The Shah’s Iran - Rise and Fall: Conversations with an Insider 9781350989245, 9781786731647

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The Shah’S Iran Rise and Fall Conversations with an Insider

abdolrez a anSarI T r a n sl aT e d by K aTayo on a n s a r i - bigl a r i

Abdolreza Ansari was a rising figure in the politics of Iran from the 1950s to the Islamic Revolution. He has lived in Paris since 1978. The interviews for this book were conducted in Washington DC and Paris.

‘Among the myriad of familiar autobiographies, Abdolreza Ansari’s personal contribution is particularly noteworthy because it is written with authority, care and frankness. Apart from this book’s authentic voice, the author’s own wide-ranging knowledge and his account of events, there is also his use of language, which captures the flavour of those times; all these combine to enrich this study.’ Dr Jamshid Amuzegar, former Prime Minister of Iran

‘Few individuals were as close to the heart of power in Pahlavi-era Iran as Abdolreza Ansari, who served the last Shah in several key functions. Rich in detail and anecdote, his memoir is essential reading for scholars of twentieth-century Iranian politics and history, and also for general readers who would like to learn more about the development of the Iranian state at a critical time in its history.’ Andrew Scott Cooper, author of The Oil Kings

The Shah’s Iran – Rise and Fall Conversations with an Insider

Abdolreza Ansari Translated by Katayoon Ansari-Biglari

Published in 2017 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright © 2017 Abdolreza Ansari English translation copyright © 2017 Katayoon Ansari-Biglari The rights of Abdolreza Ansari and Katayoon Ansari-Biglari to be identified respectively as author and translator of this work have been asserted by the author and translator in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Every attempt has been made to gain permission for the use of the images in this book. Any omissions will be rectified in future editions. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. ISBN: 978 1 78453 632 9 eISBN: 978 1 78672 164 8 ePDF: 978 1 78673 164 7 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset by Fakenham Prepress Solutions, Fakenham, Norfolk NR21 8NN

This book is dedicated to my dear wife Marianoush who has stayed by my side throughout this tumultuous life. Utterly selfless, she created a loving home for our children Nazenin, Katayoon, and Mohamad-Reza. Her encouragement and support in recording my experiences of over 26 years of service to my country was the impetus for this project. This book is also in honour of the countless civil servants who worked diligently to modernise Iran, and whose lives came crashing down in the upheaval of the revolution.

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Contents



Map of Iran

vi



List of Plates

viii



Publishers’ Foreword



Note

xiii



Foreword by Gholamreza Afkhami

xiv

x

  1: From Birth to Employment

1

  2: The Americans in Iran

11

  3: The Treasury

53

  4: From the New Iran Group to the Nationalist Party

73

  5: At the Ministry of Labour

85

  6: Establishment of the Khuzestan Water and Power Authority

97

  7: Governorship in Khuzestan

147

  8: At the Ministry of the Interior

167

  9: The Period after the Ministry

211

10: Collaboration with Princess Ashraf

213

11: Celebration at Persepolis

249



Postscript

303



Index

307 vii

List of Plates

1. Assadollah Alam, Prime Minister 19 July 1962 – 7 March 1964. 2. Dr Ali Amini, Prime Minister 6 May 1961 – 19 July 1962. 3. General Fazlollah Zahedi, Prime Minister 19 August 1953 – 7 April 1955. 4. Hossein Ala, Prime Minister 12 March 1951 – 30 April 1951; 7 April 1955 – 3 April 1957. 5. Hassan Ali Mansur, Prime Minister 7 March 1964 – 26 January 1965. 6. Dr Manouchehr Eghbal, Prime Minister 3 April 1957 – 31 August 1960. 7. Engineer Jafar Sharif-Emami, Prime Minister 27 August 1978 – 6 November 1978. 8. Dr Mohammad Mossadegh, Prime Minister 21 July 1952 – 19 August 1953. 9. Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister 26 January 1965 – 7 August 1977. 10. Dr Jamshid Amuzegar, Prime Minister 7 August 1977 – 27 August 1978. 11. Ardeshir Zahedi, Minister of Foreign Affairs / Ambassador to UK and USA. 12. Mahnaz Afkhami, Minister of State for Women and Family Affairs. 13. Group of friends at Utah State University. Left to right: Abdollah Mansour, Abdolreza Ansari, Amir Hossein Nakhaee, Mansour Esfandiari, Ardeshir Zahedi. 14. Utah State Soccer Champions. Hamid Naghsh-Tabrizi is receiving the trophy; Abdolreza Ansari is #45. 15. Abdolreza Ansari (second from left) with Karaj Agricultural College Faculty. viii

L ist o f P lates

16. Celebrating the establishment of the Iran–US Joint Fund for Economic Development. Left to right: Dr Mohammad Moghadam, Edith Warne, William E. Warne, Abdolreza Ansari, Dr Fakhreddin Shadman. 17. Left to right: Norman Paul, Loy W. Henderson, General Fazlollah Zahedi, William E. Warne. 18. Group of managers at Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, 1962–3. Left to right: Mansour Asgari, Ahmad Ali Ahmadi, Nader Hakimi, Afrasiab Bakhtiar, Ali Asghar Sherkat, Hassan Shahmirzadi, Morteza Nasser, Ali Asghar Ajdari, Mohamad-Javad Monshizadeh, Ahmad Kompani. 19. Inauguration of the Cane Sugar Project in Haft-Tappeh. Left to right: Ibrahim Mahdavi, Morteza Vakilzadeh, Abdolreza Ansari, Leo Anderson, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. 20. Ceremony to begin the pouring of cement for the Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Dam (Dez Dam), 30 October 1961. 21. Abdolreza Ansari (centre) surrounded by the operators of Dez Dam. 22. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Dam (Dez Dam). 23. Princess Ashraf Pahlavi (Bettmann / Getty Images). 24. Shahyad Monument in Tehran, built to commemorate 2,500 years of the founding of the Persian Empire. 25. Pasargad, Tomb of Cyrus the Great. 26. The Shah and Queen Farah greeting Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia and his wife. 27. Princess Grace of Monaco and Prince Rainier. 28. Queen Farah and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. 29. The Shah and Nicolai Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, speaking through interpreters. 30. Period Iranian military formation marching in front of foreign and Iranian dignitaries on the steps of the Hall of Nations at Persepolis. 31. Replica of ancient Iranian vessel. 32. Replica of military tower. 33. Foreign and Iranian guests dining inside the grand tent at a state dinner. 34. The tents that housed heads of states at Persepolis during the 2,500-year celebrations. ix

Publishers’ Foreword

A

bdolreza Ansari was a senior member of the elite which was attempting to manage Iran’s twentieth-century transition to modernity. In the event, the Western flavour of that transition proved both culturally and politically difficult for the country to absorb, resulting in discontent and eventual rejection when the 1979 Revolution upended the regime of the Shah and abolished the ancient institution of monarchy in Iran. The decades leading up to 1979 saw the emergence of a new political class in Iran which was no longer beholden to the feudal and patronage-based tradition of power dispensation which had dominated the Iranian political scene for centuries. From the 1950s the conduct of politics and national administration shifted to a new elite of educated young men (with still precious few women among them) who emerged as a technocracy which had grasped the realities of mid-twentiethcentury Iran: a country with an appalling recent history of failure and exploitation by outside powers, now bolstered by growing oil revenues and a growing educated consumer middle-class, was now in a position to throw off the stigma of poverty and a failed past, and to develop into a properly functioning modern state. These individuals, seeing the possibilities before them, were fuelled by two characteristics: a determination to make a go of pulling up their country by its bootstraps, now that it was possible; and a kind of patriotism which created a sense of duty. None of this is to say that their task was easy. The remnants of old thinking often held sway in an environment where contacts, connections and influence – parti – were still important. Petty x

P ublishers’ F o rewo rd

corruption and often mega-corruption were still endemic. Squabbling and jockeying for position and power were still factors. And the heavy hand of a highly centralised autocracy still inhibited decision-making. But none of these factors put a brake on the optimism and exuberance which defined the two and a half critical decades following the 1953 coup, which removed the government of Dr Mohammad Mossadegh and restored the absolute rule of the Shah up to 1978. This was a period of possibilities managed by technocrats who entered the system as well-intentioned achievers and doers, and who by and large managed to navigate their efforts through whatever structural difficulties faced their plans and ambitions. Their commitment to and enthusiasm for fashioning a modern state out of Iran left a permanent mark on their country that has outlasted their presence on the scene. Abdolreza Ansari was just such an individual in the early 1950s when he returned from his studies in the United States to play his part in Iran’s quest for modernity. Ansari’s advance in the administrative hierarchy of the century was rapid. By the age of 32 he had become National Treasurer of the country, then advanced to Minister of Labour and Minister of the Interior before becoming director of all the NGOs and charities controlled by Princess Ashraf. These interviews, which Ansari recorded well after his departure from Iran, are obviously the record of one man speaking about a range of projects and issues with which he was involved. As such they are the perspectives of a single individual. But they have a transcendent importance, which makes their publication a significant contribution to the historiography and narrative of a pivotal era in Iran’s late twentiethcentury history. Ansari’s words may represent the experiences of one man as described by himself. But this was a man who was at the centre of events. More importantly his words capture the spirit and essence of those times. His is the authentic voice of the political elite in late Pahlavi Iran. He reveals not so much dramatic new data, but rather the climate and environment in which the political elite – together with their thought process and their decision-making – operated, whether on matters of supreme importance or supreme triviality. We witness the relationships, concerns, rivalries and petty interests as well as the grand picture of a country attempting to change itself, with its political elite xi

P ublishers’ F o rewo rd

seeking to combine modernism, economic development and a degree of reform with historical traditions, which were not in every instance very helpful. Even the courtly language of Ansari – the politesse of his references to others, the deference to the Shah and his consort, the elegant turn of phrase, the elaborate restraint with which he describes difficult situations – all these combine to paint a picture of power in late Pahlavi Iran. We believe that future scholars and historians will find his words and the way he expresses himself invaluable as they attempt to understand the social and political texture of Iran’s leadership in an extraordinarily difficult yet transformative period in the country’s history. These are the reasons why Abdolreza Ansari’s words deserve to be made available to an international readership.

xii

Note

T

he overwhelming majority of the dialogues in this book took place between Abdolreza Ansari and Gholamreza Afkhami in the early years of the new millennium as part of the latter’s oral history project produced by the Foundation for Iranian Studies. Some interviews involving others, mostly relating to the Persepolis Celebrations of 1971, took place later.

xiii

Foreword The Foundation for Iranian Studies and Abdolreza Ansari

T

his volume is the English translation of the tenth volume in the ‘Iran’s Economic and Social Development, 1941–1978 Series’ produced by the Foundation for Iranian Studies (FIS). The series, which I edit, is an extension of the Foundation’s oral history programme. Over the years, scholars at the Foundation concluded that the material contained in the FIS oral history archives – hundreds of hours of interviews with Iranians and non-Iranians directly involved in the private and public decision-making processes of Pahlavi Iran – did not always support the historiography of the period produced after the revolution by scholars, pamphleteers, reporters and other writers in the Islamic Republic or abroad. The experiences and perspectives of major players from this period often provided facts, insights and details which we at FIS believed should be made part of the historical record available to historians and other researchers. At the same time it seemed important to allow for some distance to evolve from the pressures and emotions created by the revolution in order to ensure a greater degree of objective judgement. By a decade after the revolution the time had come to select a range of individuals and topics of particular interest in order to create a series of focused interviews. I am particularly happy to write the foreword to this volume because the idea of the series was crystallised in 1991 xiv

T he F oundation for I ranian S tudiesandA bdolreza A nsari

during an oral history interview I was conducting with Abdolreza Ansari. As a former Cabinet Minister and general manager of a major development project in Iran, he seemed an ideal individual to select for in-depth interview. The idea we agreed upon was for the interviewer to work with the interviewee to develop together the framework of the interview, and for the interviewee to be actively involved in all levels of the project – a partnership in every sense. Khuzestan’s development – as reflected in the politics and complexities of launching the Khuzestan Water and Power Authority (KWPA) under its first managing director, Abdolreza Ansari – became the Foundation’s first project. The resulting book, published in 1994 and based on interviews with Abdolreza Ansari and his two deputies at the KWPA – Hassan Shahmirzadi and Ahmad Ali Ahmadi – launched the series. Since then nine other volumes have been published, with eight focusing on a specific issue rather than the narrator’s personal history. The recollections of actual interactions by different personalities dealing with the same problem within a shared political environment has imbued the subjects with a dynamic that transcends individual narratives enhancing their value. The Persian version of the ten books so far completed may be accessed and read on the Foundation for Iranian Studies website: www.fis-iran.org/fa/resources/development-series. The present volume, consisting of an English translation of interviews conducted in Persian, covers the life experience of one of the most versatile and effective political and administrative figures of the Pahlavi era who served during a period of profound economic, social, cultural and political changes. Having finished his studies in the United States, Ansari began his career in 1951 at the Point Four AID Programme office in Tehran amidst the turbulence of the oil nationalisation saga. Point Four did much good work in a variety of health and development fields in rural and urban Iran. Just as important, Point Four was also an opportunity for many intelligent and eager young Iranians to launch careers toward effective service to their country. In the mid-1950s Ansari was appointed Treasurer General at the Ministry of Finance. About the same time, he and several other young American-educated upwardly mobile Iranians formed an organisation called New Iran. The organisation xv

T he F oundation for I ranian S tudiesandA bdolreza A nsari

caught the attention of the political parties and several members were invited to join one or the other of the two main parties – the Melliyoun (National) Party and the Mardom (People’s) Party. Ansari joined the Melliyoun Party. This was the time for educated young achievers to step into the shoes of the old guard in high office. Ansari, who had caught the eye of Prime Minister and Melliyoun Party leader Dr Manouchehr Eghbal, was appointed Minister of Labour in early 1960. Later that year, the Dr Eghbal Cabinet fell. Ansari was invited by the head of the Plan Organisation (PO) to take over the operations of the Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, until then the most important development project in Iran. The KWPA was initiated in mid-1955 by then PO head Abolhassan Ebtehaj and managed by David Lilienthal, president of the Development and Resources Corporation and former manager of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and his organisation. It was now being turned over to Iranian management. Soon after, Ansari was appointed as the Governor General of Khuzestan province in addition to his position as managing director. He was appointed Minister of the Interior in 1966 and served until 1969. He was then asked by Princess Ashraf Pahlavi to serve as her deputy – in effect to manage the various social, educational and charitable organisations under her umbrella, the most important of which was the Imperial Organisation for Social Services (IOSS). This was a vast organisation with a reach across society which might well be compared with a Ministry of Social Services and Women’s Affairs. Readers of this volume will find that Abdolreza Ansari’s experience is panoramic in scope, his perspective is penetrating and reasoned, his language is unpretentious, and his observations acute and to the point. He enlivens the events, and his discourse is informed and at the same time provides accessible reading for everyone interested in the political culture of Pahlavi Iran – the resulting work becomes an important addition to the historiography of twentieth-century Iran for scholars and researchers and a compelling narrative for general readers. Gholamreza Afkhami

xvi



1



From Birth to Employment

What is the background of your family life, education and youth? And then, your trajectory into government service? Abdolreza Ansari: My father, Colonel Mohammad-Hossein Ansari, was killed in Bojnourd (north-east Iran near the Turkmenistan border) in 1925, before I was born. My mother was the daughter of Brigadier General Ahmad Khan Shirloo, the army commander in Kermanshah (north-west Iran on the Iraq border). My father, also, lost his father at a young age and was placed under the care of his uncle, Major General Mahmood Ansari, titled Amir Eghtedar.1 He went to school with his cousins, entered the military, rose up the ranks to lieutenant colonel, and was sent to Khorasan Province (north-east Iran) on a mission. Preparations for his wedding were made in Tehran, while the groom was in Mashhad (principal city of Khorasan) and the bride’s father was in Kermanshah. The bride was sent to her husband by a carriage escorted with several armed guards. My parents lived together for seven months before my father was sent on another mission to Bojnourd, where he lost his life during a clash with Turkmen rebels. Subsequently, my mother returned to her father’s home in Tehran. I have to mention that all the men in my family were in the military: my father, grandfather, many relatives on both sides, and nearly all the 1

The type of honorific title granted to public servants in the Qajar era. 1

T H E SHA H’ S I R A N – R I SE A N D FA L L

people that I knew. The reason was that my ancestors had emigrated from the Caucasus region. They were Iranians who, prior to the Russo-Persian wars of the early nineteenth century, were chieftains in the tribes residing in Karabagh, Yerevan and Nakhchivan. Following the capture of 17 towns in the South Caucasus by the Russians, these chieftains refused to submit to the occupiers’ flag; they crossed the Aras River and settled on the Iranian side. Because they were warriors and spoke Russian, they entered the Iranian military’s Cossack units called ‘Ghazzagh-Khaneh’ and quickly rose through the ranks. After the establishment of the modern Iranian military, Reza Shah, who was familiar with their background and abilities, placed them in key military and government posts. For example, in 1921, a few months after the military coup (the 3rd of Esfand coup), when Reza Khan (then known as Commander of the Army Sardar Sepah) removed Tehran’s military commander, Colonel Kazem Khan Sayyah, he replaced him with my uncle, Brigadier General Mahmood Khan Ansari, who later became Reza Khan’s Minister of Post and Telegraph and the Minister of the Interior. In Tehran, I grew up in the neighbourhoods of Amiriyeh, Shahpour Avenue, Agha Sheik Hadi Bazaar, and the Hassanabad area. Nearly all my relatives lived in those parts of the city, and because we lived in close proximity with each other, we socialised constantly among ourselves. Two characteristics define the environment in which I was raised: first, a deep sense of patriotism, and second, the humility and simplicity of a soldier’s life. My family was intensely patriotic and nationalistic, and indifferent to the formalities and luxuries of life. I have to say that this environment left a deep impression on me, for which I am grateful to this day. Anyway, my childhood was spent in my grandfather’s home, and I attended Sharaf Elementary School. One of my schoolmates was Manouchehr Nikpour, with whom, as we were the two smallest boys of our grade, I shared a desk in the front row. For my high school education, I attended Firouz Bahram Secondary School, where I graduated and then attended Alborz College to prepare for entrance to the University of Tehran. After one year, I received my diploma in science. Manouchehr Kalali, who later became a Cabinet Minister and Secretary General of the Iran Novin (New Iran) Party, 2

F rom B irth to E mployment

was a classmate of mine at Alborz. We both received similar final grades in the national final exam (GPA of 15/17) and shared second place in the Tehran school district. I mention this because, after 24 years, our relationship had a profound effect on my career, on which I will elaborate later.

Was Dr Mohammad Ali Mojtahedi the school principal at Alborz at the time? A.A.: Dr Mojtahedi was our algebra teacher; the principal was Dr Lotfali Sooratgar. Dr Mojtahedi became the principal later. After high school, I wanted to go to the Engineering College at the University of Tehran, but for some reason changed my mind, to study medicine, but my mother objected. Because my family owned land which included a village, I was encouraged to choose the College of Agriculture.

Your relatives were generally in the military. Didn’t you have any desire to enter the army? A.A.: Not at all. Military life had no attraction for me. Since childhood I was drawn to books and preferred to spend my time reading. Most of the children in our family who were in my generation ended up attending the Military College, but I finally went to the College of Agriculture.

So you graduated from the College of Agriculture of the University of Tehran? A.A.: Yes, at the time they would award an engineering degree to the graduates of the College of Agriculture, and that is why some people still address me by that title, Engineer (Mohandes) Ansari. Once I finished my studies, I realised that it was not the foundation on which I wanted to build my future. Therefore, I entered the Law School at the same 3

T H E SHA H’ S I R A N – R I SE A N D FA L L

time I entered public service. Graduates of the College of Agriculture who wanted to start a government career would seek employment in the Ministry of Agriculture. For example, my college friend Amir Hossein Amir Parviz entered the Ministry of Agriculture and moved up the ranks and finally became the Minister in the Cabinet of Jafar Sharif-Emami.2 However, I decided to go to the Ministry of Labour. It had just been created and was referred to as the Ministry of Labour and Propaganda. There, I found a job in the Propaganda Division. My first assignment was in an office that was next to the lavatories and was supervised by a very nice man who had a ninth-grade education, and I was the only staff worker. His job was to read the mail that was received and file some of that mail as ‘confidential’. I was curious about this folder that he so zealously guarded. One day, the folder accidentally fell to the ground, and as I helped pick up the contents, I realised they were nothing but newspaper clippings. This was around 1945–6, when Ahmad Ghavam was Prime Minister. My assignment changed after a few months, and I became a reporter for Radio Tehran, which was part of the propaganda bureau that was located in Arg Square. Further up the street were the Chancellery and the Ministry of Justice. I had to visit these institutions every day to gather news. The Prime Minister had located his office in the nearby Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I would stop by there as well. It was a very interesting and eventful period. It was a tumultuous time in Azerbaijan:3 the Tudeh Party4 was very powerful, and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan5 had been formed. The government would 2

Twice Prime Minister for two short periods in 1960–1 and 1978. Better known as President of Iran’s Senate 1964–78.

3

In 1946 Soviet forces in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan were not withdrawn contrary to agreements made by Moscow with Iran, Britain and the USA following the Allied occupation of Iran in 1941. At the same time the Soviets backed a breakaway Azerbaijan People’s Republic, which was disbanded after the eventual Soviet withdrawal in late 1946. This episode has been viewed as the first serious confrontation of what was to become the Cold War.

4

Iran’s Communist Party – Moscow affiliated.

5

A Kurdish Communist Party formed in 1945 – also Moscow affiliated – to press for independence for Iranian Kurdistan, which they named the Republic of Mahabad. 4

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issue daily pronouncements, and for a young man fresh out of college, being in contact with high government officials was very exciting and educational. My contact at the Interior Ministry was the director in charge of the administration.

What was his name? A.A.: A Mr Malekzadeh. His office was the hangout of well-known high officials of the Interior Ministry. Whenever I would go to get the latest news, he would often invite me to sit down and have some tea. I learned a lot by listening to their conversations. The news I had to report for the radio was often bland and without much content. It usually stated that a commission had been set up by such and such a department and attended by so and so and some important matter was discussed. The objective was to report the names of some officials on the radio, not the content of the discussions. The same was true for the Ministry of Justice. An interesting recollection from this time is the trial of Seyed Mohammad Taddayon, the former Minister of the Interior. He was being tried at the Supreme Court on accusations brought against him at the National Assembly. Being quite an orator, he fervently defended himself. His defence was fascinating for me as I witnessed that the mistakes of a minister, regardless of his authority and the power of his political backers, could have harsh consequences. The period of my reporting for Radio Tehran was about one year. At that time I had a friend named Engineer Saeed Fozouni who wrote poetry, which was published in a weekly newspaper called Baba Shamal. It was a satirical and political publication, and my friend would sign under the pseudonym Mohandess-o-Shoara. In 1947, Ahmad Ghavam’s government collapsed; Hakim-el-Molk took over, and Dr Mohammad Sajadi was appointed Minister of the Economy. My friend Fozouni was chosen as Director General in charge of the Secretariat of the Ministry, and he took me as his assistant. This job had a profound impact on my career. The office of the Director General had two assistants: me and a Mr Yazdani, who had 20 years of work experience and 5

T H E SHA H’ S I R A N – R I SE A N D FA L L

was extremely knowledgeable about bureaucratic procedures. Being a novice and interested in learning, I used this opportunity to educate myself. Mr Yazdani would have me read reports that were sent to the office by Iranian economic representatives abroad. For example, the reports of the late Hassan Shahid Nourai, the economic attaché in Paris, were extremely interesting in content and discourse and quite educational. Meanwhile I was pursuing my education by attending law school.

Did this Mr Yazdani give you these reports to read for a special purpose, or was his objective to increase your knowledge and understanding of the inner workings of the department? A.A.: Not much action was taken in our office about these reports. The principal mission of the office was to handle the correspondence of the Minister and relay the orders and decisions to the relevant department. If Mr Yazdani placed some report in a folder without showing it to me and sent it to the archives, I would not question it. He was a decent man and would treat me as a younger brother, and his objective was to teach me the ropes. I am indebted to him. Another experienced and well-intentioned individual in the Ministry was Gholamreza Kian, the Deputy Minister. The decisions that he made on different subjects and instructions that he gave were a testament to his vast knowledge of the Iranian economy and the working mechanism of the Iranian government. I learned a lot from him. Twelve years later, when I became Minister of Labour in the Cabinet of Dr Manouchehr Eghbal, Dr Kian was Minister of State, and we became good friends. I served in that post as Mr Yazdani’s assistant for about a year, and then the preparations for my departure for the United States were finalised. By taking extended, unpaid leave, I left for the United States to pursue my studies.

6

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The period that you have just discussed was politically volatile, and several parties were active in the Iranian political arena. What was the situation of the young people of your age and generation in relation to these groups, in particular to the Tudeh Party, which was very powerful? What was your view and which way were you leaning? A.A.: At the College of Agriculture, classmates who were mesmerised by the Tudeh Party far outnumbered those who weren’t. A group of them joined the Tudeh Party, and some of them reached high positions in the Party. Those of us who for one reason or another were not attracted to the Tudeh Party and its platform and objectives were in the minority. My lack of interest, and probably that of some other students, stemmed from the association of the Tudeh Party with occupying foreign forces. On our way to and from college, we had to pass through checkpoints manned by Russian soldiers. The campus of the College of Agriculture was in Karaj. Students living in dormitories would take the bus on weekends to and from Tehran. The Russians had set up a checkpoint at Karvansara Sangi. The bus had to stop there. Russian soldiers would board the bus and conduct a search, and only if they did not find anything suspicious would they allow the bus to continue on its way. Experiencing this situation on our own soil behind Tehran’s Old Gate – foreign soldiers controlling and deciding our fate – was disgraceful and extremely painful for a young Iranian student. Apart from that, the area that had been designated for the construction of a steel mill during the reign of Reza Shah had been taken over by the Russians, who set up camp in the dilapidated buildings. Our college was on the way to these buildings, and the Russians would pass through the campus in their comings and goings. They would also use college facilities to show movies or whatever. We were constantly rubbing shoulders with them. They had even formed a soccer team that would play against our school soccer team. During this time, we were subject to their crude and rough ways. While some of our classmates were rabid supporters of the Soviet Union and were attracted to the Tudeh Party’s propaganda, I was agonised by what was taking place before my eyes. 7

T H E SHA H’ S I R A N – R I SE A N D FA L L

Back to your studies: in what year did you go to the United States? A.A.: In 1948. Accompanied by a friend and classmate, Houshang Amery, I set out for the United States with plans to attend the University of California at Berkeley. But after our arrival in New York, Mr Amery’s uncle, who had been living the United States for about 30 years, discouraged us from going to California. He recommended that, because the president of Utah State University had served in Iran as an adviser for several years and had a positive disposition toward Iranians, we should pursue our studies in Utah. Since we had little information about American universities, we headed to Utah without questioning his judgement. With my undergraduate college degree, and having completed five years of coursework at the University of Tehran, I was able to enter the master’s programme in economics at Utah State. After two years of intensive studies, I was able to graduate with honours. There were several Iranian students who returned home after completing their studies and rose to high government positions: Ardeshir Zahedi, Ahmad Ali Ahmadi, Darab Asaad, and Abbas Ghaffari to name a few. After graduation, I went to Los Angeles to continue my studies at the University of California. The nationalisation of oil in Iran was the important political and global issue of the day and one of the top news stories of that time. Under the direction of my adviser, I picked the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry as the topic for my doctoral thesis. I returned to Iran at the end of 1951 to collect documents and data for my dissertation. After visiting family and friends in Tehran, I learned about an organisation called the Iran–US Joint Commission for Rural Development, headed by Franklin Harris, the former president of Utah State University. A number of my friends from college had started working there, including Ardeshir Zahedi as assistant to Dr Harris and Houshang Ram as assistant to the executive officer. One day I went to see Sultan Mohammad Amery, my friend Houshang’s father, as a formality and to give him some news of his son. You have to remember that in those days communication between the United States and Iran was very difficult, and, unlike today, people were not up to date about world events. The only means of communication was by mail or telegraph, and it would take several weeks for a letter 8

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from Tehran to reach Los Angeles; numerous letters never got to their destination. Therefore, visits of travellers with news of loved ones was of highest importance. Anyway, having made an appointment, I went to see Mr Amery, who was a member of the Board of Supervisors of the Plan Organisation. He greeted me with affection and, after hearing news about his son, he said that a few one-year student awards called Fulbright Scholarships had been made available by the US government for eligible Iranian students. He asked for my help in completing the forms that he had acquired from the American Embassy for his son Houshang. I gladly accepted and took the forms to complete. A couple of days later, I completed the forms and took them back to his office. He thanked me graciously and told me that he had made an appointment for me to see Prince Abdolreza, half-brother of the Shah, a Harvard graduate and the acting head of the Plan Organisation. Mr Amery urged me to go to the prince’s secretariat the very same day in order to receive information about the time of the appointment. I told him that I was neither acquainted with Prince Abdolreza nor had any requests to present to him, so I did not think I should waste his time. Mr Amery said that he considered me as his own son and advised me to listen to him carefully. He said that I was just beginning my career and had to realise that our country was in the initial stages of economic development, and that in the coming years the country would need every educated young person to make a contribution. If I indeed intended to serve my country, he recommended that I familiarise myself with national development programmes and establish contact with influential officials. Now that I was in Tehran, I should meet Prince Abdolreza, a well-educated and enlightened individual, who was in charge of the development programme for the country. I acquiesced, got the address, and headed toward the prince’s palace on Kakh Avenue. On my way, I started having doubts about going to see the prince. I turned around to go back to see Mr Amery at his office and to frankly tell him of my uncertainty. As I approached the Plan Organisation building, I thought that it was inappropriate for me to rebuff the favour of this kind old gentleman, and besides, meeting with the young and educated brother of the Shah could not be detrimental to my future. Why shouldn’t I go through with this and later thank Mr 9

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Amery for his kindness? Anyway, it was a difficult decision, and after walking for about half an hour between the two buildings, I decided to go to Prince Abdolreza’s office. When I arrived, an aide escorted me to the office of Jamshid Khabir, his chief of staff. Mr Khabir, a very charming and well-mannered gentleman from a respected family, greeted me cordially and inquired about my family background. He happened to know and socialise with some of my relatives. Meanwhile, the aide returned to announce the arrival of an American gentleman. Before long, a relatively tall man in an elegant navy blue suit with a dignified demeanour entered. Mr Khabir rose to greet him, and so did I. Mr Khabir then introduced me as a recently returned student from the United States, and William Warne, the American, was introduced as the new director of ‘Point Four’.6 Mr Warne asked where I had done my studies; I replied in Utah and California. He said that he was from California and had recently arrived in Tehran. He said that he was happy to have met me and asked if I could join him the following afternoon for coffee at his office. I gladly accepted his offer. Shortly after our brief exchange, he was ushered by Mr Khabir to Prince Abdolreza’s office. Mr Khabir told me that he would inform me of the time for my appointment with the prince later. He never called!

6

See next section for explanation. 10

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2

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The Americans in Iran

Did you at least follow up with William Warne? Abdolreza Ansari: The day after my brief encounter with Mr Warne, I went to his office on Sepah Avenue, the same building where my college friends were working. Mr Warne spoke with me for about an hour; his questions were mainly about social issues and economic difficulties in Iran in the aftermath of World War II. He asked about problems with education, health, agricultural production, manufacturing and urban development. I did my best to answer his questions with my limited experience and information. He also asked about my family situation and educational goals. I explained to him that I was in Iran temporarily to conduct research and gather data and would return to the United States to complete my doctoral dissertation; meanwhile, I added that I would be interested in a part-time job to make some money. At that point he called his colleague, James J. Goulden, and instructed him to employ me as his administrative assistant. Mr Warne then turned to me and asked if that was all right with me and added that in that position I would be able to familiarise myself with the working mechanisms of the government and collect the information that I was after while working for him. I told him that several of my friends were working there already and that I would gladly accept his offer. But since I was already employed by the Ministry of National Economy, I would 11

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need to get their approval. He replied that it would not be a problem, since the government of Iran had authorised ‘Point Four’ to employ any qualified government employee of their choice, and that question would therefore be taken care of. I thanked him for his offer and started working in a small office next to his the following day.

When you started working there, other than Mr Warne and Mr Goulden, how many people were there? Had they employed many people already? A.A.: At that time, Point Four consisted of three people: Mr Warne, his American secretary, and me. In 1949, President Harry Truman had proposed a four-part plan in his inaugural speech. The fourth section dealt with the United States providing technical assistance to developing countries to allow them to raise their standard of living through better use of their natural resources. The first such agreement was signed with the government of Iran. General Haji-Ali Razmara, the Prime Minister at the time, signed the agreement on 9 October 1950. Franklin Harris, the president of Utah State University and former consultant to government of Iran, was chosen as the chief of the mission in charge of implementing this programme. The first organisation that was set up under this programme was called the Iran–US Joint Commission for Rural Development. This was the organisation where my college friends and a number of recent graduates from US universities were working on national projects in the fields of agriculture, health and education. In 1951, the US government decided to expand its technical assistance programme in Iran and chose William E. Warne, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, to head the programme. He set up his office at the facilities of the Iran–US Joint Commission. But to launch the new programme, a new agreement had to be signed with the Iranian government to authorise the new projects that had been contemplated. With the arrival of Mr Warne in Iran, Dr Harris delegated his work at the Joint Commission to his American assistant and left Iran. The projects that were already approved continued to progress according to the original plan without 12

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any difficulty, while the planning for the new programme was being discussed. The first few months were consumed by negotiations with the Iranian government over the planning for the new structure of the organisation, the nature of the projects, and the means of their implementation. During this time, different units of the Joint Commission provided administrative support for the new Point Four programme and began adapting themselves to the new direction. In a meeting with the Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh,1 Mr Warne and Loy W. Henderson, the American Ambassador, informed the Prime Minister that the American government was prepared to provide $23 million in additional funds for the new projects. The Prime Minister said that he would appoint a committee composed of several ministers to work with the American officials. Thus the so-called Cabinet Committee was composed of Mohammad Ali Maleki, the Minister of Health, who acted as chairman; Ahmad Zanganeh, managing director of the Plan Organisation; Dr Mahmoud Hessabi, Minister of Education; Khalil Taleghani, Minister of Agriculture; and Abolhassan Raji, assistant director of the Plan Organisation, who acted as the executive secretary for the committee. At the first meeting of the committee, after the usual formal greetings, the US proposals were presented. Mr Warne started his presentation by stating that the American government wished to cooperate with the government of Iran in tackling its economic problems by improving the management of its human and natural resources. He stated that although Iran was in a very difficult financial situation and had difficulty meeting its obligations, the US government believed that with increased technical assistance, given its vast natural resources, Iran could fundamentally alter the situation and stabilise its economic future in a short period. He said that the US government was ready to provide, through the Point Four programme, the necessary technical assistance to the Iranian government. Dr Maleki extended the gratitude of the Iranian government and pledged the government’s full cooperation with Point Four. After 1

Dr Mossadegh had only recently been appointed Prime Minister and relations with the United States at this time were still cordial, cooperative and collaborative. 13

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comments by other members of the committee, it was decided that a draft of the agreement be prepared by the Americans for consideration by the Cabinet Committee. In the following two to three weeks and after several meetings, the final draft of the agreement between the Iranian government and the Point Four programme was ready. The document was to be signed in a special ceremony at the Plan Organisation. On that day, in the presence of all members, Dr Maleki announced that the committee was ready to sign the agreement. As the prepared documents in English and Farsi were being distributed among the members, Dr Mahmoud Hessabi, the Minister of Education, said that he would not sign it unless Prime Minister Mossadegh first reviewed the documents and gave him permission to sign. Mr Ahmad Zanganeh tried to reassure him that the Prime Minister had already approved the signing, but Dr Hessabi was adamant. This situation was unsettling for all. Finally, it was decided that Dr Hessabi along with Mr Zanganeh would take the documents to Dr Mossadegh to get his approval. After about one hour they returned to the ongoing meeting with the Prime Minister’s approval and the documents were all signed and exchanged. A few years later, Mr Zanganeh told me about the conversation with Dr Mossadegh. The Prime Minister had asked whether there was a problem with the agreement. Dr Hessabi had replied that it was said that the Americans want to import jackasses from Cyprus, cows from the Netherlands, and grain from other places to Iran, while all that was needed was funding. Dr Mossadegh had asked whether the Americans intended to take anything out of Iran, and the answer was negative. Dr Mossadegh had said that if the Americans were not taking anything out, they could bring in jackasses, cows, or dogs. So long as they brought in and did not take out, it was acceptable. He had instructed Mr Hessabi to go ahead and sign the document. The agreement, outlining the objectives and guidelines between the two parties, was signed by all. The document contained details about the mission and included the designated institutions that were to receive technical assistance. The steps that needed to be taken were indicated. The first step was the presentation of the proposal to the Cabinet Committee; the second step was the signing of separate agreements within the guidelines of the 14

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general agreement with specific governmental or private institutions; and the third step was the appointment of executive officers from those institutions to oversee their respective projects. Under the general agreement, these separate agreements had to state clear objectives with a detailed description of the plans. Point Four would specify the total cost of the projects, including salaries and the purchase of equipment and vehicles from inside or outside Iran. Government ministries would provide qualified Iranian personnel, and Point Four would pay their salaries and benefits. In addition, the Iranian ministries and organisations would provide the necessary land for implementation of the projects. In cases where properties were to be purchased from private individuals, Point Four would provide financing. All governmental agencies were to cooperate fully to implement the projects. Then, upon completion of each project, all the property, equipment and personnel would revert to the Iranian ministries and institutions. Hence, Point Four’s organisation was formally established and the parameters of its operation defined. Every effort was made to make preparations in a timely manner to launch the projects. The first few months were spent organising the necessary services that were needed. For example, since all documents had to be in both languages, a welltrained translation unit was needed. Such a unit had been formed at the Joint Commission under the guidance of Dr Mohammad Moghadam, a university professor, but it needed to be enlarged. By expanding the unit, we were able to meet this goal quickly. Similarly, other units such as administration, transportation, communication and accounting, all parts of the Joint Commission administration, were expanded and utilised, and Point Four became operational in less than three months. It must be noted that at the end of 1952, Iran continued to suffer from the ravages of World War II.2 The destruction left behind by the 2

Following the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, one consequence was the Soviet entry into World War II on the Allied side. The need to create an Allied supply line into Soviet territory resulted in an Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in August 1941 to secure a supply corridor, which also happened to guarantee Iran’s oil in Allied – actually British – hands. The Anglo-Soviet occupation lasted throughout the war. 15

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occupying Allied forces was visible in every corner of the country. Unemployment, poverty, inadequate administration, bad roads, poor communication, insufficient goods and services and high prices for them, and the absence of hospitals and medicine were some of the major problems facing the country. The most devastating problem was the cut-off of oil revenues and the daily conflicts of the Iranian government with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the British government, which were undermining the administration. Government agencies were in stagnation, and officials were busy maintaining order among disgruntled employees. The bureaucracy had been overloaded through constant Cabinet reshuffles and lack of order and organisation. There was a constant scramble for funds to pay government employees. In Tehran, salaries were paid regularly with a few days’ delay, but in the provinces it would take months to get paid. This situation led to unrest in many parts of the country. Under such circumstances, the Point Four mission faced two major problems. To begin with, Point Four had to provide all the services connected with the launch of each project. There were no pre-existing companies or agencies that could be subcontracted. Even the transport of supplies had to be done directly by Point Four. The governmental agencies that were cooperating on various projects had nominal operational budgets and needed assistance. As Point Four was busy organising during the first months of operation, newspapers gave extensive coverage to the American initiative. The signing of the agreement between the two countries raised expectations among ministries and other government agencies. Point Four was bombarded by officials requesting funding with no strings attached. They considered the agreements with Point Four as a formality and did not want to follow the guidelines that were stipulated in the projects. Many believed that because of the conflict with the British, the Americans had stepped in to prevent the Russians from gaining a foothold in Iran and were willing to pay up. They perceived Point Four as an office where they could contact the Americans and immediately receive funds to cover their payroll and other expenses. Mr Warne had no alternative but to meet high-ranking Iranian officials requesting money almost every day. On these occasions, I had 16

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the task of translating and preparing the minutes of the meeting. The purpose of the initial meetings was for Mr Warne to become familiar with the problems facing various agencies, assessing their needs, and opening channels of communication. His responses were generally uniform as he explained the parameters of the mission and the process of application for each request. He went to great length to explain that their requests had to go through the Plan Organisation and be presented formally to the Cabinet Committee for approval before reaching his desk. This process was difficult to comprehend, and many officials were quite disappointed even when it was explained to them that the guidelines had been set by the Iranian government. The number of visits gradually declined and the office headed by Mr Abolhassan Raji, which processed the applications, became more adept at formulating the requests. Documents had to clearly define the problem, provide details about the needs, and recommend steps to achieve goals. Then they would be reviewed by the relevant division in Point Four and, if acceptable, would be presented to the Cabinet Committee for final approval. Those that were approved would be sent to Point Four for implementation. Apart from the drama at the signing ceremony of the main agreement with the Iranian government, there was concern about the political nature of the Point Four mission. Suspicion that there was a political agenda behind the technical assistance was rampant. It was not unusual that a country such as Iran, with a history of foreign meddling in its internal affairs, would view foreign assistance in general with distrust, and the Americans working at Point Four as agents with a secret mission. But to us Iranians working with the American technical staff, it was clear that they were neither interested nor involved in the politics of Iran. They were experts in such fields as agriculture, health, education, industry, road construction, and rural development. The question of whether the US government had a political objective in establishing Point Four was something that had to be worked out between the Iranian government and Ambassador Henderson, and we could see that occasionally there were tensions between the embassy and our office.

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There must have been political discussions among the employees of Point Four. Did they ever discuss the Iranian political situation, the policies of the government of Dr Mossadegh vis-à-vis the United States, or the way the Iranians perceived the oil stand-off? If so, how? A.A.: The Point Four mission lasted seven years, during which time it went through many stages. Many events were unfolding in Iran. When Dr Mossadegh was in power, the Americans were generally technical staff with little interest in politics. Several of them had been educators and had taught Iranian students. For instance, the head of the Agriculture Division was the Dean of the Agriculture Department at Utah State University. However, after the events of the 28th of Mordad (19 August 1953)3 and the formation of the government of General Fazlollah Zahedi, the situation changed, and Point Four went beyond technical assistance and toward helping stabilise the government. The Americans made sure that government salaries were paid on time, and payments for goods and services came to be of political importance.

Was there any change in the nature of your job after the signing of the agreement between the two countries? A.A.: Generally no, but the volume of my work increased. Under the established guidelines, a Programme Committee was formed at Point Four, and I had to cover the duties of that position while waiting for the arrival of an American officer to take over the job. I had to organise the proposals that were sent by the Iranian government, study the contents, and prepare a presentation. Even though the workload was heavy, it was an exceptional opportunity for me to learn the inner workings of various government agencies and the issues they faced. Furthermore, participating in negotiations between Mr Warne and the Iranian government officials, and attending the Cabinet Committee, where 3

The military coup, which toppled Dr Mossadegh’s government, re-established the absolute authority of the Shah and opened up the country for much closer relations with the United States which lasted until 1979. 18

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national issues were discussed, was an exceptional opportunity for a young man like me, and although I still considered myself a university student, I embraced this job and worked tirelessly, at least 12 hours a day, seven days a week. A few doors down from my office, Jamshid Amuzegar,4 an impressive young man whom I had met in New York through a mutual friend, worked as assistant to the head of the Engineering Department. He took his job very seriously and worked diligently to advance engineering and environmental projects. His dedication to work and his achievements were exemplary and it caught the attention of Mr Warne on several occasions. Dr Amuzegar had received his PhD at Cornell University, and he was in charge of health, sanitation and environmental projects. On my days off, I would either go to the office to work or take my working material home. Dr Amuzegar was doing the same, and since we both lived in Tajrish, a suburb of Tehran, each day after work we would take the last bus heading north on Pahlavi Avenue. The bus company was called Adl and the fare was two rials (almost three cents). Our friendship gradually developed as we shared the accounts of our daily activities at the office on the hour-long bus ride home. He was two years older than me and had a brilliant mind, a sharp memory and superior educational credentials. I was impressed by him and looked up to him as a friend and a scholarly big brother; he would reciprocate our friendship with kind words and graceful manners. During the winding months of 1952, as we took that bus ride almost every night, we were able to secure a professional friendship that would last 28 years, up to the revolution. By then, we each had great responsibilities, and our friendship was pivotal in advancing plans of significant national importance. In any event, the scope of the Point Four activities was growing steadily, and a considerable number of American technicians were arriving every week. They were unfamiliar with Iran, and it would take them a few months to get settled. They had to be informed about 4

Amuzegar was to become a highly influential Minister of Finance (1965–74), Minister of the Interior (1974–7) and Prime Minister of Iran (1977–8) in the period leading up to the Islamic Revolution. 19

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Iranian ministries and agencies and had to become familiar with the approved process in order to be able to make recommendations to the management. Meanwhile, government institutions were constantly flooded by requests from citizens who had assumed that with the arrival of American technicians, capital and equipment would follow. The expectations kept growing, and rumour had it that some high-ranking Iranian officials were complaining about the slow pace of action. One day, Dr Mahmoud Hessabi, the Minister of Education, called and asked me to arrange a meeting with Mr Warne about an urgent matter. The meeting was scheduled for that afternoon. Because Dr Hessabi did not speak English very well, I had to translate for him. He said that as a member of the Cabinet Committee, he was aware of the procedures concerning new proposals; however, the matter pertaining to his Ministry was of utmost importance and could not wait for the meeting of the committee. Furthermore, the consideration by the committee might take a long time, and the delay could cause great difficulty for the government. He asked that Mr Warne think of a way to bypass some bureaucratic hurdles and act on his request with speed. He explained that, owing to the problems that the Iranian government faced regarding a shortage of foreign exchange following Iran’s oil nationalisation and the British-inspired financial and oil boycotts, Bank Melli (the National Bank of Iran)5 had been unable, for many months, to send funds to students who were studying abroad. Therefore, every day the Ministry faced confrontations with the angry parents of more than a thousand students who were studying in the United States who had not received money for their living expenses. He predicted a dire outcome if the issue were not resolved and pleaded for a solution. Mr Warne assured him that he understood the gravity of the matter and would study the issue and find a solution. He promised to follow up and let him know as soon as possible. After Dr Hessabi left, Mr Warne asked for my view. Having been a student in the United States not too long earlier, and having personally 5

The Bank Melli was at that time Iran’s Central Bank, and thus the country’s foreign currency holder. It was only in 1960 when the Bank Markazi (Central Bank of Iran) was established that Bank Melli became solely a retail and investment bank. 20

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experienced hardship, I tried to explain the difficulties. I said that Dr Hessabi was not asking for a grant from Point Four but rather a means of providing dollars against Iranian rials that the parents of the students would provide. In other words, the issue was the conversion of rials to dollars. I mentioned that Point Four was converting dollars to rials every month in order to pay the salaries and expenses of the organisation, so this could be linked to the student funds. A solution would bring no additional cost to Point Four but would bring relief to the families and allow students to concentrate on their studies. I said that I believed the Cabinet Committee would agree and that the government of Iran would be pleased. Mr Warne agreed with my recommendation and said that he would try to find a solution within the confines of the main agreement. A few days later, Mr Warne told me that Ambassador Henderson had agreed with the premise of the suggestion and that Washington had no objection. He asked if I could set up an office that would handle student applications and verify the documents in a systematic and organised manner. Knowing full well the gravity of the problem, and eager to help, I agreed to do the job concurrently with my regular duties, provided that I was given the means. He agreed and instructed me to start planning immediately. A room in the building was designated, and Iran Ala, the daughter of the Minister of Court and a well-educated and distinguished woman, was appointed as my assistant. Along with a secretary, the office was thus established. Mr Warne worked out the details with Washington, upon which the Near East Foundation, an American NGO, would undertake the task of becoming a paymaster for the disbursement of funds to the students after receiving validated documents from Point Four. This arrangement was approved by the Cabinet Committee and announcement was made in the media. Then an agreement was reached with Bank Melli to open a special account for receiving deposits of rials from the parents of the students and to pay the equivalent in dollars to the Near East Foundation in the United States, using the dollars they would receive from Point Four in exchange for rials. According to the approved procedure, the students were supposed to obtain a certificate from their school showing that they were in good standing, get it certified by the Iranian student 21

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supervisor in the United States, and send it to their parents, who would in turn present it to my office for acceptance. After receiving approval, they would go to Bank Melli and deposit the necessary fund in rials, and the bank would then transfer the equivalent in dollars to their children. This undertaking, which I took on in addition to my heavy workload, took about three weeks to become operational, and it helped relieve some pressure from the Ministry of Education. With the help of Miss Ala, the process of reviewing the student files became so well organised that within two days we could prepare a complete file ready to be sent for payment. However, this was not the end of the story, as families kept complaining about students waiting for their funds. After numerous calls to the Foundation’s representatives in Iran and the United States, it was discovered that at the time of the signing of agreement for undertaking this project, the Near East Foundation did not yet have the necessary staff or facilities to handle the red tape, which is always an integral part of this kind of endeavour, and therefore it was the bureaucratic hurdles that were causing the delays. But, by perseverance and diplomatic pressure, the programme finally took hold, and the transfer of funds became routine. The volume of work and related correspondence were tremendous, and it became clear that the office needed a full-time staff; hence, an American officer was assigned to head the programme. I should mention that my involvement in this project was extremely valuable to me, because I met so many students visiting my office who became my friends and colleagues over the years.

What were the projects in the areas of agriculture, health and education that Point Four evaluated and planned to carry out? Can you elaborate on the plans and the courses of action taken? A.A.: In the field of health, the most important project was the fight against malaria, which was initiated by the Joint Commission on a small scale. Varamin, a district near Tehran, had been selected for the first phase of this project. All dwellings, barns, swamp and tracts of land containing stagnant water that might potentially harbour the 22

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Anopheles mosquito (the malaria-carrying variety) were sprayed with DDT. The success of this project, which reduced the number of infections significantly, laid the foundation for an agency to eradicate malaria nationwide. With additional funding, this programme expanded rapidly and became one of the most successful projects initiated by Point Four, and with assistance from the Ministries of Health and Agriculture, the malaria epidemic was uprooted from the country. In a span of a few years, there was hardly a village in the country that did not have the ‘Point Four’ sign with a DDT label posted on its wall. Another programme that had been researched for about two years and was in the planning stages pertained to the improvement of the quality of potable water and the sewer systems in villages. It had been determined that low economic activity and poverty in rural areas was due to water-borne illnesses that were compromising villagers’ health, and that providing potable water and replacing in-ground toilets with water closets would be of great benefit. This project had been initiated by the Iranian government and tested on a limited scale with positive results. With funding from Point Four, the project was expanded nationally and included an agenda to educate villagers on various aspects of hygiene. A technical staff was assigned to teach the observance of basic principles of hygiene, methods for battling against noxious mosquitoes, and the prevention of food contamination and pollution. The plan called for the use of printed materials as well as instructions delivered via brief visual presentations. The equipment and materials were provided by Point Four, and teams of technicians for showing films were dispatched to villages throughout the country. This programme was very effective and was well taken by villagers and the public at large. A third programme worth mentioning is the updating of elementary and high school textbooks with the help of the Ministry of Education. The quality and content of school textbooks were very poor, and the government had started to address this problem on a small scale as part of the programmes of the Joint Commission. However, a more comprehensive solution to the problem, covering the whole country, was developed by Point Four with the help of Gholam Hossein Mosahab, a respected scholar working at the Ministry of Education. This project was also very successful and well appreciated by the general public. 23

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A fourth project that was extremely popular was providing vocational training for women and girls, who for the first time in Iran were receiving so much attention. Another important project that had first been initiated by the Joint Commission was in the field of agriculture; it addressed very important concerns in animal husbandry, grain and sapling improvement, land preparation and the use of farm machinery, water management, fertiliser use, pest control, rural housing and grain storage in villages across the country. Studies had been made and plans were drawn, but once again owing to the lack of funds, no action had been taken. Mr Warne paid close attention to the reports that had been prepared by the American technicians working for the Joint Commission, and consequently those projects took priority among the Point Four programmes that he was considering. These reports with their invaluable information showed so clearly the problems and difficulties that the Ministries of Health, Education, and Agriculture were facing. They also showed the ways that those problems could be solved. These treasures were all available to me and were at my disposal to familiarise myself with the affairs of the government. One day, I was told that a Dr Mahdavi, who was the president of the College of Agriculture in Karaj, was in the building and wanted to see me. I was elated since I had only known him from afar and had not met him personally. Dr Mahdavi had heard about Point Four’s involvement in agricultural projects. As I had been a student at the College of Agriculture and was most likely inclined to contribute to the institution, he had come to ask for my assistance. I welcomed him in my office with all the courtesy that I could muster. He said that he needed $20,000 to purchase new laboratory equipment and a few microscopes for the College of Agriculture. Being familiar with the mission of Point Four and the procedural guidelines, I recommended that a proposal be prepared that would outline the issues facing the college and clearly state all their needs. I added that a request for some lab equipment and microscopes would not garner much attention from my superiors. I assured him that a proposal that was packaged the right way would solve a lot of his problems. He said that the budget of the college was indeed limited and that he would welcome any assistance. He added that the same request had been submitted to the University of Tehran 24

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much earlier, but owing to budgetary constraints no action had been taken. He had come to Point Four for a small request, but if indeed there was a possibility of more extensive aid, he would need my help in drafting the proposal. I told him that I would do my best and suggested that as a first step he should invite Mr Warne for a tour of the College of Agriculture. I promised to encourage Mr Warne, who was interested in matters related to agriculture. Furthermore, the person in charge of the Agriculture Division at Point Four was the former head of the College of Agriculture at Utah State University and would probably accompany Mr Warne. I believed that it would be an opportunity for the faculty and the administration to meet them and present their case, leaving a good impression. The mission of Point Four was to give technical assistance, so what better place than his college? Dr Mahdavi agreed with my suggestion. He returned a few days later for a meeting that I had arranged with Mr Warne with an official invitation in hand. The visit was scheduled for the following week, and lunch was to be served. Mr Warne, accompanied by the head of the Agriculture Division and another technician, visited the college and toured all the facilities. Having lived on campus for three years, I was quite familiar with the details and was able to contribute as I tagged along and provided translation. There was a lengthy meeting after lunch with the faculty that was also attended by the head of the Institute of Animal Husbandry in Heydarabad, and by a Dr Rafii, the head of the Institute for Serum Production in Hesarak. The visit was a great success; the tour and the meeting left a big impression on Mr Warne, and he promised to do his utmost to improve conditions at the college. He instructed me to help Dr Mahdavi with drafting the plans and recommendations. I will never forget the events of that day and the subsequent actions. That day established the foundation upon which the college was able to advance its academic goals. In the following years, whenever I ran into Dr Mahdavi, he would recall our first meeting and would praise me and all that had been accomplished. At that time, issues related to oil and the conflict with the AngloIranian Oil Company, and the involvement of the international community in the dispute, dominated the news. Other than that, the 25

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press extensively covered Point Four activities. Public interest arose because of the initiative’s close association with the US government, and regardless of efforts to maintain the mission as a strictly technical one, the Iranians could not be easily convinced and all activities at Point Four were scrutinised through a political lens. The Cold War was underway, and the policies and activities of the Soviet Union were supported by leftist groups. It was only natural that those leaning to the right perceived the economic stability of the country as being tied to the West, and in particular to the United States. They feared a destiny that would parallel the fortunes of Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The dire economic condition of Iran, with unemployment and a high cost of living, fuelled the rush to an agency that had money and that promised economic development projects. Affluent families wanted to rent out their country homes, mostly in the northern parts of Tehran, to the Americans. They would contact either an acquaintance who was working with Point Four or a broker. Point Four was inundated with such requests, and the number of brokers kept increasing, at which point it was decided to prevent these individuals from entering the building. Finally, an office was established to handle such affairs, and an American was assigned to that desk. Point Four was a destination for those seeking employment; not only were jobs available, but the pay was considerably higher than at any private or government agency. Other than that, working there had a special draw for women, because Iranian institutions would hire women primarily for secretarial duties, not for any higher positions. The Ministry of Education was the only institution that had women in the higher ranks, and their duties involved training young female students. There was a great divide between men and women in the work force. Point Four was the first institution in Iran that treated men and women equally; women served as technicians alongside men, and some achieved managerial positions with men working under them. This was a novel idea in Iran, the concept that education and experience were the sole qualifications necessary for employment at any level. Hence, many educated and capable women started working and contributing to projects alongside men. It was in such an environment that prominent Iranian families sought employment for their daughters at 26

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Point Four. The daughters of Hossein Ala, Minister of Court, and Dr Manouchehr Eghbal, a former minister and president of the University of Tehran, along with two daughters of Nezamedin Emami, the Iranian government’s inspector general at Bank Melli, all worked at Point Four. (Mr Emami’s daughters each married a future prime minister, namely Hassan Ali Mansur and Amir-Abbas Hoveyda.) This paved the way for many agencies in the country to follow suit, leading to more opportunities for women. The third reason that individuals wanted contact with Point Four was that many influential government officials were participating in the approved projects, and the activities of the agency were discussed regularly in social circles. Having a prominent position there, I was inevitably drawn into such discussions. Those leaning to the right who were concerned about the influence of Soviet Union and its doctrines embraced the existence of an American-led organisation in Iran. On the other extreme, those on the left constantly derided the activities of Point Four in their publications and criticised it at every opportunity; they considered the American presence as a threat to achieving their political goals. Those at the centre had an interesting take on the political ramifications of such an institution. At the time, most of the land and estates in the country belonged to landlords, and their ingrained relationship with farmers had made it impossible to raise the quality of life for the poor farmers. Agricultural production required five elements – land, water, grain, livestock (or tractors) and labour – and the output was also divided into five elements. Landlords and farmers were compensated according to their contribution to these elements, and in most cases the farmer’s input was only labour. It was concluded that in order to improve the lives of the farmers, a fundamental change had to be made in the existing system. Otherwise, the efforts of Point Four would only benefit the landlords and create an even greater divide. Under its operational guidelines, Point Four had to operate within the laws of the host country, and any changes or reforms had to be initiated by the host government. Furthermore, plans for improvement in the areas of health, medicine, education, culture, and pest control were not just in the context of landlord versus farmer but of interest to the general 27

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public. Other programmes of expansion in the areas of manufacturing, communication and exports were issues to be dealt with by the Iranian government and outside the parameters of Point Four’s mission. These issues were constantly debated. At the time, a programme to distribute royal landholdings among the farmers had been announced by the Shah, and Bank Omran was established to facilitate the transfer of ownership and provide support to the farmers. As I had been involved in discussions concerning such matters, it occurred to me that once the transfers of ownership were completed, conflicts in landlord-farmer relations would no longer be an impediment to our efforts at Point Four. Farmers would own their land, and any help from Point Four would benefit them directly. I contemplated this matter for some time and decided to do something about it, asking my assistant, Miss Ala, to request a meeting with her father, the Minister of Court. Hossein Ala was a brilliant man, full of grace and affection, highly educated and a true patriot. He greeted me warmly, and, after asking about my background, inquired about the reason for my visit. I explained the scope of the projects at Point Four and told him about my ideas to advance national interests. I believed that at that juncture, when the Shah was dividing his royal estates among the farmers, Point Four was in a position to help the farmers by providing the required technical assistance and necessary credits for the purchase of farming equipment and other materials that would ensure the success of the programme and benefit all sides. I emphasised that I was there on my own initiative without the knowledge of Mr Warne, and was only trying to help my country as a private citizen. Mr Ala listened carefully and said that I had picked a good day to visit. The High Council for the distribution of royal estates was meeting at his office that afternoon, and he asked me to present my case at that meeting. I did so. As far as I can recall, the participants included Mr Ala; Mr Habibollah Amuzegar, the former Minister of Education; Mr Jamal Akhavi, the former Minister of Justice; Mr Sarabandi, director of the General Bureau of Registry; and several other elder statesmen. Mr Ala introduced me to the participants and told them that I had an interesting proposal. He then asked me to present it to the council. 28

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I was very nervous addressing such a distinguished panel. They all had served in high government positions for a longer period of time than I had been alive, and I had only read about them in newspaper articles. I felt like a student defending his thesis in front of the faculty. I began to make my case by emphasising that I was acting as a concerned citizen who happened to work for an agency of a foreign government, and that I was not on a mission and did not know if the plan would be approved by my superiors. If the council were to act on my suggestions, certain preliminary steps needed to be taken. The gentlemen were nodding all along, in particular Habibollah Amuzegar, who was full of praise. I told Mr Warne about the matter at an opportune moment the next day. He was very positive and gave his approval, adding that in his first audience with the Shah similar issues had been raised by the Shah himself. A few days later, Mr Warne told me that he had met Mr Ala at a dinner party, where Mr Ala had told him about my proposal and the willingness of the Council for Distribution of Royal Estates to collaborate with Point Four; Mr Ala had invited Mr Warne to visit the properties under consideration in Varamin. Arrangements were made for Mr Assadollah Alam, the administrator of the Office of Distribution of Royal Estates, to come to Point Four to pick up Mr Warne and head out to a designated village. It was winter and raining heavily. Mr Alam suggested that the prepared lunch that was in his car be served on the premises and the presentations be done later. Mr Warne agreed, and shortly thereafter, Mr Alam’s staff laid out an elaborate lunch in the conference room. This unexpected gesture changed the dynamic of the day. Negotiations took place during and after lunch in a very friendly atmosphere. Mr Alam, who had good command of the English language, explained in detail the scope of the project and the responsibilities of Bank Omran. The outcome of the meeting was very positive, and preparations got underway to draw up proposals within the framework of the original agreement. I was involved in the first phase of this programme when the process of assistance to the farmers was formulated, but then I had to follow it from afar since my duties changed after four months. In the last quarter of 1952, there was a flurry of visits to Point Four by government officials of various agencies requesting assistance. 29

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For instance, the head of the State Avionics Organisation came for a meeting with Mr Warne. Mr Ahmad Shafigh, the husband of Princess Ashraf, enthusiastically promoted the need to expand the existing Mehrabad Airport, which was adjacent to the old airfield known as Ghale-Morghi. His only request was that Point Four purchase some navigation equipment for air traffic control. This was accepted because two months earlier a plane carrying Henry Garland Bennett, the administrator of Point Four, had crashed in the hills north of Tehran, killing all passengers. The plane was unable to land at the airport owing to a combination of bad weather and inadequate air traffic control technology. Upgrading the airport systems became a priority, and plans to address it were made quickly. In another case, Mr Gholam Ali Maykadeh, the director of the Tehran Water Authority, asked for assistance in completing water purification and distribution projects. The water authority’s facilities lacked equipment and, owing to the shortage of funds, Tehran’s water distribution network was incomplete. Potable water was unavailable in many parts of the capital, and drinking water was delivered in iron barrels carried by mules. Unsanitary water flowed through narrow ditches and canals along city streets. This issue was addressed promptly. Dr Jamshid Mofakham, the acting Minister of National Economy, requested assistance to expand export markets for cotton, wool and dry goods. He was also interested in research about natural resources and fishing in the Persian Gulf. A lot was accomplished in those areas, as I will describe later. Another request, made by General Ahmad Adjoudani, the director of Tehran’s power company, dealt with the inadequacy of the power grid. The existing system was old and generated a mere 16,000 kilowatts. He needed funding for repairs and the construction of a new power plant that would generate an additional 50,000 kilowatts; otherwise a large part of the rapidly expanding city would go dark at night. This was also approved. But the execution of this project was delayed temporarily because of the change of government. Ahmad Zanganeh, the Director of Plan Organisation, insisted that renovation of sugar factories and cotton manufacturing factories be considered as priority projects. He was afraid that the closure of those factories would lead to the layoff of 30

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workers and cause public unrest. He asked for a substantial amount of funds and technical assistance. Many managers of important organisations would come to Mr Warne with requests that were in line with Point Four’s mission. However, Point Four only had technicians and experts in the fields of agriculture, health, and education, who had come to Iran in the prior two years working on projects that had been approved by the Joint Commission. Therefore, actions taken on requests in other fields such as manufacturing, aviation, water distribution, and import-export were mere formalities, done in such a way that lacked content, and gradually the ministries and other organisations began to complain about the lack of progress in their dealings with Point Four. Inside the organisation, it became clear that to improve economic conditions in Iran, Point Four had to address a whole range of issues and not just those in the areas of agriculture, health and education. Mr Warne was fully aware of this problem and was convinced that an economic development division with a competent staff was needed to ensure the success of the programme in Iran. However, the preparation of documents justifying the need for such an office, and communication with authorities in Washington and getting their approval, was extremely time-consuming. In the meantime, Point Four had to deal with constant demands from Iranian officials on one side, and justifying various decisions to officials in Washington who had little knowledge of the actual situation in Iran on the other. I remember a letter that Mr Warne sent to the official in charge of Iranian affairs in Washington saying that ‘for my next meeting with the Cabinet Committee, I need something more than a smile and promise of future aid. Please come to my rescue.’ Finally in early 1952, Mr Warne travelled to Washington to explain the situation, and to expedite and secure funding. Even though $23 million had been allocated six months before, Point Four had only sufficient received funds to cover its payroll. There was much chatter among the government officials about empty promises. Mr Warne returned after about three weeks. He had been successful in overcoming bureaucratic hurdles and had been assured that funding and technicians would be made available. Also, the proposal for a new Division for Economic Development with additional technicians and funding 31

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had been approved. With the departure of American technicians upon the expiration of their two-year contracts, the activities of the Joint Commission were effectively terminated. They were replaced by employees of Point Four. Following his return and having secured additional funding for new projects that were to be assigned to the division, Mr Warne asked me to consider working there and to get involved in the preparation and the implementation of new projects. Deciding there and then not to pursue my PhD studies at UCLA, I did not hesitate to accept the offer, as I had been present at most of the negotiations and was keenly aware that this was an extraordinary opportunity for a young man to gain exceptional experience in the field of economic development. He was delighted and offered me the position of assistant director of the Economic Development Division. He told me that my salary would be increased by 40 per cent and that he wanted me to accompany him on certain trips and meetings. By that time, all the activities of the Joint Commission had merged into Point Four, and Ardeshir Zahedi,6 who had been the director’s assistant, was chosen to take over my duties. His appointment was an excellent choice, since he had been involved with the American initiative from the onset and was familiar with the details of the overall mission. Furthermore, his combination of personality, social skills and excellent connections with high government officials was an asset in the promotion and implementation of Point Four programmes. I was glad that our friendship, going back to our college days, could develop into a mutually beneficial working relationship. Unfortunately, before long his association with Point Four came to an abrupt end. It was rumoured that his father General Fazlollah Zahedi’s political rivals had convinced Prime Minister Mossadegh that having the general’s son at Point Four was a liability for the government. Ardeshir, being valiant, undaunted and extremely close to his father, upon hearing of these insinuations decided to step aside. Mr Warne was quite bitter about the whole affair and mentioned it on several occasions. 6

Ardeshir Zahedi was to be very instrumental in the coup which in August 1953 would unseat Dr Mossadegh and replace him with Ardeshir’s father General Fazlollah Zahedi, all with US assistance. 32

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The Division of Economic Development was organised very quickly, and within a few weeks a big building close to the Point Four offices was rented. The building was known as Adl Hospital and was located at the beginning of Pahlavi Avenue. This unit was under the supervision of an American specialist with 30 years of experience in industrial projects. This division became functional with the arrival of American specialists in the areas of manufacturing, mining, statistics, cooperatives, fisheries, commodities and exports. A good number of educated and experienced Iranians came to work there, including Abbasgholi Ardalan (a former Treasurer General of the Ministry of Finance); Manouchehr Kazemi, an economist (future Minister of Agriculture); Ahmad Minai, an economist (future Ambassador and Secretary General of the Central Treaty Organisation); Manouchehr Nikpour, an expert in business and manufacturing (future head of Bank Sepah and the Workers’ Welfare Bank); and a Mr Massud Etehadieh, together with a Mr Jalinous and a Mr Mousavizadeh, all economic and business majors who were later successful executives in the private sector. During this time, Iran had a foreign exchange reserves problem and had difficulty meeting import demands because of the oil crisis. Having seen the assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company nationalised in 1951, the British mounted an international embargo on the purchase of Iranian oil which dramatically reduced Iran’s foreign exchange reserves, inevitably leading to huge shortages. The government was searching for solutions to alleviate shortages in all imports including medicine, sugar, spare parts for factories, and other items. The Cabinet of Dr Mohammad Mossadegh was considering an economic model that would be less reliant on oil revenues. The goal was to economise on all government activities, promote self-reliant manufacturing for domestic consumption, and develop export markets for goods. The government wanted to know the extent of Point Four’s contribution to those goals. This was conveyed through the Cabinet Committee and in particular through Jamshid Mofakham, the acting Minister of National Economy. In Point Four, the task was given to the Economic Development Division to work with the Ministry of National Economy and come up with suggestions and practical solutions. 33

