The Shan of Burma: Memoirs of a Shan Exile 9971988623

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THE SHAN OF BURMA Memoirs of a Shan Fxile

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the multi-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The I restitute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce and professional and civic organizations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations, it is chaired by the Director, the institute's chief academic and administrative officer. The Oral History Programme of the Institute commenced in 1972. Eight years later it was subsumed under the wider rubric of "Local History and Memoirs". This has not only allowed for greater scope and flexibility, but also better reflected the Institute's real interest in the area. As in the case of the Oral History Programme, the emphasis has continued to be on the collection and publication of reminiscences, recollections, and memoirs of those who have participated in the history and development of the region generally, or in a particular event.

THE SHAN OF BURMA Memoirs of a Shan Exile

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe (alias Eugene Thaike)

Local History and Memoirs

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Hong Mui Kong Terrace Pasir Padang Singapore O511 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, 01' transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

© 1987 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author, and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect oNe views or iNe policy of oNe Institute or its supporters.

Cover photographs (from left to right): Shan United Army recruits attending a class, Saw Yanda, and Yawnghwe Hall. Photographs on Yawnghwe Palace (cover and page 4) and the Shan United Army (cover and page 28) were reproduced with the kind permission of Bertil Lintner.

Cataloguing in Publication Data l u l l

I

Tzang Yawnghwe, Chao (Eugene Thaike) The Shan of Burma: Memoirs of a Shan Exile. I- Shan State -- Politics and government. 2. Shan State -- History. 3. Shan. I.

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

II. Title. DS530.8 S45C46

1987

ISBN 9971-988-62-3 Printed in Singapore by Kef ford Press

Contents

Acknowledgements Preface

vii viii

PART ONE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION

1

I

3 3

A NATIVE OF THE SHAN HILLS

The Early Years Answering the Call Against the Dark Tide

PART TWO: SHIN-BURMESE RELATIONS II

ul

AN OVERVIEW OF SPAN-BURMESE RELATIONS

45

47

Politics in Burma

47

Shan State Politics and the Opium Question

53

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SHAN~BURMESE RELATIONS

Shan or Tai Nationalism and the Burmese Centre The Upsurge of Shan Nationalism and the British Annexation

The Shan Under the British Umbrella World War II: A New Set of Circumstances IV

11

24

SHAN-BURMESE RELATIONS FROM 1948 The Spirit of Penglong and the Union

Shan~Burmese Co-operation During the First Decade The Military and the Shan The Shan Resistance: Trials and Ordeals

63 63 70 77 83

96 96

101 110 121

The Restoration of Peace and Stability in Burma and the Shan State

137

PAFIT THREE: WHO'S WHO iN SHAN STATE

153

V

155

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PEFISONALITIES

(A personal perspective)

vi

Contents APPENDICES

Appendix I

Appendix II

253 Historic Decisions and Agreements Prior to Independence Shan Proposals to Terminate the

Opium Trade in the Shan State

Appendix Ill

253

-- Notes on the Film, Opium Warlords

261

264

ABBREVIATE:ONS GLOSSARY

269 271

BIBLIOGRAPHY

273

Acknowledgements

For a person such as myself whose l i f e has been eventful, born i n the midst of p o l i t i c a l turmoil which s t i l l

having been

rages on in my

homeland, the debt of gratitute I have accumulated from the people I have come across

--

fortunate

needless t o

is

indeed overwhelming.

say,

for

me and unfortunate Everyone I

for

them

-'-

have met i n

Thailand and particularly i n Chiangmai has not only been courteous and

kind, but generous and compassionate. t o all

I am, as such, humbly grateful

and deeply regret that I am unable t o l i s t all their names.

I would, however, l i k e assistance

in

the

t o c i t e some of those who have provided

writing

of

this

book:

M.R.

Dr

Sukhumbhand

Paribatra, and Mrs Piensuvan Nakpreecha, for their most valuable help;

Dr K of Chiangmai, a scholar and a man of a l l seasons, who has been not only a great teacher but an inspiring example as w e l l ; Mr Ber t i l Lintner, me

a serious student of p o l i t i c s

books

and materials

on

Burma

and history, and

for kindly lending

providing

photographs;

Mrs

Frederika Scollard and a friend for editing and correcting my a l l too

numerous errors i n grammar and composition; Nu Nu Myint Yawnghwe, for making

numerous

trips

to

photocopies, and generally

buy

stationary

supplies

keeping things i n order;

and

to

make

Khufu Kya Nu, a

long-time colleague and friend for checking out f acts and dates; and

the Director

of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore,

Professor K.S. Sandhu for h i s encouragement and support. And 1 ast,

but

not

the

Menges, of ATV, London, for

world, poor

at great

peasants of

risk

least,

Mr Adrian

Cowell

and Mr Chris

bringing t o the attention of the outside

t o their well-being,

the Shan State

with i t s

the tragic plight of the anarchy

made l i f e for them meaningless and devoid of hope.

and war which has

Preface

Shan State tratively,

in

Burma today has i t s

there

is

a Northern

capital

at

and Southern Shan State

capitals at Lashio and Taunggyi respectively. Mao

kingdom

around

principalities or

the

states,

Taunggyi.

Adminisw i t h their

At the time of the Tai

twelfth

century,

there

were

nine

Shan

seven of

which are in present- day Burma.

Although the British were i n the Shan area by the l a t e 1800s i t only

in

1922 that

they

Federated Shan States

grouped the

.

Shan principalities

was

into

the

Shan State has generally been out of bounds to foreign v i s i t o r s since the military coup of 1962. The few places open include Taunggyi and the Inle Lake of Yawnghwe. Shan State p o l i t i c s narcotics

given

armies,

the

political,

current and

Given the situation where accounts of

are sensationalized drug

trafficking,

paucity

of

historical

warlords I

felt

of opium wars,

and opium kings,

knowledge regarding

realities,

inadequacy, that I should try

with reports

and

socio~economic,

despite

feelings

of

to f i l l the information gap w i t h respect

t o not only the Shan, but the p o l i t i c s

of Burma as w e l l .

I am not a

scholar. My problem was compounded in that books dealing directly w i t h the

Shan and their homeland are few.

Moreover, except for Chao Sairnong

Mangrai's The Shan Stat.e and B r i t i s h Annexation (1965), none deal with politics.

Of course, a l l

historians

as Hall

(1967),

Htin

Silverstein

Aung (1977),

of Burma by such distinguished

(1950),

Harvey

(1967),

Maung Maung Pye (1951),

(1925),

Christian

(1945), Trager

Tinker (1966),

and Steinberg (1982) do contain references to the

Shan and Shan States.

Burma, one i s

histories

However, in the parts

able t o perceive,

it

dealing with post-l948

seems, the reluctance

of

these

scholars to dig t00 deeply into areas which would offend the powers

ix

Pref ace that be i n Rangoon. almost

imagine

against

In reading some of these works on Burma, one can

these

otherwise

scholarly

the non-Burmese, especially

Burmese) for

writers

muttering

the Shan Chaos a ( o r

curses

Sawbwa, in

surly opposition to Burmese leaders nobly engaged i n the

task of nation-building.

I

feel

that the greatest

f l a w i n current

works dealing with

post-1948 Burma i s the confusion over the term "nation-building" general,

and more s p e c i f i c a l l y ,

its

connotation

within

the

in

inter-

nationa1 ly recognized political perimeter

known as Burma, which, i n

r e a l i t y i s a composite of many homelands.

That i s , i t i s composed of

the homeland of the Burmese, a broad plain lying on both sides of the

Irrawaddy River that flows into the sea between the Gulf of Martaban and the Bay of

Bengal; and surrounding

this

Burmese plain

in

an

elevated horseshoe (comprising 60 per cent of the total land area of

are

Burma)

Tai/Thai,

the

homelands

of

the

Arakan,

Chin,

Kachin,

Shan

or

Karenni, and Karen.

Although the Burn an or Burmese are more numerous, the non-Burmese ethnic groups constitute collectively quite a large minority.

Census

taking i n independent Burma has strong political overtones i n addition t o obvious flaws such as the lack of trained personnel, the state of war, lack of roads and communications infrastructure. be i n the interest

of Rangoon t o deflate

figures

Kachin, and t o i n f l a t e the Burmese population.

It

for

appears t o

Shan, Karen,

For example, the Tai

or Shan population was 1.6 m i l l i o n i n 1973 as compared t o 1.3 m i l l i o n

i n 1931 ( a n increase of only 0.3 million within 42 years), whereas the Burmese population reportedly increased from 10 t o 20 m i l l i o n i n the same period.

Moreover, both British (1931) and Burmese authorities

(1973) included i n Burmese figures substantial

numbers of Shan, Mon,

Karen, Chin, and others who dwelt i n Burma Proper. counted

as Burmese, much

example, claims

to

their

displeasure.

the government of Kawthoolei

there

are roughly

The Arakanese were Finally,

(Karen nationalist

as

an

movement)

seven m i l l i o n Karen even though

Burmese

authorities f i e r c e l y dispute t h i s figure.

Taking into account the geographic and demographic f actors and

even

ignoring

the

complex political

and historical

circumstances

Pref ace

x

shaping these ethnic entities, i t must be recognized that the task of nation-building

i n Burma i s not easy as i t requires great wisdom and

--

statesmanship which flashed

alas, too b r i e f l y

Aung San, Burma's George Washington. is,

then,

nation-building

nationalist,

in

and covers

the

--

i n the person of

The subject of this monograph

Burma from the

viewpoint

of

a Shan

relationship between the Shan and the

various Burmese centres of power from the Pagan period (1044-1257)

to

the 1980s. I

write

on

those

few

momentous

and

dynamic

years

before

independence (1945-48) without recourse to important primary sources

--

that i s , participants

Shan p o l i t i c s following

who played important roles then, and also i n

and administration

reasons.

At present

up t o 1962. I

This

is

so for

the

cannot return t o the Shan State;

also, the voices of these men have been silenced, some by death, but the majority political

struggle.

convictions, wilderness

by the f act of their being on the "wrong" side of the but

--

As

such,

they

not

only

suffered

for

have since the coup of 1962 been cast

becoming

a

"lost

and

silent

their

into

the

of

Shan

generation"

leaders. Nonetheless,

(1963-76),

though I

and though I

was involved i n the Shan rebel

lack

academic

qualifications,

movement

as well

access to primary sources, I w i l l try my best t o be f actual.

as

Though

footnotes t o documents w i l l be scanty, what I put down as f acts can be checked by anyone who cares t o speak t o and question any knowledgeable

native of Burma or

the

t r e a d i n g on uncertain

been

thus

I

am f u l l y aware that

I

am

ground because I am dealing mostly w i t h l i v i n g

history, the realities not

Shan State.

of which have not become f acts sin ce they have

anointed

between

covers

of

published

books

by

established scholars. In first

keeping therefore par t

nationalist

of

my

with

monograph

such circumstances, I relate

my

involvement

shall in

i n the

the

Shan

movement which, I hope, w i l l give the readers a feel for

the forces and events shaping the l i f e and the thoughts of one man, a native

o f the Shan h i l l s

--

wine before the main meal.

rather l i k e serving

a few glasses of Shan

Pref ace

xi

One more word in conclusion to this introduction:

I do not claim

that i n the Shan struggle to preserve their identity and rights

as a

nation which has since the late 1950s taken the form of open warfare

--

as i t

Shan.

d i d before 1885

--

that Right i s always on the side of the

At any rate, in p o l i t i c s , Right i s seldom Might.

