagu e in providing for collective security. In a letter to Robertson a s early as 1 4 March 194 3 Pearson said : 'We are hearin g fa r too muc h these days that there i s no us e o f the Worl d Organization even contemplat ing the impositio n of sanctions against a Great Power.' He recognized political reaso n fo r thi s lin e i n certai n countries , 'bu t I se e n o reaso n wh y we should encourage it in Canada. ' Robertson and Wrong recognized that neither the great powers nor the Canadian government were going to accept that kind of world authority. Nevertheless, Wrong told Pearson he fully agreed with his criticism o f th e outrigh t rejectio n b y the Britis h and American s o f a Soviet suggestion fo r a n internationa l ai r force and though t this position would be supported b y the government, 13 but such ideas never reached the stage when the Canadian government ha d to look at the implication s for Canada . Robertson an d Wron g wer e mor e dispose d tha n thei r Washingto n col leagues t o temper thei r conception s o f an idea l world order wit h a recogni-

235 Draftin g the Charte r tion tha t th e willingnes s of all great powers to participat e was of over-riding importance. Robertson , i n th e latte r stage s a t Sa n Francisco , go t King' s agreement t o a position which he set out as follows: It seems clear to us that, in this year of grace, there cannot be a World Organization established, wit h Russia a member, unless it provides for voting rights in the Security Council substantially as set fort h i n the Grea t Powe r memorandum .. . The effectiv e choice appears , therefore , t o be between suc h a n Organization and a n Organization from whic h th e Sovie t Unio n an d thos e countrie s whic h feel thei r securit y mos t closely dependent o n thei r relation s with it are excluded . Our vie w is that it is better to take the Organization that we can get and, having come to that decision, to refrain from furthe r effort s t o pr y apar t th e difficul t unit y whic h th e Grea t Power s hav e attained. This means foregoing the luxury of making any more perfectionist speeches either on the voting procedure itself or on the general amendment procedure , which is very closely linked with it. We can continue to oppose th e Soviet Union and other Great Power s on .. . essentially secondary questions, bu t w e should not insist on forcing decisions o n suc h central questions a s veto an d amendmen t t o a vote i n which our associatio n wit h the othe r middl e and smalle r Power s migh t well resul t i n th e rejection o f the Dumbarto n Oak s proposals. 14

The positio n wa s directed ostensibl y agains t th e Australia n externa l affair s minister, bu t Robertson probably had in mind a tendency to 'perfectionism ' in the Canadia n rank s as well. FUNCTIONALISM A S A PRECEP T

It woul d b e misleadin g t o identif y th e exac t prescriptio n Canad a advance d for th e new world order. The earlier projections had to be modified rapidly in 1944 to take into consideration th e compromise the great powers were reaching, th e functiona l institutions whic h were already unde r construction , an d the chaoti c stat e o f th e world . On e can , however , identif y a n approach , a creed perhaps , certai n principle s which could be applied to the structure a s it came together. Whe n i t became clear that the earlier vision was unattainable, the Canadian s kep t workin g to mak e th e bes t o f what was left. B y moving with the tid e they avoided th e danger of splendid isolation and were of some consequence in the creatio n o f structures which were not reall y what any of the powers had intended - an d probably the better for that. What was set out in various charter s an d then shape d i n use may have been a United Nation s system mor e consisten t wit h the Canadians ' functionalis m tha n th e some what authoritarian blueprin t with which they tentatively set out i n 1943 .

236 Th e Shapin g of Peace The Canadia n theor y of functionalism was more tha n a n argumen t fo r a larger Canadia n role . I t wa s a philosoph y fo r worl d self-government . I t accepted a special role for the grea t powers in matters of security, and there fore th e veto , not simpl y because o f political necessity bu t becaus e securit y was the appropriat e functio n o f the grea t powers. But security wasn't every thing, an d those who ha d major militar y responsibilities could not clai m on that basi s t o dominat e othe r internationa l matters. Th e hierarch y o f eco nomic power s was different. Th e four majo r militar y powers - althoug h not necessarily a t that momen t - happene d als o to be the four majo r economi c powers an d the y migh t hav e specia l place s i n economi c bodie s bu t o n th e grounds o f their economi c qualifications . Thi s was a theory of world gover nance, bu t it was intended t o avoid centralized world government. I t was not a scheme of world federalism, althoug h spokesmen abou t any kind of international institution s ha d a habit of implying that the eventual goal was a kind of BNA Act for the world . Canadian functionalist s sought to put the function of security in its place and not allow it to dominate all others. The theory was designed t o prevent the Securit y Council from becoming an executive com mittee o r cabinet of the Unite d Nations. The great power s were not going to be allowed to run everythin g through the 'Worl d Council' as it was called in earlier drafts. The General Assembl y would not be subordinate to the coun cil. Althoug h th e linkag e o f variou s functiona l bodies , especiall y th e Eco nomic an d Socia l Council , wa s stresse d i n th e interest s o f co-ordination , nevertheless the domination of the great powers and the exercise o f the veto would be limited . The functionalis t thesi s was intende d to dea l wit h the dilemma that if every country demanded representatio n o n every body, then international government becam e impossible . If ther e wa s to b e a special plac e for grea t power s i n matters o f security, then ther e should also be a special place for secondary powers - a term Canadian official s use d unti l th e en d o f th e wa r whe n the y graduall y adopte d 'middle power,' which was coming into wider usage. In his statement t o th e Commonwealth prim e minister s o n 1 1 May 194 4 King referred t o Canad a 'as a power of middle size.' Canada was as anxious to distinguish its position from tha t o f th e smal l power s as it was to acknowledg e the positio n o f th e great powers. A t first Ottawa played with the ide a that ther e migh t b e some special positio n i n the Charter reserved for semi-permanent member s o f the Security Counci l base d o n militar y capacity. Durin g th e Dumbarto n Oak s meetings the y pressed th e case for tying eligibility for the Security Council to a commitment to provide forces for UN service.15 These ideas had no future. There wer e middl e power s withou t militar y capacity , especiall y i n Lati n America, wh o woul d vot e dow n an y suc h proposal . Whateve r sympath y

237 Draftin g th e Charte r some American s ha d wit h th e Canadia n attitude , th e Unite d State s wa s determined no t to oppose th e Latins. The emphasi s o n th e relatio n betwee n powe r an d responsibilit y mad e good sense , bu t a somewhat Presbyteria n vie w was taken i n Ottaw a o f re sponsibility. Countrie s whic h qualifie d a s middl e power s ha d t o b e very , very responsibl e an d bein g responsibl e mean t payin g one' s due s an d no t being irresponsibl e i n word or deed . Ther e wer e no doubts about Canadian worthiness o r o f th e pric e Canad a ha d pai d fo r du e representation . I n re trospect Canada' s contributio n t o th e victorie s o f 194 5 ma y no t loo k a s handsome a s i t di d t o thos e wh o fel t tha t Canad a wa s on e o f a ver y few allies tha t ha d gon e t o wa r without bein g attacked . Th e particula r selflessness o f th e Canadia n contributio n mad e u p fo r th e unavoidabl e lac k o f suffering o n the hom e front . I n its attitude to the League, Canad a ha d been afraid o f commitments tha t would take it to war . Now it had been take n t o war, ha d don e a good job, an d seeme d t o hop e tha t tha t on e contributio n could justif y a permanen t statu s base d o n pas t effort . I n fact , i t wa s pro bably th e potentia l Canadian contribution to relie f and rehabilitatio n rather than its past military effort tha t made this Canadian self-image more acceptable to allied countries . The avoidanc e o f rigidit y wa s a Canadian ai m throughou t th e debat e o n the new organization - eve n thoug h the Canadian delegation s did press in certain places for more precisio n in the Charter . Canadian view s were by no means alway s entirely consistent wit h eac h other , th e emphasi s ofte n de pending on the drafter s of the message . I t was accepted tha t the fear s of the great power s fo r thei r securit y woul d have t o b e accommodate d b y special rights on security questions and, tha t being the case, th e lesser power s were better of f in a loose structur e than i n one base d o n a formally defined hierarchy. Whe n i n Septembe r 194 4 ther e wa s deadloc k a t Dumbarto n Oak s over securit y arrangements a message wen t from Ottawa to Churchill which was designed t o avoid a confrontation wit h the Russian s by not meeting this problem head on. King's telegram said: 'In actual practice it seems to me that this matte r o f individua l vet o i s likel y to b e mor e forma l tha n real . I t i s unlikely that important questions directl y interesting the Soviet governmen t would b e presse d t o a vot e i n th e Counci l ove r Sovie t opposition . I f they were s o pressed , i t i s stil l mor e unlikel y tha t the y woul d secur e requisit e support fro m othe r Counci l members . I f the Sovie t governmen t wer e full y conscious o f th e respec t whic h other nation s hav e fo r thei r strength , the y would realiz e that , eve n withou t bein g assure d a righ t o f veto , thei r ow n power i s a safeguar d against th e adoptio n o f decision s whic h they ar e un willing to accept.'

238 Th e Shapin g of Peace The telegram , whic h reflect s Robertson-Wrong pragmatism , stressed th e practical importanc e o f th e organization' s havin g th e suppor t o f smalle r powers. 'From the point of view of countries without permanent seats on the Council, especially those which are expected t o make a substantial contribution to the maintenance of security, the proble m is not fundamentally one of status but of the degree to which their people will accept a permanent delegation o f control over thei r own policie s and action s t o a body on which they may not be represented.' These proposals , King said, raised more than theo retical issues of sovereignty. 'I am conscious of the potentia l political difficulties i n Canad a i f such pledge s wer e sought an d i t seem s t o m e tha t thes e difficulties wil l presen t themselve s mor e acutel y i n Europea n secondar y states.' Ottawa saw a possible solution as follows : While Soviet participatio n in the Organizatio n i s vital for it s success, i t is also mos t important that public opinion throughout the United Nations should warml y support the plan, not only now but fo r many years to come. I f the Organization is intended t o be mainl y an allianc e betwee n th e Unite d States , th e Unite d Kingdo m an d Sovie t governments (whic h is , o f course , on e o f it s purposes) i t would b e logica l now t o accept th e Russia n vie w on th e questio n o f the veto . I t would , however , b e mor e realistic an d probabl y more acceptabl e t o othe r countrie s i f suc h a n allianc e wer e represented a s a necessar y transitiona l stag e i n th e organizatio n o f worl d security , and no t as part of a general and permanen t system base d o n 'th e sovereign equalit y of peace lovin g states.'16 THE TRANSITIO N FRO M WA R T O PEAC E The concept o f a transitional stage on the way from th e wartime alliance to a peacetime international structure was important in Canadian thinking during the month s before San Francisco. It was, for one thing, a means o f reconciling presen t exigencie s wit h the persisten t visio n o f wha t a ne w leagu e o f nations shoul d be . Wrong saw clearly the risk s in the Dumbarto n Oak s discussions, which , he said, 'involve s an egg-dance becaus e ther e i s too muc h make-believe.' Among the illusions he noted was the assumption that China and th e Unite d Kingdo m were great powers ; tha t France di d not exist; tha t no ne w great powers would arise; that the great powers would never quarrel or i f they di d i t wa s no concer n o f th e others , eve n thoug h the y might b e sacrificed t o avoi d a conflict, a s were Czechoslovakia, Finland , an d Poland . There were, he recognized, mor e o r less valid reasons for all of this evasio n and make-believe. 'Bu t is not its magnitude so great as to render constitution making premature? Of course something mus t be done now but might it not

239 Draftin g the Charter be better to have a temporary device? In this context he suggested looking at 'the possibility of amendment' and 'th e promise of overhaul.'17 If on e judge d b y publishe d statement s alone , on e woul d assume tha t Canadian planner s wer e naïv e i n their assumption tha t quarrels among th e great power s di d no t pos e a serious threa t t o the Unite d Nations . Interna l memoranda mak e clea r that there wer e few illusions. R.A. MacKay, for example, in a comment date d 2 9 February 1944 on a PHP paper, noted tha t the dangers, rathe r tha n fro m German y o r Japan , cam e fro m th e conflictin g interests amon g th e Bi g Three. They were likely to reassert themselves , an d it was doubtful i f the coalitio n coul d b e maintaine d b y conjuring up hypothetical foes. Wrong recognized that the Security Council could never handl e a seriou s disput e betwee n th e grea t powers. 18 The proble m wa s that public acknowledgment o f this fear threatened th e allied unity necessary for the last thrust to victor y and whatever possiblity there wa s of maintaining th e great power coalition a t the heart of the United Nations . At the same time as they were planning the new international organization External Affair s officer s wer e contemplating proposals for the occupatio n of Germany an d Japan, both of which were expected to be more turbulent than they turned ou t to be. The struggl e for a voice in the international organization coul d not b e divorce d fro m th e difficul t question s concernin g a role in the occupatio n régime s an d th e relationshi p t o that issue o f a commitmen t of forces. 19 Canadian attitude s were ambivalent. On the on e han d there was the argumen t fo r regardin g th e postwa r arrangements fo r enem y state s as interim, divorce d fro m a mor e 'democratic ' régim e fo r a lastin g Unite d Nations. There wa s the persuasive argumen t that the League had been han dicapped b y its too close connectio n wit h a punitive peace treaty. Nevertheless, ther e wa s a cas e fo r mobilizin g wartime attitude s t o strengthe n th e peacetime crusade . Th e Unite d Nation s ha d bee n establishe d a s a n allie d struggle against aggressio n an d thi s spiri t must b e continued. I f the Unite d Nations were to prosper o n the basi s of precedents ther e must b e successful precedents. Great-powe r unit y vis-à-vi s th e defeate d state s coul d wel l b e the mos t effectiv e precedent . I n King' s telegra m t o Churchil l mentione d above20 h e suggeste d tha t 'i n th e Unite d State s an d i n nearl y all the othe r allied countrie s publi c opinio n woul d accep t far-reachin g obligation s de signed to prevent a further outbrea k from German y o r Japan. This would be regarded i n quit e a differen t ligh t fro m th e assumptio n o f permanen t an d indefinite obligation s t o assis t i n al l circumstance s i n th e enforcemen t o f settlements prescribed b y the Council. ' I n a statement o f questions arisin g from th e Dumbarto n Oak s proposals put forward for discussion b y the Cana dian delegation t o the Commonwealt h meetin g of April 1945,21 it was stated:

240 Th e Shapin g of Peac e The firs t stag e o f the contro l o f Germany b y a Military Control Commissio n will , of course, b e in many respects th e final stage of military operations agains t that enemy . Full militar y occupation an d governmen t i s expected, however , t o give way before very lon g t o othe r method s o f supervision. I f the Securit y Council is not associate d with thi s long-term supervision , it s importance ma y in fact be small during the year s when it is most desirabl e fo r i t to acquire prestige i n respect o f all nations .

'This conceptio n o f th e organizatio n in it s initia l stag e a s a transitional arrangement' was recommended t o the Commonwealth meeting as 'realistic in vie w of the impossibilit y of long-range planning during the final stages o f the wa r before th e peac e term s ar e agreed upon . Furthermore, th e knowledge that a member woul d have the opportunity of reviewing the question of membership afte r a ter m o f year s would help t o mak e palatabl e th e initial acceptance of the Charte r which doubtless will incorporate a number of provisions ope n t o vali d and serious criticism. ' For thi s reason importanc e was attached t o a n easie r arrangemen t fo r amendin g th e Charte r an d als o fo r withdrawal. The Unite d Nation s ought not t o be paralyzed by withdrawal as the League ha d been, bu t at the same tim e it was recognized tha t the Unite d Nations migh t quickly b e transformed into something rather different fro m what it s member s ha d though t the y wer e joining and the y shoul d hav e a clearly specified right to get out . A s it was obvious in the las t months o f th e war that the great powers were planning their treatment of the enemy among themselves alon e and intended t o make clear in the Charter that there would be n o interferenc e fro m th e Unite d Nations , Canadia n attentio n move d from advocatin g th e concep t o f a transitional arrangement t o providin g for amendment o f the Charter after a fixed period and by as flexible a process a s possible. THE PRIORITY ISSUE S

Up t o th e sprin g of 194 5 Canadia n attention wa s increasingly fixed on tw o related aspect s o f th e ne w organizatio n tha t seeme d directl y t o affec t th e Canadian interest . On e might be described a s the righ t of consent, the par ticipation o f lesser power s in decisions tha t woul d commit the m t o provide forces o r engag e i n sanctions , a deman d roote d dee p i n Canadia n history . The other was the recognition o f 'responsible' powers with medium military capacity i n th e selectio n fo r non-permanen t seat s o n th e Securit y Council . Much effor t wen t int o findin g formula s t o aver t a n obligatio n b y lesse r powers to enforce decisions o f the Security Council in which they had played no part. It was the blatant inequity of the great-powers proposals which riled.

241 Draftin g the Charter Whereas the y would be protecte d b y their vetoes fro m enforcin g decision s they disliked , othe r member s wer e regarde d a s obligate d t o d o wha t the y were told. Although the latter' s military obligations would be determined b y special agreemen t separatel y ratifie d b y eac h member , onc e consen t ha d been give n th e Securit y Council could presumably call upon th e membe r t o act. Much was made in Canadian memorand a o f the argument that no state can really represent anothe r an d that i t was not i n the Canadia n traditio n to delegate.22 There were variou s Canadia n suggestion s t o mee t thi s situation: by securing Assembl y approva l of such Security Council decisions o r by giving temporary membershi p o n the Counci l to states whos e co-operation was needed. On th e eligibilit y o f middl e power s fo r specia l consideratio n i n appointments t o th e Securit y Council, th e Canadian s fro m th e beginnin g presse d their case har d wit h the Britis h who gav e the m som e heed . I t was proof o f British loyalt y that the y di d what they could t o help , althoug h i n thei r ex changes wit h the Canadian s the y produce d som e dismayin g questions. I n a telegram o f 2 1 August 194 4 from th e secretar y o f state for dominio n affair s to th e secretar y o f stat e fo r externa l affairs , agreemen t wa s expresse d i n principle tha t weigh t shoul d b e give n t o differenc e i n power , status , an d functional importanc e a s wel l a s t o th e nee d fo r representatio n fro m th e different regions . But we feel that any system which attempted to classify secondary powers in differen t categories migh t arouse antagonism to the organization at the outset. Moreover.. . it is questionabl e whethe r any specia l weight should b e give n t o militar y powe r as a qualification fo r election. It is by no means certain that it would operate to the advantage o f Britis h Commonwealt h countries . A s regard s th e suggestio n tha t th e par t played in the present war by candidates for the Council should be a relevant criterion, this will no doubt b e the cas e t o some extent in the earl y postwar years, but i t will be impossible t o ignor e th e clai m o f Europea n countrie s whos e co-operatio n wil l b e essential, thoug h their contribution to victory may have been limite d because, owing to their geographical situation, they have been over-ru n by the enemy.

Subsequent Canadia n communication s faile d t o grappl e wit h th e Britis h arguments bu t merel y state d agai n th e injustic e o f i t al l an d th e politica l difficulty i t involved fo r Canada . This preoccupation durin g the Dumbarto n Oak s phase wit h special grievances perhaps distracte d official s fro m th e broade r issue s they had contemplated i n th e beginning . The y justifie d thei r concern , however , o n th e grounds tha t no international institutio n could be strong an d stable withou t

242 Th e Shapin g of Peac e the willin g support of the lesser powers. They were also convinced that Canadians woul d reject a charter tha t would obligate them unjustly . In retrospec t their nervousnes s abou t parliamentar y reaction seem s exaggerated , a s th e Canadian governmen t an d parliamen t wer e b y 194 5 too far committed t o a United Nation s t o rejec t anythin g th e Britis h and American s woul d join. Public opinio n poll s o f th e tim e sugges t tha t Canadians, particularl y those who spoke English , favoure d a United Nation s wit h force s a t it s comman d and wer e not especiall y sensitive abou t whethe r Canad a wa s represented o n the body that called them i n to action.23 Warnings that parliament 'would not understand' are , o f course , th e instinctiv e weapon s o f diplomats . Th e Americans could get almost anything by warning that the Senate might again walk out . Canadia n diplomat s wer e encourage d b y their prim e ministe r t o take a cautious vie w of the internationa l dedicatio n o f the Canadia n people . Some o f them realized , furthermore, that it would help the Canadian peopl e to swallo w certain inevitabl e provision s i f they kne w tha t thei r representa tives had put up the best possible fight against them. In a realistic assessment of th e prospect s fo r th e militar y provisions o f th e Charte r i n earl y 1945 , Hume Wron g concluded : The proposals looked at by themselves appear more formidable tha n they are likel y to b e i n reality , at any rate for a number of years. The Securit y Council will control military power less extensive than one would expec t from th e tex t of the proposals. The chie f organizatio n o f powe r wil l probabl y aris e fro m th e commitment s mad e between the majo r allie s to enforce the executio n of the peac e terms. There are, nevertheless, serious objections from th e Canadian point of view to the acceptance without chang e of those parts of the draf t whic h defin e th e authorit y of the Securit y Counci l t o cal l upo n al l members t o assis t i n enforcin g it s decisions . These objection s ar e likel y t o b e les s important i n practic e than i n securing publi c support for the plan. 24 It is of interest als o to note the subjects which did not ge t much attentio n in the preparatory studies, includin g some which were to prove controversial and t o occup y priorit y attentio n o n th e agend a o f th e evolvin g Unite d Nations system . Ther e is little in the workin g papers abou t huma n rights, 25 partly because o f the warines s of the federa l government o n the subjec t and partly because o f the conviction that there were too many honest but divers e national interpretation s t o permi t muc h usefu l initiativ e by an internationa l organization. O n th e questio n o f interferenc e i n th e interna l affair s o f a country the Canadia n vie w was also cautious. Support was given to the British opinion tha t the onl y valid reason fo r interference wa s to forestall condi -

243 Draftin g the Charte r tions that endangered internationa l peace and security. Even more surprising is th e lac k o f attentio n i n th e positio n paper s t o th e economi c an d socia l functions. On e reaso n wa s that the y wer e no t give n muc h attentio n i n th e great-power proposals on which comments were being made. It was the security issues which mattered t o them, and the Russian s discourage d considera tion o f othe r functions . Canad a di d a t leas t le t th e power s kno w that they planned to rectif y thi s situation at San Francisco. 26 There wa s littl e mentio n o f disarmamen t either , a subjec t regarde d o f great importanc e i n th e Leagu e an d on e i n which Canada wa s to b e muc h involved i n th e Unite d Nations . Th e planner s i n Ottaw a were, o f course , unaware o f th e atomi c bom b t o b e unleashe d i n Augus t 1945 , a n even t which would have upset any previous calculations on the regulatio n of armaments. O n thi s question Canadia n thinkin g reflected tha t o f others. Every one's min d wa s on collectiv e securit y rather than disarmament . A wartime poll (2 0 Januar y 1943 ) foun d 8 0 pe r cen t favourin g th e maintenanc e o f strong arme d forc e after th e war . One o f the fe w mentions o f disarmamen t was in the memorandu m entitle d 'Militar y Aspects o f the Dumbarto n Oaks Proposals' b y Hum e Wrong. 27 Unde r th e headin g 'Regulatio n o f Arma ments' he noted that in contrast wit h the League Covenant th e draft Charter had littl e t o sa y on th e contro l o f armaments , excep t fo r a brief statemen t that in order to promote peac e and security with the least diversion of human and economic resource s for armaments, th e Security Council should formulate plans for a system o f regulation of armaments t o be submitted to mem bers o f th e organization . Wrong' s commen t wa s a s follows : 'Th e wor d "regulation" has been deliberately adopted in place of the word "limitation" with the ide a tha t i t might prov e desirable to agree o n the minimu m as well as the maximu m armament s whic h should b e maintained b y members. Th e regulation o f armaments has a low priority in the minds of the framers of the proposals an d consideration o f it is put off until the Militar y Staff Committe e is in a position t o advise the Securit y Council on a general system o f regulation for submission t o members o f the organization.' Disarmament got scant attention a t San Francisco an d onl y a brief reference i n the Charter . THE C O M M O N W E A L T H AN D TH E UNITE D N A T I O N S

There had been thos e who regarded Canada's association wit h the League of Nations a s a threat t o Commonwealt h loyalty , bu t b y 194 5 ther e wa s little opposition t o the vie w that each ha d its function and they were compatible. Among those notions whic h did not survive th e brass-tacks stag e of negotiation wa s tha t o f designatin g th e Britis h Commonwealth , rathe r tha n th e

244 Th e Shapin g of Peac e United Kingdom, as one of the great-powe r members o f the Security Council.28 I n th e Foreig n Offic e the y laughe d a t th e idea. 29 Althoug h Kin g assumed tha t Churchill favoured it, Churchill does not seem t o have raised it with him personall y and specifically. Speakers continued carelessly to refer to the Commonwealt h as a great power , but it did not appea r in any of the British proposals discussed a t or after Dumbarto n Oaks . The British , in fact, were seeking t o get an assured sea t on the Securit y Council for a Common wealth country in addition to the United Kingdom. This was a proposal about which th e Canadian s wer e unwisel y cool. Miscalculating , as the y wer e in clined to do at this time, th e continuing importance of Canadian power, they thought such a n arrangemen t woul d give Canada inadequat e opportunitie s to serv e o n th e Securit y Council. Whe n Unite d Nation s politic s started t o work, however, they realized it was a considerable advantage to be a member of the mos t exclusiv e of all the groupings . On the ev e of the Sa n Francisco Conferenc e ther e was a demonstration i n London o f the valu e of Commonwealth consultatio n whe n th e representa tives had what Lord Cranborne described a s 'a sort of dress rehearsal for San Francisco.' A s Massey pointe d ou t i n a report t o Norman Robertso n date d 23 April, the question o f a 'single voice' was irrelevant. He thought it unfortunate tha t advocate s o f suc h a polic y coul d no t se e th e Commonwealt h consulting together i n this way so that they might realize the impracticability of the singl e voice in real situations.30 If the delegation s ha d in fact cast votes on eac h issue , th e Unite d Kingdo m woul d have foun d itsel f out-vote d o n several matter s i n whic h i t ha d a t leas t taci t commitment s t o th e Sovie t Union an d th e Unite d States . I t wa s the stronger opponent s o f a collective voice, Canada an d South Africa, who were in fact closest to the United Kingdom i n thei r view s on majo r Unite d Nations issues . Messr s Fraser o f New Zealand an d Evat t o f Australia , alread y preparing for obstreperou s role s a t San Francisco, too k vehemen t issu e wit h the Britis h even o n matters which the Britis h considered o f critical importance - th e question o f mandates and dependent territories . Masse y calle d Frase r 'th e onl y Wilsonian present.' 31 He was not eve n prepare d t o compromise b y accepting the Yalta voting formula. H e got some Canadian suppor t for his stand agains t admitting to San Francisco wha t he called 'the bandwagon states,' those who had made death bed repentance s b y declaring war at th e las t minute . Th e Commonwealt h members ha d all been upset by the bloc tactics of the Latin Americans at th e Philadelphia IL O conference , Bretto n Woods , an d particularl y the Interna tional Civi l Aviatio n Conferenc e i n Chicago 32 an d wante d t o preven t suc h activities from frustrating the purpose s o f the new organization.

245 Draftin g the Charte r Although Canad a go t broa d suppor t for it s views on th e right s of secondary powers , th e amendmen t o f th e Charter , an d th e righ t o f withdrawal, they did less well on th e obligation s o f non-member state s to enforce sanc tions. Smut s agree d wit h them, bu t ther e wa s opposition fro m th e Unite d Kingdom, Australia , an d India . Her e the y ra n int o th e stron g prejudic e against anything which would seem t o weake n the credibilit y of the Unite d Nations as an instrument of collective security. Smuts and the British clashed with Fraser an d Evatt on the anti-colonialist ideology of the Labour governments i n Australia and New Zealand. It was undoubtedly useful for the Brit ish to have this preview of what they would encounter a t San Francisco, an d later in the United Nations itself , and no doubt their positions were modified to some extent. Althoug h there wer e some vigorou s anti-colonialists i n the East Block , Ottawa did not shar e th e mor e extrem e view s of Canberra an d Wellington a t that time . They did think it in the interest s o f Britain and th e other imperial powers to co-operate i n a reasonable syste m o f mandates an d they were worried about friction wit h the doctrinaire views of the American s on colonialism. THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE An interesting aspec t o f the preparations for San Francisco was a determine d effort t o engage th e publi c in the discussion - a n effort a t participatory democracy hardly equalled b y those who some years later invented th e principle. King discouraged discussion . It would have been contrar y to his instinct about th e specia l natur e o f foreig n polic y actually to wan t advice fro m th e public. Nevertheless, the Wartime Information Boar d put out a pamphlet on the Dumbarto n Oak s proposals in the autum n o f 194 4 and distribute d ove r 40,000 copies. The illustrative charts were sent to newspapers and other periodicals, discussio n group s wer e encouraged, speaker s note s wer e provide d for radi o i n co-operation wit h th e Canadia n Counci l for Educatio n fo r Citizenship. The prim e minister table d a copy of the Dumbarto n Oak s proposa l and had it distributed to every MP. Behind this effort wer e some enthusiasti c officials who fel t strongl y the nee d for broa d public support if Canada wer e to play the activ e role they wanted in a new international organization. 33 King conceale d hi s doubt s abou t th e whol e projec t and wen t of f to San Francisco a t the hea d o f the delegation . H e had no alternative. He liked the sense of historic occasion bu t ha d not worked up much interest in the major issues. He was preoccupied with the Jun e electio n and was absent fro m San Francisco fo r about six crucial weeks. Fo r the same reason th e othe r parlia-

246 Th e Shapin g of Peace mentary delegate s wer e present onl y for the first month o r so. The official s on the delegation were a remarkable group. For the infightin g in committee s they ha d th e knowledg e required . Lackin g th e politica l clout whic h onl y ministers can bring to bear, they had to use their wits. They could not cut the figure of politicians like Evatt or Fraser o r play the kin d of role Smuts did in the draftin g o f th e Preambl e t o th e Charter . Professiona l diplomats , how ever, kne w they were there. The Canadia n positio n was perhaps helpe d b y the rudenes s o f th e Australian s an d Ne w Zealanders . I n th e critica l lat e stages Pearso n wa s asked b y Halifax, Dulles, an d Vandenber g i f he would caution Evat t about carrying too far hi s demands o n powers being accorded the Assembly , an d Pearso n wa s able to d o so . The Canadian s ha d a mor e sympathetic awareness o f th e politica l problems o f the five powers and this was appreciated. Their expertise at drafting compromises (bot h because they were good drafter s and goo d compromisers ) firml y establishe d th e reputa tion whic h had been growin g at Bretton Woods, Atlanti c City, and Chicago. It i s ironi c tha t Pearson' s reputatio n fo r mediatio n owe d somethin g t o a much note d interventio n to relieve wit h humou r th e tensio n create d b y an unpleasant publi c ro w o n th e par t o f th e Australian s and Ne w Zealander s with the Britis h at San Francisco.34 Although the parliamentary representatives had to leave most of the negotiation to the professional s they were by no means cyphers. The presence on the delegatio n of members o f the opposition , made particularly necessary by the fac t tha t ther e would be an election befor e any United Nations Charte r could b e considere d fo r approval , reflected the collectiv e will of parliament to pledge non-partisan support for the ne w organization. King said the government would have to take ultimate responsibility for positions adopted and also for appointing the delegation, bu t he would not prevent any member, if that member found it impossible to agree, from making his views known. He preferred t o have the member s g o as one delegation rathe r than have those from th e oppositio n present a s associates o r advisers. 35 He had bee n some what reluctant at first to have an all-party delegation but his hand was forced by th e Britis h and Australia n announcement s tha t the y planne d t o d o so . King did not, however, allow the parties to choose their own representatives . The Conservatives protested the failure to include their leader, John Bracken, but the government' s choic e of Gordon Graydo n was a happier one. Bracken subsequently proved at United Nations assemblies hi s innocence o f international affair s wherea s Graydo n worked hard and effectively . Tha t hi s views on some controversial issues, such as those having to do with the Common wealth, wer e closer t o those o f th e governmen t tha n wer e the position s of some Tories was undoubtedly a consideration in King's mind. M.J. Coldwell

247 Draftin g the Charte r for th e CC F was on e o f th e best-informe d parliamentarian s and conscien tiously interested i n all aspects o f the subject . Partisan differences di d not i n fact arise , bu t ther e wa s n o doub t wh o wa s i n charge . A s Pearso n com mented: 'Fo r a fe w week s a t least , Canad a wil l probabl y have a national government - at San Francisco!' 36 The oppositio n member s fro m th e beginnin g accepte d th e principa l emphases o f the delegation . When th e prim e minister outlined th e positio n h e would take o n the commitmen t o f Canadian forces by the Securit y Council, Coldwell said that s o long as the grea t power veto remained, th e polic y suggested wa s the onl y one tha t could b e taken by Canada. Graydon suggeste d that, whil e it was implicit in the statement , i t might be made clea r that Canada was anxious t o mee t it s full obligation s for securit y and wa s making its suggestions, no t t o evad e thos e obligations , bu t i n realit y t o increas e th e capacity fo r ready an d effective actio n - a position whic h was closer t o the hearts o f the official s tha n to the prime minister, although he could not hav e denied it. 37 Th e governmen t wa s influence d b y a genera l anxiet y t o rais e Canada's par t in the internationa l organization above domesti c politic s and, with the helpfu l collaboratio n o f the opposition , th e Unite d Nations di d not become a n issue o f any consequence i n the election s which took place while it was being created. 38 Mackenzie King , reaching fo r th e histori c moment, pu t a great dea l into his openin g speec h a t Sa n Francisco . A littl e too muc h o f himsel f perhap s went int o it . Ther e wa s a lo t abou t nation s unitin g t o sav e an d t o serv e humanity, forgin g and fashionin g fro m th e fire s o f wa r a n institutio n fo r world security , an d givin g hope t o grief-stricke n humanity . Th e Canadia n aim wa s 't o hel p t o brin g int o bein g a worl d communit y i n whic h socia l security an d huma n welfar e will becom e a part o f th e inheritanc e o f man kind.' King' s excessiv e modest y abou t wha t the Canadia n delegatio n woul d do prove d t o b e wishfu l thinking . 'We shal l not, ' h e said , 'b e guide d by considerations o f nationa l prid e o r prestig e an d shal l no t see k t o hav e changes mad e fo r reason s suc h a s these.' 39 Althoug h thi s kind o f holines s was peculiarl y Mr King's , th e busines s abou t prestig e wa s echoe d i n th e solemn insistenc e i n the officia l paper s tha t countries shoul d no t seek seats on th e Securit y Council fo r reason s o f prestige . Suc h low-mindednes s was constantly deplored . At San Francisco th e Canadia n delegatio n abl y argued its favourite causes and manage d t o ge t some revisions o f the Charter . Muc h o f th e effor t wa s directed against the great powers, but the British, and sometimes th e Americans, tried t o b e helpful . O n a few issues Canad a ha d prejudices which were more Nort h America n tha n middlepower . It oppose d th e movemen t le d by

248 Th e Shapin g of Peac e New Zealand t o get a guarantee of the territoria l integrity of states. It would approve a general principle of respect for the sovereign equality of states, but a sweeping guarantee of the statu s qu o territor y of every member ha d bee n what Canadians disliked in the League . The Unite d State s Senate ha d maintained a simila r bias , an d U S opposition wa s such tha t Canada wa s not re quired t o pu t u p much o f a struggle. Altogether, the great powers did ben d somewhat more than might have been expected , although no great dent was made in the Dumbarto n Oaks or Yalta frameworks. In the proces s o f a good energetic conferenc e th e Charte r wa s made mor e attractiv e t o th e lesse r powers an d coul d b e accepte d a s somethin g the y ha d helpe d creat e rathe r than something that ha d been entirel y imposed upo n them. In their anxiety to mak e th e Charte r widel y acceptabl e t o th e Canadia n parliamen t an d people officia l spokesme n perhap s exaggerate d the succes s o f the Canadia n delegation but, given the odds , i t was creditable. Like the othe r lesser power s the Canadia n delegatio n favoure d widening the scop e o f th e Genera l Assembly , bu t thi s purpos e wa s conditioned b y concern that the great powers accept rather than run away from their security obligations. According to the delegation's report, 'i n order to place responsibility wher e i t belong s an d t o avoi d divided o r concurrent jurisdiction an d jurisdictional dispute s whic h wil l pla y int o th e hand s o f trouble-makin g states,'40 the Genera l Assembl y must not b e able to act on matters o f peace and securit y whe n th e Securit y Counci l i s dealin g wit h the m activel y and effectively. However , th e Genera l Assembl y shoul d b e abl e t o tak e over responsibility i f a veto i n the Securit y Council made action impossible. Th e delegation oppose d som e o f th e mor e extrem e claim s fo r th e Genera l Assembly, as for instance those put forward by New Zealand. They favoured the granting of power to the Assembly to take initiatives in securing peaceful change (Articl e 14 ) bu t recognize d th e dange r o f bein g to o specific . Fo r example, referrin g t o treat y revisio n migh t inspir e disrespec t fo r existin g treaties. Th e Canadian vie w was that the Security Council was not a creature of th e Genera l Assembly . I t was not responsibl e t o the General Assembly , but a t th e sam e tim e i t wa s no t a n executiv e committe e o f th e Genera l Assembly. I t was a body whose powers, like those of the General Assembly , stemmed fro m th e Charter . Canad a favoure d report s fro m th e Securit y Council to the Genera l Assembl y but denied tha t this empowered th e Gen eral Assembly t o subject Security Council actions to inquisition. There was , o f course, muc h oppositio n t o the vet o fro m middl e powers . Canada defended i t on functional grounds but joined other middl e powers in opposing th e applicatio n of the vet o t o peaceful settlement as distinct from breaches of the peace. They had hoped also to limit its use over membership .