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After working with the Ministry, two things became quite clear. To begin with, there were no statistics at any of the ministries; all inquiries were referred to the National Bureau of Statistics, which was only responsible for issuing birth and death certificates. Even if a Ministry had an organisational unit assigned to gather data and statistics, the sole purpose was to justify the employment of some incompetent people whose salaries had to be paid. For example, the office at the Ministry of National Economy, which was supposed to be the hub for national statistics, was headed by a famous poet who would come to the office for a couple of hours every day to see his friends and make some social calls. It became obvious that in order to begin serious planning for any project, one had to have reliable data, and therefore there was an urgent need to lay the foundation for a Bureau of Statistics. On this basis, the necessary reports and projects were prepared and submitted by Point Four to the Cabinet Committee and duly approved. The Ministry of the Interior was named as the Iranian counterpart, and Nasrollah Samii, the Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, was appointed as the project manager. The organisation was set up, the American specialist was recruited, the necessary equipment was ordered, and a staff was trained and started functioning. Over the years, this organisation expanded and eventually became the National Bureau of Statistics. It became an independent entity and was an important unit of the Plan Organisation. Several distinguished officials headed this bureau such as Dr Abbas Jamei, who later became the president of Jondi Shapour University and later a minister in the Cabinet of Shapour Bakhtiar. The second subject that was addressed was the disregard for inter­ national export standards. Except for carpets, products were often mixed with low-grade materials and shipped in low-quality packaging. They were being sold in international markets in small quantities at low prices. There were complaints abroad about cotton and wool exports; buyers had found old quilts and even packsaddles in the packages. Opening new markets and increasing exports required an effort on a national scale to establish guidelines and improve the quality and packaging of products. Standardised controls had been the responsibility of the Office of Weights and Measurements at the Ministry of 34

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National Economy. The office was tasked with providing the official units of measurement to commodities such as rice, oils, grains and other items by merchants. These units, which had the seal of the government, were to be the only measurement that the merchants were allowed to use. The office had been created during the reign of Reza Shah to convert the old system of weights to the metric system. Back then, measurements were made in units corresponding to different items such as peas or garlic, and merchants would use pebbles or stones as equivalents. There were often discrepancies in weight because of the different stones used by merchants. Measurements used for distances and volumes were not used elsewhere, either. This situation was preventing merchants from competing in international markets. Reza Shah wanted Iran to enter the community of progressive nations, and through legislation he instituted the metric system used by the European countries. The production of these weights was done by the Iranian National Mint and was overseen by the Ministry of Finance and later by the Ministry of National Economy. The task of conversion of weights to the metric system for export goods was left to an office headed by a supervisor who had minimal education and only a few unskilled employees. The proposal for the overhaul of this office went through the established process, and a parcel of land south of Tehran’s airport was purchased for the Ministry of National Economy. An office building with the required facilities for a Bureau of Standards was built there with Point Four financing. Point Four also provided the necessary laboratory equipment and helped draft new guidelines and standards for this rather important agency. A Dr Khorsand, who had done his graduate studies in Switzerland and France, was named by the Ministry to supervise this programme. This agency eventually became a successful independent unit of the Ministry of National Economy. In view of the fact that cotton was exported by independent merchants with little government oversight, Point Four experts prepared the necessary guidelines and regulations. A variety of courses were prepared to train the staff in the classification of the cotton based on quality and variety so they could train other trainees. This programme was very successful and well taken by the farmers and merchants, as they benefited greatly 35

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by being able to sell their products more efficiently and at higher prices. Also, buyers were willing to pay higher prices for a certified product. The outcome was that cotton exports increased dramatically, and it became a major commodity for Iran. At the time of the nationalisation of oil in 1951, one of the major import items was textiles, chintz in particular, which was used by low-income villagers. Some small, privately owned spinning and clothweaving factories were faltering due to lack of spare parts. Workers were either idling or on strike. The government had built a large factory in the south of Tehran that faced similar problems and was not fully operational. Numerous requests about these problems were sent to Point Four by the Plan Organisation and the Ministry of National Economy. Unfortunately, Point Four could not allocate enough funding to solve the problem and was only able to offer technical assistance to improve their production. Wool was a different matter. Persian carpets had a unique position in international markets, and carpet merchants had a long-standing relationship with European and American importers. The majority of wool production was consumed domestically; however, the small amount that was being exported was substandard and poorly packaged. The Ministry of National Economy wanted to increase wool exports, and to that end, two experts in the field of wool industry and exports were brought in by Point Four and joined the staff of the Economic Development Division. It was concluded that new facilities were needed to wash and classify the wool, and prepare the product for standardised packaging. The plans were approved by the Cabinet Committee, and the Ministry of National Economy named Khalil Ameri, a director at the National Carpet Company, as the Iranian project manager. A tract of land in Karaj, adjacent to an old steel mill, was appropriated, and Point Four financed the purchase of necessary equipment and machinery. Training was provided for various stages of the process, and within one year standardised packages of wool were ready for export. This development was embraced by wool merchants and became the standard practice in the industry. Dried fruits were another export product to be considered. Pistachios, almonds and dates were being exported in small quantities to neighbouring countries and Europe. 36

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Dates, which constituted the main output of the southern regions of Iran, were either consumed domestically or exported in discarded gasoline tins and wicker baskets to Pakistan and the Persian Gulf states. The lack of attention to proper handling and the mixing of various grades combined with improper packaging led to very low prices for Iranian dates. By contrast, dates from Iraq were packaged properly and sold at much higher prices across Europe. To address this issue, Point Four organised a mission to go to Iraq to observe the operation there. The group comprised two American experts in manufacturing and exports, together with Abbasgholi Ardalan and me. We started our ten-day visit in Baghdad. We were greeted by American officials from the US embassy, and, along with Iraqi officials, we started our mission with a tour of the organisation responsible for commerce and exports. We were given information about the organisation and its export programmes. We then travelled south to Basra, where most of the palm groves and the packaging facilities were located. We visited many locations and observed the process of collecting, cleaning, fumigating, classifying and packaging of dates. In the final leg of our trip, we went back to Iran, to the region of Khorramshahr and Abadan, for observation and comparison. Accompanied by local officials, we visited palm groves and packaging facilities. The contrast was so stark that Mr Ardalan and I felt very awkward in front of the American advisers. We had observed in Iraq how dates were picked from palm trees by workers in uniform overalls carrying sacks on their shoulders. They would climb ladders to pick the dates and empty the sacks into metal containers. This prevented dirt and animal waste from contaminating the fruit. The containers would be transported to a central facility for disinfection, classification and packaging. Packaging was automated, and dates of various grades were encased in clearly marked cartons prepared for shipping. By contrast, in Iran, impoverished workers in drab and dirty clothes would climb the palm trees, and by shaking and occasionally breaking the branches would toss the dates to the ground. Once they removed the fruit, they would use a wheelbarrow to collect and transport the dates to roofless mud huts. There were drains at the base of these mud huts for the sap to flow out, which would be collected and stored in clay jugs. The dates 37

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would be put in discarded gasoline tins that were lined alongside the huts. Wicker baskets were also used. I even saw workers stomping with their bare feet to stuff more dates into the containers. It became evident that correcting the process of collection and storage was of foremost importance, and the purchase of new machinery would have to wait. Another issue was the absence of a specific government unit that would take responsibility for the initiative. Following our return to Tehran and the ensuing discussions, it was decided that Point Four would send its recommendations based on our findings to the Ministry of National Economy. The Ministry, in cooperation with the Agriculture Bank, was to provide assistance to the producers. The Khorramshahr Chamber of Commerce had become interested in this matter, and it was to purchase equipment for the disinfection and packaging of the dates while Point Four was to provide technical assistance. This programme advanced gradually as merchants and local officials took interest. In the ensuing two to three years, as the oil crisis subsided and relative calm returned to the region, private industry was able to step in and make a difference. Another concern of Point Four was the fishing industry. Limited studies had been made about the fisheries in the north, and concessions had been given to the Soviet Union. However, very few records or documents were available at any government agency about the fisheries in the south. A study conducted earlier by a Dutch organisation indicated the existence of 350 species of fish of high to excellent quality in the Persian Gulf. The inadequacy of infrastructure, including roads, electricity and necessary equipment such as freezers and transport vehicles, had led to the neglect of a valuable food source. The impoverished residents along the coast fished to satisfy local demand. Meanwhile, some East Asian companies were fishing illegally in Iranian waters without hindrance. Alerting the Ministry of National Economy and the Plan Organisation to this matter caused quite a stir. However, at a time when the Iranian government could not meet its own payroll and Point Four could only offer technical support, addressing this huge task was limited to conducting some preliminary studies. As the economic situation improved in the coming years, the studies became the basis for establishing the Southern Fisheries Company of 38

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Iran. Unfortunately, those projects were handled by opportunists and incompetent organisations, and as a result this natural resource was not properly managed. Toward the end of 1952, Mr Reza Sarrafzadeh, an influential deputy of Parliament from Yazd, called for an appointment to see Mr Warne. He came to explain the difficulties faced by residents of this remote region at the edge of the Loot salt desert. After his recounting of agricultural, medical and educational conditions in his district, he asked Mr Warne to visit Yazd, even if for just one day. Mr Warne was genuinely moved. He instructed me to join a fact-finding mission headed by Lucy W. Adams, head of the Point Four regional office in Isfahan. Preparations were made, and in the following weeks I accompanied Mr Sarrafzadeh for a two-day visit to Yazd. The inhabitants of this beautiful, ancient city were living in poverty, their medical facilities dilapidated and potable water unavailable. Streets were unpaved and the city’s buildings in ruins. The main occupation of the residents was spinning. Families, including children as young as four years old, were spinning and cloth weaving in poorly lit mud huts. It was said that farmers had also resorted to this occupation due to a drought that had dried up the shallow wells and the subterranean canals. To finance the purchase of materials, families had succumbed to loan sharks and forced their children into labour to help make ends meet. Our group was quite disconcerted by the situation, and I prepared a serious assessment for Mr Warne and made a number of recommendations. I suggested the formation of a cooperative with the objective of granting low-interest financing, providing weaving equipment and supplies, and assisting the weavers in the sale of their products. Furthermore, I proposed a joint initiative with the Ministry of National Economy whereby Point Four would purchase 300 weaving handlooms from Japan, which would be given to the cooperative for use by members and which would increase their output tenfold. The goal was to encourage weavers to expand their business and to provide them with low-interest financing for future expansion or upgrade through the cooperative and local banks. The report and its recommendations were well received by the Economic Development Division, and it was decided to pursue 39

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the matter further. Ahmad Minai and Manouchehr Nikpour were dispatched to study and develop a plan of action for the weavers in the areas of Isfahan and Yazd. The cooperatives were established and the project was operational within a year. The success of this effort laid the groundwork for the future expansion of the trade. In the following decade, as Iran’s economy flourished, major textile factories were built that absorbed the local workforce and brought prosperity to that region. With the expansion of Point Four operations in Iran, one issue became apparent to the initiative’s policy makers. Whereas in the United States the private sector was the main engine of the economy and the government had a regulatory role, in Iran, the government was involved in all aspects of development. Long-established policies and traditions had placed the responsibility of initiating and developing ideas on the government. Every issue had to be dealt with by an existing governmental agency. Even in industries where the beneficiaries were individuals, there was no mention of private sector involvement in planning or execution of projects, and the creation of cooperatives was inevitable. The complex nature of this effort required expert advice, so an American adviser joined our technical staff to oversee the project of weaving cooperatives in Isfahan and Yazd. As reports of these activities were circulated, other governmental agencies became interested in the concept. The Ministry of Agriculture and the Agriculture Bank devised plans for cooperatives in different parts of the country. Unfortunately, the American technician and his replacement did not have the gravitas or stature to push through the total implementation of the projects. Another important project of Point Four was to provide scholarships to government employees. After three years of operations in Iran, it was recognised that, other than directors, most Iranian officials were educated in Iranian institutions and only a few had been trained in Europe. Many were unaware of managerial skills used in advanced European and American institutions. So Point Four proposed that, each year, 100 scholarships for training in the United States would be granted to qualified government officers. This project was approved by the Cabinet Committee. Point Four would provide management training and tours of American institutions to officials representing various governmental agencies. It was decided that several candidates 40

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would be considered for each scholarship; those who were not selected owing to insufficient language skills would be enrolled in English classes and reconsidered at a later time. The 100 scholarships would be divided among the agriculture, health, education and economic divisions at Point Four. Candidates were selected by a panel of officials from Point Four and Iranian ministries. I had the responsibility for the panel at the Economic Development Division. It included officials from the Ministry of National Economy and the Plan Organisation. In the first two years of the programme, we awarded about 70 scholarships to candidates in various economic fields and sent them to the United States. The programme continued for several years, and many candidates were able to contribute greatly to Iran. Many of them later became governors and high-ranking officials.

Did Point Four have a network of offices to handle operations across the country, or were all of its activities concentrated at the headquarters in Tehran? A.A.: In the beginning, operations were concentrated in Tehran. In order to launch such an extensive programme, planning and preparations had to be done in the capital. You have to realise that because of the nature of this operation, the fact that a foreign government was involved required constant interaction with the central government and its agencies to clarify objectives and avoid misunderstandings. In the first phase, preparations for travel and lodging for incoming American technicians had to be made, administrative needs had to be fulfilled, and funding and financing had to be allocated to different programmes. As far as machinery and equipment were concerned, difficulties had to be overcome in procuring and transporting them from other countries, clearing them through customs, providing storage, and training personnel to operate them. There was a host of other issues to be tackled that consumed much time that first year. By the end of the year, offices were operational in Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Ahvaz, Babolsar, Mashhad, Rasht, Tabriz, Kerman and Kermanshah. The success of projects such as the eradication of 41

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malaria, the digging of shallow wells to provide potable water, and the replacement of ground toilets with sanitary ones encouraged Point Four’s expansion to other parts of the country. Programmes such as the campaign to eradicate locusts, the disinfection of dwellings in villages, improvements in maintaining livestock, the introduction of new methods in agriculture, vocational training for women, audiovisual programmes for improvement in different aspects of life, and many other projects that Point Four was pursuing were of great interest to villagers and local populations. Money transfers to students abroad had become a smooth and routine operation. Apart from the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Point Four developed good working relations with all government ministries. Programmes were welcomed with little opposition; vehicles with Point Four markings that went through villages were welcomed by the local population, and the staff were greeted with offers of cooperation. Nevertheless, there was one incident in Shiraz in which leftist radicals created a disturbance that was of concern to the Americans, but the situation was quickly resolved by the direct involvement of Prime Minister Mossadegh. In the spring of 1953, Dr Mohammad Moghadam, whose main task was to do translations for Mr Warne, decided to leave Point Four to pursue academic work at the University of Tehran. Following his departure, Mr Warne asked me to go back to headquarters and work as his special assistant.

How were the events of August 1953, which led to the ousting of the Dr Mossadegh government, observed by you at Point Four? How did Point Four’s activities proceed after the regime change? 7 A.A.: In a radio broadcast at 7 a.m. on 16 August 1953, it was announced that there had been a failed military coup by the Imperial Guards and 7

The entire summer of 1953 was taken up with talk of coups and counter-coups. Unrest from all different sides was palpable, exacerbated by the country’s economic woes following the British-led boycott of Iranian oil. With the increased instability of an oil-rich Iran sitting on the southern borders of the Soviet Union, the Americans became more interested in the country’s crisis. 42

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that the perpetrators who claimed to be enforcing the Shah’s order to remove Dr Mossadegh had been arrested. Later that day, it was announced that the Shah had left Iran for Baghdad. At Point Four, work continued as usual and preparations were made for a cocktail party at Mr Warne’s residence. He had invited about 100 Iranian and American dignitaries to his house in the Zargandeh district north of Tehran. All the guests, including Hossein Ala, the Minister of Court, arrived at the designated time. It was early in the evening that reports started coming in about unrest in the city; gangs carrying red flags were breaking store windows and looting, while others were taking down statues of the Shah in city squares. Hearing of these events was quite unsettling for the guests, and they began to leave. The situation was brought under control by security forces, and by the next day work continued as usual. The Board of Trustees of the Dreyfus Charity Foundation were meeting as scheduled at 10 a.m. on 19 August 1953, at Bank Melli. The Foundation had been established during World War II by Grace Dreyfus, the wife of the American Ambassador at that time, Louis G. Dreyfus Jr, to help the poor people of south Tehran. The board of this Foundation included the wives of high-ranking American diplomats, several distinguished Iranian women, and Dr Abdollah Daftari, former assistant director of the Iran National Bank. Mr Warne had been asked to join the board as well, but he had named me to join the board in his stead. The meeting convened as scheduled on that fateful day. It ended around noon, and I headed back to the office. However, when I got there, I was told that the office was closing because of the unrest in the south of the city, and many of the employees had already left. I went to my office to take care of some work and turned on the radio to see what is going on. Around 2 p.m. I could hear the sound of continuous gunfire coming from the city centre. Sometime later, I heard the voices of those who had taken over the radio station announcing that the government of Dr Mossadegh had fallen and that General Fazlollah Zahedi had taken over. People poured into the city streets, and military trucks and jeeps carrying soldiers were seen driving through neighbourhoods chanting ‘Long live the Shah!’ A lot has been said about the events of that day and there is not much more that I can add other than my personal experience. Those 43

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seeking the truth about the events of 19 August 1953 should note that if the American officials at the embassy or at Point Four had any idea about what would unfold, it would not make sense for them to let their spouses attend a charity meeting. Their residences were located in the northern suburbs of Tehran in the areas of Tajrish, Zargandeh and Elahiyeh, and the meeting was held at the Bank Melli building on Ferdowsi Avenue in the centre of the city. In any event, we went back to work the next day; the change of government did not affect our activities. But I have to mention that, after the Islamic Revolution of 1978–9 and my departure from Iran, I read Kermit Roosevelt’s book Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran in which he wrote about the events of that day. His account suggests behind-the-scene political activities and the involvement of the United States. After reading the book, I wrote to Mr Warne, who was in retirement by that time. As one of his closest Iranian friends, I wanted to know whether his friendships over the years with Dr Mossadegh and his government, and in particular with his son, Gholam Hossein Mossadegh, were genuine or not. I wondered whether his activities in Iran had been a front behind which he was conspiring to overthrow the Prime Minister. Warne wrote back to me and unequivocally denied any knowledge or involvement in the activities that Kermit Roosevelt had written about. A few days after General Zahedi took over the reins of government, Mr Warne was invited to meet the new Prime Minister, who at that time had set up his office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I accompanied Mr Warne to the meeting for translation purposes. Abdullah Entezam, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr Ali Amini, the new Minister of Finance, were also present. After the customary greetings, General Zahedi, with the demeanour of a victorious commander and with a dignified posture and a calm and eloquent voice, addressed Mr Warne. He stated that the government was determined to establish order and peace and was committed to tackling the issues of poverty and the distress that had overtaken the country. He went on to say that he was aware of the extent of Point Four’s activities across the country through his son, Ardeshir. He knew that the programmes touched ordinary citizens and those at the lowest levels of the society. He wanted to assure Mr Warne that he had the full support of the government. He said that 44

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he was concerned about high unemployment in Tehran and requested that Point Four come up with a plan to address this pressing issue. He stated that the government would continue to honour the agreement and the procedures that had been established, the only change being the composition of the Cabinet Committee, in which the new Cabinet Ministers would take over. Mr Warne thanked General Zahedi for the meeting and his support and informed him of a letter from the US government that was to be delivered by Loy Henderson, the American Ambassador. He added that the US government had allocated $45 million, in addition to the budget for technical assistance, to be given in increments to Iran through Point Four. The first instalment was to arrive shortly to cover the payroll of those government employees who had not received their salaries in months. He also said that I would be Point Four’s contact with Dr Amini, the Minister of Finance. The meeting ended on a positive note, and I was complimented by Mr Entezam for my translation skills on sensitive issues. In a meeting that afternoon at Point Four with division chiefs, we discussed the government’s request at length. It was concluded that Point Four would employ day labourers for the ongoing agricultural and health projects in the Tehran district, within the guidelines and existing budget. The Karaj Dam project to provide drinking water for Tehran had been initiated by the Iranian government, but road construction for the area around the dam was progressing slowly due to budgetary shortfalls. Karaj Dam was identified as a suitable project for Point Four to be able to employ day labourers immediately. In the following week, the first instalment of aid in the amount of $5 million was transferred to the Ministry of Finance for the back pay of government salaries. It was at this juncture that Point Four involvement with the Iranian government went beyond technical assistance and small experimental projects. After two or three months, when I went to deliver the monthly instalment of $5 million to the Minister of Finance, he returned the cheque and told me to relay his message that Iran did not need a handout. If the United States was really intent on helping Iran, he said, it should give a lump sum as indicated in the letter. Although the instalments had helped, receiving aid indefinitely 45

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in this manner was not acceptable. When I returned to the office with the cheque and the message, the American officials at Point Four were confused and unsettled. Interpretations of this new response varied. Ambassador Henderson was informed of the matter. I was not told about the actions that followed this incident, but a few days later the matter was resolved and the Ministry of Finance accepted the cheque. What followed this episode was interesting. American officials began expressing their views on the workings of the Iranian government bureaucracy. The consensus was that government agencies lacked objectives, suffered from poor organisation, and were incapable of meeting requirements to help solve national problems. Agencies functioned as piggy banks that employees would visit at the end of the month to collect salaries, and low-level employees were abusing their positions and demanding bribes. I must add that Iran was rich in natural resources and had an affluent class that controlled manufacturing and trade without paying taxes. Therefore, the US taxpayers’ funding of the Iranian government’s payroll could hardly be justified. As projects moved forward at a rapid pace, it became evident that government agencies had to be reorganised. Meanwhile, in the press and at official and social gatherings, the issues surrounding Iran’s bureaucracy were constantly debated. New laws and regulations had been added to the existing ones in successive governments, then arbitrarily changed or adjusted by influential Parliament members. Point Four officials who had to deal with government agencies were frustrated and believed that an overhaul of the system was needed. At this time, a new division was created at Point Four, the Office of Public Administration, and an experienced American officer came to Iran to head it. Hassan Shahmirzadi, who had finished his graduate studies in Switzerland and the United States, was appointed as the Iranian associate in that office. With the addition of several American and Iranian employees, the technical staff was completed. During its first few weeks, the office was preoccupied with collecting statistics and data from various government institutions. With the help of American and Iranian colleagues who had been working on these issues, the office was able to make timely recommendations for administrative improvements in the structure of the ministries. Mr Warne discussed the matter 46

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with the Cabinet Committee. It was well received, and he was given assurances that all agencies would cooperate. The contacts between Point Four experts and government institutions commenced, and the projects got underway. The first and most interesting study was done at the Ministry of Finance, one of the biggest and most important of all the government agencies, tasked with collecting taxes and other revenues and paying all government expenses. Despite its seriousness, the first meeting between a Point Four expert and the director of the Internal Revenue Office appeared comical. The American expert was accompanied by an Iranian associate for the appointment at the Ministry. They were escorted to an office, and the director was seated at the far end of the room, behind a large desk covered by stacks of folders. There were chairs alongside the walls, and several people were already seated, apparently waiting for their meeting with the director. Everyone rose to greet the American official. A half-hour was spent drinking tea and coffee and engaging in small talk. Finally, the American official asked about the number of taxpayers in the country. The answer was 350,000. He then inquired about the method by which tax rates were determined, how they were collected, what follow-up was conducted, and what procedures were followed in handling the files. The director responded without hesitation that he knew all the taxpayers and was aware of everything that went on. The American official thanked the director and left in amazement. He reported his findings to the Office of Public Administration, and it took some time before anyone could think of a way to approach the problem. Other reports were similar in nature and were a clear indication of the ailing organisation and management of these institutions. Government institutions had been established in the 1930s midway through the reign of Reza Shah, based on the French model. With the occupation of Iran by the Allies during World War II and the dire economic situation after the war compounded by successive, short-lived governments, these institutions had gone through many changes. The outcome was a huge bureaucracy that employed thousands of people to administer unnecessary regulations, and a group of officials who created problems for citizens in the name of law. The meagre government salaries 47

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that did not even cover living expenses led to rampant bribery and corruption. The ambiguity of regulations and the complexity of the laws compounded by difficult instructions had facilitated a culture of paper-pushing and obstruction. It was obvious that under such circumstances, implementing national programmes would face great obstacles. Irrespective of announcements by the government and the good intentions and efforts of top officials, owing to extensive problems and inadequacies in the system, failure was inevitable. Studies and discussions of the issues called attention to problems with the execution of projects. Many studies showed that even during the government of Dr Mossadegh, when legislation was passed to limit the government payroll by offering incentives such as five years of credit to encourage retirement, the number of government employees continued to increase. Government agencies and municipalities were using loopholes in the law by employing contractors and day labourers, compounding the problem. The government was desperately trying to address this problem without having much success. In the spring of 1955, General Zahedi resigned and Hossein Ala became Prime Minister. Mr Ala had worked closely with Mr Warne while he was Minister of Court and was familiar with Point Four activities, so the programmes continued without interruption. The oil crisis was over by then,8 and with its resolution came the promise that oil revenues would allow the implementation of programmes and generate economic development and prosperity. A few days after his appointment, Seyed Fakhreddin Shadman, the new Minister of National Economy who was also a member of the Cabinet Committee, called me to his office. He was interested in the activities of Point Four and since I was technically an employee of the Ministry, he asked me to prepare a detailed report every two weeks. I told him that Point Four was working on 150 projects, and for me to write even a page for each one 8

One outcome of the 1953 coup which ousted Dr Mossadegh was that Iranian oil again began to flow. BP (the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) was again involved in the marketing and distribution of Iran’s oil, but now as part of a Consortium of the seven great oil companies dominated by the five great American firms and including BP and Royal Dutch Shell – together known as The Seven Sisters. Extraction remained in Iran’s hands following the 1951 nationalisation of the oil fields and refineries. 48

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of them was too huge a task to handle. He said that he was not asking me for a written report; I could meet him every other week for half an hour and tell him about the progress of various projects, discussing any problems that needed attention. These meetings were very productive and continued as long as he held that post. One of the initiatives that was of interest to Mr Ala’s government was the passing of a law to ensure the stability of the administrative structure in the ministries by establishing a permanent Undersecretary position. This plan was devised with the cooperation of the Division of Public Administration at Point Four, presented and approved by the government and then presented to Parliament, duly approved and thus becoming law. The law established a permanent post of Undersecretary for administration in each Ministry, whereby selected candidates would be appointed to five-year terms. The intention was to bring stability to administrative offices by appointing honest employees and protecting them against personal attacks for political purposes during ministerial shake-ups. Such laws had been successfully implemented in other countries such as Great Britain, and the hope was that it would work in Iran as well. With the consent of the Cabinet Committee, the dean of the School of Public Administration at the University of Southern California was invited to Tehran to help with reforming the Iranian bureaucracy. His visit led to the signing of an agreement to establish a School of Public Administration at the University of Tehran for the purpose of training students at the graduate level for managerial positions. Point Four took responsibility for all expenses associated with the programme. Initially, it was decided to send six students with graduate degrees to the University of Southern California to pursue doctorate degrees in public administration. Among the first group of students who were selected, I can name Manouchehr Goodarzi,9 who already had a doctorate from Princeton University, Houshang Ram10 and Karim Pasha Bahadori.11 9

Minister of State in the cabinets of Assadollah Alam and Amir-Abbas Hoveyda.

10

Became a prominent banker and chairman/managing director of the Omran Bank as well as a close confidant of the Shah.

11

Became Minister of Information and Tourism and head of Queen Farah’s Private Bureau. 49

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By 1956, with the oil crisis subsiding and projections that oil revenues would increase, there was optimism in the ministries and in the country. There was a sense that it was time for the government to gradually take responsibility for the programmes that had been put in place for the previous five years by Point Four. To facilitate this transfer, US advisers suggested the establishment of the Iran–US Joint Fund for Economic Development, to be managed by a representative from the Iranian government and the head of Point Four. This proposal was accepted by the Iranian government; Dr Shadman, Minister of National Economy, was selected as the Iranian representative, and a new agreement was signed between the two countries. Then Mr Warne and Dr Shadman each appointed a personal representative to handle the daily operation on their behalf and provide the administrative support for the projects that were in the stage of execution. Mr Warne appointed his deputy as his personal representative, and Dr Shadman appointed me as his. To organise this operation, instructions had to be prepared and guidelines established to consolidate transportation equipment and assets accumulated and used by American and Iranian employees of Point Four, and the future of the more than 6,000 people working on various projects had to be decided. At this juncture, the Cabinet Committee was dissolved, and communication between Point Four and the Iranian government was handled by Dr Shadman. This was in fact the beginning of the conclusion of Point Four’s activities in Iran. With the increased oil revenues and the active involvement of the Plan Organisation, under the direction of Abolhassan Ebtehaj, the need for US funding of development projects declined. Following changes in the government, Dr Ali Amini, the new Minister of Finance, replaced Dr Shadman, and later Khalil Taleghani, Minister of State without Portfolio, represented the government of Iran. My position was not changed, and I continued my duties throughout this transition period. At that time, Mr Taleghani was also the head of the organisation of Karaj Dam and was in charge of overseeing the financing of different projects through foreign loans and several other government projects. He did not have an office or a staff at the chancellery, so he would ask me to provide the necessary administrative support for his affairs. So 50

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gradually we developed a solid working relationship during the months that we worked on different projects such as grain distribution to victims of flood disasters in different parts of the country, negotiations with foreign creditors of the country, and my representing him in various public affairs projects. After a few months, at the suggestion of Jamshid Amuzegar,12 he strongly supported my nomination for the post of Deputy Minister of State. Actually, it was a newly created position, and it took a while for it take shape. However in the following years, it became a permanent position in the Prime Minister’s office. Initially, the process of handing over the Point Four programmes to Iranian government agencies faced some obstacles. The Point Four operation was based on US laws and regulations, and its programmes had to be adapted to the Iranian system; particularly, the transfer of employees faced a host of regulatory impasses. Nevertheless, the institutions that had cooperated with Point Four found it necessary to take on the employees and helped overcome the problem. By the early part of 1957, most of the projects had been transferred to Iranian institutions, and they continued to operate without interruption. The transfer of Point Four assets to the Iranians was a major issue. Since the Ministry of Finance was the custodian of Iranian government assets, Bagher Pirnia, Undersecretary of Finance, was selected to oversee the operation. He would attend the weekly meetings of the Joint Fund and sign the necessary transfers of assets to the Iranian government. After a few months, as the process was winding down and almost all the transfers were completed, he called me for a meeting and said that he was in charge of two functions at his Ministry, the Office of Revenue and the Treasury. He added that the volume of work was too much for one person, and the Minister of Finance had asked him to concentrate on the Revenue Department and select someone for the post of Treasurer. He had proposed my name to Ali Asghar Nasser, Minister of Finance, and the latter had agreed. I thanked him for his gracious gesture but told him that there were two problems. The offered position would be lower than my current rank, and the pay would be 500 tomans less than my current salary. He asked me whether I 12

By then a Cabinet Minister in the administration of Hossein Ala. 51

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would accept the job if my concerns were addressed, or if I had some other concerns. I responded that I would need an approval from Mr Taleghani, the head of the Joint Fund, as well. After a couple of weeks, Mr Pirnia told me that the issues had been resolved and that I would become Treasurer General with the rank of Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance, and my salary would be supplemented from the special fund at the disposal of the Minister. He added that Mr Taleghani had approved my appointment to the new position. I thanked him and accepted the position. A short time later, the last transfer of US assets to the Iranian government was completed.

52

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3

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The Treasury

What were the first steps in your arrival as Treasurer General at the Ministry of Finance? Abdolreza Ansari: As my concerns about rank and salary were addressed, I anticipated a call from Bagher Pirnia to start my new job. One early morning a couple of days later, Major General Valiollah Ansari, the Minister of Roads, surprised me by coming to my home unannounced. Having heard of my appointment at a Cabinet meeting the night before, he had come to give me some fatherly advice. He warned me that the Ministry of Finance was rife with conflict and that the officials who had worked their way up through the ranks would be hostile to an outsider. He believed that it was impossible to accomplish anything and that I would be held accountable and responsible for all the problems there. He strongly recommended that I decline the position. I recounted the sequence of events, emphasising that I had not sought the job. I had given my word and could not retract. Major General Ansari left with much concern. At my first meeting with Ali Asghar Nasser, the Minister of Finance, he asked me to concentrate my time and energy on finding a way to meet the government’s payroll on the first day of each month. He added that each day a great part of his time was spent answering the complaints of ministers and deputies of Parliament who were concerned about unpaid bills and the unpaid salaries of government employees. I said 53

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that although I was familiar with the problems of government finances in general, I would need at least two weeks to understand the nature of the problem and come up with a solution. Within the first couple of days Mr Pirnia took me on a tour of the Treasury and introduced me to his colleagues, asking them to cooperate with me. Everybody was very cordial to this new arrival in their midst.

What precisely was the Treasurer’s scope of responsibility? A.A.: In some countries such as the United States, the rank of the Treasurer is equivalent to that of the Minister of Finance. In Iran, the Treasury is a unit of the Ministry of Finance, and the Treasurer General is a Director General in charge of receiving all revenues of the government and dispensing funds to all government agencies according to their approved budgets. The funds would be sent to the chief accountant of each Ministry, who was actually an employee of the Ministry of Finance though based in the respective Ministry or agency. This chief accountant would be responsible for the disbursement of payrolls or other expenditures in Tehran. For payments of other expenditures throughout the country, there were financial officers stationed in each province called pishkar who were in charge of disbursing funds to all provincial offices of ministries or agencies. During the previous tumultuous 15 years, Iran had been occupied during World War II; the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan with the Soviet backing had declared independence;1 and the nationalisation of the oil industry and conflict with Great Britain had halted all oil exports. The combination of these events plus a number of other issues had plunged the country into utter financial chaos. The government had difficulty collecting taxes and other revenues, and the Treasury was practically empty. Therefore, it was a challenge to meet government payroll and pay other expenses including the military and security needs of the country. Under such circumstances, the Treasurer had a sensitive position in prioritising payments. 1

See Section 1. 54

T he T reasury

When I started, the Treasury had less than a million tomans (the equivalent of about $150,000) available and more than 50 million tomans in approved payment notes. The daily revenue forecast from customs, the sale of sugar, the sale of tobacco products, and other revenue items was only 1.5 million tomans. Other revenue streams such as oil were deposited in the Treasury at certain dates throughout the year. Having met the directors at the Ministry, I visited the employees of various divisions at the Treasury. I was astonished and disturbed by the condition of the offices. Discoloured newspapers covered the windows to block the sun, and the office furniture was in a state of disrepair. One division chief who was responsible for disbursing billions of rials pleaded for a new chair so that he would be able to comfortably perform his duties. The condition of the bathrooms was terrible; the copper ewers (aftabehs, traditionally used in those days for ablutions and cleansing) were chained to prevent theft. The Treasury was located in a grandiose 20-year-old building of the Ministry of Finance that had been built during the reign of Reza Shah. It had been built under the supervision of European contractors and was made of sound, solid materials. However, offices had deteriorated owing to lack of maintenance funds. With the consent of the Minister of Finance, and my familiarity with Point Four projects, I managed to get a budget of 350,000 rials (about $5,000) for the renovation of the offices at the Treasury and immediately proceeded to renovate them. At the same time, I began meeting all the chief accountants of all governmental ministries and agencies to understand their procedures. The facts I learned were surprising and enlightening. These officers, with long records of service, who were technically employees of the Ministry of Finance, believed that their duty was to prevent the expenditure of approved allocated funds. I was astonished that some of them were complaining that their service in preventing expenditures had not been recognised or properly rewarded by the Ministry. I was told that since they were principal officers participating in the preparation of the ministries’ and agencies’ annual budgets, their method was to overstate the expenditure items in the budget and at the same time understate the revenue items. Then, after the approval of the budget by Parliament, they would block expenditures throughout the year, and 55

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with realisation of actual revenues, which would be higher than the forecasted items, the Ministry would come up with a balanced budget. So it would be natural that the Ministry should reward them for this valuable service. For me, this accounting method was contrary to the modern managerial objectives that I aspired to. I believed that the Ministry of Finance had the responsibility to find ways and means to facilitate the implementation of government policies and projects, and not to block the approved programmes and projects. Especially at a time when the country was on the verge of economic take-off, I thought that every government agency had to collaborate to sustain the economic growth that was picking up steam nationwide. I was not in a position to alter this ingrained mentality but was determined to find a solution. Having worked at an organisation where statistics were the foundation of any programme, I approached the Ministry’s unit of statistics and information. I met Ali Ardalan, the head of the unit, and after two hours of discussion, I realised that he had no information and no expertise. He was a respectable employee of the Ministry from a distinguished family who had been removed from his previous position because of his political affiliation with the National Front,2 and he had been given this job to enable him to earn a meagre salary. This office consisted of three or four employees who collected and filed documents from the customs office. I concluded that a new unit had to be established at the Treasury with the specific task of collecting and analysing data from all government agencies. With the approval of the Minister of Finance and Mr Pirnia, the Office of Research and Statistics was created. I invited a former colleague from Point Four, Kouross Rejalee, a graduate of Oxford University, to head this new unit. The impact of their work on the fiscal procedures of the government was enormous, and I will elaborate on that later. Directors General and division chiefs of the Ministry visited me during the first couple of weeks and pledged full cooperation, but I could sense their scepticism. 2

The political movement, which had formed itself into a party, espousing the reformist, anti-colonial sentiments of Dr Mohammad Mossadegh. 56

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During this period, I had to deal with a flurry of requests for payments on outstanding invoices, take calls from influential officials asking for priority, and attend to routine demands. As the month drew to a close and salaries had to be paid, the payroll manager tried to alleviate my concern by stating that the present situation was not something new but rather an ongoing issue for many years, and he knew how to handle it. He said that the salaries of government employees in Tehran were paid first in order to silence chief accountants in the ministries. Then, the salaries for the provinces were sent gradually throughout the month or afterward. He added that provincial offices were accustomed to receiving funds with a two-to-three-month delay and had arrangements with local creditors who knew that the government would eventually pay its bills. In cases of vocal dissent, funds would be sent quickly to remedy the situation. He said that I was worried because I was new to the job, whereas everyone else was accustomed to the situation. I told him that when government employees in the provinces cannot pay their bills to local bakers and butchers, it damages the respect for the individual and the whole government. I worried for employees who had moved to the provinces because of the high cost of living in the capital, only to wait for their small pay cheques and be embarrassed in front of their families and friends. He responded that this has been a concern for previous treasurers as well, but the structure of government finances had made it impossible to meet the payroll on time for all government employees all over the country. He challenged me to find a new way to deal with the situation. Fortunately, I was able to locate the records of all receipts and payments made by the Treasury for the previous five years. The data was analysed and charts and tables were prepared, and I made an appointment to see Ebrahim Kashani, head of Bank Melli (the Iran National Bank), whom I knew from my Point Four days. Bank Melli, which in those days also functioned as the country’s central bank, held the account of the Treasury, and all receipts were deposited there. The government payroll accounted for about half of all deposits made throughout the year. I proposed that at the end of each month, if we did not have enough money in our account to meet all government payroll, the bank should loan us enough funds, at 3 per cent interest, to allow 57

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us to meet our obligations. Similarly, the bank would give us 3 per cent interest on our unspent deposits. At the end of the fiscal year, if we were in the red, the Ministry of Finance would compensate the bank for any difference and include the amount in the budget for the following year. (At that time, banks were paying 3 per cent interest on the balance of each account holder in order to get more deposits.) He responded that if Mr Nasser, the Minister of Finance and former head of the Bank Melli, would approve, he would go along. I went to see Mr Nasser right away, and he was impressed with the proposal. The agreement between the government and Bank Melli was prepared and signed in the following two to three days. For the first time in many years, the order for payment of salaries of all government employees across the country was issued three days prior to the end of the month. The order to all chief accountants and provincial officers stipulated that funds transferred for payment of the payroll could not be diverted to any other purposes. Mr Nasser reported this action Dr Manouchehr Eghbal, the Prime Minister. It was considered a great achievement and was well received by all ministers and members of Parliament. Nevertheless, shortly after, a report was received that the salaries of government employees of Khorasan Province had not been paid. The Minister called and asked me to personally investigate the matter and take any action that I deemed necessary. I flew to Mashhad the following day and was greeted by Sadegh Vaziri, the chief financial officer, an honourable veteran administrator. I found out that he had been pressured by influential military chiefs to pay the invoices of the military before paying the payroll, as this had been the normal way of operation. He had to be informed that his old ways of handling accounts would not be tolerated. Even though I had been given authority to remove him, instead he was given a warning and permitted to stay in his position. This episode served as a notice to all financial administrators to follow the government directive concerning salaries. The resolution of this particular issue dramatically decreased correspondence and complaints to the Treasury. Another matter to address was the constant stream of visits by contractors with connections to members of Parliament, the 58

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government, and the military. I contacted my friend Majid Alam, who was the head of the syndicate of construction contractors, and asked him to inform company managers that payments from the Treasury for their services would be made on the third and eighteenth day of each month. In case of insufficient funds at the Treasury, a percentage would be deducted from all invoices and compensated for in the following pay period. I asked him to reiterate that influence peddling would not be tolerated and might even work to a contractor’s disadvantage. Even though this directive was initially taken as another government ploy, a routine was established, and gradually the burden of these visits was removed. Over the next few months, an analysis of dealings between the Treasury and various governmental agencies exposed the existence of special accounts within the ministries and outside the normal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance. These accounts had been created according to some legal authorisation attached to certain laws. The reason for these accounts was that, following the forced departure of Reza Shah after the military occupation of the country by the British and the Soviets,3 resulting in the collapse of the old order, the economy of the country gradually degenerated. This, coupled with the culture of belt tightening and the obstructionist policies of the Ministry of Finance, had led to the ministries and agencies to create shadow units. The budget approved by the government basically covered salaries and maintenance of the basic structure of the ministries. Therefore, a number of ministries created special accounts to pass the control of the Ministry of Finance. This type of operation had happened mainly in the ministries that were generating revenues for the government such as the Tobacco Monopoly, the Sugar Monopoly, the Forestry Administration, and so on. The legal authorisation for these accounts was usually vague and open to interpretation. Therefore, the ministries could use those funds as they pleased without regard to other 3

Following the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941 Reza Shah, who was thought to have pro-German – or at least anti-British – sentiments, was promptly dethroned and dispatched by the British into exile in South Africa. He was succeeded by his son Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi who was Iran’s Shah during the author’s career prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979. 59

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restrictions, such as hiring new employees or purchasing goods and services. For instance, thousands of employees had been hired as daily workers or contract employees, some kept on for a number of years, at a time when engaging new government employees was legally forbidden. So the government was saddled with tens of thousands of unauthorised employees who were a tremendous burden on the government payroll. This was just one example of abuse of authority, and there were so many others that space does not permit elaboration. Also, I was made aware that the Ministry of War and some other agencies had signed contracts with foreign entities for the purchase of goods and services, guaranteeing payments from their future budget allocation without approval of the government. To learn more about this, a representative was sent by the Treasury to all government agencies asking for clarification and documentation on such matters. The response across the board was that the independent actions taken were within the law, and that they were not accountable to the Ministry of Finance. The Treasury had to convince the ministries that the purpose of the inquiry was purely a matter of accounting and did not involve meddling in their affairs. I pursued the matter and had the Prime Minister’s office support my request. The ministries relented, and we started receiving the necessary reports. The collected data was alarming. While at that time the yearly oil income of the country was only about $250 million, 85 per cent of which had been allocated for development programmes by the Plan Organisation, the outstanding commitments by these outside units stood at about $480 million. Based on these figures, several charts and spreadsheets were prepared that clearly demonstrated payment schedule commitments from each agency. Copies were sent in white folders marked ‘Highly Confidential’ in black and red to the ministries and the Prime Minister’s office. This created quite a stir in Dr Eghbal’s Cabinet. The financial commitments made by these organisations largely circumvented regulations that required parliamentary approval for foreign loans. These purchases had been named as suppliers’ credit without the prior approval of the Ministry of Finance for inclusion in their future budget or of Bank Melli for guaranteeing the payments in foreign exchange. It was obvious that failure to meet these commitments by either the involved agency or 60

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Bank Melli would have seriously damaged Iran’s credit rating abroad. The exposure of these seemingly corrupt practices alarmed Dr Eghbal’s government, which had run on an anticorruption platform. In order to address the problem, it became clear that all government agencies had to report all their expenditures to the Ministry of Finance, to be reflected in the annual budget. However, owing to bureaucratic turf fighting and cumbersome regulations, the implementation of reforms faced major obstacles. The organisational structure at the Ministry of Finance had to accept its share of blame. There were three undersecretaries at the Ministry who supervised different Ministry operations. The senior undersecretary was the Parliamentary Undersecretary, who represented the Ministry in Parliament and also supervised the Office of Verification of Documents. He had to sign and give approval for every payment no matter how small the amount was. Then there was the Undersecretary for Revenue, who oversaw the tax offices and various other departments including the Treasury and Budget Office. The third undersecretary was the Administrative Undersecretary, who was in charge of all administrative affairs including the Personnel Office, the Retirement Office for the entire government, the Government Properties Office, the Bureau of Accounts, and various other functions. As it happened, some of the heads of these offices were constantly fighting with each other because their responsibilities were not well defined and in fact were rather murky. There was no manual that could precisely define the laws and resolutions of Councils of Ministers and ministerial decrees that could be referred to. I was told that the Parliamentary Undersecretary and the head of the Budget Office had a file that contained all the documents that affected the operation of the Ministry of Finance and they were keeping the documents under lock and key. It was said that this bundle of documents was the ‘secret bullet’ that could be used to refuse some payments and rationalise that action on the strength of some law or ministers’ resolution, or some directives that had been long changed or modified but that no one knew about or had access to. This gave the concerned officers a great deal of power, and it was obvious that something had to be done about it. I will come back to this subject later on. 61

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At the time of discussions about the need for review of the organisation and procedures of the Ministry, Mr Pirnia was appointed as the economic attaché to the Iranian embassy in Washington, and he was replaced by Abbasgholi Ardalan, who had held the position of Treasurer for ten years and had been the economic adviser to the Iranian mission at the United Nations. He was a distinguished veteran of the Ministry. In order to coordinate the operations of the various sections of the Ministry, a weekly meeting between Mr Ardalan, Mr Anvari (the Undersecretary for Parliamentary Affairs), Mehdi Vosoogh (the Undersecretary for Administration), and myself was scheduled. At the first meeting, the discussions revolved around problems facing the Ministry. When it was my turn to speak, I said that in the meetings between Iranian and American advisers, it was always believed that the issue of resolving the country’s fiscal problems was of utmost importance, and if the Ministry of Finance could collect all the taxes it was owed and pay its obligations on time, there could be a spectacular advancement in the development of the country. I added that the rules and regulations that had been passed 30 years earlier had to be updated to accommodate the changing needs of the country. I suggested that department managers be given an opportunity to participate in this effort to express their ideas and propose necessary changes in the burdensome regulations. I thought that we could encourage them by offering rewards for practical and interesting ideas. This simple concept, which is practised in modern organisations everywhere, met stern opposition from Mr Anvari. He proclaimed that such a declaration would be taken as a sign of weakness on our part and would imply our inability to tackle the problem. He believed that it would lead to insubordination, and on that note he left the meeting. The other gentlemen, who considered Mr Anvari as their senior, remained silent, leading to the eventual cancellation of such meetings. Since I was in the good graces of the Minister, he gave me the task of drawing up plans to improve the existing mechanism for meeting the expenditures of the government and for budget planning. With the help and cooperation of some well-meaning colleagues, we were able to prepare a set of recommendations that would improve the 62

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operation of the Ministry. As an example, it became clear that the annual budget that was presented to Parliament reflected only a portion of the national revenue and expenditures, and it was often based on the figures from the previous year plus a request for a small percentage increase. Therefore, Parliament never had a clear picture of the financial situation of the country and consequently could not approve a total budget for the government. So they would resort to approving expenditures in piecemeal fashion, frequently holding the government at the mercy of lawmakers. It was not unusual that the year would end without a budget being passed. This state of affairs had put the Ministry of Finance in a precarious position, as all agencies were constantly pressuring the Ministry for funding. Also, the procedures for obtaining funds from the Ministry were so complicated that it was always a great achievement to be able to get the necessary funds to complete any project. For instance, there were several forms to be filed with Ministry of Finance for each funding request. These forms had to go through several offices of the Ministry and get approval from the heads of those offices. Then, after getting the approval of the Directors General of the Verification Office and the Budget Office, a request had to go to the office of the Parliamentary Undersecretary, who was a thorough and uncompromising veteran of the system, who had to sign every payment order to the Treasury. Mind you, these documents had also been through the time-consuming bureaucracy of their originating agency. Now, since Mr Anvari was preoccupied every day with visits from prominent officials and lawmakers, there was always a huge backlog of forms waiting for his signature. Then the signed forms would be sent to the Treasury for payment, and another round of influence peddling and delay. Under this type of operation, the web of bureaucracy and the culture of corruption had led many hard-working and honest public servants to become indifferent and negligent. Another significant matter was the absence of a manual containing all laws, Council of Ministers’ resolutions, and ministerial operating directives pertaining to the dispersal of funds by the Ministry. Judgements on cases that could be used as precedents were scattered throughout various departments. It would happen that new rules or regulations would not be enforced simply because they had not been registered, 63

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or the old regulations had not been removed from the books. Certain Ministry officials would enforce those rules that were to their personal advantage. The Central Budget Office held the most complete set of documents but would act only on Mr Anvari’s order. It was observed that different judgements had been given for similar requests. For instance, approval would be given for the purchase of machinery for a certain Ministry but not to another, even though they were both included in the same budget. These sorts of situations led many to believe that the Ministry of Finance was an antiquated, obstructionist and possibly a corrupt institution. The organisational structure of the Ministry was problematic as well. Basically, the Ministry’s functions had been divided among its three top officials, namely the parliamentary, administrative and revenue and expenditure undersecretaries; all the operating units of the Ministry had been assigned to each undersecretary, based on the political and sentimental considerations of successive ministers. For example, the Budget Office and Office of Document Verification, which ordinarily should have fallen under the purview of the Undersecretary for Revenue and Expenditure, received its orders from the Parliamentary Undersecretary, and the Office of Research and Statistics maintained a very low status and was relegated to the Administrative Undersecretary. For me, the Ministry of Finance was like the heart of the country; it needed to operate efficiently in order to get the other parts of the government moving efficiently. But in practice it had become a massive impediment that stopped the machinery of government in its tracks. My assessments were well received by Mr Nasser, the Minister of Finance, and he assured me that changes would be made. To begin with, a panel of three retired former Ministry officials was assembled to organise, update and prepare a comprehensive compendium of laws, rules and regulations that were still valid. They were given the necessary mandate and promised good compensation if they could finish the job as soon as possible. They started work immediately. Toward the end of the summer I was asked by Mr Nasser to join a mission to London as the representative of the Ministry for discussions with the Oil Consortium. The group included Fouad Rohani, Reza Fallah, Ataollah Etehadieh, Abbas Parkhideh, Hooshang Farkhan, 64

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and a Mr Erfani. All were experts and top officers of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). When I asked about my tasks and responsibilities, Mr Nasser responded that my presence was to affirm the acquiescence of the Ministry, and by extension that of the Iranian government. He elaborated that the government needed assistance from the Consortium to put into action projects that were needed for development of the country’s oil industry. He said that the representatives whom I was accompanying were quite knowledgeable about the purpose of the mission. I suggested that we use this opportunity to demand an increase in the amount of oil extraction accorded to Iran. Iran’s revenue from its oil industry was much less than that of other oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq, and an agreement on the matter would help alleviate the country’s fiscal woes. Mr Nasser agreed and asked me to propose it at the meeting. The delegation travelled to London a couple of days later and stayed at the Dorchester Hotel, where the Consortium had planned the event. Our group met privately to discuss strategy before the official meeting with the Consortium was to start. The meeting was conducted by Fouad Rohani, who was legal counsellor of the NIOC. Several issues were discussed, and when it was my turn, I put forth my proposal, and it was decided that as spokesman for the delegation, Mr Rohani would present the case along with the other issues and call on members for elaboration as needed. At the meetings, he presented the concerns of the Iranian mission in a competent and professional manner. The request for the increase in oil production was rejected, deemed unattainable at that juncture owing to two major factors. Foremost was the quality of Iranian oil compared to that of other oil-producing countries. Delegates maintained that refining Iranian oil was more expensive due to high levels of sulphur. The other issue was that the Iranian oil industry had too many employees. Upgrading a system that employed over 70,000 workers required a substantial investment, which the Consortium was unwilling to make. The Iranian case was based on the principle that 85 per cent of oil revenues would be spent on development programmes, which would stabilise the country and create more reliable conditions in which the oil industry could operate, and thus it would become a 65

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more stable partner. But the Consortium was quite reluctant and did not commit itself to any increased level of production. At my first opportunity in London, I contacted Ghods Nakhaii, the Iranian Ambassador, to pay him a visit. I was surprised to discover that he was unaware of the visit by our delegation. Nevertheless, he was quite helpful in our team’s communications with Iran. The London meetings concluded in about ten days and we returned home.

Did you have any responsibilities other than financial affairs, paying government expenses, and carrying out special assignments at the Ministry of Finance? A.A.: Yes, the Treasurer had three other duties. I participated in weekly meetings at the Bank Melli with the Committee of Currency Oversight, alongside Nezamedin Emami, the government inspector at the bank, and Mr Moshir Fatemi and Mr Bayat-Makoo, the elected representatives from Parliament. The purpose of these meetings was to safeguard Iran’s Imperial Crown Jewels4 and oversee the incineration of outdated currency. I also supervised the government mint that produced coins, weights and scales, and the government print office that produced postage stamps and state-sponsored publications.

Going back to the Treasury, did Iran receive any financial aid from the United States? A.A.: No, the oil impasse had been resolved three years earlier and financial assistance from the United States had ceased. However, military assistance for upgrading the armed forces continued for some

4

Iran’s Crown Jewels, generally regarded as a unique and fabulous collection, for a long time continued to underpin the value of the country’s currency. Hence their interest to the Ministry of Finance and the Currency Oversight Committee. In the 1950s they were housed in the Bank Melli which at that time functioned as the country’s Central Bank. They are now in the Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of Iran. 66

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time, until the revenue from the oil industry was substantial enough to take care of the needs of the armed forces. The gradual revenue increase and the heightened sense of security and stability had set the wheels of economic growth in motion. Oil revenues and increases in tariff collection on sugar and tobacco, along with the establishment of order at the Treasury through restructuring, decreased the volume of time-consuming complaints. However, our needs far exceeded our means. I was then instructed by the Finance Minister, Mr Ali Asghar Nasser, to work on the budget for the following year with the assistance of the Budget Office. It was to be presented to the government two months prior to the New Year. This assignment became quite challenging, as officials previously in charge of the budget were offended and refused to cooperate. However, by sweet talk and a little pressure from the top we were able to come together. Convincing government ministries and agencies to divulge their tightly guarded accounts was another hurdle. These agencies had developed ingenious methods to bypass officials from the Ministry of Finance, and they did not want to open their books. Powerful ministers had to be pressured by Dr Eghbal, the Prime Minister, and Mr Nasser to comply and submit all revenue and expense figures, excluding details, to the Treasury. Nevertheless, there was resistance, and ministries refused to believe that this was a serious initiative. They used their old delay tactics in hopes of a policy change or the removal of the officials who were pressuring them. At the time of these budget battles, Mr Nasser asked me to prepare a report about the needs of the Ministry of Finance. He explained that US President General Dwight Eisenhower was en route to a state visit to India with a stopover in Tehran to meet the Shah.5 All ministries were asked to prepare a report on their needs, which would be included in a request for assistance from the US government. He wanted me to prepare the request of the Ministry of Finance. I thought about the matter for a day and came to the conclusion that the combination of these separate reports from all ministries would 5

The meeting took place on 14 December 1959. 67

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amount to a voluminous document that could not be used effectively in a short meeting. I thought that, instead of writing reports, it would be much better if we presented our needs via graphs and charts. On this basis, we prepared four diagrams. The first one was a pie chart showing the earnings from various sectors of the government. The second chart showed the expenses of the various parts of the government. The third diagram demonstrated the history of oil revenues in Iran, and the fourth chart compared Iran’s per capita income from oil versus that of other oil-producing nations in the Persian Gulf, namely Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait. The chart showed that while Kuwait’s share was $2,000 per capita, Iran’s share was a mere $13. The purpose of this presentation was to convey the message that if Iran could raise its oil revenue, it would not need foreign assistance. I asked a graphic artist who had earlier worked at Point Four to produce these diagrams for our presentation. They were ready the morning of the arrival of the US President and were rushed to the palace. I called the head of the Palace Guards and asked to have them displayed in the entrance hallway and be brought to the attention of the Shah. We expected that the diagrams would be returned to the Treasury so that we could use them on other occasions. Unfortunately, I learned later that the discussions about American aid to Iran had centred on these charts and that President Eisenhower had asked to take them back to the United States with him. I still regret not having made copies or taken pictures of them. Needless to say, after that visit, we never heard again about the excess sulphur in Iranian oil or the superfluous Iranian workers in the Iranian oil industry. Rather, in the next three years the country’s oil production more than doubled and the Oil Consortium initiated a number of projects to absorb the extra workers they did not need. The Shah’s approval and the backing of the Minister of Finance led to more support for the Treasury’s mandate. From that point on, all ministries and government agencies that had not heeded the Treasury’s requests before submitted their budget proposals on time, including the army, the national police and the gendarmerie. This endeavour was the foundation for future cooperation between government agencies and the Ministry of Finance, and, as the result of 68

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this effort, a single document was produced that reflected all revenues and expenditures of the government. This document served as a basis for the preparation of the national budget in the future. In any event, we managed to complete the national budget on time, and I was asked by the Minister to present it to the Council of Ministers. The Council approved it without any change, and it was presented to Parliament two months before the end of the year. This was hailed as a big achievement by the government, as it was the first time that it had happened. Apart from this episode being a career accomplishment, coming to understand the details of government mechanisms was an invaluable experience, and it helped me significantly in my future appointments. Alongside the routine tasks that went along with my position, the project to consolidate the Treasury’s rules and regulations and prepare a complete operational manual was pursued and came to fruition. The result was a two-volume manual that was printed by the government press and ready to be distributed among all offices of the Ministry of Finance. As for the reorganisation of the Ministry, a comprehensive plan was drawn up with the assistance of Abdolhossein Moghtader, a Director General of the Ministry, and his colleague, Mahmud Kashefi. The ratification of our proposal was delayed due to Mr Nasser’s heart problems. He was hospitalised for few weeks and finally retired, being replaced by Major General Ali-Akbar Zargham on 6 December 1959. On the first day of his arrival as the new Minister of Finance, Major General Zargham held a meeting with all the top officials at the Ministry. After the customary greeting and speeches, he asked me to stay behind for a private talk after everybody had left. He said that prior to the confirmation of his appointment to the Ministry of Finance it had been decided that I would replace him as the head of the Ministry of Customs and Monopolies. Without waiting for my response, he began to inform me of the structure of that Ministry, the ongoing projects and what needed to be done there. Being familiar with Major General Zargham’s managerial style, I found myself wondering how I would be able to accomplish anything there, as he continued to lecture me for an hour. His management philosophy and his outlook on the overreaching role of government were completely contrary to my beliefs and convictions. He was a staunch believer in the establishment 69

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of government-owned supermarkets to supply all the needs of government employees, building government housing for them, and providing different services in order to free the government employees from the yoke of the private profiteers; he had a host of proposals along these lines. He told me that he wanted me to continue his legacy at the Ministry of Customs and Monopolies. He was a domineering personality and legendary in his clashes with other ministers. I knew that I was not his match and could see clearly that I would have to seek his approval for every action that I wanted to take, or face a battle with him in the Council of Ministers. So, while listening to his lecture, I was patiently pondering my own response. I told him that it would be an honour to be promoted to the rank of Minister, but as I was so young and had a long period of service before me I was sure that I might one day attain that honour. But at this juncture I preferred to be a constructive citizen, figuring that I would best serve the interests of the country by completing the projects that I had worked on for the previous two years at the Treasury. He asked me to elaborate. I told him that the comprehensive manual of rules and regulations and the plans for the restructuring and reorganisation of the Ministry were completed and ready to be acted upon, and therefore, if he had no objection, I preferred to stay at my current position to implement the necessary reforms. He welcomed my proposal but asked me to get approval from the Prime Minister myself. That afternoon, I went to see Dr Nosratollah Kasemi, the Secretary General of the Melliyoun (National) Party at his headquarters. He was a close friend and confident of Prime Minister Dr Manouchehr Eghbal. I recounted my conversation with Major General Zargham and confided to him that I believed that only a close associate of Zargham would be able to replace him at the Ministry of Customs and Monopolies without creating problems. I asked Dr Kasemi to express my most sincere gratitude to the Prime Minister for the confidence and honour that had been extended to me and convey to him my discussion with Zargham. Dr Kasemi called me back late that evening and told me that the Prime Minister had accepted my point of view. I relayed the message to Major General Zargham the next day. He requested to see the documents that had not been signed by Mr Nasser owing to his illness. It was 70

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a productive day, as Zargham proceeded to sign several documents related to the restructuring and reorganisation of the Ministry of Finance. He also approved 60,000 tomans (about $8,000) as a bonus to be divided among the three retired veterans of the Ministry who had been called on to work on this project. I was appointed Undersecretary of Finance in charge of all the departments that were related to budget and expenditures. A few days later Mr Moussa Khattatan, who was a close associate of Major General Zargham, became the Minister of Customs and Monopolies, and a close relationship was established between the two ministries. My service at the Ministry of Finance continued for another three months, working on the budget for the following year. We had gained the confidence of all the government ministries and agencies. Even Major General Alavi Moghadam, chief of national police, and General Mozaffar Malek, chief of the gendarmerie (two of the most powerful personalities in the armed forces), came personally to defend their budgets. In previous years, they had only sent a signed document carried over by a junior officer to announce their request. On 30 January 1960, in the early morning while I was still in bed, Dr Eghbal contacted me by telephone and instructed me to be at the Marble Palace in three hours, wearing a formal morning coat, customary for very official or ceremonial occasions. Then he hung up. I thought it was all about presenting the following year’s annual budget before the Shah, but when I arrived at the palace, I was greeted and congratulated by Hassan Ali Mansur, the Minister of Labour. I asked him what was going on; he disclosed that I was replacing him and that he was being appointed as the next Minister of Commerce. The Prime Minister arrived at that point, and we accompanied him to His Majesty’s office, where I was presented as the new Minister of Labour and Social Affairs.

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4

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From the New Iran Group to the Nationalist Party

How did your relationship with Mr Hassan Ali Mansur begin? Abdolreza Ansari: Our encounters were mostly in work-related meetings and occasionally at social gatherings. He was the Secretary General of the High Economic Council and I was Treasurer General at the Ministry of Finance. Inevitably we would come across each other at commissions dealing with economic issues. Our regular interactions began when Jamshid Amuzegar,1 who at that time was the Undersecretary at the Ministry of Health, asked me to join a weekly Economic Council meeting organised by Hassan Ali Mansur. The purpose of these meetings was to bring together a group of influential people to discuss and think of solutions to the economic issues facing the country in a friendly atmosphere. The idea was to present wellthought-out plans to the Council of Ministers and make efforts to have them implemented. Dr Amuzegar pointed out that Mr Mansur had asked Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, one of the directors of the National Iranian Oil Company, to join the meetings. He wanted to know if I was interested, although he had already suggested my name. I welcomed the idea and attended the 1

Later to become Prime Minister 1977–8. 73

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first meeting of the group at Mr Mansur’s office. At that meeting, we agreed on other candidates, who included Gholamreza Moghadam, a senior expert at the High Economic Council; Abdolhossein Etebar, head of the Mortgage Bank (Bank Rahni); Mehdi Samii, senior counsel at the Iran National Bank (Bank Melli); Mr Reza Razmara, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Industries and Mines; Taghi Sarlak, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Roads; and Abolghassem Kheradjou, noted expert in banking and economic affairs. The first few meetings were held in Mr Mansur’s office at the Prime Minister’s building. Gradually, they became working lunches at restaurants or residences. Topics that were discussed related to difficulties faced by various ministries and economic challenges faced by various institutions. The meetings were quite productive as the ideas gradually took shape, and two important organisations were created, the Housing Agency and the Industrial and Mining and Development Bank. As the activities of the Housing Agency broadened, it evolved into the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, and the Industrial and Mining Development Bank became one of the engines of growth for the country. I recall that one of the first topics that was discussed at those meetings was housing. The influx of people from the villages to the cities, Tehran in particular, had created a grave housing problem, and the government was under tremendous pressure to address the shortage. The government institutions that had been created for this purpose were Bank Rahni and the Bank of Construction. Bank Rahni had been established at the time of Reza Shah to provide small loans for housing to individuals. It did not deal with planning for housing shortages on a national scale. The Bank of Construction had been created at the time of Dr Mohammad Mossadegh to reclaim government-owned lands that had been taken over by influential individuals so they could be sold to the public or distributed among government employees. This institution was mired in court cases pertaining to such activities and was exploited by influence-peddlers demanding a piece of land. It was thought necessary to establish an agency to do long-term planning and address housing shortages on a national scale. 74

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The first document to illustrate this need was prepared by Gholamreza Moghadam, and after several long discussions about a multitude of issues, the charter of the Housing Agency was completed. It was presented to the High Economic Council by Mr Mansur and was duly ratified. Jamshid Amuzegar, who had been appointed Minister of Labour during that time and had been instrumental in developing the project, was given the responsibility to oversee that agency, and Farhad Ganjei, who had studied low-cost housing in the United States, was named head of that agency. The discussions relating to the Industrial and Mining Development Bank were equally extensive, and after that project was approved by the Council of Ministers, Mehdi Samii and a Dutch expert were nominated to head the newly established bank. At that time, Bank Melli was basically a commercial bank that had been given the responsibility to issue banknotes and control the country’s currency in addition to providing commercial loans and financial services to the private sector. It was hardly suited to meeting the tremendous needs of the private sector, which was at the taking-off stage in terms of industrial undertakings. The creation of this bank was welcomed by the private sector, and it became one of the most effective institutions in assisting the economic growth of the country. The weekly meetings of our group continued for some time but, as members changed jobs and took on various other responsibilities, the meetings were often postponed and eventually discontinued. Nevertheless, a bond of friendship had been established among the members.