In other

words, those powerful and ruthless enough w i l l have no difficulty in achieving what they roughshod

over

want, i n committing grave injustices,

truth.

triumphs over Right.

Fortune, problems.

is

Nowadays,

no matter

what,

However, one must not forget

but

in

the

end,

or riding

Might

usually

that Might, l i k e

not

only

fickle,

After

all,

the embracing of Might i s but a r e j e c t i o n

only

creates more of

Wisdom, and, stupidity gets no one anywhere.

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe (Eugene Thaike)

Chiangmai 1984

1

PART ONE AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 1NTR0DUCT1ON

1

A Native of the Shan Hills

The Early years I

was born i n 1939 i n

British

flag,

in

the Federated Shan States,

a princely

Yawnghwe Palace).

manor

--

the

Yawnghwe Haw (Shan for

My b i r t h took pi ace i n

a temporary hut

northern garden of the palace, b u i l t specifically

was customary among Shan ruling f amities.

then under the i n the

for child-birth1

as

My earliest memories are of

World War II,

of delicious Japanese rice-cakes, bespectacled Japanese

officers

long swords and shining boots,

being

with

carried

shelters,

by

adults

in

the

dark

of

arid looks of fear and uncertainty

balmy days i n

the I n l e Lake,

sounds of

night

to

aeroplanes,

ear therm bomb-

on adult Faces.

Then, the

and always on the move, we children

enjoyed running across green and fragrant pad bamboo groves, and swimming i n the lake.

f i e l d s , hiding i n cool Japanese soldiers

of ten

appeared, but so did, I recall v i v i d l y , two men with blue eyes and red hair

clad

in

green

(in

contrast

to the dusty yellow of

They were, we were told, men belonging to the Maha-mate

uniforms).

army, that i s , the A l l i e d forces. taste of cheese and chocolates,

photographs Mussolini,

and

coloured

We enjoyed the strange texture and and pored over magazines f i l l e d with

cartoons

(mostly

caricatures

of

Hitler,

and Tojo) brought by these strangers.

When the war ended, we children

relatives

Japanese

travelled

with my mother and

from Yawnghwe to Hsenwi, her hometown ( a distance of 200

m i l e s by c a r ) . 2

On the way, we saw for

the f i r s t time men who were

blacker than the Kula ( I n d i a n s ) , whose teeth shone in their dark f aces

l i k e half moons i n the starless told),

of

night.

Men of

importance (we were

different races came and went, many staying

Yawnghwe Haw.3

for

days at

We, l i k e the adults around us, were greatly amused at

seeing Burmese men in sarongs and pink silken caps perched daintily on

4

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe Wu

_.,

Yawnghwe Haw, where I was born. (18611-85)

.....

.

1 u-~4=.

was built b y Sir Chao Mawng, the Chaofla of` Yawnghwe

It

and my grand-uncle (lB97-1927).

It

is

the only Shan Palace not destroyed in

World World II.

their heads since men in the Shan State always wore Shan trousers similar

to

Chinese

We were also

ones.

a town called

taken to

Panglong, where two very important and h i s t o r i c

--

conferences were held

r e s u l t i n g i n the Pang long Agreement of 1947 which shaped and changed But as children we noticed only the s t a l l s

the course of our history.

selling cooked food and toys; the nightly entertainments ( a t - p w e or Burmese tattooed (pillow

opera, all

movies,

by

dances

black doing fierce

fights,

sack

h i l l tribe

Shan men events

sword dances); the sporting

climbing

races,

performers,

the

greased

pole,

football

matches); and gambling booths offering games t o suit every pocket and

taste. Around the age of

six,

I

was sent with my elder

brother

to a

Roman Catholic convent in Kalaw (Loi Ann in Shan), but we contracted

typhoid

and came home

in

an

ambulance.

We recovered

and were

5

A Native of the Shan H i l l s

dispatched to the far north to Hsenwi, again as boarders at a convent. At one time my father, Chao Shwe Thaike, while President of the Union of Burma, came on tour to Hsenwi, where he also attended the wedding

of

h i s eldest son.4

waved l i t t l e

flags

We stood in line with other

school children,

as the motorcade passed, and later

joined

the

family at Hsenwi Haw. Due to a congenital heart defect, I was not allowed to fly,5 and was l e f t at Hsenwi when my older family from Maymyo

vacation) lasting

(where

to Rangoon.

we

brother f 1 ew with the rest

joined

the

family

the

summer

While at Hsenwi, I was caught in a battle

two days between Kachin mutineers

Kachin battalions

during

of the

of

loyal to the government.7

Captain Naw Serge and

It was a confusing period

f i l l e d with run ours and movements of armed men.

My uncle, Chao Hom

Pha, the Prince of Hsenwi, was at one time abducted by Naw Song, which caused great excitement among his subjects.8 There was fighting everywhere, and i t that every male adult was a soldier

seemed to me at the time

of some sort.9

I was then l i v i n g

with different r e l a t i v e s , passing from one family to the next, l i k e an

orphaned c h i l d ,

and moving from town to

town.

Finally, perhaps i n

l95Q, I rejoined my family i n Rangoon, no longer a nomadic orphan, but

as one of the sons of the Union President. Although

my

father's

term

as

President

ended

services were retained by U Nu's AFPFL ( A n t i - F a s c i s t League)

government,10

Upper Chamber of family moved into

growing

friends senior

Burma's unicameral Parliament), our

his

Peoples{ Freedom

schoolboy servants,

up to 1960.

own house which had formerly belonged

--

school,

(from among children

civil

1952,

as Speaker of the House of Nationalities (the

Indian tycoon,11 on Kokine Road, Rangoon. any

in

My to an

My days were l i k e those of

homework, play,

of ministers,

"boy

scouting",

top military o f f i c i a l s ,

prominent - p o l i t i c i a n s ,

wealthy

merchants,

aristocratic landowners, and so forth from the Methodist English High School,l2 considered exclusive,

and the best i n Burma).

I matriculated at 18, and enrol led at Rangoon University i n 1957.

In this institution with i t s p o l i t i c a l tradition, which had nurtured

nationalist leaders such as Aung San, U Nu, Ba Swe, Kyaw Nye in, I was

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe

6

introduced to p o l i t i c s .

Here, I met people who vehemently opposed the

government and who could talk about nothing but the armed overthrow of

--

capitalism

seditious but exciting for one who was keen on history,

and had v i s i t e d Mao's China when the family Premier

Zhou Enlai

The private

(Chou En-1ai).

People's Republic

of

was invited

China ( A p r i l

family

and May 1957),

to do so by tour of the

the meeting with

legendary revolutionaries 3 who figured so prominently i n Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China, as well as the seeming happiness and buoyancy of

the people under communism,l4 not surprisingly thought.

It

gave me much food for

impressed on me that oppression and exploitation

of the

humble and poor were very wrong and inhumane. It

was at Rangoon University

that I f i r s t met other young Shan,

and got to know personally Kachin, Karen, Mon, Arakanese, Chin, and

other students. their

Burmese

distrusted

The more vocal and outgoing ones were as p o l i t i c a l as counterparts

Burmese

though

intentions

domination and subjugation

that

all

evil,

less

which

of

other

anti-government,

they

perceived

ethnic

groups.

to

but

all

be Burmese

Noticeable was

these young non-Burmese regarded communism as the ultimate

and thus

shunned or

avoided the Rangoon University

Students

Union leaders and a c t i v i s t s who professed Marxism, and allegedly had contacts with secret communist c e l l s in Rangoon, Having gained friends touring

as

much

of

the

from my homeland, I began, every summer, Shan

State

as

motorcycles, local buses, bullock carts, in

monasteries

acquaintances.

atrocities

or

homes

of

I

friends,

On these exploratory

disappearance

questioning

of

people,

--

and on foot;

travelling

I

and

casual

of ten heard t a l e s

villages beating

razed,

and

on

and putting up

relatives,

trips,

involving Burmese soldiers:

looting,

could

of

wholesale

torture

under

about secret arms caches, molestation and rapes, shooting

of l i v e s t o c k and poultry, and wanton k i l l i n g s . My involvement i n the p o l i t i c s

deepened when my mother, (Member

of

Parliament)

1956.15

Thereafter

A11 day

and for

of national

the Mahadevi of

of

the

Yawnghwe was elected MP

Lower House (Deputies)

home became a p o l i t i c a l

half

the

awakening was further

night

people

for

headquarters

ranging

Hsenwi of

in

sor t s .

from Shan chaos a

7

A Native of the Share H i l l s (princes),

to MPs and other political

other ethnic

leaders

(Burmese, Shan, and

groups), Shan monks, and student leaders drifted i n and

out. It

was my father,

the

mother to enter p o l i t i c s . Burmese disregard

for

Yawnghwe prince

who had encouraged my

He was very much disturbed by the apparent

the Shan State government and Shan autonomy.16

Burmese soldiers acted i n a manner that made the natives see them as a predatory today).

foreign occupation force (which seems to be s t i l l the case But since my father was a l s o the Speaker of the Upper House,

he could not directly i n t e r f e r e . having Buddhist texts move

which

revolution

He therefore de;/oted h i s energy t o

translated

"Shan-ized"

and resulted

from Burmanized P a l i

Buddhism.

It

i n the revival

catalyzed

t o Shan

a

-- a

mini-cultural

of Shan l i t e r a t u r e which i n

turn increased national awareness and a c t i v i t i e s . I

was swept along by the

myself

initially

as a shy and nervous par t i c i p a n t .

m i l i t a r y takeover

(1958) when sever'al

Shan resistance organization

leaders dropped out

nationalism high on campus.l8

I

--

the f i r s t

a c t i v i s t s 17 from

and the remaining student

worked at keeping the s p i r i t

of

I was not only successful i n t h i s t a s k ,

was by 1961 able to unite

associations

nationalism,

the Noom Suk Harm, the f i r s t

at the border,

i n fear,

of

But after

Shan student

the u n i v e r s i t y went underground t o j o i n

but

r i s i n g tide

all

on-campus non-Burmese student

Kachin, Karen, Arakan, Pa-0, Karenni, Chin, and Shan

~ - under the wing of the Nationalities

Students United Front which was

as powerful as the Rangoon University Students Union. While thus engaged on campus, I established clandestine contacts w i t h both the Sharm and Karen movements, of ten s l i p p i n g

to

meet

their

retrospect,

It

leaders.19

of dubious value.

was

a dangerous

i n t o the jungle

venture

and,

in

However, being young and f i r e d with

zeal and patriotism, I did not rose much sleep over the r i s k

I was

taking. After the head of the Burma Army, General Ne Win, was i n v i t e d i n 1958 by th e then Prime Minister U Nu t o take over power, the m i l i t a r y r e a l l y got down to,

in its

own unique s t y l e , r e s t o r i n g s t a b i l i t y and

law i n Shan State.