249 Draftin g the Charte r From th e beginning the delegation recognize d tha t the case agains t th e vet o over peacefu l settlemen t wa s one they must suppor t - bu t with the provis o that i t would no t driv e th e Russian s ou t o f th e UN . Within the delegation , Wilgress, th e Canadia n ambassado r i n Moscow , argue d tha t althoug h i t would be a mistake t o be 'tough ' all down the line with the Russians , i t was necessary t o stan d fir m o n importan t issue s lik e thi s on e tha t coul d b e defended.41 Th e Wester n great power s agree d tha t th e lesse r power s ha d a good case and tried to get a compromise agreemen t wit h the Russians. Whe n they failed , i t looke d a s i f th e conferenc e migh t brea k up , an d desperat e measures wer e being considered . At thi s poin t Norma n Robertso n asserte d hi s authority . Th e minister s were all back in Ottawa. Fraser an d Evatt accused th e Britis h of duplicity for abandoning th e positio n the y ha d take n wit h Commonwealth countrie s o n the veto. Robertso n sai d the Britis h position was understandable i n the light of their obligation to maintain great-power unanimity . Robertson an d Pear son talked to Evatt who said he had in mind both the possibility that the great powers wer e bluffin g an d th e probabilit y that i f he presse d hi s stan d t o a n ultimate vot e h e woul d not ge t enough suppor t bu t woul d be i n a stronge r position i n dealing with domestic criticism . Robertson sai d there were many things on which it would be desirable to point to a firm stand on principle but it wa s a luxur y which coul d no t b e enjoye d b y man y delegation s withou t running th e ris k of upsetting the entire conference . A t this point Robertso n thought tha t i f Canad a thre w it s weigh t energeticall y behin d Evatt , the y could probabl y defeat th e grea t powers on th e vet o question , bu t he got the agreement o f the prim e minister t o a policy of not forcin g the questio n t o a vote.42 In the en d the Russian s too k a more flexible position o n the righ t of the Counci l t o discuss a n issue withou t the veto, bu t ther e wa s no compro mise on the veto right over an y action o r decisions. Canada did not vote with Australia and the other intransigent s on this issue althoug h they tried unsuc cessfully a couple of compromise suggestions. 43 The guidin g Canadia n attitud e wa s summe d u p i n th e statemen t o f St Laurent t o the Hous e o f Commons on 1 6 October 194 5 when he said: 'It was apparent that the joint interpretation o f the Yalta voting formula represente d the greates t possibl e measur e o f agreement whic h could be obtained amon g the grea t power s themselve s a t thi s tim e o n thi s subject.' 44 H e said h e had been influence d b y th e combine d statement s o f th e representative s o f th e great powers that they would use their special voting position with a sense of responsibility, consideratio n fo r th e interest s o f smaller states , and, there fore, sparingly . Gettin g thi s pledg e ou t o f th e grea t power s wa s properly regarded a s an achievemen t b y the lesse r powers . Wester n power s di d us e

250 Th e Shapin g of Peace the vet o sparingly, although it may be argued tha t they were guided les s by their pledg e than b y the realizatio n in the earl y years of the Unite d Nation s that the y could normall y count o n majorit y suppor t i n the Securit y Council in an y case . Th e Canadia n delegation' s repor t recognize d tha t th e Unite d Nations was going to be a highly political organization and its practices would be determined mor e b y the art of the possible in varying circumstances than by legalisti c provisions. Ther e was the furthe r consideratio n tha t i t i s possible t o exaggerat e th e importanc e o f voting arrangement s i n th e Council . For example, durin g the whole course o f the Conference th e Grea t Power s had been abl e to work together withou t taking formal votes.'45 In th e Canadia n vie w the Charte r t o b e constructe d o n th e basi s o f th e Dumbarton Oak s proposals wa s to be a beginning and not an end. 'I t was to be th e foundatio n o f a new structure to create an d preserv e peace , no t th e whole vast completed edifice . If the Organizatio n is to free the peoples o f the world from the fear of war, it would eventually have to be given the right and the powe r t o restrai n an y disturbe r o f the world' s peace.' 46 In spit e o f thi s belief, however , i n the nee d fo r an instrument o f collective security, Canadian boy s were not goin g to be sent t o war by external bodies . Not onl y the Russians, however , bu t also some vulnerabl e middle powers feared tha t any provision fo r specia l representatio n i n th e Securit y Counci l woul d rais e doubts abou t th e credibilit y of that bod y as a deterrent t o aggression . I t was the kin d of opposition Canada had rouse d whe n it opposed Article 10 of th e League. The British , French, an d Chinese agree d wit h a proposed Canadia n amendment t o the effec t tha t an y member no t represente d o n the Securit y Council coul d participat e i n th e decision s concernin g th e employmen t o f contingents o f its armed forces . Th e American s came round , bu t th e Rus sians wer e ver y dubious . Privatel y th e Russian s sai d the y accepte d th e reasonableness of the proposa l so far a s it concerned Canad a bu t coul d no t agree t o th e generalizatio n o f th e principle . Novikov o f th e USS R tol d th e Canadians i n confidence tha t there wer e onl y four countrie s tha t ha d really fought th e war , th e USSR , th e Unite d States , th e Unite d Kingdom , an d Canada47-a gros s misrepresentatio n bu t calculate d t o appea l t o Canadia n prejudice. Eventuall y the Russian s agree d t o accep t a wording that applie d only to situations in which the use of the member's forces was under consid eration i f Canada woul d drop two other amendment s concerning temporar y membership o n th e Council . A s these latter ha d little chanc e o f adoption , Canada agreed t o get what it could and Article 44, providing for participation as Canada wanted , was enshrined i n the Charter . The effor t ma y have bee n wort h while to appease th e Canadia n sense of grievance, bu t as the special agreement s calle d for in Article 43 have neve r

251 Draftin g the Charter been reached, there has been n o occasio n to apply Article 44. When Canada eventually did provide forces for peacekeeping operations, an entirely differ ent kin d of operation from wha t was envisaged i n 1945 , this was done o n a voluntary basis. In the kin d of United Nations which developed ther e could be n o questio n o f conscriptin g the force s o f any membe r state . Wha t was achieved i n getting Article 32 into the Charte r may have been o f more lasting importance. This article provides that a party to a dispute which is not a member o f th e Counci l should b e invite d to participat e in the discussions . The Canadian and Dutch delegations were unsuccessful in their effort t o see that bot h partie s to th e disput e would have equa l voting privileges, even if one was a member and one was not, but, in spite of the apparent logic of the demand, i t wa s clear t o a majorit y tha t voting privileges for a d ho c participants in Council sessions would introduce a chaotic element. Canadians migh t hav e take n more credi t fo r th e rol e they played in em phasizing the Securit y Council's functio n t o promote peaceful settlements of disputes under Chapte r vi . There was some general nervousness, shared by the Unite d States , abou t th e Council's seemin g t o 'impose' peaceful settlement. Th e Commonwealt h member s in Apri l ha d argued that th e Council should b e empowered to recommend appropriat e terms of settlement when ever it thought fit to do so in serious disputes. Both France and Canada made proposals t o thi s effec t a t Sa n Francisco , bu t thei r suggestion s wer e no t adopted. On this move Ruth Russell i n her authoritative History of the United Nations Charter, commented: 'Th e two delegations , it wil l be noted , had suggested change s that woul d have altered th e Dumbarto n Oak s concept of the Counci l a s primaril y policeman, rathe r tha n a s an arbite r o r mediato r concerned wit h th e merit s o f the dispute s or situations.' 48 Eventually, however, the latte r is the wa y the Securit y Council moved. In th e moo d o f 194 5 th e mediator y functions as stressed i n the Leagu e were considered inadequate ; th e new body must have the powers of a police force. Canadians shared that view to a point, but they had always considered the mediator y function s a s importan t also . I n hi s repor t t o parliamen t St Laurent modestl y said : 'I t is , I think , satisfactor y that th e charte r dealin g with th e peacefu l settlemen t o f dispute s ha s bee n enlarge d an d improved , because it is before violence has broken ou t tha t the organization can do its most usefu l work in preventing aggression.' 49 This wa s beginning to soun d more like the prewar views on the functions of an international organization. The muc h heralde d triump h of Canadian functionalism was the insertion in the Charte r of Article 23 concerning the qualifications for non-permanen t members o f the Securit y Council. This also proved a hollow victory. Article 23 directs tha t i n th e electio n o f the member s o f the Securit y Council du e

252 Th e Shapin g of Peac e regard shoul d b e 'speciall y paid , i n the firs t instanc e t o th e contributio n of Members o f th e Unite d Nation s t o the maintenanc e o f international peac e and security and to the other purposes o f the Organization.' At San Francisco there wer e pressures fo r various criteria. The Lati n American blo c sought a permanent sea t fo r th e regio n o r a specifie d allocation . Indi a wante d du e regard paid to population and economic capacity. The Dutch wanted middle power membershi p formall y specifie d in the Charter . Canad a wante d t o require the Assembl y to adopt rules governing selection, but this was defeated. When th e Britis h proposed addin g 'equitabl e geographi c distribution' a s a second criterion , thi s was adopted a s a 'sponsors' amendment. ' I n spit e of Canadian insistence tha t the second criterion was intended t o be subordinate to th e first , i t could no t b e sai d that thi s interpretatio n wa s affirmed b y th e conference. I n fact thi s question, t o which Canada had attached primary importance i n th e earl y stages o f preparing the Charter , fizzled out a s a major issue a t Sa n Francisco. Perhap s th e Canadia n attachmen t t o a logica l case, based o n an impeccable principl e of functionalism, obscured fro m them th e political unreality of what they sought. I t is difficult t o avoid the conclusio n that th e Sovie t Union , th e Unite d States , th e Lati n Americans, an d other s considered th e bes t tacti c was to accep t th e amendmen t an d ignor e it-as they did. On regionalism 50 th e Canadia n attitud e wa s decidedl y sceptical . A t th e Commonwealth Prim e Ministers meeting in 1944 King had successfully shot down some impractica l views of Churchill on this subject, views which were not share d in the Foreig n Office . Thes e provided for regiona l councils on a continental basis. What King especially disliked was that the Commonwealt h would b e represented b y one of its members o n each counci l - Canad a o n the Nort h America n Council , fo r example. 51 Whe n Churchil l realized tha t the othe r prim e ministers wer e dubious, h e withdrew his paper, saying that he ha d himsel f wondere d ho w th e representatio n woul d b e worke d out. 52 The basi c Canadia n premis e wa s that worl d security could no t b e trusted i n the first place to regional organizations, although certain functions, both eco nomic an d strategic , migh t b e handle d b y a d ho c regiona l bodie s strictl y within the authorit y of the worl d organization. It had been continental isola tionism, they believed, tha t had allowed the two great wars to happen. The y had not liked the earl y proposals by which regional organizations would have the authorit y t o settl e loca l dispute s becaus e the y preferre d tha t regiona l organizations hav e n o politica l authority. They realized , o f course , tha t i t would b e difficul t t o secure United State s consen t t o an agreement tha t did not allo w th e settlemen t o f inter-America n dispute s b y inter-America n bodies. It was important , however , tha t no enforcemen t actio n be take n

253 Draftin g th e Charte r without approva l by the Securit y Council. It was recognized tha t there were likely t o b e regiona l agreement s i n Wester n Europ e t o preven t th e resur gence o f Germany, bu t thes e could b e treated a s part of the specia l arrange ments t o enforce th e peace . At Sa n Francisco Canada' s attitude on regionalis m wa s muted. Althoug h the officia l delegatio n repor t describe s i n detai l th e discussio n o f regiona l arrangements, i t i s curiousl y silent abou t an y Canadia n position , probabl y because a n energeti c Canadia n positio n wa s unnecessary. Th e Britis h had views whic h Canad a ha d approve d an d the y were very effective i n securin g the necessar y compromise . Th e Canadia n delegatio n considere d i t tactically wise to direct its resources wher e they were needed and avoid wasting credit. In view of their importance later , a t the tim e when NAT O was established , Canadian attitude s towards Articl e 51, whic h provided fo r th e righ t o f individual o r collectiv e self-defence , an d Articl e 53 , o n th e right s o f regiona l agencies for peac e an d security , ar e o f interest. Canad a favoure d th e asser tion o f th e authorit y of th e universa l bod y ove r th e regiona l bod y whe n it came t o enforcement. Th e proble m wa s that the zealou s desir e o f the Latin Americans t o preserv e th e autonom y o f thei r inter-America n syste m go t mixed u p with th e concer n o f the Europea n state s tha t they be fre e t o take action agains t Germany , o r Japan , o r unspecifie d aggressor s i n th e con fused post-hostilitie s situation s expecte d befor e th e Securit y Counci l ha d achieved th e powe r an d authorit y t o assum e responsibility . The Latin s did not wan t the Europea n power s with vetoes to be able to interfere with their holy righ t t o settl e thei r ow n affairs . Thi s vie w wa s supporte d b y som e American politician s bu t th e wise r head s i n Washingto n recognize d tha t such a precedent woul d rule out America n exercise of its great-power rights in othe r hemispheres . Th e questio n wa s how to provid e for th e European s to ac t i n accordanc e wit h thei r mutua l defence treatie s durin g the perilou s time o f transition withou t making exceptions which would enable a regional group lik e th e pan-American s t o ac t indefinitel y without th e authorit y of the Securit y Council . Th e solutio n finally agreed upo n wa s the provisio n of both Article s 5 1 an d 53. " Articl e 51 , whic h authorize d collectiv e self defence, wa s designe d t o allo w th e European s t o d o wha t the y fel t wa s needed i n their uncertai n situatio n an d als o to justify actio n by the wester n hemisphere power s i n th e even t tha t non-America n power s in the Security Council tried t o obstruct thei r activities. Article 53 provided for enforcemen t by regional agencie s provide d i t was authorized by the Securit y Council. It could no t hav e been clearly foreseen a t the tim e tha t within a couple of years Article 51 would be what Canada an d its allies needed to justify a North Atlantic Treat y Organizatio n becaus e lac k o f unanimit y ha d paralyze d th e

254 Th e Shapin g of Peac e Security Council. Nevertheless, a Canadian PHP paper, dated 2 1 April 1944 , had pointed ou t th e importan t differenc e betwee n regiona l securit y and re gional defence organizations , regarding the latter as essential and the former as dubious. In Hume Wrong' s frequent considerations o f the need for transitional o r fall-bac k position s t o allo w for collective defence ther e was a clear distinction between th e actio n provided for in Article 51, by which countries could combine forces against an external threat , and arrangements b y which regional groups, possibly dominated b y a great power, could impose security upon thei r ow n members. NATO , it should b e borne i n mind, i s a collective defence organizatio n unde r Articl e 51 , no t a regiona l collectiv e securit y organization under Article 53. In th e latte r day s o f th e conferenc e Canad a activel y sough t fixe d provi sions fo r amendmen t o f th e Charter . Althoug h Canad a wa s willing t o re cognize th e exigencie s o f postwa r stresse s an d great-powe r collaboration , nevertheless, wha t was being produced a t Sa n Francisco wa s regarded a s a lowest-common-denominator Unite d Nations . I n th e interes t o f stabilit y amendments shoul d not be too easy , but the y should certainly be possible . Canada di d not lik e the righ t of veto ove r amendments bu t recognize d tha t there coul d b e n o absolut e dispensin g wit h it . The delegatio n trie d t o ease the proces s somewhat . Wit h majority suppor t from th e middle powers, they sought t o provid e fo r a revisionary conference afte r te n years . By the tim e this item was discussed a t San Francisco everyone was tired and the issues of amendment an d th e righ t o f withdrawal becam e badl y confused. Th e Rus sians wer e suspicious , an d th e American s wer e sur e th e Senat e woul d no t accept a Charter unles s th e Unite d State s maintained th e righ t of veto ove r any amendments . Pearson , Robertson , an d Wron g argued with th e Ameri cans tha t provisio n fo r a constitutiona l conferenc e a t a n appointe d time , without reference t o procedure at that conference, woul d not oblige them in advance t o accep t amendment s whic h the y di d no t approve . Pearso n wa s inclined t o cal l wha t h e regarde d a s a n America n bluff , bu t Wron g fel t obliged to remind th e delegation that 'ou r instructions wer e not to push our opposition t o a poin t wher e i t migh t endange r participatio n by the Unite d States i n the Organization.' 54 A Canadia n proposa l di d play a part in getting the sponsorin g powers , a t United States urging , to propose a general conference t o review the Charter . Such a provisio n was essential t o th e Canadia n conception o f a transitional phase o f th e UN . After muc h proposin g an d counterproposing , however , with th e figh t gon e ou t o f th e lesse r powers , Articl e 10 9 was adopted. I t provided fo r a revie w conferenc e t o b e considere d a t th e Tent h Genera l Assembly at the latest, but the veto would apply to any amendments. Again ,

255 Draftin g the Charter the fight was probably worth putting up to register a point, but a s Goodric h and Hambro point out: 'In reality, the "concessions" incorporated into Article 10 9 were of no great significance.' Th e grea t powers could block recommendations o f the conference and, as any member could at any time propose that the Assembl y call a Charter-review conference, th e special provision for the Tent h Sessio n wa s of minor importance. 55 Canadian idea s on membershi p wer e liberal. On the designatio n o f great powers Canad a no t onl y supported a permanen t sea t fo r France , bu t ha d argued fo r conferring this without delay. It was cooler abou t China. Canada feared tha t the Americans , becaus e of their hostility to de Gaulle and deference t o Chiang , woul d pu t of f recognitio n o f th e Frenc h righ t a s lon g a s possible. The Britis h thought Chin a was not reall y a great powe r and suggested tha t i f it were given a permanent seat it should not b e given the vet o powers. Ther e wa s littl e hope , however , o f an y such provisio n securin g United State s approval. 56 In general, it was held in Ottawa that membershi p in th e U N should be a s comprehensive a s possible, excep t tha t th e case s of Germany an d Japa n shoul d b e lef t fo r consideration afte r a period o f years. Canada did not lik e the agreemen t reache d at Yalta to accept separate membership fo r th e Ukrainia n an d Byelorussia n Soviet Republics , especiall y as there ha d been hint s of an analog y with the Commonwealth , bu t i f this was to be the price of Soviet adhesion - o r at least the price of Soviet consent for the admissio n o f India - i t might be necessary to pay it, without, however , going publicly on recor d i n support. Canad a di d not favou r the exclusio n of neutrals and especially wanted Ireland admitted soon, as well as Switzerland and Sweden . I t wa s privatel y recognized, however , tha t on e advantag e of confining membershi p at the star t t o fighting allies was that it would reduce the strength of the Lati n American bloc. Membership was not i n itself a serious issue at San Francisco in spite of a row over inviting neutrals to the conference. Ther e were disputes over suspension, expulsion, and withdrawal. Canada joined unsuccessfully with Australia in seeking t o remove th e veto power over membershi p and restricting it onl y t o th e membershi p o f enem y state s and Spain . While no t acceptin g the vie w tha t an y state , simpl y b y reaso n o f it s existence , ha d a righ t t o membership, Canad a supported proposal s 'that tended toward s the principle of universality.' 57 Canada di d not like , however, the great powers' proposal s for expulsio n o f persisten t violator s of the Charter , arguin g that this would release the violator from hi s obligations whereas suspension woul d not. This case was almost won, but at Soviet insistence the Dumbarton Oaks provision for expulsio n (Article s 5 and 6 ) wa s finally put int o th e Charter . I n accor dance wit h it s belie f i n keepin g as man y state s a s possibl e withi n th e UN

256 Th e Shapin g of Peac e discipline, Canad a wa s not enthusiasti c about providin g for a right of withdrawal. However, when this question cam e up at a late stage, i n the contex t of the great-powers ' insistenc e o n maintaining their veto ove r amendment s to th e Charter , Canad a an d othe r smal l power s coul d no t agre e t o bein g locked into membership of an organization which could alter its constitution without thei r consent. Canad a di d not wan t withdrawal provided fo r i n th e Charter an d proposed that it be restricted t o those who were still dissatisfied after a revisionary conference. In the en d a restricted right of withdrawal was conceded i n th e Rapporteur' s report , th e lega l status o f whic h has bee n a subject o f some differenc e o f opinion. On domesti c jurisdiction , which was to loo m larg e i n th e histor y of th e United Nations , Canad a di d not tak e a strong public stand. Articl e 2(7) prevents th e Unite d Nations from intervenin g in matters whic h are essentiall y within th e domesti c jurisdictio n o f an y stat e an d ha s bee n a t time s de nounced an d defende d b y almost all members o f the Assembly , dependin g on whethe r a friendl y o r unfriendl y stat e wa s involved. A t Sa n Francisc o practically everybod y wa s reall y i n favou r o f it , bu t mos t wer e sh y abou t saying so categorically. The Russian s naturally opposed any interference and the American s wante d suc h protectio n fo r th e sak e o f Congress . Lati n Americans insiste d upo n i t ou t o f their traditional fear o f intervention, and Australia le d th e lesse r power s i n insistin g that i t wa s unfai r fo r th e grea t powers t o hav e thi s protectio n i n th e Securit y Council throug h thei r vet o while th e lesse r power s ha d n o such defence . Th e Australian s wante d n o interference wit h their immigration policies. Neither did Canada, bu t Wrong advised King that these fears were unfounded, as a dispute over immigration policy coul d no t com e befor e th e U N unless i t was leading t o war . 'I n tha t event i t i s no t a domesti c disput e bu t a n internationa l disput e whic h th e Council should be able to deal with as threatening the peace o f the world.' 58 The only reason there was any argument over 2(7) was that everyone knew wars could arise from domestic situations - th e oppression o f minorities, for example. Some European countries, Norway in particular, were anxious that the Security Council not be hamstrung. The great powers at Dumbarton Oak s had included a domestic jurisdiction provision to apply only to peaceful settlement o f disputes b y the Security Council, but at San Francisco the y propose d an amendment extending it to all the functions of the organization, the reason being the broadening of these functions in the economic, social , and cultural fields. However, t o make clear that the security role would not be weakened the qualification was added that this limitation would not prejudice the application o f the chapte r on 'Threats to the Peace.' Although the y recognized th e argument pu t forward, for instance, b y the Worl d Jewis h Congress that th e

257 Draftin g the Charte r amendment would exclude many questions of human rights from UN jurisdiction, th e Canadian delegatio n regarded the sponsors ' amendment a s a compromise the y migh t appropriatel y support. Evat t le d a successfu l mov e t o have th e amendmen t altere d t o refe r specificall y t o th e applicatio n of en forcement measure s unde r Chapte r VI L His fea r wa s that all a great power needed t o d o otherwis e wa s to threate n a breac h o f th e peac e i n orde r t o claim that a question involvin g a lesser powe r was not a matter o f domestic jurisdiction. Given Canada' s concer n wit h enforcemen t action , th e delegatio n might have been expected t o play an active role. At an early meeting of the delega tion, however , the prime minister ha d mentioned, accordin g to the report of a delegatio n meetin g o n 1 4 May , 'tha t i n an y genera l claus e concernin g human rights, it would be necessary to bear in mind the related clause about no interventio n i n matter s o f domesti c jurisdiction . He fel t that , s o fa r a s Canada was concerned, the province s would want to be sure there woul d be no intervention i n matters such as education which fell withi n their jurisdiction.' S t Laurent an d man y provincia l premiers ha d ster n attitude s on th e subject. I t was an are a o f the Charte r i n which it was obviously better t o lie low while the prime ministe r wa s in Ottawa - eve n thoug h thi s concern fo r domestic jurisdictio n ra n counte r t o th e aspiration s fo r th e U N of som e members o f th e delegation . Th e repor t o n Sa n Francisc o note s tha t th e Australian positio n wa s supported an d expresse s satisfactio n that 'th e pro tection accorde d t o th e domesti c jurisdiction of member state s is now very complete a s i t i s clea r tha t ther e ca n b e n o interferenc e i n th e domesti c economy o r interna l legislatio n o f Members.' 59 Whereas som e members of the delegation wer e eager t o strengthen th e powers of the Assembly , Wrong warned agains t supporting proposals 'whic h had the objectiv e of making the Assembly a legislative body.' Rasminsky cautioned against the same tempta tion i n dealing with ECOSOC. 60 I N T E R N A T I O N A L COUR T OF JUSTIC E

The creatio n o f th e Internationa l Cour t o f Justic e wa s another subjec t o n which Canad a ha d conviction s bu t o n whic h a quietl y constructiv e rathe r than a spectacular rol e wa s required. At the preliminar y meeting o f a Committee o f Jurists i n Washington i n early April Canada ha d been well repre sented no t onl y by J.E. Read , lega l adviser t o th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs, bu t als o b y the presiden t o f the Canadia n Ba r Association an d th e chief justice o f British Columbia. This bod y produced a draft chapte r for th e Charter and a draft statut e fo r the court. It was the only case in which repre-

258 Th e Shapin g of Peac e sentatives o f al l members an d no t just th e grea t powers ha d produce d th e draft, an d controvers y a t Sa n Francisc o wa s thereb y reduced . Rea d wa s appointed chairman of the Draftin g Committee an d took no strong positions on the issues discussed. H e reported that he had been in a minority of one on a poin t 'bu t I hav e som e doub t a s to whethe r the othe r 3 9 representative s understood wha t they were doing.' The main point of difference was on th e basic questio n o f th e 'optiona l clause. ' Rea d reporte d tha t tha t committe e would hav e vote d 3 to 1 for som e for m o f compulsory jurisdiction, bu t ' I think there is a good deal of danger that insistence upon compulsory jurisdiction would make i t difficult, i f not impossible , fo r Moscow and Washingto n to accept the Statute .. . I should be somewhat concerned abou t the possibility of breaking the whole San Francisco Conference o n this issue, or of reviving the isolationis t movement o n thi s Continent, i n the even t o f acceptance o f compulsory jurisdiction followe d by a fight in the Senat e of Washington o n ratification.' I t was a typical Canadian response to the America n problem. So also wa s th e following : 'Languag e questio n i s bein g settle d b y preparin g reports i n American , French , Russian , Spanis h an d Chinese , bu t wit h n o English text.' 61 Canadian officials ha d a low opinion of American drafting . One majo r issu e wa s whether t o continu e th e ol d Permanen t Cour t o r create a new one. Canada favoured the maintenance of the established cour t in the interes t o f strength throug h continuity , but, because o f the objectio n of th e Sovie t Union, th e Unite d States, an d others, submitte d t o a decision which, in Article 92, did at least recognize that the statut e o f the ne w court would b e base d o n tha t o f th e old . Strengthenin g th e court' s prestig e an d authority wa s an essentia l elemen t i n th e Canadia n conceptio n o f th e ne w world orde r base d o n the rul e of law - a t least a conception o f officials an d politicians wh o mad e speeche s o n th e subject . Th e Canadia n delegatio n sought wit h othe r like-minde d delegation s no t onl y t o affir m th e court' s right to give advisory opinions but to extend th e right to seek suc h opinion s to organs other than the Assembly and Security Council and, in particular, to move toward s compulsor y jurisdiction . The y ha d limite d succes s i n th e former aim ; the latter proved t o be as difficult a s Read ha d foreseen . Possibly because of the prevalenc e of lawyers in this committee, ther e was a widespread conviction tha t th e tim e ha d come t o take the importan t ste p by which states woul d bind themselves t o submit their disputes t o the cour t by mer e adherenc e t o th e statut e o r a s a resul t o f thei r signin g a special declaration know n a s th e 'optiona l clause. ' Whe n Canad a ha d adhere d i n 1929 t o th e 'optiona l clause ' i t ha d reserve d fro m th e court' s jurisdictio n disputes wit h member s o f the Commonwealt h an d thos e which fell within the domestic jurisdictio n o f Canada . Othe r state s ha d similar reservations .

259 Draftin g the Charte r The differenc e betwee n th e 'optiona l clause' procedur e and what was called 'compulsory jurisdiction' was not great, especially as no country intended t o give u p it s reservations. Th e latter , however, sounde d bette r in th e ear s of those who wanted to move t o 'a world rule of law.' Canada, however, again gave wa y to th e view s of the minorit y which would not otherwis e have supported th e cour t at all. In spite o f their anxiety to pu t teet h i n th e law , the delegatio n wa s more cautious i n it s attitudes t o a move le d b y New Zealan d t o giv e the Security Council th e responsibilit y of taking action i f one part y to a dispute failed t o comply with a decision of the court. A compromise was reached b y which the Security Council might make recommendations o r decisions i n such circumstances. It should be noted, however , that the election of judges was one case in which the lesser powers, with Canada in the forefront, were able to eliminate the veto . NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIE S

In th e discussion s o n non-self-governin g territorie s an d trusteeshi p th e Canadian delegatio n wa s ostentatiously silent . On e can detec t a n anxiety to prove th e Canadian dedication to functionalism by an act of renunciation and also perhap s some trace o f that smugnes s Canadian s canno t see m to escap e when questions o f other peoples ' imperialis m are raised. This silence did not mean tha t th e subjec t wa s no t take n seriously . Politician s an d official s i n Ottawa did believe in the liberating force of self-government, from thei r own experience, an d favoure d a n orderl y an d peacefu l progres s i n th e Britis h pattern. The y di d regar d imperia l competition a s a cause o f war, an d mos t important o f al l a caus e o f frictio n a t tha t tim e betwee n th e Britis h an d American peoples. Th e importanc e attached t o the subject is reflected in the attention given to it in the report on San Francisco, al l with a studied neutrality. The onl y references t o Canadian positions , however , ar e to note, unde r 'Dependent Territories, ' that , 'Th e Canadia n Delegation , becaus e o f th e lack of any direct responsibility on the par t of the Canadia n Government fo r the administratio n o f colonial dependencies , too k n o activ e par t in the dis cussions, bu t followe d the m wit h close attention' ; and that th e 'delegatio n opposed th e principl e that th e permanen t member s o f the Securit y Council, whether o r not they were trustee powers , shoul d b e permanent member s of the Trusteeshi p Council.' 62 Needless to say, this oppositio n wa s unsuccess ful. They argue d also for a respectful assumption b y the U N of mandates an d other responsibilitie s o f th e Leagu e rathe r tha n ignorin g tha t bod y a s th e Russians an d Americans preferred .

260 Th e Shapin g of Peac e THE SECRETARIA T Canada's strait-lace d attitud e wa s noticeable when i t came t o th e Secretar iat. Considerabl e satisfactio n was taken i n the repor t over th e prevalenc e o f the vie w supported b y Canada that the U N should b e served b y a genuinely international civi l servic e whos e member s wer e responsibl e no t t o thei r governments bu t t o th e organizatio n itself . Th e convictio n wa s based o n the experienc e a t th e Leagu e an d als o o f course o n fundamenta l attitude s of th e Britis h and Canadia n civil service . Ther e wer e examples o f Canadi ans who at Geneva had become trul y international men, and i t was possible for thos e wit h th e Canadia n experienc e o f governmen t t o believ e i n th e immaculate civi l servant . Ther e wa s little attention give n t o thi s aspec t o f the U N in earl y Ottaw a papers , possibl y becaus e th e desirabl e principl e seemed so obvious. However , ther e wer e always those Latin American s t o worry about , an d th e delegatio n arrive d i n Sa n Francisc o wit h thre e draf t paragraphs fo r Chapte r x o n th e Secretariat . Th e firs t tw o amendment s provided fo r th e complet e neutralit y of member s o f th e Secretariat , thei r appointment b y the Secretary-General , no t b y governments, o n the basi s of competence, wit h onl y 'due regard ' t o the nee d fo r recruitin g on a s wide a geographical basis as possible. Th e thir d amendment provide d fo r th e lega l status an d immunit y o f personne l o f th e U N and associate d agencies . Th e first tw o amendment s wer e used a s a basis of discussion b y the committe e along with th e sponsors ' draft s o n th e sam e subject , and, wit h a few omissions i n th e interest s o f brevity , becam e Article s 10 0 an d 10 1 o f th e Charter. Articl e 10 1 was carried i n committe e agains t th e objectio n o f th e Soviet blo c who argued tha t suc h detail s should no t appear in the Charter . The point s raise d i n the thir d amendmen t wer e largely covered i n Article s 104 and 10 5 of the Charter . The selection o f the secretary-genera l and his deputies was a more controversial issue . I n accordanc e wit h its genera l wish to limi t the veto , Canad a argued tha t th e Securit y Council should make its nomination fo r secretarygeneral o n a vot e b y an y seve n o f it s members . Alon g wit h othe r lesse r powers it successfully oppose d the sponsors ' propositio n tha t not onl y the secretary-general but his four deputies be elected b y the Assembly on recommendation o f th e Securit y Counci l fo r a perio d o f thre e years. 63 Thi s wa s regarded as a blatant attempt by the great powers to extend their dominatio n to the Secretariat , th e assumption being that each o f the deputies would be a citizen of one of the grea t powers, with another citize n rotating as secretarygeneral. Canada argued that th e secretary-genera l mus t hav e authority over

261 Draftin g the Charter his deputie s wherea s the great-powe r proposal would mean i n practic e administration by a committee o f five. On the vet o power over selection of the secretary-general Canada had a victory in committee b y a typical ploy, omitting a referenc e t o th e vet o an d puttin g into th e Rapporteur' s repor t tha t concurrence o f th e permanen t member s woul d be unnecessary . Thi s wa s overruled, however, by the acceptanc e of the whole Yalta voting formula by the conference . Thi s defea t was not reall y consequential becaus e in practice it woul d be essentia l fo r an y secretary-genera l t o hav e th e suppor t o f th e great powers. What prove d fa r mor e importan t for th e developmen t o f th e secretary general as a strong and influentia l forc e in the system , a counter-balance t o the hegemon y o f th e grea t power s an d a critica l elemen t i n Canada' s UN diplomacy durin g the fifties , wa s the succes s o f Canad a an d it s friend s in preventing election of the deputies and removing the drastic limitations proposed fo r the secretary-general' s ter m o f office. N o term o f office wa s specified in th e Charter . The first secretary-general was appointed for five years and tha t wa s accepted a s a norm , thereb y permittin g me n lik e Hammarskjôld t o mak e thei r extraordinar y contributio n t o th e institution . Hi s authority wa s greatl y reinforced b y th e omissio n o f an y provisio n fo r de puties in the Charter, thereb y givin g him a free han d - wit h du e regard, of course, to the expectations of the great powers. This latter was one of the few cases o f a clear-cu t victory over a n intransigen t Sovie t Unio n b y the lesse r powers, wit h assistanc e fro m othe r grea t powers less convince d o f the wisdom o f thei r ow n agree d proposition . A goo d dea l o f th e succes s bot h i n drafting an d negotiatin g is attributable to Escot t Reid , wh o carrie d o n th e efforts i n the Preparator y Commission i n London against pressure from th e Russians and Yugoslavs. The Canadia n governmen t refuse d t o hav e anythin g t o d o wit h th e appointment o f it s ow n nationals . Becaus e s o man y Canadian s ha d bee n involved i n th e establishment , th e Canadia n conten t o f th e Secretaria t remained fo r man y year s ou t o f proportion . This vie w o f th e Secretariat , however, wa s not observe d b y others, an d a s Canadian number s dwindled the government wa s obliged to intervene to protect the rights of its nationals. The Russian s were , o f course, quit e hones t fro m th e beginnin g in statin g their disbelie f i n th e internationa l man . Althoug h Leste r Pearso n wa s in 1945 and agai n i n 195 1 supporte d fo r th e offic e o f secretary-general, it was clear tha t th e Russians , wh o rarel y showed a personal dislik e for him , be lieved tha t h e coul d no t hel p bein g a 'wester n man ' an d was , therefore , unacceptable.

262 Th e Shapin g of Peac e THE P R E P A R A T O R Y COMMISSIO N

At th e en d o f the Sa n Francisco Conference a good deal of gratification wa s expressed i n parliamen t an d th e press . Muc h har d thinkin g and effectiv e diplomacy had gone int o achieving certain ends tha t proved, however, to be of les s significanc e than ha d bee n anticipated . The point s wer e wel l taken, but the y were based o n a mistaken premis e about th e wa y in which the UN would in fact operate. The concern ove r having a voice in the Security Council when Canadian troops were to b e called upon prove d irrelevant, and th e principal reaso n fo r havin g countrie s o f som e militar y consequenc e a s non-permanent member s disappeare d whe n th e Counci l becam e a bod y concerned wit h th e settlemen t o f dispute s rathe r than th e enforcemen t o f sanctions. Th e preoccupatio n wit h th e legitimat e struggle fo r th e right s of middle powers seemed to divert too muc h of the Canadia n effor t awa y fro m the les s spectacula r issue s whic h wer e o f greate r consequence i n th e lon g run - settin g u p th e infrastructur e for a flexibl e an d practical intergovern mental organization . To som e exten t th e diversio n wa s inevitable becaus e these issue s o f 'collective security,' of vetoes and sovereignty , wer e central in the eyes of other powers and other peoples, large and small. The structure which emerged wa s not all that Canada had hoped for , but in the proces s of international negotiation its hopes were being constantly adapted. It was not a questio n o f hope s disappointed ; i t was an explorator y and a learning process, involving the revisio n of preconceptions. Ther e was cause for gratifica tion i n th e constructiv e attentio n t o detai l o f Canadia n delegates , i n thei r willingness t o compromis e an d thei r demonstrate d inventiveness . Th e re spect which Canada acquired in the U N was not s o much because o f its support o f any particular causes bu t rathe r because it s representatives coul d b e counted o n for common sens e - althoug h a t times the devotion t o common sense in a world of emotions wa s a little lacking in common sense . It was this kind of contribution that Canadians mad e most effectivel y dur ing the summe r an d autumn of 1945 when the Preparatory Commission an d its Executive Committee wer e meeting in Westminster. Canad a had been a member o f the Executive Committee at San Francisco and as such served on the Executiv e Committe e fo r th e Preparator y Commission , whic h was intended t o prepar e plan s fo r th e firs t Assembly . Althoug h Escot t Rei d wa s only the alternate delegate on these preparatory bodies, he stayed in London throughout an d wa s a majo r dynami c forc e during thi s period . Rei d wa s a superb an d a compulsive draftsman , wit h a zealous sens e of mission abou t international organization. 64 Leste r Pearso n onc e said , 'Escot t woul d bring the Archange l Gabriel to the mat for a comma.'