When you entered the Cabinet of Dr Eghbal as the Minister of Labour he was also the founder of the Melliyoun (National) Party. How was your interaction with Dr Eghbal on political matters? A.A.: To explain this relationship, I have to go back to 1951 when I had returned from the United States; a group of my friends asked me to join a social gathering called the Emerson Club and attend their weekly meetings to discuss cultural and social issues. This club met in the northern part of Lalehzar Street, in a small apartment. The meetings were attended by about 30 members, who were graduates 75

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of American universities and had returned to Iran. It was at these meetings that I met Dr Mohammad Moghadam and Dr Fathollah Jalali, who were university professors, Dr Sadegh Ahy, chief of the Agriculture Division at the Plan Organisation, and several other officers of the government and private institutions. The goal of the founding members of the Emerson Club was to introduce American culture into Iran and defend the rights of American-educated students. The members believed that, owing to a lack of understanding of the American educational system, degrees obtained at US universities were not well recognised in Iran. Most senior authorities and university professors in Iran had been educated in Europe, mostly in France. They viewed America through the lens of cowboy and mafia movies, and actors such as John Wayne and Humphrey Bogart. Returning graduates from the United States felt that they had to join forces to break this barrier through personal contacts, publications and speeches. The membership fee was 5 tomans per month (about 80 cents), which went toward the rent of the premises. These meetings continued for a while but gradually, owing to the irregular schedule of the meetings and the difficulty in collecting dues, the club was quietly disbanded. However, after a few months, at the insistence of Dr Moghadam, a small group that included Jamshid Amuzegar, Houshang Ram, and me started to meet to discuss national issues. The group was gradually expanded to include friends and other educated young professionals, regardless of where they had studied. These meetings would take place in someone’s home. As the group reached about 40 people, the meetings were held at the residence of Ali Asghar Mahlouji, who had a big living room. The draft of a charter for the group was prepared by Dr Moghadam and discussed at length in our meetings. The group was finally called Iran Novin (New Iran), and a one-page charter with ten articles stating the aims and objectives of the group was agreed upon. It was to be registered as a political party that was concerned with the well-being of the people of Iran and intended to improve the quality of life of citizens through growth with special emphasis on improvement in the fields of education, health, agriculture, industry and economic development. Several members had reservations about calling our group a political 76

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party, since they were concerned about the reaction of security services, but Dr Moghadam was able to convince everybody to join. Then, Dr Moghadam and I were given the task of going to the national police to register the party. With the assistance of Abolhassan Ghaffari, who was our friend, we were able to register the New Iran Group as a political party and received a licence. After the registration, the activities of the group became more serious, and its meetings were held regularly. Members were inspired to take on more responsibility, and more emphasis was placed on projects that could be well researched and put into operation. In the following years, as several members of our group rose to high ranks in the government, it was evident that the discussions that took place in our meetings played a role in their official duties. To name a few who advanced in their career and occupied high positions, I can name Jamshid Amuzegar (Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Finance, Minister of Health), Houshang Ram (Director of Bank Omran), Akbar Zad (Governor General of Isfahan), Hafez Farmanfarmaian (a university professor in the United States), Mr Farhad Ganjei (Director of the Housing Agency), Sadegh Kia (university professor), Manouchehr Nikpour (Director of Bank Sepah), Ali Naghi Farmanfarmaian (Managing Director, Plan Organisation Bank), Hassan Shahmirzadi (Undersecretary at the Ministry of the Interior, Managing Director at Pars Paper), Dr Ali Moarefi (Undersecretary at the Ministry of War), Nasser Golesorkhi (Minister of Natural Resources) and Mr Manouchehr Kazemi (Minister of Agriculture). I became Treasurer General, Undersecretary of Finance, Minister of Labour, Governor General of Khuzestan, Minister of the Interior and Managing Director of the Imperial Organisation for Social Services. As the word about our regular meetings and the depth of the matters we discussed began to spread, rumours about the nature of these meetings took an intriguing angle. Because several members of the group had worked at Point Four, some came to believe that the group had American connections, and several veteran politicians expressed interest in joining. Our group did not pay much attention to these claims and basically did not identify or mesh with the older generation of politicians. But one day, a member of the group, a Mr Tajbaksh, 77

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who was a high-ranking officer of the National Insurance Company, announced that Dr Mohammad Sajadi, the former Minister of Roads under Reza Shah and one of the most respected politicians in the country, had requested to join our group. The matter was taken very seriously and was discussed during several meetings. Some believed that he would bring stature to the group, while others questioned how a newly formed party of aspiring young technocrats could hold on to its ideals while mixing with politicians of the old school. Finally it was agreed that older politicians would inevitably exert undue influence, intimidate the group, and derail its activities. Dr Sajadi’s membership was declined by a majority vote. After a couple of months in 1956, Dr Moghadam and Dr Kia presented the case of Dr Manouchehr Eghbal, president of the University of Tehran. The case was similar to Dr Sajadi’s. However, this time Dr Moghadam was defending the nomination, and he was very convincing. He argued for the benefits of having Dr Eghbal as a member. He maintained that Dr Eghbal, as a university president, was constantly working with the young generation; he had good intentions and would bring academic respect to the group. The members finally agreed, and Dr Moghadam was asked to invite Dr Eghbal to the next meeting. Dr Eghbal came and enthusiastically asked about each member’s background. He emphasised that he was glad to join us and, as the country was developing rapidly, he would do anything in his power to help this young educated group. He attended a couple of meetings, listened attentively, and made suggestions. The bylaws of the group had a stipulation that if a member had more than two unexcused absences or did not pay the monthly dues, his membership would be terminated. Because Dr Eghbal stopped coming to the meetings and had not paid any dues, Dr Moghadam suggested that his membership be revoked. This was a difficult decision, as some members preferred to quietly drop the subject, but once again Dr Moghadam was firm in pushing that the rules be followed. He also took responsibility for notifying Dr Eghbal himself. Fortunately, this episode had no negative consequences for the group, and on the positive side ensured that members attended the meetings and paid their dues on time. The New Iran Group, whose membership never exceeded 50 individuals, 78

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continued meeting regularly to discuss and analyse current events. Over the next seven years, each member attained a higher rank in his profession. Dr Amuzegar was Undersecretary at the Ministry of Health, Dr Ram was managing director of Bank Omran, and I was Treasurer General of Iran. In mid-1959, a newspaper article was published claiming that Asadollah Alam, who was a former Minister of the Interior and Administrator of the Royal Estates, was forming a new political party called the Mardom (People’s) Party. The 15 founding members of the Party included some deputies from Parliament. At our next meeting, Dr Ram announced that Mr Alam and his colleagues had expressed interest in merging with the New Iran Group and working together to create the Mardom Party. This created quite a stir as members with differing views voiced their opinions. Dr Moghadam was adamant that this would derail the notion of a people-based independent party. He believed that such a development would transform the New Iran Group into a tool of seasoned politicians. Others saw the proposal as an opportunity to be able to make a difference at the national level. It was finally decided to invite Mr Alam to join our group, discuss the membership of his colleagues on an individual basis, and put the matter up for a vote. At the following meeting, Dr Ram relayed Mr Alam’s disagreement with our decision and his desire to discuss the merger with representatives of our group. It was decided that Dr Ram and Brigadier General Moarefi would pursue the negotiations. After a couple of weeks, Dr Ram decided to resign from our group and join the Mardom Party; he cited professional considerations for his decision. Dr Moarefi stated that Mr Alam had extended his hand of friendship and that he had acquiesced as well. This development was agonising and placed the group in an awkward position. A few days later, I was called to meet General Teymur Bakhtiar, the head of the Information and Security Organisation (SAVAK).2 He addressed me in a calm and respectful manner, telling me that he had information about the New Iran Group and the gatherings of educated, well-intentioned young professionals. He added that since it had been decided by the 2

At that time Iran’s intelligence service and secret police. 79

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Shah that there should be two political parties in the country, one headed by Dr Eghbal and the other by Mr Alam. The members of our group were recommended to join one or the other. I responded that we were not an active political party and were basically a group of friends who were technocrats, who met for tea to discuss the issues of the day. He said that he was fully aware of the nature of our gatherings but that if we wanted to drink tea and discuss issues, we better join one of the parties and drink our tea with them. I relayed the message to our group, and we had extensive discussions in the following weeks. It became clear that we would have difficulty continuing our activities. Meanwhile, Dr Eghbal, who had been appointed Prime Minister in 1957, called me to his office. He said that even though we had terminated his membership of the New Iran Group, he was willing to accept our members into his party. At the end of our meeting, he questioned why we had expelled him. I told him that he was an elder statesman with great political background and had not much in common with our young group, and besides he had never paid his dues. He smiled and said that nobody had asked him to pay! At our next gathering, I told the group about Dr Eghbal’s offer. We discussed all the issues and came to the conclusion that the New Iran Group had no future, and it would be advisable to keep it in cold storage and let the members make their own decisions. Each member had the option of choosing between the two parties that were forming. Ultimately, 16 members joined Dr Eghbal’s party, eight members joined Mr Alam’s party, and the others decided not to participate. Dr Moghadam and Dr Amuzegar were among those who believed that neither party was genuine and decided to stay neutral. This was the end of the activities of the New Iran Group. In the following weeks, the formation of the two parties dominated the news. Dr Eghbal and Mr Alam concentrated heavily on organising their respective groups. Dr Eghbal established a 12-member founding committee comprising older respected figures along with Ghassem Rezaie, a young elected member of Parliament, and me. The group included Dr Nosratollah Kasemi (Minister of State and university professor), Dr Ahmad Emami (a university professor), Dr Shahkar (a high-profile lawyer), General Mehdi Rahimi Saffari (member of 80

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Parliament), Hessamedin Dolatabadi (Mayor of Tehran), Motiodoleh Hejazi (eminent writer and senator), Dr Fathollah Jalali (Minister of the Interior), Senator Seyed Assadollah Mousavi and Senator Khanbaba Bayani. The first issue to be addressed was the naming of the group. The Secretary General of the group along with some members of the founding committee such as Mr Hejazi were assigned to discuss and decide on the suggested names. My suggestion was the New Iran Party, but eventually it was agreed that the new party be named Melliyoun, roughly translated as ‘National’. Dr Kasemi was elected as Secretary General and I was elected as Treasurer. Expenses were to be provided for by a one-time donation from some friends of Dr Eghbal and membership dues. To further assist the formation of the parties, the Shah allocated 150,000 rials per month for the Melliyoun Party and 100,000 rials for the Mardom Party. The residence of the former Prime Minister, Dr Mossadegh, was rented for 30,000 rials per month and was the headquarters of the Melliyoun Party. As the Party’s treasurer, I dreaded the day that this venture would come to an end and the blame game directed at my position for mishandling funds. With that in mind, I took the necessary steps to ensure that all the expenditures be pre-authorised by the Secretary General, and well recorded. For doing that, I appointed a well-respected retired officer at the Treasury, Hassan Tazayoni, as chief accountant, and Farokh Rahmdel, a retired officer of the National Savings Bank, as chief bookkeeper; and I personally supervised these activities regularly. I am happy to say that throughout the two-year existence of the Melliyoun Party there was not even a single complaint concerning our finances. In September 1960, Dr Eghbal resigned and Jafar Sharif-Emami, the Minister of Industry, became Prime Minister. As a result of this change, the activities of the Melliyoun Party began to wane. At that time, we had only 700,000 rials (about $9,000) in our account, which was used to pay for current expenditures for a few months until the departure of Dr Eghbal from Iran. Prime Minister Sharif-Emami’s Cabinet had a short life; after eight months, Dr Ali Amini, an arch-enemy of Dr Eghbal, became Prime Minister. My foresight in carefully handling the finances proved to be fortuitous, as I was called by the new Prime Minister to 81

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account for the expenditures of the Melliyoun Party. I explained the procedures that had been used and told him that all documents had been removed from Party headquarters and kept in a safe location, and were ready for inspection. Because Dr Amini was familiar with the workings of the Ministry of Finance, he was satisfied with my briefing and did not inquire further. After leaving the government Dr Eghbal began teaching again at the University of Tehran Medical School. However, his enemies among leftist groups followed him and set fire to his car on the university campus, an incident that hastened his departure to France. This was the story of my political affiliation with Dr Eghbal.

You were a member of the Melliyoun Party. Did the Party have a platform, an ideology that it wanted to implement, or was the party of Prime Minister Eghbal inclined to follow his agenda and listen to his instructions? A.A.: The Melliyoun Party did not have an ideology that could be labelled as left- or right-leaning. Its founders were not ideologues bent on expanding their power base. The objective was to reorganise and modernise existing institutions for the purpose of maximising the use of the country’s natural resources for the benefit of its citizens. The bylaws of the Party were written with the best of intentions and were similar to ideals included in many other political documents. The problem was that the creation of the Party was ordered from the top, and its head was the Prime Minister. The result was that many who were politically ambitious and were looking to occupy a high position in the government or to become a member of Parliament rushed to join. This led many well-qualified individuals to be pushed aside in favour of aggressive personalities, ultimately leading to the Party’s demise. This type of episode was repeated several times in Iran with the same outcome, a loud and celebrated beginning and a short life. The Iran Democrat Party during the time of Ghavam Saltaneh, the Melliyoun Party, the Iran Novin Party, and the Rastakhiz Party all shared the same fate. 82

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Can you elaborate on the much-discussed national elections during Dr Eghbal’s tenure as Prime Minister? What do you have to say on the subject? A.A.: I have several unpleasant memories of those elections. At that time, I was the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs. As was common practice, with the approval of the government, I travelled to Geneva as the head of the Iranian delegation to the annual International Labour Conference. Upon my return, there were several urgent messages requesting that I contact Hessamedin Dolatabadi; I called and was told to join a meeting in progress in his residence right away.

Who was Dolatabadi? A.A.: He was a former member of Parliament, a founding member of the Melliyoun Party, and a socially influential person. There was a meeting at his residence that included Dr Nosratollah Kasemi, Mohammad Ali Khan Massoudi, and several others who were knowledgeable about the elections. Mr Massoudi asked me what I could do to help the candidates of the Melliyoun Party get elected in the upcoming elections. Looking back, I realise how naive I was. I began explaining our efforts to benefit workers through expanded social programmes and raising their standard of living by improving their working conditions, safety measures, providing low-interest loans, and other initiatives. I suggested that we could garner votes by publicising the efforts of the Melliyoun Party in obtaining these measures that would benefit the working class of Iran. I added that during the previous year, a progressive labour law had been promulgated by Jamshid Amuzegar and approved by Parliament. In the current year, a very beneficial national insurance law had been passed by Parliament as a result of the efforts of myself and my colleagues Ahmad Ali Bahrami, Manouchehr Aryana, Ataollah Khosrovani, Manouchehr Kalali, Cyrus Majd, and Hossein Shojai, all members of the Party. The Workers’ Welfare Bank had been established and was becoming operational. I sincerely believed that, by publicising these accomplishments, candidates of the Melliyoun Party would bolster their chances. 83

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I soon realised that my comments had not made any positive impression on the members of the committee, and disappointment was evident in their expressions. On that note I left and went to see Dr Eghbal to report on my trip to Geneva. He was more interested to hear about the morning meeting at Dolatabadi’s house. I recounted the exchanges and added that I believed it would be a good idea to include two workers in the Melliyoun Party’s candidate list in order to encourage workers to vote for the Party. I said that this action would be perceived as a positive and radical move by the labour force. Dr Eghbal agreed to it without hesitation and asked me to make inquiries and name two well-liked candidates from among the workers in Tehran. This initiative caused great excitement among the workers, and the candidates were nominated and accepted by the Party. The topic of elections was discussed incessantly in the media and at social gatherings, and the list of the Party’s favoured candidates kept changing except the names of the worker candidates. Unfortunately, when the final list of the Melliyoun Party’s proposed candidates was announced, the names of the worker candidates had been replaced by the names of two other persons, namely Fathollah Foroud and Asadollah Rashidian, who were not well liked by labour groups. That night I could not sleep; I did not know what to tell my colleagues. The workers despised the candidates who were on the ballot. I contemplated resigning from the government and the Party. But I did not have the courage to confront Dr Eghbal, who had been so gracious to me. I knew that he must have been under tremendous pressure, and I did not want to abandon him at such a critical juncture. The election took place, and the Melliyoun Party gained a majority in Parliament. I kept quiet for a few days and then decided to take a break and get out of town to go to the Caspian Sea. When I returned after four days, I saw the newspaper headlines announcing that the government would resign the next day. This news was a great relief to me; I felt that a heavy weight had been lifted from my shoulders. I was contacted that evening by the Prime Minister’s office and told to attend a Cabinet meeting next morning. At that meeting, Dr Eghbal announced his intention to resign and thanked everybody for their cooperation. Shortly thereafter, Parliament was dissolved; Jafar Sharif-Emami, the Minister of Industry, was named the new Prime Minister and new elections were called. 84

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5

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At the Ministry of Labour

How would you describe your period as Labour Minister from an administrative perspective? Abdolreza Ansari: My appointment to the Ministry of Labour was quite unexpected. I asked Dr Eghbal about this decision, and he responded that the Shah was eager to promote young technocrats. He said that the Shah had been frustrated by opposition to his proposals from older politicians, who viewed him as young and inexperienced. He added that, gradually, others younger than the Shah would be joining the government. My appointment was part of an experimental plan that would be expanded if successful. This plan had been initiated at the Ministry of Labour, which had a small portfolio, with the appointments of Jamshid Amuzegar, and followed by Hassan Ali Mansur, whom I succeeded. As it happened, in less than five years, the majority of the members of the Cabinet of Hassan Ali Mansur would be younger than the Shah. The Ministry of Labour was in its developmental stage and was growing when I started. The budget for the Ministry was about 120 million rials (less than $4 million), and the organisation included two branch offices in Abadan and Isfahan and three small offices in other cities. The central office in Tehran was housed in two rental buildings, which barely accommodated the needs of this important agency. With the acquiescence of Dr Eghbal, I was able to secure a loan of 12 million 85

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tomans from Bank Melli for construction of a new office building for the Ministry’s central office, and after three years the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs was finally able to move to its permanent site in the north-western part of Tehran. The first major issue that I confronted was the passage of the new social security law through the Joint Commission of the Senate and the Majlis. The origin of this Joint Commission goes back to a ministerial decree that had been approved by Dr Mohammad Mossadegh (given his authority to promulgate laws by decrees of the Council of Ministers and put them into effect for six months before submitting them to the Senate and Majlis for final approval). With the fall of Dr Mossadegh’s administration and new elections, the Senate and the Majlis set up a selected joint committee to review and amend the legal decrees of the Dr Mossadegh government and decide on their ratification. The legislation proposed by this committee needed the final signature of the Shah. At the time of my arrival, the social security law was being studied by the joint committee, which entailed lengthy meetings to discuss its various aspects. To ensure compliance with international rules and regulations, a delegation that included Manouchehr Aryana (Technical Undersecretary of the Ministry), Dr Sardary (director of the Social Insurance Agency), and Hossein Shojai, an expert in the field, were sent to Geneva for two weeks. The delegation was able to learn about the latest developments regarding Social Insurance projects in developed nations. Armed with this information, we were able to present an updated and much-improved piece of legislation to the joint committee. All the recommendations were ratified, and the basis for a progressive social security law was established. Important articles of this legislation dealt with conditions regarding termination of employment for workers, which was our main concern (especially with respect to surplus workers in the oil industry), and legal groundwork for the establishment of the Workers’ Welfare Bank, which has been most useful to this day. In order to grasp the importance of the issue, I need to elaborate. With regard to laws pertaining to termination of employment of workers, the employees of the oil industry were the central issue. At the time, Iran was pressuring the Oil Consortium to increase its quota, 86

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which was below that of other members, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Consortium of oil companies was reluctant to comply, stating that owing to the lower quality of Iranian oil (with its high sulphur content) and the presence of 70,000 unneeded workers at Iranian oil facilities, the modernisation of the industry and an increase in the quota was not feasible. They maintained that Iran needed to decrease its workforce in the oil industry to justify investment by the Consortium in modernising the facilities. The Consortium was willing to abide by existing labour laws, which awarded employees who had been made redundant the equivalent of one month’s salary for each year of employment. However, the government of Iran and the Ministry of Labour feared unrest in Khuzestan and other oil-producing regions by laying off a vast number workers with little compensation. Discussions about this particular issue continued over a long period. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Labour concluded that if the laid-off workers were to receive the equivalent of three months’ salary for each year of employment, the maximum compensation package would not exceed 40,000 tomans (roughly, less than $6,000). This package would have allowed each worker some time to find other employment, pay off some loans and be reasonably satisfied. The prevailing law would have given them a maximum of 13,000 tomans, which would have barely covered their basic family expenses for one year after paying off debts and obligations. Failure to accommodate the needs of these families would affect more than half a million dependents and create widespread discontent. To expedite the matter, it was decided that Social Insurance legislation, which was under review by the Joint Committee of Parliament, would be amended to include the stipulation for three months’ salary for each year of employment upon termination. Furthermore, the Ministry wanted the Consortium to assist in the retraining of laid-off workers in fields that were related the oil industry. The idea was to create small businesses that would sell products to the oil industry. Meetings were held at the Ministry with representatives of the oil companies. The companies were willing to assist in the retraining but considered the compensation package to be excessive. 87

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As these negotiations were in progress, Dr Eghbal asked me to discuss the matter with Abdullah Entezam, the director of the National Iranian Oil Company. He had reservations about our efforts and had told the Shah that the Ministry of Labour was working on legislation that would adversely impact the oil industry. We had a meeting in his office, and I explained in detail the concerns of the Ministry and the reasoning behind the legislation. This decent, honourable, elder statesman listened carefully and asked if there was any other solution to the problem. I convinced him that anything less than the proposed compensation package would create much bigger problems for the country. With his approval, the legislation was amended to include the revised compensation package in the Social Insurance law. The law was passed and the Consortium had no choice but to comply.

Is it correct that you laid the foundation for the Workers’ Welfare Bank? A.A.: During my visits to health clinics operated by the Organisation for Social Insurance, doctors, administrators and staff would complain about inadequate resources to treat sick workers. Managers at the organisation complained about restrictive rules and regulations that prevented the collection of funds for Social Insurance from employers. Employers were required to withhold 5 per cent of wages and contribute 8 per cent for a total of 13 per cent to be paid to the Organisation for Social Insurance. The problem was that the employers were withholding the amount from the pay cheques, yet not contributing their fair share, delaying payment to the agency. State-owned factories, citing lack of funds, and private sector factories shirking their responsibilities and to show greater profit, owed the agency over 250 million tomans. To collect these funds, the agency had to take them to court, which would entail years of legal wrangling and possibly further resistance to pay. The worry was that factory owners would threaten to close, and lay off workers, creating unrest, and ultimately have the judgement dismissed. Such a result had already occurred at the state-owned sugar factory, the woollen factory owned by Seyed Mehdi Mir-Ashrafi (the editor of 88

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the newspaper Atash), and the Semnan cotton spinning factory owned by Mr Haj Alinaghi Kashani. Officials at the Ministry of Labour were constantly battling such cases but had been unable to find a solution. The amount owed to the agency was simply a number kept in the records. It occurred to me that in addition to the need for a disciplined accounting staff to manage the books and collections, a mechanism needed to be developed that would encourage employers to cooperate with the Ministry of Labour and the Organisation for Social Insurance to enforce the provisions of the Labour Law. A new approach was warranted to reorganise the ongoing system in order to facilitate the collections of due debts and monthly payments dues, which would benefit the workers. Another issue was the implementation of the existing labour laws. The law prohibited the employment of workers under the age of 12 and had requirements relating to safety and benefits. The Ministry of Labour was responsible for oversight and continuous monitoring. It was evident that these laws were ignored, especially in the carpet weaving industry, which regularly employed underage children; unfortunately, many poor families could not survive without that meagre income provided by their children’s labour. Since forcing employers to comply would not resolve the social issues that plagued the country, an incentive was required to entice them. At that time, the Organisation for Social Insurance had more than 200 million rials (about $3 million) in various unsecured private banks and was receiving 4 per cent interest. I conceived the idea to agglomerate these accounts toward a capital base for a new bank with its mission to protect the interests of the workers. Employers would be asked to deposit salaries in the bank, which would simplify the monitoring of the accounts and bring order to the system. Having a bank account would elevate worker morale and give them a sense of financial security. Workers would be able to ask for loans, avoid loan sharks, and plan for the well-being of their families. The bank accounts would also encourage illiterate workers to attend literacy classes. The bank would charge a lower interest rate than the open market on loans to employees as an incentive. The objective was to facilitate the implementation of labour laws in Iran. During the mid-1950s, following the oil boycotts and resulting economic crisis after the oil nationalisation of 1951, the economic 89

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development of the country was progressing in a spectacular way. However, the banking sector was not up to the task. All financial transactions related to national projects were concentrated in Bank Melli, which was unable to provide services for the private sector. Bank Melli was operating under restrictive laws and regulations that prevented it from satisfying the volume of new demands. The interest rate in the open market was very high, and companies were paying up to 20 per cent interest to meet their obligations. Following new legislation that authorised the establishment of private banking, many of these institutions approached organisations such as the National Iranian Oil Company and Organisation for Social Insurance that had large cash reserves to build their capital base. For this reason, only 5 million tomans of Social Insurance reserves were at Bank Melli, and the rest was dispersed among unsecured private banks. These banks were benefiting from paying the government 4 per cent interest for time deposits and charging their customers 20 per cent in the open market. I believed that establishing the Workers’ Welfare Bank with the available capital base, opening individual accounts for every worker, encouraging savings accounts, and receiving time deposits from retirement funds and other government agencies would allow the bank to extend sizable loans to industries that correctly implemented the labour laws, at reasonable rates; this would benefit the government by ensuring the collection of funds that were owed. I was convinced that such a plan would be the key to solving a multitude of problems faced by the Ministry. I persuaded Dr Eghbal, the Prime Minister, to support this project, but he asked me to first write a proposal and present it to Mr Mehdi Kashani, the head of Bank Melli. A week later, Dr Eghbal informed me that the proposal had been rejected and suggested that I meet Mr Kashani to discuss the issue personally. A few days after that, Cabinet Ministers were asked to join the Shah in Khorramshahr (western Iran) to inaugurate a bridge over the Karun River. The Shah was returning from a state visit to India with stops in nearby Abadan and on to Khorramshahr. Following a state dinner in Abadan, the opportunity presented itself for me to talk to Mr Kashani. We had had good relations since my days at the Treasury. I presented the case in full detail, and he responded that his rejection was a matter of principle and 90

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was general in nature. He was frustrated with the problems caused by the numerous banks that had been created since the passage of legislation regarding creation of new banks, which had resulted in a race to establish banks by unqualified persons without having adequate capital or trained personnel. In the end, I was able to convince him that the formation of this particular bank would serve the interests of the country, and I would see to it that all his constructive recommendations would be implemented. Finally, he was convinced and promised his full support. I communicated Mr Kashani’s support to the delighted Prime Minister that evening and began preparations upon my return to Tehran. The first order of business was to do the legal groundwork for the establishment of the bank. To expedite the matter, with the assistance of legal counsel, an addendum was attached to the legislation for Social Insurance that was under review by the Joint Committee of Parliament. I made the case for it at the first meeting of the committee, and following a vote, the measure was approved. This was a huge victory for the Ministry and the Organisation for Social Insurance. We were able to prepare the charter for the bank in a couple of months, and operations began in a rented building in northern Tehran on Pahlavi Avenue. Houshang Amery, assistant director at the Bank of the Plan Organisation, was appointed chairman of the board, and Manouchehr Nikpour, assistant director at Bank Pars, and Dr Eeghani, adviser to the High Economic Council, were named as board members. I am proud that this bank continues to be one of the best and most profitable institutions in Iran and has helped millions of workers to this day.

In Iran, whenever the subject of the Ministry of Labour is discussed, the first issue that arises is the matter of discord between the employer and the employee, whereas in other countries it is issues like human resources, training and research that occupy Ministries of Labour. Were these issues of concern as well? A.A.: The Ministry of Labour was not an old institution. Prior to its founding, matters between employers and employees were handled 91

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by a small office in the Ministry of Industry and Mines with limited resources. The presence of Soviet troops in the country after World War II fuelled the rise of the Tudeh (Communist) Party, and their extensive propaganda campaign promoting the rights of the workers brought attention to the plight of workers to the highest levels of government. The Ministry of Labour and Propaganda was established in 1946 during the government of Ghavam Saltaneh. It was comprised of two agencies, the Office of Labour Affairs in the Ministry of Industry and Mining and the Office of Radio Communication, which operated with a two-kilowatt transmitter supplied by the Ministry of Post and Telegraph. The activities of that Ministry were limited and dealt mainly with grievances between workers of state-owned and private factories. With the passage of the law and the establishment of the Organisation for Social Insurance, and with the creation of the Employment Agency, the activities of the Ministry expanded to include a technical staff and research department that focused on the workforce. These efforts were made during a period of turmoil in the country. The refusal of Russian troops to leave the country,1 the formation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Front advocating secession, the Tudeh Party fomenting uprisings in industrial regions, the nationalisation of oil which resulted in British-led embargos depriving oil revenue, and political pressure by the British and the Russians, all served to halt economic activity, placing enormous pressure on the government. With the resolution of the oil crisis, a sense of security and hope returned and the wheels of economic prosperity began to turn again. The nomination of Hossein Ala as Prime Minister in 1955 and the appointment of Abolhassan Ebtehaj as managing director of the Plan Organisation had created a sense of optimism as young college graduates were finding jobs in the government. Nevertheless, complicated rules and regulations prevented many of them from finding employment in the private sector. The private sector consisted mainly of small family businesses, with little opportunity for recent college graduates. At the time when I became Minister of Labour in 1960 the 1

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government still faced three major problems. First, it had to find a way to streamline operations by eliminating unnecessary employees and simplifying government rules and regulations. Second, it had to lay the groundwork to implement development projects by employing university graduates with modern managerial skills. And third, it had to create hope and incentive for the private sector to flourish in order to absorb the growing numbers of young workers. The private sector needed to be directed toward modern manufacturing rather than concentrating on small-scale trade. Progress was made in all these areas, and recounting the details is beyond the scope of this conversation. I can, however, mention some examples such as early retirement packages, giving rewards for five years of extra service, revised employment contracts for all ministries, legislation aimed at increasing investment opportunities for foreign companies, support of private industries by extending low-interest loans for expansion, and growth. It was in this economic climate that I proposed to the Council of Ministers the creation of an organisation in the Ministry of Labour for advising college graduates and to help them find suitable employment. Its mission was to evaluate and address issues facing university graduates and to serve as a location where public and private sector employers could find qualified employees. An employment office did exist at the Ministry at that time, but it was only concerned with unemployed low-wage workers and was not properly staffed or equipped to guide the graduates of institutions in Europe and the United States. To this end, a special decree was passed by the government, and the Office for Guidance of University Graduates was officially established. Ghassem Moini, a competent officer at the Ministry, was put in charge, and along with a dedicated staff he was able to assist many graduates. This office was later expanded and transferred to the Prime Minister’s office during the tenure of Amir-Abbas Hoveyda. Mr Moini later became Undersecretary and then Minister of Labour.

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Mr Ansari, what is your fondest recollection from your tenure as Minister of Labour? A.A.: My most cherished memory is the birth of my first daughter, Nazenin. Her arrival ushered in a bright light in my heart and that of my wife; she brought infinite joy and warmth to our family. Of course, the passage of the Social Insurance legislation, the establishment of the Workers’ Welfare Bank, and the creation of the Office for Guidance of University Graduates are valuable highlights of that period that I will always cherish.

How would you evaluate Dr Eghbal’s skills as a team leader and administrator? A.A.: Dr Manouchehr Eghbal was the only Iranian politician with long experience in running the affairs of the country before his appointment to the post of Prime Minister. He had studied medicine in France, then taught at Tehran University’s Faculty of Medicine. At various times Dr Eghbal served as Minister of Health, Minister of Roads, Minister of Culture, Minister of the Interior, Governor General of East Azerbaijan, Chancellor of Tehran University, and Minister of Court. He was hardworking and forward-looking, dedicated to serve his country. Above all he was an honest man. Even during his tenure as Prime Minister, he lived in a modest rental apartment near the university. Dr Eghbal’s premiership, lasting 40 months, from February 1957 to August 1960, was the longest ever tenure of any Prime Minister up to that point. Many major national initiatives that bore fruit and became reality later began during his term. Let me just mention a few: overseeing the Shah’s land reform laws that eliminated the feudal system in Iran; improving and reforming labour laws and the social security system all as part of Iran’s transition to an industrial society; establishing the Workers’ Welfare Bank; the passing of laws to reform and overhaul government agencies; industrial expansion plans for the private sector; establishing the Industrial and Mining Development Bank; creating the national Housing Agency; and preparing and 94

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introducing the first planned budget in Iran. All this happened during Dr Eghbal’s premiership. The inclusion of the younger generation of educated Iranians in national affairs, and the launch of widespread and fundamental changes in how government functioned, should be considered the brightest spots of Dr Eghbal’s premiership. After his premiership, Dr Eghbal returned to Tehran University. After the aforementioned unfortunate incident when his automobile was set on fire during riots by Tudeh Party elements on the campus grounds, he requested and received the Shah’s permission to leave Iran. He settled in Paris and went back to teaching at the University of Paris, College of Medicine.

Was Dr Eghbal a successful politician? A.A.: As I said, Dr Eghbal was a hard-working man with integrity who presided over a key few years in Iran’s twentieth-century history. But perhaps he did not have the teeth and elbows to navigate through the rough and tumble of Iran’s political scene in the 1950s. Serving a Shah with ambitious visions for his country and depending on politicians with ambitions of their own was not an easy balance to maintain. Mr Hoveyda later managed it for 14 or 15 years. But Dr Eghbal could only manage it for 40 months.

What happened to Dr Eghbal? Did you stay in touch with him? A.A.: After a meeting with the World Bank in the United States in 1961, I made a stop in Paris and rang Dr Eghbal to pay my respects. He received me graciously and came to my hotel to see me. We talked about developments in Iran and he asked me to keep in touch with him by exchanging occasional letters. At my first audience with the Shah after my return, I mentioned to His Majesty my stopover in Paris and meeting with Dr Eghbal. He immediately ordered a $3,000 per month stipend to be extended to the former Prime Minister to help him make ends meet. 95

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Dr Eghbal returned to Iran in 1963 to assume the leadership of the National Iranian Oil Company. He served as the company’s chairman for 14 years. He died while in office in November 1977, so did not live to see the convulsions in Iran which began a year later.

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Establishment of the Khuzestan Water and Power Authority1

How did your term as Minister of Labour end? Abdolreza Ansari: On 29 August 1960, the government of Dr Manouchehr Eghbal resigned and Jafar Sharif-Emami, who had been the Minister of Industries and Mines, was tasked with forming a new government. During my tenure as the Minister of Labour in the Cabinet of Dr Eghbal, Mr Sharif-Emami and I had been on a commission evaluating a proposal for the building of a steel mill by a German company. We had some heated exchanges during a Cabinet meeting; my objections to certain provisions of the proposal had forced him to reconsider and eventually withdraw the offer. Having had such an encounter, it was not surprising for me not to be invited to join the new government. Ahmad Ali Bahrami, Undersecretary for Parliamentary Affairs at the Ministry of Labour, was nominated as the new Minister.

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Khuzestan Province is located in south-west Iran bordering Iraq and sitting at the northern end of the Persian Gulf. It is rich in oil and poor in fresh water resources. 97

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So how did your appointment to Khuzestan occur? A.A.: Khosro Hedayat retained his position as the Deputy Prime Minister and head of the Plan Organisation. Mr Hedayat came to see me at my house a couple of days after the formation of the new government. I was quite surprised, as our past encounters had been limited to Cabinet meetings and official gatherings. He was quite a gentleman and came from one of the most respected families of Iran. He addressed me cordially and affectionately. He said that he had been observing my conduct at Cabinet meetings on matters of national interest and was disappointed at my absence from the new government. He had come to offer me a position to head the biggest project of the time at the Plan Organisation, the success of which had profound consequences for the economic prosperity of the country. He said that he had discussed the offer with the Prime Minister and had his full support. He added that my compensation package would be equivalent to that of a minister, and I would be given full authority over the execution of the project. I asked him to elaborate. He stated that, as I knew already, a project for the development of Khuzestan (one of the most important regions of Iran with its vast oil resources and great economic potential) had been launched four years earlier in the extreme west of the country. Recently, the charter of a new organisation called the Khuzestan Water and Power Authority had been approved by Parliament, and its mission was to take over all ongoing development projects in Khuzestan under a single entity that would operate independently, similar to the National Iranian Oil Company. The offer was intriguing, and I wanted to be of service to my country, so the next day at a meeting in Mr Hedayat’s office, I accepted the challenge to form this new organisation. He instructed Ahmad Nafisi, his assistant for administrative affairs, to help me in the preparations for setting up this new entity, such as securing office space, furniture, personnel and a credit line. I was introduced to Mostafa Mozayyani, who had been with the Khuzestan project from the beginning and was in charge of the project in the Plan Organisation. It was a pleasant coincidence, since we had been friends at Sharaf High School and shared a desk in eighth grade. He was hard-working and very organised, and 98

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had been one of the best students at our school. He was glad to see me as well and offered his help to establish this new entity. I suggested that he accept a position as my technical assistant, which he was delighted to accept, and we began our work. Mohammad Jahanshahi, chief legal counsellor of the Plan Organisation and a top lawyer at the Ministry of Justice who had drawn up the charter for this new organisation, agreed to be our legal adviser. His assistance proved to be critical in the success of the whole endeavour. An office space was rented near the Plan Organisation headquarters on Allai Avenue for 3,000 tomans a month. With the hiring of a secretary, an accountant, a driver and a person for maintenance and security, the office was operational in about a week. Having reviewed and studied existing files about ongoing projects, Mr Mozayyani and I went to visit the office of Khuzestan Development Services (KDS). We were met by the head of the office, William Bryant, a tall, light-featured American in his forties with a dry but proper manner and a cold gaze. The office provided administrative services, especially of an urgent and time-sensitive nature, such as dealing with Iranian officials at various ministries and foreign companies to obtain work permits and travel visas, communicating with operational units in Khuzestan by one-way radio, and purchasing items from shops in Tehran’s bazaar. A one-way radio may sound primitive, but in 1960, when telephone access in Tehran was limited and the telegraph was the fastest means of communication, it was a big advantage. It appeared that KDS was economising, since the few employees there were handling the large volume of work.

When did you first go to Khuzestan and what did you find there? A.A.: The next order of business was to travel to Khuzestan. Mr Mozayyani and I travelled by train, and our first visit was to the operations centre for the construction of the Dez Dam. We were greeted in Andimeshk at 4 a.m. by Leo Anderson and his Iranian assistant, Morteza Vakilzadeh. We stayed at a guest house operated by KDS for visiting technicians and travellers from various parts of the Khuzestan 99

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development programme, which had become quite elaborate. It was an old house with a small courtyard and four sparsely furnished guest rooms. It was very clean and well maintained, and a destination for travellers. The next day, we travelled to the site of the dam, which was about 30 kilometres outside the city of Andimeshk in the heart of the imposing Bakhtiari Mountains. A narrow dirt road had been built by the Development and Resources Corporation (D&R), the principal adviser and responsible organisation for the entire Khuzestan development programme. We encountered several groups working on projects such as road construction, substations, and high-tension power lines, and saw trucks carrying loads of equipment. There were foreign engineers and contractors supervising the activities of the local workforce. Robert Williams, the American chief engineer, met us at the end of the road on top of the mountain. He explained that providing access to the riverbed in order to lay the foundation for the dam was the most important part of the initial phase. Heavy equipment needed to be transported to the mountainside to excavate for the installation of huge turbines. Access to the turbines was important at all times, even after the completion of the project. He added that the Dez Dam was in a very difficult and inaccessible location, and that reaching the area to lay the foundation by following the river from the lower elevation was deemed too costly. To minimise expenses and save time, the difficult method of building a road to the highest elevation and then drilling down to the riverbed, meanwhile drilling up from the other end of the tunnel, had been selected. He was proud of the fact that the tunnels had been connected successfully regardless of the meandering paths, and that trucks could easily pass each other in opposite direction inside the tunnel. Viewing the extent of the operation and observing the dedication and expertise of the individuals working at those high altitudes left a profound impression on us. The next visit was to the office of the Dutch company Hydemat Chapi. Their project involved the study of soil, water and vegetation as part of an experimental irrigation plan for the dam. They had done an outstanding job in determining the physical and chemical properties of the soil, irrigation issues, water flow and the required hydration levels for specific plants. KDS officials later briefed us on matters such 100

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as animal husbandry, methods to combat parasites and diseases such as bilharzia, and types of plants and herbs that would survive the heat, and they gave recommendations to maximise output for the benefit of the people. In contrast, our visit to the town of Dezful was disheartening. It featured dilapidated mud huts, narrow streets littered with rubbish, a few paved streets in bad condition, poor people in drab clothing, and children playing in dirt with flies everywhere. The Mayor’s defence of these conditions was that the high level of underground water in the city prevented residents from digging sewage wells on their properties. They had resorted to constructing toilets on rooftops and channelling the sewage down to open water canals along city streets. Owing to insanitary conditions, trachoma had become prevalent, and Dezful was being referred to as the city of the blind. The Imperial Organisation for Social Services along with the US-based Near East Foundation had stepped in about ten years earlier to address the problem. Their efforts dramatically reduced the infection rate, but it was evident that underlying poverty continued to present challenges. The population had to be taught basic hygiene. The small budget of the municipality was for basic services and was used to pave some roads. A few kilowatts of electricity were provided by two privately owned companies that had placed lampposts for some city streets and some homes of affluent residents. The project managers explained that, even though it had been projected that 125,000 hectares would be serviced by the grand irrigation design, at this stage only 22,000 hectares had been targeted for the construction of the first phase of the irrigation network. The area included 58 villages that were owned by private individuals and were under cultivation, and the rest was owned by the government and remained fallow. Under an agreement with the World Bank extending a $42 million loan for the project, it was necessary to obtain the consent of those landowners to formally accept paying for water charges when the dam was constructed and irrigation water made available. The success of this initial plan would enable the implementation of the whole project. At the time, land reform legislation had been ratified by Parliament, but the mechanism for its implementation was unclear. So landowners all over Iran were trying to prevent it from 101

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taking effect. Initially, I was under the impression that the irrigation network as planned would be welcomed by the landowners, since the government was paying for the total cost of a system that would provide a reliable water supply plus agricultural services all year round, leaving them responsible only for a reasonable water bill. But I was told that the landowners were sceptical of government initiatives, citing the case of the Karkheh Dam, which had promised a great deal but delivered nothing. They did not want to sign documents pledging to pay for water that they currently obtained from the river for free; they were wary of officials harassing them for payment. This issue caused many problems that I will elaborate later. Our next destination was 30 kilometres south of Dezful. We got off to a late start, at around 2 p.m. Mr Vakilzadeh took us to see a project entailing the improvement of the cultivation of sugarcane in Haft Tapeh. After a bumpy two-hour ride in a jeep covering only six kilometres, we came upon a small structure with a faded sign. It was a four-grade elementary school named after a local landowner. We were informed that there were only three such schools in the whole area comprising 58 villages. As darkness fell, we decided to postpone our visit until the next day and headed back to Dezful. The Plan Organisation had purchased 10,000 acres of land for the reintroduction of sugarcane cultivation in Khuzestan; in the past, sugarcane had been the region’s primary agricultural product 700 years before, and a principal export item to Persian Gulf communities and India. Of the 10,000 hectares of purchased land, 2,500 hectares had been levelled, and an irrigation grid had been installed in order to start the first phase of the programme. As we toured Haft Tapeh, we saw workers planting sugarcane. A section had been designated for research and experimentation on the varieties of sugarcane, and a pumping station by the river provided water. A manager from the Brewer Hawaii Company, the principal contractor and operator of the project, briefed us and showed us the lodging facilities for the foreign workers, which included a clubhouse. A factory to process the sugarcane was under construction, and equipment for harvesting had been ordered. We noticed that there were no Iranian technicians or managers throughout the entire project, only workers. 102

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We travelled to Ahvaz with a stop in the south-western part of the city, in an area by the Karun River called Kooye-Golestan. The Development and Resources Corporation was renting about 60 homes for its foreign workers, and a private company had built a clubhouse with ten residences for technicians that it had provided. In Ahvaz, we toured the electricity substation installations managed by D&R. A private company had been providing a mere 1,000 kilowatts of electricity to the city. Plans to provide electricity throughout the city to homes, businesses, hospitals, and factories were all ready, in anticipation of the construction of the Dez Dam. Meanwhile, the excess electricity generated by the National Iranian Oil Company in Abadan was being purchased and transferred through high-tension cables. This initiative was instrumental in preparing the city for the arrival of electricity from the dam. These cables were to carry electricity in the opposite direction, to Abadan, once the system became operational. It was in Ahvaz that I first met Mr Mohammad Yamin-Afshar, one of the top experts working at D&R, having previously been assistant director of the Tehran Electricity Company. (He later became the director of the National Electricity Organisation and Governor General of the coastal provinces.) He briefed us on the system design in Ahvaz, which was based on the principles of the construction of the Tennessee Valley Authority project in the United States. For the first time in Iran, a steady voltage would be delivered to all destinations, 24 hours a day. And it would not discriminate against customers, charging everyone equally, based on signed contracts. The main reason for the bankruptcy of private electricity companies in Iran had been the difficulty in collecting fees from government agencies, large private companies, and influential individuals. The American adviser in charge of the establishment of the charter of this venture had insisted that the first article that needed to be approved by the board was the anti-discrimination clause. Even though board members originally objected, stating that anti-discrimination was a given, they relented. As anticipated, certain accounts, such as those of the military and the judiciary, accumulated overdue invoices. It was only through pressure by the central government on those agencies that the accounts were settled; the American adviser for his part did not follow through on his threat to 103

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cut off the electricity on delinquent accounts. After this episode, some measure of order was realised for the first time in Iran. After two more days of visits and meetings with other officials, including the Governor, we returned to Tehran.

What was your preliminary assessment from your trip and what happened when you returned to Tehran? A.A.: My assessment of the development of Khuzestan, which had been underway for the previous five years, covered several points. To begin with, the province of Khuzestan was rich in natural resources that had yet to be tapped. The province’s five major rivers could easily supply water to at least a million hectares of the existing good-quality soil and produce 6 million kilowatts of electricity. Access to waterways could provide easy transport of goods to domestic and foreign destinations. The sunny climate made it possible to harvest certain crops several times a year. The failure to take advantage of these natural resources had led to a high rate of poverty among the local population. Employees of the oil industry and some traders from Isfahan were the only residents with some financial means. The second assessment was that small, short-term projects would not solve the economic and social issues of the region. Next, local government officials were incapacitated by the extensive rules and regulations imposed on them by the central government in Tehran. The fourth point was that the courage of Abolhassan Ebtehaj and his associates to continue with grand-scale initiatives in the face of obstacles set by forces opposed to the project had to be commended and reinforced. And finally, foreign advisers and experts had no attachment to Iran and would leave on short notice. Therefore, and every effort had to be made to finish the projects and reap the benefits. Young, educated Iranians managers needed to be trained to replace the foreign managers and technicians. On my return to Tehran, I asked my former colleague Hassan 104

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Shahmirzadi, who was the assistant director of the American advisory group overseeing the reorganisation of the Iranian government, to join me as the assistant director at the Khuzestan Water and Power Authority (KWPA). I presented my assessments to the joint meeting of the High Council for the Plan Organisation and the board of supervisors. All members were quite appreciative of my report and expressed their satisfaction with the progress of the projects. They extended their full support for the project and my efforts. One member of the board of supervisors remarked that the clearing of the outstanding bills must be expedited. I promised to look into the matter and asked them to recommend a competent auditor capable of clearing the issues. I assumed that we had some bills to pay but was shocked when the auditor informed me of the gravity of the situation. After four and a half years of the execution of the Khuzestan development programme, the Plan Organisation had only cleared payments against the first instalment, which had been paid to D&R. Therefore, there were four and a half years of outstanding invoices that had to be cleared and accepted as legal payments. I thought about the thousands of people in Tehran, Khuzestan, and New York who depended on their salaries, and had purchased machinery, covered travel expenses for employees, and accrued many other expenses. The list of companies, domestic and foreign, that were somehow involved in the programme was as thick as a small telephone book. There were companies from all over the world, from the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Japan, India, Pakistan, and other places. I feared the day that the whole programme would stall over these uncleared bills. It was obvious that all the effort and resources that had been expended during these years would go to waste, that trust in government would shatter, and that Iran’s ability to obtain financing for future projects would evaporate. The main problem stemmed from the fact that the Plan Organisation had signed an agreement with D&R giving them the authority to plan and execute all the projects that constituted the development programme in Khuzestan as approved by all legal authorities of the Plan Organisation (meaning the High Council, the board of supervisors, and the managing director). To finance this endeavour, the 105

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Plan Organisation was to provide D&R with an initial payment of 50 million tomans (roughly $7 million) as working capital. D&R would proceed to implement the programme, using these funds according to its own discretion, and would send the invoices, audited by the international auditing firm Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, every six months to the Plan Organisation for verification and approval. If no objection was received from the Plan Organisation within two months, the expenditures were considered to have been approved. D&R had submitted its accounting reports to the Plan Organisation on time and had not received any objections, and thus considered them as approved and finalised. However, even though the Plan Organisation had not disputed any claim, it had not considered the invoices as approved or finalised, so the board of supervisors had raised objections about the finalised accounting. D&R was using accounting methods customary in the United States. These methods of accounting for expenditure did not accord with the existing rules and regulations of the Plan Organisation. Notes from the preliminary negotiations clearly showed that the Plan Organisation had agreed that D&R would use the customary American accounting methods and take full responsibility for the implementation of the plans. David Lilienthal and Gordon Clapp had agreed to take on the responsibility only if they could work with laws that they were familiar with, not those established by the Iranian government. This issue had not been clearly explained to those in charge of the financial affairs of the Plan Organisation, and therefore a decision had to be made as to which set of rules were to be followed. D&R took the position that, based on the initial agreement, the issue of accounting methods was settled, and it did not want to renegotiate. The second problem was that the Plan Organisation did not have enough accountants who spoke English, and they were not familiar with US accounting methods. Most of the documents regarding expenditures were held in D&R’s New York office, and the lack of Iranian expertise had created a considerable backlog. During all these years, supervising accountants from the Plan Organisation had complete access to records at D&R, but since D&R had the strong support of Mr Ebtehaj, the accountants from the Plan Organisation 106

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did not question the expenditures, let alone reject them. On top of this, the management at the Plan Organisation was preoccupied with other matters and had never pursued this particular issue. Funds were being transferred to D&R accounts without anyone taking responsibility for their approval. Once the bureaucratic mystery was resolved, it was decided that the KWPA, in cooperation with the board of supervisors, would review outstanding claims and declare accounts as settled or otherwise. D&R also agreed verbally to this solution. It turned out to be a short-term remedy, and this particular issue led to the most contentious period in the history of the Plan Organisation, which I will discuss later. The crisis became political in nature, leading to the arrest of Abolhassan Ebtehaj and consuming much of the government’s time and attention.

What can you tell us more about Ebtehaj? For all his highly respected status, he was quite controversial, wasn’t he? A.A.: My relationship with Mr Ebtehaj was strictly professional. I never had a direct working relationship with him. Nonetheless, I was familiar with his way of doing things through the accounts of my friends and associates at the Plan Organisation. Mr Ebtehaj was honest, outspoken, detail-oriented and demanding. In my opinion, he contributed greatly to Iran’s development in three key areas. His most important contribution was to adopt and implement a new philosophical approach to planning for development. Before him, planning for national development projects was nothing more than a theoretical exercise and a vehicle for allocation of funds. His second contribution was to harness the abilities and innovation of educated young Iranians who were genuinely eager to serve their country. We musn’t forget that this was a period when educational possibilities opened the doors to a whole new range of young people from beyond the old elites who were brimming with real enthusiasm. Ebtehaj provided them with the opportunities to share in the goal of developing Iran. Many of those individuals who gained their experience working for Mr Ebtehaj at the Plan Organisation went on to become some of the most respected 107

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managers in the country, making great contributions to development projects across the country. Ebtehaj’s third important contribution was to launch the comprehensive Khuzestan development project by adopting management techniques and procedures that were previously unknown in Iran. His courage and perseverance during the early years of that monumental task guarantees him a place in the history of Iran’s modernisation and economic development. But it has to be said he was not an easy character to work with. His impatience with fools gave him an opinionated air, and he did not find it easy to make friends. High respect, yes. Warm friendships, not really. But when all is said and done, his impact on development in Iran should never be underestimated.

And how did matters proceed with D&R? Specifically, how were the discussions with David Lilienthal and Gordon Clapp? A.A.: Having reached an agreement on past accounts and with the existing agreement with D&R expiring, a new agreement had to be drawn up with D&R. A committee was formed; it included Safi Asfia (assistant director of the Plan Organisation), Mohammad Jahanshahi (legal counsel), Mostafa Mozayyani, Hassan Shahmirzadi and myself. After several consultations, my recommendation was that certain articles needed to be amended such that the KWPA would be given more supervisory authority over projects and that it would take responsibility for them upon completion. Mr Mozayyani, who had been part of the development project from the beginning, was concerned about the reaction from Mr Lilienthal and Mr Clapp. I believed that these gentlemen were professionals and would expect Iranians to ultimately take over the operations. It seemed inconceivable that they would object to strengthening the future of the organisation or that they would abandon a project that they worked so hard for and leave Iran. The committee came to an agreement, and we invited Mr Lilienthal and Mr Clapp to Tehran for negotiations. The changes to the existing agreement were:

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1 The work of KDS in Tehran was to be wrapped up quickly and its responsibilities taken over by the KWPA. 2 D&R could hire foreign experts if a qualified Iranian applicant could not be found. 3 Foreign experts had to have a minimum of five years of experience in their field. 4 The KWPA reserved the right to review all foreign applications. 5 The KWPA had to concur with training courses to prepare Iranians to take over operations conducted by D&R. 6 D&R had to submit account claims to the KWPA on a monthly basis rather than every six months. 7 All accounts were to be transparent, and Plan Organisation inspectors were to be allowed access to all records. 8 The limit of the contract was to be the end of the Iranian government’s current Seven-Year Programme, which translated into one and a half years. (The government was in its second Seven-Year Programme.) Mr Lilienthal and Mr Clapp came to the KWPA on 4 November 1960. It was our first encounter. I had done my research and was pleased to meet them. Mr Lilienthal was a tall, heavyset man in his sixties with thinning hair and a tan from hours spent in the sun. He had a deep voice and spoke assertively like a lawyer. Mr Clapp was medium built with white hair and blue eyes; he was sharp yet bashful. A few days later we had a meeting with other officials, including Mr Asfia, to negotiate the new contract. Mr Lilienthal gave the opening remarks, in which he extended his gratitude for being given the opportunity to raise the living standard of the residents of Khuzestan and gave his commitment to complete the project. He was addressing a new group of officials and had to allay their fears about the progress of the project and cost overruns. Officials in the government had raised concerns about the price tag of the projects, and inspectors at the board of supervisors had become more diligent since the departure of Mr Ebtehaj from the Plan Organisation. When it was my turn to speak, I praised them for their efforts and assured them about the continuous support from all government agencies involved. I regarded them as professionals who 109

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knew that they had to operate within the framework of the laws of the host country, and that any disagreement could be negotiated. I emphasised that it was necessary to have more details about the projects and specifically timetables for short-term goals. Our objective was to train Iranians to operate the systems and eventually take over their management. I concluded by asking our guests to agree to the changes in the contract and to cooperate with the KWPA. As I was speaking, Mr Lilienthal was taking notes. He showed us a piece of paper when I finished. It was his name written in Farsi. He said that it had been difficult and had taken him a long time for him to learn to write his name, and it demonstrated his challenge to learn Iranian laws and regulations. He added that they had been operating within the guidelines that they were familiar with and had worked diligently and faithfully since their employment. He pledged to continue their work if they were trusted to do so. He was implying that without mutual trust, the work could not proceed. I assured him that we were gathered because of the trust that existed and that the burden of conforming to Iranian laws was on the KWPA, but that their cooperation was needed. He agreed, and we proceeded to discuss the various changes to the contract. Mr Clapp proposed an increase in D&R’s fee from $225,000 to $300,000, as many projects were expanding and becoming operational. Mr Asfia concurred, and the meeting adjourned with all issues resolved. He then praised all the participants for their hard work and took responsibility for contacting Mr Hedayat, director of the Plan Organisation, to arrange the signing of the new contract. This new contract would permit the Plan Organisation to review all past invoices, and the Plan Organisation further had the authority to dispute claims, whereas D&R considered those invoices as approved, because there had been no objection within the timeframe stipulated by the original contract. This was a major hurdle and had the potential to halt all progress in the operations in Khuzestan. Over the next year, with the employment of several qualified accountants and the application of the articles of the new contract, we were able to work with the board of supervisors to review and settle past claims. I have to commend 110

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Kazem Zanjani of the board for his tireless efforts to help resolve fiscal obstacles to this project of national importance.

What happened after the negotiations were complete and it came to signing a contract? A.A.: After these negotiations, Mr Lilienthal and Mr Clapp went to Khuzestan to check on the progress of the operations. A few days later, Mr Hedayat surprised me with an unannounced visit to my office. I was told that he had come directly from an audience with the Shah to let me know personally that he was leaving his post to become Ambassador to Belgium. He was indeed a real gentleman. A few days later, Ahmad Aramesh, a former Minister of Labour, was appointed Minister of State and acting Director of the Plan Organisation. I knew Mr Aramesh and had sought his advice during my tenure at the Ministry of Labour. He had formerly held that post and given me valuable insights to the Ministry and its personnel. He was eloquent, smart, educated and a good friend. I went to see him and offer my congratulations. Mr Aramesh had been a member of the board of supervisors of the Plan Organisation and was familiar with the development projects of Khuzestan. A story goes that he had taken offence when Mr Ebtehaj had taken away offices at the Plan Organisation that had been used by the members of the board and forced the group to conduct their business without personal secretaries, and other actions. I was delighted that he embraced the Khuzestan development programme as the most important undertaking of the Plan Organisation, even though it was one of Mr Ebtehaj’s legacies. I briefed him on the recent contract negotiations and suggested that Mr Asfia follow through and sign the contract on behalf of the Plan Organisation, since he was familiar with the details and it would save much of Mr Aramesh’s time. He asked whether I would be signing the document as the head of the KWPA. When I said yes, he told me that he would sign the document based on the trust that he placed in my signature. A meeting was convened that afternoon in Mr Aramesh’s office during which he signed the 111

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document, followed by the signatures of Mr Lilienthal, Mr Clapp and myself. Mr Asfia and Mr Shahmirzadi were also present. After the signing, Mr Aramesh asked the signatories to stay for a private discussion. He thanked the Americans for their hard work and commended them. He then proceeded to say that, because of cultural differences and inadequate information provided to the public, the development project in Khuzestan might come across as too costly and even unessential. He wanted to change the public perception by providing more information about the importance and progress of this endeavour. He also urged Mr Lilienthal and Mr Clapp to ask their American colleagues to communicate to top American officials the strategic importance of Iran, which had a 2,000-kilometre border with the Soviet Union, and the social and political difficulties faced by the Iranian government. He pointed to a map on his wall, saying that the Soviet Union was at our doorstep and was constantly offering to help with industrial development projects such as steel mills, factories to build metal products, and dams. Iran had yet to agree to any proposal, since these offers seemed to promote a certain political agenda. However, if the United States did not pay attention to the requests of the Iranian government, that might force Iran to accept such offers, since it was clear that outside help was needed. Mr Lilienthal replied that he was well aware of the wealth of natural resources in Iran and the needs of the government and that he would communicate the matter to his contacts in the United States. He added that he had been out of the government for quite some time and was not knowledgeable about the decisions made by US government. He suggested that Mr Aramesh discuss the matter with the US Ambassador.

What led you to submit your resignation from the Khuzestan Water and Power Authority? A.A.: A few days after the conversation between Mr Aramesh and Mr Lilienthal I travelled to the United States to visit facilities of the Tennessee Valley Authority. I made a stopover in Japan to inspect the huge turbines for the Dez Dam that were being built by the Hitachi 112

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Company. Khalil Taleghani, a former Minister of Agriculture, travelled with me on his own expense. Our guide in Japan was a former Minister of Finance who worked for Hitachi. The importance of that company to the Japanese economy was comparable to that of General Motors to the American economy. He told us that the company’s installations had been totally destroyed during World War II by the American bombardment. Fortunately, the day of the major bombing was a holiday, and the workers were not there. After the war, the destroyed machinery was sold by weight as scrap metal to help feed the workers. Through persistence and with the help of other companies, in 15 years Hitachi had again become a major industrial competitor. I asked our host how the government of Japan had helped at that time. He said that, because of the war, it was the government that needed help from the citizens; and besides, the company’s assets are largely the knowledge and work experience of its employees, not the buildings, which are of secondary importance. The words of this great man affected me more than anything else on the trip. It made me aware of the depth of the shortcomings in the development plans for Khuzestan. Our visit to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was most impressive. The scale of the installations and operations was exceptional. Our guide, Walton Seymour, was the former chief engineer of the TVA. His presence facilitated our access to different parts of the installation, and we were warmly received. We were briefed on the operations, and all our questions were answered. It was the first time that I had met Mr Seymour, and I was delighted to learn that he had been in charge of the design and execution of the power installations of the Dez Dam and the Khuzestan development programme. We were briefed by supervisors about issues concerning water and electricity distribution, planning for areas that would be receiving irrigation for the first time, nurturing relations with consumers, and educating employees about new electricity grids and maximising usage. When we arrived in Washington in early April 1961, I was told that Mr Aramesh, the new director of the Plan Organisation, had given a speech in Parliament and had derided the development plans for Khuzestan. I was stunned. It was hard for me to believe that he 113

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had done a 180-degree turn since our last meeting. I did not take it seriously, thinking it might have been a political move and that he might have said something in the heat of the moment. I continued with my travel itinerary, which included meetings at the World Bank about the loans for the Dez Dam and a visit to D&R’s New York office to meet managers and supervisors of various projects. I returned to Tehran in about a week. On my return, I requested an audience with the Shah to report on the trip. In the waiting room of the Shah’s office, I had the chance to talk to Dr Ali Amini; he had been the Minister of Finance during the government of Hossein Ala, and I had been his deputy when he was the head of the Iran–US Joint Fund for Economic Development. He was interested to hear about my trip and the progress of the development plans in Khuzestan. He said that he was there to request a leave of absence to go abroad for medical treatment. His audience with the Shah took so long that my meeting had to be rescheduled. That afternoon, Mr Aramesh surprised me with a visit at my home. He said that he had heard of my return and had decided to stop by on his way downtown. I asked him about his speech and the reason behind his change of heart about Khuzestan. He said that many things had happened in my absence that had led to the speech. The speech had been reviewed by the Prime Minister and presented to the Shah, who had also made some adjustments to it. He added that the story of the speech had deep roots, that Mr Lilienthal and Mr Clapp had pillaged Iran’s money and had to return it. He sarcastically said that it would only be then that he would honour the Americans. I said that he had praised their work and had signed a new contract with them before my own eyes, and that the funds had been spent in Khuzestan and had not lined their pockets. I reminded him of his promise that all Iranians would hear about the great development project of Khuzestan. His response was that a decision had been made and that we had to follow the directive. I asked whether that meant that I would have to resign. He said that it had nothing to do with me and that I should continue with my work. I told him that the reason I had accepted the offer from the Prime Minister and Mr Hedayat was the prospect of helping with development projects for Khuzestan, not to bury these efforts. He tried 114

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to persuade me to stay on the job but I refused and said that they would be able to further their cause with a like-minded person. The next day I wrote my resignation letter to the Prime Minister, stating that in view of the government’s position to halt the Khuzestan development programme, I did not have any function to fulfil.

But you didn’t follow through on your resignation. What happened? A.A.: Two days after my resignation letter, Jafar Sharif-Emami’s government itself resigned, and Dr Ali Amini was selected to form a new government. Among the letters that arrived on that day at my office was one from the outgoing Prime Minister Mr Sharif-Emami that read, ‘There is no decision about halting the Khuzestan development project; please continue with your work.’ When I went to congratulate Dr Amini, who had always had affection toward me, I said that I hoped the ailment for which he had sought treatment abroad had been cured, and similarly that the malady of the Iranian economy would be cured with his appointment as the new Prime Minister. He gave me a deep gaze and chuckled.

So you continued with your work on Khuzestan? A.A.: Yes. After establishing the Tehran office of the KWPA, our efforts were concentrated on the systemic transfer of operational duties from D&R and the preparations for the management of various projects. The first order of business was to send a reliable Iranian representative from the Tehran office to Khuzestan to observe and report on the activities of D&R and execute directives from the KWPA. Abdolali Afkhami,2 a former officer of the National Iranian Oil Company who had served many years at the port of Bandar Mahshahr and had experience in the government and private sectors, was selected and dispatched. His job was to report regularly to the main office. He was welcomed by D&R, 2

A distant relation of Gholamreza Afkhami, conducting this interview. 115

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and they provided for his accommodation. His reporting was beneficial for planning future projects; his observations were informative in a way that negotiations and correspondence with D&R had failed to achieve. For instance, we realised that all the negotiations about the transfer of operations to Iranians had ended up just being theoretical, and the issue had to be addressed. On the ground in Khuzestan, nothing had changed. Foreign managers and supervisors of the various contractors were committed to maximising profits for their companies, and they did not spend any time training Iranians. The small offices of D&R in Khuzestan and New York had a basic supervisory role and little authority over the foreign companies and their employees. They monitored the progress of projects but did not have the officers necessary to enforce the training of Iranians. The assumption was that, simply by working on the projects, some Iranians would learn enough by themselves. Mr Afkhami was escorted around like a tourist, and the confusing answers to his questions seemed to suggest that he was being led on a wild goose chase. The most daunting task was to quickly assemble a knowledgeable staff for the KWPA who would be willing to work under the tough conditions in Khuzestan. At that time, most young graduates of Iranian universities preferred to work in Tehran. It was hard to imagine leaving Tehran’s city limits, let alone moving away from the centre of activity to Khuzestan with its harsh climate. It was a difficult situation. We did not want to jeopardise our relationship with D&R at this crucial juncture. We were moving toward the construction phase of the dam and the harvesting of the sugarcane. Even though we were trying to convince D&R management to undertake the training of qualified Iranians, tensions on the ground with supervisors threatened to dishearten this new group of applicants and raised our fears that a smooth transition might not be possible. It was decided to approach D&R’s top management and solve this issue by getting their full cooperation on the matter. The next step would be to get their help in applying pressure on lower-level managers and supervisors to include Iranians in the decision-making positions in the field. We needed to create an atmosphere of cooperation rather than adversity. As an independent government agency, the KWPA was flooded 116

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with requests for employment or for the purchase of goods from local merchants. Other agencies started asking for aid in various capacities, students researching the province came for information or guidance, and complaints against projects or against individuals working on sites started to pile up. We handled simple requests for employment or purchases of goods ourselves, but for more important matters, we had to refer to D&R’s offices in Tehran or Khuzestan. It was noticed that many inquiries to D&R’s offices remained unanswered, and many responses were muddled. This was not the image that the KWPA wanted to project. After examining the situation, we concluded that although D&R had agreed in principle to the creation of an Iranian agency to take over the operations and management in the long run, foreign employees and some local employees were unaware of this goal and perceived the KWPA as an obstacle that hindered their job. The training of employees and the responses to inquiries were the main issues that were discussed at our first meeting with John Oliver, the executive director of D&R, and his colleagues. Mr Oliver’s response was that D&R was committed to keeping costs down for the benefit of the Iranian government, which was paying the bills for the operations as stipulated by the contract. He said that the employees of D&R had taken on the extra burden of training Iranians who worked alongside them while trying hard to meet deadlines; however, their experts did not have extra time to respond to written inquiries. He added that most inquiries were written in Farsi, which required translation before an appropriate expert to respond to the inquiry could be located in some far-flung corner of Khuzestan. He recounted a story that his father used to tell. The engine of a steamboat on the Mississippi River could produce enough steam to either turn the paddle wheel or blow the horn, but not both at the same time. The captain would blow the horn to signal the arrival of the boat, which would stop the paddle wheel from turning and interrupt the forward motion. Some passengers would complain. The captain would argue that the passengers had to choose between alerting their relatives to come to greet them sooner, or getting them to shore sooner. He was implying that if we wanted quicker responses to inquiries, we needed to invest in an administrative 117

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office to handle the correspondence. Adding greater cost to the project was not our intention, and a solution had to be devised. I responded with a story of my own before we continued. A cartoon that I had been watching with my children seemed to apply to our predicament. The zoo had announced a movie night, and all animals were encouraged to attend by purchasing a ticket. Most animals, including a little dog, bought tickets and arrived on time for the show. They each took a seat in the open-air theatre based on their size, the bigger animals in the back and the smaller ones, including the little dog, in the front. Just as the movie was about to begin, a gorilla entered and sat in the row in front of the small dog, blocking his view. While all the animals were rolling in laughter, all the little dog could do was complain loudly that he had bought a ticket but could not see a thing. The gorilla turned around and said, ‘Sit down and don’t make so much noise, just laugh whenever I laugh.’ The joke did not sit well with Mr Oliver, but once tea and biscuits were brought out and as the group started to laugh at my story, the mood changed. Mr Oliver said that he got the message and was sorry about any miscommunication, and added that he would work to solve the problem. After this episode, the relationship between the KWPA and D&R became much better, and we were gradually able to overcome many obstacles.