Units were sent into the countryside to clear the

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe

Chao Kyaw Toon, hero of the battle of Tangyan in 1959.

This picture was taken at Camp Pang

Tong (1960).

whole

region

rebellion

and

of

rebels,

foreign

secession. 20

This

intruders,

vigorous

those

and

exercise21 t o

planning

restore

s t a b i l i t y resulted instead i n an armed uprising i n which Shan rebels captured the town of Tangyan i n 1959,22 retreating only after about a week of f i e r c e fighting

and intense strafing by the Burma Air Force.

Though the Burma Army won the battle, the rebellion smouldered on i n the form of small armed bands scattered $1 l over the Shan country.23 This development put

Shan

State,

the

Shan

--

those directly responsible

civil

administration,

the

the Head of

chaof a,

MPs,

p o l i t i c i a n s , and Shan p o l i t i c a l par t i e s in an awkward position.

anything

concerned with the military and defence was beyond their

jurisdiction, they became mere on-lookers. that

Since

What was most worrying was

the numerous military sweeps were alienating

the bulk of the

rural population. If

peace and s t a b i l i t y

rebellion nipped before i t that

the

Shan

Shan State were to be restored

and

developed into anything threatening, i t was

imperative that some control meant

in

be imposed on the Burmese m i l i t a r y which

government

should

be

given

more

power.

Responsible Shan leaders reasoned that i f more power was vested i n the

Shan government under a genuinely federal

arrangerr\ent,24 rlationaTist

A Native of the Shan H i ] 1 s extremists Besides,

would

the

lose

9 whatever

correction

of

support

imbalances

they

in

hitherto

enjoyed.

the hastily25 drawn 1948

constitution would, Shan leaders reasoned, remove all

serious f r i c t i o n

w i t h i n the Union and thu s strengthen unity.26

These thoughts and ideas took on a more concrete form after the general election

of 1960 i n which a l l

as pro-military

throughout

form of

a proposal

movement

the Union were defeated.

victory

at

the p o l l s

the

This took the

an anti-dictatorship

(on

for reform of the Union constitution. as

seen

by the Shan State government t o U Nu whose party

had won a landslide platform),

par t i e s and personalities

Karenni

government,

It

as well

as

i n time became a the

Kachin,

Mon,

Akrakanese, Chin, and Karen leaders and parties expressed support.

Needless

to

say,

the

constitutional

imagination of a l l classes i n Shan State.

movement

captured

the

I attended several meetings

organized by the Shan government at Taunggyi to explain the movement's

aims, and i n 1961, I even persuaded delegates of the Shan literary and cultural seminar t o march' around the town i n support of the proposal

L i k e everyone else then, I believed that with the

f o r federation. 27 rejection

by

voters

tendencies, whatever c o n f l i c t the

non-Burmese

democratic

the

throughout

would

in

Union

of

anti-democratic

there was between the Burmese centre and time

be

resolved

through

peaceful

give-and-take.

However, t h i s

was not t o be.

I was rudely

awakened at about 4

a.m. on the morning of 2 March 1962, by sounds of gunfire,

first

and

but growing louder

as I

grew more awake.

directly outside the home, and b u l l e t s

f a i n t l y at

The gunfire

was

smashed through window panes

and frames, thudded against or ricocheted off w a l l s .

A m i l i t a r y unit

had crept up t o our home in the dark, and surrounding i t on two sides, had

opened

f i r e . 28

seventeen years

My

the

brother,

Chao Mee who was

only

o l d was k i l l e d " w h i l e r e s i s t i n g the armed forces

i t s performance of duty", Amidst

younger

smell

Thaike, who was former

in

according t o the authorities concerned.29

of

cordite,

the

Union President,

House, and MP (Upper House) for

Yawnghwe prince,

Chao Shwe

twice Speaker of

the Upper

Yawnghwe, was taken away at bayonet

point and put i n an army van that morning before the r i g h t of dawn.30

4

10

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe

That was the last received

time I saw my father.

a phone c a l l

One day i n november 1962, I

from a Major Their Shwe who said he was a

classmate of my elder s i s t e r ,

Chao Sanda. 31

He wished to meet me.

The Major took me to meet Colonel Levin, the head of the dreaded MIS ( M i l i t a r y Intelligence Service)

who informed me that "the President"

had expired i n j a i l . The meeting took place at Dagon House, a special meeting place for

top army brass and for

the reception

I was offered cigarettes (Benson

a

of foreign m i l i t a r y guests.

Hedges) and scotch and soda.

While

I sat there numbed by the news of my f o t h e r ' s death, wondering i f he had been tortured and f i n a l l y injected with some poison, the Major and h i s boss solemnly discussed, of a l l

Chinese Peoples Liberation

things,

Army (PLA)

the f i g h t i n g between the

and the Indian

Army at their

mutual border. The cremation of the Chaof a Luang (Shan for " s e n i o r " ) was held i n Yawnghwe town, drawing large crowds from far

the

Padaung with

their

long-necked women, Pa~0 men

of Yawnghwe and near

--

and women i n

traditional b l a c k , the Intha ( I n l e Lake dwellers) i n brown homespun,

the townspeople i n sombre clothes, and r e l a t i v e s in the white of royal mourning.

A couple of Burma Army men32 resplendent in green and red

bands on caps and tabs on c o l l a r s , coloured ribbons on chests, and gold insignias

on shoulders were there for

a while, and l e f t without

the usual pomp.

That year, 1962, I had another brush with shots fired in anger, again i n Rangoon.

on

military

usurpation of

Following the coup in March, feelings against the

campus

were

high

power by neo-Nazi

as

the

takeover

elements.

was

Aware of

seen this

as

an

the new

regime introduced new campus rules and regulations which resulted i n a series of student protests.

Ori 6 July, there was one such protest,

and the next day the police were sent i n . several

students,33

proceeded

to

close

Students Union all

Shots were f i r e d wounding

but the p o l i c e were chased out.

all

campus

gates,

hoisted

red

The students then banners

of

the

over the campus, made fiery speeches against the

m i l i t a r y , and declared the university

On the evening of 7 July,

a "fortress of democracy".

the regime unleashed i t s

soldiers,

I I

11

A Native of the Shan H i l l s

armed w i t h newly issued West German G-3 assault r i f l e s , against the student

body.

I

worked as tutor i n the Department of English,

and

that evening I found myself near the campus main gate (on my way home from the judo QW ). tutorial

class.

insults nearby

Many students

at the military ditch.

included,

When

ran.

f i r i n g ceased. fired.

I had stopped to t a l k to several students from my

were waving red banners and hurling

when a volley rang out. the

firing

stopped,

I jumped into a

those

Another v o l l e y was unleashed.

not

We h i t

hit,

myself

the d i r t .

The

We then started running again, and another volley was

And so i t went.

The m i l i t a r y declared that soldiers had had t o break up an unruly student mob, and maintained that minimum violence had been used.

sixteen

shots were f i r e d resulting, most unfortunately,

deaths.34

The university

--

Building

in

popularly regarded as a home away from home of the young

was flattened wounded

sixteen

was declared closed, and the Students Union

Aung San, Burma's Architect of Freedom, during h i s university throughout

Only

by demolition

the

capital.

students

It

were

days

--

charges, the sound of which was heard is

dumped

still into

widely this

believed

building

that dead and before

it

was

demolished.

The violence of 1962 heralded the supremacy of force, death of democracy and reason. but to answer the c a l l democracy.

This

I

I f e l t there was no other choice l e f t

to battle

did

in

and. the

April

--

for

the Shan, as well as

for

several

the

1963,

months

after

cremation of my father.

Answering the Can Before I proceed to give an account of my personal experiences i n the Shan nationalist

movement, I wish to f i r s t g i v e a very brief sketch of

the Shan. The peopl e known t o the outside world as the Shan, do not refer to themselves as such. like

their

original

brothers,

home was i n

The name they use for themselves i s " T a i " , the

Thai

or

Siamese,

south China covering

they b e l i e v e

the provinces

that

of

and

their

Sichuan

'H

12

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe

Yunnan,

(Szechuan),

Guizhou

Guangdong (Kwangtung) Chinese scholars, foundation.

--

a belief

(Kwangsi)

and

which i s dismissed by almost all

and Western ones too,

However, neither

Guangxi

(Kweichou),

as being without factual

the Shan nor Thai

because i f t h i s story of origin i s a f abrication,

should be blamed

i t was the invention

of Western scholars.

Before the coming of Westerners, the Shan or Tai

and their

the

brothers,

Lao,

northern

Thai

or

Tai~Ping

and

the

Tai-Ahom, a l l believed that they were descended from Khufu Lu and Khufu

Lai who came down from heaven on 1 adders o f , according to different chronicles, gold, silver, or iron.

In all chronicles there i s a story

of a servant of Khufu Lu and Khufu L a i , named Pang-ku, or Lang-ku, who tricked h i s masters into l e t t i n g him eat the head of the chicken sent from heaven, and as a result, he became the king of Muang Kae (China).

A very t a l l t a l e , scoffed Western scholars when they heard the story, and the natives, very much impressed by Western wonders and wisdom,

could not help but agree. why similarly fanciful others, Khufu

Somehow, they did not seem to have wondered

tales of Adam and Eve, Noah and his Ark, among

were not summarily dismissed by the West as was the story of

Lu

and

Khufu

Lai.

Perhaps

it

was

because

they

were

so

overawed.

Since a comprehensive research on the early history of the T a i speaking people (Shan, Thai or Siam, Lao, Tai-Ping or Khon Muong, Tai Chuang, Tai Chong, Thai Dam, White Thai, Tai Nua, Tai Mao, Tai Lue,

among others)

has yet to be under taken, all

that can be said about

the Tai or Thai i s that by the Tate twelfth century, they had evolved somehow into

kingdoms.

a people w i t h

and prowess

to

establish

At about t h i s time, c o i n c i d i n g w i t h increasing pressure of

the Mongol rulers established

enough s k i l l s

of China on the kingdom of Nanchao, the Tai had

various

kingdoms

near

the

southern rim

of

Nanchao.35

These were the Tai Ahom kingdom of Assam, the Shan kingdom of Ava, the

Tai Mao kingdom, the Lao kingdom of Lan-Chang, and i n present day Thailand,

the

kingdoms

of

Payao,

Chiang

Raj

(Tater

moved

to

Chi angrnai), and Sukhothai and the Shan kingdom at Martabar\.36 The Tai people

--

are

those

known as the

who constituted

"Shan"

--

the subject of t h i s paper

and established

the Tai Mao and Ava

A Native of the Shan H i l l s

13

kingdoms which had close connections and continuing relationships

with

Within the context of the history of Burma, i t w i l l

Burmese kingdoms.

be seen that there were then two Shan centres of power

--

Ava, and the

Tai Mao kingdom. with

deal

shal 1

I

the

of

detai i s

the

turbulent

and

long

relationship between the Shan and the Burmese i n the chapters to come. Here i t w i l l suffice to say that after the f a i l of the Shan kingdom of to

Ava

though without

a central

clung stubbornly all

in

focus

and splintered

subjugate

At times they

them.