263 Draftin g th e Charter Under Reid's influence the delegatio n concentrated muc h o f its attention on rule s of procedure fo r the Assembl y and othe r organs. I n compan y with the Australian s the Canadians urge d the necessity of providing a set of provisional rules of procedure even for the Security Council. The great powers did not muc h lik e this presumptuous attitud e and permitted onl y an inadequat e compromise t o be drawn up. In one case amendments submitte d by Canada for th e Securit y Council were rejected a t th e sam e tim e as they were being accepted b y another committe e for ECOSOC . Its two working papers embodying a complete revisio n o f th e rule s fo r ECOSO C were regarded a s evidenc e that a middle power knew its place. When the United Nations became not an ideal constitution bu t a turbulent political body , these good intention s may seem to have been i n vain, but i n fact U N politics would have been far worse if there ha d not bee n thi s notable effor t t o devise procedures i n the reason ably calm atmosphere o f Westminster durin g the summe r o f victory. The soli d Canadia n contributio n i n Londo n t o th e nut s an d bolt s lend s itself to few generalizations except to say that it was constructive and prudent and, o n the whole, aimed i n the same direction s as at San Francisco: wary of the excessiv e claim s o f th e great power s an d jealou s o f th e right s o f th e Assembly. Compromise s wer e pu t forward . Whe n th e USSR , fo r example , wanted a separate secretaria t for the Securit y Council, the Canadian delegation recognize d tha t some special provisions were necessary fo r such an important body as it would be meeting i n permanent session , bu t the y did not want an y privilege d positions fo r th e Securit y Council. So they successfully proposed tha t a Departmen t o f Securit y Counci l Affair s b e se t u p i n th e Secretariat. Rei d an d compan y wer e especiall y kee n o n providin g auster e rules fo r th e Secretaria t an d forbiddin g interferenc e b y governments. The y were less shy about trusteeship tha n at San Francisco an d actually served o n a subcommitte e t o draf t th e tex t o f th e resolutio n o n trusteeshi p late r adopted b y the Assembly - bu t that may have been just an acknowledgment of Reid's position a s Number On e draftsman. Among the other triumphs of Canadian pen s was the draft o n privileges and immunities for the Secretariat . Next t o econom y o f languag e i n th e Canadia n priorit y came , o f course , just plain economy. Wilgres s chaired th e subcommitte e fo r a Working Capital Fund, and th e Canadia n delegatio n propose d a n amendment, whic h was adopted, t o ensure centralized cash control from th e start. Canada continued to kee p a war y ey e on th e scal e o f contributions, showin g a particular con cern ove r suggestion s tha t n o on e countr y should pa y more tha n a certai n percentage o f the budget - a position tha t was logical enoug h i n preventing too muc h influenc e by the Unite d State s bu t whic h mean t tha t American s would b e payin g les s pe r capit a tha n Canadians . I t wa s th e campaig n fo r

264 Th e Shapin g of Peac e simple and direc t language, a brea k with jargon an d traditiona l formalities, the effor t 't o mak e Unite d Nations document s mor e easil y understandabl e by th e ordinar y man, ' i n whic h th e repor t o f the Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs too k specia l pride. 65 Thi s effort , alon g wit h that t o provid e soun d rules and regulations, was not completed when the General Assembl y began its first session i n January 1946 . S o a good dea l of continuing effort b y Reid and his colleagues throughou t the early Assembly sessions went into a committee set up at the Assembl y to study procedures and economize time . An interestin g position take n b y Canada i n the preparator y stages wa s its opposition t o a n America n sit e fo r th e Unite d Nations . A n America n sit e was supported by the Russians , th e Chinese , th e Australians , and the Latin Americans. Canad a joined the Britis h and the Frenc h in preferring a European site. This somewhat quixotic policy ran counter to traditional Canadian positions. I n favour of a European sit e the Canadia n delegatio n argue d tha t the most urgent problems with which the United Nations would have to deal related t o Europe, ye t the Canadia n objectio n to the Leagu e of Nations had been tha t i t wa s to o muc h concerne d wit h th e problem s an d interest s o f Europeans. Canadia n postwa r policy, furthermore, was dominated b y a fear of America n reversio n t o isolationis m an d haunte d b y the ghos t o f Henry Cabot Lodge , bu t th e principa l argument fo r havin g th e U N based i n th e United State s was that it would keep the Americans involve d - a calculation which proved t o b e well-founded. A factor that might have had some influ ence wa s the vie w held b y many officials i n Londo n an d Washingto n that if the sit e wer e t o b e i n th e us , ther e coul d no t b e a Nort h America n a s secretary-general. Th e preferenc e fo r Europ e wa s attributable partl y t o th e professional diplomat s wh o wer e a t tha t tim e an d continue d t o b e some what Eurocentric. Th e governmen t wa s embarrassed becaus e Gra y don (PC) and Knowle s (CCF) , wh o wer e on th e delegatio n t o th e Preparator y Com mission an d th e Genera l Assembly , ha d committed themselve s publicl y t o supporting a Canadia n site. 66 Ther e ha d bee n som e pressur e fro m inter ested group s i n favou r o f suc h site s a s Navy Island i n th e Niagar a River . The delegatio n sa w an outsid e possiblit y that i f there wer e deadlock s ove r Europe o r th e Unite d States , Canad a migh t be propose d a s a compromise . However, cabine t oppose d a Canadian site , an d th e delegatio n wa s told t o say tha t Canad a lacke d accommodation , residences , hotels , an d possibl e sites wer e far from centres o f population. Such a humiliating posture coul d have ha d onl y on e sourc e and , whe n th e delegatio n resisted , Robertso n sent a persona l not e t o Wilgres s sayin g tha t th e instruction s represente d 'views hel d strongl y b y the Prim e Ministe r wh o i s firmly oppose d t o th e selection o f a Canadian site.' 67 When th e decision fo r the Unite d State s was

265 Draftin g th e Charte r made, Canad a supported an Atlantic base in New York as against San Francisco which the Asian s and Australians favoured. Of particular concern t o the Canadian s was a respectful winding up of th e League of Nations and an orderly transfer of its assets and responsibilities to the Unite d Nations. This reflected a belief in the practica l values for a political institutio n of continuit y and traditio n an d a n anxiet y tha t th e valuabl e experience already gained by the Leagu e in such functional activities as narcotic control be the sound basis of institutions in the United Nations system . The argumen t wa s stresse d particularl y b y Hum e Wrong , wh o ha d lef t Geneva in the fateful day s of 1940 and who was to be the Canadian represen tative a t th e fina l sessio n o f th e Leagu e i n Apri l 1945 . H e favoure d th e winding up of the Leagu e in an orderly and dignifie d manner. 'Much of the practical experience on which the United Nations must build is derived from the League and the United Nations should be regarded in the light of an heir and successo r o f th e Leagu e rathe r tha t a ne w experimen t i n international collaboration.'68 He had an interest no t only in the spirit of the transfer but a practical concern with , for example , the continuatio n of serial publications , services relatin g to epidemics , treatie s an d convention s o n drugs , an d th e retention o f able members o f the Leagu e secretariat. In thes e goo d intentions , Canada , alon g with Commonwealth an d othe r League members , wer e no t i n seriou s conflic t wit h th e wishe s o f Unite d States official s bu t the y ha d t o conten d wit h th e politica l prejudice in th e United State s an d th e Sovie t Unio n agains t an institutio n wit h which their relations ha d been , t o sa y th e least , embarrassing . I n fact , mos t o f what Canada wante d o n thi s subject, excep t generous respec t fo r the lat e institution, was obtained at the windin g up in Geneva. ELECTIONS

When th e Genera l Assembl y got under way in London, Canad a received an embarrassing setback . I t los t ou t t o Australia for a seat o n th e first Security Council. Although all the instruction s an d memoranda wer e careful to state that Canad a ha d n o assuranc e o f election , ther e wa s an attitud e o f confidence. Some o f the restraint shown at San Francisco in curbing the Security Council may have been , perhap s unconsciously, inspire d b y an assumptio n that in the prope r kind of Security Council Canada woul d be a more o r less regular member . Ther e was , o f course , t o b e n o vulga r campaignin g fo r office. Whe n i n late 194 5 various Latin American ambassador s approache d Canadians, from the prime minister down, for support in elections to various offices, the y wer e give n littl e homilie s abou t Canada' s neithe r givin g no r

266 Th e Shapin g of Peace expecting pledges . The prim e ministe r wa s more o f a politician . He coul d not, o f course, mis s th e chanc e t o savour suc h a nice mora l principle , but when he told Robertson that 'an eye may be kept on the situation,' the latter recognized a hint and suggested t o Wilgress in London that when this matter arose he should explain that Canada was not giving or taking pledges but 'we consider that the standing of Canada among the United Nations is such as to make this country an obvious choice for the first Security Council'69 - in the language o f diplomac y a campaign speech i f ever ther e wa s one. Th e ide a that Australia or Mexico might get the nod over Canada upse t King's idea of Canada's status in the world. 70 Officials recognize d that Australia had a right to membershi p i n accordance wit h th e qualification s for whic h Canada ha d argued and they discussed th e proble m with the Australians. Evatt had been good enough to say that while Canada and Australi a should bot h be elected, Australia would be content wit h a one-year term whil e Canada was entitled to th e two-yea r term, i n accordance wit h th e specia l provisions for th e first elections.71 A reason for wanting both countries elected was Ottawa's anxiety that the Leagu e practice of considering only one Commonwealth countr y at a time eligible for a Council seat should not b e revived o r established . There was some lac k of proportion in the Canadia n estimate o f the coun try's importance in an already expanding United Nations. Even officials were a littl e bemuse d b y th e goo d wil l Canadian s wer e inspiring . Canad a an d Canadians wer e candidate s fo r to o man y office s i n 1946 . Althoug h Lester Pearson wa s not pressin g for th e rol e o f secretary-general an d th e govern ment wa s officially neutra l on the subject , everyone kne w that his name was being considered, as was that of Norman Robertson . John Read was a candidate, an d a successful one, fo r th e Internationa l Court o f Justice. 72 Canad a was obviously thinking of itself for the Securit y Council, for ECOSOC , and fo r the Atomi c Energ y Commission . Al l thes e presumptions , combine d wit h the sermon s o n goo d behaviour , migh t wel l have go t Canad a of f to a bad start, an d i t was a triumph of th e personalit y of the principa l characters in volved that they held their ground. Whatever migh t be said about capacity to contribute taking precedence in Article 23 over geography, there was in practice no escaping the fact that th e first qualification ha d t o apply, if it did, within a framework provided b y th e second. Variou s parts o f the world ha d to be represented - Lati n America , Eastern an d Western Europe , th e Middle East, Asia. The onl y question was whether th e candidate s fro m th e variou s region s woul d be selecte d o n th e basis o f capacit y o r b y a system o f rotation. I t would be ver y hard, furthermore, to break the practic e by which regions would choose their own nominees, an d suc h a practic e would almos t inevitabl y lead t o rotation . Votin g

267 Draftin g the Charte r without nomination s coul d no t onl y be anarchic, i t could lea d t o distorte d patterns. In the instructions to the Canadian delegation to the Assembly this fact o f regional representation wa s taken fo r granted . I t was recognized tha t the Securit y Council was going to consist o f the Executiv e Committee fro m San Francisco minu s three . A s the y ha d bee n selecte d o n a regional basis, they would have to be dropped o n that basis . Canada and Australia were left without easil y identifiabl e regions , both clearl y qualifie d b y capacit y bu t liable t o lose ou t i f they proved unreasonabl e - o r too proud t o accept the obvious categor y o f 'othe r Commonwealt h states. ' Th e Canadia n delega tion's judgment wa s so clouded b y righteousness tha t the y were unabl e t o see tha t th e Britis h would hav e t o ratio n thei r favour s t o Commonwealt h countries b y supporting some for one council and some for another. 73 In fact, Canad a prove d remarkably popular. For th e Economi c and Social Council it got forty-six ou t o f fifty-one votes o n the first ballot and a three year term . Fo r th e Securit y Council, however , th e regiona l candidates wo n out first . Shor t o f the thirty-fou r votes necessar y fo r election were Canada , with 33 , and Australi a with 28. In th e run-of f Canad a le d Australia the firs t time bu t fel l behin d i n th e nex t vote , primaril y because Mexic o had bee n chosen a s one of the Lati n Americans an d there was a feeling in other countries tha t thre e Nort h America n member s woul d be to o much . S t Laurent graciously stood down. The member s wer e n o mor e likel y t o accept thre e Commonwealt h tha n three North America n members o f the Council . At that time Canada, Australia, Ne w Zealand , Sout h Africa , an d eve n Indi a forme d a recognizabl e category i n th e eye s o f othe r states . Certainl y i n th e preparation s fo r th e United Nations they had appeared a s a vigorous group which, if it did not act as a voting bloc, wa s a consulting team wit h more coherenc e i n perspectiv e than mos t o f the regiona l groups. When th e great powers (by loose gentle man's agreement th e natur e of which was disputed) and others fel l int o the habit of recognizing 'regional ' categories fo r candidates i n both the Security and Economic and Social Councils, the Commonwealth was a category with a very short lis t which provided Canad a wit h it s best possibl e chance to get a seat onc e a decade . A s i t emerged fro m adolescenc e an d develope d a new and mor e proprietar y interest in the changin g Commonwealth, Canad a became mor e comfortabl e i n the Commonwealth sea t - unti l it disappeared in the Charte r revisio n of 1965 . As for regiona l representatio n ther e wa s a good dea l to b e said for i t in a council calle d upo n t o dea l wit h disputes i n al l part s o f th e world . A ver y small powe r i s quit e a s likel y as a mor e powerfu l middl e powe r t o offe r constructive U N diplomacy. A Securit y Council in whic h Canada an d a few

268 Th e Shapin g of Peac e other accepte d middl e power s occupie d semi-permanen t position s migh t well have been a more rigi d body - an d for Canada the adjustment to the rise or recovery later on of other 'middle powers' would have been more painful . An anxiety to maintain its status as a middle military power might even have introduced an ambiguous factor into the framin g of a national Canadian defence policy. Altogether this cause, o n which so much effort ha d been spent, was perhaps better lost.

9 Economie and Socia l Functions

The economi c and social functions, whic h hav e become th e majo r preoccupation o f th e Unite d Nations, meri t specia l attention . The y receive d muc h less at the creation tha n th e securit y issues, eve n i n Canada, althoug h they were in theory the Canadian priority. The essence of Canadian functionalism was the belie f tha t i t was as an economi c powe r that Canada deserve d par ticular consideration. I n 1945 , however , the economic an d social role of the United Nation s seeme d relate d t o long-ter m problem s rathe r tha n t o th e transitional questions of relief and reconstruction which preoccupied the European countries and required also the urgent attention o f Canadian officials . In discussing, therefore , th e establishmen t o f the UN' S economic an d social functions i t i s necessary t o trea t i n thi s chapter a more extende d perio d of postwar history than is covered i n most of this volume. Public interest i s no indication of the amoun t of effort which went into the laying o f an economi c an d socia l infrastructure . The par t played by Canadians in the conference s a t Hot Springs , Bretton Woods , Chicago , where the great agencie s t o dea l wit h food an d mone y an d aviatio n were set up, 1 was closer t o th e internationa l centre s o f powe r tha n wa s their activit y a t Sa n Francisco. Th e deferenc e t o Canadian view s and interest s i n th e establish ment o f the specialize d agencie s wa s due t o their intellectua l quality and to the fac t the y wer e no t merel y specia l pleadin g bu t a responsibl e effor t t o design effectiv e internationa l institutions. I t was also attributable to the bargaining power Canad a ha d a s one o f the tw o o r thre e countrie s capabl e of providing relief and assistance an d of thinking beyond the present emergen cies. Canada's ow n pligh t wa s in a way typical o f the postwa r situation. I t was luckier tha n mos t countrie s bu t nevertheles s face d wit h urgen t economi c problems, particularl y financial adjustments, a plight which mad e the Cana -

270 Th e Shapin g of Peac e dians usefu l critic s of th e blande r assumption s int o which Americans fell . Self-interest an d internationalis t convictions led both American s and Cana dians to support measures t o open the clogged channels of trade and finance. They were dedicated t o th e development o f international economic institu tions primaril y fo r thi s purpose. Official s i n Washingto n an d Ottaw a knew they had problems with their own politicians in accepting the domestic implications o f thei r libera l internationalism, bu t the y had fe w doubts tha t they were on the righ t path. The Britis h and other victim s of the wa r believed in international economi c institution s a s well , bu t the y were incline d t o se e them a s a means, at least i n the first instance, of sharing internationally the intolerable burden s the y ha d t o fac e righ t away, after th e commo n effor t against aggression. They saw the issue less in terms of the spreading benefits of fre e enterpris e an d somewha t mor e i n terms o f orderly protection. The y had t o envisag e a transitional stage befor e the y could pla y thei r par t in th e economic an d socia l Utopi a promise d i n th e Charter . Canadian s require d both protectio n and opportunit y and wer e in the strategi c positio n to pla y that middl e rol e whic h internationa l economic s an d politic s require d o f them. Canadian officia l attitude s o n thes e functions of the internationa l organization wer e very differen t i n 194 5 from wha t they had bee n afte r th e Firs t World War. 2 I n th e las t day s o f th e League , however , Canad a wa s giving some suppor t to the recommendations o f the Bruce Committee i n favour of a substantia l an d autonomou s Leagu e programm e on economi c an d socia l questions. Mackenzi e Kin g tol d th e Common s o n 3 0 Marc h 193 9 whe n speaking o f th e Leagu e tha t 'i n th e anarch y and passio n o f to-day , such a centre of co-ordination, such a focus of good-will, is more needed than ever. It wil l have to operate on a more limited and less spectacular stage, building up it s technical and social and economic activities, accustoming peoples and governments t o work together, until eventually they may find it possible t o use th e trie d an d teste d instrumen t fo r greate r ends. ' Confidenc e i n eco nomic and social institutions as the alternative to international provisions for security wa s characteristic onl y o f th e trues t believers , bu t th e convictio n that the y were essential, alon g with 'collective security,' fo r a lasting peace was widely held. I n Augus t 194 4 Mackenzie King said, '.. . rea l security re quires internationa l actio n an d organization in many othe r fields - in social welfare, i n trade , i n technical progress , i n transportation , an d i n economi c development. The general aim must be to lower the temperature of nationalism, while preserving its good features , an d thus to diminish national rivalries an d reduc e th e importanc e o f frontiers.' 3 H e coul d not , however , ge t away a t tha t tim e wit h th e argumen t tha t suc h actio n woul d dispense with

271 Economi e and Socia l Functions the necessit y o f securit y provision s i n th e Unite d Nations . I n on e o f th e first Externa l Affair s memorand a o n postwa r organizatio n Hum e Wron g approached th e questio n fro m th e opposit e direction : 'It is generally agreed that a n effectiv e securit y syste m i s a necessar y foundatio n fo r al l post-war planning, an d tha t internationa l plan s for civil aviation, monetary stabilization, commercia l polic y and s o on can only be effective i n an atmosphere of international security.' 4 In a diffuse wa y the ide a tha t the ke y to peac e wa s a full bell y wa s widely held i n Canada . On e o f th e leas t internationall y minde d member s o f th e cabinet, James G. Gardiner, the ministe r of agriculture, said in his blunt way in 194 6 in support of the Foo d and Agriculture Organization: 'You can have all th e u-N-o' s you like , but peopl e wh o could no t ge t foo d woul d fight for it.'5 Before talk s bega n o n establishin g a n International Trad e Organization the ministe r o f trad e an d commerce , Jame s MacKinnon , stated : 'Ther e could b e no stronger assuranc e of peace than to have the conference achiev e its objective s o f lowe r tariffs , eliminatio n o f restrictiv e trad e practice s and the establishmen t o f economic cooperatio n a s the ke y to worl d prosperity.' 6 Almost everyon e seeme d to hav e been influenced, whether they knew it or not, b y J.M. Keynes's classi c book, Th e Economic Consequences of the Peace, published in 1920 , wherein he denounced th e Treaty of Versailles which, he wrote, 'include s n o provision s fo r th e economi c rehabilitatio n of Europe. ' 'The Council of Four,' he charged, 'pai d no attention t o these issue s .. . It is an extraordinar y fac t tha t th e fundamenta l economic problem s o f a Europ e starving and disintegratin g before thei r eyes, wa s the on e question i n which it was impossible t o arouse th e interes t o f the Four.' 7 Keynes's lesso n wa s widely accepte d i n London an d Ottaw a but perhap s not a s single-mindedly as b y the Ne w Dealers i n Washington. Cordel l Hull believed tha t trad e conflic t an d discriminatio n were th e roo t caus e o f wars. Arthur Kroc k of the Ne w York Times, summarizing the moo d o f Washington, said , 'economi c freedom for all is the basi c American foreig n polic y for the preventio n o f war.' 8 The Canadia n planner s ma y not hav e gon e s o far, but the influential officials i n Finance and External Affairs were on the side of the New Deal enthusiasts i n the State Department an d the White House because these Americans were fighting the battle of internationalism agains t the conservatives i n the Treasury, in Congress, an d in the financial community. The American s wh o fought for the International Bank and fund were Roose veltian radicals , deepl y suspiciou s o f banker s an d internationa l finance more radical than the consensus of the Canadian cabinet. To understand th e intense Canadia n activit y and th e sens e o f triump h i n th e Bretto n Wood s conference i t is essential t o realize that the Canadians fel t involved in a deci-

272 Th e Shapin g of Peace sive internal struggle in Washington on which the future o f an international order depended. Joh n Deutsch , who was involved in these negotiations, ha s said that 'Canadian s often serve d a s ambassadors betwee n the State Department an d Treasury.' 9 Tha t kin d o f international orde r serve d th e apparen t interests of both the Unite d States an d Canada, bu t those in the thre e capitals who fough t th e battl e of Bretton Woods sa w it as a crusade no t fo r th e extension of an American 'empire' but for a very much reformed new world, invigorated by the prosperit y of America.10 The enemies wer e the 'reaction aries' on both side s of the Atlantic. To assess the Canadian approach - in practice as well as in theory - to the United Nations as a system throug h which to promote economic and social progress, i t i s necessary t o loo k not onl y at th e principle s professed i n preparatory paper s bu t als o a t th e performance s i n and th e adjustmen t t o th e councils an d agencie s while , i n th e firs t fe w years o f existence, the y were being fashioned i n action. The forgin g o f certain basic attitudes at the major wartime conference s an d i n th e experienc e o f UNRRA " hav e alread y been described. Attentio n must no w be directed t o the establishment o f the Economic and Social Council and th e famil y o f specialized agencies . ECOSOC

In the Canadia n view the Economic and Social Council, shielded fro m inter national politics, would be the nerv e centr e o f the socia l and economic system of the UN , if only feasible schemes t o that end could be worked out. The importance Canadian s attache d t o ECOSO C is obscured b y the fac t tha t they did no t fin d i t necessary t o figh t ver y har d fo r thei r poin t o f view . Before Dumbarton Oak s Canada indicate d tha t it favoured 'genera l supervision b y the Assembl y o f internationa l economic an d socia l activities , an d possibl y also the creation of an economic and social council on the lines of the United States proposal,' preferring 'to see these matters separated fro m th e scope of the Worl d Council except insofa r as they relate directly to security." 2 Onc e the Russian s ha d bee n persuade d a t Dumbarto n Oak s t o th e inclusio n o f economic and social questions (rathe r than their relegation t o a totally separate organization) , and i t looked a s if these would be the responsibilit y of a 'functional committee ' attache d t o th e Assembly , Canadian s wer e suffi ciently reassured t o concentrate their attention o n the set-up of the Security Council and a place for 'middl e powers.' On the eve of the Commonwealt h Conference befor e Sa n Francisc o i t wa s Wrong' s vie w tha t th e genera l scheme fo r economic and social issues set out in the Dumbarton Oak s pro posals seeme d acceptable , apar t fro m som e mino r draftin g change s i n th e interest o f clarity. 13 By the tim e the delegatio n reache d Sa n Francisco, how-

273 Economi e and Socia l Functions ever, th e exercis e i n clarificatio n ha d becom e a complete revisio n o f tha t section o f the draf t Charter . On pape r the delegatio n a t San Francisc o wa s quite successful. Canadia n amendments t o the Charter empowered the Economic and Social Council to take the initiativ e in concluding agreements wit h existin g agencies (Articl e 93:1) an d i n setting up new agencies (Articl e 59), t o participate in deliberations with the specialized agencies (Articl e 70), to obtain report s from them on the steps the y had taken to implement its recommendations an d those of the Assembl y (Articl e 64:2), an d to co-ordinate thei r work through recom mendations t o th e Genera l Assembl y an d th e U N members (Articl e 63:2). These amendments, however, did not place a radically new interpretation on the great-powe r draft ; the y ben t i t somewha t an d mad e mor e explici t th e provisions Canada liked. In the view of Douglas Anglin the Canadian delega tion did much to undo its good work in strengthening the powers of ECOSOC by inflatin g it s functions an d authorit y in othe r respect s a s well. It was saddled with enormous responsibilitie s for promoting higher standards o f living, full employment , condition s o f economic an d socia l progres s and develop ment. It was to make or initiate studies or reports and not just recommenda tions on matters within its competence an d to perform services fo r member s in specialized agencies. 'ECOSO C has been called upon to serve as a forum for discussion an d negotiatio n o f economic , socia l an d eve n politica l matters , and a s the bod y directl y responsible fo r a vast range of activities carried on through its many commissions, committee s an d boards . It is not surprising, therefore, tha t it has been unabl e to carry out effectively wha t perhaps ought to have been its primary purpose, the coordination of the work of the specialized agencies."4 It is a fair judgment on ECOSO C as a co-ordinator, but the basi c illusion was that i t coul d b e shielde d fro m politics , fo r economic s hav e increasingl y become th e politic s of the Unite d Nations . Ironically, the wa y in which coordination wa s made a s non-political as possible wa s to tur n i t over t o th e international bureaucrats . Th e Preparator y Commission i n London i n 194 6 foresaw th e trouble s ECOSO C would have and asked th e secretary-general t o establish a co-ordinating committee o f himself an d th e officer s o f the agen cies. Th e Administrativ e Committe e o n Co-ordinatio n go t unde r wa y in 1947. It was certainly not what Canadians had considered desirabl e in theory, but i t ha s worke d effectivel y an d quietl y to secur e a t leas t a minimu m o f financial and programm e contro l an d Canadian s hav e accepte d i t as something that worked. Canadians initiall y too k ECOSO C ver y seriously. Th e Counci l consisted a t first of eightee n member s electe d b y the Genera l Assembly . I t had no per manent member s although in practice the principal industrial countries were

274 Th e Shapin g of Peace always elected. A t the first session o f the Assembl y Canada was elected wit h widespread suppor t fo r a three-yea r term . Fo r som e official s thi s appoint ment wa s more importan t than election to the Security Council - a point of view i n whic h ther e migh t hav e bee n som e elemen t o f sou r grapes . Th e Council, however, soon bega n to drown in oratory, in the contemplatio n of its own organization, and the proliferatio n of commissions. Canadian s were very active in the first three years, usually represented a t sessions by a strong delegation heade d b y a cabine t minister . Th e deput y ministe r o f welfare, G.F. Davidson , was chairman of an ad hoc committee concerned wit h agreements wit h th e specialize d agencies an d Canadian s becam e member s o f a number of the commissions set up. After th e three-yea r term, however , disillusion set in. The Departmen t of External Affairs i n its report, Canada an d the United Nations 1951-1952, was complaining about 'over-ambitiou s an d over-elaborat e scheme s of co-ordi nation' which might result i n a structure 'so cumbrous that i t would defeat its own simpl e objective." 5 Canad a wen t bac k late r for a furthe r ter m on ECOSOC but by that time it was clear that the Council, which spent most of its time debatin g economi c an d socia l issue s i n platitudinou s or propagandist tones, was not the bod y to do anything so hardheaded as co-ordinate. I n any case, everythin g discusse d i n ECOSOC , muc h o f whic h ha d alread y bee n chewed ove r i n th e functiona l commissions , wa s argued ou t agai n i n th e second an d thir d committees o f th e Genera l Assembl y t o which it was responsible. Such co-ordination of the wor k of the specialize d agencies a s was achieved wa s being don e throug h th e internationa l bureaucracy unde r th e watchful ey e of the General Assembly . Canada, like other western countries , also became less enthusiastic about ECOSOC as a supervisor o f the specialized agencies because the communist countries largely boycotted the agencies but nevertheless ha d thei r opportunit y in ECOSO C t o discuss th e wor k of bodie s to which they did not belong . The Canadia n performanc e in ECOSO C was more reticent than might have been expected , give n th e priorit y accorded i t i n Ottawa' s vie w of the ne w United Nations. When the Counci l got under way it became spendthrift and irresponsible; a t leas t i n th e eye s o f Canadians wit h their prejudic e i n favour o f thrif t an d accountability . Canadian s like d thrif t i n speeche s an d procedures a s well, but ECOSO C turne d purple . It was not lon g before i t was inevitably concentratin g it s attentio n o n th e need s o f th e underdevelope d members. Canadian s wer e sympathetic and recognize d that , b y Article 55 , this wa s a legitimate concer n o f th e Unite d Nations , bu t i t had no t bee n a priority i n thei r thinking . They ha d assume d tha t th e prosperit y coming t o the advanced countries when the barriers were down would, with the greater

275 Economi e and Socia l Functions degree o f self-governmen t engendere d b y th e Unite d Nations , inevitably raise the standard s o f the poore r countries as well. At any rate they were not prepared fo r th e budgetar y nightmares th e les s develope d countrie s wer e proposing. Ther e wa s so muc h tha t neede d t o b e don e i n th e world , they realized, but the resources o f the United Nations were limited and they came largely from a small group of which Canada was one of the mos t vulnerable . It wa s th e 'bottomles s pit ' i n a n even mor e threatenin g guis e tha n ha d appeared in the contex t o f European relief. So the Canadian representative s gave lectures on accountability and shied awa y from initiatives . Two close observers o f Canadian policy, F.H. Soward and Edgar Mclnnis, noted i n 195 6 that Canadians ha d more than onc e taken positive initiatives in helpin g create institution s lik e ECOSO C tha t th e situatio n seeme d t o de mand, but they had been les s enthusiastic about subsidiary bodies and, in the actual operation of such institutions, had been 'helpfu l supporters' o r 'realistic critics' rathe r than leading advocates. 'I n the field of world economics, a s in tha t of security, there i s an ever-presen t consciousnes s that the abilit y to implement a given projec t of majo r proportion s rest s ultimatel y with a few leading states, an d th e tendenc y is to wait for their initiative as an indication of how far they are prepared to go, and t o judge the practical possibilities in the ligh t of their attitudes. Thi s is typically the rol e of a middle power, and one t o which Canada ma y possibly be more habituall y resigned tha n is warranted by Canadian resources and capacities.' 16 THE SPECIALIZE D AGENCIE S

In the meantime the specialized agencies were being established unde r their own steam an d by national representatives wh o were not always in collusion with thei r colleague s specializin g in the architectur e o f the Unite d Nations . The launchin g of the Foo d and Agricultur e Organization, the Internationa l Monetary Fund, an d th e Internationa l Ban k for Reconstructio n an d Development have been described i n chapter 2. It would be excessive t o describ e here the Canadian activity in setting u p all these bodies, although the spac e devoted t o them i n no way reflects the relative importance or the proportion of man hour s dedicate d t o this aspect o f the Unite d Nations. Notic e will be taken onl y of policie s that illustrate particular Canadian attitudes to th e UN structure. Terminology is a problem. The specialize d agencie s ar e definitely part o f th e Unite d Nation s syste m t o whic h the y ar e constitutionall y attached. Misunderstanding s aris e fro m th e tendency , faut e d e mieux , t o speak of the Unite d Nations 'proper ' as the Security Council, the Assembly , and the New York establishment i n general.

276 Th e Shapin g of Peace The Internationa l Labou r Organizatio n was alread y in existence . It had been created i n 191 9 in association wit h the Leagu e o f Nations, but instea d of sufferin g liquidatio n had continue d it s wor k throughou t th e wa r fro m Montreal. Fo r these reasons it s relationship to the propose d ne w structures had uniqu e features . Th e ILO , the bureaucrac y supported b y it s tripartite (labour, employers , and government) constituencie s i n the membe r states , had been jealous of its autonomy vis-à-vis the League , and i t was suspicious and defensiv e i n th e fac e o f proposal s t o co-ordinat e an d subordinat e i t within the all-encompassing world body people were talking about during the latter war years. It had shown its vitality in wartime by, among other things , holding a conference i n 194 4 at which the so-calle d Philadelphi a Charter, a world code fo r labour, was drawn up. It had good reason t o fear for its survival, however , as there wa s a widespread disposition to wipe the slat e clean . Early American proposals for a postwar order implied there should b e som e new body to d o what the IL O had been doing. 17 As Anglin aptly put it : 'The know-it-alls in Washington and elsewhere had little patience for the Genev a old hand s whos e experience the y dismissed a s inapplicabl e to th e change d circumstances of the world. This contempt for the past accounts for the apparently deliberate attempt to snub the ILO , mos t notably for failing to invite it to th e Ho t Spring s Food an d Agricultura l Conference.'18 I t was an attitud e shared b y only a few in Ottawa, where there was a greater disposition tha n in Washington t o recogniz e the advantage s where possible o f building from a living organism. Both th e Unite d State s an d th e Sovie t Unio n ha d bee n member s o f th e ILO, bu t th e USS R cease d t o b e a membe r whe n i t wa s expelled fro m th e League in 1939 . The Soviet Union was not only antagonistic to the ambitions of th e IL O but ha d i n mind promotin g the claim s of a rival body, the Worl d Federation o f Trade Unions, as a specialized agency. In the eyes of the western countrie s th e WFT U wa s no t a n intergovernmenta l agenc y an d i t was , furthermore, a t tha t tim e powerfull y influence d b y communist-dominate d trade unions. Th e Canadia n delegation came int o conflict with the Russian s at Sa n Francisc o ove r a Canadia n amendmen t which , havin g i n min d th e ILO, specificall y denned specialize d agencie s a s 'intergovernmental' organi zations. The Canadia n position was strongly supported and it prevailed. The official s o f th e Internationa l Labou r Offic e the n spoile d thei r goo d case fo r autonom y b y making unacceptable claims . They produced a report for discussio n a t Philadelphia19 that suggested th e organization should no t be simply on e amon g othe r agencie s bu t a forum fo r th e genera l exchang e o f views, responsibl e fo r scrutinizing al l internationa l economi c an d financia l policies and measure s adopte d b y governments a s well as b y other interna -

277 Economi e and Socia l Functions tional organizations . These proposal s wer e not wel l receive d b y th e majo r powers, whos e official s wer e at tha t tim e concerning themselves wit h ways and mean s o f linking or co-ordinating the ne w system o f international institutions. The Canadian delegatio n argued that the scope and functions of the ILO should b e specifically restricte d t o its rightful field s an d it s relations with the othe r agencie s o n th e basi s o f equality . The ILO' S scope shoul d no t b e reduced, bu t neither should it be accorded primacy. Two amendments t o the Philadelphia Charte r mad e thi s clear. Th e secon d wa s a Canadian proposal which sai d tha t th e IL O shoul d 'examin e an d consider ' rathe r tha n 'scruti nize,' a s i t ha d proposed , 'al l internationa l economic an d financial policies and measures.' The IL O fought also for special status on th e basi s of its long standing and its unique structure. A s its authority derived not merel y from governments, it ough t no t t o b e supervise d b y purely intergovernmenta l bodies . A t leas t the IL O wanted right of access t o the Assembl y rather than to a subordinate Economic an d Socia l Council . A t Philadelphia , Pau l Martin , representin g Canada, propose d a committee t o study the question , and he became chairman o f it . Whe n th e committe e me t i n Londo n i n Januar y 1945 the Eco nomic an d Socia l Council ha d alread y been designe d a t Dumbarto n Oaks , and th e force s arraigne d behind th e IL O did not lik e it. Althoug h the sam e governments wer e represented i n the specialized agencies as would be represented i n all the Unite d Nations organizations, each had its own constituency within th e nationa l government s an d i t coul d no t b e assume d tha t ther e would b e n o conflict . A difference now began t o appea r between Pau l Martin, wh o as parliamentary assistant t o th e ministe r of labour was deeply involved in the ILO , and those concerned wit h the agenda for San Francisco. I n his report t o the House of Commons Marti n said the IL O was more than just another functiona l agency and wa s entitled t o a special place . He asked th e Canadian delegatio n t o Sa n Francisco t o 'conside r carefull y th e wisdo m of having the internationa l labour office's futur e predicated upon a relationship to a body o n whic h the worker s and employer s o f the world are not repre sented'20 - tha t is , ECOSOC . Martin , however , wa s not on the delegatio n at San Francisco becaus e i n Apri l he ha d move d fro m th e Labou r pos t t o become secretar y o f state. The Canadia n delegatio n di d not suppor t hi s posi tion, which was put forward by the British ; and i t was eventually withdrawn. The firs t postwa r conferenc e o f th e IL O took plac e i n Montrea l i n th e autumn o f 194 6 a t whic h a matter o f particula r importance t o Canad a was raised. Th e uncertaint y of the jurisdiction o f the federa l and provincial governments i n Canad a over labou r matters ha d le d i n 193 7 t o a ruling of th e Judicial Committee o f the Imperia l Privy Council that denied the right of the

278 Th e Shapin g of Peac e federal governmen t t o take action i n the provincia l domain o n the ground s that it was fulfilling an internationa l obligation arising out of its membershi p in the ILO . The Canadian government secure d a clarification a t the Montrea l conference. A n amendmen t require d federa l government s t o tak e actio n similar t o tha t o f unitary governments o n question s tha t fel l withi n federal jurisdiction. I t als o require d periodica l conferences wit h provincia l authorities and report s to the IL O on question s whic h fell withi n provincia l competence. These amendments wer e dul y approved by the Canadia n parliamen t in 194 7 - bu t such declarations certainly did not solve the persisting legal and political problems of provincial jurisdiction i n United Nation s decisions. 21 The constitutional embarrassment wa s partly responsible for the Canadia n attitude toward s th e Unite d Nation s Educational , Scientific , an d Cultura l Organization, characterize d b y Professor s Sowar d an d Mclnni s a s 'dutifu l interest punctuate d b y chroni c exasperation.' 22 Th e projec t seemed t o lack the practicalit y of international co-operation i n trade or aviation, nutrition or monetary matters . An d i t raised the difficul t subjec t of education over which the federal government ha d no authority. There was no branch of the federal bureaucracy t o develo p a n interes t an d mak e plans , a s the Department s o f Agriculture, Finance , o r Transport ha d involved themselve s i n other agen cies. I n all the rhetoric about th e postwar world collaboration in matters cultural an d educationa l occupie d a prominen t place , bu t i n term s no t ver y appealing t o the pragmatist s in Ottawa or the provinces . However , th e cre ation o f suc h a n internationa l organizatio n wa s authorize d i n th e Unite d Nations Charter , an d th e Canadia n governmen t woul d have bee n criticized internally as well as externally if it had no t take n part . No Canadian cabinet minister attended th e meeting in London i n November 194 5 tha t drafte d a constitution fo r UNESCO . The organizatio n was, like most of the others, to have an assembly and an executive board , and Canad a was, i n spite o f its lack of officia l zeal , appointed t o th e Executiv e Committee. Ther e wer e t o b e nationa l commission s representativ e o f th e educa tional, scientific, and cultural organizations of the countr y to serve as liaison bodies with UNESCO . Althoug h suc h a commission wa s a useful device fo r a country that lacked a ministry of education, th e government wa s in no hurry. It was not unti l August 194 6 that parliament got round t o approving participation i n UNESCO . The prim e minister talke d o f the Canadia n nationa l com mission i n modest terms and expressed th e misgivings hel d in Ottawa about the budget . Thi s concer n ove r a dispositio n t o hig h spendin g an d feebl e accounting b y the artistic community persisted . Th e assesse d contributio n paid b y Canada wa s larger, however , tha n tha t pai d to agencie s tha t i t pre ferred.