What was the staffing situation with the Iranian management team? A.A.: When Mr Mozayyani departed for the United States to pursue a doctoral degree in hydraulics, I invited Ahmad Ali Ahmadi to join the KWPA to assist me. He was a graduate of Cornell University and had taught at the American University in Beirut for several years, and was working at the Ministry of Agriculture at the time. His expertise was needed, as several major development projects in Khuzestan involved agriculture. Soon after, he was handling all aspects of the programme relating to agriculture and irrigation, particularly improvement of the sugarcane project. He was so effective that he was tapped to become Undersecretary at the Ministry of Natural Resources, and he later became Minister of Agriculture in the Cabinet of Jamshid Amuzegar. 118

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With the arrival of Dr Ahmadi at the KWPA, the core of the management team was formed. Mr Shahmirzadi was in charge of the administration and finance, and Dr Ahmadi was in charge of all technical aspects of the development projects. Even though I was ultimately responsible and fully engaged in all aspects of the plan, they were given full authority to make decisions on the spot. Using new management skills, we worked closely together and were fully knowledgeable of each other’s activities. After a few months when the KWPA was ready to take over D&R’s activities, Mr Shahmirzadi was appointed deputy director and went to Ahvaz to head the newly established office. Our foremost goal was to assemble and train a young, educated staff to run the operations. I asked Amir Hossein Nakhaee, who had completed several management training courses, to establish a recruitment and training unit. The operating manuals and progress reports from D&R were all in English, so in the beginning we had to hire employees who spoke the language. We focused on graduates of American institutions, and for that purpose, Mr Nakhaee and I travelled to the United States. With the assistance of Iranian government representatives, we met different groups of students across the country and had lengthy meetings to present the Khuzestan development project and encourage them to join us. The result of our efforts was not as we hoped, mainly because of unsatisfactory living conditions in Khuzestan, but it did encourage many students to return to Iran and accept offers at other institutions. Nevertheless, we were able to slowly attract a competent staff. We moved efficiently to replace foreign experts, and Iranian managers gradually took over the operations. There were too many dedicated employees to mention, but I can point out that the number of foreign nationals at D&R dwindled from 250 to fewer than 35. The Iranian employees were so competent that within five years other agencies were recruiting them; several decided to take these offers, and they became very influential in their new positions.

Your work at the KWPA in 1961 was very briefly interrupted by a Ministry of Justice investigation. What was that all about? A.A.: One of the most reverberating initiatives of Dr Amini’s 119

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government was the campaign against corruption. Stories about investigations by the Ministry of Justice were covered extensively by the print media. Fuelled by public interest and eagerness to sell more copies, newspapers dedicated many columns to details about who was being investigated and the various charges that were brought. After Mr Ahmad Aramesh’s outburst in Parliament, it was reported that a dossier was being prepared against the Khuzestan development project. It was the middle of summer, and during this eventful period Mr Shahmirzadi and I went to conduct a survey in Khuzestan. After our visit to the experimental irrigation project at Dez Dam, we travelled south of Dezful and met some young, enthusiastic Iranian workers who toiled up to ten hours a day in such heat that even the flies could not survive. We had lunch in a hot metal trailer and met American and Dutch experts to discuss their concerns. We had to go to Abadan to catch a flight back to Tehran. After a four-hour car ride through stormy weather, we arrived at the airport only to find out that our plane had not arrived and there would be a long delay. We finally boarded the Iran Air flight at 11 p.m. and landed in Tehran at 2 a.m. I went to the office late that morning having gone to bed around 4 a.m. I immediately noticed that something was wrong from the expressions of the security guard and the information officer. Once at my desk, Alam Nasirzadeh, the office manager, entered the room with tearful eyes and left a stack of documents without uttering a word. A distraught Soltan Ahmad Soltani, the administrative officer, came in and asked if I had seen the letters. I said not yet, and he went on to say that I had been summoned by the Prosecutor. He added that since the arrival of the letter, everyone in the office had been worried sick and been unable to work. I brushed it off and said that I was probably being called in to answer some questions and that it had nothing to do with the office employees. Besides, we had not done anything wrong. I read the letter, which stated that I was being called as an informed witness. I told Mr Soltani that I would be going in for questioning the following day and that he should tell everyone to get back to work. I had no qualms about answering questions and tended to regular business for the rest of the day. Around five o’clock that afternoon, Ziaeddin Neghabat came to see me at home. He was a well-known 120

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personality and a distinguished lawyer at the Justice Department who had been a member of Parliament from Khorramshahr. Because of his knowledge of Khuzestan, he had been selected by the Plan Organisation as legal adviser for development plans. He was intelligent, perceptive, and eloquent. He asked about my preparations for appearing before the Prosecutor. I told him that I had not done anything in particular and was simply going in to answer questions by an official in the inquiry. He told me that it was not that simple and that I was not familiar with the procedures. He said that I was being called as an informed witness. I was not being questioned about the period that I had been Minister of Labour; otherwise parliamentary approval would have been sought to put a minister on trial. He advised that I call the Prime Minister about the summons and seek his counsel. He was concerned that a photographer might take my picture going to the tribunal and use it for political purposes, at some future time making a splash about a ‘former Minister of Labour in the Cabinet of Dr Eghbal being summoned to a penal tribunal’. He added that the story would spill over into rifts between Dr Amini and Dr Eghbal, that other individuals would be implicated, and that the outcome would not be good for anybody. I asked the counsellor what he wanted me to do. On his advice, I called and explained the situation to the Prime Minister. Dr Amini listened intently and said that he was glad that I had called and that he would get back to us quickly. He called back ten minutes later and asked me to go see Noureddin Alamouti, the Minister of Justice, at eight in the morning, and that he would take care of the situation. Mr Alamouti received me warmly and asked about my family. He said that he knew my family well and had been imprisoned with two of my relatives in an Allied prison camp during the war. He asked me to answer truthfully whether the development plans for Khuzestan had been necessary for the country and, second, if the plans had been executed properly. I said that the answer to the first question was very clear. Because of the history and the wealth of natural resources of this province, the development of Khuzestan was the most important project in the country. For this reason, the Shah and successive governments had supported this initiative. The answer to the second question 121

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was more complicated. I told him that the scale of the operation was so vast that the newly established KWPA was not yet equipped to evaluate the efficiency and quality of the work. I suggested that the government could hire an international agency that specialises in this field to make an assessment. I assured him that we had not seen anything alarming in any of the documents that we had read since the establishment of the KWPA. After some further exchanges on this subject, Mr Alamouti called Mr Nassiri, the Examining Magistrate. He told Mr Nassiri that I was in his office and that we had discussed the Khuzestan development project. He said that he had asked me to go to Mr Nassiri’s office to give him any additional information that was needed, and that I would be leaving after that. Having the Minister of Justice setting the parameters of the inquiry allayed my fear of detention. I went to Mr Nassiri’s office, assuming that he had done his research about the development project and would question me about the details. I realised that his information was quite limited, essentially based on newspaper articles. He had no idea about the importance of this project for the economic future of the country. The most significant question was in reference to Lilienthal and Clapp’s first trip to Khuzestan, when they had been invited by the Plan Organisation. Mohammad Kazemi had been their escort and had paid for their accommodation in several locations, including a hotel run by the Municipality of Ahvaz. Mr Nassiri was asking about the payments for some bottles of beer, a photo album, and such. I could only speculate that this line of questioning had no substance and only served to fabricate a case against Abolhassan Ebtehaj. My suspicion turned out to be true, as Mr Ebtehaj was imprisoned for eight months and released following an interlocutory decree. The decree reinforced the notion that the action was a ploy, that the charges were unjustified charges and misguided, leading to the imprisonment of a decent and honourable public servant. The irony was that the decree’s last sentence praised Mr Ebtehaj and noted that no one in the project had done anything to warrant an investigation. Mr Ebtehaj sent a copy of the decree to some colleagues, including me. My interrogation lasted about an hour, and when I returned to the office I found that Mr Soltani had gone to the tribunal with a briefcase 122

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full of deeds to his own properties and those of his relatives to secure my release in case of incarceration. I will never forget this gesture of affection from an esteemed colleague. My summons to the tribunal was not covered in the newspapers and in the end had been only a minor disruption at the KWPA. However, the incarceration of Abolhassan Ebtehaj had a major impact not only on the KWPA but on all agencies involved in development projects. There was an erosion of confidence during a time of expansion at the KWPA.

You were deeply involved in the planning of the Dez Dam and the initial stages of its construction. What was the first day of actual construction like? A.A.: In mid-September 1961, we were informed that preparations had been made and that the concrete for the foundation of the Dez Dam would be ready to be poured in about a month. This was communicated to the palace, and we were told that the Shah had decided to attend the occasion. We seized the opportunity and invited everyone, friends and foes, who had been involved in the project to witness this historic event. We requested the attendance of members of the Cabinet, senators, Majlis deputies, members of the High Council, the board of supervisors at the Plan Organisation, and managers and division chiefs of the Plan Organisation and all government agencies, including in Khuzestan and at the National Iranian Oil Company. We also invited a number of influential and well-known individuals in Khuzestan and the national media from Tehran. About 350 people from Tehran decided to attend the ceremony. We considered the option of flying the guests to the destination, but in the absence of a commercial airfield and the difficulties in accessing the military base in the vicinity, we decided on ground transportation. We made arrangements for the group to board a train the evening before the dedication and served them dinner and breakfast on board. There were buses waiting at the train station in Andimeshk to escort them to the site of the ceremony and return them to the train for lunch on their way back to Tehran. The guests spent much of their time on the train, 123

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because the KWPA was unable to provide better accommodation in the area of Andimeshk or Dezful. We were determined to leave a good impression and worked hard on the logistics. We were given assurances by the managers at the National Railways and were confident that it would be a successful event. To accommodate the Shah, Prime Minister, and high-ranking personalities, a tent was set up close to the riverbed where the concrete was to be poured. The programme for the ceremony was worked out in detail. The plan was for the Shah and the Prime Minister to arrive at the tent and receive the report of the director of the Plan Organisation and the director of the KWPA. A special phone was installed in the tent for the Shah to give the command for the pouring of the concrete. The Shah, accompanied by Prime Minister Amini, arrived by plane at Vahdati Military Base and was escorted to the staging area. Mr Safi Asfia delivered the welcoming address, and I gave the report on the progress of the project. I noted in my speech that the dam would be completed in 14 months. Many were sceptical about the timeline, but when the project was later completed in 13 months, it brought universal acclaim. After giving the command for the concrete-pouring process to be set in motion, the Shah headed back to Tehran. Travelling to the site of the ceremony was an impressive experience for the guests. They experienced the imposing mountain ranges in Luristan, the extensive Zagros Mountains, and 30 kilometres of roadway built through the Bakhtiari Mountains. They saw the massive installations for supplying electricity and the meandering tunnels in the mountainsides leading to the riverbed; some areas were surrounded by massive rocks up to 450 metres high. This trip was so memorable that many guests recalled it fondly over the years. We also made sure to please our local guests from Khuzestan with the help of the National Iranian Oil Company. They created a friendly atmosphere and were proud to be part of such an event. It was important for the future of the newly established KWPA to present itself as a competent organisation, even though it was still small and in search of skilled employees. It required extra effort and diligence by the staff to promote this new agency. I have to commend the other institutions that made this event possible, in particular the National Railways; 124

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their professionalism brought accolades and served to promote the railway industry. I returned to Tehran the next day and went to visit Abolhassan Ebtehaj. He was being detained in a temporary holding cell at police headquarters. My relationship with him was not social, and our encounters were work-related; I was never comfortable with his frequent outbursts. I went to see him to report on the progress of the work in Khuzestan and to comfort him. I believed that his incarceration was unwarranted and politically motivated. Seeing this patriot being held under those conditions brought tears to my eyes and prevented me from saying much. He was the same decent and proud gentleman that I had always known; he listened carefully and was elated that a project that he had initiated was progressing so well. After his eventual exoneration, Mr Ebtehaj visited Khuzestan and toured the operations, being received warmly by all. As the pouring of the concrete for the foundation of the Dez Dam began, the sugarcane that was part of the experimental phase of the project was ready to be processed in the sugar factory. We were told that the main harvest would be ready in the coming weeks. Everyone who was involved in the Khuzestan development project eagerly awaited the harvesting of 2,500 hectares of sugarcane and the inauguration of the sugar factory. The Shah expressed a keen interest in attending the ceremony and seeing the first sugar products. An arrangement similar to the Dez Dam event was planned, and many state and local officials were invited. Seeing the vast sugarcane plantations and the installations at Haft Tapeh near the ruins of the ancient city of Susa, the capital of the Achaemenid and Sassanian Dynasties, evoked tremendous pride in the history of this area and gave hope for a bright future for the country. As the first bag of sugar was produced with the push of a button by the Shah, some in the audience could not hold back their tears of joy. A few days later, I was called in by Hossein Ala, the Minister of Court. He greeted me and asked about my work. After a brief exchange, he stood up, thinking that it was the end of the meeting, and so did I. He surprised me by offering his congratulations and handed me a decree signed by the Shah appointing me as a royal aide-de-camp. I was 125

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taken aback and asked whether this meant that I was being given a new position in the government. Mr Ala replied that it was an honorary title with the advantage that I could visit the Royal Court at my discretion, outside the standard times earmarked for visitors, and see the Shah. I could only deduce that this reflected the importance of the development of Khuzestan, and it was a way for me to report directly to the Shah in case of a major problem. The Shah did indeed confirm this at my next audience. After that, I would visit the Royal Court and have an audience reporting urgent matters to him before the start of the Shah’s scheduled meetings for the day.

The work of the KWPA in general and the construction of the Dez Dam in particular were huge undertakings. Did everything always proceed smoothly? A.A.: Even though the construction of the dam had begun and the sugarcane was being harvested, the political and fiscal climate had created unease about the continued financing of this huge project. The problems at the Plan Organisation, and the threat of resignation by Mr Asfia, did not bode well for the project. Even though Khuzestan’s development had the support of the Shah, there were two groups that opposed it. The first group were those who were using the occasion of Abolhassan Ebtehaj’s investigation to settle scores by attacking his initiative. The second group were government officials who believed that by eliminating the cost burden of Khuzestan’s development, financing would be made available for their departments. This group was led by Hassan Arsanjani, the Minister of Agriculture, who used every opportunity to berate the project. Meanwhile, officials at D&R who were worried about the availability of funds and fearful of complaints and damages kept calling the KWPA. Under such circumstances, some action was necessary to ensure the completion of this important project. I figured that renaming the Dez Dam in the honour of the Shah would ensure its completion and silence the opposing voices. In my next audience with the Shah, I presented my idea, and with his approval the future of the dam was guaranteed. It is my 126

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duty to state this, because many were under the impression that the Shah named the dam after himself purely out of egotism. However, it was done specifically to remove obstacles to the completion of the project, and I take full responsibility for it. This practice is common in many countries, with the name of a person associated with a project adopted in naming that project. In this case, the Shah was instrumental in advancing this cause, justifying the naming of the dam the Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Dam. Based on the same principle and with the approval of the Shah, I recommended that the research centre for the irrigation project be named after Safi Asfia, and it was called the Safiabad Centre.

Less than two years after the pouring of the first concrete in 1961, the dam was ready for operation. How did the inauguration go? A.A.: In July 1962, Dr Ali Amini’s government resigned, and Amir Asadollah Alam was nominated to form a new government. The operations of the Dez Dam were advancing on schedule, at a rapid pace; the concrete-pouring phase of the project was accomplished in 13 months, one month ahead of schedule. Other facets of the project and the network for the distribution of electricity, including the construction of a multitude of tunnels for water flow, the installation of huge turbines for electricity production deep underground below the riverbed, the building of a large hall in the concrete rock on the west side of the dam, the construction of an expansive 400-kilometre network to supply electricity from the dam to Khorramshahr, Andimeshk, Dezful and Ahvaz, and the completion of roads to various destinations, were completed on schedule. The staff was trained and ready to take over operations. In the beginning, before the dam was fully operational, Iranian workers were supervised by foreign technical staff. With the assistance of D&R, the Canadian government-affiliated Ontario Hydro Commission sent a group of technicians to further train the Iranian workers. Meanwhile, the Shah intended to attend the inauguration ceremonies of the dam’s opening: 14 March 1963 was marked as the inauguration 127

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date. The ceremony created an unparalleled sense of joy and pride among all the workers at the KWPA and D&R. Many state and private agencies offered their services. The Vahdati Air Force Base in Andimeshk was prepared to accommodate VIP guests. The National Iranian Oil Company recruited cooks, servers, and drivers from all over Khuzestan to provide meals and transportation. The guest list included Cabinet Ministers, members of Parliament, ambassadors of countries involved in the project, well-known merchants and citizens, heads of the military, directors of state and private agencies, union bosses, and the national media. Since the area on top of the dam, where the ceremony was to take place, could not accommodate all the guests, arrangements were made for everyone to visit the facilities in small groups. From that vantage point, one could see the huge installations of the dam with a lake that stretched for 64 kilometres in the valley between the tall mountains on one side, and the Dez River at a drop of 200 metres on the other, giving some viewers vertigo. It was an amazing feat that the dam had become operational such a short time after the beginning of construction. The Shah arrived, accompanied by Prime Minister Alam and Hassan Arsanjani, Minister of Agriculture. The plan was for the ceremony to coincide with the awarding of the deeds to farmers as part of the land reform initiative. Mr Asfia, director of the Plan Organisation, delivered the opening remarks, and then I gave a brief statement about the overview of the plans and the projected outcome. I explained that in the initial phase, the placement of two generators would provide 130,000 kilowatts of electricity for Khuzestan, and with the planned expansion of electrical grids and the addition of new generators, 520,000 kilowatts would be available for use. With the push of a button, hatches to the tunnels for the water were lifted, and with the turning of the turbines the lights came on. Streetlights in city centres and elsewhere on the power grid began to light up as residents witnessed this great accomplishment. For the first time in Iran, different components of a major development project could benefit the community at once. With the construction of the dam, major problems with water, electricity and agriculture had been addressed. A couple of incidents are worth mentioning here. At the conclusion 128

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of the ceremony, the Shah, accompanied by Prime Minister Alam, General Morteza Yazdanpanah, Hassan Arsanjani, and Abolfath Atabai, Deputy Minister of Court, proceeded to have tea at the house of the chief engineer of the project. The Shah had been elated by the occasion and emphasised the necessity of such projects for the development of the country. At this point Mr Arsanjani took it upon himself to declare that such projects were tantamount to treason and a waste of national resources. Everyone in the room was stunned and speechless. The Shah, who was visibly shaken, left in a waiting car without saying a word. Another incident arose because of the tightness of the small staging area for the ceremony. David Lilienthal and Gordon Clapp, along with some other officials, were stationed in other locations. Upon the Shah’s arrival, the greetings did not proceed as planned, and the group of Americans ended up behind other enthusiastic groups. The American Minister Plenipotentiary had complained to Mr Lilienthal about the matter. Mr Lilienthal mentioned this episode in his memoirs, and I was moved by his response to the complaint, since he never mentioned anything at the time. A reporter even published a special report criticising the project and claiming that the dam had been built by traitors who planned on blowing it up, burying all the surrounding villages, and destroying Khuzestan. The important thing was that after years of uphill struggle, the sixth-largest concave dam in the world, named after Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, had been built, and its value became evident in the coming years.

The 1960s was a period of rapid economic growth and development in Iran. Yet the bureaucratic, administrative and political structures and the political culture of the country had changed little. How did you, managing a key agency for the country’s development, experience and navigate through all the bureaucratic difficulties and rivalries which characterised the era? A.A.: Let me begin with a little episode. One day in November 1963, I received a call from my friend Hassan Ali Mansur. He was in Amir-Abbas Hoveyda’s office and asked me to join them immediately. 129

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At that time, Mr Hoveyda was one of the directors of the National Iranian Oil Company. Mr Hoveyda greeted me personally and took me back to his office so that Mr Mansur could tell me about a pressing situation. Mr Mansur said that he had had an audience with the Shah and had been told to form a new government. He offered me the position of Minister of Finance. He asked me to keep it secret but to do my research and get ready to assume that position when the time for the announcement of the new Cabinet arrived. I congratulated him and accepted the offer, saying that I would begin my research promptly. During the following four months, Mr Mansur would inquire about the progress of my research, and at a formal lunch at Bank Melli he even quietly asked if Mr Alam, the Prime Minister, had contacted me. He added that because the Ministry of Finance was being run by an acting minister, those in power had considered appointing me as the Minister, in which case there wouldn’t be any need to change the Minister within a short period. I replied that I had not been contacted. At the time, Mr Barzegar, a veteran of the Ministry of Finance, was the acting Minister. I did not hear anything until rumours began to circulate that the government had resigned and that Mr Mansur would become the new Prime Minister. I was invited for dinner in his honour at the house of Bahman Atai, a member of Parliament. I assumed that my invitation was at the behest of Mr Mansur and had something to do with the forming of the new Cabinet. There were about 20 guests and everyone was in a celebratory mood; it was anticipated that some of the people there would get positions in the new government. Mr Mansur arrived, and shortly after he pulled me aside to talk. He told me that he had presented the final list of ministers to the Shah, and when they had come across my name, the Shah had hesitated. Mr Mansur had taken that as a sign of disapproval and told me that the offer was being withdrawn for now. I thanked him for having considered me but could not sleep that night, wondering why I had been passed over by the Shah. I worried that my career in the government would come to an end if I were not in his good graces. I faced many battles ahead to complete the development of Khuzestan, and this did not bode well. I decided to go and see the Shah the following morning and offer my resignation, proceeding to the Marmar Palace for an audience. As 130

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I walked into the Shah’s office, he asked if there was a problem. I told him that I was there to resign from government work. I recounted my conversation the night before with Mr Mansur. The Shah responded calmly that ‘weak people cannot say what is on their own mind and attribute the words to others’. He said that I had his full confidence and should continue with my job, keeping him informed about the progress of the programme. I bowed and kissed his hand and went back to my office full of confidence. The new Cabinet was announced, and Mansur Rohani was named as Minister of Water and Power. With the creation of this new Ministry, a new chapter was opened in the development of Khuzestan. I knew Mr Rohani from my days as Treasurer General. He was capable, hard-working, knowledgeable and an intellectual. He had accompanied Gholam Hossein Meykadeh, the director of the Tehran Water Authority, to defend the budget for that department. We established a rapport from our first encounter. Having succeeded Mr Meykadeh as director, he had come to see me on a different matter. The Tehran Water Authority was planning to build the Latyan Dam in the north-eastern part of Tehran to augment the supply of water for the capital. Because the Dez Dam had been completed, he was wondering whether some of the heavy equipment could be leased to his organisation for a short period. I told him that we were all working for the development of the country and that I was ready to help him in whatever way I could. I asked him to send his assistant to Khuzestan to inspect our warehouses and take whatever equipment they needed, and simply to sign a receipt. He was surprised and thought that I was joking. He said that he had never encountered such camaraderie. I told him that times had changed; the country was advancing at a rapid pace, and it was the duty of all to advance national goals and help each other in any way possible. The Dez Dam and the Latyan Dam were both Plan Organisation projects, and knowing Mr Asfia, I told Mr Rohani that the Plan Organisation would not object to the machinery being transferred to the Latyan project. I then called Mr Asfia to get his approval before calling our representatives in Khuzestan, informing them to expect a visit from the Tehran Water Authority and to release the equipment that was not needed, against their receipts. This action meant that millions of dollars 131

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of equipment would be transferred from one agency to another in a matter of a few minutes. This type of transaction had never been heard of between government agencies in Iran. The expediency of this matter solidified our friendship. After the announcement of the establishment of the Ministry of Water and Power, I went to see Mr Rohani to offer my sincere congratulations. Although sceptics at the KWPA were wary of this new Ministry and the possibility of interference, I was hopeful that we could work together. I told Mr Rohani that the responsibilities of the KWPA extended beyond water and electricity issues and included agriculture, road construction, industry, health, housing and other matters related to the development of Khuzestan. The KWPA was a lawful entity with a clear charter giving it a special responsibility and legal power independent of any Ministry. Its programmes were coordinated with other national projects through the Plan Organisation. If the Plan Organisation ever decided to disengage from the KWPA, a high commission with the participation of relevant ministries involved in development should be formed to supervise this big national project. I was confident that because of our friendship we would be able to overcome obstacles, and so I extended my full support in helping him establish this new Ministry. He said that he was glad to have a friend at the KWPA and would ask for any assistance that would help him get started at his new job. In the following weeks, I did not pay much attention to rumours that were circulating about the merging of the KWPA with the Ministry of Water and Power, as I had the support of the Shah and was on friendly terms with Mr Rohani. As new advisers and deputies were named to the newly established Ministry, rumours of discord among them concerning jurisdiction over the KWPA began to spread. Then one day the KWPA received a letter signed by a deputy minister requesting a file on some issue about routine daily operations in Khuzestan, citing a complaint raised by an unknown individual. This seemingly benign letter was the beginning of a new chapter, since the tone of the letter indicated a new relationship between the two agencies implying that the KWPA was a subordinate office of the Ministry of Water and Power. This was contrary to the principal idea of establishing an independent agency to carry on a host of projects for the development of the 132

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region. It would reduce the KWPA to another bureaucratic arm of a new, untested Ministry. We had fought many battles within the Plan Organisation to reduce red tape and speed up the execution of new development projects by employing new managerial techniques; all that effort could be wasted. It was clear that there were forces behind the scenes that were working out of self-interest and against the KWPA. They included local landowners who treated farm workers with disdain and opposed the land reform programme, utility companies that could not sell their electricity at high prices, local influential people who could not get a piece of the action and secure employment for their friends, local merchants who could not sell their low-quality products to the agency, and so on. These opposing forces were trying to reduce the KWPA to another failed government agency. My thoughts were on the hard-working, educated staff that was working under harsh conditions in Khuzestan and on the tremendous amount of investment over the previous seven years that was being threatened. Experience told me that the demise of many government projects began with anonymous letters followed by unsubstantiated accusations and drawn-out inquiries, all in the name of justice. But having the support of the Shah, I decided to fight the detractors. Writing with my usual green ink (my choice of ink colour to draw attention to comments), I wrote to Mr Rohani and asked that in the future, he should contact me directly himself rather than sending such inquiries signed by officials of his Ministry. I also issued an order to the KWPA secretariat telling them not to accept any letters from the Ministry of Water and Power and to refer any problems directly to me. My letter worked marvels, and we did not receive any more inquiries from the management at the Ministry. After that episode I met every minister and relevant official and explained the logic behind the need for independent regional organisations for development. I reasoned that the bureaucratic process and the layers of traditional rules and regulations within government agencies prevented the swift implementation of projects, and that new managerial techniques needed to be executed. Several young ministers who were not quite familiar with the system promised to actively support the development projects of Khuzestan and the KWPA. In 133

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addition to the unequivocal support of the Shah, the support of Mr Asfia was crucial. All the officials involved believed in his integrity, and his continuing praise of the activities of the KWPA encouraged others to cooperate. However, the legislation to establish the Ministry of Water and Power gave the government the right to decide which regional authorities would be placed under the control of the newly established entity. After these initial disputes, work at the KWPA proceeded routinely in the next four months, and the Plan Organisation continued to finance the operations. In early summer, on the eve of the Shah’s departure on a foreign trip, we were alerted to a decree that had been ratified by the Council of Ministers stating that regional water and power authorities including the KWPA, the Sefidrood Dam, the Karaj Dam, and Rezayieh Regional Water and Power Organisation were to be absorbed into the Ministry of Water and Power. Upon hearing this news, I immediately went to see the Prime Minister. Before I said anything, Prime Minister Mansur remarked that he knew the reason for my visit and added that special arrangements had been made to address my concerns about the KWPA and that my work would not be interrupted. He reiterated that the KWPA would remain an independent organisation and that the Ministry of Water and Power would not interfere with operations in Khuzestan. He said that I would be the Shah’s emissary as Governor General of Khuzestan and would have total control over the Khuzestan development programme. Only the budget for the KWPA, as determined by the Plan Organisation, would be included in the budget for the Ministry of Water and Power in the national budget bill. The Shah had also ordered that any problems between the KWPA and the new Ministry be settled by Mr Asfia (as had been suggested by Mr Hoveyda). I had gone to offer my resignation, but, considering our long history of friendship and my working relationship with the Prime Minister, I agreed to continue my work despite being put in an awkward situation. Mr Mansur noted that the KWPA was the only regional authority whose mission extended beyond water and electricity to include various other kinds of development projects; the other agencies that were included in the Cabinet decree were mainly concerned with water and power. A meeting was organised in Mr Asfia’s office with Mr Rohani, and we 134

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agreed on the parameters of the relationship between the KWPA and the Ministry. I maintained the position that the philosophy behind the establishment of the KWPA as stipulated in its charter was to create an organisation to cut through the old bureaucratic system of ministries and carry out a comprehensive development programme at the regional level; once the projects were completed and ready for operation, its units could be assigned to state and local agencies through proper lawful procedures. For instance, an electricity grid and power station that were constructed under the management of a regional organisation would be turned over to the city municipality once operational. The relationship between the regional organisation and the city would be similar to that of a vendor whose authority ends at the city limits. Similarly, in the agriculture sector, as long as the irrigation networks are incomplete and land remains fallow, the regional organisation would be responsible for all the different phases of the project. But once the land had been prepared and the project become operational, the Ministry of Agriculture might take responsibility. After this meeting, the relationship between the Ministry and the KWPA was based on cooperation and mutual respect. Mr Rohani accepted my invitation and came to Khuzestan for a few days. He was given a tour of the development project and was briefed on managerial procedures that had been established. He was so impressed that he became a supporter and spokesperson for the KWPA, requesting our manuals and work procedures so that they could be copied for other regional organisations. Ministry employees were often sent to Khuzestan for training. This rapport continued for a year, even though there were rumours of discontent among managers at the Ministry who were vying for power and who disdained the special treatment enjoyed by the KWPA. Then, on 22 April 1965, we received a letter from the Ministry notifying us that the Tehran office of the KWPA was to be shut down and its responsibilities assigned to a newly established desk at the Ministry of Water and Power. Although our Tehran office was very small and employed fewer than ten employees including a driver, a guard and a serviceman, it had many functions and responsibilities that were essential for the operation of all our projects. These included 135

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daily follow-ups on various projects at the Plan Organisation in order to file the necessary reports and answer inquiries about obtaining funds, obtaining clearance from the customs office for the import of different items, securing approval from the Ministry of Agriculture for the import of seeds, saplings, and fertilisers, receiving work permits for foreign nationals from the Ministry of Labour and other government agencies, and generally facilitating the activities of the KWPA. It was obvious that transferring all these responsibilities to a desk at the Ministry would only delay the timely completion of projects, as the Ministry’s bureaucracy would require signatures for even the smallest of requests. Instead of responding to the letter, I appealed to the Shah through a Royal Secretariat requesting that an order be issued that we be left free from interference from the Ministry in order to complete our task and carry out our assigned responsibilities. Mr Rohani realised his mistake and did not pursue the matter further, and there was no more interference from the Ministry while I was managing director of the KWPA.

And what about the landowners? Were they hostile to what you were trying to do in Khuzestan? Were they a problem? A.A.: The terms of the World Bank loan to Iran stipulated that users of the water from the irrigation network had to make a commitment to pay their water bill on time. These payments were the basis for the calculations of the loan amount and needed to be guaranteed. In 1960, land reform legislation was in its initial stages. Many landowners opposed to it were creating problems and preventing the enforcement of the law in different parts of the country. In Khuzestan, a significant portion of the area that was part of the irrigation network of the Dez Dam belonged to one prominent family, who had great influence among all local landowners. We were aware of this problem, observing that tensions between landowners and farmers were brewing and that every attempt was being made to ward off government officials. Under such circumstances, negotiations with landowners to secure their commitment to pay water bills were quite difficult. Nevertheless, we 136

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tried a variety of approaches to promote the benefits of our proposed irrigation system and help local landowners understand the economic rewards of a dependable water source. Land could be cultivated year round, and the fear of drought or flood would be alleviated. However, the landowners and farmers were wary of government promises and were concerned about land forfeiture for roads and canals. They had been using the water from the river for generations at no cost and did not want to now start paying for it. Promises of protection of their rights did not convince them. Meanwhile, we were receiving credible information that an influential landowner was organising meetings with other landowners and farmers in an effort to stymie the Dez Dam project. With the major construction phase of the dam approaching, the World Bank loan, in the amount of $42 million, was badly needed. The World Bank was firm in its demand for commitment from landowners and was applying pressure. About six months prior to this crucial juncture, I had met a distinguished member of the judiciary who had been a colleague of mine in the Cabinet of Dr Eghbal. He had asked that I meet the son of a prominent landowner from Khuzestan who had recently graduated with a degree in agriculture from an American university and wanted to gain experience by working in development projects in Khuzestan. He said that his case had been presented to the Shah, who had ordered that he be referred to me. At that time, we were constantly looking for such qualified candidates, and I personally met him and assigned him to the sugarcane development project in Haft Tapeh. I also instructed the staff to ensure that he was given all the necessary training. Now we were receiving reports that his father was increasing his involvement by arousing discontent among the foes of the Dez Dam project. Meanwhile, a copy of a letter that had been sent to the World Bank was forwarded to my office. It was signed by landowners and farmers who claimed to control 80 per cent of the land in the development area of the Dez Dam. They had declared their objection to the whole project, stating that they had the right to use the water from the river for free and had no reason to pay for it. The contents of the letter suggested that the author was knowledgeable about the negotiations with the World Bank. There was evidence that the son of the region’s top landowner had 137

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originally sought employment with us in order to gather information about the project with the aim of derailing it. After further inquiry, it was discovered that this individual was independently wealthy, and his salary did not add much to his lavish lifestyle. Since the first day of his employment, he had spread unsubstantiated rumours among workers and had sown the seeds of discontent. As the motive and his role in drafting the letter to the World Bank were exposed, we terminated his employment. At my next general audience with the Shah, as I was standing alongside former ministers, he stopped to inquire why we had fired this person. Suspecting that some negative reports had been given, I replied that I would explain the reason during my next audience. The next day during my private audience, I explained the situation and got the Shah’s approval. The World Bank sent a delegation to Iran to investigate the matter. It concluded that, since the new land reform laws were being implemented, farmers would ultimately be responsible for paying the water bills, and hence the current landowners would not play an important role in the Dez Dam development project. The success of the project would depend on the timely execution of the plans to help the farmers reap the benefits of ownership. The development plans continued on schedule, and the loan was approved. Nevertheless, landowners continued to cause trouble. For example, as contractors were preparing the land for road construction, on several occasions the walls of the old water canals were destroyed to inundate the area. The areas needed to be drained and reworked at great cost. The purpose was to delay the project in the hope that the land reform law would never take effect. But with the help of local officials, who had come to appreciate the benefits of the new development programme, we were able to overcome such obstacles, and gradually people began to benefit from our operation. For instance, there was one man who was constantly being pursued by local authorities on misdemeanour charges. A tract of land was loaned to him, and he was given training by one of our local technicians in the cultivation of vegetables. He was able to make 300,000 rials ($4,000) in three months by growing tomatoes. He went on to become one of the major producers of agricultural products in the region. Another individual who had beehives in the Kermanshah region came to the 138

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area of south of Dezful and was able to grow strawberries in time for the Persian New Year. This was something unprecedented and was received with great enthusiasm in Tehran markets.

Based on your KWPA experience, how would you characterise the difficulties of implementing development-related decisions in the Iran of the 1960s? A.A.: People who are unfamiliar with government processes in Iran might think that a development project would proceed on schedule and as planned once it had been approved by the government and the financing had been arranged. Unfortunately, that is not so, because there are unforeseen obstacles at every turn and project managers have to be vigilant and deal with each situation with great care. I will give you three examples. (1) One might assume that once a decision is made and the legislation is approved by the government, local authorities including Governors General would facilitate the implementation of a plan. When the KWPA was established, I went on an official trip to Khuzestan to meet the Governor General, to pick his brains and discuss plans. Some local officials and the head of the police were also present at the meeting. The Governor knew me from before and was gracious in his opening remarks. He then started to criticise the entire project by stating that the Americans were wasting all of the country’s resources and, under the guise of development, had disrupted the established order in the province. He gave the example of a mayor who could not find a secretary because qualified workers would rather work for the Americans, who paid higher wages. He said that, instead of installing some pumps to provide water from the river, a huge dam was being built at great cost and that it was unclear who would benefit from it. He recommended that the Americans learn from the local population, specifically from his butler, who had used some 30 cents’ worth of seeds to grow watermelons on a small piece of land and had earned $50 in profit. He imagined how prosperous Khuzestan would be if the funds for the construction of the Dez Dam were given directly to his office for 139

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various needed projects. He then said that it was up to me to stop this wasteful spending and halt the project altogether. Everyone in the room was nodding and agreeing with the Governor General. I realised that it would be difficult to convince them otherwise at that meeting. I addressed the employment problem by saying that salaries in technical fields have always been higher than those in municipal offices and that it was a national rather than a local problem. I cited the example of the National Iranian Oil Company and other oil-related businesses that offered high salaries to qualified technical staff. As far as installing pumps along the river, I said that if the solution were so simple, Khuzestan should have been cultivated and turned in to a paradise by now, since there were plenty of affluent people, lots of land, and plenty of water. Therefore, the solution to Khuzestan’s problem lay elsewhere. Case in point was the Khuzestan agriculture office, which had leased thousands of acres of land in the previous ten years in deals involving many influential individuals. Not much had been accomplished, and the projects had been abandoned. Another case was that of Mr Azari, an affluent landowner whose attempts to pump water to his cotton fields were a complete disaster. A great portion of his 10,000 hectares of land was uncultivated and had turned into salt marshes and swampland. On that note, I said that I had to leave for Tehran, and we would continue the discussions at a later date. At the next meeting at the KWPA, we discussed the huge obstacles we faced with local officials. We came to the conclusion that we had to give a comprehensive tour of the operations to state and local officials and the heads of private businesses to promote the development plans and clear up all the misconceptions. This effort was successful, and those individuals who visited our operations became advocates of the project and were proud to be associated with it. The gentleman who was the Governor General at the time was removed after some time, and he left the government for good. (2) A few days before Christmas in 1962, we got word that some foreign technicians had been prevented from leaving Iran for vacation by the police and customs office, because someone from the Ministry of Finance had claimed that they did not have the proper tax clearances. This had created a terrible atmosphere among the foreign workers, who 140

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had toiled all summer under the hot sun and in a harsh environment and simply wished to go off on a two-week vacation. They wondered whether this was a ploy by adversaries of the KWPA and might lead to the termination of their employment. Their contract clearly stated that their employer was responsible for paying all local taxes. The uncertainty arose because this charge was levelled against KWPA workers and not against other foreign nationals working for the National Iranian Oil Company. It did not seem plausible that some low-level official could make such a decision. I promptly called the Governor General and asked him to intervene on behalf of the KWPA, adding that we would take full responsibility and clarify the matter. His response indicated that he was personally involved in the obstruction. He said that these foreign workers, who were paid such high salaries, had to pay taxes; they should realise that there were rules in our country. I informed him that the expenses for this project were covered by the Plan Organisation and that the foreign individuals involved did not work for private companies. They had been contracted by the Plan Organisation, which had agreed to pay all applicable taxes. It had been determined that including taxes in incomes of the foreign workers would substantially increase the cost of the project and would benefit foreign corporations, whose revenue was based on the size of the contract. In addition, the taxes levied on those contracts would be included in the government’s revenue books and would be allocated to administrative expenses rather than development expenses, which would be contrary to the letter of the law that separates expenses. I added that the application of the law should be discussed and clarified by the government. Meanwhile, the foreign workers should not be held accountable and should be allowed to leave the country for their vacation. The cold and indifferent response from the Governor General, who should have been more sympathetic to the cause, was incomprehensible. I decided not to argue with him and looked for an alternative solution. I called Mr Asfia as well as Dr Jahangir Amouzegar, who was the Minister of Finance at the time. We decided to call the head of the regional finance office to Tehran to discuss the matter. However, this inquiry would have taken a couple of weeks and would have prevented our foreign technicians from joining their families over the Christmas 141

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and the New Year holidays. A solution was proposed by Ataollah Akhlaghi, one of our staff officers in Dezful. He suggested that since Dez Lake was partly situated in Luristan Province, exit permits for the foreign technicians could be issued by the police department there. He said that one of the top officials there was his friend and would be able to arrange for the travel of those foreign workers. We accepted his proposal and were able to provide our departing technicians with exit permits, thus sidestepping this hurdle. The issue of paying the taxes of foreign nationals was later discussed at length with lawyers and advisers at the Plan Organisation and was ultimately resolved with the Ministry of Finance. (3) As I mentioned before, the accommodation for the employees of the KWPA was in an area named Kooye-Golestan. There were 60 housing units plus a building that served as a clubhouse with ten additional rooms for short-term stays. There was a dining hall and a kitchen, which was mostly used by unmarried employees. The clubhouse also had a swimming pool, which was used by the employees and their families. This compound was exclusive to KWPA employees and could barely satisfy their needs. This arrangement was not particular to our organisation; the National Iranian Oil Company and the National Railways had their own housing compounds which were exclusively used by their staff. In the KWPA, in the spirit of good will, top officials from local government agencies had been granted access to the restaurant in the compound but had to pay the regular tariff, which was quite reasonable. However, the chief of police of Khuzestan expected the KWPA to accommodate his guests for their lodging and grant them access to the restaurant for free. He had mentioned this on several occasions to our local director, to no avail. Meanwhile, we started receiving reports of problems with local police authorities, who were interfering with our work. The issues were minor and did not cause much concern. However, when a severe summer storm knocked down a post and cut off the electricity to the Governor General’s mansion, the chief of police had an opportunity to seize the occasion. On that day, most employees of the KWPA were attending the funeral of the American wife of Mansour Asgari, the head of the power division, who had committed 142

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suicide. When the chief of police received a call from the Governor General’s mansion asking him to locate a manager to inquire about the downed power line, he sent some agents to the burial to arrest the director of the Ahvaz electricity office and bring him in for questioning. The employees at the funeral were so disturbed by this action that they decided not to return to work. On that day, I was in a meeting at the Plan Organisation, in a heated discussion concerning issues with the World Bank loan. When the news came about the situation, I immediately called the Governor General of Khuzestan, General Mehdi Rahimi Saffari, who, unlike his predecessor, was attentive to the needs of our agency. He was unaware of the arrest and had simply requested that the head of the electricity division be located. He promised to take care of the matter and added that he understood the nature of the problem and would address the complaints of our employees, which he did. The chief of police, however, was not finished with creating problems. A few months later he sent a confidential report to the central police office claiming that our housing compound had become a perverse environment. He recounted rumours being spread locally accusing employees of the KWPA of putting ice in the swimming pool during the hot summer months and pushing naked ladies around in the water. This complaint had been investigated secretly by the central police office and dismissed. I have to note that even though the chief of police, who was from the old school, created many problems, the young officers in the force were friendly and helpful to our organisation. At a formal dinner the evening after my appointment to the position of Governor General of Khuzestan, General Nematollah Nassiri, the national chief of police, came to me and said that, as a welcome gesture to me, the chief of police of Khuzestan had been called back to Tehran and that I did not have to worry about him. I thanked him sincerely.

How did your term at the KWPA end? A.A.: The KWPA was gradually established as a viable government agency. By 1966, it had a knowledgeable and dependable staff at the 143

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provincial level and had become one of the most productive organisations within the government. The established managerial skills and methods practised there were replicated in other institutions. The Dez Dam had been completed and was being operated by an Iranian technical staff. The area north of Shushtar and Marun to the north of Behbahan had been studied for the next dam project. The Karun Dam project was underway and was proceeding based on the timetested procedures established by the development of the Dez Dam. The electricity grid was expanding to include more cities and provide ever more power for factories and businesses. The electricity network was being managed and operated by Iranians, who worked diligently to provide service to as many customers as needed. The plan for the irrigation network of the Dez Dam was complete, and work was proceeding on schedule. The reports from the field were mostly about the success of the project, as traditional crops were more bountiful; we received few complaints. I recall the pride with which Ali Asghar Ajdari, the operational manager at the irrigation project, reported that the wheat crop harvest had yielded about four tons per hectare, and that grape saplings, which had been planted for the first time in the region, were already bearing fruit. Mr Ajdari had completed his studies in agricultural engineering in England and had been the director at the Agricultural Institute in Mollasani in Khuzestan. He used to complain about the bureaucracy and the slow pace of development and was worried about future prospects for his students. Now, he was confident that there was a bright future in the field of agriculture in the province. Sugarcane was growing on more than 5,000 hectares, and harvests were comparable to the best fields in the world. The fields had taken a local flavour, and the success of producing one kilogram of sugar per square metre was encouraging more farmers. Nader Hakimi, the director of the sugarcane project, had assembled a capable team of associates and had been able to reduce the foreign technical team from 68 individuals to six. With plans proceeding on schedule, Mr Hakimi asked to delegate his responsibilities to his colleague Ali Asghar Sherkat. He had full confidence in him and assured us that operations would not be interrupted. He left the KWPA to take a top position in the Ministry of Industry. 144

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Gordon Clapp had passed away, and David Lilienthal was approaching retirement. He was spending less time at D&R and was writing his memoirs. Abolhassan Ebtehaj had left public service, had established the Iranian Bank, and was preoccupied with business. Hassan Shahmirzadi and Ahmad Ali Ahmadi were handling most operations at the KWPA, as I was getting more involved in the governance of the province. However, the six years I had spent establishing the KWPA and fighting the bureaucracy and the opposition had left me drained and desperately in need of a long vacation, or a change of work. It was under such circumstances that I received a call from Prime Minister Hoveyda in the early summer of 1966 to meet him in Tehran. The following afternoon, when I arrived at his office, Mr Hoveyda congratulated me, giving me the news that I had been appointed by the Shah to be the Minister of the Interior. On my first day at the Ministry, Ghavam Nezami, the chief of staff, told me that Mansur Rohani had been waiting for half an hour to personally congratulate me. I was extremely touched, and our friendship was restored. I asked my good friend Hassan Shahmirzadi to join me at the Ministry as my deputy, which he accepted. We continued our working relationship in the coming years in various arenas. After my departure in the summer of 1966 from the KWPA to become Minister of the Interior, Iraj Vahidi, who was an undersecretary at the Ministry, was nominated to the post. Mr Rohani and Dr Vahidi convinced Ahmad Ali Ahmadi, my technical assistant, to stay on board at the KWPA, promoting him to the position of deputy managing director. With the change of leadership at the KWPA, its activities continued and expanded, because revenues from the oil industry had greatly expanded and the government was able to increase the budget for the Khuzestan development programme. The irrigation network was broadened; the construction of the Karun Dam, which was in its initial stages, continued; and new plans were conceived to increase the production of sugarcane on 30,000 hectares in the vicinity of the city of Shushtar to produce an additional 250,000 tons of sugar. This was a great achievement for the KWPA, demonstrating that our efforts to reintroduce sugarcane cultivation in Khuzestan and to revive a tradition that had gone amiss for 700 years were not in vain. 145

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7

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Governorship in Khuzestan

When you were talking about the Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, you mentioned that a few months after the establishment of the Ministry of Water and Power during the government of Hassan Ali Mansur, which created some difficulties between the two entities, you were appointed as Governor General of Khuzestan while you retained your position as managing director at the KWPA. Did this new position prevent you from spending adequate time in the management of the KWPA, and would you elaborate on the affairs related to the governance of Khuzestan? Abdolreza Ansari: My appointment as Governor General in fact facilitated the work at the KWPA, rather than created problems. It removed all governmental intrusions into the day-to-day operations and facilitated the completion of projects. During the previous four years, I had implemented a modernised management structure based on decentralised operations, division of responsibilities, and compartmentalised departments led by competent managers. The organisation was operating smoothly, the projects were on schedule, and any issues were addressed promptly. My recollections of events as Governor General might be interesting for those who wonder about the period of rapid growth in Iran. On the first day after my appointment, I got a call from Mansur Rohani, who you will recall was the Minister of Water and Power, 147

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about a report that had been given to the Shah regarding the district of Shadegan, and the Shah had ordered that the matter be referred to me. Because of a seven-year drought, the Jarahi River had dried up. This had adverse consequences: the district’s 80,000 residents were unable to grow crops, and drinking water became scarce. I was still in Tehran and immediately contacted local officials, who confirmed the information. I called Hassan Shahmirzadi, my deputy in Khuzestan, and asked him to elicit help from local officials and dispatch at least 100 tankers to distribute potable water to the affected areas. I also called Dr Manouchehr Eghbal, who had become the head of the National Iranian Oil Company, and asked him to issue instructions to the responsible officials in the oil company to cooperate with us. As there was no flight available, I took the night train, which arrived in Ahvaz, the province’s capital, the next morning. Arriving in Ahvaz, I noticed that all the heads of the civil and military organisations were waiting to greet the new Governor General at the station. After welcoming remarks, I realised that my arrival coincided with a ceremony commemorating Reza Shah the Great, the Shah’s father and the first monarch of the Pahlavi dynasty. After participating in the prearranged ceremony and laying the traditional bouquet of flowers, I was escorted to the Governor General’s mansion, where I was confronted by an extraordinary sight: 2,000–3,000 men, women and children in drab clothing and with dark, sun-stricken complexions were milling about the grounds and inside the mansion. I was told that owing to the drought in the province, people had converged on Ahvaz and that they came daily to the mansion seeking assistance. Having heard about the arrival of a new governor, their numbers had multiplied that day. They had declared that they would not leave until their misery was addressed. It was clear that the situation had to be dealt with immediately. I convened a meeting with the heads of the law enforcement agencies and other officials including magistrates and the Mayor of Ahvaz. I learned that about 2,000 tons of wheat had been allocated by the government as emergency aid but that no financial credit had been extended. We discussed ways to confront this problem and finally decided that, as of the next day, the wheat would be given to the needy in exchange for community service such as street sweeping, wall 148

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construction around barren lands in the area, and other such chores. The responsibility was assigned to the Mayor of Ahvaz and the manager of the grain warehouse. Also, the head of the Chamber of Commerce promised to solicit the assistance of local businesses to help the needy and to provide a site where the people could go to request aid and where their demands would be followed up. With the announcement of the measures and the directions to the sites, the crowd gradually began to disperse. The officials promised to follow through on their commitments to help these poor people. I then took the opportunity of the meeting to discuss the water problem in Shadegan and asked the others at the meeting to accompany me on a visit to that area. The head of the army and the security officials were wary of this suggestion. They were alarmed by the heightened emotions owing to the lack of water in temperatures exceeding 50 degrees centigrade, in circumstances where there was not enough water to wash the bodies of the deceased. They suggested that the visit be postponed until after the tankers had delivered water to the area. I was adamant in my decision to visit the area immediately and was able to convince everyone to accompany me the following day. The region of Shadegan is to the east of the artery between Ahvaz and Abadan and about 15 kilometres east of the town of Darkhovin. As we were driving from Darkhovin to Shadegan, we were disheartened to see enfeebled women and children along the road with various containers waiting for the water tankers. There were thousands of people waiting for our arrival in Shadegan. Our car was surrounded by people shouting their grievances. We proceeded slowly to the municipal building. The crowd surrounded the building once we were inside. We asked the local officials to announce with the microphone that the Shah had sent the Governor General and other officials to address their complaints, and that they should select ten representatives to discuss the problems. This had a calming effect on the crowd, and in about half an hour the ten representatives were allowed in the building. They were introduced by the local official and were treated with respect. They were told that the Shah wanted to resolve the situation, and they were asked to identify the problems that had caused the depletion of the water. They said that the main reason was that landowners up the river had diverted the 149

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water for agricultural use, which had caused the tributaries to dry up downstream in this region. A Mr Ayazi, the director of the agriculture office in Khuzestan, reasoned that the lack of rainfall was the main culprit, as landowners had always used the water upstream, and that the construction of a dam was the only long-term solution for dealing with the problem. In order to appease the people, it was decided that a team of government representatives would accompany the representatives of the local council to inspect the total length of the Jarahi River and block all the unauthorised diversions of water created by landowners. Meanwhile, the water tankers would continue delivering water to all affected areas. After reaching this decision, I personally went out to address the crowd and announce the measures. The crowd began to cheer and slowly disperse. Some officials stayed behind to accompany the representatives upstream, and the rest of the delegation headed back to Ahvaz. On the directive of Dr Eghbal, the representatives of the Oil Consortium came to assist us in the matter. They agreed to construct a 15-kilometre pipeline from the Karun River to Shadegan in the next two weeks and to put some water tankers at our disposal in the meantime. I arranged for additional wheat to be sent to the area to help the poor and hungry people and reported the progress to the Prime Minister, who approved all our actions. The pipeline was completed in 11 days, and the arrival of water to Shadegan brought much relief to both officials and locals. In the following weeks, wheat distribution continued in Ahvaz, and the programme of community service in exchange for grain was quite successful as the clean-up of the city was beneficial to all. The programme was expanded to utilise the labour force to help build overhangs in the shopping district to shield businesses and sidewalks from the brutal sun in temperatures reaching 60 degrees centigrade. The technical adviser to the municipality designed the project, and the cost was divided equally between the local government and the businesses. The share of the municipality was paid in grain to the labourers. The success of this initiative, which translated into more commerce on those city blocks, encouraged other businesses to request priority for their districts. By and large this programme contributed greatly to 150

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the livelihood of the people of Ahvaz. Having resolved the water issue at Shadegan and relieved Ahvaz from the dissatisfied mobs who had gathered there, I started to focus on other issues facing the residents of Khuzestan. During my previous four years as head of the KWPA, I had travelled extensively in the region and was aware of the hardships faced by the inhabitants of this vast province, but did not have the means or the authority to do much about it. However, as the Governor General of the province, it was my responsibility to learn about the details of the issues and take action to alleviate, to some extent, the suffering of the needy people. To begin with, I arranged for a two-day seminar in Ahvaz and summoned district governors from Ahvaz, Dezful, Andimeshk, Shushtar, Masjid Suleiman, Abadan, Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpur, Behbahan, Ramhormoz, Aghajari, and Susangerd. After hearing of all their difficulties, I directed them to arrange meetings in their districts to hear the grievances of concerned citizens and leaders of their communities, and prepare a complete report about the needs of their area of responsibility. The objective was to compile a list of issues to be addressed by the government. I personally prepared the forms to be used by the participants to enumerate the demands of the people. Also, in order to facilitate their task, I assigned 12 educated and knowledgeable employees of the KWPA to assist the governors in completing the forms and to prepare the necessary reports. The findings were compiled in a timely fashion and were sent to my office. With the assessment completed, the next step was to travel to the cities and meet the people. I wanted to meet residents and address any complaints that the governors might have overlooked. As I reviewed the reports, I noticed that the demands were quite similar across the province. Residents complained about the lack of clean water distribution, paved streets, schools, sports stadiums, clinics and hospitals, and telephone systems. However, there were certain issues that were particular to specific districts and reflected local priorities. For instance, the residents of Behbahan requested a directive from the Governor General to establish funeral procedures similar to those of Tehran. Residents of Ahvaz complained about overcrowding 151

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at the local jail and wanted more space for inmates. Other cities had their own requests that seemed important to them. Having all this information in hand, I was now prepared to meet the people in various cities. Dates of the visits were announced in advance to ensure participation by community leaders. At this time, as development projects across the country were already in progress and as problems concerning education, health, communication and transportation were mostly being dealt with by the government’s development plan, I knew that simply informing the people about the works already in progress would greatly facilitate my job. But nevertheless I intended to make every effort to show them that the government was concerned about their particular needs. The visit to Behbahan, close to the Persian Gulf, was one of the most memorable encounters of my trip. The meeting was attended by about 50 elder residents representing a variety of positions such as landowners, businesspeople, tradesmen, farmers and labourers. We had answers to many of the requests that had been forwarded to us. But their request about the change in funeral procedures was not clear and needed clarification. They explained that local tradition dictated that the family of the deceased mourn for 40 days. During this period, their home had to be open for visitors, and the mourners had to cry and scratch their faces in grief at each encounter; visitors were expected to respond in kind. Tradition also dictated that the family had to provide meals for the guests during the entire mourning period. This custom placed an enormous financial burden on the average family, who would lose face if they were unable to follow the norms. They cited the example of a pharmacist who closed his business and left town after the death of his father, specifically to avoid this burden. The residents of Behbahan wanted an official decree from the government reducing the mourning ritual to one day, comparable to the practice in Tehran.

What was your decision concerning this request? A.A.: My position was that such decisions regarding changes to local customs had to be made by community elders rather than the 152

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government. Intrusions in such contexts would be a deviation from the normal duties of government officials. By citing examples, I was able to convince them that the role of the government did not extend to meddling in the way people lived their lives. After the meeting, we went to visit the cemetery that was located in the centre of the city. An area of a few thousand square metres was enclosed by a mud wall, and in the centre was a small structure with open sides. We were told that the structure was being used to keep the corpses of affluent people while arrangements were made to transport their bodies to Shi’i holy places such as Mashhad in north-east Iran or Karbala in Iraq. Apparently, the bodies would frequently be left for several days, and as they decomposed, a stench would envelop the city. It was obvious that another location for a new cemetery had to be found. After consultation with the elders, it was decided that a piece of unused property belonging to the state, on the outskirts of the city, would be designated for this purpose, and I pledged that funds would be provided to develop the site under the supervision of the Governor. Our next visit in Behbahan was to the local jail. Three or four inmates were being held on theft and smuggling charges and one for unpaid debt. I requested to see the inmate held for the unpaid debt. The jail was basically a house, and this old man with sun-stricken, wrinkled skin and lifeless eyes was being held in the basement. I asked him why he was being held and for how long. He said that he had been unable to pay a 300-toman ($40) instalment to his landlord, and had been in jail for the past three months. The sight of this old man left us all upset and bewildered. I asked the judge who was accompanying us if the statement was true and if he would be released upon payment of the debt; the answer to both questions was ‘yes’. I said that I would personally take care of the debt and asked that he be released. When the old man realised that he could leave, he knelt on the floor to kiss the feet of those present. I will never forget this episode. I asked the photographer who was travelling with us to take some pictures and send them to my office. It occurred to me that this situation was probably not unique and that there were similar cases across the province. We addressed this issue, as I will explain later. 153

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When we returned to Ahvaz, I went to visit the local jail at the first opportunity. The conditions were dismal; 1,100 inmates were being held in a facility with a capacity of 300. Inmates charged with a variety of offences such as murder, theft, smuggling, knife attacks, or non-payment of debts were being held together. Because of overcrowding, even the hallways were all being used to hold the prisoners. One small room that had been designated for juveniles was being used to hold 11 boys charged with pickpocketing. There were about 20 women being held in another section. Some had children with them, and we were told that some of the children had been born in the prison. The police chief and the manager of the prison were very concerned about the dire situation. An officer explained that the inmate population had fluctuated between 200 and 300 in previous years; however, the influx of people to Ahvaz during the previous four years because of the development projects was responsible for the escalation in crime and the increased number of prisoners. He mentioned that drug smuggling charges had increased sixfold. The budget allocated to the police department had not taken into account the expanding prison population. Being familiar with the bureaucracy of the central government, I knew that correspondence with the Justice Department or the national police would not lead anywhere. On my next visit to Tehran, I went for an audience with the Shah in Nowshahr, the resort on the shores of Caspian Sea where he had a summer palace. I reported my findings and showed him the picture of the old man in Behbahan. He was deeply saddened by my report and said that such circumstances should not exist in our country. He directed me to talk to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice to find a solution. I suggested that since the prisons were holding many individuals who could not pay their instalments because of the drought, if a 2,000-toman threshold of debt would be enacted for incarceration, it would help with overcrowding. The Shah welcomed the idea and directed me to ask the Minister of Justice to introduce legislation to Parliament for a quick vote. I met Prime Minister Mansur and Dr Bagher Ameli, the Minister of Justice, and they both agreed to the measure. Upon my return to Ahvaz, I began collecting donations from benevolent individuals and started releasing prisoners who had debts of up 154

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to 300 tomans, before the ratification of the legislation. We released prisoners on dates coinciding with religious holidays or on the New Year. This action relieved the prison population and was embraced by the residents of Ahvaz. The legislation enacting a 2,000-toman threshold before incarceration was introduced and was approved by the National Assembly; however, it was defeated in the Senate, as many members who were landlords opposed it. With the passage of the articles of the ‘White Revolution’, women were granted voting rights and equal rights in the workplace. The legal barriers to women’s involvement in social activities were removed, but these changes had not taken root in the daily life of society at large and especially in the provinces. Therefore, women’s activities largely remained limited to women’s groups, which were basically ceremonial at best. Participants in these groups were mostly spouses of government officials, and women were elected to positions that corresponded directly to positions of their husbands, and they were addressed as such. They were not elected on the basis of their education, work experience, or other qualifications. Their activities were mostly limited to fundraising for charitable causes and arranging special events. The government had not created a platform to encourage civic engagement and more productive undertaking by local women. On a visit to Tehran, I discussed this matter with Prime Minister Mansur and asked his opinion about appointing a woman as my deputy in Khuzestan. He agreed in principle but wanted me to get the approval of the Shah. I presented the case to the Shah during my audience, and he embraced the proposal and approved it with no hesitation. The following day, Brigadier General Saffari, the former Governor General of Khuzestan, came to dissuade me. He said that he knew Khuzestan society well and was afraid that my action would cause unrest and turmoil in the region. I told him that the decision had been made and there was no turning back. He said that he was warning me as a gesture of goodwill and wished me good luck. I discussed the matter with Dr Javad Sadr, the Minister of the Interior, and went on to appoint Mrs Heshmat Yousefi as my deputy. She had completed her studies in Germany and had worked as assistant to the director of the Point Four office in Isfahan. She had contributed greatly to the programmes concerning women’s 155

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education and training. At that time, she was a high-ranking officer at the Ministry of Education.