Shan,

the

into p r i n c i p a l i t i e s ,

to their identity and independence.

Burmese moves to

and the

1555,

the Mao kingdom by the Chinese i n 1604,

of

destruction

Burinnong,

Burmese conqueror,

great

the

They resisted submitted to

strong or wise monarchs, but they rebelled whenever they could.

the B r i t i s h period37 since

The Shan enjoyed some peace during

However, following World War II

there was no Burmese centre of power.

there again appeared a Burmese centre of power which brought forefront the o l d question

to the

of the relationship between the Shan and

the Burmese. Though the B r i t i s h had blunted Shan n a t i o n a l i s t

allowing them to slumber i n a pastoral

idyll cut off

sentiments

by

from the whole

world, World War II with i t s marching armies of various n a t i o n a l i t i e s ,

f i r e and death from the skies, and stirring c a l l to arms by both the and Japanese protagonists

Allied

them to the perils the desire

since

order* of the day

--

awoke the Shan nation,

rousing

of trust and dependency on external powers.

And

to be f r e e , to be the master of o n e ' s f ate was the

--

from the Gulf of Tonkin to the Suez Cana] and even

beyond - - the Shan were natut"a11y no less affected than the Burmese by t h i s flame. Thus with the lowering of the Union Jack, the stage was set for a continuation Burmese

of the struggle

centre,

especially

greater

control

of

Shan awakening.

imperatives

"regained"

the Shan tributary; and the Shan, for

their destiny.

pulling

for

between two national

- - the

possessions ,38

greater

control of

Thus, I was born a Shan and Hved in the period of I saw, heard and experienced

i n opposite directions.

I

the drama of two forces

was drawn 1Ike thousands of my

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe

14

compatriots into a Shan-Burmese struggle similar to, or a continuation o f , the kind which had existed during the days of my grandfather,

and

further beyond.

It

was towards the end of April 1963, that I found myself i n a

jungle

camp of

Army)39

--

the 4th Battalion,

really

multi-coloured

a

couple

plastic

sheets.

of

SSIA (Shan State Independence

Team-tos

roofed

with

leaves

and

After a rudimentary basic military training by instructors (one

an ex-police sergeant, and another formerly of the 1st Shan R i f l e s , Burma Army), I was appointed p o l i t i c a l officer of Command.

the SSIA Northern

After a series of adventures and misadventures, I was given

In response

an escort of two squads by the SSIA northern commander.40

to my wish to travel further south to meet with other SSIA senior officers, namely, Sai Myint Aung (Hso-khan),41 acting chief of s t a f f , and Khufu Kya Nu,42 the most dynamic and active of at l SSIA leaders.

Around July opposition

1963,

the

new Burmese regime

all

invited

armed

groups to hold peace talks with the Revolutionary Council.

This resulted

SSIA-SNUF

National

(Shan

preliminary

important

i n my f i r s t

assignment as head of Front) 43

United

talks with Burmese authorities.

and viewed the

call

for peace t a l k s

team

to

a joint

co-ordinate

We had no expectations

as Rangoon's public relations

stunt. In this r o l e , I of beard

--

youthful

at

Union President, -J

was

and a "Rangoon boy", the Rangoon

which somewhat $1 elated the status of the

in the p u b l i c ' s eyes

It

Due to my status as the

i n t r i g u e d and gave much prominence to the

Shan delegations'

Shan rebels

rebels.

complete with shoulder length hair and a sort

was once more back i n Rangoon.

son of the former

press was

--

a major

- _

from Shan bandits to nationalist

propaganda

victory

for

the

SSIA,

in

particular, and the Shan cause in general. At this point, I think i t would be of general interest to readers t o give an account of my experience during the peace t a l k s . 1963, Colonel Tint Swe ( a t present Minister of Industry I ) of

a t a c t i c a l command at Loilem,

SNUF

team for

peace t a l k s

in

Shan State, contacted the

response to

our

In July i n charge joint SSA-

acceptance

of

the

A Native of the Shan $1115

15 A rendezvous was fixed at a v i l l a g e on

Revolutionary C o u n c i l ' s offer.

the Pang long-Laikha road.

Un hand to

welcome us was a t a l l

and

elegant gentleman who spoke excellent English, Lt.-Col. Kyaw Khine of the 12th Burma Regiment (Buregt), United States for further training.

who had at one time been to the He was courteous, and l i k e all

officers we met, seemed genuinely desirous for peace though unsure how and i f about

the war would end. the d i r e c t i o n of

soldiers,

L i k e u s , Burmese officers

the

Revolutionary

CoUncil.

were uninformed But

being career

they were committed to serving l o y a l l y .

While

in

representative

Loilem,

we

heard

over

the

radio

that

an

had landed in Rangoon from a foreign country.

SSIA

Though

bewildered by t h i s new development I , nevertheless, requested Colonel Tint

Swe for

this

"representative",

Sai Pan, to be included i n our

team when meeting with the Revolutionary Council i n Rangoon. most worrying

It

because we had no idea what Sai Pan had i n mind.

mission was exploratory,

and would thus avoid taking

was Our

any definite

stand at this early stage. After capital After

several

of

days i n Loilem, we were taken to Taunggyi, the

Shan State,

the f l i g h t

and then to the airport

at He ho (Hai-wua).

to Rangoon, we were met at Mingladon Airport

several MIS o f f i c e r s and taken t o a house within

the grounds of the

Rangoon Turf Club (then closed following a ban on horse-racing). SSIA "representative"

by The

from abroad, Sai Pan, was already there, and we

had a heated discussion out of ear-shot

of MIS o f f i c e r s , presumably,

on the deserted race track. It

became apparent that the SSIA exiles abroad responded because

they were convinced that the Burmese army was on the verge of collapse

and would agree to share power with rebels, State,

federalism.

and w i t h regard to Shan

Hence Sai Pan's view was that we should lay

our cards on the table without on the contrary, bringing

further waste of time.

all

We replied that

up federalism would amount to showing a red

rag to an enraged b u l l .

The c a l l for peace was, I argued, but a ploy

by

neutralize

the

country,

coup-makers

to

and more importantly,

national community.

to

anti-military win the

feelings

sympathy of

the

in

the

inter-

As such, our aim should be to keep the talk and

16

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe

ceasefire

going on for

f avourable exposure.

as long as possible and thus gain maximum

We argued back and forth inconclusively until

Say Pan was threatened

with exclusion from the team which would have

made him merely a representative

The meeting

with

the

of a few e x i l e s abroad.

Revolutionary

Council

took

place

in

a

luxurious mansion formerly owned by a Chinese tycoon, Y.H. Kwong, a friend of the Yawnghwe family who was expelled earlier from Burma by

General Ne Win. Council spoke

--

At the t a l k s , only two members of the Revolutionary that

i s , General Ne Win and Dr Hla Han ( a doctor of

medicine and Burma Independence Army [BIA] veteran who was then quite influential).

Ne N i n ' s opening passage was to the effect that he was

determined t o mercilessly uproot all disloyal

elements, but was giving

misguided elements a chance t o co-operate with the government.

closing,

the General asked what sort

In

of proposals we had i n mind.

Thereupon, Sai Pan whipped out a paper and l a i d i t

on the table.

It

was a demand for federal ism. Dr Hla Han picked the paper up, studied i t ,

Ne Win who, after reading i t , descended,

smiles

passed i t

and passed i t

on to others.

disappeared replaced by scowls,

p a i r s of eyes stared at us c o l d l y .

on to

A stony hush

and twelve more

Although I was i n a state of shock

at such an unexpected stab in the back, nonetheless I managed to blur t out that we, officers i n the f i e l d , had not been consulted and had no opinion on this matter. seen the proposal,

However, since the Revolutionary Council had

we would l i k e

to have time to study i t ,

and would

aga in contact the government. Dr H l a Han replied

heatedly,

which made him stammer more than

usual s that federalism and secession could not be allowed; that all races of Burma had to stand united behind the Revolutionary Council in

i t s march towards socialism. warned.

No divisions

would be tolerated,

he

I replied that due to d i f f i c u l t communications, we would l i k e

an extension of the ceasefire i n place, and assured that we were eager to establish

this

peace.

General Ne Win replied

that we should discuss

w i t h the Northeast and Eastern M i l i t a r y Command, and after

a

round of handshaking, the meeting ended on a s l i g h t l y l e s s c o l d note.

It

was a close c a l l .

A young officer on the team later told me

A Native of the Shan H i l l s

that

he had expected a l l

beautiful the

talks

17 of us to be bundl ed out, lined up on the

lawn outside, and shot.

More seriously,

would have deprived us of public

news media which was one of because we did not i n s i s t giving a press interview

exposure i n the Rangoon

our reasons for

on federalism,

responding.

However,

we continued as emissaries,

(more successfully),

factories and other sights of the capital. the ceasefire t i l l the end of 1963.

an abrupt ending to

and taken on tours of

We even managed to extend

The Eastern Command continued to

co-operate with us, even f l y i n g one SSIA leader,

Khufu Kya Nu, from

Loilem t o Loilang on the Thai border.

however 9

The talks,45 organizations

were

to

came

interested

in

as none of

nothing

joining

the

Burmese

S o c i a l i s t Party - - which was Rangoon's alternative the war.

The Burmese military

made i t

return to plurality i n p o l i t i c s One very significant

the rebel way

to

the

to continuing with

clear that there would be no

for a l ong time to come.

by-product

of the peace t a l k s of 1963, i n

the Shan State, was that i t inspired thousands of young people (mostly from middle nearest.

and

high

The people

schools)

to

join

whichever

as a whole and especially

ill-informed and p o l i t i c a l l y unsophisticated,

rebel

band

the rebels,

was

being

became wildly optimistic

and believed that victory was just round the corner.

w i t h a f l o o d of recruits

coming in,

the S5IA's main task was to

get as many arms as possible, there being but one r i f l e to every f i v e

soldiers.

My next . This

Thailand.

was

merchant-warloads46

assignment. was to purchase arms from Laos and a difficult who

were

in

task

as

Chinese

control

of

the

syndicates

border

and

trade

disapproved of strong n a t i o n a l i s t i c Shan armies.

A t t h i s juncture, my mother, the Mahadevi of Yawnghwe, arrived i n

Thailand w i t h two daughters and a son, and a young Shan graduate of Rangoon University

as escor t,47

It

was reported

that as soon as the

m i l i t a r y heard that she had l e f t Rangoon, a hunter~killer

dispatched t o bring her back dead or alerted.

It

alive,

team was

and checkpoints were

i s believed that the Burmese team even crossed the border

into the town of Maesod ( T h a i l a n d ) , and on Burmese s o i l had mistakenly

arrested a woman who was travelling

with two d a u g h t e r s . 8

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe

18

Saw

Yanda (holding

founder First

of 5har:

the

the

Noom

microphone), Suk Harn,

resistance

the

organization

(1959)-

The Mahadevi, a p o l i t i c a l leader i n her own right, at once set out to unify the feuding f actions

--

the Noom Such Harn (established i n

1958),49 the SSIA (19 60) , the SNUF (196 1), Army or TNA (1963).50 However, since i t

was thought

and the Taiiand National

that victory was just around the

corner, she was regarded by, in particular, Saw Yanda ("Chao" Noi)51 of the Noom Such Horn, and U Gondra (self-styled Chao, or Prince Riga Kham) 52 of TNA as a "Johnny-come-lately" forthcoming glory and power.

about to steal the soon-to-be

The Yawnghwe Mahadevi therefore f ailed

t o achieve unity, and had to s e t t l e for merging the SSIA and the SNUF i n a new organization, In

early

the SSA (Shan State Army) in early 1964.