279 Economi e and Socia l Functions After listin g a number of the 14 7 specific proposals before the first general conference, Edmon d Turcotte , wh o ha d bee n o n the Canadia n delegation, commented enthusiastically : 'A shor t surve y suc h a s th e presen t barel y scratches the surface of a programme covering fields as vast as human genius itself.'23 Tha t wa s the problem . The geniuse s assemble d i n Paris were convinced that 'war s begin in the minds of men' and they wanted to knock down the barriers to understanding an d create world unity by pious resolutions and the holdin g of an infinit e numbe r o f conferences i n the Cit y of Light. They wanted no t onl y to revam p histor y books an d sponsor a 'UNESC O hour' de voted t o internationa l understandin g o n world-wid e radio networks , the y also ha d some concrete idea s abou t tacklin g illiteracy and facilitatin g scientific exchange s and translations . One aspec t of thei r wor k that the govern ment too k seriously wa s the restoratio n o f works of art as an ac t o f postwar reconstruction. For thi s purpos e i t set u p th e Canadia n Council for Recon struction throug h UNESCO , partl y a s a toke n fo r th e mor e controversia l National Commission, but it was allowed to wind up in 1951 without replacement. The aloofnes s o f officials , attributabl e to extrem e cautio n abou t federa l interference in education and a deep suspicion of grandiosity, was somewhat out o f touch with strong opinions about Canada's neglected rol e i n UNESC O that wer e held b y many articulate citizens.24 Delegations t o UNESC O assemblies consisted largel y of non-officials selecte d on geographical, professional, and, alas, even politica l grounds, wit h eventually some representation fro m provincial Departments o f Education. Liaiso n with the headquarters i n Paris was maintaine d b y a n office r i n th e Canadia n embassy , an d a Temporar y Advisory Committe e fo r UNESC O wa s se t u p withi n th e Departmen t o f External Affair s whic h kept in touch with various non-governmental organizations. Ther e develope d a specia l commitmen t t o UNESC O amon g thos e who ha d served o n delegation s an d ther e wa s pressure o n th e governmen t from the m to take action. Nevertheless, i n 1948 the prime minister indicated that he was not proceeding at that time with setting up the National Commis sion, and i n 194 9 it was one of the question s referred to the Roya l Commission o n Nationa l Developmen t i n th e Arts , Letters , an d Sciences . Th e National Commissio n wit h a professiona l bas e wa s not i n fac t se t u p until 1957. The Worl d Healt h Organization , o n th e othe r hand , wa s on e o f th e agencies t o whic h the Canadia n governmen t gav e unhesitatin g support . I t was largely the step s take n i n the healt h field that had converted Canadian s before th e wa r t o a positiv e attitud e t o socia l an d economi c programme s within th e Leagu e structure . Ther e had , o f course , bee n a long histor y of

280 Th e Shapin g of Peace international co-operation in coping with epidemics and establishing rules of quarantine. Th e federa l governmen t ha d a strong Departmen t o f National Health and Welfare with a staff accustomed t o international conferences an d conventions. Ther e was no dissen t in parliamen t whe n membershi p in the WHO was approved on 6 August 1946. Canada was the first state to deposit its ratification - eve n thoug h this agency was authorized to assume power s and responsibilities closer to international administration than those exercised by other agencies . N o mor e tha n othe r internationa l institutions , however , could WH O bind its members. The Canadia n view was that WH O should provide expert s an d consultant s bu t no t establis h o r maintai n b y itself publi c health programme s i n individua l states. Operationa l activit y shoul d b e un dertaken only in emergencies suc h as epidemics. The Canadian insistence o n financial austerity was notable, and Canada was active in securing adoption at the firs t Assembl y o f th e principl e that state s whic h go t hel p fro m WHO should pa y fo r i t i f the y ha d th e means . A s i n othe r cases , th e Canadia n contribution wa s also personal . D r Broc k Chisholm, th e deput y minister o f health, laboured hard as rapporteur of the Technical Preparatory Committe e to create WH O and then becam e it s dynamic first director-general. The Canadian government also played its part in the creation or adaptation of othe r internationa l institutions . A t a conferenc e i n Genev a i n 194 8 a n Inter-Governmental Maritim e Consultative Organization was envisaged. The Canadian representativ e wa s chairma n o f th e preparator y committee, bu t this committe e ra n int o difficultie s afte r th e preliminar y meetings i n 194 8 and the organizatio n was not set up for some years. Canada was a participant in th e Worl d Meteorologica l Organization , th e conventio n fo r whic h was signed o n 1 1 October 194 7 althoug h i t di d no t com e int o existenc e unti l March 1950 . The Internationa l Telecommunications Unio n an d the Universal Postal Union had been i n existence fo r many years and were brought into the new United Nation s system at various conferences followin g the war. At an internationa l telecommunications conferenc e at Atlantic City in 194 7 an administrative counci l of eighteen member s wa s established an d Canada was elected t o it. Canada had interests to protect, includin g getting a place in the crowded radio spectrum. Durin g the war the CB C had set up an internationa l service t o projec t the Canadia n imag e and join i n allied propaganda. I n th e self-consciousness o f 194 5 there was a determination t o maintain this Cana dian presence on th e ai r waves, an d this necessitated a fight for frequencie s in th e ITU . As for th e Universa l Posta l Union , Canad a ha d been a membe r since 1878 and Canadians were their usual diligent selves at the first postwar congress i n Pari s i n 194 7 which prepare d fo r th e sanctio n o f th e UP U as a specialized agenc y of the Unite d Nation s in 1948 .

281 Economi e and Socia l Functions The propose d specialize d agenc y to whic h Canad a attache d mos t importance neve r cam e int o existence. Thi s wa s the Internationa l Trade Organization. The crusader s i n Washington ha d insisted on Article vu of the Lend Lease agreements , whic h pledged th e partie s to eliminat e 'al l form s o f discriminatory treatment i n internationa l commerce, t o the reductio n of tariff s and other trade barriers.' The question, however, was what the International Trade Organization would actually do, as it obviously was not going to be in a position t o determin e th e trad e and tarif f policie s of member governments . The IT O was regarded at first as part of a package with the Internationa l Bank and th e Monetar y Fund. However , diplomat s di d not get down to concrete discussions unti l long after Bretto n Woods - wel l after th e end of the war and the Sa n Francisco Conference . Th e expansio n o f trad e was not th e easies t subject o n whic h to ge t allie d agreemen t beyon d generalities . I t was not a matter o n whic h there coul d be muc h progress with the Russians . Th e gap between th e pligh t of the European s an d tha t o f the Nort h American s was such that there ha d to be concentration o n the emergency before the Utopia of fre e trad e coul d b e reached . Dela y was attributable also to differences of opinion amon g th e planner s i n Washington , includin g congressional resis tance to what Senator Vandenberg called an attempt 'to spell out a do-gooder program fo r th e whol e world.' 25 ECOSO C in February 194 6 set u p a Preparatory Commissio n o f eightee n countries , includin g Canada, t o prepar e a n agenda for an International Conference o n Trade and Employmen t and also a draf t charte r fo r a n Internationa l Trad e Organization . A preliminary draft charter wa s not complete d unti l August 1947 . Canad a accorde d provisional agreement t o this draft . In the meantime, however , th e countries concerned wer e getting down to business on the actual matter of reducing tariffs. Thes e bilatera l negotiations contributed t o something in the nature of a multilateral structure. According to th e principl e of non-discrimination , eac h countr y wa s entitled t o tarif f reductions mad e b y other participatin g countries. A n incredibl e number of agreements were in fact reached in Geneva in exceedingly complex negotia tions. I t wa s estimate d tha t hal f th e world' s trad e wa s involved . O n 3 0 October 194 7 twenty-three countries signed th e General Agreemen t on Tariffs an d Trade. Although Canadians did not fla g i n their anxiety to set up an ITO, the y plunge d int o th e GAT T negotiation s wit h zea l and ha d reaso n fo r satisfaction wit h the results. There was no doubt of Canada's positio n as one of th e thre e o r fou r majo r tradin g nations at tha t moment , an d unde r th e direction o f its widely experienced trad e commissioner turne d ambassador , Dana Wilgress , th e Canadia n delegatio n playe d a central role . Canad a di d agree t o make substantial concessions in its own tariffs. Nearl y two-thirds of

282 Th e Shapin g of Peac e its imports would be affected i n some way . The negotiation s came at a time of crisis in Canada's financial relations with the Unite d States , and the nee d to ope n u p th e America n marke t t o replac e lost markets in Britain and Eu rope wa s uppermos t i n Canadia n minds. 26 Th e concession s mad e b y th e Americans were encouraging. Spokesme n in Ottawa enthusiastically greeted the Genev a Conference , no t onl y th e specifi c gain s i n tarif f negotiation s but th e genera l commitmen t o f th e contractin g partie s t o establis h most favoured-nation treatmen t amon g themselves and follow th e rules covering trade relations set down in the genera l provisions of the agreement . I t was a wide commitmen t t o goo d behaviou r o f a kind Canad a strongl y favoured . The agreements, however , were subjected to considerable criticis m in parliament, partl y becaus e the y were no t eas y to understand , an d ratificatio n b y parliament was delayed. Enthusiastic Canadia n official s nex t set of f for Havan a where th e Unite d Nations Conference o n Trade and Employment began i n November 194 7 to prepare a revised charte r fo r th e ITO . Afte r extensiv e debat e tha t included , needless t o say , problem s o f th e votin g powe r t o b e accorde d grea t an d small, a fina l ac t wa s signed o n 2 4 March 194 8 b y fifty-fou r countries , in cluding Canada. I t was inevitably a compromise that satisfied few. Provisions were made for the charter to come into effect afte r ratificatio n b y a sufficien t number o f countries. An Executive Committe e o f the Interi m Commissio n was give n th e tas k o f preparin g th e wa y fo r th e firs t sessio n o f th e ne w organization and Wilgres s was chairman. The organizatio n envisaged would have had certain similarities with ICAO in that there would be an initial agreement o n trad e principle s with a n organizatio n t o supervise thei r application or revision . ICAO , however , had bee n accepted befor e the wa r was over. By this time it was too late. The enthusiasm fo r the 'creation ' was waning. Instead o f concocting longrange structures , politician s and diplomat s wer e desperately engage d in the actual tarif f negotiation s an d i n the settin g u p o f the structure provide d fo r under th e Marshal l Plan. The Canadia n governmen t remaine d faithfu l an d indicated tha t it would seek parliamentar y approval of the charte r of the ITO in it s 194 9 session , bu t i n Washington th e politician s ha d los t thei r enthu siasm. A t the end of 195 0 the Stat e Department announce d tha t the charte r would no t b e resubmitte d t o Congress . Wit h strong Canadia n support , th e GATT became i n itself a continuing institution, eventually producing its own secretariat an d furtherin g some at leas t o f th e cause s intended for th e ITO. Judged b y functionalis t Canadia n principle s i t ma y b e tha t a bod y whic h actually grew out of a strongly felt need to negotiate was off to a more practical start tha n an agency the functions of which remained nebulous .

283 Economi e and Socia l Functions INTEGRATION A N D A U T O N O M Y The relationshi p of th e specialize d agencie s t o th e Unite d Nation s evolve d from contentio n betwee n thos e intereste d i n creating an integrate d international system an d those whose needs an d purposes wer e more specific . Th e differences wer e not so much between countrie s as between peopl e of different inclination s within the variou s governments. Canadia n policy inevitably swung between the wil l t o create orde r out o f chaos and th e fea r o f erecting an unworkabl y centralized structure . I t wa s no t a simple struggl e betwee n political philosopher s in th e Departmen t o f Externa l Affair s an d official s o f the functiona l ministries, bu t the prejudic e in favour of autonomy was naturally stronge r amon g the latter . Th e ground was, in fact, cu t fro m unde r th e feet of centripetal designers b y the fact that powerful agencies , established or on thei r wa y before Dumbarto n Oak s and Sa n Francisco , wer e lik e feuda l baronies whic h could no t b e brough t unde r control. Nor coul d there be , as Canadian planners had at first contemplated, a rational allocation of responsibilities i n advanc e betwee n th e functiona l agencies an d th e propose d func tional commissions o f ECOSOC . The suppl e approac h t o thi s questio n i s wel l expounde d i n th e draf t in structions prepared unde r Hume Wrong's worldly-wis e direction for the first session of the Genera l Assembly: It is in general desirable from many points of view that the relationshi p between th e United Nation s an d thes e bodie s [specialize d agencies] shoul d b e clearly defined in order t o avoid overlapping of activities, competition fo r personnel, unequa l scales of remuneration, an d rivalr y i n particular fields of activity . The patter n o f association, however, canno t b e uniform , although certai n standar d clause s may be included in all agreements wit h specialized agencies . With regar d t o th e financing of th e specialize d agencies, the argument s in favou r of a single budget for the majo r international organizations are strong. Such a budget would hav e separate chapter s for each specialized agency as well as for the Secretar iat, th e Cour t o f Internationa l Justic e an d s o on. Th e adoptio n o f a central budget, however, raise s th e questio n o f th e degre e o f authorit y of th e Assembl y ove r th e finances of the specialized agencies. The general line to be taken is that the 'financia l autonomy' of specialize d agencie s i s not a real issue , sinc e al l of the m are , like the United Nation s itself , establishe d b y intergovernmenta l agreements, an d i t i s primarily the responsibilit y of national governments t o see that their delegations ar e instructed t o approve fai r financial provisions for all the internationa l organizations to which the y belong. Thi s doe s no t mean , however , tha t th e delegatio n shoul d pres s for complet e centralizatio n i n th e Unite d Nation s budge t o f th e finance s o f all the

284 Th e Shapin g of Peac e specialized agencies . Some o f them, indeed , wil l b e self-financin g throug h charge s levied on their own operations; this group would include the International Monetary Fund an d th e Internationa l Development Bank . For other s i t may be appropriate, because of the natur e of their operations, that contributions should be assessed on a special scale, thus necessitating a separate budget. 27

On the whole the Canadian government favoured a substantial measure of constitutional an d financia l integratio n alon g wit h functiona l autonomy , although th e wa y in which the attitud e was interpreted varie d considerabl y among officials an d ministers . Canada oppose d a wartime effort o f the IL O to detach itsel f fro m th e Leagu e o f Nation s budge t becaus e thi s woul d hav e prejudiced th e chance s fo r a co-ordinate d structur e i n th e ne w Unite d Nations system . I t wa s activ e i n bringin g the IL O in lin e whe n i t mad e it s claims at Philadelphi a to ac t as co-ordinator an d t o hav e specia l status. On the othe r han d Canad a di d support specia l concession s t o th e IM F an d th e IBRD becaus e thei r particula r kin d o f internationa l responsibilit y require d them t o hav e complet e financia l autonomy . Ther e wa s nothin g i n th e Charter, sai d Pau l Martin , 'whic h preclude d th e Counci l fro m recognizin g the inheren t difference s i n th e function s an d natur e o f th e variou s agen cies.'28 However muc h a tidy and hierarchical structure might have appealed to some officials, thos e in Ottawa who had done so much to create th e bank and fund woul d insist o n thei r operating without interference from a highly political central body. Canada trie d i n vai n t o ge t mor e Unite d Nation s contro l ove r constitu tional amendments b y the agencies, a common Unite d Nations budget, an d a hig h degre e o f administrativ e consolidation . Canad a pu t les s emphasis , however, on constitutional integratio n and uniformity of membership whe n this emphasis bega n to conflict with its wish that the agencies should, insofar as possible, b e isolated fro m th e politic s of the Col d Wa r which gripped th e Assembly an d ECOSOC . By 1949 Canada wa s admitting that a unified budge t was impossible becaus e th e Unite d Nation s syste m a s it was emerging was not constitutionall y capable o f coping with suc h a n arrangement. Ther e was a chang e als o i n th e concep t o f a n integrate d U N system o n question s o f security. I n th e formativ e stag e th e relationshi p o f agencie s lik e ICA O t o international securit y wa s stressed. Fo r severa l years , an d particularl y on the occasio n o f international crises, Canada insiste d didacticall y on the obligation o f th e agencie s t o serv e th e genera l caus e o f th e Unite d Nation s when securit y wa s at stake . Th e ide a tha t th e Unite d Nation s migh t b e a meshed structure i n which, for example, th e agencie s woul d look after th e transport o r health function s o f a grand collectiv e security operatio n lapse d

285 Economi e and Social Functions as the Unite d Nations security system emerged as something ver y far fro m that dream. Canadian policy was flexible enough to be contradictory. It was contradictory becaus e o f interna l differences over th e treatmen t o f various agencies and also because the government in practice sought equilibrium. It wanted as much co-ordinatio n and autonom y as wer e attainable and consisten t wit h each other . Whateve r the tal k o f contro l by ECOSO C o r th e Assembly , i t is clear from th e Canadia n drafts a t San Francisco that what was envisaged was that ECOSO C woul d make recommendations an d no t issu e directive s to th e agencies. Although Canada wanted to strengthen the regulatory and perhaps even disciplinar y authority of UN bodies, it should not b e assumed tha t they wanted the m to be legislative. 29 The ultimat e authority, including that ove r budgets, mus t b e hel d i n th e las t resor t b y governments. Canadia n state ments ca n be misleading if taken out o f context. At times the y stressed th e dangers of chaos and a t others th e advantage s of autonomy, and rightly so, for th e effor t t o find equipoise betwee n growt h and disciplin e remains th e constant proble m of international organization. Canada stressed th e nee d fo r member state s to co-ordinate polic y at th e national level and harmonize instructions given their delegates. Because the bureaucracy was close-knit ther e was reasonably good, i f informal, co-ordination in Ottawa. In December 194 9 an attempt was made to copy the British Steering Committee o n International Organization by setting up an interdepartmental committee on international organization, but it proved top-heavy and not very effective. Mor e effective wer e interdepartmental bodies such as the Inter-Departmenta l Committee o n the Foo d an d Agriculture Organization an d th e clos e liaiso n maintaine d b y th e Unite d Nation s Divisio n o f External Affair s wit h thos e responsibl e fo r th e specialize d agencie s i n th e functional departments . Dougla s Angli n suggeste d tha t co-ordinatio n wa s too effective . 'Th e immense car e taken i n the formulatio n of Canadian policy almost inevitabl y ensures tha t i t wil l rarel y b e bol d an d imaginative.' 30 There ma y be notable her e th e stron g han d o f the Departmen t o f Financ e through th e mediu m o f Sidney Pollack, for many years the on e man i n th e civil service who regularl y attended, an d maintaine d a close interes t i n th e work of, the General Assembl y and the various specialized agencies as well. His job wa s t o scrutiniz e an d advocat e econom y an d th e Departmen t o f Finance vie w prevailed often becaus e o f his extraordinary competence an d the respec t an d even aw e with which he was held in United Nations circles, especially the Secretariat . A usefu l descriptio n o f th e domesti c practic e i n th e earl y year s i s con tained in the Canadian reply to the secretary-general's questionnair e of 1951

286 Th e Shapin g of Peac e to member state s concerning their own administrative procedure s fo r deal ing with United Nations questions. It emphasized the paramount importance of cabinet . 'I t i s the chie f instrumen t o f co-ordination becaus e i t bears th e ultimate responsibility for co-ordination.' The tas k of cabinet, however, was facilitated t o th e exten t tha t ther e wa s preliminary consultation amon g th e other government departments . Th e description of the system in Ottawa was used t o oner a homily: 'Ever since th e United Nations was established Can ada ha s emphasized that , becaus e o f th e autonomou s characte r o f eac h o f the Specialize d Agencies and becaus e o f the difference s in the membershi p of the United Nations and the Agencies, effectiv e co-ordinatio n between th e programmes, budget s an d administrativ e practice s o f thes e organization s could b e achieved onl y if each country took steps t o ensure tha t it s delegations t o the meeting s o f the organization s pursued co-ordinate d an d mutually consisten t policies.' 31 This wa s perhaps the prescriptio n rathe r tha n th e consistent practice . Canadian policie s as expressed i n Geneva, Paris, or New York were at times contradictory, and this homily was a little rash. Neverthe less, i t wa s a reasonabl y practica l and flexibl e syste m fo r a tim e whe n th e number and the magnitud e of United Nation s operation s was limited - as was also th e ban d o f concerned minister s and bureaucrats clustered aroun d Parliament Hill. R E G I O N A L I S M A N D FUNCTIONALIS M

On economic an d social institutions Canada wa s as chary of regionalism as it was when security was involved.32 There was wide agreement wit h the views of Mitran y who had writte n in 1943 : 'There is little promise o f peace i n th e mere chang e from the rivalr y of powers and alliances to the rivalr y of whole continents, tightl y organized an d capable of achieving a high degree of , if not actual, self-sufficiency . Continenta l union s woul d have a more rea l chanc e than individua l states to practic e the autarch y that makes fo r division.' 33 At the ECOSO C meetin g o f 1 August 194 7 Pau l Marti n said Canad a wa s 'con cerned les t i n the futur e regionalis m and regional autarchy play the danger ous rol e whic h nationalis m an d nationa l autarch y hav e playe d i n recen t years.' Th e Canadia n governo r o f the Internationa l Monetar y Fund sai d t o the sevent h annua l meetin g o f th e Boar d o f Governor s o n 9 Septembe r 1952: 'The real payments problems .. . are not regional in character. They are world-wide. Eac h countr y ha s t o ge t int o equilibriu m wit h th e res t o f th e world and it cannot achiev e that end by purely regional arrangements.' 34 This emphasis o n globa l internationalis m wa s reinforce d b y specifi c fear s o f a breach between Nort h America and Europe, moves t o promote an exclusive

287 Economi e and Socia l Function s Commonwealth, th e emergenc e o f continentalis m i n Europe , an d b y in herited uneasines s abou t continentalis m i n Nort h America . Fo r Canad a regionalism was the problem , not the answer. Canada sa w i n functionalis m a n alternativ e t o regionalis m an d t o a n unwieldy centralized authority. Canada got itself elected to most of the func tional commissions se t up by ECOSOC an d argued that these shoul d be worldwide rathe r tha n regional . W.A. Mackintos h wa s the firs t chairma n of th e Economic and Employment Commission an d C.H.L. Sharman later became chairman o f th e Commissio n o n Narcoti c Drugs . Canadia n expert s wer e appointed to the Commission o n Population, Statistics, and Social questions. J.T. Marshal l of the Dominio n Burea u of Statistics became chairma n of th e Statistical Commission, an d G.F . Davidson , deput y minister o f health an d welfare, wa s a strong member o f the Socia l Commission. They wer e all experts. However , man y countries sent diplomats , political friends, an d othe r convenient appointees , an d th e concep t o f the U N as a place where experts could collaborate apolitically - a concept emphasized i n Canadian planning was undermined. Commission s an d subcommissions flourishe d ou t of hand. By 195 1 Canad a wa s joining with others t o weed ou t som e of the commis sions an d contro l proliferation . Agains t regiona l economi c commissions , however, Canad a fough t a losing battle . Canada di d accept th e earl y establishment o f economi c commissions fo r Europ e an d Asi a bu t the y resiste d pressure fro m th e Latin Americans t o set up the Economic Commission fo r Latin America. The argumen t against ECLA was that ther e wa s not th e sam e functional justificatio n as for Europe an d the Far East - Lati n America was not in need of postwar reconstruction. To a late r generatio n th e Canadia n positio n betray s a reprehensibl e un awareness o f th e need s o f region s lik e Lati n America . Th e concep t o f 'ai d and development ' a s a majo r functio n o f a Unite d Nation s i s not notabl y evident i n Canadia n planning . No on e seeme d t o thin k about Afric a a t all. Canadians merel y reflected current attitudes before the ide a of direct techni cal and capital assistance seize d th e imagination of Western government s after th e Marshall Plan and the Chinese Revolutio n and after it became clear that the vas t Britis h Commonwealth wa s going to be transformed int o units responsible fo r their own welfare and desperately in need o f help if they were to continue in their inherited democratic way. Latin America and Africa an d a good dea l of Asia were in 194 5 concealed behin d imperial structures. Lati n America wa s regarded a s an America n responsibility , and it s real condition was obscured b y its affluent representative s a t the Unite d Nations . London , Paris, Brussels , an d Lisbo n wer e responsible fo r Afric a an d ther e wa s little that othe r countries coul d do there eve n i f they wanted to. Canadians, fear -

288 Th e Shaping of Peace ful o f havin g a depresse d Europ e o n thei r hand s indefinitely , were canny about further commitments o f incalculable dimensions. Th e United Nations was accepted as an instrumentalit y for raisin g the standard s o f living of depressed countries, but largel y by unclogging the channels of trade, develop ment, an d finance . Th e communis t state s wer e certainl y not i n favou r of extensive economic powers of any kind for th e UN . Few people grasped th e revolutionary implications for the United Nations of the requirement s of the dark continents when the imperia l structures had dissolved and its constituent part s woul d turn t o th e internationa l communit y not just fo r develop ment bu t for sustenance . One area where Canadian leaders showed some interest in a regional body was the Arctic . Official s wer e anxious that th e defenc e arrangements the y were discussing with the Americans in the north not be regarded as hostile or exclusive, an d governmen t leader s wen t ou t o f thei r wa y to welcom e cooperation in non-military matters wit h other northern countries. In a speech to the Ne w York Rotary Club on 7 February 1946 Pearson said : 'We want to work ... not onl y with the U.S.A. , bu t wit h th e othe r Arcti c countries, Den mark, Norway, and th e Sovie t Union , i n exploiting to the ful l th e peaceful possibilities o f th e norther n hemisphere . Particularl y i s thi s tru e o f th e U.S.S.R. ...' I n a speech i n Princeto n o n 1 4 May of the sam e year St Laurent called o n th e fiv e Arcti c powers t o work out co-operativ e measures within the U N for the development o f the economi c and communications resources of the northern territories . During 1947 there were further suggestions fro m the same source but , as there was no interest shown by the Russians in that icy period, the suggestion lapsed. When th e regiona l economi c commission s becam e a fact , Canada , o f course, sought to subordinate them to ECOSOC with close financial control by that body and to keep them advisory, not operational. It did not want at this time to becom e a member o f any o f the commissions , bu t i t wanted to re serve the right to participate. This was met by a clause which specified in the case o f eac h commissio n tha t an y membe r o f th e Unite d Nation s coul d participate i n a consultative capacit y in th e consideratio n o f an y matte r o f particular concern . Canad a wa s careful t o stee r clea r o f ECL A but wa s les s reticent about sending observers t o meetings of the EC E and ECAFE . Needless t o say , Canada als o oppose d regionalization o f th e specialize d agencies. I t ha d accepte d th e principl e in UNRR A becaus e relie f an d recon struction problem s coul d b e see n regionally , although donor s lik e Canad a from outsid e the regions were of necessity involved - for fiinctional reasons. There wa s als o som e reaso n fo r regiona l council s i n ICA O becaus e o f th e significance of geography in aviation. Canada opposed th e deliberat e region-

289 Economi e an d Socia l Function s alization o f th e FAO . I t accepte d th e validit y o f bodie s tha t ha d com e int o existence t o serve a specific regional - and functional - purpos e such as the International Commissio n fo r Northwes t Atlanti c Fisheries an d th e Inter national Nort h Pacifi c Fisherie s Commissio n an d oppose d thei r integration into FAO . Those official s wh o ha d develope d thei r ow n way s of protectin g Canada's fish were no mor e going to agree, o n doctrinal grounds , t o inter vention i n thes e arrangement s tha n th e financ e me n woul d agre e t o th e subordination o f IMF or IBRD - o r than the whole government woul d agree to interference i n practical , established , continenta l bodie s lik e th e Interna tional Joint Commission . Canada's particular reasons fo r caution ove r regionalis m are illustrated in the lon g disput e over th e principl e in the Worl d Healt h Organization . Th e issue wa s the incorporatio n o f the alread y existing Pan America n Sanitary Organization a s th e wester n hemispher e regiona l bod y o f WHO . Canad a opposed regiona l proliferation of the agencies o n the ground s tha t these institutions shoul d creat e a solid bas e befor e thei r limite d fund s and talent s went int o regiona l office s wit h all thei r trapping s and thei r inevitabl e de mands for autonomy. It also opposed th e pretensions o f the Pan-American s to se t themselve s apar t fro m th e genera l rule s o f th e Unite d Nations , i n security a s wel l a s economi c an d socia l questions . Althoug h ther e wer e people in Ottawa who would have liked to see Canada join the Pan American family, ther e wa s also prejudice against it, a dislike of the hegemonia l role of the Unite d States, and resentment o f the politicking of the Latins . PASO pose d th e ticklis h question o f which hemisphere Canad a belonge d to, th e wester n o r th e northern . Th e mystica l symbolis m attache d t o th e Isthmus of Panama and the fortuitous naming of the two continents afte r th e same Italia n ha d create d a n assumptio n i n Washington an d furthe r south , but no t necessaril y i n Canada , tha t th e wester n hemispher e wa s a natural region. Bu t in functional bodies dealin g with health, agriculture , o r labour , Canada ha d little in common with South America. It did have much in common wit h the Unite d States, but this bilateral region was too lop-sided to be politically attractive. Such a fear ma y seem incompatibl e with the insistenc e on keeping existing bilateral North America n institution s such as the Inter national Joint Commission autonomous . Th e latter, however, were practical means of reducing frictions by enabling Canada t o bargain as an equal. Their purpose wa s not t o creat e a regional entity with a common fron t o r a single voice i n worl d councils . I t i s tru e tha t regiona l office s o r conference s o f United Nation s agencie s wer e not primaril y designed fo r consensus-makin g either, bu t ther e wa s a worrying ambiguity about th e Pan-America n frater nity (late r institutionalize d a s th e Organizatio n o f America n States) . Th e

290 Th e Shapin g of Peace Bogota Charte r o f 3 0 Apri l 194 8 specifie d in Articl e 100 : 'I n concludin g agreements wit h internationa l agencies o f a world-wide character, th e Inter American Specialize d Organizations shal l preserv e thei r identit y and thei r status a s integra l parts o f th e Organizatio n of America n States , even whe n they perform regional functions of international agencies.'35 There was about Pan America a suspicious emphasis on unity of which Canada had learned to be wary in the Commonwealth. The dilemma over WHO was explained in the officia l report , Canada and the United Nations, 1950: '... PAS O ha s focusse d it s attentio n o n th e principa l health problems of the area which are largely those of a tropical or sub-tropical nature, whereas Canada's contact s in health matter s hav e been traditionally with those countries having similar problems, namely, the United States, th e United Kingdom, and the countries of Western Europe.'"Nevertheless, both PASO and WH O declared Canada a member of PASO and o f the Regiona l Committee o f the Wester n Hemispher e fo r WHO , a curious dyad , concocted as a compromise solution to the furious debate over the 'integration ' of PASO with WHO. Stil l Canada refused to join. Canadians did , however, participate in th e debate, wagin g the battl e for the ultimat e authority of the universa l body . In retrospec t th e Canadia n resistance ma y seem excessiv e an d th e whole debate scholastic. 37 I t wa s on e o f thos e perpetua l argument s which , a s i s characteristic of the Unite d Nations , develops a momentum o f its own after positions become entrenched . On Canada's par t there seemed to be a sound principle at stake, spice d wit h a particular animus, and i t was hard t o let go. What was emerging was what might be described a s an acceptance of regionalism when it could be justified a s functionalism. That approach was consistent wit h th e genera l vie w o f internationa l organizatio n a s a respons e t o needs rather than an imposed framework . To base international governmen t on th e arbitrar y division o f the worl d into regional constituencies wa s to fly in th e fac e of histori c reality. Latin America was perhaps an entit y of sorts, and Europe had aspirations, but Asia was a region only in geographical terms. Where there were, however, agencies to perform valid functions in a region or where countries of a region wanted to combine for consultation, protection, or to pursue unity, they could be encouraged t o do so ad hoc, a s long as other countries and continents were not constrained t o do likewise and such organization was not seen as the basi s of universal federal structures. H U M A N RIGHT S

One o f th e commission s o f whic h Canada wa s not a member wa s that o n human rights . Fo r variou s reason s th e Canadia n governmen t kep t a low

291 Economi e and Social Functions profile. I t wa s th e Americans , wit h thei r declarator y tradition, th e Bil l o f Rights and al l that, who presse d har d for strong or at leas t strong-soundin g provisions about huma n rights . The Russian s an d Britis h were sceptical and went alon g becaus e i t was hard t o com e ou t i n oppositio n t o goodness an d truth. A t Sa n Francisco , however , ther e wa s considerabl e suppor t fro m lesser power s for the promotio n o f respect fo r human rights and fundamental freedom s a s a purpos e o f th e Unite d Nations . Ther e ha d bee n littl e enthusiasm i n Ottawa for adding to the Charte r anythin g like a statement o f the right s o f ma n o r a declaratio n o f th e dutie s o f states , an d no t muc h attention wa s given t o such a project . 'Such addition s ar e likel y t o b e dis cussed a t Sa n Francisco, ' Hum e Wron g warne d th e lega l adviser , 'bu t I imagine tha t ther e i s no t muc h prospec t o f thei r adoptio n i n spit e o f th e ardent suppor t give n b y Mr . Escot t Reid.' 38.What Wrong , an d Robertso n also, wer e especiall y concerned abou t - becaus e the prime minister was excessively concerne d over i t - wa s that defender s o f provincial rights coul d regard th e Charte r as an invasion . Wrong's vie w was that the onl y aspect of the proposal s whic h might b e regarde d a s touchin g the provincia l field of jurisdiction wa s th e injunctio n t o 'promot e respec t fo r huma n right s an d fundamental freedoms, ' bu t 'unles s this is made a great deal more specific, I thin k tha t it s acceptanc e coul d hardl y be regarde d a s a violatio n o f th e B.N.A. Act.' 39

The attemp t t o spel l ou t th e right s bothere d Canadia n officials . Ther e seemed somethin g rathe r Yanke e abou t th e whol e idea , contrar y t o th e Canadian/British traditio n where , i t wa s wel l known , huma n right s wer e more faithfull y respecte d i n practice than i n the unbridle d republic , in spite of it s written constitution . Ther e wa s the mor e seriou s objectio n tha t cus toms an d practice s differe d s o widel y throughout th e Unite d Nations , th e attempt t o reac h a consensu s o n right s woul d onl y promot e conflic t an d incite th e kin d o f vapi d moralizin g whic h the Ottaw a men disliked . Ther e could be no international enforcement measures ; the y must be the responsi bility o f the sovereig n governmen t - o r th e subsovereig n province . It was not tha t Canad a wa s uninterested i n o r ha d a ba d recor d i n huma n rights . That wa s made almost offensivel y clea r in official statement s on the subject . The chairman of the Canadia n delegatio n insiste d t o the General Assembl y in 194 8 when th e Universa l Declaratio n o f Human Right s was being vote d upon: 'S o fa r a s th e positio n o f Canad a i n regar d t o th e maintenanc e an d extension o f human right s is concerned, w e shall, in the future , as we have in the past , protect the freedo m o f the individua l in our country where freedom i s not onl y a matter of resolutions bu t als o of day-to-day practice from one end o f the country to the other.' 40

292 Th e Shapin g of Peac e Despite these objections, th e Commission o n Huma n Right s produced in a very few years the Universa l Declaration o f Human Right s and th e Cana dian government was faced with the kind of dilemma to which it would grow much more accustome d - wha t to do in the face of a majority whic h has not accepted th e Canadia n way. The draf t declaration was considered at length by a joint committee o f the Common s an d Senate. 41 The committe e ha d many general an d specifi c criticisms , mostl y i n accor d wit h thos e o f th e govern ment. I t was not a question o f not takin g the declaratio n seriously . Perhap s they too k i t too seriously . The vaguenes s o f some o f th e proclaime d right s was criticized because they could not be turned into legislation or interpreted in a cour t o f law . It coul d b e argued , o f course , tha t th e declaratio n wa s intended simpl y to set goals t o be aimed at , bu t th e Canadia n prejudic e was against subscribin g t o a declaratio n o f intention s tha t wa s no t alread y o r could not be promptly put on the statute books . This attitude sprang from an admirable dislik e of hypocrisy but als o a failure o f imagination. The Unite d Nations was set for a long history of ringing declarations by no means always reflecting th e practice s of members wh o subscribed t o them . Th e settin g of standards t o aim at and the encouragement o f aspirations has been one of its accomplishments. Th e Parliamentar y Joint Committe e favoure d a concis e statement o f genera l principle s rather tha n th e sprawlin g pronouncemen t intended t o includ e everyone's favourite right. Lawyers saw real trouble i n Canada's being bound t o all sorts of fanciful 'rights, ' includin g some which legitimized Marxis t economics . A t on e tim e on e bemuse d delegatio n wa s said to have proposed a declaration o f 'the right to old age.' What especiall y worrie d th e Canadian s an d other s wa s th e determine d effort t o include social and economic rights. It was increasingly recognized i n Canada tha t lega l rights could b e worth little for the jobless, but there was a distinction a s set ou t i n a Canadian submissio n i n 1951 : 'Generall y speak ing .. . economic and social rights cannot b e protected an d encouraged i n th e same wa y as civi l an d politica l rights. The latte r involv e limitation s o n th e powers o f government s an d legislature s t o interfer e wit h th e right s o f th e individual. Economic , socia l and cultura l rights, o n the othe r hand , ar e no t so much individua l rights as responsibilities o f the stat e in th e field of eco nomic polic y an d socia l welfar e whic h usuall y requir e fo r thei r effectiv e implementation detaile d socia l legislatio n an d th e creatio n o f appropriat e administrative machinery . There is thus a fundamental difference in the na ture of the tw o categories of rights.'42 These economic right s were pressed by the developing countries , an d also by the Australian s who had put up a great battle t o ge t into th e Charte r recognitio n o f the righ t t o 'ful l employment. ' This wa s a gran d sloga n o f the time s an d th e Ottaw a Keynesian s certainl y