Didn’t you have to get the approval of the Minister of the Interior prior to taking any steps? A.A.: The Governor General was considered the Shah’s emissary and the principal representative of the government in the province. The ranking was equivalent to that of a minister, and he was not considered an employee of the Ministry of the Interior. The Governor General kept the Minister of the Interior informed about events in the province but was not obligated to get approval for every decision, unless it had budgetary consequences for the Ministry. In this case, the appointment of Mrs Yousefi did not require an additional budget allocation. I had arranged for her to continue receiving salary and benefits from the Ministry of Education. Not only was this arrangement a career advancement for her but it also elevated the status of all women who aspired to break the glass ceiling and seek high-ranking jobs in the government. At that time, women were mostly relegated to careers that were related to homemaking. They were teaching classes in cooking, sewing, typing, bookkeeping, and at girls’ schools. Generally speaking, they were not given the opportunity to advance to high-ranking positions in any agency. Her ascendance to the position of Deputy Governor General created a great deal of excitement among women’s groups and encouraged other women with aspirations who worked in government agencies. There were many sceptics who were bound by tradition and believed that this would be a failed experiment. But fortunately there were many open-minded individuals in Khuzestan who were eager for modernisation and wanted to forgo traditions that prevented the advancement of the society as a whole. This appointment encouraged many women to come forward and volunteer to join our programmes and contribute to the accelerated pace of development in the province. Mrs Yousefi organised women and girls who wanted to participate in social activities across Khuzestan. She engaged volunteers to take 156

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part in activities such as teaching, vocational training, checking prison conditions, helping municipalities keep tabs on city maintenance projects and sanitation, and distributing grain among needy families. She organised self-governing groups to monitor all these activities. Getting women involved encouraged their spouses to offer support. For instance, when the wife of the Director General of Education joined the group, the Director General himself was able to arrange for classrooms in state schools to be used for women’s instructional classes after hours and offer other kinds of assistance. There were too many achievements to enumerate, but it was notable that after one and a half years of progress, Princess Ashraf, the twin sister of the Shah, who had heard about our activities, came to visit Khuzestan. She was the national chair of the Women’s Council and wanted to observe the progress and meet local women’s organisations. She spent several days in the province and at the end of her visit announced that similar programmes would be implemented in other provinces across the country. Princess Ashraf went on to establish the Iran Women’s Organisation and named Mrs Yousefi as its director. Let’s get back to Khuzestan. We worked diligently to address the issues that had been raised by the residents and presented to us at the seminar. Through constant communication with Tehran, we were able to launch and complete projects such as expanding and equipping hospitals, building schools, providing urban clean water networks, paving roads, and establishing literacy programmes in rural areas. All these efforts helped create a sense of well-being in Khuzestan. Sadly, on 21 January 1965, an attempt was made on the life of Prime Minister Mansur as he was entering Parliament. He died a few days later. Amir-Abbas Hoveyda was named as his successor, and the affairs of the country continued unabated. At the time, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of Egypt, had started a destabilising campaign against Iran.1 Through propaganda and radio transmissions, Egypt was arousing 1

This was at the height of the Cold War when Nasser’s Egypt was firmly in the Soviet camp, while Iran was an ally of the West. Proxy tussles between the superpowers were often conducted via their allies, and Nasser’s pin-pricks at Iran, such as attempts to inflame the Arab population of Khuzestan and his later attempts to change ‘the Persian Gulf ’ into the ‘Arabian Gulf ’ were examples of Cold War gamesmanship. 157

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discontent among the tribal population in Khuzestan in an attempt to bring the region into the Arab fold under the name Arabistan. It was part of a larger plan to pressure the government of Iran. The various organisations operating in the province such as the National Iranian Oil Company and the KWPA, along with security forces and other agencies, were on constant alert. In early summer of 1965, General Hassan Pakravan, the head of SAVAK, Iran’s security organisation, came to Khuzestan for a few days to assess the situation and to visit the western part of the province that bordered Iraq.2 At the end of his visit, he came to see me and outlined his observations. He noted that at the end of each autumn and in winter, when the Karkheh, Tigris and Euphrates rivers overflowed their banks and flooded the border between Iran and Iraq, the Iraqis might conceivably advance the Iraqi border by encroaching as far as 60 kilometres into Iranian territory and building some structures before the waters receded, claiming the area as Iraqi territory. This would indeed create a lot of problems. General Pakravan added that there were only two border posts in the province, one at Moosian in the north and another at Shalamcheh in the south, and nothing in between for about 200 kilometres. He said that he was going to report this security concern to the Shah and think of a solution. Alarmed by this situation, I used the resources at the KWPA to gather information about social conditions in that part of the Khuzestan frontier, an area called Dashte-Mishan. To do this job properly, I engaged Iraj Iman, who had established a sociology institute in Tehran, to survey the tribes of Dashte-Mishan. He welcomed the idea and sent a team of specialists to study the region. Meanwhile, during a visit to Tehran, I called on General Pakravan to inquire about the actions that he had taken. He informed me that, following His Majesty’s order, 20 million tomans (about $3 million) had been allocated for the construction of 200 kilometres of roads and 15 structures to serve as border posts. The project was to be carried out under my supervision and had to be completed in four months, before the 2

The Arab Socialist Union leadership in Iraq was also aligned with the Soviet Union at this time and relations between Iran and Iraq were already very tense. 158

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beginning of the rainy season. As there was only a very short time left, with the assistance of Mr Asfia and under the guidelines of the Plan Organisation, two construction companies were selected to complete the project in three months. One was the National Building Company under the direction of Hamid Ghadimi, and the name of the other company escapes me, but it was managed by a Mr Leon Palanchian, a very capable US-educated engineer. They worked diligently under the hot summer sun of Khuzestan and completed the job on schedule. The national border patrol dispatched a force to man the posts and took responsibility for border security. The area was patrolled systematically, and anxieties about the threat of incursion were alleviated. By 1965, development projects had been launched in all the cities in Khuzestan, and every week there was progress toward improving the lives of the residents. There was even competition among various government agencies over claiming credit for certain accomplishments. Parents were eager to send their children to school and wanted them to continue their education. People were forgoing traditional health remedies such as fortune tellers, geomancers and writers of amulets and prayers and instead were going to clinics and hospitals. People wanted clean water and clean streets and were wary of four-legged animals coming and going through their towns. The population was waking up to the modern world and was actively seeking services from the government. I will mention a couple of accounts to highlight this point. The Karun River flows through the city of Ahvaz. A private company had installed some pumps alongside the river and was supplying water to the city through a rudimentary network of pipes that had been salvaged from the oil company’s leftover depot. Each household would use large clay pots, which were essentially flowerpots used in gardens, to store the unfiltered water from the river. The clay pot (called a hobbe) was placed on a stool, and a smaller clay pot (called a hobbaneh) was placed under that. Water would drip into the hobbaneh and be used by the household. It was indisputable that the river was contaminated. Sometimes, dead animals and rubbish could be seen floating in the water, and the sewers would overflow during flooding. It was not unusual to see outbreaks of water-borne diseases once in a while. 159

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With the commencement of the first seven-year development plan at the Plan Organisation in 1954 under the direction of Abolhassan Ebtehaj and the continuation of the programmes by Mr Hedayat and Mr Asfia, providing potable water was on top of the agenda. The plan stipulated that the Plan Organisation would pay for half the cost of bringing potable water to any city provided that the city would guarantee payment of the other half. At that time, plans to provide potable water were being executed all across the nation, and municipalities were taking charge. Ahvaz was one of the first cities to have a water purification plant and a network of pipes completed. Residents had to pay 350 tomans (about $40) for the cost of a connection and the installation of a fixture and a meter. The owner of the private company that owned the old network of pipes that supplied the city water was an influential member of the Mardom Party in Tehran and also published a newspaper. He was quite uncooperative with the municipality and was always trying to create obstacles for the installation of the new system. However, the project was completed independently of the old grid, and the private company continued its business by supplying water for industrial and agricultural use. Nevertheless, that company continued to create problems for the water company. Information was received that the owner was plotting to have religious authorities declare that some ingredients used in the water purification process were prohibited by Islam and that the use of the water would be sanctioned. This was alarming, because it might create some unrest in the city. Fortunately, my deputy, Mr Ali Asghar Adib-Mohammadi, who was an experienced man, suggested that he would personally visit a high-ranking religious authority, on my behalf, and offer to connect the water to his home and the adjacent house that belonged to his daughter free of charge as a way of endorsing the new system of water distribution. I thought that was a great idea and offered to cover the expense of the connection myself. Mr Adib-Mohammadi made an appointment for the following day and, accompanied by the head of the water company, went to visit Ayatollah Behbahani, the respected religious leader in question. The offer was well received by the Ayatollah, and within hours his house and that of his daughter were receiving clean, potable water. We were able to circumvent a potentially adverse situation. 160

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Providing clean water eliminated only one cause of the spread of disease in Ahvaz. We still had to address the sewage system and the existence of a produce market in the middle of the city that relied on farm animals to deliver the produce. Commissioned studies concluded that building a sewer would take a long time and require a large amount of financing, which was out of our reach. However, the open produce market could be relocated expeditiously. Discussions about national goals with respect to urban expansion and improvement were mostly confined to Tehran, and, considering our pressing issues, we could not wait for the central government to take the appropriate measures. By researching available resources, a suitable alternative site for the market was located. By a stroke of luck, this site belonged to the KWPA. It had been purchased for installing electrical transformers, but only part of the land had been used for the transformers and the remaining part, which quite vast, was available for other uses. By following proper procedures, that section of land was transferred to the municipality, and the produce market was moved in less than three months to the new site. In a short time, people were relieved from being bothered by animals in the downtown city streets and the passage of heavy vehicles carrying grains, fruit and vegetables. The residents of the city had no more reason to complain, and the vendors were content to conduct their business in a new facility. The city of Khorramshahr had similar problems; however, the presence of food distribution warehouses in the city was harder to tackle. Also, Khorramshahr was a transport hub, and trucks were coming in and out of the city constantly, delivering goods that were destined for other countries and receiving imported products for delivery to other parts of Iran. The roads were heavily abused by this traffic, always torn to pieces and in need of constant repair. This beautiful city on the banks of the Karun River had become a truck depot, and residents had to deal with air and noise pollution. Since the government owned most of the land along the highway between Ahvaz and Khorramshahr, we were able to allocate a large area outside the city limits to accommodate all the incoming and outgoing trucks and prevent them from having to enter the city, allowing only small vehicles to supply the city’s needs. Relocating the warehouses to the outskirts was not so easy, but after 161

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much negotiation and after offering some incentives, we were able to persuade the truck drivers to move to the new location and relieve the city from all kinds of headaches and difficulties. This move proved to be beneficial for both traders and transportation companies, who were able to expand their operations with the extra room provided and grow very rapidly. As I mentioned earlier, the country was developing at a rapid pace and there was competition among government agencies to reap credit for positive achievements. In Khuzestan, the Dez Dam had been completed and the provision of an irrigation network for 120,000 hectares of farmland was underway and progressing as scheduled. The electrical grid was expanding to include all cities in the province and to supply power for industry. Sugarcane production had exceeded our expectations, and harvests rivalled those of the best sugarcane plantations in the world. The possibility of producing one kilogram of sugar from one square metre of land encouraged consideration to expand beyond the original project to include land to the north of Khuzestan and around Shushtar, where the water from the Karun Dam could be accessed. The availability of electricity and the possibility of air conditioning encouraged people to stay in the cities of Khuzestan rather than leave for other regions during the hot summer months; this indirectly boosted economic activity in the region. It was also a factor in our ability to recruit qualified employees, who would have been discouraged from coming to Khuzestan in the past. To sum up, progress in the social and economic arenas was noticeable all across the province. It was under such circumstances that we were informed of plans to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Shah’s ascension to the throne in cities all across the country. The subject was discussed at the next meeting of the Provincial Directors’ Council. When it was my turn to speak, I said that we were all aware of traditional ways of celebrating undertaken by municipalities such as arches of triumph adorned with flowers, additional city lighting, parades by military and university marching bands, people handing out sweets, officials giving speeches, and other activities generating a carnival atmosphere. But the following day, while maybe a column or a statue would remain as a reminder of the occasion, otherwise there would only be a pile of debris that 162

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needed to be cleaned up. I said that I did not want to discourage such celebrations and was certain that municipalities would continue such traditions. However, I believed that there was an opportunity for us take advantage of this occasion and help to build 50 elementary schools in villages that did not have any. I said that we could use all means at our disposal to publicise the occasion and collect donations toward this end. Everyone in the council agreed with the proposal and offered recommendations. It was decided that the Director of Education for Khuzestan would survey the province and, based on population and need, would select the sites for this initiative. The schools were to be built under the supervision of governors, with the assistance of local officials and agencies. Businesses and residents, including government employees, would be asked to donate services, materials, labour or funds. To launch the programme, council members agreed to donate one day of their salary to the cause. The Director of Education recommended that the structure for the school buildings consist of two rooms that would be used for four grades, alternating between morning and afternoon sessions. The project was implemented in a timely manner, and the progress of the construction was photographed, with photos sent to my office regularly. This initiative was embraced by the residents of the designated sites, and whole communities, including farmers and women, helped with construction. The 50 schools were completed in less than three months with local resources. Most structures were built with bricks, but stone was used in the mountainous regions. The completion of each school was celebrated and photographed; an album was made of the pictures. The album proved to be quite useful on my next trip to Tehran. When I went to see Prime Minister Hoveyda, he told me that the Shah had received reports that the construction of the schools was just a propaganda effort and a pretext to collect money from the people. He was amazed to see the album and asked that I show it to the Shah myself as proof of the project’s success. During my audience with His Majesty, he ordered that I send the album to the Royal Private Bureau for review. I found out later that an undercover agent had been sent by the bureau to verify the existence of the new schools; we received a letter of commendation from the Royal Court sometime after that. 163

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During the course of our social development activities, a situation arose that is worth mentioning. It is often said that high-ranking officials lose contact with ordinary folks and cannot be accessed, and people who go to agencies with questions or problems are given the run-around. This was indeed the case in many offices where modern managerial systems had not been implemented. As Governor General, I decided to implement an open-door policy for one afternoon a week during which I did not schedule anything. Anyone who wanted to meet me was welcome to come and discuss his or her grievance; I continued this practice as long as I was Governor General. People would take a seat in my office or wait in the adjacent room for their turn. The mere process of airing grievances would solve most of the issues, and those matters that required further action were sent to the proper agency to be addressed. Occasionally, these meetings would go into the evening, as I did not want to turn anybody away. On one occasion, a 16-year-old boy with a dark complexion and a strong build came to see me. He said that he was a student in tenth grade and would have to leave his studies because of the death of his father; he said that he was now responsible for the welfare of his mother and his younger siblings. He was a resident of Bandar Shahpur and wanted assistance to get his diploma and become a teacher. I was extremely moved by his request and asked him to return the following day, which would give me time to find a solution. We had no programmes or financing available at the state level to deal with such requests. I consulted my wife that evening, and we decided to support the boy ourselves for the next two years. I asked him about his expenses when he came back the next day; he said that he needed 500 tomans per month (about $65). I told him that we would cover his expenses until he graduated and that he should come every month to collect the funds. I asked the Director of Education to supervise him and to keep me informed. After this episode, it occurred to me that there must be many others in a similar predicament and that something had to be done on a statewide level, probably outside the government bureaucracy and instead with the help of benevolent donors. I consulted with the Director of Education, the state’s Solicitor General, and the chairman of the 164

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Chamber of Commerce. It was thought that any assistance programme should be given legal status so that it would outlast our own tenures in government service. Thus, the Educational Foundation of Khuzestan was established with the backing of the Chamber of Commerce and respected local personalities. I wrote the charter for the Foundation myself, and within two weeks it was legally registered and operational. The Municipality of Ahvaz and the Chamber of Commerce provided the seed money to inaugurate the programme by providing 50 scholarships to needy children. This experience had a profound influence on me. When I became Minister of the Interior two years later, I proposed a similar initiative to Asadollah Alam, the Minister of Court, who presented it to His Majesty. The Shah welcomed the idea, and the Reza Pahlavi Educational Foundation was established. The charter was based on that of Khuzestan, and the Foundation was placed under the guardianship of Lady Farideh Diba, the Queen’s mother.

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You went to Tehran and were told by Prime Minister Amir-Abbas Hoveyda that you had been appointed to the position of Minister of the Interior; what year was that? Abdolreza Ansari: It was 1966. After six exhausting years in Khuzestan that involved daily clashes with the Ministry of Water and Power, particularly with a certain official who constantly undermined the Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, the news brought relief to me. I thanked Mr Hoveyda profusely and asked him to give me a week so that I could return to Khuzestan to wrap up my duties and bid farewell to my colleagues and friends in the province. The following day, along with three other newly appointed ministers, I was introduced to the Shah during an audience. Dr Javad Sadr, the Minister of the Interior at the time, was appointed as the new Minister of Justice. Houshang Ansary was named Minister of Information, and Gholamreza Nikpay was named Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister for Executive Affairs. During the audience, the Shah approached each minister and expressed his views as to what was expected of them. When it was my turn, acknowledging my familiarity with the work of the Ministry of the Interior, the Shah instructed me to continue to implement programmes and policies already undertaken by the Ministry. He also asked me to keep him informed of any new developments. 167

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When I returned to Ahvaz the following day, I got a call from Mr Hoveyda who told me that upon His Majesty’s order Abbas Salur was selected to become Governor General of Khuzestan, and Dr Sohrab Firoozian as that of Kermanshah province. Mr Hoveyda wanted me to call the Royal Court’s protocol office to arrange a time in order for me to introduce the new Governors General to the Shah. It occurred to me that, even though governors are the Shah’s emissaries and have supervisory power over all government institutions in their region, administratively they are part of the Ministry of the Interior. I wondered whether the Ministry should have been notified in advance, before such appointments were finalised. In any event, the decision had been made and there was no room for discussion, but the subject remained a question in my mind. When I flew back to Tehran to start my new job, I was greeted by hundreds of people at the airport. They were mostly employees of the Ministry of the Interior who were there to welcome their new minister. I was surprised, however, to see a large group of people whom I knew by name only, without having personal friendships with any of them. I inquired about their connection to the Ministry and was told that because of the soon to be held parliamentary elections many potential candidates were positioning themselves to gain the support and favour of the newly appointed minister. During my first audience with the Shah as the Minister of the Interior, I was ordered to expedite the passage of the election laws for town councils in Parliament. The legislation for the councils had been presented to Parliament by my predecessor, and the Shah wanted me to follow its progress in both the upper and lower chambers of Parliament and secure its passage. The Shah was adamant about giving the power of the people to the people. It was then that I realised that the rumours about the Shah’s lack of desire to do so were completely baseless. The Shah wanted the populace to be involved in the electoral process, empowered to resolve issues at local levels. He believed that the government had a supervisory role in elections, and that its task was to maintain law and order, to prevent chaos. When it came to candidates, the Shah had no particular preference, but with the overall interests of the country in mind, candidates who were deemed a threat to the 168

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sovereignty of Iran, or were against the monarch and monarchy, were marginalised. I am stating the facts here and will give some examples to prove my point as I go on. My main question during the first audience was about the process of making appointments. I needed to know the extent of my authority at the Ministry. The Shah wanted to be informed of the appointments for senior positions such as Governors General, but other appointments like governors, directors, deputy ministers, mayors, and other high officials were to be my choices and my responsibility. This was a crucial point, since governors were the government’s top representative in any locality and their authority extended to other government agencies. They were granted the position of chairman in all meetings and councils convened in their respective areas, and they had to organise and supervise local elections for the Senate, the lower house of Parliament, and the town councils. In addition, governors were responsible for official ceremonies and state security, among other duties. By tradition, governors were appointed by royal decree by the Shah and enjoyed vast powers. However, during the reign of Reza Shah, with the establishment of various new ministries, and the passage of laws defining the responsibilities of government officials, the powers of the governors had been held in check. A similar structure existed at the district level, where county officials were given authority over government agencies in their district. The appointment of mayors was also critical, because in the absence of town councils in certain parts of the country, the Minister of the Interior had to make the appointment. The nomination could be entrusted to the Governor General or the Governor, but the Minister was ultimately responsible. As the Shah continued to speak, I began to feel the weight of all these new obligations and responsibilities on my shoulders. As was the custom back then, many people came to my office to congratulate me on my new appointment, including Manouchehr Kalali who was the deputy chairman of the Iran Novin (New Iran) Party at the time. We had been friends since our high school and college days. He hailed from a prominent family in Khorasan. Dr Kalali was an intelligent man, with a high degree of aptitude who had completed his advanced studies in France. He told me that the Iran Novin Party considered the Ministry of the Interior as the most important Ministry 169

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of the government because the Party’s activities at national level were conducted through the offices of government representatives such as governors, mayors and county agents, all employees of the Interior Ministry. He went on to say that the Party was delighted by my appointment and that they considered me as one of their own. He, therefore, expected me to run the names of all appointees and job candidates by the Party leadership before nominating anyone for a position in my Ministry, as well as to help promote the Iran Novin Party agenda. I told Kalali that the Shah had given me a major responsibility: I was new to the Ministry and did not know the employees, nor did I have personal friendships or family connections with anyone there. I said that I was going to use all resources available to me, including recommendations from the Party, to select competent and qualified individuals for all open positions. If a decision were to be made to select between two equally qualified candidates, the recommendation of the Party would be considered in a favourable light. However, I remarked to him, I would be reluctant to appoint a job candidate solely based on that person’s party affiliation. When a visibly upset Dr Kalali got up to leave, he said that he had become convinced that I would not cooperate with the Party. This was my first encounter with the Iran Novin Party, and it was the harbinger of many contentious face-offs that would occur during my tenure at the Interior Ministry. A few days after Kalali’s visit, Prime Minister Hoveyda called and asked me to go to his office. He offered me coffee and we exchanged pleasantries, but I sensed that he had something on his mind. In his usual gracious tone, he said that he was glad to have me as a member of his Cabinet, that he had confidence in my performance, and that he knew he could depend on me. He had a request he wanted me to oblige. Hoveyda asked that I appoint Mr Sabzevari, a junior manager at the Ministry of Agriculture and a member of the Iran Novin Party, as the Deputy for Parliamentary Affairs at the Ministry of the Interior. I told the Prime Minister about my brush with Dr Kalali earlier and said that I would gladly nominate anybody except Mr Sabzevari, whom I thought was a gofer for the chairman of the Party. The position of parliamentary liaison was the second most important post at the Ministry. I felt as though a snake was being pushed up my sleeve. I told Hoveyda that 170

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since the Party had not been able to manipulate me directly, it was planting an agent inside the Ministry to do the job for them. I said that with such a move my authority at the Ministry would be compromised. I suggested to the Prime Minister three ways to deal with the situation. First, if he were under a great deal of pressure over the matter, I would come up with an excuse to resign and promise not to ever reveal the real reason for my resignation. The second option was for Mr Hoveyda to take a stand by saying that he had decided against Sabzevari’s nomination and take the blame and give me a break. The third option was to tell the Iran Novin Party that I would not compromise but nonetheless allow me to work out a deal with them. Mr Hoveyda got up and kissed my face and said that his respect for me had increased tenfold. He told me to go back to work and forget about the issue. He said that he would take care of the matter himself. But, as it turned out, I was to fight the Iran Novin Party until the day I left the Ministry. Were you a member of the Iran Novin Party? A.A.: Yes, I was: supposedly, a member of the High Council of the Party, but there were never any meetings of the council. So were you a member from before? And did you belong to a chapter? A.A.: All senior government officials had filled out the membership forms. There were two steps: one was that all government employees had to be members of one of the two parties – Melliyoun and Mardom; and the other was that they actually had to go to a party’s office to sign up for membership. A.A.: Honestly, I do not recall. The reason for it is that all the activities of the Party seemed to be for show. It had the appearance of a real party 171

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just like any other. The Melliyoun (National) Party and the Mardom (People’s) Party were in the same vein; you may even come across a piece of paper with my signature. The reality was that I and others like me, and thousands of young people of our generation, had a deep and heartfelt belief in the abilities of Mohammad Reza Shah. We believed that he was a capable, strong, forward-thinking and patriotic ruler who wanted to develop the country and eliminate poverty and obscurity. He wanted Iran to have a political system that was in tune with the modern world. The Shah believed in the concept of governance of the people and by the people through elections by elected representatives from different political parties. But the experiences of the early 1940s had left deep scars, a period after the departure of Reza Shah from Iran during which political parties were mushrooming in an atmosphere of relative freedom. The crowded political arena had caused turmoil in the society and economy. Some parties such as the Tudeh Party and the Azerbaijan Democrat Party were under the influence of the Soviets and favoured disintegration of Iran. Meanwhile, the National Will Party (Eradeh Melli), headed by Seyed Ziaeddin Tabatabai and other well-known sympathisers of foreign powers, was promoting British interests. This time around, however, the Shah was supporting certain parties and candidates in order to avoid repeating the same mistake. The principle of the concept was the reason why many of us did not object to the creation of political parties such as the Melliyoun Party, the Mardom Party and the Iran Novin Party. The problem was the way it was carried out by those in charge. In the rush to create these organisations, many procedures were not followed properly. A genuine social movement takes time to come together and needs the effort of qualified members to write its charter and plan its activities. These parties were created hastily and were given a lot of power. The result was that opportunistic wheeler-dealers took the reins of these three parties and turned them into despised institutions that disillusioned the electorate and drove the voters away. I will recount an episode to illustrate my point. The Melliyoun Party had been organised by Prime Minister Manouchehr Eghbal. Its headquarters were in a building on Kakh Avenue, the former residence of Dr Mohammad Mossadegh, that had been leased for 3,000 tomans 172

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a month. There was a large open area at the entrance of the building where people would gather to hear Party speeches. The structure was a small two-storey house that had about six or seven rooms. Members had to check in at the desk in the foyer of the house. This desk was controlled by Abbas Shahandeh, founder and editor of the newspaper Farman, a combative and contentious publication. He had turned the room into his personal office and made it into a gathering place for his friends and acquaintances. Every week, he would gather 200–300 people, some not even Party members, to listen to the literal but uninspiring and banal pronouncements of Nosratollah Kasemi, the Secretary General of the Party. One day, Dr Eghbal posed a question during a meeting of the High Council of the Party and asked everyone for their comments. He said that now that the Melliyoun Party had been established by the Prime Minister, that members of the Cabinet and most lawmakers and high officials had joined the Party, and that anyone who wanted to have direct access to the government would be welcome, why were people not flocking to join the Party? Why was it not getting a better reception? General Saffari, who was from a prominent family and always spoke his mind, answered, in his pleasant Rashti accent, that people who came to the Party headquarters and were confronted by Mr Shahandeh and his posse in the front room, were not encouraged to proceed, so people would turn around and leave. As it was a loaded comment, the Prime Minister did not inquire any further and the room remained silent. In any event, my point is that promoting the creation of political parties by members of government was filled with good intentions that, in practice, turned out to be detrimental to the cause. It was a similar story with the Mardom Party, the Iran Novin Party, and later the Rastakhiz (Resurrection) Party.1 Therefore, when it was announced that 1

The Rastakhiz Party was formed in 1975 by the Shah, who had become frustrated with the ineffective politics of the two-party system of the Iran Novin (New Iran) and the Mardom (People’s) parties which had also been formed by Royal Command. The Rastakhiz was, in the Shah’s mind, the appropriate vehicle for forming Iran into a single-party state. It proved equally ineffective, was never taken seriously and was disbanded in 1978 as part of the attempt to appease the protests which eventually led to revolutions. 173

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important decisions by the government had to be filtered through the Iran Novin Party and, in fact, required the Party’s approval, this created a lot of problems. Let’s go back to the Ministry of the Interior and its dealings with the Iran Novin Party. At that time, a procedure had been put in place that required all sensitive nominations for positions such as governors, directors and high-ranking officials to be cleared by the Prime Minister’s office. Such nominations would be sent to Hadi Hedayati, Minister of State, whom after review would either confirm or reject the candidate. Following this procedure, the name of Ali Asghar Adib-Mohammadi was submitted for the post of Deputy Minister for Parliamentary Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior. He had been a governor in several provinces, including Chaharmahal Bakhtiari, Deputy Governor General in Isfahan, and my deputy in Khuzestan for two years. Confirmation of his nomination dragged on for several months. Whenever I would inquire about it, Mr Hedayati would say that it was under consideration. I heard through the grapevine that the Iran Novin Party was blocking his nomination. There was no official response, but upon my insistence, I was finally told that there was a dossier on Mr Adib-Mohammadi at the judiciary. I raised a question as to how the Ministry of the Interior would send someone to Khuzestan to be Governor and then become my deputy if there were incriminating files against him in first place. I had worked with Mr Adib-Mohammadi and had come to respect his intellect and diligence; I demanded to see the file on him. With the approval of Dr Sadr, the Minister of Justice, the file was sent to me by the penal court for government agencies. I was astounded to learn how a case could so easily be fabricated against an individual in the sprawling government bureaucracy, enough to destroy the reputation, or even ruin the life, of a dedicated employee. There were four charges against Mr Adib-Mohammadi. I will recount two of them. First, when he was Governor of Ghouchan, it was decided to place a statue of the Shah in the town square. As was the practice those days, the task of building the statue was given to the army, which had the necessary materials and tools. The statue was delivered and installed while Mr Adib-Mohammadi was Governor. After he was 174

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assigned to a new position and left Ghouchan, his enemies filed a complaint against him. They accused him of replacing the high-grade metal for the head of the statue with a lower grade metal, pocketing the cost difference. An inquiry concluded that the Mayor’s office had handled the statue project, not the Governor. While the case was not pursued any further, the report remained in Mr Adib-Mohammadi’s file. The second case against him also originated from his time in Ghouchan. In that case, a photographer who had made an album of pictures of some event claimed that he had been promised 30 tomans (about $7) for his work but had received only 10; he had accused the Governor of pocketing the difference. When I reported my findings to Dr Sadr, he was extremely troubled and said that he would take care of the matter himself. I told him that this case should alert us to the fact that there may be similar baseless cases against other government employees, frivolous accusations of wrongdoing that could ruin lives. I asked Dr Sadr to assign inspectors to the Ministry of the Interior to go through all files pertaining to accusations against all Ministry employees to determine whether to prosecute claims or clear the files of baseless accusations. I wanted to relieve hard-working, dedicated civil servants of the proverbial Sword of Damocles. I pledged to cover the expense of the inquiry from the budget of the Ministry of the Interior, rather than use the meagre funds allocated to the Ministry of Justice. Dr Sadr welcomed the proposal, and within a few months, the inspectors evaluated and cleared more than 600 cases filed against employees of the Ministry of the Interior. Of all pending cases, only one had enough merit to be pursued. It involved a former Governor of Rezayieh, Mr Mojtahedi, for slapping an individual who had insulted him. The act of physical violence by a government employee was considered a crime, and the complaint had been pursued. Mr Mojtahedi’s opponents had always mentioned that there was a file on him. In any event, Mr Mojtahedi’s case was dealt with; he was punished according to law and the case was closed. The justice Ministry inspectors declared all the other cases closed and prohibited further inquiry into them. Mr Adib-Mohammadi’s nomination was cleared after nine months, and he was appointed to the position of Deputy Minister in charge of Parliamentary Affairs. 175

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Let’s go back to your first weeks at the Ministry of the Interior. Can you elaborate on the problems that you faced? A.A.: Among all the issues that I had to deal with, I have to recount the problems involving the Municipality of Tehran. As I explained earlier, many cities, including Tehran, did not have town councils, and by law the Ministry of the Interior had jurisdiction over them. At the time, Taghi Sarlak was the Mayor of Tehran. I had known him since his days as Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Roads. We had been friends and had also cooperated on some issues when he headed the Water and Power Authority in West Azerbaijan. In our first meeting since I became the Interior Minister, he was very frank about the general condition of Tehran, describing it as a miserable, bankrupt city with no hope of breaking out of deadlock. The budget for the municipality was 100 million tomans, of which 80 million was used to cover the city’s payroll. Mr Sarlak complained that many of the city's employees were a burden on the system, as they had been forced onto the city payroll by powerful contacts in the government. These individuals received salaries and benefits, even though they did not provide any services to the city, often creating problems for others. When confronted, they would make a scene, paralyse work, and dispatch their backers and accomplices to harass the Mayor. It had been decided not to bother with them and leave them alone. Of the remaining 20 million tomans (about $3 million) of the city’s budget, 10 million was allocated to interest on loans the city had taken from several institutions, including Bank Melli (the National Bank). The loan amount just from Bank Melli was 170 million tomans. The bank was constantly threatening the Mayor’s office, demanding payment of the owed interest, saying that it would even go so far as to confiscate municipality-owned office furniture. Only 10 million tomans was left for providing services for a city with a population of 3 million, with a good portion of that going for road paving. As it was, at the beginning of each fiscal year, the Tehran Municipality would decide on ten roads for paving. Once a paving project began, influential people from various branches of the government would crop up to pressure the city to pave additional streets. In an effort to silence hostile rhetoric, 176

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the city would end up paving additional streets without securing the necessary financing. The result was that work on 60 to 70 streets were left incomplete, with contractors who had not been paid on time, abandoning work and pursuing the Mayor for back pay. Meanwhile, unhappy residents were also complaining and deriding the Mayor. Apart from budgetary issues, a good chunk of the municipality work was handled by other agencies with no oversight power by the Mayor. Security and traffic were managed by the police. The city’s water was managed by the Water Department and the Ministry of Water and Power that managed the electricity supply of the city as well. Bread distribution was controlled by the Grain Department of the Ministry of Customs, and the meat supply was under the supervision of a desk at the Prime Minister’s office that would invite the Mayor for consultations from time to time. The capital’s public transport was managed by the Tehran Bus Company, which was nominally under the supervision of the Mayor but, in reality, because of its sensitive nature, was under the influence of the security forces and agents of political parties. In essence, the Mayor was only responsible for city parks and rubbish removal. Even those tasks could not be done properly because of old equipment in need of repair, and low morale among the employees. The municipality would pave a road in the city only to see it dug up and repaired by a utility company one week, and dug up again by another utility company the next. Paved footpaths were also being damaged as electricity, water and phone connections to homes were installed on yet separate timetables. The result of this dysfunction was that residents complained constantly; their complaints were printed in newspapers, blaming the Mayor. Tehran’s problems exacerbated national issues as well; the Mayor had been given a huge responsibility without the means or the authority to do his job. Mr Sarlak was losing sleep over deteriorating conditions and wanted to escape from the burden of his job. He asked me whether I could help him find a way out. I told Mayor Sarlak that no doubt problems existed, and that a solution had to be found. I believed that we needed to pass legislation for the establishment of town councils as soon as possible. Once the affairs of the city would be supervised by a council and the powers of various agencies were curtailed, then work could be concentrated at the municipality and 177

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a measure of order could be established. Meanwhile, we had to find some extra funding for the city to enable us to address outstanding complaints. After my meeting with Mr Sarlak, I was convinced that the problems of Tehran could not be solved by simply replacing a few employees or getting financing for some projects. A team of experts was needed to assess the overall situation and come up with solutions to lay a new foundation for development and management of the capital city. During a discussion at the Interior Ministry about the problems facing various municipalities, one expert whose name I cannot recall raised an important point. He said that in European municipalities, the main source of income has been property taxes, because property owners are the primary beneficiaries of city services. Property values go up whenever the city paves a street, provides utilities and streetlights, plants trees, builds a park or provides regular rubbish removal. In Iran, however, the only government fee which property-owners and landowners were obliged to pay was for building permits. Otherwise, no revenue was collected from property-owners. Municipalities generated revenue from the sales of movie tickets and alcoholic beverages, running farmers’ markets, and a few other activities. That income only covered the salaries of city employees, with not much left over for development projects. Municipalities constantly asked the government for help, but since the government itself was always short of funds, it had been unable to provide further assistance for local development projects. Services that were taken for granted in developed nations could not be delivered efficiently in Iran. My colleague did not see a solution unless some property taxes were collected. This assessment appealed to me. After a week of reflection, I came up with a comprehensive proposal to present to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. I proposed the enactment of a new law specifically for rehabilitation and development of towns by giving municipalities the power to collect new taxes. My proposal was well received by the other Cabinet members. I recall Dr Alinaghi Alikhani, the Minister of Economy, remarking that it was one of the few occasions that he had heard a good solution for the problems 178

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faced by towns, a topic that was habitually discussed during Cabinet meetings. With the agreement of the other ministers, it was decided that the text of the new law be drawn up. All aspects of the new tax were taken into consideration, with particular emphasis that no burden should be placed on the lower income bracket. Drafting the new law took several months and a great deal of effort was expended to ensure that low-income and poor districts remained exempt from paying, and that the criteria for property assessment were clear and uncomplicated. To devise a formula for calculating the tax, we sought the advice of many experts from Bank Rahni (Mortgage Bank), the Office of Document Registration, and the authority for the purchase of land for development projects. An agreement was reached after extensive debates, and we concluded that (1) the assessed value of properties could not exceed 60 per cent of their fair market value; (2) all buildings would be divided into four categories: ramshackle, brick, concrete, and reinforced concrete; (3) land would be assessed based on property values already registered in real estate transactions at the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, the value of a property would be based on the assessed land value multiplied by the co-efficient of the type of dwelling. The tax rate was set at half a per cent of the assessed value per year, and properties with ramshackle structures were exempt. There were about 30 other provisions in the law designed to facilitate the operations of municipalities. When the law was presented to Parliament for approval, dormant clashes with the Iran Novin Party resurfaced. Where a legislative process normally took two to three months, it took 14 months of persistence and follow-up to pass this legislation. Based on the calculations of the Ministry of the Interior, Tehran would raise 260–300 million tomans per year. This amount was three times the city’s total budget and about 30 times the allocated budget for city improvement. Unfortunately, though, I was removed from my post the very same week that the legislation was passed, denying me the opportunity to implement the law properly. I was glad that despite the opposition to the legislation, the document had a solid foundation and could not be altered. It became the basis for development projects in towns and cities 179

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all over the country, and today, after more than 30 years, it is still in force serving as the primary legal source for all city projects. I must add that when the legislation was first introduced in Parliament, preparations were made to create an organisation within the municipalities to handle the tax work. Following legal procedures, and by using funds available at the discretion of the Minister of the Interior, an organisation tasked with rebuilding and renovating the city of Tehran was created with a capital base of 20 million tomans. Dr Sharifi, who had an advanced university degree in city planning from France, was put in charge. The organisation’s first project concentrated on an area in the city centre called the Arab District, with decrepit structures and narrow streets. The neighbourhood had grown and sprawled in a way that it was difficult to extend any city services into the area. A team of advisers recommended buying the housing units of the area at fair market value, demolishing the neighbourhood and rebuilding it based on modern urban planning principles. The district was chosen as the first test case of the initiative, and preliminary surveys were done. This was a huge project. The entire area had to be mapped, existing structures had to be evaluated, residents had to agree to the sale, and preparations had to be made for their relocation. The objective was not simply to gentrify the city by knocking down homes of lower-income residents, sending them elsewhere to rebuild another shantytown. The task of the new organisation was to address all these issues and to implement a comprehensive plan of action.

Did you expect municipalities to make fundamental changes toward improving city conditions, simply by providing them with more money and giving them master plans? A.A.: Not at all. My experience with towns in Khuzestan, plus having learned about the problems in Tehran, convinced me that money alone was not the solution. Experience had shown that without modernising the bureaucracy and employing competent people to take the reins, providing extra funds only created opportunities for 180

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graft without producing the desired outcome. To avoid this scenario, plans were made to restructure the existing administrative system and train a technical staff. Fortunately, there were several officers in the Ministry and in the Tehran Municipality who had been working toward such objectives. These officials needed to be empowered and given positions from which they could impart their knowledge to other colleagues. An idea was put forward to send groups of employees abroad to Europe for training purposes on a yearly basis. This had already been done on a small scale with mixed results. One difficulty had been the language barrier. Another problem was that those employees who had been sent abroad were not willing to get their hands dirty with real work anymore, seeking to obtain desk jobs with titles and high salaries. It was concluded that training courses should be offered in Iran, and toward that purpose, ten small towns in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces were selected as training centres. Moderate climate and proximity to Tehran were the main factors in choosing those towns to be developed as exemplary municipalities, where employees would be trained before they were sent back to their own districts. The idea was to send municipal employees from other places who had completed academic training courses in Tehran to these training municipalities to hone their skills, and then to send them back to their home cities to take on new responsibilities. Parviz Khabir, my deputy in charge of research and planning at the Interior Ministry, was selected to supervise this initiative, and Dariush Pirnia was assigned as the executive officer for the project. Within a few months, ten towns were selected and their administration and management systems were upgraded. Training courses were designed with contribution from various ministries and the University of Tehran, and the first group of trainees were sent to class. In addition to these programmes, after negotiations with the Bureau of Pahlavi Properties, 200 hectares of land was secured in the area of Ramsar to cultivate trees and flowering plants to be used for decorative plantings in cities and towns. These were part of the overall effort to overhaul municipalities and provide them with competent staff.

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When you were at the Ministry of the Interior, is it correct there were plans to demolish the Hasht Behesht (Eight Paradises) building in Isfahan,2 and you prevented it? What was the story? A.A.: One day, a friend of mine told me that a relative of his had a complaint that needed to be heard. I agreed to meet that person. She was a very distinguished lady and claimed that her family owned a historic house in Isfahan that was slated to be torn down to make way for a wide east–west parkway. The project had the backing of the Mayor and the Governor General. She told me that the price of the property was not a determining factor, because it was impossible to put a price on such a historic structure. She was requesting that an outside panel from Tehran evaluate the merits of the case. I asked the head of the technical staff in charge of municipalities, who was supposed to be a very qualified engineer, to go to Isfahan personally and report back to me. He went to Isfahan and on his return reported that the Mayor and the Governor General were indeed justified in their decision: the highway had been in the works for several years and would relieve the city of traffic congestion. The case should have been closed, but then something interesting happened. The chief of protocol of the Royal Court called me one day and told me that His Majesty wanted me to accompany General Abdul Rahman Aref to Isfahan. He was the leader of the revolutionary government of Iraq on an official visit to Iran as the guest of the Shah. The next day, along with the official delegation, I travelled to Isfahan. After some sightseeing and lunch, I had a couple of hours of free time while the guests were resting. I decided to go and check the site of the planned parkway and the historic residence, which were not far from Hotel Shah Abbas where we were staying. Road construction had already reached the outside walls of the historic building. Fortunately, after I properly introduced myself, the caretaker of the property allowed me to walk inside this magnificent structure of the Safavid period. I was astonished that three officials – the Mayor, the Governor General, and 2

A Safavid palace of the seventeenth century which, together with its gardens, has survived as one of the architectural gems of Isfahan. 182

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the envoy from the Ministry – would allow the demolition of such a historic residence. I immediately called the Mayor and ordered that no action be taken before the evaluation by the Ministry of Culture and the Historical Society of Iran. After I returned to Tehran, I called the concerned agencies and asked them to look into the matter. They conducted their studies and their intervention helped preserve the structure that still stands today. The head of the technical staff responsible for the demolition plans was removed from his position, and the Governor General of Isfahan was replaced shortly thereafter.

Were there other Governors General who were replaced or given new positions for various reasons? A.A.: A number of Governors General were assigned to new positions because there was a new procedure in the selection process. In the past, there had been instances of instability and security problems in some provinces. And, in order to solidify the power of the central government, Governors General were chosen from the military ranks. The objective was for them to use their prestige and skill to unify the security forces and the police to confront elements of unrest among the local population. This practice of appointing military people as Governors General had become ingrained. They were even assigned to regions that did not face security issues. These positions were also sought by retiring military officials as they offered many perks. When I arrived at the Ministry of the Interior, there were about eight retired generals who were serving as Governor and Governor General, and there was always some kind of discord between them and other provincial authorities. In practice, it was difficult to expect militarystyle discipline from a civilian staff, and this had become the basis for much of the tension. At a time when high government officials were only expected to maintain order and establish security, while civilian cadres were responsible for providing basic services such as payroll, mail delivery, and tax collection, the system appeared to be adequate. The low-level civilian officers would obey any directive from their superiors. However, after 183

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1961 the situation changed completely. The country was at peace, and there were no security issues. Numerous development projects were underway all across the country, managed by educated and experienced individuals who were following established rules and regulations; they were implementing projects with budgets that had been well planned in advance. The days when a governor could call a functionary in the morning and order equipment to be sent to some location for street paving were gone. In the past, whenever a Governor General ordered such action, the officer in charge had no choice but to abide. But this new group of educated managers did not want to be ordered around, and this was creating a lot of tension. Disagreements were reported to the Ministry; usually the problem stemmed from different approaches to the work at hand, with each side trying to do their job. This type of friction existed in many provinces but they were especially problematic in Khorasan. Lieutenant General Nader Batmanghelich, a former chief of the general staff, had been appointed as Governor General of Khorasan, concurrent with his duties as the custodian of the Holy Shrine of Imam Reza. He had had difficult encounters with Javad Shahrestani, the managing director of the Water and Power Organisation, and his brother, who was the director of Khorasan’s education department. The brothers had the backing of the Iran Novin Party, and the conflict with Lieutenant General Batmanghelich had become contentious. Once as I was reporting on the state of affairs to the Shah, I referred to this situation as I made a case for appointing competent, educated and young individuals, instead of retired army generals, to governorship positions. The Shah agreed with the assessment and ordered that the procedure of selection be reviewed and updated. I discussed the matter with the Prime Minister, and with his approval I compiled a list of qualified candidates, including Gholamreza Kianpour, Deputy Minister at the Ministry of National Economy, Ghassem Motamedi, Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Health, Mr Yamin-Afshar, director of the National Electricity Organisation, and many others who were well educated, familiar with government initiatives, respectable and capable. The final list of qualified candidates turned out to be different from the one originally drawn up, but the objective was to define the 184

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responsibilities of a Governor General, and to change the notion of the position as a comfortable job for retired high-ranking military officials to one requiring special abilities. New parameters were established for the process of selection of Governors General. Along with these efforts, the legislative process for establishing town councils was being monitored and was near completion by year’s end. I took the opportunity of the New Year’s holiday to travel to Europe for rest and medical check-ups. During the trip, I received a call from my dear friend Ardeshir Zahedi, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time. He asked if I would take his former post as Ambassador to the United States. My response was that I would accept if the position was a mandate from the Shah; however, if the choice were mine, I would prefer to stay in place and implement fundamental changes that I had set in motion at the Ministry of the Interior. We ended our conversation on that note. On the way back to Tehran, we had a stopover in Rome. While there, I received a call from my political deputy at the Ministry of the Interior, Ezatollah Ameli, congratulating me on my new appointment. He had been at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had heard that I would be leaving to become Ambassador to Washington. I asked him if the Prime Minister had been told. His response was negative, so I called Mr Hoveyda and informed him of my conversation with Mr Zahedi. Mr Hoveyda interpreted the offer as a favour from the Shah toward me. He said that he was going to see the Shah, and that he would bring up the subject and let me know. Mr Hoveyda called me the next day and said that the Shah did not have any qualms about my desire to stay on, and that someone else would be sent to Washington. When I returned to Tehran, my friends who knew about the matter chastised me and said that I had made the wrong decision to decline such an offer, suggesting that it had probably upset the Shah and that it would not bode well for me. At my next audience with the Shah, I explained my decision, and, contrary to my friends’ assertions, he was gracious and told me that he was pleased. He said that in the past, many had tried very hard to get posted even to Kabul, and now I was passing up an offer to go to Washington. This episode passed, but my dear friend Mr Zahedi was upset at me for a 185

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long time because of my call to Mr Hoveyda. I had called the Prime Minister because I felt that it was my duty to call the head of the government, who was my boss and my friend. Mohammad Reza Shah was at the height of his power at that point. Economic and social problems of the first years of his reign had been resolved. The programmes of the White Revolution had created a great deal of activity in the Iranian society, and progress had surpassed even the most optimistic of predictions. Every week, some head of state would visit the country, and there were few dignitaries who did not request to meet the Shah or the Queen. Domestic opposition had been quelled, and the country was secure and at peace. Nevertheless, people in the know feared that all these blessings had become so anchored to the well-being of the Shah that they might dissipate in his absence. It had become necessary to plan for such a contingency, especially since the Shah had somehow miraculously escaped several attempts on his life. Plans for succession in case of an emergency were being discussed. It was during this period that I was called to a meeting at the Prime Minister’s office. Mr Hoveyda presided over the meeting, and it was attended by Abdullah Entezam, Jafar Sharif-Emami, Abdullah Riazi, the Prime Minister’s deputies and advisers, and members of the legislative branch. Mr Hoveyda informed us that the topic of discussion would be the appointment of the Queen to the position of Regent, on the Shah’s recommendation. Dr Mohammad Yeganeh was tasked with delivering the text, and the attendees were encouraged to make comments. The document stated that in case the Crown Prince had not yet reached the age of 20, and something were to happen to the Shah, the Queen would be in charge of state affairs as Regent. The legislators had questions and made some comments. It was concluded that in order to approve such a measure, changes had to be made to the Constitution by a Constitutional Assembly. Preparations had to be made for the formation of that body. Since the elections for Parliament and the Senate were approaching, the Ministry of the Interior had to make arrangements for elections to the Constitutional Assembly to be held at the same time.

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Now that the topic of elections has been raised, can you explain the process in detail, since many things appear to have happened behind the scenes? A.A.: I am sure that no explanation could satisfy sceptics of the elections held when I was in office. This was to be expected, as parliamentary elections were rather a new phenomenon in our country. They had been established following the declaration of the constitutional monarchy during the reign of Mozaffar od-Din Shah (1896–1906). If we go back in history, 7,000 years to the inception of Iran, governance of the country had been carried out by an absolute ruler who could force his will on the people. There was no regard for public opinion or debate. Even with the passage of the law establishing a constitutional monarchy and a parliament that was seated through fair elections, the system operated quite differently from modern institutions in other countries. The will of the Shah and of government leaders had a great deal of influence over the selection of parliamentary candidates, and people had become disillusioned and indifferent to the voting process. People had come to believe that the whole process of elections and parliaments was merely for show, staged by the government to give a sense of legitimacy to its actions and those of the Shah. This sentiment still exists, and I don’t expect it to change until the pillars of democracy are firmly established in Iran and all branches of government become genuinely independent of one another. The judiciary must become as non-partisan as in advanced societies, in order to change the public’s mentality about elections. It is for this reason that I suspect my explanations about the 1967 election will be met with scepticism. Other individuals were responsible for certain actions related to the election process and they need to offer their recollections. In any case, for historical purposes, I will recount my own personal experiences. Let’s return to the main topic of our discussion, namely the process of elections to the Senate, Parliament, and the Constitutional Assembly. One day I was informed of a meeting to be held at Niavaran Palace with the Shah to discuss the upcoming elections. Attendees included Mr Hoveyda, Ataollah Khosrovani (Secretary General of 187

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the Iran Novin Party), Yahya Adl (Secretary General of the Mardom Party) and myself. Mr Hoveyda noted in his introduction that with the upcoming elections and the necessity for the political parties to gear up, he had called the meeting for the Shah to express his wishes. The Shah stated that he did not have any particular agenda and that the elections were to be free. Anyone could participate, but the parties had to make sure to present qualified candidates whom people would vote for. The Shah then turned to me and said that the Ministry of the Interior was the trustee of the ballot box and had to be vigilant that the elections were free, that people could vote without trouble. The Prime Minister said that the parties had organised themselves across the country and that as a matter of course their strength varied based on local interests. He added that the Iran Novin Party had a maximum of 180 candidates from various districts, the Mardom Party 30 or 35 candidates and the Pan-Iranist Party about five candidates. With the approval of the Shah, Mr Hoveyda asked Mr Khosrovani and Mr Adl to name their candidates. As they read the names, the only negative comments the Shah made were about two of the candidates from the Mardom Party, Holakou Rambod and Bagher Shariat. Mr Hoveyda and I both came to the defence of Mr Rambod, suggesting that his opponents had slandered him and contrived a case against him. We believed that Mr Rambod was an honourable and qualified person, a nationalist who was well liked in his district, and a natural candidate. I also commented about Dr Shariat. I knew him from my college days, and even though he had been a member of the Tudeh Party for a while, he was an intellectual and a nationalist. Dr Shariat was a candidate from the district of Gonabad,3 known as a major centre for Dervishes, who constantly battled ignorance and superstition. He tried the Tudeh Party but bolted out at the first opportunity to start up one of Iran’s most progressive publications, the Tehran Economist. The Shah was satisfied with my justifications for the two candidates. At the end of the meeting, he mentioned a request he had received from the chief of the Kurdish Naghshbandi tribe, asking the government not to harass 3

In Khorasan province, north-east Iran. 188

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Imam Mardookh, who was a patriot and enjoyed popular support. The Shah also referred to the candidacy of Ardeshir Zahedi’s sister, whose father and her family had roots and recognition in Hamadan. She was a strong candidate for a parliamentary seat. However, because of her gender, there was a concern that there would be opposition to her candidacy. The Shah stressed that the role of government was to ensure free and fair elections. The burden of the process was on the Ministry of the Interior; there were many factors that needed to be considered and preparations that needed to be made. The first decision was to hold nationwide elections on the same day and, based on the Western model, and election results were to be announced within 24 hours. This was a novel idea. In the past, elections for the Senate, Parliament, and the Constitutional Assembly had been held by districts on different days, allowing favoured candidates of the system who were defeated in their home districts to run for seats in another district. Back then, election results were not announced for several days, giving officials time to manipulate ballot counts. For instance, if a candidate who was not considered favoured by the system was gathering a lot of local support, the governor of that province would be summoned to Tehran. As the presence of the Governor was mandated by election laws, his departure to Tehran would halt the election process. This gave enormous power to the Ministry of the Interior, and it could exercise its powers without legal repercussion. And this was only one of several legal channels that could be used to manipulate the outcome of any election. Holding nationwide elections on the same day removed the opportunity to continue such practices. It was reported that whenever the winning candidate’s name was announced by a town council, outspoken opponents of a candidate would change their allegiance and support the winner. It was also crucial to shorten the time between the end of voting and the announcement of the results. The second issue to be addressed was the ability of the Ministry of the Interior to be in communication with polling stations across the country. It was estimated then that the election process would take six weeks, and it was essential for the Ministry of the Interior to be in close communication with election centres to be able to address any 189

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problems quickly. At the time, in the absence of telecommunications in remote areas, it would take days before any news would reach the Ministry. I asked the national police to recommend an officer with experience in communications systems. Colonel Jafari, an educated and honest patriot, was assigned to the task. (He was later promoted to major general and, sadly, was executed during the Islamic Revolution.) An assembly hall in the Ministry was designated as the communication centre, and the necessary equipment was installed. The army, the police and the Ministry of Post and Telegraph agreed to cooperate in this effort. Their employees were instructed to be in contact with Colonel Jafari and accept his directives within their abilities. This assured the Ministry of the Interior of its capability to deal with any problem in a short period. Based on Iran’s election laws at the time, governors of each electoral district were required to assemble nine reputable persons to form a council to oversee the election. Once established, these councils were given official powers, and their decisions were binding. They had the responsibility of declaring election winners. After resolving any emerging disputes, the councils were technically dissolved at the end of the process. In order to conduct fair elections and prevent fraud, it was imperative to institute procedures for the selection of the councils. If a certain candidate had a majority of support among the council members, it would have been easy to manipulate the outcome of the election. Considering such a possibility, governors were instructed to pick three candidates from each of the two main parties, and three independent candidates with no party affiliation at all. They were also given responsibility to arbitrate in disputes. This arrangement allowed each party to voice objections and expose potential voter fraud. In addition to those measures, officers of the Ministry of the Interior were dispatched to polling centres as inspectors with instructions to report back regularly. According to election laws, voters had one month, after the formation of electoral councils, to register and receive their electoral cards, allowing them to vote. This gave the Ministry some time to resolve any outstanding issue before the election day. The electoral card was an innovation that had been put in practice only since the White 190

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Revolution. Prior to that, however, voters could present their birth certificate that did not have a picture for identification at different voting centres, essentially enabling them to vote multiple times. It was during the government of Dr Mossadegh (1951–3) that some measures had been put in place to prevent such practices; birth certificates were stamped, and semi-permanent ink was used to dye a voter’s finger. By issuing the electoral cards one month prior to election day, there was enough time to verify the eligibility and residency of the voters. This procedure facilitated the process of voting on the day of the election, where any dispute over the outcome could be traced. To hold elections across the country in one day was a monumental task. All my associates at the Ministry worked diligently under the supervision of an esteemed colleague, Ghodratollah Khodayari, to ensure fair elections for the Senate, Parliament and the Constitutional Assembly.

Could anyone declare their candidacy without being affiliated with either of the two political parties, the Mardom Party or the Iran Novin Party? A.A.: Certainly; there were no laws to prevent candidates from joining the political process, unless they were members of the communist Tudeh Party that had been outlawed by Parliament; security forces would deal with any Tudeh candidates. For all other candidates, there were a few requirements for eligibility, including proof of citizenship, no history of mental illness and no criminal record. Anyone meeting those conditions could not be barred from either running or voting.

Were there many individuals who declared their candidacy but did not belong to any political party? A.A.: Hardly any. Interested individuals had to invest capital and many resources to become a viable candidate. Furthermore, public perception was that elections were a diversion staged by the government; that 191

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favoured candidates would be declared winners, meaning that it was a waste of time for all others to run. Declarations by high-ranking government officials to the contrary were not believed even by those in charge of administering the elections, including governors and other high officials. They simply did not believe that elections were fair and they would often press me to divulge the names of favoured candidates. Even on the day before the elections, some Governors General who were my personal friends insisted that I whisper some names to them. When I reiterated the Shah’s desire for free and fair elections, those friends were still sceptical of my response. In that environment, some hopeful independent candidate could experience the undue influence of political parties and their members, including the Prime Minister and other top government officials, and would be discouraged from even trying to run for a seat. Of course, there were candidates like Mozaffar Baghai in Kerman, who had a solid local following and who was the founder of the Zahmatkeshan (Toilers) Party. He was well known to the two major political parties, but he never declared his candidacy. Whether he was discouraged by security forces or by some other factor, I don’t know. I can only say that there was no directive to prevent anybody from participating in the elections. In the end, the election day was announced and political parties declared their candidates. One day, Holakou Rambod, the deputy chairman of the Mardom Party, and Mohsen Movaghar, publisher of the daily Mehr Iran, in essence a publication of the Mardom Party, came to see me. Mr Movaghar was interested in declaring his candidacy from his hometown of Andimeshk. Mr Rambod, who knew of my connections in Andimeshk and Dezful from my days in Khuzestan, asked me to call my contacts and have them help get Mr Movaghar elected. I told my visitors that Mr Movaghar’s family had deep roots in the area with perhaps only a few isolated individuals unfamiliar with his name. Furthermore, his uncle was the head of the Chamber of Commerce of Khorramshahr. He was a member of Parliament, owner of a water distribution company in Ahvaz, and publisher of a newspaper. I said that Movaghar did not need my assistance, that he should declare his candidacy, and with the support of the Mardom Party, he should not have any problems getting elected. I added that under election guidelines, I could not personally 192

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support any candidate. My mission, I told them, was to supervise the process and act as the caretaker of the ballot box. Hearing that, Mr Movaghar got up and said, ‘I know I will not be elected’; he slammed the door and left my office. Poor Mr Rambod was flabbergasted and apologised that he had intervened on his behalf. The following day, I went for an audience with the Shah in Nowshahr. As soon as I entered the room, His Majesty asked me under whose authority had I told Mr Movaghar that he would not be elected. Not prepared to be met with such reproach, I asked who had reported such lies to him. The Shah said that it was Yahya Adl, leader of the Mardom Party. I realised the gravity of the situation and explained in detail my encounter with Mr Rambod and Mr Movaghar. I was certain that they had misinformed Dr Adl. I could see in the eyes of the Shah that he believed me; he told me that I had given the correct response and asked me to continue what I was doing. This was the first episode of the election season mired in misunderstandings, but it would not be the last. I requested that all my conversations over the phone and in my office be recorded to remove any doubt over the integrity of the elections. The Shah agreed to my request. I instructed a trusted technician to set up recording equipment in an adjacent office to capture my every conversation. After the elections, the taping office was shut down and all tapes were sent to a secure location. The election process was in full swing and the communications centre was operational. Reports about the progress of the organisational aspect of the elections, including the number of electoral cards that had been given to voters, kept coming in round the clock. The major political parties wanted to keep track of the votes and would usher in groups of voters to register and receive their cards. By following the daily reports, we were able to gauge the momentum of each party. Voters who did not indicate a party affiliation during registration were categorised as such. Every evening, a summary of daily reports was prepared, with four copies marked as confidential sent to the Prime Minister, the heads of each political party and myself. During the election period, any issue that was reported to us was addressed quickly. For instance, there was a report that the Governor of Khorramshahr, whom as a government representative 193

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was duty-bound to remain non-partisan, had started to promote a candidate from the Iran Novin Party. After verifying the report, the Governor was promptly removed and replaced. Every effort was made to preserve the Ministry of the Interior’s non-partisan position. During that time, I received a call from Princess Fatemeh in support of a building contractor by the name of Mr Malek-Yunan. She told me that he was a well-respected and competent candidate of Armenian descent running for a seat in Parliament. Apparently, he was being harassed by his rivals and the princess wanted the Ministry to look after him. I knew Mr Malek-Yunan from my school days and remembered him as an athlete who played football and was popular among his peers. I reiterated the position of the Ministry on the subject of candidates. I assured the princess that if he did indeed have enough votes among the Armenian community, he would be elected, but the Ministry could not provide votes to ensure his victory. She was incensed at my response and hung up. Meantime, there was another young Armenian who had recently graduated from medical school and was running for a seat in Parliament. He was a friend of Dr Shahgholi, the Minister of Health, and was running an American-style campaign. He was advertising his candidacy, and his name and pictures were in newspapers. Government had no preference as to which candidate would win the Armenian vote.

When you say ‘government’, do you mean the Ministry of the Interior or do you include other agencies such as SAVAK? A.A.: I was not informed about the activities of SAVAK. Even if it had its own preferred candidates, it was not discussed with the Ministry. As for the government, the Ministry of the Interior was the responsible agency for the management and supervision of the elections. Even the Prime Minister was not involved. The directive was for the Ministry of the Interior to organise a non-partisan election, and if SAVAK promoted any particular candidate covertly, I was not privy to that information. In any event, there was no news related to the case of Mr Malek-Yunan. 194

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I was called to the Prime Minister’s office a few days before election day. General Nematollah Nassiri, the head of SAVAK, and Ataollah Khosrovani, chairman of the Iran Novin Party, were also present. Mr Hoveyda remarked that General Nassiri had information about possible election violence in Ardabil, close to the Soviet border. It was feared that there would be shooting and possible loss of life among supporters of Abdolreza Adl-Tabatabai, a candidate from the Iran Novin Party, as well as those of a local candidate of the Mardom Party. They asked me if the elections in Ardabil could be suspended. I had known Dr Adl-Tabatabai since first grade, when we shared a desk in the classroom. I suggested making a call and asking him to leave the town, because his absence might prevent the anticipated clashes. Everyone agreed; Mr Hoveyda directed a call to the local police headquarters in Ardabil, and I asked the officer to locate Dr Adl-Tabatabai and have him call me. We were having coffee in the Prime Minister’s office when the call came, and I briefed Dr Adl-Tabatabai on the matter and asked him to leave the area. He accepted my suggestion and complied. A few days later, elections were held and the results started to trickle in. The names of the winners were announced on the radio. I saw the name of Dr Adl-Tabatabai among the winners and thought to myself that SAVAK’s concerns might have been misplaced, but did not think much about it anymore. It was during those couple of days after the election and the announcement of winning candidates that I was invited to an official dinner at Princess Ashraf ’s palace. After dinner, around 11 p.m., General Mohsen Hashemi-Nejad, commander of the Imperial Guards, told me to go to Saadabad Palace immediately for an audience with His Majesty. When I arrived, the Shah was pacing the room. When he saw me, he angrily turned around and said, ‘You finally did it – what is this mess?’ I was aghast. I asked what he was referring to. He said that it was about the Armenian who had wanted to win a seat, the friend of Dr Shahgholi. The Shah continued, ‘Your friend, you finally made him a representative.’ I realised why I had been summoned. I responded that I had not yet seen the election results of the Armenian minority, but recounted my telephone conversation with Princess Fatemeh. I added that the candidate, Mr Malek-Yunan, had relied on Princess Fatemeh’s 195

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support, whereas the other Armenian candidate had run a passionate campaign by going door to door, holding meetings, and advertising in newspapers. I reiterated that I had no preference as to who should win the Armenian vote. And, having received a call from the princess, I had specifically instructed election officials to be extra vigilant and to watch the voting process carefully. I said that if there were any doubt about my version of the story, an imperial inspectorate could be named to look into the matter. After hearing my explanation, the Shah was convinced. He said that there had always been money exchanged for favours in previous elections. He said that this election was quite clean. He added that any report that was received by authorities could not be ignored and had to be looked into. From the tone of the Shah’s voice and his gestures, I gathered that the misunderstanding had been cleared up. I bowed and was dismissed gracefully. Now, let me go back and explain the process of electing a candidate. If there were no complaints or disputes, the election council, composed of community elders, would report the results to the Governor, and he would make the official announcement. But if there were any complaints, it would take a few days to investigate the matter, occasionally leading to a recount. For instance, in Golpayegan,4 where there had been a tight race, the election council was about to announce the candidate from the Iran Novin Party as the winner. Dr Mohagheghi, an American-educated paediatrician and the Mardom Party candidate, disputed the election results and filed a complaint. I was informed of the matter through a mutual friend, Dr Entekhabi, a prominent surgeon at Pars Hospital. I called the Governor General of Isfahan, Ibrahim Homayounfar, at once to instruct him to tell local officials to suspend the announcement and secure all ballot boxes. I asked Mr Homayounfar to go to Golpayegan and personally supervise the recount. It was done the following day and, indeed, Dr Mohagheghi was declared the winner by a small margin. A similar situation occurred in Chalus,5 where a candidate from the Mardom Party was eventually declared the winner. There were a few other instances, but I will not go into detail. A remarkable 4

In central Iran, near Isfahan.

5

In northern Iran, on the Caspian coast. 196

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point was that even though the Iran Novin Party knew that it did not have strong candidates in more than 180 election districts, they had nominated candidates for every district and were trying hard to get them all elected. In instances of a strong showing by candidates from the opposing party, the Iran Novin Party would complain to the Prime Minister and hold the Ministry of the Interior responsible. When the results came in, the Iran Novin Party had won 180 seats and had the majority in Parliament, the Mardom Party had won 29 seats, and the Pan-Iranist Party got five seats. As for the Senate, the Iran Novin Party won 26 seats and the Mardom Party got four. The Iran Novin Party also won the majority of the votes for the Constitutional Assembly. After the elections, when Parliament was officially in session, I ran into Abdolreza Adl-Tabatabai in the courtyard of the Parliament building. He rushed to greet and thank me with much enthusiasm. I was not expecting such an encounter and said that not only had I not done anything helpful for him during the election, I had even asked him to leave his district. He said that when I had called the police headquarters to locate and contact him, and the locals had heard that the Minister of the Interior wanted to talk to him, all his opponents had decided to switch sides and support him, giving him an easy victory. The Constitutional Assembly was also formed, and the legislation for the succession of the Queen to the throne as regent, signed by the Prime Minister and myself, was presented and ratified. With elections behind us, it was time for me to pay attention to other ongoing issues at the Ministry of the Interior. One of the concerns was the plight of county supervisors who had university degrees. The general practice before the enactment of the White Revolution land reform legislation was feudalistic in nature. The central government enforced its laws through a bureaucratic structure, with the smallest administrative component being a county (bakhsh). The government’s agent was the county supervisor (bakhshdar). Additionally, there were villages in each county that were owned by landowners who were responsible for handling the affairs of their villages. They would appoint a village elder as headman (kadkhoda) to mitigate social issues. Village headmen had to be approved by the county supervisor and given a certified mandate to that effect. There were about 450 counties across the country, and 197

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based on geographical and local considerations, counties were grouped together to form townships (shahrestan). A governor was appointed by a decree from the Shah as a township’s top public official. Townships were grouped together to form provinces, based on statutes of land appropriation and geographical and local factors. Provinces were headed by Governors General, who were also appointed by the Shah. Within such a structure, the position of county supervisor was of extreme importance, as any response by the government to a local incident was based on the initial report made by that individual. Therefore, influential landowners deemed it crucial to manipulate county supervisors, especially during elections. Prior to the enactment of land reforms, powerful landowners, often members of Parliament themselves, would exert their influence on the Ministry of the Interior to name a candidate who was their ally. This arrangement would solidify the landowners’ authority over the inhabitants of a district and allow them to impose their will. Dr Javad Sadr, who was my predecessor at the Ministry of the Interior, was well aware of the situation and had been successful in curtailing some of those practices. He had fought hard, despite budgetary and employment difficulties, to remove undereducated county supervisors who in practice were in the service of landowners who, in turn, had made it impossible to enforce any laws or ordinances of the central government they opposed. Dr Sadr, supported by Prime Minister Mansur, had taken the bold step of recruiting 450 young and educated civil servants, and had given them training as county supervisors. When I arrived at the Ministry, that important first step had been taken, but the initiative needed to be followed through; the recruits had to be supported and reinforced. Parviz Khabir, who was in charge of research and planning at the Ministry, was assigned to oversee the implementation of the plan. The young recruits were, in fact, the foundation of the organisational structure of the Ministry of the Interior. They were promoted the following years to higher positions, having gained the experience of basic governance. Another matter that was addressed was the re-evaluation of operational procedures at the Ministry. At the time, based on the exigencies and numerous other factors that are beyond the scope 198

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of this conversation, the decision-making process, one of the basic functions of any Ministry, would usually begin at the lower levels of the bureaucracy. An issue would be passed on to higher levels and would eventually arrive at the desk of a deputy or minister. Once a decision on the issue had been made, it would travel the same trajectory back down the chain to be implemented. That system was practised in most ministries. Occasionally, some minister who was familiar with modern managerial styles would implement changes, but once gone, the old system would re-establish itself. Mid-level officials preferred not to make any decisions that might somehow jeopardise their position. They did not want to take the blame for anything that might go wrong. Such a system was feasible when government activities were limited and the ministries had few employees. But in the years after 1961, when economic development gained significant momentum and the rapid pace of expansion required a more efficient structure, the old system could not sustain itself. There was constant criticism in social circles and the media about the pace of development and the ineffectiveness of the government. To clarify the issue, I will cite some cases. Before the enactment of the land reform laws, farmers would take their complaints or problems to their landowners and ask for assistance. If there was an illness in the family, a pest problem with the crops, water distribution issues, flood damage, road erosion, or the need for some cash, the farmers knew where to get help. Once farmers became proprietors themselves, they no longer had a local ‘master’ to go to with their problems. They would approach local government employees, who were unable to respond adequately to their demands. This situation led many peasant proprietors to descend upon government agencies in search of assistance. Ministries and offices were not prepared to handle the volume of demands or the nature of the requests. The programme of land reform had been proposed by the Ministry of Agriculture and implemented by the Ministry after its ratification by the legislature. However, the Ministry of Agriculture was not equipped to manage the consequences of the legislation. Although the newly established Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperatives had adequate leverage, the Bank of Agriculture had been expanded and reinforced, and the programme 199

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had full support of the government, there was a host of issues that had not been anticipated. Villagers who were coming to government agencies were requesting assistance in various matters such as health, education, road construction, and services. Alongside those developments, the government had made a commitment to strengthen the private sector by providing low-interest loans. Collectively, a frenzy took shape across the country that had not been witnessed before. In every corner of the country, some industry or mineral resource was being sought. All this activity also increased demands on government agencies. It was clear that the old bureaucratic system was unable to deal with the changing economic and social needs of the country. Under those circumstances, the Ministry of the Interior was under tremendous pressure and had to adapt to the new reality. There had to be a fundamental change in the organisation, and solutions had to be found to address the new nature of demands that were being placed on it. One option was to decentralise and confer more authority and responsibility on officials at different levels. This strategy did not require any legislation or any additional authority; the decision could be made by the Minister. Within a short period, the directive for the delegation of authority to Governors General was issued, and the Ministry’s budget was reviewed and apportioned among its administrative units in order to eliminate the voluminous and unnecessary red tape that normally accompanied the receipt of funds for approved expenditures. The directive emphasised the notion that the Ministry of the Interior should not be asked to make simple decisions that could be handled at the local level. It also stipulated that the delegation of authority and responsibility should pass by the Governors General down the chain of command. The directive needed to be revised and amended along the way, because issues that emerged with the new way of management needed constant supervision. Prime Minister Hoveyda was always informed of the progress of this initiative and would approve the changes. During an audience with the Shah, when the case for the bureaucratic overhaul was made, His Majesty said that the Prime Minister should enforce such changes in all ministries, and should include reform initiative as one of the tenets of the White Revolution. 200

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After my audience with the Shah, I went to the Prime Minister’s office to relay the message. Mr Hoveyda decided that a committee should be set up with the participation of Manouchehr Goodarzi, Manouchehr Shahgholi, and myself to prepare the necessary recommendations for the overhaul of all government agencies. He wanted to receive our recommendations within two days. We held the meetings in Dr Goodarzi’s office and worked non-stop, discussing every issue. Based on the changes that had been devised at the Ministry of the Interior, and the know-how and experience of the National Administrative and Employment Authority, a document with 33 articles was drawn up and presented to the Prime Minister on time. Following this action, the subject of administrative reform became one of the tenets of the White Revolution, and as a first step, a large conference with the participation of high government officials was organised to launch the initiative. The conference was held over several days in the facilities of the Officer’s Club in Tehran, attended by the Prime Minister and all Cabinet Ministers. The problems and difficulties that citizens encountered when attempting to access various government agencies were discussed. The outcome was a set of directives that were given to all government agencies for implementation.