1964 Khufu

5a,53

who served

Ka-kwe-ye (KKY or Local Defence For ce) insurgency auxiliaries turned

against

and 50 notes. upon a t ]

one of

of

the

Loir aw

the many anti-

encouraged and supported by the Burma Army

the Bur

blanket nationalization

--

as chief

L:.

san...

causes for

this

--

were Rangoon's

measures54 and the de-monetizing of Kyat 100

He set up the United A n t i - s o c i a l i s t Army and called

Shan armies to unite.

He head a series

of

t a l k s with Saw

Yanda, U Gondra, and Bo Deving ( a dissident SSIA battalion commander from Muong Yai area who broke away i n 1962).

However, before much was accomplished, the three Shan leaders

A Native of the Shan H i l l s turned

against

authorities.

Khufu

So,

19

and h i s

border

camp was raided

Khufu Sa, angered by this betrayal,

by Thai

was soon back with

the Burma Army as chief of Loir aw KKY.

While these events were unfolding at the Thai border, I was with the SSA 1st Brigade whose jurisdiction covered Namsan, Muang Mit,

and

Hsenwi . 55

My main task

Battalions,

and to set up the infrastructure for c i v i l administration

was to reorganize the 4th,

and the upkeep of law and order. Kachin

5th and 6th

I was charged with l i a i s o n w i t h the

Independence Army ( K I A ) 56 operating

in

parts

of Hsenwi and

Muang M i t , and the responsibility for bringing i n small Shan groups i n areas east of Hsenwi town which were r i c h i n opium and under the loose

control of units belonging to the former KMT (Kuomintang Nationalist)

5th

--

Chinese

and 3rd Armies based at Mae-salong and Tum Ngop

respectively i n Thailand. Just as our reorganization a six-month sweep. Narntu

Bawdwin,57

was complete, the Burma Army launched

We counter-attacked, ambushing

convoys

raiding

and trains

Hsipaw, sniping at Burmese foot columns, a l l

the mining town of between Lashing

and

of which put more than

200 enemies out of action. At this

juncture,

There was trouble

an unexpected and f avourable event occurred.

for the Burmese in Kokang, a narrow s t r i p of land

between the Salween River and the Chinese border

Shan State, arising

i n the northwest of

from the detention of Olive Yang.58

Her elder

brother, Jimmy Yang, a former MP (prior to the 1962 coup) for Kokang, and Rangoon-based businessman, made h is way back and raised the banner

of revolt.59

The Kokang KKY had been recognized as an auxiliary force by the Burma Army since the early 1950s, and under Burmese protection, engaged i n opium and gold trade across the Thai border.

It

had

also had

extensive connections with the ex-KMT armies ( 3 r d and 5th) on the Thai border, and hence was a formidable and well-funded force.

The main concern of the SSA was to win over this force, or at l e a s t to keep i t The f act

that

from f a l l i n g under the control its

politically-inclined

of the ex-KMT armies.

new commander Jimmy Yang was well

seemed to be in the SSA's favour.

educated and

20

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe Therefore the SSA 1st Brigade commander, Sai Hla Aung (Colonel

and I journeyed to Kokarlg v i a Namkharn, but our column (500

Hso-lane)

ran into

men)

a Burmese operation against Bo Mawng60 and Bo Kang

Yoi,61 due to earlier attacks by the two against Burmese outposts.

We

i n f l i c t e d moderate losses on the enemy in three major clashes, but

l o s t f i v e men with ten missing.

Nevertheless, we crossed the Salween

into Kokang and met with Jimmy Yang.

We were shown well-constructed

strong

the

points

and were impressed by

Kokang troops on parade.

smart

performance

of

his

We were asked to bring more SSA commanders

so that future strategies could be devised.

I recall high-level

that

it

was in early 1965 that I again went with a

SSA team62 t o Kokang.

While the talks had barely begun,

the Kokang KKY collapsed as L0 Hsin Han,63 i t s senior most commander, defected.

There was widespread panic

unarmed, fled

for

ferry points

and people,

on the Salween.

the only ones l e f t in Kokang.6'q

both

armed and

We were, i t

seemed,

We followed the fleeing horde in the

hope of resuming t a l k s with Jimmy Yang on the western side of the river.

However, there was a large Chinese force (from the ex-KMT 3rd

Army) waiting to escort him to safety in Thailand, and off

he and his

force went with them.65 In the meantime, I receive

information by wireless that matters

at the Shan State War Council (SSWC) ,66

n m

headed by

was

bickering

the

Mahadevi

of

and intrigues

Yawnghwe,

among members.

highest organ of the SSA, not

I

going

well

due

to

was asked to return to

settle matters as soon as possible.

Late in 1965, by coincidence I met the head of the KIA, General

Zau Song.

He asked me to escort him to the border.

accomplished most

receiving

of

my

instructions

Mahad evi, t o escort

assignment from

the

for SSWC

the Kachin president,

the

SSA 1st

chairperson,

I

Having

Brigade, the

and

Yawnghwe

accompanied the Kachin

column t o the Thai border. While I was on my way

--

which took f i v e months due to the need

to evade Burmese blocking forces s i t u a t i o n took a turn for

who were out in

the worse.

strength

- _

the

There were not only extensive

enemy sweeps, but Khufu Sa and h i s Loir aw KKY were on the offensive.

A N.alive of the Shan H i m s

21

>.

Ȣ

JP'

1

uas I

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4 . .

.

¢

H'1 .. x¥~

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5 -4

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w

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founding in- 1961 to his death in

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$ [ W ¢ § 1

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w

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2'

~_E>2-' ii

=

supreme

Song,

commander of' KIA (Kachin) from its

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commander;

brigade

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E 3 '"he

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acting

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i


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Irrawaddy (Capital: Bassein)

4 Pegu (Capital: Pegu) 5 6 7

Magwe (Capital: Magwe) Mandalay (Capital: Mandalay) Sagaing (Capital: Sagaing)

LAOS

(`\

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W.._./Q \'"~\ »

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States

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.f

Map 1: Burma (States and Divisions) Source:

Government of Burma (1980) publication (obtained from Tai Revolutionary Army personnel).

In

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe

50 bring about a national bureaucratic

loyalty focused on an alien and impersonal

arrangement.

when a nation-state

are further compounded

i s composed of different ethno-linguistic groups.

The complexities

and p o l i t i c s .

The d i f f i c u l t i e s

are further heightened by the facts

That i s ,

of history

the Shan and Mon i n par ticular had, l i k e the

Burmese, evolved into kingdoms well before the coming of the West to this region.

In f act, the Mon c i v i l i z a t i o n

was much more developed

than either the Burmese or Shan, and both borrowed heavily from the Mon i n some form or other. Such being the

realities

of

history,

the

stand taken by most

Western scholars and historians that the Burmese power centre

an "egalitarian, modern state",

feudal tribalism" scholarly

since

while Shan nationalism i s "reactionary

i s untenable. it

ignores

equals

Such an attitude i s certainly not

the h i s t o r i c a l

and qualitative

f actors

governing the status and development of the various ethnic groups in Burma, especially the major ones. It

must also be remembered that before the impact of the West,

there was no such concept as national unity in Burma or elsewhere in Asia.

There was the king and h i s court

in the golden capital, and

there were vassal lords and princes who may, or may not have been of

the same ethnic group as the king.

When a king was strong or dynamic,

vassal lord Land princes enjoyed less freedom, and .More of ten than not,

such a king would invade neighbouring kingdoms.

engaging i n reasons

of

foreign personal

wars was not glory.

for

country

The Burmese,

like

or

The aim of

nation,

the

but

for

Cambodian,

the

Siamese, the Shan, the Indian, even the Chinese, were not,

prior to

the nineteenth century, conscious of nationalism or nationhood in the sense i t

i s understood today.

Burmese consciousness of nationalism was engendered only after a period of British rule. and i t outside,

Burma opened up to the world under Britian

brought to Burmese minds, knowledge and consciousness of the of

sweeping

changes,

and

historical

events

--

the

Russo-Japanese War, the birth of modern China, World Wars I and I I ,

the Irish uprising, the agitation for freedom by Gandhi and Nehru i n

India.

Intellectual

stimuli as in the introduction -.-.l-p

by the British to

51

An Overview of Shan-Burmese Relations Burma of the trappj_n.gs of a modern bureaucratic state

_

introduction

of

self-government

9

and the gradual

i n Burma4 from the 1920s onwards

were the seeds of Burmese nationalism. As the

Burmese emerged under

Burmese elites

began to

process interpreted

define

Britain

into

the modern world,

the meaning of Burma, and in the

her history i n a strongly

nationalistic

manner.

They envisioned the Burmese as a nation whose kings had by feats of

velour

created

a Burmese kingdom, bringing

under

the

sway of

the

golden peacock throne, the various subordinate peoples (the Arakanese, Shan,

Karen,

Chin,

and so f o r t h ) .

This

unity

was

shattered

by

Britain, the kingdom dismembered, and separatism encouraged i n keeping with the " d i v i d e and rule" strategem of foreign

imperial i s t s .

However

such a perception does not quite f i t the f acts.

In

the 1930s, when Burma was to be separated from India

and

constituted as a self-governing entity,5 British policy-makers had in mind the amalgamation of the Frontier Areas (homelands of the nonBurmese),

that

it

and i n par t i c u l a r the Shan State.

was "inevitable

take place, and

The o f f i c i a l view was

that sooner or later some form of union must

the policy now to be adopted with regard to the

Shan States should be framed with reference

to this

contingency..."

(September 1931).6 British

administrators

made

the

Burmese

language

language in Burma Proper which k i l l e d the Mon language.

a

second

The British

never encouraged any languages except Burmese as can be seen from the

f act that all schools i n Shan States and other Frontier Areas taught Burmese and English i n classes.

Britain

situation,

certainly did not have any plan to create a Balkan-type

and seemed to be working towards creating a nation-state

out of Burma Proper and the Frontier Areas.7 place i n the B r i t i s h scheme of things but t h i s

This was to take i t s

as a self-governing

plan was overtaken by momentous events

--

dominion,

World War II

and

the Japanese invasion. Indeed when Burma emerged in 1948 as an independent nation-state

from the ashes of World War II

and with the sun setting on the British

empire, Burmese nationalists and leaders saw themselves as heirs not

52

Chao Tzang Y.awnghwe

only to the Burmese kings (that i s , the Burmese imperial also to the British colonial

administrators.

legacy) but

The Frontier Areas were

i n their eyes either restored lost possessions or colonies of sor i s .