293 Economi e and Socia l Functions favoured i t a s a goa l o f postwa r governments . America n legislator s were wary a s i t smacke d o f socialism . Bu t wha t di d 'ful l employment ' mea n exactly, an d wa s i t necessaril y a n inflexibl e rul e fo r al l countrie s an d al l times? Canad a propose d a compromise a t Sa n Francisco, 'th e highes t pos sible level of employment,' but thi s was a little too sensible t o b e accepted. The Declaratio n o f Human Rights came t o a vote in the Assembl y late in 1948. I t wa s a notabl e fea t o f reconciliation , fo r whic h a Canadian , J.P . Humphrey, formerly of McGill University, was largely responsible - a distinguished member o f the Secretariat and the lone Canadian hero in the human rights struggle. I n committee i t was adopted without a single negative vote, but Canad a an d th e Sovie t blo c abstained . A stubbor n conviction of righteousness in Ottawa led to this blunder. Preoccupation of the senior members of the delegatio n wit h political issues regarded as more importan t allowed a situation t o develo p withou t adequate calculation . Lester Pearso n ha d just arrived i n Paris , wher e th e Assembl y wa s bein g held , i n hi s ne w rol e a s secretary of state for external affairs. H e moved quickl y to pick up the piece s and persuade d th e governmen t t o alter its stand i n th e plenar y session. H e did s o with an explanatio n of th e vot e tha t explicitly stated: '.. . i n regard to any right s whic h ar e define d i n thi s document , th e federa l government o f Canada doe s no t inten d t o invad e othe r right s whic h are also important to the peopl e of Canada, an d b y this I mean th e right s of the province s under our federa l constitution.' Th e valu e of the declaratio n a s aspiration was recognized: Canada had decided to vote in favour 'in the hop e that it will mark a milestone i n humanity's upward march.' However , 'We do not believe in Canada tha t legislatio n shoul d b e place d o n ou r statut e book s unles s tha t legislation can indicate in precise terms the obligation s which are demande d of ou r citizens , an d unles s thos e obligation s can b e interprete d clearly an d definitely i n th e courts. ' Freedom s i n Canad a ha d develope d 'withi n th e framework o f a syste m o f la w derive d bot h fro m statutes , an d fro m th e judgments o f th e courts ' an d althoug h Canad a ha d no w subscribe d t o th e general statement of principles it had no intention o f departing from it s own procedures. Th e speec h containe d a vigorous attack on th e Sovie t approach to huma n rights , just i n case there were doubts about the company Canada had bee n keepin g i n the committe e vote , an d th e Canadia n politica l philosophy of the da y was made clear: 'Without those free institutions, which can only flourish in a liberal democratic society, there can be no human rights.' 43 This was the best way out of an embarrassing situation. Cabinet ministers had no t ye t bee n expose d enoug h abroad . A s a civi l servan t newl y transformed int o a politician and suspecte d o f internationalism , Pearso n ha d t o toe the line . It was a considerable achievement t o get his colleagues to switch

294 Th e Shapin g of Peac e the vote. Th e statement, however , was legalistic and a little smug, a style he shunned whe n h e gre w more confiden t o f hi s position . The Canadia n atti tude continued squeamish when commissions an d committees settle d down to th e lon g tas k o f draftin g covenant s tha t woul d b e bindin g lega l agree ments. One favourable turn wa s that the economic and social rights were to be placed i n a separate covenant, bu t the sam e problems persisted . Much energy was put into securing a 'federal clause' recognizing the spe cial proble m o f federa l government s whic h lacked domesti c powe r ove r al l human rights . I n this struggle Canada, o f course, ha d allies in other federal states. From Ottawa' s perspective thei r position was unassailable: 'I deem i t expedient, however , to repeat here what has been sai d in previous years that the ai m of the Canadia n Governmen t i n insisting on the insertio n o f a suitable federal claus e i s not t o escap e obligation s under th e Covenants . Tim e and agai n w e have le t it be know n that in ou r opinio n suc h a clause would not reliev e federa l governments of any obligatio n which it migh t constitu tionally b e capable of implementing ... The presen t situatio n in Canada... is that internationa l agreement s dealin g wit h matter s comin g exclusivel y within th e jurisdiction of the Canadia n province s d o not becom e th e la w of the lan d eve n thoug h thes e agreement s ma y be approved or ratifie d b y the federal government ... 544 Some countrie s seemed malevolentl y obtuse in not recognizing th e sacrednes s o f Canadia n constitutiona l principles . Ye t t o others i t wa s a ver y unsatisfactor y situation whe n a membe r stat e o f th e United Nation s wa s incapable of makin g commitments, tha t i t was placing certain areas outsid e th e law. An importan t maturin g experienc e fo r Canad a an d othe r 'libera l demo cratic' societies wa s the experimen t i n promoting 'freedom o f information.' Not surprisingl y those who had fough t the Nazi s had stron g view s on government contro l of the medi a as a cause of war. Canada, with strong support from Canadia n journalists, was enthusiastic about th e conference whic h the General Assembl y i n late 194 6 authorized th e Economic an d Social Council to call. Freedom o f the pres s wa s so sacred an d so obvious a right that little opposition wa s expected, except , of course, fro m th e Soviet bloc whose perverse minorit y views would simply have to be isolated. A n impressive Cana dian delegation consistin g o f diplomats, journalists, an d a representative o f the CB C attended a month-long conferenc e i n Geneva in the sprin g of 194 8 and Canada endorse d th e draft convention o n the international transmissio n of news, the righ t of correction, and draft articles for inclusion in the declaration and the covenants o n human rights. However, certain reservations were made. I t wa s becomin g clea r tha t fo r man y people, especiall y thos e i n th e developing countries, freedo m o f information was not synonymous with the

295 Economi e and Social Functions unlimited righ t o f powerfu l foreign news medi a t o repor t an d sa y unchallenged whatever the y liked. Ther e mus t b e a right of correction. However, this proposed search for truth began to look too much like censorship to the highly sensitiv e pres s representatives . Eventuall y the Canadian s decide d a convention o n the subject would do more harm than good and in 1952, after consulting th e Canadia n media, agree d wit h other like-minded members t o oppose opening the convention fo r signature. The experience, however , was perhaps worth more than would have been the subscriptio n to an imprecise and contradictory declaration. It is a principal purpose o f the Unite d Nations t o increas e awareness by revealing complexity. Certainly some of the proposal s for checking the right of the western press to slander and distort would have also checked thei r freedom t o make known. However, the self-assuranc e o f the wester n countries needed pricking, with reference to freedom o f the press and o f some othe r huma n rights they held sacred. An argument for the educational benefits of even the most controversial Unite d Nations project s and debate s i s that i t i s doubtful if a Canadian representativ e in the seventie s woul d speak with such unguarde d immodesty abou t the stat e of human rights in Canada as the representative s did without hesitation i n the postwa r decade.

Conclusion

Recollections i n tranquillit y o f untranqui l times ten d t o excessiv e clarifica tion. I have trie d t o catc h facets of a vision which flashed briefly. W e wer e dealing not in plans but hypotheses that were instantly put to the test. To see this er a i n term s o f dream s betrayed , o f unforesee n disasters , o r eve n o f predictions fulfille d i s to impos e on histor y the value s o f drama. What happened wa s neither precisel y expected no r unexpected . W e took for grante d that event s woul d mov e rapidl y an d i n variou s directions. Th e endeavou r was t o maintai n som e contro l ove r them , t o hav e i n advance , therefore , some plan s an d eve n mor e fall-bac k position s and t o kee p a quic k eye for opportunities to seize. The syste m wa s adapting rapidly from the moment - or moments - of its conception. I t was largely the adven t o f atomic power and the unravellin g of empires whic h rendered th e worl d of Sa n Francisco ou t o f date. Th e Col d War ha d bee n anticipated ; i t wa s i n fac t alread y a facto r i n th e shapin g of peace b y th e 'allies ' i n wartime . In basin g th e provision s fo r securit y o n great-power consensus, th e drafters were displaying not blindness bu t rather a shrewd endeavour t o perpetuate the sine qua non of world peace at as high or low a common denominato r as could be maintained. It seems to me afte r three or more decades that they were essentially right. The girdle put 'round about th e earth, ' ren t o r distorte d thoug h it may be, ha s held. Th e Unite d Nations system has grown broader and deeper. It s embrace ha s become global an d th e challenges , therefore , infinitel y greate r tha n thos e foresee n i n Ottawa or anywher e else in 1945 . The frustration s it suffers ar e attributable to the intractabilit y of the agend a more tha n to weakness o f the structure . The importanc e o f the Col d Wa r in altering the practic e an d th e frame work of the Unite d Nations cannot b e dismissed, bu t i t can be exaggerated . For Canada the experience of ending the war and getting the United Nation s

297 Conclusio n into operatio n involve d an extensiv e adjustmen t of idea t o reality , mos t o f which would have been require d even i f the rif t amon g the grea t powers had not widened . Durin g a period o f transition th e languag e of disappointmen t predominated, th e blame bein g placed on the powers and especially the Russians fo r upsetting the consensu s o n which peace and progres s wer e to rest. By 194 7 th e lesson s wer e bein g digested . A ne w loo k wa s taken a t inter national politics and a new phase o f creative energy reached. The time s an d th e conception s o f this period wer e extraordinary. We err by thinkin g of it as the daw n o f a new heave n an d a new earth . Everything was impermanent . Canada' s economic , military , and diplomati c capacities were swollen; its position was not one that the country could expect to maintain or would seriously want to. Unfortunately, however, the adjustment to a more norma l ratin g has to o ofte n bee n regarde d a s decline an d fal l s o that Canada's steady ris e in real consequence ha s been obscured . A country sick of war and depressio n seized , understandably enough , o n a dream o f peac e and plent y an d o f statu s whic h ha s appeare d i n recollectio n mor e concret e than i t wa s in fact . Th e drea m wa s encouraged b y the languag e of political leaders-not fo r cynica l reason s bu t becaus e the y though t th e Utopia n clichés wer e required fo r inspiratio n and encouragement . Th e world would never b e the sam e again , i t was true, bu t i n many respect s i t was the same old world. Beneath th e rhetori c the Canadia n visio n of 'world government' was not as different a s it seemed from th e prewa r calculations. The favourit e them e was th e necessit y t o surrende r sovereignt y t o a highe r authority , but th e Canadian governmen t wa s not prepare d itsel f t o d o any such thin g - and rightly so . Th e Unite d Nation s wa s a n associatio n o f sovereig n state s fo r collaborative action. As a new generation o f diplomats coped with the actuality of international institutions, their principles began to sound mor e like the discredited view s of the thirties , not because the y were tired or had become reactionary bu t becaus e thos e more astringen t calculation s of what a world 'government' could do looked sounde r a s old problems recurred . What was new wa s the mor e active an d positiv e wil l i n Canadia n foreig n policy . The political contradictions remaine d stubborn . Mackenzi e King had been forced to adjust to a changed world and a changed country, but his scepticism about the surrender o f decisions t o other power s reflected deeply-rooted Canadia n concerns. External Affair s was , o n th e whole , well ou t i n front o f the government , but i t would b e a mistake t o se e thi s as a simple struggl e betwee n Utopia n officials and unimaginativ e politicians . For official s lik e Robertso n and Wrong, th e inhibition s of thei r ow n an d othe r government s wer e no t jus t

298 Th e Shapin g of Peace errors t o b e corrected , the y wer e th e facts o f lif e t o b e reckone d wit h in planning any kind of international community and any soundly based Cana dian foreig n policy. In this study I may seem to have portrayed the bureau crats a s wise r tha n th e politicians . I recognize , however , tha t i t i s a moo t question whether civil servants are ever advocating wise policies if these ar e out of touch with politics. It is their duty, of course, t o warn their masters of politically unpalatable factors. In this case the y also provided a n appropriate kind of leadership by formulating goals and schemes to attract the support of cabinet. I t wa s a notabl e contradictio n o f a favoure d bromid e o f political scientists, tha t th e bureaucrac y alway s exert a conservativ e influenc e o n policy.1 Where th e bureaucrat s wer e out o f step wit h th e prim e minister an d his more elderl y colleague s wa s i n thei r estimat e o f th e positiv e forc e which their countr y wa s no w read y t o exer t i n th e world . Impatience ha d bee n building during the war . When Hum e Wron g arrived in Ottawa from Lon don h e wa s distressed b y the attitude s o n th e highes t leve l an d h e wrote privately: 'A clear call to arms depicting Canada as a North American demo cracy fighting for North America n issues an d values would have unite d th e country an d greatl y influenced the Unite d States. Canad a woul d have bee n among the leadin g countries, instead o f figuring as a sutler o f the Allie s and often a s a querulou s cam p follower.' 2 Querulousnes s ha d becom e suc h a habitual stance that there were those in Ottawa who seemed actually to welcome reverse s t o Canadian claims, for these nourishe d and justified a sense of grievance. It was easier, furthermore, to complain than to contribute. A somewha t simplisti c inclination o f 194 5 wa s to d o whateve r ha d no t been don e i n the thirties . Tha t attitud e wa s certainly detectable i n Ottawa , but, o n th e whole , an d particularl y in the real m o f policy rather tha n planning, I thin k th e effor t wa s made t o absor b the lesson s whil e building on what wa s sound , recognizin g th e Leagu e an d dominio n statu s a s notabl e steps o n th e way . Many o f ou r assumption s abou t wha t ha d gon e wrong before hav e carrie d weigh t because the y wer e conclusions reache d afte r a bitter experience. The y were based, however, on hypotheses tha t can never be proved . Th e assumptio n tha t al l woul d hav e bee n wel l i f Canad a an d other countrie s had supported Articl e 10 and collectiv e security is one such unprovable hypothesis . Anothe r is , o f course , tha t i f w e ha d don e s o o r made th e pledg e to Britain, the countr y would have been rent in twain. It is at leas t a s valid to conten d tha t th e Leagu e would have succeeded i f it ha d been universal o r nearly so. Here the Canadian record was good, fo r we had argued insistentl y tha t everythin g should b e done t o attract th e American s and th e othe r recalcitran t majo r powers . Universa l collectiv e securit y i s a

299 Conclusio n dubious doctrine i n any case, bu t i n a rump League, as all Canadian governments insisted , i t was a provocation to disaster - an d it kept the American s out. Members o f the Unite d Nations ha d t o lear n withi n a few years that th e beautiful doctrin e o f collectiv e securit y wa s no t feasibl e even wit h th e Americans in. I t was based o n a simplistic view of the cause s o f war and a n ingenuous assumptio n tha t ther e woul d always b e a wide consensus abou t acts o f 'aggression. ' I t wa s a system calculated , furthermore , t o tur n small wars int o larg e ones. Tha t i s very much wha t King, Skelton , and company had been saying. Their convictio n tha t th e functio n o f the Leagu e was conciliation and economic appeasemen t ma y have been irrelevan t in the context of the late thirties, bu t it is arguable that a League stiffened b y so vital a force as the Unite d State s coul d a t a n earlie r stag e hav e use d it s mor e powerfu l capacity fo r persuasio n an d intimidatio n t o discourag e th e aggressors , provide for peaceful change on a principle of rough justice, and get at the cause s of economi c an d politica l tension . I t i s ironic , bu t illustrativ e o f th e rea l change i n Canada' s stance, tha t Canada' s majo r contribution t o security in the Unite d Nation s ha s been dedicate d t o preventing by 'peacekeeping' th e escalation o f small wars into large ones. Such thing s hav e bee n possibl e i n th e Unite d Nations , eve n thoug h th e record of accomplishment ha s been mixed . What saved th e Unite d Nations for these , its valid functions, wa s the eventual recognition of the impracticality of universal collective security and the provisio n for basic security thereafter i n functional associations fo r collective defence, the most notable being NATO an d th e Warsa w Pact. Th e Unite d Nation s wa s thereby relieved o f a military responsibilit y it coul d neve r fulfil . I n th e securit y provide d t o th e major antagonist s b y thei r alliances , th e member s o f th e Unite d Nations , large and small, could start groping with the problem s of conciliation, peaceful change , and economic 'appeasement.' Collective defence and the balance of terror are not, o f course, a n ultimate guarantee of peace. Disarmament is a muc h greate r nee d tha n th e drafter s o f th e Charte r envisaged , bu t th e problem i s no t solve d b y positin g a n illusor y international forc e o r som e other comfortabl e formula. For the foreseeabl e future peac e has to be managed an d conflic t controlle d arduousl y and persistentl y by and throug h th e United Nations and other instrumentalities . It woul d be har d t o argu e tha t al l this was precisely foreseen i n the Eas t Block befor e th e war , although Hum e Wron g in Genev a wa s on th e track. He recognize d tha t i t was folly t o as k the Leagu e i n the lat e thirties to en force collectiv e securit y against the Nazis . Nevertheless, somethin g ha d t o be done to resist such naked aggression , an d this, he said, had to be done by

300 Th e Shapin g of Peac e the Europea n power s and their associates willing and able to do so. 3 In 193 8 Canada wa s not read y for suc h a commitment; i n 194 8 it was. A universal guarantee remained , however , a dubious propositio n althoug h i n 194 5 w e were stil l clutchin g that nobl e illusion . A s forecasts o f the Unite d Nation s that wa s to emerg e i n th e fifties , Canadia n view s of the thirties , including those o f Kin g himself , stan d u p reasonabl y well. Canadian thinkin g on th e shape o f peace fro m the thirtie s to the fifties was an evolution rather than a revolution - i n the best Canadia n tradition . Wars and rumours of wars were part o f ou r education . Perhap s als o Canad a ha d t o g o throug h a phas e o f saying no , withi n th e Commonwealt h an d th e worl d organization , to well meant bu t unsoun d propositions , such a s the single empire voice , universa l collective security, or a one-sided pledg e to help in Europe's civil wars. It had to do so not just in the national interest but in order to help clear the ground for sounde r premise s o n which to build a new Commonwealth and a United Nations. On the ev e o f war political leaders an d officials , fo r all their doubts abou t the League, ha d still proclaimed th e essentiality of international organization of some kind, and that faith remaine d axiomati c throughout the war . Afterwards, Louis St Laurent could state wit h little fear o f contradiction: 'If ther e is one conclusio n that our commo n experienc e has led us to accept, it is that security for this country lies in the development o f a firm structure of international organization.' 4 That convictio n seemed to be shared b y all but a few in the country , although the obligation s involved were not clearly perceived and scepticis m revive d whe n the complexitie s o f international organization unfolded. Fo r a brief period, however, there was a near consensus, the previous doubt s o f th e nationalists , imperialists , o r pacifist s havin g bee n sub merged b y events. It was the worl d that changed, no t just Canadian policy . '... le t us not forget,' said S t Laurent, 'tha t much which forms the basi s of our agreement i n that respect i s the result of circumstances over which we have had little if any control.'5 It was not a complaint of victimization; it was a recognition that the foreign polic y of a power - especially a secondary powe r - is to a large extent adjustment t o the wa y of the world. One circumstanc e wa s the greatl y increased powe r of North America , o f Canada itself , and of the Unite d States whos e role in international organization ha d shifte d fro m periphera l t o central . Canada' s altere d convictio n about internationa l organizatio n wa s a less spectacular conversio n tha n tha t of the Americans , bu t it was in its own way just as radical. The United States , in spite of its formal dissociation fro m th e League, ha d always had to act like a world power. Canada had led a more sheltered life . For three-quarter s o f a

301 Conclusio n century a t least i t had consciously found security and a considerable degre e of prosperit y i n th e shado w o f th e Anglo-America n entente . I t wa s in th e happy position of being able to avoid entangling involvements an d pursue a passive foreign policy. The United States, however, had had to take positions of som e kin d o n issue s fro m Manchuri a to Spai n because it s powe r wa s a factor eve n whe n withdrawn. If it was isolationist vis-à-vis Europea n secur ity an d th e League , i t wa s a powe r to b e reckone d wit h in Asi a and Lati n America and in economic questions everywhere. Canada could and largely did keep as uninvolved as possible, content to be a lesser power, albeit one whose sovereign independenc e an d overseas trad e were consistently asserted. It is too simple, however, to say that Canada, as a result of the war, moved from isolationis m t o internationalism , becaus e Canadia n polic y was neve r fundamentally isolationist . Certainl y there wa s a strong hankering for isola tion, bu t tha t was not th e pat h chosen whe n the tests came. Wher e Canad a differed fro m th e Unite d State s wa s i n it s decisiv e actio n i n crisis, in 191 4 and in 1939, actions which seem uncharacteristically bold in comparison with the cautiou s peacetim e policie s o f it s governments . Canadians , o r a t leas t those responsible for the decisions, were convinced that the country's funda mental interest wa s involved in the issue s o f the great wars at the tim e they commenced. They believe d tha t America n interest s wer e as much involve d as theirs. 'We have gone into this war voluntarily,' Mackenzie King noted in November 1939 . 'We are in it at great cost while our powerfu l neighbou r is out o f it at grea t materia l advantage, thoug h I regret t o sa y at equall y great loss of moral power and influence.' 6 Canada would not have gone to war if it had not ha d th e Britis h tie, bu t i t would not have gone if a majority o f Canadians had not believe d in a cause greater than the cal l of the blood . Twice the Unite d States wen t the same wa y later. In both wars Canadians sensed that an international security system on which they depended an d for which the y ha d som e responsibilit y was threatened, jus t a s the American s had. Again they ended as partners in the same crusad e for world order. Thi s time th e Unite d State s remaine d involve d an d too k ove r leadership . Tha t made a crucial difference t o Canada, no t becaus e o f a preference for American leadership bu t becaus e th e Unite d States commitmen t altere d th e basi s of international organization and made many things possible. It undermined, furthermore, th e argument of those Canadians who had said Europe's quarrels were not o f vital interest t o North Americans . The shif t o f powe r amon g th e giant s ha d not , however , solve d th e ol d Canadian dilemma over the relationship between policy-making and respon sibility. The challenge to Canadian right s would come mor e ofte n now from the Unite d State s an d th e USS R tha n fro m Britain . The abstrac t righ t o f a

302 Th e Shapin g of Peac e country t o participat e in policy-makin g that migh t involv e i t i n militar y operations would hardly be denied by anyone. But how to provide for it? Th e allied war effort, whic h had been largel y in the hand s of a great-power directorate, was not a welcome precedent. The effor t t o find ways and means had been a central them e o f th e debat e betwee n th e wars , whether the subject was the empire or the League, and it remained a central theme when the new international institutions were set up. Before 193 9 Canadians seemed to prefer th e ambiguit y which cloude d th e degre e o f commitment . No w the y seemed read y to pledg e support t o a truly internationa l body i f their rights were precisely accorded. Some of the wise r heads, however , saw advantages in not trying to define the undefinable . I n a sparkling memorandum Genera l Maurice Pop e aske d 'i f thi s disabilit y i s on e w e can overcome , even i n a measure,' an d added : 'I s i t not on e t o whic h all but th e Grea t Power s ar e subject?' H e cite d th e Lo w Countrie s bu t als o th e fac t tha t eve n a grea t power lik e th e Unite d State s wa s unabl e t o influenc e Britis h and Frenc h policies bu t wa s 'literall y dragge d int o two world wars.' H e could no t fo r a moment imagin e tha t Canad a coul d hav e influence d Britis h polic y ove r Munich or Poland but nevertheless w e decided it was in our interest t o go to war. An d s o it would be. 'I n thes e circumstances, ' h e conclude d 'tha t ou r cautious wait-and-se e polic y ove r th e year s ha s no t bee n unsound. " Th e problem wa s inescapable, bu t i t becomes scholastic at times, an d tiresome . There i s n o answer , n o rule-of-thum b prescription . One grow s impatient with th e amoun t o f time spent o n th e devisin g of formulas for participation rather tha n o n th e substanc e o f policy . Yet th e devisin g of structure wa s at the en d o f the war a large part of the substance . An d as far as any power less than supe r i s concerned , th e concoctio n o f solution s i s futil e withou t th e means to put them across . Meanwhile a ne w generatio n o f policy-maker s wa s perceivin g tha t de manding rights did not ge t Canad a very far. Making themselves usefu l did. Within the Empire/Commonwealth an d within the League Canada had grappled with these contradictions . The easiest answe r t o the unanswerabl e ha d seemed to be to opt out, but in 193 9 Canadians learned tha t they could opt out only of the policy-making . If they had stayed out of the wa r in 1939, they could hardly have done s o when all their best friends were involved by 1942 and the wartim e alliance formally became the 'Unite d Nations.' By 1945 the country seeme d determine d o n participatio n at bot h levels , i n makin g th e policies and sharing the burdens. Mackenzie King, who had been through all this in the Commonwealth , wa s less sanguine and perhap s mor e prescient , but h e kep t hi s doubts t o hi s diary. His officers extende d th e are a o f Cana dian responsibility . The qualit y o f thei r contributio n t o policy-makin g was

303 Conclusio n much mor e effectiv e tha n querulou s complain t i n strengthening th e coun try's hand. H e worried , nevertheless, abou t al l the trouble s the y would get him into. 8 Unaware as the y may hav e bee n o f the problem s o f more distan t conti nents, the Canadian s of 1945 were in one respect more internationalist than a succeeding generation. They thought of themselves a s members o f an alliance an d wer e les s obsessivel y preoccupie d wit h th e Unite d States . Britai n loomed large in their calculations, and Western Europe , and, although imperial attitude s wer e i n transition , th e sens e o f bein g par t o f a world-girdling network persisted, whethe r it was cherished o r deplored. It is hard for a later generation t o recogniz e th e importanc e o f th e Britis h facto r i n Canadia n policy-making of the fortie s and even th e fifties because the y know that th e shift o f power had already taken place . The event s o f these times have bee n distorted b y th e fac t tha t mos t o f th e historian s ar e America n an d they , especially th e 'revisionists ' wh o blam e thei r ow n government fo r the Col d War, hav e establishe d wha t Raymon d Aro n call s 'th e myt h o f America n omnipotence.' Asid e fro m th e fac t tha t th e recover y of Britain and Franc e was expected , image s persisted . Th e wa r ma y hav e undermine d Britis h power; i t glorifie d it s reputation. Th e aur a o f a great powe r persisted fo r a t least a decade . Canadia n policy-maker s usuall y - although b y n o mean s always - though t the British were wiser and more experienced i n the game of international politics than were the raw Americans. Mackenzi e King, in spite of hi s resistance t o bein g committe d t o British policy, consistently and sin cerely expresse d agreemen t wit h the mai n line s o f British thinking on th e shaping of peace, as he ha d befor e th e war. There wa s more divergenc e on economic policie s becaus e o f th e ver y differen t circumstance s o f th e tw o countries, bu t a t least fo r th e firs t fe w years after th e wa r this was subordinated t o a common interes t i n Britis h recovery. Fo r th e officials , however , an aspec t o f the ne w internationalis m wa s a determination t o creat e close r relations wit h non-Anglo-Saxons and become mor e widel y eclectic in taking advice. That was the poin t of a greatly expanded foreig n service. What the Unite d States did or wanted was recognized as more consequen tial tha n wha t the Britis h or Australian s o r Indian s thought , bu t th e Com monwealth associatio n foun d it s meaning ofte n i n a common nee d to cop e with th e American s - not necessarily t o oppose them . Th e apparent inten tion o f th e American s t o tak e a leading role in this firm structure o f world organization was welcomed b y all, but for Canada an d the othe r countrie s it posed al l kinds o f problems i n dealing with the Unite d States . Fo r Canada it was a whole new dimension o f relations t o b e worked out. Afte r nearly two centuries th e bilatera l issues , boundar y water s o r tariff s o r rum-running ,

304 Th e Shapin g of Peac e were clos e t o th e formul a stage , althoug h critica l economic an d cultura l issues wer e abou t t o emerge . Now , however , bot h th e Unite d State s an d Canada ha d decided t o be world powers - one super an d one middle - and they would each have their own policies on a host o f global problems wher e their interest s o r thei r perspective s migh t clash . Th e acceptanc e b y bot h countries of the greate r vulnerability of North Americ a and their rejection of isolation posed dilemmas of association i n defence never before faced. So, in addition t o th e complexitie s of finding a place in new and ol d international organizations, there were raised fo r Canada in a new form the endemic questions abou t lif e wit h a great neighbour . A t th e sam e tim e ther e wer e ne w opportunities t o buffe r tha t relationshi p in wide r institutions, eve n thoug h Canadians wer e no t ver y clear i n practic e how o r whether t o us e the m fo r that purpose . The war s lef t Canad a a n industria l powe r o f consequence , bu t a s eve r dependent o n worl d trad e an d increasingl y awar e of internationa l orde r a s the nationa l interes t o f a grea t tradin g nation. On e o f th e ne w features , Robert Spence r notes, was 'a frank recognitio n that practically everything in international politic s wa s of interes t t o Canada.' 9 The war s inspire d a new kind of nationalism, with deeper root s among ordinary people, and provided Canada wit h a shar e o f th e glor y and traged y i t ha d misse d b y achievin g nationhood in a gentlemanly way. The Second Worl d War was an anguishing experience fo r Canadian s a s people , bu t fo r th e country as an entit y it was exhilarating an d profitable . B y 194 5 ther e wer e fewe r reservation s i n th e recognition b y other countrie s o f Canad a a s an independen t acto r i n world politics and considerably more than a small power in its own right. It took th e second war to drive Canadians into the establishment o f an adequate foreig n service with truly international commitments, bu t the ground work had been laid. The growin g sense of national purpose was marred, however , b y another rift amon g Canadian s ove r participation in foreign wars. The shif t o f the war effort by 1945 from an imperial to a broader international base went a considerable wa y to hea l th e rift , bu t i t is hard to estimat e th e long-rang e consequences o f th e confrontatio n betwee n francophone s an d anglophone s ove r conscription i n two world wars. Public opinion poll s taken at the en d o f th e war revea l agreemen t o n th e basi c commitmen t t o participatio n i n inter national institution s bu t dramati c difference s i n th e willingnes s t o mak e commitments t o the Unite d Nation s and in attitudes to the Soviet Unio n o r Britain or on immigration for example. 10 On the surface , however, there was in 194 5 a broader consensus on foreign policy than before o r since.

305 Conclusion In the lon g run perhap s the mos t significan t change from 191 9 to 194 5 in Canadian attitude s t o a world organization was the gradua l acceptance an d then stron g advocac y o f economi c an d socia l functions. The altere d wil l t o accept responsibilit y in securit y questions wa s important and symbolic , but that is not a realm in which Canada i s ever likely to be of major consequenc e unless i t becomes a casus bell i or a battleground. I n economics Canad a ha s become a majo r power , an d economi c an d socia l question s ar e b y far th e greatest preoccupatio n o f th e Unite d Nation s and th e Commonwealth . I n retrospect i t can be seen that this is where we mattered mos t i n the tim e of creation, i n th e settin g u p o f the grea t functional agencie s an d draftin g th e economic an d social functions of the Unite d Nations. The change of attitude had come durin g th e war . James Gibson , wh o was on th e prim e minister' s staff a t th e time , ha s distinguishe d th e Mutua l Aid legislation of 194 3 as a height-of-land becaus e 'responsibilit y appropriat e to functio n appeare d t o overtake any immediate preoccupation with status.'11 This recognition of inescapable responsibilit y remained, o f course, inconstant . W e ha d begun t o see th e Unite d Nation s quit e properl y as an instrumen t t o serv e ou r eco nomic interests. Thi s it has done, but we perhaps did not realize the extent to which it would enmesh u s in commitments t o action on a national and international scale. The ol d Canadian illusion that 'internationalism' is a policy we can choos e or reject is less prevalent, o f course, bu t i t still pops up b y inference. In fac t we probabl y could renounc e 'peacekeeping ' o r membershi p i n NATO , bu t much a s w e migh t chaf e over th e policie s o f th e Genera l Agreemen t o n Tariffs an d Trad e o r th e Internationa l Monetar y Fun d o r eve n th e north south dialogu e i n th e Unite d Nation s Conferenc e o n Trad e an d Develop ment, w e could no t sprin g ourselves loos e fro m th e consequences o f these policies. On th e economi c an d socia l function s we began wit h a major miscalculation, however. A central theme o f Canadian planning for the United Nations was the hop e tha t th e functiona l approach would take economic an d socia l questions ou t o f 'politics. ' Fo r thi s reaso n th e Canadia n delegatio n worke d hard at San Francisco for the establishment o f a separate council to deal with economic an d social problem s an d regarde d this , whe n achieved , as a great advance ove r th e Leagu e in tha t i t 'avoide d their subordination t o political issues.' A s chairma n o f th e firs t FA O conference Leste r Pearson , o n 1 November 1945 , said : 'Thi s approach t o internationa l progres s an d under standing .. . is, o f course , essentiall y a non-politica l an d non-diplomati c approach t o th e solutio n o f internationa l problems . Bu t i t i s th e bes t

306 Th e Shapin g of Peace approach because i t is concerned wit h th e welfar e o f the individual , not th e pride an d prejudic e o f th e nation. ' B y 1948, however , th e Departmen t o f External Affair s wa s disillusioned : 'I f i t wa s ever th e hop e o f thos e wh o framed th e Unite d Nations Charter that , by establishing a separate and independent Counci l t o dea l wit h international economi c an d socia l questions , they would be able to insulate the discussion o f such matters from the political tensions an d schisms o f the times , those hopes have now been prove n to be illusory.' 12 Disillusionment is , a s Hum e Wron g pointe d out , th e clearin g awa y o f illusion.13 Th e recognitio n tha t economic s wa s politics, a t hom e a s well as abroad, wa s a basic step in the learnin g experience th e Unite d Nations pro vided. I t di d not, however , alter the priorit y accorded i n Canadian policy to improving the livelihoo d o f mankind. 'N o Hollywood producer of historical romances will ever be able to make much out of the meetings of the commit tees o n statistic s o r agricultura l production, ' Pearso n ha d said i n th e sam e FAO speech. 'But millions of workers may some day live better live s because of these meetings. That is an objective more desirabl e t o achieve, I suggest , than the altering of a boundary or the policing of an election.' Pearson was to win fame and th e Nobe l Prize for his part in establishing the 'policing ' o f a boundary in 1956 , but that spectacular performance was no more important than his constructive work, largely behind th e scenes, to get UNRRA and FAO and other functiona l bodie s launched . What were the other major failure s of vision? First in importance, without doubt, was not grasping fully th e implications of real universality, the exten t to which the United Nations would be regarded by an expanded membershi p as an agenc y not just to kee p the peac e but to change the world . Secondly , the atomi c bom b wa s certainly no t foresee n o r a t leas t comprehende d b y those wh o di d mos t o f th e planning . I n a sens e i t merel y confirme d th e special status conferred b y the Charter on the great powers in security, but in fact i t altere d th e whol e basis o n whic h securit y coul d b e calculated . Th e concept o f forces delegated t o the Unite d Nations which is enshrined i n th e Charter and whic h had preoccupie d Canadian thinking up to San Francisc o became meaningless . Securit y hencefort h ha d t o b e pursue d b y mutua l deterrence an d détente . Atomi c powe r le d als o t o a bipolarizatio n o f tw o superpowers whic h ha s straine d th e Unite d Nation s almos t t o breaking point. This state of affairs was not entirely unforeseen, and , insofar as it was, we hope d i t woul d b e a temporar y phas e - a s in the lon g run i t ma y well prove to be. The challenge of Soviet power or rather Soviet intractability was not unexpected . Canad a wa s prepared t o go further tha n man y other coun tries in accommodating Sovie t biase s in order to keep them i n the structure.

307 Conclusio n What we less adequately grasped, however , was the nature of the challenge s to a multilateral institution of the overweenin g power of the Unite d States. So anxiou s wer e the Canadian s and thei r allie s - and the Russian s as well - t o get the United States involve d and, above all, to get them to accept responsibilities, tha t they encouraged a n American dispositio n to unilateralism. I n th e absenc e o f th e consensu s o n whic h a stron g Unite d Nation s authority could rest, th e Unite d States ha s become a t times a kind of surrogate United Nations. It is only fair t o recognize that it has done s o partly out of moral arrogance but t o a large extent becaus e w e have wanted it to throw its weight around, bot h its resources and its diplomacy. This asymmetry may not mak e fo r a health y internationa l system, bu t i t i s certainly better tha n one i n which the Unite d State s agai n refused t o accept th e responsibilit y of power. I doub t i f anything we could hav e don e a t th e creatio n woul d have corrected th e distortion , given the real balance of power in the world and the default o f othe r putativ e powers. I n encouragin g America n good habit s th e world community might hav e done more t o restrain its bad habits. What th e Americans neede d a t this tim e wa s candid friends to challenge their unilateral inclinations. On the whole I think that the record of the Commonwealt h countries, includin g Canada, wa s particularly commendable. W e argue d all the way , losin g mos t o f th e argument s perhap s bu t givin g a prou d lone r some education i n the constraint s o f the internationa l life o n whic h he was now embarking. Whatever th e lessons to be learned on the way and the faultiness of much of the original design, the basi c Canadian approach to international structure was proving valid. One can not e thi s approach as early as the Canadia n sub mission t o th e Imperia l Conferenc e o f 1937 , statin g tha t th e 'power s an d duties o f the Leagu e develo p b y usage and experience." 4 It was set ou t i n a prescient articl e by Pearson i n 1944. 15 He referred to the ide a of convening a great United Nations assembl y starting from the top and working down, with a genera l politica l council tha t woul d throw of f various constituen t bodies . He admitted tha t that might have been more 'spectacular ' but 'This time the approach has been different an d has been alon g functional lines. This means the callin g of special conference s t o dea l wit h special subjects and t o set u p permanent postwa r bodies covering these subjects, leaving the vital political organization to be constructed later . This procedure means working from the ground up , goin g fro m th e specifi c to th e general , fro m th e easier , i f you like, t o th e mor e difficult. ' Canadia n polic y has continue d i n thi s lapidar y tradition establishe d b y the earl y Canadian designer s an d practitioners , th e laying o f a universal structur e ston e b y stone rathe r tha n by the impositio n on a refractory humanity of an over-archin g plan. In doing so it has been i n

308 Th e Shapin g of Peace accord wit h th e wa y the Unite d Nation s and othe r internationa l institutions have grown organicall y and functionally . It should b e noted, however , tha t advances hav e bee n mad e no t b y the 'surrende r of sovereignty' bu t b y the agreement o f sovereig n state s t o disciplin e themselves. Tha t catc h phrase succeeded onl y i n frightenin g of f bot h politician s and elector s wh o wer e quite prepared to limit their own freedom o f action when multilateral agreement prove d essential . Wrong, Pearson , Glazebrook , R.G . Riddell , and many o f the othe r plan ners wer e historians b y training and instinct . S o was I, an d tha t i s probably why I foun d thei r approac h s o congenia l a t th e tim e an d i n retrospect . A danger o f th e historica l perspectiv e i s tha t i t encourages complacen t opti mism, th e fallac y o f inevitabl e progress . O n th e othe r han d a degre e o f optimism is essential fo r policy-makers, especially those involve d in the creation of a world. They do have to believe that something can be done even if the odd s are against it. They, like historians, hav e to identify, undistracte d by Utopian fantasies, just ho w much ha s been accomplishe d an d the direction s in which we are moving. Afte r th e first session o f the Unite d Nations Gen eral Assembly, Loui s St Laurent observed, 'W e have advanced fro m barbarism t o a sort o f internationa l feudalism. ' H e wa s a lawyer, but on e o f th e historians, Gerr y Riddell , wrot e it for him . It was a shrewd estimat e o f th e state that had been reached , with an awareness tha t in the light of history the feudal system, wit h all its bloody faults, did mark a considerable step forward in the contro l of anarchy.