Earlier, in discussing the Ministry of the Interior, you referred to municipal laws and the laws concerning town council elections. What became of those laws? A.A.: The legislation concerning municipal laws and town council elections was eventually ratified. The process was drawn out. Meanwhile, as the legislation was being considered in various committees, the situation in Tehran was deteriorating every day. Two major problems were the absence of lane markers in city streets, which created chaotic traffic patterns, and the poor condition of city buses used for public transport. Tehran’s municipality did not have adequate resources to properly pave city streets, and lane demarcations were almost non-existent. This situation had created such a traffic mess in the city that vehicles could hardly move. The ageing buses that roamed the 201

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streets had gradually become fume-belching machines, polluting the air. People were increasingly frustrated about not being able to get to work on time; their complaints were reaching government officials and being referred to the Ministry of the Interior. Whenever these issues were discussed, the need for financing to purchase of a new fleet of buses arose. The Mayor of Tehran claimed that the allocated budget for the municipality could not cover the expenses of public transport. The municipality had a loan of 170 million tomans from Bank Melli and was being threatened by the bank about its payments; the Mayor was worried that even his office furniture could be confiscated at any time. The director of the Tehran Bus Company, meanwhile, reported that the majority of the fleet’s 1,100 buses showed over 1 million kilometres on their odometers. The bus company’s debts to the National Iranian Oil Company, tyre manufacturers, and various supporting businesses had reached their limits and suppliers were demanding cash payments to continue providing goods, all the while harassing the company for unpaid bills. The condition of buses and lack of available funds had forced the company to retire some to be used for spare parts. Commuters were so angry at the company that the leather seats on buses were being vandalised and bus drivers were regularly insulted. The Mayor said that Mercedes Benz Company had expressed interest in purchasing one of the buses with over 1 million kilometres on its odometer to display it in the company’s museum in Germany. The Mayor’s point was that governments in many countries allocated funds in their national budgets to deal with public transport, but in Iran, not a penny was being spent to help the municipality. The position of the Prime Minister and the Plan Organisation was that the financial resources of the country had to be allocated to national development projects and could not be used for public transport issues of one city, not even Tehran; an alternative solution had to be found. Ultimately, the Tehran Bus Company proposed a fare increase of ten shahis (one-twentieth of a toman, or one-half of a rial) in order to alleviate some of the pressure on the transport system. It was a difficult decision, because the fare increase would hit the low-income people, who used the system for their large families to get to school or work, the hardest. Memories of widespread strikes against the increases in the 202

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price of fuel and the subsequent retreat by the government was still on everyone’s mind. The Prime Minister decided to present the case for the fare increase in a meeting with the Queen, who had become involved in social issues. The meeting was organised at Niavaran Palace and was attended by Mr Hoveyda, Mr Safi Asfia (head of the Plan Organisation), the Mayor of Tehran, and the manager of the Tehran Bus System. After two hours of discussions, it was decided that there would not be any fare increase. The only decision that was made was to ask Bank Melli and the National Iranian Oil Company to stop pressuring the bus company until a solution could be devised. This was only one of the problems of Tehran that was occupying the time and energy of high government officials. Town council elections were approaching, and the Ministry had to finish its preparations. At a meeting with my colleagues in the Cabinet, I set forth a plan and recommended that, now that the responsibility for governing the towns was to be transferred from the government town councils, and the Iran Novin Party was going to participate and play an important role in the elections, it was in its interest to identify qualified candidates who had the trust of the local population. By supporting those individuals for council seats in the elections, regardless of their party affiliation, the Iran Novin Party could gain acceptance, attract new members, and spread its influence. Prime Minister Hoveyda, Ataollah Khosrovani (Minister of Labour and Secretary General of the Iran Novin Party), and some other ministers endorsed the suggestion. A committee consisting of a few ministers who were members of the Party was formed that included Mr Khosrovani, Nasser Yeganeh (Minister of State), Karim Pasha Bahadori (Assistant to the Prime Minister), and me. The panel began formulating ways of identifying candidates nationwide. Local Party chapters, government agencies, and other sources of information were asked to survey and present lists of qualified people to the committee. An office was set up to receive the information, evaluate the candidates, and come up with a short list of well-qualified candidates to be considered by the Iran Novin Party, to be presented as its candidates in local elections. The plan was meticulously followed, and Mr Khosrovani eventually received the final list of candidates. Unfortunately, after a couple of days, he asked the 203

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committee to reconvene. He announced that the proposed candidates were not acceptable to the Party. They believed that, since the volunteers in local Party offices had not received any compensation, they must be considered for nomination. On that note, all efforts of the prior two to three months went to waste and the panel folded. With the official launch of the elections by the Ministry of the Interior, lists of candidates from the Iran Novin Party, the Mardom Party, and the Pan-Iranist Party were announced. According to the law, the eligibility of candidates had to be reviewed by a vetting committee composed of governors, judges and some other government officials. They had to assess the qualifications of candidates, verify their residency requirements, and confirm the absence of a criminal record. When the list of candidates of the Iran Novin Party was announced, a flood of complaints and accusations overwhelmed governors’ offices, the election commissions, and the Ministry of the Interior. During this review process, any time that a candidate was for some reason considered ineligible by the local commission, the Iran Novin Party would raise objections and complain to the Prime Minister and the Ministry of the Interior. Party officials would make every effort to overturn the decision and garner support for their candidate. The inquiries often exposed these candidates as local bullies and corrupt individuals; some had engaged in questionable business dealings that were well known to the authorities. But every time such a candidate was disqualified, the Iran Novin Party officials took it as a hostile act by the Ministry and were quite vocal with their dissatisfaction. They were constantly badgering the Prime Minister about such matters. One Friday afternoon when all government offices were closed, I received a distressed call from Mr Hoveyda. He had been informed that all the proposed candidates from the Iran Novin Party in Bandar Abbas had been rejected by the election commission, and that the Party considered this to be a conspiracy. Mr Hoveyda asked that a trustworthy person be sent from the Ministry to look into the matter. I had become exasperated by the incessant complaints and suggested sending Shahpour Meehan, a former Governor General and senior adviser at the Ministry who was in the good graces of the Prime Minister. He welcomed the choice, and Mr Meehan, who was unwell at the time, 204

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agreed to fly there the following day. I called the Governor of Bandar Abbas and instructed him to convene the election commission and present the cases to our emissary. The next day, Mr Meehan called from the meeting attended by the Governor, the chief judicial officer, the Prosecutor, and other local officials who were on the election commission. He said that the chief of police, who had also been invited to the meeting, had announced that it was unnecessary to hold the meeting. He had come to inform everyone that a boat carrying contraband had been seized and that the owners had been identified as the candidates of the Iran Novin Party. Mr Meehan returned to Tehran; the matter was reported to the Prime Minister, and the case was closed. There were several other similar situations in other parts of the country. In any event, the elections were held and the candidates of the Iran Novin Party won most of the seats in city councils; the Party was thus able to extend its influence over the town councils. However, my presence at the Ministry was a thorn in their side. My position as Minister could jeopardise their initiatives, mainly because I had the legal power to override Party decisions that would not benefit the people and could dissolve any council that was corrupt or ineffective. At this juncture, it is fitting to go back a few months and recall a matter that relates to social and administrative problems of Tehran. Since the previous year, an arrangement had been made that I would have an audience with the Shah every Tuesday to report on the affairs of the country. Habitually, I would also meet the Prime Minister and report and relay any message from the Shah. A few months prior to the election of the Tehran City Council, during one of these audiences, His Majesty stated that Mohammad Ali Massoudi had written a letter to the court and made some suggestions about the affairs of Tehran. He asked me to study the proposal and report back. I knew Mr Massoudi, who had had a long and illustrious career in the press and Parliament. He was in contact with different groups, especially members of various guilds such as bakers, furnace operators, peddlers, kebab restaurant operators, produce dealers and bodega owners. Mr Massoudi was very influential and knowledgeable, and he was a political operator who was adept at garnering support for a candidate. Whenever there 205

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were elections in Tehran, it always seemed likely that the group or the candidate who had his support would win. It was rumoured that he had in his possession thousands of birth certificates without pictures. It was also said that he was paying unemployed individuals a nominal fee to vote for certain candidates using those certificates. His ability to get candidates elected had earned him the nickname ‘the elector’ (entekhab-chi). He was the same person who during parliamentary elections in the government of Dr Eghbal orchestrated the victory of the Melliyoun Party and had all its candidates elected. As I mentioned before, what ensued in that instance was that Parliament was dissolved soon after it had convened. Mr Massoudi’s letter to the Shah recommended the establishment of a Chamber of Guilds with the authority to represent a whole host of small businesses before the government, and the power to control small businesses in Tehran through licensing rights, price controls, levies and such. In other words, Mr Massoudi wanted to give the control of all various guilds over to an organisation that would in effect be managed by his cronies, under his direction. I discussed the matter with Mr Hoveyda and gave him my opinion. It was a valid point that, in order to protect their interests, the guilds could come together within the parameters of the law to form an alliance. But at the time, Tehran was developing and expanding rapidly. The increase in population and purchasing power of people were promoting the establishment of new businesses and services. In such an economic climate, I believed that it was not advisable to create a monopoly and hand over the control of all small businesses to such an agency. Giving this new entity the power to assess levies, that was the responsibility of the city councils, and allowing it to establish price controls, would only promote corruption and destabilise market forces, unfairly benefiting those in charge. I added that city council elections were approaching and the representatives of the people would soon get a chance to decide on such issues. I thought it was not prudent for the government to initiate such an action at that time, or to get involved in the local issues of Tehran. Mr Hoveyda agreed with my assessment, and it was decided that I follow up by presenting my views to His Majesty during my next audience. The Shah accepted my views, and the issue was settled. 206

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The Ministry of the Interior was responsible for law and order, as well as security in the country. When you were the Minister, what can you tell me about the functioning of the Ministry? A.A.: The Ministry of the Interior had two principal functions – to be responsible for the shahrbani (the urban police forces in towns and cities throughout the country) and the gendarmerie (the countryside rural police force that operated outside the towns and cities, i.e. in villages and the countryside). Both handled civil security and criminal investigations, but were not part of the political security and domestic intelligence services. In reality, however, both forces were integral parts of the military structure of the country. So, while in routine operational matters the Ministry represented those organisations within the government and at Cabinet level, in actual fact they were directly answerable to the Shah, as were the heads of the army, navy and air force, nominally within the orbit of the Ministry of War, but in reality also reported directly to the Shah. So when I was appointed Minister, General Mohsen Mobasser, head of the police, and General Gholam Ali Oveissi, head of the gendarmerie, called on me to pay their respects, offer their good wishes and exchange pleasantries. But we all knew where their orders came from.

And SAVAK? A.A.: It may appear that there was a close relationship between the Ministry of the Interior and SAVAK, as it exists between interior ministries and domestic and international intelligence agencies in many other countries. But no, SAVAK in Iran was definitely its own organisation, operated in its own right and reported directly to the Shah. The only oversight of SAVAK came from the so-called Special Bureau (Daftar-e Vizheh), whose task was to keep an eye on the security organisation. When I was the Governor of Khuzestan, I received a series of complaints about a man by the name of Shushtari, a one-time Mayor of Ahvaz who went on to become a Parliament deputy. He had a reputation as a local power broker and wheeler-dealer. I investigated 207

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the complaints against him and found them to be legitimate. He was living in Tehran at the time. I sent him a message, and banned him from returning to Khuzestan. Unbeknownst to me, however, he was also on SAVAK’s payroll. So he took the matter to his superiors at SAVAK, who were inclined to see him reinstated. At that point, however, the Special Bureau stepped in to investigate the file, persuading SAVAK to let the man’s dismissal stand. The point of this minor episode is to show that while SAVAK was able to wield influence in the affairs of the government, it was, nonetheless, subject to oversight and control itself.

How did you get on with Prime Minister Hoveyda? A.A.: My relationship with Mr Hoveyda was very close at that time, and during the elections he would often ask me to go to his house in Zafaranieh in the morning and accompany him to his office so that we could talk. Our conversations were mostly about the management of the Party and the undesirable consequences of supporting unqualified candidates who had breached the ranks, tarnishing the image of the Party. My understanding from our conversations was that the Prime Minister realised the extent of the problem and the inadequacy of available solutions, but his hands were tied by certain constraints. For that reason, he preferred short-term remedies to long-term solutions. Suddenly, out of nowhere, a false rumour began to circulate around town by questionable sources connected to the Iran Novin Party, about my selection to be the next Prime Minister. I did not pay much attention to the rumour when I heard it, because I knew it was not true. But a few days later, during a conference of Governors General at the Ministry of the Interior, Mr Hoveyda, who was there to give the opening remarks, made a comment while looking at the portraits of former Ministers of the Interior hanging on the hallway walls. He noted that most former Prime Ministers had earlier held the position of Minister of the Interior. He then turned to reporters around us and jokingly told me, ‘Reza, you see that most Ministers of the Interior become Prime Ministers.’ Everyone laughed, and I took it lightly. But in the following weeks, I 208

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sensed that our relationship was not as affable as before. I attributed the change of behaviour to mounting pressures of his job and difficulties facing the government. Other than that, however, our work was proceeding normally. City council elections in Tehran and elsewhere were over and Iran Novin candidates had won most of the seats; in Tehran, Javad Shahrestani was poised to become the next mayor. The Monday before my next audience with the Shah, I received a call from the Royal Court’s chief of protocol that I was to accompany His Majesty to Shiraz and have my audience there. We travelled on the royal private plane, and I had a quiet dinner with the Shah and Mr Alam. I had my audience on Tuesday afternoon, reporting on a variety of issues and receiving some directives. There was only one issue that needed to be decided by the Prime Minister. I returned to Tehran the following day on a government plane and went directly to report to Mr Hoveyda. The week after, I received a call from my friend Nasser Yeganeh, the Minister of State, asking me to go to his house for coffee. He told me that changes were being made in the Cabinet and that he had been told to ask for my resignation (this was in November 1968). In the ensuing reshuffling of Cabinet leadership, Ataollah Khosrovani was named the new Minister of the Interior. One of his first decisions in the job was the establishment of the Chamber of Guilds. Something that I found puzzling, however, was that whenever an official was removed from a high position, others would stay away from that person out of fear of jeopardising their own position; the dismissed individual would be shunned by the system. But in my case, Mr Alam, the Minister of Court, and others who were in the inner circle of the Shah, did not change their behaviour or conduct toward me. My wife and I continued to get invited to social events that the Shah and the Queen attended. I sensed that the Shah had not changed his opinion of me, and that my removal had more to do with the Prime Minister’s actions. My suspicion was reinforced when a civil adjutant of the Shah confided to me that sometime prior to my dismissal, during the Prime Minister’s audience with the Shah, he had entered the room to serve tea, overhearing Mr Hoveyda speak ill of me before the Shah. It dawned upon me that by replacing me with Mr Khosrovani, Mr Hoveyda could achieve two objectives. First, he eliminated daily complaints from 209

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the Iran Novin Party about the unyielding Ministry of the Interior by replacing me with the Secretary General of the Party. Second, he mistakenly considered me a political rival of certain aspirations, thus removing me from his Cabinet. It did not take long before the Prime Minister realised that such baseless rumours and misguided accusations had been planned by a bunch of corrupt and malicious Party operatives. During the ten years prior to the Islamic Revolution, Mr Hoveyda took every opportunity to compliment and support me, trying to make amends. Mr Khosrovani, the Secretary General of the Iran Novin Party, who succeeded me at the Ministry of the Interior, did not last long in the job. After a few months, he was removed from office and left the political arena for good. The Chamber of Guilds turned into a den of corruption and trampled the rights of honest merchants. The director of the chamber, an Iran Novin Party hack who had once enjoyed support from security forces, was legally pursued and sacked by the justice Ministry. That individual would boast in social gatherings that during his tenure, he had managed to raise 50 million tomans, half the budget of the Municipality of Tehran, from various guilds, in order to use those funds to organise street demonstrations in support of the Iran Novin Party. He was one of the promoters of such demonstrations, and there were many others like him who had taken control of the levers of the Iran Novin Party throughout the country.

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What happened after you were sidelined, and what did you do about it? Abdolreza Ansari: Mr Ataollah Khosrovani replaced all the competent and experienced officers of the Ministry with Iran Novin (New Iran) members who had joined the Party solely for the purpose of gaining jobs and influence in the government. One of these individuals, who had previously been employed at the Ministry of Finance, was known to be malicious and intent on gathering files on others. He was appointed as Deputy Minister in Charge of Municipalities, and he publicly declared that he was looking for evidence of wrongdoing by Hassan Shahmirzadi, my deputy, and me. Fortunately, there was nothing for him to discover, and his efforts ultimately failed. I was familiar with the practice of falsifying records and worried for myself and my colleagues who had worked honestly and diligently for several years. I felt responsible for them being scrutinised by the new Minister because of their association with me. I anticipated that by staying in Tehran, I would be visited by concerned friends and colleagues, which could have appeared as a brewing conspiracy against the new leadership at the Ministry. I did not want to cause trouble for anybody and decided to spend some time with relatives in Ramsar, a small town on the shore of Caspian Sea. To keep myself occupied, I started building a small house on a piece of land that I had purchased for 30 rials per 211

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square metre from the Land Bureau. I went back, once in a while, to Tehran to visit my family and run errands. Of course, my good friends and colleagues from many years in the public and private sectors, and from different parts of the country, did not refrain from expressing their benevolence toward my family. I consider it my duty to take advantage of this occasion to sincerely thank each and every one of them, in particular my dear and magnanimous friend Khalil Taleghani, whom I had the privilege of serving as deputy for many years. This honourable and righteous man came to our home immediately after my removal and pledged to extend a loan to cover my monthly expenses so that my personal life would not be disrupted. The arrangement of monthly deposits to my account continued for nine months, until I was appointed by His Majesty to a new position. As the period of my unemployment dragged on, I set a deadline for myself to enter the private sector within the year. I had received several offers during that period from acquaintances; one person even asked me to run a huge construction and trade business and offered me a salary triple that of a minister, plus a commission of 10 per cent of the net profits of the operation. I turned down all offers with gratitude, and thought that, if necessary, I would start my own business.

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How did your collaboration with Princess Ashraf occur? Abdolreza Ansari: Toward the end of the summer of 1969, nine months into the period that I was housebound, while in Ramsar, I received a call from the Minister of Court, Asadollah Alam, to go in for a meeting the following day. After greetings and some warm exchanges, he explained the scope of the undertakings made by Princess Ashraf, the twin sister of the Shah, during the previous 30 years. She had founded and directed the Imperial Organisation for Social Services (IOSS), the National Committee for World Literacy Programme, the Women’s Organisation of Iran, and the Iranian Committee for Human Rights. Also, she was chairman of the board of the University of Jondishahpour, which was going through a vast rejuvenation programme. He said that the princess had been spending more time outside the country on various diplomatic missions and that the organisations were operating without supervision. Mr Alam said that His Majesty had ordered that an office be established for the purpose of managing these operations, and he had appointed me as the director and deputy to Princess Ashraf. He added that I should expect a call the following afternoon from the princess, who was abroad and wanted to talk to me and give some instructions. I thanked him and we parted. 213

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Princess Ashraf called the next day and, after some exchanges, asked that I supervise all of her organisations and do whatever was necessary. She said that I would occupy her office at the IOSS, and her car would be at my disposal. She asked that the text of the decree for my appointment be prepared with the consent of Mr Alam. She was en route to India and wanted me to board the plane during her short stopover at Mehrabad Airport, to meet her and have the decree signed. The document was prepared in a couple of days and approved by the Shah. I was summoned to join the princess on the plane when she arrived. It was decided that all the organisations under her direction were to be visited and evaluated and that I would meet her in one month in Paris to report my findings. The most important organisation under Princess Ashraf ’s patronage was the Imperial Organisation for Social Services. The organisation was founded at the end of World War II, when Allied forces had left every corner of the country in a state of poverty, unemployment and hunger. The situation in Tehran was dire, the city’s streets filled with poor and hungry people and vagrant youths. The organisation had been established as a directive from the young Mohammad Reza Shah. Its objective was to feed the hungry and to gather the vagrant youths and provide them with education, with the help of the government and benevolent individuals. The Shah was at the helm and his twin sister, Princess Ashraf, was the director and supervisor of the organisation. The board of directors included the president of the National Assembly and several ministers and important personalities. After the establishment of the Senate, the president of that body also joined the board. The Director General of Bank Melli (Iran National Bank), who was also on the board, served as the treasurer; the auditing was done by the government’s auditing department in the Ministry of Finance. Dr Javad Ashtiani, who came from a prominent and respectable family, had been appointed as managing director of the new organisation. The board and Dr Ashtiani had audiences with the Shah every so often to report on the activities of the organisation. This practice continued up to the Islamic Revolution in 1979; the last audience occurred on 27 April 1978, which was the anniversary of the inception of the IOSS. 214

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The work of the IOSS had begun by setting up centres for the distribution of hot meals in the southern areas of Tehran and establishing a permanent site for dining halls, dormitories, and vocational training such as plumbing, carpentry and metalwork. The focus of the initiative were poor children and the vagrant, and the budget was provided from the Shah’s personal account. A clinic that was free of charge had been established in Tehran along with 30 other clinics in remote areas of Iran. At the time, experienced Iranian doctors were not willing to practise at those locations. Dr Ashtiani had been able to recruit 30 Austrian doctors, who were desperate for jobs because of the deplorable economic condition in Europe in the aftermath of WW11. The number of clinics steadily increased and reached 250; serving the needs of over 5 million patients a year. Villagers who could afford to pay would be charged five rials for a visit (equal to six cents); if they could not afford it, visits were free of charge. Ten of the clinics had a few beds for patients in need of further treatment. In Tehran, a wellequipped hospital with 100 beds, named the Reza Pahlavi Hospital, had been built in Tajrish, in the northern suburbs of the city and it was also free of charge. In the city of Qom, a benevolent Mr Nekouee had bequeathed a building to the organisation and had helped establish yet another well-equipped hospital, the only one in Qom. The IOSS opened the first clinic for the treatment of scalp disease with electrical therapy, also free of charge. Another health concern that was addressed was trachoma in the city of Dezful. The disease had affected most of the population and had led the city to be called ‘city of the blind’. With the assistance of the Near East Foundation, the IOSS had been able to implement a project for the elimination of trachoma in that city. Along with expansion into health care, the IOSS established the Princess Ashraf School of Nursing. This was a three-year training course where 50 trained nurses graduated every year and went on to work in hospitals across the country. Studying at the institution, which was operated as a boarding school, was free of charge, but the trainees were required to work, in exchange, for an equal amount of time at clinics operated by the IOSS. In 1967, the majority of nurses who worked in hospitals around the country were graduates of the programme. 215

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In addition to initiatives in health care, the IOSS had founded Daroopakhsh, the first pharmaceutical company in Iran. It was managed by Dr Nader Sharghi, a university professor and top pharmacologist, who had transformed it into the most important pharmaceutical company in Iran by establishing licensing arrangements with major companies such as Roche from Switzerland, Glaxo from Great Britain, and Merck from the United States. In the field of education, vocational training workshops that had been established at the inception of the IOSS were upgraded and supplied with modern equipment with the assistance of the Austrian government. Students of these programmes were finding jobs quickly and at higher wages. At the time, the Austrians were also involved with the construction of a school in Isfahan with the capacity to train 1,000 students. Another important initiative in education was the improvement and upgrade of scholastic textbooks and the distribution of free textbooks through the fourth grade to elementary school students in Iran. Also the IOSS had established a large offset printing company in Tehran, which – as Offset – became the most important printers in the country responsible, among much else, for all the nation’s schoolbooks. The budget for IOSS operations was generated from the sale of lottery tickets, one-half per cent of import tariffs as had been granted by law, revenue from Offset and Daroopakhsh, and donations from benevolent individuals. This was the scope of the IOSS’s undertakings, under the management of Dr Ashtiani, the former Minister of Health, and his deputy, Nosratollah Kasemi, a former Minister of State without Portfolio. The second important entity under the supervision of Princess Ashraf was the National Committee for World Literacy Programme. The Shah was at the helm, and the board of directors included the Prime Minister, the leaders of the Senate and Parliament, the Minister of Culture, and several other ministers and statesmen. The chief executive was Dr Parviz Natel-Khanlari, the former Minister of Education, who was a distinguished scholar. The goal of the organisation was to educate adults who had not had the opportunity to learn to read and write, which was the majority of the population of Iran at that time. It was said that more than 1 million people had taken classes through the programme since its inception. 216

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The third entity was the Women’s Organisation of Iran, which had been established four years earlier by Princess Ashraf herself, and she served as president. Heshmat Yousefi was its chief executive officer, and the board of directors included ten educated and well-respected women. Its mission was to empower women who had formed groups in various fields with a wide array of objectives across the country. The small budget for the organisation was provided through indirect and occasional donations from other national organisations. It had not been integrated into the national infrastructure of the government and was in its formative stages. Alongside this organisation, a small group of five educated women led by Shirin Mahdavi had come together to form a study group for women’s affairs. They considered themselves affiliated with Princess Ashraf but were operating independently. The fourth entity was the Iranian Committee for Human Rights. It had been the brainchild of Manouchehr Gandji, and he was the director. Since Dr Gandji also held a full-time position as the president of the College of Law at the University of Tehran, and Princess Ashraf had been spending much time abroad, the organisation was not thriving owing to the absence of strong political backing. Government institutions and security services were not taking the initiatives of the committee seriously. Princess Ashraf was also the president of the board at the University of Jondishahpour in Ahvaz. The importance of this institution was in name only. Because of the lack of adequate funding and its location, it was replete with problems. The university did not have a solid framework; it lacked acceptable equipment for its teaching staff, a competent administrative staff, a good library, adequate laboratories, and accommodation facilities for students and staff. This institution for higher education did not even have the basic requirements for operation. Davood Kazemi was in charge of the university. This eminent person used to come to see me when I was Governor General in Khuzestan five years earlier, and would lament that no one in Tehran would listen to his concerns. He even promised to work for me if I would agree to take the title of the president of the university. He thought that my voice might be heard and something would be done 217

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for his beloved institution. This was a summary of the challenges that I faced in my new mission. These various organisations were being managed by experienced and well-respected individuals who had served as ministers or elected representatives. They included Dr Javad Ashtiani, Dr Parviz NatelKhanlari, Nosratollah Kasemi, and Manouchehr Gandji. Therefore, my role and function was to effectuate cooperation among these various entities and to facilitate and mitigate problems with government agencies. Except for Dr Gandji, who was among Iran’s young educated technocrats, the other gentlemen were of the older generation and because of their stature did not have firm relationships with the new generation of ministers and directors. So, they would delegate issues to their young subordinates, who did not have access to high-ranking government officials. At the time when Princess Ashraf was in Tehran and was supervising these operations, arising issues were relayed to the Prime Minister or the relevant minister, and there were no communication problems with the government. But during her long absences, issues regarding financing and government permits took a long time to be addressed. Since I was friends with many high officials and had long work experience in the government, the communication problem was resolved. In essence, my job was to handle the problems that these organisations had with the government and to establish working relationships. At the time, only the Women’s Organisation did not have a functioning organisation or adequate funding. It was in the initial stages of establishing itself as a nationwide organisation, and I spent a lot of time dealing with administrative and legal issues. For instance, the women who were on the board of directors complained that even though issues with women’s equality and gender discrimination had been part of the programme of the White Revolution,1 and even though the Shah 1

The ambitious plan, launched by the Shah in 1963, to institutionalise land reform and workers’ rights. Peasants were granted the deeds for the land that they worked, including extensive royal lands and much of the rural property of the larger landlords. At the same time the rights granted to industrial workers mimicked some of the most fundamental parts of welfare state thinking: health care, job security and access to education. The intention behind the White Revolution was to help pave 218

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had referred to them on several occasions, the existing laws prevented any advancement on those concerns. The women believed that unless some fundamental changes were made in the laws of the country, it was unlikely that women’s legal and social status would improve. They argued that the court rulings did not take into account the basic notion of equality between men and women. To tackle this problem, with the consent of Princess Ashraf, I asked Mr Ashraf-Ahmadi, who was a member of the Supreme Court and a former Minister of State, to form a committee of experienced judges and legal experts in order to identify instances of gender discrimination in the laws and to recommend changes. Mr Ashraf-Ahmadi who was truly a noble statesman, accepted this mission and assembled a group of distinguished colleagues. The first meeting was convened in my office with the attendance of some of the women who were on the board of the Women’s Organisation, and arrangements were made to facilitate their endeavour. A couple of weeks later, I got a call from Mr Alam, the Minister of Court, to go to his office immediately. As I entered, without extending any greeting and with an accusatory gesture, he inquired about meetings being held in my office that had raised the ire of the Shah, who had ordered that I be court-martialled. I asked him to elaborate. He said that reports had been received that there had been meetings in my office with judges and that there was a conspiracy to upend the foundation of the country. Suddenly it dawned on me what he was talking about. I explained to him that, in fact, we were executing His Majesty’s will and that Mr Ashraf-Ahmadi, who was in the good graces of the Shah, was conducting this effort. Mr Alam was relieved and said that he now realised that these reports had probably been invented by the clerics. He told me not to worry and to continue my work. Princess Ashraf returned to Tehran after some time and then handled most of the issues related to the Women’s Organisation. She wanted the Women’s Organisation to be the first national institution in Iran to have a young, educated and energetic woman at its helm. the way toward the modernisation of the country and at the same time to cement relations between the Shah at the pinnacle of the institution of monarchy, and the mass of Iranian society occupying the lower rungs of Iran’s social ladder. 219

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She asked me to propose some candidates for the job. To carry out the directive, with the assistance of the National University of Iran, the files of all the women professors in the fields of sociology and social sciences were put at my disposal. Ten candidates were chosen for further evaluation, and their qualifications were charted. Among the candidates, Simin Rejali had the highest qualifications in the selected categories. Since many of the candidates were highly qualified, Princess Ashraf decided to personally interview them, and she finally decided on Dr Rejali. After her appointment, Dr Rejali picked Mahnaz Afkhami to manage issues regarding young women. Of course this does not need further elaboration, because after two years Dr Rejali went back to her teaching job and Mrs Afkhami was appointed as president of the Women’s Organisation, going on to become the first female Minister for Women’s Affairs. She is now a well-renowned personality and is held in high regard in organisations around the world that deal with women’s and children’s issues. She is indeed the pride of Iranian women. Dr Natel-Khanlari, who was the director of the National Committee for World Literacy Program, asked to be relieved of his duty; his major preoccupation was at the Foundation for Iranian Culture. Princess Ashraf asked Mr Asfia, a Minister of State without Portfolio, to take responsibility for the organisation. Dr Gandji, who had a heavy workload and obligations at the College of Law, also decided to step aside from the Committee for Human Rights. He was replaced by Alinaghi Alikhani, the former Minister of Economy. These new directors ushered in new enthusiasm and energy to the organisations, and I continued establishing rapport between the entities and resolving issues. After some time, Dr Ashtiani, who had served as the managing director of the IOSS for 30 years and who was over 90 years old, expressed his desire to be relieved of his job. He was ceremoniously retired and was honoured with the top-ranking level of the Order of Homayoun and a pension equal to his full salary in perpetuity. Princess Ashraf intended to name Majid Rahnama, a former Ambassador, to head the IOSS, but because he preferred research on social issues to bureaucratic work, he declined. She asked me to handle the affairs of the organisation in the interim, until a replacement was named. Initially, I named Mr Reza Razmara, the former Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Mines, 220

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as associate director in charge of educational activities at the IOSS. It was apparent that, with the country heading toward rapid economic growth especially in the industrial sector, the youth had to be educated and prepared for the anticipated jobs. Mr Razmara had experience in technical training while at the Ministry and knew about the requisites of the industries. He accepted my offer and took charge of the technical training programme, Daroopakhsh (the pharmaceutical company), the Offset printing company, and future planning, as I will elaborate later. In the field of health care, Princess Ashraf asked that I meet Mohsen Ziai, the former president of the University of Mashhad, and offer him the position of assistant director of the IOSS for health care activities. A new perspective was needed to address the developing nature of health care in our country. Meeting with this charming personality who had illustrious educational credentials and work experience, in addition to a philosophical outlook toward medicine and health care, was an unforgettable encounter. I was able to convince him to accept this position, which had the potential to influence the politics of the health care industry in Iran. His request was to have his colleague Parviz Ghaem-Maghami transferred to the IOSS, which was agreed to and done. Dr Ziai studied the system and the procedures for several months and concluded that some fundamental changes needed to be implemented. The health care needs of the country had evolved over the preceding 30 years, and the old methods did not apply adequately to modern conditions. In the past, residents of villages and small towns had relied on exorcists, or writers of amulets, or community elders who would use medicinal plants, to treat maladies. Under these circumstances, building a clinic and sending a physician or even a medical trainee to these areas was a big deal. When the IOSS built a clinic in a remote area where there was no government facility within a 100-kilometre radius, and then sent an Austrian physician who would treat patients for free, it was the most important event ever to have happened there. It should not be underestimated what a significant accomplishment it was to establish 250 clinics across the country. However, with the increase in population and the development of the country’s infrastructure, the health care system also needed to adjust. Dr Ziai believed that with the 221

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advances in medicine, doctors were not expected to be experts in every field. With new discoveries every day, a physician would need hundreds of years to develop special expertise in all of them. Dr Ziai maintained that medical training was heading toward specialisation, with doctors getting a general education and then deciding on their scope of interest. To that end, the concept of sending a lone doctor to a remote area should be reconsidered. The second recommendation was that, with advances in medicine and the advent of basic instruments to diagnose and treat simple maladies, it had become possible to train able individuals with a sixth-grade education in six months to perform these simple treatments. They could be sent to villages to treat the majority of ailments with basic medications that would be provided to them. Therefore, by adding a couple of beds to existing clinics, investing in new equipment such as X-ray machines, and providing ambulances to be utilised at the disposal of the manager of the clinic, the return on these clinics would be multiplied. The success of this effort would hinge on instituting a comprehensive training programme for basic health care. By working with the Ministry of Health and obtaining the required permits, a selected few of the existing clinics could be targeted as ‘model clinics’ to receive the new equipment. These model clinics could then be studied to rectify problems in the system, and the programme could be expanded to include all centres once the problems were solved. Dr Ziai added that, at that time, the Reza Pahlavi Hospital in Tajrish, which had 100 beds, was considered the biggest and most effective institution in north Tehran, and residents depended on it. However, with advancements in medicine, institutions that only cared for patients were gradually losing importance to research-oriented ones. Doctors interested in growing in their specialties would prefer to transfer to big hospitals with research and educational capabilities. Dr Ziai believed that it is through the process of teaching and interaction with students that doctors can enhance their own knowledge. He predicted that if the Reza Pahlavi Hospital did not adapt to the evolving nature of health care, it would be reduced to a third-rate institution, unable to attract highly qualified doctors. Dr Ziai suggested that a comprehensive plan for the hospital be devised and implemented. The emphasis was on the expansion 222

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of the hospital to transform it into a centre for medical training, with a 500-bed capacity. He envisioned that the hospital would collaborate with big medical institutions around the world, through doctor and student exchanges, to enhance its capabilities. Dr Ziai had completed his studies at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore and wanted to establish an affiliation with that world-renowned institution. He believed that Reza Pahlavi Hospital would not only serve the people of north Tehran, but could also train young doctors to be sent to all parts of the country. At the first opportunity, I presented the findings to Princess Ashraf, and she approved all the recommendations. She instructed me to use all means at my disposal, under the guidelines of the IOSS, to move toward the goal. She added that the Plan Organisation should be approached to get further assistance for this endeavour. Once the decision was made, plans were developed by Dr Ziai and Dr Ghaem-Maghami. In the meantime, Majid Rahnama, who at that time was collaborating with UNESCO on training programmes, expressed interest in working with the IOSS to offer short-term medical training for caregivers. The programme was named Amouzesh Behvarzan (Training of Caregivers), and with Mr Rahnama’s sponsorship it became a successful venture and was recognised by UNESCO as well as high government officials as an important national initiative. The curriculum of the training programme was developed under the supervision of Dr Ziai and his colleagues. Mr Rahnama decided to launch the programme in a setting similar to where the trainees would work. He was given an official title from the Ministry of the Interior, as ‘county agent’, to avoid any local opposition to developing the training centre in the targeted village, Alashtar. The operations at Alashtar were so interesting that UNESCO and foreign experts who visited the programme were eager to replicate it in other developing nations. Their enthusiasm prompted the production of a video that explained the programme and showcased its operations; 60 copies were made and delivered to UNESCO officials. Concurrently, Dr Ziai and Dr Ghaem-Maghami worked diligently to upgrade the Reza Pahlavi Hospital by purchasing the latest medical equipment and recruiting experienced physicians; the procedures for admitting patients were also overhauled. The hospital became a first-rate institution. A working relationship with Johns Hopkins University was 223

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established, and the president of the medical school there was invited by the IOSS to visit and hold seminars. After several days of visits to the facilities and introductions to all health-related programmes, Johns Hopkins agreed to sign an agreement with the IOSS. Several doctors would be sent to Iran on a regular schedule every year to teach and train, and ten doctors from our organisation would be sent to Johns Hopkins to be trained in the latest technologies. After the agreement was signed, the first group of ten doctors was selected by Dr Ziai and sent abroad, and several doctors from Johns Hopkins came to the Reza Pahlavi Hospital. The programme was successfully launched. The project to create a model clinic was pursued by Dr GhaemMaghami, and the first one of its kind was built in the area of Ahvaz. The major project of the expansion of Reza Pahlavi Hospital to 500-bed capacity was approved by the government, and the cost was included in the national development budget. Mohsen Foroughi, the most respected architect in Iran, was tasked with supervising the expansion. Since the available land at Reza Pahlavi Hospital could not accommodate the requirements of the new plan, the purchase of neighbouring properties had to be considered. With the approval of Princess Ashraf, these properties were to be bought at market price, and to avoid any discontent, additional sums were approved to appease reluctant owners. The objective was to keep the local residents happy. Shapour Shafai, my assistant, handled all these arrangements, and no complaints were received. After few months, Dr Ziai decided to emigrate to the United States and Dr Ghaem-Maghami took over the operations up to the revolution.

Nowadays, in most developed countries, medicinal plants are also used for treating ailments, and there are pharmacies that specialise in carrying such products, so-called ‘herbal medicines’ or ‘alternative medicines’. Was there any interest to include such an approach in the health programme of the Imperial Organisation for Social Services? A.A.: The use of medicinal plants has been prevalent throughout our country’s long history, and prior to modern approaches to medicine, doctors who practised traditional medicine used their knowledge of 224

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plants to treat patients. The effectiveness of plants was well known among Iranian families, and various plant elixirs were available in local shops. This practice was also common in China, India and a majority of Asian countries. Also, major drug companies use the components of plants to manufacture new medications. The IOSS, which owned Daroopakhsh, had given this approach some consideration but had not made any major advances. As the programmes at the IOSS were re-evaluated, interest in medicinal plants was reinvigorated, and the Plan Organisation expressed interest in the programme. With the encouragement of Mr Asfia, a pharmaceutical research institute was formed within the IOSS, with its own charter and budget. Dr Rouhi, who had done extensive research in the field, was named as its director. Dr Rouhi travelled to India to visit several research facilities and was able to establish a working relationship with several institutions that were quite advanced at that time. Dr Rouhi concluded that most of the essential plants were available in Iran but were growing in the wild and mixed with other vegetation. Local residents were aware of their medicinal value and would handpick and sell them at farmers’ markets. In order to have a successful programme, areas with the right weather conditions had to be targeted to grow the plants exclusively in large tracts. With the assistance of local authorities, several fields of between ten and 20 hectares were identified and developed under the management of the pharmaceutical research institute. Meanwhile, to familiarise people with their use we imported a small quantity of herbs from Switzerland such as camomile, verbena and lime-blossom, with original packaging and Persian labelling for market development in Iran. These products were well received, and it encouraged the management of the institute to develop the market for them. However, after the Islamic Revolution, the institute faced an uncertain future.

Was the Daroopakhsh pharmaceutical company, which was part of the Imperial Organisation for Social Services, not involved in that initiative? A.A.: In terms of organisation, these two entities were separate 225

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and independent of one another; however, there was collaboration between them. Nader Sharghi, the former president of the College of Pharmacology at the University of Tehran, who was the managing director of Daroopakhsh, agreed to serve on the board of directors of the new institute when he went into retirement. Thus, a very close cooperation between the two organisations became possible.

Who replaced Dr Sharghi at Daroopakhsh when he retired? A.A.: Abolhassan Raji, former assistant director of the Plan Organisation, managed this sizable and important institution for three years before stepping aside for health reasons. Shapour Shafai, a graduate of the University of Lausanne in Switzerland, was named as his replacement.

What was the position of the Imperial Organisation for Social Services concerning professional and vocational training? As you described earlier, it had begun on a small scale with vocational training in Tehran, and had then expanded to include a centre in Isfahan with a capacity for training 1,000 students. Were there any additional programmes that were developed? A.A.: As I explained before, Mr Reza Razmara, the former Deputy Minister of Industry and Mining, was selected as deputy director for technical training, because we foresaw great demand for trained employees in various industries. With the country developing at a rapid pace, an educated and trained workforce was needed to fill the ranks between the highly educated managers and the low-skill workers. With the available resources at the IOSS, it was possible to engage all educational capabilities of different organisations toward strengthening the nation’s workforce and making a positive impact. For planning purposes, it had to be taken into consideration that the manufacturing sector had been developed by the private sector. Factories and their equipment were of different origins and were operated under 226

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different sets of standards; it was therefore necessary to teach the operational characteristics of equipment from diverse origins. Since the majority of the imported machinery was from Germany, Great Britain, the United States and Japan, it was conceived that training programmes be devised with the help of technicians from those countries. With two centres in Tehran and Isfahan that were near completion with the assistance of Austria, four additional facilities, each specialising in a specific standard and each with a capacity of 2,000 students, were planned for Mashhad, Shiraz, Tabriz and Kerman. It has to be noted that the Shah was receiving updates on the progress of these programmes. As the plans for this project were underway, I received a call from the chief protocol officer of the Royal Court asking me to meet the chairman of the Sony Corporation of Japan, who had had an audience with the Shah. At our meeting, I was given assurances that Sony was proposing to help us in any way to train students in electronics. Japan was a major supplier of electronic products to the Iranian market at the time, and the absence of technicians to repair the products was detrimental to the consumer and ultimately to the supplier. The company did not want negative publicity associated with its products and was willing to offer favourable terms. I discussed the offer with Mr Razmara and Mr Majd, the former Deputy Minister of Labour who was cooperating with the IOSS on training technicians. After full consideration of their proposal we decided to assign the Mashhad facility for that purpose. Shortly thereafter, during a visit to Mashhad by Princess Ashraf, we were able to secure 100,000 square metres of land, which was part of the endowment of the Shrine of Imam Reza (Astan-e-Ghods), for 5 million tomans ($650,000). Within a short period, the first architectural plans for the training centre were prepared with the assistance of Sony. Asghar Ajdari, the former president of the Mollasani College of Agriculture in Khuzestan, was named as the project manager. This initiative progressed at an astonishing speed. The instructors and the machinery sent by Sony arrived within a few months, well before the completion of the facilities, and the training of the first group of 400 students began in temporary locations. Some students who completed a four-month training session found jobs quickly at many times the rate of wages then being paid to workers with similar backgrounds; some 227

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opened small electronic repair shops and were able to make a decent living. The construction of the training centre continued on schedule, and classes were transferred as each section was completed.

Was the financing for the project provided by the IOSS, or was it funded through the Plan Organisation? A.A.: All these programmes were meant to support national development objectives, and the Plan Organisation was keen to assist enterprises that would help the economy rather than those driven by profit. The Plan Organisation was interested in expediting such initiatives and getting results. Given that the managing director of the Plan Organisation, the speakers of the legislative bodies, and several ministers were on the board of the IOSS, and the director of Bank Melli was the treasurer of the organisation and was supervising all expenditures, in addition to the annual audit of the accounts by the government’s general auditing office, there was no lack of confidence on the part of the government about such ventures. With the available resources, the IOSS was able to manage the completed project. Therefore, once the construction phase was completed, it was not going to be a burden on the government. The premise was for the Plan Organisation to assist in establishing such entities, and the operational costs would be borne by non-profit organisations.

Back to the subject of professional and vocational training institutions. After the completion of the centre in Mashhad with the assistance of the Sony Corporation, what was the situation with the other facilities? A.A.: The plan was to build three more training centres in Shiraz, Tabriz and Kerman. In Shiraz, a 100,000-square-metre parcel of land, close to the airport, was donated by a benevolent resident of the city, one Mr Saheb-Divani. It was decided that with the collaboration of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the programme would provide 228

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training in electronics. Mr Razmara was in charge of the project, and he started the negotiation process. A contract to provide technical assistance and cooperation was signed, the facility was designed with their input, and construction got underway. As for the other projects, it was decided that the institute in Tabriz should be established with the collaboration of a reputable British company, and the one in Kerman with a German company. Unfortunately, because of strikes, these projects were advancing slowly and were ultimately abandoned at the time of the Islamic Revolution. During this period, my personal relationship with Prime Minister Hoveyda had returned to the way it used to be, and we would frequently see each other at social gatherings. He would also invite me to his office for lunch, a couple of times a month. It would occasionally be just the two of us, but usually Manouchehr Shahgholi, the Minister of Health, would join us. In the old days, conversations among our friends were usually about the shortcomings in the country and how we were behind the advanced economies of the world. But now, we mostly talked about various aspects of the economy and the progress the country had made during the past 15 years. One time, I remarked that foreigners travelling through our country noticed the pace of development and the enthusiasm of the people who were working hard to improve their lives. All these factories, roads, dams, buildings, farms equipped with advanced machinery, and other industrial operations impressed any casual viewer. However, unlike the employees of some of the new factories who wore uniforms, the workers in small factories and on the farms were still in drab and dirty clothing that was often patched and worn out. The contrast between the big price tags of the machinery, such as a 5-million-rial (about $70,000) caterpillar tractor, and the outfit worn by its operator, which spoke of his utter poverty, was agonising. Mr Hoveyda agreed with me and said that a solution had to be found, since the private sector had not managed to provide such products on a large scale. When investments in other industries were generating a 30 to 40 per cent return, it was not surprising that business people were not interested in producing cheap clothing for workers. Even if they did, they would sell them at such high prices that the workers would not be able to afford them. Then, abruptly, Mr 229

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Hoveyda asked me if I remembered that when I was Governor General of Khuzestan, I had proposed that the government should do something to provide inexpensive outfits for the labourers on the Iraqi border. He then said that since I was now the head of a non-profit organisation, I should pursue the matter and that he would help to make it happen. I replied that if he would promise to help, I was willing to prepare a project for that purpose. He gave me his word, on the condition that the outfits would not cost the workers more than 1,000 rials (about $15). Following our discussion, plans were drawn up with the help of my colleagues at the IOSS. It was decided that during the first phase, the programme would be launched on a small scale rather than making a substantial investment and attempting to make outfits for all the workers. We thought, instead of building a huge factory to produce millions of outfits for workers in general, we would opt for small factories in different parts of the country to develop interest among the workers for the products. Also, we thought that since sewing was a vocation well established among women, we would start by training young women, who would be able to earn a salary and help their families. Considering that wages were much lower in the provinces and the number of women looking for work there was much higher than in the cities, bringing together a competent group of employees was much easier, and it would also help the local economy. We believed that once these small factories were operational and a market was developed by promoting the use of the uniforms among workers, the private sector would be encouraged to invest and the project could expand rapidly. Our preliminary plans were presented to Prime Minister Hoveyda, and he accepted our proposal and promised to help with financing. The final plans were completed and presented to Princess Ashraf for approval. She was pleased and gave us the green light. With her approval in hand, we entered the next phase of the process. The first step was to set up a separate unit at the IOSS for this project. Mr Razmara was assigned to oversee this initiative, and Heshmat Yousefi, the former head of the Women’s Organisation who had extensive experience in education and training, was named as director. The programme was tailored within the guidelines of the Planning and Budget Organisation, and with the backing of the Prime Minister, it was 230

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approved shortly by the Plan Organisation. To start the project, a large piece of land in the western part of Tehran that belonged to the IOSS was appropriated for construction of the first factory. Concurrently, with the help of local authorities we acquired the necessary lands in five other locations, namely, Zahedan, Gonbad-e Qabus, Sanandaj, Dehloran and Rezayieh.2 These lands belonged to either the government or the local municipality. The plans for the factories were designed by Mohsen Foroughi’s office, with the assistance of professionals in the Ministry of Industry and Mines. They were completed in a short period of time and construction began on the site in Tehran. The sewing machines were purchased from a German company after an open bid of international suppliers. Alongside these activities, extensive research was done in the selection of fabrics and the designs of the uniforms. Denim was chosen for its durability, and since denim was not manufactured in Iran, a supplier in Turkey who offered the best value and variety of colour was selected. Designs of the uniforms for factory and farm workers were also chosen. A matter of concern throughout the process was that the final price of a uniform should not exceed 100 tomans. All the associated costs had to be taken into account, including a fair percentage of profit. The objective of this project was to produce a uniform that was comfortable, cheap and welcomed by the workers. We wanted the workers to discard their old, worn-out clothes in favour of the uniforms and open a new market that would interest the private sector. The idea was to sell these factories at the first opportunity to the highest bidder in the private sector. It was for this reason that an independent unit was created in the IOSS for this project, and all the records were kept separate. So, when the time came to sell these factories to the private sector, their records would be easy to verify and not be mixed with other units of IOSS. After 14 months, the first factory in Tehran was inaugurated by Princess Ashraf and Mr Hoveyda, and a complete uniform for 100 tomans was presented to 2

All strategically located near the borders of Iran – in the south-east next to Pakistan (Zahedan), in the north-east next to the Soviet Union (Goubad-e-Qabus), in the south-west near Iraq (Dehloran) and in the north-west near Turkey (Rezayekh, now Urmiyeh), and in the west again near Iraq (Sanandaj). 231

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the market. At that time, denim trousers from foreign suppliers were available in the stores for 200–300 tomans, while the daily wage of a low-skilled worker was 100 tomans. The construction of the other factories was near completion, and arrangements were made for the managers and instructors to come to Tehran for training. Mrs Yousefi tirelessly travelled between various locations to ensure that the projects were completed on schedule.

Considering the vast resources at its disposal, did the IOSS help other charities or did it rather play solely by itself? A.A.: This is actually a very important matter. Since the inception of the IOSS, the idea was not to concentrate all charity efforts in one organisation, but rather to always support other charitable institutions and offer them assistance. When I started my work at the IOSS, there were more than 50 humanitarian entities classified as organisations, foundations, charities and such that regularly received aid from the IOSS. The National Organisation for Iranian Women and the Foundation for the Protection of Mothers were only two of them. These groups had gradually been organised over 30 years based on the needs of the time and were largely managed by benevolent groups or individuals; they needed assistance to be able to sustain themselves. At the same time, communities needed their services, and Princess Ashraf never shied away from using the resources of the IOSS to help maintain them, so long as there was accountability. An inspector from the IOSS would visit these organisations on a regular basis and would prepare a report for me to review. One of these reports was about a widow with two children. She had opened her home to 30 orphans and was taking care of these children with the help of donations. The report was so interesting that I decided to visit the house, accompanied by Abol Ghassem Partoazam, the former Deputy Minister of Labour and social affairs who was a senior adviser at the IOSS. We went to a neighbourhood close to the bazaar. The woman’s dedication to the cause was evident in the condition of the house; the children lived with basic means in a sanitary environment. 232

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This woman was spending all of her time caring for these unfortunate orphans who had nobody else, while raising her own children. She was a mother to all of them. The funding that she received from the IOSS was not that much, and she relied on the generosity of local businesses to feed the children and manage the premises in an exemplary manner. Consequently, we did increase the funding and helped them through other means so she could carry on with her work with not much headache. However, the experience of going to that neighbourhood and seeing the way that the residents dealt with their local issues steered me in a new direction. Foremost was that I came to realise that the way of caring for orphans in Iran had to be re-evaluated. Furthermore, a reservoir of goodwill among the benevolent citizens of the country was not being fully recognised. The top officials of the country were always seeking solutions to the problems of society through more government.

Could you elaborate further? A.A.: Regarding the orphans, in many large cities there were orphanages funded by municipalities. In some cities, the Red Lion and Sun Society3 provided for the care of these children. In other places, organisations had been set up by compassionate individuals, such as the late Mr San’atizadeh in Kerman, who was a father figure to many orphans and had personally funded an operation there. Nevertheless, children who were raised in group homes or orphanages lacked the warmth and tenderness of normal family relationships. They were different from other children and were categorised and treated as such. These early experiences had left them with deep emotional scars, but in the absence of an alternative, caring for orphans in such institutions, and trying to address their educational and developmental needs under those conditions, had been the best solution at the time. But the high cost of caring for the children amid shortages of funds and the absence of organisations to help out did not bode well for the future of these orphans. A 3

The Iranian Red Cross. 233

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noteworthy observation was that once a family unit was broken up for any reason such as death, incarceration, divorce, debt or abandonment by the father, those who wanted to help would place the children in orphanages as a first step. The mother was then able to find some menial job to make a living. This was done with the best intentions to deal with a terrible situation. But it was the breaking up of a family that had dire consequences. Social workers and members of the Women’s Organisation would often bring up the subject in our meetings. This topic had always been a concern at the IOSS, and following my visit to the home of the compassionate woman who was taking care of 30 orphans, I was determined to find a better solution to this widespread problem. These institutions, public or private, undertake a huge financial burden to take care of these families. Public institutions such as municipalities or the Red Lion and Sun Society, which operate under strict guidelines, have many expenses. In addition to providing meals, clothing, education and medical services, they incur other expenses such as the costs associated with the building and its employees. With tight budgets and constant shortfalls, these institutions were not able to keep up with the demands of a developing nation. The cost for caring for one child was more than the amount that could sustain a family of four. In other words, if the total cost of operating a 100-child-capacity orphanage were tallied, including the cost of personnel salaries, benefits and overtime; the cost of the facility in rent, utilities and maintenance; and the cost per child in education, clothing, food and medical expenses, the cost per child would suffice to support the whole family where the child had come from. Therefore, anytime we could keep a child in his or her own family unit and provide for other children in the household by giving support to the mother, with proper supervision, the home would be preserved and many problems would be avoided. With this concept in mind, I wondered if we could start a project to encourage and organise the benevolent individuals who were willing to support the children to instead support their families and help improve the children’s lives in that way. We could use the resources of municipalities and charities in a much better way to address this major social issue. I discussed the idea with my colleagues, and everyone concurred and urged me to pursue the matter. At the first 234

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opportunity, I presented the case to Princess Ashraf, and she endorsed it and gave it her full support. Having received the green light, the plan for the ‘Protection of Families’ became an important activity of the IOSS. Our plan called for the identification of poor neighbourhoods in towns that were targeted for the initiative. Local committees of elders and trustworthy residents of the neighbourhoods were to be formed. Their task was to identify families that had lost the breadwinner and were eligible for assistance. Social workers had to research their backgrounds and determine the level of assistance needed based on certain criteria, such as the number and age of the dependents. For planning purposes and budget considerations, it was decided that the average payment to each household would be 500 tomans per month, with the caveat that the amount would be adjusted based on the evaluation of each situation. Additionally, based on the local committee recommendations, a social worker would be available to offer further assistance, such as registering children in schools, helping to deal with medical issues, and other needs that may arise. Hossein Sarkeshik, who had completed his graduate studies in social work and had worked for several years with municipalities on social issues, was selected to manage this operation. This young and capable individual was able to launch this programme at the IOSS in a short period. Such a programme had only been talked about in other governmental organisations, but Mr Sarkeshik was able to recruit a group of competent social workers and establish an exemplary programme. Several local committees were formed in Tehran and in two other cities, and they were praised and welcomed in the communities. When the residents would see the elders in the neighbourhood along with butchers and bakers coming together to support families in distress, with the backing of an organisation that was undertaking the expense, they would also become interested and offer to help. In a few short months, the process was well organised and on a roll. The file on each eligible family was completed, and the information was available for reference. With the information at hand, benevolent individuals were approached and offered the possibility of supporting one or more families. Fortunately, a good number of people became immediately 235

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interested. I recall that one of the first persons to offer support to three families was Lili Nazemian, the daughter of the late Abdullah Riazi, who had been speaker of the National Assembly. A procedure was set up for those who pledged to support a family, to receive information from the family’s file and periodic reports from the social workers. This was intended to keep the donors informed and assured that their donation was properly applied and not diverted to other expenses. Once the programme was successfully established and recognised by the top officials of the country, it was decided to expand the programme in Tehran and elsewhere to include more families. Since the IOSS was not in a position to handle the project on a nationwide scale, the Planning and Budget Organisation agreed to provide financing to increase the scope of the programme with the hope of attracting more donors as time went by. Our goal was that, in a matter of two or three years, the IOSS would be responsible only for the management of the programme, and most families would be matched with donors who would support the families. Unfortunately, this vision was derailed by some officials of the newly established Ministry of Welfare and Social Affairs. They decided to take over the programme, which had successfully attracted the attention of high government authorities as well as a multitude of donors, and had secured financing from the Plan Organisation. These officials were able to convince the well-meaning Minister to try to take over this project. They were oblivious to the fact that the success of the programme was due to its structure, which depended on attracting the private sector to get involved in solving this huge social issue. They were ignoring the fact that any time a government agency gets involved, the bureaucracy discourages citizen participation, and in this case ultimately the families will end up depending on government handouts. These discussions continued for a long time, and keeping the government officials at bay was difficult because they continued to create problems. Finally, with the intervention of Prime Minister Hoveyda and Mr Asfia, the Minister of State, the issue was resolved and the IOSS was able to continue its work. By the time of the Islamic Revolution, more than 5,000 families were being supported through this programme. Also, plans were in the works 236

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to further expand our efforts to cover 25,000 more families, benefiting 75,000 children between the ages of three and 18, in 200 towns across the country. The success of this programme was mainly owing to the outstanding managerial skills of Mr Sarkeshik, who recruited and trained competent social workers and created the structure of the programme. He was rewarded by being appointed assistant director at the IOSS, in charge of the Protection of Families programme.

You said that after the visit to the house of the woman who was taking care of 30 orphans, you had a novel idea about the efforts of private citizens. What did that mean? A.A.: It occurred to me that the introduction of social services by government was a fairly recent phenomenon that had come about after the revolution inaugurating the constitutional monarchy. Prior to that, the government had mainly been responsible for collecting taxes and assessments from landowners and citizens in order to provide for the expenses of the Shah’s courts and the military, which was responsible for maintaining security in the country and defending its borders. Social services were either non-existent or limited in scope to small localities. Activities such as feeding the poor, helping the sick, building roads between villages, building bridges, maintaining communal water reservoirs, caring for orphans, clothing the needy in cold weather, and so on were all undertaken by goodhearted, benevolent individuals. In other words, no government agencies had the responsibility, or the budget, to address social issues. There was no Ministry of Health or Ministry of Roads or Ministry of Social Services. All such institutions were established after the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, and they were introduced by individuals who had been exposed to modern bureaucratic institutions in Europe. Needless to say, the establishment of new ministries assuming responsibility for various social functions did not mean that charitable zeal vanished from our society. The evidence of charitable fervour can be seen any time there is a natural disaster; people of even modest means step forward to help. The care for poor people and those in need 237

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has always been part of the fabric of our society. The question was: how to engage this enormous resource of goodwill in a manner that could be adapted to the times? Most charitable activities were limited to pious endowments by landowners and wealthy people, who would allocate revenue from part of their capital to commemorate the martyrs of Karbala, finance pilgrimages, maintain holy shrines, and sometimes run an orphanage. These charitable deeds had benefits and were useful to some extent, but they hardly satisfied the needs of a nation that was taking a great leap toward expansion and modernity. I believed that the country needed the private sector to help build modern medical centres and hospitals, training and research facilities, and other philanthropic ventures, and something had to be done about it. In this regard, the Namazi Foundation in Shiraz was an exception. It had helped provide potable water to the residents of Shiraz and had established the wellequipped and modern Namazi Hospital there. The Foundation had made arrangements to use the revenue from the water services for the operational costs of the hospital, which was a charitable entity. It occurred to me that, basically, wealthy individuals were distrustful of government institutions. They feared that any display of wealth would lead to taxes or seizures. Even if they wanted to do charity work, they would not give their money to any government institution. They had experienced that, although working with some good-willed government officials may have started out well, before long the intervention of other bureaucratic elements would lead to unfulfilled promises and unfinished projects. Therefore, in trying to engage this group of benevolent individuals, a big obstacle had to be removed. I thought that, in order to harness this untapped resource, we had to do two things. First, we had to eliminate the suspicion factor from the psyches of our potential donors. Second, we had to earn their trust and make them proud of participating in a good social cause. To allay the fears and suspicions of the donors, I thought that instead of soliciting their donations for a needed public project, as had been done in the past, we should turn the tables on them and offer our resources to help them undertake those projects by themselves, and give them all the credit and honour that their initiative would entail. We would propose to put all our weight behind their effort and provide 238

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up to 10 per cent of the cost in the form of legal fees, consultants’ fees, architectural expenses, and the like, plus obtaining government permits, acquiring government or municipality land, and providing other logistical support. In other words, we would make them feel that it was their project and not ours. The donors would control all expenditures, and not a penny would be paid to the IOSS. I presented my idea to Princess Ashraf, and she thought that we should discuss it with some ministers and distinguished personalities in whom she had confidence. A meeting was organised with about ten individuals who were regularly called upon for advice. Nosratollah Kasemi, a former Minister of State and now assistant director of IOSS, and Abol Ghassem Partoazam from the IOSS accompanied me to the meeting. Following the presentation, the consensus was that mobilising the private sector was a good idea, but the group unanimously disagreed with the proposed manner of its execution. A participant who was a Minister and had extensive experience with the private sector believed that in order to engage the donors, our projects had to be imposed on them or else nothing would be accomplished. This idea was 180 degrees opposite to my rationale; I believed that altruistic work had to be done sincerely and from the bottom of the heart. Political pressure and imposition would remove the humanly sympathetic spirit and would drive people away. Such an approach would not only discourage donors, it would damage any humanitarian initiative for a long time. Believing in my heart that the proposal was justified, I asked Princess Ashraf to allow me to take responsibility and launch this campaign on a trial basis for six months, and to call it off if it were not successful. With her acquiescence, I started planning the next day. At the first stage, I appointed Mr Partoazam as manager of the programme; together, we outlined the nature of the assistance that would be offered to the donors. To begin with, we thought that we should propose to the potential donor that he set up a charitable foundation with a board of trustees of his choosing, reserving the post of treasurer for himself. We would nominate an officer of the IOSS to attend board meetings as an observer. As for our contribution to the project, we would provide legal advice for setting up a charitable foundation, register with pertinent government agencies, acquire land 239

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from the government or municipalities, cover engineering and architectural expenses, deal with local officials, and manage other such issues that were not easily handled by ordinary philanthropic projects. Then we called on Farhad Hormozi, the manager of Fakopa Advertising Agency who worked with the IOSS on lottery ticket promotions, to design some posters and advertising material for the announcement of our new programme in the media. This young and energetic man, who was exceptionally talented, offered to work on this programme for free. It was at that point that we came up with the slogan ‘National Movement for Philanthropy’ and used it in all our advertising material on TV, radio and print media. We were hoping that donors would step forward and the programme could get started. The first sign came at a meeting with Fathollah Motamedi, the Governor General of Kerman. Accompanied by a gentleman named Mr Afzalipour, he came to see me about our new programme. He said that Mr Afzalipour was interested in building a university in Kerman and was willing to donate 50 million tomans ($6.5 million) of his personal wealth. The amount was unexpected and surprising, since we had never received a charitable donation exceeding even 1 million tomans, and this amount seemed unbelievable. Mr Afzalipour said that he had a store on Ferdowsi Avenue, close to Toopkhaneh Square, in Tehran where he sold electricity meters. His profitable business had made him a rich man, and he was interested in building a university. He had been looking for a location, and after much research he had reached the conclusion that one of the most backward provinces in the country in terms of educational opportunities was Kerman. He said that he wanted to invest there and was wondering what kind of assistance we could offer. I told him that I was so moved by his sincere gesture that I was willing to help in any way possible, and assured him of our commitment. Obviously, the first step was to get the approval of the Ministry of Sciences and Higher Education, and after that, we could work to acquire land from the government. After some discussions, I suggested that a foundation be set up with a board of trustees of Mr Afzalipour’s choosing, with himself as the executive director and treasurer to oversee all expenses. A representative of the IOSS would also be on the board to facilitate 240

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communication. He agreed, and we decided to meet again after doing some research. I mentioned this development to Princess Ashraf, and she expressed interest in meeting Mr Afzalipour personally. The meeting was arranged, and after the presentation of his project, Mr Afzalipour requested that Princess Ashraf accept the position of chair of the board of trustees, to which she agreed. In the following weeks, and with our intervention, approval was granted by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. Mr Afzalipour picked one of the top architectural firms in Iran, belonging to Mr Amir-Nasser Monaghah, to design the campus and buildings, and pledged to pay all the expenses himself. After doing his research, Mr Monaghah proposed the acquisition of 200 hectares of land that belonged to the Ministry of Natural Resources. With my recommendation, the Minister, Nasser Golesorkhi, approved the plan in a short period, and the project got underway. As we had predicted, with the first step taken by Mr Afzalipour and the publicity about the National Movement for Philanthropy, others were encouraged to participate. The plans for the buildings of the university in Kerman were ready in a few months, and construction began. Mr Afzalipour spent most of his time on this project; it was even reported that he was personally labouring under the hot sun alongside the workers. Once he realised that the government was willing to assist without creating problems for him, he pledged to spend all of his wealth on this project and did not ask for any financial support from the IOSS. In about a year, the first phase of the construction was complete, and with the assistance of the Ministry of Sciences and Higher Education, a faculty was formed and a small group of students were admitted. The second benevolent individual to step forward was a Mr SherafatYazdi. This good man proposed to bestow a 300-million-rial (over $4 million) building, which was under construction in Yazd, to establish a hospital. The resources of the IOSS were put at his disposal, and the project was finalised. Shortly thereafter, Mr Partoazam told me about Mr Sharafat-Lari, who pledged 60 million tomans for educational purposes. He owned a village located 30 kilometres south of Tehran and wanted to use it as a campus for a theological college to educate clergy, who would be learned and presentable representatives of Islam and could go abroad as missionaries. He believed that our present 241

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clergy were an ignorant, uneducated group who only brought shame to our religion. He wanted seriously to change this unfortunate situation. We accepted his proposal, and the project got underway. A month later, his brother, who was also a wealthy businessman, came forward and proposed to donate 60 million tomans to initiate a technical training school in the same area. His proposal was also accepted. Early one morning, before heading off to work, I received a telephone call from a Mr Nikbakht. He said that I might not remember him, but that he knew me and had been following my career from afar. He had been the superintendent at my high school and, after several years with the Ministry of Education, had transferred to the National Iranian Oil Company. Once he mentioned that he had been my high school superintendent, I remembered him being there the first year I attended that school. He was a tall man who would usually wear dark sunglasses. He was ill tempered, harsh and morose. All the students were frightened of him, and most of the teachers were respectful toward him. I addressed him cordially and asked how he was doing. He said that he was retired and because of some heart problems did not expect to live much longer, and that was why he had called me. He said that he had a wife and three children who had settled into their own families. His retirement benefits would allow his wife to continue living comfortably after his death. He owned a 450-square-metre house close to the Amjadieh Sports Complex, and based on inheritance laws, it would convey to his children. He was wary that his children would want to sell the house, upend his wife, and fight among themselves. Since he approved of my work, he wanted to donate his house, which was worth about 2 million tomans, to the cause. His request was that the IOSS would allow his wife to live there rent-free until she herself passed away. I thanked him for his confidence in me and asked him to come to see me at the office. He arrived at the scheduled time wearing his dark glasses, and I recognised him immediately. I asked Mr Partoazam to join us in the meeting and handle the details. This was another one of my encounters that I still remember. The National Movement for Philanthropy programme expanded under the tireless efforts of Mr Partoazam, and the results after one year were astonishing. The programme was embraced by the populace 242

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beyond our wildest imagination. We convened a meeting with Princess Ashraf and the gentlemen who had been present in our first discussions about this project. Mr Partoazam gave a presentation and named the donors and the amounts that were pledged. When he announced the total amount, which exceeded 800 million tomans ($105 million), a collective gasp of exultation could be heard. The amount was six times the municipal budget of Tehran and about 40 times the tax revenue from cultivated lands prior to the land reform. During the following year, which coincided with social unrest and labour strikes, the pledges totalled 1.2 billion tomans. I must say that the success of this programme falls squarely on the superb social skills of Abol Ghassem Partoazam, who was able to give confidence and assurance to donors and elicit their goodwill. The success of this endeavour and the public’s reception of it demonstrated the degree to which the people of Iran were charitable, and opened this untapped resource in our country that could be used to solve social problems. I began to think that many of the activities at the IOSS could be re-evaluated. There were some activities that no longer needed to be part of our organisation. The IOSS had stepped in when there had been a need, and in the absence of another institution to handle the matter. By transferring such responsibilities to institutions that had been created in the meantime and were now handling the cases, the IOSS would be able to redirect its human and monetary resources toward philanthropic endeavours. For instance, earlier, when there had been no health clinics in remote areas, a programme to establish them was of utmost importance and had no precedence. But now that there were health clinics in many parts of the country, and every year several hundred Health Corps trainees were sent to those locations, the management of 250 health clinics, at enormous cost and with a multitude of problems in terms of staffing and supplies, was not as critical. The responsibility for these centres could be transferred to the Ministry of Health, and, with the help of donors, we could launch new initiatives. I shared my thoughts with Princess Ashraf, and even though she had instituted the health clinics and had an emotional attachment and was keen on maintaining them, the success of the philanthropic 243

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fundraising, with which she was extremely pleased, convinced her to re-evaluate the focus of the organisation. With her consent, we began to review all the activities of the IOSS. Unfortunately, these deliberations coincided with social unrest and strikes across the country, and with the Islamic Revolution our efforts came to a standstill and all the dreams dissipated.