Whilst isolation

the

peoples

of

the

Frontier

Areas

had been kept

in

from the rest of the world by the British, they were rudely

awakened by the Japanese,

Japanese war.

Chinese,

Indian,

Their

villages

British,

American,

were bombed, and

even

and

African

soldiers marched freely across their fields and valleys, and they were harangued to r i s e , to stand and fight for

their motherland, and to

expel alien rulers or invaders as the case may be.

These pleas struck

a different chord i n the "minority" leaders (most of whom had had

military training of some kind, or combat experiences under foreign flags)

who

suddenly, the

felt

that

within

the

context

of

what befell

them so

they could no longer afford to have their destinies

control

Certainly,

of

others,

no

matter

how

benevolent

or

under

powerful.

they had no intention of becoming anyone's subjects, or

inferiors.

Nationalism then, was at fever pitch among both the Burmese and the non-Burmese ethnic

constitution

which

groups after World War I I .

tied

the

Burmese

and

other

The 1948 Union ethnic

groups

in

political matrimony was a hasty compromise between Burmese nationalism (with

overtones of

attitudes)

Burmese

imperial

motives

and the awakening national

and British colonial

awareness of

the non-Burmese

groups.8 Today, problem

is

this

basic

probably

contradiction

one more of

remains

method than

unsolved, of

though

interest.

It

the is

Burma's misfortune that Burmese policy-makers have not, and are s t i l l reluctant to re-think

the framework of the relationship

between the

major and minor components of what could become a real nation.

Given

a correct perception and grasp of political and historical realities and

politics

by

Burmese

leaders,

there

seems

little

reason

why

national unity cannot be achieved without resort to war and bloodshed.

That this i s possible had once been proved by no other than Aung San. It

would serve present

Burmese leaders

as well

as future ones to

examine why leaders of the Frontier Areas agreed to sign the Panglong

An Overview of Shan-Burmese Relations

53

Was i t because they knew him w e l l , or was i t

Agreement with him.9

because they feared him, or were they dazzled by his personality?

The

f act i s that they were practically strangers to him, and he to them. More than anything,

i t was because the leaders of the Frontier

lacking education and political sophistication

Areas,

were nonetheless very

practical men, and Aung San, i n his own way, was one of them. Those who hold power i n their hands also hold the answer, or at least half

the solution

to the very basic problem of national

unity,

or lack of unity, a f f l i c t i n g the country and ravaging national

since independence.

The correct handling of the relationship between

the Burmese power centre and constituent

components i s , in my opinion,

the key not only to the problem of national question

of

life

national

development, progress,

interest of Burma and all humanity

--

unity, but also the peace,

--

and

i n the

the problem of opium cultivation

and heroin trade.

Shan State Politics

and the Opium Question

The most widely held view, popularized by the

Western media and

encouraged by Rangoon, i s that opium cultivation in the Shan State i s widespread because the people are forced by Shan rebels and warlords

to grow poppy. to

Thailand

Opium thus obtained i s then escorted by rebel armies

where

it

is

refined

into

heroin

which

is

shipped,

presumably by a Shan network of couriers and agents, to cities all over

the world.

Money thus

obtained

i s used to finance rebellion

against Rangoon.

The above i s a very simple and plausible story which infers that an easy and uncomplicated solution than the elimination of Shan rebels,

and heroin

(benefiting humanity),

(which would allegedly

i s at hand: through

this being no other

the eradication

and m i l i t a r y victory for

of opium

Rangoon

contribute to the peace and s t a b i l i t y of

the

region). However, the elimination

of Shan rebels i s easier said than done

and can be achieved only with a massive i n f l u x of m i l i t a r y and other

assistance from external

donors, which in turn, implies the "blind"

l

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe

54 par ticipation f avour.

of

donor countries

The word "blind"

i n Burma's c i v i l

war i n Rangoon's

i s chosen because Rangoon though obviously

needing and desiring military and other assistance, just as obviously, does not l i k e outsiders to see for conditions

i n Burma are.

themselves what the problems and

International participation i n Burma with

the view to eradicating opium and heroin should be modeled on such programmes as exist i n Thailand.

They involve not only the government

but the growers themselves and give development assistance to u p l i f t the opium growing region.

This i s the key.

No solution w i l l be found

i n a headlong rush into

a war i n blind

participant

which i s now more than twenty years o1d.10

i n a conflict

At any rate, to

elsewhere)

obliteration

tie

the

apolitical The

eradication

of

opium

and

heroin

to

the

of the Shan and other rebels i n Burma, the link i s i n

international

That i s ,

of one or the other

despite attempts by policy-makers i n Rangoon (and

r e a l i t y incidental. the

support

In f act, the opium business i n Shan State, trade

those i n this

in

heroin,

are essentially non-political.

business, and making money are a class of

people whose sole interest

majority

are

Chinese

whose

in life

i s trade and profit.

relatives,

organizations, finance, loyalties, interests,

national frontiers.

and

partners,

friends,

and obligations straddle

Their creed, "commerce i s commerce", pays l i t t l e

heed t o the l e g a l i t y or morality of the merchandise blame them for t h i s attitude given the historical

--

and who can

f act that two wars

were fought by Western powers t o impose opium and i t s trade on China?

There i s l i t t l e evidence as t o how opium and heroin dealers are organized.

However,

it

can be

informal and close-knit.

assumed that

the

organization

is

Drug financing appears to be no different

from the financing of, say, trade i n soya beans.

It i s very d i f f i c u l t

to

financial

point

involved borrowing

out

which Chinese trading-house

because

of

the

and investment

system practices

though that Chinese syndicates,

of

or

informal

or

dealer

is

non-institutional

among the Chinese.

It

i s clear

though informal and decentralized, are

extremely powerful since their members are involved i n many businesses w i t h i n and outside the law.

55

An Overview of Shan-Burmese Relations

With regard

to

the much publicized

involvement of Shan rebel

armies i n the narcotics trade, their role i s limited to taxing growers and the buying agents, and at times escorting

for

an agreed fee.

caravans to the border

Even the "narcotics kingpin"

Lo Hsin Han who

commanded the Kokang KKY (1965-73), did not own all the opium that was

traded,

or the refineries or have access to international markets,

much less control over heroin beyond the Shan border. Why i s opium extensively

cultivated

i n Shan State?

Is i t ,

as

alleged by Rangoon, because the Shan and tribal peasants are forced by

Shan rebels and the CPB to do so?

It i s not easy to force peasants to

grow anything since there are many ways to get around such compulsion.

For

forced

cultivation

of

opium

to

succeed,

it

must

be

run

plantation-style with peasants forced into barracks under guard among

other things which implies that rebel armies must hold secure areas, and this has never been the case. The next question

logically i s ,

do they

grow opium for

profit?

The f act i s , as anyone who i s acquainted with the mechanism of rural economies knows, cultivators is

grown, be i t

family

with

onions,

rarely make substantial

sugarcane, or

an optimum work-force

of

opium.

profit from what

Besides, a peasant

four, given favourable

weather

and soil conditions, w i l l at most produce about 12 kg a year. f i e l d price mid-1960s; 1980s (kyat

of

one kg of

600 kyat

opium i s

as fo1 lows:

300 kyat

The in

the

in the early 1970s; and 1,000 kyat in the early

and baht are about equal, u n o f f i c i a l l y ) .

It

i s indeed

rare for a family to be able to produce the maximum amount.

However,

l e t us say that a certain peasant family did produce 12 kg of opium i n

1980.

Its annual income would be 12,000 kyat (or 12,000 b a h t ) .

But a

sarong costing 30 baht in Thailand in the same year, costs 90 kyat (or 90 baht) i n Shan State; and a cheap cake of soap at 3 baht would cost that rural

Shan family 9 k y a t .

In

terms

of

purchasing

power, the

family's maximum income would therefore be only 4,000 baht ( l e s s than US$250 ) per year.11

The vast majority earned far

l e s s for

the year

1980.

Most opium cultivators moreover l i k e most peasants of Southeast

Asia,

are

indebted

to

buying

agents

or

local

moneylenders before

An Overview of Shan-Burmese Relations

57

planting and have to hock the yield, or borrow usually at 30 to 50 per cent interest per season.

It

i s thus amply clear that Shan and other

tribal peasants are not growing opium for profit.

The answer must thus be sought in another area.

In 1958, the

figures given by the Shan State government in response to questions by

MPs on opium production was 12,000 viss ( 1 viss i s about 1.5 kg), or roughly 18 tons.12 underestimated

However, let us assume that the figure was grossly

due to

the

Even allowing room for

of

inefficiency

the

officials

a very wide margin of

involved.

error, the annual

production could not have been more than 60 to 80 tons in 1958. after the 1962 coup and the

blanket

nationalization of

all

And

private

businesses, retail trade, factories, agricultural trade and marketing

and demonetizing of 100 kyat and 50 kyat notes, the annual production figure in the early 1970s (according to Rangoon, Washington, and the

United Nations) was 400 to 600 tons.

This increase from 18 (or 60-80)

tons in 1958, to 400-600 tons annually i n the early 1970s, i s really incredible.

A revolutionary leap never seen before

history, and this achieved without

the American taxpayers' money.

UN assistance or a single cent of

As one person who i s considered an

expert on Third World affairs, puts i t : the Shan opium production

i n agricultural

"Perhaps there i s a lesson in

phenomenon for

the UN's FAO, and related

agencies".13

In 1963-64, when I passed through Muang Nai, Muang Pan, Laikha, and toured

extensively

Muang Y a i , Hsipaw, and Hsenwi, though opium

cultivation

had increased,

villages.

However,

in

I

rarely saw poppy plants

1969,

poppy

plants

were

in or

around

everywhere,

in

backyards, and around the hamlets.

While I

State,

I

agree that opium cultivation i s widespread in the Shan

seriously

doubt

any figure given by o f f i c i a l s .

reason i s that Rangoon does not control

the rural areas.

The main

There i s no

love lost between Burmese authorities and the populace and therefore there has been l i t t l e effort by Rangoon to survey opium production. Furthermore no outsiders

hav

the situation for themselves.

opium production figure

--

been int

the Shan rural areas to assess

Thus, the internationally accepted Shan

400 to 600 tons annually,

seems quite

58

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe

unreliable.

It

i s a sad f act that despite all

the millions of dollars

the hue and cry, and

spent on suppressing Shan opium, practically

nothing i s known about this main opium growing area of Southeast Asia, the Shan State.

Shan nationalists

and rebel spokesman have claimed time and again

that `0pium and heroin trafficking social,

and political

malaise

economic fool hardiness,

political r e a l i t i e s . to

end

the

agencies,l4

opium

caused by a deep economic,

arising

from Rangoon's harsh rule,

and arrogant defiance

of

socio-economic

Moreover, the Shan have in all problems,

which contrasts

The Burmese a t t i t u d e s

is

welcomed

and

their proposals

foreign

observers

and

sharply with that of Rangoon's attitude.

one which seems to say:

"The opium and heroin

problem i s our internal affair, and concerns no one. concerned, you must support us unconditionally.

But i f you are

We w i l l

solve i t

in

our own way".

I do not claim that the Shan rebels are in the right, or condemn Rangoon's stand on this very serious international problem which i s the cause of so much misery the world over.