Notes

NOTE O N SOURCE S Unless otherwise specified, documents referre d to may be found in the Departmen t of Externa l Affairs records . Th e Documents on Canadian External Relations covering the wa r years, publication of which is expected shortl y after th e appearanc e of Th e Shaping o f Peace, will facilitate the researcher' s task. United Nations documents ma y be found in the CH A and othe r Unite d Nations depository libraries while League of Nations documents are housed in the Leagu e of Nations Archives, UN Library , Geneva. Al l polls mentioned wer e conducted b y the Canadia n Institute of Public Opinion and ar e available in the CIPO' S Toronto office . PREFACE 1 Erns t B . Haas, 'Turbulen t Field s an d th e Theor y o f Regional Integration,' International Organization, XXX, sprin g 1976 , 18 0 2 Edwar d Hallett Carr , Th e Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939, 2n d ed . (Londo n 1946), 62 3 Loui s S t Laurent, 'Th e Foundatio n o f Canadian Polic y in Worl d Affairs, ' Department o f Externa l Affairs , Statements and Speeches, 47/2 , 1 3 Jan. 194 7 CHAPTER 1 : T R I AL AN D E R R O R , 1914-4 5 1 Raymon d Aron , Th e Imperial Republic: Th e United States and th e World 1945-1973 (Cambridge , Mass . 1974) , xxiv 2 I n particular , James Eayrs , I n Defence o f Canada, n : Appeasement an d Rearmament (Toront o 1965) ; Richard Veatch, Canada an d th e League of Nations (Toronto 1975) ; Norman Hillmer and Rober t Bothwell , eds., Th e In-Between Time: Canadian External Policy in the 1930s (Toront o 1975) ; and O.P. de T.

310 Note s for pages 4-14 Glazebrook, A History o f Canadian External Relations. II: In th e Empire and th e World, 1914-1939 (Toront o 1966 ) 3 Se e Rober t Crai g Brown, Robert Laird Borden. I: 1854-1914 (Toront o 1975) , 149. 4 See , fo r example , Keit h Feiling, Th e Life o f Neville Chamberlain (London 1946), 349 . Fo r King' s Paper s see , fo r example , Eayrs , Appeasement an d Rearmament, 60ff , 226-31 . 5 J.L . Granatstein an d R . Bothwell , 'King Foreig n Policy , 1935-1939,' in Hillmer an d Bothwell , eds., Th e In-Between Time, 222 6 Fo r a revealing description of the spring s of Bennett's foreig n policy on thi s and other subject s see Donal d C. Story, 'The Foreig n Polic y of the Governmen t of R.B. Bennett : Canada an d th e Leagu e o f Nations, 1930-35 ' (PH D thesis, University o f Toronto, 1976) . Se e also R . Bothwel l and J . English, 'Th e Riddell Incident,' i n Hillme r and Bothwell , eds., Th e In-Between Time, 122-34 . 7 See , fo r example, Newton Rowel l to th e Leagu e Assembly , 2 0 Nov. 1920 , a s cited i n Margare t Prang, N.W. Rowell: Ontario Nationalist (Toront o 1975) , 358. 8 Se e Veatch , Canada and th e League of Nations, chapte r 7. 9 Ibid. , 5 1 10 Mike: Th e Memoirs of th e Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. I: 1897-1948 (Toronto 1972) , 13 0 11 Quote d b y F.H . Sowar d in Alexande r Brady an d F.R . Scott , eds. , Canada after the War: Studies in Political, Social and Economic Policy for Post-war Canada (Toronto 1943) , 127 ; an d note d i n a valuable critical survey, 'Watchma n What o f the Night ? The Canadia n Academi c Community and th e Threa t of War, 1931-1939, ' b y Charles Spence r i n a Universit y of Toront o under graduate paper , 197 6 12 Quote d i n Hillmer and Bothwell , eds., Th e In-Between Time, 19 1 13 Memorandum , 1 6 Feb. 1937 , 'R e Monro e Doctrine, ' i n John A . Munro , éd., Documents on Canadian External Relations. VI: 1936-1939 (Ottaw a 1972) , 178 . For view s of Christie and Skelto n se e John A . Munro , 'Lorin g Christi e an d Canadian Externa l Relations , 1935-1939, ' pape r presented t o Canadia n Historical Associatio n annua l meeting , Winnipeg , 3 June 1970 ; an d Norma n Hillmer, 'Th e Anglo-Canadia n Neurosis : The Cas e of O.D. Skelton, ' i n Peter Lyon, éd., Britain and Canada: Survey of a Changing Relationship (Londo n 1976). 14 Th e revealin g exchanges o n refuge e polic y ar e t o b e found i n Documents, vi, chapter 5 . 15 Se e memorandum b y L.C. Christie, 2 9 March 1939 , 'Not e on th e proposal s for a Canadian embarg o o n wa r materials to Germany , Ital y and Japan, ' in ibid., 1147-50 .

311 Note s fo r pages 14-2 4 16 'R e Monro e Doctrine, 1 ibid. , 177- 8 17 Memorandum , 'Canad a an d th e Polis h War,' ibid. , 124 7 18 Mike, I , chapter 7 19 I n a memorandu m date d 1 8 February 1933 Robertso n too k issue wit h th e Skelton positio n b y saying that i t 'does not see m desirabl e to rais e th e ques tion o f "status " in a situation of this seriousness.' H e adde d tha t 'th e desir e evident i n Drummond' s conversatio n wit h Riddel l that sh e shoul d i n he r ow n right an d o n accoun t o f he r interes t i n Pacifi c problem s b e invite d to si t o n the Committee , i s ample recognition of her internationa l position.' Bennett' s telegram o f instruction of th e sam e dat e addresse d t o th e hig h commissioner in Londo n use d Robertson' s argumen t that 'refusa l t o serv e o n i t might be interpreted a s evasion o f responsibility. ' 20 Despatc h 36 , 1 1 June 1938 , Secretar y o f Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s t o Perma nent Delegate , Geneva , Documents, vi , 802 ; an d N.A . Robertson , memo randum, 2 9 Nov. 1938 , 'Canad a and th e Refuge e Problem, ' ibid. , 837-4 3 21 H . Blai r Neatby , 'Mackenzi e Kin g and Nationa l Unity,' i n H.L . Dyck and H.S. Krosby , eds., Empire an d Nations (Toront o 1969) , 5 8 22 Documents, vi, 1104-1 0 23 J.W . Pickersgill , éd., Th e Mackenzie King Record. I : 1939-1944 (Toront o 1960), 43 4 24 Memorandum , 3 0 Nov. 1938 , 'Som e proposal s Concernin g Canada and th e International Labou r Organisation, ' Documents, vi , 636-4 8 25 Ibid. , 1129-3 1 26 Memorandum , 4 Nov. 1936 , 'Leagu e o f Nations,' ibid. , 907 27 Memorandum , 2 0 May 1936 , 'Italia n Conques t o f Ethiopi a and th e Situation Confronting th e League - Questio n o f Amendment o f the Covenant and Canada's Relation s Thereto, ' ibid. , 895 28 Dominion s Secretar y to SSEA , 30 Jul y 1938 , ibid. , 933 29 SSE A to Dominion s Secretary , 1 8 Aug. 1938 , ibid. , 93 7 30 Canada , Hous e o f Commons, Debates, 1 8 June 1936 , 3862-7 3 31 J.S . Macdonald , memorandum , 2 0 May 1936 , Documents, vi , 88 7 32 Memorandum , 12 April 1937 , 'Imperia l Conference 1937 : Sout h Africa n Pro posals Respectin g a Publi c Declaration a s to Internationa l Status and For m o f Participation i n Treaties,' ibid. , 14 1 CHAPTER 2 : THE W A R T I M E E X P E R I E N C E 1 See , fo r example , the reference s t o th e Iv y Lea and Kingsto n speeches in James Eayrs, In Defence o f Canada. II : Appeasement and Rearmament (Toront o 1965), 183-4 . 2 Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences at Washington and Quebec 1943 (Washingto n 1970) , 39 7

312 Note s for pages 25-35 3 Fo r a thorough account of this exercise and a perceptive analysis of the personali ties involved se e Don Munto n an d Do n Page , 'Plannin g in the Eas t Block : The Post-Hostilities Problem s Committe e i n Canada 1943-5, ' International Journal, xxxii, autumn 1977 , 687-726 . 4 Charle s Ritchie , Th e Siren Years: A Canadian Diplomat Abroad, 1937-1945 (Toronto 1974) , 19 5 5 DEA , 'Repor t o f th e Canadia n Delegate s t o th e Twenty-Firs t Assembl y o f th e Leagues o f Nations,' Conferenc e series , 1946 , n o 2 , 25 6 A privat e note writte n in Januar y 194 0 7 Lincol n Bloomfield , 'Nuclea r Spread an d Worl d Order, ' Foreign Affairs, LIU , July 1975 , 74 9 8 Dea n Acheson , Present at th e Creation: My Years i n the State Department (New Yor k 1969) , epigraph 9 Canada , Hous e o f Commons, Debates, 1 7 Feb. 1943 , 50 1 10 J.W . Pickersgil l and D.F . Forster , eds. , Th e Mackenzie King Record, m : 1945-1946 (Toront o 1970) , 3 1 11 J.W . Pickersgill, éd., Th e Mackenzie King Record, i : 1939-1944 (Toront o 1960), 68 3 12 Munto n an d Page , 'Plannin g in th e Eas t Block, ' 69 6 13 Debates, 9 Feb. 1943 , 28 6 14 Thes e fears were shared i n DEA . On 1 9 October 194 3 Wrong drafte d a tele gram expressin g concer n abou t allie d support o f th e kin g and Badogli o i n Ital y and th e royalis t regimes i n Yugoslavi a and Greece , but Kin g did not sen d it. 15 FRUS , Conferences a t Washington an d Quebec 1943, 39 7 16 Se e chapte r 5 , 144 . 17 Brook e Claxton , 'Th e Plac e o f Canad a i n Post-Wa r Organization, ' Canadian Journal o f Economics and Political Science, x, Nov . 1944 , 41 2 18 Se e chapte r 7 , 212ff . 19 As , fo r instance , th e argumen t agains t leavin g occupation force s in Germany . See chapter 4 , 109-12 . 20 Se e R . Warre n James , Wartime Economic Co-operation: A Study o f Relations between Canada and th e United States (Toront o 1949) , 20 . 21 Se e chapte r 6 , 176 . 22 Se e chapte r 3. 23 Repor t o f Delegatio n Meeting , Sa n Francisco , 1 1 May 194 5 24 I n A.L.K . Acheson , J.F . Chant , an d M.F.J . Prachowny, eds., Bretton Woods Revisited (Toront o 1972) , 4 4 25 Thi s doctrin e wa s of such importanc e i n Canadian officia l thinkin g tha t it crops u p i n many section s o f this book . Fo r th e mos t extensiv e treatmen t se e 72-3 of this chapter .

313 Note s fo r pages 37-4 6 26 USSE A to High Commissioner, London , 4 Aug. 1942 27 I n Londo n th e Dominion s Offic e champione d th e Canadia n caus e whil e the Foreign Office , wedde d t o it s preferenc e for great power action, raise d difficul ties. Th e Treasur y and other s wante d t o keep the Canadian s swee t i n hope of more aid . An interestin g accoun t o f th e Britis h vie w as contained i n their archives i s to b e foun d i n J.L . Granatstein, Canada's War: the Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toront o 1975) , 300ff . 28 Rober t Sherwood , Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (Ne w York 1948), 70 7 29 Mike: Th e Memoirs of th e Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. I: 1897-1948 (Toronto 1972) , 13 0 30 Memorandu m fo r Prim e Ministe r b y Under-Secretary reportin g on a conver sation wit h the Britis h High Commissioner, 1 8 Jan. 194 3 31 Prim e Minister to Canadia n Minister , Washington , 8 Feb. 1943 ; an d USSE A to Pearson, 7 Feb. 194 3 32 Pearso n t o Robertson, 2 7 Feb. 194 3 33 Reporte d i n Robertso n t o Pearson , 4 March 194 3 34 SSE A t o Canadia n Minister , Washington , 2 6 Feb. 194 3 35 SSE A to Canadia n Minister , Washington , 9 March 194 3 36 Robertson , memorandu m fo r th e Prim e Minister , 2 April 1943 37 DE A memorandum t o Cabine t Wa r Committee , 6 April 194 3 38 SSE A t o Canadia n Minister , Washington, 7 April 1943 39 Allar d (Washington ) t o Robertson , 1 4 June 194 3 40 Th e 'tak e cognizance of formul a was successfully used year s later b y the Canadian governmen t fo r a simila r purpos e o f avoiding commitment when , in concluding th e agreemen t o n relation s with th e People' s Republic of China , they simply 'took note ' o f the Chines e declaratio n tha t Taiwan wa s a part of China. (Join t Communiqué, ' 2 The Chinese Governmen t reaffirm s tha t Taiwan i s an inalienabl e part of the territor y of the People' s Republic of China . The Canadia n Governmen t take s not e of this position of the Chinese Govern ment,' Mitchel l Sharp, Statements and Speeches, no 70/19 , 1 3 Oct. 1970 ) 41 Debates, 1 8 April 1944, 215 8 42 Fo r Canada' s policy on refugee s see chapte r 3. 43 Mackenzie King Record, I , 211 44 Mike, I , 247 45 Joh n Perry , 'Wh y U.N.R.R.A . ha s failed, ' Harper's, Jan . 194 6 46 Canada , no t havin g been a recipient of Lend-Leas e assistance, was, of course , the onl y major ally no t boun d t o the Unite d States b y an Articl e vil commit ment, althoug h th e Americans , a t least, regarde d Hyd e Par k as a pledge of the same kind .

314 Note s for pages 48-63 47 Wron g to Pearson, personal , 2 0 March 1945, enclosing memorandum fo r USSEA signed H.W. , 1 9 March 194 5 48 Mike, I , 247 49 Ibid. , 24 8 50 Gran t Dexter , Canada and th e Building o f Peace (Toront o 1944) , 9 1 51 Mike, I , 24 9 52 Addres s t o Institut e of Post-Wa r Reconstruction , Ne w Yor k University, 15 Dec . 194 3 53 I n Acheson , Chant , Prachowny , eds., Bretton Woods Revisited, 37 54 R.F . Harrod , Th e Life of John Maynard Keynes (Londo n 1951) , 57 9 55 Ibid. , 541-2 56 Ibid. , 553- 4 57 Loui s Rasminsky, 'International Credi t and Currenc y Plans,' Foreign Affairs, xxii, Jul y 1944, 59 9 58 Rasminsk y in Acheson , Chant , Prachowny , eds., Bretton Woods Revisited, 34 59 Harrod , Life o f John Maynard Keynes, 570- 1 60 Tentativ e Draf t Proposal s o f Canadia n Expert s fo r a n Internationa l Exchange Union, 9 July 194 3 (table d i n Commons, 1 2 July 1943 ) 61 H.D . White , assistant t o the secretar y o f the Treasury , Washington , t o W.C. Clark , deputy minister o f finance , Ottawa , 24 July 194 3 62 Acheson , Chant , Prachowny , eds., Bretton Woods Revisited, 36 63 Ibid. , 40- 1 64 'Internationa l Credit an d Currenc y Plans,' 587-60 3 65 Debates, 1 4 Dec. 1945 , 350 6 66 Ibid. , 6 Dec. 1945 , 305 7 67 Goo d accounts of these interrelate d discussions ar e t o b e foun d in R.S. Sayers, History o f th e Second World War: Financial Policy 1939-1945 (Lon don 1956) ; an d i n Robert Bothwel l and Joh n English , 'Canadian Trad e Policy in th e Ag e of America n Dominanc e an d Britis h Decline, 1943-1947, ' Canadian Review of American Studies, vin, sprin g 1977, 52-65 . 68 Acheson , Chant , Prachowny , eds., Bretton Woods Revisited, 47 69 Dexter , Canada and th e Building of Peace, 12 8 70 Debates, 17 March 1944 , 157 8 71 Whe n aske d o n 4 August 194 3 by CIPO whether a 'join t board ' shoul d b e se t up t o regulat e internationa l airline s or countries shoul d b e free to start inter national airlines as they pleased, 6 1 per cent o f Canadians favoure d th e 'join t board' an d 2 3 per cen t wer e for 'fre e competition. ' 72 Debates, 2 April 1943 , 177 8 73 Memorandum , Pau l T. David , bureau o f the budget , 1 Sept. 1943 , '.. . access to th e ric h market o f the Unite d State s i s our greates t tradin g point ; w e ough t

315 Note s fo r pages 64-7 8 not t o give that access fo r anything less tha n access t o all parts of the British Commonwealth,' FRUS , Conferences a t Washington an d Quebec 1943, 1323 . 74 C.D . How e Pres s Conference , London , 1 8 Oct. 1943 , Th e Times (London) , 19 Oct. 194 3 75 Proceedings o f th e International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, Illinois, November 1-December 7 , 1944, vo l 1 (Washington 1948) , 8 2 76 Ibid. , I l l 77 Beatric e Bisho p Berle an d Travi s Bea l Jacobs, eds. , Navigating the Rapids 1918-1971: from th e Papers o f Adolf A . Berle (Ne w Yor k 1973) , 34 2 78 Ibid. , 48 4 79 Ibid , 485 80 Stokel y W. Morgan, 'Th e Internationa l Civil Aviation Conference a t Chicag o and wha t it means t o th e Americas, ' Departmen t o f State Bulletin, xn, 7 Jan . 1945, 3 8 81 Navigating the Rapids, 25 2 82 Ibid , 365-6 . Fo r a more accurate account of Keenleyside' s thinkin g and som e further view s of Berle, se e R.D . Cuf f an d J.L . Granatstein , CanadianAmerican Relations in Wartime: from th e Great Wa r t o the Cold Wa r (Toront o 1975), 98-101 . 83 Th e argument s ar e ver y effectively state d b y Edward Warner , a t tha t tim e vice chairman o f the Civi l Aeronautics Board , i n 'Th e Chicag o Air Conference, ' Foreign Affairs, XXIII , Apri l 1945 , 406-21 . 84 Anso n C . McKi m (1s t Canadia n representative o n ICA O Council) , 'Worl d Order i n Ai r Transport, ' International Journal, II , summer 1947 , 22 9 85 Debates, 1 7 March 1944 , 157 7 86 Wron g t o Massey , 4 Aug. 194 2 87 Debates, 17 March 1944 , 157 9 88 O n coverin g not e date d 4 November 1943 , wit h memorandum b y Wrong of 3 Novembe r 89 Davi d Mitrany , A Working Peace System (Chicag o 1966 ) (firs t publishe d 1943) 90 A.J . Miller, 'Canad a a t Sa n Francisco : A Reappraisa l of th e Influenc e of th e "Functional Concept" ' (unpublishe d paper ) 91 Dougla s Anglin , 'Canadian Polic y Towards Internationa l Institutions, 1939-1950' (PH D thesis , Oxford, 1956) , 29 8 CHAPTER 3 : RELIEF, REHABILITATION , AN D RECONSTRUCTIO N 1 Davi d Corbett , Canada's Immigration Policy (Toront o 1957) , x i 2 'Toda y an d Tomorrow ' column, Ne w Yor k Herald Tribune, 25 Feb. 194 8

316 Note s for pages 79-88 3 Quote d in J.L. Granatstein, Canada's War: the Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toront o 1975) , 49 4 Fo r detail s of Mutua l Aid Agreement s se e F.H . Soward , Canada in World Affairs, 1944-1946 (Toront o 1950) , 74-5 . 5 I n a CIP O poll of Marc h 194 4 7 0 per cen t outsid e Quebe c approve d o f mutual aid wherea s in Quebec i t was approved b y only 33 per cent . 6 Canada , Hous e o f Commons , Debates, 21 April 1944 , 224 2 7 U N Doc A/c.2/86/Rev . 1 , 'Revise d Draf t Resolution ' 8 Canada , Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , Th e United Nations 1946, Repor t of the secon d par t of the first session o f the Genera l Assembl y of the Unite d Nations hel d i n New York , October 23-Decembe r 15 , 1946 , 8 5 9 Ibid. , 23 4 10 Ibid. , 23 5 11 Ibid . 12 Ibid. , 8 5 13 Ma x Freedman , 'Th e General Assembly, ' International Journal, II , spring 1947, 11 2 14 Th e exten t t o whic h th e Canadia n reputatio n i n United Nation s circle s de pended o n th e persona l contributio n of able Canadians zealou s i n the genera l cause wa s particularly illustrate d in th e cas e o f Adelaid e Sinclair, who, a s executive assistan t t o th e deput y minister o f welfare an d late r as deputy executive directo r o f UNICEF , wa s justly credited wit h a major part i n establish ing th e Unite d Nations ' best-ru n agency- a caus e sh e ofte n ha d t o support by doing battl e within th e Canadia n governmen t apparatus. 15 Fro m it s establishment i n 194 9 unti l 197 5 Canada contribute d $3 3 millio n in cash t o UNRW A and rank s third i n total contributions. UNKR A laste d fro m 195 0 to 1958 , durin g which tim e Canad a contributed $7,500,000, rankin g sixth in total contributions. 16 Fo r detaile d account s o f the Anglo-Canadia n economic negotiation s se e Robert Bothwel l and Joh n English , 'Canadia n Trad e Polic y in the Ag e of American Dominanc e an d Britis h Decline, 1943-1947, ' Canadian Review of American Studies, VIH , spring 1977, 52-65; and R.D . Cuf f an d J.L . Granat stein, American Dollars- Canadian Prosperity: Canadian-American Economic Relations 1945-1950 (Toront o 1978) . 17 Letter , A.F.W . Plumptr e to th e author , 1 9 March 197 4 18 Debates, 7 Sept. 1945 , 1 1 19 J.W . Pickersgill and D.F . Forster , eds., Th e Mackenzie King Record, in : 1945-1946 (Toront o 1970) , 16 7 20 Whe n aske d o n 2 5 May 194 6 whethe r th e loa n t o Britai n would benefit Canada, 6 4 per cent i n Ontari o and 2 6 per cent i n Quebe c sai d yes .

317 Note s for pages 89-10 1 21 Lette r fro m Loui s Rasminsky to the author , 17 Oct. 1975 22 Debates, 3 Dec. 1945 , 2845 , 284 6 23 Se e Th e Col d War ' i n the forthcomin g second volum e of this study. 24 Graha m Towers , annua l report t o th e ministe r of finance , Feb . 194 7 25 'Aide-mémoir e from th e U.S . Government,' release d t o pres s 1 7 Nov. , Department o f State Bulletin, xvn, n o 439 , 3 0 Nov. 1947 , 105 5 26 Thi s i s not t o say , as some America n historian s hav e argued , tha t Soviet mis behaviour wa s either fabricate d or exaggerate d t o gain support for a n eco nomic programm e designe d t o gain control for th e Unite d States o r for North America ove r th e Europea n economy . Th e fea r o f the Sovie t Union , whether or no t i t was based o n soun d perceptions , wa s strategic rather than eco nomic - and it was real. 27 Hig h Commissioner, London , t o DEA , 1 6 March 194 8 28 Inter-Departmenta l Committe e o n Externa l Trade, Minute s o f Meeting, Sept . 1948 29 Fo r a thorough and balance d treatment o f Canada's refugee policy during the period considered i n this chapter see Gerald E. Dirks, Canada's Refugee Policy: Indifference o r Opportunism? (Montrea l 1977), esp. chaps. 3-6, and Irvin g Abella and Harold Troper, 'Th e line must be drawn somewhere: Canad a an d Jewish Refugees, 1933-9, ' Canadian Historical Review, LX , 2, June 1979 , 178-209 . 30 Record s o f 1s t Assembly o f th e Leagu e o f Nations , 169-7 0 31 DEA , Report o n th e firs t par t of the firs t sessio n o f the Genera l Assembl y of the Unite d Nations (London , Januar y 10-Februar y 14) , Conferenc e series , 1946, n o 1 , 60, 6 1 32 Dirks , Canada's Refugee Policy, 125f f 33 USSEA , Sa n Francisco , t o SSEA , Ottawa , 27 Ma y 194 5 34 Abou t 8 0 per cen t gav e a flat no t o a CIP O questio n o f 1 4 December 194 6 as to whether immigratio n should b e planned b y the Unite d Nations . 35 For a good discussio n of the Keynesia n attitudes in Ottawa, see Corbett , Canada's Immigration Policy, 112 . 36 Letter , 2 3 June 1939 , Dr . O.D . Skelton , USSEA , t o F.C . Blair , directo r of immigration, Department o f Mines an d Resource s 37 Dirks , Canada's Refugee Policy, 74-86 38 Prim e Ministe r to Wrong , 1 1 June 1938 , Joh n A . Munro, éd., Documents on Canadian External Relations, vi: 1936-1939 (Ottaw a 1972) , 801- 5 39 Debates, 9 July 1943, 456 0 40 Cff O sample s o f 2 and 3 0 Oct. 194 6 41 Fred a Hawkins , Canada and Immigration: Public Policy an d Public Concern (Montreal 1972) , 1 7 42 Debates, 4 March 1947 , 100 5

318 Note s for pages 104-12 43 Ibid., 1 May 1947, 2645 44 Ibid., 2646 CHAPTER 4 : PEACEMAKING 1 Christie' s memorandum , fro m whic h thi s is quoted, i s reproduced i n 'Can ada's Internationa l Status: Development s a t the Pari s Peac e Conference , 1919,' External Affairs, xvi , Apri l 1964, 162-72 . 2 Statemen t o f 2 August 1946 , 'Repor t o f the Canadia n Delegatio n a t th e Pari s Peace Conference,' Votes an d Proceedings o f th e Hous e o f Commons , 10 Feb. 194 7 3 Canada , Hous e o f Commons, Debates, 30 Jan. 1947 , 1 3 4 Montrea l Star, 1 8 Jan. 1947 5 For an extensive, documente d accoun t of post-hostilities planning see Don Munton an d Do n Page , 'Plannin g in the Eas t Block : the Post-Hostilitie s Pro blems Committee i n Canada 1943-5, ' International Journal, xxxn, autumn 1977, 687-726 . 6 Debates, 27 Sept. 1945 , 49 2 7 Wrong , memorandu m fo r th e USSEA , 5 July 194 3 8 Fo r a more detaile d accoun t o f this whole question o f occupation forces together wit h appropriat e references and quotations , se e Jame s Eayrs, In Defence of Canada. Ill: Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toront o 1972) , 183ff . 9 Ibid. , 18 4 10 SSE A t o Dominion s Secretary , London, 3 0 July 194 3 11 C.P . Stacey , Arms, Men an d Governments: th e Wa r Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottaw a 1970), 6 5 12 Se e Dal e Thomson , Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toront o 1969) . 13 Debates, 3 March 1947 , 97 5 14 Ibid. , 95 4 15 See , fo r example , th e detaile d accoun t of plannin g in the memoir s o f Lord Gladwyn wh o was closely involved throughout and wel l aware of Canadian and Australia n representations. Th e Memoirs o f Lord Gladwyn (Londo n 1972 ) 16 Th e mos t meticulou s and reliabl e account o f the Pari s Peac e Conferenc e i s to be foun d i n F.H . Soward , Canada i n World Affairs, 1944-1946 (Toront o 1950), 198-215 , which , although it was written shortl y after th e event , requires n o amendment fro m th e unpublishe d record. 17 Commentar y fo r Canadian delegation to th e Pari s Peace Conference, chapte r 1, 19-2 0 18 Fo r administrativ e reasons of n o politica l significance, Canad a ha d faile d to declare wa r on Bulgari a and took n o par t in consideration o f th e treat y with that country.

319 Note s for pages 113-2 3 19 J.W . Pickersgill and D.F . Forster, eds. , Th e Mackenzie King Record, ni : 1945-1946 (Toront o 1970) , 281 20 Ibid. , 27 9 21 BB C broadcas t fro m Paris , 1 Sept. 194 6 22 Despatc h o f 2 6 Aug . 194 6 fro m Th e Hagu e 23 Mackenzie King Record, in , 292-3 24 Canadia n Delegation , Paris , t o DEA , Sept . 194 6 25 Claxton' s detaile d repor t t o th e SSE A was table d i n th e Hous e o f Commons o n 10 February 194 7 along with copie s o f th e treat y texts. Th e repor t wa s printed as an appendi x to Votes an d Proceedings o f th e sam e dat e an d th e treatie s ar e found i n Canada, Treaty Series, 1947 , no s 4-7. 26 Brook e Claxton, 'Canad a a t th e Pari s Conference, ' International Journal, n , spring 1947 , 13 0 27 F.H . Soward , ' A Surve y of Canadia n Externa l Policy,' prepare d fo r DE A 1952, chapter 5 , 2 28 Fo r a description o f this issu e se e G.K.N . Trevaskis , Eritrea- a Colony in Transition: 1941-1952 (Londo n 1960) , 81-102 . 29 SSE A t o London , 7 Aug. 194 8 30 DE A Unite d Nation s Division memorandu m t o Actin g USSEA, 2 1 Sept . 195 0 31 Memorandu m fo r Cabine t Wa r Committee, 'cessatio n o f hostilitie s and immediate organi/atio n i n Europe, ' 2 6 July 194 3 32 Wron g t o Ritchie , 2 7 Nov. 194 3 33 Reporte d i n Robertson t o th e Canadia n Minister , Washington, 3 Dec. 194 3 34 Dominion s Secretar y to SSEA , 2 1 Aug . 194 4 35 Debates, 3 0 Jan. 1947 , 5f f 36 Th e tex t o f th e submissio n i s printed i n R.A . MacKay, Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954: Selected Speeches an d Documents (Toront o 1971) , 44-6 . 37 Fro m a memorandu m prepare d i n Marc h 194 8 for presentatio n i n London , Washington, and Paris . Quoted i n Soward, 'Survey,' chapte r 5, 31 38 Th e variou s exchanges betwee n Robertso n an d DE A in Marc h and Apri l ar e reported i n Soward, 'Survey, ' chapter 5, 31-2. 39 Debates, 5 May 1948 , 3632- 3 40 Th e tex t o f th e Canadia n submission o n German y i s to b e foun d i n Debates, 30 Jan. 1947 , and, wit h a commentary b y O.P. de T . Glazebrook, in International Journal, II , spring 1947 , 132-43 . 41 Soward , 'Survey, ' chapte r 5, 34 42 Term s used b y King at th e Commonwealt h Prim e Minister s meeting , May 194 6 43 Soward , 'Survey,' chapter 5, 2 9 44 Fro m concludin g section o f th e Canadia n submissio n t o th e Counci l of Foreign Minister s

320 Note s for pages 124-4 1 45 Debates, 25 Feb. 1947 , 762 46 J.W . Pickersgill , Th e Mackenzie King Record. \: 1939-1944 (Toront o 1960) , 630 47 Prim e Minister , London , t o Prim e Minister, Ottawa , 1 3 Aug. 194 5 48 Prim e Minister , Ottawa, to Prim e Minister , London , 1 5 Aug. 1945 49 Wron g memorandum t o Prime Minister, 2 5 Aug. 1945, and memorandum , Wrong to Robertson, 1 Sept. 194 5 50 Instruction s prepare d for first meeting o f Far Easter n Advisor y Commissio n in Washingto n o n 3 0 Oct. 194 5 51 Vincen t Massey t o Lor d Addison , 2 7 Dec. 194 5 52 A sensitive an d revealin g account o f Norman's wor k i n Japan is contained i n Charles Taylor , Si x Journeys: A Canadian Pattern (Toront o 1977) . 53 A Departmenta l memorandu m fo r th e prim e minister o f 21 Nov. 194 5 said of Norman: 'Fo r the las t two months h e has , i n effect, bee n th e hea d o f th e United State s Army Counter-intelligence Divisio n i n Japan.' Followin g th e comment i s a recommendation tha t Norman b e appointed representativ e o f the FEAC , and , i n the margin : 'I approve, W.L.M.K . 30-11-45.' 54 Keesing's Contemporary Archives: vi , 1946-1948,1629

55 Debates, 16 Nov. 1949 , 183 7 56 Th e DE A views are se t ou t a t lengt h i n a memorandum o f 1 5 Feb. 1950 , fo r the Interdepartmenta l Committe e o n Reparations an d Peac e Treat y Implementation, entitle d 'Prospect s of a Peac e Treat y for Japan. ' 57 Debates, 22 Jan. 1950 , 133 , 13 4 58 Ibid. , 255-6 59 DEA , Loui s St Laurent, 'Canada' s Relations with Asia,' Statements and Speeches, n o 52/33 , 5 Sept. 195 2 60 Debates, 11 Feb. 1953 , 185 4 61 Ibid. , 3 0 Jan. 1947 , 1 0 62 Rober t A . Spencer , Canada i n World Affairs, 1946-1949 (Toronto 1959) , 53- 4 63 Debates, 8 April 1952 , 130 0 64 Ibid. , 1 3 Sept. 1945 , 134-5 ; 1 2 Dec. 1945 , 334 4 65 Statemen t b y prime minister, ibid. , 1 2 April 1946, 809-1 0 66 Canadia n position s i n the developin g Cold Wa r wil l be discussed in detail i n the forthcomin g volume 2 of thi s work. 67 'Canad a at the Pari s Conference,' 13 0 CHAPTER 5 : THE COMMONWEALTH , 1944-7

1 J.W . Pickersgill, éd., Th e Mackenzie King Record, i : 1939-1944 (Toront o 1960), 598- 9

321 Note s for pages 143-8 2 A DEA memorandum, 'Recen t Trends i n United States-Canada Relations, ' prepared by H.L. Keenleyside, 2 7 Dec. 1941, foresaw the problem . 'We may find that the American s are not as conscious o f our position an d our problems i n this regard as the Britis h have become throug h a long period of education.' 'Our position,' he defined as 'that of a separate nation fighting in this war as such.' 3 Prim e Minister , Canberra, t o Prim e Minister , Ottawa, 3 July 1941 4 Prim e Minister , Ottawa , to Prim e Minister , Canberra , 2 Aug. 194 1 5 Prim e Minister , Pretoria , t o Prim e Minister, London, 2 3 Aug. 194 1 6 Canada , Hous e o f Commons, Debates, 28 Jan. 1942, 106 7 Roben Laird Borden: His Memoirs, II (Toronto 1938) , 62 2 8 Washingto n Embass y to DEA , 9 Aug. 194 4 9 Thes e ar e describe d i n more detai l in chapter 2. 10 Se e chapter 2, Bretto n Woods section . 11 Se e chapter 2 , Chicag o section . 12 Rober t Sherwood , Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (Ne w York 1948), 707 13 Proceedings of th e International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago , Illinois , November 1-Decembe r 7 , 194 4 (Washington, D C 1948), I , 562; n, 1317-1 8 14 Fo r example , Howar d Green, Debates, 9 July 1943, 4564-5 15 Lor d Cranborn e tende d t o take the Canadia n positio n tha t existin g mean s o f consultation wer e very satisfactory. He knew only too well that Canadian opposition coul d no t b e overcome. Se e his answer i n the Hous e o f Lords , 2 Nov. 1943, with reference t o the Australia n prime minister's proposa l and his remarks durin g the prim e ministers' meetin g i n Londo n i n May 1944. 16 Fo r furthe r words on thi s proposal see chapter 8 , 'Draftin g th e Charter, ' section o n 'Th e Commonwealth an d th e Unite d Nations. ' 17 Thes e are the subjectiv e reflections of the autho r base d o n hi s experience of . liaison wit h the Foreig n Offic e fro m Canad a Hous e durin g the year s 1944-7 . 18 Curtin' s various statement s o n thi s subject may be foun d i n Nicholas Mansergh, Documents and Speeches o n British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, i (Londo n 1953) , 562-4 . 19 Speec h t o the Toront o Boar d of Trade, 24 Jan. 1944, reproduced i n ibid., 575-9 20 Pearso n t o Robertson, 1 Feb. 194 4 21 Charle s Ritchi e to Hume Wrong , 9 March 194 4 22 I t was trotted ou t year s later b y Conservative leader s suc h a s Edward Heat h seeking t o justify Britain's turnin g to Europ e instea d o f the Commonwealth . 23 Thi s quotatio n i s from a Report o n Prim e Minister s Meetings , London , Ma y 1944, undate d an d initialle d JWH which the author , wh o was general factotu m

322 Note s for pages 148-5 5 to the delegation , was asked to make. Material on the conference is based on this report and on the author's notes and occasionally his recollections , checked against the officia l record s of the conferenc e produced by the Dominions Office . 24 Appendi x I to repor t of th e conference . Statement mad e b y the prim e minister of Canad a o n 1 1 Ma y 194 4 25 Non-verbati m repor t o f 12t h meeting, Prim e Ministers Conference, 1 1 May 1944 26 Statemen t o f 1 1 May, ibid. 27 A s lat e a s 195 4 he revive d the ide a wit h S t Laurent bu t go t n o response . High Commissioner, London , t o SSEA , 1 1 March 195 4 28 Holmes , London , t o Wrong , 1 May 194 6 29 'W e should no t under-estimat e our improve d chance s o f influencing the British sinc e th e Sa n Francisco Conference . Ther e i s no doub t o f the profound impression mad e on the United Kingdom authoritie s - as well as those of other countrie s - b y the Canadian delegatio n a t U.N.C.I.O . The important thing about thi s Canadian contributio n was that it was not i n a limited sphere i n which w e were considered t o b e speciall y interested bu t i n th e broades t spher e of worl d affairs. W e ar e no w looke d upo n a s a country which has soun d an d responsible idea s on importan t problems.' Memorandu m fo r Pearson , 1 0 Sept. 1945, initialle d JWH , th e Canad a Hous e office r responsibl e fo r liaiso n wit h th e Dominions an d Foreig n Office s o n politica l an d securit y questions 30 Testimon y o f the autho r a s eye-witness 31 Se e chapte r 4 , 119ff . 32 Draf t memorandum fo r Pearso n fro m Holmes , London , 1 0 Sept. 194 5 33 Ibid . 34 Canad a Hous e t o SSEA , 3 June 194 6 35 A survey of the exchange s betwee n Ottaw a and Londo n o n thi s issue i s to b e found i n F.H. Soward , ' A Surve y of Canadian Externa l Policy, ' compiled fo r DEA, 1952 , chapter 3 , 61-6 . Se e also Memorandu m fo r th e Advisor y Com mittee on Post-Hostilitie s Problem s o f 1 7 July 1944 , exchange s betwee n Robertson an d Masse y of 2 1 and 2 8 March 1945 , th e repor t o n th e prim e ministers' meeting s o f 194 6 fro m Canad a House , 3 June 1946 , an d a memorandum fo r th e prim e ministe r o f 1 3 Nov. 1946 concerning the U K White Paper entitle d 'Centra l Organization fo r Defence, ' publishe d i n October; and a penetrating and amusin g memorandum fo r Robertso n b y Maurice Pope, 2 Aug. 1945 . 36 Se e chapte r 6, 174ff . 37 Minute s o f Meetings o f British Commonwealth Prim e Ministers , London , May 194 6