What about the financial affairs of the IOSS? What seems clear is that the IOSS was under the patronage of the Shah and the guidance and supervision of his twin sister, Princess Ashraf. The IOSS was receiving a considerable amount of funding from various sources for charitable causes and the benefit of the public. What were these sources of funding and how did this idea of accountability work? A.A.: The main source of funding for the organisation was a half per cent of revenue from customs, which had been allocated for humanitarian work and divided between the Red Lion and Sun Society and the IOSS. Another important source was revenue from the national lottery, which was operated by the IOSS. It did not amount to much in the beginning, but during the last few years, because of economic development and the successful advertising campaign done by Fakopa, it had reached about 70 million tomans a year. The IOSS was not responsible for any expenditure related to this activity, since Fakopa was paying for the operational costs and was providing all the prizes, receiving a percentage of the earnings. A supervisory board consisting of a representative of the Ministry of Finance, a representative of the treasurer of the IOSS, and several other members oversaw the management of the lottery. The representative from the Ministry of Finance had to ensure the government’s share of the revenue for the Treasury. The income from the lottery, which usually amounts to more than 30 per cent of the earnings in most countries that sponsor lotteries, was limited to 25 per cent in Iran, with 75 per cent being returned to the public in prize money. This was the reason the lottery was embraced by the public. The third source of income for the organisation was profits from various institutions that had been established, such as Daroopakhsh, 244

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which was the largest drug manufacturing plant in the Middle East, and 25 Shahrivar, the Offset printing company. The profits from these companies were deposited into the IOSS account. Also, a savings account for the IOSS had accumulated a considerable sum over 30 years, from which an investment account had been established, managed by a board of directors. They included the director of Bank Melli, who was also treasurer of the IOSS, several board members from the IOSS, and Mr Kheradjou, president of IMDI – the International Mining and Development Bank of Iran, who was the chairman. The deposits into this account amounted to 100 million tomans (approx. $7 million), was invested in various industries, and all the revenue from this account was used for charitable activities. In addition to these sources, there was the income from donations to the organisation. The most important aspect was the management and supervision of the expenditures, and to ensure that they were spent correctly on charitable causes. The supervision was done through several channels, and its approach had been meticulously instituted by the late Dr Javad Ashtiani, who was the first executive director of the IOSS. Every operational unit of the organisation had its own accounting office, which facilitated audits and prevented the commingling of revenues and expenditures between units. Since the inception of the IOSS, the director of Bank Melli had been the organisation’s treasurer, and the accountants had been trained to follow accounting methods used in banks; several accountants at the IOSS were in fact retired bank employees who were familiar with the procedures and followed them diligently. Also, the director of Bank Melli had appointed a trusted colleague as representative to the IOSS, who had to approve and sign every cheque. Because of this, the IOSS had one of the best accounting divisions in Iran, which made the operation of this huge organisation feasible. This was because, when Dr Mohammad Mossadegh was in power, there was some animosity toward Princess Ashraf. A group of inspectors had been sent to audit the organisation’s books for evidence of misappropriation of funds, to pressure the princess. After an exhaustive search, they were unable to cite a single misdeed. Hence, Dr Mossadegh summoned Mr Ashtiani to appease him, and gave him a handwritten 245

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commendation of the IOSS’s working procedures. Therefore, when I went to the IOSS, I did not change any accounting procedures or staff, and work progressed as usual. I did, however, appoint Abbas Sarabandi, a former director at the Ministry of the Interior, as the budget director for the organisation. After the Islamic Revolution, one of the institutions that was targeted by the revolutionaries was the IOSS. They raided the organisation to find fodder for their anti-regime propaganda. At that juncture, two brave and honourable assistant directors from the accounting department whom I had only met a couple of times, who were pious Muslims with fanatical tendencies, stood up to the revolutionaries. They declared that all the accounts had been under their supervision, and they took responsibility. They were able successfully to calm the situation and turn the men away. This was a synopsis of my time at the IOSS.

And what happened to you following the Islamic Revolution? A.A.: Early in 1978, the year of the revolution, I accompanied Princess Ashraf to western Azerbaijan, where an event had been planned as part of a visit to survey social development projects in the area. In Rezayieh, I got a very serious nosebleed during an event. The local medical staff was unable to stop the bleeding, and I was flown on a private plane back to Tehran and taken directly to the Reza Pahlavi Hospital in Tajrish. My condition was alarming, as I had lost about 30 per cent of my blood. Dr Saeed Ghaem-Maghami was so concerned that he asked Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, with which the hospital was affiliated, to send a specialist. The Iranian embassy in Washington was alerted, and the personal involvement of my dear and noble friend Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi made it possible to make swift travel arrangements. The head of the Ear Nose and Throat department at Johns Hopkins and an assistant arrived within 24 hours with the necessary medical equipment. Thanks to their treatment, I recovered in 15 days and was able to leave the hospital and go back to work. After this episode, around the month of November, I travelled to Europe for a week on a mission. The day prior to my return, I got 246

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another heavy nosebleed in Paris. I sought medical treatment at the American Hospital and, with my history, I was told to refrain from heavy activity and air travel. Princess Ashraf was informed, and she approved that I delay my return to Tehran until I recover. Meanwhile, the reports of strikes and unrest in Iran kept coming. My three-year term as the director of the IOSS was coming to a close, and a decision had to be made about my successor. Under those circumstances, and with Princess Ashraf being in the United States, it was decided that Nosratollah Kasemi be named as the interim director. My stay in Paris was prolonged, and, with the occurrence of the revolution, it has continued to the present day.

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Celebration at Persepolis

When did you begin working at the High Council for the Imperial Celebrations at Persepolis? Abdolreza Ansari: My Persepolis story begins in September 1970, when I was in charge of the various charity organisations under Princess Ashraf. One day, she called me and summoned me at once to her palace on an urgent matter. When I reported to her, she informed me that the Shah had decided that preparations for the celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great should begin in earnest. At the time, Mr Amir Homayoun Boushehri, a prominent government official who had been the Minister of Roads and Government spokesman under the former Prime Minister, Dr Mohammad Mossadeq, was responsible for the project. However, he sadly was ill with cancer and undergoing treatment in Europe, and in his stead Dr Mehdi Boushehri, Princess Ashraf ’s husband and nephew of Amir Homayoun, had been chosen to replace him. Unfortunately, Dr Boushehri was abroad and too busy with other projects, including the construction of the Maison d’Iran, a cultural centre in Paris. So I was instructed to take over Dr Boushehri’s role immediately. The next day I moved into to the Central Office of the High Council for the celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire, located in a modest building in Tehran on Elizabeth 249

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Boulevard. Looking at the dossiers, I learned that ten years earlier, when the late Hossein Ala was Court Minister, Mr Shoja’eddin Shafa, cultural adviser to the Imperial Court, had suggested that, to coincide with the commemoration of the 25-centuries-old proclamation of human rights1 by the Persian King Cyrus the Great (who was introduced to the Jewish and Christian worlds in the Old Testament and who was named ‘God’s Messenger’), a celebration be held at Persepolis to mark Iran’s glorious history, culture and civilisation. This idea had been discussed with the Shah and had received his blessing. Eventually it had been decided back in the early 1960s that the celebrations be held to mark the actual birth of Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Persian Empire rather than to be linked to his human rights proclamation. The Imperial Court had been given the task of planning and handling the necessary preparations. Once the decision was approved, a High Council for the Imperial Celebrations was established under the direction of Mr Amir Homayoun Boushehri. This was of course prior to his illness. The goals of the celebrations were listed as follows: ‘The reawakening of the history, civilisation and culture of Iran and creating awareness among the peoples of the world.’ To achieve these goals, a series of programmes had been proposed to be launched, which included: 1 The formation of an Iranian and International Congress of Iran Scholars to be held in the city of Shiraz to examine various aspects of Iran’s culture and civilisation and its influence in the world. 2 The publication and printing of important historical records on Iran. 1

This refers to the so-called Cyrus Cylinder, now in the British Museum. It is a small (22.5 cm by 10 cm) clay cylinder created c.539 bc carrying a declaration by the Persian King Cyrus the Great on matters of governance and proclaiming the rights of captive peoples to be repatriated to their homelands. This iconic clay document has been seen as the vehicle for the return to Jerusalem of the captive Jews who had been held in Babylon since the Babylonian capture and destruction of Jerusalem about 50 years earlier. The Cyrus proclamation on this clay cylinder, which liberated the Jews held in captivity, is often portrayed as the world’s first declaration of human rights. 250

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3 The encouragement of Iranian writers and researchers to produce books and articles relating to Iranian culture. 4 The construction of a monument and museum to represent the historical epochs of Iranian civilisation and culture. 5 The hosting of exhibitions, seminars, and festivals in all of Iran’s provinces and townships, as well as in embassies and Iranian agencies in other countries. When I began working, some of these projects were already underway, including the construction of the Shahyad Monument, which had been designed by a talented Iranian architect and came under the management of Mr Ghassem Bonshari, younger brother of Amir Homayoun Boushehri. A committee of Iranian experts composed of first-rate scholars met regularly to commission the publication of 40 historical books by providing funding to their authors. There were also plans to reproduce a 700-year-old copy of the Baysonghori Shahnameh,2 a rare fifteenth-century manuscript containing miniatures and illustrations. The Bagh-e Javadieh, a garden in east Tehran with an opulent villa belonging to Mr Mehdi Yazdi, a prominent businessman, had been purchased for use during the celebrations. A bank account was set aside for the celebrations with about 50 million tomans ($7 million), and its interest was used to cover the council’s daily expenses. This was the state of the High Council for the Imperial Celebrations in September 1970. My conclusion was that, given the current state of the High Council, any plans for such a national and international event was doomed to failure if it simply relied on its own resources without the full participation and cooperation of the country’s high officials. For this reason, I waited a few days until Mr Asadollah Alam, the Minister of the Imperial Court, returned to Tehran from his travels. 2

The Baysonghori Shahnameh is one of the few surviving manuscripts of the poet Ferdowsi’s tenth/eleventh-century epic poem which tells the story of Iran’s past through a mixture of mythology and the medieval knowledge of Iran’s history. Baysonghor was a fifteenth-century Timurid warlord and patron of art and culture who commissioned an edition of Ferdowsi’s text in calligraphy and beautifully executed miniature paintings depicting key scenes from Ferdowsi’s text which refer to his epic verse. 251

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At the opportune time I discussed my concerns with Mr Alam, who listened with great interest to my detailed explanations; he said that the matter was extremely important and that he would bring it to the Shah’s attention and refer back to me. One or two days later when I visited his office, he told me: ‘I delivered your report to His Majesty and received instructions that in order to implement the celebrations, which is a national duty, a High Committee should be formed under the supervision of Her Imperial Majesty, the Queen, and chaired by the Court Minister.’ The High Committee, I learned, was to be composed of Mehrdad Pahlbod (Minister of Arts and Culture) and the Shah’s brotherin-law – husband of his older sister, Princess Shams, Dr Mehdi Boushehri (head of the High Council for the Imperial Celebrations who had replaced his ailing uncle Amir Homayoun Boushehri), Hormoz Gharib (Grand Master of Ceremonies), Shoja’eddin Shafa (Assistant Court Minister for Cultural Affairs), General Nematollah Nassiri (director of SAVAK, the national security and intelligence organisation), Amir Mottaqi (Assistant to Court Minister and responsible for administrative affairs), Reza Ghotbi (director of the National Iranian Radio and Television), and myself. Mr Alam added that the date for the commencement of the celebrations had been set for October 1971 and that the High Committee’s first meeting was set for the following week. At the first meeting of the High Committee, Mr Alam gave a brief summary on the purpose of the celebrations and the Shah’s directives regarding the committee’s duties. He explained that this project would be independent of government activities and programmes but, since there were already development programmes underway across the country, inevitably some of these projects would come to fruition and no doubt would add to the celebratory mood. I was asked to inform the committee on the impending work so that it could be reviewed. I gave an overview of the ongoing projects, and it was agreed that in the next meeting we would review the details and reach a final decision. In the numerous meetings that were held later, each programme was discussed in full and the broad schedule for the celebrations agreed upon as follows: 252

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1 A ceremony honouring Cyrus the Great at Pasargad.3 2 Hosting of the Congress of Iranian Academics and Scholars at Pahlavi University in Shiraz. 3 A military parade with the participation of the army, with each unit representing one of the epochs of Iran’s history. 4 A light and sound show at Persepolis similar to those held at the Pyramids in Egypt and the Acropolis in Athens. 5 The launching of seminars on the history and culture of Iran in all the provinces and townships in Iran, and in embassies and Iranian agencies around the world. 6 The republication of a high-quality book about the history of Iranian culture translated into several of the world’s most important languages. 7 The republication of a facsimile edition of the Baysonghori Shahnameh manuscript. It was suggested that a few heads of state and key international figures be invited to the ceremonies and that the Imperial Court be tasked with this job, keeping the committee informed of progress. In order to speed up matters, it was decided that all matters of protocol be handled by Mr Gharib; Mr Pahlbod was to deal with the organisations supplying the logos, songs, ceremonial details, maps, brochures on historic monuments, and films; security would be the responsibility of General Nassiri; coverage by the radio and television networks was given to Mr Ghotbi; Mr Shafa was to deal with the Congress of Iranian Academics and Scholars in Shiraz and abroad; any matter that dealt with the celebrations but was related to the Imperial Court was to be referred to Mr Mottaqi; and all matters dealing with the provinces and townships, the construction of monuments and the Shahyad Museum, the light and sound programme at Persepolis, the reproduction of the Shahnameh and the publication of a book on Iran’s cultural heritage, and the monitoring of preparations and progress of the celebrations and coordination between the various programmes and the High Council for the Imperial Celebrations was my responsibility. 3

The site of Cyrus’s palaces and his tomb a few kilometres north of Persepolis. 253

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It was also agreed that from time to time a progress report would be given at a meeting chaired by the Queen. In this manner, the elaborate programme for the celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire, which had until now been semidormant, came to life.

What were the ‘celebrations’ and were there to have been other ceremonies than the one at Persepolis? A.A.: It had been planned to hold ceremonies in all of our provinces, townships, and embassies abroad. You must realise that throughout Iran’s 2,500-year history, our country had numerous capitals such as Susa, Shiraz, Qazvin, Isfahan and Mashhad. Each of these places had once been a key political, economic and cultural centre in its own right, and it was crucial that their glorious past be revived for the present generation so that Iranians and especially our youth be made aware of their rich heritage and in turn feel a responsibility for protecting and embellishing it. That was the basis upon which the idea for the celebrations had been founded. To coincide with the ceremonies at Persepolis, there were plans to hold in every part of the country exhibitions and seminars attended by experts and academics and scholars with the aim of creating a vital movement and strengthening patriotism and pride among Iranians. In addition, all Iranian embassies and agencies were to set up exhibitions with photographs, distribute publications on Iran’s history and culture, and organise conferences not only to introduce foreigners to Iran’s heritage but also to attract Iranians abroad to their ancestral land; naturally, these programmes would be entertaining as well. That is why these events were referred to as the jashnhayeh shahanshahi, or ‘imperial celebrations’.

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Why, only a few months before the Persepolis Celebrations, was the emblem of the occasion, which had been printed for the previous ten years on the High Council’s stationery, changed from an eagle’s head to ‘The Cyrus Cylinder’? Who ordered the change? A.A.: The reason was that the High Council for the Imperial Celebrations received a letter from my dear friend Dr Khosrow Khosrovani, then Iran’s Ambassador to Egypt, in which it was officially stated that the emblem used on the brochures advertising the celebrations was similar to those used in ancient Egypt before the time of Cyrus the Great. Our Ambassador was concerned that the use of this emblem might be misinterpreted. For this reason I mentioned this issue during one of our early meetings of the High Committee. It was decided that Mr Mehrdad Pahlbod4 should study the matter at the Ministry of Culture and report the result to committee members. One day during a meeting of the High Committee that was held at Niavaran Palace in the presence of the Queen, Mr Pahlbod arrived with two prominent experts of the Ministry of Culture and Arts. I recall that one of them was Dr Sadegh Kia, a well-known and prominent Iranian academic. Mr Pahlbod asked the two gentlemen to report their findings to the committee. These gentlemen explained that the choice of the original emblem had been made after serious research and had been inspired from a depiction discovered on one of the clay tablets excavated at Persepolis; the emblem was found on many other relics of that period and was without a doubt of Persian origin. It was also mentioned that in the past, other nations such as ancient Greece and Rome had used the eagle emblem in various ways but were distinctly different from Iranian patterns. The emblem used for the imperial celebrations, they stated, was Iranian without any doubt. After a lengthy discussion, Mr Alam finally proposed that, because the matter had cast some doubts, it would be prudent to avoid further disagreements by designing a new emblem for the celebrations. This proposal was ratified, and it was decided that the Ministry of Culture and Arts would come up with a new emblem and forward it in due 4

Minister of Culture and husband of the Shah’s elder sister, Princess Shams. 255

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course to the High Committee for final approval. It was for this reason that after one or two weeks a new design was presented in which the cylinder of King Cyrus’s proclamation of human rights was at the centre, surrounded by 25 symbols representing 25 centuries; the emblem was inspired by the relics at Persepolis and included the Pahlavi crest in a prominent position. This emblem was approved in a meeting held in the presence of the Queen and was used from that date onward. I later found out that the use of the Cyrus Cylinder had been suggested by Mr Shoja’eddin Shafa.

Was there an organisation at Persepolis itself charged with overseeing local aspects of the project? A.A.: The supervision of the project had been entrusted to the Governor of Fars Province, which was supposed to work with other related organisations. Before year end, the High Committee decided that all its members should visit Shiraz and Persepolis to inspect the progress being made in the construction of the Kourosh5 (Cyrus) and Darius Hotels, which had been a part of the government’s development plans for tourism. Officials at the Ministry of Development and Housing and the Tourist Board had assured us that the hotels would be ready for use by foreign guests during the celebrations. The Ministry of Roads had also assured us that the asphalting of the Shiraz–Persepolis road would be a priority. The inspection tour began one sunny day in the company of all committee members with the exception of Mr Hormoz Gharib (grand master of ceremonies and protocol) and Mr Reza Qotbi. At Shiraz Airport, we were received by Mr Nasser Sadri, the Governor of Fars Province, and other civilian and military officials. After a brief stay we headed toward Persepolis. The first place we inspected was the Kourosh Hotel in Shiraz. The sight of an unfinished building where a few workers were busy soldering metal beams hit us like a thunderbolt. In addition, the deserted lands, filthy and dilapidated walls, and incomplete buildings that stood along 5

An alternative rendering of the Persian name Cyrus. 256

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the route through the city made a very poor impression. After leaving the city and driving down the snake-like and half-paved Shiraz Road toward Persepolis, we journeyed for 60 kilometres through a barren landscape devoid of trees, with only a few patches of farmed lands. Next to the southern walls of Persepolis we could see the skeleton of a building similar to the one in Shiraz, which we were told was the spot where the Darius Hotel was to have been built and where seven or eight workers were busy working. In all that area, the only building worth mentioning was an old pavilion built under Reza Shah the Great to house the Department of Archaeology. Witnessing this lamentable state of affairs had a profound and indescribable effect on the morale of Mr Alam and other members of the High Committee. We were frankly all in a state of deep shock and disbelief at the local officials who had assured us that all work was proceeding at a fast pace and on schedule. After a short tour, we returned to Shiraz for lunch at the Governor’s mansion. Following lunch, a meeting was held in the company of the Governor, military personnel, and security heads to discuss the situation. In the beginning, the usually calm but now annoyed Mr Alam demanded an explanation from the gathered officials. Once he had heard their explanations and promises that their respective tasks would be completed on time, Mr Alam took the floor and said: I’m telling you once and for all that the staging of these celebrations is a national priority, and what is at stake is Iran’s honour in the eyes of the world. If there is to be the slightest error in the work that has been assigned to you and if the ceremonies are not conducted to the highest expected standards, I will personally take my pistol and shoot every one of you before taking my own life! From today you know what has to be done, and be warned that no excuses will be tolerated.

With these words the meeting came to an end and we all returned to Tehran. It was still not clear then how many foreign guests and at what level would be invited to attend the ceremonies. Of course it was assumed that the Iranian guests would be in charge of finding their own accommodation in Shiraz and that, once complete, the Kourosh and Darius 257

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Hotels, each with 100 rooms, could easily hold the foreign guests. Other visitors were to be put up in facilities in Shiraz and at Pahlavi University. Until then, we had assumed that the main programme was the hosting of the Congress of Iranian Academics and Scholars at Pahlavi University in Shiraz and that the attendees would be housed in dormitories and other university facilities. In the meantime, Mr Shafa was vigorously pursuing the details of the congress. The Bagh-e Eram6 was to accommodate members of Iran’s royal family, as it had always done in the past. The distance between Shiraz and Persepolis was deemed sufficiently manageable to supply all the necessary materials from the city to Persepolis. The only major problems left to deal with at the time were cleaning the city walls, asphalting the Shiraz Road, and finishing the Kourosh and Darius Hotels. We had also been assured that the military parade that was to be supervised by General Fathollah Minbashian7 and the Ministry of Culture and Arts would be ready in time. The light and sound show, overseen by Dr Mehdi Boushehri and being prepared by a French company that had produced similar performances at the Pyramids in Egypt and the Palace of Versailles, was progressing on schedule.

Do you think Mr Alam would have carried out his threat to use his pistol? A.A.: Of course not! Such talk was only to demonstrate his firm commitment and the depth of attachment that Mr Alam had for the work that needed to be carried out to ensure that the celebrations were conducted to the highest standard. I was never among Mr Alam’s close friends or colleagues, but since the nature of my work brought me in contact with him I can say that Mr Alam was a generous man, polite 6

The Eram Gardens and Pavilion form an iconic Persian Garden which dates in parts back to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

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Brother of Mehrdad Pahlbod, Minister of Culture and Arts. 258

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and open-minded, kind, friendly, humane and patriotic. Mr Alam had all the positive traits associated with a feudal lord. His work philosophy could be described as Machiavellian, and he believed that ‘the end justifies the means’.

So, in 1970 the conditions for such a major event were not yet ready. What had gone wrong and why at this stage, when things were not yet in place, was it decided to invite a range of world leaders to the celebrations? A.A.: By 1970, ten years had already passed since the initial planning for these celebrations. In my opinion, those who were responsible for the task had overstated matters in their reports, giving the false impression that all the work had been done and that all that was left to do was to get the date of the celebrations from the Shah! At that time, the country’s development and reconstruction plans were progressing at an impressive pace. Women had won the right to vote and, like their male counterparts, they were active in the country’s political, economic and social spheres. Tens of thousands of educated Iranians were serving in the Literacy and Health Corps8 and working for the progress of their country. Millions of farmers had received water and land; they had taken their destiny into their own hands and become hopeful about their future. Any problems they encountered were addressed in their houses of justice, comprising village elders. Hundreds of thousands of factory workers felt that they had a stake in their workplace and were sending their children to universities and private schools at home and abroad. Iran was no longer the backward country it had been 15 years earlier. Qualified managers who had studied in the world’s best universities had returned to Iran and been absorbed in the public and private sectors, turning the economic wheels in the stable and peaceful environment that Mohammad Reza 8

Young graduates were encouraged to spend months in villages and the countryside teaching literacy, public health and providing general health support. Often these programmes could take the places of conscription and military service. 259

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Shah had tirelessly created despite the domestic and international pressures he faced. Despite the numerous attempts on his life and the assassination of two of his prime ministers, the Shah never gave up, and in order to reach his goal, which was to promote the greatness of Iran, he often travelled to the farthest corners of his country to meet officials working under the most difficult conditions to express his gratitude. I remember that when I was in charge of Khuzestan’s water and power authority supervising the province’s development plans in tough conditions, in the burning desert regions where 6,000 young Iranians were busy working away from their families, the Shah would pay them a visit once or twice a year. He was very kind toward them and even knew a few of their names. In the 1960s, Iran had enjoyed an astonishing economic growth rate. The country was standing proud and was respected by the community of nations. The Shah was aware that times had changed. The days of colonialism and feudalism were over. It was the age of science and technology, and he knew that in order for Iran to join the community of developed nations, it was paramount that we work together, and thus it was vital to cultivate good relations with these countries. To achieve this goal, the use of Cyrus the Great’s name and the staging of a ceremony at Persepolis provided an excellent platform. That’s why the Shah always welcomed the reports he received on this subject. Maybe if this decision had been made a year earlier or if the celebrations had been postponed for a year we could have prevented many of the problems that we faced later. Of course, judging the past with the benefit of hindsight is always easy.

One frequent criticism relates to the choice of subcontractors. Why did the organisers turn to Maxim’s restaurant in Paris for the catering and the firm of Jansen, also from Paris, for the tents? Would it not have been better to rely on domestic resources and Iranian organisations, and to have served the guests Persian food? A.A.: Unfortunately, after the celebrations these points were among the major criticisms. In addition to the regime’s opponents, who blindly 260

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faulted everything, most of the people who spoke about the celebrations often pointed their finger at such things, often forgetting all the positive aspects of the festivities and the important works that had been done as if the programmes surrounding these celebrations were limited to Maxim’s and Jansen. Curiously, the initial criticisms began in the French media and press and only later made their way to Iran, where they had widespread impact. Because the special book about the celebrations was not published, for reasons I will explain later, many of the questions raised remained unanswered. Even now, decades after the event, whenever there is talk about the imperial celebrations, the first question that is raised has to do with the House of Jansen and Maxim’s restaurant. It is perhaps a good time now for me to tell you everything I can remember and leave the readers to judge. As an introduction, I must recount an episode. In 1966 Marshal Tito, the leader of the former Yugoslavia, came to Iran on a state visit. Mr Hassan Zahedi, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, and his wife were assigned as his hosts. At the time I was Minister of the Interior. As part of the visit, a trip to Persepolis and Isfahan had been organised. One day I received a call from the grand master of ceremonies and protocol, Mr Hormoz Gharib, that His Majesty had ordered that, as a sign of respect to Marshal Tito, Iran’s Minister of the Interior also be present on the trip. I immediately contacted the Governor of Fars and asked him a few questions relating to the security and reception details taken when welcoming our honourable guest. The Governor replied that all was in order and that he had arranged for a lunch to be held at Persepolis. He assured me that this was not the first time such a visit had taken place and that his people were well experienced in these matters, and he told me not to worry. On the scheduled date we flew our guest to Shiraz in a special plane, and, after the welcoming ceremony, the Party moved to Persepolis, where a well-informed member of the Ministry of Culture gave Marshal Tito a tour of the ruins. While Marshal Tito and others in the entourage were busy sightseeing, I asked one of the Governor’s men about the arranged lunch. He explained that a table had been prepared in the shade among the ancient 261

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ruins. The food, which consisted of rice and kebabs, had been prepared by the Sa’adi Park Hotel in Shiraz. I asked where they had set up their kitchen. He answered that the lunch equipment brought from Shiraz was set up behind one of the walls. Out of curiosity, I decided to inspect the place, and while the rest were busy strolling among the historic ruins I went with the Governor’s assistant to where they were preparing the lunch. It was an awful sight. In one corner a fire had been lit. Here and there were old plates and huge metal pots sitting next to plastic buckets filled with water in which floated pieces of lettuce and onion. Worst of all was seeing the fly-infested kebab meat and tomatoes on skewers being cooked by unshaven cooks with dirty, sweaty shirts. Looking at this scene made me so sick that I almost froze on the spot. When I came round, I immediately summoned one of the photographers who had accompanied us to take 20 pictures of the setup and to enlarge them and send them to my office in Tehran. Of course, throughout this period I was worried that Marshal Tito and his wife would see this lamentable state of affairs. Fortunately, our distinguished state guests were too tired from viewing the ancient ruins and went to sit down at their table. The menu consisted of cucumber and raisin yoghurt as a starter followed by a main course of chelo-kebab, and for dessert a bowl of Shirazi sorbet known as paloudeh. In this way, lunch was served without a major diplomatic incident. Later we moved to Isfahan and, after staying at the Hotel Shah Abbas and visiting the tourist spots of this beautiful city, we returned to Tehran. Back in Tehran, I had an audience with His Imperial Majesty during which I described everything I had witnessed and showed him the pictures, which gave a vivid image of the situation. The Shah looked at the pictures and became very angry; he ordered that they be sent to the Ministry of Culture and to send word to the Protocol Department that in the future to avoid scheduling any lunch programmes at Persepolis. With this precedent in mind, when the High Committee returned from its inspection tour in Shiraz and brought up the matter of catering at Persepolis, I recounted my own previous experience. We discussed for several hours the way we planned to serve the guests. We reviewed a variety of suggestions including the organisations responsible for the catering. The points of discussion were mainly about the manner in 262

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which food would be served, given the long distance between Shiraz and Persepolis; the type of food, bearing in mind the guests’ preferences; the region’s climate and its impact on health considerations and the spoilage of food in the heat; the time required to introduce the guests to various Iranian dishes and the need for educated and welltrained waiters with language skills; and such issues. Finally, at the end of the meeting it was decided that the High Council would study all the possibilities and draw up a list of competent organisations with the necessary experience and capabilities to support us, and report the findings to the High Committee. On the basis of this decision, I personally contacted every one of these organisations and discussed with them what we needed. The first organisation I got in touch with was the catering department of the Imperial Court, which was under the directorship of Mr Abolfath Atabai, the Assistant Court Minister. When Mr Atabai heard me explain that we would need to entertain 30 foreign dignitaries at Persepolis, he told me frankly that he could not do it. It was impossible, he said, for him to shut down the Imperial Court Ministry’s catering department for several days and transfer personnel to Shiraz and Persepolis, and he added that while he could serve three or four parties in Tehran, serving guests at Persepolis was beyond his capacity. The second organisation I contacted was the group responsible for running the hotels belonging to the Pahlavi Foundation, headed by Mr Hossein Maghsoudi. In a meeting we had, I discussed the catering issue for the celebrations. He told me that his organisation was responsible for the management of the Darband and Ramsar Hotels and a number of smaller inns in Gachsar, Chalus and Babolsar. These hotels were committed to serving the tourist industry and could not be closed down during the celebrations by sending key staff to Persepolis to take on such an important responsibility. Finally, after lengthy discussions, Mr Maghsoudi agreed that, subject to a contract and agreed price, he would supply the food for the academics and journalists who would be staying at Pahlavi University. In this way, some of the catering needs were solved. I must say that they did a good job. The third organisation I approached was the National Tourist Board, headed by Taqi Emami. I had a long discussion with Mr Emami 263

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explaining the challenges we faced and requested that he take over the responsibility of managing the needs of the guests in whatever manner he saw fit. He was to draw up a list of all necessary items and submit the estimated costs to the High Committee for approval and execution. After two hours of discussion, Mr Emami finally said: Mr Ansari, the organisation that I am managing was not designed for such a responsibility and is not capable of handling it. Our resources are limited. We have a small professional and administrative team that relies on a few educated ladies who speak foreign languages and who direct several tourist groups. Therefore I cannot accept the responsibility that you ask of me, nor can I commit to it.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also gave us a negative answer, saying that their catering department had special duties preventing them from taking responsibility for serving guests at Persepolis. With the feasibility study completed, the findings were discussed in full at a meeting of the High Committee. It was clear to us all that we had to either cancel the banquet at Persepolis or turn to an international organisation with the necessary experience in such matters. The situation was very clear, and we had to make a decision. Finally, Mr Alam told us that we could not cancel the banquet at Persepolis because the invitations had gone out; there was no turning back. The responsibility lay with the Ministry of the Imperial Court. The meeting ended without a result. Between this meeting and the next, Mr Alam went to Europe, and, after returning, he told us at the first meeting of the High Committee that it had become clear to him that unless a different approach were taken, any programme dealing with the Persepolis Celebrations would end in failure. He pointed to the fact that hosting a banquet for the various members of royalty and heads of state at Persepolis, which was situated between a barren mountain to the north and a desert to the south, was a difficult undertaking. He also ruled out the 100-room tourist hotel that he had seen, saying that it was no more than a metal skeleton and that even on completion he doubted would be an interesting building. These factors made the project unsuitable, and there was a risk that it would embarrass our country. Therefore, after reviewing all aspects of the problem, he had concluded that perhaps the best solution would be to entertain the 264

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guests according to historical Iranian tradition, whereby Persian kings would stop en route while travelling and inspecting their empire, feasting and being entertained in plush tents pitched in the desert. He said that we could use tents to shelter and entertain our guests. These tents would be equipped with all the modern comforts of the day, and if there were any shortcomings during the stay of our honourable guests, they could blame the desert, and maybe they would even enjoy the exoticism of their experience. Mr Alam mentioned that during his trip to France he had met the director of the House of Jansen, a well-known interior decorating firm with experience decorating great palaces, and it was agreed that they take on the project. Jansen was to prepare a design for a compound that would incorporate more than 50 tents. He added that, in his preliminary discussions, Jansen had proposed that each tent be constructed as a modern apartment disguised as a tent complete with a sitting room, two bedrooms, and bathroom, and other facilities. Mr Alam said: ‘Since they sounded reasonable, I placed an order for 50 tents: 30 tents for international guests and 20 for members of the Iranian royal family and Iranian dignitaries.’ As for the catering, Mr Alam said that because there was no organisation in Iran that was experienced enough or capable of such a task, he had turned the job over to the world-renowned Maxim’s in Paris, asking them to offer us a proposal. ‘As for the cost,’ he said, ‘we have given it some thought and we hope to be able to pay the bill without straining the national budget.’ Full responsibility for the foreign guests was taken by the Ministry of the Imperial Court. Some time later at one of the meetings of the High Committee, Mr Alam announced that, fortunately, the ideas he had generated for covering the cost of the event had achieved success and that the necessary funds had been raised. He had explained to a group of industrialists and well-known businessmen, in a meeting at the Ministry of the Imperial Court, that because they owed their sizable fortunes to the progress being made in the development of the country, it would only be fair that the private sector cover the cost of entertaining Iran’s international guests at two banquets. It had been agreed that they would collectively donate 60 million tomans ($8 million), which was deemed sufficient for the event without denting the national budget. 265

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By the middle of spring 1971 it had become clear that some important European leaders would be attending the celebrations. The meetings of the High Committee became shorter and more efficient. Meetings were usually held either in the conference room next to Mr Alam’s office or at his house in Shemiran, but because of urgent phone calls or his immediate summoning the meetings were less formal. It was therefore decided that the meetings would henceforth convene at a place outside Tehran in order to have sufficient time to discuss important matters. Our meetings were to be held at the Ramsar Hotel or another of the Caspian resorts. All the members of the committee were to be flown north in a small plane and returned to Tehran after each meeting. I still recall that during one of these meetings at the Ramsar Hotel, it had become clear that a sizable number of royalty and state leaders of various republics would be attending the banquet, and we spent a whole afternoon discussing the protocol and the ranking of the guests, and who would sit where. Regarding the seating arrangements, because the guests comprised royalty, presidents, foreign ministers, and other key figures representing their respective countries, and because their countries were not equal in political and economic terms, we debated whether it would be wise, for instance, to seat the Soviet leader, who was from a socialist state, next to the king of a small African state, or to seat the king of a small European nation next to the president of an important country. Should we follow the protocol laid down by the United Nations, which had established the prominence of World War II’s primary victors (the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France and China), or should we rely on the protocol of an older European order? Most of our time was spent discussing these issues. In the end it was decided that Mr Gharib, the grand master of ceremonies and protocol, would seek the advice of his European counterparts and to report back to the High Committee. The second matter that preoccupied us was the selection of food that was to be served during the two-night reception at Persepolis. How would we cope with the preferences of guests who were coming from countries on five continents, each with his own customary diet? They would be of different ages, and some might be required to 266

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follow a special diet. How were we to keep everybody happy? Another point was the importance of serving Persian food, which we could not neglect because the hosts were to be the King and Queen of Iran, and it was natural that our local cuisine be presented. This decision would also present an opportunity to advertise our national culinary tradition as equal to those of China, India, Italy, and France. This discussion took a long time, and some of our favourite Persian dishes were included on the menu. Some committee members were of the opinion that we should also introduce regional dishes alongside the national ones. We finally reached an agreement that, because the first night would be a seated state dinner, it would make sense to serve an international menu alongside Iranian caviar, which the guests would be familiar with. But on the second night, dinner would be served buffet style with various Iranian dishes alongside foreign ones, in case some people preferred them, and in this way nobody would go away hungry. Of course the presence of Iranian hostesses at each table would ensure that the guests would learn about the recipes and ingredients used in the Persian dishes. It was decided therefore that the Ministry of the Imperial Court select its top chefs and introduce them to the staff of Maxim’s to assist them in preparing the Persian menus. Mixed in with our serious discussion, some of us told jokes to lighten the atmosphere. Somebody for instance speculated that some of the guests would become sick after eating kashk-eh bademjaan (eggplant puree) or koofteh tabrizi (meatballs) and would need to be rushed to Nemazi Hospital in Shiraz instead of sightseeing at Persepolis. At the beginning of the summer, Mr Shoja’eddin Shafa returned from a trip to Europe to Tehran and came to my office to deal with a few outstanding matters. During our talks he stated that the imperial celebrations had attracted bad publicity in France, especially in connection with the contracts signed with Jansen to purchase the tents to house the guests, and with the catering plans by Maxim’s restaurant. He said that the newspapers were filled with many critical articles. He asked me whether something might be done. I replied that, because the entire affair was in the hands of the Ministry of the Imperial Court, all I could do was to add it to the agenda of the 267

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High Committee meeting, and because Mr Shafa was a member he should bring up the matter himself. He agreed, and a few days later at a meeting held at Niavaran Palace in the presence of the Queen, Mr Shafa gave a report on his recent trip and raised the issue of the criticisms in the French press. During this period, the Queen was constantly being interviewed by the international media and was a principal supporter of the celebrations. Therefore, when Mr Shafa had finished his report, she said: ‘I don’t know who is benefiting from these contracts with the foreign firms, but certainly the press attacks are hurting His Majesty’s image.’ Mr Alam’s face was already swollen with anger at Mr Shafa’s report, but he took the Queen’s comments to heart. He asked for permission to speak. Addressing the Queen directly in a bitter tone, he said: All the necessary decisions that were taken to maintain the dignity of Iran’s Imperial Court and the respected guests were taken by me, and the entire responsibility of these matters rests on this obedient servant’s shoulders. Because this is being questioned, from this moment onward I resign from all my functions.

With these words Mr Alam rose to his feet, collected all his papers, and left the room. His reaction to Mr Shafa’s report, which only covered his trip, was a surprise to everyone at the meeting; a heavy silence descended over the assembly, leaving the Queen in an unexpected and uncomfortable position. A few moments later, she said that, given the extraordinary situation, it would be best to conclude the meeting and report to His Majesty. The meeting ended in this fashion; it was not clear what the future of these celebrations and the fate of Mr Alam and Mr Shafa would be. This was no ordinary matter. The crux was that an important event had been discussed on an international level and was in full progress, with formal invitations sent to the leaders of many nations; it was therefore not an undertaking that could be suddenly halted. Without a doubt, any delay would have had serious repercussions. Fortunately, the following week, the next meeting of the High Committee was convened by Mr Alam at the Ministry of the Imperial Court, and no mention was made of the discussions of the prior meeting. 268

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Wasn’t Mr Alam’s reaction to Mr Shafa’s report unusual? Might it have been rooted in the scattered rumours about corruption regarding the contracts with Jansen and Maxim’s? A.A.: One may interpret it that way, but please note that overall in our country those who oppose someone or something will always begin with accusations of financial corruption. Therefore it is not surprising that those who opposed the Imperial Court and the celebrations should have accused officials involved in the project of financial impropriety. But in this case we cannot target Mr Alam, because not only was he from one of Iran’s oldest and most powerful families, he was also personally a very wealthy man and effectively the uncrowned sultan of south-east Iran, Sistan and Baluchistan. In addition, he was the closest person to the Shah and viewed himself as a modern-day vizier, equivalent to figures such as Khajeh Nezam-ol Molk9 and Amir Kabir.10 It therefore did not make sense that such a person should degrade himself by taking commissions from firms like Jansen or Maxim’s. And, even if such a rumour was being spread among people, no such malfeasance can be attributed to him based on any evidence. I must mention an important point here. We must not think that the ceremonies that were held at Persepolis were a programme based only on Mr Alam’s contracts with Maxim’s and Jansen, that these firms did all the work and sent the bill while the Iranian authorities were simply observers. The truth was that, after Mr Alam expressed his overall agreement with the preliminary proposals of Jansen and Maxim’s, they prepared detailed plans for setting up the tents and the two banquets, which formed only part of the whole ceremony. Many of these firms’ executives flew to Tehran to discuss their plans at length with key officials at the Ministry of the Imperial Court. However, I was not involved in the details of these discussions and deliberations. 9

The powerful eleventh-century Grand Vizier of Seljuk era Iran.

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The Qajar era Grand Vizier who mentored the young Nasser-ed Din Shah before being assassinated in Kashan in 1852 on the orders of the Shah and at the instigation of the Queen Mother. 269

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So are you saying that under Mr Alam’s organisation there was no corruption? A.A.: I would never make such a claim or say such a thing, and basically I am not in a position to comment about Mr Alam’s activities in office. As I said before, I was never among his entourage. In fact, my role as Minister in the Cabinets of Dr Manouchehr Eghbal and Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, both of whom were in strong opposition to Mr Alam, meant that I was viewed as being in the anti-Alam camp. Therefore, if I defend him today it is based on my personal observations during the period when I was involved with him regarding the related activities dealing with the celebrations. I clearly could see how he looked at the problems with a long-term view, and if some irrelevant individuals in his organisation did something wrong he would normally ignore them. Some people believe that this manner of doing things was not right or commendable.

With all the problems that you explained earlier, what was the outcome of the issues surrounding the invitation of the various heads of state? A.A.: By midsummer, when the subject of the celebrations and the participation of an important number of world leaders had been reported in the media, the Imperial Court was flooded with requests from various countries expressing an interest in attending. This posed a serious challenge for the organisers, and it was not possible to give a positive response to them all. Many of the telegrams that were received by the Imperial Court from Iranian Ambassadors pleading that this or that person be invited because of their importance had to be turned down. In addition to all this, because of the catering shortages it was decided that each of the invited countries be asked, via diplomatic channels, to limit their party to five persons. In the final stages, based on information given by Mr Gharib, 62 country delegations, headed by monarchs, presidents, premiers, or other important state figures such 270

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as heads of Parliament or foreign ministers, were to participate in the celebrations. Because only 50 tents had been taken into account, all the tents were reserved for monarchs and presidents. Exceptionally, a spot in the encampment was found to house the French Prime Minister, while the other parties were housed at the Darius Hotel, which was being completed at a fast pace – this move caused a number of countries to complain, including West Germany, which was being represented by its head of Parliament. Because the Darius Hotel was housing most of the foreign guests, there was unfortunately no room for many of the Iranian figures who had key roles in the celebrations such as the high-ranking generals, hostesses and others who had to stay at Persepolis for various reasons. So, a piece of land that was situated north of the Darius Hotel and where wheat was being cultivated was purchased, and in three months 100 prefabricated apartments were constructed to house 200 people. In addition, a well-equipped canteen with the capacity to serve 1,000 people was set up to cater to the Persepolis staff for a period of several days. In Shiraz, with the help of education officials, we appropriated ten large schools with large rooms and equipped them with 1,000 beds and other comforts in case foreign or domestic reporters or other unaccounted people needed a place to stay. In this fashion and with the assistance and cooperation of all those involved in the celebrations, everything took place in an orderly manner and proved a resounding success.

Is it true that the film of the celebrations was prepared by Orson Welles? A.A.: Not at all. This was another lie about the celebrations. The film on the celebrations was produced by Mr Shahrokh Golestan, one of Iran’s most brilliant and well-known filmmakers. The fact was that, from the start, the High Committee intended to produce a documentary on the entire event, have it translated into various foreign languages, and show it around the world. During the discussions, some people 271

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expressed the opinion that the film should be of the highest technical quality – something that was beyond the capabilities of Iran’s nascent film industry. It was suggested that the responsibility for this project be given to a renowned international film director. And because the film had a historical dimension and would be preserved forever, it was agreed that no expense would be spared and that the work would be produced by professionals. Mr Pahlbod strongly disagreed; he was convinced that Iranian filmmakers cooperating with the Ministry of Culture were fully qualified for the task and declared that they were prepared to assume full responsibility. Now that everything was clear, it was decided that he take any action required. After this decision was made, the principal task of producing the documentary film on the Persepolis Celebrations was handed over to Mr Golestan, and this talented Iranian filmmaker and his crew completed this great work with such expertise and dedication that viewers inside and outside Iran were amazed by it. The film remains a masterpiece in the annals of Iranian cinema. I hope that Iranian television channels outside our country will broadcast this film, which is called Forough-eh Javedaan or Eternal Flame, several times so that our youth in Iran (who are subjected to daily disinformation and propaganda and are told for instance that Iran’s history began 1,400 years ago on the Arabian Peninsula during the wars of Kerbala)11 will realise that they belong to a country and nation that a thousand years before those dates possessed a history, culture and civilisation with deep roots. Iran was a land where people lived with pride, and 2,500 years ago, one of their kings Cyrus the Great issued the ancient world’s first proclamation of human rights whereby he allowed his subjects to enjoy complete freedom of religion and customs so that they could live with dignity and all the privileges worthy of human beings.

11

The battle site where Hossein, the grandson of the Prophet, was defeated by the mainstream orthodox Muslim Caliphate of Baghdad. This occasion is an iconic event for Shi’i Muslims and is strongly commemorated in Iran, especially since the Islamic Revolution whose leaders have emphasised Iran’s ‘Shi’i’ identity. 272

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What was the government’s role in all of this? A.A.: As I mentioned earlier, Mr Alam, the Imperial Court Minister, repeatedly declared that the government would not interfere in this project. During the entire year of preparations for the celebrations, the Prime Minister and his ministers, with the exception of Mr Pahlbod, the Minister of Culture and Arts, did not participate in any aspects of the planning. It was only two months before the celebrations that Mr Alam invited Prime Minister Hoveyda and his Cabinet to the Imperial Court, explained the entire programme for the celebrations, and received their approval. Later, a few of the Cabinet Ministers were invited individually to attend the meetings of the High Committee and inform the committee about the activities of their respective organisations that were related to the celebrations. For instance, Mr Hassan Shalchian, the Minister of Roads, spoke about the asphalting of the Shiraz-Persepolis highway, which was part of the country’s overall development plans but which would specifically benefit the celebrations. Mr Mansur Rohani, the Minister of Water and Power, explained that plans for the electrification of the areas around Shiraz, where key government institutions such as the College of Agriculture and the fertilising factory were located, were in full swing, and that electrification would also be extended in time for the celebrations to the Persepolis area and be used by the Darius Hotel. In summary, I must say that the Cabinet Ministers were invited to Persepolis as guests.

One of the main events of the Persepolis Celebrations was the military parade. Can you provide us with more details? A.A.: Most people imagine that this event was the same as others held every year on various national occasions when army units paraded. In reality, preparations had taken several years. A dedicated team of historians, archaeologists, Iranian artists at the Ministry of Culture, and military experts had worked hard in order to supply all the necessary equipment, military uniforms of various epochs, flags, chariots, bows 273

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and arrows, armour, spears, shields, helmets, weaponry, trumpets, drums and towers to ensure that the replicas were close to the real thing. This was achieved by studying all historical records including books, paintings and carvings on stones discovered at archaeological digs. In addition, by seeking the help of music experts about the type of sound that may have emanated from the trumpets, drums and other instruments, we were able to recreate battle music. Supplying these essentials was all under the supervision of General Minbashian and Mr Pahlbod, who reported on their progress to the High Committee. Around the end of summer, the Queen expressed her concerns that the final result ran the risk of being criticised or ridiculed. It was therefore decided that she, accompanied by all the members of the High Committee, should travel to Persepolis and review the parade drill. The practice drill took place one afternoon on the scheduled date so that we could determine if there were any flaws or problems in the work and rectify them while there was still time. I must admit that many of the people who made the trip were extremely worried that the military reports about the work being done had been exaggerated. But when from a distance we heard the sound of large beating military drums, the trumpet cries, and the special music in the air, and when we watched the disciplined lines marching solidly toward the guest box, everyone simply froze in their seats. We all felt an indescribable sense of awe; the spectacle resembled a scene from an epic film set in ancient Greece or Rome. The sight of our handsome troops, who looked exactly like the armies of the Achaemenid period like those we had seen on the stone walls of Persepolis with their armour, helmets and weapons, was stunning. When replicas of wooden warships representing King Xerxes’s Greek invasion fleet passed by complete with sailors and white sails blowing in the wind, many of the viewers felt such pride in their hearts that a few had tears in their eyes. The parade ended after all the various units of imperial Iran’s epochs had marched by. The army commander leading the parade was Colonel Boghrat Jaffarian (later promoted to general), one of the brightest and bravest officers of our ground forces who rose up the military ranks to become the chief of the Khuzestan army. During the Islamic Revolution, Colonel Jaffarian was among the early victims killed. 274

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Mr Alam was very happy with the result of the parade and suggested that, after the marching of the last unit of the Literacy and Health Corps, the members of the Legion of World Servants (created by Mr Alam) be allowed to participate in the parade as a symbol of Iran’s current policy of international engagement. This suggestion was approved by the Queen, and thus ended the trip to Persepolis.

A point of criticism made about the celebrations was that ordinary people were barred from attending the ceremonies and that Iranians only made up a handful of individuals at Persepolis, all of whom were senior political, administrative or military figures. A.A.: I will describe what happened and leave the final judgement with readers. At the end of summer when it was clear that more than 50 nations would be represented at the ceremonies and that an impressive number of monarchs, presidents and prime ministers of important countries would be heading the attending delegations, the question of their security became paramount. The several hundred kilometres separating Persepolis from Tehran and the 60-kilometre distance between Persepolis and Shiraz posed new security challenges. The presence of so many heads of state at the Persepolis Celebrations called for extraordinary security measures and restricting public access to the area. It was obvious that several hundred thousand inhabitants of Shiraz and nearby areas were keen to gather at the spot and view the spectacle of the arriving kings, queens and world leaders. It was easy to predict what might happen under such circumstances, given that even a small ceremony or a visit by an important figure to one of Iran’s cities would paralyse the area for several hours. Therefore, it was impossible to allow hundreds of thousands of people eager to watch the Persepolis events to descend upon the place and paralyse the road with their cars, buses, trucks and bicycles. It was decided that 1,000 persons from Tehran and 1,000 from Shiraz would be invited as guests under certain conditions and that a transport committee be in charge of the logistics. 275

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On the day of the parade, 1,000 guests from Tehran would fly to Shiraz and then take buses to Persepolis. In addition, the chiefs of various tribes were each invited to send ten representatives and introduce them to the provincial governors. This group was not to exceed 1,000 people, who were also to be transported to Persepolis. The transport and logistics committee was headed by General Ali Mohammad Khademi, president of Iran Air, the national airline. Khademi accepted this responsibility in good spirit and agreed to submit his feasibility study within a week. The results of his findings were that his capacity to transport guests from Tehran to Shiraz on the day of the military parade would be limited to 800 people; even by using the maximum facilities available to Iran Air, only eight planes could be put into operation. As to why Iran could not lease more aircraft, the answer was that the real obstacle was the state of the airports at Mehrabad (serving Tehran) and Shiraz, which had limited capacity. The runways at Shiraz were in no condition to accommodate greater numbers of passengers and return them to Tehran the same day. An important security point was the time required between each aircraft taking off. It was key to anticipate any emergency landings or technical problems for an aircraft and the time needed to prepare the runway for the next aircraft, because the nearest suitable airports to Mehrabad were at Isfahan and Hamadan, each some 400 kilometres distant. A similar problem existed at the Shiraz Airport, with the closest neighbouring airports being those at Abadan and Bandar Abbas both some 570 kilometres away. In addition to these problems, General Khademi announced that the flight time between Tehran and Shiraz would be about one and a half hours. It would take another three hours for guests arriving at Shiraz to get on their bus, travel to Persepolis, and be seated in the viewing stands. Some of the guests were senior national figures of an advanced age who would have to be treated and handled with care, and that in itself would require more time. All things considered, no more than 800 people could be transported to Persepolis and returned to Tehran in a single day. After his detailed explanation, General Khademi added that, according to his estimates, he would need to keep the runways at Shiraz Airport free so that those foreign guests who were arriving in their own private aircraft could be 276

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given priority. This would pose many restrictions on the travel arrangements of domestic guests. We must not forget that we are talking about the situation of the early 1970s, when Iran Air had limited capacity and the country’s airports were still being developed, especially the one in Shiraz, which had few good runways and limited facilities for handling passengers. In any case, after reviewing the challenges of handling the domestic guests, we agreed to transport 800 guests; all the logistics were to be left to General Khademi, and the cost was to be charged to the High Council. General Khademi completed his duties in the best manner possible, and with all the necessary care the Iranian guests who were waiting at Mehrabad Airport at 6 a.m. for their flight to Shiraz returned home by midnight. The guests from Shiraz who were on a list prepared by the Governor’s office as well as the tribal representatives were able to travel by bus to Persepolis in an organised manner and without conflicting with the travel arrangements of the guests from Tehran. The total number of Iranian guests attending the military parade and seated in podiums next to those of the heads of state was 2,000 people. This was the true story behind the invited guests. But please note that, as I said before, the ceremonies at Persepolis were only part of the bigger programme celebrating 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy, also attended by world leaders. Additionally, there were programmes in all the provinces, 150 townships, 400 districts, thousands of large villages, and most of the schools in the country that could house big crowds; and all the country’s embassies, consulates, and agencies in foreign countries staged whatever related programmes they could manage. All this took place during the week that the Persepolis event was running. Every Iranian city exuded decorations and festivities; people were treated to fireworks displays and were served food and drink. Many centres hosted seminars and exhibitions on Iranian history and culture. Teachers and students played a key role in these gatherings as they created awareness among the local people about their ancestral history and culture. Millions of people participated in these programmes and other events. Were these people not Iranians? I wish that we could have taken everybody to Persepolis to see the incredible spectacle there with their own eyes. Of course, I regret that 277

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the television coverage, despite the earnest efforts of Mr Ghotbi and his hard-working colleagues, was not able to cover all the country and allow our people to watch the events at Persepolis simultaneously. Nevertheless, millions of Iranians and people around the world were able to watch this unforgettable ceremony from their television sets and, later on, cinema screens.

Before the ceremonies there were rumours that there would be a terrorist attack, but in reality not only did this not happen but the event took place in good order without a hitch. Can you please explain further? A.A.: From the start, General Nematollah Nassiri, the head of security and intelligence (SAVAK), was a member of the High Committee; he attended all the meetings and was responsible for all security matters. As a result, no security details were discussed with the exception of one matter that General Nassiri brought up: the issue of maintaining security on the Shiraz–Persepolis highway. General Nassiri stated that, because most of the foreign guests would, given the time difference between Europe, Africa and Iran, arrive by night at the Shiraz Airport and be taken right away to Persepolis, security precautions for the guests travelling the 60-kilometre distance between Shiraz and Persepolis would pose serious problems because of the darkness. Therefore, he asked the High Committee to provide some solution. After some discussion on this matter, we decided to seek advice from the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which had gained considerable experience in providing security for oil pipelines. We asked the NIOC to send one of their top experts to the High Committee. Fortunately, they responded positively, and two top NIOC executives (Latif Ramazanniya and Mahmoud Pouzeshi) attended the meeting of the High Committee. They declared that with the equipment they possessed they could light both sides of the Shiraz–Persepolis highway with torches all through the night. Not only did this solution solve the security problem, but the torch-lit highway gave the Persepolis 278

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Celebrations a special quality. In this manner, with close cooperation between the army, police, gendarmerie and domestic security organisation, the security question on the main road was solved in the best possible way. After the end of the celebrations, at the first opportunity I asked General Nassiri, given all the worries about sabotage that had haunted him before the festivities, what was the reason that nothing had happened? Was all the sabotage talk simply make-believe and based on exaggerated rumours? The general replied that the saboteurs – leftist groups who opposed the monarchy – had tried their best to create an incident but that cooperation among all the services prevented this from happening. He added that the security forces monitored 1,500 suspects and detained some of them during the celebrations. We were relieved and pleased that all the foreign heads of state and guests who had come to Persepolis were able to return to their countries safely.

Tell us about the schools built during the celebrations with private funding in the background to this programme. A.A.: The story is that in one of the meetings of the High Committee, Mr Alam announced that His Majesty, having studied the reports on the celebrations, had noted that all the work being done for the celebrations was by the Imperial Court Ministry. The Shah had wanted to know the role of the people in all of this. Mr Alam said that he had replied that during the celebrations across the country the people would, as in other festive periods, participate by lighting up the streets, putting up triumphal arches, and engaging in other activities, and then he asked for our views. Most of the High Committee members postponed their answers, but since I had some experience in such matters I informed the committee that during the celebrations marking the Shah’s twenty-fifth year on the throne while I was Governor of Khuzestan, besides decorating the streets, we had encouraged people to build 50 rural schools in areas that lacked educational facilities. This action enjoyed widespread support, to such a degree that even old men and women and local figures had 279

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given material support or lent a hand in constructing these schools, and 50 primary schools up to fourth class were built and handed over to the Ministry of Education. I suggested that, if the High Committee approved, we could launch such a programme across the country and build 2,500 schools in rural areas. The majority of the High Committee were principally in agreement with the idea of building the schools but added that the lack of facilities and the shortness of time before the start of the celebrations rendered the idea impracticable. Mr Alam said that if I were to accept full responsibility for this project, he would approve it. Because I believed in this project with all my heart, I accepted the task, and my proposal was approved by the High Committee. From that afternoon onward and with the support of a few patriotic and competent officers of the Plan Organisation, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Housing and Development, we prepared an operational plan taking into account the climate differences in various parts of the country, the designs for the buildings, construction requirements and budget estimates. Once we had a preliminary plan, we came to the conclusion that the construction cost of each school building, including the cost of desks and chairs and other materials, would be an average of 30,000 tomans (about $4,000). The Ministry of Education promised that for each school completed it would send a teacher from the Literacy Corps to inaugurate and operate it. Armed with this information, I discussed the issue at the next High Committee meeting and proposed that this project be announced to the public; those people interested in participating in this non-profit project could deposit 30,000 tomans into a special account held at the Melli Bank, and, in return, the High Council for the Celebrations would name one of the completed schools with any name of their choice. The High Committee approved the project unanimously, and from the next day news about the project reached the public through the media. Support for the project was so widespread that in the first two weeks several hundred people volunteered to help; when the public realised that by giving 30,000 tomans they could immortalise the name of a beloved father or mother, they gave their full support. At the same time that the programme was announced, state and 280

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provincial governors were asked to work with education officials to prioritise those areas most in need of educational facilities and that qualified for a grant. Once that had been established, the governors would receive building plans and budget so that, with the help of the people, they could begin construction of their respective schools. The job of informing the public was given to Mr Farhad Hormozi, managing director of the advertising company FACOPA. The people responded so positively that, instead of 2,500 new schools, it was possible to build 3,200 units and to finish them before the start of the academic year. At the start of the celebrations, the new school bells were rung by the members of the Literacy Corps sent to inaugurate the schools; in total, 120,000 pupils started school that year. This was a project that was brilliantly implemented with the support and sincere efforts of the people and government officials.

Did the Queen and the Shah offer gifts to the guests? A.A.: During all state visits, it is customary for the leader of the host country to give his or her guests a gift as a souvenir of their trip. In the preparatory stages of the celebrations, when there was still no mention of inviting heads of state but simply of having foreign guests, it was planned to offer each invited guest a book on Iran’s history and the illustrated facsimile edition of the Baysonghori Shahnameh,12 which would be given as a gift. But when in early summer we began discussing the invitation of heads of state, the issue of gifts took an important turn, and the most interesting suggestion came from Mr Pahlbod. He declared that not long previously his Ministry had undertaken a project to revive the once popular but now disappearing art of weaving portraits on Persian carpets. For this purpose, a training school had been set up in Isfahan with the help of a group of living masters of this dying art form, and a few young students were being trained to create masterpieces. It was 12

See Section 10 for further details. 281

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proposed that, with the approval of the High Committee, the portraits of the visiting heads of state could be reproduced on small silk carpets and offered as gifts. Not only would these gifts be rare and priceless, but they would also reflect the work of Iranian artisans and be exhibited forever in palaces and museums around the world. This proposal caught the attention of the High Committee, and at the next meeting a small carpet in the form of a large painting was presented for viewing by Mr Pahlbod. It was decided therefore that this project should begin right away; Mr Alam’s office was to supply the Ministry of Arts and Culture with photos of those heads of state who had confirmed their attendance so that the illustrated carpets could be prepared. In the event that some of the carpets were not ready in time, it was agreed that they would be sent to the respective heads of state on the earliest possible occasion. In addition, it was decided to offer guests a copy of a book on Iran’s history, plus the Baysonghori Shahnameh, and a china plate with the logo of the imperial celebrations, which had been ordered by the Ministry of the Imperial Court as a souvenir. These rare books and plates are now bought and sold among collectors at high prices.

Why was the long-established Muslim solar calendar year of 1355 changed to an ‘imperial calendar year of 2535?’13 As you know, this subject has caused much controversy, and some people regard it as one of the chief causes of the discontent that eventually led to the revolution in 1978–9. A.A.: One day, about three years before the celebrations when I was Minister of the Interior, Mr Mohammad Farahmand, general counsel of the Ministry, came to my office and said that he had prepared a proposal on an important political matter that needed the government’s attention. He added that, because this proposal could cause some 13

In 1976 the imperial calendar replaced the Islamic calendar which was based on Prophet Mohammad’s migration from Mecca to Medina. The solar hijri 1355 became Imperial 2535 based on the date Cyrus the Great was crowned king. 282

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problems, he would prefer that it be reviewed carefully and discussed before it was officially submitted to my office. The key point of his suggestion was that currently Iran had two national calendars with two dates; one was Shamsi, based on the earth’s rotation around the sun, and the other was Qamari, based on the moon’s orbiting of the earth. Both of these calendars were based on events that had taken place during the advent of Islam in Arabia. The Qamari date was principally used by the clergy, and it began with the month of Moharram. For the start of each month, the sighting of the crescent was a principal condition, and for sure the start of Ramadan had to take place after the new moon was sighted. Important religious dates like Eid-e Fetre, Tassu’a, and Ashu’ra14 were chosen on this basis. In addition, marriage and transaction documents had in the past been controlled by the clergy, and therefore Shamsi and Qamari dates were recorded next to each other. There was no disagreement over this point. But with respect to the Shamsi date, which at the time was 1347, Mr Farahmand felt there was no convincing reason that the first day of the calendar should also be the starting day of Iran’s historical and administrative dates, because usually the history of each country should begin at the time it establishes an identity, setting boundaries and forming civil society. In Iran’s case it was clear that the country’s civilisation and cultural heritage predated Islam by several thousand years, and what is referred to today as the Persian Empire, which came into existence over 1,000 years before the arrival of Islam in Iran, formed an important chapter in global history. This is universally recognised. However, unfortunately, Mr Farahmand continued, few people outside Iran knew that today’s Iran is the same ancient country that in other contexts they referred to as Perse or Persia. The reason for this is very clear; first, when the word ‘Iran’ is written in the Latin alphabet it is very similar to the word ‘Iraq,’ leading many foreigners to imagine that the two countries are the same. Second, the Shamsi date in the records and calendars suggested that the country of Iran was founded 14

Important commemorations in the Muslim and especially Shi’i calendar. 283

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1,347 years ago – at the advent of Islam – and that before that date the country had no real national identity. Besides these points, the Shamsi calendar existed more than a thousand years before the advent of Islam in Iran and was in use in our country. Our Nowruz (Persian New Year) was celebrated on the first day of the solar year, and other celebrations like Mehregan and Sadeh were based on the Shamsi year long before Islam. Each time we put aside our religious passions, the current Shamsi calendar became a reminder of the Arab conquest of Iran and the cruel massacre of Iranians, the burning of libraries, the destruction of cultural centres, and the eradication of our rich and glorious civilisation and culture. Therefore, it made no sense at all, Mr Farhmand concluded, that the starting point of the history of our country should begin with a date coinciding with the emergence of Islam in Arabia. Remembering those days, he said, was painful to every patriotic Iranian. Now that we were planning to resurrect Iran’s cultural and historical past, and with the development programmes underway in all sectors of the economy, it was proper that the Shamsi calendar be reconsidered.

What was your reaction? A.A.: After hearing Mr Farahmand’s views on the subject, I told him that this was not an issue that could be dealt with by the Ministry of the Interior alone, because there were many aspects to consider that had to be addressed by various levels of government. I told him that I needed to discuss this first with the Prime Minister. After these discussions, at the first opportunity I discussed the subject with Prime Minister Hoveyda. He listened to me carefully and then said he thought Mr Farahmand’s views to be reasonable but that at the moment the government was struggling with many other domestic and international issues and that it was better to review this matter at a later time. He added: ‘You make him understand that for now it is not really an opportune time to bring up this subject.’ I called Mr Farahmand and relayed the Prime Minister’s views, and he agreed to postpone the matter for the time being. 284

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Until the matter of the celebrations came up? A.A.: Yes, three years later at the end of the summer when the celebration plans were fast approaching it was decided at the High Committee to invite the ministers and various heads of government bodies to hear the progress of the development plans under their direction and to see which projects were completed or would be completed in time for the start of the celebrations, thus adding a special touch to the entire event. For this reason, in the meetings that were held at the Ministry of the Imperial Court, the ministers and organisational heads came individually to discuss the various projects underway. In one of these meetings, a suggestion similar to Mr Farahmand’s was brought up, and it was declared that with the world’s attention focused on Iran it would be better if the date of the founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great be the basis of the solar calendar. At that time, when the publicity around the imperial celebrations had reached its zenith, there was a positive mood that encouraged the decision to replace the calendar with one beginning with the birth of Cyrus the Great to be taken without any objection. It was also agreed that His Majesty would be informed of the matter by Mr Alam, the Court Minister, and, once approved, preparations be made to implement the changes.