I will

leave i t

to the

readers to form their own judgement. To c l a r i f y , the worldwide furore and condemnation of the flow of opium and heroin from Burma i n the early 1970s presented Rangoon with

a serious threat since i t

focused international attention on the Shan

State, the main opium growing area. formulate a strategy favour.

was therefore imperative to

which would turn the situation

Rangoon admitted

Burma's Shan State.

It

around in i t s

that a massive amount was flowing out of

However, this was because, the Burmese claimed,

the centre had no control because of the Shan rebels.

As such, the

elimination of Shan rebels would be the f i r s t requirement in solving the opium question.15

In other words, Rangoon's answer to the problem i s no other than the

continuation

of

the

decades-old

war,

but

financial assistance from governments interested

and heroin. achieving

too.

with

military

and

in suppressing opium

In effect this means that the West must assist Rangoon in

a m i l i t a r y victory in Shan State,

and presumably

elsewhere

Such being the case, i t would not be out of place therefore

to

59

An Overview of Shan-Burme.s.e_ Red ation.s. examine the v i a b i l i t y of Rangoon's military plan to eradicate opium. On the purely m i l i t a r y aspect i n the Shan State,

it

is doubtful

i f Rangoon can f i e l d more than 70,000 combat troops due to rebellions elsewhere.

As

nationalists;

9,000

Shan

1,000 rebel tribesmen (We, Palaung, among others);

2,000

KIA contingent

against

i n Shan State;

under the (:PB.16

there

7,000

to

and a 20,000 to 30,000 strong force

are natives,

know the l i e

of the land, and to

enjoy the support of the populace.

Moreover, while the

Burma Army i s able to apply i t s period,

are

In numbers and arms, the Burma Army enjoys a great

advantage, but rebels some extent,

this,

strength

fully for

the rebels operate in f u l l strength

combat capabilities, the rebels

all

only a limited

year round.

are just as tough,

As for

and perhaps even

more s k i l f u l in bush warfare. Again, from a military angle, rebel armies are not the American Indians of John Wayne's movies.

For instance,

it

i s evident from the

f i l m , Opium Warlords (Adrian Cowell, ATV, London, 1975) that the Shan armies

are

systems,

well-armed,

and

organized,

and have battle-tested

use

officers

modern

communciation

possessing more than the

rudimentary knowledge of modern military concepts and tactics.

In 1961, all

Shan rebels totalled

excluding the ex-KMT Chinese armies.18 9,000 men at present.

In addition

strength, the Burma Army i s

casualties,

at

not more than 1,500 merl

--

Compare this to the 7,000 to

to the increase i n Shan military

the moment having to care for

and at one time i n 1978, i t

suffered

its

20-30 casualties

daily in the Shan State alone.19

It is therefore, doubtful, even with Western military assistance, that there w i l l be any quick or decisive outcome.

Though the chances

of the rebels defeating the Burma Army are slim, there i s also no possibility

that they w i l l

give up meekly whatever the pressure.

A

possible scenario i s that with increasing Western assistance to and

proximity peasants

with Rangoon, would

leaders. through

lose

The only its

the rebel

confidence winner

then

in

rank

and f i l e

their

non-

would be the

as well or

as the

anti-communist

CPB since i t

would,

a b i l i t y to provide arms, be able to take over the various

nationalist movements and armies.

60

Chao _Tzang Yawnghwe

i s obvious that the purely military

It

and practised

fundamental

by Rangoon t o

problems

deal

unity,

(national

problems than solutions.

with

approach being advocated

narcotics, for

and other

example)

creates

more more

The realities of the c o n f l i c t in Burma and

the Shan State are very different from the fight between law-enforcers

and Mafia godfathers within a p o l i t i c a l l y stable society such as New

York.

In the case of Burma, one ethnic group i s trying to impose i t s

concept of nationhood on the other by force.

These groups are i n turn

resisting what they see as attempts to subjugate them or destroy their

ethnic identity. Rangoon's attempts to gain control therefore

over the various homelands i s

linked to the problem of narcotics only because of negative

and short-sighted

policies.

A solution l i e s not in the escalation of

violence and destruction, but in something simpler

this

being

relevant

no

and

other

than

rational

what

point

is

known as

which

and more basic

--

"good government",

international

a

policy-makers,

bureaucrats, and scholars gloss over when discussing the problem of drug trafficking i n Burma. no7Es 1

These include the Pyu, Kayan,

Thet, Mon, Burmese,

Shan,

to name some major ones.

The Burmese claim to be descended from the Pyu, known as Piao to the Chinese and Shan.

Scholars are

Folklorists beings" in

s t l l l uncertain who the

claim the Kayan the Padaung

are

the Karen's

Kayan and Thet are. forefathers

dialect), and Thet are natives of

(Kayan

But Karen

means "human

the Thai Thet country,

that is, forefathers of the Thai or Tai.

2

Arakan was another Burmeee kingdom, power

C

but

it

did not submit

ntre until conquered by Bodawpaya in 1784.

p r , A

d M

g M . T h

b its d t

form

to the main Burmese

There were two Shan cert res of B

i

g i

1555,

dth

latter was destroyed by a Chinese invasion in 1604.

3

Since r ceiving aid from the Chinese Fraternal party in

the late 1960s, the name

was Cha ged from the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) to Communist Party o f Burma (CPB).

to

It

j

was most powerful in

ity

f th

AFPFL-

t

the early stages of the civil war having won over

ll

d

it

Y (th

pvo),

1 o t all of the 1st,

2nd and 3rd Burma Rifles, and enjoyed the support of` students, labourers, oilfield

An Overview of Shan-Burmese Relations workers, and militant peasants.

61

Though reduced in

strength b y the 1950s, it

still

controlled the Pegu Yoma (just over 100 miles north of Rangoon), the Irrawaddy deltas, and had strongholds following the Chinese liquidation of'

in Central Burma.

example,

staged

But in the mid-19609

the party,

a cultural revolution resulting in

top-line leaders such

as Goshal,

Yebaw Htay

the

and most military

commanders, plus many hundreds of` experienced political cadres.

Consequently many

more hundreds in anger and in fear for their lives surrendered and divulged party secrets, thus enabling Rangoon to break the communists resulting in the decimation

of

top

leaders such as the chairman, Thakin Than Tun,

Zin, Thakin Chit, Thakin Tin Tun, and Bo Pu. communist:

movement

would have

prolonged the life o f the CPB.

ended It

Were it

there and

and also Bo Zeya, Thakin

not For Beijing, the Burmese

then.

But

Chinese assistance

remains today as an alternative Burmese power

centre, but only by virtue o f Beijing's support and the prop of a non-Burmese (Wa, Kokang, Kachin, Akha, and Shan) armed f`orce. much importance, except during World War II

the Japanese,

II

late 1970.

It

ceased to exist after Thakin

To add to the confusion, the official name o f the

the Communist Party of Burma (CPB).

Selfl-government d

spearheaded resistance against

and attracted only the extremists.

Soe surrendered in Red Flag is

Th kin Soe's Red Flag did not attain when i t

with its executive

frth,

` t r d

d

and legislative organs,

l y t B

judiciary, elections,

P p r o r l t , M i i t r i 1 B u

The homelands of` the Shan, Chin, Kachin, Arakan, and Karenni were excluded from

self-government,

though

the Shan

and

Karenni enjoyed some

form of

self-rule

through hereditary princes.

5

Burma Proper, or the Burmese homeland became a s lfl-governing entity under Britain

by the Government of India Act 1935 (Schedules

X to XV).

See J. L. Christian

(1945). 6

See

Taylor

(1983).

Quoting

from letters by

H.L.

Nichols,

officiating Chief

Secretary, Government of Burma.

7

For bureaucratic reasons these were known variously as Excluded Areas, Scheduled Areas and Frontier Areas, which were separately and varyingly administered by the

British.

The Frontier Areas were recognized by both the British (in possession o f

Lower Burma) and King Minden (lB53-7B) as independent in a treaty signed in 1875. 8

The constituent assembly met on 10 June 19417, and the constitution was formally

adopted on 2h September

of` the same year.

For a good account of the negotiation

with the British for independence, see Cady (1958).

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe

62

9

Signed on 12 February 19117 between Aung San as head of

the interim government

of

Burma and leaders of` the Frontier Areas whereby the amalgamation of the Frontier Areas

with Ministerial Burma

was

agreed

upon

and

the

form

of

amalgamation

defined.

10

Actual fighting with Shan rebels began in

1959; Karen

in

1949; Mon and Pa-D

following closely; Kachin in 1961; Arakanese

in 1947; and Karenni, about the same

year as the Karen.

II

Though the figures given may not survey has

ever been made,

indicators,

for

example,

be accurate in

whatever the

actual price or

price differences

correct, in terms of percentage and effects.

price, that is, l kg at US$0.5 million.

12

totality since no professional

of

opium

cost, the comparative

and consumer

goods,

are

(Compare Shan price to international

Bangkok Post, 16 June 198ls.)

Union o f Burma printing Dflflice, Records of the Shan State Council 1957-58 Session [in Burmese].

13

In

a discussion with Dr David

Institute for

A. Feingold, Director, Centre of Opium Research,

the Study o f Human Issues, Philadelphia, Ll.S.A., in Chiangrnai,

May

l981L.

14

See Lintner (1984).

15

See statements by Burmese authorities, reports government press

releases concerning

to the United Nations by Rangoon,

the Burmese narcotics problem,

especially

from 1976 to the present.

16

Figures obtained

from SSA field reports, interviews with leaders and officers of

the armies mentioned,

Incredibly

enough,

which were then cross-checked with traders and others.

top

leaders

in

rebel

organizations

exaggerating their strength though junior officers are.

are

not

prone

to

Talks with people of the

locality are quite revealing because villagers are n t over-awed by rebels whom they support.

17

These include more than a00 in the Noom Suk Harn; SSIA, below Ann; Kengtung around 1400; scattered bands with more than 300 men.

18

According to Rangoon's report (Kuomintang Aggression against Burma, 1953), there

were over 10,000 men under the KMT in (Seminar

Shan State.

I

According to Thai officials

at Chiangmai University, Political Science Department, 1982) there were

then over 20,000 KnoTs in Thailand, as Far as is

19

~._

heard about it

known.

from several sources particularly people with close relatives

(who were officers holding the rank o f major and above) in the Burma Army.