323 Note s fo r pages 156-65 38 Canad a Hous e t o SSEA, 3 June 194 6 39 Holme s t o Wrong , 1 Sept. 1945 . Whe n Wron g cited thi s comment i n a memorandum t o th e prim e minister o f 4 Sept . 194 5 he discreetl y substitute d 'Evatt' an d 'Bevin. ' Kin g would not hav e approve d o f such familiarit y o n th e part o f a firs t secretary . 40 Th e Canadia n public was dimly aware of the ne w Commonwealth emerging , contradictory i n it s attitudes an d incline d to thin k i n old patterns . Polls taken in 194 4 showe d a considerable majority , outside Quebec , whic h seemed t o favour a common foreig n policy bu t man y o f th e sam e people wante d Canada free t o ac t b y itself. CIPO polls of 2 5 Marc h and 1 7 Ma y 194 4 CHAPTER 6 : NORTH A M E R I C A 1 R.D . Cuf f an d J.L . Granatstein, Canadian-American Relations in Wartime: From th e Great Wa r to the Cold Wa r (Toront o 1975) ; Jame s Eayrs , In Defence of Canada, m : Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toront o 1972) ; A.F.W . Plumptre , Three Decades of Decision: Canada and the World Monetary System, 1944-75 (Toronto 1977 ) 2 Cite d i n Eayrs , Peacemaking and Deterrence, 325 3 Se e chapter 8 , 252-4 , and chapte r 9 , 286-90 . 4 Secretar y of Stat e fo r Externa l Affair s t o Dominion s Secretary , 1 6 June 1946 , in Donal d Page , éd. , Documents on Canadian External Relations, xn : 1946 (Ottawa 1977) , 160 0 5 Fo r detaile d account s of continental defence i n this perio d se e Jame s Eayrs , In Defence o f Canada. Il : Appeasment and Rearmament (Toront o 1965 ) an d HI: Peacemaking and Deterrence', C.P . Stacey, Arms, Me n an d Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottaw a 1970) ; Stanle y Dziuban, Military Relations between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945 (Washington , DC 1959); an d J.L . Granatstein, Canada's War: the Politics o f th e Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toront o 1975) . 6 Jame s Eayrs , Appeasement an d Rearmament, 177ff ; Joh n Michae l Little , 'Canada Discovered : Continentalis t Perception s o f the Roosevel t Administration , 1939-1945' (PH D thesis, Universit y of Toronto, 1975 ) 7 Little , 'Canad a Discovered,' 127 , an d N.H . Hooker , éd. , Th e Moffat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, 1919-1943 (Cambridge, Mass . 1956) , 328- 9 8 Stacey , Arms, Me n an d Governments, 350ff

9 A mor e extensive analysis of th e PJB D will be include d i n volum e 2. 10 I n th e preparatio n o f this section I have profite d greatl y fro m th e researche s and insight s of Danfor d Middlemis s of the Universit y of Albert a wh o ha s

324 Note s for pages 165-7 2 completed a University of Toronto doctora l thesis, 'A Pattern o f Cooperation: the Case of the Canadian-America n Defence Productio n Sharing Arrangements, 1958-1963, ' and of John Kirto n of the Universit y of Toront o whose extensive wor k on defence productio n has appeared i n summary versio n in Andrew Axline, et al., eds., Continental Community? Independence an d Integration in North America (Toronto 1974) . 11 Plumptre , Three Decades o f Decision, 25 12 Little , 'Canad a Discovered, ' 33 3 13 Ibid. , 429ff , contain s a n interestin g account of Morgenthau' s efforts . 14 Plumptre , Three Decades of Decision, 62-4 15 R . Warre n James , Wartime Economic Co-operation: A Study o f Relations between Canada an d th e United States (Toront o 1949) , 2 2 16 Beatric e Bisho p Berle an d Travi s Beal Jacobs, eds. , Navigating th e Rapids 1918-1971: from th e Papers o f Adolf A . Berle (New York 1973) , 365 . See als o chapter 2 , 67-9 , fo r more o f Berle's view s of North America . 17 Canada , Treaty Series, 1941 (Ottawa 1943 ) 18 Canada , Hous e of Commons , Debates, 28 April 1941 , 228 9 19 Se e Ka l J. Holst i and Thoma s Alle n Levy , 'Bilatera l Institutions and Trans governmental Relations between Canad a an d th e Unite d States,' International Organization, xxvm , autumn 1974 , 875-901 . 20 Unite d States , Departmen t o f State Bulletin, v, 2 7 Dec. 1941 , 57 9 21 'Canada' s Relations wit h War-tim e Agencies in Washington,' Canadian Journal o f Economics and Political Science, xi, Aug . 1945 , 41 1 22 Granatstein , Canada's War, 90 23 James , Wartime Economic Co-operation, 1 3 24 Se e chapter 2 , 30-3 . 25 Se e chapter 7 , 198-9 . 26 Quote d i n James , Wartime Economic Co-operation, 13 3 27 Middlemiss , ' A Patter n o f Co-operation,' 43- 4 28 Joh n J . Kirton , 'Canadian-America n Integratio n i n Defence Productio n 1941-1971: Causes , Courses , Consequences' (M A thesis, Carleton University , School o f Internationa l Affairs , 1973 ) 29 Th e tex t o f the Repor t o f the Advisor y Committee o n Post-Hostilitie s Pro blems, 'Post-wa r Canadian Defenc e Relationshi p wit h th e Unite d States : General Considerations, ' 2 3 Jan. 1945 , i s reproduced a s Document 1 in Eayrs, Peacemaking and Deterrence, 375-80. 30 A summary o f the exchang e i s in F.H. Soward , 'A Survey of Canadia n External Policy,' compiled fo r DEA , chapter 3 , 67ff . 31 Associat e Under-Secretar y o f State for Externa l Affair s t o Secretar y o f th e Cabinet, 2 4 June 1946 , Documents, xn, 156 9

325 Note s for pages 173-85 32 Correspondenc e concernin g weather stations ma y be found in ibid., 1543ff , an d concerning the revisio n o f ABC-22,1598ff . 33 Ibid. , USSE A t o Deput y Minister of Transport, 2 4 Jun e 1946 , 1533- 4 34 Debates, 1 Feb. 1943 , 20- 1 35 Dzuiban , Military Relations, 322 36 Treaty Series, 1948, n o 1 , 'Exchang e o f Notes,' 7 and 1 5 May 194 5 37 Eayrs , Peacemaking and Deterrence, 345 38 J.W . Pickersgill and D.F . Forster , eds., Th e Mackenzie King Record, m: 1945-1946 (Toront o 1970) , 9 2 39 Cite d in Robert Bothwel l and Joh n English , 'Canadia n Trad e Polic y in th e Age o f American Dominanc e an d Britis h Decline, 1943-1947, ' Canadian Review of American Studies, vm, sprin g 1977, 58-9 40 FRUS , Th e Conferences a t Washington an d Quebec 1943 (Washingto n 1970) , 653ff 41 Cite d i n Bothwell and English , 'Canadia n Trad e Policy, ' 5 9 42 Public Papers o f th e Presidents: Harry S . Truman, 1949 (Washingto n 1964) , 21 8 43 Ibid. , 107 44 Assistan t Secretar y o f State fo r Economi c Affair s (Thorp ) memorandu m t o Under-Secretary o f State (Lovett ) i n FRUS , 1948, i x (Washingto n 1972) , 406. See also th e les s inhibite d views of Adol f Berl e i n Navigating th e Rapids, 365-6. 45 Robertso n t o Prime Minister , 1 2 Dec. 194 3 46 Se e J.L. Granatstei n an d R.D . Cuff , 'Canad a and th e Marshal l Plan, June December 1947, ' pape r presente d t o th e Canadia n Historica l Associatio n Annual Meeting , Fredericton , 5 June 197 7 47 Wron g to DEA , 2 2 Ma y 194 8 48 Wron g to DEA , 2 3 Dec. 194 7 49 Abbot t t o S t Laurent, 2 6 July 194 8 50 Cite d i n Soward, 'Survey,' chapter 7, 5 0 51 Quoted i n ibid. , 4 1 52 Cite d i n Rober t A . Spencer , Canada i n World Affairs, 1946-1949 (Toront o 1959), 26 3 53 Wron g to DEA , 2 1 Jul y 194 8 54 Repor t from Pierc e i n Pari s of a conversation o f 2 6 Jul y 1948 , quote d i n Soward, 'Survey, ' chapter 7 , 45 55 Quote d i n ibid. , 1 7 56 DE A to London , 9 Sept. 194 7 57 DE A to Robertson , 2 Sept. 194 7 58 Robertso n t o DEA , 1 9 June 1947 ; Soward, 'Survey,' chapte r 7, 5

59 Soward , 'Survey, ' chapter 7 , 2 0

326 Note s for pages 186-9 7 60 Lette r t o the autho r from Loui s Rasminsky, 1 7 Oct. 197 5 61 Soward , 'Survey, ' chapter 7, 2 6 62 Ibid. , 1 1 63 Ibid. , 2 8 64 FRUS , 1945, u (Washingto n 1967) , 1069-70 , 1087- 8 65 Robertso n fo r prim e minister , 2 2 Dec. 194 1 66 Mike: Th e Memoirs of th e Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. I: 1897-1948 (Toronto 1972) , 254 67 Se e Cuf f an d Granatstein , Canadian-American Relations, 9 2 68 James , Wartime Economic Co-operation, 3 69 Harol d A . Innis , Essays i n Canadian Economic History, edited b y Mar y Q. Inni s (Toronto 1956) , 406 70 Debates, 6 June 1947 , 3863-87; 9 June, 3913-2 6 71 Mackenzie King Record, III , 21 1 72 Debates, 1 2 Feb. 1948 , 116 8 73 Se e chapter 7. 74 Se e Cuf f an d Granatstein , 'Th e Perils of Exemptionalism, ' i n CanadianAmerican Relations, 156-63 , an d th e respons e i n Plumptre, Three Decades of Decision, 82-5. 75 Holst i and Levy , 'Bilateral Institutions, ' 87 8 C H A P T E R 7 : THE ATOMI C T R I A D 1 'A n Outside r Lookin g In,' Canada' s Tomorro w Conference , Quebec , 13-1 4 Nov. 1953 . I am indebte d t o Professo r Pau l Ambros e o f Shippensbur g Stat e College fo r drawin g my attention t o thi s ap t quotation. Hi s 196 6 dissertatio n for th e Universit y of Pennsylvania , 'Canad a Become s a Potentia l Nt h Coun try: 1943-1951, ' an d hi s unpublished paper, 'Canad a and th e Nort h Atlanti c Atomic Triangle,' ar e the mos t complete account s o f Canada's atomi c rela tions an d hav e bee n o f grea t value in th e preparatio n of thi s chapter . 2 C.S.A . Ritchie , 'Control o f th e Atomi c Bomb b y the Unite d Nations Organiza tion,' Departmen t o f Externa l Affairs , 8 Sept. 194 5 3 Th e bes t published account s o f th e wartim e and postwa r atomi c policie s are the officia l Britis h and America n accounts, bot h o f whic h are admirabl y objective and contain , especiall y the British , a good dea l of informatio n abou t th e Canadian involvement . Margare t Gowing , Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London 1964) , an d Independence an d Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-1952. i : Policy Making; n : Policy Execution (Londo n 1974) ; and Richar d G. Hewlet t an d Osca r Anderson , Jr , History o f th e United States Atomic Energy Commission, I: Th e New World, 1939-1946; Hewlet t an d Franci s

327 Note s for pages 199-20 9 Duncan, il : Atomic Shield, 1947-1952 (Universit y Park, PA 1962, 1969) . Fo r a more detaile d account of Canadian policie s see Wilfrid Eggleston , Canada's Nuclear Story (Toront o 1965) ; an d Jame s Eayrs , I n Defence o f Canada, in : Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toront o 1972) , 258-318. 4 'It s existenc e ha d give n Britai n the foundation s o f a peacetim e nuclea r reacto r programme, and Canad a a flying start int o th e nuclea r age , wit h al l the implications this hel d fo r he r scienc e an d industry. ' Gowing , Policy Making, 8 5 Gowing , Britain and Atomic Energy, 10 3 6 Ibid. , 193 , an d Eggleston , Canada's Nuclear Story, 64-6 7 Marti n J. Sherwin , A World Destroyed: Th e Atomic Bomb and th e Grand Alliance (Ne w York 1975) , 71- 6 8 J.W . Pickersgill an d D.F . Forster , eds. , Th e Mackenzie King Record, n : 1944-1945, 327-45 1 9 Gowing' s conclusion , however , afte r reading th e documents , i s that i t would probably no t hav e mad e a difference if the bom b ha d bee n destine d fo r Europe. Mackenzi e King , however , confide d to hi s diary that i t was fortunate the bom b wa s used o n th e Japanes e 'rathe r than upo n th e whit e races o f Europe.' Se e Eayrs, Peacemaking and Deterrence, 276. It is an appallin g comment. However, thos e intereste d i n the curiou s working s of King's min d shoul d se e this i n th e contex t o f al l the impetuou s extravagance s o f expression i n th e diary. 10 Wron g t o Mackenzie , 2 2 Oct. 194 5 11 'Memorandu m o n Attlee' s letter o f 25 September t o Presiden t Truma n regarding the forthcomin g exchang e of views on th e atomi c bomb,' 6 Nov. 1945, drafte d by C.S.A. Ritchi e and signe d b y Wrong 12 J.W . Pickersgil l and D.F . Forster , eds., Th e Mackenzie King Record, in : 1945-1946, 4 2 13 DE A memorandum o f 6 Nov. 194 5 14 Quotation s draw n from memorand a annexe d t o Washingto n despatch t o Ottawa, 2 1 Nov. 194 5 15 Th e Canadia n repor t o n th e meetin g i s contained i n Pearson's despatch o f 21 Nov. 194 5 t o SSEA . 16 Fo r example , Andr é Fontaine , History of th e Cold War, I (New Yor k 1968) , 268ff 17 Memorandu m o n Atomi c Warfare, initialled LBP, 8 Nov. 1945 , attache d t o letter o f 2 1 Nov. 194 5 t o DEA , reproduced i n J.A. Munro an d A.I . Inglis , 'Th e Atomic Conferenc e o f 194 5 and th e Pearso n Memoirs, ' International Journal, xxix, winter 1973-4 , 94- 9 18 Volum e n o f this study , forthcomin g 19 Gowing , Britain and Atomic Energy, 95

328 Note s for pages 209-2 1 20 America n messianism wa s a problem for Canadians because th e bes t inter nationalists in Washington took it for granted that the United States was not like other powers. See a discussion o f this phenomenon i n connection wit h the formation of ICA O in chapter 2. 21 Andre w Pierre, Nuclear Politics: the British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970 (Londo n 1972 ) 22 Cowing , Policy Making, 117 , 277- 8 23 Ibid. , 9 8 24 Ibid. , 13 4 25 Pearso n t o Robertson , 1 4 Dec. 1945 ; Wron g t o Ignatieff , 1 5 Ma y 1946 . How e wrote t o Heeney , 1 7 May 1946 , sayin g that 'unde r dat e o f May 1 3 I sent yo u a repl y whic h 1 now fin d i s wholly i n error.' Thi s concerne d th e amount s o f uranium Eldorad o wa s producing and unde r contract to suppl y to th e Unite d States. Fortunatel y th e inaccuracie s balanced out an d di d not radicall y affect a reply sent t o th e Unite d Kingdom. 26 How e t o Bateman , 1 1 Dec . 194 5 27 How e to Pearson , 3 0 Nov. 194 5 28 Pearso n t o Robertson, 4 Dec. 194 5 29 Kin g to Attlee , 1 May 194 6 30 Pearso n t o Heeney , 3 May 194 6 31 DE A to London , 1 May 194 6 32 Heene y t o Howe , 2 0 March 194 6 33 Hous e o f Common s Standin g Committee o n Externa l Affairs, Minutes of Proceedings an d Evidence, no 2 , 7 April 1954 , 4 4 34 Hewlet t and Anderson , Th e New World, 1939-1946, 50 1 35 Heene y t o Wrong, 1 0 Dec. 194 7 36 Wron g to Heeney , 2 4 Sept. 194 7 37 Heene y t o Wrong , 1 1 Sept. 1947 38 Pearso n t o Howe , 2 Dec. 194 7 39 Wron g to DEA , 1 9 Dec. 194 9 40 Heene y t o Wrong , 1 1 Sept. 194 9 41 Eggleston , Canada's Nuclear Story, 14 5 42 How e to Heeney , 8 Sept. 194 7 43 Gowing , Policy Making, 13 8 44 Canada , Hous e o f Commons, Debates, 5 Dec. 1945 , 295 9 45 How e t o Malcol m MacDonald , 2 3 March 194 6 46 Gowing, Policy Making, 134 . Sh e notes, however , that i t was Howe an d Mackenzie, no t King , who wanted the Britis h piles. 47 Memorandum , Wron g to Pearson , 1 6 Dec. 194 6 48 Gowing , Policy Making, 32 8

329 Note s for pages 221-33 49 Wron g to Heeney, 2 4 Sept. 194 7 50 Th e Journals o f David E . Lilienthal. II: The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950 (New Yor k 1964) , 381 , 385 ; an d Hewlet t and Duncan , Th e Atomic Shield, 1947-1952, 480f f 51 Th e Private Papers o f Senator Vandenberg, ed . Arthu r H. Vandenberg , J r (Boston 1952) , 267 52 J.E . Hodgetts , Administering the Atom for Peace (Ne w York 1964) , 5 7 53 Debates, 4 Feb. 1947 , 8 1 54 Hodgetts , Administering the Atom, 177- 8 55 Thre e specialized bodie s wer e se t u p t o control nuclea r energ y in Canada : Eldorado Minin g and Refinin g Ltd , responsibl e fo r procuremen t o f uranium and fo r al l processes from exploratio n t o manufacture ; Atomi c Energy of Canada Ltd , t o handl e researc h an d development ; Atomi c Energy Control Board, primarily concerned wit h regulation . A succinc t accoun t o f thei r work is to b e foun d i n ibid. , 50-7 . 56 CIP O polls o f 3 Oct. 1945 , 2 6 Jan. , an d 8 June 194 6 CHAPTER 8 : D R A F T I NG TH E C H A R T E R 1 Skelto n t o Massey , 1 4 March 1939 , i n John A Munro , éd., Documents on Canadian External Relations, vi: 1936-1939 (Ottaw a 1972) , 141 1 2 Dated 2 3 Feb . 1944 . Fo r a survey of th e wor k of the Post-Hostilitie s Problems Committees se e Do n Munto n an d Do n Page , 'Plannin g i n the Eas t Block : the Post-Hostilities Problem s Committe e i n Canada 1943-5, ' International Journal, XXXII, autum n 1977 . Thi s articl e contains als o a n excellen t analysis of th e officials involved . 3 Pearso n t o Robertson, 1 Feb. 194 4 4 Pearso n t o DEA , 8 Sept. 194 4 5 Reproduce d i n R.A . MacKay, Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1955: Selected Speeches an d Documents (Toronto 1971) , 6-1 0 6 Canada , Hous e o f Commons, Debates, 1s t sess, 2 8 March 1945 , 30 0 7 Se e hi s comments o n th e unwisdo m fo r a secondary powe r of plannin g fro m the foundatio n upwards , chapter 4 , 107 . 8 Wron g memorandum , 'Canadia n plannin g for th e internationa l settlement,' 23 Feb. 194 4 9 Wrong , 'Not e for Mr. Robertson,' 24 Feb. 1944 , wit h comments b y Robertso n 10 Wron g t o Reid , 1 1 Oct. 194 4 11 I t wa s all the mor e creativ e becaus e o f the respec t all these me n ha d fo r eac h other an d thei r close persona l ties . This wa s evident t o a junior office r wh o was fortunate enoug h t o wor k for eac h o f them .

330 Note s for pages 234-45 12 A very interesting account of American and British views on the qualifications of these two Canadians is contained i n James Barros , 'Pearso n o r Lie: The Politics of the Secretary-General' s Selection , 1946, ' Canadian Journal o f Political Science, x, Marc h 1977 , 65-92. 13 Wron g to Pearson , 1 Feb. 194 4 14 USSEA , Sa n Francisco , t o SSEA , Ottawa , 1 0 June 194 5 15 Canadia n view s put forwar d t o Dumbarto n Oak s participants are summarize d in a memorandum o f 1 8 September 1944 , initialle d JWH an d entitle d 'The Dumbarton Oak s Conference o n Worl d Organization: Canadian Interests. ' 16 SSE A to Secretar y of Stat e for Dominion s Affairs , London , fo r Churchil l fro m King, 2 8 Sept. 194 4 17 Undate d scribble d note probabl y written in the earl y summer o f 194 4 18 Wron g to Canadia n Hig h Commissioner, Canberra , 2 0 Feb. 194 5 19 Se e chapter 4 20 Se e not e 1 6 above. 21 Memorandum , 'Question s arising from Dumbarto n Oaks,' intende d fo r London Conference , 2 March 194 5 22 Fo r example , i n memoranda b y Wrong of 2 5 April and MacKa y of 1 1 July 1944. Sir Charles Webster i n the Foreig n Offic e argue d that 'if Canad a and Brazil do not agree the whol e existence o f a World Organization is threatened.' P. A. Reynolds and E.J . Hughes, Th e Historian as Diplomat: Charles Kingsley Webster and th e United Nations, 1939-1946 (Londo n 1976) , 51 23 CIP O poll s of 2 0 Jan., 2 0 Nov. 1943 ; 1 0 Jan. 1945 ; an d 1 3 July 194 6 24 Memorandu m signe d H.H . Wron g and entitle d 'Militar y Aspect s o f th e Dumbarton Oak s Proposals , Februar y 19t h 1945 ' 25 Se e chapter 9 , 290-5 . 26 Mike: Th e Memoirs of th e Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, i : 1897-1948 (Toronto 1972) , 271-2 27 Se e note 2 4 above . 28 Se e chapter 5 . 29 Se e Reynold s an d Hughes , Th e Historian a s Diplomat, 31. 30 Masse y t o Robertson , London , 2 3 April 194 5 31 Ibid . 32 SSE A to Secretar y o f Stat e for Dominion s Affairs , London , 4 Sept. 194 4 33 Rei d an d Pearso n wer e mor e enthusiasti c abou t publi c discussion o f Canadia n policy tha n wer e Wrong and Robertson , wh o were closer t o th e throne . Rei d wanted t o publis h hi s draf t charte r t o get discussion goin g and Pearso n wante d to pu t th e recor d straigh t when th e Ne w York Times ha d misrepresente d Cana dian positions . Neithe r reques t wa s granted. Ther e wa s legitimate concern tha t Canada woul d jeopardise it s sources i f it made publi c its view s on Britis h and

331 Note s for pages 246-9 American paper s shown the m i n confidence. Wrong went rather far, however , when he doubted the wisdom of presenting other governments befor e San Francisco with a summary of Canadian view s because ' a document o f this sort would certainly become publi c property and migh t prove embarrassing i f we were unable t o secure th e amendment o f the proposals on the lines we desire and nevertheless wishe d to lay the Charte r before Parliamen t for ratification. ' Memorandum fo r the prim e minister from Wrong , 1 5 March 194 5 34 Frase r calle d a British statement 'contemptible ' and 'mos t dishonest.' Senato r Connally (us ) aske d hi m t o withdra w this unparliamentary language. Robertson reporte d t o DEA : 'Al l told i t was an extraordinar y and deplorabl e exhibition o f Commonwealt h publi c manners. Pearso n intervene d effectivel y just befor e th e clos e o f debate an d managed , I think, to put Commonwealt h differences i n a little better ligh t an d perspectiv e fro m tha t i n which they ha d been exhibite d by th e principa l protagonists.' USSEA , San Francisco , t o SSEA , 10 June 194 5 35 Debates, 2 8 March 1945,31 1 36 2 0 April diary entry , quoted i n Mike, I , 273-4 37 Memorandu m o n Delegatio n Meeting , 9 May 194 5 38 Th e practic e of mixe d delegations wa s continued b y Canada i n composin g delegations t o th e Genera l Assembl y unti l 1947. Eventually it was realized , however, tha t it was a principle which did no t accor d wel l with the Canadia n system o f responsibl e government . Unanimit y was essential o n th e Charte r it self, bu t i t was inevitable and prope r that issues considered i n the Assemblie s should b e ones on whic h there migh t be political divisions a t home. A s each country was allowed only five representatives an d five alternates o n a n Assembly delegation , i t was difficul t t o know what status t o accor d oppositio n leaders. Kin g did no t wan t all three oppositio n partie s represented o n th e dele gation an d i n particular he did no t wan t either John Diefenbake r o r Donal d Fleming a t all . It was Pearson wh o suggested th e formul a for advisers . (Memorandum fo r SSEA , 1 3 Aug. 1947) . Th e compromis e wa s a provisio n fo r 'parliamentary observers' fro m al l parties whic h has don e a great deal eve r since t o expose member s o f parliament to th e realitie s o f the Unite d Nations. 39 Canada , DEA , Conferenc e Series , 1945 , n o 2 , 'Repor t o n th e Unite d Nations Conference o n Internationa l Organization held at Sa n Francisco , 25t h April 26th June , 1945 ' (Ottaw a 1945) , 10 , 1 1 40 Ibid. , 2 3 41 Repor t o f Delegatio n Meeting , 2 1 Ma y 194 5 42 Ibid. , 1 1 June 194 5 43 Rut h B . Russell wit h Jeannette Muther , A History o f th e United Nations Charter (Washington , D C 1958), 735-4 1

332 Note s for pages 249-55 44 Debates, 1198 45 'Repor t o n th e Unite d Nations Conference,' 3 2 46 Ibid. , 3 6 47 Repor t o f Delegatio n Meeting, 1 9 May 194 5 48 Russell , A History o f th e United Nations Charier, 66 2 49 Debates, 16 Oct. 1945 , 119 9 50 Se e also the discussio n o f regionalism in economic an d socia l functions, chapter 9 , 286ff . 51 Robertson , London , t o Wrong , 1 3 May 1944 52 Si r Charles Webster, th e historian-advise r to th e Foreig n Offic e o n inter national organization, was contemptuous o f Churchill's concep t an d give s a gleeful accoun t i n hi s diary note s o f th e rol e of th e dominion s i n forcin g him to abandon them . Reynolds and Hughes , Th e Historian as Diplomat, chapte r 3 53 Article 51: 'Nothing in th e presen t Charte r shall impai r the inheren t righ t of individual or collectiv e self-defense if an arme d attac k occurs against a Mem ber o f the Unite d Nations, unti l the Securit y Council ha s taken th e measure s necessary t o maintain international peace an d security . Measures take n by Members i n the exercis e o f this right of self-defense shal l be immediatel y reported t o th e Securit y Council and shal l not i n an y way affect th e authority and responsibliti y of the Securit y Council under the presen t Charte r t o tak e at any tim e such actio n a s it deems necessary i n orde r t o maintai n or restor e international peace and security. ' Article 53 '1. The Securit y Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regiona l arrangements o r agencies for enforcemen t actio n unde r it s authority. But n o enforcement actio n shall be take n unde r regiona l arrangements o r b y regional agencies withou t the authorizatio n of the Securit y Council, wit h the exceptio n of measure s against any enem y state, as denned i n paragraph 2 of this Article, provided fo r pursuant to Articl e 107 or i n regiona l arrangements directe d against renewa l of aggressive polic y on the par t of any such state , until suc h time as the Organizatio n may, on reques t o f the Government s concerned , be charged wit h th e responsibilit y for preventin g further aggression b y such a state. '2. The ter m enem y stat e a s used i n paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state whic h during the Secon d Worl d Wa r has been a n enem y o f any signatory o f the presen t Charter. ' 54 Repor t o f Delegatio n Meeting , 1 5 June 194 5 55 Lelan d M . Goodrich , Edvard Hambro , an d Patrici a Simons , Charter of the United Nations: Commentary an d Documents, 3rd rev . ed. (Ne w York 1969) , 645

333 Note s for pages 255-66 56 'I n the philosoph y of power politics China is an obligation and a danger and not an asset. Inclusion as a party to the Declaratio n [ie , a proposed Four-Power Declaration on security after th e war] is a question of "face " and a departure from th e basi c principle as I see it. It is, however, vain to propose the exclusio n of China in view of the attitud e adopted by the United States Government.' Wrong memorandum for the prime minister, 22 Sept. 1943 57 Repor t o f delegation meeting , 1 4 May 194 5 58 H.W. , Memorandu m fo r th e Prim e Minister , San Francisco , 1 1 May 194 5 59 'Repor t on th e Unite d Nations Conference,' 19 60 Repor t o f delegation meeting , 2 4 May 194 5 61 Rea d t o Robertson , fro m Washington , 17 April 1945 62 'Repor t o n th e Unite d Nations Conference, ' 49 , 53 63 Th e delegation' s intention , as reported i n a telegram fro m Sa n Francisc o o f 2 3 May 1945 , was : 'In vie w of th e term s o f ou r ow n amendment, whic h is designed t o establish independen t statu s of a real international secretariat, I think we shall have to oppose Grea t Powers ' amendment , bu t shal l do so in very moderat e language. ' 64 H e wa s also indefatigable . He no t onl y proposed afte r Dumbarto n Oak s that Canada produc e it s own redraf t of th e Charte r i n th e interes t o f greater clarit y and mor e popula r appeal, he di d the job himself . A s he reporte d t o Norman Robertson: 'In Chicag o [wher e he ha d bee n ver y active at the Civi l Aviation Conference] I got into the habi t of drafting dozen s o f Convention Article s overnight. I have not ye t been abl e wholl y t o break myself o f that bad habit, to whic h I have latel y been succumbin g between th e hour s o f eight and mid night. Consequently I am sendin g you b y bag on Saturday , as a Christmas present, a redraft o f th e Charte r an d i n m y redraf t hav e incorporate d 7 5 per cent t o 9 0 per cen t of th e Constitutiona l Articles of the Permanen t Aviation Convention.' Washingto n t o SSEA , 2 1 Dec. 1944 . In Ottaw a Robertson an d Wrong doubte d tha t this would, as Rei d thought , 'ru n a good chanc e of being taken a s the basi s o f discussion.' 65 DEA , Conference Series, 1946, no 1 , 'Repor t of the firs t par t of th e firs t sessio n of th e Genera l Assembl y o f the Unite d Nations ' (Ottaw a 1946), 4 3 66 Wilgress , London , t o Robertson, 8 Dec. 194 5 67 Robertso n fo r Wilgress , 6 and 1 0 Dec. 194 5 68 Draf t initialle d H.w. enclosed wit h Memorandu m fo r th e Prim e Minister , 28 Dec . 194 5 69 Robertso n t o Wilgress , 1 1 Dec. 194 5 70 Memorandu m fo r th e prim e ministe r b y N.A. Robertson, 2 6 Nov. 1945 , with marginal comments b y WLM K

334 Note s fo r pages 266-77 71 Robertso n t o the prime minister, ibid . Beside Robertson's comment tha t Australia was disposed t o concede 'Canada's prior claim,' Kin g noted ungener ously 'w e certainly have. ' He commented also : 'I f Mexic o were on the Securit y Council and Canad a no t this would surely raise a question here. ' 72 Rea d wa s a senior an d essentia l membe r o f the Canadia n delegatio n t o th e first session o f the Genera l Assembl y bu t h e illustrate d his personal an d national dedicatio n t o auster e principle s by walking out o n th e delegatio n th e instant h e was elected t o suc h a hig h judicial position an d ha d nothin g mor e to d o wit h it. 73 Wilgres s t o Robertson , London , 2 4 Dec. 194 5 C H A P T E R 9 : ECONOMIC AN D SOCIA L FUNCTION S 1 Se e chapter 2 , 47ff . 2 Se e chapte r 1 , 8ff , 20ff . 3 Canada , Hous e o f Commons , Debates, 4 Aug . 1944 , 5909-1 0 4 7 August 194 3 5 Canadian Information Service Weekly, 1 March 1946 , 5 6 Ibid. , 1 2 April 1946 7 J.M . Keynes , Th e Economic Consequences of th e Peace (New Yor k 1920) , 22 6 8 Quote d b y Richard Gardne r i n A.L.K . Acheson , J.F . Chant , an d M.F.J . Prachowny, eds., Bretton Woods Revisited, (Toront o 1972) , 2 2 9 I n ibid. , 4 6 10 Poll s take n during the latte r years o f the wa r confirm the vie w that th e public regarded 'fre e trade ' wit h th e Unite d State s an d wit h th e worl d at larg e as a desirable situation . 11 Se e chapte r 2 , 33ff . 12 DE A telegram t o Dominion s Office , par a 12 , 2 Aug . 194 4 13 'Question s arisin g from Dumbarto n Oaks, ' intende d fo r Londo n Conference , 2 Marc h 194 5 14 D.G . Anglin , 'Canadian Polic y Towards Internationa l Institution s 1939-1950 ' (PHD dissertation, Oxford , 1956) , 16 5 15 DEA , Canada and th e United Nations 1951-1952 (Ottaw a 1952) , 9 2 16 F.H . Sowar d and Edga r Mclnnis , Canada and th e United Nations (Ne w York 1956), 18 7 17 See , fo r example , Th e Memoirs of Cordel! Hull, H (New Yor k 1948) , 1302 . 18 Anglin , 'Canadia n Policy, ' 16 0 19 Internationa l Labour Conference , 26t h session, Repor t 1 : Future Policy, Programme and Status of th e International Labour Organization (Philadelphia 1944), 39-43 , 185- 8 20 Debates, 2 0 March 1945 , 4 4

335 Note s fo r pages 278-94 21 See , fo r example, th e sectio n o n huma n rights , 290ff . 22 Sowar d and Mclnnis , Canada and th e United Nations, 20 2 23 'Th e Worl d o f UNESCO, ' International Journal, I , autumn 1946 , 368- 9 24 Tha t th e attitud e of th e officials , viewe d i n retrospect, wa s somewhat priggish and unimaginativ e is hereby acknowledged by one o f them . 25 Quote d i n Rut h B . Russell wit h Jeannett e Muther , A History o f th e United Nations Charter (Washington, DC 1958), 61 6 26 Se e chapter 3,91-3 . 27 (Draft ) Instruction s fo r th e Canadia n Delegatio n t o th e Genera l Assembly of the Unite d Nations, 2 7 Dec . 1945 , initialle d HW, under cove r o f Memo randum fo r th e prim e minister, 2 8 Dec. 194 5 28 Officia l Record s o f the Economi c an d Socia l Council, Fift h Session , 271 Summary recor d 29 Se e doubts abou t assumption s o f legislative power expressed b y Wrong an d Rasminsky a t San Francisco , chapte r 8 , 257. 30 Anglin , 'Canadian Policy, ' 16 9 31 Canada and the United Nations, 1951-52, appendix 3 , 152-4 . The repor t con tains a thorough descriptio n o f the responsibilitie s o f Canadian department s and th e mean s o f co-ordination characteristic, wit h some alterations, o f th e first decad e o r s o o f U N policy. 32 Se e chapte r 8 , 252ff . 33 Davi d Mitrany , A Working Peace System (Chicag o 1966) , 1 2 34 Internationa l Monetar y Fund , Summary Proceedings of th e Seventh Annual Meeting o f th e Board of Governors (Washingto n 1952) , 12 1 35 Reproduce d i n International Conciliation, no 442 , June 1948 , 43 2 36 DEA , Canada and th e United Nations, 1950 (Ottaw a 1951) , 12 3 37 Th e detail s o f the controvers y ove r a number o f years canno t b e recounte d here, bu t a good accoun t ca n b e found i n Anglin , 'Canadian Policy, ' 243-58 . 38 Memorandu m fo r th e Lega l Adviser , signe d HW , 23 March 194 5 39 Fo r consideratio n o f huma n right s in the contex t o f domestic jurisdiction se e chapter 8 , 256-7. 40 DEA , Canada and th e United Nations, 1948 (Ottaw a 1949), 24 8 41 Specia l Joint Committe e o f the Senat e an d th e Hous e o f Commons o n Human Right s an d Fundamenta l Freedoms , Minutes of Proceedings, including the secon d an d final report, 2 1 and 2 3 June 194 8 42 U N Doc E/CN.4/515/Ad d 13, 1 6 March 195 1 43 Canada and th e United Nations, 1948, 248 , 24 9 44 Statemen t b y Canadian representativ e i n 3rd Committee o f th e Genera l Assembly, 2 Nov. 1954 , cite d i n R.A . MacKay , Canadian Foreign Policy 1945-1954: Selected Speeches an d Documents (Toront o 1971) , 16 8