But in Europe, which has rich secular traditions, the birth of Jesus has been used as the basis of the calendar without any issue? A.A.: A good point. Yet the spread of Christianity in Europe took place under conditions very different from the establishment of the Islamic religion in the land of Iran – and this subject requires a detailed explanation outside our current discussion. At the time when the subject of changing the Shamsi date came up, there was never any talk of linking the birth of the Prophet with changing the Shamsi calendar because, as I said earlier, important religious events were calculated according to the lunar (Qamari) date, which had been established since the advent of Islam and which 285

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was respected throughout the reigns of Reza Shah the Great and Mohammad Reza Shah, whose attachment to Islam was never in doubt. It is no secret that during Mohammad Reza Shah’s 37-year reign, not only was special attention given to religious precepts but royal care and personal assistance by the Shah and the Queen contributed to the restoration of important religious buildings in Iran and Iraq. Restoration and decoration of religious centres in Iraq and the beautification of the Shrine of the Eighth Imam in Mashhad, the Hazrat Massoumeh Shrine in Qom, and the Shah Cheragh in Shiraz all received considerable royal attention. In addition, throughout the Pahlavi era good relations existed between the court and religious quarters. Therefore, when the subject of changing the calendar came up, it was only in the context of honouring Iran’s glorious heritage and national events. Unfortunately, leftist groups in Iran who in principle were at war with nationalism and the imperial regime cleverly used the regime’s decision to change the calendar to sow the seeds of discord in our society and with their actions succeeded to upset the religious establishment. Perhaps one can say that this was one instance in which the religious community fell under leftist influence. We must remember that any changes in deep-rooted customs and practices in our society were bound to meet resistance, and only time can solve this problem. People found the change of the calendar odd, and it took time before it was accepted in normal fashion. As you are probably aware, four years after the celebrations were held, the economic boom and fast-paced development in the country made everyone hope for a better future. The rise in oil prices and the inflow of petrodollars in a country that was unprepared to spend it, plus exaggerated forecasts by government organisations that confused dreams with reality, created a situation whereby people’s expectations to improve their welfare by obtaining good housing, health, education, and political freedoms rose so rapidly that it was impossible to realise them all in a short space of time. Economic shortages and implementation problems, which became apparent two years before the revolution, and the massive propaganda campaign launched by the regime’s enemies inside and outside 286

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Iran created such a negative environment among the people that the government’s attempts to defend itself against every criticism, however baseless, became useless. After the celebrations, the opposition accelerated their accusations and rumour-spreading and criticising the imperial celebrations and the new calendar. These two events were among the prime targets of the opposition. During this time, the government did not see itself as responsible for the celebrations and saw no reason to take any countermeasures. In 1977, Mr Alam, the Court Minister, was hospitalised for cancer treatment in Paris, and the others were too busy with their own affairs and responsibilities. The political and social situation in the country was in such a mess that nobody listened to reason. Later, when revolutionary slogans and destructive propaganda became louder by the day and the state became paralysed, retreating daily in the face of the opposition, the government issued a terse statement announcing that the imperial calendar, which had already taken root in the country, was to be discarded and replaced with the Shamsi calendar. This, as the expression goes these days, was like administering the coup de grace to the reputation and memory of the imperial celebrations.

The preparation for the celebrations, with all their complexity, must have produced some hair-raising moments? A.A.: In the 13 months that I spent dealing with various people, departments, organisations and programmes – each of whom had their own views on how the celebrations should be carried out – many, shall we say, interesting occasions took place. Each was unique in its own way. For example on the night when the light and sound spectacle was staged. The event had been organised in such a way that after the Shah, the Queen, and their guests had been seated in the special area within the ancient ruins at Persepolis, all the lights were to be switched off and a special piece of music written by Mr Loris Cheknavarian, a young, intelligent Armenian Iranian who now enjoys world recognition, was played as the ruins of Persepolis were lit by coloured spotlights and a 287

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warm voice recounted the words of Darius and other kings from Iran’s 2,500-year history. It had been scheduled that after the end of this spectacle all the lights were to be switched back on and all the guests were to follow Their Majesties, walking the short distance toward the royal tents for an Iranian state dinner. During this stroll, it had been planned that a marvellous display of fireworks would be staged for entertainment. As it happened, the entire light and sound spectacle went according to plan without any technical hitch. But at the end of the programme, when the lights were supposed to be switched on, nothing happened. Meanwhile, all the guests remained in their seats in complete darkness. Suddenly in the distance the sound of explosions could be heard. For a few minutes, as the sky was lit by explosions, everyone looked scared and anxious, not knowing what to do. When the lights did not come on, as the one responsible for overseeing the spectacle, I ran in the darkness toward the electrical control room where all the switches were located. Making my way through the Persepolis ruins with some difficulty, I saw in the distance the shadowy figure of a man and shouted: ‘Why don’t you switch on the lights?’ This figure vanished and after a few seconds the lights came on, illuminating the area. When I reached the control room, I asked the man what had happened. It turned out that when the programme had started, this poor operator had been so impressed by the show that he had come out of the bunker of the control room to watch the spectacle and forgotten to switch on the lights in the area when it had finished! In any event, after the lights came on, I quickly joined the guests. At that moment I saw that the Shah and the Queen were walking with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia followed by the rows of monarchs and other heads of state, making their way to the banqueting tent. En route, the Queen turned to Mr Alam, who was standing in a corner, and in a very angry tone said: ‘Whose idea was it to have these fireworks?’ I was so shocked because until then I was under the impression that Mr Alam had received the Queen’s approval on all the programmes. And, of course, being in charge of the celebrations I assumed I would be pilloried by Her Majesty. 288

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But Mr Alam, with his characteristic charm and elan, bowed his head respectfully and said: ‘Your obedient servant was responsible and I think it was very nice and beautiful.’

You said that the supervision of the celebrations was with the Queen and that regular meetings were held in her presence. Why was she not aware of the plans for the fireworks display? Was her role purely ceremonial? A.A.: No, it was not like this at all. The meetings chaired by the Queen had no ceremonial purpose; they were not the sort of meetings in which those responsible were lined up to attention while the Court Minister read a prepared speech before closing the meeting. On the contrary, the meetings that were held in the presence of the Queen were to discuss and review all aspects of the project, and she, with her easy-going style, would allow all the attendees at the meeting to express their opinions. Any final decision was taken only after hearing and respecting the opinions and views of the participants and taking into account the different aspects of the task. Of course, Mr Alam, the Court Minister, was able to have an audience every day, and in most cases he would report matters and later discuss them at the High Committee, which was held at the Ministry of the Imperial Court. Sometimes it would happen that Mr Alam would say that this matter or that matter had been reported to the Queen and approved. In such cases there was no more discussion. So, perhaps, in the case of the fireworks we had wrongly assumed that the project had been approved. Perhaps Mr Alam was planning to present this interesting and beautiful programme as a ‘surprise’, and for this reason he had not reported it. Anyway, I do not recall that the plan for the fireworks display was ever discussed in the meetings chaired by the Queen. But I was aware that all the plans were shown to the Queen in detail, and after careful review many necessary amendments were implemented. Since the Queen was host to her important guests, she 289

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naturally paid careful attention to many of the protocols and colourful aspects of the celebrations.

Didn’t the Swiss Ambassador give you a little headache at one point? A.A.: Yes. At the end of the summer of 1971, Prime Minister Hoveyda telephoned me and said that the Swiss Ambassador was sitting in his office and had asked me to look into a small matter. I set up an appointment with the Ambassador, and he came to see me. With great enthusiasm he recounted how a group of retired private sector Swiss performers had formed a musical group who often attended ceremonies here and there at their own expense, where they would perform in traditional Swiss costumes playing special tunes. This group had been welcomed in many places and was very popular in Switzerland. He requested that we send them an official invitation so that they could perform at the Persepolis ceremonies. I replied politely that this was an interesting proposition but that sadly the schedule for the Persepolis event was so tight and each programme organised in such precise detail that there was no room to entertain even one additional parade or event. I had to turn his request down and expressed my regret. In any event the Ambassador listened to my answer and, after drinking his coffee and thanking me, left. I then informed Mr Hoveyda of the outcome of the meeting. Two days later, Mr Alam telephoned and asked me about the Swiss Ambassador’s request. I recounted my telephone conversation with the Prime Minister and my meeting with the Swiss Ambassador, and Mr Alam agreed with my decision to turn him down. Several days later I received another call from Mr Alam saying that the Swiss Ambassador was putting pressure on him to reconsider, and he urged me to meet him again and find a way to satisfy him. The next day, the Ambassador called me and we set a date to meet. This time the Ambassador brought with him a colourful album of snapshots depicting the group’s musical tour around the world. Finally after much discussion and wracking my brains for a face-saving solution, I hit on a compromise idea. Why not have this group come 290

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to Tehran and perform at the inauguration ceremony of the Shahyad Monument? To my great relief the Ambassador agreed and left my office beaming. I then spoke to Mr Gholamreza Nikpay, the Mayor of Tehran, and he agreed to take care of everything. So, the Swiss Ambassador had his Swiss performers come to Tehran. They duly paraded energetically down the streets of the capital and attended the inauguration ceremony of the Shahyad Monument as happy guests. And to some extent their efforts did receive some attention from a cheerfully bemused public.

And other memories? A.A.: The third unforgettable event is the problem we faced on the night of the state dinner. In order to monitor and oversee the correct implementation of the programmes, we had taken a large room in the administrative part of the Darius Hotel, which had a big conference table in the middle. This place became our operational headquarters, and all our meetings regarding the supervision of the events were held here. At around 6 p.m. on the day of the formal state dinner in the large tent, I was sitting in the headquarters room and watching over the events when Hormoz Gharib, the chief of protocol, walked into the room dressed in his formal white tie and tails with a wide array of medals ranged across the left side of his jacket, sat down in a chair, and promptly burst into tears. As he sobbed, he kept saying that he was ruined and that he had no choice but to commit suicide. At that moment, several of our colleagues came in and we looked at each other in bewilderment. Nobody knew what had happened or what should be done. We all stood around him and asked him what was wrong. After several long minutes of sobbing, Mr Gharib drank a glass of water and seemed to calm down somewhat. He told us that he had lost control over everything, that he was not sure what disaster awaited him that night and that suicide was the only way out. I asked him gently what had happened. He replied that although he had repeatedly notified the various delegations to keep their numbers down to five, some of them had arrived with more people, and the main problem was that they all wanted to attend the state banquet despite the fact 291

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that the seating order for all the guests had already been decided and there was no extra space. In addition, other people wishing to attend the dinner had appealed to the Queen, and she had passed the matter on to him. ‘I cannot disobey Her Majesty’s orders,’ Mr Gharib sobbed. ‘Before knowing if there was any seating available, I sent out the extra invitations; I don’t know how many people will show up tonight, and I am going completely mad. Half an hour ago the German Ambassador cornered me and said that he wanted to bring his secretary with him, and he asked that a good place be found for her. This has been the final straw, and it has ruined me!’ And the tears continued to flow. By now all our colleagues had arrived, each of us dressed with the same formal white tie and tails with medals jangling on our chests as one after the other each person tried to comfort him. Gradually, as we spoke, a solution began to emerge. All the Iranian guests would be informed that, after their arrival, they should stand next to the tent wall until all the foreign guests, our Prime Minister, and his ministers and their wives had all been seated. The wives of Iranian personalities were to go next, followed by the other Iranian guests, who were to take the remaining seats. If there were still some available seats, the High Committee members were to be invited to take these empty places. After we solved this problem, Mr Gharib recovered and returned to the reception tent, now fully in control, to continue with his duties. Fortunately, because some of the foreign delegations had not arrived at Persepolis on time, seats were found for everybody, and no one was any the wiser about the backstage drama that had unfolded behind the scenes.

The Congress of Iranian Academics and Scholars attending the celebrations were to be housed on the campus of Pahlavi University. Can you tell what happened? A.A.: As I said before, the entire responsibility for all this was left to Mr Shoja’eddin Shafa. The duty of the High Council was only to provide 292

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the necessary material support for the project and to coordinate it with other programmes. But from what I remember the congress was held with the participation of 300 Iranian and international academics in Shiraz, about 120 speeches were given, and 1,000 academic papers on the history and civilisation of Iran were presented to the congressional board. The papers were indexed, and the index was published by the Pahlavi Library. This was a major achievement of the Congress of Iranian Academics and Scholars. In addition, I must reiterate that it had been planned for Iranian embassies to host special programmes aimed at promoting Iran’s history and culture to the world. This matter was directed by the Cultural Bureau of the Imperial Court under the supervision of Mr Shafa and the cooperation of Iranian Ambassadors in most countries. Special committees were set up for this purpose, which had received the patronage of the various heads of state. According to Mr Shafa’s report, the countries that lent their support were West Germany, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Italy, Spain, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Japan, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, the United States, Canada and Australia. Thirty-nine artistic and cultural galleries relating to Iran and 14 university seminars were organised, and 112 books, brochures, and catalogues on Iranian history and culture were published with the cooperation of several hundred academics. A set of the entire collection was kept in Mr Shafa’s private library. Much later when I was speaking to Mr Shafa he told me that, among the precious academic souvenirs of the imperial celebrations, he would recommend the Acta Iranica, an encyclopedia that was published by the University of Liège in Belgium. Forty-six volumes of this work have now been completed, and it is considered an important work on Iran and the Middle East in general. The first three volumes (each volume is about 400 pages) of this encyclopedia are devoted to Cyrus the Great.

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Besides the parade, the light and sound programme, and two nights of state dinners, were there other programmes held at Persepolis? A.A.: The day after the banquet, most of the heads of state and a number of the guests left Shiraz on their own aircraft, and some of them went to view the historic sites at Isfahan before leaving Iran. Others came to Tehran to meet their nationals living in Iran. In reality, the main part of the celebrations had come to an end, and these visits were largely non-official. Only those who returned to Tehran attended the ceremony honouring Reza Shah the Great, the founder of modern Iran, at the mausoleum. In this matter, the protocol departments of the Imperial Court and the Foreign Ministry under Mr Parviz Khonsari provided the essentials in the best possible manner, and many of the guests left Iran with sweet and unforgettable memories. Here I must add that during state visits among leaders, the issue of protocol and ceremony is of the highest importance; even the slightest error in this regard could lead to the deterioration of relations between two countries. That’s why during this ceremony the hardest duty fell on the Court Ministry’s Protocol Department, and it is appropriate that we remember the contributions of Hormoz Gharib and his very able and competent staff, among them Khosrow Akmal, Eissa Malek, Hedayat Zolfaghari, and the Amir Momtaz, who paid attention to every aspect of protocol with their refined skills such that they won the respect of all who were present.

And what happened to these imperial celebrations? To most people the real cost of this event is still not clear, and there have been rumours that hundreds of millions of dollars were spent on the celebrations. Can you tell us a figure that is closer to the truth? A.A.: The cost associated directly with the celebrations was around $22 million, and any other figure you may hear is nothing but pure fantasy. Of course after all these many years and without access to documents and relevant files it is not possible to accurately state the final figures in detail, but what I will reveal to you today is entirely 294

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based on the documents and evidence that exist in Iran. The officials in the Islamic Republic who possess these documents can naturally confirm or deny my explanations. Overall, the expenses relating to the celebrations were paid by two primary organisations: first, the Imperial Court, and second, the High Council for the Imperial Celebrations. Expenses relating to the Imperial Court were supervised directly by Court Minister Alam, and the expenses relating to the High Council were under my control. The most significant expenses paid by the Imperial Court included those for building the tent encampment at Persepolis, entertaining the invited guests at the celebrations, purchasing gifts for the guests, and other miscellaneous expenses. The main expenses of the High Council for the Imperial Celebrations included money spent on the Shahyad Monument, the Iranian History Museum, the light and sound performance, the publishing of a book on the history of Iran and the reproduction of the Shahnameh, the salaries of the provisional workers, logistics and various administrative costs. In situations where we had to request support from one of the government bodies, we would settle their bill immediately so as not to put pressure on state funds. For instance, the cost of transporting and entertaining the guests who were invited and flown by Iran Air to Persepolis was borne by us, and later, when the Ministry of Information issued special publications about the celebrations, all expenses were covered by the High Council. Therefore, the benchmark for calculating the cost of the celebrations is the sums that were paid out by the Imperial Court and the High Council, which are reflected in the official financial documents of the time. With regard to the Imperial Court’s expenses and based on comments made by Mr Abdol Majid Majidi, the head of the Plan Organisation, the amount of funds allocated for the celebrations and provided to the Ministry of the Imperial Court was a figure of 50 million tomans, which is equivalent to $6.5 million. In addition, according to remarks made by Mr Alam, a figure of 60 million tomans, equal to $8.5 million, earmarked for receptions and entertainment was raised by key industrialists and businessmen. The budget for the High Council was also 60 million tomans, which brings the total of these three sums to about $22 295

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million, although the exact figure may have been 5–6 per cent higher or lower. I recall that during the press conference held by Mr Alam at the end of the celebrations, the figure given for the cost of the event was something around $16 million. After the interview, I asked him for a short audience. After the reporters and television crew had left, I asked him why there was a discrepancy between the figures I had given and those stated by him. He replied that his figures were based on the report issued by his financial department and that the figures paid by the private sector represented their ‘gifts’ toward entertaining Iran’s distinguished guests. These private contributions were no different from sums paid out for various festivities held around the country, whether religious or national (like erecting triumphal arches and giving out food and sweets), and could not be counted as official expenses. Where did those who spoke of ‘hundreds of millions of dollars’ get their figures? Of course, if we were to include all the urban and rural development projects that were implemented around the country during the year of the celebrations, the sums would change. We would have to refer to the country’s national budget and see the actual figures. Do we really have to add the expenses incurred in the building of roads, dams, universities, sports stadiums, urban developments and other public works to those specifically related to the celebrations? In other words, if the imperial celebrations had not been staged, would all these public works not have taken place? Were all these national development works implemented in order to stage the celebrations? Or were the celebrations staged to celebrate all the great new projects and rejuvenation of our country and to let the world take notice?

Why did all the criticism of the Persepolis Celebrations emanate from France when all the purchases had come from there? A.A.: It is difficult to believe that these naive and supposedly unbiased criticisms were generated out of sympathy for the Iranian people. After 296

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all, the same media remained silent seven years later when precious Iranian antiques were looted and smuggled out of the country on board government aircrafts and taken to Libya and other countries. The same media remained unconcerned when the current regime in Iran gave away billions of dollars of our oil, which is our national asset, to bankrupt countries and terrorist organisations in return for worthless paper. Perhaps in 1971 the French and other Western governments were asking themselves how a country they considered to be underdeveloped, whose kings had been their puppets and hired hands, could now dare to think big and join their ranks as an equal. Maybe the French were upset that they had not been given the lion’s share of the Iranian development projects. Is it not ironic that a country such as France, when it was being run by socialist government, should spend over $530 million on a showcase building complex at La Défense at a time when France had over 3 million unemployed people? Or the City of London, celebrating the beginning of the twenty-first century by spending $1.4 billion on the Millennium Dome, and later they did not know how it would be maintained. Nobody criticises these undertakings to the same degree with which they criticised Iran for spending $22 million to honour 2,500 years of its history. Unfortunately, there was much criticism resulting from the exaggerated claims of the companies supplying their goods and services – all bragging about what luxury they were supplying to an exotic Shah of Persia celebrating 2,500 years of continuous monarchy in an ancient site in the middle of the desert. These companies were in effect promoting themselves with their exaggerations, but the resulting criticisms were picked up by liberal and left-wing commentators in France who were in any event deeply hostile to Iran’s monarchical regime. So of course this provided Iranian dissidents of all shades inside Iran with the opportunity to attack the regime. In reality, the goods and services provided by these firms were nothing unreasonable in the context of the festivities we had in mind. For instance, the furniture for the tents were items that you find in the homes of well-to-do people. Nothing extraordinary. Just something with good taste. 297

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And also maybe those who criticise the Persepolis Celebrations and point at Maxim’s and Jansen are unaware that, unlike the Acropolis or the ruins in Rome, Persepolis was not located inside a modern city where it could have benefited from amenities such as hotels, telecommunications, and other services. Instead, the remoteness of Persepolis, its proximity to mountainous terrain and a vast, empty plain with no inhabitants or dwellings, 60 kilometres from the nearest city, created its own set of challenges to the organisers. Even in the days of Darius and Xerxes, when Persepolis was at its apex and glory, the palaces of which only the foundations remain were used for short stays and ceremonial events; most of the imperial entourage and their armies lived under tents. In any case, six months before the Persepolis events, at a site where it was planned to stage a parade of armies representing various dynasties in Iran’s 2,500year history followed by a light and sound spectacle describing Iran’s glorious civilisation to invited monarchs and presidents, there was nothing but countless snakes, scorpions and insects crawling among the metal foundations of a hotel building that hopefully would be completed by the autumn, Inshallah (God willing).

Was it really full of snakes and scorpions? A.A.: Perhaps your readers may think that this is a load of nonsense, but the truth is that at my suggestion, Dr Rafii, Director General of the Biological Institute in Hesarak, sent a team to spread insecticide in an area within a radius of 30 kilometres of the site. After this operation, a five-ton truck collected the snakes, scorpions and various insects. Some of these creatures, which were poisonous and interesting from a scientific point of view, were placed inside large glass containers and taken to the Hesarak laboratories. In summary, if the Persepolis Celebrations had been merely a domestic event, we could have handled it with ease and would have had no problem, but because we were obliged to make preparations to receive more than 60 heads of state at Persepolis, where no facility existed, we had to take bold and

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unusual action. This attracted some criticism, but there was no viable alternative.

What did you do after the celebrations and what happened to the High Council? A.A.: My main duties ended after the closing ceremonies of the celebrations. After leaving Persepolis, I was so exhausted that I slept for 24 hours and was unable to attend the ceremony at the Reza Shah the Great Mausoleum and the inauguration of the Shahyad Monument. The remaining duties of the High Council included paying off the bills and moving the temporary staff back to their original organisations. At that time, the only remaining asset of the High Council was the Majidieh Garden, which was to have been used to entertain the guests during the festivities. Purchased a few years earlier, the garden was not used because of the way things turned out. With the permission of the Shah, the garden and its facilities were sold to Tehran Municipality to be used as a park for the residents of east Tehran, and the proceeds of the sale, 12 million tomans ($1.6 million), were given to the religious authorities to be used to complete the great mosque in Qom to honour the memory of the late Ayatollah Boroujerdi.

Was such a sum actually paid to the religious authorities responsible for the mosque’s construction in Qom? A.A.: Yes, we did, and then all the files belonging to the High Council were packed and sealed and transferred to the Ministry of the Imperial Court. The administrative offices of the High Council, which along with its facilities were leased, were handed over to Dr Mohammad Baheri, the Deputy Court Minister, and in this fashion we closed the books of the High Council and the Persepolis Celebrations and I returned to my post in the Imperial Organisation for Social Services.

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At the time was there a detailed report or book prepared on the Persepolis activities? A.A.: After the celebrations were over and all the guests had departed, the Shah, who was very pleased with the results and the manner in which the celebrations had been staged, granted a press interview and answered every question posed by foreign and domestic reporters. What a pity that I do not have access to this interview these days. However, this event was reflected in the media and published in full. Anyone interested can look into it. In addition, the Shah ordered that all documents related to all the activities concerning the celebrations be gathered together and a comprehensive book be published on the subject. It was clear that this work would have required a large staff and sufficient budget to gather all the relevant documents from government bodies, scholars and embassies. Therefore, because the results of the celebrations had exceeded our expectations and the organisers had so many other projects to attend to, the idea gradually died and nothing was done about it. Only a small book was published by Franklin Publications in a limited edition.

Can this small book be found anywhere? A.A.: Only in private libraries. You know that after the 1979 Revolution the warehouse belonging to Franklin Publications was overrun and confiscated, and I do not know what happened to the books that were kept there.

So, when all is said and done, were the goals of the celebrations achieved? What was the real benefit of this project? A.A.: In the final analysis, the celebrations were part of a project that was both political and cultural. It was political in the sense that Iran regained its special place in the Middle East region and the broader international arena, and other countries developed a new appreciation 300

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for Iran’s geopolitical and economic role and began to reconsider their relations with us. I remember that, until the early 1960s, Iran was considered an underdeveloped country. After the start of land reform and various development projects that were taking place in all sectors of society, the advanced nations relegated Iran to the category of developing countries, although it still had a long way to go to enter the modern world. Maybe there are still people who think that it was not in Iran’s best interest to enter the dangerous world of rapid development and clashes with powerful oil companies and that it would have been better to shelve far-reaching goals in favour of moving slowly and being content with the riches we already had. But Mohammad Reza Shah was keenly aware of the pressures and sufferings of a poor, weak and miserable nation and had seen how the great powers had treated Iran, a fully sovereign country, as just another colonial backwater. That is why, when he had the chance, the Shah used all his force to break the chains that had kept every Iranian down and carved a deserving place for Iran among the other countries of the world. Let us not forget that when our country was occupied in September 1941 by the armies of Great Britain, Russia and the United States, the leaders of those three nations came to Iran, and two of them (Joseph Stalin excepted) did not observe the most basic political etiquette and seek an audience with the Shah of Iran. And when Mohammad Reza Shah went to discuss the plight of his country with these leaders, according to Dr Gholamreza Afkhami, a distinguished Iranian researcher, there was not even a chair for him to sit on. Therefore, when on the night of 15 October 1971, the Soviet premier, the Vice President of the United States, and the husband of the Queen of England along with monarchs, presidents, prime ministers and high representatives from 62 of the most important countries in the world sat for one hour in complete silence among the ruins of Persepolis in the presence of Mohammad Reza Shah and the Queen of Iran listening to a voice describing Iran’s 2,500-year-old history accompanied by a spectacular sound and light performance complete with music, it was truly a rare experience. 301

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All those present had played a role in their nation’s current history and walked behind Mohammad Reza Shah and the Queen of Iran as they strode the distance from Persepolis to the royal tent. It was unprecedented. This was the moment of glory for a proud nation comprising Persians, Kurds, Lurs, Qashqais, Bakhtiaris, Turkomans, Baluchis, Azeris and other groups, with its different religious faiths including Shi’as, Sunnis, Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians, who without suffering intolerance had gathered under the tricolour Lion-Sun flag as Iranians. From a cultural point of view, by our staging of the Congress of Iranian Academics and Scholars along with various conferences and seminars, and publishing books and magazines on a global scale, not only did the people of other countries realise the importance of our country’s history and culture, but Iranians who had lost confidence in themselves because of the defeats and humiliations of the past centuries could now stand up and feel proud. All this was the result of staging the celebrations, and one could see that until the advent of the Islamic Revolution, Iranians travelling to other countries were greeted warmly and treated with the utmost respect, because Iran was no longer an unknown country and Iranians no longer felt inferior in front of foreigners. I will never forget that after the end of the celebrations, Mr Jack Miklos, chargé d’affaires at the US embassy, told me: ‘By staging this ceremony, your king placed Iran firmly on the globe, and you could not have done a better job advertising your country to the world even if you had spent hundreds of millions of dollars to do so.’

302

Postscript Final Reflections

Princess Ashraf was a huge personality in the Iran of your era. You for several years were the official closest to her. What did you make of her? Abdolreza Ansari: My dealings with Princess Ashraf – and her attitude towards me – were all entirely matter-of-fact and businesslike. She was extremely intelligent, sharp-witted and had a good grasp of detail. She was determined, decisive and impatient with foolishness. At the same time I could see that under a tough exterior she had a gentle disposition. She was loyal to a close circle of friends with whom she socialised. At the same time she was a well organised person who was able to pick effective and well-qualified administrators: She had well-qualified people such as Mr Foad Rouhani and Mr Iraj Amini to manage and look after her dealings with foreign dignitaries and international organisations; Mr Ali Izadi who had been secretary to her father, Reza Shah, had stayed on to become her private secretary; and Mr Reza Golesorkhi who was responsible for her household and personal affairs. Each of these functions – including the running of the Imperial Organisation for Social Services and the other NGOs, for which I was responsible – was completely separate and independent, and I can only give an account of what was in my domain of responsibility.

303

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Princess Ashraf rightly or wrongly had a controversial image with talk of favouritism and political ambitions. Did you see any signs that might justify some of these controversies? A.A.: On the matter of ambition, she was ambitious for Iran and her political ambition concerned the well-being of her brother, the Shah. She and he had different kinds of sensitivities which complemented each other well. As the running of the country became more complex after the 1950s, and once the Shah became more involved with a family of his own, she developed her own ways of undertaking public service – which is where I came in.

But was there favouritism and political ambition? A.A.: My responsibilities were not political in nature. Princess Ashraf was a caring person and worked hard for the disadvantaged families in Iran, especially the uneducated single women with children. We worked very hard with local organisations to identify and reach out to them. She always tried to help her friends and that might have been viewed as favouritism by those who wanted to criticise her.

How did you view the build up to the unrest and revolutionary fervour of 1978–9? A.A.: We – that is those of us in the government and other positions of leadership – were of course aware of the events of 1963 when Ayatollah Khomeini led some opposition to the Shah and was subsequently exiled first to Turkey, then to Najaf in Iraq. In the 1960s and early 1970s we paid little attention to religion as a possible focus of opposition. There had been isolated instances of violence from secular leftist groups as well as from other leftist radicals who claimed inspiration from Islam. These were all successfully contained by the country’s security forces. What was unexpected was a movement so effectively led by clerics from Qom and other religious centres. The 304

F inal R eflections

re-emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini as the pivot of a revolutionary movement was a surprise. But I should add importantly that most government ministers, leading civil servants and the leadership of the private sector were heavily engaged in managing a rapidly growing and increasingly complex economy. The day-to-day problems, challenges and opportunities that Iran had to deal with in the 1970s were very extensive. It should not come as much of a surprise if the first stirrings of what turned out to be a revolt were not taken as seriously as they perhaps should have been. We were all content to bask in President Carter’s assessment of Iran, during his New Year’s celebration speech on the night of 31 December 1977 in Tehran, as: ‘an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world’.

305

Index

25 Shahrivar printing company 245

257–9, 264–5, 268–70, 275, 288–91, 295–6 Reza Pahlavi Educational Foundation 165 Women’s Organisation of Iran 219 Alam, Majid 59 Alamouti, Noureddin 121 Alikhani, Alinaghi 178, 220 alternative medicine 224–5 Ameli, Bagher 154 Ameli, Ezatollah 185 Ameri, Khalil 36 Amery, Houshang 8, 91 Amery, Mohammad 8–9 Amini, Ali 44, 45, 50, 81–2, 114, 115, 121 Amini, Iraj 303 Amir Parviz, Amir Hossein 4 Amouzegar, Jahangir 141 Amouzesh Behvarzan (Training of Caregivers) 223 Amuzegar, Habibollah 28, 29 Amuzegar, Jamshid 19, 51, 73, 75 Iran Novin (New Iran) Party 76, 77, 69, 80 Ministry of Labour 85 Anderson, Leo 99 Ansari, Abdolreza Alam, Assadollah and 270 Amery, Mohammad and 8–9 Aramesh, Ahmad and 114 Ashraf (princess of Iran) and 213–14, 219–21, 223, 239, 241, 243–4, 249, 303–4 charities 232–40

Abdolreza (prince of Iran) 9–10 Acta Iranica 293 Adams, Lucy W. 39 Adib-Mohammadi, Ali Asghar 160, 174–5 Adjoudani, Ahmad 30 Adl, Yahya 188, 193 Adl-Tabatabai, Abdolreza 195, 196 Afkhami, Abdolali 115–16 Afkhami, Gholamreza 301 Afkhami, Mahnaz 220 Afzalipour, Alireza 240–1 agriculture 24–5, 27–9, 138, 140, 144 dried fruits industry 36–8 farmers 199 sugarcane industry 102, 125, 144, 145 Agriculture Bank 38 Ahmadi, Ahmad Ali 8, 118, 144, 145 Ahvaz 103, 148–52, 154–5, 159–61 Ahy, Sadegh 76 aid 45–6 airports 30, 276–7 Ajdari, Ali Asghar 144, 227 Akhavi, Jamal 28 Akhlaghi, Ataollah 142 Akmal, Khosrow 294 Ala, Hossein 27, 28, 29, 43, 48, 92, 125 Ala, Iran 21, 28 Alam, Amir-Assadollah 29, 79, 80, 209, 213, 287 Dez Dam 126, 127 Persepolis Celebrations and 250–2, 307

I nde x

clothing 229–30 College of Agriculture 3, 7, 24–5 coup of 1953 43–4 as Deputy Minister of State 51 as director of NGOs and charities 220–1, 223–4, 227, 230, 232–40 Dreyfus Charity Foundation 43 dried fruits industry 37–8 early career 4–6 Ebtehaj, Abolhassan and 107–8, 124–5 Economic Council 73–4 education 2–4, 7–8 Eghbal, Manouchehr and 95–6 elections 83–4, 186–8 Emerson Club 75–6 family of 1–2, 94, 121 as Governor General of Khuzestan 134, 143, 147–52, 156–7 Ahvaz 160–1 border security 158–9 development 162 education 162–3, 279–80 Khorramshahr 161–2 open-door policy 164 prison reform 153–5 SAVAK 207–8 scholarships 164–5 women’s equality 155–6 health 246–7 Hedayat, Khosro and 98 Hoveyda, Amir-Abbas and 186, 208–10, 229–30 Imperial Organisation for Social Services (IOSS) 220–1, 223–4, 227, 230, 232, 234–43, 246–7 Iran Novin (New Iran) Party 76–80, 169–72, 174, 203–5 Iran–US Joint Fund for Economic Development 50–1 Khuzestan Water and Power Authority (KWPA) 98–105, 107–19, 139–45 Dez Dam 99–103, 112, 120, 123–9, 131, 136–8, 139 Ministry of Justice investigation 119–22 Ministry of Water and Power 131–6 as Managing Director of the Imperial Organisation for Social Sciences 77

Mansur, Hassan Ali and 71, 73 Melliyoun Party 81–4 as Minister of Labour 71, 83, 85–94, 97 as Minister of the Interior 145, 165, 167–71, 174–5, 185–6, 208–9, 211 calendar change 282–5 county supervisors 197–8 elections 187–97, 201, 203–6 Governors General 183–5 Hasht Behesht (Eight Paradises) building, Isfahan 182–3 operational procedures 198–201 Persepolis visit 261–2 SAVAK 207–8 security 207 Tehran 176–81, 201–6 Ministry of Customs and Monopolies 69–70 Ministry of Water and Power 131–6 National Movement for Philanthropy 240–4 Nikbakht, Mr and 242 Oil Consortium discussions 64–6 Pahlavi, Shah Mohammad Reza and 126, 129 Persepolis Celebrations 249–58, 262–4, 266–8, 279–81, 287–91, 295–6, 299 Point Four AID Programme 11–12, 18–25, 28–9, 32–3, 37–46, 48–50 political rivalries 129–36, 169–75, 205 as royal aide-de-camp 125 scholarships 41 Sharif-Emami, Jafar and 97 social services 237–40 Sony Corporation 227 Taleghani, Khalil and 212 as Treasurer General 51–2, 53–4, 55–71, 73 as Undersecretary of Finance 71 unemployment 211–12 United States 8, 64–6, 185 University of Jondishahpour 217–18 Warne, William and 10–11, 42 Women’s Organisation of Iran 218–20 Workers’ Welfare Bank 88–91 Yazd 39–40 Zahedi, Fazlollah and 44–5 308

I nde x

Ansari, Mahmood Khan 1, 2 Ansari, Mohammad-Hossein 1 Ansari, Nazenin 94 Ansari, Valiollah 53 Ansary, Houshang 167 Anvari, Mr 62 appointments 169, 174, 183–5, 209 Aramesh, Ahmad 111–12, 113, 114 Ardalan, Abbasgholi 33, 37, 61 Ardalan, Ali 56 Aref, Abdul Rahman 182 Arsanjani, Hassan 126, 128 Aryana, Manouchehr 83, 86 Asaad, Darab 8 Asfia, Safi 124, 126, 128, 133, 134, 141, 220 Plan Organisation and 108–11, 160 Tehran and 203 Asgari, Mansour 142 Ashraf (princess of Iran) 30, 157, 213–14, 217, 249, 303–4 clothing industry 230 Imperial Organisation for Social Services (IOSS) 220, 223, 243–4, 245 National Committee for World Literacy Programme 220 National Movement for Philanthropy 241, 243–4 social services 239 University of Kerman 241 Women’s Organisation of Iran 219–20 Ashraf-Ahmadi, Mr 219 Ashtiani, Javad 214, 215, 216, 218, 220, 245–6 Atabai, Abolfath 128, 263 Atai, Bahman 130 Ayazi, Mr 150 Azari, Mr 140 Azerbaijan 4 Azerbaijan Democratic Front 92, 172

Bakhtiar, Teymur 79–80 Bangh-e Javadieh garden 251 Bank Markazi 20 n.5, 66 n.4 Bank Melli 20, 21–2, 57, 66, 75, 90, 176 Bank of Agriculture 199 Bank of Construction 74 Bank Omran 28 Bank Rahni 74 banking 90–1 Barzegar, Mr 130 Batmanghelich, Nader 184 Bayani, Khanbaba 81 Bayat-Makoo, Mr 66 Baysonghori Shahnameh 251, 281 Behbahan 151, 152–3 Behbahani, Mohammad Baqir (ayatollah) 160 Bennett, Henry Garland 30 Bonshari, Ghassem 251 Boroujerdi, Seyyed Hossein (ayatollah) 299 Boushehri, Amir Homayoun 249, 250 Boushehri, Mehdi 249, 252, 258 Brewer Hawaii Company 102 Bryant, William 99 budgets 63, 67–9, 71 Bureau of Standards 35 Cabinet Committee 13–14 calendar change 282–7 carpet industry 34, 36, 281–2 Carter, Jimmy (president of the US) 305 celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Empire see Persepolis Celebrations Celebrations 283–4 see also Persepolis Celebrations Chalus 196 Chamber of Guilds, the 206, 209, 210 charities 232–40 National Movement for Philanthropy 240–4 Cheknavarian, Loris 287 city planning 180–1 Clapp, Gordon 106, 108–9, 110, 111, 114, 128, 144 clothing industry 229–32 Cold War, the 4 n.3, 157 n.1 College of Agriculture 3, 7, 24–5

Baba Shamal 5 Bagh-e Eram 258 Baghai, Mozaffar 192 Bahadori, Karim Pasha 49, 203 Bahrami, Ahmad Ali 83, 97 bakhsh 197 bakhshdar 197 Bakhtiar, Shapour 34 309

I nde x

Committee of Currency Oversight 66 Communist Party see Tudeh Party Congress of Iranian Academics and Scholars 258, 292–3 cooperatives 40 corruption 61, 63, 119–22, 205–6, 210, 211 Persepolis Celebrations 268–70 cotton industry 35–6 county supervisors 197–8 coup of 1953 18, 32 n.6, 42–4 crime 153–4 Crown Jewels 66 culture, celebrating 254, 283–6, 293–4, 300–2 customs 152–3 Cyrus Cylinder 250 n.1, 256 Cyrus the Great (king of Persia) 250, 272

arrest 107 imprisonment 122, 124–5 Plan Organisation 111, 160 Economic Council 73–4 economic development 31–2, 67, 92, 162, 229, 259–60, 286, 301–2 see also Economic Council; Point Four Aid Programme economy, the 33–5 see also Ministry of Finance; Treasury the, education 23–4, 162–3, 216, 259, 281 Afzalipour, Alireza and 240–1 Amouzesh Behvarzan (Training of Caregivers) 223 graduates 92–3, 116, 119, 259 n.8 Imperial Organisation for Social Services 22, 222–4, 226–9, 240–1 medicine 222–4 National Committee for World Literacy Programme 216, 220 National Movement for Philanthropy 240–2 Persepolis Celebrations 279–81 scholarships 40–1, 164–5 Sharafat-Lari, Mr and 241–2 Sony Corporation 227–8 University of Jondishahpour 217 Education Foundation of Khuzestan 165 Eeghani, Dr 91 Eghbal, Manouchehr 71, 81–2, 84, 85, 94–6 daughters of 27 Iran Novin (New Iran) Party and 78, 80 Melliyoun Party 173 National Iranian Oil Company 148 Workers’ Welfare Bank 90 Egypt 157–8 Eisenhower, Dwight (president of the US) 67–8 elections 83, 168–9, 186–97, 201, 203–6 electricity 103, 128 Emami, Nezamedin 27, 66 Emami, Dr Ahmad 80 Emami, Taqi 263–4 Emerson Club, the 75–7 employment 48, 60, 88–9, 139, 140–3, 259 graduates 92–3

D&R (Development and Resources Corporation) 100, 103, 105–7, 108–10, 115–18 Daftari, Abdollah 43 Darius Hotel 256, 257–8, 271 Daroopakhsh 215, 225–6, 244–5 Dashte-Mishan 158 dates 36–8 debt 153, 154–5 Democratic Party of Azerbaijan 4 Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan 4 Development and Resources Corporation (D&R) 100, 103, 105–7, 108–10, 115–18 Dez Dam 99–103, 112, 120, 123–9, 131, 136–8, 139 Dezful 101, 120 Diba, Farah (queen of Iran) 268, 274, 275, 288–90 Diba, Lady Farideh 165 distribution 161 Dolatabadi, Hessamedin 81, 83 Dreyfus, Grace 43 Dreyfus, Louis G. Jr 43 Dreyfus Charity Foundation 43 dried fruits industry 36–8 drought 148–51 Ebtehaj, Abolhassan 50, 92, 104, 107–8, 144 310

I nde x

Point Four Aid Programme 26–7, 45–6, 51 social security laws 83, 86–9, 91 training 181 Entekhabi, Dr 196 Entezam, Abdullah 44, 45, 88, 186 equality 26–7, 155–7, 218–19 Eradeh Melli 172 Erfani, Mr 65 Etebar, Abdolhossein 74 Etehadieh, Ataollah 64 Etehadieh, Massud 33 exports 30 standards 34–7

Ghaffari, Abolhassan 77 Gharib, Hormoz 252, 253, 291–2, 294 Ghavam, Ahmad 5 Ghotbi, Reza 252, 253, 278 Golesorkhi, Nasser 77, 241 Golesorkhi, Reza 303 Golestan, Shahrokh 271, 272 Golpayegan 196 Goodarzi, Manouchehr 49, 201 Goulden, James J. 11 government 187 administration/structure 49, 138–41, 183–4, 197–201 bureaucracy 46–9, 198–201 control 40 county supervisors 197–8 elections 83, 168–9, 186–97, 201, 203–6 SAVAK 79, 194 municipalities 178–81, 201–2 opposition 286–7 politics 77–82, 129–36, 168–73 social services 237–44 unrest 304–5 village headmen 197–8 see also IOSS; Treasury; under named Ministries governors 169, 198 Governors General 183–5, 198 graduates 92–3, 116, 119, 259 n.8 Great Britain 15 n.2, 16, 33, 42 n.7, 92, 297, 301

Fakopa 244 Fallah, Reza 64 family support see orphans Farah (queen of Iran) 268, 274, 275, 288–90 Farahmand, Mohammad 282–4 Farkhan, Hooshang 64 Farman 173 Farmanfarmaian, Ali Naghi 77 Farmanfarmaian, Hafez 77 farmers 199 Fatemeh (princess of Iran) 194, 195 Fatemi, Moshir 66 Firoozian, Dr Sohrab 168 fishing industry 38–9 foreign exchange 20–2, 33 Foroud, Fatollah 84 Forough-eh Javedaan (Eternal Flame), film 272 Foroughi, Mohsen 224, 231 Fozouni, Saeed 5 France 296–7 Franklin Publications 300 Fulbright Scholarships 9 funerals 151, 152–3

Haft Tapeh 102 Hakim-el-Molk, Ebrahim 5 Hakimi, Nader 144 Harris, Franklin D. 8, 12 Hashemi-Nejad, Mohsen 195 health 22–3, 88, 101, 215–16 alternative medicine 224–5 Amouzesh Behvarzan (Training of Caregivers) 223 Imperial Organisation for Social Services 221–6, 243 Reza Pahlavi Hospital 222–4 Sherafat-Yazdi, Mr and 241 Hedayat, Khosro 98, 110, 111, 160 Hedayati, Hadi 174 Hejazi, Motiodoleh 81 Henderson, Loy W. 13, 45

Gandji, Manouchehr 217, 218, 220 Ganjei, Farhad 75, 77 gender see women gendarmerie 207 Ghadimi, Hamid 159 Ghaem-Maghami, Parviz 221, 223, 224, 246 Ghaffari, Abbas 8 311

I nde x

Hessabi, Mahmoud 13, 14, 20 High Committee (Persepolis Celebrations) 252, 255–7, 262–3, 266, 267–8 High Council for the Imperial Celebrations 250–1 history, celebrating 254, 272, 283–6, 293–4, 300–2 Hitachi Company 112–13 Homayounfar, Ibrahim 196 Hormozi, Farhad 240, 281 House of Jansen 260–1, 265, 267, 269, 298 housing 74, 141–3 Housing Agency 74, 75 Hoveyda, Amir-Abbas 27, 73, 95, 129, 144–5, 208–10 bureaucracy 200–1 elections 188, 195, 203, 204 as Prime Minister 157, 163, 167–8, 170–1, 186, 229–30, 284 regency 186 Tehran 203, 204, 206 Hydemat Chapri 100

clothing industry 230–2 education 22, 222–4, 226–9, 240–1 health 221–6, 243 Kasemi, Nosratollah 247 National Movement of Philanthropy 240–4 Plan Organisation 228 Protection of Families programme 235–7 social services 237–9 University of Kerman 240–1 Iran 300–2, 305 Iran Air 276–7 Iran Democrat Party 82 Iran Novin (New Iran) Party 76–82, 169–74, 188, 197, 210–211 Tehran and 203–5 Iran–US Joint Commission for Rural Development 8, 12–13 Iran–US Joint Fund for Economic Development 50–1 Iran Women’s Organisation 157 Iranian Committee for Human Rights 217, 220 Iraq 37, 158 Isfahan 40, 182–3, 281 Islam 283–6 Izadi, Ali 303

Iman, Iraj 158 Imperial Celebrations 254 see also Persepolis Celebrations Imperial Organisation for Social Services (IOSS) see IOSS import demands 33 Industrial and Mining Development Bank 74, 76 industry 30–1 carpet industry 34, 36, 281–2 clothing industry 229–32 cotton industry 35–6 fishing industry 38–9 power industry 30, 103, 128 see also Khuzestan Water and Power Authority (KWPA) textile industries 35–6, 39–40 wool industry 36 see also agriculture; oil industry Information and Security Organisation (SAVAK) 79, 194 insects 298 IOSS (Imperial Organisation for Social Services) 101, 213–16, 220–6 accounting 244–5 charities 232–43

Jafari, Mohammad 190 Jaffarian, Boghrat 274 Jahanshahi, Mohammad 99, 108 Jalali, Fathollah 76, 81 Jalinous, Mr 33 Jamei, Abbas 34 Japan 112–13, 227 jashnhayeh shahanshahi 254 Johns Hopkins University 223–4, 246 Joint Commission of the Senate and the Majlis 86 Jondishahpour, University of 217 Kabir, Amir 269 kadkhoda 197 Kalali, Manouchehr 2–3, 83, 169–70 Karaj Dam 45 Karun Dam 143 Kasemi, Nosratollah 70, 80, 81, 83, 173, 216, 218 312

I nde x

Imperial Organisation for Social Services 239, 247 Kashani, Ebrahim 57 Kashani, Haj Alinaghi 89 Kashani, Mehdi 90–1 Kashefi, Mahmud 69 Kazemi, Davood 217–18 Kazemi, Manouchehr 33, 77 Kazemi, Mohammad 122 KDS (Khuzestan Development Services) 99, 108 Kerbala, wars of 272 Kerman 229, 240–1 Kerman, University of 240–1 Khabir, Jamshid 10 Khabir, Parviz 181, 198 Khademi, Ali Mohammad 276–7 Khan, Reza see Reza Pahlavi (shah of Iran) Khattatan, Moussa 71 Kheradjou, Abolghassem 74, 245 Khodayari, Ghodratollah 191 Khomeini, Ruhollah (ayatollah) 304, 305 Khonsari, Parviz 294 Khorasan 184 Khorramshahr 161–2 Khorramshahr Chamber of Commerce 38 Khorsand, Dr 35 Khosrovani, Ataollah 83, 188, 195, 203–4 as Minister of the Interior 209, 210, 211 Khosrovani, Khosrow 255 Khuzestan Development Services (KDS) 99, 108 Khuzestan Province 97 n.1, 98, 99–101, 104, 139–41 Ahvaz 103, 148–52, 154–5, 159–61 border security 158–9 crime and imprisonment 153–5 demands 151–2, 157 development 162 Development and Resources Corporation (D&R) 100, 103, 105–7, 108–10, 115–17 drought 148–51 education 162–3, 164–5 Education Foundation of Khuzestan 165 Egypt and 157–8

Khorramshahr 161–2 police 141–2 sugarcane industry 102, 125 Khuzestan Water and Power Authority (KWPA) see KWPA Kia, Sadegh 77–8, 255 Kian, Gholamreza 6 Kianpour, Gholamreza 184 Kourosh Hotel 256–8 Kurdistan 4 KWPA (Khuzestan Water and Power Authority) 98–105, 107, 108–18, 131–2, 143–5 Dez Dam 99–103, 112, 120, 123–9, 131, 136–8, 139 employment 140–3 government processes 139–43 Karun Dam 143 landowners 136–8 management team 118–19 Ministry of Justice investigation 119–22 Ministry of Water and Power and 131–6 La Défense 297 labour laws 89, 93 see also employment land ownership 27–9, 74, 101–2, 136–8, 198 Latyan Dam 131 Lilienthal, David 112, 114, 144 Development and Resources Corporation (D&R) 106, 108–11, 114 Dez Dam 128–9 lottery 244 Maghsoudi, Hossein 263 Mahdavi, Dr 24–5 Mahdavi, Shirin 217 Mahlouji, Ali Asghar 76 Majd, Cyrus 83 Majidi, Abdol Majid 295 Majidieh Garden 299 malaria 22–3 Malek, Eissa 293 Malek, Mozaffar 71 Malek-Yunan, Mr 194, 195 Maleki, Mohammad Ali 13–14 313

I nde x

Malekzadeh, Mr 5 Mansur, Hassan Ali 27, 71, 73–4, 75 Ministry of Labour 85 as Prime Minister 129–30, 134, 154, 155, 157 Mardom (People’s) Party 79, 81, 172, 188, 197 Mardookh, Imam 189 markets 161 Mashhad 227 Massoudi, Mohammad Ali Khan 83, 205–6 Maxim’s restaurant 260–1, 265, 267, 269, 298 Maykadeh, Gholam Ali 30 mayors 169 measurements 35 Meehan, Shahpour 204–5 Melliyoun (National) Party 81–4, 172–3, 206 metric system 35 Meykadeh, Gholam Hossein 131 Miklos, Jack 302 military coup of 1953 18, 32 n.6, 42–4 military occupation 15 n.2, 59 n.3, 92, 301 Millennium Dome 297 Minai, Ahmad 33, 40 Minbashian, Fathollah 258, 274 Ministry of Agriculture 3–4, 199 Ministry of Customs and Monopolies 69–71 Ministry of Education 26 Ministry of Finance 46, 51, 53, 61, 85–94 Budget Office 64 budgets 63, 67–9, 71 Eisenhower, Dwight and 67–8 funding requests 63 Office of Document Verification 64 Office of Research and Statistics 56 Oil Consortium discussions 64–6 operational manual 61–4, 69 secret documents 61 structure of 64 undersecretaries 61 Workers’ Welfare Bank 88–91 see also Treasury, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 264 Ministry of Housing and Urban Development 74

Ministry of Justice 119–22, 174–5 Ministry of Labour 4, 85–8 Ministry of Labour and Propaganda 4, 92 Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperatives 199 Ministry of National Economy 33–5, 38 Ministry of the Imperial Court 263, 265 Ministry of the Interior 168–71, 174–80, 189–91, 209–10 county supervisors 197–8 elections 186–97, 201, 203–6 Khosrovani, Ataollah and 209, 210, 211 operational procedures 198–201 SAVAK 207–8 security 207 Tehran 176–81, 201–6 Ministry of War 60, 207 Ministry of Water and Power 130, 131–6 Ministry of Welfare and Social Affairs 236 Mir-Ashrafi, Seyed Mehdi 88–9 Moarefi, Ali 77, 79 Mobasser, Mohsen 207 Mofakham, Jamshid 30, 33 Moghadam, Alavi 71 Moghadam, Gholamreza 74, 75 Moghadam, Mohammad 15, 42, 76–80 Moghtader, Abdolhossein 69 Mohagheghi, Hassan 196 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (shah of Iran) 43, 59 n.3, 85, 90, 186, 259–60, 301 appointments 125, 130, 185, 209 bureaucracy 200 Dez Dam 125, 126, 128 education 163, 165 Eghbal, Manouchehr 95 elections and 168–9, 172, 188, 193, 195–6 Ministry of the Interior 167 Persepolis 262 Persepolis Celebrations 300 prison reform 154 religion 286 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Dam 126 see also Dez Dam Mohandess-o-Shoara 5 314

I nde x

Moini, Ghassem 93 Mojtahedi, Mr 175 Mojtahedi, Mohammad Ali 3 Momtaz, Amir-Farhang 294 Monaghah, Amir-Nasser 241 Mosahab, Gholam Hossein 23, 44 Mossadegh, Gholam Hossein 44 Mossadegh, Mohammad 13, 14, 42–3, 44, 86, 245–6 Motamedi, Fathollah 240 Motamedi, Ghassem 184 Mottaqi, Amir 252, 253 Mousavi, Seyed Assadollah 81 Mousavizadeh, Mr 33 Movaghar, Mohsen 192–3 Mozayyani, Mostafa 98–100, 108, 118 municipalities 178–81, 201–2

Nikbakht, Mr 242 Nikpay, Gholamreza 167, 291, 291 Nikpour, Manouchehr 2, 33, 40, 77, 91 NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company) 64, 124, 127, 139, 278 od-Din Shah, Mozaffar 187 Office for the Guidance of University Graduates 93 Office of Labour Affairs 92 Office of Radio Communication 92 Office of Research and Statistics 56 Office of Weights and Measurements 34–5 Offset printing company 216, 245 Oil Consortium 64–6, 68, 86–7, 150 oil industry 8, 16, 25, 33, 42 n.7, 48 embargoes 33, 92 employment 86–8 Oil Consortium 64–6, 68, 86–8, 150 revenues 68 Oliver, John 117–18 Ontario Hydro Commission 127 Organisation for Social Insurance 88–91 orphans 232–7 Oveissi, Gholam Ali 207

Nafisi, Ahmad 98 Nakhaee, Amir Hossein 119 Nakhaii, Ghods 66 Namazi Foundation 238 Nasirzadeh, Alam 120 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 157 Nasser, Ali-Asghar 51, 53, 58, 64–5, 67, 69 Nassiri, Mr 121–2 Nassiri, Nematollah 143, 195, 252, 253, 278–9 Natel-Khanlari, Parviz 216, 218, 220 National Building Company 159 National Bureau of Statistics 34 National Committee for World Literacy Programme 216, 220 National Front 56 National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) 65, 124, 127, 139, 278 National Mint 35 National Movement for Philanthropy 240–4 National Party see Melliyoun Party National Railways 124 National Tourist Board 263–4 National Will Party (Eradeh Melli) 172 Nazemian, Lili 236 Near East Foundation 21, 22, 101 Neghabat, Ziaeddin 120–1 New Iran Party see Iran Novin Party Nezam-ol Molk, Khajeh 269 Nezami, Ghavam 145

Pahlavi, Farah 268, 274, 275, 288–90 Pahlavi, Prince Abdolreza 9–10 Pahlavi, Princess Ashraf see Ashraf (princess of Iran) Pahlavi, Princess Fatemeh 194, 195 Pahlavi, Shah Mohammad Reza see Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (shah of Iran) Pahlavi, Shah Reza 2, 35, 59 n.3 Pahlavi Foundation 263 Pahlbod, Mehrdad 252, 253, 255, 272, 273, 274, 281–2 Pakravan, Hassan 158 Palanchian, Leon 159 Pan-Iranist Party 188, 197 Parkhideh, Abbas 64 Partoazam, Abol Ghassem 232–3, 239, 242–3 Parviz, Amir Hossein Amir 4 People’s Party see Mardom Party Persepolis 256–8, 261–2, 298 Persepolis Celebrations 249–50, 300–2 315

I nde x

calendar change 285–6 catering 262–5, 266–7 complexity of preparations 287–92 Congress of Iranian Academics and Scholars 258, 292–3 criticisms 259–61, 267–70, 275, 296–9 education 279–81 emblem 255–6 film of 271–2 finance 265, 294–6, 299 gifts 281–2 government role 273 guests 270–1, 275–8, 281, 294 hotels 256–8 light and sound show 258, 287–9 military procession 258, 273–5 programmes 250–1, 252–4, 277, 293–4 protocol 266, 294 report on 300 security 275, 278–9 state dinner 291–2 subcontractors 260, 267–70 Swiss Ambassador and 290–1 television coverage 278 tents 265 transport 275–7 Persian Empire 283 pharmaceutical research 225 Pirnia, Bagher 51–2, 54, 62 Pirnia, Dariush 181 pishkar 54 Plan Organisation 50, 102, 105–8, 110–11, 131–2, 141, 236 Imperial Organisation for Social Services 228 water 160 planning 180–1 Point Four Aid Programme 12–20 agriculture 24–5, 27–9 aid 45–6 Bureau of Standards 35 coup of 1953 43–4 dried fruits industry 37–8 Economic Development Division 31–4, 37–42, 33–6 education 23–4 employment 26 equality 26–7 exports 30

fishing industry 38–9 foreign exchange 20–2 government bureaucracy 46–9 handing over 50–2 Iran–US Joint Fund for Economic Development 50–1 Karaj Dam project 45 land ownership 27–8 malaria 22–3 office locations 41–2 Office of Public Administration 46 politics 26–7 power industry 30 public interest 26–7, 42 scholarships 40–1 State Avionics Organization 30 textile industry 36 translation unit 15 unemployment 45 water and sewerage 23, 30 weaving cooperatives 39–40 wool industry 36 Zahedi, Ardeshir 32 Zahedi, Fazlollah 44–5 see also Iran–US Joint Commission for Rural Development politics 77–82, 129–36, 168–73 see also elections Pouzeshi, Mahmoud 278 power industry 30, 103, 128 see also Khuzestan Water and Power Authority (KWPA) Princess Ashraf School of Nursing 214 prisons 153–5 Protection of Families programme 235–7 Qamari calendar 283, 285 Qom 299 Radio Tehran 4 Rafii, Dr 25, 298 Rahmdel, Farokh 81 Rahnama, Majid 220, 223 Raji, Abolhassan 13, 17, 226 Ram, Houshang 8, 49, 76, 77, 79 Ramazanniya, Latif 278 Rambod, Holakou 188, 192–3 Rashidian, Asadollah 84 Rastakhiz (Resurrection) Party 82, 173 316

I nde x

Razmara, Haji-Ali 12 Razmara, Reza 74, 220–1, 226, 229, 230 Red Lion and Sun Society 233, 234 regency 186 Rejalee, Kouross 56 Rejali, Simin 220 religion 283–6, 304–5 Resurrection Party see Rastakhiz Party Revolution of 1979 304–5 Reza Pahlavi (shah of Iran) 2, 35, 59 n.3 Reza Pahlavi Educational Foundation 165 Reza Pahlavi Hospital 222–4 Rezaie, Ghassem 80 Riazi, Abdullah 186 roads 176–7 see also transport Rohani, Fouad 64, 65, 303 Rohani, Mansur 130–1, 134, 135, 136, 145, 147–8 Persepolis Celebrations and 273 Roosevelt, Kermit: Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran 43 Rouhani, Foad 303 Rouhi, Dr 225 Russia 7, 301 see also Soviet Union

Sayyah, Kazem Khan 2 scholarships 40–1, 164–5 School of Public Administration 49 scorpions 298 security 207, 275, 278–9 see also SAVAK Seven Sisters 48 sewerage 23, 161 Seymour, Walton 113 Shadegan 148–51 Shadman, Seyed Fakhreddin 48–9, 50 Shafa, Shoja’eddin 250, 252, 253, 256, 267–8, 292 Shafai, Shapour 224, 226 Shafigh, Ahmad 30 Shahandeh, Abbas 173 Shahgholi, Manouchehr 201, 229 Shahid Nourai, Hassan 6 Shahkar, Mohammad 80 Shahmirzadi, Hassan drought 148 Iran Novin (New Iran) Party 77 Khuzestan Water and Power Authority 104, 108, 111, 118–19, 144 Ministry of the Interior 145, 211 Office of Public Administration 46 shahrbani 207 shahrestan 198 Shahrestani, Javad 184, 209 Shahyad Monument 251, 291 Shalchian, Hassan 273 Shamsi calendar 283–4, 285 Sharafat-Lari, Mr 241–2 Sharghi, Nader 216, 226 Shariat, Bagher 188 Sharif-Emami, Jafar 4, 81, 84, 97, 115, 186 Sharifi, Amir-Hossein 180 Sherafat-Yazdi, Mr Sherkat, Ali Asghar 144 Shiraz 42, 228, 256–8, 271, 276–7 Shirloo, Ahmad Khan 1 Shojai, Hossein 83, 86 Shushtari, Mr 207–8 snakes 298 social programmes 83 see also social services social security laws 83, 86–9, 91 see also Workers’ Welfare Bank

Sa’adi Park Hotel 262 Sabzevari, Mr 170 Sadr, Javad 155, 167, 174, 175, 198 Sadri, Nasser 256 Saffari, Mehdi Rahimi 80–1, 142–3, 155, 173 Safiabad Centre 126 Saheb-Divani, Gholam-Hossein 228 Sajadi, Mohammad 5, 78 Saltaneh, Ghavam 82, 92 Salur, Abbas 168 Samii, Mehdi 74, 75 Samii, Nasrollah 34 San’atizadeh, Haji Akbar 233 Sarabandi, Abbas 246 Sarabandi, Mr 28 Sardary, Dr 86 Sarkeshik, Hossein 235, 237 Sarlak, Taghi 74, 176, 177 Sarrafzadeh, Reza 39 SAVAK (Information and Security Organization) 79, 194, 207–8 317

I nde x

social services 83, 237–40 see also charities; National Movement for Philanthropy Soltani, Soltan Ahmad 120, 122 Sony Corporation 227 Sooratgar, Lotfali 3 Southern Fisheries Company of Iran 38–9 Soviet Union 4 n.3, 15 n.2, 92 see also Russia Stalin, Joseph 301 State Avionics Organization 30 state control 40 sugarcane industry 102, 125, 144, 145

unemployment 45 UNESCO 223 United States of America 42 n.7, 66–8, 112, 301 coup of 1953 44 see also Emerson Club; Point Four Aid Programme University of Jondishahpour 217 University of Kerman 240–1 University of Tehran 49 Vahdati Air Force Base 127 Vahidi, Iraj 145 Vakilzadeh, Morteza 99, 102 Varamin 22–3, 29 Vaziri, Sadegh 58 village headmen 197–8 Vosoogh, Mehdi 61

Tabatabai, Seyed Ziaeddin 172 Tabriz 229 Taddayon, Seyed Mohammad 5 Tajbaksh, Gholam-Reza 77–8 Taleghani, Khalil 13, 50–1, 52, 112, 212 taxation 46, 47, 140–1, 178–80 Tazayoni, Hassan 81 Tehran 176–81, 201–6, 299 Tehran, University of 49 Tehran Bus Company 202 Tehran Economist 188 Tehran Water Authority 30, 131 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 112–13 textbooks 23 textile industries 35–6, 39–40 Tito, Josip 261–2 Toilers Party see Zahmatkeshan Party transport 161–2, 176–7, 201–3 Persepolis Celebrations 275–7 Treasury, the/Treasurer 54–5 accounting methods 55–6, 60 contractors’ payments 58–9 duties 66 foreign contract commitments 60–1 government payroll 57–8, 60 office renovation 55 operational manual 61–4, 69 special accounts 59–60 see also Ministry of Finance Truman, Harry S. (president of the US) 12 Tudeh (Communist) Party 4, 7, 92, 95, 172, 191 TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority) 112–3

Warne, William E. 10–11, 12–13, 16–17, 20–1 agriculture 25, 29 coup of 1953 43, 44 economic development 31–2 Yazd 39 Zahedi, Ardeshir 32 Zahedi, Fazlollah 44–5 water 23, 30 Ahvaz 159 drought 148–51 Karaj Dam 45 Plan Organisation 160 Tehran Water Authority 30, 131 see also Khuzestan Water and Power Authority (KWPA) weaving 39–40 Welles, Orson 271 White Revolution 218 Williams, Robert 100 women 24, 26–7, 155–7 clothing industry 230 see also Women’s Organisation of Iran Women’s Organisation of Iran 217, 218–20 wool industry 36 workers 83–4, 92–3 see also employment; Workers’ Welfare Bank Workers’ Welfare Bank 83, 86, 88–91 World Bank 136–8 318

I nde x

World War II 15

Zad, Akbar 77 Zahedi, Ardeshir 8, 32, 185, 189, 246 Zahedi, Fazlollah 32, 43–5, 47 Zahedi, Hassan 261 Zahmatkeshan (Toilers) Party 192 Zanganeh, Ahmad 13, 14, 30 Zanjani, Kazem 110 Zargham, Ali-Akbar 69–71 Ziai, Mohsen 221–4 Zolfaghari, Hedayat 294

Yamin-Afshar, Mohammad 103, 184 Yazd 39–40 Yazdani, Mr 5 Yazdanpanah, Morteza 128 Yazdi, Mehdi 251 Yeganeh, Mohammad 186 Yeganeh, Nasser 203, 209 Yousefi, Heshmat 155–7, 217, 230, 231

319

Plate Section

1.  Assadollah Alam, Prime Minister 19 July 1962 – 7 March 1964.

2.  Dr Ali Amini, Prime Minister 6 May 1961 – 19 July 1962.

3.  General Fazlollah Zahedi, Prime Minister 19 August 1953 – 7 April 1955.

4.  Hossein Ala, Prime Minister 12 March 1951 – 30 April 1951; 7 April 1955 – 3 April 1957.

5.  Hassan Ali Mansur, Prime Minister 7 March 1964 – 26 January 1965.

6.  Dr Manouchehr Eghbal, Prime Minister 3 April 1957 – 31 August 1960.

7.  Engineer Jafar SharifEmami, Prime Minister 27 August 1978 – 6 November 1978.

8.  Dr Mohammad Mossadegh, Prime Minister 21 July 1952 – 19 August 1953.

9.  Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister 26 January 1965 – 7 August 1977.

10.  Dr Jamshid Amuzegar, Prime Minister 7 August 1977 – 27 August 1978.

11.  Ardeshir Zahedi, Minister of Foreign Affairs / Ambassador to UK and USA.

12.  Mahnaz Afkhami, Minister of State for Women and Family Affairs.

13.  Group of friends at Utah State University. Left to right: Abdollah Mansour, Abdolreza Ansari, Amir Hossein Nakhaee, Mansour Esfandiari, Ardeshir Zahedi.

14.  Utah State Soccer Champions. Hamid Naghsh-Tabrizi is receiving the trophy; Abdolreza Ansari is #45.

15.  Abdolreza Ansari (second from left) with Karaj Agricultural College Faculty.

16.  Celebrating the establishment of the Iran–US Joint Fund for Economic Development. Left to right: Dr Mohammad Moghadam, Edith Warne, William E. Warne, Abdolreza Ansari, Dr Fakhreddin Shadman.

17.  Left to right: Norman Paul, Loy W. Henderson, General Fazlollah Zahedi, William E. Warne.

18.  Group of managers at Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, 1962–3. Left to right: Mansour Asgari, Ahmad Ali Ahmadi, Nader Hakimi, Afrasiab Bakhtiar, Ali Asghar Sherkat, Hassan Shahmirzadi, Morteza Nasser, Ali Asghar Ajdari, Mohammad Javad Monshizadeh, Ahmad Kompani.

19.  Inauguration of the Cane Sugar Project in Haft-Tappeh. Left to right: Ibrahim Mahdavi, Morteza Vakilzadeh, Abdolreza Ansari, Leo Anderson, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.

20.  Ceremony to begin the pouring of cement for the Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Dam (Dez Dam), 30 October 1961.

21.  Abdolreza Ansari (centre) surrounded by the operators of Dez Dam.

22.  Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Dam (Dez Dam).

23.  Princess Ashraf Pahlavi (Bettmann / Getty Images).

24.  Shahyad Monument in Tehran, built to commemorate 2,500 years of the founding of the Persian Empire.

25.  Pasargad, Tomb of Cyrus the Great.

26.  The Shah and Queen Farah greeting Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia and his wife.

27.  Princess Grace of Monaco and Prince Rainier.

28.  Queen Farah and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.

29.  The Shah and Nicolai Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, speaking through interpreters.

30.  Period Iranian military formation marching in front of foreign and Iranian dignitaries on the steps of the Hall of Nations at Persepolis.

31.  Replica of ancient Iranian vessel.

32.  Replica of military tower.

33.  Foreign and Iranian guests dining inside the grand tent at a state dinner.

34.  The tents that housed heads of states at Persepolis during the 2,500-year celebrations.