3

The Development of Shan-Burmese Relations

Shan or Tai Nationalism and the Burmese Centre The relationship between the Shan or Tai and the Burmese power centre

has always been long and turbulent, years.

stretching

Yet to the present day, the origins

i n mystery and surrounded by controversy. city

back more than 900

of the Shan are shrouded

For instance, the ancient

of Tagaung which the Burmese claim to have established as their

f i r s t capital i s disputed by Shan and Tai chronicles which claim that

by 568 A.D. the Tai, descendants of Khufu Lun and Khufu Lai, had founded a kingdom i n Upper Burma with their capital

at Muang Maorong in the

same environ as the Burmese kingdom of Tagaung.1 that

their

kingdom was

Buddha, whilst

founded during

the

The Burmese claim

life-time

of

the Lord

the Shan claim that Tagaung i s a Shan or Tai word,

Ta-Gong, meaning "Drum Ferry" town. Another controversy

surrounding the early Shan (Tai/Thai) i s the

Nanchao question, and whether the "Ai-Lao" mentioned in early Chinese

annals

were

Tai/Thai.

subscribe very strongly

Shan

nationalists,

to the theory that

and

some

the Thai

historians

(Tai/Shan,

OI"

Siam), as the "Al-Lao", even before the Han, had established themselves between Tibet and the Chang Jian (Yangtze) River, a few thousand years

ago.

which together

with China and Tibet,

for

a

time.

immediately

Later, they set up the Nanchao empire (650-1236)

According after

Nanchang

to few]

this

was a major power in the region theory,

to Kublai

some Khan,

time

the

before

and

Shan or

Tai

(Thai/Siam) migrated south and westwards, founding Tai/Thai

kingdoms

i n Assam ( w e l l established by 1229);2 i n Upper Burma and present-day Shan State, kingdom of

the

Tai Mao kingdom ( w e l l

Ava in

Central

and Upper

before

1215 to 1604);3 the

Burma (1287-1555);4

in

Lower

Burma, Nareru, the Shan son-in-law of Sukhothai ' s King Ramkhamheng

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe

64

1

established the kingdom of Martaban;5 in present-day Laos,

(1275-1317)

the Lan-Chang kingdom; i n Vietnam, the kingdom of Sip song Chu-Tai; and the

kingdoms

of

Payao,

present-day Thailand, all

Chi angsaen,

Chiangmai,

and

Sukhothai

in

founded well before 1238, except Chiangmai

( i n 1296)-

Though the belief that the Al~Lao and Nanchao kingdoms were Tai is

a few scholars,

ridiculed by quite

Taiwan

and mainland

remains that

China,

as

especially

a pan-Thai

Chinese of

pipe

they did found kingdoms stretching

dream,

the

both fact

from northeast India

to the upper Tonkin i n the t a i l period of the Nanchao empire, and more importantly,

all

these Tai or Thai kingdoms touched upon were

not very far from Nanchao's southern rim. My opinion i s

that this has much bearing on the question of

whether nanchang was Tai

or not.

(Thai)

If

Nanchao was Lolo, would

these kingdoms not be Lolo instead of Tai/Thai?

would find i t more acceptable i f (Shan/Siam) magically

kingdoms.

If

Perhaps, some people

i t were suggested that the Tai/Thai

appeared from nowhere, complete with kings and

Nanchao was Lolo, why was i t

the Tai, not the Lolo, who

founded new kingdoms when Nanchao declined? The Thai or Siamese are referred

Lower Burma as "Shan".

to by the Karen and Burmese of

In f act, in o l d Burmese stone inscriptions

and sometimes even now, the word "Shan" i s spelled as "Syam",6 but as i n all

Burmese words ending with "in" i t

sound.

i s , pronounced with the "rl"

The word for road, for example, i s spelled lam but pronounced

lan.

When

the

British

arrived,

they

adopted

the

Burmese

pronoureciation of the word "Siam", th.us giving the impression that the

Shan (Tai) and Siam (Thai) are two different groups. The Wa, Kachin, Palaung, and others, refer to the Tai as "Sam" or "Syam".

This i s strange because the Shan never refer to themselves as

anything but T a i .

No one really knows the meaning of the word "Siam"

a name given by others

to

the Tai/Thai

people,

although theories

abound.7

Shan organized.

kingdoms

of

old

Drawing upon o l d

were terms

relative

to

their

time,

well

and usages, we can deduce that

there was a Chao Haw Kham (Lord of the Golden Palace), or a king.8

The Development of Shan-Burmese Relations

65

Above the king, there was Chao Haw Seng (Lord of the Palace of Gems),

or Chao Nong, the Emperor (King of Nanchao, perhaps, or the ruler of China). Below corrupted

sons

of

the

Burmese to

the

monarch,

Kham

were

Sawbwa.

who

Chaofa

is

usually

These were princes,

ruled

the

of

(Lord

over

a muang

--

below the Chaof a was a Kem-Muang

who

brothers

Haw

in

Immediately Chaofa,

Chao

brother

or

and sons were given d i s t r i c t s

the

the

Sky),

brothers

or

(prin cipa litie s). the heir

eldest

of

son.

the

Other

to rule with the t i t l e of

Chao Khufu Muang (or Myoza, a Burmese word adopted by the Shan).

Under

the Chao Khufu Muang were the Paw-Muang, Tao Muang, and Pu Haeng in charge of

a large

group of

charge of several villages,

or Pu Kang.

Directly

villages;

next,

were the Pu Muang in

and in charge of a v i l l a g e was Pu Kae,

attached to the courts of the Chaof a were

o f f i c i a l s bearing t i t l e s of Tao Sung, Pu Seung, Phawng Muang, Tao, Paw Lam, Ho Bo, Bo, and so forth.

It

definitions

of

as Burmese or

introduced

(particularly

the

various

titles during

i s d i f f i c u l t to give precise

British

rule)

Pali

terms

such

as

were

Myoza,

Ngwekhunhmu, Myo-ok, Myowun, Amato-choke, Banda-wun, and others.9

The t i t l e s used for

were no

longer

used

officers

after

the

(1555), and Muang Mao (1604). i n the Tai Ahom script

in

f all

the Tai or Shan royal courts

of

the Tai

kingdoms of

Ava

However, the text of the Ahom Buranji

mentions such t i t l e s as:

Chao Seung Luang,

Chao Phawng Muang, Qhao J i , Chao Seng Luang, Chao Ching Luang, Chao Tao Luang, Pukon Luang, Phukon, Chao Seng Muang, Tao Muang Luang, Phu Kae Luang, Maw Seng Muang, N i u Muang, Ru Ring, Ru Pak, Ru Shao,

and so forth. Borgohein,

In the English text only Indianized titles such as

Gohein, Barua, Sakia,

and so forth

are given

(Barua,

1930).

From historical

and political evidence one can argue that the

T a i , known by others as Shan (or more correctly, Siam) constituted a state

as

political

the

Shan

had

organization.

Shan-Burmese

nation-state.

conflict

probably This

is

one

of

achieved shatters

a the

"tribalism"

very

high

theory against

form that

the

of the

modern

In f act from the f all of Pagan (1286) to the r i s e of

Chao Tzang Yawnghwe

66

a new Burmese power centre under Burinnong (1551-81), Tai dominated all

areas.

the Shan or

Burma, with the exception of Arakan and some Mon

The Burmese were confined to small p r i n c i p a l i t i e s

such as

those at Tour goo, Prome (Prae) which paid homage to the Shan-dominated

court at Ava. After Pagan, there were two centres of Shan or Tai power at Ava as mentioned, and another, the Tai Mao kingdom.

--

one

It seems that

Ava comprised both Shan and Burmese, though i t

could we11 be that in

the early years the Tai were the majority.10

Or perhaps, they l i k e

the Mongol and Manchu i n China constituted on1y a thin top strata. In contrast,

the Tai Mao kingdom was wholly Tai or Shan and i t

included

the

eleven

Yunnan Shan states ,II Muang Yang (Mohr yin

Burmese)

and Muang Gong (Mogaung) which covered a t ]

in

of Upper Burma

north of Shwebo; and the principalities of Muang Mit, Hsenwi, Hsipaw

(0ngbong),

Muang

Pai ,12

Muang

Nai,

and

Yawnghwe 9

Kengtung,

the

original components of Shan state.

of th e t we Th at cent res, the Tai Mao Shan were not only more powerful,

they also had a say i n who should rule

at Ava.13

The Ava

kings in turn regarded the Tai Mao princes as a l l i e s and depended on

these

princes

in

times

of

trouble

or

war.

It

has never

been

determined why Ava and Muang Mao did not merge into a single kingdom or

why scant attention

historians

on

Burma

is

despite

developments i n Ava.14

f all

accorded to

its

the Tai Mao kingdom by all

close

links

with

events

and

Shan dominance i n Burma Proper ended with the

of Ava to the great Burmese conqueror Burinnong i n 1555, and i n

1604, Shan cohesion was shattered when the Muang Mao kingdom f e l l to

an inv ° ading Chinese force. Regardless of the destruction far

from being dispersed,

under

their

respective

of their' power centres,

prevailed

chaofa.

as forces

to be reckoned with

Burmese chronicles

such

Hmannan Maha Yazawintawkyi [The glass palace c h r o n i c l e s , mention

elephants

the

presence

of

Shan ministers

in

the Shan,

as

the

frequently

Burmese courts,

of

Shan

and horses i n wars, of Shan spearmen, and of Shan princes

par ticipating in wars against

the Mon and in foreign wars, not as

nameless subjects or tribal cannon fodder, but as princes who obeyed

The Development of Shan-Burmese Relations

67

only the king and owed personal loyalty.15

In addition Shan princes

and Shan women warriors. fought the B r i t i s h

during the F i r s t Anglo-

Burmese War (1824) at Prome with so much velour that their foes were impressed.

Major J.D.

Snodgrass, a participant, had this t o say:

Eight thousand men of h i s [Maha Ne-myo, a Burmese prince] corps d'armee were Shans

accompanied by three young and

handsome women of high rank, constantly

among the

These Amazons

troops,

rode

inspiring them w i t h courage

and ardent wishes for an early meeting with their foe, The grey-headed Chobwas of the Shan

...

swords i n hand

...

attacking a l l who offered to approach them with humane and

friendly

feelings,

they only sought the death which too

many of them found.16

On the other side of the coin however, rebellions were frequent.

Though submitting t o exceptional Burmese kings such as

Burinnong (1551-81),

Alaungpaya (1752-60), and Hsinphyushin (1763-76),

rebellion was never far from their minds. King Burinnong, the greatest Muang N a i ,

by Shan chaofa

of Burmese monarchs, Shan princes

Yawnghwe, Kengtung,

Hsipaw, Muang M i t ,

Muang Gong, rebelled repeatedly. rare one not led by princes.l7

Burmese capital

Even during the reign of of

Muang Yang, and

There was also a Shan rebellion, a It occurred i n Hanthawaddy (Pegu), the

i n 1564 involving tens of thousands of Shan, who not

onl y burned down the capital,

but also took several provinces.18

was quelled only when Burinnong returned

It

from Ayuthia and personally

put i t down. Despite countless rebellions by patriotic Shan princes, the Shan

did not succeed i n overthrowing what they saw as a foreign overlord, which also meant, conversely, that Burmese kings were never able to really

control

the

Shan.19

From

time

to

time,

certain

Shan

p r i n c i p a l i t i e s were able t o free themselves, but according t o Harvey,

"whenever

a recalcitrant

answer the royal

Sawbwa gave trouble,

summons and put

characterized

all

of coherence"

i n the

more grievous plights.20

Sawbwas would

down the wicked member"

Shan struggles for Shan psyche,

other

freedom, revealing

which not

That i s ,

--

this

" a f a t a l want

s u r p r i s i n g l y l e d them t o

their r'ebeHiorn achieved nothing

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