336 Note s fo r pages 298-30 7 CONCLUSION 1 See , fo r example , W.D . Coplin, Introduction to International Politics: A Theoretical Overview (Chicag o 1974) , 74ff . 2 fro m a private letter. 3 Chapte r 1 , 17-1 8 4 'Th e Foundatio n o f Canadian Polic y in World Affairs, ' Statements and Speeches, n o 47/2 , 1 3 Jan. 194 7 5 Ibid . 6 Davi d R . Murray , éd., Documents on Canadian External Relations, vu: 1939-1941, Parti (Ottaw a 1974) , 19 2 7 Memorandu m addresse d t o Robertson , Wrong , an d Heeney , 2 Aug. 194 5 8 See , fo r example , J.W . Pickersgil l an d D.F . Forster , eds. , Th e Mackenzie King Record, iv : 1947-1948 (Toront o 1970) , 135-6 . 9 Rober t A . Spencer , Canada i n World Affairs, 1946-1949 (Toront o 1959) , 2 10 Se e poll s mentioned o n 28 , 97 , 224 , 242 . 11 'Roo t an d Branc h i n Canadia n Foreig n Policy, ' fro m note s for a seminar a t Darwin College , Universit y of Ken t a t Canterbury , 1 0 May 197 2 12 DEA , Canada and th e United Nations, 1948 (Ottaw a 1949) , 8 5 13 Se e chapte r 2 , 26 . 14 Joh n A . Munro , éd. , Documents on Canadian External Relations, vi: 1936-1939 (Ottawa 1972) , 935- 7 15 'Canad a and the Postwa r World,' Canadian Affairs, 1 April 194 4

Index

Abbott, D.C. 93,181 , 194 Acheson, Dea n 27 , 37, 39, 187 , 205, 214, 221, 234; on functiona l repre sentation 4 1 Addison, Lor d 152 , 153, 157 Advisory Panel on Atomi c Energy 216 , 218,223 Alaska highway 172 , 174, 175 Anders, General 99 , 101 Anderson, Si r John 200 , 207 , 218 Arctic: new importance of 23 , 61, 171-3, 205 ; and U N 288 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (1970) 17 4 atomic bomb 197 , 202-3, 231, 243 atomic energy 94 , 168 , 194 , 196-225 passim, 296, 306 Atomic Energy of Canada Lt d 224 n Atomic Energy Control Boar d 223- 4 Attlee, Clement: and occupation forces 110, 125 ; and Commonwealt h 151 , 152,153,154-5,157,186; and atomic energy 211 , 213 Australia 70 ; and UNRR A 43-4 ; approach of to international organization 44 ; mutual aid to 81 ; at San Francisco 95 , 235, 246; and refugee s

100, 101 ; and peac e settlement 108 ; and FEA C 126 ; and Commonwealt h unity 146 ; and Commonwealt h defence 153,154 ; and U N 230,245, 265-6, 292 Austria 86 , 115 , 124 aviation 10 , 60-4, 145 . See also Com monwealth Air Trainin g Plan, ICA O Badoglio, Marshal 29 n Barton, G.H. 5 1 Baruch, Bernard 20 9 Bateman, George 212 , 213 Batt, W.L. 17 9 Beaverbrook, Lord 63 , 145 Belgian Congo 199 , 203 , 212, 216 Belgium 73,91,114,162,23 0 Bennett, R.B. 5-6 , 8-9 , 14 Berle, Adolf 65- 9 passim, 166 Berlin 121- 2 Bevin, Ernest 114 , 120 , 152 , 157, 185, 186, 22 0 Bidault, Georges 12 0 Borden, Sir Robert 6 , 8, 106 , 143- 4 Boyd-Orr, Sir John 5 1 Bracken, John 106-7,24 6 Brazil 31 , 35, 73, 84,145, 230, 241 n

338 Inde x Bretton Woods se e United Nations Monetary and Financial Conférenc e British Commonwealth 104 , 139 , 141-58, 220 , 287, 303, 305 , 307 ; prewar attitudes t o 4-8 ; common voic e for 5- 8 passim, 37 , 145-51 , 162 , 244 ; and League of Nations 17 ; Conserva tive and CC F attitudes t o 29 ; and combined board s 30 ; and civi l aviation 62-4 ; and u s loan to Britain 89; as information system 108 ; and Japanese settlement 125 , 127, 128-9 ; consultation i n 151-4 ; defence o f 154-6, 176 ; commercial polic y in 156-8; British attitudes to 185 , 186 , 187; and atomi c energy 200 ; and UN 241 , 243-5, 267; and regional ism 252 . See also Commonwealt h Air Training Plan, imperia l preferences - Conferences : (1944 ) 148 , 230, 236, 252; (1945 ) 231,239-40,272 ; (1946) 151 , 153 ; (1947 ) 13 0 British North Americ a Ac t 236 , 292 Bryce, R.B. 186,23 2 Bulgaria 112 n Burma 13 0 Bush, Vannevar 204 , 207 'Buy American' Act 16 7 Byelorussia 25 5 Byrnes, James 214 , 220 Cabinet Wa r Committee 35 , 37, 40, 170,171; on role in inter-allied bodies 38, 39; on occupatio n force s 109-10 ; and German settlement 11 8 Canadian Arm y Occupation Force 11 0 Canadian Ba r Association 25 7 Canadian Broadcastin g Corporatio n 280, 294

Canadian Council for Education fo r Citizenship 24 5 Cardin, P.J.A. 2 9 Caribbean 155 , 16 5 Casablanca Conferenc e (1943 ) 27-8 , 29 Ceylon 2 3 Chadwick, Sir James 21 9 Chalk River 199 , 200 , 213 , 217, 218, 220, 221 Chamberlain, Nevill e 6 , 7, 21 Chiang Kai-shek 25 5 Chicago conference o n civi l aviation se e International Civil Aviation Organization China 159 ; diplomati c links with 24 ; and mutua l aid 81 , 91, 178 ; repatriation 102 ; and civi l aviation 145 ; as a UN grea t powe r 238 , 250, 25 5 Chisholm, Dr Brock 28 0 Christie, Loring 13-14 , 19-20 , 105 Churchill, Winston S . 198 , 202 ; and King 7 , 141 , 151 ; at Quebec Conference 63 ; on Commonwealth voic e 148; and How e 200 ; and collectiv e security 209 ; and Commonwealt h UN sea t 252 ; on U N regional councils 25 2 Clark, Clifford 39 , 52 , 56 Claxton, Brook e 113 ; on North Atlan tic triangle 30 ; on functiona l repre sentation 42 ; on occupation force s 111 ; at Paris Peace Conference 113 , 114, 115 ; on Japanese externa l assets 13 3 clearing union 54-5 , 56 , 57,144 Cockcroft, Si r John 200 , 211 , 217 , 218 , 219 cold war 92,98 , 134,171,177,195 , 208, 284 , 296, 303 Coldwell, M.J. 59 , 246-7

339 Inde x collective security 17-18 , 106 , 243, 270; and Leagu e of Nations 8-9 , 11 , 225, 298-9; and ne w importance of Arctic 23 ; and U N 31, 94, 123 , 154 , 209, 233, 234 , 235, 245, 250; and aviation 61-2 ; and U N veto 237- 8 combined boards 25 , 30, 35,40,43,168 Combined Chief s of Staff Committe e 30, 36, 144 , 21 3 Combined Developmen t Trus t 31 , 168 , 201,212,214,223 Combined Foo d Board 30 , 36 Combined Munition s Assignment Board 3 0 Combined Polic y Committee 31,201 , 202,211,216,218,219,221,223 Combined Productio n Resources Boar d 30 Combined Ra w Materials Board 30 , 3 1 Combined Shippin g Adjustment Board 30,31 Commonwealth Ai r Training Plan 61 , 78-9, 89 , 14 1 Conant, Jame s B . 20 4 Congress (us ) 92 , 179,187 , 211, 256 ; and relie f 84 ; and loa n t o Britain 89 ; and UNRR A 43 , 46 ; and postwar financial plannin g 52 ; reaction of to Prague Coup 93 ; and E C A 181 ; an d Marshall Plan 181-2 ; and atomi c energy 210 , 214 , 215, 220 Connally, Thomas T. 246 n Co-operative Commonwealt h Federa tion 247 , 264; on peace settlemen t 29; and FA O 51; on Bretto n Wood s 59-60; on immigratio n 10 0 Council of Foreign Minister s 106 , 114 , 124,130, 152 ; and Italian colonie s 116; and German settlemen t 119-20 , 122

Cranborne, Lor d 146n , 149 , 153 , 244 Crimson Rout e 6 1 Cripps, Sir Stafford 181 , 184 , 18 6 Croll, David 10 1 Crowther, Geoffrey 14 8 Cuba 6 7 Curtin, John 147 , 148-9 Czechoslovakia 91 , 92-3, 114 , 115 , 238 Dafoe, J.W . 1 2 Dandurand, Raou l 10 , 11 David, Paul T. 63 n Davidson, G.F . 274 , 287 de Gaulle, Charle s 25 5 Denmark 84,91,28 8 Deutsch, Joh n 6 0 Dexter, Gran t 50 , 61 Diefenbaker, Joh n G . 104 , 247n diplomacy 135-6,187-91 , 197 disarmament 243 , 299 displaced persons 95 , 98-102 passim. See also refugee s domestic jurisdiction 95 , 117 , 242-3, 256-7 Dominions Offic e (UK ) 125,146 Dresden 20 2 Drury, C.M. 8 4 Dulles, Joh n Foster 131 , 246 Dumbarton Oaks conversations (1944 ) 25, 229-3 1 passim, 235-5 6 passim, 272, 283

Economic Commissio n fo r Asia and th e Far East 28 8 Economic Commission fo r Europe 28 8 Economic Commission fo r Latin America 287 , 288 Economic Cooperation Administratio n 181, 182 , 18 3 Eden, Anthon y 38 , 39, 153

340 Inde x Egypt 67 , 15 3 Eisenhower, Dwigh t David 21 1 El Salvador 6 7 Eldorado Gold Mines Company 199 , 200, 212 Eldorado Mining and Refining, Ltd 224n Eritrea 116-1 8 espionage 196-7 , 204-5 , 210, 214-15, 217 Estonia 1 0 Ethiopia 116-1 8 Europe: and League of Nations 9 ; financial aid to 86-94 ; occupation forces in 109-12 , 23 9 European Advisory Commission 11 8 European Recover y Programme 93 , 181, 182,18 3 Evatt, Herbert 44 , 73,114, 120,157 , 244, 245 , 246; and Commonwealt h voice 150-1 ; on U N veto 249 ; an d domestic jurisdiction 157 ; and UN Security Council seat 26 6 Export Credits Insurance Act 87 , 90-1 Export Development Corporatio n 9 1 Export-Import Bank 9 2 External Affairs, Departmen t of 297 ; prewar attitudes of 13-16 ; and post war planning 25-7,107 ; and UNRR A 47; and immigratio n 94-5, 102 ; and British sources 107-8 ; and occupation forces in Europe 109 ; on Ger man settlemen t 121 , 122; on us rol e in Japanese settlemen t 126 ; growth of 136 ; kinship of with Foreign Office 146-7 ; and Commonwealt h consultation 152 ; and us weathe r stations 173 ; and atomic energy 203-4, 205-6, 211-12; and draftin g UN

Charter 232- 5 passim; and UNESC O 279 Far Eastern Advisor y Commission 12 6 Far Eastern Commission 127,128,129 , 130,136 federal-provincial jurisdiction 257 ; and ILO 8-9, 18-19 , 277-8; and UNESC O 278-9; and human rights 291- 5 passim Finance, Departmen t o f 271 , 285 Finland 91,112,115,23 8 Fleming, Donald 247 n Food and Agriculture Organization 50-2, 60 , 271, 285, 289, 306. See also United Nations Conference o n Foo d and Agriculture Foreign Assistance Ac t (us ) 93 , 18 1 Foreign Offic e (UK ) 244 , 252; as sourc e of information 107-8 ; and Common wealth voice 14 6 France 145 , 209, 238, 250, 251; at ICA O conference 65 , 70; credits to 91 ; and peace settlement 10 8 Franks, Oliver 22 1 Fraser, Pete r 148,149 , 244 , 245, 246, 249 Free France 24 , 108 , 164 , 199 Freedman, Ma x 8 5 'freedom o f information' 294- 5 French Committe e o f National Liberation 8 1 Fuchs, Klau s 21 7 functional representatio n 72-3 , 235-8; and Combine d Chiefs of Staff Com mittee 30 ; and combined board s 31-3; and UNRR A 35-6 ; and IM F 58; and ICA O 66 ; and U N Security Council 67 ; Wrong on 71 ; and Germa n settlement 111 , 119 ; and Common -

341 Inde x wealth 153 ; i n PJB D 160 ; an d UN Charter Articl e 23 251-2 ; and non-self-governing territorie s 259 ; and ECOSO C 26 9 functionalism 72-3 , 161 , 182 , 235-8, 282, 306 , 307 ; and Leagu e of Nations 18 ; and allie d war efforts 29 ; in IMF and IBR D 59 ; Mitran y o n 72-3; and us 160 , 183 , 194 ; and Commonwealth 151 ; and Hyde Park declaration 166 ; and U N veto 248 ; and IL O 277 ; and specialize d agencies 283-6 ; and ECOSO C 287-9 0 passim Gardiner, J.G . 50,51,27 1 General Agreement o n Tariffs an d Trade [GATT ] 71 , 92 , 281 , 282 , 305 General Arrangement s t o Borrow 5 5 Germany 204 , 239; peac e settlemen t with 106 , 118-24,152 ; high commis sion fo r 118 ; reparations 132-3 ; changing attitudes to 134- 5 Glazebrook, O.P . de T. 30 8 Glen, J.A. 9 7 Gouzenko, Igo r 196-7 , 204 , 215 Graydon, Gordo n 33 , 83, 246, 247, 264 Greece 86 , 91 Green, Howard 28 , 146n , 223 Greenland 24 , 68,164, 172 Groves, Leslie R . 22 1 Halban, H . von 20 0 Halifax, Lor d 147 , 152 , 246 Hammarskjold, Da g 26 1 Harrod, Si r Roy 53 , 55 Heath, Edward 148 n Heeney, A.D.P. 173 , 213, 214, 217 , 218,223,231

Hickenlooper, Bourk e B. 22 1 Hickerson, J.D . 18 7 Hiroshima 197 , 203, 210 , 224 Hoffman, Pau l 18 7 Holmes, Joh n W. 147n , 148n , 151 n Hong Kong 23,125 , 133 Hopkins, Harry 14 5 Hot Springs se e United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture House Committee o n Atomic Energy 223 House Committee o n un-American Activities (us ) 21 7 Howe, C.D. 168 ; and combined board s 30, 33 ; and ICA O conference 61-2 , 66, 69, 70, 71; and atomic energy 31 , 199,200,201,211,213,218,219, 222, 223 ; and atomic bomb 202 , 219 Hull, Cordell 37 , 38, 166 , 27 1 human right s 242 , 290-5 Humphrey, J.P. 29 3 Hungary 91,112,11 5 Hyde Park Agreement (1941 ) 69 , 91, 163, 166 , 168 , 175 , 177, 188 , 190 , 194, 19 5 Iceland 17 2 Ignatieff, Georg e 20 9 Ilsley, J.L. 58 , 60, 88,166; on mutual aid 87 ; on credit s t o Europe 88 , 91 immigration 9 , 94-6. See also refugee s imperial conference (1937 ) 7 , 21, 307 imperial preferences 6 , 89, 144 , 157 , 184 Imperial War Cabinet 5 , 143 India 67 , 130 , 141 , 146,154 , 156 , 158 , 162, 245 , 252, 255, 267 Inter-Allied Committee on Postwa r Requirements 3 4

342 Inde x Inter-Allied Reparations Agency 13 2 Intergovernmental Committee fo r European Migration 10 3 Intergovernmental Committe e o n Refugees 97 , 98, 99 Inter-Governmental Maritim e Consultative Organization 161 , 28 0 International Air Transport Conventio n 64 International Ban k for Reconstructio n and Developmen t 52 , 53, 275, 281, 284; Plumptre on 33 ; establishment of 58- 9 International Civil Aviation Organization 190 , 244 , 262n, 282, 284, 288; formation o f 64-7 1 International Commission fo r Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 28 9 International Court of Justice 161 , 257-9, 266, 283 International Joint Commission 11 , 159-60, 161 , 164 , 193 , 289 International Labou r Organization 8-9 , 18, 244, 276-8, 284 International Monetary Fun d 52 , 53, 58, 271, 275 , 281 , 284, 286, 305 ; Plumptre on creation of 33 ; Atlantic City meeting on 5 6 International North Pacific Fisherie s Commission 28 9 International Refugee Organizatio n 32 , 44, 45, 85 , 95, 98-102, 103 , 104 International Ruhr Authorit y 119 , 122 International Telecommunication s Union 28 0 International Trad e Organizatio n 185 , 271,281-2 Ireland 63 , 255 Italy 132, 135 ; and war with Ethiopia 9 , 12; and militar y relief 82 ; post-

UNRRA relie f to 86 ; peace treaty with 112 ; and frontie r disput e with Austria 115 ; colonie s 116-18,15 3 Japan 135 , 239; and atomic weapons 202-3, 224; peace settlemen t with 124-32 Jews 14-15,96 , 115 Joint Committee o n Atomi c Energy (us) 221,22 3 Joint Economic Committes (Canada-us ) 167 Joint War Production Committe e (Canada-us) 167,17 6 Keenleyside, H.L. 69,143 n Kennan, George 216,22 1 Keynes, J.M. 54-5 , 96, 144 , 271 King 69 , 86, 95, 198 , 209 , 245 , 297, 300; and Commonwealt h 5-6 , 147 , 148-9,149-50,157,158; and appeasement 6 , 21; prewar policies of 6-8 , 13; on refugees and immigrant s 14 , 97, 101 , 104 ; and autonom y 15 ; and League of Nations 20 , 28, 270; o n Casablanca Conferenc e 28 ; on func tional representation 35 ; and UNRR A 37, 38, 47; and Roosevel t 45 , 180 ; on aviation 62 ; on functionalism 72 ; on war efforts 78-9 ; on loan s t o UK 88 ; and peac e settlement 105-6 , 108, 239 ; on repatriation offeree s 110; on peac e treaties 113 ; on oppo sition exclusion from peac e conference 113 ; at Paris Peace Confer ence 113-14 ; on occupatio n force s for Japa n 125 ; and Herber t Norma n 127n; on triangula r relationship 138 ; and Churchill 141 ; on Imperia l Cabinet 143 ; on pa x Americana

343 Inde x 162; on Hyd e Park 166 ; on defenc e co-operation wit h u s 190 , 194 ; and atomicenergy 201,204,207,212-13 ; and atomic bomb 202 ; and espionag e 205; and publi c opinion 222 ; on Wrong 232 ; and postwa r order 234 ; on middl e powers 236 ; on U N veto 237-8; at San Francisco 247 ; and UN 252 , 266; o n Canadia n site for UN 264 ; on collectiv e securit y 270; on war effort 301 ; and policy-making 302-3 Korea 118 , 131 , 15 6 Knowles, Stanley 26 4 Krock, Arthu r 27 1

Lehman, Herber t 4 3 Lend-Lease 80 ; non-acceptance o f 32 , 165-6, 169 ; Article vu of 46 , 48 , 57 , 81, 281 ; cessation o f 87 ; co-ordination o f with mutual aid 178,18 3 LePan, Dougla s 18 2 Lewis, W.B. 21 8 Liberal party 192 , 225 ; and Articl e 10 of League 10 ; on immigratio n 10 0 Lilienthal, David 22 1 Lippmann, Walter 7 8 Litvinov, Maxim 3 7 Lodge, Henr y Cabot 26 4 London Daily Herald 15 4 Luce, Clare Booth 6 4

LaBine, Gilbert 199-20 0 Labour, Departmen t o f 10 1 LaGuardia, Fiorello 43 , 84 Lapointe, Ernes t 1 1 Latin America 37 , 267 , 301; o n IM F executive 58 ; and ICA O 66 , 67 , 244 ; us attitudes toward s 108 , 163 , 164 , 190, 236-7 ; at San Francisco 252 , 253, 256 ; and U N site 264 ; an d WHO 289-9 0 Laurence, Georg e 19 7 law of the se a 7 1 League o f Nations 3 , 188 , 233 , 239 , 299; Canadian attitudes to 8-12 , 237; and collectiv e securit y 9 , 10 , 225, 234, 250 , 298-9 ; and sovereignt y 94 ; Council membership o f 1 1 ; Wrong on 17-18 ; Covenan t revisio n o f 20 ; and Danzi g 115 ; lessons of for UN 240, 248 , 251, 260, 264 ; and disarma ment 243 ; and Commonwealth 243 ; winding up of 265 ; social and eco nomic programmes of 270 , 279 ; an d ILO 276 , 284 ; and u s 300- 1

MacArthur, Dougla s 127 , 128 McCarthy, Leighton 37 , 38 Macdonald, J.S . 2 0 MacDonald, Malcol m 21 8 Macdonnell, J.M . 5 9 McDougall, E.S. 13 4 McDougall, Frank 4 9 MacKay, R.A. 23 9 McKellar, K.D. 22 1 Mackenzie, C.J. 199-20 4 passim, 215, 217-18,219 MacKinnon, Jame s 27 1 Mackintosh, W.A . 48 , 54 , 56, 58, 232, 287 McMahon Ac t 214 , 216 McNaughton, A.G.L. 215 ; and military standardization 177;andUNAE C 208-9 Mahoney, Merchan t 17 4 Maitland-Wilson, Field-Marsha l 20 2 Makins, Roger 22 1 Manchuria 9 , 301 Marshall, George C. 92 , 120 Marshall, J.T . 28 7

344 Inde x Marshall Plan 79 , 93, 121 , 163 , 216 , 282, 287; for purchases i n Canad a 78, 187 , 194 , 195 ; approval of 80 ; and whea t 90 ; Canadian associatio n with 180- 4 Martin, Paul 84 , 277, 284, 286 Massey, Vincent 13 , 152 , 244 Materials Coordinating Committee 17 6 Maud reports 198 , 209 Menzies, Rober t 14 3 Mexico 67,173 , 266, 267 middle powers 268 ; role of 114-15 , 146, 230 , 236-7 , 275 ; and atomi c energy 219 ; and U N 248,272 Military Control Commission 24 0 Military Co-operation Committe e 170- 1 military relief 34 , 82-5 , 87 , 132 Mitrany, David 72-3 , 286 Molotov, V . 12 0 Monroe Doctrin e 24,16 3 Montreal, a s site of ICA O 6 7 Montreal Gazette 7 3 Montreal laborator y 199 , 200 , 204, 210 Montreal Star 10 7 Moore-Brabazon, J.T.C . 20 9 Morgenthau, Henr y 122,16 5 Moscow: Counci l of Foreign Minister s meeting at (1945 ) 112 , 208; Declara tion on Postwar International Organization (1943 ) 118,126,23 0 mutual aid 78 , 81 , 87, 93, 166 , 178 , 183, 30 5

Newfoundland 63 , 67, 117,164 , 170 , 174 New York Times 56 , 182 , 245 n New Zealand 73 , 151 , 267 ; and mutua l aid 81 ; at San Francisco 95 , 246 , 248, 259 ; and peace settlements 108 , 126,129; and UN 230 ; and Common wealth defence 153,15 4 Nicolson, Harol d 11 4 Nigeria 15 6 non-self-governing territorie s 25 9 Norman, E.H . 127- 8 North Atlantic Treaty 9 3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] 6,135,172,182,211,216 , 299, 305; an d imperia l defence 154 , 156; and militar y standardizatio n 177; and U N Charter Article s 51 an d 53 25 3 North Atlanti c Triangle (Canada-UK-u s relations) 4 , 8, 135 ; in war effort s 29-33, 162 ; i n postwar financial planning 53-6 0 passim; at ICA O conference 64-5; i n military relief 82 ; and loan to Britain 88-9 ; and postwar economic policies 91-2,168,178,184-6 ; changing natur e of 138-9 , 160 ; an d linchpin role 189 , 197 ; in atomic energy 196-22 5 passim Norway 91 , 256 , 288 Northwest Stagin g Route 61 , 164 , 175 Novikov, N.V. 25 0

Nagasaki 20 3 Nash, Walte r 15 7 National Defence, Departmen t of : and us weather station s 17 3 National Research Counci l 197 , 199 , 203, 22 4 Netherlands 42 , 73,126, 230, 251 , 252 Netherlands Indie s 9 1

occupation forces : for Europe 109-12 ; for Japa n 124- 5 Ogdensburg Agreement (1940 ) 23-4 , 138, 160 , 163 , 164 , 166 , 177 , 194 , 289-90 Pacific war 22-3 , 109,124-5 , 202 Pakistan 130,146 , 154 , 158

345 Inde x Palestine 15 3 Pan American Sanitary Organization [PASO] 289-9 0 Paris Peace Conference: (1919) 105 , 112; (1949 ) 106,112-16,132,13 5 peacekeeping 156 , 251 , 299, 305 Pearson, Leste r B . 12 , 14 , 15 , 233, 245n, 247, 249, 308; and UNRR A 37 , 42, 43, 83, 84; and Hot Springs conference 45 , 49 , 50 ; and FAO 50-1, 306 ; on relation s with UK 90; on peace settlements 118,130 ; on trade with Japan 131-2 ; on Commonwealth voice 147-8 ; and ABC-2 2 173; and Marshal l Plan 181 ; on economic relations with us 185,190 ; and atomic energy 207 , 208, 221; and Combined Polic y Committee 211-14 ; and U N 230-1, 254; on U N sanctions 234; a s mediator 246 ; on U N delegations 247n ; as possible UN secretarygeneral 234 , 261, 266; on Reid 262 ; on Arctic 288 ; o n Declaration of Human Rights 293 ; on ECOSO C 305-6; on functionalis m in U N 306 Permanent Court of International Justice 25 8 Permanent Joint Board on Defence 24 , 139,154,160,161, 164 , 166 , 170-7 passim, 193 Persia 1 0 Philippines 12 6 Pickersgill, J.W. 12 5 Pierce, S.D . 167 , 183 Plumptre, A.F.W. 165,16 7 Poland 8,10,35,91,115,153,238 , 302; UNRR A missio n in 84 ; refugees / immigrants from 91 , 98, 99, 101 Pollack, Sydney 28 5 Pope, Maurice 113 , 121-2,132,144 , 232, 30 2

Post-Hostilities Problems Committee 25 , 107, 118-19 , 125 , 160 , 170 , 230, 234 prisoners of war [POWS ] 125,13 3 Privy Council, Judicial Committee of 8-9, 18 , 277-8 Progressive Conservative party 59,146 , 225, 246 , 247n, 264; and Common wealth 5-6 ; and Leagu e of Nations 8, 10 ; on Casablanca Conferenc e 27-8; o n voice in peace settlemen t 29, 106-7 ; and FA O 51; on immigration 100 public opinion 27-9 , 62n, 106-7 , 193 , 245; an d Quebec 80 ; and peace settlement 120 ; and atomic energy 222- 5 - poll s 82n , 88n , 95n , 97 , 100, 110 , 158n, 224 , 242, 243, 304 Quebec 80 , 82, 97 Quebec Agreement (1943 ) 201 , 210, 211-12,214 Quebec Conference (1943 ) 24, 63 Rasminsky, Louis 232 ; at Bretton Woods 56 , 58; on IM F 53, 56-7; on loan to Britain 186 ; and ECOSO C 25 7 Read, J.E. 257 , 258, 266 refugees 14-15 , 94-103; Evia n conference on (1938 ) 96 ; wartime measures 96-8 ; Bermuda conference o n (1943) 97 . See also displace d persons, immigration, IR Q regionalism 173 , 241; and Common wealth 155 ; in UN 160,252-4,267-8 ; in ECOSO C 286-9 0 passim Reid, Escott 25 , 233, 263,264, 291; and ICAO 66 ; an d U N Charter 245n , 262n; and U N secretary-general 26 1 relief and reconstructio n 79 , 181- 6 passim, 188 , 275 . See also Marshall Plan, mutual aid, UNRR A

346 Inde x Riddell, R.G. 30 8 Riddell, Walter 11 , 14 n Ritchie, Charles 25 , 197 Robertson, Norma n A . 25-6 , 47, 113 , 149, 181,186 , 234, 246n , 266, 291, 297-8; and Leagu e of Nations 14-15 ; on combined board s 40 ; and whea t agreements 90 ; at San Francisco 95 , 233-4; and German settlemen t 121 , 123; on economic relation s 180,184 , 185; on relation s wit h us 189-90 ; on international police force 233 ; as possible UN secretary-general 234 , 266 ; on U N 235, 254 ; on vet o 24 9 Romania 112 , 115 Roosevelt, Frankli n D. 34 , 165,166 , 179,189, 219; and Ogdensburg 23-4 ; at Quebec Conferenc e 24 ; on Com bined Chief s of Staff Committe e 30 ; on membershi p o f Policy Commit tee 37 ; and UNRR A 45 , 145 ; and Ho t Springs Conference 48-9 ; an d Evia n Conference 96 ; and continenta l defence 163 , 164,194 ; and territorial waters 173 ; and atomi c energy 198 , 202; an d collective security 20 9 Rousseau, Jean-Jacque s 77- 8 Rowell, Newton 9 4 Royal Canadian Ai r Force 23 , 109 , 17 5 Royal Commission o n National Deve lopment i n the Arts, Letters , and Sciences 27 9 St Laurent, Loui s 58 , 78, 88 , 215, 231 , 257, 267; and USS R 93 ; on sover eignty 94 ; on occupation force s 110 , 110-11; and opposition representa tion at Paris Conference 113 ; on German settlement 120,121 ; on trade wit h Japan 131 ; on whea t exports 181 ; on postwa r foreign

policy 195 ; on U N vet o 249 ; a t UN 251 , 308 ; o n Arcti c 288 ; o n international organizatio n 30 0 St Lawrence seawa y 17 9 St Pierre 24 , 68 , 16 4 San Francisco se e United Nation s Conference o n International Organization sanctions 11-12,14 , 245 Senate Standin g Committee o n Immigration and Labou r 10 0 Sharman, C.H.L . 28 7 Sicily 23 0 Sinclair, Adelaide 86 n Sinclair, Sir Archibald 6 2 Singapore 15 1 Six Nations Indian s 1 0 Skelton, O.D . 9 , 13-14 , 19 , 229 Smuts, Ja n Christian 143 , 153 , 202 , 245, 246 Social Credit part y 59 , 97 South Afric a 147 , 216 , 244 , 267 sovereignty 94,172,173,174,193,194 , 201,238 Spain 12 , 255, 301 State, Department of (us ) 173 , 187 , 190, 211 , 230-1, 234, 271 ; attitudes of to Canada 92 , 179-80 , 187 , 190 ; andiTO 28 2 Sudan 11 6 Suez Canal 15 6 Sunday Times (London ) 15 3 supreme commande r fo r the allied powers [SCAP ] 127 , 128 , 129,13 0 Sweden 25 5 Switzerland 25 5 Symington, H.J . 31,6 6 Toronto Globe and Mail 7 3 Towers, Graham 23 2 Trail Smelter 20 1

347 Inde x Trans-Canada Ai r Lines 62 , 63, 66 Transport, Departmen t o f 17 5 Treaties: Versaille s (1919 ) 20 , 61, 112 , 131, 271 ; Anglo-Japanese 5 ; for postwar Europe 112-16 ; with Japan 131; o f Washington (1871 ) 13 8 Trieste 115,15 0 Truman, Harr y S. 131 , 174 , 181-2 , 204 ; on relation s wit h Canada 179 ; on atomic energ y 20 7 Turcotte, Edmon d 27 9 Turgeon, J.G . 9 8 Turkey 9 1 Tweedsmuir, Lor d 6 9 Ukraine 99 , 255 Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] 144 , 145 , 171 , 231 , 234 , 297 , 301; diplomatic links with 24 ; and UNRRA 34-4 4 passim; and mutua l aid/credits to 81 , 91; and Atlanti c economies 92n ; and refugees 98,99 , 103; and peace settlement s 108,115 , 119-22 passim; and Arctic 172,205 , 288; espionage o f 196-7 , 204-5 , 210 , 214-15, 217 ; and U N 235, 252, 254, 256, 306 , 307 ; an d U N Securit y Council 243 , 250 , 263 ; an d UN veto 237 , 238, 249; and U N membership 255 ; and U N secretarygeneral 261 ; and ECOSO C 272 ; and ILO 276 ; and huma n right s 29 3 United Kingdo m [UK ] 159 , 238 ; an d UNRRA 34-4 4 passim; wartime aid to 80-2 ; post-UNRR A relief to 83-5 , 87-94; wheat agreements wit h 89-90 ; and positio n o f lesser power s in peac e settlement 108 ; an d Commonwealt h 144, 145 ; and Commonwealth com mon voic e 145-5 1 passim; pres s opinion in on Commonwealt h 148 ,

153-4; an d Commonwealth defenc e 154-6; economic relation s wit h 184-5; and atomi c energy 197-22 5 passim. Se e also Nort h Atlanti c triangle United Nations 139 , 299 ; AngloAmerican monopol y o f 36-7 ; western approache s t o 47-8 ; ICA O conference a s pattern for 71 ; and functionalism 72-3 , 235-8; and post UNRRA relief 85-6 ; an d immigration 95; obligations of membership i n 104; and peacemakin g 108 , 123 , 135-6 ; and independen t municipalitie s 115; and Italian colonies 116-18 ; Com monwealth sea t i n 148 ; and Canada us defenc e co-operatio n 173 ; and multilateral diplomacy 189 ; an d atomic energy 207 , 208, 211 , 214 ; secretary-general o f 234 , 260-1 , 264 , 266, 273, 285-6 ; composition o f Canadian delegation s t o 247n ; mem bership of 255-6 ; secretariat of 260-1,263,283,285,293; site of 264-5; election s t o 265-8 ; and human right s 291- 5 passim; specialized agencies o f 269 , 273, 274, 275-86 - Charte r 229-68 , 273, 278, 306 ; Article 2 (7) 256-7 ; Article s 5 and 6 255-6 ; Article 23 251-2 , 266; Article 32 251 ; Articl e 43 250-1 ; Article 44 250-1 ; Articles 5 land 5 3 253-4 ; Article 92 258 ; Article s 100 and 101 260 ; Article s 10 4 and 10 5 260 ; Article 10 9 254- 5 - Economi c and Social Council [ECOSOC ] 32-3,94,161,236,257,263,266,267, 269-95 passim, 305, 306 ; an d refugees 98 , 103 ; an d functionalis m and regionalis m 287-9 0 passim

348 Inde x - Genera l Assembl y 231,236,248 , 274, 275 , 280, 284, 285 - Securit y Council 67,160,161,236-7 5 passim; and Commonwealth 146 ; and vet o 235-5 0 passim; Chapter vi 251 ; Canadian seat on 265- 6 United Nations Atomic Energy Com mission 208-9 , 214, 215, 224 , 266 United Nations Commission fo r Europe 108 , 109,11 8 United Nations Commission o n Human Rights 29 2 United Nations Conference o n Food and Agriculture (Ho t Springs 1943) 45 , 47-52, 229, 276 United Nations Conferenc e o n International Organization (San Francisc o 1945) 3,145 , 151n , 190 , 229-6 7 passim, 283, 291,305 , 306 United Nations Conference o n Trad e and Developmen t [UNCTAD ] 30 5 United Nations Conferenc e on Trad e and Employment 28 2 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultura l Organization [UNESCO ] 278-9 United Nations High Commissioner fo r Refugees 102- 3 United Nations Internationa l Children' s Emergency Fun d 85-6 , 99 United Nations Korea n Reconstructio n Agency 8 6 United Nations Monetar y an d Financia l Conference (Bretto n Woods 1944 ) 33, 52-60, 68 , 145 , 191 , 229 , 233, 244, 271-2 United Nation s Relie f and Rehabilitation Administratio n [UNRRA ] 32 , 87 , 104, 132 , 178 , 233 , 272 , 306; formation of 33-44 ; an d functiona l repre -

sentation 35-6 , 72 , 190 , 288 ; American domination o f 45 ; public support for 82-3 ; dissolution of 84-5; and refugees 95 , 98; and Commonwealth representatio n i n 145 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 8 6 United Nations War Crimes Commis sion 133- 4 United States [us ] 144 , 145,147 , 301 ; and IL O 19 ; and Pacifi c war 23 ; defence co-operation with 23-4 , 32 , 163-77 passim, 193, 288 ; and UNRR A 34-44 passim; attitudes t o UN 45-7; New Dealer s i n 54 , 67, 271; and civil aviation 63-7 1 passim; and post UNRRA relie f 83-5 ; refugees t o 100 ; and Japanese settlemen t 126-3 2 passim; and Commonwealth 143,145 ; changing relations with 159-9 5 passim; wartime economic co-operatio n with 166-70 ; an d territoria l waters 173-4; economic relation s with 175-6, 178-8 7 passim, 192-3 ; and atomic energy 197-22 5 passim; and UN Charter 229-6 8 passim; an d human right s 291- 5 passim; as surrogate UN 307. See also Nort h Atlantic triangle Universal Declaration o f Human Rights 291,292,29 3 Universal Postal Unio n 70 , 280 uranium 196,197,198 , 202, 204, 212 , 216, 224n Vandenberg, Arthu r H. 83 , 222, 246, 281 Vietnam 67 , 192 Vyshinsky, A.Y. 9 9

349 Inde x Wallace, Henry 6 4 war crimes 133- 4 War Production Board (us ) 168 , 179 Warsaw pact 29 9 Wartime Information Board 24 5 Washington Conferenc e (1945 ) 204-9 , 211 Washington Declaratio n o n Atomic Energy (1945 ) 19 6 Webster, Sir Charles 24In , 252n Wedemeyer, A.C. 12 5 Welles, Sumner 14 5 Western European Unio n 121,123 , 184,195 wheat 89-90 , 181- 2 White, Harry 55 , 56 Wilgress, E. Dana 107,113 , 185 , 187 , 263, 281 Wilson, J.A . 6 6 Wilson, Woodro w 9 , 222 World Federation of Trade Union s 27 6 World Health Organizatio n 279-80 , 289, 290

World Jewish Council 256- 7 World Meteorological Organization 28 0 Wrong, Hume 13 , 25, 93, 95, 187 , 221, 245n, 297-8 , 306, 308 ; prewa r attitudes of 15 , 16-19, 299-300; on postwar planning 26 , 107 , 232; on functionalism 35 , 71, 72; approach of to UN 47-8; and occupatio n forces in Europe 109 ; on us rol e in Japanese settlement 126 ; on ER P 181,182-3; and atomic energy 215 ; on inter national police force 233 , 234 ; on Dumbarton Oak s 238 , 238-9 ; on Security Council 239 , 242; on dis armament 243 ; and collective security 254 , 271 ; on Chin a 255n ; an d UN 256 , 257; on windin g up of League of Nations 265 ; on ECOSO C 272; on specialize d agencies 283 ; on human rights 29 1 Yalta 107 , 255, 261 Yugoslavia 114 , 115 , 26 1